

SOUTHEAST ASIA

*A Historical Encyclopedia,
From Angkor Wat to East Timor*

OOI KEAT GIN, EDITOR

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from Angkor Wat to East Timor*

EDITED BY OOI KEAT GIN

A B C  C L I O

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FOREWORD

History in Southeast Asia's Regional Future

WANG GUNGWU

The task of providing exhaustive information about any subject is a daunting one, but it is a measure of maturity when a group of scholars believe they are ready to produce an encyclopedia about their field of knowledge. When that field concerns Southeast Asia, the challenge is all the greater. Although various parts of the region can claim a recorded history of some two thousand years, Southeast Asia is one of the most fragmented regions in the world. Its maritime links stretch outward in at least three directions—toward the Indian Ocean and the West, toward the China Seas and eastern Asia, and toward the Polynesian-Melanesian world of the Pacific. In addition, it has strong overland and riverine bonds with continental China and the highlands of Tibet and eastern India. Partly because of these many-directional ties, there have not been pivotal centers that help to define a region, and it has taken a long time for the divided lands and strung-out islands to be recognized as having a significant identity as a region in its own right.

How the Story Began

Once, however, the imaginative leap was made to view the area between the imperial powers

of the Chinese and Indian subcontinent as one that needed a name and to be given a more precise shape, the geographers and historians got to work. But as long as their vision was colored by rival European colonial boundaries, they used different criteria for their studies and were not able to sustain an integrated picture of the region. Names like *Malaisie*, *Malaysia*, *Indonesie*, and *Indo-China* show that only certain parts of the region were included, while those like *Greater India*, the *Hinduized states*, and the *Far East* were so vague that they could encompass somewhat larger areas but gained little credibility. Nevertheless, the foundations of a regional grouping were laid during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But it was not until the region faced a common enemy, imperialist Japan in 1941, with its call for a *Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere*, that a collective response could take shape. The strategic needs of a hard-fought war drove the Western allies to find a common name for a South-East Asia Command (SEAC) based in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) for the final stage of that campaign. Winning the war ensured that the name would stand. Although the idea of a strategic region was externally determined, it became part of the countervision of an economic and

political identity that could be nurtured after the colonial powers had departed. This gave fresh impetus after 1945 to Anglo-American scholars to find an identity that would distinguish the region from China and Japan on the one hand, and from the Indian subcontinent on the other. The other powers of the time—notably the two other former empires, France and The Netherlands, and the short-lived empires of Japan and Germany, as well as the weak new nations of China and India and the emerging Russian superpower—were all in no position to prevent Britain and the United States from carving out a distinct space for their postcolonial relationships. All that remained was to wait for the peoples and states within the region to accept this new identity for themselves.

This latter recognition was far from being straightforward. The return of Western, largely Anglo-American, power met with strong opposition from anticolonial, anti-imperialist, and nationalist forces that were supported by an international communist movement. The region was freshly divided along new fault-lines. Anglo-American forces provided support for nationalist elites who rejected communism in order to match the Soviet and Chinese assistance being given to socialists who sought total independence from a capitalist West. For at least three decades, from the late 1950s to the end of the 1980s, there was a deadly struggle by political leaders both inside and outside to define whose Southeast Asia the region should eventually be. But, for different reasons among the various protagonists, the region was being steadily defined. Even those on opposing sides came to accept the redrawn map of Asia as they fought for the hearts and minds of the peoples in the region. The final triumph came after the collapse of Soviet power and the end of the Cold War. After that dramatic end, all the four anticapitalist states of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), and Cambodia had agreed to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), thus establishing the boundaries of a region that historians and strategists had worked hard to affirm. That was a significant marker of success when it is borne in mind that ASEAN had been created thirty years earlier by anticommunist states that supported the American superpower in the Vietnam War (1964–1973)

against Soviet Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The Role of Historians

Throughout this period, historians played a vital part in shaping the image of a unified region. They were backed first by Anglo-American agencies and institutions, and then by scholars in other disciplines. They were among the earliest whose imaginations were stimulated by the possibilities of a synchronic reinterpretation of the great diversities that characterized the region. It was a challenge that two British historians, Brian Harrison and D. G. E. Hall, took up when they wrote the first histories of Southeast Asia. These were the first attempts to outline a postcolonial view of the region. They were assisted in this task by Victor Purcell, who offered a perspective of Southeast Asia that was colored by the Sino-Japanese concept of the Nanyang (Chinese) or Nanyo (Japanese; the South Seas area), one that included a similar geographical area. Two institutions, the University of London (notably the School of Oriental and African Studies and the London School of Economics) and Cornell University, then led the way to consolidate the vertical and horizontal representations of the region. During the decade of the 1950s, a new generation of scholars was trained to define its borders. They also dug deep into the region's history to refine our understanding of the region's commonalities so that they would eventually suffuse the minds and perceptions of everybody concerned.

The course of political changes, supported by continuous efforts by dedicated scholars, has now made Southeast Asia a discrete region, one that can hope to survive the pressures from powerful interests that still wish to manipulate regions in different ways. These interests have conflicting agendas. Some to the region's east and south would like to combine the region with East Asia or the Asia-Pacific, while others on its western flank would stress what it has in common with South and West Asia. Yet others would want to dilute such regional groupings in order to accommodate the expansive future of a truly globalized world. Thus the battles won so far to establish the historical validity of the region may yet be short-lived, especially if the political leaders fail to strengthen the re-

gion's defenses against future change. The ten members of ASEAN may wish to find more muscle power in their unity, but they have yet to prove that they can bury their historical differences effectively and act together no matter what threatens them.

This brings us back to the contributions of the art of history to this encyclopedia. They remind us of the divergent ways that history has been used to meet the needs of newly established nation-states in a newfound region. The most important, of course, have been the efforts to project the region as having common roots in its past. This has been easier for historians outside the region than for those within it because the postcolonial nations that had recently emerged all needed to examine their own state histories afresh. Thus, this encyclopedia is not a work done essentially within the region so much as the culmination of the achievements of several generations of historians from many parts of the world. What they have achieved was encapsulated by the essays in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, edited by Nicholas Tarling and published in 1992, in which fewer than a quarter of the twenty contributors have their roots within the region itself. All the same, that was the strongest demonstration yet that the region's time has come. The analyses and narratives published there confirm the value of the scholarly work accumulated since the 1950s. The historians do not argue that the region's borders are perfect or unchangeable. But they have moved forward more convincingly than other, earlier attempts to do so, including the pathbreaking volume *In Search of Southeast Asia*, edited by David J. Steinberg and his colleagues in 1971. Twenty years afterward, the case for a better understanding of Asian, if not world, history through a holistic view of the region has become more difficult for anyone to refute.

For a better appreciation of the value of this encyclopedia, however, we need to take into account the parallel but opposite tendency within the region for the historians of each country to write their national histories by assuming that the modern borders that mark out their states are permanent and are deeply rooted in the past. Here most historians in each Southeast Asian country began by following the prevailing methods of writing national his-

tory as practiced in Europe. This was particularly true during the decades of the 1950s and the 1960s. Was it unavoidable?

How History Shaped the Future

The historians at the time felt that they too were bound to perform civic duties for their respective countries. The past in each of the ten countries (it is too early to speak of the national history of East Timor) could not be left unwritten. The political leaders could not afford not to ask their historians to reexamine, if not repackage, the past to strengthen the weak foundations that their countries have inherited. Each country had to live with new boundaries that included minority peoples, whether indigenous or not, who did not necessarily share the same inherited value systems. It was understandable that these leaders expected their historians to perform a nation-building role. However, the task of these historians, if they were serious about their profession, would still have to be to ensure that what they wrote conformed to high standards of scholarship. The historians had to show their governments and peoples that reliable accounts of the past would make for a better future and that the credibility of their nation itself was invariably at stake.

This was an awesome responsibility. It was not only that the historians had to deal with strident calls for unity and conformity by minimizing internal differences and conflicts in the country's past, but that they also had to resist the urge to depict the quest for peace and harmony with its neighbors in the region as the historical norm. This difficult path between two extremes has often led national historians to favor less controversial topics and avoid those that are politically sensitive. But without doubt the most successful local historians did succeed in overcoming the narrow confines of national history and making significant contributions to the history of the region. A few notable examples would suffice here. For Indonesia, there have not been many who have dedicated their lives to the study of history. Of these, there is general agreement that Sartono Kartodirdjo, Onghokham, and Taufik Abdullah have made valuable contributions. There have been more professional historians in Malaya/Malaysia. Of

these, the writings of Wong Lin Ken, Khoo Kay Kim, and Cheah Boon Kheng have made an impact on a wider historiography. As for the Philippines, Horacio de la Costa, Cesar Majul, and Teodoro Agoncillo had earned wide respect for their writings and, among the younger historians, Reynaldo Ileto has gained an international reputation. On the mainland of Southeast Asia, historians have not fared as well, but the work of Charvut Kasetsiri for Thailand, Michael Aung-Thwin for Burma, and Hue-Tam Ho Tai for Vietnam has received the recognition that they deserved.

But the reality is that, where the history of the region as a whole is concerned, local historians have shown less interest because priority has had to be given to national history. In contrast, scholars from outside the region could avoid the pressures to perform patriotic duties on behalf of each country's past. Their freedom and capacity to think of common regional themes have been, therefore, that much greater. In time, however, they have become more understanding about the constraints that their local counterparts have had to face and less inclined to criticize them either for their timidity or their bias where their own histories are concerned. If the views of earlier colonial historians, who showed scant respect for local attitudes toward the past, are compared with those of the major contributors in the 1990s to *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, it will be clear how much the advent of professional history-writing during the closing decades of the twentieth century has changed our perspectives.

Taking the long view, it has to be acknowledged that the story of how Southeast Asia's past has been reconstructed as regional history has owed much to contributions made from outside. The epigraphic and archaeological record was largely put together by scholars from India and the West; the main traces of

early economic activity have been kept by Chinese scholars and officials; and the earliest indigenous annals and chronicles of Vietnam, Java, Thailand, Melaka, and Myanmar, not prominent until after the twelfth century, have been influenced by models from outside the region. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the tools of historical inquiry were augmented by European classical scholars who introduced new methods of research. They were followed by Japanese, Indian, and Chinese historians before local scholars found their own voices. It is no wonder, therefore, that the regional history of Southeast Asia remains one that displays very strong external perspectives. Indeed, that was an inevitable result of the region's fragmentation throughout most of recorded history and the weak traditions of indigenous historical writing.

Now that the region has surfaced and the depths of its historical record are being systematically explored, this dominance of external scholarship may be replaced by a more balanced contribution from local historians. This encyclopedia represents the *first* effort to demonstrate a growing self-consciousness within the region. Although international contributions are still clearly very much stronger than regional ones, the leadership of the editor, Dr. Ooi Keat Gin from Penang in Malaysia, has been decisive in bringing forth the fresh perspectives that modern national scholarship within Southeast Asia can offer. The process of change in that balance has begun, and further changes are bound to come. At this stage of our understanding of how a new region has taken its place in world history, this encyclopedia is an event to be celebrated. It gives me great pleasure to congratulate the editor and his advisory board for the steps taken to advance a cause that has taken centuries to mature. It is time for exhaustive information to be displayed for all to see.

PREFACE

Morning Coffee

The idea for an encyclopedia of Southeast Asian history came to the fore in the spring of 2000. It was through a conversation between Dr. Bob Neville (senior acquisition editor, ABC-CLIO) and me in his office in Oxford, England, that the idea of this project was first proposed. I was spending a research sojourn in Oxford and decided one morning to drop by Bob's office for a social visit. Over coffee, Bob inquired about new proposals for publications, and I casually suggested an encyclopedia of the historical development of Southeast Asia. Nicholas Tarling's two-volume *Cambridge History of Southeast Asia* (Cambridge, 1992) was the major work to date. But that series of long essays by renowned scholars appeared to be rather intimidating for nonspecialist readers, and perhaps inaccessible to a younger audience such as high school students. An encyclopedia format of alphabetically arranged entries of various lengths (the longest not exceeding 3,000 words) might have wider readership appeal. I myself thought that smaller articles written in an easily accessible style would be more appropriate than Tarling's volumes. Then the question of editorship came up. I named several senior scholars as potential candidates; Bob interrupted and proposed that my name be added to the list. It was flattering to be considered but at the same time rather daunting to think of embarking on such a major project. Eventually, however, I agreed to proceed with the project,

working in cooperation with an advisory board of senior scholars.

The Work

Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia from Angkor Wat to East Timor is intended to be the authoritative reference work on Southeast Asian history, catering to users of high school, public, and university libraries. This encyclopedia will serve as a reliable source of information and a quick reference guide to high school and college students, researchers, academicians, and others who want a better understanding of the intricate historical development of Southeast Asia, one of the fastest growing regions in the world.

A pioneering work, this user-friendly, dictionary-style encyclopedia has over 800 entry-articles contributed by more than 130 specialists worldwide, offering in-depth coverage of a wide range of topics including archaeology and prehistory, political history, cultural heritage, economic and social transformation, and ethnohistory of ethnic minorities. Also featured are historical periods and eras, concepts and ideas, institutions and organizations, wars and conflicts, personalities, religions and popular beliefs, constitutional developments and legislation, and historical geography and the environment. Complementing the large number of historians, the international panel of contributors includes archaeologists, sociologists, political sci-

entists, anthropologists, ethnographers, geographers, economists, and demographers.

The geographical coverage encompasses the contemporary nation-states of Myanmar (Burma prior to 1989), Thailand (Siam prior to 1939), Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, the Philippines, and East Timor (since 2002). Owing to the interconnectedness of their historical relations, influences, and developments, India and Sri Lanka (Ceylon) of South Asia, and China, Taiwan (Formosa), and Japan of East Asia are each given appropriate focus and emphasis. The time frame traces the historical development of Southeast Asia from the period of “Java Man” (ca. 500,000 B.C.E.) to the declaration of independence by East Timor (August 2002).

Arranged alphabetically, entry-articles range in size from a brief entry of some 300 words to long essays of 3,000 words. Brief entries generally focus on concepts, ideology, and terminology, whereas medium and long entries represent thematic essays and feature articles. Whether long or short, each entry balances descriptive narrative with in-depth analysis, interpretation, and commentary designed for a general readership. Each entry-article contains three components: textual content, cross-referencing, and a list of references for further reading. Cross-referencing allows the reader to have a follow-up, thereby building a secure understanding of historical knowledge and the appreciation of the interrelationships and linkages of events, phenomena, and personalities. A list of readings (books and journal articles) accompanies each entry-article, to cater to those who intend to explore the subject further or in more detail. Although the references recommended are mainly academic-oriented works, care has been taken to select books and journal articles that are easily accessible (in most public libraries) and congenial for a general audience. Despite advances in electronic information technology, the print media have been given priority in the reference listing; some more permanent websites and WebPages are recommended. Non-English titles of books and journal articles have been rendered in English in parentheses to give readers an idea of their contents; they do not imply that there is an English version available.

The selection process is, to say the least, a tedious and unenviable task. A balancing act and

coordination effort must be exercised to ensure that all the territories and areas are given equal focus in accordance with their historical importance. The same attention is given to events, personalities, phenomena, wars, organizations and movements, concepts, and ideologies of Southeast Asia’s past. No encyclopedia can be entirely comprehensive. Omissions are inevitable because of time and word constraints.

Maps, tables, and photos are designed to supplement the text. The majority of the illustrations come from the contributors. However, not all the proposed illustrations could be accommodated within these pages.

Explanatory Notes

Alphabetical Order

The order of entry-articles is alphabetical, in accordance with the rules of word-by-word alphabetization.

Entry-articles

There are four types of entry-articles based on word length: brief (300 words), short (800 words), medium (1,800 words), and long (3,000 words). Irrespective of its length, the textual content of every entry-article has three parts. The first part primarily defines the entry and explains its historical significance vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. The second part provides the basic information of the entry. The concluding section places the subject matter into perspective in the overall historical development. Moreover, it offers the current historiographical insights on the subject matter.

Cross-references

Each entry-article is cross-referenced to others of close or related interest. Many entry-articles are interrelated, and cross-referencing provides the reader a better and clearer picture of a particular subject matter.

References

For further or more detailed study, the reader should explore the readings listed under “References.” As far as possible, English-language books and journal articles have been recommended.

In-text Citation

In-text citation is used in lieu of footnotes or endnotes. It is also utilized to indicate the source for quotations and statistical data.

Terms and Alternative Spellings

Preference has been given to the common usage of a term, word, place-name, title, or the names of individuals that are generally recognized. The alternative or other term is given in parentheses—for example, Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Melaka (Malacca), Beijing (Peking), Burma (Myanmar), Siam (Thailand)—upon first mention. The Hanyu-Pinyin system of transliteration is generally preferred, with the Wade-Giles version in parentheses upon first mention—for instance, Qing (Ch'ing/Manchu). Where appropriate, however, the Wade-Giles transliteration of certain words and names has been retained where it is widely known—for instance: Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) and Admiral Cheng Ho (Zheng He). Likewise, spelling variations abound owing to the transliteration of indigenous languages into the Roman alphabet. Hence Ayutthaya, Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, or Ayuthia, and Yogyakarta or Jogjakarta. Similarly, popular usage is adopted: Suharto over Soeharto.

Non-English Words/Phrases

Terms, words, phrases, and titles of reference materials in languages other than English are given their English translation in parentheses.

Life Dates

The lifespan of an individual, institution, or organization is indicated in parentheses, if available. Abbreviations are used: “r.” = reign; “b.” = birth; “d.” = death; “t.” = tenure of office.

Family and Personal Names

Southeast Asians, including the Chinese community, have their own format for writing their names. In the Western style, personal names precede family names—for example, Dwight David Eisenhower; among Southeast Asians, only those of Christian Philippines and East Timor follow this format: Sergio Osmena, José Rizal, Rogerio Lobato, José Ramos Horta.

Other Southeast Asians possess their own style of address.

For Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore, the main ethnic groups are Malays, Chinese, Indians including Sikhs, and various ethnic minorities in the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Malays do not have family names, therefore their personal name is used in lieu of a form of formal address—for example, Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad Badawi is addressed as Encik (Mr.) Abdullah; Rafidah Aziz as Puan (Mrs.) Rafidah. Family names precede personal names for the Chinese, and rarely is hyphenation used in personal names, such as is the practice among the mainland Chinese and Taiwanese—thus Tan Cheng Lock, Lee Hau Shik. Some Indians do display their family or clan names following their personal names, as in Dharma Raja Seenivasagam and Selvakumar Ramachandran, Seenivasagam and Ramachandran being family names; but Anthony s/o (son of) Andiappen must be addressed as Mr. Anthony. “Singh” and “Kaur” are not family names of Sikhs; the former denotes male and the latter, female. The Sikhs do possess family or clan names, such as Kernial Singh Sandhu, Harcharan Singh Khera; others, however, do not insert the family/clan name in their names—thus Amarjit Kaur. For the Iban, Sarawak’s largest ethnic group, family names often do not appear—for example, Leo Moggie anak (son of) Irok and Peter Tinggom anak Kamarau. Therefore they would be addressed as Mr. Leo Moggie and Mr. Peter Tinggom. Among the Kadazan-Dusun, personal names precede family names as in the Western style: Joseph Pairin Kitingan, James Ongkili.

Discerning family names in Indonesia is at best problematic. Apparently for Muslims, like their counterparts in Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore, there are no family names, and the initial name is taken for addressing purposes—for instance, Tan Malaka, Kahar Muzakkar, and Abdurrahman Wahid. However, it seems that there is a preference for addressing Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo and Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie as Kartosuwiryo and Habibie respectively. On the other hand, there are communities possessing family/clan names—for instance, among the Bataks and Mandailings of Sumatra, names like Lubis and Nasution are prominent. Then there are the single-word names such as Semaun, Soekarno, and Suharto. Amid these

divergences, Indonesian names are presented in their popular usage, with apologies for any inconsistency.

In Myanmar (Burma), there are apparently no family names. Often the initial name is assumed as the “family name” or name to address. Thus Kyaw Thet, Maung Maung, and Thant Myint U are referred to as Mr. Kyaw, Mr. Maung, and Mr. Thant, respectively. U, as in U Thant, is an honorific denoting an individual of standing.

In the case of Thailand (Siam), the personal name precedes the family name: Kukrit Pramroj, Thanom Kittikachorn, Prem Tinsulanond. But the bibliographic reference for them is listed under “K,” “T,” and “P,” respectively, as convention dictates.

Similar to Chinese names in Brunei, Malaysia, and Singapore, the Vietnamese family name precedes the given name—for example, Nguyễn Long Thanh Nam and Ngô Đình Diệm.

In Cambodia an individual’s personal name precedes the family/clan name: Norodom Sihanouk, Ieng Sary, Heng Samrin. But often, as in the case of the latter two personalities, they are addressed in full as Ieng Sary and Heng Samrin; likewise with Pol Pot, or when using his real name, Saloth Sar.

Laotians such as Katay Don Sasorith, Khammao Vilay, and Nhoy Abhay are addressed as Messrs. Katay, Khammao, and Nhoy.

Research/Study Aids

In addition to helping readers to select topics from the pool of entry-articles, the Topic Finders and Index are designed to assist the reader in identifying and locating particular themes, issues, and facts. Furthermore, the Chronology offers the flow of historical development through the ages and highlights significant events, incidents, and happenings coupled with concise explanatory notes.

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*Ooi Keat Gin
The Pongo, Island Glades
Penang, Malaysia
May 2004*

INTRODUCTION

The term “SOUTHEAST ASIA” is a recent construct that came into use during the Pacific War (1941–1945) to designate the area of operation for Anglo-American forces under ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN (1900–1979) and SOUTH-EAST ASIA COMMAND (SEAC). While American GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR (1880–1964) focused on fulfilling his promise of retaking the Philippines, the reoccupation of the rest of the region was entrusted to the British and their Australian and New Zealand partners. Subsequently, in the aftermath of the sudden Japanese surrender in early August 1945, BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION (BMA) IN SOUTHEAST ASIA held sway for several months (except in the kingdom of Siam/Thailand and the Philippines) until the reinstatement of civilian government.

The lands of Southeast Asia comprise what are today Myanmar (Burma), Thailand (Siam), Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, Indonesia, and East Timor, possessing a long and complex historical development dating back to the first millennium C.E. Known human habitation in the region is believed to date from 500,000 to 1,000,000 years ago. The region is indeed ancient. Over the centuries, Southeast Asia has been known by numerous designations. SU-VARNABHUMI (LAND OF GOLD) was what Indians during the early centuries C.E. called the lands of Southeast Asia, often referring to the island of SUMATRA and the Malay Peninsula (present-day West/Peninsular Malaysia). ARABS and Persians referred to Southeast Asia as the “lands below the winds,”

acknowledging the fact that the seasonal MONSOONS—namely, the prevailing winds from the northeast and southwest—brought their sailing trading vessels to the region. *NANYANG* (“South Seas”) to the Chinese and *Nanyo* to the Japanese were references to the region denoting the seas to the south of China and Japan.

The Environment

Lying between the Indian subcontinent (South Asia) to the west and the Chinese mainland (East Asia) to the east, Southeast Asia’s strategic position had from earliest times played a pivotal role in seaborne East-West trade and commerce, as well as communication and interaction. The monsoonal winds from the northeast (November–February) and the southwest (June–August) not only facilitated shipping and trading but also dictated the agricultural cycle. RICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA has long relied on the seasonal rainfall; the northeast monsoon ushers in the wet season, whereas the reversed winds of the southwest monsoon offer lesser precipitation, hence the drier season. The characteristically hot, wet, and humid equatorial conditions throughout the year are prevalent to maritime Southeast Asia—namely, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, East Timor, and central and southern Philippines. Mainland Southeast Asia—Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—and the northern Philippines experience tropical conditions with a more distinct wet and dry season. The greater part of the region receives an annual average rainfall of more than 1,500 millimeters. With the notable exception of northern parts of Vietnam, which expe-

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rience a lower temperature (that is, 23° C/74° F), the yearly average temperatures throughout Southeast Asia hover around 27° C (80° F).

The ECOLOGICAL SETTING OF SOUTHEAST ASIA is dictated by tropical and equatorial climatic characteristics coupled with the monsoon patterns. The imaginary WALLACE LINE, named after the nineteenth-century British botanist and explorer Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913), divides the biogeographical zone of Asia from Australasia, with the Philippines straddling a transitional zone. Those regions of Southeast Asia situated west of the divide possess a distinctively Asian pattern of flora and fauna: tropical rainforests supporting tigers, elephants, rhinoceros, and orangutan.

The HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA portrays the major river systems—the Irrawaddy, Salween, Chao Phraya, Mekong, and Red—which have a great influence on the demographic pattern, economic activities, and sociocultural characteristics of the land and peoples. On the other hand, the HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF INSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA is shaped by the shared similar tectonic characteristics of volcanic activities and fertile lava-based soils. The surrounding seas and the strategic STRAITS OF MELAKA play a prominent role in the lives and history of the inhabitants, dispersed over the myriad spread of thousands of islands. Bridging continental and maritime Southeast Asia is the ISTHMUS OF KRA, which had a long history of international trade.

Southeast Asia Today

Contemporary Southeast Asia is best identified and better known to the international community by the regional grouping known as the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967). From the time of its founding with only five members, today ASEAN has doubled its membership to ten: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Including the non-ASEAN, newly independent East Timor, Southeast Asia today comprises eleven sovereign nation-states.

Officially known as Negara Brunei Darussalam (“Abode of Peace”), this small (5,765-square-kilometer) Malay Islamic sultanate perched on the northeast coast of BORNEO

once claimed suzerainty over the entire island. A protectorate of Britain since 1888, Brunei gained independence in 1984. BRUNEI MALAYS constituted close to 67 percent of the estimated total population of 358,098 (July 2003 est.); Chinese constituted about 15 percent, and the remainder was BRUNEI ETHNIC MINORITIES (Daniel 2002: 208). Bandar Seri Begawan is the administrative capital of this Malay Islamic monarchy.

The state of Cambodia (Roat Kampuchea), occupying the southwestern part (181,035 square kilometers) of the Indochinese peninsula, once hosted the kingdoms and empires of Southeast Asia during the early centuries C.E. Following a long period of French colonial rule since the late nineteenth century, Cambodia became independent in 1953. Thereafter followed a complicated unfolding of events intertwined with developments in neighboring Laos and Vietnam, as well as decisions undertaken in Washington, Bangkok, Moscow, and Beijing. The majority of the 13,124,764 population (July 2003 est.) were KHMERS, with sizable communities of Vietnamese and Chinese (ibid.: 241). The capital city of PHNOM PENH bears witness to the KHMER ROUGE regime, Vietnamese invasion, the intervention by the United Nations, and the political fortunes of NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–).

Stretching from ACEH (ACHEH) in the west to IRIAN JAYA (West Irian) in the east, more than 13,000 islands compose the archipelago of “INDONESIA,” making the republic of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia) the largest country in Southeast Asia, covering an area of nearly 2 million square kilometers. The prominent islands include SUMATRA, JAVA, the southern half of BORNEO (named Kalimantan), and the chain of islands from MADURA, BALI, and LOMBOK to West TIMOR. In the eastern part of the archipelago lie SULAWESI (Celebes), MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS), ROTI (ROTE), SAVU (SABU), and IRIAN JAYA (West Irian). Equally diverse is the population of an estimated 234,893,453 (July 2003 est.) that comprised a wealth of ethnic communities (ibid.: 520). Better known ethnic groups are the Javanese, Madurese, Sundanese, Balinese, BATAKS, MINANGKABAU, DAYAKS, and BUGIS (BUGINESE). Others are REJANGS and TORAJAS. The varied EAST INDONESIAN ETHNIC GROUPS add to the complexity and

multicultural characteristics of present-day Indonesia. Fittingly adopted is *BHINNEKA TUNGGAL IKA* (“UNITY IN DIVERSITY”) as the national motto since 1950. Composed of the former *NETHERLANDS (DUTCH) EAST INDIES* or *DUTCH EAST INDIES*, Indonesia gained its independence in 1945. Jakarta on the island of Java had since the early seventeenth century—at which time it was known as *BATAVIA (SUNDA KELAPA, JACATRA, DJAKARTA/JAKARTA)*—played the role of administrative center of this far-flung country.

Indonesia’s affair with democracy has gone through various metamorphoses, from the *GUIDED DEMOCRACY (DEMOKRASI TERPIMPIN)* of *SOEKARNO (SUKARNO)* (1901–1970) to the *ORDE BARU (NEW ORDER)* of *SUHARTO* (1921–). Post-Suharto governments have to struggle to balance an array of diverse elements—namely, a powerful and politicized military, a growing and influential Islamic popular movement, and a liberal and Western-leaning intellectual elite—while addressing separatists and regional aspirations, economic decline, and the increasingly widening gulf between the haves and have-nots.

Laos, or officially the *LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR)* (*Sathalanalat Pasathipatay Pasason Lao*), is a narrow, landlocked country occupying an area of 236,800 square kilometers in the Indochinese peninsula. Sparsely populated (5,921,545 [July 2003 est.]), the country’s predominant ethnic group is *LAO*; numerous ethnic minorities are dispersed in the hilly countryside. Contested by Siam and France during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, Laos was under French colonial domination until 1954. The post-French period witnessed the struggle for ascendancy between royalist elements and communist groups, with the latter establishing the *LPDR* in 1975. *VIENTIANE* is the seat of this socialist-based government.

The Federation of *MALAYSIA* (1963), constituted in 1963, is composed of two parts. It encompasses a total land area of 329,750 square kilometers, and the South China Sea separates West or Peninsular Malaysia (the former *BRITISH MALAYA*) from East Malaysia (the former *BRITISH BORNEO* less Brunei). The former consisted of the *WESTERN MALAY STATES (PERAK, SELANGOR, NEGRI SEMBILAN, AND PAHANG)*, *MELAKA*,

PENANG (1786), *SINGAPORE* (1819), the *SIAMESE MALAY STATES (KEDAH, PERLIS, KELANTAN, TERENGGANU)*, and *JOHOR*. The former British Crown colonies of *SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO)*, components of *BRITISH BORNEO*, and *SINGAPORE* (1819) gained their independence through *MALAYSIA* (1963). *SINGAPORE* (1819), however, moved out of the federation in 1965. There is a unique system of *CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY (MALAYA/ MALAYSIA)*, whereby the position of the Malaysian king is rotated among the nine Malay sultans. A Westminster style of democracy is practiced by successive governments based on a coalition of the major ethnic groups in the country—namely, *MALAYS*, Chinese, Indians, *IBAN*, and *KADAZAN-DUSUN*. *KUALA LUMPUR (KL)* is the capital city, but the administrative center is the newly planned city of *Putrajaya*. The population of the country is estimated to be 23,092,940 (July 2003 est.), the bulk of which is in West Malaysia.

The republic of Singapore, a city-state (692 square kilometers) on the southern tip of West Malaysia, gained independence from Britain through joining the Federation of Malaysia in 1963; this island republic, however, separated itself from the federation in 1965. Chinese formed the bulk of the 4,608,595 (July 2003 est.) population, along with minorities of Malays and Indians. Parliamentary democracy is practiced, but since independence a one-party government has been the norm.

The Union of Myanmar (*Pyidaungzu Myanma Naingngandaw*) replaced the Union of Burma in 1989. With a land area of 678,500 square kilometers, Myanmar’s political and international boundaries coincided with those of the former *BRITISH BURMA* with Bangladesh and *INDIA* to the west and northwest, respectively; China to the north and northeast; Laos to the east; and Thailand to the southeast. Since independence from Britain in 1948, the country has experimented with parliamentary democracy, dictatorship, and military junta government. The country’s population was officially estimated as 42,510,537 (July 2003 est.), with a diversity of ethnic groups: *BURMANS*, *CHINS*, *KACHINS*, *KARENS*, *MONS*, *PYUS*, and *SHANS*. There are small enclaves of Chinese and Indians, particularly in urban areas including the capital city of *RANGOON (YANGON)*.

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The kingdom of Thailand (Muang Thai) was formerly known as the kingdom of Siam. The name Thailand (Land of the Free) was adopted in 1939 to reflect its independent status, unshackled by foreign domination vis-à-vis its neighbors, which were all under Western colonial rule. Moreover the name change was an assertion of the ethnic T' AIS, who shared linguistic similarities with LAO, SHANS, and other minorities in northern Vietnam and south and southwest China. Situated in the heartland of mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand's overall land area is 514,000 square kilometers including the extension southward, where it shares the ISTHMUS OF KRA with Myanmar. Ethnic T' AIS composed the majority of the inhabitants of 64,265,276 (July 2003 est.). The Chinese, though an urban minority, had long been and continue to be a significant and influential economic player. MUSLIM MINORITIES (THAILAND) dominated peninsular or southern Thailand. Civilian parliamentarians jostled for power with the military, the latter an ever influential party to the political landscape. The CONSTITUTIONAL (BLOODLESS) REVOLUTION (1932) (THAILAND) replaced absolutist monarchical rule with a constitutional monarchy.

Named after the Spanish monarch Philip II (r. 1556–1598), the Republic of the Philippines (Republika ng Pilipinas) comprises an archipelago of more than 7,000 islands. The Philippines possesses a total area of 300,000 square kilometers surrounded by the South China Sea to the west and north, the Philippine Sea to the east, and the Celebes Sea to the south. The three major island groupings are, from north to south, LUZON (Luzon, Mindoro, and Palawan), VISAYAN ISLANDS (BISAYAN ISLANDS, THE BISAYAS, THE VISAYAS) (Bohol, Cebu, Leyte, Masbate, Negros, Panay, and Samar), and MINDANAO. Filipinos whose ancestors were MALAYS composed the main ethnic group of a population estimated at 84,619,974 (July 2003 est.). Consequent of MISCEGENATION, there emerged MESTIZO minorities of Sino-Filipino, Spanish-Filipino, and American-Filipino descent. In the southern Philippines are found ILANUN AND BALANGINGI, MOROS, Sulus, and Tausugs. The Philippines declared its independence from Spain in 1898; how-

ever, the United States assumed colonial rule from that year and granted independence only in 1946. The Philippines adopted the U.S. political system of a presidency and a congress. MANILA served as the national capital of the country.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Cong Hoa Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Viet Nam), with an area of 329,560 square kilometers hugging the eastern hump of the Indochinese peninsula, was established in mid-1976. Out of a population of 81,624,716 (July 2003 est.), VIETS composed the predominant ethnic group; minorities include HMONG and MONTAGNARD, as well as Chinese enclaves in urban localities particularly in SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY). Under French colonial rule since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Vietnam gained its independence in 1954. The country, however, was partitioned at 17° north latitude into NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945), comprising TONKIN (TONGKING) and ANNAM, and SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945), covering COCHIN CHINA and surrounding provinces. Reunification was achieved a year following the conclusion of the SECOND INDOCHINA WAR (VIETNAM WAR) (1964–1975), and since then Vietnam has been governed along socialist-communist principles. HANOI (THANG-LONG) is the capital city of the country.

The Democratic Republic of East Timor gained its independence in 2002. The eastern portion of the island of TIMOR, East Timor, once declared its independence in 1975, following the end of Portuguese colonial rule. Shortly afterward, however, Indonesia annexed the territory. A 1999 plebiscite witnessed an overwhelming majority of Timorese opting for independence rather than remaining within the Republic of Indonesia. With a total area of 15,007 square kilometers, the country has a population of 800,000 (July 2003 est.). A democratic system of government is gradually evolving. Dili is the capital of the country.

The Peoples

Toward the closing years of the twentieth century, Southeast Asia's population was close to half a billion, with Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand the most populous countries. A predominantly rural-based settlement pattern is

the norm, although some metropolitan centers, such as BANGKOK and metropolitan MANILA, have huge concentrations of people—6.3 million (2000 census) and 1.5 million (2000 census), respectively (Daniel 2002: 1392, 1255).

Ethnohistories

In a region where the monsoons meet, Southeast Asia is host to a rainbow spread of ethnic groups. Southward migration from the Asian interior brought settlers to the region. Subsequent waves of migrants displaced or settled with earlier arrivals, resulting in the emergence of a complex ethnic pattern. The ETHNO-LINGUISTIC GROUPS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA reflect the multiethnic and multicultural characteristics that the region has nurtured since earliest times.

The ethnic tapestry of Myanmar comprised the majority BURMANS and minorities of CHINS, KACHINS, KARENS, MONS, PYUS, and SHANS. T' AIS predominate in Thailand's population, while KHMERS predominate in Cambodia. In Laos the main ethnic group is LAO. VIETS are an overwhelming majority in Vietnam, with HMONG and MONTAGNARD minorities. MUSLIM MINORITIES (THAILAND) are found in peninsular Thailand.

MALAYS are spread over large areas of insular Southeast Asia, encompassing the Indonesian archipelago, the Malay Peninsula (West Malaysia), and the Philippines. The aboriginal inhabitants of West Malaysia are the ORANG ASLI, a collective term representing more than a dozen small ethnic groups. The ORANG LAUT have settlements on both shores of the STRAITS OF MELAKA and the Riau-Lingga archipelago. The IBANS are predominant in Sarawak, while KADAZAN-DUSUNS predominate in neighboring Sabah. Besides the minority BAJAUS, there are a host of other EAST MALAYSIAN ETHNIC MINORITIES. BRUNEI MALAYS are the largest group in this small kingdom. Although small in numbers, the varied BRUNEI ETHNIC MINORITIES add color to the demographic composition.

The inhabitants of the Philippines are of MALAY stock. In the southern provinces there are the Muslim ILANUN AND BALANGINGI, and the MOROS. Other Muslim groups

are the SULU AND THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO and TAUSUG AND THE SULU SULTANATE.

Diversity characterizes Indonesia's ethnic map. SUMATRA is the heartland of the BATAKS, MINANGKABAU, and REJANGS. The DAYAKS are the predominant group in Kalimantan Borneo, while BUGIS (BUGINESE) and TORAJAS inhabit SULAWESI (CELEBES). EAST INDONESIAN ETHNIC GROUPS further contribute to the rich diversity.

Owing to the marketplace position of Southeast Asia from the dawn of historical times, the region has witnessed the congregation of traders and merchants from Europe, West Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and East Asia. Scholars, missionaries, pilgrims, soldiers, adventurers, and a host of other foreigners over the centuries decided to settle rather than to sojourn. INDIAN IMMIGRANTS ranged from Brahmin priests, wealthy merchants, and professionals (doctors, lawyers) to prisoners, soldiers, and coolies. Distinct communities of CHETTIARS (CHETTYARS) and GURJARATIS are found in Myanmar and Malaysia. ARABS and other West Asians initially came as traders but later decided to call Southeast Asia home, often settling in Malaysia, Brunei, or Indonesia. The CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA are generally urban based, although farming communities are found in Malaysia and Indonesia. SINGAPORE (1819) is reputed to be the largest city of Chinese outside of China. "Chinatowns" flourished in RANGOON (YANGON), BANGKOK, SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY) PENANG (1786), KUALA LUMPUR (KL), Medan, SURABAYA, and MANILA. While they represent a small minority in most nations of Southeast Asia, the Chinese in MALAYSIA form close to a third of the total population.

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In the Beginning Human Existence and Prehistoric Cultures

The HUMAN PREHISTORY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA dates back to some 1 million years ago, with finds in Java of human existence as exhibited by the skeletal remains of “JAVA MAN” AND “SOLO MAN.” The former (representing *Homo erectus*) and the latter (*Homo sapiens soloensis*) are believed to be from 500,000 to 1,000,000 years old, and 100,000 years old, respectively.

HOABINHIAN, the hunter-gatherer culture of Southeast Asia, became evident around 16,000 B.C.E. The term derives from Hoa Binh, the province in northern Vietnam where there is evidence of an occupied cave or rock shelter with findings of stone tools. Other, similar discoveries have been uncovered in cave sites throughout Southeast Asia—namely, in central Vietnam, various parts of Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, and Malaysia. An excavation in central Perak, Peninsular Malaysia, uncovered a Paleolithic human skeleton, “PERAK MAN,” estimated to be 10,000 to 11,000 years old. Apparently these hunter-gatherers had their counterparts in Indonesia and the Philippines as well, and also in southern China.

The NEOLITHIC PERIOD OF SOUTHEAST ASIA denotes the practice of crop cultivation or agriculture prior to the advent of metal. The period is also referred to as the New Stone Age, in which adzes, pestles, mortars, and other polished stone implements were used in the labors of forest clearance, planting, harvesting, and processing of food crops. Representative of this period is the BAN KAO CULTURE, named after the site in Kanchanaburi province, south-central Thailand. It has been dated to between 1300 and 2000 B.C.E. Early Ban Kao pottery includes the characteristically narrow-stemmed cups, three-legged bowls (tripods), and vases with a wide foot-ring and funnel-shaped mouth.

The DONG-SON best reflect the METAL AGE CULTURES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. This 2,000-year-old culture from northeast Vietnam is particularly famous for its bronze kettledrums. Inscriptions on the drums depict the society that was in existence then. Bronze, TIN, lead, iron, GOLD, and silver were important metals used in METALSMITHING.

Archaeological Sites

Current work at ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA is increasingly uncovering new discoveries and fresh interpretations that challenge past analyses of the prehistoric period of the region. Despite controversies and differing claims, archaeological finds in the past several decades have added to the understanding of Southeast Asia’s distant and elusive past. Further complementing land sites are contributions drawn from UNDERWATER/MARITIME ARCHAEOLOGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

As early as the 1860s the NIAH CAVES (SARAWAK) attracted the attention of scholars, and their curiosity and labors have been amply rewarded; this immense cavernous complex displays the longest continuous sequence of human existence in Southeast Asia, dating from 2,000 to 40,000 years ago. Situated about 110 kilometers from the oil-rich town of Miri, Sarawak, the caves at Niah offer a wide range of artifacts including human skeletons, animal bones, CERAMICS, shells, and botanical remains. Moreover, there are more than 200 burial sites and numerous wall paintings depicting paddled boats and dancing human figures.

Across the Balabac Straits to the western coast of Palawan in the southern Philippines is series of caves collectively known as the TABON CAVES (PALAWAN). The discovery of Pleistocene fossil *Homo sapiens* established the presence of human habitation in the Philippine archipelago. It is believed that the caves continuously hosted human dwellers from about 9,000 to about 30,000 years ago.

BAN CHIANG, together with its related sites such as Non Nok Tha and Ban Na Di, situated in Thailand’s Khorat Plateau in the northeast, is known for its bronze artifacts and painted ceramic wares. Continuous occupation is estimated between about 3,500 B.C.E. and 500 C.E.

In the lower reaches of the Mekong River in Vietnam, between the delta area and the Gulf of Thailand (Siam), lies OC ÊO, an archaeological site generally believed to be FUNAN, a kingdom that flourished in the third through seventh centuries C.E., hitherto known only through written source materials. The phrase “Culture of Oc Êo” is used to denote the culture that emerged and developed in this delta

area throughout the first half of the first millennium C.E., as exhibited by the uncovering of more than 300 sites.

The Story Unfolds

The Religious Legacies

RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA witnessed the propagation, adaptation, and impact of the world's religious traditions on the multi-ethnic and multicultural peoples. Out of the complexity and diversity that characterized Southeast Asia, some form of division could be discerned along lines of religious adherence. BUDDHISM holds sway over mainland Southeast Asia: THERAVADA BUDDHISM in Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos; and MAHAYANA BUDDHISM in Vietnam. Vietnam, which possesses a Sinicized tradition, upholds tenets of CONFUCIANISM and Taoist beliefs that have served to complement Buddhist teachings. ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA presented an alternative to Hindu-Buddhist traditions in island Southeast Asia, gradually displacing the latter from the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries C.E. The island of BALI alone withstood the influence of Islam and continues to this day to strongly embrace HINDUISM. The city-state of SINGAPORE (1819), with an overwhelming Chinese majority, along with the Chinese in Malaysia, practice the traditional Chinese beliefs of an eclectic combination of CONFUCIANISM, MAHAYANA BUDDHISM, and Taoism. CATHOLICISM accompanied Spanish annexation of the Philippines, spreading rapidly throughout the archipelago except in MINDANAO and other southern islands in the Sulu Sea, which remained Muslim. Despite the spread of established world religions over the centuries, there have remained in Southeast Asia pockets of communities that abide by ADAT and other animistic beliefs and practices. Likewise, FOLK RELIGIONS abound in modern, contemporary Southeast Asia.

Hindu-Buddhist Influences

The HINDU-BUDDHIST PERIOD OF SOUTHEAST ASIA introduced to the region HINDUISM and BUDDHISM from INDIA

and SRI LANKA (CEYLON). Initially, INDIAN IMMIGRANTS composed of Brahmin priests and members of the upper caste acquainted the Southeast Asian ruling class with the intricacies and influential utilization of Hindu practices to further enhance their political status and power. INDIGENOUS POLITICAL POWER demonstrate the apparent interrelationship between religion and the reins of political control. The INDIANIZATION process witnessed the adoption of concepts and ideologies by the indigenous elite in sustaining and expanding their power over lands and peoples. The erection and architectural design of the royal palace adhere to traditional Hindu cosmological precepts of replicating the universe on earth. Identifying themselves as the Hindu *DEVARAJA* or the Buddhist *CAKKAVATTI/SETKYA-MIN* (UNIVERSAL RULER), Southeast Asian rulers exerted a powerful and influential hold on the minds of their subjects.

Kingdoms and empires that were established and flourished during the HINDU-BUDDHIST PERIOD OF SOUTHEAST ASIA were FUNAN, CHAMPA, CHENLA, ANGKOR, and PAGAN (BAGAN) on the mainland. SRIVIJAYA (SRIWIJAYA), LANGKASUKA, SAILENDRA, and MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca. 1520s) were all prominent powers in insular Southeast Asia, each in its own heyday.

Further perpetuating HINDUISM and BUDDHISM were the temples and monasteries that undertook the task of transmitting TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION to the subject class. The Buddhist *SANGHA* preserved the sanctity of the monarch; the ruler in turn supported the clergy and their institutions. A symbiotic relationship persisted that sustained the TEMPLE POLITICAL ECONOMY as demonstrated in Burma.

Literary works played an important role in religious and sociocultural influences, as shown by the Indian epics *MAHÁBHÁRATA* AND *RÁMÁYANA*, and by the *JATAKAS*, Buddhist moral stories based on the historical Buddha. The MONUMENTAL ART OF SOUTHEAST ASIA reflects Hindu-Buddhist influences as depicted in the celebrated ANGKOR WAT (NAGARAVATTA) and the awe-inspiring BOROBUDUR. Other equally

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impressive structures can be found in the MALANG TEMPLES, BLITAR, and PRAMBANAN.

Buddhist organizations like Burma's YOUNG MEN'S BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION (YMBA) (1920) and the GENERAL COUNCIL OF BURMESE ASSOCIATIONS (GCBA) (1919), Cambodia's BUDDHIST INSTITUTE OF PHNOM PENH, and Vietnam's UNIFIED BUDDHIST CHURCH (1963) were involved in political struggles. Burma attempted to create BUDDHIST SOCIALISM as a political philosophy and a form of governance.

Confucian and Chinese Heritage

The CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA practiced an eclectic system of beliefs combining MAHAYANA BUDDHISM with a measured dose of CONFUCIANISM peppered with a host of Taoist tenets. This seeming hotchpotch that represents Chinese popular religion is both adaptable and accommodating of other beliefs and practices. For instance, Malay holy men who were venerated after their passing as *keramat* (saints) often received *halal* offerings of dishes such as chicken curry served with glutinous rice as a thanksgiving offering from Chinese patrons at small shrines along roads or under trees. The philosophical as well as religious principles of CONFUCIANISM were perpetuated through OVERSEAS CHINESE EDUCATION whereby schools were organized wherever a Chinese community emerged.

Owing to the Chinese occupation of Vietnam of some 1,000 years (111 B.C.E. to 968 C.E.), SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS prior to Vietnamese independence in the tenth century C.E. were cultivated on political, economic, and sociocultural foundations. The Chinese colonial period, or *Thoi Bac-Thuoc*, saw the introduction of TAM GIAO, which denotes the three traditional religions of Vietnam: BUDDHISM (THERAVADA and MAHAYANA), Taoism, and CONFUCIANISM.

Vietnam inherited the Chinese model of political economy and administrative structure, which was steeped in Confucian doctrines. The Chinese tradition of the scholar-bureaucrat selected on the basis of academic merit through a

system of public civil service examination was adopted in governing even independent Vietnam. Like their Chinese counterparts, the Vietnamese elite were conversant in the Confucian classics and possessed a reverence for history and a faith in BUDDHISM; in addition, they appreciated Taoist traditions and practices. Chinese heritage with a basis in TAM GIAO was preserved and transmitted from generation to generation through TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION.

Much emphasized and adopted as the basic ruling theory of feudal absolutism of Vietnamese dynasties was TAM CUONG, the sociopolitical relationships of CONFUCIANISM—namely, ruler-subject, father-son, and husband-wife. The basic principle of observance is the unquestionable obedience and loyalty of subject, son, and wife to ruler, father, and husband, respectively; conversely, the revered ruler, father, and husband should be exemplary and virtuous models.

Islamic and Christian Impact

The coming of ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA from the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries was an inevitable development owing to the close trading and commercial ties between the region and the Indian subcontinent. Just as INDIA played a prominent role in the introduction of HINDUISM and BUDDHISM more than ten centuries ago, when Islam gradually spread it was Indian traders and merchants who had brought along their new faith to Southeast Asia. Continental Southeast Asia was less receptive to Islamic influence, but maritime Southeast Asia readily welcomed it. In the latter, conversion of the ruling elite often was repeated among the common people.

The north Sumatran city-ports of PASAI and ACEH (ACHEH) adopted Islam to their economic advantage. SPICES AND THE SPICE TRADE, Southeast Asia's prized commodity, were much sought after by Europe; ARABS and Indian merchants served as the intermediaries. From the tenth to eleventh centuries the carrying trade of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean was in the hands of Muslims from West Asia and South Asia. Prudently, the fifteenth-century Malay port of call of MELAKA, strategically situated midway in the STRAITS OF MELAKA, converted to Islam,

further enhancing its economic prowess. The savvy Malay sultans of MELAKA transformed the city-port into a religious center where Islamic scholars and missionaries congregated. Territorial expansion covering SUMATRA and the Malay Peninsula, coupled with expansive trading relations, spread throughout the Malay archipelago (encompassing present-day Malaysia, Indonesia, and southern Philippines). MELAKA was credited with the Islamization of the greater part of insular Southeast Asia, particularly the *PASISIR* polities of JAVA.

DEMAK, BANTEN (BANTAM), and later MATARAM in Java and BRUNEI in north-west BORNEO received the patronage of Muslim traders who avoided MELAKA, which had from 1511 become a part of the PORTUGUESE ASIAN EMPIRE. ACEH (ACHEH), commanding the northern entrance to the STRAITS OF MELAKA, profited the most as the new spice entrepôt (for PEPPER in particular) and the focus of Islamic teachings and scholarship. Sufi scholarship, for instance, is the much richer for the contributions of HAMZAH FANSURI, SHAMSUDDIN AL-SUMATRANI (d. 1630), and NURUDDIN AL-RANIRI (d. 1658).

In JAVA, Islamic influence impacted unevenly on the inhabitants. The *ABANGAN*, though embracing the new religion, continued to retain Hindu-Buddhist practices and indigenous Javanese beliefs. On the other hand, the *SANTRI* were more steadfast to principles of the faith such as the obligatory five daily prayers and the observance of the fast during Ramadan. In the Javanese context, a *KIAI* is a religious leader whose knowledge of Islamic doctrines is generally acknowledged. The concept of the *RATU ADIL* (RIGHTEOUS KING/PRINCE) that emerged in PEASANT UPRISINGS AND PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA reflects an example of the combination of Islamic deliverance with traditional Javanese messianic expectations. DIPONEGORO (PANGERAN DIPANEGARA) (ca. 1785–1855) of the JAVA WAR (1825–1830) and HAJI OEMAR SAID TJOKROAMINOTO (1882–1934) both were said to be the *RATU ADIL* (RIGHTEOUS KING/PRINCE), who would deliver the people from the Dutch colonial rulers.

SUMATRA posed as a hotbed of Islamic movements, from the PADRI MOVEMENT

that sparked the PADRI WARS (1821–1837) to the DARUL ISLAM MOVEMENT (DI) of the twentieth century. The ACEH (ACHEH) WARS (1873–1903) used Islam as a bulwark against Dutch IMPERIALISM and COLONIALISM.

Similarly Islam pervaded the Indonesian nationalist struggle. SAREKAT ISLAM (1912) utilized the faith as a rallying point as well as a defense against socialism and COMMUNISM. NAHDATUL ULAMA and MUHAMMADIYAH had Islam as their guiding principle. Similarly, PERSATUAN ULAMA-ULAMA SELURUH ACEH (PUSA), or the Association of Aceh *Ulama*, utilized Islam in its anticolonial struggle.

ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (TWENTIETH CENTURY) witnessed the emergence of a gulf of divergence between the traditionalist and the reformist. In Indonesia, the formation of the MADJLISUL ISLAMIL A'LAA INDONESIA (MIAI) (GREAT ISLAMIC COUNCIL OF INDONESIA) was an attempt to resolve differences and unite the faithful. SYED SHAYKH AL-HADY (1867?–1934), who was based in PENANG (1786) during the early decades of the twentieth century, was a prominent leader in Islamic modernism.

During the JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (1941–1945), the MADJELIS SJURO MUSLIMIN INDONESIA (MASJUMI) (COUNCIL OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONS) was established in Indonesia to garner Muslim support. After the Pacific War (1941–1945), Islam continued to have an important influence in the unshackling of colonial domination and nation-building. PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) was at the forefront in the fight for independence for BRITISH MALAYA. In the early 1970s the ANGKATAN BELIA ISLAM MALAYSIA (ABIM) (MALAYSIAN ISLAMIC YOUTH MOVEMENT) sought to champion the Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. Brunei adopted the concept of MELAYU ISLAM BERAJA (MIB, MALAY ISLAMIC MONARCHY).

MUSLIM MINORITIES (THAILAND) of South/Peninsular Thailand had long resisted the authority of the Buddhist central government in BANGKOK. More akin to the neighboring peninsular Malay States of West Malaysia, the Muslim descendants of the SUL-

TANATE OF PATANI (PATTANI) preferred cession to assimilation into the Buddhist Thai polity and identity.

MINDANAO and most of the islands of the southern Philippines resisted Spanish colonization and HISPANIZATION, the latter including Christianization. They remained Muslim and defended their faith and land in a protracted struggle against the Spanish colonial regime. In that centuries-old conflict, the MOROS took center stage during the 1970s when the revolutionary MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) launched a separatist struggle. The issue of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the Philippines remained unresolved—a blemish on the Christian Philippine government that had inherited this legacy from the past.

In the sixteenth century, CATHOLICISM made rapid advances in tow with the HISPANIZATION of the Philippines following the establishment of Spanish colonial rule over the islands. Among SPANISH FRIARS (THE PHILIPPINES) of various denominations, the Dominicans were especially dominant, possessing spiritual as well as temporal influence over the Filipinos. The fear of God made excommunication a decidedly powerful instrument of control over the masses. Besides amassing great material wealth in the form of land and property, the Catholic Church wielded tremendous influence in secular state affairs. The FRIAR-SECULAR RELATIONSHIP was often strained. Dissatisfaction was even more rife among Filipino clergy, as racism was the norm in the hierarchical Catholic establishment.

Elsewhere throughout Southeast Asia, CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES made little headway. A small Christian community can be found in SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY). The city-state of SINGAPORE (1819) has a growing Christian following. Outside the Philippines, indigenous ethnic communities in SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO) account for the greatest number of Christian converts to CATHOLICISM and Protestantism (Anglican, Methodist, Adventist, and Borneo Evangelical Mission). The majority of IBANS and KADAZANDUSUNS and some groups of EAST MALAYSIAN ETHNIC MINORITIES embraced Christianity. Others, like the BAJAUS and Melanau of the coastal areas, turned to Is-

lam, whereas those in the interior kept to ADAT and animistic practices.

Despite the propagation of the world religions and modernity from without, a variety of FOLK RELIGIONS remained vibrant and continued to be practiced among the peoples of Southeast Asia. ADAT, “custom,” or “customary law” remained the spiritual compass for a great many ethnic groups from the Chin Hills of western Myanmar to the Maoke Mountains of IRIAN JAYA to the Sierra Madre of LUZON. Notwithstanding formal acknowledgment of the world religions, many Javanese are followers of KEBATINAN MOVEMENTS, indigenous Javanese spiritual movements based on ancestral culture that predate Hindu-Buddhist influences. CAO DAI is an indigenous Vietnamese religion that drew its inspiration from a host of other religious philosophies—namely, from CONFUCIANISM, BUDDHISM, Taoism, CATHOLICISM, and others. HOA HAO, a South Vietnamese indigenous religion, is a variant of BUDDHISM with messianic overtones.

RELIGIOUS SELF-MORTIFICATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA is a phenomenon that both fascinates and intrigues observers as to the motives and inspirations that result in the performance of such rituals in the name of a faith. Examples could be found throughout the region, from crucifixion by nailing during Holy Week in central LUZON to body piercing with spears and lances during the Thaipusam procession in PENANG (1786). In the latter a Hindu devotee carries a *kavadi*, a fancifully decorated wooden or steel frame with skewers literally supported by his body, representing the burden of the carrier by way of paying penance.

Hindu-Buddhist Kingdoms and Empires

The HINDU-BUDDHIST PERIOD OF SOUTHEAST ASIA from around the first century B.C.E. to the thirteenth century C.E. saw the growth, development, expansion, and decline of numerous political centers throughout the region.

Chinese records noted a maritime kingdom situated on the lower reaches of the Mekong that flourished from the third to seventh centuries C.E. Referred to as FUNAN, this polity is believed to be the intermediary of the sea-

going trade between IMPERIAL CHINA to the east and INDIA to the west. During its heyday during the mid-third century, FUNAN dominated modern-day southern Vietnam, Cambodia, central Thailand, and northern West Malaysia. It was also a reputable center of Buddhist scholarship during the latter part of the fifth and early sixth centuries. The CHINESE TRIBUTE SYSTEM was imposed on FUNAN from the fourth century until its demise in the latter half of the sixth century. The archaeological site of OC ÈO is generally believed to be the uncovering of the kingdom of FUNAN.

The name CHAMPA refers to a series of small kingdoms situated on the coastline of today's central Vietnam. A contemporary of FUNAN, the first of these kingdoms was established toward the end of the second century C.E., located in the vicinity of modern HUÈ. Maritime commerce with southern China was the lifeblood of CHAMPA. During the early seventh century, Hindu-Buddhist culture blossomed. CHAMPA continually had to defend itself from attacks by IMPERIAL CHINA, VIETS, KHMERS, and Mongols. The last of the kingdoms fell to Vietnam in the early nineteenth century.

Akin to the MONS of Burma, the KHMERS established CHENLA, which encompassed modern Cambodia and northeast Thailand. Originally a vassal of FUNAN, CHENLA during the seventh century not only asserted its independence but also dominated its former overlord. Chinese records spoke of Land CHENLA and Water CHENLA, the former accessible overland and the latter reached by sea. Like FUNAN and CHAMPA, CHENLA maintained tributary relations with China and conducted a lucrative trade along the maritime silk route. The division of CHENLA weakened the KHMERS, and their power dissipated in the ninth century when rivals from island Southeast Asia began to encroach on the East-West trade.

The MALAYS established the greatest maritime power in insular Southeast Asia, that of ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA), which flourished during the seventh to thirteenth centuries. The fall of FUNAN, which had played such a prominent role in the carrying trade between IMPERIAL CHINA and INDIA, created a vacuum without a worthy successor on main-

land Southeast Asia. Based in southern SUMATRA, with its fortified city-port of PALEMBANG possessing a strategic command of the STRAITS OF MELAKA, ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA) rose to the challenge and cornered the lucrative East-West trade. Its mighty fleet enforced its monopolistic will, demanding that all vessels call at its ports to partake of their facilities and pay dues. ARABS, both traders and chroniclers, spoke of the power and influence of ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA), which extended throughout SUMATRA, the Malay Peninsula, and the western part of JAVA. I-CHING (I-TSING) (635–713 C.E.), the Chinese pilgrim, wrote of PALEMBANG as a significant center of Buddhist learning, with monasteries accommodating more than a thousand students.

Envious and determined to reap the fabulous wealth and impose their hegemony, the Cholas of southern India sacked and occupied large parts of ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA) on either side of the STRAITS OF MELAKA for two decades following 1025 C.E. Overstretched in their commitments, however, the Cholas withdrew; ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA) nonetheless wisely accepted Chola overlordship.

Also challenging the political and economic power of ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA) were the SAILENDRAS, toward the end of the tenth century. The SAILENDRAS were Buddhist monarchs whose kingdom lay in MATARAM in east-central JAVA during the eighth to mid-ninth centuries. The SAILENDRAS harbored imperialistic ambitions to expand their power, not only in insular but also in mainland Southeast Asia. Accordingly, a Javanese force defeated Water CHENLA. The KHMERS rallied to the aid of JAYAVARMAN II (r. 770/790/802?–834 C.E.) to expel the invaders. Credited as the builders of the BOROBUDUR, the SAILENDRAS left behind numerous Buddhist temples and monuments. The association of SAILENDRAS with the SUMATRA-based maritime power of ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA) is unclear; some sources point to their rivalry for the Sino-Indian trade.

The KHMERS rejuvenated their power in the founding of ANGKOR. Shifting from the delta area to northwest Cambodia, ANGKOR was the dominant power in mainland Southeast Asia from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries. Water control and architectural prowess

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in temple building were the twin Angkorian legacies. The crowning achievement is the imposing ANGKOR WAT (NAGARAVATTA). During the reign of SURYAVARMAN II (r. 1113–1145?), the power of ANGKOR extended to modern Burma and Vietnam. Angkorean kings utilized the concept of *DEVARAJA* to enhance their power and establish legitimacy. Temple building and maintenance of monuments, large numbers of state-supported Buddhist clergy, and punitive wars, coupled with the more egalitarian characteristics of THERAVADA BUDDHISM and the rise of the T' AIS, contributed to the decline of ANGKOR.

The kingdom of NAM VIET (NAN YUE) was mentioned in Chinese records at the early part of the first century B.C.E., encompassing a territory that included present-day Guangdong/Guangxi province, Hainan Island, and the northern portion of Vietnam. This early kingdom had five rulers, a century of independence, and then was under Chinese domination for a millennium from 111 B.C.E. Sinicization took root during this Chinese colonial period. Scholars and officials who fled the mainland crossed over to the Red River delta following the demise of the Imperial Han dynasty (202 B.C.E.–220 C.E.); this elite arrival contributed tremendously to the Sinicization process in language, political philosophy, social etiquette, and religious adherence.

The VIETS successfully shook off Chinese colonial rule with the establishment of the Early Ly dynasty in 980 C.E. For the next millennium Vietnam enjoyed its independence and adopted the term DAI VIET, or Great Viet, implying the rule of all VIETS. Interestingly, all the indigenous dynasties resisted Chinese reoccupation, but their politico-administrative structure and sociocultural norms imitated the Chinese model. During the period of DAI VIET, which lasted to the early nineteenth century, SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS were maintained on the basis of the CHINESE TRIBUTE SYSTEM. The rulers of DAI VIET sent tributes to IMPERIAL CHINA acknowledging the overlordship of the latter. But at the same time in relations with neighboring kingdoms, DAI VIET assumed the status of a Chinese-styled empire to which all others had to owe subservience.

During DAI VIET the nomenclature of Vietnamese dynasties included the Early Ly dynasty (980–1009), LY DYNASTY (1009–1225), Tran dynasty (1225–1400), Ho dynasty (1400–1407), and LE DYNASTY (1428–1527; 1533–1789). The Tran repulsed a Mongol offensive in the mid-thirteenth century. Between 1407 and 1418, China once again asserted domination over the VIETS, instituting a harsh and repressive rule with an accelerated dose of Sinicization. This Chinese interregnum ended with the establishment of the LE DYNASTY (1428–1527; 1533–1789).

Beginning in the fourteenth century, DAI VIET expanded southward over the next two centuries at the expense of CHAMPA and the KHMERS to reach the Mekong Delta. This southern migration, NAM TIEN, was spurred by overpopulation as well as Trinh–Nguyễn rivalry. The Nguyễn family actively pursued this policy of expansion that finally established the NGUYỄN DYNASTY (1802–1945), which occupied ANNAM and COCHIN CHINA, modern central and southern Vietnam, respectively. Meanwhile the TRINH FAMILY ruled over TONKIN (TONGKING) in the name of the greatly weakened LE DYNASTY.

Migrating southward from southwest China, the PYUS entered Burma in the third century C.E. and established a capital city in the area of modern Prome. The PYUS embraced HINDUISM and both MAHAYANA and THERAVADA BUDDHISM, the latter being dominant from the seventh century C.E. Meanwhile the MONS, akin to the KHMERS, around the first century C.E. moved from central Burma (Dry Zone) to Lower Burma. The MONS in Lower Burma came into contact with Indian traders and Buddhist missionaries, facilitating the process of INDIANIZATION in Burma. THERAVADA BUDDHISM was particularly strong among the MONS. In the eighth century, the MONS drove the PYUS away; the latter fled to the north and came under the T' AIS, then established at NAN CHAO (NAN-CHAO) (DALI/TALI). The MONS established themselves at Thaton, PEGU, and Martaban.

Originating from northern China, the BURMANS migrated through Tibet and then YUNNAN PROVINCE into the Kyaukse plain in central Burma during the seventh to tenth centuries C.E. They displaced the PYUS

in Upper and central Burma. The BURMANS founded their capital city of PAGAN (BAGAN), which developed into the first Burmese empire (ca. 850–1287 C.E.), attaining its apex during the eleventh and twelfth centuries and expanding as far southward as TENASSERIM. One of the renowned rulers of PAGAN (BAGAN) was ANAWRAHTA (ANIRUDDHA) (r. 1044–1077), who expanded the rule of the BURMANS over the area coinciding with the contemporary Union of Myanmar in the process of defeating the MONS and seizing Thaton. The name “Myanmar” has been used for the country during the PAGAN (BAGAN) period from around the thirteenth century. The BURMANS adopted THERAVADA BUDDHISM, which was derived from SRI LANKA (CEYLON), as the predominant religious tradition that spurred the erection of fabulous temples, mural paintings, and other visual arts. The BURMANS also embraced the Indianized high culture of the MONS, including the concept of kingship and divine political power.

The T’AIS, the main ethnic group in modern Thailand, originated from southern China and later moved southward and westward into mainland Southeast Asia. The T’AIS established the kingdom of NAN CHAO (NANCHAO) (DALI/TALI); that contention, however, has been disputed. NAN CHAO (NANCHAO) (DALI/TALI) proved to be the “back-door” trade passage to IMPERIAL CHINA, and the T’AIS profited from that position from the eighth century C.E. onward. The Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century drove the T’AIS southward into the upper Menam Valley. It turned out to be a fortunate move, as RAMA KAMHAENG (r. 1279–1298) seized the opportunity in capturing SUKHOTAI (SUKHODAVA), then an outpost of ANGKOR that was fast declining following the demise of JAYAVARMAN VII (r. 1181–1220?). The SUKHOTAI (SUKHODAVA) period from the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries witnessed the effervescence of the arts and culture of the T’AIS. Two *muang* (principalities) of the T’AIS were CHIANG RAI and CHIANG MAI, both established in the second half of the thirteenth century.

RAMATHIBODI (r. 1351–1369) in 1351 C.E. established the KINGDOM OF AYUT-

THAYA (AYUTHAYA, AYUDHYA, AYUTHIA) (1351–1767 C.E.). THERAVADA BUDDHISM and the Hindu-Buddhist concept of kingship reigned supreme. The capital city of the same name situated at the confluence of the Chao Phraya, the Pasak, and the Lopburi was sufficiently strategic to command the central floodplain, the major rice-producing heartland. Situated close to the Gulf of Siam and the ISTHMUS OF KRA, the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA (AYUTHAYA, AYUDHYA, AYUTHIA) (1351–1767 C.E.) profited from international maritime commerce and an agriculturally rich hinterland.

AIRLANGGA (r. 1019–1049), of Javanese-Balinese parentage, was a ruler of the eastern part of JAVA who attempted in vain to subdue the declining ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA). From his capital at Kahuripan, he ruled over the Brantas Valley as a divine ruler. Despite the division of his kingdom into the southern part—Pangjalu or KADIRI (KEDIRI), with the capital at Daha—and the northern half—Janggala—to forestall disputes between his two sons, war broke out between the heirs. KADIRI (KEDIRI) finally won after more than half a century of conflict. It was not long before rebellions broke out within KADIRI (KEDIRI). Ken Arok or Angrok (r. 1222–1227) established the kingdom of SINGHĀSĀRI. SINGHĀSĀRI was the first Javanese kingdom that had pretensions of achieving *NUSANTARA*, an archipelagic empire outside Java. KERTANAGARA (r. 1268–1292), ruler of SINGHĀSĀRI, prepared the way for the achievement of *NUSANTARA* by the rulers of MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca. 1520s).

MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca. 1520s) was born out of several factors: the arrogance of KERTANAGARA (r. 1268–1292), a Mongol invasion, a usurper who seized the throne of SINGHĀSĀRI, and a dispossessed heir apparent. The latter, Wijaya, finally prevailed, establishing the new kingdom of MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca. 1520s) and assuming the name *Kertarajasa Jayawardhana* (r. 1294–1309). The reign of HAYAM WURUK (RĀJASANAGARA) (r. 1350–1389) and the tenure of the celebrated *patih* (grand vizier) GAJAH MADA (t. 1331–1364) witnessed the attainment of *NUSANTARA*, which covered most of contemporaneous Indonesia. MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca.

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1520s) was the greatest and last of the Hindu-Buddhist polities prior to the advent of ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

Buddhist Polities, Confucian Dynasties, and Islamic City-Ports

From the fifteenth century, Islamized city-ports in island Southeast Asia took center stage as the main players in the East-West trade. Meanwhile, Buddhist-based polities and Confucian Vietnam on the mainland attempted to consolidate their power amid contentions and conflicts. The BURMA-SIAM WARS that began in the early sixteenth century were the singularly disruptive element in mainland Southeast Asia.

The KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA (AYUTHAYA, AYUDHYA, AYUTHIA) (1351–1767) successfully weakened ANGKOR with offensives launched in the mid-fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries; ANGKOR was sacked, and the KHMERS fled to PHNOM PENH. To the north, SUKHOTAI (SUKHODAVA) was absorbed into the realm. CHIANG MAI remained independent. In the south, LIGOR/NAKHON was incorporated, as well as some parts of the northern Malay Peninsula. The rise of MELAKA in the early fifteenth century was seen as a threat, and two offensives were launched on the city-port; both failed. Relations with IMPERIAL CHINA were ordered on the CHINESE TRIBUTE SYSTEM; despite paying tribute and acknowledging the suzerainty of IMPERIAL CHINA, Ayutthaya made much profit from transactions in Chinese products (such as silk and CERAMICS). Trading relations were established with Japan beginning in the fifteenth century and lasting till the mid-seventeenth century, including the settling of a Japanese mercantile community. This East Asian trade, coupled with that of insular Southeast Asia, made the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA (AYUTHAYA, AYUDHYA, AYUTHIA) (1351–1767) fabulously prosperous.

Meanwhile the demise of PAGAN (BAGAN) in the early part of the fourteenth century witnessed a power vacuum until the ascension of the FIRST AVA (INWA) DYNASTY (1364–1527 C.E.). In terms of size, wealth, power, and influence this new kingdom with its capital at Ava (situated 128 kilometers

inland from its predecessor) was a smaller replica of PAGAN (BAGAN). Ava's legacy lay in the sociocultural traditions that had their roots in PAGAN (BAGAN) that was preserved and developed during the two centuries of the FIRST AVA (INWA) DYNASTY (1364–1527 C.E.) and continues to be evident to the present day.

The sixteenth century witnessed increasing tension between the BURMANS and the T' AIS. Contention over the control of the polities of the MONS along the northern parts of the ISTHMUS OF KRA, such as Tavoy, Mergui, and TENASSERIM, and of CHIANG MAI with the BURMANS subsequently led to the destruction of the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA (AYUTHAYA, AYUDHYA, AYUTHIA) (1351–1767) in 1767. It was one of the most significant events in the protracted BURMA-SIAM WARS.

The establishment of the TOUNGOO DYNASTY (1531–1752) saw the acceleration of the BURMA-SIAM WARS. TABINSHWEIHTI (r. 1531–1550) launched offensives against the SHANS and the T' AIS/Siamese. Under the reign of BAYINNAUNG (r. 1551–1581), the empire surpassed that of PAGAN (BAGAN), extending westward to Manipur and eastward to Cambodia, often sacking the LAO and the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA (AYUTHAYA, AYUDHYA, AYUTHIA) (1351–1767). In the Buddhist tradition, BAYINNAUNG (r. 1551–1581) became a *CAK-KAVATTI/SETKYA-MIN* (UNIVERSAL RULER). Partial to the MONS, PEGU in Lower Burma was made the capital city and flourished from foreign trade. But PHRA NARET (KING NARESUAN) (r. 1590–1605) of PITSANULOK (PHITSANULOK) regained Siamese pride and independence in defeating the Burmese Crown prince in a duel on ELEPHANTS at Nong Sarai in 1593.

The Restored Toungoo Dynasty (1597–1752) revived its former strength and reconquered polities like CHIANG MAI that had asserted their independence. The capital city had shifted to Ava in Upper Burma. But after the reign of King Thalun (r. 1629–1648), internal court struggle greatly weakened the empire. The MONS seized the opportunity and revolted in the mid-eighteenth century; again PEGU became their rallying point. Into this

chaotic situation of a declining dynasty arose a champion of the BURMANS, ALAUNGH-PAYA (r. 1752–1760), who defeated the MONS and regained and reunited the whole country with the establishment of the KONBAUNG DYNASTY (1752–1885).

The third ruler of the KONBAUNG DYNASTY (1752–1885), HSINBYUSHIN (r. 1763–1776), repeated the feat of BAYINNAUNG (r. 1551–1581) in dominating mainland Southeast Asia from Manipur to the Lao regions. His generals sacked the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA (AYUTHAYA, AYUDHAYA, AYUTHIA) (1351–1767) in 1767.

After the fall of the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA (AYUTHAYA, AYUDHAYA, AYUTHIA) (1351–1767) the empire fragmented, with each polity asserting its freedom and independence. PHYA TAKSIN (PHYA TAK [SIN], KING TAKSIN) (r. 1767–1782), a Sino-Thai provincial governor, emerged to defeat the BURMANS, regain lost territories, and reunify the realm, which approximated contemporary Thailand. Key areas for safeguarding Siam's independence were seized, including CHIANG MAI and the Cambodian provinces of BATTAMBANG and SIEM REAP. Also conquered was the city-port polity of HATTIEN on the Cambodian coast, made into an economic powerhouse during the reign of MAC THIEN TU (1700–1780); it controlled the Mekong hinterland. A new capital, Thonburi, was built across the Chao Phraya opposite modern BANGKOK—hence the Thonburi period.

In Vietnam, although the LE DYNASTY (1428–1527; 1533–1789) reigned, real power rested with two parties: the TRINH FAMILY and the Nguyễn. A stalemate ensued as neither was able to subdue the other. The TAY-SON REBELLION (1771–1802) broke this impasse in defeating the TRINH FAMILY and almost wiping out the entire Nguyễn clan. The country was apportioned among three brothers: Van-Hue ruled TONKIN (TONGKING) in the north, Van-Nhac controlled ANNAM in the center, and Van-Lu occupied COCHIN CHINA in the south. One surviving Nguyễn prince, NGUYỄN ANH (EMPEROR GIA LONG) (r. 1802–1820), managed to rally his forces and to defeat and reunite Vietnam under the NGUYỄN DYNASTY (1802–1945).

The advent of ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA gradually began in the thirteenth century, making inroads in the conversion of the city-ports of northern SUMATRA. Two centuries later emerged the greatest of the Islamic city-ports of the MALAYS, that of MELAKA.

By the beginning of the fifteenth century, MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca. 1520s), although in existence, was an emaciated kingdom. Into this vacuum emerged a prince from PALEMBANG, PARAMESWARA (PARAMESHWARA, PARAMESVARA) of the ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA) line, who fled his father-in-law's kingdom and sought refuge in TEMASIK (TUMASIK). In attempting to seize control, he killed the local ruler and fled northward up the Malay Peninsula. At a small fishing village on the western coast settled by ORANG LAUT, the prince decided to establish his kingdom. Named after a local tree, MELAKA was established around 1400. Conversion to Islam followed and brought many Muslim traders to that strategically located city-port at the narrowest part of the STRAITS OF MELAKA, where it could command the sea traffic of this international waterway. Acknowledging the Chinese MING DYNASTY (1368–1644) as its suzerain power and cordially receiving ADMIRAL CHENG HO (ZHENG HE) (1371/1375–1433/1435) was another prudent and calculated move by its Malay rulers. Through trading relations, MELAKA propagated Islam throughout island Southeast Asia; Muslim clerics and scholars congregated at the city-port to teach and to learn. Under the able leadership of TUN PERAK (d. ca. 1498), the *bendahara* (chancellor/chief minister), the empire of MELAKA, which encompassed large parts of central and southern SUMATRA and most of the Malay Peninsula, further enriched the flourishing entrepôt city-port.

The fabulous success and prosperity of MELAKA was its undoing, as foreign eyes covetously lusted for possession. In Portuguese plans for creating a maritime PORTUGUESE ASIAN EMPIRE, MELAKA featured as one of several key strategic city-ports stretching from the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea.

ACEH (ACHEH) and BRUNEI (SIXTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES) were contemporaneous with MELAKA but remained as secondary Muslim

city-ports, dealing in specialized local products, the former in PEPPER and the latter in JUNGLE/FOREST PRODUCTS. In JAVA the *PASISIR* city-ports were quick in seeing the economic advantages of conversion to Islam.

DEMAK in north-central JAVA embraced Islam through one of the *WALI SONGO* shortly after the collapse of MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca. 1520s). Establishing close alliance through trade and religious relations with other *PASISIR* city-ports along the northern and eastern Javanese coast, including BANTEN (BANTAM) (1526–1813), made DEMAK a strong Islamic polity in the sixteenth century, largely between 1518 and 1550. DEMAK also nurtured cordial contacts with MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS) and southern SULAWESI (CELEBES), as well as with the influential and powerful ACEH (ACHEH) and PALEMBANG of northern and southern SUMATRA, respectively.

BANTEN (BANTAM) (1526–1813) began as a Hindu kingdom around the twelfth century, controlling the ports of Sunda Kelapa and Banten. Having command of the Sunda Strait, the kingdom was strategically placed to be a major entrepôt for PEPPER from southern SUMATRA and western JAVA. Conversion to Islam attracted Muslim traders from INDIA and across the archipelago.

Hindu-Javanese MATARAM emerged around the fourth century C.E. in western JAVA; it then shifted to the central part of the island, where a high culture flourished from around 732 C.E. to 918 C.E. It is highly probable that MATARAM was absorbed into the great realm of MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca. 1520s). The ascendancy of Islamic MATARAM was contemporaneous with that of BANTAM (BANTEN) (1526–1813). Amid the political chaos following the decline of DEMAK in the mid-sixteenth century, Panembahan Senapati (r. 1582–1601), a vassal ruler of the kingdom of Pajang in south-central JAVA, successfully rebelled against his overlord to establish MATARAM. In the reign of Krapyak (r. 1601–1613) the foundations of a great Islamic-Javanese empire were laid and reached their zenith during the tenure of Rangsang, who assumed the title of AGUNG, SULTAN OF MATARAM (r. 1613–1645).

China and Southeast Asia

Apart from imposing its imperialistic will and implementing the process of Sinicization over Vietnam, IMPERIAL CHINA pursued a lord-vassal relationship with the territories of *NANYANG* (South Seas)—that is, Southeast Asia. This relationship was structured in accordance with the CHINESE TRIBUTE SYSTEM. The Chinese world order admitted no equals; all external relations were conducted on the basis of IMPERIAL CHINA as the overlord and others in subordinate positions paying tribute to the Chinese emperor, the “Son of Heaven.”

The CHINESE TRIBUTE SYSTEM demanded of vassal rulers that they personally journey to Beijing to perform the *kow-tow* (act of obeisance) and present a tribute to the emperor, acknowledging him as suzerain lord. Exhibiting his benevolence and the abundance of the wealth of IMPERIAL CHINA, the emperor bestowed Chinese products upon the vassal ruler several times the value of the tribute that was originally given. Thereafter some form of limited trading transaction was allowed for the foreign entourage; in this sense the tribute mission was in fact also a trading expedition, and much profit was gained for the vassal party returning home with invaluable Chinese goods, such as silks and CERAMICS. In fact, the tribute missions from various corners of Southeast Asia around the seventh century C.E. recorded the heyday of the *Nanhai* or *NANYANG* (South Seas) trade. Consequently, the office of the superintendent of the shipping trade was established at Guangzhou (Canton) in the early part of the eighth century to oversee that lucrative enterprise.

IMPERIAL CHINA under the Song (Sung) dynasty (960–1279 C.E.) had good relations with ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA); it encouraged foreign and tributary trade with the region. Taking this official cue and on their own initiative, Chinese private traders embarked on commercial expeditions to Southeast Asia, ushering in the age of the Chinese junk trade, which flourished over the next 200 years.

The YUAN (MONGOL) DYNASTY (1271–1368) asserted the CHINESE TRIBUTE SYSTEM as a means to gain submission of Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, trade was left to private enterprise—not only to Chinese mer-

chants but also to others such as ARABS, Persians, and Europeans—for example, the Italian MARCO POLO (1254–1324). Expeditionary forces to punish recalcitrant kingdoms were launched against the VIETS, KHMERS, BURMANS, and Javanese in not always successful attempts to bring them into line.

Fearing subversion from within and from without, possibly funded by the profits gained from maritime commerce, the MING DYNASTY (1368–1644) placed an embargo on foreign overseas trade. Politics and security were prioritized in tributary relations, leading to the various expeditions of ADMIRAL CHENG HO (ZHENG HE) (1371/1375–1433/1435), which reasserted the CHINESE TRIBUTE SYSTEM and announced that all trade be officially regulated with Guangzhou as the designated port. This format and related regulations were in force until the early nineteenth century, and several Southeast Asian polities such as Vietnam, Laos, and Siam continued to send tribute missions on a regular basis.

The European “Age of Discovery”

While the MING DYNASTY (1368–1644) was regulating formal tributary relations with Southeast Asia, a far-reaching agreement was reached between two powers of CATHOLICISM—Portugal and Spain. Mediated and decreed by the Holy See in the Vatican, the TREATY OF TORDESILLAS (1494) divided the non-Christian world into two halves designated by an imaginary line some 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands in the east Atlantic Ocean. Lands to the east were the Portuguese sphere, and those to the west the Spanish. Two years prior to this agreement, Christopher Columbus (1451–1506), an Italian in the patronage of Spain, had reached the Bahamas in the Caribbean claiming it to be INDIA—hence the “West Indies.” In order to avoid disputes over territories, the Catholic powers signed the TREATY OF TORDESILLAS (1494), which set in motion the beginning of European IMPERIALISM and COLONIALISM in Southeast Asia.

By the mid-thirteenth century, Portugal and Spain had managed to drive the Muslim Moors out of their peninsula; the last Moorish stronghold, Granada, was regained only in 1492.

Spurred on by “God, Gold, and Glory,” the Catholic Iberian powers of Portugal and Spain embarked on the “Age of Discovery” from the early fifteenth century. From 1420, Prince Henrique “The Navigator” (1394–1460), son of John I (r. 1385–1433) of Portugal, gave patronage to geographers, cartographers, and sailors to explore the west coast of Africa; they reached as far south as the Gambia River, the Azores, and the Cape Verde Islands. Prince Henrique’s sponsoring of expeditions was an attempt to strike at the erstwhile Muslim enemies of Portugal. Greater success in reaching INDIA followed, with Bartholomeu Diaz (1450–1500) rounding the Cape of Good Hope, the southern tip of Africa, in 1487, and the celebrated voyage of VASCO DA GAMA (1459–1524), who landed at Calicut, India, in 1498.

The Portuguese threefold ambition of eliminating Muslims and spreading CATHOLICISM, securing SPICES AND THE SPICE TRADE, and establishing a PORTUGUESE ASIAN EMPIRE for the glory of Portugal laid plans to capture various strategic city-ports. Having defeated a confederation of Muslims at the Battle of Diu (1509), Viceroy Dom Francisco d’Almeida (t. 1505–1509) launched the imperialistic grand plan. It was to the credit of his successor, ALONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE (ca. 1462–1515), that Goa was secured in 1510, MELAKA in 1511, and Ormuz in 1514. MACAU (MACAO) was captured in 1556 to serve as the foothold to IMPERIAL CHINA.

Ferdinand Magellan (ca. 1480–1521), a Portuguese navigator in the service of Spain, reached MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS) in 1511. Starting out in 1519, he sailed an alternative route that reached South America, rounded the Strait of Magellan, and crossed the Pacific Ocean to reach the Philippines in 1521, where he was killed in a clash with natives. Four decades later the Spaniard CAPTAIN GENERAL MIGUEL LOPEZ DE LEGAZPI (1500–1572) colonized the Philippines for Philip II (r. 1556–1598).

Trade Patterns and Economic Transformation

Witnessing the development of the ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EARLY MODERN

18 Introduction

SOUTHEAST ASIA (PRE-SIXTEENTH CENTURY), we have had some inkling of the gradual changes taking place. But a century prior to the coming of the Europeans and the widespread Islamization of insular Southeast Asia in the sixteenth century, apparent changes were in motion.

Until the mid-fifteenth century, the commodities from Southeast Asia that featured in the commercial transaction list of the East-West trade comprised exotic JUNGLE/FOREST PRODUCTS and MARINE/SEA PRODUCTS. Apparently, the cloves and nutmegs from MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS) were collected from the wild. But a change began to be apparent from the mid-fifteenth century that witnessed the emergence of commercial agriculture, intraregional trade, and the growth of large urban centers. The period from that time to the seventeenth century was described as the AGE OF COMMERCE, whereby coastal areas throughout Southeast Asia were increasingly active in participating in the global economy, resulting in the growth of city-port polities.

Cash cropping was intensified for the global market with PEPPER, a major Southeast Asian export commodity. Other SPICES AND THE SPICE TRADE flourished, and production in MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS), known as the “Spice Islands,” was undertaken on a systematic, commercial basis. Cloves, nutmegs, mace, and the fabulous PEPPER fetched lucrative profits. SUGAR, produced largely by the CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, featured as a major export in the seventeenth century. Grown generally by immigrant Teochew (Teochiu), one of the CHINESE DIALECT GROUPS, sugar was produced for the Japanese market from central Vietnam, Siam, Cambodia, and BANTAM (BANTEN). TIN exports were also important in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, largely derived from the Malay Peninsula and JUNK CEYLON (UJUNG SALANG, PHUKET). The export boom stimulated the import of consumption products, particularly Indian textiles. SHIPBUILDING also intensified, in the production of vessels for trade goods.

The boom period of the AGE OF COMMERCE was from the last quarter of the sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century, spurred by rising prices for most Southeast Asian

commodities, abundant flow of silver, and keen competition among the many players. Urbanization was another consequence, and by the sixteenth century, cities such as HANOI (THANG-LONG), Ayutthaya, ACEH (ACHEH), BANTEN (BANTAM), MATARAM, and Makassar supported populations of more than 100,000, comparable to their European counterparts. The large urban cosmopolitan centers relied on imported foodstuffs. RICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, the staple food, was increasingly produced on an export-oriented basis, focusing more on the intraregional market than world export.

A global crisis during the mid-seventeenth century of climatic variations and the decline in output of silver hurt Southeast Asia. The advent of Europeans with technologically advanced FIREARMS tipped the balance of power toward European superiority by the early eighteenth century. Southeast Asian city-ports that relied on trade for economic and political power were steadily eclipsed by European might. As trade declined and wealth dissipated, the urban population increasingly receded into the hinterland.

The Dutch, the English, and Southeast Asia (ca. 1600–ca. 1800)

When in 1594 Philip II (r. 1556–1598) of Spain (who also ruled Portugal from 1580) closed Lisbon to the Dutch, they were forced to venture directly to Southeast Asia for SPICES AND THE SPICE TRADE. The Dutch had been the main distributor for northern Europe of spices that had been brought by Portuguese carracks from MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS) via MELAKA. The action of Philip II was designed to destroy the economic base of the Protestant Dutch, who had revolted against Catholic Spain’s rule over The Netherlands.

Under the aegis of the Compagnie van Vere (1595), Cornelius de Houtman headed the first Dutch expedition to Southeast Asia. Rounding the Cape of Good Hope, the expedition made for Madagascar, then across the Indian Ocean to the west coast of SUMATRA to BANTAM (BANTEN), avoiding the STRAITS OF MELAKA and the Portuguese at MELAKA. De Houtman was well received by local rulers, as European rivalry translated into higher prices.

After achieving their national independence in 1598, the Dutch ambitiously planned to oust all competitors and to monopolize SPICES AND THE SPICE TRADE in Southeast Asia. The formation of the VEREENIGDE OOST-INDISCHE COMPAGNIE (VOC) ([DUTCH] UNITED EAST INDIA COMPANY) (1602), as a single umbrella enjoining several small Dutch companies with total support from The Netherlands government, was to spearhead the Dutch offensive. By the mid-seventeenth century the Dutch had established factories (outposts) at several vital points in Southeast Asia, such as Banda and Ternate in MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS), ACEH (ACHEH), and BANTEN (BANTAM), and had driven the Portuguese out of Amboina and Tidore. MELAKA fell to the Dutch in 1641 with the assistance of the JOHOR-RIAU EMPIRE. SPANISH PHILIPPINES, with MANILA as the base of operations, failed in their attempts to halt the Dutch advance in maritime Southeast Asia. But the major threat to Dutch monopolistic practices came from the English.

ANGLO-DUTCH RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (SEVENTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES) were highly complex, conditioned by the geopolitical situation in Europe, which often was incongruent with the economic conditions and realities in Southeast Asia. English COUNTRY TRADERS were an irritant to the enforcement of Dutch monopoly. But the greater threat was that posed by the ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY (EIC) (1600), an ardent exponent of FREE TRADE that was diagonally opposed to Dutch VOC monopolistic policy and trading modus operandi of “buying cheap and selling dear.” Their opposing trading practices created intense conflicts between them. Unable to make much headway or profits in SPICES AND THE SPICE TRADE, the EIC decided to withdraw and focus more of their undertakings in INDIA. The AMBON (AMBOINA/AMBOYNA) MASSACRE (1623) hastened this decision. The EIC, however, still maintained commercial relations with BANTAM (BANTEN) from 1628 until the Dutch conquest in 1682. Thereafter the EIC built Fort Marlborough on BENGKULU (BENCOOLEN, BENKULEN) in 1685, which remained the sole British outpost in Southeast

Asia until the establishment of PENANG (1786).

European Imperialism and Colonialism

Southeast Asia from the mid-sixteenth century to the early twentieth century was partitioned into European spheres of influence that subsequently led to colonization. European IMPERIALISM entered into an earnest stage in the nineteenth century whereby the whole region, with the notable exception of the kingdom of Siam, was territorially colonized. Overall the metropolitan powers centered in Lisbon, Madrid, London, The Hague, Paris, and Washington dictated the political, economic, social, and to a lesser extent the cultural development and norms of their respective colonies and protectorates in Southeast Asia.

In establishing their far-flung PORTUGUESE ASIAN EMPIRE stretching from Ormuz to MACAU (MACAO), the Portuguese in 1520 moved into the Spice Islands with an outpost at Oekusi on TIMOR trading in sandalwood. The Portuguese Dominican Order operated a base on Solor Island around 1561. A half-century later the VOC opened a trading post, ousting the Dominicans. Following a peace between the Dutch Republic and Portugal in 1641, TIMOR was partitioned: the West was under the Dutch while East Timor became a Portuguese enclave.

Meanwhile, their Iberian neighbor was preoccupied with the creation of SPANISH PHILIPPINES. PRE-HISPANIC PHILIPPINES comprised a string of independent BARANGAY of some 30 to 100 families headed by a *datu* (chief). Animists, and ethnically MALAYS, the decentralized BARANGAY had a sociopolitical structure that could easily be dominated by the Spanish conquistadors numbering fewer than a thousand men. Colonizing the entire Philippine archipelago was in line with an economic-cum-religious design for the SPANISH EXPANSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA—namely, a share in the lucrative SPICES AND THE SPICE TRADE, and the Christianization of the islands. Moreover, the islands would be convenient as a base of operations for the various CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES laboring in East Asia (China and Japan), as well as for tapping the China trade. In fact, from Madrid’s

viewpoint the Philippines were an extension of the Spanish empire of the Americas—namely, Peru and Mexico; they served the fabulously profitable GALLEON TRADE with the international linkage of Madrid-Acapulco-MANILA-MACAU (MACAO).

Spanish conquest was not difficult, beginning with the taking of Cebu (1565), a major island in the VISAYAN ISLANDS (BISAYAN ISLANDS, THE BISAYAS, THE VISAYAS), and MANILA (1571) in LUZON. The lands were apportioned to Spanish colonists under the *encomienda* system adopted from Mexico. Claiming to be the patrons of the Filipinos, the Spanish *encomenderos* (landowners) also had rights over the labor services of the BARANGAY. The Filipinos as clients had to pay tribute (*tasacion*) to Spanish patrons. In return the *encomenderos* were responsible for protecting and defending the Filipinos and instructing them in CATHOLICISM with a view toward conversion. The PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS were often lopsided to the advantage of the former; however, overly harsh or oppressive means were eschewed. Initially the SPANISH FRIARS (THE PHILIPPINES) defended the Filipinos from harsh treatment by their Spanish patrons.

The HISPANIZATION process, largely referring to the Christianization of the lowland tribute-paying inhabitants, was moderately successful. HISPANIZATION failed, however, to penetrate the highland ethnic groups (Bontocs, Igorots, Ilocanos, Ilocanos) of northern LUZON, or the Muslims of the south in MINDANAO such as the MOROS, SULU AND THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO, and TAUSUG AND THE SULU SULTANATE. Spanish CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES of various denominations (Augustinians, Dominicans, Franciscans) spread CATHOLICISM among the hitherto animistic Filipinos. Awed by the rich ritual and pageantry, the recipients were, however, at best nominal converts, with a superficial understanding of the religion. The Filipinos, in fact, combined pagan practices and beliefs with CATHOLICISM, a blending that by the nineteenth century was the religious norm.

In the adjoining archipelago of modern Indonesia, the creation of the NETHERLANDS (DUTCH) EAST INDIES, commonly referred to simply as DUTCH EAST INDIES, was under way, with the VOC consolidating its economic

monopoly complemented by political and military domination. The Dutch empire builder was JAN PIETERSZOOM COEN (1587–1629), who captured BANTEN (BANTAM) and in 1619 converted one of its two ports into the main base of operations of the VOC, renaming it BATAVIA (SUNDA KELAPA, JACATRA, DJAKARTA/JAKARTA). But it was not until the early 1920s that the DUTCH EAST INDIES became a reality: JAVA (1830), SUMATRA (1904), Riau Archipelago (1911), DUTCH BORNEO (1911), SULAWESI (1907), MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS) (1907), and IRIAN JAYA (1921).

Starting with a monopolistic control of SPICES AND THE SPICE TRADE for the greater part of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a trade based largely on treaty engagements with local rulers, the Dutch shifted their policy as a result of the acquisition of a territorial empire coupled with the ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (ca. 1400–ca. 1800). Following the NAPOLEONIC WARS IN ASIA, whereby Dutch possessions came under temporary British tutelage (1811–1815), JAVA came under a LIBERAL EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD (1816–1830). The financially devastating JAVA WAR (1825–1830), led by the charismatic DIPONEGORO (PANGERAN DIPANEGARA) (ca. 1785–1855), resulted in a revision of policy to ensure that the colonial possessions were not a drain on the metropolitan treasury and should instead bring in wealth. COUNT JOHANNES VAN DEN BOSCH (1780–1844) designed the highly profitable CULTIVATION SYSTEM (*CULTUURSTELSEL*), which focused on JAVA. With the connivance of the Javanese *bupati* (regents) and *camat* (district heads), as well as the Dutch *controleur*, this systematic program of forced cultivation by Javanese peasant farmers of export crops (COFFEE, SUGAR, tea) reaped fabulous returns. The metropolitan government was the main benefactor. The Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij (Netherlands Trading Company) handled the shipping of the export crops from JAVA to Amsterdam.

Eager to secure bigger profits, the Dutch and Javanese overseers of the CULTIVATION SYSTEM (*CULTUURSTELSEL*) disregarded the built-in safeguards; abuses set in, as poignantly demonstrated in prose by Edward

Douwes Dekker's *MAX HAVELAAR* (1860) or *The Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company*. Liberals in The Netherlands from the 1860s began to voice criticisms of this system of FORCED DELIVERIES of export crops by Javanese peasants, and a more liberal approach was proposed to rectify the appalling situation. In the next decade efforts were under way to gradually phase out the CULTIVATION SYSTEM (*CULTUURSTELSEL*). In its place a policy shift encouraged participation and investment of Dutch private enterprise on the basis of free competition. During this period of economic liberalization (1870–1900), new cash crops were introduced, notably RUBBER. TIN production surged rapidly, oil exploration and exploitation were undertaken, HIGHWAYS AND RAILWAYS were constructed, communications were improved, and WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION was introduced. However, instead of government-sponsored oppression of the indigenous Indonesians during the phase of the CULTIVATION SYSTEM (*CULTUURSTELSEL*), the liberalization period witnessed the exploitation of the local peasantry by Dutch and Chinese capitalists in their pursuit for greater profits.

Perplexed by two successive failures of the unresolved equation of Dutch profits versus Indonesian welfare, the metropolitan government swung full circle to lay emphasis on native welfare; thus the ETHICAL POLICY (*ETHISCHE POLITIEK*), introduced in 1901. Advancement in social services, native welfare, and the promotion of democratic self-government were characteristics of this new approach to the colonial question. The lack of sincerity on the part of the Dutch and the high expectations of the Indonesians worked against the success of the ETHICAL POLICY (*ETHISCHE POLITIEK*). A conspicuous outcome was the beginning of Indonesian NATIONALISM AND INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

Unable to compete profitably with the Dutch VOC, the English EIC retreated to INDIA, where it carved out an empire on the subcontinent. Meanwhile, enterprising English COUNTRY TRADERS utilizing their wit and native network crisscrossed maritime Southeast Asia, penetrating the VOC monopoly to pursue their fortune. The GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA, besides benefiting from

the Indian cotton textile industry that supplied the Manchester looms with raw materials, visualized a lucrative area of investment that awaited just over the horizon in IMPERIAL CHINA. Long before the mission of Lord Macartney in 1793 to IMPERIAL CHINA of the isolationist QING (CHING/MANCHU) DYNASTY (1644–1912), many an English capitalist was fully convinced that the “end of the rainbow” lay in the China trade of silk, tea, and CERAMICS. After a century of closed-door policy on foreign maritime trade, IMPERIAL CHINA allowed restricted trade at Guangzhou in 1751.

Between INDIA and IMPERIAL CHINA there was no friendly port of call for the shelter and repair of the East Indiamen of the EIC. These ships made use of the MONSOONS, and Southeast Asia was the halfway point where they would await the next favorable winds. The EIC's sole outpost was BENGKULU (BENCOOLEN, BENKULEN) on the northwestern coast of SUMATRA. Furthermore, the Anglo-French struggle over the subcontinent often resulted in battles in the Bay of Bengal. While the French could retire to their base in Mauritius or at ACEH (ACHEH) under treaty agreements, the English had to brave the MONSOONS, because they had only Bombay. On the basis of both economic and military concerns, it was imperative to the GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA that a viable outpost be established on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal that could serve as both a naval base and an entrepôt for Southeast Asian products.

Against this scenario emerged the ambitious CAPTAIN FRANCIS LIGHT (1740–1794), an English COUNTRY TRADER who had for decades traded along the ISTHMUS OF KRA and the northern parts of the Malay Peninsula from his base at JUNK CEYLON (UJUNG SALANG, PHUKET). Acting as the intermediary between the GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA and the Kedah ruler, who had offered the island of PENANG (1786) in return for military protection against his Siamese overlord, Captain Light secured for the former an outpost on PENANG (1786). He, however, was less than explicit on the question of military assistance. PENANG (1786) became a naval base and entrepôt for the EIC's China trade. In 1800 the strip on the mainland

opposite the island was acquired from Kedah and named Province Wellesley.

When in 1821 the ruler of LIGOR/NAKHON attacked and overran Kedah on orders from BANGKOK, the British in PENANG (1786) remained uncommitted, though Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin (r. 1797–1843) was given shelter. The British did not want to risk Anglo-Siamese relations over Kedah, as there were imminent developments intimating the outbreak of the ANGLO-BURMESE WARS (1824–1826, 1852, 1885). A Burmese-Siamese alliance would have been detrimental to British ambitions in Burma.

The NAPOLEONIC WARS IN ASIA caused a chilling of ANGLO-DUTCH RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (SEVENTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES). In accordance with the KEW LETTERS penned by the Dutch monarch in exile in England, the British temporarily administered the DUTCH EAST INDIES. SIR (THOMAS) STAMFORD BINGLEY RAFFLES (1781–1826) became lieutenant governor of JAVA from 1811 to 1816. During his tenure he instituted liberal reforms (TAXATION, SLAVERY) that were retained during the Dutch LIBERAL EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD (1816–1830). Similarly, MELAKA came under British occupation.

The British victory at the Battle of Trafalgar (1805) over the Franco-Spanish invasion fleet established its supremacy at sea. PENANG (1786) as a naval base became irrelevant. Its status as an entrepôt supplying the China trade was at best fair in tapping the products of northern SUMATRA, southern Siam, and the northern peninsular Malay States. And as an outpost for checking Dutch activities, its location on the northern part of the STRAITS OF MELAKA proved inconvenient. The drawbacks of PENANG (1786) led to the search for a more strategically located base farther south that could be in a better position not only to procure a wider range of Southeast Asian products but also to monitor DUTCH INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA FROM 1800.

SINGAPORE (1819), formerly TEMASIK (TUMASIK), proved to be the ideal British base that possessed all the qualities that PENANG (1786) lacked. The visionary SIR (THOMAS) STAMFORD BINGLEY RAFFLES (1781–1826) executed some sleek ma-

neuvering to take possession of the island for the EIC at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula. With its free port status, natural, sheltered harbor, and British rule, SINGAPORE (1819) within a short period was a booming port. The Dutch protested over the controversial ownership of the island, which they claimed was part of the JOHOR-RIAU EMPIRE, with which the Dutch had treaty relations. Nonetheless the GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA stood firm over SINGAPORE (1819), having witnessed its impressive performance.

Meanwhile in Europe, the Battle of Waterloo (1815) changed the balance of power and improved ANGLO-DUTCH RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (SEVENTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES). Britain wanted an ally in an economically strong Netherlands to avoid a repeat of the latter's being used as a launching base for the invasion of the British Isles. The DUTCH EAST INDIES was a vital key to this resurgence. Therefore the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London (1824) apportioned the Malay archipelago with the Straits of Singapore as the division between two spheres of influence: the Dutch to the south of the straits and the British to the north. BENGKULU (BENCOOLEN, BENKULEN) was exchanged for MELAKA. This agreement effectively chartered the fate of modern Indonesia in Dutch hands, and Malaysia under the British.

In 1826 the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1946) were constituted, comprising PENANG (1786), SINGAPORE (1819), and MELAKA, further strengthening the British command of the STRAITS OF MELAKA in protection of the EIC's all-important China trade from PIRACY. The ENTREPÔT TRADE AND COMMERCE OF SINGAPORE (NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 1990s) developed rapidly. The STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1946) served as a platform for the British entry into the WESTERN MALAY STATES (PERAK, SELANGOR, NEGRI SEMBILAN, AND PAHANG) in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.

BRITISH BORNEO was created when Britain in 1888 granted protectorate status over the Malay sultanate of BRUNEI (SIXTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES) and the oddities of SARAWAK

AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO). Theoretically, BRUNEI (SIXTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES) claimed possession of BORNEO—at least the northwestern portion of the island. The DAYAKS and the IBANS in particular and the EAST MALAYSIAN ETHNIC MINORITIES in general paid little attention to the suzerainty of this Bornean Malay kingdom. However, an anti-Brunei revolt (1836–1841) broke out in the northwest corner, owing to oppressive treatment of the local inhabitants. A visiting English gentleman-adventurer was invited to intervene; he succeeded and was consequently rewarded with a fiefdom by the sultanate. JAMES BROOKE AND SARAWAK is the romantic tale of an English white raja who ruled over a multiethnic, multicultural population; he (and his heirs) practiced a consistently paternalistic policy of championing the interests and welfare of the native inhabitants. The second white raja, SIR CHARLES ANTHONI JOHNSON BROOKE (1829–1917), expanded the fiefdom to the borders of contemporary Brunei and laid the foundations of a modern state. From the mid-nineteenth century a series of speculators had secured rights from BRUNEI (SIXTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES) and the sultanate of Sulu for the territory encompassed by the present-day East Malaysian state of Sabah. In the early 1880s an Anglo–Austrian private partnership was in possession of these territorial rights and successfully gained a royal charter from Britain in establishing the BRITISH NORTH BORNEO CHARTERED COMPANY (1881–1946). The Austrian interests withdrew, and the solely BRITISH NORTH BORNEO CHARTERED COMPANY (1881–1917) administered what became known as British North Borneo. Owing to the increasing encroachment on BRUNEI (SIXTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES) by the respective regimes of SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO), Britain granted the protectorate to ensure the integrity of the Malay kingdom.

Britain in the mid-1870s intervened in the affairs of the TIN-producing WESTERN MALAY STATES (PERAK, SELANGOR, NEGRI SEMBILAN, AND PAHANG) (in the 1880s) established the RESIDENTIAL SYSTEM (MALAYA), ushering in the beginnings

of British COLONIALISM that subsequently created BRITISH MALAYA by the first decade of the twentieth century. A succession dispute over the Perak throne, intertwined with clashes between rival Chinese *HUI* squabbling over mining territories, PIRACY in Selangor, and civil war in Sungai Ujong (later to become Negri Sembilan), created a most untenable situation in these TIN-producing Malay States, disrupting production and trade.

TIN, which does not rust, was in high demand for the tin-plate industry. Several *TOWKAY* from the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1946), some of whom headed the *HUI*, invested heavily in the lucrative TIN industry. The EUROPEAN AGENCY HOUSES also had a stake in the TIN of the WESTERN MALAY STATES (PERAK, SELANGOR, NEGRI SEMBILAN, AND PAHANG) as the increasing demand pushed up ore prices.

In a high-handed manner, SIR ANDREW CLARKE (1824–1902), governor of the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1946), executed a *fait accompli* by intervening and settling the disputes and wars in the WESTERN MALAY STATES (PERAK, SELANGOR, NEGRI SEMBILAN, AND PAHANG) through the terms of the PANGKOR ENGAGEMENT (1874), which introduced the RESIDENTIAL SYSTEM (MALAYA). Excluding Islam and Malay customs and practices, the resident was the *de facto* administrator possessing legislative, judicial, and executive power, but in the eyes of the *rakyat* (masses) he appeared to rule in the name of the Malay sultan.

As a means of achieving administrative centralization, the WESTERN MALAY STATES (PERAK, SELANGOR, NEGRI SEMBILAN, AND PAHANG) were combined into the FEDERATED MALAY STATES (FMS) (1896). Through the Treaty of Bangkok (1909), Britain acquired the SIAMESE MALAY STATES (KEDAH, PERLIS, KELANTAN, TERENGGANU), among other privileges from the kingdom of Siam. These northern peninsular Malay States had been acknowledging Siamese suzerainty through the periodic tribute of the *BUNGA EMAS* to BANGKOK. Under the British fold, each of the Malay rulers had in his royal court a British adviser, no different in function from the RESIDENTIAL SYSTEM (MALAYA). ABU BAKAR (r. 1862–1895),

SULTAN OF JOHOR, the far-sighted Anglophile ruler, had succeeded in delaying the imposition of British COLONIALISM by building his kingdom as a modern, Westernized state. Through the Chinese *KANGCHU SYSTEM*, his father and predecessor had encouraged cash cropping of PEPPER and gambier. Nonetheless, Ibrahim (r. 1895–1959), son and successor of ABU BAKAR (r. 1862–1895), SULTAN OF JOHOR, had little choice in 1914 but to tolerate a British adviser. By means of the system of indirect rule through British residents and advisers, BRITISH MALAYA became a reality from 1914.

The expansionist designs of the KONBAUNG DYNASTY (1752–1885) under Bodawpaya (r. 1782–1819), who conquered ARAKAN in 1784, brought about the sharing of a common border with the GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA. But ARAKAN was far from subdued and regularly staged futile revolts against Burmese authority, with the defeated rebels crossing into Chittagong as refugees. Attempts were made to annex Manipur, Assam, and Cachar in eastern Bengal, bringing them under the KONBAUNG DYNASTY (1752–1885). Maha Bandula, the ambitious general of Bagyidaw (r. 1819–1838), harbored plans for the annexation of eastern Bengal. Fearing increasing French influence over Konbaung rulers, the GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA used the disputed possession of the island of Shahpuri as a pretext for war.

KONBAUNG RULERS AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM witnessed the clash of two proud, imperialistic powers that erupted into the ANGLO-BURMESE WARS (1824–1826, 1852, 1885), which subsequently led to the emergence of BRITISH BURMA. The hurriedly concluded TREATY OF YANDABO (1826), lest British forces violate the capital city of Amarapura during the first conflict of 1824–1826, was in itself the bone of contention that resulted in the second war, in 1852, and the acquisition of PEGU. The issues of the British annexation of ARAKAN, TENASSERIM, and PEGU and the acceptance of a British resident on a diplomatic basis at the Burmese royal court created a quagmire of problems that soured Anglo-Burmese relations. The reign of MINDON (r. 1853–1878) was a respite in the troubled relationship between the KONBAUNG RULERS AND BRITISH IM-

PERIALISM. But Thibaw (r. 1878–1885) lacked the finesse of MINDON (r. 1853–1878) in playing off the British against the French, with fatal consequences. THE “SHOE ISSUE” was another touchy matter that effectively led to the complete breakdown of diplomatic intercourse between the two parties. Sensing the ascendancy of French influence over MANDALAY, the British unfairly seized the transgression case of the BOMBAY BURMAH TRADING CORPORATION (BBTC) as a pretext for the third and final war, in 1885. Following the Burmese defeat, Upper Burma was annexed in 1886 and Thibaw was exiled to INDIA, hence bringing an end to the KONBAUNG DYNASTY (1752–1885).

At the same time attempting to assert their influence over the KONBAUNG DYNASTY (1752–1885) in Burma, FRENCH AMBITIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA were also focused on the Indochinese peninsula, which subsequently led to the creation of FRENCH INDOCHINA in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Anglo-French concern over Burma and the Indochinese peninsula, particularly Vietnam, focused on the possibility of accessing the Irrawaddy and Mekong in order to reach YUNNAN PROVINCE in China’s southwest, rumored to possess vast commercial potential. This “back door” to IMPERIAL CHINA to a large extent played a significant role in influencing the relationship between the KONBAUNG RULERS AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM, especially from the mid-nineteenth century; likewise the NGUYỄN EMPERORS AND FRENCH IMPERIALISM.

In 1867, steamers were permitted accessibility to the Irrawaddy by MINDON (r. 1853–1878), as far north as Bhamo. The British were keen to uncover a trade route to YUNNAN PROVINCE, with the thought of annexing Upper Burma. The LAGRÉE-GARNIER MEKONG EXPEDITION (1866–1868) revealed to the French the unsuitability of the Mekong as a back-door route; subsequently, it led the French to earnestly press for the acquisition of TONKIN (TONGKING) so as to facilitate exploration of the Red River.

Unofficial French involvement in Vietnam began with the assistance rendered by PIERRE JOSEPH GEORGES PIGNEAU DE BEHAINE, BISHOP OF ADRAN (1741–1799) to NGUYỄN ANH (EMPEROR GIA

LONG) (r. 1802–1820), who reunified the country and established the NGUYỄN DYNASTY (1802–1945). For the sake of his beloved bishop, the first emperor tolerated CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES in his realm. The NGUYỄN DYNASTY (1802–1945) in fact adopted a closed-door policy to all Europeans, in the hope that the Western powers would leave the country alone; the same was the case in IMPERIAL CHINA. Despite the humiliating lessons of the so-called Opium Wars (1839–1842, 1856–1860), Thieu-tri (r. 1841–1847) not only enforced the disastrous closed-door policy but also began persecuting CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES, in an attempt to eject both them and CATHOLICISM from Vietnam. Minh Mang (r. 1820–1841) had set the persecution policy with edicts from the mid-1820s without any adverse effect, but his successors Thieu-tri (r. 1841–1847) and Tu-duc (r. 1848–1883) faced an aggressive France bent on securing its “place in the sun” vis-à-vis their erstwhile rival, the British.

The story of the NGUYỄN EMPERORS AND FRENCH IMPERIALISM is a tale of arrogance, stubbornness, and pursuit of an unrealistic policy by the former in the face of an ambitious, prestige-conscious Napoleon III (r. 1852–1870) of the Second Empire.

French IMPERIALISM in Vietnam, which was initially an attempt to defend and protect CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES from persecution, began to feature an economic angle in securing overseas markets for manufactured goods. Furthermore, French prestige and honor were emphasized, particularly during the reign of Napoleon III. After 1860, *MISSION CIVILISATRICE* (“CIVILIZING MISSION”) was an added motive for France’s aggressive attitude toward Vietnam. FRANCIS GARNIER (1839–1873), a naval officer and colonial official, was a vocal advocate of France’s adopting *MISSION CIVILISATRICE*; also influential was Justin Napoleon Samuel Prosper, Count de Chasseloup-Laubat (t. 1859–1867), French minister of marine and colonies in Paris. Therefore the annexation of Vietnam was a foregone conclusion.

The French conquest of Vietnam and Indochina began as follows: Tourane (1858), COCHIN CHINA (1858–1862, 1867), SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY) (1862), CAMBODIA (EIGHTEENTH

TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES) (1863), ANNAM and TONKIN (TONGKING) (1883). By 1887, when COCHIN CHINA, ANNAM, and TONKIN (TONGKING)—modern Vietnam—succumbed to French IMPERIALISM and COLONIALISM, the FRENCH INDOCHINESE UNION (UNION INDOCHINOISE FRANÇAISE) (1887) came into existence. Then in classic gunboat-diplomacy style, AUGUSTE PAVIE (1847–1925), French consul in BANGKOK, forced the Siamese through the PAKNAM INCIDENT (1893) to return the provinces of BATTAMBANG and SIEM REAP to CAMBODIA (EIGHTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES), and to hand over LAOS (NINETEENTH CENTURY TO MID-1990s) to the French. The creation of FRENCH INDOCHINA was completed with COCHIN CHINA as a colony, and protectorates over ANNAM, TONKIN (TONGKING), CAMBODIA (EIGHTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES), and LAOS (NINETEENTH CENTURY TO MID-1990s).

King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910) of Siam had no room for maneuver during the PAKNAM INCIDENT (1893) when faced with a determined AUGUSTE PAVIE (1847–1925). But like his father and predecessor, Mongkut (Rama IV) (r. 1851–1868), Chulalongkorn knew that his priority was the PRESERVATION OF SIAM’S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE. Mongkut had observed the humiliation suffered by IMPERIAL CHINA and the neighboring KONBAUNG DYNASTY (1752–1885) in the face of Western IMPERIALISM and COLONIALISM. The closed-door policy was suicidal in the face of aggressive Western powers bent on exploiting weaknesses and engineering any pretext for imposing COLONIALISM on unreceptive regimes. Therefore Mongkut practiced an open-door policy and at the same time set in motion the process of REFORMS AND MODERNIZATION IN SIAM that were brought to their fruition by Chulalongkorn. Having concluded a cordial and satisfactory treaty agreement with the British government’s representative SIR JOHN BOWRING (1792–1872) in 1855, Mongkut signed similar treaties with other Western nations. Modeled after the treaty with Britain, agreements were made with France

and the United States (1856), Denmark (1858), Portugal (1859), The Netherlands (1860), Prussia (1862) (later with a unified Germany in 1872), and Belgium, Italy, Norway, and Sweden (1868). The treaties in effect opened Siam to Western trade and commerce under favorable terms; a consul was to reside in BANGKOK, and extraterritorial rights were granted to Westerners. Although the agreements largely favored the Western nations, Siam swallowed its pride to ensure the PRESERVATION OF SIAM'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE.

Colonial Southeast Asia

COLONIALISM paid handsome dividends for the metropolitan powers, largely as a result of the exploitation of natural resources (TIN, GOLD, OIL AND PETROLEUM, and timber) and commercial agriculture (ABACA [MANILA HEMP], PEPPER, COFFEE, SUGAR, TOBACCO, RUBBER, and RICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA). EUROPEAN AGENCY HOUSES, Western joint stock companies, Chinese TOWKAY entrepreneurs, CHETTIARS (CHETTYARS), and most of the indigenous elite of Southeast Asia who collaborated with the colonial regimes reaped financial benefits from their capital investments in the mining industry or plantation agriculture.

Toward the close of the nineteenth century, RICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA was increasingly cultivated for the export market in the spacious floodplains and deltas of the mainland—namely, Lower Burma, the Menam central plain, COCHIN CHINA, and the Red River delta. Production of RICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA largely catered to the vast workforce in mines and plantations throughout the region. No other food crop—SAGO, tapioca—could match this staple food of monsoon Asia. The CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA in various corners of the region produced PEPPER and gambier, SUGAR, and RUBBER in smallholdings for the export market. Western capital and enterprise relying largely on immigrant labor managed vast plantations of COFFEE and TOBACCO, and in the early twentieth century, the fortune maker, RUBBER. The peasantry in JAVA was the most hard-pressed in the FORCED DELIVERIES of export crops;

likewise their Burmese, Vietnamese, and Filipino counterparts.

The exploitation of TIN, initially for the greater part of the nineteenth century a Chinese-dominated industry with capital from TOWKAY entrepreneurs and imported labor from southern China, was transformed toward the last quarter of the century. By the first decades of the twentieth century, the TIN industry of the WESTERN MALAY STATES (PERAK, SELANGOR, NEGRI SEMBILAN, AND PAHANG) was a highly capitalized, technology-driven sector monopolized by Western joint stock companies registered in London, Paris, and Amsterdam. Processing and smelting plants and shipping of the ore were in the hands of Western companies. Likewise, the labor-intensive, sluggish mining methods in GOLD exploitation as undertaken by the Chinese were outpaced by Western technical advancement utilizing machinery and huge capital outlays. OIL AND PETROLEUM—whether in THE NETHERLANDS (DUTCH) EAST INDIES, BRITISH BURMA, or BRITISH BORNEO—from the outset was dominated exclusively by Western companies. For instance, the BRUNEI OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY from the outset was a British enterprise. Similarly the mining of iron and coal enjoyed profitable returns by Western enterprise.

Colonial regimes invested in the provision of HIGHWAYS AND RAILWAYS to facilitate the transportation needs of mining and commercial agriculture linking producing areas to the ports for shipment to markets abroad. BRITISH BURMA, BRITISH MALAYA, JAVA, and Vietnam possessed a purpose-built, fairly efficient network of HIGHWAYS AND RAILWAYS. Intraregional shipping was in indigenous hands and those of the Chinese, while Western shipping lines plied international routes to West Asia and Europe. The SUEZ CANAL (1869) immeasurably improved East-West trade and commerce. By the early twentieth century the bane of PIRACY was generally under control.

The complementing equation of Western capital and Asian immigrant labor (namely Chinese and Indian) fueled the exploitation of minerals and development of export agriculture in colonial Southeast Asia. Dire conditions in IMPERIAL CHINA and INDIA during the second half of the nineteenth century, coupled

with a resource-rich but labor-deficient South-east Asia, resulted in the immigration of Chinese and Indians to the region. BRITISH MALAYA in particular was the major recipient of these waves of immigration; the Chinese surge began in the 1840s, whereas mass INDIAN IMMIGRANTS came in the early decades of the twentieth century.

Accompanying economic development, progress and expansion of social services (public health and education) were undertaken by colonial regimes. The promotion of Western medical care, the provision of hospitals in urban centers and clinics in rural areas, and public health campaigns to eradicate malaria, tuberculosis (TB), and other tropical DISEASES AND EPIDEMICS were emphasized to ensure that the workforce was not delinquent in its contribution to the colonial economy. In 1900 the INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH (IMR) was established in KUALA LUMPUR (KL). The colonial period assisted THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. Investments in public health showed apparent results as the mortality rate commenced to dip from the early part of the twentieth century, accelerating from the 1950s. At the same time there was a high increase in the birth rate.

CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES initiated the introduction of Western-style schooling and education in place of TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION. The apparent intention of mission schools was to infuse religious doctrines among their charges. Schools, orphanages, and hospitals were the vehicles of proselytization by the CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES. The UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, reputedly the oldest existing tertiary institution in the Philippines and Asia, began as a boarding novitiate in 1611, then became a university in 1645. The Catholic Christian Brothers and the Sisters of St. Maur established Brothers' schools for boys and convent schools for girls, respectively, throughout BRITISH MALAYA, BRITISH BORNEO, and BRITISH BURMA. Often boarding was provided to further facilitate proselytization. Anglicans and U.S. Methodists emulated the strategy of their Catholic counterparts in the provision of schools and Western-style education, which used one of the Western languages as a medium of instruction: Spanish in the

Philippines and English in the British-dominated territories.

Alongside the mission schools, WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION employing Western languages as the medium of instruction, without the religious aspect, was popular and much sought after by the indigenous elite, including the PERANAKAN community and the BABA NYONYA in the DUTCH EAST INDIES, BRITISH MALAYA, and BRITISH BORNEO. The "Free" in the PENANG FREE SCHOOL (1816) meant that this secular English-language school was open to all pupils irrespective of their ethnicity, creed, or religion. Other similar "free" schools were established in the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1946). Modeled after the British public school, the MALAY COLLEGE, KUALA KANGSAR (MCKK) was purpose-built for the provision of English-language WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION for the sons of Malay sultans and chiefs. Its graduates proceeded to Britain for tertiary studies, to return as middle-ranking officers in the colonial bureaucracy. The clamor for higher education locally led to the establishment in SINGAPORE (1819) of the KING EDWARD VII COLLEGE OF MEDICINE and RAFFLES COLLEGE in 1905 and 1929, respectively.

British colonial officials who combined their administrative duties with scholarly pursuits—the latter out of genuine interest in the MALAYS and the Malay archipelago, in the footsteps of SIR (THOMAS) STAMFORD BINGLEY RAFFLES (1781–1826)—established in 1877 the STRAITS/MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY (MBRAS). It published a scholarly journal that continues to be undertaken from its original base in KUALA LUMPUR (KL). SIR R[ICHARD] O[LAF] WINSTEDT (1878–1966), a colonial officer who had contributed much to MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN EDUCATION, was a staunch supporter of the society and wrote many articles in its journal.

The SARAWAK MUSEUM, established in Kuching in 1870 by the second white raja, SIR CHARLES JOHNSON ANTHONI BROOKE (1829–1917), features the flora and fauna of BORNEO. The collection expanded from the nucleus of exhibits collected by the English naturalist and botanist Alfred Russel

Wallace (1823–1913), who spent a sojourn in Sarawak in the 1860s as a guest of Sir James Brooke (1803–1868), the first white raja. (The WALLACE LINE, a biogeographical divide, was named after this English scientist who formulated the evolutionary theory independently of Charles Robert Darwin [1809–1882].) The SARAWAK MUSEUM published the multidisciplinary *Sarawak Museum Journal* from 1911 to the present.

Under the ETHICAL POLICY (*ETHISCHE POLITIEK*), an expansion of education particularly at the elementary level was featured. In the urban centers, particularly in JAVA and SUMATRA, schools using Dutch as the language of instruction serviced mainly PERANAKAN and the indigenous middle and upper classes. BRITISH BURMA also emphasized English-language WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION, but that policy harmed the Buddhist monastic order. In Burma the SANGHA had for centuries been the custodian of TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION; the latter's displacement by WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION created a vacuum in their ranks. Moreover, the demise of the monarchy that had been the patron of THERAVADA BUDDHISM and the SANGHA, coupled with the colonial government's total indifference, saw members of the SANGHA sliding into disarray; some even transformed into antigovernment activists.

In Vietnam, when the French colonial policy of "assimilation" replaced "association" at the turn of the twentieth century, French education pushed aside the traditional, heavily Sinicized Confucian system of education that gave undue emphasis to history, morality, and the Chinese language. The latter was abolished, and in its place QUỐC NGŨ, the romanization of Vietnamese script, was promoted. French culture and civilization consistent with the objectives of *MISSION CIVILISATRICE* ("CIVILIZING MISSION") dominated the curriculum, with French as the language of instruction. The French-language schools laid emphasis on critical and analytical thought in place of the traditional Confucian rote learning. Such a pedagogical shift had dire consequences for the colonial regime in the long run. Although WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION was introduced and greatly encouraged in COCHIN CHINA, AN-

NAM, and TONKIN (TONGKING), the TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION of the Buddhist monastic school system was retained in the French protectorates of CAMBODIA (EIGHTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES) and LAOS (NINETEENTH CENTURY TO MID-1990s). The SANGHA of both territories remained intact and continued to be the custodian of Buddhist learning and scholarship despite the impotent monarchies.

The immigrant communities of CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA emphasized the importance of book learning and literacy, reflecting upon the traditional social hierarchy of the elite scholar-bureaucrat. Every Chinese, whether a penniless coolie or a wealthy TOWKAY, harbored the passionate desire that the next generation be literate as a means of moving up the social ladder. Therefore Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia set up their schools, often community funded and managed, with curricula, books, and teachers imported from IMPERIAL CHINA. The orthodox Confucian repertoire of learning to mold the Chinese gentleman and scholar-bureaucrat was the basic content of OVERSEAS CHINESE EDUCATION.

Throughout colonial Southeast Asia, government-sponsored, elementary vocational-type education in the vernacular was promoted. Some basic literacy was deemed essential for the indigenous population to understand the dictates of the colonial authorities. Instruction in Western languages was limited to the training of subordinate, clerical personnel to staff the colonial bureaucracy and European capitalist establishments. The fear of creating an army of "B.A.s" without appropriate employment, as was the case in British India, was an ever-present concern among official colonial circles in Southeast Asia.

The REFORMS AND MODERNIZATION IN SIAM were undertaken in earnest under Chulalongkorn. The formulation and successful implementation of this forward policy were largely due to the cooperation, support, and capable assistance of the royal princes, notably PRINCE DEWAWONGSE (1858–1923) and PRINCE DAMRONG (1862–1943), and members of The Bunnag Family. The act of prostration to the monarch was abolished, likewise SLAVERY and com-

pulsory labor. A decree of 1878 forced all nobles to send their sons to Europe for WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION; the royal princes also had their schooling abroad, particularly in Britain. The REFORMS AND MODERNIZATION IN SIAM covered fiscal, administrative (centralization and local administration), judicial, and educational concerns (English-language schools were emphasized). The development of HIGHWAYS AND RAILWAYS was an important component in the modernization program. From 1915, BANGKOK was linked by rail to KUALA LUMPUR (KL). The policy of engaging Western technocrats in various fields, as begun by Mongkut, continued during the reign of Chulalongkorn. Notwithstanding the pursuit of REFORMS AND MODERNIZATION IN SIAM, the traditional institution of absolute monarchy remained unquestioned.

While Chulalongkorn's REFORMS AND MODERNIZATION OF SIAM were being implemented and the ETHICAL POLICY (*ETHISCHE POLITIEK*) was under way in the DUTCH EAST INDIES, BRITISH BURMA was grappling with moving colonial policy from a laissez-faire approach to an active, committed administration beginning in the late 1890s. Dictated by the GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA, as BRITISH BURMA was a part of British India, a British system of administration was adopted after 1826 with priority placed on maintaining law and order. However, after 1897 a more active role was played by the colonial administration, attending to socioeconomic problems and infrastructural development. All vestiges of the traditional administrative structure of the KONBAUNG DYNASTY (1752–1885) were eliminated, retaining only the *thugyis*, or headmen, at the village level. The age-old institution of the HLUTDAW, an advisory council of ministers (*wungyis*) to the monarch, was dispensed with like other traditional officials. British colonial officials assumed the role of tax collectors, magistrates, school inspectors, and welfare officers. Although it was undeniable that the colonial administration was efficient, the cold and impersonal nature of British officers created a conspicuous gulf between ruler and ruled.

British and Indian private enterprise was given a free hand in the economic develop-

ment of BURMA UNDER BRITISH COLONIAL RULE, which by the early decades of the twentieth century had transformed Lower Burma into a major rice-producing and -exporting region of the world and RANGOON (YANGON) into an international port. INDIAN IMMIGRANTS were a cheap and plentiful pool of labor (both skilled and unskilled) that dominated the export sector of the economy. Indian laborers were engaged for public works, while Indian clerks attended to the paperwork of the Western (mostly British) commercial firms. Indians also dominated the medical profession, the railways, and postal and telegraph services. Chinese vied with Indians as shopkeepers, retailers, and middlemen in the profitable rice trade. CHETTIARS (CHETTYARS), the Indian money-lending clan, exploited the ignorance of illiterate indigenous farmers of the British credit facilities that provided much-needed capital for rice cultivation; the farmers pledged their rice fields as collateral on their loans. Crop failures or a dip in rice prices meant the foreclosure of the land by the CHETTIARS (CHETTYARS). Absentee-landlordism, peasant indebtedness, and the phenomenon of the landless indigenous farmer were widespread, especially in Lower Burma where commercial monoculture of rice was the norm.

The absence of the Burmese monarchy meant a loss in patronage of the arts (literature, music, and dance), and consequently cultural decay set in. Together with the moral decline of the *SANGHA*, the sociocultural and religious landscape of BRITISH BURMA appeared desolate and impoverished. Notwithstanding the establishment of the BURMA RESEARCH SOCIETY (1909) to study, preserve, and promote the country's history and sociocultural heritage, it had scant impact on the overall situation.

The plural population phenomenon consequent of BURMA UNDER BRITISH COLONIAL RULE was replicated in BRITISH MALAYA. In fact the bulk of the CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA settled in BRITISH MALAYA, with PENANG (1786), SINGAPORE (1819), and KUALA LUMPUR (KL) possessing overwhelming Chinese majorities. The TIN industry of the WESTERN MALAY STATES (PERAK, SELANGOR, NEGRI SEMBILAN, AND PAHANG) ush-

ered in large waves of Chinese immigrants (mostly Cantonese) from the 1840s. INDIAN IMMIGRANTS started to arrive in huge numbers in the early years of the twentieth century in response to the high demand for labor on the RUBBER estates. Public works in HIGHWAYS AND RAILWAYS also relied heavily on Indian labor. But the socioeconomic problems arising in BRITISH BURMA were largely avoided in BRITISH MALAYA. Nonetheless the emergence of a plural school system—English, Chinese, Malay, Tamil—sowed the unhealthy seeds of separatism among the various ethnic groups.

The PHILIPPINES UNDER SPANISH COLONIAL RULE (ca. 1560s–1898) witnessed the process of HISPANIZATION. SPANISH FRIARS (THE PHILIPPINES) became increasingly influential and repeatedly intervened in administrative matters, consequently straining the FRIAR-SECULAR RELATIONSHIP. The traditional administrative structure of PRE-HISPANIC PHILIPPINES was retained with the *datu* (non-royal chiefs) overseeing village administration and the BARANGAY as the smallest political unit. The *adelantado* (governor-cum-captain-general) headed an oligarchical form of government whereby power lay in a few hands, be it at the level of the BARANGAY, *pueblo* (group of BARANGAY), or *provincia* (province). The CACIQUES (the indigenous class of chieftains), together with Spanish colonial officials and SPANISH FRIARS (THE PHILIPPINES), oppressed and exploited the Filipino peasantry, exacting from them tribute (*vandala*) and labor (*polo*).

The teaching and use of Spanish were restricted; Tagalog, the language of the lowlands of LUZON, was the preferred choice for the indigenous inhabitants. SPANISH FRIARS (THE PHILIPPINES) used Tagalog in their pastoral work.

The Spanish introduced a monetized economy of using silver for transactions of goods and services. Silver from the mines of Spanish Mexico was plentiful. Chinese luxury products such as silk and CERAMICS were bought with silver, and MANILA facilitated this highly lucrative trade. Chinese traders soon became residents, and a quarter in MANILA designated the Parian housed the Chinese community. As elsewhere in MELAKA, PENANG (1786), and BATAVIA (SUNDA KELAPA, JACATRA, DJAKARTA/JAKARTA), MISCE-

GENATION produced a PERANAKAN community in MANILA.

MANILA was an important port of call of the fabulously rich GALLEON TRADE, which operated from 1593 to 1815. Chinese junks brought the highly prized silk and CERAMICS to MANILA. Spanish galleons with cargoes of silver bullion from Mexican and Peruvian mines sailed transpacific from Acapulco to MANILA. The junks, laden with silver, journeyed home, while the galleons returned to Acapulco with Chinese luxury goods. From Mexico the Chinese cargo crossed the Atlantic to Madrid, where it fetched high prices in the European market. The Filipinos were mere bystanders to this profitable transcontinental trade operating from their doorstep.

The Filipino peasant farmers were forced through *polo* labor to work on the government-owned plantations of commercial crops that enriched the colonial regime. The most successful export crops undertaken in the SPANISH PHILIPPINES were TOBACCO, ABACA (MANILA HEMP), and SUGAR.

VIETNAM UNDER FRENCH COLONIAL RULE was administratively structured under a French residential system headed by a governor-general responsible to the ministry of marine and colonies in Paris. A lieutenant governor administered COCHIN CHINA, while a *resident particulier* (senior resident) was appointed for the protectorates of ANNAM and TONKIN (TONGKING), as well as for CAMBODIA (EIGHTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES) and LAOS (NINETEENTH CENTURY TO MID-1990s). French control over the colony of COCHIN CHINA was far more penetrating under direct rule to the village level than in the protectorates, where a less regimented, semiautonomous state of affairs existed. In fact, CAMBODIA UNDER FRENCH COLONIAL RULE was described as a “painless colonialism.” Governor-General Paul Doumer (t. 1897–1902) resolved various difficulties, such as making the colony and protectorates profitable concerns through fiscal and economic reforms. HIGHWAYS AND RAILWAYS linked SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY) to HANOI (THANG-LONG) and the port of Haiphong to Kunming in YUNNAN PROVINCE. French capitalists, the Banque de l’Indochine (Bank of Indochina), and a handful

of Vietnamese landowners benefited from the export-oriented cultivation of rice and RUBBER on vast plantations. The majority of the Vietnamese peasantry suffered from indebtedness; others were landless tenant farmers, and those who drifted to the towns subsisted as lowly paid coolies or seasonal laborers.

A middle class emerged as a result of VIETNAM UNDER FRENCH COLONIAL RULE. The redistribution of land benefited some quarters of the peasantry who prudently leased out their land to tenant farmers, making a small fortune from land rent. Those Vietnamese who possessed a smattering of the French language and who held subordinate, clerical appointments in the lower rungs of the colonial administrative machinery joined the ranks of the middle class. The middle class sent their children to French-language schools to earn the recognized paper qualifications for a civil service appointment. Students who performed well at the *lycées* (French secondary schools) with financial support from their middle-class parents could pursue tertiary education in one of the universities in France. But frustrations set in upon their return home, as they were denied appointments commensurate with their French-earned qualifications. Regardless of the policy of “assimilation,” discrimination in position and salary persisted against the Vietnamese in spite of their French education.

In line with the introduction of WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION, the French established the prestigious ÉCOLE FRANÇAISE D’EXTRÊME-ORIENT as a research center for the study of Asia. Such an elitist institution was meaningless to the illiterate Vietnamese coolie; likewise the modern HIGHWAYS AND RAILWAYS to the rural peasant farmer tilling his rice field of less than an acre. Small sections of the indigenous population of Southeast Asia reaped benefits during the colonial period. The vast majority of the inhabitants, however, suffered under the colonial yoke.

Struggle for Freedom

Protracted struggles resisting the advancement of colonial domination were exemplified in the case of the MOROS in MINDANAO and the southern Philippines against Spanish IMPERIALISM and COLONIALISM. Similarly, the

Dutch fought the long and arduous ACEH (ACHEH) WARS (1873–1903). But once colonial rule had been imposed, the avenues and possibilities for resistance became more restrictive. The ANTI-SPANISH REVOLTS (THE PHILIPPINES) were sporadic, parochial, and isolated—hence their easy suppression; likewise the Vietnamese and Javanese peasant uprisings against French and Dutch colonial authorities, respectively. On the other hand the JAVA WAR (1825–1830), and to a lesser extent the MAT SALLEH REBELLION of 1894 to 1905 and the Saya San Rebellion (1930–1931), revealed the vulnerability and rejection of the established colonial regime.

Oppression, exploitation, discrimination, and downright bullying characterized the colonial experience in Southeast Asia. The peasant farming masses across the region were the hardest hit because of their small, insignificant voice. To be sure, precolonial Southeast Asia was no peasant paradise; on the contrary, indigenous rulers were rapacious, ruthless, and even cruel in the treatment of the masses. But the peasants could move en masse, depriving the potentate of tributes, foodstuffs, and labor if treatment was deemed too harsh. The colonial period, with clear-cut, designated territorial boundaries marked out by the rival Western powers, formed a kind of cage for all inhabitants, restricting freedom of movement from one colonized country to its colonized neighbor. With nowhere to run or hide, the peasantry of Southeast Asia bowed to the demands of their colonial masters.

PEASANT UPRISINGS AND PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA represented bottled-up frustrations, dissatisfactions more often than not economic in origin. Millenarian beliefs of a “golden age,” often translated as a return to precolonial times, propagated by a charismatic individual, brought hope to the weary peasant masses that willingly climbed on the bandwagon. Millenarianism, usually with a religious twist, could invoke a huge following among the people. What is more, a *jihad*, or holy war of Islamic tradition, declared on the infidel colonial regime could swell the ranks of a rebel army.

It would be naive to assume that the various PEASANT UPRISINGS AND PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA were nationalistic expressions. Whether they were

based on economic or religious grounds, or the ushering in of some millenarian golden age, there was scant thought of the idea of a united struggle for a nation-state. Ironically, it was during the colonial period that Southeast Asia possessed fixed political boundaries of nation-states mirroring the European continent. WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION was the second irony. Introduced and promoted by the colonial regimes, the liberal education exposed Southeast Asians to the ideals of the French Revolution (1789–1799): *Liberté, Fraternité, and Egalité* (Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality). These liberal aspirations, combined with the sense of belonging to a nation-state, gradually instilled among the inhabitants of Southeast Asia a nationalistic consciousness. Furthermore, during the colonial period ethnic differentiation became increasingly apparent, thereby creating the identification of ethnicity and country, indigenous and immigrant.

Moreover, NATIONALISM AND INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA received impetus from the international arena. Japan's humiliating defeat of IMPERIAL CHINA and czarist RUSSIA in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), respectively, was a flowering tribute to the grand achievements of Japan's modernization program following the Meiji Restoration (1868). Japan's entry into the GREAT WAR (1914–1918) on the side of Britain and France signaled the equality of an Asian nation with the Western powers. To many Southeast Asians, Japan was a role model for emulation. During the early decades of the twentieth century the tumultuous events on the Chinese mainland were observed closely, thanks to NEWSPAPERS AND MASS MEDIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. DR. SUN YAT-SEN (1866–1925) and his revolutionary ideology *sanmin zhuyi* (Three Principles of the People—namely, Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood) impacted positively on the region. More inspiring were the unfolding of events: the CHINESE REVOLUTION (1911), the collapse of the QING (CHING/MANCHU) DYNASTY (1644–1912), and the emergence of NATIONALIST CHINA. The Russian Bolshevik Revolution (1917) introduced to the world the first nation to embrace COMMUNISM. The ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(TWENTIETH CENTURY) was a wake-up call to Muslims for self-evaluation and making Islam relevant to the modern world.

Within Southeast Asia the Filipino experience in nationalist awakening was inspiring, despite witnessing the closure of one colonial chapter (PHILIPPINES UNDER SPANISH COLONIAL RULE [ca. 1560s–1898]) only to open another colonial era (PHILIPPINES UNDER U.S. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION [1898–1946]). While the various localized ANTI-SPANISH REVOLTS (The PHILIPPINES) had little bearing or significance, recalcitrant behavior on the part of certain Filipinos during the course of the nineteenth century had a great influence on the national psyche, leading eventually to the PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION (1896–1898).

Two events greatly spurred the growth of Filipino nationalism. In 1841, Spanish soldiers massacred hundreds of members of the *Cofradía de San José*, an *indios* (indigenous Filipino) religious organization headed by APOLINARIO DE LA CRUZ (1814/1815–1841). Then, in 1872, the Spanish colonial government ordered the execution by garroting of three prominent Filipino priests accused of conspiracy in the CAVITE MUTINY. But the reformers, rather than the revolutionaries, took the initiative.

Filipino students studying in Europe, including JOSE RIZAL (1861–1896), joined the PROPAGANDA MOVEMENT. Through its newsletter *LA SOLIDARIDAD*, the PROPAGANDA MOVEMENT during the 1880s and 1890s sought to convince the Spanish public and in turn the government in Madrid that reforms were needed in the Philippines. In line with this strategy were the publications of *NOLI ME TANGERE* (1887) AND *EL FILIBUSTERISMO* (1891), two novels by JOSÉ RIZAL (1861–1896) that exposed the defects of the Spanish colonial administration and the frightful and intolerable conditions of the Filipino peasantry. Neither the Spanish public nor the Madrid government gave any serious attention to the PROPAGANDA MOVEMENT.

The revolutionary phase began with the establishment of LA LIGA FILIPINA by JOSÉ RIZAL (1861–1896) in 1892, which aimed at the improvement of the lot of the Filipinos. Shortly thereafter Rizal was arrested and deported to Dapitan, MINDANAO. The suppress-

sion of LA LIGA FILIPINA led to a split: those who remained convinced of the reformist line continued contributing to *LA SOLIDARIDAD*, whereas others joined the revolutionary KATIPUNAN.

Under the leadership of ANDRES BONIFACIO (1863–1897), the KATIPUNAN spearheaded the PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION (1896–1898), which broke out prematurely in August 1896. In December 1896, JOSÉ RIZAL (1861–1896) was executed by firing squad, accused of conspiring in the uprising. In death Rizal became even more potent in inspiring the nationalist struggle for independence.

Rivalry within the KATIPUNAN between ANDRES BONIFACIO (1863–1897) and EMILIO AGUINALDO (1869–1964) resulted in the execution of the former under orders from the latter. In January 1899 the revolutionary government declared the Philippines an independent republic with a written constitution. APOLINARIO MABINI (1864–1903) was the prime composer of the constitution.

While the PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION (1896–1898) was under way, the SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898) broke out. COMMODORE GEORGE DEWEY (1837–1917) destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. The Americans supported EMILIO AGUINALDO (1869–1964) in his revolutionary struggle. With better arms supplied by their U.S. ally and support from all strata of Filipino society, the revolutionaries managed to bring most of LUZON under their control. In June 1898 the revolutionary government confidently declared the Philippines independent from Spain. Allowing the Americans to take MANILA, however, EMILIO AGUINALDO (1869–1964) and his followers were cheated of their freedom. The SPANISH-AMERICAN TREATY OF PARIS (1898) ceded the sovereignty of the Philippines from Spanish hands to the United States.

The PHILIPPINE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1899–1902) was basically a guerrilla war fought between a bitter and betrayed EMILIO AGUINALDO (1869–1964) and his revolutionary militia and the disciplined, well-equipped army of the United States. The Americans were determined to secure the Philippines, invoking a MANIFEST DESTINY. Following the surrender of EMILIO

AGUINALDO (1869–1964), the struggle against the United States rapidly subsided.

The PHILIPPINES UNDER U.S. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION (1900–1941) witnessed CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES (1900–1941), preparing the Filipinos and the country for self-rule and eventual independence. The pace of progress seesawed between U.S. Republican and Democrat administrations. U.S. administrators who played prominent roles in preparing the country for self-government were WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT (1857–1930) and FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON (1873–1957). On the Filipino side MANUEL LUIS QUEZON (1878–1944) and SERGIO OSMENA SR. (1878–1961) were leading figures. FILIPINIZATION of the administration was carried out. In the economic field, the Filipinos were given preferential access to U.S. markets and benefited from this closer relationship, often referred to enviously as the PHILIPPINES–U.S. “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP,” which also extended to the political sphere. Landmark legislation, the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, established the Commonwealth of the Philippines in 1935, and within a decade the Philippines would be granted independence. But the JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (1941–1945) disrupted the independence timetable of the Philippines.

BURMA UNDER BRITISH COLONIAL RULE nurtured anti-British and anti-Indian feelings among the indigenous Burmese population, the former resented as colonial political masters and the latter as economic oppressors. Burmese nationalistic consciousness manifested in political, economic, and religious terms all targeted toward the British colonial administration at RANGOON.

The early expression of Burmese nationalism was in the cultural field. Among the organizations aimed at resuscitating Buddhist traditions and cultural heritage were the YOUNG MEN’S BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION (YMBA) (1906) and the BURMA RESEARCH SOCIETY (1909).

THE GREAT WAR (1914–1918), which disrupted and curtailed shipping, exacerbated the dire situation of the Burmese peasantry with the halt to the export of rice, the staple income earner. This economic disaster added to

the bitterness of the Burmese toward the colonial regime, as well as toward the CHETTIARS (CHETTYARS) and Indian absentee landlords. But ironically, the Burmese gained inspiration from the nationalist movement of “Mahatma” Gandhi (1869–1948), particularly the potency of “civil disobedience,” boycotts, and strikes. On the other hand, members of the dispirited *SANGHA* led violent mobs in unruly antigovernment demonstrations.

From the 1920s, aggressive, violent, and politically motivated nationalist activities became the norm. The opening of the UNIVERSITY OF RANGOON in 1920 witnessed a massive student strike objecting to colonial education policy. As BRITISH BURMA was considered a part of INDIA, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA (1900–1941) mirrored those of the subcontinent. In 1923 the GENERAL COUNCIL OF BURMESE ASSOCIATIONS (GCBA) (1920) opposed through boycott and violence the implementation of dyarchy government in the country. The GREAT DEPRESSION (1929–1931) devastated the lives of the Burmese peasantry, while rice stocks stood idle in the RANGOON (YANGON) docks, as all export shipments were canceled owing to the absence of buyers. The Hsaya San Rebellion (1930–1931) capitalized on the dire economic situation in garnering support that swelled its rebel ranks. In attempting a monarchical restoration, the uprising injected a large dose of Burmese pride into their traditional institutions, further boosting nationalistic consciousness. DR. BA MAW (b. 1893) gained prominence as Hsaya San’s defense attorney.

From the 1930s, Burmese nationalists began to append THAKIN to their names to declare that they and not the British were the rightful masters in Burma. A constitution was granted in 1935. In 1937, Burma was separated from INDIA and came directly under the British Parliament in London. A Westminster-style parliamentary government was introduced with DR. BA MAW (b. 1893) as prime minister. He had the support of the THAKIN, the most prominent being AUNG SAN (1915–1947). Not satisfied with the CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA (1900–1941), DR. BA MAW (b. 1893) and the THAKIN turned to Japan for assistance.

Indonesian nationalism aimed at political independence as the ultimate goal but also strove

for socioeconomic reforms to improve the livelihood and welfare of the population. The *PRIYAYI*, Java’s traditional aristocratic-bureaucratic elite, had benefited from the fruits of Dutch colonialism, serving as subordinate administrators alongside Dutch officials; they now began to reevaluate their role. Younger members of the *PRIYAYI*, products of Dutch-language schools and higher education, increasingly rejected appointments in the lower rungs of the colonial bureaucracy mainly as clerical staff, positions once held by their grandfathers and fathers. Instead, many aspired to professional careers as doctors, engineers, and schoolteachers, but there were few such openings under colonial rule. Nevertheless, having themselves benefited from WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION, they argued for the wider provision of Dutch-language schools and higher educational institutions accessible to all Indonesians and not only the privileged few. WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION was seen as the passport to freedom, as well as a means of improving their socioeconomic status.

RADEN AJENG KARTINI (1879–1904), a Javanese princess of the royal family of Japara and reputedly the first Indonesian feminist, promoted female education as a means of emancipation. Using a curriculum of Dutch and local subject matter, she established “Kartini Schools” throughout JAVA. Kartini was an inspiration to the early awakening of Indonesian nationalistic consciousness. Dr. Wahidin Soedirohoesodo, who had assisted Kartini in her educational crusade, established BOEDI OETAMA (BUDI UTOMO) (1908). Basically an intellectual, *PRIYAYI*-dominated organization, it attempted a cultural renaissance of Javanese aristocratic culture and a synthesis of Asian and European culture. At the same time, BOEDI OETAMA (BUDI UTOMO) (1908) promoted the spread of WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION.

Within a short period, the Javanese-based, elitist *PRIYAYI* organization that had education and sociocultural issues as its priority was taken over as a politicized organization with mass support. In the early part of this political phase in Indonesian nationalism, socioeconomic and religious aspirations were prominent.

SAREKAT ISLAM (1912), originating with Sarekat Dagang Islam (1909), promoted the economic progress of Indonesians. Its highly respected leader, HAJI OEMAR SAID

TJOKROAMINOTO (1882–1934), relied effectively on Islam as the rallying point for garnering members and supporters numbering in the thousands, with branches throughout JAVA and beyond. In 1916 cries for self-government were heard, alarming the Dutch colonial government. Fearing a concerted challenge, the Dutch denied recognition of a central body of SAREKAT ISLAM (1912), instead giving official sanction only to its branches. Even more demanding was the PERANAKAN National Indische Partij (National Indies Party) (1912), which argued for socioeconomic equality and political independence. Highly vocal, the leaders of the Indische Partij demanded that the DUTCH EAST INDIES belong to those who had permanently settled and made it their home.

In response to the clamor from various quarters for a say in the administration, as well as the overall decentralization and democratization process under the ETHICAL POLICY (*ETHISCHE POLITIEK*), the VOLKSRAAD (PEOPLE'S COUNCIL) (1918–1942) was constituted. The membership of this unicameral parliament was along ethnic lines—namely, Dutch, Indonesians, and “foreign Orientals” (usually Chinese). The Indonesian members tended to be conservative, and not highly nationalistic. HAJI AGUS SALIM (1884–1954) was the representative of SAREKAT ISLAM (1912) between 1921 and 1924. Despite moving from an advisory role to acquiring limited legislative powers in the mid-1920s, and even sanctioning the budget in the early 1930s, the VOLKSRAAD (PEOPLE'S COUNCIL) (1918–1942) did not satiate nationalist aspirations for greater command of their destiny.

Attending to the challenges of the ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (TWENTIETH CENTURY), religious parties such as MUHAMMADIYAH and NAHDATUL ULAMA emerged. Nonpolitical and modernist in outlook, the MUHAMMADIYAH, established in 1912, aimed at improving the welfare and religiosity of the Muslim community through Islamic-based education and social programs. Defending the orthodox view, NAHDATUL ULAMA, set up in 1926, was an influential bastion of traditionalism. Opposing the modernist emphasis on the sole authority of the Qur'an and Hadiths, the traditionalists relied on the teaching authority

of the *ulama* (Islamic scholars) and their diversity of thought. NAHDATUL ULAMA propagated their thought through the *KIAI* (Islamic teachers) and their *pesantren* (religious boarding schools). Members of NAHDATUL ULAMA undertook social welfare work in eastern rural JAVA. MUHAMMADIYAH and NAHDATUL ULAMA, each in its own sphere of influence—cities and urban areas and rural communities, respectively—brought about an awakening and pride in Islam vis-à-vis the Protestant Dutch colonial masters.

Alongside the Islamic resurgence, KEBATINAN MOVEMENTS emerged in the early 1900s. Their members practiced indigenous Javanese ancestral culture that predated Hindu-Buddhist influences. It was a wholly indigenous spiritual movement that gave Indonesians—the Javanese in particular—a sense of identity and pride in their ancient culture. Rejecting both Western and Islamic modernist influences was the TAMAN SISWA (1922). A homegrown educational association, its string of schools focused on promoting indigenous (mainly Javanese) social values and cultural heritage. The contribution of TAMAN SISWA (1922) to the nationalist cause was in its inculcation of an Indonesian sociocultural identity that made the people proud to be “Indonesian.”

PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920) was by far the most radical nationalist movement, with COMMUNISM as its ideological engine. SEMAOEN (SEMAUN) (1899–1971) and IBRAHIM DATUK TAN MALAKA (1897?–1949), both communists who became leaders of PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) 1920, attempted to infiltrate and seize control of SAREKAT ISLAM (1912). They, however, failed. Within a short time of its emergence, the Dutch colonial government proscribed the party, forcing PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920) to operate underground for the greater part of its existence throughout the 1920s. Full political independence, adopting COMMUNISM as the national ideology, was the ultimate objective of the PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920), which garnered the bulk of support from the urban proletariat and some peasantry. But PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920) tended to portray an internationalist outlook rather than an Indonesian nationalistic struggle. The communists

swerved the nationalist movement into revolutionary, militant gear.

Having captured large sections of mostly urban proletariat, PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920) launched a series of strikes between 1923 and 1926 as a strategy to cripple the Indonesian economy and bring down the Dutch colonial government. Into this orchestrated chaos, the communists would seize control of the country and establish a communist regime under its leadership. In an ambitious plan in 1926, a full-scale revolution erupted in SUMATRA and BANTEN (BANTAM).

Repression was swift and harsh throughout the archipelago. Thousands were arrested and faced imprisonment; suspected leaders and hard-core elements were deported to internment camps in Papua New Guinea. The Dutch colonial government effectively crushed the communists, and PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920) was dealt a severe blow that it never recovered from during the remainder of Dutch rule.

Like their Filipino counterparts abroad, Indonesian students studying in The Netherlands organized into the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Union), which demanded outright independence. Although formed in 1922, it came into prominence only in 1927, after the failed communist putsch. Returned students set up study clubs as a means of organizing support. The major contribution of the Perhimpunan Indonesia was in its emphasis on Indonesian independence above all other concerns.

In this spirit, SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970), who was a member of the Bandung study club, together with others, founded the PERSERIKATAN NASIONAL INDONESIA (PNI) (1927). Its strategy was to unite all Indonesians under the umbrella of secular nationalism and to achieve independence through a policy of noncooperation with the colonial authorities. The fiery speeches of the gifted SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) were like a beacon, attracting huge popular support from the masses. The PNI's unity plan attained some success in the formation of Permuafakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (Union of National Political Associations of Indonesia). But the arrest of the charismatic SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) in late 1929 doomed the PNI, which folded in 1931.

MINANGKABAU nationalists such as SUTAN SJAHRIR (1909–1966) and MOHAMMAD HATTA (1902–1980) formed the socialist Club Pendidekan Nasional Indonesia in 1932, aimed at educating the people in nationalist principles. For their efforts, both were deported to Papua New Guinea in 1934.

AMIR SJARIFUDDIN (1907–1948), together with R. M. Sartono, formed Partai Indonesia (Partindo) in 1931. Its objectives mirrored those of the PNI. Upon release from prison in 1931, SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) joined Partai Indonesia (Partindo) and was made its chairman. Thanks to his inspiring speeches, membership rapidly surged and branches were set up in most urban centers of JAVA. Realizing the potential danger that SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) posed, the Dutch authorities had him arrested in 1933. The next time he stepped out of prison was to witness the raising of the Japanese *hinomaru* (red rising sun against a white background, the flag of Imperial Japan) over Indonesia.

The colonial Dutch government had by 1935 silenced all dissenting voices to its rule. The term “INDONESIA” was proscribed, as its increasingly subversive use among nationalists crystallized their aspirations of an independent, multiethnic polity to replace the DUTCH EAST INDIES. Organizations that then survived were those focusing on social and Islamic concerns (MUHAMMADIYAH and NAHDATUL ULAMA) or educational issues (TAMAN SISWA [1922]). Even the mild proposal of the SOETARDJO PETITION (1936) requesting a discussion of the constitutional position of Indonesia was given an outright rejection. However, when a similar proposal was voiced in the WIWOHO RESOLUTION (1940), a commission of inquiry was initiated. Then the Pacific War (1941–1945) broke out.

VIETNAM UNDER FRENCH COLONIAL RULE sparked opposition that initially came from members of the NGUYỄN DYNASTY (1802–1945) and the scholar-gentry class, which primarily sought the restoration of the traditional rule of the emperor; later, from the 1920s, it came from moderate intellectuals, and throughout the 1930s, radical revolutionaries led by the communists. The French colonial administration eliminated the traditional group with ease and brushed aside reform-minded Vietnamese intellectuals. Repressive

offensives were launched against the communists but failed to extinguish their influence.

CAN VUONG (AID THE KING) MOVEMENT was an attempt to garner support for the restoration of the young emperor Hàm-Nghi, who had fled in 1885. It invoked patriotism, attracting peasant support mainly from the provinces of ANNAM—Nghe An, Hà Tĩnh, and Thanh Hóa. By 1897 French forces had snuffed out those uprisings that took the form of guerrilla-style opposition. The mandarin class at the beginning of the twentieth century was in despair, having witnessed the failure of opposition and the impotence of the monarchy in the face of French IMPERIALISM and COLONIALISM. A feeling of uselessness and hopelessness became pervasive among the scholar-gentry class, and also trickled down to the peasantry, becoming associated with the term *MAT NUOC* (LOSING ONE'S COUNTRY). It was coined by the Vietnamese intellectual PHAN BÔI CHÂU (1867–1940), who in his essays argued that if the Vietnamese did not improve themselves, the result would be annihilation by the French. It was therefore imperative to set in motion a sociopolitical revolution that was aimed not only at rejecting French rule but also at rejuvenating Vietnamese society. PHAN BÔI CHÂU (1867–1940) looked to emulate Japan, which had succeeded marvelously in modernization (equated with Westernization) but at the same time had retained much of Japanese tradition and culture. He journeyed to Japan to seek assistance; several Vietnamese students followed in his footsteps.

PHAN CHAU TRINH (1872–1926) agreed that revitalizing Vietnamese society was essential to unshackle the country from foreign rule. To him the monarchical system was outdated; he firmly advocated Western republicanism. The strategy he proposed was to embark on reforms and the process of modernization, based on the Western model. The caveat, however, was not to rely exclusively on foreign assistance, as advocated by his fellow reform-minded activists. At the same time he opposed the mindset that considered the force of arms as the only way of attaining freedom from COLONIALISM. Instead he favored moderate means and proposed that a series of reforms be gradually introduced into the French colonial system in Vietnam. A keen supporter of *Đông*

Kinh Nghia Thuc (Free School of the Eastern Capital [Hanoi] for the Just Cause), a patriotic educational organization that utilized *QUỐC NGŨ* (romanized script of the Vietnamese language) in teaching Western science and technology, he fervently believed this approach would provide the much-needed sociopolitical change.

The first Vietnamese political organization, Viet Nam Quang Phuc Hoi (Association for the Restoration of Vietnam), the brainchild of PHAN BÔI CHÂU (1867–1940), was clandestinely and illegally established in 1913. Within a short time, the French colonial authorities suppressed it and imprisoned its founder.

Advocates of the line of thought of PHAN CHAU TRINH (1872–1926) established political organizations that cooperated with the French colonial administration—namely, the Constitutional Party (1923) and the Viet Nam People's Progressive Party (1926). Little, however, was achieved. He was enthroned as the Nguyễn emperor BẢO ĐAI (VĨNH THỤY) (1913–1997) in 1926; his return in 1932 following studies in France saw the young monarch attempting to effect reforms and modernization from the imperial court at HUE. Proposals for greater autonomy and for self-government mooted by BẢO ĐAI (VĨNH THỤY) (1913–1997) were flatly rejected by the French.

Failure of the moderate, collaborationist group led to the ascendancy of radical nationalists that favored revolutionary and militant methods in the struggle for freedom. Although the CAO DAI was a religious organization, its adherents were reactionaries that sought the overthrow of the French and the restoration of Prince Cuong De. But a more formidable revolutionary force was the VIET NAM QUOC DAN DANG (VNQDD) (VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PARTY). Modeled on the KUOMINTANG (KMT) of DR. SUN YAT-SEN (1866–1925), this revolutionary organization sought the overthrow of the French colonial regime and its replacement with a Chinese-style republican government. The clandestinely established VNQDD built up a following from a cross section of Vietnamese society: the landed gentry, civil servants, soldiers, schoolteachers, and students. But a botched assassination of French officials and betrayal led to the ruthless suppression of this

foremost noncommunist revolutionary organization in 1930.

Into this vacuum came the communists under the leadership of HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969). He established the INDOCHINA COMMUNIST PARTY (JUNE 1929), which later was renamed the VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY (VCP) in 1930. ANNAM and especially TONKIN (TONGKING) were communist strongholds. The communists were equally successful in organizing the urban proletariat and the rural peasantry. The NGHE TINH SOVIETS (1930–1931) were set up in the provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh in ANNAM, representing model communist states. Terrorist tactics were employed in their attempt to cripple the economy. As with all opposition and subversive activities, the French colonial administration swung into swift and merciless repression.

From 1936 the communists in COCHIN CHINA, in accordance with a COMINTERN directive, adopted a “united front” strategy against fascism. The Popular Front government (t. 1936–1937) of Leon Blum (1872–1950) provided a conducive environment for the Vietnamese communists to operate in—but not so much anticolonialist as anti-Fascist. But toward the late 1930s, the French colonial authorities took repressive action against the communists consequent of an uprising.

In the face of an uncompromising French colonial government in Vietnam and harsh suppression of any semblance of challenge, the Vietnamese nationalist struggle, from reformers to revolutionaries, faced a dead end. The changing geopolitical situation ushered in by the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945) offered a new dawn for Vietnamese patriots of various persuasions.

Anticolonial revolts in BRITISH BORNEO and BRITISH MALAYA in the nineteenth century were generally localized though protracted, offering little threat to the respective colonial regimes. RENTAP, the Iban warrior who opposed the rule of the white raja, staged a stout resistance that finally ended with the storming of his jungle fort atop a hill in 1857. He and some of his followers apparently escaped into the jungle in the area of the headwaters of the Skrang, Katibas, and Kanowit Rivers. His ability to rally supporters in opposition to Brooke rule made him a hero of the

upriver IBANS. RENTAP represented a struggle against change to the traditional Iban way of life instituted by Rajah Brooke’s regime. Likewise, the decade-long MAT SALLEH REBELLION against the administration of the BRITISH NORTH BORNEO CHARTERED COMPANY (1881–1946) between 1894 and 1905 resembled a traditional type of opposition to change from without.

The assassination of the British resident to Perak, J. W. W. BIRCH (1826–1875), at the hands of local Malay chiefs led by the Maharaja Lela in November 1875 was a response to the loss of traditional status and privileges of the Malay elite. Haste to effect reforms and introduce changes to the traditional administrative structure where the Malay chiefs were major players brought the British resident to a head-on collision with the chiefs. Local opposition in PAHANG in the late 1880s was instigated by chiefs who had lost political power, social status and prestige, and economic privileges. TO’ JANGGUT (1853–1915), who led a brief uprising in Kelantan in 1915, fought for the return of the traditional way of life; the introduction of a new land tax provoked the rebellion.

The foregoing opposition to the implementation of colonial rule had scant hint of a nationalistic struggle. Neither was any millenarian or religious element present. Basically, the resistance resembled the response of traditional societies to change from without, resulting in the loss of freedom, power, status, and privileges by certain quarters and resort to arms and violence.

Malay nationalism began to manifest during the early decades of the twentieth century; the struggle was undertaken by three groups, each with its own agenda—namely, Muslim reformists, secular revolutionaries, and English-educated nationalists. SYED SHAYKH AL-HADY (1867?–1934), of Arab descent, was a reformist who maintained that the basic doctrines of Islam were in tune with modern, secular knowledge such as science and constitutional law. Female education was also stressed. Representing the *Kaum Muda* (modernist) against the *Kaum Tua* (traditionalists), he argued for the benefits of modern secular education, including the teaching of English to complement Islamic schooling, which emphasized religious doctrines. Through the influential *Al-Imam*, SYED SHAYKH AL-HADY (1867?–

1934) and his fellow reformists sought to win over the Malays to their progressive line of thought, which had some measure of success among urban Malays in the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1946). The Arab reformists, despite having scant influence over the bulk of the Malay population in the peninsular Malay States, caused small ripples in Malay consciousness.

The formation of the KESATUAN MELAYU MUDA (KMM) (YOUNG MALAY UNION) in 1938 under the presidency of IBRAHIM YAACOB (1911–1979) galvanized the aspirations of the Malay-educated revolutionary group. It drew most of its membership from alumni of the SULTAN IDRIS TRAINING COLLEGE (SITC) and civil servants; the main objective was to overthrow the British colonial regime, including the Malay sultanates, and thereafter effect union with neighboring Indonesia. This revolutionary group failed to gain support from the conservative and parochial Malay peasantry. With only a handful of members, the KESATUAN MELAYU MUDA (KMM) (YOUNG MALAY UNION) awaited the entry of Japanese forces into BRITISH MALAYA at the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945).

English-educated Malay nationalists were particularly conscious of Malay rights, special privileges, and unity of the community vis-à-vis other communal groups—namely, the British, Chinese, ARABS, and Indians. Alien domination in all sectors of the economy was apparent in the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1946), and the clamor of the Chinese for equal rights as citizens of BRITISH MALAYA aroused the members of this group, who were from the aristocracy and high-ranking civil servants. Notwithstanding their stance in protecting Malay rights, the English-educated Malay nationalists were staunchly loyal to Britain, and nothing in their numerous discourses in the Malay press, in periodicals, or in speeches at the various Malay associations and clubs gave any hint of their questioning the presence of the British and colonial rule. They were to play prominent roles in the negotiations toward independence in the post-1945 period.

VAJIRAVUDH (RAMA VI) (r. 1910–1925) ascended the throne as the sixth ruler of the Chakri line of absolute monarchs. Even more Westernized in outlook than his father, Chula-

longkorn, as a result of his British education, his reign achieved remarkable success. In the field of education, recognized as an important component in the modernization process, VAJIRAVUDH (RAMA VI) (r. 1910–1925) instituted compulsory elementary education and the establishment of CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY in 1917. His reign saw an abrogation of extraterritoriality, acceded to by his successors so as to avoid any pretexts that might be used by the Western powers to compromise Siam's political independence. It was a significant diplomatic coup, as now the kingdom of Siam was in theory accorded equal standing with the Western powers.

“THE JEWS OF THE ORIENT,” penned by VAJIRAVUDH (RAMA VI) (r. 1910–1925), offered a caveat to his fellow countrymen regarding the threat posed by the immigrant Chinese in the kingdom. This article, published in mid-1914, compared the Chinese to the Jews of Europe. The Chinese, he wrote, possessed three adverse characteristics: nonassimilation in their host society, superiority of attitude and contempt toward non-Chinese, and a highly mercenary approach to business. “THE JEWS OF THE ORIENT” cast aspersions on the Chinese community in Siam, and that prejudicial attitude persisted for a long time.

The extravagance, the nepotism, and the controversial lifestyle of VAJIRAVUDH (RAMA VI) (r. 1910–1925) were shortfalls that marred a remarkable reign. “THE JEWS OF THE ORIENT” stirred a national consciousness among the indigenous T'AIS.

PRAJADHIPOK (RAMA VII) (r. 1925–1935) inherited a serious deficit in the royal treasury and a contempt for the throne among the kingdom's emerging middle class. This Anglo-French-educated monarch created a supreme council of state to temper the excesses of absolutism by devolving power to a larger group of political leaders. All major decisions had to be a consensus among the monarch and all five members of the council, thus reducing arbitrariness and favoritism. The GREAT DEPRESSION (1929–1931), which hit Siam in 1930, seriously affecting rice, the major export earner, forced the government to implement drastic budgetary cuts to alleviate the fiscal situation. Then in 1932 a major crisis with long-term impact for the political landscape broke out.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL (BLOODLESS) REVOLUTION (1932) (THAILAND) ended 150 years of Chakri absolute monarchy. Within a brief three hours, the People's Party, comprising junior military officers and civilians, engineered a coup and instituted a constitutional monarchy. PRIDI PHANOMYONG (1900–1983), a law instructor at CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY and a prime coup plotter, set about to draft a constitution based on the principle of popular sovereignty. The seeds of this revolution were sown toward the end of Chulalongkorn's reign, ironically as a result of the successes attained in the REFORMS AND MODERNIZATION IN SIAM. Social equality and justice were, however, overlooked in the modernization program, and princes and members of the nobility continued to wield power and influence. Centralization of the administration concentrated all power in the throne and the bureaucracy at BANGKOK. Republicanism then became an inviting alternative to the educated of common birth who held subordinate appointments in the military and civil administration. Little headway could be achieved during the reigns of Chulalongkorn and VAJIRAVUDH (RAMA VI) (r. 1910–1925). But the besieged reign of PRAJADHIPOK (RAMA VII) (r. 1925–1935), appearing always on the defensive, seemed the opportune time to launch the CONSTITUTIONAL (BLOODLESS) REVOLUTION (1932) (THAILAND).

The first constitutional government established THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY in 1934 as the second public university aimed at teaching law and politics. The brainchild of PRIDI PHANOMYONG (1900–1983), THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY was to embody the future of a democratic country, the engine of democratic thought and institutions for the people.

The success of the CONSTITUTIONAL (BLOODLESS) REVOLUTION (1932) (THAILAND) brought to the fore FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964), who was credited with bringing the military into politics. (MILITARY AND POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA became a major theme in post-1945 developments.) As a member of the People's Party and the leading military officer in the

government, he further established his position following the failed Boworadet Rebellion of October 1933, when royalist-conservative elements attempted to overthrow the constitutional government. His first premiership (t. December 1938–July 1944) covered most of the period of the Pacific War (1941–1945). In June 1939 the kingdom of Siam became the kingdom of Thailand, emphasizing the nation as the "Land of the Free," the only country that retained its political independence while the rest of the neighboring territories in Southeast Asia were under Western colonial rule. In his characteristic authoritative style, FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964) attempted to instill a Thai identity and consciousness through language, appearance and mannerism, and a strong patriotic zeal and nationalism. His attitude and relations with the monarchy were at best lukewarm, which subsequently hurt his political survival. FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964) brought Thailand into the Pacific War (1941–1945) as an ally of Imperial Japan.

Wars and Conflicts

The first half of the 1940s was dominated by the Pacific War (1941–1945) and the JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (1941–1945). The second half of the decade witnessed the DECOLONIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, beginning with the Philippines (1946), Burma (1948), and Indonesia (1949). The following decade saw the attainment of independence for Cambodia (1953), Laos (1953), Vietnam (1954), and BRITISH MALAYA (1957). Some achieved their freedom peacefully, while others paid a high price in blood and tears; still others had a long, torturous path to freedom. Japanese fascism reigned over Southeast Asia from 1941, and after 1945 a battle for the "hearts and minds" between the Western democracies and the communist bloc ensued. Virtually all of Southeast Asia became a set piece in the COLD WAR. The two decades of the mid-twentieth century were filled with modern wars and conflicts, some extending to the last quarter of the century.

Prior to the military push to the south in late 1941, there was already a peaceful migration of

Japanese to Southeast Asia, beginning with the Meiji period (1868–1910). The early immigrants were peasant farmers followed by professionals (doctors, dentists), photographers, barbers, and prostitutes. The traffic of young women and girls from poor peasant families to supply inmates of brothels in the urban centers of Southeast Asia was a common phenomenon from the late nineteenth century. Japanese investment in mineral extraction and commercial agriculture (ABACA [MANILA HEMP], RUBBER) began to flow into the region in the early twentieth century. Cordial relations existed between JAPAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (PRE-1941). Western colonial regimes across the region welcomed Japanese immigrants and investments. The Japanese community largely kept to themselves and mostly assumed a low profile. Indigenous Southeast Asians viewed Japan and the Japanese with admiration and respect, an Asian model to emulate. The CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA were the only group who harbored reservations about the Japanese.

Japan's phenomenal achievement in modernization and proven military prowess over IMPERIAL CHINA (1894–1895) and Tsarist Russia (1904–1905) made it inclined to assume the leadership role over all of Asia. Besides providing a safe haven and providing military training and higher studies for nationalists from IMPERIAL CHINA, Japan also accommodated nationalists from Vietnam, Burma, and other Southeast Asian countries.

Southeast Asia, as the supplier of raw materials (OIL AND PETROLEUM, RUBBER, TIN, rice and other foodstuffs) to Japan and a market for its manufactured goods (mainly textiles), was economically vital. When denied access to the region by the Anglo-Americans in the late 1930s, Japan adopted the forward policy of annexing Southeast Asia. While the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in Hawai'i was being crippled on 8 December 1941, simultaneous amphibious landings of Japanese troops were under way in HONG KONG and on the beaches of Kota Bahru on the northeastern coast of the Malay Peninsula. Swift landings in other key points throughout Southeast Asia followed thereafter. MANILA was occupied on 2 January 1942, and in less than three months following the Kota Bahru landings, "FORTRESS SINGAPORE" surrendered to GENERAL

YAMASHITA TOMOYUKI (1885–1946), dubbed the Tiger of Malaya, on 15 February 1942. By early March BATAVIA (SUNDA KELAPA, JACATRA, DJAKARTA/JAKARTA) and RANGOON (YANGON) had fallen. The military takeover of all of Southeast Asia was accomplished by the end of May 1942.

The situation in FRENCH INDOCHINA and Thailand was slightly different from that in the rest of Southeast Asia. Prior to hostilities, Japan, through arrangement with the French Vichy regime, had occupied the northern part of Indochina on 23 September 1940 and the southern portion on 29 July 1941. The government of FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964) (t. December 1938–July 1944) concluded the Pact of Alliance with Japan on 11 December 1941, which effectively sanctioned the de facto occupation of Thailand.

The overall military command of the Philippines was entrusted to U.S. GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR (1880–1964). The swift Japanese offensive launched from their base in occupied Vietnam caught the U.S. forces unprepared, and they began to retreat to the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor. Lacking naval support and with the destruction of Clark Field depriving them of air support, there was little hope for the besieged Americans. Bataan surrendered on 9 April 1942, followed a month later by Corregidor on 6 May. The BATAAN DEATH MARCH consumed the lives of more than 10,000 U.S. and Filipino prisoners of war during the 120-kilometer, nine-day ordeal in early April 1942, their deaths brought about by malnutrition, disease, harsh treatment, and outright murder.

Prior to the surrender some U.S. and Filipino soldiers had fled to the jungles and highlands, where they conducted a guerrilla war against the Japanese. LUIS TARUC (1913–) organized the HUKBALAHAP (HUKBO NG BAYAN LABAN SA HAPON) (PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY) (1942), an anti-Japanese guerrilla band of peasant irregulars that operated in Central Luzon. Its strategy was aimed at depriving the enemy of food supplies and other essential resources and eliminating collaborators, mainly members of the landowning class and those who served in the constabulary that cooperated with the Japanese. Al-

though the core members of the HUKBALAHAP (HUKBO NG BAYAN LABAN SA HAPON) (PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY) (1942) were communists, many non-communists joined its struggle. The guerrillas could readily tap the peasantry for foodstuffs and information on enemy movements in the locality. While undertaking efforts at sabotaging the Japanese, LUIS TARUC (1913–) implemented land reforms and distributed land to the landless peasants, a classic communist strategy of winning over the peasantry to their cause.

The United States had promised independence to the Philippines scheduled for 4 July 1946. Therefore, despite the Japanese offer of an earlier date of independence if the Filipinos cooperated, there was little enthusiasm. However, although GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR (1880–1964) had encouraged the people to wage guerrilla warfare prior to his return, Commonwealth of the Philippines president MANUEL LUIS QUEZON (1878–1944) urged his fellow countrymen, in particular the civil servants, to remain at their posts and accommodate the Japanese in order to lessen the burden of the common people. Taking this cue, many Filipino civil servants served in the wartime regime under Japanese superiors.

In October 1943 the Japanese declared the Philippines independent, with JOSE PACIANO LAUREL (1891–1959) as president overseeing a Republic of the Philippines with executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Nonetheless no one was the least convinced of Japanese sincerity; what was declared and set up was a “hollow,” independent republic in which the Japanese continued to hold the reins of power.

The greatest irony was that the successes gained by the Anglo-American forces in the Pacific theater in destroying Japanese naval power and eliminating most of its merchant marine fleet led to the disruption and almost total halt of essential goods to the civilian population of Southeast Asia after 1944. In the Philippines starvation was rife, despite rationing. The countryside faced harsh reprisals consequent of Japanese offensives against the HUKBALAHAP (HUKBO NG BAYAN LABAN SA HAPON) (PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY) (1942) and other resistance groups.

Preparedness in gathering reliable intelligence of British defense arrangements, coupled with the high morale of Japanese troops, paid handsome dividends as the Japanese swept down in a two-pronged offensive on both sides of the Malay Peninsula. The defenders—British, Australian, New Zealand, and Indian—were unprepared for a northern invasion; some of the troops were inexperienced vis-à-vis the Japanese veterans of the Manchurian campaign. Victory was swift.

Based in BANGKOK, the Japanese military intelligence network, FUJIWARA KIKAN (F. KIKAN), headed by Major Fujiwara Iwaichi (1908–1986), was from September 1941 gathering support and cooperation from the nationalist movements in Southeast Asia—Indian, Malay, Indonesian, and Chinese. The Japanese scored the most success with the Indian Independence League (IIL), the organization headed by SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE (1897–1945). Members of the IIL accompanied the Japanese army in the invasion of BRITISH MALAYA and succeeded in persuading Indian soldiers in the British Army to desert to the Japanese side. In this manner those who switched allegiance were gathered to form the INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY (INA), the military arm of the IIL.

BRITISH BORNEO offered even less resistance to the Japanese invaders; only one Punjab regiment was deployed to protect the petroleum industry in Miri and Lutong and the airfield outside Kuching. There was little fighting, and on Christmas Eve 1941, Kuching was in Japanese hands. Unlike the formation of resistance groups in the Philippines and the MALAYAN PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY (MPAJA) and WATANIAH, SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO) and Brunei had none. Toward the end of the war in 1945, the Australian SERVICES RECONNAISSANCE DEPARTMENT (SRD) operated behind enemy lines in the highland areas of north-central BORNEO preparing the groundwork for the reoccupation of northwest BORNEO in June of that year. Besides Australians, there were British and New Zealand operatives. They organized resistance groups among the Kayans, Kenyahs, Kelabits, Muruts, and IBANS.

In the Malay Peninsula the MALAYAN PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY

(MPAJA) and WATANIAH were active, although overall they had little impact on the Japanese occupying forces. The Chinese-dominated MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP), headed by CHIN PENG (ONG BOON HUA/HWA) (1922–), was the architect of the MALAYAN PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY (MPAJA), which drew most of its members from the Chinese community with a sprinkling of Malays and Indians. The Malays of PAHANG organized the resistance group WATANIAH, which, like the MALAYAN PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY (MPAJA), cooperated with FORCE 136. The latter, set up by the British under the SOUTH-EAST ASIA COMMAND (SEAC) based in SRI LANKA (CEYLON), undertook the task of sending its members (mostly British) to occupied Southeast Asia to promote indigenous armed resistance by training and arming those local groups.

Under the Japanese, SINGAPORE (1819) was renamed SYONAN-TO ("Lighting up the South" or "Light of the South"). The occupation years were characterized by deprivation of daily necessities and acute shortages of foodstuffs, particularly rice, the staple diet of the multiethnic population. Conscious that the Chinese might organize resistance to the occupation forces based on their prewar vociferous support for the KUOMINTANG-sponsored CHINA RELIEF FUND and other national salvation movements, the Japanese singled out this community for harsh treatment in order to preempt their threat. *SOOK CHING*, or "cleansing," was carried out in SINGAPORE (1819) and PENANG (1786) to weed out suspected or potential anti-Japanese elements (read Chinese); consequently, thousands of Chinese men were victims of massacres by the Japanese army. The KEMPEI-TAI, the Japanese military police, through their local informers weeded out subversives; their modus operandi was arrest, torture, then questioning, and thereafter, killing and disposal. For the Chinese in Brunei, SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO), *SOOK CHING* took the form of exorbitant monetary demands as a means of redeeming themselves for their prewar anti-Japanese activities—such as contributing to the CHINA RELIEF FUND and the British war effort. Furthermore, Chinese women were singled out as "COMFORT WOMEN" for the

Japanese soldiers; women from other ethnic groups, including Europeans (Dutch), were also recruited into "comfort stations" (military brothels) throughout Southeast Asia. Fear and hatred toward the Japanese were dominant thoughts among the Chinese in BRITISH MALAYA and BRITISH BORNEO during this period of occupation.

The peninsular Malay aristocracy and the English-educated Malay elite were unharmed; not having any option, both groups collaborated with the Japanese military administration. Likewise, Malay members of the lower rungs of the bureaucracy and police personnel remained at their prewar jobs and bowed to Japanese superiors. While the townspeople suffered food and material deprivation, the Malay peasantry in the rural areas were in less dire straits, as they bravely stowed away rice and other foodstuffs from requisitioning by the Japanese. The indigenous peoples of BRITISH BORNEO reacted similarly to Japanese demands. Initially Japanese-indigenous relations were cordial. The Malays initially viewed the Japanese as liberators. However, the harshness of Japanese soldiers toward the Malays and other native peoples created resentment. The IBANS were particularly offended by the public face slappings meted out by the Japanese for slight delinquent behavior, such as forgetting to bow to a sentry.

Their harsh behavior notwithstanding, Japanese propaganda of "ASIA FOR THE ASIATICS" and their grand economic design of the GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE had little impact on the Chinese, Malays, or other native EAST MALAYSIAN ETHNIC MINORITIES. Certain quarters of the Indian community might have been swayed, likewise the radical Malay groups—both parties that looked to Japan and the Japanese for deliverance.

The Indian community in BRITISH MALAYA was split: one group remained steadfastly loyal to the British, whereas another supported the Japanese, riding on the promise of the liberation of INDIA. The latter group swelled the branches of the IIL that were set up in all major towns and enthusiastically jumped on the bandwagon of the INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY (INA).

In fact, members of the KESATUAN MELAYU MUDA (KMM) (YOUNG MALAY UNION) assisted the Japanese with intel-

ligence during the initial landings and the southward advance down the peninsula. Imprisoned by the British in August 1941 for spreading anti-British propaganda, IBRAHIM YAACOB (1911–1979) was released by the Japanese in February 1942. Despite its assistance, the KMM was proscribed. Instead the Japanese elevated IBRAHIM YAACOB (1911–1979) to the rank of lieutenant colonel to head the Pembela Tanah Ayer (PETA, Defenders of the Fatherland), a Japanese-sponsored Malay militia, as a means of garnering support in anticipation of an Anglo-American reoccupation. Then in June 1945, another Japanese ploy to win over Malay support was the establishment of Kesatuan Raayat Indonesia Semenanjung (KRIS, Union of Peninsular Indonesians). IBRAHIM YAACOB (1911–1979) was keen on independence together with Indonesia; however, when SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) announced independence on 17 August 1945, BRITISH MALAYA and BRITISH BORNEO were not mentioned.

In general most Indonesians welcomed the Japanese as liberators and as ushering in a new dawn. The Japanese on their part encouraged Indonesian nationalism, which was consistent with their “ASIA FOR THE ASIATICS” policy, with Japan as the leader of the “New Asia.” The red-and-white Indonesian flag fluttered in public for the first time alongside the singing of *Indonesia Raya*, the nationalist anthem. Educated Indonesians were given the golden opportunity of filling in middle and even top positions in the civil administration, as Dutch and Eurasians were behind the wire in internment camps. While the Japanese sought to utilize the influence of SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) to garner support for their cause, the wily nationalist in turn used the opportunity in his public speeches to awaken the masses to Indonesian nationalism and independence. His adroitness in exploiting Javanese language and symbolism couched his anti-imperialistic messages under the nose of the Japanese imperialist. While SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) and MOHAMMAD HATTA (1902–1980) seemingly appeared to be collaborating with the Japanese, SUTAN SJAHRIR (1909–1966) headed an underground resistance movement aimed at sabotage. Both groups—“collaborators” and the “resistance”—possessed

common objectives—namely, Indonesian independence at all costs. They cooperated and coordinated their plans and actions.

PUSAT TENAGA RAKJAT (PUTERA) (CENTRE OF PEOPLES’ POWER) was aimed at mobilizing the inhabitants of JAVA for the Japanese war effort through an aggressive propaganda campaign. SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) and MOHAMMAD HATTA (1902–1980) were chairman and vice chairman, respectively. The Japanese promise of self-government attracted much mass support. Together with the Central Advisory Board under the presidency of SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970), large numbers of Indonesians lent their support. The Pembela Tanah Ayer (PETA, Defenders of the Fatherland), a Japanese-sponsored militia similar to the organization that was established in the Japanese-occupied Malay Peninsula, was the most significant of all organizations, as it formed the core of the republican army that played a pivotal role in the INDONESIAN REVOLUTION (1945–1949). In efforts to win over Islamic elements, the Japanese created the MADJELIS SJURO MUSLIMIN INDONESIA (MASJUMI) (COUNCIL OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONS), which brought together all Muslim groups and organizations. (It succeeded the MADJLISUL ISLAMIL A’LAA INDONESIA [MAI] [GREAT ISLAMIC COUNCIL OF INDONESIA], which was established in 1937.) Both the MUHAMMADIYAH and NAHDATUL ULAMA were participants, a coup for Muslim solidarity. The exalted status of the Showa emperor alienated the *KIAI*, who withdrew their support.

Japanese sincerity in granting Indonesian independence was demonstrated by the establishment of a preparatory committee for Indonesian independence (January 1944) and the Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan (Research Body for the Preparation of Independence) (March 1945), both entrusted with the task of preparing a draft constitution. FIELD MARSHAL COUNT TERAUUCHI HISAICHI (1879–1946), Japanese supreme commander of Southeast Asia, on 7 August 1945 ordered the setting up of a Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Preparatory Panel for Indonesian Independence) and promised to grant independence to Indonesia

on 24 August 1945. Events escalated rapidly—the U.S. atomic bombings of Hiroshima (6 August) and Nagasaki (9 August), Japan's unconditional surrender (15 August)—and SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) was strongly urged to declare the independence of Indonesia. He procrastinated. Then, on 17 August 1945, he finally proclaimed Indonesian independence.

Looking to Japan for assistance in their nationalistic aspirations, the group calling themselves THAKIN, led by AUNG SAN (1915–1947), formed the THIRTY COMRADES; they underwent military training on Hainan Island under the Japanese. The THIRTY COMRADES was the nucleus of the BURMA INDEPENDENCE ARMY (BIA). Like their Indonesian counterparts, AUNG SAN (1915–1947) and his fellow nationalists were pragmatic strategists, Machiavellian in character and with the dedicated objective of attaining independence for Burma by any means. Therefore, if the situation suited them to be pro-Japanese, they allied with the Japanese; conversely, when it became prudent to be pro-British, they aligned themselves with their former colonial masters.

BURMA DURING THE PACIFIC WAR (1941–1945) was the only country in Southeast Asia to suffer the ravages of war twice over. Through the Three Pagoda Pass the Japanese invaded the country from the south, advancing northward until halted on the borders of British India. Then British forces under ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN (1900–1979), supreme commander of the SOUTH-EAST ASIA COMMAND (SEAC), pushed the Japanese southward in his reoccupation campaign. Prior to the reoccupation, an Anglo-American guerrilla force, the CHINDITS, who were trained and led by Major General Orde Charles Wingate (1903–1944), undertook sorties in occupied Burma from 1943. Burma proved to be a vital funnel for supplies via the BURMA ROAD to southwest China, fueling the KUOMINTANG-led Chinese fight against the Japanese in besieged NATIONALIST CHINA.

As in Indonesia, the Japanese promised to grant independence to the civilian administration of DR. BA MAW (b. 1893) if Burma declared war on the Anglo-American powers. Accordingly, on 1 August 1943, Burma was

proclaimed independent and thereafter declared war on Britain and the United States. DR. BA MAW (b. 1893) assumed the position of *Adipati*, or head of state, as well as prime minister.

The Japanese defeat at the BATTLE OF IMPHAL-KOHIMA (1944) halted their westward advance and signaled the turn of their military fortunes. The INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY (INA), which had had a part in the battle, was annihilated, to a large extent dashing the aspirations of the IIL and SUBHAS CHANDRA BOSE (1897–1945).

Meanwhile, in March 1945, the THAKIN (LORD, MASTER) nationalists had switched allegiance, becoming anti-Japanese. AUNG SAN (1915–1947) and GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) transformed the Burma Defence Army (previously the BURMA INDEPENDENCE ARMY [BNA]) into the Burma National Army (BIA) in 1943. The THAKIN (LORD, MASTER) organized the ANTI-FASCIST PEOPLE'S FREEDOM LEAGUE (AFPFL). In early 1945 the Burma National Army (BIA) launched attacks on the Japanese. By the time ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN (1900–1979) reoccupied RANGOON (YANGON) in mid-1945, the ANTI-FASCIST PEOPLE'S FREEDOM LEAGUE (AFPFL), under the leadership of AUNG SAN (1915–1947), was the most influential and powerful nationalist force agitating for full independence.

Neighboring Thailand, under the premiership of FIELD MARSHAL PLAEEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964) (t. December 1938–July 1944), entered the Pacific War (1941–1945) as a Japanese ally, declaring war on Britain and the United States. But the Thai minister plenipotentiary to the United States, M. R. SENI PRAMOJ (1905–1997), held back the delivery of the declaration of war to Washington. Instead he organized a chapter of the FREE THAI MOVEMENT in the United States. In Thailand itself members of the FREE THAI MOVEMENT led by PRIDI PHANOMYONG (1900–1983) went underground and undertook sabotage activities against the occupying Japanese forces and infiltrated the pro-Japanese Thai administration. The ultimate objective of the FREE THAI MOVEMENT was to negotiate favorably with the Anglo-American powers regarding the ambivalent status of Thailand in the war to ensure

that the country's sovereignty and independence remained intact.

The Japanese rewarded the collaborationist government of FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964) by transferring the northern peninsular Malay States, formerly the SIAMESE MALAY STATES (KEDAH, PERLIS, KELANTAN, TERENGGANU), Laotian territory west of the Mekong River, and the Cambodian provinces of BATTAMBANG and SIEM REAP to Thai authority. (After the war all those territories were returned.)

In order to facilitate the transportation of troops and supplies to Burma, the Japanese undertook the construction of a 415-kilometer rail link connecting Kanchanaburi in Thailand to Thanbyuzayat in Burma, across difficult terrain. Work on this arduous task (mid-1942 to late 1943) was undertaken by hundreds of thousands of conscripted laborers—British, Australian, New Zealand, Dutch, and Indian prisoners of war, alongside Thais, Burmese, Indians, Chinese, and Malays. The death rate was frighteningly high, hence it was dubbed the DEATH RAILWAY (BURMA-SIAM RAILWAY). Death resulted from tropical diseases (malaria, beriberi), overwork, malnutrition, and harsh treatment by the Japanese.

INDOCHINA DURING WORLD WAR II (1939–1945) was a curious anomaly, in that for a greater part of the war years, the colonial French administration continued to function and remain intact while Japanese troops were garrisoned in the territory with freedom of mobilization. French governor-general Jean Decoux (t. 1940–1945) administered FRENCH INDOCHINA for the Vichy government and accommodated or bowed to the Japanese as the situation developed.

When ominous war clouds gathered, most of the Vietnamese nationalists took flight and regrouped in southern NATIONALIST CHINA, close to the border with TONKIN (TONGKING). They received support from the KUOMINTANG (KMT) government of NATIONALIST CHINA. HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969) and his communists reevaluated their struggle and decided to postpone the class struggle and instead to strive for the independence of Vietnam. A “united front” organization, VIỆT MINH (VIỆT NAM ĐỘC LẬP ĐỒNG MINH HỘI, LEAGUE FOR THE

INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM), was set up in 1941 under the leadership of HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969). Its main objective was to solicit mass support of all Vietnamese in the nationalist struggle against France and Japan. In 1944 the VIỆT MINH (VIỆT NAM ĐỘC LẬP ĐỒNG MINH HỘI, LEAGUE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM) returned to Vietnam, where they orchestrated sabotage operations against the Japanese military.

In a sudden and swift manner the Japanese executed the takeover of the FRENCH INDOCHINESE UNION (UNION INDOCHINOISE FRANÇAISE) (1887) on 9 March 1945, catching Decoux and his administration by surprise. The following day the Japanese requested that Emperor BẢO ĐÀI (VĨNH THỤY) (1913–1997) proclaim the independence of Vietnam (less COCHIN CHINA), likewise the monarchs SISAVANG VONG (r. 1904–1959) of Laos and NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) of Cambodia. Despite independence and the setting up of the ineffectual collaborationist government of Tran Trong Kim (t. April–August 1945), the Japanese remained in control, concentrating their military forces in and around SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY). Seizing this opportunity, the communist-dominated VIỆT MINH (VIỆT NAM ĐỘC LẬP ĐỒNG MINH HỘI, LEAGUE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM) entrenched itself in TONKIN (TONGKING) and the greater part of NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945).

During the war years two movements emerged in occupied LAOS (NINETEENTH CENTURY TO MID-1990s), one anti-Japanese and another anti-French. The royal court of LUANG PRABANG led the former, whereas the latter, the LAO ISSARA (ISSARAK), was headed by PHETSARATH (1890–1959), based in VIENTIANE. No parallel resistance movement arose in neighboring Cambodia. After the Japanese-impelled proclamation of independence by the young NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) in March 1945, SON NGOC THANH (1907–1976?) headed an impotent government as the Japanese remained in control.

In an unprecedented manner the Japanese Showa emperor Hirohito (r. 1926–1989) announced in a radio broadcast to the Japanese

nation the unconditional surrender of Japan on 15 August 1945. This event broke all traditions. No Japanese emperor had ever given public speeches—in fact, no one outside the inner palace in Kyoto had ever heard the august voice or seen this god-king. The sudden Japanese surrender was generally though reluctantly accepted by Japanese commanders and their troops in the empire stretching from Manchuria in northeast Asia to Papua New Guinea to Guadalcanal in the southwest Pacific. Opportunities immediately arose, conflicts erupted, and chaos and relief intermingled in the aftermath of the surrender.

The BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION (BMA) IN SOUTHEAST ASIA faced the seemingly insurmountable task of addressing the urgent issues of food and nationalists. Food shortages, especially of rice, reigned throughout the region. The distribution of supplies was hampered by the lack of ships. Equally daunting were nationalist demands for independence. Securing the release of thousands of European prisoners of war and civilian internees, who spent the war years in prisons and internment camps where malnutrition and harsh treatment killed many, was a race against time. There was a real fear of the recurrence of tragedies like the SANDAKAN DEATH MARCH in northwest BORNEO, where thousands of mostly Australian prisoners of war were force-marched from the prison camp at Sandakan to Ranau in the interior during the closing months of the war. Thousands perished, and only a handful of survivors (those who managed to escape) lived to tell the horrifying tale. It was feared that the Japanese in their humiliation and shame of defeat might vent their anger and vengeance on European prisoners of war and internees.

As supreme commander of SOUTH-EAST ASIA COMMAND (SEAC), which was responsible for the BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION (BMA) IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN (1900–1979) managed to establish fairly effective and efficient short-lived military governments throughout the region. A sticky question faced by the brief military administration was the COLLABORATION ISSUE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. In order not to jeopardize the delicate situation in British India, where nationalist agitation for independence had

reached a near-explosive level, prosecution was limited to those “collaborators” whose actions had directly led to the deaths of their fellow countrymen. The postwar Anglo-American military tribunals pronounced the death sentence on FIELD MARSHAL COUNT TER-AUCHI HISAICHI (1879–1946), Japanese supreme commander of Southeast Asia, and GENERAL YAMASHITA TOMOYUKI (1885–1946), commander of Japanese forces in the Philippines toward the end of the war.

Amid the rubble of war and the efforts at reconstruction and rehabilitation, the United States kept its promise, and the Philippines was granted independence on 4 July 1946. In Burma the situation was less straightforward in the attainment of independence; similarly with Indonesia.

Governor SIR REGINALD DORMAN-SMITH (t. 1941–1946) and his administration, which had spent the war years in INDIA, were critical of AUNG SAN (1915–1947) and the ANTI-FASCIST PEOPLE’S FREEDOM LEAGUE (AFPFL). But ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN (1900–1979), who had retaken Burma in May 1945, was cautious in the treatment of the powerful, influential, and popular AUNG SAN (1915–1947). Sir Hubert Rance, who had headed the military administration, was appointed civilian governor (t. 1946–1948). Talks regarding a peaceful transfer of power commenced thereafter and concluded in early 1947, when Britain agreed to Burma’s independence. Interestingly, the conservative faction led by U Saw and the communist wing of the ANTI-FASCIST PEOPLE’S FREEDOM LEAGUE (AFPFL) was dissatisfied with the negotiated agreement. U SAW AND THE ASSASSINATION OF AUNG SAN was an event of tragic proportions for Burmese politics. Fired with ambition and thirst for power, U Saw ordered the killing of AUNG SAN (1915–1947), his arch political rival. AUNG SAN (1915–1947) and members of his cabinet were gunned down during a meeting on 19 July 1947. The British invited U NU (1907–) to form a new government and to draft a new constitution. On 4 January 1948, Burma became independent, and unlike other former British colonies, it left the Commonwealth.

The INDONESIAN REVOLUTION (1945–1949) was a protracted struggle colored by bloodshed, insincerity, bitterness, and hatred.

It was only with the intervention of the United Nations (UN), the first test of the UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, that The Netherlands finally recognized an independent Indonesia in December 1949.

Lieutenant Governor-General DR. JOHANNES HUBERTUS VAN MOOK (1894–1965) faced a very different DUTCH EAST INDIES when he returned in 1945. The British who reoccupied the country before the arrival of the Dutch faced stiff, armed opposition from the Indonesian republican forces in BATAVIA (SUNDA KELAPA, JACATRA, DJAKARTA/JAKARTA), Bandoeng, Semarang, and SURABAYA. Negotiations interspersed with DUTCH POLICE ACTION (FIRST AND SECOND) were the strategy employed by the Dutch in an attempt to reinstate their prewar colonial authority over Indonesia. Two efforts at a peaceful resolution failed—namely, the LINGGADJATI (LINGGAJATI) AGREEMENT (1947) and the RENVILLE AGREEMENT (JANUARY 1948).

Then, suddenly, the MADIUN AFFAIR (SEPTEMBER 1948) broke out. It was an attempt by the lower-echelon members of the PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920) to wrest power from the republican government. The MADIUN AFFAIR (SEPTEMBER 1948) put the PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920) in a very bad light; while the republican government of Prime Minister MOHAMMAD HATTA (1902–1980) was battling the Dutch, the communists were trying to undermine him. Consequently, the Indonesian republican armed forces virtually annihilated the entire leadership of the communist movement. Musso, AMIR SJARIFUDDIN (1907–1948), and IBRAHIM DATUK TAN MALAKA (1897?–1949) were killed. The Dutch seized the opportunity to launch an offensive in December 1948 but failed.

The republican government benefited from the unsuccessful communist putsch in that it gained a supporter in the United States for its anti-leftist stance. Finally in December 1949, with pressure from Britain and the United States coupled with the intervening role of the United Nations, The Netherlands at The Hague agreed to transfer sovereignty to an independent United States of Indonesia. In August 1950 the

unitarian Republic of Indonesia came into being with SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) as president. Indonesia at last achieved its *MERDEKA* (FREE, INDEPENDENT) following a prolonged *PERJUANGAN* (*PERJUANGAN*).

A Cambodian nationalist movement, the KHMER ISSARAK (FREE KHMER), emerged in June 1945 in BANGKOK and soon had units in the country, especially in the southeast. The objective of the movement was to eject the French from Cambodian soil. In addition to Thai backing, the KHMER ISSARAK (FREE KHMER) received support from the VIỆT MINH (VIỆT NAM ĐỘC LẬP ĐỒNG MINH HỘI, LEAGUE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM).

Then in October 1945, the French reoccupied Cambodia and deposed the government of SON NGOC THANH (1907–1976?). The Cambodian nationalist groups split into communist and noncommunist camps. The communists with Vietnamese support waged an anti-French guerrilla war in the countryside. SON NGOC THANH (1907–1976?) led the noncommunist Khmer Serei in opposition. But NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) upstaged both parties. In June 1952 he took over the reins of government. Through his visits to the Western democracies to garner support for his government and country, his diplomacy won him support. Even the French were won over and consequently granted independence to Cambodia in 1953. This independence was confirmed in the GENEVA CONFERENCE (1954) when the government of NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) was acknowledged as the sole legitimate authority over Cambodia.

Upon the reemergence of the French in LAOS (NINETEENTH CENTURY TO MID-1990s) in the early months of 1946, the LAO ISSARA (ISSARAK) fled to Thailand. The French recognized the internal autonomy of the country under SISAVANG VONG (r. 1904–1959), king of LUANG PRABANG. In 1949 the French granted limited self-government. This government was dominated by radical figures, notably SOUPHANOUVONG (RED PRINCE) (1911–1995), who assumed the presidency. In 1950 the PATHET LAO (LAND OF LAOS), an anti-French, procommunist movement, emerged with close ties to the

VIỆT MINH (VIỆT NAM ĐỘC LẬP ĐỒNG MINH HỘI, LEAGUE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM). It was particularly strong in the northeast of the country bordering Vietnam. In October 1953 the French granted independence to the country.

The day after the Japanese surrender was announced, a People's National Liberation Committee under the presidency of HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969) was constituted by the VIỆT MINH (VIỆT NAM ĐỘC LẬP ĐỒNG MINH HỘI, LEAGUE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM). The committee refused to acknowledge the Japanese puppet government in SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) under Tran Trong Kim. A communist-orchestrated general uprising was staged. To resolve the impasse, Emperor BẢO ĐẠI (VĨNH THỤY) (1913–1997) abdicated in August 1945. A week later, on 2 September 1945, HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969) proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

The drama unfolded when the French with the assistance of British forces reoccupied COCHIN CHINA. The lines were drawn with a communist-dominated NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) and a noncommunist, French-controlled SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945). The stage and the props were ready for the players to act out the FIRST INDOCHINA WAR (1946–1954).

In the initial stage in early 1946, there was an agreement between HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969) and the French; the latter recognized the communist government and the promise that French troops would remain on Vietnamese soil awaiting a gradual withdrawal over a five-year period. However, it was apparent that both sides possessed objectives that were poles apart: a united Vietnam with complete, full independence against the reinstatement of a colonial regime. In November the first shots were fired in the FIRST INDOCHINA WAR (1946–1954).

The French through force of arms reunited the country to create the Associated State of Vietnam in 1949 with former emperor BẢO ĐẠI (VĨNH THỤY) (1913–1997) as the head of state. No Vietnamese, whether communist or noncommunist, was amused. The guerrilla war conducted by the VIỆT MINH (VIỆT NAM ĐỘC LẬP ĐỒNG MINH HỘI, LEAGUE

FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM) was under way and increasingly moving toward a victory for the communist regime in HANOI (THANG-LONG). The conflict began to resemble a proxy struggle between adversaries of the COLD WAR. Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and the newly proclaimed People's Republic of China (PRC) were funneling supplies to their brother communists across the border to TONKIN (TONGKING). U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) was justifying his support to the French with the term DOMINO THEORY; if Indochina became communist, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow suit like falling dominoes.

The BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU (MAY 1954), though a heroic stand on the part of the French forces, was not only a military victory for GENERAL VO NGUYỄN GIAP (1911–) but more significantly a political triumph for HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969). The GENEVA CONFERENCE (1954), originally intended to resolve the KOREAN WAR (1950–1953), ended the FIRST INDOCHINA WAR (1946–1954)—but at the cost of the partitioning of Vietnam at the 17° N parallel, officially creating NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) and SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945). There was also the provision (the Final Declaration) for an election to unify the country, scheduled for July 1956, to be conducted under an international commission. In order to deny an almost certain election victory for the VIỆT MINH (VIỆT NAM ĐỘC LẬP ĐỒNG MINH HỘI, LEAGUE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM), the United States and the regime of SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) refused to pen their signature to the Final Declaration in the Geneva Accords. Hence the elections were never held.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) under the supreme leadership of HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969) governed NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945). Both the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) and the PRC were staunch supporters of this newly emerging communist state. A socialist program of agricultural collectivization and industrialization was implemented with financial, material, and technical aid from Moscow and Beijing. The leadership of the DRV included personalities such as PHAM VAN DONG

(1906–2000), TRUONG CHINH (1907–1988), LE DUAN (1907–1986), and LE DUC THO (1911–).

In SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945), a noncommunist regime, the Republic of Vietnam, was set up in October 1955 under the presidency of NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM (1901–1963). By April 1956 the last detachment of the French military finally left. U.S. influence and presence became increasingly apparent in supporting the government of NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM (1901–1963). In fact, since 1950 a U.S. military mission had been set up in SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY) as U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict began to escalate.

The fortnight interregnum between the Japanese surrender (mid-August 1945) and the arrival of British forces under ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN (1900–1979) (September 1945) witnessed revenge killings and murders of individual collaborators, but more serious were the Sino-Malay clashes in several places in the peninsular Malay States. The harsh wartime treatment of the Chinese and the seemingly cozy existence of the sultans and Malay civil servants who collaborated with the Japanese military administration sparked a racial hatred of one community accusing the other of being traitors. Aggravating the Sino-Malay tensions was the emergence from the jungle of the MALAYAN PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY (MPAJA), which was dominated largely by the Chinese-based MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP) claiming to be the liberators of the country.

The announcement of the British postwar political and administrative setup known as the MALAYAN UNION (1946) to replace the varied structure of BRITISH MALAYA sparked Malay opposition. Led by the English-educated Malay nationalist group headed by ONN BIN JA'AFAR (1895–1962), the MALAYS rejected the proposed MALAYAN UNION (1946), which they claimed was too liberal in granting citizenship to immigrant groups (mainly Chinese), and because of the abrogation of Malay special rights and privileges. The high-handed manner employed by the special representative of the British government, Sir Harold MacMichael, in securing the royal assent of the nine Malay rulers was an-

other sore point with the MALAYS. In May 1946 forty-one Malay organizations from all the peninsular Malay States came together to inaugurate the formation of the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO), which spearheaded Malay opposition after the MALAYAN UNION (1946) came into force on 1 April 1946.

Bowing to Malay demands, a revised constitution and political-cum-administrative setup—the FEDERATION OF MALAYA (1948)—replaced the MALAYAN UNION (1946). SINGAPORE (1819) was retained as a British Crown colony for geopolitical reasons. Certain quarters within the Chinese community were dissatisfied with the FEDERATION OF MALAYA (1948). The English-educated BABA NYONYA of PENANG (1786) refused to participate in the new setup, citing anticipated economic losses and political subservience. The PENANG SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT (1948–1951) campaigned for PENANG (1786) to remain as a British Crown colony of the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1946), with close ties to the British Empire. Petitions to the British government failed because London, after having successfully ridden the storm of Malay protest and winning them over to a new setup, had no intention of again rattling Malay sensitivity by acceding to English-educated Chinese professionals and businessmen.

Meanwhile the MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP), led by CHIN PENG (ONG BOON HUA/HWA) (1922–), launched an attempt to overthrow the colonial regime and to attain independence for BRITISH MALAYA less the “British.” The strategy employed was to cripple the economy and in the ensuing socioeconomic chaos seize power. The MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP), through “united front” tactics, infiltrated labor and labor unions, and strike action was commonplace in SINGAPORE (1819) and other urban centers. Sabotage of dredges and other machinery, the destruction of rubber trees, and burning of workers' quarters on estates were undertaken to terrorize Chinese and Indian workers in the TIN and RUBBER industries, the backbone of the colonial economy. Then came the murders of European planters. In mid-1948 the MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960) was declared.

Combating the MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP) was done on several levels: military, political, psychological, and socioeconomic. Troops from the British Commonwealth (largely from Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji) conducted search and pursuit operations against the communist terrorists (CTs), a term attributed to members of the MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP). On the political front, local elections were under way as a preparation for eventual self-government, countering the communist assertion that they alone were fighting for independence. The psychological warfare of winning the “hearts and minds” of the multiethnic population, but mainly targeting the Chinese community, was most challenging. The resettlement of Chinese communities that had established villages on the fringe of the jungle during the Japanese occupation to avoid recruitment into labor gangs and harsh treatment was another daunting but highly effective strategy. Dubbed the BRIGGS PLAN after Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, the director of operations (t. 1950–1952), it witnessed the transfer of nearly half a million Chinese squatters from the jungle fringes to “NEW VILLAGES” (MALAYA/MALAYSIA). A helping hand for the newly settled inhabitants came from members of the MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION (MCA) (1949), which was established from among the *TOWKAY* led by SIR TAN CHENG LOCK (1883–1960). Initially a welfare organization, the MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION (MCA) (1949) was to be to the Chinese inhabitants an alternative to the MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP). This resettlement campaign succeeded in its primary objective of cutting off the supply line of the CTs in food, recruits, and intelligence. Deprived of their support and supplies, the CTs moved farther into the jungle; in some instances they enlisted the assistance of the ORANG ASLI for food and safe havens. The British colonial government on its part wooed the ORANG ASLI, accommodating them in improving their socioeconomic conditions.

The MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP) scored a major victory when CTs ambushed and shot dead Sir Henry Gurney (t. 1948–1951), British high commissioner of the FEDERATION OF MALAYA (1948), at

Fraser’s Hill in October 1951. Morale then was at the lowest ebb on the government side. The appointment of GENERAL SIR GERALD TEMPLER (1898–1979) as Gurney’s replacement, however, turned the tide against the CTs. Implementation of the BRIGGS PLAN continued in earnest. The number of special constables and home guards was increased. Much to Malay distress, he relaxed citizenship requirements to increase the number of Chinese as citizens as one of the ways of winning over the community. Collective punishment was meted out to whole villagers if found assisting the CTs. “Black Areas” faced around-the-clock curfews and rationing (food, water, and electricity).

The road to independence for BRITISH MALAYA by the early 1950s was clearly marked out. In the effort to resolve the MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960), steps toward self-rule were hastened: village and municipal council elections in 1952, as well as elections to the federal Legislative Council in 1955. In the latter, TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990), the second president of the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO), struck an alliance with the MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION (MCA) (1949)—hence the birth of the ALLIANCE PARTY (MALAYA/MALAYSIA)—to sweep 51 out of 52 contested seats. (PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA [PAS] won 1 seat.) British fears of Sino-Malay problems drastically subsided. It was amply clear that the newly elected chief minister, TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990), could lead the country to *MERDEKA* (FREE, INDEPENDENT).

Riding on his success, TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990) agreed to the request by CHIN PENG (ONG BOON HUA/HWA) (1922–) to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the hitherto “undeclared war.” But the BALING TALKS (1955), which brought together the top leadership of the MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP) led by CHIN PENG (ONG BOON HUA/HWA) (1922–) and the government headed by TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990), came to nothing. The latter refused to recognize the MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP); CHIN

PENG (ONG BOON HUA/HWA) (1922–) and his colleagues Chen Tien and Abdul Rashid Mahideen would not agree to the dissolution of their party and to giving up their struggle. TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990) argued that independence was imminent and graciously granted amnesty to all surrendered CTs; few took up the offer.

On 31 August 1957, TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990) proclaimed *MERDEKA* (FREE, INDEPENDENT) for Malaya and became its first prime minister, with the ALLIANCE PARTY (MALAYA/MALAYSIA) as the ruling party. The MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN INDIAN CONGRESS (MIC) had by then joined the ALLIANCE PARTY (MALAYA/MALAYSIA), making it truly representative of the three main ethnic groups of the country—namely, Malay, Chinese, and Indian.

SINGAPORE (1819) was again excluded from the independence granted to Malaya in 1957. Elections for a limited self-government as recommended by the Rendel Constitution (1955) brought to the fore DAVID SAUL MARSHALL (1908–1995), the leader of the Labour Front, as the city-state's first chief minister (t. 1955–1956). Having failed to attain full internal self-government in talks in London, he resigned. LIM YEW HOCK (1914–1984) assumed the chief ministership (t. 1956–1959). The talks in London in March 1957 led by LIM YEW HOCK (1914–1984) were successful and resulted in the elections of May 1959. LEE KUAN YEW (1923–), who led the PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP) to victory, became the prime minister. He pledged independence through merger with Malaya.

The PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP) government faced a series of communist-instigated strikes by labor unions, and infiltration of the Chinese schools. A prime target for the communists was the NATIONAL TRADES UNION CONGRESS (NTUC). Leftist elements also worked their way into the PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP) itself. As in Malaya and BRITISH BORNEO, the English-educated Chinese of SINGAPORE (1819) eschewed COMMUNISM; the ideology attracted the Chinese-educated Chinese. The latter, owing to their Chinese school education (teachers, curriculum, and textbooks all imported and highly oriented toward IMPE-

RIAL CHINA, then after 1911, NATIONALIST CHINA, and from the 1920s, COMMUNISM), looked to China for inspiration and sustenance. They became particularly patriotic when a resurgent China emerged in 1949 under Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The leftist elements within the PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP) attempted to topple the English-educated leadership of LEE KUAN YEW (1923–). But he outmaneuvered them, forcing their expulsion to form the BARISAN SOSIALIS (SOCIALIST FRONT) in mid-1961. The following year the PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP) received the mandate from the electorate for merger with Malaya, together with SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO), to form MALAYSIA (1963).

Through MALAYSIA (1963), SINGAPORE (1819) and SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO) gained their independence. TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990) mooted the idea of a greater federation in May 1961 as a means of preventing a communist takeover of SINGAPORE (1819); the indigenous inhabitants of SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO) would offset the racial balance, favoring a non-Chinese majority.

Following the Japanese surrender, momentous events unfolded in BRITISH BORNEO. Despite Sarawak Malay opposition to cession, SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO) were transformed in mid-1946 into British Crown colonies following the transfer of sovereignty to Britain from Rajah Charles Vyner Brooke (r. 1917–1941, 1946) and the BRITISH NORTH BORNEO CHARTERED COMPANY (1881–1917), respectively. Brunei remained a British protectorate. Much investment in development projects was under way in SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO), as the years of neglect in the former and the ravages of war in the latter required energetic efforts at reconstruction and rehabilitation. Notwithstanding the commendable input by the British colonial government, the formidable physical terrain seriously hampered progress.

ANGLO-BRUNEI RELATIONS (NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 1980s) were on a secure footing. British technical assistance and investment had benefited the BRUNEI OIL

AND GAS INDUSTRY. OMAR ALI SAIFUDDIN III, SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1914–1986), who came to the throne in June 1950, was ambivalent over the MALAYSIA (1963) proposal. However, the staunchly anti-MALAYSIA (1963) PARTAI RAKYAT BRUNEI (PRB) led by SHEIKH AZAHARI BIN SHEIKH MAHMUD (1928–2002) perceived the palace as keen on the wider federation. SHEIKH AZAHARI BIN SHEIKH MAHMUD (1928–2002) had alternative aspirations—namely, the idea of Kalimantan Utara (Northern Borneo) encompassing Brunei, SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO), with the sultan as head of state and him as prime minister. Despite having won the election in 1962, PARTAI RAKYAT BRUNEI (PRB) remained powerless in the legislative and executive councils that were dominated by nominated members and officials.

The outbreak of the BRUNEI REBELLION (DECEMBER 1962), led by PARTAI RAKYAT BRUNEI (PRB), was a debacle that sealed the fate of the party. Within a week British troops rushed over from SINGAPORE (1819), crushing the uprising. Whether this failed BRUNEI REBELLION (DECEMBER 1962) had any influence on the decision of OMAR ALI SAIFUDDIN III, SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1914–1986), not to participate in MALAYSIA (1963) remains unanswered.

In the meantime, across the border in SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO), British administrators were encouraging the native inhabitants to view MALAYSIA (1963) in a positive light. The Chinese community in both territories favored the wider federation that they anticipated would widen the economic scope. After all, most of the trade, commerce, and shipping—including also capital flow of Chinese undertakings—were from SINGAPORE (1819). MALAYSIA (1963) increased political consciousness among the non-Malay indigenous population of SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO). But to be sure, apart from the few native leaders, each with his own personal agenda, the majority of the indigenous peoples had little inkling of what MALAYSIA (1963) entailed. Apart from the Chinese, left-leaning Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), the newly formed political parties of SARAWAK AND SABAH

(NORTH BORNEO) favored independence through MALAYSIA (1963). But as the findings of the British-sponsored Cobbold Commission (August 1962) showed, and as confirmed by the United Nations Commission (August 1963), more than three-quarters of the inhabitants in both territories were approving of MALAYSIA (1963), but with certain built-in safeguards (immigration, labor, education).

Despite the SABAH CLAIM from the Philippines and KONFRONTASI (“CRUSH MALAYSIA” CAMPAIGN) launched by Indonesia, on 16 September 1963 MALAYSIA (1963) was inaugurated with TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990) as prime minister. British commitments continued as obligated in the ANGLO-MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN DEFENCE AGREEMENT (AMDA) that ran from 1957 to 1971.

Post-Independence Developments

By 1963 only Brunei and East Timor remained under a colonial arrangement, to British and Portuguese, respectively. The unshackling of independence in other Southeast Asian countries brought in different challenges and struggles. All the newly independent states faced the uphill task of nation-building, but for some the process had to be postponed, as other pressing, more urgent matters awaited resolution. Wars and conflicts continued to plague several territories, while in others the search for an appropriate system of government, economic setup, and sociocultural policy appeared illusive. Various “isms,” including attempts to draw sustenance from religious traditions, were undertaken with varied outcomes.

The first president (t. 1946–1948) of the independent Republic of the Philippines was MANUEL ROXAS (1892–1948). He defeated SERGIO OSMENA SR. (1878–1961) in the presidential elections of April 1946. The PHILIPPINES–U.S. “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP,” particularly in the economic and military sphere, established a firm footing during this period. U.S. investments and business enterprises were accorded preferential status in the Philippines. Among U.S. MILITARY BASES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base on LUZON were the most important, after Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. U.S. military bases functioned as an *imperium in*

imperio; they, however, were economic assets in terms of providing employment, businesses, and commercial opportunities to the surrounding local community. MANUEL ROXAS (1892–1948) faced an insurgency launched by the HUKBALAHAP (HUKBO NG BAYAN LABAN SA HAPON) (PEOPLE’S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY) (1942) that demanded agrarian reform. The government’s response to this rural-based, communist-led uprising was the banning of the organization in 1948.

Philippine president ELPIDIO QUIRINO (1890–1956) (t. 1948–1953) took a reconciling stance toward the HUKBALAHAP (HUKBO NG BAYAN LABAN SA HAPON) (PEOPLE’S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY) (1942): a truce with the rebels. He allowed their leader, LUIS TARUC (1913–), to take the seat in the Philippine Congress that he won in 1946. But abruptly LUIS TARUC (1913–) left MANILA and in April 1949 publicly declared that the HUKBALAHAP (HUKBO NG BAYAN LABAN SA HAPON) (PEOPLE’S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY) (1942) aimed to overthrow the government. To combat this threat, RAMON MAGSAYSAY (1907–1957) accepted the presidential appointment as secretary of national defense. Combining a new tenancy reform program with the rehabilitation of surrendered rebels, as well as eschewing military excesses that were driving peasants to the rebel cause, RAMON MAGSAYSAY (1907–1957) succeeded in ending the insurgency that came about with the surrender of LUIS TARUC (1913–) in mid-1954.

The presidency (t. 1953–1957) of RAMON MAGSAYSAY (1907–1957) witnessed the further strengthening of the PHILIPPINES–U.S. “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP.” The U.S. parity with Filipinos in the exploitation of natural resources was expanded to encompass all economic activities (the Laurel–Langley Agreement). An aggressive rural development program focusing on agrarian reform was implemented, aimed at improving the livelihood and welfare of the rural poor. RAMON MAGSAYSAY (1907–1957) made the Philippines a founding member of the U.S.–mooted military pact of the SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION (SEATO) (1954). His sudden death in an air accident in March 1957 saw the beginning of a loosening of the ties in the PHILIPPINES–U.S. “SPE-

cial Relationship.” His successor, President Carlos P. Garcia (t. 1957–1961), embarked on a “Filipino First” policy that asserted the country’s economic nationalism with the objective of reducing dependence on the United States.

Economic reforms funded by foreign sources, mainly from the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), characterized the presidency (t. 1961–1965) of DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL (1910–1997). His MAPHILINDO CONCEPT, which mooted the creation of a regional organization of territories of the MALAYS, comprising the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, was realized in August 1963. MAPHILINDO succeeded the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and was a forerunner of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967). But when MALAYSIA (1963) finally came into being in September despite the SABAH CLAIM by the Philippines, diplomatic relations were severed with KUALA LUMPUR.

The SABAH CLAIM was the sovereignty dispute over the East Malaysian state of Sabah (previously North Borneo). The Philippines argued that the territory of North Borneo formed part of the Sulu sultanate. Since the latter had become a part of the Republic of the Philippines, all territories of the sultanate rightly belonged to the Philippines. MANILA formally protested the sovereignty claim in June 1963 to KUALA LUMPUR (KL), when SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO) were planning to join MALAYSIA (1963).

Besides the SABAH CLAIM, Prime Minister TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990) of the newly inaugurated MALAYSIA (1963) faced cross-border military raids in SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO) from Indonesian Kalimantan as part of *KONFRONTASI* (“CRUSH MALAYSIA” CAMPAIGN). SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) viewed the formation of MALAYSIA (1963) as a neocolonial ploy by the British imperialists to prolong their control and influence in Southeast Asia despite independence for its former colonies of SINGAPORE (1819), SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO). With the assistance of Commonwealth troops, the Malaysian armed forces managed to contain these military incur-

sions. By 1966, KUALA LUMPUR (KL) had resumed relations with both Indonesia and the Philippines.

The PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP) led by LEE KUAN YEW (1923–) sought the creation of a “Malaysian Malaysia” that represented a direct challenge to the “special rights and privileges” of the MALAYS that were enshrined in the Malaysian constitution. The PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP) undermined the position of the MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION (MCA) (1949) in competing for the Chinese electorate. The divisive policy pursued by LEE KUAN YEW (1923–) that might lead to interethnic clashes subsequently brought about the expulsion of SINGAPORE (1819) from MALAYSIA (1963).

The “Malaysian Malaysia” concept pursued by LEE KUAN YEW (1923–) disrupted the consensual agreement between the leaders of the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) and the MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION (MCA) (1949), as well as the MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN INDIAN CONGRESS (MIC). The consensus among the elite of the main ethnic groups was that the MALAYS held political predominance and that the Chinese continued in their control of the country's economy, with the Indians playing a lesser economic role. Gradually, but without a specific time frame, it was expected that a greater parity would evolve, with MALAYS sharing more of the economic pie and the Chinese and Indians partaking in some aspects of political power. The “Malaysian Malaysia” concept demanded that equal opportunities be given and be open to all, regardless of ethnic background. If it were adopted, the numerical advantage of the Chinese would have them seizing the political stewardship and at the same time dominating the economy. Consequently, the peninsular MALAYS and EAST MALAYSIAN ETHNIC MINORITIES would be in a completely subservient role.

TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990) maintained close ties with Britain and the Commonwealth politically, economically, as well as militarily. The last mentioned was apparent when British and Commonwealth forces assisted the Malaysian military in facing *KONFRONTASI* (“CRUSH

MALAYSIA” CAMPAIGN). In the COLD WAR, MALAYSIA (1963) stood solidly with the Western democracies; it supported the increasing involvement of the United States in Vietnam during the SECOND INDOCHINA WAR (VIETNAM WAR) (1964–1975). It effected no diplomatic relations with either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China (PRC). TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990) was one of the major players in the formation of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967).

SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO) as East Malaysian states experienced glitches in federal-state relations. A political crisis led to the removal of the IBAN chief minister of Sarawak, Stephen Kalong Ningkan (t. 1963–1966), through the use of federal emergency powers by KUALA LUMPUR (KL). Similarly, Donald/Fuad Stephens, Sabah's chief minister (t. 1963–1967), who promoted the interests of the KADAZAN-DUSUNS and allegedly harbored separatist ambitions, was removed by the federal government.

“MAY 13, 1969” (MALAYSIA) was the date of the Sino-Malay riots in KUALA LUMPUR (KL) and in other urban centers; they rocked the entire country. The crisis brought to the fore the leadership of TUN ABDUL RAZAK (1922–1976), then the deputy prime minister, who immediately assumed control of the situation as director of the National Operations Council that governed the country by decree in lieu of a suspended parliament. Neglect of the Malay masses who stood by the sidelines while other ethnic groups—particularly the Chinese—forged forward created frustration and anger within the community. The MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION (MCA) (1949), which was party to the consensual agreement, lost ground to the Chinese-dominated parties of the opposition that demanded a faster end to Malay political predominance. Gains by the opposition Chinese-dominated political parties—namely, Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan, Malaysian People's Movement) and DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (DAP)—in the elections of May 1969 provoked a backlash from the Malays.

Consequent of “MAY 13, 1969” (MALAYSIA), sedition laws were passed that pro-

scribed public discussion relating to sensitive subjects—namely, the powers and status of the Malay sultans, Malay special rights and privileges, statutes making Islam the official religion of the country, and citizenship rights. To nurture integration and solidarity among the multiethnic and multicultural population, a five-principle national ideology, the RUKUNEGARA, was promulgated. The implementation of *Bahasa Malaysia* (Malay language) as the language for education and administration was stepped up. The basic principles of the country's education policy, based on the Razak Report (1956), were aimed at national unity through a national school system using *Bahasa Malaysia* as the language of instruction, a national curriculum, locally recruited teaching staff, and textbooks oriented toward Malaya from 1957, then MALAYSIA (1963). MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN EDUCATION considered as the key to national integration was a minefield, especially over the issue of the language of instruction.

TUN ABDUL RAZAK (1922–1976), who assumed the premiership (t. 1970–1976), implemented the NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP) (1971–1990). In two decades it was expected to eradicate poverty irrespective of ethnicity, extirpate the identification of economic activities along racial lines, and ensure a better distribution of the country's economic pie, as well as educational and employment opportunities. Also targeted were BUMIPUTERA (*BUMIPUTRA*), meaning MALAYS and EAST MALAYSIAN ETHNIC MINORITIES, ownership of 30 percent of the share capital in commercial and industrial concerns by 1990. The NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP) (1971–1990) in its poverty-eradication program focused on rural development where the bulk of the poor—largely MALAYS—resided. DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD (1925–) criticized the government of the aristocratic TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990) in his book *The Malay Dilemma* (1970) for sidelining the development of the Malays vis-à-vis other communities.

In foreign relations TUN ABDUL RAZAK (1922–1976) moved the country out of the pro-Western camp to a neutral stance. In fact, he proposed that Southeast Asia be a ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY (ZOPFAN) (1971). Such a concept was

consistent with the principles agreed to in the ASIAN-AFRICAN (BANDUNG) CONFERENCE (APRIL 1955), although then MALAYSIA (1963) was still under colonial rule. The NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) AND SOUTHEAST ASIA was increasingly relevant to avoid the flaring up of another conflict similar to the ongoing SECOND INDOCHINA WAR (VIETNAM WAR) (1964–1975). TUN ABDUL RAZAK (1922–1976) visited Beijing in 1974, establishing diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC); assurance was given by the Chinese government of noninterference and nonsupport of the MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP).

The formation of the BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974) was an attempt by the ALLIANCE PARTY (MALAYA/MALAYSIA) to encompass a wider membership of political parties that were established largely along ethnic lines. The intention was to lessen politicking among the multitude of parties and to channel all efforts to national development and nation-building.

The secular policies of TUN ABDUL RAZAK (1922–1976), despite the avowed acceptance of Islam as the country's official religion, were viewed with distrust and disappointment by certain quarters of the Malay Muslim community. The 1970s witnessed another wave of ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (TWENTIETH CENTURY). The *dakwah* movement began to impact on the Malay Muslims thanks to the influence of PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) and ANGKATAN BELIA ISLAM MALAYSIA (ABIM), or the Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia. The latter, led by the student leader Anwar Ibrahim (1947–), was highly critical of the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO)-led government for not implementing Islamic principles in governance. PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS), though a component of the BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974) until it left in 1978, accused the government of being un-Islamic; it consistently sought the creation of an "Islamic State" but remained vague as to its structure and content. PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) appealed to the rural, conservative MALAYS in Malay-dominated states such as Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu. As a

response to the onslaught of modernization, globalization, and Western sociocultural influences, the MALAYS turned toward Islam for sustenance, identity, and belonging.

Hussein Onn (1922–1990), son of ONN BIN JA'AFAR (1895–1962), became prime minister on the sudden death of TUN ABDUL RAZAK (1922–1976) in London in 1976. In the domestic sphere, he successfully eliminated corruption involving key figures in the government, the most celebrated case being that of the *Menteri Besar*, or chief minister, of the state of Selangor, who commanded Malay grassroots support. He also neutralized the powerful Mustapha bin Datu Harun, the founding leader of the United Sabah National Organization (USNO), who apparently entertained ambitions of heading a new nation comprising Sabah and three southern provinces of the Philippines (Sulu, MINDANAO, and Palawan). The KUANTAN PRINCIPLE (1980), though not implemented, demonstrated the security concerns of Hussein Onn and Indonesia's president SUHARTO (1921–) over the increasing influence of the PRC and the Soviet Union on Vietnam, which had invaded and occupied Cambodia in late December 1978. The Malaysian-Indonesian statement urged the condemnation of Vietnam for its aggression over Cambodia. However, both Indonesia and MALAYSIA (1963) toed the ASEAN line and dropped the KUANTAN PRINCIPLE (1980).

DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD (1925–) took over the premiership upon the retirement of Hussein Onn in 1981. DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD (1925–) was of common parentage; as a locally trained medical doctor he differed from his predecessors, who had pedigreed backgrounds. Under his leadership the country entered a new era in its development, characterized by phenomenal economic growth throughout the 1980s and lasting till the mid-1990s. The country also enjoyed domestic political stability and became an increasingly important player in the international arena as a voice of the Third World, the South, and the global Muslim community.

Postindependence Burma was plagued with ethnic insurgency, separatist movements, and communist uprisings. Constitutional, civilian government under the ANTI-FASCIST PEOPLE'S FREEDOM LEAGUE (AFPFL)

led by U NU (1907–1995) ruled the country until a coup engineered by GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) brought about a military dictatorship (1962–1974).

The government of U NU (1907–1995) faced revolts from virtually every known ethnic minority in the country. SHAN NATIONALISM provoked a struggle for a Shan state, and the SHAN UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (SURA) sought through the force of arms to attain that objective. The KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ORGANIZATION (KIO) championed the nationalist struggle of that hill minority, the KACHINS of northern Burma. Mostly Christianized, the KACHINS resented the policy of U NU (1907–1995) in making BUDDHISM the official religion of the country. The KAREN NATIONAL UNION (KNU), KAREN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (KNLA), and KAREN NATIONAL DEFENCE ORGANIZATION (KNDO) pursued the separatist aspirations of the KARENS through armed insurgency against the central government. Meanwhile, members of the BURMA COMMUNIST PARTY (BCP) sought the overthrow of the government through revolutionary means.

Under the leadership of GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002), the army undertook a ruthless clampdown on all recalcitrant groups. By the early part of the 1950s most of the country had come under the control of the central government of U NU (1907–1995) at RANGOON (YANGON). Pockets of insurgency remained in the hill regions.

In 1958 schism in the ruling party of the ANTI-FASCIST PEOPLE'S FREEDOM LEAGUE (AFPFL) led U NU (1907–1995) to invite GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) to head a "caretaker" government. Meanwhile preparations were made to hold the forthcoming election scheduled for 1960. The military administration sufficiently quelled most insurgencies, fostered economic growth, and weeded out corruption in the public sector. In the 1960 elections, U NU (1907–1995) won under the banner of his Union Party, the so-called Clean faction of the ANTI-FASCIST PEOPLE'S FREEDOM LEAGUE (AFPFL). BUDDHIST SOCIALISM that envisaged a Buddhist welfare state was the prime objective of U NU (1907–1995). But in declaring BUDDHISM to be the state religion, he antagonized non-Bud-

dhist ethnic groups, notably the SHANS and KACHINS; likewise the MONS and the KARENS also displayed dissatisfaction. The communists were undoubtedly opposed to such a policy. Amid intense opposition toward the central government, with revolts flaring up in the regions of the SHANS and KACHINS, GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) seized control through a coup and instituted military rule from 1962.

A revolutionary council consisting of a handful of senior officers headed by GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) ruled the country by decree; one of the first decrees was the abolition of BUDDHISM as the state religion. GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) transformed the political landscape that accommodated a single-party government; the BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY (BSPP) was created in June 1962 to fulfill that end. Its political philosophy was spelled out in its manifesto, “The Burmese Way to Socialism,” which was composed of a concoction of Marxism and THERAVADA BUDDHISM. The registration of all members of the *SANGHA* was made mandatory, to preempt any attempt by that influential group to rally against the military government. An isolationist policy was adopted. Educational reform was implemented, including the monastic schools replacing the TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION with a curriculum designed to inculcate the state ideology in the younger generation. The process of Burmanization was undertaken in earnest (1963–1971), embracing economic, social, and cultural aspects of the country and affecting the inhabitants in virtually all ways. In a single stroke of the brush, Burmanization eliminated Indian, Chinese, and Western (mostly British) trading and commercial interests that had long dominated the country’s economy during the period of BURMA UNDER BRITISH COLONIAL RULE.

The Burma of GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) was characterized by a stagnating economy, an increasingly flourishing black market, net imports of rice, abuse of power and corruption among the ruling military junta, and an administration staffed by senior military officers. Then in mid-1971, a new constitution and a civilian government assumed power from the military. The civilianization of the government began with the resignation of GEN-

ERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) and twenty of his colleagues to become ordinary citizens who continued to hold the reins of power. The revolutionary council disbanded. Elections held in 1974 in accordance with the new constitution ushered in a council of state under the chairmanship of GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002), who assumed the presidency of the new, civilian government (1974–1988).

As intended, one-party rule was achieved with the civilian government of the BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY (BSPP). A policy reversal was adopted toward the *SANGHA* and BUDDHISM; the civilian government set up the Ministry of Religious Affairs to offer administrative and financial support. Religious courts were revived to further monitor recalcitrant elements within the Buddhist order. Indians and Chinese were accorded “associated” or “naturalized” categories of citizenship that came with restricted rights in politics and the economy; they were barred from the armed forces.

Notwithstanding the granting of amnesty to U NU (1907–1995) and the release of thousands of political prisoners, the civilian government of the BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY (BSPP) faced civil unrest, with riots in late 1974 caused by rice shortages. Student riots broke out in 1976 to protest declining educational quality standards. Without prior approval from GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002), the BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY (BSPP) government implemented several liberal policies in response to the social turmoil: foreign aid and investment were encouraged, and the disclosure of assets by public servants and politicians was made mandatory.

GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) reacted with a policy reversal and undertook a series of purges (1976, 1977, 1978) of the BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY (BSPP). He replaced the top positions of the party with serving as well as retired military officers. In 1981, GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) officially stepped down as president. San Yu assumed the presidency, but it was apparent that his predecessor still held the reins of power behind the scenes. For the next decade (the 1980s), socialist principles were adhered to under the leadership of military personnel.

A combination of adverse weather, mismanagement in rice and other agricultural produc-

tion and distribution, and escalating inflation resulted in appalling poverty throughout the country. Publicly admitting errors on the part of the government in August 1987, GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) implemented various reforms to alleviate the situation. State control over basic food items including rice was lifted; likewise the government monopoly on rice exports in 1988. Devaluation of the *kyat*, intended to undermine the black market, effectively limited the flow of money in the country, prompting student protests in RANGOON (YANGON) and elsewhere. Police reprisals were brutal; universities and schools were closed, and curfew was imposed in most regional centers as unrest spread nationwide.

In response to the national crisis, GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) and San Yu stood down from their positions in July 1988. Both the chairmanship of the ruling party and the presidency of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (as the country was then officially designated) passed to the hands of Sein Lwin, a known hardliner. Not surprisingly, protests by reform groups in August were brutally suppressed; it was alleged that thousands were killed.

Under Dr. Maung Maung the situation was stabilized. Martial law was lifted, political prisoners were released, and there were promises of reforms, including elections within three months. Political parties were permitted, hence the emergence of the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD), which subsequently became the main opposition party. Its leaders included former colleagues and associates of GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002) such as Brigadier General Aung Gyi and General U Tin Oo. Undoubtedly the most high-profile and most popular leader of the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) was the daughter of the slain AUNG SAN (1915–1947), DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–).

Anticipating a landslide victory for the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) in the forthcoming elections, in September 1988 General Saw Maung, who headed the armed forces, launched a coup. Citing his intention to ensure public order in the follow-up to the elections, he instead established a new military junta, the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL

(SLORC), with himself as chairman. All governmental institutions and bodies were abolished, demonstrations were proscribed, and a dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed throughout the country. The army was accused of massacring several hundred protestors following the coup.

SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) was the first president (t. 1945–1967) of an independent Indonesia. In June 1945 he introduced PANCASILA (PANTJA SILA), the philosophical principles that he hoped would be adopted for an independent Indonesia. The five principles were “belief in one God,” “nationalism,” “humanitarianism,” “democracy,” and “social justice.” PANCASILA (PANTJA SILA) was incorporated in the preamble of the 1945 constitution and subsequently in the 1949 and 1950 versions. These national principles were intended to act as a unifying set of noble values amid the diversity of the land and the people. The principle of “A belief in one God” was intended to deflect any demands for an Islamic state and at the same time to reject COMMUNISM as the state ideology. Furthermore, BHINNEKA TUNGGAL IKA (“UNITY IN DIVERSITY”), Indonesia’s national motto adopted in August 1950, encapsulated the multiethnic, multicultural population spread over 13,000 islands.

The experiment with parliamentary democracy between 1950 and 1957 under the figure-head presidency of SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) and several brief governments, where prime ministers and cabinets had to resign owing to lack of support, was at best ineffective in attending to the multitude of challenges. The rapid succession of governments of no fewer than five prime ministers and their respective cabinets and governments created disillusionment and lack of confidence.

Disparity and conflicts arose between the heavily populated JAVA and the resource-rich SUMATRA and the Outer Islands. During this period rebellions were aplenty, from the secessionist REPUBLIK MALUKU SELATAN (RMS, REPUBLIC OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCAS) to the Islamic DARUL ISLAM MOVEMENT (DI) in JAVA, SUMATRA, and SULAWESI (CELEBES). The latter sought the establishment of an Islamic state.

One significant achievement that raised the country’s standing on the world stage was the

hosting of the ASIAN-AFRICAN (BANDUNG) CONFERENCE (APRIL 1955), which gave voice to the dilemmas faced by small countries caught in the COLD WAR. The NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) AND SOUTHEAST ASIA offered an alternative, that of neutrality: nations in the region could adopt a neutral stance instead of being manipulated into one of the contending camps—namely, Western democracies versus the communist bloc.

On the domestic front, the elections of 1955 proved the ascendancy of four leading political parties: PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920), MADJELIS SJURO MUSLIMIN INDONESIA (MASJUMI) (COUNCIL OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONS), PERSERIKATAN NASIONAL INDONESIA (PNI) (1927), and NAHDATUL ULAMA. In terms of support, there was a JAVA predominance among the parties except for MADJELIS SJURO MUSLIMIN INDONESIA (MASJUMI) (COUNCIL OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONS), which possessed strongholds in western SUMATRA, southwestern SULAWESI (Celebes), and among the Sundanese of eastern JAVA. Cleavages were also drawn between the SANTRI (devout Muslims), staunch supporters of NAHDATUL ULAMA, and ABANGAN (pre-Islamic syncretism) that provided sustenance to MADJELIS SJURO MUSLIMIN INDONESIA (MASJUMI) (COUNCIL OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONS).

SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) became restless holding an impotent presidency. In early 1957, with backing from GENERAL ABDUL HARIS NASUTION (1918–2000), the chief of staff of the army, SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) demanded a return to the 1945 constitution whereby the president was not only the ceremonial head of state but also invested with executive power to govern.

Having straddled himself with executive power, SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) introduced GUIDED DEMOCRACY (*DEMOKRASI TERPIMPIN*), which drew sustenance from indigenous concepts and indigenous styles of decision-making. *Musyawarah* and *mufakat* were two procedures commonly practiced at the village level that were adopted at the national level. The former refers to prolonged discussions before arriving at a consensual (*mu-*

fakat) decision. He proposed the inclusion of functional groups besides political parties to compose the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People's Consultative Assembly). Overall, GUIDED DEMOCRACY (*DEMOKRASI TERPIMPIN*) represented a retreat toward authoritarianism, the curtailment of democracy and at the same time increased authoritarian rule with SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) as supreme dictator. SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) sought self-glorification and embarked on a grandiose campaign with symbols of greatness reflected in national monuments and impressive public buildings matched by equally impressive slogans to make his fellow countrymen proud to be Indonesians and of their independence.

More concerned with showmanship and his oratorical skills, SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) was uninterested in day-to-day administration and attending to real issues facing his regime. On the economic front GUIDED DEMOCRACY (*DEMOKRASI TERPIMPIN*) was a national calamity. The country suffered from high inflation, declining exports, and a massive foreign debt. Nationalization of Western, mainly Dutch, enterprises, with a military that lacked managerial and technical expertise assuming control, led to neglect, decline, and waste. The land reform program, though commendable, faced bureaucratic inertia as well as resistance from vested local interests.

SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970), acting like the Javanese *dalang* (“puppeteer”), orchestrated a balancing act between the armed forces and PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920), often playing one against the other. He consistently shielded the communists from attacks by the army and increasingly made use of communist rhetoric—for example, emphasizing the continuing revolution for the poor and the oppressed. SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) used the PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920) in mobilizing popular support. By the mid-1960s the PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920) claimed to receive support from more than one-third of the country's population. Although Indonesia adopted a neutralist stance following the ASIAN-AFRICAN (BANDUNG) CONFERENCE (APRIL 1955), SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) pro-

gressively moved against the Western democracies (Oldfos, Old Established Forces, as against Nefos, New Emerging Forces). The army and Muslim groups were concerned about the potential threat of the communists, though none held power; some quarters even speculated about a coup by the PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920) following the death or sickness of SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970).

Therefore, during the second half of the 1950s there emerged the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia), a right-wing uprising of the military in response to GUIDED DEMOCRACY (*DEMOKRASI TERPIMPIN*). The intention was to establish a conservative national government with a more balanced representation than the JAVA-based, increasingly left-leaning central administration, which apparently sidelined the Outer Islands. PRRI was confined to western parts of SUMATRA and northern SULAWESI (CELEBES). The recalcitrant army units that set up PRRI were crushed within four months in 1958; remnants of the rebel force, however, continued their struggle until 1961.

The parochial and staunchly Islamic ACEH (ACHEH) began in the early 1950s to resent the JAVA-based central government that from the vantage point of faraway northern SUMATRA was corrupt, un-Islamic, and nonchalant regarding affairs of the provinces. Daud Beureu'eh (1906–1987) led a rebellion in ACEH (ACHEH) in the latter part of 1953 that subsequently merged into the wider DARUL ISLAM MOVEMENT (DI), which aimed at the creation of an Islamic state of Indonesia. As a peace settlement, ACEH (ACHEH) was accorded the status of *Daerah Istimewa* (“Special Territory”) in 1959, which allowed it greater autonomy over religious and educational affairs.

In foreign relations SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) won genuine support among Indonesians when IRIAN JAYA (WEST IRIAN) was recovered in 1962. (The Dutch retained the territory in 1949.) *KONFRONTASI* (“CRUSH MALAYSIA” CAMPAIGN) was launched in 1963 in response to SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) perceiving MALAYSIA (1963) as a British strategy to retain its influence in Southeast Asia. The In-

donesian armed forces launched cross-border incursions into SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO) with inconsequential results. In protest against the appointment of MALAYSIA (1963) as a member of the UN Security Council, Indonesia withdrew from the world body.

The GESTAPU AFFAIR (1965) on 30 September witnessed the kidnapping and killing of six generals by a group of allegedly left-wing junior army officers. Then a full-scale attempt at seizure of power was launched, despite the poor preparation for such a major undertaking. The backlash was spearheaded by SUHARTO (1921–), then deputy to the army chief of staff and commander of KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserve Command). The communists were blamed for the coup attempt. The PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920) was proscribed. The ensuing witch hunt claimed, it was believed, the deaths of half a million party members and communist sympathizers, mainly at the hands of the army. Another 1.5 million were detained for various periods.

Between October 1965 and March 1966 SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) was increasingly eased out of power. Initially elected as acting president by the MPR in March 1967 and as president in March 1968, SUHARTO (1921–) was cautious not to provoke the supporters of the charismatic and still-popular SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970). The latter moved off center stage and remained under house arrest until his death in 1970.

ORDE BARU (THE NEW ORDER) was the regime ushered in by SUHARTO (1921–) when he assumed the reins of power. First and foremost, in external relations, he terminated *KONFRONTASI* (“CRUSH MALAYSIA” CAMPAIGN) and by 1966 attained normalization with KUALA LUMPUR (KL). Likewise Indonesia rejoined the United Nations. In 1967, Indonesia became one of the founding members of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967). ADAM MALIK (1917–1984), architect of the foreign policy of *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER), played a significant role in rehabilitating Indonesia's international standing. Besides ADAM MALIK (1917–1984), the *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER) regime incorporated civilian leaders such as Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX of YOGYAKARTA

(JOGJAKARTA). The armed forces allied with the civil administration to support a basically authoritarian form of government headed by SUHARTO (1921–) at the apex of its power structure.

Political groups were amalgamated with Muslim-based parties coming under the umbrella of the United Development Party, whereas non-Muslim parties joined the Indonesian Democratic Party. Then there was the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups, or GOLKAR, a nonpartisan government-sponsored organization comprising the functional groups (similar to those of the MPR). In reality, GOLKAR was a government party with full support of the incumbent during elections.

The regime of the *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER) adopted the *PANCASILA* (*PANTJA SILA*) as the national ideology. It was vigorously promoted during the first two decades of SUHARTO's (1921–) 30-year presidency.

Dwifungsi, or dual function, the idea that the military undertook the dual roles of national defense and ensuring a stable and efficient government, guaranteed the prominent place of the military in the *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER) setup. Operating on this concept, members of the Indonesian armed forces (serving and retired personnel) took on the task of becoming village heads, factory managers, and chief executive officers (CEOs) of corporations to cabinet ministers.

The *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER), in contrast to its predecessor, was fully committed to economic recovery. A group of U.S.-trained economists was entrusted to effect the turnaround of the deteriorating economy. Their efforts bore fruit. Within a decade the economy not only recovered but also was rapidly developing, with impressive growth rates. Inflation was reduced and the *rupiah* stabilized. Adoption of new techniques in rice cultivation improved production to the extent that by the early 1980s the country had become self-sufficient in rice, the staple food. Foreign direct investments (FDIs) paid handsome returns, especially conspicuous in oil and natural gas exploration and exploitation (through Pertamina, the state oil corporation), forestry, and the manufacturing sector. FDIs benefited the Outer Islands, specifically northern SUMATRA, Riau, IRIAN JAYA (WEST IRIAN), and eastern Kaliman-

tan. Profits from the oil industry underwrote a massive program of infrastructure development that was viewed as the basis for growth. Military entrepreneurs drawing from a younger generation with business savvy, coupled with managerial skills, brought success and profits to military-managed enterprises.

Economic development and the successes gained brought about the emergence of an Indonesian middle class. A cross-sectional profile of its components ranged from rural small-time traders to big-time capitalists, top bureaucrats to clerical personnel, military officers, professionals, and Chinese entrepreneurs (from retail shop owners to wealthy industrialists). The booming economy helped to spur rapid population growth. A decade of the vigorous implementation of the transmigration scheme (transferring inhabitants from densely populated regions like JAVA and BALI to sparsely populated areas like BORNEO and SUMATRA) succeeded to some extent in lessening population pressure, especially in JAVA. The social consequences of transmigration and the blossoming middle class began to be felt toward the third decade of SUHARTO's (1921–) rule.

The transmigration program in the 1970s that brought other Indonesians to ACEH (ACHEH) was greatly resented by the highly provincial Acehnese, who felt that their autonomy was being compromised. Furthermore, the exploitation of natural resources such as natural gas and coal by the central government, with few of the profits being plowed back to the province, angered the locals. The general feeling was that the autonomy granted in the late 1950s was being eroded. Exploiting the widespread resentment, Hasan di Tiro established the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement) in 1976; he boldly declared the independence of ACEH (ACHEH) in 1977. When the military suppressed the rebellion, Hasan di Tiro formed a government-in-exile in Sweden, where he and several others were granted political asylum.

Dictatorship was in the making when in November 1965 constitutionally elected FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989), shortly after his second term as Philippine president, declared MARTIAL LAW (1972–1981) (THE PHILIPPINES). During his first term, Marcos faced serious opposition: student activism, a renewed leftist insurgency by the NEW

PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA), and secessionist movements from Muslims in MINDANAO. From 1969, student demonstrations increased in frequency, demanding social justice and economic sovereignty. The latter referred to the preferential status accorded foreign, particularly U.S., businesses and investments. The gap between the rich and the poor was rapidly widening; the flawed distribution of the country's economic pie made the rich richer and the poor poorer, forcing the latter to seek revolutionary solutions to their predicament. The frustration and dissatisfaction of the lower classes resulted in their swelling the ranks of the NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA), the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), led by Jose Maria Sison (1939–). While the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP, Philippines Communist Party) preferred the constitutional and parliamentary way to redress grievances and condemned violence, Sison and the CPP turned to armed revolutionary means. The Muslim MOROS of the southern Philippines had long resented the rule of the Christian central government of MANILA and sought cession. The MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF), headed by NUR MISUARI (1940–), launched an armed struggle to break away from the Republic of the Philippines.

The presidency (t. 1965–1986) of FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989) witnessed a mounting foreign debt brought about by massive public expenditure on infrastructure, largely financed by foreign loans. Critics accused the Marcoses—the president and the first lady, Imelda Romualdez Marcos (1930–)—of having amassed a huge personal fortune allegedly plundered from the country; likewise their associates (cronies), who had benefited enormously from government contracts involving corruption and plunder. Conspicuous consumption by the first family further fueled rumors of personal aggrandizement. Key wealthy landowning families and political figures kept private armies.

Against this volatile backdrop and as a means not only to secure but also to strengthen Marcos's position, MARTIAL LAW (1972–1981) (THE PHILIPPINES) was imposed from September 1972. Under a new constitution, FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989) was both president and prime minister, possessing far-

reaching executive and legislative powers. He was empowered to dictate the convening of the National Assembly (Batasang Pambansa). In 1978 he formed the NEW SOCIETY MOVEMENT (KILUSANG BAGONG LIPUNAN, KBL), created specifically to keep him in power. Not surprisingly, the KBL won in the elections to the National Assembly in April 1978 as well as in local polls held in January 1980.

Under MARTIAL LAW (1972–1981) (THE PHILIPPINES), which ran until January 1981, the country returned to authoritarian dictatorial rule. The justification for declaring MARTIAL LAW (1972–1981) (THE PHILIPPINES) was the deteriorating law-and-order situation in the country, which was rapidly sliding into anarchy with antigovernment demonstrations and a declining economy, in addition to a growing Muslim secessionist movement in the southern provinces. All protests and dissents were violently suppressed; democracy was suspended. Opposition politicians, including Benigno ("Ninoy") Aquino Jr. (1932–1983), were held in detention. Large hoards of firearms were confiscated from the general public, and private militias were disbanded. Owing to these high-handed measures, there was a temporary lull in antigovernment protests during the mid-1970s.

In the Tripoli Agreement brokered by Muammar al-Qaddafi (1942–) of Libya in the late 1970s, the Philippines government agreed to grant regional autonomy to the Muslim areas in the southern provinces. It was alleged that leaders of the MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) were bought over with large monetary handouts.

Despite repressive measures, from the late 1970s, antigovernment protests were again active and highly vocal. Under pressure from the international community and especially from Washington, MARTIAL LAW (1972–1981) (THE PHILIPPINES) was lifted in early 1981. Earlier, several political detainees had been released. Upon his leaving detention in May 1980, Aquino left for the United States for medical treatment.

Three years later, in August 1983, Aquino returned home from self-exile in the United States. Among the leaders of the opposition, Aquino appeared to be the most viable alternative to FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–

1989). Upon alighting from the aircraft, Aquino was shot by one Rolando Galman, who in turn was killed by military guards. According to the published report (October 1984) of an independent commission of inquiry, a military conspiracy had engineered the assassination. Twenty-five officers, including General Fabian Ver, commander of the armed forces, were tried for the murder.

By the mid-1980s the Philippines was racked with daily demonstrations, faced with a massive foreign debt, and suffering a tottering economy close to collapse. The disparate opposition prudently decided to combine under the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO). When presidential elections were announced for early 1986, CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–), Aquino's widow, and Salvador Laurel became presidential and vice presidential candidates, respectively, on the UNIDO ticket. Just prior to the elections, General Ver and others were acquitted of murder charges; many believed that FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989) had had a hand in the verdict.

In the presidential elections on 7 February 1986, FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989) claimed victory. The government's Commission on Elections (Comelec) authenticated this claim, and the National Assembly endorsed Marcos as president. Meanwhile, the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel), an election watchdog organization financed by the National Endowment for Democracy based in the United States, declared CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–) president. The influential Catholic Church of the Philippines led by Cardinal Jaime Sin declared the elections a fraud; several foreign observers concurred. A week later Aquino launched a nonviolent civil disobedience campaign to protest the election results.

Thereafter a military coup by right-wing reformist army officers (Reform the Armed Forces Movement, RAM) occurred on 21 February. The following day saw the minister of national defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, and the deputy chief of staff of the armed forces, Lieutenant General FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–), seeking refuge in Camp Aguinaldo; both had renounced their support for FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989). Within the next two days Enrile and Ramos received sup-

port from Cardinal Jaime Sin and the United States. Led by CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–), more than a million Filipinos from all walks of life gathered peacefully at EDSA (Epifanio De los Santos Avenue—henceforth the EDSA REVOLUTION [1986]) to lend their support to the duo. Under pressure from Washington, on 25 February FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989) reluctantly left the presidential Malacanang Palace for Hawai'i on board a U.S. Air Force plane. The EDSA REVOLUTION (1986) of "people power" had brought about the presidency of CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–) (t. 1986–1992).

Following the partition, SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) came under a noncommunist regime headed by former emperor BẢO ĐÀI (VĨNH THỤY) (1913–1997). In June 1954, NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM (1901–1963), with backing from the United States, became prime minister. In October 1955 through a government-orchestrated referendum, BẢO ĐÀI (VĨNH THỤY) (1913–1997) was removed as head of state and replaced by NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM (1901–1963), who also assumed the premiership. Together with his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu (d. 1963), who operated a pervasive secret security force, NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM (1901–1963) attempted through totalitarian methods to eliminate all opposition. His pro-Catholic regime alienated the majority Buddhist population—particularly his repressive campaigns against members of the Buddhist clergy. Apart from plans for land reform that failed to materialize owing to resistance from vested interests, NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM (1901–1963) expanded resources in building up the ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN). The communists, referred to as VIET CONG, were the main enemy, as they sought to overthrow the regime and reunify the country. NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM (1901–1963) rejected the all-Vietnamese elections as provided for by the Final Declaration consequent of the GENEVA CONFERENCE (1954).

In NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) under HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969) launched a land reform program (1953–1956) designed to eliminate as a class rich peasants and landlords. The lands thus confiscated were redistributed to landless farmers. Cooperatives were established

in the late 1950s; another energetic drive, by TRUONG CHINH (1907–1988), commenced a decade later. The less conservative LE DUAN (1907–1986) replaced TRUONG CHINH (1907–1988) as party secretary in 1959. In order to assess the situation himself, LE DUAN secretly toured SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) in 1956 and again in 1958. He was responsible for designing a new strategy (1959) for the armed struggle undertaken by the VIET CONG. Courted by both Moscow and Beijing with material support and technical assistance, LE DUAN (1907–1986) was treading on delicate ground against the backdrop of the SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

In 1960 the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet Nam, popularly known as the National Liberation Front (NLF), was established to challenge the SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY) regime. At this time U.S. president John Fitzgerald Kennedy (t. 1961–1963) was convinced of the DOMINO THEORY, first advanced by his predecessor Dwight David Eisenhower (t. 1953–1961); he therefore determined to contain the spread of COMMUNISM. A contingent of U.S. Army personnel (about 8,000) were stationed in SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) as advisers to the ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN). In mid-1963 the VIET CONG launched an offensive and through guerrilla tactics managed to control several rural areas. Then in November 1963, apparently with U.S. approval, elements within the ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) ousted NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM (1901–1963), who was killed together with Ngo Dinh Nhu. Following the coup, two more military seizures of power occurred before NGUYỄN VAN THIỆU (1923–2001) became head of state and Nguyễn Cao Ky his prime minister. (Under the new constitution in 1967, NGUYỄN VAN THIỆU [1923–2001] was elected president [t. 1967–1975], and Nguyễn Cao Ky, vice president.)

The GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT (AUGUST 1964), the naval exchange between U.S. warships and naval units of NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945), was the pretext used by President Lyndon Baines Johnson (t. 1963–1969) to commence the involvement of the United States in Vietnam on a massive scale.

The U.S. Congress had given the president *carte blanche* authority to address the situation in Vietnam without any formal declaration of war. The number of U.S. combat troops rose rapidly; by early 1968, U.S. military forces stood at more than half a million men. The naval fire-fight in the GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT (AUGUST 1964) was the first salvo in the SECOND (VIETNAM WAR) INDOCHINA WAR (1964–1975), commonly referred to as the Vietnam War.

The increasing presence of U.S. combat troops as well as contingents from the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) witnessed the escalation of the conflict. Aerial bombardment over NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) commenced in March 1965. Although no regular DRV troops were deployed at this juncture (mid-1960s), the VIỆT CONG through the NLF received supplies from NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945). The HỒ CHÍ MINH TRAIL, a complex network of hidden and camouflaged tracks through jungles traversing southern Laos and northeastern parts of Cambodia, was the main supply conduit between NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) and SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945). Military aid from the Soviet Union to the DRV increased proportionally to the escalation of this undeclared war.

The TET OFFENSIVE (1968), though a military defeat for the VIỆT CONG that launched a major offensive, including attacks on SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY), was a political triumph. The offensive was coupled with domestic mass demonstrations in the United States, and Washington was forced to reevaluate its Vietnam policy. Informal peace talks began in Paris; then in early 1969, President Richard Milhous Nixon (t. 1969–1974) converted that informal discussion into a peace conference involving all parties concerned. The PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT (1968, 1973) (VIETNAM) at this stage came to nothing. Nixon commenced troop withdrawals, as domestic pressure was mounting for disengagement.

Notwithstanding the PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT (1968, 1973) (VIETNAM), the years from 1969 to 1970 saw the intensification of the war. In April 1970 the Americans launched an invasion of Cambodia to unseat

NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–). The following year they made incursions into Laos in an attempt to destroy the HỒ CHÍ MINH TRAIL. The early part of 1970 witnessed the entry of regular troops of the DRV.

The year 1972 was a turning point in the SECOND (VIETNAM WAR) INDOCHINA WAR (1964–1975). By the early part of the year the number of U.S. combatants stood at about 95,000, following withdrawals since 1969. The VIET CONG launched a new offensive. The U.S. response was the massive bombardment of NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945), including HANOI (THANG-LONG) and the mining of Haiphong and other harbors. By September a deadlock in the conflict was apparent.

Meanwhile, on the outskirts of Paris, secret discussions were held (starting in 1969) between LE DUC THO (1911–), a senior figure of the DRV, and Dr. Henry Kissinger (1923–), chief presidential adviser on foreign policy and national security. In order to force the communists to the negotiating table following the collapse of secret talks, December 1972 witnessed the heaviest bombing raids on NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945), including on HANOI (THANG-LONG). The following January a ceasefire agreement was secured in Paris. In the PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT (1968, 1973) (VIETNAM), the United States agreed to a complete withdrawal and the DRV reciprocated by the return of U.S. prisoners of war.

As far as the U.S. government was concerned, the war had ended. The issue of MIAs (MISSING IN ACTION) remained unresolved, and MY LAI and similar incidents continued to haunt the U.S. conscience. The Vietnam War was a war that Washington and the U.S. public would prefer to forget.

LE DUAN (1907–1986) lent his support to a new offensive in early 1975, one aimed at toppling the government of NGUYỄN VĂN THIỆU (1923–2001). To the delighted surprise of the campaign's planners, the ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN), without their U.S. allies, offered scant resistance, and within two months (instead of the anticipated two years), the regime collapsed. SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY) was captured on 30 April 1975 without much fighting.

The two decades following Cambodia's independence in 1953 witnessed challenges to the

political ascendancy of NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) from virtually all shades of the political spectrum. Feeling restricted as a constitutional monarch, he stood down from the throne to establish the SANGKUM REASTRE NIYUM (PEOPLES' SOCIALIST COMMUNITY) (MARCH 1955), a mass political movement. (His father, Norodom Suramarit [t. 1955–1960], succeeded to the throne.) The SANGKUM REASTRE NIYUM (PEOPLES' SOCIALIST COMMUNITY) (MARCH 1955) defeated the Democrats in the polls held in late 1955 and dominated the National Assembly. Styled as Prince NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–), he was prime minister until he ascended the throne upon his father's death in 1960. His authoritarian rule limited all forms of political activity; the state police clamped down on all opposition. A handful of Cambodian communists fled to the northeast forest fringe of the country bordering Vietnam; in that isolated refuge, POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998) and his comrades built up the KHMER ROUGE, or Red Khmer.

In foreign relations NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) adopted a nationalist stance opposing in general the U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (POST-1945) and in particular the U.S. role in SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) and in the SECOND (VIETNAM WAR) INDOCHINA WAR (1964–1975). U.S. MILITARY BASES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, especially those established in SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) and Thailand, were viewed with misgivings. But at the same time, NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) was not in favor of a communist victory in the Vietnam conflict and the threat of a unified Vietnam under HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969). Publicly Cambodia then adopted a neutrality position on the international stage. In 1965, however, convinced of Washington's attempt through the regime of NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM (1901–1963) to topple his government, NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) broke off diplomatic relations with the United States. To counter the U.S. threat, he allowed the VIỆT CONG to operate on Cambodian soil; secret agreements with HANOI (THANG-LONG) protected a communist offensive against PHNOM PENH. At the same time, he also moved closer to Beijing when the Vietnam War escalated from the mid-1960s.

Domestically, NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–), though revered by the masses, faced serious opposition from both the conservative right and the radical left. The former resented his break with Washington while the latter was indignant over the shackles placed on political dissent. Furthermore, the non-state-orchestrated elections of 1966 brought members to the National Assembly who were not particularly pro-Sihanouk. Drawn from the small Cambodian intelligentsia, these members voiced their opposition to the authoritarian regime. The prince responded with even more severe repression against the opposition forces. The pro-U.S. Khmer Serei headed by SON NGOC THANH (1907–1976?) received the brunt of the prince's wrath, including public executions of its members (or Thanists). Notwithstanding his clandestine arrangements with the VIET CONG, POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998) and his comrades increasingly engaged the Cambodian army in skirmishes in the northeast of the country. Rapprochement with Washington increased domestic communist opposition. There had been a deteriorating economic situation since the mid-1960s, and by 1969 NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) found himself caged in on all sides; he had failed in his juggling act to play off one enemy against the other.

In March 1970, LON NOL (1913–1984), the prime minister of Cambodia and commander of the armed forces, together with anti-communist elements such as SON NGOC THANH (1907–1976?), engineered a bloodless coup that ousted NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) from power. The prince was in Moscow when the plotters announced the establishment of the Khmer Republic headed by LON NOL (1913–1984). The coup leaders justified their action by arguing that NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) had compromised the country's sovereignty and permitted a threat to its independence by allowing the VIET CONG sanctuary on Cambodian soil. LON NOL (1913–1984) assumed the presidency, while SON NGOC THANH (1907–1976?) became the prime minister of the new government.

From Moscow, NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) proceeded to Beijing. Convinced of U.S. involvement in his ouster, he readily agreed with his Chinese host to head a united

front government-in-exile that incorporated the KHMER ROUGE and was allied with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), then headed by LE DUAN (1907–1986). The prince thereupon entered the socialist camp in the COLD WAR.

The formation of the Khmer Republic of LON NOL (1913–1984) brought the country into the SECOND (VIETNAM WAR) INDOCHINA WAR (1964–1975). Opposition to the new government in the form of mass demonstrations by NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) loyalists and communists prompted an invasion by a joint U.S. and ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) force in May 1970. Ironically, the invasion, which was meant to eliminate the VIET CONG in eastern Cambodia, instead drove them farther inland. The Vietnamese communists assisted the KHMER ROUGE in training and organization, provision of military supplies, and recruitment. With Vietnamese support the KHMER ROUGE was in a stronger position to play a greater role in the United National Front of Cambodia (FUNC), led by NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) in exile. LON NOL (1913–1984) on his part launched two unsuccessful offensives against the VIET CONG and KHMER ROUGE.

Notwithstanding massive U.S. military and economic aid, the corrupt Khmer Republic was crumbling. The armed forces of LON NOL (1913–1984) suffered defeat toward the close of 1972. The Vietnamese presence was most unpopular among the population, and the government's inability to eject them encouraged opposition demanding its removal. The saturation bombing undertaken by the U.S. Air Force over Cambodia for the greater part of 1973 was inconsequential. But the PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT (1968, 1973) (VIETNAM) resulted in the withdrawal of the VIET CONG from Cambodia. Toward the end of 1973, LON NOL (1913–1984) controlled only the capital city, PHNOM PENH, parts of the northwest region, and several provincial towns; the rest of the country was under the KHMER ROUGE.

The ascendancy of the KHMER ROUGE was apparent when they occupied ministerial portfolios in the government-in-exile styled as the Royal Government of National Union of

Cambodia, led by the then-powerless NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–). Despite past assistance and collaboration, the KHMER ROUGE always viewed the Vietnamese communists as a threat and began to eliminate (mainly killed) pro-Vietnamese elements within their ranks. KHMER ROUGE forces rapidly closed in on PHNOM PENH. In early April 1975 the Khmer Republic collapsed; the KHMER ROUGE captured PHNOM PENH on 17 April. Earlier, LON NOL (1913–1984) was airlifted by the Americans to Hawai'i.

Within weeks of their victory and entry into PHNOM PENH, the KHMER ROUGE removed all inhabitants to the countryside, leaving behind ghost towns. The high death toll from the hurried forced evacuation was the prelude to four horrifying years when Cambodia was transformed into *THE KILLING FIELDS*, which consumed an estimated 1.7 million lives, or about 15 percent of the country's population. (Some estimates place the death toll at more than 2 million.)

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK) was a radical Marxist-Leninist regime set up by the KHMER ROUGE headed by the little-known former schoolteacher POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998). Among his more prominent comrades were IENG SARY (1927–), CHEA SIM (1932–), KHIEU SAMPHAN (1931–), HENG SAMRIN (1934–), and HUN SEN (1951–). Drawing inspiration from Maoist China, the leadership believed in the peasantry as the vanguard of the revolution, and that revolutionary will alone could overcome all obstacles and attain the utopia outlined by COMMUNISM. Money, markets, and private property were abolished; likewise, schools, hospitals, shops, and monasteries were closed. Publication of books and newspapers was proscribed. Everyone was to don peasant clothing (which was dull and formless), not unlike the population in Maoist China. The attempt at achieving total collectivization of the country and doubling the rice output witnessed the emptying of the towns and removal of the entire population to the rural areas, where they became an army of slave laborers. Overwork, disease, malnutrition, starvation, and execution drove the death toll to horrific figures.

The paranoia that engulfed POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998) and the handful of cadres led to the torture and execution of thou-

sands of so-called traitors in the notorious interrogation facility of the regime in PHNOM PENH. Party members were continuously purged to weed out "traitors." This untenable situation drove many, such as HENG SAMRIN (1934–), HUN SEN (1951–), and CHEA SIM (1932–), to defect to the Vietnamese.

Elections were held in March 1976 for the People's Representative Assembly, a legislative body. The restricted electorate, limited to supporters of the KHMER ROUGE, elected KHIEU SAMPHAN (1931–) as chairman and the relatively unknown POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998) as prime minister. NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–), by then in PHNOM PENH, declined the role as the head of state. In 1977, POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998) publicly declared that the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) was the ruling party of the country.

Then on Christmas Day 1978, a huge Vietnamese force invaded Cambodia, and within weeks, DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK) collapsed. POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998) and the KHMER ROUGE fled to Thailand. A Vietnamese-sponsored regime, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), was inaugurated. Accompanying the Vietnamese military force were HENG SAMRIN (1934–), HUN SEN (1951–), and CHEA SIM (1932–), who formed the leadership of the KAMPUCHEA UNITED FRONT FOR NATIONAL SALVATION (KUFNS).

According to the GENEVA CONFERENCE (1954), instead of partition like neighboring Vietnam, an armistice was declared in LAOS (NINETEENTH CENTURY TO MID-1990s). The northeastern provinces of Xam Neua and Phongsali were allocated to the procommunist PATHET LAO (LAND OF LAOS), led by SOUPHANOUVONG (RED PRINCE) (1911–1995), and the rest of the country to the Royal Lao Government (RLG) based in VIENTIANE. Furthermore, elections were to be held as a means of effecting the unification of the country. Having failed to agree on the electoral process, the RLG proceeded with elections in regions under its jurisdiction. Heading the newly formed government was SOUVANNA PHOUMA (1901–1984), younger brother of PHETSARATH (1890–1959) and the half-brother of SOUPHANOUVONG (RED PRINCE) (1911–1995).

By the mid-1950s, the United States had replaced France as the major Western power in Indochina supporting the Republic of Vietnam or SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) and the government of SOUVANNA PHOUMA (1901–1984) in Laos. As in Vietnam, the major concern of the Americans in Laos was to prevent a communist takeover. SOUVANNA PHOUMA (1901–1984), on the other hand, possessed a nationalist agenda—namely, the unification of Laos, and a neutralist stance lest the country be dragged into the COLD WAR. Under an agreement with SOUPHANOUVONG (RED PRINCE) (1911–1995), SOUVANNA PHOUMA (1901–1984) accepted two representatives of the PATHET LAO (LAND OF LAOS) in the coalition in order that national unity be achieved with the inclusion of the two provinces.

The Americans retaliated by cutting off aid to the country, which succeeded in bringing down the coalition government of SOUVANNA PHOUMA (1901–1984). From 1958 to 1960, right-wing elements and the military (Lao National Army [LNA]) took turns dominating the government; the United States resumed its support. In the early part of 1961, amid the clash between the neutralist party led by SOUVANNA PHOUMA (1901–1984) and the PATHET LAO (LAND OF LAOS), headed by SOUPHANOUVONG (RED PRINCE) (1911–1995), the Americans pursued a policy for the neutralization of Laos. A second coalition government including representatives from the PATHET LAO (LAND OF LAOS) declared the neutralization of Laos in July 1962.

SOUVANNA PHOUMA (1901–1984), one of the powerless neutralists in the second coalition government, was able neither to achieve unification nor to prevent the country from being drawn into the conflict in Vietnam. All hope rapidly dissipated following the assassination of the foreign minister in April 1963 in VIENTIANE. PATHET LAO (LAND OF LAOS) representatives in the government hurriedly left the capital.

When the SECOND (VIETNAM WAR) INDOCHINA WAR (1964–1975) broke out, Laos became a pawn between the United States and the DRV. The strategic Plain of Jars and the HỒ CHÍ MINH TRAIL that passes through southern and eastern parts of Laos were vital to

the DRV. The former could be used for launching an offensive on the DRV and the latter was the lifeline for supplies from the DRV to support the VIET CONG in SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945). The Americans recruited the HMONG to wrest the Plain of Jars while massive aerial bombings sought to destroy the HỒ CHÍ MINH TRAIL.

A major casualty of the SECOND (VIETNAM WAR) INDOCHINA WAR (1964–1975), Laos suffered more than 200,000 killed and twice that number wounded. The U.S. aerial bombing of the country was considered the worst in history.

When the third coalition government was constituted in April 1974, it was apparent that the PATHET LAO (LAND OF LAOS) held the upper hand. SOUVANNA PHOUMA (1901–1984) again headed the government; he was the sole neutralist. In LUANG PRABANG, the royal capital, SOUPHANOUVONG (RED PRINCE) (1911–1995) chaired the National Political Consultative Council (NPCC). The following year the die was cast: PHNOM PENH fell to the communist KHMER ROUGE, followed by SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY) to the VIET CONG. Then on 23 August, VIENTIANE was symbolically “liberated” without a shot being fired. King Savang Vatthana (t. 1959–1975) abdicated on 2 December, and the LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) was proclaimed with SOUPHANOUVONG (RED PRINCE) (1911–1995) as president.

The major concern facing the government of postwar prime minister M. R. SENI PRAMOJ (1905–1997) of Thailand in September 1945 was to rehabilitate its wartime alliance with Japan and return to the good graces of the Anglo-American powers. Thanks to his prudent wartime action in refusing to deliver FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM’s (1897–1964) declaration of war on the United States, and instead establishing a chapter of the FREE THAI MOVEMENT in Washington, the Americans sided with the Thais against British demands for war reparations. Moreover, all territories seized by Thailand with Japanese support were returned—namely, territories west of the Mekong River to Laos; the provinces of BATTAMBANG and SIEM REAP to Cambodia;

the northern peninsular Malay States of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu to Malaya; and the Shan States to Burma.

During the period of civilian governments from 1945 to 1948, constitutional democracy was restored and political parties were established. KHUANG APHAIWONG (1902–1968) formed the Democrat Party (DP, Prachatipat), reputedly the only civilian political party to ride successfully the series of coups during the late 1940s and the 1950s. The party owed its survival to its conservative, proroyalist stance, which gained staunch support from the urban electorate, especially of BANGKOK. Corruption and mismanagement among civilian politicians marred their reputations and created resentment from the military. King Ananda Mahidol (Rama VIII) (1935–1946) died from a gunshot wound in the palace in BANGKOK. His mysterious death was blamed, though unsubstantiated, on the prime minister, PRIDI PHANOMYONG (1900–1983), by his political rival FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964). The incident forced the resignation of PRIDI PHANOMYONG (1900–1983), who went into exile.

Sensing the geopolitical situation to be conducive for his return, a military coup seized power in the later part of 1947, which paved the way for FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964) to return to power as prime minister in April 1948. Against the COLD WAR scenario, with mainland Southeast Asia in turmoil, Thailand alone appeared to be a reliable ally to the Western democracies, especially to the Americans. From the late 1940s and the early 1950s it became apparent that U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA was steadily accelerating vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

During his second dictatorship, FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964) set aside the constitution, proscribed all political parties and activities, and clamped down on all opposition; radical elements faced imprisonment or the death sentence. Adopting a staunch anticommunist stance, he made Thailand a devoted ally of the United States; in return, U.S. military and economic aid flowed into the country. BANGKOK became the headquarters of the

SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION (SEATO) (1955), aimed at the collective security of the region against COMMUNISM.

Pragmatism persuaded FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964) to soften his stance on economic nationalism and to establish mutually beneficial alliances with Chinese entrepreneurs in exploiting the economic boom consequent of the KOREAN WAR (1950–1953) and the increasing U.S. presence. Powerful figures within the military emerged to challenge him, the most prominent being General Sarit Thanarat (t. 1958–1963), who later presided over an authoritarian government during his fourteen-year premiership.

Sarit's military dictatorship was characterized by rapid economic modernization opening the country to FDIs, and a boom consequent of the deep involvement of the United States in the SECOND (VIETNAM WAR) INDOCHINA WAR (1964–1975). While BANGKOK was the mecca of entertainment for U.S. troops on rest and relaxation (R&R) sojourns, the countryside benefited from road-building schemes and improvements in communications funded mainly by the U.S. military for security ends. Local businesses prospered in supplying the U.S. bases. The construction sector in BANGKOK and in other provincial towns enjoyed a boom as buildings sprang up to accommodate new businesses. Labor came from the rural areas, lured by the comparatively attractive wages.

Against this background of economic prosperity, traditional values and sociocultural norms and practices were sidelined. The money economy that rapidly engulfed the rural farming communities undermined the traditional social structure that was far more apparent in BANGKOK and other towns. Sarit stepped in to arrest the erosion and sought to restore traditional values. After the CONSTITUTIONAL (BLOODLESS) REVOLUTION (1932) (THAILAND), Sarit reestablished reverence, respect, and loyalty to the Thai throne—BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (RAMA IX, r. 1946–). His predecessor, FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964), during neither his prewar government nor his postwar administration, paid any particular attention to the monarchy.

But the obverse side to development and prosperity was the greater tightening of the political reins. Owing to obsession with security, the inhabitants in the rural areas—particularly in ISAN, the northeast, bordering Laos and Cambodia—came under greater direct control. Resentment drove many to join the communist insurgents operating along the borderlands. The MUSLIM MINORITIES (THAILAND) in southern Thailand harbored secessionist tendencies and rebellions flared up continually. Despite his authoritarian rule, Sarit failed to contain the numerous uprisings throughout the country; beyond the Thai heartland of the central plain there was little security for life and property.

FIELD MARSHAL THANOM KITTIKACHORN (1911–) and General Praphat Charusathien held the reins of power (t. 1963–1973) following Sarit's death in 1963. For the rest of the decade, the new regime rode the crest of prosperity thanks in large part to the escalation of the SECOND (VIETNAM WAR) INDOCHINA WAR (1964–1975). FDIs, mainly Japanese, invested in manufacturing, trade, and agribusiness. Consequent of Washington's decision to negotiate an honorable disengagement from the Vietnam conflict and Nixon's historic visit to Beijing in 1972, followed by the thawing of Sino-American relations, adverse ripples were felt throughout the Thai economy. Cutbacks were made in both the public and private sectors, resulting in widespread resentment. Within the military among those outside the inner circle, there was dissatisfaction with corrupt practices and personal enrichment of the chosen few.

The STUDENT REVOLT (OCTOBER 1973) (THAILAND) that originated from the campus of THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY in BANGKOK was soon replicated on provincial campuses. Students criticized the government for the economic woes and demanded social reforms, besides voicing a multitude of grievances. The National Student Centre of Thailand (NSCT) played a decisive role in organizing the protests. King BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (RAMA IX) (r. 1946–) decided to withdraw support for the military government; henceforth the options for survival were narrowed. Then when armed action against the student demonstrators backfired—the soldiers refused to shoot the students—FIELD MAR-

SHAL THANOM KITTIKACHORN (1911–) and General Praphat Charusathien went into exile.

The period from 1973 to 1976 in the aftermath of the STUDENT REVOLT (OCTOBER 1973) (THAILAND) saw the comings and goings of a series of short-lived, ineffectual civilian governments. This period was characterized by a markedly conservative attitude among the urban electorate (largely the middle class) and an escalation in insurgency in the northeast and peninsular Thailand. Unwavering loyalty to BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (RAMA IX) (r. 1946–) remained strong. There was little progress in economic development, while instability reigned in the countryside. At the same time Thailand sought to disentangle its ties with the United States relating to the military bases.

Between 1976 and 1988 military rule was reinstated. In fact, the urban middle class regarded authoritarian rule as a probable panacea to Thailand's stagnating economy and the increasing instability. But the harshness of Thanin Kraivixien's government (1976–1977) through the military-dominated National Administrative Reform Council (NARC)—which undertook severe reprisals to dissent, particularly from leftist elements—alienated the majority of the middle class. The clampdown on all opposition drove numerous student leaders, leftist activists, labor leaders, and peasant organizers (from farmers' associations) to the jungle to join the communist insurgents. The NARC apparently went overboard; the repressive actions marred the country's international standing. General Kriangsak Chomanan's government (1977–1980) offered a reprieve. His regime scaled down censorship, allowing limited activity by political parties, and released detainees. But like that of his predecessor, his three-year rule was unable to address the deteriorating economic situation.

PREM TINSULANOND (1920–) assumed control, and his military-dominated government (t. 1980–1988) received increasing support from center-right politicians who were the vital linkages among the powerful groups—namely, the military, civilian (politicians), civil service, and business interests. The discovery and exploitation of petroleum and natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand toward the end of the 1970s and increasing FDIs (largely from Japan)

revived economic growth and hastened development. Expansion occurred in the industrial, construction, manufacturing, and agribusiness sectors. The robust economy perked up the middle class, and the working class assumed a new importance. The new emerging urban centers in the provinces began to gradually erode the political primacy of BANGKOK.

The political landscape experienced a transformation that saw the shifting of power bases from the traditional PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS and revolving around personalities to the forging of smart partnerships between interest groups and political ideals. Bankers, industrialists, and other captains of capitalist enterprises began to become involved with political parties, while within the military, groups emerged based on shared political objectives rather than personalities. But political impasse was not uncommon among the various military and civilian groups. The revered monarch BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (RAMA IX) (r. 1946–) increasingly assumed a legitimizing role in Thai politics; often a royal pronouncement would resolve a seemingly insurmountable political deadlock.

In the international arena, Thailand under PREM TINSULANOND (1920–) benefited from the adversarial developments in SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS that on the domestic front meant the drastic reduction in material and moral support from its two patrons for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), the major force of the insurgency in ISAN. Students and others who had fled to join the communists in the north and northeast provinces became disillusioned with the CPT's continuous strategy of protracted peasant warfare. The amnesty offered by the government in 1982–1983 witnessed mass defections. Coupled with earlier successful military campaigns undertaken by General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (later the supreme commander of the armed forces from 1985), the CPT-led insurgency came close to defeat. Thailand opposed the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Vietnamese-sponsored regime of HENG SAMRIN (1934–) and urged its fellow members in the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) to be firm in their stance on the Cambodian issue. Closer military-based ties were forged with the United States, including joint military exercises and military aid projects.

In contrast to Thailand's seesawing trend between parliamentary democracy and authoritarian military rule, SINGAPORE (1819) maintained a stable civilian, paternalistic-style government following its expulsion from MALAYSIA (1963) in 1965. Separation was not unduly problematic; there was little change either constitutionally or administratively. Challenges came in terms of defense and the economy. The British continued their military commitment to SINGAPORE (1819) through the ANGLO-MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN DEFENSE AGREEMENT (AMDA), which operated from 1957 to 1971. (Besides Britain, Australia and New Zealand were members.) Nonetheless, in 1966, Britain announced its military withdrawal "east of Suez" over a ten-year period. Such a move directly affected SINGAPORE'S (1819) position as one of the prime British bases in Southeast Asia. Compulsory national service was introduced to prepare and bolster SINGAPORE'S (1819) defenses. The British intention to bring forward its withdrawal to 1971 sent shock waves through the city-state, as close to one-fifth of its economy was dependent on the British base. Efforts to promote a mixed economy to attract FDIs went hand in hand with promoting export-oriented industrialization. Fortunately for an island republic that historically thrived on trade and commerce, the mid-1960s to the early 1970s saw a global boom. Industrialization and the service sector came to the forefront as significant contributors to the economy. The U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA had a positive effect on SINGAPORE (1819), which, like neighboring Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, furnished an array of supplies to the U.S. military.

The PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP) government of LEE KUAN YEW (1923–) adopted a national policy aimed at increasing living standards but eschewed creating a welfare state. Full employment was one of their principles, in addition to subsidization in housing, public health, and high-quality education (elementary to tertiary). The school curriculum stressed technical skills and English, the language of modernization. Government-built and -subsidized high-rise apartments housed virtually all the population, each family owning its own home. Hospitals both public and private offered unparalleled health care. A single-child family and a strict immi-

gration policy were aimed at capping population growth.

But LEE KUAN YEW (1923–) governed the island republic with a firm hand, emphasizing political stability as the vital prerequisite for economic prosperity. His government's track record for stability was unrivaled in the highly volatile region. There was little room for dissent. The Internal Security Act (ISA), an inheritance from the British colonial period, allowed indefinite detention without trial of anyone deemed by the government to be a security risk.

SINGAPORE (1819) participated in the formation of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967). Only in the mid-1970s did the city-state begin to forge closer links with its regional neighbors, in particular with Malaysia. SINGAPORE-MALAYA/MALAYSIA RELATIONS (ca. 1950s–1990s), often strained, began to thaw in the early 1970s; cooperation was established in combating leftist subversion and in curbing narcotics trafficking. A member of the United Nations and the British Commonwealth since 1965, SINGAPORE (1819) maintained cordial and diplomatic relations with all countries in the world, including Israel and FORMOSA (TAIWAN).

The PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP), led by LEE KUAN YEW (1923–), had been unchallenged for more than two decades in the parliament and the government. The 1981 electoral triumph of J. B. Jeyaretnam of the Workers' Party, followed by Chiam See Tong of the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) in 1984, was a wake-up call to the incumbent PAP. Although inconsequential, the two seats in a parliament dominated by the PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP) showed that their once-invincible armor was now dented. Nevertheless, the opposition's victories did not lead to the emergence of a credible alternative, and none seemed to appear in sight.

Following the election of 1984, Prime Minister LEE KUAN YEW (1923–) decided to hand over the task of day-to-day administration to a younger set of ministers, notably GOH CHOK TONG (1941–), the first deputy prime minister.

The New Population Policy of 1987 encouraged early marriages and the promotion of the three-child family, consequent of a decline in fertility. Immigration of talented Asians to work

and settle in the city-state was another strategy to attain the targeted 4 million by the year 2010.

The uncovering of the so-called Marxist network in 1987, alleged to have members in the opposition Workers' Party and among student and Christian groups, led to the arrest of several activists under the ISA. The following year the ISA was further strengthened in that detention was beyond the review of the law courts, closing virtually all avenues for redress.

Reluctant Sultanate and Blood for Freedom: Independence for Brunei and East Timor

OMAR ALI SAIFUDDIN III, SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1914–1986), and his son and successor, HASSANAL BOLKIAH, SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1946–), were determined that Brunei remain under Britain's protective umbrella lest the wealthy but vulnerable sultanate be absorbed by its ambitious neighbors. In contrast, blood and tears lined the long road to independence for the East Timorese as they became victims of the COLD WAR politics of the 1970s.

Following the abortive BRUNEI REBELLION (DECEMBER 1962) and the banning of the PARTAI RAKYAT BRUNEI (PRB), voices supporting entry into MALAYSIA (1963) from the Brunei Alliance Party were wholly ignored by OMAR ALI SAIFUDDIN III, SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1914–1986). MALAYSIA (1963) came into being without Brunei.

During the latter half of the 1960s the main political party in the sultanate was the PEOPLE'S INDEPENDENCE FRONT (BARI-SAN KEMERDEKAAN RAKYAT, BAKER) (1966). It sought independence through peaceful, constitutional means, pledging complete loyalty to the palace. Nonetheless, several of its members were from the proscribed PARTAI RAKYAT BRUNEI (PRB). In 1968 the party failed to gain support in the district council elections.

In 1967, HASSANAL BOLKIAH, SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1946–), ascended the throne upon the retirement of his father. ANGLO-BRUNEI RELATIONS (NINETEENTH CENTURY to 1980s) entered a new level with the signing of a treaty in 1971 that gave the sultan full control of internal administration, while

Britain handled the sultanate's foreign relations. In a separate treaty, a Gurkha battalion maintained by Britain was stationed in the sultanate.

HASSANAL BOLKIAH, SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1946–), and his father, the former sultan, were both reluctant about independence from Britain. They were suspicious of the intentions of neighboring MALAYSIA (1963) and Indonesia. Relations were strained with Malaysia, as it had not only harbored fugitive members of the PARTAI RAKYAT BRUNEI (PRB) and the establishment of an office in KUALA LUMPUR (KL) but also in 1975 sponsored a delegation to the United Nations presenting its case for independence. Two years later the UN General Assembly sanctioned a Malaysian-sponsored resolution that called for free elections in Brunei, lifting of the ban on political parties, and the return home without prosecution of all exiles.

Having failed to further delay the granting of independence, HASSANAL BOLKIAH, SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1946–), and the former sultan reluctantly penned an agreement pronouncing 1 January 1984 as the date on which Brunei would become a sovereign nation. In 1983 an Anglo-Brunei defense agreement allowed the continuing presence of the Gurkha battalion, maintained by the sultanate.

The strategic location of TIMOR, literally on the doorstep to Australia, witnessed the landings of Australian troops in Dili in East Timor in mid-December 1941, despite Portugal's declaration of its neutrality in the war in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific region. Notwithstanding the stiff resistance they offered the invading Japanese, the Australians were eventually evacuated in early 1943. As with others throughout Southeast Asia, privation to near starvation engulfed the hitherto impoverished inhabitants of East Timor through the war years.

DECOLONIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA was gaining pace in the late 1940s and 1950s, and Portugal was under international pressure to give up its colony of East Timor. The belief then was that East Timor—like Goa and MACAU (MACAO), components of the PORTUGUESE ASIAN EMPIRE—would be absorbed by powerful neighbors; Brunei shared that fear. No move on the part of SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) or SUHARTO (1921–) showed any indication of annexation at this juncture.

The coup in April 1974 in Lisbon offered some hope of possible independence for Portugal's far-flung colonies. Responding to such indications, three East Timorese political organizations emerged. Advocating democratization and eventually independence was the Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT, Timorese Democratic Union). Its supporters were senior civil servants of the colonial administration in league with plantation owners. The Associacao Social Democratica Timorese (ASDT, Timorese Social Democratic Association), composed of intellectuals and Portuguese-trained professionals, insisted on a faster pace to independence and strongly emphasized the implementation of social reforms. (Consequent of colonial neglect, the majority of East Timorese were illiterate, eking out a bare subsistence existence.) Opposing independence—and favoring integration with Indonesia—was the Associacao Popular Democratica Timorese (Apodeti, Timorese Popular Democratic Association). It was believed that this group was supported by Indonesia's intelligence organization, which unofficially and clandestinely was working toward annexation of East Timor. The radical stance of ASDT was appealing, and the organization gained widespread support. Later in that year ASDT acquired the new identity of FRETILIN (FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIA DO TIMOR-LESTE INDEPENDENTE), or Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor. Riding on its popular support, the left-leaning FRETILIN assumed the role of the voice of the East Timorese.

ADAM MALIK (1917–1984), Indonesia's minister of foreign affairs (t. 1966–1977), in June 1974 formally announced that Indonesia respected the self-determination of the East Timorese and had no intention of annexing the territory. But within Indonesia's military and intelligence circles, annexation was the solution, considering the leftist profile of FRETILIN; a "Cuba" on Indonesia's back door was unpalatable to the staunchly anticommunist Indonesian armed forces. The DOMINO THEORY added to the concerns of the military as events in the Indochina peninsula foresaw an eventual communist victory. Therefore the Indonesian military prepared for imminent annexation.

In 1975 events moved rapidly. To forestall possible Indonesian intervention, colonial officials in January proposed that UDT and FRETILIN form a coalition as a national transitional gov-

ernment to independence scheduled by Lisbon to eventuate in the latter part of 1976. The MACAU (MACAO) conference for the decolonization of East Timor took place in May. FRETILIN refused to participate; it opposed the presence of Apodeti, but, more important, objected to Lisbon's taking the leading role in the discussion. Then UDT withdrew from the coalition in May and on 11 August launched a coup, capturing Dili. FRETILIN retook Dili later that month. Meanwhile Indonesian forces moved stealthily into East Timor. By the latter part of November Indonesian intentions were apparent. In response FRETILIN on 28 November declared independence and the establishment of the Democratic Republic of East Timor under the presidency of Francisco Xavier do Amaral. An all-out invasion was under way, apparently with U.S. blessing. On 17 December, Apodeti headed a provisional government of East Timor. Then, in mid-July 1976, East Timor officially was incorporated as Indonesia's twenty-seventh province.

FRETILIN, which continued to maintain wide support, resisted the Indonesian military occupation through guerrilla warfare. Adopting a strategy similar to that of the BRIGGS PLAN, which successfully implemented positive outcomes in the MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960), Indonesia embarked (1977–1979) on the resettlement of villages into strategic hamlets. Although successful from a military perspective, it was a social calamity. Mismanagement and flawed planning resulted in famines that claimed more than 100,000 lives.

Numerous UN resolutions (1975–1982) calling for Indonesia's withdrawal and respect for the self-determination of the East Timorese went unheeded by Indonesia, the United States, and Australia.

Notwithstanding Indonesia's investments, which achieved rapid advances in communications and education, the harsh suppression of dissent, including torture and massacres, alienated the East Timorese. Economic development in commercial agriculture (mainly COFFEE), and the service and construction sectors benefited Indonesian entrepreneurs and the military but not the majority of the East Timorese population, who remained at the poverty line.

In the mid-1980s, Jose Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao assumed the leadership of FRETILIN.

A new impetus to the East Timorese struggle came from Portugal. Lisbon, with support from the United Nations, reasserted its claim as the legitimate governing power of East Timor. Through the European Union, Portugal sought the support of the international community for the plight of East Timor. In 1990, Indonesia began negotiations with Portugal through the office of the UN secretary-general to resolve the issue; Indonesia sought international recognition as the legal administering power for East Timor.

The focus of the international community was brought to bear on the massacre in Dili on 12 November 1991. Perpetrators of the killings, Indonesian military personnel, were court-martialed, resulting in dismissal and sentences of varying periods of imprisonment. The following year Gusmao was captured in Dili and incarcerated in Cipinang prison in Jakarta.

The downfall of SUHARTO (1921–) in mid-1998 was a harbinger of positive developments in East Timor. President Bucharuddin Jusuf (B. J.) Habibie (t. 1998–1999), in an unprecedented announcement in January 1999, stated that in the event that East Timor was not keen on autonomy, Indonesia would allow it to be independent. Furthermore, it was agreed that a referendum (for autonomy or independence) under the auspices of the United Nations would be held in August. Intimidation and violence erupted to coerce the population away from voting.

On 30 August 1999 the referendum was undertaken, and an overwhelming majority rejected autonomy and voted for independence. Indonesia ratified the result of the referendum in October. At the same time the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was formed to oversee the transition to independence. In August 2002, East Timor became a sovereign, independent nation with Gusmao as president.

Some Recent Developments (1980s–2000)

The last two decades of the twentieth century saw a lesser degree of upheaval in Southeast Asia than the previous decades. Vietnam and Laos, together with Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore, steadily progressed, registering healthy signs of economic growth and overall

development. In fact, Singapore was accorded “developed nation” status, while Malaysia and Thailand were dubbed potential “economic tigers.” Indonesia entered a new era with the end of *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER), whereas the Philippines continued with the search for a viable and stable government. The impasse between prodemocracy groups led by DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–) and the military junta of Myanmar (prior to 1989, called Burma) remained unresolved. With the intervention of UN peacekeepers, the volatile situation in Cambodia achieved some semblance of stability and optimism. The ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) expanded its membership to include Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1995), and Cambodia (1999). A challenging and long road lies ahead for the newly independent (2002) East Timor.

Following independence in 1984, Brunei introduced the state ideology *MĒLAYU ISLAM BERAJA* (MIB, MALAY ISLAMIC MONARCHY). Emphasis was on the upholding and promotion of Islamic values, the socio-cultural heritage of the BRUNEI MALAYS, and the Brunei sultanate. BRUNEI MALAYS as *BUMIPUTERA* (*BUMIPUTRA*) took precedence over other BRUNEI ETHNIC MINORITIES by means of preferential treatment. The Chinese community, constituting about one-third of the total population, was classified as noncitizens, deprived of any state benefits. Their economic role was limited to the private sector. MELAYU ISLAM BERAJA (MIB, MALAY ISLAMIC MONARCHY) was the bulwark against modernization, globalization, and other non-Islamic influences. The 1990s witnessed an intensification of Islamization in banking, education, and the mass media.

HASSANAL BOLKIAH, SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1946–) since 1967, and the royal family monopolized power in Brunei. The sultan assumed the portfolios of prime minister and minister of defense; his brother Mohamed held the portfolio of foreign affairs, while brother Jefri undertook that of finance. Jefri was chairman of both the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) and the Amedeo Development Corporation, the largest investment and construction firm in the sultanate.

During the mid-1980s political parties were permitted to function, though under strict sur-

veillance. The BRUNEI NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (BNDP) (1985–1988), supported by Malay professionals and the corporate sector, sought democratization and equitable distribution of the economic pie and administrative power. A breakaway faction formed the BRUNEI NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PARTY (BNSP) (1985), but it was dissolved in less than a year following the publication of its “radical” demands: removal of the sultan as the head of government, an end to the state of emergency (imposed in 1962), and free elections. In 1996 all members of the proscribed PARTAI RAKYAT BRUNEI (PRB) were allowed to return home from exile, but they had to pledge noninvolvement in political activity.

The sultanate suffered undisclosed financial losses in the last quarter of the 1990s, brought about by a combination of developments: plummeting global petroleum prices; haze pollution from forest fires in Kalimantan caused by SWIDDEN AGRICULTURE and logging activities, which harmed tourism; and the collapse of the Amedeo Development Corporation owing to mismanagement.

Following independence Brunei established diplomatic links with numerous countries in the region and beyond. It also joined the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Commonwealth, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Brunei retained its traditional defense with related ties with Britain and Singapore, and in the 1990s it forged military relations with Australia and the United States. The sultanate attended a conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1991 together with other claimants over the SPRATLY AND PARACEL ARCHIPELAGOS DISPUTES. Closer ties with Malaysia in 1993 saw bilateral discussions over the Limbang issue, the territory in the East Malaysian state of Sarawak adjacent to Brunei.

To what extent MELAYU ISLAM BERAJA (MIB, MALAY ISLAMIC MONARCHY) can withstand the onslaught of increasing globalization, information technology (IT), modernization, and secularization is a question for this sultanate in the twenty-first century. Moreover, the sustainability of the BRUNEI OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY is in question, according to

the Brunei Darussalam Economic Council (BDEC) in its evaluation report of February 2000.

GOH CHOK TONG (1941–) assumed the premiership of Singapore when LEE KUAN YEW (1923–) stepped down in November 1990. The latter became senior minister in the cabinet as well as secretary-general of the ruling PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP). Ong Teng Cheong, secretary-general of the NATIONAL TRADES UNION CONGRESS (NTUC), and Lee Hsien Loong, the son of LEE KUAN YEW (1923–), were elevated as deputy prime ministers; the latter became acting premier in the absence of the prime minister, clearly indicating the hierarchical power structure.

The changing of the guard did little in terms of policy direction. Authoritarian and paternalistic rule continued to be the norm, creating the reputation of a “nanny state.” Like his predecessor, GOH CHOK TONG (1941–) emphasized diligence, meritocracy, quality education, and steady economic growth; he eschewed a welfare state. Although public criticism—albeit constructive criticism—was welcomed and even encouraged, proposals for radical change were unacceptable. The draconian Internal Security Act (ISA), a legacy from the British colonial period, continued to be invoked when and if the need arose. All dissenting voices were silenced; only the elected leadership could determine the country's political agenda.

GOH CHOK TONG (1941–) faced several challenges. One major concern was the difficulty in attracting capable and willing candidates for public office, especially as ministers of state. Even the increase in ministerial remuneration on a par with the private sector did not prove successful. A declining birth rate and an increasingly aging population were prime concerns for the leadership. Inculcating a sense of nationhood and belonging, patriotism, and multiethnic and multicultural integration occupied the social policy agenda. Efforts were undertaken to stem the brain drain and immigration abroad; foreign skilled professionals were welcomed.

Singapore continued to be the financial hub of Southeast Asia. Possessing a strong economic infrastructure, a huge foreign exchange reserve, and unparalleled political stability, the city-state could ride out the repercussions of the financial

crises of the 1990s—namely, the collapse of Barings PLC, the British banking giant in 1995; and the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998). Prudent measures were rapidly taken to shield the republic from the adverse impact of the latter. Singapore was elevated to the status of “more advanced developing country” by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1996, the first to attain that rank in Southeast Asia. The gains from economic successes were plowed back into the population in terms of housing subsidies, tax rebates, education, and public health. Incidences of corruption, mismanagement, and abuse of power were virtually nonexistent in tightly controlled Singapore.

In the regional arena Singapore supported the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) proposed in 1992; the entry into the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) of Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia; and the so-called policy of constructive engagement in relations with Myanmar. Singapore was the prime mover in reestablishing the strength of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967), which had failed to contain the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998) that crippled many economies of the region. Boosting intraregional trade and attracting the return of FDIs to Southeast Asia were main priorities in the rehabilitation program. Apart from the occasional minor hiccups, SINGAPORE-MALAYA/MALAYSIA RELATIONS (ca. 1950s–1990s) were more cordial and intimate throughout the 1990s. GOH CHOK TONG (1941–) struck a good working relationship with Malaysia's DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD (1925–), resolving disputes and issues through bilateral negotiations.

Despite the successes, GOH CHOK TONG (1941–), like Senior Minister LEE KUAN YEW (1923–), repeatedly emphasized the city-state's vulnerability and the fact that political stability was a pivotal ingredient for continuous and dynamic economic prosperity. The Singapore government is ever vigilant toward changes in the global economic barometer, the adverse effects of globalization, terrorism, and the geopolitical situation, particularly in the Southeast Asian context.

Toward the end of the 1980s, Thailand experienced parliamentary rule (1988–1991) inter-

spersed with a brief return to military domination (1991–1992) and back to civilian government (from 1992). The political climate was marred by the phenomenon of vote-buying and by violence during the electoral period; military-dominated regimes when in power tended to be harsh and repressive, whereas civilian governments were plagued with corruption, abuse of power, incompetence, and infighting among coalition members.

Following the 1988 elections, General Chatichai Choonhavan, the leader of Chart Thai, became prime minister (t. 1988–1991). Leading a political party like Chart Thai, which drew its support from the business sector, Chatichai was partial to policies that benefited the Thai private sector. He turned to Thailand's mainland neighbors as potential marketplaces and as a field for economic exploitation. He sought from Myanmar fishing rights, timber concessions, and mining contracts (gems). In turn Thailand was keen to supply consumer necessities to the isolated regime. ISAN, Thailand's northeast, was to serve as the country's springboard for economic penetration into Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Chatichai's rapprochement with the Indochinese states was viewed with disaffection within the Thai military. The military was staunchly anticommunist and continuously fighting a protracted leftist-led insurgency in the borderlands. Chatichai entrusted General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, supreme commander of the armed forces and commander of the army, with a free hand in senior military appointments. Chavalit used his prerogative to promote members of the Class 5 Group, the graduating class of 1958 of Chulachomklao Military Academy. Its leader, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, was elevated to deputy commander of the army in 1989. Chavalit, who harbored political ambitions, resigned from the military in 1990 to form the New Aspiration Party (NAP). Into his shoes stepped General Sunthorn Kongsompong, to become supreme commander of the armed forces, and Suchinda, as commander of the army. Sunthorn was known to be supportive of the Class 5 Group. Chatichai failed to learn from his predecessors PREM TINSULANOND (1920–) and Kriangsak Chomanan in not allowing the domination by any single faction in the military.

It was too late for Chatichai to make amends when in February 1991 a bloodless coup was

staged that brought the military to power. Sunthorn headed a NATIONAL PEACE KEEPING COUNCIL (NPKC) (THAILAND) that governed the country under martial law. The military chose Anand Panyarachun, president of the Federation of Thai Industries, reputedly an honest and capable captain of industry, to be prime minister (t. 1991–1992). Although non-military technocrats dominated his cabinet, the legislature was controlled by the military. Suchinda took over from Sunthorn as supreme commander of the armed forces and promoted his brother-in-law, General Issarapong Noonpakdi, to the position of commander of the army. Interestingly, Anand's military-backed government allowed political parties to function. A new constitution was proclaimed in December 1991.

The March 1992 elections witnessed a weak coalition forming the government. Apparently no one in particular was suited to be prime minister; instead, Suchinda assumed the premiership. His action sparked widespread demonstrations against a nonelected prime minister, despite the provision in the new 1991 constitution. When a violent backlash from the military resulted in about 100 deaths in BANGKOK, BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (RAMA IX) (r. 1946–) stepped in to resolve the crisis. Suchinda resigned in May. In his place the palace recalled Anand to be interim prime minister. The National Assembly amended the constitution, stipulating that only an elected member of the legislature could hold the post of prime minister; at the same time it trimmed the powers of the nonelected senate.

The Democrat Party (DP) won the September 1992 polls, and its leader, Chuan Leekpai, became prime minister (t. 1992–1995). Chuan's agenda was threefold: stamping out corruption, decentralization of power from BANGKOK to the provinces, and rural development. He was not very successful on any count, as he lacked strong leadership qualities.

In February 1993, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos agreed to jointly develop the "Greater Mekong Sub-Region." Nevertheless, the socialist states were not exactly welcoming of Thailand's initiative. For instance, Cambodia preferred investments from Malaysia and Singapore to those from Thailand. Likewise, Myanmar was partial to investments from Singapore in preference to its immediate neighbor. Laos

sought to balance Thailand's influence with that of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam. Moreover, Laos insisted that the Mekong River Commission be shifted to VI-ENTIANE from its base in BANGKOK. Thailand also sought to transform centrally located BANGKOK as an investment and financial hub for mainland Southeast Asia and southern and southwestern China. Furthermore, to spur economic growth Chuan's government signed an agreement in July 1993 with Malaysia and Indonesia to establish a "growth triangle" (Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Economic Triangle) that encompassed northern SUMATRA, Peninsular Thailand, and northwestern Peninsular Malaysia.

Chart Thai, with its recourse to huge campaign funds furnished by business concerns, was able to "buy over" the electorate, especially in the provinces during the July 1995 elections that swept it to power. Banharn Silpa-Archa, leader of Chart Thai, assumed the premiership (t. 1995–1996). Patronage replaced expertise as the qualification for ministerial positions in Banharn's cabinet; consequently, incompetence ruled. Even BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (RAMA IX) (r. 1946–) voiced his concern over government incompetence. Money politics and blatant corruption were the norm during this period.

The November 1996 elections brought in a coalition government led by Chavalit as prime minister (t. 1996–1997) as well as minister of defense. Two major events marked Chavalit's tenure—namely, the drafting of a new constitution (promulgated in October 1997) and the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998), which severely crippled the Thai baht (currency) and economy. The Constitutional Drafting Assembly chaired by Uthai Pimchaichon, a respected political activist, was given the mandate to draft a constitution that would enable the functioning of a genuine democratic system of government. Significant provisions included composition and membership of the Senate (reduced to 200 members, all elected), the requirement that cabinet members (the executive) resign from the National Assembly (legislature), and making a university degree necessary for membership in the National Assembly. The electorate (a minimum of 50,000) could initiate investigations into corruption charges against a member of the National Assembly. A proposal for fewer

restrictions on the mass media was also included.

The inability to resolve the economic crisis led to Chavalit's resignation in November 1997. Chuan of the Democrat Party was able to convene a viable coalition to form a new government. Like his predecessor, Chuan became prime minister (t. 1997–2001) and minister of defense. In tackling the economic crisis, Thailand adopted the IMF rescue package of U.S.\$17,200 million, accompanied by mandatory macroeconomic reforms. Although the IMF rescue plan achieved success, the implementation of austerity measures as part of the rescue package resulted in criticisms of Chuan's government. Despite various accusations and resentments toward the government in handling the economic crisis, Chuan was able to ride out the storm. In August 1998, Queen Sirikit commended the premier and urged public support for the government's efforts to stabilize the economy and at the same time to revitalize it.

Chuan's meetings with Malaysian prime minister DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD (1925–) in April 1998 led to an agreement whereby the latter guaranteed that no assistance would be rendered to the Muslim separatists of southern Thailand. Furthermore, Malaysia would cooperate in suppressing the Muslim separatists and in apprehending those operating within its borders. Both countries also agreed to develop the gas reserves in the Thai-Malaysian Joint Development Area, a part of the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Economic Triangle.

Relations between Thailand and Myanmar were strained over numerous issues, such as narcotics trafficking, separatist groups, and refugees. Also unpopular among its neighbors was Thailand's participation in the UN International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999. Similarly, Thailand's initiative to convert "constructive engagement" to "flexible engagement" as a new approach to interrelationships among members of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) was rejected. Mooted in mid-1998 by Surin Pitsuwan, the Thai minister of foreign affairs, "flexible engagement" made possible discussion of domestic matters of another member country if such matters went beyond the country's borders. The traditional policy of noninterference in domestic affairs was upheld.

Membership in the newly elected senate (March 2000) under the provision of the 1997 constitution saw increasing representation of the media, academia, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) vis-à-vis the military and civil service. The new composition ushered in a new era for this upper house.

By the time of the January 2001 election for the House of Representatives (formerly the National Assembly), the main rival of Chuan's ruling Democrat Party was Thai Rak Thai, which was established in 1998, led by Thaksin Shinawatra. Thai Rak Thai won overwhelmingly. Thaksin successfully forged a merger with the Seritham Party; consequently, Prime Minister Thaksin headed a government that commanded an absolute majority. Finally, the days of coalition government were over. Later in the year, Thaksin barely escaped imprisonment for violation of assets disclosure.

When the LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) was established in 1975, the PATHET LAO (LAND OF LAOS) assumed the new name of Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), led by Kaysone Phomvihane, its powerful secretary-general. The first decade of the LPDR was a disastrous period. In 1985, Laos was one of the world's poorest nations. The comforting fact was that at least the country was self-sufficient in rice, the staple food. Owing to repressive totalitarian rule, it was estimated that more than 10 percent of the population had fled abroad; of that, some 90 percent constituted the educated elite. This emigration of talent and expertise was a major loss to nation-building.

The economy was severely crippled through socialist policies of nationalization of industry, collectivization of agriculture, and restriction on domestic trade. The establishment of agricultural cooperatives, unpopular among the farming population, drove many to flee across the border into Thailand. Likewise, the detention of persons in reeducation (imprisonment) camps for long periods (even years) deprived many families of breadwinners; once released many fled to Thailand. The Lao National Revolutionary Front subsequently emerged from the refugee camps in Thailand; small groups returned to Laos to spread antigovernment propaganda and to undertake sabotage operations. By the early 1990s there were some 60,000 refugees remaining in Thai camps; most of them were HMONG.

In 1977 the royal family, including the Crown prince, were arrested and exiled to Xam Neua, where it was believed they were all killed. The communist authorities feared that the royal personages would rally opposition to their rule following an incident in northern Laos when a group of HMONG briefly held a village near LUANG PRABANG, the royal capital.

By 1979 there was realization among the leadership circle that adherence to dogmatic socialist policies was problematic. A reevaluation of policy resulted in preparation of plans to gradually return to a market economy. In this context the first five-year economic development plan was designed (1981–1985); none of the objectives were attained, however, largely consequent of the dire need of expertise and for want of basic infrastructure. By 1985 it was again necessary to rethink the economic plan. A second five-year plan (1986–1990) adopted the so-called new economic mechanism policy, which basically endorsed a market economy and began the dismantling of the centralized socialist economic system. Relations with foreign capitalist countries were encouraged to woo FDIs.

The LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR) had historical ties with Vietnam, which had been a major ally, mentor, and aid donor. Likewise Laos also relied on the Soviet Union for ideological, economic, and military support. Relations with the PRC were rather problematic. In the SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE, Laos chose Moscow over Beijing.

Local elections were held in April 1988, the first since 1975, followed by national elections in March 1989. A Constitution Drafting Committee set to work on the historic task of producing a constitution for the country. Rapprochement with the PRC was achieved in 1988, and by the early 1990s, Laos had established good ties with Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia. In cooperation with Thailand and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Laos sought the resettlement of Laotian refugees who were in Thai camps. Repatriation or resettlement in third (mainly Western) countries led to the closure of the refugee camps and the reduction of insurgency along the Thai-Laotian border. Cooperation with Thailand achieved much in reducing the activities of the insurgents. Laos also coop-

erated with the United States on two major issues: the search for U.S. MIAs (MISSING IN ACTION) from the SECOND (VIETNAM WAR) INDOCHINA WAR (1964–1975), and combating the narcotics trade. Northwestern Laos, with northern Thailand and northeastern Myanmar, formed the infamous “Golden Triangle,” in which private militias coerced the hill people to grow poppy and set up makeshift “factories” to produce heroin, cocaine, and other drugs. The trafficking in illegal narcotics, undoubtedly a lucrative enterprise, involved separatist movements (drugs for arms) and corrupt officials.

During the Fifth Congress of the LPRP in 1991, the new constitution was endorsed, together with economic reforms based on free-market principles. In August the National Assembly (formerly the Supreme People’s Assembly) adopted the new constitution, which ensured basic freedoms and private ownership of property. Kaysone was named president of the LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR), and Khamtay Siphandone was prime minister. The following year when Kaysone died, Nouhak Phoumsavanh, chairman of the National Assembly, was elevated to the state presidency. Khamtay retained the premiership and also became president of the LPRP. Saman Vignaket assumed the chairmanship of the National Assembly. Surprises were in store at the Sixth Congress of the LPRP in 1996, when a power shift occurred with the military dominating the party lineup, although Khamtay retained the presidency.

Laos became a member of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) in 1997. Sharing a common mistrust of Thailand, Laos moved closer to Myanmar and Cambodia. Strong ties were maintained with Vietnam. Meanwhile, Laos continued to nurture friendly relations with the PRC.

FDIs flowed into Laos with Thailand heading the list; others included the United States, Australia, France, and the PRC. Japan led as the main foreign aid donor, followed by Germany, Sweden, France, and Australia. During the latter part of the 1990s, tourism became an important foreign exchange earner. In 1998 the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) accorded LUANG PRABANG the status of a World Heritage site, further spurring

the influx of foreign visitors to this royal capital city and boosting the tourist industry.

The fortunate policy shift from a dogmatic socialist stance to more liberal “open-door” approach marked a significant reorientation of the LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR). The replacement of the red star of COMMUNISM with a silhouette of That Luang stupa in the national crest might be the harbinger of further sociocultural reevaluation, even a reinstatement of traditional values and norms. Meanwhile the country faced numerous challenges, such as drugs (addiction, trafficking, and trade), prostitution, HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) and AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome), and environmental degradation (dam construction, logging, SWIDDEN AGRICULTURE). HMONG insurgency continued to be a thorn in the side of the VIENTIANE regime.

The establishment in January 1979 of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (a Vietnamese-sponsored regime dominated by the KAMPUCHEA UNITED FRONT FOR NATIONAL SALVATION [KUFNS] headed by HENG SAMRIN [1934–]) as the government replacing DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK) did not win international acceptance. Both the PRC and the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) strongly objected to the invasion by the communist HANOI (THANG-LONG) regime. In February–March the PRC clashed with Vietnam in the latest of the SINO-VIETNAMESE WARS, and the Vietnamese ejection of the Beijing-supported DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK) was viewed by the Chinese as a Vietnamese hegemonic design over mainland Southeast Asia. The invasion was seen by the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) as a threat to its security.

Through the 1980s the Cambodian situation hogged the headlines of the international media and posed another major challenge to the capabilities and resources of the UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By the early part of the decade the various antagonistic camps were outlined. The PRK was led by HENG SAMRIN (1934–) based in PHNOM PENH, with Vietnam and the Soviet Union as its main support (moral, military, and economic). Opposing

the PRK was the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), presided over by NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–). CGDK comprised the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK, formerly the Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK]), led by KHIEU SAMPHAN (1931–) and POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998) and others in the shadows; FUNCINPEC (a French acronym for United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia), led by NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) and later his son, Prince Ranariddh; and the KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (KPNLF) under Son Sann. The PRC provided military supplies to all three factions of the CGDK. FUNCINPEC and the KPNLF received nonmilitary aid (mainly humanitarian and medical) from the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967), the United States, Britain, and France.

The armed conflict between the CGDK and PRK was of low intensity; both parties, willingly or reluctantly, looked to a political settlement. Non-Cambodian players and events from without appeared to be more influential in dictating the situation within. First, in 1983, Vietnam began to withdraw its troops; this unilateral action intensified the international desire to resolve the Cambodian issue. Vietnam's action of scheduling a complete withdrawal by the latter part of 1989 was consequent of the pressure from Moscow. The Soviet Union had reduced aid (military and economic) to Vietnam since 1987. The rapprochement in 1988 with Beijing had replaced decades of SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE, prompting Moscow to demand a settlement to the Cambodian impasse.

The ruling party of the PRK, Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), in PHNOM PENH appealed to all nationalist groups to effect a "national reconciliation" based on a broad coalition comprising all parties except the PDK. Domestically the KPRP began to "liberalize" its state-controlled economy, including implementation of a partial form of private ownership of property (land, housing). A name change was also made, with the PRK becoming the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 1989.

Again events from without initiated a step forward in resolving the Cambodian issue. The

worldwide retreat of COMMUNISM with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1989–1990 prompted the convening of the PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA (PCC) (1989, 1991). Coupled with the decisions reached at the UN Security Council in 1990, a comprehensive political settlement was finally signed in Paris in 1991. A UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC) (1992–1993) would undertake to create a conducive and neutral condition in which free elections could be held in the country.

In October 1991, the KPRP had a makeover. First, it abandoned the one-party state and supported the establishment of a multiparty democracy. Second, a name change took place from KPRP to the Cambodian Peoples' Party (CPP), and at the same time it announced the renunciation of COMMUNISM. HENG SAMRIN (1934–) was relegated to an honorary role in the CPP; CHEA SIM (1932–) assumed the chairmanship of the Central Committee with HUN SEN (1951–) as deputy chairman and party spokesman.

The UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC) (1992–1993), the largest peacekeeping operation undertaken by the United Nations, formally assumed responsibility from February to March 1992, headquartered in PHNOM PENH. Akashi Yasushi was named the special representative of the UN secretary-general in Cambodia and chief of the UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC) (1992–1993); Australian major general John Anderson headed the 16,000-strong international military force.

On 23–28 May 1993 the anticipated elections were carried out, with close to 90 percent of the registered voters participating. The FUNCINPEC Party edged the CPP with fifty-eight seats (48.5 percent of the votes) to fifty-one seats (38.2 percent of the votes). In mid-July HUN SEN (1951–) and Prince Ranariddh would share the chairmanship of the Provisional National Government of Cambodia, while a new constitution was being drafted. In September the new constitution was adopted, proclaiming the kingdom of Cambodia, a constitutional monarchy advocating a multiparty liberal democracy. NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) acceded to the throne as the king of

Cambodia; the seventy-one-year-old monarch had come full circle since relinquishing the throne in 1955. The Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), a CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition, was headed by Prince Ranariddh as the first prime minister and HUN SEN (1951–) as the second prime minister.

Although most of the country was under the control of the RGC, the PDK still held sway over some 10 percent of the territory and the population. CHEA SIM (1932–), with support from the FUNCINPEC Party, was elected chairman of the National Assembly and in mid-1994 legislated the proscription of the PDK.

The CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition managed, through a series of rather undemocratic methods (for example, the new press law of 1995), to eliminate all other political parties and possible opposition. At the same time, within the CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition itself things were rather stormy, with each party attempting to consolidate its power and position. Interestingly, in the early days (around 1994), Ranariddh and HUN SEN (1951–) agreed to eliminate Sam Rainsy, the FUNCINPEC Party member who was appointed minister of finance in the RGC, as his policies geared toward economic growth (free markets, independent system of assessing customs duties, close relationship with foreign donors, review of past business contracts) intruded on party patronage and vested interests. But from 1995, Ranariddh–HUN SEN (1951–) relations turned from strained to a fallout in mid-1997. Accusing Ranariddh of attempting to bring KHIEU SAMPHAN (1931–) of the PDK and other KHMER ROUGE leaders back into the political mainstream, HUN SEN (1951–) in a series of calculated moves forced Ranariddh to leave the country for France in early July. The removal of the first prime minister undoubtedly strengthened HUN SEN's (1951–) hand, and the CPP rapidly seized the initiative in establishing pivotal control over the power structure in the civil service, the armed forces, and the police, sidelining their FUNCINPEC Party partners in the process.

On 26 July 1997 news over PDK radio announced the denunciation and trial of POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998) by the KHMER ROUGE, which sentenced him to life imprisonment at the Anlong Veng guerrilla enclave in the northwest of the country on

treason charges. It was, however, difficult to ascertain whether the event was a show trial or a genuine purge.

The need for international recognition and foreign aid forced HUN SEN (1951–) to request a full pardon from King NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) for Ranariddh, who was sentenced in absentia to a total of thirty-five years' imprisonment on a variety of charges, mainly complicity with the KHMER ROUGE and causing instability in the country.

Opposition parties, including the FUNCINPEC Party, entered the elections of July 1998 at a disadvantage following the events of July 1997. Name changes were effected: the Khmer Nation Party (KNP) (formed in 1995) became the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) (formed by the KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT [KPNLF]) became the Son Sann Party. In elections said to be "free and fair" by the UN Joint International Observation Group, the CPP won a majority (sixty-four seats), but shy of the two-thirds required to form a government. Offers for a CPP-led coalition were rejected by both the FUNCINPEC Party (forty-three seats) and the SRP (fifteen seats). A political impasse thus resulted.

King NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–), through tireless efforts in the course of 1998, finally breached the stalemate in October: HUN SEN (1951–) became prime minister, Ranariddh president of the National Assembly, and CHEA SIM (1932–) chairman of a yet-to-be-established senate and acting head of state in the absence of the monarch. The senate was created the following year.

Meanwhile, the KHMER ROUGE was disbanded when large numbers defected to HUN SEN (1951–) in March 1998. Many were reintegrated into the ranks of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. On 14 April, POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998) died, apparently of suicide. Several of the KHMER ROUGE leaders—Noun Chea, KHIEU SAMPHAN (1931–), and IENG SARY (1927–)—reentered society. Others, such as Ta Mok and Duch (Kang Khék Ieu), were in government custody.

The HUN SEN (1951–) government opposed the trial of KHMER ROUGE leaders that might provoke the rank and file to return to the jungle and relaunch the insurgency. King NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–) shared

that view. National reconciliation, peace, and stability overrode justice when framing the tribunal law that maintained the maximum penalty of life imprisonment for convicted KHMER ROUGE leaders.

The issue of the trial of KHMER ROUGE leaders was a sore point for Cambodia in the international arena, particularly in relations with the United Nations and the United States. Cambodia was able to secure financial assistance from the IMF and the World Bank in 1999–2000. In the regional context, Cambodia did fairly well. Eager for bilateral trade relations, Malaysia had long lobbied for Cambodia's entry into the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967); Cambodia finally gained membership in April 1999. Relations with the PRC and Vietnam remained cordial and close throughout the turmoil of the 1990s.

Consequent of national elections held in 1976, a single National Assembly came into being in April; in its inaugural seating in July it proclaimed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam with HANOI (THANG-LONG) as its capital. The ruling party, the Communist Party of Vietnam (formerly the Vietnam Workers' Party), dominated the political leadership and the government of the country. During 1976–1977, agriculture and light industry were emphasized; then from 1977, in line with the practice in other socialist countries—namely, the Soviet Union—all capitalist enterprises were proscribed: agricultural cooperatives were created, private industry was nationalized, and labor was sent from the urban areas to the NEW ECONOMIC ZONES (NEZs) (VIETNAM). The last mentioned was a program to forcefully reverse the rural-urban migration—in short, to repopulate the countryside where labor was much needed in the agricultural sector.

In an attempt to attract FDIs in its industrialization program, especially from the West, Vietnam joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1976. The following year Vietnam gained membership in the United Nations. At the same time Vietnam moved closer to the Soviet Union and joined the Soviet trading bloc. Intimacy with Moscow was viewed with suspicion by Beijing. At this juncture SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS were highly strained. Vietnam visualized a leadership position in an “Indochinese Federation”; close ties therefore

needed to be fostered with both Cambodia and Laos. The PRC viewed the situation in the context of the SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE: by establishing direct ties with PHNOM PENH and VIENTIANE independent of HANOI (THANG-LONG), Beijing sought to eliminate the influence of the Soviet Union in the region.

Then, in December 1978, Vietnam, together with the KAMPUCHEA UNITED FRONT FOR NATIONAL SALVATION (KUFNS), invaded DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK). PHNOM PENH fell to the invaders. In January 1979 the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), a Vietnamese-sponsored regime, was established, headed by HENG SAMRIN (1934–). The Cambodian invasion brought untold problems for Vietnam.

SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS were on the downturn, mainly as a result of the Vietnamese invasion, which toppled the Beijing-backed DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK), and partly because of the treatment of the Chinese inhabitants in Vietnam. The Chinese community played a major role in the economy of Vietnam—particularly in the southern provinces and in SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY)—as traders and entrepreneurs, traditionally dominating trade and commerce. The centralization of the state-controlled economy harmed the Chinese, which drove many to leave the country. Unable to flee overland to the PRC, as the borders were closed, the Chinese turned to the South China Sea for escape. The phenomenon of the BOAT PEOPLE was to dominate world headlines for the next decade, bringing adverse publicity to Southeast Asian countries, notably Malaysia. It was estimated that by the first half of 1979, more than 200,000 BOAT PEOPLE had braved the precarious journey to Southeast Asia, HONG KONG, FORMOSA (TAIWAN), and as far as Australia. Vietnamese officials exploited the plight of these Chinese in demanding gold or Western currencies in exchange for exit papers. Unknown numbers, perhaps thousands, lost their lives on board unseaworthy vessels. This human tragedy prompted the UNHCR, in agreement with Vietnam, to arrange and underwrite an Orderly Departure Program (ODP).

Soured SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS slipped into another SINO-VIET-

NAMESE WAR. In February 1979, the PRC launched an offensive. Beijing claimed to have captured several provincial capitals (Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Lao Cai) in the border provinces. Following a month of fierce battles, the Chinese forces withdrew in March. The peace negotiations thereafter did not produce any settlement, apart from the exchange of prisoners of war.

A new constitution was adopted in 1980, consequent of four years of debate. In addition to the National Assembly, there were the State Council and a Council of Ministers (cabinet). TRUONG CHINH (1907–1988) was the president of the State Council, hence head of state, whereas PHAM VAN DONG (1906–2000) was the chairman (prime minister) of the Council of Ministers. LE DUAN (1907–1986) remained a dominant figure in the Communist Party of Vietnam as general secretary. After his passing in 1986, TRUONG CHINH (1907–1988) took over as general secretary while at the same time retaining his governmental appointments.

Reforms were under way, particularly in the economy, from the mid-1980s. Modeled after the Soviet Union of Mikhail Gorbachev (t. 1985–1991), a restructuring of the economy (termed “renovation” [*doi moi*]) was under way in Vietnam that aimed at reducing centralized planning and state subsidies. But progress in carrying out the reforms was sluggish, owing to opposition from the traditionally dogmatic factions in the party and the government.

The Cambodian issue created a serious rift between Vietnam and Thailand. Thailand and its partners in the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) supported the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), headed by NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–). All three members of the coalition had resistance forces operating from camps in Thailand that launched attacks on Vietnamese forces inside Cambodia. In 1985, Vietnamese offensives eliminated the base camps of these resistance groups on Thai soil, much to the anger of BANGKOK and other supporters of the CGDK—notably the PRC, the United States, and the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967).

It became imperative for Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia as a prerequisite

to the receipt of foreign aid. It was duly emphasized that the lifting of the trade embargo imposed on Vietnam by the United States, Japan, the European Community (currently the European Union, EU), and the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) consequent of its invasion would take place only if Vietnam agreed to withdraw. Even the Soviet Union exerted pressure on Vietnam to disengage from Cambodia. Vietnam promised to commence the withdrawal of troops in mid-1988, to be completed by the end of 1989.

The retreat of COMMUNISM and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (which became the Russian Federation in 1991) prompted a rapprochement in SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS. Of help in this quest was the comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian question as outlined in the PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA (PCC) (1989, 1991). Subsequently, in November 1991 following secret talks, Vietnam and the PRC resumed political relations. But the unresolved territorial issue of the SPRATLY AND PARACEL ARCHIPELAGOS DISPUTE remained a thorn in SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS. For instance, in 1995, Vietnam, not yet a member, showed solidarity with the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) in protesting the Chinese occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratlys, claimed by the Philippines.

Vietnam’s foreign policy from the early 1990s placed scant emphasis on ideological considerations and began to establish relations with all, including former foes. Relations with the Russian Federation were dramatically established in 2001. During a visit to Vietnam in February, Russian president Vladimir Putin slashed the country’s outstanding debt to the former Soviet Union from U.S.\$11 billion to U.S.\$1.6 billion, including an extension to a twenty-three-year repayment schedule. The Russian lease on Cam Ranh Bay as a military facility would be renewed upon expiration in 2004.

In June 1991 the Communist Party of Vietnam adopted a decade-long program for economic liberalization and for upholding the socialist political system. The April 1992 inauguration of the new constitution stressed the pivotal role of the Communist Party of

Vietnam and that it had to abide by the country's laws. Notwithstanding the socialist economic system, the constitution guaranteed FDIs in the country. Furthermore, Vietnamese were allowed to invest abroad as well as permitted to travel overseas. In September the National Assembly elected General Le Duc Anh and Nguyễn Thị Bình to the posts of president (head of state) and vice president, the latter being the first woman to enjoy senior standing. Under the new constitution President Anh appointed, with approval from the National Assembly, Vo Van Kiet as prime minister. In an unprecedented move the National Assembly in June 1994 gave assent to a labor law that gave workers the right to undertake strike actions. Taking the cue, workers in some of the southern provinces went on strike. This new labor law was part of Vietnam's open-door strategy to woo FDIs.

Diplomatic relations were reestablished between Vietnam and Japan in September 1993. Japan proved a dynamic economic catalyst in becoming not only the largest foreign aid donor but also a major trading partner to Vietnam. Japanese "soft" loans for infrastructure development undoubtedly were a vital prerequisite to spurring economic growth and development. Even prior to the conclusion of the PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA (PCC) (1989, 1991), Australia, confident of a settlement to the Cambodian question, restored direct developmental aid to Vietnam. Australia numbered among the most important FDIs to the country.

Political dissent continued to be proscribed, and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, recalcitrant elements—opposition voices, critics of the government or of the ruling party, advocates of organized religious groups—were imprisoned while others were executed. Officials of the UNIFIED BUDDHIST CHURCH (1963) who opposed the government's intolerance of organized religions were tried and imprisoned. Dissenters within the Communist Party of Vietnam itself were silenced through incarceration.

By the mid-1990s there were concerns from the leadership about the continued existence of widespread poverty and the increasing rate of corruption and crime. The national education system also came under scrutiny for its flaws and weaknesses. The rising disparity between the urban and rural economies was another

source of concern. Social evils attributed to foreign (Western) influences, such as drug addiction, gambling, prostitution, and pornography, were targeted in a government campaign in 1996.

In July 1995, Vietnam was admitted into the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967). Trade and investment in Vietnam from the member states of ASEAN increased considerably during the 1990s (prior to the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998).

The Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in mid-1996 reaffirmed the position of senior leaders—namely, Do Muoi as party secretary-general, Le Duc Anh as state president, and Vo Van Kiet as prime minister. The concept of multiparty democracy was strongly rejected. Economic modernization was the short-term objective, while industrialization (particularly in heavy industries) was the long-term aim of the socialist economic policy. Although the private sector was permitted to function alongside state enterprises, the unquestioned dominance of the latter was emphasized. FDIs continued to be encouraged in line with the country's open-door policy.

Elections to the expanded National Assembly (from 395 to 450 seats) in mid-1997 brought in a legislature with members drawn from a younger generation and with a comparatively higher level of education. Women and representatives from ethnic minorities were conspicuous. But more important was the presence of nonparty deputies and independent candidates. To a certain extent this new National Assembly ushered in some form of political liberalization. The newly elected leadership lineup was as follows: Tran Duc Luong as state president, Nguyễn Thị Bình as vice president, and Phan Van Kai as prime minister.

In combating the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998), Vietnam undertook the mobilization of domestic capital to counter the retraction and poor performance of FDIs. Priority was also given to promote labor-intensive, export-oriented processing industries. In mid-1998 a securities market was created subsequent to the establishment of a stock exchange.

Toward the end of the 1990s the protracted debate between conservative hardliners and reformists over the issue of the pace and extent of economic reform was aimed at growth and de-

velopment. In October 1998, Prime Minister Phan Van Kai concurred with his Chinese counterpart, Zhu Rongji, who prioritized “socialist stability” over economic reforms. This pronouncement undoubtedly strengthened the hardliners’ argument for restraining the pace of economic reforms, lest they compromise and threaten the political stability of the country and the monopolistic power of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Also of concern in this ongoing debate were the adverse effects of Western influences and globalization vis-à-vis the preservation of indigenous culture, values, and identity.

In 1998, Vietnam, together with the majority, opposed the Thai proposal of “flexible engagement” in place of the long-held principle of nonintervention in domestic affairs of member countries in the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967). Surin Pitsuwan, the Thai minister of foreign affairs, justified his “flexible engagement” concept, which sanctioned discussion of the internal affairs of another member country if such affairs had an impact beyond the country’s borders—with examples of recent developments that had affected the region. They included the haze pollution in Indonesia, human rights issues in Myanmar, and the violence in Cambodia in July 1997.

Relations with the United States were commendable, beginning with joint missions seeking U.S. MIAs (MISSING IN ACTION) starting in 1986, the lifting of the economic embargo (February 1994), and the establishment of full diplomatic relations (July 1994). Furthermore, the United States was one of the major FDIs (by the mid-1990s). In July 2000, Vietnam was accorded normal trade relations, which drastically reduced tariff rates on its exports entering the United States from 40 percent to 3 percent. But more important, it was a step in enabling Vietnam to gain membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Despite these breakthroughs achieved in Vietnam-U.S. relations, President Bill Clinton’s November 2000 visit was coldly received by his Vietnamese counterpart.

The baneful repercussions of resettlement programs in the second half of the 1970s returned when massive peasant rebellions erupted in the Central Highlands in the early months of 2001. Antagonisms between the ethnic minori-

ties of the hill regions played themselves out, in particular between the HMONG and the immigrant VIETS. Coincidentally, the HMONG and the MONTAGNARD once collaborated with the U.S. military during the SECOND (VIETNAM WAR) INDOCHINA WAR (1964–1975), and afterward had grudgingly accepted the communist government of HANOI (THANG-LONG).

The clampdown on organized religion continued against Catholics and the UNIFIED BUDDHIST CHURCH (1963). Religious leaders and their organizations apparently were viewed with suspicion and even as a threat to the government. Curiously, however, Evangelical Protestantism was legalized and given official status. In a dramatic protest against religious suppression, a Buddhist nun committed self-immolation in March 2001.

Beginning in the late 1990s, tourism became an increasingly important foreign exchange earner for Vietnam. Europeans and Americans have been contributing valuable tourist dollars and boosting the service sector; the learning of English was encouraged and officially promoted for greater interaction with foreigners.

Indonesia during the late 1980s and the 1990s witnessed some turbulent developments that at times made it appear that the far-flung country of more than 13,000 islands might disassociate. From 1998 to 2001 the country witnessed widespread street demonstrations, riots, anti-Chinese retributions, secessionist movements, and ethnic-related violence in the wake of three regime changes. At the same time rapprochement with the PRC beginning in 1985 led to the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations in August 1990.

In 1989 a flare-up was again apparent in ACEH (ACHEH), which had long harbored secessionist tendencies and strongly resented the central government. The National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra led an uprising that, like previous rebellions, sought the independence of ACEH (ACHEH). The SUHARTO (1921–) government responded by declaring this province in northern SUMATRA a “military operations zone” in 1990; it meant that the military was given a free hand in suppressing the insurrection. Independent reports revealed that excessive force was used by the Indonesian military in swiftly clamping down on the uprising. By mid-1991 several

thousands were killed and many more had “disappeared”; there were also reported atrocities committed by the military on the civilian population.

But unlike the pogroms following the fall of SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) in 1965, the collapse of the *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER) of SUHARTO (1921–) did not mass massacres or witch hunts. Amid street violence that rocked the capital city of Jakarta, peaking in mid-May 1998, came a late-night visit on 20 May to the presidential palace by the armed forces chief of staff, General Wiranto, informing President SUHARTO (1921–) that the military was unable to guarantee security in Jakarta if he did not step down. It was a clear signal that the military had deserted him. Then on the following morning, President SUHARTO (1921–) announced his resignation to the nation. Vice President B. J. Habibie (1936–) took the oath of office as Indonesia’s third president.

Reflecting on the last decade of SUHARTO (1921–) rule, few would have dared to venture that he would ever leave the scene except through death, as developments in the 1990s gave little indication of an exit for the aging but still formidable leader. Ironically, the successes achieved during *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER) led to the emergence of a new middle class with higher education and possessing higher expectations and aspirations—demanding *keterbukaan*, or “openness”—that subsequently exerted pressure on the government for more liberal and democratic changes. By the mid-1990s the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, People’s Consultative Assembly) was engaged in debate aimed at terminating government-controlled news services and a possible reduction of parliamentary seats held by the military from 100 to 75 at the forthcoming election. Even the PAN-CASILA (PANTJA SILA), which was rigorously adhered to in the 1970s, was less stringently emphasized during the 1990s. There was a growing perception, particularly among the middle class, that a more liberal political order was gradually emerging in place of the *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER). That was reflected in the mushrooming of independent political organizations. Two intellectual organizations in particular were especially prominent. The first was Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim In-

onesia (ICMI, Association of Muslim Intellectuals), established in 1990 and headed by B. J. Habibie, a protégé of SUHARTO’s (1921–) who held the governmental appointment of minister of state for research and technology. The other was the Democracy Forum, founded in 1991 by a well-known *KIAI*, Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–), popularly known as “Gus Dur.” Another was the revitalized Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, Indonesian Democratic Party); in 1993, Megawati Sukarnoputri (1947–), a daughter of SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970), assumed its chairmanship. The Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia (United Democratic Party of Indonesia) was founded by Sri Bintang Pamungkas in mid-1996.

Despite the economic successes of *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER), the seemingly liberal relaxation in the political arena was insufficient to satiate the appetite of *keterbukaan*. In addition there was the increasing public perception that SUHARTO (1921–) intended not only to entrench the economic position of his children but also to hand down political power to his family and friends. One clear indication was the high possibility of the promotion of General Prabowo Subianto, his son-in-law, to head KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserve Command). This move, it was believed, was intended to ensure the family’s position and fortunes following the demise of the president.

In the follow-up to the parliamentary elections of May 1997, religious and ethnic strife erupted in various corners of the country. Targeting the Chinese Indonesian community, mobs of Muslim youths burned and looted churches, temples, and trading establishments in JAVA. In West Kalimantan, indigenous DAYAKS launched a reign of terror (including massacres) in an attempt to forcibly evict the immigrant Madurese from the province. (In the 1970s, under the transmigration program, several thousand Madurese were resettled in parts of Kalimantan where they became prominent in trade and commerce.)

GOLKAR was victorious in every province in the May 1997 parliamentary elections, with a voter turnout of close to 94 percent. SUHARTO (1921–) emerged from the polls in a strong political position and was prepared to commence his seventh presidential term. But developments from without that impacted adversely on the country were to create a situa-

tion in which his options to maneuver were closing in.

The Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998), which saw the rapid devaluation of the Indonesian *rupiah*, exacerbated the country's massive foreign indebtedness. There appeared little choice but to turn to the IMF for assistance. Cost-cutting measures in the IMF package impinged into the realms of the sources of patronage—notably of family members of SUHARTO (1921–) and his cronies.

The downward plunge of the *rupiah* resulted in the closure of many industries, with layoffs of labor numbering in the hundreds of thousands nationwide. The price of imported goods, including such staples as wheat flour, shot up, aggravating the dire situation of the impoverished working class. The army of the poor and unemployed took to the streets in demonstrations, rioting, and even killings, with the ethnic Chinese community as the prime target. Arson of Chinese businesses and looting of shop houses were carried out, as the Chinese were generally (though unfairly) perceived as being responsible for the hike in prices. The crisis worsened when it became apparent that the regime had little intention of implementing the IMF rescue package. There were calls from respected individuals that strongly appealed to SUHARTO (1921–) to relinquish his hold on power. The value of the *rupiah* further plummeted toward the end of January 1998, when SUHARTO (1921–) made known that Habibie was his intended choice for vice president. Habibie was reputed to be an advocate of economic nationalism with a taste for highly expensive technological projects with doubtful returns. It did not bode well for the austerity program put forth by the IMF.

SUHARTO (1921–) formally began his seventh term as president in March 1998, when he was elected by the MPR with Habibie as vice president. Having his father-in-law at the helm confirmed General Prabowo's position as head of KOSTRAD. In a move to further consolidate his power, SUHARTO (1921–) had a cabinet that comprised his family members and close associates, sidelining all others including Habibie's supporters.

The blatant nepotism exhibited in the cabinet lineup sparked increasing student demonstrations and riots throughout the country, with urban centers seeing the worst of the public

disorder. *Reformasi* (reform) was the united opposition's slogan, aimed at ousting SUHARTO (1921–).

The final straw was the announcement in early May of a 70 percent increase in fuel prices in accordance with an IMF strategy to cut state subsidies. Street demonstrations immediately escalated and violence against the ethnic Chinese community forced many to flee to neighboring Malaysia and Singapore. By mid-May the situation had reached a climax. The once-undisputed strongman of Indonesia, the seventy-seven-year-old SUHARTO (1921–), left the stage without applause.

The late 1990s witnessed uneasy relations between Indonesia and its neighbors Malaysia and Singapore. The haze pollution as a result of man-made forest fires in Indonesia disrupted communications and air transport, hurting the trade and tourism sectors of Malaysia and Singapore. Consequent of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998), Malaysia deported several thousand Indonesian workers from the early part of 1998. Earlier in 1993 there had been friction between Indonesia and Malaysia over the disputed islands of Ligitan and Sipadan, situated offshore from the East Malaysian state of Sabah. On the international platform, East Timor was the contentious issue of Indonesia's relations with the West.

Habibie's brief tenure as president (t. 1998–1999) saw the revision of election laws in preparation for the June 1999 elections. There were also attempts to launch investigations into the family wealth of the deposed SUHARTO (1921–). Habibie lent his support to General Wiranto when the latter dismissed General Prabowo as head of KOSTRAD. He also released several notable political prisoners, including Sri Bintang Pamungkas, leader of the Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia. In a well-publicized gesture, Habibie not only visited the homes and shops of ethnic Chinese damaged in Jakarta as a result of the racial riots of May 1998 but also expressed sympathy for the plight of the victims.

Meanwhile, owing to internal struggles within the PDI, Megawati's faction became PDI-Perjuangan (PDI-P, Struggle of PDI). Abdurrahman Wahid established the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party), which drew its main support from conservative Muslim communities of eastern JAVA.

Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN, National Mandate Party), led by Amien Rais, also vied for the electorate.

Ethnic- and religious-based violence erupted in various parts of the country, witnessing clashes between Muslims and Christians in MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS), the unresolved murder of hundreds of Muslim clerics and others, and DAYAKS with support from the Malay community clashing with immigrant Madurese in West Kalimantan. In ACEH (ACHEH) secessionist elements began to be active.

In June 1998 the status of ACEH (ACHEH) as a “military operations zone” was revoked, and shortly thereafter troop withdrawals from the province began. General Wiranto even publicly apologized for past military excesses. But when antigovernment riots erupted in September, a halt was made to troop withdrawals. The general feeling among the Acehnese was complete independence. Guerrillas from the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) engaged in a protracted war against the Indonesian military.

A 91 percent voter turnout in a relatively fair election in June 1999 brought victory for Megawati’s PDI-P (34 percent), with GOLKAR (20 percent) coming in second. The main Muslim party of the *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER) era, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party), secured third place (11 percent). The PKB, as expected, scored promising support from its stronghold of eastern JAVA. PAN, however, had a poor showing.

The election of Indonesia’s president was scheduled for deliberation in the MPR in November 1999 from the nominees that had been submitted by the political parties prior to the June polls. The two front-runners were Megawati and Habibie. In an impressive rebound from the disastrous showing in the polls, Amien Rais managed to bring about a coalition of Muslim parties (with the notable exception of the PKB) to form Poros Tengah (Central Axis); his intention was to ensure a strong Islamic voice in the next government. Habibie’s prospects began to dwindle owing to several of his actions, the most prominent being the general perception that he had mishandled the East Timor issue. The overwhelming rejection by the East Timorese of integration and the vote for independence in the referendum of August

1999 were considered by many in Indonesia as a slap in the face, especially within the military. Megawati’s aloofness, the fact that female leaders were not generally favored among Muslims, and the alleged “money politics” of her PDI-P put Megawati at a disadvantage despite her pedigreed background.

At the eleventh hour Habibie withdrew his candidacy. GOLKAR and Poros Tengah immediately swung their support to Abdurrahman Wahid, who subsequently won the presidency in an MPR election on 20 October 1999, garnering 373 votes to Megawati’s 313. The following day Megawati was sworn in as vice president.

With a “rainbow” cabinet drawn from a multitude of political parties and led by a *KIAI* who was partially blind and in deteriorating health (he suffered a severe stroke in early 1998), the twenty-two-month presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid did not exude much confidence. The new government had little impact on the country’s deteriorating economic situation; likewise the religious strife in MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS), which subsequently developed into an all-out civil war with local army units backing the Muslims and the police supporting the Christians. Elsewhere, violence persisted in West Kalimantan between DAYAKS and Madurese. A standoff between the president and General Wiranto in the early part of 2000 ended in the latter’s handing in his resignation in mid-May. (The Human Rights Commission of Indonesia implicated General Wiranto in the postreferendum [August 1999] violence in East Timor.) The investigation into the accumulated personal wealth of former president SUHARTO (1921–) was resumed. (SUHARTO [1921–] suffered a stroke in 1999.) Hutomo “Tommy” Mandala Putra, the youngest son of SUHARTO (1921–), was accused of a series of bombings in August and September of 2000; but the lack of evidence failed to convict him. He was, however, handed eighteen months’ imprisonment for corruption by a Jakarta judge, but he evaded arrest. Gunmen assassinated the presiding judge in July 2001; they later confessed to police that Hutomo ordered the killing.

In his effort to garner support and recognition for his government and to restore confidence among the international business community, President Abdurrahman Wahid, despite

his ill health, undertook a series of visits to foreign countries in late 1999 and early 2000. His foreign tours took him to thirty-four national capitals. But the persistent instability, widespread unrest, and violence in Indonesia worked against the president's efforts abroad.

In ACEH (ACHEH) President Abdurrahman Wahid, when he initially came to power, hinted at a referendum on independence. A proreferendum rally was immediately organized in Banda Aceh in early November 1999. But a referendum like the one in East Timor was strongly opposed by the military. But in his characteristic indecision, President Abdurrahman Wahid by the early months of 2000 had apparently backtracked on his referendum proposal. He instead stressed the granting of wider autonomy, with a greater share of revenue derived from the province's natural resources, and some concessions in the introduction of some aspects of Islamic law. Few were convinced, and the campaign for independence continued. By mid-2000 GAM claimed to control almost half of all the villages in the province. Talks between the government and the secessionists in Geneva in May 2000 resulted in a three-month ceasefire. Although extended to January 2001, the ceasefire was at best on paper while violence reigned in the province.

As early as mid-2000 there was dissatisfaction with the performance of Abdurrahman Wahid, and he was ordered to explain his actions to the MPR in August. At this juncture no action against him was taken, in the fear that his supporters might retaliate with violence and unrest. A year later, despite being cleared of corruption charges, the president faced impeachment by the MPR on the basis of unsatisfactory performance. A standoff occurred between Abdurrahman Wahid and the MPR on 23 July. In the afternoon the MPR unanimously voted for the dismissal of Abdurrahman Wahid as president. Megawati assumed the presidency, with Hamzah Has of the PPP as vice president.

In Myanmar the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) was established in 1988, with Saw Maung assuming three portfolios concurrently as minister of defense and foreign affairs, and as prime minister. The country became known officially as the Union of Burma. Despite the abrogation of the single-party law and the registration of

political parties for the 1990 election, martial law restricted virtually all types of political activities—for example, gatherings were limited to five persons, and there were various restrictions on publications, public meetings, and travel. The BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY (BSPP) was renamed the National Unity Party (NUP) under the chairmanship of U Tha Kyaw. Following his expulsion from the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) over a clash with DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–), Aung Gyi established the Union National Democracy Party (UNDP). Although elections were scheduled for mid-1990, the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) declared that it would continue to be the government even after the elections until a new constitution was drafted and accepted by the elected legislative assembly. Until then, martial law remained in force.

In order to avoid identification with the majority BURMANS and to reflect multiethnic composition, another name change was effected in June 1989, from the Union of Burma to the Union of Myanmar (Myanma Naing-ngan). BURMANS acquired the new term Barmars, KARENS became Kayin, and Karenni became Kayinni.

The NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) scored an overwhelming victory in the May 1990 elections, winning 392 seats out of the total 485 seats. The NUP managed 10 seats. The remainder, 83 seats, were shared among twenty-three political parties. Ethnic-based parties received much support from the electorate. A coalition was formed of non-BURMANS, calling itself the United Nationalities League for Democracy (UNLD). When all opposition parties combined, they dominated 95 percent (461 of 485 seats) in the legislative assembly.

Then in July 1990, the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) issued Order 1/90, which declared the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) as the de facto government, as it had international legitimacy recognized by the United Nations and other countries. Until a new constitution accepted by all ethnic groups in the country came into being, political power was to rest with the STATE LAW AND ORDER

RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) as a safeguard to national solidarity. It further reiterated that the May 1990 elections were aimed not at forming a new government but at providing an assembly that was to draft a new constitution under the auspices of a national convention to be constituted by the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) in due course.

In April 1991, Lieutenant General Than Shwe, the vice chairman of the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) and the deputy commander of the armed forces, announced that there would not be any transfer of the reins of power to those elected representatives of the May 1990 polls. He accused the political parties of being subversive. In March–April 1992, Than Shwe became both minister of defense and prime minister when Saw Maung stepped down. Despite that change, many still regarded Khin Nyunt, the first secretary of the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) and head of the military intelligence service, to be the principal influence in the government.

Throughout the 1990s, tension and strained relations occurred between the opposition, led mainly by the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) in the persona of DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–), and the de facto government of the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC). The latter in fact waged a war of attrition with DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–), whose struggle for democracy gained international support when she became a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1991.

The National Convention—which had a six-year life span from 1993 until it went into indefinite recess in 1996—was a pathetic showcase of a rubber-stamp assembly. Some 80 percent of the delegates were appointed by the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC), while the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) had a 13 percent representation of the overall total of 702 delegates. The major contention of the opposing groups was the demand by the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) to provide a central role to the military. Nonetheless, following the arrest and intimidation of

the opposition, the sitting of the National Convention in September 1994 emphasized the pivotal role of the Tatmadaw (armed forces), which was subsequently incorporated in the new constitution.

Paralleling the military-dominated STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) was its civilian front, known as the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). It was established in 1993 and not registered as a political party but as an “association” under the purview of the ministry of education; civil servants were encouraged to be members with promises of privileges. There was little doubt that the military junta fully controlled the USDA; Than Shwe was its patron.

DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–), under house arrest beginning in 1989, was released on 10 July 1995. Prior to this unexpected event, there were some indications of such a possibility. A year earlier, Khin Nyunt had stated the willingness on the part of the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) to hold talks with DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–). In mid-September 1994 she had talks with Than Shwe and Khin Nyunt; a second meeting took place in October. In November she was granted permission to meet Tin Oo and Kyi Maung, leaders of the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) serving prison sentences. In February 1995 the UN assistant secretary-general Alvaro de Soto held talks with leaders of the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC). The following month Tin Oo and Kyi Maung, together with several political detainees, were released.

There was apparently some relaxation of the ban on gatherings of more than five individuals, as crowds easily numbering more than a thousand wellwishers and enthusiastic supporters congregated outside the house of DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–) in RANGOON (YANGON) to see and hear her public speeches. On 19 July 1995 she was shown on state television laying a wreath on the grave of her father, AUNG SAN (1915–1947), in a Martyrs’ Day ceremony in RANGOON (YANGON). The foreign media were allowed access to her. In interviews with foreign journalists she appealed to the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORA-

TION COUNCIL (SLORC) for the release of all political prisoners and the gradual lifting of martial law. She requested that the ruling junta officially sanction the May 1990 election result and convene a discussion with opposition groups with national reconciliation as the priority agenda. In mid-November the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) reinstated DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–) as general secretary. Aung Shwe retained the chairmanship, and Tin Oo and Kyi Maung both remained as vice chairmen.

But in the latter part of 1995, subtle signs of restrictions were beginning to be imposed on DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–). For instance, she was strongly advised by the military authorities that for her own personal safety she should refrain from leaving the compound of her house in RANGOON (YANGON). After her talks in September and October 1994, no further dialogue had developed; it appeared that DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–) was being shunned by the military junta.

Nonetheless, in July 1997, Khin Nyunt held talks with Aung Shwe. But the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) refused to attend the scheduled second meeting in September, as the military junta barred the participation of DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–). In fact, her reinstatement as general secretary of the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) was considered illegal by the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC).

In a surprise move in November 1997, the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) was replaced by a State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). It was mere window dressing, however, as the principal players remained: Than Shwe as chairman (concurrently prime minister, minister of defense, and commander of the army), Maung Aye as vice chairman, and Khin Nyunt as first secretary (and head of military intelligence). The second and third secretaries were Lieutenant General Tin Oo (different from the NLD's Tin Oo) and Lieutenant General Win Myint (also the adjutant-general), respectively. In fact, the entire nineteen-member SPDC consisted of serving military officers. Besides the premiership, civilians drawn largely from the USDA held ministerial portfolios in the cabinet.

Beginning in 1998, the SPDC stepped up its efforts at clamping down and ultimately eliminating the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) with arrests, imprisonment, and the forced resignation of several thousand of its members. Several of its regional centers were forced to close. Paralleling this development was the SPDC's continuous refusal to allocate any role for DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–) in national politics. The military leadership persistently questioned her nationality, whether British or Myanmar, as she was married to a British academic, Michael Aris, and her children held British passports.

By a combination of military offensives, diplomacy, and negotiations with individual groups, the military regime by 1998 was able to eliminate most of the ethnic insurgencies and separatist movements in Myanmar. Only the KAREN NATIONAL UNION (KNU) under the leadership of Saw Ba Thin continued to challenge the SPDC. However, in early 2000 the KAREN NATIONAL UNION (KNU) announced its willingness to negotiate a political settlement with the SPDC, and reportedly there were a series of talks between them in February and March.

The international community, including the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967), possessed two major concerns relating to Myanmar—namely, democracy and narcotics. Having failed to bring the ruling military junta and the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD) to the negotiating table despite five attempts, Alvaro de Soto was replaced in April 2000 by the Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismail as UN Special Envoy to Myanmar. Razali brokered the commencement of secret talks between the two parties. He himself, however, was barred from entering the country in 2001. But in mid-2003 Razali resumed his efforts; there was apparently little headway.

Equally frustrating was the fight against narcotics production and trafficking in the notorious “Golden Triangle.” In the mid-1970s, Burma (Myanmar) participated with the United Nations and the United States in a campaign to suppress the cultivation of opium in the northeastern part of the country. All joint efforts were, however, suspended following the 1988 military coup. Despite Myanmar's being a signatory to the UN Vienna Convention against traf-

ficking in illegal drugs, it was believed that during the 1990s the country's export earnings were derived largely from the narcotics trade. Provincial military commanders were directly or indirectly involved in this lucrative narcotics business. Likewise, ethnic insurgent groups conducted a "drugs-for-arms" deal to bolster their armaments in their struggle against the central regime in RANGOON (YANGON).

Myanmar became a member of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) in July 1997. Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia were keen on the potential economic opportunities that Myanmar might offer. From the political perspective, Indonesia in particular and the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) in general were concerned to ensure that Myanmar not come under the influence of the PRC. In the 1990s a policy of "constructive engagement," which meant non-intervention in domestic affairs of individual countries, was the policy adopted by the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) toward Myanmar's military regime. As a goodwill gesture Myanmar's foreign minister, U Ohn Gyaw, was invited to BANGKOK in July 1994 as a guest in the opening and closing ceremonies of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) yearly meeting of ministers for foreign affairs. Meanwhile, trade relations between Myanmar and its regional neighbors steadily increased. Prior to full membership Myanmar had concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation in 1995, and the following year it was granted observer status to witness the July 1996 ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) meeting in Jakarta. Myanmar also qualified in becoming a full member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Prior to Myanmar's entry into the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967), the latter had shown solidarity and support for it. For example, in 1991 the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) refused demands by the United States that it use its influence to pressure Myanmar to end human rights violations and restore democratic government. Then in 1999, an ASEAN-EU meeting planned for February was postponed indefi-

nitely over the issue of Myanmar's presence, which was strongly objected to by the EU while vigorously defended by ASEAN. There was optimism in the region that the efforts of Razali Ismail, UN special envoy to Myanmar, would achieve significant breakthroughs in the near future.

DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD (1925–), Malaysia's fourth prime minister, was the most controversial, characterized by his outspoken style in speaking his mind, whether at the meeting of his UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946)—the leading component in the BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974) coalition government—or while addressing the UN General Assembly in New York. Abiding by his publicly declared intention to step down in October 2003, Dr. M (as he is popularly known) completed twenty-two years as prime minister, almost equivalent to the combined tenures of his three predecessors. When, true to his word, he retired as Malaysian prime minister in October 2003, the premiership passed to his deputy, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (1939–), who also concurrently held the finance and home affairs portfolios. Of commoner background and a medical practitioner by profession, Dr. M differed from the aristocratic lineage of previous prime ministers. He in fact represented a new generation of Malays determined to assert their position vis-à-vis the other ethnic groups in a multiracial country. His emphasis on meritocracy was a bitter pill to swallow within the Malay community, which had hitherto enjoyed a "helping hand" from the government primarily through the NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP) (1971–1990).

Determined that Malaysia be a modern and developed nation, Dr. M embarked on a modernization program that earmarked industrialization as the engine of economic growth and development. The exploitation of natural resources (oil, natural gas, timber) and the promotion of export agriculture (mainly palm oil extraction) paralleled industrialization (electronics to car manufacturing). East Asian work ethic models, particularly those of the Japanese and the South Koreans, were encouraged and energetically emphasized in Dr. M's "Look East Policy" of the 1980s. For the 1990s there was "Vision 2020," his ambitious foresight that by

the year 2020, Malaysia would attain the status of a “fully developed” nation. Outlining its objectives in February 1991, he envisaged not only material gains (the public health care system, quality education, advanced infrastructure facilities) but also harmony in a dynamic, just, and democratic multiethnic society.

Meanwhile, the NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP) (1971–1990) was replaced in June 1991 with the New Development Policy (NDP). Economic growth and the eradication of poverty were the twin foci of the NDP, with “Vision 2020” as its ultimate objective. By 1997, Malaysia was confidently on the path to attaining the Newly Industrialized Country (NIC) status and becoming another promising Asian “economic tiger.”

Within the Malay community, three groups challenged Dr. M. There was the conservative, religious PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS), which aimed at transforming Malaysia into an Islamic state. It was particularly strong in the Malay heartlands of Kelantan and Terengganu, with growing influence in Kedah (once its stronghold in the 1960s and 1970s) among the rural Malay population. The royal authority of the Malay sultans, some of whom were known to intervene in political matters in transgression of the federal constitution, posed another challenge to Dr. M’s government. But the most dramatic opposition came from within the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946) when in April 1987, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (1937–) vied for the party’s presidency. Dr. M, the incumbent, narrowly won, and the deep schism within the party appeared irreparable. But by a twist of fate in 1988, the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946) apparently violated the Societies Act and was declared technically illegal, thus forcing it to dissolve. Dr. M formed a new party, UMNO Baru (New UMNO), which inherited the assets of its predecessor, and a reregistration of members was undertaken; Razaleigh and his supporters were denied membership. Razaleigh established Semangat ’46 (Spirit of ’46), which claimed to capture the essence of the Malay struggle as originally defined in 1946 when the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946) was constituted.

With the ruling coalition of Dr. M’s BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT)

(1974) holding the two-thirds of the parliamentary seats in the Dewan Rakyat (Lower House of Representatives) required for any constitutional amendment, the aim of the diverse opposition was to deny that advantage. The most unlikely political partnerships were struck among the opposition parties for the 1990 elections. Despite their animosity in Kelantan, the secular Semangat ’46 and PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) became political bedfellows, forming an alliance called Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah (APU, Muslim Unity Movement). Semangat ’46 also allied with the Chinese-dominated DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (DAP); this alliance was termed the Gagasan Rakyat (People’s Concept). Through these alliances, PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) ended as a political ally of the DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (DAP); from the start it was apparent that they had nothing in common except to deny the “two-thirds” to the BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974). Few could envisage the formation of a government in the event of an opposition-upset electoral victory. Dr. M’s BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974) comfortably retained its “two-thirds” in the 1990 elections.

Two years into his premiership Dr. M proposed to remove the right of the nine hereditary Malay sultans to withhold assent to legislation. Although theoretically the BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974) government could push through such amendments with its two-thirds majority, a compromise was struck between the parties involved. The Malay aristocrats began to view Dr. M with mistrust. In mid-1992 the government issued a code of conduct for the Malay sultans that restricted their role in any political process. Furthermore, in early 1993 the legislature removed the personal legal immunity of the sultans. And in May 1994 a constitutional amendment removed the sultans’ right to withhold assent to legislation. In 1997, Islamic jurisprudence, hitherto the purview of the individual sultan as the head of the faith in his own state and of the state religious authorities, was centralized and controlled from the federal government in KUALA LUMPUR (KL). The intention was not particularly to target the Malay rulers but more to control the conservative state religious authorities that allegedly im-

peded national development with various religious injunctions, or *fatwa*.

Turning to the judiciary, several changes were effected in the late 1980s. The controversial removal of Tun Salleh Abbas, lord president of the Supreme Court, on charges of “misbehavior” in August 1987, followed by the suspension of the remaining five judges of the Supreme Court, of whom two were dismissed, shocked the nation and the British Commonwealth. (The Malayan/Malaysian bench was highly regarded within the Commonwealth.) The following year the powers of the judiciary to interpret laws were curtailed through a constitutional amendment. In 1994 the government outlined a mandatory code of ethics for judges; moreover, the Supreme Court became the Federal Court and the lord president was renamed chief justice.

Not only was the Internal Security Act (ISA) retained, it was strengthened in June 1988 in that detainees were denied appeals to the court. The sale of political parties’ newspapers was limited to within the party itself. That was directed specifically at opposition groups, notably PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) and the DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (DAP), and to a lesser extent, the social reform organization ALIRAN Malaysia.

Just prior to the 1990 elections the Christian-dominated Partai Bersatu Sabah (PBS, Sabah United Party), led by Joseph Pairin Kitingan, disengaged itself at the eleventh hour from the BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974) to ally with the opposition, Semangat '46. Although Kitingan won and led as chief minister a PBS state government in Sabah, he was excluded from decision-making meetings in KUALA LUMPUR (KL), and development funds for Sabah were deliberately delayed or withheld. Attempts were made to remove Kitingan from office, including court cases brought against him over corruption charges. Furthermore, in February 1991, the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946) established a branch in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. In the 1994 state elections PBS narrowly won; shortly thereafter there were several defections from PBS to various splinter parties. The UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946) was able to create a coalition with a Chinese-based party and with the KADAZAN-DUSUNS. The coal-

tion members agreed that the three major communities (Malay, Chinese, and KADAZAN-DUSUNS) should take turns providing a chief minister.

Malaysia under Dr. M’s government created currents in the international arena. For instance, Dr. M’s idea of an East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), a trade group that excluded the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, was strongly objected to by Washington. The Americans were keen to promote the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (APEC), a grouping that they initiated. In mid-1993 it was agreed that EAEC would be a component championing East Asian interests within APEC. EAEC was formally established in the latter part of 2000; a Malaysian proposal for a trans-Asian railway to enhance economic integration was accepted.

Dr. M played a pivotal role in environmental issues. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration (April 1992) demanded that the developed West cease criticizing issues such as logging in developing countries, and at the same time that the rich nations should review their consumption and production patterns in order to lessen the adverse impact on the environment. This Kuala Lumpur Declaration was brought to the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992.

In the run-up to the polls of 1995, the already uneasy alliance of the opposition parties that formed the Gagasan Rakyat was aggravated by the announcement of the intention of PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) to introduce *hudud* (Islamic criminal code) in Kelantan, which would include jurisdiction over non-Muslims. Regardless of the fact that such a move contravened the federal constitution that guarantees freedom of worship, PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS), which ruled Kelantan, passed the legislation; it was adopted in 1993. Not surprisingly the Chinese-based DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (DAP) withdrew from the Gagasan Rakyat just prior to the general elections.

Notwithstanding several embarrassments to the government—allegations of corruption and serious offenses such as statutory rape leveled against senior political figures, which received extensive coverage in the local media—Dr. M’s BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974) again won a convincing vic-

tory in the 1995 elections. Of the opposition parties only PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) managed a fair showing. In alliance with Semangat '46, it managed to retain Kelantan. Following the polls there was a concerted effort on the part of PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) to maneuver Semangat '46 out of Kelantan, leading to the end of the APU. Its poor showing in other parts of the country forced Razaleigh to dissolve Semangat '46; many of its members rejoined the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946). The DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (DAP) suffered a devastating defeat, largely because of its association with PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS), that appalled many of the non-Muslim, urban electorate.

In the aftermath of his 1995 triumph, Dr. M faced the perplexing question of his successor. Past practices in Malaysia witnessed the smooth leadership succession process. There was little doubt that Anwar Ibrahim (1947–), deputy president of the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946), deputy prime minister, and minister of finance, should step into Dr. M's shoes upon his retirement. But events in the second half of the 1990s unfolded in a manner that few observers would have anticipated back in 1995. The Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998) played a decisive role in the succession stakes.

Meanwhile, smoke from the open burnings in the rain forests of Indonesia, particularly of Kalimantan and SUMATRA, harmed Malaysia's trade and commerce, in particular the tourist industry. In the spirit of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967), Malaysia was less critical of Indonesia. Moreover, Malaysian firefighters assisted their counterparts in alleviating the situation.

SINGAPORE-MALAYA/MALAYSIA RELATIONS (ca. 1950s–1990s) became strained in the mid-1990s consequent of some remarks from Singapore's senior minister, LEE KUAN YEW (1923–). In 1994 he touched a highly sensitive note when he proposed that a merger between Singapore and Malaysia was possible, even desirable, if only the latter abandoned its affirmative BUMIPUTERA (BUMIPUTRA) policy. In 1997, LEE KUAN YEW (1923–) made disparaging remarks about the city of Johor Bahru, where an opposition Singapore

politician sought refuge to escape arrest; he later apologized. Then in his published memoirs, he criticized several Malay leaders of Malaysia. Disputes over the island of Batu Putih (Pedra Branca) again soured relations between the neighbors.

Conflicting sovereignty claims over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan between Malaysia and Indonesia were brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), The Hague. The ICJ ruled against Indonesia in its verdict, announced in 2003. The repatriation of thousands of unskilled Indonesian laborers from Malaysia in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998) created unease between the governments. Malaysia-Thailand relations were strained over the issue of MUSLIM MINORITIES (THAILAND) and their separatist aspirations. In 1998, Malaysia-Thailand agreed to jointly develop an offshore oil field and natural gas in a disputed area in the Gulf of Thailand. KUALA LUMPUR (KL)–MANILA ties became strained over the kidnap-ransom issue in Sipadan in April 1998, as well as President Joseph Estrada's comments on the Anwar case.

In mid-May 1997, Anwar became acting prime minister while Dr. M was abroad. In mid-July the *ringgit* (currency) began to slide consequent initially of the disastrous situation in neighboring Thailand, but increasingly exposing structural problems in the Malaysian economic system. By October the *ringgit* lost 40 percent of its value, which hit companies and investors that had borrowed from foreign sources particularly hard. Rejecting assistance from, and henceforth the intervention of, the IMF, Dr. M decided to impose capital controls to arrest the *ringgit's* downturn by pegging it at a fixed RM3.80 to U.S.\$1.00. Acceptance of an IMF rescue package might involve the abandonment of large, prestigious infrastructure projects and scaling down or even ending the policy of affirmative action in the economy for Malays and other BUMIPUTERA (BUMIPUTRA). Anwar as minister of finance favored implementing an austerity program that appeared to be more in tune with IMF proposals, but such a view was opposed to Dr. M's plan.

Taking a cue from events in neighboring Indonesia when SUHARTO (1921–) was forced to step down in May 1998 amid allegations of ill-gotten family fortunes, cronyism, nepotism, and corruption, in June at the annual confer-

ence of the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946), an Anwar supporter delivered a strongly worded speech condemning corruption and implicating the party leadership. The distribution among delegates of the pamphlet *Lima puluh dalih mengapa Anwar tidak akan menjadi perdana menteri* ("Fifty Reasons Why Anwar Cannot Become Prime Minister") presented the conspiracy of Anwar to seize power and his various sexual misdemeanors (homosexuality and sodomy). Furthermore, Anwar's cronies who benefited from his patronage were exposed. Apparently Dr. M asked Anwar to resign; if not he would be dismissed in disgrace and criminal charges would be brought against him.

On 2 September 1998, Dr. M sacked the deputy prime minister, citing his corruption and sexual impropriety as unsuitable for a leader of Malaysia. The following day Anwar was expelled from the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946). Daim Zainuddin, a corporate figure and a former minister of finance in the late 1980s, was recalled to oversee the economy. Dr. M himself assumed the post of minister of finance.

Again looking toward Indonesia, Anwar expected a groundswell of public support. Exploiting his oratorical skills, Anwar portrayed himself as a victim of a political conspiracy and denied all the allegations of homosexual relations and sodomy. (Homosexuality and sodomy are serious offenses punishable under Malaysia's penal code; Islam condemns such practices as "unnatural acts.") His supporters, numbering a few thousand, held peaceful demonstrations in KUALA LUMPUR (KL), uttering the adopted Indonesian slogan of *reformasi* (reform). Invoking the ISA, Anwar and a handful of supporters were arrested on 20 September. Nine days later a badly bruised Anwar appeared in court, where he was charged with five counts of corruption and five counts of unnatural sexual acts. Investigations revealed that Abdul Rahim Noor, inspector-general of police, was responsible for assaulting Anwar during his detention; as a result he tendered his resignation and later was sentenced to a brief jail term and a small fine.

The trial of Anwar Ibrahim went through several twists and turns with amended charges and appeals; finally in April 1999 he was convicted of four charges of corruption and received a six-year imprisonment term. This con-

viction automatically disqualified him from public office. Then in early August 2000, he was convicted of sodomy and was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment, to commence only after the completion of his earlier six-year prison term. As early as May 1999, Dr. M already had made it clear to delegates of the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946) at its yearly conference that there was no reconciliation with Anwar.

In January 1999, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (1939–), the minister of foreign affairs, was appointed deputy prime minister and minister of home affairs; Daim was appointed minister of finance. While Dr. M consolidated his hold on power, Anwar's supporters, rallying under his wife, Dr. Wan Azizah Wan Islamil, formed the Partai Keadilan Nasional (PKN, National Justice Party) in April 1999. Although the PKN claimed to be multiethnic and multireligious, it was undeniably predominantly a Malay Muslim party. In June, the PKN allied with the DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (DAP) and PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) to create the Barisan Alternatif (BA, Alternative Front) to run in the June 2000 election.

But the election was brought forward to November 1999. As expected, Dr. M's BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974) again retained its two-thirds majority. However, besides continuing its hold on Kelantan, PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) seized Terengganu. Abdul Hadi Awang became chief minister of Terengganu and embarked on an Islamization program. Fadzil Mohamed Nor (1937–2003), the president of PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS), became the opposition leader in the Dewan Rakyat. The PKN and the DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (DAP) had a lackluster showing. But a year later in a by-election for the Lunas seat in Kedah (Dr. M's home state), BA scored a major victory in denying the BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974) a two-thirds majority in the Kedah state legislature. Such inroads in Malay-dominated Kedah became a major concern for the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946).

The Philippine presidency (t. 1986–1992) of CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–) began on a high note, but by the early 1990s it became apparent that little was

achieved, owing to the continuous threat of real and rumored military coups. The president often appeared to be in a perpetually besieged situation, faced with a restive military and ministers with personal political agendas.

Shortly after her inauguration, CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–) created the Presidential Commission on Good Government and the presidential Commission on Human Rights. The former was entrusted with the difficult mandate to recover the huge fortune of former president FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989), alleged to have been plundered from the country during his long tenure. The task of the second commission was to undertake investigation of alleged human rights abuses during the previous regime. A generous number of political detainees—about 500—were released from detention, including communist leaders such as Jose Maria Sison.

A national referendum in February 1987 gave resounding approval to the new constitution. It provided for an executive presidency and a bicameral legislature: a House of Representatives of 250 (200 elected, 50 presidential appointees), and a 24-seat Senate (directly elected). It also stipulated that there should not be any foreign military bases or nuclear weapons on Philippine soil after 1991; that clause undoubtedly referred to the U.S. military bases in the country.

In the latter part of the 1980s, the controversial issues surrounding the U.S. military bases in the Philippines invoked a nationalistic consciousness that preferred to see the closure of those foreign installations, which many believed contained nuclear weapons. The six U.S. military bases provided both employment and government revenue (from the lease). Under the October 1988 agreement to extend the lease another two years after its expiration in 1989, the Philippines gained more than twice in yearly military and economic aid from the United States. In return the Americans were allowed to use the facilities without having to disclose whether nuclear weaponry was present. In 1990 it was announced that all U.S. military planes and personnel would vacate the Philippines by the end of 1991. But in August 1991 a new ten-year lease was signed for Subic Bay Naval Base, with generous compensation; the Senate, however, voted against it.

An ambitious Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) was launched in June

1988 that attempted to address the perennial problem of land shortages and landlessness among the farming population. CARP was a ten-year agricultural land redistribution scheme for untenured farmers. Implementation of the program was an onerous task, as opposition came from vested interests, notably the landowning class (disproportionately occupying the majority of seats in the House of Representatives). Overall little was accomplished despite the noble intentions.

The Philippine government in July 1987 initiated legal proceedings against FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989), his family, and his cronies (associates). By the time the first of the numerous civil suits was served on the former president in September 1989, in an attempt to recover his ill-gotten wealth, he died in his home in Hawai'i. His body, however, was denied burial in the Philippines in the interest of national security.

Despite formal talks with communist rebels (NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY [NPA]) and Muslim secessionist groups (MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT [MNLF] and Moro Islamic Liberation Front [MILF]), there was no permanent solution to the insurgency. Although a ceasefire was agreed upon in the mid-1980s between the NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA) and the government, pessimism and insincerity on either side rendered the peace process meaningless. In 1986, while the government in negotiations with the MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) agreed to the autonomy of four Muslim-dominated provinces in MINDANAO, the MILF, which was not party to the talks, rejected the government's offer. The MILF commanded a wider support base than the MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF), led by NUR MISUARI (1940–). Ultimately, little was accomplished.

By early 1987 it became apparent that, for want of resources, the armed forces were unable to contain both the communist insurgents and Muslim secessionists. Talks brokered by the OIC resulted in the MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) agreeing to autonomy and to discarding demands for independence. Again the MILF stressed that it would not recognize any agreement over MINDANAO between the government and the MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION

FRONT (MNLF). MILF forces clashed with government troops in western MINDANAO, where fierce fighting flared up. Nevertheless talks continued sporadically between NUR MISUARI (1940–) and the government; there was hope that a joint commission could be formed to undertake the task of drafting an autonomy plan for MINDANAO.

President CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–) faced no fewer than seven military coups to oust her government. If not for the support from FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–), the chief of staff of the armed forces, in executing fast action to diffuse the critical situation, there was likely to be massive unrest or even civil war. Some quarters in the military expressed dissatisfaction with the president's accommodating approach toward the leftist insurgents and Muslim secessionists demanding that a tougher line be adopted. In fact, within her cabinet the president faced challenges to her authority from Juan Ponce Enrile, the minister of national defense, and Salvador Laurel, the vice president, to the extent that those individuals directly engineered attempts to topple the government and seize power for themselves.

For instance, in October 1986, Enrile and Laurel, with support from Ramos (later withdrawn), demanded that new presidential elections be held and that the government adopt a tough stance toward the insurgents. The following month Enrile and some factions in the military staged a coup in various military camps. President CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–) took immediate steps in sacking Enrile as minister of national defense; her entire cabinet was ordered to hand in their resignations. Then in August 1987, Colonel Gregario Honasan, a close associate of Enrile's, seized Camp Aguinaldo, the headquarters of the Philippine Army. In the ensuing exchanges more than fifty people died; Honasan and his colleagues escaped. (They were finally apprehended in December.) It was Enrile again and Laurel who were behind the coup attempt staged by the Marines and the Scout Rangers, the elite units of the army in cohort with pro-Marcos officers in December 1989. The rebel soldiers managed to seize the headquarters of the Philippine Air Force and a military base. The president turned to the U.S. Air Force, which scrambled several jets in the skies over

MANILA and over the presidential Malacanang Palace as a deterrent to rebel aerial attacks. In February 1990, Enrile was arrested for treason and also for harboring the rebel Honasan.

Following a plebiscite held in November 1989 in thirteen provinces and nine cities in MINDANAO for a government-proposed autonomy plan, four provinces agreed to the option of having direct elections to a unicameral legislature in each province. Therefore Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Tawi-Tawi, and Sulu formed the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

The three-year trial over the assassination of Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman (the supposed assassin) ended in September 1990 with the conviction of sixteen members of the military; twenty others were acquitted. It was, however, believed that the real perpetrators escaped justice. In mid-1991 the government announced that Imelda Marcos, the former first lady, and her family were allowed to return to the Philippines to face charges of tax evasion and fraud. A year earlier a New York court had acquitted Imelda Marcos of charges of fraud and illegal transfer of stolen funds into the United States. Then in October 1991, President CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–) granted permission for the remains of FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989) to be brought back for burial in his home province of Ilocos Norte. Imelda Marcos returned home to stand trial on more than eighty civil and criminal charges.

Negotiations over the SPRATLY AND PARACEL ARCHIPELAGOS DISPUTE among rival claimants were held in January 1990, July 1991, and mid-1992. The PRC, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines agreed in principle to settle the disputed sovereignty issue peacefully and to jointly develop the natural resources of the archipelagos (which were believed to possess vast oil and natural gas reserves).

In the presidential elections of May 1992, President CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–) supported the candidacy of FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–), whose running mate was Joseph Ejercito Estrada. FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–) won to become the first Protestant president of the mainly Catholic Philippines. Shortly following his inauguration in June, President FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (t. 1992–1998) announced his gov-

ernment's intention to resolve the insurgencies by the communists, Muslim secessionists, and rebels within the Philippine armed forces.

Although during the 1987 OIC-brokered talks the MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) agreed to drop its demands for independence and accept autonomy, it again demanded that the 1976 Tripoli Agreement be reinstated. This demand for the creation of an independent Islamic state in the southern Philippines was emphasized during formal negotiations with the government of President FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–) in Jakarta in October 1993. The second round of talks at the same venue was convened in April 1994. In June a military offensive was launched against the Abu Sayyaf, a Muslim secessionist organization alleged to have links with Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda international terrorist network. The modus operandi of the Abu Sayyaf was the kidnap and ransom of Westerners and others and various terrorist activities, including wholesale killings. In April 1995, for instance, the Christian town of Ipil in MINDANAO witnessed the massacre of more than fifty civilians allegedly by the Abu Sayyaf; some quarters, however, blamed it on the Islamic Command Council, a splinter group of the MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF). In June 1996 it was announced that a proposal by President FIDEL RAMOS (1928–) to create a transitional administrative council—the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD)—was agreed to by the MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF). The establishment of the SPCPD was in preparation for a referendum on an expanded autonomous region in MINDANAO to be added to the existing ARMM. In September 1996, NUR MISUARI (1940–) became governor of Muslim MINDANAO when he was unopposed in the elections; the following month he assumed the chairmanship of the SPCPD.

Meanwhile, the Abu Sayyaf and MILF refused to abide by any negotiations or concessions resulting from talks between NUR MISUARI (1940–) and the government. But in August 1996 the MILF agreed to hold preliminary talks with the government. The Abu Sayyaf remained recalcitrant, refusing to support any talks with the government and MILF. Clashes broke out in Cotabato and Maguindanao involving the MILF and government

forces. Despite the fighting, a second round of MILF-government peace talks proceeded in January 1997. In an attempt to derail the peace process the following month, the Abu Sayyaf assassinated a Catholic bishop in Jolo. Curiously, the MILF was suspected to be responsible for the kidnapping of forty workers from the Philippine Oil Company in June. Not surprisingly, the peace talks collapsed.

The peace process with the communists similarly faced a multitude of obstacles. In August 1992, talks were held in The Netherlands with leaders of the National Democratic Front (NDF, an umbrella organization including the CPP, formed in the early 1970s) such as Sison and Luis Jalandoni. Other communist leaders, such as Saturnino Ocampo and Romulo Kintanar, were released from detention to enable them to participate in the discussion. Manuel Romero, head of the NDF, agreed to negotiate for a settlement of the protracted insurgency. Owing to demands and counterdemands, the peace talks in The Netherlands between the government and the NDF reached an impasse with little prospect for progress. Sison then announced the postponement of peace negotiations to be suspended until the end of the tenure of FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–) in 1998. Meanwhile, in October 1992, following several rounds of secret talks with military rebel leaders such as Jose Maria Zumel and Honasan, they too agreed to discuss a negotiated settlement with the government.

By September 1992 the Americans had completed their withdrawal from the Subic Bay Naval Base and formally handed over the facility to the Philippine government. The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority was created to undertake the conversion of the 56,000-hectare area to commercial use.

In July 1993, President FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–) reiterated his predecessor's permission for the remains of former president FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989) to be brought back from Hawai'i for burial in his home province of Ilocos Norte, without state or military honors. In September only a few thousand supporters paid their last respects at the funeral, and no incidents were reported. In the same month Imelda Marcos was sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment for corruption.

In December 1993 the Philippines agreed to cooperate over fishing rights with Malaysia in

the SPRATLY AND PARACEL ARCHIPELAGOS DISPUTE areas that were not claimed by the other four countries—namely, the PRC, Taiwan, Brunei, and Vietnam. President FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–) made a historic visit to Vietnam and appealed to all claimants to remove any military installation or personnel from the disputed archipelagos. The Philippine government authorized petroleum exploration by a U.S. company off southwestern Palawan, which was within the SPRATLY AND PARACEL ARCHIPELAGOS DISPUTE perimeter. The PRC lodged an official complaint, but in a deft move Jose de Venecia, trusted envoy of President FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–) and speaker of the House of Representatives, invited Beijing to join the project as a partner.

In March 1994, in an attempt to reconvene peace talks with military rebels, President FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–) announced an amnesty for all rebels as well as government soldiers who were charged with offenses during counterinsurgency operations, except for those involved in serious crimes (torture, wanton killings, rape, and robbery). RAM (Reform the Armed Forces Movement) rejected the presidential gesture, saying that the root causes of the rebellions had not been addressed. Ocampo accused the government of discrimination in that the pardon was not applicable to large numbers of communists who were charged with common crimes that were beyond the purview of the amnesty.

Meanwhile, the East ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA) was formally established in March 1994. It was an attempt to promote joint ventures and economic cooperation in the area comprising the East Malaysian states of SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO), Brunei, the southern Philippines, and the east Indonesian islands of SULAWESI (CELEBES) and MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS).

The high incidence of serious crime, in particular kidnapping for ransom, was dissuading foreign investments in the country. The formation in July 1992 of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) under the oversight of Vice President Estrada was an attempt to address this problem. The following year rampant corruption was uncovered in the Philippine National Police (PNP), leading to the removal of hundreds of personnel includ-

ing several senior officers. By the extended deadline of November 1993, efforts to disarm private armies had made little headway. Estrada apparently failed in his task in the PACC; from October 1995, President FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–) took personal charge to eradicate serious offenses and organized crime, which more often than not exposed collusion with members of the PNP. The worsening crime situation was a damaging blot on the presidency of FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–).

The SPRATLY AND PARACEL ARCHIPELAGOS DISPUTE again occupied the agenda in February 1995, when the PRC occupied and established permanent structures on Mischief Reef, which was claimed by MANILA. Discussions in August made little headway in terms of resolving the overlapping claims, but a significant breakthrough was accomplished: for the first time Beijing agreed to settle the issue in accordance with international law and not by invoking the principle of the precedence of historical claims. Thereafter a code of conduct was agreed to by both parties to ensure that a military confrontation was avoided. Likewise the Philippines contracted a similar agreement with Vietnam in November 1995. In March 1996 both the Philippines and the PRC agreed to cooperate in eliminating PIRACY. Following a series of military moves from the PRC and the Philippines over the SPRATLY AND PARACEL ARCHIPELAGOS DISPUTE, in August 1997 both parties agreed to put aside their territorial claims and instead to focus on strengthening economic cooperation.

Attempts to amend the constitution to grant FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–) a second presidential term failed. Sensing such efforts on the part of the supporters of FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–), the highly respected Cardinal Jaime Sin of the influential Catholic Church, together with former president CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–), orchestrated a peaceful demonstration in September 1997 displaying displeasure and rejection of a second term for the incumbent. FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–) backed down.

The May 1998 presidential elections brought to power the flamboyant Estrada (t. 1998–2001), a former popular film actor. Consistently identifying himself with the lower

strata of society despite his middle-class background, Estrada not surprisingly drew the bulk of his support from among the working class or the *masa* (the masses).

Estrada's "pro-poor" platform faced an uphill challenge, owing to the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998). The focus of his policy was to ensure "food security" for the lower socioeconomic strata of society. Various mechanisms and pieces of legislation were put in place to achieve these goals—notably the National Anti-Poverty Commission, CARP, and the Agricultural and Fisheries Modernization Act. The last mentioned ensured that government funding was allocated to projects such as rural credit and the improvement of infrastructure (irrigation, roads). For the urban poor, rehousing under a state-sponsored mortgage scheme made available homes for more than 25,000 of the lower income group in MANILA. In addition, the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority was engaged in reorienting its development to accommodate the needs of its depressed surrounding areas—for instance, by providing employment opportunities and other economic benefits. But overall the "pro-poor" policy was a disappointment, partly because of the economic downturn during its initiation and partly because of vested interests with strong political influence.

The Philippine secretary of foreign affairs, Domingo Siaszon Jr., supported his Thai counterpart's proposal that flexible engagement replace the traditional nonintervention policy of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967). Curiously, while it was generally believed that President Estrada was opposed to "flexible engagement," he publicly criticized the government of DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD (1925–) in the arrest and assault of the former deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim. KUALA LUMPUR (KL) was not the least amused at such unwarranted comments.

Ironically, when Estrada headed the PACC in the early 1990s, the results were far from satisfactory in addressing the high crime rate. But during his presidency serious crimes such as kidnapping for ransom were sharply reduced. It was apparent that preventive measures worked out between the government and the Chinese community, and with the close cooperation of the PNP, had made promising

progress. Surprisingly, in April 2000, while a climate of dissatisfaction with the government's performance was gaining momentum, significant improvements were made in tax collection.

President Estrada was unsuccessful in the peace process with the various antigovernment groups. The NDF withdrew talks with the government in May 1999 when the Senate ratified a defense treaty with the United States—namely, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). (The VFA permitted joint military operations between Philippine and U.S. forces.) Its military wing, the NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA), was actively tapping for recruits from among the increasing numbers who were greatly disillusioned with the political leadership, which was blamed for the plethora of social and economic inequalities in the country. The government's inability to address the needs of the rural poor in the southern Philippines, in particular among Muslim constituencies, led to the growth of secessionist groups such as the MILF and the MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF), as well as radicals such as the Abu Sayyaf. Government military offensives against Muslim secessionists further alienated the entire community, which was weary of the Christian administration in faraway MANILA. Consequent of the fighting, thousands were displaced, and they were potential recruits in the drawn-out struggle.

During the early part of 2000 there was an escalation of hostilities, engineered in particular by the MILF. An olive branch with development grants on the one hand, and an automatic gun on the other, were the symbols of President Estrada's stance toward the troubled areas of the Muslim southern provinces. But the gun became dominant when in February the Philippine Air Force bombed Camp Omar, a prominent base of the MILF; government troops succeeded in overcoming a secondary facility of the MILF. By the middle of the year, government forces retook sections of a highway that for a long time had been under the MILF owing to its proximity to the headquarters of Camp Abubakar, Maguindanao. In July, Camp Abubakar itself fell to government forces. Despite President Estrada's offer of amnesty, MILF leaders instead appealed to their supporters and all Muslims, saying that the struggle was a *jihad*, or holy war. It was not surprising that such a

declaration occurred: besides the government offensive, Christian vigilante groups had been terrorizing and even killing ordinary Muslims. Both the amnesty offer and the promise to reconvert the area of Camp Abubakar into a special economic zone for the Muslims were shunned by the MILF, which remained steadfast in its demands for an independent Islamic state.

The Abu Sayyaf, which had long opposed any negotiations or compromise with the government and demanded nothing less than complete independence, continued its terror campaign and its trademark activity of kidnapping for ransom. In March 2000 about thirty students and teachers were kidnapped and ransom was demanded. Then in April the Abu Sayyaf kidnapped twenty-one tourists—mainly Western vacationers—on Sipadan Island, off the East Malaysian state of Sabah. They were held hostage on Jolo Island, the headquarters of the organization, awaiting the payment of a huge ransom. It was uncertain whether the release of the foreign hostages in late September was a result of the payment of the demanded ransom or a political compromise. Later reports revealed that the ransom, millions of U.S. dollars, was paid in the form of “development aid” by the Libyan government in securing the release of the citizens of South Africa, France, Germany, Finland, and Malaysia who had been seized as hostages from Sipadan Island.

As early as the latter half of 1999 dissatisfaction, disappointment, and outright disgust with Estrada’s government were increasingly voiced, not only by the political opposition but also by ordinary citizens. Peaceful expressions in the form of large rallies and demonstrations were organized, such as the one on 21 September 1999 led by Cardinal Jaime Sin and former president CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–), and the march by farmers on the presidential palace in October, protesting the proposed constitutional amendment that would make possible foreign ownership of land. Opposition also came from trade unions and teachers over wages; the Makati Business Club protested the slowness of economic liberalization and reforms, and legislation that allowed foreign interests to enter the retail industry and buy into local banks.

Although President Estrada seemingly appeared to be popular, the urban and rural poor

were increasingly disillusioned with government efforts and the abysmal implementation of the “pro-poor” program. Even Karina Constantino-David, the head of the government’s mass housing scheme, tendered her resignation in October 1999 over the sluggish pace of housing reform and the influence exerted by developers with political connections that opposed such reform. It was therefore not surprising that the NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY (NPA) was able to increase substantially the number of armed guerrillas, which were estimated at about 6,000 in 1994 and swelled to close to 9,500 by mid-2000, largely as a result of disaffected rural and urban youth.

In the international arena the Philippines supported the efforts of the UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. For example, the Philippines participated in the peacekeeping force INTERFET in East Timor prior to its becoming independent in August 2002. Malaysia and especially Indonesia were not pleased at the involvement of the Philippines in East Timor.

On the domestic front, however, the proverbial beginning of the end for President Estrada was in October 2000, when an estranged former supporter, Luis Singson, the governor of Ilocos Sur, accused the president of accepting bribes from illegal gambling businesses as well as from provincial tobacco taxes. Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, in an attempt to distance herself from Estrada, announced her resignation from the cabinet in which she had served as secretary for social welfare and development. Arroyo, however, retained her vice presidency. Notwithstanding repeated denials by Estrada, the opposition parties began impeachment proceedings in the latter part of the month. In November, Estrada faced impeachment charges of bribery, corruption, culpable violation of the constitution, and betrayal of public trust. No vote was taken, as a petition endorsing impeachment had been signed by one-third of members of the House of Representatives. Speakers of both the Senate and the House of Representatives stepped down, having simultaneously tendered their resignations from the ruling coalition.

Since the time of Singson’s accusations, street demonstrations had been under way demanding Estrada’s removal. Anti- and pro-

Estrada groups clashed in the streets. A fortnight into the impeachment trial, on 30 December 2000 five separate bomb explosions shook MANILA, resulting in at least twenty-two fatalities and many more injured. Speculation was rife as to the real perpetrators, despite official blame being leveled on opposition parties or Muslim separatists. Many, however, believed that pro-Estrada supporters were the real culprits; their action was designed to intimidate witnesses to the ongoing trial or to create an untenable situation in which martial law could be declared by the government.

When the pro-Estrada Senate blocked prosecutors from opening an envelope that many believed contained damning evidence of Estrada's corrupt banking practices as alleged by a bank officer, the prosecutors resigned in protest. More and more of Estrada's supporters deserted him, including the military and the police, as street protests gained momentum mirroring the EDSA REVOLUTION (1986), when FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989) was toppled.

On 20 January 2001, Estrada finally decided to leave Malacanang Palace. Arroyo was immediately sworn in as president. The removal of Estrada reinforced the earlier precedent of the so-called People Power Revolution, which undoubtedly further weakened the process of electoral democracy and its institutions.

On Storytelling

Modern historical works on Southeast Asia as a region in its own right appeared in the mid-1950s with Brian Harrison's *South-East Asia: A Short History* (London: Macmillan, 1954), followed by D. G. E. Hall's *A History of South-East Asia* (London: Macmillan, 1955; 2nd ed., 1964, 3rd ed., 1968, 4th ed., 1981). While the former was composed for a general readership, the latter was a scholarly volume with a specialist audience in mind. Despite not offering any innovative conceptual framework or introducing new methodological approaches, Hall's single-volume work was a watershed achievement. "What is attempted here," as Hall explained in the preface (1955), "is first and foremost to present South-East Asia historically as an area worthy of consideration in its own right, and not merely when brought into contact with China, India or the West. Its history cannot be

safely viewed from any other perspective until seen from its own." John R. W. Smail embraced this approach, putting forth his persuasive argument in his paper "On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 2, no. 2 (1961): 72–102. Taking the cue, several notable works of scholarship appeared in the 1960s—namely, John F. Cady's *Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964) and Nicholas Tarling's *South-East Asia: Past and Present* (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire, 1966).

While historical works in the years prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945) and the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945) were largely the work of European and U.S. colonial scholar-administrators, the immediate postwar decades witnessed the predominance of Western professional historians. It was only from the late 1960s and early 1970s that professional historians of Southeast Asian heritage began to chart the history of the region and of its constituent parts. Again the majority of these indigenous historians were trained abroad, particularly in Europe, the United States, and Australia and New Zealand. While prewar works were accused of being biased and sympathetic to the Western colonial regimes, nationalist historians of the postwar era turned the tables, in being partial to the indigenous viewpoint and exhibiting their patriotism. As two wrongs do not make a right, the contentious issue of perspective should be amicably resolved by producing a balanced, objective history.

The postwar era, which was an eyewitness to tremendous changes in the geopolitical and regional sphere, required a paradigm shift in approach to historical works. H. J. Benda in "The Structure of Southeast Asian History: Some Preliminary Observations," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 3, no. 1 (1962): 103–108, argued convincingly that historians should also be social scientists. The trend of historians to draw on the methods and the findings of other disciplines—political science, economics, anthropology, sociology, archaeology, demography, and others—is increasingly common and acceptable. More often than not, history merged with politics when in dealing with more contemporary political developments, and history combined with ethnography and anthropology in detailing the past and present situation of ethnic minorities.

The literature on the writing of Southeast Asian history is a recent development. Some of the more notable works on historiography are listed in the recommended readings. These works on historiography focus on the major characteristics of historical writing and outline the principal shifts in orientation and emphasis. In addition, some of these works debated issues, discussed emerging trends, and even set future directions. For instance, in the last quarter of the twentieth century there was an increasing concern among historians over several issues—namely, the overnationalistic content of school textbooks, “national history” versus “regional (Southeast Asian) history,” and the predominance of political history with lesser emphasis on other foci (economic, social, cultural, religious, ethno-history, etc.). Furthermore, there appeared to be a lacuna in historical works on indigenous ethnic minorities, marginalized groups, and women. Also, many Southeast Asian historians have published in their native language; consequently their works are less known or available to the international scholarly community.

Suggested Readings

No reading list can claim to be definitive or exhaustive, but what is attempted here is to offer some suggested works that are useful for a greater understanding of the historical development of Southeast Asia, from prehistory to the early 2000s. The following list is meant to complement the references that appear under each entry-article in the *Encyclopedia*. Six categories of works are identified to facilitate ease of selection—namely, Historiography of Southeast Asia; Southeast Asia—General Overview; Anthologies of Travelers’ Accounts; Thematic Works on Southeast Asia; Country Focus—General; and Country Focus—Themes and Topics. The brackets indicate when the work was first published.

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Closing Remarks

It is hoped that this encyclopedia will promote a wider and deeper understanding of the historical development of the region and offer some cognizance of the lessons of the past. If so, the time and energy expended will have been more than worthwhile, and we as scholars have made a difference, however modest.

Ooi Keat Gin

A

ABACA (MANILA HEMP)

Abaca is the name given to the fiber of the plant botanically known as *Musa textilis*, a member of the *Musa* genus (to which the banana tree also belongs). Technically, the name *Manila hemp* is incorrect because, properly speaking, hemp is a bast fiber extracted from the bark of the plant *Cannabis sativa*, whereas abaca fiber is obtained from the leaf sheath. *Musa textilis* is a treelike herb growing to heights of 5 to 10 meters. Abaca is a hard fiber that does not absorb moisture, is resistant to water (even saltwater), and can be made into excellent cordage, particularly naval cordage and binding twine. Early in the nineteenth century, its qualities were recognized as superior to those of other natural fibers, such as sisal and maguey. Because of its lightness and strength, abaca can also be used as a raw material for clothing, rugs, paper, and other items.

Musa textilis is indigenous to the Philippines, where both climatic and soil conditions are conducive to its growth. The plant requires a humid environment and rainfall throughout the year, is susceptible to drought, and can be damaged by severe winds during typhoons. The most favorable locations for the plant are along the eastern and southern coasts in the Philippines. The Philippines have had the natural monopoly of this product.

The fiber is obtained from the leaf petioles, which are peeled from the stalk with a knife. The extraction of fiber can be done either by

hand stripping or by using stripping machines. The oldest method in the Philippines is hand stripping, a labor-intensive and burdensome process whereby the laborer uses a knife blade to strip the fiber. It was only in the 1920s and 1930s that properly functioning fiber-extracting machinery was introduced.

Although its qualities had been noticed in previous centuries, abaca did not become an export product of the Philippines until the 1820s. American and British merchant houses established themselves in Manila, engaging in the exportation of abaca, sugar, tobacco, and other products. Abaca exports increased over the years, from about 26,000 metric tons in the 1860s to more than 100,000 tons in the early 1900s, 130,000 in the 1920s, and 140,000 in the 1930s; they fell back to a level of less than 100,000 tons in the 1960s. During the first two decades of the U.S. colonial administration of the Philippines, abaca was the leading export product of the islands, accounting for more than 50 percent of total export earnings. Between 1875 and 1900, most of the exports went to Great Britain, with the United States being the second largest buyer. When the United States assumed sovereignty of the islands in 1898, the market switched to America, and Great Britain became the second largest buyer. In the second half of the 1930s, Japan emerged as an important buyer.

The greatest percentage of abaca exports has always been in the form of raw fiber, for pro-

cessing in cordage factories in the United States and Great Britain. In the 1930s, a somewhat greater part of the exports consisted of manufactured cordage, but this trend did not continue after the Pacific War (1941–1945). In the 1930s and during the Pacific War, the shortage of natural fibers had stimulated the development of synthetic fibers as a replacement. As a consequence, abaca exports declined significantly after the war.

The area of abaca production has changed over the years. During the nineteenth century, the Bicol region in southern Luzon (the provinces of Albay, Sorsogon, and Camarines) was the main production area, followed by the eastern Visayan Islands (Leyte and Samar). In the 1920s and 1930s, the island of Mindanao (particularly the province of Davao) became an important producer of abaca, as a result of the efforts of Japanese settlers who had established large plantations in the Philippines. They formed production and marketing associations, introduced fiber-stripping machinery that allowed them to produce quality fiber, and used auctions to market their produce—in short, they operated with modern methods. In 1934, Japanese producers in Davao contributed almost 45 percent to the national abaca output. After the Pacific War, though the Japanese had been forced to leave the country, the province of Davao remained an abaca-producing area.

Abaca prices have always fluctuated in accordance with the international conjuncture. During the last decades of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, until about 1918, abaca brought relative prosperity to the prime abaca-producing region, the Bicol area. But during the economic depression in the first half of the 1930s, abaca prices in the world market dropped dramatically, exports fell, and the production areas suffered widespread poverty. Economic historian Norman Owen (1984) has drawn attention to the fact that, although abaca has brought prosperity during periods of economic upswing, the Bicol region ultimately has not made the transition to self-sustaining economic growth. Apparently, its people have been unable to convert periodic wealth into sustainable economic activities.

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See also Great Depression (1929–1931); Japan and Southeast Asia (pre-1941); Philippines

under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1898–1946); Philippines–U.S. “Special Relationship”; Shipbuilding

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ABANGAN

Abangan, from the word *abang* (red), originally meant “worldly” or “profane.” This term was first used in East Java as a pejorative designation in contrast to *putihan*, from *putih* (white), which was applied to the more piously Islamic segment of the population, many of whom adopted white garb. The formation of a *putihan* group in East Java was associated with the spread of Islamic schools (*pesantren*) during the nineteenth century. In the 1950s, *abangan* acquired political connotations in association with both the communist and nationalist parties that adopted red as their group color. In his influential book entitled *The Religion of Java* (1960), based on fieldwork in East Java in the 1950s, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz used the term *abangan* to designate a significant segment of the Javanese population whose “syncretic” religious traditions featured extensive spirit beliefs; were centered on a ritual feast called *slametan*; and involved a set of theories and practices of curing, sorcery, and magic. He used *abangan* as a sociological contrast term to *santri*, which he defined as a subvariant of the Javanese villagers who espoused a “purer Islam” and had strong associations with trade. Whereas *santri* originally referred to students and graduates of a *pesantren* and was, indeed, another expression for the so-called *putihan*, in Geertz’s discussions it came to refer to pious Muslims in general. Geertz’s sociological characterizations have been widely criticized as overly simplistic and lacking in adequate historical comprehension. Generalizing such historical contrasts to the whole of the Javanese population proved particularly difficult. After the destruction and banning of the Parti Komunis Indonesia in 1965, the social use of the term *abangan* declined in East Java, and it now no longer retains

popular currency except among scholars influenced by Geertz.

JAMES J. FOX

See also Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (PNI) (1927); *Santri*

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ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ, TUNKU (1903–1990)

Nationalist Prince

Officially addressed as Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj and more popularly known by the royal designation "Tunku," this first prime minister of independent Malaya and later Malaysia is designated *Bapa Merdeka* (Father of Independence) in Malaysian school textbooks.

Born in Alor Setar of a Siamese mother, on 8 February 1903, Tunku was the twentieth child of Sultan Abdul Hamid Halim Syah (1881–1943) of the Malay state of Kedah in Peninsular Malaysia. Educated in Alor Setar, Bangkok, and Penang, Tunku later attended St. Catherine College (1920) in London and then Cambridge University, where he obtained a B.A. degree in law and history in 1925. After three attempts to commence studies in order to qualify as a barrister-at-law, Tunku resumed his studies at the Inner Temple in 1946 and was called to the English bar in 1949.

In 1926, together with some fellow students and future leaders of independent Malaya, Tunku formed the Malay Society of Great Britain, which soon became the nucleus of the social, intellectual, and, to some extent, political activities of Malay students in Great Britain. Another Malay prince and his namesake, Tengku Abdul Rahman (1895–1960)—later the first Yang Di Pertuan Agung (King) of independent Malaya—became the society's first president and Tunku the honorary secretary. Tunku headed the society a number of times and after

the Pacific War (1941–1945) had the experience of working with younger colleagues such as Abdul Razak Hussein (1922–1976) and Muhammad Suffian Hashim (b. 1917).

Back in Kedah in 1931, Tunku was appointed assistant district officer of Kulim, and having passed the cadet's law exam of the Kedah Civil Service, he was promoted to district officer (DO) and served in various districts. A naturally sociable and caring man, Tunku soon became famous, and his "abduction" of his father, the sultan, from the retreating British convoy in December 1941 enhanced his reputation. During the war, Tunku led or participated in relief efforts for the distressed and poor, including the setting up of the Poor Men's Home in Alor Setar. Toward the end of the war and immediately after, by virtue of his royal descent and popularity, Tunku became involved in politically motivated organizations such as Saberkas and Persatuan Melayu Kedah (Kedah Malay Association). When he moved to Kuala Lumpur as assistant public prosecutor in 1949, he became involved in the wider pan-Malaya organizations, and following the resignation of Dato' Onn bin Jaafar (1895–1962), he was appointed the second president of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in 1951.

Contrary to Dato' Onn's hasty endeavor to create a multiracial party, Tunku kept UMNO as an exclusively "Malay" organization but began to foster ties with organizations representing other communities, in particular the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). Following the success of the UMNO–MCA cooperation in the Kuala Lumpur municipal election in February 1952, the Alliance Party was officially formed in 1954, consisting of UMNO, MCA, and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). Tunku's stature rose when the Alliance won fifty-one of the fifty-two seats contested in the first ever general election in July 1955. Appointed as chief minister, Tunku led the negotiations for self-government and played a major role in the Baling Talks with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in December of the same year. After his country achieved independence from Britain on 31 August 1957, Tunku contributed significantly to the formation of the bigger Federation of Malaysia in 1963, encompassing the eleven states of Malaya, Singapore, and the British territories of North Borneo and Sarawak.

While facing Filipino claims over Sabah as well as Sukarno's "Crush Malaysia" policy (*Konfrontasi*), Tunku had to deal with the communal politics engendered by the People's Action Party (PAP), which formed the government in Singapore. Communal politics, which persisted even after the Singapore separation from Malaysia (in 1965), took a turn for the worse in the May 13, 1969 incident. The communal clashes that erupted in and around Kuala Lumpur three days after the 10 May general elections forced Tunku to the background. The day-to-day running of the country was handed over to Tun Abdul Razak, the deputy prime minister and director of the newly formed National Operations Council. Parliament was suspended, and measures were taken to reduce sources of conflict between the various communities. When Parliament reconvened on 22 September 1970, Tunku tendered his retirement to the fifth Yang Di Pertuan Agung, who, coincidentally, was also his nephew.

Shortly after his retirement, Tunku became secretary-general of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and was instrumental in setting up the Islamic Development Bank. Returning from Jeddah in 1974, he wrote his reminiscences in *The Star*, a national English daily. The articles were later compiled into volumes entitled *Looking Back* (1977), *View Points* (1978), *As a Matter of Interest* (1981), *Lest We Forget* (1983), *Something to Remember* (1983), *Challenging Times* (1986), and *Political Awakening* (1987). Tunku died on 6 December 1990, and his remains were laid to rest at his family's royal mausoleum in Langgar, Alor Setar.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Razak, Tun (1922–1976); Alliance Party (Malayan/Malaysian); Baling Talks (1955); *Konfrontasi* ("Crush Malaysia" campaign); Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Malayan/Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC); Malaysia (1963); "May 13, 1969" (Malaysia); *Merdeka* (Independence); Onn bin Jaafar (1895–1962); People's Action Party (PAP); Sabah Claim; United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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ABDUL RAZAK, TUN (1922–1976)

Champion of the Rural Peasantry

Tun Abdul Razak, more popularly known as Tun Razak, was a prominent Malay administrator and politician who played a major role in the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Alliance Party as well as the negotiations that led to Malaya achieving independence from Britain in 1957. The 1956 Razak Report, issued one year after he became minister of education, would be the blueprint for the national education policy for Malaya and later Malaysia. When Malaya achieved independence, Razak was appointed deputy prime minister and minister of defense in the Tunku Abdul Rahman cabinet. In 1961, he was also entrusted with the national and rural development portfolio, which endeared him to the rural Malays. His efforts to improve and modernize rural life by bringing amenities such as electricity, clean water, health care, education, and economic projects to the rural areas changed the socioeconomic landscape of the country, and as a result, he is regarded as *Bapa Pembangunan* (Father of Development). His contributions were recognized internationally when he received the Magsaysay Award in 1967.

When another senior minister, Dr. Ismail Datuk Haji Abdul Rahman (1915–1973), resigned in 1967, Razak also became responsible for the Ministry of Home Affairs, and following the May 13, 1969 incident, he was made director of the National Operations Council and minister of finance. Razak's experience was greatly enriched in 1959 when he served as prime minister of Malaya for more than four months (from 21 April to 7 August) after Tunku Abdul Rahman resigned temporarily in order to devote his time to campaigning for the

Alliance Party in the first general election after independence.

In addition to his other responsibilities, Razak often served as a roving envoy representing Malaya/Malaysia at international meetings and conferences. He played a major role in the negotiations leading to the end of the Indonesian *Konfrontasi* against Malaysia in 1966. He strongly propagated the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) concept as well as regional cooperation, which finally materialized in the form of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Having such a wide exposure in politics and administration, Razak was well prepared for the job when Tunku retired on 22 September 1970. It was under Razak's guidance that the new national ideology, the Rukunegara (lit. State Doctrine), and the New Economic Policy (NEP) were promulgated to foster unity and a more equitable distribution of resources and wealth among all Malaysians, regardless of ethnicity. As prime minister, Razak successfully changed Malaysia's strongly pro-West foreign policy to one of nonalignment. His visit to Beijing in 1974 made him the first Southeast Asian leader to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Born in Pekan in the eastern Malay state of Pahang on 11 March 1922, Razak was the first child of a prominent Pahang aristocrat, Dato' Hussein Mohd. Taib. Razak entered the elite Malay College at Kuala Kangsar in 1934 before enrolling at Raffles College in Singapore in 1940 to study economics, law, and history. In 1946, he embarked for London to study law, and he entered Lincoln's Inn in October 1947. He was called to the English bar in May 1950 and returned to Malaya immediately after his father's death.

Active in the Malay Society of Great Britain, Razak became its president when Tunku returned to Malaya in 1949. Back in Malaya in 1950 and still a bachelor at the age of twenty-eight, Razak was installed as Orang Kaya Indera Syahbandar (a traditional chieftainship title), and about three months later, he was nominated as a member of the Federal Legislative Council, a position held by his late father. In June 1951, he became assistant state secretary of Pahang, and he assumed the post of state secretary the following January. About three years

later, at the young age of thirty-two, he became the *menteri besar* (chief minister) of Pahang.

Razak's rise in politics was rapid. Shortly after joining UMNO in 1950, he was chosen as the organization's youth chief; in August 1951, he became its deputy president. By that time, he was second only to Tunku, the president of UMNO, whom he had earlier invited to join UMNO in anticipation of Dato' Onn's resignation. Being number two in UMNO and deputy head of the Alliance Party, he was pivotal in the success of the Alliance. After Tunku's retirement and learning from past mistakes, Razak worked toward political conciliation and merger with former adversaries, such as the Gerakan Party and the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), which led to the formation of an even bigger organization known as the Barisan Nasional (National Front) in 1974. Although PAS was expelled from the Barisan Nasional in 1978, the membership of the Barisan Nasional had grown to more than a dozen communal-based parties by 2003.

In 1952, Razak married Rahah, the daughter of a senior officer in Johor, Noh Omar, who later became speaker of the Malaysian House of Representatives. Razak died suddenly of mononucleosis on 14 January 1976 and was laid to rest at the National Mausoleum in Kuala Lumpur.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Alliance Party (Malaya/Malaysia); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Barisan Nasional (National Front) (1974); Konfrontasi (“Crush Malaysia” campaign); Malay College, Kuala Kangsar (MCKK); “May 13, 1969” (Malaysia); New Economic Policy (NEP) (Malaysia) (1970–1990); Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Southeast Asia; Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS); Raffles College; Rukunegara; Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971)

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ABDULLAH BIN ABDUL KADIR, MUNSYI (1797–1854)

Modern Malay Writer

Better known as Munsyi Abdullah, Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir was the foremost modern Malay writer. Indeed, his writings represented a radical departure from traditional works of Malay literature. Recognized as a pioneer and innovator, he introduced a refreshing trend that not only enriched and popularized Malay literary works but also contributed to Malay historiography.

Born in 1797 in Melaka of Indian-Arab-Malay parentage, Abdullah had an early education that comprised traditional Koranic teachings, as well as the reading and writing of Jawi (Malay script), Tamil, and Arabic under the tutelage of his father. He moved to the newly established British outpost of Singapore, and his fluency in Malay enabled him to teach the language to the Indian soldiers, or *sepoys*, of the British garrison in exchange for acquiring Hindi from them. The sepoy respectfully addressed him as *munsyi*, meaning “teacher.” From 1823, Abdullah diligently learned English from Christian missionaries; he in turn taught them Malay.

Because of his proficiency in Malay in particular and his knowledge of English, he served well as a copywriter for the colonial government. He benefited from working in a European printing and publishing firm and briefly was the acting head of the Anglo-Chinese College in Singapore when the Reverend G. H. Thompson was on furlough in England. He also served as letter writer to Stamford Raffles (1781–1826), governor of Singapore from 1819–1823, the “Tuan Raffles” mentioned in his writings. Raffles had an immense interest in the history and cultural heritage of the Malay world; he undoubtedly tapped Abdullah’s knowledge and experience.

Abdullah’s memoirs, *Kisah Pelayaran Abdullah* (1838) and *Hikayat Abdullah* (1848), broke new ground in Malay literature. Unlike their predecessors, these writings were printed, not handwritten, and they were published commercially.

Moreover, their authorship was prominently displayed. The pronoun *I* was used, and the contents were conveyed in simple, contemporary Malay. Fantasies and legendary stories and characters were absent; Abdullah’s writings dealt with realism. He presented ideas, opinions drawn from personal experiences, observations, and reflections. In relating the activities of the T’ien Ti Hui (Heaven and Earth Society), a clandestine Chinese organization in Singapore, Abdullah employed elements of investigative journalism. Departing from past practices of utilizing symbolism and incredible tales as means of criticism, he used straightforward language in his critiques of Malay rulers, officials, and the establishment as well as the ordinary Malay peasant. Although he mainly wrote in prose, he also composed verses, as in *Syair Singapura Terbakar* (1830).

Straddled between the traditional, insular, and conservative world of Malay aristocracy and the ignorant and illiterate *rakyat* (masses), on the one hand, and the modern, cosmopolitan, and progressive world brought by European colonialism and its attendant influences, on the other, Abdullah attempted to use his pen to raise Malay consciousness and awaken his people from their prolonged slumber. Abdullah died during his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1854. His son, Mohamed Ibrahim, followed in his footsteps as a scribe to Sultan Abu Bakar (t. 1862–1895) of Johor.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Malays; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Singapore (1819); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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ABU BAKAR, SULTAN OF JOHOR (r. 1862–1895)

Father of Modern Johor

Abu Bakar is considered the founder of modern Johor and was the first of the new-model Malay princes in British Malaya. His ancestors included Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor (r. 1699–1719) and Daing Parani, one of the Bugis chiefs who seized power in Riau during the early eighteenth century. Abu Bakar was the eldest son of Daing Ibrahim (r. 1825–1862), *temenggong* (state minister of defense and justice) of Johor, and the grandson of Temenggong Abdul Rahman (r. 1806–1825), the Malay chief who had permitted the settlement of Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) at Singapore in 1819. Raffles was lieutenant governor of Java (1811–1816), governor of Benkulen (1816–1819), and governor of Singapore (1819–1823), which he was instrumental in establishing as a British outpost in 1819. Abu Bakar grew up in colonial Singapore in his father's kampong at Teluk Belanga and attended the Malay school of the Reverend Benjamin Peach Keasberry. He was thus one of the first Malay rajas to receive an English education.

Temenggong Ibrahim had made a start at settling Chinese pepper and gambier planters on the mainland of Johor and had continued to play a role in the politics of the nearby Malay States. Abu Bakar, in his turn, pursued these initiatives with ambition and skill.

As soon as he succeeded his father, he established a capital at Tanjong Putri (now Johor Bahru), and in close partnership with a clique of Chinese merchants in Singapore, he introduced large numbers of planters into the virgin jungles of Johor. Calling upon his siblings and other Malays who had once been his classmates, he built up a state administration based at his new capital. With reliable revenue from

the Chinese planters and well-ordered government in his own state, he was hailed by British administrators and merchants in Singapore as an enlightened ruler.

Abu Bakar also continued to seek a place for himself in the politics of nearby Malay States, becoming involved in the Pahang civil war in the 1860s and in the affairs of nearby, Dutch-controlled Riau. He overshadowed the heirs of Sultan Hussain (r. 1819–1835), claimants to the Johor crown. He was also a presence in conflicts that later arose in Negri Sembilan, Perak, Selangor, and Terengganu. Although British governors and Singapore merchants were concerned about his ambitious schemes, he ultimately was able to establish an acceptable balance between his goals and British sensibilities. For the most part, the colonial officials found him a useful ally whose own power was never allowed to threaten the stability of prosperous Singapore.

In 1865, he traveled to England and was presented to Queen Victoria (r. 1837–1901), thus establishing a connection that significantly boosted his status not only among his fellow rajas but also in Europe. He dropped the title of *temenggong* and adopted that of *maharaja* (the original Malay title had been *temenggong sri maharaja*), a term more recognizable in Europe. Throughout his life, he remained a close friend of the British monarch, and through her, he gained a privileged entry into the world of European aristocracy. He spent much time during the 1880s and 1890s traveling in Europe, entertaining and being entertained by the crowned heads of the Continent. At the same time, he constructed European-style palaces in Johor Bahru and at his Singapore estate at Tyersall, where he entertained a procession of global dignitaries, including the Duke of Buckingham and General Arthur MacArthur, among many others.

His wealth and status were reinforced by his ability to understand and compete with Europeans on their own ground. Early on, he made use of the services of European lawyers in Singapore, and he maintained close commercial relations with a number of the main European agency houses as well as with the key Chinese *toukay* (merchants, entrepreneurs) in the town. Colonial authorities were forced to recognize the sovereignty of his state, and the British gov-

ernment ultimately acknowledged him as sultan of the state and territory of Johor in 1885.

His relations with colonial governors and the Colonial Office in London were not always smooth, as British officials and mercantile factions in Singapore found much to criticize in his independence and his sometimes extravagant lifestyle. Ultimately, his son was forced to yield to British pressures in 1914 and submit to colonial status. Abu Bakar made a significant impact, however, not only in creating a viable state but also in finding a path for educated and progressive Malays in his administration. They and their immediate descendants were important figures in establishing Malaysia's first political parties and its federal administration.

CARL TROCKI

See also Agency Houses, European; British Malaya; Bugis (Buginese); Chinese in Southeast Asia; Johor; Johor-Riau Empire; Pahang; Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Singapore (1819); *Towkay*; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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ACEH (ACHEH)

Banda Aceh, the present-day capital city of the province of Aceh, Indonesia, lies strategically in the northwestern tip of the island of Sumatra.

From the early sixteenth century, Banda Aceh developed as the capital of a great and powerful Islamic kingdom. Foreign accounts as well as local chronicles and legends point to the existence of small kingdoms (Lamuri or Ramni and various others—Lambri, Lan-li, Lan-wu-li) prior to the emergence of Banda Aceh. In Chinese and Arab sources, mention was made of several exported items, including brazilwood, camphor, coral, cranes' nests, gold, ivory, rattan, tin, turtle shells, and lignal-oes (the resinous wood of various tropical trees, from which oil is extracted for use as an ingredient in soaps, perfumes, and foods).

Chau-Ju-Kua (1225) mentioned that Lan-wu-li (Lamri) was under the control of Śriwi-jaya, which annually sent tribute to San-fo-chi, and the Javanese chronicle *Nāgarakertāgama*, written by Prapanca (1365), mentioned Perlak, Samudra, and Lamuri among the Sumatran states that recognized the supreme authority of Majapahit's king, Hayam Wuruk (Rājasanagara, r. 1350–1389).

From the early part of the sixteenth century, Lamuri was apparently subjected to the king of Aceh, as mentioned by Tome Pires in his *Suma Oriental* (1512–1515). The well-known king who strengthened Aceh was Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah (r. 1496–1530); he was mentioned in the Malay literatures—particularly in the *Hikayat Bustan as-Salatin*, written in the seventeenth century by Nuruddin Al-Raniri (d. 1666). Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah was identified as Raja Ibrahim in the Portuguese account. In 1511, the Portuguese conquered Melaka, the very important international trading center in Southeast Asia. Consequently, the Islamic kingdom of Demak avoided the Straits of Melaka and utilized the trade route through the Strait of Sunda and the Indian Ocean along the western coast of Sumatra. This diversion benefited Aceh. Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah began to expand his power and proclaimed Aceh's independence from Pedir in 1520. Daya was annexed in 1520; four years later, the kingdoms of Pedir and Samudra-Pasai were conquered. Both Pedir and Pasai were pepper ports with a flourishing trade with Gujerat and China. In 1528, despite the opportunity, Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah failed to capture the Portuguese fleet commanded by Simao de Souza Galvao, which was sheltering from a storm off the port of Aceh. One year later, the sultan's plans to attack



Detail of a map from the sixteenth century depicting Sumatra and regions of present-day Aceh Province in Indonesia. (James Ford Bell Library, University of Minnesota)

the Portuguese in Melaka also failed to materialize. He died in the following year and was buried at Kandang XII in Banda Aceh.

Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah al-Khahar (r. 1537–1568) was another great ruler of Aceh. He expanded the armed forces, developed

trade, and established close relations with Islamic powers in the Middle East (West Asia), especially with Turkey, and in Africa, namely with Abyssinia and Egypt. In 1563, he sent an envoy to Constantinople requesting assistance against the Portuguese. Two years later, Turkey

dispatched two ships with supplies and military technicians to Aceh. Therefore, with his strong military forces, the sultan conquered Batak, Aru (Deli), and Barus. Johor and Melaka were attacked in 1537, 1547, and 1568 by large forces of the Acehnese armada, equipped with Turkish-manned artillery pieces.

The political expansion of the Acehnese sultanate was continued by his successors, who attacked Melaka in 1573 and conquered the rich tin-producing state of Perak in the Malay Peninsula two years later. Meanwhile, Aceh struck an alliance with the Javanese kingdom of Japara under Ratu Kalinyamat.

When Aceh overran Perak in 1575, its ruler, Sultan Ahmad, died; his wife and his son, Mansur, were taken to Aceh. The Acehnese sultan married his daughter to Mansur; the latter succeeded his father-in-law as Sultan Alauddin Mansur Shah (r. 1579–1585). After that time, a foreign sultan ruled Aceh. According to the *Hikayat Bustan as-Salatin*, Sultan Alauddin Mansur Shah was a very virtuous and just king, and he supported religious scholars. During his reign, Aceh was visited by many 'ulamas (religious teachers), such as Syekh Abulkhaer ibn Syekh ibn Hajar. In 1582, he was teaching *sufism* (mysticism), *fikh* (law), and *tauhid* (knowledge on the unity of God). In the same year, Syekh Muhammad Jamani, an expert in *usul ad-din* (basis of religion), arrived in Aceh; he was followed by the famous ulama Syekh Jailani ibn Hasan ibn Muhammad Hamid.

The chronicles say that Sultan Alauddin Mansur Shah died in 1585 and was succeeded by Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah ibn Sultan Munawar Shah, who reigned until 1588 and in turn was succeeded by Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah ibn Firman Shah (r. 1589–1604). During the latter's reign, the Europeans, notably the English East India Company (EIC) under James Lancaster in 1599 and in 1602, visited Aceh and presented a letter from England's Queen Elizabeth I (r. 1558–1603). The Dutch ships commanded by Cornelis de Houtman anchored in the Bay of Aceh on 30 June 1599. De Houtman and Lancaster were given a friendly reception and permitted to buy pepper.

When Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah died in 1604, the throne of Aceh was in the hands of a very weak ruler, Sultan Muda, also known as Sultan Ali Riayat Shah, who reigned until 1607. His successor was the famous Sultan Iskandar

Muda (Mahkota Alam, r. 1607–1636). He reigned over a prosperous city and a strong kingdom that thrived because of his achievements in the development of international trade and commerce, political expansion, and the establishment of close relations with foreign Islamic kingdoms that not only strengthened Aceh's military forces but also intensified the kingdom's Islamic faith. The regions along the western and eastern coasts of Sumatra acknowledged the power of Aceh. Johor, in the Malay Peninsula, was forced to acknowledge the authority of the Acehnese sultanate. Aceh's international trade networks encompassed England, France, India, Africa, Egypt, Turkey, Arabia and the Middle East, China, and Japan. The port of Aceh hosted foreign merchants armed with foreign commodities: porcelain, cloth, carpet, silk, fine chintz, butter, rice, wheat, and lacquerware. The export commodities from Aceh itself and from the other countries included pepper, silk, benzoin, pitch, lignal-oes, camphor, sulphur, petroleum, gold, tin, lead, ivory, sandalwood, cinnamon, and other spices. Of all of the native products, pepper was the most important export commodity. The total amount of pepper produced annually on the western coast of Sumatra at the time was about 40,000 bags, and the sultan of Aceh handled about 16,000 bags, so the total amount for the kingdom was about 56,000 bags (Dasgupta 1962). Through the mercantilist system, many noblemen and aristocrats became much richer than the sultan himself. Sultan Iskandar Muda was said to be the richest king in the region, with his large income derived from trade revenues and customs duties. He created an efficient bureaucratic system and codified the basic law of the sultanate, known as *Adat Meukuta Alam* or *Kanun Meukuta Alam*. Iskandar Muda also supported the development of Islam. The teaching of the heterodox Sufism, or *Wihdatul Wujud*, of Hamzah al-Fansuri and Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani (d. 1630) was protected, and their influence spread over the kingdom and even to the Malay Peninsula. After Sultan Iskandar Muda died in 1636, Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1658) returned to Aceh and undertook a reformation against the teaching of Hamzah al-Fansuri and Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani. Al-Raniri was an expert not only in theology and history but also in neo-Sufism (orthodox Sufism), or *Wihdatul Shuhud*, and his teachings

were supported by Sultan Iskandar Thani (r. 1636–1641), the successor of Iskandar Muda. The historical books *Bustan as-salatin* and *Taj as-salatina* were written by Nuruddin al-Raniri. His follower in Aceh was also a famous ulama, named Abdurraf as-Singkili or Syekh Kuala.

The news of the fall of Melaka to the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1641 had spread, but it had little impact on the sultanate. After the demise of Iskandar Thani in 1641, the sultanate of Aceh was ruled by queens (from 1641 to 1699): Taj al-Alam Safiatuddin Shah, Sri Sultan Nur al-Alam Nakiat ad-din Shah, Inayat Shah Zakiat ad-din Shah, and Ratu Kamalat Shah. Thereafter, rulers of Arab descent reigned: Sultan Badr al-alam Syarif Hasyim Jamal ad-din (r. 1699–1702) and Sultan Perkasa Alam Syarif Lamtui Ibn Syarif Ibrahim (r. 1702–1703). There were also rulers who descended from the Buginese dynasty, namely, Sultan Ala ad-din Ahmad Shah or Maharaja Lela Melayu (r. 1727–1735). The political situation and economic condition of the Acehnese sultanate apparently began to decline from the end of the seventeenth century and continued to do so throughout the eighteenth century.

In the nineteenth century, the sultanate of Aceh was threatened by Dutch political expansion. As in other regions in Indonesia, there was resistance to Dutch colonialism. The Aceh Wars (1873–1903) represented the most intense and protracted struggle. Because the spirit of war was stimulated by religious motivation—the so-called *perang sabil* (holy war)—the opposition against the establishment of Dutch hegemony was intense. The roots and passion of the conflict could be traced to the early nineteenth century.

From the time of Sultan Alauddin Muhammad Daud Shah's reign (1823–1838), the prestige of Aceh as an Islamic kingdom was strong and constantly promoted. Meanwhile, Dutch political control, reaching to Sibolga and the interior of Tapanuli and Batak in 1830, threatened the freedom of Aceh. The regions along both the western and the eastern coasts of Sumatra began to be influenced by the political power of the Netherlands Indies. In February 1858, the Dutch subjugated Siak, followed by Deli, Asahan, Kampar, and Indragiri. These kingdoms were directly and indirectly under the protection of the sultanate of Aceh. The subjugation of these kingdoms by the Dutch,

strengthened by the Sumatra Treaty of 1871 between The Netherlands and Great Britain, directly threatened the sovereignty of Aceh. Preparations for war with the Dutch were made, and the sultan sent Habib Abdurrakhman to Turkey to seek assistance. When the delegation returned and visited Singapore, agreements regarding aid to Aceh were made with the consuls of the United States and Italy.

In March 1873, Sultan Muhammad Daud Shah refused to submit to the authority of the Netherlands Indies, and military campaigns were launched in April and again in December. By mid-January 1874, Aceh Besar also came under the authority of the Netherlands Indies. But it took another thirty years before Acehnese opposition was finally subdued. The *uléëbalangs* (provincial chiefs) and the 'ulamas provided the leadership in this protracted armed struggle. The government of the Netherlands Indies gradually realized that military action was not the key to overcoming Acehnese recalcitrance. The Dutch government engaged Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936), who was an expert on Islam and had conversed with the 'ulama of Aceh while in Mekka (Mecca). Hurgronje proposed that the unity of the 'ulama and the aristocrats had to be broken. Further, the Netherlands Indies government had to offer civil service appointments to aristocrats and their sons.

However, the military campaign continued under the civil and military governor, J. B. van Heutsz, who led a major offensive against Pedie (Pedir) in March 1898. Acehnese resistance slowly crumbled with the deaths and surrender of the leadership: Teungku Cik Di Tiro and Muhammad Syaman died in 1891; Panglima Polem and his wife were captured in 1903; and Teuku Umar was killed in February 1899 and his wife, Cut Nya' Din, was captured and exiled to Sumedang in 1906. By the September 1904 decree of the Netherlands Indies government, van Heutsz was appointed as governor-general of the Netherlands Indies, and General J. C. van der Wijck was appointed as governor of Aceh.

UKA TJANDRASASMITA

See also Aceh (Acheh) Wars (1873–1903); Darul Islam Movement (DI); Demak; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Hamzah Fansuri; Hayam Wuruk (Rajasanagara) (r. 1350–1389)

Iskandar Muda, Sultan (Mahkota Alam) (r. 1607–1636); Islam in Southeast Asia; Johor-Riau Empire; Melaka; Nurud-din al-Raniri (d. 1658); Pepper; Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA); Portuguese Asian Empire; Snouck Hurgronje, Professor Christiaan (1857–1936); Sumatra; Van Heutsz, General Joannes Benedictus (1851–1924)

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ACEH (ACHEH) WARS (1873–1903)

Beginning in 1873, the contest for the former sultanate of Aceh was emblematic of the struggle for Islamic independence in the Indonesian archipelago. The Aceh Wars were the longest conflict in which the Dutch became embroiled in Indonesia and formally lasted until 1903, although fighting persisted well into the following decade.

Aceh had long served as one of the principal centers for the study of Islam and as a gateway for the pilgrimage to Mecca. By the late sixteenth century, it had become the most powerful state in Sumatra, reaching its apogee under Sultan Iskandar Muda (r. 1607–1636). This state exercised control over territories in the west of present-day Indonesia and Malaysia and forged formal links with the Ottoman Empire. The following centuries, however, witnessed a decline in Acehnese fortunes, though the region persisted as an independent kingdom.

The 1824 Treaty of London divided insular Southeast Asia into British and Dutch spheres while recognizing Acehnese sovereignty. Anxiety about the intervention of a third power in the region led Great Britain and The Netherlands to conclude a new agreement in 1871, allowing for Dutch intervention. The Dutch alleged, with little evidence, that the Acehnese were seeking to negotiate with the United States, and on the pretext that the sultanate was sponsoring piracy in the Straits of Melaka, they sent an expedition to north Sumatra in March 1873.

This poorly prepared force did not even locate the royal residence and was forced to retreat after the death of its commander, General Köhler. A massive expedition, better planned and equipped, was mounted in late 1873. This time, the palace was captured and the sultanate was declared at an end; on 31 January 1874, General van Swieten proclaimed Aceh a part of the Netherlands Indies. This proved to be a

hollow victory. The young successor to the throne, Muhammad Dawot (Muhammad Daud), was taken to safety while a key adviser to the late sultan, Habib 'Abd al-Rahman al-Zahir (1833–1896), continued to press for Ottoman aid from Istanbul. Such aid was not forthcoming, but the continuing resistance of the Acehnese served as a source of inspiration for many of the Muslims of the Netherlands Indies and the Malay Peninsula and among the Southeast Asian community in Mecca.

Effective resistance to Dutch incursions now passed briefly to the various petty lords (*uléëbalang*). Subsequently, opposition was undertaken by the religious leaders, the 'ulama. Key 'ulama such as Teungku di Tiro (1836–1891) enjoyed popular support bolstered by widely disseminated texts equating the struggle with a holy war, a *jihad* (Arab) or *perang sabi* (Aceh). In 1876 and after two years spent gathering support from the British port of Penang, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Zahir returned to Aceh to coordinate the resistance. He soon fell out with the local leadership and submitted to the Dutch in 1878 in exchange for a lifelong pension in Mecca. The war dragged on regardless.

With an uncertain foothold on the coast and beset regularly by cholera and dysentery, the Dutch would opt to fortify their position as a base from which to launch incursions into the surrounding territory. This state of affairs prevailed for several years, being formalized with the so-called line of concentration, inaugurated under General van Pel (d. 1876). Thereby, the capital was surrounded by a series of fortified posts connected by an armored tramway. This policy worked to the advantage of the Acehnese leadership. The vast majority of Greater Aceh was still impassable for the Dutch.

A third campaign to complete the pacification of the province was begun in 1884. But with the Indies in recession and the ongoing campaign causing substantial hardship in Java, where most colonial revenues were raised, the morass persisted. Criticism of the war from within Dutch and Indies society led to the appointment of an Aceh veteran, J. B. van Heutsz (1851–1924), as military governor in 1898. With the advice of Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936), whose studies had identified the *uléëbalangs* as potential clients and who counseled the vigorous prosecution of guerrilla tactics against the 'ulama, van Heutsz

engaged in a series of successful campaigns, advancing Dutch control across Pedir (1899–1901) and Daya (1898–1903) and pushing into the Gayo highlands by 1903. In each territory, the local *uléëbalang*, on submission, was obliged to sign “the short declaration,” a document drafted by Snouck Hurgronje that pledged allegiance to the Dutch sovereign and her agents.

Victory finally seemed complete in 1903, with the submission of the aspirant sultan Muhammad Dawot. But the conflicts were by no means over: fighting continued until the taking of Alas (1907), and indeed scattered resistance occurred until as late as 1912. Furthermore, Dutch rule, as enforced under van Heutsz and his successor van Daalen, was barely accepted, being accomplished by the use of extreme violence. The Aceh campaign would continue to haunt the Dutch in Indonesia, and its incorporation within the Java-centered Netherlands Indies would be a source of instability in the future nation of Indonesia.

M. F. LAFFAN

See also Aceh (Acheh); Iskandar Muda, Sultan (Mahkota Alam) (r. 1607–1636); Islam in Southeast Asia; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Penang (1786); Pepper; Short Declaration, Long Contract; Snouck Hurgronje, Professor Christiaan (1857–1936); Van Heutsz, General Joannes Benedictus (1851–1924)

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ADAT

Despite its probable Arabic origin, the term *adat* resonates deeply throughout the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago. Often defined as “custom” or “customary law,” the word refers,

broadly speaking, to the customary norms, rules, interdictions, and injunctions that guide an individual's conduct as a member of the community and the sanctions and forms of redress by which these norms and rules are upheld. *Adat* may also refer, more abstractly, to the natural order (for example, that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west) or to the ideal, in the sense of what is correct or proper.

Among Muslim societies in Southeast Asia, the concept of *adat* is generally distinguished from *ugama'* religion (which is separately concerned with the rules of religious observance) and from Islamic law. For most non-Muslim groups, this distinction between *adat* and religion is not recognized. Iban *adat*, for example, concerns not only social norms but also ritual procedures and rules of propitiation. For the Iban, the prime function of *adat* is to ensure harmonious relations among community members. At the same time, conduct in accordance with *adat* is believed to maintain the community in a state of ritual well-being in respect to the gods, ancestors, and spirits. The correct observance of *adat* is thought to result in a continuing state of spiritual well-being, demonstrated outwardly by the health, longevity, and material prosperity of community members. In this sense, the meaning of the word is not restricted to customary law but rather applies to the entire normative framework of traditional social and religious life.

The word *adat* means roughly what an English speaker means by *custom*. Thus, it describes the various things people customarily do and the ways in which they customarily do them. Like the English notion, it also covers personal habits. To have good *adat* implies that a person not only acts in accordance with the rules of *adat* but also that his or her conduct exemplifies more abstract ideals, such as generosity or personal courage. The notion of *adat* therefore also embraces more general values, moral ideals, and standards and so provides a measure against which a person's conduct may be judged.

In the early decades of the twentieth century in the Netherlands East Indies, the study of *adat* emerged as a specialized field of inquiry. Although associated with the needs of colonial administration, this study nevertheless gave rise to an active scholarly discipline that dealt with differing systems of *adat* comparatively, and many scholars were involved in compiling

codes of *adat* from throughout the Indonesian archipelago. The massive literature that resulted remains, to this day, a major contribution to Indonesian ethnography and jurisprudence.

CLIFFORD SATHER

See also Brunei Ethnic Minorities; Brunei Malays; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Iban; Kadazan-Dusuns; Malays; Orang Asli

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AGE OF COMMERCE

Anthony Reid first coined the phrase *age of commerce* in the late 1980s in his two-volume masterpiece *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450–1680* (1988, 1993). Since its publication, this pathbreaking work has become the most influential interpretation of early modern Southeast Asian civilization. With a focus on examining Southeast Asia in its relations with the rest of the world that shaped the region, it has entirely reconstructed the understanding of precolonial Southeast Asia.

In the historiography of the colonial era that dominated the field of Southeast Asian history up to the early 1960s, the region was studied in separate parts, as colonial dependencies of the West or as appendages of China and India. This view saw Southeast Asians as fundamentally lacking the impetus for internal change. Departing from this colonial stand, nationalist histories either treated Southeast Asians as powerless victims or attempted to correct this image by forging a more celebratory, empowering view of the region's past that emphasized the internal orientation of individual Southeast Asian countries. Ironically, this approach supported the colonial historiography in that it

compartmentalized Southeast Asian history into separate national histories. This approach served to further isolate the study of the region from international forces and comparisons.

The publication of *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce* reflected the shifts in the political and academic climate during the late twentieth century and heralded a new trend of scholarship on Southeast Asian historiography. Reid sought to reposition the region back into a world historical process on which it had made an impact. Building on the achievements of postcolonial scholarship, he highlighted the region's interconnectedness to the world without displacing the Southeast Asians from the center of their own historical stage.

Carrying on the Annals School's tradition of rejecting events and great people as the simple causes of historical change, Reid focused on the daily life of ordinary peoples in Southeast Asia and organized his research along the themes of physical and material culture. In his first volume (1988), he dealt with Southeast Asian social structure, environment, diet, dress, and entertainment. He identified the cultural essence that made Southeast Asia one unit and distinguished it from the rest of Asia. In this grand historical investigation, Reid applied an interdisciplinary approach and built his strength on the scholarship of modern geographers, anthropologists, demographers, and environmental scientists. His grasp of the details in the lives of ordinary men and women and nonelite merchants permitted a remarkable departure from the elite-centered paradigm of political narrative that had dominated Southeast Asian historiography for centuries.

For Reid, the period between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, the age of commerce, was the major turning point in Southeast Asian history. This notion broke away from the conventional historiography that labeled the period as "early European contact," "Islamization," or simply according to the individual dynasties, such as Ayutthaya and Mataram. Such labels, Reid argued, obscured the underlying coherence of a period that brought profound and momentous changes to all of Southeast Asia, whereas the age of commerce theme enabled Reid to trace the longer-term shifts. Again he departed from the conventional historiography, which marked the arrival of Europeans in 1500 as the start of a new era in

Southeast Asian history. Reid's age of commerce starts in 1450, the initial impetus being the explosion of energy of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) in China. The movement toward coastal areas and the rise of port polities marked this period. This followed the decline of the Indianized kingdoms that had been centered in dry, inland areas.

In his second volume (1993), Reid provided an economic analysis based on carefully derived statistics on the rapid growth of cash cropping, spice exports, indigenous intraregional trade, and urbanization. His intention in emphasizing the economic dimension of Southeast Asian history was to be able to compare it with other parts of the world. Commerce was taken as an index of change in order to demonstrate the important changes that took place in Southeast Asia before the colonial period. Reid traced the intense interaction with the world economy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the decline of trade from the mid-seventeenth century.

In this age of commerce, a significant portion of the Southeast Asian population was drawn into the international market economy. Pepper, the most important single export of Southeast Asia in the age of commerce, was carried from India to Southeast Asia as a cash crop explicitly grown for the market. Reid argued that the involvement of hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asians in cultivating and marketing pepper in response to world demand was one of the most overt economic consequences of the trade boom. As such, Southeast Asia provided many of the goods that dominated global long-distance trade, the elements essential to the creation of merchant capitalism in Europe.

The boom in exports stimulated a rapid increase in imports of consumption products, most noticeably Indian cloth, at a value of about 40 ton silver equivalent per year, at the height of the age of commerce from 1620 to 1650 (Reid 1990: 22–23). This flourishing commerce enabled a large percentage of the population to live on food supplied not by local but by long-distance trade. This trade was carried out by thousands of Southeast Asian junks, a distinct type of vessel incorporating elements of Chinese and Southeast Asian traditions. In the sixteenth century, at least six cities in Southeast Asia (Thang Long, Ayutthaya, Aceh,

Banten, Makassar, and Mataram) had a population of 100,000, equivalent to most contemporary European cities except for Paris, London, and Amsterdam (Reid 1993: 72–73). As such, these cities were larger in 1600 than they were in 1850. Reid's finding overthrew the conventional view in which urbanization went hand in hand with colonization and the peasantry was placed at the heart of "traditional" Southeast Asia. He further argued that the region was, in the age of commerce, an intensely mobile society both horizontally and vertically, in which the functions of farmer, trader, warrior, and chief were often combined in one extended family or even one individual.

These multiethnic market cities witnessed the most intensive process of both Islamization and Christianization in Southeast Asia. More than half the population of the region adopted Islam or Christianity during the age of commerce, leaving a permanent impact on the course of Southeast Asian history. Ironically, Reid argued, the arrival of the Portuguese and Spaniards, who were determined not only to make Christian converts but also to destroy Muslim trading dominance, was a stimulus to the spread of Islam. Islam was still a minority coastal phenomenon when the Portuguese arrived in the early 1500s. Their takeover of Melaka in 1511 and their consequent expulsion of Muslim spice trade merchants created a diaspora of Muslim traders who established their trading centers in Aceh, Johor, Pahang, and Patani. Islam proliferated from these port towns to the hinterland, whereas Christianity quickly converted most Filipinos and large numbers of Vietnamese. Parallel to this was a marked shift to a more universalist and moralist emphasis of Theravada Buddhism in Burma, Siam, southern Vietnam, and Cambodia and an enforcement of neo-Confucian orthodoxy in northern Vietnam. All these changes fragmented Southeast Asian countries, on the one hand, but led them in a similar direction, on the other. They strengthened the appeal of universal moral codes, which were reinforced by written scriptures and a system of eternal rewards and punishments.

Scriptural religion and the enhanced prestige of the rulers in turn reduced the power of local nobility and helped in the formation of centralized states. These entities owed their power largely to the wealth and military expertise that

came with international trade. The absolutist states being created in this age drastically changed the oligarchic style of governance commonly found in the island kingdoms in Southeast Asia in the beginning of the age of commerce. The necessity of trying to survive under the external pressure from the (Dutch) United East India Company (VOC) sped up this process. According to Reid, the shift toward centralized rule, the mobilization of huge armies, the royal monopoly of trade, and the codification of law were all consequences of the age of commerce. Kings, who by then considered themselves "universal" monarchs, recognized no real legal restraints on the royal will, and consequently, there were no clear safeguards for private property. Tensions developed between royal authority and the market as this lack of security undermined commercial initiative and profit accumulation.

At the peak of the age of commerce, Southeast Asia shared similarities with Europe and Japan in that it had advanced more rapidly than most parts of the world. This is evident in terms of the integration into world trade, the commercialization of production and consumption, the growth of cities, the specialization of economic functions, the monetization of taxation, and the rapid improvements in the military and transport technology. Yet Southeast Asia differed from Europe and Japan in terms of the accumulation and mobilization of capital in private and corporate hands. These characteristics became fatal when Southeast Asia was facing the aggressive European expansion into the region. Reid pinpointed 1650 as a turning point. In 1600, Southeast Asians interacted as equals with Europeans, but by 1700, the inequalities between them were clear. Europeans had altered the balance of power by their superior naval firepower, impregnable fortresses, and Asian allies. As a consequence, the states most dependent on trade wealth were the most vulnerable and the first to fall victim to European arms: Melaka (1511), Pegu (1600), Banda (1621), Makassar (1669), and Banten (1682). The prosperous indigenous ports of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries declined, and by the 1630s, Dutch Batavia and Spanish Manila became Southeast Asia's most important international ports.

Reid's work demonstrated that the age of commerce remade Southeast Asia and enabled

it to play a leading role in global commerce. As commerce declined, so did the role of merchants, the growth of cities, and the cosmopolitan character of the society. The seventeenth century marked not only a retreat from reliance on the international market but also a greater distrust of external ideas. Reid's *Age of Commerce*, as pointed out by many in the field, raised early modern Southeast Asian historiography to a new level of sophistication and synthesis. For sheer originality, breadth of vision, and encyclopedic brilliance, these volumes have no equal.

LI TANA

See also Aceh (Acheh); Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767 C.E.), Kingdom of; Banten (Bantam); Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jakarta, Djakarta/Jakarta); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1602), English; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (c. 1400–ca. 1800); Hanoi (Thang-long); Islam in Southeast Asia; Melaka; Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Pepper; Portuguese Asian Empire; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Spices and the Spice Trade; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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AGENCY HOUSES, EUROPEAN

Agency houses were large European firms that dominated the economies of Southeast Asia in

the colonial era (ca. 1800–ca. 1965). They became central to the region's economic growth because of their dual commercial role—first, as the agents for European manufacturers, shipping lines, and insurance companies, and second, as the managing agents of investments in primary production (for example, rubber estates). In these ways, the agency houses linked European financiers and manufacturers with investment and trading opportunities in Southeast Asia. Distant investors could relax in the knowledge that their capital was being managed "on the spot" by Europeans with local expertise. Manufacturers, meanwhile, avoided the need to set up their own sales branches, distributive networks, and factories.

The agency houses were predominantly British. Merchant firms—such as Guthrie & Company—set up in Singapore following British annexation in 1819. At first, they focused on trading activities, exchanging Straits produce for British goods. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, the agency houses took on new roles as promoters of fixed investments. Following the extension of British authority to the Malay States after 1874, the Singapore firms expanded into the peninsula through diversification into plantations and mines. In particular and from the 1900s, they channeled money from the city of London into rubber plantations. In being awarded managerial and secretarial functions as well as seats on boards of directors, the agency houses came to control clusters of companies they often did not own. By 1931, for example, Guthrie's was the managing agent for twenty-six planting companies with £6 million in capital, presiding over 52,800 hectares of rubber and 4,200 hectares of oil palms. The British houses also extended their trading and investment interests from Singapore into British Borneo. The Borneo Company Limited (BCL) exercised a virtual monopoly in Sarawak, and Harrisons & Crosfield became a major extractor of timber from North Borneo. In Burma, similar developments took place from the 1860s. Steel Brothers & Company built up a vast commercial portfolio encompassing rice, timber, oil, cotton, tin, imports, shipping, manufacturing, rubber, and insurance. The tentacles of the agency houses also spread into independent Thailand, where, for instance, the BCL had vast investments in the teak industry—British colo-

nial rule was not essential for the success of the agency house.

Concurrently, the British firms played a central role in the economic development of the Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies (Indonesia). After 1906, Harrisons & Crosfield became a major promoter of rubber companies on Sumatra and tea companies on Java. Even so, there were four huge Dutch firms with wide-ranging activities that compared with the British agency houses and rose to prominence after the liberalization of Indies trade in the 1870s. The Borneo-Sumatra Company, for example, engaged in activities ranging from merchanting to mining. The Dutch specialist managing agencies (*administratie kantoor*s) and agricultural finance corporations (*cultuurbanken*) also performed managerial and investment functions akin to those of the British agency houses. Dutch and, before the Great War (1914–1918), German merchants were also to be found in Singapore. But the British, Dutch, and German firms could not penetrate French Indochina, where the protectionist policies of the colonial administration ensured that about ten French import-export firms monopolized trade with France by 1914. In contrast to their British and Dutch equivalents, however, the French merchants tended not to venture into plantations or mines. Rather, the promotion of fixed investments, from the 1920s, was the role of giant finance corporations, or *banques d'affaires*, that directly owned and managed a number of subsidiaries.

The agency houses weathered the depression of the 1930s and returned to Southeast Asia after the Japanese occupation (1941–1945). Yet in the postwar era of decolonization and economic nationalism, it made sense to spread risks and diversify geographically. Most of the British houses established branches and investments in North America and Australasia. In independent Burma (Myanmar) and Indonesia, British and Dutch assets were nationalized. In Malaysia, the big British firms continued to operate after independence (1957) and diversified into local manufacturing. But the government's New Economic Policy (NEP) (1971–1990) forced the agency houses into Malaysian ownership and control during the 1970s and 1980s, and by that time, they had been superseded by Japanese capital.

Nevertheless, at their height in the late colonial period, the agency houses had proved to be

the linchpins of modern capitalism in Southeast Asia, linking the region to the industrialized world. In recent scholarship, the British agency houses have been termed "investment groups"; they have been recognized as crucial to British economic expansion in Southeast Asia and beyond, and it is estimated that they commanded financial resources equivalent to those of some of the larger industrial firms in metropolitan Britain. The heads of the agency houses had close links with the city of London, but their influence over colonial administrations and imperial governments was limited. Despite the relative decline of the British economy, the agency houses remained dynamic and enterprising into the late twentieth century.

NICHOLAS J. WHITE

See also British Borneo; British Burma; British Malaya; Burma under British Colonial Rule; Decolonization of Southeast Asia; French Indochina; Great Depression (1929–1931); Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Java; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; New Economic Policy (NEP) (1971–1990) (Malaysia); Rubber; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Singapore (1819); Singapore (Nineteenth century to 1990s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Sumatra; Tin; Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Western Malaya States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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AGRICULTURAL INVOLUTION

The concept of involution was brought to prominence by the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz in his historical and ecological study of social, cultural, and economic changes among Javanese peasants under Dutch colonialism (Geertz 1963). He attempted to explain the reasons for Indonesia's failure to modernize and industrialize in comparison with Japan. He identified the obstacles to economic evolution or revolution in the particular kinds of colonial policies and practices that the Javanese experienced during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Geertz argued that with the introduction by the Dutch colonial state of the forced cultivation of cash crops such as sugar and coffee in 1830 and then the development of commercial, plantation agriculture from the 1870s, Javanese society was stifled; it turned in on itself and became internally so elaborate and complex that the villagers were locked into a "permanent transition." The Dutch did this by using Javanese land and labor for the cultivation of crops for the world market while confining the farmers to the rice subsistence sector. This dualism was made possible by the properties of irrigated agriculture, in contrast to the forest-based shifting cultivation practiced in Indonesia's Outer Islands. Wet-rice cultivation can support increasing population densities, and it responds to agricultural intensification. Therefore, the Javanese, without access to the Dutch-dominated cash crop sector, squeezed more and more of their number into the rice sector, dividing up and redistributing work and production. This resulted in a high level of peasant socioeconomic homogeneity, a large number of small rice farms, and what Geertz called "shared poverty."

Geertz's work has been the subject of much debate and criticism, particularly by historians such as Robert van Niel (1992). Geertz's critics draw attention to his oversimplified picture of the country's ecology; the evidence of marked

inequalities in rural landownership, wealth, and power; the considerable variations among population density, rice cultivation, cash crop agriculture, and land tenure across Java; the dynamism rather than involution in Javanese rural areas; and the increase in rural prosperity in the nineteenth century, particularly among those who owned land. Geertz has also defended his thesis and responded to his critics (1984).

VICTOR T. KING

See also Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Forced Deliveries; Java; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies

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AGUINALDO, EMILIO (1869–1964) Filipino Revolutionary Leader

Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy was a general in the Philippine Revolution and the founder and president of the first Philippine republic. He led the fight against the Spanish colonial regime during the first phase of the revolution and the fight against the Americans during the second.

Aguinaldo was born in the town of Kawit, in the province of Cavite, on 22 March 1869, the son of a well-to-do family. He started his secondary schooling in Manila, but when his father died, he had to discontinue his studies for financial reasons. He then worked on the agricultural family holdings in his hometown. In 1895, he was elected municipal captain in Kawit. In that year, he also joined the Katipunan, the secret association founded and led by Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897) that strove to mobilize Filipinos against oppressive Spanish rule in the islands. In August 1896, the revolution started with uprisings in Manila, the capital, and in the nearby provinces. The Spanish colonial government was repressive in its clampdown. Spanish forces marched against the



Emilio Aguinaldo was a Filipino leader who fought first against Spain and later against the United States for the independence of the Philippines around the turn of the twentieth century. (Library of Congress)

ill-prepared rebels and defeated them in several places. However, in Cavite, the rebel troops, ably led by Aguinaldo, defeated the Spanish forces repeatedly and drove them out of the province.

The revolutionary movement in Cavite consisted of two rival factions. The Katipunan chapter in Kawit, which was given the symbolic name *Magdaló* (after Maria Magdalena) and was led by Aguinaldo, thought that the time had come to replace the Katipunan organization with a new revolutionary government. The council in the town of Noveleta, with the symbolic name *Magdiwang* and associated with the Katipunan *supremo* (supreme head) Bonifacio (1863–1897), opposed the move. In March 1897, the two councils convened in Tejeros,

Cavite, and a majority decided to elect a revolutionary government, with Aguinaldo as president. Andres Bonifacio, who attended the meeting, disagreed and opposed the new government. Aguinaldo then ordered the arrest of Bonifacio; he was charged with sedition and treason before a military court. Bonifacio was sentenced to death and executed on 10 May.

In June, a strong Spanish army defeated the rebel forces and regained control over Cavite. Aguinaldo moved the revolutionary government to the town of Biyak na Bato in the province of Bulacan. Negotiations started between the Spanish government and the revolutionary government. In December 1897, an agreement was reached—the Pact of Biyak na Bato—on the following terms: (1) 800,000 pesos would be paid to Aguinaldo and other revolutionary leaders, who would then go into voluntary exile in Hong Kong; (2) 900,000 pesos would be paid to other revolutionaries, who would remain in the Philippines; (3) the rebels would promise to surrender their arms; (4) a general amnesty for all would be granted; and (5) the Spaniards would verbally promise to institute reforms in the colony. With two Spanish generals as hostages, Aguinaldo and a number of revolutionary leaders then went to Hong Kong.

In the first half of 1898, a number of developments took place. The two parties to the agreement accused each other of breaking the pact. In April, war broke out between Spain and the United States, and the American fleet destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Aguinaldo returned to the Philippines and resumed the leadership of the revolutionary movement. On 12 June 1898, Aguinaldo proclaimed Philippine independence at his home in Cavite. In August, American forces seized Manila, and Spanish military and civil officials started to evacuate their positions throughout the country, which were quickly taken over by the revolutionaries. In November, a congress of representatives convened in Malolos adopted the Constitution of the Philippine Republic. In January 1899, Aguinaldo was inaugurated as president of the new republic, and he formed a cabinet, with Apolinario Mabini (1864–1903) as prime minister.

The U.S. government, having concluded the Treaty of Paris with Spain on 10 December 1898 and claiming jurisdiction over the Philippines, did not accept Philippine independence.

In February 1899, war broke out between the United States and the Philippine Republic, a conflict usually referred to in U.S. history textbooks as the Philippine Insurrection. Facing a strong American army, the revolutionaries resorted to guerrilla warfare. In June, a conflict erupted between Aguinaldo's staff and General Antonio Luna, leading to an incident in which Luna was killed. Under pressure from the bloody American campaign and confronted with overwhelming forces, Aguinaldo's troops retreated to the north. From June 1899 until March 1901, Aguinaldo and his dwindling group of followers succeeded in evading the U.S. military columns chasing them.

When he was finally captured in March 1901, Aguinaldo took an oath of allegiance to the United States and issued a manifesto urging the Filipinos to lay down their arms. After that, he retreated from public life to manage his farm in Cavite. In 1935, during the first elections of the Philippine Commonwealth, Aguinaldo ran for president, but he lost to Manuel Quezon (1878–1944). During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines (1942–1945), Aguinaldo was appointed a member of the Japanese-controlled Council of State, a move that postwar Filipino officials did not hold against him. In 1962, President Diosdado Macapagal (t. 1961–1965) officially proclaimed the date of 12 June as Philippine Independence Day, acknowledging Aguinaldo's proclamation of 1898. Emilio Aguinaldo died on 6 February 1964.

Filipino historians have portrayed him with some ambiguity. On the one hand, he was the leader of the revolution and the president of the first republic, but on the other, he was tainted by the fact that he ordered the execution of Andres Bonifacio and may have been involved in the murder of Antonio Luna. For some scholars (Constantino 1975), he epitomizes the leading role of the landowning elite in the revolution.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Collaboration Issue in Southeast Asia; *Ilustrados*; Katipunan; La Liga Filipina; Mabini, Apolinario (1864–1903); Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1896–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Rizal, Jose (1861–1896); Spanish-American Treaty of Paris (1898); Spanish-American War (1898)

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AGUNG, SULTAN OF MATARAM (r. 1613–1645)

Javanese Imperialist

Sultan Agung, the son of Seda-ing Krapyak (r. 1601–1613) and grandson of Senapati (r. 1582–1601), is regarded as the greatest Indonesian conqueror since the fourteenth century. He did not formally assume the title of sultan until 1641.

Agung undertook expeditions to expand the boundaries of his kingdom of Mataram, beginning with attacks on the southern region of Surabaya in 1614. In 1615, he captured Wirasaba, a strategic city that guarded the entrance to the lower Brantas Valley. Next, Agung was able to attain temporary allegiance from Pajang, which proved crucial to his effective decimation of the Surabayan army sent to stall his progress in January 1616. Agung's victory over the Surabayan army paved the way for further successes in subjugating Javanese cities: Lasem in 1616, Pasuruhan in 1617, and Tuban in 1619. By 1620, only Surabaya remained. Mataram carried out a five-year siege that eventually led to Surabaya's surrender. By 1625, Mataram had become the sole sovereign power in central Java. Balambangan in the east and Banten in western Java remained autonomous, but these polities were incapable of challenging Agung's military prowess.

Early in Agung's reign, a new player began to establish its presence in Java. This new force was the Dutch East India Company (VOC), and it gained a foothold in West Java in 1619, which the company renamed Batavia. The VOC was able to establish a presence there because Agung was initially more interested in pacifying and bringing other Javanese rulers under his control than in challenging the strength of the Dutch.

His earlier neglect of the Dutch and the deeply entrenched distrust between Mataram and its coastal vassals allowed the opportunistic Dutch to wrench power from Sultan Agung's successors after his death in 1645.

Though Agung's success was based mainly on his military superiority, part of his authority was founded on his ability to establish a cult of personality that attracted other, lesser rulers to him. He was skilled at balancing centralized legitimacy and decentralized administration. Agung built a new capital at Kartasura between 1614 and 1622. Kartasura's palatial architecture utilized pre-Islamic iconography to symbolize the macrocosm. Agung's palace demonstrated a preference for the number four—for example, the presence of four high officials divided into two groups, two of the left and two of the right. The number nine—comprising the four cardinal directions, the four intermediate points, and the center—was also manipulated as a symbol of sacredness.

Agung reached the zenith of his power between 1625 and 1627, demonstrating his military superiority by engaging in constant wars against his lesser neighbors. His continued success in expanding his empire gave him an aura of invincibility. These repeated wars and resulting epidemics eventually took their toll on Agung's forces. Meanwhile, Agung began to turn his attention to the Dutch in Batavia, following his conquest of Surabaya in 1625. However, his forces did not set off until 1628. In fighting that continued over the course of a year, the Javanese suffered heavy losses. Agung's army was forced to retreat in 1629 after the Dutch withstood the Javanese siege, and the Javanese army began to suffer from diseases and starvation brought about by the refusal of another Javanese kingdom, Banten, to supply Agung with food. This defeat showed that Agung had overextended himself and overestimated his strength. Perhaps the greatest damage, however, was the destruction of the myth of Sultan Agung's invincibility.

The Mataram ruler had to continue to assert his authority by pursuing further campaigns of conquest. Between 1631 and 1636, he had to crush resistance from Sumedang and Ukur in West Java. The greatest threats, however, came from Central and East Java; these stemmed from religious authorities located in various pilgrimage sites. In 1630, Agung had to subdue opposi-

tion at Tembayat. He then erected a ceremonial gateway at the holy site, demonstrating his possession of spiritual as well as military prowess. In 1636, he subjugated Giri, another holy site. Giri, however, would only be completely overcome during the reign of Agung's grandson, Amangkurat II (r. 1677–1703). War continued to tear through the eastern half of Agung's empire from 1636 to 1640, when he finally conquered Balambangan.

In 1639, Agung sent an envoy to Mecca to request a new title in celebration of his impending victory over Balambangan. The ambassador returned in 1641 with authorization for a new title, Sultan Abdullah Muhammad Maulana Matarani. This move signaled the beginning of a period of peace. As the sultan neared the end of his life, he ordered the construction of a royal gravesite on top of a hill at Imogiri, which was to become the royal burial ground for many generations of kings. In 1646, Sultan Agung passed away; the probable cause of death was the epidemic that broke out in the city during the same year.

GOH GEOKYIAN

See also Amangkurat I (Sunan Tegalwangi) (r. 1645–1677); Amangkurat II (Adipati Anom) (r. 1677–1703); Banten (Bantam); Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jakarta, Djakarta/Jakarta); Diseases and Epidemics; Mataram; *Pasisir*; Surabaya; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); *Wali Songo*

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AGUS SALIM, HAJI (1884–1954)
Modernist Muslim Nationalist

Haji Agus Salim was an Indonesian political leader and diplomat. He was born in Kota Gedang, Bukittinggi, in West Sumatra, the son of a government official and the cousin of Sutan Sjahrir (1909–1966). He studied at a Dutch secondary school in Batavia and was employed at the Dutch consulate in Jeddah from 1906 to 1909. He then worked in the public works department at Batavia before returning to his home village in Minangkabau to set up an elementary school, where he taught until 1915.

Salim first came into contact with Sarekat Islam (SI) in 1915 as a member of the political section of the police, sent to investigate rumors that the nationalist organization was planning a revolt supplied with German arms. Satisfied that the rumors were untrue, he left the police and joined SI. He subsequently played a prominent role in drafting the party's "Basic Principles" in 1921, becoming vice-president of the SI's central committee in 1923 and later chairman of the Dewan Partai (Party Council). He strongly backed the participation of SI in the *Volksraad* (People's Council), where he represented the party from 1921 to 1924 (and where he used the Indonesian language for the first time). Salim then turned his back on the *Volksraad* as a sham, recommending instead the adoption of Mohandas Gandhi's policy of non-cooperation, which was refined into the *Hidjrah* policy (the noncooperation stance vis-à-vis the Dutch colonial government). During his years in SI, he was editor of a number of periodicals, such as *Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad*, *Neratja*, *Fadjar Asia*, and *Moestika*. In addition, he was active in the labor movement, in particular serving as secretary of the important pawnshop employees' union.

He visited Europe in 1929 as technical adviser to the Netherlands Trade Union Federation, and he attended an International Labor Organization (ILO) conference in Geneva. He also spent nearly a year in The Netherlands, where he met Dutch and Indonesian socialists and was particularly impressed by Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980). Despite his labor activities, he was strongly opposed to communist infiltration in SI and backed the expulsion of leftist elements from the party, believing they weakened its foundation in Islam (although one promi-

nent communist leader was his brother, Abdul Chalid). He was similarly wary of some of the forms of indigenous nationalism that were developing. For instance, in 1928, he warned that Sukarno (1901–1970) and others were elevating nationalism into a form of religion, and he pointed out the difference in principles between SI and Sukarno's Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian National Party). He also visited Mecca in 1927 as the SI representative to the abortive Second al-Islam Congress.

In 1936, Salim feared that stricter government regulations against noncooperating parties would leave the SI movement paralyzed, and he founded the Barisan Penjadar PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Insaf) (meaning "Movement to Make the Sarekat Islam Conscious"), but his opposition to the party's policy of noncooperation led to his own expulsion from SI.

Although not involved in active politics in the following years, he did begin, in 1943, to provide linguistic and educational support to the Pembela Tanah Air (PETA, Defenders of the Fatherland)—the Indonesian voluntary army launched by the Japanese. In 1945, he played an important role in the Japanese-appointed Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence. He was part of the subcommittee that drew up the Jakarta Charter, which, among other things, proclaimed the state was to be based upon "belief in God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law."

In the following years, Salim served as the republic's deputy minister of foreign affairs and then as the principal foreign minister. He was the official chairman of the Indonesian delegation to the Asian Relations Conference convened by Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru (t. 1947–1964) in India in 1947. This was followed by travels to the Middle East (West Asia), where he secured recognition of the new republic by a number of Arab countries and contracted important commercial treaties, most notably with Egypt. He was also a member of the republic's delegation that signed the Renville Agreement with the Dutch in January 1948. During the second Dutch "police action," he was arrested and imprisoned together with Sukarno and Sutan Sjahrir, in Brastagi and then in Prapat (near Lake Toba in Sumatra), before finally being taken to Bangka (off the east coast of Sumatra).

After 1950, Salim no longer held a cabinet post. In 1953, he went to the United States as a visiting professor at Cornell University and also addressed a colloquium at Princeton University. He died in November 1954.

Salim was one of the most prominent and respected figures in the new Indonesian republic, referred to fondly by his colleagues as “Indonesia’s grand old man,” and he was honored as a gifted linguist (fluent in nine languages) and a man of letters as well as a skilful diplomat. Islam was central to his life and political vision, but he was also emphatic that democracy, socialism, and brotherhood lay at the heart of Islam. Writing in the periodical *Neratja* on 29 October 1921, he declared that the “aim of Islam is man’s equality, complete and absolute justice, and the efforts and cooperation of all for the benefit of all.” It was such convictions that made him a living symbol of the vital role of the modernist Muslim movement in Indonesian nationalism.

ANTHONY MILTON

See also Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (PNI) (1927); Sarekat Islam (1912); Sjahrir, Sutan (1909–1966); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); *Völkstraad* (People’s Council) (1918–1942)

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AIRLANGGA (r. 1019–1049)

King of Hindu-Buddhist Mataram

Airlangga was a king who reigned over mainly the eastern part of Java, Indonesia, in the eleventh century C.E. His distinction lies in the fact that during his reign, he ordered a project in dam construction along the course of the River Brantas, presumably guided by an integrated political and economic outlook. He emerged on the political scene within the context of a hegemonic rivalry over the control of trade between Śriwijaya in Sumatra and the prominent kingdoms in Java. The management of interstate trade relations and the issue of “political marriages” were central preoccupations of Airlangga’s reign.

Airlangga’s emergence appeared in his well-known bilingual (Sanskrit and Old Javanese) stone inscription of 963 śaka (the Burmese era beginning in 78 C.E.), now deposited at the Indian Museum of Calcutta, in which a reference was made to the mishap that befell Yawad-wîpa, the kingdom ruled by his father-in-law. The mishap was called the *pralaya*, literally meaning “the end of the world.” In Hindu cosmogony, the term means “the end of a cycle of creation,” premeditated by the age of Kaliyuga in which all noble values have been disrupted. It is then to be followed by another cycle, beginning with very ideal conditions of virtue. The *pralaya* in 1016 C.E. referred to in the inscription was caused by an attack by the king of Wurawari, who until Airlangga had been considered an ally of Śriwijaya. The inscription further stated that, at that time, Airlangga (who was sixteen years old), together with Narottama (a faithful state dignitary), took refuge in the forests and lived with the hermits. He prepared himself spiritually and perhaps also physically. The fact is that he then became the king and restored the kingdom from the damaging *pralaya*.

Airlangga was born in the year 1000 C.E., and just before the tragedy, he married the daughter of King Dharmawangsa Tguh (r. 991–1007 C.E.), who reigned in Java before him. Airlangga himself was the son of Gunapriyadharmapatnî (also known as Mahendradattâ), who was possibly Dharmawangsa Tguh’s sister and who married the Balinese king Udayana. It is important to note that the Java-Bali relation was accentuated by the use of Old Javanese script in Bali during Udayana’s time.

As indicated by Balinese inscription, Udayana seemed to reign together with his consort, Mahendradattâ. Airlangga's marriage with Tguh's daughter could then be seen as a strengthening of the Java-Bali relation, which might have been not only political but cultural as well. Among the cultural reminiscences of Airlangga in Bali is the story of Calon Arang, a well-known narrative used for the ritual performance known by the same name: Calon Arang, or Barong-Rangda, enacts the perpetual battle between evil and virtue.

Between 1029 and 1037 C.E., Airlangga launched several campaigns to subdue his enemies and consolidate Java. The inscriptions noted that Wurawari, Wuratan, Lewa, Magëhan, Hasin, and Wëngkër resisted his advances. His sphere of influence extended over parts of West Java, as can be inferred from the use of the Old Javanese language (and not Old Sundanese) in the inscriptions of Jayabhupati, who reigned in West Java during Airlangga's time.

The first capital Airlangga established was at Wwatan Mas. But a siege forced him to abandon the place and move to Pâtakan. Then, in 1032 C.E., a new capital was erected at Kahuripan. An inscription of 1042 C.E., however, indicated that the capital at that time was Dahana (Daha or Dahanapura). His last capital was situated in the region of Pangjalu. The regions Pangjalu and Janggala were partitions of Airlangga's kingdom, later divided by him for the sake of his two sons.

Between 1035 and 1042, after the consolidation phase of his reign, Airlangga embarked upon programs that benefited agriculture and economics (primarily a river-control system) and cultural development (primarily in literature and architecture). His inscription of 959 śaka (1037 C.E.), found in Kelagen, East Java, mentioned the construction of a dam at Wringin Sapta in the area of the village of Kamalagyan. Taxes were reduced as a compensation for maintaining the dam, including security measures. With the River Brantas controlled, trading boats could travel farther upstream, all the way to Hujung Galuh.

Airlangga's inscriptions are known for the beauty of their language. Moreover, it was under his patronage that one of the two most beautiful Old Javanese poetical narratives was created, namely, the *Arjunawiwâha* written by Mpu Kanwa (the other one being the *Râmâ-*

yana). This work is recognized as an original Javanese creation, using only the gist of the story gleaned from the Indian *Mahâbhârata*. In architecture, Airlangga is known for developing more specific traits of the house to indicate rank and privilege.

EDI SEDYAWATI

See also Bali; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Java; Kadiri (Kediri); Mataram; Srivijaya (Sriwijaya)

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ALAUNG-HPAYA (r. 1752–1760)

Founder of the Konbaung Dynasty

After a period of severe disorder, Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760) restored the hegemony of Upper Burma over western mainland Southeast Asia and founded Burma's last and most successful dynasty, that of the Konbaung kings.

In the 1730s and 1740s, the Restored Toun-goo dynasty (1597–1752), which was based at Ava in Upper Burma, disintegrated through the combined effects of court factionalism, disorders in the military service system, price inflation, and imperial rebellions. Among the latter

challenges, a revolt by the predominantly Mon population of Lower Burma, which seized Ava in 1752, was by far the most destructive, laying waste wide areas of the interior. Even before the capital fell, a number of bandit chiefs and strongmen in the north, many eager to supplant the stricken Toungoo house, built independent bases, and it was from the ranks of these contenders that Alaung-hpaya emerged. As hereditary headmen of Mok-hso-bo in the Mu Valley, Alaung-hpaya—or, as he was known originally, U Aung-zeya—was a member of the rural gentry and a man of relatively modest social station. But he capitalized on his extended family network, a nearly infallible strategic instinct, and a growing Burman–Mon ethnic polarization that he systematically nurtured. Insofar as self-identified Burmans were in a large majority in the Irrawaddy lowlands, ethnic opposition eventually proved fatal to the Mon-dominated Lower Burma kingdom.

Having proclaimed himself a royal “Embryo Buddha”—whence derived his posthumous name, Alaung [Embryo]-hpaya [Buddha]—the erstwhile headman began his reconquests. In early 1754, he expelled the southern garrison from Ava. In early 1755, the fall of Prome opened the way to the Irrawaddy Delta, where his armies seized a series of riverine towns, including Dagon, which he renamed Rangoon (meaning “the enemy is consumed”), and Syriam. Finally, in May 1757, he subjected Pegu, the last major Mon redoubt, to a horrific sack. In keeping with his universal religious claims, he presented his realm as a polyethnic domain, but in practice, his unabashed Burman partisanship and his sponsorship of Burman colonization hastened the collapse of Mon ethnicity and the forcible reintegration of Lower Burma into a Burman-led polity centered in the north. Reproducing arrangements started in the early seventeenth century, this geopolitical dispensation would continue until the British transferred the capital from Mandalay to Rangoon.

Following his southern victory, Alaung-hpaya devoted himself to administrative and religious affairs. He reorganized Toungoo military formations and founded *de novo* at least seventeen regiments, chiefly musketeers, composed of Upper Burmans with an enlivening influence or boost of Mons, French, Muslims, and Manipuris. To reverse the damage of recent

decades, he gathered refugees and sponsored resettlement throughout the lowlands, appointed headmen, and strengthened fiscal administration. To provide his rough-and-ready court with suitable charters, he sponsored the best-known law code of the precolonial era, the *Manu-kye Dhammathat*, and a treatise on court punctilio.

Alaung-hpaya devoted the last two years of his life to attacking Shan principalities in the northeast, Manipur, and Siam. His Shan and Manipuri campaigns, both relatively successful, were defensive insofar as these areas had ravaged Upper Burma during the period of Toungoo debility. His grand invasion of Siam also had a defensive element because he feared Siam’s support for renewed Mon disturbances, but in a broader sense, he sought to validate his increasingly strident millennial claims and to reproduce the Siamese triumphs of sixteenth-century Burman rulers. Yet ironically, his strategy of eschewing a north-south pincers attack defied the lessons of sixteenth-century campaigning. The invasion of Siam failed, and Alaung-hpaya himself died on the retreat, either from a war wound or from a venereal disease.

His sons were destined to subdue Siam (albeit temporarily), to strengthen their hold over the Shans, and to annex Arakan, but by the time of Alaung-hpaya’s death, the essential achievements of early Konbaung rule had been realized. Whereas the Restored Toungoo court had been dominated by courtiers who were politically astute but militarily incompetent, the crisis of the mid-eighteenth century produced a new class of proven warriors. Expanding from Upper Burma to the coast and thence to the upland perimeter, Alaung-hpaya reversed the basic pattern by which the imperial territories had come apart. He also halted the loss of manpower to private networks, enlarged the royal service population, and created a more unified patronage system. In combination with a growing emphasis on commercial taxation under his sons, Alaung-hpaya’s achievements would endure until the onset of the Anglo-Burmese Wars of the nineteenth century. In a broader sense, his work paralleled late-eighteenth-century, postcrisis consolidations in Siam and Vietnam and thus finalized an effective tripartite division of the mainland that would endure to the present.

VICTOR B. LIEBERMAN

See also Arakan; Burmans; Burma-Siam Wars; First Ava (Inwa) Dynasty (1364–1527 C.E.); Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885); Mon; Mons; Pegu; Rangoon (Yangon); Toungoo Dynasty (1531–1752)

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ALBUQUERQUE, AFONSO DE
(ca. 1462–1515)

Portuguese Empire Builder

Afonso de Albuquerque was not the original architect of the Portuguese Empire in Asia, but he was chiefly responsible for laying its foundations by creating the chain of *fortalezas* (fortresses) and *feitorias* (trading posts) in the Indian Ocean on which Lisbon's power came to be based. Born around 1462 into a noble family with royal blood and a long tradition of service to the Portuguese Crown, he took part in military campaigns in Morocco and Castile and in two expeditions in the Indian Ocean. In the second of these campaigns, he captured Socotra with Tristão da Cunha and invested Ormuz, before being appointed governor of India in 1509. Earlier that year, his predecessor, Dom Francisco de Almeida, had decisively defeated an alliance of Mameluk Egypt and several Indian states at Diu, thus giving Albuquerque an opportunity to achieve Portuguese dominance of trade in the Indian Ocean.

In March 1510, Albuquerque captured Goa and established his capital there. The previous year, a Portuguese fleet commanded by Diogo Lopes de Sequeira had been to Melaka and attempted to set up a *feitoria* but had been thwarted by the hostility of the Muslim merchants. Therefore, in April 1511, Albuquerque, with a force of only 800 Portuguese soldiers and 200 Malabar mercenaries, sailed to Melaka; on 25 July, he took the city and drove the sultan into exile. He spent five months in Melaka, during which he built a fortress (A Famosa); established a Portuguese administration; minted a coinage; and sent an embassy to Siam and an expedition, led by António de Abreu, to



Engraved portrait of Afonso de Albuquerque.
(Bettmann/Corbis)

Maluku. After his return to India, Albuquerque had to repossess Goa and Ormuz, and he attempted unsuccessfully to take Aden. He died on 15 September 1515 within sight of Goa on board the ship that was taking him there from Ormuz.

JOHN VILLIERS

See also Melaka; Portuguese Asian Empire

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ALLIANCE PARTY (MALAYA/MALAYSIA)

The Alliance Party, or Perikatan, in Malay was initially a political organization composed of the three major political parties—the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC)—that formed the government of the Federation of Malaya between 1957 and 1963. The alliance was formed in Sabah in 1962 to forge a united force in negotiations related to the formation of Malaysia and was composed of organizations such as the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO), the United Sabah National Organization (USNO), and the Sabah Chinese Association (SCA). In Sarawak, the Alliance was formed prior to the 1963 election, and it was composed of parties such as the Barisan Rakyat Jati Sarawak (BERJASA), the Parti Negara Sarawak (PANAS), the Sarawak National Party (SNAP), and the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA). When Malaysia came into being in September 1963, the two Alliance parties in Sabah and Sarawak became closely linked to the Alliance of the Peninsula, thus facilitating the control of the two states from Kuala Lumpur.

Historically, the Alliance came into being rather accidentally. It began as an ad hoc and temporary electoral arrangement for the Kuala Lumpur municipal elections of 16 February 1952. It was fostered between the Kuala Lumpur branch of UMNO, headed by Dato Yahaya bin Dato Abdul Rahman, and the Selangor MCA, headed by the wealthy tin miner Lee Hao-shik (better known as Colonel H. S. Lee). Their joint announcement on 9 January came as a surprise to the headquarters of both parties, but the electoral pact was allowed to materialize nevertheless. The UMNO-MCA candidates won nine of the twelve contested seats, and the noncommunal Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), headed by Dato Onn bin Jaafar (1895–1962), secured only two. The success of the coalition in subsequent municipal

elections cemented the UMNO-MCA “communal friendship.”

When Dato Onn and the chief ministers of seven Malay states held a national conference in April 1953, UMNO-MCA boycotted it and organized its own national convention in August and October. The convention demanded more elected representatives in the federal and legislative councils and called for federal elections to be held no later than 1954. Toward the end of 1954, MIC, which had previously supported Dato Onn, left the national conference and joined the Alliance. Despite various communal and conflicting issues between them, the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance managed to enter the July 1955 federal election as one body, and it secured fifty-one of the fifty-two contested seats and 81 percent of the total votes. Guided by its election manifesto, *The Road of Independence*, the Alliance intensified its efforts toward ethnic conciliation and negotiation for political independence from Britain.

Due to the Alliance’s overwhelming majority in the federal, state, and local councils, the Reid Constitutional Commission that was formed in 1956 to prepare the constitution for an independent Malaya afforded priority to the Alliance’s representations. The commission’s work was facilitated by prior agreements between the different communities within the Alliance.

Composed of three political parties representing three different communities with diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds, the Alliance found that its stability was often threatened by internal disputes that were communal and partisan in nature. Extremists from each of the component parties frequently made demands that challenged the sensitivities and interests of other parties within the Alliance. However, the liberal attitude and exceptional ability of the top leadership, headed by Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (1903–1990), managed to safeguard the continuity of the Alliance at least until 1969.

Externally, the Alliance had to face other political parties in the elections. It managed to chalk up victory after victory to form the government at the federal level and in most states. However, it was comparatively less successful in the overwhelmingly Malay-populated north-eastern states of Kelantan and Terengganu and

in the states populated by large numbers of non-Malays, such as Penang, Perak, and Selangor on the west coast of the peninsula. When Singapore was part of Malaysia from 1963 to 1965, it was ruled by the People's Action Party (PAP), which vigorously challenged the MCA for the leadership of the Chinese; after Singapore's separation, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) emerged to rival the MCA. In terms of the total votes at the federal level, the Alliance's performance in the various general elections is reflected in the following percentages: 81.7 percent (1955), 51.8 percent (1959), 58.4 percent (1964), and 48.4 percent (1969). Thus, by 1969, although still an overall winner, the Alliance garnered less than half of the total votes. At the state level, it secured only 47.95 percent that year, which was 10 percent less than in 1964. The mixed sense of anxiety within the Alliance and the uncontrolled jubilation among supporters of the non-Malay opposition parties contributed to the eruption of the 13 May 1969 disturbances, which led to the declaration of a state of emergency the following day.

After a series of negotiations following the reconvening of the Malaysian Parliament in February 1971, the Alliance was enlarged, and it was replaced in 1974 by the Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front), which saw former opposition parties such as the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS), Gerakan, and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) as its components.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Abdul Razak, Tun (1922–1976); Barisan Nasional (National Front) (1974); Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Malayan/Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC); "May 13th, 1969" (Malaysia); Onn bin Jaafar (1895–1962); Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS); People's Action Party (PAP); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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A. M. AZAHARI

See Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud, Sheikh (1928–2002)

**AMANGKURAT I
(SUNAN TEGALWANGI)
(r. 1645–1677)**

A Murderous Reign

Amangkurat I was the son of Sultan Agung (r. 1613–1645) and the great-grandson of Senapati (r. 1582–1601). Amangkurat I assumed the throne during a trying time. The Javanese kingdom of Mataram was afflicted by epidemics, and the sudden nature of Sultan Agung's death in 1645 threatened to bring about chaos and succession disputes. The palace gates were secured during the coronation ceremony of Amangkurat I to avert a possible coup.

Amangkurat I was an ambitious ruler, much like Sultan Agung, but unlike his father, his attempts to unify the kingdom and bring about a centralized government were doomed to fail, due to two factors. The first was recorded in the Javanese chronicles known as the *Babad*. According to these sources, while Senapati was meditating at Sela Gilang, a falling star signified that Mataram would fall during Amangkurat I's reign. The second factor pertained to the conceited and designing nature of the sultan himself, for the arrogant Amangkurat I alienated many powerful people by his efforts to acquire absolute authority over all of Java. Unlike Sultan Agung, who was able to maintain a strong grip on his empire through military genius and prowess, Amangkurat I lacked fundamental military ability and leadership. He attempted to accumulate power either through coercion or by assassinating important nobles and military commanders.

Murder and tyranny characterized the almost macabre nature of Amangkurat I's reign. One of the sultan's victims was Tumenggung Wiraguna, whose wife was involved in a scandalous affair with the sultan when he was still the crown prince. In 1647, Amangkurat I sent Wiraguna to drive the Balinese forces from the Eastern Salient of Java; while there, the latter

was conveniently disposed of. Other members of Wiraguna's family were subsequently killed as well. Amangkurat I's brother, Pangeran Alit, the patron of Wiraguna, feared for his life and assembled a force of devout Muslims to attack the royal palace. However, Amangkurat's troops repelled the assault, and the prince was killed in battle. Fearing further threats from the Islamic community, Amangkurat I ordered the massacre of all prominent Islamic leaders and their families, totaling approximately 5,000 to 6,000 people. Many of Sultan Agung's old associates were also murdered.

Amangkurat I's oppression extended to his immediate family as well. In 1659, the sultan ordered the killing of his own father-in-law, Pangeran Pekik of Surabaya, who was slaughtered together with most of his family. Even Amangkurat I's uncle was not exempted from his cruelty; he was, however, saved from the jaws of death by the timely intervention of the sultan's mother. Other nobles were not that lucky. Amangkurat I's period of rule can be characterized as a reign of terror during which the nobility and court officials lived in perpetual fear of the sultan's whimsical rages.

As Amangkurat I meted out terrible punishments to those he suspected of opposing his rule, he continued to alienate allies and vassals on the fringes of his empire. The 1647 expedition had failed to bring the Eastern Salient under Mataram's control, allowing the Balinese to raid the eastern coast. Two failed campaigns to Banten, in 1650 and 1657, by Mataram forces resulted in the estrangement of not only Banten but also Cirebon. By 1659 and 1663, Kalimantan and Jambi, respectively, had escaped from Mataram's control. Amangkurat I's desire to establish a centralized Mataram empire increasingly became a forlorn and unrealistic dream.

Amangkurat's lack of resourcefulness, compared with his father and the tyranny of his rule, led many vassals to reconsider the wisdom of maintaining allegiance to Mataram. Realizing that the sultan was not able to mobilize a large army, more and more vassals began to break away from the empire. Amangkurat also lacked foresight and charisma. He was an insecure man who lived in constant fear and distrust of his military officers and court officials, which contributed greatly to his failure to amass support, earn loyalty, and rule efficiently.

Amangkurat I also made another important mistake during his reign: he misconstrued the strength of the Dutch in Java. One of his greatest failings was his inability to recognize that not only did the Dutch East India Company (VOC) represent an important source of wealth, it was also an important political rival to his control over the peripheral areas of his now dwindling empire. His initially amicable relationship with the Dutch soon worsened, as the sultan's attempts to reestablish control over the north coast of Java repeatedly met with failure.

The oppressive rule of Amangkurat I eventually generated enough unhappiness and opposition to stimulate a rebellion, which broke out in 1675. This rebellion was part of a sequence of events that began with an attempted coup by the sultan's son, the crown prince, who eventually succeeded to the throne under the title Amangkurat II (r. 1677–1703). Even as the relationship between the father and the son became increasingly estranged, the crown prince began to cultivate the friendship of the Dutch. He also plotted with Raden Kajoran and Trunajaya to overthrow Amangkurat I. Trunajaya, a vassal ruler from the island of Madura, agreed to start a rebellion in favor of the crown prince. The rebellion reached its peak when Trunajaya's forces attacked the court of Amangkurat I at Plered in 1677. The *Babad* recounts that the rebel forces met little resistance at the court because the sultan allegedly had told his troops not to resist, as it was God's will that Mataram was to fall during his reign. Amangkurat I fled the court but did not survive long thereafter. He died a few months later and was buried at Tegalwangi on the northern coast of Java.

GOH GEOKYIAN

See also Agung, Sultan of Mataram (r. 1613–1646); Amangkurat II (Adipati Anom) (r. 1677–1703); Javanese Wars of Succession (1677–1703, 1719–1722, 1749–1755); Madura; Mataram; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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AMANGKURAT II (ADIPATI ANOM) (r. 1677–1703)

A Troubled Reign

Amangkurat II was the son of Amangkurat I (r. 1645–1677) and a Surabayan princess, the daughter of Pangeran Pekik. Adipati Anom, as he was known before his ascension to the throne as Amangkurat II, possessed an adversarial relationship with his father because of the murder of Pangeran Pekik and his family. However, Amangkurat II shared certain other interests with his father, the most prominent of which was a weakness for beautiful women. Ultimately, however, a contest for the affection of a woman between 1668 and 1670 led to a complete rupture between father and son. The crown prince had earlier attempted to overthrow his father in a failed coup in 1661. But that did not prevent Adipati Anom from hatching further plots to dethrone his father. A rebellion in 1675 eventually brought about the end of Amangkurat I's reign.

Adipati Anom grew up in a court marked by dissension, personal jealousies, and distrust, as various princes jostled for position. The Plered court was a dangerous place ruled by a tyrannical Amangkurat I, who did not tolerate mistakes. The crown prince learned at an early age that in order to succeed, he needed the support of parties from without, especially the powerful (Dutch) United East India Company (VOC, or *Kumpeni*). Adipati Anom was aware that the sultan was unpopular and realized that a successful rebellion might effectively oust him. He first attempted to gain the support of the Dutch by sending nine missions to Batavia. He next plotted with Raden Kajoran and Trunajaya, an alienated Madurese prince, to overthrow Amangkurat I. Trunajaya was more than willing to rebel against Amangkurat I: his own father had been murdered at court in 1656, and

his own life was threatened by the suspicious ruler.

In 1670, Adipati Anom and Trunajaya came to an agreement whereby Trunajaya was to start a rebellion against Amangkurat I; when the sultan was deposed, Adipati Anom would ascend the throne, and in return for his services, Trunajaya would be awarded control of Madura and part of East Java. Trunajaya gathered troops and successfully took control of Madura in 1671. Adherents flocked to his cause, and in 1675, the rebels carried out many attacks on the ports of East Java.

One year later, Adipati Anom was placed in charge of an army sent to suppress the rebellion. Amangkurat I might have arranged for the crown prince to be killed in battle, or perhaps the assignment was Adipati Anom's own idea, for he may have wanted to engage in a mock battle with Trunajaya to channel suspicion away from himself. In any case, Adipati Anom survived the battle, but a number of other princes were killed. In 1677, the rebels continued to expand the territory under their control. Most of Mataram's vassals succumbed to the demands of the rebels and ceased paying homage to Amangkurat I. Trunajaya enjoyed one success after another, and he began to entertain the ambition of seizing the throne for himself. Adipati Anom soon realized that he had lost control of the rebellion that he had incited.

In May 1677, the rebellion reached its peak when the forces of Trunajaya attacked and took the palace at Plered. Adipati Anom fled with his father, and his younger brother, Puger, was left to defend their retreat. Amangkurat I died a couple of months later, and the crown prince buried him at Tegalwangi. Armed with only the royal regalia, the crown prince began his reign as the new ruler, Susuhunan Amangkurat II. Without an army, a court, a treasury, or even a kingdom, the new ruler turned to the Dutch for assistance to fight the war and regain his throne.

In July 1677, Amangkurat II formed an alliance with the Dutch. He promised them the revenue from port duties, rice and sugar monopolies, land, and other rewards in return for help in regaining the throne. In 1678, the Dutch began expeditions to regain the ruler's territories. By late 1679, the rebels were in retreat. Trunajaya was captured and executed by Amangkurat II. With the assistance of the

Dutch, the ruler enjoyed a string of victories as more and more Javanese began to pledge allegiance to him. His younger brother, Pangeran Puger, still controlled the site of the old palace at Plered. Amangkurat II established a new court at Pajang, which he named Kartasura. But Puger and many other princes who survived the constant wars refused to recognize Amangkurat II's authority. Puger attacked Kartasura in 1681 but was defeated by the Dutch forces. His subsequent submission to Amangkurat II finally secured the latter's position.

As Amangkurat II's confidence grew, his relations with the Dutch cooled. He tried to renege on the concessions that he had promised the Dutch in 1677. And even as his relations with the Dutch gradually worsened, a rebellion against the Dutch broke out in West Java, led by a former slave of Balinese ancestry, Surapati. Surapati's forces also attacked a number of Dutch posts farther east, including Kartasura. Though the Dutch suspected the sultan of complicity, there is no evidence that he was directly allied with Surapati's cause. However, various members of the Kartasura court did supported the rebel leader, among them the crown prince, the son of Amangkurat II. The kingdom once again began to fall into disarray, as Surapati's power increased and competing factions within the court threatened the sultan's position. The Eastern Salient of Java was soon lost to the rebel. In a last bid for help, the king pleaded for reconciliation with the Dutch but was rejected. Amangkurat II died in 1703, throwing the Kartasura court into chaos as the crown prince, who was to become Amangkurat III (r. 1703–1704), competed with his uncle, Pangeran Puger, for the throne.

GOH GEOK YIAN

See also Amangkurat I (Sunan Tegalwangi) (r. 1645–1677); Javanese Wars of Succession (1677–1703, 1719–1722, 1749–1755); Madura; Mataram; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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AMBON (AMBOINA/AMBOYNA) MASSACRE (1623)

The massacre at Ambon is one of the most notorious episodes in the turbulent history of Anglo–Dutch relations in the seventeenth century: indeed, it became the subject of a play, John Dryden's *Amboyna*, making propaganda in the Third Anglo–Dutch War (1672–1674). Yet the reasons for the massacre remain, even now, uncertain, and its impact on Anglo–Dutch relations has been a subject of controversy, too.

Ambon was a source of cloves, one of the fine spices so much sought after by the Europeans in a period when they were without effective food preservatives. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) was then far better capitalized than the English East India Company (EIC). Commercial competition in Asia was, however, accompanied by a political connection in Europe. In 1619, the EIC was allowed to establish factories alongside the Dutch ones in Maluku, in return for bearing one-third of the costs of the Dutch garrisons. That arrangement proved a burden that the English, enjoying only a limited share of the trade, could not bear. On 21 January 1623, the English council at Batavia (Jakarta) finally decided to withdraw from the eastern islands.

On 27 February, Gabriel Towerson, the chief English factor (merchant) at Ambon, was beheaded by order of the Dutch governor, Herman Van Speult, along with nine other Englishmen, ten Japanese, and a Portuguese. The charge was that they had planned to kill Van Speult and overwhelm the Dutch garrison as soon as an English ship arrived to support them. Some of the evidence came from a Japanese man under torture, and Towerson and his men confessed only under torture. Though Van

Speult may have been convinced, the conspiracy seems quite improbable: “The attempt had only been for Fools and Madmen,” as Towerson says in Dryden’s play (Dearing 1994: 71). There were only about twenty Englishmen at Ambon, and any ship that came was likely to be bringing instructions to leave. The letter of 21 January may not have arrived before the executions, but Van Speult acted with undue haste, given that the English were in alliance with the Dutch.

It is possible that the action was intended, in some measure, to set an example. In fact, historians have sometimes argued that the massacre prompted or at least confirmed the English decision to withdraw. They have gone on to argue that it marked the end of the EIC’s commercial enterprise in the archipelago. The late David Bassett convincingly refuted both these points. Without at once dropping its trade in clove, the EIC built up its pepper trade from its factory in Bantam. It retreated to the western coast of Sumatra only in the 1680s.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth–Twentieth centuries); Banten (Bantam); Bengkulu (Bencoden, Benkulen); East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Maluku (The Moluccas); Pepper; Spices and the Spice Trade; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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**ANAWRAHTA (ANIRUDDHA)
(r. 1044–1077)**

Founder of Pagan

Considered the first historical king of Pagan (Strachan 1996: 7), Anawrahta is credited with turning a small chieftainship in the dry zone of Upper Burma into the first Burman empire, which lasted until the Mongol invasions of 1287. Historical tradition also credits Anawrahta with an invasion of the Mon city of Thaton in

1057 that resulted in his deporting its Mon king Manuha, Theravada Buddhist priests and the Buddhist scriptures, and artisans and population to Pagan to inaugurate a renaissance in Buddhist culture in Pagan. It is said that prior to that point, the culture of Pagan was based on a mixture of *nat* (spirit) worship and elements of Mahayana Buddhism. Under the impact of the Theravada Buddhist culture, the literary life of eleventh-century Pagan flourished. Anawrahta and his chief priest, Shin Arahan, made Theravada Buddhism the official state religion of Pagan and commenced an era of monumental temple building, resulting, by the thirteenth century, in over 3,000 temples rising above the Pagan plain. Anawrahta’s conquest of Thaton most likely had a strategic commercial motivation as well, for possession of this port gave him access to the lucrative international trade of the maritime provinces, an advantage later Pagan kings built on in establishing control over ports on the Tenasserim coast.

Pagan’s economy became centered on temple building, thereby encompassing the means for its own demise (Aung-Thwin 1985). To escape the exactions of the king, well-to-do people donated wealth to the temples, constructed temples, and became temple slaves, thus denying resources to the Crown. This paradigm may have been repeated in successive Burmese empires.

The strength of Pagan’s culture was undoubtedly its inclusiveness—its gift for syncretism that underpinned the development of its distinctive visual arts. Pagan culture was not distinctively Mon, as has been often supposed, but exhibited a Pyu base. Recently, Michael Aung-thwin (2001) questioned the entire legend of the conquest of Thaton and the import of Mon culture to Upper Burma, placing emphasis instead on the impact of the Pyu in the development of Pagan culture. He suggested that the technological, cultural, and political development in early Burma moved from the interior to the coasts rather than the other way around, and he considered the “Mon paradigm” a creation of colonial historians (Aung-thwin 2001).

HELEN JAMES

See also Buddhism; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Burmans; Mon;

Mons; Pagan (Bagan); Pyus; Temple
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**ANCIENT COINAGE
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA**

Prior to the rise of Melaka in the early fifteenth century, Southeast Asia possessed three distinct coin-producing subregions: (1) northern Vietnam; (2) a mainland zone extending from the Bay of Bengal through Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, Cambodia, and southern Vietnam; and (3) island Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, peninsular Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

In the late tenth century, the Dinh were the first independent Vietnamese rulers to issue their own coinage, consisting of square-holed, copper-alloy cast coins based upon the design of Chinese cash pieces that had circulated in the region for more than a millennium. Under the Dinh (968–980 C.E.), an inscription written in Chinese characters on the obverse included the reign title of the issuing monarch and the phrase *hungbao* (to prosper, precious); under the Early Ly dynasty (980–1009 C.E.), the secondary phrase became *tranbao* (to guard, precious). The dynastic name was often included on the reverse. This Chinese-inspired tradition of cast coinage was maintained by later Vietnamese dynasties, and it continued unabated through the nineteenth century.

The first coinage of mainland Southeast Asia proper had its origins in the coastal zone of Lower Burma. By the fifth century, the ancient Mon had initiated a silver Conch/Temple coin

type that would influence numismatic productions on the mainland for nearly four hundred years. The ancient Pyu of central Burma issued an extensive series of struck silver coins derived from the Conch/Temple series—a Rising Sun type as well as a series impressed with an hour-glass-drumlike design. Both were issued in multiple denominations. Central Thailand under Mon Dvaravati saw similar coinage issues, supplemented by an extraordinary series of rare, inscribed dedicatory medals. By the early ninth century, this diverse numismatic tradition was at an end. Subsequent coin production in Thailand, first under Sukhothai and later under Ayudhya (Ayuthia; Ayutthaya), took a unique form—small, elongated struck silver (and occasionally gold) pieces of globular shape commonly known as "bullet" coinage. Burma proper would not see coinage again until the eighteenth century.

Deva rulers in southeastern Bengal minted Gupta-style gold coinage for at least two hundred years following the latter's demise in the mid-sixteenth century. In neighboring Arakan (on Burma's west coast), Candra kings and their successors between the fifth and eleventh centuries struck a Southeast Asian-style silver Bull/Trident coinage, a type also favored by southeastern Bengal's Harikela rulers. This series continued through the eleventh century. Beginning in the thirteenth century, Turkic rulers established mints in Bengal and Assam as an explicit statement of Islamic control over the region.

Indigenous silver and gold coin issues first appeared in south-central Java at the end of the eighth century. This so-called Sandalwood Flower coinage—consisting of a simple, four-petaled design on the obverse of the coin and a single Devanagari letter opposite—eventually spread to Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Bali, and the Philippines. Derivative types included large slablike silver and gold stamped ingots and a nearly spherical gold series known in the Philippines as *piloncitos* (named after the conical shape of coarse brown sugar sold in the marketplace). By the end of the thirteenth century, this native tradition was supplanted by the widespread adoption of low-value imported Chinese copper cash.

The initial series of Islamic-style coinage in island Southeast Asia was a diminutive, epi-

graphic gold type containing (on the obverse) the phrase *malik al-zahir* (the victorious king) together with the name of the issuing ruler and (on the reverse) *al-sultan al-'adil* (the just sultan). These coins were first struck at Samudra/Pase in northern Sumatra in the late thirteenth century. Struck to the indigenous 0.60-gram *kupang* standard, north Sumatra gold under Samudra/Pase's successor, Aceh, became a staple in Southeast Asian commercial transactions.

Due to the difficulty of acquiring specimens from clearly defined archaeological contexts, the precise function of coinage in early Southeast Asia remains imperfectly understood. Rising Sun issues were often struck in multiple denominations and have been found over a large geographic area, an indication that they likely served an exchange function in the marketplace. Other types, such as Dvaravati medals, with a much more limited geographic distribution and no significant wear, were probably used chiefly in ritual deposits and for personal adornment.

One of the most intriguing problems facing the student of early Southeast Asian coinage is why some areas that displayed otherwise high levels of cultural achievement, maintained extensive commercial ties, and possessed relatively complex monetary systems based upon units of silver and cloth—areas such as ancient Cambodia under Angkor or Burma's Pagan—did not adopt coinage as a facilitator in monetary transactions.

ROBERT S. WICKS

See also Banks and Banking; Dvaravati; Ly Dynasty (1009–1225); Tun-sun

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ANDA Y SALAZAR, DON SIMON DE (1710–1766)

Spanish Patriot

Don Simon de Anda y Salazar was a Spaniard who distinguished himself in the service of the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines during the British invasion of the islands in 1762. He organized forces to resist the British and kept the Spanish administration functioning even as the British established their own government in Manila. He was recognized for his feats by being named governor-general in 1769. As governor-general, he sought to reduce the hold of the friars and implemented orders to shift power to secular priests.

Anda was born in 1710, and by 1761, he was an official in the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines. He was formally appointed a judge (*oidor*) in the Royal Audiencia in Manila in that year.

In 1762, the British invaded Manila as a consequence of the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) in Europe. The acting governor-general of the Philippines, Archbishop Manuel Antonio Rojo, seeing the imminent danger of Manila falling into the hands of the British, appointed Anda as lieutenant governor and captain general, making him the second-highest-ranking Spanish colonial official. When the British occupied Manila, Anda left the city and established the capital of the Spanish government in Bacolor, Pampanga, north of Manila. Anda proclaimed himself as the governor-general while the British were in Manila, and he led the anti-British resistance. The British attempted to crush Anda and his followers, but Anda was able to defend the province of Bulacan (between Manila and Pampanga) against the British who were out to capture him. The British declared Anda a rebel and offered a 5,000-peso reward for his apprehension. Anda, however, successfully eluded all attempts to capture him.

The Treaty of Paris in 1763 ended the war between Britain and Spain and provided for the return of the Philippines to Spain. In 1764, the British left Manila, and authority was returned to the Spaniards. Anda reclaimed Manila for Spain, keeping the title of governor-general. Since a new governor-general had been formally appointed, he surrendered his command to the incoming official. Because of his resistance against the British and his loyalty to

Spain, as well as his success in keeping other areas of the Philippines from being conquered by the British, Anda was considered a hero in his homeland. Spain recognized and rewarded him for his deeds by formally appointing him as governor-general in 1769.

In that post, Anda was given orders to turn over parishes from the friars to secular priests. The intent was to reduce the strength of the big religious orders in the Philippines; the secular priests, who did not belong to any of the orders, were believed to be more loyal to the Spanish Crown. Anda initially carried out these orders, but the friars complained and reminded him that they had supported him during the British invasion. Anda suspended implementation of the secularization of parishes partly because of the friars but also because he felt the secular priests (most of them Filipino) were not qualified. He also sought to reduce corruption in the government and filed suits against his predecessor and other corrupt officials. His enemies, however, were able to get the court decisions overturned, and Anda was charged with paying all the costs of the trials.

Anda died on 30 October 1776 in San Felipe, Cavite. It was said that the pressures from his enemies had hastened his death. The role he had played in keeping the Spanish flag flying during the British occupation of Manila was commemorated by the erection of a monument in his honor in Manila. The monument was damaged during the Pacific War (1941–1945) but was repaired in the 1950s. It still stands as a reminder of Anda's service to the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Manila; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898)

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ANG CHAN (1781–1835)

Ruler amidst Powerful Neighbors

Ang Chan reigned over Cambodia as king from 1797 to 1835. As a child, he succeeded his father, Ang Eng (r. 1779–1796), and for several years thereafter, Thai officials who were sent to Cambodia from Bangkok closely supervised his kingship. Soon after he formally ascended the throne in 1806, he sought to weaken his dependency on the Thai court by forming an alliance with Vietnam. His efforts angered the Thai king and induced three of his brothers to seek refuge in Bangkok. Consequently, his alliance with Vietnam led in the 1830s to a de facto occupation of Cambodia by Vietnam. Chan's tactics vis-à-vis larger powers foreshadowed the maneuvers that would be pursued by his great-grandnephew Norodom Sihanouk (1922–) more than a century later. Both rulers sought a modicum of independence by playing larger powers off against one another.

When a Thai army invaded Cambodia in 1833, Chan was evacuated to Vietnam. The Thai forces eventually withdrew after sacking the Cambodian capital (Phnom Penh), burning Chan's palace, and driving the population into exile. Chan returned to Phnom Penh in 1834 and died soon afterward aboard his royal barge, moored in the Tonle Sap, opposite his gutted palace.

Little is known of Chan's personality, but he seems to have inspired little loyalty among his subordinates. The Vietnamese treated Chan with contempt, and his reign is dealt with fleetingly in Cambodian historiography, which often displays an anti-Vietnamese bias.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Ang Duong (Ang Duong) (1796–1860); Ang Eng (ca. 1774–1797); Cambodia (Eighteenth to Mid-Nineteenth Centuries); Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Nguyen Dynasty (1802–1945); Rama I (Chakri) (r. 1782–1809); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–)

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ANG DUONG (ANG DUANG) (1796–1860)

Founder of Modern Cambodia

Ang Duang was king of Cambodia (r. 1848–1860), succeeding his niece Ang Mei (r. 1835–1847). Duang was the youngest brother of King Ang Chan (r. 1797–1835). Following a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1811, Duang fled with two other brothers to Bangkok, where he sought the protection of the Thai court. In 1835, following Chan's death and a Thai defeat inside Cambodia at the hands of the Vietnamese, the Thai placed Duang in charge of a formerly Cambodian province of Siem Reap, which had been administered by the Thai since 1794. Three years later, in an obscure incident that may have involved a Vietnamese offer to Duang of the Cambodian throne, the Cambodian prince was arrested by the Thai, taken to Bangkok, and forced to swear allegiance to Rama III (r. 1824–1851). In 1841, he was allowed to return to Cambodia, accompanying a powerful Thai army that aimed to remove the Vietnamese from Cambodia and to reestablish political influence in Vietnam. As fighting between the Thai and Vietnamese forces inside Cambodia dragged on, Duang struggled to enlist support from Cambodia's small and decimated elite in an attempt to rebuild the rudiments of national government. When the Vietnamese withdrew from Cambodia in 1847, the Thai placed Duang on the throne and established the Cambodian court in Udong, north of Phnom Penh, where Chan and Mei had once ruled with Vietnamese protection. The court remained there until 1866, when it was reverted to Phnom Penh.

Although Duang's activities were closely monitored by Thai officials, he has been treated respectfully by most Cambodian historians, who see him as the founder of a modern, independent nation that reemerged after decades of warfare, disorder, and Vietnamese control. Duang was an accomplished poet and a fervent Buddhist, who sought through his actions and his example to restore dignity to his kingdom. He welcomed several European visitors to his court, and toward the end of his reign, he successfully led Cambodian forces against Cham rebels. He also sought to lessen Thai political influence by secretly appealing to the French emperor Napoleon III (r. 1852–1870) for support. Accordingly, a French diplomatic envoy

was sent to take up this offer, but Thai officials prevented him from proceeding to Udong, and Duang's initiative was effectively snuffed out. Norodom (1836–1904), Duang's son, revived the appeal for French assistance in 1863, which consequently ushered in almost a century of French protection. Under the Cambodian constitution, only Duang's descendants are eligible candidates for the throne.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Ang Chan (1781–1835); Ang Eng (ca. 1774–1797); Cambodia (Eighteenth to Mid-Nineteenth Centuries); Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Siem Reap; Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–)

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ANG ENG (ca. 1774–1797)

Impotent Ruler

Ang Eng reigned as king of Cambodia from 1794 to 1797 and founded the dynasty that ruled Cambodia from 1794 to 1970. The monarchy was restored in 1993. During Eng's boyhood, Cambodia was without a monarch; the country was fought over by Thai, Vietnamese, and local forces. Eng had been spirited out of the country in 1779 and spent his youth under the protection of the Thai court. He was crowned king of Cambodia by the Thai in 1794 and allowed to return to his country under Thai supervision. The Cambodian court *Chronicle*, celebrating his return after a time of kinglessness, boasted that when he entered the country, "the sky did not get dark, nor did rain fall, but thunder boomed in the noon sky, making the noise of a mighty storm" (Eng 1969: 1013). In reality, he was powerless, and soon afterward, without referring the matter to Ang Eng, the Thai assumed administrative control over two Cambodian provinces, namely, Battambang and Siem Reap (the latter containing the medieval ruins of Angkor). The provinces did not revert to Cambodia until 1907. Eng's brief reign, monitored by Thai advisers, was uneventful. According to the *Chronicle*, he built a new palace at Udong, north of Phnom Penh,

and visited Bangkok in 1796 on a tributary mission.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Ang Chan (1781–1835); Ang Duong (Ang Duang) (1796–1860); Battambang; Cambodia (Eighteenth to Mid-Nineteenth Centuries); Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; *Cambodian Chronicles*; Nguyen Dynasty (1802–1945); Phya Taksin (Pya Tak [Sin], King Taksin) (r. 1767–1782); Siem Reap

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ANGKATAN BELIA ISLAM MALAYSIA (ABIM) (MALAYSIAN ISLAMIC YOUTH MOVEMENT)

Formed in 1972 in the wake of the worldwide Islamic resurgence, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia) was founded by a group of young Muslim students and intellectuals led by student leader Anwar Ibrahim (1947–). The primary aim of ABIM was to promote the true understanding of Islam and the realization of Islamic teachings as a complete and perfect way of life, particularly among Muslim youths and the public in general. It was essentially an educative and reformist organization that strove to propagate modern Islam through lectures, seminars, and publications. It started its own kindergartens and schools as an alternative to the existing mainstream educational institutions. Its members, numbering about 40,000 in 1986, consisted of religiously inclined, educated youths disenchanted with what they regarded as the decadent, secular, and imbalanced ways of the Western world. ABIM became a strong social critic and attacked policies and practices it deemed inhumane, unjust, and contrary to the teachings of Islam. During its heyday toward the end of the 1970s, ABIM was at the forefront of the struggle against oppressive laws such as the Internal Security Act (ISA) and the Universities and University Colleges Act.

Although not a political organization, ABIM was ideologically closer to the Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party (PAS, Parti Islam Se Malaysia), and many of its leaders, such as Fadzil Mohamed Noor (deputy president) and Abdul Hadi Awang (Terengganu commissioner), stood as PAS candidates in the elections. But when Anwar Ibrahim joined the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) to contest in the 1982 general elections, ABIM became seriously split, and its credibility and popular support began to wane. Anwar's participation helped to boost UMNO's image among some Malays, but it tainted and weakened ABIM's. ABIM became less critical of the government and often directly opposed PAS. But when Anwar was dismissed from UMNO and the government in 1998, ABIM-PAS relations resumed, albeit rather guardedly.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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**ANGKOR
Cambodia's Cultural Heritage**

Located in northwest Cambodia, Angkor was the capital of Khmer kings from the ninth to fifteenth centuries. Until the thirteenth century, it was a center for the building of hydraulic works and for an art and architecture that were unequaled in peninsular and insular Southeast Asia. The Angkorian landscape was marked by the building of reservoirs, canals, monuments, and cities displaying distinctive architecture and sculpture. In the capital and also

in the kingdom's other cities, temples represented the spiritual consecration of achievements in the economic and social realms. At that time, the Khmer kingdom was the most prosperous and powerful in Southeast Asia.

The city of Angkor and its monuments, sanctuaries for the most part, rose from the center of a network of reservoirs and canals. Intimately linked with this network and lying at the heart of a systematic spatial organization, the capital was central both geographically and symbolically. The irrigation reservoirs, whose banks were dotted with monasteries, were also considered sacred ponds. Today, the Angkor plain is still punctuated by some fifty major temples and gigantic hydraulic works. In 1992, the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) paid recognition to the present-day archaeological park, covering 400 square kilometers. Art from the Angkorian period continues to be a reference point nationally, regionally, and internationally.

The Rise of a Kingdom

Following the decline of Funan sea power by about the sixth century, the Khmers turned inland, to the country's agricultural regions. Lying in the Cambodian floodplains, Angkor is well provided with water resources. Not only is it near Tonle Sap (lit. Great Lake), which practically becomes an inland sea with the yearly flooding of the Mekong River, it is also watered by rivers descending from the surrounding mountainsides. In this monsoon-affected area of Asia, the builders of Angkor learned how to control fluctuations in the water supply and adapt them for irrigation purposes.

Traditionally, the Angkorian period is said to have begun in 802, the year that Jayavarman II (r. 802–834) was crowned king. In a ritual evoking the mythology of Śiva and celebrated in the Phnom Kulen (Kulen Mountains), north of Angkor, he became the *cakravartin/cakkavatti* (universal monarch) of the new kingdom. The Khmer land had previously experienced an architectural and artistic flowering, and local hydraulic works had been built in small administrative units. However, with Jayavarman II, the founder of Angkor, there was a shift to centralization under royalty.

In the reign of Indravarman I (r. 877–889), whose capital, Hariharālaya (present-day Roluos),

stood about 20 kilometers from present-day Angkor, the scale of the hydraulic work undertaken was unprecedented. The first great reservoir, the Indratatāka (meaning “the reservoir of the god Indra”), measured 3,800 meters by 800 meters and could hold at least 10 million square meters of water, or 100 times more than any previously built reservoir. Indravarman's royal temple, Bakong, was similarly larger in volume than any other (Groslier 1974: 100). In this reign as well, the sequence for carrying out grand projects was clearly defined for the first time. A public foundation (a hermitage or reservoir) was built initially, followed by a temple consecrated to ancestors and then by a royal temple (Stern 1954: 684).

Yaśovarman I (r. 889–900) was the first king to establish his capital on the future site of Angkor (known then as Yaśodharapura). The most important monuments he had built were the Eastern Baray, a reservoir measuring 7 kilometers by 2 kilometers and capable of holding 42 to 70 million square meters of water, and the mountain temple of Phnom Bakheng, constructed on an elevation. The greatest of the kings who followed Yaśovarman I expanded the irrigated limits of Angkor, and each built a new royal temple, in the form of a mountain temple, to mark the center of the newly enlarged city.

The Temples

The mountain temple was not only the most prestigious institution that a Khmer king could build but also the most symbolically significant. This original architectural form began to emerge when Prasat Ak Yum was constructed in the eighth century, a short time before the founding of the Angkor royal line. A mountain temple was the royal foundation par excellence. It was shaped like a tiered pyramid surmounted by one or several sanctuaries. Organized around the six directions of space, it corresponded to a specific concept of the cosmos. The mountain temple structured and controlled the spatial order of the city of Angkor and the kingdom. Marking the center of the city, the kingdom, and even the entire universe, the mountain temple was built in the image of the sacred mountain Meru, which was the center of the gods' world. Symbolically, the purifying, fertilizing water of the sacred mountain's rivers streamed down from the summit of the temple

and flowed into its moats before irrigating the land. The most famous of these temples are Bakong (ninth century), Phnom Bakheng (tenth century), Prè Rup (tenth century), Phimeanakas (early eleventh century), Angkor Wat/Angkor Vat (twelfth century), and Bayon (late twelfth century). Other religious monuments expressed the same principles of architectural composition but were built on the same level.

The temples of Angkor held images of Hindu deities. Foremost was Śiva, represented as a *linga* (phallus, symbol of creative power and pillar of the world); Viṣṇu, as well, was often found in temples throughout the Angkor period. Buddhist deities also appeared, particularly in the reign of Jayavarman VII (r. 1181–ca. 1220). Numerous sanctuaries dedicated to ancestor worship existed as well. These cults melded in various combinations and forms of syncretism. However, in the mythological universe of every cult, the sacred nature of the mountain was primordial. The mountain was both the source of fecundity and fertilizing, regenerative waters and a place of sacrificial offerings. It was also the axis of the world.

Angkorian temples expressed a strict order in their architectural composition and in their orientation. Whether the layout was built around an axis, a central point, or a combination of the two, the temple was aligned with the cardinal points and emphasized the east-west direction, which, with very few exceptions, was the direction from which the temple was entered. On either side of this main axis, architectural elements were organized in a symmetrical arrangement, although, on closer examination, this symmetry reveals elements of dissymmetry with a systematic pattern of their own. The whole might be organized in tiers or on the same level, but every component helped to accentuate the importance of the central sanctuary, which was necessarily lofty.

Visual considerations were also extremely important in these monuments. Perspective effects were sought, often based on proportion reduction. In the case of Angkor Wat, built in the reign of Sūryavarman II (r. 1113–ca. 1145), the entire planning of the monument was colored by this objective. To create viewpoints, the architect positioned elements so that they acted as screens between the visitor

and certain parts of the structure. He also used changes in level to vary the angle of the visitor's gaze. The approach to the central sanctuary is thus punctuated with obstacles that provide unexpected views and make the monument into an architectural spectacle (Dumarçay and Royere 2001: 84). The architecture of the early twelfth century, when Angkor Wat was erected, achieved unprecedented grandeur through its innovation, daring, and tremendous scope.

Sculpted Decoration

Sculpted decoration also played a role in the strict spatial and visual organization of the temples. Ornamentation became richer and fuller over the centuries, adapting to various architectural elements such as pilasters, doors, abutments, column bases and arris, modenatures, and the now famous pediments, exemplified in particular by those of the temple of Banteay Srei (ninth century).

Certain temples are also decorated with bas-reliefs. At the beginning of the Angkor period, a frieze of little mythical scenes, ruined today, was sculpted on Bakong's fifth tier. At the great temple of Baphuon, groups of small scenes also frame the second-level *gopuras* (monumental entrances). But at Angkor Wat and Bayon (the center of the city now known as Angkor Thom), the galleried walls are covered with immense narrative bas-reliefs, some stretching for about 30 meters. They depict scenes of daily life, particularly at Bayon, as well as certain historical events and cosmological themes inspired by Indian literature. These included the Indian creation myth *The Churning of the Ocean of Milk*, as well as stories from the Indian epics, the *Rāmāyana* and the *Mahābhārata*, involving conflicts between gods and demons or battles between their representatives.

By the Angkorian period, the culture of India had been known in the Khmer land for centuries. Indians traveled to Cambodia, and the Khmers themselves, like other peoples of Southeast Asia, seem to have visited the subcontinent. They apparently brought back new ideas, which they adapted freely to local concepts. According to Michael Vickery (1998: 141), "Indigenous traits and institutions may lie under the Indic façade."

Angkor Today

Today, Angkor is the symbol of the Khmers' cultural heritage. It is given considerable importance not only culturally but also from a national perspective. Internationally as well, the archaeological site is a standard reference for the country. At present, efforts to develop Cambodian tourism are concentrated on Angkor, along with other archaeological sites such as Sambor Prei Kuk, Preah Vihear, and Angkor Borei.

From the early twentieth century until the tragic events of the 1970s in Cambodia, the École Française d'Extrême-Orient accomplished immense work on the history and art of the monuments. During that time, the French school's epigraphists, notably George Coedès, had translated the greater part of the Cambodian inscriptions (in the Khmer language and Sanskrit). These inscriptions represent the largest such collection in Southeast Asia. Since the 1980s and 1990s, when work recommenced on the site, other international teams have become involved. Since 1995, the Autorité pour la Protection du Site et l'Aménagement de la Région d'Angkor (APSARA), a Cambodian public establishment, coordinates all operations, overlooks the work of international agencies, and is responsible for the maintenance of the archaeological park. The French are now concentrating on four major projects: the restoration of Baphuon, the stratigraphic excavation of the city of Angkor Thom, a study of the urban margins of Angkor, and a study of the Marches of the Empire. Today, two Japanese teams and an American one, as well as teams from Italy, Germany, and China, are working on sites such as Angkor Wat, the Bayon, Suor Prat, the Preah Khan, Prè Rup, and Chau Say Tevoda. Part of the teams' mission is to train the Cambodians who will eventually take charge of the Angkor archaeological park. A training school with a similar goal has also been established at the little-visited ruins of the Ta Nei temple. Finally, the newly established Center for Khmer Studies (CKS), located inside the monastery walls of Wat Damnak at Siem Reap, is devoted to the promotion of international cooperation in the field of social and human sciences in relation to Khmer studies.

HÉLÈNE LEGENDRE DE KONINCK
TRANSLATED BY JANE MACAULEY

See also Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta);
Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia;
Cakkavatti/Setkya-min (Universal Ruler);
L'École Française d'Extrême-Orient; Funan;
Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia;
Hinduism; Indianization; Jayavarman II
(r. 770/790/802?–834 C.E.); Jayavarman VII
(r. 1181–1220?); *Mahâbâratha* and *Râmâyana*;
Monumental Art of Southeast Asia;
Sūryavarman I (r. ca. 1002–1049);
Sūryavarman II (r. ca. 1113–1145?)

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ANGKOR WAT (NAGARAVATTA) Palladium of Cambodia

The temple of Angkor Wat (Angkor Vat), located in the Angkor Park near the city of Siem Reap, was built during the reign of King Sūryavarman II (r. ca. 1113–1145?). It was a funerary edifice meant to exalt the memory of a



Temple of Angkor Wat. (Corel Corporation)

deceased king whose statue, in the form of the god Viṣṇu, stood in the central cella.

This monument deviates in some respects from the architectural models that had previously guided the works of the Khmer builders; for instance, the perspective effects that had been used for several centuries were abandoned. Furthermore, for one of the first times in Cambodia, the personality of an architect was clearly visible, not only in the originality of the plan but also in the care devoted to the construction of the edifice, a factor that partly explains its present condition.

The placement of the temple was determined by previously existing structures and the main axis of the town, perpendicular to that of the temple, which merged with the western edge of its moat. The location that was chosen probably corresponded with a depression that significantly lessened the labor needed for the terracing involved in the construction of the 200-meter-wide moat that surrounds the temple grounds. The grounds are enclosed by a lat-

erite wall that one passes through along the axes at entrance pavilions made of sandstone.

The main entrance to the complex is located on the west side and is marked by a causeway (there is also a causeway on the east, which was never finished) that allows visitors to cross the moat. This construction is faced with laterite and paved with sandstone, on each edge of which is a balustrade symbolizing a *naga* (serpent). The moat is bounded by terraces built of upper courses of sandstone on a laterite base; the construction of these was never completed. Visitors enter the interior of the complex through a very wide pavilion crowned by three towers; there is a gate for a cart at either end. Crossing the pavilion through the central door, one enters the temple itself by way of a path (faced with sandstone) raised above the surrounding ground level. Staircases along the sides of the path lead to structures that once stood nearby, to pavilions called “libraries” and built of sandstone, or to pools reflecting the temple.

The monument is accessible via staircases on three sides of the building, but on the west is a special structure—a wide terrace that completely surrounds the structure and a cruciform terrace (a structure that was not part of the original design). From the latter, one enters the first gallery, comprising an interior wall bearing the famous narrative reliefs and on the exterior a colonnade of shorter pillars. The roof resting on these pillars evokes tiles on arches. Pavilions at the corners and axes adorn this gallery.

On the west upon exiting the entrance pavilion, one reaches a section now called “the gallery of the thousand Buddhas”; this consists of a cruciform gallery with, on its eastern aisle, three staircases that provide access to the second-story terrace. On the other three sides, one reaches the second story directly through a simple entrance pavilion. The first-story terrace comprises two libraries on the north and south of the main edifice. The second gallery, having neither reliefs nor a demigallery, completely surrounds the main edifice. At the corners, towers have been erected (partially in ruins today) resembling those on the pinnacle and, on the axes, simple pavilions on the north, east, and south but tripled on the east.

The second-story terrace is almost completely taken up by the very large base of the highest temple, each face of which is broken by three staircases. On the west, one can, however, discern two libraries of small dimensions. A gallery flanked on the interior by a demigallery surrounds the third story. At the corners of this complex are towers, and at the axes are pavilions that open on another gallery, flanked by a demigallery leading to the central tower, resembling those at the corners but on a larger scale.

The decoration, which plays a major role in the symbolism of the temple, is essentially of Viṣṇuīte inspiration, illustrating the main scenes of the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana* episodes that have been sculpted on the wall of the first-story gallery. These do not consist of consecutive illustrations of the text but rather feature various prestigious scenes, perhaps organized parallel with the lives of the deceased king and of the heroes celebrated in the texts. The walls are covered with reliefs depicting feminine divinities, or *apsaras*, probably meant to evoke the heaven of Viṣṇu.

The monument was abandoned in the course of the fourteenth century, then transformed into

a Buddhist temple. During the sixteenth century, King Satha undertook a complete restoration of the monument and had reliefs carved in the gallery of the first story (the northeast corner that had been left incomplete in the twelfth century). Finally, at the end of the nineteenth century, Angkor Wat became the palladium of the Cambodian kingdom. Thereafter, it was depicted on the state flag.

JACQUES DUMARÇAY

TRANSLATED BY JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also Angkor; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana*; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia

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**ANGLO-BRUNEI RELATIONS
(NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 1980s)**

The United Kingdom was the key factor in Brunei's history during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but for the British, Borneo was never of central strategic importance. After 1945, the relationship between the two countries became more equal, as the British Empire was liquidated throughout the world and Brunei moved steadily toward full independence at the end of 1983.

British interest in Southeast Asia was based at Bantam (Java) from 1602 until 1682 and at Bencoolen (Sumatra) between 1685 and 1825. During the seventeenth century, the English East India Company (EIC) maintained an extensive trade in the East Indies, but it displayed scant interest in Brunei. Situations during times of war, such as the temporary British occupa-

tions of Manila (1762–1764) and Java (1811–1816), tended to be accompanied by closer British attention to Borneo and Sulu: desultory attempts were made to establish a station at Balambangan (1762–1763, 1773–1775, and 1803–1805). In 1775 and 1803, Brunei offered Labuan to Britain in return for protection against Sulu piracy.

The British, who succeeded in establishing flourishing settlements in the Malay Peninsula (Penang in 1786 and Singapore in 1819), regarded Borneo alternately as a nuisance and an irrelevance. Policy was driven not so much by the island itself as by the imperatives of European politics, the needs of the British Indian Empire, and the growing importance of the China trade. Interference by individuals (the Brooke family) or organizations (the British North Borneo Company) further complicated British policy due to the comparative weakness of indigenous regimes. The British government did not wish to become entangled in the island, contenting itself for decades (from 1846 to 1889) with Labuan as a coaling station and a base to fight piracy. Brunei, North Borneo, and Sarawak did become British protectorates in 1888, but all three territories retained considerable internal autonomy. The establishment of a British residency in Brunei (1906–1959) was a last resort, failing any better solution. Political stability in Brunei was necessary to avoid giving a rival European power a pretext for intervention. The possible existence of oil in Brunei was *not* a factor in British thinking at the time.

Brunei's primary concern was mere survival. It was difficult enough to resist Sulu, much less combat more powerful Western nations. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, Brunei also wanted some protection against encroachment by Sarawak and North Borneo. In the twentieth century, its concerns were to uphold the royal dynasty, the Muslim religion, and the Malay language. The United Kingdom could assist the sultanate in these goals.

The Treaty of London (17 March 1824), an Anglo-Dutch agreement regulating colonial expansion south of Singapore, was an effort by London to secure Dutch friendship in European affairs by ending the hostility of the two nations in the East. Amsterdam argued that the agreement applied to Borneo; Whitehall argued to the contrary.

James Brooke (1803–1868), an English gentleman-adventurer, arrived in Kuching in 1839 and assumed power in Sarawak two years later. During the next fifty years, the Brooke dynasty absorbed more and more Brunei districts, culminating in the annexation of Limbang in 1890, thereby splitting the sultanate into two parts. Meanwhile, Brunei had come under pressure from the northeast. The British North Borneo Company then governing the region acquired large swaths of territory in the closing two decades of the nineteenth century.

In view of threats to its security, Brunei accepted a treaty of friendship and commerce with Britain in 1847. Then, in 1888, in order to defend the existence of Brunei, Sultan Hashim Jallal (r. 1885–1906) agreed to a protectorate agreement with the United Kingdom. Brunei was to continue to be governed by the sultan as an independent state, and the British would have rights of interference only in certain specified instances. Under a further agreement concluded in 1905 and 1906, Brunei accepted "a British officer to be styled Resident," whose "advice must be taken and acted upon on all questions in Brunei other than those affecting the Muslim religion" (*Brunei Annual Report 1946*: 82). The treaty placed Brunei under a residential system like that in the Federated Malay States. According to the treaty, the resident was to serve as an adviser to the sultan, but in reality, state administration was assumed by the colonial power.

When the Pacific War broke out in 1941, Japan expelled the British and placed Brunei under military administration for three and a half years. Australian forces liberated the sultanate in June 1945. A British Military Administration lasted until civil government was restored in July 1946. Once again, a British resident was appointed. A written constitution was proclaimed in 1959, when the residential system was abolished and Brunei regained responsibility for its internal affairs.

In the advance toward full independence, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah (1946–) held a series of discussions with the British, and further treaties were signed in 1971 and 1979. The upshot was that on 1 January 1984, Negara Brunei Darussalam assumed full responsibility as an independent, sovereign, and democratic Islamic Malay monarchy. Before it could accept independence, Brunei needed a stable regional environ-

ment, which was lacking during the Cold War era. In effect, the British protective role was taken over by international organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Commonwealth, and the United Nations.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Ambon (Amboina/Amboyna) Massacre (1623); Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth–Twentieth Centuries); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Banten (Bantam); Bengkulu (Bencoolen, Benkulen); Borneo; British Borneo; British Interests in Southeast Asia; British North Borneo Chartered Company (1881–1946); Brooke, Sir Charles Anthoni Johnson (1829–1917); Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); East India Company (EIC) (1602), English; Federated Malay States (FMS) (1896); Hassanal Bolkiah, Sultan of Brunei (1946–); Labuan (1847); *Melayu Islam Beraja* (MIB, Malay Islamic Monarchy); Piracy; Residential System (Malaya); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Singapore (1819); Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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ANGLO-BURMESE WARS (1824–1826, 1852, 1885)

The three Anglo-Burmese wars ended the independence of Konbaung Burma, for progressively more of the country was annexed to British India after each conflict concluded. The first war, from 1824 to 1826, was halted with the Treaty of Yandabo. This war was the result of a clash of different forms of imperialism resulting from the two very different political and administrative systems that prevailed in Europe and Southeast Asia at the end of the eighteenth century. To Burma's west was the growing empire of British India, which was expanding, seemingly inexorably, and absorbing Indian states one after another with apparent ease. In Manipur, the British came up against a Burmese assertion to suzerainty over the ruling prince there, who had been placed on the throne by the troops of the Konbaung King Hsinbyushin (r. 1763–1776) following their battles against the Chinese in the Shan states.

The Burmese court treated Manipur and Assam as their dependencies, but the British refused to accept such claims. The British refused to deal with the Burmese court as a legal equal but insisted on conducting negotiations with Burma through the instrument of the East India Company (EIC). The Burmese under Hsinbyushin's successor, King Bodawpaya (r. 1781–1819), found this attitude insulting and unacceptable. Contradictory concepts of sovereignty also created misunderstandings between the two imperial forces. The Burmese understood sovereignty to be a multilayered and imprecise set of relationships. The British, by contrast, believed they should have sole control over any territory where they felt their interests predominated.

The British were also concerned that their great European imperial rival, France, might be making inroads into Southeast Asia at their expense. War eventually broke out along the British-designated border at the River Naaf. Anti-Konbaung rebels, claiming to be fighting for the restoration of the Arakanese monarchy,

repeatedly fled across the river, where they were pursued by the Konbaung forces. The British viewed these cross-border incursions as an unacceptable violation of sovereignty and insisted that such events cease. The British protest was unacceptable to the Burmese, who felt that they had every right to defend their territory against enemies of the throne by whatever means necessary. The British were also upset at the treatment that British traders received when they entered the Burmese port of Rangoon. From the king's perspective, however, these individuals were not mere traders but illegal usurpers of his own royal prerogative to monopolize trade in the kingdom in order to generate the revenues required to support the state and its activities. The continuing activities of Burmese armies in Assam and Manipur further whetted the appetite of the British for war with what they saw as a recalcitrant and unreasonable monarchy.

Diplomatic relations between the two sides terminated in 1811, and therefore, the ability of both sides to assess the power and intentions of their rivals deteriorated. The new king of Burma, Bagyidaw (r. 1819–1837), who succeeded to the throne in 1819, sent General Maha Bandoola (Bandula), as governor first of Assam and then of Arakan, to suppress the rebels operating in those territories. The British at this time began to assist the rebels in the hope of weakening Burmese influence in the area. Bandoola's forces began to threaten the British state of Cachar and also seized an island in the middle of the River Naaf that the British claimed in 1823. The result was war the following year, when the British dispatched a naval expedition to Rangoon in May 1824. They easily seized the city as well as the delta region. This success did not force the king to sue for peace, however, and the following year, the British Indian army began a slow and difficult march against the king's forces until they reached Yandabo, where the king agreed to end the conflict. Arakan and Tenasserim were thus lost from Burmese control. In this way, what had commenced as a minor irritant to a powerful kingdom ended in a humiliating defeat because of the faulty assessment of the strength and intentions of the new imperialist force to Burma's west.

The second war arose in 1852 as the result of another clash between Burmese administrative

practices and state trading monopolies and British ideas about free trade in an age of liberal imperialism. In 1850, King Pagan (r. 1846–1853) appointed a new *myo-wun* (governor) of Rangoon. Named Maung Ok, he quickly developed a reputation among the foreign trading community for his arbitrary decisions as well as the exorbitant tax rates he applied. His extracting of fees to avoid prosecution and the various court fees designed to increase his personal income and that of his ruler were standard practice in Southeast Asian monarchies at the time. But such practices rankled British and other foreign traders, who sought low, regular, and predictable rates of taxation as a precondition for successful business. As the level of complaints going back to the EIC grew, the Indian government sent Commodore Lambert, known as “combustible Lambert,” to investigate in November 1851.

Lambert, ignoring his instructions to merely investigate the cases of two British shipmasters imprisoned for failing to pay a fine, single-handedly precipitated a war. Using his three ships, he seized one of the king's vessels and sailed it out of Rangoon waters. This insubordinate behavior, however, fit with larger British intentions toward Burma, and a full-scale war was soon under way. The major ports of the country were seized quickly, and by July 1852, an army formed to march on the capital. Meanwhile, a palace revolt had taken place against King Pagan, and several princes deserted the throne, taking their troops with them. Pagan's brother, Mindon Min, organized against the king and soon entered the capital. By the time Pagan was ousted, the British had advanced north of Prome, thus seizing the best teak forests of Lower Burma. Mindon (r. 1852–1878), who was crowned king in February 1852, sued for peace, and though he refused to sign a peace treaty with the British, he tacitly acknowledged British possession of British Burma, to which were added Arakan and Tenasserim. By March of that year, following the initial intervention of two Italian priests, the war was over. The British had cut the territorial control of the Konbaung dynasty down to a mere rump of its former glories. All seaborne trade now had to pass through British territory, and river transport would quickly become a near monopoly for the British.

There are few examples of such naked imperialist ambition as the Second Anglo-Burmese

War. As the British liberal statesman Richard Cobden (1804–1865) wrote at the time:

[The governor-general of India] begins with a claim on the Burmese for less than a thousand pounds; which is followed by an additional demand of an apology from the Governor of Rangoon for the insult offered to our officers; next, his terms are raised to one hundred thousand pounds, and an apology from the king's ministers; then follows the invasion of Burmese territory; when, suddenly all demands for pecuniary compensation and apology cease, and his lordship is willing to accept the cessation of [Lower Burma] as a compensation and reparation. (Htin Aung 1967: 230)

The Third (and final) Anglo-Burmese War was a short, sharp affair. Between the final two wars, the British had imposed a number of constraints on the capacity of the new monarch to reform his administration. With the financial base of the kingdom severely eroded, the fighting capacity of the king's army was much reduced. And though the British merchants in Rangoon continued to demand that the king's remaining monopolies be abolished for the greater good of free trade, the British became increasingly worried about the alleged threat of growing French influence in the king's court. The court was itself riven with factionalism, and two of the key princes had defected to the British; they, in turn, were plotting to put one of themselves on the throne in the place of Mindon's successor, Thibaw Min (r. 1878–1885).

In a failed attempt to gain some leverage over the British, Thibaw sent a delegation to Europe in 1884 to negotiate commercial treaties with France, The Netherlands, and Germany. This fueled speculation that there were secret military clauses negotiated in Paris, and though the French never ratified the agreement, it justified, in already suspicious minds, further arguments for finally annexing all of Burma. There were even rumors circulating at the time that the French had agreed to supply the king of Burma with arms or, alternatively, to organize an invasion from Vietnam via Siam to impose a new, pro-French king on the throne.

In this atmosphere of frenzied speculation, the Hlutdaw, the royal court at Mandalay, issued its decision on a long-standing case involving



British troops with the officers and remnant of the Burmese Army in 1886 during the Third Anglo-Burmese conflict. (The Illustrated London News Picture Library)

the large, Indian-owned Bombay Burma Trading Corporation. Bombay Burma had a near monopoly over the export of timber from the king's forests. The case started as a suit by private individuals seeking compensation for logs supplied by them to the company, but when the records were examined, it was revealed the company had been underpaying the royalties due to the Crown. Under Burmese law, this required the company to pay twice what was owed as punishment. Though British officials accepted the justice of the decision, they felt the fine was excessive.

The governor-general of India, Lord Dufferin (t. 1884–1888), however, sought to use the case as the excuse for the imposition of a number of demands on the Burmese monarchy. In effect, these would have made the king a mere agent of the British in India, as most of his remaining limited authority would be severely constrained. Moreover, his political position at home would be gravely damaged, for granting such concessions would deliver a severe blow to his prestige. Without waiting for a reply to these demands, the British amassed troops at Thayetmyo in anticipation of a third invasion. The king's reply to the demands made upon him was deemed unsatisfactory and was rejected, and the British ordered their army to march.

The Burmese empire was too weakened to put up more than token resistance to the might of the British forces. When the king sought to conclude an armistice with the British com-

mander, he in turn demanded complete surrender. The war was over in eleven days, as British troops surrounded the king's palace at Mandalay and took the king and his chief queen away to a life in exile in India. The last Burmese monarch made his final journey not as the Lord of Life in a royal procession with elephants and attendants, as all his predecessors had done, but as a virtual prisoner of war, riding in a common cart pulled by two oxen.

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See also Arakan; Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation; British Burma; British India, Government of; British Interests in Southeast Asia; East India Company (EIC) (1602), English; Free Trade; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Hlutdaw; Hsinbyushin (r. 1763–1776); Imperialism; Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Mindon (r. 1853–1878); Tenasserim; Yandabo (1826), Treaty of

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ANGLO-DUTCH RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (SEVENTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES)

The English polity—and the larger British polity that succeeded it in the eighteenth century—shared a number of interests with the Dutch Republic, the United Provinces, and the Netherlands monarchy that was its successor in the nineteenth century. Their interests were not, however, identical: indeed, there were four

Anglo-Dutch wars. Moreover, the change in their relative strengths over time produced arrogance and resentment, admiration and envy, adding to the complexity of the connection between two states that faced each other over the narrow seas.

The Dutch polity emerged from a struggle with Hapsburg Spain, with which it fought a long war of independence between 1576 and 1648, broken only by a twelve-year truce from 1609 to 1621. With its cause, the England of Elizabeth I (1533–1603) and James I (1566–1625) found common interest: the independence of the Dutch was a guarantee of the security of England against a dominant power on the Continent. There was a common cause, too, in Protestant opposition to the Counter-Reformation, with which the Hapsburgs identified themselves. At this time, however, England was much weaker than Spain. Elizabeth's rhetoric was coupled with caution, and she intervened in the struggle only belatedly and without declaring war on Spain. James I was still more equivocal.

England and the United Provinces were, moreover, also commercial rivals. To ensure their survival, the Dutch pursued control of the European carrying trade that was the original source of their prosperity. Then, after the Crowns of Portugal and Spain were united in 1580, they sought to displace the trade of the Iberian powers by trading directly with Asia and displacing Iberian trade in Asia and elsewhere. In this case again, England was the weaker of the two powers. England's trade suffered, as did that of the enemies of the Dutch.

The mismanagement on the part of the Stuart monarchy, culminating in its overthrow and the execution of the king (Charles I) in 1649, prevented England from effectively mobilizing its power. The republic in England sought to put its relations with the Dutch Republic on a new basis. It directed the Navigation Act of 1651 against the Dutch carrying trade and asserted a right to search Dutch ships for contraband. At the same time—feeling politically insecure—it sought a “union” with the Dutch. Now no longer under threat from Spain, the Dutch saw no reason to respond, and the Dutch Reformed Church was incensed by the English treatment of the Presbyterians and by the invasion of Scotland. Clashes at sea developed into a naval war. That conflict showed the

vulnerability of the Dutch in the narrow seas. But Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658)—anxious to reduce opposition to his regime—accepted a mild treaty. Though the Navigation Act remained and the Dutch had to pay reparations for the Amboyna massacre of 1623, no permanent damage was done to the Dutch system save in Brazil.

The restored Stuart monarchy renewed English pressure on the Dutch. It passed a strengthened Navigation Act and prohibited Dutch vessels from fishing in coastal waters. The king's brother, James, backed by junior ministers and courtiers, wanted to go further than Charles II (1630–1685) himself. He believed that the English would be victorious in a new war and that, adopting the prevailing "mercantilist" view of international trade, victory could lead to the annexation of the republic's trade and its wealth. Taking a share of the slave trade as an objective, the English attacked the ports of the Dutch West India Company in West Africa, and they seized New Netherland, renaming New Amsterdam as New York after the duke. In home waters, the battle off Lowestoft was a triumph for the English. The best-known event in the war, however, is the Dutch attack on the great English ships in the Medway in June 1667. That event and the king's reluctance to contact Parliament and secure funds led to the conclusion of a peace.

That, however, did not halt James's ambitions. He concluded that he could deal a decisive blow to the Dutch with the help of Louis XIV (1638–1715) and the French army. What resulted was the Third Dutch War, 1672–1674, which was very much, as J. R. Jones (1996) argued in his excellent study of the wars, the work of the court rather than of the anti-Dutch interest groups involved in making the first two wars. John Dryden's play *Amboyna* was part of the propaganda of the day. But the war became deeply unpopular, all the more so because of the alliance made with Catholic France. In the House of Commons, William Coventry declared that "the interest of the king of England is to keep France from being too great on the Continent, and the French interest is to keep us from being masters of the sea" (Jones 1996: 214).

The chief effect of the war was felt within English politics in the following decade. When James II (1633–1701) realized that William of

Orange (1650–1702) was about to invade England, he tried to rally support by describing the Dutch as England's traditional enemy, but "his attempt failed abysmally." William could argue that now, as in the 1670s, the kings of England and France had allied not only against the republic "but also against the liberties and religion of England and Scotland" (Jones 1996: 216).

The Revolution of 1688 turned out to have yet larger effects. It produced a consensus on the political future of England and indeed of Britain and thus permitted the mobilization of resources that had evaded the Stuart monarchy and the Cromwellian Commonwealth. Britain became a major commercial and naval power, successfully contending with the French throughout the world. And that had its effect on the Dutch at home and overseas.

In Southeast Asia, the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), or the (Dutch) United East India Company, had pursued its commercial objectives—monopoly of the fine spices of Maluku and then of the far more widely grown pepper and a share in the tin trade—with increasing determination, particularly during the recession in the latter half of the seventeenth century. As the Amboyna massacre suggested, they were no less ruthless toward the English than toward other rivals, European or Asian, and their policies took no account of what the two powers had in common, let alone their moments of collaboration. A burden- and trade-sharing agreement in 1619 worked to the disadvantage of the weaker company, the English East India Company (EIC). Even before Amboyna, the EIC had resolved to withdraw its factories from the eastern part of the archipelago. The EIC withdrew from Bantam in the 1680s, retreating on the pepper trade of the western coast of Sumatra.

Yet even before the revolution and reconstruction at home, England was securing advantages in the Asian trade, which the Dutch did not share. The VOC did not compete as successfully in the newer branches of that trade as in the old. Driven almost entirely from the archipelago, the English company dedicated itself to supplying the new European craze for Indian textiles and satisfying the new demand for Chinese tea. The VOC increasingly focused on the Indies rather than on Asia as a whole, with the introduction of coffee in Java being its major innovation. When Britain, in the pursuit of

its rivalry with France, began to build a territorial dominion in India, the Dutch were further disadvantaged, for their factories there were more on sufferance and their access to opium was inferior. Increasingly, too, English “country traders” penetrated the archipelago, partly by contacting Bugis intermediaries. But the British government stopped short of issuing a political challenge to the Dutch in Asia because of their relationship in Europe. The ideas William Coventry had enunciated in the 1670s were no less true in the subsequent decades.

Joint Anglo-Dutch opposition to the French was a feature of the wars of the early eighteenth century—those of the Spanish succession (1701–1714) and the Austrian succession (1740–1748). At the end of the former, the Dutch gained the right to garrison fortresses in the southern Netherlands, which passed to Austria. In the latter, by which time the Dutch republic had become much weaker, the ruling oligarchy sought to pursue a cautious policy, even though that risked their relations with Britain. In 1744, however, the French invaded The Netherlands, and in 1747, they overran Dutch Flanders. Called to the Stadhouderate (the seat of government) during the crisis, William IV of Orange (1711–1751) told the British he could not continue without a loan. The following year, however, the peace treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle more or less restored the status quo.

The Stadhouder (governor) failed to effect the reforms that those in the Dutch Republic believed were necessary to restore the country’s fortunes, much damaged by the wars and by economic competition, and to check the role of the old oligarchy. Calling themselves the “Patriots,” opponents of the royal house of Orange looked to French ideas. But even more risky, they looked to French influence. They were joined by a section of the oligarchy mainly from Holland (the chief province, traditionally opposed to the Orange princes) and by some of the First Hand, or international merchants, who saw that Britain’s commercial expansion divided its interests from theirs, though security interests might unite them. The British tried to avoid provoking a pro-French reaction and weakening the Anglophile Orange party. The American War of Independence (1775–1783) made that impossible. The British wanted to deny neutrals the ability to trade with the

rebels and with their French and Spanish allies, but the First Hand wanted to retain that ability, and the Patriots sought to weaken the Stadhouder. Late in 1780, Britain declared war on the Dutch Republic to prevent it from joining the League of Armed Neutrality sponsored by Catherine II (1729–1796) of Russia.

In the seventeenth century, the VOC had pursued its commercial objectives without taking much account of the common interests—often obscured, if not displaced—of England and the Dutch Republic in Europe. The eighteenth-century policy of the EIC was, in this respect, a more restrained one. The British avoided recognizing the exclusive claim of the VOC to navigation in the archipelago, with which the VOC sought to back the numerous commercial privileges and monopolies it gained by treaties and contracts with Indonesian and Dutch rulers. Furthermore, though the British carried on what the VOC saw as a “smuggling” trade, they did not openly invade the Dutch sphere of influence. Their attempt to settle at Balambangan in the 1770s was, for example, more a challenge to Spain than to the republic.

Access to French influence in the republic undermined this approach. If it had been followed up in Asia, moreover, the French would have been in a stronger position to renew their challenge to the British in India, to command the Bay of Bengal, and to threaten the route to China. With the opening of the war in 1780, the British took preemptive measures, acquiring Trincomalee in Ceylon, for example, as well as Dutch settlements in India and Padang, neighbor of Benkulen in western Sumatra. At the end of a war that was, in general, far from glorious for the British—the Americans made good their independence—they hoped to secure at least some successes. Though the Dutch were still supported by the French, the British did secure their right to navigate in the eastern seas—namely, Southeast Asian waters—in the 1783 treaty that ended the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War.

The continued Franco-Dutch alliance was a factor in the British decision to occupy Penang in 1786, affording some access to the trade of the archipelago and some protection for the Bay of Bengal. However, by establishing themselves north of the main settlement of the Dutch in the Straits, Melaka, the British still

avoided making a direct challenge to them. The following year, the pro-French Patriots were overthrown by a Prussian intervention, designed to protect the Stadhouder William V's (1748–1806) Prussian wife from Patriot insults but supported diplomatically and financially by the British. The latter now sought to put their relations with the republic on a more friendly footing. Their idea of a compromise—in which the Dutch would cede Trincomalee, as well as the recently acquired Riau at the tip of the Straits, in return for a guarantee of the spice monopoly—was quite unacceptable even to a friendly regime in the republic. No treaty was made, even though the British ambassador, Lord Auckland, argued in 1791 that “the general ferment in Europe” was a reason “for strengthening our union with the Republic both really and ostensibly” (Tarling 1962: 44).

French armies, penetrating the republic from late 1794, were not unwelcome, and the Patriots set up a “Batavian Republic” under their aegis, allied with the French republic from May 1795. In turn, the British took preemptive action in Asia, aided by a letter secured from William V, who had fled to England. A number of Dutch possessions were taken, usually, despite the Kew Letters (a document by William V instructing Dutch colonial governors not to resist British forces), as a result of some hostilities. They included the Cape Province, Trincomalee, settlements in India, Melaka, Padang, and Maluku. Java itself was occupied only in the second phase of the French wars. An interim administration was installed, headed by Stamford Raffles (1811–1814), who favored the creation of a British empire in the archipelago.

That was not, however, the course British policy took. The peace treaties included provisions designed to prevent a further French attempt to dominate the European continent. The establishment of the kingdom of The Netherlands, encompassing the Belgian provinces of the Hapsburgs as well as the old republic headed by the Orange prince as King William I (1772–1843), was one of the measures taken. The return of the majority of Dutch possessions overseas would help to sustain the new Netherlands kingdom and enable it to fulfill its role in Europe. That was Britain's priority. It retained the Cape and Ceylon but returned what it had taken in the Indies. “I still feel great doubts about the acquisition in sover-

eignty of so many Dutch colonies,” the British foreign secretary, Lord Castlereagh, wrote. “I am sure our reputation on the Continent, as a feature of strength, power and confidence is of more real value than an acquisition thus made” (Koebner 1961: 289).

In such a concept, the security of the route to China and access to the trade of the archipelago relied on the goodwill of the Dutch and their ability to exclude other powers. Neither Raffles nor his superiors in Bengal thought that the convention of 1814 was adequate. The result was the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, the kind of compromise with a friendly Dutch regime that the British had vainly sought during the prewar period. The essence of it was that the British should not offer a political challenge to the Dutch in the archipelago, whereas the Dutch would offer British traders fair opportunity in ports they possessed or in respect of which they had contracts with Indonesian rulers. There was also a kind of territorial division, though expressed in negative terms. The British transferred Benkulen and agreed not to make settlements in Sumatra in the future. The Dutch accepted the occupation of Singapore (accomplished by Raffles in 1819), transferred Melaka, and agreed to make no settlements on the peninsula.

The negative phrasing of much of the treaty was prompted by a recognition that the two powers were, as Robert Stewart Castlereagh's successor, George Canning, put it, “exclusive Lords of the East” (India Office Records 1824). Once it had been decided that the Dutch should predominate in the archipelago and so boost their strength in Europe, it was necessary to be sure that they could keep others out. Too clear an assertion of the deal might only encourage others to challenge it.

The policy was successful. No other powers seriously challenged the Dutch in the nineteenth century, all being aware of their relationship with the greatest power of the day. Secure in their ultimate claim, the Dutch were thus able to take their time in what they could regard as rounding out their empire. They therefore focused on the most profitable part of their domains, Java, before turning to the Outer Islands, and they established the “culture system,” a revenue system that forced farmers to cultivate land for the production of cash crops, the sale of which solely to the Dutch colonial gov-

ernment would enable the farmers to pay land tax. The implementation of the culture system in Java was accelerated when William I made a bid to stop the Belgians from breaking away from his kingdom after the Revolution of 1830.

This is not, of course, to suggest that the Anglo-Dutch relationship was always smooth. Being patronized by a superior power is not always easy to bear. Nor was the patron ready to accept the measures the Dutch took—in apparent defiance of the treaty—to build up their commerce in the 1830s and 1840s. But though that led the British to offer some support for the Brooke venture, the appointment of an Englishman, James Brooke (1803–1868), as rajah of Sarawak in northern Borneo, they offered no overall challenge to the Dutch. It seemed, as Lord Wodehouse put it in 1860, “very advantageous to us that the Dutch should possess this Archipelago. If it was not in the hands of the Dutch it would fall under the sway of some other maritime Power, possibly the French unless we took it ourselves” (Memorandum, 18 August 1860, FO 12/28, Public Record Office, London).

In the Great War (1914–1918), the German Empire destroyed the neutrality of Belgium but respected that of the kingdom of The Netherlands. Its eastern possessions became a base for German-backed subversion of India, but the British Foreign Office rejected a suggestion from its consul general in Batavia that part of Netherlands India be given to Britain’s ally, Japan. “If the Netherlands Indies are not too friendly they are harmless,” wrote W. Langley at the Foreign Office. “It would be quite another matter if the islands were in the hands of the Japanese” (Minute, n.d., FO 371/2691 [235431/31446], Public Record Office, London).

The Japanese were seen to be the main threat to the future of colonial Southeast Asia, particularly after their conquest of Manchuria. Now much weakened, however, the British felt themselves unable formally to promise to aid the Dutch in the event of an attack, unless there was some undertaking from the United States as well. The Japanese did not move in 1940, when the Germans invaded The Netherlands and Belgium. Their move, prompted by the American embargoes, came in late 1941. Only at the last minute had the United States

promised aid. The Japanese overthrew all the Western empires.

Following the Pacific War (1941–1945), the Europeans determined to return to Southeast Asia. The Dutch were all the more intent on doing so because they connected the possession of the Indies with their hopes of recovery in the postwar world. Their return, however, depended on the British, who were dominant in the Allies’ South-East Asia Command (SEAC). The British saw no prospect of simply restoring the colonial structures in Southeast Asia: the powers had to come to terms with nationalism. That the Dutch found difficult to do, particularly in respect to nationalists whom they saw as Japanese collaborators or extremists, and they resented pressure from the British. Their “police actions” were, however, counterproductive. Indeed, the second action underlined their dependence in Europe, not on the British now but on the Americans.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also Ambon (Amboina/Amboyna) Massacre (1623); Banten (Bantam); Bengkulu (Bencoolen, Benkulen); British Borneo; British India, Government of; British Interests in Southeast Asia; British Malaya; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Bugis (Buginese); Coffee; Country Trader; Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Dutch East Indies; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Dutch Police Action (First, Second); East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Great War (1914–1918); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Japan and Southeast Asia (pre-1941); Java; Kew Letters; Maluku (The Moluccas); Napoleonic Wars in Asia; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Penang (1786); Pepper; Raffles (1781–1826), Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley; Singapore (1819); South-East Asia Command (SEAC); Spices and the Spice Trade; Sumatra; Tin; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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ANGLO-DUTCH TREATY (1824)

See Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries)

ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION OF LONDON (1896)

Signed by Lord Salisbury, the British prime minister and foreign secretary, and by Alphonse de Courcel, the French ambassador in London, the Anglo-French Declaration penned on 15 January 1896 was intended to stabilize Anglo-French rivalries in Siam (Thailand) and in southwest China. Furthermore, it sought to resolve a series of smaller colonial irritations on the Lower Niger and in Tunis. Its principal clause effectively immunized central Siam from the threat of military invasion by France or Britain. Some historians attribute Siam's escape from European colonization to the barrier established by this arrangement to unilateral annexation by either power.

The declaration also reflected the pursuit of separate, as well as common, objectives by the British and French in Siam. For the British, the clauses relating to Siam were primarily intended to debar French colonialists from urging any future annexation. The French *parti colonial* tended to advocate westward encroachment into Siam from Indochina. The Paknam Incident of 1893, marked by the forcing of the Chao Phraya River defenses by two French gunboats, had sharpened British realization of the high influence enjoyed by the French colonial lobby over the making of French policy in Southeast Asia. Since British economic and political influence already predominated in Siam, the arrangement to preclude military intrusion worked mainly in favor of British local interests.

From the perspective of the French foreign ministry, the arrangement was entered into

mainly to serve the broader purposes of France's continental diplomacy. Courcel hoped that it would open the way to a possible resolution of Anglo-French acrimony over the far greater problem of Egypt. French colonialists, for their part, chose to interpret the agreement as having established an "Anglo-French condominium" in Siam, an impression that the Siamese successfully worked to eliminate in the decade following the agreement by systematically blocking French investment in the kingdom's modernization.

PATRICK TUCK

See also British Interests in Southeast Asia; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Paknam Incident (1893); Preservation of Siam's Political Independence; Reforms and Modernization in Siam

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ANGLO-MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN DEFENCE AGREEMENT (AMDA)

The Anglo-Malayan/Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) commenced on 12 October 1957 and ceased on 1 November 1971. Under AMDA, Britain would guarantee the external defense of Malaya/Malaysia. Australia and New Zealand joined AMDA in 1959, as did Singapore in 1961. AMDA also permitted British, Australian, and New Zealand forces to station armed troops in Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore. Because AMDA's viability depended on Britain's military commitments, however, AMDA's financial cost to Britain would eventually precipitate its demise.

For Malaya/Malaysia and Singapore, both newly independent and with nascent defense forces, AMDA was a guarantee of security in an unstable region. For Britain, AMDA expressed its commitment to Malaya and Singapore as former colonies. And for Australia and New Zealand, AMDA also guaranteed their own security by ensuring Britain's military presence in the region.

Britain's rapid and substantial military reaction to Indonesia's Confrontation (*Konfrontasi*, a campaign against British plans to create a new Federation of Malaysia) and Australia and New Zealand's military commitments demonstrated AMDA's viability. However, the economic impact on Britain was considerable at a time when economic crises in the homeland precipitated considerable defense cutbacks. Consequently, in 1967, Britain announced its intentions to end its defense commitments "East of Suez" by the mid-1970s. Australia and New Zealand, despite increased military commitments, could not fulfill Britain's pivotal role in AMDA, without which the agreement was not viable.

By 1971, despite their security and economic concerns at Britain's withdrawal, all parties agreed that AMDA was untenable. Subsequently, AMDA was replaced that same year by the more flexible Five-Power Defence Agreement, which facilitated the parties' adjustment to a post-AMDA world. The Five-Power Defence Agreement involved Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Malaysia, and Singapore.

IAN K. SMITH

See also Australia and Southeast Asia;

Cold War; Domino Theory; Konfrontasi ("Crush Malaysia" campaign); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia; Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971)

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ANNAM

The term *Annam* was one of the traditional popular appellations of Vietnam when the country was a protectorate of T'ang China, which then covered present North Vietnam. The term is also the official name of Vietnamese (Dai Viet) dynasties as vassals of the Chinese Empire. During the nineteenth century, Annam referred to the French protectorate of Central Vietnam.

The Chinese term *Annam* (lit. pacification of the South) was originally employed during the Six Dynasties period (third to sixth centuries)

as part of a title of general usage conferred on Chinese officials or foreign kings (of Champa and Funan). During the T'ang period (618–907 C.E.), Annam became the name of one of the T'ang protectorates (*tu-hu-fu*) founded outside China to loosely control surrounding "barbarians." The An-nan (Annam) *tu-hu-fu* was established in 679 C.E. and covered provinces of the Red River delta (with the administrative center of Chiao-chou at present-day Hanoi) and the Thanh Hoa-Nghe Tinh region, as well as tribal chiefs in the surrounding mountains. The *tu-hu-fu* controlled mountainous chiefs only nominally, and the traditional assimilation policy enforced in the deltaic regions since the first century C.E. was abandoned gradually because of the persistent resistance of the indigenous people, including the rebellions led by Mai Hac De in 722 C.E. and Phung Hung in 791 C.E. The *tu-hu-fu* also suffered foreign invasions of Java (Sailendra-Śrīvijaya) in 767 C.E., of Champa in 803 C.E., and of Nanchao (kingdom of Yunnan) in 860 C.E. and 862 C.E. The Chinese general Kao P'ien defeated Nanchao, but he himself established a semi-independent polity to put an end to China's direct rule in Vietnam.

After the tenth century, an indigenous polity that would call itself Dai Viet after 1054 ruled North Vietnam. Nevertheless, although the expeditions for reconquest by the Nan-han (in 923 C.E. and 938 C.E.) and the Sung (in 980 and 1075) were all unsuccessful, Chinese rulers still regarded former Annam as one of their provinces, conferring domestic official titles and peerage on its rulers. It was only in 1174 that China conferred the title "King of the Nation of Annam" on Ly Anh Tong, recognizing Annam as a foreign country, though it was still expected to send tribute to China. From then until the eighteenth century, Vietnam maintained a dual diplomacy: faced with China and other East Asian countries, it was the Chinese vassal state of Annam; with Southeast Asian neighbors such as Champa and Cambodia, it was the Chinese-styled empire of Dai Viet, to which all these countries were to be subject.

The Yuan (in 1258, 1284, and 1287), the Ming (from 1407 to 1427), and the Ch'ing (in 1789) dynasties also invaded Dai Viet in vain. Once they had driven back the Chinese armies, the rulers of Dai Viet resumed tributary relations with China for the purpose of national

security and trade. However, not all of them could obtain the title “King of the Nation of Annam” because China often looked unfavorably upon “disobedient” vassal kings. For instance, the Yuan gave the title to three persons other than the ruling king, though none of the three could actually rule. The Ming only conferred lesser titles on the early Le rulers (regretting the defeat in 1427) and on the Mac rulers and then the restored Le rulers (first blaming the usurpation by the Mac). The Le rulers recovered the title “King of the Nation of Annam” only in 1647, when the Ming government in exile, seeking support for the resistance against the Ch’ing, promoted the status of the Le dynasty. The Ch’ing dynasty, for its part, confirmed the title after the exile Ming government perished.

The Tay Son rulers, who overthrew the Le and defeated the Ch’ing army, also managed to obtain the title “King of the Nation of Annam.” Nguyễn Phuoc Anh, who defeated Tay Son and unified South and North Vietnam but never defeated the Chinese invasion, did not regard his polity as a mere successor of the dual state of Dai Viet–Annam. His first proposal to adopt the name Nam Viet (in Chinese, Nan-Yueh) was refused by the Ch’ing because it could imply that the polity should dominate not only Vietnam but also Kuang-tung and Kuang-hsi, as did ancient Nan-Yueh (203–111 B.C.E.). Then a compromise was made, and a new official name—Vietnam—was used after 1804, though Annam continued to be popular in unofficial expressions.

The French were deeply interested in Annam ever since they helped Nguyễn Phuoc Anh defeat Tay Son. In their French Indochinese Union, established in 1887, the core area of the Nguyễn dynasty—namely, Central Vietnam—was called Annam, despite the Nguyễn’s official names of Vietnam and Dai Nam (the latter was also employed from 1838 on). In the protectorate of Annam, the French *résident supérieur* (resident general) exercised power, reducing the emperor and his imperial bureaucracy to honorific positions. In general, Annam and Tonkin (protectorate of North Vietnam) were left underdeveloped, whereas the French invested much in the development of Cochin China (the colony of South Vietnam).

MOMOKI SHIRO

See also China, Imperial; Dai Viet (939 C.E.–1407); French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*); Le Dynasty (1418–1527; 1533–1804); Ly Dynasty (1009–1225); Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Nam Viet (Nam Yue); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Qing (Ch’ing/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1911); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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ANTI-FASCIST PEOPLE’S FREEDOM LEAGUE (AFPFL)

Normally known by the acronym AFPFL (or, in Burmese, as Pa Has Pa Lat), the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League was the major legal political organization in Burma (Myanmar) from the time of its formation in March 1945 until its final split in 1958. Organized in 1944 as the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO), it was initially a coalition of the Burma Communist Party (BCP) led by Thakin Than Tun and Thakin Soe, the People’s Party Revolution group led by U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein, and Burmese army leaders, most importantly General Aung San. As implied by its original title, it sought an alliance with the British to drive the Japanese out of the country. However, that was only the first stage in its strategy to regain Burma’s complete independence, as suggested by the league’s revised name in 1945. At that time, it had cast its net even wider and incorporated a number of other political groups.

From 1945 through 1947, the AFPFL, led by Chairman Aung San and General Secretary Than Tun, provided the major opposition to the restored British colonial administration. However, the league began to disintegrate in 1946 over policy disagreements between its communist and noncommunist factions and, following the expulsion of the communist parties, became more narrowly based. But as the British changed their policies toward Burma, the AFPFL was included in the Governor's Executive Council (cabinet). When Burma regained independence on 4 January 1948, following the assassination of General Aung San and other Executive Council members in July 1947, the league, now led by U Nu, controlled the government.

Never tightly organized, the AFPFL had little ideological coherence and a poorly articulated organizational base. Although successful in returning to power in elections in 1952 and 1956, it never gained the support of half of the voters. Presided over by Prime Minister Nu, the league was split by rival factions of socialists and conservative interests, which made it difficult to form stable governments. In the 1950s, the league's principal constituent organizations included the Socialist Party and its affiliates—the Trades Union Congress-Burma (TUC-B) and the All Burma Peasants Organization (ABPO). Minority organizations were also included, such as the Burma Muslim Congress, the Kachin National Congress, the Union Karen League, the Chin Congress, and the United Hill People's Congress, as well as women's, youth, and trade associations and fire brigades and the St. John's Ambulance Corps. But the real power lay in the hands of many bosses who dominated parts of the countryside following the Pacific War (1941–1945).

Corruption spread, and in 1956, clashes of interests among the leaders threatened the league's coherence. Following elections in that year, Prime Minister Nu resigned from his government office to devote himself for one year to rebuilding the AFPFL and ridding it of corrupt elements. His action was a ploy in a rapidly developing rift within the leadership of both the AFPFL and the Socialist Party that had started before the 1956 elections. Nu's action had the effect of revealing to the public some of the abuses that made it possible for league officials to use the power and privilege

of government for their own and their party's advantage. He could not push reform too far, however, since it might have undermined the entire structure of the league.

The overlapping authority of the government and the league ensured the election of AFPFL candidates by a variety of means. In addition to controlling the electoral machinery, some local league leaders had their own private or pocket armies to guard their positions. League affiliate ABPO saw to it that only league supporters had easy access to redistributed agricultural lands and annual government crop loans. The Union Military Police, a paramilitary force under the control of the home minister, was at the disposal of league members. As a front with no better justification than controlling the state, the AFPFL suffered from much bickering among its members over the spoils of office. These disputes were kept under control until 1958, when, following the league's first national congress since 1947, they became unmanageable and precipitated an open rift.

Conflicts within the political leadership then became so severe that the league and the government split, thus opening the way for the military "caretaker government" from 1958 to 1960. The AFPFL name continued to be used by the socialist faction that called itself the "Stable" AFPFL, but the party failed to win the elections of 1960; those were won by U Nu's faction, renamed the Union Party. The AFPFL never returned to power and was banned by the Revolutionary Council in 1964. The name "AFPFL," however, had a brief revival when a party contesting the elections in Myanmar adopted it in 1990.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Aung San (1915–1947); Burma Communist Party (BCP); Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Dorman-Smith, Sir Reginald (t. 1941–1946); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Nationalism and Independence Movement in Southeast Asia; Nu, U (1907–1995); Suu Kyi, Daw Aung San (1945–); Thakin (lord, master)

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ANTI-SPANISH REVOLTS (THE PHILIPPINES)

Throughout the Spanish colonial period in the Philippines, several revolts were launched by Filipinos against the Spanish rulers. Indeed, there was resistance against the Spaniards from the inception of their colonial rule. As the Spanish Empire consolidated its hold on the Philippines in the late 1500s and until the end of Spanish rule in 1898, Filipinos throughout the archipelago revolted due to various causes. Some of the revolts were small and very localized; others crossed provincial boundaries. By the late nineteenth century, the revolts came to have a more nationalistic character. They culminated in the Philippine Revolution of 1896.

When the crew of the first Spanish expedition, led by Ferdinand Magellan (1480–1521), arrived in the Philippines in 1521, they met opposition on the island of Mactan. In the resultant battle, Lapu Lapu led a group of men who killed Magellan. Subsequent voyages to assert Spanish control over the Philippines were likewise met with resistance, and the Spanish expeditions ended in failure. Then, in 1565, the colonizing mission headed by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (1500–1572) arrived and claimed the Visayan Islands and Luzon for the Spanish king, Philip II (r. 1556–1598). The start of colonization and consolidation into the Spanish Empire, together with Christianization and Hispanization, the establishment of colonial government, and the galleon trade, brought Spanish policy and practices into conflict with existing traditional practices. In response to Spanish impositions, injustices, and control, various revolts broke out. Some lasted only a few days; the longest was crushed only after more than eight decades.

The early anti-Spanish uprisings were led by political and/or religious leaders who had lost their positions of authority as a consequence of

the establishment of the Spanish colonial government; they attempted to recoup their losses by leading revolts. Although the Spaniards gave some of the chieftains and local leaders minor positions in government, the loss of power, influence, and prestige, as well as the failure of the Spaniards to keep their promises, prompted several of these chieftains to encourage popular uprisings against the colonizers. In 1574, Raja Lakandula and Raja Sulayman, chieftains in the newly established Spanish city of Manila, attacked Spanish positions to oppose Spanish rule and also because the Spaniards did not keep their promises to exempt them and their families from taxation. In 1589, descendants of Lakandula plotted to overthrow the Spanish in Luzon, aiming to regain the freedoms enjoyed by their forefathers.

Religious leaders also staged revolts, partly due to the loss of power they experienced but also in reaction to the spread of Christianity in the colonized areas. Native priests or religious elders enjoined their followers to reject Christianity and return to the old, traditional religion. Others reacted to impositions by the Spanish priests. Anti-Spanish movements of this sort were particularly common in the Visayan Islands. In 1621, a native priest named Tamblot led a revolt of hundreds on the island of Bohol; in the following year, a similar revolt led by Bankaw erupted on the island of Limasawa and spread to the larger island of Leyte.

Other revolts broke out in response to Spanish impositions, particularly forced labor, heavy taxes, mandatory payment of tribute and other fees, and forced sales of agricultural products at low prices. These uprisings took place throughout the colonized areas in Luzon and the Visayans. Other revolts resulted from unjust treatment by *encomenderos* (Spaniards who were given the privilege of administering property), high land rentals, and a variety of agrarian injustices. Still others were in response to government monopolies. The 1596 revolt of Magalat in Cagayan was one example of resistance against tribute and other Spanish impositions. The revolt led by Sumoroy in Samar in 1649 opposed conscription for forced labor; it eventually spread to neighboring islands and provinces in southern Luzon, the Visayans, and northern Mindanao. The Maniago revolt in Pampanga in 1660 similarly resisted forced labor and forced sales of agricultural produce.

With the British defeat of the Spaniards in Manila in 1762, Filipinos in Pangasinan demanded the abolition of tribute collection and the removal of the local Spanish official. Diego Silang, in the Ilocos provinces, revolted against Spanish rule and attempted to create a “kingdom,” seeking British assistance. A Spanish mestizo assassinated him, but the revolt continued, led by his widow, Gabriela, until superior Spanish forces crushed it.

The longest revolt, which lasted for eighty-five years, took place on the island of Bohol. Initially led by Dagohoy, who was incensed when a Spanish priest refused to allow a Christian burial for his brother, the revolt underscored deep-seated grievances in the island’s population in regard to colonial rule.

Most of the revolts were local in character, due to the Spanish policy of divide and rule, whereby travel from one town or province to another was discouraged. Linguistic differences were maintained, and the Spaniards were able to utilize drafted men from one region or province against those revolting in another. Through the use of spies and the church, some of the plots were uncovered in their early stages, resulting in the quick imposition of countermeasures. After a revolt was crushed, the leaders were usually executed in public or exiled to distant places in the Philippines or in Mexico. The Spaniards resorted to harsh penalties and the threat of torture as well as excommunication from the church to deter would-be rebels. Nonetheless, revolts continued to erupt throughout the Spanish colonial period.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Galleon Trade; Hispanization; Legazpi, Miguel Lopez de (1500–1572); Manila; Moros; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898)

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ANWAR IBRAHIM

See Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement)

AQUINO, CORAZON COJUANGCO (1933–)

Reinstating Democracy in the Philippines

Making history as the first woman president of Southeast Asia, Corazon Cojuangco Aquino was drawn into the vortex of Philippine politics by the overthrow of the Marcos regime (1965–1986) in a four-day “people power revolution” in February 1986, following fourteen years of Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship, which began with his imposition of martial law on the Philippines in 1972. Widow of the assassinated opposition leader Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr. (1932–1983), Cory Aquino became the rallying symbol for the struggle to restore democracy in the Philippines. What she lacked in political experience was more than made up for by her moral authority and widespread popularity as the logical leader for the opposition, making her the overwhelming choice of the people to replace Marcos. In the 1986 “snap election” that Marcos had called, Aquino was massively cheated, leading to a chain of events that culminated in the toppling of the dictator three weeks later.

Upon assuming office as the “transition president,” Aquino convened a representative group of Filipinos to draft a new constitution. Ratified by a large majority, this constitution took effect in 1987, followed by the first national election since the Marcos overthrow; twenty-two of Aquino’s candidates for twenty-four senatorial seats won.

Aquino’s presidency (1986–1992) was wracked by a series of attempts to stage military coups or destabilize the government by disgruntled elements who had been plotting even against Marcos earlier. They thought Aquino was soft on the communists and unable to govern. They almost succeeded in removing the fledgling Aquino administration in 1987, and they were to strike again toward the end of 1989. In both cases, the Filipino tradition of civilian supremacy, the loyalty of Aquino’s followers in the military, and U.S. assistance in fending off the plotters saved the day for Aquino. By the time she handed the presiden-

tial reins to Fidel Ramos (t. 1992–1998), the country had returned to political normalcy.

Aquino's principal contribution as president was the restoration of democratic institutions and civil liberties, which had been flagrantly violated during the Marcos regime. One of the most important developments during her tenure was the lifting of censorship over the media. But as was expected in a free society, the media later became Aquino's major critic, calling her term a presidency of "lost opportunities."

Aquino comes from the nation's wealthy landed elite and now devotes her time to family concerns and a foundation that she established in honor of her martyred husband. She remains a well-respected figure and now and then speaks her mind on current political issues. She was vocal during the so-called second people power revolution that toppled the presidency of Joseph Ejercito Estrada (t. 1998–2001).

BELINDA A. AQUINO

See also EDSA Revolution (1986); Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989); Martial Law (1972–1981) (The Philippines); New Peoples Army (NPA); Ramos, Fidel Valdez (1928–)

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ARABS

Arabs may have traveled to Southeast Asia for spices as early as the beginning of the common era. Their role changed when some became missionaries of Islam, especially from the thirteenth century C.E. The sixteenth-century irruption of Europeans temporarily impaired links with Arabia but never completely severed them. As the Dutch grip faltered in the later eighteenth century, Arabs settled in growing numbers, as entrepreneurs, religious teachers, and political figures. The majority of this latest wave of migrants were Muslims from Hadhramaut (eastern Yemen), who went chiefly to Indonesia and Malaysia. In contrast, most of those entering the Philippines were Christians from Ottoman Syria. Despite marriages with local women and a sharp reduction in immigration



Swept to power in 1986 after the assassination of her husband, Benigno Aquino, Corazon Aquino served as president of the Philippines through six coup attempts and public unrest related to the slow pace of political and economic reform. (Embassy of the Philippines)

after 1941, Arab communities have retained their separate identity. Many captains of industry, religious leaders, civil servants, and even cabinet ministers in Indonesia and Malaysia have come from their well-educated ranks since independence.

Arabs first appeared in Southeast Asia as the spice trade gathered momentum. Those claiming descent from the prophet Muhammad (s.a.w.), bearing the title of "Sayyid" or "Sharif," are often credited with a major role in mass conversions to Islam from the late thirteenth century, for example, in Java and the southern Philippines. As Southeast Asian Muslims are overwhelmingly members of the Shafi'i legal school, contacts may have been strongest with southwestern Arabia and the Red Sea, although South India and pre-Shi'ite Persia are other possible origins of this legal school.

After a depressed period during the Dutch heyday, Hadhrami Sayyids immigrated to Southeast Asia from the mid-eighteenth century. Revered for their descent from the Prophet, they married into noble families and became senior religious figures, and their tombs sometimes became centers of pilgrimage. However, other Sayyids became pirates and then seized power, notably members of the Bin Shihab dynasty of Siak in Sumatra and the Algadri dynasty of Pontianak in West Kalimantan. Yet others became senior advisers to Europeans; Sayyid Hasan al-Hibshi, for instance, was entrusted by the Dutch with diplomatic missions to Thailand (Siam) and Bali. At the same time, they purchased square-rigged European vessels and temporarily dominated the regional sea-lanes of the archipelago, outstripping both European and Chinese competitors. Their main economic centers were in Surabaya, Semarang, Palembang, and Singapore.

Hadhramis were progressively eased out of shipping as sail gave way to steam from the 1860s, but they successfully diversified. They were among the wealthiest owners of urban real estate in Indonesia and Malaya, and they dominated the horse trade from the Lesser Sunda Islands to Java. They traded in a host of other products and became famous money-lenders as well as pioneer industrialists on Java in the 1930s. Their religious role grew to the point that the Dutch appointed Sayyid 'Uthman as the grand mufti of Indonesia in the late nineteenth century. Singapore's leading Sayyid families took turns in being honorary Ottoman consuls from the 1860s. Wealthy Arabs sent their children to European schools and universities, and they benefited from the relaxation of Dutch controls over "foreign Orientals."

Success did not, however, bring unity. Non-Sayyid Hadhramis were attracted to Southeast Asia in increasing numbers from the 1870s, together with a few Hijazis and Iraqis, and the community grew to around 75,000 at its height in the 1930s. Newcomers resented Sayyid pretensions, and a formal split occurred in 1914 over the question of Islamic modernism. Most non-Sayyids became members of al-Irshad, a charitable organization that concentrated on providing modern schooling in Arabic. This division was overlaid with another in the 1930s, when young locally born Arabs, Sayyid and non-Sayyid, threw in their lot with local na-

tionalists, whereas their elders remained attached to Hadhramaut. The Sukarno regime (1947–1967) drove many of the latter back home or to Saudi Arabia after Indonesian independence.

A quite different stream of migration took Arabs to the Philippines. This community was smaller, peaking at around 10,000 in the late 1970s (Gleek 1975). The pioneers were probably Bethlehem Christians in the 1870s, but later, Lebanese dominated—mainly Maronite Christians but also Druze Muslims. In addition, there were Greek Orthodox and Jewish families, mainly from Syria proper. This migration was closely linked to large and influential Syrian communities in the Americas, and many took out U.S. citizenship after the U.S. takeover of 1898. They tended not to get involved in religion or politics but to stick to trade and, later, manufacturing.

The role of Arabs in Southeast Asia's history has been much less studied than that of the Chinese, yet their influence was felt across a wider spectrum of activities, at least in the Hadhrami case. Growing interest in the Arab case could usefully be extended to other Middle Eastern (West Asian) minorities in Southeast Asia, notably Iraqi Jews, Armenians, and Persians.

WILLIAM G. CLARENCE-SMITH

See also Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Islam in Southeast Asia; Miscegenation; Piracy; Plural Society; Spices and the Spice Trade; Trade and Commerce of Southeast Asia

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ARAKAN

Situated on the southwestern coast of Burma (Myanmar) adjoining Bangladesh, Arakan, or Rakhine State, is some 36,760 square kilometers (14,200 square miles) in area. Its capital is Sittwe. It has a population of around 3 million (Hla Min 2001: 99). Since 1784 when the Konbaung monarch, King Bodawpaya (r. 1782–1819), conquered it, Arakan has been incorporated into Burma. Events in Arakan precipitated the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826), in the course of which pestilence and fevers in Arakan accounted for the deaths of an entire British army.

Arakan has had a checkered history in modern times, and it had an illustrious autonomous history before its incorporation into monarchical Burma, when its kings and fleets influenced the course of events around the Bay of Bengal. Independent Arakan in the early centuries of the Christian era was centered at Dhanyawadi, the capital city in the fourth to sixth centuries C.E. and original home of the Buddhist Mahamuni Shrine, the palladium (state image) of Arakan. On the sixth-century stone stele, the Shit-thaung pillar, the early history of the kings of Arakan is inscribed. From the sixth to ninth centuries, the political center shifted to Vesali, a short distance south of Dhanyawadi. Archaeological remains have revealed an oval-shaped city of some 7 square kilometers (2.7 square miles) surrounded by a moat, similar to Dhanyawadi. The palace site, with its own moat and royal lake, was at the center of the city. There, the Candra kings ruled. A certain Anandracandra ruling at Vesali in the eighth century was a Buddhist monarch who endowed monasteries and gilded images. Early Arakan drew its wealth from the trade of the Bay of Bengal and kept close relations with the Pyu and Mon cities to the east. With the migration of the Tibeto-Burman peoples into the Pagan region from the eighth century, the population pool in Arakan received newcomers called Rakhaing,

who then took over the country. On the Mrauk-U plain, in the tenth century, two new cities were built, one of which, Mrauk-U, became the capital center. Other cities arose at Sambawak, Hkrit, Launggret, and Parein west of the Le-mro River. The Vesali kings are thought to have founded Sambawak about 1018 C.E. A princess of Vesali is said to have been sent to King Anawrahta (r. 1044–1077) of Pagan as a peace offering. For a time in the mid-Pagan period, Arakan was a tributary state of Pagan, but it regained its independence as the power of Pagan faded. From the new capital at Launggret in 1237 C.E., Arakan again extended its influence around the Bay of Bengal up to Cape Negrais, and it maintained relations with the Buddhist cultural world of Ceylon (Sri Lanka).

In the fifteenth century, Arakan for a time had a precarious existence between the Islamic power taking hold in the Bengal sultanate to the west, the Burmese at Ava, and the Mons at Pegu in the east. For a period in 1404, the Burmese occupied Launggret. The king, Min Saw Mun, sought help from the sultan of Gaur in Bengal, and with his assistance, Min Saw Mun recaptured Arakan and founded Mrauk-U in 1433, destined, as the last capital of independent Arakan (1433–1784), to preside over the glory days of Arakan's dominance in the region. Tributary to Bengal for a century, the Buddhist kings at Mrauk-U used Muslim titles. Their coinage was inscribed with the *kalima*, the Islamic declaration of faith. At Ramoo, Min Saw Mun's brother, Ali Khan, was installed, and his son, Kalimah Shah, took Chittagong. Under Min Bin (r. 1531–1553), a contemporary of Tabinshweihti of Toungoo (r. 1553–1551), and aided by Portuguese mercenaries and munitions, Arakan asserted its power in the region. It possessed a navy of some 350 ships that raided the coasts, taking slaves, trading cotton and rice, and dominating the economy of the Kaladan and Le-mro Valleys. With civil war in Bengal after the arrival of the Mughals, Min Bin occupied eastern Bengal. Arakan maintained a viceroy at Chittagong until 1666. Min Bin held off the Burmese under Tabinshweihti in 1546 and 1547. In 1595, his successor, Raza-gri, with Portuguese allies, captured Pegu, then ruled by Nanda Bayin (r. 1581–1599). Along with a white elephant and a royal princess, Raza-gri's spoils of war included the thirty Buddhist im-

ages and bronze cannon that Nanda Bayin's father, Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581), had captured at Ayutthaya in 1569.

Allied with the Portuguese Felipe de Brito at Syriam, Arakan's power extended along the Bay of Bengal up to Moulmein in Tenasserim Province. In the seventeenth century, King Sandathudamma provided additional support to Arakan's power based on the trading ventures of the Dutch, who were allowed to trade out of Mrauk-U. But King Sandathudamma's lust after the daughter of Shah Shuja, the former Mughal viceroy of Bengal who had taken refuge in Arakan after his defeat by his brother, Emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1659–1707), led to a crisis. Mughal retaliation for the death of Shah Shuja and his family destroyed Arakan's power in Bengal. Instability in Arakan for the rest of the century saw Arakanese power recede back to the environs of Mrauk-U. With the rise of the Konbaung dynasty in Burma, it was only a matter of time before Arakan attracted their imperial designs. In 1784, King Bodawpaya (r. 1782–1819) sent his crown prince to seize Arakan and to deport its royal family, 20,000 people, horses, munitions, and the great Mahamuni image, the palladium of Arakan, back to the Burmese capital at Amarapura (Koenig 1990: 22–23; Gutman 2001: 34, 39).

Arakan under the Konbaung dynasty was subjected to massive levies in 1790 and 1795 to support public building projects, notably the Meiktila irrigation system and the Mingun pagoda construction. The Burmese governor, Mingyi Mingaung-gyaw, appointed subordinates at Ramree, Sandaway, and Cheduba. Arakan was now administered as a province of Konbaung Burma. Arakanese refugees fled to Chittagong, then under the English East India Company (EIC). Border tensions in Arakan increased in 1811 with the rebellion of the Arakanese chief, Chin Pyan. The Burmese suspected the British of supporting his rebellion, a belief Chin Pyan encouraged. Such suspicions had not been allayed by the missions of Michael Symes (1795, 1802), Hiram Cox (1796), or Lieutenant (later Captain) John Canning (1803, 1809, 1811). Chin Pyan's death in 1815 and Bodawpaya's in 1819 did not reduce the tensions. From 1821 to 1822, the Burmese general Maha Bandula was stationed in Arakan, ready for the onset of hostilities with the British in 1824. His epic march from Arakan to

Rangoon (Yangon) could not save the city. Arakan, with Tenasserim, was ceded to the British in accordance with the Treaty of Yandabo (1826) at the conclusion of the First Anglo-Burmese War.

After independence (1948), Arakan was the site of insurgencies by Muslim groups seeking autonomy. Suppression during the socialist and postsocialist era of modern Burmese history caused over 150,000 Rohingya (Muslim) refugees to seek safe haven in Bangladesh (Christie 1996: 170–171; *Guardian Weekly*).

HELEN JAMES

See also Anawrahta (Aniruddha)

(r. 1044–1077); Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); East India Company (EIC) (1602), English; Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885); Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Pagan (Bagan); Sri Lanka (Ceylon); Tabinshweihti (r. 1531–1550); Yandabo (1826), Treaty of

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ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Archaeological sites are the physical register of past activity. Most archaeological remains are debris left behind at habitation abodes and task stations, along with the vestiges of dwellings and other facilities. A small proportion consists of useful artifacts that have been lost during use or when dropped underfoot. A very small proportion, usually involving the most spectacular and informative artifacts, comprises those goods intentionally buried in caches or in graves. The physical remains of burials and other customary treatments of the deceased are also considered part of the archaeological record. However, early *Homo* fossils fall within the domain of paleoanthropology because the dead were then, apparently, abandoned to the same physical processes that affected other animals, and when preserved, they turn up in fossil beds of general interest to paleontologists. Southeast Asia has a rich record essentially on a par with Northern Europe in terms of its paleontological beds with hominid fossils, rock shelters and caves, stone-tool and pottery scatters, mounds of kitchen waste (middens), wetland sites with a wide array of organic remains, old agricultural fields, megalith sites, temple monuments, historical urban complexes, and other sites.

Archaeologists use a wide range of skills to explore and understand their sites. Classification and comparison of artifacts remain important but have definitely taken the back seat compared with more scientifically oriented approaches. The study of faunal (nonhuman animal) and floral remains is critical for understanding the human ecology and subsistence economy of early Southeast Asians. The sediments that hold together or encase a site—and preserve it for the archaeological record—offer clues on water flow, erosion, and other environmental factors. Older sediments can often be dated in various ways, for instance, through correlation with the shifts and switches of the

earth's magnetic field or through measuring the decay of radioactive isotopes. Materials within the sediments can also be dated, most notably through radiocarbon dates on organic items (going back some 40,000 years) but also thermoluminescence dates on ceramics and a host of other techniques.

Generally speaking, sites can be classified as closed sites (caves and rock shelters), open sites, and built sites (with imperishable structural remains). All have their advantages and drawbacks. Closed sites trap sediments and items taken inside the cavern, which can lead to continuous cultural sequences that may span 40,000 years or longer. However, by the same token, human burials and even mild forms of sediment disturbance can juxtapose objects that belong to intervals thousands of years apart. Deciphering closed sites in terms of which items belong to the same time band is a chronic problem. Some open sites also suffer from an admixture of objects from different periods, especially as the attractions of a location are likely to persist over time, but most open sites offer greater scope for catching a discrete episode of human activity. More problematic is the greater exposure of open sites to the elements and the large element of luck required for an open site to be sealed by protective sediments but then subsequently exposed to archaeological inquiry. (The greater visibility of closed sites has tricked many archaeologists into believing that cave-dwelling troglodytes held sway in times of yore.) Built sites provide a framework to trap sediments and objects, but in Southeast Asia, sites such as these date to the last two millennia. Also, as archaeologists move to a historical time scale, their research questions require an increasingly finer chronological resolution. Because built sites are particularly prone to various forms of earthworks, their digging, construction, and usage cycles demand close attention.

The oldest known hominid presence in Southeast Asia is found in Java, but there is much debate on whether the correct dating is closer to 1 million or 1.8 million years ago. A series of volcanic eruptions on Java has bequeathed layer upon layer of volcanic debris that potentially can be scientifically dated and so provide age brackets for any fossils, including *Homo erectus*, sealed between the layers. Unfortunately, Java's fossil beds have been subject to

vigorous water action, and materials of very different antiquity have often been jumbled together. Although by no means a certainty, the 1.8-million-year dates would support other evidence that the direct ancestor of *Homo erectus*, not *Homo erectus* itself, left Africa at around 2 million years ago, before evolving into *Homo erectus* in Asia. Java has additionally yielded later *Homo erectus* skulls, dating through to about 300,000 years ago, but a lengthy gap in the fossil record immediately follows. Consequently, paleoanthropologists cannot determine whether *Homo sapiens* in Southeast Asia arrived from Africa between 60,000 and 100,000 years ago, as per the “out of Africa” theory on modern human origins, or else evolved at least partly from Southeast Asian *Homo erectus*, as claimed by the “multiregional continuity” theory.

Apart from tentatively identified *Homo erectus* specimens near the border between Vietnam and China, all of the human fossils found in Southeast Asia’s closed sites clearly represent anatomically modern *Homo sapiens*. Hunter-gatherer burials are concentrated in the Malay Peninsula and at Niah Cave in Borneo, whereas smaller numbers are known in North Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Even after the spread of farming across most of Southeast Asia and the establishment of permanent settlements, many communities continued to inter the deceased in caves. However, most preferred to establish open-air cemeteries or to bury the dead beneath their houses. Estimates of the number of burials can exceed a thousand in the largest sites, such as Khok Phanom Di (Thailand, Neolithic) and Gilimanuk (Bali, Iron Age). These large burial assemblages allow useful assessments of the residents’ life expectancies and their susceptibility to infectious disease, trauma, genetic disorders, and dental problems. Broadly speaking, burials dating to the last 4,000 years resemble present-day Southeast Asians in their skeletal features, whereas more ancient skeletons suggest a larger people with more rugged and elongated skulls.

Apart from hominid fossils, stone artifacts are the oldest preserved reminder of humans in Southeast Asia. Dates on volcanic samples, meticulous study of the geomorphology, and correlations with ancient changes in the earth’s magnetic field have shown that *Homo erectus* produced stone tools in Java by 800,000 years ago, in Flores by 700,000 years ago, and in

North Thailand by 560,000 to 700,000 years ago. Remarkably, whereas *Homo erectus* would have been able to walk to Java in those days, further travel to Flores would have required at least one sea crossing. In the caves of South Java, a small number of stone artifacts may be up to 150,000 years old, even if most date to the last 16,000 years. Attempts to place early Southeast Asian stone tools on a timeline from early and crude to more evolved have never succeeded, and morphologically identical examples may be separated by hundreds of kilometers and tens of millennia.

A major concern is that where open and closed sites are believed to overlap in their chronology (and the dates exceed 10,000 years ago), the stone artifacts in these two contexts fail to match up. This problem affects the Malay Peninsula, Java, Sabah (northeastern Borneo), and southwestern Sulawesi. Hunter-gatherers evidently took an expedient approach to making stone tools, dictated more by the specifics of the raw material than by any attempt to produce standardized end products. It is true that in certain parts of Indonesia, well-defined types appeared in the last 10,000 years, such as bone points, stone arrowheads, and spear barbs with characteristic trimming along their backs. Further, a broad division can be made between mainland Southeast Asia (and northern Sumatra), where river pebbles tended to be utilized, and the usual pattern in island Southeast Asia of shaping blocks of stone into cores, knocking flakes off the cores, and trimming the flakes. However, generally speaking, stone tools in Southeast Asia resist classification into discrete, coherent cultures.

Economic information on Southeast Asia’s earliest inhabitants is sparse. Where the fossils of extinct vertebrates are found in association with hominid remains or ancient stone artifacts, their main use is to help to date the materials of archaeological interest. It would be mere supposition that the early hominids preyed on the animals found in the same geological layer. The outlook is brighter for closed sites, where it is more likely that any faunal remains are scraps discarded from people’s meals. Changes in hunting patterns spanning the last 40,000 years or so have been observed in the Malay Peninsula, Sarawak (Niah Cave), southwestern Sulawesi, and Java. Shellfish were, naturally enough, consumed from early times. The layers



Archaeological sites of Southeast Asia. (David Bulbeck and Elizabeth Bactis)

deposited between 30,000 and 20,000 years ago at Leang Burung 2 in southwestern Sulawesi are thick with freshwater shell. Plant foods have always been important in Southeast Asia, and charred fragments of vegetation in closed sites provide some insight into that component of the diet, especially over the last 10,000 years. By then, people clearly exploited the whole range of edible resources, and a broad-spectrum economy is thought to be a useful defining feature, along with the inclination toward pebble tools, of the so-called Hoabinhian technocomplex of mainland Southeast Asia and North Sumatra.

Marine shellfish make up an abundant resource for communities based on the coast. Some Hoabinhian middens in Sumatra reached 12 meters in height from waste marine shells thrown upon the heaps. There is little reason to doubt that coastally oriented Southeast Asians have been consuming marine shellfish since time immemorial, but sea-level changes over the millennia mean that the oldest marine shellfish middens we know of date only to the last 4,000 to 9,000 years. The largest middens may have been deliberately built up as monuments and territorial markers and were often used as burial places, but the usual motivation was probably to keep the beaches free of dangerously sharp-edged litter. By themselves, middens need not imply a diet centered on shellfish, and indeed, they always preserve scraps from other animals discarded along with the masses of shell.

The oldest sites to give a well-rounded view on daily life are habitation mounds, which date back to 6,500 years ago in North Vietnam, 5,000 years ago in Thailand, and 3,000 years ago in Indonesia. These build up over time through the concentration of material brought into the settlement: timber, stone, clay, and other materials for building and craftwork; useful objects manufactured or obtained elsewhere; the day's catch or the season's harvest, including food that will be stored on site; dirt carried in on the body or clothes; and the excrement of humans and domestic animals. Even when preservation circumstances treat these sites unkindly and congeal them into one relatively homogeneous body, they at least have a coherence that forms a buffer against the rampant destruction that awaits most temporary, open-air encampments. On occasion, rapid

buildup and positive conditions can bequeath a succession of discrete layers, which, through meticulous excavation, can be distinguished and interpreted in terms of a succession of phases spanning hundreds of years. The 12-meter-high mound of Khok Phanom Di is particularly exemplary; a series of monographs detail the information available on subsistence economy, handicrafts, mortuary practices, physical health, and so forth. In places where bronze and especially iron metallurgy was practiced, the masses of ore brought on site for processing could have led to an even more rapid accumulation of debris.

Archaeological remains from settlements built over oxygen-starved wetlands can be especially informative. Housing on wooden piles has undoubtedly been widespread in Southeast Asia since its first settlements were established, so waterlogged terrain has proved no barrier to permanent residency, especially when canoes can carry people over tides and swamps. Swampy and shallow marine conditions are responsible for the preservation of indigenous Southeast Asian watercraft between 2,000 and 1,000 years old at Butuan in the Philippines, Pulau Kelumpang and Pontian in the Malay Peninsula, and Palembang in southern Sumatra. At the 2-hectare village of Pulau Kelumpang, where residents made beads of glass and semiprecious stone, the estuarine mud reveals extraordinarily detailed information such as house piles, burials (sometimes contained in canoes), and traces of dammar resin. Food refuse includes rice, coconuts, crabs, marine fish and shellfish, whales and porpoises, monkeys, squirrels, deer, pigs, dogs, and chickens. In Luwu, Sulawesi, a Bugis palace center dated between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries has been discovered in what used to be a sago swamp. An estimated 400 to 500 tons of cultural materials are sealed within its 3-hectare area, with earthenware pottery apparently the major class by weight, followed by timber and faunal fragments (especially water buffalo) and some plant remains (dammar gum, canarium nut, coconut husks).

Megaliths are a distinctive part of the landscape in the plateaus of southern Sumatra, Java, Sarawak, central Sulawesi, and the area known as the Plain of Jars in Laos. Here, we find boulders sculpted into human figures and other effigies, shaped into huge vats and other contain-

ers, or arranged into characteristic patterns of upright stones (menhirs) and lidded chambers (dolmens). Some of the megalith complexes of West Java are massive architectural works that resemble the Polynesian temples built of stone slabs and laid boulders. Excavations at the Plain of Jars suggest that the production of its massive vats and lid-shaped disks started in the last centuries B.C.E., whereas other Southeast Asian megaliths would date to the last two millennia. The most spectacular of Southeast Asia's megaliths are probably the enormous tombs constructed to this day in Sumba, as well as the stone villages of the Nias Islands, Sumatra, where the ancestors are placed in huge stone tables that skirt the central, paved plaza. Many megaliths, such as the boat-shaped altars of southern Maluku, seem to be aggrandized versions, in stone, of artifacts originally made in timber, and attempts to trace long-distance cultural relationships through shape similarities would be illusory. In other cases, particularly where the megaliths appear intrusive, formal similarities may reflect cultural connections. For instance, the megaliths of Malaya have probably derived from Sumatra but in two discrete episodes: the first involving slab-sided graves about 2,000 years ago and the second involving plain and carved menhirs at the time when Islam was spreading among the Malays.

Megaliths carry an implicit association with the indigenous Southeast Asian belief systems of animism and ancestor worship. These beliefs have obviously carried over into the various brands of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity followed in later times, and the transition is evident in Southeast Asia's megaliths. One reason for dating Indonesia's early megaliths to the first millennium C.E. is the fifth-century dating of its oldest Sanskrit inscriptions on what would otherwise be considered standard megaliths, specifically, menhirs at Kutai in East Kalimantan, and boulders in West Java with carved impressions of the king's footprints. However, Southeast Asia's oldest stone inscriptions (fourth century C.E.) are actually found in the Cham area of central Vietnam, which lacks a megalith tradition. Hindu-Buddhist architectural complexes, with their origins dating back to the first millennium C.E., are widely known in Java, Sumatra, Malaya, southern/central Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The picture emerges of cosmopolitan centers

espousing an Indic model of royal organization, located at nodes in the international trade routes and at certain hinterland locations of exceptional agrarian potential (especially in Java), surrounded by more traditional societies where people continued to erect megaliths and otherwise follow their ancestral ways.

The enormous potential of archaeology to illuminate Southeast Asia's historical period has already led to some major successes. Whereas early views on the "Indianization" of Southeast Asia presumed a socially undifferentiated world, in which visitors might as well choose one place as any other, we now know of sophisticated, stratified societies in certain locations with origins stretching back to 2000 B.C.E. A local view generated through archaeology strongly suggests that chiefly authority—and comparative security for the subjects—developed early where resources were concentrated and access to trade routes was optimal. These circumstances subsequently attracted traders, artisans, scribes, and priests to come from afar and set up shop. This is certainly the general impression to be gained in areas of secondary civilization, such as southwestern Sulawesi, where events unfolded more recently, allowing greater insight into the relevant processes. At the same time, archaeological evidence has dated the onset of Indianization further back in time than the historical records would have allowed. Sites such as Ban Don Ta Phet in Thailand and Sembiran in Bali trace Indian contacts back to the last centuries B.C.E.

The pivotal role that archaeological sites can play is well illustrated in their contribution to early Malay history. Based on its concentration of relevant inscriptions in Old Malay, Palembang has long been touted as the capital of the Hindu-Buddhist empire of Śrīvijaya. This encouraged archaeologists to continue prospecting the area despite initially disappointing returns, until the expected tons of relevant cultural materials finally were unearthed beginning in the late 1980s. Further archaeological discoveries at Barus, Kota Cina, Lobu Tuo, and other coastal sites have provided additional insight into the complexities of early trade relations in Sumatra. Excavations at Fort Canning conclusively show that Singapore acted as an intermediary step in the movement of Malay imperial rule from Śrīvijaya to Melaka. In addition, ongoing work at the late classical capitals

of Angkor Wat in Cambodia and Majapahit in Java—cities whose sheer size seemingly defies the usual processes of urbanization, as observed elsewhere in the world—highlights the relevance of historical archaeology in Southeast Asia not only for the region but also for humanity as a whole.

The view of historical archaeology as the “handmaiden of history” still tends to prevail for the period when Europeans arrived in Southeast Asia and began keeping detailed records. Archaeological research is mainly used to confirm information from written accounts and maps or to highlight cultural resources such as the forts of indigenous rulers who faced off the European intruders. Theory lags behind that in other parts of the world where the archaeology of capitalism (broadly defined) is increasingly seen as the ideal opportunity to develop the full potential of archaeology. The rapid turnover of highly standardized, internationally marketed goods allows extremely fine chronological resolution, whereas textual accounts offer a “thick description” of the use of material culture in maintaining and negotiating social relations. Some Southeast Asian archaeologists are embarking on the critical use of material culture over the last few centuries to explore the nuances of change at a time of wide-scale social transformations and unprecedented new opportunities. The challenge remains to plumb Southeast Asia’s “ghost towns” and other historical complexes for their insights into the region’s economic, social, and religious history.

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See also Ban Chiang; Ban Kao Culture; Hoabinhian; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; “Java Man” and “Solo Man”; Metal Age Cultures in Southeast Asia; Niah Caves (Sarawak); “Perak Man”; Tabon Cave (Palawan)

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ARCHITECTURE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Architecture depends on climate, topography, population, culture, history, ethnic composition, and religion. Southeast Asia was once the site of several great architectural civilizations. Indeed, the architectures of Pagan (Burma [Myanmar]), of Sukhothai (Siam [Thailand]), and of the Khmer of Cambodia are all significant landmarks in the architectural record.

The region's climate features heavy tropical rains, and seasonal monsoon winds predominate over most of the area. The population is unevenly distributed, with very high densities in many low and flatland areas. The chief crop is rice. Yet despite such commonalities, there is great diversity in terms of economic activities and other critical dimensions in the lives of the people of Southeast Asia.

From the late sixteenth century, Europeans began to colonize the whole of Southeast Asia, with the exception of Siam. The architecture designed by people who had a long tradition of adapting to climate and culture was abruptly stopped by colonization. The schools of thought in architecture developed in opposite directions. Newly developed or redeveloped schemes of architecture in the colonial period derived from Europe. Moreover, the architecture of Southeast Asia was brutally attacked in the course of heavy fighting during the Pacific War (1941–1945). After the war, most of the Southeast Asian countries achieved independence in terms of architectural thought, but weak economies and political turmoil, including violent conflicts between communist and noncommunist factions, have disrupted the history of architecture in the region. Nonetheless, as the historical record attests, the architecture of the region provides considerable evidence and even definite proof that the people of Southeast Asia have often lived in harmony.

From very early times, this region has ranked among the most important in regard to the architectural features of Asia. It is widely acknowledged that the development of Southeast Asian architecture in its unique form was influenced by the great civilizations of its two neighbors—India and China. However, there are few studies and little research on the early settlers of Southeast Asia and the settlements

and architecture they developed. For example, the Pyu, Kanyan, and Thet were the earliest settlers known in present-day Burma, a fact that was mentioned in the *Glass Palace Chronicle* (1828) but was almost unknown in other contexts. Among the three ancient settlers, the Pyu left the most significant architectural remains in their cities and towns. Their unique culture and lifestyle, dominant for about a millennium, presumably started in the first century B.C.E.

There can be no doubt that the enormous walls and broad moats of Pyu cities afforded stout defenses, and there were fortified rice fields, vegetable lands, and water tanks for urban dwellers within a broad architectural base. The largest architectural achievement of Pyu cities involved the irrigation systems inside the urban areas and across the surrounding territory. In most Pyu cities, the land area enclosed by the city walls was between 5 and 20 square kilometers and contained a significant proportion of cultivated land, tanks, canals, the royal palace, and urban settlements. Funeral halls, burial terraces, temples, stupas, monasteries, and nonfood production facilities lay beyond the cities' citadels. Blacksmiths, traders, potters, brick makers, jewelers, weavers, dancers, drummers, learned monks, and courtiers to the king and his family were graded in a hierarchical order within a well-organized society that evolved over many centuries. It is evident that Pyu architecture was unique and possessed its own principles and traditions.

These Pyu conceptions of architectural design in urban spaces are still evident in contemporary Mandalay, with its large royal territory surrounded by cultivated lands, the spacing between numerous monasteries, and the courtyards of craftspeople and business quarters with markets and waterways, which together formed the unique urban complex. Even modern Bangkok, with its Western architectural theories, still preserves many of the Southeast Asian values of architecture, including the historical Southeast Asian concept of space derived from the urbanization of traditional Pyu cities. This is not to say that Mandalay and Bangkok have direct connections with Pyu cities. However, the ancestral remains of their predecessors' cities reveal some traces of connections to the Pyu, as, for example, in Pagan in central Burma and Sukhothai in Siam.

Architecture of Pagan

The traditional architecture of Pagan is based on Pyu achievements, such as the system of city and palace planning, as well as the main type of Buddhist temples and the brick-building technology that employed radiating arches. At the beginning of the eleventh century, the town was under Burman control. Before that, no monumental buildings were erected inside or outside the city walls. Pagan was an ordinary feudal town, surrounded by villages and arable lands. The territory of the initial town was small (about 1.5 square kilometers), but its defensive system was strong, notably consisting of walls that were 4 meters thick and 10 meters high. It remains unclear who constructed the town—whether Pyu, Mon, or local people.

In 1044, the year the kingdom of Pagan was founded, King Anawrahta (r. 1044–1077) took the throne. He transformed the little principality into a mighty kingdom, embracing a territory at least as large as present-day Burma. Rich architectural monuments were constructed in the capital. Prisoners provided an unlimited source of cheap labor. These favorable conditions promoted enormous monumental buildings, which continued to be constructed until the end of the thirteenth century. Within Pagan's area of about 48 square kilometers, there stood some 5,000 monuments erected from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. Today, 2,217 monuments are officially listed.

Siam's Golden Age of Architecture

Sukhothai, which means “dawn of happiness” in Thai, is the name of a city, a kingdom, and a historical landmark of architecture in Southeast Asia. The history of Sukhothai unveils the major achievements in art and architecture of the first kingdom of Siam, which flourished from the mid-thirteenth to mid-fifteenth centuries. The architects of Sukhothai studied a number of distinctive ideas from nearby kingdoms, including Mon, Khmer, and Pagan examples, and combined them in a way that formed a unique Sukhothai style of architecture. King Rama Kamhaeng (r. 1279–1298) had organized a writing system (the basis of modern Thai), and he also codified the Thai form of Theravada Buddhism, borrowed from the Sinhalese. Sukhothai architecture is considered to have

had great sentimental vision, representative of the golden age of Thai art and architecture. It lasted until the city was taken over by Ayutthaya in 1376, and by that time, a national architectural identity had started to emerge.

The T'ai kings of Ayutthaya became very powerful in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; they conquered former Khmer strongholds such as U'Tong (Udong) and Lopburi, then moved eastward in their conquests until Angkor was defeated in 1431. The Khmer court customs and language were assimilated into Ayutthayan traditions. Architecture of that period favored the Khmer style. In the early sixteenth century, Ayutthaya received European visitors, first the Portuguese in 1511, who set up an embassy, then the Dutch in 1605, the English in 1612, the Danes in 1621, and the French in 1662. Ayutthaya was one of the greatest and wealthiest cities in Asia, admired not only by the Burmese who periodically invaded but also by Europeans, who were in great awe of the city. Ayutthaya was the site of the first capital of the kingdom of Siam. The city was founded in about 1350 by King Ramathibodi (r. 1351–1369), and it remained the center of Thai power and culture until 1767, when the Burmese destroyed it. Some of the architectural monuments still survive in Ayutthaya.

Angkor Wat

The history of Southeast Asian architecture would not be complete without mention of Angkor Wat. Angkor was the capital city of the Khmer Empire (present-day Cambodia) from the ninth to fifteenth centuries. According to Hindu cosmology, the original city was constructed around the Phnom Bakheng Temple on a hill representing the center of the world. Utilizing architecture as a tool, the successive Khmer kings enlarged the city with new buildings devoted to the Hindu god Viṣṇu. The greatest and the most representative architecture in the Angkor dynasty was Angkor Wat, which was built by King Sūryavarman II (r. ca. 1113–1145?) in the thirteenth century. Angkor covered about 100 square kilometers and was one of the largest cities in the world. During the early decades of the fifteenth century, the Angkor Empire started to decline, and it fell to the Thai in 1431. The monuments and architecture of Angkor still survive, despite having

witnessed various wars. At present, Angkor Wat is one of the world's largest religious buildings.

Borobudur: Buddha in a World of Emptiness

The Buddhist philosophy of "Nothingness" and its relation to the usage of space is reflected in the majestic Borobudur monument, with its horizontal lines and elegant relief. The monument is a masterpiece of Buddhist architecture: its layout concentrates spiritual energy in the center and a series of square terraces ascend toward its highest point. Undeniably, Borobudur is one of the greatest architectural marvels of Southeast Asia. Buddhism made its way along the trade routes to Java and found a firm settlement there; Buddhist monks and pilgrims traveled frequently through Indonesia during the seventh and eighth centuries. Borobudur was begun in the mid-eighth century, and construction continued for sixty years under an organized society. The architecture of Borobudur tells about the ancient civilization of the Javanese, and in turn Javanese history tells about Borobudur's architecture. Its construction utilized about 1 million stones (each weighing 100 kilograms), comprising a total of over 40,000 cubic meters, and several hundred men were engaged to complete the monument, working seasonally to accommodate the agricultural cycle. A century after its completion, the Javanese court civilization disappeared, and though Borobudur was not entirely forgotten, it faded away in history. Successive governments tried to rediscover the structure, and restoration attempts were made. Restoration work was finally completed in 1983, making Borobudur one of the best-preserved ancient monuments in the world today.

The monuments mentioned here are just some of the highlights of the history of architecture in Southeast Asia. Many more could be discussed, and some of the indigenous architecture in the remote areas has yet to be studied. The glories of Southeast Asian architecture developed under long-held traditional values. However, the twentieth century is likely to be viewed as a time in which architectural developments in Southeast Asia revolved around Western styles and values. Mechanization eventually created today's high-tech societies and made life more con-

venient and more financially rewarding for many. But we must not forget that the period of colonial domination by Western states and the struggles under a succession of indigenous governments during the postindependence period also caused an immense loss of cultural heritage in the countries of Southeast Asia. Postwar fluctuations of power, contested between democracies and military takeovers, pushed many citizens of Southeast Asia, particularly many minority groups, to the brink of annihilation, and countless invaluable cultural treasures were destroyed. In many instances, therefore, a succession of political, military, and economic catastrophes resulted in the devastation of an older and invaluable cultural heritage.

KOUNG NYUNT

See also Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Bangkok; Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jakatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Borobudur; Buddhism, Theravada; Burmans; Hanoi (Thang-long); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; Islam in Southeast Asia; Kuala Lumpur; Luang Prabang; Malang Temples; Mandalay; Manila; Mons; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Pagan (Bagan); Penang (1786); Prambanan; Pyus; Rangoon (Yangon); Saigon (Gia Dinh; Hồ Chí Minh City); Singapore (1819); Sukhotai (Sukhodava); T'ais

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An Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) patrol discovers a communist outpost with an improvised bulletin board in Tân Phước. Though some of its units were outstanding, as a whole the ARVN suffered from a lack of effective leadership and thorough training. (U.S. National Archives)

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ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN)

The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) (Saigon) lasted for only twenty-one years, between 1954 and its collapse in 1975. Yet despite the brevity of its existence, it played an important role in the history of South Vietnam.

The ARVN was heir to the National Army of Vietnam, which was built up with the help of France during the First Indochina War. The "associated state" of Vietnam (Bảo Đại) was recognized by Paris in 1949 in order to counter the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) under Hồ Chí Minh, which drew up its own army to fight on the side of the French expeditionary corps. Although the National Army was small at the beginning, there were already some 250,000 soldiers by 1954. The officers, of whom there was a shortage, were trained at the Military College of Dalat under French supervision.

Under Ngô Đình Diệm (t. 1955–1963), who overthrew Bảo Đại in 1954 and transformed the state of Vietnam into the Republic of Vietnam, south of the seventeenth parallel, the ARVN stood to benefit from U.S. military aid. Its soldiers would be trained and supplied with weapons from the United States. From 1961, American advisers were assigned to various units when the Kennedy administration (1961–1963) decided to provide Saigon with the means to contain the Viet Cong (Vietnamese communist) insurrection. In the context of the struggle against the communists, the ARVN became increasingly powerful: it had more than 600,000 men in 1965, the year of the American military intervention, when ARVN field officers had already assumed control of power. In November 1963, backed by Washington, a military putsch overthrew and killed President Ngô Đình Diệm and his brother and adviser Ngô Đình Nhu. In the ensuing confusion, General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu emerged as the head of state, remaining so until 1975.

The Tet offensive (1968) marked a turning point. Intending to withdraw troops progressively, President Richard Nixon (t. 1969–1974) encouraged the “Vietnamization” of the conflict through an enlarged South Vietnamese army that was more seasoned in combat. The army would exceed 1 million men in 1972 and should have been able to master the situation on the terrain, not only serve as a backup for American troops.

At the time (late 1960s to early 1970s), the South Vietnamese army was essentially composed of thirteen regular divisions divided into four army corps, each of which was further divided according to four military regions. In addition, the army had specialized units, such as parachutists, marines, and special forces. The army constituted the major component of Saigon’s military force. The air force remained less than effective despite the panache of General Nguyễn Cao Kỳ (1930–). The South Vietnamese Air Force had undergone spectacular growth due to Vietnamization but, despite having some 50,000 men and thirty-nine operative fighter squadrons in 1972, it could not withstand the fierce conflict technically or on the level of organization or material. The navy, almost equally strong in manpower (42,000) and number of ships (albeit of small tonnage), was

confined to river and coastal operations. Nonetheless, in 1974, it could not prevent the Chinese occupation of the Paracel Islands off the coast of Danang.

This military apparatus performed unevenly. Faced by regular enemy units, ARVN troops rarely displayed enough pugnacity, at least when fighting on their own. Deployed in the Mekong Delta, they performed poorly in offensive operations such as the 1971 Lam Son 719 operation in southern Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail. Despite sufficient manpower, the South Vietnamese army suffered endemic problems that affected its strength: the soldiers’ motivation was less powerful than that of the Viet Cong, and corruption was present at all levels. These shortcomings had repercussions on the supply of material, besides an almost total dependence upon support from the United States.

After the cease-fire agreement signed in Paris in January 1973 and the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the ARVN permitted South Vietnam to control the government area, while remaining dependent on American supplies. When supplies failed to materialize and despite battles in which it made a good impression (such as Xuân Lộc), the ARVN collapsed like a house of cards in the spring of 1975, driven from the field by the last communist offensive. When the Popular Army entered Saigon on 30 April, except for a few pockets of resistance it did not encounter many members of the numerous units of the ARVN, whose commanding officer had already fled. Only their abandoned uniforms and shoes were seen in the streets. Soon afterward, “reeducation” would come for the soldiers and officers of the fallen republic. Thus, the ARVN would go down together with the regime with which it had progressively identified itself, in the inglorious end to South Vietnam.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Bảo Đại (Vĩnh Tuy) (1913–1997); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Hồ Chí Minh Trail; Indochina War (1964–1975), Second (Vietnam War); Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); Nguyễn Văn Thiệu (1923–2001); Paris Peace Agreement (1968, 1973) (Vietnam); Tet Offensive (1968); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia; Viet Cong; Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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“ASIA FOR THE ASIATICS”

“Asia for the Asiatics” was the slogan advocated by the Japanese Imperial government prior to and during the Pacific War (1941–1945). The objective was to garner Asian peoples’ support for its policy of ousting the Western colonial powers from Asia. An Indian nationalist, it was said, originally inspired the Japanese to adopt this slogan in the mid-1910s. It embodied the idea of the Japanese Asianists who had emerged since the early Meiji era (1867–1912). The Japanese Asianists fundamentally fell into two schools. In order to liberate Asia, adherents of one school intended to cooperate with the Asians as an equivalent partner; adherents of the other school intended to unite the Asians, with Japan as a supreme leader. From the late 1880s, those in the latter school prevailed. In the earlier period, they mainly focused on East Asia. The Japanese Imperial government implemented this idea when it colonized Taiwan (1895) and Korea (1910), sent troops to China, and then established the Manchurian puppet government (1932). Southeast Asia became the focus after 1938 when the term *East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, understood to include Southeast Asia, was first used in a military plan. In August 1940, the then foreign minister, Matsuoka Yosuke (1880–1946), announced the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was the first official proclamation that Southeast Asia was included in the area that would be liberated by Japan to realize the new order in Asia and bring to fruition the idea of Asia for the Asiatics.

HARA FUJIO

See also Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; Japan and Southeast Asia (pre-1941); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia

(1941–1945); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia

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ASIAN-AFRICAN (BANDUNG) CONFERENCE (APRIL 1955)

The Asian-African Conference in the Indonesian town of Bandung on 18 to 24 April 1955 was an unprecedented meeting of political leaders from twenty-nine countries. The conference marked the first decisive step toward the independent cooperation of Third World countries and the later Non-Aligned Movement in a world that was becoming increasingly dominated by the contending Western and Eastern blocs.

The initiative for the conference had come from Indonesia at a much smaller gathering in Colombo, Sri Lanka, a year earlier. In Bandung, all Southeast Asian governments were represented except Malaya and British Borneo. The conference brought together the first generation of leaders of postcolonial Asian and African countries, with the dominant figures being Ahmed Sukarno (1901–1970) of Indonesia, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) of India, Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) of China, and Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) of Egypt. In its central communiqué, the conference declared basic principles of international relations, denouncing colonialism and alignment with one of the dominant blocs and advocating independence, a multilateral system of states under the United Nations, racial equality, and self-determination for all states. Of particular significance were the participation of China and its relations with India. In the years following the conference, China’s clear commitment to communism and the deterioration of relations with India excluded it from the Non-Aligned Movement, whereas Indonesia emerged as the main advocate of nonalignment in Southeast Asia.

Although an attempt to convene a second Asian-African meeting in 1965 in Algeria did not materialize, the Bandung Conference remains a symbol of the emancipation process of the Third World. The event gave the newly in-

dependent states of the South—and Indonesia in particular—unprecedented visibility. However, it did not lead to the establishment of an institutionalized organization as a counterweight to the bipolar system of international relations.

STEFAN HELL

See also Anglo-Malayan/Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Cold War; Comintern; Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Southeast Asia; Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (1954); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia; U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971)

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A-SO-YA-MIN

A-so-ya-min is a transliteration of an old Myanmar (Burma) word meaning “government”; it literally breaks down as “royal person who has authority over or rules.” The traditional form of government in Myanmar, as in all Theravada Buddhist kingdoms in South Asia and Southeast Asia, was a monarchy that drew its legitimacy from certain theories of government that were commonly accepted by king and subject alike. The hereditary ruler, always the son of a king through a senior wife who was also descended from the royal clan, was the theoretical fount of all authority. All other members of the ruling classes, including ministers and chiefs, acted as his agents. Among his many titles was “Lord of Life,” denoting his supreme authority.

The theory of Buddhist kingship that provided the legitimating myth for the monarchy began with the notion that the king was descended from the *Maha Thammada*, or “The

Great Elected.” In a variation of the social contract theory of government, the first king was said to have been chosen when people, then living in a degraded paradise, realized that greed was undermining the tranquillity of their society. They then chose one among them, the *Maha Thammada*, to have absolute power over them to keep order. He was elected in two senses. In one sense, the first king was the choice of the people, and his hereditary descendants shared his lineage. In another sense, he was special in that he could be trusted with all power because the king was a *Hpaya laung* (future Buddha). He had achieved this august status because of the merit derived from the good deeds he had performed in previous lives. The king thus ruled because of his ability to uphold the moral law as a *dhamma raja* (the Just King of Buddhist thought).

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Buddhism; Buddhism, Theravada; *Cakkavatti/Setkya-min* (Universal Ruler); *Devaraja*; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Indianization; Indigenous Political Power

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ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967)

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 7 August 1967. In the ASEAN Declaration, adopted on the same date, the organization’s main goals were spelled out. The association was to promote regional collaboration in Southeast Asia and in so doing contribute to peace, development, and prosperity in the region. Relations among the member states were to be governed by two fundamental documents adopted in 1976: the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC, also known as the Bali Treaty) and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord.

Following a period of tension between ASEAN and the three Indochinese countries (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) in connection with the Cambodian conflict between 1979 and 1991, the rest of the 1990s was characterized by a gradual process of ASEAN expansion, with Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar (Burma), and Cambodia becoming members of the association. The 1992 agreement to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) within fifteen years marked an expansion of economic cooperation within the organization. This expansion was considerably slowed by the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC, 1997–1998), which had major negative impacts on the economies of the member states. The expansion of membership and the negative repercussions of the AFC posed major challenges for ASEAN to address in the late 1990s and into the early 2000s.

Establishment of ASEAN

ASEAN was established in 1967, but it was not the first subregional association to be set up in Southeast Asia. In 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was formed, bringing together what was then the Federation of Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand. In 1963, Indonesia, the Federation of Malaya, and the Philippines established Maphilindo, in an attempt to promote cooperation among the three countries. But cooperation within both ASA and Maphilindo was seriously hampered by the conflicts between Malaysia and Indonesia and between Malaysia and the Philippines, respectively, over the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. In fact, ASA and Maphilindo proved to be inadequate for handling and containing the two conflicts, thus indicating that the two bodies could not be used to manage severe interstate conflicts among their members. The limitations and shortcomings of these organizations showed that there was a need for a broader and more efficient association to serve as a vehicle for regional cooperation and conflict management. The establishment of ASEAN can be seen as the result of efforts by some Southeast Asian states to create an association that could provide a framework for the successful management of disputes among member states. To bring about a broader membership base in the new association, all the major nonsocialist countries in Southeast Asia ex-

cept the Republic of Vietnam joined ASEAN, together with Singapore, in 1967.

Regional Cooperation through ASEAN Intra-ASEAN Dimension

Although ASEAN was created as part of a process aimed at peaceful management of conflicts among its members, the main goal expressed through the ASEAN Declaration in 1967 was to promote social and economic cooperation among the member states.

Through a system of informal and formal meetings between their leaders, ministers, and senior officials, the ASEAN states have managed to build confidence, familiarity, and an understanding of one another's positions on a range of issues. ASEAN is renowned for its decision-making process, which requires that all decisions be reached by consensus. Particular emphasis has been put on promoting and achieving regional resilience based on the internal resilience of each of the member states through economic development. This approach should result in greater political support for the governments and lead to enhanced political stability in the future.

Achieving a high level of interaction, cooperation, and understanding among the original member states was a gradual process influenced both by intra-ASEAN developments and by developments in the broader Southeast Asian region. Already by 1971, the ASEAN countries had responded to international developments by issuing the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on 27 November 1971, which called for the creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. The next step came in 1976 with the signing of TAC and the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord on 24 February 1976 in connection with the first ASEAN Summit, in Bali.

The core element of the structure of formal collaboration within the organization is the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), which was set up by the member states on a rotating basis at the establishment of the association. As collaboration within ASEAN has expanded, the number of meetings has increased considerably, and there are now hundreds of meetings each year in various fields of cooperation. It is notable that official and informal summits are held among the leaders of the

member states on a regular basis. In 1981, the ASEAN Secretariat was established, and it has assumed a coordinating role within the association.

As the economies of the ASEAN member states developed, in particular from the late 1980 and into the 1990s, a process of expanding economic cooperation within the association took place. This development led to the establishment of subregional economic zones linking various regions in the member states. The early 1990s were also characterized by coordinated efforts to expand economic cooperation and integration. In 1992, an agreement was reached on the establishment of AFTA within fifteen years. The member states also signed an agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT), which is the key instrument in the process through which AFTA will be established. However, beginning in 1997, the expansion of economic cooperation was considerably slowed by the AFC, which caused a regionwide economic recession. The AFC has been a major issue of concern for the member states of ASEAN, and the early 2000s have shown that many countries (Indonesia in particular) are still facing continued economic problems coupled with political instability.

External Relations and the Expansion of ASEAN

In its foreign relations, ASEAN has generated strength from the fact that the member states have acted together as one political force by taking a collective stand on major foreign policy issues. The most obvious example is the ASEAN success in gaining widespread international support for its position on the Cambodian conflict. In the post-Cambodian conflict era (that is, since 1991), ASEAN has initiated two major foreign relations initiatives. First was the process of expanding membership in ASEAN within the Southeast Asian region. Second was the process leading to the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The expansion of membership in ASEAN in the 1990s grew out of the rapprochement between ASEAN and Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, following the settlement of the Cambodian conflict in 1991, as well as the ASEAN policy of "constructive engagement" toward Myanmar. (Brunei had joined in 1984 after achieving

independence from the United Kingdom.) These two processes led to the accession to the Bali Treaty by the four states. ASEAN observer status and membership in ARF for the four states followed. Finally, Vietnam (in 1995), Laos and Myanmar (in 1997), and Cambodia (in 1998–1999) acceded to full membership in ASEAN. The integration of the new members is a challenge to the organization and is leading to the gradual emergence of a more heterogeneous association.

The "political factor" seems to have been crucial in creating the necessary conditions for an expansion of membership in ASEAN. This refers to the fact that the founding members of ASEAN had, from the outset, formulated the vision and goal of "one Southeast Asia" with all ten Southeast Asian countries as members of the association. There was also a political interest among the other four Southeast Asian countries to improve relations with the ASEAN countries and to gradually integrate into the framework for regional cooperation. Changes within countries of the region, within the region, and within relations among the major outside powers contributed to create conducive conditions for rapprochement and gradual integration.

The "security factor" is also relevant in explaining the expansion of ASEAN, given the history of internal as well as interstate conflicts in the region. Expanding the acceptance of the Bali Treaty as a code of conduct for interstate relations and expanding ASEAN membership within the Southeast Asian region are processes designed to enhance the overall security in the region by promoting regional cooperation.

The "economic factor" does not seem to have been as crucial in explaining the urge to expand ASEAN membership within Southeast Asia, as seen from the perspective of the six original ASEAN members ("the ASEAN six"). However, it was of considerable importance for the four new members, as other ASEAN members were major foreign investors in and leading trading partners of those four countries.

The ARF grew out of an increased awareness among the ASEAN states that there was a need for a multilateral forum to discuss security issues within the broader Asian Pacific context following the end of the Cold War. The indications of a reduction in the U.S. military presence in and commitment to East and Southeast

Asia also influenced the ASEAN states. They reached a consensus on the need for such a forum at the ASEAN Summit in Singapore in January 1992. Australia had already expressed support for such an idea. Gradually, the major powers—notably China, Japan, and the United States—decided to give their support. This process led to the establishment of the ARF, with its first working session being held in connection with the AMM in Bangkok in July 1994. The founding members of the ARF were the six ASEAN members, the Dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States) of ASEAN, the “consultative partners” of ASEAN at the time (China and Russia), and the ASEAN observers at the time (Papua New Guinea, Laos, and Vietnam). In all, there were eighteen founding members. The number of ARF members has since expanded to twenty-three.

Conclusion

Despite ASEAN’s original goal of promoting social and economic cooperation among its member states, as expressed in 1967, it is generally recognized that ASEAN has achieved more in terms of cooperation in the political and security fields as compared with the economic field.

Some observers argue that ASEAN was a success story up to the mid-1990s but that its image was tarnished thereafter due to the challenges brought about by the expanding membership and the impact that would have on the coherence of the association, as well as the impact of the AFC that swept through the region from 1997. A more balanced assessment suggests that ASEAN was not such a success story by the mid-1990s and that cooperation within ASEAN has not been weakened to the extent argued by its critics. Nevertheless, ASEAN must address a number of difficult issues. Some of these relate to interstate relations, and others involve internal problems in the individual member states. One persisting challenge, both nationally and regionally, involves Indonesia, with its continued political instability and the questions that remain about its future as a unified nation given the armed secessionist movements in some parts of the country.

RAMSES AMER

See also Economic Development of Southeast Asia (post-1945 to ca. 1990s); Konfrontasi (“Crush Malaysia” campaign); Kuantan Principle (1980); Malaysia (1963); Maphilindo Concept; Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Sabah Claim; Spratley and Paracel Archipelagos Dispute; Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971)

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AUGUST REVOLUTION (VIETNAM, 1945)

See Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Vietnam, North (Post-1945)

AUNG SAN (1915–1947)

Acclaimed Burmese National Hero

Aung San is the foremost national hero in modern Burma (Myanmar). His foreshortened political career, ended when he was assassinated by political rivals at the age of thirty-two, left a brief and ambiguous legacy that every political actor in Burma subsequently has claimed as his or her own. Held up as an example of fearless nationalist dedication and ultimate self-sacrifice for the good of the country, Aung San is championed by all who seek power in Burmese politics. A photograph of Aung San, ironically clad in the greatcoat of an English army officer (taken on his only visit to London in 1947), hangs in every schoolroom and office in Burma, reminding students and others of the traditions of Burmese politics that Aung San represented. His written legacy is sufficiently ambiguous that all—socialist, communist, liberal, civilian, or military—can claim to be carrying on Aung San's flame.

Born on 13 February 1915 in the small town of Natmauk in Burma's Magwe Division, he described himself as a descendant of prosperous rural gentry with distinguished patriotic forefathers. After schooling at Natmauk and the National High School in Yeinangyaung, he attended Rangoon University, where he studied English, history, and law and commenced postgraduate studies in law. He was twice suspended from the university because of his political activities. On one of these occasions, in 1936, his suspension prompted a nationwide strike of students from universities and high schools, leading to a revised universities act in 1938. Following his student days—during which he had been editor of the student newspaper and president of the student union, as

well as cofounder and president of the All-Burma Students Union—he worked briefly on the editorial staff of the only Burmese-owned English-language newspaper in the capital.

In 1938, he joined the Dobama Asiayone (DAA), a fiery nationalist organization dominated by other young men determined to speed the achievement of self-government in Burma. Aung San assumed the title of "Thakin" (master) at that time. Thakin Aung San became the general secretary of the DAA and was arrested for subversion in 1939. At that point, the DAA was in alliance with Dr. Ba Maw's Hsinyeitha Party to form the Freedom Bloc, opposed to cooperation with Britain's war effort against Nazi Germany. In 1940, he went to India to attend a congress of the Indian National Congress before going underground to avoid rearrest. Fleeing Burma, he set off to the east in search of assistance for the Burmese nationalist cause. He was intercepted in Amoy (Xiamen) by the Japanese, who took him to Tokyo for discussions on Japan's support for Burma's independence. Aung San returned to Burma in 1941 with the outline of a plan to train the officer corps of a future Burmese national army. He then returned to Hainan with twenty-nine other young men for military training.

The famous Thirty Comrades then accompanied the Japanese as they invaded Thailand and Burma in 1942. Raising en route an army of more than 15,000 young men, known as the Burma Independence Army (BIA), General Aung San and his men became key figures in the establishment of the nominally independent but Japanese-sponsored state headed by Dr. Ba Maw (b. 1893) in 1943. However, Aung San and his fellow nationalists soon became disenchanting with the sham independence the Japanese allowed; in response, they joined the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO), as well as the Burma Communist Party (BCP) led by his brother-in-law Thakin Than Tun and other groups. In March 1945, the BIA, which had been renamed the Burma National Army, turned against the Japanese, having assured the British in secret communications of its willingness to join forces against the common Japanese enemy.

After the defeat of the Japanese, General Aung San agreed with Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979), who headed the

South-East Asia Command (SEAC), to merge his army, now renamed the Burmese Patriotic Forces, with the official British Burma army. Aung San then resigned from the army to pursue the goal of Burma's independence as a civilian politician. Many of his former troops, however, remained loyal to him. Eventually, the British government was forced to concede independence to the noncommunist nationalists that Aung San led. Aung San joined the colonial Governor's Executive Council as its deputy chairman—effectively becoming the prime minister of the preindependence government. In January 1947, he went to London, where he concluded the Aung San–Attlee Agreement that established the terms of Burma's independence a year later. Just six months later, however, in July 1947, Aung San was assassinated while chairing a meeting of the Governor's Council in the Secretariat Building in Yangon.

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See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Ba Maw, Dr. (b. 1893); Burma Communist Party (BCP); Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma Independence Army (BIA); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Constitutional Developments in Burma (1900–1941); Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis (1900–1979); Nationalism and Independence Movement in Southeast Asia; Suu Kyi, Daw Aung San (1945–); Thakin (lord, master); Thirty Comrades; U Saw and the Assassination of Aung San

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AUSTRALIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

For much of Australia's history, Asia was largely undifferentiated: it was a racially and culturally homogeneous entity within which only China and Japan possessed identifiable characteristics.

Only in the mid-twentieth century did the term *Southeast Asia* begin to have a geographically precise definition. Today, it includes Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Before European settlement, trade in *trepan* (a type of sea slug) had developed between northern Australia and Macassar (Makassar) in the Celebes (modern Sulawesi). This trade, which continued throughout the nineteenth century, fostered close links between trepan fishermen and aboriginal people. Although Southeast Asia provided nineteenth-century Australians with foodstuffs and various manufactured goods, contacts were mediated through the colonial powers that controlled most of Asia. Australia viewed the region through the prism of European imperialism and race, and many Australians feared it would be the route for an invasion of their continent. This prompted the creation of a restrictive immigration policy, known as the White Australia Policy, that was intended to keep Australia socially harmonious and beyond Asia's influence.

Australian travelers rarely ventured to the region until the 1930s, when Batavia (Jakarta), Bali, and Singapore became, for wealthy citizens, exotic destinations in their own right and not simply ports of call en route to Europe and North America. For most Australians, however, Southeast Asia remained a romanticized, exotic area, found only in popular books, newspapers, journals, or art.

The Pacific War (1941–1945) and the threat of a Japanese invasion propelled Southeast Asia into the public imagination. Australia's first mass engagement in the region occurred when about 18,000 Australian troops faced the Japanese army in Singapore. Most of these men became prisoners of war (POWs), along with 4,000 other Australians. More than 8,000 died in prison camps across the region: in Java, Changi, Sandakan, Ranau, Ambon, Tol, Banka, and on the Burma–Thailand “Death Railway” (Beaumont 2001: 345).

After the war, decolonization, the ascendancy of Asian nationalism, and the Cold War impelled nervous Australian governments to protect their country from the region. Australia played the role of an armed frontier state, with a continuous military presence in Southeast Asia from 1941 until 1974. Public debate and

the Australian government's approach to Southeast Asia were dominated by the so-called domino theory, a metaphor for the strategic consequences for the region if Indochina fell to communism: according to that theory, other Southeast Asian nations would tumble like a row of dominoes until communism reached Australia. The fear and misunderstanding that underpinned the theory, combined with memories of the Pacific War, influenced Australia foreign policy for decades. In the postwar years, Australia fought in Malaya (1950), Korea (1950–1953), and Indonesia (1964–1966). Then, in 1954, it became a founding member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); shortly thereafter, Australia stationed troops and naval vessels in Malaya as part of the Far East Strategic Reserve. The Australia, New Zealand and the United States Treaty (ANZUS) was intended to bolster Australia's "forward defense" policy. This policy culminated in an Australian commitment to support the United States in the Vietnam War (1964–1975).

Positive engagement with the region occurred in the areas of technical and economic assistance and diplomatic representation. By 1960, Australia's diplomatic service had expanded significantly, with permanent representatives in Indonesia, Malaya (after 1963, Malaysia), the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Portuguese Timor, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma. Developmental aid under the Colombo Plan sponsored thousands of students for tertiary and technical education in Australia and sent Australian professionals to most countries in Southeast Asia. The students were the forerunners of thousands more self-funded Asian scholars who have gained tertiary qualifications in Australia. In 1956, the Australian government funded the creation of Indonesian departments at the Australian National University (ANU) and the Universities of Sydney and Melbourne. By the mid-1950s, the government's overseas radio service, Radio Australia, was broadcasting news commentaries in English, French, Indonesian, Thai, and Mandarin.

From the 1970s on, Australian prime ministers placed increasing emphasis on their nation's role in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Australia's foreign relations were characterized by a commitment to regional economic cooperation and

efforts to build multilateral regional institutions, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (APEC). Some setbacks occurred, such as Australia's failure to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

There were few Southeast Asian migrants in Australia before the late 1970s and early 1980s, when thousands of refugees arrived from Vietnam and Cambodia. Of the 1 million Asian-born Australians in 2000, just over half (about 3 percent of the total population) were born in Southeast Asia. Their most common countries of birth were Vietnam (174,400), the Philippines (123,000), Malaysia and Brunei (97,600), and Indonesia (67,600) ("Australian Social Trends").

Although many Australians remain concerned about their place and responsibilities in the region, the country has taken a prominent role in some regional issues, helping facilitate a peace settlement in Cambodia (1989, 1991) and leading a multinational peacekeeping operation in East Timor (1999–2000). Australia continues to be concerned with refugees from Southeast Asia, human rights abuses, conflict between ethnic and religious groups, violations of territorial integrity, and acts of terrorism such as the October 2002 Bali bombings.

DANIEL OAKMAN

See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jakarta, Djakarta/Jakarta); Boat People; Cold War; "Death Railway" (Burma-Siam Railway); Domino Theory; "Fortress Singapore"; Indochina War (1964–1975), Second (Vietnam War); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Konfrontasi ("Crush Malaysia" Campaign); Korean War (1950–1953); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Marine/Sea Products; Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Sandakan Death March; Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD); Timor; United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

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AVA DYNASTY

See First Ava (Inwa) Dynasty (1364–1527 C.E.)

AYUTTHAYA (AYUTHAYA, AYUDHYA, AYUTHIA) (1351–1767), KINGDOM OF

Ayutthaya was the capital city of Siam for more than four hundred years. It was founded by King Ramathibodi I (U Thong) on 4 March 1351 and was destroyed by Burmese armies in the reign of King Ekathat on 7 April 1767. In all, thirty-four kings ruled there, from five different dynasties (U Thong, Suphanburi, Sukhothai, Prasat Thong, and Ban Phlu Luang). Hinayana Buddhism was the dominant religion throughout its territory, although generally mixed with elements of animism and Mahayana Buddhism. At the highest social level, the royal court, Hindu and Brahmanic rites were maintained to enhance the power and aura of the ruler, understood as a fusion of Dhammaraja (the Just King of Buddhist thought) and Devaraja (the God-King of Hindu tradition).

The royal capital was strategically located at the confluence of three big rivers (the Chao Phraya, the Pasak, and the Lopburi) and formed an island, secure all on its own. The road encompassing this island measured about 12 kilometers, and the city itself eventually contained about 190,000 people (Loubere 1693, vol. 1). The surrounding region was a flat plain perfectly adapted for wet-rice cultivation, while at the same time being sufficiently close to the sea to make external trade an easy matter. Hence, Ayutthaya had a double character, combining a

land-based agricultural realm and another realm based on maritime commerce.

From the middle of the thirteenth to the middle of the fourteenth century, various Thai states came into being—Sukhothai, Lanna (Chiang Mai), Lanchang (Luang Phrabang), and others—but these kingdoms were still of a quite local and decentralized character, and they arose spontaneously on their own. None of them formed a true royal domain under strongly centralized power.

Ayutthaya had its origins in the union of Suphanburi and Lopburi, the two “local” powers dominant in the central region of today’s Thailand. Suphanburi was overlord of the region to the west of the Chao Phraya River. It encompassed various ancient statelets, such as Nakhon Chaisi (later Nakhon Pathom), Rattuburi, and Phetburi, and its influence probably extended as far south as Nakhon Srithammarat. Lopburi, by contrast, dominated the region to the east of the Chao Phraya.

Both Suphanburi and Lopburi were the historical legatees of the kingdom of Dvaravati (sixth–eleventh centuries C.E.) and came under the influence of Angkor from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, that is, in the reign of Sūryavarman I (ca. 1002–1049) and thereafter.

Three developments created the opportunity for the creation of various larger “local” powers in what is present-day Thailand. First, the power of Angkor began to decline after the reign of Jayavarman VII (1181–ca. 1220). Second, major alterations occurred in religious outlook, with a shift from Brahmanic Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism to Hinayana Buddhism. And third, political transformations in Asia took place as a consequence of the dynastic change in Imperial China from the Sung (960–1279) to the Yuan (1271–1368) dynasties.

Therefore, in 1351, U Thong founded the new kingdom of Ayutthaya in the ancient city-state known as Ayodhya, which lay between Suphanburi and Lopburi. The early political history of Ayutthaya was characterized by the rivalry between two dynastic families, that of U Thong himself and that of Suphanburi (represented by the family of U Thong’s wife); the rivalry ended with the triumph of Suphanburi in 1409, in the reign of Intharacha I (1409–1424). The outcome was that in the first half of Ayutthaya’s history (from 1351 to 1569, that is, until its first crushing defeat by the Burmese), only

three of the seventeen rulers came from U Thong's direct line.

In the early period of Ayutthaya, efforts were made to expand the realm by attempting to seize the domain of Angkor in three successive wars—in 1369, 1388, and 1431. Angkor gradually grew weaker, and finally, the Khmer capital was sacked, forcing the rulers to move far away to Phnom Penh. At the same time, Ayutthaya also tried to expand to the north and successfully incorporated Sukhothai, although it failed to enforce permanent control of Chiang Mai. To the south, Ayutthaya established its authority over Nakhon Sri Thammarat and tried to achieve the same control over the peninsular Malay States.

Ayutthaya's favorable geographic location meant that maritime trade was a very important factor in its growth. The monarchs held a monopoly over this trade, and they used Chinese seamen to carry it on. From its earliest days, foreign commerce was vital to the royal revenues, no matter whether the court's dealings were with the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) or the Ch'ing (Qing) dynasty (1644–1911). The trade between the two states took the form of "gifts." The Ayutthayan court sent them as "tribute" to the Chinese emperor and in return was given special privileges in buying and selling Chinese goods. Usually, Ayutthaya's tribute consisted of forest products, such as sappanwood or other fragrant woods; from the Chinese, it obtained finished goods such as porcelain and silk (in this way, Ayutthaya became a station on the famous Silk Sea-Route).

Ayutthaya also had trade connections with states in today's Southeast Asia and beyond, especially on the Malay Peninsula, in the Indonesian archipelago, and in India, though these connections declined gradually after the Europeans started their incursions in the sixteenth century. In the fifteenth century, there were also commercial exchanges with Japan; one result of this traffic was that Japanese went to Ayutthaya, formed their own settlement there, and played an important role from the end of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century. It was exactly in this period, however, that the Europeans began to seize control of the older Asian trade system, displacing the Indians, Arabs, and Chinese. Among these Europeans, who included the Portuguese, the English, and the French, it was the Dutch who were the

most important (with their base/center on Java) in establishing a commercial presence and playing a significant role in Ayutthaya right up to its final destruction in 1767.

The ultimate outcome was that, at its peak, the Ayutthayan state encompassed a population of around 2 million people, including a mixture of Thais, Chinese, Mons, Malays, Cambodians, and even some foreigners from distant lands, such as Portugal and Japan (Loubere 1693, vol. 1; Reid 1988: 14).

The expansion of Ayutthaya's domain led to intensifying competition with Burma, especially for control over Chiang Mai and the kingdom of the Mon (which later became part of Burma). In the sixteenth century, Ayutthaya suffered a major defeat at Burmese hands (1569), but the setback was only temporary. In the seventeenth century, it managed to establish control over parts of the Mon kingdom, for example Tavoy, Mergui, and Tenasserim—port cities that gave Ayutthaya direct access to the Indian Ocean. But the endeavor to exercise control over Chiang Mai and the Mon realm caused continuous conflict with the Burmese and eventually led to Ayutthaya's destruction in 1767.

Ayutthaya's form of government was a monarchy, but it was not an absolutist monarchy. Although the king was the highest authority, there was as yet no sharp and clear division marking off the monarch and the nobility from everyone else, as would emerge in the middle of the Jakkri (Chakri) dynastic era. Ayutthaya's king, nobility, Buddhist monks, and commoners were organized in a graduated *sakdina* hierarchy, which was first clearly regulated by law in the reign of King Trailokanat (1448–1488). According to the letter of this law, every man had his own *sakdina* rank, and everyone had a given amount of land depending on this rank, running from 5 to 100,000 *rai* (2.5 *rai* is equal to 1 acre of land). For example, beggars, street musicians, slaves, and children of slaves were assigned 5 *rai* of paddy fields; low *phrai* (serfs) got 10 *rai*, middle *phrai* 15 *rai*, *phrai* with families 20 *rai*, *phrai* foremen 25 *rai*, low artisans 50 *rai*, taxmen and market chiefs 200 *rai*, ship captains 400 *rai*, elephant masters 600 *rai*, heads of the Muslim community and the Chinese population 1,400 *rai*, grandchildren of the king 1,500 *rai*, high nobles 10,000 *rai*, and the second king/heir apparent 100,000 *rai*. The *chao* (roy-

alty) was divided into three ranks: *chao fa* (children of the king), *phraong chao* (grandchildren), and *mom chao* (great grandchildren).

According to the letter of Ayutthayan law, all land originally belonged to the King/Lord of the Land, who would then divide it up among his male subjects according to their status. But the general belief today is that there was no real division of land (even though the rulers held firmly to the principle that they owned all the land in the realm and could bestow it or take it back at will). In other words, *sakdina* actually functioned as a hierarchy of social status: it marked each individual off from others, in an order from high to low, thereby determining each person's means of livelihood, residence, and even clothes and type of housing. It was also used as an instrument of legal punishment.

The status division between royalty and nobility was neither absolute nor permanent. In succession crises, a nobleman might seize power and found a new dynasty, as happened, for example, in the case of Khun Worawongsathirat (1548) or the last two Ayutthayan dynasties—Prasat Thong (1629–1688) and Ban Phlu Luang (1688–1767).

Commoners were divided mainly into two types of *phrai* (attached to lords, or *munnai*): the *phrai luang* and the *phrai som*. The *phrai luang* were directly attached to the monarch, whereas the *phrai som* “belonged” to the nobles. Both types of *phrai* were subject to *corvée* (unpaid labor) at the will of their respective lords, and they could be conscripted in times of war. A special group known as the *phrai suai* were free from *corvée* duties but were obliged to pay special taxes in kind. This kind of *phrai* typically lived in remote areas where forest and mineral resources were available.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the *phrai* were liable for six months of *corvée* labor each year (in alternating months), but it was possible to buy remittance from this labor by making payments at the rate of about 2 baht a month or 12 baht a year. Ayutthayan society, however, also had a stratum of slaves. Most of these individuals became slaves as prisoners of war or as a result of unpaid debts. (The *phrai*-slave system only began to disappear in the later nineteenth century. Slavery was abolished in 1874, and *corvée* labor was

replaced by general military service in 1905.) But the head tax (paid for remittance of *corvée* labor) was only completely abolished in 1939, well after the end of the absolutist monarchy in 1932.

So extensive and long-lasting was the realm of Ayutthaya that it continued to exert a powerful influence even after its final destruction by the Burmese in 1767. Following the disaster of 1767 (the sacking of Ayutthaya by the Burmese), a younger generation of Thai leaders, such as Phra Chao Taksin (r. 1767–1782) and Phra Phuttayotfajulalok (Rama I) (r. 1782–1809), endeavored in turn to build a new center of power on the banks of the Bangkok River by tracing their historical and cultural lineage back to Ayutthaya while at the same time constructing new traditions of their own.

CHARNVIT KASETSIRI

See also Angkor; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Burma-Siam Wars; Chiang Mai; Chinese Tribute System; *Devaraja*; Dvaravati; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Hinduism; Lopburi (Lawo); Mon; Phya Taksin (Pya Tak [Sin], King Taksin) (r. 1767–1782); Rama I (Chakri) (r. 1782–1809); Ramathibodi (r. 1351–1369); Slavery; Sukhothai (Sukhodava); T'ais; Taxation

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**AZAHARI BIN SHEIKH MAHMUD,
SHEIKH (1928–2002)**

Charismatic Brunei Politician

Sheikh Azahari, popularly known as A. M. Azahari, was perhaps the most charismatic Brunei political figure of the twentieth century. After building up his Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB, Brunei People's Party) into a major political force (1956–1962) capable of winning a landslide victory at the general election of August 1962, he was forced into life-long exile after the failure of the December 1962 uprising.

A political leader and businessman of mixed descent (Arab, Malay, Javanese, Sumatran, and European), Azahari was born at Brunei Town in 1928. Sent to Java by the Japanese in 1943 for training as a veterinary surgeon, he became a precocious participant in Indonesia's postwar independence struggles. In 1956, having returned to Brunei some years earlier, he emerged as leader of the newly established PRB. A *merdeka* (independence, freedom) mission to London in September 1957 ended in failure. His party's fortunes slumped, and its adherents were not galvanized until after Malaya's premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman (t. 1957–1970), called, on 27 May 1961, for the creation of "Greater Malaysia." The sultan, though he vacillated somewhat, appeared to favor the idea, and so did the British; the PRB, however, resolutely opposed the sultanate's inclusion in the proposed federation, preferring instead a union of Kalimantan Utara (Northern Borneo). The party won a decisive victory in the 1962 election, but it was still left in a minority position

on the partially nominated legislative and executive councils. Frustration led to the disastrous uprising by the party's military wing in December 1962.

The exiled Azahari presided over the party again after it was revived under Malaysian patronage in 1974. He successfully lobbied the United Nations in 1975 and enjoyed the satisfaction of seeing the United Kingdom being pilloried by the international community. The irony is that those who fought hardest for Brunei's independence, such as Azahari, paid the highest price for the accomplishment of that goal, whereas those who did the least and indeed resisted independence for as long as possible garnered the most benefit from the sacrifices of others. Azahari died in Bogor on 30 May 2002.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Brunei Rebellion (December 1962); Malaysia (1963); *Merdeka* (Freedom, Independence); Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB)

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B

BA MAW, DR. (b. 1893) **Prominent Burmese Nationalist**

One of the dominant nationalist figures in late colonial British Burma, Dr. Ba Maw was the first premier of the colony following its separation from British India in 1937 (until 1939) and head of state during the nominal independence granted by Japan from 1943 to 1945. He made his mark initially as a barrister, defending the leader of the 1931 peasant revolt, Hsaya San. On the back of the fame he achieved as a politician who stayed within colonial law while defending the downtrodden, his small Hsinyei-tha (Poor Man or Proletarian) Party was sufficiently popular to allow him to form a coalition government after the elections for the Legislative Assembly. Following his fall from office two years later, he began his political alliance with nationalist students, including Thakin Aung San and Thakin Nu, eventually gaining the backing of Imperial Japan both before and during the Pacific War (1941–1945).

Born in 1893, Ba Maw was a man of prodigious intellect. After an education that included studies at Rangoon College and Calcutta University, he was called to the bar at Grays Inn, London. While pursuing his legal studies at Cambridge University, he simultaneously earned a doctorate in literature from Bordeaux University in France. As a politician, he was most adept at developing strategies to achieve the most power for the Burmese under colonial rule. This approach often led to accusations that

he was inconsistent and lacked principle, but in the logic of colonialism, he was merely adopting the politician's adage of seeing his opportunities and taking them. Following the trial of Hsaya San, which first put his name before the public, Dr. Ba Maw became active in the popular campaign over whether Burma should be separated from India. He was publicly said to be on both sides of the question as he read the changing political mood of the electorate. Dr. Ba Maw first assumed public office in 1934 when he became education minister. An astute coalition builder, he managed to construct political machines with a combination of patronage, corruption, and financial backing from the Asian (mostly Indian) business community in prewar Burma.

The Government of Burma Act (1935) established an elected legislature and cabinet form of government under the colonial governor. Although the governor remained responsible for defense, finance, and foreign affairs, the elected Burmese ministers had extensive powers in all other areas of administration in central Burma. Dr. Ba Maw, despite the fact that his party had won only a minority of the seats in the previous elections, was able to form a government and became the first elected Burmese prime minister. His rise to power was greatly assisted by the financial support he received from the Indian business community, especially the powerful Chettiar caste of moneylenders who controlled much of the agricultural land

in Lower Burma. His government fell two years later in the face of opposition from students and workers who accused him of being pro-imperialist and aiding foreign capitalists. Inevitably, anyone in office under the British could have been similarly accused, and as radical nationalism grew in Burma in the late 1930s, the attacks on the government became fiercer still.

Out of office, Dr. Ba Maw joined with the student leaders who had helped oust him. Together with prominent students such as Aung San, who would become a national hero, and U Nu, the future prime minister, he helped organize a united front called the Freedom Bloc, which opposed continued British rule as well as Burmese cooperation in Britain's war against Nazi Germany. Arrested by the British, he was released by the invading Japanese in August 1942. Recognizing Dr. Ba Maw's popularity and his ability to work with the youthful nationalists of the country, the Japanese made him head of a newly proclaimed independent state. Taking the title of *adipati ashin minkyi* (head of state), a title with royalist pretensions, Dr. Ba Maw led a government that was recognized by only Japan and the Axis powers. His brother, Dr. Ba Han, helped draft a detailed planning document for the future of Burma under his supervision. Together with other prewar nationalists, Ba Maw founded the Maha Bama Asiayone (Greater Burma Association) as a nationalist front to rally support to his government and the faltering Japanese war effort.

At the end of the war, Dr. Ba Maw fled Burma with the retreating Japanese army. He was captured and held by the U.S. Army in Japan, then released after being considered for prosecution as a war criminal. The British authorities in London deduced that his wartime crimes were no more extensive than those of General Aung San and Dr. Ba Maw's prewar rival, U Saw. Returning to Burma, he attempted to reestablish a political career; however, by that time, he lost out to the former students he had both opposed and worked with in the previous decade. His waning influence was subsequently expressed through occasional newspaper articles. His memoirs, published in the United States in 1968, tell little of his experience of prewar politics but make much of his wartime exploits.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Aung San (1915–1947); British Burma; British India, Government of; Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Chettiars (Chettyars); Constitutional Developments in Burma (1900–1941); Dorman-Smith, Sir Reginald (t. 1941–1946); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Nu, U (1907–1995); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Thakin (Lord, Master); U Saw and the Assassination of Aung San

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BABA NYONYA

The Baba Nyonya, a subgroup within the Chinese community, are the descendants of Sino-indigenous unions in Melaka and Penang. It was not uncommon among early Chinese traders to take "Malay" women of Peninsular Malay, Sumatran, or Javanese descent as wives or concubines. Consequently, the Baba Nyonya possessed a syncretic mix of Sino-Malay socio-cultural traits.

The term *Baba*, derived from Hindustani (which has been strongly influenced by the Persian language), refers to an honorific of respect and was used to address men of Straits-born Chinese heritage. (Straits Chinese are Chinese people born in the British Straits Settlements, as opposed to Chinese born in China.) *Nyonya* (like its variants *Nyonyah*, *Nonya*, and *Nona*) refers to Straits Chinese women and is a traditional Malay form of address for non-Malay married women of standing; its etymological origin could be traced to the Portuguese word meaning "grandmother." The term *Nyonya*, although not commonly used in contemporary Malaysia, remained popular in neighboring Sumatra and in Java and had a similar meaning.

The term *Straits Chinese* is often used interchangeably with Baba Nyonya; there are, however, qualifications. As mentioned, Straits Chinese are those Chinese born and/or living in the Straits Settlements, a British-created administrative unit of Penang, Melaka, and Singapore that was constituted in 1826. But Straits-born Chinese or those living in the Straits Settlements were not regarded as Baba Nyonya unless they displayed certain unique characteristics. The term *Straits Chinese* was used to differentiate Chinese people who had long been settled in the Straits Settlements from those who had recently (from the mid-nineteenth century on) arrived from China, namely, the China-born, who were referred to as *Sinkheh* (lit. new arrivals).

The Malay term *peranakan* (lit. born of, children of), meaning “locally born foreigner,” refers to people of mixed Malay and foreign ancestry but born in the region of present-day Malaysia and Indonesia. For instance, *Jawi Peranakan* denotes a Muslim of mixed South Indian–Malay descent born in Malaysia; also, there are Chinese communities in Medan (Sumatra) and Surabaya (Java) whose members are addressed as *peranakan*. Therefore, Baba Nyonya are *peranakan*, but not all *peranakan* are Baba Nyonya.

The Baba Nyonya possessed identifiable characteristics and traits that differentiate them from the China-born Chinese and their descendants who were born and raised in the Straits Settlements or in the Peninsular Malay States. Their unique characteristics were apparent in attire, food, language, educational background, occupation, religious adherence, and loyalties.

The Baba preferred Western suits and leather oxfords to Chinese attire. The Nyonya’s clothing was akin to that of the Malay, typically featuring the *baju panjang* (lit. long dress), the *batik sarung* (wraparound), and the *kerongsang* (brooch) and other Malay-style jewelry. Home-cooked meals were an eclectic ensemble of Malay coconut-based curries, Chinese roast pork and braised duck and stir-fry vegetables, and English steak and kidney pie. Bread pudding and ice cream vied with Nyonya *kuih* (cakes) as desserts; there was also an assortment of teatime specialties collectively termed *th’ng chooi* (sweetened water/soup), such as *pungat* (sweet potatoes and yam boiled in sweetened

coconut milk), *bee-koh moi* (black glutinous rice cooked with sugar in porridge form and served with slightly salted coconut milk), *cendol* (stringy green stripes of rice flour in coconut-sugar syrup with ice shavings), and *thour tau th’ng* (peanut soup). The Penang Baba Nyonya spoke a jumbled admixture of Hokkien (Chinese dialect), English, and Malay. Baba Malay, a patois heavily based on Malay, remained the lingua franca of the community in Melaka and Singapore. English-medium education was the preferred choice for the children of Baba Nyonya families. The affluent sent their sons to Britain to study medicine and law. Others became clerks in the colonial civil service or in European firms or banks. Teaching and nursing were acceptable careers for a Nyonya.

Marriages within the community and between those of similar socioeconomic status were the norm during the prewar (pre-1941) period. The wealthy preferred to contract a *chin choay*, or matrilocal marriage, that is, the husband moved in with his wife’s family following the wedding. Consequently, daughters in Baba Nyonya families were not considered liabilities. In fact, it was not uncommon for wealthy families to seek promising young bachelors of lesser socioeconomic standing for marriage to their daughters as a means of injecting “talent” into the family gene pool.

The Baba Nyonya subscribed to Chinese beliefs—Taoism, Confucianism, and Chinese Buddhism. But at the same time, true to their eclectic nature, they might pay homage to Malay *keramat* (deified holy man, saint), pray at Hindu temples, or offer candles in churches. Some embraced Christianity through marriage; a small minority converted to Islam when they married Muslims.

The Baba Nyonya of Penang shared similarities with counterparts in northern Sumatra (Medan) and southern Thailand (Songkhla, Patani, Phuket). There are slight differences between members of the community of Penang and their brethren in Melaka, including its offshoot, Singapore. One apparent difference is in language usage.

Because of their inherited family wealth and their English-medium education, most Baba Nyonya families were economically better off than the China-born Chinese. Their fluency in English and their jobs in civil service or as professionals (doctors, lawyers), coupled with their

family wealth and social connections, qualified them to form the Chinese elite. Being British subjects, their loyalty was to the British Crown. They established the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) and played leading roles in the postwar Penang Secession Movement (1948–1951). They also led in the establishment of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) in 1949, which fought for pan-Malayan Chinese rights.

In many cases, a lack of thriftiness and an ostentatious lifestyle among members of Baba Nyonya households gradually eroded their inherited wealth, built over generations. The depression (1929–1931) and the Pacific War (1941–1945) affected many families that had suffered reversals in fortune. Thus, by the 1950s and 1960s, there were but a handful of rich Baba Nyonya families. And by then, several of the China-born Chinese had managed to build empires in trading, mining, and commercial agriculture. The China-born also gradually displaced the Baba in political leadership of the Chinese community.

Today, the Baba Nyonya communities of Penang, Melaka, and Singapore are shrinking quickly; their way of life and material culture are disappearing. Efforts to revive the Baba Nyonya cultural heritage during the 1980s and the 1990s were commendable. But the heyday of the Baba Nyonya during the early decades of the twentieth century had long entered the annals of history.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Melaka; Miscegenation; Penang (1786); Penang Secessionist Movement (1948–1951); Peranakan; Straits Settlements (1826–1941)

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BAJAU

The term *Bajau* (also *Badjaw*, *Bajo*, and other variants) is applied to a diverse collection of Sama/Bajau-speaking peoples. They are spread over a vast area of islands and littoral, extending from the central Philippines through the Sulu Archipelago to the eastern coast of Borneo and from coastal Sulawesi southward through the Moluccas to western Timor. In the Philippines, most Sama speakers are referred to by others as *Samal*, whereas in eastern Indonesia, they are generally known by the Bugis term *Bajo*. Most refer to themselves as *Sama*, or *a'a Sama*, usually with an additional toponymic name to indicate geographic and/or dialect affiliation. The Sama are highly fragmented politically and were divided in the past among a number of maritime states, most of them dominated by other ethnic groups.

In all of Southeast Asia, Sama speakers number between 800,000 and 950,000. In 2001, the Bajau numbered 354,000 in Sabah (Malaysia), making them the second largest indigenous group in the state. No reliable population figures exist elsewhere, but recent estimates place their numbers at 400,000 in the Philippines and at between 150,000 and 230,000 in Indonesia. The Sama/Bajau language family belongs to the Hesperonesian branch of Austronesian and includes an estimated ten languages, most of them highly dialectalized.

Linguistic evidence suggests that the proto-Sama homeland was centered in the islands of the Basilan Strait. From there, Sama speakers spread generally south and westward, establishing themselves throughout the Sulu Archipelago. Although some groups, in reaching Borneo, settled along the western coast of Sabah, others moved eastward through the Straits of Makassar to southern Sulawesi. Their subsequent dispersal over much of eastern Indonesia was closely linked to the development of a *trepang* (sea slug) trade and, with it, the expanding commercial and political influence of Bugis and Makassarese traders. For almost three hun-

dred years, the Bajau were the principal gatherers of trepang in eastern Indonesia and the Sulu region. With the rise of the Tausug sultanate as a major slave market, some Sama speakers, most notably the Balangingi, emerged for a time as major slave raiders.

Local communities take a wide variety of forms. Formerly, at one extreme were boat-dwelling groups—local communities that consisted of flotillas of boat-living families who regularly anchored at the same moorage site. Far more common, both in the past and today, are the pile-house or shoreline villages, typically aggregated settlements where houses are raised on piles above the sea or built along beaches or estuarine shorelines. At the opposite extreme are the land-based villages, with individual houses dispersed and surrounded by fruit trees and gardens.

In most shoreline settlements, fishing is a major source of livelihood. However, farming is also practiced, and in western Sabah, most Bajau settlements are located inland; there, most of the people farm (growing mainly rice) or engage in trade. In addition, some raise water buffalo, cattle, and horses. For centuries, trade has been a central part of the Bajau economy, and historically, Sama speakers have been valued by the traditional trading states of the region for their craft products, for their boatbuilding and seafaring skills, and as suppliers of marine produce.

Households are often large, frequently containing the families of one or more married children. Houses are typically grouped in clusters (*tumpuk* or *ba'anan/banan*). In daily life, household clusters form important support groups, with members lending help in farm-work, child care, and house building and in conducting village ceremonies. Kinship ties, which are traced through both men and women, tend to be heavily focused within these groups and are often reinforced by inter-marriage. A cluster may coincide with a parish, a group of households affiliated with a single mosque, or a parish may contain more than one cluster, with one cluster's spokesperson acknowledged as the parish leader. In villages containing more than a single parish, one parish leader typically acts as village head. The latter administers village affairs and is empowered to convene face-to-face hearings in the event of village disputes.

Considerable respect is shown for age. In household clusters, elders, including cluster spokespeople, are invariably consulted when important decisions must be made. Responsibility for resolving disputes falls chiefly on the house elders and the parish and village leaders. Above the village level, factional rivalries tend to be pervasive. Vendettas occur, but endemic armed conflict, characteristic of other ethnic groups in the Sulu-Sulawesi region, is generally lacking. Political relations are organized primarily in terms of leader-centered coalitions. Locally, these coalitions coalesce around cluster, parish, and village leaders. In Sabah, in contrast to Indonesia and the Philippines, the Bajau have played a major role in state politics and today hold numerous public offices at all levels of state government.

The Bajau are Sunni Muslims. Religious piety and learning are important sources of prestige, and persons considered descendants of the Prophet (*salip* or *sharif*) are shown special deference. Every parish is served by a set of mosque officials, including an *imam* (leader in prayer), a *bilal* (he who calls the faithful to prayer), and a *hatib* (preacher). In addition to conducting mosque prayers, the imam officiates at life-transition rituals, counsels parish members in religious and legal matters, and leads them in prayer during household-sponsored rites. Those who are well versed in religious matters are known as *paki* or *pakil*. In times of misfortune, a variety of other religious practitioners may also be consulted, including midwives, herbalist-curers, spirit mediums, and diviners.

CLIFFORD SATHER

See also Borneo; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Brunei Ethnic Minorities; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Iranun and Balangingi; Marine/Sea Products; Piracy; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Slavery; Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Tausug and the Sulu Sultanate

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BALI

Bali, an island of about 5,633 square kilometers, is located between Java and Lombok and bounded by the Bali Sea in the north, the Indian Ocean in the south, the Strait of Lombok in the east, and the Strait of Bali in the west. In the center of the island is a range of volcanic mountains; Mount Agung and Mount Batur are active volcanoes. Mountain ranges divide the island into the very narrow northern part and the wider southern part, where the population is concentrated; there are roughly 3 million people in Bali today, most of whom are Hindus. The mountain is very important in the Balinese cultural concept. It is considered the center of the world and the place of God, according to the cosmology and Mandala concept in Hindu mythology. Four lakes (sources of irrigation) are located in the center of the island: Tamblingan, Buyan, Beratan, and Batur.

According to the archaeological data, Bali has been inhabited at least since the Upper Pleistocene (60,000–50,000 years ago), as evidenced by the discovery of stone tools in Sembiran and Trunyan and the caves at Karang Boma and Selonding.

Bali might have received two cultural influences, from mainland Southeast Asia and from South Asia (India). The appearance of early metal (bronze) technology in Bali was considered as the influence of Dongson culture (Vietnam) or a local development, with artifacts at Manuaba and Sembiran. With neither tin nor

copper available, Bali may have been involved in long-distance trade during prehistoric times. The economic surplus of Balinese society during the prehistoric period might have been based on rice cultivation, which has been practiced in Bali to the present.

Inscriptions dating from the ninth and tenth centuries C.E. mention *sawah* (wet-rice fields), *pagagan* (dry-rice fields), *parlak* (dry fields), *mmal* (garden), and *padang* (grasslands). The intensification of agriculture may have been facilitated through the construction of dikes and irrigation canals and also by the introduction of the plow. The terms *suwak* and *kasuwakan*, meaning an "irrigation system," were already being recorded in Balinese inscriptions dating from the eleventh century.

Archaeological evidence indicates that contacts between Bali and India might have started some two thousand years ago. The appearance of Indian pottery in North Bali might have stimulated the development of Hinduism in Bali. By the seventh century, Hinduism had been entrenched in the island; it remains speculative whether Hinduism derived directly from India or via Sumatra and Java.

The appearance of Balinese inscriptions in the late ninth century C.E. provides insight into the social and political units in early historical Bali. The oldest inscriptions, from 882–975 C.E., use the title *Sang Ratu* (Indonesian/Austronesian for "Maharaja") to refer to the highest political authority. The inscriptions also mention a king, Warmadewa. During the tenth century, it is believed that Hindus from East Java migrated to Bali, among them Mahendradatta, the mother of Airlangga (r. 1019–1049). She married Prince Udayana from the Warmadewa royal lineage. Thus, when Airlangga's half brother ascended the Balinese throne, he consummated the blood ties between the ruling houses of East Java and Bali.

The kingdoms of Singhasari and Majapahit in East Java attacked Bali in 1284 and 1343, respectively. Kertanagara of Singhasari seized Bali in 1284 and held on to the island until his demise in 1292. The Balinese enjoyed a brief period of independence until Majapahit forces arrived in 1343. A Javanese nobleman, Sri Krisna Kepakisan, and his fellow nobles (*aryas*) from Majapahit in East Java reigned over Bali. The intense Javanization of Bali had begun, including the stratification of society into caste



Sunrise on Gunung Batur in Bali. (Corel Corporation)

groups, with the *satriya*, or warrior caste, presiding at Samprangan. Those who rejected this hierarchical society fled to the mountain regions; they came to be referred to as the Bali Aga (Bali Mula), the so-called original Balinese. The majority, however, bowed to Javanese domination to the extent that the contemporary Balinese commonly believed that their ancestors derived from Majapahit. Another wave of Javanese Hindus crossed over to Bali following the collapse of the Majapahit regime to the Muslim *pasisir* states (those on the northern coastal strip of Java) around the late 1520s. Thereafter, the narrow Strait of Bali separated Hindunized Bali from Muslim Java.

The focus of political power was initially centered at Samprangan; later, it shifted to Gelgel and then to Klungkung. Bali as a unified polity never existed; instead, the island was fragmented into numerous small kingdoms. Bali reached its zenith of political influence during the twenty-year reign of Batu Renggong (Waturenggong, r. 1550–1570), the ruler of Gelgel.

Then, Balinese hegemony encompassed Balamangan in East Java and Lombok and Sumbawa. During the seventeenth century, nine competing states coexisted: Klungkung, Karangasem, Mengwi, Badung, Bangli, Tabanan, Gianyar, Buleleng, and Jembrena. Slaves were Bali's only exportable commodity. Balinese slaves comprised a sizable portion of Batavia's population in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. South Africa received a considerable number of slaves bought and brought from Bali. Chinese traders prized female slaves for their diligence and beauty, and being Hindu, they had no aversion to having pork in the household.

Cornelis de Houtman led an unsuccessful Dutch expedition to Bali in 1597. But Dutch priorities were focused elsewhere (Maluku, Java, and Sumatra), and it took another two centuries before Bali came onto the Dutch agenda. In 1839, Mads Lange, a Danish "country trader," opened a trading post at Kuta, dealing with everything from luxury items to com-

mon trade goods. Kuta was a regular port of call until Lange's death in 1856.

Then, in the mid-nineteenth century, as a preemptive measure to exclude other Europeans, the Dutch adopted a forward policy toward Bali. Klungkung, Karangasem, Badung, and Buleleng acknowledged Dutch sovereignty in 1841. Military expeditions were launched in 1846, 1848, and 1849 to curb piracy, the plunder of shipwrecks, slavery, and the Hindu practice of *suttee* (the burning alive of a widow at her deceased husband's funeral pyre). In 1853, Buleleng and Jembrena were brought under direct Dutch control. The Dutch then subdued Karangasem and Gianyar in 1882. The looting of a Chinese-owned ship at Sanur in 1904 was utilized as a pretext for the final subjugation of Bali. A sizable Dutch force landed in September 1906 and marched toward Badung. More than 3,000 Balinese collectively committed ritual suicide (*puputan*, meaning "ending" in Balinese) amid the hail of gunfire from the Dutch troops. Likewise, in operations against Klungkung in 1908, *puputan* was again practiced.

The Bali who had remained relatively unchanged since the sixteenth century gradually slipped into the twentieth century with direct Dutch colonial rule. The Dutch took pride in not exposing the Balinese to foreign cultural influences. For instance, Christian missionaries were allowed access to the island only in the 1930s. In 1929, the Dutch restored the former kingdoms to their rulers and declared these territories as *zelfbesturen* (self-governing territories, under Dutch authority). But the period of Dutch colonial rule (1908–1942) witnessed one disaster after another: a devastating earthquake in 1917, a plague that killed off almost all of the island's rice crop, an influenza outbreak, and then the disastrous effects of the Great Depression (1929–1931).

Apart from shortages of food and other daily necessities, Bali experienced little change during the Japanese occupation (1942–1945). The hectic postwar period witnessed the Dutch creation of the Republic of East Indonesia, with Bali as one of its thirteen administrative constituencies. The republic lasted for seven months. In August 1950, Bali became part of the independent Republic of Indonesia.

The several thousand deaths recorded as a consequence of the eruption of Mount Agung in 1963 did not compare to the estimated

60,000 massacred as alleged communists during the bloodbath that took place from October 1965 to February 1966. The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) had gained a reasonable footing in the early 1960s in local politics.

The last quarter of the twentieth century saw the flourishing of Bali's tourism industry. The island's rich, unique sociocultural heritage, exotic traditions and practices, and numerous colorful festivals complement the physical landscape of rugged mountains and beautiful sandy beaches, making Bali a visitors' haven. Germans, Australians, and Japanese made up the majority of tourist arrivals.

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998, followed by political instability in Indonesia, adversely affected Bali's economy, where tourism was a mainstay. Developments during the early 2000s, in particular the terrorist bombings of October 2002, were even more damaging to the tourism industry.

I. WAYAN ARDIKA

See also Airlangga (r. 1019–1049); Dong-son; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Indianization; Kertanagara (r. 1268–1292); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Mataram; Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Rice in Southeast Asia; Singhasari

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BALING TALKS (1955)

The so-called peace talks at Baling in the northern Malay state of Kedah, close to the Thai border, were held on 28 and 29 December 1955. The participants were Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (1903–1990), Malaya's chief minister at the time, and Chin Peng (1922–), the secretary-general of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP). Aimed at bringing an end to the Malayan Emergency—the communists' armed insurrection that began in 1948—the talks marked an important turning point in Malaya's independence struggle, although they ended in a stalemate. The Tunku (prince) went to the talks accompanied by David Marshall (1908–1995), Singapore's interim self-government chief minister, and Tun Tan Cheng Lock (1883–1960), president of the Malayan Chinese Association. Chin Peng attended with his colleagues Chen Tien and Rashid Mydin. In the midst of tight security, the communist leaders emerged from the jungles outside of Baling town and were escorted by British police officers to the schoolhouse where the talks took place. The talks received wide coverage from the local and international media.

Chin Peng's "unexpected" assurance that the communists would lay down their arms if the Tunku could secure powers in internal security and defense from Britain served to strengthen the latter's hand in the independence talks he held later with the British government in London in February 1956. Indeed, it hastened the end of British rule by at least three years. Chin Peng told the Tunku that he recognized that the people had elected the Tunku's UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance government in the 1955 general elections, but internal security and defense were still in British hands. Anxious not to appear as a stumbling block in efforts to end the "shooting war," in which thousands of lives had been lost, the British government not only acceded to the Tunku's request for those powers but also agreed to his suggested date for independence—"if possible, by 31 August, 1957." Britain, however, secured an agreement with the Tunku that British military bases in Malaya would continue to operate for as long as it was mutually acceptable to both countries.

After independence had been secured, the communists failed to keep their promise: they did not lay down their arms until 1989. However, the Emergency was ended many years ear-

lier, in 1960, as the government felt the communists no longer posed a threat. The Baling talks broke down over the Tunku's refusal to accept Chin Peng's demand that the MCP be allowed to exist as a legal organization and that the communist insurgents who laid down their arms were not to be detained and screened by the police authorities.

Malaya (the Malay Peninsula) is one of three territories that make up the present nation-state of Malaysia. The other two are the Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah. The MCP operated mainly in Malaya.

CHEAH BOON-KHENG

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Chin Peng (Ong Boon Hua/Hwa) (1922–); Malayan Communist Party (MCP) (1908–1995); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Marshall, David Saul; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Tan Cheng Lock

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BAN CHIANG

Ban Chiang is one of Thailand's most famous archaeological sites, owing to its critical place in the well-publicized claims that there was an early Bronze Age in Thailand, as well as the exquisite antiques of painted pottery that had been buried by the inhabitants as grave goods. The site is a large mound, approximately 8 hectares in area and standing 5 meters above the surrounding rice fields, and takes its name from the modern village built over it. The prehistoric deposit was built up during the Neolithic, Bronze Age, and early Iron Age, during a period of occupation from approximately 3,500 B.C.E. until 500 C.E. In terms of continuity of occupation and preservation of ancient materials, it is arguably the best exponent of a group of related prehistoric sites, which include Non Nok Tha and Ban Na Di, located on the Khorat Plateau in Thailand's semiarid northeastern corner.

At the time of first occupation, Ban Chiang was a low mound of yellow soil. The inhabitants apparently built wooden houses on piles in small areas of habitation that shifted over time, and they buried their deceased in isolated graves or small cemetery areas. Reflecting the role of farming in the subsistence economy, rice chaff was used as a pottery temper from the outset, and the remains of domesticated pigs, dogs, cattle, and chickens from early times are still present. Hunting and gathering supplemented the diet significantly throughout the site's occupation. Ceramic crucibles for metal production are most common after 1000 B.C.E. but are reported throughout the sequence, and anvils attest to pottery manufacture on site. Differences in social status seem to have remained fluid, with no evidence for the imposition of a hierarchical society, and Ban Chiang seems to have remained one among a network of autonomous villages that participated in long-distance trade and exchange. Analysis of skeletons from the site has revealed little or no evidence for population change. Notwithstanding these continuities in the site's prehistoric character, significant changes in technology and mortuary practices allow archaeologists to recognize ten phases, grouped into three periods.

The Early Period (approximately 3500–1000 B.C.E.) is characterized by cord-marked and incised pottery, the appearance of bronze, and the largest range of burial modes. The mortuary pottery varies considerably in terms of whether curvilinear or parallel lines were incised, the location and extent of cord-markings and burnishing, the color of the jar, and the choice of a rounded base or a foot-ring to sit the vessel. On the basis of the detail of ceramic decorations and other stylistic markers, Joyce White (1997) divided the Early Period into five phases. The earliest dated bronze, a nodule from the base of a grave assigned to the junction between phases 2 and 3, is radiocarbon-dated to between 1500 and 2000 B.C.E. A spearhead, an adze head, and various bracelets and anklets of bronze were interred as grave goods during phases 3, 4, and 5 of the Early Period. Most of the adult burials were extended lying on their backs, including one apparently associated with a ca. 3500 B.C.E. radiocarbon date. Five adults (phases 2 to 4) were interred in a flexed position, with the oldest of these reliably dated to around 2000 B.C.E. Nine fetuses, newborns, and infants up to two

to three years of age were buried inside pots, perhaps symbolizing the concept of a womb, and one newborn and six children up to five years of age were buried in the usual manner for the adults. A four-year-old wore bronze anklets, which, given the scarcity of bronze at the time, is suggestive of an elevated status compared with most of the population. Radiocarbon dates of over 4500 B.C.E. (perhaps too early for any archaeologist to believe) and 1500–2000 B.C.E. have been obtained for the burials in jars. Flexed burials and jar burials fell out of practice after the Early Period's phase 4.

The Middle Period (approximately 1000–300 B.C.E.) witnessed an increase in local bronze working, the arrival of iron, and the earliest painted pottery at the site. Traces of bronze metallurgy include a casting hearth, the bulk of the crucibles and crucible fragments excavated at the site, and the recycling of slag (a by-product of smelting ore) as a temper occasionally added to the clay from which the crucibles were made. For reasons that are not clear, ornaments were found with most of the burials of children up to five years of age but with few of the remains of more mature persons. In any case, seven of the thirty-three burials assigned to this period were found wearing anklets or bracelets of bronze, and one of these also had iron bracelets, indicative of the increased availability of metal wares. Iron, following its appearance in the Middle Period's phase 7, evidently succeeded bronze as the preferred material for weapons. The earliest examples are two spearheads with bronze sockets and blades of forged iron. As similar spearheads have been found only in Dong-son sites, it is probable that these were not local products but had been traded in from the Red River area. An iron blade hafted to a wooden handle was found with one phase 8 burial. The mortuary pottery during the Middle Period was mostly dark brown to black in color, with incised decorations, often enhanced with an infill of red paint.

The final two prehistoric phases are assigned to the Late Period, ca. 300 B.C.E.–500 C.E. During this Late Period, red-on-buff mortuary vessels, which feature a range of spiral and curvilinear designs painted in red on a buff background, were often interred alongside the extended corpse. These exquisite and widely sought-after antiques, with which Ban Chiang is most often associated, had probably been

made at specialist potting centers and exported to sites such as Ban Chiang. Ornaments and other artifacts of bronze from this Late Period often have a high percentage of tin, suggesting they, too, were imported from production sites located elsewhere, just as the glass beads found in some burials had certainly been imported. Cylindrical objects of clay, with a hole through the long axis and deeply carved designs circumscribing the external face, appeared concurrently at Ban Chiang and other sites in the vicinity. Their interpretation as seals for marking ownership or recording transactions would directly support other evidence for increased trade at around two thousand years ago, but even if they had had some other function, their sudden appearance at several sites would at least point to increased interaction between rural communities at that time. Iron knives and spear-blades, as well as axes of bronze or iron, are other noteworthy implements.

Late Period burials and mortuary goods dominated the discoveries made at Ban Chiang during the initial excavations, by Thai archaeologists, during the 1960s and early 1970s. But the Late Period was poorly represented, comparatively speaking, during the major season at the site in 1974 and 1975, with the excavation and subsequent analysis of finds dominated by U.S. researchers. Fieldwork at Ban Chiang has come full circle with the most recent excavation of an extensive, well-laid-out Late Period cemetery by the Thai archaeologists Bannanurag and Khemnark. The sheer size of the site and its independent investigation by several different teams have created some difficulties in delivering a final verdict on the site's interpretation. Technical advances in archaeological analysis, many of which are particularly germane to a site whose stratigraphic sequence is as long and as complex as Ban Chiang's, are still being applied to the 1974–1975 finds, and the chronological details described here are subject to revision.

The human remains from the 1974–1975 season have been fully described by Michael Pietruszewsky (1997) and Michele Douglas in a series of articles and a joint monograph (2002). Depending on the precise makeup of the comparative populations, skull measurements link Ban Chiang most closely to one of two sites: either the Neolithic skulls from the Neolithic site of Khok Phanom Di in central Thailand or

the prehistoric and recent skulls representing the non-Japanese inhabitants of the main islands and the Ryukyu chain of Japan. In either case, as also indicated by study of the teeth, the Ban Chiang people seem to have been part of a broadly “Mongoloid” population whose roots in Southeast Asia appear older than those of the T'ais who now dominate Thailand demographically. The demographic profile of the Ban Chiang skeletal series is consistent with an essentially stationary population that could have remained in equilibrium with the available subsistence resources over several millennia. The lifestyle appears to have been rigorous but relatively free from chronic ill health or warfare. Many people wore their teeth down to stubs, and bouts of anemia (possibly associated with malarial infection) occurred at modest rates. Some of the more elderly (especially the males) were afflicted by osteoarthritis, and both men and women occasionally suffered bony fractures that are best attributed to accidents experienced during the course of daily activity.

In summary, Ban Chiang may be viewed as a major archaeological testament to the long-term history of the Mon-Khmer speakers who numerically dominated the Thailand region before the immigration of T'ai speakers in historical times. The continuities in cultural practices and economic pursuits agree with the biological evidence for occupation by essentially the same population throughout the site's prehistory. Cultural practices such as the preference to bury the dead as extended, supine inhumations with pots and other grave goods and a similar weight placed on farming, hunting, and gathering in the food quest support the biological evidence of a stable population. Complementing this basic stability, changes in material culture over time reflect a dynamic situation of trade and related interactions between the communities at Ban Chiang and other rural settlements on and near the Khorat Plateau. This network facilitated the flow of novel goods and technologies across the region during the Bronze Age and especially the Iron Age, without swamping the local identity that served as a key ingredient in the social reproduction of the communities and their web of communication.

DAVID BULBECK

See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast of Asia; Ceramics; Dong-son; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; Khmers; Metal Age Cultures in Southeast Asia; Mons; Neolithic Period of Southeast Asia; T'ais

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BAN KAO CULTURE

Ban Kao is an ancient village mound in Kan-
chanaburi Province, in south-central Thailand,
with numerous burials preserved in the debris.
Apart from one flexed burial, all of the exca-
vated human skeletons were found extended
on their backs, and all but two individuals had
pots placed at strategic points around the
corpses. Adzes of polished stone, of varied

shape, size, and cross-sectional geometry, were
common funerary gifts. Rings, beads, and other
jewelry of stone, bone, or shell often accompa-
nied the dead. Two of the graves had iron rather
than stone adzes, and one of these included
ivory disks. This association of extended inhu-
mations decked with earthen pots that conform
to certain canons of shape and decoration, pol-
ished stone adzes, and nonmetallic ornaments is
the distinguishing feature of the so-called Ban
Kao culture.

Per Sørensen (1967) originally nominated
the term *Ban Kao* to refer to the Neolithic
phase in southern Thailand and West Malaysia.
However, the chronology of Ban Kao has gener-
ated some controversy. Radiocarbon dates on
charcoal consistently date the early period of
habitation at the site to about 2000–1300
B.C.E., as would be entirely reasonable for Ne-
olithic remains in central Thailand and the
Malay Peninsula. However, iron slag, fragments
of iron implements, and small pieces of bronze
occur in the upper layers of the site. The iron
demonstrates that occupation must have con-
tinued until at least 500 B.C.E. Most burials lie
beneath the layers with metal remains, but as
the excavation could not determine the levels
from which the graves had been cut, they could
be of either Iron Age or Neolithic antiquity.
The two graves with iron adzes are among the
deepest at Ban Kao, in support of an Iron Age
dating for the whole lot. However, these two
graves did contain pots that are thought to be
relatively late in the Ban Kao sequence, so the
burials with earlier pottery could be Neolithic.

The three most interesting of the early Ban
Kao pottery types are narrow-stemmed cups,
vases with wide foot-rings and funnel-shaped
mouths, and three-legged bowls called tripods.
Cups and vases such as these are extremely
scarce in Southeast Asia. Tripods like those at
Ban Kao are otherwise restricted to the Malay
Peninsula, notably the approximately four-
thousand-year-old examples from Jenderam
Hilir. Chronologically and geographically, the
Ban Kao culture would have a very narrow ap-
plication if these distinctive vessels were in-
cluded in its definition. So they do not particu-
larly help Sørensen's cause when he
distinguished a Ban Kao culture to the exclu-
sion of sites in Southeast Asia north and east of
Ban Kao. Yet all three vessel types can be found
in the "Lungshanoid" sites of China and Tai-

wan, which approximately date to between 4000 and 500 B.C.E. Perhaps early contact with China introduced these ceramic forms to the people of Ban Kao and some closely related groups.

Two other early Ban Kao pottery types are bowls on funnel-shaped stands and long-necked beakers and bowls with a carination at the midriff where the contour abruptly changes direction. Lungshanoid parallels for these forms are still apparent but now provide less precise matches than can be found in Southeast Asia. Bowls with funnel-shaped pedestals have been found at the base of Non Nok Tha in northeast Thailand and at Khok Charoen in central Thailand. Gua Cha, in the Malay Peninsula, yielded a few carinated, long-necked beakers. All of the burials with these vessels are Neolithic.

The later vessel forms at Ban Kao have the least number of Lungshanoid similarities and the greatest number of Southeast Asian parallels. These forms include saucers and bowls on trumpet-shaped stands, wide-necked carinated bowls, globular jars with necks of varying length, vases with funnel-shaped or trumpet-shaped mouths, and a wide variety of dishes and shallow bowls. Analogues of these forms have been illustrated for Non Nok Tha, Khok Charoen, and Gua Cha, as well as Khok Phanom Di in southeast Thailand, Gua Hari-mau and Bukit Tengku Lembu in the Malay Peninsula, and Sa Huynh sites on the central coast of Vietnam. Per Sørensen noted similar pottery at sites lying between Bukit Tengku Lembu and Ban Kao. The age span of these sites lies between about 2000 and 1 B.C.E., with Neolithic, early Bronze Age, and Iron Age associations.

The concept of a Ban Kao culture implies that the later Ban Kao forms would have evolved from the earlier ones. However, archaeologists now understand that the so-called later forms had appeared at some sites in Thailand before even the earliest funerary pottery was buried at Ban Kao. So the notion of an archaeological culture—a recurring association of distinctive artifact types—is difficult to sustain in the case of Ban Kao. Archaeologists now prefer to interpret the similarities of Ban Kao with other sites in Thailand and northern Malaya as evidence of a common tradition. They also recognize locally specialized craft practices based on the occurrence of vessel types peculiar to

one or the other site (for example, Khok Charoen, Khok Phanom Di, and Non Nok Tha, as well as Ban Kao).

In addition to a similar repertoire of vessel forms, Neolithic to Iron Age pottery in Thailand and Malaya is similar in the common use of cord-marking as a decorative technique. This effect is achieved by wrapping a paddle in twine or cloth and beating it against the outside wall while a stone anvil takes the pressure on the inner wall. Refining a pot's shape with the paddle-and-anvil technique before firing the vessel is very widespread in Asia, and adding cord-marked decorations during the exercise is a truly ancient practice in mainland Southeast Asia. Where the surfaces of Ban Kao and related vessels are not cord-marked, they may bear types of geometric and curvilinear motifs that occur widely on Southeast Asian pottery dating to the same time frame. The mortuary practice of extended inhumations decked with adzes (bronze and iron, as well as stone) and jewelry, in addition to the funerary pots, is another shared characteristic of the Thailand and Malaya sites that partake of the same tradition as Ban Kao.

The types of sites where these extended inhumations occur illustrate a marked contrast between the Malay Peninsula and the main body of Thailand to the north of the peninsula. Almost all Ban Kao-related sites in the peninsula occur in rock shelters, and many are cemeteries of burials dug into more ancient deposits containing debris from Hoabinhian hunter-gatherers. In contrast, the sites located north of the peninsula are always mounds of varying size with traces of village occupation throughout the deposit. The burials were most likely interred beneath the villagers' houses (except at Khok Phanom Di, where designated cemetery areas have been discerned). The height and expanse of the mounds vary widely because of various factors, such as cycles of erosion, intentionally created layers of clay or shell, and the quantity of waste debris left by the residents. With an area of around 8,000 square meters and a depth of about 2 meters, Ban Kao is a smaller example of these mounds, as compared, for instance, with Khok Phanom Di (50,000 square meters in area and a height of up to 12 meters).

Despite the size of the Khok Phanom Di mound and its remains of domesticated rice,

the excavator, Charles Higham (1989), is ambivalent on the degree to which the inhabitants practiced farming rather than a hunter-gatherer economy. In marked contrast, a farming subsistence is generally accepted for the occupants of other, related village sites in Thailand, which are now marked by mounds. The wealth of Khok Phanom Di, represented by its burial goods, is attributed by Higham to the bounty of natural resources in the immediate environment and a range of highly developed crafts, the products of which were traded with adjacent groups for exotic goods and agricultural produce. Actually, Higham's approach may apply with greater force to the burial grounds in rock shelters in the Malay Peninsula. Direct evidence of domesticated food is rarely forthcoming from these burial grounds, and the peninsula includes vast swaths of rain forest inhabited by hunter-gatherer groups to this day. Collection of rain forest produce to trade for manufactured goods is an ancient practice among Malaya's hunter-gatherers. Further, religious customs may be transmitted through trade relationships. This sort of interaction could conceivably account for the incorporation of Ban Kao-related funerary goods with the Neolithic extended burials in rock shelters in various parts of the peninsula.

Analysis of the burials also permits inferences on biological differences between the people in the peninsula and their counterparts to the north. The Neolithic burials at Gua Cha evidently represent a short people, with male and female stature estimated at 157 and 150 centimeters, respectively, compared with the sites of Ban Kao, Khok Phanom Di, and northeast Thailand, where both males and females were between 5 and 10 centimeters taller. The skulls in the Thailand sites are large by present Southeast Asian standards but clearly represent Mongoloid people with broad cranial vaults, flat faces, and shovel-shaped incisors. No such claims can be made for the Gua Cha Neolithic skulls, whose longer cranial vaults, short faces, and lack of Mongoloid dental features invite comparison with the earlier, Hoabinhian inhabitants of the area. The Ban Kao burials in particular have been viewed as forerunners of the T'ais, who constitute the dominant ethnic group in present-day Thailand. This claim emphasizes their Mongoloid affinities even if his-

torical evidence and the location of present-day enclaves of Mon speakers make a Mon association far more likely. Almost certainly, the people of Ban Kao and related sites spoke languages belonging to the Mon-Khmer family, even in the Malay Peninsula, where the distribution of the indigenous "Aslian" branch of Mon-Khmer coincides with sites linked to the Ban Kao tradition.

Sorenson's nomination of a Ban Kao culture was a pivotal step toward the current archaeological understanding of a widespread tradition in Thailand and Malaya that bridged the Neolithic phase with the protohistorical phase of early, Iron Age civilization in the region, as best represented by the Mons. The common practice of extended burials furnished with pots of frequently exceptional quality, ornaments of fine production, and implements such as adzes, bark-cloth beaters, and pottery anvils points to a period of cultural integration, which underpinned early historical developments in the region. The expansion of trade relations, the local establishment of bronze metallurgy and other aspects of craft specialization, and the spread of farming practices are all linked to the extensive distribution of this shared tradition. Complementary economic specialization by the communities linked within this network and the emergence of incipient social stratification are other critical features of the period. Continued debate among archaeologists on the details of Ban Kao and its counterparts can be expected in the process of furthering our understanding of the long-term historical implications of these sites.

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See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast of Asia; Hoabinhian; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; "Java Man" and "Solo Man"; Neolithic Period of Southeast Asia; "Perak Man"

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BANDJARMASIN (BANJERMASIN), SULTANATE OF

Bandjarmasin was one of the most important Muslim states in Dutch Borneo. Like the sultanates of Brunei and Kutai, it had Hindu-Buddhist roots, and the chronicles of the kingdom indicate connections with the Javanese state of Majapahit. Its origins are given in the "Story of Lambu Mangkurat and the Dynasty of the Kings of Ban(d)jar and Kota Waringin" (Ras 1968). The early court and capital were apparently modeled on the Javanese style of palace (*kraton*) and on Javanese origin myths (Ras 1968: 182–200). Apparently, an "Indianized" kingdom called Negaradipa had been established in the hinterland region of present-day Bandjarmasin sometime before the middle of the fourteenth century. It came under the influence of the northern Javanese Muslim state of Demak in the early sixteenth century; the ruler of Bandjarmasin, Pangeran Samudra, converted to Islam along with his followers and became Sultan Surian Allah or Suriansjah, possibly around 1530 (Hudson 1968: 60–61).

Bandjarmasin witnessed an increase in trade after the fall of Melaka to the Portuguese in 1511 when more Chinese visited the port to trade in camphor, diamonds, and bezoar stones in return for Chinese ceramics. The capital was transferred from the interior to its present location in the Barito Delta in the mid-sixteenth century to facilitate trade. The Dutch then established a factory at Bandjarmasin in 1603 to develop the trade in pepper (Irwin 1955: 4). Javanese traders also settled at the port from the 1620s, fleeing conflicts in Java, and this gave a boost to commercial pepper cultivation that expanded rapidly in the hinterland regions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The need for greater quantities of pepper resulted in the expansion of Banjar Malay cultivators throughout the southeastern Barito River basin at the expense of the interior Dayak populations (Hudson 1968: 65). In the seventeenth century, Bandjarmasin was one of the principal Bornean states and counted among its clients all the Muslim kingdoms of the east coast, along with Kota Waringin, Sukadana, Landak, and Sambas in the southwest and west.

Although the Dutch attempted to establish a firmer presence in Bandjarmasin and set up a monopoly over the pepper trade in the seven-

teenth century, the Banjarese were still sufficiently strong militarily to resist the Dutch until well into the eighteenth century, and they played the Dutch off against English traders. The Dutch also had to deal with commercial competition from the Buginese and the Chinese, and their interest in Bandjarmasin dwindled from the 1670s until they reasserted their presence in the later eighteenth century. It was not until 1786 that the Dutch, intervening in a succession dispute, supported the usurper Pangeran Nata, and in 1787, they negotiated a treaty with him by which the control of most of the sultanate's possessions and rights over several trade items were ceded to the Dutch (Hudson 1968: 69–74). Further treaties followed in 1817, when Bandjarmasin ceded its claims to various east coast states (including Kutai), and in 1826, when additional concessions by Sultan Adam (r. 1825–1857) were made to the Dutch. In 1849, two administrative divisions were created in Dutch-controlled Borneo: the Western Division, with the seat of the Dutch resident at Pontianak, and the Southern and Eastern Division, with its capital at Bandjarmasin (King 1993: 147).

Following the Dutch interference in another succession dispute in 1857 after Sultan Adam's death, a major anti-Dutch rebellion, the so-called Banjar War, broke out in 1859. The Dutch then abolished the sultanate in 1860 and placed Bandjarmasin and its territories under direct colonial rule. Intermittent Banjarese struggles continued against the Dutch until 1905 when the last pretender to the throne, Mohammed Seman, died in the Upper Barito region (Avé and King 1986: 24).

Bandjarmasin continued to enjoy commercial prosperity in the twentieth century. The export of rubber increased rapidly, supported by the ongoing production of pepper and copra (Lindblad 1988: 178–179). It also retained its important administrative role during the remainder of the Dutch colonial period and into the period of Indonesian independence. It became the capital of the Indonesian province of South Kalimantan and now has a population, primarily of Banjar Malays, approaching half a million (King 1993: 4–6). Nevertheless, its economic importance has been eclipsed by the oil, gas, and timber industries of the Balikpapan-Tarakan-Samarinda region on Kalimantan's east coast.

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See also Borneo; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Dayaks; Demak; Dutch Borneo; Kraton Culture; Kutai (Koetei); Oil and Petroleum; Pepper; Sambas and Pontianak Sultanates

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BANGKA AND BELITUNG (BILITON)

See Tin

BANGKOK "City of Angels"

Founded in 1782 by Phya Chakri, King Rama I (r. 1782–1809) of the reigning Chakri dynasty, Bangkok is the capital of Thailand, home to a population of around 15 million people. Bangkok, or Ban Kok as it appeared in the description of Engelbert Kaempfer (1727) in 1690, was a small village. During the turbulent times at the end of the reign of King Narai (r. 1656–1688) in 1688, the French temporarily had a garrison of soldiers there before being forced to withdraw from the country.

Under the first three kings of the Chakri dynasty, the village was transformed into a flourishing city that thrived on international trade, the profits from which were used to erect magnificent temples and palaces. Some 2,000 Buddha images were carried from the countryside to temples built to adorn the new city. There, in 1826, King Rama III (r. 1824–1851) signed the first commercial treaty with the British envoy, Henry Burney.

During the reign of King Rama IV (r. 1851–1868), known as King Mongkut, Bangkok's importance as a center for international trade increased following the signing of the commercial treaty with Sir John Bowring in 1855. The opening of the country to British and international trade in this reign was further enhanced during the succeeding reign of Mongkut's son, King Chulalongkorn (Rama V, r. 1868–1910), when Siam was able to benefit from much British investment. Furthermore, Siam's security was ensured because its old rival, Burma, had been incorporated in the growing British overseas empire following the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885). King Chulalongkorn employed foreign advisers from Western nations—Belgium, France, Germany, Denmark, the United States, and Britain—to revamp the administration in a far-reaching reform program designed to modernize Siam and strengthen its capacity to withstand the encroachments of imperialistic colonialism. King Chulalongkorn's astute domestic and foreign policies enabled him to play Britain and France off against each other during the dangerous decade of the 1890s when Siam's independence was in jeopardy, caught between British Burma and French Indochina. In the 1893 Paknam Incident, a French naval contingent forced Siam to cede territory along the Mekong in eastern Siam to France and paid an indemnity to hold off further French demands. The rivalry between Britain and France at this time was part of the broader competition for the trade and markets of Siam and potential access to the southwest "back-door" route to China. Bangkok was the backdrop to the events of these critical years.

At the heart of the old city encircled by the Banglamphu canal, or *khlong*, is the magnificent Grand Palace, which was enlarged and enhanced during the reign of King Rama V. The Chakri Maha Prasad throne hall was but one of the many official buildings in Bangkok in the



Detail of the ornate Grand Palace in Bangkok, Thailand. Construction began on the royal palace, also known as Wat Po, in 1782, after the capital of Siam moved from Ayutthaya to Bangkok. The palace was initially built in the style of the original ancient capital, and each subsequent ruler added to the impressive complex of buildings. (Corel Corporation)

late nineteenth century that featured the Italianate architectural styles. The Ananta Samakhom throne hall is another fine example. Near the Grand Palace is the most revered Temple of the Emerald Buddha, housing the palladium of the Chakri dynasty, said to have been brought originally from Laos, and Wat Po, famous for its large Reclining Buddha. A short distance away is the Palace of the "King to the Front," or the "Second King," as he was known to foreigners; this building currently houses the National Museum. The Wang Lang, or Palace at the Back, is across the Chao Phraya on which Bangkok stands, in Thonburi, seat of King Rama I's predecessor, the ill-fated King Taksin (r. 1767–1782). The twin cities (Bangkok-Thonburi), as they were once called, have now blended into a huge metropolis.

In the mid-twentieth century, as William Klausner (1998) described it, Bangkok still had the canals for which it was known as the Venice of the East. With the exception of the Phetburi canal, these are now mostly filled in to make way for roads for Bangkok's ever growing traffic. A maze of overpasses and freeways and a sky train attempt to ease the traffic flow. In the 1960s, Bangkok still had many traditional wooden houses, but high-rises of cement and

blue glass now dot the skyline. Yet Bangkokians still love their markets and flock to the Pramane ground near the Grand Palace or to Chatuchak, looking for the coveted bargains.

Bangkok is home to many universities, both state and private. The oldest two, Chulalongkorn University (founded in 1917) and Thammasat University (founded in 1933), take their place in modern Thai history in connection with the student activist movement of the 1973–1992 period that ushered in Thailand's strengthening democracy and displaced its former military dictatorships. The student uprisings of 1973 and 1976 were centered on Thammasat University, founded by former prime minister and regent Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983). From the Grand Palace past Thammasat University, the royal avenue, Rajadamnoen, runs down to the present monarch's home at Chitralada Palace. Here, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the much loved and revered King Rama IX (1946–), has an experimental farm and carries out agricultural research in support of his many projects for the advancement of rural peoples.

From a small village on the banks of the Chao Phraya, Bangkok has grown to be one of the great conurbations of the world, at the crossroads of international transport. The city with the longest name in the world—the “City of Angels,” whose shortened name is Daravati-SriAyuthiaKrungthepPrahaMahaNakorn, known to Bangkokians as Krungthep—is a cosmopolitan center of international trade and commerce, with a population hailing from all quarters of the world.

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See also Chulalongkorn University; Narai (r. 1656–1688); Paknam Incident (1893); Phya Taksin (Pya Tak [Sin], King Taksin) (r. 1767–1782); Preservation of Siam's Political Independence; Rama I (Chakri) (r. 1782–1809); Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Student Revolt (October 1973) (Thailand); Thammasat University

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BANKS AND BANKING

As economies develop, they rely increasingly on money as the medium of exchange. Banks perform several roles that facilitate the use of money. For instance, they create money through lending. The supply of currency in Southeast Asia long depended on the development of foreign trade. A few banks were active, but mainly in facilitating payments, not lending. A consequence of the “gold-exchange standard” was that national currency systems emerged during 1870–1910, and data on money in circulation became available. The table suggests that the monetization rate was low. Per capita money supply in Southeast Asia was about one-third of levels in developed countries, except in Malaysia, where it was about half.

Most pre-Pacific War (1941–1945) money supply consisted of currency (banknotes and coins). Demand deposits became significant only in the 1930s, when they were about 10 to 15 percent of M_1 (a measure of the volume of money) in Burma, Thailand, and Indochina, and 25 to 30 percent in Indonesia and the Philippines, compared with, for instance, 70 percent in Japan (Mitchell 1995: 832–835). After the war, the share of demand deposits increased, as banks attracted more deposits to enhance their lending. The low rate of monetization implies a low usage of banking services and a small size of capital markets.

The first banks were established with share capital raised overseas, or were branch offices of foreign banks. During the nineteenth century, the number of such banks and their activities remained limited. They were most significant in Indonesia and the Philippines and later Malaya, where they catered to the needs of foreign firms. They mainly arranged overseas payments by discounting bills of exchange drawn on trusted institutions, generally banks. They also discounted promissory notes. For most domes-

Supply of Money, 1890–1999 (U.S. dollars per capita, ten-year averages)

	Burma (*)	Thai- land	Malaya/ Malaysia	Singa- pore	Indo- nesia	Indochina				
						Total	Vietnam (**)	Cam- bodia	Laos	Philip- pines
A: Currency only										
1890s	0.1		3.3		1.6					
1900s	0.5	4.3	4.6		1.5					2.4
1910s	1.9	5.2	7.3		2.4	1.2				3.9
1920s	8.1	6.0	9.2		3.5	2.8				5.1
1930s	13.1	3.9	6.4		2.6	2.2				4.5
B: Currency plus demand deposits (M_1)										
1950s	5.6	13.9	58.7		5.6	9.4	11.7	7.7		16.9
1960s	5.6	20.6	47.9	165.6	6.1		19.8	13.1		20.5
1970s	6.1	43.1	154.6	609.3	21.1		23.9	18.4		31.9
1980s	9.3	82.3	371.9	1,678.0	55.1		20.1	10.8	5.1	45.4
1990s	34.3	208.6	802.1	4,203.5	96.1		67.8	11.9	12.9	90.4

NOTE: Black market exchange rates have been used after World War II where necessary to approximate the actual purchasing power of currencies.

* Prewar Burma banknotes only. No data available on Indian rupee coins circulating in Burma.

** South Vietnam 1955–1974, Vietnam 1986–1999.

SOURCE: Calculated/compiled by the author from various sources.

tic payments, cash rather than banknotes and bank transfers remained the main means of exchange.

Western enterprises in the region were generally financed with private investment capital, often raised overseas. Their expansion was financed by incorporating ventures and selling their shares on foreign stock markets or by reinvesting profits. Banks had a limited role in lending for the establishment of firms. As far as they were lending, it was on the basis of share capital and their own reserves, not on the basis of deposits. The most important lenders were trading houses that extended short-term self-liquidating loans for current operations of plantation companies, against the expected revenue of next year's crop. They were prominent in colonial Indonesia, where they were known as *kultuurbanken*, such as the *Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij* and the *Nederlandsch-Indische Escompto Mij*. Gradually banks and trading houses also provided working capital to ventures in other economic sectors, such as manufacturing. For instance, the *Banque Franco-*

Chinoise financed trade and industry ventures in Indochina. Toward 1900 the trading houses also offered services previously provided only by the exchange banks.

As countries in the region stabilized their currencies relative to gold, the reduced exchange risk encouraged foreign banks to establish branch offices in the region. For instance, European banks such as Lloyds Bank; the Mercantile Bank; the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China; and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation established branch offices throughout the region. Banks from other countries followed, such as the U.S. National City Bank of New York, the Bank of China, and the Japanese Yokohama Specie Bank.

Foreign banks generally started with exchange banking and gradually provided short-term credit to foreign-owned ventures. They also provided long-term credit to a new generation of foreign companies in the region: large capital-intensive rubber and oil palm plantations and mining and petroleum companies

that required sums of investment capital not available in Southeast Asia. Foreign banks acted as managing agents or brokers between such companies and overseas banks in international financial centers such as London, Amsterdam, and New York.

As banks increased their extension of credit, they also started to take deposits. Deposit banking was long restricted to high-income earners. Banks had little interest in small deposits, because of the high overhead costs. That changed after 1900 when foreign-owned banks in the region—although not all—expanded their banking services and started to accept checking and demand deposits in an effort to emulate the success of small-scale savings banks in attracting deposits.

Until then, people with lower incomes could not use bank accounts to accumulate savings. Many commonly saved in the form of accumulating nonproductive assets, such as gold and jewelry. Such assets could be turned into cash at pawnshops, which were significant institutions that required a license to operate.

Small Chinese banks and some local indigenous banks were at the forefront of deposit banking. Chinese traders had long been involved in moneylending, and in the organization of remittances of migrant workers to China, generally in an informal way based on trust. Those activities expanded, leading to the incorporation of such Chinese ventures as small banks. The first was the Kwong Yik Bank, established in 1903 in Singapore. Others soon followed in other urban centers. Chinese banks successfully tapped small savers. They used cost-effective ways of monitoring deposits and lending. The success of Chinese banks often depended on the support of wealthy Chinese businesspeople (*toukay*), which inspired confidence among small would-be depositors.

Until then, Western banks financed large Chinese commercial ventures through a Chinese *comprador* (agent on commission). In some cases *compradors* established banks themselves with the support of wealthy Chinese, attracting deposits and starting deposit-based lending. Deposit banking was initially an urban phenomenon of local importance, but gradually ethnic Chinese financial networks developed that spread from the cities into rural areas where Chinese traders had long been a source of credit.

This development enhanced concerns about the high interest rates that informal money-lenders generally charged and about the problems that indebtedness created in rural societies. Around 1900, colonial governments in the region considered steps to break the supposed grip of usurers on the rural economy. In Indonesia the government encouraged the establishment of small local credit institutions after 1900. Such local institutions were merged into a national organization, the Algemeene Volks-credietbank (AVB), with up to 5,000 village banks. Its impact was significant. In the 1920s and 1930s, AVB-provided credit was about half the total value of credit extended by the big four banks in Indonesia. The French colonial government emulated the system in Indochina as the *Crédit Agricole Mutuel*. Other government-sponsored facilities were post office savings banks and a government savings bank (1913) in Thailand. They took deposits but did not lend to private borrowers. A range of small, local, semi-incorporated cooperative banks or loan associations such as credit unions emerged. Although of regional significance, their overall impact was marginal.

A growing number of financial institutions started to accept demand deposits and to lend to the public. As their loan portfolios increased, banks added to the amount of money in circulation, because banks extend more credit than they have deposits. Gradually the volume of currency in circulation started to depend primarily on the money-creating role of banks, rather than the currency issued by central banks on the basis of export earnings. Still, the increase depended on whether people trusted the banks with their savings, and whether the banks offered high enough interest rates that made savings deposits worthwhile.

With the development of banking, the need for supervision increased. Supervision was left to central banks. In Southeast Asia, selected private banks acted to different degrees as central banks. For instance, they had a monopoly on the issuance of banknotes and acted as government banks in the region in brokering loans and setting discount rates, but they did not lend to other banks. The oldest of such banks was the Javasche Bank (1827) in colonial Indonesia, followed by the Banco Español Filipino (later the Bank of the Philippine Islands, 1851), and the Banque de l'Indochine (1875). These banks

were different. For instance, the *Banque de l'Indochine* was also an investment bank, providing investment and operating credit to most foreign enterprises in Indochina.

The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945) threw monetary and financial systems into disarray. Rampant inflation eroded the reserves of financial institutions. After the occupation, and after gaining independence, indigenous governments in the region set out to make the financial systems of their countries subordinate to the tenet of their economic policies. They established government-owned central banks and regulated financial sectors, in part to orchestrate lending toward favored sectors and enterprises.

Central banks were nationalized or newly established as government-owned banks. The Bank of Thailand was established in 1942, and the Central Bank of The Philippines in 1948. The *Javasche Bank* was nationalized in 1952 and became Bank Indonesia. The Union Bank of Burma was established as a private bank in 1948 and was nationalized in 1960 and renamed Central Bank of Myanmar in 1990. The *Banque de l'Indochine* lost its monopoly on the issuance of banknotes in 1947, after which government-owned central banks were established in North Vietnam in 1951 and in Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam in 1955. The government-owned Bank Negara Malaya (1959, Bank Negara Malaysia after 1963) and the Central Bank of Singapore (1970) were established as central banks and took over the issuance of currency notes from the Board of Commissioners of Currency. The new institutions took on tasks commonly associated with central banks: issuance of currency, supervision of the financial sector, acting as lenders of last resort, arranging the government's transactions, and discounting government bonds.

Postwar governments had a new array of monetary policy tools. Before the war, the main tool was keeping the exchange rate stable. But the 1930s had shown that exchange rates could be manipulated to discourage imports and encourage exports. The late 1940s had shown that foreign exchange and credit could be rationed to particular sectors or industries, at below-market interest rates. Throughout the region governments actively used such instruments.

Limitations were placed on the operations of foreign banks, and domestic banks were favored

in all countries except Malaysia and Singapore. During the 1950s the number of domestic commercial banks increased quickly. In Indonesia and Burma hostility toward foreign banks was so strong that the largest commercial banks were nationalized in 1958 and 1963, respectively. Increasingly tight regulation of financial markets was used to channel credit to the industries or the special interest groups that governments supported. Interest rates were capped in order to stimulate borrowing. In the case of Indonesia in the 1960s, inflation was so high that real interest rates were negative, and credit rationing took place on the basis of political favors.

Banks increasingly became machines to lend to favored companies—be it state-owned companies in the case of state-owned banks (such as Bank Negara Indonesia), military-commercial ventures in the case of military-owned banks (such as the Thai Military Bank), or private firms. A growing number of private business groups were associated with banks (such as the Bank of the Philippine Islands and the Ayala Group).

Such policies did not always yield the most efficient allocation of finance or a guarantee that loans would be repaid. Except for Malaysia and Singapore, the supervisory role of central banks was lax. For instance, the rules that required banks to maintain minimum reserves against outstanding liabilities were not always strictly enforced, and supervision of the credit policies of commercial banks was poor, leading to increased exposure to bad debts. Poor supervision became a problem in the 1980s, when economic development in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN-4) countries increased the demand for finance and banking services that the tightly regulated government-dominated financial sectors could not provide. Governments acknowledged that financial services to customers had to improve in order to attract more deposits and allow services to diversify. In the late 1980s, financial systems were liberalized. Foreign banks were allowed back into the financial sector, new bank licenses were issued, and rules regarding the direction of lending were loosened. The financial sectors diversified significantly to encompass a greater range of nonbank institutions, such as finance and insurance companies. Only the financial sectors of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma remained restricted.

Liberalization and the increase in lending occurred faster than effective monitoring evolved. Owners of new banking licenses established banks whose main purpose was to lend to companies in their business groups. In the early 1990s, several private and state-owned banks experienced bad debt problems that were not acted upon. Countries opened their capital accounts, which allowed banks to take advantage of low international interest rates through international short-term borrowing. This development climaxed in mid-1997, when the poor state of the financial sectors in the ASEAN-4 countries was exposed, and each country was forced to address its bad debt problems by nationalizing some banks, pumping public funds into the financial system, and tightening supervision of the financial sector.

Throughout the development of the formal banking system, informal small-scale lending remained an important source of finance. Before the Pacific War, informal moneylending was dominated by ethnic Chinese and rich indigenous traders, and by Chettyars (Chettians) who were mainly active in Burma, Malaya, and South Vietnam. Although governments sponsored various initiatives to provide small-scale formalized credit, informal small-scale lending continued to be very important, especially in rural areas. Lenders were often regarded as usurers, but recent research has indicated that high rates of interest were caused by the fact that credit was supplied on highly personalized terms, generally without collateral or means of foreclosing on collateral. The small amounts involved and the short duration of the loans also explain why interest rates tended to be high.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Agency Houses, European; Chettyars (Chettyars); *Towkay*; Trade and Commerce of Southeast Asia (ca. Nineteenth Century to the 1990s)

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BANTEN (BANTAM) (1526–1813)

Banten most likely emerged out of the Hindu kingdom of Pajajaran in the twelfth century; the kingdom had two main ports: Kelapa (Jakarta/Jacatra; present-day Jakarta/Djakarta) and Banten. Even before the arrival of the Europeans, Banten was one of the busiest ports in the Malay Archipelago. After the Portuguese captured Melaka in 1511, Chinese, Arab, and Indian traders poured into Banten, turning it into the most important trading center in the Sunda Straits, an important entrepôt for pepper produced in South Sumatra and West Java.

In 1522, the Portuguese formalized trade relations with Banten. The ruler of Banten accepted Portuguese advances, which he took as support against the sultan of Demak, who intended to convert Banten to Islam. The Portuguese received unlimited access to the pepper supplies and were allowed to build a fort near Tangerang. The Portuguese returned in 1527, just after the sultan of Demak had seized

most of Banten. They left without building their fort.

Under its first Muslim ruler, Mulana Hasanudin (r. ca. 1550–1570), Banten converted to Islam. Hasanudin conquered pepper-producing Lampung in South Sumatra and turned neighboring Jakarta into a vassal. Trade increased with the Chinese and Portuguese, who established a trading post in Banten. Trade strengthened Banten's economy and the growth of its port. Hasanudin's son, Pangeran Yusuf (r. 1570–1580), conquered Pajajaran in 1579. He also introduced irrigated rice agriculture in Banten to improve food production.

The first Muslim rulers of Banten remained subordinate to the sultan of Demak. When his sultanate weakened and ceded parts of its territory to the most powerful state in Java, Mataram, Banten broke away from Demak. Its ruler adopted the title of sultan. The rule of Hasanudin's grandson, Pangeran Mohamed (r. 1580–1596), marked a turning point in Banten's fortunes. Mohamed waged war against neighboring Palembang in 1596, but he died during the siege of the city. A political vacuum emerged when the Dutch arrived in the Indonesian archipelago.

The rulers of Banten were unsuccessful in withstanding the advance of the Dutch, who defeated the Portuguese fleet in a battle in 1601 in Banten harbor and dominated the pepper trade. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) established a trading post in Banten in 1610. When the sultan of Banten resisted the attempts of Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen (t. 1618–1623, 1623–1629) to entirely control the pepper trade, Coen transferred the VOC's headquarters to neighboring Jakarta, where he established a fort in 1618.

When Coen left for the Maluku islands in 1619, the sultan of Banten seized Jakarta and besieged the VOC fort. Upon his return, Coen ended the siege and founded the city of Batavia on the ruins of Jakarta. He forced the sultan of Banten to surrender the city and its surroundings to the VOC. Coen moved all VOC trade from Banten to Batavia and demanded pepper deliveries. Although the English maintained a trading post in Banten, the sultanate lost its economic significance.

Subsequent rulers of Banten sought to extend their territory southward into the Priangan area, provoking unceasing conflicts with

Mataram. In addition, Banten had to contend with the Dutch. The border between Banten and Batavia and its surroundings was established in a treaty in 1659. However, conflicts persisted because the VOC aimed to reduce the significance of Banten by redirecting all trade to Batavia.

Sultan Ageng tried to turn the tide, but he had to acknowledge the power of the VOC in a disadvantageous treaty in 1684. Thereafter, Banten's history was marked by futile attempts to withstand the mounting demands of the VOC in terms of claims to territory and deliveries of pepper. For instance, Banten gave up Pulau Panjang in 1731, and it gave Pulau Seribu to the VOC in 1776. In 1752, after the VOC's suppression of a general uprising in West Java, the sultan of Banten acknowledged subservience to the VOC.

In 1808, after the Dutch government had taken over the possessions of the VOC, Governor-General Herman W. Daendels (t. 1808–1811) led a military expedition to Banten and put its coastal areas under direct Dutch colonial rule, leaving only the interior to the sultan. The British lieutenant governor, Thomas Stamford Raffles (t. 1811–1816), ended the existence of the sultanate of Banten in March 1813 because he wanted to introduce the land tax in as large an area of Java as possible. Banten became a residency under direct colonial rule, and the sultan was banned from the area in 1832. However, effective colonial rule was introduced after 1846. By then, local colonial officials had ended the extortionist demands made by the nobility and the religious elite on the local population.

Banten experienced uprisings against Dutch colonial authority in 1849, 1888, and 1926. The first two incidents took place in Cilegon and were provoked in part by the high land tax, in part by religious chicanery and fanaticism, and in part by intrigue among the local nobility. The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) instigated the 1926 uprising.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Coen, Jan Pieterzoon (1618–1623, 1623–1629); Demak; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Islam in Southeast Asia; Java; Mataram; Palembang; Partai Komunis

Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Pepper; Raffles, (Thomas) Stamford Bingley, Sir (1781–1826); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East Indies Company) (1600)

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BẢO ĐẠI (VĨNH THỤY) (1913–1997)
The Last Emperor of Vietnam

Born Prince Vĩnh Thụy on 21 October 1913, the last emperor of the Nguyễn dynastic line that had ruled Vietnam since 1802 was enthroned on 8 January 1926 under the imperial name Bảo Đại (meaning "Preservation of Grandeur"); he succeeded his father, Khải Định, who had died on 6 November 1925. While Bảo Đại continued his studies in France, a regency council back in Huế managed imperial duties. Those duties, however, had been reduced to purely ritual matters, for the convention imposed by the French colonial administration after Khải Định's death had taken away whatever political prerogatives were still left to the Vietnamese monarch.

In 1932, Bảo Đại returned to Huế and, despite the limitations of his authority, showed his determination to modernize the Vietnamese administration. He championed judicial, financial, and educational reforms and endeavored to do away with some of the more archaic practices of the court. He soon realized, however, that he had no real power, as the officials of the French protectorate were never eager to emancipate the functions of the imperial government. Consequently, Bảo Đại abandoned whatever desire he might have had for personal government and confined himself to being a figurehead.

After the Japanese unseated the French colonial regime on 9 March 1945, Bảo Đại declared the abolition of the 1884 protectorate treaty and Vietnam's independence under Japan's aegis. But because he was considered to be a

king who reigned but did not govern, he could not possibly attract mass support. Following Japan's capitulation on 15 August 1945, the communist movement led by Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969) proceeded to take control of the whole country. Bảo Đại readily agreed to step aside on behalf of the superior interest of the nation, and he affirmed through his edict of abdication, dated 25 August 1945, that he was voluntarily transmitting his mandate, thereby lending legitimacy to the regime that was to succeed him. He briefly accepted the position of supreme adviser to the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), before going abroad to live in exile.

The outbreak of war between France and the DRV in December 1946 highlighted Bảo Đại's role as an alternative to Hồ Chí Minh. Once France had given way on the two issues of unification for the three regions of Việt-Nam and complete self-determination, it proved possible to persuade Bảo Đại to return from his voluntary exile and preside over a *Quốc Gia Việt Nam* (State of Vietnam). Though retaining the appellation "His Majesty," he was no longer emperor but simply head of state (*Quốc Trưởng*). The autonomous Associated State of Vietnam within the framework of the French Union came into existence on 1 January 1950, but during its short life span, it won only limited recognition at home and abroad as the legitimate representative of the national aspirations of the Vietnamese people.

The Geneva Agreements in 1954 having resulted in the division of Vietnam into the North and the South, Bảo Đại and his advisers tried to assume true power in Saigon. But in 1955, his prime minister, Ngô Đình Diệm (t. 1955–1963), organized a referendum that deposed him and ended his long involvement with the history of the Vietnamese people. Bảo Đại chose not to contest the referendum and spent the rest of his life in France.

Having squandered most of his royal fortune, he lived out his final years in a modest Paris apartment. He passed away on 31 July 1997 at the age of eighty-three, leaving an ambiguous legacy. Reputedly a *bon vivant*, he was a reformer with enough intelligence to have foreseen the limits of the causes he could represent. He adapted to changes but without great conviction, and he apparently lacked the necessary motivation to abide by a long-lasting

choice. He sincerely cared about the plight and future of his people—in 1972, in a rare public statement, he appealed to the Vietnamese for national reconciliation—but he did not seem to possess the necessary political skills to adequately fulfill the functions of a chief of state.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Geneva Conference (1954); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Indochina War (1946–1954), First; Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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BARANGAY

Barangay (*balangay*, *balangai*, *balanghai*) is a native word in the Philippines with two meanings: first, a type of boat, and second, the basic sociopolitical unit of the pre-Spanish Tagalog society as well as the smallest unit of local government in the Philippines today. In the first context, the barangay was a rowed boat used widely in the Philippines prior to the arrival of the Spaniards; reputedly, it was also used by some settlers to reach the Philippines. In the second context, the barangay was an independent political, social, and economic unit in the Tagalog regions of the Philippines. Consisting of around 30 to 100 households, the barangay was under the leadership of a *datu* (chief), to whom all members owed allegiance. The residents of the barangay were generally related by blood, having originated from one family, and they lived together with their slaves and relatives. The various barangays traded and had

friendly relations with each other and were known to make alliances. On occasion, however, they went to war or raided other barangays.

The Spaniards retained the word *barangay* during the Spanish colonial period and incorporated the institution into their colonial government. The Spaniards used the barangay heads to collect taxes and tributes and maintain order. During the 1970s, the term was revived and used in reference to the basic unit of local government in the Philippines, replacing the word *barrio*.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898)

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BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974)

Officially registered on 1 June 1974, Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front) was a confederation of political parties formed in Malaysia following the May 13, 1969 incident. The political parties that initially comprised BN were: United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), People's Progressive Party (PPP), Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP), Partai Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB), and Sabah Alliance. The overall aims of the coalition were to minimize politicking, to foster national unity, and to coordinate efforts toward national development and progress.

Started loosely in 1970 in the two Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak, the idea for an organization of this type spread to the peninsula, leading to the Gerakan-Alliance coalition in Penang (February 1972), the Alliance-PPP coalition in Perak (1 May 1972), and the PAS-Alliance coalition agreement of 28 December 1972. Chaired by Tun Abdul Razak (1922–1976), then UMNO president and prime minister of Malaysia, BN was administered by a

supreme committee composed of members from the component parties. Differences of opinion were to be settled through negotiations within BN, and decisions were to be arrived at by consensus.

The new political formula contributed significantly toward interparty political calm, lasting at least until 1978. The popular votes for the ruling coalition in Peninsular/West Malaysia immediately swelled from 48.4 percent to 84.6 percent, a figure never to be attained thereafter. Although UMNO had to accommodate PAS in its effort to remain influential among the Malays, MCA and MIC leaders had to share their role as spokespeople for the Chinese and Indians in the government with representatives from other non-Malay parties.

BN won 135 (87.7 percent) of the 154 parliamentary seats in the 1974 general election and formed governments in all thirteen states. Intraparty disputes within PAS and its continued challenge to UMNO resulted in PAS being expelled from BN. Consequently, BN lost Kelantan in 1978. With UMNO as its backbone, BN membership grew to fourteen in 2002, and it continues to enjoy a two-thirds majority in the Malaysian Parliament.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Razak, Tun (1922–1976); Alliance Party (Malaya/Malaysia); Mahathir bin Mohamed, Dr. (1925–); Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Malayan/Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC); “May 13th 1969” (Malaysia); Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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**BARISAN SOSIALIS
(SOCIALIST FRONT)**

Barisan Sosialis, formed in July 1961, was the foremost opposition party in Singapore in the early 1960s, but it faded into political obscurity by the latter half of the decade. It had come into being as a result of a split within the ruling People's Action Party (PAP), precipitated by the prospect of Singapore gaining independence through merger with a wider Malaysian federation that would include Malaya and the British Borneo territories. Though the PAP government welcomed the scheme, the procommunist faction within the party opposed it, and thirteen of its parliamentarians crossed the floor and went on to form the Barisan Sosialis, with Lee Siew Choh (1917–2002) as chairman and Lim Chin Siong (1933–) as secretary-general. The split had seriously hurt the PAP, leaving it with only a fragile parliamentary majority of one and with the Barisan firmly in control of a far superior grassroots and party network.

In February 1963, however, Barisan suffered a major setback after the Internal Security Council launched a preemptive security operation, code-named Operation Cold Store, and made 113 arrests, including 24 of the Barisan's ablest nonparliamentary leaders. Two months later, a belated protest march over the detention turned into a riot and led to further arrests of Barisan leaders, including 10 assemblymen. Though the Barisan retained its 13 seats in the September 1963 elections, it was now bereft of its top leadership and was a party on the wane. After Singapore gained its independence in August 1965, upon its separation from Malaysia, Lee Siew Choh announced in December the party's decision to boycott Parliament. With the resignation and walkout of its remaining parliamentarians ten months later, the Barisan ended its days at the front line of Singapore politics. It failed to contest the 1968 elections and failed to win any seats in the elections in which it subsequently participated. Though it still exists as a registered political party, it has long ceased to have any political significance.

ALBERT LAU

See also British Borneo; British Malaya; Communism; Labor and Labor Unions in Southeast Asia; Lee Kuan Yew (1923–); Malaysia (1963); People's Action Party (PAP); Singapore–Malaya/Malaysia Relations (ca. 1950s–1990s)

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BATAAN DEATH MARCH

The Bataan Death March was a forced march of some 80,000 Filipino and American prisoners of war who surrendered in the Bataan Peninsula on 9 April 1942. The march covered some 120 kilometers and was characterized by extremely brutal and barbaric treatment meted out by the Japanese guards. Around 10,000 Filipinos and at least 650 Americans are confirmed to have died during the nine-day march, due to malnutrition, disease, torture, or murder.

The march was initially disorganized, with the Filipinos and Americans being made to travel to collection points on their own and without guards; the Filipinos were even told that they could go home. Many soldiers became victims of Japanese lootings, but otherwise, the Filipinos and Americans were left alone. However, as the prisoners approached the town of Balanga, the Japanese soldiers became increasingly cruel toward them. Men were deprived of food and water, were beaten by rifle butts or poles, or were run down by tanks or trucks. From Balanga, they were made to march in the hot sun in groups of 100; the prisoners had been on short rations and with little medicine for over three months, and those who were so weakened by hunger or disease that they could not keep up were beaten or killed outright. Conditions worsened as the march moved northward. They were jammed into enclosures during rest stops and were given scarcely any food or water. The prisoners of war were forced to board boxcars in San Fernando, Pampanga, and were taken to the town of Capas, Tarlac, in the hottest part of the day; many suffocated in the airless cars. From Capas, the prisoners were made to march a final stretch to the concentration camp, where thousands more died.



U.S. prisoners of war in the Philippines use improvised litters to carry their comrades who, from the lack of food or water on the march from Bataan, fell along the road. (U.S. National Archives)

The Bataan Death March was one of the worst atrocities in the Philippines during the Pacific War (1941–1945), and Lieutenant General Homma Masaharu, commander-in-chief of the invading Japanese forces, was subsequently tried and executed for his role in this atrocity in April 1946.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also “Death Railway” (Burma–Siam Railway); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Sandakan Death March

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BATAKS

The cosmopolitan history of North Sumatra's Batak peoples belies any attempt to classify them in superficial ways as remote, isolated, highland tribal societies. Indeed, the Bataks are among the most literate and school-focused of Indonesia's Outer Islands peoples beyond Java and Bali. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, they were particularly active shapers of early Indonesian nationalist debates, in Tapanuli's then-thriving vernacular newspaper trade (Ahmat 1995).

After the 1945–1949 national revolution against the Dutch, Bataks again spoke loudly on the national political stage. They featured in the military contest on both sides of the failed *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* (PRRI) separatist rebellion from 1957 to 1959. Bataks were also prominent in the politics of culture debates about the permissible limits of ethnic society autonomy and pride under former president Suharto's authoritarian, Java-centered New Order regime (1965–1998). And most recently, they were active in public discussions in highland rural areas and in diaspora, émigré Batak communities about local control of natural resource development during the nation's fitful transition to democracy. This degree of engagement with larger-scale political discourses between colony and metropole and between ethnic society and the Indonesian nation continues a much longer historical trend: for centuries, the Bataks were deeply enmeshed in Southeast Asian dynamics between the court center and the highland society, just as they were in regional and international trade and in world religious exchanges.

Sumatra's long string of upland volcanic lakes, including Lake Toba, anchor productive, terraced, rice-farming societies with settlement patterns dating to at least 2,000 years ago. Forest clearings for swidden agriculture near Mount Kerinci and also Lake Toba may date to 4,000 to 7,000 years before the present (Bellwood 1997, 1995). Austronesian speakers reached Sumatra from Taiwan about 2500 B.C.E. (Bellwood 1997). The Batak dialects, generally called Karo, Toba, Simelungun, Dairi-Pakpak, and Angkola-Mandailing, apparently can be traced to this southward Austronesian migration era. By contrast, Sumatra's Malayic languages (Malay itself, Minangkabau, and some South Sumatran tongues) seem to be more closely tied to court state development in South Sumatra; this Malayic language expansion may well have ties to the rise of the kingdom of Śrīvijaya in the seventh century C.E. (Bellwood 1997). Interaction between Batak hill settlements and Sumatra's impressive Indic court states such as Śrīvijaya (influential until the eleventh century) and Minangkabau's Adityavarman kingdom (about 1340 to 1400 C.E.) may have been extensive, if indirect and mediated through long-distance trade networks. The Batak syllabic scripts (the *aksara*) are

clearly cultural imports to highland villages from such states (Kozok 1996). Sanskrit-derived words for some religious ideas (for instance, *Debata*, meaning "high god") are found in many Batak areas and may betoken long-term exchange with Sumatra's Indianized kingdoms. The ruins of a Tantric temple from around the twelfth or thirteenth century in Padang Lawas apparently can be traced to the Panai kingdom, mentioned as early as the sixth century in Chinese annals (Schnitger 1989). Panai was strategically located astride trade routes leading to the Straits of Melaka—the gold trade from Mandailing and Minangkabau and the trade in aromatic forest resins (camphor, benzoin) upland from Barus in Dairi. Starting by at least the seventh century, kingdoms of this sort not only had religious ties to India but also regularized economic connections to China. Were these hill peoples self-consciously calling themselves "Batak" at this period? That is unlikely, at the level of overt folk views.

Islam also strongly shaped Batak societies, particularly in the south in Angkola and Mandailing. Trade links to states were again pivotal. By the early 1300s, river ports in northern Sumatra along the Straits of Melaka served as stopovers for ships from India and the Middle East (West Asia). These sites became the archipelago's pioneer Muslim footholds. Spending five months in 1292 in Sumatra, Marco Polo reported considerable conversion to Islam in the Peurlak (Perlak) kingdom. Yet the early coastal Muslim presence apparently had little direct impact on most Batak peoples: their introduction to the faith came in the 1820s and 1830s, when the reformist, Wahabhist Padri forces marched northward from West Sumatra into the southern Batak areas, making large-scale conversions. Mandailing today is entirely Muslim, and Angkola is approximately 90 percent Muslim. Southern Toba and Silindung near Tarutung are largely Protestant Christian, with a small admixture of Islam along Angkola's vague border (all geographic demarcations here are labile, given the instability of Batak identities [Kipp and Kipp 1983]).

The Protestant presence in the south and Toba is largely the result of the vigorous proselytizing of the Rhenish Mission of Barmen, Germany (the RGM), starting in the 1850s. The colonial state warily allowed Christian missionary work in the Batak regions at this

time, with the veiled aim of fostering a Christian buffer zone between Muslim Aceh and Muslim Minangkabau, both fervently anti-Dutch. Sipirok, which was largely Muslim by the 1850s, was the RGM's first base of operations, resulting in early school construction there. The state was developing Sipirok for coffee production at the time, as an offshoot of the forced cultivation schemes of the West Coast Residency, where Dutch officials oversaw the colonial administration of Sumatra. The mission made some conversions in Sipirok, but since the southern highlands were distinctly Muslim by this period, the astute Rev. Ingwer Ludwig Nommensen (1834–1918) soon took leave of his mission colleagues to push northward into pagan territory in Silindung. From there, he was soon to become the “Evangelist to the Toba.” By the 1890s, Christianity had made major inroads and was central to Toba identity. To Muslim Malay observers along Sumatra's eastern coast, in fact, to be Batak meant to be Christian. Protestantism spread in the early twentieth century to Dairi, Pakpak, and sections of Simelungun (which had extensive Muslim influence from eastern coast sultanates). Under the auspices of the Dutch Reformed mission, Karo conversions increased in the 1920s and 1930s, although that area remained in part unconverted to the world religions until the political cataclysm of 1965 (Kipp 1990, 1996). Then, it became distinctly dangerous to not “have a religion,” an official *agama* (otherwise, one could easily be branded a communist and thus an enemy of the emerging New Order [Kipp and Rodgers 1987]).

“Batakness” began to consolidate in the indigenous public imagination, to a degree, during the harsh Dutch colonial period (Niessen 1993). This was a conflicted identity: indeed, some Mandailing migrants to east coast tobacco, tea, and rubber plantations denied Batak heritage, as it was connected to imageries of tribalism, pig eating, and Christianity. Mandailing and Angkola migration for salaried work in Deli on the eastern coast was notable by the 1910s. Formal education in these southern regions had arrived by the 1870s, producing school graduates who could compete for Deli clerical jobs. The schools offered instruction in both Malay and Mandailing Batak; Sumatra's second teacher-training institute was opened in Tano Bato, Mandailing, in 1862, led by the

Mandailing schoolmaster Willem Iskander. He had been trained in pedagogy in The Netherlands (a remarkable circumstance then for the Outer Islands). Some of his students went on to prominent careers in education and journalism (Said 1976). Angkola and Mandailing writers authored an abundant literature protesting colonial control in subtle ways (Rodgers 1997).

Toba's dealings with the colonial state were more violent. Major Dutch incursions into the area came in 1878, and thirty years of guerrilla warfare ensued. This conflict in effect ended with the military defeat and death of the charismatic priest-warrior-king Si Singamangaraja XII in 1907 (Batara Sangti 1997). Based in Bakkara, he had sought to repel the Dutch via both magic and weaponry. A period of high colonialism in Toba followed, with road, school, and hospital construction (Sherman 1990).

By the 1930s, a passable road linked the highlands to Deli. The eastern coast tea, tobacco, and eventually rubber plantations had burgeoned between the 1880s and 1920s (Stoler 1985). Infused with foreign capital, these plantations served as labor magnets on Angkola and Mandailing. Some families also fled the uplands to escape heavy *corvée* labor demands.

School development proceeded apace in the highlands, which now had both Dutch- and Malay-language primary and secondary schools in some favored areas (Rodgers 1995). The rush toward school-based literacy in “the Dutch letters” (the Latin alphabet) and away from “village tradition” had several interlocking ideological consequences for Batak youth in the colonial era. Old Batak ways came to be counterposed to Indies modernities. Familiarity with the Malay language (then being promoted by nationalists as Bahasa Indonesia) intensified, which nurtured nationalist debates in towns such as Sibolga, Tarutung, and Padangsidimpuan. Social horizons expanded, as Batak schoolchildren came to discover that they themselves were one of the many constituent peoples of the Indies. And a Batak elite of schoolteachers and newspaper writers encountered Dutch and mission scholarship on “the Batak peoples,” their customs, and their languages. The categorization schemes of the colonists for typing language and culture began to be appropriated and debated by the colonized.

The Japanese occupation during the Pacific War (1941–1945) was devastating for the uplands, bringing much privation. The national revolution saw guerrilla action in several parts of Tapanuli and also the forced departure of some of the old traditional aristocrats (accused of being in league with the Dutch).

Since the 1950s, any possibility of a politically viable Batak nationalism has been swamped by Indonesian nationalism. The public schools have once again been crucial for identity formation. The Batak urban diasporas have grown, with many individuals now working for the national government, the police, and the military (other economic niches are education, law, journalism, the ministry, and bus transportation).

The New Order was a time of political compromise and contestation in North Sumatra, as the state attempted to folklorize the Batak societies as “quaint and outmoded” whereas Bataks themselves often painted their histories in politically stronger hues. Much argument over Batak heritage and who should properly narrate it ensued (Steadly 1993).

SUSAN RODGERS


See also Education, Western Secular; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Missionaries, Christian; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Newspapers and Mass Media in Southeast Asia; *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Padri Movement; Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Sumatra

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BATAVIA (SUNDA KELAPA, JACATRA, DJAKARTA/JAKARTA)

The history of names introduces us to the history of a place. Jakarta is the capital of Indonesia, but the record of human habitation there is



Canal at Batavia, Indonesia. (Bettmann/Corbis)

much older than the name. Excavations have uncovered tools and a stone bearing, in Sanskrit, the record of the fifth-century C.E. King Purnavarman and his kingdom of Tarumanagara.

The site, under the name Sunda Kelapa, served the Hindu kingdom of Pajajaran (1344–1570s) as its principal outlet for pepper. In 1527, the sultan of Cirebon sent militias to conquer Sunda Kelapa. They renamed it Jayakarta, meaning “Great Victory.” A hundred years later, Dutch shippers found in Jayakarta a port with about 2,000 Sundanese and Chinese residents. Jayakarta’s ruler styled himself sultan, acknowledged the king of Banten as his suzerain, and used Javanese as the language of his administration. Dutch scribes rendered the port’s name in Roman script as Jacatra.

Jayakarta had a good harbor and was conveniently sited for ships sailing archipelago water highways. In 1618, armed bands from Banten

attacked the Dutch compound there. By May 1619, Dutch forces had repelled the attack, conquered the town, deposed Jayakarta’s sultan, and burned down his palace and mosque. A European administration, acting for Holland’s United East India Company (VOC), replaced Javanese rule and renamed the port Batavia to honor the Germanic tribe from whom the Dutch considered themselves descended. The new government promoted Protestant Christianity as the religion of Batavia’s ruling class. It introduced the Christian calendar and work-week and set up Dutch municipal institutions.

Batavia Castle was built at the water’s edge to control the harbor and house the headquarters of the VOC. International ships anchored in the bay and unloaded travelers and goods onto small sailing boats operated by Malays, Javanese, and Chinese. The walled town that grew around the castle was laid out like a

Southeast Asian port city. Each ethnic group was assigned its own quarters and lived under a headman (*kapitan*). Markets were located throughout the town. Land surrounding the walls was cleared for vegetable gardens and rice and sugar crops. These businesses were pushed from the walls as the town grew, and suburbs were laid outside the walls.

When the Dutch conquered Jayakarta, they declared the region between the sultanates of Banten and Cirebon to be under Dutch suzerainty. District heads now owed allegiance to the Dutch. They paid taxes to the Batavia authorities in products harvested from forest trees fringing the clearings where farmers sowed their crops. In the eighteenth century, farmers began planting coffee seedlings, obtained through the company, and they paid their taxes in harvested beans. Some of the lands were sold to Dutch, Javanese, and Chinese individuals, who ruled them as private fiefdoms.

Batavia was the major trading center in the archipelago for Chinese merchants. It had diplomatic relations with its principal neighbor, the Javanese sultanate of Mataram, and with most archipelago states. It obtained paramount privileges in Java's north coast ports from Amangkurat I (r. 1646–1677) in return for supplying Mataram with mercenaries from its own army. In the archipelago, Batavia was the seat of government for Dutch settlements and the site of a commercial power that was aggressively expanding its territorial and political reach into archipelago states.

Batavia was always a multiethnic town. From its polyglot population, there emerged a distinctive community identifying itself as the *Kaum Betawi* (Batavians). They were Muslim and speakers of a Malay that incorporated words from the Chinese and Balinese languages.

In the nineteenth century, a colonial government accountable to Holland's Parliament replaced rule by the VOC, which was primarily a private commercial company. Batavia became the capital of the Netherlands East Indies, and Dutch rule expanded north, east, and west in the period from 1850 to 1940. Batavia was the hub of the archipelago's commerce and transport networks, the headquarters of its businesses, the site of high schools and university colleges, and a rival to Indonesian sultanates in

setting fashions. From the 1890s, its steamship and telegraph services connected Indonesians to The Hague and Mecca.

In 1942, Japan defeated the colony's armed forces. Batavia became the headquarters for the Sixteenth Japanese Army, under the name Djakarta. It ceased to be the capital of an archipelago-wide state, shrinking to become only a principal city of Java. Separate Japanese army and navy administrations controlled Sumatra and eastern Indonesia until the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945).

Sukarno (1901–1970) proclaimed the independence of the Indonesian people in Djakarta on 17 August 1945. He envisioned the city as the capital of a republic that would extend to the boundaries of the former Dutch colony. In 1946, Dutch troops retook the city and revived the name Batavia. Sukarno led the struggle for independence from Yogyakarta. The Federal Republic of Indonesia achieved international recognition in December 1949 and named Djakarta its capital. Djakarta remained the capital following the transformation of Indonesia into a unitary state in August 1950. In 1972, the city became known as Jakarta when Indonesian spelling was revised.

In modern Indonesian life, Jakarta is the site of a new national culture. It exports Javanese settlers, soldiers, and administrators across the archipelago to hold together a multiethnic state. Jakarta represents both the nation's triumph and its exertion of power over Indonesia's regions and ethnic cores.

JEAN GELMAN TAYLOR

See also Amangkurat I (Sunan Tegalwangi) (r. 1646–1677); Banten (Bantam); Chinese in Southeast Asia; Coffee; Hindu–Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; “Indonesia”; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Java; *Kapitan China* System; Mataram; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Pepper; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); Yogyakarta (Jogjakarta)

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BATIK

See Textiles of Southeast Asia

BATTAMBANG

Battambang, Cambodia's second largest city, is the capital of Battambang Province, bordering Thailand in Cambodia's northwest area. Its population was estimated at 80,000 in 1998. The region has long been productive agriculturally, and for most of the twentieth century, Battambang provided the bulk of Cambodia's rice exports.

Battambang has had a rich and often tumultuous history. In medieval times, when the kingdom known as Angkor dominated much of the region (ninth through fifteenth centuries), Battambang was the site of numerous Hindu and Buddhist temples. After the decline of Angkor in the sixteenth century, Battambang remained under the jurisdiction of the Cambodian king, whose capital was in the vicinity of Phnom Penh.

In 1794, the king of Thailand demanded that the Cambodian king, Ang Eng (ca. 1774–1797), who had just been crowned by Thai authorities, relinquish control of Battambang and the neighboring province of Siem Reap, in exchange for being allowed to return to Cambodia, which he had fled as a child. The provinces remained under Thai control until 1907, when French colonial authorities pressured the Thai to return them to Cambodian jurisdiction. During the Pacific War (1941–1945), Thailand occupied the provinces again, relinquishing them in 1946.

During the early years of independence, Battambang regained its position as Cambodia's rice bowl, and the city prospered. Along with other Cambodian cities, it was forcibly evacuated by the Khmer Rouge regime that governed Cambodia from 1975 to 1979. Hundreds

of thousands of urban dwellers from Phnom Penh and elsewhere were relocated into the province at that time, and tens of thousands of them died of starvation or overwork and by execution. After the Khmer Rouge fell following a Vietnamese invasion in 1979, thousands of residents sought refuge in Thailand. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the province was the scene of an ongoing civil war. Battambang became a prosperous province in the 1990s, and the city benefited from extensive private investment from nearby Thailand.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Ang Eng (ca. 1774–1797); Angkor; Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Cambodia (Eighteenth to Mid-Nineteenth Centuries); Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Democratic Kampuchea (DK); French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Khmer Rouge; Rama I (Chakri) (r. 1782–1809); Siem Reap

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BAYINNAUNG (r. 1551–1581) “World Conqueror”

As the third ruler of the First Toungoo dynasty, Bayinnaung, in a series of wars with Burma's neighbors, established Burmese hegemony over mainland Southeast Asia from Manipur to Laos. His administration was patterned on a core area around the capital governed directly by the high king (*chakravartin*, meaning “world conqueror”) and a periphery of surrounding appanages governed by royal relatives, or *bayin*, who were allowed usage of the five royal regalia (umbrella, fly whisks, betel box, golden slippers, and gongs). Autonomous, they often rebelled in attempts to take over the throne. Beyond these royal appanages was an outer circle of vassals among the ethnic groups in the uplands—Shan, Kachin, Chin, Kayah—over whom Bayinnaung established Burmese suzerainty.

Bayinnaung's conquest of Siam in 1569 continued this pattern. The conquered territory was not laid waste but was incorporated in the empire as part of the *mandala*, or circle of federated states owing allegiance to the *chakravartin*,

whose righteousness was attested to by his possession of numerous White Elephants. A Siamese princess, sister of Prince Naresuan (later king, r. 1590–1605), was presented to Bayinnaung. A key element of his policies was to increase manpower beyond that available from the Burmese heartland. Chiang Mai came under Burmese suzerainty in this period and remained within the Burmese sphere of influence for two hundred years. Bayinnaung appointed his son ruler in Chiang Mai, a tradition that continued throughout the First Toungoo dynasty.

European travelers considered Pegu the foremost trading city in mainland Southeast Asia. From this base, Bayinnaung drew the profits of the Asian spice trade around the coasts of Siam and Burma and across the transpeninsular routes, as well as the luxury goods from the hinterland areas of the T'ai states. At Mergui and Tavoy, he made detailed administrative arrangements for the supervision of merchant shipping and envoys from India. In the 1570s, he had a fleet of seven oceangoing ships built for commercial ventures (Lieberman 1984: 31). By the end of the sixteenth century, some 18 percent of eastward trade from India passed through Mergui and Pegu. A devout Buddhist, Bayinnaung adorned the pagodas of Pegu with the wealth from international trade. But what the father won, the son lost, and by 1599, the empire was in disarray, with the rich delta lands laid waste and depopulated by the ravages of civil and external wars.

HELEN JAMES

See also Buddhism, Theravada; Burma-Siam Wars; *Cakkavatti/Setkya-min* (Universal Ruler); Chiang Mai; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Pegu; Toungoo Dynasty (1486–1752)

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BEJALAI

The Iban term *bejalai* means "to walk" or "to go on a journey." Traditionally, Iban men, especially unmarried men, were expected to leave home for a time and venture out into the world for adventure and to seek their fortunes. These journeys, or *bejalai*, frequently lasted for several years and often took parties of men far from home.

One Iban commentator (Datuk Amar Linggi) described the role of *bejalai* for Iban youth as a traditional "requirement for the transition from childhood to manhood, [which] our ancestors selected . . . as a test of character and an education for life" (Kedit 1993: vii–viii). By leaving home and journeying to other places, young men displayed courage and resolve, and in the course of their travels, they were expected to develop resourcefulness and gain experience and knowledge; they were also to bring home foreign goods, ideas, and a sense of the wider world beyond their local communities. Such travels contributed to Iban restlessness, giving men the self-confidence and planning abilities needed to undertake what became, at times, large-scale territorial migrations. Mobility itself was and continues to be culturally valued, and most Iban even today regard journeying as part of their cultural heritage. For young men, a further motive was *ngiga' bini* (meaning "to seek a wife"), travel being considered an enhancement to marriageability, while at the same time expanding the opportunities for courting.

Bejalai, however, has not always been seen in such positive terms. During the Brooke (1841–1941) era (while English gentleman-adventurer James Brooke was raja of Sarawak) and the later British colonial (1946–1963) period, European officers viewed Iban traveling as a matter of concern. Traveling parties of young men were frequently suspected of troublemaking and, during the nineteenth century, of clandestine headhunting. *Bejalai* was also thought to be a labor drain. In the contemporary situation, politicians blamed the practice of *bejalai* for the failure of rural development schemes and as a cause of family desertion. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, *bejalai* played an important part in drawing the Iban into a monetized economy. Today, however, economic need tends to overshadow the lure of adventure, and many rural families depend on labor migration and the remittances

of family members working in towns or timber camps to survive. Today, Iban men on bejalai may be found on North Sea oil rigs; in the dockyards of Singapore; and in logging camps in Cambodia, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Vanuatu.

CLIFFORD SATHER

See also *Adat*; Borneo; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Dayaks; Ibans; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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BENGKULU (BENCOOLEN, BENKULEN)

Bengkulu is a town and region in West Sumatra. In the early seventeenth century, it was under the influence of both Banten and Minangkabau. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) established a trading post in the area in 1633. After the Dutch forced the English East India Company (EIC) to leave Banten, the English established Fort Marlborough along the beach in Bengkulu in 1685. This was long the only British stronghold in the Malay Archipelago. Consequently, Bengkulu was the only major region of British influence in the archipelago until the temporary demise of Dutch rule in the area between 1795 and 1811. Bengkulu had a port (or rather an anchoring place) about 9 kilometers off the coast. Through this port, mainly pepper was traded. However, the trade was only marginally profitable for the English. The areas surrounding Bengkulu were under Dutch influence. The VOC supported the rulers of Minangkabau against an expansionist Aceh, which yielded them the right to establish

trading posts all along Sumatra's western coast, with the main office in Padang.

After his stint as lieutenant governor in Java (t. 1811–1816), Stamford Raffles became governor of Bengkulu in 1818 and sought to expand the production of nutmeg, cloves, and cassava in the region. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 revised the British and Dutch holdings in the Malay Archipelago, with the Dutch ceding Melaka and receiving Bengkulu. However, although Bengkulu was under Dutch influence, effective colonial government was not established there until 1868. At that stage, the area had little going for itself. Pepper production had waned, and other spices were ailing. Efforts to revive pepper production were unsuccessful, as was the promotion of coffee cultivation. The replacement of compulsory cultivation with a regular taxation system proved an incentive for the production of spices. The development of both the town and the region took off, and the Dutch turned Bengkulu into a separate residency in 1878. It became a province of Indonesia after the Pacific War (1941–1945).

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Aceh (Acheh); Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Banten (Bantam); East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Melaka; Minangkabau; Pepper; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); Spices and the Spice Trade; Sumatra; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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BHINNEKA TUNGGAL IKA ("UNITY IN DIVERSITY")

On the state crest of the Indonesian nation, the words *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* are featured prominently. The language is old Kawi Javanese, and

the words mean “Unity in Diversity.” *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* is the Indonesian motto, adopted on 17 August 1950. Indeed, it is a very logical motto, given that Indonesia consists of more than 13,000 islands spanning the seas from the Indian Ocean to Australia.

The origins of the motto are steeped in mystic tradition. According to legend, passed down to posterity from the fifteenth century or even earlier, a king called Purushada fed on human flesh. His victims were chosen from among the common folk, who were naturally terrified. A knight by the name of Sutasoma decided to help the people by offering up himself to be devoured. The king was furious that a mere knight would try to change his dietary preferences, and he attempted to kill the knight. A major fight ensued in which the celestial powers participated. Lord Śiva entered the body of the king, and Lord Buddha entered the knight’s body. When the fight became supernatural, neither side could win. Brahmin priests intervened. They appealed to the combatants to stop fighting, arguing that the king and the knight were one, though their forms were different: the Brahmins used the phrase *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* to describe the oneness of Śiva and Buddha. Thereupon, Śiva and Buddha left the bodies of the king and the knight, respectively, and the king gave up his habit of eating human flesh. This legend was recorded in a poem written by Mpu Tantular, the famous poet of the Majapahit court.

Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is a reflection of the challenges facing Indonesia. When the Netherlands East Indies became Indonesia, the nation consisted of many ethnic groups, with divisions existing even within those groups. And Dutch colonialism only also accentuated the differences. Consequently, working toward unity in accordance with the motto *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* was imperative.

YONG MUN CHEONG

See also Borneo; East Indonesian Ethnic Groups; Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; “Indonesia”; Java; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; *Nusantara*; Sulawesi (Celebes); Sumatra

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**BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ
(RAMA IX) (r. 1946–)**

Beloved Monarch of Thailand

The most popular, revered, and respected monarch of his land, King Bhumibol (1927–) has become the highest symbol of Thailand and has successfully revitalized the Thai monarchy, transforming it in a way that had not been done since the death of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) in 1910. Enthroned in the post-Pacific War (1941–1945) period, King Bhumibol has adroitly maneuvered the role of the monarchy so that it can function meaningfully in the rough political transition Thailand has experienced. Under his reign, the Thai monarchy has changed from the old center of power to the new center of loyalty, redefining the relationship between the institution and the people. More significantly, the monarchy has become a unifying force in a country divided and factionalized by the forces of political democratization and economic development. As a spiritual leader of the nation, he has instilled discipline to regulate the people so that the country can preserve its unity. The king has played many crucial roles in shaping the country’s path to constitutional democracy.

King Bhumibol Adulyadej was born on 5 December 1927 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, where his father, Prince Mahidol, was studying medicine at Harvard University. He was the grandson of King Chulalongkorn. He ascended the throne on 9 June 1946 following the sudden death of King Ananda Mahidol (Rama VIII), his elder brother, on the same day. He was officially crowned King Rama IX of Thailand on 5 May 1950.

King Bhumibol began his primary school education in Bangkok before he and his family went to Switzerland. He finished his secondary education at the *École Nouvelle de la Suisse Romande*, Chailly sur Lausanne, and received a baccalaureate from the *Gymnase Classique Cantonal of Lausanne*. At Lausanne University, he chose to study political science and law instead of pursuing his interest in science. He was married to M. R. Sirikit in 1950 in Bangkok, shortly before his coronation. King Bhumibol is a gifted musician and composer, especially in jazz music. He is accomplished in the fields of painting, photography, and engineering, as well as languages and cultures. He is fluent in three European languages. The king has four children:

Princess Ubol Ratana (1951–), Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn (1952–), Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn (1955–), and Princess Chulabhorn (1957–).

Since the Revolution of 1932, which overthrew the absolutist monarchy, questions about the proper role of the monarch in the constitutional regime have not been satisfactorily resolved. Generally, it is believed that the monarch should be a ceremonial head of state and is in a position of revered worship. He is above partisan affairs and should not be involved in any government decisions; nor should the monarch be disrespected. However, such principles are difficult to apply in an emerging nation-state like Thailand, where the traditional forces and support for the monarchy have been cultivated for a long time and the new democratic forces are relatively recent inventions. It is obvious to the king and royalists that in the twenty-first century, the only group that is capable of overthrowing the monarchy is the military. The most important question for the king during his active reign involves how to balance various political groups and parties so that the institution of the monarchy is able to exist safely while maintaining its spiritual leadership for the nation.

The immediate task of King Bhumibol was how to maintain good relations with the military in power, even though the monarch might find it more convenient to work with civilian governments, which are more divided and easier to deal with. Such political realities and conditions of the monarchy in relation to the political system determined, to a certain degree, the role of the monarchy in politics.

From 1946 to 1951, the king saw tumultuous political situations created by coups and factional conflicts between civilians and the military. By 1951, when he returned from abroad to stay permanently in Thailand, there had already been eleven governments installed, three constitutions abrogated, and four elections held, along with five coups and attempted coups.

By the mid-1950s, the royalists and conservatives were on the rise, and the monarchy began to see the role it could play in national life again. From their trip up-country and their regular radio broadcasts, the king and queen received an enthusiastic response from the people. Accordingly, they assumed more active

roles in national life. The first break with the military-led government under Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (Phibun) (1897–1964), the leader of the army faction of the People's Party, came in the late 1950s. In the symbolic celebration of the 2,500th anniversary of the death of the Lord Buddha, Phibun assumed the role of patron of Buddhism, a role previously played by monarchs. At the grand opening of the state ceremony in 1957, the king was conspicuously absent. In 1957, General Sarit Thanarat (d. 1963), a powerful army commander, launched a coup against Phibun and proclaimed that his legitimacy was derived from the throne.

From then on, the monarchy and its traditional ideology of a paternal king was revived, and the institution once again was identified closely with the nation and the people. To promote a good understanding of Thailand under the Sarit regime (1957–1963), the king and queen visited many foreign countries, especially Western European nations and the United States. Later on, the king also made many visits to provinces in Thailand, particularly the remote and less developed areas, after which came the royal development projects. By the 1970s, a version of Thai nationalism centered on the monarchy had become predominant. The popular support the monarchy gained from the people and university students in urban centers proved central in ending the period of military dictatorship.

The testing time for the monarchy came when the military establishment was crumbling under attacks by students and urban groups in the famous uprising of 14 October 1973. To restore peace and order, the king put an end to the riot and asked Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn (1911–), General Prapat Jarusathien (Praphas Charusathian), and Colonel Narong Kittikachorn to leave the country. The king's intervention forced the military to share power with civilian politicians; more significant still was the reversal of the relationship between monarch and government. The monarchy was no longer manipulated by the government in power but had become a center of authority in its own right.

Political radicalism from 1973 to 1976 was viewed by the king as threatening to the unity and proper order of the nation; thus, the palace actively supported the village scout movement,



Thailand's King Bhumibol Adulyadej at a state dinner he hosted for U.S. President George W. Bush at the Royal Grand Palace in Bangkok. (Jason Reed/Reuters Newsmedia Inc./Corbis)

a right-wing mass organization created and led by government agencies to fight against the student-labor-peasant movement. The coup of 6 October 1976 terminated leftist politics and the civilian government of Prime Minister Seni Pramoj (1905–1997), ostensibly to save the country from communism. The military-led government installed Thanin Kraivixien, a former Supreme Court justice and later a member of the Privy Council who was also the king's choice as prime minister.

The attempted coup led by Young Turks on April Fool's Day (1 April) in 1981 was another occasion on which the king took action. He left the Bangkok palace to join General Prem Tinsulanond (1920–) in Nakorn Rajasima, the northeastern headquarters of Army Region 2,

to fight against the coup party that had temporarily controlled key areas of Bangkok. However, the military coup in 1991 that was led by the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) against the civilian elected government of Chatichai Choonhavan was not openly opposed by the king. When protesters took to the streets and violence erupted from the attempted suppression by the military government in May 1992, the king called in the two leaders of the conflicting parties—the prime minister, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, and the protest leader, Major General Chamlong Srimuang. He told both of them to quit the fight and restore peace. Generally, the king has chosen order and stability rather than conflict, even when that meant he had to identify himself with a government that allowed a preeminent role for the military.

By nature, the monarchy is oriented toward conservatism, based on the idea of social organicism. Ideologically, King Bhumiphol emphasizes the primacy of the common good over the good of the individual. In times of crisis, he believes, authority, discipline, duty, and allegiance to an objective national interest should take precedence over any claim based on personal desire or personal interest. Given this Buddhist political worldview, coupled with the instability of elected governments, the king has urged that democracy in Thailand should not be defined according to foreign terms but should be modified to fit Thai culture and tradition. Thus, constitutionalism was not as crucial to the survival of the country as the preservation of unity and the old institutions of the nation.

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also Constitutional (Bloodless) Revolution (1932) (Thailand); Constitutional Monarchy of Malaya/Malaysia; Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; National Peace-Keeping Council (NPKC); Plaek Phibunsongkhram, Field Marshal (1897–1964); Prem Tinsulanond (1920–); Student Revolt (October 1973) (Thailand); Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal (1911–)

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BINH XUYEN

The Binh Xuyen was not a religious group and therefore differed from other movements in South Vietnam, notably the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. Named after a hamlet in South Cholon, the Binh Xuyen first emerged in the early 1920s as a criminal gang of about 200 individuals. Most of the early Binh Xuyen members came from marginal strata. Armed with rough weapons, the group relied on extortion and robbery in Saigon and Cholon.

The Binh Xuyen leader, Le Van Vien (Bay Vien), was born in 1904 in Cholon and served several prison terms. In August 1945, he aligned himself with the Vietnamese communists (Viet Minh) against the French. However, in June 1948, he rallied to the French, and four years later, the French promoted him to the rank of general.

At its height in the early 1950s, the Binh Xuyen group was believed to have up to 25,000 troops and paramilitary forces. Among the most important Binh Xuyen economic assets were gambling and lottery concessions, prostitution operations, opium-boiling plants, and retail shops in Saigon. The French also assigned the Binh Xuyen to collect a number of taxes, notably the coal tax.

By 1954, the Binh Xuyen military commander, Lai Van Sang, became director-general of Saigon's police. The Binh Xuyen troops controlled the Saigon region and the 100-kilometer strip between Saigon and Vung Tau, where they became notorious for their so-called road safety taxes. Once sought as a bandit, the Binh Xuyen chief—the illiterate Le Van Vien—was eyeing the post of prime minister by 1954.

However, in March and April 1955, the Binh Xuyen lost a violent confrontation with Prime Minister Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963) and his team. In September, Le Van Vien fled to France, and in October 1955, the last Binh Xuyen units

halted their resistance. Following their military defeat in 1955, the Binh Xuyen ceased to exist as an organized force.

SERGEI A. BLAGOV

See also Ngô Đình Diệm; Viet Minh; Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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BIRCH, J. W. W. (1826–1875)

First British Resident of Perak

John Woodford Wheeler Birch was the first British resident sent to the peninsular Malay state of Perak late in 1874 under the Pangkor Engagement. His zealous haste to effect changes exasperated the ruler and leading chiefs of Perak, and the conflict that ensued led to his assassination in November 1875, followed by British military intervention. Although his British contemporaries regarded Birch as a martyr to the cause of reform, present-day Malaysian historians and public opinion see his Malay opponents as champions of independence and Birch as an unworthy public figure.

After a brief stint in the Royal Navy, Birch joined the Ceylon (Sri Lanka) colonial government service in 1846 as a road overseer; subsequently, in 1853, he was transferred to the administrative service. He held a sequence of district and magistrate posts and made his reputation as an active and able official, with useful experience in the improvement of irrigation works. In May 1870, he was transferred to the Straits Settlements as colonial (chief) secretary, where he was judged to be efficient but rather domineering. He showed a keen interest in the western Malay States, which he visited on official missions in 1871 and 1874. He was not, however, included among the advisers who accompanied Governor Sir Andrew Clarke (t. 1874–1875) to the meeting at Pangkor in January 1874. The outcome of that meeting was that

Raja (later Sultan) Abdullah and some of the Perak chiefs were induced to sign the Pangkor Engagement, an ambiguous document whose purpose they probably did not fully grasp. Birch applied for the new post of resident to Perak, in which his function would be to advise the ruler on the improvement of the state government. Birch, however, believed that to achieve that end, he needed to act with a strong hand.

The inevitable conflict centered on Birch's determination to take control of the collection of taxes and to abolish "debt bondage," under which members of the Malay ruling class obtained domestic and personal services from followers who were nominally their debtors. Birch, like other British officials, regarded debt bondage as a form of slavery. In thus seeking to deprive Malay aristocrats of traditional privileges and their customary revenues, Birch appeared to them to undermine their status and authority. The British-installed Sultan Abdullah (r. 1874–1875) and his deposed predecessor, Sultan Ismail, together with the leading chiefs, were able to delay and frustrate Birch to some extent. Further complicating matters, Birch gave asylum in his household to runaway bondswomen, which led to Malay accusations of sexual impropriety on his part.

William F. D. Jervis (t. 1875–1877), who had succeeded Clarke as governor in May 1875, decided to adopt more drastic measures. Accordingly, Birch would become a commissioner with executive powers (for which the Pangkor Engagement made no provision). Sultan Abdullah was coerced into accepting this change, and Birch began a tour of Perak villages to post a proclamation announcing his new status. He arrived at Pasir Salak, where the local chief, the Maharaja Lela, was so embittered against Birch that he had him killed on 2 November. Jervis overreacted to the news and brought in from abroad a military force of several thousands, with naval support, to deal with a Malay opposition that, in reality, posed no serious threat, for it had neither purpose nor leadership.

The official inquiry that followed found that there had been much discussion, though inconclusive, between Abdullah and some chiefs (although others were at odds with him) and that the Maharaja Lela had received authority from Abdullah to take unspecified action. The Maharaja Lela and those directly involved in killing

Birch were convicted of murder and hanged. Abdullah and three leading Malay chiefs were exiled to the Seychelles, and Ismail was exiled to Johor.

Frank Swettenham (1850–1946), who had narrowly escaped death along with Birch, argued that the result of these events was immediate Malay acquiescence instead of continuing resistance to necessary reforms. But Birch's death was also a warning to his successors that they needed to carry out their duties with patience, tact, and an understanding of the Malay point of view, which Birch entirely lacked. The choice of Birch to promote better government in Perak was a disastrous misjudgment, but it also reflected the more general British failure to understand the nature of the problems they faced and how to deal with them satisfactorily.

As a man, Birch had other faults. He drank too much, without being a drunkard, and allowed his personal finances to become an embarrassment. His confidence in his ability to perform his task in Perak was misplaced; among other failings, he lacked an adequate command of the Malay language. The allegations of sexual relations with refugee bondswomen and earlier suspicions during Birch's time in Singapore that he was corrupt are not supported by adequate evidence, but they formed part of the contemporary picture of a controversial figure.

JOHN MICHAEL GULLICK

See also Clarke, Sir Andrew (1824–1902); Low, Sir Hugh (1824–1905); Pangkor Engagement; Straits Settlements (1826–1946); Swettenham, Sir Frank (1850–1946); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang); "White Man's Burden"

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BLITAR

The town of Blitar lies in the upper Brantas Valley of East Java. Religious sites in the Blitar region belong to the second half of the fourteenth century, the last of the three phases of classical art in this region.

The main site of the Blitar phase is Panataran, most of which was built between 1345 and 1375. The complex appears to have developed somewhat haphazardly, rather than according to an overall plan. The group of structures is divided into three courtyards, reminiscent of Balinese temple complexes. Though inscriptions imply that Panataran was sponsored by the highest levels of the court of the kingdom of Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s), the trip to the shrines here would have required a pilgrimage of several days. The principal structure in the compound farthest from the entrance was a Viṣṇu shrine that consisted of a three-story stone base bearing *Rāmāyana* reliefs, supporting a wooden structure that vanished long ago. Winged mythical creatures supporting its foundation symbolically bore it aloft, recalling a palace floating in heaven above Mount Meru. In the second courtyard stands the Candi Naga (Serpent Shrine), decorated with heavenly beings that carry serpents, perhaps recalling the churning of the elixir of immortality. The first courtyard that visitors enter contains a shrine with the date 1369 carved over its doorway. This temple at one stage contained a statue of Ganesha, the elephant-headed Hindu god who is the patron of learning. Also in the entrance courtyard are low foundations for wooden structures, probably open-sided. One of these has elaborate reliefs; many of them are undeciphered, but they

include the story of Sri Tanjung and a princely figure, which may allude to one of the stories of the indigenous Panji cycle, a series of legends revolving around a prince who loses contact with his beloved and has to go through numerous trials before being reunited with her. In the environs of Blitar, there are several other sites, including a well-known statue of Ganesha at a site called Bara that probably once guarded a river crossing and several bathing places.

The Blitar area lies in the upper reaches of the Brantas watershed, near the foot of Mount Kelud, one of the most destructive volcanoes in Indonesia. In its vicinity lie numerous remains of the fourteenth-century kingdom of Majapahit, including the largest monumental complex of that kingdom, located at Panataran. This site apparently served as a kind of ceremonial center for the kingdom, and various structures were built there over the span of a century. Blitar's modern importance stems from the fact that the tomb of Indonesia's independence leader Sukarno (1901–1970) is located there, near the site of his birth. The tomb has become a major shrine visited by hundreds of thousands of Javanese each year, mainly during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. The pilgrims are drawn by a combination of reverence for his nationalist philosophy and his reputation as having supernatural spiritual power.

JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also *Candi*; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Indianization; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); *Mahābāratha* and *Rāmāyana*; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Pancasila (Pantja Sila); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970)

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BOAT PEOPLE

The term *boat people* refers to the more than 1 million Vietnamese refugees who fled from



A Vietnamese refugee with his belongings secured between his teeth climbs a cargo net to the deck of the combat store ship USS White Plains, on 30 July 1979 in the South China Sea. (U.S. National Archives)

their country by sea between the fall of Saigon in 1975 and the 1980s. More than 800,000 fled in the first six years, and altogether, perhaps 1.5 million escaped or tried to escape the newly reunified Vietnam. The original flow occurred after the communist takeover in South Vietnam and was composed of families linked in some way with the former regime. But the exodus grew in the following years with the worsening situation—the transformation of the South to socialism to the detriment of the private economy and the deterioration in relations with Cambodia and China, which ended in war in the early part of 1979. The composition of the refugees changed, too, by then including a large portion of ethnic Chinese (called Hoa), who for generations had prospered in trading and banking; other Hoa fled at this time from the North, through the Chinese border. The flow from the South continued after the 1979–1980 peak.

More or less illegal, the exodus encouraged corruption among officials who turned a blind eye to those leaving the country. The refugees embarked on various boats through the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea for perilous journeys, especially if they crossed pirates, who robbed, raped, and sometimes killed them. The neighboring countries—Malaysia, Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines—did not warmly welcome them. During the 1979 crisis, these countries announced that they would no longer accept refugees. Those who landed were housed in asylum camps pending relocation to third countries. For example, Pulau Bidong, an island off the northeast coast of Peninsular Malaysia, was a center for boat people for many years. After the June 1979 UN Geneva Conference, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) got involved in resettlement projects, and Vietnam, for its part, accepted official emigration.

During the 1990s, as the domestic situation in Vietnam improved, the flow of boat people gradually receded. UNHCR encouraged a small relocation movement. The last camps were closed in the late 1990s when the refugees were relocated, mostly to North America, Western Europe, and Australasia.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Indochina War (1964–1975), Second (Vietnam War); Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Sino-Vietnamese Wars; Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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**BOEDI OETAMA
(BUDI UTOMO) (1908)
Harbinger of the Indonesian
Nationalist Movement**

Boedi Oetama (Budi Utomo in Javanese, meaning “high endeavor”) was colonial Indonesia’s first significant political association. Its focus was the strengthening and rejuvenation of Javanese

aristocratic culture, but before being taken over by more radical organizations, it engaged seriously with the question of how Indonesian society should develop under colonialism.

In May 1908, Wahidin Soedirohoesodo founded Boedi Oetama. It was initially a student organization, but it soon became dominated by the lower echelons of the *priyayi*, Java's aristocratic-bureaucratic elite. The organization especially attracted people who were interested in the relationship between Eastern and Western culture and in the possibilities for some kind of synthesis that would reinvigorate Eastern society. Although it never challenged colonial rule and indeed was welcomed by some Dutch leaders as a sign of engagement between East and West, its aims implied an eventual end to the tutelary relationship between the Dutch and the Javanese. Its call to extend Western education in the Indies suggested that the Javanese would eventually replace the Dutch in at least some posts.

Boedi Oetama reached its membership peak of 10,000 in late 1909 and never developed a mass base. The later nationalist leader Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo (1885–1943) was briefly a member of Boedi Oetama and argued unsuccessfully within it for a focus on mass education and for attention to the Netherlands Indies as a whole, rather than just Java. Short of funds and thoroughly outflanked by newer nationalist parties, Boedi Oetomo dissolved itself in 1935.

The anniversary of Boedi Oetomo's founding is celebrated in Indonesia as National Awakening Day, but the organization's focus on Java and its lack of a clear political platform have led many observers to describe it as a precursor to the nationalist movement rather than that movement's first expression.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Colonialism; Education, Traditional Religious; Education, Western Secular; Ethical Policy (*Ethische Politiek*); Java; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; *Priyayi*

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BOMBAY BURMAH TRADING CORPORATION (BBTC)

Partner of British Imperialism

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation (BBTC) was a British-owned timber and trading firm derived from a company established in 1862. In that year, King Mindon (r. 1853–1878), whose government had recently been forced to abandon Lower Burma to the victorious troops of the British Indian Empire in 1856, gave the firm timber extraction rights in the Pyinmana area north of British-administered Lower Burma. In 1885, following years of suspicions and accusations, the king's government accused the BBTC of illegally exporting logs to avoid paying export duty owed to the Burmese state. The Hlutdaw, the king's council, imposed a fine on the company of 23 lakhs of rupees in August of that year. This prompted the corporation to seek the assistance of the British government's authorities in Rangoon and London. Pressure was then applied to reduce the fine, but before negotiations ended, the British imposed an ultimatum on the Burmese, to which they did not have time to respond. The result was war, and the BBTC entered Burmese nationalist historiography as the capitalist-imperialist engine of the country's colonialization and the ending of the Burmese monarchy. During the colonial period, the BBTC was one of many British firms that, in addition to dealing in timber, traded in other commodities, such as oil, rice, and various pulses for export abroad. The BBTC's operations in Burma were nationalized at independence in 1948, but the company continued to operate in other parts of Southeast Asia.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Agency Houses, European; Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); British Burma; British India, Government of; Burma under British Colonial Rule; Colonialism; Hlutdaw; Imperialism; Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Mindon (r. 1853–1878)

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BONIFACIO, ANDRES (1863–1897)**Proletarian Leader of the Philippine Revolution**

Andres Bonifacio was the founder, organizer, and later supreme head of the Katipunan movement that started the revolution against the Spanish colonial regime in the Philippines. Filipinos venerate him as a national hero, the “Father of the Revolution,” and more specifically as a plebeian hero, “the Great Plebeian,” who epitomized the proletarian and mass character of the Revolution of 1896 (Agoncillo 1963: 1). When Bonifacio lost the leadership of the rebel forces to General Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964) in March 1897, it meant, in the words of a prominent Filipino historian, “the end of a share for the lower and non-ilustrado classes in the directing of the Revolution” (Corpuz 1989, 2: 204).

Andres Bonifacio was born in Tondo, Manila, on 30 November 1863. His parents were poor, and he had to work to earn his living. He attended primary school and one year of high school, but when his parents died, he had to quit school. He earned his livelihood first as a peddler and later as a clerk-messenger for a commercial firm and as a salesman. Bonifacio, who was largely self-educated, was reportedly fond of reading and had read José Rizal’s (1861–1896) novels and books about the French Revolution (1792–1802). He married twice; his first wife died of leprosy, and in 1892, he married Gregoria de Jesus, daughter of a local official in Kaloocan.

When the Spanish government arrested Rizal and deported him to Mindanao in July 1892, Bonifacio, together with others, founded the Katipunan. Its aims were, to some extent, the same as those of Rizal’s Liga Filipina, namely, fighting religious fanaticism, defending the poor and oppressed, and morally uplifting the people. But in addition, the organization intended to separate the Philippine Islands from Spain by means of a revolution. The Katipunan was a secretive society with a cellular organiza-

tional structure. In 1893 or 1894, Bonifacio became the *supremo* (supreme leader) of the Katipunan. Initially, the members were of lower-middle-class background, and during the first two years, only a few dozen people were initiated as members. But after January 1896, the number of followers increased, running into the thousands.

In August 1896, after the Spaniards had discovered the existence of the Katipunan and started a reign of terror, Bonifacio and his fellow leaders fled to the town of Balintawak in the province of Bulacan. During a mass meeting, the *katipuneros* decided to raise the flag of revolution. In Manila and the surrounding provinces, thousands of people joined the movement. Groups of revolutionaries attacked Spanish garrisons in and around Manila, but they were repelled and, during a Spanish counteroffensive, defeated. In December 1896, Bonifacio went to the province of Cavite, where the revolutionaries under the military leadership of Aguinaldo had been much more successful against the Spanish forces.

The revolutionary movement in Cavite had evolved out of several Katipunan town chapters, two of which had become the strongest—notably, the Magdalo group in the town of Kawit, led by Aguinaldo, and the Magdiwang group in the town of Noveleta, led by a relative of Bonifacio. Soon after Bonifacio’s arrival in Cavite, tension arose between him and leaders of the Magdalo group, especially General Aguinaldo. The two men were basically competing for the leadership of the revolution. Bonifacio still clung to the organizational structure of the Katipunan, of which he was the head, whereas Aguinaldo had become the leader of a much larger revolutionary movement.

In late March 1897, when a Spanish army was marching against Cavite, the revolutionary leaders held a meeting in a house in Tejeros. During this meeting, they decided to replace the Katipunan by a revolutionary government, and they elected Aguinaldo as president of the new government. Bonifacio refused to accept these decisions, and he withdrew with his followers. Fearing a plot against the new government, Aguinaldo ordered Bonifacio’s arrest. A trial was held, and Bonifacio was found guilty of treason and sentenced to death. He was executed on 10 May 1897.

Historians have interpreted and portrayed Bonifacio in different ways, and the discussion persists. Teodoro Agoncillo (1954) considered him the proletarian leader of the revolution—the leader of the masses who was tragically defeated in a competition for power with Aguinaldo. Renato Constantino (1975) interpreted the Bonifacio–Aguinaldo conflict in terms of a class struggle between the lower classes and the landowning *ilustrado* (indigenous intelligentsia; lit. Spanish: “enlightened one”) elite, depicting Bonifacio’s execution as the victory for the elite. Reynaldo Ileto (1979) saw Bonifacio as the heir to an older religious folk tradition—the *pasyon*, or story of the suffering and redemption of Christ—with which the Catholic Filipinos had strongly identified themselves. He argued that Bonifacio and the katipuneros expected that independence for the Philippines would mean more than political liberation, that it would usher in a new era in which the world would become “whole” again. Glenn May (1997) pointed out that very little is known about Bonifacio, that publications attributed to him are surrounded with numerous doubts, and that it is probable they were forged. He saw much of the early-twentieth-century Philippine literature about Bonifacio as a conscious attempt to bolster the man’s stature as a national hero. He argued that historians had to admit that little is known with certainty about the man behind the heroic myth. May’s analysis, however, has been strongly contested by nationalistic Filipino historians (Reyes Churchill 1997).

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Aguinaldo, Emilio (1869–1964); Katipunan; La Liga Filipina; *Noli Me Tangere* (1887) and *El Filibusterismo* (1891); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Rizal, José (1861–1896)

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BORNEO

The island of Borneo, the third largest island in the world, lies at the heart of Southeast Asia. Covering an area of some 750,000 square kilometers, the island is divided politically among the three states of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei—the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak; Brunei Darussalam; and the Indonesian states of East, Central, South, and West Kalimantan. The island is renowned for its important ecological zones, in particular the expanses of tropical rain forest. Except in certain coastal zones, the population is light and densities are low; recent estimates suggest a total population of about 16 million (Cleary and Eaton 1995). Ethnically and culturally diverse, the indigenous Dayak communities have been augmented by the in-migration of Malays, Europeans, Javanese, and Chinese groups over the centuries. Alongside traditional systems of shifting cultivation (“slash-and-burn” farming), overexploitation of the island’s forest reserves through logging, coupled with the search for hydrocarbons and other minerals, has created rapid economic growth as well as serious environmental degradation. Such problems, together with political conflict, have meant that the island displays an uneasy coexistence between the apparent simplicity and stability of native groups and the rapacious pace of economic and environmental change.

Most of the island lies within the broad equatorial monsoon belt, and three broad ecological zones have historically dominated pat-

terns of settlement, migration, and historical development—the coastal and estuarine zone, the river valleys, and the interior. The coastal and estuarine zone, often flanked by mangrove swamps, provides the location for the chief cities of Borneo—Kota Kinabalu, Bandar Seri Begawan, Kuching, Pontianak, and Samarinda. The coastal trade was vital for the early growth of such cities, and the wide river estuaries provided important means of access to the interior. This coastal zone was a prime area of settlement and colonization for the powerful Malay groups of Borneo. Settlement, trade, and economic development penetrated inland along the great river valleys of the Rajang, Kapuas, and Kayan. Colonization was focused along the rivers, especially at river confluences, with longhouse communities of groups such as the Ibans and Kayans extending along their banks. The interior of the island is dominated by tropical rain forest. Rich and diverse flora and fauna have long provided a livelihood for the range of indigenous tribal groups (known collectively by anthropologists as Dayaks) who practice shifting cultivation and trade in a range of jungle products with coastal peoples. Isolated groups of hunter-gatherers (the Penan are perhaps the best known) are interspersed with rich tablelands dominated by wet-rice cultivation.

The early peopling of Borneo is not easy to reconstruct because of the relative paucity of archaeological research that has been done. The Niah Caves system in Sarawak has provided evidence of human occupation dating back to at least 40,000 B.P., and subsequent research suggests a mixing of Austronesian and Austro-Mongoloid groups in the early settling of the island. Stone Age findings are concentrated in the coastal areas, and it is unlikely that metal came to be widely used on the island before the sixth or seventh century C.E. By the end of the first millennium C.E., the coastal regions were well settled, and there is plenty of evidence of trade between Borneo and the rest of Southeast Asia, notably China. It is the development and amplification of that trade from about 1000 C.E. that gives us an insight into how the economies and societies of Borneo developed. Archaeological finds, coupled with documentary records from Chinese sources, suggest that a range of jungle products from Borneo found their way onto the international market. The Chinese and Malays traded with coastal communities, who in turn

sourced their products from the river and interior communities of the island. We know that the maritime empires of Majapahit and Melaka traded with groups on Borneo, and as Islam moved westward in the region onto the coast of Borneo, religious and trading connections were strengthened. Although the coast was the main focus, traders and their goods found their way deep into the interior.

When Antonio Pigafetta (b. 1480), the chronicler of Ferdinand Magellan's round-the-world voyage, visited the city of Brunei in northwest Borneo in 1521, he found a rich, socially diverse, and prosperous trading state that thrived as an entrepôt port. Skilled in the collection and processing of a range of products from the interior of Borneo—rattans, camphor, precious stones—traders exchanged these on the international market for textiles, ceramics, and metalwork and built the city's prosperity on that trade. Other cities followed a similar pattern, and the maps of the island that appear from the sixteenth century onward show the emergence of cities such as Brunei, Succadana, and Banjarmasin as trading cities that thrived on their ability to control and channel the products of the interior. Their command of the coasts and estuaries of Borneo, as well as the cohesive influence of Islam, resulted in a rich and diverse set of Malay-Muslim city-states adept at trading, negotiating, and forming alliances to further their ends. This was the scenario that greeted the first European traders and explorers in the region: Borneo was not a primitive and undeveloped island.

In addition to general maritime trade, the search for minerals was an important catalyst for change. Gold in particular proved an important attraction for many Chinese miners, especially in western Borneo. In the early nineteenth century, the region was the largest gold producer in Asia, and the mining population in the goldfields between Sambas and Pontianak may have exceeded 30,000 (Jackson 1970). There, the powerful Chinese *kongsi* created a distinctive cultural and social landscape linked to specifically Chinese systems of organization and extraction. Many Chinese miners would later migrate into Sarawak, where the Bau goldfields were to contribute to the local economy.

European traders and explorers had sought commercial and military success on the island from the early seventeenth century onward, but

their real interest lay elsewhere in the region. The Dutch, taking time from their activities in Java, established trading factories episodically on the island, as did the English, but met with only limited success. It was not until the nineteenth century that more concerted European intervention on the island developed. In essence, in the course of the nineteenth century, Borneo was divided up between the British and the Dutch. For many Europeans, it appeared to be an exotic, rich, and captivating land. As an island of wealthy Malay potentates, of “noble savages,” of rich, diverse, and captivating natural treasures, it attracted a whole range of merchants and adventurers seeking their fortunes in the East. James Brooke (1803–1868) was one of the most powerful and successful of such individuals. From his arrival in Kuching in 1839, he expanded his personal fiefdom, taking over the lands of the moribund Bruneian empire and expanding northward to create Sarawak. By the 1880s, the establishment of a chartered company to govern North Borneo, together with the consolidation of British influence in Brunei, meant that much of northwest Borneo fell within the orbit of the British Empire. The Dutch, alarmed by this expansion of British interests, moved to consolidate control over their territories in Kalimantan and sought to strengthen their tenuous hold in central and eastern Borneo. By the early twentieth century, imperial powers controlled most of the island, albeit without any especially strong military presence.

The economic and social impact of European colonial authority on Borneo was mixed. Although the political power and authority of traditional leaders was compromised, the huge size and geographic difficulties of the island meant that colonial authority was, at best, only partial. Native rebellions in the early years of the twentieth century, notably the Mat Salleh revolt in North Borneo between 1895 and 1905, were crushed, but such armed revolt was exceptional. The expansion of mining (particularly the search for oil in eastern Kalimantan and Brunei), the development of plantation crops (notably rubber and tobacco), and attempts to open up communications both on the island and with neighboring regions (the steamship companies, for example, on both coast and river) gave some impetus to economic development. Attempts to develop

schooling and health facilities also were made in the colonial period, although the extent to which such efforts penetrated much beyond the coastal and estuarine regions is difficult to estimate. The number of Europeans on the island was always tiny; the impress of the colonial government was relatively light. The much fabled wealth of Borneo turned out to be largely illusory given the huge costs of development, especially in the interior. For both the Dutch and British, the priority was to govern as lightly and, ultimately, as cheaply as possible.

Demands for independence elsewhere in Southeast Asia were especially strong, but in Borneo, ethnic and social diversity, coupled with the constraints of geography, meant that concerted independence parties faced numerous obstacles. With the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia in 1949, the Kalimantan states became four provinces of Indonesia. In Sarawak and North Borneo, the move toward independence was more complex. Both became Crown Colonies in 1946, as their previous regimes—Sarawak under the Brookes and North Borneo administered by the chartered company—were anachronistic and became untenable after the Pacific War (1941–1945). The concept of associating the British territories in Borneo with Malaya had been a part of postimperial strategy for some years. The independence of Malaya in 1957 made the position of Brunei, North Borneo, and Sarawak increasingly acute. A 1962 coup in Brunei, seeking to link together Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei, failed, and in 1963, North Borneo (renamed Sabah) and Sarawak joined the newly created Federation of Malaysia. Brunei remained outside the federation and became a fully independent state in 1984.

Today, the island of Borneo remains a place of striking contrasts. Although large areas of the interior remain characterized, as they have been for hundreds of years, by extensive tropical rain forests and traditional indigenous cultures, the pace of both economic and environmental change in recent decades has been rapid. International logging companies have made major inroads, bringing wealth and employment as well as environmental damage and cultural change. International scientific interest in the consequences of tropical deforestation has put Bornean research high on the international agenda. In-migration from the densely popu-

lated provinces of Indonesia, accelerated through the transmigration program, has brought indigenous Borneans into conflict with their Javanese, Madurese, or Sumatran compatriots. The island is the scene of major international investment in resource extraction. Like the timber business, the hydrocarbon industry has been a catalyst for change. The pace of change on the island has never been greater, and the conflicts between traditional and modern, between the old and the new, have never been sharper.

MARK CLEARY

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Bajau; Banjarmasin (Banjermasin) Sultanate; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Brunei Ethnic Minorities; Brunei Malays; Brunei Oil and Gas Industry; Brunei Rebellion (December 1962); Chinese Gold-Mining Communities in Western Borneo; Dayaks; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Ecological Setting of Southeast Asia; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; Islam in Southeast Asia; Jungle/Forest Products; Kutai (Koetei); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Malays; Malaysia (1963); Mat Salleh Rebellion (1894–1905); Melaka; Metal Age Cultures in Southeast Asia; Neolithic Period of Southeast Asia; Niah Caves (Sarawak); Oil and Petroleum; Sambas and Pontianak Sultanates; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Swidden Agriculture

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BOROBUDUR

A Buddhist Prayer in Stone

Borobudur, on the island of Java (near the town of Magelang), is a monument with a complex architectural history. It was primarily designed between the reign of the Sanjaya dynasty (732–ca. 882 C.E.) and the end of the eighth century, as a pyramid to support a Hindu temple. Meanwhile, a Buddhist dynasty, the Sailendra (752–ca. 832 C.E.), was set up in the south of the island. Initially practicing mainly the rituals of the Lesser Vehicle (the belief that each individual is responsible for his or her own salvation), the dynasty adopted the cult of the five Jina (Buddhas who were never born but have existed for all eternity) from about 790 C.E. This new doctrine was a great success and probably was accompanied by a military campaign against the Sanjaya that was also highly successful. When the Sailendra took over the site of Borobudur, the monument was in an unfinished state, having only two lower terraces of the pyramid that was intended to support the temple. These two stages were built with perspective effects meant to increase the apparent height of the building; in addition, the width of the staircase leading to the



Borobudur Temple, Java, Indonesia. (Corel Corporation)

third level was narrower than the width of the next lowest level.

The Sailendra decided to resume the work but changed the character of the temple, which would become Buddhist. One of the first acts of the new master of works was to suppress the perspective effects, which in various forms were the mark of Hindu architecture of the period (the temples of Dieng and Gedong Songo comprised such forms). The worksite experienced several collapses that necessitated important alterations in the architectural program, leading to the present monument.

Staircases were cut into the axes of the base, and they were modified several times because of the relative fragility of the structure. In a second phase—which was never finished (like the first phase left incomplete by the Sanjaya)—the edifice had at the center of its summit a rather rude structure. Since this structure collapsed several times, the base had to be significantly enlarged, completely obliterating the already partially sculpted reliefs illustrating the Buddhist text *Karmavibhanga*.

On top of the base stood four galleries enclosed on their exteriors by balustrades supporting niches, in which were placed statues depicting one or another of the five Jinas; they corresponded to the cardinal directions with the fifth and more important considered to reside in the center. The retaining walls on each of these galleries were decorated with reliefs, which, on the first gallery, were divided into two registers. On the upper register, beginning at the eastern staircase and proceeding in a southerly direction, the reliefs illustrate the life of the historical Buddha until his arrival at Bénares; the lower reliefs, readable in the same direction, depict the previous lives of the Buddha.

The reliefs of the second and third galleries illustrate a text, the *Gandavyuha*, that recounts the quest for enlightenment undertaken by Sudhana, the son of a rich merchant. These reliefs do not imply that they should be read consecutively, since they contain numerous repetitions; it is thus probable that they were intended for something other than the education of pilgrims. These images contributed to

the overall significance of the edifice (a practice that was the rule from the fourteenth century onward in East Java). Some reliefs illustrating the earlier lives of the Buddha (with numerous gaps) were added between the ground level and the lower cornice of the balustrade of the first gallery; their addition certainly had a goal quite distinct from simply being read, for that cannot be done unless one bends over. The reliefs of the fourth gallery illustrate another text, the *Samantabhadrapranidhana*, also with some repetitions and omissions.

The upper level supports the superstructure of the edifice, consisting of three nearly circular terraces on which have been built 72 latticed stupas, each containing a Buddha statue. There are 32 with lattices in lozenge form on the first terrace, 24 with lozenge-shaped lattices on the second, and 16 with square lattices around the central stupa on the third terrace. This latter edifice, which seems to be solid but in fact contains two empty chambers or hollow spaces in its interior, was first thought to contain a statue of an unfinished Buddha, but when other unfinished Buddha images were found in the fill of the monument, this hypothesis was abandoned. It is probable that the crowning structure symbolizes the essence of Buddhism, the 72 Buddhas are those of the future, and the hollow spaces in the central stupa represent the true essence of the world.

In 1955, a serious cave-in took place on the north wall. Fortunately, the incident occurred at night and without injuries, but it revealed the instability of the monument. The director of the Archaeological Service, Soekmono, launched an appeal that led to several meetings in 1965 and resulted in a restoration project that the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) entrusted to C. Voûte.

This project only restored the four quadrangular galleries. The upper terrace, which had been restored by the Netherlander Theodoor Van Erp in 1911, was judged to be in sufficiently good condition that it did not need to be redone. Project managers decided to interfere with the nearby section of the base as little as possible, electing instead to simply dismantle some rainwater drains. The four galleries were disassembled and rebuilt on reinforced concrete foundations. One difficulty was experienced in this reconstruction: Van Erp had already dealt with this part of the structure, preserving defor-

mities caused by such factors as the leaning of the walls of the ruin. It was possible through research to attempt to restore them to their original form, however, thereby considerably reducing the width of the galleries and making it less convenient to walk through them; also, the galleries had been restored according to the layout that Van Erp had provided. The dismantled stones were a given complex treatment that consisted of drying each stone and setting the facing on a sheet of lead, but the most important task was the installation of two vertical layers of waterproofing behind the facing.

Borobudur is perhaps the finest Buddhist monument representing the architectural genius of the Sailendra dynasty. Although the reliefs are based on Indian models, the sculpturing work clearly reflects Javanese artistic traditions.

JACQUES DUMARÇAY

TRANSLATED BY JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also Buddhism; Buddhism, Theravada; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; *Jatakas*; Java; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Sailendras

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BOSCH, JOHANNES

See Van den Bosch, Count Johannes (1780–1844)

BOSE, SUBHAS CHANDRA (1897–1945)

Indian Nationalist Hero

Hailed as the “Netaji,” or Great Leader, at the height of his political career, Subhas Chandra

Bose was regarded by his admirers as almost an equal to Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) in the hierarchy of Indian nationalist heroes. According to a biographer, Bose was a charismatic man who provoked extreme reactions. His admirers idolized him for his style of leadership and fiery oratorical skills; his detractors regarded him as an ambitious man with authoritarian inclinations.

In 1942, he took the reins of leadership and revitalized the deflated Indian National Army (INA, Azad Hind Fauj). His involvement with the INA was motivated by both idealistic and pragmatic reasons. The INA not only served as a vehicle for Bose's burning ambition to prize India from British imperial rule, it was also supposedly formed (as revealed in the INA trials in 1946) to save thousands of Indian prisoners of war who faced starvation unless they organized themselves to fight on the side of the Japanese in the Pacific War (1941–1945). In the early 1940s, with prominent nationalist leaders placed in jail following the abortive Quit India movement, Bose became the most visible symbol of the Indian nationalist resistance to British rule.

Born in Cuttack, Bengal, Bose received his early education in Calcutta. He was influenced very early on by the philosophical teachings of Vivekenanda and Aurobindo Ghosh. He proceeded to England in 1919 and earned a place to read a tripos in moral sciences at Cambridge University. However, he was soon influenced by political developments in India. He abandoned his studies in 1921 to return home to participate in the nationalist movement spearheaded by Gandhi. During the 1920s, Bose was to spend several years in jail for his revolutionary activities. But as he got deeply involved in the nationalist movement, he became increasingly disillusioned with the nonviolent Gandhian approach.

His political differences with Gandhi cost him the presidency of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee in 1939, where he was subsequently barred from holding elective office for three years. In 1941, while under house arrest, Bose escaped his British jailers and surfaced in Berlin. Having secured the support of Adolf Hitler (1889–1945), dictator of Nazi Germany, Bose then traveled to Southeast Asia, where, with the help of the Japanese, he entrenched himself as the leader of the Indian Independence League (IIL) and the INA. Under

his stewardship, both the civilian arm (represented by the IIL) and the military arm (the INA) were reorganized and expanded. The prime objective of the INA, as envisioned by Bose, was to launch a "second front" in India's struggle for independence. Aided by the Japanese, Bose went on to organize and head the Free India Provisional Government in 1943.

The political career of Subhas Chandra Bose came to an abrupt end in August 1945 when he was fatally wounded in a plane crash in Taiwan. Despite the brevity of his political life, Bose was remembered as the man who offered an alternative approach to the Indian independence movement through his convictions and the way in which he went about realizing them.

TAN TAI YONG

See also Imphal-Kohima, Battle of (1944); Indian National Army (INA); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia

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BOURBON REFORMS

The establishment of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain with the accession of Philip V (r. 1700–1746), grandson of Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715) of France, opened the country to the ideas of the Enlightenment. It heralded a prolonged period of reform under his successors, particularly during the reign of Charles III (r. 1759–1788). In the Philippines, the eighteenth century was distinguished by attempts to diversify trade, develop domestic resources more intensively, and overhaul public administration. Reforms were aimed at increasing economic productivity through state-directed enterprise and fostering commerce by a more liberal stance toward foreign merchants. In his General Economic Development Plan of 1779, Governor-General José Basco y Vargas (t. 1778–1787) proposed incentives for developing the islands' natural resources, favored further Chinese im-

migration, and recommended changes to the “galleon trade.” The Plan for Reforming the Government of the Philippines, devised by his successor, Felix Berenguer de Marquina (t. 1788–1793), advocated opening Manila to foreign shipping, a policy that was effectively accomplished under the administration of Rafael María de Aguilar y Ponce de León (t. 1793–1806). In fact, the archipelago did not lack either readily exploitable resources (including gold, silver, and base metals) or suitable land for the cultivation of commercial crops (such as pepper, nutmeg, clove, cinnamon, sugarcane, tobacco, dyewoods, and timber). Rather, their neglect was due more to a merchant class grown rich and complacent on the easy profits of the monopolistic Manila-Acapulco trade. And just as the economic recovery of eighteenth-century Spain was greatly facilitated by the state’s role in supporting the activities of joint-stock companies and economic societies, so these institutions similarly played a part in the development of the Philippines.

Proposals for a joint-stock company to initiate trade between Spain and the Philippines had first been raised at the beginning of the century, but it was not until 10 March 1785 that the Real Compañía de Filipinas was established. The company was granted an exclusive charter to sail directly to Manila and other Asian ports, and it had permission to carry merchandise to and from the Americas; its first vessel sailed from Cádiz on 1 October 1785. In the Philippines, the company attempted to develop agriculture by purchasing local products such as sugarcane, cotton, and indigo; planting mulberry trees; and introducing skilled labor to cultivate pepper. Most of these ventures, however, proved unsustainable, and the company’s activities were already seriously in decline by 1789.

The company was finally dissolved in 1834. The reasons for its failure were almost as varied as its activities: the chaotic conditions in Spain from 1808 to 1814; the uncertainties of the American trade during the War of Independence (1775–1783); the opposition of competitors; and the complications of simultaneously being a product’s investor, producer, and carrier. In its final years, growing debts, internal dissension, the continuing hostility of galleon traders, and disputes in Spain further hampered its ac-

tivities. Yet the company did provide a new sense of direction for Philippine agriculture, drawing attention away from the Pacific to Europe, breaking the monopoly of the Manila galleon, and linking the archipelago to the contemporary commercial world.

Equally instrumental to the development of the Philippine economy was the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País de Manila, established on 26 April 1781 and modeled after similar organizations in Spain and England. Composed of a small group of educated people, it established committees to investigate the natural history of the country and to promote local agriculture, industry, and trade. In particular, it organized the translation and publication of the latest scientific literature from Europe; convened regular meetings to disseminate such material; and offered prizes to cultivators, farmers, and inventors. Despite the society’s promising start, however, interest soon began to flag, and it was dissolved in 1809. Revived by royal orders in 1811 and 1813, it played only a minor role during the nineteenth century. In the long run, however, the society was much more successful in making a wider public aware of the potentialities for economic enterprise in the archipelago. It was only after the colony’s integration into the world commodity market in the 1820s that such ventures became more viable commercial propositions.

The colonial administration was also a target of reform during that period. Finances were placed on a sounder footing with the introduction of an *intendencia* (monitoring) system in 1784, the overhaul of government monopolies, and the creation of new ones. The most significant measure concerned the establishment of a tobacco monopoly in 1782 that confined cultivation to designated regions where no alternative crop could be grown and where even producers were forbidden from consuming their own products. Monitoring all these monopolies required the concomitant creation of a custom’s agency, but that agency’s troopers were often ill paid and easily bribed. The result was rampant smuggling. However, these reforms did generally prove effective in raising revenues, and the tobacco monopoly in particular became the colony’s single most important source of funds after the loss of the *situado* (the yearly subsidy

sent to the Spanish colonial administration in the Philippines from the Spanish treasury in Mexico) with Mexican independence (1821).

Despite the more modern character of many of these measures, however, mercantilism remained the governing paradigm of the Bourbon monarchy, and colonies were only considered to exist for the benefit of the metropolis. Overlooking the interests of the indigenes in the pursuit of enriching the metropolis sowed the seeds of discontent that subsequently evolved into nationalistic aspirations for independence toward the closing years of the nineteenth century.

GREG BANKOFF

See also Galleon Trade; Manila; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Tobacco

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BOWRING TREATY (1855)

See Bowring, Sir John (1792–1872)

BOWRING, SIR JOHN (1792–1872)
Advocate of Free Trade

Sir John Bowring was a British diplomat who succeeded in negotiating with King Mongkut (Rama IV, r. 1851–1868) of Siam (Thailand) to sign a treaty opening Siam to Western com-

merce and culture in the middle of the nineteenth century. Bowring was a journal editor in the 1820s. During the 1830s and 1840s, he served as a member of Parliament and supported a free trade policy. In 1849, he took up a diplomatic career and was appointed British consul at Canton (Guangzhou) and superintendent of trade in China. In 1854, he assumed the governorship of Hong Kong.

Bowring was chosen by the British government to travel to Bangkok in 1855 as head of a government mission, rather than as a representative of the British East India Company (EIC). The main purpose of his mission was to persuade King Mongkut to open up Siam to Western trade after the British had failed to persuade King Rama III (r. 1824–1851), Mongkut's predecessor, to adopt a liberal trade policy.

Bowring was very well received by Mongkut, who recognized the power of Western colonialism and realized that Siam had to change its foreign policy if the kingdom was to avoid the same fate as Burma (Myanmar), defeated by the British in the war of 1824 to 1826. In the Bowring Treaty, signed in 1855, Siam agreed to adopt a free trade policy and allow the British to do business without intervention. Import and export taxes were levied at a fixed low level; in addition, British subjects were given extraterritorial rights (Wyatt 1984: 183–184). Even though the Bowring Treaty put Siam in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the Western powers, it undoubtedly helped save the kingdom from colonization and enabled Siam to develop into a modern state in terms of foreign trade and relations.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Free Trade; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Preservation of Siam's Political Independence; Reforms and Modernization in Siam

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BRIGGS PLAN

Cutting the Lifeline

The Malayan Emergency in British-ruled Malaya was declared in June 1948 in response to attempts by the mainly Chinese-dominated Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to overthrow British colonial rule. The communists launched a campaign of terror and sabotage with a spate of murders and destruction of rubber trees and tin mine equipment; the communists' objective was to cripple the colonial economy (rubber and tin) and, in the ensuing economic collapse and social chaos, to seize power. When the state of Emergency entered its third year in 1950, the British government announced the appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs to plan, coordinate, and direct the anticommunist operations. The Briggs Plan was but one of a variety of strategies—military, political, socioeconomic, and psychological warfare—employed by the British colonial government in countering the communist insurgency. One of the major features of these operations, which had already been implemented before Briggs arrived, was the resettlement of thousands of Chinese squatters who lived near the jungle fringes and were thought to provide the communist insurgents with their primary source of food, assistance, and information. Briggs restructured the plan more thoroughly by coordinating the civil, army, and police authorities. But before he had completed two years of service, ill health forced him to return to Britain. Ultimately, however, the plan that he drafted succeeded in disrupting the communists' "masses organizations" (*min yuen*) and isolating resettlement areas (later known as New Villages) from the communist insurgents.

At the height of the resettlement program in 1954, some 500,000 men, women, and children, 85 percent of whom were Chinese, were resettled in the New Villages (Stubbs 1989: 102). In 1952, expenditures on the New Villages amounted to \$43.6 million Malayan; in 1954, the figure rose to \$49.4 million (Stubbs 1989: 109–110). The sites of the New Villages were carefully surveyed and developed. They were located near main roads and were formed by extending the limits of existing towns; they were also enclosed by protective barbed-wire fences. The lands were provided by state governments and were usually surrounded by valu-

able estates or smallholdings. The New Villages looked like concentration camps, and each had its own police barracks, stations, and watchtowers. The movements of the New Villagers and their visitors were carefully checked at the gates each time they entered or exited. A curfew was imposed from 7:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M. For those residents who gained their livelihood by working outside the New Villages on rubber estates, smallholdings, or tin mines, the curfew restrictions were rather frustrating, as they had to endure long delays each day caused by security checks at the gates. The New Villagers were allowed to form their own home guards to help the police protect and defend their areas, and by the end of 1952, more than 150,000 Chinese and Malay home guards were defending over 2,000 settlements (Stubbs 1989: 158). Many of these home guard troops were armed with shotguns.

The New Villagers were provided with normal social services. Roads and drains were laid out, wooden houses were built, wells were dug, and latrines were erected. Force was initially used to remove squatters from their land. Police screened these individuals, and then their huts were demolished and burned down. The squatters were transported in trucks to the new sites, escorted by British soldiers or local police. Gradually, shops and schools were opened and medical services were provided in the New Villages. Chinese-speaking officers were put in charge of the settlements, and even Christian missionaries helped in resettlement work.

Since the squatters were illegal occupants of the land, and since the communists sought out squatter farmers as a source of recruits, information, and food and medical supplies, attempts were made to provide each family with legally authorized land and thus to sever the lifeline of the communists. But this plan ran into trouble. The Malay-dominated state governments that exercised constitutional jurisdiction over land were not supportive. They had seen the large amount of money and attention being lavished on the New Villages and the Chinese, whom they considered to be responsible for the lawlessness and the persistent trouble with the communists, even as the largely law-abiding rural Malays were being neglected. They were, therefore, reluctant to alienate more land for New Village agriculture.

Undoubtedly, the resettlement of the squatters under the Briggs Plan did succeed in its aim of severing the close ties between the squatters and the communist insurgents. It also put pressure on the insurgents to come out into the open in search of food, where they could be attacked by the security forces. And over time, the resettlement program changed the demographic picture of Malaya, as many of the New Villages grew and developed into the large townships that exist today along the main trunk roads of Peninsular Malaya (West Malaysia).

CHEAH BOON-KHENG

See also Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); “New Villages” (Malaya/Malaysia); Strategic Hamlet Program (Vietnam); Templer, General Sir Gerald (1898–1970)

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BRITISH BORNEO

The term *British Borneo* referred to the northwestern Bornean territories of Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah) (present-day East Malaysia) and the Malay kingdom of Brunei that came into being in 1888 when all three territories became protectorates of Britain. Until the mid-nineteenth century, the sultanates of Brunei and Sulu held vague overlordship over Sarawak and North Borneo. The chance intervention of an English gentleman-adventurer—James Brooke (1803–1868), who became the raja of Sarawak in 1841—led to the establishment of a dynasty of White Rajas. Brooke and his successors expanded Sarawak’s frontiers eastward until 1905 with the acquisition of Lawas.

The British East India Company (EIC) secured the cession of Labuan from Brunei in 1846, and Labuan remained a Crown Colony until 1890, when it was administered as part of British North Borneo. In the late 1870s, private Western entrepreneurs negotiated the cession of territories in North Borneo from the sul-

tanates of Brunei and Sulu. In 1881, the territory of North Borneo (Sabah) was established and administered by the British North Borneo Chartered Company.

Throughout the Pacific War (1941–1945), British Borneo was occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army. In the postwar period, from 1946 to 1963, Sarawak and British North Borneo were Crown Colonies. In 1963, Sarawak and North Borneo joined the Federation of Malaysia and became East Malaysia. (Thereafter, North Borneo resurrected its ancient name of Sabah.) Brunei remained a British protectorate until its independence in 1984.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also British Interests in Southeast Asia; British North Borneo Chartered Company; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Labuan (1847); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago

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BRITISH BURMA

British Burma, which encompassed the area now known as the Union of Myanmar (Burma), was created as a result of three wars between the British East India Company (EIC) and the Burman Konbaung dynasty, whereby the latter was subsequently liquidated. After the first conflict (1824–1826), the British were ceded Arakan and Tenasserim; Pegu was annexed following the second war (1852). Initially, Arakan, Tenasserim, and Pegu (collectively referred to as Lower Burma) were known as British Burma. The Konbaung rulers continued to rule over Upper Burma. The third and final Anglo-Burmese War (1885) witnessed not only the annexation of Upper Burma but also the abolishment of the Konbaung monarchy. The whole country of what is today Myanmar be-

came British Burma, and until the late 1890s, it was administered as part of the Presidency of Bengal of British India. British Burma dissociated itself from the Bengal government in 1897; thereafter, it became a province in itself administratively but remained part of British India. Rangoon (present-day Yangon) was the seat of government. In 1937, British Burma ceased to be part of British India and became a British colony. During the Pacific War, Imperial Japanese forces invaded and occupied the country (from 1942 to 1945). In 1948, Britain granted the colony independence, and the Union of Burma came into being.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); East India Company (EIC) (1602), English; Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism

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BRITISH INDIA, GOVERNMENT OF

The British encounter with India began in the early seventeenth century when the merchants and traders of the East India Company (EIC) steadily established a series of factories—warehouses—around the coast of the subcontinent, notably in Madras (Chennai), Bombay (Mumbai), and Calcutta. From its coastal settlements, the EIC, driven by the desire to protect its trade and other vested interests, gradually extended political control over large tracts of Indian territories. The expansion of British power in the subcontinent was, to a large extent, facilitated by a divided and weakened India as well as a power vacuum created by the declining Mughal Empire (1526–1857). By the mid-nineteenth century, the EIC had become the dominant political power in India, and most of the subcontinent soon came under direct or indirect British rule.

Having acquired political control over large parts of India, the British had to decide on the best way of governing their empire. From the capture of Calcutta in the mid-eighteenth cen-

tury to the annexation of the Punjab nearly a century later, the stabilization of land revenue in the territories they held became a critical feature of EIC administration. The business of expansion exacted heavy resources, and money was needed to finance expensive wars of conquests and annexation and also to maintain the ever-growing military machinery. In the first instance, the EIC sought to institutionalize revenue collections based on local practices. In and around Bengal, a permanent settlement was effected with the established local order—the large landed magnates—to secure land revenue. In the west and south, the EIC adopted the *ryotwari* system, whereby payment of land revenue was arranged with individual proprietors, not collectively through headmen or chiefs, on the basis of the assumed value of the fields.

As the EIC transformed itself from a mere trading company to a territorial power and a political body responsible for the collection of revenue in many parts of India, it found that it had to expand its increasingly lucrative trade with China to meet its growing administrative costs in India. And as interests in the China trade increased, the EIC found a renewed interest in the Southeast Asian trade as well. This prompted the search for a strategic foothold along the Straits of Melaka that could be used to safeguard the company's trade route to the market in China as well as to counter Dutch influence (and trade monopoly) in the region. The need for a suitable base east of the Bay of Bengal had long been evident to EIC servants in India, who were concerned that India's eastern flank was especially vulnerable to a naval foe operating from the east.

In the late eighteenth century, Capt. Francis Light (1740–1794) had acquired a settlement in the island of Penang at the northern tip of the Straits of Melaka. But the island settlement was located too far north to be of strategic importance in the ensuing Anglo-Dutch rivalry. As it turned out, from their base in Penang, the British could hardly challenge the Dutch in the archipelago. In 1819, the lieutenant governor of Benkulen, Stamford Raffles (1781–1826), obtained permission from Lord Hastings (t. 1774–1785), governor-general at Calcutta, to search for a base farther south in the Straits of Melaka. This led to the founding of Singapore. By 1824, following the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, the EIC further entrenched its monopoly in the

Straits of Melaka by securing Melaka to add to Penang and Singapore. Two years later, the three port cities were amalgamated into the Straits Settlements (with Singapore as its headquarters from 1832) and governed from Calcutta. In 1851, the Straits Settlements were transferred from the Bengal Presidency to the direct supervision of the governor-general and the supreme government of India. The interests of the Straits Settlements and the government of India at Calcutta soon diverged, however, and in 1867, control of the Straits Settlements was transferred to the Colonial Office in London, thereby severing India's legislative and judicial control over British territories in peninsular and insular Southeast Asia.

During the nineteenth century, the government of India's concern to secure its northeastern borders against an ambitious Burmese empire, compounded by commercial designs and Anglo-French imperial rivalry, led to three separate Anglo-Burmese wars, culminating in the annexation of Burma to the British Indian Empire in 1886. The first war started in 1824 and concluded two years later with the Treaty of Yandabo, which placed Arakan and Tenasserim under British control. In 1852, Governor-General Lord Dalhousie, James Ramsay (t. 1847–1856), anxious to secure a continuous British-dominated eastern Indian coastline up to Melaka and Singapore, acquired Pegu after a brief conflict with the Burmese kingdom. Then, in 1885, suspicions that the Burmese king was consorting with the French against British interests led to a third war, which eventually resulted in the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886. Burma would be part of the British Empire in India until 1935, when the Government of India Act of the same year excluded the administration of the Burmese territories from the Indian Federation.

During the process of expansion and consolidation, the nature and objective of the British government in India became subjects of intense debate in London and India. The traditionalists argued that the EIC should not interfere too directly in the lives of its Indian subjects, who should, under British patronage, be tutored in their own culture and great traditions. The reformers (the utilitarians and evangelicals), by contrast, insisted that Britain had a "moral duty" to "civilize" India according to the modern British model. In the 1820s and 1830s, the

reformers held sway, and India went through an "age of reform." During this period, the wages and budgets of EIC servants were curtailed, Indians were brought into the lower rungs of administration, and the English penal code and education were introduced into the system. Historians have argued that the reforms had only a limited impact on Indian society and that the experience existed mainly in the minds of the British, who were concerned with India but not with the Indians. Nonetheless, British reforms unified India through a centralized administrative, political, and legal structure in which the apex at Calcutta (and later Delhi) was integrated with the provincial, district, and village administrations. The "steel frame" of empire consolidated British rule in India. This was particularly apparent after the revolt of 1857, when EIC rule was replaced by Crown rule, creating a centralized system of governance that permeated to the provincial and district levels.

To a very large extent, the administrative and judicial structures that were created in the British Empire in Southeast Asia were based on the British India model of governance, particularly when key administrative and military positions were regularly dominated by former members of the Bengal service as well as officers of the Bengal and Madras armies. But as in India, even with an elaborate administrative structure, effective British government continued to depend on strategic alliances forged between the rulers and the ruled.

Under British rule, the Indian economy was developed to serve Britain's industrial and imperial interests. India provided a vital market for British products and was a key supplier of raw materials to Britain and other markets in Europe and the United States. It also became a great recipient of British capital, and by the outbreak of World War I (1914–1918), about one-fifth of British capital overseas was invested in India. By the middle of the nineteenth century, with the abolition of slavery in the British Empire and the French colonies, India, too, became a major supplier of labor to various parts of the British Empire. Large numbers of people from India moved into Southeast Asia as indentured laborers, service workers, or merchants, taking advantage of the opportunities offered by an imperial labor market and trading network. From the third quarter of the nineteenth

century, many from British India moved to Burma to take up employment opportunities when the latter came to be administrated as part of the Indian Raj after 1886. A similar exodus occurred when Indian immigrants went to Malaya to work in the rubber plantations there from the early decades of the twentieth century. On the eve of the Pacific War (1941–1945), there were an estimated 1 million Indians in Burma and about 750,000, mainly Tamils, in Malaya.

By the late nineteenth century, as Indian nationalism slowly gained momentum in the subcontinent, the British started to draw in the moderate, Western-educated Indian elite as political allies in a bid to deflect increasingly strident criticisms of and organized opposition to colonial rule. Indians were gradually brought into decision-making bodies by political reforms to the legislative mechanisms, as well as the “Indianization” of the civil service and military. By the twentieth century, the British government in India responded to the challenge of mass-based nationalist politics mainly by promoting containment through constitutional changes.

During the Pacific War, India was spared the ignominy of defeat that befell the rest of the British Empire in Southeast Asia, but the threat of a Japanese invasion through Burma remained throughout. The nationalist movement picked up momentum during the war years with the Quit India movement in India in 1942 and the mobilization of Indian prisoners of war (POWs) in Southeast Asia into the Indian National Army (INA), whose objective was to liberate India through a military invasion with Japanese help. Neither movement achieved its objectives: the Quit India movement was suppressed by British troops within weeks of being launched, and the INA turned out to be nothing more than a paper tiger that hardly threatened the British forces that engaged INA troops at the Imphal-Kohima front.

By the end of the war, the British were ready to relinquish their empire in the subcontinent. With the exception of Burma, which shared a similar constitutional experience with the rest of India until 1935, political changes and the nationalist movements in the British Empire in Southeast Asia did not keep pace with their Indian counterparts. And though the subcontinent and Burma achieved their respec-

tive independence a few years after the end of the Pacific War, the rest of the British Empire in Southeast Asia remained as colonies until the mid-1960s.

TAN TAI YONG

See also Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Chettiars (Chettyars); East India Company (EIC) (1602), English; Imphal-Kohima, Battle of (1944); Indian Immigrants; Indian National Army (INA); Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Penang (1786); Singapore (1819); Straits Settlements (1826–1941); Yandabo (1826), Treaty of

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BRITISH INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In Southeast Asia, as in other parts of the world, the nature of British interests varied over time, reflecting a variation in the relative importance of commercial, economic, political, strategic, religious, cultural, and demographic concerns. There was a regional variation as well, so that, although security of the homeland was necessarily always the prime interest, the relative importance of British interests in other parts of the world, of whatever kind, might fluctuate. There were also questions of hierarchy, questions of coordination, and questions of perception. The definition of British interests was contested among the groups involved—merchants and manufacturers, politicians and administrators, church and state, private groups and individuals and public opinion, local and metropolitan authorities. The mode in which the definition was contested also varied over time, given the growth of communications, the advance of literacy, and the development of democracy.

In no period did Southeast Asia enjoy a priority among British interests. Its importance to the British was often the result of factors extraneous to the region, such as its position in relation to its great neighbors, India and China. Nor was Southeast Asia always seen as a region, though it was recognized that significant interests in one part of the region might make another part of it important as well. And if the importance of the region to British interests was often indirect, so was the importance of some states or territories within the region.

Britain may be regarded as having been constituted, or reconstituted, when two of the “three kingdoms,” England and Scotland, were drawn into the Union of 1707. That was part of a yet wider reconstruction that followed the Revolution of 1688 and that included, for example, the creation of the Bank of England. The reconstruction marked a further step in the emergence of the British islands from the division and conflict of the seventeenth century and the assertion of a wider role. Britain was not yet an industrial power, nor did it possess an empire in India. Its trade there—monopol-

ized by the East India Company (EIC), chartered in 1600—was expanding, however, as a result of the fashion for Indian textiles. So, too, was its trade in China, then the source of the tea that became first a fashionable and then a popular drink, as well as a source of revenue.

Southeast Asia, particularly the area around the Straits of Melaka, became important to the British because it flanked the route to and from Canton (Guangzhou), the only port the Manchu dynasty opened to the British. The emergence of this interest concerned the Dutch, for it was a potential source of disruption for their empire in Java and the straits. They were concerned, too, by the commercial penetration of the Indies by the “country traders” based in India. The (Dutch) United East India Company (VOC), predominant in the seventeenth century, failed to compete effectively in textiles and tea. Its more old-fashioned monopoly of the spice trade therefore seemed all the more important. Indeed, the British were unwilling to accept the Dutch monopoly in the spice trade, since the fine spices were still confined to Maluku. To that point, however, they offered no open challenge. Good relations with the Dutch in Europe were a priority.

Britain’s interests in Southeast Asia changed again when the East India Company became a territorial power in India. That outcome was precipitated by the transfer to the subcontinent of the bitter rivalry between the two main Western European powers, Britain and France, and the attempts of the commercially weaker player to gain advantage over the stronger by intervening in Indian politics. The Battle of Plassey (1757) can be regarded as a turning point. After that, the dominion of the British—still represented by the company, though from 1773 increasingly regulated and controlled from London—advanced. Threats from the French were still a factor, intensified with the new series of wars with France following the Revolution in 1789 and the rise of Napoleon (1769–1821). So, too, however, were the profits of conquest and acquisition, public and personal, though attempts were made—most famously with the 1788 trial of Warren Hastings (1732–1818)—to limit the corruption found in their connection.

Territorial dominion in India gave Britain additional resources. Commercially, it facilitated

the expansion of the trade with China, providing opium as a means of paying for China tea at a time when British manufactures failed to penetrate the market; politically, it helped by providing the revenue and labor needed for maintaining or expanding ventures in the subcontinent and beyond. But this territorial dominion also imposed new responsibilities. The security of India became a factor in Britain's foreign policy. Indeed, India had security needs of its own, not entirely compatible with the needs of Britain itself. In India, Britain was a "continental" power, concerned that no state on its frontiers should be in a position to challenge it. Such states had to be kept clear of foreign European powers, such as the French and the Russians. They also had to demonstrate a degree of submission, so as not to set a bad example to the states on the subcontinent that entered what were called "subsidiary alliances" with the company. These requirements were not those of a commercial power, yet such was increasingly the nature of Britain's preferred relationship with the world.

It is easy to antedate the impact of the Industrial Revolution on Britain and its place in the world. But contemporaries clearly recognized that the creation of the first industrial society was a revolution. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, if not sooner, the British came to recognize that they would gain more by promoting free trade than by adhering to the mercantilist regulation of the past. Furthermore, that approach would serve them better in promoting relations with other parts of the world on the basis of free trade rather than on a colonial basis. At the same time, they sensed that their advantages might be temporary, as others emulated and caught up with them. A small country on the fringe of Europe should not build a world empire. The "imperialism of free trade" was a striking but somewhat misleading description of Britain's policy at midcentury. The British were determined, for example, not to make China "another India." The "unequal treaties" were not a colonial relationship. Nor did the British believe that other powers—even the French—should be deprived of all opportunity overseas.

Their security at this time was enhanced by political as well as economic success. France had been defeated at sea at the Battle of Trafalgar (1805) and on land at Waterloo (1815). Those

victories met Britain's prime interest, security in Europe. It was sustained in the subsequent decades by what is sometimes called the balance-of-power policy but what is better seen as an attempt to avoid the dominance of the Continent by any one power. The creation of a new kingdom of the Netherlands—initially including the Belgian provinces of the Hapsburgs as well as the old Dutch Republic—was an attempt to check the French. It was also designed to secure the independence of that part of Europe from which Britain was most vulnerable to attack.

The position of Southeast Asia in this phase reflected the nature of Britain's interests and the priorities among them. Despite its great power, Britain made no attempt to secure dominion over the region as a whole. Indeed, at least until the First Anglo-China War (1840–1842), it adopted a cautious policy on the mainland, lest it alienate the Chinese and damage the company's trade at Canton. It made a conciliatory treaty with Siam in 1826 and vainly sought to make one with Nguyễn Vietnam, accepting failure without any punitive action. When the break with China came and the victorious British acquired Hong Kong and made the first unequal treaties, no real break occurred in the relationship with the states to the south. Siam, in fact, made its own unequal treaty, the Bowring Treaty of 1855. Again, Vietnam failed to follow its example. The British did not, however, oppose the expedition that Napoleon III (1808–1873) sent against Vietnam from 1858 to 1859, ostensibly to support the cause of the Catholic missionaries. Their ambassador in Paris was instructed to ascertain the "ulterior object" of the expedition, if any, but "not to convey the impression that the French operations are viewed with any jealousy or suspicion" (Letter from Malmesbury 1858).

In Burma, however, Britain's policy differed, for it was an Indian policy, determined not by commercial interests at home or indeed abroad but by the security interests of the new subcontinental dominion. It was imperative that no foreign power establish itself in Burma, and beyond that, Burma itself had to accept a measure of subordination if it was to retain its independence. It refused. The First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826) was the result. Apparently, the only way to mark British supremacy was through the acquisition of Arakan and Tenasserim, yet that was not the object of the war,

and it did not put Anglo-Burman relations on a secure footing. A second war followed in 1852, again less the result of the commercial disputes that were its ostensible cause than of the incompatible political objectives of the two states. Viceroy James Ramsay Dalhousie's (t. 1847–1856) answer was to acquire Pegu. But there is good reason to contend that he had not, in the radical Richard Cobden's (1804–1865) phrase, "got up" a war for that purpose. Dalhousie argued strongly against trying to secure a new treaty: it would only be a further source of dispute and lead to further territorial expansion. That should, he believed, be absolutely avoided.

In archipelagic Southeast Asia, the British demonstrated their ability to dislodge the other colonial powers but did not, in the event, do so. The need to provide for India's security gave the British a new interest not only in Burma but also in the western parts of the archipelago, from which the Bay of Bengal and thus the Coromandel Coast were vulnerable. The company's sole remaining settlement—at Bencoolen (Bengkulu) in West Sumatra—was too remote to be useful. That fact was an argument for acquiring Penang from the sultan of neighboring Kedah in 1786. However, in doing so, the company intended both to avoid a clash with Siam, to which Kedah owed tribute, and to avoid a challenge to the Dutch. Kedah was beyond the fringe of their empire in the Malay world, now focused on Maluku, Java, and Melaka.

Britain's concern for its own security put a premium on friendly relations with the Dutch Republic. Only when the republic came under French influence did the British move against the Dutch in the Indies. That had happened during the American Revolution (1775–1783). At its conclusion, however, the republic remained under the patronage of the French, which was one reason indeed for Britain to acquire Penang. In the peace treaty of 1784, the British had had to restore the acquisitions they had made, though to protect the country traders, they had secured the assurance of a right of free navigation in the "Eastern Seas," that is, Southeast Asian waters. The overthrow of the pro-French Patriots in 1787 was followed by a British attempt to reconcile the interests of the British and the Dutch. The former hoped to secure Trincomalee (Ceylon/Sri Lanka) as a naval base. They were no longer

prepared to challenge the spice monopoly in Maluku, but they wanted a settlement at Riau. That would enable them to protect the route to China and provide an entrepôt for country trade with the archipelago, without directly challenging the position of the Dutch. The proposals looked toward an Anglo-Dutch compromise. But not even a friendly Dutch regime could, at that time, accept those terms. The compromise followed after the new sequence of French wars, in particular in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 17 March 1824.

That agreement affirmed that the British would accept Dutch predominance in the archipelago, provided that the Dutch levied only limited customs on Britain's trade. In addition, the Dutch, though taking over Bencoolen, had to transfer Melaka to the British and to accept that Singapore, occupied by Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) in 1819, should remain in British hands. With what became the Straits Settlements, the British could protect the route to China and secure a share of the trade of the archipelago, from which Bugis and other traders came. India helped to meet the expenses of the settlements, making it easier to free them from customs duties and all the more commercially attractive. The treaty created a kind of divide between peninsula and archipelago but not a frontier: the removal of the Dutch from the peninsula did not mean the insertion of the British. The treaty did, however, warn off other powers. At times, the two powers were at odds, particularly over the commercial clauses of the treaty, but overall, their compromise endured.

In the 1840s, a time of bad relations with the Dutch and, more generally, of commercial recession, the British government offered some support to the venture James Brooke (1803–1868) undertook in Sarawak and Brunei, though Borneo had arguably been left to the Dutch in 1824. Britain played down its commitments in the following decade, as prosperity returned and the Brooke venture became more controversial. But it did not endorse his policy in Sulu, where, in 1849, he had made a treaty with the sultan. That treaty challenged the claims of Spain, and Spain protested. Once more, European concerns prevailed at the British Foreign Office. The question of the Sulu treaty was to "sleep," said the foreign secretary. Pressing it would only promote French influence at Madrid.

The British had restored Manila to Spain after capturing it in 1762 during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). The Spaniards sought to avoid antagonism—and, after the loss of Mexico and Peru, to gain revenue—by opening the Philippines to foreign trade in the new century. That gave the British a further stake in the continuance of their rule.

The 1870s saw a revival of the rivalry among European powers, promoted by the spread of the Industrial Revolution and the movement for national unification; this rivalry would be extended beyond Europe in the subsequent decades by an industrializing United States and a modernizing Japan. At the same time, non-European states felt the effects of that political rivalry and also of the economic and social changes promoted by the industrial and communications revolutions, and they generally found it difficult to respond.

In Southeast Asia, the changes threatened the arrangements that protected the interests of the British during the days of their primacy. The changes they made were reactive. They entered a third Burmese war in 1885 and abolished the kingdom of Burma on their victory. They established residents in a number of west coast Malay states in 1874, chartered the British North Borneo Company in 1881, and made the Borneo territories what they called “ordinary protectorates” in 1888. But those moves were designed to sustain a number of British interests in a changing world—in particular, the security of the route to China—and not to change the world. They did not, moreover, simply involve moving from informal dominance to formal empire: even where the British decided to strengthen their position, they sought to do so without provoking others. Burma was again an exception. There, a French threat, intended, it now seems clear, to give the Third Republic leverage over Siam and Laos, was met by war and acquisition. When the partition of Southeast Asia turned to repartition, the British were clear that they could not intervene in the Philippines. If the Spaniards could not remain, it was better that they should be replaced by the Americans rather than by the Germans. With that, too, the United States recruited itself, somewhat uncertainly, to the ranks of the colonial powers and placed an obstacle in the way of the Japanese, who had acquired Taiwan in 1895.

One theme in the world history of the early twentieth century was the question of the succession to Britain's primacy. Two potential superpowers were emerging, Russia and the United States. Could a powerful Germany then share world power? That notion lay behind the reckless policies of the kaiser and the yet more extreme policies of Adolf Hitler (1889–1945). The world wars, for which they bore prime responsibility, brought about the predominance of the two superpowers. Germany was defeated, but Britain, though on the victorious side, was greatly weakened, economically and politically.

That fact was reflected in Southeast Asia. One part of it gained a priority among British interests that it had not previously enjoyed, but in a sense, that outcome reflected weakness rather than strength. After intervention, the Peninsular Malay States had been a major source of tin. The development of the automobile industry spawned a rubber boom in the early twentieth century. That made Malaya a dollar-earner, and the Great War (1914–1918) made dollar earnings significant for Britain and the “sterling area” as a whole. Postwar, too, Singapore gained a new strategic importance, marked by the laborious and expensive creation of a naval base. But again, this was a sign of weakness as much as strength. It reflected Britain's commitment, under the Washington treaties of 1921 and 1922, not to modernize Hong Kong. It also reflected Britain's attempt to meet commitments in Asia as well as Europe with a one-ocean navy. No substantial fleet would be permanently based in Singapore; a major fleet would be sent there in case of crisis. In other parts of Southeast Asia in the interwar period, the British generally pursued cautious policies designed to avoid upsetting the status quo. Burma was, as ever, an exception and, as ever, because of its connection with India. Pressed by Burmese nationalism, the British accepted that Burma, as well as India, should advance to self-government.

Challenged by the Americans' decision to build a two-ocean fleet and by their embargoes, the Japanese abandoned their notion that, given time, Southeast Asia would fall into their hands. They dislodged the colonial regimes by a dramatic invasion in 1941 and 1942. Like the other colonial powers, the British nevertheless intended to return when the Japanese had been overthrown. Malaya and Singapore, they be-

lieved, would be no less important to them in the postwar world. But it was necessary to put their interests in Southeast Asia (and those of the Europeans in general) on a new, postimperial footing. In particular, they had to come to terms with the nationalists to whom the Japanese had given new opportunities and accept the concept of a Southeast Asia made up of nation-states. It was important, too, that those states be viable and able, with assistance, to defend themselves. The policy met only limited success. The Dutch and the French found it difficult to accept. In Malaya, Singapore, and Borneo, it was difficult to pursue. Exceptional yet again, Burma secured complete independence in 1948 and became the only country to leave the Commonwealth.

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See also Anglo-Brunei Relations (Nineteenth Century to 1980s); Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia; Bengkulu (Bencoolen, Benkulen); Bowring, Sir John (1792–1872); British Borneo; British India, Government of; British Malaya; British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; British North Borneo Chartered Company; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Bugis (Buginese); Colonialism; Constitutional Developments in Burma (1900–1941); Country Traders; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Formosa (Taiwan); “Fortress Singapore”; Free Trade; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Germans (Germany); Great War (1914–1918); Hong Kong; Imperialism; India; Japan and Southeast Asia (pre-1941); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Java; Johor; Johor-Riau Empire; Maluku (The Moluccas); Manila; Missionaries, Christian; Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Opium; Penang (1786); Preservation of Siam’s Political Independence; Residential System (Malaya); Rubber; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Singapore (1819); Spices and the Spice Trade; Straits of Melaka; Straits Settlements (1826–1941); Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Tin; Yandabo (1826), Treaty of

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BRITISH MALAYA

The term *British Malaya* came into being after 1914 in reference to the Malay Peninsula (present-day West or Peninsular Malaysia) and Singapore. In formal and legal terms, British Malaya did not officially exist; however, administratively, the peninsular Malay States, Penang, and Singapore were under British control. British Malaya consisted of the Crown Colonies of the Straits Settlements (Penang, Melaka, and Singapore), the British protectorates of the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang), the former Siamese Malay States until 1909 (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu), and Johor.

Penang was established as a British outpost in 1786. Melaka was under British control from 1795 to 1815 during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) but was restored to the Dutch in 1816. The British acquired Province Wellesley in 1800 and Singapore in 1819. The entire Malay Peninsula came under the British sphere of influence in accordance with the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. In that year, the Dutch handed Melaka to the British in exchange for Bencoolen (Bengkulu). In 1826, Penang, Melaka, and Singapore formed the Straits Settlements, which were administered as part of British India until 1867; they then became a separate Crown Colony governed directly by the Colonial Office in London. Under the terms of the Burney Treaty of 1826, Britain acknowledged Siamese suzerainty over the northern Malay States of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu. The British expanded control over the central Malay States of Perak and Negeri Sembilan in 1874 and Pahang in 1888. These

four Malay States became the Federated Malay States in 1896. Then, in 1909, under the terms of the Treaty of Bangkok, Siam ceded the four northern Malay States of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu to Britain. The southern Malay State of Johor (Johore) accepted a British adviser in 1914, thereby bringing to a conclusion the establishment of British political power over the entire Malay Peninsula and Singapore.

Imperial Japan occupied British Malaya from 1941 to 1945, during the Pacific War. In 1946, Penang and Melaka joined the Peninsular Malay States to form the Malayan Union. Singapore remained a Crown Colony. The Federation of Malaya replaced the Malayan Union in 1948, and Malaya became an independent nation in 1957.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth–Twentieth Centuries); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Federated Malay States (FMS) (1896); Federation of Malaya (1948); Johor; Malayan Union (1946); Melaka; Pahang; Pangkor Engagement (1874); Penang (1786); Residential System (Malaya); Rubber; Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Singapore (1819); Straits Settlements (1826–1941); Tin; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION (BMA) IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

British Military Administration (BMA) was imposed on territories in the Southeast Asian theater under the military responsibility of the South-East Asia Command (SEAC), headed by Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979), the supreme Allied commander (SAC). SEAC was entrusted with the unenviable task of reoccupying and establishing the military administration of a vast region of more than 160 mil-

lion people, the majority of whom had suffered the worst ravages of war.

In Burma (Myanmar), BMA operated from January 1944 to October 1945; it commenced later in British Malaya, operating from September 1945 to April 1946, and in British Borneo—Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo (Sabah)—it was implemented from January to July 1946. No formal BMA operated in Indochina or in Indonesia. However, British forces were compelled by circumstances in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender (15 August 1945) to undertake similar responsibilities in territories under BMA. The task of BMA was most trying in Burma, as it had to function in the midst of military operations against the Japanese.

Toward the closing months of 1942, work had commenced on planning for the reestablishment of military governments in territories of Southeast Asia under Japanese occupation. The planning for the postwar period focused on the formulation of future policy and the preparation for reoccupation and the establishment of military administration. The responsibility for Burma rested with the Government of Burma in exile in Simla, India. The Colonial Office in London undertook this task for Malaya and British Borneo, in consultation with the representatives of Raja Charles Vyner Brooke (r. 1917–1941, 1946) of Sarawak (who was then in Australia) and the Court of Directors of the British North Borneo Company in London.

Priorities and Challenges

BMA's chief priorities were to disarm and remove Japanese troops from the reoccupied territories and, at the same time, to liberate and relieve the hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian internees in camps scattered throughout Southeast Asia. The functions of BMA were undertaken at two levels, administrative and political. At the administrative level, the functions involved providing transportation; supplying various types of equipment, clothing, accommodations, and housing; handling the importation of supplies (mainly rice, other foodstuffs, and basic consumer goods) for the civil population; and conducting relief work related to refugees and displaced individuals. Such BMA administrative duties were the

responsibility of the Civil Affairs Service (CAS) headed by the chief civil affairs officer (CCAO). On the political level, BMA personnel were faced with the difficult task of handling local political interest groups, composed of ardent nationalists and militant resistance organizations with left-wing elements. The clarion call of these vocally assertive groups was the independence of their colonized countries. The SAC directly dealt with political issues.

Rice and independence posed the most acute challenges to BMA. Rice, the staple food of Southeast and East Asia, was the single most important and basic commodity of trade. Pre-war Burma, Siam (Thailand), and Indochina were major exporters of rice. As a consequence of the Allied blockade, rice exports dwindled down to a trickle during the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia. Moreover, wartime conditions severely retarded rice production, as producers reverted to subsistence in the absence of markets. BMA not only had to deal with rice shortages but also had to undertake the distribution of available supplies under an increasingly deteriorating situation of widespread lawlessness following the Japanese capitulation. Equally threatening to BMA operations were the activities of militant nationalists, with their unceasing clamor for independence. Facing BMA and at times even disrupting its operations was a strong and militant nationalist movement—left-wing inspired, fairly organized, well armed (ironically with guns and munitions supplied by the Allies during the war), and possessing a new self-confidence fostered by wartime experiences. In Indochina and Indonesia, nationalist elements were highly provocative, uncompromising in their stance, and ever raring for a fight.

Burma, British Malaya, and British Borneo

SEAC assumed the administration of liberated Burma from January 1944. The Civil Affairs Service (Burma), known as CAS (B), under Major General C. F. B. Pearce, established BMA in reoccupied Burma. Immediately, CAS (B) under SAC found itself in a predicament. Although entrusted with the immediate responsibility for restoring law and order, it had no authority in political matters; such authority resided with the Government of Burma in

Simla. Further complicating matters, CAS (B) had to contend with the clandestine activities of operatives of Force 136, a unit of the Special Operations Executive (SOE) based at Kandy, Ceylon (Sri Lanka). In fostering guerrilla resistance movements, there were political implications in the activities of Force 136, which neither referred to nor conferred with SAC or CCAO.

A monumental task confronted CAS (B) in running BMA in Burma. Among all the countries of Southeast Asia, Burma had experienced the worst destruction of the war. The country had the most unfortunate fate of having been fought over from south to north in 1942 and again from north to south from 1944 to 1945. Furthermore, CAS (B) had to face the nationalist Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), led by Aung San (1915–1947). In May 1945, a British government White Paper proposed a delay in Burma's constitutional development toward self-rule. AFPFL rejected outright all such proposals and insisted upon immediate and complete independence and swift dissociation from the British Commonwealth. By then, Pearce had been replaced by Major General H. E. Rance as CCAO for Burma.

At the time of the Japanese surrender, CAS (B) had control over the entire country except for the area east of the Sittang River. The surrender hastened the handover to the civil government that formally assumed control in October 1945. Although the governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith (t. 1941–1946), took office in mid-October 1945, it was another five months before the transfer of all responsibility was effected. CAS (B) managed to restore the railway and inland water transport system, but acute shortages in consumer goods persisted and prices remained astronomical.

Unlike Burma, British Malaya was spared the wrath of Allied bombings; however, physical conditions reflected dilapidation and gross neglect. The human suffering due to wartime conditions was acute and widespread. Serious shortages of rice coupled with malnutrition among the inhabitants of some districts beset Major General H. R. Hone, CCAO (Malaya). The immediate and urgent tasks of BMA in Malaya were the relief of the thousands of POWs and civilian internees and the rehabilitation of the country's economy. BMA performed commendably in addressing both these tasks. The

smooth implementation of the Key Plan for British Military Administration in Malaya (approved in March 1945) enabled BMA to be ready to hand over responsibility even before the civil authorities were in a position to assume control. On the political front, however, BMA had to contend with deteriorating Sino-Malay relations that erupted in armed clashes and several leftist-led industrial strikes. During October 1945, as a consequence of food shortages, riots broke out. Widespread lawlessness and banditry in some areas seriously threatened BMA authority. Meanwhile, plans for the Malayan Union, a new political-administrative scheme, was under way. This new setup envisaged the union of the nine Malay States and the Straits Settlements of Penang and Melaka. Singapore was excluded and would remain a British Crown Colony. Citizenship under the new arrangement offered equal rights to all, irrespective of ethnicity or creed. There was also a provision for dual citizenship. The Malayan Union was constituted on 1 April 1946 and ended the tenure of BMA in British Malaya.

Initially, British Borneo was within the theater of operation of the U.S. forces under General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964). But when plans were being made for the reoccupation, the Australian Ninth Division was assigned the task. Following a brief but momentous six-month stewardship under the Australian British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit (BBCAU) from June to December 1945, SEAC took responsibility for British Borneo. Brigadier C. F. C. Macaskie, CCAO, headed the British 50 Civil Affairs Unit (50 CAU) and BBCAU. Although 50 CAU remained behind at Ingleburn, Australia, Macaskie and BBCAU, operating from Labuan after the Australian landings at Brunei Bay on 10 June 1945, established the initial military administration. Several British officers served with the Australians in BBCAU. When SEAC assumed responsibility for British Borneo, these British officers reverted to 50 CAU, which was then redesignated as British Military Administration (British Borneo), or BMA (BB). Most of the major towns in North Borneo and, on a lesser scale, in Brunei had been all but obliterated by preinvasion Allied naval bombardments. Sarawak escaped both aerial bombings (Allied or Japanese) and land battles.

By January 1946, when BMA (BB) began operations, active hostilities had ceased. BB-

CAU, in fact, had attended to most of the pressing and major tasks, including containing epidemics, clamping down on occasional disturbances, bringing relief to European POWs and civilian internees, and redistributing foodstuffs. BMA (BB) thus continued and improved upon these tasks and at the same time concentrated on the major undertaking of rejuvenating the economy.

Raja Charles Vyner Brooke (1874–1963) of Sarawak and the Court of Directors of the British North Borneo Chartered Company had agreed to cede their respective domains to Colonial Office administration. The sultanate of Brunei was to retain its prewar status as a British protectorate. The British Crown Colonies of Sarawak and North Borneo came into being on 1 June 1946 and 15 July 1946, respectively. In respect to the handover by BMA (BB) to civil government, the case of Sarawak was unique. First, the transfer of authority to the raja's government was made on 15 April 1946; then, on 1 June, the raja ceded Sarawak to the British government. Thereafter, BMA (BB) continued to attend to the distribution of civil supplies, until its dissolution on 15 July. On the same date, the handover was effected in North Borneo. The handover in Brunei had been completed a week earlier, on 6 July 1946.

Indochina and Indonesia

In Indochina and Indonesia, no BMA structure was established. But SAC was entrusted with the tasks of enforcing the surrender and disarmament of the Japanese forces and liberating the POWs and civilian internees in these two territories. British forces operated in Indochina, specifically in Saigon, from September to December 1945; in Indonesia, they served for more than a year, from September 1945 to November 1946. In both cases, British troops confronted volatile and highly tense situations.

British ground troops were instructed to assist the small French contingent in the reoccupation of Indochina. Major General D. D. Gracey, commanding the Twentieth Indian Division, was assigned the mission of flying a British force into Saigon to reoccupy the headquarters of the Japanese Southern Armies. Accordingly, on 13 September 1945, Gracey and his British-Indian troops arrived in Saigon and

swiftly secured certain key sections in the city and its immediate environs. Vulnerable points were protected by the British, and Japanese forces were deployed to maintain order elsewhere within the designated zones of Saigon-Cholon, Thudau Mot-Bien Hoa-Lai Taien, and Mytho.

The Viet Minh had declared the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam in August 1945. A public proclamation to this effect was made on 17 September 1945, and Viet Minh forces were poised for a confrontation with British troops. When his warning to the Viet Minh went unheeded, Gracey issued a statement asserting that he was under instructions from SAC to ensure law and order not only within the designated key areas of Saigon but also in all of Indochina south of sixteen degrees north latitude. This pronouncement actually went beyond his original instructions: theoretically, British forces assumed no governmental responsibility other than maintaining the peace. But due to prevailing conditions, they had to keep in operation essential public utilities and at the same time maintain an orderly food distribution system for the civil population. On 20 October, Gracey succeeded in convening a meeting between the French and the Viet Minh; no agreement, however, materialized.

Preempting an outbreak of hostilities, Gracey seized all the key areas of Saigon. The British commander had full authority over military and civil matters within the extended occupied area. This situation continued until the French administration and military forces assumed responsibility for the preservation of order. The handover to the French came in March 1946.

In comparison, Lieutenant General Sir P. A. Christison, commander of British forces in Indonesia, faced a more difficult situation. At the time British troops landed at Batavia in late September 1945, there were no Dutch forces on hand to offer assistance. Christison was instructed to receive the Japanese surrender and to prepare, through officers of Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs (NICA), for the eventual handover to Dutch civil authorities. Although these tasks appeared straightforward initially, developments in Indonesia had adversely changed in regard to the reinstatement of Dutch colonial rule.

On 17 August 1945, just two days after the Japanese surrender, Sukarno had proclaimed the

Republic of Indonesia. Indonesian nationalists, armed with Japanese weapons, jealously guarded the six-week-old independent republic when British troops appeared on the scene. Notwithstanding republican armed opposition, Christison set out to secure key areas, namely, Batavia (29 September), Bandoeng (10 October), Semarang (17 October), and Surabaya (25 October). Despite landing in late October, British troops did not effectively secure control of Surabaya until 19 November. Likewise, armed clashes broke out with republican forces in Batavia, Bandoeng, and other towns where the British landings were contested. Ironically, British forces had to wage battles with the Indonesians they had come to liberate.

The presence of NICA staff was met with violent hostility from nationalists as well as the local population. Under such tense conditions, it was decided to replace NICA with the Allied Military Administration, Civil Affairs Branch (AMACAB). The takeover was achieved toward the end of October 1945. Fortunately, AMACAB received greater acceptance and cooperation from the Indonesians.

Dutch troops began to arrive in force in mid-1946, which enabled the withdrawal of British forces except in Java, Sumatra, and Riau. By July, British forces had transferred responsibility for Surabaya, Semarang, and Bandoeng to their Dutch counterparts. In the Outer Islands, the Dutch were in effective control, as republican influence was weaker.

It was no easy task for the British forces to disarm the Japanese (nearly 300,000) and relieve the POWs and civilian internees (about 200,000). And the situation was only aggravated by the republican opposition and open attacks on British operations. In retaliation for what they called transgression by Allied troops, republican authorities announced the cessation of all evacuations of POWs and internees effective 24 July 1946. Hence, the fate of 30,000 European men and women hung in the balance. Lord Killearn, the British special commissioner in Southeast Asia, intervened directly, and despite all odds and in a precarious situation, he succeeded in negotiating the resumption of the evacuation, which began in late September.

In October, Lord Killearn convened a conference between the republicans and the Dutch. This fruitful face-to-face meeting resulted in the declaration of a cease-fire on 4

October. On 15 November, the two parties penned the Linggadjati Agreement. Two weeks thereafter, the last British troops left Indonesia, thus concluding SEAC's responsibilities.

Sterling Performance

BMA was entrusted with wide-ranging responsibilities, encompassing the diverse areas of finance (currency control, custody of property), relief supplies (food, medical, and other supplies), trade and industry (facilitation and rejuvenation), the legislation of law and administration of justice, and the relief of POWs and internees and handling of refugees. Besides these heavy tasks, it had to deal with the political dimensions of an emerging nationalism characterized by militant resistance and violent opposition to the reinstatement of colonial regimes.

In terms of its overall performance in Burma, British Malaya, and British Borneo, BMA succeeded in attaining its general objectives despite trying conditions, particularly in the case of Burma. Moreover, in Burma as in British Borneo, BMA undertook its responsibilities in the midst of military operations. It was a daunting challenge in terms of the organizational skills, resources, and expertise required. Nonetheless, BMA earned accolades for its efficiency and professionalism, to the extent that in Sarawak, the Ibans regarded BMA as the government they would most like to have, thanks to the efficient food distribution network it implemented. In Indochina and Indonesia, there was no formal establishment of BMA, and the chief responsibility of the British commanders was political rather than administrative in nature, yet the rapidly changing circumstances ensured that British forces assumed a greater role in the administration of the reoccupied areas. Notwithstanding a tougher challenge, British forces in Indochina and Indonesia managed to give a sterling performance in carrying out their varied tasks amid a provocative and hostile situation.

Without undermining the achievements of BMA, it should also be noted that from the psychological standpoint, gratitude was owed to the fighting men of the Allied forces. "They indeed brought relief and the opportunity for freedom to the people whose countries had been darkened by the invasions of 1941 and

1942. All that the military governments could do was to try to make fruitful the gift offered by these men" (Donnison 1956: 443).

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Aung San (1915–1947); Dorman-Smith, Sir Reginald (t. 1941–1946); Force 136; Indochina War (1946–1954), First; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Linggadjati (Linggajati) Agreement (1947); MacArthur, General Douglas (1880–1964); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA); Malayan Union (1946); Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis (1900–1979); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Saigon (Gia Dinh, Hồ Chí Minh City); Soekarno (Sukarno, 1901–1970); South-East Asia Command (SEAC); Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (Vietnam Independence League); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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BRITISH NORTH BORNEO CHARTERED COMPANY (1881–1946)

The British North Borneo Chartered Company was created toward the end of 1881 when the British monarch granted a royal charter for the administration of a territory known as North Borneo on the northwestern corner of the island of Borneo. The company administration lasted for more than six decades, and what was once a practically unknown land inhabited by a diversity of people constituting more than thirty ethnic communities was gradually transformed into a nascent modern state.

The genesis of North Borneo (renamed Sabah in 1963) as a modern state featured several players, all with material wealth in mind. Claude Lee Moses, the U.S. consul general to Brunei, obtained in mid-1865 the cession of territory in northern Borneo from the Brunei sultan in return for cash. Shortly thereafter, in September 1865 in Hong Kong, Moses sold the cession rights to two American businessmen—Joseph W. Torrey and Thomas B. Harris—and their two Chinese partners—Lee Assing and Pong Ampong. On the Kimanis River, a settlement named Ellena was established as the base of the newly formed American Trading Company. Both company and settlement were closed within a year for want of funds. Torrey was anxious to sell the concession, and his offer to do so was readily taken up by Baron Gustav von Overbeck (d. 1894). Overbeck, the Austrian consul in Hong Kong, was interested in brokering a sale to the Austrian government.

When Vienna showed no interest, Overbeck wooed Alfred Dent (1844–1927), a businessman based in London. Overbeck also attempted, albeit in vain, to attract German interest in this venture. At the same time, he discussed the possibilities of obtaining a royal charter from the British government with William H. Treacher (1849–1919), the governor of the British colony of Labuan. The Overbeck-Dent partnership renegotiated a new cession from the sultan of Brunei in December 1877. (Torrey's cession had expired in 1875.) This new cession covered the present-day outline of Sabah. Realizing that the eastern portion of the cession territory was under the jurisdiction of the sultan of Sulu, Overbeck proceeded to Sulu and obtained the sultan's agreement to cede the eastern half of Sabah in exchange for cash payment in January 1878. As a means of exhibiting their presence, Overbeck and Dent sent three Englishmen to North Borneo: William Pryer, based in Sandakan on the east coast; W. Preyman, in Tempasuk; and H. L. Leicester, at Papar on the west coast.

On the matter of the charter, Julian Pauncefote, the permanent undersecretary in the British Foreign Office, was sympathetic to the Overbeck-Dent proposal. But it was a long (three-year) and uphill process for Pauncefote to convince his superiors of the advantages of granting a charter for North Borneo. He utilized a dual thesis, stressing the commercial aspect of the proposal and the *real* danger of a rival Western power colonizing North Borneo. There was, after all, Otto von Bismarck's Germany, which had shown interest in the region during the 1870s. Thanks to protests and objections raised by The Netherlands, the United States, and Spain, the Foreign Office as well as the Colonial Office became convinced of Pauncefote's strategic argument.

In September 1880, Overbeck sold off his share to Dent. Early the next year, Dent established a provincial association and transferred all of his share and control to it in exchange for a substantial cash payment. The association's chairman was Sir Rutherford Alcock, and several prominent personalities were members of the board. This association would cease once the charter was granted and once its assets had been transferred to the British North Borneo Chartered Company, which would undertake to administer North Borneo. Accordingly, on 1

November 1881, the royal charter was granted, and the British North Borneo Chartered Company came into existence.

A court of directors based in London governed the overall policy decisions of the company in its administration of North Borneo. The court appointed a governor to be its representative and head the administration of North Borneo. North Borneo was administratively divided into the West and East Coast Residencies, with Jesselton and Sandakan as the headquarters, respectively. Each residency (province) was under the direction of a resident and was further subdivided into districts under the charge of district officers. During the early decades of company rule, fewer than ten Englishmen governed a territory the size of Scotland. Due to the lack of personnel and the paucity of knowledge about local conditions, the company administration relied on the cooperation and assistance of native chiefs and headmen. Consequently, a native system of administration at the grass roots complemented the duties of the European district officers and residents.

The company administered North Borneo along the lines of a private business corporation in which profitmaking and producing handsome dividends for London shareholders were the chief objectives. Although the interests and the welfare of the indigenous inhabitants were kept in mind, the company generally approved capitalist ventures, knowing that such operations might impinge on native concerns. Large tracts of land concessions were granted to loggers, against the interests of native swidden rice cultivators. Commercial agriculture (tobacco, rubber) was enthusiastically promoted, with fair success, but mineral extraction (gold, manganese, coal) failed to meet expectations. Exports included timber, jungle products (damar, rattan, birds' nests, camphor, gutta-percha), and, on a lesser scale, sea produce (trepan [sea slugs], pearls). Roads were confined to urban networks; bridle paths greatly increased cross-country travel, and telegraph lines enhanced communication. A railway ran along the western coast from Jesselton to Tenom.

After North Borneo suffered through three years and eight months under occupation by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Pacific War (1941–1945) as well as wartime devastation, the Court of Directors was moved to con-

sider transferring sovereignty to the British Crown in July 1946. Thus, North Borneo became a Crown Colony, and the British North Borneo Chartered Company ceased to exist.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Bajau; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Jungle/Forest Products; Labuan (1847); Marine/Sea Products; Mat Salleh Rebellion (1894–1905); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Sulus and the Sulu Archipelago; Tausugs and the Sulu Sultanate

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BROOKE, SIR CHARLES ANTHONI JOHNSON (1829–1917)

Protector of Native Interests

As the second white raja of Sarawak from 1868 to 1917, Charles Brooke laid the foundation of a modern state. He strongly adhered to the paternalistic tenets of the Brooke tradition, as advocated by his uncle, James Brooke (1803–1868), the first white raja, whereby the interests and the well-being of the indigenous inhabitants of Sarawak were paramount, surpassing even capitalist gain.

Charles Anthoni Johnson was the youngest son of Emma Johnson, the sister of James Brooke. After leaving the Royal Navy, he joined his uncle's service in 1852 at age twenty-three. His decade-long stewardship as a Brooke officer—spent in the heartland of the Iban region in the thickly forested valleys of the Lupar, Skrang, Saribas, and Krian Rivers—made him knowledgeable and respectful of the native culture and way of life. His formative experiences were recorded in his two-volume memoirs, *Ten Years in Sarawak*, published in 1866. He established himself as a consummate leader of Iban warriors, guiding them into countless expeditions. He was also

instrumental in eliminating Chinese (1857), Iban (1850s), and Malay-Brunei (1860–1861) opposition to Brooke rule. Upon his uncle's insistence, Charles adopted the name Brooke in 1863.

Notwithstanding his position as an absolute ruler, Charles, like his predecessor, sought the advice and opinion of native chiefs. In completing the Supreme Council (1855), an advisory body of Malay *datu* (nonroyal chiefs), Charles inaugurated the General Council (the present-day Council Negri) in 1867, with the goal of increasing interaction between the raja and his senior officers, on the one hand, and leaders and chiefs of the various ethnic communities, on the other. The General Council was more a public relations exercise than a functional advisory committee. Charles made it imperative that all European Brooke officers consult with native chiefs to keep abreast of native public opinion, although the advice the chiefs offered was considered nonbinding. Charles reorganized his uncle's makeshift administration with European residents and district officers, assisted by Malay native officers, Chinese and Eurasian court writers, and clerical personnel.

Believing the Brunei sultanate was in the last stages of collapse and considering himself the appropriate successor, Charles expanded the territorial boundaries of Sarawak eastward, ending in 1905 with the transfer of Lawas. He was apprehensive of Brunei's cession of the territory that subsequently became British North Borneo, administered by a stockholding company (the British North Borneo Chartered Company).

Having pride in the Brooke tradition of prioritizing the interests of the indigenous peoples over other concerns, Charles was highly critical of British imperialism, which he took to task in a 1907 pamphlet entitled *Queries: Past and Present*. He reluctantly accepted the protectorate status granted by Britain in 1888.

Charles greatly encouraged trade (jungle products, sago), promoted the exploitation of mineral resources (gold, coal, mineral oil), and supported the development of commercial agriculture (pepper, gambier, rubber, sago, coconut). Infrastructure facilities were developed, particularly land, sea, and river transport and the telegraph. Putting faith in the Chinese in regard to the development of the country's

economy, Charles realized the ambition of his uncle in implementing the immigration of Foochow and Cantonese agriculturalists to the Lower Rejang (1900–1901). Although the original intention was to increase domestic rice production, the Chinese farmers, in the face of failures, turned their attention to rubber small-holdings and achieved much success.

Charles did not look favorably on speculative Western capitalist enterprises. Consequently, only a handful of European companies operated in Sarawak, notably the Borneo Company Limited (BCL), the oil companies, and a few other businesses in commercial agriculture.

Emphasizing food crop and commercial small-scale agriculture, Charles urged the native inhabitants to rely on the land for sustenance. He reminded his native subjects that their lands were their heritage or *darah daging* (blood and flesh) and that they should value and never lose possession of them. Fearing that natives could be left landless in their own homeland, Charles decreed in 1910, at the height of the rubber boom, that no land was to be sold or transferred to any European firm or individual.

In promoting agriculture, Charles set up an experimental farm at Matang near Kuching (the state capital), where various crops were cultivated and, if proven viable, promoted. Having faith in coal, he invested in the Simunjan colliery and bought the Muara Damit (Brooketon) mines. The auriferous (gold-rich) region of Upper Sarawak (gold, antimony, cinnabar) was left to the Chinese and BCL to exploit. The oil strike at Miri in 1910 placed Sarawak on the world map.

Although, like his predecessor, Charles sought to maintain the traditional way of life of the various ethnic inhabitants, age-old practices such as headhunting and Iban migration were proscribed and discouraged, respectively, and slavery was gradually abolished. Ironically, the Brooke government's punitive expeditions, which pitted downriver Ibans against recalcitrant upriver Ibans, Kayans, and Kenyahs, served as an impetus to headhunting.

Western-style schooling was introduced by Christian missionaries and the Brooke government, but Charles had reservations about the benefits that such an education could bring to the indigenous peoples. He favored miscegenation and encouraged it among his European of-

ficers; he himself had a child with a Malay woman. He believed the mixed-blood offspring would make better citizens and enlightened rulers of lands in the East.

Charles's pronative policies, designs toward Brunei, and anti-imperialistic views, coupled with his reserved personality and his aversion to mingle with European society whether in Britain or in Singapore, made him few friends. His wife, Raneë Margaret (1849–1936), lamented his maverick and isolated position, which distanced him from British official circles and the business community.

Charles died in 1917. His eldest son, Charles Vyner Brooke (r. 1917–1941, 1946), became third white raja of Sarawak. However, Raja Charles did not totally trust this son, and therefore, in his political will (1913), he established a joint rajaship between Vyner (1874–1963) and another son, Bertram (1876–1965).

OOI KEAT GIN

See also British Interests in Southeast Asia; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Colonialism; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Ibans; Miscegenation; Rentap (d. ca. mid-1860s); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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BROOKE, JAMES, AND SARAWAK Maverick Colonialist

In 1841, James Brooke (1803–1868), an English gentleman-adventurer, established a dynasty of white rajahs in a territory called Sarawak on the northwestern corner of the island of Borneo. The Brooke white rajahs, who governed Sarawak for more than a century, were guided by principles that emphasized the protection and promotion of the rights and interests of the multiethnic indigenous inhabitants.

Born of an East India Company (EIC) official, Brooke spent his childhood in India and completed his early education in England. After sustaining an injury while serving as a cavalry officer in the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826), Brooke returned to England. He made two voyages to China (1830–1831, 1834), visiting the Straits Settlements en route. Convinced of Stamford Raffles's vision of a greater role to be played by Britain in the Malay Archipelago, Brooke published a prospectus in 1838 wherein he advocated territorial possession in place of treaty arrangements as the basis for developing free trade and promoting British commerce and interests.

Utilizing the inheritance from his late father's estate, Brooke acquired the 142-ton schooner *Royalist* to undertake a geographic and scientific expedition to Marudu Bay at the northern tip of Borneo, the Celebes (Sulawesi), and New Guinea. He made his initial call at Kuching, the river port capital of Sarawak, in 1839 to convey a letter to Pengiran Bendahara Pengiran Muda Hassim (d. 1846) from the mercantile community of Singapore, thanking him for assisting shipwrecked British seamen. Sarawak was then a fiefdom of the sultanate of Brunei and was in the midst of a rebellion (1836–1840). On his journey home, Brooke again visited Kuching. Hassim was unable to end the rebellion and turned to Brooke for assistance, granting him the title of "Raja (Governor) of Sarawak" in return. Brooke succeeded and was conferred as the first white raja in 1841 by Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin II (d. 1852) of Brunei.

Initially, Brooke attempted to realize the Rafflesian vision of a British commercial empire in the Malay Archipelago, but his hopes were dashed when the pro-British Hassim and his family were massacred in 1846. He then

shifted his attention to Sarawak, where he laid the foundation of an enlightened, paternal despotism in which the raja ruled in consultation with the native chiefs by incorporating the Sarawak Malay *datu* (nonroyal chiefs) into his administration as advisers.

The principles of Brooke's rule emphasized the development of free trade, the protection of native interests, and the promotion of native welfare. In upholding native interests, the population's traditional way of life was maintained as far as possible; if change was necessary, its introduction was to be gradual, allowing the indigenous peoples to adopt and adapt at their own pace. Brooke objected to the large inflow of European capitalist investment and the concomitant influx of Europeans into the country, concerned that indigenous interests would be compromised in favor of Western interests and that native labor would be exploited for foreign capitalist gains. The principles of prioritizing native interests above all else became enshrined in the so-called Brooke Tradition, which was steadfastly adhered to by Brooke's successors—his nephew Charles Anthoni Johnson Brooke (r. 1868–1917) and the latter's son, Charles Vyner Brooke (r. 1917–1941, 1946).

During his tenure as raja (1841–1868), James Brooke eliminated the piratical menace along the northwestern Bornean coast with the assistance of the Royal Navy, thereby facilitating trading activities. He also proscribed exploitative traditional native practices, such as *serah dagang* (forced trade), that Malay *datu* and Brunei *pangeran* (nobles) impressed on the weaker indigenous communities, including the Bidayus (Land Dayaks) and the Melanaus. Furthermore, the gory practice of head-hunting by the Ibans (Sea Dayaks) and other interior peoples was proscribed.

In 1857, the Hakka Chinese gold miners of Upper Sarawak attacked Kuching in an attempt to overthrow his regime, yet Brooke nonetheless maintained his faith in the ability of the Chinese to develop the economic resources of the country, especially in mining and trade. His goal of encouraging Chinese immigration was realized by his successor in the early 1900s when Foochow and Cantonese farmers were brought to settle in the Lower Rejang.

Brooke successfully overcame opposition to his rule from the Hakka Chinese (1857), the



Sir James Brooke, raja of Sarawak.
(Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Brunei-backed Malays of Mukah (ca. mid-1850s–1860), and the upriver Ibans led by Rentap (1850s–1861). At the same time, he pushed Sarawak's borders eastward to the Rejang (1853) and the Bintulu (1861) Rivers at the expense of Brunei. However, he attempted in vain to secure recognition and protectorate status for Sarawak from Britain or from other European nations (The Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Italy). Although Sarawak was recognized as an independent state by the United States in 1850, it was not ceded by Britain until 1863.

Brooke was investigated for wrongdoing in the 1847 massacre of "pirates" at Batang Maru, but he was vindicated both in the British Parliament and at an inquiry in Singapore in 1854. Despite this vindication, however, Brooke remained disappointed about failing to gain recognition and protection for Sarawak, and he left for England in 1863 in poor spirits and failing health. He passed away in 1868. Brooke left a legacy whereby Sarawak's multiethnic indigenous inhabitants continued with their traditional subsistence-based livelihood, for the most

part undisturbed by either European or Chinese capitalistic influence and exploitation.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Borneo; Brooke, Sir Charles Anthoni Johnson (1829–1917); Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Colonialism; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Free Trade; Imperialism; Piracy; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); Rentap (d. ca. mid-1860s); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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BRUNEI (SIXTEENTH TO NINETEENTH CENTURIES)

The history of Brunei prior to the mid-nineteenth century reveals rare beacons of light within an ocean of darkness. Source materials are vestigial. Brunei was not a bureaucracy; government records and statistics hardly exist. Archaeology, coinage, and maps are of minimal assistance. Personal papers are wanting. Indigenous sources, particularly royal genealogies, yield valuable insights but little solid fact. Considerable reliance has to be placed, therefore, on European (mostly Iberian) reports. It is not known how many sultans there have been, nor can the reigns of many of them be dated accurately. The present monarch (Hassanal Bolkiah) is claimed officially to be the twenty-ninth of his dynasty; no serious historian accepts this. With regard to secondary sources, one or two Western writers suffer from a lingering colonialist mind-set, and some indigenous historians

have succumbed to the imperatives of nation building and the glorification of Islam.

An eyewitness account reveals that the Muslim sultanate was definitely in existence by 1521; the exact date of its foundation remains unproven. The Brunei royal family certainly incorporated Bornean, Malay, Chinese, and Arabic elements. In 1521, Brunei's sway extended northward to Luzon and at least as far south in Borneo as the Kapuas Delta. The capital, built mainly over the river but also with a land section, had a settled court with an established protocol and was defended by land and naval forces.

Although Brunei gave its name to Borneo, it is doubtful whether the sultanate ever exercised sway over the whole island. During the sixteenth century, moreover, rival Muslim dynasties were established elsewhere around the coast. Brunei was not a territorial state with clearly defined frontiers. Its outer limits waxed and waned; its control of the interior was limited. The main method of control was to station an official at a river mouth to tax the trade going up and down the waterway.

Wealth was derived from products such as camphor, pepper, and fish; cloth was imported via Melaka. Europeans were prone to regard Brunei as of negligible commercial importance, but for the Portuguese, it provided a staging post between the Malay Peninsula and the Moluccas (Maluku). By 1580, when Portugal was brought under the Castilian throne, Spain had begun to make good its hold of the Philippines, which cut off Brunei's archipelagic empire. The Spaniards occupied the capital of Brunei from April to June 1578, razing the national mosque. They returned in March 1579 but sailed away without accomplishing anything. The upshot was that Brunei lost control of Sulu, and the activities of its Muslim missionaries in the archipelago were curtailed. Relations between Brunei and Manila steadied after 1588, but between 1577 and 1787, only seven trading vessels went to Manila from the Bornean kingdom.

The "despotic" reign of Sultan Hassan, which probably fell within the first two decades of the seventeenth century, has been called "the last high point in Brunei fortunes before the mid-twentieth century" (Saunders 1994: 62). Hassan is reported to have boosted the complement of viziers from two to four and to have reasserted Brunei domination of Sambas and Sulu.

Although Raja Bongsu, son of Sultan Hasan, was nominally Brunei's *adipati* (viceroy) in Sulu for about four decades until 1650, this did not preclude open warfare between the two Muslim regimes. In 1650, Raja Bongsu's illegitimate son, Raja Bakhtiar, took over and later styled himself Sultan Salah-ud-Din Bakhtiar, the "first authentic Sultan of Sulu." Sulu was strong and warlike and established its own zone of domination, including northern and north-east Borneo, its economy being based on slavery and piracy. Sulu was not warlike enough, however, to subjugate Brunei's heartland.

In the seventeenth century, Brunei was prone to civil war, connected with disputed successions to the throne. Such internal strife split the royal family into factions and weakened Brunei's dominion over its outlying territories. Seagoing Bajaus increasingly preyed on Brunei.

The eighteenth century is a particular problem in deciphering the historical record. Sultan Muhammad Aliuddin, whose reign had marked a rapprochement with Manila, died in 1690. The speculation is that his illegitimate son elbowed aside the nominated heir and called upon Buginese support to keep a "usurper dynasty" in power for several decades. The legitimate line was restored in the person of Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin I, who was certainly reigning by 1762.

British reports indicate that in the late eighteenth century, there was still a junk trade between Brunei and China and that a Chinese community was settled locally. An ineffectual commercial treaty was signed in 1774 with the English East India Company (EIC) in return for protection against pirates.

Brunei remained beyond colonial control at the end of the eighteenth century, largely because it offered few economic prospects and was in a strategic backwater. The foundation of Singapore (1819), the growth of the India-China trade, and the involvement of ambitious individuals (such as James Brooke) would transform this situation. Meanwhile, Brunei's cause was not helped by further succession disputes within the royal family in the early decades of the nineteenth century.

From the 1840s onward the story of Brunei was one characterized by weakness, internal disunity, poverty, and massive territorial losses, first to the Brooke White Rajahs of Sarawak and subsequently to the British North Borneo

Company. The island of Labuan, which commands Brunei Bay, was acquired by Britain in 1846. By 1905–1906, when the situation had stabilized thanks to the appointment of a British Resident, the sultanate had been reduced to a rump state, comprising two separate wings detached from each other by the Limbang district of Sarawak. Political rescue was followed by economic salvation, thanks to the discovery of the Seria oil field in 1929.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Anglo-Brunei Relations (Nineteenth Century to 1980s); British North Borneo Chartered Company (1881–1946); Brooke, Sir Charles Anthoni Johnson (1829–1917); Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Brunei Ethnic Minorities; Brunei Malays; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Manila; Piracy; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Slavery; Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Tausugs and the Sulu Sultanate

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BRUNEI ETHNIC MINORITIES

The Brunei sultanate is dominated by the Brunei Malay, but its population also comprises several native ethnic minorities who have played important roles in the history of the state. Indeed, in oral traditions, the Brunei Malay and the ruling family are said to have descended from local pagan peoples who converted to Islam and “became Malay.” The process of identifying with the politically and culturally dominant Malay, intermarrying with them, and converting to Islam continues to this day.

For constitutional and census purposes, the Brunei government classifies most of the indigenous ethnic groups in the country together with the Brunei Malay as Malay or as constituents of the Malay race, and their languages are identified as Malay dialects (King 1994: 178–179). The Brunei Nationality Enactment of 1961 and the national ideology of the “Malay Islamic Monarchy” both have the long-term aim of assimilating other groups into the Malay culture and polity (Braighlinn 1992: 19–20). The “Malay” category includes those people in Brunei called Dusun (or Bisaya), Murut (or Lun Bawang/Lun Dayeh), Kadayan, Tutong, and Belait. It excludes such groups as the Iban and the nomadic Penan, who are classified as “other indigenous” in government publications.

Historically, the constituent Malay ethnic groups of the Brunei sultanate were administered through their own leaders, designated *menteri darat* (land chiefs), who were granted Malay-derived titles by the state, such as *penghulu* (government-appointed district headman), *temenggong* (official responsible for defense and policing the city), and *pemancha* (a traditional title for a chief) (King 1993: 227). At the very bottom of the hierarchy were the village headmen (*ketua kampung*), who were responsible for the primary constituent units of the polity: the village and longhouse communities. These non-Malay populations were usually classified as subjects, dependents, or clients (*hamba*); some of them were also acquired as slaves (*ulun*) or concubines by members of the royal family, nobles, and nonnoble officials through capture, purchase, or indebtedness (Brown 1976: 187–189). With the gradual reduction in the extent of Brunei territories following European intervention in the mid-nineteenth century, several of these communities are now found in politically separate territories in

Malaysian Sarawak and Sabah and even in Indonesian Kalimantan.

The group most closely associated with the Brunei Malay comprises the Kadayan—so much so that some observers have suggested they are complementary segments of the same society (Maxwell 1996). In the Malay language, *kadayan/kedayan* means “attendants,” “followers,” or “prince’s retinue.” These people were traditionally farmers and suppliers of rice and other food crops in the Brunei sultanate, and they occupied the land extending out on either side of the Brunei River and Brunei Bay; they are also now found in the district of Temburong, where they began to settle after 1918, as well as in the Miri and Lawas areas of Sarawak, in Sipitang in Sabah, and on the island of Labuan. They entered into economic relationships with the Brunei Malay, who comprised administrators, traders, craftspeople, and fishermen. The Kadayan are Muslims and speak a Malay dialect, and therefore, over time, they have tended to identify with the dominant Brunei Malay, intermarry with them, and assimilate to their culture. They appear to have acted as a buffer population between the Brunei Malay and the other pagan ethnic minorities, and there is evidence of Lun Bawang, Tutong, and Belait being absorbed into Kadayan communities.

The term *Murut* is an externally imposed word used by the Malay to refer to interior pagan populations in Brunei, adjacent parts of Sarawak, western Sabah, and East Kalimantan. They are not to be confused with the Murut of interior Sabah, who are culturally very different (King 1994: 190–191). The people (particularly those in Sarawak) call themselves *Lun Bawang*, which means “people of this place” or “people of the country” (in Sabah, the name *Lun Dayeh* is used, meaning “people of the interior”). In the past, the Lun Bawang had been subject to Brunei overlordship and subject to tribute and taxes. Their local leaders from the upper rank (*lun do’*) were appointed to offices in the sultanate and given titles. Some Lun Bawang were also absorbed into Malay society.

The term *Dusun* was also externally imposed; it is a Malay term meaning “[people of the] orchards” or “[people of the] gardens” and is still in use in Brunei. The internally accepted name is *Bisaya*, which is more frequently used in those communities in Sarawak. The

Dusun/Bisaya are found in the Tutong and Belait regions of Brunei and in the Limbang area of Sarawak (King 1994: 190–193). As with the Kadayan, the Bisaya traditionally supplied rice to the Brunei polity. Brunei officials were given special rights to tax the Dusun, and they in turn granted titles to selected Bisayan leaders, who periodically had to deliver tribute at special Brunei ceremonial occasions.

The Tutong and Belait are remnant populations who have been subject to processes of conversion to Islam and assimilation by the Malay and Kadayan. Their original culture and language have now largely disappeared. They are part of a much larger, submerged cultural complex of peoples scattered in the lower Baram River basin in Sarawak and western Brunei, and they demonstrate the consequences of the considerable pressures on local communities to identify with and assimilate to Brunei Malay culture.

VICTOR T. KING

See also Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Brunei Malay; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Ibans; Malays; Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB, Malay Islamic Monarchy); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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BRUNEI MALAY

The Brunei Malay (or Barunay) are the politically, economically, and culturally dominant population of the sultanate of Brunei, the only surviving Muslim Malay monarchy on the is-

land of Borneo. Until recently, the focus of their settlement was the famous Kampong Ayer (meaning "Water Village"), which traditionally surrounded the sultan's palace and the main mosque. In effect, it comprises several villages or parishes of wooden family dwellings raised on stilts above the waters of the Brunei River, upstream from Brunei Bay. Although Kampong Ayer is still a thriving settlement, many of its former inhabitants have now been resettled on dry land.

The origins of the Brunei Malay as a separately defined ethnic group are obscure. The Brunei Malay oral epic poem *Sya'ir Awang Simawn* provides an account of the origins and historical development of Brunei in the deeds of the founding heroes (Maxwell 1995: 178–206). The culture hero, Awang Simawn, is also well-known to other native, non-Muslim communities in the Brunei Bay area, including the Bisaya (Dusun), Kadayan, and Lun Bawang (Murut). There are several versions of these oral traditions, but the most likely interpretation of them is that at some unspecified time, local pagan populations converted to Islam; it is these who are the ancestors of today's Brunei Malay. Various versions of the epic have Simawn as an older brother of Awang Alak Batatar, a pagan Bisaya or Lun Bawang who converted to Islam and became Sultan Muhammad, the first Muslim ruler of Brunei. Stories of Awang Simawn therefore connect the Brunei Malay with the neighboring non-Muslim natives in a common cultural and historical heritage.

Although one Brunei authority has the conversion of their first ruler to Islam in 1363 and another puts it in 1405, European sources suggest that the conversion did not take place until the early sixteenth century (Nicholl 1975: 3–7). Brunei's roots as a trading emporium go back as far as the sixth century C.E. when a Hinduized state on the northwest coast of Borneo, which the Chinese referred to as P'o-ni, sent tribute to the imperial court. Following conversion to Islam, Brunei became a powerful trading center from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, claiming suzerainty over the whole island of Borneo and parts of the southern and central Philippines. However, the extent of its authority existed more in name than in substance, and Brunei power rarely penetrated the vast hinterlands of the island. The sultanate instead controlled strategic coastal and riverine

locations and the flow of the luxury forest product trade. Brunei power was progressively weakened as Europeans began to intervene in local political and economic relations, and by the early twentieth century, the sultanate had lost most of its territories and retained only two small enclaves of land amounting to some 5,765 square kilometers (Leake 1990).

The focus of the realm was the Malay sultan, or *raja*, a hereditary ruler who could confer titles and appanages on his appointed administrators. The royal family and the nobility (*pengirans*) were highly stratified and status conscious, operating within an elaborate system of administrative, ceremonial, and ritual offices and a complex hierarchy of honorific titles, linguistic usages, and etiquette. The system was Hindu in origin, with subsequent Islamic modifications (Brown 1970: 11, 19, 87, 89). The main distinction was between the nobility and the commoners. The nobility comprised a “core,” which was “descended from current or recent Sultans or other high officials” (Brown 1976: 186–187). The most important officials next to the sultan were the four viziers (*wazir*), who had ministerial functions. These comprised the *pengiran bendahara* (responsible for the administration of the land or the interior), the *pengiran di-gadong* (finance and treasury, particularly taxation), the *pengiran pemancha* (mediator of the State Council), and the *pengiran temenggong* (military leader) (Brown 1970: 106). Below the core nobility were the commoner nobles (*pengiran kebanayakan*); these were appointed as officials with the title *cheteria*, a Hindu-derived term for the warrior caste. They, too, had appanages assigned to them. Then came those of nonnoble rank, including the aristocrats (*awang*) who undertook much of the day-to-day administration of the state on behalf of the nobles and as officials were termed *menteri*. Finally, there were the commoners (*ra'ayat*), some of whom also had official positions.

Most of the Malay wards in the state capital performed specialist functions: fishing, strand collecting, palm weaving, woodworking, textile manufacturing, rice processing, and trading. Of special importance were the blacksmiths, silversmiths, and brass-smiths. Specialist smiths made high-quality items for the court, and their tasks were often associated with aristocratic households and handed down from parents to children.

Given the wealth generated in Brunei following the discovery of oil and gas in the 1930s, the present-day Brunei Malay enjoy a relatively high standard of living; they pay no income taxes and are provided with free schooling, health, and other services. The continuation of monarchical rule after achieving full independence from Britain on 31 December 1983 has also meant that many of the traditional offices, ranks, and titles of Brunei Malay society have survived into the modern era.

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See also Borneo; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Brunei Ethnic Minorities; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Kampong Ayer (Brunei); Malays; Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB, Malay Islamic Monarchy); Miscegenation; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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BRUNEI NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (BNDP) (1985–1988)

The Partai Kebangsaan Demokratik Brunei (Brunei National Democratic Party, BNDP) was the first political party to operate legally in the sultanate of Brunei after the Brunei People's Independence Front (BAKER) fizzled out in the early 1970s. Nonetheless, BNDP attracted minimal support from an apathetic populace and

lasted for only three years (1985–1988). No legislature existed during that period.

The BNDP was registered in May 1985, with Haji Abdul Latif bin Abdul Hamid (d. 1990), former secretary-general of BAKER, as president and Awang Mohamad Hatta bin Haji Zainal Abidin as vice-president. Membership was confined to Malays. The party's objective was to establish parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchical system. It also campaigned for the sultanate to take control of the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company and for antipoverty measures to be activated. On the eve of its official launch in September 1985, a setback was suffered when the government prohibited civil servants (then comprising nearly half the sultanate's entire workforce) from engaging in political activity.

No sooner had the BNDP been founded than it split, apparently because its executive rejected calls for a congress to vote on the party's leadership. In November 1985, some 150 members resigned and set up the rival Brunei National Solidarity Party (BNSP), leaving the rump BNDP with fewer than 50 members. Nevertheless, the BNDP continued to hold press conferences abroad and to urge the government to hold elections. By early 1988, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah (1946–) had begun to fear that party political activity would upset the stability of the nation. The BNDP was deregistered on 27 January 1988 on the grounds that it had contravened the Societies Act.

The party's president and its secretary-general, Abdul Latif Chuchu (b. 1946), were held without trial for two years. Amnesty International adopted them as "prisoners of conscience." Abdul Latif Hamid died in May 1990, at the age of fifty, shortly after his release from internment. Five years later, Abdul Latif Chuchu joined the BNSP, of which he was briefly president.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Brunei National Solidarity Party (BNSP) (1985); Brunei Oil and Gas Industry; Brunei Rebellion (December 1962); Hassanal Bolkiah, Sultan of Brunei (1946–); People's Independence Front (Barisan Kemerdekaan Rakyat, BAKER) (1966)

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BRUNEI NATIONAL SOLIDARITY PARTY (BNSP) (1985)

The Partai Perpaduan Kebangsaan (PPKB), usually translated as the Brunei National Solidarity Party and known by the acronym BNSP, appeared toward the end of 1985. It became largely inactive after 1988 but was revived in 1995 and again in 1998; in 2001 and 2002, it was cited from time to time in the local press, it held a party congress, and it was intending to set up a website, although none had appeared by the end of 2003. Press reports reveal that the party has both a women's section and a youth wing; even so, total BNSP membership remains limited to a few hundred persons at most.

Founded by breakaway members of the Brunei National Democratic Party (BNDP), the organization pledged support for all government policies executed within the framework of the Malay Islamic Monarchy concept (*Melayu Islam Beraja*, MIB). Unlike the BNDP, membership was open to Malays and those of other indigenous ethnic groups regardless of religion. After the dissolution of the BNDP in 1988, the BNSP became the sole legal political party in the country.

From 1988 to 1995, the political atmosphere in Negara Brunei Darussalam was quiet: "People had learned the futility of anti-government opposition," Graham Saunders remarked, "and on the whole accepted the secure but bland life offered to them" (1994: 189). In 1995, however, the BNSP sprang back into life, holding a general assembly attended by about fifty people. The BNSP hoped for a revival of the Legislative Council, which had been abolished in 1984. Forty-nine-year-old Haji Abdul Latif Chuchu (b. 1946), a businessman and for-

mer teacher, was elected president, with Haji Mohd Hatta Zainal Abidin, the founding party president, as vice-president. Haji Abdul Latif Chuchu resigned shortly afterward, however, reportedly as a condition of his release from detention five years earlier. In May 1998, the BNSP held a further congress, at which Haji Mohd Hatta was elected president.

Any serious political party would have made hay out of contemporary scandals in the sultanate; the BNSP, however, has failed to do so. In the meantime, the royal-led Brunei government is more than capable of upholding the MIB system without any assistance from the BNSP.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Brunei National Democratic Party (BNDP) (1985–1988); Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB, Malay Islamic Party)

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BRUNEI OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY A Sultanate's Treasure Trove

The wealth derived from hydrocarbons, beginning in 1932, transformed Brunei from a debt-ridden backwater into one of the richest countries in the world. Exports increased from Straits dollars 543,707 in 1915 (*Brunei Annual Report 1915*: 4) to B\$6,733.5 million in 2000 (HSBC 2002: 8), government revenue from less than Straits dollars 29,529 in 1915 (*Brunei Annual Report 1915*: 1) to B\$5,084.4 million in 2000 (HSBC 2002:7). In 2001 hydrocarbons accounted for 90 percent of all export receipts and 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).

Before 1922, several companies had prospected for oil in the country, but by the early 1920s, the British Malayan Petroleum Company (BMPC), a Shell subsidiary, had the field to itself. On 5 April 1929, oil was struck at Seria, but production was delayed pending more favorable market conditions. By the

1930s, Brunei had quickly become the third largest oil producer in the British Commonwealth. All the oil was exported via a pipeline to Lutong (Sarawak), completed in 1932. The BMPC, which soon acquired a major role in the sultanate, was reformed in 1957 as the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company (BSPC), the head office being in the sultanate itself. In 2000, BSPC oil production averaged 190,000 barrels a day, the highest level achieved by the company in more than twenty years. Under the Eighth National Development Plan, production of 212,000 barrels per day (bpd) was planned for 2001 and 207,000 bpd for 2002 to 2005. Proven reserves in 1999 stood at 1,400 million barrels; one source claims that Brunei's oil and gas reserves are currently estimated to last for twenty-five years and forty years respectively. Markets include countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, South Korea, China, and Australasia.

During the first decade of the oil era (1932–1941), government revenue increased fourfold, the national debt was repaid, and substantial credit balances were amassed. A less inefficient standard of administration became possible; greater attention was paid to infrastructure and social services. The limited gains of the 1930s, however, went to waste during the period of Japanese military administration (1941–1945).

Following the postwar rehabilitation of the oil field, terrestrial production expanded rapidly, peaking at an average of 115,000 bpd in 1956. A new field was discovered at Jerudong in 1955, but production there fizzled out after a few years. Meanwhile, Brunei annexed its continental shelf in 1954, and several offshore strikes were made, initially at Southwest Ampa in 1963. Offshore production was inaugurated on 28 October 1964, and as output from Seria declined, Southwest Ampa rapidly became the oil industry's center of gravity. Overall, crude oil output hit 261,000 bpd in 1979, of which only 20 percent was derived from land-based wells. Although Brunei was not a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), its coffers benefited massively from the rapid rise in global oil price during the 1970s. A conservation policy was then introduced, resulting in a phased reduction in output to 150,000 bpd by 1988. In the wake of the Gulf War (1990–1991), production crept up again to 182,000 bpd in 1992. Some 3 per-

cent of Brunei's crude oil is retained for domestic use: for this purpose, there is an oil refinery at Seria with a capacity of 10,000 bpd, but actual output in 1990 was half that amount. The sultanate is seeking an expansion locally of "downstream" activities.

Liquefied natural gas (LNG), processed at Lumut since 1972 and 1973, is another lucrative source of income, with several million tons being shipped annually. LNG contracts are settled on the basis of government-to-government negotiation. Initially, Japan was the sole buyer; a second twenty-year deal was concluded in 1993. However, in the mid-1990s, a new customer was found in Korea Gas. In 1990, LNG exports were valued at B\$1,606.4 million, compared with crude oil shipments of around B\$2,336.1 million. In the mid-1970s, Brunei was the leading exporter of LNG in the world, although that status was not retained for long. According to the government newspaper *Pelita Brunei* (30 January 2002: 10), Brunei currently supplies less than 7 percent of the world market and is only the fifth largest producer, well behind Indonesia (26.76 percent). Proven reserves of natural gas in 1999 (390,000 million cubic meters) were sufficient to last thirty-five years at current rates of output. Prior to the LNG industry coming onstream, there was a gas plant at Seria, opened in 1955.

A new player in the oil industry, Jasra Elf, sells its oil to Brunei Shell. Another competitor, Fletcher Challenge Energy of New Zealand, was bought out by Shell in 2000–2001, thereby adding a further 35 million barrels of oil equivalent to the latter's reserves in NBD (*Daily Telegraph*, London, 11 October 2002: 38).

The hydrocarbon industry was originally taxed in the form of royalties (from 1932 to 1949), then royalties plus income tax (from 1950 onward). The state acquired a 25 percent stake in BSPC in 1973, doubled to 50 percent in 1975. A government minister chaired the BSPC board of management. Similarly, the Brunei Oil and Gas Authority (BOGA), set up in 1993 to supervise production levels and the granting of concession rights, had a government minister as chair. BOGA was superseded by the government-owned Brunei National Petroleum Company (officially abbreviated PetroleumBRUNEI), formed on 6 November 2001, which aims to play a major role in oil and gas policy and to accelerate the development of

a domestic industrial base in Brunei. The Brunei Oilfield Workers' Union was registered on 17 July 1962.

The need for economic diversification has been imperative almost since the inception of the oil industry. Future hopes for broadening the sultanate's economic base rest on the development of tourism and financial services. Thus far such efforts have met with limited success.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Borneo; Economic Development of Southeast Asia (post-1945 to early 2000s); Oil and Petroleum; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Trade and Commerce of Southeast Asia (ca. Nineteenth Century to the 1990s)

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BRUNEI REBELLION (DECEMBER 1962)

A Cry for Change

The revolt of December 1962 is the seminal event of Brunei's post-Pacific War (1941–1945) history: although the back of the attempted revolution was broken within a week, its ramifications persist to this day. In a coordinated maneuver, armed rebels seized control of much of the sultanate, along with parts of adjacent territories. Police were rushed in from North Borneo to hold the fort on the first day. Then, armed forces from Singapore (Gurkhas, Royal Marines, Green Jackets, Queen's Own Highlanders) recaptured the main towns, releasing rebel-held hostages in the process. No significant damage had been done to economic installations. The monarch was safeguarded, and a curfew was imposed. In the years since that tumultuous December, the deeper meaning of these events has been much debated. The whole truth has not yet emerged, particularly regarding the role played by Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III (1914–1986).

The late 1950s and early 1960s—part of a global age of transition between colonialism and independence—were times of political, economic, and social instability in Brunei. A climate of regional uncertainty had been generated by Malayan premier Tunku Abdul Rahman's (t. 1957–1970) proposal in May 1961 for the creation of a federation of Malaysia, which he expected Brunei to join. Domestic political weakness had been heightened by the ineptness of a new governmental system inaugurated after the end of the British Residential Era in 1959, by the failure of the sultan's government to honor its pledge to hold elections within two years of September 1959, and by the unpopularity of administrators seconded to Brunei from Malaya. Economic instability was occasioned by the gap between the completion of the first national development plan (1953–1958) and the commencement of the second (1962–1966), by the interval between the Seria oil field passing its peak (1956) and news of the discovery of deposits offshore (1963), and by an unemployment problem. Social instability arose out of a greater democratic spirit and waning deference by the common people toward monarchy.

When the elections were eventually held in late August 1962, the anti-“Malaysia” Brunei

People's Party (Partai Rakyat Brunei, PRB) won a crushing victory; but power still eluded its members. The immediate pretext for their insurrection was a postponement of the first meeting of the Legislative Council. There was also a fear that the authorities had discovered their plans to stage a rebellion. Revolt erupted on the morning of Saturday, 8 December 1962. Led by the PRB and its military wing, the Northern Borneo National Army (Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara, TNKU), the aim was to establish a unitary state to be known as Kalimantan Utara, comprising Brunei, North Borneo, and Sarawak. Furthermore, a desire for eventual inclusion within Indonesia was hinted at in the name of the proposed new territory. For the time being, Sheikh Ahmad Azahari (1928–2002) was to be prime minister, with Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III (r. 1950–1967) as head of state. By the first evening of the insurrection, most of the country was in rebel hands, as were neighboring parts of Sarawak and North Borneo. However, the government still controlled the capital, including the telecommunications network, the radio station, and, crucially, the airport. Meanwhile, a message had been received in Singapore through the chief minister, saying that the sultan wished to invoke the protection of the British as enshrined in the 1959 agreements between Brunei and the United Kingdom.

A state of emergency, proclaimed on 12 December 1962, subsisted even as of 2004. In the short term, an emergency council including the sultan (as president) and the British high commissioner governed the sultanate. The PRB was proscribed. In addition, the Legislative and District Councils were suspended (until July 1963). Military mopping-up operations continued for some months, and the rebellion was not declared officially over until the rebel commander, General Muhammad Yassin Affandy bin Abdul Rahman, was arrested at Serdang on 18 May 1963.

TNKU casualties amounted to forty persons killed by 20 December 1962. The British suffered seven fatalities and twenty-eight wounded, many of them during an action at Limbang (Sarawak) on 12 December 1962 (James and Sheil-Small 1971: 42–43). Great bravery was shown by the police (many were from Malaya), particularly in defending the Panaga and Kuala Belait police stations; the former held out throughout the siege, and the

latter was not surrendered until the last round had been fired, which meant that much-needed arms were denied to the insurgents. Overall, the rebellion was poorly led (Azahari was absent in Manila) and insufficiently provisioned. Effective outside support failed to materialize, particularly anticolonial intervention by the United Nations (as had happened in Indonesia in the late 1940s). Furthermore, at the height of the uprising, Sultan Omar Ali made a broadcast denouncing the outbreak, which led to the surrender of the many rebels who supposedly thought that they were fighting on his behalf. After the security forces had reestablished control, there were mass arrests, denuding many government departments of personnel, but all except the hard-core rebels were soon released. The last of the rebels, none of whom had ever been tried in court, were set free in 1990.

The Brunei Rebellion sparked a *Konfrontasi* (confrontation or low-intensity war) between Indonesia and Malaysia (1963–1966). Although Brunei opted to remain outside Tunku Abdul Rahman's federation in 1963, it would be dubious to argue that this decision was *caused* by the revolt. The sultanate's relations with both Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta remained strained until the late 1970s.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Anglo-Brunei Relations (Nineteenth Century to 1980s); Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud, Sheikh (1928–2002); *Konfrontasi* ("Crush Malaysia" Campaign); Malaysia (1963); Omar Ali Saifuddin III, Sultan of Brunei (1914–1986); Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB)

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
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BUDDHISM

Buddhism dates back to the sixth to fifth century B.C.E., when a man known as Siddhartha Gautama (ca. 563–ca. 483 B.C.E.) awakened (*buddha*) to the truth and became the most recent in a long series of Buddhas. From that moment on, the Buddha was no longer subject to *samsara*, the round of rebirth.

Buddhist thought holds that beings are trapped in *samsara* because of their greed, hatred, and ignorance. The term *nirvana* means the "extinction" of these vices. They or the opposite virtues inform all our intentional actions, or *karma*. Everyone's current and future experiences and rebirths as humans, animals, or inhabitants of the various Buddhist hells and heavens are determined by previous karma.

Although the ultimate truth is regarded as experiential and beyond the understanding of ordinary, unenlightened individuals, it is given a variety of formulations. Phenomena have three characteristics: impermanence, lack of an enduring self or soul, and suffering. The concept of the "four noble truths" formulates Buddhist teaching along the lines of a medical diagnosis. The first truth identifies the symptoms and asserts that everything is suffering or unsatisfactory; the second diagnoses the cause of this suffering, identified as craving; the third offers the prognosis that there can be an end or cure; the fourth presents the course of treatment to end the suffering, the "noble eight-fold path." This path includes virtuous action, correct understanding, and meditation. There are many types of Buddhist meditation, the principal mechanism through which one can transform one's mental and emotional re-



A Buddhist monk at a temple in Phnom Bok, Cambodia, 1993. (Corel Corporation)

sponses and attitudes. Other important practices include generosity, particularly in supporting the sangha (institution of the Buddhist monkhood living in monasteries, also including nuns in separate monasteries), undertaking pilgrimage, practicing rites, and participating in religious festivals. The role of the sangha includes preserving and providing religious teachings handed down from the Buddha, performing rituals, and providing a source of religious power and sanctity.

There are, therefore, two main sources of authority in Buddhism, the sangha and the texts, which consist of three collections. These are the *Vinaya Pitaka*, containing the rules for the sangha; the *Sutra/Sutta Pitaka*, which contains the Buddha's teachings; and the *Abhidharma/Abhidhamma Pitaka*, which systematizes those teachings, or *dharma*. Not all forms of Buddhism accept this third collection.

Buddhism spread throughout Asia from the third century B.C.E., under the patronage of

the Indian emperor Asoka (ca. 271–238 B.C.E.). Its spread along the silk routes reflects the hegemony of India; the value of universal (rather than community or caste-specific) ethics; and its appeal to merchants and foreign rulers, in its authorization for the spiritual value of their occupations. Legends about its spread emphasize the meaningfulness of its teachings, the magical power of its teachers, and the close relationship between Buddhist monks and local kings.

KATE CROSBY

See also Borobudur; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Buddhist Institute of Phnom Penh; Buddhist Socialism; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; I-Ching (I-tsing) (635–713 C.E.); Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Palembang; Sri Lanka (Ceylon); Srivijaya (Sriwijaya); *Tam Giao*; Unified Buddhist Church (1963) (Vietnam)

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BUDDHISM, MAHAYANA

Mahayana, meaning the “great way” or “great vehicle,” is a collective term referring to a group of traditions in Buddhism. These traditions have a number of features in common, including an emphasis on the ideal of the altruistic spiritual hero, the *bodhisattva*. In addition to the three collections of texts at the core of Buddhism, scriptures such as the *Lotus Sutra* and *Perfection of Wisdom Sutra* are accepted, as well as the belief in many Buddhas existing at the same time. So, too, is the concept of having faith in “celestial” bodhisattvas and in one of a range of philosophical systems.

The origins of Mahayana are obscure. Quite commonly, it is regarded as a movement that validated the spiritual potential of laypeople in reaction to the perceived selfishness of the monastic life dedicated to personal enlightenment. However, Mahayana has, to a great extent, been preserved and pursued by monks and nuns. Furthermore, recent research shows that early Mahayana texts emphasized renunciation, meditation, and ascetic practices. They criticized more moderate or “lapsed” forms of monasticism. It is not known whether Mahayana began within the mainstream tradition or at the margins of the Buddhist world. The term *Mahayana* itself is polemical. It occurs in texts that claim that their version of Buddhism is great, or superior—*maha*—in contrast to the preexisting Buddhism, which is characterized as *hina* (inferior).

There are three main philosophical schools within Mahayana. Madhyamaka is associated with the doctrine of emptiness. Yogacara or Cittamatra (meaning “mind-only”) is associated with theories of relativity in epistemology, the three “inherent natures,” and the use of *alayavijñana* (storehouse consciousness) to explain memory and karmic causality. Tathagatagarbha emphasizes the potential, or embryo (*garbha*), to become a Buddha (*Tathagata*). Each school seeks to restate the original truth of Buddhism in such a way as to defend it from possible misinterpretation or misapplication, yet each is also criticized as straying from true Buddhism.

The bodhisattva ideal is the commitment to become a Buddha and save all beings from the sufferings of samsara. In Mahayana practice, a distinction is made between “the path of the perfections” (*paramitayana*) and the “path of sacred formulae” (*mantrayana*). The former is the long path pursued over many thousands of rebirths in which the bodhisattva, the person destined to become a Buddha, perfects the necessary set of virtues, including generosity, patience, and wisdom. The latter, *mantrayana*, is the fast route to enlightenment through the manipulation of inherently powerful sounds (*mantra*) and symbols. This path is often referred to as Vajrayana (meaning “diamond path or vehicle”) or Tantric Buddhism. It is the Mahayana form of tantra, the pan-Indian religious phenomenon, that employs empowerment through initiation, the ritual manipulation of powers through microcosm-macrocosm identifications,

and sometimes transgression of societal norms to acquire spiritual or worldly powers. Other key practices include the mental or visual creation of mandala, that is, patterns representing the macrocosm at the microcosmic level; the summoning of Buddhas and different deities; and the practitioner achieving Buddhahood through ritually identifying the Buddha with him- or herself. The ideology of all three philosophical schools underpins the interpretation of Buddhist tantra.

In modern Southeast Asia, Mahayana Buddhism has only been present among small minorities, with the exception of Chan (Zen) Buddhism in Vietnam under Chinese influence. From the eleventh through thirteenth centuries, Theravada replaced Mahayana as the dominant form of Buddhism in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia. This in part reflects developments in neighboring regions: the eclipse of the Mahayana dynasties of Bengal and Theravadin Sri Lanka’s victory over the Hindu Cola (Chola) empire of south India. Islam largely replaced Indian religions in Indonesia from the thirteenth century. However, in the early medieval period, Mahayana flourished throughout Southeast Asia. Its former importance is reflected in the monumental architecture of the period, which is still impressive today. In mainland Southeast Asia during the twelfth century, King Jayavarman VII (r. 1181–ca. 1220) built the magnificent Bayon temple at Angkor Thom toward the end of the Angkor period. In the Indonesian archipelago, Borobudur—an enormous, terraced, and three-dimensional mandala decorated with scenes from Mahayana texts—was built under the Sailendra dynasty in central Java (eighth to ninth centuries). The Sailendra dynasty’s more powerful ally, the Śrīvijaya kingdom, centered in Sumatra (seventh to eleventh centuries), also embraced Buddhism and was a major patron. The kingdom even funded buildings at the Buddhist university of Nalanda in northern India. The Indian monk Atisa, who studied tantra in Sumatra in the eleventh century, became highly significant in Tibetan Buddhism.

That insular Southeast Asia adopted both Buddhism and forms of Hinduism, especially Saivism, is reflected in the close relationship between these religions as they survive in Java and Bali to this day. The significance of forms of Avalokitesvara, the bodhisattva of compassion,

throughout Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka reflects his importance as the patron saint of travelers at the height of the period when Buddhist culture dominated the silk routes.

KATE CROSBY

See also Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Borobodur; Buddhism; Buddhism, Theravada; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; I-Ching (I-tsing) (635–713 C.E.); Jayavarman VII (r. 1181–1220?); Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; *Sangha*; Sri Lanka (Ceylon); Srivijaya (Sriwijaya)

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BUDDHISM, THERAVADA

The term *Theravada* means "doctrine of elders," that is, senior monks, and is applied to the dominant form of Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and mainland Southeast Asia. It has probably been present in these regions from the third century B.C.E., when Buddhism spread along trade routes partly because of the power of the Mauryan empire (321–185 B.C.E.), centered in the heartland of Buddhism. Theravada has been the state religion of Sri Lanka, Burma (Myanmar), Thailand (Siam), Laos, and Cambodia in various periods, and all these countries have myths describing visits made to them by the Buddha. Theravada has also been present in south India historically and in Bangladesh and among Khmer and T'ai minorities in Vietnam into the modern period.

Adherents regard Theravada as the purest form of Buddhism. They claim it has preserved the fullest form of the *Vinaya Pitaka* at the division between Mahasamghikas and Sthaviras at the Second Council of the sangha in the fourth century B.C.E. The *Vinaya Pitaka* is a Buddhist text that espoused the discipline of the sangha (institution of the Buddhist monkhood) in the form of rules and decisions laid down by the Buddha. At the second council of the sangha,

there was a split between the orthodox Sthaviravadins (Sthaviras), who were the Pali Theravadins (followers of the "doctrine of the Elders") and the Mahasamghikas, the members of the Great Community (Mahayana Buddhism). In the first century B.C.E. a schism occurred between the sects in the division into two sacred languages: the Sthaviravadins adopted Pali and the others used the Sanskrit canon. Consequently the two sects evolved separately, each developing divergent ideas that subsequently formed the basis for the division into Mahayana (Greater Wheel or Vehicle) and Hinayana (Lesser Vehicle) Theravada. Theravada is then associated with the form of Buddhism purified of "heretics" by the Mauryan emperor Asoka (Ashoka) (r. 264–238 B.C.E.) in the third century B.C.E. At the Third Council immediately after this purification, the *Kathavatthu* ("Points of Controversy"), a text of the Theravadin *Abhidhamma Pitaka* (a catechism-style exposition of the *dhamma*), was compiled. This work discussed and rejected rival doctrines and revealed some of the key doctrinal differences between Theravada and other Buddhist schools at that time. Doctrines rejected include the existence of more than one Buddha at a time and the concept of *dharmanairatmya*, that is, the notion of no-self of *dhammas* into which the constituents of Theravada Abhidhamma analyze the individual and the world, a doctrine propounded in *Perfection of Wisdom* literature and *Madhyamaka* Buddhist philosophy. Theravada in different regions was partly localized through the incorporation of local deities into the pantheon of gods who support Buddhism. However, the doctrine that there is only one Buddha at a time means that the pantheon of Theravada Buddhas is relatively limited, with the only future Buddha being Metteyya (Maitreya). The concept of the altruistic hero, the *bodhisattva*, is present but not much emphasized in Theravada.

The chronicle literature of Sri Lanka and mainland Southeast Asia associates the arrival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka and mainland Southeast Asia with missionaries sent by Asoka, Sona and Uttara. They went to Burma, and Asoka's own son, Mahinda, and daughter, Sanghamitta, became the first monk and nun to go to Sri Lanka. Mahinda is believed to have taken the Buddhist canon to Sri Lanka immediately after the Third Council, as well as the commentaries,

which are attributed to the Buddha's immediate disciples. Theravada tradition further authenticates the validity of its canon and commentaries as the original teachings of the Buddha and his enlightened disciples through the figure of the Indian monk Buddhaghosa. Buddhaghosa went to Sri Lanka in the fifth century, where he produced two types of work. One, a handbook called the *Visuddhimagga* ("Path of Purity"), systematizes the teachings of the canon under the tripartite division of moral conduct, meditation, and wisdom. To prove the perfection of this treatise, deities confiscated the text each time Buddhaghosa finished it. Only when he had finished it for the third time did the deities restore the first two copies, each of which was identical to the third, word for word. The other task attributed to Buddhaghosa is the composition of the commentaries on the canon—or rather, re-dressing them in the original language of the canon, Pali. This notion reflects the belief that Mahinda had translated the preexisting commentaries in local languages from Pali originals brought by him from India. Although scholars might regard the commentaries as showing historical development since the canon, Theravada orthodoxy does not accept this. Buddhaghosa is regarded by many as the representative of true Theravada orthodoxy.

The language in which Buddhaghosa composed, Pali, is treated as a sacred language in Theravada. It is regarded as the original, unchanging language in which the Buddha spoke but also the universal language spoken in heavens and hells or by a child if left abandoned in the wilderness. As such, Pali has been used in sacred texts and rituals. Local languages are also used for Buddhist texts or their interpretation.

The historical diversity of Theravada is difficult to assess because of the dominance of the Mahavihara school as well as the demise of Buddhism in mainland South Asia. In the twelfth century, King Parakkamabahu I of Sri Lanka unified different Buddhist monastic lineages under the Mahavihara school. The ascendancy of the Mahavihara school is associated with a period of Buddhist literary revival and a reemphasis on the strict adherence to Vinaya rules. With Sri Lanka's defeat of the south Indian Cola (Chola) empire and the defeat of the Buddhist rulers of north India by Muslim powers, Sri Lanka became dominant in the Buddhism of mainland Southeast Asia. The histories that we

have come either from the Mahavihara school or from schools heavily influenced by it in mainland Southeast Asia, as Buddhists there sought to import the prestigious Buddhism of Sri Lanka.

KATE CROSBY

See also Buddhism; Buddhism, Mahayana; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; *Sangha*; Sri Lanka (Ceylon)

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BUDDHIST INSTITUTE OF PHNOM PENH

The Buddhist Institute is a Cambodian learned society formed in 1931 under French colonial auspices in an effort to diminish Thai influence on the Buddhist sangha, or monastic community. In its early years, under the direction of the Buddhist scholar Suzanne Karpeles, the institute became a meeting place for Cambodian monks and laypeople interested in Buddhism and Cambodian culture. The institute sponsored a Khmer-language journal, *Kampuchea Surya* ("Cambodian Sun"), that contained learned articles and translations from Buddhist texts, as well as original Cambodian poems, folktales, novels, and short stories. The institute also became a forum for a group of young Cambodian nationalist intellectuals, led by Son Ngoc Thanh (1907–1976?). In 1936, the group began publishing a weekly Khmer-language newspaper, *Nagara Vatta* ("Angkor Wat"), which printed mildly nationalistic, development-oriented articles and gained a wide audience among Cambodia's small but influential intelligentsia, dominated by schoolteachers and Buddhist monks. Following the fall of France in 1940, the journal became stridently nationalistic, and many of its issues were censored. In the wake of an anti-French demonstration in July 1942, led by *Nagara Vatta's* editor, Pach Chhoeun, the paper ceased publication.

During World War II (1939–1945), inspired by the French anthropologist Madeline Poree-Maspero, workers at the institute began collecting documents relating to Cambodian folklore, rituals, and popular religion. This archive was maintained until 1975 when the Khmer Rouge seized power, and it has never been recovered.

The institute remained closed under the Vietnamese protectorate (1979–1989) but reopened in 1990. With funding from Germany and other countries, the institute again began publishing *Kampuchea Surya* in the 1990s, and it has resumed its position as a powerful force in Cambodia's intellectual life.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Buddhism; Buddhism, Theravada; Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Khmer Rouge; Newspapers and Mass Media in Southeast Asia; Son Ngoc Thanh (1907–1976?)

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BUDDHIST SOCIALISM

The official program of Buddhist socialism was initiated in 1960 by U Nu (1907–1995), the first prime minister of independent Burma, as part of his election platform. The ruling democratic party, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), had split into two factions. The Stable group, led by U Kyaw Nyein and U Ba Swe, was based on the educated or college socialist groups within the AFPFL, and the Clean group, led by Thakin Kyaw Tun, was based on the uneducated or monastery school socialists. U Nu supported the Clean faction, which considered agriculture as the primary sector in the economy, whereas the Stable faction aligned itself with industrialization.

In 1954, U Nu launched his Pyidawtha Program for the Buddhist welfare state, which was to give practical expression to traditional Burmese cultural millenarianism anticipating the Metteyya (Maitreya), or the coming Buddha; Metteyya would make a utopian society in the present world, long expected as the outcome of independence. In 1960, U Nu's Buddhist socialism drew on Burmese folklore to declare that the remedy for the poverty that

had come on the people with the appearance of private property was for the fruits of their labor to be shared according to the toil needed to produce them. He evoked the legend of Mahathammada, the Yaza or Raja, who came to ease social unrest when the people's Wishing Tree, the Padeytha Tree, on which grew all the necessities of life, was destroyed after private property was introduced in society. He looked to the reintroduction of property in common in a utopian society without oppression, where Buddhist nirvana would replace samsara, the world of suffering. Drawing on the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence, U Nu explained that freeing oneself from suffering required one to realize that acquisition of property arose from ignorance and prolonged suffering.

His appeal to Burmese folk beliefs and incorporation of Buddhist social ethics led to a landslide victory at the polls in 1960. He also received major support from the Burmese Buddhist abbots at the monasteries at Sagaing, Ava, Amarapura, and Mandalay. The support for U Nu was impressive, indeed, to the extent that he was perceived as a *bodhisattva*, or a future Buddha, himself.

U Nu's platform of Buddhist socialism evoked one of the deepest cultural beliefs of Burmese people: to be Burmese is to be Buddhist. His platform encapsulated the ideals of the Burmese who had regretted the displacement of the monarchical state and the undermining of the Buddhist sangha, or monastic community, during the sixty years of British colonial rule. On being reelected, U Nu moved to make Buddhism the state religion of Burma, in accordance with the wishes of the Buddhist sangha. During his first term in office, from May 1954 to May 1956, he convened the Sixth Buddhist Synod at Kaba Aye Pagoda, evoking the actions of the great King Mindon in 1871, who had convened the Fifth Buddhist Synod in Mandalay. By a vote of 324 to 28, the State Religion Bill was passed in August 1961, ending the separation of church and state. Burma was once again a Buddhist nation, promoting Buddhism as the Burmese monarchs had done. At the instigation of Attorney General U Chan Htoon, the Buddha Sasana Council was established. Buddhism was to be taught in state schools. The Buddhist sabbath, based on the lunar calendar, was decreed the official holiday for government offices,

schools, and markets, and no liquor was to be served that day. The Department of Religious Affairs initiated the building of 60,000 sand pagodas to support peace and tranquillity in the country.

However, the passage of the State Religion Act incensed the minorities and non-Buddhists, leading to serious civil unrest in the country. The measure appeared to fan the cause of federalism and minority aspirations for autonomy; to the army, it seemed to prepare the way for extended Chinese Communist influence in the northern states of Burma. Thus, on 2 March 1962, the army, led by General Ne Win (1910–2002), launched a coup. In the military takeover, Parliament and the constitution were prorogued, the State Religion Act was repealed, the Buddha Sasana Council was abolished, and the secular state was again affirmed, as Ne Win stated the new policy was to separate “*pongyis* [lit. “great glory,” referring to a Buddhist monk in Burma] from politics.”

HELEN JAMES

See also Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL); Buddhism, Theravada; Burma under British Colonial Rule; Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Ne Win, General (1911–2002); Nu, U (1907–1995); *Sangha*; *Thakin* (Lord, Master)

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BUGIS (BUGINESE)

The Bugis are the dominant ethnic group of South Sulawesi and occupy much of its fertile lowland. The Austronesian ancestors of the South Sulawesi peoples entered the area after 2500 B.C.E., bringing with them horticulture, pottery, weaving, polished stone axes, a tripartite cosmology, and hereditary leadership. The Bugis evolved as a separate linguistic group around the central lakes and in the long, narrow Soppeng Valley to the south.

Little is known of the Bugis during the Neolithic (ca. 2500 B.C.E.–ca. 300 B.C.E.): only one large site, Bulu Baku, in the upper Soppeng Valley has been discovered. From the Bronze Age through the Iron Age (ca. 300 B.C.E.–1200 C.E.), the Bugis were organized into a large number of small chiefdoms (*wanua*) practicing dry-field and shifting agriculture, with some wet-rice cultivation. A lively megalithic tradition flourished in Soppeng and other Bugis areas during the late Bronze Age through the Iron Age and continued into the early historical period (ca. 1200–1600).

Agricultural settlements centered on wet-rice farming appear in the archaeological record of the upper Cenrana Valley around 1200. The pace of change accelerated during the thirteenth century as a result of the incorporation of South Sulawesi in a trading network extending to India and China via the eastern Javanese kingdom of Singhasari-Majapahit. The next four hundred years saw the establishment of large, loosely unified kingdoms based on wet-rice cultivation. It is in this period of increasing social stratification, growing cultural sophistication, and rising population that much of the present-day Bugis “high culture” has its roots.

Oral traditions and cultural practices point to influence from Java: the Javanese-style cremation of the corpse and burial of the ashes in expensive, imported porcelain jars became standard practice after about 1300. The transvestite ritual priests called *bissu* who guarded the kingdoms' regalia and acted as intermediaries with the upper and lower worlds probably developed from an earlier shamanistic tradition.

The earliest kingdom was Luwu (or Ware') in the Gulf of Bone, which was established by Bugis settlers to control the trade in iron ore carried down from the Rongkong Valley. The iron was smelted at the principal Bugis settlement of Malangke and was a key element in the expansion of agriculture across the forested southern peninsula. The Luwu Bugis united the disparate hill tribes of the interior into a powerful, predatory kingdom that established itself as the regional overlord. Luwu was eclipsed after about 1500 by the rising power of the southern agricultural kingdoms that had expanded to their present borders. Wars between kingdoms became frequent, but several peace treaties between kingdoms endured for long terms.

The sixteenth century saw the rise of the Makassar kingdom of Gowa and its union with neighboring Tallo'. Gowa's trading ships plied the waters of Maluku and controlled a sizable part of the trade in nutmeg, cloves, and mace. The port of Makassar became an international entrepôt, attracting traders from India, Europe, China, mainland Southeast Asia, and other parts of the Indonesian archipelago. Cultural and technological development was rapid: guns and cannon were imported, and settlements were fortified with 3-meter-thick brick or stone walls and flanking defenses.

The Luwu Bugis converted to Islam in 1605, followed shortly by the ruling elites of other kingdoms. The Dutch arrived in Makassar the same year and attempted to impose control over the spice trade. They enlisted the aid of the Bone Bugis and defeated Gowa in 1669 after a protracted civil war. In exchange for a Dutch monopoly on trade, Bone became the effective overlord of South Sulawesi. The following decades saw a diaspora of Bugis who had sided with Gowa, with important consequences for the Malay world. The eighteenth century was a period of instability, with a contested succession to the throne of Gowa in

1739 and an uprising in 1776 led by a commoner: both drew on deep resentment of the Dutch presence in Makassar. The British replaced the Dutch in Makassar between 1811 and 1816 and invaded Bone, sacking the palace and seizing its library. Uneasy relations continued when the Dutch returned; Bone was invaded again in 1865 and 1905, when the king was deposed and exiled to Batavia.

Dutch colonial rule made use of traditional Bugis and Makassar hierarchies, and in the 1930s, a limited form of kingship was reintroduced. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the notorious Dutch captain "Turk" Westerling directed a brutal repression of nationalist forces. From the early 1950s to the mid-1960s, the countryside was laid waste by the quasi-Islamic rebellion led by Kahar Muzakkar, a disaffected Bugis army officer from Luwu. The rebels controlled much of the countryside, and attempts were made to wipe out all non-Islamic elements, resulting in the burning of traditional houses and manuscripts. Recent years have seen increased prosperity, political stability, and a development of regional identities based on local histories, in which Bugis have a great interest.

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See also Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Johor; Johor-Riau Empire; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Maluku (The Moluccas); Spices and the Spice Trade; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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BUMIPUTERA (BUMIPUTRA)

Bumiputera, literally meaning "son(s) of the soil," is a modern Malay word that was first used in the Malay Peninsula during the second and third decades of the twentieth century. The term came into current usage when the Malays were beginning to be conscious of the political threats that immigrants (namely, the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, the Indians) posed to their presumed ownership of the country. *Bumiputera* refers to the indigenous person(s), or people of Malay (*Melayu*) stock, and the native communities of the country. It is often interchangeable with *peribumi* (native, indigenous) and sometimes with *anak negeri* (son[s] of the country). A daily paper called *Bumiputera* was started in Penang in January 1933 but had ceased publication by the middle of 1935. In response to the constitutional commission in the mid-1950s, Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), a party that adopts the viewpoint of Islam as not only a religion but also a political ideology, among others, repeatedly pointed out that the Peninsular Malays are the original and sovereign bumiputera of the country and should be respected and treated as such.

With the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the term *bumiputera* was entrenched in the Malaysian Federal Constitution to also refer to the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, who were accorded a "special position" previously granted to the Malays in the peninsula (West Malaysia). In daily life, it soon became a generic term to refer to all indigenous peoples

of Malaysia, namely, the Malays, the peninsular Orang Asli (meaning "original people" or "aborigines"), and all the ethnic minorities of East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak). The Partai Bumiputera appeared in Sarawak in 1966, and early in 1973, it was enlarged to become the Partai Pesaka Bumiputera Bersatu (PBB), a political party that continues to be dominant in the state.

As provided for by Article 153 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution, affirmative measures were taken by the Malaysian government to uplift the social and economic conditions of the bumiputera, which were lagging behind those of the non-bumiputera, particularly the Chinese. Public institutions were set up to improve the lot of the bumiputera. Organizations such as the Bank Bumiputra (for credit and banking), the Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PERNAS, for trading and employment), and the Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA, for training and education) were established as recommended by the 1965 and 1968 bumiputera economic congresses. Though only halfway successful, the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1971–1990) had, to some extent, improved bumiputera participation in banking, commerce, and industry. The NEP had greatly improved bumiputera access to education, in particular at the tertiary level.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Razak, Tun (1922–1976); East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Mahathir bin Mohamad, Dr. (1925–); Malayan/Malaysian Education; Malays"; "May 13th 1969" (Malaysia); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; New Economic Policy (NEP) (Malaysia) (1971–1990); Orang Asli; Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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**BUNGA EMAS (BUNGA MAS)
(GOLD FLOWERS)**

Bunga emas was a form of gift given by the Malay sultans of Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Patani to the ruler of Siam. In return, the Siamese ruler would give valuable gifts to the sultans and promise to protect their states from external threats. The tradition of sending *bunga emas* started in the fourteenth century and was first practiced by Kedah, as mentioned in the famous Kedah annal *Hikayat Merong Maha Wangsa* (“The Tale of Merong Maha Wangsa”). Initially, the gift was sent to the ruler of Siam, the older brother of the Kedah sultan, to mark the latter’s happiness upon the birth of his first son. Thereafter, a *bunga emas* was sent to Siam after the birth of each child. This tradition began to be emulated by the other sultans. Some scholars, however, interpreted the giving of *bunga emas* from the Malay States as a show of allegiance from vassal states to their sovereign.

The *bunga emas* was made in the form of a tree, which was about 1.8 meters high. The trunk was made of teak wrapped in fine gold. The tree consisted of four boughs that were tiered upward. Each bough had three little branches, with five golden leaves about 2.5 centimeters in size on each. At the end of each branch was a golden flower with four petals, and on top of the tree, a golden bird was perched. The *bunga emas* was sent to Siam with much splendor. A special boat, called the *Perahu Bunga Emas* (*Bunga Emas Boat*), was used. Besides the *bunga emas*, other gifts were sent, such as silver flowers, four spears with golden handgrips, and two gold rings. Local specialists normally took six months to finish making one *bunga emas*, and because this and the other gifts were so important, the sultans personally supervised their creation.

The cost of making the *bunga emas* was borne by the people through the head tax imposed by the states. However, the value of each offering differed from state to state. It was reported that the Kedah *bunga emas* was the most costly.

Kedah claimed that the sending of *bunga emas* was a gesture of its friendship with Siam, but Kelantan sent one as a show of gratitude after Siam recognized Muhammad II as the sultan of the state. Terengganu claimed that *bunga emas* was sent to Siam in return for gifts sent by

the Siamese king in recognition of the help the former had rendered in defeating Ligor. Patani, by contrast, sent *bunga emas* to Siam as a show of allegiance.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also Chinese Tribute System; Ligor (Nakhon); Patani (Pattani), Sultanate of; Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu)

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BUNNAG FAMILY**A Persian-Siamese Influential Lineage**

The Bunnag family, one of the most powerful families of Siam (Thailand), played a vital role in administering the kingdom from the early Chakri period until the 1880s. Thereafter, King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910) undertook administrative reforms—reforms that would ultimately lead to the decline in political and economic control exercised by the Bunnag family.

The ancestors of the Bunnag family were of Persian descent and settled in Ayutthaya during the reign of King Ekathotsarot (r. 1605–1610). The years of his reign saw an increasing volume of foreign trade, and the king needed foreign expertise to handle it. In 1602, the Persian brothers Sheik Ahmad and Muhammad Said arrived in Ayutthaya. They were very successful in conducting business in the capital city, and Sheik Ahmad served the bureaucracy as an offi-

cial in a trade department dealing with Muslim merchants from India and Arab. During the two following reigns, Sheik Ahmad rose to power, first through his appointment as minister of trade and later as prime minister; his nephew, Muhammad Said, also served as a court official of King Songtham (r. 1610–1628). As a result, this Persian family established very firm roots in the Siamese bureaucracy from the middle of the Ayutthaya period.

One of the children of the Persian family, named Bunnag, spent his childhood with Thongduang, who later became King Rama I during the period prior to the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767. When Rama I founded Bangkok and established the Chakri dynasty in 1782, Bunnag served in the bureaucracy and established very close ties with the king through marriage (Wyatt 1994: 114, 117). During the reign of Rama I (1782–1809), Bunnag's power and influence steadily increased, and he was appointed *kalahom* (minister of defense). Thus, from the beginning of the new dynasty, the Bunnag family members gradually established their political and economic power with the royal family. These ties were strengthened during the reign of King Rama II (r. 1809–1824) because the king's mother was closely related to the Bunnag family. Her sister was the mother of two Bunnag members, who were appointed minister of defense and minister of the capital (responsible for Bangkok and its environs).

Another Bunnag, Dit, was appointed *phrakhlang* (minister of finance and foreign affairs) in 1822. When Rama II died in 1824, a grand assembly was called to choose the new monarch. (Rama II had not named the son who was born to the queen as his successor.) The Bunnag family, who by then controlled the most powerful ministries, supported Prince Chetsadabodin, King Rama II's son by a concubine, and he was duly named King Rama III (r. 1824–1851). During his reign, a younger brother of Dit, called That, was appointed *kalahom*. It is evident that by the third reign of the Chakri dynasty, members of the Bunnag family were the most powerful and influential among all courtiers.

Their political and economic power rose dramatically during the reign of King Rama IV, also known as King Mongkut (r. 1851–1868). King Rama III had died without directly naming his successor, even though he

avored Mongkut, who was still in monkhood at that time. A grand assembly was called again, under the chairmanship of the *phrakhlang* (Dit Bunnag), and it was decided to name Mongkut as the new king. King Mongkut rewarded the Bunnag family, and during his reign, members of the family filled a good number of important administrative positions (Wyatt 1984: 182). For instance, when Dit retired, he was replaced by his two sons, Chuang and Kham. Chuang took on the official title of Chaophraya Sri Suriyawong, the minister of defense, and Kham was appointed as a new finance minister. Once again, the Bunnag family was responsible for the most important ministries of the kingdom.

The family's rise in power culminated in October 1868 after Mongkut died without clearly naming his successor, even though he would have liked Chulalongkorn, his son born to the queen, to be the new king. But Chulalongkorn's ascension to the throne was based upon the condition that Sri Suriyawong would serve as a regent until the young king came of age (Wyatt 1984: 191). Sri Suriyawong had very close ties with Prince Wichaichan, the son of King Pinklao (who was known as the second king during the reign of King Mongkut). However, when a council was called, Sri Suriyawong named Chulalongkorn the new king, and the council agreed. As a result, Chulalongkorn became Rama V and ruled under the regency of Sri Suriyawong until 1873, when he came of age. During his regency, Sri Suriyawong took good care of the young king, and although many courtiers were afraid that he would usurp the throne, he never expressed any interest in doing so. Chulalongkorn rewarded him by giving him a princely title.

The power of the Bunnag family declined after the death of Sri Suriyawong in 1883 and after King Chulalongkorn undertook drastic administrative reforms in the 1880s in order to centralize the political and economic power with the king.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also Khaw Family; Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Trinh Family (1597–1786)

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BURMA COMMUNIST PARTY (BCP)

The Burma Communist Party (BCP) was the major armed opposition to the government of Burma (Myanmar) from the time it went underground in 1948 until its surrender to the army in 1989. The BCP was founded by a small group of intellectuals, including its two most prominent leaders, Thakins Than Tun and Soe, in Rangoon (Yangon) in 1939. It reached its popular apogee at the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945) when it combined with the Japanese-trained Burma National Army to form the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL). However, the party soon split (in 1946) over the question of whether Burma could achieve independence without violence. The minority radical faction led by Thakin Soe, whose members called themselves the Red Flag Communists, then went underground, leaving the majority White Flag faction retaining the BCP title, with Thakin Than Tun at the helm.

Before long, though, the BCP fell out with its non-Communist associates in the AFPFL and was expelled from the government. Within three months of independence, the party went underground and began the long-running civil war. It was joined by a number of troops from the army and posed the major threat to the central government at Rangoon. However, the army slowly gained ground, and following the 1962 military coup, the BCP entered into peace talks with the government. When these failed, the party then went through a period of internal feuds, leading to the death of Thakin Than Tun. In 1971, the party established its base in the Shan State near the Chinese border. Ethnically

still led by Burmans, its troops were composed primarily of minorities such as the Wa and Shan, many of whom had been involved in the drug trade. In 1989, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) withdrew its support for the BCP, the troops mutinied against their commanders, and the party collapsed.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma Independence Army (BIA); Ne Win, General (1911–2002); Shan Nationalism; Shan United Revolutionary Army; Thakin (Lord, Master)

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BURMA DURING THE PACIFIC WAR (1941–1945)

The Pacific War had dramatic consequences for the future of Burma. The country was fought over twice, once as the Japanese invaded in December 1941 and again as the British returned in 1944. The economy was badly damaged, and the country has never regained the level of per capita income that had been achieved by 1939. During the war itself, many people suffered great privation as the export-oriented agricultural economy crumbled, and clothing and medicines became very scarce. The authoritarian behavior of the Japanese Imperial Army also caused much individual suffering. Thousands of Indian immigrants walked out of the country and back to India to flee the advancing Japanese. Politically, the ordered world of the colonial regime was upended. Those who had enjoyed power and privilege under the British were stripped of all their authority, whereas political radicals, many of whom had been imprisoned by the British, were able to assume the mantle of office, if not the power of government, under Japanese tutelage. When the British returned at the end of the war, they had lost the capacity to re-create the prewar order

in the face of the torrent of nationalist and radical sentiment that had been engendered during the war years.

Thirty young Burmese nationalists who had fled the country in 1940 and 1941 to receive military training on Hainan Island under Japanese tutelage readily joined the latter in their invasion of Burma. Led by Thakin Aung San (1915–1947) and known as the Thirty Comrades, they included men who would become some of the most prominent leaders of the country for the next fifty years. Among them was Thakin Shu Maung, who, as General Ne Win (1911–2002), came to dominate Burma until the 1990s. The Thirty Comrades, entering Burma through the southern provinces of Tenasserim in 1942, organized a Burmese nationalist army in the wake of the Japanese, known as the Burma Independence Army (BIA). The BIA has now entered into the historiography of Burma as one of the greatest achievements of the nationalist era. Led by Thakin Aung San, the BIA soon became a group of approximately 30,000 young men who had been mobilized in the belief that the Japanese were about to restore their country's independence. The formation of the BIA was also a great boost to national morale, for the British had, until just prior to the war, refused to recognize the modern military prowess of the Burman population. The British military regularly recruited primarily from the ethnic minorities in the hill areas, namely, the Karens, Chins, Kachins, and Shans.

The war had the effect of increasing the political differences between the hill peoples and the lowland Burma population. Although the Burmans rallied to the BIA and their Japanese sponsors, many of the minority communities cleaved to the British. A number of Karen, Chin, and Kachin troops were organized into anti-Japanese guerrilla units and served behind the lines throughout the war, harassing the occupiers. Because of their loyalty to the British, many came to believe that Britain would not abandon them in the future. Toward the end of the war, a group of Burman troops massacred a number of Christian Karens, and this gory incident became a symbol of the growing strains between the ethnic communities. Also, the Shan Sawbwas were not included under the new administrative order the Japanese created but swore their allegiance directly to the Japa-

nese emperor in Tokyo. Moreover, the Shan States east of the Salween River were ceded to Thailand during the war years.

Within two weeks of the British departure from Rangoon, the Japanese installed Thakin Tun Oke as the chief administrator of the Burma *baho* (central) government. This was a government more in name than in reality, and the management of the country was effectively in the hands of the Japanese Imperial Army and the newly formed units of the BIA. A number of these troops lacked discipline, and disorder, accompanied by looting and banditry, soon became rife. In June, the Japanese ordered the BIA to cease its involvement in administrative and political affairs and to regroup for training as a more disciplined military force under General Aung San's command. The discredited *baho* administration was soon superseded by a preparatory committee established to create some degree of political order out of the chaos. The Japanese turned to the prewar leader Dr. Ba Maw (b. 1893) to spearhead this effort, and he brought together his own followers from the Hsinyeitha (Poor Man's) Party, as well as a number of young thakins and former student leaders, to begin to form a new government. The new joint organization, the Dobama-Hsinyeitha Party—renamed the Maha Bama (Greater Burma) Party in 1944—included a number of individuals of prominence. It featured Thakin Nu (1907–1995), who would be the first prime minister of Burma after independence in 1948, and Thakin Than Tun, who became the leader of the Burma Communist Party.

On 1 August 1943, Japan formally announced the independence of Burma under a government headed by Dr. Ba Maw. Ba Maw took the title of “*Naingngandaw Adipadi*” (State Leader), and later he was referred to as “*Anashin Mingyi Kodaw*” (King). Thakin Nu became the foreign minister in the new government, but since the only independent government that recognized the regime was Japan, he had little to do. Thakin Than Tun, however, as minister for agriculture and subsequently for transport, traveled the country widely and learned a great deal about the conditions of the peasantry, the vast majority of the population. Many other members of the government had been politically active under the British. From the start, however, many Burmese nationalists doubted the genuineness of Tokyo's promise of indepen-

dence and refused to cooperate with the Japanese. Their views came to be more widely shared as the war progressed and the conditions of the country deteriorated. By 1944, when the once seemingly invincible Japanese began to suffer defeats, the tide of opinion ran very strongly against them.

While developing this new administration for Burma, the Japanese regrouped the BIA and opened an officer training school at Mingaladon. A number of officers who later served in the postwar Burma army received their military training there. The BIA had its manpower greatly reduced, and it was renamed the Burma Defense Army. It was renamed again, in September 1943, as the Burma National Army (BNA), under the command of Defense Minister Aung San and General Ne Win. The BNA was never used by the Japanese in battle but quickly became a political instrument at the disposal of its leaders.

Prior to the war, a number of thakins and other left-wing students took the view that it was inappropriate for nationalists to collaborate with the "fascist" Japanese even if doing so would speed Burma's independence. This was the position advocated by the followers of the budding communist movement within the nationalist ranks. Led by Thakin Soe, the leading theoretician of Burmese Marxism, this group held that Aung San and the Thirty Comrades had made a strategic error in cooperating with the Japanese. They argued that in the circumstances, it was better to cooperate, even if temporarily, with the British and other Allied forces against fascism. So, as the Japanese invasion commenced, a number of these individuals went underground and began to organize a resistance movement.

Thakin Thein Pe Myint, with another youth, walked out of the country to India, where he met with members of the British military intelligence and the Special Operations Executive (SOE), Force 136. They worked to organize anti-Japanese propaganda within Burma as well as an alliance with the Chinese and Indian Communist Parties. In so doing, they paved the way for the eventual (but temporary) reconciliation of the underground communists and Aung San and the BNA. By late in 1943, the beginning of what became the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL)

had been formed, led by Aung San and his brother-in-law Thakin Than Tun, the agriculture minister and secret leader of the Burma Communist Party. During 1944, they worked covertly through bodies such as the East Asia Youth League and peasant and worker organizations to develop a resistance movement. Then, as the Japanese were weakening, Aung San led the BNA out of Rangoon on 27 March 1945 to join the Allied cause against their erstwhile Japanese benefactors.

Because of his role as leader of the BNA as well as general secretary of the AFPFL, Aung San was flown to Kandy, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), to negotiate the future of the indigenous army with Lord Louis Mountbatten (t. 1943–1946), the supreme Allied commander, South-East Asia Command (SEAC). Aung San sought to have the BNA recognized as an Allied armed force of a provisional government organized by the AFPFL. However, the British refused to countenance this proposed recognition, and eventually, Aung San had to accept that the BNA would become a subordinate element of the British forces in Burma.

The British returned to Burma in force in 1945 but were never able to assume the authority that they had possessed before the war. The country's infrastructure was in tatters, and for many months, the government was in the hands of the Civil Affairs Service (Burma), or CAS (B), under Major General Hubert Rance. Rance returned a few years later following the removal of Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith as the civilian governor (t. 1946–1948) appointed by the Labour government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee (t. 1945–1951). Mountbatten remained the dominant figure in shaping British policy toward Burma during that time. As viceroy of India, he eventually realized that the military forces necessary to hold Burma within the British Empire were evaporating as Indian independence loomed; an orderly departure from Burma was the best that could be achieved.

The AFPFL eventually came to cooperate with the British and led the country to independence in 1948. Before that happened, however, the communist and noncommunist factions of the league became estranged over strategy and tactics in the nationalist movement, paving the way for the civil war that engulfed Burma within three months of indepen-

dence. Also, the rift between the Karens and the Burmans had not healed, and that, too, led to years of bloodshed. And in July 1947, Aung San and other members of the Governor's Executive Council were assassinated. The architect of Burmese independence was killed before his goal had been achieved.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Aung San (1915–1947); Ba Maw, Dr. (b. 1893); British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; Burma Independence Army (BIA); Collaboration Issue in Southeast Asia; Force 136; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis (1900–1979); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; South-East Asia Command (SEAC); Thakin (Lord, Master); Thirty Comrades; U Saw and the Assassination of Aung San

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BURMA INDEPENDENCE ARMY (BIA)

The Burma Independence Army (BIA) was the forerunner of the armed forces of Burma (Myanmar) after the country regained its independence in 1948. The BIA was formed in 1942, initiated by Burmese nationalist students

who had become disillusioned with the parliamentary politics of the British Burma government and sought a revolutionary route to independence. The initial officer corps grew from the nucleus of the famous Thirty Comrades who, led by Thakin Aung San (1915–1947), had fled Rangoon (Yangon) in 1940. Aung San was intercepted by the Japanese in Amoy (Xiamen) and taken to Japan; there, the Japanese convinced him that they would support the Burmese nationalists in their independence struggle.

Returning from Japan to Rangoon in early 1941, with the assistance of colleagues in the Dobama Asi-ayone, a nationalist association led by students at the University of Rangoon, Aung San gathered the Thirty Comrades for eventual officer training on Hainan Island. The BIA was formed from Burmese in exile in Bangkok and subsequently from the southern peninsula of Burma during December 1941 and January 1942, in the wake of the Japanese Imperial Army's invasion of the country at that time. Riding the nationalist wave sweeping through Burmese youth, the BIA grew rapidly in the first months of 1942; by May, it was a force of about 23,000 ill-trained and ill-equipped men. Though used by the Japanese primarily behind the lines, engaging in only one major battle with British forces, the BIA played a significant role during 1942 by establishing effective, if short-lived, administrations in many areas as the British withdrew. These self-appointed local governments often clashed with the Japanese as well as with non-BIA Burmese politicians and administrators. During its rapid growth, the BIA had attracted adventurers and opportunists as well as patriots, and its reputation in some areas was tarnished by the high-handed, autocratic, and self-serving behavior of some of its members.

Because of the BIA's unwieldy size, slack discipline, and political pretensions, the Japanese ordered the force's reduction and consolidation in July 1942, and the BIA was regrouped as the Burma Defense Army (BDA). It was from the BDA, more than the BIA, that the bulk of the post-1948 officer corps was developed. The overwhelming majority of the Thirty Comrades eschewed subsequent military careers for politics and business, with the significant exception of General Ne Win (1911–

2002). Simultaneously with the formation of the BDA, the Japanese opened a military academy at Mingaladon near Rangoon to train regular officers and sergeants. In 1943, the BDA was renamed once again, becoming the Burma National Army (BNA).

In terms of social background, the officers of the Burmese force reflected the hierarchy of social rank and status in valley Burma at that time. The higher-ranking officers came from larger towns, and most had more formal education than the bulk of the population. Ethnically, the majority of the officers were Burman, though a few Karens, several from the former British Burma army, were also recruited. The BNA never penetrated and recruited from the hill areas, where the British continued to draw troops throughout the war.

Frustrated by the limitations placed on their nominally independent government and the arrogant behavior of some Japanese officers, a number of junior BNA officers began to plot in 1943 to rebel against the Japanese and side with the British. In this, they were advised and guided by a number of civilian politicians, many of whom were identified with the underground anti-Japanese resistance led by the Burma Communist Party (BCP). As the tide of the war turned against the Japanese, more and more officers came to believe that a revolt against the Japanese was essential. The military was prompted to act by the deteriorating economic conditions of the country, which were severely impacting the army's popularity. Furthermore, many believed that if the army were to have a role in postwar Burma, it would have to make itself useful to the British in the final defeat of the Japanese.

In August 1944, the BNA leadership entered into a united front, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), with the Burma Communist Party to prepare for an eventual anti-Japanese rising. In February 1945, BNA troops attacked Japanese forces near Mandalay, and the following month, on 27 March, the remainder of the Burmese army under General Aung San marched out of Rangoon to attack the Japanese. That date has been celebrated as Army Day or Resistance Day in Burma (Myanmar) ever since.

Though some British officials felt that the leaders of the BNA, including Aung San, should have been tried as war criminals after the war,

the supreme Allied commander for Southeast Asia, Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979), took a different view. He and Lieutenant General William Joseph Slim (1891–1970) determined that it would be possible to work with the BNA in the final defeat of the Japanese. At Kandy in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) in 1945, Mountbatten and Aung San reached an agreement to incorporate a proportion of BNA troops, now renamed the Patriotic Burmese Forces (PBF), into the British Burma army. The remainder were organized into the People's Volunteer Force, which played a political role in the subsequent negotiations between the AFPFL and the British, leading to Myanmar's eventual independence. Aung San resigned from the army at that time, leaving General Ne Win as the senior Burman officer from the BIA and the Thirty Comrades in charge of the Burma army.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Aung San (1915–1947); British Burma; Burma Communist Party (BCP); Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Loius (1900–1979); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Ne Win, General (1911–2002); South-East Asia Command (SEAC); Thakin (Lord, Master); Thirty Comrades

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BURMA RESEARCH SOCIETY (BRS) (1909)

For seventy-one years, the Burma Research Society (BRS) was an independent organization

for the sponsorship and dissemination of research on the history, culture, economics, and natural sciences in Burma. Burma, now known as Myanmar, was colonized by Britain in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, but the colonial government did very little to understand the history and culture of the colony, which was then administered as a province of British India. The society originated in 1909 as the inspiration of John Sydenham Furnivall (1878–1960), a Cambridge University graduate and a member of the Indian Civil Service, the elite administrative corps of the British Indian Empire, as well as a Fabian socialist. His keen interest in all things Burmese grew from his study of the reasons why British institutions and ideas seemed to result in such socially divisive and politically destabilizing consequences when transferred to Burma. Having a deep knowledge of the Burmese language and (unusually for an Englishman in colonial Burma) being married to a Burmese woman, he had an intense and respectful interest in all aspects of Burmese culture.

It was in the spirit of Furnivall's broad intellectual interests that the BRS held its first formal meeting in Rangoon (Yangon) on 29 March 1910. The society attracted as members the leading British figures in Burma studies of the first half of the twentieth century—outstanding scholars such as C. O. Bladgen, C. Duroiselle, D. G. E. Hall, G. H. Luce, U Pe Maung Tin, and Htin Aung. The BRS published a number of monographs and texts on matters relating to Burmese history and culture, and biannually from 1911, it produced the *Journal of the Burma Research Society* in both Burmese and English. The society and its scientific aims were often considered subversive by the government, whether British or Burmese. British officials prior to the Pacific War (1941–1945) frequently considered the work of the society antithetical to the maintenance of colonial rule. Ironically, the BRS was closed down in 1980 by the Burma Socialist Programme Party government of General Ne Win (1911–2002).

R. H. TAYLOR

See also British Burma; British India, Government of; Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP); Ne Win, General (1911–2002)

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BURMA ROAD
A Lifeline to China

The Burma Road, also known as the Lashio-Kunming Highway, was built in the late 1930s, primarily at the behest of the Chinese Nationalist government, to provide a southern route for the receipt of war supplies during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). Running 1,120 kilometers (700 miles), it was opened in 1938. The Burma Road connected the town of Lashio in the Shan State of Burma (Myanmar) to the Chinese border at Muse and then continued on to Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province in China. The southern terminus at Lashio connected with the single rail line that ran down to Mandalay and thence on to the port city of Rangoon (Yangon). This route was closed to the Chinese in 1941, when Japan invaded Burma and then occupied the country militarily for the next four years.


After the closure of the Burma Road and the broadening of China's war with Japan to include Britain and the United States, the U.S. Army Air Force (USAF) and the Royal Air Force (RAF) opened an alternative route to supply China via the air. However, the limited capacity of airplanes to fuel an army, especially in the difficult flying conditions encountered at high altitudes over the eastern Himalayan range, led the Allies to open another route later in the war. Known as the Ledo Road, it commenced at Ledo in India's Assam Province and ran across Burma to Myitkyina in the Kachin State where it connected with the Burma Road, a distance of about 800 kilometers (500 miles). This strategic stretch was also referred to as "Stillwell Road" in honor of the rough and tough U.S. commander Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell (1883–1946).

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Highways and Railways; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945)

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Aerial view of the Burma Road, taken by a U.S. Army Signal Corps photographer in the China-Burma-India Theater in June 1944. This section of the Burma Road contains twenty-four switchbacks. (Bettmann/Corbis)

BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAMME PARTY (BSPP)

The Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), or Lanzin Party, was the ruling political institution in Myanmar (then known as Burma) from 1974 until 1988. The members of the Revolutionary Council military government that had seized power the previous March formed the BSPP in July 1962 as a small cadre party. Led throughout its existence by one man, General

Ne Win (1911–2002), it was very much the instrument of his creation. In March 1964, the BSPP became the only legal party in Myanmar following the failure of talks between the Revolutionary Council and the previous legal political parties that had emerged from the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL). The party's major ideological doctrines were drawn from the Revolutionary Council's policy statements, entitled "The Burmese Road to Social-

ism" (April 1962) and the "System of Correlation of Man and His Environment" (1963). Drawn from a blending of Buddhist and Marxist philosophical concepts, the party's ideology attempted to encapsulate the major political traditions in modern Myanmar political thought.

In 1971, the BSPP expanded to become a mass party. With the introduction of a new constitution in 1974, which was intended to pave the way to a civilian regime, General Ne Win and other senior officers resigned their military commissions but carried on in office. The BSPP government continued to pursue policies of economic autarky that were similar to those of its predecessor. Between 1971 and 1988, the party held several congresses to address the growing economic and political problems in the country. But by 1988, the socialist one-party model had lost what little viability it had ever had, and Chairman Ne Win resigned while calling for the abandonment of socialism and a return to multiparty democracy. His plans for a peaceful transition were thwarted, however, by public demonstrations that led to a military coup in September 1988.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Buddhist Socialism; Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Ne Win, General (1911–2002); State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC); Suu Kyi, Daw Aung San (1945–)

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BURMA UNDER BRITISH COLONIAL RULE

Britain colonized Burma as the consequence of three wars fought in the nineteenth century against the armies of the Konbaung kings. The effects of colonial rule varied in different parts of the country, and some areas had a lengthier experience under colonialism than others. The British held the Tenasserim coast in the far south and Arakan, adjacent to Bengal, longer than any other area—more than one hundred and twenty years—whereas the Irrawaddy Delta (or what the British often referred to in the nineteenth century as Pegu or Lower

Burma) was held just over ninety years. The center of the country, the heartland of Burmese civilization in the previous centuries, was held by the British a mere sixty years, though the traumatic effects of the loss of the monarchy and its support for the Buddhist faith had profound consequences there. Farther north—in the region the British referred to as the Frontier Areas Administration, home to a variety of tribal peoples who had acknowledged the suzerainty of the Konbaung monarchy—the consequences of colonialism were by far the least profound. The differential political, economic, and social consequences of the colonial era contributed to the complexities of post-colonial Burmese society.

A review of the early consequences in each of the major regions of the country clarifies the initial differential effects. Arakan, or Rakine State, which bordered Indian Bengal, was opened to immigration from the Muslim population of that region, a fact that generated a degree of resentment among the Buddhist people who believed that their land and religion were being taken away from them. Antipathy to Muslims, who make up less than 5 percent of the current population of Burma (now known as Myanmar), is derived in part from this experience. Tenasserim, the other region colonized in 1824, was sparsely populated at the time and was a zone of contention between the Burmese and Siamese kings. Many of the people who resided in this region were from animist hill tribe minorities, and though Christian missionaries who accompanied the British merchants and soldiers found few converts among the Buddhist population, they had greater success among the hill tribes, particularly in the Karen community. Nearly a quarter of the Karen population became Christians and strongly identified their community with Britain, which was seen as their protector. Karen converts normally became Baptists, whereas Catholicism became the faith of a number of smaller tribes. The introduction of Christianity among the hill tribes then spread farther north; today, approximately 5 percent of the people of Myanmar consider themselves to be Christians.

Although the annexation of Arakan and Tenasserim generated ethnic and religious issues for Burmese society, the annexation of Lower Burma had profound economic conse-

quences. The delta of the Irrawaddy River was largely unpopulated when the British assumed authority over it in 1852. As they had in the earlier annexed territories, they applied the rules and regulations of British India. The fundamental purpose of British rule was to ensure that trade and commerce could operate largely unfettered by government monopolies and constraints. But this goal was antithetical to the principles of statecraft of the Burmese kings, whose administrative system was buttressed by the concept of the monarch as the leading trader and organizer of economic life. The application of the principles of free trade and relative low levels of taxation by the British proved attractive to many Burmese peasants living in the north under the king's rule, and there was a large migration of families to open up new rice fields in the delta. They were facilitated in this by large-scale engineering works undertaken by the British to control the water levels of the delta and increase productivity.

Soon, Lower Burma became the rice bowl of not only Burma but also India. Prior to the Pacific War (1941–1945), Burma was the largest rice exporter in the world. But the new prosperity sought by the Burmese peasants under British rule proved illusory. The system of agriculture they established was heavily dependent on agricultural credit. Farmers borrowed funds at the beginning of each growing season to buy seeds and other materials and, in some cases, the labor they needed to plant and nurture their crops in the expectation that when they sold them after the harvest, they could repay their debts and have a profit for themselves. However, when crops failed or international rice prices fell below their production costs, the farmers fell into arrears, and eventually their land was confiscated by the moneylenders who had made loans to them.

Initially, many of the moneylenders were Burmese, but they were soon replaced by a caste of moneylenders from South India, known as Chettiars. The Chettiars were members of a banking caste and had no intention of becoming landlords. But like the peasant farmers with whom they did business, they were subject to world economic forces beyond their control. At times of economic crisis and particularly during the Great Depression of the late 1920s, the Western banks that they had borrowed from called in their loans, forcing the

Chettiars to take possession of the lands of the Burmese peasants. By the 1930s, more than 25 percent of the best delta lands were no longer owned by owner-cultivators but were in the hands of alien landlords (Adas 1974: 188). Resentment at this situation, coupled with an increasing tax burden and the lack of alternative forms of employment, caused widespread disaffection among the peasant population of the delta. This expressed itself in the so-called Hsaya San Rebellion from 1930 to 1932, which was suppressed only after more than 10,000 troops were transferred into Burma from India.

The Hsaya San Rebellion was a manifestation not only of peasant economic grievances but also of one of the other major consequences of British rule in Burma—the development of modern nationalism. Nationalism in Burma came to be expressed in a Buddhist image—to be Burmese is to be Buddhist—for when the British annexed Upper Burma in 1885, they removed the king, who personified the Buddhist faith, and ignored the indigenous social institutions they found there. The Burmese interpreted this action as an attack on their faith, and the country was largely in revolt for the next ten years. The British were able to pacify the country, as they described it, by establishing a military occupation, but soon the Burmese began to organize their resistance through non-violent political means. The first such organization was the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA), which became the General Council of Buddhist Associations after World War I (1914–1918) and later was known as the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA). The GCBA, with a related organization for Buddhist monks, led the nationalist movement until the early 1930s.

When the British introduced electoral politics to all the country except the frontier areas in the 1920s, some members of the GCBA formed political parties and entered into the colonial legislature. Others, however, refused, and they received encouragement from the peasantry, which organized at the village level to boycott the elections and refuse to pay taxes and rents. Hsaya San, a former Buddhist monk, provided a focus for these groups, and he rallied many of them to join his doomed revolt.

Students had been involved in Burmese nationalist politics from the start. Rangoon University students organized a boycott of the in-

stitution before it opened its doors in 1921. In the 1930s, students became involved in nationalist agitation in other ways. The Rangoon University Students Union became a focus of protest, and in the 1930s, it organized nationwide strikes of both university and high school students to protest what they referred to as the “slave education” provided by the British. Students also became involved in the Dobama Asiayone (DAA), or We Burmans Association. The DAA argued for more radical policies than those advocated by the politicians who cooperated with the British in the legislative politics of the day. Influenced by the ideas of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Karl Marx (1818–1883), as well as by British Fabianism and Burmese Buddhism, the DAA sought ways of overthrowing the British and regaining Burma’s independence. DAA members were attracted to left-wing ideologies, yet when the Japanese offered to assist them in pursuing the goal of independence, many of those who subsequently came to power proved willing to work with “fascists.”

While most of Burma was undergoing massive political, economic, and social changes during the colonial era, the areas in the far north that now make up the Shan, Kachin, Chin, and Kayah States remained largely untouched by the full effects of the modern world. There, the British, rather than uprooting the existing political order as they did in Burma proper, kept in place the traditional rulers, the Shan and Kayah *Sawbwas*, the Kachin *Duwas*, and the Chin headmen. There was very little economic change, other than that stemming from isolated pockets of mining for lead, zinc, and silver. Many of the poorer parts of the population were attracted to service in the colonial army, and having been identified by the British as “martial races,” large numbers of Kachins, Chins, and Karens joined the military. They remained loyal to the British during the Pacific War, creating one of the great fissures in modern Burmese political life.

The colonial period saw the development of much of the infrastructure of modern Burma (Myanmar). The railways, roads, and inland navigation systems that were developed by British capital and Burmese and Indian labor tied the country together in ways unimaginable a hundred years earlier. Burma was also linked to the outside world through trade and immigration.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Rangoon was the busiest immigration point in the world after New York City, as thousands of Indian laborers entered and left the country each year to seek economic opportunities. But the rewards of the economic growth that colonialism had created were not equitably distributed, and the majority of the population—the Burmese peasants—felt that they were losing control of their lives and their livelihoods. The Burmese nationalist slogan captured their dilemma: in essence, it said that under the Burmese kings, they had been poor people in a poor country, but now they were the poorest people in a rich country. This sense of economic unfairness, coupled with the attack on Buddhism that colonial policies directly and indirectly fostered, generated a nationalist reaction, which took shape in the militant, autarkic nationalism that dominated Burmese thought and action after colonialism had passed.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Arakan; British India, Government of; Buddhist Socialism; Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Chettiars (Chettyars); Chins; Constitutional Developments in Burma (1900–1941); General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) (1920); Kachins; Karens; Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Rangoon (Yangon); Rice in Southeast Asia; Shans; Tenasserim; Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) (1906)

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BURMANS

The Burman people are the largest ethnic group in the modern state of Burma, which was renamed the Union of Myanmar in 1989. They make up one of the principal ethnic groups of Southeast Asia and have had a significant impact on the cultural, religious, and political development of the region. The Burmese language is part of the Sino-Tibetan language family. In the absence of significant archaeological research, linguistic classifications such as this have had considerable influence on attempts to write the early ethnohistory of the Burman people.

The beginning of the Burmese era is traditionally traced to 638 C.E. This date refers to the myth of a brother and sister who lived at Tagaung, a town in the upper Irrawaddy Valley. They died at the hands of Popa Sawrahan, an early king of the small city-state of Pagan in the dry zone in the central part of Burma, and they became significant in the distinctively Burman spirit, or *nat*, cults approved by the early Burman kings. This area in the dry zone is the historical and cultural heartland of the Burman people. Archaeologists believe that Burmans migrated into this region from the northeast in the seventh to tenth centuries. The ethnography of this region was already complex. Ethnic Pyu governed the principal city-states of the central zone as well as Upper Burma at that time, and to the south were the Mon kingdoms. Significant numbers of T'ai (Shan) people were also migrating down the Shweli, Irrawaddy, and Chindwin River valleys; other communities, such as the Karen, also seem to have been long established. The decline of Pyu power enabled the Burman kings to establish themselves as the dominant political authority in the central zone by the eleventh century.

Burman ethnohistory proper starts around 1044, when the Burman king Anawrahta (r. 1044–1077) took control of the small city-

state of Pagan. This king also annexed Arakan to the west and subdued the Mon kingdoms in Lower Burma, including Thaton. A complete set of Mon Theravadan Buddhist scriptures, the *Tripitaka*, was taken to Pagan. Following this, a distinctly Burman political, cultural, and Theravadan Buddhist religious identity emerged. This identity incorporated elements of local popular nat homage and also contained elements of Mahayana Buddhism. During the next two centuries, a huge complex of pagodas and temple buildings developed around Pagan, which helped to establish a specifically Burman style of religious architecture. It was also in the Pagan period that the Burmese script developed, with the first inscriptions being dated to around 1100. These religious and literate identities are of importance in helping to define a specifically Burman ethnohistory.

The fall of Pagan, which resulted from Mongol invasions, is usually dated to 1287. Since the British colonial period (1824–1948), it has been customary to identify the Ava dynasty that followed not with ethnic Burman rulers but with three Shan brothers, who would thus be ethnic T'ai. These ideas have recently been challenged. Much more research is needed, but it is clear that the early Ava dynasty did not take on a Shan character, and it can thus still be identified as socially, culturally, and politically Burman. The periodization of Burman ethnohistory focuses on the establishment of dynasties that took their names from the places where their central authorities were established. Although kingship was hereditary, lineages were frequently overturned in the violent power struggles that ensued upon the death of a monarch. The main dynasties are known as the Ava, Taungoo (Toungoo), Shwebo, Konbaung, and Mandalay or Yadanapon. Some of these dynasties overlapped chronologically, reflecting the extremely unstable political situation of the region as Mon, Arakanese, and T'ai kingdoms all sought to expand their influence.

There were periods in which Burmese political control was very extensive, notably under King Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581) and the Konbaung kings Alaungpaya (r. 1752–1760) and Bodawpaya (r. 1782–1819). From 1754 to 1757, Alaungpaya (Alaung-hpaya) retook most of Lower Burma from the Mons, raided Manipur, ousted the British from their factory trading post at Negrais, and sacked the Siamese capital

of Ayuthaya. Alaungpaya's sons continued their father's expansionist policy, particularly westward through Arakan and Manipur. In 1824, this policy brought Burma into conflict with the British imperial administration in northeast India. In 1852, Lower Burma was annexed, and in 1885, the whole of Burma came under British rule and the last Burmese monarch, Thibaw (r. 1878–1885), was deposed. It was not until 1948 that independence was granted to Burma. Independent Burma, however, had a much more complex political structure ethnographically, as areas were now under the direct control of the majority Burman center that had previously been independent or only tributary to Burmese monarchs.

The British colonial period created many problems in the political, social, and economic relations between ethnic Burman peoples and other ethnic groups with whom they were in contact. These difficulties have not been resolved since independence. In this situation, the historical periods of expansion cited earlier, sometimes referred to as the era of "Burman empires," have gained significance in the attempt by Burman nationalists to give historical justification to the control over non-Burman peoples exercised by a Burman political center. Many non-Burman ethnic minority communities feel that the identification of the state of Burma (Myanmar) with majority Burman ethnohistory and Burman culture also challenges their right to cultural and political autonomy. As evidence, they cite policies that have been introduced by the country's military regime that encourage the hegemony of majority Burman culture. There are also a number of Burman subgroups with very strong linguistic identities who are vulnerable in this context. In reality, a great deal more social, anthropological, and historical research is needed to understand the relationships between ethnic Burmans and other communities in the country, as well as to understand the complexities of ethnic Burman identity and ethnohistory, which have considerable regional variation.

MANDY SADAN

See also Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760); Anawrahta (Aniruddha) (r. 1044–1077); Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581); Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Burma under British Colonial Rule; First Ava

Dynasty (1364–1527 C.E.); Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885); Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Mon; Mons; Pagan (Bagan); Pyus; T'ais; Toungoo Dynasty (1531–1752)

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BURMA-SIAM WARS

Begun in the 1500s, the Burma-Siam wars extended until 1809. The period of conflict was launched by Tabinshweihti (r. 1531–1550) of Burma's First Toungoo dynasty (1486–1599) and Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581), and it was pursued by Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760), the first king of the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885), and his sons Hsinbyushin (r. 1763–1776) and Bodawpaya (r. 1782–1819). These wars originated in economic rivalry over control of the revenues from international trade that traversed the trade routes of the upper Malay Peninsula and around the Gulf of Siam. From 1767 to 1809, Siam was continuously at war with Burma. From the destruction of the Siamese capital at Ayutthaya by the Burmese in 1767 to the founding of the new capital at Bangkok in 1782, the Siamese armies under the generals Phya Taksin (King Taksin, r. 1767–1782) and Phya Chakri (Rama I, r. 1782–1809) fought eleven campaigns against the Burmese. These wars were primarily struggles for regional and dynastic supremacy and were neither national nor ethnic conflicts.

Founded in 1350, the Siamese kingdom of Ayutthaya grew quickly to become a major

commercial entrepôt in mainland Southeast Asia. In the late 1400s, Ayutthaya captured the trade routes on the Malay Peninsula that passed through Mergui, Martaban, and Tavoy, thus positioning itself to profit from the growing Indian Ocean trade based on Melaka. After the fall of Melaka to the Portuguese in 1511, the cities on the transpeninsular routes became alternative centers for the Muslim traders. In 1539, to capture this trade, Tabinshweihti moved the capital from Toungoo to Pegu in the Irrawaddy Delta, a convenient base from which to launch military offensives against Siam. Tabinshweihti unsuccessfully attacked Siam in 1548.

Under the pretext of gaining the propitious white elephants of the king of Siam that had been denied to him, Tabinshweihti's successor, Bayinnaung, succeeded in subduing Siam in 1569. Ayutthaya became a tributary kingdom until King Naresuan (r. 1590–1605) and his brother, Prince Ekathotsarot (r. 1605–1610), reestablished Siamese independence by defeating the Burmese armies at the Battle of Nong Sarai in 1593. King Naresuan killed the Burmese crown prince in a duel on elephant-back. Mergui reverted to Siamese control, the profits from the Indian Ocean trade again flowing to Ayutthaya. Burmese unity crumbled under King Nandabayin (r. 1581–1599), a fact that became apparent following the destruction of Pegu in 1599 by the Arakanese and their Portuguese allies. King Anauk-hpet-lun (r. 1606–1628) tried to recapture the transpeninsular trade, gaining Ye and Tavoy; however, the Siamese retained control of Mergui, destroying the Burmese fleet in 1614. Anauk-hpet-lun's successor, King Thalun (r. 1629–1648), recognized Ayutthayan independence and moved the Burmese capital north to Ava in 1635.

In the seventeenth century, Siam expanded its international linkages, revenues, and influence, attracting Dutch, English, French, Japanese, Arab, Persian, Chinese, and other Asian merchants to its burgeoning markets. The palace revolution of 1688 at the death of King Narai (r. 1656–1688), when the usurper, King Phetracha, seized the throne, did not interrupt Ayutthaya's commercial activities for long. At the death of King Borommakot in 1758, Ayutthaya was the wealthiest city in mainland Southeast Asia.

To capture this wealth and redirect trade to the newly established port city of Rangoon

(Yangon), Alaung-hpaya launched his 1760 campaign against Ayutthaya. A subsidiary motivation may have been related to Siamese attacks on Burmese shipping around Tavoy and tacit Siamese support for the Mons during the civil war fought between 1740 and 1757. According to the *Burmese Annals*, Alaung-hpaya left Rangoon in January 1760 with an army of forty regiments, headed for Pegu and Martaban, sending a contingent to attack Tavoy, where he killed the governor, and his remaining forces were transported to Moulmein. At Tavoy, he waited seven days for reinforcements to arrive by ship from Rangoon and Martaban before proceeding to take Mergui and Tenasserim. His forces consisted of 300 horses and 3,000 men under Mingaung Nawrahta and 500 horses and 5,000 men under his son, the Myedu prince. To counter the advancing forces, the Siamese king assembled an army of five regiments (300 horses and 7,000 men) under Bya Tezaw and fifteen regiments (200 elephants, 1,000 horses, and 20,000 men) under Aukbya Yazawunthan. They met the invading force outside Kui but were forced to retreat. The Burmese took Phetburi and Ratburi, and despite a spirited Siamese stand at Ban Lwin, the Burmese, thanks to the timely arrival of the Myedu prince, captured Supanburi. The Siamese king defended the capital. A force of 300 elephants, 3,000 horses, and 30,000 men engaged the Burmese at the Talan River to prevent them from crossing it. Despite heavy losses, the Burmese pressed on, taking five senior Siamese commanders and their war elephants. On 11 April 1760, the Burmese army arrived in the environs of Ayutthaya, burning the outer suburbs and bombarding the city itself from 14 to 16 April 1760. Having defeated the new Siamese force of 15,000, the Burmese were on the brink of victory when they suddenly withdrew. Alaung-hpaya had fallen ill from scrofula. He died on 11 May 1760 at the village of Kinywa, a three-day march from Martaban, and was cremated at the family seat of Moksobo.

Renewing the attack in 1765, Hsinbyushin's three armies caught Ayutthaya in a pincer movement, cutting the communication routes and taking manpower from Ayutthaya's neighboring states and outlying provinces. One army came from the south through Tavoy, Mergui, and Tenasserim; a second came from the southeast through Three Pagodas Pass; and a third ar-

rived from the north through Chiang Mai and Laos. Well prepared, they commenced the campaign at the start of the rainy season, had boats with them, and grew their own rice throughout the siege. Maha Nawrahta, one of two senior Burmese commanders, was killed; the other, Neimyo Thihapate, finished the campaign on his own. Chinese attacks in the north prompted Hsinbyushin to direct his commander on 9 January 1767 to sack the city and kill or deport the inhabitants; the Burmese forces were needed to defend the homeland. Ayutthaya fell through subterfuge. The Burmese dug tunnels under the walls, and those tunnels collapsed. The *Annals* describe courageous Siamese efforts to storm the forts protecting the tunnels. The city was plundered, the king was killed, and 2,000 members of the Siamese royal family were taken captive to Burma. The king's brother, Prince Uthumphon, found in chains, was freed and taken to Burma, where he lived out his life in a monastery at Sagaing. The First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826) finally ended the Burmese attempt to gain economic hegemony in mainland Southeast Asia.

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See also Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760); Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Ava; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767 C.E.), Kingdom of; Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581); Chiang Mai; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Elephants; First Ava (Inwa) Dynasty (1364–1527 C.E.); Hsinbyushin (r. 1763–1776); Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885); Ligor (Nakhon);

Melaka; Mons; Narai (r. 1665–1688); Patani (Pattani), Sultanate of; Pegu; Penang (1786); Phra Naret (King Naresuan) (r. 1590–1605); Phya Taksin (Pya Tak [Sin], King Taksin) (r. 1767–1782); Rama I (Chakri) (r. 1782–1809); Rangoon (Yangon); Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Singapore (1819); Straits of Melaka; Tabinshweihti (r. 1531–1550); Toungoo Dynasty (1531–1752)

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CABECILLA SYSTEM

The term *cabecilla* (meaning “boss” or “foreman”) was used in the Philippines under the Spanish colonial administration in the first half of the nineteenth century to denote the headmen of occupational groups in the Chinese community. After about 1850, the term acquired a more general meaning as “head of a Chinese firm,” particularly a Manila-based wholesaler of imported goods and export products dealing with foreign merchant houses, as has been pointed out by historian Edgar Wickberg (2000).

These wholesalers maintained a network of agents in the rural areas, through whom they distributed import goods and collected agricultural produce. The cabecilla-agent relationship was largely built on credit. A foreign merchant house would advance cash or credit to the cabecilla-wholesaler, enabling him to purchase import goods; he sent these goods on a consignment basis to his agents in the province, who in turn sold them to farmers in exchange for agricultural products; then, these products were shipped to the cabecilla in Manila, who delivered them to an exporting firm. The cabecilla-agent relationship was a way to avoid the Spanish “shop” tax, as the cabecilla did not maintain a store and did not sell his products to independent retailers but delivered them to his agents. The parties in these transactions usually kept their relationship secret.

As money circulation was very limited in the Philippines in the nineteenth century, the system of exchanging import goods against export produce within the cabecilla-agent network was a way to economize on the use of coins. Rather than paying in cash and having to ship large amounts of heavy metal coins back and forth between Manila and the provinces, participants used bookkeeping money and a mutual clearing system to carry out their business. This business practice—in the institutional economic literature known as interlinked transactions—was widely used in the Chinese trading community in Southeast Asia, and it has been extensively described for Sarawak and the Outer Islands of Indonesia. Trading import goods for export products worked best for crops that had a year-round production, such as Manila hemp (*abaca*), coconuts, and, from the beginning of the twentieth century, rubber.

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See also Chinese in Southeast Asia; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); *Towkay*

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CACIQUES

The term *cacique*, though its specific etymology relates to the Arawak people of the Caribbean, was widely employed within the Spanish Empire to denote a local ruling class of chieftains. In this sense, it is sometimes used interchangeably in the Spanish Philippines with the indigenous word *datu* to denote an incumbent ruler, one who commands vassals, and all members of a chiefly class of either sex. Although a *datu's* authority arose from his descent, his actual power was dependent more on his reputation and personal prowess. The office was made hereditary under Spanish rule, confirming the chief's political power and transforming him into an agent of colonial authority as a municipal mayor (*gobernadorcillo*) or village headman (*cabeza de barangay*). However, such people were more commonly referred to in the Spanish colloquial to the archipelago as *principales*, and persons who belonged to this class were termed *principalia* rather than *caciques*.

Only in the latter part of the nineteenth century does the term *caciques* gain more widespread currency to refer specifically to a newly emergent rural elite composed from the remnants of the old indigenous *principalia* and commercially oriented Chinese mestizos. This group's ability to dominate local politics was known as *caciquismo*, and if anything, it became even more pronounced during the U.S. colonial administration (1898–1946), when the phenomenon was known by a corruption of the Spanish word as *caciquism* and *caciqueism* or more prosaically as *bossism*. Under this latter characterization, the term (and condition) is still prevalent in many rural areas of the contemporary Philippines.

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See also *Barangay*; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Hispanization; *Inquilino*; Mestizo; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1898–1946); Spanish Philippines

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CAKKAVATTI/SETKYA-MIN (UNIVERSAL RULER)

The concept of the *cakkavatti*, or universal ruler, derives from the Buddhist principles of kingship as discussed in three long sermons (*dighanikaya*) of the early canonical texts. It is in the importance given to *dhamma* (*dharma*), or righteousness, that the Buddhists distinguished themselves from other contemporary writings on kingship, such as the *cakravartin* of the Sanskrit *Dharmasastras*. The Buddhist political *dharma* was a theory of royal conduct, which stated that *cariya* or *vidhana* (procedure or method) made the king a moral being, and this was the ultimate objective of early Buddhist political thought. Thus, by emphasizing righteous behavior, Buddhism provided a new meaning to the role of the king in society.

Historians have debated whether this concept was practiced or if it was merely a normative notion. Part of this debate derives from an implicit assumption that Buddhism was an apolitical religion and one that addressed itself largely to those who renounced social obligations, namely, the Buddhist monks and nuns. In recent years, this issue has been rethought.

It is being suggested that, though not referring to himself as a *cakkavatti* in his inscriptions dated to the third to second centuries B.C.E., the Mauryan ruler Asoka (ca. 271–238 B.C.E.) did adopt many of the Buddhist concepts of a righteous ruler—concepts that later found favor with several Southeast Asian dynasties. From around the ninth to tenth centuries C.E. onward, there is evidence for the direct attribu-

tion of qualities of the cakkavatti to pre-Aniruddha kings in Pagan and Sinhala rulers.

The concept underwent further adaptation and change in Southeast Asia under the Khmers. In 802 C.E., a *brahmana* priest (one well versed in the *Brahmanas*) performed the *cakravartin* ceremony for Jayavarman II (r. 802?–834 C.E.), who declared his independence from Javanese domination and proclaimed himself a *devaraja*, or god-king.

HIMANSHU PRABHA RAY

See also Buddhism; *Devaraja*; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Indianization; Indigenous Political Power; Jayavarman II (r. 770/790/802?–834 C.E.)

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CAMBODIA (EIGHTEENTH TO MID-NINETEENTH CENTURIES)

Between the 1750s and the middle of the nineteenth century, Cambodia almost disappeared. The beleaguered kingdom was frequently a battleground between the Vietnamese and the Thai. Both of these powers sought to dominate Cambodian political life. The kingdom's internal politics in this period were particularly fragmented and full of rivalries, the monarchy was weak, its people were decimated in war, and over the years its territory became depleted.

Following the Burmese sacking of the Thai capital of Ayutthaya (Ayudhya) in 1767, a newly established Thai dynasty, led by a former provincial governor, sent invading armies into Cambodia several times in search of loot and prisoners. Vietnamese rebel forces and government troops sent against them also swept into the kingdom. In 1772, a Thai army sacked Phnom Penh, and soon afterward, in the wake of a Vietnamese incursion, several members of the Khmer royal family, including a young prince named Ang Eng (ca. 1774–1797), fled to

Bangkok to seek the protection of the Thai court. A Thai general staged a coup against the throne in 1781 and became king himself, as Rama I (r. 1782–1809), in the following year. In 1794, the Thai court in Bangkok crowned Prince Ang Eng, who was then barely twenty years old. The young king was sent back to Cambodia to govern under Thai patronage. In exchange for placing him on the Cambodian throne, Siam assumed control of two prosperous Cambodian provinces, Siem Reap (which contained the ruins of the medieval city of Angkor) and Battambang. When Ang Eng died in 1797, his four sons were underage, and a Thai regent assumed the day-to-day administration in the Cambodian capital of Udong.

Over the next sixty years or so, rivalries between the Vietnamese and Thai royal houses, exacerbated by factional divisions in Cambodia, led to repeated invasions of Cambodia by Thai armies and to many years of enforced Vietnamese protection. This situation foreshadowed the French protectorate in the late nineteenth century, as well as the Vietnamese-installed Cambodian government in the 1980s.

This turbulent period bequeathed two legacies to Cambodians. One was a widespread resentment toward Vietnam and a distrust of Vietnamese intentions, which contrasted with a naive failure to admit the destructive aspects of Thai policies toward Cambodia. Another was awareness on the part of Cambodian monarchs and political actors that to survive and flourish, they needed patrons who could protect them against their rivals and against hostile foreign powers. Such patrons were often hard to locate, and in any case, their commitment to Cambodia was seldom deep. After ninety years of French colonialism, history came close to repeating itself when Cambodia's ruler Norodom Sihanouk (1922–), seeking a neutral position in the Cold War, sought protection from China against what he saw as the U.S.-backed hostility of the regimes in power in Thailand and southern Vietnam.

The period also saw a decline in the power and prestige of the Cambodian monarchy as an institution. The reign of Ang Eng's son, King Ang Chan (r. 1797–1835), was disastrous for Cambodia. Although the reign of his younger brother, Ang Duang (r. 1848–1860), was an improvement, the monarchy came under French

control soon afterward, and Cambodian kings never regained the luster or freedom of maneuver that they had enjoyed in the 1700s.

One reason for the decline of the monarchy was Chan's unfortunate decision to resist Siamese patronage by seeking support from the Nguyễn emperors in Vietnam. Chan's rationale for seeking the friendship of Vietnam is unclear and probably had several aspects. The *Cambodian Chronicles* indicate that Chan may have offended the Thai monarch, Rama II (r. 1809–1824), by failing to attend his coronation. He certainly resented the loss of the northwestern provinces to the Thai. Economic links between Chan's court and entrepreneurs in Saigon might also have been important. In any case, after a brief Siamese invasion of Cambodia in 1811, Chan moved his capital to Phnom Penh and began to send tributary gifts on a regular basis to the Vietnamese emperor in Huế. Three of his brothers, with Thai encouragement, had sought refuge in Bangkok. Chan feared, correctly, that the Thai wished to place one of his brothers on the throne, and this fear probably forced him into an alliance with Vietnam. For several years, like Norodom Sihanouk in the 1950s and 1960s, Chan managed to play the two hostile powers off against each other to maintain a fragile independence.

Vietnamese protection became more systematic after a large-scale Thai invasion in 1833 that was possibly instigated by Chan's wife but also came in response to an antidynastic rebellion in southern Vietnam. Retreating from an unsuccessful campaign in Vietnam, the Thai army sacked Phnom Penh and drove thousands of Cambodians into captivity in Thailand, foreshadowing the forced evacuation of the city under the Khmer Rouge in 1975. Chan, meanwhile, had been hastily evacuated to Vietnam. Soon after returning to his devastated capital in 1834, Chan died, with his kingdom more or less in ruins. Vietnamese officials at his court, wishing to buy time and to strengthen their administrative grip on Cambodia, quickly named one of Chan's daughters (the deceased king had no sons) as Cambodia's queen but allowed her almost no independence.

Over the next few years, the Vietnamese proceeded with what the French would later call, referring to their own regime, a full-scale "civilizing mission" that was intended to turn

Cambodia into a submissive and prosperous appendage of Vietnam. Vietnamese settlers, teachers, and bureaucrats were sent into the country; a local militia was raised; and the Vietnamese emperor, Minh Mang (r. 1820–1841), sought to reform Cambodian culture to fit Vietnamese Confucian norms. "Let . . . good ideas seep in," he wrote to a Vietnamese official in Cambodia, "turning the barbarians into civilized people" (Chandler 2000: 126).

The civilizing mission failed primarily because Cambodian provincial officials were unwilling to exchange their royal titles and capricious patron-client networks for Vietnam-dependent, supposedly meritocratic positions. Ordinary Khmer resented Vietnamese taxes and Vietnam's interference with Buddhism and other aspects of their lives. Vietnamese disdain for the Khmer and their harsh treatment of dissidents also increased local animosities toward them. Local uprisings against Vietnamese rule soon broke out in different parts of the kingdom, and a larger one, probably backed by Siam, occurred in 1840 after the Vietnamese had decided to tax Cambodians directly, bypassing what they considered to be corrupt and disloyal local officials.

Suspecting the queen of disloyalty, the Vietnamese imprisoned her, and rumors soon spread that she had been killed. In the following year, Siam invaded Cambodia for the third time since 1811. For the next five years, the kingdom was a battlefield, with the advantage seesawing between the Thai and the Vietnamese and with the casualties largely Khmer, in an eerie foreshadowing of the proxy wars fought by larger powers in Cambodia in the 1970s and 1980s. Minh Mang had died in 1841, and his successor, Thieu Tri (r. 1841–1847), was less interested than his father had been in dominating and "civilizing" every aspect of Cambodian life. The war dragged on nonetheless. In 1847, the Vietnamese finally withdrew their forces and allowed the Thai to install Chan's youngest brother, Ang Duang, on the Cambodian throne. Duang had lived in Siam, as well as briefly under Thai protection in Cambodia, since 1811.

The renewal of Thai patronage depended on Cambodian acquiescence and also on Vietnam's loss of interest in the kingdom. The Cambodian countryside was devastated, and the Khmer people, who preferred Thai patronage to Viet-

namese protection, were happy to live in peace. Over the next thirteen years, King Ang Duang turned out to be a talented and popular ruler who presided over the kingdom's return to normal life. He sponsored the restoration of several Buddhist temples in Udong, helped to revive Cambodian literature (he was a talented poet), and was assiduous in performing the rituals that his subjects associated with the welfare of the kingdom. Duang also welcomed French Catholic missionaries to Cambodia. With the encouragement of one of them, he wrote to the French monarch, Napoleon III (r. 1852–1870), asking for his friendship, clearly a euphemism for protection. The presents accompanying the letter were lost en route, and the French court did nothing to protect the unknown, unimportant king. In the late 1850s, a second attempt on Duang's part to make contact with French emissaries was foiled by his patrons in Bangkok.

During Duang's reign, two Frenchmen, the naturalist Henri Mouhot and the missionary Edouard Bouillevaux, visited the ruins at Angkor. Both men claimed later to have "discovered" them. Mouhot's report fired the imagination of European scholars and of readers entranced by the notion of a "lost" city hidden in impenetrable jungle. Although the ruins were deserted and in bad repair, they were well-known to local people, and a Buddhist monastery on the grounds of Angkor Wat housed more than 100 Thai and Cambodian monks. The ruins did not come under Cambodian jurisdiction, however, until the early 1900s, when the Thai abandoned their claims to the province of Siem Reap.

When Duang died in 1860, his eldest son, Norodom (1836–1904), was unable to take the throne because of a revolt led by Cambodia's Muslim minority, descendants of the Chams who had been driven from Vietnam two centuries before. In the meantime, French forces had landed in southern Vietnam, and France began to be interested in what was later to become French Indochina. In 1863, Norodom, still uncrowned, agreed to accept French protection, assuming that this would involve military assistance and might relieve him from the patronage of Bangkok. Instead, he unknowingly ushered in nine decades of French colonial rule.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Ang Chan (1781–1835); Ang Duong (Ang Duang) (1796–1860); Ang Eng (ca. 1774–1797); Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Battambang; Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; *Cambodian Chronicles*; Khmer Rouge; Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Norodom (1836–1904), King; Rama I (Chakri) (r. 1782–1809); Siem Reap; Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–)

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CAMBODIA UNDER FRENCH COLONIAL RULE

Although French missionaries had worked in Cambodia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, France did not become politically interested in the Cambodian kingdom until after the French conquest of southern Vietnam in the early 1860s. In 1863, the Cambodian king, Norodom (1860–1904), fearful of Thai and Vietnamese intentions, secretly signed a treaty establishing a French protectorate over Cambodia. The Thai court pressured the king to break the treaty, but diplomatic negotiations between France and Siam soon led to the withdrawal of Thai patronage over the Cambodian court, leaving the French nominally in command. French control over Cambodia remained light. Laissez-faire economic policies, limited French investment, and relatively friendly relations between French authorities and the Cambodian court characterized the first two decades of the protectorate.

In 1884, however, Charles Antoine Francis Thomson, the French governor of Cochin China (t. 1883–1885) (the southern portion of present-day Vietnam), visited Phnom Penh without warning and at night. With a French gunboat moored opposite the royal palace, Thomson delivered a harsh ultimatum to Norodom. The French demanded the abolishment of what they considered to be slavery in

Cambodia, removed the king from day-to-day power, established a system of French resident governors, and opened the gates for the intensification of French investment and control. An anti-French rebellion broke out soon afterward, and it took the French and Cambodian forces nearly three years to suppress the uprising.

Norodom and the French became estranged in the closing years of the nineteenth century, but French control over Cambodia and Cambodian cooperation increased when Norodom's brother, Sisowath, handpicked by the French, took the throne in 1904. Sisowath, then in his sixties, reigned for twenty-three years. In 1907, the northwestern provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap were returned to Cambodia by Siam, which had held them since the 1790s. Over the next two decades, increased French investment brought economic prosperity and some modernization to the country in the form of urbanization, roads, and provincial towns, as well as increased exports of rice, rubber, and timber. Because the kingdom was at peace, Cambodia's population quadrupled in the colonial era; health care also improved, and the rudiments of a national school system were established, although Cambodia's first high school did not open until the 1930s (soon after the construction of its first railway). Yet few industries developed, no representative political bodies were formed, and no elections were ever held. Until the 1950s, there was no talk of Cambodia being granted its independence.

As a component of French Indochina (along with Laos and three sectors of what is now Vietnam), Cambodia was a backwater that attracted little sustained attention from the French. One area of exception was the field of archaeology. French scholars, inspired by the grandeur of Cambodia's medieval civilization popularly known as Angkor, examined its history in detail. They translated over 1,000 Angkorian inscriptions from Sanskrit and Old Khmer, restored dozens of Angkorian temples, built a museum to house Cambodian classical sculpture, and established the chronology of Angkor's artistic styles and its twenty-seven kings. In doing so, they presented Cambodia with a glorious past that had been more or less forgotten. The impact of the gift on Cambodia's intellectuals and ordi-

nary people was mixed, but an image of the most famous Angkorian temple, Angkor Wat, has appeared on every Cambodian flag since independence.

Cambodia prospered in the boom conditions of the 1920s and was badly hit by the Great Depression (1929–1931), when the prices for its export crops, rice and rubber, fell dramatically. In Vietnam, severe economic conditions provoked a series of violent rebellions led by the Vietnamese Communist Party, but no unrest occurred in Cambodia, where political activity of any sort was rare and where, despite high taxation, French rule was relatively benign. Meanwhile, Cambodian nationalism was slow to develop. The sluggishness was partly due to the fact that respected Cambodian institutions such as the court and the Buddhist monastic order remained in place and partly due to the innate conservatism of the Cambodian elite. In addition, many Cambodians believed that French colonization protected them against the encroachments of the Vietnamese and the Thai.

In the 1930s, nonetheless, a small Cambodian intellectual elite began to emerge, primarily in Phnom Penh. It was made up of civil servants, Buddhist monks, schoolteachers, and graduates of Cambodia's only high school, the Lycee Sisowath. The elite included several young men who were affiliated with the Buddhist Institute in Phnom Penh and with the mildly nationalist newspaper *Nagara Vatta* ("Angkor Wat"), founded in 1936. Some French officials referred to these encouraging developments as a national awakening, and Cambodians in the 1930s were gradually given a greater role in provincial governance.

After the fall of France in 1940, Indochina was isolated from Europe, and after 1941, Japanese troops were stationed there, but French administration of the region continued in force. In Cambodia, following the death of King Sisowath Monivong in 1941, the French crowned his grandson, Norodom Sihanouk (1922–), a nineteen-year-old student, as king. They expected him to be a pliant instrument of their policies.

In March 1945, fearful of an Allied invasion, the Japanese imprisoned French officials throughout Indochina and persuaded Sihanouk, along with other Indochinese rulers,

to declare Cambodia's independence. The nationalist leader Son Ngoc Thanh (1907–1976?) was brought back from exile in Japan and briefly became prime minister. The government lasted until the French returned in strength in October 1945, arrested Son Ngoc Thanh, and imprisoned him for several years in France.

Because they faced serious military opposition in Vietnam, the French bought peace in Cambodia in 1946 and 1947 by offering the country's largely Francophile elite the chance to write a constitution, establish political parties, and elect a national assembly. These offers, although eagerly taken up, were almost meaningless because financial, diplomatic, and military affairs remained firmly in French hands. At the same time, Cambodians in the late 1940s and early 1950s regained an appetite for partisan politics that had been muffled for nearly ninety years. During these years, Sihanouk became aware of his political skills and popularity. He also chafed at the idea of being subordinated, constitutionally, to other politicians.

In 1949, France bestowed greater autonomy on Cambodia. Three years later, King Sihanouk dissolved the National Assembly and embarked on what he called a royal crusade for independence. The move embarrassed the French, who swiftly caved in and granted Cambodia its independence before similar arrangements could be made with Vietnam and Laos.

French scholar Paul Mus has called the French era in Cambodia a "painless colonialism," and the contrast between French conduct and local responses in Cambodia and those in Vietnam is very sharp. Most writers would agree that had the French not offered their protection in the 1860s, larger neighbors would probably have annexed Cambodia. The Cambodian elites were much more pro-French than their Vietnamese counterparts, and the population at large followed the lead of the Francophile rulers and civil servants. The aftermath of colonialism was almost as painless as the colonial era had been. Until the early 1970s, French was still Cambodia's official language, French investment in the country remained high, and government institutions, established under French control, remained essentially unchanged.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Battambang; Buddhist Institute of Phnom Penh; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Norodom (1836–1904), King; Siem Reap; Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); Son Ngoc Thanh (1907–1976?); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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CAMBODIAN CHRONICLES

The *Cambodian Chronicles* are historical documents originally written on specially prepared strips of palm leaves. Those still extant were begun at the outset of the nineteenth century. Most of them begin their stories in the mid-fourteenth century, just when the Angkor inscriptions end, and they seem to continue, in a different style, the history that may be constructed from those inscriptions.

It is impossible, however, to make a connection between the last rulers and events of Angkor and the first kings of the *Chronicles*. The *Chronicles* show no knowledge of Angkor, and the names of the kings are of an entirely different type. Therefore, the authenticity of the *Chronicles* for any time before they are corroborated with other evidence, that is, before the sixteenth century, is now being questioned. Internal evidence in the extant *Chronicles* shows that there had been a chronicle of the kings of Lovek (a sixteenth-century capital) starting at that time.

In the early nineteenth century, Cambodian scholars were under strong Thai influence, and they apparently wished to write new Cambo-

dian chronicles beginning at about the same time as the Thai chronicles that started with the founding of Ayutthaya in 1351. They took the first king of the historical Lovek chronicle, Ang Chan (d. 1566), and inserted his posthumous title, *Nibbanapada* (pron. Nipean Bat), into the new composition in the mid-fourteenth century. Then, for the intervening two hundred years, they invented kings based on Cambodian and Thai folklore and semihistorical traditions.

Although they included some true information—an Ayutthayan occupation of Angkor in the mid-fifteenth century and a King Yat who developed a new Cambodia after that foreign occupation—the dates are misplaced, and the *Chronicles* are of no use in reconstructing the history of Cambodia between the end of Angkor and the middle of the sixteenth century (Vickery 1977; 1979).

MICHAEL VICKERY

See also Angkor; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Cambodia (Eighteenth to Mid-Nineteenth Centuries); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia

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**CẦN VƯƠNG
(AID THE KING) MOVEMENT**

Rebelling against the imposition of the French protectorate, the regent Tôn Thất Thuyết fled from Huế in July 1885 with the young king

Hàm Nghi to seek refuge in the mountains and stimulate an anti-French resistance movement. An edict was issued, calling on all patriotic elements to take up arms in support of the king (*Cần Vương*, meaning "Aid the King"). Thus were precipitated the "righteous uprisings" known as the Cần Vương movement. From various parts of the country, scholar-gentry and peasants responded, but the most determined reaction came in the central provinces of Nghệ An, Hà Tĩnh, and Thanh Hóa, where Phan Đình Phùng, a former official of the imperial Censorate, created a guerrilla force around Vu Quang, west of the coastal city of Vinh.

The Cần Vương movement attested to the strength of the commitment of the Vietnamese at the time to the Confucian concept of dynastic loyalty (*trung quân*), which stood then for national consciousness. Having no real notion yet of Vietnam as a nation-state in competition with other nation-states, its partisans went to battle with the cry "Kill all heterodox people and drive out the French," the former objective being accomplished by the indiscriminate slaughter of Vietnamese Catholics. Their struggle was therefore not quite nationalistic but was rather a compound of xenophobia and Confucian loyalism. It never materialized on a nationwide scale but found expression only in disparate movements, heavily dependent upon regional leaders, none of whom gained enough prestige to unite their followers under a single command. And the Cần Vương fighters continued to nurture a disembodied monarchism six or seven years after 1888, when Hàm Nghi's capture by the French deprived the movement of a physically present king to serve as a focus of loyalties. The December 1895 death of Phan Đình Phùng, the most obstinate of the fighters, put an end to their insurrection. With the total extinction after 1896 of the Cần Vương movement, the first stage of Vietnamese opposition against French control had clearly failed.

The Cần Vương movement was also, in a sense, a popular, religious movement. Ordinary villagers who responded to this royalist, scholar-gentry movement could be seen as fulfilling their traditional duties toward their social betters. However, the scholar-gentry also represented, at the local level, the link between the human and divine planes of existence. The

political situation after 1885 would have been construed by many as the imminent end of the dynastic cycle, precipitating a tumultuous period during which the mandate of heaven might shift. And this was precisely one of those times when the scholar-gentry assumed leadership of popular movements. But the scholar was only one type of figure around whom the peasantry gathered. After the definitive suppression of the last focal points of the armed resistance that mobilized the Confucian literati on behalf of reestablishing the legitimate sovereign of Vietnam, traditionalist ideologies of resistance seemed to survive in sudden, short-range movements that would still stir up the countryside now and then. However, unlike the Cần Vương movement, those insurrections were no longer prompted by any clearly defined political doctrine. Rather, there was only a vague belief in the providential mission of leaders guided by supernatural forces in their struggle to restore the country's independence, either under a new heaven-sent king or under a descendant of the founder of the reigning dynasty; such an individual would restore the harmony between heaven and society that was so crucial for prosperity and happiness. The rebels were inspired by healers, fortune-tellers, or mediums, who had acquired some local notoriety through their allegedly magical power and who presented themselves as reincarnations of tutelary spirits of the country. These would-be messiahs were able to impress the peasants with magical practices and predictions. Promising to offer exactly what the Nguyễn dynasty was no longer capable of providing—solidarity, justice, and salvation—those messianic movements obviously indicated that people experienced intense crises for which traditional authority no longer seemed an adequate solution. Although they would in no way ever be able to seriously threaten the colonial order, such movements emphasized the state of disarray following upon the dire shock that the consolidation of the colonial regime had inflicted on the traditional sociopolitical structures.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Confucianism; Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia

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CANDI

The Indonesian word *candi* means both "Hindu temple" and "Buddhist temple." Due to this double meaning, the word designates structures that are very different in form and function, from Candi Borobudur to Candi Prambanan. Although the Malay language is known to have existed from the seventh century, it is difficult to give a date for the first use of this term. However, it appears several times in a Javanese text, the *Nāgarakertāgama*, of the fourteenth century, with the sense of "monument."

The meaning of a Hindu temple has also evolved considerably over time. Although a "Candi Bima" was described in the eighth century and a "Candi Pari" was mentioned in the fourteenth century, these edifices certainly were not constructed according to the same basic principles. In epigraphic texts, the monuments are called *caitya*, *vihara*, and *prasada*, but none of these terms are well defined.

One cannot, therefore, give a precise definition of the term *candi* that would cover all these diverse structures. At best, it can be defined as a temple associated with a religion of Indian origin; accordingly, a mosque, for example, could not be considered a *candi*.

JACQUES DUMARÇAY

TRANSLATED BY JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also Blitar; Borobudur; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Malang Temples;



Mendut Temple in central Java, Indonesia. (Wolfgang Kaehler/Corbis)

Monumental Art of Southeast Asia;
Prambanan

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CANTONESE

See Chinese Dialect Groups

CAO ĐÀI

Cao Đài is an indigenous religion of Vietnam that emerged in 1925. Its full official name is Đài Đạo Tam Kỳ Phổ Độ (The Third Great Universal Religious Salvation). Cao Đài, or Caodaism (literary translated as “High Palace”), denotes a heavenly palace where the Supreme

Being reigns above the universe. Ngo Van Chieu (1878–1932), a district head in the French administration of Cochin China who is also known by the name Ngo Minh Chieu, was regarded as the first adept of Caodaism. In 1921, he saw the vision of a Divine Eye (*Thien Nhan*) and received messages from the Cao Đài God (*Duc Cao Đài*). Consequently, he adopted the Divine Eye as a symbol for worship.

In December 1925, the Cao Đài God identified Himself during a table-moving séance to three Vietnamese civil servants (Pham Cong Tac, Cao Hoai Sang, and Cao Quynh Cu). These were the first Caodaist mediums to be entrusted by the Cao Đài Spirit to propagate the religion. One of the early messages these men received (in 1926) went as follows: “Formerly people of the world lacked means of transportation, therefore they did not know each other. . . . Nowadays, all parts of the world are explored: humanity, knowing itself better, aspires to real peace. But because of the very

multiplicity of religions, humanity does not always live in harmony. That is why I decided to unite all these religions into One to bring them back to the primordial unity.” They were also directed to see Ngo Van Chieu for instructions.

The founders of Caodaism drew their ideas of salvation, spirituality, hierarchy, and organization from other religious philosophies (Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, the cult of ancestors, and Catholicism). However, the Caodaist religious banner has three colors only: red, yellow, and blue, representing the unity of the three religious traditions and beliefs that are widespread in Vietnamese society at large: red is associated with Confucianism, yellow with Buddhism, and blue with Taoism. In addition, the Cao Đài places much emphasis on performance of the spirit séance, unity between Heaven and Earth, direct communication with God, and the brotherhood of humankind. Inside every Cao Đài temple is a representation of a Divine Contract between Heaven and Earth written in French: Dieu and Humanité; Amour et Justice; and in Chinese: Tian Shang Tian Xia Bo Ai Gong Pinh. The Cao Đài pantheon of Great Spirits includes many famous personalities of the past, of which the most revered are Jesus, Kuan Yin, Li Bo, Sun Yat-sen, Victor Hugo, and Joan of Arc.

The organizational structure of Caodaism largely reflects its characteristics as transmitted by God and the Great Spirits. Within the structure, there are three powers: the Council of the Holy Spirits (Bat Quai Đài), directed by the Cao Đài God; the Medium Branch of the religion and the Legislative Body (Hiep Thien Đài), headed by the Protector of the Laws and Justice (Ho Phap); and the Executive Body (Cuu Trung Đài), headed by the Pope (Giao Tong).

The guiding texts of the religion are the Religious Constitution of Caodaism (Phap Chanh Truyen), a collection of divine messages that contain information on the election of officials, their powers, and ritual dresses; and the New Canonical Codes (Tan Luat), approved by the Spiritual Realm. The latter serve as laws regulating religious, secular, and monastic life. Both men and women play essential parts in the administration and priesthood of the religion. All positions, except that of the pope, are open to women. There are a few distinct de-

nominations in Cao Đài, but the Tay Ninh group is regarded as the strongest. The charismatic and messianic appeal of Ho Phap Pham Cong Tac (1890–1959) contributed greatly to the popularity of Cao Đài.

It is estimated that there are between 2 and 3 million Cao Đài followers (U.S. Department of State 2002: 3). Following the fall of South Vietnam to the communist forces of North Vietnam in 1975, many Cao Đài families moved overseas, where they continue to adhere to Cao Đài teaching. They have established the U.S.-based Cao Đài Overseas Mission and new temples around the globe. Within Vietnam, despite years of communist suppression, Cao Đài remains strong, and its Holy See in Tay Ninh Province is a major center of pilgrimage as well as a tourist attraction.

TRAN MY-VAN

See also Buddhism; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Catholicism; Confucianism; Religious Development and Influence in Southeast Asia

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CATHOLICISM

Catholicism arrived in Southeast Asia as a rival and competitor not only to tribal religions but also to the world religions—Buddhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, and Islam—that had arrived earlier. It appeared together with the various Western trading and colonizing nations, although missionaries often tried to distance themselves from the colonial regime. Today, an overwhelming majority of the people in the Philippines and East Timor are Catholics, but in other parts of the region, Catholics are a small minority.

The first Catholics to arrive in Southeast Asia were the Portuguese (1511), who made Melaka a vibrant Catholic center. Melaka had a bishop of its own from 1557 until 1641 when the city was taken over by the Dutch, who banned all priests from their territories. The Portuguese Catholics had arrived about one century after Melaka had accepted Islam. The race between Islam and Christianity was even closer in the Moluccas, where the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore accepted Islam about 1470. After some unlucky experiences of cohabitation between the fanatic Catholic Portuguese and the outspoken Muslim rulers of the Moluccas, the Portuguese founded the city of Ambon in 1576 as a Catholic realm in a nearly empty space. Portuguese traders also carried Catholicism to the southeastern parts of Indonesia, where it found adherents on Flores and Timor. Between 1602 and 1808, all Catholic priests were banned from the territory of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), and native Catholics (already comprising about 20 percent of the Moluccas population in 1600) were summoned to embrace Protestantism (Latourette 1937–1944, 3: 302). Catholicism only experienced a rebirth in Indonesia in the nineteenth century.

In the Philippines, the Spaniards were the first to propagate the Catholic faith, arriving from the east (through Mexico) in 1521. The first regular missionaries started work in 1565. Under Spanish rule, Catholicism was supported against native religions and against Protestantism and Islam. Consequently, the Philippines became the most Catholic nation of Southeast Asia (about 83 percent Catholic, according to national statistics in 2000) (Barrett 2001: 657). Catholicism, however, continued to be mixed with animist practices. In many respects, the Catholic Church was the human

face of colonialism. The church offered education and health care. Only in the eighteenth century were Eurasians allowed to enter the priesthood; native Filipinos had to wait until the nineteenth century. The number of priests, both foreign and native, has remained low until the present day. In 1840, a first independent church developed as result of a schism within the Catholic Church: the Confraternity of St. Joseph. In the aftermath of the turmoil of the revolution of the 1890s, the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) was founded in 1902 by the Catholic priest Gregorio Aglipay (1860–1940) and the nationalist leader Isabelo de los Reyes (1864–1938). In this period, Catholicism lost its privileges and many of its possessions. After the imposition of U.S. rule in 1898, Catholicism gradually transformed and regained its power, but since then, a formal separation of church and state has been maintained. In 1906, church property was restored, and many of the Filipinos who had joined the PIC (half the population) returned to the Catholic Church (Sunquist 2001: 656). In 1905, the first Filipino was consecrated a bishop.

In Indonesia, Catholicism resumed its race with Islam after 1860, when more and more regions were subjected to colonial rule and opened to outside trade. The Dutch colonial administration kept some regions, such as Aceh, West Java, and Bali, closed to missionaries until the 1930s. Other regions were divided between Catholics and Protestants. “Double mission,” overlapping of Catholic and Protestant missionaries working in the same field, was prevented. Flores and the eastern section of West Timor became Catholic strongholds, especially after all education in these regions was entrusted to the Catholic mission. West Papua was divided along the sixth degree north latitude: land to the south of this line became Catholic territory after 1900 (with Merauke as the center), and that north of the line was entrusted to Protestant missions. After 1905, the Catholics made quick and quite spectacular progress in central Java, where many nominal Muslims from the sultanates of Yogyakarta and Solo attended the schools of priests and nuns and converted to Catholicism. This region also produced the first Indonesian bishop, Soegijopranoto (1940), a staunch defender of independence in the period from 1945 to 1950. With about 3.5 percent of the population, the Catholics are a small

minority in Indonesia, but thanks to their unity and their excellent schools and hospitals, they have more social, cultural, and political influence than would be expected from their modest numbers (Sunquist 2001: 374–382).

The temporary integration of East Timor into Indonesia brought prominence to Catholicism in that region. This last Portuguese territory was about 35 percent nominal Catholic in 1975, but since then, the Catholic Church has become one of the sources of opposition to Indonesian rule and oppression. Bishop Belo of Dili received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996, at a time when nearly 90 percent of the people were baptized and considered themselves Catholic (Barrett 2001: 737–738).

In Vietnam, the first missionaries arrived from the Philippines in 1580. In 1668, there were already four Vietnamese priests. Though it had some quick successes, the mission also caused much opposition. The Edict of Tu Duc, banning Christianity in 1851, is said to have caused 90,000 deaths (Neill 1964: 415–417). This was the most serious of many persecutions that followed. In 1882, French colonial rule was imposed, in part because of the Nguyễn emperor's persecution of the Catholics. In 1933, the first Vietnamese native was ordained a bishop. In 1945, the four Vietnamese bishops supported independence, but after the struggle continued, most priests fled the communist north. Currently, about 3.5 percent of the population of Vietnam confess the Catholic faith.

In other Southeast Asian countries, Catholicism is the religion of a tiny fraction, for the most part ethnic minorities. In Malaysia, the 3.5 percent of the people who are Catholics are mostly Chinese, Indians, or ethnic minorities of Sarawak and Sabah (Barrett 2001: 474). In Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, the 1 percent who are Catholics are by and large of Vietnamese or Chinese origin (Barrett 2001: 163, 439, 734).

KAREL STEENBRINK

See also Missionaries, Christian; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Portuguese Asian Empire; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia

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CAVITE MUTINY

The Cavite Mutiny was staged in 1872 by a group of Filipinos employed in the Spanish arsenal at Cavite. Although it was more of a local expression of anger against specific actions of the Spanish colonial government, the uprising served as an excuse for Spanish friars to suppress the growing clamor for a more liberal administration. Ultimately, this led to a reign of terror that further entrenched anti-Spanish sentiment; it also aided in the development of nationalism in the Philippines.

The Cavite Mutiny was caused by the abolition, by Governor-General Rafael de Izquierdo y Gutierrez (t. 1871–1873), of privileges enjoyed by Filipinos in the service of the Spanish military and naval forces, as well as workers in the arsenal of Cavite. Around 250 of these Filipinos seized Fort San Felipe on the naval base at Cavite on the evening of 20 January 1872. The Spaniards responded quickly and sent troops from Manila, including two Filipino infantry regiments. The Spanish forces retook the fort the following day. Leaders of the mutiny were tried and executed, and the other rebels were imprisoned.

The Cavite Mutiny was defeated within three days, but the Spanish friars and conservative government officials saw it as an excuse to crack down on the growing number of Filipino priests, businessmen, and intellectuals who were calling for a more liberal and less discriminatory administration. The friars claimed that the mutiny was part of a large-scale conspiracy against Spain and that the real leaders were Fil-

ipino priests who had been campaigning for equal treatment.

The night after the mutiny began, Governor-General Izquierdo ordered the arrest of the three leading Filipino priests, Frs. Jose Burgos, Mariano Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora, together with other prominent Filipino professionals and businessmen. This was the first time the Spaniards had resorted to a reign of terror after an uprising. The three Filipino priests were subjected to a court-martial as leaders of the conspiracy but were denied a chance to defend themselves. They were executed in public on 17 February 1872, to serve as an example to other Filipinos should they continue to challenge Spain. The execution had the opposite effect, however, and served to further incite Filipinos to seek changes if not outright independence.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898)

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CELEBES

See Sulawesi (Celebes)

CERAMICS

The term *ceramics* applies to items made predominantly of clay, which, in its wet state, can be molded into virtually any desired shape before setting as moisture is expelled through drying and firing. Vessels are the most important of Southeast Asia's ceramics, but clay figurines, architectural elements, and metalworking aids have also been made since ancient times, not to mention tobacco pipes and indus-

trial products introduced to Southeast Asia in recent centuries. Ceramics are divided into earthenware, stoneware, and porcelain objects. As the firing temperature increases, the color of the clay changes from russet to gray to white, the porosity and proportion of inclusions decrease, and the technological sophistication required to produce the ceramics rises from part-time cottage operations to factories staffed by craft specialists. When the technology needed for higher firing temperatures was introduced, thin glass coats (glazes) could replace or be used in conjunction with earlier developed surface treatments, such as slips of clay, resin coats, painting, and burnishing.

Regardless of the aspect of technology under consideration, China has been the ultimate source of inspiration in the field of ceramics, with minor contributions being made by India, the Arabic world, and, most recently, Europe. Of course, numerous traditions peculiar to Southeast Asia have developed over the millennia as Southeast Asian potters learned to utilize their natural and cultural resources and to blend the medley of exotic influences into products that met local needs. However, the penetration of Chinese advances in ceramic technology through Southeast Asia has been uneven. Derivative stoneware industries had spread across Thailand and Indochina by 600 years ago but not as far as island Southeast Asia. China jealously guarded the secret of its perfectly white, translucent porcelain until the last couple of centuries, when expatriate Chinese established porcelain factories at industrial centers across Southeast Asia.

Earthenware pottery constitutes the oldest ceramic tradition in Southeast Asia. Potshards appeared in archaeological sites in North Vietnam and northern Thailand by 8,000 years ago, Cambodia and Taiwan by 6,000 years ago, the Malay Peninsula and Borneo by 5,000 years ago, and the islands from the Philippines to Timor and Java by 4,000 to 3,500 years ago. Earthenware potting persists as a significant cottage industry across island Southeast Asia and Malaya, where, until very recent times, most households relied on these local wares for their water-storage jars and much of their crockery. Numerous field studies have recorded the details of forming the vessels and firing them in a bonfire or underground hearth, as well as information on the distribution net-

work for the finished wares and, especially, the deployment and significance of local decorative motifs. Some progress has been achieved in identifying production locations from chemical analysis of the fabric (clay), and this can be useful in tracing the movement of mariners through the South Seas. An example in this regard is the confirmation of the South Sulawesi homeland of the Macassan traders who left potshards at their campsites in northern Australia, where they collected sea cucumbers between about 1700 and 1900 C.E.

Earthenware vessels, in particular those of high quality, have been widely trafficked across the archipelago. During the late nineteenth century, Kei Islanders, in the Moluccas, achieved regional fame for the quality of their pots. Earlier examples include the sixteenth-century to seventeenth-century wares, stamped with Islamic motifs, that were manufactured in Banten in West Java. Between the late first and middle second millennia C.E., “fine paste wares” could be found at various trading centers in Java, Sumatra, Malaya, and the Philippines. In fact, their shards are so common at Trowulan, the capital of the fourteenth-century to fifteenth-century empire of Majapahit in East Java, that they are sometimes referred to as Majapahit ware. East Java is the suspected source of most of the Sumatran examples. Indeed, the refined quality of Majapahit ware and Trowulan’s production of lead-glazed architectural elements suggest that the Trowulan potters had access to kiln technology.

During late prehistoric to protohistorical times, vessels of exceptional quality were produced widely across mainland Southeast Asia. The painted Bronze Age wares from Ban Chiang, in northeast Thailand, are among today’s most sought-after antiques of Southeast Asian origin. The ancient, locally established skills in pottery production undoubtedly facilitated the entry of more advanced ceramic techniques from China over the last two millennia, leading to numerous distinctive traditions among the subcontinent’s major ethnolinguistic groups. Earthenware production has survived, particularly among certain hill tribe minorities, but only as a lesser ceramic tradition.

During the Han dynasty (202 B.C.E.–220 C.E.), when China established direct rule over the Dai Viet, Chinese artisans set up shop in northern Vietnam. Archaeological excavations

in the Red River delta have documented the kilns used in making the bricks, tiles, model houses, and glazed pottery necessary to build Han-style tombs and furnish them to a standard appropriate for deceased members of the local bureaucracy. These kilns also produced comparable items for local household consumption and may have spawned the establishment of other factories to the south. At the Buu Chau site in central Vietnam, archaeologists have recovered numerous mold-impressed tiles and stamped-pottery shards of Han Chinese inspiration in contexts dated to the early centuries C.E. China’s millennium-long rule over northern Vietnam firmly entrenched this region as Southeast Asia’s leader in ceramic production. Glazed architectural elements were produced in abundance to build ornate religious structures as Buddhism blossomed in the region after the fifth century C.E. And large stoneware jars of export quality, sent to island locations in Southeast Asia by the eighth century, are very similar whether they derive from southern China or northern Vietnam.

The eviction of the Chinese in 979 allowed the Dai Viet to expand their repertoire of fine, whitish stonewares made from high-grade local clays. A wide range of celadons and other monochromes (single-colored wares) were exported in large numbers from Vietnam from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. A distinctive class of wares featured calligraphic scrolls and floral sprays, initially in iron black beneath a straw-colored glaze. Black was replaced by underglaze cobalt blue when this technology was introduced to East Asia from West Asia in the late fourteenth century. (Blue-and-white wares were not produced elsewhere in Southeast Asia until modern times.) China’s brief reoccupation of northern Vietnam in the early fifteenth century, during the late Yuan dynasty, introduced a tradition of Yuan-style motifs, whose popularity persisted in Vietnam even after they fell out of fashion in China. They formed the high point in Vietnam’s history of export tradewares, which included blue-and-white wares and small vessels with red and green enamels painted on the glaze, from the fifteenth to early seventeenth centuries. Vietnam was the chosen supplier for the blue-and-white tiles found at Trowulan and several other Majapahit sites. Even more remarkable is Vietnam’s plethora of ornate, Buddhist statuary and ritual vessels, of-

ten embellished with multiple glaze colors, produced for domestic consumption over the centuries.

Massive stoneware jars, broadly similar to their Chinese counterparts and frequently be-decked with dragons, continued to be shipped from northern Vietnam for overseas destinations during the second millennium C.E. Particularly at around the fifteenth century, Cham potters based in central Vietnam added “Go Sanh Red” to the Southeast Asian trade in martavan (martaban) jars, along with minor quantities of the smaller vessels produced primarily for local consumption. Martavans in the “Sawankhalok” style were also a major export ware from Sisatchanalai in central Thailand, a specialist pottery center attached to the Thai kingdom of Sukhotai throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Similar jars were concurrently produced in kilns throughout northern and central Thailand, but very few of these reached international markets.

The Thai tradition was influenced, to some degree, by the Khmer tradition, particularly as a result of Angkor’s domination over much of mainland Southeast Asia from the ninth to fifteenth centuries. Khmer wares are characterized by a notably coarse body, which is often a high-fired earthenware; a limited range of black and brown glazes; a distinctive assortment of *kendi* (kettles), water droppers, covered bowls, and jars of massive architectonic structure; and more reminders of Indian influence than can be found in Southeast Asia’s other main ceramic traditions. Recent work in Burma suggests that Burmese jars enjoyed a secondary currency on international markets, similar to that already recorded for Khmer wares. Also worthy of note is the production of “dragon jars” and other martavans by expatriate Chinese in Borneo and elsewhere during recent centuries.

The ceramic industry in Thailand has been treated to particularly intensive study. Its earliest known stonewares are heavily potted and sparsely decorated monochromes. Their local name, Mon wares, is probably correct in associating them with the Mon speakers who originally ruled much of Thailand. By the fourteenth century, “fish and flower” wares with iron decorations beneath a pale celadon glaze had appeared. These plates and bowls formed the blueprint for Thailand’s mature export period during the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-

turies. Sawankhalok celadons retained the fine stoneware body, open vessel form, and greenish glaze; Sawankhalok iron-painting techniques moved into small, covered vessels and a clear glaze over an array of geometric motifs similar in style to the Jizhou decorations of northern China; finally, Sukothai wares differed from the fish and flower wares principally in that they were made of much coarser stoneware. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Sisatchanalai was replete with kilns of various construction types, where martavans, smaller vessels, and Buddhist statuary were mass-produced in a range of monochrome and brown-and-white colors.

China’s trade of its ceramics to and through Southeast Asia essentially paralleled the development of Southeast Asia’s stoneware traditions. Han dynasty ceramics are claimed to have reached Java, Sumatra, and Borneo, but definite finds are restricted to Vietnam. Tang dynasty ceramics, dating to the late first millennium C.E., are known from major centers and transport nodes along the trunk route to the Indian Ocean, especially in Sumatra, Java, and Malaya. The Philippine register began slightly later, with Five Dynasties pieces found at Butuan in Mindanao. As the Song dynasty proceeded, increasing numbers of Chinese wares reached an ever wider set of destinations on the mainland and in the archipelago, achieving a temporary crescendo during the Yuan dynasty. A lull in China’s fifteenth-century exports evidently spurred the peak period of trade in wares from Vietnam and Thailand. As of the sixteenth century, Chinese ceramics reentered the world market in full force, with an increasing array of monochromes and polychromes, until the “age of plastic” seriously eroded the market for ceramics beginning in the twentieth century.

Ceramics offer a unique insight into lifestyle changes and craft skills in Southeast Asia over the long term; during the historical period, they reveal patterns in commerce, technological exchange, and the transmission of ideas. Textiles have undoubtedly been more important in all of these aspects, but their survival as heritage pieces and archaeological debris has fared far worse, and textile workshops have rarely left a spectacular imprimatur like those of ceramic kilns. Southeast Asia’s ceramics combine a strong showing in textual sources, vibrant long-

term traditions, and remarkable archaeological preservation in helping to chart Southeast Asia's socioeconomic advances over the last two thousand years.

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See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Ban Chiang; Ban Kao Culture; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Hoabinhian; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia

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CHAMPA

Champa is a general term used to denote a series of small kingdoms along the coastline of what is now central Vietnam. The first of these kingdoms was founded at the end of the second century C.E., whereas the last was absorbed into the modern state of Vietnam during the first half of the nineteenth century.

The earliest recorded kingdom on this coastline was formed from the southernmost outpost of the Chinese Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.). Known to the Han as Xianglin, this outpost is thought to have been located in the region of the modern city of Hué. A rebellion around 192 C.E. succeeded in Xianglin's breaking free from Han control, and an independent kingdom known as Linyi was formed there. During the third century, Linyi was known to have been a close ally of Funan, located in the lower Mekong Delta of modern Cambodia and southern Vietnam. Almost continuous warfare and piracy along the southern borders shared with China during the fourth and early fifth centuries, however, culminated in the sacking and looting of the capital of Linyi by a Chinese army in 445 C.E.

After this destruction, political and economic power in central Vietnam apparently shifted south to the Thu Bon Valley, near modern Hoi An. This region had an active trade with southern China from at least the first century B.C.E., and inscriptions written in Sanskrit record the foundation of a Hindu temple by King Bhadravarman in the fifth century C.E.

This temple was founded at My Son, in the foothills of the upper Thu Bon Valley; the political center lay at Tra Kieu, some 15 kilometers downstream. The economy was largely based on trade. At the mouth of the river near Hoi An, an active port thrived. The name *Champa* first occurs in an inscription at My Son dated to around 600 C.E., but it may, in fact, relate only to this single valley system. This geographic and political pattern probably recurred along the whole coastline of central Vietnam, with small states developing within individual river valley deltas.

The wealth of these coastal kingdoms depended largely on maritime commerce with China, and the kingdoms flourished during the peak periods of the South China Sea trade under the early Tang (618–907 C.E.), Song (960–1279), and early Ming (1368–1644) dynasties of China. During the early Tang period, trade remained concentrated in the Thu Bon Valley, where Sanskrit inscriptions, brick temples, and sandstone sculpture attest to a flowering of Hindu and Buddhist cultures. After the decline of the coastal kingdoms' main trading counterpart of Guangzhou (Canton) in the mid-eighth century, however, the primary maritime trade routes transferred to the south. The kingdoms of Kauthara (based on the port of Nha Trang) and Panduranga (located around the modern town of Phan Rang) both appeared in this period.

With the return of trade to Guangzhou in the late ninth century, the Thu Bon Valley again became economically dominant, and it remained commercially important until at least the thirteenth century. From the eleventh century onward, however, political power in Champa became increasingly centralized under the kingdom of Vijaya, in modern Binh Dinh Province. From there, the most powerful kings were able to control and leave inscriptions at the main religious sites of My Son in the north and Nha Trang in the south.

The dominance of Vijaya on the central coastline led to increasing conflict with the neighboring powers of Dai Viet, based at Thanh Long (modern Ha Noi) to the north, and the kingdom of Yasodharapura (Angkor) to the west. Dai Viet won a series of major victories against Champa during the tenth and eleventh centuries, and in the mid-twelfth cen-

tury, Champa was again invaded by the Khmer king Sūryavarman II (r. 1113–1145?). Vijaya sacked Angkor in retaliation in 1177, but this in turn led to a series of military campaigns in Champa sponsored by Jayavarman VII (r. 1181–ca. 1220) from the end of the twelfth century onward.

Despite these political setbacks, Vijaya remained an important power in the region, successfully deflecting a Mongol invasion at the end of the thirteenth century and sacking Ha Noi three times at the end of the fourteenth century, under a king known to the Vietnamese as Che Bong Nga. However, the demographic dominance of northern Vietnam and its increasing administrative and military organization eventually overcame the politically fragmented and personality-based system of the Champa kingdoms. Vijaya itself fell to Dai Viet in 1471 and was followed by Kauthara in 1653. Panduranga retained some independence until 1832, when it finally became absorbed into the modern state of Vietnam. The most comprehensive history of Champa remains that written by Georges Maspero (1928), but Keith Taylor (1992) and Kenneth Hall (1992) provide a modern historical perspective.

WILLIAM A. SOUTHWORTH

See also Angkor; China, Imperial; Dai Viet (939 C.E.–1407); Funan; Hanoi (Thang-long); Jayavarman VII (r. 1181–1220?); Sūryavarman II (r. 1113–1145?)

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CHAMPASSAK

Bordering Cambodia and Thailand in south-western Laos astride the Mekong River, Champassak emerged in the early period as an independent kingdom separated by geography and tradition from the northern Laos kingdoms. With its origins reaching back to the fifth century and occupying the territory of the ancient state of Chenla, historical Champassak entered Khmer lore as the fount of the Angkorian kingdom from the ninth to the twelfth centuries. This correlation is attested to by Sanskrit inscriptions and other evidence associated with the Vat Phu temple of Hindu provenance and the hill flanking the sacred mountain of Bassak.

Champassak was eclipsed by Vientiane under Souigna Vongsa (r. 1637–1694), and its status under Vientiane was in turn reduced by vassalage imposed by King Taksin (r. 1767–1782) of Siam in 1778. Such dynastic and historical differences were well understood by the French, who juridically separated Champassak from the protectorate they imposed upon Luang Prabang in the late nineteenth century. The French abolishment of the monarchy in Champassak in 1912, notwithstanding the royal lineage of the court, continued under French-educated Prince Boun Oum (1912–1980), twelfth in the line of the royal family of Champassak. In 1941, with Japanese blessing, Champassak was ruled by Thailand, and it was only retroceded to Laos at the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945). An anti-Japanese fighter, Boun Oum of Champassak, emerged as the foremost personality and traditional leader of the southerners in the postwar period. Despite a secret protocol concluded with the French in 1946, he renounced his ambitions to the throne of Champassak. Although removed from the picture in 1975, the pro-Western Boun Oum never entirely relinquished his ambitions for southern autonomy vis-à-vis Vientiane and especially the court in Luang Prabang.

Champassak was known to the French as Bassac Province. Today, under the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), it is recognized as a territorially enlarged province, with its capital at Pakse.

GEOFFREY C. GUNN

See also Angkor; Chenla; French Indochina; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Indochina

during World War II (1939–1945); Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR); Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s)

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CHEA SIM (1932–)

A Party Stalwart

Chea Sim, a Cambodian political figure, was born into a peasant family in Svay Rieng Province. He studied for several years as a Buddhist monk. He joined the anti-French Khmer Issarak movement in 1951 and the Kampuchea Peoples' Revolutionary Party, a communist front, soon afterward. Chea Sim was active as a regimental commander during the Cambodian civil war that was fought from 1970 to 1975. Under the Khmer Rouge regime (1975–1979), he worked as a political commissar in eastern Cambodia, before seeking refuge in Vietnam in late 1978 following an unsuccessful uprising in eastern Cambodia against the Khmer Rouge. In early 1979, Chea Sim returned to Cambodia as part of the Vietnamese-sponsored Cambodian government established in Phnom Penh, in the Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea. He served briefly as minister of the interior and, after 1981, as chairman of the National Assembly. In 1991, following the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, he became president of the Cambodian Peoples' Party (CPP), the formerly communist group that dominated Cambodian politics. He became president of the National Assembly again in 1993 and president of the newly established Senate in 1998.

Chea Sim's half century as a party stalwart and skillful infighter enabled him to build a strong base of support, especially in the Ministry of the Interior, eastern Cambodia, and the CPP. Although he was seen by some as a potential rival to the younger and more dynamic prime minister, Hun Sen (1951–), Chea Sim seemed content with the trappings of office, while nourishing his support base and his nationwide patronage networks.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Hun Sen (1951–); Khmer Issarak (Free Khmer); Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF); Khmer Rouge; *Killing Fields, The*; Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

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**CHENG HO (ZHENG HE),
ADMIRAL (1371/1375–1433/1435)**

The Foremost Chinese Navigator

Cheng Ho is commonly regarded as the greatest Chinese navigator in history. Between 1405 and 1433, he undertook seven expeditions from China to various places throughout the South Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf and as far as the eastern coast of Africa—an epic that took place eighty years before the voyages of Christopher Columbus (1451–1506).

Cheng was a Muslim eunuch in the early Ming dynasty (1368–1644). He was selected to command the voyages because of his knowledge of foreign countries, acquired from his father and grandfather, both of whom had been to Mecca on pilgrimage. His fleet called at major ports, including Champa, Kelantan, Pahang, Java, Melaka, Semudera, Lambri, Ceylon, Quilon, Cochin, and Calicut. Parts of his subsidiary fleets even reached Hormuz, Dhufar, Aden, Mogadishu, and Brava on the Somali coast of East Africa. His ships, known historically as “treasure ships,” had facilitated cultural and economic interaction, carrying Chinese products (including tea, ironwares, porcelains, silks, and other luxurious items) to exchange for ivory, spices, and exotic animals (such as lions and leopards) as cargoes of tribute to the Ming emperor.

Cheng's expeditions proved to be among the most adventurous and costly navigational expe-

riences in human history. The extraordinarily large fleet (sixty-two ships in the first expedition) employed huge ships (the biggest had nine masts and was 133 meters long and 56 meters wide) that were manned by a crew of about 27,000. Although Cheng's fleet was successful in spreading the Ming Empire's influence across half the earth, the adventures were stopped, as they had seriously drained the national coffers. Instead of maintaining a maritime empire, the Ming government opted to divert its dwindling financial resources to a defense against the revival of Mongol influence along the northern border.

Cheng's adventures impacted Southeast Asia in two major ways. First, they enhanced the spread of Chinese culture, including the lunar calendar and poetry, to the region. Second, Cheng himself grew to be a kind of patron saint of the Chinese sojourners who migrated to Southeast Asia in increasing numbers following his expeditions. Temples worshiping him can still be found in Java and Melaka; in the latter, he is revered among the Hokkien community as the deity Sam Poh Kong.

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Tribute System; Folk Religions; Melaka; Ming Dynasty (1368–1644)

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CHENLA

The term *Chenla*, a Chinese name, was used from the seventh century C.E. to refer to the territory of modern Cambodia and northeast Thailand. Modern historians have also applied the term to the period of Cambodian history from the seventh to early ninth centuries C.E.

The origin of the name is unknown. According to *Sui shu* (*History of the Sui Dynasty*, 581–618 C.E.), Chenla was a former vassal of the kingdom of Funan, and it gradually grew in power until King She-to-ssu-na of Chenla was able to assert his independence and conquer Funan. She-to-ssu-na is generally identified with King Citrasena Mahendravarman, whose reign dates from around 600 C.E. and whose inscriptions have been found in many areas of modern

Cambodia and northeast Thailand. *Sui shu* first mentioned Chenla in its description of an embassy sent to the Chinese court in 616 or 617 C.E.; the embassy was likely that sent by Isanavarman I, the son of Citrasena Mahendrarvarman. His reign is known from inscriptions found at Sambor Prei Kuk in the present-day Kompong Thom Province of Cambodia and in many areas of the lower Mekong Valley. During the Tang dynasty (618–907 C.E.) that followed, embassies were also received in 623 and 628 and were perhaps sent by the same king.

Although *Chenla* is used as a general term in the Chinese histories of that period, it is important to note that the inscriptions found within Cambodia never mention this name. Territories were designated according to the most important political centers, such as Bhavapura or Isanapura, the latter name being identified with Isanavarman's capital at Sambor Prei Kuk. The ritual heart of this capital consisted of two sacred enclosures surrounding a complex series of brick temples or shrines, perhaps constructed over the course of two centuries, from the late sixth to late eighth centuries C.E. Despite some damage from bombing and the effects of long neglect, much of this ritual site remains intact.

At the beginning of the eighth century, in 711 and 717 C.E., two embassies from Chenla were received at the court of the Tang dynasty, together with embassies from a kingdom named Wentan. The *Chiu T'ang shu* (*Old History of the Tang Dynasty*) stated that from 706 C.E., Chenla was divided into two parts: Water Chenla and Land Chenla. Land Chenla was also called Wentan, and this kingdom sent three further embassies in 753 or 754, 771, and 799 C.E. An itinerary has survived from the end of the eighth century, describing an overland voyage to Wentan across the mountains from the region of modern Hà Tĩnh in north-central Vietnam. The precise route of this journey is uncertain, but one of the destinations may have been the ancient city and temple site at Vat Phu in southern Laos. It is probable that the story of the division of Land and Water Chenla originated from the realization by the Tang court that the territory of Chenla comprised at least two major kingdoms—one that could be reached by sea, the other reached overland.

Although the Chinese histories mentioned two distinct kingdoms in the eighth century, the



The crocodile stone, a boulder with a crocodile carved into it, which possibly was used for human sacrifice by the Chenla culture. Vat Phu, Champasak, Laos. (Nik Wheeler/Corbis)

study of Sanskrit and Old Khmer inscriptions has revealed a far more complex political structure, with largely autonomous city-states controlling particular areas of rice-growing land or particular stretches of the Mekong Valley. The rulers of these city-states were only the most conspicuous and sometimes arbitrary representatives of a highly stratified and largely permanent local bureaucracy, whose members enjoyed inherited status and performed particular duties within the society. It was clearly exceptional for a large number of city-states to be combined under one ruler, and only rarely were embassies sent to China as a mark of this status (or of the ambition to achieve it).

Between 806 and 820, a further embassy was sent from Chenla to China, possibly by King Jayavarman II (r. 770/790/802?–834 C.E.). This king is thought to have placed his

capital in the region of Angkor, on the north bank of the Tonle Sap, and the Angkorian period is usually dated from the year of his consecration, 802. It is remarkable that no further embassies were sent to China for the next three hundred years. Consequently, historians often used Chenla as a convenient heading for the period of Cambodia's history from the seventh to early ninth centuries. It should be noted, however, that when King Sūryavarman II (r. 1113–1145? C.E.) renewed diplomatic contact with China in 1116 and 1120, his kingdom was again recorded under the name Chenla.

WILLIAM A. SOUTHWORTH

See also Angkor; Funan; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Jayavarman II (r. 770/790/802?–834 C.E.); Sūryavarman II (r. 1113–1145?)

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CHETTIARS (CHETTYARS)

The Chettiars were a South Indian moneylending caste and played a decisive role in the expansion of Lower Burma's rice industry in the late nineteenth century. The Chettiars were

ubiquitous and found in virtually every region of economic importance during the colonial period (ca. 1800–ca. 1960s) in Southeast Asia. Chettiar firms in Malaya and Burma borrowed from European banks in the region to relend, at a higher rate of interest, either to local cultivators or to indigenous moneylenders. Each Chettiar business concern, sustained by caste and kinship ties, was part of a network with links across the Southeast Asian region and India. Like the Chinese financial and commercial intermediaries, the Chettiars linked the rural Southeast Asian communities to the expanding Western economy.

The Burmese rice industry serves as an important example to highlight the role of Chettiar capital in export expansion in Southeast Asia. From around 1880, Chettiar moneylenders made mortgage loans to Burmese cultivators needing capital for land clearance and plow animals and to pay migrant workers. Indeed, it has been asserted that Chettiar credit was fundamental to the growth of the industry. When the Burmese cultivators suffered a reversal, they lost their land, which the Chettiars then sold to other cultivators; the process was repeated within a few years. The Chettiars were thus regarded as the cause of Burmese landlessness and impoverishment. They also played an important role in financing Malay agriculturalists in small-holder rubber production in Malaya. In Malaya, however, an amendment to the Malay Land Reservation Enactment in 1933 prevented Chettiars from gaining land through default in Malay reservations.

During the interwar period, the Chettiars made a significant transition. Once primarily short-term moneylenders, they became bankers, long-term creditors of trade and manufacturing concerns, and land and property owners.

AMARJIT KAUR

See also Banks and Banking; Burma under British Colonial Rule; Indian Immigrants; Rice in Southeast Asia; Rubber; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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CHIANG MAI

Chiang Mai, with a population of about 300,000, is a vibrant and historical city that has been a major political, religious, and economic hub of the Salween, Chao Phraya, and Mekong River basins since the thirteenth century. As the capital of Lan Na—the “Kingdom of a Million Rice Fields”—it was a relative and rival of the Lao kingdom of Lan Chang—the “Kingdom of a Million Elephants” at Luang Prabang. Both were on the networks of the caravan trade routes between the mountains of Yunnan and the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. As a hinterland polity, Chiang Mai based its wealth on wet-rice farming, forest products, and handicrafts production. At its height in the fifteenth century, it was the home to new Theravada Buddhist sects and Pali scholarship unrivaled in the Buddhist world. Yet it never lost its animistic roots and multiethnic, cosmopolitan character.

Chiang Mai did, however, lose its political preeminence and independence during the political turmoil and wars that took place from the mid-fifteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century. The new political ties forged in the nineteenth century with the Thai regime in Bangkok marked the beginning of its revival and eventual integration into the new Siam under King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910). New territorial demarcations and administrative arrangements turned Chiang Mai into a border province of Thailand in the twentieth century. Yet its historical legacies, which include architecture, handicrafts, and cultural traditions, make it a unique Thai city and a hub for the trades and tourism of the Greater Mekong Sub-region of the twenty-first century.

Origins, Expansion, and Disintegration (Thirteenth to Nineteenth Centuries)

Local written and oral historical records suggest that Chiang Mai was, in effect, an extension of

a group of small city-states, or *muang*, a type of political community that was prevalent among the T'ai-speaking peoples. These clusters of city-states were scattered throughout the areas of present-day northern Thailand, northern Vietnam, Lao People's Democratic Republic, southern Yunnan, and eastern Myanmar (Burma), known as Yonok. These polities depended on wet-rice agriculture and the caravan trade, whose routes crisscrossed the mountainous river valleys. The Mekong, the Red River, the Salween River, and their tributaries were the main sources of water and aquatic food, as well as the arteries for navigation and access links with the neighboring communities. The leaders were related through a common ancestral family, possibly linked through marriage to one of the Wa or Lua groups. The Yuans of Yonok were based in Chiang Rung, Chiang Saen, and Chiang Rai. A prince named Mangrai moved from Chiang Rai to capture Haripunchai or Lamphun, the major center of another group of Mon city-states with links to Thaton on the Gulf of Martaban and Lopburi near the Chao Phraya River. Mangrai gradually moved out of Lamphun to build the walled city of Chiang Mai in 1296 between the Ping River and the sacred Suthep Mountain.

From the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, the Mangrai dynasty established a circle of power over more than fifty cities and towns stretching from Chiang Tung east of the Salween to Nan on the western bank of the Mekong. Chiang Mai's success mainly stemmed from its commitment to the rule of law, as reflected in the law code of King Mangrai, the *Mangraisat*. Further, its webs of matrimonial alliances and kinship ties, its dedication to reformed Buddhist sects and their Sri Lankan-educated scholars, and its support for easy flows of economic exchanges in a multiethnic context also contributed to its prosperity. Chiang Mai was at the center of a cultural zone identifiable by its common language and scripts; architectural styles; bronze Buddha images; beliefs and rituals that combined Buddhism with animism; and special music, cuisine, silver works, lacquerware technique, and textiles.

The political decline of Chiang Mai coincided with the arrival of European firearms and trading opportunities in the fifteenth century, which changed the balance of power in the re-

gion and tempted local rulers and the nobility to seek new status and autonomy. The entangled web of matrimonial alliances was now producing both male and female claimants to the Chiang Mai crown. The reformed Buddhist sects were in open, bitter feuds and competed for political favors. Chiang Mai also found itself in the middle of the Ayutthaya-Ava contest, which resulted in its annexation by the Ava-Pegu kingdom under Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581) in 1558.

Nineteenth-Century Revival and National Integration

Chiang Mai became a tributary state of Bangkok in the early nineteenth century and was gradually absorbed into the modern state of Siam built by King Chulalongkorn. It was open to economic penetration by Western teak business interests as well as Protestant missionary activities that introduced modern medicine and education. Chinese merchants populated the city and dominated the regional market, where imported goods from China and Europe were exchanged for forest products and opium. A Bangkok bureaucratic and middle-class lifestyle became prevalent, as did Bangkok language, scripts, and tastes in music, food, and attire. In recent years, road building and pressure on forestland has forced the highland groups to adapt to the social and environmental changes, albeit with difficulty. National cultural homogeneity is the norm, but the cultural diversity these groups represent is an asset to the tourist industry.

Although over 700 kilometers from the sea, Chiang Mai has occupied a strategic and mediating position between southwestern China and northern Southeast Asia, on one hand, and between the eastern and western regions of the Mekong, on the other. Its economic and cultural strength offsets its loss of political autonomy since the nineteenth century.

Chiang Mai has not received much attention in Southeast Asian historiography because of its fringe location and the lack of experts who can read the northern Thai language and scripts. The few studies that have been produced include the translation of *The Chiang Mai Chronicle* by David Wyatt and Aroonrut Wichienkeo (1998) and works by Hans Penth (1994) and Saratsawadi Ongsakun (2000).

RUJAYA ABHAKORN

See also Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581); Buddhism, Theravada; Burma-Siam Wars; Chiang Rai; Luang Prabang; Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Sri Lanka (Ceylon)

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CHIANG RAI

Located on the Kok River, a western tributary of the Mekong River, Chiang Rai was founded in 1262 by King Mangrai of Ngoen Yang, a T'ai state associated with Yonok, or the Yuan country. Chiang Rai was probably already a small settlement in the region, based at present-day Chiang Saen on the Mekong. It has been suggested that Mangrai moved away from the banks of the Mekong in response to the Mongols' advance. He continued moving south to found another major city, Chiang Mai, over thirty years later, in 1296. Chiang Rai became secondary in status to the new center but continued to be ruled by senior princes of the Mangrai dynasty. Chiang Rai and Chiang Saen were important Myanmar (Burma) garrisons during the Pegu-Toungoo occupation of the Chiang Mai or Lan Na kingdom from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The peoples from Chiang Rai and the neighboring region were moved to populate Chiang Mai after its reconstruction by the Kawila dynasty, which joined forces with Bangkok in driving out the Myanmar troops in the late eighteenth century.

Chiang Rai was rebuilt in 1843 with the population from the region east of the Salween River. When the north was integrated into the new Siam, Chiang Rai became a fourth-grade province in 1910. Its location on the crossroads between present-day Thailand, Yunnan, Myanmar, and the Lao People's Democratic Republic highlights its multinational nature, in which all kinds of commodities are exchanged.

Cultural Incubator

Chiang Rai and its region west of the Mekong is perhaps best viewed as the “cultural incubator” of northern Thai civilization before the thirteenth century. Stone chopping tools associated with Hoabinhian hunter-gatherers have been found near Chiang Rai and Chiang Saen. Aerial photographs show the existence of over 100 settlements with moats or earthen walls, 55 of them near Chiang Rai city. As the Kok River extends west into Myanmar and an overland northern route leads directly to the western towns of Sipsong Pan Na in Yunnan, Chiang Rai was an important center linking the Mekong, Salween and Ping Rivers. When considered as part of a fertile subregion, Chiang Rai and the communities on the Kok, Fang, Lao, and Ing Rivers and the western bank of the Mekong north of Luang Prabang formed a pre-thirteenth-century T'ai-Yuan civilization. Archaeological evidence, written records, and social traditions suggest that the people had basic knowledge in wet-rice cultivation and irrigation, means of providing for basic needs, and sustainable sociopolitical institutions. Legendary accounts of the exploits of heroic kings suggest a tradition of ancestral worship that unified the various scattered communities. As the political domains included a number of upland groups, particularly the Mon-Khmer-speaking peoples such as the Lua or Lawa, they were included in the state through rituals and probably marital relations. Local chronicles contain references that point to early practices of T'ai governmental and political polities, with their emphasis on tutelary spirits, fictive and real kinship association, the maintenance of social order, political legitimacy, and hegemony through descent. The Buddhism that came from the Mon country through Hariphunchai (present-day Lamphun) and Pagan was still in its formative stage.

Center of Buddhist Arts

It was during the Mangrai dynasty from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries that the Chiang Rai-Chiang Saen region, combined with the Chiang Mai-Lamphun-Lampang area, prospered as a center of Buddhist arts—in particular, the design and casting of Buddha images and architecture and handicrafts such as lacquerware, silverware, textiles, and ceramics. Some of these artistic and cultural developments seem to have resulted from cross-cultural exchanges. For example, according to certain accounts, Mangrai made political advances into Pagan and brought back gong makers who were sent to Chiang Saen. The Emerald Buddha presently in Bangkok was said to have been first discovered in Chiang Rai before it was taken to Chiang Mai in 1486 and subsequently to Vientiane in the sixteenth century.

Chiang Rai continued to be part of the later development of the Chiang Mai-based polity and cultural zone, which was characterized by a literary society and adherence to a new and localized form of Theravada Buddhist tradition. However, the mass migrations of the twentieth century, caused by major conflicts and socioeconomic dislocations around the region, transformed Chiang Rai into an international border zone that reflected those upheavals, even as it attempted to maintain its Yuan roots.

RUJAYA ABHAKORN

See also Buddhism, Theravada; Burma-Siam Wars; Chiang Mai; T'ais; Yunnan Province

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CHIN PENG (ONG BOON HUA/HWA) (1922–) A Communist Guerrilla Leader

Chin Peng was the secretary-general of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which launched an armed uprising against British rule in Malaya in 1948. He remained the undisputed leader of the MCP until it called off its armed struggle and disbanded in 1989. By then, the British government had granted Malaya—the present-day West/Peninsular Malaysia—inde-

pendence (in 1957) and allowed its Bornean colonies of Sarawak and Sabah to merge with Malaya, together with Singapore, to form the enlarged Federation of Malaysia (in 1963).

Chin Peng took over the post of secretary-general in 1947 from a Cantonese-speaking Vietnamese, Lai Tek, to whom he was a close companion. Lai Tek was exposed as a secret agent who had been planted in the party by the British police since 1934. Chin Peng and those who took over the leadership had not dared to tell party members about the traitor Lai Tek, who had absconded with the organization's funds, but kept the information to themselves for nearly a year until they had established their leadership.

It was, in part, this internal crisis that forced Chin Peng to take the party underground, to renounce the "soft and cooperative" policy adopted by Lai Tek toward the British authorities, and to adopt a militant line. It was not long before the British authorities enacted tough measures to curb communist activities such as strikes and demonstrations. Confrontations with the British authorities pushed the party toward armed revolution.

Chin Peng has been fondly remembered as a sincere communist ally in several memoirs by British intelligence officers who worked with him in the resistance war in the jungles of Malaya against the Japanese Imperial Army during the Pacific War (1941–1945). He was responsible for organizing food supplies and other services for British groups stranded behind enemy lines. In recognition of his wartime services, he was among the party's top guerrillas who were invited to London to attend the great victory parade at the conclusion of the conflict. He was later awarded a British decoration—Officer of the Order of the British Empire (OBE)—although that was rescinded when the MCP began its revolt.

Chin Peng's real name is Ong Boon Hua (Ong Boon Hwa); Chin Peng was his party nom de guerre. He was born in the coastal town of Sitiawan in Perak state, where his father owned a small bicycle repair shop. After an early education in Chinese, Chin Peng went to an English school. He was eighteen when he joined the MCP, cutting stencils for the group's propaganda department; there, he met his wife, who also worked in the department. His wife followed him into the jungles when the party

launched its revolt in 1948. They have two children, one of whom is a lawyer.

A soft-spoken, courteous, and bookish man, Chin Peng wielded tremendous power over his small, highly trained, and efficient army of some 5,000 guerrillas (Coates 1992: 73, n. 46). The British government put a price of \$200,000 on his head, but Chin Peng managed to elude capture. In 1955, the Malayan public and the world press witnessed him emerge from his jungle hideout to broker a deal with the Alliance Party leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (1903–1990), of the preindependence government of Malaya at Baling town in Kedah state near the Thai–Malayan border. But the talks collapsed due to Tunku’s refusal to recognize the MCP as a legitimate political party and to allow surrendered communist guerrillas to return to society without police screening.

In 1960, as the communist forces were nearly routed militarily, they withdrew to the Thai–Malayan border, where they established base camps. The Malayan government declared an end to the state of emergency. As the party feared that an attempt would be made on his life, Chin Peng was ordered to leave for China; he sought refuge there because the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had established cordial and fraternal ties with the MCP. He remained in China until 1989, all the while running his party’s struggles from afar.

In 1989, Chin Peng was among several top MCP leaders who initiated a peace agreement between the party and the Malaysian government, which marked the end of their armed struggle. More than 1,000 party members accepted the Thai government’s offer of land to set up homes in villages near the Malaysian border. However, Chin Peng and others waited in Thailand to be allowed to return to Malaysia and resettle. The latest press reports suggest that after a long and fruitless wait, they might now also decide to seek Thai citizenship.

On 3 April 2002, the seventy-six-year-old Chin Peng announced that he had just completed writing his memoirs, recounting the successes and mistakes committed by the pro-Beijing MCP, providing analyses on why the communist bloc collapsed in 1990, and detailing how the event affected communist parties globally. He also said that although the MCP had failed to grab power from the state, it was

responsible for the country achieving independence in 1957. The memoirs were published in 2003.

CHEAH BOON-KHENG

See also Abdul Rahman, Tunku (1903–1990); Baling Talks (1955); Force 136; Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA)

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CHINA, IMPERIAL

Imperial China began in 221 B.C.E. when Emperor Qin Shihuangdi (r. 259–210 B.C.E.) unified North and Central China and ended when the Qing (Ch’ing/Manchu) dynasty (1644–1912) was overthrown. For more than two thousand years, Imperial China’s relations with Southeast Asia were determined by the rate at which the native peoples of South and Southwest China became its subjects and their territories were settled by immigrant Chinese from the north. Maritime trade flourished and centered on ports now known as Guangzhou (Canton, the capital of modern Guangdong [Kwangtung] Province) and Hanoi (the capital of modern Vietnam), but Imperial China did not expand beyond what is today the northern half of Vietnam. During the tenth century, Vietnam became an independent kingdom. Imperial China reached its present land borders with Burma (Myanmar) and Laos only after the Mongol conquest of the kingdom of Dali (937–1253). Since the thirteenth century, the overland southern limits of China have been more or less firm until the present day.

Trade and diplomacy under the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.) were conducted through a tributary system, whereby countries bordering on China and countries that wanted to trade with China acknowledged China’s imperial status by sending tribute. In return, Chinese

emperors would send gifts to the respective rulers. This arrangement provided the framework for Sino–Southeast Asian relations until the nineteenth century.

The earliest chronicles of the Qin and Han dynasties described an ancient trade in rare luxury goods from the south. The first mission recorded (in the year 2 C.E.) came from India. Others that followed were sent by rulers of port kingdoms along the coasts of Indochina (modern Vietnam and Cambodia) and the Malay Archipelago (mainly the islands of Java and Sumatra). One purported to have come from Andun, the ruler of Daqin (the Roman Orient at the time of Marcus Aurelius, 161–180 C.E.).

The trade with the kingdoms of Linyi (later Champa, now central Vietnam) and Funan (later Zhenla, now Cambodia and Thailand [Siam]) was the most important down to the Tang dynasty (618–907 C.E.). It provided all that Imperial China needed from the region and from the Indian Ocean. In the Malay world (contemporary Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines), the flow of trade between China and India was vital to the wealth and stability of the dynastic houses of Java and Sumatra. Notable were those of Moloyou (Melayu or Jambi) and later Sanfoqi (Śri Vijaya/Śrivijaya), both in eastern Sumatra, and Holing in Java. But no less significant was the fact that these and other Indianized kingdoms were centers where Chinese Buddhist monks sojourned to prepare for study in India.

Chinese traders were not themselves active in Southeast Asia until the tenth century, when independent Chinese kingdoms were established in the south after the fall of the Tang empire in 907. The most notable was the kingdom of Nan Han (917–971 C.E.), based in the modern province of Guangdong and Guangxi (Kwangsi). Also important was the empire of Min (907–945), based in modern Fujian (Fukien) Province, which, after 945, was conquered by the Yangzi Delta kingdom of Nan Tang (917–971 C.E.) and became its southernmost prefectures. Cut off from the north, the peoples of this region turned to the sea. This was a major turning point for the South China Sea trade. Even after these kingdoms were incorporated into the Song (Sung) empire (960–1279), the merchants of Guangdong and Fujian Provinces continued to be active in that trade. When the Song emperors lost their terri-

tories in northern China in 1127 and moved their capital to Hangzhou (Hangchow), Zhejiang (Chekiang), they became even more dependent on the revenues derived from that trade. This was the first time a Chinese imperial center was located at a coastal port, and the needs of the capital provided great stimulus to maritime relations with Southeast Asia.

Overland trade from India and Burma through the tribal areas of modern Yunnan Province had begun in the Han dynasty and become prominent during the Tang. Goods were transported north across Yunnan, carried down the Yangzi (Yangtze) River to Sichuan (Szechuan), and then either transported farther north to the ancient capital of Changan (now Xian) or east down the Yangzi Valley to the rich provinces of the delta region. This was also the route of Buddhist missions to the Burman and Shan, or Thai-Dai, peoples that carried the faith to the tribes within Yunnan. Although there was intermittent warfare among the tribes, trade and culture contact marked the cross-border relationships. The Chinese did not play a prominent role along these borders until the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279) was cut off from its overland trade routes to the west via Central Asia.

The Mongols were the first nomads of the steppes to have conquered all of China and thus come into contact with Southeast Asia. They did so when they destroyed the kingdom of Dali (also known as Nanchao) in 1253 and reached the borders of Burma. Later, after they replaced the Song as the Yuan dynasty of China (1279–1369), they tried to subdue both Burma and Vietnam. The momentum of their empire building, however, did not stop at the coasts, as had happened with the Chinese during the earlier centuries. The Mongol Yuan sent expeditionary forces to invade Burma, Vietnam, and Champa (1281–1303) as well as Java (1292–1293). For the first time in history, a large part of both mainland and maritime Southeast Asia faced a colossal threat from a powerful empire in China.

None of the Mongol expeditions was successful, and the invasions across the South China Sea were aberrations in Chinese history. After Chinese rebels drove out the Mongols and established the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the founder of the dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang (Emperor Hongwu, r. 1368–1398), reverted to traditional policies. He adopted a strategy that

focused on defending North China from nomadic enemies and coastal China from Japanese pirates. He used the tributary system both as a diplomatic instrument and as a means to control all external trade. His son, Zhu Di (Emperor Yongle, or Yung-lo, 1402–1424), then sent Admiral Zheng He (Cheng Ho, 1371–1435) on his famous naval expeditions to Southeast Asia and across the Indian Ocean to South and West Asia as well as East Africa. The seven expeditions lasted from 1403 to 1433. But though these were demonstrations of China's wealth and power, there was no reversal of imperial policy. Not only was there no intention to expand territory, there was also no commitment to continue the naval show of force. After 1433, the Chinese navies withdrew, and Imperial China never sent them out again.

Thus, over the following six centuries, the region we now call Southeast Asia was a relatively minor concern for Imperial China. From 1433 to the fall of the Ming dynasty in 1644, its emperors paid little attention to the south except to fight off pirates of both Chinese and Japanese origins and manage the armed traders sent by the kings of Portugal and Spain during most of the sixteenth century. By the early seventeenth century, internal rebellions from within and Manchu invaders in North China from without troubled the dynasty; consequently, maritime activities were neglected. The Portuguese in Melaka and Macao (Macau) and the Dutch in Java and Taiwan became the major players in Southeast Asia. They were joined by Chinese private navies off the Fujian coast led by Zheng Zhilong (d. 1661) and his son Zheng Chenggong (better known as Koxinga, 1624–1662), who had both learned from the Portuguese and Dutch experience. By the time the Ming dynasty fell in 1644, armed Chinese merchants had become active protagonists in the region.

On the mainland, Vietnam recovered from the war with Emperor Yongle that lasted from 1406 to 1428, but it continued to have an uncomfortable relationship with China. Burma, too, felt the pressure of Ming control of the borders to its north as Chinese settlers and armies moved into the new province of Yunnan. This presence grew when remnants of the Ming armies that were defeated by the northern Manchu invaders in the 1640s escaped into Burma. The situation fostered determined ef-

forts by the Burmese kings to strengthen their control over the territories bordering China.

During this period, the kingdoms and port cities of Southeast Asia were only aware of China as a powerful neighbor that normally stayed aloof from their regional affairs. Following the decline of the Javanese empire of Majapahit at the end of the fifteenth century and the flourishing of Melaka throughout the fifteenth century with Chinese support, Chinese traders defied imperial policy to extend their trading ventures throughout the region. Several books recording their interest in the region had appeared during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but it was not until the beginning of the seventeenth century that a full account was published. This was Zhang Xie's *Dongxi yang kao* [*On the Eastern and Western Oceans*] (preface dated 1617), the most important book on maritime affairs since the end of the Zheng He expeditions. It captured the growing freedom in the private trade with Southeast Asia on the eve of the Zheng family's dominance during the sixty years up to 1683. By that time, Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch records were providing the world with glimpses of where in the region the Chinese were most active and how these Chinese merchants were contributing to new kinds of trading networks dominated by Europeans.

Imperial China continued to keep a tight control over foreign trade during the eighteenth century, and that policy was retained until the 1840s. In Chinese terms, this was a century and a half of peace and stability. The only external threats came from the Mongol and Turkic nomads of Inner Asia, and the Qing armies fought several fierce wars that reinforced China's dominance over modern Xinjiang (Sinkiang) and Tibet. A few local rebellions were troubling, but they were all crushed with relative ease. In short, on the eve of the British East India Company's Opium War with China in 1840, there were no reasons for Imperial China to feel threatened by enemies coming by sea. In turn, Southeast Asia noted China's indifference to its southern neighborhood. Each country in the region had to adjust, as best it could and in its own way, to the coming of the Europeans for over three hundred years. In so doing, the region was increasingly tied to European interests in India and the Middle East (West Asia). But private Chi-

nese merchants and, following the opening of China and the advent of the Industrial Revolution, cheap Chinese labor for the mines and plantations of Southeast Asia together kept the region close to developments in China. The relationship was a relatively passive one until the end of Imperial China and the emergence of Nationalist China.

WANG GUNGWU

See also Angkor; Buddhism, Mahayana; Champa; Cheng Ho (Zheng He), Admiral (1371/1375–1433/1435); Chenla; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Tribute System; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Formosa (Taiwan); Funan; Galleon Trade; Hong Kong; I-Ching (I-tsing) (635–713 C.E.); Java; Jungle/Forest Products; Macau (Macao); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Manila; Marine/Sea Products; Melaka; Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Nam Viet (Nan Yue); Nan Chao (Nanchao) (Dali/Tali); Qing (Ching/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912); Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Sino-Vietnamese Wars; Śrīvijaya (Śrīvijaya); Sumatra; Tin; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty (1271–1368); Yunnan Province

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CHINA, NATIONALIST

Nationalist China's origins were closely associated with Southeast Asia. The first Chinese Nationalist leader, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), turned for help to the Chinese in Singapore, Penang, and the Malay States in 1900. Sun Yat-sen's impact lasted until his death in 1925 and several years thereafter. The last political party he established, in 1921—the Guomintang (Kuomintang, KMT, or Nationalist Party)—expanded on these early links, especially after it became the party in government in 1928. His successor, Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi, 1887–1975), was controversial because many overseas Chinese did not respect his assumption of power over the country. Nevertheless, the Guomintang's external connections remained strong because the party was projected as identical with the national government and with the fate of the Chinese republic. The party's influence thus continued after 1949, notwithstanding the Nationalist government's defeat at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the fact that the Republic of China was forced to move to Taiwan. Although the circumstances were less favorable, KMT still retained the loyalties of its older members. Even after the European colonies of Southeast Asia gained their independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the government in Taiwan remained active in encouraging many Chinese school graduates of the region to study in universities in Taiwan. And despite the fact that the political links have diminished in significance, some Taiwan business firms still depend on their over-

seas Chinese supporters for facilitating start-ups in Southeast Asia.

When Sun Yat-sen first visited Singapore in August 1900, the Manchu Qing court had put a price on his head. He had led a rebellion against the dynasty five years earlier and was briefly incarcerated in the Chinese Legation in London in 1896. His dramatic escape made him an international figure, and thereafter, he saw himself as a revolutionary. But the British banned him from Hong Kong, his original political base, so he had to turn to his compatriots overseas in Japan and Southeast Asia for support. In 1905, he established a coalition of political parties, the Tongmeng Hui. He set up its South Seas headquarters the next year in Singapore and then moved it to Penang in 1909. By that time, he had become a symbol of the anti-Manchu movement among overseas Chinese everywhere. From 1906 to 1907, he personally traveled through the Western Malay States of the Malay Peninsula to collect funds for uprisings in South China. For the next five years, his followers, many of them students from China who had joined his party in Japan, were sent to do the same in other cities of the region, notably Penang, Bangkok, Rangoon (Yangon), Manila, Batavia (Jakarta), Medan, Saigon, and Hanoi. From the Chinese community of these Southeast Asian cities, he received enough help to launch a series of six uprisings between 1906 and 1911. Although every one of these failed, his prestige remained high among younger Chinese, especially those from the laboring classes. The most spectacular support from them came in 1911, when a large number volunteered for the rebellion in Guangzhou and sacrificed their lives. Of the "Seventy-Two Martyrs" of the Huanghua gang uprising, over twenty came from Southeast Asia.

The Qing dynasty was overthrown after the Wuchang Uprising in late 1911, and the Republic of China was proclaimed in Nanjing (Nanking) in 1912. Sun Yat-sen returned from North America and Europe via Southeast Asia to become its provisional president. Many of his Southeast Asian supporters followed him to serve the revolution in China. For the next thirteen years, through the many vicissitudes in his political struggle for the republic against a series of warlords in both North and South China, Sun Yat-sen continued to receive help from the party branches that he had set up in

the region. In particular, the party newspapers in various cities gave him sustained support. Also, his ideas were spread among the hundreds of modern Chinese schools that were set up wherever there were communities large enough to support them. And businesspeople who had first been encouraged to invest in the economic development of China by the Qing court were exhorted to a new patriotism toward the republic, and most of them responded readily.

The governments of Siam (Thailand) and the various European colonies in Southeast Asia viewed this development among their Chinese residents with growing concern. The British in the Straits Settlements had accepted Chinese consular representation in Singapore and Penang during the last decades of the Qing dynasty, and they watched the anti-Manchu movement grow from the start. After allowing dissidents such as Kang Youwei (K'ang Yu-wei, 1859–1927) and Sun Yat-sen to take refuge in British territory, they became very alert to the strong feelings aroused among the Chinese residents and sojourners under their jurisdiction. As a result, they were well prepared to deal with the revolutionary groups that would use the colonies to recruit supporters. The French authorities in Saigon and Hanoi were also sensitive to such activities because these Chinese rebels had inspired young Vietnamese to embrace nationalism and oppose French colonial rule. The Dutch, too, became increasingly troubled by the warm response to patriotic calls among the Chinese in the Netherlands East Indies, notably in the Sumatran areas close to British Malaya, and in the cities of Batavia and Surabaya. Indigenous reactions against Chinese business successes after 1900 were turned against colonialism itself. This only made the Dutch authorities more determined to place Chinese nationalist sentiments under tight control.

From 1916 to 1928, the new Republic of China was engulfed in a civil war among the warlords. Its seat of government in Beijing was weak. The Western powers that dominated the trade and politics along its southern and eastern coasts had little to fear from the republic. But when the Nationalist government in Nanjing replaced the ineffectual Beijing government in 1928, the situation changed. The new military leader, Chiang Kai-shek, continued to fight to try to unify all of China, and he encouraged

strong Nationalist voices to be raised to rid China of Western dominance. These voices found their echoes among the overseas Chinese all over Southeast Asia.

Japan's ambitions in Shandong (Shantung) Province, where the Japanese had replaced the Germans after World War I (1914–1918), provoked even stronger emotions. The Shandong (Jinan) incident in 1928 was the beginning of a series of actions that heightened anti-Japanese patriotism throughout the 1930s. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 alarmed all the Western powers, but international reaction was ineffective, and the Japanese pushed on into North China. Thus, the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia were increasingly drawn into the vortex of China's politics, as it became inevitable that China and Japan would go to war. At the time, Chiang Kai-shek was fighting a civil war against his communist rivals and several surviving warlords, and he had tried to avoid an open war against the Japanese. His position became increasingly unpopular, including among the Southeast Asian Chinese. This situation was changed in 1936 by the Xian mutiny, led by the Manchurian leader Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsueh-liang, 1898–2001). The mutineers forced Chiang Kai-shek to stand up against the Japanese, and the overseas Chinese responded with bursts of patriotic activities. In every city and town in the region, the Chinese organized themselves to express their approval.

When the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1937, the Chinese in Southeast Asia were ready to act. Young men were encouraged to volunteer for military service to fight in China. But the most effective strategy was to raise funds for the war-against-Japan effort. Activities encouraged and managed by the Nationalist government mobilized concerted efforts throughout the *Nanyang* (as the Chinese called maritime Southeast Asia). Under the leadership of Tan Kah Kee (Chen Jiageng, 1874–1961) in British Malaya, the South Seas China Relief Fund Union was established in October 1938, marking the first time a region-wide organization in support of the war in China was widely accepted.

The Nationalist leaders never succeeded in unifying the country. They had to fight the warlords until 1928. And at the same time, the Chinese Communist Party, their erstwhile partner (during the “united front” period from

1936 to 1945), continually contested the Nationalists' leadership of the revolution. When Chiang Kai-shek turned against the Communists, he concentrated on destroying them before tackling the remaining warlords and resisting Japanese advances into China. This decision was unpopular with both patriots and left-wing intellectuals. Rival groups formed in opposition to Chiang Kai-shek appeared, not least among the Chinese in Southeast Asia who wanted to see more resistance against Japanese encroachments in China. Of these, the Communists gained the sympathy of many schoolteachers and journalists. Through sections of the Chinese press and the students in Chinese schools, political radicalization began to take place.

In this way, Guomindang-Communist rivalry in China was reproduced in various parts of the region, notably in urban centers where the overseas Chinese were numerous. And where there was a sizable proletariat, as in British Malaya, left-wing movements critical of both the colonial and the Guomindang governments found growing support for their revolutionary cause. Although this phenomenon was a common threat to all governments, the British were the most concerned because, by the late 1930s, about half the population of British Malaya was Chinese; urban areas such as Singapore and Penang were literally “Chinatowns.” The fact that there were deep divisions within these communities was not reassuring. Neither the nationalist call for patriotism toward the home country by the Guomindang nor the internationalist call against imperialism and colonialism by the Chinese Communists was acceptable to British interests. With the onset of war in Europe (in September 1939) and the threat of a Japanese invasion in Southeast Asia, however, the colonial powers found themselves on the same side as the Chinese. In the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies, both Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists fought a common enemy, Japan, together with the Allied forces.

After World War II (1939–1945), Nationalist China fought a bitter civil war (1945–1949) against the Communists. For the first time, it found it had lost the support of major sections of the overseas Chinese. This was partly because local Chinese were adapting to new developments that replaced colonial regimes with indigenous Nationalists all over Southeast Asia but also because the younger generation of Chinese

were sympathetic to the criticisms of widespread incompetence and corruption among Guomintang leaders. The Nationalists' loss of the war coincided with the establishment of new nation-states that demanded a new kind of loyalty from resident Chinese. The Sun Yat-sen heritage of the patriotic *huaqiao* (overseas Chinese) was thereafter no longer defensible.

Nationalist China asked Southeast Asian Chinese to look more toward their country of origin, but it also educated them to understand the world beyond China—the world of science, international economics, and national sovereignty. Thus, it was itself the source of the paradox that made some Chinese more Chinese and others more ready to adapt themselves to become the nationals of the new states of Southeast Asia.

WANG GUNGWU

See also China Relief Fund; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Revolution(1911); Kuomintang (KMT); Sun Yat-sen, Dr. (1866–1925)

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CHINA RELIEF FUND

The China Relief Fund was a fund-raising effort among the Chinese sojourners in Southeast Asia from 1937 to 1942, with the goal of assisting China in its fight against Japanese aggression. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, patriotic Chinese sojourners formed committees in different places in Southeast Asia to raise money for the resistive Chinese armies. In mid-1938, representatives of these groups urged the establishment of a federation to supervise the relief-fund committees. Primarily due to the efforts of Tan Kah Kee (1874–1961), a Chinese industrialist and educator in Singapore, a convention of over 180 representatives met in Singapore on 10 October 1938, China's National Day, and resolved to establish the Federation of China Relief Funds of Southeast Asia. Tan was elected chairman.

The fund-raising activities were tolerated by the Straits Settlements and other Indochinese governments on the understanding that the money raised would not be used to pay the costs of the war but only to relieve the wounded soldiers and refugees, a restriction that was regarded as necessary to avoid agitating Japan. This restriction was sound only on paper, however, as all the donations were handed over to the Executive Yuan, the highest administrative organ of the Republic of China, which naturally directed the money to war purposes. With the patronage of the Executive Yuan, the federation actually served as a propaganda organ among the Chinese sojourners; for example, it denounced Wang Jingwei's betrayal of China in forming a pro-Japanese government in Nanjing and supported Britain in its war against Germany.

There is no accurate figure on the total donations remitted to China via the funds. According to Tan, the amount raised in 1939 and 1940 totaled \$140 million in Chinese currency. By early 1942, all activities of the federation ceased when much of Southeast Asia fell into the hands of the Japanese army.

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also China, Nationalist; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Sun Yat-sen, Dr. (1866–1925)

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CHINA SINCE 1949

The swift victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao Zedong (1893–1976) in China's civil war (1945–1949) surprised contemporaries both in China and in Southeast Asia. That 1949 victory highlighted the threat communism posed to colonial governments as well as to the emerging nationalist leaders of Southeast Asia. Marxist-Leninist ideas had been introduced in the 1910s into Vietnam and the Netherlands East Indies, about the same time they reached China. But for forty years, communist movements had been overshadowed by the anticolonial struggles for freedom and independence. The fact that China became communist just when new nations were being established led to volatile relationships between China and the region. As a partner of the Soviet Union in the Cold War against the capitalist West in the 1950s, the Beijing regime put strong pressures on its southern neighbors to accept communism. In response, the local nationalist leaders turned to the West for help. They also became particularly wary of their residents and citizens of Chinese descent.

Throughout the Cold War era, Communist China was the source of the tension that colored the lives of all the Chinese who had decided to make their homes in the new nations. But even before the Cold War ended in 1990, China had embarked on systematic economic reforms that brought unforeseen changes to the country. In the early years of the twenty-first century, China under the Communist Party may still be called Communist China, but what remains of its communism no longer threatens its neighbors. Thus, two distinct periods may be distinguished: the period before the reforms (1949–1978) and the period after 1978.

In the first period, Communist China gave military support to communist forces in the Indochina states and Burma (Myanmar) and at least propaganda and moral support to those in Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Western powers helped those governments that sought their assistance. For most of the postwar years, the region was divided roughly between mainland Southeast Asia, where governments leaned toward the Soviet

Union and China, and maritime Southeast Asia, where countries depended for their national security on the United States and its allies. Indonesia under Sukarno (1901–1970) was an exception in island Southeast Asia, but Sukarno's policies came to an end following a coup in September 1965. Thailand, by contrast, faced both the mountains and the seas and sought U.S. assistance in order to function as the pivot of the embattled region.

This was a time of particular difficulty for new nations. None was economically independent after long periods of colonial rule, and each had plural societies that had yet to give shape to a national identity. All had concerns whether their population of Chinese ancestry would give their loyalty to the adopted homes that offered them citizenship rights. The local Chinese had been drawn into the politics of China for more than half a century, and China was now divided between a communist regime on the mainland and a nationalist one on Taiwan. With both sides seeking legitimacy and financial support among the overseas Chinese (*huaqiao*), Southeast Asian governments treated their resident Chinese with varying degrees of suspicion. For their part, most Chinese had chosen to settle down in their adopted lands, and increasing numbers of them made firm commitments to the future of the new nations. During the critical years of the 1950s, the continuing rivalry between Beijing and Taipei to win their support did not sway them and may even have persuaded many to confirm their commitments.

More significant was Communist China's policy of weaning the new Southeast Asian countries away from the former imperial powers by encouraging them to be neutralist. To this end, the Bandung Conference in 1955 was a milestone in Southeast Asian history. The communists believed that the conference advanced their cause among the neutralist countries. But those against communism were alarmed that the neutralist positions taken by the new governments would undermine their influence in the region. President Sukarno had led Indonesia on the road to neutralism, with the support of Burma and Cambodia, whereas Britain, France, and the United States and its allies Thailand and the Philippines tried to find ways to counter this trend. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was an example

of an early effort to contain Communist China's reach into the region through an international alliance.

As for the overseas Chinese, the message from Premier Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) in 1955 was clear: they should settle down to become good citizens of their adopted countries. Although the rhetoric was unambiguous, there was still skepticism about China's motives and the sincerity of the overseas Chinese response. The departing colonial government and its successor in Kuala Lumpur depicted the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) as a Chinese operation fighting a jungle guerrilla war against a legitimate authority. The Indonesian military was convinced that the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) was financed and supplied by its comrades in China. Thus, tensions between “sons of the soil” and “immigrant Chinese” were aggravated by China's efforts to support its revolutionary friends throughout the Malay Archipelago.

By the early 1960s, China's troubled relationship with the Soviet Union provided relief for the region. The situation had begun to split the communist forces in Asia, and with the exception of Vietnam, it reduced the pressures on the new national governments in Southeast Asia. Also helpful were the internal power struggles within the CCP itself. Matters came to a head during China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. That self-destructive series of events coincided with two major developments in the region: the U.S. intervention in the Vietnam War (1964–1975) and the abortive coup by left-wing forces in the Indonesian military. Together with China's failure to win the Vietnamese communist leaders over to its side, these events led to China's final break with the Soviet Union (ca. 1970).

China's growing diplomatic isolation gave the United States the opportunity to revamp its policy toward Mao Zedong. Although the Kissinger–Nixon initiative in 1971 to open up relations with China could not prevent U.S. failures in Vietnam, it did encourage America's allies to refocus their policies with regard to China. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, three members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which had been formed in 1967 to defend the region from the growing communist threat, decided to establish official relations with China and cut down on their



Chinese poster from 1968 encouraging the people to “respectfully wish Chairman Mao eternal life.” Mao Zedong’s image dominated the landscape of Chinese life for decades.
(Stefan Landsberger)

links with the rival Republic of China in Taiwan. It was a time when the Communist Parties in their respective countries were in disarray because of the intensifying Sino-Soviet rivalry, but it was the fear of a Soviet-Vietnamese partnership to advance communism in the region that led these Southeast Asian countries to review their policies toward Communist China.

The first period thus ended with a People's Republic of China (PRC) enfeebled by the Cultural Revolution and fearful of Soviet intervention. The Chinese leaders therefore sought to make friends in Southeast Asia in order to minimize the danger of isolation and encirclement. And because the excesses of the Cultural Revolution had antagonized the majority of the Chinese overseas, most of whom had turned away from communism altogether, their adopted countries were more comfortable in establishing formal ties with China.

Following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the return of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) two years later to introduce radical economic reforms, the region began to face a “new China” that systematically began to look outward. This was an unexpected development, and even more surprising was the speed at which the Chinese people responded to the complete change of policy direction. Some

doubted whether there was a rejection of communism in favor of capitalist ways. Others focused on the role that a reformed China might play in the region. For most Southeast Asian governments, China's cooperation with ASEAN, Australia, and the United States in settling the Cambodia problem and its efforts to restrain Vietnam's control of the Indochina area were encouraging developments. All of this prepared the way for China to be invited to join the ASEAN Regional Forum. At the same time, ASEAN could move forward to invite Laos, Burma, and Cambodia to join the organization; all ten countries of Southeast Asia are now in the alliance.

The export-led East Asia model of rapid growth had made the key countries of ASEAN confident that peace and security would be better secured by bringing in partners from beyond the region. The changing mood was a cautious one. The hard facts of China's size and potential power had to be acknowledged. If China's economy continued to grow at an annual rate of over 10 percent, as it had, on average, for twenty years, the only way to avoid its future dominance over the region would be for Southeast Asia to sustain the growth of its more advanced members. No one predicted the 1997–1998 financial crisis that undermined the progress of future “tigers” such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, just as no one expected China to come out of that crisis almost unscathed. From 1997 to 2000, China strengthened its economy while the whole region struggled to free itself from heavy debts. This fact underlined the growing importance of China. Thus, steps were taken to draw China closer to the region in order to advance the security and prosperity of a larger East Asia in which Southeast Asia would be a vital part. It is in this context that the group known as “ASEAN plus Three” (the three being China, Japan, and South Korea) held special meetings between ASEAN and China that led to talks about a free trade agreement. When that finally comes about, a new era for the region will have dawned.

WANG GUNGWU

See also Asian–African (Bandung) Conference (April 1955); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Chinese in Southeast Asia; Cold War; Democratic

Kampuchea (DK); Economic Development of Southeast Asia (post–1945 to ca. 1990s); Formosa (Taiwan); Gestapu Affair (1965); Indochina War (1946–1954), First; Indochina War (1964–1975), Second (Vietnam War); Kuantan Principle (1980); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK); Sino–Soviet Struggle; Sino–Vietnamese Relations; Sino–Vietnamese Wars; Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (1954); Suharto (1921–); United States Involvement in Southeast Asia (post–1945)

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CHINDITS

“Boldest Measures Are the Safest”

The Chindit Special Forces were a group of Allied servicemen from the United Kingdom, Burma, Hong Kong, India, Nepal, West Africa,

and the United States who carried out guerrilla operations behind enemy lines in Burma in 1943 and 1944. They were led and trained by Major General Orde Charles Wingate (1903–1944). Wingate's brainchild was the concept of using long-range penetration groups backed by air support, a concept demonstrated with outstanding success in his first sortie into Burma in 1943 (Operation Loincloth). The name *Chindits* was derived from the word *chintse*, a mythical lion-beast that guarded Burmese temples. The Chindits' motto was "Boldest Measures Are the Safest."

With experience in Ethiopia and Palestine, Wingate caught the eye of the British wartime prime minister, Winston Churchill (t. 1940–1945). Churchill took Wingate and his wife to the Quebec Conference in 1943, which developed plans for the liberation of Southeast Asia under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979). An unorthodox military man who was an inspirational leader, Wingate was killed along with eight others in the crash of a U.S. Army Air Corps transport plane in India on 25 March 1944. The remains of those killed were interred in Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia, on 10 November 1950.

The son of Colonel George Wingate and Mary Ethel Stanley Wingate (née Orde Brown), Wingate married Lorna E. M. Wingate (née Moncrieff Paterson). He was a well-decorated soldier, innovative and unorthodox, and a passionate Zionist. Wingate was awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and the Lawrence of Arabia Memorial Medal.

The sabotage operations of the Chindits, supported by the U.S. Army Air Corps, the forerunner of the U.S. Air Force, are credited with having thwarted the planned Japanese invasion of India in March 1944. Echoing the U.S. Army Air Corps motto, Wingate sent the Chindits a message stating, "We will go with you boys anyplace, anytime, anywhere." With six months of training in jungle warfare and survival techniques, the Chindits were launched into history. On the night of 5 March 1944, Operation Thursday saw over 500 men and 15 tons of supplies delivered behind Japanese lines to Landing Zone Broadway by means of C-47 cargo aircraft and gliders. On the night of 7 March 1944, ninety-two planeloads of men and supplies, one every four minutes, were safely deposited in a small jungle clearing as part of

the successful effort to stop the Japanese invasion of India.

At the 1943 Quebec Conference, the Allied High Command had decided to utilize Wingate's strategy and planning. Accordingly, some 10,000 Chindits, 1,000 mules, artillery, and bulldozers were flown over the 8,000-foot (2,400-meter) mountains to the Indaw area of northern Burma in support of the American and Chinese forces commanded by the U.S. general Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell (1883–1946) in a concerted operation to drive the Japanese out of Burma. A new road was to be built from Ledo in India to the "old Burma Road" near Myitkyina in Kachin State, northern Burma. In a series of daring operations from strongholds Wingate had reconnoitered in 1943, the Chindits harassed Japanese forces in the Imphal and Kohima areas and along the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway. Fighting continued through the monsoon season. After Wingate's death, Major General Walter David Alexander Lentaigne led the Chindits.

Important engagements were fought at the Myitkyina airfield in May 1944, where the Japanese general Tanaka held out for seventy-six days against 15-to-1 odds while General Stilwell flew in reinforcements. The Chindits of the Seventy-seventh Brigade attacked close to Mogaung to prevent reinforcements from reaching Tanaka. In the Indaw area, where Tanaka had hoped to overcome the Chindits' "White City" stronghold, some 200 Chindits of the Black Watch ambushed 1,200 Japanese troops to enable the successful evacuation of the White City units, in what was recognized as the largest single action of the Burma campaign. In August 1944, the last Chindit operation occurred in the Padiga hills, where the Black Watch Corps overran closely defended Japanese positions and held them against counterattacks. On 8 August 1944, the Allied forces of the Thirty-sixth Division advancing from India met up with the remaining Chindits. Losses had been heavy.

One measure of the daring and courage of the Chindits is the score of Victoria Crosses awarded by King George VI. At Taukkyan War Cemetery and Rangoon Memorial in Myanmar, and Digboi and Gauhati War Cemeteries in India, the rolls of honor to some of the fallen from the Black Watch bespeak the lost youth of these daring commandos, most of whom were

in their early twenties. Their exploits are commemorated at the Chindit Special Forces Memorial at the Westminster Embankment in London.

HELEN JAMES

See also Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma Road; Force 136; Imphal-Kohima, Battle of (1944); Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis (1900–1979); Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD); South-East Asia Command (SEAC)

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CHINESE DIALECT GROUPS

Although the Chinese in Southeast Asia came mainly from the southeastern provinces of Guangdong (Kwangtung) and Fujian (Fukien), the immigrants originated from various districts within the provinces where the spoken languages were distinctly different from one another. The major dialect groups include the Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew (Teochiu), and Hakka (Kheh). Other smaller speech groups are the Foochow (Hock Chiu), Hainanese (Hailam), and Henghua. There are also pockets of northern Chinese dialect groups from Tianjin (Tientsin) and Shandong (Shantung) and natives from Shanghai. Moreover, within each dialect, there are further divisions based on geographic origins, with slight variants in speech patterns. The Hakka, for instance, are differentiated into Taipu, Kaying, Hopo, and other groups. Interestingly, though Hokkien and Teochew dialects might share some similarities, Hakka is as unintelligible to a Foochow speaker as Dutch is to an Italian speaker.

The various dialect groups also harbored traditional animosity toward one another, which accompanied the immigrants to Southeast Asia; there, the strained relations might even be aggravated due to rivalry over economic activities. During the mid-nineteenth century, for in-

stance, there was intense Hokkien-Cantonese rivalry over the control of the tin-mining industry in the peninsular Western Malay States. Consequently, business partnerships and also marriages across dialect lines were unknown and unacceptable during the prewar (pre-1941) period.

Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia occurred in trickles for several centuries. However, from the mid-nineteenth century, there was a mass exodus of people from southeastern Chinese provinces, most of them going to the *Nanyang* (Southeast Asia) and to areas such as North America, the Caribbean, South Africa, and Australia. Although earlier immigration involved traders and merchants mainly from the Hokkien and Teochew dialect groups, those in the mass migration that began in the 1840s were generally of peasant coolie stock and largely of Cantonese and Hakka origins.

Within Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia, the various dialect groups are represented, but in certain localities and occupational niches, a particular dialect group predominates. In general, mercantile communities of Hokkien and Teochew tend to predominate in urban centers such as Rangoon (Yangon), Bangkok, Saigon-Cholon (Hố Chí Minh City), Singapore, Penang, Surabaya, Kuching, and Manila. Mining areas such as those in the Malay Peninsula (West Malaysia) and southwestern Borneo (Kalimantan Indonesia) have a high density of Cantonese and Hakka communities.

The widespread use of vernacular Mandarin in Chinese schools throughout Southeast Asia after the May Fourth Movement (1919) gradually closed the dialect cleavage. Furthermore, the assimilation of Chinese minorities within the dominant indigenous host population in Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines diminished the usage and importance of dialects among these Chinese communities.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Chinese in Southeast Asia; Education, Overseas Chinese; *Kongsi*

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CHINESE GOLD-MINING COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN BORNEO

Independent Chinese gold-mining communities existed from the mid-eighteenth century until 1884 in northwestern Borneo. Often described as democracies or republics, they demonstrated many attributes of a modern state—minting coins, dispensing justice, maintaining communications and public security, using religious traditions to cement mutual loyalties, and so forth. The Dutch saw these communities as states within the (colonial) state and determined to eliminate them.

The island of Borneo had widespread but not rich gold deposits. For centuries, local people had worked the gold as a sideline to hunting and agriculture, trading the gold dust they panned from rivers and streams to their rulers or using it to pay tribute. In the eighteenth century, however, Chinese miners, probably invited by the Malay rulers of Sambas and Mempawah, began mining gold. The immigrants worked in well-organized groups called *kongsis*, sharing the labor, electing a boss from among their number, and dividing the profits after the cost of food, supplies, and other items was deducted. They used simple machines, opened larger sites, and worked more continuously than the native people. The rulers expected to see their revenues increase.

The *kongsis* of Borneo soon grew larger and more powerful, and they escaped the control of the Malay rulers. They joined together into federated groups, partly for self-defense in a hostile environment. By the early nineteenth century, there were three federations, as well as a number of smaller, independent operations. The big three were the Fosjoen (*heshun*) Kongsis in Monterado, whose most important member

organization was the Thaikong (Malay, *dagang*) Kongsis; the Samtiaokioe (*santiaogou*) Kongsis, which was part of Fosjoen but in 1819 quarreled with Thaikong and moved north (Thaikong and Samtiaokioe remained enemies); and the Lanfang (*lanfang*) Kongsis in Mandor, not far from Pontianak.

If the small miners' *kongsis* were nominally democratic, the large *kongsis* were often under the influence of those who provided capital for mining. Only if new immigrants came from China and money was available for provisions could they continue to operate. Although Thaikong elected its headmen regularly and submitted policies to a vote of the miners, Lanfang had a fairly autocratic structure, especially after its peace with the Dutch in 1823, depending in its final years on the headman himself.

By the early nineteenth century, quarrels were common. Decades of mining had depleted many deposits, and miners fought over good sites and/or water supplies. They also quarreled with the Malay rulers, refusing to pay tribute to them. When the Dutch tried to establish their authority in the area after 1818, levying taxes on the miners, more conflicts ensued. As a result, the three so-called Kongsis Wars broke out from 1822 to 1824, 1850 to 1854, and 1884 to 1885.

In the first war, the Dutch managed to subdue Lanfang. They would ratify its choice of headman, and the *kongsis* promised to pay taxes regularly. They cowed Thaikong into submission as well (but only temporarily) and soon withdrew most of the colonial troops from the region.

In 1850, the Dutch took on the *kongsis* again, partly because they feared that Raja James Brooke in Sarawak would utilize the unrest to extend his influence into what they regarded as their territory. After a series of incidents involving tax evasion and smuggling, the Dutch took the side of the Samtiaokioe Kongsis against Thaikong and its smaller allies. They were determined to eliminate Thaikong and establish direct rule over the Chinese in the *kongsis*. Attacked by strong Thaikong forces, most Samtiaokioe people fled to Bau in Sarawak, effectively removing that *kongsis* from Dutch territory. The Dutch finally took Monterado in 1853 and declared Thaikong disbanded, although resistance continued for some months.

Because its headman maintained good relations with the Dutch, the Lanfang Kongsî survived until his death in 1884. Then, Lanfang was dissolved, eliminating the last independent Chinese community. Nevertheless, some kongsî elements resisted, and troops had to be sent in from Java to put down the resistance.

Thaikong and Lanfang had been heavily indebted, and their mines were depleted. Former miners and their descendants were turning to agriculture; many migrated to the coast. Others moved inland, seeking new gold sites. From the late nineteenth century, Chinese also went up-country to trade with the indigenous Dayak people. The former kongsî territories, called the "Chinese Districts" in colonial times, had a large, rural Chinese population until 1967, when Chinese villagers and farmers were driven from the area in a violent attack by Dayaks organized by the Indonesian military. They were accused of supporting procommunist and anti-Malaysia guerrillas in West Kalimantan, as the province is known to Indonesians. The Chinese population, over 350,000 (or about 10 percent of the total), is now concentrated along the coast and in larger towns (Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta 2003: 81).

MARY SOMERS HEIDHUES

See also Borneo; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Dutch Borneo; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Gold; *Hui*; *Kongsî*; Sambas and Pontianak Sultanates

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CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Chinese in Southeast Asia were known as *huaqiao*, or Chinese sojourners, until the 1950s because most of them were Chinese nationals living temporarily in foreign countries. Today, these Chinese are a minority, for most Chinese abroad have become nationals of the countries in which they now live. The common estimate is that there are 25 million *haiwai huaren*, or Chinese overseas, spread around the world, and about three-quarters of them live in Southeast Asia.

The 20 million domiciled in Southeast Asia include a great variety of people, but most of them are second- or third-generation local citizens and nationals, and many are only partly Chinese. In countries such as Thailand, the Indochinese states, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Indonesia, there are also many of Chinese ancestry who no longer identify themselves as Chinese. Thus, only the census figures from Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia are relatively accurate.

China was an importer of immigrants until the Song dynasty (960–1276 C.E.), when records show that small numbers of Chinese trading overseas settled there and did not return to their homeland. These numbers grew slowly during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), and after the sixteenth century, the Chinese merchants also took artisans and peasant workers with them. But it was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that large-scale emigration from China occurred.

That emigration was related to the growth in China's population in the coastal provinces, where people had access to the sea. The first rapid growth in South China had begun in the tenth to thirteenth centuries, and this accelerated during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. When the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912) brought a century of peace to the empire during the 1700s, the total population reached nearly 400 million. Increasingly, the search for agricultural land or urban employment led to massive internal migrations. In addition, many of the migrations were forced on the people by war and by floods, droughts,

locusts, and other natural disasters. It is difficult to calculate how many were actually involved, as these people movements happened under turbulent conditions and records were not properly kept. There is little doubt, however, that millions of people moved from their homes during every major dynastic change in Chinese history. Yet few ventured beyond the natural boundaries along the coasts.

These few were largely merchants who traveled around the empire in search of business and also reached out to overseas markets. Theirs was always a precarious profession, and only those who saw good profits and were willing to take great risks would leave the country to trade abroad. In addition, there were, from the beginning, official restrictions about who could or could not trade with foreigners. Furthermore, both family and community were disapproving of long absences from home that could end in the itinerants never returning.

The rise in the numbers of such merchants often resulted in some disorder at the ports, and security concerns led to an imperial monopoly of foreign overseas trade after 1368 that was to last for nearly two hundred years. In this period, although it was impossible to stop the trade altogether, private trading overseas was prohibited. When the Europeans arrived on the China coast, the ban was replaced by specific controls designed to regulate the number of Chinese traders. The Europeans found Chinese traders ready to cooperate with them, and they opened up many trading centers to which the Chinese were made welcome. By the seventeenth century, this situation had led to the amassing of Chinese ships and sailors who not only supported commercial activities but also established merchant fleets to compete with the Europeans. The most notable were those of the Zheng family—the family of the famous Zheng Chenggong (1624–1662) (Koxinga). The Zheng fleets were strong enough to delay the Manchu conquest of the coastal province of Fujian and able to harass the Qing armies for several decades after 1644.

Ultimately, the Qing rulers restored controls over foreign trade along the coasts and inhibited the Chinese traders' freedom to travel abroad. It was not until the nineteenth century, when the Qing empire was poorer and much weakened, that Chinese people left the country

in large numbers to find work in distant lands. This new phenomenon of emigration marked the beginning of agrarian China's response to the Industrial Revolution in Europe. The Qing emperors were slow to realize what this involved, but a series of defeats, from the 1840–1842 Opium War to the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War, made it inevitable that China would have to join the race for modernization in order to survive.

All migrations involve pull or push factors. China experienced some of the cruelest forms of both during the nineteenth century. War and famine within the country drove many abroad, and the dire need for cheap labor in the newly industrializing powers opened up opportunities for China's poor. Thousands of coolies were transported around the world, including Southeast Asia. This emigration offered life and hope, and the Chinese met the challenge with a fortitude and enterprise that confounded their own governments and elites back in China. Their story is closely linked to the responses the sojourners made to the conditions they found abroad. The experiences that led many of them to decide to settle and not return to China shaped the kinds of communities they established. This in turn determined the future they hoped their descendants would have in their adopted countries.

The earliest of the Chinese who settled in Southeast Asia were assimilated over time and are no longer identifiable as Chinese. They were descended mainly from individuals who had traded there before the sixteenth century. After that, however, those sailing to Southeast Asia developed a regular sojourning pattern. As merchants and merchants' workers, they used their distinctive family, religious, and other customary ties at home to ensure that their small communities survived in foreign lands. Many Chinese men did marry local women and raise their families abroad, but sojourning remained the pattern, underlining the idea that the settlements were meant to be temporary.

After the middle of the nineteenth century, large numbers of urban and rural laborers were transported to work in mines and plantations. Most of them worked hard to save enough money to return home. Many, however, sojourned for longer periods. In this way, they strengthened the resistance to assimilation

among those who had chosen to settle. By the beginning of the twentieth century, new waves of such sojourners followed. They included not only single women sent out to marry the men overseas but also families of women and children. In addition, there were educated teachers, journalists, students, and political refugees. Many of these individuals had communication and organizational skills that connected the emergent communities with a modernizing China.

Thus, the new sojourners of the early twentieth century carried with them changing political and cultural values from China—values that influenced the way Southeast Asian Chinese responded to new economic opportunities both within China and in their host countries. The successful ones relied on the economic roles they could play in relations with China. They saw that if they performed such roles successfully, they could ensure a continued political, social, and cultural position among the people they had chosen to live with. In regions where ports and cities traded closely with China, the importance of Chinese residents for the region's commercial success was more obvious, confirming how key China's proximity to the region had always been.

With a few exceptions, it had long been a habit of mind among sojourning Chinese to treat every place outside China as only a temporary home. This changed after World War II (1939–1945). From the 1960s, the majority of Chinese abroad decided to settle down permanently and accept foreign citizenship and nationality. Their integration into local societies has been marked by great progress ever since. Nevertheless, sojourning remains an option because education and travel today have contributed to the notion that settlement is no obstacle to regular contacts with China and Chinese communities anywhere in the world. Distance means much less than it used to now that facsimiles, diskettes, videos, e-mail, and other forms of modern communications are available. Given their trading origins, the sojourners cannot resist the immense business opportunities that such communications equipment can provide.

The sojourning tradition is still strong among the small and newer communities that were formed during the twentieth century. Although prone to assimilate or remigrate if their populations are not augmented by new immi-

gration, the Chinese in these communities use their trading skills to sustain themselves. Most of them steer clear of political activity and, for their social and cultural life, depend on new technologies to reduce the distances between them and similar communities elsewhere. The recent economic transformation of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and then the mainland has made it possible for these communities, however small, to expand their trading role and strengthen their links with people in China.

The sojourner mentality is not simply the product of mere convenience and profit. It has deep roots in Chinese culture. It used to tie the Chinese intimately with their home villages or towns, their ancestral graves, and their extensive kinship connections. Sojourning today still draws strength from family relationships, but it has a more diffuse sense of Chinese identity. Thus, the Chinese who go abroad now are attracted to countries where there is less pressure to assimilate and where the laws protect minorities.

In an era of expanded global relationships, many of the Chinese communities around the world are now less likely to develop in isolation. The Southeast Asian Chinese are no exception. As they become more articulate and confident, this ability to keep in regular contact could lead them in several different directions. At one end of the spectrum, the political leaders in China might ask them to emphasize their Chinese identities and welcome them back to China. At the other, the settled communities might choose to give their total loyalty to their adopted homelands, the ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Between these extremes will be many positions along the spectrum, determined largely by local needs, the possibilities of remigration, and the place of China in the people's lives.

Unlike their predecessors in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, recent Chinese emigrants are primarily from the business and professional classes. Attracting most attention are the Chinese entrepreneurs who have adapted fully to the globalized world. Their achievements are remarkable because they come from a society where merchants did not have any place in the power and status structures. Traditionally, the merchants' wealth depended on official favor and was never secure. They invested their fortunes in land and

property and sought respectability by giving away significant sums of money to support charities or show their appreciation of Chinese culture. If they were lucky, their sons would be able to choose either to follow in their footsteps or to study for the imperial examinations to become scholar officials.

Outside China, such merchants succeeded without the support of their government. They depended instead on their own daring, their skills, and, most of all, their entrepreneurship. For this, they needed a keen understanding of the power relationships in the country they lived in and a readiness to link up with the power that foreign rulers wielded in order to achieve their commercial ends. They learned how to be wealthy without seeking political power. This was a lesson reinforced by what they had already learned before leaving China. The conditioning they had received served them in good stead. By not seeking power, they were more acceptable to regimes that wanted them to help produce wealth for their lands. They thus laid the foundations that enabled later arrivals to succeed in commerce and industry.

Most Chinese in the region today aspire to hone their entrepreneurial and professional skills. They appreciate having the freedom to earn while living their own lives and becoming accepted in their adopted country. They can still promote trading and financial relations with enterprises in China. Some also send funds to their ancestral homes in China in order to build schools and clan temples, to support relatives, and even to help family members in local construction and housing ventures. This represents a symbolic return through philanthropic duty and proxy investments. Many maintain their obligations to relatives in China, and they keep the links alive to enable their families abroad to stay culturally Chinese.

The Chinese understand local power systems and national cultures, and they have learned to work effectively in such environments. They do not have to be totally assimilated to local cultures or neglect their links with other Chinese. Furthermore, Chinese values concerning business methods and responsibilities continue to be helpful. Young Chinese with modern educations are well attuned to the needs of business organizations and are better oriented than their predecessors to help their adopted countries develop

economically. Also, many governments have recognized the advantages of allowing the Chinese to use their own business connections and methods, which have proven invaluable for maintaining the extensive networks that Chinese entrepreneurs now control.

Entrepreneurs of Chinese descent have found it profitable—and in the host country's interests—to promote trade and investment in the economies of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. In this way, they demonstrate the value of cultural links. The bridges they are able to build between their adopted countries and the three Chinese territories have been fortified by their familiarity with Chinese values and commercial ways. There are signs now that an increasing number of such entrepreneurs are consciously playing a role in this process and that local nationalist leaders have come to accept that these entrepreneurs may prove invaluable to peace and prosperity in the region.

Chinese entrepreneurs have shown that they can adapt business skills to modern political and cultural changes. They understand how significant cultural factors are in their commercial and industrial enterprises, as well as in their dealings with other entrepreneurs and with powerful officials everywhere. Some exercise a wide range of options in a larger trading framework and a more open international system. The world has grown smaller, and the role of these entrepreneurs in helping to strengthen such economies has become potentially important. No study of the Chinese overseas can afford to neglect this phenomenon.

The importance of these Chinese for Southeast Asia is linked to changes in Greater China—that is, the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong–Macau, and Taiwan. Since Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) implemented his reforms, the commitment to China's economic growth has been surprisingly successful. That growth has highlighted the need for Southeast Asia to be more competitive to prevent it from falling behind China's new centers of dynamism and entrepreneurship.

The Chinese in Southeast Asia have a role to play in this competitive struggle. They have come a long way, from adventurous merchants and desperate laborers to successful and respected sojourners and from new citizens of foreign nations to global entrepreneurs. Today, their networks centered on Asia and spreading

toward the West have caught the imagination of business communities everywhere. The links these networks have with China have often intertwined both with their ties to their adopted homes and with their new national loyalties. This process has made the modern overseas Chinese multifaceted and complex: old stereotypes cannot be sustained. Perhaps the most important features that distinguish them from their predecessors are their dependence on the goodwill of their respective host nation-states and their readiness to serve the national interests of these countries. They also possess a sophisticated understanding of modern technology and an ability to skillfully use the international marketing system.

WANG GUNGWU

See also Baba Nyonya; Bangkok; Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); China, Imperial; China, Nationalist; China since 1949; Chinese Dialect Groups; Chinese Gold-Mining Communities of Western Borneo; Economic Development of Southeast Asia (Post-1945 to Early 2000s); Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Education, Overseas Chinese; Education, Western Secular; Hong Kong; Macau (Macao); Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Manila; Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Miscegenation; Penang (1786); Peranakan; Qing (Ch'ing/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912); Saigon (Gia Dinh; Hồ Chí Minh City); Singapore (1819); Straits Settlements (1826–1941); Yunnan Province

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CHINESE REVOLUTION (1911)

The Chinese Revolution of 1911 was the culmination of a decade-long endeavor aimed at overthrowing the Manchu dynasty in China. It achieved its purpose after a successful uprising in Wuchang, Central China, in October 1911. For the numerous uprisings that took place in the interim, Southeast Asia played an important role as a logistical base, where support in various forms was provided by Chinese sojourners there.

After China's defeat in the Arrow War (1856–1860), the Manchu court introduced some Western-style reforms to improve China's material strength. Unfortunately, such reforms, implemented beginning in the 1860s, could not prevent another Chinese defeat in a foreign war (the 1894–1895 Sino-Japanese War), this time by a former tributary state, Japan. The impotency of China in combating a small and presumably less advanced Asian country convinced some Chinese intellectuals that overthrowing the alien regime of the Manchu dynasty by force was the only alternative available to save China. Province-based revolutionary organizations thus sprang up, and small-scale rebellions occurred all over the empire.

Among the various revolutionaries, Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) soon earned greater credit than others, both for his efforts in shaping a

modern Chinese revolutionary ideology and especially for his perseverance in spreading the principles to the overseas Chinese (*huaqiao*) communities and seeking support from them. The revolutionary ideology that Sun propagated was known as *Sanmin Zhuyi* (Three Principles of the People): nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood. Although all the uprisings planned by Sun broke out in South China, most of them were planned and organized abroad. He formed his first revolutionary body, the Xingzhonghui (Revive China Society), in Honolulu in 1895. The Tongmenghui (Chinese United League), a union of several revolutionary bodies that were organized along the lines of Xingzhonghui, was founded in Japan in 1905. Japan, a popular destination for overseas Chinese students, was made into an important center for training revolutionary cadres, and Southeast Asia gradually gained momentum as a revolutionary base for soliciting material support for the uprisings. Before 1900, there was no trace of revolutionary activity among the Chinese sojourners there, who were then under the strong influence of the royalist reformists, notably Kang Youwei (1858–1927). But in the 1900s, the efforts to spread revolutionary ideas by Sun and his colleagues, particularly Wang Lie (1866–1936), provided a kind of alternative patriotism, attracting the admiration and support of prominent local Chinese leaders such as Teo Eng Hock (1871–1957), Tan Chor Nam (1884–1971), Lim Nee Soon (1879–1936), and others.

Led by Tongmenghui branches in Indochina, such local Chinese made remarkable contributions to the ultimate success of the Chinese Revolution in many ways. They turned Southeast Asia—and Singapore in particular—into a center of propaganda, which worked closely with Tongmenghui branches in Hong Kong and Japan. Singapore actually served as the revolutionary headquarters from 1906 to 1911, when nearly all revolts in South China were planned there. Papers such as *Thoe Lam Jit Poh* and *The Chong Shing Press* were published as the revolutionary organs. Penang was another planning base, as well as a site for fund collection and the publication of revolutionary literature. Participants of uprisings in the Chinese mainland, after being suppressed, fled to Southeast Asia to seek refuge. The Tongmenghui branches in Indochina rendered indis-

pensable financial resources, usually comprising handsome donations from local Chinese sojourners, for the funding of such Chinese uprisings.

Bordering three Chinese provinces—Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan—Vietnam was the only Southeast Asian territory that was directly involved in the operation-level preparations of the uprisings, primarily in the shipment of arms and ammunitions. Hanoi and Haiphong were two transshipment points. Ammunitions were shipped to China either across the Sino-Vietnamese border or via Hong Kong by commercial liners. The geographic advantage of South China, making it a convenient location for receiving such military supplies, partially explained why Sun chose it as the field for all ten of his major uprisings.

Chinese sojourners in Southeast Asia did not only act behind the scenes in the revolution. They also took part physically in the uprisings. For example, in the Guangzhou Uprising in April 1911 (the largest rebellion before the successful Wuchang Uprising), about one-third of the famous “Seventy-Two Martyrs” executed by the local Manchu authorities after the uprising failed were identified as Chinese revolutionaries from Southeast Asia.

Strictly speaking, the success of the 1911 Chinese Revolution was limited. Although it succeeded in overthrowing the Manchu dynasty and replacing the monarchy with a republic, the urgent need to avoid a potential civil war induced Sun to make a political compromise by shifting the presidency to Yuan Shikai (1859–1916). A prominent ex-Qing official and commander of a modern army, Yuan was regarded, especially by the foreign diplomats, as the only person capable of controlling the anarchic situation following the collapse of the Qing. However, this decision sowed the seeds of political struggle in the post-Qing era, as Yuan, a monarchist instead of a republican, used his presidency (1912–1916) in an attempt to restore the monarchy. His efforts to establish a new dynasty, with himself as the new “Son of Heaven,” were strongly opposed by the Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party), the successor to the Tongmenghui.

In his struggle against Yuan and the subsequent warlords, Sun implemented what he had learned from his previous revolutionary experiences in seeking support from the overseas

Chinese, who were acclaimed by him as “the Mother[s] of the Chinese Revolution.” In turn, the Chinese people, both from the mainland and from overseas, proclaimed Sun “the Father of Modern China.”

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also Education, Overseas Chinese; Hong Kong; Kuomintang (KMT); Newspapers and Mass Media in Southeast Asia; Penang (1786); Qing (Ching/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912); Singapore (1819); Sun Yat-sen, Dr. (1866–1925); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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CHINESE TRIBUTE SYSTEM

The rhetoric and rituals of the Chinese emperor receiving tribute from a lesser ruler were rooted in the political structure of China from ancient times. This idea of the less powerful paying tribute to superior rulers was common to all known interstate relations in some form, but the Chinese developed it to its fullest extent for the longest period of time. After a unified empire was established in 220 B.C.E., the Chinese extended what had originally been feudal obeisance within the country into a tribute system that was applied to all others who wanted relations with China. Thus, the system reached well beyond Chinese boundaries and ultimately became one that was more elaborately evolved than all other tributary practices. With occasional breaks when China was weak and in disorder, the system was maintained for over twenty-five hundred years. And because of the relative accuracy of Chinese records from

the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.– 220 C.E.) to the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), the uses and refinements of the system are well documented. In fact, over the centuries down to the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), its institutions grew increasingly sophisticated, and the rationale for the system became better defined. It was so impressive and dominant by the fifteenth century that it has led to the idea that the system had been the basis for a Chinese “world order.”

The tributary system may have been used mainly as an instrument of defense and diplomacy in China’s overland relations. But, where Southeast Asia was concerned, it functioned more as a regulator of foreign trade. The controversy as to whether the system was more adapted for political purposes or for commercial purposes has been difficult to resolve. This is because tribute and trade were, in Chinese eyes, inseparable for so long that much of the documentation is ambivalent on this point. It was clearly a flexible institution that could be adapted to defense and diplomatic use when needed and be made to serve commercial ends if it was in the interest of the empire to do so.

The countries of Southeast Asia posed no serious military threat to the Chinese rulers, so the defense function was precautionary and rarely needed in that context. For the first thousand years, until the tenth century, the Chinese utilized tribute to manage border relations with the kingdom of Linyi and its successor state, Champa. The latter, at the peak of its power, covered the territory between the counties north of Hue and ports east of the Mekong Delta. Similarly, the tribute system was applicable to the kingdoms of Funan and Zhenla (modern Cambodia and southern Vietnam). During the Song dynasty (960–1279), a unique relationship was developed with the independent kingdom of Vietnam. This area was carved out of colonial territory that had been administered by Chinese and local commanders and mandarins since the Han dynasty. Unlike all others in the region, tribute from Vietnam was regular and primarily political. The Vietnamese rulers saw this special relationship as essential to their sovereignty and adapted the Chinese rhetoric to serve their own purposes. To that extent, Vietnamese tribute served a Chinese political order.

For the rest of Southeast Asia, however, trading and cultural relations were the key features

of the tributary records kept by the Chinese. These were desultory during the Han and the Jin dynasties (from 2 to 420 C.E.). But following the establishment of the southern kingdom of Liu Song in 420 C.E., tributary records for the region were more systematic. This change had been stimulated by the role of Buddhism in the Chinese courts, by the need for Chinese and Vietnamese monks to get to India via the Buddhist kingdoms in the region, and by the growing market for incense and spices that came with the advent of the Buddhist connection. From then until the end of the Tang dynasty (618–906), regional trade from port cities and kingdoms on the western side of the South China Sea, mostly carried by Indian, Persian, and Arab merchants, was largely conducted through tribute missions. The tribute missions from various parts of the region during the seventh century marked one of the most prosperous periods of the *Nanhai* (or *Nanyang*, referring to Southeast Asia) trade. In the early eighth century, this led to the establishment in Guangzhou (Canton) of the office of superintendent of the shipping trade. In this way, the close links between tribute and trade where Southeast Asia was concerned were confirmed.

This kind of tribute-trade was intended to protect the foreign traders, whether they led or accompanied the missions, from rapacious Chinese officials. It also helped to ensure that, after the tributary goods were accounted for, the actual trade conducted between Chinese and foreign merchants yielded revenues for the emperor. However, the system was in the hands of protocol officials from the court who were given special powers, and they often harassed the traders on both sides. Thus, despite the practice of tribute, foreign trade at the ports was disrupted from time to time. This was particularly true after Tang imperial control was weakened beginning in the latter half of the eighth century. After 758 C.E., when the city of Guangzhou was sacked by Persian and Arab merchants, fewer tribute missions arrived. Private trading became more common over the next two hundred years.

The records on the tributary system during the decades of division in the tenth century are not well preserved, but in that period, the system was focused much more on trade than on defense. South China had freed itself from the imperial courts of the Five dynasties (907–960).

The independent kingdoms in Fujian, Guangdong, and Vietnam conducted their own relations with Southeast Asia. In particular, the Nan Han based on Guangzhou and the Min in Fuzhou encouraged overseas trade. The extent to which these kingdoms used the tribute system is not clear because their histories were written later from the records of the Song dynasty. It is likely that after Song Taizu (r. 960–976) conquered South China, references to tribute to these lesser kingdoms did not survive.

The Song (Sung) dynasty (960–1279) reaffirmed many Tang practices. Tribute missions from Southeast Asia arrived regularly, but the unified empire that was not fearful of the kingdoms to its south encouraged foreign trade and opened a new era for tributary trade. The rise of maritime commercial empires, such as Śrīvijaya, that benefited from good diplomatic relations with the Song rulers was a major factor in the growing numbers of Chinese traders who were commercially active in Southeast Asia. They did not wait for official missions but financed their own shipping to sail to the coasts of Indochina, Siam (Thailand), the Malay Peninsula, and the island world of Java and Sumatra.

During the next two centuries, private overseas trade expanded at the expense of tribute. Song China was militarily on the defensive in the north and spent most of its imperial revenues pacifying enemies such as the Khitan Liao dynasty (907–1125) and then the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234). The latter drove the Song court out of its capital in Kaifeng in North China, forcing it to seek shelter in Hangzhou. The Song court was also cut off from the overland trade with the West by the Tangut Xi Xia kingdom (1032–1227). In this critical condition, the authority to insist on tribute was considerably weakened. As tribute became less relevant, Chinese traders were encouraged to venture out to sea and tap the markets of Southeast Asia themselves. Although official protocol remained in place where tribute missions were concerned, revenues derived from foreign trade had become significant. By the early thirteenth century, when the *Record of Foreign Nations* (*Zhufan zhi*) by Zhao Rugua (Chao Ju-kua) was compiled, the interaction among Chinese and Muslim traders became a vital part of the Southern Song (1127–1279) economy. It is interesting to observe that when

the Chinese Empire really needed overseas trade, tribute was set aside.

Even more interesting was what the Mongols (the Yuan dynasty, 1279–1368) did with the tributary system after conquering the Song. They adapted it to their own vision of world conquest, in which tribute represented submission to a great power. Trade would continue to be important, but that could be left in private hands, including the foreign traders who regularly arrived on China's southern shores. Thus, the system was revived without reference to trade but employed to assert political power in the region. The rulers of kingdoms in Vietnam, Champa, Burma (Myanmar), and later Java were deemed not to have shown sufficient respect to the Mongol emperors. Therefore, expeditionary forces were sent to destroy them. Trade might have been affected because Chinese vessels were gathered to support the naval expeditions, but foreign merchants from the Indian Ocean retained their share of the China trade.

The Mongols reinterpreted the Chinese traditional tributary system in this way for nearly a century, which would have its effect on the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) that followed. Although the Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang (Emperor Hongwu, r. 1368–1398) claimed to have returned to the institutions of the Han and Tang dynasties when he ousted the Mongols and restored China to Chinese rule, his adoption of a formal tributary trade system was unique. It was quite different in spirit not only from that of the Han and Tang but also from that of his Song and Yuan predecessors. In his struggle to gain imperial power, he encountered challenges from rivals whose power was based, to some extent, on the thriving maritime trade, including that with venturesome Japanese operating close to the Yangzi Delta and along the southern coasts. This experience confirmed him in his belief that it was not in the empire's interest to have much to do with maritime kingdoms. On coming to the throne, he therefore decreed that no more private overseas trade would be permitted.

From the end of the fourteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth century, the administration of tributary relations clearly emphasized political and security concerns. The seven expeditions of Zheng He (Cheng Ho, 1371/1375–1433/1435) conveyed the message about

Chinese power and reaffirmed that all relations had to be conducted through tribute. This tribute was not a financial burden for the missions, for they were well compensated for behaving appropriately, and their members were allowed to trade with the Chinese waiting at the designated ports, notably Guangzhou. Also, records indicate that trade was encouraged more for some than for others, and the details about how the missions were received and rewarded were carefully recorded. What was clear was that the relaxed conditions that existed for merchants during the late Tang dynasty, the Five dynasties, the Song dynasty, and the Yuan dynasty were now over.

The formal tributary system was steadily subverted after the arrival of the Europeans in Southeast Asia. By the end of the eighteenth century, only a few countries, such as Vietnam and Siam and the lands of some of the Shan rulers in Burma and Laos, still presented tribute regularly. Although much has been made of the British mission led by Lord Macartney in 1793, its failure actually marked how irrelevant the tribute system had become for the growing maritime trade. The hollow shell of the system would be preserved for another half century thereafter, but the time had clearly come for a new system of diplomacy and trade to help defend China.

WANG GUNGWU

See also Champa; Cheng Ho (Zheng He), Admiral (1371/1375–1433/1435); Chenla; China, Imperial; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Funan; I-Ching (I-tsing) (635–713 C.E.); Jungle/Forest Products; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Marine/Sea Products; Melaka; Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Polo, Marco (1254–1324); Qing (Ching/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912); Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Śrīvijaya (Śrīwijaya); Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty (1271–1368)

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CHINS

The Chin peoples reside in the west and northwest of Burma (Myanmar). However, Chin communities also exist in the west portion of India in Mizoram and in the hill regions of Chittagong in Bangladesh. The term *Chin* is typically used only in reference to those living inside Burma. The origins of the term are uncertain. Some claim that it was derived from the Burmese word for "basket," possibly a reference to the handwoven baskets that Chin people would carry. Until recently, there appeared to be a consensus that the term *Chin* was not an identity that any of these peoples would choose to describe themselves, and for many, it was (and is) considered derogatory. However, some Chin nationalist historians have tried to claim authority for this term as an indigenized form of self-reference.

Although not invented by the British, the word was consolidated as an administrative term with the introduction of the Chin Hills Regulation in 1896. Following this, it became administrative ethnographic shorthand to refer to a broad range of socially, politically, and culturally complex communities. This usage continued after Burmese independence in 1948 with the establishment of the Chin Special Division. In 1974, a new constitution in Burma created the Chin State. However, a lingering awareness of the negative associations of the term historically have led some Chin national-

ists to attempt to replace it with an ethnonym of their own. Some promote the terms *Zo* and *Zomi*, stating that they are derived from the name of the mythic common ancestor of all the Chin peoples. However, not all Chin groups accept this interpretation. There have also been concerns within the Burmese government about the development of a pan-Zo political movement, which might seek to unite "Zo Land" in Burma with Mizoram in India.

The Chin are divided into many subgroups, and the historical ethnographic literature on these peoples often uses a bewildering array of terms. Some subgroups are identified by their place of origin, some by a specific clan or lineage term, and others by dialect. Some of the largest Chin subgroups, based on linguistic and geographic definitions, are the Thado, Tiddim, Lushai, Falam, Haka, Asho, and Khumi. These communities have other ethnonyms by which they call themselves. A common Chin identity is asserted through linguistic links (although there is no common Chin tongue); similar customs, myths, and traditions; and a common understanding of the significance of Chin lineage and clan groups.

The Chin area is very diverse geographically, ranging from the high mountains near Mount Saramati in the north to the lowland-dwelling Asho Chin villages in Arakan (Rakhine State) and the Irrawaddy Valley, about 560 kilometers (350 miles) to the south. Some anthropologists have identified a north-south divide, with the northern groups having a more elaborate social, cultural, and political organization. Today, many Chin people are Christian, and our anthropological understanding of these complex communities is very out-of-date. A great deal more anthropological and historical research needs to be carried out.

The Chin people claim to have an ethnohistory of great length, with a major migration into the region traced from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries. Accounts are derived from Chin oral traditions and chronicles from neighboring cultures. The sixteenth to eighteenth centuries seem to have been turbulent times, with much infighting among the various Chin lineages. These disputes could also involve nearby Shan and Manipuri centers of authority. However, when the Burmese king Bodawpaya (r. 1782–1819) annexed Manipur in 1810, this led to increased conflict with the British, who

were expanding into northeast India. Subsequent conflicts over the Kabaw Valley between the British and Burmese also involved Chin chiefs, who sought to establish advantageous positions for themselves.

The Chin chiefs and elders retained a high degree of independence throughout the nineteenth century, and it was not until 1894 that the British disarmed the Chin people and set about establishing their own authority through the medium of the hereditary chiefs. Yet there were always dangers of emergent nationalist discontent. For example, there was a widespread Chin uprising from 1917 to 1919, brought about by the enforced quota conscription of Chin men into the Burma Rifles during World War I (1914–1918). The British period saw control but little development of the region, leading some administrators, such as H. N. C. Stevenson, openly to lament the colonial administration's failure to prepare the "Hills regions" adequately for independence after the Pacific War (1941–1945). Representatives from parts of the Chin Hills were present at the Panglong Conference in 1947, where issues relating to independence were discussed with the main Burmese leaders, such as General Aung San (1915–1947). Since independence, many of these issues concerning the rights of minority nationalities such as the Chin within the Burmese state have not been resolved. A number of armed Chin nationalist organizations have opposed the Burmese government since the 1960s, such as the Chin Democracy Party, the Chin National Front, the Chin National Liberation Party, and the Chin National Unity Organization. The fragmented nature of the Chin ethnic political front partly reflects the historical lack of unitary political structures in this region, as well as the diversity of local ethnohistories among the Chin peoples themselves.

MANDY SADAN

See also Burma under British Colonial Rule; Burmans; Kachins; Mons; Shans

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CHULALONGKORN UNIVERSITY A Bastion of Conservative and Royalist Traditions

Chulalongkorn University was founded in Bangkok on 26 March 1917 by King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) (r. 1910–1925) in memory of his father, King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (1868–1910). The idea of an institution for higher learning that would be open to a wider group of citizens was conceived during the reign of King Chulalongkorn, spawned by the urge for the regime to modernize its kingdom. At that time, education was not an institution but was transmitted through home and monastery. In 1871, King Chulalongkorn initiated a series of formal schools in Bangkok, in particular the Suankularb, the Army Cadet School, the Cartographic School, the School for Princes, and the School for Dhamma Studies.

After the administrative reform in the 1890s, the focus was on training for the civil service, which led to the birth of the Royal Pages School in 1902. The focus expanded in 1911 to include more disciplines, such as law, international relations, commerce, agriculture, engineering, medicine, and teacher education. The Civil Service College operated for six years before it became a full university, with a huge plot of land donated by King Vajiravudh. The idea was that it should educate not only those who would become civil servants but also anyone who wanted to receive a higher education.

In the beginning, Chulalongkorn University had four faculties—in medicine, public administration, engineering, and arts and science. After the 1932 Revolution, the government transferred the Faculty of Law and Political Science (formerly Public Administration) to the newly founded Thammasat University. Chulalongkorn University continued developing undergradu-



Portrait of Chulalongkorn, or Rama V, King of Siam (present-day Thailand) (1868–1910). (Library of Congress)

ate programs until 1961, when it started to provide graduate studies and set up research centers and institutes.

As the first state university founded by the monarch, Chulalongkorn University became a bastion of conservative and royalist traditions. But this did not prevent its students from participating in political activism, especially in the demonstration against the rigged election of 1957 and the student uprising in 1973. Ironically, one of its arts students, Jit Phumisak, became a revolutionary hero of the student movement after the 1973 uprising.

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also Constitutional (Bloodless) Revolution (1932) (Thailand); Education, Indigenous and Religious; Education, Western Secular; Reforms and Modernization in Siam;

Student Revolt (October 1973) (Thailand); Thammasat University; Vajiravudh (Rama VI) (r. 1910–1925)

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CLARKE, SIR ANDREW (1824–1902)
British Imperialist

As governor of the Straits Settlements (1873–1875), Andrew Clarke convened the Pangkor Engagement (1874) that introduced the Residential System in the Peninsular Malay States. Through his decisive actions, he ushered in a new epoch in Anglo-Malay relations that subsequently established British colonial rule over the Malay Peninsula (present-day West Malaysia).

Educated at Canterbury, England, Clarke joined the colonial service and spent the major part of his career in New Zealand. The earl of Kimberley, who served as the secretary of state for the colonies, designated Clarke as governor of the Straits Settlements in 1873 and instructed him to study the situation and to report on the advisability of appointing a British officer to reside in the then-anarchic Peninsular Malay States, entrusted with the task of restoring peace and protecting British trade and commerce. Taking the initiative to act first and report later, Clarke boldly convened a meeting of the warring factions in Perak at Pangkor. The Pangkor Engagement restored the peace in Perak. He conducted similar meetings in other troubled areas, such as Selangor and Sungai Ujong, whereby Pangkor-style treaties were signed with the contending groups.

In the Pangkor Engagement, Clarke widened Kimberley's suggestion relating to the responsibility of the British officer-styled resident. The resident was expected to give advice on all matters except those touching on Malay customs and traditions and the Islamic faith, in which the Malay ruler was obliged to take action. British residents were accredited to the court of the rulers of Perak, Selangor, and Sun-

gai Ujong in 1874 and to Pahang in 1888. The Malay court paid the residents' salaries.

Clarke stood down as governor in May 1875 and proceeded to British India to serve on the Viceroy's Council. Despite the brevity of his governorship, Clarke was instrumental in introducing the Residential System to the Peninsular Malay States, which proved to be an innovative, practical, and economical method of exerting British political and economic influence on indigenous rulers.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also British Interests in Southeast Asia; Pangkor Engagement (1874); Residential System (Malaya); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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COCHIN CHINA

Cochin China is the term used to refer to southern Vietnam. Portuguese priests and merchants who arrived there in the middle of the sixteenth century coined the term, deriving *Cauchin* from *Giao Chi* (the Chinese name for Vietnam) and then adding *China* in order to distinguish the area from Cochin, a Portuguese colony in India (Karnow 1994: 70). When the French colonized southern Vietnam in the 1860s, Cochin China became the official name of the region as part of the French Indochinese Union.

Before it was attached to Vietnam, Cochin China was the border area under Cambodian rule. The Vietnamese began their "march to the south" (*nam tien*) in the early fifteenth century, and Huế soon fell under Vietnamese rule. However, it was under the Nguyễn family

(which became the Nguyễn dynasty in the early nineteenth century) that the Vietnamese began a vigorous expansion southward. Vietnamese settlers from the center and the north had been sent to open and occupy the land in the south. By about 1700, the area around Saigon was occupied by the Vietnamese, and by 1750, the entire Mekong Delta was under Vietnamese rule (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig 1978: 268–269; Steinberg 1987: 234–235). After Nguyễn Anh of the Nguyễn family established the Nguyễn dynasty in 1802 C.E., he and his immediate successor, Minh Mang (r. 1820–1840), took it as their overriding task to develop the southern region. This they did by sending more people from the north and center to clear the land and settle in the south. Under the early Nguyễn dynasty, the south was divided into six provinces. It became the most important rice-producing area of the kingdom.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the French were interested in expanding their colonial power to Vietnam. They were hoping to use Vietnam (especially the Red River in the north and the Mekong River in the south) as a gateway to southern China and also to proselytize the local people. However, their attempt to occupy the port of Đà Nẵng in central Vietnam in 1858 was not successful, and as a result, they moved toward the south. In February 1859, French forces entered and besieged Saigon, a major province in the south. The fighting lasted until 1861, when the French overcame Vietnamese resistance and were able to occupy the three eastern provinces of the south. The court of Huế appointed Phan Thanh Gian, the governor of the south, to negotiate with the French. In 1862, both parties concluded a treaty in which defenseless Vietnam had to cede to France the three eastern provinces, pay an indemnity of 20 million francs, and allow the French to use three ports (Nguyễn Khắc Viện 1987: 149–150). The occupation of the three eastern provinces led to local resistance, which gave the French a pretext to resume the war in order to occupy the rest of the south, and in 1867, they conquered the three western provinces in the Mekong Delta. Phan Thanh Gian, who was still the governor, was humiliated and committed suicide. Thus, by 1867, Vietnam for the first time had lost its southern region to French colonialism. The treaty of 1872 between Vietnam and France confirmed

the cession to France of the entire southern region of the kingdom and made the south a French colony under direct rule. Under French colonialism, the southern part of Vietnam became widely known as Cochin China, and the northern and the central regions were called Tonkin and Annam, respectively.

Since the Mekong Delta of Cochin China had the potential to become one of the major rice producers of the world, the French developed the entire area by building an intensive network of irrigation canals to exploit fully this fertile land. Under French rule, Cochin China became the major rice-producing competitor of British Burma and Siam. By the beginning of the twentieth century, French colonists developed rubber plantations in the south. Saigon (renamed Hồ Chí Minh City after the unification of the country in 1975) became the capital city of Cochin China.

Out of the five components constituting the French Indochinese Union created in 1887—the colony of Cochin China plus the four protectorates of Tonkin, Annam, Cambodia, and Laos—Cochin China became the most prosperous. It was the center of economic activity that generated income for the French administration in Indochina. This fact partly explains why the French tried to return and reoccupy the south after the Pacific War (1941–1945).

Cochin China was a de facto independent state (South Vietnam) during the period from 1954 to 1975, before being defeated by the communist regime from the north in April 1975. Thereafter, it became the southern region of reunified Vietnam.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; French Indochina; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Nam Tien; Nguyễn Anh (Gia Long Emperor) (r. 1802–1820); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1955); Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Saigon (Gia Dinh, Hồ Chí Minh City); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Viets

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COCOA

Although cocoa had been introduced in Southeast Asia in the seventeenth century, the region did not become a world-class cocoa player until the 1980s. After fluctuating fortunes, the great 1970s price spike sparked a major boom, with Sulawesi smallholders emerging as the largest producers. Filipinos were the only Asians to become major consumers of chocolate, but they were rarely able to meet their own needs and had to import cocoa until the opening-up of Mindanao in the 1980s. Originally a lower-story tree of the Upper Amazon rain forests, cocoa needs fairly high heat and humidity throughout the year and can only be grown at elevations up to about 500 meters. It is thus more or less limited to lowland maritime Southeast Asia.

The Spaniards became acquainted with cocoa after seizing Mesoamerica in the early sixteenth century, and they spread the habit of drinking a newly concocted hot chocolate beverage to the Philippines. Cocoa seeds soon lost their ability to germinate, and it was hard to keep seedlings alive during the long journey across the Pacific, but eventually, a fine Criollo type of cocoa was successfully acclimatized in the Philippines. A vague assertion that Spaniards planted cocoa in North Sulawesi in 1560 is almost certainly legendary. A Jesuit probably planted the first cocoa in Leyte, in the eastern Visayas, around 1665, although a ship's pilot in the Bicol peninsula around 1670 also claimed this honor. Moreover, it is possible that the Dutch carried cocoa the other way around the world to Indonesia, via Ceylon (Sri Lanka), at about the same time.

Despite eighteenth-century attempts by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) to develop cocoa as an alternative to cloves in Maluku, cultivation long remained confined to meeting the needs of individual households. The Philippines could not even meet Manila's requirements, possibly because the islands lay in the typhoon belt and cocoa trees are sensitive to strong winds. Cocoa was thus one of the few commodities to be transported with silver on the yearly voyages of the Acapulco galleons across the Pacific. After ties with Mexico were cut in the early 1820s, some beans were sent directly from Ecuador, but supplies were erratic and Ecuador's Forastero cocoa was disliked. Indonesian smallholders and small Dutch planters in North Sulawesi and Maluku thus became Manila's main foreign suppliers. However, the pod borer moth, only found in Southeast Asia, ravaged aging groves of delicate Criollo trees from the 1850s. Consequently, Java and Ceylon became the mainstays of Manila's imports in the 1880s.

The trade to Manila was overshadowed by a burst of Javanese exports to The Netherlands from the 1880s. However, the Dutch discriminated against smallholders, backed European estates producing Criollo and Criollo-Forastero hybrids, and forced cocoa beans to be sent to The Netherlands. They were almost entirely re-exported, as their quality was unsuited to the needs of Dutch manufacturers. This expensive system could not withstand the sharp fall in the real-world price of cocoa from around 1910, especially as the pod borer moth spread in Java. The real price of cocoa remained extremely depressed in the interwar years, and cocoa was almost forgotten in Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asian interest in cocoa waxed and waned after the Pacific War (1941–1945), depending on erratic price swings and political problems. Postindependence chaos in Indonesia ensured that Malaysia got a head start in cocoa cultivation, but the Malaysians made the error of banking on estates in Sabah, which proved unable to make a profit when prices plummeted. The Philippines similarly backed large estates in Mindanao. By default rather than through any clear policy, a more politically stable Indonesia after 1965 gave smallholders their head start. There were both estates and smallholdings in various parts of the country, but the real dynamism lay with Bugis farmers, many of whom acquired planting material and

a knowledge of cocoa cultivation by migrating to work on Sabah estates. An efficient chain of private commercial intermediaries, Bugis and Chinese, contributed to their success, as did successive currency devaluations. Sulawesi smallholders mainly grew the hardy Amelonado variety of Forastero, although they also experimented with faster-maturing Upper Amazon hybrids.

Despite its venerable history, cocoa cultivation has attracted little attention from historians of Southeast Asia, and chocolate consumption has been even less studied. The colonial bias in favor of estates is still widespread, despite the weight of historical evidence that smallholders are the most efficient producers. The shadow on the horizon remains the dreaded pod borer moth, and yet colonial research into this plague has been neglected, perhaps because so much of it is written in Dutch. A better grasp of cocoa's long history in Southeast Asia could thus help to boost rural prosperity.

WILLIAM G. CLARENCE-SMITH

See also Bugis (Buginese); Chinese in Southeast Asia; Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Galleon Trade; Java; Maluku (The Moluccas); Manila; Mindanao; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Sulawesi (Celebes); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); Visayan Islands (Bisayan Islands, the Bisayas, the Visayas)

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COEN, JAN PIETERSZOOM (1587–1629)

Architect of the Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies

Jan Pieterszoon Coen was born to a strict Calvinist family on 8 January 1587 in Hoorn, The Netherlands. He received his merchant's training in a Flemish company in Rome before joining the Dutch East India Company (VOC) as assistant merchant in 1607. He traveled extensively in the East Indies and returned to The Netherlands in 1610. Coen submitted a report on the trade opportunities throughout Southeast Asia to the VOC's directors. Consequently, he was sent to the Indies as chief merchant in 1612. Upon returning from a trip to the Moluccan islands in August 1613, he became head of the VOC's trading post in Banten (West Java); he was made general accountant of all VOC posts in October 1613 and then director-general of the company's operations in Asia in November 1614.

Coen was skillful in establishing alliances with local rulers against their rivals or against the Portuguese and English. In return for this support, the VOC received commercial monopolies. The most lucrative involved cloves in the Moluccan islands and nutmeg in the Banda islands. In this way, the VOC gradually increased its hold over trade in the archipelago. Coen's appointment as governor-general of the Dutch East Indies on 25 October 1617 (to 1623) was an acknowledgment of his skills.

When the sultan of Banten resisted his attempts to control the pepper trade, Coen transferred the VOC's headquarters to neighboring Jakarta (Jacatra), where the company had established a trading post in 1610. When the ruler of

Jakarta also opposed the presence of the VOC in 1618, Coen had a fortress constructed, despite disruptions both from the ruler and from the English. After an inconclusive sea battle against the English, Coen left for the Moluccan islands in January 1619 to seek naval reinforcements. On his return trip in May 1619, he lay waste to Japara, where Dutch residents had been killed the previous year. At Jakarta, he discovered that the forces of the sultan of Banten had subdued the Jakatran ruler, had forced the English to withdraw, and were besieging Fort Jakarta. Coen ended the siege, and on the ruins of Jakarta, he founded the city of Batavia, which became the center of Dutch power in Asia.

In 1620, the Dutch and English trading companies reached an agreement. Each would allow the other to conduct trading in existing trading posts, and both would contribute to a joint fleet against mutual foes. The English took up residence in Batavia but refused to accept VOC rules. Coen was dismayed. He curtailed the behavior of the English by organizing and implementing VOC rule in Batavia and its surroundings.

In January 1621, Coen left with a fleet for the Banda islands, where the rulers had started to supply spices to the English despite the VOC monopoly. After a short battle, the islands were brutally subdued. When this became known in The Netherlands, the VOC's board of directors reprimanded Coen.

In 1622, Coen sought to establish the VOC's influence in East Asia. He sent a fleet to China but only succeeded in establishing a Dutch settlement on the island of Formosa (Taiwan). This became the stepping-stone for the VOC's trade with China and Japan.

With the VOC's position in the East Indies consolidated and with the VOC maintaining trading posts from India to Japan, Coen believed that the time had come for the company to send Dutch colonists to the Indies. They could be involved in the intra-Asian trade while the VOC concentrated on trade between Asia and Europe. He left in February 1623 for The Netherlands to convince the VOC's directors of his plans.

Coen's appointment as governor-general was renewed on 3 October 1624 (to 1629). However, his travel back to the Indies was obstructed when details became known about the arrest and execution of some Englishmen in

Ambon on suspicion of hatching a plot to take the Dutch settlement. Coen was held responsible for their execution. The Dutch government wanted to maintain the friendly relations it then enjoyed with the English, so Coen was forbidden to return to the Indies. This suited the English, who regarded him as a formidable opponent in the Indies.

Coen returned incognito in 1627 and resumed his position. However, his colonization plans were stalled after the VOC directors decided not to grant colonists exemptions from the VOC's trade privileges. In 1628 and 1629, Batavia was besieged by Sultan Agung (r. 1613–1645) of Mataram, the most powerful ruler in Java, but the sultan was not successful. During the second siege, Coen masterminded the destruction of the sultan's supplies. However, he died suddenly on 21 September 1629 during the siege, probably of dysentery.

As a military commander and economic organizer, Coen established the foundations of the empire of the Dutch in the East Indies for the next three hundred and fifty years. He founded a chain of trading fortresses throughout the archipelago. In doing so, he forced the Portuguese to withdraw and prevented the further expansion of the English. However, Coen's military and administrative prowess was overshadowed by his harsh treatment of the indigenous peoples of Indonesia, particularly his cruelty toward the population of Banda.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Agung, Sultan of Mataram (r. 1613–1645); Ambon (Amboina/Amboyna) Massacre (1623); Anglo–Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Banten (Bantam) (1526–1831); Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Formosa (Taiwan); Java; Maluku (The Moluccas); Mataram; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Portuguese Asian Empire; Spices and the Spice Trade; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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COFFEE

Southeast Asia was a major player in the world coffee market from the 1720s to the 1870s and became so again in the 1980s. The ravages of a fungus and the consequences of forced cultivation doomed the first boom, limited to Arabica varieties. The boom of the last decades of the twentieth century was based on hardier Robusta varieties, but land shortages and the falling popularity of instant coffee became worrisome.

The Arabica variety of coffee, originating in Ethiopia, was first cultivated in Yemen, whence the Dutch claimed to have introduced it into West Java in the 1690s. The Dutch signed contracts for the delivery of coffee at fixed prices with regents who forced their subjects to grow the crop, making West Java the chief source of Asian exports to Europe in the eighteenth century. However, Muslim pilgrims had already smuggled Yemeni seed to western India, the real source of Dutch seedlings, and probably introduced it into Sumatra. West Sumatran coffee was sold to British interlopers and to Americans from the 1790s. Catholic missionaries spread coffee further, notably to the Philippines in the eighteenth century. Southeast Asia's own consumption of coffee grew slowly, most closely associated culturally with Islam.

After the collapse of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1800, forced coffee cultivation reached new heights. It persisted in West Java, even during the British interregnum from 1811 to 1816, and was imposed on North Sulawesi in the 1820s. After the inclusion of coffee in the Cultivation System (under which farmers were forced to cultivate cash crops, the sale of which would enable them to pay land tax to the Dutch colonial government) in 1832, the compulsory cultivation of coffee spread across Java and to West Sumatra. The Javanese preferred to grow coffee either as hedges or in forests, merely clearing the undergrowth and thinning the trees. However, Dutch officials insisted on the rapid felling and burning of primary forest and the laying out of



Vietnamese workers manually pick out foreign matter, such as tree branches and crushed stones, mixed in with beans at the Thang Loi Coffee Company, the biggest state-run producer in Vietnam's key growing province of Daklak, 16 May 2003. Vietnam rapidly emerged in the 1990s as the world's biggest producer of Robusta coffee, an expansion other producers partly blamed for leading global prices in the early 2000s to their lowest levels in thirty years. (Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis)

“regular plantations.” These so-called plantations were divided among individual families, who transported dried beans to government storehouses and were paid in cash at the fixed price. As the world price rose in the nineteenth century, Dutch profits ballooned. The Portuguese in East Timor and the Spaniards in the Philippines attempted to copy Dutch methods, albeit with less rigor and more emphasis on European estates.

These prosperous days did not last. The 1870 Dutch abolition of the Cultivation System was gradually applied to coffee from the 1880s, and peasants quickly opted out of the hated crop. Coffee vanished in West Sumatra, North Sulawesi, and parts of Java. Clearing upland forest was prohibited in Java, as devastating erosion silted up lowland irrigation works. Leaf blight struck in the 1880s, caused by the

fungus *Hemileia vastatrix*, and the world coffee price collapsed in the mid-1890s, hastening the exodus from coffee by planters and smallholders across Southeast Asia. British planters fleeing leaf blight in Ceylon (Sri Lanka) carried coffee to Malaya but turned to rubber when the fungus caught up with them. The Philippines even became a net importer of coffee, as estates in southern Luzon gave up the crop. The New World, spared by *Hemileia vastatrix*, consolidated its supremacy on the world coffee market.

Nevertheless, coffee persisted in Southeast Asia. Arabica crops retreated to relatively high and dry areas, where leaf blight did less damage and other cash crops did poorly. Indigenous smallholders clung to Arabica in central Sulawesi, Timor, South Sumatra, central Vietnam, and southern Laos. They were joined by a few

small, subsidized European planters who benefited from forced labor in the French and Portuguese territories. At lower elevations, some planters and smallholders grew hardy African Robusta and Liberica varieties as a catch crop, to be uprooted when the rubber trees, oil palms, or coconut palms matured. However, consumers disliked the taste of these varieties.

The situation was transformed after 1945 by better prices and cheap instant coffee, for which Robusta was suitable. The price spike of the late 1970s led to an export boom, and Southeast Asia replaced Africa as the world's main supplier of Robusta. Indonesia was at the fore, joined by Vietnam and Thailand. However, coffee does best on cleared primary forest, which is in increasingly short supply. Moreover, Robusta prices are low, due to a drift away from instant coffee by discerning Western consumers as well as increasing African competition.

The history of coffee cultivation suggests that estates suffer from high overhead costs and a lack of economies of scale, problems worsened by state ownership. Free smallholders are more efficient and better stewards of the environment. (Thus, they preferred agroforestry methods when the Dutch insisted on clear felling, with devastating ecological effects.) Moreover, smallholders are better positioned to serve niche markets in the West with highly valued organic Arabica brands, such as those from Timor, the Toraja country, and the Sumatra Barisan.

WILLIAM G. CLARENCE-SMITH

See also Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Java; Sumatra; Timor; Torajas; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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COINAGE AND CURRENCY

As economies develop, they rely increasingly on the exchange of goods and services, for which money is required as a medium. Currency in Southeast Asia long consisted of an amalgam of imported silver coins and locally produced coins and ingots of various denominations, metals, shapes, and purity. These had to be weighed and assayed at every transaction. Merchants preferred silver as the unit of account.

The amount of silver in circulation expanded gradually after major silver mines were opened in Central and South America beginning in the sixteenth century. Silver minted as Spanish reals, or dollars, and, in the nineteenth century, as Mexican dollars reached Asia via the London silver market. European importers of Asian produce purchased dollars, which were the main goods that they traded in return for the products of Asia. Mexican dollars were preferred because of their reputation for constant silver purity and weight (25.5 grams). They were accepted increasingly by unit rather than weight. The circulation of silver coins grew as a consequence of the development of intercontinental trade, although Spanish reals leaked out of Southeast Asia into China, where the demand for reliable silver currency was insatiable. When reals were in short supply, the British East India Company (EIC) and the Dutch East India Company (VOC) minted additional silver coins.

Southeast Asia during the course of the nineteenth century faced a shortage of silver currency. The supply of dollars increased with trade between Europe and Asia, but intra-Asian trade drained dollars away to China and India. The money shortage constrained economic development. Governments, for instance, found it difficult to raise tax revenues. In Java, the Dutch colonial government issued currency notes, but these were accepted reluctantly and circulated at a discount. It also issued copper subsidiary coins, but the intrinsic and nominal values of such coins varied. Copper coins disappeared when copper appreciated relative to silver and vice versa.

To address the dollar shortage, British authorities in the Straits Settlements tried to introduce the Indian rupee as legal tender. Authorities in other parts of Asia imported their own dollars, which were similar in size, weight, and silver content to the Mexican dollar. The Dutch rix dollar was used in parts of Indonesia under Dutch colonial control. In 1867, the British introduced the Hong Kong dollar and later the British Trade dollar in the Straits Settlements and Hong Kong. The French in Indochina introduced a silver trade piastre in 1885, and the Spanish in the Philippines introduced a new peso for domestic circulation in 1887.

Although legislation specified only one currency as legal tender, foreign silver coins were widely accepted by weight. Throughout Southeast Asia, silver coins of various denominations could be found: Mexican dollars, Indian rupees, Thai ticals (known as baht), and Japanese yen. Only subsidiary coins were restricted to the countries of issue. Governments issued currency notes, and various private banks in the region issued promissory banknotes, but paper currency was mainly used by foreign firms and in cities. The denominations were too big for most people, and bullion was generally preferred.

Silver coins suited Asian economies as the means of exchange. The borders between countries were not yet clearly drawn, and in many areas, central governments only exercised nominal authority. Even if governments wanted to do so, it would have been difficult to enforce monetary unity. All Asian economies still had large subsistence sectors; the low level of economic development caused a low opportunity

cost for labor, and therefore, prices of the same commodities and services in Asia were lower than in Europe. The purchasing power of silver currency was higher in Asia, and the same transaction incurred a smaller amount of silver. Most domestic and intra-Asian transactions were relatively small and were settled with cash. Gold was too valuable to suit such transactions.

Silver could also be used in international trade with Europe and North America because its value was stable relative to gold. However, after 1870, silver depreciated quickly as a consequence of the discovery of new silver ore deposits and a decline in world gold production. Countries in Europe and North America with a bimetallic or silver standard currency system terminated the free coinage of silver. Most embraced the gold standard. Silver depreciation turned their silver coins into token coins, which circulated for their nominal rather than their intrinsic value. Many countries sold excess silver as bullion on international markets or used it to cover trade deficits with silver standard countries.

Countries with silver standards, such as those in Southeast Asia, had to come to terms with the fact that most international trade and finance became denominated in gold-based currencies. The depreciation of their silver currencies meant that imports from gold countries became more expensive, at a time when many silver countries required capital goods from Europe for their development. However, devaluation encouraged exports to countries with gold-based currencies. Governments in Southeast Asia also acknowledged that volatile exchange rates in principle discouraged foreign investment in their countries because of the exchange rate risk. They found it more difficult to borrow abroad because devaluation increased the cost of debt servicing. The depreciation of silver generally furthered inflation, which in turn increased interest rates.

From 1870 to 1914, most governments of Asian countries chose to stabilize their currencies against gold. Dutch Indonesia (1877), British India (including Burma, 1893), the Philippines (1903), the Straits Settlements (1904), and Thailand (1908) embraced the "gold-exchange standard." Only French Indochina continued the silver standard until 1930 because changing to a gold-based currency would have had negative consequences

for its trade contacts with Hong Kong and China, which continued the silver standard.

Governments stopped the free minting of silver currency and passed legislation to make only one currency legal tender: the guilder in Dutch Indonesia, the rupee in Burma, the peso in the Philippines, the Straits dollar in Malaysia, the baht in Thailand, and the piastre in French Indochina. The nominal value of the legal silver coins gradually exceeded their intrinsic value, and coins started to circulate for their nominal value in the designated areas. Thus, the currencies of Southeast Asia became national currencies.

The nominal value of the national currencies was kept at a stable level relative to gold through reserves of a gold-based currency overseas (the Dutch guilder for colonial Indonesia; the pound sterling in the case of Burma, Thailand, and the Straits Settlements; and the U.S. dollar in the case of the Philippines). These reserves handled overseas payments and receipts for each country. For instance, a reserve accepted local currency from importers in Southeast Asia and released pound sterling for the payment of overseas exporters and vice versa. For this system to work, the countries had to have a trade surplus to stock the reserve with gold-based currency in order to defend a stable rate of exchange of the local currency. Due to the disruption of world trade, most countries had to suspend the gold-exchange system during World War I (1914–1918), but they resumed it in the 1920s.

While the currency systems took shape, more and more paper currency became circulated as the need for larger denominations increased. These notes were generally issued by designated privately owned central banks, such as the Javasche Bank in colonial Indonesia and the Banque de l'Indochine in French Indochina, or by private trading banks, such as the Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London and China in Singapore.

Under the gold-exchange system, economies were not shielded from such fluctuations in international prices through currency devaluation. These fluctuations were immediately imported through an adjustment of the domestic money supply. This became painfully clear during the global economic crisis after 1929 (the Great Depression). International commodity prices plummeted, prices in the region fol-

lowed, and all Southeast Asian countries experienced the negative consequences on output and employment of rapid deflation. One by one, they followed the gold-based currencies against which their currencies had been pegged: Burma, Thailand, and the Straits Settlements (1931); the Philippines (1933); and French Indochina and Dutch Indonesia (1936).

During the Pacific War (1941–1945), Japanese occupation authorities and the government of Thailand did not have access to foreign currency reserves to maintain realistic exchange rates. The public hoarded coins, which disappeared out of circulation. The Japanese authorities issued increasing amounts of paper money to finance public expenditure. The value of this currency soon eroded, as local economies came to a standstill and less and less could be purchased. Inflation was rampant throughout the region. One of the first tasks of the governments that returned after the Japanese surrender in August 1945 was to reestablish monetary order by reintroducing prewar currencies and guaranteeing their value.

Despite decolonization, countries continued their monetary regimes. Only North Vietnam introduced a new currency, the dong (in 1947). Burma's rupee was renamed the kyat after 1947, and Indonesia's guilder was renamed the rupiah after 1949. Indochina's piastre became the South Vietnamese piastre, the Cambodian riel, and the Laotian kip after 1954. The Straits dollar became the Malayan dollar in 1957 and then the Brunei, Singapore, and Malaysian dollars in 1967. The Malaysian dollar was renamed the ringgit in 1975. The dong became Vietnam's national currency after monetary reunification in 1978. In all countries, central banks were either nationalized or established and put in charge of monetary policy and the issuing of banknotes.

Except for North Vietnam, all countries became members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), promising to keep their currencies at a realistic rate of exchange relative to the gold-based U.S. dollar. Most countries experienced trade deficits that eroded the exchange funds available for the defense of realistic exchange rates. To avoid further erosion, the central banks of all countries strictly controlled the inflows and outflows of currency and gold. Such capital controls were used to allocate scarce foreign exchange. Subsequently,

black markets for Southeast Asian currencies emerged.

In part due to superior export performance, controls were not a major obstacle in the case of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, where the discrepancy between official and black market exchange rates remained minimal. For Burma, Indonesia, North and South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines, the discrepancy remained significant. The value of their currencies eroded in line with inflation fueled by budget deficits. Improved export performance and reduced inflation in Indonesia and the Philippines in the 1970s (and in the late 1980s, also in Vietnam) allowed the authorities to establish realistic official exchange rates.

In the 1980s, the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) opened up to foreign trade and investment. Their growing dependence on foreign trade and investment required more flexible exchange rate regimes. One by one, they liberalized their foreign exchange controls and allowed international markets to determine the exchange rates of their currencies. Their central banks assumed an active role in currency markets, buying and selling local currency through open market transactions in order to dampen exchange rate fluctuations or defend a peg relative to the U.S. dollar or to an index of key international currencies.

In the early 1990s, high economic growth in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia increased the need for investment capital. These countries opened up to short-term capital in the form of foreign investment in the shares of local companies and company debentures. In the light of sustained exchange rate stability, foreign lenders and local borrowers perceived a low exchange risk. Short-term debt denominated in international currencies increased quickly in the 1990s.

This development ended in mid-1997, when foreign investors and lenders learned about the difficulties firms had in servicing their debts. They rushed to sell shares and call in short-term debt, putting depreciating pressure on the currencies of the ASEAN countries. Central banks ceased defending their own currencies, which went into a tailspin. Malaysia stabilized its currency by reimposing capital controls and fixing the exchange rate to the U.S. dollar. Thailand and Indonesia applied for IMF sup-

port to stabilize the exchange rates of their currencies.

Throughout the 1990s, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia continued capital controls. The Vietnamese dong was stabilized after 1991, but the depreciation of the Cambodian riel and the Laos kip continued in line with inflation in these countries. The official value of the Burmese kyat remained unrealistic, and the gap between its black market and official rate surged after 1995 to 100 to 1 in 2001.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Ancient Coinage in Southeast Asia; Banks and Banking; Economic Development of Southeast Asia (post-1945 to early 2000s); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Great Depression (1929–1931); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Trade and Commerce of Southeast Asia (ca. Nineteenth Century to the 1990s)

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COLD WAR

An American columnist, Walter Lippman, coined the term *Cold War* to refer to the state of tension, hostility, competition, and conflict that characterized Soviet-Western relations, particularly those between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is conventional to date the Cold War as lasting from the mid-1940s to 1991, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), or Soviet Union, disappeared from the political arena. Two main features of the Cold War were bipolarity and ideological competition. The most overt aspect of the Cold War was the division of the world into two competing camps—liberal-democratic and communist, each with its respective allies and satellites.

The Cold War appeared as a consequence of the power realignment after World War II (1939–1945). Only the United States and the USSR emerged with enough power to deter-

mine postwar settlement. The Cold War bore many features of a traditional geopolitical power struggle among nation-states. Americans could not understand why the Soviet Union did not accept the preeminence of the United States, and the Soviets could not understand why the Americans refused to treat them as equals. The two great empires competed without engaging in direct conflict.

The competition for preeminence in the postwar period was aggravated by ideological differences. The USSR wanted to advance socialism on a worldwide scale. The Soviet leadership was eager to provide a favorable context for the revolutionary struggle for socialism in the capitalist and newly independent countries—a struggle that Moscow would aid ideologically, politically, and materially. Leaders in the United States regarded communism as antithetical to their most basic values and principles and feared the Soviet Union's commitment to world revolution. America's goal was to create a world order conducive to the interests of the United States, in which the values Americans treasured would be carried around the world.

There was a security dilemma, too. Each step the Soviet leaders took to add to the security of their country was viewed by American leaders as detracting from the security of the United States. Each nation defined its own policies as defensive but saw the other's as threatening.

The Cold War began with the division of Europe into socialist and capitalist camps. The victory of communist forces in North Korea (1948) and China (1949) took the Cold War into Asia. As the Soviet and American positions in Europe and East Asia stabilized, the great powers turned their attention to the Third World—the newly independent nations in Asia and Africa, which were struggling to develop viable economies and to establish national identities. The USSR and the United States came to regard these new nations, including those in Southeast Asia, as testing grounds in the contest between their two systems and as pawns in the global struggle for power. Both vigorously competed for their allegiance by massive propaganda campaigns and generous offers of economic and military assistance. Containment denoted the American effort by military, political, and economic means to resist communist expansion throughout the world, particularly in Southeast Asia. That was the be-

ginning of confrontation and polarization in the region.

In Southeast Asia, a communist regime was created with Soviet and Chinese assistance in North Vietnam, where the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was proclaimed in 1945. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) supported communist parties and left-wing organizations in the region and instigated the anticolonial and anti-imperialist struggles of peoples in Southeast Asian countries. The USSR greeted the proclamation of independence in Indonesia and gave political, moral, and diplomatic support to the republican government in the United Nations during the Indonesian people's fight against Dutch and British imperialists. It welcomed the creation of an independent Burma and established friendly relations with it. At the same time, the communist powers tried to draw newly independent states into their orbit of influence.

The growth of communist and Soviet influence in Southeast Asia aroused great concern in the United States. American officials feared that the Soviet influence in North Vietnam would represent only the first stage of a broader pattern of Soviet and communist expansion in the region—the so-called domino theory. The policy of containing communism policy was extended to Southeast Asia. Washington also responded with policies to enhance U.S. influence in Southeast Asia. It supported anti-communist and right-wing nationalist forces in the countries of the region, as well as the establishment of authoritarian anticommunist regimes in Thailand, the Philippines, and South Vietnam, and it succeeded in drawing these nations into the orbit of its foreign policy. Southeast Asia split into two opposing camps: the pro-Soviet camp included the DRV and later was joined by the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) and, for a short period, by Cambodia, and the pro-American camp consisted of Thailand, the Philippines, and South Vietnam.

The 1954 formation of a military anticommunist bloc known as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which included Thailand and the Philippines and extended its control to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, completed the division of Southeast Asia. SEATO became a mutual defense alliance to deter communist aggression. As the Cold War

in Southeast Asia intensified, the USSR and the United States rebuilt the military machines that had been demobilized after World War II and initiated an arms race in conventional, nuclear, and other sophisticated weapons of growing destructive capacity. The United States provided assistance to military regimes in Thailand and built a number of American navy and air bases in this country as well as in the Philippines. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy roamed the seas in the region. The Soviet Union was escalating its assistance, including military aid, to the DRV, which was, in its turn, undermining anticommunist regimes in the region. A Soviet navy was also present in Southeast Asian seas.

Several great international crises of the Cold War era—the Korean War in 1950–1953, the Cuban crisis of 1962, the American involvement in Vietnam (1964–1973), the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan (1979–1988)—at times seemed to threaten the outbreak of a new world war.

The Vietnam War stands out among Cold War crises for its scale, length, intensity, and global repercussions. It claimed more than 58,000 American lives and more than 3.2 million Vietnamese lives (“The Cold War in Asia” 1995–1996: 232). The escalation of the conflict in Vietnam began soon after two incidents. The Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964, naval exchanges involving American warships in the Gulf of Tonkin, was followed by the February 1965 attack by armed units of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) on the base of American military advisers in Pleiku, which triggered U.S. aerial bombardment on North Vietnam in retaliation. Fearing a loss of Soviet influence in the region, particularly in the context of the mounting differences between Beijing and Moscow, the USSR leaders pursued a policy of confrontation with the United States, which in turn facilitated President Lyndon Johnson’s (t. 1963–1969) escalation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In the Cold War context, Soviet leaders could hardly react indifferently to the Vietnam conflict and the intensification of American military activity in Southeast Asia. Moreover, U.S. support for an unpopular neo-colonial Saigon regime offered a target for condemnation and undermined Washington’s international stature. Meanwhile, the USSR could pose as a consistent fighter for the tri-

umph of a just cause. Moscow acted in the spirit of proletarian internationalism—as evidenced by its moral-political, economic, and military assistance to North Vietnam—and also as a potential mediator in the forging of a peaceful settlement.

Yet the Vietnam War also presented long-term difficulties and dangers for both Moscow and Washington because there was a real threat that it could escalate from a local fight into a world war. As sharp and intense as the tensions between the USSR and the United States were, both sides had an interest in constraining the Cold War; in limiting and controlling the rivalry and competition; and in achieving a degree of stability, order, and predictability in world politics. One of the most compelling reasons for containing the conflict was the existence of nuclear weapons—which threatened mutual annihilation in the event of the outbreak of a “hot war” between the great powers.

In fact, the hope for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam War was shared by both Soviet and American leaders. Richard Nixon’s victory in the 1968 elections marked a turning point in U.S. policy toward the USSR. The incoming Nixon administration (t. 1969–1974) made every effort to obtain greater Soviet involvement and cooperation in the process of achieving a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. And for its part, the USSR managed to make a considerable contribution to the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam conflict. Ultimately, in 1973, a bilateral agreement was signed by the DRV and the United States on ending hostilities and restoring peace in Vietnam. American military forces were withdrawn from Indochina.

An apparent victory for the Soviet side in the Cold War in Southeast Asia was signified by several happenings. The first was the end of the Vietnam War and the creation in 1976 of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which united the North and the South. Then came the establishment of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, and the creation of a pro-Vietnamese government, which seemed to signify a Soviet victory. The military presence of the USSR in the region grew from year to year. The key element was the strong Soviet naval presence, for the airpower of the USSR’s naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans became a challenge to the regional balance of

power that had once favored the United States. Further, the civil government that came to power in Bangkok in 1973 pushed for an accelerated withdrawal of American military forces from the country. The withdrawal started in 1974 and ended by 1976, and all the bases were turned over to the government of Thailand. The military bloc SEATO disintegrated. The USSR acquired for its fleet the former American naval base in Cam Ranh Bay.

But at the end of the 1980s, the Soviet economy, overstrained by the arms race and by the competition with the United States, was in trouble. Soviet society was on the verge of crisis, and the political system was not working. The new communist leadership in the USSR, which came to power in 1985, became aware of the need for deep and urgent reforms. The new leaders required a respite from the Cold War to be able to devote their energies and the nation's resources toward building a more modern and efficient Soviet state. They rejected the ideological implication of Soviet foreign policy.

The USSR modified its military doctrine, reduced its armed forces, and concluded a number of agreements with Washington on strategic arms reduction and limitation. The Soviet Union and the United States had ceased to be enemies. In 1991, the USSR officially ceased to exist. Its successor, the Russian Federation, withdrew from Southeast Asia.

In the Southeast Asian region, this led to the end of ideological conflict and confrontation. Vietnam and Laos started their transitions to market economies. A coalition government was established in Cambodia, freed from Vietnamese influence. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), an economic and cultural alliance that previously had included only nonsocialist countries, was opened for all Southeast Asian nations, regardless of ideology. This ended the division of Southeast Asia.

LARISSA EFIMOVA

See also Asian–African (Bandung) Conference (April 1955); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); China since 1949; Domino Theory; Indochina War (1964–1975), Second (Vietnam War); Korean War (1950–1953); Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR); Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Southeast Asia;

Russia and Southeast Asia; Sino–Soviet Struggle; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (1954); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945); Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971)

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COLLABORATION ISSUE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Directly after the surrender of the Japanese in September 1945, the “collaboration issue” was widely discussed among the Allied powers. The Americans, who had already promised independence to the Philippines before the Pacific War (1941–1945), refused to bring into power representatives of the ruling class who, in their eyes, had collaborated with the Japanese. They believed such individuals should be removed from authority and arrested and tried for treason against the United States. This was one of the most radical interpretations at the time. The

policy of the British and Dutch colonial powers toward indigenous ruling elites who had cooperated with the Japanese during the occupation, like that of the Americans, was directed toward removing them from power. But the collaboration issue was not a prime priority for the French in Indochina. Like their counterparts in Europe who had collaborated with the German Nazis, the French colonial authorities in Indochina had themselves collaborated with the Japanese military regime.

The Allied views, based on Western ideas about collaboration, were not apposite in the far more complex Asian context. Their views relating to *collaboration* were strongly connected to Western ideas about collaboration and resistance in the European context. With such concepts inspiring the policies of the Allies on the handling of the collaboration issue in their colonies in Asia, conflict between the colonial powers and the nationalists who had fought for independence was inevitable. The nationalists had quite different views on the issue of collaboration. In order to attain freedom for their people, they had decided to cooperate with the Japanese. They used the Japanese for their own means to liberate their countries from the colonial powers. When the colonial powers strove to restore their colonial regimes after the capitulation of Japan, the nationalists made it quite clear that they wanted independence for their respective countries. Most of the former colonial powers refused to negotiate with the nationalists and marked them as collaborators. Not only the nationalists but also many other people had cooperated with the Japanese by various means. However, little is known about the collaboration of the common people as compared with what is known about the different elites throughout Southeast Asia. To understand how the issue of collaboration influenced the postwar political debate in the countries of Southeast Asia, we must consider the issue in the historical context of each nation.

In the Philippines, the collaboration issue lay at the core of the political debate. In spite of the Commonwealth government's promise that, at the end of a prescribed period, an independent republic of the Philippines would be realized, many leading Filipinos chose to cooperate with the Japanese. The returning Americans saw the old elites who had been involved in the new administrative structure of the Japa-

nese military as traitors. They were viewed as leaders who had failed to discharge the demands of continuing loyalty to the Commonwealth government and to the United States. The case of José Paciano Laurel (1891–1959) and Jorge B. Vargas, two Philippine Commonwealth ministers in the prewar period, is a good example of the one-sided American policy. Laurel accepted the post of president in the nominally independent, Japanese-supported Philippine government, and Vargas was one of his closest colleagues. They followed a strategy of cooperating minimally while avoiding measures that actively helped the Japanese war effort. After the war, they were arrested on the orders of General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) and incarcerated in Sugamo Prison near Tokyo. The Americans demanded that the postwar Philippine government bring collaborators to trial. It was charged with investigating the conduct of those public officials or employees who had served during the enemy occupation and who might now be recalled to duty. In 1946, the José M. Sison trial was staged as a kind of test case. Sison belonged to the prewar elite and had served as minister of justice and home affairs in the Laurel government during the occupation. He was charged before the Peoples Court on twenty-six counts of treason. Sison's final defense before the judges was a fervent protestation of his innocence. He said that if it was a crime to have feigned collaboration with the enemy in order to be of service to his people, then he was ready to accept the penalty meted out to him by the tribunal of Philippine justice. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined 15,000 pesos. However, with the increasing threat of communism, the Americans abruptly changed their policy. To restore order and to lead the fight against communism, they advocated massive support of the traditional oligarchy. The collaboration issue faded, and a general amnesty was declared for those who had already been convicted (roughly 150 individuals).

The dream of Japanese-sponsored independence drove Sukarno (1901–1970), Aung San (1915–1947), and other nationalists to cooperate with the Japanese. They expected to gain concessions from the occupying force that had been denied them by their own colonial powers. Many of these nationalist leaders were released from detention by the Japanese armies.

In the Netherlands Indies, most of the nationalists cooperated with the Japanese throughout the occupation. Before the war, there were two groups of nationalists in the Netherlands Indies: the noncooperating and those who were still willing to work and cooperate with the Dutch colonial government. Faced with the refusal of the Dutch to make any political concessions that would lead to more autonomy, the latter changed their policy and cooperated with the Japanese in the hope of gaining independence for their country. The noncooperating nationalists who were imprisoned by the Dutch were released by the Japanese and used for anti-Allied propaganda and mass mobilization. From the beginning, however, it was clear that both the Japanese and the Indonesian nationalists had their own agendas for reaching their respective goals. Two of the most prominent leaders among them were Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980). The Japanese also tried to utilize Muslim influence, and Muslims consolidated among themselves while cooperating with the Japanese. They profited greatly from the opportunities offered by the Japanese. For the first time, the Muslims captured a position in the administrative structure. The independence of Indonesia was declared by Sukarno and Hatta two days after the Japanese surrender. Meanwhile, the Dutch, who had returned and wanted to restore their colony, accused Sukarno of being a Japanese collaborator and refused to negotiate with him. But the charge did not really bring him into disrepute, nor did it affect his political authority. The social revolution that swept throughout Java during the first three months after the Japanese surrender claimed many victims among people who were suspected of having profited from the wartime situation at the cost of others among them, in particular Chinese businesspeople and Indonesian officials.

In Burma (Myanmar), Aung San, the leader of one of the most important nationalist groups, fled his country before the war broke out to escape imprisonment by the British colonial government. He was offered military training by the Japanese and formed the Burma Independence Army (BIA). The BIA participated in the Japanese conquest of Burma, and the Burmese considered the invasion a liberation campaign. In July 1942, the BIA, which had taken over parts of the local government,

was forced to dissolve by the Japanese occupation regime. Yet despite the disbanding of the BIA, Aung San was willing to cooperate with the Japanese, who granted independence to Burma on 1 August 1943. When it emerged that the independence was purely nominal, Aung San changed his policy and turned to the British, fighting the Japanese with his Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO) until Tokyo surrendered in mid-August 1945. Aung San negotiated with the British, leading, in the end, to Burma's independence in 1948. The patterns laid down by the BIA in 1942 were the basis of his success after the war. The people's broad support for the movement convinced the British that independence could no longer be postponed. Aung San was assassinated in 1947 and did not experience independence himself. But Dr. Ba Maw (b. 1897), another prominent nationalist, who headed the Japanese-sponsored regime in Burma, remained politically active after the war. Like other well-known leaders, he viewed his own and other peoples' cooperation with the Japanese in the context of the nationalist movements to gain freedom for their countries.

In British Malaya, the prewar political allegiance with the British was divided along ethnic as well as social lines, affecting the choices people made for or against cooperation with the Japanese. On the one hand, Malays who belonged to the Malayan Civil Service (MCS) were pro-British but were not willing to oppose the Japanese fervently. On the other hand, Malay nationalists, who formed the *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* (KMM, Young Malay Union), welcomed the Japanese as liberators. The Japanese used them as community leaders without making any political concession for an independent Malayan state. By the outbreak of the war, Chinese formed the majority of the population in Malaya. Some of the locally born, British-oriented Chinese involved in business adapted to the Japanese regime. But among the Chinese migrants who were politically oriented toward their homeland, many were opponents of the Japanese due to Japan's invasion of China. These migrants were organized in the Kuomintang (KMT) and in the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China. During the Japanese occupation, the Communists were active in the Malayan Peoples' Anti-

Japanese Army (MPAJA). Indians, the third largest ethnic group, were organized in the Central Indian Association of Malaya. They cooperated with the Japanese, hoping to gain independence for India with Japan's support. Both the British and the Japanese tried to utilize these groups for their own aims. The British provided support for the Chinese guerrillas to fight the Japanese, and the Japanese maintained good relations with Malay nationalists and created a local defense force that was mainly used to combat the Chinese Communist-led guerrillas. After the restoration of British rule, it was clear that prosecutions for collaboration would be most unlikely. As an act of clemency in March 1946, the British government decided not to institute any action against people who would otherwise have been charged with collaboration with the enemy in British territories in Southeast Asia. This policy had been forced by the political situation in India, where it had been agreed that nationalists who had collaborated with the nationalist leader Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945) would not be punished.

Before the war, British Borneo had consisted of Sarawak, North Borneo (including Labuan), and the Malay kingdom of Brunei. Most of the inhabitants were in the first instance neutral or pro-Japan, but loyalties changed when the situation deteriorated under Japanese military rule. The Iban formed the largest ethnic group in Sarawak, and most of their leaders cooperated with the Japanese to survive the war. Many Chinese businesspeople benefited from the high demand for foodstuffs as the war turned against Japan. As elsewhere in occupied Southeast Asia, the Japanese supported the local branch of the Indian independence movement. The Borneo branch of the pro-Japanese Indian Independence League (IIL) was established in Kuching in mid-1942. British Borneo had been reoccupied by the Australians, with the ultimate task of reestablishing the British government. The prosecution of collaborators was not a priority for the Australians, but prominent members of the IIL and some of the native civil servants suspected of being collaborators faced the anger of the general public and were put in jail for their own safety. The only successful prosecution for collaboration took place in the Resident's Court in Kuching in early March 1946, when two Indians and a Chinese man were ac-

cused of various offenses involving assault. No further prosecution of collaborators was pursued, given the British clemency announcement in March 1946.

French Indochina was the only area under Japanese military influence in which a Western colonial regime was allowed to remain in place. The colonial authorities permitted Japanese troops to enter north Indochina in September 1940. Thereafter, the Japanese occupied northern Indochina but left the colonial regime intact until 9 March 1945 in accordance with their policy of maintaining tranquillity. The Japanese did not impose military rule as they had in other parts of Southeast Asia but instead granted the three nations of Indochina—Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam—nominal independence. As elsewhere in occupied Southeast Asia, the choice between resistance and collaboration was related to aspirations for independence. Some Vietnamese politicians and intellectuals forged links with the Japanese using the political symbolism of Prince Cuong De (1882–1951). Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963) and other members of the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Viet Nam Ai Quoc Dang or Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, VN-QDD) promoted Cuong De and even hoped to establish a government that would be approved of by the local Japanese military authorities. Their hopes were dashed in March 1945 when the Japanese army carried out a military coup and pushed the French aside. Instead of imposing military rule, the Japanese gave Emperor Bảo Đại (1913–1997) of Vietnam, King Sihanouk (1922–) of Cambodia, and King Sisavang Vong (1885–1959) of Laos the opportunity to declare the independence of their countries. In Vietnam, developments during this period contributed to the failure of the Japanese-supported Bảo Đại–Kim government to take the political initiative and led to the transfer of power to the Viet Minh under Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969). After the war, the French who had initially collaborated themselves found their colony in great disorder, giving room to other power players such as the communists.

Thailand, the only independent nation in the prewar era, sought its own way through the war period. Just like indigenous leaders in the colonial situation, political figures changed sides according to the course of the war. One of the most prominent leaders at the outbreak of the Pacific War was Phibun (Plaek Phibun-

songkhram, 1897–1964). In 1941, he was prime minister and chose to cooperate with the Japanese, using them to realize his dream of a greater Thailand. Phibun succeeded in expanding the territory of Thailand at the cost of Malaya and Burma. In July 1944, however, he was forced by other Thai politicians to resign as the war turned against Japan. His government was replaced by a more Allied-oriented one, which tried to repair Thailand's relationship with the Allied powers and at the same time maintained good relations with the Japanese. Not only the top political leaders but also larger groups of government officials had been pro-Japanese. Thanks to their position in the administrative structure, they had profited personally through the Japanese invasion and the subsequent seizure and confiscation of the property of enemy aliens in Thailand. After the Japanese surrender, Phibun and seven other political leaders were arrested. The British considered them collaborators and forced the Thai government to bring them to trial. But in 1946, the Thai Supreme Court decided that the 1945 War Criminal Acts were unconstitutional, and the charges against them were dropped. The collaboration issue did not damage Phibun's political career: in 1948, he returned to power, once again becoming prime minister.

In the wake of the immense political changes that took place directly after the end of the war in Southeast Asia, including the growing influence of communist-oriented groups that had fought the Japanese during the war, the collaboration issue faded away within a year. The Allied powers needed the support of the old elites who had collaborated with the Japanese to restore order and to form a bloc against communism. The Cold War had begun.

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TRANSLATED BY ROSEMARY
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See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Aung San (1915–1947); Ba Maw, Dr. (b. 1893); Bao Đai (Vinh Tuy) (1913–1997); Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma Independence Army (BIA); Cold War; Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere; Hồ Chí Minh

(1890–1969); Ibrahim Yaacob (1911–1979); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) (Young Malay Union); Laurel, Jose Paciano (1891–1959); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Plaek Phibunsongkhram, Field Marshal (1897–1964); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); Sisavang Vong (1885–1959); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, League for the Independence of Vietnam)

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COLONIALISM

The term *colonialism* is often used more or less synonymously with *imperialism*. Similarly, *decolonization* is a word that covers the removal of the formal structures of European empire from the “colonial” world. *Neocolonialism*, like *neo-imperialism*, may be used to describe the external forces that appear to ensure the continued dependence of former “imperial” or “colonial” territories even after they have secured political independence. It is, however, possible to draw a distinction.

The word *colony* derives from a Latin word, *colonia*, which was applied to a settlement of Roman citizens in a hostile or newly conquered territory. *Colonization* thus implied settlement. *Empire*, again a word of Roman origin, did not necessarily do so: *imperium* implied a rule or sway over an extensive territory or collection of states. *Imperialism* was more apt than *colonialism* as a descriptive term for the creation of dependent territories in the nineteenth century. And but for the ugliness of the word, *de-imperialization* would be more apt than *decolonization* for the creation of independent states in the twentieth century.

Neither term truly encompasses one of the most extraordinary movements of the nineteenth century. Economic, social, and political change, coupled with the development of communications, contributed to worldwide migration on an altogether unprecedented scale—a movement of Asian people within and beyond Asia but even more a movement of European people to non-European parts of the world. In some cases, they built up what might properly be called colonies, though, rather confusingly, the British came to call them dominions. The great bulk of the emigrants went, however, to noncolonial territories, in particular to the former colonies of the United Kingdom, Spain, and Portugal in the Americas. They included

people from European states that had little or no overseas territory. They also included vast numbers from states that did possess empires. Between 1871 and 1901, the grand total of German emigration was 2.75 million, but only about 21,000 Germans lived in the German colonies in 1911 (Knoll and Gann 1987: 160). Even more striking—since the German Empire was a Johnny-come-lately—were the British figures: two-thirds of the British emigrants for the period from 1843 to 1910 went to destinations outside the British Empire (*Times Literary Supplement*, 24 July 1987).

These mass movements have been reversed only to the most limited extent in the post-colonial period. In some cases, there have, however, been bitter struggles, and there may be more to come. One of the bitterest was in Algeria. There, after the French conquest, a substantial number of French *colons* (colonists) established themselves, without eliminating or absorbing the existing population. They desperately opposed the breaking of the colonial link, bringing down the Fourth Republic that had managed to extricate France from Indochina only a few years before. One of the Fourth Republic’s difficulties had been with the colons in Cochinchina, far more influential than their numbers suggested.

The French, like the Germans, had talked of “colony” rather than “empire.” Eugène Étienne’s famous pressure group in the France of the late 1880s and 1890s was seen as the *parti colonial* (colonial lobby). What Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) took up in the mid-1880s was the so-called colonial question. No doubt these two countries had an obvious reason to prefer the term *colonialism* to the term *imperialism*, which was accepted in Britain by supporters as well as detractors. France attached the word *empire* to the regime of the Bonapartes, whose focus had been on Europe. The Germans, having defeated France in 1870 and 1871, had established an empire in Europe, the Second Reich.

In the case of the French at least, there was a more crucial distinction. They had, in fact, no concept of empire overseas, and no constitutional provision was made for it. The emphasis was on the republic, one and indivisible, of which all Frenchmen were deemed citizens. That included the colons and the limited number of non-French people in the overseas terri-

tories who were admitted to French citizenship. These groups were represented in the French Parliament. It was only after World War II (1939–1945) that the French sought to redesign their empire in terms of states as well as citizens, setting up the French Union.

The British had taken a different stance. At the time of the American Revolution (1775–1883), they had decided against the admission of colonial representatives in Parliament. However, the monarchy they retained gave them the possibility of establishing an empire in the sense of a congeries of states and territories. One form such an entity could take was that of a colony. Labuan was annexed as a colony in 1847, and the Straits Settlements became a colony in 1867, as did Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah) in 1946. They were not colonies of settlement, but that did not prove to be an obstacle to self-government.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also British Borneo; British Burma; British Interests in Southeast Asia; British Malaya; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Imperialism; Labuan (1847); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Portuguese Asian Empire; Preservation of Siam's Political Independence; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Spanish Philippines; Straits Settlements (1826–1941); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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"COMFORT WOMEN"

Sex Slaves of the Japanese Imperial Forces

Female prostitutes forced to serve the Japanese Imperial Forces (JIF) during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Pacific War (1941–1945) were referred to as "comfort

women," and their brothels were known as "comfort stations." The first Japanese overseas comfort station was set up in Shanghai in January 1932 when the Shanghai Incident occurred. After the Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, comfort stations were established in most of the places occupied by the JIF. Soon after the Pacific War broke out on 8 December 1941, the JIF started to set up stations in the occupied areas in Southeast Asia. In Malaya, the first one was opened in Alor Star on 19 December 1941. As of September 1942, a total of 400 comfort stations had been established: 280 in China, 100 in Southeast Asia, 10 in the South Pacific islands, and 10 in Sakhalin. The total number of comfort women is estimated to have been between 50,000 and 200,000, consisting of Koreans, Chinese, Japanese, Philippines, Indonesians, Vietnamese, Malays, Indians, Burmese, overseas Chinese, and Dutch. In Southeast Asia, some comfort women were from East Asia, but the majority were procured locally. Though not strictly followed, Japanese wartime law prohibited the sending of Japanese women abroad, with the exception of professionals over the age of twenty-one. However, there were no such restrictions in regard to female inhabitants in the colonized or occupied areas.

Some of the comfort stations were administered directly by the Imperial Army or the Imperial Navy, and those that were managed by private operators were also by and large supervised by the JIF. The main objective of setting up comfort stations was to lessen the incidence of rape of local women by Japanese soldiers, though they were proven ineffective in this respect. The means employed to procure young women were mostly deceit, abduction, coercion, and purchase. Sometimes, the JIF forced the local community leaders to supply girls for the comfort stations. And some comfort women were taken to the battlefronts.

Beginning around 1990, former comfort women began to demand an official apology and compensation from the Japanese government. Claiming the system had been run privately, the government, for its part, obstinately rejected such demands at first. However, given the revelations of various official documents that recorded the direct involvement of the JIF, the Japanese government partially admitted its responsibility in 1992.

HARA FUJIO

See also Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Miscegenation; Sexual Practices; *Sook ching*; Women in Southeast Asia

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COMINTERN

The Comintern was an association of national communist parties that was founded in 1919, with its headquarters in Moscow. The Comintern based its ideology upon the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism and declared that its primary goals were to promote the “World Communist Revolution” and establish a dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Comintern’s second congress was held in Moscow in 1920 and featured the participation of delegates from Asia. The resolutions promulgated at that meeting called for communist parties to be established in each participating country in order to train the proletariat for the seizure of state power. The Comintern’s “Twenty-One Conditions of Membership” urged “the whole-hearted support of the Soviet Republic as the base of the world revolutionary movement,” which would become one of the primary aims of all communist parties. Notwithstanding its stated purpose of promoting the World Communist Revolution, the Comintern functioned chiefly as an organ of Soviet Russia’s control over the communist movement across the globe and as an instrument of foreign policy for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

One of the conditions of membership had a direct bearing on the colonial question, for it compelled those seeking affiliation with the Comintern to denounce all the methods of their own imperialists in the colonies and to support liberation movements in the colonies by practical means. The effect of this was to ensure that all communist parties throughout the world would play an active part in bringing about the overthrow of imperialism and the liberation of colonial and dependent territories. Communists in the colonies were encouraged

to form “anti-imperialist united front” organizations with various social groups of native populations, including the national bourgeoisie. The second congress approved the structure of the ruling organs—the World Congress, the Executive Committee, and the International Controlling Commission. Only the communist parties affiliated with and supportive of Comintern made up its sections.

During the Comintern’s third congress, in 1921, the Youth Communist League and Profintern, the trade union organization of the Comintern, were established. The fourth congress, in 1922, discussed the Comintern’s national-colonial program. “To the masses!” was the slogan proclaimed at that meeting, alluding to world communism’s immediate task of enlisting the masses in its global campaign. The Asian parties were called on to participate in any movement that would give them access to the people. The fifth Comintern congress in 1924 emphasized the need to increase work with the labor unions and to strengthen the proletarian orthodoxy. At the same time, the congress called on the communists in the countries of the East to solve national and agrarian questions in the spirit of Leninism. In order to intensify communist activities in the colonies, the Central Executive Committee of the Comintern established an Eastern section, known as the Far Eastern Bureau.

The sixth congress approved the Comintern program that was designed to replace the global capitalist economy with communism. The program obliged the world proletariat to promote the building of socialism in the USSR. The communist parties were also directed to carry out a ruthless struggle against social democrats (perceived as “the last reserve of bourgeois society”) and fascism. The defense of the Soviet Union was stressed as the foremost task of the Comintern and of communist parties in all countries. On the colonial question, the Comintern position held that the national bourgeoisie could not play a progressive role in national liberation movements.

The seventh and last Comintern congress was held in 1935. It launched the “Popular Front” policy, which envisaged an agreement with bourgeois and other non-working-class organizations in a common struggle against fascism and entailed adopting a more cooperative attitude toward democratic governments and

organizations. For the communists in the colonies, that meant cooperating with their colonizing countries. With this new policy—and as a consequence of it—the former stress on proletarian revolution receded into the background for the time being. This approach represented a radical departure from previous communist tactics and from the basic statutes of the Comintern's Twenty-One Conditions of Membership, which forbade communists from coalescing with bourgeois parties. Thereafter, the conflict between Soviet national interests and world revolutionary interests was resolved by subordinating the world revolutionary strategy to the USSR's security concerns, on the grounds that the Soviet Union was the base of the World Communist Revolution and therefore had to be made safe at all costs.

With the signing of the Soviet-Nazi Pact in 1939, fascism ceased being stigmatized as the enemy in communist propaganda, and the Popular Front phase came to an end. Less than two years later, the German invasion of the USSR brought about an equally abrupt termination of Soviet-German collaboration. Fascism again became the main target of communist fulminations, and the Western powers were restored to favor.

Then, on 15 May 1943, the Comintern was dissolved. The official reasons were that there was no longer a need for an international body to guide the communist parties throughout the world and that the leading cadres of the parties in various countries had become politically mature. The prime object, however, was to allay fears of communist subversion among the USSR's Western allies in World War II (1939–1945).

LARISSA EFIMOVA

See also Burma Communist Party (BCP); Colonialism; Communism; Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Imperialism; Indochina Communist Party (1930); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Nationalism and Independence Movement in Southeast Asia; Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI); Russia and Southeast Asia; Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP)

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COMMUNISM

Communism is a system of economic and social organization whereby the community owns all property and all members of that community share in the enjoyment of the common wealth according to their needs. The origins of communism lie deep in Western thought. The mainstream of contemporary communist theory originates in Marxism—a complex of philosophical and sociopolitical doctrines formulated by European socialists Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) in the *Political Manifesto*, published in 1848, and other works. The main ideas of Marxism call for the destruction of capitalism through socialist revolution, the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, and the establishment of a new organization of society (socialism and its highest stage, communism) by the destruction of all class distinctions. Founders of the original Marxist system held that socialist revolution could only take place in urban centers in highly industrialized Western Europe, where a massive proletarian class “groaned” under the rule of the bourgeoisie. The East and the colonial question were peripheral in Marxist thought because a major part of the population in the backward and mostly feudal, colonial, and semi-colonial countries of Asia and Africa was peasants, regarded by Marx and Engels to be petty bourgeoisie.

After Marx's death, his followers began to reinterpret his doctrine. One of the main interpreters was a Russian left-wing socialist named Vladimir Lenin (1870–1924). His interpretation of Marxism was adjusted to conditions in Russia and was known as Leninism. Lenin asserted

that socialist revolution could be brought about in a single country as highly industrialized and semifeudal as Russia was. It was he who first recognized the peasantry's worth as the proletariat's ally. Lenin also emphasized the fundamental connections between imperialism and capitalism and linked the demands of subject races for the right of self-government with the anticapitalist campaign for a "World Socialist Revolution." He argued that the proletariat and the socialists of industrialized countries should advocate the struggle for the liberation of the colonial and semicolonial peoples. In this way, Asian nationalism could rally the peoples of the East to the cause of world revolution, and removal of those areas from control by the colonizing powers would mortally injure the capitalist system. Lenin stressed the importance of a revolutionary alliance—a revolutionary bloc formed by the proletariat of the advanced countries and the oppressed peoples of the enslaved colonies for the victory of the world revolution. The colonial question and revolution in the East were moved from the margins of Marxist thought to its very center.

In the 1920s, communist ideology in its Marxist and Leninist variations penetrated the East. The most well-known Asian interpreter of communism became the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Mao Zedong (1893–1976). Mao tried to adjust Marxism and Leninism to conditions in China. His contribution to communist doctrine lay in the recognition that in backward countries of the East, where the major part of the population lived in the countryside, the industrial working class (the proletariat) was too small a base on which to mount a revolution. Consequently, he formulated a new doctrine based on the belief that in the East, the socialist revolution could not be brought about in urban industrial centers. Instead, Mao advocated the establishment of a rural base that was physically separate from urban industrial centers and that was defended by an armed force. From this rural base, the Communist Party could seek to extend its power and influence outward. Instead of working-class support, the revolution would have to depend on the peasants. And instead of swift insurrection, there would be protracted war. Though it was recognized that political power grew out of the barrel of a gun, the supremacy of the party over the armed forces and of the proletariat

over the peasantry was upheld as an absolute principle.

The term *communism* is also applied to revolutionary movements inspired by Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist ideas that seek to bring about a society based on principles involving the destruction of class and common property. A number of communist parties sprang up in the world, including in East and Southeast Asia. The 1920s witnessed the emergence of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) in 1920, followed by the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. The next decade saw the establishment of the Indochina Communist Party (ICP, 1930), the Malayan Communist Party (MCP, 1930), the Communist Party of the Philippines (1930), and the Burma Communist Party (BCP, 1939). In 1942, the Communist Party of Thailand was formed. Most of the parties in Southeast Asia were encouraged and supported by the Soviet and Chinese communists, as well as the metropolitan communist parties in Europe, either directly or through the Comintern (the Communist International).

Communism was declared the official ideology and the main target of development in Soviet Russia (1917–1922) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, 1922–1991), as well as in a number of socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Asia where communist parties held the reins of state power.

LARISSA EFIMOVA

See also Burma Communist Party (BCP); Colonialism; Comintern; Imperialism; Indochina Communist Party (1930); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malaya Emergency (1948–1960); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920)

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COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA (CPK)

See Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Khmer Rouge; Pol Pot (Saltho Sar) (1925–1998)

COMMUNIST PARTY OF MALAYA (CPM)

See Malayan Communist Party (MCP)

CONFUCIANISM

Confucianism is a body of ethical thought mainly based on the teachings of Confucius (551–479 B.C.E.). Among Southeast Asian countries, only Vietnam embraced this thought. Confucianism regards the ancient times of the saints as ideal. Moralistic and ritualistic politics are advocated. According to Confucianism, the Son of Heaven, who has virtue and received the Mandate of Heaven, civilizes people with the ideal of moral and ritual order, which was thought to have existed in the golden ancient times. Hierarchy and harmony are the focus of social relationships. Three Bonds (between ruler and subject, father and son, and husband and wife) and Five Cardinal Principles (the Three Bonds plus those between elder brother and younger brother and between friend and friend) are thought to be the basis for human relationships. Rites dedicated to Heaven, deities, ancestors, and sages are valued. Among the Confucian virtues, *ren* (benevolence) and *yi* (justice) are supreme.

In China, Confucianism became a state religion by the proposal of Dong Zhong Shu (176? B.C.E.–104? B.C.E.) of the Western Han dynasty (202 B.C.E.–8 C.E.). Dong Zhong Shu advocated a correlation between Heaven's will and human affairs, and it was assumed that Heaven as a personified god gives a warning to a government mismanaging its affairs. Neo-Confucianism was invented under the Song dynasty (960–1279) and completed by Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi, 1130–1200) of the Southern Song (1127–1279). Opposing Buddhism and Taoism, neo-Confucianists added philosophical dimensions, such as the *li* (abstract principles) and *qi*

(material forces) theory, to Confucianism. Explanatory notes of the Four Books and the Five Classics by Zhu Xi were officially recognized, and neo-Confucianism established its position as the official state orthodoxy. A reconstruction of the rites system was planned. Enlightenment by private intellectuals—for example, in family rites and village rites—was advocated, in addition to enlightenment by the emperor. During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the doctrines of Wang Yang Ming (known as *Xinxue*, or the School of Mind) emerged. The Ming dynasty promulgated the Six Lessons taught by the first emperor and advocated enlightenment by the emperor. Wang Yang Ming promoted the spread of village rites as a private enterprise.

Vietnam won its independence from China in the tenth century C.E. State institutions were constructed following the Chinese system, but Confucian influence was not as strong. The influence of Buddhism was stronger from the tenth century to the thirteenth century. In the fourteenth century, a civil service examination system was developed, and regional, metropolitan, and palace examinations began. The Le dynasty (1428–1789), which won its independence from the temporary rule of the Ming dynasty in the early fifteenth century, introduced the Chinese system more faithfully than preceding dynasties had. In the times of Emperor Le Thanh Tong (r. 1460–1497), the civil service examination system and a school system were developed, and many Confucian intellectuals were educated. Confucian moralities of the Three Bonds came to be emphasized by the dynasty. The Forty-Seven Articles of Enlightenment were promulgated in the latter half of the seventeenth century. In these articles, the Five Cardinal Principles and moralities in villages were regarded as important, and Buddhism and folk belief were severely criticized. That criticism demonstrated the prosperity of Buddhism and folk belief then. In the eighteenth century, cheating on the civil service examination became quite common. As for the Forty-Seven Articles of Enlightenment, periodical reading in villages was advocated, but such a practice did not take root. However, the Tho Mai Family Rites (Tho Mai Gia Le) were edited on the basis of Zhu Xi's Family Rites, demonstrating the deepening of enlightenment as a private enterprise.

The Nguyễn dynasty (1802–1945) was the first dynasty to unify the north and the south. It

held examinations and developed the school system on a countrywide scale. Emperor Minh Mang (r. 1820–1841) promulgated the Ten Maxims, which preached Confucian moralities, and mandated the periodical reading of them in towns and villages. Emperor Tu Duc (r. 1847–1883) translated the Ten Maxims, originally written in Classical Chinese, into Vietnamese and transcribed them into *chu nom* (southern characters) for broad distribution. In the early twentieth century, the Four Books and the Five Classics were removed as examination subjects, and Confucianism was less emphasized. The last palace examination was held in 1919. Thus, Confucianism as a state orthodoxy ended, although Tran Trong Kim tried to reinstate it between 1930 and the 1940s. The argument on the significance of Confucianism continues today.

Several features distinguish Vietnamese Confucianism. First, there was little interest in philosophical dimensions such as *li qi* theory. Second, no influence of Wang Yang Ming's doctrines has been found in the Vietnamese context. Third, the argument regarding the correlation between God's will and human affairs appeared often in the Nguyễn emperor's discourses. Fourth, local teachers educated many intellectuals in the rural areas. Fifth, Confucian intellectuals often conducted Taoistic practice, as well. And sixth, in the years since ritual Confucianism was ended in the country, the Vietnamese-specific belief in spirits has persisted.

SHIMAO MINORU

See also Buddhism, Mahayana; Le Dynasty (1428–1527; 1533–1789); Le Thanh Tong (r. 1460–1497); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945)

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CONSTITUTIONAL (BLOODLESS) REVOLUTION (1932) (THAILAND)

The Constitutional Revolution of 24 June 1932, staged by a group of mainly junior military and civilian officials organized underground as the People's Party, overthrew the absolute monarchy of Siam (Thailand). The coup took only three hours and caused no casualties. The People's Party then set about creating a constitution based on the concept of popular sovereignty. The monarchy was not abolished, but it was made subject to constitutional rules. Consequently, this 1932 coup has retrospectively been known as the Bloodless Constitutional Revolution.

In historical perspective, it is clear that the coup was the outcome of political conflicts generated by the political and social changes initiated during the long reign of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910), in response to the impact of and pressure from Western colonial powers. Modeled after the "new" colonial policies and administration of the Netherlands East Indies and British India, Chulalongkorn's reforms succeeded in creating a large, new, functionally organized civil service that allowed the monarch to centralize power in an unprecedented manner. But these reforms were much less successful in effecting greater social equality and justice for the king's subjects. Gradually, members of the new bureaucracy, into which many able commoners were necessarily recruited, began to resent the monopoly of high office by royalty and aristocrats and to see advantages in a republican form of government. The impending internal political conflict at the end of Chulalongkorn's reign was thus over whether the ruling regime should continue or should be modernized and transformed into a democratic state, with or

without the monarchy. Still in full control of the government and the newly modernized army, the monarchy and upper-class elite were convinced that the implementation of a democratic form of government in Siam, allowing the population full political participation, was not a serious issue. For them, democracy in Siam was inappropriate and even farcical.

The seeds of the successful revolt against the absolute monarchy were sown during the reign of Chulalongkorn's son, King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) (r. 1910–1925). As early as 1912, a coup was attempted by a group of junior military officials whose political goal, in part influenced by the Chinese Republican Revolution of 1911, was the establishment of a republican form of government. The monarchy reacted to the failure of the coup and the growing restiveness of a new generation of government officials by instituting repression. Not long afterward, however, King Vajiravudh built a miniature town that he called Dusit Thani, whose residents were members of the nobility and government officials, to conduct experiments in self-government and as a living showcase of “democracy already at work” in the kingdom. Yet the king continued to appoint his favorites to powerful positions at court and in the government, causing great dissatisfaction among the senior royal princes and criticism within the emerging public sphere and among commoner civilian and military officials.

By the time that King Prajadhipok (Rama VII) (r. 1925–1935) succeeded to the throne, newspapers and magazines had spread the call for a constitution widely among the urban and educated populace of the kingdom. King Prajadhipok tried to salvage the declining image of the monarchy and its administration by creating the Supreme Council of State, consisting of senior members of the royal family, many of whom had been made inactive in government affairs during the previous reign. Feeling the pressure of the times, the king inclined toward the idea of promulgating a constitution as a means to restore faith in the regime. But his American adviser and the high nobility, including the members of the Supreme Council of State, were not supportive. The king therefore postponed the proclamation of any constitution. Meanwhile, the world economic depression had set in (1929–1931), and Siam was seriously affected by the plummeting prices of rice

and rubber on the international market. The state's finances had already been badly strained by the extravagance of Rama VI's reign, and the depression increased pressure for steep cuts in government spending and more taxes with stiff penalties imposed upon the people. Many Thai were hurt by these policies, but those best positioned to express their resentment were the urban educated, many of whom had their salaries cut or were dismissed from the civil service.

The seeds of the revolution sprouted inside the country, but those seeds had been brought home by Thai students who had studied overseas. In 1926, a group of seven government scholarship students in their mid-twenties, led by Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983), a student in law and political economy at the University of Paris, got together in a student's dormitory in the Latin Quarter to “promote” a new future for Siam. They agreed to set up a political group to push for a change of the government in Bangkok. Their underground activities continued after they returned home to serve in civil and military posts. The so-called Promoters' plan came closer to reality when Colonel Phraya Phahonphonphayuhasena (Phot Phahonyothin), a senior military officer in the Royal Artillery whose sincere and humble character earned him respect and trust from many military as well as civilian officials of the time, agreed to lead the group. He had graduated from a military academy in Germany and afterward was sent on tour to Japan to study the Japanese army.

The revolution finally broke out in Bangkok very early in the morning of 24 June with a swift military takeover of Government House. Shortly thereafter, a large group of officer cadets, soldiers, and sailors were ordered to attend and observe a supposed training session for the cadets on the grounds in front of the Ananta Samakhom Throne Hall. Standing atop a tank, Phot Phahonyothin declared to this surprised audience that the People's Party had seized the government from the absolute monarchy regime. The royal government and the senior princes were unable to make any effective resistance, not least because King Prajadhipok was on vacation at his seaside palace, “Klai Kangwol” (*Sans Souci*, or Far from Worries), several hours away from the capital by train. Proclamation No. 1 of the People's Party, which served as the manifesto of the coup

group, strongly condemned the monarchy's favoritism toward princes of blood and accused the absolutist of exploiting the people in hard times. It also demolished the ruling myth behind centuries of the absolute power and the righteousness of the monarchy. Not the king, according to the People's Party, but the people were the true owners of the country, and they themselves should rule it. Issuing Proclamation No. 1 was probably the most radical act by the coup group. And had it then been acted upon consistently, something like a real revolution might have developed.

The announced policy of the People's Party was summed up in six principles:

- To maintain absolute national independence in all respects, including the political, the judicial, and the economic
- To maintain national security both externally and internally
- To promote economic well-being by creating full employment and by launching a national economic plan
- To guarantee equality for all
- To grant complete liberty and freedom to the people, provided that this did not contradict the preceding principles
- To provide education for the people

In fact, the Promoters quite quickly backed off from the republican radicalism of Proclamation No. 1: Pridi and other leaders of the People's Party apologized to the king for the proclamation's "defamatory" language about the royal family. Soon came a period of negotiation and compromise between the old order and its adversaries, resulting in the appointment of several former high-ranking nobles to an interim cabinet. Two important figures who played a crucial role at this juncture were Phraya Manopakorn and Phraya Srivisarvaja. Manopakorn was a chief judge of the Court of Appeals and was named prime minister. Srivisarvaja, former permanent secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was appointed foreign minister. (Ironically, he had helped to deter Prajadhipok from granting a constitution.)

Subsequent negotiations between King Prajadhipok and the People's Party resulted in the promulgation of the supposedly permanent Constitution of 1932, replacing an interim constitution written solely by Pridi of the People's

Party. The 1932 Constitution created a unicameral parliament consisting of two categories of representatives in equal numbers. Because of the political "immaturity" of the common people, it was declared that the first category of members of Parliament (MPs) would be elected not directly but by delegates of the people, whereas the second category of MPs were to be nominated by the People's Party with royal consent. Direct election by the people—and the elimination of the second category of MPs—would be instituted when more than half the population had completed four years of primary education, a process to be completed in not more than ten years. The first indirect election took place on 15 November 1933. The *tambon* (subdistrict) representatives gathered in the provincial governors' offices to cast their votes for the parliamentary candidates, who presented their policies in speeches that day. Most of the successful candidates were respected local figures.

But the Constitution of 1932 by no means settled the conflicts between the People's Party and the court. The former worked to exclude aristocrats from the new arenas of democratic politics; the king and his circle resisted, insisting on Prajadhipok's prerogatives as a constitutional monarch.

Nine months after "the change of government" (*kan plian plang kan pokkrong*)—the phrase commonly used today to describe the 1932 Revolution—the first crisis broke out. Pridi had drafted in outline form an economic plan designed to fulfill the People's Party's stated commitment to ending unemployment and promoting social equality. This plan called for comprehensive state planning for and management of the economy, including the nationalization of industries and services. Private property, however, was to be respected. Pridi's initiative allowed the court and its allies to go on the offensive. The king himself wrote a detailed, confidential critique of the plan, which was promptly leaked by Foreign Minister Phraya Srivisarvaja. Prime Minister Phraya Manopakorn, together with a faction of senior army members of the People's Party led by Colonel Phraya Songsuradej, thereupon denounced the whole plan as a communist plot.

An uproar broke out during the debate in the National Assembly in reaction to this campaign and to the prime minister's transparent

threats to the leaders of the People's Party. Phraya Manopakorn then threw down the gauntlet by proroguing the National Assembly and issuing, on his own authority, an anticommunist law. Pridi was forced to leave for voluntary exile in Europe. When the military group within the People's Party under Colonel Phahol and Lieutenant Colonel Phibul (Phibun-songkhram) discovered that Phraya Manopakorn's and Phrya Songsuradej's factions were moving to eliminate the People's Party and to restore the absolute monarchy, they reacted swiftly. They executed a preemptive counter-coup, taking over the government and declaring Parliament open once again. Colonel Phahol became prime minister and Phibul minister of defense. In 1934, Pridi returned from his exile in France, and over the next years, he became, successively, minister of the interior, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of finance.

This setback to the royalists and the consequent strengthening of the younger and more progressive Promoters in the new government engendered a violent reaction. In October 1933, on the eve of Siam's first elections, provincial military units under the command of Prince Boworadet, a former minister of war under the absolute monarchy, marched down to Bangkok. The heavy fighting took place north of the capital, resulting in many deaths and casualties on both sides. But the rebellion was eventually suppressed by government troops under Lieutenant Colonel Phibul. The Boworadet Rebellion thus reintroduced into the infant constitutional system the old practice of employing force to overthrow a government.

Phraya Manopakorn's authoritarian proroguing of the National Assembly in 1933, together with the Boworadet Rebellion in the same year, destroyed the fragile understanding between King Prajadhipok and the People's Party. Although the king was not directly involved in either case, he had been implicated by the use of his name. Further unresolved conflicts finally led the king to abdicate the throne in 1935 (while in England for medical attention).

From 1934 to 1938, political stability and national sovereignty came to the government and the country. The much abused traditional practices of poll taxes, forced labor, and confiscation of peasants' land and property to pay their debts were finally abolished. The structures of government and the development of

political democracy, as outlined in the constitution, were based on a three-stage program: a period of military rule, a period of political tutelage, and a period of full constitutional government. These ideas closely resemble Sun Yat-sen's (1866–1925) theory of a three-stage revolution for China.

Underlying this political theory was a strong emphasis on popular education as a prerequisite for attaining political democracy. Educational progress was a significant component of national policy in the first four years of the government led by the People's Party. But private initiatives were also encouraged, the most remarkable of which was Pridi's personal founding of Thammasat University, the country's first open university, in 1934, specifically intended to develop that culture of citizenship that democracy requires.

As self-proclaimed defenders of the people, the Promoters were necessarily also nationalists. Nothing grated on their nationalist sensibilities more than the extraterritorial privileges forced on the absolute monarchy through a series of unequal treaties with Western powers and with Japan. By 1937, thanks largely to Pridi's efforts, these treaties were all terminated, and Siam was, for the first time, able to stand as a visibly independent nation-state.

The important legacy of the 1932 Revolution thus was the termination of the absolute monarchy and its replacement by a constitutional government based on the sovereignty of the people. Thailand thereby entered the historical era of formal bourgeois democracy, along with other former colonial and semi-colonial states in Asia. But Thailand's entry into that era occurred only with hesitation. The People's Party, born inside the absolutist bureaucracy, proved unable to transcend its origins fully. In an overwhelmingly rural society with a high degree of illiteracy, it had no large and firm popular base. It was quite easy to seize and retain power once the royalists had been crushed, but it was much more difficult to transform and modernize society in a thoroughgoing way. In significant respects, then, the coup of 1932 was actually the replacement of one elite by a newer and more modern one, while large segments of Thai society continued much as before. In this sense, "the Revolution of 1932" is mostly a misnomer. At the same time, 24 June 1932 does

mark a turning point in Siam's history. There would be no reversion to absolutism, the prestige of the aristocracy was permanently damaged, and institutions and policies were created that opened the way for democratic popular participation in the longer run.

THANET APHRONSUVAN

See also Chinese Revolution (1911); Indigenous Political Power; Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Plaek Phibunsongkhram, Field Marshal (1897–1964); Prajadhipok (Rama VII) (r. 1925–1935); Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983); Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Sun Yat-sen, Dr. (1866–1925); Thammasat University; Vajiravudh (Rama VI) (r. 1910–1925)

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CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BURMA (1900–1941)

Burma was an integral province of British India until 1937. Consequently, constitutional developments in Burma between the beginning of the twentieth century and the Japanese invasion of the colony in 1941 shadowed constitutional developments in British India. There, the intention of constitutional policy was, after World War I (1914–1918), the creation of a viable, self-governing, democratic state that would be managed by politicians who would be attracted by its institutions and would implement policies sympathetic to British economic and

strategic interests. Creating India and Burma as integral parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations as it operated in the 1930s was the ultimate but distant goal. The internal form this was to take was the establishment of a political system that was modeled on British parliamentary democracy, with an elected parliament, a cabinet responsible to the parliamentary majority, and a nonpolitical civil service to administer the state.

In January 1886, British Burma (present-day Myanmar) was created as a unified province. This political entity included Arakan and Tenasserim (both captured in 1826), Lower Burma including the Irrawaddy Delta and Pegu (annexed in 1852), the remainder of what is now the country of Myanmar (that is, Upper Burma), and what was known as the Frontier Areas. This entity was formally under the charge of a chief commissioner who was responsible to the governor-general of India. In 1897, after peace had been established in the province, the chief commissioner was replaced by a lieutenant governor. Assisting him was the small and purely advisory Legislative Council of 9 appointed members, all British officials except for 2 European businessmen. The council was expanded to 15 members in 1909, with 4 Burmese, 1 Indian, and 1 Chinese, all appointed by the lieutenant governor. It was again expanded in 1920 to include 30 members—there were 10 Burmese, 2 Indians, and 1 Chinese, with the remaining positions filled by officials and businessmen, almost all of whom were British.

During World War I, the British government in London repeatedly stated that the intention of colonial policy in India after the war would be to create conditions conducive to development and democracy under British tutelage. However, initially, it was believed that Burma was not “ready” for the first steps in self-government, and accordingly, it was excluded from the reforms introduced in 1919. At that time, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, named after the viceroy and the secretary of state for India, were incorporated in the Government of India Act of 1919. That act established a system of government known as a dyarchy in the provinces of India proper but excluded Burma. Dyarchy allowed for elected Indians to be responsible for some government departments while ultimate power, especially over defense,

financial affairs, and foreign policy, remained in the hands of British officials, including the governors of Indian provinces.

The consequence of excluding Burma from the constitutional advances in India at that time was a nationalist campaign demanding the introduction of a more democratic political system than the then governor, Sir Percy Reginald Craddock (t. 1917–1922), had been willing to contemplate. Soon, amid widespread political protests in Burma, two delegations of Burmese politicians arrived in London and demanded that the dyarchy be extended to the colony. The secretary of state relented, and the British Parliament passed legislation to that effect in 1921. Responsibility for education and forests was given to Burmese elected politicians from 1922 onward, but their powers were limited, and the change did not affect the running of the government. Nor did their powers extend to the entire country. The Frontier Areas remained exclusively under the control of the governor. The new system was not popular, and very few people bothered to vote in the elections held every three years after 1922.

In 1928, the British government established the Simon Commission to review how dyarchy was working and to make recommendations for the next stages of tutelary democracy. It was followed by the Indian Round Table Conference (November 1930–January 1931) and the Burma Round Table Conference (November 1931–January 1932), which were efforts to gain the consent of nationalist politicians for constitutional reforms that would retain ultimate powers in the hands of the British. The conclusions of these conferences were that India and Burma should be given a greater degree of self-government under revised constitutional structures. Over the objections of the government of India, it was also decided that Burma should be separated from India and established as a discrete entity under the secretary of state for India and for Burma.

A large number of people in Burma had been advocating such a separation for many years. It was argued that, culturally and administratively, Burma was sufficiently different from India to justify a separate government. The absence of immigration controls between the two regions angered many Burmese, who saw the proportion of Indians in the total population rise within a short period of time to nearly 10

percent. Moreover, extensive Indian ownership of agricultural land and many industries was seen as holding back the advancement of the Burmese nation. Most Burmese nationalist politicians concurred with the government of Burma that India was draining their country of much-needed revenues through a fiscal system that operated in India. The demand for separation was clearly popular, and the Legislative Council endorsed the conclusions of the Burma Round Table Conference in February 1932.

Separation was to be the major issue in the next elections for the Legislative Council, to be held in November 1932. Although it was widely expected that political parties that favored separation would easily dominate the new council, the power of money in politics was soon to change the balance of power. None of the pro-separatist political parties were able to raise much in the way of funds to back their election campaigns. However, their opponents, the politicians who advocated federation with India, were well financed by Indian businesses that believed their interests would be harmed by a separate Burmese political authority with autonomous control over immigration, financial flows, and the like. A number of leading politicians who initially advocated separation switched sides toward the end of campaigning. The antiseparatists won the election but then immediately began to backtrack, as they realized that the result had not been in the interest of the Burmese.

To resolve the issue, the British government called another Burma Round Table Conference to consult Burmese political opinion. After long and inconclusive consultations, the British Parliament concluded in 1934 that Burma would be established as a separate entity with the power to regulate trade and immigration with India after a transitional period. This arrangement was established in the Government of Burma Act (1935), which, in effect, became the constitution of Burma until the Japanese invasion in 1942. The act provided for a two-house legislature. The lower house, known as the Legislative Assembly, was to be fully elected, whereas the upper house, or Senate, was appointed by the governor. The governor's cabinet, which would be formed with majority support from the Legislative Assembly, would have responsibility for all government matters in Burma proper except for defense, finance,

and foreign affairs. Those areas remained the prerogative of the governor, as did all the affairs of the Frontiers Area Administration. The Legislative Council had 132 members. Although the majority of these members were elected at large, there was separate representation provided for ethnic minorities. Twelve seats were reserved for Karens, 8 for Indians, 2 for Anglo-Burmans, and 3 for Europeans. In addition, there were 12 seats set aside for the various ethnic communities' chambers of commerce and 4 for labor unions. One seat was reserved for Rangoon University.

In the first and only election held under the 1935 Constitution, no party won a majority of seats, so a great deal of jockeying for position ensued to put together a coalition government. The man who succeeded in forming the first cabinet and who became the first premier was Dr. Ba Maw (t. 1937–1939). He remained in power until his majority dissolved following widespread public demonstrations, including anti-Indian riots in Rangoon and elsewhere. U Pu formed the second government in 1939, but it fell in turn the following year as the coalition broke up over internal divisions. The last government was formed by U Saw, who had been the forest minister in Pu's government and had been instrumental in bringing down Ba Maw's government. The second elections, scheduled to take place in 1941, were postponed because of the Pacific War (1941–1945).

During the five years that the Government of Burma Act of 1935 was in force, Burmese politicians and British civil servants developed a new working relationship with each other. By establishing what the Burmese press referred to as the "91 Departments Government"—denoting the 91 government areas that were now under Burmese ministerial jurisdiction—the 1935 act gave Burmese politicians significant political power, something they did not have under the dyarchy. The tone for working under the new constitution was set both by the two British governors who operated it and by the exigencies that their governments faced. After 1937, both governors were themselves politicians. Sir Archibald Cochrane (t. 1936–1941), the inaugural governor, was a somewhat dour individual who kept power and information to himself. His successor, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith (t. 1941–1946), favored a far more open style of government and was willing to enter into politi-

cal negotiations with his ministers. U Saw proved to be a master in this arena, and he was in the process of achieving significant advances in terms of increasing the Burmese proportion of the civil service and gaining control over Indian immigration. The Pacific War ended this experiment in tutelary democracy. But had it not occurred, one can at least speculate that Burma would have developed a political system more like that of India or Malaysia today rather than the military domination that has existed for most of the years since independence in 1948.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Aung San (1915–1947); Ba Maw, Dr. (b. 1893); British Burma; British India, Government of; Dorman-Smith, Sir Reginald (t. 1941–1946); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Thakin (Lord, Master); University of Rangoon

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CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES (1900–1941)

During the American colonial period (1898–1946), the Philippines did not have its own constitution until 1935. Instead, American laws specifically passed for the Philippines replaced

the constitution that was framed by Filipinos in Malolos, Bulacan, in 1898. In general, the provisions of the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution applied to the Philippines, except for the right to bear arms and the right to a trial by jury. Filipinos lobbied for independence early in the colonial period, and their efforts, together with anti-imperialist sentiment in the United States, resulted in passage of the Jones Law in 1916, which promised the Philippines independence once stable government had been achieved. No steps were taken by the Americans to have Filipinos prepare a constitution, however, until the 1930s. Filipinos formed an independence congress in 1930 to thrash out potential problems related to independence, and they made recommendations in regard to the framing of a constitution.

Formal steps to draft a constitution were to be taken after the passage of a definitive independence law in the U.S. Congress, a law that would have to be approved by Filipinos. In 1934, the Tydings-McDuffie Law was passed by Congress and accepted by the Filipinos. Immediately thereafter, a constitutional convention was created. The convention drafted a constitution that was ratified in 1935 and became known as the 1935 Constitution. It had to be approved by the U.S. president and thus was written partially to gain acceptance in Washington. This constitution became the basic charter for the Philippine Commonwealth government, a semiautonomous government that would prepare the Philippines for independence in 1946. The 1935 Constitution, minus the transitory provisions, was also intended to serve as the basic law of the Philippine Republic that would be established in 1946. It set up a republican state based on the American model, with governmental powers separated into the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. The 1935 Constitution was amended in 1940 to turn the unicameral legislature into a bicameral body, and the length of the president's term was changed. As amended, that constitution served as the basic law of the Philippines until 1973, when a new constitution was ratified during the period of martial law (from 1972 to 1981) under President Ferdinand E. Marcos (t. 1965–1986).

When the Americans formally acquired the Philippines in 1898, under the terms of the Treaty of Paris, the Philippines had already established a republican government with a con-

stitution that had been framed and adopted in Malolos, Bulacan. However, the United States recognized neither the Philippine Republic nor the 1898 Constitution; instead, the Americans implemented a military government from 1898 to 1901. Thereafter, a civil government was established, which, as noted, applied most provisions of the U.S. Bill of Rights. The Philippines was governed by policies set by the U.S. president as carried out by the War Department; this arrangement was formally approved by the U.S. Congress in the Philippine Act of 1902, which gave the president the power to govern the Philippines. The direct representative of the president was the governor-general, who was head of the Philippine Commission that acted as the legislative and executive body in the Philippines. In 1907, under the provisions of the Act of 1902, Filipinos were allowed to participate in the legislative process with the creation of an elective assembly. The Philippine Assembly served as the lower house of the Philippine legislature, but all its bills had to be approved by the U.S. governor-general and the U.S. president.

In 1916, in line with the American democratic policy of self-determinism and independence for the Philippines, the Jones Law was passed. The legislature was changed to the all-Filipino Senate and House of Representatives, following the U.S. model. The Jones Law did not have any provisions for framing a constitution, however, and all laws passed by Filipinos had to be approved by the American governor-general and the president. Filipinos lobbied for independence under the Jones Law, sending special delegations of political leaders to the United States to champion the cause. In 1924, the Fairfield Bill was filed in the U.S. Congress, advocating that the Philippines be granted independence after a thirty-year transition period. The bill did not pass due to opposition by Filipino politicians led by Manuel L. Quezon (1878–1944), on grounds that the transition period was too long.

With no acceptable independence bills in the U.S. Congress, the Philippine legislature passed a measure that would provide for a nationwide plebiscite on the independence question. The bill was vetoed by Governor-General Leonard Wood (t. 1921–1927), sustained by President Calvin Coolidge (t. 1923–1929). To further the cause of independence and show

the Filipinos' readiness for it, the First Independence Congress was held in Manila in February 1930. The congress discussed various problems the Philippines faced in regard to independence and made recommendations preparatory to drafting a constitution.

The Americans passed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act in 1933, providing for Philippines independence, but it was rejected by the Philippine legislature. Subsequently, the Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed after Quezon went to the United States seeking a more acceptable independence measure. That act was passed in 1934 and was accepted by the Philippine legislature.

The Tydings-McDuffie Act provided for a constitutional convention to be called no later than 1 October 1934. It also set basic requirements for the constitution: that it be republican in form, that it include a bill of rights, and that it be approved by the president of the United States. The measure also stated that any amendments to the constitution would have to be approved by the U.S. president.

Special elections were called on 10 July 1934 for delegates to the convention. The 202 delegates met in an inaugural session twenty days later. The oldest delegate, Teodoro Sandiko, had signed the 1898 Constitution; the youngest, Wenceslao Q. Vinzons, a former provincial governor, was twenty-five years old. Elected president of the convention was Claro M. Recto, a former senator.

The convention worked for six months, finishing on 8 February 1935 with the formal approval of the draft constitution. The document was formally signed by the delegates on 19 February 1935 and was approved by U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt (t. 1933–1945) on 23 March 1935. The Filipino people ratified it in a plebiscite on 14 May 1935.

The 1935 Constitution had seventeen articles that covered the national territory, national principles, the bill of rights, citizenship, suffrage, the civil service, and the conservation and utilization of natural resources. Also included were transitory provisions related to the country's shift in status from a colony to an independent republic, as well as the framework for creating a democratic republican state following the U.S. model. The government would follow the principle of the separation of powers and have three separate and equal branches—the executive,

legislative, and judiciary. An elected president would head the executive branch; a unicameral national assembly would comprise the legislative branch; and a supreme court, together with regional and other courts, would form the judiciary. The president would have one six-year term.

Transitory provisions provided for the establishment of an American high commissioner to represent the U.S. president in the Philippines. They also addressed trade and immigration relations between the United States and the Philippines, currency and security limitations, and the continuance of American military and naval bases even after independence.

The 1935 Constitution served as the basis of the Philippine Commonwealth government and was meant to remain in force for the Philippine Republic that would be inaugurated after a ten-year transition period, on 4 July 1946.

Pursuant to the provisions of the 1935 Constitution, national elections were held on 17 September 1935. Manuel L. Quezon won as president, with Sergio Osmeña (1878–1961) as vice-president. Representatives of the National Assembly were also chosen in the first elections held under the constitution. The Commonwealth government was inaugurated on 15 November 1935.

The ruling Nacionalista Party met in July 1939 to consider amendments to correct weaknesses in the 1935 Constitution and, ostensibly in reaction to popular demand, to extend Quezon's term as president. Under the original provisions for the presidency, Quezon's term was to end in 1941, so an amendment was necessary in order to extend his stay in office. After much discussion, three amendments were formulated to: (1) change the terms of the president and vice-president to four years, with reelection, thereby giving a maximum of eight straight years for any one person; (2) change the unicameral National Assembly into a bicameral legislature to consist of the Senate and the House of Representatives; and (3) establish the independent Commission on Elections to supervise all official elections.

The National Assembly approved the amendments on 11 April 1940, and the Filipino people ratified them in a plebiscite on 18 June 1940. After President Roosevelt approved the amendments on 2 December 1940, the 1935

Constitution as amended went into force. This constitution remained in force throughout the rest of the Commonwealth years, including the years of the Pacific War (1941–1945) and those of the Philippine Republic inaugurated on 4 July 1946. It would be superseded by a constitution drafted in another constitutional convention convened in 1971; the new constitution would be ratified under the martial law regime of President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

The constitutional developments during the American regime in the Philippines showed that the Filipino people had an active political capacity. And for its part, the United States proved to be a permissive colonial power. The 1935 Constitution was the first document of its type to be created by Southeast Asian people under colonial rule.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989); Martial Law (1972–1981) (The Philippines); Osmeña, Sergio, Sr. (1878–1961); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration; Philippines–U.S. “Special Relationship”; Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia

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CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY OF MALAYA/MALAYSIA

Like Thailand and Cambodia, Malaysia has a constitutional monarchy. The idea of a Malay ruler being guided by a written law can be traced to the *Undang-Undang Melaka* or *Hukum Kanun Melaka*, the laws of Melaka, which became the basis for the written laws of the various Malay sultanates after Melaka fell to the Portuguese in 1511. The development of the mod-

ern Malay constitutional monarchy was enhanced by the Residential System introduced by the British in Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang beginning in 1874. When the Federated Malay States (FMS) was formed in 1896 to streamline the administration of the four states, the Durbar, or Conference of Rulers, was instituted as a forum for the sultans to meet and express views on issues pertaining to their states. In the meantime, to guarantee its independence and to avoid direct foreign (British) intervention, Johor promulgated its modern constitution (the *Undang-Undang Tubuh Kerajaan Johor*) in 1895, which expressly prohibited even the sultan himself from ceding any part of the Johor territory to a foreign power. In the same light, Terengganu introduced its modern constitution in 1911. In general, in addition to the British Resident or Adviser, Malay rulers shared power with their respective state councils.

The Federation of Malaya/Malaysia Constitution stipulates that the nine hereditary Malay rulers will elect from among themselves the *yang di-pertuan agong*, or supreme head of state/paramount ruler (king), who shall hold office for a maximum of five years and be succeeded by another ruler likewise elected. Seniority is an important criterion; however, some rulers have declined on the basis of advanced age. The nine Malay sultans of the peninsular Malay States (Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Pahang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Johor) form the Majlis Raja-Raja (the post-independence term for the Conference of Rulers), where the election is held.

Article 40 of the constitution states that the king “shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet,” headed by the prime minister. The amended Article 66 (4A) rules that a bill shall automatically become law thirty days after it has been presented to the king.

The king is the head of state in Malaysia and ceremoniously convenes and dissolves Parliament upon the advice of the prime minister. As each Malay sultan is the head of the Islamic faith in his own state, the king assumes this role for Penang, Melaka, Sabah, and Sarawak. The king can grant a royal pardon to a death-row inmate’s appeal.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX) (r. 1946–); Constitutional (Bloodless)

Revolution (1932) (Thailand); Federated Malay States (FMS) (1896); Johor; Melaka; Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB, Malay Islamic Monarchy); Pahang; Penang (1786); Residential System (Malaya); Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–) *Undang-Undang Laut* (Melaka Maritime Laws/Code); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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CONSULADO

Merchants within Manila and certain other cities of the Spanish Empire were authorized to form guildlike organizations (*consulados*) with an executive composed of a "prior" and two "consuls" indirectly elected annually or biennially by the entire membership. Among the Manila consulado's most significant responsibilities after 1769 was the apportionment of the vouchers, or *boletas*, that entitled Spanish residents to cargo space on the two galleons each year that were the only authorized vessels permitted to transport Asian luxury merchandise across the Pacific to Acapulco. In general, affairs of a commercial nature were dealt with by these merchants, who organized themselves into a special court known as the *tribunal de consulado* (tribunal of commerce), with a jurisdiction confined to Manila but covering questions of mercantile obligation, commercial rights, and contracts. Decisions were reached more in accordance with the provisions of equity than through strict conformity with the letter of the law. Officers and seamen involved in the galleon trade were also subject to the court's jurisdiction while it persisted (until 1811). Appeals were referred to the *tribunal de alzas* (court of appeal), composed of a magistrate

from the high court and two merchants, and in the final resort to the Council of the Indies. In 1834, the tribunal de consulado was replaced by the *real tribunal de comercio* (royal court of commerce), and its jurisdiction finally was merged with that of the ordinary courts by a royal decree of 1 February 1869.

GREG BANKOFF

See also Galleon Trade; Hispanization; Manila; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Spanish Philippines

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COUNTRY TRADERS

Country trade was the term used by the British East India Company (EIC) in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to describe the external commerce of India conducted privately and not with its own ships. The company's royal charter granted a monopoly of trade east of the Cape of Good Hope, but by the early eighteenth century, the EIC acknowledged private trade as useful; from the middle of the century, it left the bulk of external trade to country traders. These individuals were either the EIC's own officials, who were permitted to trade on their own account outside India itself, or merchants based in India under license. The trade was recorded in the company's books, and taxes were paid on it.

Until the mid-eighteenth century, country traders rarely ventured beyond Tenasserim, Kedah, and Aceh but were attracted eastward, largely by the rapid expansion of the China trade. They collected tropical produce from the

Indonesian archipelago, and beginning in the 1780s, they turned to the opium trade, which the company preferred to leave in private hands. The country trade was stimulated by the foundation of Penang—which was acquired for the company in 1786 by a Madras-based country trader named Francis Light (1740–1794)—and by the occupation of Dutch Java, Melaka, and the Moluccas during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815).

Country trade agency houses, mainly based in Bengal or Madras, were initially financed almost entirely by company servants in their private capacity and were often staffed by former officials. The end of the company's Indian trade monopoly in 1813 attracted free traders from Britain, who were not welcomed at first by country traders and found it difficult to compete. But they had broken into the archipelago trade by the time Singapore was founded in 1819, and the loss of the company's monopoly of the China trade in 1833 ended the country trade.

C. M. TURNBULL

See also Aceh (Acheh); Agency-Houses, European; Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); British India, Government of; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Jungle/Forest Products; Junk Ceylon (Ujung Salang, Phuket); Light, Captain Francis (1740–1794); Napoleonic Wars in Asia; Opium; Penang (1786); Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); Singapore (1819); Spices and the Spice Trade; Straits of Melaka; Straits Settlements (1826–1941); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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CRUZ, APOLINARIO DE LA (1814/1815–1841)

Nationalist *Avant-la-lettre*

Apolinario de la Cruz was the founder of a religious organization that attracted large numbers of followers in the provinces of Tayabas, Laguna, and Batangas in the Philippines in 1840 and 1841. He is generally regarded as a Filipino hero, a nationalist *avant-la-lettre* (fore-runner).

Cruz was born in 1814 or 1815 to a relatively well-to-do peasant family in the town of Lucban, in what was then called the province of Tayabas (present-day Quezon). He was deeply religious and wanted to enter the monastic life. For this purpose, he went to Manila at the age of fifteen. However, as a native Filipino, an *indio*, he was not allowed to join one of the religious orders. He worked as a lay brother in the hospital of San Juan de Dios, a charitable institution in Manila. He also became a lay preacher and begged for alms. In 1832, he belonged to a group of people who founded a confraternity, the Cofradia de San José—an association focused on the worship of God, praying, promoting union among its members, and practicing charity.

In 1840, Apolinario de la Cruz, who had become known as *Kakang Pule* (Elder Brother Pule), returned to Lucban. There, he established a chapter of the Cofradia and sent representatives to towns in the surrounding provinces to spread the word. Cruz also submitted a request to the government to officially recognize the Cofradia. The local friar became jealous and suspicious of the popularity of the association, and he alerted the Spanish authorities. The Spaniards suspected the confraternity of being a political and subversive organization. What especially aroused suspicion among the Spaniards was the fact that the Cofradia accepted only pure-blooded *indios*, not Spaniards or mestizos, and that the leaders traveled around in the countryside, preaching and recruiting members to the movement. The request for recognition was rejected, and the Lucban friar urged the authorities to dissolve the association. Local officials undertook a halfhearted attempt to arrest some of the members.

To escape this harassment, Cruz and many of his followers moved to the neighboring province of Laguna, where they attracted large numbers of adherents. In September 1841, they

established a camp in a village near the town of Bay, where followers from all sides responded to the call to join the movement. On 23 October 1841, a group of Spanish militia, police, and supporters of the friars, led by the governor of Tayabas, attacked the Cofradia camp, but they were repelled, and the governor was captured and killed by the *cofrades* (members of the *cofradía*). The Cofradia then moved its camp to a place called Alitao on the slopes of a hill known as San Cristobal. On 29 October, a much stronger Spanish expedition surrounded the camp, and the *cofrades* were attacked while dancing, singing, and praying. On 1 November, the Spanish soldiers overran the defenses and entered the camp, where they killed 300 to 500 followers and took about 500 as prisoners, including some 300 women. Cruz escaped, but the Spaniards captured him within a day. After a mock trial, he was executed by a firing squad on 4 November, and his head was cut off, stuck on a bamboo pole, and displayed on the road to serve as a warning to the population. On the same day, hundreds of prisoners were executed.

Historians have often found it difficult to place this seemingly irrational rebellion within the tradition of resistance movements in the country. David Sturtevant (1976) characterized the confraternity as a millenarian rebellion in a series of popular uprisings, a precursor of the nationalist movement at the end of the nineteenth century. Reynaldo Ileto (1979) placed the Cofradia within a broader Philippine tradition, namely, that of the *pasyon*, the story of Jesus Christ's suffering, death, and resurrection as the savior of humanity. Ileto showed that folk versions of the story were recited among the rural people and that images of the *pasyon* pervaded the thinking of the Cofradia. Cruz urged his followers to pray frequently, to participate in rituals, and to experience suffering in order to liberate the inner self and to remain steadfast. What the Spaniards found striking about the rebels was that they were fighting in a state of excitement, with a seeming disregard for death. When Apolinario de la Cruz was executed, Spanish observers noted that he "died serenely and showed unusual greatness of spirit" (Ileto 1979: 79).

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Anti-Spanish Revolts (The Philippines); Friars, Spanish; Mestizo; Peasant

Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898)

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**CULTIVATION SYSTEM
(CULTUURSTELSEL)**

Keeping The Netherlands Afloat

The Cultivation System (CS), or *Cultuurstelsel*, was designed as a revenue system and implemented by the Dutch colonial government mainly in Java. It forced farmers to use part of their existing farmland or to bring land under cultivation for the production of cash crops, the sale of which would enable them to pay the land tax.

The system was a consequence of the poor financial situation of the Dutch East Indies after the Java War (1825–1830). It continued the prerogatives of indigenous rulers, who taxed their people in the form of forced deliveries. During the rule of Governor-General Herman W. Daendels (t. 1808–1811) and the British lieutenant governor Stamford Raffles (t. 1811–1816), these practices were largely abolished in parts of Java under direct colonial rule and replaced with a land tax. The reasoning was that the Javanese would themselves start to produce cash crops for export. However, tax revenues remained below expectations, and under the regimes of Governor-General Godert A. P. Van der Capellen (t. 1816–1825) and Commissioner-General Leonard P. J. Du Bus de Gisignies (t. 1826–1830), the financial situation of colonial Indonesia deteriorated.

Governor-General Johannes Van den Bosch (t. 1830–1834) introduced the Cultivation System in 1830. He had argued against Du Bus's proposal to open Java to European entrepreneurs and have them cultivate idle land with wage labor. Van den Bosch favored state-led development that would maximize the revenues of the colonial government. Consequently, private entrepreneurs were banned from rural areas of Java under direct colonial rule. In those areas, rural villages were compelled to use a maximum of one-fifth of their land to produce cash crops, and villagers had to deliver *corvée* labor for a maximum of one-fifth of the year (sixty-six days). Until 1836, villages were exempted from the land tax and other taxes in kind if a sufficient amount of produce was delivered. They would also be indemnified against crop failures beyond their control. After 1836, the land tax was levied in full, and farmers received full payment for their produce. Van den Bosch believed that the Cultivation System would encourage Javanese farmers to produce export crops beyond what they needed to pay the land tax.

Junior officials of the colonial government—the *controleurs*—implemented the system through the local rulers—the *bupati* (regents) and *camat* (district heads). They determined the crops that had to be grown and the land to be set aside (in the case of, for instance, indigo or sugarcane) or the amount of land that had to be newly cultivated (in the case of, for instance, tea or coffee). They also requisitioned the labor to maintain, harvest, and transport the crops. The orders were passed to village heads, who then secured the cooperation of villagers. These officials arranged payment for the deliveries at predetermined prices and levied the land tax at the time of crop payments. Any surplus from the sale of produce above the land tax was credited to the farmer. Both colonial and Javanese officials had an interest in making the system work because they received a percentage of the revenues.

Produce was delivered to government agents, who organized the transport of the produce to local ports for shipment to the main ports of Batavia or Surabaya. When processing was required, for instance, with sugarcane, the produce was sold to government contractors. They produced the final product, such as sugar, with requisitioned labor and arranged transport to local ports.

A further reason for the implementation of the Cultivation System was the fact that the Dutch company *Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij* (NHM) badly needed customers. The company had been established in 1824 by all Dutch merchants engaged in trade with the Dutch East Indies, with Dutch king Willem I (r. 1815–1840) serving in his private capacity as its chief shareholder. The NHM received a monopoly on transporting CS products to The Netherlands and on their sale. The net proceeds of the auctions—gross sales less the value of the purchases, the NHM fees, freight charges, insurance premiums, and so on—benefited the coffers of the Dutch colonial government. In fact, these proceeds were not remitted to Indonesia because the colonial government used them to purchase various goods and services in The Netherlands.

After establishing the CS, Van den Bosch became minister of colonial affairs (t. 1834–1839) and designed the positive net revenue (*batig slot*) policy. It decreed that the government of the Dutch East Indies would be expected to generate budget surpluses for remittance to the treasury in The Netherlands. This expectation was based on the fact that the Dutch government had taken responsibility for the assets and liabilities of the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC) when the bankrupt company was dissolved in 1800. The Dutch government urgently required a source of revenue after subventions from the southern Netherlands (now Belgium) stopped when the Belgians declared independence in 1830.

The Cultivation System achieved its goals. Indigo and sugarcane were the first crops to be produced with compulsory cultivation. Coffee, tea, tobacco, and pepper were later added. The value of all exports increased quickly from *f*11 million in 1830 to *f*60 million in 1850 and *f*125 million in 1870. CS products dominated exports during the first few decades. Government revenues increased quickly after the implementation of the system in line with exports, from *f*19 million in 1830 to *f*74 million in 1850 and *f*124 million in 1870. Not all revenues were derived from the sale of CS crops, however, because the government gradually diversified its revenue base. From 1832 to 1877, the colonial government remitted positive net revenues to The Netherlands. Total remittances amounted to *f*823 million, or *f*18 million per

year, approximately one-third of the Dutch government's budget (Van Baardewijk 1993).

As a consequence of the CS, the colonial administrative system deepened. By making the *bupati* responsible for the delivery of CS products, the system elevated them and increased their access to an additional source of revenue. However, to acquire it, the *bupati* relied on Dutch colonial authority, rather than indigenous supremacy. The CS therefore accelerated the conversion of the loosely structured administrative aristocracy into a salaried civil service. In principle, the *bupati* became dependent on their salaries. They were aided by a *controleur*, who himself answered to a regional Dutch resident. By 1860, Java's administrative divisions had been established, and the system of indirect colonial rule would, in essence, be maintained until the end of the colonial period.

In The Netherlands, controversy surrounded the CS. Two groups criticized the system: those who considered it morally wrong because of the degree of compulsion it employed and those who felt aggrieved by the effective monopolization of the trade in cash crops by the colonial government and the NHM. Both groups cited various incidents of misuse and abuse that became public knowledge to advance their case.

The first group emphasized the burden the system placed on farm households in Java. Several of the crops were alien to farmers, and their cultivation often took more time and effort than anticipated. Transportation of the produce was difficult and time-consuming. It was argued that farmers often had to neglect the production of food crops, which in turn caused occasional food shortages. Among the allegations raised against the CS was that the system had been the cause of famines in Demak and Grobogan (Central Java) in 1849 and 1850.

Other allegations concerned the fact that colonial officials received a percentage of the proceeds of the CS and conspired in the abuse of farmers. For instance, sugar contractors would insist on the delivery of cane at particular times during the milling season, for which purpose they plotted with colonial and indigenous officials to commandeer villagers, carts, and oxen for transporting the cane. In some cases, more than the set maximum of farmland or of *corvée* labor was commandeered. In other

cases, farmers who had produced CS crops were also required to supply *corvée* labor. Sometimes, the *bupati* abused their authority, secure in the knowledge the Dutch *controleur* and resident would support them, by imposing additional burdens upon their subjects.

The benefits that Dutch firms drew from the system were another source of controversy. Sugar contractors established ventures that operated with guaranteed and generous margins set by the colonial government. The NHM used its monopoly on the transport and sale of CS products to become the biggest private company in colonial Indonesia. It diversified its operations into general trade and finance, and after 1900, it was one of the biggest banks. Several Dutch shipping companies benefited from the system because they were engaged by the NHM for the transport of CS produce to The Netherlands. And both NHM and shipping companies benefited from the fact that they were tacitly allowed to charge above-market rates for their services involving CS produce (for example, transport and insurance services).

Private entrepreneurs had found the way to urban Indonesia and parts of the country that were still under indigenous princely rule. However, only those who managed to obtain a contract to process or handle CS products derived benefits from the system. As the economy of the Dutch East Indies evolved, private enterprises in The Netherlands started to object to the fact that they could not invest in ventures in most of rural Java. They mobilized public opinion and Liberal opposition members in Parliament in favor of opening Java up to private enterprise. In the 1860s, it was argued that the limits of state-orchestrated development had been reached and that private enterprise should take over.

The evidence for the charge that the CS was detrimental to economic development in Java is inconclusive, since the implementation of the system varied over time and between regions. The CS imposed obligations on the rural population that were often difficult to meet and sometimes led to the neglect of food crops. However, the total payments that farm households received for crop deliveries exceeded tax payments. The system therefore brought cash into the Javanese economy and spurred economic activity, albeit on a still-modest scale.

The consumption of meat, salt, opium, and cloth all increased. Only 40 percent of all farm households in the whole of Java were involved in the production of CS crops in 1840 and less than 25 percent in 1870. Likewise, the share of total cultivated land used under the CS was only 25 percent around 1840 and 13 percent around 1870 (Van Baardewijk 1993).

Changes were introduced in the 1860s. In 1867, the Dutch Parliament was granted the right to approve the budget of the Dutch East Indies. Previously, the Dutch king in theory approved the budget of the colonial government through the minister of colonial affairs. Parliament thus gained influence in colonial affairs, which led to the decision to phase out the CS. This effort led to the new 1870 Agrarian Law, which allowed foreign investors to acquire land under short-term leases from indigenous landholders or through the purchase of unoccupied land from the colonial government under long-term leases.

The CS was gradually phased out. The batig slot policy ended in 1877, after which CS revenues only benefited the treasury of the Dutch colonial government. The compulsory cultivation of sugarcane was abolished in 1870, leaving it to the owners of sugar mills to organize the local production of cane. Forced cultivation of perennial crops continued, although tea and coffee estates were gradually handed over to villages. In 1915, the last government-owned coffee plantations were abandoned.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Coffee; Du Bus de Gisignies, Viscount Leonard Pierre Joseph (1780–1849); Forced Deliveries; Java; Java War (1825–1830); Liberal Experimental Period (1816–1830); Max Havelaar; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Sugar; Van den Bosch, Count Johannes (1780–1844); Van der Capellan, Baron Godert Alexander Philip (1778–1848)

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CỨU QUỐC (NATIONAL SALVATION)

The term *Cứu Quốc* (National Salvation) appeared in early 1941, when the first platoon of the National Salvation Troops (*Cứu Quốc Quân*) was formed under the control of the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) in the area of Bộc Sơn, about 40 kilometers west of Lạng Sơn. Operating at no more than squad level on the Chinese border in the beginning, these guerrilla forces would gather enough strength by August 1943 to engage in the actions of “armed propaganda” that contributed to the building of the first bases of the Việt Bắc liberated zone. In April 1945, these troops merged with the Vietnamese People’s Propaganda Unit for National Liberation, created in December 1944, to become the Liberation Army of Vietnam, the forerunner of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN).

By then, the ICP had been expanding its influence by forming several mass organizations, all of which incorporated the title National Salvation Association (*Cứu Quốc Hội*). Thus, in 1943, the National Salvation Cultural Association (*Hội Văn Hóa Cứu Quốc*) was established with the assistance of ICP cadres to recruit urban intellectuals to the cause of the Viet Minh (Vietnam Independence League) and find ways of insinuating anti-French and anti-Japanese propaganda into legally published newspapers and journals. Other associations followed: the Peasants’ National Salvation Association, Students’ National Salvation Association, Women’s National Salvation Association, Teenagers’ National Salvation Association, and so on. Together, these organizations acted as a shield for the Viet Minh. Individually, each association translated esoteric communist slogans into the language of its own members. In theory, then, the Viet Minh front was the coalition of these National Salvation Associations, through which it could give impetus to a broad national movement, uniting large numbers of Vietnamese regardless of their politics and reaching down into the masses. The theme of unity and national salvation (even the Viet Minh’s main newspaper bore the title *Cứu Quốc*) thus enabled the Viet Minh to involve local popula-

tions in its cause and the socioeconomic reforms it proposed.

The famine raging in North Vietnam in 1945 provided further opportunities for the Viet Minh both to eliminate the anticommunist village elites who had been seizing requisitioned rice to store in guarded granaries and to build a mass movement of political and social salvation in the countryside. “National independence” and “Seize paddy stocks to save the people from starvation” became, like “Peace, bread, and land” in the Russian October Revolution, the slogans around which the people were mobilized. Villagers responded enthusiastically to the appeals for donations to the Independence Fund, the National Defense Fund, and Gold Week in order to finance basic administrative operations and the expansion of the armed forces for the cause of national independence. In early 1946, as the need arose for a broadened coalition and wider participation of all progressive elements in preparation for possibly protracted fighting with the French, additional Catholic and Buddhist Cứu Quốc associations were formed as a part of the larger Liên Việt front.

Attesting to the Viet Minh’s well-polished mass organizational skills, the different Cứu Quốc associations had thus contributed to laying the groundwork for the formation of local communist party branches. They also helped to

enhance the legitimacy of Hồ Chí Minh’s (1890–1969) government in preparation for the Franco–Viet Minh war (the First Indochina War, 1946–1954), during which the support of local populations would prove critical for the success of Viet Minh guerrilla strategy.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969);

Indochina Communist Party; Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Indochina War (1946–1954), First; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (Vietnam Independence League); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945); Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, Dong Cong San Viet Nam)

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D

ĐÀ NẴNG (TOURANE)

A port on the South China Sea giving access to the plains of central Vietnam (Việt-Nam, Quảng Nam Province), Đà Nẵng is built upon the banks of the Hàn River, at the back and to the southeast of a horseshoe-shaped bay. Protected on the east by the Tiên Sa peninsula and the Đà Nẵng cape hanging over the sea at a height of 693 meters and thus offering a splendid shelter to ships, this harbor was the site of the first landing of European missionaries in Vietnam (in 1535). The Jesuit Alexandre de Rhodes (1591–1660), the main contributor to the romanization of the Vietnamese script, arrived there in 1625. Known to Western traders and navigators as Tourane (sometimes Turon), the port was a haven for goods transportation and ship repair; it gradually developed into the main harbor of the Nguyễn principality in the eighteenth century thanks to its bay, which was capable of receiving large, deep-draft ships. After the emperor Minh-Mang (r. 1820–1841) decreed in 1835 that foreign ships would be allowed to cast anchor only at the mouth of the Hàn River, Đà Nẵng became the largest commercial port in central Vietnam.

French intervention in Vietnam came, in the very beginning, in the form of three attacks on Đà Nẵng: in 1847, when a French squadron, sent with the mission of demanding an immediate end to the persecution and proscription

of Christians throughout the Vietnamese empire, opened fire on the Vietnamese fleet stationed in the bay; in January 1857, when the French ship *Le Catinat* bombarded the forts guarding the harbor; and in 1858, when, as an initial step to the conquest of Vietnam, Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, commander of the French fleet in the Far East, captured the port and its neighborhood before deciding to move the bulk of the French forces south to Saigon. After the imposition of a French protectorate, in 1888, the city of Tourane was ceded to the French colonial administration as a concession distinct from the territory of Annam.

Located 80 kilometers from Huê to the southeast, Đà Nẵng assumed new importance after the partition of Vietnam in 1954. In the late 1960s, the United States established a large military base there, and in one decade, growing rapidly, Đà Nẵng became the second largest city in South Vietnam, next to Saigon. Linked presently to Hồ Chí Minh City (formerly Saigon) by road and by railway, the city is a market for local produce; textile mills and machinery plants have recently been added to old traditional crafts. Đà Nẵng is home to the Cham Museum, which holds a great number of Cham objects from the surrounding area. There are also Buddhist temples carved into the limestone hills around the city and the Marble Mountains to the northeast.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH



Germany lending a hand in the Vietnam conflict. In this aerial view of the huge U.S. base at Đà Nẵng, South Vietnam, the German hospital ship Helicoland is seen berthed in the Đà Nẵng River (background, left). At right is a U.S. vessel. (Bettmann/Corbis)

See also French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Rhodes, Alexandre de (1591–1660); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia

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DAI VIET (939–1407 C.E.)

Dai Viet was the formal name for the Vietnamese empire employed from the Early Ly dynasty (980–1009 C.E.) to the Tay Son periods (1771–1802). The name *Dai Viet* (Great Viet) connoted an empire that would rule all the *Viet*

people (from the Chinese term *Yueh*, which originally indicated all non-Chinese peoples south of the Yangtze [Yangzi] River). This concept was legitimized with two seemingly contradictory claims: that every dynasty defeated Chinese invasions but that the state and society were well civilized after the Chinese model (in maintaining Viet customs).

Ly Thanh Tong (r. 1127–1138) first adopted the name Dai Viet to replace the former name *Dai Co Viet* (also meaning “Great Viet” but in a more vernacular form), which had been employed since 966 C.E. Dai Co Viet/Dai Viet inherited the territory of the T’ang protectorate of Annam, including the Red River delta as the center, its surrounding mountainous area, and the present Thanh Hoa–Nghe Tinh region. The rulers regularly sent tribute to China from 973, disguising their imperial titles. Nevertheless, Sung (Song) China (960–1279) first regarded Chiao-Chih (an old Chinese administrative

name for northern Vietnam) as a colony, trying to make a reconquest of it in 980 and 1075, both times in vain. The borders between Dai Viet and China were diplomatically fixed in the 1080s. Ly Anh Tong (r. 1138–1175) was conferred the title King of the Nation of Annam in 1174, a title that meant China recognized Annam as a separate state although it was still expected to pay tribute to China. From that point until the eighteenth century, Dai Viet maintained a dual diplomacy. On the one hand, faced with China and other East Asian countries, it was a Chinese vassal state of Annam; on the other hand, with Southeast Asian neighbors such as Champa and Cambodia, it was a Chinese-styled empire to which all these countries should be subject.

Under the Tran dynasty (1225–1400), the national/imperial consciousness developed with the victory against the Mongol invasion. The compilation of Chinese-styled imperial annals entitled *Dai Viet su ky* (The History of Dai Viet) and the development of the legend of the national/imperial founders (the Hong Bang dynasty and Hung kings) also contributed to the consciousness, both tracing back the history beyond the period of Chinese dominion (the second century B.C.E. to the ninth century C.E.). Though the short regime of Ho Quy Ly (1400–1407) replaced the name Dai Viet with *Dai Ngu* (after the kingdom of the ancient Chinese sage-king Shun), the Le dynasty (1428–1789) restored the name Dai Viet. This dynasty was established after driving back the Ming army that had occupied northern Vietnam for twenty years. In the Le declaration of independence, the Binh Ngo dai cao (Great Imperial Edict of Pacification of the Ming), the “[Great] Viet Empire” was defined as an empire that shared a common civilization with China but had its own territory, customs, emperors, and history.

Beginning in the fourteenth century, Dai Viet expanded to the south, due to the development of Chinese-styled government and intensive agriculture in the Red River delta (resulting in an everlasting population pressure). Champa, located in present-day central Vietnam, was crushed in the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. To the west, Laos had been under Dai Viet’s pressure since the fifteenth century. Ironically, the expanded empire lost its unity. The sixteenth century witnessed civil war between the Mac dynasty in the Red River

delta and the Le in Thanh Hoa. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Tonkin—or the Trinh government (controlling the restored but powerless Le emperors)—ruled the northern provinces, while Cochin China—or the Nguyễn (also nominally recognizing the Le sovereignty)—ruled in the south, extending as far as the Mekong Delta.

By the end of the Le period, the Chinese-modeled consciousness of the greatness of their civilization had developed to the extent that the Vietnamese people sometimes called themselves the Han or the Hoa, regarding the Tau, or Ch’ing Chinese, as less civilized under the Manchurian regime. The northerners often called their country Annam among themselves, whereas the southerners, who did not have diplomatic relations with China, tended to speak of Dai Viet. Simultaneously, however, China’s demographic and cultural expansion appears to have let Vietnam’s national consciousness develop, especially among the northerners. With a conception of national history and geomancy within the actual borders, they criticized the legendary founders who had claimed the territory south of the Yangtze River. Similarly, they rejected the old history that legitimized Trieu Da (the Chinese Chao T’o, who founded the Nan-yueh kingdom in Kuang-tung in 203 B.C.E.) as one of their own emperors.

Defeating the short-lived Tay Son dynasty (1771–1802), Nguyễn Phuoc Anh established the Nguyễn dynasty (1802–1945) and unified a territory that was wider than any prior dynasty’s. He did not regard his empire as a mere successor of Cochin China or of Dai Viet. Instead, he adopted, in 1804, the new formal name of *Vietnam* (lit. Southern Viet), which might have indicated the unification of the south (Dai Viet) and the north (Annam).

MOMOKI SHIRO

See also Annam; China, Imperial; Cochin China; Le Dynasty (1428–1527, 1533–1789); Ly Dynasty (1009–1225); Nam Tien; Nam Viet (Nan Yue); Nguyễn Ánh (Emperor Gia Long) (r. 1802–1820); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Sino-Vietnamese Wars

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DAMRONG, PRINCE (1862–1943) **Engineered Administrative Centralization**

Prince Damrong, a son of King Monkut (r. 1851–1868) of Siam, was born on 21 June 1862. His birth name was Dissaworakuman. During the reign of Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910), who was Damrong's elder brother and born to Mongkut's queen, he served in many important positions in the bureaucracy and proved to be one of the most talented and capable bureaucrats who helped the king to modernize Siam.

At the age of fourteen, Damrong attended a military school, and he served the king in the royal scribes' department and the royal pages' bodyguard regiment after he graduated. In the late 1880s, Chulalongkorn started the modernization of the kingdom and appointed Damrong the head of the department of public instruction in 1887. Modern public education expanded considerably under his leadership; this was the first time that commoners had access to modern education, although primary schooling was not made compulsory until the following reign. Both Chulalongkorn and Damrong considered education an important tool for the modernization of the kingdom.

However, the most outstanding contribution Damrong made to the kingdom took place in the 1890s when King Chulalongkorn undertook drastic administrative reforms to allow him to centralize his power. In 1891, the king sent Damrong to visit Russia as his representative and instructed him to take the opportunity to visit other European countries and colonies

and study the organization of European governments. In the following year, the king launched the reforms and appointed Damrong as minister of interior. The interior ministry was established to help the king centralize ruling power, which, until the early 1890s, had still been under the control of local chiefs or noble families. As a result, Damrong was given a great responsibility, since the drastic administrative reforms at the expense of local power might have led to resistance from local leadership. Damrong, however, carried out his task successfully, with little opposition from local leaders.

He began his work by traveling to many parts of the country to study situations and to find alternative forms of administration. During his provincial tours, he found loopholes in the traditional administration by which local leaders, most of them semihereditary, were allowed to take advantage of their status for personal benefit. Corruption, injustice, and overlapping administrations were not uncommon (Wyatt 1984: 209).

At the same time, the external threat posed by Western colonialism prompted the central government to find methods to safeguard and rule remote areas. In order to make the bureaucracy more efficient and to allow the king and the central government to exercise more direct control over local administration, Damrong introduced a new form of local administration termed *monthon thesaphiban* (circle administrative system). Under this system, a number of provinces were grouped together to make a single administrative unit called the circle, or *monthon*, which was to be supervised by a resident commissioner appointed directly by the king. The resident commissioners were Chulalongkorn's brothers or close cousins, whom he could trust. The new local administrative system also allowed the central government to have complete control over other local affairs—for example, revenue collection, justice, and the police.

Clearly, this newly reformed administration was achieved at the expense of local power, and resistance was inevitable. However, the more powerful and better-equipped armies of the central government were able to suppress rebellions. Eventually, the ministry of the interior under the leadership of Damrong was able to transfer local power to the central government under Chulalongkorn at the turn of the twentieth

eth century (Tarling 1992: 122). Damrong's success in carrying out administrative reforms was highly appreciated by Chulalongkorn, and as a result, Damrong retained the post of minister of the interior until the king's death in 1910.

Damrong still headed the ministry in the following reign of his nephew Vajiravudh (Vachiravudh) (r. 1910–1925) until 1915. At that point, he sought the king's approval to resign due to "poor health," and the latter gave his approval, though it was known that Vajiravudh wished to work with his own political following more than with that of his father (Wyatt 1984: 227; Girling 1981: 55). The resignation allowed Damrong to have more time to work on archaeology and history, interests that were sparked when he was a monk in 1883 but that he had not had enough time to develop in the intervening years.

After the government changed to a constitutional monarchy in 1932, Damrong left Siam for the British colony of Penang, where he spent the next decade. During that time, he greatly expanded his knowledge of Thai history and archaeology. He returned to Bangkok in 1942 when the Pacific War (1941–1945) made it more difficult for him to live in Penang. Damrong died in 1943 at the age of eighty-one. His contributions to the modernization and administrative reforms of the kingdom laid a solid foundation for modern Thailand.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also British Interests in Southeast Asia; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Paknam Incident (1893); Preservation of Siam's Political Independence; Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Vajiravudh (Rama VI) (r. 1910–1925)

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DARUL ISLAM MOVEMENT (DI)

Struggling for an Islamic State of Indonesia

The Darul Islam Movement (DI) aims for the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia. DI in Java was closely associated with Tentera Islam Indonesia (TII, Islamic Troops of Indonesia). A very significant DI-TII revolt had broken out in West Java in the late 1940s, led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo (1905–1965). Later on, several other uprisings occurred in other regions in Indonesia, with aims similar to those of Kartosuwiryo's movement. They were the DI-TII revolt of Kahar Muzakkar (1920–1965) in South Sulawesi, the DI revolt of Daud Beureu'eh in Aceh (Acheh), the DI revolt of Amir Fatah in Central Java, and the rebellion of South Kalimantan. The movements associated with these revolts used the name of Darul Islam and developed networks with Kartosuwiryo's movement. In the paragraphs that follow, the focus will be on the DI-TII movements of Kartosuwiryo, Kahar Muzakkar, and Daud Beureu'eh.

Several factors were responsible for the rise of DI Movements—specifically, socioeconomic, religious, and political issues and the gulf between guerrilla leaders and political elites. The political situation that split the nationalist, Islamic, and communist groups remained apparent. Some Muslim leaders felt that their proposal for the establishment of an Islamic state was not accommodated.

Kartosuwiryo, the former vice-president of Partai Serikat Islam Indonesia (PSII) who was expelled because of his policy of noncooperation, moved to Malangbong, in the eastern part of West Java, and founded a kind of *pesantren* (Islamic school) called Institut Supah. This institute then became the center for training his guerrilla forces, Hisbullah and Sabilillah. Before the proclamation of Indonesian independence, Kartosuwiryo had actually announced "Darul Islam Independence" on 14 August 1945, though he then adhered to the leadership of Sukarno (1901–1970) and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980). However, Kartosuwiryo clashed with the republican Indonesian government because he did not agree with the Renville

Agreement (1948). In fact, the Hisbullah and Sabilillah troops were left behind by the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian National Army) and fought against the Dutch. When the Dutch left Indonesian territories, Kartosuwiryo still appealed for the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia, after having failed to achieve it through constitutional means. The efforts made by Prime Minister Mohammed Natsir (t. 1950–1951) toward reconciliation came too late because on 7 August 1949, Kartosuwiryo had already, for the second time, announced the establishment of Darul Islam as Negara Islam Indonesia (NII, Islamic State of Indonesia). He was the imam and commander-in-chief of the TII. The territory of Darul Islam was the mountainous area of West Java to the east of Bandung, expanding to the border area of Central Java. For the decade from 1949 to 1959, his power was still strong when the central government tried to negotiate with him. However, after the 1960s, his movement started to lose its strength when some of his followers were caught. Kartosuwiryo himself was captured on 4 June 1962 and was killed in September. Thereafter, the West Java DI Movement came to an end.

Kahar Muzakkar's DI Movement was initially a protest of the former guerrillas of South Sulawesi, who insisted on being transformed into TNI as a separate battalion group. Since Kahar had formed this group of ex-guerrillas during the Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949), he was sent to South Sulawesi to resolve the issue in early 1950. However, he refused the assignment from the government. Instead, Kahar then became the leader of approximately 20,000 guerrillas, and on 5 July 1950, he joined them in the jungle that covered the mountainous areas from southern to southeastern Sulawesi. Kahar made contact with Kartosuwiryo and used the DI ideology for his movement. On 20 January 1952, he was appointed as TII's Sulawesi commander, and later, on 7 August 1953, his movement was accepted as a part of Negara Islam Indonesia. Kahar criticized nationalist and communist parties as hypocritical and godless and Islamic parties as counterrevolutionary; therefore, he believed all of them should be eliminated. He exercised Islamic law and commanded that a spiritual revolution take place. In 1955, he made contact with DI Aceh and also with the Permesta (the Common Struggle

Movement) in North Sulawesi—where he received weapons and ammunition—and with the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI, Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) in Sumatra. However, after 1960, his movement was weakened by the TNI. The movement ended after Kahar was shot and killed on 3 February 1965 in southeastern Sulawesi.

Unlike what had happened in Sulawesi and West Java, the Aceh DI Movement arose mostly because of conflicts between the central government and local leaders over the issue of possessing more regional autonomy without intervention from Jakarta. The movement began in 1945, enriched by the social revolution between traditional elites and religious leaders. As residents of an important Islamic region where Dutch colonial rule had little impact, the Aceh people felt that they had an extensive role to play in achieving Indonesian independence. They refused to be integrated into the North Sumatran province and demanded a separate province. In 1953, Daud Beureu'éh, an Acehese governor (t. 1949–1950), proclaimed that Aceh was part of the Islamic State of Indonesia and launched a rebellion against the central government. This movement also got in touch with Kartosuwiryo's DI Movement but without the intention of being part of it. In 1959, the central government gave Aceh the status of a special administrative district (*daerah istimewa*) with special autonomy in religious matters, education, and *adat* (customary) law. Daud Beureu'éh ended his movement in May 1962 and was pardoned by Sukarno. However, the peace in Aceh lasted only for several years. Aceh Province is still struggling for independence through a movement known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Aceh Movement for Independence).

AMELIA FAUZIA

See also Aceh (Aceh); Aceh (Aceh) Wars (1873–1903); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Minangkabau; Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Persatuan Ulama Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA); Renville Agreement (January 1948); Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS, Republic

of the South Moluccas); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970)

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DAYAKS

The term *Dayak* has become an accepted general term for the native, non-Muslim populations of Borneo; alternative forms are *Dyak*, *Daya*, or *Dya*. The word first came into general use in the nineteenth century, when it was increasingly employed by Europeans to refer to the pagan, head-hunting natives they were gradually pacifying and bringing under colonial administrative control. Dutch and German scholars used the term to distinguish all native pagans from Muslim Malays. English writers in Sarawak tended to restrict the term to the Land Dayaks (or Bidayuhs, as they are now called) in the western areas of Sarawak inland from the state capital, Kuching. Sea Dayaks (or Ibans) were found throughout the western and northern regions of Borneo, and at the time of the establishment of the rule of James Brooke (1803–1868) in the 1840s in Sarawak, they were expanding rapidly to the east and northeast; in the company of Malays, they were engaged in coastal piracy and head-hunting (King 1993: 29–30). The ethnic label Dayak was known by the Dutch as far back as the mid-eighteenth century and was used then as a general referent for inland or interior people (Pringle 1970: xviii). Complicating matters is the fact that the term has sometimes been employed specifically for native settled agriculturists, and the separate and general referent *Punan* has been adopted for the forest nomads or hunter-gatherers (Rousseau 1990: 20).

Although the derivation of the term *Dayak* is uncertain, the word (or some variant of it) is used in various local languages, and it might have been adopted by coastal populations such as the Malays and given a condescending or pejorative connotation, meaning something akin to *rustic* or *yokel*. Despite this circumstance, the

non-Muslim natives of Borneo have more recently begun to use the term *Dayak* in a political sense to demarcate themselves from Muslim communities. The word has also been incorporated into the names of indigenous political parties in Sarawak and Kalimantan, following the development of modern politics after independence.

There are no exact population figures for the Dayaks of Borneo, though they currently probably exceed 3 million in number. They comprise a culturally diverse collection of populations, among them the Ibans and related groups including the Kantus; Kayans; Kenyahs; Bidayuhs; Malayic-Dayaks such as the Selakos and Kendayans; the Barito groups including the Ngajus, Ot Danums, and Ma'anyans; Dusuns; and Muruts. There are also numerous smaller groupings, including the Kelabits, Kajangs, and Punans. However, the Dayaks are all speakers of Austronesian languages, and some common cultural elements are found widely throughout Borneo. Among these common elements are large pile-houses or longhouses on stilts accommodating many families; fertility cults related to head-hunting, rice cultivation, and death ceremonies; patterns and symbols in material culture, bodily decorations, cosmology, and religion; and social and economic adaptations to a riverine and rain forest environment (Avé and King 1986).

Although the term *Dayak* is contrasted categorically with *Malay*, the boundaries between the two are not sharply defined in practice. The majority of present-day Malays are descended from members of the Dayak communities of Borneo who converted to Islam and over time gradually changed their ethnic affiliation to Malay; the process is called *masok Melayu* (meaning “to become Malay” or “to enter Malaydom”). The Malay language has also long been used as a lingua franca. At any one time, there have therefore been transitional communities in Borneo, such as the Pekaki Malays who, having converted to Islam, continued to observe various Dayak customary practices.

The ruling families of the Malay States depended on alliances and sometimes intermarriage with local Dayak chiefs and headmen to mobilize support against their enemies; they also levied taxes, tribute, and services from Dayaks under their authority (the “tied” or “bonded” Dayaks) and raided hostile commu-

nities for slaves. Those natives, usually living beyond Malay jurisdiction, were referred to as "free Dayaks" (King 1993: 129–130).

Following European intervention, these Malay-Dayak relations were disrupted. Head-hunting and feuding were stamped out. Dayaks were gradually incorporated into colonial administrations, settlement patterns were regularized, physical migrations were restricted, and local leaders were employed as low-level intermediaries to collect taxes and administer customary law; many Dayaks were converted to Christianity and given access to mission education. Traditional religious beliefs and practices were transformed, and some disappeared. The Dayaks also began to grow cash crops such as rubber and pepper for the market, and some migrated to coastal towns and plantations in search of paid work.

Since the 1970s, the social, economic, and cultural changes affecting the Dayaks have accelerated in pace, particularly with the opening of the rain forests for commercial timber exploitation, road building, mining, plantation agriculture, hydroelectric projects, resettlement, and ecotourism.

VICTOR T. KING

See also *Adat*; Borneo; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Brunei Ethnic Minorities; Brunei Malays; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Malays

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**"DEATH RAILWAY"
(BURMA-SIAM RAILWAY)**

The Death Railway was the rail line between Siam (Thailand) and Burma (Myanmar) that was constructed by the Japanese Imperial Army (JIA) during the Pacific War (1941–1945). Its

macabre name reflected the belief that a life was sacrificed for every sleeper (railroad timber) that was laid. The Death Railway has come to symbolize the horrors of the war.

The plan to construct a railway between Siam and Burma was originally devised by the JIA Railway Corps on board a ship traveling from Osaka to Vietnam in October 1941, prior to the outbreak of the war. The main objectives were to expedite military operations and to transport soldiers as well as materials. The difficulty of marine transportation due to enemy attacks necessitated the implementation of this railway plan.

In March 1942, the Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) ordered crews to complete the 415-kilometer railway connecting Kanchanaburi in Siam and Thanbyuzayat in Burma by the end of 1943. Work started in July 1942. In February 1943, the IGH shortened the completion term by four months, but the project was actually completed only in October 1943. The line passed over sheer cliffs and through deep jungles.

More than 60,000 Allied prisoners of war (POWs)—British, Australian, New Zealand, Dutch, U.S., and Canadian—worked on the project, together with 200,000 Southeast Asian *romushas* (laborers) comprising Siamese (all were Chinese residents in Thailand), Burmese, Malaysians (the majority were Indian rubber tappers), Indonesians, and Vietnamese. Due to heavy workloads, maltreatment, lack of food, inadequate clothing and medicines, and harsh climates, some 40 percent of them perished. Though small numbers of Thai and Burmese laborers managed to abscond, laborers from other countries could not. They were unfamiliar with the terrain and faced severe difficulty in surviving should they escape and elude recapture. By contrast, of the more than 20,000 Japanese soldiers who were engaged in the work (some Korean civilian employees were included in their ranks), the number of deaths was something over 1,000.

After completion, the railway could not be effectively used due to frequent bombardment by the Allies. Although some of the remnant laborers stayed on to maintain and repair the railway, others were taken elsewhere. After the end of the war, more than 100 Japanese soldiers (and some of the Koreans) who had mistreated the POWs were prosecuted at the war crimes

courts. (The ill treatment of the romushas, however, did not receive the attention of Allied prosecutors.) Of these, 36 were sentenced to death. Korean civilian employees who were compelled to directly mistreat the POWs tended to be subjected to unduly harsh punishment. Today, some 120 kilometers of track from the Death Railway in Thailand are still in use.

HARA FUJIO

See also Bataan Death March; "Comfort Women"; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Sandakan Death March; *Sook ching*

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DECOLONIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Decolonization in Southeast Asia was the process whereby formerly colonized territories discarded their colonial controls and influences. Some of these territories assumed new forms of governance and often borrowed extensively from their colonial experience. Others retreated into the past to revive age-old forms of governance that predated colonial rule. The process of decolonization thus involved considerable change, and this change was peaceful, gradual, ugly, or violent depending on the circumstances.

In Southeast Asia, all societies experienced decolonization, including Thailand. Thailand was never formally placed under colonial rule but was nevertheless subjected to political pressures from nearby colonial powers.

The period normally associated with the process of decolonization started with the establishment of independent Southeast Asian governments after the Pacific War (1941–1945). However, there is as yet no terminal point to the process. Indeed, decolonization is an open-ended business, since the effects of the century of Western colonial rule are still not fully known.

The decolonization process brought together the transient and the durable. Governments continuing former colonial processes were established, but not all such governments lasted for long. Although national elections, the secret vote, the establishment of political par-

ties, modern armies, and police were embraced, these practices—many of them with colonial roots—were soon absorbed by and modified within the local cultures.

The decolonization process also did not occur in isolation. Rather, it took place in conjunction with other global processes occurring at the same time. In the postwar world, new power relationships developed, and decolonization came to be subsumed within these new developments. More specifically, decolonization in Southeast Asia must also be viewed in terms of the British liquidation of the Indian empire; the emergence of separate independent states such as India, Pakistan, and Ceylon (Sri Lanka); and the unification of China (minus Taiwan) by the communists under Mao Zedong (1893–1976). The reemergence of Japan as a major economic power following its defeat by the United States was also a global factor for consideration.

Decolonization is not the simple account of the withdrawal or retreat of Western colonial powers from Southeast Asia, although it cannot be too far wrong to start from that point. Most accounts of decolonization in Southeast Asia begin with the Japanese occupation (1941–1945).

In Vietnam, the struggle against the Japanese provided the stage on which previous enemies could coalesce around a common cause. Thus, the Chinese nationalist wartime government collaborated with the Vietnamese communist leader, Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969), to fight the Japanese. Using their bases in China, the Vietnamese communists formed the Viet Minh, a united front of sympathizers mobilized against the Japanese. Because of their anti-Japanese role, the Viet Minh received assistance from the British and U.S. intelligence organizations. Hồ Chí Minh was able to consolidate his power, not least because he also suppressed all opposition. By 1945, the Viet Minh were unchallenged, what with the Japanese army in retreat, the Chinese supporters in disarray, and the French authority still not firmly reestablished. On 2 September 1945, Hồ Chí Minh proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Hanoi.

By early 1946, with the withdrawal of the Chinese occupation forces from northern Vietnam, Hồ was left in undisputed control except in the south, where the French army returned

in strength. It only remained to resist any further consolidation of the French, and this began with the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954) where the Viet Minh achieved a decisive victory over the French-led army. Then followed peace negotiations in Geneva that led to the division of Vietnam into north and south along the seventeenth parallel. The peace was short-lived. Massive migrations took place as anticommunists fled south to escape from the communists who now controlled the government in Hanoi. Meanwhile, American interests were further involved as the United States took on the job of fighting communism worldwide. It was only in 1975 that American troops were finally defeated and forced to leave, ignobly.

In Burma (Myanmar), the Thakins led by General Aung San (1915–1947) made the strategic decision to turn against the Japanese authorities once it was clear the British had succeeded in spoiling Japanese plans to invade India. The Thakins formed the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), a united front to drive out the Japanese. When the British were firmly reestablished at Rangoon (Yangon), they had to decide whether to punish Aung San for his wartime collaboration with the Japanese. The advice of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979), the Allied military commander of the South-East Asia Command (SEAC), prevailed. Aung San was recognized as the leader of the Burmese and designated prime minister. The road to decolonization was thus opened.

Thailand was the only state that was not colonized, although it still faced the pressures of Western colonialism. Making full use of its independence, Thailand presented itself as an ally to the Japanese and thus escaped occupation. In return, it declared war against the former Western colonial powers. However, when the tide turned against the Japanese, Thailand deftly exploited its independence to mend fences with the United States. With American support, it escaped almost unscathed the wrath of the Western colonial powers for having sided with the Japanese. A civilian politician emerged as the national leader after the succession of military commanders who controlled the country after 1932. It would thus appear that the impact of decolonization did not affect Thailand to any great extent, but in reality, the process had just begun. Surrounded by hostile neighbors, espe-

cially Vietnam and China, Thailand sought close ties with the United States. It was drawn into supporting the Americans in the Vietnam War from 1954 onward, aligning itself with a partner that was viewed as the dominant hegemonic power replacing the former Western colonial authorities. Thus, though Thailand escaped colonization during the colonial era and therefore did not experience decolonization as such, its subsequent history showed its inability to avoid entanglement with the regional conflicts that were a legacy of decolonization.

Cambodia and Laos were not critical players in the Japanese strategies to occupy Southeast Asia. The Cambodian leadership under King Norodom Sihanouk (1922–) continued intact from the colonial era through the Japanese occupation period to independence. Sihanouk successfully outmaneuvered his political opponents and was able to maintain Cambodia's neutrality in the regional conflicts. Generally, the decolonization process appeared to have given Cambodia a miss until the country was drawn into the maelstrom of war in neighboring Vietnam. From 1970, Cambodia became an essential part of Vietnam's decolonization process to get rid of foreign intervention and reestablish a reunified Vietnam.

Laos was another backwater state during the colonial era. Its borders were arbitrary. Various rival states were merged, and these continued to maintain uneasy relationships with other regional powers beyond Laos. As long as the French were able to impose an artificial unity, peace prevailed. However, as French control receded, rivalries resurfaced. The Laotian princes were encouraged and abetted by their regional neighbors, and the decolonization era was marked by conflicts among these princes, of whom there were three main players. One was allied with Thailand and the Americans. The second depended on Hanoi for support. The third sought to be neutral. Factional fighting with the armed forces and discontent among minorities further complicated the rivalries.

The decolonization process in Malaya (Malaysia) can be easily contrasted with the earlier period of colonial rule by the occurrence of near anarchy. As happened in other states in Southeast Asia, the weakness of British authority was revealed under the Japanese occupation in Malaya. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP), led mainly by Chinese cadres,

launched a revolt in 1948 to prevent the restoration of British rule after the Japanese surrendered. This revolt, the so-called Emergency, lasted twelve years. It compelled the British to consider granting independence to Malaya earlier than was scheduled in order to counter the MCP propaganda that the British would only leave if forced to do so. It compelled the Malay elites to adopt multiracial political strategies to confront the communal threat of the MCP, consisting as it did mainly of Chinese followers. The outcome was the establishment of a federation of Malay States and the colonies of Penang and Melaka in 1948, with privileges entrenched for the indigenous Malays and citizenship extended to other immigrant races. The Federation of Malaya subsequently attained independence in 1957.

In the Philippines, plans for decolonization were already firmly in place by the 1910s. American colonial rule in the first decade of the twentieth century operated on the assumption that a tutelage process was necessary to train Filipinos in the art of democratic government. Many Filipino leaders therefore viewed the Japanese occupation as an interruption of this process. Thus, it was only in 1946 that the Philippines finally became independent. As in the United States, a two-party system with elections and four-year terms was established. However, this system remained rooted in the Filipino culture of family networks and patron-client relationships. The two-party system also faced the challenge of overcoming a third-party challenge in the form of the (Huk) communist revolt in central Luzon from the late 1940s until the early 1950s. The image of an independent Philippines was also somewhat marred by the agreement concluded with the departing Americans, stipulating that U.S. firms would be granted parity rights similar to those available to Philippine companies. In all, extraterritorial rights were granted to Americans within two military bases. These concessions, despite political decolonization, were issues that plagued the Philippine political scene for a few decades after independence because they suggested that the Philippines was not truly independent.

Some of the most detailed studies on the process of decolonization in Southeast Asia have been devoted to Indonesia. In 1942, the Japanese ripped apart the thin veneer of Dutch colonial rule. Then came three years of Japanese

occupation, followed by surrender. The Dutch failed to restore their erstwhile colonial authority immediately, and in the ensuing vacuum of power, Indonesian nationalists proclaimed the independent Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch challenged this republic by establishing a federal state in which the republic would be incorporated as one of the constituent states, thus diluting its influence. Four years of dispute with the Dutch led nowhere, and in 1949, the Republic of Indonesia agreed to join the federal United States of Indonesia. After securing independence from the Dutch, the next step in the decolonization process was to rid the country of the Dutch-imposed federal structure. This task was successfully completed in 1950 and was followed by a campaign to wrest control over West Irian (which the Dutch retained after granting independence). Meanwhile, Sukarno (1901–1970), as president of the republic, attempted to restore more indigenous political practices, such as consensus seeking, rather than “Western democracy,” which he disparaged as “50% + 1 democracy.” In this vein, “guided democracy” was established in 1959. The decolonization process in Indonesia was thus multifaceted and multipronged.

The Wider Context of Decolonization

Decolonization impinged on Southeast Asia in different ways simply because the degree of colonization varied from region to region. Although lines were drawn on maps to delineate the spheres of influence of the British, Dutch, and French, these lines were set arbitrarily, without reference to the ethnic realities on the ground. As long as the Western colonial powers were strong, the lines served as boundaries. Once the Western colonial powers retreated, however, precolonial rivalries revived. Thus, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia were involved in tussles over territories, while Vietnam interfered in Laotian affairs. Further south, the separation of the Malay Peninsula from the Indonesian archipelago was never a neat solution for the indigenous people living in both those regions. In short, one outcome of decolonization was the emergence of interstate disputes over boundaries.

This arbitrary separation of ethnically related peoples by boundaries inherited from the colonial past also resulted in the problem of minori-

ties. Shan people were now distributed between the borders separating Burma and Thailand. In Vietnam, mountain people straddled the divide between Vietnam and Laos, constituting minorities when compared with the lowland Vietnamese. The Lao people were actually a minority in Laos, and most Lao people lived in Thailand. In every corner of Southeast Asia, minorities could be found, with the significant exception of Cambodia.

The migration of Chinese and Indians to settle in various parts of Southeast Asia during the colonial period further complicated matters when decolonization took place. The Indians formed important population groups in Burma and Malaya, and the Chinese were ubiquitous in practically all the Southeast Asian states that proclaimed independence in the late 1940s and 1950s. Both the Chinese and Indians became targets of nationalist agitation against further colonial intervention.

It will be useful to set the process of decolonization of Southeast Asia within a wider context of the end of empire. The discussion on the dynamics of decolonization described earlier merely related the story of the colonial dimension, namely, the domestic and, at best, regional factors that led to the overthrow of colonial rule. In the case of Southeast Asia, the primary focus fell on the period after 1945. There was also a global dimension at work—the changing international environment that emerged around 1945. This environment was not conducive to the continuance of colonial rule, principally because the Japanese occupation had demonstrated beyond doubt that Western colonial rule was an anachronism. It can also be argued that for Southeast Asia, the decision by the British to grant independence to India set the momentum for changes further east. There was also a metropolitan dimension, in terms of the changes taking place in the empire capitals such as London, Paris, and The Hague. New groups had emerged, questioning the basis and value of colonial subjugation of far-flung territories.

Unresolved Issues

If the causes of decolonization can be categorized and set in context, the next task is to ask when the process began and when it ended. This discussion has used 1945 as the starting point, but actually, a case can be made that the

process began in the 1930s, signaled principally by the onset of the worldwide economic depression. The depression hit Southeast Asia unevenly, but it set in motion measures to decentralize government authority, and it raised issues that challenged the competency of Western colonial powers to continue their rule. When did the decolonization process end? It certainly did not end with the establishment of independent nation-states. If it were possible to identify a closing stage, then that stage would only take place in consonance with the ideological perspective of the observer. One who feels that a Southeast Asian state had returned to its original roots would argue that decolonization had completed its course. This, of course, begs the question of whether it is possible to discover these original roots. Another who feels that decolonization was a search for liberalization and democracy would argue that a Southeast Asian state had decolonized when the search was successful. This, of course, begged more questions than the answers provide. What, for example, is the definition of liberalization or democracy?

Then there are issues such as the geographic location within which the processes of decolonization took place. Was decolonization to be studied only within the confines of the nation-state that eventually emerged, that is, by reading history from the present back to the past with the benefit of hindsight? Was decolonization entirely a land-based event? Was there such an event as maritime decolonization? Should decolonization be studied in terms of peoples rather than nation-states? It seems to be easier to ask questions than to provide answers.

YONG MUN CHEONG

See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Aung San (1915–1947); British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Dutch Police Action (First, Second); Federation of Malaya (1948); Geneva Conference (1954); Great Depression (1929–1931); Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon) (1942); Indochina War (1946–1954), First; Indochina War (1964–1975), Second (Vietnam War); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia

(1941–1945); Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Laotization; Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Philippines–U.S. “Special Relationship”; Preservation of Siam’s Political Independence; Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (Vietnam Independence League); Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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DEMAK

Demak was the greatest Islamic kingdom of Java in the sixteenth century C.E., with a role that was very important for the development of Islam—religiously, politically, and economically. The political expansion that was motivated by religion and economic affairs made Demak a strong Islamic kingdom not only in Java but also in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. In Java, Demak’s influence was ensured through the establishment of Cirebon and Banten on the north coast of West Java, which enabled the control of all ports along the north coast, including those of East Java. Close relationships between Demak and kingdoms in South Sulawesi, Maluku, and Aceh created the hegemony in defending against the political power of the Portuguese based in Melaka, the prime international trading center of Southeast Asia at the time. Rulers of Demak often launched offensives on Melaka in attempts to unseat the Portuguese.

Before the emergence of Demak as an Islamic kingdom, there were Muslim communities along the north coast of Java, then under the political control of the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Majapahit. The process of Islamization gained momentum in the face of a declining Majapahit, which prompted some aristocrats and the common people to readily embrace the new faith.

Against this backdrop, Raden Patah, together with his followers at Bintara in 1479, proclaimed Demak as an Islamic kingdom a year after the fall of the capital of Majapahit at Trowulan to Girindrawardhana, ruler of Kadiri. The Javanese *Chronicles* mentioned that the establishment of the kingdom of Demak was in accordance with the advice of Raden Rahmat, the pioneer *Wali Sanga* (the *Wali Songo*, the Nine Saints, were reputedly the nine founders of Islam on Java). Raden Patah, who was also called Dipati Jimbun, was the son of Brawijaya, the ruler of Majapahit, who married a Chinese princess. When the princess was pregnant, she was presented to Aria Damar, the governor of

Palembang. Demak consequently maintained close ties with Palembang.

After Raden Patah's ascension, Bintara was developed as the capital city of Demak. He erected the palace, the square, the mosque, and the market. The great mosque played an important function in the preaching of Islam undertaken by the Nine Saints. Under the reigns of Raden Patah (r. 1479–1513) and his successors Pate Unus (Sabranglor, r. 1513–1518) and Pangeran Trenggana (r. 1518–1546), Demak flourished as a city-state. The Portuguese traveler Tomé Pires mentioned that the city of Demak had about 8,000 or 10,000 houses and that Pate Rodim (which may have been a corruption of the name Raden Patah) was lord of the country. The international trade was conducted via Japara, as the harbor town of the kingdom. Persians, Arabs, Gujaratis, Bengalis, Malays, and other nationalities traded at this harbor town.

Demak's political influence spread to the western and eastern parts of the north coast of Java. Cirebon, one of the vassals of the Sunda-Pajajaran kingdom that had had a Muslim ruler since 1475, was under the political control of Demak. In 1526, Syarif Hidayatullah (Sunan Gunung Jati), one of the Nine Saints, established Banten as an Islamic kingdom. According to *Sajarah Banten* (Chronicle of Banten), Maulana Hasanuddin reigned over Banten from 1526 to 1552 under the supervision of his father, Syarif Hidayatullah, who lived at Cirebon until his demise in 1568.

Meanwhile, the Malay Islamic sultanate of Melaka under Sultan Mahmud Syah (r. 1488–1511) fell to the Portuguese Afonso de Albuquerque (1453–1515) on 10 August 1511, following a siege that lasted more than a month. Sultan Mahmud Syah and his son, Sultan Ahmad Syah, fled into the interior. Bentan (Bintang), Mahmud Syah's new capital, was also destroyed by the Portuguese in 1526. Sultan Mahmud Syah fled to Kampar on the eastern coast of Sumatra, where he died in 1528.

Albuquerque's political alliance with Ratu Samiam (Surawisesa), the ruler of Sunda, from 1511 to 1512 posed a threat to Demak. Consequently, in 1513, Demak launched a naval assault on Melaka, led by Pate Unus with the assistance of the Pate of Palembang. The Javanese armada was defeated, and Pate Unus was killed. Subsequently, on 21 August 1522, Albuquerque

signed a political and commercial treaty with the regent of the Sundanese kingdom, Ratu Samiam (perhaps Prabu Surawisesa). In 1527, a Portuguese armada under Francisco de Sa arrived at the harbor city of Kalapa (Kelapa). The armada was suddenly surrounded by Muslim forces from Demak and Cirebon, commanded by Fadhillah Khan (Falatehan). The Portuguese were defeated; on 22 June 1527, the victorious Fadhillah Khan renamed Kalapa as Jayakarta. Consequently, the Portuguese severed contact with the Hindu-Buddhist kingdom of Sunda-Pajajaran.

The Hindu-Buddhist kingdom in the hinterland of East Java, Daha-Kadiri, came under the control of Demak in 1527. During the reign of Pangeran Trenggana, the third sultan, Demak reached the zenith of its power. Cordial relations with the kingdoms of Aceh, Jambi, Palembang, South Kalimantan, and Maluku had been maintained against the expansion of Portuguese political and economic power.

Demak began to decline after Pangeran Trenggana waged a war against Panarukan. He was killed in battle in 1546. Thereafter, Demak witnessed a violent struggle within the royal family. Pangeran Adiwijaya (Jaka Tingkir), the son-in-law of Trenggana, emerged the winner after killing Aria Penangsang. But the Demak that he inherited was greatly weakened. The capital of Demak shifted to Pajang, in the hinterland, during the reign of Pangeran Adiwijaya (r. 1568–1586). Demak itself was reduced to the status of a regency, or *kadipaten*.

UKA TJANDRASASMITA

See also Aceh (Acheh); Albuquerque, Alfonso de (ca. 1462–1515); Banten (Bantam); Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Islam in Southeast Asia; Java; Kadiri (Kediri); Mahmud, Sultan of Melaka (r. 1488–1511); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Maluku (The Moluccas); Melaka; Palembang; Pires, Tomé (ca. 1465–ca. 1520s); Portuguese Asian Empire; Sulawesi (Celebes); *Wali Songo*

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DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (DAP)

The Democratic Action Party (DAP), the most dominant non-Malay opposition party in Malaysia since 1966, was formed when the People's Action Party (PAP) based in Singapore was deregistered in Malaysia after Singapore became a separate and independent nation in 1965. Headed by C. V. Devan Nair, the sole PAP representative in the Malaysian Parliament and a Malaysian citizen by birth, DAP, which was officially registered in March 1966, adopted the “Malaysian Malaysia” strategy of the PAP. From its beginnings, the DAP positioned itself as a vigorous critic of the Alliance Party government, which it accused of discriminatory practices against the non-Malays.

The DAP openly declared itself committed to the principle of racial equality in all fields, political, social, economic, cultural, and educational. Thus, it opposed the classification of the population into *bumiputera* (sons of the soil), referring to the Malays and other indigenous inhabitants, and non-*bumiputera*, or non-Malays and nonindigenous people, and demanded equal treatment and equal opportunities for all citizens, irrespective of racial origins. It openly attacked the special position of the Malays as provided for in the Malaysian Constitution and harped on the plurality of the nation and the use of the Chinese and Tamil languages on a par with Malay for official purposes. Like the PAP, DAP accused the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) of not doing enough for the Chinese and of being subservient to the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). It offered itself as the alternative to the MCA as well as to the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).

This confrontational style of the DAP and other radical non-Malay-based parties such as the People's Progressive Party (PPP) and Gerakan (Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, the Malaysian People's Movement) was attractive to the younger generation of non-Malays. But the DAP was seen as a threat by the Malay political parties from within and without the government. The tense political atmosphere thus created contributed to the outbreak of the May 13, 1969 incident.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Alliance Party (Malaya/Malaysia); *Bumiputera (Bumiputra)*; Federation of Malaya (1948); Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Malayan/Malaysian Education; Malayan/Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC); "May 13, 1969" (Malaysia); New Economic Policy (NEP) (Malaysia) (1971–1990); People's Action Party (PAP); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK)

Democratic Kampuchea (DK) was a radical Marxist-Leninist regime that ruled Cambodia between April 1975 and January 1979, when it was driven from power by a Vietnamese invasion. The Cambodian Communists, known outside Cambodia as the Red Khmers (or Khmer Rouge), were led by Saloth Sar (1925–1998), better known as Pol Pot, and drew much of their inspiration from Maoist China.


Saloth Sar and his colleagues (who included Son Sen, Ieng Sary [1927–], and Nuon Chea) had developed their plans for a socialist Cambodia when they were hiding in guerrilla camps in the forested northeast in the late 1960s. During the civil war that swept through Cambodia from 1970 to 1975, the leaders gained valuable military and organizational skills and continued to believe that revolutionary zeal, top-down management, and the collectivization of property could solve Cambodia's social and economic problems and provide a luminous example for other developing countries.

The Khmer Rouge came to power in April 1975 when their forces seized Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh. For several months, the leaders of the movement claimed that power was in

the hands of the mysterious "Revolutionary Organization" whose affiliations, leadership, and membership were kept secret from outsiders. In January 1976, after its leaders had drafted a constitution, DK emerged as a state onto the international scene. The existence of the Cambodian Communist Party, however, and the names of its leaders remained concealed.

DK's leaders boasted that their revolutionary program owed nothing to foreign precedents or advice. However, it was clear to outside observers as information filtered out of the country that the program drew inspiration from Maoist China. Like Mao Zedong (1893–1976), DK's leaders based their ideology on continuous class warfare. They admired China's Great Leap Forward (1958) (which they probably thought had been a success) and the ongoing Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). They believed, like Mao, in the empowerment of the peasantry and in the importance of revolutionary will. Some DK policies, however, such as the abolition of money, markets, and private property and the wholesale evacuation of towns, were more radical than anything that had been attempted in China.

In July 1976, DK's leaders unveiled a utopian four-year plan, borrowing its name from China's Great Leap Forward, that envisaged tripling rice production throughout the country almost overnight, without material incentives or sufficient machinery and in the wake of a ruinous civil war. The foreign currency earned from rice exports, it was thought, would be used to buy agricultural machinery and to lay the basis for further industrialization. The plan was couched in pleasing revolutionary rhetoric but bore little relation to Cambodian realities and made no provision for the people's health or welfare. It was a colossal, overreaching failure. As it went into effect, hundreds of thousands of men and women, attempting to meet impossible agricultural goals, died of undernourishment and overwork. Thousands more, especially those evacuated from the towns, were executed summarily as enemies of the state. The DK leadership, unwilling to accept responsibility for what had happened, claimed that enemies from within wrecked the plan. Purges soon swept through the ranks of the party, the army, and the regions that had failed to reach their quotas. In a secret interrogation facility in the capital known by its code name, S-21, over



Cambodian Sam Vishna, age twenty-eight, looks at a mixture of brown and white skulls that make up a map of Cambodia at Tuol Sleng (S-21 prison) Museum in Phnom Penh, 9 December 1998. The former high school was turned into a prison by the Khmer Rouge during the Pol Pot regime. More than seventeen thousand men, women, and children were held there before they were taken to the “killing fields” to be executed. Sam Vishna’s father, older brother, and sister were all killed in 1976. (AFP/Corbis)

14,000 men and women, accused of counter-revolutionary crimes, were questioned, tortured, and put to death. Those killed included many high-ranking members of the party. The purges continued until the demise of DK in January 1979.

In 1977, just before embarking on a state visit to China, Pol Pot revealed the existence of the Cambodian Communist Party. In China, he obtained political support and military aid for the growing conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam, which was allied with the Soviet Union and by implication hostile to China. Full-scale warfare broke out between Cambodia and Vietnam in early 1978, and although the Khmer Rouge forces were courageous,

they were no match for the seasoned and well-equipped troops arrayed against them. Vietnam invaded Cambodia at the end of the year, driving Pol Pot and his colleagues into exile in Thailand.

A Vietnamese protectorate established in 1979 labeled DK a “fascist” regime and condemned Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to death in absentia. As data emerged from refugees, survivors, and archives over the next ten years, it became clear that DK had presided over the deaths of perhaps 2 million Cambodian citizens, or one in five, making it one of the cruelest, most misguided, and most horrific governments in recent times.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); China since 1949; Cold War; Ieng Sary (1927–); Khmer Rouge; *Killing Fields, The*; Kuantan Principle (1980); Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK); Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) (1925–1998); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); Sino-Soviet Struggle; Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Sino-Vietnamese Wars

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DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Demographic Transition in Perspective

The term *demographic transition* is used for the process whereby high levels of mortality and fertility—in other words, high death and birth rates—slowly but irreversibly drop to much lower levels. It is a long and drawn-out process that can take many decades, even a century or more.

The process is rather well documented for Western Europe, and the general trend can be summarized in a few sentences. From the late eighteenth century onward, mortality figures started to drop in a number of countries. From death rates of between 25 and 50 or more per thousand (the crude death rate, or CDR), they fell to below 10 per thousand at the end of the twentieth century. This mortality transition (also called *epidemiological transition*) was accompanied by a fertility decline of similar proportions, from 40 or even 45 per thousand (crude birth rate, or CBR), to 10 and below (Livi-Bacci 1992: 101, 108).

At the beginning of the transition process, the annual average rate of natural increase of

the population (births minus deaths) was often fairly low. Between 1600 and 1750, most Western European countries experienced average annual growth rates of 0.15 to 0.2 percent per year (Livi-Bacci 1992: 69). As the death rate usually started to drop quite some time before the birth rate did, the rate of natural increase went up considerably, easily reaching rates of 1 percent per year and over. Then, however, fertility started to fall as well, while the mortality figures began to stabilize at a low level. Thus, the rate of natural increase started to drop, reaching zero growth. That moment had arrived when the so-called Total Fertility Rate (TFR, or the average number of children per woman) dropped below 2.1 or 2.15. In what has been termed Europe's Second Demographic Transition, fertility rates dropped even further after the mid-1960s, leading to a negative rate of natural increase.

Southeast Asia was and is going through the same or at least a very similar process. However, in most regions of Southeast Asia, the (first) transition started much later, the growth rates of the population were much higher, and it would appear that the duration of the fertility transition would be shorter.

The Transition in Action

Conventional wisdom has it that the fertility decline did not start in Southeast Asia before the 1960s. Scholars are less sanguine about the beginning of the mortality transition, but most apparently agree that in many Southeast Asian countries, the death rate started to drop at the beginning of the twentieth century and that the downward trend accelerated in the 1950s. In the short run, this led to very high annual rates of natural increase. However, around the year 2000, the total fertility rate had dropped in some cases below replacement level (Singapore, Thailand), and it was coming close to that in others (Indonesia, Vietnam). In countries such as Cambodia and Laos, with TFRs in 2000 of 4.77 and 4.80, respectively, the demographic transition still has a long way to go. Rates of natural increase in the region are now 1 to 2.5 percent per year (*The Future of Population in Asia* 2002: 132–135). This is, in a nutshell, the demographic transition in Southeast Asia.

The remainder of this section is dedicated to a more detailed discussion of the factors influ-

encing the demographic transition process. As the drop in mortality preceded the fall in fertility, the death rate will be discussed first.

As population statistics on most Southeast Asian areas are either absent or rather unreliable prior to 1900, it is virtually impossible to formulate statements on the development of the death rate in the whole region in the nineteenth century. There is mounting evidence, however, that in a number of areas, the death rate may have been dropping slightly, particularly during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The three most frequently mentioned factors behind this modest drop in mortality are vaccination against smallpox, the so-called *pax imperica* (lit., “imperial peace,” the peace resulting from the establishment of Western colonial regimes), and improved transportation networks.

Vaccination was a technique discovered in Europe on the eve of the nineteenth century and already introduced in Asia shortly after 1800. It was not immediately implemented effectively on a large scale, but by 1850, it was a success in many areas in Southeast Asia. As smallpox was one of the big killers around 1800, successful vaccination campaigns ushered in lower mortality. In many areas, however, vaccination on a meaningful scale had hardly been started around 1900. Such differences were largely related to the presence or absence of a colonial state.

The colonial state was also the key factor in the *pax imperica*. In most areas where it was present, the colonial state put an end to constant “tribal” warfare, civil war, and other forms of intergroup violence, such as head-hunting. The number of direct victims of such violence may have been low, but the number of people killed by diseases and famine as a consequence of these conflicts appears to have been considerable, as the destruction of the means of production was often a side effect of conflict. Of course, colonial armies brought violence of their own, but it would seem that on balance, at least in the nineteenth century, the *pax imperica* meant lower death rates.

The nineteenth century also saw the construction of more and better roads and, in the last half of the century, the creation of railways and steamship connections. This made it much easier to send food to areas hit by harvest failures, thereby preventing local famines.

Be that as it may, the drop in the death rate is well documented for the twentieth century. After the medical revolution of the late nineteenth century, during which the causative agents of many lethal diseases were discovered, researchers were finally able to come up with effective cures for many killers. Apart from quinine, a drug that had been available in impressive quantities since the late nineteenth century, salvarsan (1909) and the sulpha drugs (1930s) were the first “chemical” treatments that brought mortality rates down slightly. This effect was greatly strengthened by the so-called miracle drugs (antibiotics) that came on the market after World War II (1939–1945). Other successes were to be found in the preventive sphere. Quinine had been an effective cure against some types of malaria, initially through species sanitation (elimination of the disease-carrying mosquitoes) and then, after the war, dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) did much to fight the vectors of the malaria plasmodium, the *Anopheles* mosquitoes. Of course, later on, DDT had to be abandoned when it turned out to be harmful to other life-forms as well, but it did bring down the rate of infection with malaria and therefore the CDR. Thus, the drop in the CDR accelerated in the 1950s. Steadily improving hygiene, primary health care, and a stream of new drugs and treatments coming from the Western world ensured that the death rate dropped slowly but surely and constantly.

Finally, the better quality of the diet of large sections of Southeast Asian populations since the 1970s, due to sustained rates of economic growth per capita, did much to reinforce the downward trend of the death rate. Whereas in the 1950s CDRs from 20 to 30 had been the rule, by the year 2000, mortality rates ranged from 5 to 15 per thousand (*The Future of Population in Asia* 2002: 132–135).

The drop in the birth rate came much later than that in the death rate. In fact, in the nineteenth century and even in the first half of the twentieth century, fertility appears to have increased among specific groups and during particular periods. We know even less about the details of this phenomenon than we do about the drop in mortality rates in the nineteenth century, but a number of factors are often quoted in the scholarly literature. The transition from foragers and shifting cultivators, often in

tandem with conversion to Islam or Christianity, may have played a role. Also mentioned is a drop in the age of marriage, probably related to increased economic opportunities and/or increased labor burdens, in addition to shorter lactation periods. Both factors may lead to higher birth rates.

However, there are indications for dropping birth rates in the nineteenth century as well. This may have been related to locally deteriorating economic circumstances in high-population-density areas (density-dependent reaction). It may have been also influenced by the incipient drop in the death rate, which was strongly reflected in the rate of infant mortality. With fewer deaths among breast-fed children, the average period of lactation increased, thus influencing fecundity.

Almost all factors mentioned here imply that women were willing and able to manipulate their levels of fertility. There are, indeed, many indications that prior to the period of modern birth control methods, which started in the 1960s in Southeast Asia, traditional ways of family limitation had been known and used for ages. Generally speaking, it is now accepted by many scholars that “tribal” peoples, often engaged in foraging or shifting cultivation and often living in extended families, had low rates of fertility, much lower than the rates of “natural fertility” they were formerly assumed to have had.

Around 1960, rates of natural increase in most developing countries were so high that terms such as *population explosion* were used to describe this phenomenon. Rates from 2.5 to 3.5 percent per year—much higher than they had ever been in the developed world—were normal. In the 1950s, crude birth rates in Southeast Asia varied from 40 to almost 50. In the late 1990s, the extremes varied from just over 10 (Singapore) to around 35 (Cambodia, Laos), but most rates are now below 25 per thousand (*The Future of Population in Asia 2002*: 132–135).

What are the factors behind this amazingly rapid fertility transition? The “proximate factors” affecting the process are clear. Women marry later, and their marital fertility is lower than it used to be because they are using methods of family limitation, which they can do because reliable methods of birth control are readily available. For the search for the “ulti-

mate” or “underlying factors,” we have to look at things such as economic development, modernization, and mass communication.

Not so long ago, demographic orthodoxy insisted that in order to achieve lower rates of fertility, all that was needed was economic development. Even though it is now recognized that other factors have contributed to this process, it is still rather obvious that economic growth is the real motor behind the demographic transition. But the first step is to look at the proximate factors.

One of the most obvious factors is, of course, the use of modern methods of contraception, including the pill, condoms, sterilization, and intrauterine devices (IUDs). Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia are good examples of countries where the acceptance of modern birth control methods has been increasing steadily. In Indonesia and Singapore, this has been strongly stimulated by the state. In the Philippines, where the influence of the Roman Catholic Church is strong, antinatalist policies are far less popular. This seems to be reflected in the Philippines’ fairly high total fertility rate (TFR of 3.24 in 2000) (*The Future of Population in Asia 2002*: 134–135). Increased use of modern methods of birth control is reflected in lower rates of marital fertility. Early termination of pregnancies (induced abortions) may play a role as well, as is shown in the case of Singapore, where the law, originating in Victorian Britain, was changed in 1970. This brief discussion illustrates the potential importance of the state in these matters. It also suggests that variation between regions is to be expected, based on differences in culture, religion, and ethnic reproductive patterns.

The effects of family planning are reinforced by the increasing age of women at first marriage. In 1960, the proportion of women in Thailand aged twenty-five to twenty-nine who were married was 87; it had dropped to 75 by 1990. For Indonesia, these figures are 96 and 89. If experiences in East Asia are anything to go by (and they seem to be), this proportion might drop as low as 60 (Japan in 1990) (Westley and Mason 1998). Generally speaking, past experience has shown that a higher age at first marriage leads to lower numbers of children per woman.

Later age at marriage is generally assumed to be related to a drop in arranged marriages and

to higher proportions of women being educated beyond primary school. Education for women also had other implications for the birth rate. Educated women were, at least in an early stage of the fertility transition, quicker to accept modern family-planning methods. More education for girls and young women also implies that they are no longer available to their parents as cheap labor. On the contrary, they are now costing money. It is assumed by many scholars that these considerations have played and still are playing an important role in the declining birth rate, as children are turning from being an economic asset into a liability, at least in the short run. However, the role of education for women varies from country to country. Whereas Singapore, the leader in fertility transition, shows the expected combination of low TFR and high proportion of women in secondary education, the runner-up, Thailand, combines a low TFR with a low rate of female participation in education.

But how do we explain the sudden interest of the state in birth control, the success in the adoption of family-planning methods, the growing interest in education, and the postponement of marriages? The keywords here are *modernization*, *economic development*, and *mass communication*.

Economic growth, in the sense of an almost continuous increase in real income per capita, is probably the most important driving force behind the success story of the demographic transition in (parts of) Southeast Asia. Economic development was largely responsible for the lower rate of mortality (through better diet and better medical care); it is also one of the main forces behind the fertility transition. Economic development implies, among other things, urbanization and a shift from agriculture to industry and the service sector, with young women migrating temporarily to urban areas. This may have influenced the age of marriage and the arrival of a first child, as children could be combined with agricultural activities but far less easily with working in the factory. Economic development also implies schooling.

Modernization, admittedly a rather vague notion, follows in the wake of economic growth. Notions of individual choices and destinies, of better education, of higher aspirations, particularly for women, are all part of the "Western" ideology that is more or less identi-

cal with the modern way of life, which has been globalized during the last few decades.

The enormous impact of modernization and the rapid adoption of methods of birth control would have been unthinkable without the spread of radio and television. It would appear that this goes a long way toward explaining why the fertility transition could have taken place so quickly in a number of countries.

About international and interregional migration, some thoughts are in order. In various Southeast Asian countries, large numbers of (young) people leave their region or country for many months or even years, in search of better-paid employment. However, this is temporary migration; the migrant is supposed to return to the home village eventually and start a family. This is somewhat different from the situation in Europe during the demographic transition, when many people left their countries in order to establish themselves permanently abroad. Temporary migration, particularly of women, might have some effect on the age at marriage, but it will probably be slight. The numbers involved seem to be huge, but as a proportion of the relevant cohorts, they are not impressive.

Consequences and Prospects

One of the positive effects, often referred to as the "demographic bonus," is the drop in the dependency ratio in countries where the fertility transition is well under way. As the proportion of young children in the population drops and the dependency ratio therefore falls, the number of workers per capita increases. This facilitates increased savings per household, leading to higher capital-to-labor ratios and thus increased productivity. At a later stage, the dependency ratio will go up again, when the proportion of elderly increases significantly, a situation now being witnessed in East Asia.

However, for the time being in many countries in the early stages of the demographic transition, the proportion of adolescents and young adults, sometimes indicated by the term *youth bulge*, has been increasing. This group is less likely to get married early and represents an increased demand for education (and, of course, jobs). In a stagnating economy, this poses an even more serious problem than is usually the case. It is a group that is, in several respects, at

risk in a period in which the threat of HIV/AIDS looms as large as it does. It is difficult to believe that behavioral changes related to this threat will leave reproductive behavior unaffected.

The demographic transition process in Southeast Asia does not follow one trajectory, nor does it show one rhythm from one area to another. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that, within a few decades, the region as a whole will have emulated East Asia, the second region in the world where the (first) demographic transition was completed.

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See also Diseases and Epidemics; Education, Western Secular; Highways and Railways; Newspapers and the Mass Media in Southeast Asia; Sexual Practices; Women in Southeast Asia

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DEVARAJA

Throughout Southeast Asia, religion has been used to sanction kingship, be it a local religion or a religion that has spread to Southeast Asia from other regions, such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Vaisnavism, or Saivism. The degree of sanctity has ranged widely: from validating God's or the Buddha's sanction of the king's rule, via ritual, religious acts, or personal practice for the king, to associating the ancestors of the current ruler with deities, to identifying the king himself as a deity. In this, the holy men of the relevant religion, such as Brahmins or Buddhist monks, were involved in authenticating the king's sanctity. In the Angkor kingdom (present-day Cambodia), a series of kings had images and *lingas* consecrated, including portable *lingas*, each given a different name of the god Siva; his name was then also reflected in the king's own. A *linga* is a phallic representation of Siva, usually made of stone. A particularly famous but little understood association of the ruling monarch with the god Siva is found in the so-called *devaraja* cult, associated with Jayavarman II (r. 770/790/802?–834), who founded the Angkor empire at the beginning of the ninth century C.E.

The French scholar George Coedès interpreted the Sanskrit compound *deva-raja* literally, following the word order, as "god-king" and interpreted it to mean that Jayavarman and his

successors were claiming to be God on earth. In other words, Jayavarman was supposedly creating a cult of himself and his successors. However, the grammatically correct interpretation of this Sanskrit compound is “king of the gods”—that is, the term should be read from right to left, as pointed out by the French Indologist Jean Filliozat in 1966. He reinterpreted the term to refer not to Jayavarman but to Siva as the king of the gods, an unremarkable epithet.

Hermann Kulke (1974) confirmed Filliozat's correction of Coedès's work. Reexamining the inscriptions, he suggested that the term refers to a transportable image of Siva being moved to the different Angkor capitals. A distinction is clearly made between “the king of the gods” and the earthly rulers he is said to accompany. In being taken by the kings to their different capitals, the statue acted as a centralizing pædium, located with the king even when the king moved. The significance of this particular Siva statue appears to have declined in the tenth century. There is therefore no such thing as the devaraja cult but rather just another instance of the Siva worship then widespread in mainland Southeast Asia.

There were two main difficulties in Coedès's understanding of references to devaraja. The first was that he had only a handful of Sanskrit and Khmer inscriptions. The second was that Coedès was involved in the process of making grand statements about the culture of Southeast Asia at an extremely early stage in the academic study of the region's history. This was fashionable in his day and perhaps necessary for a pioneer in the field.

That such a possibly insignificant cult has received so much attention is due to the fact that the works of Coedès were groundbreaking at the beginning of the twentieth century and, although now much revised, have remained seminal in the study of mainland Southeast Asia.

KATE CROSBY

See also Angkor; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; Indigenous Political Power; Jayavarman II (r. 770/790/802?–834 C.E.)

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DEWAWONGSE, PRINCE (1858–1923)

Preserver of Siam's Independence

Prince Dewawongse was born on 27 November 1858 as Prince Dewan Uthaiwongse to Lady Piem, a consort of King Mongkut (Rama IV) (r. 1851–1868). He was appointed the minister of foreign affairs in 1885 and held this position until his death in 1923, thus becoming Thailand's longest-serving foreign minister. His most outstanding contribution was the development of a sophisticated and articulate foreign policy, which helped save the kingdom from Western colonialism.

As a child, Dewawongse already showed great intelligence and a particular aptitude at English and mathematics. When King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910), whose three queens were younger sisters of Prince Dewawongse, undertook financial reforms by transferring to the royal audit office control of all the financial work of the kingdom, he appointed Dewawongse as chief of staff of the office. When the office of royal secretariat was founded, Chulalongkorn chose Dewawongse to be head of that office. While working at the royal secretariat, the prince also served as the king's adviser for foreign affairs. In 1882, on his advice, Siam for the first time appointed ambassadors to be posted in European countries.

In 1885, after considerable hesitation, Chulalongkorn appointed Dewawongse minister of foreign affairs, when the latter was only twenty-seven years old. Elderly and senior men traditionally held ministerial positions; Chulalongkorn's reluctance to make this appointment therefore reflected his desire to avoid conflict with his conservative courtiers. However, De-

wawongse's talents and experience in giving advice on foreign affairs were indisputable, and most senior officials agreed that he was the most suitable person to hold the post. In 1887, he was sent to London as Chulalongkorn's representative, to attend the celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of Queen Victoria's rule. The king also asked him to study the organization of European governments while abroad, for the purpose of implementing Siamese governmental reforms. Upon his return, Dewawongse recommended the establishment of a modern administration in Siam, comprising a cabinet and twelve ministries (Wyatt 1984: 200). Eventually, in 1892, the king undertook a major governmental reform and established the twelve ministries. The cabinet council was also founded, and Dewawongse was appointed chairman, a position he held for thirty-one years.

Dewawongse became the minister of foreign affairs at a time when Siam was facing the most serious threat from both France and Britain, who were competing in expanding their colonial rule in Southeast Asia. By the 1880s, France had already colonized Vietnam and some parts of Laos and Cambodia, but it wanted to extend its rule to cover Laos east of the Mekong River and western Cambodia, which were still under Siamese sovereignty. In Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Terengganu in the Malay Peninsula, the British were seeking to have power transferred to them from Siam (Wyatt 1984: 203, 206). The first major confrontation with colonialism took place in July 1893 when the French sent gunboats to the Chaophraya River to demand that the region of Laos to the east of the Mekong River be ceded to France. The French also planned to blockade the Gulf of Siam and make Siam a French protectorate if the latter did not accede to their demands. The confrontation led to skirmishes between French and Siamese forces in the Chaophraya, which are referred to as the Paknam Incident (1893). Dewawongse had to handle the situation with great care because the independence of the kingdom was at stake. Even though he would have liked to use force to respond to the French threat, he chose a peaceful and compromising approach once he discovered how weak the Siamese forces were and how lukewarm the British response was during the crisis (Tuck 1995: 109, 114–115). Thanks to his diplomatic

finesse during the negotiations, the French withdrew, and the independence of the kingdom was saved, even though Siam had to accept the French demand to cede the region of Laos east of the Mekong River.

The Paknam Incident was only the beginning of colonialist threats. After the incident, the French and the British continued to demand that Siam cede territories under its sovereignty. For example, territories opposite Luang Prabang, Champasak, and Manophrui were ceded to France in 1904. Three years later, the Siamese court abolished its claims over western Cambodia, and the right to rule was transferred to France. And in 1909, after long negotiations, Bangkok agreed to cede the four Malay States to the British (Wyatt 1984: 206). Dewawongse played vital roles in these negotiations with the purpose of saving the independence of the kingdom, and he achieved that goal. Dewawongse died in 1923 after serving thirty-eight years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thanks to his brilliant diplomatic skills, Siam was able to preserve its independence.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also British Interests in Southeast Asia; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Paknam Incident (1893); Preservation of Siam's Political Independence; Reforms and Modernization in Siam

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DEWEY, COMMODORE GEORGE (1837–1917)

An American Imperialist

George Dewey was the commodore in command of the U.S. Asiatic Squadron and gained fame on 1 May 1898 when he won the Battle of Manila Bay against the Spanish fleet in the early

days of the Spanish–American War (1898). That battle established the United States as a new Asiatic imperial power and paved the way for the American colonization of the Philippines.

Dewey was a professional U.S. Navy officer, born on 26 December 1837 in Montpelier, Vermont. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, and was commissioned as a regular navy officer. He saw action in the American Civil War (1861–1865) as executive officer of the USS *Mississippi*. Dewey was a supporter of Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan's views on projecting national strength by sea power and naval bases, and he favored the U.S. acquisition of a naval base in Asia in the 1890s. He was in command of the Asiatic Squadron, based in the British colony of Hong Kong, when the Spanish–American War broke out and immediately prepared the squadron to attack the Spanish fleet in the Philippines. Leading the ships into Manila Bay on board his flagship, the USS *Olympia*, he caught the Spaniards by surprise, and with little opposition and the loss of only one man, his force totally destroyed the Spanish fleet. The Battle of Manila Bay was the first modern naval battle, and it made the United States a major world power. Dewey favored the American takeover of Luzon from the Spaniards, even as he reportedly promised to assist Filipino revolutionary forces in their war against Spain. He held off attempts by other powers to assert power over Manila Bay and assisted U.S. ground troops in the capture of Manila in August 1898.

For his victory over the Spanish fleet, Dewey was made an admiral of the navy, the highest rank in the U.S. Navy. He was given a hero's welcome on his return to the United States and continued to serve in the navy as president of the navy's General Board until his death on 16 June 1917. Americans remembered Dewey as the victor of Manila Bay and the man responsible for bringing the United States to empire status. To Filipinos, however, he is seen as an imperialist who broke his promise to aid the Filipino revolutionary forces.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Aguinaldo, Emilio (1869–1964); “Manifest Destiny”; Manila; Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration

(1898–1946); Spanish–American Treaty of Paris (1898); Spanish–American War (1898)

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DIEN BIEN PHU, BATTLE OF (MAY 1954)

A Vietnamese Victory

On 7 May 1954, the Vietnamese Popular Army defeated the French forces at Dien Bien Phu, putting an end to the First Indochina War (1945–1954). The battle took place within the framework of French strategy. It was part of the Navarre Plan—named after the French commander-in-chief, General Henri Navarre—a two-year plan (1953–1955) intended to allow the French Union troops, which were supposed to hold back the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, under Hồ Chí Minh [1890–1969]), to progressively win back territory for the so-called national army of the State of Vietnam (headed by Bảo Đại [r. 1925–1955]) supported by France and the United States.

The occupation of the basin of Dien Bien Phu, situated in enemy territory near the Laotian border, served two purposes: first and most important, to immobilize the regular troops of the adversary that would be attracted by this entrenched camp and possibly be neutralized by it, and second, to protect Laos, where the valley was considered to be the birthplace of the T'ai people that the Lao belonged to. On 20 November 1953, Operation Castor enabled French parachutists to occupy the valley and to airlift the soldiers and matériel necessary to make it impregnable. This included an airstrip and a military defense system, defended by powerful artillery and protected by operational bases, mainly in the surrounding hills. Everybody seemed to be sure of themselves, with only a few exceptions. Roger Guillain, journalist for *Le Monde*, published the following description of the famous basin: “The true image would be that of a stadium, but of an immense stadium, at least 20 km long and 7 or 8 km wide. The bottom of the stadium is controlled by us, the slopes of the surrounding mountains by the Viet Minh” (*Le Monde*, 14–15 February 1954).



Supplies are delivered by parachute to French troops in Indochina during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. French forces, led by General Henri Navarre, greatly underestimated the Viet Minh. The fall of Dien Bien Phu was not only the death knell of the French in Asia, it was also the beginning of U.S. involvement in the region. (U.S. National Archives)

The Viet Minh were determined to take up the challenge. It is difficult to know exactly who had more influence in making this decision, whether it was General Vo Nguyễn Giáp and his staff or their Chinese advisers, whose role was crucial. Nevertheless, in spring 1954, the military effort of the Popular Army met this challenge by organizing a momentous mobilization to transport men and matériel from the other end of the north. The image of the endless columns of bicycles converted to transport heavy loads is well-known. In addition, trucks made their way down the mountains from the Chinese border. Thus, thousands of men and their artillery were discreetly deployed around the entrenched camp. The stakes were high because even as the battle was brewing, the decision had been made to hold an international conference in Geneva to reach a settlement of the Korean and Indochinese conflicts, which took place on 26 April 1954. It was therefore important for the DRV to achieve the best possible bargaining position.

Apparently in order to profit from the advantages of his own artillery and against the advice of his Chinese counselors, General Giáp at the last moment renounced the decision to at-

tack early. The battle proper finally began on 13 March when a powerful bombardment destroyed the airstrip, thus immediately destabilizing the French system of defense. The concept of the French camp was, in fact, based upon the idea of an airlifted umbilical cord. The air force now had to proceed, subject to bad weather and to the long distance from its home bases, to parachuting reinforcements, ammunition, and other materials. Some 12,000 soldiers of the French Union endured the enemy bombardments under difficult conditions while the enemy was digging an entire network of trenches to approach them.

Would it have been possible for the United States—already involved financially in the conflict, to the extent of almost 80 percent of its cost—to intervene? The French government asked it to do so on 5 and 23 April. An American contingency plan, an air operation named Vulture, was readied in vain, as President Dwight Eisenhower (t. 1953–1961) decided not to put this plan into action, thereby condemning the French expeditionary corps to a predictable defeat. On 7 May 1954, after fifty-five days of bitter fighting, the entrenched camp was overrun by the Popular Army and the French garrison captured. The very next day, as part of its two-pronged goal, the Geneva Conference would tackle the Indochinese question, thus consecrating the French defeat.

The name *Dien Bien Phu* remains a synonym for *trap*. Those who conceived the battle plan fell into their own trap, and the fatal outcome caused them to lose the war. The end of the First Indochinese War sounded the knell of the French Empire, and the battle became a symbol for the irrevocable victory of a dominated country over an imperial power.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Bào Đại (Vinh Tuy) (1913–1997); China since 1949; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Geneva Conference (1954); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Indochina War (1946–1954), First; Sino-Vietnamese Relations; U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (Vietnam Independence League); Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vo Nguyễn Giáp, General (1911–)

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DIPONEGORO (PANGERAN DIPANEGARA) (CA. 1785–1855)

Nationalist Javanese Prince

The Javanese prince Diponegoro is one of those historical personages who still speak to the imagination. He was probably born in 1785, the eldest son of Hamengkubuwana III (r. 1810–1811, 1812–1814) and a woman of low birth. This fact would have exerted a decisive influence on his life, certainly when a younger brother was born to another of his father's wives who was from the aristocracy. It would be he and not Diponegoro who would be the heir apparent to the throne. Diponegoro grew up at some distance from the Javanese court of Yogyakarta in the village of Tegalreja. There, he lived with his grandmother, the Ratu Ageng, wife of Hamengkubuwana II (r. 1792–1810, 1811–1812). His relative isolation does not mean that he was not involved in the gossip and quarrels common to the court society of his time. He took the side of his father when the latter was appointed prince regent by the Dutch governor-general, Herman W. Daendels (t. 1808–1811), in 1811, and his grandfather, Hamengkubuwana II, in that same year was compelled to step down in favor of his son.

At an early stage in his life, according to the chronicle *Babad Diponegara* (Chronicle of Diponegara), Diponegoro had already devoted himself to Islam. It was his custom to pray in his own prayer house, where he could also recite endlessly from the Koran. The prayer house

was situated in a garden with beds of flowers of all kinds and a pond full of goldfish. He roamed regularly through the countryside, where he visited the graves of his ancestors of the Mataram dynasty. He sojourned at these holy places, fasting and praying, and had visions in which it was foretold that he would be the one to purify Java from all iniquity. During his wanderings, he also visited the mosques in the region, where he talked with the local religious leaders. Soon, the common people in the region thought of him as a holy man, favored by Allah. When he was about twenty years old, he underwent a religious experience that convinced him that he was the one chosen to become the future king of Java. He would be the *Ratu Adil* (the just king) who, according to Javanese legend, would reign justly over the land after a short period of war.

In 1814, his father, Hamengkubuwana III, died unexpectedly, and his younger brother was appointed by the British lieutenant governor Stamford Raffles (t. 1811–1816) to take the throne as Hamengkubuwana IV (r. 1814–1822). In contrast to his elder brother Diponegoro, the new king led a carefree, dissolute life. The Javanese court increasingly adapted itself outwardly to the European lifestyle. This exorbitant court lifestyle had to be paid for by the people, who were subjected to extortion by the leaseholders of the aristocracy. Discontent grew among the common people and the aristocracy alike during the reign of Hamengkubuwana IV, who was increasingly confronted with the interference of the Dutch in internal court affairs. Two measures taken by the Dutch governor-general, Godert A. P. Van der Capellen, in 1822 and 1823 caused a growing part of the Javanese aristocracy to look to Diponegoro as the leader to free them from Dutch domination. The first action was a direct blow to Diponegoro. Upon the death of Hamengkubuwana IV in 1822, his three-year-old son was appointed as his successor instead of Diponegoro, who had hoped to succeed his brother. The second was the decision to abolish the private leasing of land to Chinese and Europeans. As a consequence, most of the Javanese aristocracy suffered great financial difficulties.

Mindless actions on the part of the Dutch authorities were the direct cause of the outbreak of the Java War (1825–1830). Without Diponegoro being informed, the colonial gov-

ernment had planned a road cutting across his land in Tegalreja. Skirmishes broke out, and Diponegoro was forced to flee. In the beginning, he and his troops were very successful at harassing the Dutch forces using guerrilla warfare. Diponegoro soon assumed the title of sultan and behaved as such. But in the course of 1827, the tide turned against Diponegoro. His troops were defeated time after time, and people began to desert him. At the beginning of 1830, Diponegoro decided to commence negotiations with the Dutch commander, General Hendrik Merkus de Kock. He was invited to meet the general in Magelang. When Diponegoro arrived, the fasting month of Ramadan had begun, where *puasa* (fasting) was observed, and Diponegoro refused to start the negotiations. The first talk took place after the fasting month. Diponegoro demanded that he be recognized by the Dutch as sultan as well as the leader of Islam in Java. This was unacceptable to the Dutch. Despite being guaranteed safety, Diponegoro was arrested and exiled to Makassar, where he died in 1855.

For the Indonesians, Diponegoro is still considered one of the first champions of independence. In Indonesian historiography, he marks the beginning of a new era that led into the breakdown of the Dutch colonial power and freedom for Indonesia. As such, he is a symbol for each generation of Indonesians who fought and continue to fight against oppression and injustice.

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TRANSLATED BY ROSEMARY
ROBSON-MCKILLOP

See also Islam in Southeast Asia; Java War (1825–1830); Liberal Experimental Period (1816–1830); Mataram; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Raffles, (Thomas) Stamford Bingley, Sir (1781–1826); *Ratu Adil* (Righteous King/Prince); Van der Capellan, Baron Godert Alexander Philip (1778–1848); Yogyakarta (Jogjakarta)

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DISEASES AND EPIDEMICS

Serious research on long-term disease patterns in Southeast Asia remains in its infancy, and much of what we know about the subject before 1800 is a matter of deduction from fragmentary reports of so-called plagues or extrapolation both backward from the last two centuries and laterally from better-documented patterns in Europe, China, and India. Nevertheless, in seeking to understand the long-term disease patterns of the world's humid Tropics, there is no better source of potential data for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than the copious reporting of Spanish and Dutch agents in Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia in the Disease Pools of Eurasia

The heavily forested environment and year-round high temperatures and rainfall of Southeast Asia allowed a wide variety of human and animal parasites to flourish—parasites that would not have withstood the rigors of a northern winter. But as William McNeill (1995: 70–77) pointed out, the abundant diseases and parasites of the rain forest may have helped protect scattered Southeast Asian rural populations against their expanding urban enemies. This is in contrast to the biological advantage that enabled civilizations (in the sense of dense urban populations with antibodies against endemic diseases) in temperate Eurasia to defeat their rural enemies.

Nevertheless, these populations were never wholly isolated from broader Eurasian disease pools, such as the peoples of Australia, the Americas, or the Pacific islands. From at least the dawn of the common era, there were en-

trepôts in the region serving the long-distance trade of the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and in turn interacting with hinterland forest populations. Two Eurasian diseases are likely to have played a particularly powerful role in keeping Southeast Asian populations low (in comparison with China and India). Smallpox has been in India and China for almost two millennia and must therefore also have reached Southeast Asia. The earliest records suggest it or related diseases such as measles were the most feared. In most settled agricultural areas and trading ports, it became endemic, affecting chiefly children every seven to ten years. Many more isolated populations, however, lost immunity and continued to be devastated by new exposure to it as late as the nineteenth century.

Malarial plasmodia, the parasites carried back and forth between the bloodstream of monkeys and humans by mosquitoes, were the principal reason why the lowlands of Southeast Asia were sparsely inhabited before the fourteenth century. The deltas of the Irrawaddy, Mekong, and Chaophraya and the swampy lowlands of eastern Sumatra and southern Borneo were forbidding for humans because they were havens for the *Anopheles* mosquito. Only when the forest was turned into continuous paddy fields where the mosquitoes were exposed to harsh sunlight did such areas become safe for humans. Viet cultivators appear to have achieved this in the Red River delta in the first millennium C.E., as did Thais in the lower Chaophraya in the fourteenth century and Javanese in the Surabaya-Gresik area in the fifteenth century. With these exceptions, the largest population concentrations were on higher ground beyond the reach of the *Anopheles* until the nineteenth century.

Crisis Mortality of the Early Modern Era

If, in general, Southeast Asian populations rose only very slowly and spasmodically before 1750, there appears to have been a particularly serious period of diseases from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. The new epidemics were not, as in the Americas, exclusively derived from Europeans; the European arrival in 1509 was part of a broader pattern of increasing commercial contacts throughout maritime Eurasia.

What the Europeans did bring was an increasing availability of census data at regular intervals for specified populations. These show, notably, a decrease of one-third in the population of much of the lowland Philippines from 1591 to 1655 and even more dramatic declines in Dutch-dominated areas of the Moluccas and northern Sulawesi from the 1630s to 1670s. Indigenous data for the larger population centers are more questionable. Nonetheless, it does seem that major rice bowls of the Red River and Irrawaddy deltas (present-day northern Vietnam and southern Burma [Myanmar]) both lost substantial population during periods of intense warfare (usually accompanied by disease and famine) in the late sixteenth century. Similarly, the Javanese heartland appears to have lost population in the century after 1650.

We cannot know whether this was simply a continuation of long-standing patterns of growth in stable periods and decline in unsettled ones or if it was really something new. If there was an increase in crisis mortality in this period, there are five rival explanations for the cause—urbanization, warfare, economic crisis, climate, and exposure to new epidemic diseases.

Southeast Asia's "age of commerce" from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries was undoubtedly a period of exceptional preindustrial urbanism, perhaps 5 percent overall at the peak around 1650 and significantly more in highly commercial areas around the Straits of Melaka. As was the case everywhere before the introduction of clean water in the late nineteenth century, cities were breeding grounds of disease. Cities such as Pegu, Surabaya, Banten, and Makassar suffered drastic population losses in the seventeenth century primarily because of warfare, which always prompted epidemics that did most of the killing. Major urban epidemics not directly related to war occurred in Banten in 1625, when one-third of the population reportedly died in five months, and in Makassar in 1636, when 60,000 reportedly died in forty days (Reid 1988: 60–61). The most reliable data we have about urban crisis mortality, however, come from Dutch Batavia (Jakarta), which sustained an astonishing annual death rate equivalent to about half its roughly 100,000 population throughout the period from 1730 to 1752 (Reid 2001: 49–50; Van der Brug 1995). Recent research has shown that Batavia's notorious

mortality at that time was a result of malaria, which overwhelmingly affected the great influx of new immigrants to the city (Dutch soldiers and Chinese immigrants and slaves), about half of whom died within a year of arrival (Van der Brug 1995).

Warfare does appear to have been the greatest variable in mortality. The decline in the northern Vietnamese population, for example, occurred during the ferocious civil war between Trinh and Mac from 1545 to 1592, whereas the population of Pegu was almost wiped out during the siege and warfare of the 1590s. The introduction of firearms, initially by Chinese and Muslim traders but much more murderously by Europeans after 1511, probably increased the human costs of warfare. But since these costs were greatest in terms of the famine and disease that always accompanied wartime dislocations, we might seek more fundamental reasons in the economic competition for Indonesia's valuable spices, which peaked with the Dutch quest for monopoly in the seventeenth century.

The notion of a seventeenth-century climatic crisis being the cause of increased mortality in Europe and China is still controversial. Trends over time in the Tropics are much less well understood, and the data for Southeast Asia are too sparse for more than speculation. The most persuasive piece of data is a tree-ring sequence from Java, supported by historical evidence of droughts and crop failures. This sequence shows exceptionally dry seasons in the two periods from 1633 to 1638 and 1643 to 1675, which correlate with unusually widespread and severe epidemics.

Evidence for new diseases reaching Southeast Asia with the Europeans is not very persuasive. Syphilis was once thought to have been carried by Europeans from the Americas, but there were reports of something very like it well before this contact. More likely is that the increasing mobility of European, Chinese, and Muslim traders and warriors in the age of commerce brought more frequent reinfections with smallpox, measles, and perhaps plague in areas where these had not yet become endemic.

Modern Epidemics

Despite the considerations that have been mentioned thus far, European observers of the six-

teenth and seventeenth centuries generally considered Southeast Asians to be relatively healthy. They observed fewer crippled and disfigured people and reported fewer catastrophic epidemics than they were familiar with in the fetid cities of Europe. High rainfall, a habit of frequent bathing, and a diet low in meat except when animals were freshly slaughtered at feasts may, indeed, have given some protection against the diseases that were prevalent in Europe. Once conditions of political stability were established, as happened in Java, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Siam in the nineteenth century, populations rose at rates in excess of 1 percent a year.

Better data in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the beginnings of medical services enable us to track some major epidemics in the region. The first securely documented pandemic of Asiatic cholera began in Bengal in 1817 and reached Bangkok via Penang in May 1820. It may have caused upwards of 30,000 deaths there and a similar number in the then much smaller city of Saigon, within only three weeks. It reached Java in 1821, and the Dutch recorded with precision that 1,255 people died in Semarang and 778 in Batavia, each within a span of eleven days (Boomgaard 1987: 53). Total mortality from the disease in Java in 1821 has been estimated at 125,000 (Boomgaard 1987: 50). Cholera remained a recurrent feature of nineteenth-century Southeast Asia but subsequently became devastating only during times of severe warfare.

Plague is another disease once thought to have spared Southeast Asia until the modern epidemic of 1910, but as with cholera, this assumption was based principally on ignorance. Mortality from plague was not demographically weighty, with only 215,000 deaths attributed to this cause in Java between 1911 and 1939 (Hull 1987: 211). But countering the dreaded disease became a major preoccupation of the Dutch administration in the years after 1911, with a million and a half houses refurbished to make them rat-proof and tiled roofs replacing thatch as the norm of Javanese villagers.

Since 1950, a number of diseases have been reduced markedly in intensity through control measures, vaccination, and better nutrition and sanitation. Smallpox was the most spectacular success and was largely eradicated by inocula-

tion by 1970. Malaria has been eliminated from urban areas in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, but the forests remain a prolific breeding ground for mosquito vectors.

Rising levels of welfare in most countries of the region after 1970 also dramatically reduced the incidence of waterborne diseases. Singapore and Malaysia by the 1980s reflected a pattern of disease not unlike those of developed countries in temperate areas, with the traditional “tropical” diseases no longer major killers. Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines were moving rapidly in a similar direction.

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See also Aceh (Acheh) Wars (1873–1903); Age of Commerce; Bangkok; Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jakarta, Djakarta/Jakarta); British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Burma–Siam Wars; Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Ethical Policy (*Ethische Politiek*); Famines; Hanoi (Thang-long); Kuala Lumpur; Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Indochina War (1946–1954), First; Indochina War (1964–1975), Second (Vietnam War); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Manila; Penang (1786); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1898–1946); Rangoon (Yangon); Saigon (Gia Dinh; Hồ Chí Minh City); Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1900s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Surabaya; Surakarta; Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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DOBAMA ASIAYONE (WE BURMANS ASSOCIATION)

See Aung San (1915–1947); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Burmans; General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) (1920); Nu, U (1907–1995); Thakin (Lord, Master)

DOMINO THEORY

In its broadest and most general meaning, the “domino theory” pertained to a chain reaction, a succession of events set in motion by a single force. The theory was announced in 1954 as the rationale for the U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. The immediate force behind the domino theory was the struggle that had developed between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) at the end of World War II (1939–1945), a contest for pre-

dominant political and strategic position as well as ideological influence in Southeast Asia. This competition was enhanced and sharpened with the communists' victory in China in 1949.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–1969) had introduced the term *domino theory* on 7 April 1954 in explaining why Indochina should not be allowed to come under communist control. The fall of Indochina, it was argued, would likely lead to the collapse of nearby states—Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia—and eventually all of Asia would stand in the path of an advancing communist menace.

But although many prominent resistance leaders of national liberation movements in Southeast Asia were communists, the movements usually had self-determination as an objective and not the fostering of Soviet, Chinese, or international communism. The major error of U.S. policy during the Cold War stemmed from a conviction that communist movements were the same everywhere, that all were subservient to the Soviet Union or China, that all were imposed upon the native populations, and that all were inherently hostile to American interests. Consequently, the administrations of John F. Kennedy (1961–1963) and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–1969) reaffirmed the commitment to the domino theory. But gradually, Americans began to understand that the status of countries in Southeast Asia depended not on events in neighboring states or on command from Moscow or Peking (Beijing) but on conditions and problems within each nation. With the armistice of 1973 in the Vietnam War, the domino theory lapsed into limbo. Nevertheless, American governments have not discredited the idea itself.

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See also Cold War; Comintern; Indochina War (1964–1975), Second (Vietnam War); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia; United States Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945)

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DONG-SON

The term *Dong-son* has multiple meanings, standing for a major archaeological site in North Vietnam and the roughly two-thousand-year-old culture of the Bac-bo region in the far northeastern portion of Vietnam. It also refers to the famous bronze drums made by the Dong-son people, as well as the art style found on these drums and certain other antiquities. At the time they were occupied, sites belonging to the Dong-son culture were probably the largest in Southeast Asia and supported a standard of wealth and material sophistication that could not be found anywhere farther south. The several meanings of the term *Dong-son* testify to the importance of this culture in laying a substratum foundation for early civilization in North Vietnam and absorbing the brunt of ancient Chinese interest in, and occupation of, Southeast Asia. Scholars can claim considerable knowledge of the Bac-bo region some two thousand years ago because of the riches of the archaeological record, the brilliant depictions of Dong-son society on the drums, and early written accounts after the Chinese established an official presence on the Red River delta in 111 B.C.E.

The site of Dong-son introduced colonial French archaeology to the splendors of ancient Vietnam through the amateur collections of Louis Pajot in the 1920s and the systematic excavations by Olav Janse in the 1930s. More recent work, which was resumed at the site by Vietnamese archaeologists beginning in the 1960s, now suggests that it was first occupied around 1000 B.C.E. during the Go-mun phase, by which time bronze metallurgy and rice farming were entrenched in the region. By the Dong-son phase, after 500 B.C.E., iron implements (forged according to procedures prevalent in India at the time) and wet-rice agriculture were evidently standard features of daily life, as were spindle whorls, fishing equipment, pottery of ordinary quality, earrings of stone, and an enormous bronze repertoire. Bronze

objects included axes of various shapes, dagger handles, spearheads, bracelets, apparel, bells, sickles, spittoons, plowshares, and blades of digging tools, as well as the kettledrums. Many of these items were found as though arranged around an extended corpse whose vestiges had long since disappeared, allowing the identification of cemetery areas. Habitation areas are equally detectable from traces of piles that would have elevated the houses above ground level, as are manufacturing areas from discarded blanks of bronze and stone. The site may have had a significant role in local commerce, as it occupied a defensible location on the banks of the Song-ma River at a point that could be reached from the coast by large watercraft.

The heart of Dong-son culture focused on the Red River delta, where most of the 100 or so recorded Dong-son sites lie. Opulent burials in boatlike coffins, with up to 100 funerary goods in a single coffin, demonstrate the existence of a wealthy elite, who were most probably hereditary chiefs. The fact that some sites are much larger than others and have more extensive cemeteries points to the operation of powerful centers that exercised authority over smaller, attached communities. Depictions on the kettledrums include a warrior class of well-armed individuals with sweeping headdresses who were presumably charged with maintaining the social order. The images depicted on the drums vividly display many other features of Dong-son life that are suggested from the study of habitation debris. The features included houses on piles, sometimes with granaries attached; large watercraft, sometimes defended by archers with crossbows; water buffaloes plowing the fields; farmers pounding their crops in mortars; elaborate dress; and the important role of the drums themselves as musical instruments and the insignia of authority. When the Chinese finally annexed the Bac-bo region as the southernmost province of their empire in 43 C.E., they confiscated the drums owned by the local chiefs to deprive them of these regalia.

Friezes of flying birds and intricate, curvilinear motifs provide further insight into the high culture of the paramount chiefs who headed Dong-son society and its numerous occupational divisions. Symbols of nature—deer, lizards, and fish—also occur occasionally on Dong-son panels. The middle of the drum's

tympanum invariably features a bas-relief design with six to twelve engraved triangles pointing toward the center, leaving a star-shaped embossment. The exquisite decorations on the drums were achieved through the "lost wax" technique, in which wax was used to coat an inner core of clay. After the wax had been decorated, an outer casing of clay was packed around the wax, chaplets were positioned to hold the outer casing in place, the wax was removed by heating it, and molten bronze was poured into the resultant cavity. Removal of the outer casing revealed the finished drum. This technique and the drums themselves may have originated in Yunnan in southern China, where early Dong-son drums are quite common, rather than in the Bac-bo region.

Spearheads with bronze hafts and iron blades have so far been recorded only at Dong-son and the northeast Thailand site of Ban Chiang, suggestive of trade or technological transfer from Bac-bo to Thailand. Occasional gold and silver ornaments, beads of glass, and the bronze swords and halberds found at Dong-son were probably imported from sources beyond Southeast Asia. This would certainly apply to the Han Chinese mirror, coins, and stamped earthenware shards, which, as a group, show that habitation at Dong-son continued after 43 C.E. Han-style graves at the site reflect direct Chinese influence over its residents or even Chinese occupation. Dong-son drums continued to be produced in the Bac-bo region until around 300 C.E. but with increasing signs of Chinese influence, including occasional inscriptions in Chinese characters. Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism all began to make inroads into the Bac-bo region at around that time, spelling the end of the aristocratic warrior traditions and other homegrown beliefs that had evidently furnished Dong-son culture with its ideological inspiration. Dong-son culture receded in the face of the development of a true urban culture in the Red River delta, as exemplified by the fortified site of Co-loa that grew to an area of 600 hectares.

The Viennese scholar F. Heger classified the Dong-son kettledrums as Type I in his system, defined by their angular contours, wide bases, and equally wide tympana. His Types II to IV refer to derivative kettledrums produced in later times. Heger III drums, associated with the Karen people who live in the hills between

Burma and Thailand, are still made for the tourist trade. As well as being generally smaller than Heger I drums, they have narrower bases and more rounded contours and a simpler array of motifs dominated by frogs on the tympanum and elephants on the side. Heger II drums resemble Type III in their general shape and predilection for frogs on the tympanum but are restricted to the region between southern China, northern Laos, and central Vietnam (where they were still made into the early nineteenth century). Heger IV kettledrums are known in the thousands but are restricted to southern China; their simplified shapes and decorations betray their lack of great antiquity.

Also related to the Dong-son drums (but possibly descended from a different prototype) are the Pejeng drums, cast in Bali for use there and in East Java. These were among the first bronze kettledrums to be noticed in Western scholarship when Georgius Everhardus Rumphius recorded the enormous “Moon” drum at the village of Pejeng in Bali in the late seventeenth century. These hourglass-shaped drums stand up to 2 meters high and were decorated with bands of triangles and human faces with prominent eyes. The site of Sembiran in Bali yielded a production stamp in the Pejeng style that would date to the early centuries C.E., and a similar age is likely for a Pejeng drum that villagers found there. Although the Pejeng style is sufficiently distinct from the Dong-son style to warrant its own name, the intricate looping motifs found on rare ceremonial bronzes to the north—clapperless bells in Malaya and bronze flasks in Madura, southern Sumatra, Cambodia, and central Thailand—are conventionally referred to as the Dong-son style.

In support of this association, Dong-son drums made in Bac-bo have been recorded widely across Southeast Asia and, indeed, as far eastward as the Bird’s-Head Peninsula of New Guinea. Their find locations are dispersed evenly across mainland Southeast Asia to the south of Bac-bo before coming to particular concentrations in the middle third of West Malaysia, the western half of Java, and the islands east of Sumbawa in southeastern Indonesia. Several drums are also known from southern Sumatra, as is a famous rock frieze of an armed warrior carrying one of these drums on his elephant. Conceivably, these ninety or so

known cases of kettledrums transported over long distances could have underwritten the occurrence of geometric and curvilinear motifs similar to those on Dong-son drums, as found on early pottery (as well as bronzes) widely across Southeast Asia. Alternatively, the kettledrums could stand out as the spectacular markers of a vigorous trade in other, usually smaller bronzes from Bac-bo to regions to the south; this trade would have spread the Dong-son style over much of Southeast Asia.

However, other observations suggest that the so-called Dong-son style has deeper roots. Much of the pottery decorated in this style is older than the Dong-son culture; indeed, all of the Dong-son drums found in Indonesia could have been produced after Bac-bo had been incorporated within the Han empire. Nor have Dong-son drums been found in coastal central Vietnam, Borneo, the Philippines, or the main body of Sulawesi, where assemblages of pottery with lavish geometric and curvilinear motifs, referred by William Solheim as the “Sa-huynh Kalanay” tradition, are most prevalent. A case in point involves the ceramics from Kalumpang, in western Sulawesi, whose decorations are frequently compared to the Dong-son style but date back to at least 500 B.C.E. and possibly 1000 B.C.E. Similarities between the Dong-son and Sa-huynh Kalanay decorative motifs would presumably extend back further in time and possibly reflect descent from early Neolithic southern China. Many of the same geometric motifs can be found on the ceramics from Hemedu, an ancient village site in southern China that dates to around 5000 B.C.E.

In addition, many of the objects depicted on Dong-son drums, such as houses on piles, large circular earrings, and various domesticated animals, would have been widely distributed across southern China and/or Southeast Asia around two thousand years ago. Olav Janse had preferred the term *Indonesian* for mortuary features at Dong-son that he considered indigenous to Southeast Asia, and his term underlines the similarities in material culture between Bac-bo and a good number of contemporary societies to the south. Thanks to the complexity of Dong-son society and its capacity to support highly skilled artisans, Dong-son imagery provides a unique insight into conditions that prevailed to varying degrees throughout Southeast

Asia on the eve of concerted attention from Chinese and Indian emigrants.

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See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast of Asia; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia

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DORMAN-SMITH, SIR REGINALD
(t. 1941–1946)

The Last British Governor of Burma

Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith was the penultimate governor of British Burma from 1941 to 1946. A former president of the National Union of Farmers in Great Britain and a Conservative Party member of the House of Com-

mons, he served as minister of agriculture in Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's government (1937–1940) prior to World War II (1939–1945). When Chamberlain's government fell and was succeeded by Sir Winston Churchill's wartime government (1940–1945), Dorman-Smith was appointed in 1941 to succeed Sir Archibald Cochrane (t. 1936–1941) in Rangoon (Yangon). An extrovert, Dorman-Smith thoroughly enjoyed the political intrigues of the various Burmese politicians he worked with prior to the Pacific War (1941–1945). As colonial governor, he presided over a political system that gave Burmese politicians wide powers in all areas except defense, foreign affairs, finance, and the so-called Frontier Areas. Much of his time was spent in reaching compromises with the elected politicians over their respective spheres of authority.

His period of office was, however, interrupted in 1942 when he was forced to flee to Simla in India to establish a government-in-exile following the Japanese invasion. There, he laid elaborate plans for the reconstruction of Burma after the war. Constitutionally, he had agreed with the British government that he would take complete power during the reconstruction period, setting aside the democratic aspects of the Government of Burma Act until order and prosperity had been restored. This arrangement was unacceptable to the new generation of Burmese nationalist politicians he met on his return to Rangoon in October 1945. Led by General Aung San (1915–1947) and the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), they refused to compromise with him, and when the British Labour government under Clement Attlee (t. 1945–1951) recognized that the political stalemate in Burma was unsustainable, Dorman-Smith was recalled as governor.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Aung San (1915–1947); Ba Maw, Dr. (b. 1893); British Burma; Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Constitutional Developments in Burma (1900–1941); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia

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**DU BUS DE GISIGNIES,
VISCOUNT LEONARD
PIERRE JOSEPH (1780–1849)**

Fiscal Reformer of the Dutch East Indies

In 1825, Viscount Du Bus was appointed as commissioner-general of the Dutch East Indies to replace Governor-General Godert A. P. Van der Capellen (t. 1816–1825), during whose reign the cost of Dutch administration of the Indies had increased. Du Bus had to reorganize the colony's finances and investigate what system of government would be most appropriate. He reduced public expenditure by dismissing a number of public servants and lowering the salaries of those he retained. He also studied ways of increasing public revenue. His report of May 1827 advocated the development of Java by issuing unused land to private entrepreneurs for agricultural production. In addition, he lifted restrictions on the settlement of Europeans in Java. However, Du Bus's proposals were not implemented. The Dutch king, under the influence of Count Johannes Van den Bosch (1780–1844), did not expect instant financial benefits from the plan and advocated the Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*).

Du Bus worked closely with Lieutenant Governor-General H. M. de Kock, who was in charge of ongoing affairs. Military exploits and monetary reforms marked Du Bus's tenure in the Indies. De Kock subdued the Diponegoro uprising during the Java War (1825–1830). Matan in southwest Kalimantan was conquered, and the sultanate of Sukadana was established there. Tanette in South Sulawesi was subdued, but an attempt to establish Fort Du Bus in New Guinea in 1828 failed.

Monetary reform was urgent. Previous governments had increased the circulation of copper doits and paper money. Silver and gold coins were in short supply, flowing out of the system due to the colony's trade deficit. Fluctuations in the exchange rates of the currencies caused monetary chaos. In an effort to encourage the use of silver, Du Bus decreed in 1826 that copper doits would be legal tender up to É10. He withdrew all paper currency, exchanging it for silver, gold, copper currency, and government bonds. He oversaw the establishment of the Java Bank in 1828, which received a monopoly on the issue of banknotes. Although en-

couraging, these efforts were insufficient to end the monetary chaos.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Diponegoro (Pangeran Dipanagara) (ca. 1785–1855); Java War (1825–1830); Van den Bosch, Count Johannes (1780–1844); Van der Capellen, Baron Godert Alexander Philip (1778–1848)

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DUAL ECONOMY

The “dual economy” was an analytical concept first formulated by Julius H. Boeke (1884–1956) to explain sustained underdevelopment in Indonesia. Boeke never provided an unambiguous definition of the concept. He basically maintained that ethnic Indonesians were imbued with a different economic rationale compared with Western people. Rather than economic inducements such as relative wages, rents, and prices, Indonesians were largely motivated by mutual social obligations. They were inclined to work less if their income increased because they valued leisure. Western economic theory would therefore not apply to Asian societies. This different rationale made Indonesian farmers less susceptible to technological change.

Reflecting widely shared perceptions of the timeless social organization of rural villages in Indonesia, Boeke's term *static expansion* described a process by which more and more people were accommodated in Java's agricultural sector, without any dynamic changes in agricultural productivity or in the economy at large. Boeke argued that Dutch efforts to promote economic development would only hasten the disintegration of traditional society, without another social system taking its place. The Dutch could best serve the interests of native Indonesians by protecting and restoring what he perceived as traditional communal village life.

Boeke published most of his work after 1929 as an academic at the University of Leiden. He had little influence on economic policy formulation in colonial Indonesia. Contributions in *Indonesian Economics: The Concept of Dualism in Theory and Practice* (1961) indicated that many Dutch contemporaries rejected his pessimism about Indonesia's development prospects.

The economist Benjamin Higgins (1912–2001) criticized Boeke. He also used the term *dual economy*, but his version was grounded on the difference in production technology in the “modern” and “traditional” sectors. With reference to Indonesia, Higgins argued that the modern sector produced on the basis of capital-intensive technologies and that the traditional sector produced with labor-intensive technologies. The modern sector produced for export, and its expansion had little impact on the traditional economy, whereas development in the traditional sector was restricted by a shortage of investment capital.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Burma under British Colonial Rule; Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Patron-Client Relations; Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1898–1946); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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DUPLEIX, JOSEPH FRANÇOIS (1696–1763)

Aspirant to a French Indian Empire

Joseph François Dupleix, whose dream had been to create in India a French empire to confront British imperialism, prefigured the type of

colonial administrator often encountered in the history of French colonization in the nineteenth century. Although an agent of the French East India Company (Compagnie des Indes Orientales), he distinguished himself with his individual initiatives, his independence, and his propensity to act as an omnipotent proconsul. Spurred on by increasing international rivalry and interested only in the expansion of commerce and not at all in religious diffusion, he conceived from the outset the idea of inland expansion in India, which he persistently carried out.

He arrived in India in 1721 as an officer of the French East India Company, and ten years later, he was appointed governor of Chandernagor, where he acquired a considerable fortune. In 1742, he became governor of Pondichéry and was thus the chief official of the French establishments in India. He wished then to make the Compagnie des Indes Orientales not only a commercial but also a territorial power, and he began to devise an ambitious policy of territorial domination in order to develop French influence and to check the British control of India. In the First Carnatic War (1740–1748), part of Europe's War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), which brought the French and English East India Companies into conflict, he supervised the capture of the English company's territory of Madras (1746), but it was returned to the British by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748). Dupleix nevertheless continued to take advantage of the confused situation in South India to establish a real protectorate over southern Decan. Integrated into the Mogul political and economic system (he obtained a *jagir*—a feudal concession and the title of *nabob* in 1750) and helped by his wife, “Begum Jeanne,” who spoke several local languages, he intervened actively in native political intrigues and warfare (the Second Carnatic War, 1751–1754). Above all, he expected to use the taxes of the dependencies of his *jagir* to provide regular subsidies to the French company, the commerce of which he knew would be greatly at risk in the event of a war. Much at ease in his role as a Hindu prince, he interceded in succession quarrels: he helped Muzaffer Jing to become the *nizam* (the title accorded native rulers) of Hyderabad; he backed the claimant to the throne of the Carnatic, Chanda Sahib; and he assured the

Marathas of his support. Through the cleverly combined use of diplomacy and war and with a force of 2,000 European soldiers leading Indian sepoy, he conquered the coastal Andhra and gradually controlled nearly the entire Deccan.

Furthermore, Dupleix was eager to extend eastward the scope of the French company's activities. Aware of the importance of the Burmese ports in the naval strategy of the Bay of Bengal, he suggested as early as 1727 the establishment of a dockyard at Syriam, which began to function two years later under the management of experienced shipwrights. Approached by the Mons in revolt against the Burmans under King Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760), he sent an envoy in 1751 to negotiate with the Mon government at Pegu and craft a treaty by which, in return for commercial concessions, the Mons were to receive substantial French aid. Convinced of the advantages that an armed intervention in the Mon-Burman struggle would bring to the French, he commanded a military expedition to gain control over the Mon kingdom. But the directors of the French company, who feared that anything involving military commitments would provoke a further contest with the British, rejected Dupleix's proposal.

Dupleix also turned his attention to Vietnam. In 1748, he sent a representative to Tourane to investigate the commercial possibilities, and in 1753, he obtained from the Nguyễn the authorization to set up a factory. This project, however, was abandoned following the outbreak of the Seven Years' War between England and France in 1756 because the French lacked the naval resources to defend the sea-lanes to such remote outposts. French interest in Vietnam, largely maintained by Dupleix, soon dwindled away after his departure from India in 1754.

Indeed, in India, the British regained ground under the leadership of Robert Clive (1725–1774), who repelled the troops of Chanda Sahib, Dupleix's ally, at the siege of Arcot. Anxious to avoid war and to negotiate peace with England, the French king Louis XV (1710–1774), apparently uninformed of Dupleix's grandiose schemes, recalled the governor in 1754. Dupleix's successor, Charles Godeheu, signed a truce with Thomas Saunders, the president of the English company at Madras, whereby the two companies committed them-

selves to abandoning their respective conquests in India. As a result, the hope of establishing a French empire in India vanished.

Dupleix's original initiative was a challenge that perhaps was impossible for France to take up, entangled as it was at the time in its European quarrels. In any case, such a policy went against the interests of the shareholders, who looked for immediate profit and would not care for colonization, and the French East India Company lacked the working capital that would enable it to embark on great undertakings. Its directors, who, by contrast, dreaded a policy of counterintervention on the part of the British, would limit themselves to a mercantile conception of expansion: "no power on land" but "many goods and some increase in dividends" (Moreel 1963). As for Dupleix, he spent the rest of his days pleading against the company in order to recuperate the sums he had advanced for it. He died in poverty and neglect.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760); British India, Government of; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Mon; Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Pegu

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DUPRÉ, MARIE JULES (1813–1880)
A French Imperialist in Vietnam

An activist governor of Cochin China, France's colony in southern Vietnam, from 1871 to 1874, Marie Jules Dupré is remembered for his failed attempt to gain control of northern Vietnam. He was born at Albi in southern France

on 25 November 1813, the son of an army officer. After attending the French naval academy, he served in a wide range of appointments, including as governor of Réunion Island in 1864. He was promoted to rear admiral in 1867.

When Dupré became governor of Cochin China in April 1871, France was recovering from its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), and policymakers in Paris were skeptical about the value of France's colony in Vietnam and opposed to further colonial expansion. Dupré took a very different view on both these issues. In Cochin China, he worked hard to entrench the French administration, strengthening the Native Affairs Service, introducing compulsory vaccination, and promoting primary education. But it was Dupré's attempt to adopt a forward policy of expanding France's colonial presence into northern Vietnam (Tonkin) that has most interested historians.

In 1873, at a time when relations between the French authorities in Saigon and the Vietnamese court at Huế were strained, Vietnamese officials in Hanoi prevented a French trader and adventurer, Jean Dupuis, from conducting commerce up the Red River into China. Dupuis appealed to Saigon for assistance, and Admiral Dupré seized on this appeal to send Francis Garnier (1839–1873) to northern Vietnam to extricate Dupuis. It also seems certain that he gave Garnier secret instructions to take the opportunity to establish a new colonial position in Hanoi and the surrounding region. Dupré never put these instructions in writing, and he would later deny authorizing Garnier to act as he did. In any event, Garnier was killed, and the small force that accompanied him to Tonkin was withdrawn in ignominy. Dupré was recalled from Cochin China in semidisgrace, but he was subsequently promoted to vice-admiral and ended his official career as the prefect of Toulon. He died in Paris in 1880.

MILTON OSBORNE

See also French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; French Indochina; Garnier, Francis (1839–1873); Huế; Lagrée-Garnier Mekong Expedition (1866–1868); Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Saigon (Gia Dinh, Hồ Chí Minh City); Tonkin (Tongking)

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DUTCH BORNEO

Dutch Borneo encompassed the area of present-day Kalimantan Indonesia, covering the western, central, and eastern portions of Borneo. Not until the early decades of the twentieth century was Dutch political hegemony established over the several native principalities of Western and Central Borneo and the sultanates of Bandjarmasin and Kutai. The various small native states of Western Borneo include Sambas, Monterado, Mempawah, Mandor, Pontianak, Kubu, Landak, Sanggau, Sukadana, Sintang, Semitau, Tojan, Melawi, and Matan. The sultanate of Bandjarmasin claimed suzerainty over the southern portion of Borneo from Kotawaringin in the west to Pasir in the east. The sultanate of Kutai dominated the eastern half of Borneo and the area along the Mahakam River. Pockets of independent principalities were found in the northeastern region—Gunung Tabur, Sambaliung, and Bulungan.

Prior to the nineteenth century and despite contracting treaties with native rulers, the Dutch established no effective control over Western Borneo. However, by a combination of new treaties and expeditionary campaigns, they succeeded in establishing their authority over the Chinese *kongsi* (associations) of Sambas, Monterado, and Mempawah (ca. 1850s); Sintang (1846); Semitau (1858); and Melawi (1864). The interior Dayak territories in Semitau were finally brought under Dutch control in 1916.

Notwithstanding the fact that Bandjarmasin ceded Kotawaringin to the Dutch in 1787, it was only in 1824 that effective control was established. Likewise, it was only with the conclusion of the Bandjar War (1861–1865) that Bandjarmasin bowed to Dutch authority. In 1905, the Dutch finally exercised control over the Muaratewe area.

On the eastern coast, Kutai and Pasir submitted to the Dutch in the mid-1840s. In 1906, Gunung Tabur, Sambaliung, and Bulungan became Dutch vassal states. And from 1906 to 1908, the Dutch managed to subdue the Upper Mahakam and Upper Pasir.

During the Pacific War (1941–1945), Japanese Imperial forces occupied Dutch Borneo from 1942 to 1945. From 1945 to 1949, Dutch Borneo was a component state of the Dutch-created federation known as the United States of Indonesia. It formed part of the unitary setup of the independent Republic of Indonesia in 1949 and came to be referred to as Kalimantan Indonesia.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Bandjarmasin Sultanate; Borneo; British Borneo; Chinese Gold-Mining Communities in Western Borneo; Kutai (Koetai); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Sambas and Pontianak Sultanates

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DUTCH EAST INDIES

Although the term *Dutch East Indies* (or *India*)—alternatively, *Netherlands East Indies* (or *India*)—was widely adopted during the nineteenth century in reference to the Dutch realm in Southeast Asia (the area of present-day Indonesia), it was only in the early decades of the twentieth century that such an entity was an actuality.

Java was the main focus of the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company). Founded in 1602, the VOC concentrated on securing the political hegemony of Java. The establishment of Batavia in 1619 gave the VOC a base for expansion during the next two centuries. Combining diplomacy and force of arms, the VOC progressively acquired control over West and East Java, the northern coastal periphery, and Madura at the expense of the Javanese empire

of Mataram. Subsequently, in the mid-eighteenth century, the decaying empire of Mataram fractured into two states—Surakarta and Jogjakarta—that between them controlled Central Java. With the dissolution of the VOC in 1799, Java came under the authority of the Dutch state—the Batave Republic, the Kingdom of Holland, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. During the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), the English East India Company (EIC) administered Java from 1811 to 1816. The EIC encroached on territories in Central Java and eliminated the sultanate of Banten. Upon their return in 1816, the Dutch reasserted control over Java. The conclusion of the Java War (1825–1830) established Dutch supremacy over the entire island.

The exertion of Dutch suzerainty over Sumatra, begun in the mid-seventeenth century, was accomplished only in 1911. Over a period of three centuries, the Dutch had to contend with various native sultanates—Acheh (Acheh), Asahan, Deli, Siak-Indrapura, Indragiri, Djambi, Langkat, Palembang (including Bangka and Billiton), Riau-Lingga, Lampung (controlled by the West Javanese sultanate of Banten [Bantam]), the Minangkabau areas, and the Batak regions around Lake Toba. Padang was under Dutch control after 1659; the British assumed jurisdiction from 1795 and restored control to the Dutch in 1816. Under the terms of the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, Bencoolen (Bengkulu), a British outpost since 1685, was transferred to the Dutch, and in return, the British obtained Melaka. The Dutch annexed Bangka and Billiton in 1806; both were occupied by the British from 1812 to 1816 during the Napoleonic Wars and returned to the Dutch thereafter. Palembang bowed to Dutch suzerainty in the early 1820s. A decade later (in the early 1830s), Lampung fell to the Dutch. The end of the Padri Wars in the late 1830s witnessed the establishment of Dutch control over the Minangkabau territories and Indragiri. Siak submitted to Dutch authority in 1857, as did Djambi in the following year. But the interior of Djambi only acknowledged Dutch power in the first decade of the twentieth century. The Dutch subdued the Batak territories, beginning with Angkota and Mandailing (1832); Tapanuli (1841); Slindung (1859); Toba-Batak (1869); and Karo-Batak, Pakpak-Batak, and Dairi-Batak (1904–1907). Offshore islands,



A Dutch house in Melaka. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) received its charter in 1602, and the Dutch gained control of Melaka in 1641. (North Wind Picture Archives)

such as Siberut and Nias, came under effective Dutch control in 1905 and 1906, respectively. Although the Dutch offensive against Aceh began in 1873, the entire region only accepted Dutch overlordship from 1903 to 1904. The Galo-Alas territories, dependencies of Aceh, bowed to Dutch authority in 1907. Finally, with the annexation of Riau in 1911, the whole of Sumatra was under Dutch control.

The Dutch began to assert control over Borneo in the nineteenth century. Utilizing treaty arrangements coupled with military force, the various native sultanates and Chinese gold-mining *kongsi* (associations) of West Borneo—Sambas, Monterado, Sintang, Semitau, and Melawi—were brought under effective Dutch administration by the mid-1860s. The interior regions of Semitau were finally subdued in

1916. The Bandjar War (1861–1865) decisively eliminated any resurgence of the Bandjarmasin sultanate. In 1844, Pasir and Kutai bowed to Dutch authority. Nonetheless, the Dutch only succeeded in annexing the Upper Mahakam and Upper Pasir areas from 1906 to 1908 and the interior of Apokajan in 1911.

Dutch authority in Sulawesi (Celebes) was established over Makassar following the Treaty of Bongaya (1667); thereafter, the Dutch assumed control of Manado (1679), Gorontalo (1681), and the island of Salajar (1675). Butung had been a Dutch ally since the seventeenth century. Manado and Makassar were under the British from 1810 to 1816 during the Napoleonic Wars. Treaties were signed with Sopenng, Bone, and Luwu in the early 1860s and with Wadjo and Poso in 1888. Despite

treaty relations, effective Dutch control had to be attained through military campaigns in the first decade of the twentieth century that finally brought into the fold Bone, Gowa, and Luwu, as well as the various confederacies of Mandar, Masenrempulu, and Adjatapparang. The sultanate of Ternate ceded Banggai, Laiwui-Kendari, and Bungkus to the Dutch in 1907, and only after that was Dutch sovereignty established over all of Sulawesi.

Effective Dutch authority over the Lesser Sunda Islands commenced toward the end of the nineteenth century and in the first decade of the twentieth century. Lombok acknowledged Dutch control after 1894, whereas Flores, Sumba, Sumbawa, and Timor did so from 1905 to 1908. Meanwhile, the Balinese kingdoms of Badung and Klungkung were subdued from 1906 to 1908.

In Maluku (the Moluccas), Dutch suzerainty was acknowledged by the sultanates of Tidore (1657), Batjan (1667), and Ternate (1683). By the early 1780s, the Dutch directly controlled Ternate, Tidore, Obi, Ambon (Amboina), Uliasser, the Huwamahal peninsula of Ceram, the Banda islands, and Halmahera. During the Napoleonic Wars, British authority was established over Ambon and Banda (1796) and Ternate (1799), but these territories were returned to the Dutch in 1816 and 1817. Ceram and Buru finally bowed to Dutch authority in 1905 and 1907, respectively.

By virtue of the sultanate of Tidore's status as a vassal to the VOC, the territories in its possession also came under Dutch authority. They included those in New Guinea such as the Onin peninsula; Bird's Head; the islands of Waigeo, Misool, Salawati, and Batanta; and the Radja IV archipelago. In 1900, the Dutch acquired all of Tidore's rights over New Guinea. But effective Dutch control was only established during the late 1890s and the early 1920s, with the submission of Fakfak and Manokwari (1898), Merauke (1902), Hollandia (1910), Biak (1916), and Waigeo and Misool (1921).

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Borneo; Coen, Jan Pieterszoon (1587–1629); Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Java; Maluku (The Moluccas); Melaka; Napoleonic War in Asia; Netherlands

(Dutch) East Indies; Spices and the Spice Trade; Sumatra

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DUTCH INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA FROM 1800

For most of their history, the Dutch had no particular interest in or indeed concept of Southeast Asia. The commercial ventures in which the Dutch Republic, its chartered companies, and its citizens engaged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not only Asia-wide but also worldwide in scope. The focus of the Dutch monarchy and its subjects after the French Revolution (1789–1799) and the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) was on what they called “Netherlands India” and what nationalists were to call “Indonesia.” What happened elsewhere in Southeast Asia—in fact, in Asia as a whole—interested them only in terms of its impact on Netherlands India.

Yet the striking feature of this phase is not that the Dutch lost so much but that they retained or gained so much. Their worldwide interests were depleted—though they still retained Surinam and remained the only Europeans with a toehold in Japan until the latter years of the Tokugawa—but for a small European state, their Indies realm was strikingly large and prosperous. What was it that enabled them to build up this impressive realm?

One of the most sophisticated of the Indonesian nationalists, the Sumatran Sutan Sjahrir (1909–1966), pointed to the answer. “For more than a hundred years now Dutch power over our country and our people has been a by-product of the calculations and decisions of British foreign policy.” Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Dutch had remained in Indonesia “not on the basis of their

own strength, but by favor of the English, on whose policies they have been wholly dependent" (Sjahrir 1968: 24–25).

Though the British had dislodged the Dutch from the Indies as well as the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) during the wars, they handed the Indies back in the convention of 1814. The aim was to consolidate the new monarchy and its friendship with the British, seen as a constraint on further threats from France. The acquisition of Singapore (1819) prompted a further adjustment—the Dutch left their settlements in India and on the Malay side of the straits, and the British left Sumatra—but the essence of the understanding was confirmed. Though the British would trade in the archipelago, they would not offer a political challenge to the Dutch. What was unspoken in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 was no less important than what was openly said. Other powers also accepted the view of the predominant power of the day: territorially speaking, the Indies was for the Dutch.

Somewhat paradoxically, that enabled the Dutch to limit their establishment of formal political control over much of the Indies for some fifty years or more. Though the Dutch United East India Company (VOC) had established a measure of direct control in parts of Java during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it had, for the most part, continued to work through treaties and contracts with local rulers. The new colonial rulers adopted and adapted the practice. Indeed, throughout its history, Netherlands India remained a collection of directly ruled and "self-administering" territories.

Most colonial realms proceeded by securing collaboration from indigenous elites, backed up by infrequent demonstrations of effective and exemplary force. The Dutch were no exception: in fact, they were quite systematic in that regard. They had, after all, practical motives for the study of *adat* (custom or customary law), for the investigation of dynastic claims, and for the shaping of both. They had every reason, too, to be sparing in the use of force. Yet there were some conflicts they should not have entered into, for it was impossible to succeed. The notable one was, of course, the long war with Aceh.

The early years of the new realm had been marked by another major conflict, the Java War of the 1820s, brought to an end with difficulty

and deceit. Its challenge only intensified the problem the Dutch faced. How were they—their worldwide commerce finally destroyed by the French wars—to make the most of the empire to which they had been restored? How could that empire contribute to the new monarchy, itself challenged by the Belgian revolution of 1830 and the breakaway of an independent Belgium? The answers were found in the Cultivation System associated with Governor-General Johannes Van den Bosch (t. 1830–1833) and in the policy of "peace and order" associated with his successor, Jean C. Baud (t. 1833–1836). The former was designed to substitute Javanese labor for Dutch capital in developing exports from Netherlands India, and the latter was intended to avoid further disruption to a fragile realm. The concentration had to be, as Van den Bosch put it, on "profitable activity" (Graves 1971: 144).

These solutions would only work if they avoided alienating the British. They came near to doing so. The Cultivation System limited the role of British capital, and the differential duties imposed on foreign trade seemed to the British to breach the 1824 treaty. In view of the British protest to Dutch expansion in East Sumatra in the 1830s and 1840s, Baud withdrew the posts the Dutch had established, without dropping their claims. The dispute also led the British government to offer some support to James Brooke's venture in Borneo (1803–1868), though arguably Borneo had been left to the Dutch under the treaty. That worried the Dutch, who sought to back up their claims elsewhere in Borneo and in Bali. Essentially, however, the relationship with the British, though uneasy, remained positive. The security it offered made it possible to adopt *outhouding*, abstention from involvement in unprofitable areas.

Although the Dutch had become more prosperous by the 1870s—partly as a result of the success of the Cultivation System in boosting Indies exports and helping to create textile industries and infrastructure in The Netherlands—they had also become more nervous. Other powers were beginning to rival their patron, Britain, and the guarantee the British offered was thus less secure. The Dutch response was twofold. They extended to others the commercial opportunities they offered the British, indeed moving toward the abolition of differential duties and the creation of an "open-door"

policy. They also moved toward asserting their control in parts of the archipelago where their rule was still informal or nonexistent—in Bali and Lombok, for example, as well as Aceh.

There was, of course, a larger threat, and the Dutch were unsure how to respond to it. The relationship with the British had helped to insulate the Indies from the outer world. But insulation was no longer possible. Even if the intervention of other powers could be precluded, new ideas penetrated. The development of the economy dislocated the relations with the elite established under the Cultivation System and required the introduction of at least a measure of modern education. A more sophisticated society could learn from newspapers what was going on elsewhere: that the Japanese had defeated the Russians in 1905, for example, or that the Manchu dynasty had been overthrown in 1911. Meanwhile, modernist Islam was gaining ground, despite Dutch colonial official Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje's (1857–1936) belief that it was a contradiction in terms. With the growth of democracy at home, the Dutch themselves had to find a new rationale for colonial policy.

The answer was the “Ethical Policy,” an inflow of Dutch investment capital aimed at developing natural resources and increasing export production, associated with Dutch liberals C. Th. van Deventer and J. H. Abendanon (1852–1925) and several others. But this was an uncertain answer—even an ambiguous one—and was never fully adopted. Could the Dutch welcome or even encourage the Indonesian nationalism that developments were bringing about? Could they find new collaborators among the nationalists? Or did caution still have to prevail? Should the Dutch try to prevent the nationalists from making contact with the masses or even turn back to *adat* and to old elites? The unrest of the 1920s and the depression of the early 1930s largely destroyed the cause of the Ethical Policy.

During this period, the activities of the political information service (PID) made Netherlands India something of a police state. Its rulers acquired a new but negative interest in other parts of Southeast Asia. Singapore, thrust into the islands and always a source of commercial jealousy simply because it was a commercial convenience, now harbored nationalist opponents. The Americans, too, were

setting a bad example in the Philippines. Manuel Quezon (1878–1944), soon to be the first president of the Philippine Commonwealth, visited Surabaya in 1934. Dutch officials thought him “more subversive . . . than Marx, Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin rolled into one” (Friend 1965: 170).

In fact, the British-backed colonial framework in Southeast Asia was dissolving, and it was upon that framework that the Dutch ultimately relied. The more immediate threat came, however, from the Japanese. The Dutch had been nervous when Britain allied with Japan in 1902. A Japan unrestrained by alliance was more worrying still, and its descent upon Manchuria in 1931 seemed a possible precedent, especially as Sumatra and Borneo had oil and the Japanese had none. Britain could make no promises and was of little help when the Japanese invaded Netherlands India in 1942.

The Dutch returned to the Indies once more after the defeat of the Japanese in 1945. They now faced a republic, proclaimed by Indonesian nationalists at the very end of the interregnum. Their patrons, the British—on whom, as Sjahrir saw, so much had depended and still depended—urged them to collaborate with nationalism. They could not, however, find nationalists with whom they were prepared to collaborate, and the use of force without a context of collaboration necessarily failed.

Netherlands India, they had proclaimed, extended from Sabang to Merauke. Yet when they accepted the independence of Indonesia in the Round Table Agreements of 1949, they were not prepared to make over West New Guinea to their successors. The Dutch States-General could not accept the disappearance of the Dutch flag from Asia: the Agreements were acceptable only if the transfer excluded West New Guinea. Yet for the Indonesians, West New Guinea was part of their inheritance, sanctified, moreover, by the sufferings of nationalists exiled there in the interwar years.

In the course of the dispute, which ended only in 1962, the Indonesians moved to eliminate Dutch economic interests in the republic. Those interests were, however, no longer deemed vital by the Dutch. “The transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia has opened the way for the Netherlands to resume the traditional position in the International economy,” Dirk Stikker, the Dutch minister of Foreign Affairs,

wrote in 1950 (Baudet 1984: 274). His colleague, the minister for economic affairs, had, on the very eve of the Round Table Agreements, offered the States-General an industrialization plan that did not mention Indonesia. That plan, new markets, the growth of services, and the European Economic Commission (EEC) offered the Dutch and their state new sources of wealth. Growth was “spectacular”: 3.5 percent a year between 1950 and 1970 (Wesseling 1980: 128). There was no need for a flag.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also Aceh (Acheh); Aceh (Acheh) Wars (1873–1903); *Adat*; Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Bali; British Interests in Southeast Asia; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Ethical Policy (*Ethische Politiek*); “Indonesia”; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Linggadjati (Linggajati) Agreement (1947); Lombok; Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Padri Movement; Padri Wars (1820s, 1830s); Renville Agreement (January 1948); Singapore (1819); Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1990s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Snouck Hurgronje, Professor Christiaan (1857–1936); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Sumatra; Van den Bosch, Count Johannes (1780–1844); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East Indies Company) (1602)

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DUTCH POLICE ACTIONS (FIRST AND SECOND)

A Clash of Wills

The First and Second Dutch Police Actions were military confrontations between the Dutch and the Republic of Indonesia. The Dutch believed the first action was necessary to enhance the conditions required to implement the terms of the Linggadjati Agreement (1947), a pact between the Netherlands government and the Republic of Indonesia whereby both agreed to the creation of a federal state to be known as the United States of Indonesia (USI). Similarly, the second action was launched by the Dutch to enforce compliance with the Renville Agreement (1948), an agreement between the Netherlands government and the Republic of Indonesia over recognition of the authority of the Republic over Java and Sumatra. The Republic of Indonesia regarded both police actions as undisguised aggression against its sovereignty.

The First Police Action was launched in July 1947. The field of operations encompassed Java and Sumatra. The tactical aim was twofold: first, to destroy the armed units operating in the name of the Republic of Indonesia, and second, to capture the export commodities in Dutch-owned estates that were located in republican-controlled territories. The republican response was guerrilla warfare. Of the two tactical aims, only the second was achieved. Estate products were recaptured, but the military units of the republic simply melted away.

The Second Police Action was launched in December 1948. The political aim was to force the republican government to participate in a federal government that the Dutch claimed was provided by the Renville Agreement concluded earlier in the year. The military operations centered on the capture of Jogjakarta, the republican capital. In one fell swoop, almost all of the top republican leaders were arrested and sent into exile. However, an emergency republican government was proclaimed in Sumatra, and the republican military units again melted into

the countryside to resume their guerrilla warfare. Thus, the Second Police Action failed to extinguish the Republic of Indonesia.

YONG MUN CHEONG

See also Indonesian Revolution; Linggadjati (Linggajati) Agreement (1947); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Renville Agreement (January 1948); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; Van Mook, Dr. Hubertus Johannes (1894–1948); Yogyakarta (Jogjakarta)

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DVARAVATI

A Mon Polity in Thailand

Dvaravati was the name given to a city or kingdom located in Central Thailand during the first millennium C.E. as well as to a wider archaeological or art historical culture in Central and Northeast Thailand. Both the kingdom and the culture are often identified with the Mon ethnic group, who are thought to have occupied much of Central Thailand during that period. The polity of Dvaravati appears to have been centered on the lower Menam or Chao Phraya River, and it is particularly associated with the Buddhist site of Nakhon Pathom and the walled citadel of U Thong. The name Dvaravati also survived into later periods of Thai history, appearing among the official names of both Ayutthaya and Bangkok.

Scholars in the nineteenth century originally reconstructed the name of the early state of Dvaravati in accordance with Chinese historical texts that mentioned a kingdom named To-lo-po-ti or Tu-ho-lo-po-ti. This country sent embassies to the Tang court of China in 638, 640, and 649 C.E. and was also mentioned by the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims Hsuan Tsang (ca.

596–664 C.E.) and I-tsing (635–713 C.E.), who traveled through Southeast Asia during the second half of the seventh century. However, there was no further record of this kingdom in Chinese sources after that date. Both Hsuan Tsang and I-tsing described To-lo-po-ti as lying east of Sri Ksetra, a kingdom of the Pyu people located in the central Irrawaddy Valley of present-day Burma (Myanmar) and west of Isanapura in modern Cambodia. To-lo-po-ti (Dvaravati) therefore seemed to have been located in the lower Menam Valley of modern Thailand.

These conclusions were supported by information published in 1964 about two silver medals found in the region of Nakhon Pathom in Central Thailand, which bore inscriptions reading “the meritorious act of the lord of Dvaravati.” Two further medals with the same inscription were discovered in the 1970s (the first at U Thong and the second at Ban Ku Muang, north of Lopburi), and other examples have since been found at a number of early Buddhist sites in Central Thailand. Coins bearing the symbol of a conch shell (*sankha*) and the outline of a temple or shrine are known to have been minted at U Thong and Nakhon Pathom from the sixth to ninth centuries C.E. (Mitchiner 1998: 179–200).

Archaeological investigations at Nakhon Pathom and U Thong have revealed a distinct cultural level dating from the sixth to ninth centuries. This evidence has led to the definition of a Dvaravati culture, characterized by urban settlements protected by extensive earthen ramparts and moats and above all by Buddhist votive tablets, sculpture, and religious foundations. Among the most elaborate sculptural elements are stone *dharmacakras*, or “wheels of the laws,” erected as symbols of Buddhist teaching, and carved *sema* stones, used to mark the sacred boundary of Buddhist monastic foundations. Both have been discovered in many areas of modern Thailand, although some particularly fine series of *dharmacakras* have been collected at Nakhon Pathom, as were *sema* stones at Muang Fa Daet in Northeast Thailand.

It is unclear, however, whether this cultural distribution suggests the territory of a wider kingdom or simply the pattern of local trade issuing from one or two major commercial, political, or religious centers. David Wyatt (1982: 21–24) has emphasized the commercial impor-

tance of the Central Plain of Thailand in commanding the overland trade routes leading westward into Burma, to the north up the Chao Phraya (Menam) Valley, and to the northeast into the Khorat Plateau. It is probable that the spread of Dvaravati culture was the result of this trade and that the polity of Dvaravati itself was localized in the lower Menam Valley.

Almost all of the sites associated with the Dvaravati culture are distinguished by the presence of inscriptions in the Mon language. This has encouraged the Thai art historian Piriya Krairiksh to suggest that the art forms associated with Dvaravati should preferably be described as "Mon art," as the geographic extent of the kingdom of Dvaravati remains unknown. However, the ethnic or linguistic composition of Central and Northeast Thailand at that time is also uncertain, and the term *Mon* may therefore be equally deceptive.

What is beyond doubt, however, from both the historical and the art historical material, is the importance of Theravada Buddhism in that culture. Small clay tablets bearing an image of the Buddha and sometimes a Buddhist formula in Pali on the obverse have been found in large numbers at many Dvaravati sites and also in cave sites in southern Thailand. It is clear that towns such as Nakhon Pathom must have played an important role in the propagation of Buddhism across much of mainland Southeast

Asia. These towns formed part of a Buddhist network linking the ancient pilgrimage sites of northern India and Sri Lanka in the west to the new Buddhist dynasties in China, Korea, and Japan.

WILLIAM A. SOUTHWORTH

See also Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; I-Ching (I-tsing) (635–713 C.E.); Mon; Mons

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E

EAST INDIA COMPANY (EIC) (1600), ENGLISH Transformer of Southeast Asian Trade and Commerce

The English East India Company (EIC) was a joint-stock firm founded by royal charter in 1600, with exclusive rights to trade between England and Asia. Its goal was to develop the spice trade of the eastern Indonesian archipelago. Unable to compete with the Dutch East India Company (VOC), it withdrew to India, maintaining only one outpost in Southeast Asia after 1685. A century later, it returned to establish the ports of Penang (1786) and Singapore (1819). The British government disbanded the EIC in 1858.

For its first twenty years, the EIC attempted to trade with the Moluccas and Bandas, the islands where cloves and nutmegs grew. But the VOC forestalled these efforts, and English forays in the area led to conflicts. The EIC lost out to the better-funded Dutch. Local events undermined attempts by the directors in London and Amsterdam to compel their employees in Indonesia to cooperate. (Their efforts included the transfer of the EIC's headquarters from Bantam [Banten] to the Dutch-controlled port of Batavia in 1619.) Finally, all was shattered when the Dutch governor of Ambon in the Moluccas executed ten English merchants in 1623, an incident known as the Amboina Massacre. After that, the EIC concentrated on its trade to India.

The factory in Bantam remained, collecting pepper, ginger, sugar, and (until the Dutch captured Makassar in 1667) cloves smuggled by Malay traders from the Moluccas. From Bantam, new voyages were made to Japan and China, Siam (Thailand), and Cambodia. But competition was severe—in Makassar, from Portuguese, Spanish, and Asian traders, and in Bantam, from Indians, Portuguese, and Danes. By 1670, Bantam was largely a supply station for the China trade, and when the VOC captured Bantam (1682), the English withdrew their pepper trade to Benkulen (Bengkulu), on the western coast of Sumatra.

But as the China trade grew, so did the EIC's need for Southeast Asian products, such as pepper, tin, and spices. These goods were smuggled from the Dutch-held territories to the Malay ports of Kedah, Selangor, and especially Riau by Malay and Bugis traders and taken to India by private English merchants (the "country traders," who were often financed by employees of the EIC).

In the 1760s, the China trade and the need for a safe haven on the windward side of the Bay of Bengal prompted the EIC to search for a new base in Southeast Asia. Various places were tried (Negrais, Manila, and Balambangan). In 1784, following the Dutch capture of Riau, the main port of the country trade, an English country trader named Francis Light (1740–1794) persuaded the sultan of Kedah to cede

Pulo Pinang (Penang) to the EIC (which he did in 1786).

By 1786, the EIC was more an organ of the British government, ruling an empire in India, than a commercial enterprise. In 1813, its monopoly of Asian trade was canceled, except for the trade to China. During the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), the EIC occupied the Dutch possessions in the archipelago, including Melaka, Batavia, and Ambon. By 1814, when these ports were returned to Dutch rule, it was apparent that Penang, at the western end of the Straits of Melaka, was no substitute for those ports or for Riau. The governor of Benkulen, Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781–1826), acquired Singapore, at the southern end of the Straits of Melaka, from a Johor prince who had been passed over in his claim to the throne. The Dutch disputed the legality of Raffles's 1819 treaty, but the port flourished, and the English were reluctant to give it up. Negotiations led to the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, which divided English and Dutch spheres of influence in the archipelago by a line through the Straits of Melaka. Benkulen was exchanged for Dutch Melaka.

The EIC administered Penang, Melaka, and Singapore (the Straits Settlements) as free ports until 1858. This was a period of commercial growth, encouraged by immigration from China. The peninsular Malay States, by contrast, were in political collapse because of a threatened invasion by Siam (Kedah was overrun in 1821) and economic recession. There was an upsurge of violence in the Straits of Melaka, as Malay princes battled to acquire power. Though the Straits government had been ordered to avoid direct intervention in the affairs of its neighbors, the peninsular Malay States viewed such actions as piracy and acted accordingly, laying the groundwork for British intervention and colonial rule later in the century.

The EIC helped to shape the face of modern Southeast Asia economically, socially, and politically. Together with the VOC and other European traders, the EIC at first brought an era of economic expansion, "which remade Southeast Asia and enabled it to play a leading role in global commerce" (Reid 1993: 326). But later, it brought decline and decay, as Penang and Singapore diverted trade from the Malay ports.

The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 set up a political division in the archipelago, and the EIC's encouragement of Chinese immigrants to its ports foreshadowed a policy in the British-governed Malay States that played an important role in shaping the demography of modern Malaysia.

DIANNE LEWIS

See also Ambon (Amboina/Amboyna) Massacre (1623); Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Banten (Bantam); Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Bengkulu (Bencoolen, Benkulen); British Interests in Southeast Asia; China, Imperial; Country Traders; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Light, Captain Francis (1740–1794); Maluku (The Moluccas); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Penang (1786); Pepper; Singapore (1819); Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1990s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Spices and the Spice Trade; Straits Settlements (1826–1941); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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EAST INDONESIAN ETHNIC GROUPS

Historically, eastern Indonesia has been variously defined. Here, it is considered to include the islands of Sulawesi, Maluku, and East and West Nusa Tenggara, including the whole of the island of Timor, half of which now (since August 2002) comprises the new nation of Timor Leste (East Timor).

Language is a useful starting point for any ethnic classification. The overwhelming majority of the population of eastern Indonesia speaks a language that belongs to the Austronesian family of languages. This places most eastern Indonesian ethnic groups among the large group of linguistically related populations that stretch from Madagascar in the west to Easter Island in the east and from Taiwan in the north to Timor in the south.

All of the Austronesian languages outside Taiwan are classified as Malayo-Polynesian. Within this grouping, linguists distinguish between Western Malayo-Polynesian and Central Malayo-Polynesian. The dividing line for this classification occurs within eastern Indonesia. All of the languages of Sulawesi and those on the western half of Sumbawa belong to the Western Malayo-Polynesian grouping. The language of Bima on Sumbawa and all of the languages of East Nusa Tenggara and North and South Maluku are considered to be Central Malayo-Polynesian. This Central Malayo-Polynesian grouping is a large and as yet provisional categorization that still lacks sufficient subgrouping criteria. It does, however, point to a long history of regional differentiation and linguistic interaction among language speakers in eastern Indonesia.

Eastern Indonesia, however, is also notable for its scattering of non-Austronesian languages. The largest number of these languages are found on the islands of Alor and Pantar. The languages are related to other languages found in central and eastern Timor as well as to one language on the island of Kisar. All of these languages are considered to belong to the Trans-New Guinea phylum of languages, most of whose members are found in New Guinea. Other non-Austronesian languages spoken on Ternate, on Tidore, and on Halmahera in northern Maluku belong to the West Papua family of languages. Long contact and interaction between speakers of Austronesian and

non-Austronesian languages have led to significant borrowings across these language families. This historical interaction is probably responsible for some of the social and cultural differences between the eastern and western halves of the Indonesian archipelago.

For a critical period in the 1930s, anthropologists associated with Leiden University, in particular J. P. B. de Josselin de Jong and his eminent pupil, F. A. E. van Wouden, looked upon eastern Indonesia, especially Flores, Timor, and the islands of Maluku, as a privileged field of study. In their view, this area preserved elements of the oldest forms of Indonesian society, particularly in various encompassing systems of marriage exchange and in the reliance on complex dual cosmologies. These views led to a somewhat exaggerated emphasis on the differences between these societies and other societies of the archipelago. Currently, greater attention is given to locating the majority of societies of eastern Indonesia within a more general comparative Austronesian framework and to tracing similarities as well as differences among these societies and other Austronesian-speaking populations.

Historically, the societies of eastern Indonesia have long been open to trade with the outside world. Nutmeg and clove from the islands of Maluku and sandalwood from Timor were traded as valued commodities for many centuries. These islands were also a principal location for the trade of bird of paradise feathers, marine products such as *bêche-de-mer* (*trepan*, or sea slug), and rare woods that originated from New Guinea. Trade in captured slaves was also widespread. These commodities provided a source of wealth in the creation of local polities and eventually attracted Europeans to the region. The sultanates of Ternate in Maluku, Makassar in Sulawesi, and, to a lesser extent, Buton on the island of Buton and Bima on Sumbawa were important trading ports and became political and religious centers of influence. Islam, which began to spread in eastern Indonesia in the fifteenth century, together with the increasing use of Malay as a *lingua franca*, was a crucial ingredient in the formation of trading networks.

The Portuguese were the first to arrive in eastern Indonesia in the sixteenth century, soon followed by the Spanish, British, and Dutch. The Europeans, particularly the Portuguese,

fostered the spread of Christianity. Through the seventeenth century, the (United) Dutch East India Company (VOC) gradually gained monopoly control over most of the islands of eastern Indonesia, signing contracts with local rulers that recognized their local sovereign authority in return for support and the exclusive right of trade. Only in central and eastern Flores and on Timor were the Dutch unsuccessful in driving out the Portuguese. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, control over these islands was strongly disputed. Some local rulers acknowledged Portuguese authority, others acknowledged Dutch authority, and some acknowledged both as was expedient. The allegiance of rulers and of their local populations was also linked to religion, both Islam and Christianity.

The Dutch maintained five main trading centers, or “factories”: at Ternate, Ambon, and Banda in Maluku; at Bima on Sumbawa; and at Kupang on Timor. After a long struggle, the Dutch also managed to gain monopoly control of Makassar. In addition to a presence in these port centers, it was VOC practice to station Europeans as “interpreters” (often with a few soldiers) on many of the islands where they maintained contracts of trade.

Unlike the regulated Dutch VOC organization, the Portuguese presence in eastern Indonesia was organized through independent traders and missionaries, primarily Jesuits and Dominicans. This Portuguese presence was most notable at Larantuka in eastern Flores and at Lifao on the north coast of Timor. In 1769, the Portuguese officially transferred their authority from Lifao to Dili, leaving much of central Timor to the control of an independent group of Portuguese-speaking mestizo traders who were collectively referred to as “Topasses” or as “Black Portuguese.”

After the Dutch colonial government took over from the VOC at the end of the eighteenth century, it continued to recognize the local polities of eastern Indonesia and to maintain a form of indirect rule through a complex structure composed of hundreds of local rajas and sultans. The preaching of Christianity by Dutch missionaries in the nineteenth century spread the Christian religion into the interior of many of the larger islands of eastern Indonesia. Local schooling in Malay was generally linked to this mission effort. The “pacification”

of some areas on Sumba, Flores, and Timor continued into the twentieth century, when the efforts began to consolidate the patchwork of local polities and crosscutting patterns of allegiance in a more ordered colonial structure. After independence, the government of Indonesia continued the process of establishing bureaucratic uniformity over a diversity of social groups with complex historical roots in widely varying environments.

By rough count, there are more than 300 linguistically distinct ethnic groups in eastern Indonesia (130 in Maluku, 110 in Sulawesi, and 60 in Nusa Tenggara). The majority of these groups are of relatively small size, consisting of fewer than 10,000 to 20,000 individuals. Only a few groups number more than 1 million, notably the Bugis (Ugi), Makassarese, Gorontalo, and Atoni. The Bugis and Makassarese of South Sulawesi have historically migrated widely and can now be found in large numbers in Maluku as well as in Kalimantan. The Gorontalo are prominent in North Sulawesi, whereas the Atoni (Atoni Pah Meto/Dawan) constitute the dominant population of West Timor and of the East Timorese enclave of Oecussi. Groups with populations of over half a million include the Sadan Toraja of Sulawesi, the Bimanes of Sumbawa, the Manggarai of west Flores, and the Tetun of Timor.

The Butonese present an interesting case. Those identified as Butonese include speakers of different languages from various islands of Southwest Sulawesi, all of which were once part of the sultanate of Buton. Together, these Butonese also constitute a major group in eastern Indonesia. The Bajau present another interesting case. Although by no means as large a group as the Butonese, the Bajau (sometimes known as the “sea gypsies”) can be found scattered in small coastal settlements throughout the region. The sea, rather than the land, defines their social life and provides their means of livelihood.

Given the diversity of these groups and their complex histories, a simple characterization of the region is impossible. Social identities are closely entwined with local ideas of origin. These ideas uphold status distinctions of long standing. Disputes over precedence in matters of origin are prominent in social life and give scope for considerable social mobility. Houses—in a social as well as a physical sense—are a fo-

cus of identity and provide the basis for the reckoning of descent relationships. Religious allegiances, whether Muslim, Catholic, or Protestant, are another critical component of local social identity. Many groups continue to maintain elaborate registers of dual symbolic categories that emphasize spiritual complementarity, and most groups perform engaging rituals associated with marriage, house building, and death. Exchange between groups at such rituals is fundamental to defining individuals within society and joining generations, including the ancestral dead.

In a modern context, education is seen as highly desirable and a means of gaining status. Local, national, and increasingly international migration affects most communities in the region. This migration is, in many ways, a continuation of a long-standing historical pattern. Conflict has been a part of this pattern and has, in recent years, come to the fore in Maluku, parts of Sulawesi, and Timor. Traditionally, countervailing local relationships have limited such conflicts, and it is likely that this will continue to be the case in the years ahead.

JAMES J. FOX

See also Bajau; Bugis (Buginese); Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; Jungle/Forest Products; Maluku (The Moluccas); Marine/Sea Products; Missionaries, Christian; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Portuguese Asian Empire; Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS, Republic of the South Moluccas); Slavery; Spices and the Spice Trade; Sulawesi (Celebes); Timor; Torajas; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East Indies Company) (1602)

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EAST MALAYSIAN ETHNIC MINORITIES

In a very real sense, minorities and their identities are created, and the native populations of the Malaysian Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah (formerly British North Borneo) were incorporated into and became minorities in the expanding empire of Britain from the nineteenth century onward. At that time, Britain was in intense competition with The Netherlands for control of the trade in profitable tropical commodities and the sources of production, although European merchants had been arriving on the coasts of Borneo and had established relatively precarious footholds there since the seventeenth century. Competition in Asian trade, in which the British were increasingly establishing a dominant position, also led to the European powers gradually taking control over territory and drawing local populations into colonial administrations. Nevertheless, the British were, in some respects and certainly in some circumstances, reluctant imperialists. It is in this connection that the form of Western control established in northern Borneo and the particular

ways in which local minorities were administered are of special interest.

One significant consequence of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry in Borneo was that ultimately the island was divided into two separate colonial spheres of influence. The political boundaries that were agreed upon and drawn between the British-dominated north and the Dutch-administered south arbitrarily cut across the distribution of ethnic groups, and as a result, culturally and linguistically related populations found themselves in separate political units subject to different kinds or styles of European administration. However, the carving up of territories and the drawing of fixed lines on maps did not prevent the physical movements of local people across borders for the purposes of trade, warfare, and settlement.

For Britain, the northwest coasts of Borneo were of strategic importance to protect shipping along the great sea routes between India and China and between the Malay Peninsula, the Straits Settlements (especially Singapore), and the eastern Indonesian spice islands. The coastal Bornean trading settlements along these routes, which were under the sovereignty of the sultanates of Brunei and Sulu, also channeled valuable tropical forest products and marine resources into Asian commercial networks. In establishing control in northern Borneo, the British wanted to secure these northern coasts without being encumbered with an expensive civil administrative apparatus (Irwin 1967: 10). They were also engaged in combating coastal piracy and head-hunting, which were causing considerable problems for the safe and profitable conduct of trade. With great good fortune, the British were able to accomplish their strategic and commercial objectives by working through two surrogates rather than establishing a system of direct rule. In 1839, the English adventurer James Brooke (1803–1868) arrived at the Sarawak River and was subsequently installed as the governor of Sarawak (the “White Raja”) by the sultan of Brunei. Over the next sixty years or so, Brooke and his successor and nephew, Charles Brooke (1829–1917), extended their domains at the expense of the weakened Brunei sultanate (Crisswell 1978). In northern and northeastern Borneo, what was to become the British North Borneo Company was ceded territory by the sultans of Brunei and Sulu, and in 1881, it was granted a royal

charter to administer these regions (Black 1983: 30–79). The British granted Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei protectorate status in 1888, assuming responsibility for the three territories’ external affairs but leaving internal government in the hands of the Brookes, the chartered company, and the sultan of Brunei in their respective domains.

Therefore, the local populations were administered by and through British “representatives.” Over time, a distinction came to be drawn between the Muslim communities of northern Borneo, the majority of whom were designated by the term *Malay*, and the native non-Muslim communities, delineated by “tribal” or subgroup names, although commonly referred to by Europeans by the general referent *Dayak*; alternative forms are *Dyak*, *Daya*, and *Daya*. One important exception in this regard was the forest nomads, or hunter-gatherers of the interior rain forests, who were referred to either by their group names or by the separate cover term *Punan*, although they are related culturally to various neighboring Dayak farming communities (Rousseau 1990: 20). The coastal and riverine Malays were part of loosely organized states based on the control of trade, and leading members of Malay communities served as intermediaries between Europeans and Dayaks and were recruited as low-level administrators in colonial regimes. Nevertheless, prior to European intervention, the ethnic boundaries between the Malays and Dayaks were not sharply drawn. Many Malays traced their descent from local pagan peoples who had converted to Islam and over time had increasingly adopted Malay customs and language and “become Malay” (*masuk Melayu*, meaning “to enter Malaydom”) (King 1993: 30–34).

There is still much dispute about the derivation of the term *Dayak*. It was known by the Dutch as far back as the mid-eighteenth century and was used by them as a general term for inland or interior people (Pringle 1970: xviii). Yet it is likely that the term was coined by coastal Malays to refer pejoratively to the “less civilized” rural inhabitants of the upriver and hinterland regions of the island. Early on, the Brooke government in Sarawak confined the term *Dayak* to two major groups—the Sea Dayaks (who later came to be called Ibans) and the Land Dayaks (subsequently referred to as

Bidayuhs). At the time of the establishment of Brooke's rule (around the 1840s), the Ibans were expanding aggressively and rapidly eastward and northeastward into the territories that came to be known as Brooke Sarawak. In the company of Malays, the Ibans were engaged in coastal piracy from the Skrang and Saribas areas of the lower Batang Lupar basin. In search of fertile areas of virgin forest to occupy and then to clear, burn, and plant with rice and other crops, the Ibans were also involved in head-hunting raids against those who stood in their way. In some cases, they took captives in war, and they formed alliances with, intermarried with, and ultimately assimilated with other native groups. By contrast, the Land Dayaks, living in the hilly, upriver regions of the Sarawak and Sadong River basins, were a much more settled and peaceable people and often the victims of Iban headhunters.

The term *Dayak* also embraces several other non-Muslim groups in Sarawak, including the Selako Dayaks of western Sarawak; the Kayans and Kenyahs of Central Borneo, traditional enemies of the Ibans, and several smaller neighboring groups, usually considered together as Kajangs (some of the coastal groups called Melanau and related to interior Kajangs have mainly embraced Islam); the Kelabits-Muruts of the easternmost parts of Sarawak (Muruts are now referred to as Lun Dayehs or Lun Bawang); and the Berawans and several small related groups of the Baram River basin. In Sabah, most of the Dayak groups have close linguistic affinities with native populations of the Philippines. Significant numbers are known as Dusuns, apparently a coastal Malay-derived term to refer to farmers or "orchard" people. They comprise several named subgroups that reside along the northwest coasts of Sabah, including the Kadazan, Rungus, Ranau, and Tambunan, and on the east coasts, there are Islamized Dusuns referred to as Idahans. The other major population comprises Muruts, culturally different from the Murut of Sarawak, who are found in the lowlands from Keningau through the interior uplands and southward and eastward from there (King 1993: 36–57).

Despite the diversity and complexity of the ethnic category Dayak, some social, cultural, and ecological commonalities are relatively widespread and can be traced back to the settlement of the island by Austronesian speakers. There are

similarities in worldview, cosmology, and symbolism; funeral practices and fertility cults, such as head-hunting and rice rituals; material culture; and kinship organization. Many but not all of the settled agriculturalists live in long-houses—large pile-houses on stilts accommodating several household or family units. Finally and with the exception of the forest nomads, their dominant mode of subsistence is the shifting cultivation of hill rice, supplemented by forest hunting, gathering, and fishing.

Although elements of Dayak traditional culture are still in evidence, these native populations have been subject to dramatic changes set in train by the colonial powers. However, it is well to remember that transformations such as the conversion to Islam, physical migrations, and environmental adaptations had taken place prior to European intervention and were to continue during it. One of the major changes introduced by the British regimes in the north was the elimination of head-taking, intervillage feuding, slavery, and human ritual sacrifice. Another was the incorporation of the scattered populations into a formal administration. Pacification was accomplished by the use of punitive expeditions (in Sarawak, for instance), often employing mercenaries drawn from among friendly Dayaks. Other methods included military patrols, fines, imprisonment, the conclusion of treaties, and the institution of intertribal peace-makings. Taxation systems were developed, population censuses organized, ethnic classifications formulated, land registered, and village headmen and regional chiefs employed as local representatives and administrators to ensure that law and order were maintained and taxes were collected. Traditional or customary law was gradually undermined.

Pacification and administrative incorporation were also accompanied by the expansion of Roman Catholic and Protestant Christian missions and the conversion of natives to Christianity, along with the introduction of Western schools and education, using English and Malay as the main languages of instruction. These changes quite naturally led to the elimination or at least the modification and adaptation of traditional pagan beliefs and practices. In addition, Europeans promoted the cash economy, with the gradual displacement of subsistence production along with the expansion of urban and market centers; they introduced cash crops

such as rubber, coffee, cocoa, and pepper; developed a transport infrastructure; and encouraged the migration of Chinese to Borneo as miners, commercial farmers, traders, and shopkeepers. In Sarawak, the emphasis remained on small-holding cultivation, but under much more commercially minded chartered company rule in North Borneo, large-scale rubber and tobacco plantations using imported labor were established along the east coast. The colonial powers were also especially concerned about reducing the practice of shifting cultivation, which they considered wasteful of natural resources, and progressively restricting native migrations and promoting the permanent settlement of land.

With the transfer of sovereignty over Sarawak and North Borneo to the British Crown in 1946, followed by the political independence of British Borneo (with the exception of Brunei) within the wider Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the pace of change among the native peoples has, if anything, increased. Three of the most prominent transformations have been the founding of political parties and the involvement of Dayaks in modern political activity, the rapid development of education and the increasing contribution of Dayaks to the state bureaucracy and the market economy, and the accelerating displacement of traditional modes of livelihood by the widespread exploitation of the rain forests for commercial timber and the development of large-scale plantation agriculture (Avé and King 1986: 65–80, 103–117). Nevertheless, despite these changes, the sense of identity among the various Dayak groups remains strong, and with the growth of tourism and an increasing interest in Dayak culture both from within and beyond Dayak communities, there has been considerable innovation and adaptation of Dayak arts, crafts, performance, and rituals in the modern era.

VICTOR T. KING

See also *Adat*; Bajau; Borneo; British North Borneo Chartered Company (1881–1946); Brooke, Sir Charles Johnson (1829–1917); Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Brunei Ethnic Minorities; Brunei Malay; Dayaks; Iban; Jungle/Forest Products; Kadazan–Dusuns; Marine/Sea Products; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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ÉCOLE FRANÇAISE D'EXTRÊME-ORIENT, L'

On 15 December 1898, a decree signed by Paul Doumer (t. 1897–1902), Indochina's governor-general, founded the Archaeological Mission of Indochina. Then, on 20 January 1900, the mission took its present name of L'École Française d'Extrême-Orient (EFEO) in order to specify the role it was assigned in collecting, inventorying, and analyzing the archaeological and cultural data of Indochina. It did not take long, though, for this research organization to widen its exploratory activities to the neighboring civilizations of India, China, Japan, and insular Southeast Asia. However, installed in Hanoi since 1902 after a short stay in Saigon, it naturally favored studies of the country where it was established: practically half of the first eleven works published during the first years of the EFEO's existence related to Vietnam, be they on numismatics, on linguistics and philology, on history, or on archaeology.

A learned institution placed under the patronage of France's Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, the EFEO had nonetheless

been conceived as an appendage of the colonial system, which gave it life, and it was from the beginning confronted with the contradictions of its status and its vocation. Should its members be considered as scholars at the service of an administration to which they were to furnish the ruled peoples' secrets? Or should they be specialists devoted to applying European methods of investigation and analysis to exotic and unfamiliar subjects of study? In any case, the EFEO could not escape the political influences of its times. From 1907 to 1908, for instance, after having published in its *Bulletin* Phan Châu Trinh's (1871–1926) letter to the governor-general of Indochina requesting comprehensive reforms in Vietnamese society, the EFEO was called to order and to its initial vocation. Thereafter, it was careful to limit its researches to the fields least likely to harm the interests of the French authorities: social sciences were to be somehow ruled out for the benefit of archaeology, linguistics, textual criticism of ancient documents, history, and some cautiously conducted ethnology. These research fields have been thoroughly explored nevertheless, and the scope of the investigation is visible through the diverse published monographs and the very numerous and copious articles of the *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient*; year after year, its issues (eighty-seven tomes to date) have supplied hundreds of printed pages of scholarly studies and reports. Determined to vie with the famous École d'Athènes and École de Rome, of which it is the Asiatic counterpart, the institution has been spreading its focal interest over the whole of Asia and has given to Orientalism many of its most distinguished names. Yet the public is more aware of the restorations it has carried out for the temples of Angkor in Cambodia and the Cham monuments in central Vietnam or the research it has conducted on the architecture of the site of Pagan in Burma, rather than the less perceptible in-depth processing of old texts and inscriptions accomplished by its members.

Departing from Hanoi in 1957 after the end of the First Indochina War (1946–1954), the EFEO has transferred its seat to Paris, at No. 22, Avenue du Président Wilson, where its library presently provides researchers on Asia with every facility. Its reorganization has led to the setting up of local centers at Pondichéry and Poona (India), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia),

Jakarta (Indonesia), Bangkok and Chiang Mai (Thailand), Phnom Penh and Siem Reap (Cambodia), Vientiane (Laos), Hanoi (Vietnam), Beijing and Hong Kong (China), Taipei (Taiwan), and Kyoto and Tokyo (Japan), which attests to its physical presence at the foci of its activities.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Buddhist Institute of Phnom Penh; Burma Research Society (1909); French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; French Indochina; Phan Châu Trinh (1871–1926); Sarawak Museum; Straits/Malayan/Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (MBRAS); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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ECOLOGICAL SETTING OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

The ecological setting of Southeast Asia, its climate, relief, soils, and vegetation, has always been an important factor in the evolution of the landscapes, cultures, and peoples of the region. Its past and present cultural environment can be seen as a product of the interaction of human societies with their physical environment; that environment has played, and continues to play, an important role in shaping patterns of land and life. Human settlements; the patterns of farming, commerce, and trade; and


the flow of goods, people, and ideas have reflected the diverse and complex interactions of physical ecology and human ingenuity. Any proper understanding of the history of the region must be rooted in an appreciation of its ecological character.

Much of the physical character of the region can be attributed to the effects of the geological structure on relief, orientation, and drainage patterns. Recent research into plate tectonics has shown that the region consists of a zone formed by the Eurasian plate to the north that is bounded by a series of deep-sea trenches where the Australian, Pacific, and Philippine plates to the south are submerged or subducted under the Eurasian plate. Along the line of that subduction is a broad arc of intense tectonic activity characterized by volcanoes and earthquakes produced by strong plate movement. Recent research has been focused on identifying both the rate of movement and the likely locations for the intense tectonic activity that might result. The relatively stable Sunda Shelf, on top of the Eurasian plate, forms a broad continental shelf in the region. Structurally then, the region is characterized by an older, relatively stable, and heavily weathered mountain range in the north; a wide, relatively shallow continental shelf fronting the coastline; and a tectonically active, relatively young set of landform assemblages running through the island region (see Map 1).

This physical structure is particularly important in understanding the broad character of mountain, valley, and coast in the region. The older mountain ranges in Indochina and Burma (Myanmar) constitute outliers of the great Himalayan massif and, historically, provided something of a barrier to the southward movement of peoples and goods. In terms of mineral wealth, the longer period of denudation in these uplands has sometimes exposed deep-seated ore deposits in regions such as Perak in northern Malaya, where tin deposits have been significant. By contrast, the more recent Tertiary deposits of the tectonic arc have proved less rich in minerals, with the exception of hydrocarbons. From the older mountain ranges to the north, major rivers flow southward—the Irrawaddy, Sittang, Salween, Mekong, and Song Koi (Red River)—bringing with them large quantities of eroded material and creating important valley and estuarine sites for farming and settlement.

The Sunda Shelf has been an important structural element in the human and physical geography of both the mainland and island Southeast Asia. During the Quaternary (from about 2 million to some 15,000 years ago), lower sea levels meant that much of the Sunda Shelf was above sea level. That had two important consequences. First, mainland and insular Southeast Asia would have been connected by a variety of land bridges, thereby facilitating flows of plants and animals through the region. Second, the relatively recent flooding of the coastal area has led to the drowning of river mouths and estuaries, with the consequent deposition of huge quantities of silt in those estuaries as rivers have adjusted to their changing base levels. That has produced ideal conditions for wet-rice farming in valley and estuary, and extensive low-lying areas of swamp and mangrove along the shallow shores of eastern Sumatra and western and southern Borneo. Rising sea levels in the contemporary period are likely to accentuate such characteristics.

The importance of the arc of tectonic activity running through the region is hard to overestimate. Along that arc, running through Sumatra, Java, the Outer Islands of Indonesia, and the Philippines, the danger of volcanic eruptions (from Krakatoa in 1883 to Mt. Pinatubo in 1990) and of earthquakes is ever-present, and human settlement has had to cope with the consequences of living in a tectonic shatter-belt. Equally, however, the predominance of geologically younger, less weathered acidic rocks there can produce astonishingly fertile soil conditions for intensive rice farming. Along with the estuaries of the great rivers to the north, the young soils of parts of Java and Bali, for example, produce prodigious yields of rice, and can support very high population densities. Elsewhere in the region, however, soils remain relatively poor, despite the apparent richness of the vegetation. This apparent paradox of lush vegetation coupled with poor soils can be explained in a number of ways. First, most of the nutrients in these tropical ecosystems are concentrated in the plant biomass above the ground, rather than in the soil. Thus the canopies of the tropical forest store large quantities of nutrients that tend to be recycled within the plant mass, rather than through decomposition on the forest floor. Biomass and nutrients that do become part of the soil are, in



Map 1. Structure and geology of Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia: A Region in Transition. (Adapted by permission from Rigg, Jonathan, ed. 1991. London: Unwin Hyman, p. 4)

any case, recycled very quickly because of the rapid rate of physical and chemical composition in the tropical climate. Second, high rates of rainfall, coupled with rapid chemical activity, can quickly leach minerals and nutrients out of the soil. This leaching impoverishes many tropi-

cal soils and can lead to a laterite layer in the soil horizon that makes cultivation very difficult. Failure to recognize the essential poverty of many soil types in the region can lead to overexploitation of what are essentially fragile soils.

The region has some of the richest and most diverse ecosystems in the world. Most of the great Indo-Malayan tropical rain forest formations are to be found in a region extending from northern Burma to the Outer Islands of Indonesia. These rain forests have attracted travelers, scientists, and settlers over many hundreds of years and provide a majestic setting. For the geographer Charles Ficher (1964: 42–43), the forest, “with its gigantic soaring trees and its wealth of shrubs and smaller plants is renowned for its remarkable stillness, broken only by the occasional chatter of monkeys and the sudden swish of a snake. . . . The buzzing of myriads of insects, the trilling of cicadas and the hideous croaking of frogs.” There is a huge variety of flora and fauna in the rain forest, and the formations of the region are diverse. With increasing elevation, one can trace a shift from the mangrove formations in the flooded lowlands to the tropical lowland evergreen formations and semievergreen formations in the higher elevations.


For all its geographic and ecological diversity, the rain forest shares a number of common features that divide it from surrounding biogeographical zones. Thus, as Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913) argued more than a century ago, a floral and faunal division between Southeast Asia and Australia can be identified reflecting the broad tectonic lineaments of the region. Species diversity is the rule—a conservative estimate suggests at least 50,000 different plant species. Many more remain to be discovered, and this diversity is likely to provide an important gene pool for future biotechnological innovations. In their natural state, rain forests provide a stable, carefully balanced ecosystem that is often structured vertically into a series of distinctive ecological layers between forest floor and upper canopy. That diversity of ecological niches provides a wealth of flora and fauna, and has historically provided a vital resource, producing jungle products such as camphor, resins, and rattans as well as internationally traded timber products. That trade can be traced back to the earliest societies in the region.

For human settlement then, the forest has long offered huge potential. Indigenous peoples exploited the hunting and collecting possibilities of the forest. Shifting cultivators cleared through slash and burn, before moving on to other parts of the forest in order to allow the

ecosystem some time for recovery. Such systems of cultivation, the mainstay for at least 15 percent of the population well into the late twentieth century, have now become increasingly vulnerable with population growth and the loss of indigenous lands to logging. Thus modern exploitation has focused on logging and clearing, with transnational corporations seeking out the especially valuable hardwoods—the *dipterocarps*, which are most in demand on the international timber market. The growth of population and increased intensity of shifting cultivation has resulted in extensive growths of secondary forest, or *belukar*, a degraded form of the original cover, while overburning has in some areas led to a savanna-type vegetation of *alang*, which is difficult to cultivate. Today, the rain forests provide the arena for major conflicts between economic development and environmental protection, particularly in areas such as Borneo and Sumatra.

The region lies within the humid tropics and, while sharing in broad terms a climate that is hot, wet, and humid, does nevertheless show considerable geographic variations that are a function of both latitude and elevation. Temperatures are generally high, with annual averages of around 27–30° C and relatively little annual variation. Such variations as exist for both daily and annual temperature can be attributed largely to temperature changes with elevation. Rainfall provides the main climatic variant in the region. While few parts of the region receive less than around 1,500–2,000 mm of rain, there are important regional variations in the annual distribution of that total. Within about 10 degrees of the equator, rainfall is relatively evenly distributed through the year. Singapore, for example, does not have a marked wet or dry season but rather has only slight variations around a monthly mean.

However, as one moves away from the equator, seasonality of rainfall increases, primarily as a consequence of the monsoon regime. Thus the northeast monsoon that dominates from December to March forms the wet season in much of island Southeast Asia, while the southwest monsoon from July to September brings drier conditions. On the mainland, as one moves from the equator, rainfall can be slightly lower and more seasonally pronounced, and the effects of the monsoon on rainfall are reversed. The northeast monsoon brings drier air to



Map 2. Climate and rainfall. Southeast Asia: A Region in Transition. (Adapted by permission from Rigg, Jonathan, ed. 1991. London: Unwin Hyman, p. 7)

Thailand and Vietnam, and the southwest monsoon brings wetter conditions. With distance from the equator, variation in the climatic regime increases, the monsoon becomes more pronounced, and the length of the dry season increases (see Map 2).

From the point of view of human settlement and exploitation, it is seasonality and the variability of rainfall, rather than absolute totals, that are most important. Rainfall variability can have a major impact on rice cultivation systems. Rice varieties and cultivation techniques have traditionally been carefully adjusted to the climatic regime. Thus hill rice can prosper in regions where a marked dry season is evident, while irrigated rice systems, often producing

very high yields, require a more even annual rainfall regime. The development of new varieties and techniques, often the product of the “green revolution” of the last few decades, has tended to accentuate, rather than reduce, the importance of such basic physical constraints.

In addition to influencing rainfall variability, the monsoon winds have an important effect on maritime communication. Generally, the seas of the region are warm, shallow, and easily navigable. The shallow continental shelf, only flooded since the Pleistocene, provides a long, indented, and navigable coastline in the region. Typhoons are locally significant—the Philippines and the Vietnamese coast are periodically subject to these storms—but their effect is for-

tunately localized. In the era of sail, the monsoon winds played an important part in determining sea travel, especially at the continental scale. The southwest monsoon tended to blow shipping away from the Straits of Melaka and Sunda Straits toward India and China, while the northwest monsoon blew shipping back to the Straits region. Historically, then, ships plying the Middle East–India–China routes would be forced to anchor somewhere in these “lands below the winds” to wait for the monsoon to “turn.” Ports such as Melaka, Singapore, Palembang, and Batavia grew up largely to service this trade.

Ecological characteristics undoubtedly provide both constraints and advantages for the development of the region. Certainly the nature of the climatic regime does pose problems for human settlement and growth. While the direct effects on human health of a regime of high humidity, temperatures, and rainfall have perhaps been exaggerated, indirect effects are potentially severe. Climate and physical conditions create distinctive patterns of disease that, historically at least, have created difficult living conditions. Malaria thrives in many of the waterlogged coastal and swamp areas, as well as in the hill country of the mainland. Human settlement, drainage, and the use of spraying have dramatically reduced its incidence, but new and resistant strains continue to emerge as resistance to antibiotics grows. Equally important in terms of the geography of health is the incidence of diseases such as cholera and typhus. The former, in particular, can emerge in very sudden flare-ups and is especially significant in areas where irrigation, drainage, and sewage are under pressure.

In general, though, it would be difficult to argue that the ecology of the region has been a barrier to development and growth. Clearly the evidence of the tremendous historical achievements of the region argue against too deterministic a view of climatic and physical constraints. Thus while such conditions may have constrained development in some areas (some of the coastal mangrove areas, for example, have proved resistant to development), in general, physical conditions have been beneficial to development. The combination of fertile acidic soils, accented slope, and human skills has produced some of the most sophisticated and productive wet-rice systems, in regions such as Java and Bali; in the deltaic regions of the Red

River, Irrawaddy, and Mekong, similar skills have harnessed the river waters and silts to produce highly sophisticated farming systems. Likewise, the sheer wealth and diversity of the rain forest environment have provided major opportunities for well-developed farming groups to evolve complex and sustainable farming systems based on shifting cultivation, communal farming, and involvement in trade in rain forest products.

The physical layout of the region has been a contributory factor to its growth and development. The importance of the sea cannot be overestimated. Maritime communication was fundamental to the power of both mainland and island Southeast Asia. The growth of a farming–fishing culture, the local and long-distance trade, and the flow of goods, ideas, capital, and peoples into the region were enhanced by the enormous area of coastline. The region has a longer coastline, area for area, than any other part of the world of comparable size, with most of the best agricultural land located within some 200 kilometers of tidal waters. That fact alone goes some way toward explaining the huge importance of the sea in the human and physical geography of the region. The ecological setting has also shaped the nature of external penetration into the region. The mountain barrier to the north, a barrier dividing China from the Indian Ocean, has been important both in shaping Chinese interest in Burma as a link to that ocean and in the encouragement that land barrier gave to Chinese maritime trade through the Straits of Melaka. It was through the sea-lanes of the region that pre-colonial empires such as those of Śrīvijaya and Melaka were established. Power was measured in maritime rather than territorial control. Equally, European colonialism was channeled, in the early stages at least, through sea-lanes and maritime conquest rather than in outright territorial conquest.

Ecology then provides a framework, a set of constraints and possibilities, that has shaped many aspects of the history and human geography of Southeast Asia. The tectonic structure and geology have created important physical environments for human exploitation. The patterns of human settlement and exploitation of the “old” uplands of Indochina or the new, volcanically active lands of Java and Bali reflect both physical constraints and human ingenuity.

Equally, patterns of vegetation and soils have been important in the evolution of farming systems, patterns of settlement, and the evolution of intraregional and international trade. Finally climate has been important through its impact on developments in farming, settlement, trade, and, not least, disease pathologies. While the advances of modern technology have perhaps mitigated some of the more damaging aspects of the physical environment of the region, they have involved economic and social costs. Contemporary societies, no less than those in the past, are shaped in many ways by the ecological framework within which they have originated, flourished, and, ultimately, declined.

MARK CLEARY

See also Diseases and Epidemics; Historical Geography of Insular Southeast Asia; Historical Geography of Mainland Southeast Asia; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; Jungle/Forest Products; Marine/Sea Products; Monsoons; Straits of Melaka; Swidden Agriculture; Wallace Line

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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (POST-1945 TO EARLY 2000s)

Introduction: Enclaved Beginnings

A half-century ago, there were many theories concerned with how economic development of poor countries such as those in Southeast Asia should best proceed. These countries depended on agriculture for subsistence, and commodity exports were the only means for foreign-exchange earnings. Experts then believed that a whole new set of economic models and policies, very different from those in

Western market economies, would be needed for the development of poor countries. Over the years, the various countries in Southeast Asia have followed different paths toward development, and with different results. Today, in contrast, economic policy prescriptions have become more uniform, regardless of country. Managing the economy well is now the same everywhere—that is, through higher levels of efficiency as dictated by market forces. This means prudent monetary as well as fiscal policies, coupled with increased liberalization that will pave the way toward tapping the world's markets to drive growth even further.

Of the countries in Southeast Asia, some are still being referred to as “mango republics”; five—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—formed the regional economic alliance, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in 1967. These countries, which include a couple of “mini-tigers,” have gained ground, albeit at different rates, over three of their neighbors. In Vietnam, the war has been over for nearly thirty years, and although it proclaimed itself a socialist republic in 1976, like China it has begun to tap into globalization for its growth. Cambodia, Myanmar (Burma prior to 1989), and Laos, on the other hand, choose instead to look inward, preferring to shield themselves from external interference, although funds from foreign sources essential for financing growth would be welcomed if under acceptable terms.

The most unusual case in Southeast Asia is perhaps Brunei, which is among the last bastions of absolute monarchy in the world. Citizens and residents of Brunei pay no taxes, and all public expenditures, whether social services or infrastructure, are at the pleasure of the sultan. Revenue in relation to the size of his highness's kingdom is plentiful, because of the rich oil resources that make it possible for the Brunei dollar to be pegged, one to one, with Singapore's dollar. Brunei became a member of ASEAN in 1984.

Southeast Asian countries once formed enclaves of Western domination even when they were never or no longer colonies. However, education, technology, information, source of financing, and the ability to do cross-border business deals all went through revolutionary changes during recent decades. As a result, Western and Eastern—or for that matter

Northern and Southern—interactions were forced to evolve and produced a world that is increasingly seamless in both time and space, leaving behind only the last remnants of archaic barriers that divide peoples despite common goals of better living standards and a safer environment. Once countries interacted one to one; the big dominated the small. Today the interaction is among many of varying sizes, possessing special core competencies that have the capability of offering a wide variety of niched products and services.

Postwar Reconstruction

Immediately after the Pacific War in 1945, Southeast Asia reverted to its status before the Japanese military occupation in 1941: Indochina returned to the French and Malaya and Singapore to Britain. The Philippines, which was increasingly granted self-government by the United States, became fully independent in 1946. Burma was a province of India until 1937, when it was given self-rule as a Crown colony, but after the Japanese withdrawal the country was liberated and proclaimed independence in 1948, as Indonesia did. Thailand, which had never been colonized, was again free.

However, political liberation was a far cry from economic independence, because integral to postwar reconstruction are the continuing presence and therefore influence of former colonial powers. In Indonesia, the Dutch, with superior wealth and education, controlled the economy. Indian investors continued to dominate the Burmese economy, as French investors did in Indochina. Economic presence by Americans continued in the Philippines. In Malaya and Singapore, British rule had been well entrenched without the visible uprising found among its neighbors, and thus political liberalization, despite the existence of local nationalistic ideologies, remains unlikely for an indefinite period. Thailand too was an open field for foreign investments.

Although foreign funds bore the bulk of postwar reconstruction in Southeast Asia, the intention was not to restructure the respective economies such that they could evolve along a path of development similar to those experienced by their colonial powers. Instead, the thinking then was that Southeast Asia could continue splendidly as a source of raw and

semiprocessed materials. Industrialization, a key component of economic growth in the West, was thought unwise, because it would be best left to locations on the globe that have an abundance of bituminous coal, which is of insufficient supply in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, in largely agrarian subsistence societies there would be little demand in the local market for manufactured goods. Trade should thus be on the basis of comparative advantage—the West exporting manufactured goods and the East exporting commodities, since this is how the appropriate skills happen to be divided.

Technological Shifts

In retrospect, the experts erred when they decided on the thrust of postwar development in Southeast Asia. It was labor, not coal, that determined where manufacturing would be best located, and the size of the local market became irrelevant, because the only market is the entire globe (*see* Alonso 1975). Timing made all the difference in which country would succeed and which was passed over. The 1970s marked the beginning of large-scale production of integrated circuits, which at the time was highly labor intensive. Unlike other manufactures, electronics was light enough to exploit the age of intercontinental commercial transport by jet. It became possible to ship input components into Southeast Asia and return the assembled product to the markets of the world. Such shipment costs were lower than the difference in wage costs between production carried out within advanced countries and in the cheap labor markets in the East. The choice locations in Southeast Asia were the ASEAN countries, where foreign investors were enticed by further widening the cost savings through tax incentive packages.

This concept spawned the product life-cycle theory of trade. Before, countries in Southeast Asia were made to focus on commodity production because that was their comparative advantage. Later on, Linder's theory suggested that even if manufacturing were to be adopted as a natural sequence to economic development, on the basis of product quality, the only hope for exporting manufactures would be to countries at an even lower stage of development. Experts again erred. As it turned out, high-volume production in the attempt to reduce unit costs would require standardized production pro-

cesses. Once that had taken place, the cheap labor markets gained the advantage, forcing high-tech goods to transfer their production to the less developed East. To remain in business, the North, from which these high-tech goods first originated, had to bring forth via research and development (R&D) activities yet another generation of high-tech goods that would eventually also transfer their production to the East. This iterative process considerably shortens product life cycles—that is, the time elapsed from invention and prototyping to full-scale production.

Countries in the East, for a long time the choice location for foreign direct investments (FDIs), became the world's major exporters of manufactured goods. During trade talks, the West wants intellectual properties protected so that investments in R&D do not merely end up profiting producers in the East (Speiss 2002). Nonetheless, before the issue is likely to be amicably solved the Internet will set forth yet another revolution in global production, as air transport and electronics did during the early 1970s. Broadband global communications would completely remove the isolation of any part of the world. While multilateral debates go on heatedly, the global village has more and more become reality. Somewhere in the world a keyboard is punched to invoke an order. The computer scans stock levels among different production locations across the world and existing inventory that will set prices minute by minute. Automated warehouses transfer the ordered items to the shipping floor. Planes take off and land, and bookkeeping entries take place to reflect the amount of funds transferred as payment. Economic textbooks talk about the perfectly competitive market of total knowledge and zero distance between seller and buyer. What is described is nearing that utopia in our real world.

Open Economies

Most Southeast Asian economies are very open economies. ASEAN member countries aggressively exploited the benefits of global trade, and for their efforts those economies enjoyed phenomenal economic expansion at rates well beyond what would have been achieved if growth were dependent only on domestic markets. To achieve this, however, many priorities in the do-

mestic agenda have to be set aside, in preference to competition policy that is demanded in the more borderless world. As a result, exports and imports make up a substantial portion of the countries' gross domestic product (GDP) (see Basu et al. 2003; Davidson 2002; Hakim 2002).

Almost overnight, these countries were able to wean themselves out of their dependence on commodity exports to become major producers of manufactured goods and components. Producing for the world's markets means not only going high-tech but also doing so at low unit prices at huge production volumes. FDIs made this possible. However, contrary to widespread apprehensions during the sixties and seventies, FDIs turned out not to be postcolonial manufacturing versions of enclaves formed by foreign ownership of local plantations and mines, which occurred during colonial times. Instead, there is much evidence of closed business partnerships formed between foreign investors with domestic enterprises.

The opening-up of ASEAN economies was the result of export-oriented industrialization during the early 1970s. The more typical import-substitution industrialization adopted by developing countries was, however, not replaced. Instead, these economies practiced a dual regime system that enabled selected industries to undertake free trade alongside protectionism in other production sectors. Although import duties help keep local industries viable, they do not encourage global competitiveness. Therefore in the attempt to further foster trade, as well as to boost the scope and volume of interregional trade, ASEAN members have begun scheduling the abolishment and reduction of tariffs across a broad range of traded items among themselves under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA).

Closed Economies

ASEAN members saw the potential for growth that trade might bring even though they saw each other more as keen competitors than as strategic partners. Nevertheless, the need to compete likely made these countries more resilient than they would have otherwise been. Forty to fifty years afterward, the original ASEAN member countries are in stark contrast to the remaining countries of Southeast Asia. Population growth rates did not vary much

among these countries, but over the course of development, income levels have deviated among them. Myanmar (formerly Burma) had long been under the rule of generals. While its open economy counterparts in Southeast Asia struggled with financial reforms and liberalization in order to further integrate into the global economy, Myanmar remained on guard against foreign imperialists thought to have the intention of destabilizing and then toppling its government. Three or four decades ago, such a call might have gained popular attention. Today, however, the thinking has changed.

Across the buffer that Thailand provides, Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea did not see an end to wars until at least a couple of decades later than the rest of Southeast Asia. Vietnam began mending the wounds of war after U.S. military withdrawal in 1973. Although tightly controlled by their communist government, the Vietnamese are highly entrepreneurial. Unfortunately, Vietnam was not as timely in catching the first waves of foreign investment during the 1970s as the founding members of ASEAN. Then again, timing may not have been as critical an issue when compared with the bureaucratic backlog caused by the maze of regulations to maneuver before business could be legitimately carried out. Vietnam was admitted into ASEAN in 1995.

In Kampuchea a fifth of the population lost their lives under the reign of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 until after its invasion by Vietnam in 1978. The United Nations sponsored elections in 1993 and again in 1998 that produced a fragile coalition government. Laos, like Myanmar, remains under the military, which controls the single party that makes up the government. Kampuchea, along with Laos, has attempted economic reforms to heighten business confidence and attract foreign investments. Faced with the current economic downturn, investment funds are sorely needed. However, just as important political reforms remain overlooked. Inspired by Vietnam's entry into ASEAN, the three remaining countries in Southeast Asia applied for admission in 1996. Myanmar and Laos gained membership the following year, but Kampuchea was finally admitted only in 1999. ASEAN stands to become the unifying factor that will bring all of Southeast Asia together into a caucus that will not only provide regional stability but also boost trade.

Market Integration

Although countries in Southeast Asia started out in much the same ways as did their developing country counterparts in most parts of Africa, the success in Southeast Asia of global trade has made the critical difference. Opening up the economy causes the ratio of trade to the gross national product to expand and helps drive economic growth, which averaged 5 percent per annum during the early nineties. In contrast, much of Africa has remained as impoverished as it was a half-century ago in absolute terms, worse still in relative terms compared with the technologically advancing world.

The original ASEAN members plus Brunei began the Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) initiative in 1992, aimed at creating a free trade area among them by 2003. A common effective preferential tariff or CEPT scheme was introduced that would systematically reduce intra-ASEAN tariffs and abolish them altogether by 2010. With the introduction of Vietnam, Myanmar, Kampuchea, and Laos as members of ASEAN, their participation in AFTA means an intra-Southeast Asian market that contains a half-billion population.

Tariff reductions, aimed to boost trade, are but a means to market integration. Accompanying the CEPT scheme are other initiatives such as the ASEAN Investment Area, the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation, and the ASEAN Customs Initiatives that would foster industrial production linkages among manufacturers more seamlessly across Southeast Asia. For example, when these are fully implemented, a Thai manufacturer located in the Philippines would enjoy all the privileges of a local Filipino. The same would be true for any Southeast Asian national located anywhere in Southeast Asia.

In the meantime, talks are under way for an AFTA + 3 scheme that includes China, Korea, and Japan and will eventually extend to cover India—that is, eventually a total market size in excess of three billion people, the largest market in the world.

Funding Development

FDIs spared Southeast Asian countries a major portion of the badly needed development funding. Compared with Latin America, the external debt is thus much smaller, especially when the debt burden is considered in proportion to ex-

port revenues, the latter being the chief source of foreign exchange earnings useful for servicing the debt. This relatively lower debt position turned out to be quite useful: when the East Asian financial crisis, which has since extended into the current recession, occurred in 1997, it became possible for these countries to widen their external debts for funding economic recovery programs without seriously affecting their debt servicing capabilities.

The more remarkable development, however, is that Southeast Asian countries were able to develop domestic capital markets fairly successfully. The types of debt securities that are traded remain few, but those that do remain have received strong support by local private investors. These fledgling financial markets manage to attract short-term foreign capital as well. This means that economic growth is driven not entirely by public fiscal spending, but also by the expansion in commerce and industries funded by capital markets.

The subject of interest among economists is the question of how much economic growth can be mustered by making investments. One special feature of the rapid pace of growth experienced in much of Southeast Asia has been the very high rate of investments funded not only via FDIs but also through, by world standards, a massive amount of domestic savings. In Latin America capital inflows have tended to boost consumption, and growth has therefore been led mainly by capital. Up to a point, economic growth could easily be achieved by the injection of investment funds. But economies like those of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are already investing some three- to four-tenths of their gross national products (GNP), such amounts being nearly twice the rate in most countries. Milking more growth in the future becomes increasingly difficult because it will require that citizens set aside an even greater portion of their income to raise even more investment funds.

The Workforce

The labor resource remains in good supply in Southeast Asia; it does not suffer from the aging population structure affecting most advanced economies. About half of the population in nearly all Southeast Asian countries are below the age of 25. Typical of emerging societies, la-

bor is less organized. International organizations such as Amnesty International and the International Labor Organization (ILO) attempt to keep a keen watch over labor practices and working conditions, seeking ways to enforce labor standards through trade rules. However, until recent years, exports have been quickly expanding in most of Southeast Asia, resulting in full employment conditions. Competition for labor allowed Asian workers to be relatively well taken care of. Before long, however, wage pressures began to erode away the cost advantage that made Southeast Asia the choice industrial location. To remain competitive against alternative production sites worldwide, skills and labor productivity have to rise in relation to wage costs. That is why Southeast Asian countries put heavy emphasis on education in their development budgets, hoping to develop greater competence in the workforce. But in reality the task of human development is formidable because of the large numbers in the school-age population.

Competitiveness

Political stability is perhaps among the most important attributes that help Southeast Asia become a choice investment location for FDIs (Borner et al. 1995). The electorate in Singapore and Malaysia has returned the same political party to government throughout their postindependence histories. Thailand, on the other hand, has never been colonized. There were frequent shifts at the reins alternating between influential businessmen and army generals, but Thailand has always been politically stable. Thais are steadfastly loyal to their king, who becomes a powerful moderating force during political conflicts. In the Philippines, where there is a two-term limit to the presidency, the people continue to experience peaceful transitions of power through the exercise of their constitutional rights since the 1980s. Vietnam, on the other hand, remains tightly controlled as a socialist society. In the rest of Southeast Asia, the military has played a dominant role in the political structure and thus leaves very little behind by way of political discourse and the exercise of democratic rights. Indonesia has become the exception, as a new political leadership without ties to the military has finally come into existence.

One weakness of too much stability, however, is that governments become too powerful, leading to questionable policies and lack of transparency. The extent to which that is true depends on the degree of openness of the economies concerned, because if investor confidence is to be earned, regulations, policies governing money supply and the banking system, and other relevant controls must harness market forces, not stifle them. Southeast Asian economies, being very open, have had to be relatively free in the context of having policies that embrace the market. The relative success of these countries may be judged by scores given by independent assessors, such as those published by the World Economic Forum (WEF) and by the International Institute of Management Development (IMD) as follows:

	WEF	IMD
Singapore	1	2
Hong Kong	2	3
United States	3	1
Taiwan	9	18
Malaysia	10	23
Japan	13	4
Thailand	14	30
Britain	15	19
Germany	22	10

SOURCE: *The Economist*, 1 June 1996.

The WEF score depends on the ability of the country to achieve sustained high rates of growth, compared against the IMD's definition of competitiveness, which rates the country's ability to increase wealth by managing production factors integrated into an economic and social model.

Agricultural Production and Food Security

The inability to modernize the agricultural sector is a major failure among Southeast Asian countries. It may not be for lack of trying, but rather because of the large peasant population, distorted agricultural pricing, and shrinking

land availability resulting from competing land uses. The greatest impact, however, was social mobility, involving the transition out of agriculture over the course of development. As a result, although the number of rural poor declined, living standards among them did not improve as much as for those who switched to other sectors of the economy. Policies aimed at retaining agricultural population while modernizing and significantly improving their living standards would have been better at keeping agriculture viable and ensuring better food security in the future.

Prospects and Conclusions

During the last half-century, Southeast Asia has emerged from its dismal past under foreign dominance to become a viable economic player within the international division of labor in the age of globalization. Singapore, for instance, is by per capita income standards well past the level that marks a developed nation. But at the close of the twentieth century, the age of miraculous growth appeared to be nearing its end for Southeast Asian economies as growth rates plummeted. For decades, Southeast Asia had been the recipient of the bulk of foreign investments. By the 1990s, four-fifths of the investment capital, along with the latest technologies, had instead gone to the People's Republic of China (PRC), leaving the remainder to be shared by the countries of Southeast Asia. This development would not have been as critical had Southeast Asia embraced its golden age of economic expansion with a little more emphasis on building up technocratic skills and with more robust capital markets. It would have had at least a couple of decades of a head start.

The time for yet another transition has come, because Southeast Asian countries can no longer continue to compete on the basis of cheap labor and resources. Instead they need to move up to become a global supplier that bridges the technology gap between the advanced North and those new entrants that have now joined the global production market. A half-century of growth in Southeast Asia has mostly been a disarray of strategies, policies, and priorities among its various countries. Today there is a refreshing hope that ideas and mind-

sets will converge through the tested forum of ASEAN, whose membership list is now complete for all of Southeast Asia.

CHAN HUAN CHIANG

See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Banks and Banking; Brunei Oil and Gas Industry; Buddhist Socialism; Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR); Laos (Nineteenth Century to mid-1990s); Martial Law (1972–1981) (The Philippines); New Economic Policy (NEP) (1971–1990); New Economic Zones (NEZs) (Vietnam); *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC); Taxation; Trade and Commerce of Southeast Asia (ca. Nineteenth Century to the 1990s)

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ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EARLY MODERN SOUTHEAST ASIA (PRE-SIXTEENTH CENTURY)

When did the early modern period in Southeast Asia begin? Some historians identify the middle of the fifteenth century as a time when rapid change began to affect Southeast Asia's economy and society. The spread of trade networks based on Islam and the incursions of Europeans beginning some fifty years later have been conventionally identified as two of the major factors responsible for the transition to the modern era. Other historians and some archaeologists suggest that the new economic institutions that became established during the fifteenth century, in some areas associated with early conversion to Islam, did not constitute discontinuity with the past. Instead, they formed part of a gradual transition that had begun one or even two centuries earlier.

Few records of everyday economic activities in early Southeast Asia have survived. It is therefore difficult to prove that the spread of Islam and European influence were correlated with important changes in the economic systems of the region, since the amount and types of documentation available changed greatly over the course of the sixteenth century. Evidence is, however, accumulating to show that

another key factor in altering economic conditions in Southeast Asia—sizable communities of resident foreign merchants—was already present by the thirteenth century. Chinese immigrants may have begun to form enclaves by the twelfth century. They were not the first; Tamil groups may have been present in northern Sumatra and southern Thailand by the early eleventh century, but their influence in the economic sphere, as opposed to artistic and religious matters, seems to have been neither extensive nor lasting.

Chinese involvement in the region's trade therefore preceded both intensive Islamization and European influence. The role of Chinese communities in Southeast Asia's economy is still one of the principal features of that sphere of activity today. Effects of Chinese merchant communities in Indonesia include the introduction of a convenient, low-value coinage suitable for use in everyday market transactions. Southeast Asian coins were traditionally made of gold and silver, high-value materials, which restricted their usefulness in low-value trading. A Javanese document of 1300 C.E. shows that Chinese coinage was common enough that it had become the accepted legal tender of Majapahit, one of Southeast Asia's largest kingdoms. The existence of this mode of exchange would have led to a much greater volume of economic activity and would have encouraged occupational specialization. Archaeological discoveries indicate that Chinese coinage was used over an area stretching from East Java to northeast Sumatra. When Islamic kingdoms in fifteenth-century Southeast Asia, such as Melaka, began minting locally made low-value coins, the use of these coins would not have represented a new idea but rather an elaboration of a preexisting custom.

The monetization of mainland Southeast Asia's economy began in the fifth century. The oldest coin hoards have been found in a zone reaching from Myanmar (Burma) through Thailand to southern Vietnam. Although coinage existed both on the Southeast Asian mainland and in major islands of the archipelago by 800 C.E., the two regions followed different paths of development thereafter. Coinage disappeared from the archaeological record of the mainland, not to reappear until after Islamization and the arrival of Europeans. The large kingdoms of Pagan and Angkor abolished

coinage and implemented a command economy in which the government regulated economic activity through taxation and redistribution. In Indonesia, by contrast, coinage continued to be produced, and it became more integral and/or essential to the functioning of several societies.

This dichotomy is correlated with differential involvement in long-distance trade. Indonesian kingdoms had been heavily involved with trade networks from China to the Persian Gulf since the beginning of the common era (C.E.). Mainland Southeast Asian societies, however, seem to have shifted their orientation away from the sea and toward elaborate, agrarian-based economies. By the fourteenth century, Chinese coinage had become a standard medium of exchange in kingdoms from North Sumatra to Bali. Thus, an economy based on coinage was already well developed in the insular realm of Southeast Asia before either Islamic or European models were introduced. However, data are lacking to draw inferences regarding the impact this means of exchange had on social structures. The most that can be said is that monetization was already well advanced when the new forms of documentation of the Southeast Asian economy became available.

The origins of Southeast Asian Islam are still a subject of inquiry. Many early Chinese immigrants may have been Muslims, as records of the Zheng He (Cheng Ho) voyages in the early Ming dynasty attest. But immigrants from India were almost certainly the most important group in this transition. In any case, Islamization, which primarily affected southern Southeast Asia, would have had an impact on two areas of economic history in particular: the use of wealth and the formation of new networks of relationships. In premodern times, much wealth (considered as liquid assets such as money or other readily exchangeable commodities, accumulated from taxation and trade) was probably expended on large-scale ritual performances, fulfilling a kind of redistributive function. The introduction of Islam must have had an important effect on the use of surplus wealth. Large ceremonies such as cremations when substantial amounts of wealth were burned or given out to the public were gradually abandoned. Court life would have become more somber and restrained. Although Bali is not a fossilized replica of premodern Southeast Asia, a comparison be-

tween the amount of resources expended on religious activity in (Hindu) Bali and (Muslim) Java today has to correspond to the reallocation of resources that must have occurred in Java during the conversion to Islam. The end result would have been to increase the amount of wealth theoretically available for reinvestment in productive enterprises rather than conspicuous consumption or gift giving.

Yet it would be a mistake to characterize pre-Islamic Southeast Asia as economically unsophisticated, concerned mainly with ritual and ceremony. One of the main reasons for the existence of royal courts may have been the organization of rituals involving large proportions of their subjects, but most of the population would still have had to obtain their means of livelihood from other sources. The amount of change that took place in the sixteenth century, when Islam attained its greatest extent and Europeans began to enter the region, is difficult to measure but would not have been very great.

When the Portuguese, the first European group to penetrate Southeast Asia, arrived in 1509, their own country was still comparatively underdeveloped economically in comparison with the more prosperous areas of Europe. Their motivations were to gain wealth and to make converts to Christianity. Their leader, Afonso de Albuquerque (ca. 1462–1515), had fought Muslims in northern Africa and considered himself a religious crusader rather than a merchant. The Portuguese incursion into Southeast Asia was also part of a grand strategy to outflank the greatest trading port in the Mediterranean at the time, Venice, and its Muslim partners, the Mamelukes of Egypt. The chosen tactic was the bold stroke of advancing straight to the heart of the region that provided the basis of Venice's wealth: the spice islands. By seizing Melaka in 1511, the Portuguese achieved what Christopher Columbus (1451–1506) had tried and failed to do in 1492. They succeeded in establishing a direct route from Europe to Maluku, the only source of the cloves and nutmeg, a route that played such a disproportionate role in Europe's balance of power relative to its utilitarian value. From Melaka, the Portuguese forced their way to Maluku, and through a combination of violence and negotiation, they sought to deflect the income that had built the grand structures of the Venetian lagoon to Lisbon.

Although the Portuguese strategy succeeded in attaining its physical objectives, it failed to make Lisbon the equivalent of Venice. One of the results of Portugal's policy was simply to shift the locus where most of the spices entered the main east-west trade route from Melaka to Banten (Bantam), West Java. Melaka languished under the Portuguese until 1641, when it was acquired by the Dutch, who intentionally prevented it from competing successfully with their own base in West Java, Batavia (Jakarta). Economically, the main lesson to be drawn from this sequence of events is that the spice trade network was flexible enough to make quick adjustments to unforeseen disturbances to its overall system.

The strength of trading connections forged by Islamic traders provided the flexibility of the spice trade network. From Gujarat, northwest India, to the Coromandel Coast and Bengal, the network passed through the Arakan coast where rulers were either Muslims or Buddhists whose culture had a strong Muslim element. Thereafter, the network went to Aceh at Sumatra's northern tip, to the Straits of Melaka, to Cambodia and southern Vietnam where Muslim Malays and Chams were predominant, and eventually to Quanzhou, Fujian, where a Muslim population had been established since the early Ming dynasty. Other important Muslim ports were found at Brunei in northwest Borneo and along the eastern rim of the South China Sea in the Philippines. Welded together by a common religion, traders all along this extensive network of ports enjoyed access to commercial intelligence and credit facilities that the overseas Chinese were only beginning to assemble.

Other than causing a slight repositioning of the trade routes, the Portuguese and later the Spanish had little effect on the Southeast Asian economy. They did not add a large new element of demand to the market, so prices remained largely the same. The Muslim network for the most part stayed intact. The seventeenth century tells a different story, however. The arrival of the English and especially the Dutch was correlated with a shift in dominance from the Muslim to the Chinese network. India became an area for competition among various European powers, and gradually, the hold of the Mughals over their mainly Hindu subjects was broken. Indian Muslim political and economic power declined

in tandem with the introduction of more efficient north European military technology. Muslim groups in Southeast Asia found themselves increasingly fragmented and facing competition from several parties at once. Slowly but inexorably, the Sino-European alliance overcame the Muslim coalition. The climactic event in this transition was the transfer of control over Banten's economy to the Dutch in 1682. Banten was the last great Muslim trading port to survive; after its ruler ceded control in return for Dutch support in a civil war against his own father, indigenous shippers found themselves more and more hemmed in by Dutch restrictions. These regulations were intended to favor Dutch traders, but due to a combination of factors, the Chinese ended up as the main beneficiaries. The Dutch were physically unable to conduct all trade and transport themselves; the Chinese were able and willing to pay fees to the Dutch, thus guaranteeing them their profit, while still making enough additional money to accumulate their own capital. Thus was formed an alliance between two non-Southeast Asian groups. The Dutch were never entirely happy with this arrangement, and more than once, they turned on their Chinese subjects. Nonetheless, the Chinese traders managed to survive and resume their activities after periodic pogroms once the Dutch realized that they could not prosecute their economic plans without Chinese participation. Muslims from India and Arabs too continued to participate in the economy, but they were less influential or powerful than the Chinese.

Only in Sumatra, Borneo, and the southern Philippines did Muslim networks remain dominant through the early modern period. Aceh and Brunei and, to a lesser extent, the Johor-Riau area at the southern end of the Malay Peninsula and the Sulu sultanate represented significant concentrations of economic power in the hands of Muslim rulers with strong links to Islamic kingdoms across the Indian Ocean.

The economy of mainland Southeast Asia was much less intertwined with long-distance trade and therefore attracted less attention from outsiders. Cambodia experienced a brief era of involvement on the part of various foreign groups, from both Europe and other areas of Southeast Asia (particularly Malays), but it sank back into relative isolation due to a lack of large quantities of products in demand in interna-

tional markets. Similarly, Europeans and other Asian groups made attempts to exploit the commercial possibilities of the Arakan and Martaban coasts of Myanmar, but they made no significant impact there during the early modern era. In Siam (Thailand/Ayutthaya), the Dutch, French, and English tried during the seventeenth century to reap commercial profits and gain political influence, but they were rebuffed.

The practices through which foreign trade was conducted during the early modern period incorporated both premodern and modern elements. And even within the same kingdom, policies might fluctuate between one pole and the other. An example is Aceh. Strong sultans such as Iskandar Muda (Mahkota Alam, r. 1607–1636) of the early seventeenth century attempted to monopolize all international trade throughout their realm, which, in his case, extended over much of North Sumatra and far down the west coast as well to pepper-producing regions in West Sumatra. Later, a system of rule by queens was adopted. This practice seems to have been favored by local merchants, who found the rule of women much less onerous. In most cases, international trade was conducted on the basis of the ideal of reciprocity and gift giving rather than hard bargaining. The Dutch eventually learned to turn this system to their advantage, usurping the rights of local rulers through treaties and instituting monopoly control over foreign trade as efficiently as any local rulers ever had succeeded in doing. The Dutch quickly gained the upper hand over other foreign groups in Southeast Asia, and from 1641 through 1800, they dominated most of the region's long-distance maritime trade.

Although many data exist for the study of the international trade of Southeast Asia during the early modern period, the agrarian economy is much less well documented. That economy was not of interest to the foreign traders, and local archives have not survived. On the mainland, coinage was only gradually introduced during the early modern period. In Thailand, the practice of using cowrie shells instead of coins persisted until modern times. This system was also very popular across the border in Yunnan, where the Chinese had to resort to threats of imposing the death penalty to suppress the use of cowries instead of Chinese coins in the late Ming dynasty (seventeenth century) among the T'ai linguistic groups of that region. Ac-

According to an English visitor of the early seventeenth century, this shell money was used as far south as Kedah in the Malay Peninsula and at other places around the Bay of Bengal. In the absence of a widespread system of coinage, taxes and tribute were paid in produce and precious metal by weight rather than in a currency system.

In both mainland and island Southeast Asia, the very notion of “the economy” differed from that of the modern period in one important respect: control over labor was much more esteemed and emphasized than control over physical assets. The social structures of both parts of the region were predicated upon the notion that it was the fate of everyone to “belong” to someone else of higher status, in the sense of the need to uphold a set of mutual obligations. The lower-status person in most settled societies was expected to form part of the retinue of someone of higher status and to perform certain duties for that individual in return for the fulfillment of specific obligations, mainly protection. Early European sources refer to slaves as a major component of Southeast Asian population, but this single word does not do justice to the range of relationships that it described in early modern Southeast Asia. People could become enslaved for debt and as war captives, or they could sell themselves. As a result of accepting someone as a slave in some societies, however, the slave master in fact became responsible for ensuring the welfare of the slave. In this matter as in so much else having to do with early modern Southeast Asia, one cannot simply read the European sources as literal descriptions of reality. References to slavery have to be analyzed in the context of the place and specific period in which they are situated. The complexity of this set of institutions in determining the allocation of social and physical resources and in determining the economic choices of individuals suggests that the notion of the economy in early modern Southeast Asia is itself a concept in need of definition according to the local situation.

The early modern period can be conveniently considered to end in the early nineteenth century. The next decades saw the rapid spread of European administration from small enclaves to a large proportion of Southeast Asia. Economic activity was strongly influenced by imperial demands and administrative practices,

plantation agriculture, industrial expansion, and a host of other new factors. Yet even in the twenty-first century, one cannot understand Southeast Asian attitudes toward matters that Westerners may consider purely economic without recognizing that Southeast Asians often place higher priorities on matters of personal relationships than on principles of profit and loss. Continuity with aspects of the premodern and early modern periods is still an important phenomenon.

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See also Aceh (Acheh); Age of Commerce; Albuquerque, Alfonso de (ca. 1462–1515); Ancient Coinage in Southeast Asia; Angkor; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Banten (Bantam); Batavia (Suanda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Cheng Ho (Zheng He), Admiral (1371/1375–1433/1435); Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Tribute System; Coinage and Currency; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Gujaratis; Indian Immigrants; Islam in Southeast Asia; Iskandar Muda, Sultan Mahkota Alam (r. 1607–1636); Johor-Riau Empire; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Maluku (The Moluccas); Mataram; Melaka; Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Pagan (Bagan); Portuguese Asian Empire; Slavery; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Spices and the Spice Trade; Straits of Melaka; Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; T’ais; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East Indies Company) (1600); Yunnan Province

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ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (ca. 1400–1800)

The humid Tropics, despite their abundance of water, are not easy to tame with settled agriculture. Southeast Asia was relatively lightly peopled until the nineteenth century; the majority of the population then consisted of mobile, shifting cultivators and fisherpeople. Pockets of irrigated rice agriculture became important in the drier areas from the ninth to thirteenth centuries and sustained the classic cultures of Angkor, Pagan, Java, and Dai Viet in that period.

Throughout the recorded history of the region, Southeast Asia was a place of exchange and interaction—between uplands and coasts, trading ports and hinterlands, specialist production centers and their clients. Because it lay athwart the maritime routes between China, the world’s largest economy, and the rest of the known world, Southeast Asia was always home

to important ports, notably around the Straits of Melaka, the portages across the Malay Peninsula, and the Cham coast of what is today southern Vietnam. Rivers and sea-lanes provided ready access by water to populated parts of the region, compensating for the unusual difficulty of movement by land.

Cash Crops for the World

Until the fifteenth century C.E., the long-distance exports of the region were the product of foraging rather than agriculture—exotic spices; birds’ nests; birds of paradise; woods and resins from the forests; and pearls, tortoiseshells, and seashells from the oceans. Even the cloves and nutmeg that found their way from the Maluku (“Spice”) Islands of eastern Indonesia to the Roman Empire and Han China had been plucked from trees growing wild in these small islands.

In the decades before and after 1400, evidence suggests a more systematic production for the export of cloves in northern Maluku (especially Ternate and Tidore), nutmeg and its by-product mace in the Banda islands, and pepper in northern Sumatra. Venetian agents reported that about 30 tons of cloves and 10 tons of nutmeg annually were arriving in the Mediterranean ports of Europe, through Egypt, at that time. The growth was slow and spasmodic through most of the fifteenth century but rapid enough after 1570 to find about 200 tons of cloves and 100 tons of nutmeg arriving in Europe annually by the early 1600s. Prices paid in Maluku for the spices also grew about twentyfold as competition mounted between 1500 and 1600 (Reid 1993: 13–24). Since these precious spices passed through many hands on their long journey from *entrepôt* to *entrepôt*, they were crucial to the growth of mercantile activity.

Piper nigrum, the true pepper vine, is native to India, and southwest India provided virtually all the world’s needs for this commodity until around 1400. Likely stimulated by Chinese demand, pepper then began its remarkable career in Southeast Asia, beginning in northern Sumatra. Primary forest was felled to create the pepper gardens, and yields would decline after about the tenth year of production, leading to the opening of new tracts of forest and the abandoning of exhausted ones. Pepper cultivation therefore tended to shift, spreading around almost the whole of the coastal and riverine

portions of Sumatra most accessible to trade and into the Malay Peninsula, coastal Borneo, southeastern Siam, and south-central Vietnam. By the early 1600s, Southeast Asia was exporting 4,000 tons of pepper a year and supplying the bulk of the world's needs. Around 6 percent of the population of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula must have been living from pepper production for export in the seventeenth century (Reid 1993: 33).

Sugar began its career as a major Southeast Asian export in the seventeenth century. Chinese (mostly Teochiu) immigrants started growing it, primarily for export to Japan, in the Quang Nam area of central Vietnam, in Siam, and in Cambodia. Chinese migrants also began growing sugar in the outskirts of Banten, in Java, around 1600. The Dutch encouraged them to move to Batavia in the 1620s, and by the 1640s and 1650s, up to 1,000 tons a year were being shipped by the Dutch to Europe, Japan, and Persia (Bulbeck et al. 1998: 112).

Mention should also be made of tin, Southeast Asia's primary mineral export. Tin was extracted from flooded pits by part-time Thai and Malay miners, primarily in the river valleys of Perak and Kedah on the Malay Peninsula and Phuket. Production appears to have grown markedly from the time around 1500 when the Melaka sultanate controlled the export to India until the seventeenth century, when Dutch, Acehnese, and Thai authorities competed to control it. At its seventeenth-century peak around the 1630s, 1,000 tons may have been exported (Irwin 1970: 268–269).

An Age of Commerce

The growth in cash cropping around 1400 was likely stimulated by the extraordinary interest in Southeast Asia (and beyond) of the first three Ming dynasty rulers of China (1368–1424). In particular, the third, the Yung-lo emperor, sent six huge naval expeditions to the ports of the region and intervened militarily in Dai Viet and northern Burma. There is good evidence for the Chinese demand for Southeast Asian products such as pepper, sappanwood, and minerals, and Chinese migrants left behind by the expeditions greatly assisted the development of ports such as Japara, Demak, and Gresik (in Java); Ayutthaya (in Siam); Melaka; Brunei; and Manila.

Subsequent emperors lost interest in official contacts while continuing to ban private trade, and the Chinese commercial element merged with other traders to form a largely Malay- and Javanese-speaking trading class. Whereas earlier and later Chinese contacts proceeded both along the western route (Vietnam coast and Malay Peninsula) and the eastern route (Taiwan, Philippines, and Borneo), the eastern route appears to have died in the mid-fifteenth century. Manila, Brunei, and eastern Indonesia redirected their China trade through the major entrepôt of Melaka, presumably because goods traveling along the coastal routes linking that city to Chinese ports were easier to disguise as local trade. Around 1500, therefore, Melaka played a crucial role as the single privileged entrepôt for trade in cloth from India and spices from the archipelago, as well as metal goods and ceramics from China.

The arrival of Portuguese vessels in 1509 and their capture of Melaka two years later contributed to a major disruption to Southeast Asian trade and to Indian Ocean trade more generally. The predatory nature of their attacks on the large Javanese and Indian Muslim ships that dominated the trade appears to have set back the level of commerce by several decades. By the 1530s, however, Muslim traders had established new bases in ports such as Aceh (North Sumatra), Patani, Pahang and Johor (Malay Peninsula), and Banten (West Java), and they established a direct route for pepper and spices from Aceh to the Red Sea ports controlled by Turkey, avoiding the former stapling ports in India where the Portuguese had become dangerous. The Portuguese themselves adjusted to more peaceful forms of trade, and the oceanic trade networks continued to expand.

The height of Southeast Asia's age of commerce occurred in the period from 1570 to 1630, fueled by rising prices for most products, an abundant flow of silver, and intense competition for the key commodities. Three related events contributed to the increase in commerce. First, in 1567, the Ming emperor lifted the imperial ban on foreign trade, beginning a system of licensing junks for a dozen Southeast Asian ports. Second, silver production from both Peru and Japan increased rapidly beginning around 1570 as a result of new techniques of mercury extraction. And third, the Spanish established in Manila (1570) an entrepôt where

Chinese traders could obtain American silver as well as Japanese and Southeast Asian goods. Muslim and Portuguese traders competed in carrying silver and Indian cloth eastward to exchange for spices, pepper, and Chinese manufactures in Southeast Asian ports, with the result that prices and quantities both rose. The Japanese began sailing directly to Southeast Asian ports in the 1580s (chiefly to exchange with the Chinese, which they were forbidden to do directly), and the northern Europeans did so in the 1590s, adding to the competition and the buoyancy of mercantile ports.

Urban Life and Commerce

This age of commerce created large cosmopolitan cities, which, for more than a century, were the centers of cultural innovation and political power as well as commercial dynamism. In both Burma and Java, the political and cultural centers shifted to coastal ports roughly between 1450 and 1620, and Cambodia's capital also moved to the river port of Phnom Penh in the fifteenth century. Port cities such as Pegu, Ayutthaya, Aceh, Banten, and Makassar grew to the dimensions of contemporary European cities and dominated their agricultural hinterlands to an even greater extent. Most cities had a royal core, often fortified in the form of a citadel, and extensive suburbs in which the different national groups of traders would congregate in their respective quarters.

The growth of commercial transactions stimulated a relatively sophisticated pattern of commercial techniques, paralleling many of the capitalist institutions of Europe, India, and China in the period. The alternation of monsoon winds in the region favored a pattern of seasonal voyages, with traders from China, India, or Java remaining for several months in the main entrepôts before returning home on the favorable wind. Within the region, traders identified with Java, Banda, Makassar, Pegu (ethnically Mon), Melaka/Johor/Patani (ethnically Malay), and Champa owned and operated large rice junks as well as smaller vessels, whereas the trade to China and India was dominated by Indian and Chinese traders, respectively.

The key indigenous commercial actors were the *nakhoda* (supercargos) who traveled on each vessel and regulated the trade of the traveling merchants on it and the merchant-aristocrats

(*orangkaya* in Malay) who regulated commerce in the ports and mediated with rulers, often also acting as port officials. These were frequently foreign-born individuals, since what autonomy and security of property they enjoyed rested largely on their mobility. In addition, resident Indian, Chinese, Arab, and Portuguese minorities played important mediating roles, often including the introduction of commercial or manufacturing techniques. Indian commercial castes, including Gujarati Sharafs and south Indian Chettiars, operated as money changers, moneylenders, and protobankers, with the capacity to send letters of credit (*hundi*) to their counterparts in distant cities. In the larger ports, an interest rate of 2 percent per month became common for reliable borrowers (Reid 1993: 110). Trading voyages were financed through established principles of profit sharing and bottomry (a credit system of lending to a ship owner on the security of his vessel).

If in these respects Southeast Asia was moving in a capitalist direction comparable to that in Europe, India, and Japan, it lagged behind in others. In the seventeenth century, there still were no impersonal banks or stock exchanges, as were starting to emerge in Europe. A more fundamental point was the lack of security of property against the whim or greed of a ruler. Power was diffuse in practice but unlimited in theory, in part because the new port-centered power bases adopted new ideologies of absolutism to justify using power to obtain wealth and vice versa. The *orangkaya* elite adopted a number of devices to curb arbitrary royal power, including a succession of female rulers in Aceh and Patani, child rulers in Banten, and supernaturally sanctioned pluralities in Makassar. Yet none of these became permanently institutionalized, as free cities, parliaments, and courts did in parts of Europe.

Crisis and Retreat in the Seventeenth Century

The Europeans traveled to Southeast Asia in pursuit of increasingly high-priced spices and at first contributed to the competition that drove local prices higher still. In the mid-seventeenth century, however, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) established an effective monopoly over cloves, nutmeg, and mace and a partial monopoly over pepper, cinnamon, and sandal-

wood. In pursuing these monopolies, the VOC also conquered two of the largest entrepôts—Makassar (1669) and Banten (1682)—and weakened a number of others. It has therefore often been blamed for reversing the healthy development of Indonesian commerce as well as urbanism, at least in Indonesia, and inaugurating a period when foreigners dominated all the high points of commerce.

Other parts of the world, however, such as the Hapsburg, Chinese, and Ottoman Empires, also experienced major crises in the mid-seventeenth century. Some of the factors that turned Southeast Asians away from an export-dependent path were global, notably, a worldwide cooling effect, which appears to have caused unusual climatic variation, and a downturn in world output of silver, which had been fueling price rises throughout the sixteenth century. In almost every part of Southeast Asia for which records are available, population dipped in the second half of the seventeenth century. It is more helpful to see the increasingly deadly competition for spices in the 1600s as a development in a time of crisis, in which there was room for only one winner.

For Southeast Asians, one major effect was a sharp decline in the influence that cosmopolitan port cities had in their lives. Capitals had fallen and shifted before, but there were to be no indigenous replacements when major port cities fell in this crisis, as Pegu did in 1599, Surabaya in 1623, Makassar in 1669, or Banten in 1684. The Javanese and Mon ethnic groups ceased to be identified particularly with maritime commerce, which became increasingly the business of minority diasporas—Chinese, Arab, European, Malay, Bugis. In the archipelago, the defeat of important port capitals led to a return to more diffuse systems of power, though on the mainland, such an effect was short-lived at best.

Euro-Chinese Cities

The Portuguese occupation of the Melaka entrepôt in 1511 dislocated trade to new centers but had little effect on urban life more broadly. The establishment of Manila in 1570, however, immediately proved very interesting to Chinese traders who had been newly authorized to trade to the *Nanyang* (South Seas, namely, Southeast Asia). By 1589, almost half of all junks that ac-

quired licenses were destined for Manila, where they could exchange the abundant manufactures of China (especially silk and porcelain) for Mexican silver. By 1603, there were about 20,000 Chinese living in the Chinese quarter (*parian*) of Manila and providing most of the city's needs for manufactures, construction, and foodstuffs (De la Costa 1967: 68, 205).

Founded by the VOC in 1619, Dutch Batavia set out to emulate this model by attracting Chinese settlers and traders through every means possible, including force. By 1630, the Chinese had become the most useful group in terms of urban services, manufacturing, and tax revenue, but they made up less than 20 percent of the population. Batavia was the headquarters of the Asia-wide network of the VOC, and slaves were introduced first from India and Arakan and then, after 1670, chiefly from South Sulawesi and Bali. They constituted about half of Batavia's population in the sixteenth century, and freed slaves (*mardijkers*) comprised another 20 percent (Raben 1996: 82–97). Batavia was even more attractive than Manila to both Chinese and Muslim (chiefly Indian Muslim and Malay) traders and settlers, since no demands were made for conversion or cultural assimilation. This model of a culturally plural entrepôt, with a valuable Chinese population of craftspeople and traders, was repeated in other Dutch ports, such as Padang, Melaka (after 1640), Semarang, Makassar, and Kupang.

The trade, which initially sustained the early Dutch, Spanish, and English operations in Southeast Asia, was gradually supplemented by the controlled cultivation of cash crops for export. The Dutch had begun with nutmeg after 1621, producing all the world's supply on slave estates in Banda. Company cloves and pepper were produced through binding contracts with producers in specified regions. The British also used a system of binding contracts with local chiefs to produce their share (about a quarter, at best) of the world's pepper needs after 1684. In 1707, the Dutch company began distributing coffee seedlings to the chiefs of the Priangan highlands above Batavia with such success that West Java became Europe's main supplier of coffee until West Indian slave production developed in the 1730s.

The eighteenth-century companies were as much producers of tropical produce under monopoly contracts as they were traders. In 1781,

the Spanish took a similar route (about the time the VOC system was collapsing), declaring all tobacco cultivation in the Philippines a government monopoly. In the 1790s, a factory was built to produce the subsequently renowned Manila cigars, employing 5,000 women rollers (De Jesus 1980). This quickly became the Philippine government's primary source of revenue.

A Second Commercial Boom

In the latter part of the eighteenth century, European and Chinese free traders were visiting Southeast Asia in ever-increasing numbers, whereas the Dutch, English, and Spanish monopoly systems were in decay. The freeing of trade to competitive influences, coinciding with a period of global trade growth, inaugurated another phase of commercial expansion and urban growth roughly between 1780 and 1840.

China's population is thought to have doubled during the relatively peaceful and prosperous reign of the Qienlong emperor (1736–1795). Chinese trade and emigration to Southeast Asia increased throughout the reign but especially after 1754, when Chinese were officially permitted to return home with their foreign wealth. In the previous century, Manila and Batavia were the principal destinations, but now the Chinese made Asian-ruled centers such as Bangkok, Saigon, Ha Tien, Riau, Brunei, Sulu, and Terengganu their major destinations. Miners for tin and gold and planters of pepper, gambier, and sugar established relatively autonomous frontier settlements in lightly populated areas in Borneo, the Malay Peninsula, the Riau archipelago, and the Gulf of Thailand. In the decades before Singapore's foundation (1819), Bangkok became the largest base for Chinese trade and shipping outside China.

The Chinese may have been the most important single factor in the second boom. Nonetheless, the growing numbers of English and French country traders based in India after 1760, of New England pepper traders from 1793, and of Chulia and other Indian merchants also profited from the atrophy of the Dutch and English companies, which could no longer control effective monopolies. The Americans as a group were the biggest single buyer behind a huge expansion of pepper growing in Aceh from the 1790s, and Aceh's total exports increased about tenfold in value between the

1770s and the 1820s (Bulbeck et al. 1998: 66). Coffee escaped from the narrow world of Dutch forced cultivation in the Priangan to become the smallholder crop par excellence in much of Sumatra and Java. By the 1830s, Southeast Asia produced the bulk of the world's coffee as well as pepper. Shipping records for Singapore in the years after 1819 reveal that maritime trade in its hinterlands, from southern Vietnam and Siam to Bali and Borneo, increased several-fold between the 1790s and the 1830s.

This kind of expansion in trade, the most measurable dimension of economic performance, was matched by a growing commercialization within the larger states of the region. It is possible to see this second period of commercial growth, like the age of commerce two centuries earlier, as the harbinger of various types of modern sensibility in literature, art, and religion, as well as of more modern, centralized state forms. For instance, Nidhi Aeusrivongse has shown this scenario for Siam in the early Bangkok period; likewise Li Tana for Cochin China.

ANTHONY REID

See also Aceh (Acheh); Arabs;

Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767 C.E.), Kingdom of; Banten (Bantam); Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jakarta, Djakarta/Jakarta); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Chettiers (Chettyars); China, Imperial; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Tribute System; Coffee; Coinage and Currency; Country Traders; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Hanoi (Thang-Long); Indigenous Political Power; Islam in Southeast Asia; Java; Jungle/Forest Products; Manila; Marine/Sea Products; Melaka; Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Penang (1786); Pepper; Portuguese Asian Empire; Saigon (Gia Dinh, Hồ Chí Minh City); Shipbuilding; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Spices and the Spice Trade; Sugar; Sumatra; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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EDSA REVOLUTION (1986)

“People Power Revolution”

EDSA is the acronym for Epifanio De los Santos Avenue, the major highway in metropolitan

Manila, the national capital region of the Philippines. It was the site of the four-day “people power revolution” of 22 to 25 February 1986, where more than a million Filipinos gathered on the road to force a showdown with president-turned-dictator Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989). Marcos had refused to resign from office after fourteen years at the helm of a repressive regime. The vast multitude responded to frantic calls by Manila’s archbishop, Jaime Cardinal Sin, to go to EDSA to show their support for the defense minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, and the armed forces vice chief of staff, Fidel Ramos, who had forsworn Marcos and defected to the opposition, headed by Corazon (Cory) Aquino (1933–). In four days, EDSA swelled with crowds of Filipinos from all walks of life—rich, poor, young, old, professionals, executives, farmers, workers, laborers, students, women, children, religious, and so on. The phenomenon had a heavily religious atmosphere. Priests and nuns intoned prayers and chants; carried religious icons such as the Virgin Mary and Santo Niño (Child Jesus); and offered rosaries, flowers, and food to Marcos’s soldiers, who were just waiting for orders to shoot into the crowd.

Some called the EDSA rebellion nothing short of a miracle because, with the presence of a million people and the full weight of Marcos’s military arrayed against them, the potential for violence was extremely high but did not erupt. All that was needed was for someone in the crowd to throw a stone, and violence would have ensued. It was a very tense situation, yet the crowd remained disciplined but determined. They pleaded with rather than confronted or taunted the military. For their part, the troops could not fire on the crowds or drive their tanks into their midst because they knew some of their relatives and friends were there. They voluntarily returned to their barracks without firing a single shot.

The defection of various units of the military, especially the air force under Colonel Antonio Sotelo, sealed the fate of Ferdinand Marcos. Isolated in Malacanang, the presidential palace, with his family and loyal military, he underestimated the size of the EDSA crowd and continued ordering his troops not to shoot. Meanwhile, he was in constant touch with the administration of Ronald Reagan (t. 1981–1989), asking the U.S. president, whom he con-

sidered his friend, what to do. In turn, President Reagan (1911–2004) requested a U.S. senator, Paul Laxalt, to tell Marcos to “cut, and cut cleanly,” to which the latter responded, “I’m so very very disappointed” (Kerkvliet and Mojares 1991: 160). In his delusion, if not arrogance, he had expected Reagan to support him to the very end.

On the night of the fourth day at EDSA, two helicopters from Clark Field Air Force Base in the Philippines arrived at the presidential palace to evacuate Marcos and company after the dictator was persuaded it was in his best interests to go into exile in Hawai’i. The U.S. Embassy in Manila had contacted incoming president Cory Aquino, who had said in very definite terms that it was best for Marcos to leave the Philippines to forestall any violence that might ensue if he remained. Marcos and his entourage of eighty-nine persons were put on a plane to Guam, en route to Hawai’i. A second plane carried 300 pieces of luggage, containing jewelry, Philippine currency, U.S. dollars, guns, medical equipment, clothing, Imelda Marcos’s shoes, and other items too numerous to mention, which were later impounded by the U.S. Customs authorities in Honolulu.

The EDSA crowd reached Malacanang after the Marcos party had left, and the people celebrated the end of the dictatorship by throwing out and burning the portraits of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. They photographed themselves taking over the presidential desk and other parts of the palace. The incoming Aquino government had sent its couriers to retrieve whatever papers and documents were left behind, which could later be used in court cases against the Marcoses. Much jewelry had been left behind, as well as several dialysis machines, confirming long-standing rumors that Marcos had suffered from a kidney disease.

EDSA has since been reconstructed, with a massive statue at its heart symbolizing “people power.” There is also a specially commissioned, towering icon of the Virgin Mary, to whom the crowd prayed during those tense days to bring a peaceful end to the Marcos regime. The site is a reminder of the unique Filipino contribution to the theory of modern revolution.

BELINDA AQUINO

See also Aquino, Corazon Cojuangco (1933–); Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989); Martial Law

(1972–1981) (The Philippines); Ramos, Fidel Valdez (1928–)

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EDUCATION, OVERSEAS CHINESE

The educational policies and provisions for immigrant Chinese and their descendants, Southeast Asia’s most significant immigrant minority, changed as former colonies became independent countries striving for national unity and development in the 1950s and 1960s. The relations between China and the immigrants’ countries of overseas residence influenced the educational changes that occurred. Across the region, there were variations in the minority status of the Chinese, including their numerical and economic importance. These differences affected government policies toward Chinese education—policies that had political as well as educational significance.

Extensive Chinese immigration to Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century led to the emergence of a settled Chinese population and a demand for local schools, as only a small proportion of the Chinese could afford to send their children to private tutors or to China for education. Some Chinese children gained an education in the few modern, Western-style schools established by colonial authorities and Christian missionaries. These schools used the colonial language and a curriculum designed to produce the colonies’ future clerks and bureaucrats. As in the Straits Settlements, the Chinese children educated in these schools became a distinctive segment of the Chinese population—the English-educated Anglo-Chinese.

The inability of these schools to accommodate the demand spawned by the growing school-age population among the Chinese, especially those seeking a Chinese-language education, led local Chinese associations to found their own schools. Diversity characterized these early community-funded schools. There was no common curriculum or common language of instruction. Although some schools taught in Mandarin, the national language, many used the

dominant local Chinese dialect, such as Hokkien, Teochew (Teochiu), or Cantonese.

Soon, these schools, begun as a response to the immediate educational needs of the emigrant Chinese families and employers, were influenced by the social and political reform movements in China, where education was emphasized as a key to modernization, including the replacement of the Qing (Ch'ing) dynasty (1644–1912). In Southeast Asia, local schools were urged to prepare citizens for the new China through a modern, Western-oriented curriculum that used the Chinese national language. The recruitment of teachers from China to overcome local shortages contributed to curriculum reform in Southeast Asia's Chinese schools, including an increased use of Mandarin. Colonial governments viewed the expansion of the schools and their orientation to China with suspicion. Accordingly, they introduced restrictions on size, curriculum, and teachers to ensure that the schools did not become promoters of a Chinese nationalism that would threaten colonial interests.

After the Pacific War (1941–1945), the Chinese schools played an important role in meeting the growing popular demand for education. But their perceived links to China, with its communist government that was supporting communist groups in Southeast Asia, strengthened the concerns of the colonial authorities. Many indigenous independence leaders also were hostile to the economic influence of the Chinese, which they wished to limit as their countries became independent.

With the growth of nationalism, Chinese schools became subject to even harsher controls in the 1950s and 1960s. The use of the Chinese language was either banned or severely curtailed. In the Philippines and Indonesia, schools were closed or restricted so that they could not provide a viable alternative to the national systems of education that had as a major objective the promotion of national unity. Even in Singapore, with its majority Chinese population, the government worked to establish a national system of education based on English, with a subsidiary role for Chinese, Malay, and Tamil.

These changes coincided with a declining demand for separate Chinese education, as the Southeast Asian Chinese increasingly saw that their long-term future lay in the region. Immigration from China ceased, and the idea of re-

turning to China was less attractive to Southeast Asian Chinese. Among the growing numbers of locally born Chinese, there was a strong desire to become more fully integrated into the new homelands. One pathway was to be educated in the mainstream school system, following the national curriculum and using the national language. The merging of Nanyang University with the University of Singapore in 1980 deprived the region of its only Chinese-language tertiary institution. The closure, justified on the grounds of declining student numbers, symbolically ended more than a century of Chinese community-based education in Southeast Asia. Today, only in Malaysia, where the ethnic Chinese remain a significant minority, are there private as well as government schools making significant use of Chinese as their medium of instruction. The status of these schools and educational provisions for ethnic Chinese remains an important area of political debate.

By the end of the twentieth century, improving political relations between China and Southeast Asian countries and their growing economic links led to a lessening of hostility toward knowledge of the Chinese language and culture. Although there has been an easing of bans on the use and teaching of the Chinese language in countries such as Indonesia, it is difficult to envisage an extensive return to separate schooling for ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia.

CHRISTINE INGLIS

See also China since 1949; China, Imperial; China, Nationalist; Chinese Dialect Groups; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Revolution (1911); Education, Western Secular; Malayan/Malaysian Education; Qing (Ch'ing/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912)

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EDUCATION, TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS

Prior to European contact, Southeast Asia had strongly developed traditions of literacy and education. These traditions were built upon the region's diverse religious heritage and the Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic institutions integral to the local societies. Buddhism, with an education system based on the monasteries, was firmly established in contemporary Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. Islamic schools existed in Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. In Vietnam, Confucian principles derived from China underpinned a highly systematized pattern of education. Only in the Philippines is there little evidence of such a tradition of religious education. The initial contacts between Western education, both Christian and secular, and these traditional patterns of education varied with religion and colonial policies and their reception in the traditional societies.

The contemporary survival and modification of these earlier patterns of traditional education have been affected in complex ways by the patterns of religious diversity that exist in today's nation-states. Another important factor is whether the nation-state is secular or has an official religion. Indonesia is a secular state, although most of its people are Muslims, with smaller numbers of Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and animists. By contrast, Islam has an official role both in Brunei, an Islamic monarchy with an Islamic majority, and in Malaysia, where one of the attributes of a Malay is to be a Mus-

lim. Yet Malaysia has a far smaller percentage of Muslims in its population than Indonesia, and there are substantial minorities of Buddhists, Hindus, and Christians. Thailand is a Buddhist monarchy and includes several Muslim provinces in its southern region. Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos have all had periods of communist rule and, like Burma, have no state religion. The Philippines has a Christian (mainly Catholic) majority but also has provinces dominated by Muslims.

The extent to which religious education touched the lives of children in traditional society is difficult to determine precisely. Family-based education provided the skills needed for daily agricultural and domestic life and was probably the most common form of education available to boys as well as girls in traditional Southeast Asia. In those regions where animism was the major form of religious and spiritual belief, education could also include apprenticeships in magic and sorcery. Indeed, when Western-style schools were introduced in such areas, they were sometimes viewed as a form of these apprenticeships.

Buddhist Education

The traditional form of education in Buddhist societies was provided by monks attached to the monasteries (*wats*). The first stage of education was a prerequisite for young men to be ordained as monks, an important rite of passage in these societies. Typically at the age of five or six, boys were sent to the local monastery, where monks would teach them to read religious texts, do simple arithmetic, and learn religious principles. The instruction was individualized, as a monk would have no more than ten or twelve pupils, each working through his lessons at his own pace. There was no specific curriculum or formal examination, although there was progression through texts and tasks. Boys were free to come and go as they wished from the classes. Once they had been ordained as monks, only a few would remain to continue their studies in religious or secular knowledge.

For most young men, their education did not continue past their ordination. Although they had gained some secular knowledge, the educational outcome most frequently emphasized by Western observers was that they had gained a moral education that situated them within their

community. With education considered a religious act, commentators suggest that this type of education was relatively common among young men. Girls were not part of this system; they learned to read or write either at home from members of the family or, in certain elite groups, with a tutor. The young men who continued with their education were the exception; the system did provide an avenue of social mobility for those from poorer backgrounds.

In Burma in 1866, the British had initially proposed to provide Western education by working in conjunction with the monasteries. Although slow to develop, 801 of these monastic schools existed by 1873, compared with only 112 secular schools. Later policies favored these Anglo-vernacular secular schools. They became the path to employment in the colonial economy and increasingly attracted pupils from the monastery schools. There was also a decline in the prestige of the monks. Some of the monks involved themselves in anti-British uprisings. Most significant, argued British administrator John Sydenham Furnivall (1878–1960), was that young men and their families were more interested in economic gain and opportunities for social mobility than in the moral education at the heart of Buddhist education. He also noted that the extensive changes affecting the society that monastic education had served further undermined its viability (Furnivall 1948).

In Laos, the French had a similar plan to build upon the monastic schools. Colleges were set up in 1909 and 1911 to retrain the monks to teach in the secular school system. Although welcomed by the local population, the scheme proved impractical, as the monks sought better-paying civil service posts when they completed their training. Efforts to modernize the monastic schools by adding subjects such as French and arithmetic encountered problems because of difficulties in finding monks with the appropriate training to teach them.

In Thailand, however, the strategy of using the monastic schools as a basis for the expansion of modern education was far more successful. After 1898, these schools underpinned the effort to extend modern education beyond Bangkok and into the provinces. Modern textbooks were provided to the schools, which also received limited government funding. Important for the success of this strategy was the ac-

tive support provided by King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910); indeed, his brother, head of an influential monastery, was in charge of its implementation. This situation contrasted with that in Burma and Laos, where the traditional power holders were not involved in the attempts to modify the monastic schools. The Thai monastic schools also complemented rather than competed with the lay school system in providing pathways to social mobility. The viability of the strategy was demonstrated by the fact that in the early 1970s, one-fifth of Thai primary schools were still these monastic schools. In the Muslim areas of southern Thailand, the government also allowed the operation of Koranic schools that combined Muslim education with parts of the national primary curriculum.

Islamic Education

In contrast to the organization of Buddhist education around individual monasteries, there was greater diversity in the patterns of Islamic education that developed in Southeast Asia. Apart from recitation centers associated with mosques, the major form of schooling was the village school (*pondoks*, *pesantren*), where students (*santri*) would gather around an individual scholar (*'ulama* or *kyai*). Often, these were boarding schools. The content of education followed patterns not too dissimilar from those found in Buddhist schools: rote learning was the method of instruction, and students would work their way through a series of religious texts. The schools also were intended for boys rather than girls. One significant difference, however, was that many of these schools used not the vernacular language but rather Arabic, the language of Islamic religious texts and rituals. Few students studied beyond the initial level, but for those who continued, educational opportunities were available outside Southeast Asia in the Middle East (West Asia) at institutions including al-Azhar University in Egypt, which played a major role in the development of modern forms of Islam. The existence of this alternative to higher education in the European metropolises was an important element that was absent from Buddhist education. It was also a factor of particular significance for the development of Islamic education in the Netherlands East Indies.

Most of the people of the Netherlands East Indies were Muslims, but there were significant differences in the nature of their involvement with Islam. Those from western Sumatra and Aceh were widely regarded as far more devout in their practice of Islam as compared with those from Java and other islands. Acehnese efforts to gain independence from the Dutch administration were intertwined with the work of Islamic opposition groups who derived much of their support from students inspired by their Islamic teachers. There was also considerable debate among Indonesian intellectuals about how and to what extent Islam and Islamic education should be modernized to operate more effectively within the changing world order. During the 1920s and 1930s, increasing numbers of *madrasahs* (traditional Islamic schools), which combined Islamic and modern, secular education, were set up. Changes also occurred in certain pesantren as they attempted to compete with the reformist Islamic schools. Debate about modernization was not unique to Indonesia, but it played a most important role in political, as well as educational and religious, developments. Among the movements that changed Islamic religious education in the first half of the twentieth century were Kaum Muda (young group) and Muhammadiyah (“Way of Muhammad”), which established pesantren based on modernist principles. Taman Siswa (Garden of Students) schools, with their combination of Javanese culture and a modernist, Western-oriented curriculum, provided an alternative to modernist Islam.

After the Pacific War (1941–1945), the newly independent Republic of Indonesia was constituted as a secular state that recognized the existence of different religious groupings. Nevertheless, its state-funded education system still supports both secular and Islamic systems of schooling. The Ministry of Education regulates the secular schools, whereas the Islamic schools are under the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The government Islamic schools are recognized as an integral part of the state education system, and their structure parallels that of the secular schools at the primary and secondary levels. One of the challenges confronting educators responsible for these schools is their ability to successfully integrate a modern education and a religious education. The Ministry of Religious Affairs also is responsible

for supervising the private pesantren or pondoks. Though these schools enjoy considerable independence, there is nevertheless a decline in their enrollments, and increasing control is exercised by the government, as they accept funding from it.

Like Indonesia, contemporary Brunei also has a parallel system of Islamic schooling; this voluntary schooling requires that students study at both the secular and the religious schools. Unlike Indonesia, however, Brunei is an Islamic state. The existence of a parallel system of Islamic religious schools in secular Indonesia seems somewhat paradoxical. But it should be viewed as an attempt by the state to maintain control over religious education that, in the past, provided a base for opposition to national unity and political leaders.

In British Malaya, Islamic schools never became the same focal point for opposition to the administration as occurred under the Dutch in Indonesia. In large part, this was because the traditional rulers retained effective political and religious control while working with, rather than against, the British administration. The divisions between advocates of modernism and more traditional approaches of Islam existed in the British colonies but did not result in the establishment of alternative systems of Islamic schooling. The growth of the government village schools was slow, as villagers saw little advantage in sending their children to them because the curriculum was based on Malay literacy and vocationally oriented schooling for the boys and girls. Attempts to overcome resistance to the village schools involved associating religious instruction with these schools in parts of British Malaya.

Following independence (1957), a priority for the Malaysian government was to unify the linguistically diverse colonial education system. This task was accomplished through introducing a common curriculum and making Bahasa Melayu the primary medium of instruction in all except the Chinese and Indian primary schools. Today, however, to meet pressures for greater diversity, the government allows private schools to operate. Although some cater to the Chinese-speaking population and those wanting English-language education, there is also a group of Islamic schools that operate alongside the regular state school system. They do not need a license to operate, but these schools are

monitored and regulated by the Religious Affairs Department of the Ministry of Education. In allowing the operation of these schools, the government is accommodating stronger, more fundamentalist views of Islam. These schools exist in certain states of Peninsular Malaysia, where political parties with a strongly Islamic base oppose the national government led by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Recent years have also seen a growth of fundamentalist Islamic influences throughout Malaysia, paradoxically associated, in part, with Malay students studying in Western countries. The effectiveness of these controls has been called into question by evidence that Jemaah Ismailiah, an extremist group in Southeast Asia, used Islamic educational institutions to promote its course. In response, the Malaysian government temporarily suspended public funding to private Islamic schools in 2002. There are also proposals to closely regulate the content of private Islamic education and absorb the estimated 126,000 students studying in private Islamic schools into the government's national schools. Further, plans are being discussed to remove religious instruction from the national school curriculum, leaving its provision to special after-school classes with no political content.

Confucian Education

When the French administration was established in Vietnam in the 1880s, a highly developed national system of education based on the Chinese Confucianist model existed. Although more appropriately regarded as an ethical system rather than a religion, Confucianism provided the basis for a rigorous classical education in which successful exam candidates were appointed to administrative positions in the mandarin state. Like both Buddhist and Islamic schooling, Confucianist education catered to boys rather than girls. Like them, it also provided opportunities for social mobility independent of established elite status, although students from educated, official families began with better resources for success in the examination system. Where Confucian education differed was that the examination system ensured that students pursued a uniform pattern of education.

Instead of seeking to use Confucian education as a basis for introducing modern, Western

education, the French aim was to replace the whole system. The Confucianist schools taught Vietnamese literacy through the medium of Chinese characters; the French administrators replaced this with the romanized form of *quốc ngữ* (lit., national language) in their own schools. Complementing practical reasons for this shift, there was also a view that the use of characters inhibited modernization. The French also hoped to remove a source of potential opposition by undermining the power of the Vietnamese mandarins. By the 1870s, the Confucianist schools were already losing their influence and role. The abandonment of the national system of examinations eliminated the employment rationale for the schools. To gain employment in the French administration, students now needed the newer education introduced by the French. It was also becoming difficult to find teachers able to use the Chinese characters needed to teach Vietnamese.

The Future of Traditional Religious Education

Examples exist of the incorporation and modification of traditional patterns of religious education in the colonial school systems and, in some cases, in the educational systems of contemporary Southeast Asian nations. However, in many cases, the continuity is more apparent than real. Extensive modernization of curricula has occurred in an effort by both government and religious leaders to ensure that the schools provide a meaningful pathway to modern life. The challenges involved in this "modernization" were evident in Singapore's attempts in the 1980s to introduce a moral education curriculum based on traditional Asian values and religions. Singaporean educators had to decide which version of Hinduism, Islam, or Buddhism was to be privileged in the curriculum. In the case of Confucianism, the task involved reformulating the key social relationships at the core of traditional Confucianism so that they neither ignored nor downplayed the role of women.

Many commentators have noted, with romantic regret, the loss of traditional values associated with these changes to traditional and religious education. This sentiment overlooks the way the traditional societies served by these schools have undergone irreversible changes as

they have been drawn, over more than a century, into a modern world very different from that which existed before. When governments such as that of Myanmar speak of revitalizing monastic education to complement primary education, this does not mean a return to the older forms but an attempt to use them to meet contemporary needs. The Thai experience shows that the success of using the Buddhist monastic schools to extend the new, modern education depended on a very specific combination of factors. These factors were motivated by a concern to retain the schools' contribution to moral and ethical standards while expanding opportunities to learn the modern knowledge necessary to survive in a rapidly changing world. Islamic reformers in Indonesia had similar objectives. In other Southeast Asian countries, the diverse approaches of those seeking to introduce an Islamic dimension to contemporary education highlight the ways in which religious education may be used for directly political purposes hostile to existing governments. However, religious education can also be an important means of providing the ethical and moral dimension to education overlooked in many instrumental approaches to educational expansion and innovation.

CHRISTINE INGLIS

See also Aceh (Acheh); Boedi Oetama (Budi Utomo) (1908); Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Buddhism; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Burma under British Colonial Rule; Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Confucianism; Darul Islam Movement (DI); Education, Western Secular; Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); *Kiai*; Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Malayan/Malaysian Education; Muhammadiyah; Muslim Minorities (Thailand); Netherlands (Dutch East Indies; Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS); *Quoc Ngu*; Reforms and Modernization in Siam; *Sangha*; *Santri*; Taman Siswa (1921); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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EDUCATION, WESTERN SECULAR

Colonialism underlay the introduction of Western education to the countries of Southeast Asia. The exception was Thailand, where King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910) introduced Western education as a means to modernize his country. As colonies became independent after the Pacific War (1941–1945), colonial education systems were viewed as inappropriate for the needs of the new nations in pursuing national development and unity. Extensive educational restructuring and expansion characterized the period of independence, to be followed by efforts to improve the quality and relevance of education to meet emergent needs. Although these phases and the type of issues addressed are remarkably constant throughout Southeast Asia,

each country's history and development dictated the specific forms of educational change and expansion.

The Colonial Period

Southeast Asian societies had long traditions of literacy, albeit restricted to the secular and religious elite. Patterns of elite education were also the norm in Europe until the late nineteenth century, and they influenced the earliest forms of European education introduced to Southeast Asia. Under the Spanish administration in the Philippines from the sixteenth century, the Catholic Church played a major role in education, including the foundation of Santo Tomas University in 1611. Although educational initiatives of this type were significant for the introduction of Western religion and knowledge, they touched only small sections of colonial society. The more extensive impact of Western education began in the latter half of the nineteenth century as the expansion of European colonization coincided with the European development of compulsory, secular systems of schooling. The focus of content then shifted from the classics toward new, scientific knowledge to meet the needs of an industrializing society for a suitably educated, literate, and compliant labor force. This type of Western education attracted rulers such as King Chulalongkorn. It was also the form familiar to European administrators. Nevertheless, not all administrators saw the content of European education as appropriate in the colonies, even if they were committed to bringing their colonial subjects the benefits of Western civilization.

Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, Christian missionaries played the major role in establishing schools for the small European population and local elite in Southeast Asia. These schools operated independently and did not provide a common system of education. This situation changed as the colonial powers established more formal control in the region and began to consider the role of schooling for the ethnically diverse and stratified populations under their administration. Their response was shaped by circumstances different from those in Europe, as they were operating in societies without sizable European populations but with established elites, large agricultural populations, and growing numbers

of Chinese and other immigrant groups who played an important role in the colonial economies. Although the need for workers fluent in European languages was limited, other objectives of schooling included the maintenance of traditional lifestyles and inculcating loyalty to the colonial regime. Financial constraints also shaped colonial educational policies, since the colonies were intended to provide wealth to the metropole rather than to be an economic burden on it.

Debates about the language of education—whether teaching should be done in the local vernacular or in the colonial language—played an important part in the formulation of colonial education policies. In India and in Burma (Myanmar), British administrators had adopted policies based on extensive English-language education. However, British administrators in the Federated Malay States (FMS) and the Straits Settlements believed that this policy had led to a large, “overeducated” populace that was dissatisfied with the traditional lifestyle and unable to find employment in the relatively small, Western-oriented urban economies. As part of their policy of protecting the lifestyle of the Malay peasant, they thus settled on a policy of vocationally oriented, vernacular primary education for Malay students. However, for the Malay elite, who were to provide the core of the colonial administration, they established the Malay College at Kuala Kangsar, modeled on British boarding schools such as Eton, to groom the country's leadership. The government played only a limited role in establishing other schools. The Chinese set up their own schools, which were regulated by, but eligible for only limited funding from, the colonial administration. The children of Indian plantation workers were educated in vernacular primary schools funded by the plantation owners. However, the administration did establish a small number of English-language schools and offered grants to those English schools that were established by Christian churches. In doing so, they were addressing the need of the colonial administration and commerce for a relatively small number of English-educated local workers. These schools became extremely popular; Eurasians, Chinese, and Indians viewed the English-medium schools as avenues for social mobility. During the depression of the 1930s, the administration reduced funding

to them, in part to limit the numbers of “unemployable” graduates.

The linguistically stratified systems of education in British Malaya were also replicated in French Indochina and the Netherlands East Indies after often lengthy consultations and debate. The Dutch Ethical Policy, emphasizing the need to uplift the Indonesian people through education and closer association with The Netherlands, led to increased opportunities for Dutch-language schooling, although the majority of children were educated in vernacular schools. In Indochina, the 1917 Code of Public Instruction was a key expression of educational policy and practice. Both colonies had schools, primarily for European students, that followed the metropole’s education system and curriculum. In the rural areas, a system of vocationally focused village primary schools that used the vernacular evolved. In Vietnam, *Quốc Ngữ*, or romanized Vietnamese, replaced the traditional Chinese characters for Vietnamese; this was a means to distance the new schools from the traditional ones. In the higher levels, French was introduced. Despite this innovation and despite the presence of Link schools (elementary schools “linked” to a particular secondary school) in the Netherlands East Indies, there was little scope for students from these schools to progress to secondary schooling that used French or Dutch as the medium of instruction.

The Philippines under U.S. control from 1898 followed a different path. Although the Spanish administration had promulgated educational decrees in 1863 and 1865 applying to primary and secondary schooling, little progress had been made to implement these policies. When the Americans seized control of the Philippines, they rebuilt the education system using English and patterning the organization, curriculum, and methods of instruction on those in the United States.

By the end of the 1930s, just prior to the Pacific War, the colonial systems of Western education had been in existence for little more than thirty years. Although schooling had been extended to many in the local population, primary education and literacy were far from universal. The 1925 Monroe Report in the Philippines highlighted the shortcomings that persisted in the education system despite substantial expenditure. Similar evaluations were made in other colonies. A lack of financing and

a low priority for education meant that little action was taken to redress problems of access and quality. Especially in rural areas, schooling opportunities were ignored by the local population as either irrelevant or in competition with more important priorities, such as the harvesting of crops and domestic chores. Western education did, however, provide an important means of social and economic mobility for a group of Western-educated individuals fluent in the colonial language.

The Pacific War and the Japanese occupation of many Southeast Asian countries were watershed events for educational development. Schooling was extensively disrupted, with many teachers and students displaced or killed. In Singapore and Penang, the Japanese introduced Japanese-language (*Nihon-go*) schooling, but few students attended, and, as elsewhere, the outcome was the collapse of the earlier school systems. When the colonial administrations returned after 1945, they faced major educational challenges, including the need to rebuild schools and satisfy the unmet demand for education. Even more significant were the strong pressures for independence, since it was evident that the earlier educational policies were unsuitable for modern independent nations.

Preparing for Independence

In Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, independence followed swiftly after the Japanese capitulation, so the colonial authorities had little opportunity to revisit educational policies. In Indochina, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam gained independence from the French in the early 1950s, but the conflict surrounding French withdrawal ensured that there was little educational preparation for independence. By contrast, in British Malaya, independence did not come for more than a decade. During this period, the British confronted the pent-up demand for education. Schools had to be rebuilt, teachers trained, and textbook and resource materials prepared. Similar pressures existed for the newly independent nations.

The more pressing political issue confronting educators in British Malaya was resolving the tensions associated with the linguistically stratified prewar schooling system. Indian and especially Chinese immigrant groups made up a substantial segment of the population, and

they now sought a future alongside the Malays in an independent Malaya. How could this be accomplished under the existing educational policies? Compounding the difficulty was the fact that the predominantly Chinese Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which had played a major role in resisting the Japanese during the occupation period, was mounting an insurgency campaign against the British—the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960). Prewar British concerns about the loyalty of the Chinese and the role of Chinese schools again came to the fore. Early on, the British decided to separate predominantly Chinese Singapore from the rest of British Malaya. However, this move did not resolve the issue of linguistic diversity in Singapore's school system, since a substantial divide existed between Chinese educated in the English-medium schools and those from the Chinese-language schools. Not only were the latter viewed with political suspicion, they also faced barriers to employment in the English-language administration. Chinese schoolteachers also were alienated by the fact that they received less pay than their peers in English schools, who were considered better qualified. Dissatisfaction spilled into the streets in bloody rioting in 1955 and 1956 before the government set up the All Party Committee on Chinese Education. The report issued by this committee recommended that unity be encouraged through a policy of instituting a common curriculum and giving equal treatment to each of the four language streams of schooling: English, Chinese, Tamil, and Malay. Given the unequal resources available, this approach was never likely to be fully achievable. Nevertheless, it provided a respite while the administration and the Singaporean politicians charted a future federation with the other states of Malaya. Given the predominance of Malays in the short-lived Malaysia, which included Singapore (1963–1965), it was not surprising that the Malay language was declared the national language, although in Singapore, English remained the language of administration and Chinese and Tamil had the status of official languages. Elsewhere in Malaysia, educational issues surrounding the preparation for independence took a similar, although far less conflictual, course. As a result, it was acknowledged within the federation that the independent government should support the four separate strands of education.

The inherent instability of this policy became evident when Singapore broke from Malaysia in 1965 and further changes were made to education.

Postindependence Education

The independent states of Southeast Asia embraced Western mass education as a tool for achieving their sociopolitical objectives of developing national unity and ensuring the legitimacy of the new political regimes. All the countries inherited ethnically diverse populations through annexation and the immigration of groups such as the Chinese. The achievement of national unity was a major imperative for all the new states, and schooling was seen as capable of making a substantial contribution to that end. One way this was to be achieved was by teaching in a common language. The older colonial debates about the relative importance of the vernacular and the metropole's language took a new turn at independence as nations sought to unify around a single language. The selection of the common language was influenced by the linguistic composition of the population and debates about the advantages of a major international language such as English. In the Philippines, the debate was settled in favor of retaining English as the medium of instruction. However, in other colonies, the stratified schooling system worked against this approach. In Indonesia, Bahasa Indonesia was identified as the lingua franca to be developed in place of Dutch or a regional language. Bahasa Melayu played a similar role in Malaysia, although the government continued to fund Chinese and Tamil vernacular primary schools. In Singapore, Bahasa Melayu remained the national language and was taught with English in all schools, including those using Chinese and Tamil as the medium of instruction until 1979. In that year, reforms began, so that today, English is used in all schools, with students also studying their native Chinese, Malay, or Tamil. In Indochina, Laotian, Vietnamese, and Khmer replaced French as national languages, and Burmese replaced English in Burma. This issue also confronted Thailand, since it, too, had a diverse population, including Chinese who had developed their own schooling system. These schools were closed, and the Thai language became the medium of instruction in all schools. At the

same time, English was introduced as a subject. Before independence in 1984, Brunei had separate English and Malay schools, but these were amalgamated to provide bilingual education in English and Malay.

Another means used by states to promote national unity was the introduction of curriculum content that promoted the national ideology, such as Pancasila (“Five Principles”) in Indonesia, Rukunegara (“National Principles”) in Malaysia, and civics and moral education. In doing so, they were highlighting the state’s distinctive values and seeking to socialize the youth into them. This was especially important in states involved in revolutionary change, such as Cambodia and Vietnam. In Singapore, too, the moral education curriculum was emphasized as a means of promoting the society’s underlying Asian values as a prerequisite to avoiding adoption of undesirable and alienating Western values associated with individualism. Asian values have been viewed as contributing to successful Singaporean social and economic development.

The potential of mass education to contribute more directly to economic development has also been embraced by national leaders. In doing so, they share the views of international experts on development and modernization who advocate the importance of basic levels of education and literacy as key to economic development and modernization, goals espoused by all the states. This agreement is particularly significant for those developing states unable to fund their educational expansion without international assistance, since many international agencies provide funding for projects that are congruent with their educational models. In addition to international agencies such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Bank, the Southeast Asian region has regionally based agencies with an educational focus, including the Asian Development Bank and the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO). Established in 1965, SEAMEO sponsors twelve specialist centers concerned with educational issues, including educational innovation and technology (INNOTECH), mathematics and science education (RECSAM), vocational and technical education (VOCTECH), language teaching (RELC), and history and tradition (CHAT).

The lack of substantial economic resources has been exacerbated by lengthy and debilitating periods of civil war and unrest, particularly in the countries of Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In addition to reducing funding for education, civil unrest directly affects the ability of schools to operate.

By the 1970s, although considerable resources had been invested by all states in developing universal primary education and achieving literacy, questioning arose in regard to the educational outcomes, which often fell far short of the high initial expectations for economic growth and social development. Concerns continue today and include whether the expansion has actually resulted in higher levels of literacy and whether educational access for women and regional and ethnic minorities has been substantially improved. Explanations for the educational outcomes focus on the quality of the education. Particular attention is given to the existence of adequately trained teachers, appropriate teaching methods, textbooks, and other classroom resource materials as well as suitable curricula. The emphasis in these explanations is on the technical nature of the problems confronting education.

Other criticisms are more concerned with underlying educational assumptions and strategies. They focus on the appropriateness of the curricula. These criticisms are bolstered by evidence that many students favor the more academic curriculum associated with higher education and social mobility despite indications that, with increasing levels of education, their aspirations may not be achievable. A related issue is that vocational training, seen as more important for economic development, is failing to attract a sufficient number of students. It is somewhat ironic in light of colonial rural educational policies that some people explain these trends by arguing that the “Western” curriculum is inappropriate for those in rural areas, as it is irrelevant to their needs and may dislocate them from their traditional lifestyles.

As this indicates, notions of what constitutes Western education have changed over the years of contact between Europe and Southeast Asia. Initially, Western education was distinguished by the way in which it introduced different belief systems and knowledge, which, in conjunction with other changes associated with colonialism, led to change in the tradi-

tional societies. By the nineteenth century, one of the distinguishing features of Western education in Southeast Asia was the development of education systems that offered a more homogeneous and centrally determined educational experience (albeit within diverse educational streams). Although there was also some shift in the content of education to include newer subject areas, attempts were made to ensure that change in traditional rural society was minimized. In the postindependence period, Western education has come to be associated with the further development of mass education systems involving extensive government control, even as the trend toward increasing privatization at the primary, secondary, and postsecondary levels has grown. This growth reflects a market response to unmet educational demand sanctioned by states for financial and/or ideological reasons. The challenge for Southeast Asian states in the years ahead will be to determine whether a modification of their control of education in the postindependence period will jeopardize the future achievement of their national objectives.

CHRISTINE INGLIS

See also Chulalongkorn University; Education, Overseas Chinese; Ethical Policy (*Ethische Politiek*); Federated Malay States (FMS) (1896); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); King Edward VII College of Medicine; Malay College, Kuala Kangsar (MCKK); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Malayan/Malaysian Education; “Manifest Destiny”; Missionaries, Christian; *Mission Civilisatrice* (“Civilizing Mission”); Pancasila (Pantja Sila); Penang Free School (1816); *Quốc ngữ*; Raffles College; Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Rukunegara; Santo Tomas, University of; Straits Settlements (1826–1941); University of Malaya; University of Rangoon; “White Man’s Burden”

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ELEPHANTS

From the Sacred to the Mundane

The Asian elephant (*Elephas maximus*) has been worshiped as a god, served as the mount of royalty, suffered as a battle tank, and labored as the workaday helper of loggers, farmers, soldiers, and merchants throughout much of its history. It is smaller, more docile, and more adaptable to life among humans than its distant relative, the African elephant (*Loxodonta africana*). The Asian elephant is now an endangered species.

The range of the Asian elephant once extended from present-day Syria east to Vietnam, north to China, and south to Sri Lanka. By the end of the twentieth century, the habitats of both wild and tamed elephants were limited to scattered locations in Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal in South Asia. They were also confined to forested areas and preserves in Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, and the island of Sumatra in Indonesia. Elephants numbered in the hundreds of thousands as recently as the nineteenth century. Yet at the beginning of the twenty-first



*Statue of Ganesh decorated with hibiscus flowers.
(Paul Seheult/Eye Ubiquitous/Corbis)*

century, wild Asian elephants likely numbered under 50,000, and tame elephants approximate less than 20,000.

No historical or prehistorical record informs us when the elephant was tamed in Southeast Asia. The South Asia evidence is clear, however, that elephants were under human control during the Indus Valley civilization in the third millennium B.C.E. A Mohenjo-Daro steatite seal depicts an elephant with a saddle blanket, and others show elephants at feeding troughs. The idea of elephant control may have spread from India into the heavily forested areas of Southeast Asia, where wild elephant populations abounded. In Southeast Asia, the use of elephants in warfare may not have occurred until complex, stratified societies with chiefs and minor kings developed.

An early state or complex of chiefdoms now called Funan, dating to the first five centuries C.E., had the first record of Southeast Asian use of elephants. The Funan polities were located in the Mekong Delta and north into Cambodia. Chinese envoys to Funan in the fourth century

C.E. recorded tame elephants sent to the Chinese emperor as tribute. Elephants increasingly assumed important roles in work and in aristocratic society about the time South Asian cosmology and writing were adopted. The elephant in the form of the Hindu god Ganesh, an elephant-headed human, came to take a prominent place in Southeast Asian religion, a place still retained today.

The elephant was most clearly recorded during the Khmer empire dating from roughly 809 C.E. to 1431 C.E. During this time, the great temple of Angkor Wat and the Bayon were built. The frequent wars against the Thais and Chams involved use of large “tuskers,” or superior male elephants, as well as elephants that carried men and goods. Elephants were important in moving the stones that built the temples, the logs that built the palaces, and the rice and other foods produced by the populace to feed the royalty and the priests. The war elephants are wonderfully illustrated in the reliefs on the gallery walls of Angkor Wat. Similarly, many elephants are found among the carvings on the walls of Borobudur, the great Javanese Hindu-Buddhist temple dating to about 800 C.E.

Elephants continued to play important roles throughout the historical period, in the colonial era, and into modern times. The sacred and royal “white elephant,” a rare elephant with light skin color and special characteristics, was always the property of a king. Possession of the white elephants often figured in conflicts among kings. An important episode in Thai history featured King Mahachakrapat of Ayutthaya, who ascended the throne in 1549, facing the attacking Burmese army. The king rode his war elephant, as did Queen Suriyothai and Princess Tepsatri. In battle, Queen Suriyothai drove her elephant between those of her husband and the Burmese king, saving King Mahachakrapat’s life but losing her own and her daughter’s lives. This heroism has remained celebrated among the Thai, most recently in the 2002 feature film *Suriyothai*.

With the appearance of the Western colonial powers in Southeast Asia, teak logging became important, and elephant use shifted emphasis. Elephants and teak logging were especially important in British Burma, throughout the interior and upland forests of the region. Teak logging continued in the early

twentieth century in Burma but was largely curtailed by the Pacific War (1941–1945) and by the postwar diminishing of the forests. The teak elephants did play an important role in the war, being used by both the Allies and the Japanese army to haul equipment, munitions, and men in the remote, inaccessible, and inhospitable interiors. Elephants continued their war efforts, although only for haulage, in the Indochina conflicts of the 1960s. Elephant populations suffered greatly in Vietnam and Cambodia, since U.S. pilots shot elephants to prevent their use by enemy forces.

At the close of the twentieth century, elephants no longer were held in large numbers in royal stables, they no longer logged (except in Burma and in occasional illegal logging), and they no longer served as war elephants. An endangered animal today, they increasingly play roles in tourism, carrying visitors around the temples of Angkor and into Thai forest on short excursions, and they are favorites in festivals and fairs. International elephant polo teams now compete, replacing the real battles of the past. The Asian elephant has lost much of its sacred status, although it is still loved as a symbol by millions. Its survival may depend on history—on the cultural heritage of its millennia of partnership with the Southeast Asian people.

BION GRIFFIN

See also Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Burma-Siam Wars; Borobudur; Funan; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Indianization; Indigenous Political Power

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**EMERGENCY
(1948–1960) (MALAYA)**

See Malayan Emergency (1948–1960)

**ETHICAL POLICY
(ETHISCHE POLITIEK)**

The Ethical Policy was the stance adopted by the Dutch in their colonial administration after 1900. By the end of the nineteenth century, it seemed that Dutch policy in colonial Indonesia was not generating the effects expected from the demise of the Cultivation System thirty years earlier. With the phasing-out of the Cultivation System in Java and the inflow of Dutch private investment capital for the purpose of developing colonial resources, increasing export production was expected to gradually improve the lot of indigenous people in colonial Indonesia. However, in the late 1890s, foreign enterprise had not flooded into colonial Indonesia to the degree anticipated, and there were no clear signs that the lot of the Indonesian people was improving, particularly in Java. In fact, famines in 1900 and 1902 in Semarang suggested that the Javanese population was sliding into poverty.

In The Netherlands, criticism of the colonial policy was mounting. The lawyer Conrad Theodor van Deventer, later a Liberal Democratic member of the Dutch Parliament, gave such criticism particularly influential expression. In an 1899 article in the journal *De Gids*, he argued that The Netherlands had been draining wealth from Java during the nineteenth century and had therefore incurred a “debt of honour” of f200 million that had to be repaid. He suggested that the colonial policy be reformulated to include a program aimed at improving the welfare of the Indonesians, generously supported by the Dutch treasury. In 1901, the editor of the newspaper *De Locomotief* in Semarang, Pieter Brooshoof, maintained that colonial Indonesia required an “ethical policy.” Such a policy, he proposed, would include altruistic measures by the Dutch government to further the prosperity of Indonesians in the main island of Java, where the indigenous population was widely believed to be experiencing a decline in living standards.

The leader of the Dutch Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (the Calvinist Christian Democrats), Abraham Kuijper, had long advocated an end

to the economic exploitation of colonial Indonesia. In 1901, he came to lead a new coalition government that provided an opportunity for change in Dutch colonial policy along the lines suggested by van Deventer. In her annual speech to the Dutch Parliament, Queen Wilhelmina (r. 1880–1962) formally announced this change. She mentioned that it was the “moral duty” of The Netherlands to combat the causes of perpetual poverty in colonial Indonesia and improve the welfare of the people there.

The new stance became popularly known as the Ethical Policy. However, a clear definition of this policy, particularly its goals and means, has never been provided. The queen’s announcement was only a reflection of an ongoing process of change in Dutch colonial policy. The term therefore meant different things to different people.

Its most fervent supporters saw the Ethical Policy as the Dutch version of the “white man’s burden,” a selfless experiment aimed at transforming Indonesian society, enabling a new elite to share in the riches of Western civilization, and bringing the colony into the modern world. For instance, van Deventer foreshadowed the emergence of a Westernized elite that would be grateful to The Netherlands for its material wealth and high culture and would work to cement a lasting bond between Indonesia and The Netherlands. Others hoped for the development of a new Indonesian society that would blend elements of Indonesian and Western cultures. Furthermore, this new society would enjoy a large measure of autonomy within the framework of the Dutch colonial empire. Brooshoof stressed decentralization of colonial administration and measures to spur the welfare of Indonesians. A widely used slogan summarized the practical implications of the Ethical Policy: “irrigation, migration and education.”

The Ethical Policy comprised a complex of ideas and goals, all arising from a sense of ethical or moral responsibility for colonial Indonesia. In practical terms, it was associated with improvements in educational opportunities for Indonesians, a degree of tolerance for Indonesian nationalism, decentralization of the colonial administrative system in Indonesia, limited participation in local government for Indonesians, and a series of proactive policies aimed at furthering economic development, particularly in Java.

It was initially believed that economic change in Indonesia could be achieved with financial assistance from The Netherlands. In 1904, the Dutch Parliament approved a proposition that The Netherlands guarantee the repayment of the current debt of the Dutch colonial government, extending f40 million as grants-in-aid for development projects (Van der Eng 1996: 152). Although a sizable sum at the time, the grant was much less than van Deventer’s debt of honor and small compared with sums required to further economic improvement in Indonesia. Hence, most policy initiatives were to be funded with revenues generated in colonial Indonesia. This imposed clear limits on the initiatives the colonial government could develop with the aim of furthering economic and social development. Still, during the late colonial period, the government developed and pursued a range of initiatives. In all cases, these measures involved the creation of public services and an expansion of the number of public officials—both Dutch and Indonesian.

From the start, improvements in irrigation works were at the forefront, possibly as a consequence of Dutch prowess in hydraulic engineering. Already in the 1890s but with more fervor after 1901, weirs and primary and secondary irrigation channels were improved with modern construction methods, schedules for water distribution and management were established in river systems, and schemes for the operation and maintenance of irrigation structures were put in place throughout Java. The aims of such measures varied, but they generally involved raising rice yields, increasing the area suitable for double cropping, and reducing crop failure. Despite some failures, such as the grandiose Solo Valley works in 1905, the irrigation effort contributed to the sustained growth of rice production in Java in the face of increasing population pressure.

In the nineteenth century, Dutch officials were concerned about the rising population density in Java. Orchestrated migration to sparsely populated parts of the country was entertained as a possible way to relieve population pressure. Government-sponsored migration schemes started in 1905 with a project in Lampung (South Sumatra), and later projects were initiated in Kalimantan and Sulawesi. But between 1905 and 1930, only 37,800 people migrated under these projects, while the popula-

tion in Java increased by 9 million. The effort to enhance education involved the establishment of village schools after 1906, which brought larger numbers of indigenous children into the classrooms. However, the colonial government continued to favor educational facilities for European children. The enrollment of indigenous children increased quickly, but the quality of their educational facilities and of the education they received remained lower than that of European children and children of the indigenous aristocratic elite. Still, these changes created chances for bright Indonesian children to qualify for education at European primary and secondary schools and at institutions for tertiary education. This development nurtured the rise of a small but well-educated indigenous elite who, ironically, started to give expression to the growing popular anticolonial feelings. By the end of the 1930s, still only a small number of indigenous students graduated from high school, and the adult literacy rate was just under 19 percent (Van der Eng 1996: 120).

The Dutch colonial government introduced a range of other public services, including an agricultural extension service that propagated improved crops, superior farming methods, and the use of fertilizers. The Public Health Service disseminated knowledge of common diseases and how to prevent them through basic hygiene. A service for small-scale credit aimed to reduce widespread dependence for credit on usurers and crop foresters (moneylenders who accept the pledge of the farmer's future crop as surety for credit), in an effort to combat the problem of rural indebtedness and the evil of usury. A system of village banks and district banks was established and became the predecessor of the current Bank Rakyat Indonesia.

Throughout the 1920s, Dutch colonial officials were involved in most aspects of indigenous agriculture. They assisted and advised the people on irrigation, selection and spreading of new crop varieties, improvement and demonstration of new cultivation procedures, prevention of pests and crop diseases, furthering fertilizer use, credit supply, agricultural education, rural cooperatives, and enforcing an agrarian legislation that protected the rights of small farmers. Before the Pacific War (1941–1945), several international observers of Dutch colonial policy considered that the Ethical Policy had been without precedent in the colonial

world, and they praised the benevolence of the Dutch colonial regime.

The popular perception of the Ethical Policy involved more than furthering prosperity. Decentralization of government and greater political participation of Indonesians in political processes were other aspects of the approach. Developments in this regard took the form of the establishment of municipal and regency councils and a surrogate parliament (the *Volkstraad*) in 1918, all with participation of indigenous Indonesians, and the subsequent establishment of three provinces with a degree of administrative autonomy in Java in the late 1920s. It is difficult to say whether all these measures were, in a strict sense, part of the Ethical Policy because neither the Dutch nor the colonial government ever defined the policy or made a formal announcement of the policy's abolishment. In addition, the phrase *Ethical Policy* was less commonly used in the early 1920s because it became associated with a budding Indonesian nationalism that took on more and more radical tendencies. Although initially perceived as a development effort that would help Indonesia achieve administrative self-sufficiency, the Ethical Policy became increasingly regarded as a politically neutral effort to enhance popular prosperity.

Despite the grandiose visions some may have entertained about the impact of the ending of the Cultivation System, the achievements of the Ethical Policy in the form of spurring indigenous prosperity were, on the whole, modest. The good intentions and genuine candor of colonial administrators were not in doubt, and evidence to conclude that there was a continued slide of greater numbers of people in Java into poverty was scant, but a very significant improvement in the living standards of Indonesians in Java was not achieved. A major reason was that, due to limitations of the budget of the colonial government, the development effort was simply not extensive enough. However, the seeds for the further development of the welfare services were sown. All were reestablished after Indonesia's independence, and they formed the basis for later efforts to improve prosperity through education, health care, agricultural extension, popular credit, and other means.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Boedi Oetama (Budi Utomo) (1908); Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Education, Western Secular; Famines; Java; "Manifest Destiny"; *Mission Civilisatrice* ("Civilizing Mission"); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; *Volksraad* (Peoples Council) (1918–1942); "White Man's Burden"


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ETHNOLINGUISTIC GROUPS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

There is still considerable dispute among archaeologists, prehistorians, anthropologists, and ethnolinguists about the origins, differentiation, distributions, and migrations of the major ethnolinguistic groups of Southeast Asia and the interrelationships among them. However, what is certain is that the prehistory and early history of Southeast Asia must be seen in a much broader context, given that the region and its constituent nation-states are relatively recent creations and that ethnic and cultural relationships do not map neatly onto these political units. As Sandra Bowdler noted, "There is no particular reason to assume that south China was a separate entity from northern Vietnam, Laos and Burma in prehistoric times" (1993: 49). Indeed, there were considerable movements of people and traits across this mainland region, and there is evidence of shared cultural traditions and exchanges, as well as migrations by sea between what is now southern China and Southeast Asia. Thus, there are no sharply defined and bounded ethnolinguistic or human biological groupings either in prehistory or at the present time. Peter Bellwood has shown in some detail that it is "impossible to construct watertight categories"; specifically, "a cursory survey of the ethnographic record reveals that people who appear biologically to be quite different may speak languages in the same family, and peoples with strong physical similarities may be quite different in terms of language and cultural background" (1992: 56).

Research on the prehistory of Southeast Asia, including the neighboring and culturally related area of southern China, has made an important contribution to our knowledge about the development of human societies (Bellwood 1992: 54). It was from the Southeast Asian region that Australo-Melanesian populations made early sea-crossings to Australia and the western Pacific islands some forty thousand years ago. These early Australoid hunting-and-gathering communities were subsequently displaced by expansions of Southern Mongoloid agriculturalists in what were quite remarkable colonizations by Austroasiatic speakers into much of mainland Southeast Asia and by Austronesian speakers into the maritime regions and further afield into the Pacific. Northern mainland Southeast Asia and south-central



Ethnolinguistic pattern of modern Southeast Asia. The Modern Anthropology of South-East Asia: An Introduction. (Adapted by permission from King, Victor T., and William D. Wilder. 2003. London: RoutledgeCurzon, p. xxv)

China were also important sites for the development of early Neolithic cultures and the domestication of plants and animals.

The first clear evidence we have for the presence of *Homo sapiens* in Southeast Asia is the human skull found in the West Mouth of the Niah Caves limestone complex in north-western Borneo. The skull was dated to the late Pleistocene period about forty thousand years ago, though there is still some debate about the accuracy of this dating, given the methods employed in the Niah archaeological excavations

undertaken in Sarawak during the 1950s (King 1993: 65–67). Some archaeologists suggest that the skull may be more recent than originally supposed (Bellwood 1997: 84). What seems to be agreed is that it is of Australoid or Australo-Melanesian type and that Southeast Asia was populated at that time (and probably further back to fifty thousand years ago) by ancestors of the present differentiated Australian–Melanesian aboriginal populations of Australasia and New Guinea (Bellwood 1997: 91–92). Other more recent skeletal remains, also of Melanesian type,

have been excavated in Niah burial sites; in addition, in Tabon Cave, on the Philippine island of Palawan, an excavated mandible, dated between 20,000 and 18,000 B.C.E., was also identified as Australo-Melanesian.

The Southeast Asian Australo-Melanesian economy was based on hunting, gathering, and fishing. Large forest animals were hunted, including cattle, pigs, and deer, as well as arboreal mammals such as monkeys and orangutans. These early communities made use of cave sites at or close to the coast or in more open sites along the lower courses of rivers, though there is evidence of some communities penetrating to inland lake sites and caves some distance from the sea. They used stone implements, and some were also “coastally adapted” and used watercraft (Bowdler 1993: 57). Early stone tools were probably multifunctional and comprised pebble and basic flake artifacts, which became more refined between twenty thousand and ten thousand years ago, with evidence of such processes as edge grinding. Many of the finds from the Niah excavations comprise burial artifacts of stone, bone tools, and ritual shells occurring in a range of different burial types, dated between about 15,000 B.C.E. and 4000 B.C.E. (King 1993: 68–72). No doubt, these early peoples also fashioned equipment and objects from perishable materials such as bamboo, wood, and other vegetable matter. There is also early evidence of hunter-gatherers in mainland Southeast Asia at the rock shelter of Lang Rongrien in Krabi Province, southern Thailand, with hearths, animal bones, and flaked stone implements dated from thirty-eight thousand to twenty-seven thousand years ago, at the Red River sites of Son Vi, which have been dated from about 18,000 B.C.E., and in the important Hoabinhian sites south of the Red River Valley, commencing from about 11,000 to 9000 B.C.E. (Higham and Thosarat 1998: 24–25, 64; Higham 1989: 35).

Up to about 8000 B.C.E., roughly at the commencement of the Holocene period, the climate was drier and cooler than it is today, vegetation was more open, and sea levels were lower; consequently, large areas of the Sunda Shelf comprised dry land, bridging what is now mainland and island Southeast Asia. However, postglacial warming, commencing from about eighteen thousand to six thousand years ago, resulted in gradually rising sea levels, increasing

temperatures and rainfall, and denser and lusher vegetation, especially in the tropical, equatorial zones. Mainland Southeast Asia, once joined to what is now western Indonesia and permitting the movements by land of people and fauna, became separated from such present-day islands as Sumatra, Borneo, and Java by the South China Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, the Straits of Melaka, and the Java Sea. It is from the warmer, wetter Holocene period that we have evidence of marked cultural change, the domestication of plants and animals, and the movements of people by sea.

Again, the details are disputed. Bellwood and others argued that from about 3000 B.C.E., these early Australo-Melanesian populations, which were widespread in Southeast Asia, gradually gave way in the island world to Southern Mongoloid, Austronesian-speaking peoples, the ancestors of most of the present-day Southeast Asians in the Philippines and the Indo-Malaysian archipelago (Bellwood 1997: 96–127). In mainland Southeast Asia, it was Southern Mongoloid Austroasiatic speakers who gradually expanded southward.

Austronesian cultures were moving southward from Taiwan into the northern Philippines from about forty-five hundred years ago and are assumed to have settled much of the Philippines and eastern Indonesia between 2500 and 1500 B.C.E. and the western Indo-Malaysian archipelago between about 1500 and 500 B.C.E. The related Austronesian-speaking Polynesian and Micronesian populations began to settle the Pacific islands in about 2000 B.C.E., and with the exception of New Guinea and some neighboring islands, they had populated most of the Pacific islands by 500 C.E.

Nevertheless, this was not a straightforward replacement process, and neither were the boundaries between Australo-Melanesians and Southern Mongoloids sharply defined; migrations, interactions, and local evolutions were undoubtedly complex, and aside from migrations of people, there were movements of ideas and practices. Bellwood has also considered and to some extent accepted the view that “the postulated Southern Mongoloid migrants may have been settling amongst populations [Australo-Melanesians] who were also evolving in similar ways.” Moreover, “many aspects of the present Southern Mongoloid phenotype have actually evolved within Southeast Asia from the

Late Pleistocene onward.” Indeed, “many of the present Southern Mongoloid populations of Indonesia and Malaysia also have a high degree of Australo-Melanesian genetic heritage” (Bellwood 1997: 89, 92).

The Southern Mongoloids are usually distinguished from Northern Mongoloids, represented by the Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese, and these southern populations probably originated somewhere in present-day southern China before some of them began to move eastward and seaward to Taiwan and the Philippines. In physical type, Southern Mongoloids are generally short or medium in stature, with yellowish or brown skin, and most are straight-haired. By contrast, the remaining Australo-Melanesian peoples of Southeast Asia are generally small in stature and very dark-skinned, with tight curly or woolly hair (sometimes brown or red in color) and Australoid facial features.

Residual elements of earlier Australo-Melanesian settlement are represented today in the Negrito populations of central Peninsular Malaysia and in small pockets in the Philippine islands of Luzon, northern Palawan, Panay, Negros, and Mindanao; they are also in the Andaman Islands and in various Melanesian communities in the eastern Indonesian islands of the Lesser Sundas and the Moluccas. Of course, substantial numbers of Melanesians in western New Guinea (Irian Jaya, West Papua) were incorporated into the Netherlands East Indies, and following a Dutch postwar interregnum, these territories were eventually transferred to the Republic of Indonesia in 1962. Australoids have also intermixed with Mongoloid populations to give rise to phenotypically intermediate populations, such as the Senoi of Peninsular Malaysia (Bellwood 1997: 72). Moreover, the Philippine Negritos have adopted Austronesian languages from their neighbors, and Malaysian Negritos speak Austroasiatic languages related to Mon and Khmer. Prior to their contact with Mongoloid populations, we assume that they spoke Papuan-type languages distantly related to those of the present-day Australo-Melanesian groups.

Evidence from archaeological excavations in island Southeast Asia suggests a “cultural break” during the third millennium B.C.E. and the appearance of hand-molded, plain or red-slipped pottery in burial and other sites. But in mainland Southeast Asia in Hoabinhian and Bacson-

ian sites, pottery remains are found in earlier hunting-gathering contexts, at least going back some seven thousand years ago (Bellwood 1992: 87). Bellwood and others have argued that cultural and other changes from about 2500 B.C.E. coincided with the expansion of Austronesian settlement in island Southeast Asia (Bellwood 1997: 119–124).

The Austronesians were agriculturalists who planted rice, millet, and sugarcane, though they also hunted, gathered, and fished. They kept domestic pigs, poultry, and dogs; used more sophisticated stone tools; lived in substantial timber houses; manufactured pottery; developed distinctive art styles; practiced a range of elaborate funerary rituals; and used canoes for sea transport. In their movements into the tropical regions, there was also increasing adoption of other crops, including taro, breadfruit, banana, yam, sago, and coconut. Nevertheless, small groups of Austronesians and surviving Australo-Melanesian communities were involved in forest hunting and gathering, and some Austronesian communities specialized in coastal marine fishing and strand collecting.

In mainland Southeast Asia, too, the Southern Mongoloid ancestors of Austroasiatic speakers had expanded their settlement from the north probably from about 4000 B.C.E. By 2000 B.C.E., the whole of the mainland region, extending through the Malaysian Peninsula and Sumatra (with a possible outlier in western Borneo), was occupied by Southern Mongoloid, Austroasiatic populations (Bellwood 1995: 105; 1997: 117). Austroasiatics and Austronesians increasingly came into contact in the western Malay-Indonesian archipelago as Austronesians expanded westward from about 1500 B.C.E. and also settled in coastal southern Vietnam. There is evidence of rice-cultivating, pottery-making Austroasiatic populations from excavations at Ban Kao in Kanchanaburi and Tha Kae in the Lopburi area and from the Red River Valley in Vietnam. The finds indicate that agriculture was known from about 2300 B.C.E. (Higham and Thosarat 1998: 76–89) and in the Khorat Plateau of northeast Thailand from about five thousand years ago (Bellwood 1992: 97–98). The use of metals came somewhat later, during what is termed the Late Neolithic. Archaeological evidence suggests bronze casting was known in Thailand and Vietnam soon after about 1500 B.C.E., and iron forging was known

from about a thousand years later, associated subsequently with an increase in population and the size of settlements, political centralization, and trade with India and China (Higham 1989: 190–238). It was during this latter period that the Austroasiatic Dong-son bronze industry, with its manufacture of remarkable decorative bronze drums, flourished in the region around Hanoi in northern Vietnam, and the Austronesian Sa Huynh culture, especially skilled in iron manufacture, developed in central and southern Vietnam. Both bronze and iron appeared together in island Southeast Asia toward the end of the first millennium B.C.E.

Linguistic classification is a subject of much controversy in Southeast Asia, given that there have been both convergence and divergence of languages over a considerable period of time in Asia, and some of the interrelationships are still uncertain. However, it is generally maintained that there are four major language families in the region: Austronesian (with two major subgroups, Formosan and Malayo-Polynesian), Austroasiatic (or Mon-Khmer), Tai-Kadai, and Sino-Tibetan. This classification is based on genetic relationships; in other words, languages grouped together in the same overarching language family are assumed to share some common characteristics, which are attributed to a postulated common ancestor or protolanguage (Amara Prasithrathsint 1993: 76–77).

Austronesian is a nontonal language, and proto-Austronesian is said to have originated from a Taiwanese source about six thousand years ago and ultimately from southern China (Bellwood 1997: 117). Austronesian speakers then spread over the Indo-Malaysian archipelago from about 2500 B.C.E. onward.

They also populated the islands in the Pacific. They found their way to central and southern Vietnam, where the colonization eventually gave rise to the kingdom of Champa. (Austronesian languages are spoken by the Cham and by Vietnamese upland minorities such as the Rhade and Jarai.) Others traveled across the Indian Ocean to Madagascar in eastern Africa; Malagasy is an Austronesian language (Bellwood 1995: 98–101). It is estimated that this language family now comprises up to about 1,200 identifiable languages. Austronesian languages also constitute the national languages of Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia (Malay/Indonesian), and the Philippines (Taga-

log). The largest Austronesian-speaking community is the Javanese, whereas the major Austronesian-speaking minority populations are the Balinese; the Dayaks of Borneo; the Batak, Rejang, and Minangkabau of Sumatra; the Toraja of Sulawesi; and the Ifugao and Kalinga of northern Luzon.

In mainland Southeast Asia, the linguistic patterns are rather more complex. However, a major set of languages comprises the Austroasiatic family, consisting of about 150 separate languages spoken by the Vietnamese; the Khmers or Cambodians; the Mons of Burma; and certain hill groups of northern Burma, Assam, Vietnam, and Laos, including the Khasi, Palaung, Wa, Lawa, and Moi. Also included are most of the aboriginal groups of the Malay Peninsula and the Nicobarese. The Austroasiatic family also encompasses the Munda languages of Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal. Prior to the movements into northern Southeast Asia of such ethnic groups as the Thais and the Burmese, there must have been a continuous distribution of Austroasiatic speakers over much of the mainland region and into eastern India.

The third language family is that of Tai-Kadai. The languages in this group are very widely spoken in Thailand; the Shan states of Burma; lowland Laos; the southern Chinese provinces of Guizhou (Kweichow) and Guangxi (Kwangsi); and on the northern fringes of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Major Tai-speaking populations, who began to expand from the borderlands of southern China into northern mainland Southeast Asia in the eleventh century C.E. and displaced Austroasiatic speakers, are the Thais, Laos, and Shans. The scattered Hmong-Mien (or Miao-Yao) languages, spoken by upland tribal minorities in southern China and northern mainland Southeast Asia, once thought to be separate from Tai-Kadai, have more recently been included within this language family (Bellwood 1997: 111).

Finally, there is the Sino-Tibetan language family, of which Chinese is a member. A major branch is Tibeto-Burman, and its speakers comprise the lowland Burmese or Burmans and various hill peoples in Burma and the neighboring mainland Southeast Asian countries, as well as in southern China, northern and northeastern India, Bangladesh, southern Tibet, and Nepal (Amara Prasithrathsint 1993; Burling

1992: 162–165). Important minorities in the borderlands from Assam through Burma, southern China, Laos, northern Thailand, and northern Vietnam include the Garo, Karen, Kachin, Lolo, Chin, Naga, Akha, Lisu, and Lahu. The language of the lowland Burmese became firmly established in central and lowland Burma following the expansion of the power of the Burmese kingdom of Pagan from the interior dry zone of Upper Burma from the ninth and tenth centuries C.E. At one time, this major language family was thought to include Tai-Kadai, but subsequently, Tai-Kadai was established as a separate family.

Although the matter is still a subject of contention among linguists, it has been suggested that there could be very remote connections among these four large Asian language families. Some linguists argue for distant connections between Tai-Kadai and Austronesian (together referred to as Austro-Tai), whereas others argue for remote or deep links between Austronesian and Austroasiatic (together known as Austric) (Bellwood 1997: 111–112). Bellwood has also suggested that the ancestors of all these four families, who were of Southern Mongoloid physical stock, inhabited contiguous areas of southern and central China, south of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River, from the early period of monsoon agricultural development about eight thousand years ago. However, it is uncertain whether these networks of linguistic connections were the result of common origins or borrowings or both, and there is still some uncertainty about the status of Sino-Tibetan (Bellwood 1995: 96–98). Bellwood has further suggested that these Neolithic revolutions then led to the expansion of settlement and, over a very long period of time, the complex movements of populations and cultural traits into other parts of Asia, including the regions to the south. Some thirty-five years ago, Robbins Burling, though suggesting that some of the “typological resemblances” among several of the mainland languages are likely to have been the result of contact and exchange, also posed the following question: “Could it be that all these languages are, even if only very remotely, related to each other in one great super-family?” (1992: 157).

Undoubtedly, a considerable amount of further social, cultural, political, and economic differentiation then took place, beginning in the

early centuries of the first millennium C.E., when Southeast Asian peoples were adopting traits from both India and China and were becoming increasingly involved in far-flung Asian trade. Early Indian-influenced coastal states were identified from the second century C.E. along the sea routes between India and China, in southern and central Vietnam, around the margins of the Gulf of Thailand, in southern Thailand, in Sumatra, and in West Java. Northern Vietnam, however, was incorporated into a Chinese cultural sphere of influence. With the introduction of Indian court culture, particularly Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism and subsequently, during the second millennium C.E., Theravada Buddhism and Islam, the lowland populations of Southeast Asia, which were part of large-scale political systems with more developed urban forms of settlement, became increasingly differentiated from upland tribal populations. This differentiation persisted between the lowland peoples and the upland communities despite their shared common linguistic and cultural roots. These divisions were further consolidated during the period of European colonialism and, in the Philippines, the conversion of the majority of the lowland communities in the northern two-thirds of the island to Roman Catholicism.

The contemporary cultural diversity of Southeast Asia is therefore the result of a progressive differentiation of populations originally of the same stock as they moved through and settled in different parts of the region. The diversity is also a consequence of the complex migrations of peoples and the displacement and assimilation of some by others, long-established exchanges of goods and cultural elements, and, subsequently, the adoption of cultural influences from India, China, the Middle East (West Asia), and the West.

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See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast of Asia; Bajau; Ban Kao Culture; Bataks; Brunei Malay; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Bugis (Buginese); Burmans; Champa; Chins; Dayaks; Dong-son; East Indonesian Ethnic Groups; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Hmong; Hoabinhian; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; Iban; Ilanun and Balangingi; Indian

Immigrants; Indianization; Islam in Southeast Asia; Kachins; Kadazan-Dusun; Karens; Khmers; Lao; Malays; Metal Age Cultures in Southeast Asia; Minagkabau; Mons; Neolithic Period of Southeast Asia; Niah Caves (Sarawak); Orang Asli; Orang Laut; Pagan (Bagan); Pyus; Shans; Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Tabon Cave (Palawan); T'ais; Torajas; Viets

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EUROPEAN WAR (1914–1918)

See Great War (1914–1918)

F

FAMINES

Historically, hunger and malnutrition were common problems throughout Southeast Asia. Hunger often occurred before the main rice harvest when old stocks were depleted. Malnutrition was the plight of the poorest, who had no access to land for growing food crops or who lived in marginal areas with high crop-failure risks. But, unlike famines, hunger and malnutrition do not necessarily endanger survival. They are incidental situations in which the normal systems that ensure access to sufficient nutrients for survival break down, causing social disintegration. The community loses its ability to support marginal members, who migrate or die from starvation or starvation-induced diseases.

Southeast Asia did not suffer extensive famines as China and India did. Its population density was much lower. Access to land was, for a long time, sufficient to expand food production by rolling back the land frontier. Famines were generally caused by coincidence, such as natural disasters (drought or floods and subsequent crop failures), and/or acute man-made problems, such as war. For instance, the eruption of the Tambora volcano in Sumbawa (Nusatenggara, Indonesia) destroyed food crops in 1815 and caused 44,000 deaths from hunger (Stibbe and Uhlenbeck 1921: 254). Evidence of abandoned villages in the Red River delta in North Vietnam suggests that population growth was long constrained by crop failures and famines caused by floods in delta areas.

Densely populated Java suffered local famines in the nineteenth century. The operation of a rice mill by European entrepreneurs and the granting of padi purchase monopolies to them triggered the 1844–1847 famine in Cirebon Residency (West Java). The millers purchased padi without regard for local rice requirements. In the lean season, local supplies were insufficient, and Chinese rice traders, generally a source of credit to bridge the season, were no longer allowed to operate in the area.

The 1849–1850 famine in Demak and Grobogan (Central Java) was caused by four successive crop failures due to drought. Farmers had to sell buffaloes to pay the land tax. The demands on farmers to supply labor for the Cultivation System, local rulers, village elite, and colonial public works worsened the situation. A lack of action by colonial officials to bring relief also explains why this famine took the lives of 83,000 people (Elson 1985: 56).

The 1881–1882 famine in Banten Residency (West Java) was caused by cattle plague, which reduced the cattle stock by two-thirds, followed by a fever epidemic that killed 10 percent of the population (Hugenholtz 1986: 172). The 1900–1902 famine in Semarang Residency was the result of several crop failures, followed by a cholera epidemic that kept people at home and left the fields uncultivated. The colonial government mitigated both disasters by selling imported rice below cost.

The development of markets for imported and locally produced food products was effective famine mitigation. Areas suffering food deficits experienced an inflow of food products, organized by entrepreneurs to take advantage of high prices. The development of the intraregional trade of rice from Burma, Thailand, and South Vietnam to rice-deficit areas prevented starvation in times of adversity.

The Japanese occupation caused famine in Java and North Vietnam. In Java, the requisitioning of rice to feed Japanese troops amounted to modest demands compared with total production. However, Japanese authorities paid for rice purchases with money that quickly lost its value, and farmers became reluctant to sell. In 1943 and 1944, the Japanese imposed a quota from the highest to the lowest administrative levels and forbade all nonregulated trade of rice. Farmers sought to evade the quota, and rice production plummeted. A long dry season that delayed planting and harvesting for the 1944–1945 crop aggravated the situation. Insufficient rainfall caused widespread crop failures. Black market food prices increased quickly, and people not included in the official rice distribution system, such as migrant workers in urban areas, and those without assets to sell or barter were caught out. In 1944 and 1945, excess mortality was 2.4 million people (Van der Eng 2002: 503).

In the 1930s, North Vietnam was a rice-deficit area that depended on imports from South Vietnam. The Japanese obliged French Indochina to supply large amounts of rice for export to Japan and to troops in Asia. Most rice came from South Vietnam, but to meet the demands, the French introduced a system of compulsory requisitioning throughout the country, including North Vietnam. Inflation eroded purchase prices and increased the reluctance among farmers to produce a surplus. In 1944, the fifth-month harvest was poor. Insufficient rice was available until the main tenth-month harvest. When typhoons followed by strong tidal waves swept the country, flooding destroyed a large part of the tenth-month crop. Famine spread in North Vietnam, particularly among the landless. The cold 1944–1945 winter prevented the production of nonrice food crops. Estimates of the deaths during 1944 and 1945 range from 1 to 2 million people (Bui 1995: 575–576).

Other parts of Southeast Asia were also affected, particularly the areas that relied on food imports in times of production shortfalls. For instance, drought in 1944 affected the Nusatenggara region in East Indonesia, where at least 40,000 people died on Timor (Telkamp 1979: 75). A major famine struck East Timor in 1975 and 1976 as a consequence of the war in Timorese freedom fighters and Indonesian troops. The dislocation of farming communities and the destruction of food crops caused the death of possibly 100,000 people (Cribb 2001: 82–98).

In the mid-1970s, a famine emerged in Cambodia, which had been a rice-surplus area in the 1960s. In 1970, civil war broke out between Khmer nationalists and the U.S.-supported government. Warfare and American bombing drove more than a quarter of the population to the cities. Starvation started in Phnom Penh in 1974. The victorious Khmer Rouge forced people to join regimented rural cooperatives and work the land. Massive dislocation, widespread purges, and the shunning of foreign aid led to starvation. A Vietnamese invasion in 1978 toppled the brutal regime, but many people abandoned fields and fled toward Thailand. By 1979, Cambodia suffered a full-blown famine, requiring foreign food assistance. From 1975 to 1979, an estimated 1.5 million people died from malnutrition, illness, or overwork (Chandler 1999: 3).

Floods and drought caused occasional food shortages in the region, as in Irian Jaya in 1997 and 1998 and Vietnam in 1999. The specter of widespread famine has, however, disappeared. The Green Revolution in rice agriculture increased rice productivity. Growing numbers of people are no longer primarily dependent on food agriculture; their discretionary income is high enough to purchase food. Better communications encourage food to flow where the price is highest, including areas suffering shortages. Further, individual countries and international aid agencies now have famine prevention and relief mechanisms in place.

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See also Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Diseases and Epidemics; Great Depression (1929–1931); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia

(1941–1945); Java; Khmer Rouge; Timor; Vietnam, North (Post-1945); Vietnam, South (Post-1945)

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FEDERATED MALAY STATES (FMS) (1896)

The Federated Malay States (FMS) came into being in 1896, bringing the peninsular Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang under a central federal administration based in Kuala Lumpur. Although the FMS created uniformity and greater administrative efficiency, it enhanced the role and status of the central federal government at the expense of the state authorities. The FMS eroded the power and authority of the Malay rulers, who were reduced to the status of constitutional monarchs without political influence.

The British Residential System, implemented after the Pangkor Engagement (1874), created four separate independent entities of the Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang (from 1888), each under their own resident. There was a limited amount of mutual support and cooperation among the states. The tin-rich states of Perak, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan progressed and prospered by leaps and bounds. Pahang, however, despite its size and perceived potential mineral and agricultural resources, became a financial liability, with the Straits Settlements' government as its creditor. Federation appeared to be Pahang's salvation, as the richer partners would be obliged to assist in developing its resources.

Frank Swettenham (1850–1946), an ardent proponent of federation, stressed the advantages of administrative uniformity, greater administrative efficiency, and economy. Centralization would enhance coordination of services such as revenue, infrastructure development (in particular rail and road construction), public health, education, and law and justice. The agricultural and mining sectors would benefit from federation, as would matters relating to land.

Interestingly, although the issue of federation would significantly change the status of the Malay sultans and their country, the debate was confined within British colonial official circles. In a whirlwind tour of ten days in July 1895,

Swettenham secured the signatures of the Malay rulers to the Federation Agreement.

On 1 July 1896, FMS came into effect. Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang became British protected states, to be administered under the advice of the British government through its representative, the resident-general based in Kuala Lumpur. He would advise the four Malay sultans on all aspects of administration, apart from those dealing with the Islamic religion. Theoretically, the powers and authority of the Malay rulers remained intact but confined to their respective states.

Sir Charles B. H. Mitchell (t. 1894–1899), governor of the Straits Settlements and first high commissioner for FMS, presented a blueprint of how this new entity was to be administered. Centralization of authority dwelling on the resident-general was apparent. Federal heads of the various government departments, directly responsible to the resident-general, would direct and coordinate the work of his department in the four states. A *Durbar* (conference of Malay rulers) was constituted whereby the four Malay sultans would meet annually with British officials to discuss state affairs; the outcomes of these meetings were, however, nonbinding.

Although the resident-general was, in theory, subordinate to the governor, he could exert his independence through sheer force of personality, as demonstrated by Swettenham, who was the inaugural appointee. To prevent having a too-powerful resident-general, Governor Sir John Anderson (t. 1904–1911) created the Federal Council in 1909 to ensure that power and authority were centralized with the governor/high commissioner, who was its president. Furthermore, the title of resident-general was reduced to chief secretary in 1910. Although all resolutions passed in the Federal Council had to be sanctioned by the State Councils presided over by the sultans before they were enacted, this step was a mere formality, as all decisions made by the former had to be accepted. Consequently, the State Councils functioned as mere rubber stamps to the federal government.

Partly to assuage concerns about over-centralization and the erosion of the political authority of the Malay rulers and partly to induce the five other Malay States (Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Johor) to join FMS,

proposals for decentralization were initiated during the 1920s and 1930s. However, the decentralization proposals of Sir Lawrence Nunns Guillemard (governor/high commissioner, t. 1920–1927) and Sir Cecil Clementi (governor/high commissioner, t. 1930–1934), which were approved and implemented in 1927 and 1933, respectively, did not restore power to the Malay rulers. Instead, these rulers remained politically impotent despite being consulted more frequently. Toward the late 1930s, state governments regained control over certain departments (medical and public works), and State Councils could legislate on certain subjects and have some control over their revenue and expenditure. Efforts at decentralization failed to entice the other Malay States to participate in federation.

The creation of FMS brought prosperity to all its member states, including Pahang. Infrastructure development was efficiently undertaken, whereby a good rail and road network was established. The economy—in particular, the agricultural sector (mainly the rubber industry)—benefited tremendously from federation. Notwithstanding the socioeconomic benefits, however, FMS reduced the four Malay rulers to politically impotent constitutional monarchs and further strengthened the colonial clasp of the British over the most prosperous parts of the Malay Peninsula.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Johor; Pahang; Residential System (Malaya); Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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FEDERATION OF MALAYA (1948)

The Federation of Malaya was officially established in February 1948. This was a new form of government in Malaya, replacing the much-criticized Malayan Union formed by the British in 1946. Under the federation, all the nine Malay States—Perlis, Kedah, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Johor, Pahang, Kelantan, and Terengganu—as well as the former Straits Settlements of Penang and Melaka were placed under one government headed by a British high commissioner.

The high commissioner, who was the highest-ranking executive officer of the federal government, administered the federation with the help of two councils, the Executive and Legislative Councils. He had to ensure that Malay privileges and the rights of the different communities according to the constitution were safeguarded. The federal government was also responsible for matters concerning security, foreign affairs, civil laws and legislation, trade, transport, communication, and finance.

The position of the nine sultans as heads of their respective states was guaranteed. They headed the state governments with the help of the State Executive and Legislative Councils. The state governments had jurisdiction over matters concerning their own local governments, religious affairs, education, health, and land. The governments of Melaka and Penang, former members of the Straits Settlements, were headed by governors appointed by the high commissioner. The sultans and the governors formed the Rulers' Council to discuss matters concerning themselves and other crucial issues with the high commissioner. They met annually or whenever the need arose.

One very important factor that emerged under the constitution of the federation was the question of citizenship. Under the constitution, people could apply for citizenship by legal means or acquire it by birth. Citizenship was accorded to those who had been born in any one of the states, or alternatively whose parents (or at least one parent) had been born in the states and had been domiciled for a specific period of time. They were also required to know the Malay language or English and to be of good character. The Federation of Malaya placed all the states in Malaya under one constitution, and for the first time, non-Malays

were given the opportunity to be citizens of the federation.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); British Malaya; Decolonization of Southeast Asia; Federated Malay States (FMS) (1896); Johor; Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Malayan Union (1946); Melaka; Onn bin Jaafar (1895–1962); Pahang; Penang (1786); Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Straits Settlements (1826–1941); Tan Cheng Lock, Sir (1883–1960); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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FILIPINIZATION

Filipinization was the process, during the American colonial period in the Philippines, of putting Filipinos in active positions in government, replacing U.S. officials. This was part of the American policy of creating a government for the Philippines and preparing the country for eventual independence. Filipinization peaked during the administration of Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison (t. 1913–1921), when Harrison made it his policy to place more administrative control in the hands of Filipinos.

Since the establishment of American civil government in the Philippines in 1901, U.S. policy toward the islands was to create a stable government and to build a Philippines for the Filipinos. In the first thirteen years of American rule, Filipinos were gradually given positions of increasing responsibility in government, including local government and the legislature. Those with sufficient educational attainment and economic means were given the right to vote; out of the three provincial board positions, Filipinos held two of them through election. The lower chamber of the legislature was

Filipino-controlled. Until 1913, however, Filipinos were a minority in the upper chamber of the legislature, the Philippine Commission. They were seldom appointed as executive division or bureau heads, and in the provincial governments, U.S. officials routinely checked up on local administration. The governor-general—always an American—had the final say in legislative, executive, and judicial matters.

Filipinization echoed the liberal policy adopted by the Democrat U.S. administration, headed by President Woodrow Wilson, from 1913 to 1921. In the Philippines, Governor-General Harrison endorsed the belief that the best way to prepare Filipinos for independence was to place them in government and in positions of responsibility and to grant them as much autonomy as possible. Hoping to encourage Americans who were working in government service in the islands to retire early or otherwise leave their posts, he approved legislation that offered attractive early-retirement benefits and lowered the salaries of those Americans who stayed on. As Filipinos replaced Americans who vacated such positions, the civil service was increasingly dominated by Filipinos.

In addition to appointing Filipinos as executive department and bureau heads, Harrison allowed the top Filipino political figures, led by Manuel L. Quezon (1878–1944) and Sergio Osmeña (1878–1961), to form the Philippine Council of State, an advisory body to assist the governor-general. Meanwhile, President Wilson increased the number of Filipinos in the Philippine Assembly, thereby giving them control of both houses of the legislature. The Harrison administration also made all provincial board positions elective, thus paving the way for an all-Filipino provincial administration.

The Jones Law (sponsored by William Atkinson Jones, a Democratic representative from Virginia), passed by the U.S. Congress in 1916, gave greater impetus to Harrison's Filipinization policy. The law provided that the United States would withdraw its sovereignty over the Philippines and recognize its independence when a stable government could be established. Harrison believed that a stable government would be one controlled by Filipinos who had been prepared for self-government by handling the government themselves. Toward that end, he also gave Filipinos greater

leeway in administration by not actively exercising his powers as governor-general, thereby giving more initiative to the local political leaders. He also used his veto power sparingly and supported actions of the Filipinos in government.

Harrison's Filipinization policy reduced the number of Americans in the Philippine government from 2,623 in 1913 to only 614 in 1921, while increasing the number of Filipinos from 6,363 in 1913 to 13,240 in 1921 (Agoncillo and Alfonso 1967: 340). Filipino political power increased as that of the Americans waned.

The people of the Philippine Islands welcomed Filipinization, especially as undertaken by Governor-General Harrison. The policy was, however, criticized by Americans who wanted greater U.S. control over the Philippine insular government. Critics pointed out that the rapid pace of Filipinization resulted in inexperienced persons taking important posts and led to inefficiency and corruption. Governor-General Leonard Wood (t. 1921–1927), who succeeded Harrison, discontinued the Filipinization policy.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Harrison, Francis Burton (1873–1957); Osmeña, Sergio, Sr. (1878–1961); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1898–1946); Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944)

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FILIPINO-AMERICAN WAR (1899–1902)

See Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902)

FIREARMS

When Portuguese and Spaniards first entered the seas of Southeast Asia, early in the sixteenth century, they often marveled at the quantity and the quality of the locally cast swivel-guns in use aboard boats and on the wooden palisades of fortified settlements. These were light, very mobile cannons, many of them carried and shot by a single man. The guns were mounted on a swivel yoke that could be set up almost instantly on stirrups cut into the rails of ships or on stockades, to absorb recoil. Most of the pieces were made of bronze, but some were cast in brass; it is known that both copper alloys often were obtained through the smelting of imported Chinese cash. Although most of the cannons that were made were muzzle-loading, there are also quite a few examples of breech-loading cannons in various collections, and these are probably the oldest. A piece of wood, or tiller, was inserted into the back handle and lashed to the cannon with rattan, which enabled it to be trained by the gunner. Most of these swivel-guns had small bores (30 to 60 millimeters). They were loaded with small cannonballs or hail shots and primarily used against people. Such firearms were still being cast and used until modern times, as they were best adapted to common Southeast Asian warfare techniques. Brunei was known for its foundries in the nineteenth century, and in 1904, the Americans often fought in the Philippines against "Moros" armed with such cannons.

Chinese are known to have built breech-loading swivel-guns in the sixteenth century. These, however, were considered, in China, to be of Turkish origin. This is a perfect illustration of the swift diffusion of firearms and gunpowder techniques in the Old World, after the invention of fast-burning gunpowder in thirteenth-century China. Southeast Asia came in regular contact with Chinese artillery shortly after this invention, during Kublai Khan's (1215–1294) late-thirteenth-century invasions, and there are a few other testimonies to the use of firearms in Southeast Asia during the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. At the crossroads of the transasian maritime route and in overland contact with both India and China, Southeast Asians quickly adopted the warring techniques they needed in military conflicts, whether internal or with the Europeans.

Larger cannons do not seem to have been in regular use in Southeast Asia before the second half of the sixteenth century. When they appeared in the region, they did so as part of a broader evolution of military techniques. At sea, small swivel-guns were ideally suited for the light and swift local boats that composed most of the war fleets of the Southeast Asian powers in the beginning of the sixteenth century. Later on, much larger, galley-type war vessels, influenced by Mediterranean techniques learned from Portuguese renegades and Turkish shipwrights, complemented these indigenous fleets. Sultan Iskandar Muda (r. 1607–1636) of Aceh built the largest of them all in the 1620s. These sturdier vessels were able to carry and absorb the recoil of much larger cannons that could be used in sieges for offshore bombardment.

As a by-product of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century developments in fortress construction, large land-based siege cannons were soon cast in most countries of Southeast Asia, with the help of Turkish and Portuguese foundries. Regardless of the actual efficiency of such unwieldy cannons in war tactics, local legends and literature point to the spiritual power that was attached to them and to the vested interest Southeast Asian rulers had in possessing as many as possible. Lighter guns, such as muskets, were also incorporated into the armament of Southeast Asian armies, whether locally produced or bought from Indians, Turks, or Europeans.

By the late seventeenth century, technological innovations and mass production meant European firearms became ever more efficient and prestigious among Southeast Asian rulers, leaving local productions in their wake. They became a trade commodity that European merchants could provide best, at a cost. The ability to purchase and resourcefully use European artillery was a decisive factor in conflicts internal to the region, such as the eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century wars between Burma and Siam or between the warring lords of Vietnam.

PIERRE-YVES MANGUIN

See also Aceh (Acheh); Aceh (Acheh) Wars (1873–1903); Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Anti-Spanish Revolts (The Philippines); Burma-Siam Wars; Elephants; Iskandar Muda, Sultan (Mahkota Alam) (r. 1607–1636); Java War

(1825–1830); Moros; Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Piracy; Shipbuilding; Sino-Vietnamese Wars; Trinh Family (1597–1786)

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FIRST AVA (INWA) DYNASTY (1364–1527 C.E.)

Prelude to Modern Myanmar

The end of the Pagan kingdom in the early fourteenth century as a central and unifying authority ushered in a short period of political decentralization, with different centers of power struggling for paramountcy. By 1364, these contending powers had been unified under a new dynasty that was located at the city of Ava and hence was called the First Ava (or Inwa, in Burmese) dynasty, which lasted until 1527. Although the Ava period is conventionally known as the "period of Shan domination," there is little or no evidence to support such a contention, particularly since the significance of this age was more political, cultural, and religious than ethnic. Indeed, the structural principles and institutions that the Burmese kingdom of Pagan had established did not die; instead, the kingdom of Ava resurrected them to perpetuate the Pagan standard, the model for subsequent dynasties. The crucial difference be-

tween Pagan and Ava was quantitative, not qualitative: in size and scale, wealth and power, influence and image. Ava was, in effect, Pagan writ small.

The city of Ava was located on an island. On its north and west was the Irrawaddy River; on its east was the Myitnge River, which flowed into the former; and on its south was the Myitha River, a tributary of the Myitnge running east to west to which was joined a canal, both emptying into the Irrawaddy. Clearly, security and defense were on the minds of the new leaders when they made Ava the capital. The shift northeast from Pagan to Ava, over 128 kilometers (80 miles) away, addressed an important concern that all Upper Burma capitals faced: an invasion from the north coming down the Irrawaddy Valley. The kingdom of Nanchao invaded the Pyu kingdom in the ninth century from the north via this route. Pagan, likewise, had to fight unnamed forces from the north in the early twelfth century, only to be invaded again from the north in the late thirteenth century by Mongols using the same routes. Pagan's leadership seemed to have anticipated this problem early and addressed it during the eleventh century by building a line of 43 forts along that invasion path. (The Yuan sources actually mentioned 300 stockades built for that purpose.)

Ava's location revealed another concern: the city lay at a strategic point for control of Shwebo and Kyaukse, two of the most important rice-growing regions in Burma at the time. They were the economic mainstay of any Burma dynasty, especially one that had political ambition or visions of reunifying the country. Although Pagan was far from Kyaukse, it had been powerful enough to control the region from that distance. But the new dynasty was not as powerful and therefore had to move its capital right to its source of wealth, where the region could be better defended and utilized. By doing so, however, the seat of power was also moved farther away from the coasts of Lower Burma, which meant the dynasty lost control over that region (control that Pagan once had). The result was the rise of the first Lower Burma kingdom in Burma's history, led by kings who claimed Mon rather than Burman descent. Thus, the decision to build the new capital at Ava, next to the dynasty's main economic resources, revealed both defensive

and offensive military and economic concerns and would have unanticipated consequences.

The style and configuration of the capital city revealed that traditional cosmological beliefs were also part of the dynasty's concern. The city of Ava represented heaven on earth and was designed to suggest that the king, while in his symbolic city, was the intermediary between this world and the heavenly realm. Culturally, the Ava period is best known for the further development (and in some cases, the birth) of Burmese literature. Pagan had clearly been a very literate society as well, and in many respects, it produced literature (especially Pali literature) that has not, in general, been surpassed. But certain genres of verse, some of the earliest chronicles, and several of the most exemplary treatises on legal and religious topics to have survived had their origins at Ava. Still, the principles, conceptualizations, and organization of court and king, provincial administration, military and Crown service groups, village society, the economy, the legal system and jurisprudence, and the sangha (Buddhist monkhood) and religious affairs were virtual replicas of Pagan's—only on a smaller scale.

Ava *did* break with the Pagan tradition in at least one respect: in its art and architecture. The city of Sagaing, across the Irrawaddy from Ava, represents Ava's field of merit, where most of its temples and other religious edifices were built. The majority of the monuments at Sagaing reflect a preference for the solid temple, or *stupa*. Although important at Pagan as well, the stupa was not a prevailing style like the hollow *gu* (cave-temple) had been, with its interior space, keystone arching, barrel vaults, double stories, interior stairways, and varied floor plans. Ava may have lost the technique of keystone arches and barrel vaults, the architectural principle fundamental to the hollow-style temples of Pagan. Indeed, there is some evidence of this, as the few Pagan-style hollow temples built during the immediate post-Pagan period at the city of Pinya, briefly the predecessor to Ava, showed signs of flawed and tiered design in their arches.

Perhaps it was also a matter of economic resources. Ava did not and could not recapture the wealth needed for this kind of expensive and technically demanding temple construction on the size and scale enjoyed by Pagan, especially since the latter had committed, in perpetuity,

much of the available landed wealth to the tax-exempt sector. At the same time, Ava could no longer harness the commercial revenues of the Lower Burma coasts that Pagan had enjoyed, as that region saw the beginning of a new Lower Burma dynasty led by Mon speakers centered at Pegu, once a provincial capital under Pagan. Moreover, other areas that had once submitted to Pagan and had supplied it with human and material resources, such as Arakan on the western coast and the Shan polities located in the highlands, both north and east of Ava, were no longer reliable tributary regions.

The zenith of the Ava kingdom occurred during the hundred years between 1400 and 1500, when it was politically and militarily dominant in all of Upper Burma and exercised considerable influence over Lower and western Burma periodically. This was the time when Ava produced brilliant Burmese poetry and literature, when hundreds of temples and monasteries were built, and when religion was well patronized. It was also the time when the court was resplendent and when Crown soldiers were strong enough to repel invasions by powerful external forces such as the Ming, as well as internal competitors from Arakan, Pegu, and Prome. It was also a time when Ava was considered a model Buddhist state by its Buddhist neighbors. In short, it was an era when Ava was once more like Pagan but on a smaller scale. But this era was not to last.

In 1527, one of its Shan vassals, sensing the weakness at the center with court factionalism, marched on Ava and took it. The city's vulnerability was, in part, caused by the same kind of wealth flow experienced by Pagan from state to sangha, along with the untimely death of a brilliant young general who would have been king. However, without a larger vision to unite Burma, the conquerors only played the role of spoiler, and after appointing a titular head to hold the city, they returned to their home turf, leaving the heartland in limbo. With no central authority and no able leaders with the kind of vision needed to unify the "feudalistic" and anarchic situation, the population fled to another regional center farther south that was once under Ava's rule, Toungoo. And here began the next dynasty of Burma, the Toungoo, which was to reunify the country once more in the mid-sixteenth century under the militarily brilliant king Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581). This dy-

nasty was to become the largest, most far-reaching empire that the Burmese ever had, twice conquering Ayutthaya, the capital of Siam, and even taking Vientiane, now the capital of Laos. But the Toungoo was also the shortest dynasty, ruling for a mere seventy-seven years before it was brought down by internal factionalism, wealth flow to the religious sector, and the ambition of regional rivals.

The legacy of the First Ava dynasty lay in its contributions in developing Burmese literature and preserving many of the classical traditions begun and developed at Pagan, including the Burmese Theravada Buddhism (and its conceptual system) that has underpinned Burma's state and society to the present. But it did more than preserve traditions: it also preserved what was to become modern Burma. It did this by successfully forming a political, cultural, and military barrier at Ava against the movement of the T'ai speakers who had been migrating southward into the river valleys of western mainland Southeast Asia for several centuries. In doing so, it prevented that migration from going down the plains of the Irrawaddy River and establishing what might have been a T'ai polity in what is now Burma. And perhaps, therefore, it also prevented the formation of a modern Thailand that would have stretched from Assam on the Indian border in the west to Cambodia on the east.

MICHAEL AUNG-THWIN

See also Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581); Buddhism, Theravada; Burmans; Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Mon; Mons; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Nan Chao (Nanchao) (Dali/Tali); Pagan (Bagan); Pegu; *Sangha*; Shans; T'ais; Temple Political Economy; Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty (1271–1368)

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FIRST WORLD WAR (1914–1918)

See Great War (1914–1918)

FOLK RELIGIONS

To speak of folk religions is, in the first place, to refer to what ordinary village people do in everyday practice rather than to ideals articulated by religious specialists or urban elites. As soon as Europeans, already conditioned by the print revolution of the Reformation (sixteenth century), encountered the peoples of what we call Southeast Asia, they registered differences between formal professions of faith and everyday practices. Most observers thought this meant that ordinary people did not really understand Islam or Buddhism, the prevalent formal religions, and that, in practice, locals were actually animists, or superstitious believers in magical powers and ancestral spirits.

More recently, students of the region were influenced by the anthropologist Robert Redfield's analysis of folk and civic traditions in Mexico and India. He suggested that the "great tradition" of urban written cultures always interacted dynamically with a "lesser tradition" of village oral customs—each shaping the other yet remaining distinct and coherent (Redfield 1956). Thus, although Burmese villagers bow to Theravada monks, they may be more focused on healing and connection to spirits, the *nats*, than on the Buddhist imagination of spiritual liberation. Similarly, committed Muslims in Java may spend more time making pilgrimages

(*ziarah*) to sacred sites to connect with the goddess of the Southern Ocean (Nyai Loro Kidul) than practicing daily prayers (*solat*).

The keynotes of folk religion in villages throughout monsoon Asia are remarkably consistent. Villagers have generally held that all of existence, even stones and metals, is animate—alive and charged with specific, magical energies. In the Malay Archipelago, such ideas are evident in beliefs about the *kris*, or the wave-shaped daggers that were traditionally critical to war and manhood. Springs, caves, mountains, and trees (especially the banyan) are each thought to be alive with spirits that influence the human domain. The spirit of rice, named Nang Phrakosib in Thailand or Dewi Sri in Java and Bali, is seen as a goddess upon whom life depends.

Beyond shared awareness of a spiritually charged environment, villagers usually relate to nature through hierarchies of spirits inhabiting invisible planes accessible only to especially powerful people. Shamanic mediums and healers have often been female; the *datu* (rulers or chiefs) have usually been “big men,” meaning important men in the society. In any case, every person is understood as being differently empowered rather than equal, and links with guardian (or tutelary) spirits are believed to underlie the power of the living. Thus, the founding ancestor of a community or kingdom would, upon death, move into the spirit world, becoming a bridge between human and natural realms and remaining accessible to living descendants. Usually, prayer or meditation at graves or other sacred sites would be undertaken to tap into spirit powers through contractual relationships, which ensured healing of the sick, the success of crops, or social power.

The past is knowable through living practices as well as through traces in texts, monuments, or artifacts. Since ethnography exposes such practices in a way archival research cannot, cultural archaeology is a crucial means to aid our understanding of local histories on their own terms. Insofar as prehistoric patterns persist into the present, they must have conditioned intervening transitions. Village rituals, divination, sexual magic, and the quest for powers through sacred sites relate at once to contemporary social contests and, as Anthony Reid (1988) showed, to early historical transitions. Because animistic folk religion remains a

pervasive underlayer in village societies, the basic logic of this pattern must be original. Although this does not imply that the substratum is either singular in essence or unique to the region, it does mean that it is foundational in the same way that grammar is within language.

Focus on ancestral folk religion became a central feature in seminal works of French scholarship on Indochina. George Coedès (1968) termed it a “substratum,” whereas Paul Mus (1975) stressed that contractual relations with tutelary spirits underpinned rice cultures throughout Asia. Their works helped shift attention from outside influences to indigenous forces, from elites to the foundations of subsistence and everyday life, to what Harry Benda (1962) later called the “infrastructure.” We are now more likely to call the village substratum a Bakhtinian “chronotype,” noting that folk religion carries a distinctive sense of time that speaks dialogically with subsequent discursive domains, thus producing the separate rhythms of social life in agricultural villages, trading ports, and dynastic kingdoms.

Distinct spheres, related at once to different historical phases and groups, coexist in the present, however transformed internally and through the gestalt that contextualizes them, rather than replacing each other in simple sequence. This relationship is suggested by the coexistence of oxcarts, horse carriages, bicycles, cars, and airplanes—each following a distinct rhythm and thus embodying a different sense of time yet moving together. Using this image and noting that peasant societies have focused, as Mercia Eliade (1954) suggested, on rituals that “regenerate time,” we can imagine a sense in which folk religions maintain a literally timeless, because nonlinear, awareness from prehistory into the present.

In sociological terms, continuity of the substratum is stressed in the works of J. C. van Leur and B. J. Schrieke. Van Leur (1967: 95) held that “the sheen of the world religions and foreign cultural forms is a thin and flaking glaze; underneath it the whole of the old indigenous forms has continued to exist.” Schrieke (1957) argued that the infrastructure of Java did not fundamentally change from 700 to 1700 C.E. And Mus (1975) noted that Vietnamese villagers were traditionally autonomous in their internal affairs. Symbolically, bamboo hedges marked their autonomy, bounding them socially just as

they were insulated by the mediation of councils of notables that protected them from centralizing states. Later and in different ways Clifford Geertz's (1976) work on Java and S. J. Tambiah's (1970) on Thailand drew attention to the persistence of primal village religious patterns within present frames.

The formation of states in what would remain the core areas—the dominant centers of population and power in Southeast Asia—brought dynastic periodicity into the seasonal and life cycles of the folk religious substratum: villages counterpointed courts so that they came to define each other. Cosmopolitan contacts within early states brought not only increasing scale but also an imperative to conceptualize local forces in more universalized terms—as societies of millions replaced the kinship patterning of villages, scale called for specialization, for a new language to orchestrate energies. Indian (or in Vietnam, Chinese) written culture offered an instrument for this purpose.

There is no doubt that, in the process, folk religion was transformed. Through most of Southeast Asia, even most of what became the Philippines, Indian-derived terms for deities, *dewi* or *dewa*, became common. Mythologies derived from Indian cycles—the *Jatakas*, *Mahābhārata*, and *Rāmāyana*—found reenactment in oral village traditions such as the *wayang* (shadow play) in Java. Notions of karma and reincarnation became parts of a pervasive new frame for local imaginations of spirit realms.

Syncretism defined the process by which local beliefs found voice within, rather than being simply replaced by, Indian spiritual vocabularies. Syncretism arises naturally from folk religious ontologies because those usually register all as being one at root. This perspective predisposed locals to allow additions and new interpretations, to be received as supplements that enriched by elaboration rather than replacements for what went before. Localization provided new idioms relating to the same energies of spirits, shrines, caves, and ancestors. Spirit hierarchies continued to parallel social structures, as had earlier tutelary spirits. But with new kingdoms, kings, queens, princes, and armies fought in the spirit as well as the social realms.

Everywhere in these societies, external influences have been transformed, reworked, and used by local systems that have ancestral spirits at their heart. As the template world religions

fitted into has been animistic, spirit cults still percolate below the surface. Richard Winstedt (1951) linked shamanism, Saivism, and Sufism to show how the main strands of Malay religious history wove into a pattern based on prehistoric systems. L. Golomb (1985) noted that animistic healing practices transcended boundaries between Buddhism and Islam or Thais and Malays. Because Muslims in Java meditate on graves seeking magical powers, Suharto's grave complex at Blitar was styled to enshrine him as the guardian ancestor of the modern state in the same way that earlier Indian-influenced rulers had themselves enshrined within massive stone temples.

When changes appear overwhelming on the surface, underlying continuity is obviously obscured. The substratum is now breaking down rapidly, yet it retains more power than we easily register. Only nocturnal ethnography opens this face of local practice, as in the daylight, little activity suggests any of the power present within sacred sites. As with the subconscious or the submerged portion of an iceberg, the surface evidence of folk religion—what may catch our eye and enter discourse—depends profoundly on what does not appear. Emphasis on it is analogous to the importance of the first years of life as recognized in psychology: we may not remember them, but we know that the patterns imprinted then nevertheless inform our subsequent paths. The spiritual substratum of the Southeast Asian region is especially hard to see because modern Europeans have suppressed or marginalized their analogues to it and cannot see in others what they can no longer imagine as existing in themselves.

PAUL STANGE

See also *Adat*; Buddhism; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Cao Dai; Catholicism; Darul Islam (DI) Movement; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Hispanization; Hoa Hao; Indianization; Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); *Jatakas*; *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana*; *Tam Giao*; *Wali Songo*; *Wayang Kulit*

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FOOCHOW (HOCK CHIU)

See Chinese Dialect Groups

FORCE 136

Promoting Anti-Japanese Armed Resistance

The India Mission of Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) was set up in May 1941 to counter subversion in India. In August 1942, its purpose changed to the promotion of in-

digenuous military resistance in Japanese-occupied Burma, Malaya, Siam, Indochina, and Sumatra. The mission was based at Meerut in India and then, from 1944, at Kandy, Ceylon (Sri Lanka). After coming under the control of the South-East Asia Command (SEAC), the India Mission changed its name in March 1944 to Force 136. European and Asian operatives of Force 136 armed and trained thousands of Southeast Asians, with the aim of eventually expelling the Japanese and reestablishing British dominance.

As well as operating with pro-British groups such as the Karen in Burma (Myanmar), Force 136 struck alliances with anticolonial and left-wing resistance groups. Consequently, in May 1945, Aung San's Burma National Army deserted the Japanese for the British. In Malaya, Force 136 gained the support of the Malayan Communist Party's Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).

Operations in Sumatra and Indochina were much less successful. In Sumatra, there was insufficient opposition to the Japanese to support armed resistance. And in Indochina, the Force 136 support of pro-French resistance proved too weak to withstand Japanese attacks.

There was often bitter operational rivalry between Force 136 and the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The United States aimed to extend its political and economic influence in Southeast Asia and opposed the restoration of British, French, and Dutch colonies.

By the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945), Force 136's biggest military successes were in Burma, where it assisted British reoccupation. In Siam, the war ended before troops trained by Force 136 could make any significant military impact. In 1948, the communist forces, armed and trained by Force 136 in Malaya, commenced a twelve-year (1948–1956) insurgency against the British in the so-called Emergency.

IAN K. SMITH

See also British Military Administration

(BMA) in Southeast Asia; Burma Independence Army (BIA); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA); Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD); South-East Asia Command (SEAC)

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FORCED DELIVERIES

The term *forced deliveries* refers to the compulsory deliveries of produce by farmers to rulers. The term is generally associated with the Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*), which the Dutch colonial government maintained in Java between 1830 and 1870. Under this system, farmers were forced to produce cash crops such as coffee and take their produce to collection points supervised by Dutch colonial officials. Payment for the crops enabled the farmers to pay the land tax. However, the Dutch colonial government continued a prerogative of indigenous rulers in areas it had brought under direct colonial rule. Such deliveries to local rulers had generally been made in rice. The predecessor of the Dutch colonial government, the Dutch United East India Company (VOC), also demanded the delivery of produce. The VOC often exacted from subjugated indigenous rulers valuable cash crops such as coffee and spices as either a form of tribute or a tax in kind from farmers in areas under its direct rule. The Cultivation System was based on such precedents. The practice of forced deliveries existed in places other than colonial Java as well. For instance, in the surroundings of Padang, farmers were compelled to supply coffee in lieu of income tax.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Coffee; Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Java; Java War (1825–1830); Max Havelaar; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Sugar; Van den Bosch, Count Johannes (1780–1844); Van der Capellen, Baron Godert Alexander Philip (1778–1848); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East Indies Company) (1602)

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FORMOSA (TAIWAN)

An island situated 160 kilometers off the coast of Fujian Province in China, Formosa (also known as Taiwan) was governed by the Republic of China from 1949. Due to its geographic proximity, it has, from time to time, played a part in the Southeast Asian network throughout its known history.

The word *Formosa* originated in the term *Isla Formosa* (Beautiful Island), expressing admiration for the island's beauty as experienced by sailors aboard a Portuguese ship in 1517. Nowadays, the term *Formosa* may connote the independent regime on the island that is objectionable to the Beijing Chinese leaders, who regard the island as an indivisible part of China. The Chinese first used the name *Taiwan* during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). Neither the Portuguese nor the Chinese were indigenous to the island. Aborigines of Malay-Polynesian origin had lived on the island since the prehistoric era.

Though the island had been mentioned vaguely in Chinese texts since the Sui dynasty (581–618 C.E.), it was under the Dutch that Taiwan gained its first experience of being ruled by a regime, albeit briefly (from 1624 to 1662). The Dutch East India Company (VOC) then made Taiwan a transshipment center for China, Japan, and Batavia. Such trade continued after the Dutch were expelled by Zheng Chenggong (also known as Koxinga, 1624–1662), who established an anti-Manchu regime in Taiwan that existed from 1662 to 1683. To Zheng, the relationship with Southeast Asia was something beyond trade. He planned to stage an onslaught on the Manchus in China, manned by an army of Philippine Chinese. However, the effort was aborted, as the Spanish killed all the 10,000 Chinese in the Philippines upon learning of the plot.

Taiwan was incorporated institutionally as part of Fujian Province after the Manchus defeated Zheng's regime in 1683. Trade was

maintained only with the Chinese mainland, and Taiwan's Southeast Asian connections were not renewed until the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Treaty of Tianjin (1858) opened Taiwan to foreign trade. Liners bound for Southeast Asia plied the waters between Taiwan and ports such as Singapore, Saigon, and Manila (Luzon). The enhanced economic and strategic importance of the island made the Qing court grant it provincial status in 1887.

After two hundred years of Chinese rule, Taiwan became a colony of Japan. The Treaty of Shimonoseki that concluded the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) ceded the island to Japan after China's defeat. Taiwan became an attractive market for Japanese products, although its exports, including tea, camphor, sugar, and opium, continued to go to Southeast Asia. During the Pacific War (1941–1945), Japan used Formosa as a military base for the expansion to Southeast Asia.

Taiwan was returned to China after Japan's defeat in 1945. Taiwan was portrayed as "Free China" after 1949 (as it continues to be), for it was planned to be an anticommunist stronghold under the Kuomintang (KMT), which still claimed legitimacy over the whole of China in spite of its defeat by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Anticommunism became a common interest for Taiwan in maintaining relations with Southeast Asian countries, but other factors hindered closer contact. The newly independent Southeast Asian states developed industries quite similar to those of Taiwan, and they became competitors. A further setback was suffered in the diplomatic sphere. In 1971, Taiwan, represented as the Republic of China, lost its seat to Beijing (that is, the People's Republic of China, PRC) in the United Nations. Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines recalled their ambassadors from Taiwan in the mid-1970s and recognized the PRC; the latter had, by then, become less threatening to its Asian neighbors after reaching rapprochement with the United States.

Taiwan's diplomatic setback was partially compensated by its "economic miracle." Toward the end of the 1970s, Taiwan was recognized as a successful newly industrialized country (NIC) and extolled as one of Asia's "Four Little Dragons," alongside Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore. In the 1980s, Southeast Asia had a new role to play in Taiwan's economic develop-

ment. The rise of the middle class in Taiwan led to a huge demand for domestic helpers. Southeast Asians filled the need, and currently, their numbers total more than 200,000. In view of the mounting labor cost in Taiwan in the 1980s, Taiwanese entrepreneurs running labor-intensive industries turned to the Southeast Asian countries, which by then had adopted open-door policies and provided the much-needed cheap labor. This trend of southward investments culminated in the proclamation of the 1993 "go south policy" by President Lee Teng-hui (1923–), with a view to checking the multiplying investments to mainland China, a trend that may put Taiwan in a bewildered situation in a future political contest with Beijing.

To break its diplomatic isolation, Taiwan practiced "pragmatic diplomacy" in the 1990s, and Southeast Asia was considered important for relations at various levels. However, developments are not optimistic. On the one hand, Beijing will not tolerate any Taiwanese diplomatic activities conducted under the name Republic of China or Taiwan. And on the other hand, there are sovereignty conflicts over territories such as the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, where Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines claim overlapping parts of these lands.

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also China, Imperial; China, Nationalist; China since 1949; Hong Kong; Kuomintang (KMT); Manila; Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Qing (Ch'ing/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912); Saigon (Gia Dinh; Hồ Chí Minh City; Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1990s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Spratly and Paracel Archipelagos Dispute; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East Indies Company) (1602)

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"FORTRESS SINGAPORE"

Illusory Strategy

After World War I (1914–1918), Singapore became a focal point for the British military in Southeast Asia. Faced with U.S. objections to the continuation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the British government in London decided in June 1921 that the interests of regional and empire defense would best be served by building a new, first-class naval base in Singapore.

Situated on the northern coast of the island at Sembawang less than a mile (about 1.6 kilometers) across the Strait of Johor from the Malayan shore, it was designed to become the largest base that the Royal Navy possessed east of Malta in the Mediterranean. However, it was never the British government's intention to station a substantial number of warships permanently at the Sembawang base. Nonetheless, the Admiralty envisaged that in times of grave emergency, such as the outbreak of war with Japan, the Royal Navy would send a large battle fleet to Singapore to defend British interests in the region. This plan (the "Singapore strategy") has often been derisively described as a strategic illusion. Starved of the funds necessary to build a first-class naval base, the Sembawang base could never hope to function as the British planners had originally hoped it would. Moreover, the growth of fascism and militarism in Germany, Italy, and Japan in the 1930s was to pose an ever-increasing problem for the British and reveal the improbable nature of their Singapore strategy. This was clearly a case of imperial overreaching, and no amount of wishful thinking would make Singapore become the fortress it was portrayed as the international media. Denied the aircraft and defensive measures in Malaya that it would have required if it was ever to have become an impregnable fortress, Singapore became a hostage to fortune once the Japanese had launched their invasion of Southeast Asia on 8 December 1941. By 31 January 1942, the Malay Peninsula had fallen,

and Singapore became a temporary home for more than 100,000 British and Allied forces. Shortly thereafter, the island fell to General Tomoyuki Yamashita's (1885–1946) forces on 15 February 1942.

Fortress Singapore was little more than a mirage and the "Singapore Strategy" an unrealistic anachronism more suited to the Victorian heyday of *Pax Britannica* than the turbulent epoch in which it was actually conceived and supposed to operate.

MALCOLM H. MURFETT

See also Great War (1914–1918); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia; Yamashita Tomoyuki, General (1885–1946)

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FREE THAI MOVEMENT

The Free Thai Movement (or Siamese Movement, as it was called by the British) was a national resistance group organized while Japanese troops occupied Thailand (Siam) from 1941 to 1945. Before the Japanese invasion on 8 December 1941, the Thai government, in anticipation of the coming of war, had instilled in the people's mind the duty to fight and sacrifice their lives to preserve the nation's independence. Quickly following the surprise invasion of the country, many Thai political and government leaders, both inside and outside of the country, began to formulate what would later become the Free Thai Movement. The movement's objectives were, first, to fight against the Japanese occupation of Thailand and, second, to be able to negotiate with the principal Allied countries in order to resolve Thailand's status in the war. Ultimately, the primary aim was to ensure the restoration of Thailand's sovereignty and establish an independent nation that would be regarded as an equal by the Allies.

By late December 1941, Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983), the former foreign minister in Plaek Phibunsongkhram's government (1938–1944) who would shortly be appointed chairman of the regency, formed an underground organization to resist the Japanese occupation in Thailand. Operating from the regent's office, the underground movement quickly gained support and cooperation from members of Parliament, bureaucrats, and military officials. Meanwhile, Thais in the United States and Britain organized parallel resistance movements. The Free Thai Movement in the United States was initiated and led by M. R. Seni Pramroj (1905–1997), a prominent lawyer appointed by Phibun to be the Thai minister in Washington. Seni made clear from the beginning that the Thai legation in Washington would not follow the Bangkok government's collaboration with Japan, and he firmly sought U.S. support to fight against Japanese acts of aggression. Thai students in England organized, by themselves, the third resistance movement in July 1942, without support from the Thai officials there. The group, however, received support from the British government and high-ranking royalty who resided in England following the 1932 Revolution.

During the first phase of the movement, from 1941 to 1943, the three resistance groups in Thailand, the United States, and Britain operated independently from one another. There was no real and systematic cooperation in their efforts to resist Japanese occupation. Not until the second phase, from 1943 to 1945 during which Pridi assumed the official leadership of the Free Thai Movement, did all the resistance forces come under a unified command that directed concerted activities. This was the period when the Free Thai Movement finally established contacts with and joined the U.S. and British forces in fighting the Japanese.

By the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945), the Free Thai Movement had proved to be a very successful effort on the part of the Thais because it helped saved the country from becoming a defeated nation that would be subjected to harsh punishment and reparation for its war crimes. Furthermore, the Free Thai Movement was also the first grassroots political movement to give an opportunity to many local political activists. This opened the way for the development and growth of their organiza-

tions, including the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), which was formed on 1 December 1942.

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also Collaboration Issue in Southeast Asia; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Khmer Issarak (Free Khmer); Lao Issara; Plaek Phibunsongkhram, Field Marshall (1897–1964); Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983); Seni Pramroj, M. R. (1905–1997)

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FREE TRADE

Free trade is a phrase that has, over time, been widely used in public affairs, and like other such phrases, it has consequently been subjected to a diversity of meanings. They all call to mind the relationship between the state and the economy. In the contemporary phase of globalization and the nation-state, that relationship seems more important than ever. Are the governments going to promote the free trade that globalization calls for? Or is the relationship a more ambiguous one, depending on the relative position and interest of the states? Contemporary concerns may cast light on the past, just as study of the past may enhance an understanding of current problems.

Even before they avowed their interest in the welfare of the people, governments the world over were interested in the prosperity of their domains: only that, after all, could provide them with revenues for sustaining church and state and with the sinews of war. In the majority of states, the prime resource was agriculture, and trade was local or regional. For some states, foreign trade was more important, and for a few—such as Venice or Melaka—it was the state's very *raison d'être*.

Intensifying competition among the European states accompanied the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire and the advent of the Renaissance. That was a powerful motive behind the voyages of “discovery” and the establishment of dependencies and trading posts outside Europe on the part of the Portuguese and the Spaniards initially and then others, such as the Dutch and the English. Though the world economy expanded—with the exploitation of Japanese silver mines and then with the mobilization of the wealth of Mexico and Peru—states still saw it in strictly competitive terms, and the recession that followed in the seventeenth century promoted a mercantilist approach. Trade was seen as a zero-sum game: what one had, another could not have. Commercial competition was thus accompanied by measures designed to reserve the colonial trade to the colonial power and to exclude others.

In the long period of expansion that ensued in the eighteenth century and that gathered momentum with the industrial and communications revolutions of the nineteenth century, such perceptions were undermined. The relationship of state and commerce remained important. Should a state cling to old-fashioned regulations or sacrifice the vested interests involved in them in favor of new interests that would profit by a new approach? Not all the states would answer the question in the same way, for their positions differed.

The keenest advocates of free trade had been the states whose economies were most likely to benefit. The Dutch East India Company (VOC) had used the argument of *mare liberum*—open seas—against the then much weaker English East India Company (EIC) in the early seventeenth century, though it also proceeded to argue that it could impose commercial monopolies by making agreements with the rulers in Southeast Asia. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the British came to enjoy an economic advantage over other European states and became the advocates of free trade. Though it took some decades, they abandoned their navigation acts and accepted competition at home and overseas in the confidence that they could benefit from it. The lesson that Adam Smith had drawn from the struggle with the American colonies in *The Wealth of Nations* (1776) was adopted. “No nation ever voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province,” he

had argued, “how troublesome it might be to govern it. Such sacrifices . . . are always mortifying to the pride of every nation, and . . . contrary to the private interest of the governing part of it. . . . If it was adopted, however, Great Britain would not only be immediately freed from the whole annual expense of the peace establishment of the colonies, but might settle with them such a treaty of commerce as would effectually secure to her a free trade, more advantageous to the great body of the people, though less so to the merchants, than the monopoly which she at present enjoys” (quoted in Bennett 1962: 47).

Britain embarked on what Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher (1953) memorably but misleadingly called “the imperialism of free trade.” The object was not to rule other lands—rather the reverse—but to remove the trade obstacles their governments put in the way of Britain’s goods, which would otherwise, it was assumed, have been economically competitive. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, those goods faced a new obstacle. Emulating Britain’s industrialization, other Western states, including the United States as well as Germany and Russia, sought to protect their nascent industries by protective tariffs. Britain did not react by abandoning free trade until, under the impact of the depression (1929–1931), it adopted a strategy of “imperial preference” in 1931 and 1932. The United States, which was then the predominant economic power, criticized this British strategy. It was the United States that appeared to be the prime advocate of free trade in the postwar years.

In Southeast Asia, the French had initially adopted a free trade regime in Cochin China, designed to attract Chinese and other traders. The Meline Tariff of 1892 imposed a protectionist regime on Indochina, which was to stand in the way of industrialization in Vietnam. The Dutch, long pressed by the British and now anxious to avoid the intervention of others, dropped protectionism in Netherlands India in the 1870s, but in the depression, they reintroduced it as a means, above all, of limiting the competition of cheap Japanese goods.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also Age of Commerce; British Interests in Southeast Asia; Dutch Interests in Southeast

Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Economic Development of Southeast Asia (Post-1945 to ca. 1990s); Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Penang (1786); Portuguese Asian Empire; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); Singapore (1819); Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1990s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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FRENCH AMBITIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Before the nineteenth century, the French made no attempt to establish a territorial empire in Asia. In the two previous centuries, French commercial and missionary interests in India, China, and Southeast Asia were sustained by *comptoirs* (stations, outposts, branches) and mission stations, protected by naval forces that were eventually based on Mauritius. From the mid-nineteenth century, the interventions of the French state in Asia became more systematic and culminated in the formation of a territorial empire principally located in mainland Southeast Asia. In the process, the ambitions of the French were both stimulated and constrained by rivalry with the British, whose large Eastern empire was seen both as a standing threat to French interests in Asia and as a model to emulate.

In Asia from 1669, the French presence consisted of a succession of short-lived royal-chartered trading companies. In 1720, the formation of the powerful new *Compagnie des Indes* inaugurated over forty years of direct competition with the English East India Company (EIC) for dominance of the India trade. The downfall of this company in 1769 left French

influence diffused among mercenaries working for Indian rulers, individual traders operating from small settlements in India, and French missionary networks extending from India to China.

In Southeast Asia, political initiatives by the French government were rare. The Chaumont embassy to Siam, a major diplomatic mission sent by Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715) in 1687 and 1688 to implant French political and military influence and encourage Christianization, had been a disaster, precipitating the downfall of King Narai (r. 1656–1688) in a political coup. A later intervention in Vietnam was equally without success. In 1787, a French missionary, Msgr. Pierre Joseph Georges Pigneau de Behaine (1741–1799), negotiated a Franco-Vietnamese treaty and obtained material assistance for the reinstallation of the Nguyễn dynasty on the throne of Vietnam. The French state made nothing of this isolated adventure, which was of temporary benefit only to French missionaries in Vietnam until the persecutions of the 1820s.

The earliest signs of a systematic state policy to establish a significant French presence off the mainland of Southeast Asia began in the 1840s, when King Louis Philippe's (r. 1830–1848) premier, François Guizot, sanctioned a search for a naval station in the South China Sea. But the effort, intended to support French trade with China, produced no suitable point d'appui. The intensification of missionary appeals for protection from persecution in Vietnam in 1856 and 1857 spurred the beginnings of the French commitment to large-scale territorial annexation in Southeast Asia. Anti-Christian violence provided the occasion for intervention, but French military involvement plainly reflected an interest in pursuing economic and strategic advantages in the region. The Brenier Commission (1857), convened to report on the proposal for a Vietnam expedition, strongly emphasized the material benefits both of establishing some form of protectorate over Vietnam and of gaining a strategic foothold from which to protect French access to the China market. The proposal was controversial, and Napoleon III's (r. 1852–1870) cabinet balked at the likely cost. It was the emperor himself who made the final decision, influenced by Empress Eugénie's concern about Vietnamese persecution of missionaries.

The subsequent development of a new French colony in Vietnam was the product of initiatives by French expeditionary admirals. The first of these, Admiral Rigault de Genouilly, seemed reluctant to embark on wholesale conquest. He planned to impose a limited political and commercial treaty on the Vietnamese after a difficult assault on the port of Tourane (Danang), close to the capital. But the Vietnamese declined to capitulate, and his successor, Admiral Page, decided to shift the locus of French attack southward to Cochin China, the main source of Vietnam's food supply. In a peace treaty forced on him by Admiral Louis Adolphe Bonard in 1862, the Tu Duc emperor finally acknowledged French sovereignty over Saigon and the three eastern provinces. In June 1867, without prior authorization from Paris, Admiral-Governor Charles-Marie de La Grandière seized an opportunity provided by rebel cross-border infiltration to extend and consolidate French dominance over the rest of the Mekong Delta. Shortly afterward, a nominal French protectorate over the kingdom of Cambodia, previously agreed upon in secret between King Norodom (r. 1860–1904) and Admiral de La Grandière, was reluctantly acknowledged by King Mongkut (Rama IV, r. 1851–1868) of Siam, Norodom's overlord, in a formal treaty with France. In return for Siamese renunciation of suzerainty over Cambodia, the French foreign office, in the teeth of de La Grandière's protests, acknowledged Siamese sovereignty over two formerly Khmer provinces, Battambang and Siem Reap, held by Siam since 1794. Battambang, which bordered the Great Lake of Cambodia (Tonle Sap), was of considerable economic value, and Siem Reap, containing the ruins of Angkor, was the historical heartland of the Khmer people. These two Siamese-held Khmer provinces remained consistently high on the French colonialist agenda for future retrieval.

The historiography of the later stages of French expansion reflects considerable debate and forms part of the wider framework of controversy over the nature of later nineteenth-century imperialism as a whole. Most historians agree that there was a clear pattern of preemptive economic calculation behind French expansion over the following forty years. There is less agreement as to whether expansion was led

by officials seeking to establish a *raison d'être* for this haphazardly assembled colony or whether business pressures alone were strong enough to account for it.

The early stages of growth took place under exclusively naval management. In the 1860s and 1870s, French entrepreneurs and banks had largely ignored Cochin China as a field of activity, but the navy's colonial administration pursued strategic control over the remainder of Vietnam's major river systems as a means of securing political dominance over the whole economy. Initially, Admiral de La Grandière had hoped to seize Siamese Laos in order to connect the Mekong Delta with the southwest China market. Draining Chinese goods out through the delta would help, in the governor's phrase, to turn Saigon into "the queen of the Far East," outperforming Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore. When the Mekong River expedition under Captain Ernest Doudart de Lagrée (1823–1868) discovered in 1866 that the great river was blocked and unusable for this purpose, administrative attention shifted away from Laos and toward the northern Vietnamese province of Tonkin (Tongking). There, when a French trader discovered in 1872 and 1873 that the Song Koi, or Red River, was commercially usable as a link to the southwest China market, the naval administration in Saigon under Admiral Marie Jules Dupré acted. An unauthorized expedition was mounted, led by Lieutenant Francis Garnier (1839–1873), to seize the Song Koi and with it the rest of Tonkin. One of the major concerns driving Dupré had been the fear of intervention by British and German China coast business interests, which had shown excitement at the opening of the river. But when Garnier was killed on a *sortie* in December 1873, French forces were ignominiously withdrawn. In 1874, Dupré and his successor, Admiral Jules François Émile Krantz, sought to cover French embarrassment by imposing two treaties on Vietnam by which the French acquired a range of special commercial and political privileges in Tonkin and Annam. British diplomatic pressure, however, ensured that the term *protectorate* did not appear in these agreements, leaving French dominance in question.

The Garnier fiasco, a mission undertaken without authorization from Paris, had been a response to local crisis and opportunity. The

subsequent decision to seize Tonkin by the government of Jules Ferry in the early 1880s was an outcome of a more complex process of political change in France itself, stimulating the revival of a state policy of colonial expansion in Africa, the Middle East (West Asia), and the Pacific.

Defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1870 had helped to inflame French nationalism, but German continental ascendancy made French colonial expansion a safer outlet than *revanche* (revenge) for the restoration of French prestige. Business interests were also becoming more evidently engaged in the process of colonial acquisition. Historians, however, are divided over whether French capitalism or French nationalism was the greater influence in French expansion. Charles Ageron (1978), C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner (1981), and Patrick Tuck (1995) have developed, in relation to Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the argument of Henri Brunschwig that the nationalistic colonial party was the predominant force shaping French late-nineteenth-century imperialism. John Laffey (1969), Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémerly (1995), and Dieter Brötzel (1971) have argued that French expansion in Southeast Asia was fundamentally a business-driven process.

In the new climate of metropolitan commitment to expansion, the cabinet of Jules Ferry (t. 1883–1885) opted to monopolize control over the Song Koi route into southwest China. Ferry found himself engaged first in hostilities with the Vietnamese in 1883 and 1884 and then in a debilitating conflict with the Vietnamese monarch's overlord, China. By 1885, the increasing scale and cost of the Franco-Chinese war provoked revulsion among the French public, and Ferry was ejected from office. His successors were to take a further decade to pacify northern Vietnam, and the possession, renamed French Indochina, continued to disappoint French economic expectations. A belated effort by Governor Paul Doumer in 1899 and 1900 to galvanize the Indochina economy by organizing the seizure of the Chinese province of Yunnan was suppressed by the French foreign office, resulting in Doumer's removal. Not until after the start of World War I (1914–1918) did the economy begin to fulfill the aspirations of the 1880s.

As colonial expansion proceeded in the 1880s, French possessions in mainland Southeast Asia came to converge with those of the

British in the vicinity of Siam, and the "Siam question" then emerged as an acute issue in Anglo-French diplomacy. Already at odds with Britain over Egypt and in tropical Africa, the French colonial interest in Paris and Indochina showed increasing concern at the possibility that Siam would become a British colony. Siam's economy, already closely linked to the trade of British India, Singapore, and Hong Kong, could only be wrenched into alignment with that of Indochina if the French imposed political control and forced the kingdom's economy into their new colonial protectionist system, formed in 1892. This became the objective of a powerful French colonial lobby, the *parti colonial*, which worked through official networks and through Parliament to promote the advance of French expansion across the Mekong Valley. French challenges to Siamese suzerainty over Lao principalities in the Mekong Valley eventually precipitated a crisis (the Paknam Incident) between France and Siam in 1893, marked by a French naval invasion of the Chaopraya River and the imposition of a humiliating treaty. But the crisis backfired on the French colonialists. In order to reduce ensuing diplomatic friction with the British, the French foreign ministry chose to sidestep the colonial party, and by the Declaration of London in 1896, France agreed with Britain to avoid pursuit of military measures or exclusive privileges in the central part of the kingdom. Debarred from pursuing French dominance, the colonial party aimed at joint Anglo-French exploitation of the kingdom, but this project was thwarted by Siamese exclusion of virtually all forms of French influence from the kingdom. Only in negotiations leading to the Entente Cordiale of 1904 did the French colonial party finally give up its ambitions for an Anglo-French "condominium" in Siam, in return for the prospect of British diplomatic support for the French dominance of Morocco. By the terms of a subsequent agreement with Siam in 1907, the colonial party agreed to sacrifice some French extraterritorial rights in return for the Siamese surrender of Battambang and Siem Reap to the French-protected state of Cambodia. This final acquisition brought French territorial expansion in Southeast Asia to a close.

PATRICK TUCK

See also Anglo–French Declaration of London (1896); Annam; Battambang; British Interests in Southeast Asia; Cochin China; Colonialism; Đà Nẵng (Tourane); French Indochina; Germans (Germany); Imperialism; Lagrée–Garnier Mekong Expedition (1866–1868); Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Napoleonic Wars in Asia; Nguyễn Anh (Emperor Gia Long) (r. 1802–1820); Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Norodom (1836–1904); Paknam Incident (1893); Pigneau de Béhaine, Pierre Joseph Georges, Bishop of Adran (1741–1799); Preservation of Siam’s Political Independence; Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Siem Reap; Tonkin (Tongking)

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FRENCH INDOCHINA

The term *French Indochina* refers to the French-created Indochinese Union (1887), constituting the colony of Cochin China, the protectorates of Annam, Tonkin (Tongking), and Cambodia. When Laos became a French protectorate in 1893, it was incorporated in this administrative structure.

The imperialistic expansion of France into Indochina was begun in the late 1850s and was

completed by 1893. The French occupied Tourane (Đà Nẵng) in 1858 and proceeded to capture Saigon, including the three surrounding provinces, from 1859 to 1862. Cambodia then became a French protectorate in 1863. Subsequently, in 1867, the French annexed three other provinces in lower Cochin China, situated west of the Mekong Delta to Pulo Condore. Annam and Tonkin became French-protected territories in 1883 and the French extended similar protectorate status to Laos in 1893.

During the Pacific War (1941–1945), French Indochina initially allied itself with the Japanese Imperial military authorities. However, in the early part of 1945, the French civil administration was terminated and replaced by Imperial Japanese military rule. The Indochinese Federation replaced the prewar Indochinese Union, whereby the components Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were constituted as quasi-independent “associated states” within the federation.

Full political independence was attained: Cambodia in 1953, Vietnam in 1954, and Laos in 1953 and 1954. Vietnam, however, was partitioned at the seventeenth parallel that split the country into two, with Tonkin and North Annam constituting the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and Cochin China and South Annam forming the Republic of Vietnam (or South Vietnam).

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), Battle of; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (Post-1945); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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FRENCH INDOCHINESE UNION (UNION INDOCHINOISE FRANÇAISE) (1887)

Spread over some thirty-odd years, the French takeover of Indochina started with the absorption of southern Vietnam and its conversion into the Cochin China colony (1858–1867); it was completed with the establishment in 1893 of the French protectorate over the Lao principality of Luang Prabang. But as early as 1887, Cambodia, Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin had been brought together to form the *Union Indochinoise*, placed under the ultimate authority of the French minister of marine and colonies in Paris. The administration was entrusted to a civilian governor-general assisted by a higher commander of the troops, a higher commander of the marine, a general secretary, a chief of the judiciary service, and a director of the customs and excise. The governor-general was advised but not controlled by a government council (called *Conseil Supérieur de l'Indochine*—Higher Council of Indochina—from 1887 to 1911, and *Conseil de Gouvernement*—Council of Government—after 1911), which sat each year to discuss general matters of public interest.

It was Paul Doumer, governor-general from 1897 to 1902, who made the Indochinese Union an actual administrative and financial unity. He centralized the civil services of the colony—customs, postal telegraph service, forestry, and commerce. He also introduced the common general budget funded by the proceeds of indirect taxes (customs, taxes on opium, alcohol, salt, etc.), while revenues from direct taxes (land and poll taxes) were assigned to the regional administrations. At the same time, he organized for Laos an entirely new state within borders formed by the amalgamation of territories that had never before been under a single administration. During Doumer's term of office, the Indochina Geographical Service was created, as well as the *École Française d'Extrême-Orient*, a scientific establishment whose mission was to collect and study the archaeological and cultural data of Indochina and to preserve its historical monuments.

The *Union Indochinoise* incorporated into a political, economic, and social federalism five separate administrative regions, under five regional heads, the governor of Cochin China and the *résidents supérieurs* of Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and Laos. It represented a complex

supranational structure. If Cochin China was the colony in the narrow constitutional sense, a system of indirect government, similar to that applied by the British to certain parts of Burma, was put into practice in the protectorates of Cambodia and Laos. Local political structures based on the Cambodian provincial governors and the Laotian *chao miang* (heads of provinces) had been left intact. But it meant for Vietnam in particular the dismantlement of its territorial unity. Moreover, the bureaucracy of the “protected” Vietnamese emperor was merged into a highly centralized system dependent exclusively on the competence of France's representatives, who surrogated themselves to the authority of the monarch on the one hand, and his mandarins on the other, for the effective exercise of power. In such a regime of protectorate, the distinction between direct and indirect rule was legal rather than practical.

In fact, the actual movement was toward more direct rule—notwithstanding Governor-General Paul Beau's (t. 1902–1907) efforts after 1902 to restore a part of the local administration and set up a consultative assembly in Tonkin, and Albert Sarraut's (t. 1911–1914) promise in 1911 to revert to the policy of association, while reforming justice, developing public education, and enlarging political representation in consultative councils. Eventually, in 1928, Indochina was endowed with a *Grand Conseil des Intérêts Économiques et Financiers* (Great Council of Economic and Financial Interests). It was composed of a French section and a native section, with an advisory role for all financial and economic issues and the right of decision on the matters of taxation. At the regional level, the creation of indigenous assemblies with elected delegates seemed to indicate a liberal evolution. Nevertheless, the governor-general's authority remained absolute, and as far as his position was concerned the term *viceroi* could be used. If the policy of association was supposed to be guiding the French administration of the *Union Indochinoise* from 1907 until the suspension of direct French rule by the Japanese in March 1945, the powers of the governor-general were repeatedly exercised to overrule the nominal autonomy of the component territories. Although native sovereignties continued to be recognized in certain formalities, in practice they were considered to be overridden by the authority of the French state.

In any case, during most of its history, the *Union Indochinoise* was administered by governor-generals whose average term of office was less than two years, with the exception of Paul Doumer, who stayed in office for five years. Moreover, the men appointed to this paramount position were nearly proconsuls whose previous careers had brought them little experience relevant to the problems of colonial administration. Rare certainly were men of established professional standing whose names came to figure on the list of Indochina's governors-general.

The movement toward greater centralization, rationalization, and efficiency could be explained by metropolitan demands to reduce costs and to find local resources for colonial improvements and for European capitalist investments. The interest attached to the colonies was indeed related to the investments they represented and controlled by means of big financial groups: the principal mining or rubber companies in Indochina depended more or less directly on the Banque de l'Indochine (Bank of Indochina). The influx of private capital (more than 3 billion francs from 1924 to 1932) accelerated economic development, while colonial loans were allocated to the construction of the rail and road infrastructure (Nguyễn 1999: 350–351). But the new economy based on rich cultures, mining, and big commerce disturbed the balance between the forms of activity: efforts were concentrated on the exportation of raw materials and the importation of metropolitan manufactured articles. And, compared with the other products, rice was by far the most exported item. Thanks to the construction of new dykes in Tonkin and of irrigation canals in Cochin China, rice fields covered 4 million hectares in 1913, and 5.6 million in 1938 (*ibid.*: 354).

But the people did not live better because rice, coal, and rubber could now be exported. Indochina's apparent prosperity at the end of the 1920s was beneficial to less than 10 percent of the population, and first to the civil or military French population (36,000 in 1937) and to a thin class of well-off natives (*ibid.*: 356). The 1929–1930 economic crisis was going to show that the number of economic consumers in Indochina amounted to 1,800,000 persons, whereas more than 17 million were utterly destitute (*ibid.*).

NGUYỄN THÉ ANH

See also Annam; Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Cochin China; Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Tonkin (Tongking); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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FRETILIN (FRENTE REVOLUCIONÁRIA DO TIMOR-LESTE INDEPENDENTE)

FRETILIN, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente), was established on 12 September 1974 by members of the Timorese Social Democratic Association (Associação Social Democrata Timorense, ASDT), which had been founded only a few months previously, on 20 May 1974. Initially, its founders considered FRETILIN as a united front directed by a central committee rather than as a unitary party.

During 1975, after conflict with rival parties, FRETILIN gained control of the Portuguese colony, and on 28 November 1975, it declared the country's independence as the Democratic Republic of East Timor. The first East Timorese government under FRETILIN included Francisco Xavier do Amaral as president, Nicolau

Lobato as prime minister, Mari Alkatiri as minister of state for political affairs, Abilio de Araujo as minister for economic and social affairs, Rogerio Lobato as defense minister, Vincente Sa'he as minister of labor and welfare, José Goncalves as minister for economic coordination, Alarico Fernandes as minister for internal affairs and security, and José Ramos Horta as minister of foreign affairs. Many of these founding members of FRETILIN went on to play significant roles in a long struggle to regain independence for East Timor.

On 7 December 1975, Indonesia invaded the country, and East Timorese resistance groups, under FRETILIN leadership, were forced to flee into the mountains. Key members of the Central Committee—Mari Alkatiri, Rogerio Lobato, and José Ramos Horta—were overseas. As a consequence, the Central Committee established two fronts, an armed front and a diplomatic front, to maintain its struggle. The Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor (*Forças Armadas da Libertação de Timor Leste*, FALINTIL) carried out guerrilla warfare within East Timor, whereas the diplomatic efforts were pursued at the United Nations and in countries that supported FRETILIN's struggle, in particular Portugal and Mozambique.

In the year after the invasion and under heavy pressure from Indonesian forces, party stalwarts in the mountains adopted a Marxist-Leninist stance, which resulted in internal disputes. Xavier do Amaral, the head of FRETILIN and the country's former president, was expelled from FRETILIN and was later captured by the Indonesians in September 1977; he was replaced by Nicolau Lobato, who would be killed on 31 December 1978. José Alexandre "Kay Rala Xanana" Gusmão replaced Lobato as the head of FALINTIL and began a process of restructuring the resistance forces in the interests of national unity. As part of this process, FALINTIL was formally detached from FRETILIN on 7 December 1986, to become the army of national resistance. One year later, Gusmão formally resigned from FRETILIN and was joined in this move by Ramos Horta.

The Central Committee of FRETILIN agreed to work with the broader resistance bodies established under Gusmão's leadership. The first of these was the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance (CRRN), formed in 1981; this was followed by the Na-

tional Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), formed in 1987, and the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), which was established in Peniche, Portugal, in April 1998. During this period, a third, "clandestine" front was established to carry the struggle from the countryside into the towns and villages of East Timor.

During the 1980s, FRETILIN was headed by a succession of guerrilla leaders, two of whom, Ma Huno (Antonio Gomes) and Hudo Ran Kadalak (José da Costa), were captured by Indonesian forces, as was Xanana Gusmão in 1992. For a brief period thereafter, Konis Santana assumed command of both FALINTIL and FRETILIN.

In 1999, East Timor was given the right to a UN-supervised vote on whether to accept autonomy within Indonesia. Activists under the umbrella of the National Council of Timorese Resistance rallied the population, which voted overwhelmingly for independence. Following this vote, the UN Transitional Administration of East Timor assumed responsibility from Indonesia for preparing the country for independence.

For a period, the CNRT acted as the principal representative of the East Timorese population. Key political figures returned from detention, from the diaspora, or from the mountains where they had maintained the guerrilla struggle.

In preparation for elections to the Constituent Assembly that was to draft a constitution for the country, FRETILIN—as well as its rival, União Democrática Timorese (UDT)—withdrew from CNRT to operate independently. Other parties were also established or reconstituted until, in the end, there were sixteen parties in the election for the eighty-eight-member Constituent Assembly.

Francisco Xavier do Amaral formed his own party, the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT), using the name of the 1974 organization that was transformed into FRETILIN; Abilio de Araujo, who had been expelled from FRETILIN for cooperating with Indonesia, established the Timorese National Party (PNT).

In the elections held on 30 August 2001, FRETILIN obtained over 57 percent of the vote, giving it an allocation of forty-three nationally determined seats and another twelve district seats in the new assembly. It was thus able to form a government on 20 May 2002

when the United Nations officially handed over authority to East Timor.

The new government included Mari Alkatiri as prime minister, Rogerio Lobato as minister of internal affairs, and José Ramos Horta as foreign minister. Lu Olo (Francisco Guterres), the head of FRETILIN, became the speaker of the National Assembly, and Xanana Gusmão, who had been elected by an overwhelming majority in a contest with Xavier do Amaral, became the president of the revived Democratic Republic of East Timor. It had taken twenty-seven years of work by a committed group of East Timorese, all of whom were at one time or another associated with FRETILIN, to achieve this goal.

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See also Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Portuguese Asian Empire; Suharto (1921–); Timor

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FRIARS, SPANISH (THE PHILIPPINES)

The friar orders played a crucial role both in the evangelization of the Philippines and in the maintenance of Spanish colonialism in the islands for over three hundred years. The close relationship between ecclesiastical mission and secular authority had its basis in the *patronato real* (royal patronage), whereby the Spanish Crown assumed the financial support of the Roman Catholic Church in the New World, including the cost of sending missionaries, in return for the privilege of nominating ecclesiastical benefices. This arrangement was extended to the Philippines with the arrival of Miguel López de Legazpi (1505–1572) to-

gether with five members of the Augustinian order in 1565, an event that constitutes the origins of missionary endeavor in the archipelago. Many religious came from Spain, a journey that involved sailing to Vera Cruz on the Caribbean coast of Mexico, traveling overland to the Pacific port of Acapulco via Mexico City, and finally taking a ship to Manila. Sending just one missionary from Spain to the Philippines is said to have cost 129,526 maravedis or about 1,012 pesos, a truly fabulous sum for the period (Cushner 1971; Roth 1977). Despite an unfavorable start to the mission, reflecting the tenuousness of the Spanish settlement's early days, there were 134 religious in the archipelago by 1595. Apart from the Augustinians, these included the Franciscans arriving in 1578, the Jesuits in 1581, and the Dominicans in 1587. Other orders subsequently arrived: the Augustinian Recollects (1606), the Fathers of San Juan de Dios (1641), the Vincentians or Paúles (1862), the Capuchins (1886), and the Benedictines (1895). By 1896, there were a total of 1,124 friars in the archipelago (Cushner 1971; Roth 1977). Nor should the good works of the female religious be overlooked. Notable for their contributions to charity, education, and health were the Beaterio of the Society of Jesus, established in 1684 (presently the Religious of the Virgin Mary); the Beaterio of Santa Catalina in 1696; and the Daughters of Charity in 1852. The Philippines also functioned as a base for missionary endeavors to the rest of Asia and the Pacific; missionaries set forth from the archipelago to evangelize neighboring peoples in Japan, China, Formosa (Taiwan), Indochina, Siam (Thailand), the Moluccas, the Marianas, and the Caroline and Palau islands.

The religious retained houses in and around Manila, though each of the four main orders had definite districts or missions assigned to them by the king (royal decree of 27 April 1594). Augustinians were mainly in northeastern Luzon and the central Visayas; Franciscans in southern and eastern Luzon, Mindoro, and Marinduque; Jesuits (before their expulsion in 1768) in the Visayas; and Dominicans in Pangasinan and northwestern Luzon. The Augustinian Recollects also played an important role in evangelizing Romblon, Bohol, and Negros. Members of the missionary orders enjoyed a great deal of freedom to evangelize in their own ways. The *Omnimodam auctitatem*, first

granted by Pope Adrian VI to the Franciscans in 1522 and subsequently extended to the other orders, gave friars permission to perform every episcopal faculty as occasion demanded for the conversion of pagans and the preservation of the faith. Their independence was further strengthened by the papal brief *Exponi nobis* in 1567, which effectively authorized members of the missionary orders to act in the capacity of parish priests throughout the archipelago. Friars were only supposed to administer *doctrinas*—communities of the recently converted—as a temporary stage in preparing these communities to become established parishes or curacies, at which point they were to be handed over to the care of the secular clergy. However, due to the shortage of the latter in the Philippines, this transfer was never completed, and many *doctrinas* effectively became regular parishes administered by the religious orders.

Evangelization was carried out in the vernacular despite the difficulties often encountered in finding appropriate equivalents for Christian concepts; it was considered easier for a friar to learn the local language than for a community to learn Spanish. The colonial government's repeated orders to establish local schools in which the Spanish language was taught were stubbornly ignored. Instead, the friars' main missionary endeavors were directed at the principal inhabitants of a village, as such conversions often encouraged others in the community to follow suit. These first baptisms were conducted with great pomp to impress upon people the solemn nature of the sacrament being received, and they were accompanied by choirs and brass bands and followed by other festivities. The fact that many friars were accomplished physicians able to dispense medicine and cure the sick also greatly facilitated their activities. Nor should the distinct social advantages of conversion in terms of legal status, tributary payments, and labor requirements be underestimated in this respect. For most of the colonial period, these friars constituted the only European presence to be found in most native pueblos; Spanish settlers did not become a significant factor until the second half of the nineteenth century with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and even then, they came only in small numbers. As such, the religious often paid dearly for their mission, being seized or murdered by nonsubdued tribespeople and

marauding pirates. Jesuits in the Visayas proved particularly tempting prizes for Muslim raiders due to both their geographic vulnerability and the ransoms they commanded. Still, this missionary endeavor was ultimately responsible for the gradual evangelization of most of the archipelago, from the northernmost islands off Luzon to the tip of the Zamboanga peninsula in Mindanao.

Relations were often strained among the friar orders, the colonial governments, and episcopal authorities. Enforcement of the royal patronage resulted in friar-secular clashes. For instance, the Augustinians and the Jesuits objected to the action of governors-general in appointing or removing the religious from parishes; the friar orders claimed that only their superiors in Rome possessed such a prerogative. The orders successfully opposed in 1637, 1650, and 1682 the efforts of the colonial governments to impose the Crown's right of *presentación* (the right to offer an ecclesiastical benefice). In this struggle with the secular authorities, the orders turned to the simple threat of relinquishing their parishes amidst an acute shortage of secular clergy. Likewise the orders relied on the same strategy when they resisted the efforts of the Archbishop of Manila during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to exert control over the friar orders by vetting those acting as parish priests and carrying out episcopal visitations. However, in 1773 Archbishop Basilio Sancho de Santa Justa y Rufino bravely called the Augustinians' bluff and expelled them from their parishes in Pampanga. Rufino replaced them with Filipino clergy who were hastily ordained and largely unprepared. The dire consequences of this policy considerably weakened the development of a native clergy vis-à-vis the religious, who returned to their parishes and attained a stronger position than they had possessed previously. Although the Crown generally supported the policy of episcopal visitation, as any claim to perpetual parish jurisdiction seriously compromised the royal patronage, it was also mindful of the important role friars played in maintaining allegiance and order in rural areas and so sought to mediate in these disputes.

Many friars destined for the Philippines were those who were "exiled" there for one reason or another, with consequent repercussions for both the clerics involved and the proper evangeliza-

tion of native peoples. Regular complaints about their abuse of office had been partly responsible for attempts at enforcing episcopal visitation in the first place. Friars were frequently accused of exacting excessive fees for burials and weddings (supposedly free or voluntary offerings), illegally using indigenous labor, and requisitioning food supplies. Still others were charged with openly flaunting their vows of celibacy and living in concubinage with indigenous women who acted as their so-called housekeepers. Many of these women also played important roles as the priests' agents or factotums, helping them with their financial and trade transactions. Specific orders were known for particular transgressions: Augustinians were continually admonished for engaging in local commerce, Jesuits for usurping lands and engaging in the galleon trade, and Dominicans for excessive rigor and the use of corporal punishment at the slightest provocation. A particular cause of much resentment was the growth of the religious-owned estates, or *haciendas*, often acquired by means of fraudulent surveys and the illegal incorporation of village lands. Anger and frustration culminated in the agrarian revolt of 1745, one of the most serious uprisings against Spanish colonialism prior to the Philippine Revolution (1896–1898). Attacks on haciendas occurred in the provinces of Cavite, Tondo, Bulacan, and Batangas, during which granaries and irrigation works on disputed lands were burned down or destroyed, cattle were stolen or slaughtered, and administrators were forced to flee. The rebellion was only suppressed by an adroit mixture of firmness and redress, which involved restoring much of the disputed lands to the municipalities in question. Despite limitations on growth, the religious orders still had extensive landholdings by the nineteenth century, from which they derived a substantial income.

The influence and material assets of the religious orders grew accordingly in a colony where they played such an important role in upholding the regime, though much of this wealth was directed toward the maintenance of schools, hospitals, orphanages, asylums, and universities. In particular, the expansion of the export economy proved an incentive to develop the friar-owned haciendas during the nineteenth century. Undeveloped portions of estates were often leased out to Chinese mestizo or indigenous tenant farmers (*inquilinos*), who gen-

erally hired sharecroppers (*kasamahanes*) to work the land. Attempts to raise rents in line with increasing productivity were bitterly resented and a major cause of the widespread anticlericalism found among the *ilustrado* (intelligentsia) sector of society. Some 40 friars were killed during the Philippine Revolution, and a further 403 were taken prisoner, though virtually all of these were later released (Cushner 1971; Roth 1977). Still, only 472 religious were left in the Philippines by 1900, and their numbers continued to decline, falling to 246 in 1902 (Cushner 1971; Roth 1977). Appropriation of friar lands was called for under the Malolos Constitution (1899) but was not realized until 1903 when the new U.S. colonial administration purchased approximately 166,000 hectares for redistribution, farmed by some 60,000 tenants (Cushner 1971; Roth 1977). However, the subsequent resale of these estates to members of the upper class did much to consolidate a landed elite in the Philippines and proved the root cause for a continuing agrarian unrest that persists today.

GREG BANKOFF

See also Anti-Spanish Revolts (The Philippines); Catholicism; Cavite Mutiny; *Ilustrados*; Friar-Secular Relationship; Galleon Trade; Missionaries, Christian; Patron-Client Relations; Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Rizal, José (1861–1896); Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia

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FRIAR-SECULAR RELATIONSHIP

Relations between the religious orders and the colonial and episcopal authorities of the secular clergy in the Philippines under Spanish colonialism were seldom harmonious. The *Omnimodam auctitatem* (“Enlargement of any kind,” meaning extension of power) of Pope Adrian VI (r. 1522–1523) in 1522 granted the missionary orders the freedom to evangelize in their own way, and the papal brief *Exponi nobis* (“It is expounded to us,” meaning provide a detailed explanation) of 1567 effectively allowed them to act as parish priests in the archipelago. Friars were only supposed to administer communities of the recently converted (known as *doctrinas*), as a preparatory stage to becoming established parishes that were then to be surrendered to the secular clergy. Despite Philip II’s (r. 1556–1598) confirmation in 1583 that parochial administration belonged to the latter except where dire necessity had prompted papal concessions, the transfer of parishes was never completed in the Philippines. An acute shortage of secular clergy, occasioned by the reluctance to ordain Filipinos, meant that many *doctrinas* effectively became regular parishes administered by friars. The subsequent history of the colonial state in the islands was largely determined by the various attempts of both royal and episcopal officials to limit the influence of these orders and exert their own authority over rural populations.

Enforcement of the royal patronage led to much bitter controversy as governors-general tried to remove or appoint the religious from parishes, which the latter claimed was the sole prerogative of their superiors in Rome. The colonial governments’ attempts to impose the Crown’s right of nomination were successfully resisted in 1637, 1650, and 1682. The simple expedient of threatening to relinquish their parishes in the face of an acute shortage of secular clergy gave the orders the upper hand in any such contest of wills. A further attempt by

Ferdinand VI (r. 1746–1759) to relieve the orders of their parishes in 1753 was never put into effect in the Philippines. Similarly, efforts by the archbishops of Manila to exert episcopal control over the friar orders by vetting religious acting as parish priests and carrying out visitations failed for much the same reasons during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The most serious confrontation occurred in 1773 when Archbishop Basilio Sancho de Santa Justa y Rufino called the Augustinians’ bluff and expelled them from their parishes in Pampanga, replacing them with hastily ordained and unprepared native clergy. The disastrous results of this policy led the king to rescind his actions and restore the friars to their ministries. Although the Crown vigorously resisted all claims that might compromise the royal patronage, it was also mindful of the important role the religious played in maintaining allegiance and order in rural areas.

Secularization assumed more overtly political dimensions during the nineteenth century as an issue between a largely Spanish regular clergy and an increasingly native secular one. The shortage of regular clergy due to the expulsion of the Jesuits (1768), together with the fact that there were fewer arrivals from Spain during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), ensured that secularization continued as parishes were turned over to native clergy on an interim basis. The question was raised once again in 1803 when three new parishes were assigned to the regular orders, prompting a petition to the king to assign them to the secular clergy. The subsequent royal consent, however, was simply ignored by colonial authorities in the Philippines. Prior to the independence of Spain’s American colonies, successive governments in Madrid had been in favor of further secularization to relieve the state of the high costs of sending religious to the colonies. After the loss of the Americas, however, Ferdinand VII (r. 1808–1833) moved swiftly to prevent any further moves of that type and even called for the restoration of the religious orders to their former parishes on the death or retirement of their secular incumbents (royal order of 8 June 1826).

The last half century of Spanish rule was one of increasing hostility between a largely secular native clergy deemed to have separatist aspirations and a colonial administration bent on restoring the influence of the religious orders.

Matters were only exacerbated by subsequent royal orders that granted friars parishes that were formerly in the possession of the secular clergy and by the return of the Jesuits in 1859. Events further degenerated after the recall of the liberal governor-general Carlos Maria De La Torre y Nava Cerrada (t. 1869–1871) and his replacement by the much less sympathetic Rafael Izquierdo (t. 1871–1873). Subsequently, three secular native priests—Frs. José Burgos (1837–1872), Mariano Gomes (1799–1872), and Jacinto Zamora (1835–1872)—were implicated in the abortive Cavite Mutiny of 1872 and executed. Others were sentenced to varying terms of exile in Guam. It is now generally considered that the friars seized upon this incident to preserve their influence and discredit the native clergy. Though the latter played a much less prominent role in subsequent developments, José Rizal (1861–1896) dedicated his second novel, *El Filibusterismo*, to the memory of the executed priests, and still others were arrested for circulating revolutionary material. The complete secularization of the parishes was only effected during the Philippine Revolution (1896–1898), when many of the religious were forced to abandon their parishes and subsequently prevented from returning.

GREG BANKOFF

See also Catholicism; Cavite Munity; Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Missionaries, Christian; *Noli Me Tangere* (1887) and *El Filibusterismo* (1891); Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Rizal, José (1861–1896)

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FUJIWARA KIKAN (F KIKAN)

Harnessing Indigenous Nationalist Support

Fujiwara Kikan (known as F. Kikan) was the Japanese military intelligence organization headed by Major Fujiwara Iwaichi (1908–1986) (who was promoted to lieutenant colonel in August 1944). The *F* stands for Fujiwara as well as "Freedom" and "Friendship"; *Kikan* means "organization."

The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) formed F. Kikan in September 1941. Originally, the organization consisted of six officers (excluding Fujiwara) and an interpreter; later, it increased to more than twenty members. At the end of September 1941, members were sent to Bangkok to contact and garner the cooperation of the various nationalist movements—Indian, Malay, Indonesian, and Chinese—in preparing for the war. They were most successful with the Indian Independence League (IIL). Fujiwara met its leader, Pritam Singh, in October 1941 and secured his agreement to cooperate with the Japanese Imperial Army (JIA). (Pritam Singh died in a plane crash in Japan in March 1942.) When the Pacific War (1941–1942) started, F. Kikan, with the help of some seventy IIL members who followed the JIA, succeeded in persuading many British Indian army soldiers to switch allegiance without fighting. While advancing southward in the Malay Peninsula, the Indian National Army (INA), which had been formed on 31 December 1941, recruited troops from among surrendered British Indian soldiers. In the main cities, IIL branches were established.

After reaching agreement with Fujiwara, Captain Mohan Singh, who was skeptical of the real intention of the Japanese, became commander of the INA; in February 1942, he was promoted to major general. The agreements with both Pritam Singh and Mohan Singh stated that the Indian organizations were independent and were to be treated as Japanese al-

lies. These agreements were, however, regarded by the IGH as personal matters and ignored. The IGH staffers tended merely to utilize the Indian organizations as their subordinates. Though 25,000 of the 65,000 British Indian army soldiers who had surrendered to the Japanese ultimately joined the INA, the superior attitude exhibited by the Japanese increasingly irritated their organization (Allen 1977: 261).

F. Kikan also contributed largely in the Sumatran campaign. Twenty Sumatra Youth League members recruited by F. Kikan penetrated into Sumatra and succeeded in mustering tens of thousands of local people to drive out the Dutch. F. Kikan also played a part in gaining the support of the Young Malay Union (*Kesatuan Melayu Muda*) of Malaya, headed by Ibrahim Yaacob (1911–1979).

In April 1942, Fujiwara was transferred to the Southern Army Headquarters, and F. Kikan was replaced by Iwakuro Kikan, headed by Colonel Iwakuro Hideo (1897–1965). After this replacement, Mohan Singh was arrested in December 1942. A paramount nationalist leader, Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), arrived in Singapore from Berlin in July 1943 to lead the IIL as well as the INA.

HARA FUJIO

See also Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Collaboration Issue in Southeast Asia; “Death Railway” (Burma–Siam Railway); Ibrahim Yaacob (1911–1979); Imphal–Kohima, Battle of (1944); Indian National Army (INA); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* (KMM) (Young Malay Union)

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FUNAN

An Early Maritime Power

Funan is the name applied in Chinese dynastic histories to a maritime kingdom located in the lower Mekong Valley of modern Cambodia and Vietnam, dated from the third to seventh cen-

turies C.E. At the height of its power in the mid-third century, Funan is also thought to have controlled some of the major ports on the Malay Peninsula and to have been influential in the development of maritime trade between India and China.

Archaeological excavations in 1944 at the town of Oc Eo in the western Mekong Delta have demonstrated close contact with the Indian subcontinent during the first centuries C.E. It may well have been a manufacturing site for the nearby city of Angkor Borei, where archaeologists from Hawai'i University have recently excavated the remains of a substantial ceremonial center.

Much of our knowledge of Funan is derived from a Chinese embassy led by K'ang T'ai and Chu Ying in the mid-third century C.E. Their original writings have not survived but are quoted in later Chinese histories. They include a description of the founding of Funan by a man named Hun-t'ien, who sailed to Funan and married a queen named Liu Ye or “Willow Leaf.” This story is also recounted in a seventh-century inscription from Champa. There, however, the man is called Kaundinya and the queen, Soma.

The importance of Funan as a maritime power is attributed to the king Fan Man or Fan Shi Man, whose reign has been dated to around 200 C.E. He is said to have constructed a fleet of ships and to have attacked more than ten kingdoms. Only three kingdoms were individually named, but all have been identified with the Malay Peninsula. These raids appear to have been an attempt to take control of the maritime trade flowing from India through the Malay Peninsula to China.

The embassy of K'ang T'ai and Chu Ying was received by King Fan Chan, who also sent and received envoys from the country of Dayuezhi in northern India. Fan Chan sent a further embassy to the southern Wu kingdom of China in 243 and 244. However, relations with Wu gradually soured, and in 268, envoys were sent to the northern Chinese kingdom of Jin, together with representatives from the kingdom of Linyi in what is now central Vietnam. Between 270 and 280, Linyi and Funan continually harassed the southern Wu borders until the kingdom finally fell to the Jin in 280 C.E. King Fan Hsün thereafter sent three trade embassies to China from 285 to 287.

Little is known of Funan in the fourth century. In 357 C.E., a gift of trained elephants was sent to the Jin court by a king of Funan named T'ien Chu Chan-t'an. T'ien Chu was a common Chinese name for India at that time, and it has been argued that this king was of Indian origin (Coedès 1968: 46–47). Another king, named Kaundinya, is said to have come from the kingdom of Pan Pan on the Malay Peninsula and to have introduced Indian administrative reforms in the early fifth century. Little is really known, however, regarding either of these men. The first king of Funan with a recognizably Indian Sanskrit name was Shih-li-t'o-pamo (possibly Sri Indravarman), who sent three embassies to China between 434 and 438 C.E.

In 484 C.E., an embassy was sent by Kaundinya Jayavarman of Funan and delivered by a Buddhist monk named Nagasena. Kaundinya Jayavarman was granted the title of "General of the Pacified South, King of Funan" by the Chinese Liang emperor in 503, and he sent further embassies in 511 and 514. Two inscriptions have been attributed to his wife and son: the first, from the province of Takeo, was ordered by a Queen Kulaprabhavati; the second, from the Plain of Reeds, by Gunavarman. According to the Chinese histories, a king named Rudravarman succeeded Kaundinya Jayavarman. He sent six embassies to China between 517 and 539. The Chinese associated his reign with Buddhism; two monks named Sanghapala and Mandrasena were sent to China from Funan.

According to Chinese sources, after the reign of Rudravarman, Funan was conquered from the north by the kingdom of Zhenla (Chenla). However, three more embassies were received from Funan between 559 and 588, and further embassies were sent in the early seventh century. Funan was clearly an important maritime power during the third century C.E., and it was a center of Buddhist learning in the late fifth and early sixth centuries. It is widely regarded as an ancient, maritime precursor of the modern kingdom of Cambodia. Paul Pelliot (1903) pioneered the collection of information on Funan derived from Chinese sources; George Coedès (1968) added the evidence gleaned from inscriptions.

WILLIAM A. SOUTHWORTH

See also Buddhism, Mahayana; Champa; Chenla; China, Imperial; Chinese Tribute

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FUNCINPEC (UNITED NATIONAL FRONT FOR AN INDEPENDENT, NEUTRAL, PEACEFUL AND CO-OPERATIVE CAMBODIA)

FUNCINPEC is the Cambodian royalist political party founded in Pyongyang, North Korea, by Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1922–) in March 1981. Its name is an acronym for its full French title, usually translated as United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia.

In the aftermath of the Khmer Rouge era (1975–1979) in Cambodia, Sihanouk was living in comfortable exile in North Korea. Cambodia was governed by a pro-Vietnamese regime, following the Vietnamese invasion that had driven the Khmer Rouge from power. Sihanouk's patrons in Pyongyang and Beijing pressed him to form a united front with the Khmer Rouge faction, which operated a guerrilla army on the Thai-Cambodian border and occupied Cambodia's seat at the United Na-

tions. Sihanouk agreed reluctantly and designated his eldest son, Norodom Rannaridh, then a professor in France, as leader of the party. FUNCINPEC joined forces with the Khmer Rouge and with another anti-Vietnamese faction on the Thai-Cambodian border to confront the Vietnamese forces still occupying Cambodia. The three factions formed the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1982 and held Cambodia's UN seat until the early 1990s. FUNCINPEC candidates contested national elections sponsored by the United Nations in 1993 and won a majority of seats. But the incumbent former communist party forced the royalists into a coalition, which survived for several years but broke down in 1997 when Cambodia's prime minister, Hun Sen (1951–), carried out a *coup de force* (sudden successful strategy employed with overwhelming force/pressure) against his coalition partners. Under foreign pressure to

reinstate the coalition, Hun Sen agreed, but new elections in 1998 confirmed the popularity of his party vis-à-vis FUNCINPEC, whose fortunes declined sharply over the next two years.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Hun Sen (1951–); Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

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See Burma Research Society (1909); Plural Society

G

GAJAH MADA (t. 1331–1364) **Javanese Empire-Builder**

Gajah Mada's name is popular in post-Majapahit traditions, though in contemporaneous sources such as inscriptions and the literary work *Nāgarakērtāgama*, the name is also often spelled Gaja Mada. As the grand vizier (t. 1331–1364) of the kingdom of Majapahit during its heyday in the fourteenth century C.E., Gajah Mada served two sovereigns of Majapahit, namely Queen Tribhūvanatunggadewī (r. 1329–1350) and her successor son, King Râjasanegara Dyah Hayâm Wuruk (r. 1350–1389).

His career in serving the Majapahit kingdom began as a leader of the king's guard, when the king at the time was Tribhūvanatunggadewī's brother, King Sundarapandyadewa (r. 1309–1329)—more popularly known as King Jayanagara. The corps of the king's guard was called Bhayamkara (meaning “that generates fear” or “to be feared by the enemies”). (This name is presently used in the administration of the Republic of Indonesia as a denomination for the state police.) His praiseworthy achievement related to the incident of Badander, where he, as the chief guard, protected and hid King Jayanagara from the hazards of Kuti, the rebel Javanese nobleman. Kuti was then subjugated. That happened in the year śaka 1241 (the śaka years refer to the Burmese Era beginning in 78 c.e.), or around 1319 c.e. Presumably after these heroics, he assumed a position as rake mapatih ring Janggala Kadiri (head or chief minister of the

provinces Janggala and Kadiri); his name was mentioned (as Pu Mada) in an undated inscription of Walandit. His appointment as grand vizier (freely translated from the titles used, such as sang mantry-apatih, rakryan sang mapatih, or sang mantry-adhimantri, which is normally mentioned as the first among high dignitaries) was the pinnacle of his illustrious career.

The mention of *Janggala Kadiri* may mean just a territorial part of the great kingdom of Majapahit, which consisted of several other regions, such as Wurawan and Madhura (Madura). However, it may also be symbolic of the general idea of unification. As it is mentioned in a much later chronicle (ca. early seventeenth century), the *Pararaton*, Gajah Mada was said to take an oath that he would not partake of pleasures (*amukti palapa*) until (the entire) *Nusantara* (regions overseas) came under the domination of Majapahit. The names of places mentioned in that text, excluding the hinterland of Majapahit itself such as Kadiri and Janggala, are Gurun, Seran (in Maluku), Tanjungpura (in Kalimantan), Haru, Pahang, Dampo (in Sumbawa), Bali, Sunda, Palembang (in Sumatra), and Tumasik (Singapore).

Nine years after the rebellion of Kuti, Tañca, the royal physician, assassinated King Jayanagara. Gajah Mada killed Tañca in śaka 1250 (1328). A year later, Tribhūwanatunggadewī, the princess of Jiwana and Jayanagara's sister, was put on the throne of Majapahit. In 1331, Gajah Mada was sent to vanquish Sadeng and Keta, the enemies

of Majapahit. Thereafter, his position was raised, and he became “the protector of the kingdom.” According to the *Nāgarakērtāgama* in the year śaka 1265 (1343), Gajah Mada led an expedition to subjugate Bali. An inscription at the posterior of a statue of Mañjuśrī found at Candi Jago in East Java, from the year 1341, mentioned that in his campaigns to Bali, Gajah Mada was accompanied by Adityawarman, a prince of the Singhasāri-Majapahit line of descent who later became a king in Sumatra. From such evidence, it can be surmised that the conquest of Bali took several years; Bali was finally subjugated in 1343. An account of Gajah Mada’s death in the year 1364 is noted in the *Nāgarakērtāgama*.

Gajah Mada’s popularity in traditional historiography spills over into fictional literature. Works possibly written in the late seventeenth century, called the *Kidung Sunda* and the *Kidung Sundayana*, dramatically rendered, were supposedly based on a short account in the *Pararaton*. The chronicle related historical incidents in which Gajah Mada played a significant role, namely, the defeats of Dempo and Sunda in the year śaka 1279 (1357). Even in the twentieth century, a poetical work in Old Javanese composed in Bali, the *Kakawin Gajah Mada*, narrated Gajah Mada’s story from his divine birth to the peak of his career in Majapahit. As P. J. Zoetmulder (1974) observed, there are many details in this fiction that are incongruous with historical accounts.

EDI SEDYAWATI

See also Bali; Hayām Wuruk (Rajasanagara) (r. 1350–1389); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Java; Kadiri (Kediri); Madura; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); *Nusantara*; Palembang; *Pararaton* (Book of Kings); Singhāsari; Tumasik (Temasek)

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GALLEON TRADE

Spurring Asia-Pacific Commercial Links

Prior to the nineteenth century, the commerce of the Spanish colony in the Philippines was built around a single activity known as the galleon trade. The strategic location of Manila

off the Chinese mainland and its colonial links with the Americas ensured that the port became an important entrepôt from the late sixteenth century onward. Manila merchants acted as middlemen in the exchange of New World silver brought by galleon across the Pacific for the luxury merchandise of East and South Asia. Initially, this trade was conducted by Manila together with the Viceroyalties of New Spain (Mexico) and Lima and proved highly lucrative. Effective lobbying by the merchants of Seville and Cádiz, who felt their commercial position in the American market was threatened, and mercantilist fears about the drain of silver to China led the Spanish monarch to end unrestricted shipping. Laws passed between 1591 and 1604 confined sailing between China and Manila to the Mexican port of Acapulco and restricted those able to engage in it to Spanish residents of the Philippines. Trade was further constrained to only two galleons of 300 tons a year (raised to 560 tons in 1729), and limits were placed on the value of the goods carried: America-bound merchandise was not to exceed 250,000 pesos in value and that of the return cargo of bullion 500,000 pesos. Reshipment of goods between New Spain and South America was strictly prohibited, but this rule was difficult to enforce. In the Philippines, the Spaniards' inability to discover workable mines of precious metals and their disinclination to engage in tropical agriculture largely confined economic activity in the colony to the galleon trade. Moreover, the duties levied on cargoes at Acapulco (10 percent *ad valorem*, subsequently raised to 16.6 percent) were returned to the Philippines, along with an annual subsidy known as the *situado* to cover the yearly administrative deficit of the Manila treasury.

All Spanish residents in the Philippines were theoretically considered to be merchants and thus able to engage in this trade. A galleon's hold was divided into parts equal to a bale, or *fardo*, with each bale being further subdivided into four *piezas* (packages). The right to ship merchandise was then allotted by a system of *boletas*, or vouchers, that corresponded to one *pieza* each with a nominal value of 125 pesos. Vouchers were supposedly distributed according to individual needs and resources as determined by the governor-general. In 1604, however, the governor-general was forced to share this privilege with a *junta de repartimiento* (board

of apportionment) representing the principal interests of the Spanish community (royal government, church, "city and commerce"); it was subsequently replaced by a *consulado* (the executive of a mercantile guild) of merchants in 1769. However, as the governor and board members were also the chief beneficiaries of any such apportionment and wielded inordinate influence in colonial society, the system was open to abuse. Charges of fraud and nepotism were commonplace; governors-general reserved up to 45 tons of a vessel's cargo for themselves, and in one instance, a governor-general did not provide any space at all for citizens. The selling of vouchers also became common practice during the seventeenth century, as many of those who were allotted vouchers (such as common soldiers and widows) lacked the means to purchase exportable merchandise. Though such sales were forbidden by decree in 1638, vouchers continued to be illegally exchanged. Eventually, in 1734, the law was relaxed to permit widows and orphans to sell vouchers openly to active merchants.

The most flagrant circumvention of the restrictions occurred in regard to the issue of a cargo's value. Trade was supposedly highly regulated, with the governor-general of the Philippines providing the viceroy in New Spain with a report on the distribution of space. At the same time, a treasury official in Acapulco inspected the arriving cargo to ensure that it complied with the manifest and that the vessel did not carry contraband. In practice, though, the values of cargoes in both directions were regularly underestimated, and ships frequently carried the equivalent of 6,000, 12,000, or even 18,000 *piezas* in some years (the officially permissible number was 4,000). Nor were the tonnage restrictions strictly enforced, and some galleons were as large as 2,000 tons by the eighteenth century. Despite periodic incremental revisions of the *permiso* (the allowable value) from 300,000 pesos outgoing in 1702 to 500,000 pesos in 1734 and 750,000 pesos in 1776, with return cargoes double these amounts, galleons continued to regularly carry from 1.5 million to 3 million pesos during the galleon trade's last century of operation. Space was made by piling the decks high with chests and bales, stowing away the cannons, and depending on qualls at sea to replenish minimal water supplies. Officers, crew, and passengers

also filled their chests of “personal” belongings with silks and other trade items. Additional cargo was often loaded during the ship’s progress through the island-studded channels along the south coast of Luzon en route to Mexico. When the *Covadonga* was captured in 1742, for example, it was found to be carrying 1,313,843 pesos in pieces of eight and 35,632 ounces of bullion, with many of the coins secreted in the rind of cheeses and the silver stuffed into the vessel’s beams and timbers. The accounting for cargoes was made even more difficult by a legal loophole that exempted Filipino goods and repatriated proceeds from previous voyages from the limits imposed by the permiso.

Much of the capital used in the Manila-Acapulco trade was supplied by the Obras Pías. These were pious foundations composed of lay brothers affiliated with religious orders such as the Hermandad de la Misericordia de Manila, a group of virtuous gentlemen originally formed to raise alms and provide charitable services. Granted space on the galleons from which to finance these activities, they grew immensely rich on the proceeds of trade. Moreover, the various legacies of the *hermanos* (brothers) and other wealthy benefactors often specifically apportioned a third part of their bequest for use in the Acapulco trade. The income derived from such ventures not only supported the foundations’ good works but also was lent out at interest to others engaged in the galleon trade, the funds having the character of both bank loan and marine insurance. Over time, this commercial involvement would make the Obras Pías a powerful economic force in the colony, and by the end of the eighteenth century, they operated much in the capacity of a professional banking system run by salaried officials experienced in financial matters.

The galleon trade itself drew on the full spectrum of goods available in the East, attracting silks from the north (China and Japan), spices from the south (Southeast Asia), and cottons and ivory from the west (Indian subcontinent). More specifically, exports to Mexico included textiles, porcelain, ivory (especially carved religious images), furniture (inlaid and lacquered items), metalwork (from grills and delicate filigrees to cast-iron pots), various foods and plants (rice, tea, mangoes, orchids, and other flowering species), and occasionally

slaves. Carpets from Persia, precious stones from India and Burma (Myanmar), rich hangings and bedcoverings from Bengal, cinnamon from Ceylon, pepper from Java and Sumatra, balsam from Cambodia, camphor from Borneo, civet from the Ryukyu Islands, and silverware from Japan also figured among the items transported. Domestic Philippine exports included gold dust, wax, cordage, various kinds of sheeting, and some textiles but never amounted to more than 10 percent of the total value of the shipment. Return cargoes constituted mainly silver (from 90 to 99 percent) in the form of irregular cob coins and minted dollars (after 1732), along with some American products (cochineal, cacao, leather bags) and transshipped Spanish products such as wine, olive oil, and woolen cloth. Of more importance was the transfer of New World plants, some of which enriched the diets of Filipinos (maize, papaya, cassava, tomatoes, eggplant, and potatoes); others subsequently became important commercial crops, such as tobacco, indigo, maguey, cacao, pineapple, and coffee.

The galleons were mainly constructed in the Philippines (except one built in Siam [Thailand] and another in Japan). They were made of native hardwoods (almost impervious to contemporary cannonballs), fitted with cordage prepared from local abaca, and had sails manufactured in the Ilocos; only the metal fittings were imported from China, Macao, Japan, or India. Filipinos also constituted the workforce employed in their construction (through the *repartimiento*, or *polo*, system of forty days’ annual corvée labor) and between 50 and 80 percent of the crews that sailed in them.

Initially conceived of as a means to provide gainful livings for Spanish settlers in the islands, the trade gradually became concentrated in fewer and fewer hands as rich merchants monopolized the cargo space and bought up the vouchers of others. When the galleon *San Martín* sailed for Acapulco in 1586, the merchandise it carried belonged to 194 persons, but when the *San Andrés* sailed two centuries later, its cargo was the property of just 28 individuals. A law of 1769 that restricted trading to Spaniards with ten years of residence in the archipelago and in possession of 8,000 to 10,000 pesos in capital only further constrained participation. Moreover, even at the best of times, the galleons remained an erratic source of income

for the colony, subject to the vagaries of weather, the arrival of junks from China, the state of the market in Mexico, and the deprivation of corsairs. The failure of a galleon could plunge Manila into a financial crisis, as happened when the *San Javier*, bound for Acapulco, sank with its entire cargo in 1705 or when the returning galleon of 1709 was wrecked. The distress was particularly acute when a succession of such events occurred, as was the case when the *situado* failed to arrive in the three years prior to 1721. In all, 30 of the 108 galleons that sailed between 1565 and 1815 (or nearly a third) were lost to shipwreck or capture (4 of them fell to the English).

It is estimated that in the span of more than two hundred years of the galleon trade, more than 250 million pesos in silver and 50 million in gold were carried from Acapulco to Manila. Cyclical analyses of trade reveal five discernible periods: expansion between 1580 and 1620, severe contraction from 1620 to 1670, recovery between 1670 and 1720, mild recession between 1720 and 1750, and brief expansion again after 1750. In 1773, the galleons were allowed to call at Californian ports for the first time, but despite such new initiatives, there was a gradual overall decline in the trade during the eighteenth century, leading to the gradual immiseration of even formerly wealthy Spanish families. Many factors contributed to this deterioration. They included embezzlement, corruption, overtaxation, the loss of ships, the British seizure of Manila (1762–1764), and the inroads made by English and French merchants. The drain of silver to China, the increased competition of industrial products from Western Europe, the establishment of the Royal Philippine Company (1785), and the outbreak of the Mexican War of Independence in 1810 further contributed to the overall decline. By 1790, the decline was irreversible, and the last galleon, aptly called the *Magallanes*, set sail for Mexico in 1811.

In the context of East Asian commerce, however, the galleon trade was an innovative one, stimulating increased traffic between China and the Philippines, linking the archipelago to a world economy based on Seville and the Atlantic, and making Manila the first primate city (large urban center) in Southeast Asia.

GREG BANKOFF

See also *Consulado*; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Manila; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898)

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GAMA, VASCO DA (1459–1524)

Precursor of Portuguese Imperialism

Vasco da Gama's fame rests on his discovery of the sea route to India, which made possible the foundation of the Portuguese Empire in Asia. Da Gama was born in Sines about 1459 into a family of minor Portuguese nobility. As a young man, he had some experience as a seafarer, but little is known about his life before 1497. The Portuguese king Manuel I (1495–1521) gave him the command of a fleet of four ships, with instructions to sail to India. His mission was to complete the work begun by Bartolomeu Dias, the first Portuguese to sail around the Cape of Good Hope (1487–1488). He was to identify the principal spice markets and to persuade any

Christian rulers he might encounter to join an alliance of Christian powers against Islam. On 20 May 1498, he landed near Calicut, India. He was coolly received by its Hindu ruler, the *samorin*, whom he believed to be a Christian, and soon incurred the hostility of the powerful Muslim traders in the city. He left Calicut, with a small cargo of spices, at the end of August 1498 but did not reach Lisbon until September 1499.

In 1500, Manuel I dispatched another, larger fleet to India, commanded by Pedro Álvares Cabral. Cabral also soon fell out with the Muslim merchants in Calicut and so bombarded the city and made alliances with the rulers of Cochin and Cannanore, who were opposed to the *samorin*. In 1502, Vasco da Gama, now ennobled as conde da Vidigueira, was again sent to India, with an even larger fleet, to punish Calicut—which he did with appalling ferocity—and to establish the Portuguese permanently as a naval and military power in India capable of wresting control of trade in the Indian Ocean from Muslim hands. In 1503, he returned to Portugal and remained there until 1524, when he went once more to India as viceroy. He died in Cochin on Christmas Day in that year.

JOHN VILLIERS

See also Albuquerque, Afonso de (ca. 1462–1515); Portuguese Asian Empire; Spices and the Spice Trade

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GARNIER, FRANCIS (1839–1873) Explorer of the Mekong

A naval officer, a colonial official, and, most important, an explorer of the Mekong River, Francis Garnier typified the generation of convinced and energetic French colonialists who served in Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1860s

and 1870s. Second in command of the 1866–1868 French Mekong River expedition, he became its leader after the death of Ernest Doudart de Lagrée (1823–1868) and was later responsible for the publication of the expedition's official report. In 1873, he was killed while heading an unofficial attempt to establish a new French colonial position in northern Vietnam.

The son of a retired army officer, Garnier was born on 25 July 1839 at Saint-Étienne in central France. Baptized as Marie Joseph François (Francis) Garnier at birth, he was known by his shorter name throughout his brief but adventurous life. Entering the French naval college at Brest against the wishes of his family in 1848, he participated in the French conquest of southern Vietnam (Cochin China) in 1860. After recuperating from a tropical illness, he returned to France's new colony in Vietnam as an inspector of native affairs in 1862 and took up his post in Cholon, Saigon's twin city. In this position, Garnier was among a small group of officials who lobbied the French government to explore the Mekong River, arguing that this would open up the possibility of profitable trade with China using the river as a transportation route.

As second in command of the Mekong Commission, as it was called, Garnier displayed great energy and personal courage, among other things overcoming serious illness in the expedition's early stages. In terms of French hopes that the Mekong would be navigable and that commercial opportunities would be found in China, the expedition was a failure. From the point of view of exploring previously unknown territory, however, the expedition was of the greatest importance. Throughout the expedition, which lasted for more than two years, Garnier played a major part in surveying and mapping more than 6,000 kilometers (3,759 miles) of the river and surrounding territory. He also compiled a mass of information on political and ethnographic aspects of the regions through which the expedition traveled. Assuming leadership of the expedition when Lagrée died in China in March 1868, he led it to its conclusion in June of that year.

Returning to France, Garnier was the principal author of the magnificent official account of the expedition, contained in two volumes of

text and another two devoted to maps and illustrations. Yet his achievements excited remarkably little interest in France, a fact that Garnier resented deeply. However, he shared an award with the famous Scottish explorer and missionary David Livingstone (1813–1873) at the 1869 Geographical Congress in Antwerp. The following year, he was honored by the Royal Geographical Society of London and awarded the society's Patron's Medal for an expedition that was described as "the happiest and most complete of the nineteenth century" (Osborne 1997 [1975]: 186).

Concerned for his financial future and bitter about France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), the recently married Garnier returned to the East in 1872 with the hope of beginning a commercial venture importing silk and tea from China. Nothing came of these plans. Instead, in October 1873, he answered an appeal for assistance from the French governor of Cochin China, Admiral Marie Jules Dupré (1813–1881), to extricate a French trader, Jean Dupuis, who was in difficulties with the Vietnamese authorities in Hanoi. The weight of evidence strongly suggests Dupré authorized Garnier to try to establish a new colonial position in northern Vietnam, but he was careful not to include this direction in the written orders he gave Garnier, since such action was contrary to the policy of the government in Paris.

Despite being briefly successful in gaining control over an area around Hanoi, Garnier was soon threatened by a combined force of Vietnamese troops and Chinese Black Flag bandits. Characteristically making a bold advance against these adversaries, Garnier was killed on 21 December 1873. The French authorities wholly disavowed his actions in Hanoi. It was only after a decade that his reputation was rehabilitated. A statue honoring Garnier was eventually erected in Paris in 1896.

A man of passionate beliefs and strong convictions, Francis Garnier was a loyal friend if sometimes a difficult companion for those who did not share his views. A firm supporter of France's advance in the Indochinese region, his association with the Mekong River prefigured the later French advance into the Lao territories at the end of the nineteenth century. Likewise, his actions in northern Vietnam set the stage for France's subsequent occupation of the



Portrait of Francis Garnier. (Milton Osborne)

whole of Vietnam in the 1880s. Above all, his role as a member of the Mekong River expedition ensured Garnier's status as one of the great explorers of the nineteenth century.

MILTON OSBORNE

See also Annam; Cochin China; Dupré, Marie Jules (1813–1881); French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Hanoi (Thang-long); Lagrée-Garnier Mekong Expedition 1866–1868); Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Saigon (Gia Dinh; Hồ Chí Minh City); Tonkin (Tongking); Travelers and Sojourners, European; Yunnan Province

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GENERAL COUNCIL OF BURMESE ASSOCIATIONS (GCBA) (1920)

Crystallizing the Burmese Nationalist Movement

The General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) succeeded the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) in 1920, as the earlier association was split by disagreement between those who were uncomfortable with the overt political focus the association was taking and those who wished to pursue more radical measures against the British colonial administration. Within the GCBA, the General Council of Sangha Samettgi (GCSS) became the vehicle for politically conscious Buddhist monks, or *pongyis*, concerned at the decline of monastic education and discipline within the Burmese Buddhist sangha (term denoting the Buddhist monkhood). They sought to unite the urban-based, Western-educated nationalist leadership with the rural masses in protest actions against the foreign domination of Burmese cultural and political life. There were precedents for this in the monk-led uprisings in Tenasserim, Toun-goo, and Tharrawaddy against the British in Lower Burma after Pegu was annexed in 1852. One of the politically active monks, U Ottama (1897–1939), had participated in the Indian National Congress Party's independence movement. Returning to Burma in 1921, he preached self-rule for Burma and urged monks to leave their monasteries to take up the national struggle.

In its 1921 conference in Mandalay, the GCBA had 12,000 affiliated associations, led by

the council's president, U Chit Hlaing. The split in the GCBA between those who advocated cooperation (led by U Ba Pe) and those who urged boycotting the Legislative Council elections resulted in a triumph for the latter group, which was led by U Chit Hlaing. At the first elections, twenty-eight members were elected to the Legislative Council. Sir Harcourt Butler (t. 1923–1927), the new governor in Burma, however, chose only one of these individuals for his Council of Ministers. Others, such as U Maung Gyi, were chosen from among the loyalists in the Twenty-One Party. Another group, the Golden Valley Party, supported the government. Thereafter, the GCBA was referred to as the Hlaing-Pu-Gyaw Party, reflecting the names of its leaders. The fragmentation in the GCBA after its sixteenth conference marked the end of the first phase of the nationalist movement. The Dyarchy reforms initiated by the British administration in India soon failed due to internal dissent within the nationalist group, leaving a suspicion of Western institutions and those who supported them (Maung Maung 1980: 35).

The GCBA drew support for its policy of noncooperation from younger monks, in particular the martyred U Wizara (1888–1929), whom U Ottama had sent to the Indian National Congress at Gaya. From 1927 to 1929, he was imprisoned by the British for his political activities, and he died on 19 September 1929 as a result of a 166-day hunger strike. As political dissent grew following the Rangoon University strike of 1920, the government's persecution of monks and leaders of village *wunthanu* (anti-colonial rural societies) increased. From 1928 to 1929, the colonial authorities imprisoned some 120 monks for political activities. Political agitation by the *pongyis* on 17 February 1939 led to a tragic massacre of monks, part of the concerted program of dissent that had gathered pace since the 1930 Hsaya San peasant revolt in Tharrawaddy District.

The Hsaya San revolt (1930–1931) and the formation of the Dobama Asiayone (We Burmans Association) by student activists at Rangoon University marked the transition from nonviolent to violent agitation, culminating in a series of labor and race riots during the late 1930s. Arising from economic hardship and repression, the Hsaya San rebellion quickly spread to other districts in the Pegu Yomas. From

Theyetkan village in Shwebo District, Hsaya San had been a member of the district GCBA. In August 1931, he was betrayed when he sent a local guide to a village for food; he was then tried by a special tribunal and hanged on 28 November 1931. The Hsaya San rebellion was the most serious challenge to the colonial authorities since 1886.

At Rangoon University, student leaders who gained experience in organizing nationwide mass protests advanced the nationalist cause. Under the tutelage of the Thakin movement (composed of members of Dobama Asiayone, including Aung San [1915–1947]), the cooperative government of Dr. Ba Maw (b. 1893), which had been formed following elections in November 1935 based on the new constitution and the Government of Burma Act of 1935, was undermined. This process began with the 1936 student strike at Rangoon University and was furthered by the oil field labor strike in Chauk, initiated on 8 January 1938, in the period leading up to the Pacific War (1941–1945).

Known as the BE 1300 Revolution, the thirty-four strikes affecting the oil industry, foundries, dockyards, steamer services, manufacturing plants, plantations, port labor, rice mills, and offices were a measure of how far the nationalist movement had come since the debating days of the YMBA. Marxist literature had begun circulating among the nationalist groups after the Hsaya San revolt in 1930. Thakin Thein Maung brought back more such works from the London Round Table Conference in 1932, where he had met Ashin Kyaw Sein, a member of the British Communist Party who introduced him to the League against Imperialism and for National Independence. (Established in 1919 in London, the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence was an ultranationalist, leftist group, comprising left-leaning elements, communists, and nationalists with close ties to international Marxism. It was closely allied to the Burma Reform League.) J. S. Furnivall (1878–1960) introduced further sources through his Burma Book Club (Trager 1959: 21). Steeped in such literature, the nationalist movement within the Dobama Asiayone soon split into communists and socialists, a legacy that would continue past independence on 4 January 1948 into the history of postcolonial Burma.

At the beginning of the Pacific War, the Burma Freedom Bloc had begun calling for the Burmese right to self-determination. The political agitation of the 1930s, the various associations and parties, and exposure to new ideologies provided a foundation for the leaders of the independence movement, mostly students at Rangoon University, to prepare to lead the nation. The achievement of the 1930s nationalist movement, inaugurated by the GCBA, was to bring together the urban and the rural, the educated and the working class, and the peasant and the office clerk in a genuine mass movement for Burmese independence. By the end of the 1930s, several Burmese political groups in addition to the Dobama Asiayone were actively seeking political change, among them the Sinyetha Wunthanu Aphwegyi of Dr. Ba Maw and the Myochit Party led by U Saw. The reforms of 1937 granted by the British colonial administration were too little, too late, as signified by the burning of the Union Jack at the high court by those who became the leaders of independent Burma (Myanmar).

HELEN JAMES

See also Aung San (1915–1947); Ba Maw, Dr. (b. 1893); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Decolonization of Southeast Asia; Great Depression (1929–1931); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; *Sangha*; Thakin (Lord, Master); University of Rangoon; *Wunthan Athin*; Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) (1906)

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GENEVA CONFERENCE (1954)

Birth of Two Vietnams

The Geneva Conference, which took place in the Swiss city from April to July 1954, was an outgrowth of a meeting among the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France in Berlin in January and February. It was intended to seek a settlement of the war in Korea, in which the Chinese had introduced troops that they called “volunteers,” hoping to thus avoid all-out war, and thus follow up the truce of July 1953. It failed in this regard, but it succeeded in bringing an end to the war in Indochina, which had been added to its agenda.

Whether in so doing it also averted a major war is less certain, though there was much apprehension about the possibility of a large-scale conflict at the time, especially in Britain—a fear that was only increased by news of the unexpected power of the hydrogen bomb. In retrospect, it seems unlikely, but the negotiations were conducted against that background. The attempts of Anthony Eden (t. 1951–1955), the British foreign secretary, to bring about a settlement were the more persistent, and his success is the more widely admired. But the United States saw his achievement as a defeat, not strictly in line with their goals of containment, and the process soured the Anglo-American relationship.

In Indochina, the Viet Minh, backed by Chinese aid and advice, had won striking successes against the French: these climaxed, after the conference had started, at Dien Bien Phu. Support for the war in France had never been

wholehearted, and by late 1953, leaders in the Joseph Laniel (1889–1975) government (1953–1954) were committed to peace without dishonor—a goal they hoped might be secured through international negotiation. But though the People's Republic of China (PRC), like the Soviet Union, had switched to a policy of coexistence, it was not prepared to abandon Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969). Nor did it want a colonial power to remain on its southern frontier.

What kind of deal, if any, was possible in these circumstances? The British believed it had to be some kind of partition of Vietnam. That would leave the Viet Minh with a north Vietnamese state, establish an independent Laos and Cambodia, and leave the Bảo Đại regime (t. 1949–1955) in the south. The British recognized that the division of Vietnam might only be temporary.

Such a deal accorded with the British desire for peace and Britain's pragmatic foreign policy. The United States, however, could not endorse the “loss” of territory to communism. It had no intention of introducing troops nor, indeed, of using the bomb. Its main objective was to keep the French fighting, while pressing them to complete the independence of the Indochina states.

A settlement was reached in July. A new French premier, Pierre Mendès-France (t. 1954–1955), had set himself a deadline for achieving one. The Chinese wanted a settlement in Indochina all the more because they had not gotten one in Korea, and the PRC's premier and foreign minister, Zhou Enlai (1898–1976), was ready to accept an independent Laos and Cambodia. The deal over Vietnam that Zhou impressed on Hồ effected a kind of partition based on military regrouping but envisaged unification elections in 1956. The Americans did not endorse the settlement but did not undertake any overt military action to oppose it.

The Americans' fear that the “loss” of the north would be followed by the “loss” of the south encouraged them to support the regime Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963) created in the south, which lasted from 1955 to 1963. So, too, did their experience in Korea: they drew a mistaken parallel between South Korea and South Vietnam.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also Bảo Đại (Vinh Tuy) (r. 1925–1945); China since 1949; Cold War; Decolonization of Southeast Asia; Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), Battle of; Domino Theory; Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Korean War (1950–1953); Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); Sino-Soviet Struggle; Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (Vietnam Independence League); Vietnam, North (Post-1945); Vietnam, South (Post-1945); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (Post-1945)

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GERMANS (GERMANY)

If they did not invent the term *Southeast Asia*, Germans and Austrians gave it a scholarly usage, even before the Pacific War (1941–1945) and before the creation of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's allied South-East Asia Command (SEAC) gave it popular and political currency. Franz Heger may have been the first to use the term in the title of a book—*Alte Metalltrommeln aus Sudostasien [Ancient Metaldrums from Southeast Asia]* (1902)—and the 1923 monograph entitled “Sudostasien” [Southeast Asia] gave Robert Heine-Geldern a claim to be the founder of Southeast Asian studies. Neither Germans nor Austrians possessed colonies in the area, and they could more readily adopt a regional approach, “not hampered,” as Donald K. Emmerson (1984: 5) put it, “by the geographic limits that preoccupation with a specific possession tended to place on the perspectives of land-controlling colonizers.”

Their lack of possessions did not mean that the Germans were without political effect, par-

ticularly after the creation of the Second Reich in 1871. The colonial powers were bound to consider that a major new European state might become a colonial rival, despite the disclaimers of the German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898). “For us in Germany,” he had said, “this colonial business would be just like the silken sables in the noble families of Poland who have no shirts on their backs” (quoted in Henderson 1993: 32). Action matched rhetoric: in 1871, he took Alsace-Lorraine from France but not Cochin China. “We are not rich enough to be offered the luxury of colonies,” he explained (quoted in Taboulet 1956: 579). Yet apprehension about Germany was a factor in Britain's decision to protect the security of the Straits by appointing residents in Perak and Selangor in 1874.

The presence of German ships and traders in Sulu alarmed the Spaniards and concerned the British. The British ambassador in Berlin was, however, assured in 1873 that Germany had “no wish or intention . . . to acquire transatlantic possessions in the Sulu Archipelago, or indeed in any other portions of the Globe” (Tarling 1978: 132). Refraining from a colonial policy, however, meant that it was “urgently . . . bound to secure German commerce from unjustifiable encroachments on the freedom of its movements.” Such were presented by the “paper claims” of other powers (Tarling 1978: 132, 147).

Bismarck's domestic politics shifted in 1879 when he offered the industrialists a protective tariff. That had its effect on the free-trading British, giving Lord Kimberley, secretary of state for the colonies, for example, an additional argument for granting a charter to the British North Borneo Company. Bismarck's adoption of a “colonial policy” should, however, be seen less as a further gesture to industrial interests than as a means of co-opting right-wing support. “All this colonial business is a fraud, but we need it for the elections” (quoting Winfried Baumgart, in Knoll and Gann 1987: 157). Bismarck tried to adopt a limited policy of “protection” that would not alienate other powers.

In 1884 and 1885, Bismarck took up the idea of a conference on the Congo; that conference was held in Berlin and was designed to prevent antagonism to Germany as a colonial power but also to gain it recognition as a world power. The conference was, in theory, confined to Africa, but in renewing the opposition to

“paper claims,” it was enunciating a principle of “effective occupation” that might be used elsewhere. The Dutch became more determined to round out their claims in eastern Indonesia, and the British established protectorates in Borneo. British premier William Gladstone (1809–1898) welcomed Germany’s colonial endeavor, however, and New Guinea was divided.

After the fall of Bismarck, the kaiser’s government adopted a more vigorous “world policy,” especially from 1897. The extension of the Spanish–American War (1898) to the Philippines the following year aroused the interest of all the powers. Prince Heinrich, then in command of the Asiatic squadron, cabled that the Filipinos were ready to place themselves under German protection. Bernhard von Bulow, the secretary of state, advised against allying with revolutionaries. But after the Peace of Paris, Germany agreed to pay Spain U.S.\$4.2 million for the Caroline, Pelew, and Mariana islands, except Guam, and the United States accepted the deal. These islands were to become Japanese mandates after the Great War (1914–1918).

German competition in trade and shipping aroused some jealousy in Singapore, and in the war, the interned Germans were connected with the mutiny of 1915. German expertise had, however, been welcomed in Siam, which sought to utilize a mix of foreign experts, including some from noncolonial states. Germans were particularly prominent in railway construction. Other states welcomed them, too. Lord Dalhousie, governor–general of India, appointed Dietrich Brandis as superintendent of forests in the newly acquired Pegu, Lower Burma, in 1855, and his first order became the basis for forest administration in India as a whole.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also British North Borneo Chartered Company (1881–1946); Colonialism; Imperialism; Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Residential System (Malaya); South-East Asia Command (SEAC); “Southeast Asia”; Spanish–American Treaty of Paris (1898); Straits Settlements (1826–1946); Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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GESTAPU AFFAIR (1965)

Annihilation of the Left

The Gestapu Affair was an ambiguous coup launched by junior military officers in Jakarta and Central Java on 1 October 1965, ostensibly to forestall a coup by senior officers that was allegedly scheduled for 5 October. The coup was thwarted by General Suharto (Soeharto) (1921–), who blamed it on the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) and used it as the pretext for a bloody purge of communists in which perhaps 500,000 people died.

Early on 1 October, military units arrived at the houses of seven conservative generals to arrest them. Three generals, including the army commander General Ahmad Yani (1922–1965), were shot while resisting arrest; three more were captured, and the seventh, Defense Minister General A. H. Nasution (1918–2000), escaped, though his daughter was killed. The survivors were taken to the Halim air force base in south Jakarta, where they were killed; their bodies were dumped in an unused well. Other troops seized important positions in central Jakarta, and both President Sukarno (1901–1970) and the PKI leader, D. N. Aidit (1923–1965), were taken to Halim. The ostensible leader of the coup, Lieutenant Colonel Untung, who was commander of President Sukarno’s palace guard, the Tjakrabirawa Regiment, then announced that the action had been launched to prevent a coup by a “council of generals” on 5 October. He also announced the formation of a revolutionary council to rule Indonesia as an interim government. A similar seizure of power took place in Central Java.

Untung, however, appeared to do little to consolidate his coup, and his forces were soon outmaneuvered by those of General Suharto, commander of Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (KOSTRAD, Army Strategic Reserve). The coup in Jakarta was crushed within twenty-four hours, and that in Central Java was put down within three days. The immediate leaders of the coup were tried in a special military tribunal (*Mahmillub*) and were sentenced to death or long prison terms. Suharto's forces, however, quickly claimed that the coup had been masterminded by the PKI, and on this basis, he launched a campaign of extermination against the party. The character of the killings varied widely from region to region. In some places, they were mainly the work of army units, especially Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (RPKAD, Army Paracommando Regiment). In other places, the army trained and armed civilian militias to carry out the killings, and in still other locations, social antagonisms were so strong that news of the coup and clear indications that killing would not be punished were enough to start massacres. The military further encouraged the killings by circulating false stories that the murdered generals had been sexually tortured by communist women before they were killed. The name Gestapu (from the acronym for the 30 September Movement) was adopted to link the coup with the methods of the Gestapo in Nazi Germany. There is almost no evidence on the number of people killed, but many scholars suggest that the figure was close to half a million.

The question of who organized the coup remains deeply contested, and reliable evidence is still scanty. The New Order maintained that the PKI organized the coup through a "Special Bureau" set up to infiltrate the military and that the actions in Jakarta and Central Java were only the first phase of a planned nationwide seizure of power in which the enemies of the PKI were to be massacred on a vast scale. Evidence of this broader plan is virtually nonexistent. The Special Bureau appears to have existed, but whether it instigated, encouraged, or simply observed the coup plans is unclear. As later events proved, the PKI was highly vulnerable to military suppression and would have had great interest in an action to weaken the military's power.

Sukarno's presence at Halim compromised him in the eyes of many people, and shortly after the coup, there was speculation that he might have instigated it to remove Yani and other obstructive generals. Little evidence has emerged to back this view. Further speculation has focused on General Suharto, for several reasons: because he was the most senior general not on the list to be kidnapped, because he was a friend of Untung and is known to have met one of the plotters a few hours before the coup, and because the incompetence of the plotters in consolidating the coup raises the suspicion that it was intended to fail. This theory attracted much attention in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto in 1998. It has also been suggested that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used agents in the PKI Special Bureau to instigate an unsuccessful coup as a pretext for destroying the party. Although this speculation cannot be dismissed, the evidence is perhaps more consistent with Suharto and/or the CIA having had some inkling of a plot and having seized the opportunity it presented rather than having engineered the affair.

The alleged treason of the PKI in 1965 became an important source of legitimacy for Suharto's New Order, and the anniversary of the coup was commemorated each year as Sacred Pancasila Day.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Nasution, Abdul Haris, General (1918–2000); Pancasila (Pantja Sila); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (Post-1945)

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Singapore prime minister Goh Chok Tong speaks to the media surrounded by supporters of his ruling People's Action Party after voting in national elections, 3 November 2001. (Reuters NewMedia Inc./Corbis)

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GISIGNIES, DU BUS DE

See Du Bus de Gisignies, Viscount Leonard Pierre Joseph (1780–1849)

GOH CHOK TONG (1941–)

Leading the “Second Generation”

Goh Chok Tong is the second person to have held the office of prime minister of Singapore, having succeeded Lee Kuan Yew (1923–) on 28 November 1990. He was born on 20 May 1941 in Singapore. After studying at Raffles Institution, he read economics at the University of

Singapore, graduating with first-class honors in 1964. He then joined the premier administrative service and was sent to Williams College in Massachusetts, where he graduated at the top of his class with an M.A. in developmental economics in 1967. Two years later, he was seconded to Neptune Orient Lines, the newly established national shipping company, as its planning and projects manager. Within four years, he became its managing director and was credited with having put the company back on its feet. In 1976, he was recruited by the finance minister, Hon Sui Sen (t. 1972–1983), to enter electoral politics. Within nine months of being elected to Parliament in the general elections of December 1976, Goh was promoted to senior minister of state for finance in 1977. In 1979, he became Singapore's first trade and industry minister, a post he held until 1981, when he moved to other portfolios in the Health and Defense Ministries. After the general elections in December 1984, Goh was picked by his cabinet colleagues to be first deputy prime minister and leader of the younger team to succeed the “first-generation” leaders. Though not Lee Kuan Yew's first choice, Goh succeeded him as prime minister in November 1990. He is distinguished from Lee, who remained in the cabinet as senior minister, by his more consultative political style. But like his predecessor, he is not averse to making tough and controversial decisions to ensure Singapore's sovereignty, political stability, social unity, and continual economic progress. One of the urgent tasks that he sets for himself is that of party and leadership renewal: to find a new group of men and women to lead Singapore in the twenty-first century.

ALBERT LAU

See also Lee Kuan Yew (1923–); Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1990s), *Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Singapore–Malaya/Malaysia Relations* (ca. 1950s–1990s)

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GOLD

All That Glitters

Gold, one of the most easily worked of all metals, is found in varying amounts (often along

with silver, copper, lead, tin, and zinc) in various parts of mainland and island Southeast Asia. It appears in Myanmar (Burma), Vietnam, the Philippines, the Malay Peninsula (West Malaysia), the islands of Sumatra, eastern and southern Kalimantan (Borneo), western and southern Sulawesi (Celebes), and eastern Indonesia. On Java, there are virtually no deposits of modern economic significance. Gold, though rarely found in large quantities, has been of economic importance for centuries and was one of the earliest exports from the region, along with spices, aromatics, and other forest products. With silver, it played a major role in the medieval and later trading systems of East and Southeast Asia and was an important part of early tribute systems throughout the region.

Early Indian sources refer to *Suvarnabhumi* (the land of gold) or to *Suvarnavipa* (the gold islands) of Southeast Asia. The Romans knew of the Malay Peninsula. Pliny mapped it as *Aurea Chersonesa* (the Golden Chersonese)—a source of gold, though its gold may have come from Sumatra. For centuries, India has had an insatiable demand for gold. Indeed, the earliest Indianizing influences in the archipelago are associated with the polities of Kutei in eastern Kalimantan, thought to have been established by the fifth century C.E., and the slightly later Tarumanegara in the Sundalands of western Java, both polities being founded in close proximity to alluvial gold sources. Those in Kalimantan are extensive and gave rise to the Busang gold hoax of the 1990s. In western Java, alluvial sources at Ponggol along the upper reaches of the Cikaniki River, which rises in the hills of Banten, may have been worked during the early Hindu period. These were lost, however, for centuries due either to earthquakes or landslides that covered the workings, only to be rediscovered in the 1980s. In Sulawesi, the Kalumpang Buddha, dated to the sixth century C.E., was discovered at a riverine settlement site on a route that leads to gold deposits in the interior. Although the arrival of outsiders may have stimulated a demand for gold, the metal apparently was appreciated by indigenous peoples in Southeast Asia long before the arrival of Indian and other traders.

By the early medieval period, the Hindu Buddhist polities of Central Java generated a strong demand for gold for use in rituals. Although Java is mentioned in historical records

as a source of gold, the precious metal would have been imported there in exchange for rice. The advanced skills of the Javanese gold workers are reflected in the magnificent jewelry and ritual utensils recovered in the ninth-century Wonoboyo hoard found near Yogyakarta, now in the National Museum in Jakarta. Cambodia also imported gold, having none of its own.

In Sumatra, Hindu and Buddhist images made from gold-washed copper-bronze appear to have been produced in preference to those of pure gold, possibly reflecting the relative difficulty in obtaining the metal. In medieval Kalimantan and Java, by contrast, images were made of pure gold.

Gold foil impressed with Chinese characters was recovered at Kota Cina, a medieval Tamil trading site in northeast Sumatra. China exported gold in preference to silver, and Chinese gold artifacts have been found in medieval shipwrecks. Unfortunately, in the past, most recoveries of earlier gold artifacts seem to have been simply melted down and reworked. Traditional gold-working methods exist among most peoples of the archipelago, with some very fine filigree jewelry made by the Acehnese and Malays. A large part of the modern gold trade is in the hands of Chinese goldsmiths.

Although almost all gold procured in the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian archipelago came from alluvial sources, gold was mined on a relatively large scale in Vietnam from the twelfth century on. In the archipelago, Pasai, Melaka, and Aceh produced small gold coins known as *mas* (gold). Gold dust would appear, however, to have been the most usual medium of exchange.

By the latter half of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth, immigrant Chinese exploited alluvial deposits in the Sambas region of western Kalimantan. Apart from a minor operation at the Salida mine under the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in western Sumatra between 1669 and 1735, there was little European interest in commercial gold exploitation in the Indonesian archipelago until the end of the nineteenth century. Western-style commercial gold exploitation has had a very checkered history.

In the Malay world, gold was panned from alluvial deposits that produce *mas urai* (loose gold) using a *dulang* (wooden pan). The Rejang people of the interior of Bengkulu in south-

west Sumatra used chicken feathers to extract gold dust from streams. Alluvial deposits do, however, tend to run out, and signs of earlier workings are no guarantee of any present-day presence of the metal. Modern indigenous, small-scale, alluvial gold-mining operations are often associated with acute mercury and cyanide poisoning.

E. EDWARDS MCKINNON

See also Borneo; Chinese Gold-Mining Communities in Western Borneo; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Java; Sumatra; *Suvarnabhumi* (Land of Gold)

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GOLKAR

Harnessing Loyalty

Golkar, a shortened form of Golongan Karya (Functional Groups), is a political party in Indonesia. Golkar was dominant under the regime of President Suharto (Soeharto) (t. 1967–1998).

After Indonesia's general elections of 1955, a large number of parties in Parliament kept the country politically divided. In reaction, President Sukarno (t. 1945–1967) established "guided democracy" in 1959 and furthered the establishment of an increasing number of "functional groups" that would replace political parties. In an effort to consolidate the political power base of the Indonesian army, senior army personnel established the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya) in October 1964. It was intended to be the coordinating body for almost 100 anticommunist social organizations but later became a federation of these organizations. In theory, Golkar was a nonpartisan organization representing the functional groups.

Under President Suharto's New Order, military men were appointed in administrative positions, and the military started to use Golkar as

its political vehicle. Effectively, Golkar became the government party and drew its strength from the fact that promotions, assignments, and appointments in the public service depended on the loyalty of public servants to Golkar.

In 1971, Golkar secured 236 of the 360 seats in the Indonesian Parliament. It supported the government's forced amalgamation of the remaining nine political parties into two parties. These opposition parties could not prevent Golkar from scoring overwhelming majorities in the subsequent parliamentary elections in 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997. Each of these elections was followed by the unopposed reelection of Suharto to the office of president.

Golkar's electoral success owed much to the pressure exerted on voters during elections by the various government agencies, particularly the regional public service. Polls were also managed to ensure its success. At least initially, Golkar's success was also due to the fact that the party was genuinely popular in several sections of society and willingly accepted in many others. When Golkar was opened to individual membership in 1983, it soon had around 9 million individual members (Reeve 1985: 220).

Golkar obtained 21 percent of the votes during the free elections in 1999 and became the biggest opposition party. It has since sought to cast off its reputation as Suharto's political machine. It remains a significant player in Indonesian politics because, unlike other parties, it has extensive resources and an organizational network that spans the entire nation.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Orde Baru (The New Order); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–)

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GREAT DEPRESSION (1929–1931)

Economies are subject to business cycles. The more they are integrated in the international economy through trade and investment, the more the business cycles of various countries will be synchronized. For that reason, the so-called Great Depression of the early 1930s re-

verberated more strongly in the Western world, where it originated, than in the rest of the world, including Southeast Asia.

The Depression was triggered by the bursting in October 1929 of an asset bubble caused by extensive speculation on the U.S. stock market. The deeper causes of the crisis were overproduction in various economic sectors, such as the automotive industry and in real estate, in the 1920s. Overproduction reduced the profitability of U.S. firms, but that was hidden by the sustained inflation of stock prices fueled by misguided optimism. The stock market crash brought underlying problems into the open and forced companies to reduce production and costs by dismissing workers and reducing wages. The severe macroeconomic contraction decreased U.S. imports from overseas. The crisis was first felt in Europe in 1930, after stock markets followed the U.S. trend and companies started to experience difficulties in exporting to the United States. European firms also started to lay off workers and reduce wages. The macroeconomic contraction in Western Europe was less severe than in the United States.

The gold standard made it impossible to use exchange rate devaluation as a buffer against having to import deflation, until some countries ceased gold-parity—for instance, the U.K. devalued in September 1931, the United States in April 1933, and France in September 1936. The crisis was also combated through severe trade restrictions to reduce imports and encourage import-substituting production. World trade was drastically reduced and became subject to stifling bilateral trade agreements.

The impact of the crisis in Southeast Asia was exacerbated by the buildup of excess production capacity in various export commodities such as rubber, sugar, copra, tobacco, tea, rice, and tin during the 1920s. For instance, Java achieved record sugar output levels as a consequence of the development of high-yielding cane varieties and the success of sugar factories in achieving economies of scale. But that happened at a time when various Western countries imposed restrictions on sugar imports. Rice production for export in Burma (Myanmar), Thailand (Siam), and South Vietnam reached record levels in the 1920s, and rice prices started to fall after 1928. Rubber trees that had been planted when rubber prices peaked in the late 1910s were ready for tapping

by the early 1920s, thereby increasing production. Consequently, the prices of the region's main export commodities fell during the late 1920s.

The price decrease accelerated in 1930 and 1931, when firms in the United States and Europe scaled back imports of primary commodities. Particularly the contraction of overseas automobile production caused a decline in the demand for rubber for car tires, affecting rubber producers in Indonesia, Malaya, and Vietnam. Their initial reaction was to increase output for export in an effort to beat declining prices, thus exacerbating the price drop. In particular, rubber producers with low marginal costs of production increased output. The initial reaction of other producers of primary commodities was the same. However, orders decreased, and access to foreign markets became more restricted. Consequently, the deterioration of the terms of trade was much worse for commodity-exporting nations than for exporters of manufactures. The decline in both the volume of exports and commodity prices led export revenues to reach rock bottom in 1932 throughout Southeast Asia, as the accompanying table shows.

The crisis in the United States and Europe also affected Southeast Asia in the monetary sphere. Preceding the 1929 crisis, the speculative stock market boom had led to increases in interest rates as well as reduced lending to less developed parts of the world, including Southeast Asia. The onset of the crisis led to bank collapses in North America and Europe, which intensified international credit scarcity, including in Southeast Asia. Higher interest rates were difficult to absorb in the region's export industries, because by the late 1920s they were already operating with small profit margins. Falling export revenues caused firms to default on their debts, which in turn reduced the international creditworthiness of Southeast Asia.

Colonial governments in the region (except for Thailand) were to different degrees dependent on taxing foreign trade. They saw their revenues decline. Although some governments increased borrowing, all had to cut expenditure drastically, mainly by dismissing public servants. Export revenues and reserves were insufficient to sustain imports. Limited reserves also made it difficult to qualify for loans to sustain imports.

The macroeconomic contraction was worsened by the monetary regimes of countries in Southeast Asia. When the crisis hit, all had a gold exchange standard according to which the value of their currencies was fixed relative to a gold-based international currency. Such monetary regimes made it difficult to use currency devaluation as a buffer to reduce the overseas cost of their export products. The regimes forced countries to import deflation. Some relief came for Burma, Thailand, and Malaya when the U.K. devalued the pound in September 1931 and for the Philippines when the United States devalued the dollar in April 1933. In contrast, French Indochina and colonial Indonesia had to wait until September 1936.

An earlier devaluation of the guilder would have relieved the plight particularly of Indonesia. Given the small size of the Dutch market, Indonesia could not benefit from preferential trade agreements with The Netherlands. Devaluation would have been possible, because Indonesia effectively had its own currency—the guilder—which was kept at par with the Dutch guilder in The Netherlands. On the other hand, devaluation might not have had much effect. Indonesia's access to commodity markets for sugar and rubber had been severely restricted. Indonesia had the highest level of foreign debt in the region, largely denominated in the gold-based Dutch guilder. A devaluation of the guilder in Indonesia would have increased the cost of servicing that debt and would have made it difficult for the colonial government to borrow on the Dutch capital market in order to dampen the fall in public expenditure in Indonesia.

International import restrictions meant that goods were traded on the basis of bilateral trade agreements rather than price, quality, and delivery terms. Thus the recovery in Southeast Asia was assisted by the preferential trade arrangements that the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, and Indochina had with, respectively, the United States, the British Commonwealth, and France.

The Philippines suffered less from the crisis, because of the preferential access for Philippine sugar to the protected U.S. market. In fact, sugar production in the Philippines increased during the 1930s. In contrast, sugar from Java suffered severely from declining free-market prices and rising protectionism in Japan, India, and Europe following the 1931 Chadbourne Agreement. Sugar producers in Java did not

have a benefactor, as the Dutch market was too small to absorb Java sugar. Sugar production had to be scaled back dramatically in Indonesia.

Rice producers in Burma benefited from lower import duties in India and Malaya on Burmese rice than for Thai rice, while rice producers in South Vietnam were supported by the fact that France and its colonies gave preferential treatment to Vietnamese rice and significantly increased rice imports after 1930. In contrast, Thai rice producers faced depressed international prices.

At the micro level, the crisis started to take its toll in 1932. Increasing numbers of firms were unable to find sufficient markets for their produce or were unable to meet production costs. The initial reaction had been to reduce production costs by lowering wages and dismissing workers, but by 1932 more were forced to close down. In particular, the labor-intensive plantations and mines in Malaya and Sumatra released hundreds of thousands of migrant workers from China, India, and Java.

Small indigenous producers of products such as rice, rubber, and copra chose instead to increase production in an effort to offset lower prices. For instance, rubber farmers in Sumatra and Kalimantan increased production until the colonial government in Indonesia entered the 1934 International Rubber Regulation Agreement and imposed a production quota system to curtail output and stabilize prices. Thai rice producers also maintained high levels of export production. Thai rice found ready markets throughout Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, where imports of cheap Thai rice—and also cheap Japanese manufactures such as textiles—increased quickly as a consequence of the fact that the Indonesian guilder remained linked to gold until September 1936.

The literature on the crisis in Southeast Asia is dominated by concern about the consequences for the standard of living. It was argued that the crisis exacerbated the plight of the rural poor, leading them to resist payment of land taxes to governments and of debt to moneylenders. That led to peasant uprisings and a heightened level of political radicalization that precluded later calls for independence. However, the available evidence reveals a mixed experience. In Indochina, the colonial government insisted on land tax payments, while the colonial administration in the Philippines and In-

Crisis and Recovery of Exports and Government Revenues, 1929–1938

	Burma	Thailand	Indochina	Malaya	Indonesia	Philippines
A. Commodity exports from Southeast Asia (million U.S.\$)						
1929	249	97	125	378	588	164
1932	115	54	43	76	217	100
1935	201	70	85	226	301	102
1938	183	90	82	238	360	147
Crisis: fall 1929–1932	-54%	-44%	-66%	-80%	-63%	-39%
Recovery: 1932–1938	59%	67%	91%	213%	66%	47%
B. Government expenditure in Southeast Asia (million U.S.\$)						
1929	92	47	42	121	369	42
1932	64	26	24	88	253	40
1935	96	41	37	86	324	38
1938	60	59	26	143	355	70
Crisis: fall 1929–1932	-30%	-45%	-43%	-27%	-31%	-5%
Recovery: 1932–1938	-6%	127%	8%	63%	40%	75%

SOURCE: Calculated/compiled from export and government expenditure data from Mitchell, B. R. 1993. *International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia & Oceania*. London: Macmillan.

Indonesia turned a blind eye to tax evasion. In Burma rising rural indebtedness indeed led to increased landlessness as Chettyar (Chettiar) moneylenders foreclosed on land that marginal farmers had put up as collateral. Rural indebtedness increased in Indonesia as well, but it did not lead to a similar degree of increased landlessness because Chinese moneylenders were prohibited from owning agricultural land and would not accept it as collateral.

Recent research has emphasized that the impact of the crisis varied across Southeast Asia, depending on the dependence of income earners on export production. For instance, urban wage laborers experienced an increase in their standard of living as retail prices fell faster than wages. In rural areas, farmers changed to the production of nonexport crops for domestic markets where technically possible and economically feasible.

Perhaps the crisis was more important for its long-term impact. In particular, it instilled among local nationalists a sense of lasting mistrust of economic forces and of colonialism. Reflecting international trends, governments in the region implemented trade policies that furthered

domestic industrial production in an effort to reduce dependence on international commodity markets and to diversify economies. Such remedies established the foundations for inward-looking development policies that became prominent after the Pacific War (1941–1945).

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Banks and Banking; Chettiars (Chettyars); Cocoa; Coffee; Labor and Labor Unions in Southeast Asia; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Rice in Southeast Asia; Rubber; Sugar; Taxation; Tobacco; Trade and Commerce of Southeast Asia (ca. Nineteenth Century to the 1990s)

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GREAT WAR (1914–1918)

Conflict between Imperialists

Southeast Asia was involved in the 1914–1918 Great War only indirectly, whereas it was twice fought over in the 1941–1945 Pacific War. Yet it was, inevitably, affected by the Great War, which is also referred to as World War I or the European War.

Controversy over the origins of the war dates back to its outbreak but was intensified by the horrors of the trench warfare into which it rapidly descended and by its unexpected length. The victorious Allies (mainly Britain and France, and the United States) were to pin guilt upon the Germans, though they did not, as after World War II (1939–1945), proceed with the trial of war criminals. Historians are

less confident about attributing guilt, but the investigations and reconsiderations that have continued to take place have led to something of a consensus that the German leaders bore a predominant share of responsibility for the deterioration in international relations that preceded the war and for the outbreak itself.

After the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II (1859–1941) in 1890 and especially after 1897, the Germans had spoken of achieving "world power" and pursued *Weltpolitik* (playing a role in world affairs and politics). What they meant was not always clear, though not the less alarming to other powers in consequence. Perhaps the best definition relates German aspirations to those of the British, the predominant nineteenth-century power, and those of the Americans and the Russians. The potential of the United States and Russia seemed so great that they were likely to dominate the world of the twentieth century, territorially and economically. The Germans could not wait for the achievement of economic success, which would certainly take them past Britain, though not the United States. To be sure of obtaining a share of world power, moreover, they believed they would need a secure base in Europe, and since Europe could, at most, sustain only one power with worldwide influence, the British had to see the wisdom in stepping aside and accepting German leadership in Europe. What Britain perceived, however, was a threat to its security and even its independence, and it sought to uphold the resistance of other powers to German hegemony.

Baffled and frustrated, the Germans attempted an open challenge to "encirclement." At most, they expected a short war; it would quickly resolve a diplomatic impasse, and the troops would be home by Christmas. They failed, however, to secure the rapid victory they anticipated. Nor did they admit defeat. The war extended, drawing in other powers—even, in 1917, the United States itself. It also challenged the organization of the individual states and their capacity to mobilize their human and material resources. The weakest of the Great Powers (though the most populous)—Russia—could not meet the challenge. The czarist regime was overthrown in Russia, and in October 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power. At the end of the war, the German and Austrian monarchies were also overthrown. At the same

time, the victorious European powers had themselves been profoundly challenged. The involvement of the Americans on their side had committed them to a more idealistic approach to international affairs, set out, for example, in U.S. president Woodrow Wilson's (1856–1924) Fourteen Points (which called for greater liberalism in international affairs and supported national self-determination) and the creation of the League of Nations.

The extension of the war to Asia was more indirect than direct. Germany was deprived of its colonial possessions, but those were mostly in Africa and the Pacific. Its Turkish ally was dismantled, though by no means without conflict or without effect on Islam. One way in which Turkey sought to fight back was by supporting Indian revolutionaries, particularly the Ghadr movement, radical and militant Indian nationalists of the Ghadr (Mutiny) Party. The future of India was, however, more affected by the concessions the British felt they had to make, given their increasing use of the Indian army. Those culminated in the Montagu declaration of 1917, which made it clear that India was destined for self-government within the empire.

In the first war, unlike the second, Japan was the ally, not the opponent, of Britain. Tokyo took advantage of its position to secure the German concessions in Shandong (Shantung) and to exert pressure on divided postrevolutionary China while the Europeans were otherwise occupied, presenting the so-called Twenty-One Demands in 1915. It also enjoyed major economic opportunities, becoming a creditor rather than a debtor nation in this phase. The British needed Tokyo's friendship, but they also wanted to restrain Japan, feeling that the help Japan offered in the Singapore mutiny of 1915 was too demonstrative. The British felt that the efficient and powerful force of the Japanese should be concentrated on China rather than on British territory.

In Southeast Asia, the colonial structure was unaffected by the war. In the Great War, unlike the Pacific War, the Dutch were neutral. The British consul general thought that the government in Batavia leaned toward the German side, but the Foreign Office gave no support to his suggestion that Japan should be given part of eastern Indonesia. Britain's object was to maintain the status quo for as long and as far as

possible. That remained its postwar policy: though victorious, it had been greatly weakened by the war.

The ideologies the war promoted were also to have their effect in the longer term. Burma was to seek the self-rule Britain had promised India. Even the Dutch were moved to set up the *Volksraad* (People's Council). They and, to a lesser extent, the other colonial powers faced an upsurge in communism after 1917. Nationalists did not have the opportunity they found in the Pacific War—to secure independence out of a worldwide struggle—but the struggles among their metropolitan powers suggested the possibility of change. Some Southeast Asians were directly involved in the conflict. Though they made no political concessions in Indochina, the French recruited seventeen Indochinese battalions to fight in the Balkans and on the western front. Siam declared war in 1917 in the hope of enhancing its status and ending the unequal treaties.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also Constitutional Developments in Burma (1900–1941); Germans (Germany); Japan and Southeast Asia (pre–1941); Preservation of Siam's Political Independence; Russia and Southeast Asia; *Volksraad* (Peoples Council) (1918–1942)

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**GREATER EAST ASIA
CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE
Imperial Japan's Aspiration**

Establishing the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" was the official goal of the Japanese government when it waged the war in Asia and the Pacific that began on 8 December 1941. The concept implied that Japan would liberate

East and Southeast Asia from Western colonial rule and create a co-prosperity sphere under its leadership. In reality, however, it was a pretext for Japan to invade, occupy, and rule Asian countries. The term was first announced by the Japanese foreign minister, Matsuoka Yosuke (1880–1946), on 1 August 1940. Previously, a few cadres of the military proposed to establish the “East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” around 1938. The sphere was to contain Japan, Manchuria, North China, and Mongolia as the “self-relying” sector; Siberia, central and southern China, and the parts of Southeast Asia located east of Burma (Myanmar) as the defense sector; and India and Australia as the economic sector.

According to Matsuoka, the sphere would encompass Japan, Manchuria, and China as the basic unit, with the South Sea area, consisting of Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), French Indochina, and Thailand, as the supplemental unit. In September 1940, British Malaya, Borneo, Burma, and India were added (India could be put in the Soviet survival bloc). Originally, the decisive objective was proclaimed to be securing the important strategic resources in East and Southeast Asia. However, from around September 1940 on, liberation of the area was advocated. The second objective was apparently to procure Asian peoples’ support for Japan’s war against the Western powers. In Japan, there are still individuals who insist that as a result of this policy, Asian countries were able to attain independence much earlier. Few Asians, however, concur with this thesis.

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See also “Asia for the Asiatics”; Japan and Southeast Asia (pre-1941); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945)

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GUANGZHOU (CANTON)

See China, Imperial; Chinese Tribute System

**GUIDED DEMOCRACY
(DEMOKRASI TERPIMPIN)**

Indonesian Style of Governance

Guided Democracy was a semiauthoritarian regime introduced by President Sukarno (t. 1945–1967) in Indonesia from 1957 to 1959. The system led to economic decay and sharp political tension, and it collapsed in late 1965 in the aftermath of the Gestapu Affair.

Guided Democracy was a confluence of four processes. First, it was an expression of Sukarno’s drive to place his person at the center of Indonesian politics. He had been the most important nationalist leader since 1927 and president since 1945, but he was only a figurehead under the parliamentary system from 1950. Guided Democracy placed him once more in the center of politics as the arbiter of political power and the main source of ideology. During 1957 and 1958, he teased the Indonesian public with hints about the kind of system that he believed would suit Indonesia. In 1959, he sidestepped the Constituent Assembly, which had been elected in 1955 to prepare a new national constitution, and unilaterally restored the provisional 1945 constitution that gave the president sweeping powers. He became president-for-life in 1963 and took grandiloquent titles such as “Extension of the People’s Tongue.” He paid little attention, however, to administration, and the government of the country decayed disastrously, especially after the death of his nonparty chief minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja (1911–1963), who had headed a series of “business” or “working” cabinets on Sukarno’s behalf. By 1965, Indonesia was suffering from high inflation, administrative disintegration, infrastructure collapse, and impending famine.

Second, Guided Democracy was an intellectual response to the problems of applying Western democratic forms to a large and diverse developing country. Many Indonesians, especially Sukarno, felt that the party system encouraged division rather than unity and that a majoritarian system would necessarily oppress minorities. Sukarno described a process of *musyawarah* (exhaustive discussion) and *mufakat* (consensus articulated by wise leaders), allegedly followed in village Indonesia, as more appropriate to Indonesian culture. Guided Democracy also rested on a long-standing intellectual tradition of corporatism in Indonesian thought that em-

phasized the harmonious interaction of different functional groups within society, rather than competition based on individual, class, or other particularist interests. Sukarno also stressed *gotong royong* (mutual self-help) as preferable to competition, and in 1959, he appointed 200 functional group representatives (representing workers, peasants, women, intellectuals, youth, and so on) and 94 presidential nominees to sit alongside the existing 281 members of Parliament in the new Provisional People's Deliberative Council (Madjelis Permusyawaratan Rakjat-Sementara, MPRS), which formally became the central legislative body of Guided Democracy.

Third, Guided Democracy was a major step toward military domination of Indonesian politics. In March 1957, Sukarno responded to a series of regional military rebellions by declaring martial law, effectively ending parliamentary rule and legalizing those rebellions. The army also took over management of former Dutch-owned enterprises, which were seized by workers in December 1957 in protest against the Dutch retention of West New Guinea (Irian Barat), which Indonesia claimed as an integral part of its territory. The army was active in sponsoring mass organizations as representatives of the various functional groups. Although martial law formally ended in 1963, Guided Democracy greatly expanded the military's economic resources and established it as the clear leader of a broad coalition of anticommunist forces.

And fourth, Guided Democracy was an unsuccessful attempt to overcome the political conflict of the 1950s by creating a structure in which parties and social groups would be forced to cooperate. Until Indonesia received international recognition in 1949, deep disagreements over the appropriate nature of the independent state had been partly controlled by the need for national unity. From 1950, however, the deep divisions over regional autonomy, social and economic reform, and the place of Islam raised the stakes in Indonesian politics.

By 1957, several regions were in revolt, discontented with their treatment by Java, and the elected Constituent Assembly was deadlocked over whether Islam was to have a place in the constitution. At the same time, a major Islamic revolution, the Darul Islam, was under way in the countryside in West Java and South Su-

lawesi. Moreover, the strong performance of the communists (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) in the 1955 national elections and their even stronger performance in 1957 regional elections raised the prospect of communist participation in government after the elections scheduled for 1959. Under these circumstances, Guided Democracy initially seemed to offer a moratorium on political change.

Quickly, however, it became apparent that change had only been postponed. Observers commonly described the real political structure of Guided Democracy as a triangle, in which Sukarno balanced the army (with the Muslims) against the communists. Sukarno, however, was ailing and aging, and he would be succeeded either by the PKI or by an army-led coalition. Bitter antagonism developed between the two sides, often spilling over into violence when the PKI pursued issues such as land reform. The external campaign to recover West Irian (West New Guinea), which succeeded in 1963, as well as the subsequent *Konfrontasi* ("Crush Malaysia" campaign launched by Sukarno's Indonesia against British plans to create a new Federation of Malaysia) and Sukarno's general espousal of Third World anti-imperialist causes, provided only limited distraction from internal divisions. The perception that the PKI had launched a preemptive coup against the army high command in Jakarta on 1 October 1965 (the Gestapu Affair) gave the military grounds to destroy the party and to remove Sukarno from power.

The military-dominated Suharto regime that succeeded Guided Democracy described itself as the New Order, in contrast to Sukarno's Old Order. However, it inherited from the Sukarno era an authoritarian presidential constitution, a doctrine of military engagement in politics, and a system of military finance through enterprises separate from the state budget. It also assumed a suspicion of democracy, a sympathy for political corporatism, and a preference for removing conflicts by repressing them and defining them out of existence. In this respect, the legacy of Guided Democracy persisted until the late 1990s.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Aceh (Acheh); Darul Islam Movement (DI); Gestapu Affair (1965); Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth

Century); Konfrontasi ("Crush Malaysia" Campaign); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS, Republic of South Moluccas); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–)

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GUJARATIS

Of the Indian trading groups that conducted international trade throughout Southeast Asia, the most widespread and important was the Gujarati. The Gujaratis, from their base at Gujerat on the west coast of India, were skilled shippers and traders and formed part of the vast

trading network that linked western Indian ports with ports on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal. These included the Burmese ports of the Irrawaddy Delta, Thai ports, and Malay ports. The Gujaratis plied routes linking West Asia, the Mediterranean, Southeast Asia, Japan, and China. They were specialist textile traders, distributing silk and cotton textiles from Ahmedabad and Baroda to the Southeast Asian region in exchange for rice and teak from Burma, pepper and tin from western Indonesia and Malaya, and spices gathered in the Straits of Melaka from the neighboring region. Gujarati shipowners controlled the interisland trade and parts of the international trade with western Asia and Europe.

Like the Chettiars, the Gujaratis also developed a financial trading system throughout the region. They operated as bankers and merchant bankers, and their letters of credit (*hundi*) issued in one region could be cashed in another. The arrival of the Europeans in the sixteenth century resulted in the dispersal of the spice trade and forced the Gujarati and Malabar Muslim networks to disperse into other areas as well.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Gujaratis became increasingly important as compradors (*shroffs*) to Western banks in Southeast Asia, securing credit for large urban textile firms or opium traders, with networks extending from Persia (Iran) to China. The Gujaratis also provided short-term credit to the Chettiars. Their dominance in the Indian textile trade in the urban areas of Singapore, West Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak, Indonesia, and Bangkok continues to this day.

AMARJIT KAUR

See also Age of Commerce; Arabs; Banks and Banking; Chettiars (Chettyars); Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Indian Immigrants; Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1990s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Spices and the Spice Trade; Textiles of Southeast Asia; Trade and Commerce of Southeast Asia (ca. Nineteenth Century to the 1990s)

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GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT (AUGUST 1964)

Prelude to the Vietnam War

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident involved the August 1964 naval exchanges in which U.S. warships faced smaller North Vietnamese naval units in the Gulf of Tonkin. It was the main event preceding the massive involvement of U.S. forces in Vietnam, and it served as the pretext for the United States to escalate its intervention.

To this day, the facts surrounding the incident remain controversial, as does the background to the event. On 2 August, there was a twenty-minute skirmish between Hanoi patrol boats and the destroyer USS *Maddox* off the North Vietnamese coast. Washington decided not to act. In a tense context between North and South Vietnam, ten years after the Geneva cease-fire, the juxtaposition of two American naval operations near the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) would prove explosive—the OPLAN-34A commando raids on coastal islands (covert operations from South Vietnam) and the U.S. naval patrols near DRV territorial waters (DeSoto program for electronic surveillance). But on 4 August, in very bad weather, a second alleged naval incident occurred, involving the *Maddox* and another U.S. destroyer, the *Turner Joy*, which apparently was attacked by DRV torpedo boats. Did this last Vietnamese attack really happen? Decades later, former U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara himself apparently was not sure (McNamara 1996).

Regardless of what actually did or did not happen on 4 August, the consequences of the incident are clear. Only a few hours later, Washington authorized reprisal raids on four North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and an oil depot. Thereafter, events unfolded quickly: sixty-four sorties were made from aircraft carriers cruising nearby, and Lieutenant Everett Alvarez Jr. be-



U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson signs the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution on 10 August 1964. The congressional resolution authorized the president to take whatever measures he deemed necessary to deal with communist aggression in Vietnam. The resolution was repealed at the end of 1970. (U.S. National Archives)

came the first U.S. pilot to be shot down and imprisoned in Hanoi. Even more important, on 7 August 1964, the U.S. Congress voted almost unanimously for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that had been submitted by Lyndon B. Johnson's administration (1963–1969): “the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” (quoted in Galloway 1970: 167). The idea incorporated in the resolution had been percolating for a few months, and the Gulf of Tonkin incident gave the opportunity for its execution. The time had arrived for the Vietnam War.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Cold War; Domino Theory; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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H

HAINANESE (HAILAM)

See Chinese Dialect Groups

HAKKA (KHEH)

See Chinese Dialect Groups

HAMENKUBUWONO II (r. 1792–1812)

Imprudent Ruler

Hamengkubuwono II was the son of Sultan Hamengkubuwono I (r. 1742–1792) of the Yogyakarta sultanate. His father was deemed the most able descendant of the Mataram royal family since Sultan Agung (r. 1613–1645). In 1774, when Hamengkubuwono II was still crown prince of Yogyakarta, he wrote *Serat Surya Raja* (“The Book of the Sun of Kings”). In this work, which became part of the royal regalia of the Yogyakarta sultanate, he prophesied that the conflict between the two kingdoms of Yogyakarta and Surakarta would be resolved and the kingdoms reunited. The Dutch, according to the text, would convert to Islam, and Java would emerge triumphant under the rule of the hero represented by the crown prince.

Hamengkubuwono II’s disregard for the Dutch was clearly expressed in this work. This lack of respect made him very unpopular with the Dutch, whose reluctance to recognize his right to succeed Hamengkubuwono I forced

the latter to abandon his plans to abdicate his throne in favor of his son.

The crown prince eventually succeeded his father upon the latter’s death in 1792. When Hamengkubuwono I died at the age of eighty, he left behind a strong and wealthy state and a legacy of astute leadership. But Hamengkubuwono II found it impossible to emulate his father. His disregard for the prowess of the Dutch was apparently the single most important obstacle to the new ruler’s chances for a successful reign. He believed that the Dutch constituted an insignificant group in the overall context of Java and that they could be easily manipulated. His disdain for the Dutch was one of several factors that resulted in Yogyakarta’s diminished and enfeebled state by the end of his reign.

When Hamengkubuwono II ascended the throne in 1792, he inherited a mighty kingdom. The sultan’s own personal troops amounted to 1,765 men, in addition to which he could levy over 100,000 men from his nobles (Ricklefs 2001: 143). However, the sultan’s troubled relations with his brothers and his mismanagement of the internal affairs of the kingdom threatened Yogyakarta’s military prominence by upsetting the order and stability of the court. Hamengkubuwono II was wary of his brothers, especially Pangeran Natakusuma, whose popularity and influence threatened the sultan’s own position. The sultan was also not a good judge of character and talent. He replaced many of his father’s advisers and officials with persons of mediocre ability.

The replacement of his father's capable prime minister, Danureja I, with the latter's less able grandson, Danureja II, was but one of several instances of poor judgment on his part.

Hamengkubuwono II embarked on a series of building projects that stretched the kingdom's treasury and labor force, especially in the peripheral regions (*mancanegara*), to the limits. The sultan's oppressive taxation and corvée programs were extremely unpopular. His failure to maintain good relations with the Dutch enabled his rival, Sultan Pakubuwono IV (r. 1788–1820) of Surakarta, to plot the destruction of Yogyakarta. Unlike Pakubuwono IV, who accepted Dutch proposals to change the status of his kingdom, Hamengkubuwono II rejected Dutch requests with contempt.

A revolt by the sultan's brother-in-law, Raden Rangga, heralded a period of turbulence as Yogyakarta–Dutch relations worsened. The Dutch easily crushed the revolt, but this rebellion gave the Dutch the pretext for issuing an ultimatum to Hamengkubuwono II. They demanded that the sultan accept changes proposed by the Dutch and reinstate former prime minister Danureja I, who had been dismissed. Hamengkubuwono II defied Dutch orders, whereupon Dutch troops defeated the sultan's forces and compelled him to step down. Though Hamengkubuwono II was allowed to stay in the Yogyakarta court, his son replaced him as the new ruler, becoming Hamengkubuwono III (r. 1810–1814).

The Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) led to drastic changes in Java. French defeat of the Dutch led the Netherlands government-in-exile to issue the “Kew Letters,” allowing Britain to take over the administration of the Dutch colonies as a caretaker government. Hamengkubuwono II seized the opportunity to regain the Yogyakarta throne. Hamengkubuwono III was reduced to his former status as crown prince. However, he remained the favorite of the Europeans, who saw him as malleable in comparison with his father.

Hamengkubuwono III, Natakusuma, and Pakubuwono IV of Surakarta soon launched a plot aimed at bringing about the downfall of Hamengkubuwono II. The latter's disdain for Europeans made him susceptible to the schemes of his enemies. Pakubuwono IV wrote a secret letter to Hamengkubuwono II, advocating a joint revolt against the Europeans by

both sultanates in which Surakarta troops would be sent to support Hamengkubuwono II's army. In June 1812, during the British occupation, when European troops were sent to conquer Yogyakarta, Pakubuwono IV did nothing to aid Hamengkubuwono II. The British, assisted by the Mangkunegaran Legion, conquered Yogyakarta and plundered the court. Hamengkubuwono II was dethroned and exiled to the British colony at Penang, on the Malay Peninsula. Hamengkubuwono III was restored to the position of sultan.

GOH GEOK YIAN

See also Kew Letters; Mataram; Surakarta; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); Yogyakarta (Jogjakarta)

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HAMZAH FANSURI

Proponent of Sufi Mysticism

A Malay Sufi writer and poet, Hamzah Fansuri was one of the foremost proponents of Wujudiyah mysticism and lived and taught in Aceh during the second half of the sixteenth century, during the reign of Sultan Alauddin Riayat Shah ibn Firman Shah (r. 1589–1604). Although his teachings were denounced and his works were burned in the mid-seventeenth century, thirty-two poems and three prose writings have survived to the present. His works reveal a creative marriage of the Malay verse compositions—*syair* and *pantun*—with the grace and eroticism of Persian mysticism.

The date and place of Hamzah's birth remained problematic. It is very likely that he was born sometime in the mid-sixteenth century. As his name suggests, he was connected to Fansur, a port on the western coast of North

Sumatra between Singkil and Sibolga. Foreigners called Fansur by the name Barus. Chinese sources referred to Fansur (Barus) as Pin-su or Pan-ts'ut, where the famed Barus camphor was an important export. Though it is probable that Hamzah spent the greater part of his adult life in Barus, it is not clear if he was born there. Citing from Hamzah's verses, one writer concluded that he was born in either Shahr Nawi (Shah r-i-Naw) or Ayutthaya (Al-Attas 1970: 5–8). Established in 1351, Ayutthaya, as the capital of Siam, attracted foreign traders, including Muslims (Malays, Indians, Persians, Arabs, and Turks). It is more probable that Hamzah traveled to Shahr Nawi and learned Persian from the Muslim community there than that Shahr Nawi was Hamzah's birthplace (Drewes and Brakel 1986: 5). The date of his death remains open to speculation as well. It is suggested that he lived until the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda (Mahkota Alam) (r. 1607–1636), as hinted at by one of his verses. Further scrutiny, however, reveals that he likely died in or about 1590 (Drewes and Brakel 1986: 3).

Hamzah was an avid traveler, visiting and sojourning in the Malay Peninsula (Pahang), Ayutthaya, Mughal India, Mecca and Madinah, and Baghdad. As noted, he lived and taught in Barus and Banda Aceh.

Greatly influenced by the doctrine of *Wahdat al-Wujud* (Unity of Being), which was pioneered by Ibn al- 'Arabi of Spain and attained currency in Persia and Mughal India during the latter half of the sixteenth century, Hamzah was the doctrine's preeminent writer and teacher in Aceh. Toward the last quarter of the sixteenth century, Aceh emerged not only as a major political and military power in the Straits of Melaka but also as the regional center of Islam, replacing Melaka, which had been under Portuguese control since 1511. Hamzah's teachings and the influence of his writings spread throughout the Malay Archipelago. Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani (Shamsuddin of Pasai, d. 1630), a powerful and influential theologian during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda, shared Hamzah's beliefs and convictions, commented on his writings, and promoted his teachings. Hamzah's three prose works are *Asrau'l-Arifin* ("The Secrets of the Gnostics"), *Sharabu' l-'Ashqin* ("The Beverage of the Lovers"), and *Al-Muntahi* ("The Adept"). His thirty-two poems (*rubai*) are of

unequal length, from thirteen to twenty-one strophes of four lines each.

Hamzah's greatest critic was Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1658) from Gujerat. He denounced Hamzah and Shamsuddin for promoting *Wahdat al-Wujud* as opposed to what he believed was the true, orthodox mysticism, *Wahdat al-Shuhud* (Unity of Witnessing). In Nuruddin's India, the doctrine of *Wahdat al-Wujud* had been strongly criticized by theologians, and Nuruddin carried that criticism to Aceh. Garnering the support of Sultanah Taj al-Alam Safiatuddin Shah (r. 1641–1675), he attempted to obliterate Hamzah's name and works.

Due to Nuruddin's denunciation but also to Hamzah's antagonism of three powerful groups—the 'ulama (theologians), the *qadi* (judges), and the aristocracy, all of which he attacked with his pen—Hamzah was literally persona non grata in official records, including the *Hikayat Aceh* (*History of Aceh*). Ironically, however, Hamzah Fansuri's name and writings were resurrected in Nuruddin's denunciation and also in Shamsuddin's commentary on his poems.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Aceh (Acheh); Islam in Southeast Asia; Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1658); Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani (d. 1630)

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HANOI (THANG-LONG)

Citadel of Power

The capital city of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi today consists of seven wards of urban area (*noi thanh*) and five prefectures of suburban area (*ngoai thanh*). The total area of Hanoi is about 918 square kilometers. The population is about 2.7 million, and the overall population density is 2,952 people per square kilometer. The population density in the urban area is noticeably higher: with 1.45 million people residing in about 84 square kilometers of urban area, there

are 17,207 people per square kilometer (Hanoi Statistical Office 1999). Communist organizations, a base of the People's Army, the ministries, and the diet are concentrated in Hanoi, the center of the state power in Vietnam. Geographically, Hanoi is located on the natural levees of the Red River, where many lakes and marshes are scattered, and it functions as a node that connects Yunnan in China to the Bac Bo Gulf and the South China Sea.

In the late seventh century, the Annam protectorate, the local capital of the Imperial Chinese Tang dynasty (618–907), was built at this site, and the city apparently was a political center under Chinese rule. In 1010, Ly Cong Uan (1009–1028) moved the capital from Hoa Lu, the then capital of Dinh (968–980) and of the early Ly dynasty (980–1009), to Hanoi. The city was then named Thang-long, which means “ascending dragon.” Hanoi was sometimes also called Dong Do or Dong Kinh (meaning “eastern capital”), in contrast with Thanh Hoa, which was called Tay Do (meaning “western capital”) during the Hồ dynasty (1400–1407). After the Nguyễn dynasty (1802–1945) moved the capital to Hue in the early nineteenth century, the political importance of Hanoi decreased. The name *Hanoi* was actually given to the city only in 1831. During the French colonization of the late nineteenth century, the governor-general of French Indochina was established in Hanoi, and the city again became a site of political importance. Since the foundation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in September 1945, Hanoi has been the capital of the independent state.

Before Hanoi was reconstructed by the French, the city was surrounded by outer ramparts of earth. Called *dai la thanh*, they were developed by the Annam protectorate of the Tang dynasty and were the first such walls in Vietnamese history. Inside the outer ramparts were the political and economic areas. The political area was formed around an inner citadel. The economic area was located around the political area and was a place where merchants and craftspeople lived.

Hanoi was the capital for the successive dynasties from the eleventh century to the eighteenth century. The imperial palace in the political area of Hanoi was constructed in the Chinese style of the period, but under the Nguyễn dynasty, a Vauban-style citadel was

built at the site of the former imperial palace, and Hanoi became the only center of local administration. The most prosperous part of the economic area was east of the palace or citadel along the Tô Lịch River, which flows into the Red River. Because the economic area of the city had many markets, Hanoi was called Ke Cho (the place of markets). In the sixteenth century, British and Dutch firms were located temporarily in the city. The Chinese immigrant town within Hanoi appeared in the fifteenth century and developed greatly during the nineteenth century. A clubhouse (*huiguang*) of the Guangdong community and the Fujian community was built on the eastern side of the citadel in the nineteenth century. The economic area to the east of the citadel had distinct characteristics. First, there were many blocks of craftspeople, and only one category of job was conducted in each block. Job categories included textile dyeing, gold and silver work, woodwork, paper manufacture, hide processing, and xylography. Second, each block consisted of people from the same village, and they worshiped the tutelary deity of their native village.

After the French occupation in 1884, the French colonial government destroyed the citadel and the outer ramparts and carried out infrastructure projects. Straight roads were constructed at the center of the city, and with modern technology, a bridge named after Governor-General Paul Doumer (t. 1897–1902) was constructed over the Red River. Streetcars and railroads also appeared. A French district with many French-style buildings was constructed. The most typical French-style buildings were the governor-general's office, the opera house, and the church. Light industries were also imported from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, and match, cigarette, and liquor factories were established.

When the First Indochina War ended in 1954, Hanoi had an area of only about 130 square kilometers and a population of 380,000. In 1961, the area of the city was expanded to more than 900 square kilometers. In 1978, Hanoi annexed peripheral provinces and once had more than 2,000 square kilometers, but in 1991, the city was shrunk again to its current scale (Hanoi Statistical Office 1999).

SHIMAO MINORU

See also Nam Viet (Nan Yue); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Vietnam, North (post-1945)

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HARRISON, FRANCIS BURTON (1873–1957)

Champion of Filipinization

Francis Burton Harrison was the sixth American governor-general of the U.S. colonial government in the Philippines, serving from 1913 to 1920. As governor-general under the Democratic administration of President Woodrow Wilson (t. 1913–1921), he carried out a policy of increased Filipinization, which meant placing more Filipinos in positions of authority in the colonial government. He granted greater autonomy to the Filipinos in government and lessened his own powers in the belief that the best way to prepare the country for independence was to provide its people with more experience through actual governing. He was very popular among Filipinos, although conservative Americans criticized his liberal rule.

Harrison, born in 1873, was a Yale University graduate and earned his law degree from the New York Law School. He volunteered for the Spanish–American War (1898) and served with the U.S. garrison in Cuba. He was elected to the U.S. Congress, where he served a full term and came to know the Philippine resident commissioner at the time, Commissioner Manuel L. Quezon (1878–1944).

With the election of Woodrow Wilson of the Democratic Party in 1913, Harrison was appointed governor-general of the Philippines, to succeed W. Cameron Forbes (t. 1909–1913). The Filipinization policy he pursued after assuming that post was in line with the Wilson

administration's liberal policy toward the Philippines and in accordance with the report of Henry Jones Ford, who had been sent to the Philippines to assess conditions there.

During Harrison's term in office, the U.S. Congress passed the 1916 Jones Law, which stated that the Americans would withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippines and recognize Philippine independence once stable government had been established. Harrison interpreted this to mean that Filipinos should be granted greater autonomy in domestic affairs in order to prepare them for independence.

As governor-general, Harrison took steps to increase the number of Filipinos in the government, while simultaneously reducing the number of Americans in the civil service. To give Filipinos more hands-on training and hence more active roles in government, he approved bills from the Philippine legislature that offered attractive early-retirement benefits to Americans in civil service jobs and reduced the salaries of those who stayed on in government. Posts vacated by Americans were then filled by Filipinos.

Harrison also approved legislation that made all posts in the provincial boards elective, thus doing away with appointments from the governor-general. He increased the number of Filipinos heading executive departments and bureaus and allowed Filipino politicians, led by Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmeña (1878–1961), to form the Council of State, a body that served as a link between the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Harrison granted Filipinos great leeway in government and did not actively exercise his prerogatives and functions as governor-general. He vetoed only five bills—the smallest number by any American governor-general in the Philippines.

Harrison also believed in the need for Filipinos to prepare themselves economically, and he allowed increased government participation in the economy, through government-owned and government-controlled corporations. Further, he permitted Quezon and other political leaders to form the Board of Control, which would decide on policies for these corporations. He authorized the establishment of the Philippine National Bank and agreed to having it directed by a Filipino president. When the Great War (1914–1918) broke out in Europe

during his administration, Harrison organized the Philippine National Guard in an effort to contribute to the war effort. After his term as governor-general, he returned to the United States and wrote a book defending his policies.

Harrison was viewed as a pro-Filipino American administrator and was a good friend to Quezon. He was one of the most popular governors-general during the U.S. colonial administration, and he returned to the Philippines during the Commonwealth period to aid Quezon. He was made an honorary Filipino citizen and, upon his death in 1957, was buried in Manila.

Although Harrison supported the cause for Philippine independence and granted much autonomy to Filipinos, he was criticized by many Americans for being too liberal and not supportive of U.S. interests. He was condemned for being too lenient and for failing to exercise stronger executive control. Critics also pointed out that his policy of Filipinization led to inefficiency and corruption, as many Filipinos who were given high-ranking positions did not have enough experience and many safeguards were not implemented. His term as governor-general marked one extreme of American colonial rule in the Philippines; the other extreme would be manifested by his successor, Leonard Wood (t. 1921–1927), who pursued a stricter policy.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Filipinization; Osmeña, Sergio, Sr. (1878–1961); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1898–1946); Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944)

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**HASSANAL BOLKIAH,
SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1946–)**

Exemplifying a Malay Muslim Monarch

Sultan since 1967, Hassanal Bolkiah guided Brunei to complete independence from the United Kingdom at the start of 1984, when his country became known as Negara Brunei Darussalam and he himself was promoted from “His Highness” to “His Majesty.” A national ideology, the *Melayu Islam Beraja* (Malay Islamic Monarchy) (MIB) concept, was formulated to meet his requirements. Besides being monarch, he has held numerous posts: unelected prime minister (1984–), minister of defense (1986–), minister of finance (1984–1986 and 1997–), minister of law (1998–), head of Islam, commander-in-chief, inspector general of police, and chancellor of the local university. His reign has involved a process of nation building, consummated in 1996 with recognition of the sultanate as a “developed nation.”

Hassanal Bolkiah represents a generation that has been spared firsthand experience of national ignominy, for the oil price rises of the 1970s brought his realm unprecedented riches. Born on 15 July 1946, he was installed as crown prince in 1961, educated at Sandhurst from 1966 to 1967, and ascended the throne in 1967 upon the abdication of his father, Omar Ali Saifuddin III (1914–1986). The two monarchs then ruled together for nineteen years, the latter gradually asserting his authority and taking over in his own right.

Hassanal Bolkiah has expanded the armed forces and police service; he has also had a modern bureaucracy trained and has overseen town planning projects. Further, the provision of health and education has been enhanced, and the communications infrastructure has been improved. In foreign affairs, the sultanate emerged from under the British umbrella in the 1980s to make its voice heard in the international arena, culminating with the hosting of the Asia Pacific Economic Caucus (APEC) Summit in Bandar Seri Begawan in November 2000.

At the same time, however, there is a lack of democracy in Negara Brunei Darussalam, coupled with a degree of secrecy and incompetence, and materialism and secularism have not been entirely excluded. Legislation is by decree, and the power of patronage is concentrated in the royal family. A succession of development



Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah during the ceremony in which his son was proclaimed crown prince, 10 August 1998. (Attar Maher/Corbis Sygma)

plans designed to diversify the economy enjoyed only patchy success.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Brunei Oil and Gas Industry; *Melayu Islam Beraja* (MIB, Malay Islamic Monarchy); Omar Ali Saifuddin III, Sultan of Brunei (1914–1986)

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HATIEN

Hatien was a major eighteenth-century overseas Chinese free port and kingdom in southwest Indochina, lying across the present Cambodian-Vietnamese border. It was originally a Cambodian vassal and then nominally dependant on Nguyễn Cochinchina from 1708, but by the later 1750s, under its second ruler, Mac Thien Tu (r. 1735–1780), Hatien had become a wealthy, expanding state. It extended along the coast from Ca Mau in the far end of southern Vietnam to Kompong Som in Cambodia (including the island of Phu Quoc). It stretched inland from the Hau Giang (Bassac) arm of the Mekong to the headwaters of the Ha Tien River and west to Tuk Meas in Cambodia. However, when the 1767 Burmese destruction of the Siamese Ayutthaya kingdom radically transformed political conditions in southern mainland Southeast Asia, Mac Thien Tu's bid for greater power ultimately caused Hatien's ruin at the hands of the formidable new Thai king, Taksin (r. 1767–1782). Later, a greatly reduced Hatien was incorporated into the new unified Vietnamese kingdom established in 1802, and it subsequently became part of French Cochinchina and a district in modern Vietnam.

As a young Cantonese fleeing the fall of the Ming dynasty in China, Mac Cuu (1655–1735) had immediately recognized the potential of the Hatien River (Giang Thanh) to become a major commercial artery. Its broad, deep estuary and inner basin would easily accommodate merchant shipping following the coastal current from China and Taiwan to Vietnam and past Hatien to Siam, the Malay Peninsula, and Sumatra. Traders could transact business year-round in the old river port of Banteay Mas (known as Panday Mas to Malays, Phuttaimat to Thais, and Pontemas to Europeans). Alternatively, during the wet season, traders could use the ancient canal that connected the river to the Lower Mekong arm for easy access to the inland Khmer capital. Accepted into royal service in

Cambodia, Mac Cuu later managed to arrange an official appointment to Banteay Mas, with the aim of developing it commercially.

Sometime in the early part of the eighteenth century—traditional sources disagree about the date—Mac Thien Tu, son of Mac Cuu, moved his operations to the river mouth (Peam to Cambodians). There, he established a market town at the spot long known to Chinese mariners as Kang Kau (Kankao/Cancar to eighteenth-century Europeans or Hatien to Vietnamese). His encouragement of commerce and agriculture quickly attracted Vietnamese and Chinese immigrants, but before adequate defenses could be erected, Hatien was devastated in 1717 by Siamese forces intervening in a Cambodian civil war. After returning in the early 1720s, Mac Cuu and his son began erecting the entrenchments and fortifications that would enable Hatien to withstand Khmer attacks in 1730, 1736–1739, and 1750. They also maintained close diplomatic relations with the Nguyễn court in Huế, accepting the subordinate Vietnamese titles that promised military support in return.

From the 1730s until its destruction in 1771, Hatien developed as a unique experiment in overseas Chinese localization. The Mac regime encouraged all traders, whatever their Chinese dialect affiliation, ethnicity, or religion. Their subjects included Khmer, Malays, Vietnamese, Chams, and Portuguese descendants, as well as Chinese from Hainan, Guangzhou (Canton), Fujian (Fukien), and elsewhere. Though the Mac court maintained Ming forms, its military and civil officials were drawn from several ethnic groups. By the 1760s, even Christianity was openly tolerated, with a French seminary established at Hon Dat (1765). Hatien developed its own export-based industries (pepper, sea products, timber, lacquer, and rice), and as a duty-free entrepôt, it linked various Chinese trading networks and local commodity-producing collectives (*kongsí*) throughout insular Southeast Asia and up to China. In 1757, as a reward for Mac's military support for the Cambodian king, Hatien acquired the former Khmer ports of Kampot and Kompong Som and, with them, the monopoly of Cambodian maritime trade.

Wealthy and confident, Hatien reacted ambitiously to the political instability in southwest Indochina after 1767. Its ruler immersed himself in intrigues and regional conflicts, but, impru-

dent and unfortunate, he overextended Hatien's resources and offended neighboring Khmer and Vietnamese ruling factions. His activities also enraged Taksin, the half-Teochui Chinese Thai ruler. Backed by Teochui trading communities in rival ports along the Gulf of Siam, especially Chonburi and Trat, Taksin attacked Hatien in 1771. Denied Vietnamese support, the town was utterly devastated and depopulated before Thai forces chased Mac remnants deep into Vietnamese territory. To prevent Hatien's resurgence, Taksin sank the large Mac fleet at the harbor entrance, making its channel too hazardous for large seagoing junks. Combined with later silting, this barrier ultimately doomed Hatien to receive coastal traffic only.

Although later Vietnamese sources always portrayed Hatien as a Nguyễn dependency, the wider historical perspective reveals it as an autonomous state that was in large part responsible for spreading throughout southern Indochina the political shock waves that followed the 1767 fall of Ayutthaya. Although the Mac expansionary push rebounded catastrophically on Hatien, the subsequent decades of warfare forged the new Chakkri and Nguyễn kingdoms that would dominate mainland history in the precolonial nineteenth century.

NOLA COOKE

See also Age of Commerce; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Burma-Siam Wars; Chinese Dialect Groups; Cochin China; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Mac Tien Tu (1700–1780); Marine/Sea Products; Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Pepper; Phya Taksin (Pya Tak [Sin], King Taksin) (r. 1767–1782)

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HAYÂM WURUK (RĀJASANAGARA) (r. 1350–1389)

Presiding over the Malay Archipelago

Hayâm Wuruk was the fourth king of the great kingdom of Majapahit, with its main territory on the island of Java. He was the reigning monarch when Majapahit, under the leadership of the “grand vizier,” Gajah Mada (t. 1331–1364), reached the zenith of its imperial expansion. Majapahit then dominated *Nusantara*, which encompassed Kalimantan to the north; Sunda, Bali, and Maluku to the east; and Tumasik to the west—that is, more or less the entire Malay Archipelago, the area of modern-day Malaysia and Indonesia.

During Hayâm Wuruk’s reign, the court poet Prapañca wrote the *Nāgarakertāgama*, a poetical narrative about occurrences in Majapahit, both contemporaneous and historical. The literary work was completed in 1365 C.E. In its opening lines, the king was lauded as the incarnation of the supreme god, Bhaṭāra Nātha or Śrī Parwwatanātha. Hayâm Wuruk’s official name was Rājasanagara, but a later chronicle, the *Pararaton* (written around the year 1600 C.E.), gave the king other appellations, namely, Janeśwara, Hyang Wēkasing Sukha, and just Bhaṭāra Prabhu. The name Sanghyang Wēkasing Sukha and its synonym, Pamēkasing Tuṣṭa—referring to Hayâm Wuruk as a royal personage who was still leading the royal family—was also mentioned by the contemporaneous poet Pu Tantular in his work *Arjunawijaya*.

Hayâm Wuruk was born in 1334 as a prince of Kahuripan during an earthquake and the eruption of the volcano Kampud, which, ac-

ording to the *Nāgarakertāgama*, reflected his superhuman nature. He ascended the throne when he was sixteen years old, the same age as the much earlier ruler of Kahuripan, Airlangga (r. 1019–1049), had been when he became king. Hayâm Wuruk was of an illustrious royal line. His mother, Queen Tribhūwanatung-gadewî (who was also called the queen of Jīwana or Kahuripan), had ruled before him, from 1329 to 1350. She was the daughter of the much venerated “queen mother” Gayatrī, who was the daughter of Kērtanāgara (r. 1268–1292, the last king of Singhasāri) and the consort of the first king of Majapahit, Wijaya/Kērtarājasa Jayawarddhana.

As narrated in the *Nāgarakertāgama*, King Hayâm Wuruk undertook tours to several regions within his kingdom, where he inspected the villages and the sanctuaries; occasionally, these were in a dilapidated state. His first royal tour was to Pajang (Central Java) in the year 1275 śaka (1353 C.E.). In the following year, he visited Lasēm (on the north coast of Java), traveling along the coast. In 1357, he partook of the beauties of the “Southern Ocean,” traveling through the woods and visiting three towns, including Lodaya in the southern part of East Java. During the full moon in the month of Bhādrapada in 1359, the king and his entourage—all the princes with their wives, officials, and officers, as well as the king’s priest and the court poet—visited Lamajang and many other places. The royal entourage utilized all kinds of vehicles and was followed from place to place by people on foot; the group eventually traveled on the *rājamārga*, or royal highway.

The king and his company spent the night in many places, including Kapulungan, Gangan Asēm, a Buddhist foundation at Mandala Hambulu Traya (a freehold foundation granted by the Patih Gajah Mada), Balater, and Rēnēs. At Patukangan and at Kēṭa, the king stayed for more than one night. At Patukangan, he received officials from Bali and Madura, as well as from different places in the eastern part of Java. They brought gifts in the form of various kinds of animals and cloth. The next morning, the king distributed gifts of clothing to all the troops and the poets. At Kēṭa, the king stayed for five nights. Officials from that city and its dependent territories came to pay respect to the king, bringing gifts of food, and they were all pleased when he gave them fine clothes.

When the king departed from Kēṭa, the number of servants escorting him increased.

In the next stop at Kalayu, at a Buddhist freehold foundation, the king attended a royal ceremony known as *amēgat sigi*, or cutting the warp. After the rites, excellent foods were served, and many kinds of drums accompanied dancing that went on all day long. Then the king went to the nearby villages, unannounced. While spending several nights in these villages, he took “perfect maidens” as *bini haji* (wives of the king). The next destination was another Buddhist foundation at Kambang Rawi. Further on, at Pajarakan, he stayed for four days, camping on a grass field near a Buddhist foundation. The next stop was the hermitage at Sagara. The great sage of that hermitage served the king the refreshments that he himself consumed in the hermitage, and the king duly repaid him with honey. The king and his company continued their journey, spending the night at Gēnding, Kagēnēngan, Wēdwa-wēdwan, Pahañangan, and Padāmayan. While traveling between all those places, the king visited many other villages.

Hayâm Wuruk’s final inspection journeys were taken in the years 1360 and 1361. During the last tour, one destination was Palah, where the present Panataran temple complex is situated. The royal party spent the night at Lodaya, stayed for a while at Siping to restore the holy sanctuary, and spent another night at the eminent religious foundation of Śûrabhâna (in which there is the temple now known as Surawana). After the king returned to the capital, Gajah Mada reminded him that the grand royal ceremony known as the *śraddha* was to be executed in 1362, in honor of the late queen mother Gayatrî. Hayâm Wuruk consented to the preparations. Gajah Mada led the rituals and festivities of that royal undertaking, and during the ceremony filled with pomp and circumstance, Hayâm Wuruk himself danced in the exclusive presence of ladies of the court.

The reign of Hayâm Wuruk not only marked the expansion of the political hegemony of Majapahit but also represented the efflorescence of Javanese literary tradition, culture, and history. Prapañca’s *Nāgarakertāgama* and Pu Tantular’s works—*Arjunawijaya* and *Purushadasanta* (*Sutasoma*)—glorified the kingdom and empire of Majapahit and showcased the Javanese cultural accomplishments of the Hindu-Buddhist era.

EDI SEDYAWATI

See also Airlangga (r. 1019–1049); Bali; Gajah Mada (t. 1331–1364); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Java; Kadiri (Kediri); Kertanagara (r. 1268–1292); Madura; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); *Nusantara*; Palembang; *Pararaton* (Book of Kings); Singhāsari; Temasik (Tumasik)

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HEEREN ZEVENTIEN (GENTLEMEN SEVENTEEN)

Directing from Afar

The Heeren Zeventien, or Gentlemen Seventeen, constituted the central board of the Dutch United East India Company (VOC). The Heeren Zeventien was not a permanent institution but consisted of regional representatives (directors) of the six separate “chambers” that made up the company. This peculiar arrangement was the outcome of the intricate history of the company’s founding: it had been formed out of a number of preexisting companies in various places in the United Provinces, which, under political pressure, merged into one.

The Heeren Zeventien met only two or three times per year, alternately in the cities of the two largest chambers: Amsterdam and Middelburg (Zeeland). The meetings lasted only a few weeks. The directors decided on all major matters of general concern to the enterprise. They ruled on the number of ships to be built and dispatched to Asia, the amounts of commodities and bullion to be exported and imported, the auctions of imported products from Asia, and the most important political and military issues in the Asian possessions. To facilitate decision making, several preparatory commit-

tees were established, which concerned themselves with correspondence, accounting, auditing, and inspection.

The Heeren Zeventien and its committees consisted of delegates from the boards of directors of the six chambers and had limited discretionary powers. Thus, the central organ of the company was neither permanent nor very centralized. The decision-making structure, although fairly sophisticated, was inefficient. But the Heeren Zeventien was far from powerless: the chambers were to execute the policies stipulated by the central meetings, and the dominance of the Amsterdam chamber in the entire enterprise guaranteed some degree of stability and permanency. As for the operations of the company in Asia, the directors were severely handicapped by the magnitude of the enterprise and the slowness of communications. The Heeren Zeventien could only give general instructions and outlines for the policies to be followed by the officials in the Indies, who consequently had much latitude.

REMCO RABEN

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Dutch East Indies; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1600)

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HENG SAMRIN (1934–)

Pro-Vietnam Cambodian Political Leader

Heng Samrin, a Cambodian political figure, was born into a poor peasant family in Prey Veng, eastern Cambodia. Little is known about his early life, except that he joined the communist-dominated resistance to the French in the early

1950s. He probably became a member of Cambodia's clandestine communist party at that time, but he managed to evade arrest in the years that followed.

During the Cambodian civil war (1970–1975), Heng Samrin was a Khmer Rouge military commander, and after the Khmer Rouge victory, he rose to become political adviser to the Fourth Division, operating in the eastern part of the country. In 1978, the Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot (1925–1998), believed that cadres in the eastern provinces were secretly allied to the Vietnamese, and he set in motion a wave of brutal purges that soon claimed tens of thousands of lives. In May 1978, Heng Samrin, Chea Sim (1932–), and several hundred Khmer Rouge soldiers from the Eastern Zone sought refuge in Vietnam, where the Vietnamese, then at war with the Khmer Rouge, organized them into a “patriotic front” that would take power once the Vietnamese had defeated the Pol Pot regime.

In January 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia, and in the puppet regime set up in Phnom Penh a few days later, Heng Samrin was named head of state, a largely ceremonial position that he held for over a decade. In the 1981 elections, running for the National Assembly, Heng Samrin allegedly gained over 99 percent of the vote. By the mid-1980s, however, he was overshadowed by Cambodia's dynamic prime minister, Hun Sen (1951–). Heng Samrin made little impression on Cambodian governance and held on to his position on the basis of his seniority in the party, his loyalty to Vietnam, and his lack of political ambition. In the 1990s, he faded from view, although he was retained in ceremonial positions in successive ex-communist regimes.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Chea Sim (1932–); Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Hun Sen (1951–); Khmer Issarak (Free Khmer); Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF); Khmer Rouge; *Killing Fields, The*; Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) (1925–1998); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

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HENGHUA

See Chinese Dialect Groups

HIGHWAYS AND RAILWAYS

Prior to the nineteenth century, the forested terrain of much of Southeast Asia severely restricted overland communication, and the rivers and seas provided the main means of cultural and commercial contact. Land transport was slow, expensive, difficult, and dangerous. Colonialism and the creation of new states in Southeast Asia represented new departures within the region. These new states had precisely delineated boundaries and a permanency that indigenous states had lacked, a new style of administration and institutional structures to oversee the various aspects of government, and intensity in governance not hitherto experienced in the indigenous states. Few changes were as striking as those in transportation, as governments created physical and economic infrastructures to make colonies profitable. Railways and roads both enhanced and modernized communication links and promoted a closer involvement with the world economy. They also facilitated an expansion in agricultural and mineral production and the transformation of Southeast Asian states into export-oriented economies.

Transport Development in Historical Perspective

If we survey in a broad fashion the economic basis of traditional Southeast Asia, two general types of economies can be distinguished: those based on agriculture and those based on coastal or river trade. As far as political organization was concerned, the agriculture-based economies tended to exist in large, highly structured states or empires located in the broader river valleys of the mainland. Leaders in these states and empires usually ruled from a powerful inland center that controlled, with varying degrees of trib-

ute relations, the more remote provinces. By contrast, the trading centers, or entrepôts, strongly influenced by Muslim traders, often controlled particular rivers or coastal locations that held some distinct advantage. Historically, the main mode of communication within and between the different states was by water, with the seas and rivers forming natural highways. Land transport was hindered by, among other factors, barriers of dense vegetation and the absence of suitable beasts of burden. The only channels of communication between riverine and estuarine settlements were the river networks. Although systems of footpaths evolved to provide land links, these were short and limited in scope, permitting only limited incursions into the surrounding regions. Another striking feature was that these overland facilities were unevenly distributed throughout the region.

Transport Development during the Colonial Period

Railway and road development was seen as the key to opening up the colonies to the outside world. Indeed, railways and highways functioned as instruments of the expansion of the world economy, designed to facilitate the reproductive capacity of the states. Therefore, their specific forms and locations reflected the features of the larger capital growth process and investment in the region. Subsequently, a complex of interlocking circular and cumulative changes took place in these countries, resulting in the uneven distribution of transport networks and disparities between regions. From a geographic viewpoint, this spatial dualism was most evident in the creation of export-oriented enclaves associated with mineral deposits, agricultural commodity production, and administrative centers. A few case studies will illustrate this point.

British Malaya

Broadly, three phases can be distinguished in the development of the railway system in British Malaya, corresponding approximately to the three stages in British political involvement in the peninsula. In the first period (1885–1896), short latitudinal lines were built in the western half of the peninsula to serve the tin-mining areas. These lines linked the inland tin-producing centers to coastal ports from which the ore was

shipped to either Penang or Singapore for smelting. The localized nature of economic penetration was congruent with the piecemeal development of the infrastructure. The second period of railway development (1897–1909) was marked by the construction of a north–south trunk line that connected the original latitudinal lines. This process of railway amalgamation had its political counterpart in the consolidation of British rule in the four western states of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang by the creation of the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1896. The final stage in the development of the railway system (1910–1931) was consistent with the needs of commercial (plantation) agriculture that was not confined solely to the Straits Settlements and FMS. Politically, this period marked the outer limits of the British sphere of influence in the country by the establishment of protectorates over Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Perlis, and Johor.

Since the main function of the railways was to assist the development of the extractive economy, the pattern of railway development and the nature and frequency of the services provided were unduly biased toward the advancement of the export sector and the interests of foreign investors. Furthermore, railway development was largely confined to the western half of the peninsula, where the profitability of the lines—in terms of both forward linkages (lowered transportation charges resulting in greater productive efficiency of the economy as a whole) and railway revenues—was ensured. The pattern of railway construction also contributed to Singapore's position as a focal point by rail, whereas Kuala Lumpur became a railway nodal point.

Railways as the chief means of transport witnessed a development that was not intended to facilitate well-rounded economic development in the country. The railroads were concentrated in the western half of the peninsula and laid out in such a way as to allow for rapid transport of minerals and agricultural products from the interior to the chief ports. The major towns in Kedah, the Straits Settlements, the FMS, and Johor, where economic activity was the greatest, were connected with one another and with the centers of raw material production; there was an absence of such linkages between towns in the eastern half of the peninsula. The freight rates favored the long haul of primary products to the ports from the interior. Furthermore, since

the tariff structure favored large clients, these interests experienced a greater reduction in transportation costs in comparison with most producers for the domestic market. Consequently, the railroads facilitated the transformation of British Malaya into an export-oriented, lopsided economy heavily specialized in tin and rubber.

Road development in the different regions of Malaya took place at different times to meet specific needs. In the western half of the peninsula, roads were initially constructed as feeder lines to the railway or were seen as a mechanism for extending the developmental space of the western coast states. In Pahang, Johor, and the northern Malay States, they were built principally to provide accessibility or were a means for initiating economic growth. In Kelantan, roads were also constructed for security reasons. Compared with the railway, roads were less substantial lines of communication, and road building could be carried out within a flexible policy. Moreover, road development could be done in stages, depending on the financial health of the states, and road improvements such as metalizing could be undertaken when funds permitted.

Road development policies were aimed at the construction of north–south roads that could be connected with those of neighboring states to facilitate interstate communication. By 1895, there was a fairly complete through road for carts from Melaka in the south to Province Wellesley in the north; seven years later, it had become a main trunk road, 576 kilometers (360 miles) long. In 1928, a through road ran from Johor Bahru in the south to the Siamese border in the north. In the eastern coast states and Johor, roads enabled many export products to be transported by land. The growth of the road system was accelerated by technical innovations in road transport, including the development of the internal combustion engine, which resulted in the expansion of motor transport and road haulage services. The configuration of the country dictated the almost parallel location of highways and railways and subsequently led to competition between the two transport systems.

Indonesia

In Indonesia, overland transportation facilities were concentrated in Java. Railway (and tramway) development was associated mainly with the sugar industry. The first railway conces-

sions were let in 1863 and 1864, and in 1872, they resulted in the completion of a railroad from Batavia to Bogor and one from Semarang to Solo and Yogyakarta. A third railroad, linking Surabaya, Pasuruan, and Malang, was completed in 1879. Subsequently, the network was extended all over the island. Beginning in 1884, an increasing number of narrow tramways were built as feeder lines to serve the sugar industry. Each company operated its own dedicated workshops to service the tramways. Since the construction of the railways was primarily motivated by commercial considerations, the railway system was fragmented.

The road system of Java originates from the time of the administration of Governor-General Herman W. Daendels (t. 1808–1811) and extends from one end of the island to the other, paralleling the north coast. Subsequently, a second main east–west route was added. The roads were built for strategic reasons. Overall, the focus on Java has helped the island maintain its central position in relation to the other islands.

Siam (Thailand)

Siam, which remained independent during the age of empire building, stands out among the other Southeast Asian states as the exception to the rule of being surrounded by colonized neighbors while retaining its sovereignty. The Siamese government's main reason for building its rail network was related to political considerations. Fearful of its colonial neighbors, Siam built railroads to counter the threat from the French. Three major lines were built, starting in 1892. The first, from Bangkok to Khorat, was intended to help counter the French advance through Laos. Branch lines were also built toward the Mekong in the 1920s and 1930s. The second major line ran north from Bangkok to Chiang Mai. The third line connected Bangkok to Penang and Singapore along the northwest of the Malay Peninsula. A subsequent line connected Haadyai to the East Coast Malayan Railway and thence to Singapore in 1931. The first two lines were built using state funds, but the Malayan connection was built with a loan from the Federated Malay States (FMS) government.

Notwithstanding the political considerations, the economic effects of railroad construction were striking. The northern and eastern lines permitted the carriage of rice exports

from the area to other regions. More important, the railroads provided vital connections with Malaya and Singapore, which handled a large amount of Siam's trade prior to the Pacific War (1941–1945). In 1917, for example, rice shortages in Malaya were met by imports of rice transported overland from Siam.

In contrast, highway construction in Siam was undertaken on a piecemeal basis. Prior to the Pacific War, the road network linking urban centers to rural areas was relatively poor. After 1950, the Thai government embarked on a program of road construction that effectively linked rural villages to the larger urban centers. This was followed by the provision of bus services, which permitted rural–urban transport and stimulated the market economy.

Railways and Highways in Perspective

In all countries, railways and highways also had an integrative effect. Although the railways permitted the penetration of capital, roads especially helped administrations to maintain the peace so that development by rail could take place. Steamships played a less revolutionary role in transport development, although they strengthened connections in island nations (Indonesia, the Philippines) through the provision of interisland shipping facilities. More significantly, international shipping provided a fundamental link between Southeast Asia and the rest of the world and contributed to the export orientation of the region. Shipping lines not only moved bulk commodities, machinery, and food within and outside the region but also carried millions of migrant workers from China and India to the Southeast Asian region to work in the mines, plantations, and urban areas. Thus, the three main modes of transport shaped and continue to shape economic structures in the region.

AMARJIT KAUR

See also Burma under British Colonial Rule; Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Ethical Policy (*Ethische Politiek*); Federated Malay States (FMS) (1896); Johor; Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Penang (1786); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1898–1946); Reforms and Modernization in Siam;

Rubber; Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1990s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Tin; Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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HINDU-BUDDHIST PERIOD OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (FIRST CENTURY B.C.E. TO THIRTEENTH CENTURY C.E.)

The Hindu-Buddhist period will be interpreted here as the period of Southeast Asian history from around the first century B.C.E. up to the end of the thirteenth century C.E. That period was when two successive phases of early cities and states flourished in Southeast Asia on a brilliant level of material culture, making original contributions to wider Buddhist and Hindu traditions. The first part of this article presents new information and interpretations on Southeast Asia as a region; the second encapsulates in table form, country by country, information on spe-

cific sites, based on palaeoenvironmental, archaeological, and epigraphical data.

In approaching this subject, three overarching considerations should be kept in mind. First, it was Dutch historians who formulated the term "Hindu-Buddhist period" in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mainly to describe the period of civilization in Indonesia before the widespread adoption of Islam—but they extended it to Southeast Asia as a whole. In Indonesia and the whole Southeast Asian region, the spread of all three of the world's religions—of Hinduism and Buddhism in the first millennium C.E. and Islam in the second millennium C.E.—was a long process that took place in strikingly uneven ways in space as well as time. On mainland Southeast Asia, the main population centers—namely, the lowland societies of Burma (Myanmar), Siam (Thailand), Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam—converted to Hindu and Buddhist religions in the first millennium C.E. This conversion occurred mainly from the third to sixth centuries C.E.; they still adhere to Buddhist cultures tinged with Hindu influences in the twenty-first century. For most of them, therefore, the Hindu-Buddhist period has never ended, and conversion to Islam has been insignificant except among the Cham population of central Vietnam.

The second consideration is that among the ancient conversions to Hinduism and Buddhism in Southeast Asia, not a single case can be found to support the cultural colonization model proposed by George Coedès. Coedès sketched a picture in which Indian Hindu colonists were thought to have implanted Sanskrit literacy, kingship, statecraft, and religion in passive Southeast Asian societies that had "failed to evolve beyond a late Stone Age level" (Coedès 1962). In reality, every early urban society in Southeast Asia reveals or implies significant anterior stages of development through the Bronze and Iron Ages associated with increasing degrees of economic and social complexity *before* they converted to Hinduism or Buddhism. The earliest evidence of those conversions (whether in the form of writing systems, sacred art, or architecture) already reveals processes of selective assimilation of a variety of Indian influences and their creative reworking. The results produced a garland of Southeast Asian Hindu or Buddhist cultures resulting from encounters with identifiable traditions in India

and Sri Lanka (Ceylon), but they were new flowerings that never reproduced a prototype.

The third general consideration is that many nonliterate upland societies of mainland Southeast Asia coexisted with the magnificent Hindu or Buddhist cultures of their lowland neighbors without adopting their religions—and influenced only marginally by their cultures, despite having links with them through trade and exchange. In maritime Southeast Asia, Hindu and Buddhist societies developed from the sixth to seventh centuries in parts of northwest Java, Central Java, and southeast Sumatra. Brilliant Buddhist and Hindu art and architecture survive in Central Java, northwest Malaysia, and northeast and southeast Sumatra from the eighth to tenth centuries. Monumental evidence of this kind has not been found in the Philippine archipelago. Some degree of cultural assimilation must have taken place, to judge from the Sanskrit words assimilated into Filipino languages and from the sumptuous, apparently royal, hoards of gold regalia found there in which Hindu/Buddhist motifs appear. In the early second millennium C.E., Hindu and Buddhist cultures flourished in east and central Sumatra, northwest Malaysia, East Java, and Bali. But, as on the mainland, so too in the archipelagos, the non-Buddhist and non-Hindu communities collectively known as animist societies coexisted with them in Peninsular Malaysia, Sumatra, Java, Bali, and all the islands of Eastern Indonesia. The Hindu and Buddhist societies of ancient Southeast Asia have monopolized the attention of historians but occupied only a minority of the total terrain.

In India and Southeast Asia, the early cities and states were based mainly in the plains. It is true that these were the most densely populated, economically active areas of the region, and the only ones that left abundant records of themselves in art, architecture, and writing on durable materials such as metal and stone. But these Hindu and Buddhist communities of the plains were surrounded by vast tracts of upland forest, estuaries, and small islands, whose inhabitants usually left no record of their cultures and economies in durable materials as art or inscriptions. Nonetheless, they contributed to the prosperity of the urbanized societies in a variety of crucially important ways: only they possessed the specialized skills that enabled them to harvest the treasures of the forests, the caves, and

the seas, and they were porters and navigators par excellence. Ancient Southeast Asian trade in particular depended heavily on these people who did not write their own history and are too often overshadowed by those who did.

Conversions to Islam in Indonesia took place over an extended period and in a patchy way, starting in the eleventh to twelfth centuries C.E. in Aceh (northern Sumatra), and were still taking place up to the nineteenth century in parts of Java. The population of Madura converted to Islam, while most of the dense population of neighboring Bali describes itself as Hindu-Buddhist-animist even today. Most of the peoples of the islands of Eastern Indonesia converted to Islam only through the internal migrations of the twentieth century or to Christianity as a result of colonial influence. Islamization thus occurs only at the very end of the period covered by this entry.

Regional Patterns of Early Urban Settlement in Southeast Asia

Among the criteria of a city, the following are representative: a well-defined, sometimes fortified, central space in relation to its hinterland, revealing an exceptional degree of socioeconomic specialization in relation to other communities, hierarchical organization, and a dominant position as a ceremonial center. One pattern of late prehistoric settlement, found consistently in mainland Southeast Asia, repeats itself in early historic settlements of proto-urban or fully urban character. It is the clustering of settlements along the tributaries of the great rivers and avoidance of the great rivers themselves. There are no ancient urban sites directly on the Irrawaddy, Mu, Sittang, and Salween Rivers in Burma, the Chao Phraya in Thailand, or the Mekong in Cambodia and Vietnam. This pattern also holds true for the great rivers in China and India. In Central Java, too, where early settlements are less easily distinguished and less researched than the monumental clusters, the latter are also associated with small rivers. Pagan, an apparent exception, was in fact built on a high plain above the Irrawaddy, and watered by several small tributary streams.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's (1770–1831) often-quoted vision of great river valleys as the cradles of early civilization does not apply to Asia, home to some of the world's great-

est rivers, except in a generalized sense. Settlements along the tributaries of the great rivers appear to be linked to flood retreat irrigation and a whole range of other experiments with water control to achieve larger and more reliable harvests. Unlike the great rivers of Southeast Asia named above, which remain untamed to the present, smaller rivers presented much more manageable conditions for the development in Southeast Asia of an impressive repertoire of ancient irrigation techniques leading to reliable agricultural surpluses. Settlements located in habitats of that kind constitute the majority of known early cities in Southeast Asia. They took shape on the basis of evolutionary processes of increasing agricultural prosperity and the activities of specialists in water control.

A second pattern of proto- and early urban settlements can be seen near ancient coastlines, lower river valleys, and estuaries. It is linked both to upriver/downriver trade and long-distance maritime trade. It included the exchange of cultivated plants, such as rice, bananas, and coconuts, and plant products such as timber, incense, and spices across large distances—as well as the invisible cargoes, both in the form of technologies such as metallurgy, ceramics, brick-making, and irrigation and the ideas that shaped religions and cultures generally. The history of trade in Southeast Asia begins at the latest in the first millennium B.C.E. with local networks of the upriver/downriver or montane-forest/rice-plain kind. Improvements in Southeast Asian shipbuilding and navigational techniques transformed the remarkable journeys of prehistory across the Indian Ocean to East Africa and across the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean into maritime trade networks with established links between communities in India, Sri Lanka, Southeast Asia, and South China. The results of this trade were conspicuous from the third to second centuries B.C.E. and the second to third centuries C.E. in driving urbanization in all these areas. Maritime trade between the eastern provinces of the Roman empire and Southeast Asia via South India and Sri Lanka dates from the second to fifth centuries C.E., succeeded by trade between Byzantium and Southeast Asia up to and beyond the end of the thirteenth century. Maritime trade between Southeast Asia and China assumed significant proportions in the second half of the Tang dynasty, from the seventh/eighth century C.E., and also continued

beyond the end of the thirteenth century. Trade across both the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea was marked by significant fluctuations in density and commodities, with a corresponding impact on the prosperity of Southeast Asian port cities.

The Malay Peninsula, often depicted as a north-south land bridge between continental and maritime Asia, was equally an east-west land barrier to navigation between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, creating specific hazards along both its east and west coasts that, certainly throughout the period discussed here and even as late as the early twentieth century, were a forcing house for the expertise of Southeast Asian navigators and obliged foreign ships to depend on them in those waters. The benefits of maritime and trading skills such as these, or of land-based expertise in agriculture, irrigation, metals, ceramics, art, and architecture, were unevenly distributed. They reinforced the claims of the elite to privileged contacts with gods and forces of nature, creating social stratification, rivalries, and conflicts in protohistoric societies that led to the appearance of courts, rulers, literate societies, and religions.

These were the conditions that preceded the conversions to Hinduism and Buddhism. Buddhism was adopted in many parts of Southeast Asia before Hinduism, and the earliest contacts appear to date from the second century C.E. Missionaries and forest monks probably came to Burma at that time both from the Satavahana kingdom of Andhra and from Sri Lanka. The second to fourth centuries were a period of active travel and reciprocal influence among Buddhist monks and lay benefactors along much of the southeastern coast of India and northern Sri Lanka. The web of their activities spread to include both coastal and inland communities in Burma. From the fourth to the eighth centuries C.E., Buddhist and Hindu cultural influences of many kinds passed among Southeast Asian communities as much as they did among India, Sri Lanka, and Southeast Asia.

The final part of this entry presents a table of early urban sites or states in Southeast Asia, giving location, broad chronology, religious orientations, and affinities, and relating each to the major site types described above (based on agricultural surpluses or maritime trade, often both).

JANICE STARGARDT

**Table of Early Sites and States in Southeast Asia
(First Century B.C.E. –Thirteenth Century C.E.)**

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Econ. Base</i>	<i>Culture</i>
BURMA				
Beikthano	C. Burma 9 sq. km.	1st c. B.C.E.– 9th. c. C.E.	Irrigated rice; some indirect trade with Andhra, S.E. India	Pyu; ancestor worship in grouped cremation burials; Andhra-style Pali Buddhism. Phase 1, late 3rd–5th c. C.E.; phase 2 (under Sri Ksetra), 6th–9th c. Visnuite minority 7th–8th c.
Minbu	C. Burma near Beik- thano	1st mill.	Irrigated rice	Pyu; ancestor worship in grouped cremation burials, also Buddhist.
Halin[gyi]	C. Burma 5 sq. km.	2nd c.– 9th c. C.E.	Irrigated rice; salt, jade, rubies trade to China, Thailand, Vietnam.	Pyu; ancestor worship inhumation burials; Buddhism 4th–9th c. (under Beikthano); phase 2 (under Sri Ksetra) 6th–9th c.
Sri Ksetra	C./S. Burma ca. 19 sq. km.	2/3d c.– 9th c. C.E.	Irrigated rice; trade S.E. India	Pyu; ancestor worship in grouped cremation burials, integrated into Pyu Pali Buddhism 4th–9th c. Earliest Pali texts in world preserved here. Most powerful Pyu kingdom and Buddhist center; important cultural contacts with Andhra, Orissa, Bengal; diplomacy with Nanchao and Tang courts; created a standard of royal urban culture with which the kings of Pagan identified themselves to enhance their legitimacy.
[H]Maingmaw	C. Burma	1st mill.	Irrigated rice	Pyu; Buddhist; surveys/excavs. Incomplete; 1 major inscription.
Pagan	C. Burma ca. 50 sq. km.	?9th–13th c.	Imperial/ religious capital ruling Pyu, Mon, and Arakanese. Trade with India and China.	Burmese; Buddhist architecture in brick magnificent and innovative; Pala influences on art. In 12th c. center of Pali grammar for South and S.E. Asia; 1st Burmese imperial capital, very powerful, remains center of Buddhist pilgrimage; assimilated many influences from Pyu and Mon. With Angkor, the greatest monumental achievement of mainland S.E. Asia. Created a standard of material magnificence and political authority to which later kingdoms aspired. King defeated by Mongol invasions 1295–1298.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Econ. Base</i>	<i>Culture</i>
BURMA (<i>Continued</i>)				
Dhanyawadi	Arakan	?–4th c.	Irrigated rice and trade with India and Pyu in C. Burma	Arakanese, Buddhist, and Hindu; small but important city-state.
Vesali	Arakan	4th–10th c.	Irrigated rice and trade with India and Pyu in C. Burma	Arakanese: Buddhist and Hindu; small but important city-state.
Thaton	S. Burma Delta ca. 4 sq. km.	?–13th c.	Rain-fed rice and trade with S.E. India and Pyu in C. Burma	Mon, Buddhist, and Hindu, few remains in laterite soil. Many early Mon coins with conch shell in area. (?4th–?6th c.). Royal monk in Pagan from Thaton 11th c., led indirectly to Pagan’s conquest of Thaton, capture of king, court, Buddhist Pali, and Mon texts and strong Mon influences in Pagan 11th–12th c.
Ayethema	S. Burma	?4th–12th c.	Trade	Mon—Suvannabhumi of the Mahavamsa?—part of the Thaton cluster with ruined walls and stupas rebuilt many times, traditionally associated with Sri Lanka and Buddhaghosa.
Kyaikto	S. Burma	?1st–7th c.	Trade	Mon. Buddhist and Hindu, no settlement defined but most productive find-site of hoards of early coins in silver and gold, including thousands of “elm-seed”-sized coins noted by Chinese travelers 6th/7th c.; major trading site on or near ancient coastline; Kyaiktiyo stupa on huge rock nearby contains hair relic.
Dagon	S. Burma Delta	?–15th c.	Trade, shipbuilding	Mon, Buddhist, no ancient area of settlement defined but associated with Shwe Dagon stupa (hair relics)—greatest Buddhist monument of Burma; many small clay votive tablets of 8th–9th c. Mon style found in Rangoon area, especially Tadagale.

(Continues)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Econ. Base</i>	<i>Culture</i>
THAILAND				
Nakorn Pathom [first city]	C. Thailand western edge Chao Phraya Valley	5th/6th–13th c.	Trade, irrigated rice. Contacts with Mekong Delta and S. Burma.	Dvaravati-Mon kingdom, Buddhist, special veneration of Dhammacakka, influenced by post-Gupta art styles, brick monuments.
Uthong [gold port]	C. Thailand western edge Chao Phraya Valley	5th/6th–13th c.	Trade, irrigated rice. Contacts with Mekong Delta and S. Burma.	Dvaravati-Mon kingdom, Buddhist, brick monuments, stucco decorations.
Si Thep [great god]	C. Thailand E. edge of Chao Phraya River Valley	6th/7th–9th/10th c.	Not studied	Mon kingdom, Hindu-Visnu stone statues with cylindrical crown in dynamic style.
Chansen	C. Thailand E. edge of Chao Phraya River Valley	?9th c. B.C.E.–7th c. C.E.	Trade with India and Mekong Delta	Mon? developed Iron Age to historical period. Water stored in large moats. Pottery of 6th/7th c. suggests association with Dvaravati.
Lopburi	C. Thailand	1st mil. B.C.E.? 10th c. C.E.	Iron-smelting trade, capital city, strong agriculture	Mon, continuously settled Iron Age to end of study period. Powerful Mon kingdom, assimilated many Khmer influences 11th–13th c.
Muang Fa Daed	N.E. Thailand Tributary of Chi River	1st mil. B.C.E.–?10th c. C.E.	Irrigated rice, some river trade with Khmers	Mon, continuously settled Iron Age into historical period. Cult of stone circles and markers, assimilated into numerous Buddhist Sema stones of huge size with vivid relief carvings of <i>Jatakas</i> and other Buddhist themes. Small stucco ornaments similar to Kubua. Site development from prehistoric moated sites to historical city delineated.
Kantarawichai	N.E. Thailand on tributary of Chi River	?–6th/7th c.	Irrigated rice?	Mon, find-site of cache of silver plaques with Buddhist relief motifs showing post-Gupta influences. Close to Muang Fa Daed.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Econ. Base</i>	<i>Culture</i>
THAILAND <i>(Continued)</i>				
Sukhothai	N.Thailand	?10th–14th c.	Irrigated rice	Thai, earliest Thai capital city extended rectangular form, many Buddhist monuments, irrigation works within urban area. Famous for elegant, original style of Buddhist art in bronze, especially “Walking Buddhas.” Eclipsed by Ayutthaya from late 13th c.
Sawangkhlok	N.Thailand	12th–14th c.	Ceramics	Thai, center of ceramics industry for Sukhothai kingdom, inspired by Song green, brown, white glazes but coarser pastes.
Satingpra	S.E.Thailand	4th–14th c.	Irrigated rice and center of transisthmian trade on Trang–Sating–Pra, Palaing–Staingpra routes	Mon origs., pre–urban participation in Romano–Asian trade. Urban cultural phases: (1) 5th/6th–8th c. maritime trade and cultural contacts across the Indian Ocean (Pallavas) and Gulf of Thailand to Oc Éo and Sambor Prei Kuk; religion Visnuite and post–Gupta–style Buddhist—part of S. Thailand and S. Cambodian worship of Visnu with cylindrical crown. (2) 8th–9th c. strong cult. influences from C. Java Mahayana Buddhist and Saivite Hindu. (3) 11th–13th c. strong contacts with Muara Jambi in S.E. Sumatra. From 10th to 14th c. major part in maritime trade with S. China: incense for ceramics trade. With Bujang Valley sites and Palembang—later Jambi—one of the three great maritime trading centers of S.E. Asia grouped under Sanfoqi in Song records. Center of many dependent sites linked by large network of navigable canals on Isthmus of Malay Peninsula, served as center of collection and re–export of S.E. Asian trade goods extending from Butuan Philippines to Kota Cina, N.E. Sumatra. (4) 14th c. Mon–style Buddhist art of Buddha seated on Naga. Declined economically as Chinese ships increasingly carried Chinese trade through S.E. Asia and into Indian Ocean; destroyed as city c. 1340 before trade in blue–and–white Chinese ceramics began.

(Continues)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Econ. Base</i>	<i>Culture</i>
THAILAND (<i>Continued</i>)				
Ban Pah O	S.E. Thailand	?8th–13th c.	Ceramics	Mon, main production center of ceramics for Satingpra complex 11th–12th c., at Kok Moh kiln; unglazed but finely potted and burnished flagons [kendis] and pots in white, red, buff monochromes—signposts to parts of trade network. Twin village, Ban Wat Khanoon, find-site of 9th c. bronze statue of Siva (C. Javanese style) and nine-chambered stone deposit box.
Nakorn Si Thammarat	S.E. Thailand	5th–14th c.	Trade and capital city	Mon origs., originally part of Satingpra complex, outlived it to become center of S. Thai culture; in 18th c. supplied court Brahmans to Bangkok dynasty; had same long cultural sequence as Satingpra but less intensely involved in maritime trade. Linked to Satingpra by navigable canal via Ranot but otherwise not involved in major canal works. Said to be find-site of Srivijaya and Sailendra inscriptions that testify to Javano-Sumatran influences on Isthmus [Ligor inscriptions], but many Hindu and Buddhist artifacts moved here after the destruction of Satingpra.
Si chol	S.E. Thailand	5th–?8th c.	Trade and religious centers	Mon origs., between Nakorn Si Thammarat and Chaiya, beads and monumental remains of many small stone temples belonging to the earliest style of temple-building in India; no settlements defined, but fragments of Hindu statuary, shrines, and inscriptions from an early phase of monumental civilization in Thailand. Probably connected with trans-isthmian trade between Indian Ocean and Gulf of Thailand.
Chaiya	S.E. Thailand	?5th–14th c.	Trade and religious center	Mon origs., not part of Satingpra complex; had similar cultural sequence but less intensely involved in maritime trade, though just north of the ancient transisthmian route from Krabi to Ban Don Bay.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Econ. Base</i>	<i>Culture</i>
THAILAND <i>(Continued)</i>				
Takua pa	S.W. Thailand	6th–10th c.	Trade	Unknown origs., settlement site not yet defined. Find-site of magnificent stone Visnu with cylindrical crown 8th c., and later Visnu with Tamil merchants' inscription.
Khlong Thom	S.W. Thailand	?2nd–6th c.	Bead trade	Unknown origs., in Krabi Prov., center of prolific manufacture and trade in stone beads in the Indian Ocean and across the isthmus to S.Vietnam.
SOUTH VIETNAM and CAMBODIA				
Oc Êo	S.Vietnam	?2nd–6th c.	Maritime trade, drained agriculture	Mon/Khmer, large city [Funan?] near ancient W. coast of Mekong Delta. Trade network embraced E. provinces of Roman Empire, India, Isthmus, and S. China. Network of navigable canals to coast and Angkor Borei. Center for manufacture of small jewels in tin and silver in two-piece stone molds, traded regionally; involved in stone and glass bead trade. Early Buddhist sculpture in wood; later stone Visnus with cylindrical crown.
Angkor Borei	S. Cambodia	5th/6th–8th c.	Trade, agriculture	Khmer, political/cultural center [Chenla of Chinese sources?]; retreat from coast but still linked to it by over 90 km. of canals navigable by very small boats. Center of great cult of worship of Visnu with cylindrical crown, Phnom Da school.
CAMBODIA				
Pre-Angkorian	Tonle Sap and Middle Mekong	6th–8th c.	Irrigated agriculture	Ca. 17 small kingdoms with unstable successions and rivalries. They demonstrated the historic establishment of secure surplus agriculture along the small rivers draining into Tonle Sap and the Mun–Chi basins, which provided the economic base for the centralized Angkorian kingdom. Main sites, (1) Srestha-pura, (2) Bhavapura, (3) Purandarapura, Isanapura in the Sambor Prei Kuk group. Sites mainly known by royal data in inscriptions; settlements ill-defined, but monuments of Sambor Prei Kuk group excavated and dated by art, architectural, and paleographical styles.

(Continues)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Econ. Base</i>	<i>Culture</i>
CAMBODIA (<i>Continued</i>)				
Angkor	N. of Tonle Sap on three small rivers	9th–15th c.	Irrigated agriculture; capitals; lacustrine resources	Khmer pronunciation of <i>nagara</i> —Sanskrit city. In fact a complex of cities: covering sites (1) to (3) above as well as others. Founded mid-9th c. by King Yasovarman. Twenty-five kings traced and dated in inscriptions and art. Capital moved within Angkor plain and outside it to Kulen plateau, mid-Mekong (Koh Ker) and Roluos. With Pagan, Angkor has the greatest concentration of monumental architecture in S.E. Asia: Angkor Wat founded by Suryavarman II, 12th c.; Angkor Thom founded by Jayavarman VII, early 13th c., centered on the Bayon temple. He also endowed many other great monuments, roads, and hospitals. Khmer religion: Siva and Visnu worship (also Harihara = fusion of both), with gradual transition to Buddhism. Numerous inscriptions in Khmer and Sanskrit. Angkor, again like Pagan, created a standard of grandeur and legitimacy to which later courts aspired; court rituals survive in Phnom Penh and Bangkok. Exposed to twin pressures from Thais and Chams, abandoned for more defensible site of Phnom Penh.
VIETNAM				
Mi Son	C. Vietnam near E. coast	7th–12th c.	Trade and capital city; Rice-breeding	Cham, part of Amaravati area complex where Cham culture flourished from 3rd to 12th c. Restricted area of alluvium very productive owing to development of Champa [short-season] rice, allowing multiple cropping—introduced to Song China and fueled demographic/economic expansion there. On trade route from S.E. Asia to Guangzhou [Canton]. Religion Hindu and Buddhist, tower-temples in brick with single shrines. Stupas with breast-shaped mouldings. Sculpture in relief and round, including the famous Mi Son dancer in relief and gold-sheathed heads of Siva from linga-shrines.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Econ. Base</i>	<i>Culture</i>
VIETNAM (<i>Continued</i>)				
Tra Kieu Dong Duan	C. Vietnam	?-?	Trade and ceremonial	Cham, associated with Mi Son in the Amaravati complex.
Panduranga Po Nagar, Vijaya	S.C. Vietnam	?-?	Trade and ceremonial centers	Cham, smaller coastal complexes south of Amaravati area. Had occasionally separate diplomatic relations with Song China.
Co loa	N. Vietnam Red River	3d c. B.C.E.– 13th c. C.E.	Trade and irrigated Lac agriculture	Viet/Yue, center of late Bronze and Iron Age culture, long history of site occupation and reconstruction, including some periods of fusion of Chinese and Viet culture under the Han and later dynasties, punctuated by reassertion of independence. On trade route from S.E. Asia to Guangzhou; relations with China oscillate among diplomacy, war, and annexation into Chinese commanderies.
MALAYSIA				
Kuala Selinsing	S.W. coastal Malaysia	2nd–?4th c. C.E.	Bead trade	Malay, settlement ill-defined but strong concentration of glass and carnelian beads; active in circumpeninsular trade with Oc Êo complex in S. Vietnam and Philippines.
Bujang Valley	W. Malaysia Muda and Merbok Rivers	5/6th–14th c.	Trade, monumental clusters	Malay, settlements ill-defined; complex but numerous monuments and two major sites with trade, esp. ceramic, debris identified and partly excavated: Pengakalan Bujang and Sungai Mas sites. Total sites number between 40 and 55; discrepancy ca. 200 yrs. between dating of Buddhist traders' inscriptions and other evidence. Attest to long process of urbanization and involvement in maritime trade. Nine Buddhist monuments, 14 Hindu monuments identifiable. Kadaram of Cola inscriptions? With Satingpra and Palembang/later Jambi, one of the three great S.E. Asian maritime trading centers grouped under Song references to Sanfoqi?

(Continues)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Econ. Base</i>	<i>Culture</i>
INDONESIA				
Buni complex	N.W. Java Taruma River	5/6th c.–?	Trade and irrigated agriculture	Malayo-Javanaese. Inscriptions by King Purnavarman mention canal, script related to Pallava; settlements undefined but related inscriptions found in Jakarta, Banten, and Bogor.
Śrivijaya complex	S.E. Sumatra and Bangka Island	7th–9th/ 10th c.	Trade	Malay, seven related 7th c. inscriptions in Palembang, Jambi, and Bangka concerning ruler of Śrivijaya and his subjects, identified with Foqi of 7th c. Chinese Buddhist pilgrim as great center of Buddhist learning. Upriver/downriver trade mainly in incense; Malay maritime skills expanding to exploit strategic location on Straits of Melaka, where Indian Ocean traders interacted with South China Sea traders. Active throughout the Tang dynasty and Five Kingdoms but in Song was eclipsed in China trade by Jambi. Controversy surrounds location and identity of Sanfoqi of Song records: identical with Śrivijaya-Foqi of Tang period? Appropriate to identify Śrivijaya with Sanfoqi, the greatest S.E. Asian trading power, after 11th c.? Despite areas of uncertainty, there was a powerful trading entity in this area known to the Chinese as Sanfoqi, whose incenses were a major driver in the Song economy and whose ships dominated the Straits of Melaka. They conveyed their own and other S.E. Asian embassies to Song China, where they enjoyed special respect.
Jambi	S.E. Sumatra	9th–13th c.	Trade and ritual center	Malay, great city on estuary of Batang Hari-Malayu Rivers, settlement area well defined, partly excavated, and many brick temples restored. With Padang Lawas, greatest monumental center of Sumatra—Mahayana Buddhist and Hindu. Also riverine trading deposits test-excavated, reveal intensive trade with Song China and Satingpra: Ban Pah O-Kok Moh kendis found among trade debris, in sacred ponds and as foundation deposits in Chandi Gumpung, the largest temple in Jambi. By 11th c., with Satingpra and the Bujang Valley sites, the Sanfoqi of Song records?

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Econ. Base</i>	<i>Culture</i>
INDONESIA (<i>Continued</i>)				
Kota Cina, Aceh, Barus	N. Sumatra	9th–14th c.	Trade	Ports on the coast of northern Sumatra, all engaged in upriver/downriver and maritime trade, especially in forest products. Barus great center of camphor trade. All loosely linked to chronology and directions of trade of Palembang, Jambi, and Isthmus. First Islamic sites in Aceh.
Padang Lawas	S.W. Sumatra	10th/11th–13th c.	Ritual center	Malay, concentration of temples, stupas, and statuary on plateau; settlement area and historical context not yet fully defined. Pilgrimage center?
Tuban	N.C. Java	?–14th c.	Port for C. Java	Malayo-Javanese, seaport for C. Java. Settlement area not yet defined but well-stratified trade debris along ancient beach ridges.
Dieng Plateau	C. Java	8th–10th c.	Ceremonial center	Javanese, contemporary with Borobudur and Prambanan groups. Never a secular settlement but site of pilgrimage and monastic habitations. Small stone temples (Hindu and Buddhist) and remains of monasteries distributed along a route of worship on a high plateau ca. 2000 m.
Borobudur complex	C. Java	8th–9th c.	Great ceremonial center	Javanese, largest single monument in maritime Southeast Asia—Mahayana Buddhist—terraced stone structure covers a natural hill with infilling to support solid superstructure of crowning stupa and three circular terraces austere decorated with small stupas containing stone sculptures of seated Buddhas. Below them five square terraces are covered with exuberant stone sculptures in high relief, representing a high point in S.E. Asian art. No associated royal city so far identified; founded by Sailendra kings of C. Java. Within 5 km. radius of Borobudur, 30 locations with fragmentary sculptures and monumental structures identified.

(Continues)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Dates</i>	<i>Econ. Base</i>	<i>Culture</i>
INDONESIA (<i>Continued</i>)				
Prambanan	C. Java	9th–10th c.	Ceremonial center	Extensive group of stone temples of varying size, Hindu and Buddhist. Attempts have been made to distinguish Hindu and Buddhist reigns and their patronage, but this may be irrelevant to a situation where, as in India, kings patronized both religions at the same time. The exceptional beauty and originality of architecture and sculpture of Borobudur continued here. No associated royal city or cities of benefactors so far identified.

SOURCE: Janice Stargardt.

See also Aceh (Acheh); Ancient Coinage in Southeast Asia; Angkor; Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Arakan; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Bali; Blitar; Borobudur; Buddhism; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Candi; Ceramics; Champa; Chenla; Dvaravati; First Ava (Inwa) Dynasty (1364–1527 C.E.); Funan; Hinduism; India; Indianization; Indigenous Political Power; Islam in Southeast Asia; Isthmus of Kra; Jambi; *Jatakas*; Java; Khmers; Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885); Ligor/Nakhon; Lopburi (Lawo); Madura; *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana*; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Malang Temples; Mons; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Oc Êo; Pagan (Bagan); Palembang; Pegu; Prambanan; Pyus; Śrivijaya (Śriwijaya); Sri Lanka (Ceylon); Straits of Melaka; Sukhotai (Sukhodava); Sumatra; *Suvarnabhumi* (Land of Gold); Toungoo Dynasty (1531–1752); Tun-sun

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HINDUISM

The spread of Hinduism across the Bay of Bengal to several regions of Southeast Asia is reflected in the use of Sanskrit, the adoption of Hindu deities for worship, the acceptance of the Hindu devotional movement, or *bhakti*, and the construction of religious edifices such as the Hindu temple. O. W. Wolters (1999) has suggested that the “Hindu world” was a selective appropriation and localization of what were originally “foreign” concepts by local societies. What were these elements that formed a part of the larger cultural ethos in the first millennium C.E.?

The first was the use of Sanskrit as a language of both royal edicts and texts, such as the epics (namely, the *Rāmāyana* and the *Mahābhārata*), treatises outlining duties of the king (for example, the *Arthashastra*), and other works. Stone inscriptions in Sanskrit dated to the fourth to fifth centuries C.E. appear in several parts of mainland and island Southeast Asia, whereas local indigenous languages were used somewhat later, around the seventh century. These inscriptions of the early rulers refer to the kings adopting Sanskrit names and titles, performing sacrifices as enjoined in Hindu sacred literature, and making generous donations to *brahmanas* (priests), who had been invited to perform these rituals.

It is interesting that many of the rituals were a continuation of earlier practices. For example, the seven Sanskrit records on stone pillars from Kutei (Kutai) in East Kalimantan are the earliest sets of inscriptions from Indonesia. These record victories of the king Mulavarman, son of Asvavarman and grandson of Kundunga (clearly a non-Sanskritic name), over his rivals and the regular gift-giving ceremonies undertaken by him at the site of Vaprakesvara. It is generally accepted that elaborate potlatch rituals occupied an important place in early Indonesian society, and hence, the ceremonies recorded in the Kutei epigraphs are a continuation of this earlier practice in a different form.

Another element of the common cultural ethos was *bhakti*, or devotion to the gods, such as Visnu and Siva, the latter worshiped in both his iconic and his aniconic forms. Early images of these deities have been found in mainland Southeast Asia and the Indonesian archipelago, but by the sixth century C.E., these were pro-

duced locally and were distinctive enough to be distinguished from Indian prototypes. Nearly all early Hindu temples in Java seem to have been of Saivite affiliation, but it is almost impossible to find an Indian prototype of the Javanese *candi* (temple) or even a distinct temple style in the subcontinent that may have been the direct source of the influence.

Epics such as the *Mahābhārata* were recited in temples of seventh-century Cambodia, and the *Rāmāyana* is mentioned in pre-Angkorian inscriptions. These public recitations were a means of popularizing social ideals and cultural norms as envisioned in the Hindu world and provided the worshipers an occasion for identifying with the heroes of the epics. It is significant that many of these texts, such as the *Rāmāyana*, were reworked in several centers in Southeast Asia as early as the ninth century.

How were these Hinduistic concepts introduced into Southeast Asia? It is generally agreed that religious teachers traveled along trade routes to the courts of the local rulers and were instrumental in the spread of the Hindu religion and culture. Many of these are mentioned in early inscriptions; for example, the renowned philosopher Sankara (700–750 C.E.) is referred to in ninth-century Cambodian inscriptions.

Similarly, the sacred geography associated with Hindu pilgrimage sites in India was recreated in Southeast Asia. For instance, the Tuk Mas inscription from Java describes the spring in which it is found as being as purifying as the Ganga, the holy river of the Hindus that flows through North India. Further evidence for this comes from Laos and is found on a stone stele at Vat Luong Kau on the right bank of the Mekong River in southwestern Laos, near the ancient shrine of Vat Phu. The stele is inscribed on each of its four sides with sixteen lines of Sanskrit in an early variety of Brahmi dated paleographically to the second half of the fifth century. The objective of the record was to establish a new *mahatirtha* (major pilgrimage center) called Kurukshetra, which was meant to duplicate the spiritual efficacy of the original center in North India. This historical foundation of a *tirtha* (pilgrimage center) is in contrast to the practice in India, where the foundation of *tirthas* is not associated with historical events and figures but is regarded in mythological and

legendary terms. It is this process of adaptation and reinterpretation that added richness and variety to the Hindu cultural experience in Southeast Asia.

How is the influence of Hinduism to be assessed? The answer to the question would include complex facets of the cultural heritage of several Southeast Asian countries, such as traditional notions of kingship, the importance of the *Rāmāyana* and the *Mahābhārata* in art and architecture, and the growth of literature based on these works. This would include texts such as the *Rāmāyana* of Yogisvara in Java, the *Ramakerti* of Cambodia, the *Ramakien* of Thailand, the *Hikayat Seri Rama* of Malaysia, and smaller recensions in the form of *wayang* stories. But perhaps most important are the reinvention and reinterpretation of these religious inputs by the local societies and communities.

HIMANSHU PRABHA RAY

See also Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Bali; Blitar; *Candi*; *Devaraja*; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; India; Indian Immigrants; Indianization; Indigenous Political Power; *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana*; Malang Temples; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia

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HISPANIZATION

The term *Hispanization* is used to denote the process by which profound changes took place

in the lifestyle, socioeconomic organization, and political structure of the Filipino people during the Spanish colonial regime in the Philippines (Phelan 1959). The term should not be conceived as suggesting that the end product of this process was a transformation of Filipinos into Spaniards. As the historian John Leddy Phelan has pointed out, the Spaniards were only moderately successful in changing the Filipino way of life (1959: 159). It was a two-way process in which Spanish institutions introduced into the islands became infused with Filipino elements as well. The process of Hispanization mainly involved the Christianized, tribute-paying lowland population. In other areas, non-Hispanized populations were living beyond the control of the Spanish government. These were the Muslim populations and the animistic tribal groups in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago and the ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordilleras Mountains in northern Luzon.

The Spanish expansion in Asia had three objectives. The first was to get access to the spice-producing islands in the Moluccas (Maluku). The second was to acquire a foothold in China and Japan and to Christianize these countries. The third was to conquer the Philippine Islands and to Christianize the inhabitants. The first objective was not realized because the Dutch drove the Spaniards out of the Moluccas. The second failed because the rulers of China and Japan were not sympathetic to missionary activities. The third objective was partially realized.

The Spanish conquest of the Philippine Islands was facilitated by several factors: the population was thin and widely dispersed, political units were small, and there was an absence of centralized states. The basic social and political unit was a local kinship group called the *barangay*, under a local chief, called the *datu*. State formation had just started, with small sultanates in the south and an incipient sultanate in Manila. This fragmented social structure allowed the Spaniards to spread the Catholic faith in the islands and to introduce a system of colonial rule.

For most of the three centuries of Spanish rule (ca. 1560s–1898), contact between Spaniards and Filipinos was limited. The number of Spaniards in the islands was small prior to the mid-nineteenth century. For instance, in 1810, about 4,000 Spaniards were living in the midst

of a population of about 2.5 million lowland Filipinos (Corpuz 1989, 1: 547–548). Most Filipinos only had contact with the Spanish friar in their hometown. In Manila, where the majority of the Spaniards were located, contact was somewhat more intensive. It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century that the Spanish influence in education increased, when sons of rich landowners went to Manila for studies; a small number of them went to Spain.

In the Spanish Empire, the Catholic Church and the state were closely intertwined. The pope had granted the Spanish king patronage and power over the administration of church affairs in the newly conquered areas in the Americas and Asia. The Crown had the task of promoting the conversion of the “Indian” population to Christianity. In addition, the Spanish Crown assumed the obligation to finance all missionary activities. This was also the situation in the Philippines. Friars sailed with the Spanish expeditions to Asia, and together with Captain-General Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (1500–1572), a number of Augustinian friars arrived in the islands.

The Spanish conquest of the Philippines was carried out with violence and destruction in the first few decades. Alongside the conquerors, missionaries explored the islands and started to Christianize the population. By 1622, an estimated 500,000 people had been baptized by a few hundred missionaries (Corpuz 1989). Missionaries studied the native languages, wrote grammars and dictionaries, and used these languages for teaching the Christian faith.

The number of Spanish priests and friars was relatively small throughout the period of Spanish rule in the islands. The friars opposed the admission of Filipinos into the priesthood. In the nineteenth century, the Spanish government was afraid that Filipino priests would spearhead a nationalist movement striving for independence.

As the contact between the Spanish clergy and the rural population was limited, the indoctrination of the population with the Catholic religion was flawed. The religious teachings reached the population selectively. And though people participated in the colorful rituals and fiestas (such as Holy Week and Christmas) with processions, dances, and theatrical performances, the believers had little doctrinal knowledge, and the performance of

religious duties was often an outward, formal activity. In fact, the Catholic religion had split into two layers. One was the Catholicism of the Spanish clergy, the Spanish colonists, and the urban Filipino elite. The other was the folk Catholicism of the Filipinos. Historian Reynaldo Clemeña Iletto has argued that the Filipino brand of folk Christianity was deeply influenced by the experience of Holy Week, focused on the suffering, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Ideas associated with this experience permeated the thoughts of religious preachers such as Apolinario de la Cruz (1814/1815–1841), as well as the political ideals of revolutionaries such as Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897).

Because of the close interconnection between church and state, the Catholic hierarchy was one of the administrative pillars of colonial rule. In the rural areas, the Spanish priest or friar was the only representative of the Crown in a town. Aside from his religious duties, the priest performed administrative tasks, such as collecting taxes, leading the local officials, mediating local conflicts, advising the higher Spanish officials, supervising local elections, and executing public orders. In short, he was a man of great prestige and power. Individuals who displeased a friar either in personal or business matters would be denounced to the authorities as a *filibuster* (rebel) and deported. Excommunication would also be imposed, which was one of the grievances of the Filipinos against the friars and the Spanish regime.

The Catholic custom of *compadrazgo*, or ritual coparenthood, was integrated in the Philippine kinship system, though with a special Filipino ingredient. In this ritual, a child who is baptized has two sponsors, a godfather (*compadre*) and a godmother (*comadre*), who assume responsibility for giving the young person spiritual guidance in life. In the Philippines, the *compadrazgo* relationship acquired another function: it strengthened the bond not only between the godparent and the godchild but also between the godparent and the parent. The relationship, consecrated in church, involved a moral responsibility between the two parties to help each other in social life. This custom became an important mechanism for the creation of political alliances.

One of the most salient legacies left by Spanish rule in the Philippines is the system of fam-

ily names. In Southeast Asia, an individual traditionally had a personal name (or often several during a lifetime) but no family name. The Spanish priest gave the individual a personal name upon baptism, usually the name of a saint. In addition, people often used nicknames in addressing each other. But in 1849, the Spanish government ordered the adoption of a system of family names—a system that had been generalized throughout Europe during the Napoleonic period (ca. 1800–1815)—because it proved to be efficient for administrative purposes. The Spanish government prepared an alphabetic catalog of Spanish family names. As officials had only one copy of this list, they took out a few letters of the alphabet for one town, a few other letters for another town, and so on. Consequently, one finds in many places in the Philippines a regional concentration of surnames, all starting with the same letter of the alphabet. Present-day Filipinos possess three types of family names: old Filipino names, Spanish names, and Filipinized Chinese names. It should be pointed out that the Dutch, British, and French colonial governments in Southeast Asia refrained from interfering with the traditional name systems of their colonial subjects.

The Spanish language was never adopted as the national language in the Philippines, unlike in Hispanic America. Indeed, toward the end of the Spanish rule, less than 10 percent of the population could speak Spanish (Phelan 1959: 131), mostly in urban areas, and people in rural areas could not speak and read the language (Corpuz 1989, 1: 488). Spain had ordered that schools be set up, but these orders were not obeyed in the colony. It was only toward the end of the Spanish regime that the government actively encouraged the use of Spanish. At that time, a number of authors, essay writers, and poets had started writing in Spanish. The nationalists in the Propaganda Movement published their journal *La Solidaridad* in Spanish, and so did José Rizal (1861–1896) with his novels *Noli Me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo*. Spanish was the language of the Malolos Republic, and Apolinario Mabini (1864–1903) wrote his decrees in that language. If the Americans had not occupied the country and made English mandatory, Spanish would probably be the national language of the Philippines today.

Architecture during the Spanish period blended Spanish and Mexican influences and

newly emerging Filipino creativity. Religious architecture, the construction of churches and convents, had a characteristic Philippine style. Spanish and Mexican Baroque exerted a great influence, but the exigencies of climatic conditions as well as local building techniques and materials added a specific flavor. Religious architecture was in the hands of the friars, who relied on Mexican and Filipino master builders, masons, and carpenters and Chinese sculptors. The massive churches, with their thick stone walls, were built with a solidity that could withstand earthquakes and the corrosive effects of the tropical climate (Coseteng 1972).

Private houses with a typical Filipino style were constructed during the nineteenth century, with the emergence of Filipino landowning elites who prospered from the cultivation of export crops. They were no longer satisfied with the traditional native house on stilts, constructed of wooden poles, woven rattan, and bamboo and with a straw roof. Instead, they built two-story houses, with massive stone on the bottom and wood above. The architecture and decoration of these houses were the typical products of a Filipino-Spanish mestizo culture, developed in the late Spanish period. The style combined elements such as iron grilles, wooden carving, wooden balustrades, red tile roofs or galvanized iron roofs, sliding windows, lattice-work, and staircases, and the homes featured wide, spacious rooms and European furniture. In the second half of the eighteenth century, a number of Spanish-trained Filipino architects used their creative skills to design churches and private houses. Unfortunately, in the late twentieth century, many of these beautiful houses gave way to modern concrete buildings (Zialcita and Tinio 1980).

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Architecture of Southeast Asia; *Barangay*; Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Catholicism; Cruz, Apolinario de la (1814/1815–1841); Education, Western Secular; Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship; Mabini, Apolinario (1864–1903); Mestizo; Missionaries, Christian; *Noli Me Tangere* (1887) and *El Filibusterismo* (1891); Patron-Client Relations; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Propaganda Movement; Rizal, José (1861–1896)

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HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF INSULAR SOUTHEAST ASIA

The historical geography of insular Southeast Asia is dominated by the patterns of land and life as shaped by environment, culture, and historical development. Island Southeast Asia is generally held to comprise those parts of the region that lie astride and to the north of the major tectonic plate boundary that runs through the heart of the region. Sumatra and Java, the Outer Islands of Indonesia through to Irian Jaya, the island of Borneo, and the Philippines constitute insular, as opposed to mainland, Southeast Asia. This broad geographic region has been shaped by rather different historical and geographic factors from the mainland regions.

Undoubtedly, environmental conditions give these island territories a degree of unity. Geologically, much of the region shares similar tectonic characteristics. The fact that lines of tectonic boundaries run through Sumatra, Java, the Celebes, and the Philippines has meant that

they have shared the consequences thereof—frequent earthquakes and volcanic activity (from Krakatoa to Mount Pinatubo, the region is the scene of frequent, catastrophic eruptions) and a predominance of volcanic, acidic soils that have helped to shape agricultural systems and patterns of settlement and livelihood. Climatically, equatorial monsoon conditions dominate. This brings high rainfall and humidity coupled with a dry season that may last less than a month astride the equator or three or four months in parts of the Philippines and the more easterly islands of Indonesia. The climate brings important patterns in wind speed and direction. Thus, the northwest and southeast monsoons have important navigational consequences; in addition, frequent tropical cyclones, especially in the northern part of the region, can make navigation difficult.

How, then, have these environmental conditions contributed to the creation of the cultural landscapes of the region? Historically, farming systems have been based on rice. Complex and highly developed wet-rice farming systems on islands such as Java and Bali have developed using fertile, acidic soils and well-organized systems of social control to facilitate irrigation. Pockets of highly fertile wet-rice farming are also evident in parts of the Philippines and Malaysia. Historically, they have supported very high population densities. In other parts of the region, dry-rice or hill-rice systems dominate. In many areas, these are based on shifting cultivation systems in which fields are periodically abandoned and new land cleared through burning. Such “slash-and-burn” farming systems provide good short-term yields and are ecologically viable, provided the land is allowed to rest for fifteen- to twenty-year periods. Each cultivation type elicits its own landscapes and systems of social organization, from the highly concentrated population and intensive, manicured landscapes of Bali to the seemingly chaotic cleared and burned fields of the Borneo interior.

Another important culture trait that can be linked, in part, to the distinctive geography of the region is the basic settlement pattern. A continuum of settlement types can be identified, from the temporary habitations of hunter-gatherer groups such as the Penan of Borneo to the nucleated *kampongs* (villages) of the Malay Peninsula and the port cities that have

flourished on the shores of the region. Such settlement patterns reflect the influence of environmental factors and the impact of social and cultural attitudes on ways of life. Both the artifacts themselves (the houses, farms, tools, and techniques) and the producers of culture themselves (the ways in which societies are organized, their territorial conceptions, their hierarchies) help shape the landscape of the region. Thus, the Javanese or Malay village settlement encapsulates not only a particular set of connections to the material environment (wet-rice farming, the importance of irrigation skills) but also a set of social relations that govern how the settlement and its peoples function. Geographic studies of the Dayak longhouse or of the Malay stilted house can be an important means to help our understanding of territorial organization.

The role of the sea in shaping the historical geography of the region has been of major significance. During the Pleistocene when sea levels were lower, the landmasses of the region were connected by a land bridge, which allowed for the dispersal of plants and animals through the region. In the period of human history, sea transport has allowed for a remarkable diversity of peoples and cultures to develop, especially along the shores of the South China Sea and the Straits of Melaka. The importance of fishing to the domestic economy was and remains great, and many indigenous coastal peoples successfully combined fishing with a range of trading and agricultural pursuits. Along the sea-lanes of the region flowed goods, ideas, and peoples, and it has been through the sea and maritime trade that the influences of Indian and Chinese civilization have been felt in the region from as early as the sixth and seventh centuries. The characteristic port cities of the region were the product of trading through the seas of the region, often taking advantage of the monsoonal wind systems that left ships becalmed for months at a time in these “lands below the winds.” In general, the seas of insular Southeast Asia are warm, shallow, and relatively easy to navigate. Indigenous maritime skills created traditions of coastal trade, and the rise of maritime empires such as Śrīvijaya on the island of Sumatra from the eighth century and Melaka from the fifteenth century established prototypical port cities. The careful regulation of trade, a degree of political stability,

and good port facilities contributed to the opening-up of the region to merchants from West Asia, India, and China, and the powerful trading and sailing skills of indigenous groups such as the Bugis from the Celebes were also important. The built form of many of these cities, which often had carefully demarcated trading quarters, palaces, and marketplaces, created an urban type that developed in many parts of the region.

Western enterprise and the development of colonialism undoubtedly reshaped many of the characteristic culture traits of the region, though one should be cautious and not overestimate the degree or magnitude of the changes wrought. To the traditional cultivation systems of the region, colonialism brought new forms of agriculture and new geographies of rural change. The regimented and regulated landscape of the plantation spread through the region from its early footholds in the “Spice Islands” (the Moluccas) to the large tobacco, rubber, coffee, and tea plantations of areas such as western Sumatra, northern Borneo, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines. Pencil-straight roads, industrial buildings, and barrackslike workers’ housing subsequently intruded into the traditional rural landscape. Colonialism also reshaped culture through the migration of peoples, goods, and capital into the region. The migration of the southern Chinese into Malaya, Sumatra, and Borneo, for example, brought new ways of living. Distinctive cultural traditions of architecture and farming were introduced, together with a focus on trade and enterprise that reshaped many small trading settlements into small towns and centers for commerce and administration. European colonial administration also brought new settlements, often grouped around forts and trading bazaars, into the landscape, and they acted as catalysts for new patterns of in-migration and economic and social change.

The urban fabric of the region was undoubtedly transformed by the arrival of European colonialism. The concentration of many immigrant communities in the towns and cities created new economic conditions. Furthermore, along with these new economic conditions were new urban forms. Port facilities were greatly expanded—the city of Singapore, for example, was transformed from a small Malay kampong in 1819 to a major global port by

1910: colonial government helped establish a port infrastructure even as a dynamic immigrant Chinese and Malay population transformed its trade and commerce. Other cities, such as Jakarta and Manila, epitomized this combination of a dynamic indigenous population and external colonial influences shaping and reshaping the port city.

Alongside economic changes, colonial government and administration created new political geographies and boundaries. Thus, the diverse peoples and environments of the Dutch East Indies were transformed into the Republic of Indonesia in 1949. The creation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963—most notably the decision to incorporate the Bornean states of Sabah and Sarawak—reflected the conveniences of diplomatic policy rather than geographic and ethnic reality. New regional and administrative boundaries, a new transport infrastructure, the concentration of power in the key district towns and capitals of the colonial era, and the hypergrowth of capital cities such as Manila and Jakarta epitomize postcolonial geographic transformations.

Postcolonial impacts on the landscape and way of life have been huge. It may be argued that the pace of change is faster now than at any time in the history of the region. Agricultural and rural populations continue to fall in percentage terms as migration to the towns and cities grows. The search for natural resources is well reflected in the deforestation of parts of Borneo or the onshore and offshore installations of the hydrocarbon industry in the South China Sea or Straits of Melaka. The expansion of urban boundaries, the growth of squatter populations, and the economic expansion of the economies of countries such as Singapore and Malaysia have created new urban landscapes and radically changed patterns of employment.

Culture traits, the patterns of field and farm, and the fabric of urban and rural settlement have evolved through the continued interaction of environment and culture. A diverse physical environment has produced a range of cultural environments. Landscapes of town and country can thus reveal much about how societies are organized and how they have changed. Physical conditions are important in patterns of land and life, and so, too, is the role played by social and cultural change in modifying and transforming

environments. The incorporation of a historical perspective in understanding how landscapes and ways of life have been shaped is vital if we are to capture the full, rich dimension of historical change in insular Southeast Asia.

MARK CLEARY

See also Bali; Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Bengkulu (Bencoolen, Benkulen); Borneo; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Chinese in Southeast Asia; Ecological Setting of Southeast Asia; Highways and Railways; Indian Immigrants; Java; Luzon; Madura; Maluku (The Moluccas); Manila; Melaka; Mindanao; Monsoons; Rice in Southeast Asia; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1990s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Straits of Melaka; Sulawesi (Celebes); Sumatra; Surabaya; Surakarta; Swidden Agriculture; Timor; Visayan Islands (Bisayan Islands, the Bisayas, the Visayas); Wallace Line

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HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY OF MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mainland Southeast Asia comprises a broad region extending from the tip of Myanmar (Burma) to Johor at the end of the Malay Peninsula (West Malaysia), a distance of some 3,200 kilometers. At its widest, its breadth is some 1,200 kilometers, extending through Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam; toward the south, the mainland narrows in southern Thailand and Malaysia. The region represents the southern edge of continental Asia, and both relief and soils reflect these continental origins. Broad sweeps of mountains and valleys dominate the relief and influence patterns of settle-

ment and human exploitation. The climate is equatorial, with generally high rainfall, average temperatures, and humidity. The transition from insular to mainland Southeast Asia is marked by more varied monsoonal conditions, with a dry season four or five months in length and cooler, dryer winters, particularly in the uplands.

Especially important for human settlement are the great rivers of the mainland, which flow broadly from north to south—the Irrawaddy, Sittang, Chao Phraya, Mekong, and Song Koi (Red River). The high temperatures and heavy rainfall in the continental uplands of the mainland have led to high rates of weathering and erosion. Consequently, these key rivers transport very large sediment loads, which provide a rich alluvium for intensive rice production in the valley basins and river deltas. It is these areas that provided the core of dense human settlement in the past, and they continue to be important in the present. Drawing on the skills of drainage and irrigation technology, indigenous techniques of rice growing flourished and supported rich and technically sophisticated civilizations. Much of the rest of the mainland is upland and, although not poor in terms of resources, has historically been devoted to shifting cultivation systems. Hill rice has been the mainstay of these areas. In places such as northern Burma and Thailand and the uplands of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, indigenous groups have largely exploited the rain forest through shifting cultivation. Clearing and burning fields to provide a nutrient-rich ash produces an excellent short-term yield of hill rice, and if the fields are rested adequately (usually between fifteen and twenty-five years) before reclearing, soil and biomass can recover. Such systems, once much derided by tropical agronomists, are now increasingly recognized as viable and sustainable means of farming rain forest areas, provided population densities are low.

Historically, settlement patterns in the region have been agricultural and rural in character. In areas of shifting cultivation, village sites have usually been static, although some groups do migrate to temporary settlements at certain times of the year depending on the agricultural cycle. The use of bamboo and palm leaf as construction materials and the frequent use of pile-dwellings are typical cultural traits of the region. But migration has introduced diversity, and the dwellings of, for example, Chinese

groups are marked off from those of their neighbors by form and materials. A propensity to locate close to water has given many settlements, even in the interior, what one author called an almost amphibious way of life, in which farming and fishing provide key sources of employment and sustenance; it has also shaped both the location and form of rural settlements.

In addition to its characteristic rural settlement pattern, mainland Southeast Asia has been the location for culturally and historically significant cities and kingdoms. The inland state of Angkor and its magnificent monumental complex of Angkor Wat in northern Cambodia, which flourished from the tenth to fourteenth centuries, was built on tremendous technical skill in marshaling the problems of irrigation and drainage to create an economy based on intensive wet-rice farming. Its artistic and aesthetic achievements more than matched its technological capacity and created perhaps the most important of the mainland empires in the historic period. But the wealth and skills of the mainland peoples and their rice-based civilizations were equally well reflected in other great kingdoms and empires—the Pagan empire in Myanmar, for example, was dominant in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; the Champa empire on the coast of Vietnam was also important in that period.

These monumental empires serve to emphasize the richness of material and nonmaterial cultural artifacts arising from intensive wet-rice farming systems. What the built form of mainland Southeast Asia in the classical period reflected, then, was the importance of a strong agricultural base, an economic surplus generated through technical skill and sophisticated systems of political patronage, and an ability to control route ways in order to encourage the development of regional trading systems. River transport was vital in connecting regional powers, and though port cities were more characteristic of island Southeast Asia, the ports of the mainland region were vital in connecting the region to the circuits of trade from West Asia, India, and China.

The impact of colonialism on the mainland was rather different from that on the islands. Although the ships and merchant-adventurers of Holland, Portugal, and Britain scoured the islands and inlets of the archipelago for spices

and precious goods, contact with the mainland was more limited. The exigencies of geography meant that any contact was, in any case, limited to a narrow coastal belt. Navigation up the winding and braided river deltas could be perilous: moreover, richer and easier pickings were to be found elsewhere. The lure of the mainland was also more limited due to the lack of spices and precious goods that Europeans found relatively easily elsewhere. Finally, the mainland states—notably the Thai and Vietnamese states—were more powerful than most island states and better able to resist colonial authority. By the middle of the nineteenth century, nonetheless, much of the mainland had fallen under Western influence. The British colonized Burma largely in order to consolidate their Indian border. The French, after a number of exploratory missions in the mid-nineteenth century, had, by the 1880s, taken control of most of Indochina through establishing either protectorates or direct colonial dependencies. Only Thailand remained outside direct colonial intervention, partly because of political skill and partly because both Britain and France preferred to maintain Thailand as a buffer state between their respective zones of influence.

The impact of the colonial era on the landscapes and cultures of the mainland was varied. Traditional cultivation systems were modified with the development of the plantation system and cash-crop farming. In southern Vietnam and the Malay Peninsula, the production of rubber, tea, coffee, and cocoa created new landscapes and new forms of social and economic organization. The production and export of minerals, from tin in British Malaya to oil in British Burma, also brought important changes to landscapes and peoples. The flow of migrant workers into the region—especially the Chinese—reshaped settlements and introduced new culture traits (in housing, diet, religion, social organization), and European capital and administration wrought changes in the urban hierarchy, in urban form, and in the infrastructure. Railway lines linked the different parts of Vietnam or British Malaya with administrative and economic centers. The port city of Singapore, at the fulcrum of mainland and island Southeast Asia, acted as a funnel for the export of commodities from the region and the import of Western goods. Capital cities grew rapidly as commerce and administration

expanded—colonial cities such as Saigon (Hố Chí Minh City) and Rangoon (Yangon) and noncolonial cities such as Bangkok expanded with the integration of the region into the nascent global economy at the end of the nineteenth century.

If the historian is struck by the increased pace of change in the colonial period, for the geographer, change has been ever more rapid with the dismantling of the colonial regime. The impact of population growth and migration since 1970 has been enormous, even in the more isolated parts of the mainland. Previously isolated tribal groups in northern Thailand or inland Vietnam have been drawn into the mainstream economy as new groups have sought to develop their traditional lands. The ravages of deforestation have created both environmental and social problems in many interior regions of the mainland as both national and multinational companies seek out the most valuable species in the rain forests. Such deforestation has compromised fundamentally the ability of shifting-cultivators to maintain their way of life. Political unrest and uncertainty have also created major problems for minority groups, especially on the borders of Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos, where the territorial and cultural affinities of groups such as the Karen are in dispute.

Rural-urban migration has been an endemic population characteristic in recent decades. Rural change, much of it articulated through the technical advances of the Green Revolution, has reduced agricultural employment and, through changing patterns of investment, has led to the interpenetration of the rural and urban in new forms of spatial and social organization. Farm, field, and factory are now closely intermeshed in the new landscapes of the region. Population shifts have also meant that cities such as Bangkok and Saigon have swollen with new migrants eschewing traditional rural lifestyles in favor of industrial employment in the factories of the city. A new urban fringe landscape has emerged around Bangkok, Saigon, and similar cities—a landscape in which industrial estates, squatter housing, and the residences of a burgeoning middle class intermingle. The past remains omnipresent in the landscapes and culture traits of mainland Southeast Asia: the task of interpreting them becomes ever more complex as the pace of social and

economic change in the region accelerates. It is a more difficult but arguably more rewarding task than ever.

MARK CLEARY

See also Annam; Arakan; Bangkok; Cambodia (Eighteenth to Mid-Nineteenth Centuries); Chiang Mai; Chiang Rai; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Cochin China; Coffee; Ecological Setting of Southeast Asia; Hanoi (Thang-long); Highways and Railways; Hué; Indian Immigrants; Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Kuala Lumpur (KL); Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Mandalay; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Rangoon (Yangon); Rice in Southeast Asia; Rubber; Saigon (Gia Dinh; Hồ Chí Minh City); Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1990s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Swidden Agriculture; Tin

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HLUTDAW

The Hludaw was a council of ministers established to advise the king that became integrated into the main functions of government in monarchical Burma. It is said to have been formed in the reign of King Htilominlo (r. 1210–1234) of Pagan but may have existed earlier. Composed of the king's brothers in Pagan times (Htilominlo, for example, relegated his powers to his four elder brothers [Mya Sein 1973: 5]), the council wielded a great deal of actual power, as demonstrated in 1254 when the ministers of the Hludaw chose Narathihapate, the son of a concubine, to succeed to the throne instead of Thingathu, the son of a queen. This pattern developed through the Toungoo dynasty (1531–1752) and continued into the third Burmese empire of the Kon-

baung dynasty. Under King Thalun in 1637, the Hludaw had responsibility for royal edicts concerning taxation, military, and legal issues (Lieberman 1984: 87).

By the time of King Thibaw (r. 1878–1885) at the end of the Konbaung dynasty and the era of independent, monarchical Burma, the Hludaw had become the supreme Council of State, presiding over all executive and judicial issues. Its membership comprised the four Wungyis (ministers), four Wundauks (junior ministers), four Sayedawgyis (senior Buddhist monks/teachers), and four Nakhandaws (officers who present petitions to the king). The senior prince usually presided over its deliberations, but the king could do so if he wished, as King Thibaw announced he intended to do in 1884. The members of the Hludaw were appointed by the king and remained in office at his pleasure. He could dismiss them if they passed orders contrary to the interests of the realm or the king. All orders from the king passed through the Hludaw.

The Council of Ministers met daily in a hall within the palace compound or sometimes at the home of a Wungyi. It heard petitions and appeals; proceedings were public, and evidence was presented verbally. In function, the council was both an advisory body and a judiciary, acting as a court. The four Wungyis were the highest officials in the administration. Four Wundauks assisted the Wungyis; the former often settled minor cases without reference to the Wungyis. Various administrative departments reported to the Hludaw. Separate from the Hludaw was the functioning of the Atwinwuns (deputy ministers), lower in rank than the Wungyis but very influential because their responsibilities for the palace gave them constant access to the king. An indefinite number of Atwinwuns operated as a privy council. An order from the king was first passed to the Atwinwun on duty before being passed up the ranks of officials to the Wungyis, who, if they disapproved, could refer the order back to the king. He, in turn, could insist on his order being carried out. Life at court was hazardous, and Wungyis, Wundauks, and Atwinwuns alike could be deprived of office, thrown into prison, or executed at the whim of the king. None received a salary, but they were remunerated through the lands bestowed on them by the king—they received revenue from the villages or districts under their domain. The Hludaw

was abolished in 1886 following the British annexation of Upper Burma at the end of the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885), but five Wungyis were retained to advise the new chief commissioner, Sir Charles Bernard (t. 1880–1887).

HELEN JAMES

See also Indigenous Political Power; Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885); Pagan (Bagan); Toungoo Dyanasty (1531–1732)

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HMONG

With over 4 million individuals worldwide (Culas and Michaud 1997), the Hmong constitute one of the most numerous mountain minority groups of the Indochina peninsula. Linguistic data show that the Hmong of the peninsula (around 1.2 million) stem from the Miao of southern China as one among a set of ethnic groups belonging to the Miao-Yao linguistic subfamily (which included 7.4 million Miao in 1989) (Culas and Michaud 1997).

A few centuries ago, the lowland Chinese started moving into the mountain ranges of China's southwest region. This migration combined with major social unrest in southern China in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to cause some minorities of Guizhou, Sichuan, and Yunnan—where the majority of the Hmong in China (around 2.5 million) still live today—to migrate south (Culas and Michaud 1997). A number of Hmong thus settled in the ranges of the Indochina peninsula to practice subsistence agriculture and opium poppy cultivation.

Vietnam, where their presence is attested to from the late eighteenth century onward, is probably the first Indochinese country into

which the Hmong migrated. During the colonization of Tonkin (1883–1954), a number of Hmong decided to join the Vietnamese nationalists and communists, whereas many Christianized Hmong sided with the French. In particular, numerous Hmong took part on both sides in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. After the Viet Minh victory, many pro-French Hmong had to fall back to Laos and South Vietnam. The ones remaining in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) had to accept living under communist rule.

The traditional trade in coffin wood with China and the cultivation of opium—both prohibited only in 1992—long guaranteed a regular cash income. Today, cash cropping is the main economic activity. As in Laos, some Hmong participate in the local and regional administrations. At the time of the 1999 national census, there were 787,604 Hmong living in Vietnam. Also in the late 1990s, several thousand Hmong moved to the Central Highlands, and in 2001, some crossed the border into Cambodia, constituting the first attested presence of Hmong settlers in that country.

In Laos, Hmong settlement is nearly as ancient as in Vietnam. After decades of distant relations with the Lao kingdoms, closer ties between the French military and some Hmong on the Xieng Khouang plateau were established after the Pacific War (1941–1945). There, a particular rivalry between members of the Lo and Ly clans developed into open enmity, also affecting those connected with them by kinship. Clan leaders took opposite sides, and as a consequence, several thousand Hmong participated in the fighting against the Pathet Lao communists, and perhaps as many were enrolled in the People's Liberation Army. As in Vietnam, numerous Hmong in Laos also genuinely tried to avoid getting involved in the conflict in spite of the extremely difficult material conditions under which they lived during wartime.

After the 1975 communist victory, thousands of Hmong from Laos had to seek refuge abroad. Approximately 30 percent of the Hmong in that country crossed the border, although the only concrete data we have indicate that 116,000 Hmong from Laos and Vietnam together sought refuge in Thailand up to 1990 (Culas and Michaud 1997). In 1995, the Hmong in Laos numbered 315,000 (Culas and Michaud 1997).

In Thailand, the presence of Hmong settlements is documented from the end of the nineteenth century. Initially, the Siamese paid little attention to them. But in the early 1950s, the state suddenly took a number of initiatives aimed at establishing links. Decolonization and nationalism were gaining momentum in the peninsula, and wars of independence were raging. Armed opposition to the state in northern Thailand, triggered by outside influence, started in 1967, yet here again, most Hmong refused to take sides in the conflict. Communist guerrilla warfare stopped by 1982 as a result of an international concurrence of events that rendered it pointless. Priority has since been given to sedentarizing the mountain population and introducing commercially viable agricultural techniques and national education, with the aim of integrating these non-T'ai animists within the national identity. In 1995, the Hmong in Thailand numbered 124,000 (Culas and Michaud 1997).

Myanmar most likely includes a modest number of Hmong (perhaps around 2,500). However, no precise census has been conducted in recent years (McKinnon and Michaud 2000).

As result of refugee movements in the wake of the First and Second Indochina Wars, the largest Hmong community to settle outside Asia was in the United States, where approximately 100,000 individuals had already arrived by 1990 (Culas and Michaud 1997). California became home to half of this group, and the remainder went to Minnesota, Wisconsin, Washington, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina. By the same date, 10,000 Hmong had migrated to France (that figure includes 1,400 in French Guyana) (Culas and Michaud 1997). Canada admitted 900 individuals, and another 360 went to Australia, 260 to China, and 250 to Argentina (Culas and Michaud 1997). Over the following years and until the definitive closure of the last refugee camps in Thailand in 1998, additional numbers of Hmong have left Asia, but the definitive figures are still to be produced.

JEAN MICHAUD

See also Cambodia (Eighteenth to Mid-Nineteenth Centuries); Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), Battle of; Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Laos

(Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Montagnard; Pathet Lao (Land of the Laos); Swidden Agriculture; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Yunnan Province

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HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969)

Vietnamese Nationalist Hero

Hồ Chí Minh, who set up the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) in 1929 and the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) one year later, led the August Revolution in 1945 and ruled the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) from 1954 until his death in 1969. He is still portrayed everywhere in Vietnam, and

Saigon, the country's busiest city, now bears his name—Hồ Chí Minh City.

Hồ was born Nguyễn Tất Thành in 1890 near Vinh (Nghe An), the second son of a civil servant at the imperial court in Huế, under the French protectorate. He left school without graduating in 1910. At about the same time, his father was dismissed from his government post. In 1911, Thành chose to work abroad in French shipping. It was, of course, unknown then that he would only return home thirty years later.

His first years abroad were mostly spent in Europe. He stayed in London during World War I (1914–1918) and thereafter settled in Paris. He joined other Vietnamese nationalists, studied socialist theory, and assumed the name Nguyễn Ai Quốc (Nguyễn the Patriot). He was present outside the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference with a petition (*Annamite People's Claims*) demanding the right of self-determination for Vietnam.

As a socialist, he participated in the 1920 Tours Congress, cofounding the French Communist Party. But in the tracts and articles he wrote at this time, especially in *Le Paria*, the paper he launched in Paris, he addressed the national and the colonial questions together. He went to Moscow in 1923 and sojourned there for a year and a half. His most significant activity in this period was his attendance at the Fifth Communist International Congress.

Between 1924 and 1931, Nguyễn Ai Quốc was pivotal in setting up a communist network in Southeast Asia. Initially, he joined Mikhael Borodin and the Soviet mission in Guangzhou (Canton). In 1925, he established the Thanh Nien (the Vietnam Revolutionary Youth League) and wrote *Duong Cach Mang* ("The Revolutionary Path"). In the late 1920s, he visited Siam (Thailand) and British Malaya, where the communist movement was disorganized. While in Hong Kong, he unified three Marxist groups of Vietnamese to establish the Indochina Communist Party in June 1929. Due to factionalism, a decision was made in February 1930 that brought about the founding of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Imprisoned in 1931 at Hong Kong, he spent the next two years behind bars, sparking a rumor that he had died. Following his release in 1933, he made his way back to Moscow, where he served as a Comintern cadre (1934–1937).



Vietnamese communist leader and first president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) Hồ Chí Minh in 1950.
(Bettmann/Corbis)

Then came the World War II (1939–1945) period. In late 1938, Nguyễn Ai Quốc left Moscow for China, which at that point had been partly invaded by Japan. In early 1941, he entered Vietnam, where he settled in the northern caves of Pac Bo. There, in May, he founded the Viet Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam). He took the name Hồ Chí Minh (*Hồ* means "who brings the light") in this period and was arrested in 1942 in Guangxi (Kwangsi), South China, and incarcerated for more than a year.

Consequent of a pact between the French Vichy government and the Japanese, the French colonial administration in Indochina continued to function from August 1940 to March 1945. Opposing this Franco-Japanese arrangement were the Anglo-American allies that were in league with the Soviet Union and Nationalist China. Owing to this alliance, the anti-communist Chiang Kai-shek reluctantly ordered the release of Hồ Chí Minh in 1943. This was to

enable him to organize a resistance movement in Vietnam. Hồ and his Viet Minh comrades received military supplies and technical assistance from the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in his plans for the toppling of the Japanese-dominated Vichy government.

The opportune moment came with the Japanese surrender in 1945. Immediately upon news of the Japanese capitulation on 14 August, the Viet Minh convened and elected a National Liberation committee, which, for all intents and purposes, was a provisional government led by Hồ *inter alia*. The committee's ten-point plan was to engineer a seizure of power, achieve independence for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and ensure cordial relations with the Anglo-Americans. It was basically a nationalist agenda. A Viet Minh uprising, often referred to as the August Revolution, witnessed the seizure of Hanoi, on 26 August, and most provinces of northern Vietnam (later to be known as North Vietnam). Demonstrations by the common people numbering in the hundreds of thousands declaring their support for the Viet Minh and demanding complete independence swept Huế and Saigon. On 26 August the French-installed Bảo Đại (Vinh Thuy) (1913–1997), the last of the Nguyễn emperors, abdicated in favor of Hồ's provisional government, hence affording the new regime legitimacy. The Viet Minh's August Revolution had triumphed. On 29 August Hồ formed his first government with himself as president. Then on 2 September, Hồ presented his government to the country and proclaimed in Hanoi the establishment of the DRV. Communists dominated the cabinet (ten members of fifteen, but the local situation remained complicated.

At the Potsdam Conference (July–August 1945), the Anglo-American and Soviet alliance had agreed to maintain the status quo in post-war Southeast Asia. As a result, the reoccupation of Vietnam north of the sixteenth parallel was entrusted to Nationalist China and South Vietnam to Britain. British major general D. D. Gracey, commanding the 20th Indian Division, arrived in Saigon on 13 September and managed to secure strategic sections of the city and certain designated zones of Saigon-Cholon, Thudau Mot-Bien Hoa-Lai Taien, and Mytho. French officials imprisoned since March 1945 when the Imperial Japanese military seized

control were released by the British and, contrary to instructions, were given arms.

The presence of Nationalist Chinese troops, the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party), and other pro-Chinese groups deterred Viet Minh occupation of North Vietnam, meaning territories north of the sixteenth parallel. Hanoi was effectively partitioned, with the Viet Minh in control of the central and southeast suburbs and the VNQDD and others in control of the northeast section. In South Vietnam (south of the sixteenth parallel), the French, with British assistance, succeeded in reoccupation. With scant popular support, the Viet Minh turned to guerrilla warfare in efforts to exert pressure on the French.

Then, on 6 March 1946, Hồ signed an agreement with Jean Sainteny, the head of "Mission 5" of the French intelligence service based in Kunming, China, thereby recognizing Vietnam as a free state within the French Union and allowing French troops to return to North Vietnam and replace Nationalist Chinese troops. At the same time, the French agreed to a referendum as to the status of Cochinchina, which would be a part of the French Union, and the gradual withdrawal of French military presence from Vietnamese soil.

But the cohabitation quickly deteriorated. Hồ spent three months in France in the summer of 1946 during the Fontainebleau talks, which ended in vain. The peace talks at Fontainebleau were destined not to succeed or achieve any concrete political developments simply because the French had no intention of putting Vietnam on the road to independence. Hồ and his Viet Minh colleagues, on the other hand, sought national liberation. The French intentions were reflected in the composition of the French delegation, where no cabinet member participated. Instead decisions were left to colonial officials, who were determined to ensure that basic political differences remained unsettled. Hồ had included in the Vietnamese delegation not only cabinet ministers of the DRV but also representatives of pro-Viet Minh groups as well as anti-Viet Minh parties. Hồ, however, had Pham Van Dong (1906–2000) to head the Vietnamese delegation. The talks at Fontainebleau revealed that war was inevitable. A few months later, after the 23 November bombardment of Haiphong that signaled the outbreak of hostilities in the First Indochina

War (1946–1954), Hồ Chí Minh called for national resistance.

Facing the French “puppet emperor” Bảo Đại (1913–1997), Hồ Chí Minh led the resistance during the Indochina War, supported by both Beijing and Moscow from January 1950. In the latter part of 1953, Hồ was in a position of strength, and he suggested via a Swedish newspaper that the conflict be concluded through negotiations. He did not attend the conference in Geneva that ensued, but in early July 1954, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (t. 1949–1976), who had played an important part in that conference, traveled to the Sino-Vietnamese border to discuss the provisional partition of Vietnam with him.

Returning to Hanoi after the 1954 Geneva Agreement was concluded and heading the DRV in North Vietnam, President Hồ Chí Minh entered his sixty-sixth year in a new life. Living modestly, dressing simply, and affectionately addressed as “Uncle Hồ,” he often traveled around the country and met with the people; he also visited other communist states and various Asian nations. But he faced several crises, as well. In 1956, when it was clear that the government land reform program had proceeded too hastily, Truong Chinh (1907–1988) was dismissed as general secretary of the party, and Hồ himself assumed the vital post. When the general elections scheduled in 1956 for the whole country did not materialize, the party secretly decided in 1959 to “promote the armed struggle” in the South in 1960. (It was apparent that Ngô Đình Diệm [1901–1963], the head of state of the Republic of Vietnam [South Vietnam], a Catholic and anticommunist regime, would never negotiate with the DRV [North Vietnam]; plans were under way to unite the country through the force of arms. He had demonstrated his refusal to abide by the Geneva Agreement to hold nationwide, all-party elections; instead, on 4 March 1956 elections were held in South Vietnam only to give a constitution to the Republic of Vietnam. No communist parties were allowed to participate.) Consequently Hồ relinquished the party’s general secretariat to Le Duan (1907–1986), the principal leader of the resistance in South Vietnam. And in the 1960s, with the Sino-Soviet conflict heating up, Hồ had to tread a middle course between them: it was imperative to maintain impartiality, for

the DRV received aid from both Beijing and Moscow.

But the main crisis occurred with the outbreak of the American/Vietnam War in 1964 (Second Indochina War [1964–1975]). At this time, Hồ Chí Minh’s name was chanted everywhere in the world in support of the Vietnamese resistance. Hồ Chí Minh, who was not a theoretician and had never commanded troops in combat, threw his prestige behind mobilizing the population to support the resistance effort in the South. He repeatedly told Washington why the United States could not win the war it was fighting, and in the last years of his life, he provided advice to the Hanoi delegation in the 1968 Paris peace talks. In March 1968, American president Lyndon Johnson (t. 1963–1969), as a gesture to bring the DRV to the negotiating table, announced that aerial bombing would be temporarily reduced. In May, peace talks began in Paris between the DRV (Xuan Thuy [1912–1985], foreign minister) and the United States (William Averell Harriman [b. 1891], ambassador at large). Then in January 1969, the two opposing sides met at a round table meeting in Paris: the government of South Vietnam and the United States on one hand and the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) on the other. Following a series of meetings that dragged on over four years, little was achieved.

Hồ Chí Minh died on 2 September 1969. In 1975, at the end of the Vietnam War, his body was enshrined in a public mausoleum on the main square in Hanoi. To this day, everywhere in reunified Vietnam, he is revered as a nationalist hero.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Bảo Đại (Vinh Thuy) (1913–1997); Cold War; Communism; Decolonization of Southeast Asia; Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), Battle of; Geneva Conference (1954); Gulf of Tonkin Incident (1964); Hồ Chí Minh Trail; Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Le Duan (1907–1986); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; New Economic Zones (NEZs) (Vietnam); Paris Peace Agreement (1968, 1973) (Vietnam); Sino-Soviet Struggle; Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Sino-Vietnamese Wars;

Strategic Hamlet Program (Vietnam); Truong Chinh (1907–1988); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Viet Cong; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (Vietnam Independence League); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945); Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP); Vo Nguyễn Giáp, General (1911–)

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HỒ CHÍ MINH TRAIL

The Strategic Key to Reunification

The Hồ Chí Minh Trail, a network of tracks linking North and South Vietnam via southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia, served the communist resistance during the First and Second Indochina Wars (1946–1954, 1964–1975), especially during the 1960s and the 1970s. Indeed, when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) decided in May 1959 to promote the “armed struggle” in South Vietnam, the trail was the main way for Hanoi to support the insurgency there. (Abiding by the Geneva Agreement of 1954, Vietnam had been divided into north and south at the seventeenth parallel five years earlier.) As the chief supply conduit, the trail was the target of many U.S. air raids during the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War, 1964–1975).

Reopened by Group 559, a logistical unit of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), the trail crossed sparsely populated areas and apparently was not too difficult to secure for the Vietnamese communists and their Lao and Cambodian allies. Notably commencing from the My Gia Pass in North Vietnam, it skirted around the seventeenth parallel, using hundreds of kilometers of paths and roads on the other side of the border and into South Vietnam, where the trail ended in the highlands not far from the vicinity of Saigon. In 1964, when the threat of an American action became clear, engineer bat-

talions were sent to widen the roads, construct stations, and build bridges to allow heavy trucks and other vehicles carrying troops and material to use the trail day and night. Consequently the trail extended to more than 20,000 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers of pipeline.

From the mid-1960s, the trail appeared to be the most important front of the war. It was involved in the secret war from Laos in 1964. Southeastern Laos in the location of the trail became an aerial bombing target of the U.S. Air Force, which through Operations Steel Tiger and Tiger Hound from 1965 to 1973 sought to destroy the NVA bases on Laotian territory. B-52 bomber strikes were employed to destroy the trail. Operation Die Marker (known as “McNamara’s Wall” or “The McNamara Line”) was a forty-kilometer barrier constructed astride South Vietnam’s northern perimeter as a means to block the infiltration of the NVA. Work on this barrier began in April 1967. Building materials included not only conventional material such as land mines and barbed wire but also acoustic sensors (some 20,000 devices) and infrared intrusion detectors linked to computers, which were employed to function as an early warning system of enemy movement. The air campaign against the trail strengthened in late 1968, with chemicals being used to defoliate the jungle and high technologies employed to hit the targets.

U.S. and South Vietnamese forces launched a land operation, albeit unsuccessful, to cut the trail near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) at Lam Son 719 in February 1971. But the United States and its South Vietnamese ally lost the battle of the supply line. The Hồ Chí Minh Trail was instrumental in the defeat of the South and, in turn, the reunification of Vietnam.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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HÒA HÀO

Hòa Hào or Hòa Hào Buddhism (Phat Giao Hòa Hào) is an indigenous religion of South Vietnam. Hòa Hào originally was the name of a village in Chau Doc Province, where Prophet Huynh Phu So was born. Located on the western side of the Mekong at the confluence of two tributaries, the Hòa Hào village became the cradle of Hòa Hào Buddhism as established by Huynh Phu So (1919–1947). From its inception in 1939, the religion attracted many peasants, and it quickly spread across those provinces known as the “rice basket of the South.” The popularity of the religion was the result of the charismatic, messianic, and mysterious character of its founder and preacher. Huynh Phu So was also regarded as a prophet due to his early prediction of the fall of France to Hitler’s Germany. He proved to be right with the outbreak of World War II (1939–1945) and France’s defeat at the hands of Nazi Germany.

In 1939, the young Huynh Phu So wrote four volumes (about 150,000 words) known as the *Oracles (Sam Giang)*, which form the basic Hòa Hào doctrine; they included notions for self-improvement. These works were written in simple language and arranged in the popular Vietnamese poetry style, which is easy to remember and understand. Although Huynh Phu So’s overall teachings were closely related to Buddhist doctrines, they strongly reflected the Buu Son Ky Huong tradition formulated in 1849 by a living Master Buddha (Phat Thay Tay An). In his day, Phat Thay preached Buddhism and encouraged people to cultivate their land. In addition to following in Phat Thay Tay An’s footsteps, Huynh Phu So asked his followers to “study Buddhism to improve yourself,” which serves as one of the guidelines of Hòa Hào. In other words, the religion holds that followers can improve themselves by observing Buddhist teachings. The Four Graces/Four Debts of Gratuities (*Tu An*) are among its most important tenets: be grateful to your parents and ancestors; be grateful to your country; be grateful to the three gems—Buddha, Buddha’s teachings, and the sangha; and be grateful to fellow countrymen and to humankind.

In line with the original teachings of Buddha, which stressed that belief must come from the heart, Hòa Hào Buddhism allows its followers to practice religion at home. The faithful do not have to shave their heads or take refuge in pagodas. They are allowed to reside with their families and live normal lives. In a Hòa Hào’s home, the Buddha’s altar does not have to be adorned with a Buddha statue, gongs, or bells. A piece of brown cloth is used to symbolize the human harmony. An Ancestors’ Altar is placed below the Buddha’s altar. Outside the home, a Heaven’s Altar (*Ban Thong Thien*) can be set up to help in communication with the Universe (sky and earth, the four cardinal corners, the ten Buddhist directions). The offerings are simple: pure water, symbolic of cleanliness; flowers for purity; and incense to freshen the air. The Hòa Hào flag is quite plain: it is brown in color and rectangular in size, bearing no characters or images.

The founder and leader of Hòa Hào is engraved in Vietnam’s history as an ardent nationalist. He was concerned about the harsh French colonial rule. Due to his popularity, the French wanted to banish him. However, he was rescued by the *Kempeitei* (Japanese military police) and took refuge under Japanese protection. He continued to teach and gather more followers, while also demanding independence for Vietnam. After the Pacific War (1941–1945), he continued to be involved in the political affairs of Vietnam out of concern for the future of the country. Many Hòa Hào followers took part in the guerrilla resistance against the French and against the communist Viet Minh. Consequently, Huynh Phu So disappeared at the hands of the communists in 1947.

It is estimated that there are up to 3 million Hòa Hào followers today (U.S. Department of State 2002: 3). Few Hòa Hào have moved overseas: most still hold fast to the hope that Huynh Phu So will come back to save the country from French rule again. Despite repression by the authorities, the Hòa Hào hold to their faith. The Hòa Hào village, the home of Hòa Hào Buddhism, is referred to as Holy Land (*Thanh Dia*), and it continues to attract many pilgrims. Each year, there are large gatherings of the faithful at the Ancestral Temple for religious ceremonies to pay respect to the founder.

MY-VAN TRAN

See also Buddhism; Buddhism, Mahayana; Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Religious Development and Influence in Southeast Asia; Vietnam, South (post-1945); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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HOABINHIAN Hunter-Gatherer Cultures of Southeast Asia

Hoabinhian is a term used to describe the hunter-gatherer cultures of Southeast Asia. The earliest sites date to approximately 16,000 B.C.E., but the end of the Hoabinhian tradition varied regionally. Nearly all the sites comprised inland rock shelters or caves located in a canopied forest near streams or rivers. There is no doubt that the hunter-gatherers also lived in the open, but few of their sites have survived. The name *Hoabinhian* derives from the Vietnamese province of Hoa Binh, where the first occupied caves were examined by a French archaeologist, Madeleine Colani. She excavated numerous sites in this limestone upland area lying southwest of the Red River delta (Colani 1927). Subsequently, many more cave sites have been identified in the central uplands of Vietnam; in northern, central, and southern Thailand; and in Burma, Cambodia, and Malaysia. Related and contemporary groups of hunter-gatherers also occupied southern China and the islands of Southeast Asia. The stone technology and the subsistence activities largely determine the definition of the Hoabinhian culture. Stone

tool manufacture centered on an artifact known as a sumatralith, or unifacial discoid. This was made of a large river cobble, flaked only on one side, and was probably used for a variety of purposes. There are also flaked stone axes, scrapers, and points. The Hoabinhian people hunted a wide variety of forest animals, and they fished and collected shellfish. They also collected plants for food, medicines or stimulants, poison, and fuel. It is highly likely that they made many of their tools and weapons from wood, particularly bamboo.

The origins of the Hoabinhian people lie in the expansion into Southeast Asia of anatomically modern human groups of hunter-gatherers. These people originated in Africa and began to spread in Asia sometime between 60,000 and 100,000 years ago. The analysis of DNA from modern hunter-gatherers in the Andaman Islands has shown close biological links with African populations. Recent excavations have revealed the ancestral populations to the Hoabinhian people. They are distinguished by different preferences for stone tool making and date back as early as 40,000 to 38,000 B.C.E. For much of the period when these ancestral groups and Hoabinhian hunter-gatherers occupied the forested uplands of Southeast Asia, the Pleistocene Ice Age absorbed a great deal of water in the form of continental ice sheets. Therefore, the sea level was much lower than it is today. From about 4000 B.C.E., as the world climate warmed sharply, the sea level rose higher than it is at present. Only from that period do we have any evidence for the hunter-gatherers who occupied the rich coastal environment, for any earlier settlements would have been drowned by the rising sea. The excavation of the settlements on the old shorelines allows us to appreciate the contrast between the culture of those living in the inland-forested stream valleys and the occupants of permanent settlements on the seashore.

To understand the Hoabinhian way of life, it is best to begin by examining the lives of surviving hunter-gatherer groups in Southeast Asia. In Trang Province of southern Thailand, Gerd Albrecht has not only excavated the large cavern of Sakai but has also visited and recorded the Mani, surviving hunter-gatherers in this region. This unique opportunity even involved the analysis of the remains of Mani occupation on the surface of the cave floor. Among these

people, the seasonal rhythm of the monsoon encouraged settlement in the airy and cool rain forest during the dry season, whereas the protection afforded by rock shelters made them more attractive during the rains. The social groups in either case were small, measured in the teens in one case (with twelve adults and five children), and the area under occupation covered about 40 square meters. The Mani exploited a similar range of animals as during the remote prehistoric past, including gibbons, macaques, squirrels, fish, and shellfish. Their shelters comprised small huts fashioned from bamboo, tree bark, and leaves that would leave few if any archaeological traces. However, hearths containing stones and raised on clay supports were used, and these would survive.

The excavations within Sakai cave itself incorporated a cultural buildup about 2 meters deep and dating up to 10,000 years ago. It included a number of hearths, and stone flakes dominated the material remains. No polished stone tools or pottery vessels were encountered. The faunal remains reflected hunting in a canopied forest: the bones of gibbons and macaques, squirrels, and civets predominated. The prehistoric hunter-gatherers also collected freshwater shellfish, and a few marine shellfish must have come to the cave from at least 30 kilometers away.

This pattern of forest hunting and gathering is matched by the findings of many other excavations. The most famous research program centered on the limestone uplands of Mae Hongson Province, Thailand, where Chester Gorman excavated three rock shelters from 1965 to 1973. The rugged limestone crags and valleys of his study area are cut by swiftly flowing streams. His first excavation took place at Spirit Cave, a complex of three small rock shelters, all of which contained prehistoric occupation (Gorman 1971, 1972). The first occupants scooped out shallow depressions, laid sticks in a radial manner like spokes of a wheel, and lit their fires. This activity was followed by a buildup of cultural material: stone artifacts, food remains, and further ashy lenses. This layer was homogeneous across the excavated area and may well represent intermittent occupation over a lengthy period.

The occupation lasted between about 9000 and 5500 B.C.E. The stone artifacts included unifacial discoids, grinding stones, and flakes

bearing signs of edge damage. The surfaces of all the grinding stones recovered had traces of crushed red ochre, fragments of which were found at the site. About a third of the flakes had been used, for microscopic examination revealed thin striations running both along the worked surfaces and vertical to them.

Many species of animals and fish were consumed at Spirit Cave. Although it was a sharp half-hour climb from the Khong Stream to the cave, the occupants included the valley bottom in their territory, for each layer contained fish bones as well as freshwater crab claws. Shellfish, too, were taken to the shelter from the streambed, and both otter and fishing cat bones were found. Arboreal animals predominated. Among primates, the langur and macaque were most common, but the gibbon and slow loris were also present. Other small arboreal mammals included the banded palm civet, the elusive marten, the flying squirrel, and many small squirrels. Then there were small ground-dwelling mammals, such as the bamboo rat, badger, porcupine, and leopard cat. The sambar deer and pig were the only reasonably large mammals found at Spirit Cave.

Careful screening recovered a large number of plant remains. *Canarium* seed fragments were the most numerous. All were smashed, probably to obtain the edible kernels. The kernels of butternuts and the fruits of other plants were particularly interesting finds because they were sources of poison. Poison-tipped projectile points would help account for the presence of the bones of elusive arboreal mammals. Seven fragments of bamboo stem indicated interest in this valuable plant. Almond remains provided evidence of food collection in the surrounding forests. This assemblage demonstrated that the occupants of the cave exploited a range of local plants with a variety of potential uses. Some are still used for food, others as condiments and stimulants. Then there were sources of poison, gum, and resin. Indeed, any survey of hunter-gatherer occupation of the evergreen forest habitat following the research at Spirit Cave must acknowledge the broad spectrum of resources, as well as the intimate acquaintance of the occupants with the plant and animal world around them.

Two other sites were excavated in the same program, Banyan Valley and Steep Cliff Caves. The former, occupied from about 3500 B.C.E.,

is located beside a permanent stream just as it cascades into a cleft in the limestone bluff. Precipitous slopes and canopied evergreen forest hem in the Banyan Valley. The hillside has a series of caverns that yielded prehistoric remains considerably broader and deeper than those of Spirit Cave. Steep Cliff Cave was occupied between 5500 and 3500 B.C.E. A huge dump of burned and smashed animal bones suggests that it was used to process wild cattle, deer, and water buffalo, perhaps to dry the meat for later consumption.

In the classical area of northern Vietnam, where the Hoabinhian tradition was first recognized, there has been much recent research. Here as elsewhere, the characteristic Hoabinhian site comprised a small rock shelter, giving access to both the dissected limestone uplands and the nearby stream. Food remains included shellfish, fish, and hunted mammals. The Con Moong fauna, for example, revealed the presence of wild cattle and water buffalo, rhinoceros, forest birds, and both water turtles and land tortoises. Many freshwater bivalve and gastropod shellfish were also recovered. Excavations at Xom Trai have also yielded, for the first time in a Vietnamese Hoabinhian context, the remains of rice. This site is located only about 15 meters above the surrounding plain, and it has been meticulously excavated by Nguyễn Viet. The basal 2 meters were undisturbed and yielded a wide array of Hoabinhian stone implements in association with carbonized plant remains and shellfish. The radiocarbon dates suggest, as has been noted, that occupation was under way by 16,000 years ago. Although stone pieces dominated the artifacts found in these sites, there was also a vigorous bone industry, as evidenced at the Da Phuc rock shelter. Most of the 105 bone tools found there comprised points or awls. An intriguing question is how the Hoabinhian people disposed of the dead. Burials are rare in the cave sites. A major exception is Lang Cao, where Madeleine Colani found about 200 skulls within an area of only 25 square meters. The skulls were propped up by stones, with few associated limb bones, but there were no grave goods. The crania were buried sometime after death within a reserved area. If the social group responsible for these artifacts was mobile for some of the year, then this cave may represent a central focus for the burial of the dead

whose remains were returned there at some interval after death.

There are many settlements of coastal hunter-gatherers on the old raised shorelines of Southeast Asia. There, the rich harvest of fish, shellfish, and marine mammals allowed people to settle for lengthy periods of time, and one finds large deep sites that incorporate cemeteries. The dead were interred in a crouched, seated position and accompanied by grave offerings. Excavations at one such site, at Nong Nor, have revealed many aspects of this coastal adaptation (Higham and Thosarat 1998a, 1998b). It was occupied for a brief period, measured in months rather than years, in the vicinity of 2450 B.C.E. The people chose to live on the protected shore of a deep marine embayment. By launching their boats, they could reach the open sea in a matter of minutes. They collected millions of cockles adapted to sandy beaches, but they also fished for tiger and bull sharks and hunted dolphins and eagle rays. The shell midden contained many hearths and ash spreads. Some of the latter may have been used for firing ceramic vessels, since pottery sherds were relatively common. Indeed, several complete pottery vessels were found over a woman buried in a crouched and seated position. Her grave goods also included a pebble used for burnishing the surface of the clay vessels before firing, to impart a sheen to the surface. Clay anvils used to shape pottery vessels were recovered, showing beyond doubt that the hunter-gatherers of Nong Nor made burnished and incised pottery vessels at the site. They also used polished stone adzes, but there was no evidence for plant cultivation or the raising of domestic animals.

The Hoabinhian cultures of Southeast Asia occupy a vital 20,000 years. They reveal a successful adaptation to the canopied inland forests that has continued to the present in peninsular Thailand and Malaysia. There were also groups adapted to the mangrove-fringed estuaries and inlets along the coast, which come into archaeological visibility only when the sea rose above its present level between about 4,000 and 1,500 B.C.E. From about 2,500 B.C.E., intrusive rice cultivators infiltrated the river valleys of Southeast Asia from an ultimate homeland in the Yangzi (Yangtze) Valley in China, bringing with them domestic animals and new patterns of village settlement. They interacted with the

Hoabinhian people, but the number of occupied caves dwindled as farming took hold.

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See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast of Asia; Ban Chiang; Ban Kao Culture; Ceramics; Dong-son; Ecological Setting of Southeast Asia; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; Metal Age Cultures in Southeast Asia; Neolithic Period of Southeast Asia; Niah Caves (Sarawak); Tabon Cave (Palawan)

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HOKKIEN

See Chinese Dialect Groups

HONG KONG

Hong Kong, an international cosmopolis of South China, consists of Hong Kong proper, Kowloon, and the New Territories. A British colony from 1841 to 1997, it has had a long and close connection with Southeast Asia, especially in the years before the Pacific War (1941–1945). The name *Hong Kong* literally means "fragrant harbor"; nowadays, Hong Kong is often known by its sobriquet—the "Pearl of the Orient."

When the British first occupied Hong Kong, it was described as a "barren rock" with

only a small number of fishing villages, and the surrounding waters were notorious for piracy. Declared a free port, Hong Kong developed the area along its northern coast on the island in the 1840s, followed by a more massive buildup in the 1850s, primarily due to the influx of immigrants from mainland China during the Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864). Among those who arrived in that period were merchants of *nam pak hong* (import and export firms), who found Hong Kong a haven where they could continue their trade in goods from mainland China and Southeast Asia, a business they had long conducted in Chaozhou and Shantou (Swatow) before moving their base to Hong Kong.

Such businesses became even more lucrative when Chinese products were in great demand among the increasing numbers of Chinese immigrants who poured into Singapore and other Southeast Asian cities via Hong Kong. The hardy Chinese coolie was a boon in providing much-needed cheap labor. Whether he worked in tin mines (Southeast Asia), gold and diamond mines (South Africa, Australia, California), or railroad construction (North America) or on sugar plantations (Caribbean) or, later in the twentieth century, on rubber estates (Southeast Asia), the coolie became indispensable after slavery was prohibited throughout the British Empire in 1833. Many of these Chinese immigrants anticipated a sojourn of several years' labor and planned to return to the homeland with great wealth; instead, most found themselves working with no end point in sight and with scant hope of either obtaining riches or returning to China. Others decided to settle down in the host country. In the process, Singapore and Hong Kong functioned as the centers of a vast network not only for the trade of goods but also for an expanding financial market, for voluminous remittances were sent by Chinese sojourners in Southeast Asia to their relatives in mainland China via Singapore and Hong Kong. Charitable institutions such as the Tung Wah Hospital and Po Leung Kuk, whose directors were mostly influential merchants, established tight working relationships with sister institutions throughout Southeast Asia.

These growing connections with Southeast Asia were part of a process that turned Hong Kong into a regional center of shipping, trade, and finance. It became a stronghold for invest-



Hong Kong Harbor. (PhotoDisc, Inc.)

ments, especially those of the British and Chinese. Hong Kong also became such a trade magnet in South China that Guangzhou (Canton) and Macau, the twin cities that had monopolized foreign trade during the Qing dynasty (1644–1912) before the colonization of Hong Kong, began to lose their centrality and suffer perennial economic recessions.

Hong Kong as an entrepôt facilitated the movement of not only goods, but also the educated elite. For example, Wu Tingfang (1842–1922), a Singapore-born Chinese who had received his secondary-school education in Hong Kong, was the first Chinese member of Hong Kong's Legislative Council; his appointment to the council in 1880 led to a distinguished diplomatic career in China. Hong Kong also provided opportunities for tertiary education. Students from British Malaya and the Philippines took their degrees at the University of Hong Kong (founded 1912) and after graduation contributed to building the modern states of their home countries. Only after the Pacific War (1941–1945), when tertiary educa-

tion in Southeast Asia became more developed, did the number of students seeking higher education in Hong Kong begin to decrease.

The 1920s and 1930s witnessed fluctuations in the Hong Kong–Southeast Asian trade, due to the Great Depression (1929–1931) and the anti-Chinese movements in Southeast Asia. Trade recovered and expanded during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), when Southeast Asia served as China's only source for both strategic and daily necessities, imported via Hong Kong. The import and export business expanded substantially in Vietnam and Singapore during this period.

Following the end of the Pacific War and the Chinese civil war (1946–1949) between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, there was a massive influx of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, and with them came capital, industrial expertise, and cheap labor. This inaugurated an era of industrialization in Hong Kong, with the production of competitive commodities that were traded worldwide. By contrast, trade between Hong Kong and

Southeast Asia experienced an overall decline. Embargos imposed by the United Nations on the People's Republic of China (PRC), or Communist China, and protectionism among the Southeast Asian countries confined trade expansion for decades.

The 1980s witnessed revived connections between Hong Kong and Southeast Asia in several respects. The rise of the middle class and the predominance of small families in Hong Kong resulted in a great demand for domestic helpers, a demand that was largely filled by Southeast Asian people. Today, the total number of such employees exceeds 230,000; most of these workers are Filipinos, and others include Indonesians and Thais. Meanwhile, the impact of Hong Kong's television programs, soap operas, movies, popular music, and magazines and novels has been increasingly felt among the Chinese community in Southeast Asia, to the extent that Hong Kong has become a model of popular culture. Another trend is the renewed interest expressed by the Hong Kong government in encouraging investments in Southeast Asian markets. In turn, Southeast Asian companies, such as the Thailand-based Charoen Pokphand Group, are investing heavily in both Hong Kong and China.

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See also Agency Houses, European; British Interests in Southeast Asia; China, Imperial; China, Nationalist; China since 1949; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Economic Development of Southeast Asia (post-1945 to ca. 1990s); Education, Overseas Chinese; Education, Western Secular; Great Depression (1929–1931); *Hui*; Labor and Labor Unions; Macau (Macao); Qing (Ching/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912); Rubber; Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1990s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Tin; Trade and Commerce of Southeast Asia (ca. Nineteenth Century to the 1990s)

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HORSES AND MULES

Horses were vital to war, prestige, sport, and transport in large swaths of Southeast Asia, whereas mules were mostly restricted to transport in the far north. There was a lively regional trade between breeding and consuming areas, as well as some maritime exports of horses to India and China. However, these were overshadowed by overland imports of horses and mules from Yunnan and Tibet and maritime imports of luxury horses, initially from the Middle East (West Asia), India, and China and later from Australia, Europe, and the Americas.

How and when these natives of the Eurasian steppe reached Southeast Asia remain shrouded in mystery. Most archaeologists consider that horses arrived from the north around the beginning of the common era (C.E.). They were certainly present over much of Southeast Asia by the time Europeans arrived around 1500 C.E., with the major exception of the northern and central Philippines. The basic stock consists of small and tough Mongolian and Tibetan ponies, that is, breeds measuring less than fourteen and a half hands (147 centimeters) at the shoulders. However, there are also clear indications of Arab blood, possibly derived from western India. Horses do best in relatively dry and high areas, notably those with calcareous soils for good bone formation. They are most numerous in relation to humans in the Lesser Sunda Islands of Indonesia and East Timor. Other maritime clusters occur in the western Philippines, South Sulawesi, Java, and the Sumatran highlands. Mainland Southeast Asia's horses are concentrated where the Yunnan Plateau extends from China and in the rain shadow areas of central Burma (Myanmar), northeastern Siam (Thailand), Cambodia, and central Vietnam. Around 1910, there were some 800,000 horses in maritime Southeast Asia, and about 300,000 in mainland Southeast Asia.

There is some correlation between centers of horse breeding and core regions of classical empires, suggesting that easy access to horses contributed to the military might of Pagan, Angkor, Champa, and Majapahit. This is most strikingly illustrated by well-preserved bas-reliefs of prancing Khmer horses. An elite culture of horsemanship diffused from India in the course of the first millennium C.E., reflected in Sanskrit words embedded in many Southeast Asian languages, with China as another influential model. Numerous Indian and Chinese texts relating to horses were available, but the military technology and court rituals of Southeast Asia remained distinct. To a greater extent than in India, horses were subordinate to elephants, for both war and prestige. Mounted infantry was more common than cavalry proper, and the technique of the mounted archer was scarcely employed. Vietnam and Burma fought off several major Chinese attacks, carried out with large cavalry forces, but the Restored Tounggoo dynasty (1597–1752) of Burma was undermined by fierce Hindu horsemen from the tiny state of Manipur in the early eighteenth century. Colonial armies in Southeast Asia had some light cavalry units, but they mainly relied on horses and mules for the transport of mountain artillery and machine guns. This persisted as late as the Pacific War (1941–1945), notably in the great Burmese campaigns. Vietnamese troops were the last to use a few horses and mules in this way, against both France and the United States.

Other uses of horses and mules are less well documented. The Mongol conquest of Yunnan in the thirteenth century C.E. led Central Asian Muslims (Hui, Haw, Panthay) to develop a spider's web of mule and pony caravans, covering northern Southeast Asia, southern China, and eastern Tibet. This system reached its zenith in the late nineteenth century, but it still persists on a small scale, especially for contraband. The revolution in the use of coaches and carriages in late-eighteenth-century Europe affected rural Java and Luzon, but elsewhere, roads remained rudimentary prior to the advent of the internal combustion engine. However, carriages had a major impact on late-nineteenth-century towns, sometimes supplemented by horse trams. Light pony traps endure in places, partly because of tourism. Horse racing, polo, jousting, and horse fights were ancient sports in

Southeast Asia, and racing with Australian and Western horses remains a multimillion-dollar business to this day. Horses have played some productive roles in herding, forestry, plowing, trampling, threshing, and carting, especially in the eastern archipelago. They have also been eaten on a small scale in Muslim, Christian, animist, and Mahayana Buddhist areas but not in Theravada Buddhist and Hindu ones.

The history of Southeast Asia's horses and mules is little known. Archaeologists and rural historians have paid most attention to more directly productive animals, notably buffalo, cattle, and pigs. Historians of transport have concentrated on ships, railways, and motor vehicles, ignoring not only horses and mules but also the many other animals employed for pack and traction. Even political and military historians have neglected the noble horse, perhaps because elephants have so often stolen the show.

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See also Elephants; Yunnan Province

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HSINBYUSHIN (r. 1763–1776) Feared Conqueror

Third king of the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885), Hsinbyushin, known as the Myeidu prince, was the second of Alaung-hpaya's (r. 1752–1760) sons to reign over the empire in accordance with the dying wish of his father that each of his six sons should reign in turn. Alaung-hpaya, the founder of the dynasty, had hoped thereby to forestall dynastic succession disputes. Hsinbyushin was a much-feared conqueror whose armies extended the empire across mainland Southeast Asia from Manipur to Laos, covering a territory as large as that of the sixteenth-century First Toungoo dynasty under Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581). He launched the final campaign against the Siamese capital at Ayutthaya in 1765, and his generals Neimyo Thihapatei and Maha Nawrahta conquered and destroyed the capital two years later, although the latter died in the siege. His 9 January 1767 order to Neimyo Thihapatei to quickly finish the Ayutthaya campaign and deport the Siamese king and his subjects arose from the imminent threat of invasion in the north by the Chinese army of the Manchu Ch'ien Lung emperor (r. 1735–1795). The Siamese armies under Generals Phya Taksin and Chakri were able to regroup, and by 1770, they had overwhelmed the small numbers of Burmese troops who had been left behind. For the rest of his reign, Hsinbyushin had to contend with almost annual campaigns on the eastern frontier as Siam asserted its independence.

Hsinbyushin's military power was also demonstrated in the north when his forces won major victories against three invading Chinese armies from 1766 to 1769. Competing for dominance and control of the overland trade in the Shan states and Yunnan, the Burmese outmaneuvered the Chinese, ignored a treaty negotiated by the Burmese general Maha Thihathura when the Chinese army was on the defensive, and established Burmese supremacy in the border areas.

Hsinbyushin's military expeditions meant he had a continuing need for arms, an issue that led to the renewal of commercial contacts with the French in 1770. Pierre de Milard, a former prisoner who became commander of the palace guard at the court of Hsinbyushin, facilitated the arrival of the French envoy, Feraud, and the reopening of the French shipyard at Rangoon.

Hsinbyushin offered the French trade concessions in return for munitions. Beset with conspiracies arising from his plan to make his son Singu his successor, in contravention of his father's directive, Hsinbyushin slept in the same room with Milard as a protection against his enemies—a situation in stark contrast to his claims in the 1774 Poudaung inscription to have subdued all the kings of the world. He fell ill and died in the spring of 1776.

HELEN JAMES

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767 C.E.), Kingdom of; Burma-Siam Wars; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885); Phya Taksin (Pya Tak [Sin], King Taksin) (r. 1767–1782); Rama I (Chakri) (r. 1782–1809); Toungoo Dynasty (1531–1752)

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HUẾ

Situated on the banks of the Huong (lit. perfume, scent) River in the province of Thua Thien-Hue in Central Vietnam, Huế emerged as a major town. It was the capital city of Vietnam from 1802 and was the last capital city of independent Vietnam before the kingdom was completely colonized by the French in 1883. From then on, the city remained as the imperial city but held no political significance as far as French colonial rule was concerned.

Huế first came under Vietnamese rule at the beginning of the fourteenth century. King Jaya Sinhavaraman III gave the land as a gift to a Tran emperor in 1301 after the latter allowed

him to marry his daughter, and the area was then known as Thuan Hoa (Woodside 1988: 126). In the second half of the sixteenth century, Vietnam was engaged in a political rivalry between two powerful entities: the Trinh and the Nguyễn. The Trinh, under the leadership of Trinh Khiem, managed to capture Hanoi, the capital, and the Nguyễn, under the leadership of Nguyễn Hoang, chose to move to the south to avoid Trinh domination. In 1558, Nguyễn Hoang was made the governor of Thuan Hoa, which he used as a base to rule his southern principality. In 1601, he paid a visit to Huế and developed the area to be the center of his rule. The Trinh tried to capture the south in the seventeenth century, but their forces failed to reach Huế, and they did not succeed in taking political control of the region; in 1673, they gave up their attempt. From then on, the kingdom was divided into the north, under the Trinh who ruled from Hanoi, and the south, under Nguyễn who ruled from Huế, and both pledged loyalty to the powerless emperor at Hanoi (Buttinger 1973: 48).

However, it was the Nguyễn dynasty (1802–1945) that built and developed Hue as it is known at present. In 1802, Nguyễn Anh, a member of the Nguyễn family who survived the suppression of the Tay Son brothers (1772–1802), was able to defeat the Tay Son with French assistance. He reunified the kingdom of Vietnam and proclaimed himself Emperor Gia Long (r. 1802–1820). He chose Huế to be the new capital because it was centrally located between the north and south branches of the kingdom. Furthermore, Huế had long been the home of the Nguyễn family (Woodside 1988: 127). The decision to build a new capital there instead of ruling from the family's traditional capital at Hanoi had political and cultural significance. First, Hanoi was too far away from the south; as a result, it would be difficult for the newly established dynasty to administer the region. Second, Hanoi had long been the political base of the Trinh family; this could destabilize the power of the Nguyễn. And third, the transfer of the capital to Huế led to the demise of Hanoi's cultural and educational monopoly; Hanoi had long been the center for Confucian studies and the place where the literati concentrated themselves. In the nineteenth century, Vietnam saw a better

proportion of literati and mandarins who came from the center and the south.

The new capital city reflected Gia Long's political and cultural thinking. Huế was an imitation of Beijing in terms of political and cultural cosmology. The imperial city was the center of the universe on earth from which the emperor ruled his kingdom. Its plan—citadels, gates, halls, mandarin offices, and imperial tombs—was modeled after the Chinese ones. Even names of buildings were comparable to those of Beijing. The Chinese imitation was deliberate, reflecting the way in which the Vietnamese emperor and his court ruled the kingdom in conformity with Chinese codes (Woodside 1988: 128, 129, 131).

Huế kept its status as the capital of unified Vietnam until the 1880s, when France completed its colonization of the kingdom. Thereafter, Huế was only the imperial city of the protectorate of Annam or Central Vietnam, whereas Hanoi became the administrative center of French colonial rule. On 30 August 1945, Bảo Đại (r. 1925–1945), the last emperor of the Nguyễn dynasty and of Vietnam, who resided in this imperial city after abdicating the throne, transferred power to the Viet Minh and agreed to move to Hanoi (Marr 1995: 451).

Today, some parts of the imperial city have been renovated, for they were badly damaged during the intense fighting between U.S. and Viet Cong forces in the Tet Offensive of January and February 1968. Huế is probably the best manifestation of the political and cultural closeness of the Vietnamese and Chinese court traditions.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also Nguyễn Ánh (Emperor Gia Long) (r. 1802–1820); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Trinh Family (1597–1786)

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HUI

Hui is a Chinese term for a society or association of any kind. It appears in the titles of various membership groups—for example, *huiguan* (place-of-origin associations), political groupings, and associations to sponsor schools, funeral associations, and the like.

A *hui* can also be a revolving credit association, an institution known in China for four or more centuries. Members each contribute a certain sum of money, usually monthly, and each can use, by turns, the entire sum for a time, usually by agreeing to pay interest to the other members; thus, it is a simple way of obtaining credit for agriculture or business.

Another meaning of the term *hui* is “sworn brotherhood” or “secret society,” as in the Tiandihui (Heaven and Earth Society) or Sandianhui (Three Drops Society, so called because of the way members wrote secret signs). Such societies spread through South China after the eighteenth century. Often, they organized opposition to the Qing or Manchu dynasty’s rule (1644–1912) there. Members took blood oaths to bind themselves together and used secret signs to recognize one another because membership was punishable by death by the Qing authorities.

Immigrants from South China brought the *hui* to Southeast Asia, using its oaths, signs, and rituals in a new environment. In the colonies, *hui* were not illegal in Southeast Asia in the mid-nineteenth century, and they appeared openly. Colonial rulers knew and often respected the leaders of such societies. *Hui* inducted new immigrants, single men far from home, into a relationship of mutual assistance through ritual brotherhood. They also helped control the opium- and gambling-revenue farms from which the colonies obtained substantial income. But outbreaks of violence or rebellion finally led Southeast Asian authorities to outlaw and suppress the societies. In the twentieth century, *hui* influence receded in economic and social life, but it reappeared in the form of criminal groupings or so-called triad societies.

MARY SOMERS HEIDHUES

See also Chinese Gold-Mining Communities in Western Borneo; Penang (1786); Singapore (1819); Straits Settlements (1826–1941); Taxation; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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HUKBALAHAP (HUKBO NG BAYAN LABAN SA HAPON) (PEOPLE’S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY) (1942)

The Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon, or People’s Anti-Japanese Army) was a Philippine anti-Japanese peasant guerrilla movement based in Central Luzon. It played an active role in opposing the Japanese occupation forces and depriving them of food and resources. It also fought against Japanese collaborators, particularly landowners, the prewar elite, and constabulary forces. After the Pacific War (1941–1945), the Huks, as members of the group were known, turned against the government when attempts at peaceful reform failed. The antigovernment Huk movement reached its peak from 1949 to 1951, after which it declined due to strengthened government military and socioeconomic programs and internal problems. Remnants of the movement, however, continued to oppose the government until the 1960s.

The Hukbalahap was built on anti-Japanese sentiments among the peasants in Central Luzon, where many were brutally treated by the Japanese. It was organized from peasants’ associations that had sought socioeconomic reforms before the Pacific War but sided with the United States and the Philippine Commonwealth government in its antifascist, anti-Japanese stance. The movement was formally organized and named on 29 March 1942. Luis Taruc (1913–) was chosen as chairman of the Military Committee, with Casto Alejandrino as second in command.

The Huks organized into squadrons and procured weapons that had been abandoned in the battlefield. They were influenced by Edgar Snow’s *Red Star over China* (1946) and Chinese communist veterans of the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), who organized a squadron that was affiliated with the Huks. Most of the Huk

leaders, however, were steeped in Russian communist and socialist thought.

The Huks developed various policies. Militarily, they built up strength and resisted the Japanese through sabotage, guerrilla raids, and armed encounters. Politically, the Huks discredited the Japanese-organized government and destroyed its influence, while building a functioning democracy in Huk areas. Economic objectives were to thwart the Japanese in exploiting Philippine resources and at the same time develop the means to provide for the people's welfare. The Huks also planned for social and economic reforms that could continue after the war, and they abolished rents and executed landlords who collaborated with the Japanese. Further, they established a propaganda and education arm and tried to organize barrios for security and self-sufficiency.

The Hukbalahap grew from around 300 members organized into five squadrons in April 1942 to between 10,000 and 12,000 members (in seventy-six squadrons) by September 1944. The movement did not get along with other guerrilla organizations, particularly the pro-American ones, due to differing policies, which resulted in clashes with pro-Japanese elements and other guerrilla groups.

The Huks participated in the 1944–1945 campaigns against the Japanese and appointed their own local officials in place of the Japanese. The U.S. Army and Filipino politicians identified the Huks as potential threats to the government after the war. Furthermore, when the Commonwealth government was reestablished in 1945, Huk leaders were not included. U.S. Army units and Filipino guerrillas disarmed the Huks; some were arrested and charged with murder, subversion, kidnapping, or espousing communism. In February 1945, over a hundred Huks were massacred by rival guerrillas in Malolos, Bulacan. Landlords demanded back rent, and the prewar socioeconomic system was reimposed.

Huk leaders ran for the postwar congress on a platform of socioeconomic reform, and they opposed granting the Americans parity rights in the exploitation of Philippine natural resources. Two of the Huk contenders, Luis Taruc and Jesus Lava (who would be captured by the government in 1964), won election but were unseated by rival politicians amid charges that they had used force and coercion to win. One of the ranking Huk leaders was kidnapped and

allegedly murdered, leading Taruc to accuse the government of plotting to kill Huk leaders.

The Huks then fought against the government. The organization was given a new name sometime around June 1947—Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan (HMB, People's Liberation Army)—and sought the redress of grievances through violent, armed means.

The government, under President Manuel Roxas (t. 1946–1948), fought back with the military and declared the HMB illegal on 6 March 1948. Roxas's successor, Elpidio Quirino (t. 1948–1953), offered amnesty to the Huks in June 1948 and allowed Taruc to reassume his seat in congress. Negotiations failed, however, and Taruc again went underground as the Huks resumed their fight against the government. The Huk rebellion peaked in the years 1949 to 1951 and spread to the Visayas and Mindanao.

Huk atrocities, internal differences, and more vigorous leadership of the armed forces under Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay (1910–1957) broke the rebellion. Ranking members of the Huk politburo were arrested as military campaigns put the Huks on the defensive. Government reform programs undermined Huk claims, and the organization ceased to be a major threat by 1954, when Taruc surrendered to the government.

The HMB was outlawed on 17 June 1957, and many Huks surrendered to the government to take advantage of the amnesty offered to them. Nonetheless, scattered Huk remnants continued to operate until the 1960s. In the 1970s, the Philippine government officially recognized the Hukbalahap as a legitimate anti-Japanese guerrilla movement; its veterans were awarded back pay and benefits.

In sum, the Hukbalahap was a peasant movement motivated by antifascist and anti-Japanese sentiments, with a long-term socioeconomic reform agenda. It proved to be a major force against the Japanese occupation army and the puppet administration it set up. In the postwar period, the movement maintained its socioeconomic agenda but was opposed by the government, leading the Huks to turn against the government. Although the leaders were communists or socialists, many of the members were not. The whole movement was considered subversive by the government, however, which led to the prolonged rebellion.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also *Barangay*; Collaboration Issue in Southeast Asia; Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Force 136; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Laurel, Jose Paciano (1891–1959); Magsaysay, Ramon (1910–1997); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1898–1946); Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944); Quirino, Elpidio (1890–1956); Roxas, Manuel (1892–1948); Taruc, Luis (1913–)

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HUMAN PREHISTORY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

The majority of Southeast Asia's history belongs to the period prior to the appearance of written records. Generally referred to as the prehistoric period, it covers more than 1 million years and begins with the Pleistocene artifactual record of early hominids and ends with the appearance of indigenous written records. The timing of the latter varies by area; for example, in Indonesia, stone inscriptions in Sanskrit appeared in the fourth century C.E., whereas extant written accounts of the Philippine islands date from the tenth century C.E. onward. The present coverage summarizes major periods and cultural developments in Southeast Asia's prehistory primarily based on English-language sources and the better-known archaeological records, at least for certain periods, of Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Although archaeologists also include southern China and

Taiwan in studying some aspects of the region's prehistory, these two areas are excluded from this discussion.

Early Hominids in Southeast Asia

Homo erectus, the first hominid to have occupied Southeast Asia, was present by at least 1 million years ago. The majority of the evidence is paleontological and primarily from sites on Java (for example, Sangiran and Trinil), though fossil remains of *H. erectus* are also known from Burma (Myanmar) and Vietnam. Stone tool assemblages, composed of large pebble and flake tools, do not generally derive from primary contexts (such as living areas), nor have they yet been found in association with hominid fossils. Thus, the interpretation of much of the archaeological record assigned middle Pleistocene dates continues to be the subject of debate. The presence of early Pleistocene (ca. 800,000 years ago) sites on the island of Flores, from which lithic artifacts have been recovered, suggests that the achievements of *H. erectus* included maritime technology. Occupation of this island would have entailed crossing deep-sea channels, since it was not part of Sundaland—the landmass connecting the mainland with Sumatra, Java, Bali, Borneo, and Palawan, which was exposed at various times during the Pleistocene. It suggests then that *H. erectus* possessed voyaging skills and watercraft (Morwood et al. 1999).

Hunter-Gatherers of the Late Pleistocene and Early Holocene

Approximately 40,000 years ago, anatomically modern humans occupied Southeast Asia, and by 30,000 years ago, they had colonized islands of the eastern Indonesian archipelago, which would have entailed ocean-crossing voyages. Well-dated archaeological evidence of late Pleistocene occupation derives from only a few sites, such as the Lang Rongrien rock shelter, the Lang Kamnan cave, Son Vi sites, Niah Cave, Tabon Cave, and Leang Burung 2 (Anderson 1990; Glover 1981; Ha Van Tan 1997; Shoocongdej 2000). The early hunter-gatherer groups who seasonally occupied these caves and rock shelters are known primarily from their flake and pebble/cobble stone tool assemblages. The majority of their material culture was probably made of bamboo and wood, as suggested by the generalized nature of

the stone tools and their probable use in manufacturing activities. Remains of hearths have also been found in these sites, as well as remains of various animals (for example, deer, wild pigs, monkeys, orangutans, shellfish), suggesting these hunter-gatherers engaged in a broad-spectrum subsistence strategy involving hunting, collecting, and fishing.

By the early Holocene (10,000 years ago), hunter-gatherers occupied most of Southeast Asia, with some areas, such as the Malay Peninsula, reoccupied following the expansion of the postglacial equatorial rain forest. Occupation of the mainland's upland areas is better known than that of the lowlands, where rising sea levels and subsequent landscape changes after the last glacial maximum destroyed or buried most sites. Holocene hunter-gatherers are also known primarily from their seasonal use and occupation of caves and rock shelters (Gua Cha, Lang Kamnan, Lang Rongrien, Spirit Cave, Xom Trai, among others) and, in some cases, from coastal shell midden sites. The primary material remains found at these sites are stone tools; the tool assemblages tend to be dominated by unifacially flaked pebble tools. Other types of tools included grinding stones, bone points, and antler wedges, though the majority of their material culture was presumably made of perishable materials. Caves and rock shelters were also used for burial; individuals were buried in either flexed or extended positions and accompanied by stone artifacts, animal bones, and red ochre. Mobility strategies may have varied with the wet and dry seasons, entailing different types of settlements (including in open areas) and exploitation of different food resources (Shoocongdej 2000). Diet varied by location and included a wide variety of terrestrial (pigs, deer, bovids, monkeys, rhinoceri), riverine, and marine shell species. Holocene hunter-gatherers also exploited a wide range of plants. Their role in plant domestication, a topic of long-standing interest in Southeast Asia, remains little known, due, in part, to the current archaeological focus on the domestication, adoption, and spread of rice farming—the subsistence base of later complex societies.

Early Rice-Farming Communities

Currently, the earliest known domesticated rice came from the middle Yangtze Valley in China

and has been dated to ca. 6000 B.C.E.; Southeast Asian sites have not yet yielded direct evidence of rice this early. Consequently, this evidence, in conjunction with linguistic data, underlies current models. The models propose that in the third millennium B.C.E., rice agriculture was introduced into mainland Southeast Asia by expanding Austroasiatic-speaking farming communities that originated in the Yangtze River area and into island Southeast Asia by expanding Austronesian-speaking communities from Taiwan (Bellwood 1997; Higham 1996). The adoption of an agricultural economy based on rice, however, did not occur simultaneously or everywhere in Southeast Asia, as hunter-gatherer societies continued in some areas.

In northern coastal Vietnam, shell middens and other sites (for instance, Da But and Cai Beo) dated from the fifth millennium B.C.E. have yielded pottery and polished stone adzes, material culture often associated elsewhere in the world with Neolithic communities. Similarly, in Thailand, pottery and stone adzes, often from burials in caves, predate evidence considered indicative of rice-farming villages. Whether such evidence indicates hunter-gatherer groups who adopted pottery and polished stone tools or early farming activities remains unknown.

In mainland Southeast Asia, evidence of village settlements and rice farming appeared earliest in the inland areas of northern Vietnam in the early to mid-third millennium B.C.E. (for example, Phung Nguyễn). The inhabitants of these farming villages also raised domesticated dogs, pigs, and cattle; manufactured plain and decorated pottery vessels; engaged in textile making as evidenced by spindle whorls; and produced and used stone ornaments (such as nephrite bracelets and beads). The villages' inhabitants were buried in nearby cemeteries, excavations of which have yielded extended burials and infant jar burials. In northeastern and central Thailand, farming communities are known primarily from cemeteries of extended inhumations (the sites of Non Nok Tha and Ban Chiang, among others), with some of these sites also yielding evidence of habitation (such as postholes that were possibly from houses raised on piles). These farming communities used and produced plain and decorated pottery (some tempered with rice chaff), polished stone adzes, stone bracelets, stone reaping knives, and

bone tools. Spindle whorls indicate they engaged in textile making, whereas marine shell beads and bracelets and exotic stone attest to participation in exchange networks. In addition to growing rice, these villagers raised domesticated cattle, pigs, chickens, and dogs, though they also continued to hunt and collect wild resources. Mortuary evidence from Non Nok Tha suggests the beginnings of hereditary social ranking and part-time craft specialization (Baryard 1996–1997). However, mortuary evidence from other contemporary/chronologically overlapping sites (for example, Khok Phanom Di and Ban Chiang) suggests differences in social status based on an individual's achievements in social, ritual, and/or economic activities (pottery crafting, exchange, and so on) (Higham 1996; White and Pigott 1996).

Within the islands and Malay Peninsula, early rice-farming communities are known almost entirely from occupation and burial remains in caves and rock shelters, as well as a few shell midden sites. In the Philippines, sites dating from at least the early third millennium B.C.E. onward indicate these communities used and produced items such as plain and decorated pottery, stone and shell adzes, stone reaping knives, textiles (as known from spindle whorls), stone and shell jewelry, and tattooing chisels. Domesticated pigs and dogs were raised, with food resources continuing to include hunted and collected wild animals and shellfish. One of the few open sites—Dimolit in northeastern Luzon—has also yielded postholes from two square domestic structures that appear to have been seasonally occupied. Within the Indonesian archipelago, pollen evidence suggests minor forest clearance, presumably for agriculture, on Sumatra around 4500 B.C.E. and permanent clearance after 1000 B.C.E.; unfortunately, on Sumatra and Java, little is known archaeologically of early farming communities. On other islands, including those of the eastern Indonesian archipelago as well as the areas of Sarawak and Sabah, sites are known primarily from caves and rock shelters. They have yielded various types of Neolithic material culture, including plain and decorated pottery and rice as well as shell beads, bracelets, and fishhooks, dating from 2500 B.C.E. on. There is also evidence for human introduction, via watercraft, of pigs and nondomesticated animals to some of these islands between 2500 and 2000 B.C.E. During the

second millennium B.C.E., caves in the Malay Peninsula (such as Gua Cha) were used for mortuary purposes and contain graves of extended individuals accompanied by items such as stone adzes, bone points, shell beads and bracelets, and plain and decorated pottery. The associated settlements may have been located along the riverine areas adjacent to these caves.

Copper- and Bronze-Producing Communities

By the early to mid-second millennium B.C.E., autonomous village communities on the mainland (known primarily from cemetery sites) became involved in the small-scale production, distribution, and consumption of copper/bronze items, with the continued production and use of stone and pottery craft goods. Hereditary ranking appears to have existed among some of these communities, though the incorporation of this new metal technology may not have been accompanied by increasing sociopolitical complexity as seen in Bronze Age societies elsewhere in the world. Around 1500 B.C.E., if not earlier, bronze objects appeared in sites in northern Vietnam (concentrated along the Red and Black Rivers at Go Bong, Dong Dau, Go Mun, and other locations). They appeared somewhat later in the central and southern areas (for example, the sites of Binh Chau and Doc Chua), where ore resources were more distantly located. Items such as arrowheads, spearheads, socketed axes, fishhooks, and, later, ornaments were locally cast in bronze using clay and stone bivalve molds. Stone ornaments and tools continued to be used, though this declined over time.

Sites in central and northeast Thailand (among them Phu Lon, Ban Chiang, and Non Nok Tha), with their initial use dating to the early to mid-second millennium B.C.E., provide the earliest evidence for copper/bronze metallurgical activity (Pigott and Natapintu 1988). The acquisition and processing of ores, as well as the smelting and casting of copper/bronze objects, do not appear to have required full-time specialists (White and Pigott 1996). After 1500 B.C.E., bronze-casting technology, which involved the use of ceramic crucibles and stone or ceramic bivalve molds, appears to have spread along riverine and coastal exchange routes (Higham 1996). Copper ingots entered

into existing exchange networks, thus enabling communities situated far from ore sources to engage in bronze casting. Prior to the production of iron craft goods (ca. 500 B.C.E.), bronzes were cast into ornaments (bracelets, ear ornaments) and utilitarian objects such as socketed ax heads and other implements, chisels, arrow- and spearpoints, fishhooks, and sickles. Bronze objects and copper ingots, together with items such as pottery vessels, animal remains, stone tools, shell ornaments, and clay figurines, also served as grave goods, though whether their value in mortuary contexts related to distinguishing status differences and/or other social identities remains unclear. These communities engaged in rice agriculture, possibly both wet and dry forms of nonintensive cultivation, animal husbandry, and hunting and collecting of wild food resources.

The Development of Complex Societies

Around the mid-first millennium B.C.E., significant changes entailing increasing social stratification appear to have been under way. Archaeologists interpret such increasing hierarchization as indicative of complex societies (such as complex chiefdoms or prestate polities). In mainland Southeast Asia, large settlements (up to 40 to 50 hectares, some with moats as in northeastern Thailand), together with smaller ones, appear to have been integrated into regional settlement hierarchies. Urban settlements (Co Loa in northern Vietnam and Beikthano in Burma) also appeared during this period. Remains of residential structures, though, are rare and usually take the form of postholes, which suggests houses were built on stilts. Other changes, occurring variably within the region, included engagement in iron production (for instance, ornaments and tools in localized forms), with smelting and forging first appearing in the Chao Phraya and middle to lower Mekong Valleys. Then there was the increased scale of production and variety of bronzes crafted (various vessel shapes, large drums, axes, spearheads, jewelry, and the like), as exemplified by northern Vietnam Dong-son bronzes (such as large decorated drums, situlae, and bells). Also, there was a greater use of bronze objects in mortuary ritual, as well as glass-working (in southern Vietnam). Intensification of wet-rice cultivation using domesti-

cated water buffalo and iron plows and participation in maritime and long-distance exchange relations between the mainland and island areas and South Asia, with exotic goods used as grave goods, are among other evident changes. The earliest evidence of trade between mainland communities and India dated to the fourth century B.C.E. and came from a cemetery site in western Thailand (Ban Don Ta Phet [Glover 1996]). Among the exotic goods were high-tin bronze vessels, beads of glass and semiprecious stones (carnelian, agate, and others, some of which were etched), and a possible Buddhist carnelian pendant.

The complex societies that developed during the last few centuries B.C.E. in areas of island Southeast Asia acquired bronze objects, including items that presumably were used to mark prestige/status (such as Dong-son drums), and iron goods via exchange with mainland polities. Soon thereafter, local metal-working centers were established in the islands. Island polities also engaged in exchange networks involving South Asia, with sites from the north coast of Bali (for example, Sembiran) so far yielding the earliest dated Indian materials (rouletted wares) from around two thousand years ago (Ardika and Bellwood 1991). As with the mainland, the majority of information on island societies of this period derives from burials; these are found interred in open sites and caves and include the distinctive jar, slab grave (Sumatra, Java, and Peninsular Malaysia), and carved stone sarcophagi (Java and Bali) forms of burial. Such sites have yielded information on mortuary ritual, along with a wealth of material culture such as decorated pottery, bronze socketed tools, bowls, drums, glass and carnelian beads, and iron tools. Much remains to be learned, though, of the social, political, economic, and ideological aspects of this period, which preceded the formation of states in the Indo-Malaysian archipelago.

Early Southeast Asian States

States in Southeast Asia are traditionally thought to have appeared on the mainland during the early centuries C.E. This dating reflects, in part, the privileging of written sources in the identification of state-level polities; thus, to understand the formation of the early historic states, archaeologists are now investigating prehistoric

sites of the last few centuries B.C.E. to the beginning of the common era. Traditionally, Funan is considered the earliest state. Written accounts, the earliest dating to the third century C.E. and prepared by visiting Chinese emissaries, describe, for example, Funan's origin story, dynastic lineage, raiding activities, and vassal polities. Also mentioned are walled settlements that contained palaces, the taxation system (paid in gold, silver, perfumes, and pearls), an intensive rice agricultural system, and the presence of a representative of the Indian Murunda king. Oc Êo, a 450-hectare rectangular site (enclosed by several ramparts and moats) of approximately the second to sixth century C.E., is located in the lower Mekong Delta, the area in which Funan is thought to have been located. It has yielded evidence of participation in extensive exchange networks that involved Persian, Roman, Indian (some engraved in Indian script), and Chinese goods from the second century C.E. onward; there are also indications of a settlement engaged in glass, stone (precious and semi-precious), and metal craft production (Higham 1996). An extensive system of canals (though not yet dated) connects Oc Êo with several other large sites, including Ta Keo (the probable port) and Angkor Borei. The latter was continuously occupied from the late centuries B.C.E. onward and was contemporary with and shared similarities in material culture with Oc Êo, suggesting the two sites were part of the same polity (Stark et al. 1999). The lower Mekong Delta state, though, was not an isolated polity, as other contemporary maritime-oriented states appear to have existed on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula and in West Java by the early centuries C.E. (Wisseman Christie 1995).

From the middle of the first millennium C.E., more early historical states are known (for example, Chenla, Dvaravati, Champa, Kedah, and Śrīvijaya). These states exhibit a shared incorporation of Indian legal, political, and religious ideas and institutions, including the use of Sanskrit names by rulers, as seen in stone inscriptions (first in South Indian and then in indigenous scripts) and in the layout and styles of religious architecture and carvings. Although "Indianization"—the view that statecraft was brought to Southeast Asia by Indians—is no longer accepted, relatively little is known about indigenous sociopolitical processes in polities that immediately preceded the early historical

states. In northern Vietnam, state polities may have existed prior to the expansion of the Han empire in 111 B.C.E., and this is an issue that requires further consideration and investigation. Recently, several archaeological projects aimed at understanding state development on the mainland have been initiated in central coastal Vietnam, the area of the Cham state (Glover and Yamagata 1995); the lower Mekong Delta, an area associated with Funan (Stark et al. 1999); and northeastern Thailand (Higham and Thosarat 2000). Such research should contribute to the understanding of the processes (social, ideological, economic, and others) leading to the formation and structure of early Southeast Asian states, as well as their development prior to the better-documented historical period.

ELISABETH A. BACUS

See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast of Asia; Ban Chiang; Ban Kao Culture; Champa; Chenla; Dong-son; Dvaravati; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Funan; Hoabinhian; Indianization; "Java Man" and "Solo Man"; Jungle/Forest Products; Marine/Sea Products; Metal Age Cultures in Southeast Asia; Neolithic Period of Southeast Asia; Niah Caves (Sarawak); Oc Êo; "Perak Man"; Rice in Southeast Asia; Śrīvijaya (Śrīwijaya); Tabon Cave (Palawan); Textiles of Southeast Asia; Underwater/Maritime Archaeology in Southeast Asia

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HUN SEN (1951–)

"Strong Man" of Cambodia

Hun Sen is a prominent Cambodian political figure and has been prime minister since 1984. He was born in rural Kompong Cham Province in April 1951. His parents were poor farmers, but Hun Sen showed promise in primary school and went to Cambodia's capital, Phnom Penh, to complete his education. In 1970, following the coup that removed Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1922–) from power, Hun Sen, while still a student, joined the Khmer Rouge guerrillas, ostensibly seeking to return the prince to power. Hun Sen was severely wounded in the final assault on Phnom Penh in April 1975, losing the sight of an eye. While recovering from his wounds, he met his future wife, who was working as a military nurse. In 1976 and 1977, under Democratic Kampuchea (DK), Hun Sen served as a regimental commander in eastern Cambodia, but when local cadre began to be purged by the regime,

he fled to Vietnam, where he was imprisoned briefly. In 1978, he was released, after several high-ranking Khmer Rouge cadre defected to Vietnam.

A Vietnamese invasion in December 1978 removed the Khmer Rouge from power. In the pro-Vietnamese Khmer government established in early 1979, Hun Sen, at twenty-eight, was named foreign minister, the youngest person in the world to hold the office. In 1984, he became prime minister, with Vietnamese encouragement, and held the post after the Vietnamese withdrew their forces five years later. In the UN-sponsored elections of 1993, Hun Sen's Peoples' Party came in second but refused to relinquish power and forced a coalition government onto the victorious royalist party. Four years later, as the royalist faction sought to arm itself for its protection, Hun Sen forcefully ousted it from the coalition. A more compliant coalition government took office after the elections of 1998, and Cambodia was admitted to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). By then, the Khmer Rouge movement had collapsed, and Cambodia was at peace. Hun Sen took personal credit for both developments.

Throughout his political career, Hun Sen has displayed a mixture of brutality, shrewdness, populism, and sensitivity. He relishes the title of "strong man," while displaying acuity in selecting his advisers, distributing patronage, and keeping political rivals at a safe distance from the levers of power.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Khmer Rouge; *Killing Fields, The*; Paris Conference



Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen appears in a reflective mood at his home south of the capital Phnom Penh, 16 January 1999. (AFP/Corbis)

on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

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I

IBAN

The name *Iban* is of uncertain origin. Early writers speculated that it derived from the Kayan term *hivan*, meaning “wanderer.” More likely, it comes from the Iban word *iban*, meaning “a person,” “human being,” or, more specifically, a “layperson,” as opposed to a “ritual specialist” (a *manang* [shaman] or *lemambang* [bard]). In the post-Pacific War (1941–1945) years, with growing political consciousness, Kalaka and Saribas Iban preferred to call themselves Sea Dayaks, reflecting a former tradition of coastal raiding. However, since the 1970s, that term has largely passed out of use, and today, *Iban* is universally employed, both officially and by the Iban themselves.

The Iban speak a single, comparatively homogeneous language that is, in turn, part of a larger complex of Borneo–Malayic languages. Also part of this complex are a number of related Ibanic dialects and languages, some of them mutually intelligible, including Kantu’, Desa, Bugau, and Mualang, all spoken in West Kalimantan. Although related to Malay, Iban is a distinct language, with its own ritual-speech genre known as *jaku’ dalam* (deep speech).

Iban are found in all of the political divisions of Borneo but in largest numbers in Sarawak, where they comprise the single most populous ethnic group. There, in 2001, they numbered 603,540, or more than a quarter of the state’s population. In West Kalimantan (Indonesia),

they number approximately 14,000; in Brunei, 10,000; and in Sabah (in 1991), 6,672. Traditionally, Ibans chiefly inhabited the hills at mid-level elevation, generally locating their settlements along rivers, especially the middle reaches. But during the last two centuries, more than half have settled downriver and in the deltaic plains of Sarawak, and over a quarter live in urban areas today.

According to genealogical traditions, ancestors of the present-day Iban began to filter across the low-lying Kapuas watershed into Sarawak sixteen to seventeen generations ago. They first settled the interior and lower rivers of western Sarawak. A period of territorial consolidation followed, giving way, shortly before the beginning of the nineteenth century, to renewed expansion. Iban pioneers from the Batang Lupar and Saribas crossed the southern watershed of the Rejang and settled along the Kanowit River and its tributaries. Still others, from the upper Batang Lupar, Lemanak, and Skrang Rivers, moved across the headwaters of the Batang Ai and along the Kanyau in West Kalimantan into the Katibas, a major Rejang tributary. Back in western Sarawak, Saribas and Skrang war leaders were, at the same time, forging military alliances with local Malay chiefs. Venturing to sea in large, well-armed war boats, they raided coastal and riverine settlements all along the western coast of Borneo, from the Rejang Delta to Pontianak and the Sambas in

southern Kalimantan. This raiding posed an immediate threat to the newly founded Brooke territory (established in 1841 when James Brooke [1803–1868] was appointed raja of Sarawak by the sultan of Brunei), which, with the aid of the Royal Navy and Balau and Sebuyau Iban allies, defeated the Saribas and Skrang Iban in a series of campaigns from 1842 to 1844.

Although Iban migration into the Rejang basin had begun several decades before James Brooke's arrival, this movement was undoubtedly accelerated by Brooke's military incursions into the Iban heartland in the 1840s, followed by the "punitive expeditions" of his successor, Charles Brooke (1829–1917). The havoc wreaked by the Brooke state as it extended its rule, together with the continuing disruption caused by interregional warfare, impelled many to migrate in search of more secure conditions and to escape the interference of the new and alien Brooke raj. The enormity of these migrations can scarcely be exaggerated. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there were no Iban living north of the southern watershed of the Rejang. By the end of the century, more than half of the total Iban population lived north of this line, having spread through the whole Rejang basin and beyond, reaching, by the end of the century, Sarawak's northernmost frontiers with Brunei and Sabah. These latter movements, indeed, played an important part in extending Sarawak's northern borders.

Iban settlements are predominantly in the form of a longhouse, although in some areas, villages of separate houses have replaced the longhouse. In the past, when head-hunting was endemic, the longhouse was an important defensive unit. Today, it continues to be a ritual entity, with residents sharing responsibility for its ritual well-being. A longhouse consists of a series of laterally joined family units, each unit built and maintained by a household. Access is typically by a notched-log ladder or stairs. Inside the longhouse, an inner wall separates individual family apartments on one side from an opened gallery on the other. Between the two is a communicating passageway. Above each apartment is a loft where rice is stored in bark bins and where, in the past, women spun cotton and wove intricate *ikat* (tie-dyed weaving) tex-

tiles. Each longhouse contains from four to seventy or eighty households.

The primary subsistence activity of most rural families is rice farming. In the hills, farmers practice swidden cultivation, whereas in low-lying areas or in upland valley pockets, many grow *padi paya*, or swamp rice. Each family maintains its own stock of rice seed and plants between one and two dozen varieties of rice annually. Farmers also interplant their fields with gourds, long beans, mustard greens, pumpkins, cucumbers, maize, and cassava. Wild fruits, shoots, and vegetables are collected, and hunting and fishing traditionally provided the principal sources of dietary protein, although today, logging and river silting have reduced the availability of fish and wild animals. Almost all families keep chickens and pigs, and every longhouse has dogs, used mainly for hunting. Chickens and pigs are used in sacrifices, and eggs are an indispensable part of most offerings. Rubber and pepper are major cash crops. Today, with a declining rural economy, off-farm labor and remittances from those working in towns, logging camps, or plantations have become vital sources of support for many longhouse families. In addition, the attraction of salaried jobs and educational opportunities is resulting in large-scale urban migration. In Sarawak, Iban are now found in all major occupations.

The fundamental unit of Iban society is the *bilik* (lit. room or apartment) family (a family group living in an apartment). Families are corporate groups that hold in trust farmland, fruit trees, sacred rice, charms, prohibitions, and heirloom valuables. Traditionally, a son or daughter remained with the family following marriage, to ensure the group's continuity. Sons and daughters have equal rights of inheritance. Adoption is common, and couples are likely to adopt an heir should they be childless. The organization of Iban society is bilateral; descent groups are lacking, and marriage is preferentially endogamous within widely ramifying kindred networks. In some areas, oral genealogies of up to twenty or thirty generations are preserved, memorializing, in particular, local pioneering ancestors. In others, such genealogies are absent. Intrakindred marriage is preferred, provided partners are of the same generation. Divorce is not uncommon and, with mutual consent, is relatively easy.

In the past, men of influence included renowned warriors, migration leaders, expert farmers, orators, bards, and augurs. Virtually all were self-made men. Although essentially egalitarian, Iban society was and remains highly competitive, and the Iban are keenly aware of status distinctions, recognizing in the past *raja berani* (the rich and brave), *orang sengapa'* or *orang mayuh* (ordinary people), *jaum* (debt-bondsmen), and *ulun* (slaves). Status distinctions were valorized by wealth and reputation and were given social recognition in ritual festivals and displays of social precedence. Debt-clients and slaves lacked the means to sponsor ritual feasts and so were precluded from the competition for prestige. The chief area of female achievement was excellence in weaving.

Following the establishment of the Brooke state, Iban society was restructured to create a hierarchy of formal offices: the longhouse headman (*tuai rumah*), regional chief (*penghulu*), and paramount chief (*temenggong*). In the early 1960s, political parties took form, but after some initial electoral success, party support split, largely along traditional regional lines, and greatly reduced the overall influence of the Iban in state politics.

Religious belief and ritual pervade every aspect of Iban life. According to Iban beliefs, the world was brought into existence and given its present form by remote creator gods (*betara*), most of which are thought to reside in the upper world (*langit*).

Among the principal pantheon is Singalang Burung, the god of augury and warfare. Others include Simpulang Gana, the god of the earth and agriculture, and Selampandai, the creator of humankind and the god of blacksmithing. Bunsu Petara, the god who imparts the breath of life to human beings; Ini' Inda, the goddess of healing; Menjaya, the god of shamans; and Anda Mara, the god of riches and material wealth, are each revered by all pagan Ibans. Singalang Burung is the eldest and most powerful of the gods, and he influences human affairs by means of his seven sons-in-law, the principal omen birds.

Intermediate between the gods and human beings are the spirit heroes and heroines (*orang panggau*), who inhabit a mythic raised world called Panggau Libau. These are exemplary figures that inspire women weavers and male warriors, orators, and craftsmen. Below the upper

world and the intermediate Panggau Libau realm is "this world" (*dunya tu'*), the earthly world of living human beings; Sebayan, the shadowy afterworld of the dead, is downriver. Invisible to the living, Sebayan's predominant feature is the Mandai River of the Dead. Along its banks, departed souls erect longhouses and clear farms. Sharing "this world" are spirits (*antu'*), including the *antu' generasi* (demon hunters), who prey upon errant human souls.

There are four principal religious practitioners: augurs (*tuai burung*), bard-priests (*lemambang*), soul guides (*tukang sabak*), and shamans (*manang*). Augurs are typically consulted before crucial activities are initiated. Bard-priests sing invocational chants during major ritual festivals (*gawa'* or *gawai*). Soul guides sing the lamentation (*sabak*) for the dead throughout the night immediately preceding burial, whereas shamans are concerned chiefly with treating spiritual aspects of illness and inauspicious dreams, and effecting a proper separation between the living and the dead. Christian missionaries have been active among the Iban for more than a century, and today many Iban are Christian.

CLIFFORD SATHER

See also *Adat; Bejalai*; Borneo; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Dayaks; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Slavery; Swidden Agriculture

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IBN BATTUTA (1304–1377)

Traveling Scholar

A famous Moroccan traveler, Ibn Battuta toured almost all the Muslim cities and, provided that his accounts he provided in his work *Rihla* can stand trial, landed as far as East and Southeast Asia in three decades' time. Born to a family of Muslim judges (*qadis*), Ibn Battuta grew up with a scholarly disposition. In 1325, he started his travel career by paying pilgrimage to Mecca. Then he traveled around the Near East (the western part of modern West Asia), seeking great learning from famous scholars. He developed a strong passion while in Cairo to visit as many parts of the world as possible. From then until 1342, he traveled widely in Egypt, Mesopotamia (Iraq), and Asia Minor (Turkey).

The connection of Ibn Battuta with Southeast Asia was established in 1342 when Sultan Muhammad of India appointed him as his envoy to the Chinese emperor. Around 1345, he set off from the Maldives to go to China, via the Straits of Melaka, calling at ports including

Barah Nagar (Burma), Qaqla (Kedah [?], on the western side of the Malay Peninsula), Samudra (Sumatra), and either Champa or Tonkin. He disembarked at Zaytun (modern Quanzhou) in China, then traveled north as far as Shangdu (modern Beijing).

Ibn Battuta's Southeast Asian narrative, part of the adventurous story that he related to a writer named Ibn Juzayy upon his return to Morocco in 1353, described the increasing exposure of Sumatra to Muslim customs and trade. Apparently, he observed a rising trend among the peoples of the Malay Archipelago to convert to Islam.

A major problem underlying his Southeast Asian narratives relates to their obscurity and unreasonable sketchiness as compared to the rest of the work, which is generally full of detailed and vivid descriptions. Some historians are skeptical of his accounts of lands east of India, believing they may have been merely hearsay and therefore suspect.

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also Champa; I-Ching (I-tsing) (635–713 C.E.); Islam in Southeast Asia; Polo, Marco (1254–1324); Straits of Melaka; Sumatra; Tonkin (Tongking); Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty (1271–1368)

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IBRAHIM YAACOB (1911–1979)

Malay Nationalist

Born in Kertau, Temerloh, in the state of Pahang in Peninsular or West Malaysia on 27 November 1911, Ibrahim Yaacob, also known by his pen name IBHY, was the first president of the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM), founded in 1937 to struggle for Malayan independence from the British.

After completing his studies at a teacher training institute in Pahang in 1927, Ibrahim was admitted to the famous Sultan Idris Training College (SITC) in Tanjung Malim, Perak, where he graduated in 1931. It was at the SITC that Ibrahim became more informed of history and politics and began to get involved in writing, journalism, and political activities. Like many other Malay students at the college in the

1920s and 1930s, his sociopolitical awareness was nurtured by nationalist-minded lecturers such as Abdul Hadi Hassan, Zainal Abidin Ahmad (Za'ba) (1895–1973), and Harun Muhammad Amin and from reading materials, especially those from Indonesia and Singapore. Ibrahim served as a teacher in a Malay school in Bentong, Pahang, from 1932 to 1935 and later, from 1936 to 1937, at the Police Cadets Training Center in Kuala Lumpur before becoming a journalist, writer, and political activist. He became assistant editor and member of the managerial board of the periodical *Majlis* (1937–1938) and in 1938 and 1939 served as chief editor and general manager.

While heading *Majlis*, Ibrahim formed the KMM with a number of colleagues—especially former fellow students at SITC such as Hassan Manan, Abdul Karim Rashid, and Muhammad Isa Mahmud—and had it registered in 1938. Ibrahim is representative of the nationalist-minded journalists and writers of his time, such as Abdul Rahim Kajai (1894–1943), Harun Aminurrashid (1907–1986), Ishak Haji Muhammad (1909–1911), and Yusuf Ishak, who made use of their writing skills to instill sociopolitical consciousness among the Malays. With the money received from the Japanese consul in Singapore in 1941, Ibrahim—who had been secretly recruited into the Japanese espionage apparatus, Kame (the code name for KMM)—bought the daily *Warta Malaya* and utilized it as a propaganda tool against the British. When the British colonial government discovered this ploy, Ibrahim and over 100 other members of the KMM were detained; Ibrahim was placed at the Outram Road prison in Singapore.

Freed on the eve of the British surrender in February 1942, Ibrahim was made commandant, with the rank of lieutenant colonel, of the Japanese-sponsored Malayan Army, the *Malai Giyu Gun* or *Pembela Tanah Air* (PETA), literally meaning “Defenders of the Motherland.” Together with Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy (1911–1969) and a number of other Malay political activists, Ibrahim was instrumental in the formation of the *Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung* (KRIS, the Union of Peninsula Indonesians) in July 1945. Through KRIS, Ibrahim and his colleagues hoped to achieve political independence together with Indonesia in accordance with the concept of *Melayu Raya*

(Pan-Malay) or *Indonesia Raya* (Pan-Indonesia). Both concepts envisaged the unity of the Malay Archipelago, which encompassed present-day southern Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines (Sulu Archipelago and Mindanao). The rather sudden Japanese surrender (15 August 1945) and the hasty declaration of independence (17 August 1945) for Indonesia without Malaya by Sukarno (1901–1970) and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980) disrupted KRIS’s planning, and as a result, Ibrahim did not attend the reduced KRIS meeting on 16–17 August in Kuala Lumpur.

On 19 August 1945, after boarding a Japanese plane in Singapore, Ibrahim; his wife, Onan Siraj; and Hassan Manan flew to Jakarta to consult the Indonesian leaders on the question of independence for Malaya. While continuing to liaise with his colleagues in Malaya, Ibrahim participated in the war against the Dutch in Indonesia. According to some sources, as a result of the British political suppression in Malaya following the declaration of the Emergency in 1948, the Central Committee of the *Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Muda* (PKMM, National Party of Malay Youth) in Malaya handed Ibrahim the “full mandate” of the party. The mandate was prepared by Taha Kalu and Abdullah Zawawi and signed by Dr. Burhanuddin on 1 May 1950. It empowered Ibrahim to lead and chart the future struggle of the PKMM against British colonialism.

After receiving the PKMM mandate through an intermediary, Ibrahim announced the formation of the *Kesatuan Malaya Merdeka* (also KMM) or Union of Independent Malaya on 27 June 1950 to enhance the anticolonial struggle in Malaya. In Indonesia, Ibrahim used a new name—Iskandar Kamel—and participated fully as a member of the *Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia* (PNI, Indonesian National Party). He later joined Partindo and was appointed as the representative for Riau in the *Madjelis Permusyawaratan Rakjat Sementara* (MPRS, Provisional Peoples’ Deliberative Council). At the same time, he engaged in business and successfully set up the *Bank Industri Nasional* (National Industrial Bank) and later the *Bank Pertiwi*.

Ibrahim was not only a practicing nationalist but also an ideologue and a recorder of his times. He wrote a number of books: *Melihat Tanah Air* (See the Motherland), *Nusa dan*

Bangsa Melayu (Malay Race and Nation), *Sejarah Perjuangan di Malaya* (The History of the Struggle in Malaya), and *Sekitar Malaya Merdeka* (Of Independent Malaya). Ibrahim's political experiences, observations, and ideas can be traced from these writings. In recognition of his contributions to the Indonesian struggle for independence, Ibrahim, who passed away on 8 March 1979, was buried at the Kalibata warriors' mausoleum in Jakarta.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Fujiwara Kikan (F Kikan); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Japan and Southeast Asia (pre-1941); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) (Young Malay Union); Malayan/Malaysian Education; Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Newspapers and Mass Media in Southeast Asia; Onn bin Ja'afar (1895–1962); Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (PNI) (1927); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Sultan Idris Training College (SITC)

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I-CHING (I-TSING) (635–713 C.E.)

Buddhist Pilgrim–cum–Travel Writer

I-Ching was a Chinese Buddhist pilgrim and was the first to take a sea route to India via Southeast Asia. He learned both the Confucian classics and the Buddhist canon as a child. After

developing a sense of mission in Buddhism, he became dissatisfied with the Chinese Buddhist texts, which were full of obscure meanings, and was eager to search the original texts. This served as a strong motivating force behind his pilgrimage to India in 671. The twenty-year odyssey was originally designed for a group of about thirty, but it turned out to be a lonely one for I-Ching, as he was deserted by all his companions when the Persian ship set out at Guangzhou (Canton).

I-Ching chose a sea route to circumvent the growing Arabian strength in Central Asia, which made a land route to India insurmountable. His travel to India turned out to be historically important. He brought from India to China 400 volumes of Buddhist manuscripts. The translations done by I-Ching provided the Chinese Buddhists with more authentic texts, which later gained currency in China. Southeast Asia, especially Srivijaya, played a special role in the success of I-Ching's pilgrimage. He was indebted to the ruler of Srivijaya, who provided much-needed assistance to his travels to India. On his return trip, he stayed for ten years at Palembang, the capital of Srivijaya and a center for Buddhist study, making use of the expertise of the numerous Buddhist monks there for translating the Buddhist texts into Chinese. He also completed here two books about his travels, in which the existence of the kingdom of Srivijaya was first revealed. His writings are invaluable source materials on early Southeast Asian history.

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also Buddhism, Mahayana; Palembang; Srivijaya (Śrīvijaya)

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IENG SARY (1927–)

Khmer Rouge Survivor

Ieng Sary, a Cambodian Communist leader, was born in what is now southern Vietnam but moved to Phnom Penh in 1945 for schooling. He was an excellent student and received a scholarship to study in France in 1951. He soon neglected his studies, joined the French Com-

munist Party, and became active in anticolonial student circles. After Cambodia gained its independence from France in 1955, Sary returned home, became a schoolteacher, and joined his brother-in-law, Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) (1925–1998), to work for the clandestine Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK). Three years later, fearing arrest, Sary fled with several high-ranking colleagues to a Vietnamese Communist encampment on the Cambodia-Vietnam border. In 1965, the group moved their headquarters to the northeast, where for five years they hammered out the utopian policies they hoped to enact when they came to power.

Following the anti-Sihanouk coup in 1970, the Khmer Rouge allied themselves with the ousted Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1922–) and the Vietnamese. During these years, Sary worked in Hanoi and Beijing as a spokesman for the Khmer Rouge. When the Khmer Rouge came to power in 1975, Sary returned to Phnom Penh and became minister of foreign affairs for Democratic Kampuchea (DK). He used his office to seek overseas allies for the Khmer Rouge and presided over purges of local intellectuals and of Cambodians returning from overseas to help the revolution.

When DK collapsed in 1979 following an invasion from Vietnam, Sary fled with Pol Pot and thousands of others to the Thai-Cambodian border, where he remained in the Khmer Rouge hierarchy as the organization launched a war against the new, Vietnamese-backed regime in Phnom Penh. Offered amnesty by the Phnom Penh authorities in 1996, Sary defected to the government, with hundreds of followers. Never brought to trial for atrocities in the DK period, Sary settled in a former Khmer Rouge area in Cambodia's northwest.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Chea Sim (1932–); Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Hun Sen (1951–); Khmer Rouge; *Killing Fields, The*; Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) (1925–1998); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992–1993)

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ILANUN AND BALANGINGI

For nearly two centuries, the Sulu-Mindanao region was synonymous with piracy in the Malayo-Indonesian archipelago. And for over eighty years, from roughly 1762 through 1848, Southeast Asia felt the full force of slave raiders from the Sulu-Mindanao region. During this period, two ethnic groups emerged, specializing in organized maritime raiding on a scale never before witnessed in the region: the Iranun or Ilanun (Lanun) and the Balangingi Sama.

Between them, these two groups were responsible for capturing and transporting to the Sulu sultanate several thousand slaves annually, seized in raids carried out over virtually the whole of maritime Southeast Asia, from the Bay of Bengal to the Timor and Arafura Seas. Captive slaves were put to work mainly in the Sulu Archipelago, chiefly by Tausug *datus* (non-royal chiefs), who acted as the principal patrons of Ilanun and Balangingi slave raiders. Great numbers of them were also absorbed by assimilation into the Balangingi and Ilanun communities themselves or were traded to Makassar or other Southeast Asian slave markets.

Raiding during this time was carried out by both groups in well-organized fleets composed of large, fast-moving vessels, some of them rowed by as many as 100 slaves and all heavily armed. Fleets annually circumnavigated Borneo and crossed the South China Sea to the Straits of Melaka, Riau, and the Bay of Bengal, where they seized Malay fishermen, attacked shipping, and plundered coastal villages. In the south, fleets sailed through the Makassar Strait and then fanned out over much of eastern Indonesia. Some crossed the Banda Sea to New Guinea; others raided the Moluccas or coastal Java. Their most devastating attacks, however, were directed against Christian, Hispanized settlements in the Philippines. There, Ilanun and Balangingi fleets preyed annually upon the poorly defended lowland villages and towns of southern Luzon and the Visayan Islands. They sometimes sailed upriver to attack and burn

churches and inland settlements, taking hundreds of captives and, in some areas, causing massive demographic decline, abandonment of farmland, and a collapse of coastal trade.

Balangingi

The Balangingi, or Balangingi Sama, belong to the Bajau/Sama ethnolinguistic group. Today, they are primarily in the Tongkil island group in the northernmost Samales island cluster of the Sulu Archipelago; on the islands and coastal areas immediately to the north, bordering Basilan Island; and along the southern Zamboanga Peninsula of Mindanao. In addition, small communities are found in the Sulu-Sulawesi region, testimony to their former dispersal as specialized slave raiders. For example, a small Balangingi settlement is present at Telisai, in the Lahad Datu District of Sabah (Malaysia). Early in the nineteenth century, these scattered settlements served Balangingi fleets as staging points and strategic havens along routes of long-distance voyaging.

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Balangingi slave raiding had become a major feature of the maritime economy of the Sulu sultanate. Balangingi raiders were active each year mainly from May to November, typically returning to their home settlements during the northwest monsoon (January to March). There, many resumed the more conventional Sama occupations of fishing and salt making. For defensive and strategic reasons, raiding fleets operated chiefly from bases located in mangrove-lined bays or reef-fringed islands, where boats could be easily hidden and settlements defended from attack by sea. Balangingi raiding proved extremely difficult to suppress. Expeditions were sent against them, but they met with only limited success due to their mobility and the vast areas over which they operated. The situation changed only with the introduction of steam-powered vessels and, by the mid-nineteenth century, increased cooperation among the colonial powers of the region. In 1845, the British navy attacked Ilanun and Bajau bases in Marudu Bay in northeastern Sabah, and in 1848, a Spanish force using steam-powered gunboats laid waste to Balangingi Island, systematically destroying all villages, crops, and orchards and forcing the inhabitants to flee to neighboring islands. But

even in the diaspora, the Balangingi continued raiding. In the following year, a Spanish naval force returned to attack Bukutua and other settlements in the Tongkil island group, and in 1851, a major force attacked and sacked Jolo town, then the seat of the Sulu sultanate. Two decades later, the Spanish established a military garrison in Jolo and began a naval blockade of the Sulu Archipelago, interdicting and destroying all native shipping. With this, Balangingi raiding came to an end.

Ilanun

The Ilanun, also known as the Iranun, Iranon, Illanun, or Lanun, were, at the height of this period (1760s–1840s), the most feared and redoubtable of all Sulu-Mindanao slave raiders. The period from the end of the eighteenth century through the first decades of the nineteenth came to be known in Southeast Asian waters as the “age of the Ilanun,” thanks, in part, to the regularity of their movements and the enormous range over which they operated. Ilanun slave raiding took them to the coasts of Thailand and Vietnam and to New Guinea. So regular was the annual appearance of Ilanun fleets in the Straits of Melaka that colonial authorities in Singapore and other Straits Settlements referred to the months of August, September, and October as the *musim lanun* (pirate season).

Expanding from their ancestral home south of Lake Lanao in southern Mindanao, the Ilanun appear to have been the first to take advantage of the growing commercial and political power of the Sulu sultanate to become large-scale slave raiders. To conduct their operations, they established a scattered network of satellite communities all across the region. The Ilanun are one of three major Muslim ethnic groups in southern Mindanao. The largest of these, the Magindanao or Maguindanao (the people of the floodplain), are the most populous Muslim ethnic group in the Philippines. Settled immediately to the north are the Maranao (the people of the lake), who occupy the region around Lake Lanao. The Ilanun live to the southwest of the lake, in and around Balabagan, and along the rivers and coastline of Illana Bay. All three groups are closely related linguistically and culturally. In the early 1970s, the Ilanun numbered an estimated 65,000 in the southern Philippines.

The Ilanun subsisted in the past chiefly by cultivating wet rice and maize. In addition, because of the strategic location of Ilanun villages along the shores bordering Illana Bay, their home area also acted as a regional conduit for trade goods flowing from Sulu and the Malayo-Indonesian world. Initially, the Ilanun allied themselves with the Magindanao sultanate of Cotobato, but with the rise of Sulu, they were increasingly drawn into the latter's political orbit, becoming, by the second half of the eighteenth century, major participants in its wider trading economy. As the more maritime Sulu sultanate eclipsed its Magindanao rival, the Ilanun emerged as a major slave-raiding force, becoming, by the 1770s, a significant factor contributing to Sulu's subsequent commercial and political ascendancy.

Visitors to southern Mindanao in the 1840s described the Ilanun as specialized slave raiders, for whom piracy was considered a community calling. Not a unified political unit but fragmented into a multitude of power centers, each revolving around individual leaders, the population went about heavily armed and lived in settlements surrounded by barricades. The economy was based on the large-scale procurement of slaves, whose labor provided subsistence to the rest of the population. Slave raiding was carried out in fleets, comprised, during the early decades of nineteenth century, of large double-decked vessels up to 30 meters (100 feet) long, rowed by slaves, and heavily armed with cast bronze swivel-cannons. Besides supplying slaves to their Sulu patrons, the Ilanun, like the Balangingi, assimilated slaves, continually replenishing their numbers with fresh captives.

During the latter half of the eighteenth century, Sulu gradually extended its control over southern Palawan, Balabac, and the northern and eastern coasts of Borneo, bringing itself into direct conflict with the Brunei sultanate. The Ilanun figured significantly in the ensuing struggle. Encouraged by Sulu, Ilanun settlements were established at Pandasan and Tempasuk on the western coast of Sabah and in Marudu Bay on the northeast coast. Marudu Bay, in particular, served as a major staging point for slave-raiding operations. By the 1820s, the presence of Bajau and Ilanun settlements in coastal Sabah effectively eliminated Brunei's political and commercial hold over the region. At the same time, Ilanun slave-raiding

activities, sponsored by Sulu, dealt a crippling blow to Brunei's maritime commerce, disrupting its traditional sea routes and severing its connections with the vital Chinese junk trade. For a short period, these Sabah settlements, particularly those of the Tempasuk Bajau, became strong enough to ignore Sulu's hegemony, but in the 1830s, Sulu reasserted its influence by recognizing the powerful chief, Syarif Usman, as its regional governor in Marudu.

In the 1840s, James Brooke (1803–1868) sought to consolidate his then still-uncertain position in Sarawak by actively seeking British involvement in the Borneo region. His principal method was to campaign for the destruction of "pirate" strongholds on the island. His efforts ultimately resulted in 1845 in the destruction of Syarif Usman's Marudu base. Many of its inhabitants dispersed to Labuk, Sugut, and Tunku on the eastern coast. Apart from this dispersal, Bajau and Ilanun settlements in coastal Sabah otherwise remained intact, although their former maritime activities were severely curtailed. Thus, the Ilanun in Sabah lost their maritime orientation and became increasingly agrarian, known especially for their artisan skills, particularly in weaving and ironwork. In 1991, the Ilanun numbered 9,781 in Sabah, most of them living in the Tempasuk district.

CLIFFORD SATHER

See also Bajau; Borneo; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Firearms; Iban; Mindanao; Monsoons; Moros; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Piracy; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Slavery; Sulus and the Sulu Archipelago; Tausug and the Sulu Sultanate

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ILUSTRADOS

The “Enlightened Ones”

The term *ilustrado* derives from the Spanish *La Ilustración*, meaning “the Enlightenment,” and initially referred to those members of the intelligentsia in the colonial Philippines who had received a liberal education and were possessed of some degree of wealth. These “enlightened ones” were mainly the sons of a newly emergent middle class composed of large tenant farmers (*inquilinos*) as well as small commercial and professional sectors who rose to prominence during the second half of the nineteenth century with the opening of the Philippine economy to world trade. Most were college students or expatriates who studied and traveled in Europe, either in Spain, France, and England or later in Germany and Switzerland. Though never comprising more than a tiny percentage of the population, they exercised an influence that was out of all proportion to their numbers, and their varied dialect, ethnic, and regional affiliations made of them the first truly national social class in Philippine history.

Exposed to the ideas of nineteenth-century liberalism while overseas, many *ilustrados* took the lead in advocating reform and subsequently independence back at home. Often divided over issues and never belonging to a single organization, they nonetheless shared a common program of assimilation based on the extension of metropolitan laws and rights to the Philip-

pinos by which all Filipinos would be recognized as Spanish citizens and treated accordingly as equals. Much of their rhetoric, however, was characterized by anticlericalism, finding fault in the Catholic practices of their day that they regarded as both childish and incompatible with modern ideas. The friar orders were a particular object of their scorn, blamed for both the uneducated state of the people and the economic backwardness of the country. Many *ilustrados* remained in Spain, principally in Madrid and Barcelona, where they engaged in nationalist activities, founded associations, dabbled in masonry, and quarreled bitterly with each other between 1880 and 1895. Principal figures among this community were the lawyer and journalist Marcelo H. del Pilar (1850–1896), the journalist and orator Graciano López-Jaena (1856–1896), and the historian Mariano Ponce (1863–1917). Newspapers constituted the movement’s main medium of expression. Most, with the notable exception of the biweekly newspaper *La Solidaridad* (first printed in Barcelona in 1889), were short-lived affairs, and all suffered from a lack of financing despite the establishment of the Comité de Propaganda in Manila to raise funds in support of these activities. Just as influential as these journalist ventures were the works of José Rizal (1861–1896), physician, linguist, poet, writer, and statesman. His two novels exposing the corruption of colonial officialdom and the avarice of the clergy, *Noli Me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo* (published in 1887 and 1891, respectively), proved particularly instrumental in preparing outlooks and minds for the Philippine Revolution that broke out in 1896. Together, this corpus of journalistic and literary endeavor convinced many that further attempts at reforming the Spanish colonial administration were futile.

More controversial is the role of *ilustrados* in the Philippine Revolution (1896–1898) and the subsequent Philippine-American War (1899–1902). Members of this class provided much of the revolutionary leadership during these turbulent years. In particular, they have been reviled by subsequent nationalist historians for the alacrity with which they transferred their allegiance from the Spanish government to the revolutionary regime to the new U.S. administration, all within a few years. Even the first president of the republic, Emilio Aguinaldo

(1869–1964), has not escaped this censure. Already a privileged and property-owning class, ilustrados benefited greatly from the policies of assimilation and accommodation practiced under American rule and were quickly granted important posts in the new colonial bureaucracy. Moreover, the electoral system introduced in 1907 fostered a form of national political leadership based on loose alliances of contending provincial factions that was rapidly subordinated to the interests of ilustrado families. Parties provided no more than vehicles for political activity, and a single party, the Nacionalistas, under the strong leadership of Sergio Osmeña (1878–1961) and Manuel Quezon (1878–1944), dominated the national scene until the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945). Despite the emergence of an ostensible two-party system after independence from the United States in 1946, Filipino politics was noted for its lack of ideological differentiation. Party membership was largely recruited from the same ilustrado families, and the winning administration merely represented the current political “ins” versus the current “outs.” These families became so entrenched in high political office that they exercised an inordinate influence over the Filipino political system, a status they continued to enjoy largely undisputed until the election of Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989) in 1965. Their influence has even experienced something of a comeback following the People Power Revolution and the restoration of democratic forms of government in 1986. In this sense, the term *ilustrado* has now become largely synonymous with *national elite*, though its colloquial use in this respect is rare.

GREG BANKOFF

See also Aquino, Corazon Cojuangco (1933–); EDSA Revolution (1986); Education, Western Secular; Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship; *Inquilino*; Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Newspapers and the Mass Media in Southeast Asia; *Noli Me Tangere* (1867) and *El Filibusterismo* (1891); Osmeña, Sergio, Sr. (1878–1961); Patron-Client Relations; Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca.

1560s–1898); Propaganda Movement; Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944); Rizal, José (1861–1896)

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“IMAGINED COMMUNITIES”

One of the most influential postwar studies of the origins and spread of nationalism is Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (1991), which emerged significantly from reflections on the process of national identity formation in Southeast Asia, especially from his detailed examination of the relations between politics and culture in Indonesia. Anderson’s work, though primarily in political science, owes much to “an anthropological spirit” and relates directly to studies by anthropologists of ethnicity and identity (Bowen 2000). He examined the cultural roots of nationalism and the values associated with nationhood, demonstrating how a “sense of fraternity” and of belonging to a nation is invented or constructed and then sustained through time (Anderson 1991: 6–7).

His study is particularly important for regions such as Southeast Asia, where the colonial powers in competition with one another carved out and demarcated their dependent territories arbitrarily; political units therefore cut across shared ethnicity and culture and often encompassed considerable ethnic diversity.

Anderson's concept helps us to understand how national identity has been thought about, represented, and given meaning with the granting of independence. For him, the key factors and processes in the emergence of nationhood as an idea comprised the development of printing and publishing ("print capitalism") and the associated creation, privileging, and standardization of particular "national" print languages, as well as the creation of administrative units and their unification through markets in the context of the expansion of Europe overseas, and the development of industrial capitalism, a bourgeois class, and rational bureaucracies. Furthermore, he highlighted the importance in colonial territories of such boundary-drawing and identity-creating agents as the "census, map and museum" (Anderson 1991: 163–185).

With few exceptions, the leaders of newly independent states maintained the political units and boundaries bequeathed them by the departing colonial powers and then set about creating national identities by promoting national languages, religions, histories, and institutions. Indonesia, with its national ideology of "unity in diversity" and its promotion of Indonesian as the national language, provides a good example of this process (Hitchcock and King 1997).

VICTOR T. KING

See also Bhinneka Tunggal Ika ("Unity in Diversity"); Colonialism; Imperialism; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Newspapers and Mass Media in Southeast Asia

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IMPERIALISM

The word *imperialism* is a political coinage and has passed through several phases in which its meaning has shifted. Initially, it did not apply

to the non-European world in the way it characteristically would. It was used to describe the ambitions of Emperor Napoleon III (1808–1873), which, though they came to involve Indochina and Mexico, focused, like those of Napoleon I (1769–1821), on Europe. Only after Napoleon's regime had been destroyed by what in 1871 became the German Empire was the term invoked to describe the extension of territorial control in Asia and Africa in which the European states engaged themselves. "It is only in quite late times within my own memory," Edward Freeman wrote in 1885, "that the word 'empire' has come into common use as a set term for something beyond the kingdom" (quoted in Koebner 1961: 295).

Some proudly accepted the description "imperialist"; but increasingly, the term *imperialism* was being defined by its critics. J. A. Hobson's *Imperialism: A Study*, which first appeared at the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer war (1880–1881, 1899–1902), had a political purpose: "to alert the British public to the new plutocratic phenomenon that was hijacking British foreign policy" (Hobson 1988, introduction: 39). His view was conspiratorial. Big moneylenders and speculators were "the prime determinants of imperial policy." Finance was not the "motor-power" of imperialism, but it was "the governor of the imperial engine. . . . Finance manipulates the patriotic forces which politicians, soldiers, philanthropists, and traders generate" (Hobson 1988: 55, 59).

Lenin (1870–1924) acknowledged Hobson and incorporated some of his ideas into Marxism, the founder of which had not used the word *imperialism*. "Of course, finance capital finds most 'convenient,' and derives the greatest profit from, a *form* of subjection which involves the loss of the political independence of the subjected countries" (Lenin 1962, 22: 259). Hobson, however, had envisaged a reform of capitalism: he attributed its evils to underconsumption. Lenin did not think it could be reformed—it had to be overthrown. "The capitalist delays the day of doom by re-allocating his resources on a world scale" (Hodgart 1977: 42).

The Great War (1914–1918) offered an opportunity, Lenin believed, to bring both imperialism and capitalism itself to an end. His April 1916 thesis, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination," en-

visaged an alliance between workers in the metropolitan countries and bourgeois-democratic nationalists in colonial and semicolonial countries, such as China, Persia, and Turkey. The Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 was followed by an attempt to carry out the policy. In making his contribution, the Dutch social democrat H. Sneevliet drew on his experience in Netherlands India.

Nowhere did the policy succeed, and Stalin (1879–1953), Lenin's successor, reverted to a policy of "socialism in one country." It had, however, achieved a measure of identification with the cause of those who wished to overthrow the unequal treaties in China and colonial rule in Southeast Asia. Their struggles gave the word *imperialism* new meanings. For Sukarno in 1930, for example, it was "a concept, an idea, a lust, a program, a system, a policy of subjugating or controlling the country of another people or the economy of another nation" (Paget 1975: 137). After the Pacific War (1941–1945), the nationalists generally secured the political independence they sought. The limitations on it tended to be ascribed to "neoimperialism" or "Soviet imperialism."

A term with so many political overtones seemed to Sir Keith Hancock "no word for scholars" (1940, 2: 1–2). It was, no doubt, a proper subject for historical study. Could it also provide useful means of studying history and offer useful concepts or analyses? The chance of effectively attempting the former and still more securing the latter depends on establishing a working definition. Probably the most useful is that offered by Maarten Kuitenbrouwer: "the effort to establish formal or informal political control over another society." He also suggested that "modern imperialism should be reserved above all for the period between 1870 and 1914" (Kuitenbrouwer 1991: 3–4).

In that phase (1870–1914), most of Southeast Asia came under the control of Western powers. A study of the process does not, however, support the assertions of Hobson or Lenin. One factor is the challenge that the recrudescence of international rivalry presented to the status quo associated with the primacy Britain had secured in the pre-1870 period. State-builders engaged in what Lord Rosebery called "pegging out claims for the future" (quoted in Bennett 1962: 310). Often, they were ahead of the capitalists, whose endeavors

they had to foster in order to secure the revenue needed to support their acquisitions.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also British Interests in Southeast Asia; Colonialism; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); "Manifest Destiny"; *Mission Civilisatrice* ("Civilizing Mission"); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Portuguese Asian Empire; Preservation of Siam's Political Independence; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); "White Man's Burden"

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IMPHAL-KOHIMA, BATTLE OF (1944)

The Beginning of the End

No single engagement could equal that of the Battle of Imphal-Kohima, which raged for five months from March through July 1944. It marked the furthest western advance of Imperial Japanese forces during the Pacific War

(1941–1945), and the eventual defeat of the Japanese at Imphal marked the beginning of the decline in Japanese military power in Southeast Asia, presaging the eventual victory by Allied forces the following year. Imphal is the capital city of Manipur, the most eastern province of British India bordering Burma (Myanmar). Imphal was set in rugged mountains, and the terrain very much favored the defenders in battle. Kohima is a village on the road from Imphal to Dimapur, providing the best route westward into India from Burma at this point. When the Japanese failed to take Imphal, the fighting concentrated around Kohima in a Japanese attempt to cut off the British lines of communication.

The fighting, which was marked by artillery exchanges as well as hand-to-hand combat, was very intense and very costly in terms of human lives. The British side, which included British, Indian, and Ghurkha forces, suffered nearly 28,000 casualties (Allen 1984: 637–641), of which the majority were suffered at Imphal and Kohima and the remainder in the last stages of the battle as the British pursued the Japanese through the Burmese division of Rakhine. The Japanese side suffered 66,000 wounded and killed, nearly 55,000 at Kohima alone (Allen 1984: 637–641). The battle was distinguished also for the inclusion on the Japanese side of troops from the Indian National Army (INA) led by Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945). Composed of forces from the Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia, they were fighting to free India from British rule.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Burma Road; Chindits; “Death Railway” (Burma–Siam Railway); Indian National Army (INA); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis (1900–1979); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia

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INDIA

India dominates the great peninsula that extends to the south of the Asian continent, known as South Asia. The vast body of water

that washes the shores of the subcontinent, the Indian Ocean, forms the connecting link between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and was India’s principal means of contact with Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia’s focal position between India and China determined its relationships with these two great centers. These relationships differed principally because of geography. In the case of India, the formidable mountain barrier meant that there was no direct overland link between it and Southeast Asia. The sea therefore provided the means for the spread of Indian culture through trading contacts, resulting in the great Indian acculturation of Southeast Asia.

This acculturation cannot be attributed solely to traders. Brahmans, the priestly class who monopolized knowledge of the sacred lore, the rites and rituals, and customs and laws, are perceived as the principal agents of the Indianization process. Southeast Asia’s ruling elites invited the Brahmans to serve at their courts as priests, advisers, and astrologers. The Brahmans introduced Indian court customs, ensured the divine nature of monarchy through a variety of ritual sacrifices and ceremonies, and enhanced the prestige and power of Southeast Asian rulers. The process of Indianization also included the alphabetical basis (with the exception of Vietnam) of the Southeast Asian scripts, the importance of Sanskrit in the vocabulary, and the introduction of the great Indian epics the *Râmâyana* and *Mahâbhârata* (*Mahâbhâratha*). Other elements included the Code of Manu, philosophy, astrology, medicine, mathematics, and the arts. The religious lore—Brahmanic, Buddhist, and a combination of both—was also introduced.

Since Indian cultural diffusion followed the sea routes, the earliest of the Indianized states that emerged in Southeast Asia were all situated along the coast in the Southeast Asian region. These states, which were based at river mouths for ease of both control and travel, provided routes into the interior. Examples of these early Indianized port states were Funan and Champa on the Indochina coast; the Mon kingdoms of Lower Burma and Thailand; Langkasuka in peninsular Thailand; and several states in western Indonesia, the most important of which was Palembang, the precursor of the extensive trading empire of Śrīvijaya. In due course, these port states were eclipsed by other larger and more highly organized states that were centered

on major interior river basins and corresponded with the major rivers of Southeast Asia. There were three principal trade zones: the western Indian Ocean, the eastern Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea. Indians played key roles in all three.

The arrival of the Europeans in the sixteenth century and the policies of the (Dutch) United East India Company (VOC) and the English East India Company (EIC) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries resulted in new trading relationships in the area. The EIC, from its major trading ports in India, stimulated the Bay of Bengal trade generally and trade with the Malay Peninsula in particular. Gujaratis, Muslims, and Chulias from India intensified their trading links with port states in Southeast Asia.

In the late nineteenth century, India became a major supplier of migrant labor to the Southeast Asian region, principally to Malaya, the Straits Settlements, British North Borneo, and Burma. Indian migration was regulated and assisted by the Indian colonial government and the colonial governments of the receiving countries. But not all Indian migrants were poor, impoverished laborers. In Malaya, North Indians were recruited to serve in the police force and a paramilitary force known as the Malay States Guides. A significant minority possessed considerable economic standing and migrated to Southeast Asia to exploit the commercial or employment opportunities available to them there. These included traders, artisans, moneylenders, and government employees. The traders and merchants in particular reinforced the commercial and financial networks that linked Southeast Asia to India.

In the post-Pacific War (1941–1945) era, following the Geneva Agreements (1954) on the partition of Vietnam, two main security alternatives emerged for Southeast Asia. The first, advocated by the United States, was the so-called domino theory, according to which if Vietnam came under communist rule, it would not be long before the other Southeast Asian states fell like dominoes to communist domination. India under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) advocated neutralization of the region and urged the United States to keep out of Southeast Asia. Nehru also secured promises from China and North Vietnam to not interfere in neighboring countries. Consequently, most

of the independent states of Southeast Asia spurned the U.S. alternative of enhanced security through military alliances. This policy culminated in the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 as the first successful experiment in regional political cooperation. Nevertheless, despite ASEAN's policy of maintaining a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" (ZOPFAN), its members continue to depend on external security guarantees.

AMARJIT KAUR

See also Asian–African (Bandung) Conference (April 1955); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Bali; Buddhism; *Cakkavatti/Setkya-min* (Universal Ruler); Champa; Chenla; Chettiers (Chettyars); *Devaraja*; Domino Theory; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Funan; Geneva Conference (1954); Gujaratis; Hindu–Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Indian Immigrants; Indianization; Indigenous Political Power; Labor and Labor Unions; Langkasuka; *Mahābāratha* and *Rāmāyana*; Majaphahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Mon; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Southeast Asia; Palembang; Penal Settlements in Southeast Asia; Penang (1786); Rubber; Singapore (1819); Śrīvijaya (Śrīvijaya); Straits Settlements (1826–1941); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang); Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971)

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INDIAN IMMIGRANTS (NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES)

Indian immigration to Southeast Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries differed from earlier migrations of merchants who had traded with the region, selling textiles in exchange for Southeast Asian produce. The migrants who arrived during the colonial period (ca. 1800–ca. 1960s) were mainly laborers, businesspeople, and financiers. Moreover, they went almost entirely to British Malaya and British Burma, places that had imperial connections with British India. These migrants were also divided on the basis of ethnicity, occupation, and economic role. There were three main groups, each of which was associated with specific economic roles. The first group—laborers—comprised mainly Tamils and Telegus who worked as plantation workers in Malaya, laborers on the Burmese rice fields, and on public works in both countries. The second group—moneylenders—was made up of the Chettiers from South India who financed the rice farmers in Burma and the rubber smallholders in Malaya. The third group—civil servants—consisted of North Indians who served in the police force and mainly Malayalees and Jaffna Tamils who were employed as clerks and civil servants. The main characteristics of the Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia were that the migrants were considered sojourners, they formed minority communities that exemplified some of the problems of plural societies, and they retained a strong attachment to India.

Indian Laborers in Malaya

The spread of plantation agriculture in Malaya was a major consequence of economic penetration accompanying the integration of economies, diversification of economic activity, changing production technologies, and the emergence of new markets for tropical products in the industrializing West. The most important crops were rubber, coffee, oil palm, and sugarcane. Labor shortages in the country meant that

planters had to rely on migrant workers to carry out the myriad tasks associated with export production. The plantation wage labor force comprised migrants principally from India.

European planters preferred South Indian labor for a variety of reasons. South Indians (Tamils and Telegus) were cheaper than Chinese labor, and they could be recruited easily because India was under the same imperial government. South India's proximity to Malaya was an additional consideration. South Indians were also preferred because they were considered docile and fitted well into the dependent relationship between management and employee. However, the South Indians lacked funds to migrate spontaneously, and there were more attractive opportunities for them in other British colonies that offered higher wages, better living conditions, and a greater chance of landing as free men. Consequently, from the start, the recruitment of Indian labor, in contrast to Chinese labor, was both regulated and sponsored by the colonial administration. In 1884, the Indian Immigration Ordinance was passed in the Straits Settlements to replace previous legislation, and in 1887, the governments of the Straits Settlements and several Malay States agreed to provide a steamship subsidy for the transportation of Indian labor migrants to Malaya. Additionally, a centralized body, known as the Indian Immigration Committee, was set up to facilitate and supervise the importation of South Indian labor. Its activities were strengthened in 1908 when the Tamil Immigration Fund, to which employers were required to contribute according to the number of workers employed, was established to provide free passages to Malaya for laborers. Basically, there were two main mechanisms for recruiting labor: the indenture and *kangani* (overseer) systems.

Indentured Labor Recruitment

The majority of migrants were impoverished and in no position to meet the cost of their passage. An employer wishing to recruit immigrants thus had to engage the services of one of the labor recruitment firms in Negapatnam or Madras (Chennai) in India or send agents to South India to recruit laborers directly. These agents advanced money to persons wanting to immigrate to Malaya. The advance was conditional on the prospective migrant entering into

a contract with the employer. The contract was usually a written one, but verbal agreements were also common. Breaches of written contracts were regarded as criminal, not civil, offenses. Workers were under indenture to a single employer for a fixed period, varying from one to three years. They could not change either employer or place of employment. Wages were fixed at the time of recruitment and were not negotiable. The employer was responsible for all recruitment charges, notably the expenses involved in the transportation of workers, and workers' wages were calculated after deducting this initial outlay. When their period of indenture was completed, workers could be reindentured for a further period or released from indenture, provided they had paid off the expenses incurred in their recruitment. Since the workers were paid very low wages, few were able to repay the advances received and were therefore reindentured. In the second half of the nineteenth century, several thousand Indian laborers migrated to Malaya under indenture, and this mechanism of recruiting workers remained in force in the Malay States and the Straits Settlements until 1910. Between 1845 and 1910, about 250,000 indentured laborers went to Malaya.

Kangani System

The *kangani* system was essentially a system of personal recruitment, and it became popular when the coffee and, later, rubber planters hired labor through this channel. The system rapidly took over as the main supplier of labor and came under the control of the Indian Immigration Committee in 1907. The word *kangani* means "overseer" or "foreman" in Tamil, and under this system, the *kangani*, usually a laborer already employed on the plantation, was sent by his employer to recruit workers from his home village in India. He was paid a commission on each laborer recruited. On his return to Malaya, he usually acted as plantation foreman for the laborers he had recruited. Compared with the indenture system, the contractual position of the laborers under the *kangani* system was less harsh. Desertion was regarded as a civil, not a criminal, offense. The contract was also more often verbal rather than written, and the worker had the right to abandon his contract at a month's notice. This sys-

tem was preferred because of the lower cost involved in sending a *kangani* to recruit labor compared with the cost of indentured labor obtained through recruiting agencies. Moreover, the monopoly of Indian recruiting firms, which were believed to be responsible for restricting labor supply, was broken. The *kangani* system also appealed to the planters because the prospect of workers absconding was less likely compared with the indenture system, especially since the *kangani* usually had a vested interest in ensuring that they did not.

In the 1910s, between 50,000 and 80,000 Indians went to the Malay States and Straits Settlements annually. After the 1920s, with the exception of a very short period, *kangani*-assisted immigration declined. In the early 1930s, under the impact of the Great Depression, *kangani* recruitment was suspended, and it was formally abolished in 1938.

Additionally, there was direct recruitment of free labor from India, whereby free laborers who volunteered themselves for employment at Malayan depots in India were assisted in migrating to Malaya. The system was cheaper than the *kangani* system because no payments or inducements had to be paid to the *kangani*. But it also meant that the hold of the *kangani* over the worker was diminished.

The labor recruitment mechanisms discussed here were also used to hire workers for service in the public services department (railways, roads), in city municipalities (construction), and at the ports (stevedores).

Indian Agricultural Labor in Burma

In Burma, the principal mechanism for recruiting Indian labor was through an intermediary known as the *maistry*. This system was similar to the *kangani* system. The *maistry* was an established laborer who recruited labor gangs in India, organized their passage to Burma, and then acted as their overseer in Burma, whether on the rice fields, on the wharves, or on public works construction. The *maistry* also exercised strong control over the Indian workers.

Chettiars

The Chettiars were a South Indian money-lending caste that played a decisive role in the expansion of Lower Burma's rice industry in

the late nineteenth century. Each Chettiar business concern, sustained by caste and kinship ties, was part of a network with connections across the Southeast Asian region and India. Like the Chinese financial and commercial intermediaries, the Chettiars linked the rural Southeast Asian communities to the expanding Western economy.

The Burmese rice industry serves as an important example to highlight the role of Chettiar capital in export expansion in Southeast Asia. From around 1880, Chettiar moneylenders made mortgage loans to Burmese cultivators needing capital for land clearance and plow animals and to pay migrant workers. Indeed, it has been asserted that Chettiar credit was fundamental to the growth of the industry. When the Burmese cultivators suffered a reversal, they lost their land, which the Chettiars then sold to other cultivators, and the process was repeated within a few years. The Chettiars were thus regarded as the cause of Burmese landlessness and impoverishment. They also played an important role in financing Malay peasants in smallholder rubber production in Malaya. In Malaya, however, an amendment to the Malay Land Reservation Enactment in 1933 prevented Chettiars from gaining land through default in Malay reservations.

Indians in the Colonial Civil Service

Policemen, civil servants, and clerks formed a smaller group of Indians who were employed in the administrative, technical, and professional fields in the urban areas. They were much smaller in number than the laborers, and they did not have the financial clout of the Chettiars. Nevertheless, their political roles were more important, and they were the first to encounter competition from the indigenous populations, especially in the 1930s when the indigenous populations clamored for employment opportunities in the urban areas. After 1938, for example, Indians were no longer welcome in Burma.

Indian Immigrants: Plight and Place

Colonialism, the circumstances of Indian recruitment and the occupations Indians had, and the divide-and-rule policy of the British played key roles in the maintenance of plural societies

in Malaya and Burma. Low economic and social mobility, an attachment to India, and the lack of advancement opportunities also contributed to the Indians' separateness in their adopted countries. Allied to these, factors such as the geographic and social isolation of the workers and the physical, cultural, and religious differences between them and the indigenous populations shaped and continue to shape ethnicity and ethnic relations in Malaysia.

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See also Burma under British Colonial Rule; Chettiars (Chettyars); Highways and Railways; *Kangani* System; Rubber

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INDIAN NATIONAL ARMY (INA)

The Indian National Army, first formed in early 1942, derived its *raison d'être* from the Indian independence movement. Its leaders were seized by the nationalist fervor that had taken hold in India. What set the movement apart from the rest, however, was the manner in which it went about achieving its demand for independence. The INA sought help from and allied itself with Britain's wartime antagonist, Japan. This course of action was to have signifi-

cant and controversial repercussions in the aftermath of the Pacific War (1941–1945).

The INA was primarily raised from the ranks of the Indian soldiers and officers who were part of the British forces that surrendered to the Japanese Imperial Army in Singapore on 15 February 1942. The beginnings of the INA can be traced to the surrender of Captain Mohan Singh, an officer in the British Indian army, to the Japanese in December 1941. He was encouraged by Major Fujiwara Iwaichi (1908–1986), a Japanese officer in charge of the Fujiwara Kikan—a small group actively engaged in subversive activities and propaganda campaigns against the enemy—to organize Indian prisoners of war (POWs) against their former army. The ultimate aim of liberating India from the yoke of colonial rule supposedly provided the impetus for these men to cast aside their allegiance to the British.

The idea of a liberation army for India was conceived soon after the Japanese Imperial Army began its campaigns in Southeast Asia. Japanese intelligence established contacts with Indian nationalist groups in the region with the aim of assisting them in forming an independence movement against the British.

The surrender of Captain Mohan Singh and his willingness to cooperate with the Japanese against the British offered Major Fujiwara the opportunity he had been waiting for. At a conference held in Tokyo in 1942, Indian representatives from Japanese-occupied Southeast Asia gathered under Japanese auspices to call for an army to be raised from Indian soldiers and civilians in the region to fight for Indian independence. Although its military value was questionable, an Indian fighting unit purportedly raised to put an end to British imperialism in India provided choice material for Japanese propaganda. With remnants of defeated Indian troops in Malaya and Singapore, Mohan Singh began building the Indian National Army. By September 1942, he had managed to raise a division of Indian POWs based in Singapore. It became the military arm of the Indian Independence League (IIL), a civilian organization formed in June 1942 to back up the INA in terms of men and money.

Although the INA was formed in 1942, it did not immediately see action as a military unit. Meanwhile, its effectiveness was compromised by leadership clashes between Resh Be-

hari Bose, as civilian president of the IIL, and Mohan Singh, as military commander of the INA. These conflicts, coupled with uncertainty over the extent of support from the Japanese in the plans for an invasion of India, rendered INA a paper tiger in its early incarnation. In December 1942, Mohan Singh was placed under house arrest by the Japanese, and despite attempts to reorganize its command structure, the INA was brought to a virtual standstill.

The flagging fortunes of the INA received a tremendous boost with the arrival of Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945) in Singapore in July 1943. The organization was plagued by low morale and discipline before Bose—a fervent nationalist fully committed to the cause of the Indian independence movement—took over the reins of the INA leadership. He assumed direct command of both the IIL and the INA, and under his leadership, both arms of the liberation movement were reorganized and expanded. Bose injected a greater sense of purpose into the INA, and his battle cry of “Chalo [On to] Delhi!” had a desired rallying effect on the troops. With the support of General Hideki Tojo (t. 1941–1944), the wartime Japanese premier, Bose went on to constitute a provisional government known as Azad Hind (Free India).

The INA created a women’s regiment named after a heroine of the 1857 Revolt, the Rani of Jhansi. Led by Captain (Dr.) Lakshmi Swaminathan, the Rani of Jhansi Regiment had several hundred women volunteers and received arms and logistical support from the INA.

The INA did not succeed in invading India. Its principal battles were fought just outside the Indian borders, in Burma and the northeast frontier in Assam, during 1944 and 1945. The INA troops who participated in those campaigns were ill equipped and poorly led, and they were duly routed by the British troops. The military reverses revealed the inadequacies of the INA. All plans to invade India evaporated in August 1945 when Bose was fatally wounded in a plane crash in Taiwan.

The impact of the INA, however, did not die with Bose. Although the INA did not create much of an impact militarily, the trials of the INA officers held in the Red Fort at Delhi in late 1945 became a cause célèbre for the nationalist movement. In an unexpected turn of events, the political nature of the trials brought latent resentments to the surface and roused the

nationalist spirit of the Indian people. The trials ignited a countrywide movement that valorized the INA and turned swiftly into an anticolonial struggle against the British. The ramifications of the INA trials undoubtedly undermined the authority of the ruling power and contributed eventually to the British decision to disengage from India.

TAN TAI YONG

See also Bose, Subhas Chandra (1897–1945); Fujiwara Kikan (F. Kikan); Imphal-Kohima, Battle of (1944); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia

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INDIANIZATION

Indianization is a term used to describe the impact and historical transmission of Indian cultural influence in Southeast Asia. The intellectual debate on Indianization once dominated historical discussion of early state formation in Southeast Asia, particularly during the first half of the twentieth century.

Early European explorers and colonial officials in Southeast Asia became fascinated by the discovery of ancient stone and brick temples, stone sculpture, and engraved inscriptions, which suggested a long historical antiquity in the areas that they traveled and worked. These three elements of monumental architecture, fine art, and writing equated exactly with nineteenth-century concepts of “civilization,” and all three could be compared with architectural, iconographic, and paleographic models from India. The influence of Indian religion, writing, and thought can still be seen in the contemporary cultures of Southeast Asia. Theravada Bud-

dism remains the predominant religion in Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, and the official scripts of all these countries are ultimately derived from Indian *Brahmi*.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, it was common to view these elements of Southeast Asian history and culture as mere offshoots or branches of Indian civilization. Just as civilization was thought at this time to have been carried to India by Aryan invaders from the north, a similar trend could be discerned in Southeast Asia. The discovery of early Sanskrit inscriptions in Southeast Asia encouraged the idea that the early cultures of the region had been imported by Indo-Aryan invaders from the Indian subcontinent.

These historical theories on the spread of civilization and the replacement of an “inferior” culture by a “superior” one through conquest and colonization were clearly well suited to the European colonial powers that took increasing control over Southeast Asia in the later nineteenth century. In India itself, the colonial model was consistently applied to interpretations of Indianization in Southeast Asia, which was often described as “Greater India.” In books and articles written during the 1920s and 1930s (many of them published by the Greater India Society) by eminent scholars such as R. C. Majumdar, the early kingdoms of Southeast Asia were routinely described as being founded by direct colonists from India. The Indians passed on their superior knowledge and culture to an entirely passive indigenous population. Majumdar himself (1927) emphasized the importance of the *ksatriya*, or Indian warrior caste, in this cultural process, with the early kingdoms of Southeast Asia being founded by Indian warrior adventurers who transplanted their own culture to these newly conquered territories. Other scholars, such as N. J. Krom (1931), saw the *vaisya*, or merchant caste, as the main promoters of Indianization, through a more peaceful process of trade and intermarriage with the indigenous elite.

Although both these models of Indianization achieved widespread acceptance, there is very little historical evidence to support them. An eleventh-century inscription of the South Indian king Rajendracola lists a series of conquests made by the king along the western coast of southern Thailand and the Malay Peninsula. It is clear, however, that this was

merely a punitive expedition, designed to open up the region to trade. Similarly, a ninth-century inscription found at Takuapa in southern Thailand describes the creation of a water tank by one of the South Indian merchant guilds. This inscription is exceptional, however, and it is probable that this was part of a South Indian commercial enclave or concession within a wider port community under indigenous control, rather than any sign of conquest or direct political control from India.

Further evidence for early trade with India was supplied by archaeology, in particular from the excavations conducted by Louis Malleret at the site of Oc Êo on the western coast of the Mekong Delta in southern Vietnam during the 1940s. In addition to a small number of statues, Malleret uncovered large quantities of Indian beads made from carnelian, agate, and glass, as well as intaglios made in imitation of Roman designs. A medallion of the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius (r. 161–180 C.E.) was also found and helped to demonstrate that the Roman sea trade to southern India had been extended to Southeast Asia during the first century C.E. (Malleret 1959: 63). The discovery of a Roman bronze lamp at P'ong Tuk in eastern Thailand also reinforced this conclusion and substantiated the historical references to Southeast Asian produce and trade routes made by classical Roman writers such as Strabo (ca. 63 B.C.E.–21 C.E.), Pliny (23–79 C.E.), and Ptolemy (90–168 C.E.).

These archaeological discoveries were included in the historical work of George Coedès, whose general history of the early “Hinduized” kingdoms of Southeast Asia was first published in French in 1944. It was further updated in 1948 and 1964 and translated into English in 1968 as *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia*. This work remains the most influential interpretation of the process of Indianization in Southeast Asia and was compiled from a wide range of historical sources. Coedès was primarily a Sanskrit epigraphist, and his conception of Indianization was closely based on Sanskrit inscriptions. Coedès identified different stages or waves of Indian influence, based on the discovery of successive groups of Sanskrit epigraphy. The earliest Sanskrit inscription of any length yet found in Southeast Asia is the Vo Canh inscription, found some 4 kilometers west of the modern town of Nha Trang in central Vietnam.

The paleography of this text suggested a date during the second or third century C.E., and Coedès therefore dated the “First Indianization” to this period. Further groups of inscriptions could be dated to the fifth and late sixth centuries, providing evidence for a second and third wave of Indianization at these periods.

The First Indianization of the Vo Canh inscription was considered contemporary to the appearance of the earliest Southeast Asian states to be mentioned in the Chinese historical records. These states, such as Linyi in central Vietnam, Funan in the lower Mekong Delta of southern Cambodia and Vietnam, and Tun Sun on the Malay Peninsula, are mentioned as having close contacts with India. They were assumed to have been created according to Indian state principles and most probably by Indian settlers. Much of the evidence for this close association with India, however, has since been eroded. The kings of Linyi and Funan in the third century C.E. are listed in the Chinese histories under names beginning with *Fan*, which Coedès interpreted as a Chinese transcription of the Sanskrit title *varman*, used by kings in southern India. This interpretation has since been rejected, and the term is now considered an indigenous honorific. Royal titles ending in *varman* certainly appear in inscriptions from the fifth century C.E., including a series of inscribed pillars of a King Mulavarman discovered at Kutei in eastern Borneo. However, though these inscriptions clearly show the adoption of Sanskrit titles by the king and his father, the grandfather of Mulavarman is simply named Kundunga, suggesting an indigenous parentage and a recent assimilation of Indian royal forms.

In the years following the Pacific War (1941–1945), traditional ideas on the passive nature of the Southeast Asian response to Indianization began to be reviewed. The most radical reinterpretation was that of J. C. van Leur (1955), who suggested that Indonesians were equally active participants in the transferral of Indian culture across the Indian Ocean. He saw Indian cultural influence as merely a thin veneer of elite cultural interests, overlaying a more general continuation of indigenous Indonesian cultural and social forms among the ordinary population. Although Sanskrit royal titles were adopted by the Southeast Asian elite, the Indian caste system was never applied even

under a simplified form, and local titles and terms for different types of function and social organization abound in the vernacular inscriptions. This historical interpretation was popular with cultural and social anthropologists who emphasized the continuation of traditional or local patterns in both material culture and social organization. Archaeologists such as Chester Gorman and Donn Bayard in the 1960s and 1970s also revealed the antiquity and sophistication of prehistoric societies in North and Northeast Thailand, at sites such as Spirit Cave, Non Nok Tha, and Ban Chiang. National governments of the newly independent countries of Southeast Asia were keen to promote the unique, local aspects of their culture and to emphasize the autonomy of their own past.

Some of the very early dates presented for the introduction of bronze, iron, and rice in Southeast Asia during this period have since been questioned by scholars such as Joyce White and Charles Higham (1989). All of these technologies may have been introduced into the region via either India or China. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that many parts of Southeast Asia achieved a high level of social, cultural, and technological sophistication well before the historical process of Indianization began. During the 1980s and 1990s, the cultural relationship between India and Southeast Asia began to be reinvestigated in terms of an equal or reciprocal relationship between the two regions.

Pierre-Yves Manguin (1985) has demonstrated the importance of Southeast Asian shipping and boat technology in the early Indian Ocean trade. Ian Glover (1990) has examined the archaeological evidence for this trade in terms of a network of commodities linking Southeast Asia not only with India but also with the eastern Roman Empire. This emphasis on a reciprocal relationship has begun to raise questions as to the possible Southeast Asian impact on India itself and has also helped to re-legitimize the study of Indian cultural transference. In some respects, this impact may be more diverse than originally suspected. The spread of Islam across maritime Southeast Asia in the thirteenth century, for example, was probably dependent on the establishment and growth of the Delhi sultanate and other Muslim states in northern India at that time. Conversely, the roles of China and Japan in the

spread and practice of Buddhism in Southeast Asia have never been fully acknowledged.

In this respect, the term *Indianization* itself is probably inappropriate. The term is never used in relation to China or Japan, even though the influence of Buddhism and Indian theological and philosophical concepts on the wider culture of these countries has been profound. There, as in Southeast Asia, particular aspects of Indian culture have been adopted, rejected, or transformed according to the needs of the indigenous society. This process has led to diverse variations of religious architecture, iconography, writing, and religion among the peoples and cultures of the region, but it is also part of a continuing system of cultural selection and adaptation.

The most influential overview of the subject of Indianization is that by Ian Mabbett, in two articles published in 1977. Although the historical section remains a useful introduction, the article on prehistory now requires major revision. The historiographic essay by J. D. Legge (1992) also includes a good summary of the debate and of the wider intellectual context, and contemporary ideas on early state formation in maritime Southeast Asia have been discussed by Jan Wisseman Christie (1995).

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See also Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Borobudur; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; *Jatakas*; *Mahâbâratha* and *Râmâyana*; Malang Temples; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia

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INDIGENOUS POLITICAL POWER Kings, Emperors, and Sultans

The men (and sometimes women) who ruled over states and kingdoms in premodern Southeast Asia were heirs to two traditions of leadership. Indigenous ideas regarded leaders as individuals possessed of special qualities that distinguished them from ordinary people. These ideas were combined with those derived from political models imported from India, China, and the Middle East (West Asia), which tended to emphasize patrilineal descent and primogeniture and to draw on religious beliefs for justification. Though monarchs have disappeared from most Southeast Asian states, echoes of earlier attitudes toward rulers can be discerned among a number of contemporary political leaders.

Indigenous Ideas of Leadership

In early Southeast Asia, words associated with leadership stressed the idea of a chief as a parent, with followers as children, and in some areas, there are indications that chiefs were supervisors of community activities, such as water control. Such individuals were often believed to embody extraordinary "luck," encapsulated in indigenous words such as *tuah* (Malay) and *hpon* (Burmese) and manifested in their possession of powerful objects, such as a sacred dagger. A leader's prowess could also be explained by tracing descent from some great ancestor, and this relationship with the supernatural provided an explanation for the leader's ability to perform feats beyond the capabilities of ordinary mortals. Rather than contesting these ideas, the arrival of the world religions reinforced indigenous views by placing rulers on a continuum that continues to conceive of them as parents, while simultaneously linking them with the world of ancestors, gods, and spirits.

Imported Ideas and the Enhancement of Kingly Powers

Penetrating the region from around the fifth and sixth centuries, Hinduized notions of kingship fundamentally influenced Southeast Asian ideas of leadership. In Cambodia, for example, it is possible to track the evolution of kingship as indigenous words were displaced by Sanskrit terms attached to the cult of the *devaraja*, or god-king, the emblem of male virility. Centered on the great complex of Angkor and surrounded by a sophisticated irrigation system, the temples between the tenth and twelfth centuries not only symbolized world-mountains but also presented the ruler as a god.

The porous line between kingship and "divine beings" was similarly evident in Mahayana Buddhism, which also arrived in this early period. A common motif was the representation of the ruler as a bodhisattva, a Buddha-to-be, especially Avalokitesvara, the compassionate bodhisattva. In East Java, elements of both Hinduism and Buddhism are found in statues that some believe to be portraits of local rulers. Both there and in Sumatra, there is evidence of Tantric Buddhism, with rulers represented in the form of the god Bhairava, seated on a dais surrounded by skulls.

Theravada Buddhism, which spread to mainland Southeast Asia from Sri Lanka around the eleventh century, introduced the idea of the *cakkavatti*, or Universal Monarch, who would prepare the world for the coming of the next Buddha. The notion was highly appealing as a justification for expansion, and the title of *cakkavatti* was frequently claimed by Buddhist rulers, who also proclaimed themselves *Dhammaraja*, or kings of Buddhist law, while still invoking Hindu gods such as Siva or Viṣṇu.

Islam, which gathered pace in island Southeast Asia from the fifteenth century, theoretically rejected ideas of royal divinity and represented rulers simply as the Shadow of Allah on Earth. Nonetheless, Persian ideas of sacral kingship and Sufi teachings that saw the ruler as the Perfect Man mingled with indigenous ideas to enhance the status of Islamic kings and make disloyalty a crime against Allah himself. Malay society, for instance, paired the Sanskrit term *derhaka* (treason) with the Arabic-derived term *daulat* (royal supernatural power); the *daulat* would punish disloyal subjects. From the fifteenth century, neo-Confucianist teachings in Vietnam likewise stressed the loyalty a subject owes the ruler as one of the five relationships (*Tam Cuong*). At the popular level, a mingling of Taoist, Buddhist, and local spirit beliefs also fostered ideas that emperors had a special path of communication to powerful ancestors and divinities.

The European Arrival and Its Effects on Indigenous Kingship

When Europeans reached Southeast Asia in the sixteenth century, they believed that alliances with rulers would be the key to achieving their political and economic goals. "Kingship" in the Philippines was represented by "enhanced chiefdoms," except in the Muslim south, but the Spanish had lost no time in making these chiefs, or *datu*, part of the governing elite through titles, emoluments, and other rewards. In the Malay-Indonesian archipelago, where Europeans actively sought to control the lucrative spice trade, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) was tied to a policy that saw treaties signed with local kings as means of monopolizing market access. Persuaded or threatened, rulers across the archipelago entered into con-

tracts with the VOC, frequently in hopes of securing Dutch military assistance. When such rulers adopted European-style clothing, assumed European names, and even converted to Christianity, they were aiming to demonstrate their close relations with a new and powerful friend. In the process, however, they became implicated in policies that sought to compel unwilling communities to sell their products only to the Dutch at the lowest possible price.

Rulers in areas of VOC control were also affected by the fact that the Dutch were quite willing to use force to oust or exile uncooperative kings. The princes who replaced them were usually ineffectual because they were VOC appointees who relied on Dutch military support to retain their position. In the long term, this type of association fundamentally undermined the standing of local rulers. Opponents to unpopular rulers had little difficulty in locating an alternative leader because most rulers had numerous wives, which meant that there were a number of princes who were potential heirs. Dutch policies were thus a significant element in prolonging civil war in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. As successive Javanese kings looked to Dutch military support to maintain their power against challenges, they ceded large tracts of territory to the VOC, and by the end of the eighteenth century, most of Java was effectively under Dutch control.

There are, of course, other aspects of this generalized picture. For example, Islamic leaders were quite willing to invoke religious teachings as a rallying cry against unpopular rulers, and in Aceh, their opposition was responsible for ending over fifty years of female rule. There were also some rulers whose reputation was actually enhanced by their association with the VOC. In seventeenth-century South Sulawesi, the Bugis people considered their prince Arung Palakka not as a Dutch lackey but as a hero who had defeated their long-standing rivals, the Makassarese. Nor should it be forgotten that numerous areas remained completely outside European interests or that a number of rulers did successfully resist the European presence. The kings of Minangkabau, for example, maintained their authority not through armies but through widespread belief in their supernatural powers, and the Spanish never succeeded in conquering the Muslim rulers of the

southern Philippines, despite many campaigns. Nonetheless, in broad terms, this period was a harbinger of the way in which full-fledged colonialism would deal with indigenous kingship. For instance, the English had no compunction in creating a new “king” of Singapore in order to legalize their occupation of the island in 1819.

In mainland Southeast Asia, the dynamics of local kingship developed relatively independently of outside interference, since the European presence was limited. As new dynasties were founded or old ones revived, rulers sought to draw on memories of past greatness and revered predecessors to validate their claims to succession or preeminence. Because of the frequency of warfare between the Thai and Burmese kings, symbols of royal legitimacy such as white elephants or venerated Buddha statues became potent symbols of power. In Vietnam, the former prestige of the Le dynasty (1428–1789) had fallen away, but the emperor remained an important figurehead, and the two great rival families (Trinh and Nguyễn) who controlled the country each claimed to be ruling in his name. As in China and Japan, therefore, the European Christian propagation of a divinity higher than the emperor was considered not only heretical but also treasonous.

Colonialism, Independence, and Southeast Asian Kingship

By the 1890s, most of Southeast Asia except Siam was under European control. This was a significant development because colonial powers always sought to cultivate and co-opt amenable rulers, while marginalizing or removing those who showed signs of recalcitrance. For instance, the Burmese monarchy was abolished in 1885, and a number of rulers in the Dutch territories were either exiled or deposed. In the Malay States, the British exploited the principle of “indirect rule,” “advising” the sultans who essentially became their agents. The Vietnamese call to “rally to the king” (*can vuong*) in 1885 had a brief period of success, but it proved impossible to mount sustained resistance against the French campaigns. Subsequent Vietnamese emperors became merely French puppets, and like their counterparts in much of Southeast Asia, their capacity to serve as a focus

of anticolonial resistance was thus severely compromised.

The crisis of indigenous kingship induced by colonialism was underscored by the prestige enjoyed by the rulers of Siam, especially Rama V (Chulalongkorn) (r. 1868–1910). There can be little doubt that his achievements in keeping colonialism at bay helped sustain the monarchy through some of the low periods in the twentieth century, including the end of absolute rule in 1932. The position of the Thai king has also been greatly enhanced during the reign of the present king, Rama IX (Bhumibol) (1946–). The only equivalent figure in Indonesia was Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX (1939–1988) of Jogjakarta, whose support for the revolution secured him a leading position in the new republic. His son continues to exercise considerable influence in modern Indonesia, although descendants of other ruling houses, stripped of their titles, seem increasingly irrelevant in contemporary Indonesian life.

With the gaining of independence, most Southeast Asian states have abandoned the monarchical system, with Thailand being a significant exception. Although the personal power wielded by the sultan of the small state of Brunei carries echoes of the “traditional” authority of Malay kings, kingship has assumed a new importance as a focus of identity in other contexts. In Cambodia, for example, the mercurial King Norodom Sihanouk (1922–) is still regarded by many Khmer as a symbol of their identity vis-à-vis the Vietnamese. In Malaysia, with its large Chinese minority, the sultans also remain an important reminder of the “Malay rights” that were guaranteed when Malaya gained its independence.

Conclusion

Today, hereditary rulers can be found in only a minority of Southeast Asian states, yet the region’s history is inseparable from the actions of kings and the attitudes toward them. In general, studies of kingship tend to concentrate on specific cultural regions, rather than attempt a regional and comparative approach, and only rarely are lines of continuity drawn between contemporary individuals and those of the past. Understanding the cultural and historical contexts in which Southeast Asian kings operated,

however, may help explain the policies of some modern leaders who have adopted significant aspects of the monarchical style.

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See also British Interests in Southeast Asia; *Cakkavatti/Setkya-min* (Universal Ruler); *Can Vuong* (Aid the King) Movement; Colonialism; Constitutional Monarchy of Malaya/Malaysia; *Devaraja*; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Imperialism; Islam in Southeast Asia; Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB, Malay Islamic Monarchy); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; *Ratu Adil* (Righteous King/Prince); Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Singapore (1819); Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East Indies Company) (1602)

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INDOCHINA COMMUNIST PARTY (JUNE 1929)

The Vietnamese communist movement originated in the Việt Nam Thanh Niên Cách Mệnh Đồng Chí Hội (Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth Association), set up in southern China by Nguyễn Ái Quốc, the future Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969), during his stay in Guangzhou (Canton) from early 1925 until April 1927. It was originally devised as a transitional revolutionary nationalist organization, under the leadership of an inner core of trained communists, that would prepare the way for a communist party in the full and strict sense. By the time of Chiang Kai-shek's (1887–1975) counterrevolutionary coup in 1927, which resulted in the headquarters of the organization's central committee being moved first to Guangxi (Kwangsi) and then to Hong Kong, some 200 cadres had been sent back to Vietnam to establish, by a process called "bead-stringing," a "people's network" that was to be used, at a suitable moment, for "masses activation."

Although not yet named "communist," Thanh Niên conformed fairly closely to the Comintern model, with an essentially communist conception of party discipline and revolutionary obligations. The rapid growth of the movement from 1928 to 1929—when membership increased from an estimated 400 to 1,250, recruited mostly from the urban, educated population—contributed to developing contradictions within its ranks. Already in January 1929, the journal *Thanh Niên* had discussed the problem of the role to be played by the petite bourgeoisie and intellectuals in particular in the revolutionary movement. Hence, the basic concept of proletarianization was developed, defined as an attempt to inculcate in the adherents a proletarian and popular consciousness. Although the principal issues dividing Thanh Niên's members were those of nationalism versus communism or proletarian internationalism, the movement was, at the same time, confronted with the problem of its relations with other anticolonial organizations, particularly the Tân Việt Cách Mệnh Đảng (Revolutionary Party of New Vietnam). The consequence was that, on the eve of the Great Depression

(1929–1931), several mutually antagonistic groups were in competition inside Vietnam, struggling for control over the Vietnamese revolutionary movement. Tensions also arose between activists working within Indochina and a central bureau now seated in Hong Kong. But they seemed also to have involved genuine disagreements about strategy and possibly different assessments of the current stage of the social contradictions in Vietnam, heightened by the deterioration of the economic situation of the masses and expressed in the outburst of anti-colonial and working-class movements. This engendered a spontaneous demand for the foundation of a Vietnamese communist party.

The confrontation of the contending forces within the Thanh Niên came at the first party congress, held in Hong Kong from 1 to 9 May 1929. But the motion presented by delegates from northern Vietnam for the establishment of a true communist party was voted down. The resolution actually approved on 9 May 1929 analyzed the development of capitalism in Indochina and recognized that the emergence of sharper class conflicts would eventually make the foundation of a communist party necessary. But it argued that the proletariat in Indochina was still too weak for that step to be taken and that the immediate need was to reorganize the existing association.

A schism within the party ensued, which followed regional lines. By the latter part of December 1929, two rival communist parties were operating inside Vietnam. The Indochina Communist Party (Đông Dương Cộng Sản Đảng), formally established in June 1929, was by far the stronger of the two in northern Vietnam, and it had some support in southern Vietnam. Its leading figures were Nguyễn Đức Cảnh in Hanoi and Ngô Gia Tự in Saigon. The Annam Communist Party (An Nam Cộng Sản Đảng), closely identified with the older Thanh Niên association, had its principal following in southern Vietnam, but its leadership organization was based outside the country, in the region of Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Macao. Sometime toward the end of 1929, the Tân Việt party apparently also decided to become communist and to change the name of the organization to the Indochinese Communist League (Đông Dương Cộng Sản Liên Đoàn).

The factionalism of Indochina's revolutionary movement was sharply criticized by the

Comintern, which insisted that the future of the revolution in Indochina was greatly endangered by the lack of a united communist party while agitation among the worker and peasant masses was increasing; the absolutely urgent task was to found a revolutionary party of the proletariat—that is, a communist party of the masses. A first but unsuccessful effort to reconcile the factions was apparently made by Lê Hồng Phong, a representative of the Comintern, at a meeting in Hong Kong in December 1929. Finally, a conference was convened in Hong Kong from 3 to 7 February 1930, with the purpose of unifying the different groups into a single communist organization, on the basis of proposals put forward by the Comintern representative Nguyễn Ái Quốc. The decisions made by the conference covered problems of both organization and strategy. It was agreed to set up an entirely new party, to be called the Việt Nam Cộng Sản Đảng (Vietnamese Communist Party). A central committee of nine members was to be formed to deal with party affairs. Its headquarters was no longer to be in China but in Vietnam, in Hải Phòng initially but later in Saigon. A program based on the general line of the Sixth Comintern Congress (1928) was set forth for a revolution founded on a worker-peasant alliance, with the support of the petite bourgeoisie. The goals were to overthrow imperialism and feudalism and secure national independence and freedom while establishing a communist society.

The first plenum of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party met in Hong Kong in October 1930, essentially to approve a constitution and a program for the party as drafted by Trần Phú. Trần Phú had been designated first secretary-general of the party in June 1930, two months after his return from Moscow to study at the University of the Toiling Peoples of the East. His “political theses” developed more systematically the basic themes of the interdependence of the anti-imperialist and antifeudal struggles: not only was the Communist Party to take the lead in anticolonial activity, it was also to aim for a “Soviet”-style revolution to establish a “worker-peasant and soldier” government, after which a radical reform program would be initiated. The change of name from Vietnamese Communist Party to Indochina Communist Party (Đông Dương Cộng Sản Đảng) was adopted as well, seemingly in response to a

Comintern directive, on the grounds that it was most necessary for the proletarian class and the oppressed masses of the three countries—Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia—to join efforts to emancipate themselves. Some months later, on 11 April 1931, the Communist International Executive Committee recognized the Indochina Communist Party as an independent section, which came directly under the Comintern.

The unification of the Vietnamese Communist Party, although it was brought about by the intervention of Nguyễn Ái Quốc, did not amount to a victory for his own immediate protégés. While he himself was occupied elsewhere with the essentially regional role of building links among the overseas Chinese communities in Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia, the people who mattered inside Vietnam were those who had founded the Indochina Communist Party in June 1929. However, Trần Phú confirmed a “proletarian” line that was more in keeping with Stalin’s current policies than the line with which Nguyễn Ái Quốc had previously been identified. The party seemed poised for a new high tide of proletarian struggle, which eventually developed with the peasant movement in the countryside in 1930 and 1931—the antitax revolts in numerous provinces, from Thái Bình in the north to Bến Tre and Long Xuyên in the south—that culminated in a peasant rebellion, now remembered as the movement of the Nghệ Tĩnh Soviets (from the name of the province where it became most intense). But the setback of the episode of the Nghệ Tĩnh uprising was soon to dictate a reversion to the “doctrine of temporary alliances” with “bourgeois” bodies of opinion wherever common ground could be found to exploit.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Comintern; Communism; Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Nghe Tinh Soviets (1930–1931); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP)

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INDOCHINA DURING WORLD WAR II (1939–1945)

The outbreak of World War II in Europe in September 1939 provided Japan with the opportunity to expand into Southeast Asia. But apart from its ultimate goal of creating “the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” an economically self-sufficient realm under Japanese control, Tokyo premeditated few other political designs for any of the countries that the Japanese Imperial Army would liberate from colonial rule. Thus, on the one hand, French Indochina remained under French authority almost throughout the duration of the war, but on the other hand, in British Malaya (including Singapore) and British Borneo, the Japanese undertook to impose their power. And in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Burma, the Japanese transferred power (at least partially) by mid-1943 to indigenous regimes composed of persons favorably disposed to Tokyo’s goals.

Japan’s advance into the Indochina peninsula was an extension of the conflict that began in China in 1937. In March 1939, the Japanese had taken over the Paracel Islands. Then, after seizing Hainan Island, off China’s southeastern coast, in September 1939, they focused their immediate interest on French Indochina, with its Red River supply route to the interior of Nationalist-controlled China. In addition, Japan

fancied the strategically located Siam (Thailand); a foothold would be helpful in any attempt at launching invasions into neighboring British Burma in the west and/or British Malaya in the south. Siam, for its part, seemed receptive; since 1938, it had appeared to be moving toward Japan, and it joined the war on the Japanese side in January 1942. France's defeat in Europe at the hands of Nazi Germany in the summer of 1940 triggered Japan's penetration into Indochina, now under the Vichy regime and nominally a Japanese ally. On 22 September 1940, a convention was signed that granted the Japanese the right to use the port of Hải Phòng as a transit base; to utilize the airfields of Hanoi, Lao Cai, and Phủ Lạng Thương; and to station troops in northern Indochina. Consequently, this Japanese move effectively severed the aid supply route to Nationalist China. In return, Japan pledged to recognize French sovereignty and to respect French territorial integrity in Indochina. But in the 1940–1941 winter, the French were forced by the Japanese to concede to Thailand (as Siam was renamed in 1939) the Lao territories on the eastern bank of the Mekong River and the Cambodian provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap, and Sisophon. Then, in July 1941, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, French colonial authorities in Indochina had to acquiesce to the landing of 30,000 Japanese soldiers. The Japanese Imperial Army was stationed in the southern part of Indochina, supposedly to protect the country, which was now completely cut off from metropolitan France.

The French colonial administration in Indochina remained in place during the war years from 1940 to March 1945, but it had to coexist with the Japanese military command in Saigon. For a brief while, from 1940 to 1942, it seemed as if Tokyo would devote special attention to exploiting the resources of French Indochina and would seek to develop its economy to meet Japan's own requirements. The French were obliged to sign a trade agreement with Tokyo in May 1941; although it allowed the Japanese to acquire the commodities they needed in exchange for their industrial products, the agreement seemed to presage a new era of investment. But that possibility was forestalled by Japan's move into the rest of Southeast Asia, leading to an intensification of the war and the consequent unavailability of invest-

ment funds for Indochina. At the same time, economic hardships resulting from the discontinuation of normal trading links and the dedication of key resources to the use of the Japanese war machine soon revealed the ruinous effects of the Japanese occupation.

Meanwhile, needing the French bureaucracy and police to ensure the management of the economy and to maintain law and order, Japan adopted the expedient policy of "upholding tranquillity" in Indochina by leaving the French administration intact until almost the very end. This enabled Admiral Jean Decoux (t. 1940–1945), appointed by the Vichy regime to be Indochina's governor-general, to devote his energy to retaining as much power as he could. The French grip on Indochina appeared even tighter during the course of World War II. Swift and harsh measures were taken against all attempts at rebellion. In November 1940, upon hearing of the Japanese entry into northern Vietnam and of the threatened Siamese invasion of eastern Cambodia and southern Laos, the communists staged a general insurrection in southern Vietnam. The rebellion was easily crushed, but the subsequent severe political repression did not entail any Japanese intervention on behalf of the Vietnamese. Forced by circumstances to bring more native officials into Indochina's civil services, Decoux tried to win over the sovereigns of the three countries of Indochina and their elites by enhancing their prestige. At the same time, he launched a sport and youth movement in an attempt to develop Marshal Philippe Pétain's cult and loyalty to France, and he applied to Indochina the Vichy regime's slogan "National Revolution" and the virtues of "Work, Family, and Fatherland." While keeping a watchful eye on Vietnamese political activists, he favored activities that glorified Vietnamese national culture, with the hope of thwarting Japanese propaganda in magnifying the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

Paradoxically, the call by the Vichy regime for a national revival had anticolonial effects. In fact, the French colonial government's inability to keep the Japanese out of its colony destroyed the myth of French invincibility and contributed to the erosion of French authority and the loss of French prestige. Under these circumstances, the Japanese occupation helped to revitalize various anti-French movements in Viet-

nam and unleash nationalist aspirations. The Japanese apparently felt the need to put all political groups together under the same banner, especially that of the exiled Prince Cường Để, to whom Japan had given shelter for nearly four decades. Without Japan's initiative and assistance, it might have been impossible for those scattered political groups and individuals who were supposed to be pro-Japanese to be unified, as they were isolated from each other because of their factionalism and regionalism. Particular support was lent to two politicoreligious sects in Cochin China—the Cao Đài, whose main area of recruitment covered Saigon and the area to the northwest of Saigon, and the Hoa Hao, with its main area of influence along the southwestern Vietnamese-Cambodian border.

But in the final analysis, it was to the Vietnamese communists that the Japanese occupation, along with the preservation of the French colonial regime, had lent support: in the communists' rise to power, the occupation and the colonial regime gave them their justification. The Vietnamese communists now had an opportunity to blend their esoteric dogmas with the more easily understood nationalist cause of resistance to both the French and the Japanese. The fatal distraction of French colonialism gave them a chance to acquire a base in the jungles of the area of Cao Bằng and Bắc Sơn (Việt Bắc), close to the Sino-Vietnamese border, from where they concentrated on building up a revolutionary nucleus and establishing contacts across the border with Chinese Nationalist leaders, U.S. and Free French liaison officers, and other anti-Japanese Vietnamese nationalists. To shed its pre-1941 image as a locus of class struggle and proletarian internationalism, the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) set up the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội), or Việt Minh, consisting of members from various subgroups called National Salvation Associations. The objective of the Việt Minh front, conceived as a purely patriotic organization, was to liberate Vietnam from the unholy alliance of the "colonialist" French and the "fascist" Japanese. Therefore, until 1945, this movement confined itself largely to developing a politico-military base and spreading patriotic-nationalist propaganda throughout Vietnam; it concentrated in particular on mobilizing the peasants of the Red River delta against taxation, *corvée* labor, and rice

requisitioning by the administration to meet Japan's requirements for food supplies. In spite of the harsh repression they encountered from both the French and the Japanese, Việt Minh cadres managed to maintain a network of secret cells in almost every city and village in Vietnam and to infiltrate all pro-French and pro-Japanese organizations.

Forced into a steady withdrawal by Allied victories, the Japanese had to move the headquarters of their Southern Army from Manila to Saigon in November 1944. In January 1945, retreating troops were used to reinforce Japan's strength in Indochina, which the Japanese High Command was ordered to hold at all cost. The situation changed dramatically on 9 March 1945. The Japanese military, anticipating an Allied offensive and fearful that the French colonial army in Indochina would turn against it, carried out a *coup de force* (swift execution of forceful action) by removing the French administration and imprisoning the French army and colonial administrators. Immediate independence was granted to the monarchies of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. In all three countries, the Japanese advised the respective sovereigns to repudiate the French protectorate and to form "independent" governments with a diverse collection of nationalist politicians. But in Vietnam in particular, the declaration of independence proclaimed by the emperor Bảo Đại (1913–1997) concerned only north and central Vietnam and had no formal effect for the time being on the political situation in Cochin China, which was still under Japanese authority. However, the new Trần Trọng Kim cabinet, composed of men with little experience in political organization, lacked both credibility and the capacity to impose its authority over the provinces. From the very moment of its inception, it was, in a sense, living on borrowed time, since much of its political authority and all of its military security were tied to the Japanese. Moreover, the new regime was confronted with a cataclysmic famine in the north, caused by a combination of bad weather, French and Japanese requisitions of the peasants' rice, and the disruption of communication among the various parts of the country due to intense Allied bombing. The worsening of the famine to crisis proportions coincided with the Japanese granting of independence to Vietnam, so the problem of

hunger in the north was an ongoing concern during the early weeks of the existence of the Trần Trọng Kim government.

The situation was ripe for the Việt Minh. The removal of the French colonial administration, the weakness of the Vietnamese substitute government, and the absence of a mass nationalist organization created a political vacuum in Vietnam. In some areas of the south, however, local organizations, such as the religious sects Cao Đài and Hòa Hào, formed what amounted to local warlord governments. But with the concentration of Japanese minds on an increasingly desperate military situation, the political vacuum presented the Việt Minh with the opportunity to spread out networks of “liberation committees” from its northern base and to build up its political and military infrastructure. The Japanese did not bother to send their troops into the northern area, and the Việt Minh forces took over the region, expanding their “liberated zone” beyond Cao Bằng to include seven provinces. They issued a proclamation calling on the people to rise up against the Japanese and to contribute to making Vietnam strong, free, and independent. The famine in the north provided them with the possibility of eliminating the anticommunist village leaders and spreading a mass movement of political and social salvation in the countryside. The status and credibility of the Việt Minh movement were greatly enhanced by the fact that its communist leaders had, since 1941, maintained a firm anti-French (the colonial enemy) and anti-Japanese (the fascist enemy) stance, not least by their military links with the Allies.

On 15 August 1945, the Japanese suddenly capitulated. Overnight, the Allies, in particular the South-East Asia Command (SEAC), were faced with the responsibility of overseeing the surrender and repatriation of an almost intact Japanese army in Southeast Asia. What is more, SEAC had to ensure the safe release of Allied prisoners of war (POWs) and civilian internees held by the Japanese, the maintenance of law and order, and the eventual transfer of power to civilian governments. The zone of responsibility for SEAC covered Malaya, Singapore, Sumatra, Java, Thailand, and the southern part of Indochina. As a consequence of American pressure, Nationalist China assumed similar responsibilities over northern Indochina. But considerably overstretched, SEAC was in no

way capable of carrying out all its tasks and filling the power vacuum left by the Japanese surrender. Therefore, the Việt Minh leader, Hồ Chí Minh, judged the moment right to seize power openly, through the agency of the liberation committees. Supported by massive demonstrations in provincial capitals, the Việt Minh took control of the whole country between 19 and 25 August. As the Việt Minh soldiers marched into Hanoi, there were demonstrations in the city celebrating independence, and the Việt Minh youth groups and militia took over the city while the Japanese stood by. By 27 August, Việt Minh committees were set up in all the provinces to administer them. Meanwhile, on 25 August in the imperial city of Huế, Emperor Bảo Đại abdicated, and the Trần Trọng Kim government, which had already resigned on 18 August, transferred its power to a Việt Minh committee. On 2 September 1945, to a huge and tumultuous crowd of Vietnamese in Hanoi as well as to the nation and the world at large, Hồ Chí Minh proclaimed the independence of Vietnam and the formation of a provisional government for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV).

By their reluctance to encourage and concede Vietnamese independence, the Japanese had therefore helped to discredit the pro-Japanese nationalist groups that they would have preferred to leave in command in Vietnam. However, Japanese forces still in control of Indochina after Japan's surrender might have crushed the Việt Minh forces had Bảo Đại and Trần Trọng Kim requested them to do so. As it turned out, Bảo Đại rejected such an extreme measure and agreed to transfer his power to the Việt Minh because he imagined that, with the U.S. support secured by Hồ Chí Minh, independence could be guaranteed to Vietnam. In the end, even a Vietnamese government led by communists who had been generally anti-Japanese seemed, from Tokyo's perspective, to be preferable to returning the country to the French. The benevolent neutrality displayed by the Japanese explains the ease with which the Việt Minh came to power.

The war years and the period of Japanese occupation had thus fundamentally changed the political environment of Indochina. Mass nationalist movements had taken root during these years and had been able to seize power and establish some form of governmental legit-

imacy. However diverse their ideological complexions and their internal divisions may have been, they were by no means keen on the restoration of colonial authority. Acquainted with the vulnerability of the French and with their own strength tested during these years, the Việt Minh forces would prepare themselves for an all-out war for independence. Yet the bridgehead of military authority—SEAC, established in September 1945 in southern Indochina—allowed the landing of a company of the French Expeditionary Corps, bent on reestablishing colonial control over all of Indochina. Meanwhile, in the northern part of Vietnam, other Vietnamese political groups returned in the wake of Chinese Guomintang (Kuomintang, KMT) troops and endeavored to abolish all the political and administrative structures set up by the Việt Minh. The end of World War II was not to usher in a new era of peace for the Vietnamese but a most destructive period in their history.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Battambang; British Borneo; British Malaya; British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Cao Đài; China, Nationalist; French Indochina; Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Hoa Hào; Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Siem Reap; Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); Sisavang Vong (r. 1904–1959); Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (League for the Independence of Vietnam); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP)

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INDOCHINA WAR, FIRST (1946–1954)

After the Pacific War (1941–1945), France fought Vietnam during the First Indochina War, resulting in the retreat of the former and the partition of the latter into two territories. The conflict arose amid the complex situation existing in 1945 and 1946. Much had happened in the course of a few months. The French colonial administration had been overthrown by the Japanese Imperial forces on 9 March 1945, and Indochina had been divided along the sixteenth parallel by the Conference of Potsdam (the division was moved to the seventeenth parallel by the 1954 Geneva Agreement). China was entrusted with the job of disarming Japanese troops in the North, and the United Kingdom handled those in the South. Thereafter, the August Revolution erupted, brought about by the Việt Minh (the League for the Independence of Vietnam). Then, on 2 September 1945 in Hanoi, Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969) proclaimed the country's independence and the establishment of the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The French returned to the South with the aid of the British in September 1945, taking back the territorial administration. The following year, after a double agreement with Hồ Chí Minh (on 6 March 1946) and the Chinese, the French were present in the North as well. However, they did not get on with the Vietnamese authorities, mainly because of the status of Cochinchina. After a few months of growing tension, the failure of the 19 December Vietnamese takeover forced the Hồ Chí Minh government to abandon Hanoi. This marked the official start of the hostilities.

From the French point of view, the war was begun to recover lost territory, especially in the North. Directed from Saigon, the war would be



Two members of the French forces capture a Viêt Minh youth who had a communist flag in his possession. From 1947 to 1950 the Viêt Minh made a concerted effort to drive the French Army out of Vietnam. (U.S. National Archives)

long, costly, and ultimately incomplete. From the Vietnamese point of view, the conflict was conceived as resistance. The DRV, whose leaders were secluded in a region accessible only with great difficulty north of Hanoi, was facing the prospect of a lengthy war, which allowed General Vo Nguyễn Giap (1911–) to build up an effective army. Confrontation was rarely direct, but the terrain was hotly contested. The guerrillas had been active in the South since 1945, and they had spread to the North at the end of 1946. After 1950, due to the evolving balance of power, several important battles were fought in the North beginning with the French defeat at Cao Bằng in October 1950 and ending with

their defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954. On the French side, nearly 200,000 men were fighting in Indochina by then, with around 250,000 Vietnamese nationals recruited on the spot; on the side of the DRV, some 360,000 men were found at the front. Estimations of strength proved to be difficult because the overlapping levels of mobilization made every DRV citizen a potential combatant.

The war took place on all levels. On the political level, in 1949, France agreed with the ex-emperor Bảo Đại (r. 1925–1945) to establish the Associated State of Vietnam and a “national army” to form a counterforce to the DRV. On the economic level, each side issued its own

currency and bitterly fought over the main rice-producing areas (the Red River and Mekong deltas). Finally, the growing importance of the conflict and the cost of the war forced each side to rely on foreign aid—from the United States on the Franco-Vietnamese side and from the Chinese on the DRV side.

The conflict can be divided into three main periods. Until 1948, the war still had a colonial character and was not yet very costly, but there was no military solution in sight. The establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 set the tone: backed by Chinese aid, the DRV was able to consolidate itself. The financing of the war became a problem, so France obtained American aid—materially—as well as the implication of the Associated State of Vietnam and its young army in the war. Finally, from 1952 to 1954, the French found themselves in an increasingly difficult position and sought to disengage themselves by shifting the fighting to the Associated State of Vietnam and financial responsibility to the United States. However, this strategy backfired: in 1954, when the United States was committed to funding almost 80 percent of the conflict, Bảo Đại's Associated State claimed its own independence; meanwhile, the DRV inflicted the defeat at Dien Bien Phu on the French expeditionary corps in May. The cease-fire agreement negotiated at the Geneva Conference of 20 July 1954 included the partition of Vietnam—which theoretically was only provisional—along the seventeenth parallel. The division was intended to return the country to the status quo of 1945 (albeit one degree latitude north), with the forces of the DRV in the North and the forces of the French Union in the South. But Bảo Đại was soon thwarted by his new prime minister, Ngô Đình Diệm (t. 1955–1963), and his American allies, and France found itself ousted even from the South. Thus, besides the French defeat, the First Indochina War, which inaugurated decolonization in a dramatic fashion, was terminated by an unsatisfactory solution that would soon provoke a new war due to international tensions.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Bảo Đại (Vĩnh Thụy) (1913–1997); British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; Decolonization of Southeast Asia; Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), Battle of;

Geneva Conference (1954); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (Vietnam Independence League); Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945); Võ Nguyễn Giáp, General (1911–)

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INDOCHINA WAR, SECOND (VIETNAM WAR) (1964–1975)

The Second Indochina War—better known as the Vietnam War—was a local war insofar as it was a confrontation between ideological blocs. It can only be understood within the context of the U.S. intervention that dealt with a communist-inspired insurrection in the South supported by the North and, beyond that, by the entire communist bloc. Its exceptional length, the importance of the American engagement, and the failure of the latter characterized this conflict.

The state of war was undermining South Vietnam in 1965 when the United States committed its forces. After the Geneva Agreement, which divided (provisionally) Vietnam along the seventeenth parallel, it only took a few years for the growing unrest, attributed to the Việt Cong (Vietnamese communists), to destabilize the regime and for the National Liberation Front to openly contest it (December 1960). President John F. Kennedy (t. 1961–1963) had sent military advisers to the area. The United States had supported President

Ngô Đình Diệm (t. 1955–1963) since 1954, but toward the end of 1963, he was overthrown with Washington's complicity by a military junta. Nguyễn Văn Thiệu (1923–2001) emerged as the victor in this incident in November 1963. Entering the White House soon afterward, President Lyndon Johnson (t. 1963–1969) decided to resort to drastic measures in Southeast Asia: to contain China and to stop the development of communist influence there, the insurrection in South Vietnam had to be crushed, which meant dissuading North Vietnam from supporting it. He obtained the necessary authority from the U.S. Congress to do so, thanks to the Gulf of Tonkin incident in early August 1964.

The intervention, as originally conceived, was intended to be limited in scope. Việt Cong operations, in particular those against U.S. military installations, were to be countered by retaliatory air raids north of the seventeenth parallel (in February 1965). But the adversary was not impressed. This kind of retaliation would become systematic—in Operation Rolling Thunder—and two marine battalions were deployed in the South, in Danang (March 1965), but again to no avail. The turning point came when the president decided to engage the army in South Vietnam (April 1965). The expeditionary corps already numbered more than 184,000 men at the end of 1965 when the U.S. leaders began to ask themselves how to pull out of the crisis.

The difficulty in finding a military solution dominated the period from 1965 to 1968. In South Vietnam, the U.S. military relied heavily on its air force and deployed about 540,000 men (by 1968), without taking into account the Saigon army. Yet the U.S. search-and-destroy strategy did not succeed in reducing the number of guerrillas deployed by the North, which probably mobilized more than 400,000 men. Meanwhile, in North Vietnam, the U.S. aerial escalation caused massive destruction (226,000 tons of bombs were dropped in 108,000 air raids in 1967), but it did not even dampen the determination of the Hanoi regime. At the beginning of 1968, the revolutionary Tet offensive launched in Saigon and in other towns demonstrated that the Viet Cong had retained its power and could undermine American confidence. Soon afterward, President Johnson decided to give up the fight. Bombardments on North Vietnam were re-

stricted, and discussions with the enemy were opened. Against a background of stalemate (a complex balance of power) on the battlefield, the communist bloc maintained strong support for the DRV in its resistance (to the Saigon regime and the United States), and while both parties in the conflict were increasingly gathering international public opinion to their side, negotiations that began in Paris in the spring of 1968 would continue for more than four years.

Parallel to these negotiations, the incoming president in the United States, Richard Nixon (t. 1969–1974), developed a strategy destined to extract U.S. forces from this quagmire. This meant a “Vietnamization” of the troops, extending the war to include Cambodia, on whose border the Việt Cong leaders were hiding (1970), and southeastern Laos, through which the Hồ Chí Minh Trail passed (1971). The strategy also fostered direct negotiations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China, which Nixon visited personally in 1972. After a second general Việt Cong offensive (1972) and an ultimate U.S. Air Force bombardment of Hanoi (December), the Paris Agreement was finally signed in January 1973. Another agreement was made in regard to Laos, but the American bombardments continued on those regions in Cambodia beyond the control of the capital (Phnom Penh). The Paris Agreement, which prescribed a cease-fire and a “union” government in Saigon that was barely respected, permitted Washington to free its armed forces from the country where its troops had suffered more than 50,000 dead.

The Vietnam War, which had become a second Indochina war, suffered a fate similar to that of the first. A devastated country was left behind on the battlefield, and in the United States, public opinion was profoundly traumatized. The outcome of the U.S. strategic failure was sanctioned by a last communist offensive in spring 1975, which forced the U.S. ambassador and his staff to evacuate Saigon by helicopter. The People's Army overthrew the Saigon regime on 30 April 1975, thereby achieving the reunification of Vietnam by force.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN); China since 1949; Cold War; Domino Theory; Gulf of Tonkin Incident (August 1964); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969);

Hồ Chí Minh Trail; Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Le Duan (1907–1986); Le Duc Tho (1911–); My Lai; Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); Nguyễn Văn Thiệu (1923–2001); Paris Peace Agreement (1968–1973); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); Sino-Soviet Struggle; Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (1954); Strategic Hamlet Program (Vietnam); Tet Offensive (1968); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia; Viet Cong; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945); Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971)

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INDOCHINESE UNION

See French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*)

“INDONESIA”

The name *Indonesia* (from the Greek *indos*, meaning “India,” and *nesos*, meaning “island”) was coined in 1850 by a British anthropologist, J. R. Logan, as a term analogous to Polynesia and Melanesia; it referred to the island region between mainland Asia and Australia where Indian cultural influence had been significant. By the third decade of the twentieth century, however, *Indonesia* had become a political term, referring to the aspiration for an independent, multiethnic state to succeed the Netherlands Indies. In 1945, the name was adopted without question for the new Republic of Indonesia.

In the nineteenth century, Westerners used several names for the region. *Further India*, *East Indies*, *Indian Archipelago*, and *Insulinde* emphasized the Indian cultural heritage; *Netherlands India* (*Nederlands Indië*), *Dutch East Indies*, and *Tropical Netherlands* (*Tropisch Nederland*) reflected Dutch political control; and *Malaysia* (sometimes *Malesia*), *Malay Archipelago*, and the Malay term *Nusantara* (lit. islands between, beyond Java) stressed the importance of Malay culture in the broad sense.

Indonesia came into more widespread public use following the 1884 publication of a general book in German by Adolf Bastian entitled *Indonesien*. In 1917, Indonesian students in The Netherlands formed the Indonesisch Verbond van Studeerenden (Indonesian Students' Society), and in 1922, the Indische Vereeniging (Indies Association) in The Netherlands adopted the name Indonesische Vereeniging or Perhimpunan Indonesia. In 1928, delegates at the second Youth Congress (Kongres Pemuda) in Batavia formally adopted the name Indonesia as part of their efforts to frame the struggle against colonialism and affirmed that they were one nation (*bangsa Indonesia*) with one language (*bahasa Indonesia*) and one homeland (Indonesia). Dutch authorities resisted the term because they saw it as falsely implying a unity of ethnic groups. In 1948, however, the Dutch constitution was changed to refer to *Indonesië* as a gesture to nationalist sentiments.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; *Nusantara*

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INDONESIAN REVOLUTION (1945–1949)

"We the Indonesian people hereby declare Indonesia's independence. Matters concerning the transfer of power and other matters will be executed in an orderly manner and in the shortest possible time." With these words, President Sukarno (t. 1947–1967), representing the Republic of Indonesia, launched the revolution on 17 August 1945. What was this revolution?

It was a struggle for independence and a strike against the reimposition of Dutch rule. This struggle lasted until 1949, when both sides reached a settlement (at the so-called Round Table Conference) with the establishment of the United States of Indonesia, consisting of several states (of which the Republic of Indonesia was one) joined in a federation.

The revolution started in August 1945 when the Japanese surrender in the Pacific War (1941–1945) resulted in a power vacuum in Indonesia. The opportunity that presented itself was seized upon by prewar nationalist leaders such as Sukarno (1901–1970) and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980) to establish the republican government, complete with a provisional parliament, a cabinet led by Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir (1909–1966), regional governors, and a newly created army. Thus, when Dutch military forces returned to the formerly occupied territory to reclaim their erstwhile colonial possession, they faced a functioning government. The Dutch were few in number and easily confined to the urban areas. They were led by Lieutenant Governor-General Dr. Hubertus Johannes Van Mook (1894–1965), who was given the unenviable task of reaching a settlement with the Indonesian nationalists, especially the republican leaders—a settlement that would ensure a peaceful outcome. Peace was not easily attained, for many nationalist leaders were wary about Dutch motives. Nonetheless, negotiations began. In 1947, the Linggadjati Peace Agreement was signed, but bad faith resulted in Van Mook ordering military action (the so-called

police action). Then, the Renville Agreement was signed in 1948. Meanwhile, the United Nations became involved in brokering the peace. The revolution became an international issue. Amid these events, measures were taken by the Dutch and other groups opposed to republican dominance to organize federal states outside Java and Sumatra. As bickering continued over the implementation of the Renville Agreement, Van Mook launched another military action against the republic (the second so-called police action). Principal republican leaders (Sukarno, Hatta, and others in the cabinet) were arrested, and the Indonesian army was driven into the countryside, where guerrilla warfare became the preferred mode of engagement. Stunned by this turn of events, world opinion was expressed through the United Nations. International pressure was applied on the Dutch to negotiate with the republic to hand over sovereignty. Independence for the United States of Indonesia was finally conceded at the Round Table Conference of 1949.

The foregoing thumbnail sketch of the major events during the Indonesian Revolution scarcely does justice to the complex series of developments that took place from 1945 to 1949. However, it serves as an anchor to set the context in which various themes about the revolution can be identified for further study.

The first aim of the revolution was to achieve independence from Dutch rule. In 1945, the permanence and continuation of Dutch authority was not to be lightly dismissed. On the Indonesian side, the fervor and strength of Indonesian nationalism was also never lacking. The youth groups (*pemuda*) were a potent force. They were the vanguard in the Battle of Surabaya (November 1945), as Indonesians fought against the returning Dutch forces working in partnership with the British-Indian soldiers. Youth leaders kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta when they felt that these older nationalist leaders were betraying the goals of the revolution and conceding too much to the Dutch. Nationalism was therefore a major force driving the revolution.

The second aim of the revolution was to achieve political unity. Unity had always been an endemic problem. There were many angles involved—political, regional, ethnicity, and others. Just to cite one example, political divisiveness constituted a major problem as religious

(Muslim) leaders vied for influence with communist and “secular” groups. There were also disagreements over the nature of the Indonesian state. Should it be Islamic or secular? And how should the interests of the non-Javanese segments be accommodated in a Java-dominant republic? The overriding concerns of independence somehow managed to move these political hot potatoes to the back burner, at least for a while. For the most part, the period of the Indonesian Revolution was focused on common goals. Muslims made concessions on the Islamic state question. Regional elites did not openly voice their challenge to the Javanese Sukarno. Army leaders were drawn from various parts of Indonesia, and all placed their professionalism above parochial interests.

A third aim of the revolution was social in nature—to achieve greater equality and justice for all. At the national level, a debate ensued between Prime Minister Sjahrir’s accommodation with capitalist interests (represented by his negotiations with the Dutch) and the communist Tan Malaka’s 100 percent *merdeka*, meaning full freedom from all, including capitalist and imperialist, controls. In this respect, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) even launched the Madiun revolt, or Madiun Affair, in 1948 to advance the goal of a social revolution. At the regional level below the politics of the nation, various incidents occurred that suggested the makings of social changes. In Yogyakarta, village heads were replaced. In east Sumatra, the sultans who enjoyed support from the Dutch in prewar days were forced to flee for their lives. The same kind of unsettling changes took place in Pekalongan (on the north coast of Java) and Aceh, where regional and local scores were settled between contesting elites with long histories of enmity toward each other.

As an event, the Indonesian Revolution was very significant in different ways to different groups. It impacted on the political processes that took place many years after. Some examples are illustrative. The revolution provided all nationalist leaders with credentials that remained important for the rest of their political careers. For the late President Sukarno, his arrest by the Dutch (1949) and subsequent internment were turning points in the history of the revolution that he could always use to justify his nationalist reputation, if it was ever

called into question. To the army leaders, participation in the revolution was critical because it gave them the reputation of saving the Indonesian state in the hour of need. When civilian leaders such as Sukarno and Hatta were interned in 1949, the army was the de facto rallying force that continued to fight the Dutch. Revolutionary values were inculcated as part of officer training long after the Indonesian Revolution ended. In 1965, when General Suharto (1921–) seized power and, later, when he became president (t. 1967–1998), the fact that he played a combat role during the revolution was an important credential.

One way to conclude this brief account of the Indonesian Revolution is to summarize the manner in which (by way of historiography) historians and others have analyzed the episode in Indonesia’s history. If it is possible to speak of schools of thought, then the following observations are relevant.

The “nationalist” school views the revolution as a struggle for independence from all forms of colonial control. In this account, the Dutch are portrayed as the villains. This perspective takes a long view of the past. Since the 1930s, it had proved impossible to dislodge the Dutch. Like Mont Blanc in the Alps, Dutch colonialism was immovable and had existed for years with restrictive controls. A pressure-cooker situation developed, with some ineffective valves provided by the Dutch to let off steam—for instance, the Dutch-organized *Volksraad*, or People’s Council, which consulted with Indonesian representatives. When the Japanese drove out the Dutch and later surrendered to the Allied forces in 1945, the Indonesian Revolution was merely the outcome of a long period of history. This interpretation of the revolution is represented in Indonesian-language textbooks, novels, personal memoirs, army histories, and various academic and scholarly accounts.

Another school adopts a more future-oriented perspective. In this view, the Indonesian Revolution released forces that shaped Indonesia’s democracy. How did this happen? The revolution was a platform to involve many in the political process. The determination of the nation’s future was not to be confined to an elite few. By dismantling an autocratic Dutch system of colonial rule, the revolution opened the way to greater participation—and more democracy.

Also, during the revolution, various democratic institutions were formed, especially parliamentary institutions and a cabinet, and generally popular leaders emerged in the republic. This was contrasted with the phalanx of Dutch leaders and other ephemeral figures who assumed positions of power in some federal states outside Java and Sumatra. The Indonesian Revolution was therefore an instrument of democracy. The most prominent exponent of this school was the late George McTurnan Kahin.

A third school of thought argues that the revolution was merely a national struggle in which the Indonesian people exchanged one set of masters for another. Supporters of this perspective have tried to place in the forefront the social revolution that was kept as a sub-theme in the other accounts. One proponent of this school is B. R. O'G. Anderson. Many others have also directed their research efforts to understanding the social aspects of the Indonesian Revolution. The intense research activity gives the impression that this is the dominant school, but this is not to say that it has edged out the thesis that nationalism was the driving force of the Indonesian Revolution.

A fourth school of thought attempts to correct the national emphasis of the Indonesian Revolution and instead focuses attention on the subnational developments. There are now more and more regional studies that explore the dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution outside Java or even at the local level within Java. These studies take Sumatra, Sulawesi, and even Singapore as their units of analysis.

The Indonesian Revolution thus remains an important event in the history of Indonesia. It continues to be a subject of research by academic historians. Memoirs, biographies, and commemorative seminars still provide various perspectives not generally available in survey accounts.

YONG MUN CHEONG

See also Dutch Police Action (First and Second); "Indonesia"; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Linggadjati (Linggajati) Agreement (1947); Madiun Affair (September 1948); *Merdeka* (Free, Independent); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Pancasila (Pantja Sila); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); *Perjuangan* (*Perjuangan*); Renville Agreement (January

1948); Sjahrir, Sutan (1909–1966); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Tan Malaka, Ibrahim Datuk (1897?–1949); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; Van Mook, Dr. Hubertus Johannes (1894–1948)

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INDULTO DE COMERCIAR

The *indulto de comerciar* (commercial privilege) was a special concession or permission that allowed Spanish provincial governors (*alcaldes*) in the Spanish Philippines to engage in commercial activities that were otherwise proscribed by law. Under the Laws of the Indies, officials were forbidden to trade but were allowed to violate this prohibition under a royal order of 17 July 1751 or 1754 by paying a prescribed fine in advance. The legal definition of the word *indulto* means a permission or privilege conceded to a person so that he or she can do what cannot be done without that permission. Provincial governors, paid inadequate salaries and frequently obliged to purchase their positions in the first place, took advantage of this concession to make their fortunes. Generally, the highest fines were paid for posts where trading opportunities were

most lucrative at centers of industry and foreign trade or along the inland frontier. But the basis on which indultos were calibrated was not always apparent, and major provinces such as Tondo and Cavite incurred no such fines. The system gave rise to many abuses. A newly appointed *alcalde* was able to establish his own supply store run by his wife or agent and then use his executive powers to undermine business rivals. He could also monopolize the market for credit by using his judicial office to interpret contracts and obligations in order to disadvantage competitors. Legal redress was difficult. The only appeal was to the same officeholder in his capacity as judge of the court of first instance (district court). The system was finally abolished by royal decree on 23 September 1844.

GREG BANKOFF

See also Galleon Trade; Hispanization; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Spanish Philippines

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INQUILINO

A person who held a near-hereditary lease on agricultural land in the Spanish Philippines was known as an *inquilino*. In return for a flat rent paid to the landowner, he either worked a lease with tenant-sharecroppers known as *kasamahanes* or sublet smaller parcels for amounts in excess of what he paid himself, a practice that was technically illegal but easily concealed. He was also assured security of tenure unless he was unable to pay rent for two consecutive years. Rents depended on the quality and location of the land

and ranged from 30 to 80 *cavans* (1 *cavan* equals 44 kilograms) of unhusked rice per *quiñon* (2.7 hectares). Tenant-sharecroppers received a percentage of the harvest in return for their labor, which varied according to the provision of seed, work animals, and tools but frequently left them in debt against the next year's labor or share, thereby laying the foundations of the paternalistic landholding system still extant today. Many *inquilinos* were Chinese mestizos who, by intermarriage with members of the hereditary chiefly class, the *principalia*, had come to constitute a rural upper class, especially in Central Luzon by the late nineteenth century. Their wealth not only assured them a reliable body of farmworkers and followers but also enabled them to send their sons to study law and medicine in Manila or overseas. The national hero of the Philippine Revolution (1896–1898), José Rizal (1861–1896), executed by the Spaniards in 1896, came from just such a family background.

GREG BANKOFF

See also Chinese in Southeast Asia; Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship; Hispanization; Mestizo; Patron-Client Relations; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Rizal, José (1861–1896); Spanish Philippines

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INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH (IMR)

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, vast areas of jungles and swamps were devoted to tin mining, plantations, and the construction of roads and railways in the British-protected

Peninsular Malay States. The British colonial authorities faced problems in tackling contagious tropical diseases that beset thousands of workers involved in the process. The hot and wet tropical conditions that enveloped jungles and swamps encouraged the breeding of malaria-bearing insects and a host of viruses that caused certain death. These problems prompted the authorities to set up a medical institute to carry out research on and eventually find cures for these diseases, for the benefit of the empire and the well-being of the people. Thus, in 1900, the Institute for Medical Research (IMR) was established in Kuala Lumpur.

The main objectives of the IMR were not restricted to research and diagnostic purposes alone. Later, the institute would also serve as a central reference laboratory, a training center for medical technologists, a site for vaccine production, and a center for reference at national and international levels. It is associated with the British Medical Research Council, the U.S. Army Medical Research Command, the International Center for Medical Research and Training at the University of California, and the Tropical Medicine Project of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO). It also has joint projects with the World Health Organization (WHO) and universities in the United States and Japan.

From the outset, the IMR has slowly but surely made progress in its research. Discoveries about the causes or sources of diseases were made, followed by preventive measures and cures. Some such discoveries were made about beriberi, which was basically linked to a dietary factor and is now no longer a medical problem. In overcoming malaria, a mosquito-borne disease, effective preventive measures and control freed Malaysia to a very large extent from the blight. Numerous other discoveries made by the IMR also led scientists elsewhere to pursue more research in the field, namely, in the causes and treatment of dysenteries, typhus, leptospirosis, leprosy, filariasis, and other diseases. The IMR has also produced and is still producing vaccines for particular diseases. Discoveries made by the IMR also help Malaysia to plan and develop health programs and to introduce policies through the Ministry of Health, which tables them in the Malaysian Parliament.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also Diseases and Epidemics; Highways and Railways; Pahang; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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IRIAN JAYA (WEST IRIAN)

Irian Jaya (Glorious Irian), also known as West Irian, West New Guinea, and West Papua, is the most eastern province of Indonesia, bordering independent Papua New Guinea. There were early trade contacts between West New Guinea (WNG) and the Majapahit empire in Java in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Rulers of Majapahit and neighboring Tidore regularly raided New Guinea to capture slaves. The Portuguese discovered the island in 1512, but it was named by the Spaniard Ynigo Ortiz de Retes, who, on his way to Mexico in 1545, noted similarities with Guinea in West Africa and named it New Guinea.

New Guinea had no significance for the (Dutch) United East India Company (VOC). The VOC recognized the sovereignty of the sultan of Tidore over the area, hoping that he would restrain piracy. In 1828, the Dutch government annexed WNG up to the one hundred forty-first parallel, and the area became part of the residency of Ternate. Attempts to actually exercise Dutch administrative control failed. Fort Du Bus was established near Lobo, in a malarial region. It had to be abandoned in 1836.

In 1861, the colonial government forbade the sultan of Tidore's raiding of WNG to demand tribute. Some Dutch trading companies started to trade with WNG, and Catholic and Protestant missionaries established themselves along the coast. German and British private

companies took an interest in eastern New Guinea. In 1884, Germany claimed the northeast area and Britain the southeast. Increased German and British interest motivated the Dutch colonial government to introduce effective colonial rule in WNG. In 1898, administrative posts were established in Manokwari and Fak Fak, as they were in Merauke in 1902. In 1905, the sultan of Tidore ceded all rights to WNG to colonial Indonesia.

It took several decades before the inhospitable interior of WNG was explored. The colonial army conducted exploratory treks from 1907 to 1915. Scientific explorations were conducted. For instance, from 1920 to 1922, an expedition climbed the Wilhelmina peak (now Puncak Trikora). The coastal regions were mapped in the 1920s. In 1936, an expedition climbed the highest mountain, the Carstensz peak (now Puncak Jaya Kesum). The Wissel Lakes were explored from the air, and in 1938, the large Baliem Valley was discovered. WNG proved to have a wide variety of peoples, organized in some 200 distinct language groups.

In 1926, the Dutch established a penal settlement at Tanah Merah, up the Digul River. It housed over 800 Indonesian nationalists, banned from other parts of the country, and members of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) who had been involved in uprisings.

By 1941, WNG had 650,000 inhabitants (Lagerberg 1962: 35, 68). Dutch colonial rule was largely confined to the coastal areas. New Guinea was of strategic significance during the Pacific War (1941–1945), during which the Dutch held on to Merauke. Australian troops surrendered the northeast part of the island, but Japanese attempts to capture the southeast failed. In 1943 and 1944, Australian and U.S. forces pushed back Japanese positions, and in July 1944, the whole island was under U.S. control; Dutch colonial administration returned to WNG.

WNG was excluded from negotiations about Indonesia's independence in 1949. The Dutch argued that the population was ethnically different from the rest of Indonesia. The small number of educated Papuans shared Dutch fears that the people would not be regarded as equals in Indonesia. The Dutch colonial government hatched plans to resettle dis-

placed Indo-Europeans in WNG and encouraged Dutch migrants to colonize its highlands.

Further Dutch-Indonesian discussions in 1950 were unsuccessful. The Dutch intensified the administration of the area and started to develop it. Indonesia failed to gain support in the United Nations in 1957 for inclusion of WNG in the Republic of Indonesia. It nationalized Dutch companies and expelled Dutch nationals. The Dutch hardened their position against WNG's integration, and they enhanced the political awareness of the population by establishing a semirepresentative body, the West Papuan Council, in 1961. The date for West Papuan independence was set for 1970. The word *Papua* was used as a substitute for WNG rather than *New Guinea*. It was obtained from the Portuguese word *papuas*, itself derived from the local word meaning "curly hair."

Indonesia started military intrusions into WNG in 1961. It again brought its case before the United Nations, but no solution was reached. The U.S. government was concerned about left-leaning President Sukarno (t. 1945–1967), and they wooed him by pressuring the Dutch and Australian governments into a compromise. Sovereignty was transferred to the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in October 1962 and to an Indonesian interim government in 1963. WNG was renamed Irian Barat (West Irian), *Irian* being a Biak word meaning "the island." During a 1969 referendum, 1,026 selected representatives were cajoled into voting for remaining with Indonesia. Irian Barat became Irian Jaya, Indonesia's twenty-sixth province, in 1972.

The Indonesian government orchestrated economic development in West Irian. In 1967, it granted exploitation rights to the vast copper and gold deposits in the Grasberg mountains to a consortium of the U.S. company Freeport McMoRan and the British firm RTZ. Other mining and rain forest logging concessions were granted to consortia of foreign and Indonesian companies. These ventures mainly employed labor from other parts of Indonesia. Land was appropriated from local people without sufficient compensation, and the mining and logging royalties flowed largely to Jakarta. Thus, the benefits to local people were limited, and the mine tailings and deforestation also caused severe environmental problems.

Migrants, partly sponsored by the government, flooded in from overpopulated areas in Indonesia. By 1990, the population was 1.6 million, of which at least 0.6 million were migrants (Kerajaan Indonesia 1990). Non-Papuans took most of the jobs in the public sector, and Papuans were forced to change their behavior to suit the cultural norms of administrators. All social indicators, such as literacy and health status, revealed low standard-of-living levels in Irian Jaya. Papuans expressed their dissatisfaction in several ways, from occasional demonstrations to open resistance by the Organization for Free Papua (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM, established in 1965). Resistance was forcefully repressed by the Indonesian military.

After the regime change in Indonesia in 1998, calls for attention to WNG's plight increased. In 2000, President Abdulrahman Wahid (t. 1998–2001) promised greater freedom of expression, which reinforced the call for independence by unified Papuan leaders. The region was renamed West Papua in 2001, but the Indonesian government has yet to deliver on its promise of greater autonomy.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Australia and Southeast Asia; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia

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ISAN

Isan (lit. northeast) is a geographic and administrative term referring to the northeastern region of Thailand. This region covers the largest part of the country and has the greatest amount of population. However, it is also the poorest part in terms of both economic prosperity and natural resources.

The term *Isan* was first coined in 1900 by the centralized government based in Bangkok when King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910) undertook administrative reforms by grouping a number of provinces into a single administrative unit called the *monthon* (circle) (Wyatt 1984: 209). As a result, some provinces in the northeast were grouped together as a circle and named *Isan*, since it was located to the northeast of Bangkok, the capital city.

Although the region as a single administrative unit was introduced only a century ago, Isan was the site of early settlements of humans from the Neolithic period. Archaeological excavations reveal that, at that period, there were early settlements around the river basins of the Chi and the Moon, two of the most important rivers of the region (Bellwood 1992: 118–120). These basic prehistoric settlements gradually developed into small city-states based on Buddhism and Hinduism from Dvaravati and Angkorian Khmer (Cambodian empire) cultures during the eleventh and thirteenth centuries C.E. However, the region was still underpopulated during this period.

Ayutthaya kings ruled the lower part of Isan, notably King Boromracha II (r. 1424–1448) and King Boromtrailoknat (r. 1448–1463);

before the fall of Ayutthaya more northeast areas were brought under its sovereignty while the others were under the influence of the Laotian kingdom. The inhabitants were a mixture of T'ai, Lao, Khmer, and other ethnic groups. However, in the sixteenth century, more Lao people started to cross the Mekong River to settle down in the northeast, but their mass migration did not take place until the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During this period, the Laotian kingdom of Lan Xang experienced political instability arising from the problem of succession to the throne, which was followed by fighting among many court factions. As a result, four groups of Lao crossed over the Mekong River to settle in Isan. This exodus led to substantial increases in the numbers of Lao in the region.

Lao settlements in the northeast helped to strengthen the political and economic power of Thai kingdoms because they provided much-needed manpower for the newly established Thonburi (1767–1782) and Chakri (founded in 1782) dynasties after the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767. During the reigns of the first three Chakri kings, Lao settlers were welcomed in the northeast, and the kings supported local Lao leaders who led their followers from Lao to live in Siam by promoting them to be local chiefs. Many new towns were founded with royal support and approval. This policy was carried out until King Chulalongkorn undertook administrative reforms in the 1880s. By the time this policy ended in 1885, 113 new towns had been founded and were ruled by local leaders according to Laotian traditions, with minimal interference from the capital. Thus, by the nineteenth century, the whole region of the northeast was brought under Thai sovereignty. It is obvious why Bangkok wanted to incorporate the region under its complete control, since it provided the capital with abundant and valuable forest products for local consumption and export, as well as cheap manpower.

The French presence in Indochina, especially its attempt to colonize Laos in the second half of the nineteenth century, posed a serious threat to Siamese control over the northeast. At the same time, the need to centralize political and economic power led King Chulalongkorn to replace traditional rule, in

which local leaders were given complete control over their vicinity, with centralized authority at the expense of local power. In 1892, the new form of regional and local administration known as *Monthon Thesaphiban* (circle) was introduced, in which a number of provinces were grouped together as a single administrative unit and ruled by a centrally appointed governor (Wyatt 1984: 209–210). In 1894, all the towns in the northeast were grouped into three circles, and in 1900, one of the circles was named Isan, hence recording the debut official usage of the word. Subsequently *Isan* became synonymous with the region.

In 1933, the Siamese government, which came into power after the 1932 Revolution, abolished the *Monthon Thesaphiban* system and divided circles into provinces; as a result, Isan as a regional administrative unit no longer exists. However, the term *Isan* is still widely used and connotes a sense of regionalism (Tambiah 1977: 495–495, 498).

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also Angkor; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767 C.E.), Kingdom of; British Interests in Southeast Asia; Dvaravati; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Khmers; Lao; Neolithic Period of Southeast Asia; Paknam Incident (1893); Reforms and Modernization in Siam; T'ais

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**ISKANDAR MUDA, SULTAN
(MAHKOTA ALAM) (r. 1607–1636)
“Crown of the World”**

Aceh reached its height in power and influence under Sultan Iskandar Muda, the self-declared “Crown of the World” (Mahkota Alam). Modern-day Acehnese people look upon him as the embodiment of Aceh’s independent imperial past. However, the wars he waged and the policies he enacted created a burden that was ultimately unsustainable for his kingdom, and his death heralded its slow decline.

The vast wealth and pomp of the court of Aceh never failed to impress foreign visitors. Guarded by a retinue of slave-soldiers, Iskandar Muda would proceed to Friday prayers accompanied by several thousand people and dozens of elephants. The port of Banda Aceh was an entrepôt crowded with the peoples of South-east Asia, India, and West Asia.

Iskandar Muda’s wealth derived from his monopolizing of the trade in forest products in the hinterland, particularly pepper, and through the levying of duties on passing shipping. Vessels from India paid the relatively high 5 percent duty, and those belonging to the European states and trading companies paid 7 percent. Iskandar Muda was said to be a rapacious harvester of properties on the death of their owners—all land being regarded as royal property. He also ensured his personal domination of commerce, first making monopoly arrangements to disadvantage local and Indian traders while attracting the Dutch and English. He then forced these newcomers in 1622 to purchase his stocks of pepper at exorbitant prices. Most foreign accounts are naturally critical of Iskandar Muda as an avaricious and arbitrary ruler. Certainly, he sought to compete with the Europeans. Anthony Reid (1993: 107) also argued that he sought to resist the influx of Spanish silver in Southeast Asia by minting and inflating the value of his own gold coin in 1620.

Iskandar Muda is also remembered as having instituted the formal Islamization of governmental structures in Aceh. He created a new legal system, giving the office of *qadi* (*kadi*; judge) greater influence. He enforced greater adherence to Islamic norms, such as obligatory fasting in the month of Ramadan and the giving of alms (*zakat*). Like his predecessors, he encouraged *‘ulama* (theologians) at

his court, the most famous being Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani of Pasai (d. 1630), although the mystical doctrines that were encouraged there were later denounced during the reign of his successor, Iskandar Thani (r. 1636–1641). Furthermore, he established a policy of appointing district chieftains (*uleebalang*) on three-year rotations, and he set up a system of parochial mosques. Aceh also maintained formal ties with the Ottoman Empire.

In the seventeenth century, Aceh was engaged in a three-way struggle for the Straits of Melaka with the Portuguese at Melaka and the Malay sultanate of Johor. Further eastward lay the equally powerful states of Banten and Mataram. Iskandar Muda had at his disposal a large fleet of war galleys. However, these vessels, heavily armed and manned, were also very unwieldy and would fail in the key campaign of 1629.

In 1612, Iskandar Muda sent to England’s King James I (1566–1625) a lavishly gilded letter describing himself as “the lord in power here below the winds who holds the throne of Aceh and Samudra and all the countries adjacent” (Schrieke 1957: 254). He sought to back up these claims through regular campaigns, succeeding against Deli (1612) and Aru (1613), defeating Johor and capturing its sultan in the same year, and then unseating the Portuguese at Bintan (1614). After failing to take Melaka in 1616, he took Pahang and its sultan in 1617. Three years later, he struck Kedah, and he sacked Johor again in 1623 and raided Nias in 1624 and 1625. His most cherished aim, though, was to remove the Portuguese from Melaka. In 1629, he assembled a massive fleet to attack Melaka. Unable to take the well-defended town, the fleet laid an ineffective siege for six months before being repulsed by a Portuguese relief mission. The majority of the Acehnese fleet was lost and with it Iskandar Muda’s hopes of dominance of the straits.

Iskandar Muda reigned for a further seven years, his ambitions checked. Moreover, with his death, the foundations he had laid were exposed. Aceh, or more correctly the crowded port city that lay at its heart, was probably unable to be sustained by the surrounding fields. And with the loss of the fleet he had developed, it was probably unable to enforce its claims at sea. None of the rulers who suc-

ceeded Iskandar Muda was able to maintain Acehese power to the same level, although it did remain an independent sultanate until the advent of the Aceh Wars in 1873.

M. F. LAFFAN

See also Aceh (Acheh); Aceh (Acheh) Wars (1873–1903); Banten (Bantam); Islam in Southeast Asia; Johor-Riau Empire; Mataram; Melaka; Pepper; Portuguese Asian Empire; Spices and the Spice Trade; Straits of Melaka; Sumatra

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ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Island Southeast Asia was Islamized over a period of eight centuries. Today, Indonesia represents the largest Muslim nation-state in the world, with an estimated 88 percent of its population of over 228 million people professing Islam. Neighboring Malaysia, with a population of 22 million, has an indigenous Malay and tribal majority of around 58 percent; Thailand and the Philippines each have substantial Muslim minorities in their southern provinces (3.8 percent of 62 million and 5 percent of 83 million people, respectively) (CIA 2001).

Some scholars have argued that Southeast Asian Islamization was accomplished primarily through the agency of foreign traders. The conversion myths of several Southeast Asian peoples, emphasizing a divine connection between the Prophet (s.a.w.) and the local ruler, often hint at such a transmission, relating stories of the visit of a holy man from India or Arabia. It is quite likely, however, that the process was even more complicated, as there were also Southeast Asians actively involved in Indian Ocean trade. Southeast Asian waters facilitated

the trade from India to China, where there was an established Muslim presence from the ninth century. Perhaps, too, there was an impulse from Muslim communities in Champa (present-day southern Vietnam), a kingdom with a history of connections with Java.

It has been suggested that communities of foreign Muslims, forced to wait in Southeast Asia for the return of the monsoon, were given the protection of local rulers. From about the late twelfth century, it appears that some of these Muslims enjoyed influence at various Southeast Asian courts and might have played a role in the conversion of their rulers. The first reports of this process are found in the accounts of Marco Polo (1254–1324), who visited Sumatra en route from Mongol-ruled China in 1292, and the Moroccan Ibn Battuta (1304–1377), who set foot in Sumatra in 1345 and 1346.

Still, trade alone does not explain Islamization, especially as Muslim traders had lived in Southeast Asia for centuries without altering the faith of their local protectors. An alternative argument, pioneered by A. H. Johns, is that with the collapse of the Muslim order in West Asia after the Mongol conquests, Islam underwent an inward turn, with the mystical teachings coming to the fore. Johns argued that traveling mystics should therefore be seen as the primary agents of Islamization, pointing out that mysticism was not a vocation precluding the taking of any other occupation. Famous examples of Southeast Asian *'ulama* (theologians) who emphasized the importance of the mystical path in their teachings include Hamzah Fansuri (d. 1526?) and Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani of Pasai (d. 1630), active in Aceh in the seventeenth century. Even the quasi-mythical *Wali Songo*, the "Nine Saints" who are said to have Islamized Java, also laid emphasis on the mystical path. These teachings did not always remain dominant, though, and some *'ulama*, such as Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1658), attempted to reduce the influence of the allegedly "heterodox" teachings of al-Fansuri and Shams al-Din.

In any case, the first documentation of a royal conversion in island Southeast Asia is the tombstone, dated 1211, of Sultan Sulaiman bin Abdullah al-Basir at Lamuri on the northern tip of Sumatra. Later evidence of the gradual Islamization of the island is seen in the stone of Sultan Malik al-Salih of Samudra (Pasai), dated



Muslim women attend a mass prayer for Idul Adl-Ha. Yogyakarta, Indonesia. (Michael Freeman/Corbis)

1297. By the late fourteenth century, much of the passing trade between India and China was dominated by another Malay sultanate, that of Melaka. After it fell to the Portuguese in 1511, the locus of Muslim trade shifted to the sultanates of Aceh and Banten. From Melaka, the Portuguese Tomé Pires (ca. 1465–ca. 1540) gave a detailed description of the ongoing process of newly Islamized kingdoms asserting their control over the archipelago.

The Islamization of Southeast Asia did not accompany an Arabic conquest and was not identified with the acceptance of Arabic culture. This is not to say that Islam was never spread by conquest, as the forced conversion of the Buginese of Sulawesi by the neighboring Makassarese in 1610 demonstrates. At first, Islamization probably followed simple outward forms for the majority of Southeast Asian populations as, like their rulers, they took Muslim names and began to forsake pork and practice circumcision and Muslim funerary rites. In time, many Muslims sought instruction in the texts of Islam as compiled and disseminated by their religious scholars, the *‘ulama*.

As in West and South Asia, Southeast Asian rulers were often styled “God’s shadow on earth.” The most important Southeast Asian sultanates after the fall of Melaka were those of Mataram (Central and East Java, sixteenth to seventeenth centuries), Banten (West Java, seventeenth century), and Aceh (North Sumatra, sixteenth to seventeenth centuries). However, the supremacy of the sultans was slowly upset from the beginning of the sixteenth century by the incursions of the European states, first Portugal and Spain and then, from the seventeenth century, The Netherlands and Great Britain. And together with the Chinese, Europeans competed aggressively for the trade in the archipelago from their fortified settlements, such as those of Melaka, Tidore, or Batavia (now Jakarta). Whereas the spice-producing sultanates of Maluku (northeast Indonesia) had been effectively under European control from the sixteenth century, it was the complete annexation of Java at the end of the Java War (1825–1830) that signified the final phase of the transition from Muslim to European dominance in present-day Indonesia.

Meanwhile, Singapore (established as a British outpost by Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles in 1819) would function as a rival British hub

to Batavia, with most of the polities of the peninsula coming under de facto British administration subsequent to the Pangkor Agreement of 1874. Nonetheless, the British and Dutch administrations differed in colonial practice with regard to the treatment of the indigenous rulers. Whereas the Dutch generally left the ruler a pensioner in the palace, with little role in the maintenance of religious practice, the British deferred to the Malay rajahs in matters touching on custom and religion.

Despite the rise of Western power, the activities of Southeast Asian scholars in Mecca and Medina continued to play an important role in shaping the future intellectual directions of Southeast Asian Islam. In Arabia, many Southeast Asian *‘ulama*, such as the Acehnese *‘Abd al-Ra’uf* of Singkel (seventeenth century), composed manuals in Malay designed to guide their cobelievers at home. Others, such as the South Sumatran scholar *‘Abd al-Samad* of Palembang (1704–ca. 1789), used the Holy Cities as a base from which to launch polemics against the Christian invaders. The conquest of the Holy Cities in Arabia by the puritanical Saudi-Wahhabi alliance in the early years of the nineteenth century also appears to have inspired the violent activities of the Padri movement in the Minangkabau cultural area of West Sumatra. In this movement and as al-Raniri had in Aceh, the Padris sought to impose a more scripturalist interpretation of Islamic law on the existing traditional (*adat*) order. Matters came to a head in the 1830s when the Dutch intervened on the side of the *adat* chiefs, suppressing the Padris and annexing West Sumatra.

More direct European control in the nineteenth century would inadvertently intensify connections with Islam in West Asia, particularly after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Increasing numbers of pilgrims were able to travel to Mecca for the hajj (pilgrimage). In Mecca, many sought admittance into the mystical orders headquartered there. For example, many West Javanese now gravitated to the Naqshbandiyya *tarekat* (Ar. *tariqa*)—a mystical order of Central Asian origin with a strong emphasis on normative piety. At a time when Europeans were concerned about the potential for Ottoman interference in the ongoing Aceh War and the question of political Islam generally, the Dutch interpreted the Naqshbandiyya as an inherently anticolonial movement. The Banten Ji-

had of 1888 further heightened such fears. However, it was the organizational structure of the movement, rather than its teachings per se, that allowed for the coordination of anti-Dutch activities.

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936), who traveled to the Hijaz in 1884 and 1885 in order to study Southeast Asia's pilgrims and the impact of the mystical orders upon them, dispelled much of the mystery about the activities of Southeast Asians in Mecca. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Banten Jihad, Snouck Hurgronje was hired to head the newly founded Office for Native and Arab Affairs in order to monitor the activities of Muslims in the archipelago.

At the same time, though, Cairo emerged as an important center for Southeast Asians and particularly the Malays, with the new reformist teachings of Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1936) creating great interest. These men inspired a new generation of Muslim activists and urged that the popular practice of Islam had to be stripped to its bare essentials and cleansed of the "heretical innovations" of medieval scholarship. To some extent, they advocated the puritanism of the Wahabiyya but with the important difference that they advocated the appropriation of Western technologies, such as the printing press, and modern organizational techniques. There was already a different reformist impulse emanating from among the Southeast Asian 'ulama in Mecca under Ahmad Khatib of Minangkabau (1860–1915) and among some Hadrami Arabs resident in the archipelago.

Such influences—Western, Cairene, and Meccan—coalesced in the 1910s to give rise to influential Muslim movements on Java, including Sarekat Islam (founded in Surakarta in 1912) and Muhammadiyah (founded in Yogyakarta in 1912). The first emphasized the political activation of Indonesian Muslims; the second prioritized educational and welfare reforms. The influence of these two movements was paralleled in the Malay Peninsula and in particular in Sumatra by the Kaum Muda movement. Shaykh Tahir Jalal al-Din (1869–1956), Abd al-Karim Amr Allah (Haji Rasul, 1879–1949), and Abdullah Ahmad (1878–1933) led the movement in Sumatra.

These reformists did not go unchallenged, and there were many Muslims who sought to

retain their traditional interpretations of Islam, particularly in the regions still under the nominal rule of the Malay sultans and on Java, where many Muslims resented the aggressive puritanism of the reformists. From their disputation for the leadership of Southeast Asian Islam—and particularly in Java after the founding of the traditionalist organization of Nahdatul Ulama (in Yogyakarta in 1926)—Islamic activism became polarized in many parts of Southeast Asia. Such divisions persist in Muslim political culture today, yet both sides have had an impact on the Islamic resurgence now in motion.

M. F. LAFFAN

See also Aceh (Acheh); Aceh (Acheh) Wars (1873–1903); Banten (Bantam); Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Diponegoro (Pangeran Dipanagara) (ca. 1785–1855); Education, Traditional Religious; Hamzah Fansuri (d. 1526?); Ibn Battuta (1304–1377); Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Java; Java War (1825–1830); Madjelis Sjuero Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi) (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations); Maluku (The Moluccas); Mataram; Melaka; Mindanao; Moros; Muhammadiyah; Muslim Minorities (Thailand); Nahdatul Ulama; Newspapers and the Mass Media in Southeast Asia; Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1658); Padri Movement; Padri Wars (1821, 1837); Pangkor Engagement (1874); Persatuan Ulama-Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA); Pires, Tomé (ca. 1465–ca. 1540); Polo, Marco (1254–1324); Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS, Republic of South Moluccas); Residential System (Malaya); Sarekat Islam (1912); Singapore (1819); Snouck, Hurgronje Christian (1857–1936); Suez Canal (1869); Sumatra; *Wali Songo*

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ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (TWENTIETH CENTURY)

The Islamic resurgence currently taking place in Southeast Asia is part of a broader trend in the Muslim world to reassert the core values and experience of Islam as the model by which all people should live their lives. It is, to a large degree, founded on the rejection of Western values and economic dominance in Muslim societies.

The Islamic resurgence arose out of both the nationalist and reformist movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At first, the character of these movements was anticolonial rather than anti-Western. In the case of Egypt, the reformists Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1849–1905) and Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905) advocated a return to the idea of a single Islamic community united under a caliph. They also advocated the appropriation of modern forms of education and technology in order to address the physical predicament of Muslims.

They nonetheless urged that this material advancement also needed a solid foundation in faith. Muslims were to do away with the centuries of “accretions” that impeded the individual's access to a true understanding of Islam as defined by the Koran and the pious conduct of the Prophet (s.a.w.). Moreover, revivalists have conceptualized an idealized state modeled on their understanding of the first Muslim community (*umma*) in Medina, which laid the groundwork for Islam as both revealed faith and a system of governance.

Muhammad 'Abduh was not alone in this regard. There were similar movements in other parts of the Muslim world, most notably in Turkey and India. However, 'Abduh's line of thought was taken up by both modernists and nationalists in Egypt. With 'Abduh's death in 1905, Rashid Rida (1865–1936) played the crucial role of disseminating 'Abduh's ideology in the pages of the influential journal *al-Manar* (established in 1898 in Cairo). This journal would prove to be a key link bringing Egyptian reformism to Southeast Asia and Southeast Asians to Cairo at the turn of the twentieth century. And although there were far fewer Southeast Asians in Cairo than in Mecca, they had a strong impact on the growth of a specifically Southeast Asian reformist movement. Mecca also played a part in the dissemination of such ideas, but in general, the traditionalist line was stressed in that city, and reformism was not encouraged.

The Southeast Asian variant of the movement also adopted the forms of technology advocated by 'Abduh and Rida. It, too, highlighted the role of modern Islamic schools and publishing. Islamic presses were of key importance to this end, and reformist ideas were disseminated through *Manar*-style journals such as *al-Imam* in Singapore (1906) and *al-Munir* in Padang, West Sumatra (1911).

This was a crucial time for Southeast Asian Islam. Reformism, often referred to as modernism, usually found success in areas where the traditional role of the local rulers as defenders of religion had been revoked. For this reason, reformism developed more easily in the areas under Dutch control (in Java in particular after 1912), with the foundation of the key movement Muhammadiyah, which was allied to the mass-organization Sarekat Islam. Ironically, the Dutch authorities were at first well disposed to-

ward the modernists. However, once they began to agitate for independence by the end of World War I (1914–1918), modernism was again regarded as a manifestation of “pan-Islamism” and a religion hostile to the colonial state.

Despite the modernists’ prominent role in the national movement, with the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate in 1924 and the rise of their traditionalist opponents in organizations such as Nahdatul Ulama, the factionalized nature of political Islam in Indonesia was manifested. Reformist support for the new Saudi regime in Arabia further alienated many traditionalists. And as the national movement began to split from the reformist movement, some Muslim leaders began to question the validity of the nationalist project as an end in itself, and they hardened their scripturalist approach.

The Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 saw the temporary neutralization of the competing variants of Indonesian Islam by their forced merger within Masyumi (Masjumi). In the constitutional debates leading up to the declaration of Indonesia’s independence on 17 May 1945, Masyumi leaders strove to have Islam acknowledged as the state religion by stipulating that the president be Muslim and that all Muslims must implement the *Shari’ah* (*Syari’ah*), or Islamic law. Their attempts to include the *Shari’ah* in the constitution as part of what was called the Jakarta Charter became one of the most contentious issues in establishing the new state. Non-Muslim leaders and secularly inclined Muslims opposed constitutional reference to the *Shari’ah* and eventually persuaded Masyumi leaders that, in the interests of national unity, the Jakarta Charter had to be omitted for the time being. Thus, Indonesia was constituted as a pluralist state based on the quasi-secular Pancasila ideology.

The late 1940s and 1950s also saw a number of Islamic insurgencies seeking to establish an Islamic state, such as the Darul Islam movements in West Java and Aceh. Sukarno’s (Soekarno’s) Guided Democracy (1945–1967) and Suharto’s (Soeharto’s) New Order (1967–1998) regimes saw political Islam as a threat and sought either to incorporate or to suppress it, but Islamic revivalism continued to grow, fed by more intensive educational activities.

Since the 1980s, Islam has become far more prominent in the political and social life of Indonesia and Malaysia, especially among urban,

middle-class Muslims. Many more Muslims are attending to ritual obligations such as praying five times a day and fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, and in recent years, record numbers have undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca. Islamic-style clothing, such as head-dresses and loose-fitting gowns, are now much more popular; the market for books on Islam has burgeoned; and programs on Islam feature prominently on television and radio. In short, both societies have taken on a more overtly Islamic flavor in recent decades, suggesting a deeper Islamization process.

A complex mix of factors accounts for this Islamic resurgence. Both Indonesia and Malaysia underwent rapid economic development and modernization from the 1970s, giving rise to a burgeoning Muslim middle class but one whose values and orientation were disturbed by the quick pace of change, competitiveness, and materialism of urban, professional lifestyles. Many turned with greater fervor to Islam as a way of restoring their moral bearings and identity. Politically, the Suharto (t. 1967–1998) and Mahathir (t. 1981–2003) governments found it expedient to appeal to Islamic sentiment. In President Suharto’s case, deteriorating relations with the military from the late 1980s led him to cultivate support among Islamic groups. Measures adopted included sponsoring the formation of new Islamic associations, increasing the proportion of Muslims in key government and military posts, encouraging Islamic banking, and expanding the authority of Islamic courts. In Malaysia, Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (t. 1981–2003) has championed Islamic causes and granted significant concessions to the Muslim community as a way of retaining the support of his Muslim Malay constituency.

This recent Islamic resurgence has taken a variety of forms, ranging from the liberal to the militant. The efflorescence in liberal Muslim thinking in Southeast Asia has attracted interest from across the Islamic world. Indonesia, in particular, has developed a strong liberal movement built on a desire to critically appraise existing doctrine and reinterpret Islamic teachings in a contemporary context. This has led to innovative and often controversial new thinking on issues such as gender, human rights, the environment, reproductive health, and civil society and democracy. Leading figures in this movement

included Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid (who served as the Indonesian president from 1999 to 2001), and Djohan Effendi. In Malaysia, a similar, though less influential, movement has been under way, led by groups such as Sisters in Islam, Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia), and Chandra Muzaffar's International Movement for a Just World.

Militant and doctrinaire expressions of the faith are diverse in both Indonesia and Malaysia. Tight control during the Suharto era kept militant groups underground, but remnants of organizations such as the Darul Islam remained active, though ineffective. Following Suharto's downfall in 1998, militant Islamic groups proliferated as state surveillance was scaled back and as greater freedom of expression made it easier to publicize their activities and recruit members. Among those that have risen to prominence are the paramilitary group Laskar Jihad, which has engaged in armed conflict with Christians in several regions of eastern Indonesia, and the Islam Defenders' Front (FPI), which resorts to vigilante action against nightclubs and red-light areas. Although such organizations have little mainstream support, they attract considerable media attention and have given Indonesia a somewhat more Islamist reputation in the West. Malaysia has taken a strong line against militant groups, banning the revivalist Al-Arqam in 1994 and more recently linking the opposition Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS, Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party) to alleged terrorist groups such as al-Ma'unah (Brotherhood of Inner Power) and the Malaysian Council of Islamic Fighters (KMM).

Political Islamism is most apparent in the efforts of several major Islamic parties in Indonesia and Malaysia to expand the scope and authority of Islamic law in national life. In Indonesia, these efforts have focused on a new campaign to reinstate the Jakarta Charter. In Malaysia, PAS is also committed to establishing an Islamic state and has sought to introduce a full Islamic penal code in the two state governments that it controls (namely, Kelantan and Terengganu), though this effort was halted by the central government.

Current indications are that the Islamic resurgence will continue in Southeast Asia, at least in the short to medium term. The election of Megawati Sukarnoputri (1947–), a secular

nationalist, as Indonesia's president in July 2001 has had little impact on the prominence of Islamic issues in the public sphere, and the survival of her coalition government relies upon her maintaining the support of major Islamic parties. Her government's muted response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the subsequent U.S.-led military campaign against Islamic terrorism was driven largely by the need to avoid alienating the Islamic community. In Malaysia, Mahathir's successor, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (1939–), continues to burnish his own Islamic credentials by adopting elements of the Islamist agenda such as making Islam the basis of the Malaysian state.

M. F. LAFFAN
GREG FEALY

See also Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM) (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement); Darul Islam Movement (DI); Education, Traditional Religious; Education, Western Secular; Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi) (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations); Mahathir bin Mohamad, Dr. (1925–); Malays; Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB, Malay Islamic Monarchy); Moros; Muhammadiyah; Muslim Minorities (Thailand); Nahdatul Ulama; Newspapers and the Mass Media in Southeast Asia; *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Pancasila (Pantja Sila); Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS); Persatuan Ulama-Ulama Seluruh Aceh (PUSA); Religious Development and Influence in Southeast Asia; Rukunegara; Sarekat Islam (1912); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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ISTHMUS OF KRA

The Isthmus of Kra is the narrow section of land in southern Thailand that separates the Andaman Sea from the Gulf of Thailand. At its narrowest, in the region between Chumphon on the west coast of Thailand and Nangin on the east, fewer than 80 kilometers separate the two seas. Its chief significance is that the isthmus traditionally provided an important route for goods moving between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, thereby connecting the important products and markets of southern China, West Asia, and Europe. An overland route across the isthmus was important because it allowed shipping to bypass the sea-lanes of the Straits of Melaka, with its attendant hazards from both the difficulties of navigation and the potential dangers of piracy.

Despite this apparent advantage, the isthmus was never especially popular as an overland alternative to the route around the Malay Peninsula. Transshipment costs were high, and crossing the isthmus, especially with heavier goods, was difficult and costly. The development of the ports of the Straits of Melaka (namely, the Straits Settlements—Melaka, Penang, and Singapore) provided added attractions for merchants taking the longer sea route around the Malay Peninsula, as well as additional trading opportunities. The expansion of European shipping into the region from the early nine-

teenth century did lead to a number of proposals to build a canal across the isthmus to seize that trade. British, French, and German interest in the potential geostrategic importance of the isthmus grew as a result. From the 1860s onward, a series of proposals were mooted, but no successful project was ever launched because of the high cost and economic uncertainty involved in the project. In recent times, canal projects have been proposed as part of wider strategies for the economic development of southern Thailand and northern Malaysia, but no clear economic benefit has yet been demonstrated from such projects, especially as the environmental costs associated with such major undertakings would be very significant.

MARK CLEARY

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767 C.E.), Kingdom of; British Interests in Southeast Asia; Ecological Setting of Southeast Asia; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Hatien; Historical Geography of Mainland Southeast Asia; Jungle/Forest Products; Junk Ceylon (Ujung Salang, Phuket); Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Straits of Melaka; Straits Settlements (1826–1946)

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J

JAMBI

The Jambi region, around the basin of the Batanghari River in central Sumatra, was the site of the pre-Islamic kingdom of Melayu. It also sometimes served as the capital of the empire of Śriwijaya (Śrivijaya). Jambi was an important pepper port in the seventeenth century and later supplied dragon's blood resin to China and Europe. Jambi resisted Dutch control until the early twentieth century.

The earliest references to the region are found in Chinese texts, which recorded an embassy from Melayu to the Chinese court around 644 C.E. A stone inscription suggests that Śriwijaya and Melayu were linked during this period, and the writings of I-Tsing (I-Ching) (635–713 C.E.) have been taken to indicate that Jambi was the capital of Śriwijaya at that time. In the ninth century and again in the eleventh century, Jambi sent further missions to the Chinese court.

The large Buddhist complex of Muara Jambi, 26 kilometers downstream from the modern capital, probably dates from the ninth century, but there is evidence that it was still of importance in the thirteenth, when Melayu seems again to have been the capital of Śriwijaya. Trade in forest products and control of the Straits of Melaka through which foreign shipping passed were key to Jambi's importance.

In the mid-fourteenth century, the Jambi kingdom came under the control of Adityawarman, who had been brought up in the Majapahit kingdom in Java but was probably the son of the

Malay ruler. Adityawarman moved his capital to Dharmashraya, somewhere in the upper reaches of the Batanghari. He extended his power to the highlands of West Sumatra and later moved the capital to Pagarruyung. Although the *Kertanagara*, a Javanese account, listed it as a dependency of Java, Jambi avoided paying tribute to Majapahit and sought patronage from China. However, this strategy caused Jambi to fall afoul of both Majapahit and China. According to O. W. Wolters (1986), the Javanese laid waste to the Jambi *keraton* (*kraton*, royal court, palace) in 1377.

After Adityawarman and until the arrival of European traders, the history of Jambi was recorded only in oral tradition. Islam was probably introduced in the early fifteenth century, when Jambi came under the sway of Demak. By the sixteenth century, Jambi was attracting Arab and Portuguese merchants, but by this time, it owed allegiance to Melaka. In the seventeenth century, pepper brought down the river from the highlands attracted Dutch and English traders. By 1626, Jambi was regarded as the chief source of pepper for the English East India Company (EIC), which brought Indian textiles and gold for exchange. The Dutch also found Jambi a profitable source of pepper, and Jambi enjoyed a time of plenty while manipulating the Anglo-Dutch rivalry.

A fall in pepper prices and conflict with Johor marked the start of economic decline. This process was exacerbated by disputes over royal succession that led to a split between upriver and downriver parts of the kingdom. By the 1630s,

the English had left. Dutch attempts to profit from Jambi's internal difficulties were unsuccessful, and the (Dutch) United East India Company (VOC) closed its post in Jambi in 1770.

In the early nineteenth century, Jambi's trade was chiefly with the British city ports of Singapore and Penang, the main exports being resins, especially *jerenang* (dragon's blood resin). The Dutch returned to Jambi in 1833 and forced a contract with Sultan Muhammad Fakhrudin (Facharudin) (r. ca. 1833–1841) in which he relinquished his rights to import and export duties. However, the British continued to assert their right to trade with Jambi, and Dutch hegemony was circumvented by the use of alternative trade routes.

In 1855, a new ruler, Sultan Taha Saifuddin (r. 1855–1858), came to the throne. He refused to continue the agreements that the Dutch had forced on his predecessors and moved to a secret location in the interior. The Dutch installed a series of puppet rulers, but none agreed to Dutch requests to reside in the capital. From upriver bases, they kept in close contact with Taha, who orchestrated a continuing but erratic resistance to the Dutch, for whom much of the territory remained unsafe.

In 1904, the Dutch killed Taha, and two years later, Jambi became a full residency. Resistance continued for some years, however, and economic factors brought about the relatively settled period thereafter. Local landowners were compensated financially for the use of their land for rubber plantations, heralding a period of prosperity for the people of Jambi. Chinese traders gradually took over the commercial center.

The period of the Japanese occupation (1941–1945) was one of hardship, which continued during the years immediately following Indonesian independence in 1949. Jambi's history from then on has reflected the fortunes of Indonesia as a whole. Proximity to Singapore, the large and economically active Chinese population, and the availability of timber have meant that a degree of prosperity has been maintained. However, the relative lack of substantial resources such as oil has meant that Jambi has remained something of a backwater.

FIONA G. KERLOGUE

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries);

China, Imperial; Demak; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; I-Ching (I-tsing) (635–713 C.E.); Islam in Southeast Asia; Johor; Johor-Riau Empire; Jungle/Forest Products; Kraton Culture; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Malays; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Palembang; Penang (1786); Pepper; Singapore (1819); Singapore (Nineteenth Century to 1990s), Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of; Spices and the Spice Trade; Śrīvijaya (Śrīwijaya); Straits of Melaka; Sumatra; Vereenigde Oost-Indische compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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JAPAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA (PRE-1941)

Japan's specific position as the only country in Asia that succeeded in economic modernization in the late nineteenth as well as the early twentieth century stipulated its relations with Southeast Asia. Japan was inclined to regard itself as a leader of Asia, including Southeast Asia. Outstanding Japanese economic as well as military performance induced a kind of respect from Southeast Asian peoples in the early stages. But as its colonialist policies became clearer, awe and respect were replaced with fear and hatred of Japan.

Starting in the 1910s, Southeast Asia became the supplier of raw materials and the market for industrial products (initially sundry goods, then textiles) for Japan. Japanese investment to this area also began in the early 1900s (first in rubber plantations in Malaya). Japanese immigration to Southeast Asia commenced in the beginning of the Meiji era (1868–1912), the largest settle-

ment being Davao on Mindanao Island, the Philippines, where Manila hemp was grown by the Japanese starting in the mid-1900s.

The clash of interests between a newly emerging imperialist country, Japan, and the old Western imperialist powers that had long ruled Southeast Asia culminated in the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941. In August 1945, Japan was defeated. The most important clue that led to the resumption of economic relations between Japan and the newly independent Southeast Asian countries after the Pacific War was the payment of war-damage reparation. It paved the way for Japanese companies to export their industrial products. Japanese investment in the area started in the late 1950s.

From the mid-sixteenth century till the late seventeenth century, there were seven Japanese enclaves in Southeast Asia that respectively formed a portion of such prosperous cities as Ayutthaya (Thailand), Manila (Philippines), Phnom Penh (Cambodia), and Hanoi (Vietnam). Because of the ban on emigration and external trade by the Tokugawa government in 1635, these Japanese “towns” were gradually extinguished. In the Edo era (1603–1868), Japan was closed to foreigners, with the notable exception of the Dutch and Chinese. Only after the Meiji Restoration (1868) were relations between Japan and Southeast Asia resumed.

Political and Diplomatic Relations

There were several cases in which the nationalists in Southeast Asia required help or assistance from Japan in struggling against the Western colonialists. For instance, in 1899 the Revolutionary Army of the Philippines procured arms and ammunition, though archaic, from the Japanese army. By this dealing Japan intended to extend its influence to the Philippines. But the Japanese ship carrying the firearms sank in a rainstorm, and the attempt was aborted. Soon after the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the Vietnamese nationalist Phan Boi Chau (1867–1940) led the “Exodus to the East” movement, sending some 200 youths to Japan. Their objective was to learn how to modernize a country and to garner support from the Japanese government for Vietnam’s independence. Several years later, however, they

realized that Japan was not their ally, but France’s.

Along with the only independent country in Southeast Asia before the Pacific War, Thailand, Japan concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation in 1898, in which extraterritoriality was admitted to the Japanese. The extraterritoriality clause was abolished only in 1924. Nonetheless, based on this treaty, Japanese advisers helped Thailand in various fields, such as modernizing the legal system, sericulture, and female education.

The first Japanese diplomatic office was established in Manila in 1888 and increased gradually following the expansion of its economic influence (see table). The Western countries welcomed Japanese advancement in the early stages because it was useful for the economic development of their colonies. That was why the Dutch East Indies government accorded the same legal status to the Japanese in 1899 as to Caucasians. But after the end of World War I (1914–1918), conflicts of interest began to surface. Although Japanese activities in Southeast Asia did not provoke anti-Japanese sentiment from the native nationalists, its military invasion and political interference in China resulted in the establishment of anti-Japanese movements among the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.

Trade

In the late 1890s, the main commodities of Japanese export to Southeast Asia were coal, fishes, and sundry goods. Its largest imported commodity was raw sugar from the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia). By the 1900s sundry goods including matches, soap, and chinaware became the largest exported item, and by the early 1910s, textiles, especially cotton products, exceeded all others. Rapid penetration of Japanese textiles into the Southeast Asian market threatened the dominant position of the products of Western countries, and eventually an import quota system was introduced in the respective colonies in the late 1930s. As for Japanese imports, by about 1900 rice from Indochina, Burma (Myanmar), and Thailand exceeded raw sugar. Tin and natural rubber from Malaya were imported by Japan from the start of the twentieth century, and iron ore from Malaya from 1921. Malaya was Japan’s biggest supplier of iron ore during the second half of

the 1930s. At that time Indonesia was the second largest supplier of petroleum to Japan after the United States. In short, Southeast Asia has been a supplier of raw materials and a market for light industrial products for Japan since the end of World War I. Japanese *sogo-shoshas* (large trading companies) had surpassed Western companies in trade with Japan by the early 1910s. The two largest *sogo-shoshas*, Mitsui and Company and Mitsubishi Corporation, established Singapore branches in 1891 and 1917, respectively. Prior to the Pacific War, the two companies had established their branches in the main economic towns of Southeast Asia.

Investments

As of 1939, Japanese investments by area and by industry were as follows (million of Yen):

By Territory

Malaya	69.9
British North Borneo	20.1
Dutch East Indies	60–90
Philippines	88.0
Indochina	0.9
Thailand	1.3
Others	22.8
Total:	300.0

By Products

Rubber	100
Manila hemp	30
Coconuts, agricultural produce	20
Forestry	20
Mining	60
Fisheries	20
Commerce, Banking & Services	40

Conglomerate companies such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and Nissan owned the larger Japanese rubber plantations in Malaya. The highest Japanese percentage of plantation acreage in Malaya (3.9 percent) was in 1919. A few Japanese companies including a Nissan affiliate monopolized the iron ore mining in Malaya, and all the products were exported to Japan. Japanese fishing companies provided half of the marine products in Singapore in the 1930s. The Japanese monopolized Manila hemp plantations in Davao. Western countries felt threatened by these activities and began to restrict them after the end of World War I.

Immigrants and Education

From the very beginning of the Meiji era, hundreds of young girls of poor rural areas were taken to foreign countries, especially to Southeast Asia. They were called “*karayuki* (go to China) *san*.” The majority of *karayuki-san* served as inmates of brothels in the major urban centers. As the Japanese government encouraged emigration of poor farmers to reduce rural poverty, hundreds of Japanese farmers were settled in Malaya, North Borneo, and Thailand in the early 1890s. But many of them died because of the tropical climate and overwork; the immigration projects failed within a few years. In the Philippines, thousands of Japanese laborers were employed to construct the Benguet Road to reach Baguio, a newly planned summer resort, in the early 1900s. After the completion of the road in 1905, Davao became the center for Japanese settlers. They grew Manila hemp, and their numbers had reached about 20,000 when the Pacific War started. In Malaya, 1,000 to 2,000 Japanese worked on rubber plantations as tappers in the 1910s. Hundreds of merchants also lived there. They started their businesses as peddlers in the 1900s and later settled themselves in various towns as retailers, photographers, dentists, and so on. They were the vanguard for Japanese goods. Hundreds of Japanese fishermen also lived in Singapore, North Borneo, the Philippines, and Indonesia. These Japanese residents formed Japanese societies even in remote towns. Most of them were formed in the mid-1910s.

Like their Chinese counterparts, the Japanese emphasized the need for and value of education. Japanese immigrants established Japanese-type elementary schools in the bigger towns. Teachers, textbooks, and curricula were imported from Japan.

Prior to the Pacific War, many of these Japanese returned to Japan. When the war started, those who had remained were arrested and interned. They were later released upon the arrival of Japanese Imperial forces. War, however, did not bring prosperity to the Japanese residents of Southeast Asia.

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See also Abaca (Manila Hemp); “Asia for the Asiatics”; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; China

Japanese Consulates and Embassies: Year of Establishment

Country	Before and during the Pacific War		After the War	
	Consulate	Embassy	Consulate	Embassy
Brunei				1984
Cambodia	1945 ¹			1954
Indonesia	1909		1952	1958
Laos				1955
Malaysia	1938 ²			1957
Myanmar	1920	1943 ⁶	1952	1954
Philippines	1888 ³	1943 ⁶		1956
Singapore	1889 ⁴		1952	1965
Thailand		1897		1952
Vietnam	1920 ⁵			1975 ⁷

NOTES: Consulates include Consulates General.

1. Japanese government approved (nominal) independence of Cambodia in March 1945.
2. Consulate in Sandakan of British North Borneo.
3. Consulate in Manila was closed from 1893 to 1896.
4. The first Japanese honorable consul in Singapore, Hoo Ah Kay, was appointed in 1879. He was concurrently the first Chinese consul, appointed in 1877. When he died in 1880, the Japanese Consulate was closed until 1889.
5. Consulate in Haiphong. Consulates in Saigon and Hanoi were established in 1921 and 1926 respectively.
6. Japanese government approved (nominal) independence of Burma and the Philippines in August and October 1943 respectively.
7. Embassy in the then Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) was established in 1954.

SOURCES: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, ed. 1965. *Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo narabini Shuyo Bunsho* [*Japan's Diplomatic Relations: Chronological Table and Main Documents*]. Tokyo: Hara Shobo.

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Relief Fund; Hanoi (Thang-long); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Manila; Phan Boi Chau (1867–1940); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Phnom Penh; Reforms and Modernization in Siam

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JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (1941–1945)

The Pacific War started when Japanese armed forces landed on the Malay Peninsula on 8 December 1941. Manila was occupied by Japanese forces on 2 January 1942, followed by Singapore on 15 February, Batavia (Jakarta) on 5 March, and Rangoon (Yangon) on 8 March. By the end of May 1942, all of Southeast Asia had come under Japanese military occupation. Prior to that, they had peacefully occupied North Indochina on 23 September 1940 and South Indochina on 29 July 1941, based on the agreements that had been concluded, under military threat, with the French Vichy government. Although Thailand (Siam) was an independent country, Japanese armies intruded there on the same day that the Pacific War erupted. With the Pact of Alliance concluded between the two countries on 11 December 1941, Thailand was de facto occupied by Japan also. Thus, until 15

August 1945, when Japan surrendered, the entire region of Southeast Asia was under Japanese jurisdiction.

Although this period itself was not long, the occupation brought about drastic changes to Southeast Asia in many dimensions. Nationalistic awakening during the occupation brought about the independence of various countries soon after the end of the war. Southeast Asians consider this awakening to have grown because Japanese rule was far more oppressive than that of the Western colonialists. On the contrary, some Japanese still maintain the opinion that this awakening resulted from the self-reliant consciousness cultivated by the occupying Japanese authorities. As to the economic situation, the occupation destroyed the prewar fundamental production system. Such products as the rice of Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, and Indochina, as well as the rubber and tin of Malaya, could not be transported to the traditional consuming areas. Manufactured daily necessities could not be imported from the Western countries as in the past. As hundreds and thousands of youths were conscripted for military construction works, production, such as rice cultivation, suffered. The Japanese military administration (JMA) issued large quantities of military banknotes, and shortages of materials and soaring inflation haunted the entire region. In the social arena the JMA tried to Japanize (*Nipponize*) the local peoples. Japanese culture, especially Japanese spirit (*Yamato-damashii*) and the Japanese language (*Nihon-go*), was imposed on them as the model to be upheld. People were compelled to worship the Japanese emperor. Religions other than Shintoism were slighted. To implement its policies, the JMA mobilized various elements of the local population such as the traditional elite and young nationalists. Many prewar elite who cooperated with the Japanese lost their influence after the war. Those leaders who had been involved in the clandestine anti-Japanese activities led the independence struggle in the postwar period.

Politics

In preparation for war, Japanese intelligence sections worked upon the various anti-Western groups. The fundamental stand of the Japanese government, as well as its army, toward the Southeast Asian peoples was shown in the "Es-

sential Guidelines in Implementing the Administration in the Southern Occupied Territories," decided at the Imperial General Headquarters–Government Liaison Conference on 20 November 1941. The "Guidelines" stated: (1) In order to ascertain acquisition of the military resources and self-support of the army in the occupied areas, heavy burden on civil life should be tolerated. (2) Lead the natives (*genju domin*) to strengthen their reliance on the Imperial Army. (3) Refrain from inducing a too early independence movement (Japan Defense Agency 1985: 91–92). Concrete policies varied, depending on the country as well as on the deteriorating war situation. As for Burma, the *Minami Kikan* (Minami Agency) headed by Colonel Suzuki Keiji was formed in January 1941. By October 1941, persuaded by the Japanese army, thirty young nationalists including Thakin Aung San (1915–1947) received training on Hainan Island, which had been occupied by the Japanese forces since February 1939. They became the nucleus of the Burma Independence Army (BIA), which was formed in December 1941 and helped the Japanese military invasion into Burma.

As for Malaya, the Japanese consul in Singapore as well as the Fujiwara Kikan approached the *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* (KMM, Young Malay Union) led by Ibrahim Yaacob (1911–1979). This was detected by British intelligence, and 140 members of the KMM were detained on 7 December 1941. On their release by the Japanese army, they cooperated with Japan. As KMM's demand for independence seemingly went too far, it was disbanded in May 1942. Afterward, some leaders including Ibrahim worked individually as advisers. As for Indonesia, Japan attached importance to such nationalists as M. H. Tamrin of the *Partai Indonesia Raya* (Parindra). Because of severe oppression by the Dutch authorities, however, Japanese intelligence works were ineffective before the war. Shortly after occupying Indonesia, the Japanese army released the most influential nationalists, Sukarno (1901–1970) and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980), who had been imprisoned since 1934. Intending to take advantage of the Japanese for their independence struggle against the Dutch, they decided to cooperate with Japan to a certain extent. In Vietnam, such conservative anti-French elements as Prince Conde (1883–1951) and the Cao Đài Church were

made the Japanese vanguards. The Indian campaign also involved Southeast Asia—inter alia Malaya and Thailand. The Indian Independence League (IIL) organized by the Indian nationalists residing in those areas cooperated with the Japanese army, and as a result the Indian National Army (INA) was born in Malaya. A prominent leader, Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), led both the IIL and the INA following July 1943.

In order to showcase the cause of Asian liberation from Western colonial rule, the Japanese prime minister, Tojo Hideki (1884–1948, t. 1941–1944), announced at the Diet (Parliament) that while Malaya and Hong Kong would be kept as Japanese defense bases, the Philippines and Burma would be permitted independence. Official documents from this period show that the real objectives were military expediency. Nonetheless, this policy, which was initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was opposed by the military and shelved when the whole of Southeast Asia came under Japanese rule. At the early stage of the JMA, the native peoples in general welcomed the Japanese forces as liberators. Because of oppressive policies and ever deteriorating living conditions, however, their hostility toward the JMA gradually and steadily grew. Besides, since mid-1942, Japan was losing the war. In order to rule and defend the occupied territories, the cooperation of the local people became indispensable. Thus, the dormant original plan was revived. Burma was granted independence on 1 August 1943, followed by the Philippines on 14 October 1943, Annam (Vietnam) on 11 March 1945, Cambodia on 13 March 1945, and Luang Prabang (Laos) on 8 April 1945. The Free India Provisional Government headed by Bose was founded on 21 October 1943 and two days later recognized by the Japanese government. As its territory the Japanese government offered the Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Indian Ocean. In any case, the Japanese army held the real power. Each independent country had to be a part of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. As such, few Southeast Asians regarded this as real independence. Moreover, based on the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934, the Philippines was to attain independence in 1946. The “future” independence of Indonesia was first referred to by Prime Minister Koiso Kuniaki (1880–1950, t. 1944–1945) on 6 Sep-

tember 1944. The Indonesian nationalists greatly shortened the originally scheduled preparation period; two days after the Japanese surrender, Sukarno declared Indonesia’s independence.

Another important device of the JMA was Japanese-trained armies. In Burma the BIA became the Burma Defense Army in July 1942 and then the Burma National Army in August 1943, following the Japanese-sponsored Burmese declaration of independence. In Indonesia and Malaya, there were the Giyugun (Pembela Tanah Air [PETA] Defenders of the Homeland), Giyutai (volunteer corps), and Heiho (auxiliary soldiers). These groups were formed in order to defend their respective territories from the Allied Forces’ imminent counterattack; in reality, they functioned virtually as laborers in the construction and repair of military installations (airfields, ports). All of them were drawn exclusively from native youths. Relations between the JMA and these armies, including the INA, were not always cordial, because while the JMA considered the armies as merely their tools, the armies considered themselves as means for attaining independence. The BNA led by Aung San, together with the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) and the People’s Revolutionary Party, formed the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) in August 1944 and en masse rose up against Japan in March 1945. PETA in Indonesia was to become the nucleus of the anti-Dutch armed struggle from 1945 to 1949 when the Dutch government denied Indonesian independence. PETA in Malaya was dissolved mainly because its commander, Ibrahim Yaacob, who was also the former KMM leader, absconded to Indonesia. But many members were to become the core of the Malay left-wing party, the Malayan Malay Nationalist Party, when it was formed in September 1945.

Various spontaneous as well as Allied-sponsored anti-Japanese movements also emerged. The former included the Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) led by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), whose members consisted mainly of Chinese, and the Việt Minh (Vietnam Independence League) led by the Indochina Communist Party (ICP). In the Philippines, there was the Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon, or People’s Anti-Japanese Army), and in North Borneo

(Sabah, Malaysia) the Kinabalu Guerrilla Force, whose numbers were composed of both natives and the Chinese. The Free Thai Movement operated underground in occupied Thailand. The Allied-sponsored anti-Japanese movements included Force 136, which was organized by both the British and Chinese governments and operated in Malaya, Thailand, and Burma. Its counterpart operating in northern Borneo was the Anglo-Australian Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD). In Malaya, those traditional elite who in one way or another cooperated with the JMA also secretly formed or sponsored clandestine anti-Japanese organizations.

In the anti-Western independence struggle in the postwar period, the overt anti-Japanese forces played the pivotal role in Vietnam and Burma. In Indonesia, Sukarno continued in leading the struggle. In Malaya and the Philippines, the returned colonial powers suppressed the respective anti-Japanese guerrilla forces and instead chose the traditional elite as their successors to power.

Economy

The prewar fundamental economic structure was broken from the onset of the Japanese occupation. As for rice cultivation, many indispensable elements gradually became scarcer. Laborers were conscripted, farming implements could not be renewed, and cattle were commandeered by the military. In one of the major producing areas, Burma, Indians who played major roles as laborers as well as moneylenders fled to India. Rice mills that had been destroyed consequent of warfare could not be repaired for want of materials. In Vietnam, farmers were forced to convert cultivation from rice to cotton and jute. Forced delivery of rice to the JMA at low prices discouraged the rice farmers. Thus production was greatly reduced (see table). Moreover, products in these areas could not be effectively transported to consuming areas such as Malaya and the Philippines. Cargo vessels, even if available, were sunk by Allied navies. Railway and road transportation was inadequate because of lack of fuel. Besides, there was a shortage of locomotives and trucks, and railway tracks were destroyed. Even in North Vietnam and Upper Burma, people suffered food shortages because rice could not be transported from the producing areas—that is, South

Vietnam and Lower Burma. In North Vietnam, 2 million people were believed to have starved to death in the first half of 1945.

In the rice-importing territories, despite JMA efforts in implementing various policies to increase rice production, none attained expected results. Schemes such as opening new rice fields, introducing high-yielding Taiwan (*Horai*) rice, irrigation, and double cropping, as well as resettlement programs in which townspeople were sent to the interior areas or to the jungle, achieved little success. Military consumption was given priority. Rationing had been introduced in Singapore and Manila in early 1942, and rations were gradually reduced and eventually in early 1945 became unavailable altogether. People were told to grow tapioca and sweet potatoes. Other foods also became difficult to obtain. In the Philippines, farmers were compelled to grow cotton instead of sugarcane. Private Japanese companies monopolized and controlled trade in essential commodities. Scarcity of commodities and their awkward circulation made the black markets thrive. The cost of living increased tremendously, and malnutrition prevailed. In Singapore, the living cost index of 100 in December 1941 shot to 10,980 in May 1945 (Kratoska 1997: 202, 203). The number of deaths in Singapore for the year 1944 was 42,751, far exceeding that of births, 31,722, and nearly triple the average prewar figures (Colony of Singapore 1958: 21, 32).

As the traditional export commodities could not be exported anymore, their production was also badly hit. Laid-off workers were either conscripted as *romushas* (laborers) or resettled to grow their own edible plants. Some 20,000 former Indian tappers joined the INA (Netaji Centre 1992: 42).

To compensate for damage caused during the military campaigns and occupation, the Japanese government paid reparations to each Southeast Asian country. In many fields, it took no less than a few years to recover the prewar production levels.

Society

When the JMA started operation, the Japanese army felt it necessary to eliminate anti-Japanese elements. In Malaya, tens of thousands of Chinese were massacred in the early days. In the Philippines hundreds of thousands of people

**Paddy Production and Rice Export of the
Major Producing Areas (thousand tons)**

	Thailand		Burma		Indochina	
	Production	Export	Production	Export*	Production	Export
1940	4,972	1,222	6,894	n.a.	6,548	1,586
1941	5,171	1,175	7,738	n.a.	6,867	944
1942	3,907	760	5,752	275	6,762	974
1943	5,758	545	3,053	85	7,259	1,024
1944	5,158	313	2,545	6	7,270	499
1945	4,928	197	2,677	0	6,497	45
1946			3,844		4,491	

*Export to Malaya and Japan only.

SOURCE: Adapted from Paul H. Kratoska, ed. 1998. *Food Supplies and the Japanese Occupation in Southeast Asia*. London: Macmillan Press, pp. 9–25.

were killed, mainly in the defense campaigns. Total death tolls in Asia including both soldiers and civilians as well as the Japanese themselves during the war are estimated at between 20 and 30 million.

The JMA designed and implemented different policies toward the various ethnic communities. The Chinese were generally discriminated against. In Malaya, northern Borneo, and the Philippines, Chinese communities were forced to donate huge amounts of compensation money to the JMA. Even though not intentional, the “divide and rule” policies widened, if they did not create, the rift between the Chinese and the natives. In Malaya, bloody Sino-Malay clashes broke out in early 1945 and lasted for a few years. In Bangkok, the Yaowarat Incident of September 1945, a celebration by Chinese nationalists living in Thailand of China’s victory of Japan, witnessed open clashes between Thais and Chinese.

Some prewar primary schools were reopened. In these schools, Western languages were prohibited. The main educational objective was to teach the Japanese language and instill the Japanese spirit. Native languages other than Chinese were allowed as auxiliary languages. Not only schoolchildren but also the general public were taught that Japan and Japanese culture were superior, and that the Japanese emperor was the supreme living god. Nonetheless, the Japanese language, in practice,

could not be used for daily life and administration. As such, the Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia) was adopted as the common language in Indonesia. Indonesian historians attributed this practice to the improvement of their national language. English was widely used for administrative purposes in Malaya and northern Borneo, despite the closure of all English-language schools.

Religion was also mobilized in order to realize the objectives of Japan, although religious disciplines and morals were slighted. Religious leaders and teachers, who had been neglected in the early stages, were later told to preach to their followers cooperation with the JMA and Japan. Even Muslims were compelled to worship, facing east toward the emperor’s palace, instead of or in addition to Mecca. These were all part of the Japanization process.

On 12 September 1945, Major General Itagaki Seishiro (1885–1948), on behalf of the commander-in-chief of the Southern Army, Field Marshal Count Terauchi Hisaichi (1879–1946), who had been taken ill in Saigon, officially signed the surrender treaty in Singapore.

HARA FUJIO

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); “Asia for the Asiatics”; Aung San (1915–1947); Bataan Death March; Burma Communist Party (BCP); Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma

Independence Army (BIA); China Relief Fund; Collaboration Issue in Southeast Asia; “Comfort Women”; “Death Railway” (Burma–Siam Railway); Force 136; “Fortress Singapore”; Free Thai Movement; Fujiwara Kikan (F. Kikan); Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon) (People’s Anti-Japanese Army) (1942); Ibrahim Yaacob (1911–1979); Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Khmer Issarak (Free Khmer); Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi) (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA); Mountbatten, Admiral Lord Louis (1900–1979); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Plaek Phibunsongkhram, Field Marshal (1897–1964); Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983); Sandakan Death March; Seni Pramoj, M. R. (1905–1997); Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); *Sook ching*; South–East Asia Command (SEAC); *Syonan-to*; Terauchi Hisaichi, Field Marshal Count (1879–1946); Thirty Comrades; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, League for the Independence of Vietnam); Yamashita Tomoyuki, General (1885–1946)

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JATAKAS

The *Jatakas* are moral stories related to the previous lives of the historical Buddha. They exist in numerous versions and have been translated into all the major languages of Southeast Asia. What makes these texts particularly appealing is that they were illustrated on numerous Buddhist monuments. For example, the lower register of the first gallery of Borobudur is composed entirely of illustrations of this type of story (the size of this composition is, however, exceptional). Other representations of *Jatakas* can be found at Candi Mendut and Candi Sojwan, both of the eighth to ninth centuries. From the thirteenth century, although Buddhism was no longer the preponderant religion, one finds some rare *Jataka* illustrations, no longer from the original text but according to a Javanese reinterpretation of the stories, *Tantri*, such as are retold in the *Pancatantra* on Candi Jago and Candi Panataran.

In Cambodia around the end of the twelfth century, Buddhism became the state religion. But despite the abundance of Buddhist iconography, the *Jatakas* were seldom depicted in reliefs. This situation probably changed when the Khmer embraced a version of Buddhism nearer to the doctrine of the Lesser Vehicle. Pagodas were ornamented with frescoes depicting not only the life of the Buddha but also the *Jatakas*, although, sadly, ancient remains of them are scanty. The situation is the same in Laos and Thailand. In the latter country, particularly in the Chiang Mai region, the paintings are often of

high quality, for example, those that adorn Wat Phra Sing from the early nineteenth century.

In Burma, the situation is rather different due to the existence of frescoes executed on brick walls of considerable area; the paintings are better preserved than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. At Pagan, in the great architectural group at the site, the Pitaka Taik library contains a remarkable group of frescoes painted in the eighteenth century. However, in Burma, the oldest *Jataka* representations are modeled on the blue-glazed terra-cotta plaques inserted in walls, remnants of which unfortunately are very fragmentary. The most complete series is found on the Ananda temple of the eleventh century and on the base of the Petleik stupa of the twelfth century, both at Pagan.

JACQUES DUMARCAY

TRANSLATED BY JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also Borobudur; Buddhism; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; *Candi*; Chiang Mai; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Pagan (Bagan)

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JAVA

Java as an identity is very ambiguous. Although in cartography and common speech the term *Java* generally applies to the island of that name, the ethnic content of the term *Javanese* applies primarily to the central and eastern parts of the island, where Javanese is spoken. As a geographic term, it was already mentioned before the common era and was subsequently found in the *Geographia* by the Greek geographer Claudius Ptolemaeus (Ptolemy) (90–168 C.E.). Whether inhabitants of the island referred to

themselves as Javanese is, of course, impossible to assess. Although the term *Jawi* is known from the earliest chronicles, it was foreigners who applied it to the island and not to the predominant polity in the central part of the island.

Central Java has been the dwelling place of humans and their supposed predecessors since the earliest times, and the world's oldest human remains have been found in that island, specifically around Merapi. In prehistoric times, Java was visited by traders from the surrounding countries, who introduced the technology of metalworking. Maritime relations with China and India increased enormously in the first centuries of the common era, and Javanese ships sailed the Asian waters as far as Madagascar. Political organization reached a level of sophistication during the first millennium C.E. For centuries, the fertile plains of central and eastern Java would be the hotbed of kingdoms and sophisticated cultures, only to be surpassed in the sixteenth century by Islamic kingdoms along the north coast and, later, by the colonial powers. The power of the Central Javanese kingdoms may have been based on agriculture and taxation, but the market economy was well developed. The numerous archaeological remains point to intensive long-distance trade relations, not least epitomized in the refined Hindu-Buddhist monumental architecture.

The most expansionist Javanese state of the next millennium was Majapahit, which dominated politics on the island from the late thirteenth century through the fifteenth century. Majapahit experienced its glory days under King Râjasanagara (Hâyam Wuruk) (r. 1350–1389). Its sphere of influence extended over most islands bordering the Java Sea and sometimes even beyond. Its hegemony over the polities outside the central plains of Java was largely based on tribute relations, not on formal rule, which makes it difficult to assess its power range. Majapahit's power weakened after the late fourteenth century.

By the fourteenth century, Islam had reached Java, where it made quick headway. It seems that only the elites of the towns on Java's north coast, where traders and settlers from Arabia had taken residence and had successfully proselytized, had adopted the new faith. But the Islamic identity became the cornerstone of the new states that sprang up along the north coast of Java after the Majapahit kingdom had crum-

bled. Its successor states fell to the armies of the sultan of Demak in the early sixteenth century. Demak's hegemony over the island was incomplete and short-lived, but it showed the importance of two new forces in Java: Islam and commerce-based politics.

By the end of the sixteenth century, a new dynasty had risen in the central plains of Java, known by the name Mataram. Within several decades until about 1630, the first three Mataram rulers managed to subdue most parts of the island, including the commercially thriving northern coast (*pasisir*). The Mataram rulers wanted to present themselves as the (rightful) successors of the Majapahit kings and did everything to prop up this claim. But Mataram never reached the expanse of Majapahit, and after the reign of Amangkurat I (r. 1646–1677), a decline set in. Internal strife eroded the strength of the state, while the expanding power of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) slowly ate away at the territories of Mataram. The VOC did this reluctantly, as it shied away from taking on large territorial responsibilities, in particular as the Central Javanese lands had little to offer in terms of high-value export products for the European markets. But the VOC was depending on rice and timber from Java, and it had no interest in a back-door neighbor that was either unstable or too powerful.

The Mataram kingdom (ca. 1580–1755) reached its greatest power during the reign of Sultan Agung (r. 1613–1646). After him, control over the kingdom became more tenuous and problematic. Central to these problems was the advent of the VOC, though not, as could be expected, by its territorial ambitions but rather by its recurrent interventions in succession struggles and pacifying the kingdom and by its maritime hegemony in the archipelago. Although the VOC added Javanese districts to its territory piecemeal, the Mataram state became crippled by recurrent succession crises and civil wars. In the mid-eighteenth century, the stalemate between two rival factions was complete, and the VOC enforced a division of the kingdom. The result was the formation of the twin kingdoms of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, which, with different status, have survived until the present day.

The balance between the European and Javanese powers tipped definitively only in the early nineteenth century, when the Dutch and, for a short period, the English rulers in Batavia

were willing and able to enforce their will on the Javanese courts with military power. The Java War (1825–1830), led by the anti-Dutch and religiously inspired Prince Dipanegara (Diponegoro) (ca. 1785–1855), was to be the last attempt at resistance from the Javanese courts, but it resulted only in a further mutilation of the territories and assertion of Dutch hegemony.

In the parts of Java under direct rule of the government in Batavia, the Dutch embarked on a reorganization of their system of administration and the extraction of marketable products. The Cultivation System, which became the formal policy of exploitation in 1830, was not a completely new invention. In fact, it was a continuation and extension of a system of forced deliveries that had been applied in the West Javanese mountain areas of the Priangan (Preanger). Historians have hotly debated the effects of the Cultivation System on Javanese society. It is argued that the introduction of the system of forced deliveries resulted in a general impoverishment of the Javanese population. But the effects were at once more varied and, in the longer term, less harmful than alleged. In reality, the effects for the Javanese differed strongly from region to region. The greatest hardship was felt in the early decades of the system. In some regions, the labor burdens were too heavy and led to severe famines. Later, the system seems to have operated more smoothly. This was reflected in the fairly quick growth of the Javanese population, which, if colonial guesswork can be trusted, rose from 6.3 million in 1825 to 19.5 million in 1880 (Boomgaard 1989: 166).

Another effect of the system of exploitation was the change in the settlement and authority structure. The position of the *pangreh praja* (administrative elite) was adversely affected. The main business of extracting products and labor went on between the Dutch Indies government and the *lurah* (village heads), thereby surpassing the Javanese regents (*bupati*). The Javanese *bupati* were gradually reduced to salaried officials with an increasingly ceremonial position. Their posts tended to become hereditary, and their numbers were gradually reduced. Although many families retained their official positions until after independence, the *pangreh praja* lost their popular leadership and would, during the last colonial decades, be surpassed by a new nationalist elite.

Colonialism was not only about the extraction of products for the world markets. As the Indies government paid for the deliveries, the Cultivation System greatly stimulated the monetization of the Javanese economy. However, the emphasis on agricultural labor, the concentration of various commercial and credit functions in the hands of Chinese, and the privileging of European business impeded the development of an indigenous Javanese business community. Another effect of the Cultivation System was the continuing commercial development of cities along Java's north coast. Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya developed into harbor towns, from where export commodities were shipped to the markets in Europe and elsewhere.

After 1860, the Cultivation System was gradually being dismantled, and a more liberal economic system was introduced, whereby the plantation sector was left to entrepreneurs and the colonial government concentrated on administration, education, and infrastructural projects. Thanks to the demographic pressure on the island, Java became the source of large numbers of laborers who were recruited for the new plantations and industries in the so-called Outer Islands, especially East Sumatra and Borneo (Kalimantan).

The first nationalist stirrings in the Indonesian archipelago occurred on Java, where, in 1908, the Javanese association Boedi Oetomo (Noble Endeavor) was founded. The association aimed at bolstering Javanese consciousness and culture against European arrogance and Chinese dominance. In its wake, other organizations sprang up, such as the Sarekat Islam (1912), which advocated, in increasingly radical terms, the independence of Indonesia. Instead of the provincial outlook of the early organizations, the later parties all had an Indonesia-wide focus. After 1900, the Netherlands Indies became increasingly unified, and the anticolonial reaction adopted the same geographic scope.

The Japanese occupation (1942–1945) set Java apart from the other portions of the former Netherlands East Indies. For three and a half years, the contacts between Java and the other islands were broken, except for the deportation of about 300,000 *romusha* (laborers) and for the Indonesian leaders who traveled to Japan (Ricklefs 2001: 255). When Japan capitulated on 15 August 1945, the nationalist leaders

immediately proceeded to proclaim the independence of the Indonesian Republic, an act that plunged Java and parts of the other islands into warfare with the Dutch. Between 1946 and 1949, Yogyakarta became the capital of the nascent republic.

In the new Republic of Indonesia, Java was often considered to be the center stage while the rest of Sumatra, Borneo, and the Outer Islands were props backstage or mere audience members. Kahhar Muzakkar, the former republican revolutionary who turned insurrectionist in the 1950s to withstand the expanding power of Jakarta in Sulawesi, blamed Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970) for “Majapahitism.” He was referring to the imperialistic vision embraced by the rulers of the Javanese Majapahit kingdom that sought to bring *Nusantara* (lands beyond Java) under their control, in other words, hegemony over the Malay Archipelago (present-day Malaysia and Indonesia). Much regional resentment against the heavy hand of Jakarta in the 1950s and later was expressed in this kind of anti-Javanese sentiment but was, in fact, more directed against the central government based at Jakarta than against Java per se.

The postindependence period is characterized by an ambiguous relationship between the center of power and the out-of-center power base in Central and East Java. After the government had moved to Jakarta in 1949, Central and East Java remained the most important electorate for Jakartan politics. It was the hotbed of communism until the Suharto-led mass killings in 1965 and 1966, as well as the center of the Nahdatul Ulama and other Islamic movements. In cultural terms, the developments of the late colonial period have continued, in which Java is primarily identified with the court cultures of Yogyakarta and Surakarta, whose courts have positioned themselves as the keepers of Javanese culture and traditions.

In the post-Suharto era (since 1998), differences between Central Java and the Sundaland have become more overt. An upsurging cultural consciousness among intellectuals and cultural brokers and the republic's policy on the devolution of responsibilities to the local (*kabupaten*, or district) level have propped up regional antagonisms between the Pasundan and Central Java and even more localized differences as well.

REMCO RABEN

See also Agung, Sultan of Mataram (r. 1613–1645); Amangkurat I (Sunan Tegalwangi) (r. 1645–1677); Amangkurat II (Adipati Anom) (r. 1677–1703); Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jakarta, Djakarta/Jakarta); Boedi Oetama (Budi Utomo) (1908); Borneo; Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Darul Islam Movement (DI); Demak; Diponegoro (Pangeran Dipanagara) (ca. 1785–1855); Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Hamengkubuwono II (r. 1792–1810); Hayâm Wuruk (Râjasanagara) (r. 1350–1389); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Islam in Southeast Asia; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); “Java Man” and “Solo Man”; Java War (1825–1830); Javanese Wars of Succession (1677–1703, 1719–1722, 1749–1755); Madura; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Malang Temples; Mataram; Metal Age Cultures in Southeast Asia; Metal Smithing; Nahdatul Ulama; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; *Nusantara*; *Pasisir*; Sarekat Islam (1912); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–); Sumatra; Surabaya; Surakarta; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); Yogyakarta (Jogjakarta)

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“JAVA MAN” AND “SOLO MAN”

Eugene Dubois made the discovery in 1891 of the skeletal remains of *Homo erectus* in Trinil, East Java—thus the name “Java Man.” He identified the remains as *Pithecanthropus*. Reputedly the first human fossil discovery in Southeast Asia, it is believed to be from 500,000 to 1,000,000 years old, from the Lower Pleistocene period. Sangiran and Ngandong as well as Trinil are sites along the Solo River as it flows from Central to East Java that possess many fossilized human remains, including skulls. “Solo Man” (*Homo sapiens soloensis*) refers to fossilized human skeletal remains found in Sambungmacan and Ngandong; much younger, they may be from the Upper Pleistocene period—or some 100,000 years old.

Java Man and Solo Man are described as having smaller brains than modern man (*Homo sapiens*), an apelike facial profile, stronger jaws and teeth, and a muscular build; they are thought to have walked upright but to have been overall shorter in stature. Although it remains uncertain whether he is a descendant of Java Man and Solo Man, the earliest discovered *Homo sapiens* is “Wajak Man,” who lived about 40,000 years ago in Wajak, East Java. There is close affinity between Wajak Man, believed to be an Austromelanesian, and the forefathers of present-day Australian Aborigines.

What is apparent is that by about 30,000 years ago, ancestors of modern humans had settled throughout Southeast Asia. Their remains have been found in the Niah Caves (Sarawak) and Tabon Cave (Philippines).

See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; Niah Caves (Sarawak); “Perak Man”; Tabon Cave (Palawan)

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JAVA WAR (1825–1830)

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, politics developed in a way that the Javanese kingdoms of Surakarta and Yogyakarta could not have imagined. When the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC, [Dutch] United East India Company) was liquidated (1799), its possessions were taken over by the then-French-dominated government in The Netherlands. Previously, the position of the Javanese kingdoms was strong and more or less free of Dutch interference. After the division of the kingdom of Mataram in the middle of the eighteenth century, peace had reigned on the island of Java. The population of Central Java expanded, and many new areas were brought under cultivation. The Javanese people, from the nobility to the peasant farmers, experienced years of prosperity. All this changed with the arrival of Herman W. Daendels, who was appointed governor-general in 1808.

Daendels (t. 1808–1811) forced new treaties on the Javanese kings, involving the annexation of great parts of their royal domains. The onset of the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) witnessed the occupation of the Dutch colonies in the Indies, including Java by the British. Daendels's British successor, Lieutenant Governor Stamford Raffles (t. 1811–1816), intervened even more profoundly in the affairs of the Javanese kingdoms. Under his rule, the land tax system was introduced and the tollgates and markets in the royal territory were rented out to the Chinese, who extorted the people. Hamengkubuwana II (r. 1792–1810, 1810–1812), who had refused to accept the newly imposed changes, was deposed and exiled to Penang. His son, Hamengkubuwana III (r. 1810–1811, 1812–1814), who was appointed as his succes-

or, only reigned for two years and was succeeded by Hamengkubuwana IV (r. 1814–1822), a younger brother of Diponegoro, the prince who instigated the Java War in 1825.

In 1816, the colony in the Indies was returned to the Dutch. They continued the new policy toward the Javanese kingdoms. It was the Dutch governor-general G. A. Ph. van der Capellen who unintentionally strengthened the power base of Diponegoro. After the death of Hamengkubuwana IV in 1822, van der Capellen appointed the king's three-year-old son, Hamengkubuwana V (1822–1826), instead of his elder brother, Diponegoro. That move split the Javanese aristocracy into two parties, for and against Diponegoro. The radical 1823 decision to abolish the private leasing of land to Chinese and Europeans put the Javanese aristocracy in great financial difficulties. They not only lost their source of revenue but also had to compensate the leaseholders for the loss of their leased land. All these measures intensified the anti-European feelings among the Javanese aristocracy. Rebellion loomed and then erupted when a new road was built cutting across Diponegoro's ancestral land in Tegalreja without his permission.

At least half of the Javanese aristocracy and a large part of the Islamic community, as well as many Javanese villagers, joined Diponegoro in his fight against the Dutch. Highly valuable was the support of his uncle, Mangkubumi, and Kyai Maja, who preached holy war against the *kafirs* (infidels, nonbelievers). One of his commanders, a nephew of Diponegoro named Sentot, proved to be an excellent guerrilla fighter. Besides their shortage of trained soldiers, it was this hit-and-run tactic that made it impossible for the Dutch to get a grip on the rebellion. Time after time, the Dutch were attacked and were not able to defeat the enemy because they constantly withdrew. Despite the Dutch having succeeded in taking Surakarta from the rebels, Diponegoro controlled the larger part of the countryside in Central Java at the end of 1826. Moreover, people considered him to be the *ratu adil* (just or righteous king), who Javanese legend said would reign justly after a short period of war. Diponegoro saw himself as the one chosen to become sultan over the whole of Java and to drive the *kafir* out of the island of Java.

By 1827, the tide of war had turned against Diponegoro. More Dutch troops arrived in

Java. The Dutch general H. M. de Kock developed the so-called *benteng* (fortress, fortification) system, in which small, mobile columns operated independently of a growing network of strategic fortified posts. In the course of 1828, Diponegoro lost a great number of his followers. The surrender of his uncle Mangkubumi and his commander Sentot, with his troops, to the Dutch in 1829 sounded the death knell for Diponegoro. At the beginning of 1830, he sent a message to General de Kock, stating that he wished to negotiate an end to war; in March, they met at Magelang. Despite guarantees of his safety, Diponegoro was arrested and exiled to Makassar, where he died in 1855.

The war had cost the lives of 15,000 soldiers on the side of the government, and about 200,000 Javanese also perished (Van den Doel 1996: 39). The end of the war ushered in a new era in which the power of the Dutch colonial state would be increased at the cost of the local authority of the Javanese aristocracy. For the Indonesians and in particular for the Javanese, the Java War marked the beginning of a new era in which nationalism developed in spite of the increasing repression of the Dutch. This led to independence for Indonesia in 1949.

ELLY TOUWEN-BOUWSMA

TRANSLATED BY ROSEMARY
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See also Diponegoro (Pangeran Dipanegara) (c. 1785–1855); Hamengkubuwono II (r. 1792–1812); Mataram; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); *Ratu Adil* (Righteous King/Prince); Surakarta; Van der Capellan, Baron Godert Alexander Philip (1778–1848); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East Indies Company) (1602); Yogyakarta (Jogjakarta)

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JAVANESE WARS OF SUCCESSION (1677–1707, 1719–1722, 1749–1755)

In 1677, the ruler of the Central Javanese kingdom of Mataram, Amangkurat I (r. 1645–1677), was faced with a rebellion launched by his own son in alliance with a prince named Trunajaya from the island of Madura, just off the coast of East Java. The rebels captured Mataram's capital, Kartasura, and Amangkurat I died while fleeing. His son took the title Amangkurat II (r. 1677–1703) and quarreled with Trunajaya. The Madurese prince then threatened to depose his former ally and take the throne. In desperation, Amangkurat II asked the Dutch East India Company (VOC) for help.

The Dutch launched a military expedition against Trunajaya. In return for this assistance, Mataram gave the VOC an extensive area of land that separated Mataram from the Dutch foothold of Batavia in West Java. The territory conceded stretched completely across the island of Java, from the north to the south coast. In this way, the Dutch became the first Europeans to become directly involved in Javanese politics, and by their interference in a war of succession, they obtained possession of a strategic land area and became a territorial power in Java.

Dutch intervention in civil wars, usually by invitation, became a pattern whereby the Dutch came to administer large areas of Java and eventually secured various special privileges from Indonesian rulers as compensation for assistance rendered to those rulers. The VOC (or *Kumpeni*, as the Javanese often referred to it) gradually expanded its civil authority over Indonesian territory as the result of its endeavors to enforce compliance with these agreements. In this way, the *Kumpeni* obtained great political as well as economic influence.

By 1677, the Kumpeni had already obtained the monopoly over the rice trade in Java. This right had been given in exchange for military assistance in putting down various rebellions. In that year, Mataram gave the VOC the monopoly over imports of textiles and opium, the export of sugar from Semarang and Jepara, first rights to the purchase of rice, and the right to administer and levy duties in the ports of north Java.

Research on the important centers of Muslim power cannot neglect the role of the *panembahan* of Kajoran, a place in the Klaten region, near Surakarta, the masters of which were the kin of Sunan Bayat, the founder of the sacred location known as Tembayat. The rulers of Kajoran repeatedly contested the rule of Mataram, despite marriage links between them. Trunajaya, son-in-law of Raden Kajoran or Panembahan Rama, played an important part in this revolt. Open war between Mataram and Kajoran in 1677 ended with Kajoran's defeat in 1679.

In 1680, Amangkurat II set up a new capital at Kartasura. In 1703, Amangkurat II died, and his son, Sunan Mas, became Amangkurat III (r. 1703–1704). Sunan Mas's uncle, Pangeran Puger, challenged his right to succeed. The Dutch were happy to assist Pangeran Puger, since they believed that Amangkurat III and a charismatic Balinese named Surapati were plotting against them. Pangeran Puger was popular among the Mataram nobles, however, and with Dutch arms, Puger captured the palace at Kartasura. He was then crowned as Paku Buwana I in 1704. Surapati died of wounds sustained in battle near Surabaya, and Amangkurat III was captured in 1707 and exiled to Sri Lanka. Thus ended what Western historians call the First Javanese War of Succession. In return for Dutch assistance, Mataram gave the VOC several districts in Parahyangan (the hinterland of West Java), Cirebon, and Madura and agreed to provide a certain amount of rice annually to the VOC.

The *Babad Tanah Jawi* (*Chronicle of Java* of the eighteenth century) states that Panembahan Wijil Kadilangu was present at the installation of Pangeran Puger as Pakubuwana I in Semarang in 1704. Nevertheless, Kadilangu's significance gradually declined and disappeared. This phenomenon is reflected in the titles used by its (Surakarta) rulers. The title "Susuhunan

Kalijaga" only persisted for five generations. Thereafter, the kings of Surakarta altered this title to "Panembahan Natapraja." The VOC itself acknowledged them as "Pangeran Wijil," later changed by the post-VOC government of the Netherlands East Indies to "Pangeran van Adilangu" (Pangeran of Kadilangu).

When Paku Buwana I passed away in 1719, his son Amangkurat IV (r. 1719–1725) took the throne but was challenged by several of his brothers. Dutch assistance was again used to quell the rebellion of the male siblings of Amangkurat IV, who refused to acknowledge his ascension to the throne, which took four years. As a result, the Dutch had to be paid again; upon the conclusion of this affair, known as the Second Javanese War of Succession, Mataram had to pay regular amounts of pepper and wood to the Kumpeni.

The Third Javanese War of Succession resulted in the dissolution of Mataram and the establishment of two separate kingdoms—Surakarta and Yogyakarta. Mangku Bumi, brother to Pakubuwono II (r. 1725–1750), felt slighted by the tactless treatment he received from the Dutch governor-general Gustaaf W. van Imhoff (t. 1743–1750). In 1749, the disaffected prince revolted against his brother and his Dutch ally (the VOC). Pakubuwono II, on his deathbed, ceded Mataram to the Dutch in 1750 as a means of denying the kingdom to his brother. The Dutch placed on the throne the late ruler's son, as Pakubuwono III (r. 1750–1788), a mere puppet. Mangku Bumi was widely recognized by many as the *Susuhunan* (supreme ruler), and his opposition to the Dutch was viewed by the Javanese populace as the key to the liberation of Mataram from Dutch control. In 1755, Governor-General Jacob Mossel (t. 1750–1761) decided on a peace settlement. By the terms of a treaty signed in 1755, Mataram was divided into two halves. Pakubuwono III, with his seat at Surakarta, ruled over the eastern part; Mangku Bumi (Sultan Amangku Buwono) administered the western half, with his capital at Yogyakarta.

JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also Amangkurat I (Sunan Tegalwangi) (r. 1646–1677); Amangkurat II (Adipati Anom) (r. 1677–1703); Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jakarta, Djakarta/Jakarta); Colonialism;

Imperialism; Madura; Mataram; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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JAYAVARMAN II
(r. 770/790/802?–834 C.E.)

Founder of Angkor

Jayavarman II was the founder of a new polity that is now called Angkor. Details of his reign are very sparse, and some of what has been synthesized by modern writers may be legendary. Several inscriptions erected much later (in the tenth to eleventh centuries) give the date 802 as marking an important event in his reign, and this has generally been taken to be its beginning. But no inscription specifies the event of 802, and one other inscription from the same period refers to a King Parameshvara, the posthumous title of Jayavarman II, ruling in 790. At least, in the tenth century, there were two different traditions about the date of his reign.

There is also a growing consensus that two eighth-century inscriptions that name a Jayavarman, in 770 and 781, actually record the first activities of Jayavarman II. They traced his activities starting in southeastern Cambodia and moving northward to the area of Kratie, before establishing his new center at Roluos, some 20 kilometers southeast of what is now Angkor. Thereafter, there are no extant inscription dates from Jayavarman II or from his son Jayavarman III (834–877), and all information about them comes from inscriptions of the ninth to eleventh centuries.

Recognition of these eighth-century records as Jayavarman's undermines his standard biography. Found in only one inscription ("Sdok Kak

Thom") written 250 years later (1052), this biography says that Jayavarman returned to Cambodia from "Java" at an unrecorded date and was first active gathering support in central Cambodia (Indrapura, Bhavapura) before moving on to Roluos. The meaning of "Java" in that record, however, is uncertain. Indonesian history does not support stories of Indonesian conquests in Cambodia in the eighth century, and no convincing hypothesis has been offered for a voluntary presence of Cambodian royalty in Java. The Java story may be a legend built up in the tenth and eleventh centuries when new centers in East Java were increasingly important in control of maritime routes.

Later generations, through the eleventh century, considered Jayavarman a great ruler and the founder of their kingdom, from whose cohorts, or wives, the most important official families later claimed descent. In addition to the first capital, these records attribute to Jayavarman the founding of another city in the northwest and a city high up on Mount Kulen, some 30 kilometers northeast of Angkor. Strangely, except for one temple in Sambor Prei Kuk in central Cambodia, constructions attributable to Jayavarman II are found only on Kulen. They show considerable Cham influence in architecture and decor, which is not surprising given the close relations between Cham and Khmer already demonstrated in the seventh-century inscriptions in southern and central Cambodia. Nothing from this "founder of Angkor" has been left in the immediate region of Angkor.

From the very sparse inscriptions and the contradictory details in scholarly work to date, we may accept the following surmises. First, Jayavarman II was a chief of some place, probably in the southeast of Cambodia, perhaps Vyadhapura or Indrapura or both, in 770. Second, around 780, he was accepted as king in Sambhupura (Kratie), which had its own dynasty of queens; this may mean that he married a Sambhupura queen. Third, in 790, he and a son named Indrayudha fought against the Cham and won. (At that time, the center of Champa was in the south, at Panduranga, very near southern Cambodia.) Fourth, during this period, from 780 to 802, Jayavarman occupied most of northern Cambodia, including the provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap. Fifth, in 802 or later, according to the Sdok Kak Thom inscription (which contains no date), he

had important ceremonies performed on Mount Mahendra (Kulen) to keep Cambodia safe from “Java.” He also made himself a great king, a *cakravartin*, with a new ritual for the protection of the king and realm. Then he returned to Hariharalaya (Roluos), where he died.

The Sanskrit name of the new state ritual, *devaraja* (meaning “god-king” or “king of gods”), found in only one inscription, has led to needless controversy over its representation. The more precise Khmer name, *kamrateng jagat ta raja/rajya*, means “lord of the world the king” or “lord of the world of the king” or “lord of the world of the realm.” The title *kamrateng jagat* designated a frequently recorded type of traditional Khmer deity, probably of a protective nature. Its importance may have been exaggerated because the powerful family who wrote the Sdok Kak Thom inscription were the caretakers of that ritual, and the inscription represented their family history more than a history of the royalty.

The end of the reign of Jayavarman II occurred in 834, not 850 as repeated in all but the very latest work. The new date is based on a better interpretation of inscription K.521, which says that in 850, his son, Jayavarman III, “had been ruling 16 years,” not “was aged 16.”

MICHAEL VICKERY

See also Angkor; Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Battambang; *Cakkavatti/ Setkya-min* (Universal Ruler); Champa; Devaraja; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; Indigenous Political Power; Siem Reap

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JAYAVARMAN VII (r. 1181–1220?) Angkor’s Greatest Ruler

Jayavarman VII was the greatest Angkor king and also the last to leave large, enduring monuments or detailed inscriptions. He descended from the Mahidharapura dynasty, whose origins were north of the Dangrek Mountains; he became king after a thirty-year period of internal and external warfare and the apparent breakdown of the state apparatus, about which few details are known because of the lack of inscriptions.

His inscriptions differ from those of previous kings. There are sixty-two inscriptions, but over thirty are one-line texts with the names of gods or dead persons inscribed near their images, in temples, usually with the title *kamrateng jagat*, a special type of Khmer protective deity. The few very long inscriptions are by the king and are in Sanskrit, not Khmer. That is, after about three hundred years of increasing use of Khmer in inscriptions, Cambodia’s greatest king returned to the use of Sanskrit for his important records.

Jayavarman came to the throne after defeating invaders from Champa who had seized the city of Angkor at a date believed to be 1177. Peculiarly, Jayavarman himself was in Vijaya, central Champa, when that invasion occurred and had apparently been there for some time. Champa inscriptions record that a Champa army returned to Cambodia with Jayavarman and was a major force in his campaigns to reunify Cambodia. His relationship with Champa was complex and is still not clear.

Jayavarman VII was Angkor’s greatest builder. Among his constructions are the huge temples



Sculpture of Jayavarman VII with missing arms.
(Luca I. Tettoni/Corbis)

of Banteay Kdei, Ta Phrom, Preah Khan, and Bayon within the city of Angkor. He also built the square city walls, measuring 3 kilometers on a side, and other structures in different parts of Cambodia, including the huge Banteay Chhmar near the Thai border in the northwest. The inscription lists thousands of people involved in the work of these temples, which shows that the royal government of Jayavarman VII had strong control over a large country.

Along with the enormous new temples, the principal religion changed to a type of Mahayana Buddhism—a change that may have been influenced by Champa, where Buddhism had always been more important than in Cambodia. Mahayana Buddhism was also very important in Vietnam. The Mahidharapura dynasty had always shown some signs of Buddhism but of a different type, perhaps from Mon and Burmese influence and illustrated in the temple of Phimai in northeast Thailand.

Besides religious works, special new types of construction were undertaken. Highways were built—straight, stone-paved roads running across hundreds of kilometers, raised above the flood level, with stone bridges across rivers and

lined with rest houses every 15 kilometers. Parts of some roads are still visible, even serving as the bed for modern roads. From the capital city, Angkor, there were at least two roads to the east and two to the west. One of the latter ran across the Dangrek Mountains to Phimai, and another went due west toward Sisophon, which means toward the only lowland pass from Cambodia into eastern Thailand in the direction of Lophburi or Ayutthaya. Toward the east, one road has been traced almost to the Mekong, and according to an inscription in which these roads are described, it may have continued as far as the capital of Champa.

Such roads must have been built for either political control or transport of goods, and the frequency of rest houses and “hospitals” indicates the movement of large numbers of people or official missions entitled to state support on their journeys, either of which is consistent with the movement of goods.

Another significant (though still incompletely understood) record is that of twenty-three cities, apparently most within Thailand, to which Jayavarman sent personal Buddha images, called “Jayabuddhamahanatha,” possibly representing the king as Buddha and intended as symbolic of his rule over the localities concerned. Only seven of the twenty-three city names are now understood: Lophburi, Muang Sing, Petchaburi, Petchabun or Kamphaeng Phet, Ratchaburi, Singburi, and Suphanburi.

Jayavarman continued the policy of Suryavarman II (r. 1113–1145?) to subjugate Champa. He attacked Champa in 1190, and from 1203 to about 1220, all of Champa, north and south, was occupied by Cambodia. In addition, Jayavarman appointed Cham princes who were loyal to him to rule for him in Vijaya in central Champa and in Panduranga in the south. He also followed Suryavarman II in attacking Vietnam. Vietnamese history says the last Cambodian attacks against Vietnam were in 1216, 1218, and 1220. After 1220, Cambodia withdrew from Vijaya, and a Cham prince who had been raised by Jayavarman became king there. Jayavarman probably died shortly before the withdrawal of Cambodian control from Champa.

Although much has been written on the topics, Jayavarman’s religious ideology, foreign policy, and economic objectives are still poorly understood. It is possible that his ambitious

construction works and territorial expansion contributed to the subsequent decline of Cambodia.

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See also Angkor; Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Buddhism, Mahayana; Champa; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; Indigenous Political Power; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Suryavaman II (r. 1113–1145?)

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JOHOR

Johor's more than 2 million inhabitants live in the third largest state (19,984 square kilometers) in Malaysia. It is also one of the most developed, mainly because it has benefited from its location directly across from the island of Singapore. Linked by road and rail over a causeway to Singapore, Johor has shared in that center's phenomenal economic development since its breakaway from Malaysia in 1965.

Perhaps the earliest known reference to Johor is from the history of Melaka known as the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Chronicles/Annals), a work conceived during the heyday of the

Melaka kingdom in the fifteenth century. The Tang Chinese between the seventh and the early tenth centuries called this area Luoyue and noted that it was simply a collecting point for forest products. From Luoyue, products were taken either to Pulau Tioman or to a settlement on Singapore, where they were then traded to the Chinese. Johor was not even mentioned in the 1365 Javanese court text, the *Nāgarakertāgama*, but it was included as part of the southern portion of the Malay Peninsula simply known as Pahang.

Johor as a political entity only began with the arrival there of the refugee princes from the Melaka kingdom, seized by the Portuguese in 1511. With the relocation of the capital of the Melaka ruler on the Johor River, the kingdom came to be called Johor. However, since the capital alternated between the mainland and the islands to the south, it was generally referred to by modern scholars as the Johor-Riau kingdom. In the sixteenth century, the survival of the kingdom was sorely tested by continuing attacks by the Portuguese and by the new power in the Straits of Melaka, the northern Sumatran kingdom of Aceh. Only in the last quarter of the seventeenth century did Johor emerge as a dominant force in the straits, due, in part, to the special privileges accorded to it by the new European power in the region, the Dutch East India Company (VOC).

In 1699, the assassination of the Johor ruler (Mahmud Syah, r. 1685–1699) created divisions in the kingdom. The result was the involvement of both the Minangkabau and the Bugis in the affairs of the Malay world. When Johor came under strong Bugis influence after 1728, Malay opposition became centered on Terengganu and Pahang. There was an uneasy partnership in Johor between the Bugis and the Malays, but for much of the eighteenth century, it was the Bugis who were dominant. In 1784, the Bugis were defeated by the VOC, thus enabling Sultan Mahmud (1761–1812) to reassert Malay control in the kingdom.

With the establishment of Singapore by the British in 1819, Johor's long-held position as the preeminent entrepôt state in the Straits of Melaka was undermined. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 placed the peninsular portion of the Johor kingdom under the British sphere of influence, leaving the island part of the kingdom based in Riau under the Dutch. Thus, the

Johor kingdom was forever divided: Riau remained under the old Johor royal family, and peninsular Johor was placed under the *temenggongs* (Malay chiefs of ministerial rank in charge of defense, justice, and palace affairs).

Johor's modern history began with Temenggong Daing Ibrahim, a descendant of the rulers of Johor. In 1855, the British and Sultan Ali of Johor signed a treaty giving Ibrahim formal control of the state of Johor. Then, in 1885, the British formally recognized Ibrahim's successor, Abu Bakar (r. 1862–1895), as sultan of Johor. In return for this recognition, Abu Bakar relinquished his control over foreign affairs. Under Abu Bakar, Johor promulgated a constitution and developed a modern administrative system. For this reason, he is sometimes referred to as "the Father of Modern Johor."

Johor's continuing good relations with the British and its ability to maintain peace and order in the land provided little reason for direct intervention by the British. Johor possessed a well-ordered government, and its road system and economy were integrated with those of Singapore and the Federated Malay States under British control. Johor was therefore the last entity to become incorporated into British Malaya in 1914, but it was unique in retaining certain privileges, such as the wearing of a Johor uniform and the preference for Johor Malays in government.

Johor's proximity to Singapore has been a major boon to the state's economy. In the nineteenth century, Singapore became not only the port of export but also a source of much-needed Chinese capital and labor for development in Johor. Today, many of Johor's inhabitants have been able to gain employment in Singapore, and Johor has provided space for expanding Singaporean enterprises. Tourism has also flourished because Johor offers Singaporeans and short-term visitors to Singapore an accessible and inexpensive weekend getaway. While profiting from its close ties to Singapore, Johor has begun to attract foreign firms to its shore because it is a cheaper alternative to Singapore. This situation augurs well for Johor's economic future.

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See also Abu Bakar, Sultan of Johor (r. 1862–1895); Aceh (Acheh); Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to

Twentieth Centuries); Bugis (Buginese); China, Imperial; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Johor-Riau Empire; *Kangchu* System; Melaka; Minangkabau; Orang Laut; Pepper; Piracy; Portuguese Asian Empire; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); *Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals)*; Singapore (1819); Straits of Melaka

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JOHOR-RIAU EMPIRE

The foundation of the Johor-Riau empire can be dated at soon after the fall of the Malay sultanate of Melaka to the Portuguese in 1511. After a period of frequent moves, the royal family settled in a new capital that alternated between a site on the Johor River and another on the island of Bintang in the Riau archipelago. Although the Johor-Riau rulers continued to claim suzerainty over their former Melaka territories, most of the latter now followed an independent policy. The change can be attributed to the dramatically altered political equation in the Straits of Melaka.

In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese in Melaka and the North Sumatran kingdom of Aceh posed a continuing threat to Johor-Riau. The rulers were forced to move frequently to avoid capture, and there was little opportunity to regain the trade that had once frequented Melaka. From 1564 to 1565 and in 1613, the Acehnese destroyed the capital of Johor, and

members of the royal family were taken as prisoners to Aceh. On neither occasion was the Johor-Riau kingdom permanently destroyed, but instead, it recovered quickly to pose yet again a challenge to Aceh and the Portuguese for dominance in the straits. In 1615, just two years after the devastation of the kingdom, Sultan Hammat Syah (r. 1613–1623) of Johor-Riau sent one of the royal princes to rule as sultan in Pahang and then organized an alliance against Aceh. This time, however, the ruler took the precaution of abandoning the site of the capital on the Johor River; he sought the greater safety of the islands of the Riau-Lingga archipelago. Riau was a preferred site, particularly in times of danger, because the Riau-Lingga archipelago was the home waters of the Orang Laut, or Sea People, who were fiercely loyal to the rulers.

The Johor-Riau kingdom was finally able to recover some of the glory of the Melakan period in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. By that time, the twin threats to the kingdom had been removed. Portuguese Melaka had been seized by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1641, and Aceh had declined in power. Johor-Riau benefited further from the fact that it had been the principal local ally of the VOC in the seizure of Portuguese Melaka and was given special trade and political privileges by the VOC as a reward. By the end of the century, Johor-Riau had become a major entrepôt much in the style of its predecessor, the kingdom of Melaka.

After the assassination of Sultan Mahmud Syah (1685–1699) by his nobles in 1699, there was upheaval in the kingdom. A Minangkabau adventurer known as Raja Kecil claimed to be Mahmud's son and was immediately supported by the Orang Laut. With the combined force of the Orang Laut and the Minangkabaus, Raja Kecil gained control of the kingdom. The son of the deposed Bendahara ruler, in turn, called in the assistance of refugee Bugis groups in the area, thus igniting a civil war that finally ended in 1728 in favor of the Bendahara-Bugis alliance.

The Bugis were rewarded by the new Bendahara dynasty with the position of Raja Muda (a title meaning young prince or heir apparent) and a base in Penyengat in Riau. From there, they controlled the activities of Sultan Sulaiman (1722–1760) and extended their influence to the Malay Peninsula. Although the Bugis were generally unchallenged in the west coast states,

the Malay faction supporting Sulaiman was particularly strong in Pahang and Terengganu on the peninsular east coast. The Bugis's dominance in the Malay world was ended with their defeat by the VOC in 1784. Nevertheless, the mistrust between the Bugis and the Malay factions in the Johor-Riau kingdom remained.

When Sultan Mahmud (1761–1812) of Johor-Riau died, he left two sons born of commoner mothers. The Bugis faction supported Abdul Rahman, and the Malay faction backed the elder son, Husain. In 1818, the Dutch signed a treaty with the former, recognizing him as the legitimate heir to the Johor-Riau kingdom in return for the right to reestablish their post on Riau. The following year, the British signed an agreement with the *temenggong* of Riau-Johor, the territorial chief of Singapore, which gave them the right to establish a post or factory on the island. To provide legitimacy to this transaction, the British recognized Husain as the legitimate ruler of Johor-Riau in a formal treaty signed in 1819. Then, in 1824, the Dutch and the British signed a treaty dividing their spheres of influence. They drew a line down the Straits of Melaka, south of Singapore, and out to the South China Sea, with British jurisdiction in areas north of the line. A permanent division of the Johor-Riau empire was thus created, with Johor now consisting of the peninsular possessions within the British sphere and Riau under the Dutch comprising the islands to the south of Singapore.

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See also Aceh (Acheh); Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Bugis (Buginese); East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Iskandar Muda, Sultan (Mahkota Alam) (r. 1607–1636); Johor; Melaka; Minangkabau; Orang Laut; Pahang; Piracy; Portuguese Asian Empire; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Singapore (1819); Straits of Melaka; Sulawesi (Celebes); *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (Precious Gift); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East Indies Company) (1602)

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JUNGLE/FOREST PRODUCTS

A major part of the maritime Southeast Asian environment comprises the equatorial dipterocarp forests, which historically have been important in local economies and in the international trade in forest products. The rain forests are of great antiquity and have been comparatively stable in composition since the Miocene period from about 20 million years ago (Bellwood 1985: 34). The earliest firm evidence of human habitation in Southeast Asia is from excavations at the Niah Caves in northwestern Borneo. It is clear that humans depended on the tropical forests for food, equipment, and shelter from at least 40,000 years B.P.; the early populations were stone-users and were of Australoid or Australo-Melanesian physical stock (King 1993: 60–61). They hunted forest animals, all of which, with the exception of the giant pangolin (*Manis palaeojavanica*), are still part of today's faunal inventory. They also gathered edible freshwater and estuarine shellfish and mollusks; shells were probably part of an early barter trade. Items discovered in burials included stone and bone tools, along with ritual shell. It is assumed that domestic and other implements would also have been made of such perishable materials as wood, fibers, and bamboo.

Some 5,000 years ago, the Indo-Malaysian region was gradually settled and the resident Australoids were replaced by peoples of different physical type and culture, though pockets of rain forest-dwelling Australoids remain in Peninsular Malaysia, Sumatra, and the Philip-

pin. The new arrivals were of Mongoloid stock and belonged to the Austronesian language family. Their origins lie somewhere in southern China, and they began to populate the Philippines in about 3000 B.C.E. and the western parts of the Indonesian archipelago by 1000 B.C.E. or later. It was the ancestors of the present-day Austronesians who penetrated the rain forests, but the effective clearance and cultivation of forest areas in the island world had to await the introduction of metal tools, which probably occurred from about 200 B.C.E. (Bellwood 1985: 309–311).

In the first millennium C.E., a sociocultural revolution took place in Southeast Asia. Trading contacts with China and India increased; harbor principalities began to be established around the coasts of such islands as Borneo and Sumatra, and smaller market centers grew up along the major rivers. These channeled luxury products from the interior rain forests into Asian commercial networks (Dunn 1975: 111). The increasing demand led to various groups of forest dwellers specializing in the gathering of products in return for metal tools, beads, brassware, ceramics, textiles, and salt; some of these items were manufactured in coastal centers. Native groups that had developed more permanent forms of agriculture in the interior usually acted as intermediaries between the coastal and main river traders, on the one hand, and the mobile bands of forest hunter-gatherers, such as the Punan of Borneo, on the other. The farmers also collected some of the more accessible products, such as resins.

The dipterocarp forests are abundant in resiniferous trees, and resins or “plant fluids” (often referred to generally as *damar*) were sought after in Asian markets for use as illuminants, sealants, glues, glazes, colorants, paints, incense, perfumes, cosmetics, and medicines (Burkill 1966). Early items referred to in the China trade comprise benzoin or “gum benjamin” (*Styrax benzoin*), for incense and curative purposes, and the aromatic wood *gaharu* or *lignum aloes* (*Aquilaria microcarpia*). Another popular product was “dragon's blood,” which was a general term for a number of red resins; one such—*rotan jaranang* (*Daemonorops didymophyllus*)—was used as an aromatic drug and a dye. There was also oleoresin or wood-oil, commonly called “gurun balsam” in India and Burma, employed for incense and medicinal purposes.

A very widely known early trade item was camphor, sought after in Chinese, Indian, and Middle Eastern (West Asian) markets. Crystalline scales of pure camphor, which formed in crevices and the decayed heart of old trees of the species *Dryobalanops aromatica*, were used in medicines and as a fumigant and incense. Beeswax, too, was collected for use in ointments and medicines.

Other forest trade items comprised birds' nests, a Chinese food delicacy made from the saliva of species of cave swiftlets (*Collocalia fuciphaga*, *C. Lowii*, *C. Lichaii*); bezoar stones, used as medicines and found in the gallbladders and intestines of certain species of monkey (*Semnopithecus Hosei* and *S. Rubicundus*); rhinoceros horn, for its curative and aphrodisiac properties; and anteater scales, for use as magical charms. Many products were also sought for decorative purposes. Such items included feathers of tropical birds such as the argus pheasant, kingfisher, and rhinoceros hornbill; "hornbill ivory" from the hardened casque of the helmeted hornbill; deer antlers; tortoiseshells and cowries; and rattans, bamboos, *pandanus*, *nipah*, and various fibers for the manufacture of mats, baskets, and other objects.

This trade in jungle/forest products lasted well into the European colonial period, but it became increasingly marginalized by the exploitation of raw timber and the clearing of forests for planting commercial crops such as rubber and oil palm and mineral exploitation for tin and gold. Nevertheless, such items as rattan, bamboo, palm leaves, resins, live birds, and animals and animal products still have an important role in local economies and in trade.

VICTOR T. KING

See also Age of Commerce; Borneo; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Ecological Setting of Southeast Asia; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; Iban; Marine/Sea Products; Niah Caves (Sarawak); Orang Asli; Spices and the Spice Trade

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JUNK CEYLON (UJUNG SALANG, PHUKET)

Junk Ceylon (or *Junkceylon*) was the name given to the island of Phuket by European travelers and traders from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. The term was, in fact, a European version of the Malay name for the island, *Ujung Salang*. The historical importance of Phuket was always very much connected with its rich tin resources.

Phuket, or Thalang, was a province of the Siamese kingdom. Nevertheless, Phuket retained much of its commercial and political autonomy. Its governors traded with Malays, Moors, Chinese, Portuguese, English, Dutch, and French merchants or trading companies. The (Dutch) United East India Company (VOC) wished to establish a monopoly on tin export on Phuket, but its hopes were constantly dashed by the endemic unrest on the island. The French obtained a tin monopoly by the Treaty of 1685, but this was not put into effect, as the French traders were forced to leave Siam in 1688.

The 1770s saw the involvement of English country traders—for example, Francis Light (1740–1794), who established the settlement of Penang—in the island's trade. Then came Burmese invasions in 1785 and 1786, 1809 and 1810, and 1811 and 1812. Although the islanders fought heroically, especially in 1785 and 1786, the invasions resulted in famine, depopulation, and a temporary decline of the island and its trade. From the 1820s onward, the Chinese became tax farmers in Phuket and began exploiting the tin mines.

During the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the Chinese, notably the Khaw family and others, exploited these tin mines to their fullest extent. Sino-Thai families

indeed came to dominate the trade and politics not only in Phuket but also in southern Siam. Since being integrated into the new centralized administrative system during the late nineteenth century, Phuket has continued to prosper. However, it is not tin that draws people to present-day Phuket but the attractions of the sun, sea, and sand.

DHIRAVAT NA POMBEJRA

See also Burma-Siam Wars; British Interests in Southeast Asia; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Country Traders; French Ambitions in

Southeast Asia; Isthmus of Kra; Khaw Family; Light, Captain Francis (1740–1794); Ligor/Nakhon; Penang (1786); Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Taxation; Tin

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K

KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ARMY (KIA)

See Kachins

KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ORGANIZATION (KIO)

The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) was founded in 1961 by a group of young Kachin nationalists whose aspirations for autonomous political power in northern Burma (Myanmar) had been forged during their time as students at Rangoon University. KIO was founded by three brothers from the Shan State, and its long-term leader was Brang Seng. The KIO first came to public notice as the result of an attack on the government treasury in Lashio. It quickly grew over the next decade to be one of the largest insurgent organizations in the country. The Kachin are an ethnic group residing in the Kachin and Shan states of Myanmar and in southern China. They account for approximately 1.5 percent of the total population of Myanmar (Smith 1999: 30). The late blossoming of Kachin nationalism was the result of the increasing centralization of power that accompanied independence in 1948 as well as the plans of the government of then Prime Minister U Nu (1958–1962, t. 1954–1956) to make Buddhism the state religion. Many Kachins had converted to Christianity during the previous

century, though many others were Buddhists or followed various local belief systems unique to themselves.

During the 1960s, the KIO linked up with the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO) in an alliance against the government, but in the 1970s, it held talks with both the government and the Burma Communist Party (BCP) to enter into alliances in exchange for arms. The KIO cooperated with a number of other insurgent and opium-smuggling armed bands over the years. For much of the 1970s and 1980s, large areas of the Kachin and Shan states were outside of government control as a result of KIO operations. However, in a surprise move in 1994, the KIO entered into a cease-fire with the government. The organization has subsequently gone into business and runs a number of community development programs.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Burma Communist Party (BCP); Kachins; Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA); Karen National Union (KNU); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Ne Win, General (1911–2002); Nu, U (1907–1995); Opium; Shan Nationalism; University of Rangoon

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KACHINS

The term *Kachin* today refers to a number of groups living in the north and northeast of Burma (Myanmar). Initially, it was used in relation to the Jinghpaw people, the dominant Kachin group, but it may now refer to the Lachik (Lashi), Zaiwa (Atsi), Lawngwaw (Maru), Nung Rawang, and northern Lisu peoples as well. All of these groups had strong links with peoples in China and Assam. However, the British colonial period in Burma (1824–1948) resulted in the identity “Kachin” developing within a quite specific Burmese political context. Related groups outside Burma do not use this identity in referring to themselves.

The origins of the term *Kachin* are not clear, but the Burmese and the Shan peoples used it before the colonial period. As mentioned, they used it in reference to the Jinghpaw people, who formed a matrix of clans and lineages sharing a common linguistic, social, and cultural identity. When the British first encountered the term *Kachin* around 1837, it referred to these communities in the hills region around Bhamo, near the Chinese border. These lineages spread westward all the way to Assam, where they were called Singpho and where many had already established themselves in the plains. The enclaving of the Assamese tea plantations by the British administration during the first half of the nineteenth century led to the artificial separation of the Jinghpaw in Upper Burma from the Singpho in Assam.

From the 1860s onward, British officers in Burma and American Baptist missionaries again came into close contact with the Jinghpaw people of the Bhamo Hills region, and usage of the term *Kachin* became established by them. It was not a term that was either used or liked by Kachin people themselves, as they felt it had derogatory associations. Following the annexation of Upper Burma by the British in 1885, loose administrative control was established over these potentially troublesome peoples. In 1896, the Kachin Hills Regulation was introduced, which consolidated the use of *Kachin* as both an ethnographic and administrative term. The recruitment of “Kachin” troops into the Burma police and the Indian army also confirmed its usage. However, the identity also began to be extended to non-Jinghpaw communities in a number of contexts—those who paid

tribute to Jinghpaw chiefs in the Kachin hills, soldiers who entered the Kachin battalions of the Burma Rifles, and those who used Jinghpaw as the lingua franca of the region.

Dislike of the term *Kachin* continued throughout the colonial period, and attempts were made to develop a local synonym. Today, the term *Wunpawng* is used. It is derived from the name of a mythic common ancestor of the Kachin peoples according to Jinghpaw oral tradition. Contemporary multigroup unity is based upon ideas of common descent, parallels between the clan organization of the different groups, common social and ritual practices, and their historical integration through reciprocal economic and political relationships. The conversion of many to Christianity has contributed to a further sense of common interest, in opposition to the majority Buddhist and Burman government. However, contemporary Kachin identity is also vulnerable to attempts by the Burmese government to create divisions between the Jinghpaw and other Kachin subgroups.

Much more research needs to be conducted into Chinese, Burmese, Shan, and Assamese sources to reconstruct the ethnohistories of the various Kachin groups prior to the British colonial period. As the Jinghpaw script was only developed in the 1890s by the Baptist missionary Ola Hanson, internal histories must be derived principally from the careful interpretation of oral traditions. However, due to the spread of Christianity, most of these traditions have almost completely disappeared. Clan histories frequently relate migrations from the north and northeast, through parts of Tibet and Yunnan into the Triangle (the territory where northeast Myanmar, northwest Laos, and northwest Thailand meet) and from there westward to the Hukawng Valley and Assam or southeast into the northern Shan State. The chronology of these migrations is highly conjectural.

Present-day Kachin nationalists remember vividly how the Kachin community freed themselves from the shackles of domination by the Shan, Burmese, and British. However, their actions also meant that in the debates leading up to the independence of Burma in 1948, the Kachin Hills were marginalized from the political center as Scheduled Areas. In 1947, a conference was held at Panglong in the Shan State,

at which the political future of the main minorities within an independent Burma, including the Kachin, was discussed. In 1948, Kachin State was created, and the Kachin hoped that promises made at Panglong to respect regional autonomy would be upheld. Following independence, there was increasing discontent with the progress of affairs in Burma, and in the early 1960s, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) was formed. This was one of the best-organized armed opposition groups in Burma, although for many years, accusations were leveled that the troops were funded by illicit opium trading. The KIA remained in conflict with the Burmese government until 1994, when a cease-fire agreement was signed. Splinter groups signed separate agreements. Today, the Kachin Independence Organization has entered into a number of business arrangements with the Burmese government, and the cease-fire holds. However, Kachin State remains economically underdeveloped, and serious infrastructure, social, and health issues loom, which may yet cause cracks in the veneer of political stability.

MANDY SADAN

See also Burma under British Colonial Rule; Constitutional Developments in Burma (1900–1941); Kachin Independence Organization (KIO); Missionaries, Christian; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Yunnan Province

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KADAZAN-DUSUNS

The term *Kadazan-Dusun* (also *Kadazan/Dusun* and *Kadazandusun*) refers to a collectivity of ethnic groups in Sabah that belong to the Dusunic linguistic family. The term is constructed from the autonyms of two ethnic groups within that family. *Kadazan* is the autonym of a Dusunic group in Papar and Penampang. *Dusun* was originally thought to be only a term applied by the coastal Muslim to the interior agriculturalists speaking a Dusunic language. Since the 1980s, however, it has been recognized that *Dusun* is actually the autonym of a large self-conscious ethnic group in the hills behind Tuaran and Kota Belud up into Ranau. The use of the term *Kadazan-Dusun* as an attempt to unite the Dusunic language family reflects a political rather than an ethnographic reality. It is not an ethnic group with a common culture or language, and use of the term ignores other autonymic Dusunic groups.

The Kadazan people experienced Catholic missionization well before other indigenous groups. This provided them with the advantage of education, which resulted in the development of a more complex economy before other Dusunic groups. In the 1950s, the Kadazan formed a society to promote the recognition of their culture and language, so that these would not be forgotten, and to uplift the welfare and standard of education of natives throughout Sabah. One of the leaders of the society, Donald Stephens (1920–1976), was of mixed European-Kadazan ancestry. His newspaper, *The Sabah Times* (1953), ran a section in the Kadazan language, which was not understood by many other Dusunic groups.

When plans were being made to create the new country that would be known as Malaysia, the formation of political parties was permitted. Stephens and other Kadazan political leaders formed the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO) in 1961. To some Dusunic groups, the name *Kadazan* meant “enemy.” However, under that banner, the Kadazan leaders attempted to attract all Dusunic speakers and eventually all the non-Muslim native peoples of Sabah. The use of this ethnic name to unite the various ethnic groups was seen by many as giving a privileged position to the Kadazan. And it met with resistance, resulting in a few other ethnic groups forming competing political interest groups.

The term *Kadazan* thus has mixed connotations, from political to ethnic. Other groups to this day deny they are Kadazan. As the Kadazan originally refused to use the term *Dusun*, considering it to be pejorative, this also isolated the autonymic Dusun group in the interior. In turn, this isolation led them to form their own Dusun cultural association and political party. Since the 1960s, there has been continuous dissension throughout the groups in the Dusunic language family over the use of *Kadazan* as a label. This has eroded much of the political unity that was originally sought.

In the mid-1990s, there were efforts to put a stop to this dissension and bring together the Dusun party and the Kadazan party into one larger party, which led to the creation of the term *Kadazandusun*. However, wrongly joined arguments still persist and confuse ethnic and ethnographic issues with political issues. There are continuing attempts to claim cultural unity as a basis for a political interest group rather than shared political issues.

In addition to the Dusunic family, there are three other major language families in Sabah: Paitanic, Murutic, and Kelabitic. Each of these is composed of a number of self-conscious, named ethnic groups, many without mutual intelligibility within the larger families. To confuse the matter further, some of these groups claim to be Kadazan when asked for their ethnic and linguistic identity, believing that this identity will give them greater privilege in the national scene.

Dusunic peoples stretch along the west coast of Sabah and into the mountains and intermontane plains. Their cultures and languages have been little studied, so the range of variation is not known. The languages of these various groups are largely not mutually intelligible. Their economy traditionally consisted of swidden agriculture of dry rice with maize, cassava, and a variety of vegetables in the hilly areas and irrigated rice along the coastal plains and intermontane basins. Chickens, pigs, and water buffalo are raised. Fruit trees are planted and cultivated. Traditionally, these peoples lived in longhouses, except in isolated mountain areas. Other shared sociocultural traits include a cognatic social organization with no unilineal groups; the village as a corporate entity holding residual rights over land in which members

cultivate their fields; bride-price; rice spirits propitiated for a good harvest; and women having high status, equivalent to that of men. Women as priestesses and spirit mediums control a body of esoteric literature that they sing in couplets to cure illness or increase the fertility of agricultural pursuits and marriages. Irritable, vindictive in-dwelling spirits are believed to cause illness. Children are highly valued, and socialization is gentle and nonpunitive. Mount Kinabalu (4,101 meters) is considered the location of the afterlife.

With development and modernization, particularly following the creation of Malaysia (1963), some Dusunic peoples have lost their lands and now serve as manual laborers in towns or on plantations. Others have developed smallholdings of coconut, oil palm, and rubber or have extended their wet-rice fields. Many are small entrepreneurs, work in various trades, or are employed by the government.

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See also British North Borneo Chartered Company (1881–1946); East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Missionaries, Christian; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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KADIRI (KEDIRI)

Kadiri was an ancient kingdom on the island of Java. It was the first kingdom known in Indonesia to have developed a stratified territorial administration, consisting of three levels: the village (called *thâni*, which itself consisted of several subdivisions, each having its own name); the coordinated unity, made up of several villages (called *wisaya*); and the state or kingdom (called *bhûmi*). The capital, where the king abided in his palace, was called *nâgara*, and the palace itself was called *kadatuan*. The denomination of the capital may, occasionally, be used as a synonym for the whole country.

Based on the location where inscriptions issued by authorities of the Kadiri kingdom have been found, the territory of this kingdom can be identified as within the present-day East Java Province. However, there are two inscriptions in Central Java Province mentioning year numbers that fall within the Kadiri period. Nevertheless, the contents of the two inscriptions do not have any connection with authorities of the Kadiri kingdom.

In its early phase, the kingdom of Kadiri must have been one of the twin kingdoms created as a result of Airlangga’s (r. 1019–1049) division of his kingdom Kahuripan, mentioned in the inscription *Wurare* (1289 C.E.) that was found at Simpang, Surabaya, and in the literary texts entitled *Nâgarakertâgama* (fourteenth cen-

tury C.E.). The twin kingdoms comprised Pangjalu and Janggala, presumably partitioned by the River Brantas, one of the two biggest rivers in East Java. The inscription of *Wurare* also mentioned that the capital of Pangjalu was Daha. The name *Daha* was also mentioned in a slightly earlier inscription (the *Mîla-malurung* inscription) as the capital of bhûmi Kadiri. Thus, it becomes clear that *Kadiri* as a name of a kingdom was a synonym of *Pangjalu*. However, the predominance of the use of the Kadiri in later textual evidences might be explained as a function of the remarkable developments during the internally called Kadiri period (mentioned in contemporaneous inscriptions and literary works). The noteworthy developments were both in state management and in cultural expression, and they may have been marked enough to cause this kingdom to overshadow its twin.

Aside from territorial administration, the Kadiri period also saw developments in military organization and mobilization. Troops were divided according to the mastery of different kinds of weapons, such as the club, the arrow, the battle-ax, and the lance, or according to mastery over different serving animals, such as the elephant and the horse. Every unit had a leader and a certain symbol put on its flag. Most symbols used a figure of an animal. Initiatives in the Kadiri state formation also included the development of a system of water management (supposedly for both transportation and irrigation purposes). A special government official appointed for this task, the *senapati sarwawajala*, first appeared during the Kadiri period. A water-related professional that was first mentioned in Kadiri inscriptions was the *undahagi lañcang*, the shipbuilder. Another official that likewise first appeared during the Kadiri period was the *sopana*, who acted as an intermediary between the king and those who needed the king’s favor.

Kings of Kadiri proper, mentioned in inscriptions, began with Bâmeswara (in inscriptions of 1117 and 1120 C.E.), then Warmmeswara-Jayabhaya (1135, 1136, 1144, and 1157), Sarwmeswara (1159), Arryeswara (1169), Kroñcaryyadipa (1181), Kâmeswara (1185), and Śrengga-Jayawarsa/Warsajaya (1194, 1204, 1205). Some of those Kadiri kings were mentioned in literary works as the patrons of the

court poet, even as literary critics. Several works by Kadiri court poets survive to the present through the tradition of copying manuscripts, both in Java and in Bali. The popularity of those works is demonstrated by their many dramatic and musical interpretations on both islands. Among the poetic works are the *Bhâratayuddha*, *Smaradahana*, *Bhomakâwya*, and *Ghatotkacâśraya*. Quotes from the *Bhâratayuddha*, telling about the war between the Pandawas and Kaurawas, are still used as formulaic expressions in today's Javanese shadow-puppet plays. The name *smaradahana* (the burning of Smara, the god of love) is perpetuated in the name of a meter in local traditional Javanese-Balinese-Sundanese poetry.

EDI SEDYAWATI

See also Airlangga (r. 1019–1049); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia (First Century B.C.E. to Thirteenth Century C.E.); Singahsari (1222–1293); *Wayang Kulit*

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KALIMANTAN

See Borneo

KAMPONG AYER (BRUNEI)

Kampong Ayer is the spiritual home of Negara Brunei Darussalam. The sultanate's former political and economic capital, it is the "Water Village" section of the present-day city of Bandar Seri Begawan.

Built at a defensive location, Kampong Ayer comprises houses built on stilts in the Brunei River, which has acted as water supply, rubbish dump, and waste-disposal system. The settlement is divided into many different wards that are interconnected by wooden walkways. Each ward has its own name, perhaps that of an economic specialization or of a prominent resident in the past. Kampong Ayer's silversmiths were among the best in the entire Malay Archipelago. Disparities of social status and income persist to this day both within and between wards.

Although there is sixteenth-century evidence of terrestrial construction, the present land town (the country's administrative headquarters) dates essentially from the early twentieth century. The combined entity was known as Bandar Brunei (Brunei Town) until 1970, when the city was renamed Bandar Seri Begawan.

Kampong Ayer's population waxed and waned in accordance with the sultanate's political fortunes, reaching a nadir in the early twentieth century but subsequently making a strong recovery (it was 27,285 in 2001) (Daniel 2002: 219). Despite government efforts since the colonial era, the inhabitants remain resistant to resettlement on terra firma. The British had wanted to promote rice cultivation; the present regime aims to improve housing and promote social welfare. There is a dilemma in that the government is obliged to supply Kampong Ayer with the essentials of modern life, yet the more it does so, the less willing people become to settle elsewhere.

Although no longer the sultanate's center of gravity, Kampong Ayer looks set to survive for many years to come. It is promoted nowadays as a tourist destination. Problems include regular conflagrations, which can destroy whole wards; in the past, savage epidemics took a fearsome toll of life.

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See also Anglo-Brunei Relations (Nineteenth Century to 1980s); Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries)

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KAMPUCHEA UNITED FRONT FOR NATIONAL SALVATION (KUFNS)

The Kampuchea United Front for National Salvation was a Cambodian political body that was established by Vietnam toward the end of 1978, prior to Vietnam's invasion of the communist regime of Democratic Kampuchea (DK). The front consisted of Cambodian soldiers and party cadre who sought refuge in Vietnam to escape the purges being conducted by the DK. Most of the refugees came from the eastern part of Cambodia, bordering Vietnam. The men selected by the Vietnamese to lead the front included such future Cambodian political figures as Chea Sim (1932–), Heng Samrin (1934–), and Hun Sen (1951–). The front leadership also included Cambodians who had lived in exile in Vietnam since the 1950s and had gained the trust of the Vietnamese.

In December 1978, Vietnam launched a blitzkrieg attack on DK, using several hundred thousand troops. The country broke open like an egg, and Vietnamese forces accompanied by their Cambodian protégés entered Phnom Penh on 7 January 1979. A new government, calling itself the Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), was swiftly established, and figures prominent in the front assumed ministerial rank.

Over the next few months, as Cambodia struggled to its feet, the newly reconstituted Cambodian Communist Party operated from the shadows, with the front taking responsibility, under close Vietnamese supervision, for a series of initiatives aimed at gaining the confidence of the war-weary Cambodian people. These steps included reopening schools and markets, allowing freedom of movement, and permitting Buddhism to flourish in a restricted form. The front ceased to exist following the Cambodian national elections of 1981, but the leaders installed by the Vietnamese remained in charge of the PRK, even after the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in 1989.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Chea Sim (1932–); Democratic Kampuchea (DK); FUNCINPEC (United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia); Heng Samrin (1934–); Hun Sen (1951–); Khmer Rouge; *Killing Fields, The*; Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Sihanouk, Norodum (1922–); Sino-Vietnamese Relations

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KANGANI SYSTEM

The *kangani* system was a system of labor recruitment from India associated with the growth of the international economy and the spread of the plantation economy in Southeast Asia in the late nineteenth century. Plantation

workers in Malaya were predominantly South Indian and were hired as either “assisted” or “unassisted” labor. Under the category of assisted labor, there were two types of recruitment systems—indenture and kangani. The kangani system was essentially one of personal recruitment. It rapidly took over as the main mechanism of labor recruitment, enabling both coffee- and rubber-planting interests and the British colonial administration to import Indian labor on a large scale for the plantation economy and the public works sector in Malaya and the Straits Settlements.

The word *kangani* means “overseer” or “foreman” in Tamil, and under this system, the kangani, usually a senior laborer, was sent by his employer to recruit workers from his home village. This system was preferred because of the lower cost involved in sending a kangani to recruit labor compared with the cost of indentured labor obtained through recruiting agencies. The kangani system also appealed to the planters because the prospect of absconding was less likely compared with the indenture system, especially since the kangani usually had a vested interest in ensuring that the laborers did not run off. The kangani was not only a powerful intermediary but also received “head money” for each recruited worker for every day he labored.

The kangani system was considered less harsh than the indenture system because laborers were no longer bound by written contracts. Desertion was regarded as a civil, rather than a criminal, offense, and workers were regarded as “free” workers. Kangani labor recruitment began to decline in the late 1920s, was suspended in the 1930s, and was formally abolished in 1938.

AMARJIT KAUR

See also Coffee; Highways and Railways; Indian Immigrants; Rubber

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KANGCHU SYSTEM

The *Kangchu System* was a pattern of agricultural development that flourished in Johor, a West Malaysian state, during the nineteenth century. The ruler gave a Chinese capitalist the authority to recruit and introduce pepper and gambier planters into the watershed of a specific river. The *Kangchu* (a Chinese term translated as “Lord of the Port”) received a letter of authority, a *surat sungai* (lit. river letter), giving him most of the powers of government over the Chinese community that he founded. These included the right to collect taxes, particularly excise taxes on the sale of opium, alcohol, pork, and the like, and the provision of services such as pawnbroking, gambling, prostitution, and theatrical productions.

Some version of the system seems to have been in operation earlier in Singapore and on the island of Bentan (Bintan) in the Riau-Lingga archipelago, where place-names (such as Lim Chukang and Pitchukang) reflect the use of this system. Most of the terminology apparently derived from Chinese expressions, primarily in the Teochew (Chaozhou) speech.

In Johor, the system reached a fairly sophisticated level of development. The existing records of the Johor archives show that the ruler gathered considerable information from the Chinese businessmen who controlled the system, maintaining a check on the partnerships formed to manage the enterprises and keeping a register of the shareholding *kongsi* (*gongsi* [lit. sharing, cooperative undertaking]), which managed each river valley. In Singapore, the British colonial government exercised virtually no control over these Chinese settlements.

The system, which reflected an ongoing political and economic relationship between the Johor ruler and the Chinese merchants of Singapore, was instrumental in bringing about a productive population in the state during the nineteenth century and providing the ruler with a substantial and dependable income. This system was abolished after Johor became a part of British Malaya in 1914.

CARL TROCKI

See also Abu Bakar, Sultan of Johor (r. 1862–1895); Chinese in Southeast Asia; Johor; *Kongsi*; Pepper

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KAPITAN CHINA SYSTEM

Kapitan China, the Malay title meaning "captain [or chief] of the Chinese," was accorded to the leader or headman of the Chinese community. This individual functioned as both intermediary and representative between the European colonial authorities and the Chinese community. The system proved to be an economical and effective means of indirect rule.

The practice of appointing a captain for each ethnic group and only dealing through this leader on all matters relating to that particular community was an administrative device used by the Melakan Malay rulers of the fifteenth century in dealing with the cosmopolitan trading community. The Portuguese adopted this method of indirect rule during their administration over the city port of Melaka in the sixteenth century, and the Dutch and the British utilized this method in handling and controlling the Chinese in their respective domains in Southeast Asia. The Dutch and the British shared the policy of restricting their interaction with the Chinese community to matters in which they had a direct material interest. Apart from that, the Chinese were left to administer and manage affairs among themselves. The Dutch and British colonial authorities appointed a prominent Chinese merchant or a miner as the *kapitan China*, whom they dealt with on all matters relating to the Chinese community. The *kapitan China* was invested with judicial powers to handle offenses within his community and to generally keep the peace. To a large extent, this individual was held responsible for the actions of his brethren. The *kapitan China* system was adopted in the Dutch East Indies, particularly in Java, and in British Malaya. The English White Rajas of Sarawak also subscribed to a similar practice.

During the mid-twentieth century, toward the close of the colonial period, the title *kapitan China* became more honorary, and the system was subsequently abandoned in the post-1945 period.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Chinese in Southeast Asia; *Kangchu* System; Melaka; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies

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KAREN NATIONAL DEFENCE ORGANISATION (KNDO)

When the British government concluded an agreement with the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) in January 1947 to grant Burma (Myanmar) independence in one year, the majority of the leadership of the Karen National Union (KNU) decided to boycott the elections for a national assembly. Unless prior agreement on seven demands, including the establishment of a separate ethnic Karen state with its own seaboard, was reached, the KNU would withdraw from the elections. Though the AFPFL agreed to give the Karen community twenty-five seats in the assembly and to discuss the other matters in time, it was unwilling to make the major concessions the KNU demanded.

At that time the KNU, having parted company with the AFPFL, decided to organize its own paramilitary force, similar to the AFPFL's People's Volunteers Organization, which General Aung San (1915–1947) had established after the war as a paramilitary force in the event that the British had not conceded independence. Named the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), the force soon began to group together young supporters into disciplined groups to defend what the leaders perceived to be the threats to Karen interests following the establishment of an independent democratic regime in Burma.

After the assassination of Aung San in July 1947, a period of civil uncertainty occurred,

and local units of the KNDO began to act without government approval to provide security protection for Karen communities in various areas of southern Burma. KNDO units held Moulmein for two months and only returned the city to government control when the Karen commander of the Burma army, General Smith-Dun, conceded their authority in other areas. The KNDO seized Moulmein again in September 1948, and at about the same time, Karen troops in the Burma armed forces revolted and joined the KNDO. The Karen insurgency had started; it would last for more than fifty years.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA); Karen National Union (KNU); Karens; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia

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KAREN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (KNLA)

The Karen (or Kayin) National Liberation Army is the armed wing of the Karen (Kayin) National Union (KNU), the longest existing separatist movement in Burma (Myanmar). Headed for many years by the veteran Bo Mya, the KNLA is a descendant of previously organized Kayin separatist forces, including the Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO), formed in July 1947, and the Kawthoolei People's Liberation Army (KPLA), established in the 1950s when the KNU broke into factions. The KPLA was aligned with a procommunist organization known as the Karen National Unity Party (KNUP) and led by Mahn Ba Zan, whereas Saw Hunter Tha Hmwe led the conservative faction that retained the KNU name. In the early 1960s, a third faction formed around the Karen Revolutionary Council (KRC). The KNLA largely operates along the Thai border areas in the Myanmar state of Kawthoolei.

The Kayin, who compose 2 to 4 million of Myanmar's 50 million population, are divided between the majority who are Buddhists and animists and the less than 25 percent who became Christians during the British colonial period (Smith 1999: 30). The leadership and most of the followers of the KNU/KNLA come from the Christian minority of the Kayin population. Many of the troops that formed the KNDO had formerly served in the colonial army. Never accepting incorporation into Myanmar at the time of independence from the British in 1948, the KNU had sought to establish a separate Karen state. Pursuing different strategies since the middle of the twentieth century, the Kayin separatist groups have never come close to success despite their tactical and actual alliances at various times with the Burma Communist Party (BCP), Chinese Nationalists, Shan Nationalists, and Thai forces.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Burma Communist Party (BCP); Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO); Karen National Union (KNU); Karens; Shan Nationalism

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KAREN NATIONAL UNION (KNU)

The Karen (Kayin) National Union (KNU) is the major Kayin rebel group in Burma (Myanmar) today. When founded in 1947, it brought together some of the leaders of the minority Kayin Christian and other communities to press the departing British colonial government to establish a separate independent Kayin state out of parts of Burma and perhaps Thailand. The Kayin and those closely related to them are an ethnic group who compose a number of distinct communities in the delta region and eastern border areas, numbering from 2 to 4 million out of Myanmar's 50 million population (Smith 1999: 30). The armed wing of the KNU, the Karen (Kayin) National Defence Organisation (KNDO), was composed initially of veterans from government forces raised before and during the Pacific War (1941–1945).

In January 1949, while the government of Myanmar was facing assaults from the Burma



Karen National Union (KNU) soldiers hold guns during the anniversary of the 53rd Karen National Resistance Day at Valay Kee base near the Thailand-Myanmar border, 31 January 2002. (AFP/Corbis)

Communist Party (BCP), the majority of the KNU went underground to join in rebellion against the new state. Because of the military training and equipment at their disposal, the KNDO forces soon controlled large parts of Myanmar, briefly including a number of major towns. Gradually, however, the government was able to regain territory. Since then, the KNU, though never threatening the government, has been a continual drain on resources and a major hindrance to creating a stable country. The organization has undergone a complex evolution, marked by several major fissures as its leaders have developed and disagreed over alliances with the BCP, Chinese Nationalist troops in Myanmar territory, and other ethnic minority insurgent groups. Although many insurgent groups entered into cease-fire agreements with the government of Myanmar after 1988, the KNU refused to do so. It has since

been significantly reduced in strength as it has further fractured from within and as the government has applied greater military pressure on it from without.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Burma Communist Party (BCP);
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA);
Karens; Nationalism and Independence
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KARENS

The Karens comprise one of the largest ethnic groupings in Myanmar (Burma), though there is dispute over just how many persons in the country identify themselves as Karens. Accord-

ing to the government, there are approximately 2.5 million Karens out of a total population of over 50 million people, but according to the Karen National Union (KNU), which has been in revolt against the government since the middle of the twentieth century, the number is closer to 7 million. Another 200,000 live in Thailand (Smith 1999: 30). In the nineteenth century, the broad ethnic category “Karen” came to be applied to hill tribe peoples living in eastern Myanmar, primarily near the border with Siam (Thailand). There are a number of subdialects of the Karen language, and over time, these have come to be identified with particular subsets of Karen. Also, political distinctions among the Karens have tended to become reified into ethnic categories.

What may be referred to as the mainstream Karens (or Kayins) now live both in the hill areas in the east and in the expansive Irrawaddy Delta, which was opened to rice cultivation in the nineteenth century. By and large, the plains or deltic Karens have integrated into Burmese society, rather like their compatriots living in Thailand have done. However, in the more variegated and inaccessible terrain of the mountainous border region, numerous distinctions among people who might be described as Karens have been maintained. Moreover, these distinctions may be even more pronounced because these people have been forced to come to terms with the political and economic changes caused by the growth in population of their neighbors and the increasing capacity of modern states to regulate life in remote territories. Sgaw and Pwo are two of the major Karen dialects. The Sgaw people tend to identify themselves as Christians, whereas the Pwo more commonly are Buddhists.

In addition to the mainstream Karens, twenty subsets can be identified, with four major political identities that have come to have ideological resonance since Myanmar achieved independence in 1948. The other three political identities are the Karenni, the Kayans, and the Pao. The Karenni are also known as the Kayinni, Kayah, or Red Karens. The Kayans are known as the Padaungs, and the Pao are sometimes called Taungthu. Predominantly practitioners of animism prior to the nineteenth century, many have been converted to Theravada Buddhism, like the majority Burman and Mon populations, or to Christianity. Both Protestant

and Catholic missionaries worked among the Karens during and after the colonial period. Christian Karens, who composed approximately 25 percent of the mainstream Karen population, are primarily Baptists (Smith 1999: 44). Catholicism is often practiced by Padaung and Pao people, even though they retain many of their earlier animist beliefs.

At the time that Myanmar achieved independence, the constitution adopted provided for a federal republic with three states and one special division, each with a separate ethnic designation given it. Independent Myanmar then consisted of the Shan State, the Karenni State, the Kachin State, the Chin Special Division, and the seven divisions of what had been known as Burma proper. Provision was also included in the constitution for the creation of a Karen state, but this was delayed as a result of the civil war that broke out in 1948 and engulfed the country. However, in 1952, such a state was carved out of the approximately 30,000 square kilometers of territory along the Thai border. Given the great ethnic mixing that exists in Myanmar, less than half the population in this territory was actually Karens, and it is difficult to see how an ethnically cohesive unit could be created anywhere in the country without massive migration and human dislocation.

Karen identity was greatly strengthened during the colonial period not only by the work of Christian missionaries but also by the policies of the British administration. Special political rights, including Karen-designated seats in the legislature, and disproportionate recruitment into the police and armed forces provided Karens with what the Burmans perceived as special favors; consequently, the Karens were considered collaborators in colonialism. These divisions were exacerbated during the Pacific War (1941–1945) when a number of Christian Karens remained loyal to the British while the majority of the population initially rallied to the invading Japanese. This resulted in the massacre of a church full of Karens one Sunday, an event that has become symbolic of the strained relations between the two groups ever since.

The Karen community was the first in colonial Burma to organize in modern political forms. In the 1880s, Christians, in conjunction with American missionaries, formed the Karen National Association. After the Pacific War, leading Karens formed the Karen Central Or-

ganization (KCO); a split in 1947 brought forth the Karen National Union (KNU). It was this organization that led the revolt against the government of Myanmar that broke out in 1948, a revolt that had not ended at the time of writing (2002). The more moderate members of the KCO continued to cooperate with the government, and a Karen woman served as a minister in the first cabinet of independent Myanmar. The KNU argued that the British had promised the Karens an independent state, similar to Pakistan, in exchange for their loyalty during the war. However, they felt let down by the failure of any British government to acknowledge their claim.

The revolt of the KNU was greatly aided by the defection of a number of troops from the Myanmar army. In December 1948, the Third Battalion Karen Rifles along with Karen military and civilian police joined the rebellion. At that time, the Karen commander of the Burma army, General Smith-Dun, was relieved of his command. The KNU managed to hang on to the territory they controlled along the Thai border as a result of a number of factors. During the socialist period in Myanmar (1962–1988), they taxed the lucrative smuggling trade then developed with Thailand. They also levied taxes on the population they controlled and received some assistance from Christian groups abroad. From time to time, they entered into temporary alliances with other insurgent groups in Myanmar, including the now defunct Burma Communist Party (BCP) and some drug warlords. Following the prodemocracy uprising in 1988, the KNU served as a rallying point for a number of anti-military factions and movements.

A majority of the troops of the KNU were not Christian, and a number of these revolted against their officers in the mid-1990s and formed the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). Claiming discrimination against Buddhist Karens by their Christian commanders, the DKBA quickly reached a cease-fire with the government army and began to conduct warfare against the KNU. Unlike the majority of ethnic groups in Myanmar, which were previously in revolt against the army government but which entered into cease-fires with it during the 1990s, the KNU, despite several failed attempts at negotiations, remains at arms. The KNU as a political movement and armed force

is now much weaker than it was, and the Karen community has suffered a great deal of deprivation and death as a result of living in what has been, for over fifty years, a war zone. More than 100,000 lived in refugee camps in Thailand at the start of the twenty-first century, and many more were displaced within their own country.

The separate Karenni or Kayah State and its diverse population of Kayah, Shans, Burmans, and others are the result of a treaty signed between the British and King Mindon (r. 1853–1878) in 1875, which recognized Kayah as a separate political entity from the remainder of the king's territories. The Kayah had adopted the more formal and hierarchical social and political kingship (*sawbwa*) systems of their northern neighbors, the Shans, than had those Karens living farther south, who organized their society around hereditary village headmen. This anomaly was formally recognized in the 1947 constitution of Myanmar, and the Kayah State, like the Shan State, was granted the right of secession from the Union of Myanmar in ten years' time. However, before then, relations between many in the Kayah State and the government became tense, and there has been armed insurgency of various degrees of intensity against the central government and its policies since 1948.

The small population of the Kayah State, estimated at only about 250,000 in 1997, in comparison with the Karen State population of 1.4 million at that time, is very diverse. These divisions are the result of linguistic, religious, ethnic, and, increasingly, ideological distinctions that often overlap and reinforce limited and antagonistic worldviews. The Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), formed in 1957, led the opposition to the government. In 1978, the KNPP split from the left-wing Karenni Nationalities People's Liberation Front (KPLF). The KPLF entered into a cease-fire with the government in the early 1990s, as did another rebel group in the Kayah State, the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP). The KNPP initially also agreed to a cease-fire with the government, but that agreement quickly broke down over disputes about logging rights and control of territory.

The Kayah State, like much of the Kayan State farther south, has been subjected not only to years of warfare that has had deleterious consequences for the people of the area but also to extensive legal and illegal logging. There is widespread smuggling of timber, cattle, and

other goods into Thailand in exchange for food and medicine. Kayah State is perhaps the poorest and least developed territory in all of Myanmar. Because of the very mountainous terrain of the state, as well as the varieties of political powers in existence, it is not an area over which any government, before or after independence, has ever had firm administrative control. In an attempt to establish its authority over the Kayah State and end the years of insurgency, the government relocated more than 35,000 villages in the first half of the 1990s. A further 20,000 fled to Thailand, where they live in refugee camps or have been absorbed into the labor force.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Buddhism, Theravada; Burma Communist Party (BCP); Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Karen National Defence Organisation (KNDO); Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA); Karen National Union (KNU); Missionaries, Christian; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Ne Win, General (1911–2002)

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**KARTINI, RADEN AJENG
(1879–1904)**

Javanese Feminist

Raden Ajeng Kartini entered Indonesia's pantheon of national heroes by presidential decree

in 1963, fifty-nine years after her death in the Dutch colony then known as the Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies. In her homeland today, Kartini is honored rather than studied. Republican Indonesia shed Kartini's inherited title, Raden Ajeng, in favor of *Ibu* (mother) and imprinted her on the national consciousness as a sanctified figure, eternally caring for others—an advocate of women's rights, advanced education, and careers and a precursor of nationalism.

Family and friends considered the historical Kartini emotional, combative, and unconventional. Her private letters preserve a jumble of thoughts, an ardent yearning for personal freedom, extravagant outpourings of affection, plans for careers, an eye for observation, and a passionate belief in her own destiny.

Kartini's family was self-consciously modern, the men holding important positions in the colonial civil service. They employed Dutch live-in tutors, invited Europeans to dinners where champagne was served, journeyed by the new railway to the colony's capital of Batavia, and wrote articles for Dutch-language journals. Vaunting their blood ties to Java's royal houses, they claimed a special relationship with the rural Javanese that enabled them to deliver to the Dutch taxes, prosperity, and calm. While cementing their place in Java's colonial present with Western jobs and tastes, Kartini's male kin linked Java's present with its past, maintaining the standing of the family through polygamous marriage alliances. Chief wives brought the glamour of royal Java, whereas minor wives reflected the obedience of village populations.

Kartini and seven of her siblings were children of her father's village wife; three others were children of the wife with connections to royalty. Kartini's experience of polygamy impressed on her the subordination of women and strife in the home. She came to view the practice through Dutch eyes as shameful. Becoming fluent in Dutch at the local European school, which was multiracial and coeducational, Kartini urgently wanted what Dutch girls seemed to have—a choice over her own future. But though her brothers continued their studies in secondary school and one went on to the university in The Netherlands, the sisters followed the dictates imposed on Javanese girls of their class. They withdrew into the home to wait through puberty for marriage.

Kartini and her sisters became invisible to the Javanese. They could, however, visit the women of the Dutch community. They expanded their reach after meeting J. H. Abendanon (1852–1925), Java's director for education, and his wife and learning of the government's proposals for girls' schooling. Kartini corresponded regularly with Rosa Abendanon, and through her, she extended her acquaintances among the senior levels of the colony's administration. In 1900 in Batavia, she met members of the governor-general's circle. She remained in correspondence with them until her death, using the letter as the medium to develop her views on the place of women in Javanese society, the need for girls' education and enlightened female behavior, and ending arranged marriages and polygamy. She also wrote for Dutch-language journals published in the colony.

Through her network, Kartini was offered a government scholarship for study in The Netherlands. Her goals were to further her formal education, to develop a mentality of freedom, and to provide a role model on her return to Java. Such ideas, conceived in opposition to the family, resulted in frustration, but at home, she started her own small school for daughters of her father's staff, trying to develop a teaching method that would attract the Javanese and mold them in modern ways.

Kartini's notoriety brought her to the attention of Raden Adipati Djojoadiningrat, the Javanese official heading the district of Rembang. Although her well-known desire to remain single was considered scandalous, her personal connections to influential Dutch families made her an eligible wife. The family overcame her opposition, and in 1903, Kartini entered a polygamous household to share her husband with three cowives and seven children. She died following the birth of a son in 1904.

In 1911, Abendanon published a selection of Kartini's letters to Dutch friends to raise funds for girls' schools in Java. Many editions and translations into numerous languages followed. Some Indonesians saw Kartini as an embarrassment due to her appreciation of Dutch people and their culture. They faulted the absence of an Islamic sensibility and her lack of interest in Dutch colonial possessions beyond Java, and they saw few accomplishments in her short life to merit public attention.

In 1987, the publication of all of Kartini's letters to the Abendanon family revealed Kartini the gossip, explained what had been conjecture, and portrayed the crucial alliance of Javanese and Dutch elites that had made colonial rule possible. The letters show the intellectual ferment provoked by a Western education and provide a rare female voice from the period. They give an eyewitness account of daily life at a critical turning point in Indonesia's history.

JEAN GELMAN TAYLOR

See also Education, Western Secular; Ethical Policy (*Ethische Politiek*); Java; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Sexual Practices in Southeast Asia; Women in Southeast Asia

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KATIPUNAN

Clandestine Filipino Revolutionary Organization

Katipunan was a secret society organized in Manila in 1892 with the purpose of working toward a separation of the Philippine Islands from Spain. The founding of the Katipunan ended the period of reformism and ushered in a period of revolutionary activity. The society represented the role of the lower classes in the Philippine Revolution. In 1896, the *katipuneros* raised the flag of the revolution and started the armed struggle against the regime.

In July 1892, José Rizal (1861–1896) had returned to the Philippines to start a reformist organization called La Liga Filipina. The Span-

ish government, suspecting him of undermining the regime, arrested him and ordered his deportation to Mindanao. A number of Rizal's sympathizers, including Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897), realized that the period of reforms had come to an end and that stronger action was necessary. On the night of 7 July, after the deportation order had been issued, they met secretly at a house in Tondo, Manila, and decided to organize a secret society. This clandestine society adopted the Tagalog name *Kataastaasan Kagalang-galang na Katipunan nang mga Anak nang Bayan* (Highest and Most Respectable Society of the Children of the People), abbreviated as KKK, or Katipunan. The society had a number of objectives: striving for the separation of the Philippines from Spain, enhancing the moral character of the Filipinos, attacking religious fanaticism, and defending the poor and the oppressed. The Katipunan venerated José Rizal as the personification of the independence struggle and used his name as a password and battle cry.

Organizationally, the society was influenced by the secret society setup of the Masons, which had been active in the Philippines for some time. Initially, recruitment took place via the “triangle method,” whereby every member initiated two individuals into the organization who were not supposed to know each other and who did not know anybody else in the society. Only the first person had contact with another triangle. This cellular structure was used so that if one person was arrested and questioned under duress, he could not give authorities information that would enable them to round up the whole organization. Another characteristic was the division of members into three grades signifying different levels of initiation, each with its distinct paraphernalia. The initiation took place during a ceremony in which a new member had to sign his oath with his blood. Women could join the Katipunan as well, and they underwent the same initiation rites, but they did not have to seal their membership with a blood compact. Like the Masons, the society had a secret password, special signs so members could acknowledge one another, and a secret code for communicating in writing. A flag was designed, with the letters KKK forming a triangle on a red piece of cloth.

This complicated system of recruitment limited the number of members. During the first two years, membership of the Katipunan was small, gradually growing from a few dozen to a few hundred, mainly concentrated in Manila. The society particularly appealed to lower- and lower-middle-class people, such as laborers, clerks, petty merchants, and peasants. After some time, the tedious and restrictive triangle method of recruitment was abandoned. In 1895, Bonifacio became the supreme head of the society. In early 1896, the first (and only) issue of a journal, *Kalayaan* (“Freedom”), was printed, and copies were widely distributed in and around Manila. The periodical had a strong effect on the people, and large numbers joined the society, bringing its membership to the level of many thousands of people; some historians cited the figure of 30,000. However, the society did not attract wealthy merchants in Manila, who loathed its lower-class character and consequently refused to contribute funds so that the organization could not purchase weapons. One of the new members initiated in March 1896 was Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964), from Kawit, Cavite. Aguinaldo and his brothers built up a strong organization in Cavite, recruiting large numbers of followers with a simple ceremony in which they only signed their names in blood.

On 19 August 1896, the Spanish government discovered the existence of the Katipunan and started a reign of terror to clamp down on the organization. Bonifacio and his followers fled to the town of Balintawak, where they convened the members of the Katipunan and proclaimed the revolution against the Spanish regime. For several months, the katipuneros led by Bonifacio attempted to conquer Manila, but they were repelled and later defeated by stronger Spanish forces. In the meantime, Aguinaldo and his followers had driven the Spaniards out of Cavite. In December, Bonifacio moved to Cavite, where he became entangled in a factional rivalry with the Aguinaldo group. When Aguinaldo was elected president of the revolutionary movement, Bonifacio, who wanted to preserve the organizational structure of the Katipunan, refused to recognize the new government. Aguinaldo ordered his officers to arrest Bonifacio and his brother. The two men were tried before a revolutionary court, found guilty of treason, and executed on 10 May

1897. With Bonifacio's death, the Katipunan practically ceased to exist as an independent organization.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Aguinaldo, Emilio (1869–1964); Anti-Spanish Revolts (The Philippines); Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); La Liga Filipina; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; *Noli Me Tangere* (1887) and *El Filibusterismo* (1891); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Propaganda Movement; Rizal, José (1861–1896)

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KEBATINAN MOVEMENTS

The word *kebatinan* refers to Javanese mystical movements and is almost synonymous with *Javanism* (*kejawen*). Both refer to Javanese traditions that prioritize syncretic ancestral culture rather than religious affiliation, especially as distinct from Islam, which is statistically dominant in Java. Javanists insist their practices were rooted in a perennial indigenous wisdom predating even Hindu and Buddhist influence. Thus, *kebatinan* refers to a category of spiritual movements, such as Bon in Tibet or Shinto in Japan, within which people imagine themselves as activating an ageless consciousness rooted in local ancestral culture.

However, the term *batin* is from Arabic (*bathin*), which is paired with *lahir* (the Arabic *zahir*). *Lahir* refers to outer material realities

known through the senses and intellect; *batin* references inner spiritual realities known only through the spiritual heart, or *rasa*, a Sanskrit word referring in this context to “intuitive feeling.” Thus, *kebatinan* may be translated as “the science of the inner,” and this framing of the esoteric leads committed Muslims to argue that Javanese spiritual discourse is Islamic at root.

Kebatinan movements appeared early in the 1900s in tandem with the rise of nationalism and the Muhammadiyah (1911), which is still the leading modernist Islamic movement. At the same time, Hardopusoro, among the earliest kebatinan movements, had strong links with the Theosophical Society. Thus, like nationalism itself, their constitution as organizations reflected all of the influences associated with the rise of the modern state. It is in the context of debate with modernist Muslims that kebatinan movements became a recurrent issue of Indonesian politics, especially during the 1950s and again in the 1970s.

Following independence in 1949, Wongsonegoro, the first minister of the Department of Information, became the patron of a series of umbrella movements that lobbied, on behalf of several hundred kebatinan organizations, to establish their legitimacy. Some movements, notably Sapto Darma, argued that as indigenous traditions, they deserved the same status as given to recognized “religions,” all of which were imported. These debates resurfaced in the Suharto era (1967–1998), at which time kebatinan (renamed *kepercayaan*, or “beliefs,” in 1971) appeared to offer potential as a counter to organized Islam. Although a significant portion of the population still empathizes with Javanism in general, the dynamism of kebatinan movements has declined markedly, and most adherents now avoid public engagement.

PAUL STANGE

See also Folk Religions; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Muhammadiyah; Religious Development and Influence in Southeast Asia; *Tam Giao*

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KEDAH

See Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu)

KELANTAN

See Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu)

KEMPEI-TAI

Suppressing Anti-Japanese Elements

The Kempei-tai–Japanese troops (*tai*) of the Military Police (*kempei*)—was established in 1881. The original objectives were to ensure discipline in the army and to maintain internal social security. Until the end of World War II (1939–1945), any kind of social reformists, especially socialists, who were regarded as antinational by the government were arrested and tortured by the Kempei-tai inside Japan.

Taiwanese, Korean, and Chinese offices were set up in 1895, 1896, and 1901, respectively, to prevent and oppress any anti-Japanese movement. When the Second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937, the Field Military Police (FMP, *Yasen Kempei*) was formed and sent to the battlefield. When the Pacific War started in December 1941, many FMP members were dispatched to the occupied Southeast Asian territories. Their tasks included vigilance of army discipline and normal police administration. However, the main task was to detect anti-Japanese elements. They employed many local informers. Tens of thousands of local people who were suspected of involvement in an anti-Japanese movement were arrested, tortured, and killed by the Kempei-tai. In Malaya, the situation was more serious among the Chinese inhabitants, who were disliked by the Japanese Imperial army because of their influential and remarkable anti-Japanese national salvation movement before the war.

When the Pacific War ended, the numbers of Kempei-tai personnel stationed in various territories were as follows: in Japan, 10,679; in Tai-

wan and Korea, 2,672; and in occupied territory, 22,686. Out of the total number of 36,037, there were 1,843 officers (Nihon Kenyu Kai 1976). Of the 984 Japanese soldiers who were sentenced to death at the various war criminal courts after the end of the Pacific War, 447 were Kempei-tai members (Nihon Kenyu Kai 1976).

HARA FUJIO

See also Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Fujiwara Kikan (F Kikan); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); *Sook Ching*

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KĒRTANAGARA (r. 1268–1292)

Harboring Ambitions beyond Java

Kĕrtanagara was the last legitimate king of Singhāsari (1222–1293) and the most prolific in terms of issuing inscriptions. After him, a usurper by the name of Jayakatwang of Kadiri ruled briefly (from 1292 to 1293). Kĕrtanagara was also the first Javanese king to have direct concerns with territories outside the island, in this case, Sumatra. The development of relationships beyond the homeland is a phenomenon worth scrutinizing in the Southeast Asian context. What factors enabled those connections? What were the expectations of the rulers who reached out to other polities? Such questions are relevant in regard to the ancient history of Southeast Asia. Presumably, relationships that linked people from two different cultural spheres entailed problems of communication, especially in terms of language use.

The fourteenth-century chronicle poem *Nāgarakertāgama* (canto 41–44; see Pigeaud 1960) incorporates the following information and quotes about Kĕrtanagara. He ascended the throne in 1176 śaka (1254 C.E.), inaugurated by his father, Wisnuwardhana (r. 1248–1268). All the local leaders of “Kadiri and Janggala” (the former unified kingdom of Kahuripan under Airlangga [r. 1019–1049]) then paid obeisance to Kĕrtanagara. His district Kutarāja “became more and more splendid and came to be known as Singhāsari.”

His father died in 1268 C.E., and Kĕrtanagara began his attempts to control his political environment by subjugating one of his enemies, a “wicked man” named Cayarĕja, in 1270 C.E. He then sent his men to Malayu to establish religious diplomatic relations in the year 1275 C.E. Another “bad man,” Mahisa Rangkah, was overthrown in 1280 C.E. Bali was conquered in 1284, and its queen was made a captive and taken to Kĕrtanagara’s court. Subsequently, many other countries—Pahang, Malayu, Gurun, and Bakulapura, as well as Sunda and Madura on the island of Java itself—submitted to the king of Singhĕsari. Kĕrtanagara died in the year 1292 C.E., which was phrased as “returning to the abode of the lord of the Jinas” in the *Nĕgarakertĕgama*.

The *Nĕgarakertĕgama* formulation of “sending his men for a search to the land of Malayu” warrants further discussion with reference to other sources. There are a pair of matching inscriptions in two different places in Sumatra—at Rambahan and Padangroco. One is written at the back part of a stone statue of Amoghapasa, and the other appears around the sides of a stone pedestal matching the statue. The inscription at the back of the statue contains a laudation to Amoghapasa, a Buddhist deity, and a reference to the regent of the respective area in Sumatra, Adityawarman by name. It is written in Old Javanese script and the Sanskrit language. The other part of the inscription, on the pedestal, is also in Old Javanese script, but the language is Sanskrit mixed with some Malay words. This part mentions that Srĭ Mahĕrĕjĕdhirĕja Srĭ Kĕrtanagara Wikrama Dharmottungadewa, namely, King Kĕrtanagara of Singhĕsari, in the year śaka 1208 (1286 C.E.), sent the statue of Buddha Arryyamoghapasa Lokeswara from bhĕmi Jawa (land of Java) to Swarnabhĕmi (Suvarnabhumi [lit. Land of Gold]—referring to Sumatra), to be installed at Dharmmĕsraya (probably a sanctuary) and to be a delight for all the people of bhĕmi Malĕyĕ (Malayu, located in southeastern Sumatra and the center of the kingdom of Śrĭvijaya [Śrĭwijaya]). The statue was taken to Sumatra, accompanied by four high dignitaries from Singhĕsari. This fact suggests a religious diplomatic expedition rather than a military one.

In the *Nĕgarakertĕgama*, the last king of Singhĕsari was praised as a learned man, virtuous and firm in his Buddhist observances and

knowledgeable in various rites and all kinds of eminent doctrines. When he died, he was said to return to the abode of Jinandra (king of the Jinas), released into the sphere of Siva-Buddha. On earth, he was then commemorated by the establishment of three divine statues in three different places—in the form of Siva-Buddha, as a Jina, and as “ardhanareswari” (a male-female form) symbolizing the Buddhist Tathagata, Vairocana, and his consort Locanĕ. Since Kĕrtanagara was also referred to as conducting rites with intoxicating drinks, as mentioned in the sixteenth-century Javanese chronicle-history *Pararaton* (Book of Kings), Piet Zoetmulder (in 1968) identified Kĕrtanagara’s practice as “tantrisme bhairawa-siwa-bouddhique” (the tantrism having a bhairawa and Siva-Buddha character), namely, as a combination of the syncretic cult of Siva-Buddha and Tantric Buddhism. With its ritualistic practices, this cult sought the redemption of the souls of the dead.

EDI SEDYAWATI

See also Airlangga (r. 1019–1049); Bali; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Java; Kadiri (Kediri); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); *Nusantara*; *Pararaton* (Book of Kings); Śrĭvijaya (Śrĭwijaya)

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KERTARAJASA JAYAVARDDHANA (VIJAYA)

See Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s)

KESATUAN MELAYU MUDA (KMM, YOUNG MALAY UNION)

The Kesatuan Melayu Muda, or Young Malay Union, was formed by a group of Malay nationalists who were in their early twenties. This organization, better known by its abbreviated form KMM, was registered in 1938 in Kuala Lumpur. To the “inner circle,” KMM stood for Kesatuan Malaya Merdeka (Union of Independent Malaya), the name later adopted by Ibrahim Yaacob (1911–1979) in Indonesia after he received the full mandate of the Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Muda (PKMM, National Party of Malay Youth) in 1950. The aim of KMM was to struggle for political independence from Britain and freeing the Malays of economic, social, and political woes caused by British imperialism, Malay feudalism, and the influx of immigrant non-Malays into Malaya. To dodge the long hand of the colonial apparatus, KMM was registered as a social organization working to improve Malay youths in sports, education, health, agriculture, and other recreational pursuits through lectures, discussions, and self-help. The first KMM president, Ibrahim Yaacob, was assisted by Mustapha Hussain (vice-president), Hassan Manan (secretary-general), Othman Mohd. Noor (vice-secretary), and a central committee consisting of activists such as Abdul Karim Rashid, Onan Haji Siraj, Ishak Haji Muhammad (1909–1911), and Abdul Samad Ahmad (1913–).

KMM branches were established throughout Malaya. The organization’s first annual meeting was held toward the end of 1939, but it gained little success among the Malay bureaucratic class. On the eve of the Japanese invasion in

December 1941, more than a hundred KMM members were detained on charges of collaborating with Japan. Some were released a few days before the British surrender and some after February 1942. On 14 January 1942, led by Mustapha Hussain, KMM demanded that Japan declare independence for Malaya. The Japanese authority instead disbanded KMM and established the Malai Giyu Gun in June 1942, thus forcing a group of KMM members to secretly form the KMM Youth Front to continue the independence struggle. KMM members made up the nucleus and backbone of the radical PKMM formed in October 1945. The PKMM, under the chairmanship of Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy (1911–1969), embraced the Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia) concept and sought the incorporation of Malaya into the Republic of Greater Indonesia.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Ibrahim Yaacob (1911–1979); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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KEW LETTERS

The Kew Letters were copies of a document written by William V (1748–1806), the exiled Stadhouder of the United Provinces, in 1795. The letters were written to the British government requesting that it assume responsibility for the Dutch possessions in the Indies (Dutch East

Indies) lest the French seize them, and return them upon the end of the war with France. Himself pro-British, Stadhouder endured the Dutch participation in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780–1784), which resulted in the loss of vast amounts of shipping and much of the Dutch colonial possessions in America, Africa, and, to a lesser extent, Asia. Begun in 1781, the Patriot Revolution was spearheaded by the Patriot press, which deluged the common Dutch people with criticism of the House of Orange and its regime. It was a revolution led by professionals (journalists, lawyers) that garnered support largely from the urban, literate middle class, in particular the shopkeepers. The members of the movement sought to spread democratic awareness among the people through the press and to compel the government to restore political power to the people at the local, provincial, and national levels. This mass movement started off at Utrecht. Subsequently there were street clashes between the Patriots, wearing black cockades and ribbons, and the Orangists, with orange cockades. The supporters of the House of Orange were working-class and less affluent. Inevitably, the radical Patriot movement gained momentum. It regarded the House of Orange as the main enemy of Dutch “liberty.” According to the Patriot rhetoric, the British were the main threat to the commerce and colonies of the Dutch republic. The United Kingdom supplied money and support for the Orangist cause after 1784, rightly seeing the Patriots as a threat to British interests. In the crisis of 1787, cash from the London government and Prussian troops enforced the Orangist counterrevolution. It was natural for William V to flee with his family to nearby England from Scheveningen on 18 January 1795 as the armies of the French Revolution overran the United Netherlands, helped by Patriot risings. When the Batavian Republic was set up, it was allied with France and at war with the United Kingdom.

In February 1795, William V was persuaded to sign, in his residence at Kew Palace near London, a “circular note of Kew,” which told Dutch colonial governors not to resist British forces. Not all surrendered the colony when they received their copy, but the letters sowed confusion and demoralization in Dutch colonial circles, which already were often deeply split between Orange and Patriot factions. The

governors of Melaka, West Sumatra, and Amboina did yield at once to British expeditions. By the end of 1796, the British had conquered Dutch posts in India and Dutch Ceylon. The Kew Letters ironically helped to save the Dutch Asian empire in the long run from the suicidal implications of Patriot confrontational policies.

BRUCE P. LENMAN

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries)

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KHAW FAMILY

A Sino-Thai Politico-Business Dynasty

The story of the Khaw family is, in essence, a typical story of Chinese immigrants arriving in Southeast Asia, especially in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in search of fortune. What makes the achievements of the Khaw stand out from those of most successful Chinese families scattered around the region is the family’s ability to develop what Jennifer Cushman (1991) termed “the corporate lineage,” that is, the maintenance of Chinese identity and clanship through a common revolving trust fund. Evidently, their corporate lineage had served them well, both in the accumulation of riches and fame and in the preservation of their Chinese identity and lineage. It has been convincingly argued that precisely because the Khaw were essential to the security and political stability in the southern region of the Thai/Siamese kingdom during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the family was able to merge their personal and clan interests with those of the Thai state, to the great benefit of both. The Khaw thus emerged as a Sino-Thai tin-mining dynasty that could keep its Chinese identity even to the present day and that defied the usual assimilation explanation of the development of the Sino-Thai community in Thailand.

Khaw Soo Cheang (1797–1882), the farsighted founder of the dynasty, was, by Thai sources, a Hokkien Chinese who at the age of twenty-five went to look for his fortune in Southeast Asia. The early history of his life in the region is inconsistent. He was reported to

have first settled down in Phang-nga in southern Siam (Thailand) or in Penang and started life as a laborer or as a fruit-and-vegetable seller. As his fortunes improved, Soo Cheang expanded his trade to other states along the western seaboard of the upper Malay Peninsula. Up to 1844, Phang-nga and Penang were the two main bases for this enterprising young man, though he appeared to have made Phang-nga his home base. In 1844, Soo Cheang left Phang-nga and put up a permanent residence in Ranong, where he had acquired the tin monopoly rights from the Thai authorities, together with the junior noble title of “Luang Rattanasetthi,” signifying his position as an official of the Siamese government. Soo Cheang proved himself a competent and conscientious official who was able to send in his farming revenue on time and to provide development and stability, both premium requirements by Bangkok, for the territory under his care. In 1862, Soo Cheang was promoted to the rank of *phraya* (gubernatorial rank), evidence of Bangkok’s appreciation of his service and loyalty. Besides a nobility status, Soo Cheang also earned an enormous fortune through the royal grant of tax farming in the Siamese western seaboard provinces. “Tax farming” involved a designated activity (gambling, pawnshops, prostitution) or commodity (opium, alcohol) where taxes were imposed. Tax farmers paid an agreed amount of money to the ruler for the right to collect taxes for a specified period of time.

Khaw Soo Cheang/Phraya Rattanasetthi took a number of local women as wives. However, his major wife was said to be a half-Thai, half-Chinese woman from Penang who gave him sons; the mother of his youngest, Khaw Sim Bee (1854–1913), however, was a Thai. His sons became governors of the provinces on the western seaboard, namely, Ranong, Kraburi, Langsuan, and Trang. Khaw Sim Bee rose to become the superintendent commissioner of Monthon Phuket, the highest position in the Siamese provincial administrative hierarchy.

Khaw Soo Cheang was a man of grand vision who was determined to keep alive the Khaw kinship. His will set up the clan trust fund—the Koe Guan Trust—in Penang in 1905, made up of a great portion of his wealth. His second son, Khaw Sim Khin (1845–1903), who established a base on Penang Island, managed this trust fund. According to the will’s in-

structions, the fund was to be invested in various businesses, the income of which was to be solely used for the sacrificial ceremonies to the ancestors and the welfare of Soo Cheang’s direct male descendants who paid homage to his tablet on their wedding day. By so stipulating, Soo Cheang made certain that the Khaw lineage would uphold the Chinese kinship tradition amid the strong local sociocultural influences. His descendants would therefore remain Chinese.

Central to the successes of Khaw Soo Cheang and his children in social status, political and administrative powers, and economic wealth and prestige was their ability to first serve the socioeconomic requirements of the semimodern Siam. Concurrently, they were prudent in capitalizing on the enormous opportunities for their own socioeconomic gains. At the time, the Siamese government required efficiency in the realm of both finance and administration of the southern provinces, especially those in close proximity to British territories in Malaya and British Burma. Stability, law and order, and economic development were on Bangkok’s priority list, as only socioeconomic and political stability would keep the colonial powers off Siam’s territory. Khaw Soo Cheang/Phraya Rattanasetthi and his sons, especially Khaw Sim Bee/Phraya Rasdanupradit, had proved themselves capable administrators, loyal officials, and shrewd businessmen. They played a major role in the development of the Thai tin-mining industry and in the modernization of the backwater provinces of Ranong, Trang, Kraburi, and Phuket. Their service was greatly appreciated, as confirmed by the honors, special favors, and economic privileges showered on them. The real reward was the Khaws’ enormous fortune, which was the product of their ability to be both efficient and trusted officials of Siam and capable and astute businessmen in the upper Malay Peninsula.

Yet the corporate lineage visualized and perpetuated by the trust fund did not succeed in perpetuating the Chinese identity of the Siamese branch of the clan. The descendants of Khaw Soo Cheang in Thailand now go by the family name of na Ranong. Most of them are unable to speak Chinese. Instead, they identify themselves as descendants of a noble and famous Thai family whose ancestors happened to be Chinese. Only those members in Malaysia

are still very much tied to the founder's vision of clanship. They are remnants of Soo Cheang's great hope and reminders of the Khaw's glorious past.

KOBKUA SUWANNATHAT-PIAN

See also Chinese Dialect Groups; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Junk Ceylon (Ujung Salang, Phuket); Miscegenation; Penang (1786); Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Tin; Trinh Family (1597–1786)

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KHIEU SAMPHAN (1931–)

A Surviving "Ghost"

Khieu Samphan, a Cambodian political figure, was born in Svay Rieng, Cambodia, the son of a judge. He studied economics in France in the 1950s and joined the French Communist Party. When he returned to Cambodia in 1959 and edited a radical French language weekly, *L'Observateur*, he concealed his affiliations. In 1962, Samphan was elected to the Cambodian National Assembly, and he became a subcabinet official while retaining his membership in the clandestine Cambodian Communist Party. Unlike many Cambodian politicians, he was popular in his electorate and among students because of his hard work, honesty, and concern for the poor. He was reelected to the assembly in 1966, but fearing arrest in an anticommunist crackdown, he fled the capital in 1967 together with two other prominent Cambodian com-

munists. For several years, the "Three Ghosts" were assumed to be dead, but they reemerged during the 1970–1975 civil war, when Samphan became deputy prime minister of the communist-dominated united front. The other "ghosts" were eventually purged by the Khmer Rouge. Following the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975, Samphan became the ceremonial chief of state of Democratic Kampuchea (DK). The Pol Pot regime was removed from power by the Vietnamese army in 1979, and soon afterward, Khieu Samphan was named prime minister of the Khmer Rouge government in exile. Throughout the 1990s, he served as a spokesman for the Khmer Rouge, defecting to the government in 1998 after receiving amnesty from the Cambodian prime minister, Hun Sen (1951–). Although he was a lifelong communist and closely associated with all the leaders of the Khmer Rouge, Khieu Samphan's name was not directly linked to the purges and killings that characterized the Pol Pot regime.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Hun Sen (1951–); Khmer Rouge; Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) (1925–1998)

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KHMER ISSARAK (FREE KHMER)

Khmer Issarak was a Cambodian nationalist movement founded in June 1945 in Bangkok by Cambodians living in exile. Its leaders, with Thai government support, sought to recruit and train a military force to overthrow the French protectorate of Cambodia, established in 1863. In its initial phase, the movement gained members and momentum because the occupying Japanese military authorities had interned French soldiers and civil servants. In October 1945, however, the French returned to power throughout Indochina. In August 1946, a small Khmer Issarak force, assembled in Thailand, launched an attack on the Cambodian provincial capital of Siem Reap and held it for six days. A former Cambodian militiaman named Dap Chhuon led the assault. In south-

eastern Cambodia, other Issarak units soon formed under the leadership of Puth Chhay, a former bandit, and Son Ngoc Minh, an ex-monk supported by the Vietnamese anti-French resistance known as the Việt Minh and controlled by the Vietnamese Communist Party.

The Issarak movement fractured in the late 1940s. Those members drawing support from Thailand were anticommunist, whereas those backed by the Việt Minh soon came under direct communist control. Dap Chhuon defected to the semi-independent Cambodian government in 1949 and was named a provincial governor. As Cambodian government forces grew stronger, Puth Chhay's faction collapsed, and the pro-Thai Issarak faction, confined to the northwest of the country, soon dispersed into ineffective guerrilla bands. In the southeast, the pro-Vietnamese Issarak, trained and equipped by the Việt Minh, became stronger and played a helpful role in Vietnam's struggle against the French, without doing much to accelerate Cambodia's own progress toward independence.

When the anticommunist Cambodian nationalist figure Son Ngoc Thanh (1907–1976?) left Phnom Penh to lead an antimonarchical independence movement in March 1952, he linked up with anticommunist Issarak forces in the northwest. Thanh and his followers received some clandestine support from Thailand, but his movement never caught fire, and after Cambodia gained its independence from France in 1953, Thanh took refuge in Bangkok.

Issarak representatives attended the Geneva Conference in 1954 as part of the Việt Minh delegation, but they were unable to obtain a regroupment zone similar to the one gained by their procommunist counterparts in Laos. Soon afterward, roughly 1,000 Issarak combatants were allowed to emigrate to North Vietnam, where they remained under government protection until civil war erupted between communist and anticommunist forces in Cambodia in 1970; most of them were sent south to join the Cambodian communist forces. Members of the movement who stayed behind went underground. Many of them reemerged as combatants in the civil war and as cadre in the victorious Khmer Rouge regime. The Khmer Rouge purged many of these cadres in 1972 and 1973, for they were suspected of being primarily loyal to Vietnam.

Several hundred pro-Thai Issaraks regrouped in Thailand after 1954, and a similar, anti-Phnom Penh movement also formed at this time in southern Vietnam. Neither faction used the name "Issarak," and neither movement was able to inflict serious damage on Norodom Sihanouk's popular, independent government.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Chea Sim (1932–); Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Khmer Rouge; Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); Son Ngoc Thanh (1907–1976?); Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (League for the Independence of Vietnam); Vietnam, North (Post-1945); Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, Dong Cong San Viet Nam)

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KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (KPNLF)

The Khmer People's National Liberation Front was a noncommunist Cambodian political group. The KPNLF was founded in 1979 in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion that had toppled the regime of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), sometimes known as the Khmer Rouge. Cambodian refugees in Thailand, initially supported financially by Cambodians living in France and in the United States, formed the front. Its policy was to oppose the open-ended Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Its leader was a venerable, respected Cambodian politician, Son San (1911–2001), who had served in several Cambodian cabinets in the 1950s and 1960s. The front's members included former bureaucrats and military officers from pre-DK Cambodian governments, as well as thousands of refugees and expatriates who resented Vietnamese control of Cambodia. In 1981, under pressure from several Western powers, the KPNLF reluctantly joined a coalition with the Khmer Rouge government-in-exile and with a royalist faction, known by its French acronym FUNCINPEC (United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Co-opera-

tive Cambodia), which was linked to Cambodia's former monarch, Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1922–). This uneasy alliance, known as the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), was dominated militarily by the Khmer Rouge, which continued to occupy Cambodia's seat at the United Nations. The KPNLF and FUNCINPEC factions, like the Khmer Rouge, fielded military forces and received military assistance from foreign powers. The KPNLF and FUNCINPEC forces received overt support from the United States and played important roles in the Paris Peace Agreements reached in 1991, two years after the Vietnamese had withdrawn their forces from Cambodia. The CGDK, together with the ruling faction in Phnom Penh, formed a temporary coalition government, monitored by the United Nations pending nationwide elections.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Democratic Kampuchea (DK); FUNCINPEC (United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia); Khmer Rouge; Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Pol Pot (Salth Sar) (1925–1998); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); Vietnam, North (Post-1945)

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KHMER ROUGE

Cambodian Communists

Khmer Rouge, or Red Khmer, was the name bestowed in the 1960s by Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1922–) of Cambodia on communists and leftists who were opposed to his rule. The ambiguous label appealed to foreign journalists, and it remained in use until Cambodia's communist movement dissolved in the late 1990s.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the movement, operating in secret, enjoyed the patronage of Vietnam. But its members were harassed and often jailed by Sihanouk's police, and the movement attracted little popular support. In



With a skull in the muzzle of his M-16 rifle, a Khmer Rouge government soldier with his comrades-in-arms waits for the word to move out from Dei Kraham 20 kilometers south of Phnom Penh during an operation along Highway 2, 5 September 1973. (Bettmann/Corbis)

1960, with Vietnamese encouragement, the clandestine movement was formally constituted into a communist party, and three years later, Salth Sar (1925–1998, better known as Pol Pot), a schoolteacher who had been active in the movement since 1954, was named secretary of the central committee. Soon afterward, Sar and his closest colleagues, fearing arrest, went into hiding in the eastern part of Cambodia and later in the sparsely populated northeast. In 1965 and 1966, Sar was summoned to Hanoi to discuss the role that the Khmer Rouge would be expected to play in the intensifying war between North Vietnam and the United States. During the visit, Vietnamese leaders supported Sar's nationally fo-

cused program. They told him, however, to subordinate Cambodia's revolution to their own and to postpone a communist seizure of power in Cambodia until after Vietnam, with Khmer Rouge assistance, had defeated the United States.

After enduring this humiliation, Sar visited China briefly and came away favorably impressed by the fervor of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1968) and by the possibility that China, rather than Vietnam, would eventually become the patron of the Khmer Rouge. He resented having to take advice from Vietnam, but he was in no position at that stage to exert his independence. He returned to his base in Cambodia's northeast, where, with his close associates and far removed from the realities of day-to-day Cambodian life, he formulated a set of radical programs that would take effect if the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) ever came to power. In the 1960s, the possibility was remote.

Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge movement gained momentum, followers, and extensive assistance from Vietnam during the civil war that followed Sihanouk's fall from power in 1970. Alliance with Vietnam and Sihanouk's support were decisive for the Khmer Rouge's success. In 1972, however, Vietnam withdrew its forces from Cambodia, under the terms of a cease-fire negotiated with the United States. The Khmer Rouge, feeling abandoned, fought on against the severely weakened forces of the pro-American regime of Lon Nol (1913–1984) that clung to power in Phnom Penh. The communists survived the massive American aerial bombardment in 1973 that effectively postponed their victory for two years. As Cambodia briefly captured the world's attention, the Khmer Rouge label stuck to those forces led by the CPK that were victorious in April 1975.

Immediately after the victory, Pol Pot (Sar) and his colleagues set in motion a set of policies that aimed to transform Cambodia completely, by overturning its institutions and dissolving what they saw as its essentially exploitative social relations. From one day to the next, schools, markets, money, law courts, and private property were abolished. Religious practices were banned. Cities and towns were evacuated, and the entire population—except the party's leaders—was forced to work as farmers or laborers under harsh conditions. The new regime

called itself Democratic Kampuchea (DK), and Saloth Sar, concealed behind the pseudonym Pol Pot, became its prime minister in April 1976. Until October 1977 when Pol Pot made a state visit to China, the existence of the CPK was kept secret from outsiders. So were the identities of its leaders. The country cut itself off from the outside world.

A four-year plan, drafted in 1976, called for doubling Cambodia's agricultural outputs almost overnight and was based on the premise that sales of surpluses, mainly rice, could provide sufficient foreign exchange to industrialize Cambodian farming and, in due course, the entire country. However, the plan ignored regional differences; shortages of manpower, livestock, and equipment; and the fact that the country was emerging from a ruinous civil war. The Khmer Rouge leaders, inspired by Maoist China, believed that their utopian goals could be attained via the revolutionary zeal of Cambodia's people, released at last from capitalist oppression.

The plan was poorly conceived, never explained, and brutally enforced. It also had disastrous effects. By the end of 1976, reports of widespread starvation in the countryside reached the Khmer Rouge leadership. So did news of high death tolls due to overwork and mistreated illness. The leadership's response was to purge those party members charged with implementing the plan, on the spurious grounds that they had deliberately betrayed the party. Subsequent purges swept through the ranks of the CPK and soon included several of its senior figures. Hundreds of thousands of other Cambodians were summarily executed as "class enemies," and thousands more continued to die of starvation, disease, and sheer overwork. As the regime spiraled toward internal self-destruction, its leaders, probably encouraged by China, embarked on a suicidal war against Vietnam, the CPK's former mentor.

In December 1978, after a year of sporadic fighting, the Vietnamese launched a blitzkrieg attack on DK using tanks, aircraft, and more than 100,000 seasoned troops. Cambodia cracked open like an egg, and Khmer Rouge forces retreated first to bases in the northwest and later across the Thai-Cambodian frontier, where they received support from China, Thailand, and the United States, all enemies of Vietnam. As news of DK's horrendous record

reached the outside world, the name Pol Pot and the phrase *Khmer Rouge* became synonymous with genocide, but the humanitarian motives of the Vietnamese in overthrowing DK and the Cambodian people's relief to see the Khmer Rouge gone were generally overlooked. The new, pro-Vietnamese regime installed by Vietnam in Phnom Penh, known as the Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), was unable to muster international support outside of the Soviet bloc. Throughout the 1980s, DK representatives held on to Cambodia's seat at the United Nations, the only government-in-exile to do so.

During these years, the Khmer Rouge forces encamped along the Thai-Cambodian border were able to draw politico-military support from Thailand, China, and, indirectly, the United States. The key leadership remained intact. Vietnamese forces withdrew from Cambodia in 1989, and foreign powers began serious negotiations to solve the "Cambodian problem." These talks culminated in the Paris Peace Accords of 1991, which placed Cambodia under a UN trusteeship pending national elections. The Khmer Rouge boycotted the elections and was marginalized permanently from Cambodian political life. For most of the 1990s, however, sporadic fighting continued between Khmer Rouge forces and PRK forces. In the 1990s, as the Cold War ended and a coalition government was formed under UN auspices in Phnom Penh, foreign support for the Khmer Rouge diminished sharply, and thousands of Khmer Rouge members defected to the government. After Pol Pot died in 1998, those Khmer Rouge leaders who were still at large received amnesties from the Cambodian government. The Khmer Rouge movement, which had devastated Cambodia for over twenty years, sputtered to a close.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Chea Sim (1932–); Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Hun Sen (1951–); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Khieu Samphan (1931–); *Killing Fields, The*; Kuantan Principle (1980); Lon Nol (1913–1984); Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK); Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) (1925–1998); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); United Nations and

Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

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KHMERS

The Khmers are the predominant ethnolinguistic group inhabiting Cambodia. Khmer is also the national language of Cambodia, whose inhabitants colloquially refer to the kingdom as *sruk khmer* (country of the Khmer).

The origins of the word *Khmer*, like those of the Khmer people and their language, are unknown, but Neolithic excavations in Cambodia suggest that people physically resembling present-day Khmers have inhabited the region for several thousand years. The Khmer language, which is distantly related to Vietnamese and many minority languages spoken in mainland Southeast Asia, belongs to the Mon-Khmer subset of the Austroasiatic family of languages. Over fifty distinct Austroasiatic languages are spoken across a wide swath of the Asian mainland, stretching from eastern India westward to Vietnam. Of these languages, only Khmer and Mon possess alphabets of their own. The Mons and the Khmers are also the only speakers of Austroasiatic languages to practice settled agriculture.

The earliest evidence of written Khmer comes from an inscription incised in southern Cambodia of the seventh century C.E., using an alphabet derived from southern India, which, in modified form, remains in use in contemporary Cambodia. The Thais adapted the alphabet for their own use in the thirteenth century C.E.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; Mons

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KHUANG APHAIWONG (1902–1968)

Political Chameleon

With his jovial and humorous talk, Khuang Aphaiwong, the founder and leader of the Democrat Party (Prachathipat), became prime minister of Thailand four times in a span of three years. Entering politics on the coattails of the People's Party, he gradually moved to a conservative and proroyalist stand in the fight against the political dominance of the People's Party under Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983) and Phibul Songkram (Plaek Phibunsongkham, 1897–1964). Khuang's legacy in Thai politics thus was the fostering of conservative opposition to the government. His party became the only civilian political party surviving the coups of the 1940s and 1950s, mainly because of its urban-based, conservative, proroyalist stand.

Khuang was born in Battambang on 17 May 1902. His father was the last Siamese governor of the province before Siam relinquished its suzerainty to France, and the family then moved to Prachinburi. Khuang finished secondary school at Assumption College in Bangkok before leaving for further studies in France in 1917 as a private student. He studied civil engineering in Central Lyonnaise in Lyon for three years. During that time, he met with other Thai students, especially Pridi Phanomyong, Phibul Songkram, and Prayoon Pramornmontri, who later formed the underground People's Party. But he did not join the Promoter's group then, due to his uncommitted political stance and especially because his elder sister was the wife of the prince who was the Thai ambassador in Paris at that time.

After graduating and a brief period of training in France, Khuang returned home in 1928 and found work in the Post and Telegraph Department. He was contacted to join the People's Party via Pridi's group three months before the launching of the 1932 Revolution. Following the revolution, Khuang was appointed to Parliament, then composed of both elected and appointed members. His initial role in the Parliament was in support of the People's Party,

which was becoming a target of attack from the royalist and senior faction of the party. Khuang served as a minister in the Phahol cabinet in 1935; this government lasted only two years. Then he became minister of communication in the Phibul government in 1941. When the Phibul government demanded the return of territories from France in 1940, Khuang headed the Thai mission to receive the eastern territory at Battambang, his birthplace. In 1942, he became deputy education minister and commerce minister.

Khuang became deputy speaker of Parliament when Phibul lost a vote of no confidence in the National Assembly and resigned in 1944. Khuang was named prime minister, minister of finance, and minister of communication on 1 August 1944 with approval from all sides in an attempt to break the image of a collaborationist Thai government. His government established the practice of rewarding members of Parliament (MPs) by appointing them as secretaries to the ministers, with authority to issue ministerial orders to government officials. Elected MPs were the first to be given this political reward, which soon expanded to include varied economic interests. At that time, the Japanese suspected the Thai government of helping the underground resistance movement. Khuang was able to allay Japanese suspicions by offering diplomatically evasive answers that got him out of difficult situations with the Japanese.

After the Pacific War (1941–1945), Seni Pramoj became the prime minister (t. 1945–1946) and entrusted Khuang as head of the Rice Delivery Committee. His performance greatly satisfied Seni, who cherished his friendship and soon formed a political alliance with Khuang. Seni resigned after completing treaty negotiations with the Allied powers, and Khuang gained majority support in Parliament to become prime minister in January 1946. Khuang also asked Seni to head the foreign ministry in his cabinet. But this cabinet was short-lived, resigning after losing a vote in Parliament. Khuang struck back by joining a newly formed proroyalist political party, the Advanced Party, to fight with Pridi's Cooperative Party. The Advanced Party (later renamed the Democrat Party) gained momentum after the sudden and mysterious death of the young king, Ananda, on 9 June 1946. The party launched an attack on Pridi and the govern-

ment, as they failed to satisfactorily resolve the case. Khuang joined the royalists and with the Democrats now tried to oust Pridi and his followers. The postwar political conflict ended with a military coup on 8 November 1947. Ironically, Khuang, who had collaborated with Pridi to oust Phibul in 1944, now joined with Phibul to oust Pridi in 1947.

After the coup group successfully gained control of the government and the country, it agreed that in order to satisfy the public, Khuang Aphaiwong, leader of the opposition to the government, should be appointed the prime minister of the new government. Khuang and the Democrat Party had called for a general debate or censure to attack the Thamrong-Pridi government in Parliament shortly before the coup took place. So the military leaders of the coup group recognized the important role of opposition politicians in making it possible for them to easily overthrow the elected government. Khuang was the nominal head of the caretaker government from 10 November 1947 to 19 February 1948 and resigned after a general election took place, in which his Democrat Party won a majority in the assembly.

Thus, Khuang became prime minister for the fourth and last time in February 1948. Having been in power for slightly over five months, he was given an ultimatum by the coup group, which apparently was dissatisfied with his government's performance. The group therefore pressured Khuang to resign as prime minister. But the hidden incentive for his ouster was that he could not satisfy the financial demands of the military. Phibul relaxed his grip on political repression in the late 1950s and allowed opposition parties to play a role in the 1957 elections. Khuang again led the Democrat Party, which was relegated to the opposition bench. The opportunity to participate was soon shut down by the authoritarian Sarit regime (1959–1963). Khuang ended his political activism, leaving the Democrat Party as his legacy. He died in 1968.

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also Battambang; Constitutional (Bloodless) Revolution (1932) (Thailand); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Plaek Phibunsongkhram, Field Marshal (1897–1964); Pridi

Phanomyong (1900–1983); Seni Pramoj, M. R. (1905–1997)

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KIAI

A *kiai* is, above all else, a religious leader recognized as an authority in the teaching of Islamic doctrine and observances. *Kiai* is also a title of respect given to masters of particular areas of knowledge. A traditional puppeteer (*dalang*) may be addressed as *kiai*. The name may even be given to ritual objects, such as a ceremonial dagger (*kris*).

Most usually, though, the term *kiai* is reserved for the custodians of Islamic knowledge, the *'ulama*. In Java and Madura, this group might include even those who have only achieved a basic mastery of Arabic grammar. But most *kiai* have spent years studying the traditional Islamic disciplines, principal among them jurisprudence and mysticism. Many of them will have performed the *hajj* (the pilgrimage to Mecca) and thus have the dual title "Kiai Haji," for example, K[iai] H[aji] Hasyim Asy'ari, one of the founders of Nahdatul Ulama.

A *kiai's* leadership of a residential religious school (*pesantren*), hundreds of which are scattered throughout Java and Madura, might bolster his reputation. Through these schools, the *kiais* stay in close contact with their local communities. The *kiais* have maintained the transmission of the traditional disciplines of Islam, often with a distinct emphasis on regional beliefs and practices. Many of them have taken a strong stand against the currents of anti-Sufi ideology propagated by the reformists, particularly by the Muhammadiyah. These reformists attempt to restrict the title *kiai* to those *'ulama* with a genuine qualification in jurisprudence. The erratic presidency (October 1999–July

2001) of Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–), a traditionalist kiai, initially welcomed by both traditionalists and reformists, to some degree exacerbated conflict among the kiais of Java and, more widely, among ‘ulama circles in Indonesia.

M. F. LAFFAN

See also: Education, Traditional Religious; Islam in Southeast Asia; Java; Muhammadiyah; Nahdatul Ulama; Religious Development and Influence in Southeast Asia; *Wali Songo*

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KILLING FIELDS, THE

The Killing Fields, a successful film released in 1984, was based on an article by *New York Times* correspondent Sydney Schanberg that recalled his time in Cambodia in the early 1970s. The article also told of the experiences of Schanberg’s Cambodian assistant, Dith Pran, who endured the Khmer Rouge era (1975–1978) and was reunited with Schanberg in Thailand when he fled Cambodia in 1979. “The killing fields” referred to the mass graves of so-called enemies of the state executed by the Khmer Rouge and unearthed in the early 1980s, after the Maoist-inspired revolutionary regime had been driven from power by a Vietnamese invasion.

The Killing Fields was filmed largely on location in Thailand, and it employed hundreds of Cambodian refugees as extras and in minor speaking roles. It was directed by Roland Jaffe and produced by David Puttnam. It starred Sam Waterston as Schanberg and a Cambodian-American refugee, Haing Ngor, as Dith Pran. For his performance, Ngor was awarded an Oscar as best supporting actor in 1985.

The film brought the horrors of Cambodia in the 1970s into sharp focus for millions of viewers around the world. Many Cambodian refugees who saw the film commented favorably on its accuracy, although some of them agreed with Haing Ngor, who had been a

physician in prerevolutionary times, that the relentless cruelties of the Khmer Rouge period, as he had perceived them, could never be fully captured on film.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Khmer Rouge; Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) (1925–1998)

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**KING EDWARD VII
COLLEGE OF MEDICINE**

As the first tertiary medical institution in Malaysia and Singapore, the King Edward VII College of Medicine in 1905 was established in response to public demand for a local institution to train physicians. Coupled with Raffles College, it formed the nucleus of the University of Malaya.

Public demand and public generosity brought forth the establishment of a medical school in Singapore in 1905. Complaints about the lack of general practitioners to cater to the large Chinese population (mostly of working-class background) had long been vented in the vernacular press but to no avail. The number of European doctors at the time was small, and their fees were beyond the reach of the ordinary coolie. In 1904, a petition initiated by Tan Jiak Kim was handed to the governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir John Anderson (t. 1904–1911), requesting that a medical school be set up to train local doctors.

The colonial government agreed to the petitioned request on the condition that the public raise the initial amount of 71,000 Straits dollars. The public response was encouraging; \$87,000 was collected, exceeding the proposed sum, and the school became a reality. The first seven students graduated in 1910.

In 1912, the King Edward Memorial Fund contributed \$124,800 to the school and consequently prompted a name change—to King Edward VII Medical School—in recognition of this monetary gift. Four years later, the General Medical Council of the United Kingdom recognized its status as equivalent to that of a uni-

versity. However, it was another four years before it finally adopted the name King Edward VII College of Medicine.

Instructors from Britain taught medical courses modeled on those in British universities. The bulk of the students were Chinese who had graduated from English-medium schools. Little research was undertaken during the college's early days; later, tropical diseases such as malaria were given priority. Dental surgery and pharmacy were introduced in 1928 and 1935, respectively.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Education, Western Secular; Institute for Medical Research (IMR); Malayan/Malaysian Education; University of Malaya

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KINTA VALLEY

The World's Richest Tin Producer

The Kinta Valley is situated in Perak, a state on the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia. It is only about 12 to 16 kilometers (8 to 10 miles) in width and was once the richest tin-mining valley in the world. Surrounded by mountain ranges on the western and eastern borders, the valley is fed by no fewer than nine rivers that flow between limestone hills. Below the surface of the valley lay tin ore, which, according to some adventurers, could at times be easily seen by the naked eye.

The state of Perak was already known for its wealth in tin. The metal was first extracted by Malays who used traditional methods of scooping the soft soil from the riverbanks or beds with a *dulang* (dish). The *dulang* would then be swirled lightly to allow the current to wash away the light sand, leaving the heavy mineral ore behind. This was the tin ore in its raw form that was sold to locals or Europeans. In the seventeenth century, the Dutch were the main importers.

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the British who had occupied the western Peninsular Malay States, including

Perak, began to exploit the production of tin. They allowed thousands of Chinese immigrants to open up mines, especially in the Kinta Valley, which was discovered to be rich in this mineral. The immigrant population increased from a mere 4,000 in 1880 to 184,693 in 1911 (Loh 1988). The Kinta Valley became the most densely populated area in the whole of the Malay Peninsula. As a result, several new townships emerged. Among them were Ipoh, which later became the capital of Perak, and Batu Gajah, which became the administrative capital of Kinta District.

From the first decade of the twentieth century, capital-intensive tin mines, most of which belonged to Europeans, began to replace the labor-intensive Chinese mines. The Kinta Valley, though still dominated by Chinese in population, began to face new developments in terms of physical and administrative changes. Roads and railways were built to facilitate the export and import of goods. These were further enhanced by the establishment of postal and telegraphic linkages that connected the valley to different places in the country as well as to Europe. Modern buildings of colonial designs mushroomed in Ipoh, Batu Gajah, Kampar, and other towns to denote the birth of modern living. This scenery, however, was changed in the late 1940s and 1950s when the outskirts of the valley began to be dotted with new settlements populated by Chinese from outlying areas. The introduction of New Villages by the British was a security measure to alienate the population from communist insurgents operating in the jungle during the Malaya Emergency (1948–1960).

Now, although tin no longer plays an important role in the wealth of the state, the Kinta Valley remains the most populated area in Perak and maintains its position as one of the most industrialized locales in the country. Because of the density of the population and other developments that took place there, Ipoh was granted city status and has its own mayor. The Kinta Valley, which started as a tin-mining location, is now a modern and progressive area that is still growing and expanding.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also Agency Houses, European; Briggs Plan; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); “New Villages”

(Malaya/Malaysia); Tin; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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KONBAUNG DYNASTY (1752–1885)

The third and last of Burma's imperial dynasties and founded by Alaungpaya (Alaung-hpaya) in 1752, the Konbaung dynasty was the predominant military power in mainland Southeast Asia until the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826). The resurgent Mon of Lower Burma, based at their traditional capital at Pegu, sacked the Burmese capital at Ava in 1752 and deported and then killed the last king of the Restored Toungoo dynasty (1597–1752), Maha Damayazadipati. From his base at Shwebo in Upper Burma, Alaungpaya raised the standard of Burmese nationalism against Mon hegemony. He was a charismatic leader, and Burmans rallied to Alaungpaya's call. When Prome rebelled against the Mon and supported Alaungpaya, he was able to seize the delta lands, investing and destroying Pegu in 1757 and executing its last king, Binnya Dala. To symbolize the end of Mon power, Alaungpaya dissociated his dynasty from Pegu. He established a new chief port city in Lower Burma at the village of Dagon, which he renamed Rangoon (or Yangon, in the current Burmese [Myanmar] variant); the term *Rangoon* means "end of strife." On the road to military success, Alaungpaya routed the British and French interests in Lower Burma, massacring the British forces at Negrais (1759), which he saw as supporting the Mon by providing them with arms and ammunition. Alaungpaya had a detestation of disloyalty and treachery. Those foreigners he considered guilty of treachery, such as the Italian priest Father Nerini, he summarily executed.

Alaungpaya continued Burma's traditional wars against Siam. In 1760, he invaded Siam by

the southern route through Tenasserim and Mergui, taking Phetburi, Ratburi, and Suphanburi on his way to the Siamese capital at Ayutthaya, where he arrived in April 1760. But illness cut short his military career. The Burmese forces suddenly withdrew, taking a fatally ill Alaungpaya with them. He died on 11 May 1760 at Kinywa on the return march, just three days' journey from Martaban. His body was taken to the family seat at Moksobo and cremated, with the ashes placed in a new gilded earthen pot and dropped in the river (James 2000: 89). His legacy to his heirs directed that each of his seven sons by his major queens succeed him in turn. By this directive, he apparently hoped to avoid the bloodshed that accompanied each transfer of power at the death of a Burmese monarch. It was a vain hope. The directive itself led to bloody succession crises, as some of his sons sought to pass the crown to their sons instead of their brothers, thereby thwarting Alaungpaya's dying wish. Another aspect of his legacy was, however, continued, as his sons prosecuted the wars with Siam for the next four years, up to 1809. Even in 1824, on the eve of the First Anglo-Burmese War, the Burmese monarch at the time, Bagyidaw, Alaungpaya's great-grandson, was contemplating another war with Siam and sounding out Vietnam to see if that country would support him in such an action.

Under Alaungpaya's son and successor Naungdawgyi (r. 1760–1763), the monarch's short reign was punctuated by challenges to his rule. These challenges came from his uncle, Alaungpaya's younger brother, Thado Theingathu; from his brother, the Myeidu prince, who purportedly claimed that their father had designated *him* as heir on his deathbed; and from the old general Mingaung Nawrahta. Of these, the first challenge ended in 1762 with Naungdawgyi's victory. He treated his uncle and family leniently, compelling the uncle to live out his life as a monk and keeping the family under house arrest at Moksobo. His brother's maneuverings ended quietly when the Myeidu prince, seeing that he did not have the support of the army, made peace with Naungdawgyi. Mingaung Nawrahta, against whom Naungdawgyi held a grudge, was made a convenient scapegoat for the machinations of the Myeidu prince (later King Hsinbyushin). With 12,000 men, he seized Ava and held out against

the king until starvation forced him and his remaining troops to fight their way out. A musket shot felled him in the forest.

Naungdawgyi was not a popular king. Known for his vindictiveness, he summarily executed those he disliked. He himself died suddenly on 28 November 1763 of scrofula, the same illness that inflicted his father and would also take his brother Hsinbyushin (James 2000: 88). There was also the possibility that he was poisoned (Koenig 1990: 198). Since his only surviving son, Maung Maung, was then only three months old, the crown passed to the twenty-seven-year-old Myeidu prince, Alaungpaya's second son, who became King Hsinbyushin (r. 1763–1776).

King Hsinbyushin conceived and prosecuted the successful pincer movement campaign against Siam from 1765 to 1767. It resulted in the total destruction of the Siamese capital of Ayutthaya in April 1767, the death of its last king, deportation of the royal family and thousands of captives, and looting of the royal treasures and temples. At the same time, Chinese armies attacked Burma in the north. Hsinbyushin's successful defense against them is a measure of how strong Konbaung Burma was at this time. Yet despite his military successes and far-flung empire, Hsinbyushin was beset with internal political troubles, including the abortive challenge from his younger brother, the Amyin prince, resentful of Hsinbyushin's obvious intent to anoint his son, Singu, as his heir, rather than follow the deathbed directive of Alaungpaya. On Hsinbyushin's death on 10 June 1776, Singu was proclaimed king, opening the way for a series of challenges, first from his younger half brother, the Salin prince, and then from his uncle, the Amyin prince, both of whom, with their key supporters, were executed. Unnerved, Singu called a halt to the continuous campaigns against Siam; he then sent his three remaining uncles, the Badon prince, the Pindale prince, and the Pahkan prince, into penurious exile.

By his intemperate and vicious behavior, Singu alienated support. His most notorious action was the drowning of the North queen, the daughter of Maha Thihathura, in a fit of pique and jealousy. This was followed by several years of unseemly behavior punctuated by orgies, gaming, cockfighting, and dissolute behavior considered unfitting for a king. By 1782, the

centers of opposition to him had grown to the extent that it was timely for a concerted effort to displace him. This came both from the other contender, Maung Maung, son of Naundawgyi, and from his uncle, the Badon prince. On 5 February 1782, with Singu away from the capital (Ava) visiting a temple, Maung Maung and his followers invested the palace. Fleeing upriver with his queens in an attempt to reach China, Singu was persuaded by his few remaining followers to return to the capital, allegedly to challenge Maung Maung, who, it was obvious to all, was unfit to be king.

Singu's uncles, smarting in exile, made their move. Drawing on his extensive circle of family support (including that of Maha Thihathura), the Badon prince, with 4,000 men from Mok-sobo, occupied Sagaing. On 11 February, he moved on Ava and captured and drowned Maung Maung, "the seven-day king," and then Singu, who was reputedly burned alive with his queens, concubines, and children. Proclaimed king at noon on 11 February 1782, the Badon prince took the title "King Bodawpaya" (r. 1782–1819). He restored the former ministers of Hsinbyushin to their positions, including Maha Thihathura, and distributed rewards to those who had supported him. He went on to reassert the military might of Konbaung Burma, becoming the most feared monarch of the dynasty yet constantly having to put down challenges to his rule. These came from his uncle, the Sitha prince, thought to have been a tool in the hands of the old general Maha Thihathura, whose plot surfaced on 23 February 1782, just twelve days into the new reign. Then there was the threat from his younger brother, the Pindale prince, who apparently had learned nothing from a previous abortive attempt to seize the crown. The Pindale prince had, through his actions, compromised his blameless brother, the Pahkan prince, who was apparently not ambitious for the crown. The Pindale prince drowned on 19 June 1785. The Pahkan prince lived out his life under house arrest until 11 December 1802, the last of Alaungpaya's sons, for whom his directive had been so ill fated, causing "twenty-five years of conflict between lineal and collateral succession" (Koenig 1990: 211).

Bodawpaya moved to ensure the succession in his own line. His two sons born in 1762 and 1765 to his second wife, Me Lun Thu, who was

made North queen on his ascending the throne, were already adults. He installed the eldest, the Shweidaung prince, as crown prince on 13 July 1783 and married him to his half sister, the Taungdwyingyi princess, the same day. His grandson, born 23 July 1784, became King Bagyidaw in 1819 on the death of King Bodawpaya, the crown prince having died in 1808. It was under King Bodawpaya and his grandson, King Bagyidaw (r. 1819–1837), that the first American Baptist missionaries, Adoniram and Ann Judson, entered Burma on 13 July 1813. It was also during this period that the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826) was fought, resulting in the defeat of the Burmese armies after the death of their competent general, Maha Bandula, at Danoubew. By the Treaty of Yandabo, signed on 24 February 1826, the provinces of Tenasserim (including Ye, Tavoy, and Mergui) and Arakan were ceded to the British and a war reparations fine equal to 1 million pounds (one crore of rupees) was exacted. Moreover, the Burmese court was committed to the indignity of having a British resident (a representative of the government of British India) located at the Burmese capital and agreed to the future negotiation of a commercial treaty.

The psychological results of the war are said to have been responsible for Bagyidaw's descent into madness. In 1837, the first British resident at the Court of Ava, Major Henry Burney, witnessed and tacitly approved the palace coup by Bagyidaw's brother, King Tharrawaddy (r. 1837–1846). His attempts to repudiate the Treaty of Yandabo and his virulent xenophobia led to the withdrawal of the residency in 1840. Like Singu before him, Tharrawaddy was given to cockfighting and unkingly behavior; he was succeeded by his son, King Pagan (r. 1846–1853), in 1846. Pagan's ineptitude, incapacity to control officials, and lack of skill in dealing with the importunities of the British East India Company (EIC) led to the Second Anglo-Burmese War, in 1852. It was a war that the British parliamentarian Richard Cobden (1804–1865) denounced as having been "got up" by merchants in Rangoon and the rash behavior of Commodore George Robert Lambert in defiance of the British colonial administration in Calcutta. The ignominious defeat administered to the Burmese forces on this occasion led to further dismemberment of the

Burmese empire, as Pegu and Lower Burma became part of British India. A coup in 1853 brought King Mindon (r. 1853–1878) to the throne; Mindon allowed his brother to live out his life peaceably.

The ablest of the later Konbaung dynasty monarchs, King Mindon was only too well aware that the continuing independence of Upper Burma rested on his capacity to institute reforms that would enable his country to modernize and acquire the skills it needed to deal with the rapidly changing international situation. He had also to rely on his diplomatic skills in managing the importunities of both British administrators and merchants who wanted to gain access to the supposedly rich markets of China through the old Burma road to Yunnan. On the diplomatic front, he received and made friends with key British administrators and hosted their delegations: Sir Henry Yule in 1855, Sir Arthur Phayre in 1862 and 1866, and later Edward B. Sladen, appointed political agent at the Konbaung court. Internationally, Upper Burma at Mandalay, cut off from the sea, was thwarted by the British authorities in Rangoon and Calcutta from developing the type of international alliances with European powers that might have provided support against the British. On the domestic front, Mindon, a devout Buddhist, built a new capital at Mandalay, hosted the Fifth Buddhist Synod and purification of the Buddhist scriptures that were engraved in stone at the Kuthodaw Temple near Mandalay Hill, and sought to keep the peace between the competing Buddhist sects. He made his able brother, the Kanaung prince, *Einsheimin* (crown prince) and he then set about to industrialize and modernize Upper Burma. The crown prince's assassination in 1866 by two sons of Mindon, the Myingon and Myingondaing princes, was a great tragedy for Burma. Mindon also reformed the administration and introduced the *thatameda*, or capitation tax, giving officials salaries instead of appendages. Mindon did not appoint another crown prince. On his death in 1878, by a clever bit of court intrigue and manipulation of the ministers of the Hlutdaw, the Alenandaw queen had a minor prince, Thibaw (whose parentage was doubtful but who was in love with her daughter, whom she married to Thibaw) appointed as king.

King Thibaw (r. 1878–1885) commenced his reign with the murder of some eighty of his relatives, sons and daughters of King Mindon, and the mother of the Mekkaya prince, one of the ablest of Mindon's sons. While the dying King Mindon thought that his beloved sons were safely out of the capital, they were actually languishing in prison, awaiting execution. Only two escaped—the Nyaungyan and Nyaung-yoke princes—having taken refuge with the British resident and then being spirited away to Rangoon. The murder of the relatives to allegedly circumvent challenges to the crown when there was a large pool of successors was not a new tactic in Burmese court politics. But in an age of rapid communications and newspapers, such events were used to emphasize the negative characteristics of the Burmese monarchy. The British residency was finally withdrawn in 1879, which opened the way for British merchants to create a *casus belli* in the case of the Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation, although even without this event, given Thibaw's close relations with France and the British–French competition, it is likely that hostilities would have resumed. The Third Anglo–Burmese War in November 1885 lasted only two weeks—“more of a farce than a war” (Mya Sein 1973: 15). King Thibaw, the last of the Konbaung dynasty monarchs, was deposed on 29 November 1885, and with his domineering queen Supayalat and their daughters (their only son having died of smallpox in infancy) he was sent into exile to British India. On 1 January 1886, Britain annexed Upper Burma. So ended the Konbaung dynasty and Burma's independence. Several minor princes vainly waged a guerrilla war in Upper Burma for the next five years, the most serious being the Limbin confederacy. Of the two sons of Mindon who escaped the massacre, intrigues and natural death took them out of serious contention for the crown, although there had been some support for Burma being a protectorate. From 1 January 1886 to 4 January 1948, Burma was part of the British colonial administration.

HELEN JAMES

See also Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760); Anglo–Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Arakan; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of;

Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation (BBTC); British India, Government of; British Interests in Southeast Asia; Burmans; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Hlutdaw; Hsinbyushin (r. 1763–1776); Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Mindon (r. 1853–1878); Mon; Pegu; Rangoon (Yangon); Tenasserim; Yandabo (1826), Treaty of; Yunnan Province

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KONBAUNG RULERS AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM

The Konbaung dynasty, the last of the Burmese kingdoms, ruled from 1752 to 1885, when it finally fell to an invading British Indian army. The dynasty succeeded the Restored Toungoo dynasty (1597–1752). The latter had become increasingly vitiated by external attacks by Manipuri raiders, rebellions among the southern provinces of the empire, and internal disagreements within the court because of the weak leadership of the last of the line and his inability to maintain the administrative machinery of the monarchy. Alaungpaya (Alaung-hpaya), a deputy to the lord of Shwebo, a town several days' ride from the then capital at Ava, mounted increasingly strong attacks on the capital after it fell to rebel forces. Eventually, by 1753, he had recaptured the capital, and his newly proclaimed dynasty was firmly in place.

Like the founders of earlier dynasties in Burma and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Alaungpaya (r. 1752–1760) worked to maintain and expand the military might of his armies while reestablishing the institutions of rule of the monarchy. Grasping the mantle of a powerful ruler on earth with the full legitimacy that came to him as a Buddhist king, he built and displayed his power through court regalia and ceremony. By 1757, Alaungpaya had reconquered Rangoon and Pegu in the southern extremities of the kingdom.

He then sought to expand his empire eastward in the direction of the king of Siam at Ayudhaya (Ayutthaya). His opportunity arose when a rebellion broke out in the region of Tavoy, in which Siamese officials from Tenasserim and Mergui were allegedly involved. Marching with his armies onto Ayudhaya in order to impress upon all who cared to know that the Konbaung dynasty was not to be challenged, Alaungpaya was wounded in battle just outside the walls of the Siamese capital and died in 1760. By this time, he had built a Burmese kingdom as large and powerful as any that had ever existed in the area. Moreover, the empire's appetite for power and prestige had not been quenched with the death of its founder. Naungdawgyi succeeded Alaungpaya and ruled for a brief three years. Hsinbyushin then ascended the Konbaung throne and reigned from 1763 to 1776.

Though the 1760 campaign against Ayudhaya was a failure, the Konbaung dynasty remained at war for the next twenty years. Burmese armies marched through the Shan and Lao principalities, gaining their allegiance to Ava. Furthermore, Burmese armies moved into the Malay Peninsula, in effect creating a trap on three sides of the Siamese kingdom. In 1767, the Konbaung dynasty once more marched on Ayudhaya, this time seizing and sacking the city. King Hsinbyushin then turned his armies back to defending the core of his kingdom in Burma, as the activities of his forces in the Shan and Lao principalities had drawn the attention of the Chinese governor of Yunnan. Yunnan launched four invasions into the Shan States in as many years, but its forces were driven back each time by the Konbaung defenders. A truce was reached in 1769 against the will of the king, who had wished to invade China. The Konbaung forces, which were faced with internal discord, were forced to pull back from Siam and the Lao principalities, though the Tenasserim range was held by the Burmese. Hsinbyushin died in 1776 and was succeeded by King Singu, who himself passed away six years later.

King Bodawpaya, who reigned from 1782 to 1819, exerted political dominance over the disputing commanders of the sovereign's realm. The last of Alaungpaya's sons to reach the throne, he demonstrated his military prowess and hence his power by annexing the formerly independent principality of Arakan to his possessions. He also attacked Siam once more. Following his military exploits, Bodawpaya turned to strengthening the grip of the state on the population. He ordered two major general revenue inquests in 1784 and 1803. The effects of these major reviews of everyone of his kingdom's 2 million inhabitants resulted in the state having a firmer fiscal basis and greater control over the economy than previously. Revolts broke out in Arakan in 1797 and 1811, but the king was able to suppress them. Bodawpaya also launched military campaigns against Manipur and Assam, and from 1804 onward, he imposed Burmese hegemony over these minor states by providing Burmese military support for compliant vassals.

Konbaung military activities along the northwest frontier of the kingdom brought Burmese military power directly up against the

military might of the British Indian Empire. The result was the beginning of a series of misunderstandings that would result in the eventual collapse of the Konbaung dynasty at the hands of British invaders. The fundamental problems that plagued the relationship between the British and the Konbaung empire were clashes that arose from different concepts of statecraft. On the one hand, the British view of sovereignty allowed for no ambiguity over territorial control but demanded clearly demarcated borders; on the other, the Konbaung view, like that of other Southeast Asian states at the time, was that sovereignties could exist side by side in the same territory. This major issue was obscured by a number of minor issues, such as court etiquette and ideas about equality of status.

At the end of the eighteenth century, Britain was concerned with the growing influence of France in Southeast Asia. Diplomatic relations were established with the Konbaung court in an attempt to ensure that British interests were protected there. However, relations soon soured as the result of rebels against Konbaung authority among the populations of Arakan who, when being pursued by the king's forces, fled over the Naaf River into British-held Bengal. When the Burmese pursued the rebels into their sanctuaries across the river, conflict was inevitable. Although the British viewed the river as the natural border between two sovereigns, the Burmese regarded these as two overlapping sovereignties. Each side saw the other as ignorant of modern state procedures and intransigent in sticking to its position.

Other issues underlay the developing conflict as well. For example, the two sides had very different ideas about how the economy should be managed. The English East India Company (EIC) viewed the king's monopolies as restraints on trade and resented the harassment British traders received from the king's officials. The Burmese, for their part, resented being dealt with by the governor-general of India rather than having equal relations with the British sovereign in London. Finally, relations were broken off in 1811, but the issues that underlay their disputes did not go away. As the rebellions in Arakan persisted and the activities of Burmese forces in Assam and Manipur continued to irritate the British, war between the two sides became increasingly probable. British as-

sistance to anti-Konbaung dissidents in Manipur, Assam, and Arakan added to the increasingly threatening circumstances.

To reassert Burmese control over the border areas, King Bagyidaw (r. 1819–1837), who succeeded Bodawpaya in 1819, posted General Maha Bandoula (Maha Bandula) as governor of Assam and subsequently Arakan. The British became alarmed when, in 1823, Bandoula's forces threatened the British protectorate of Cachar and occupied an island in the Naaf. The British replied by laying siege to Rangoon in May of the following year; they took the city without a struggle. Fighting persisted for the next year or more, as the British sought to march north and force the Konbaung king to accept their conditions for restoring peace in the region. When the British were within a day's march from the capital at Ava, the Burmese bowed to the terms of the Treaty of Yandabo in February 1826. They conceded Arakan and Tenasserim to the EIC and agreed to withdraw their forces from Manipur and Assam and pay an indemnity equivalent to U.S.\$5 million.

Relations between the two sides remained tense following the signing of the Treaty of Yandabo. The court was impoverished, and its prestige was badly damaged by the humiliating defeat it received at the hands of the British. Later in 1826, the British negotiated a commercial treaty with the court on terms that were unacceptable to the Burmese, and the effect was effectively nil. Bagyidaw, catching reports that the British were considering withdrawing from Arakan and Tenasserim, sent a diplomatic mission to Bengal to negotiate with the authorities there, but the mission returned with no new agreements being reached.

The Treaty of Yandabo had insisted on the right of the British to place a resident as representative of their interests at the Konbaung court. However, not until 1830 did Maj. Henry Burney arrive to assume the post. Unusually for that period, he made an effort to understand why the Burmese felt that the British had trampled on their rights and interests. Relations looked set to improve thanks to Burney's ability to establish a cordial personal relationship with King Bagyidaw, but they soon deteriorated again when the British made clear that they were not willing to cede Tenasserim back to the Burmese. The blow to the prestige of the

court was so great that Bagyidaw became a recluse and was ousted from the throne by his brother, Prince Tharrawaddy, in 1837. Murdering many of his brother's advisers and officials, Tharrawaddy brought into positions of authority men much less well equipped to dissemble when dealing with the British. Tharrawaddy abandoned Bagyidaw's efforts to pursue a conciliatory policy toward the British. Though not denouncing the Treaty of Yandabo, he largely ignored its terms.

Relations further deteriorated when Tharrawaddy refused to meet with Major Burney, who eventually withdrew his embassy from the capital at Amarapura. Burney's successor concluded that maintaining a mission there or even at Rangoon on the coast was a fruitless endeavor, and the relations between Britain and Burma once more ceased in 1840. Relations did not improve as the century progressed, leading to the Second Anglo-Burmese War in 1852 and a third in 1885. And with that came the end of the Konbaung dynasty and the loss of the independence of Burma. The issues that lay behind those two wars were similar to those of the first war, but by then, the power of the Burmese empire was much reduced.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760); Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Arakan; Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation (BBTC); British Burma; British India, Government of; British Interests in Southeast Asia; Burma-Siam Wars; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Hsinbyushin (r. 1763–1776); Imperialism; Indigenous Political Power; Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885); Mindon (r. 1853–1878); “Shoe Issue”; Tenasserim; Yandabo (1826), Treaty of; Yunnan Province

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KONFRONTASI (“CRUSH MALAYSIA” CAMPAIGN)

Konfrontasi (the “Crush Malaysia” campaign) was a military and political effort launched by Indonesia against British plans to create a new federation of Malaysia from its former colonial territories in maritime Southeast Asia. The campaign reflected both President Sukarno's (Soekarno's) (t. 1945–1967) hostility to incomplete decolonization and his need for an external distraction from domestic problems.

In 1957, Britain had given independence to the Federation of Malaya, comprising most of its possessions in the Malay Peninsula. Britain had retained control of the island city of Singapore and of three territories in northern Borneo, but by the early 1960s, it wished to be rid of these colonies as well. British planners felt that Singapore was too small, too dependent on its Malayan hinterland, and too vulnerable to leftist control to be made independent in its own right. If Singapore were included in the Federation of Malaya, however, its predominantly Chinese population would have tipped the demographic balance in favor of Malaya's Chinese, to the likely disadvantage of the indigenous Malays. In 1961, to make Singapore acceptable to the Malay elite of the federation, Britain proposed to include its northern Borneo territories (Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo) in an expanded state along with Singapore and the Federation of Malaya.

Britain's initiative aroused Indonesian antagonism for several reasons. First, there were

strong indications that the people of northern Borneo feared neocolonial rule from the peninsula and preferred an independent state of North Kalimantan. A. M. Azahari (Sheikh Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud [1928–2002]), leader of the Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB, Brunei People's Party), which subsequently won all but one of fifty-five indirectly elected seats in Brunei's district councils, also favored this solution and had close ties with Indonesia. Second, Indonesia objected to what it saw as Malaysia's neocolonial, neofeudal character: Britain would retain military bases, and the Malay sultans whose power had been entrenched in the Federation of Malaya would remain pivotal in the political system. And third, seeing itself as a major regional power, Indonesia was offended that Britain had not consulted it concerning plans for the region.

In December 1962, British Gurkha troops suppressed an Azahari-led uprising in Brunei aiming for an independent North Kalimantan. Indonesia's foreign minister, Subandrio, then announced that the Malaysia proposal was unacceptable and described Indonesia's policy as one of "confrontation." From May to August 1963, discussions among Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines led to vague proposals for a confederation, to be called Maphilindo, and in August, the British agreed to allow the United Nations to conduct a test of public opinion in northern Borneo. Even before the UN report was written—it indicated that only a third of the population favored the Malaysia proposal—the British and Malayan authorities announced that Malaysia would go ahead, though without Brunei, whose sultan had chosen to keep his small but oil-rich territory under British protection. The test of opinion, however, also showed that there was widespread fear of Indonesia in northern Borneo, and there is evidence that Britain expected its insensitive behavior to provoke an extreme Indonesian reaction that would, in turn, boost support for Malaysia.

Indonesia's "confrontation" of Malaysia began in September 1963 with the sacking of the British embassy in Jakarta and the severing of diplomatic relations. Sukarno announced that Indonesia would *ganyang* (literally meaning "chew up" but usually translated as "crush") Malaysia, and Indonesian troops began a small-scale offensive on the Kalimantan border and

supported communist rebels operating within Sarawak. In early 1964, acting on behalf of U.S. president Lyndon Johnson (t. 1963–1969), Robert Kennedy (1925–1968) sought unsuccessfully to persuade Sukarno to abandon his policy of confrontation. In January 1965, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations after Malaysia was elected to a nonpermanent seat on the Security Council.

Confrontation served important domestic interests in Indonesia. Sukarno could distract attention from political tension and the deteriorating economy by focusing on an external enemy. Military action justified greater resources for the armed forces, and the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) could use the campaign to help radicalize the masses. By mid-1964, however, the army had become increasingly uneasy with confrontation. As their standoff with the communists in Java grew more intense, they were reluctant to devote capable troops to the campaign, and the troops they did send to the front generally performed badly against British and other Commonwealth forces. Commandos sent to raid Peninsular Malaysia were captured. In 1965, moreover, the PKI began to urge the arming of workers and peasants to take part in the struggle against imperialism. This initiative would have cost the armed forces their monopoly of weapons, and they strenuously resisted the proposal. They also made secret contact with the British, asking that the conflict be kept low-key to avoid giving the communists an advantage.

The military dimension of confrontation effectively ended in late 1965 after the Gestapu affair, a coup launched by junior military officers that, because of the deaths of several senior generals, General Suharto and the military used as the pretext for an all-out annihilation of communists throughout the country. However, Sukarno's successor, General Suharto (1921–), did not get control of Indonesia's foreign policy until March 1966, and the ending of the confrontation was not his highest priority, partly because military prestige was involved, partly because many Indonesians remained somewhat suspicious of Malaysia. The confrontation formally ended in August 1966, but full diplomatic relations were established only in August 1967.

The confrontation was often portrayed as aiming for Malaysia absorption into Indonesia, but neither Sukarno nor other Indonesian per-

sonalities ever suggested annexation or used pan-Malay rhetoric. Rather, the confrontation was primarily an attempt to export the Indonesian brand of revolution to a close neighbor and a bid by Indonesia for a sphere of influence within its immediate region.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Abdul Razak, Tun (1922–1976); Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud, Sheikh (1928–2002); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Brunei Rebellion (December 1962); Cold War; Gestapu Affair (1965); Malaysia (1963); Malays; Malik, Adam (1917–1984); Maphilindo Concept; Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–)

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KONGSI

Kongsi (*gongsi*) is a Chinese loanword widely used in Southeast Asia to describe a common undertaking. It is therefore a generic term, having so many meanings that a definition is nearly impossible. It literally means “public and private.” Some of the possible uses of the term include:

- A commercial activity in which several persons agree to pool their capital and share profits; in modern times, a “limited liability” company.
- Mines or other enterprises in which members join together to contribute labor and sometimes capital and to share the profits. The Chinese gold and tin mines of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were run as kongsis. When they federated into larger groups, these, too, were called kongsis. The most famous of such federations were those of West Borneo.
- The headman of a kongsi was often called “kongsi”; so was his residence.
- A temple, for example that of a clan association, might also be called “kongsi.”
- Sworn brotherhoods or “secret societies,” although usually designated *hui*, also used the term *kongsi* to describe themselves. When the mining kongsis of West Borneo were dissolved, conspirative brotherhoods soon appeared.

Some authors speak of “economic democracies” in describing the essence of kongsis. Indeed, the idea of cooperation and sharing is at the heart of the word. Kongsis as cooperative undertakings have a long tradition in China, where miners pooled their labor, but overseas traders also took out shares to distribute the risks and costs of business (for example, in hiring a ship). Such endeavors were an important instrument in the commercial activities of Chinese businesspeople, both at home and in Southeast Asia.

MARY SOMERS HEIDHUES

See also Chinese Gold-Mining Communities in Western Borneo; Chinese in Southeast Asia; *Hui*; Tin

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KOREAN WAR (1950–1953)

Though fought in Northeast Asia, the Korean War affected Southeast Asia by intensifying the Cold War, by stimulating commodity trade, and by offering what seemed to be precedents. Two rival regimes had been set up in Korea in 1948—a communist regime in the north and a noncommunist one in the south. The Korean War began late in June 1950, when northern forces invaded the south. At the time, there was a tendency to see that move as part of a challenge to the West by the major communist powers—the Soviet Union and the newly founded People’s Republic of China (PRC). Recent research, however, has modified that view.

The most powerful advocate of forceful action was the northern leader Kim Il-sung (1912–1994), whose attempt to dislodge the southern regime by guerrilla action had failed. Invasion was the alternative, and despite the failure of the guerrillas, he believed that the people would rise up and bring him prompt victory. Joseph Stalin (1879–1953), the Russian leader, was in no mood to risk a major war, but it was hard to deny Kim, especially as he claimed it would all be over quickly. He referred him to Mao Zedong (1893–1976). The Chinese leader had no wish for a war in Korea. His priority was Taiwan. A war would also endanger reconstruction and threaten the industrial centers in Manchuria. Yet it was again hard to deny the North Korean leader.

The war did not, however, go as Kim forecast. The north enjoyed success at first, but only at first. Furthermore, the United States decided to intervene. It had not seen Korea as essential to its security, and it had perhaps made that all too clear. But Kim’s venture was interpreted as a challenge to the peace structure on the part of the communist powers, to which Washington had to reply. Furthermore, in the absence of the Soviet Union, the United States won the support of the United Nations and acted in its name, securing the collaboration of a number

of allies and the reluctant approval of India, the other leading Asian power.

Stalin was not entirely displeased: the war dug a ditch between the People’s Republic and the West. Kim’s failure, however, was followed by a U.S./UN counteroffensive that posed more of a threat to China and ran the risk that he would have to implement his recently made alliance with it. He offered only limited support when China intervened in October 1950, calling its troops “volunteers” in an attempt to reduce the prospect of all-out war. The United States not only stopped short of using the atomic bomb in retaliation but, amid controversy, abstained from extending the war. Truce talks began in June 1951 but were concluded only in July 1953, some months after the death of Stalin. Talks on a peace settlement began in 1954, but none was ever concluded.

The Korean War intensified the Cold War antagonism, already marked in Europe. The United States mobilized its vast resources and extended its policy of “containment.” Its major Western ally, Britain, concluded that it had to support the U.S./UN side in Korea, though to do so removed any chance of benefiting from its own recognition of the People’s Republic and damaged its economic recovery and, with it, its chance of continuing as a major world power. Britain was apprehensive, too, lest the war turn “hot.” Stalin had acquired the atomic bomb, and Britain’s own security was at risk.

The effects of the war on Southeast Asia were mainly indirect. War and stockpiling produced an economic boom, benefiting most Southeast Asian countries and then mainly producers of food and commodities. The boom helped the newly independent government in Indonesia, though it also meant that the country avoided necessary restructuring. It helped the government in Burma, struggling against the communists and the “minorities” ever since independence had been secured in 1948. It also provided additional revenue for the British in Malaya, engaged since mid-1948 in a struggle with the communists known as the Emergency.

Politically, too, the impact of the war was mainly indirect, though Thailand and the Philippines intensified their security relationship with the United States; most of all, it affected Indochina. Since late 1946, the French had been in open conflict with the Việt Minh, which received support from the PRC. The

Korean War raised the prospect of open Chinese intervention, at a time when “volunteers” were sent to Korea and again when a truce was reached in the north. The Chinese made no such move, deeming it not only unwise but also unnecessary. The French, however, used the threat as a means of attracting U.S. support and subsidy, while still avoiding U.S. intervention in Indochinese affairs.

In Burma, Chinese intervention seemed, at times, more likely. Kuomintang troops had fled there in 1950 after the triumph of the communists, and they made a number of raids back across the border. The troops were offered covert U.S. support in 1951 and 1952. Countering them diverted Burma’s army from its struggle against the Union’s internal opponents, as the British pointed out, and made it quite unlikely that its government would drop the “neutralist” stance it assumed.

The war had yet more indirect effects, though, and in some sense, these were even more important. One related to Japan. A peace treaty between the United States and Japan was concluded in 1951, and recognizing that Japan could not develop its trade with China, the United States encouraged it to look to Southeast Asia. The other effect related to the lessons the United States derived from the Korean War. On the one hand, it came to believe that aggression might be deterred by clear warnings. On the other, it saw the measures it had taken to repel the aggression in Korea as a precedent. That included supporting South Korea’s leader, Syngman Rhee (1948–1960), though he was a difficult man to deal with, and building up an effective South Korean army. The United States was to hanker after a similar “solution” in South Vietnam and even in Indonesia perhaps, when it afforded support to the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI) “government” in 1958.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN); China since 1949; Cold War; Economic Development of Southeast Asia (Post-1945 to ca. 1990s); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); Oil and Petroleum; Rubber; Tin; U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh

Hội) (League for the Independence of Vietnam); Vietnam, North (Post-1945); Vietnam, South (Post-1945); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (Post-1945); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia

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KRATON CULTURE

For over two thousand years, the courts (*kraton*) of Southeast Asia have variously served as temples, tax offices, land registers, universities, barracks, courts of law, and museums. But these courts were not always centers of highly centralized and regulated states. In eighth-century Java, for instance, they formed part of a loose system of vertical alliances between leaders that were only gradually forged into a hierarchy by force and symbolic means (Christie 1983). Leaders already associated with ancestor cults and a symbolic geography in which the mountain was associated with ancestral and local spirits used ideologies from Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam to further legitimize their authority and, in principle, strengthen their succession. In reality, these states were unstable and changing, and many kratons date from the eighteenth century. After European traders arrived in the region, they exploited factional competition and thereby secured the footholds that provided the foundations for the colonial bureaucracies of the nineteenth century (Reid 1993).

Kraton culture presents a mythologized view of the past, emphasizing the ideals of kingship and social order. Kratons have been described as exemplary centers that radiate the spiritual and material beneficence of their rulers. Cultural

activities are tangible signs of their productivity, including musical and theatrical performance, wood- and metalwork, writing and illuminating manuscripts, batik making, carriage making (Jessup 1990), and the proper customary execution of rites and ceremonies such as marriages and enthronements. These activities continue to be hedged by rituals and taboos, and they carry a mystique that serves to protect the kratons and to contribute to their claim to power. Their architecture is modeled on the heavenly palaces of Hindu gods (Dumarçay 1991), but Islam has also shaped kraton culture and the role of the ruler. In Java, the personal symbol of the sultan of Yogyakarta is the wing of the Garuda bird from Hindu mythology; he, however, is also called caliph (*kalifatullah*), Allah's representative on earth. Despite the wide range of cultural influences, local customs have ultimately defined the forms of kraton practice. The sultan's court at Yogyakarta holds *Garebeg* ceremonies three times a year to celebrate Islamic holidays. Although these ceremonies are said to have their roots in Hindu-Buddhist rituals, they also serve as occasions on which the ruler distributes food to the people. Theatrical performances also reflect this pattern. It is generally known that dance dramas in Southeast Asia, from the masked and unmasked dance dramas (*khon* and *lakhon*) of Thailand to the dance dramas and shadow plays (*wayang wong* and *wayang kulit*) of Java, draw on the Hindu epics, the *Mahâbhârata* and *Râmâyana* (Rutnia 1993; Soedarsono 1984). But the way these stories are told and the events represented vary from kraton to kraton, even in the same region. Kraton dance, theater, and puppet performances also draw on other sources, such as the *Hikayat Amir Hamzah*, relating the adventures of Prophet Mohammed's (s. a. w.) uncle; the *Pañji* cycle of tales about a wandering hero; and many local myths and legends. These performances support the illusion of unbroken and distinctive regional traditions, despite the fact that during the colonial period, their audiences included foreign administrators. In these terms, kraton culture has been analyzed as a product of colonial ideas of order that permeated the courts and not the continuation of a long-lived cultural heritage implied by the myths and stories (Pemberton 1994).

Despite this view, in contemporary nation-states that have replaced or incorporated tradi-

tional kingdoms, kratons continue to assert their claim to be the custodians of traditions that are at once morally and spiritually relevant and, as such, relevant to the cultural identity of the nation. Resources available for financing kraton patronage of such activities are much reduced today, but members of kraton families and occupational groups who carry kraton values have transferred their expertise to state educational institutions, passing on knowledge and skills about music, dance, and literature to the next generation. This pattern is particularly strong in Indonesia. There, the traditions of the different kratons have been taken up by the state to represent official Indonesian culture at home and overseas, even if this has involved a selection of traditions that does not represent the scope and sometimes earthiness of kraton culture (Florida 1987). Although *all* regional cultures are claimed to form Indonesian culture, the fact that the Javanese are numerically the largest ethnic group has meant that Javanese kraton cultures have been privileged over others. Gradually, as royal families moved from their palaces into modern metropolitan mansions and as the colonial generation died out, kraton values were transformed, kraton culture became a contested concept, and conflicts arose about the future of court centers in nation-states. In Indonesia, the New Order regime of President Suharto (t. 1968–1998) attempted to develop and preserve the colonial traditions as the heritage of Java, not only for the local community but also for tourists from other parts of Indonesia and from overseas. Today, instead of thinking of kratons as museums of culture, a new generation of leaders and custodians, such as the sultan of Yogyakarta, is trying to keep the kratons alive. These individuals aspire to maintain kratons as exemplary centers for the present, acting as patrons not only of established traditions but also of modern and innovative kinds of performance and art. But as these young leaders are dependent on state patronage, their plans will depend on the willingness of governments to allow them to keep kraton culture alive and not limit it to being a symbol of a past without a future.

FELICIA HUGHES-FREELAND

See also Buddhism; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Indianization;

Indigenous Political Power; Java; *Mahābhāratha and Rāmāyana*; Monumental Arts of Southeast Asia; *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Performing Arts of Southeast Asia; Suharto (1922–); Temple Political Economy; *Wayang Kulit*; Yogyakarta

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KUALA LUMPUR (KL) **Muddy Confluence to Metropolis**

Kuala Lumpur (KL) is the federal capital of Malaysia, formerly in the Peninsular Malay State of Selangor but since 1974 an autonomous federal territory. Kuala Lumpur was originally established (ca. 1857) as a small trading post serving tin mines in the upper Kelang (Klang) Valley. It became the capital of Selangor in 1880, of the

Federated Malay States in 1896, of Malaya in 1946, and of Malaysia in 1963.

Raja Abdullah, who became chief of Kelang town and district (ca. 1853), raised loans in Melaka to finance the opening of mines in the upper Kelang Valley in 1857, importing Chinese laborers. Standing at the junction of the Gombak and Kelang Rivers, the point at which the latter ceased to be navigable for large boats, KL was a convenient collection and dispersal point, linked with the mines by jungle tracks. The name *Kuala Lumpur* means "muddy river junction" in Malay, but it may well be a corrupt form of some other phrase. In the period up to 1880, when a rise in the price of tin restored its prosperity, KL suffered much damage in the Selangor civil war (1867–1873) and setbacks in the ensuing slump from 1875 to 1879, and its mere survival was more than once in doubt.

In 1880, it had become the most important town in Selangor, and the British resident, who had established himself at Kelang town in 1875, moved upstream to make KL the state administrative capital. Prosperity drew in a large population, making KL an overcrowded and unhealthy town, often damaged by fire or by river floods. It was, however, largely rebuilt in the 1880s, with brick and tiled houses and somewhat wider streets. From 1884 to 1890, the population rose from 4,500 to 20,000 (Gullick 2000: 45, 100). This rapid expansion owed much to the construction of a railway line (completed in 1886) between Kelang town and KL and its later extension into the interior of Selangor. Good road and rail communications led to widespread development of rubber estates around KL early in the twentieth century. A piped water supply in the 1890s was followed by a town electricity supply a few years later, but neither was reliable or adequate until about 1920, when the population had grown to 80,000 (Gullick 2000: 100, 185, 246). There was also a grave shortage of housing, especially for the lowest-paid workers, and growing congestion as the use of motor vehicles expanded rapidly after 1920.

As a federal capital (from 1896), KL acquired impressive government buildings, beginning with the Bangunan sultan Abdul Samad, designed in a style that combined features of Indian Islamic tradition with Western architecture. In the business quarter, shop fronts were attractively decorated, and in the new suburbs,



Petronas Twin Towers. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. (Yang Liu/Corbis)

there were substantial mansions and villas for the officials and the affluent. Merdeka Square (formerly “the Padang”) and the Lake Gardens date from this period. The gardens, always a fine amenity, have provided a spacious setting for buildings of the period of Malaysian independence, such as the Parliament building and the national monument to the armed forces.

In 1890, the Sanitary Board, including officials and nominated community representatives, took on the management of urban services, but KL did not become a municipality until after independence. Severe floods came at intervals after abnormal rainfall and reached a climax in 1926, when a major project to widen and straighten the rivers was at last undertaken to provide a solution.

The first English-medium secondary school, the Victoria Institution, was founded by local initiative in 1893. The Institute for Medical Research, founded in 1900, soon achieved major results in the treatment and control of malaria and other diseases. The Rubber Research Institute was established, after much deliberation, in 1926, and the University of Malaya was set up in 1962. The Jamek Mosque, at the river junction, was completed in 1909, under the auspices of Sultan Sulaiman (r. 1898–1938). Although the sultan of Selangor, like other state rulers, has an official residence in KL, the Selangor rulers have always preferred to have their main seat elsewhere—at Jugra, then Kelang, and nowadays Shah Alam.

Although major improvements and construction programs have been implemented since the middle of the twentieth century, the center of KL retains some of its historical character, especially in Chinatown and the public buildings grouped around Merdeka Square. Many of the public buildings of the colonial period have been adapted to other uses, more particularly as museums, and they join the modern additions, from skyscrapers and stadiums to a rapid-transit system, to make an attractive blend of old and new. KL now stands at the center of a conurbation of dense industrial development in the Kelang Valley, with a ring of satellite towns. Apart from its political status as the national capital of Malaysia, it is the heart of the country’s thriving business world and of its many-sided culture.

JOHN MICHAEL GULLICK

See also Federated Malay States (FMS) (1896); Institute for Medical Research (IMR); Rubber; Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia (RRIM); Tin; University of Malaya; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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KUANTAN PRINCIPLE (1980)

The Kuantan Principle (also referred to as the Kuantan Doctrine) refers to a joint statement made in March 1980 following a meeting between the Malaysian prime minister, Datuk Hussein Onn (1922–1990), and the Indonesian president, Suharto (1921–), in the Malaysian city of Kuantan. The Kuantan Principle relates to the developments in Cambodia following Vietnam’s military intervention in that country in late December 1978, with particular reference to the preferred policy to be implemented toward Vietnam as a response to the intervention.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) openly condemned Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia and sought international support for this policy. The statement made in Kuantan in March 1980 needs to be understood in the context of this ASEAN policy.

The joint statement issued by Malaysia and Indonesia took into consideration the broader security concerns of the two countries, such as the perceived threat posed by China and the increased influence of the Soviet Union in the region. The statement envisaged a Vietnam free from the influences of both China and the Soviet Union and took into consideration Viet-

nam's security interests in Cambodia. In other words, the Kuantan Principle sought to bring Vietnam out of the Sino-Soviet dispute and to reduce the influence of these two powers in the region. It also displayed a less confrontational stand toward Vietnam over the Cambodian situation as compared with the ASEAN policy.

The Kuantan Principle was never implemented. Instead, Indonesia and Malaysia opted to support the ASEAN policy on Cambodia, which was more reflective of the security concerns of ASEAN's frontline member state during the Cambodia Conflict—that is, Thailand. However, Indonesia persisted in maintaining a bilateral dialogue with Vietnam, and this dialogue played an important role in the early stages of the diplomatic efforts to resolve the Cambodian Conflict during the second half of the 1980s.

RAMSES AMER

See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Sino-Soviet Struggle; United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

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KUKRIT PRAMOJ, M. R. (1911–1995) **Royalist Democrat**

M. R. Kukrit Pramoj was prime minister of Thailand during the democratic interlude after the October 1973 uprising that toppled the military-led government. Born in Bangkok on 20 April 1911 into a junior branch of the royal family, and the younger brother of the former prime minister, M. R. Seni Pramoj (1905–1997), Kukrit studied at Suan Kularb Withayalai before completing high school at Trent College, England. He then graduated with honors

in politics, philosophy, and economics from Queen's College, Oxford University. Kukrit returned to Siam in 1933, a year after the 1932 Revolution that overthrew the monarchical, absolutist regime. He cried when he set foot in the New Siam. (Later, in June 1939, Siam was renamed Thailand.)

Kukrit started working in the Revenue Department at the Ministry of Finance and was secretary to James Baxter, an adviser to the ministry. He soon resigned and went to work with the Siam Commercial Bank, where he spent many years as manager in the Lampang branch. He married in 1938 but left married life to live on his own in later years. He had a daughter and a son. After the establishment of the Bank of Thailand in 1943, Kukrit went to work there and also taught banking at Thammasat and Chulalongkorn Universities.

In 1946, Kukrit and others organized a political party called the Advanced Party (*kao naa*) to run against the People's Party. Kukrit was the first who employed the so-called Hyde Park speech-making technique in his campaign, and he won in Bangkok. The party was later reorganized as the Democrat Party, with Khuang Aphaiwong (1902–1968) as leader and Kukrit as secretary-general. A coup in 1947 cleared the way for the Democrat Party. With no major opposition, the party won the election in 1948; Khuang became prime minister, and Kukrit became minister of finance. Nine months later, they were forced to resign by the army and take the role of opposition in the National Assembly. Soon afterward, Kukrit resigned from the assembly in protest against a salary increase for the House of Representatives. He surprised his critics when he accepted Plaek Phibunsongkhram's invitation to be the deputy minister of commerce, but he left that post after a few months.

Kukrit continued to voice his opposition in the *Siam Rath* ("Thai State") newspaper, which he established on 25 June 1949. From then until 1973, he had no political role except as a member of the Constituent Assembly set up in 1959. Kukrit was able to return to politics again after the Student Revolt in October 1973, when he became the president of the royally appointed National Convention to form the Constitution Drafting Assembly. Kukrit then set up a new political party, the Social Action Party (Kit Sangkhom), and became its leader. With

only eighteen seats in the assembly, Kukrit managed to defeat the Democrat Party, led by his elder brother, Seni, to become prime minister from March 1975 to April 1976. He dissolved the Parliament but then lost his post in a Bangkok district. His government, however, left remarkable policies in domestic and foreign affairs, namely, the economic relief fund for the villages and his tough stance with the United States in its declining role in Indochina and the rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Kukrit managed to secure a promise from Washington for rapid troop withdrawals from Thailand that proved to be a popular move among the Thais. Equally appealing were his government's attempts to resume diplomatic relations with the PRC. Again, however, his political star was dimmed by a military coup, on 6 October 1976. Kukrit resigned as chief of the Social Action Party in 1986 but continued playing the role of a "pillar of democracy."

Kukrit was a prolific writer and the author of short stories, novels, articles, columns, and critiques. He is generally regarded as the best Thai short story author. His most outstanding novel, *Si Phandin* ("Four Reigns"), written during the 1950s and early 1960s, reconstructs court life from the reigns of Kings Rama V to Rama VIII, reflecting his deep royalist feelings in regard to politics and society in Thailand. Kukrit died on 9 October 1995 at the age of eighty-four.

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also Constitutional (Bloodless) Revolution (1932) (Thailand); Khuang Aphaiwong (1902–1968); Seni Pramoj, M. R. (1905–1997); Student Revolt (October 1973) (Thailand)

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KUOMINTANG (KMT)

The Kuomintang (Guomindang) (KMT), also called the Nationalist Party, claims loyalty to Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and his Three Principles of

the People (*Sanmin Zhuyi*). Founded in 1912, KMT imposed one-party rule in China from 1928 to 1949 and then governed Taiwan for another fifty years. In a larger part of its history, it maintained a close relationship with the Chinese sojourners in Southeast Asia as a source of moral and financial support and legitimacy.

The party was formed as an open political party to supersede the underground Tongmenghui and to compete for seats in the Parliament after the founding of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1912.

The pursuit of parliamentary democracy suffered a serious setback in 1913, when President Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) murdered Song Jiaoren, a KMT leader, as a means to check the expansion of the party. The KMT organized an anti-Yuan military campaign, which was soon suppressed. The party was outlawed, and its members fled abroad.

It was at this juncture that the KMT members became revolutionary again and sought support from the Southeast Asian Chinese sojourners, as they did in the late Qing era, for their struggles against Yuan and other warlords. Sun Yat-sen, later renowned as "the Father of Modern China," founded a new Chinese revolutionary party in Japan for planning revolts in China; other less radical KMT members who had fled to Singapore and Penang formed their own. All solicited support from the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia.

Sun Yat-sen readopted the title of KMT in 1919 and later accepted Soviet guidance in fighting against the northern warlords. Sun's revolutionary regime in South China was supported financially by Chinese donations from Southeast Asia, notably from Burma (Myanmar). In the party's First National Congress in 1924, about one-tenth of the representatives came from Southeast Asia. In response to the call for "nationalist revolution" resolved in the Congress, a cadre school was established in 1926 for training professional revolutionaries to be sent to Chinese communities in Southeast Asia.

Given their substantial contributions to the Chinese Revolution, "overseas Chinese" (*Huaqiao*) became a concern for the KMT after its success in reunifying China in 1928 and the onset of the 1929 Great Depression, which deprived many overseas Chinese sojourners of the means to make a living. Committees were set



Some 1,000 supporters of the right-wing New Party (NP) march on Taipei streets on 24 November 2001, calling for unification of the Kuomintang (KMT) and its splinter group, the People First Party (PFP), in the upcoming parliamentary polls. They carried a portrait of Sun Yat-sen, founding father of the Republic of China (Taiwan's official name) and waved flags reading "KMT, PFP, NP three in one." (AFP/Corbis)

up for improving the welfare of returned overseas Chinese, who were provided with employment and educational opportunities. Overseas Chinese also returned to China for patriotic reasons. Chinese youths in Burma organized militias to Manchuria, which was invaded by Japan in 1931. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia organized the China Relief Fund under the leadership of Tan Kah Kee (1874–1961); the group raised several millions in donations for launching the war.

The KMT was successful in providing national leadership under Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and even in enhancing the international status of China, which was accepted as one of the Big Four (with Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union). But it failed in the post-

war reconstruction, which gave the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) a chance to launch mass movements against the KMT regime. The KMT finally had to retreat to Taiwan in 1949. Taiwan, then known as Free China to the capitalist world, was constructed as a stronghold for the future "reunification of China under the Three Peoples' Principles." Southeast Asia was soon perceived as a competitive testing ground between KMT and CCP in terms of their ability to win loyalty from the local Chinese communities. The KMT propaganda was as effective, if not more so, than the CCP's united front policy. The KMT was also active in receiving Vietnamese Chinese who fled from the First Indochina War (1946–1954). Every year, an increasing number of Chinese sojourners from Malaysia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines visited Taiwan for

purposes of sightseeing, exploring investment opportunities, receiving military training, and celebrating National Day. All these manifestations were assets that the KMT could use as it presented itself as the representative of all Chinese throughout the world.

However, this claim of a “Chinese connection” did not last. Both the younger generations of overseas Chinese and the new members in the KMT gradually lost their Chinese identity. After the rule of the CCP in China proved to be permanent and old leaders with strong Chinese passions, such as Chiang Kai-shek, passed away, the KMT was reduced to a party of Taiwanism, predominantly designed to promote the welfare of Taiwan. The final defeat of the Kuomintang by the Democratic Progressive Party in the 2000 presidential election formally marked the end of one-party rule in Taiwan. For survival, the KMT had to pour all its resources into local concerns and put overseas Chinese very low on its agenda. However, the ongoing Taiwanese “go-south policy,” which aims at encouraging more investments in Southeast Asian countries, can be viewed as a kind of continuation of the KMT’s traditional relations with the region.

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also China Relief Fund; China since 1949; China, Nationalist; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Revolution (1911); Formosa (Taiwan); Great Depression (1929–1931); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925)

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KUTAI (KOETEI)

The sultanate of Kutai (Kutei, Koetei), located on the banks of the lower Mahakam River in southeastern Kalimantan, was the most prominent Malay political state on Borneo’s eastern coast. It is suggested that its origins can be traced to the conversion to Islam of local pagan Dayaks, called Tunjung, sometime after 1600. However, there is evidence of the existence of a very early Hinduized kingdom in the area, Muara Kaman, from the fourth to eighth centuries (King 1993: 54, 107; Rousseau 1990: 283). Dutch traders of the (Dutch) United East India Company (VOC) visited the sultanate for the first time in 1635. Kutai was also a focus of Bugis trade and settlement from Sulawesi in the seventeenth century and an important market center for wild rubber, rattan, resins, birds’ nests, and other forest products from the Upper Mahakam in the nineteenth century (Lindblad 1988: 3, 9, 10).

Kutai was a vassal of the more powerful state of Bandjarmasin for a considerable period of time, though Bandjarmasin ceded its sovereignty to the Dutch government in 1817, and a contract was negotiated with Kutai in 1825 (Irwin 1955: 4, 153–154). In February 1844, a Scottish adventurer, Erskine Murray, with two trading brigs, arrived at Tenggarong, the capital of Kutai, with the intention of establishing a permanent British presence in the heart of the Dutch sphere of influence. The expedition was attacked by the sultan’s forces and forced to withdraw; Murray lost his life in the engagement (Irwin 1955: 102–103). As a result, the Dutch negotiated a new contract with Kutai in 1844 and put an administrator in place in 1846.

Sultan Sulaiman came to the throne in 1845 and reigned until 1899. Although Kutai was, in theory, internally self-governing, with the right to levy its own duties and taxes and run monopolies such as salt and opium, the sultan’s power was gradually undermined by the Dutch. Sultan Alimudin (r. 1899–1910) ceded

the Upper Mahakam to the Dutch in 1904, and the sultan's power to raise taxes and levies was finally removed in the 1930s under Sultan Parikesit, Sulaiman's great-grandson (Lindblad 1988: 124–125).

From the late nineteenth century, the region of Kutai became an increasingly important contributor to the Dutch colonial economy; coal deposits were discovered in the Lower Mahakam and then oil in the coastal and deltaic regions between Balikpapan and Samarinda (Lindblad 1988: 32–33, 42–47). Today, with the development of the timber industry and commercial agriculture, Kutai is a boom area and has attracted large numbers of immigrants from other parts of Indonesia.

VICTOR T. KING

See also Bandjarmasin (Banjermasin) Sultanate; Borneo; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Bugis (Buginese); Dayaks; Dutch Borneo; Jungle/Forest Products; Oil and

Petroleum; Sambas and Pontianak Sultanates; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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LA LIGA FILIPINA

La Liga Filipina was a secret patriotic association founded by José Rizal (1861–1896) on 3 July 1892 in Manila, with the purpose of promoting national solidarity, social betterment, and political reforms in the Philippine Islands. At that time, Filipino nationalists had waged a campaign for political reform for more than a decade, with the publication of the journal *La Solidaridad* and the association La Propaganda. They had done so mainly as expatriates and exiles in Europe, hoping to influence public opinion in Spain. By 1892, Rizal and others had come to realize that these efforts had been in vain, as the Spanish government and the general public were not interested in promoting reforms in the colony. In the Philippines, political opposition found expression in an underground press of antifriar leaflets. The Spanish government and the friar orders felt threatened and reacted with a campaign of arrests, denunciations, and deportations. In June 1892, Rizal returned to Manila in order to direct a more radical campaign for reform, and within a few days, he had gathered a number of political friends to start his secret association, patterned after the system of Masonic lodges. Although the Liga's statutes did not openly advocate a revolution, its first objective, "to unite the entire archipelago into one compact, vigorous and homogeneous body," was a challenge to the "Mother Spain" concept (Corpuz 1989, 2: 209); it went beyond the notion of assimilation and instead empha-

sized self-reliance. The Liga was granted only a short life. A few days after its founding, Rizal was arrested and deported to the town of Dapitan on the island of Mindanao, and the Liga was discontinued. Of the nineteen persons who had been present at the founding, six were later executed by the Spaniards, and most of the others were imprisoned or deported. An attempt to resurrect the Liga in 1893 was quickly abandoned for fear of government reprisals. On the day of Rizal's deportation, one of the Liga's members, Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897), founded another secret association, the Katipunan, which was to spearhead the Philippine Revolution in 1896.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship; Katipunan; *La Solidaridad*; Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Propaganda Movement; Rizal, José (1861–1896)

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LA SOLIDARIDAD

La Solidaridad is the name of a journal published by Filipino expatriates and exiles in Spain from 15 February 1889 to 15 November 1895, with the purpose of advocating political reforms in the Spanish colony of the Philippine Islands.

Lopez Jaena, a Filipino nationalist, established the journal in Barcelona and became the first editor. Later in the publication's first year, the office was transferred to Madrid, where Marcelo H. del Pilar (1850–1896) assumed the editorship. *La Solidaridad* was a Spanish-language journal, published biweekly in newspaper format, but it was not an ordinary newspaper, as essays and articles, rather than news items, formed the main contents. From its inception, the journal followed a liberal course, criticizing the political and legal situation in the Philippine Islands but advocating assimilation of the Filipino people to Spain and political reforms, rather than separation and revolution. The journal published a wide variety of articles on topics concerning the Philippines, such as education, Spanish administrative reforms, the political role of the friars, censorship, injustice, and proposals for the extension of the Spanish 1876 Constitution to the Philippines and the representation of Filipinos in the Spanish Cortes (parliament). The journal also published articles on art, history, ethnology, and linguistics, in an attempt to convince the Spaniards that the Filipinos were culturally advanced and should not be considered savages, as many Spaniards seemed to conceive of them.

A number of Filipino expatriates in Spain contributed to the journal, such as the writer and nationalist José Rizal (1861–1896), but there were also a few Spanish sympathizers and the Austrian professor Ferdinand Blumentritt among the contributors. The government in Manila prohibited the journal, and only a few smuggled copies circulated among nationalists in the home country.

In 1892, Rizal concluded that a journal published in Europe no longer contributed to the campaign for reforms in the Philippines. He wrote to his friend Blumentritt: "I have lost my hopes in Spain" (quoted in Guerrero 1963: 308). Rizal decided to return to the Philippines; there, he would organize a secret society, La Liga Filipina, and prepare the people for a more active role in government. However, shortly after the founding meeting, Rizal was arrested and

sent into exile. One of his followers, Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897), then established another secret society—the Katipunan, which started the Philippine Revolution in 1896.

In the meantime, del Pilar continued *La Solidaridad* in Madrid for three more years, along reformist lines and staying strictly within the confines of the law. The journal was stopped when funds were exhausted. Many of the ideas discussed in *La Solidaridad* inspired and directed the revolution and continued to influence the nationalist movement in the Philippines.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship; Katipunan; La Liga Filipina; *Noli Me Tangere* (1867) and *El Filibusterismo* (1891); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Propaganda Movement; Rizal, José (1861–1896)

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LABOR AND LABOR UNIONS

The type of labor systems that emerged in particular sectors in Southeast Asia originated in the strategies and capacities of states, firms, workers, and other actors as they socially constructed such systems. Not all these groups determined the nature and diverse outcomes of this social process, namely, the way in which both the benefits of success and the burdens of failure were shared. As such, changes in labor processes were a result of the dynamic interplay between global capitalism, the type of products/services produced for the international economy, and the availability of manpower.

Labor Processes in Historical Perspective

One of the most important characteristics of Southeast Asian demographic history before

1750 was a low population density. According to Anthony Reid, population growth in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not exceed 0.2 percent (Reid 1987: 35). Control of people rather than control of land was the main indicator of power, and the state's prosperity depended upon the ruler's ability to extract produce and taxes from the peasantry. Society was vertically organized through reciprocal patron-client relationships. Patrons offered protection to their clients, who, in turn, owed labor or service to their patrons, with the ultimate patron being the ruler of the state. Ideological sanction for this arrangement was provided by concepts of rulerless chaos, deriving from early Hindu influences. Obligations to provide labor or service could be defined by craft or other abilities, so that such industry or manufacturing as existed was tied in to the hierarchical structure of society. The legal codes of the period also indicate the monetary value of human beings who could be bought outright as slaves or could be bonded through debt. Thus, several types of economic institutions and servitude existed in various combinations in the state, which enabled the ruler to acquire wealth and distribute it among his followers.

Production and Labor Supply, 1800–1900

The main pressures underlying state formation—the process of accumulation, economic rationalization, and political centralization—required centrally controlled human resources. A resource and labor pool that expanded the capacities of the state was thus a key component in social organization. This labor pool had its basis in servitude. Essentially, there were three main forms of servitude—slavery, bondage or peonage, and labor obligations. In contrast to the first two, the third was flexible and negotiable, and in view of the fact that people were an index of power, the exaction on peasants was normally constrained. Moreover, labor obligations, or *corvée*, were used more for public purposes, whereas the first two were for private purposes.

Slavery was inevitably a consequence of war, which made available a group of prisoners for the labor pool. Since it originated in an act of violence, its continuance required coercion. The slave was seen as an outsider, as property that had marketability value. The second common form of servitude was conceived in relation to debt

and was known as debt slavery or debt bondage. Although debt bondage could be hereditary, in most cases the bonded person or his or her family worked for the creditor until the debt was repaid. The main difference between this form of servitude and slavery was that the bonded person was part of a community and had kinship ties. Bondage was also a consequence of the vertical obligations in society. The wealth of the rich lay in the power of the dependent men (or women) they could gather around them. The socioeconomic relationships inherent in the state, which prevented the accumulation of savings, further fostered the creation of bondage. In comparison with *corvée*, slavery and forms of bondage were the preferred categories of labor control and labor relations.

Corvée was an obligation of the subject or commoner class to the ruling class. In many areas, people had an obligation to labor for the state or its representatives that could last up to six months at a time. Although it was not slavery, *corvée* has been described as a form of “property in man.” The forced levy of men was effected through the headmen of villages or district chiefs. It was generally utilized to raise armies or for irregular tasks of cooperation on a large scale, such as public works construction (for example, in Cambodia, Java, and parts of Vietnam) and tin mining (as in Malaya). The arbitrary nature of *corvée* disrupted peasant agricultural production and was responsible for low agricultural productivity. Nevertheless, the state did not have the resources to enforce unreasonable demands on a regular basis, nor did it want to encourage flight to neighboring territories and the transference of allegiance to rival states.

The International Economy, 1840–1914

The period from around 1840 to 1914 saw the spread of the industrial system in Europe and North America and the integration of world markets. An important element in this globalization process was the acquisition of colonies in Asia and Africa by European powers. The process began around 1850 and climaxed between 1870 and 1914. Great Britain annexed Lower Burma in 1852, and by the mid-1880s, it had taken over all of Burma (present-day Myanmar). From the Straits Settlements (acquired between 1786 and 1824), Britain also brought the Peninsular Malay States under for-

mal control between 1874 and 1914. Indochina (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) came under the French by the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Since the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch had extended their control over the islands of the “Indonesian” archipelago, and the United States took over the Philippines from the Spaniards in 1898. Thailand (Siam) remained outside formal colonial rule, but the Thai state acceded to free trade demands from Britain and other Western countries. Thus, a new political order was created in Southeast Asia, which resulted in new economic structures, the creation of new primary production centers, and the international division of labor. The colonial states forcibly integrated their Southeast Asian colonies into the international economy through transfers of capital and labor and, later, commodities. Although the capital was of European origin, migrants were drawn from neighboring regions to meet the demand for labor, especially in the case of Malaya, Sumatra, North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak, Burma, and Thailand.

Labor Migration

Three migration networks are associated with the labor diaspora in Southeast Asia. They were the Chinese, Indian, and Javanese networks, and the workers who came through these networks had many characteristics in common. First, they were principally young, unskilled, adult males who emigrated as individuals, carrying both high labor-force participation rates and low dependency burdens with them. Second, they comprised mainly illiterate peasants who had spent very little time away from their village roots. Third, they were regarded as sojourners, to be repatriated when the demand for their services ended or when those services could no longer be justified. Fourth, the diversified recruitment policy adopted by colonial regimes meant that migrant labor could be manipulated easily. All these factors ensured that the workers were not easily assimilated or readily accepted by the local inhabitants.

Labor Dynamics in the Mining Sector

Chinese migration comprised the largest migration stream, and Chinese mining labor recruitment was essentially a personal system of recruitment, reflecting varying recruitment networks.

Workers bound for Malaya, Indonesia, and Thailand were initially recruited through the only channel of the Straits Settlements (mainly Singapore), where British firms and Baba (peranakan) Chinese coolie brokers handled the trade. Their networks extended from Singapore to the South China port cities and even to the hometowns of the Chinese subbrokers. This system of indirect recruitment later gave way to a direct recruitment policy whereby coolie foremen and middlemen, such as Chinese officials closely associated with the mines, were entrusted with the job. The new immigrants (*sinkheh*, meaning “newly arrived guests”) were transported under the credit-ticket system and were held on arrival in Singapore. The coolie brokers, who also functioned as agents for the prospective employers in the new lands, organized employment for the migrants whereby these employers settled the *sinkheh*’s travel costs or obtained their labor by way of advances on wages. Subsequently, the indentured worker was bound by a contract to serve for a specified period (usually three years) until the debt incurred by him was paid off to his employer. In effect, this meant that the employer had a contractual obligation on the *sinkheh*’s services for the specified period. The transaction was conducted between broker and prospective employer, with the worker usually unaware of the identity of his employer or the place or conditions of his work. He was not allowed to change employers until he had repaid his steamer-passage ticket or allowance. This meant that employers exercised a strong control over their employees that amounted to a de facto property right, rather than the customary rights over person, for example, to extract labor (*corvée*) in many Southeast Asian societies.

Mining was organized through the *kongsi* (association) that provided an institutional framework into which new arrivals were inducted. More significantly, the *kongsi* allowed mining operations to continue unhampered by the fluidity of workers. The *kongsi* thus offered a sense of security and identity—it relied on a variety of mechanisms, including a personal recruitment system, kinship links, and clan ties and provincial connections. Workers were essentially locked into a dependency relationship with the employers.

Low-wage Chinese labor enabled the mainly Chinese-owned mines to produce at low cost, making less labor-intensive techniques noncom-

petitive. Chinese indentured labor migration was banned in 1914. Coincidentally, the rise of protectionism after World War I (1914–1918) not only witnessed the decline of the kongsi system but also the passing of control of the industry to Western capital and technology.

Labor Dynamics in the Plantation Sector

The trade in minerals formed an important component in regional specialization, but the spread of plantation crops had a far bigger impact, in terms of both the commodities produced and labor specialization. The most important of these plantation crops were rubber, coffee, oil palm, tobacco, sugarcane, and coconut. The rapid expansion of plantation production in Southeast Asia was a direct consequence of the expansion of the international economy, especially the growth of the automobile industry in the United States, incentives provided by the colonial states such as cheap land, infrastructure, and above all the availability of low-wage labor. This plantation labor was predominantly of South Indian (Malaya), Chinese (Malaya, Sumatra, North Borneo, Sarawak), Javanese (Sumatra, Sarawak, North Borneo, and Malaya), and Vietnamese (Vietnam and Cambodia) origins. The majority of these immigrant workers were hired under the indenture system, and their transportation was both regulated and sponsored by colonial states.

European planters preferred South Indians for a variety of reasons. South Indians were cheaper, and they could be recruited easily because India was under the same imperial government. They were considered docile, fitting well into the dependent relationship between management and employee. However, the South Indians lacked funds to migrate spontaneously, and there were more attractive opportunities in other British colonies. Consequently, from the start, the colonial administration both sponsored and regulated the recruitment of Indian labor.

South Indian plantation labor was hired either as assisted or unassisted labor. Under the category of assisted labor, there were two types of recruitment systems—indenture and *kangani* (foreman or overseer). Indenture was more important in the sugarcane plantations in the first half of the nineteenth century. It gave way to *kangani*-assisted labor in the coffee plantations in the second half of the century and in turn was replaced by free or unassisted labor. In rub-

ber plantations, planters utilized all three types of recruitment systems.

The workers lived on the plantations. They were forbidden to leave without passes, they worked unlimited hours, and they were subjected to penalties for misconduct; attempts to run away were punishable, and in the Netherlands East Indies, Chinese and Javanese workers were subject to a penal sanction for any transgression. In return, the workers received basic wages that were tied to the prices of commodities (but were rarely revised upward), basic free accommodation in coolie lines, subsidized food, and return passages.

In the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch had only one labor regime or system for the mining and planting sectors, covering both Chinese and Javanese coolies. Similar regulations were introduced for workers recruited to serve on the plantations in French Indochina and in North Borneo. The authorities believed that coercion served the interests of workers because it fostered the work ethic and conditioned them to be useful. In time, coercive measures were replaced by more indirect controls, as supervisor-foremen functioned as a link between the capitalist employer and the worker. The supervisor-foreman imposed the work discipline and thus relieved the state of this task. These coercive legal measures were repealed after World War I. The distinguishing feature of the labor market in Southeast Asia during this period was that it remained in a state of flux. In all labor systems, labor continued to be on the move because in most cases, employment was permanently casual, conditioned by short-term arrangements, and contingent on economic conditions. As noted previously, many workers were contracted through advance payment, binding them to an employer or his or her agent. Others remained attached to systems of delayed payment, permitting them to leave only at the end of the “contract” or when the (planting or harvesting) season was over. Colonial regimes were thus both complicit and acquiescent in the exploitation of labor and consequently played a key role in structuring labor institutions.

Three principles governed colonial labor policy. They included the acquisition of a plentiful and cheap supply of labor for capitalist expansion, the assurance of the laborer’s freedom of movement through the abolition

of indenture, and the provision of a limited amount of protection for workers. Labor policy was determined in consultation with employer associations. These associations emerged in the early stages of the expansion of capitalist productive relations. Such employer associations aimed at dealing with the labor question, notably to keep wages low, to block workers' protest and action, to regulate competition among employers for labor by fixing wages, and to act as a lobby group. As a result, although the authorities set up labor departments, labor inspectorates, and Chinese protectorates, these involved principally the supervision of immigration and health matters and the keeping of records. To a large extent, the success of these institutions in ensuring basic rights for workers depended on the character and attitude of the administrators and the cooperation of the leading planters.

After World War I, there was a backlash against globalization and a rise in protectionism associated primarily with commodity restriction schemes in Southeast Asia. This had important consequences for the region. It stemmed the cross-border flows of goods, capital, and migrants. Indentured labor migration was banned. There was also mass repatriation of workers to their countries of origin. The ending of direct state involvement in labor recruitment also led to a decline in authoritarianism, paternalism, and the reliance on official bodies to protect labor's interests. Some colonial states (for example, Malaya) restricted labor migration but allowed the migration of women and children, thus enabling the formation and reconstitution of families. In Burma and Thailand, there was a political backlash against migrant labor and restrictions on foreign labor. In other areas, a more stable labor force emerged, resulting in the formation of a free or freer labor force.

Globalization Reinstated: The New International Economic Order after 1945

The shape of Southeast Asia's current politics and policies was set in the 1960s amid postcolonial anxieties and the Cold War. Southeast Asian nations were divided either into socialist states or pro-Western states. The states that embraced the global market economy—Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines—

became the location sites of manufacturing industries producing for the world market. One key element of this global reorganization of production systems was a corresponding reorganization of labor, or the new international division of labor.

Why did manufacturing pass into the hands of developing countries in Southeast Asia and elsewhere? In the period after 1960, the expansion of the world economy gave a further impetus to global capital markets. Direct foreign investment (DFI) represented more than simply international capital seeking out the highest returns. Firms went multi- or transnational when they wished to locate activities in more than one country. It also made sense to conduct these activities within the firm rather than through the marketplace. Moreover, overseas production made it possible to reduce operating costs. The substantial setup costs in producing abroad were no longer a problem, since production could be decomposed, the new transport and communications technology led to a reduction in transport costs, and the establishment of export-processing zones (funded by the state and international development agencies) facilitated the relocation of industry. More significantly, labor was much cheaper in developing countries. Rising wage levels and improved working conditions for labor in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries resulted in the relocation of production facilities, especially to East Asia. The targeted industries were those requiring a large, essentially unskilled workforce, such as the textile and electronics industries. This relocation was due to three main factors.

Low wages were Southeast Asia's drawing card. In their industrialization drive, Southeast Asian economies became an ever larger cog in the global economy, in which skilled operations were carried out in the developed countries of the West and Japan and the simpler parts were exported to lower-wage regions. Singapore led the second tier of newly industrializing economies, followed by Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. This low-technology, labor-intensive production niche had important implications for the labor system, since it involved state strategy becoming identified with the strategies of firms. In the construction of the manufacturing labor regime, therefore, the workers were assembly-line labor, with little bargaining power and short-lived participation.

Changing Labor and Women's Increased Labor Market Participation

A major transformation in labor relations was the feminization of labor in manufacturing. Three developments account for the increased labor-market participation of women in the economy. The first relates to the conventional hypothesis that the participation of women in the labor force increases during the course of socioeconomic development. The second relates to demographic change. Historically, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand have been among the most sparsely settled countries in Southeast Asia. As noted earlier, migrants from China, India, and the Netherlands East Indies had gone to Malaya, Singapore, and Thailand to work, whether in mining, on plantations, or in rice cultivation. In the 1960s, the pattern of migration shifted, with changes in national government policy playing a key role. Again to take the case of Malaysia, the national government imposed restrictions on immigration, and the movement of foreign labor into Malaya was curtailed. The subsequent labor shortage was also related to demographic change arising from a decline in fertility. The transition from high to low fertility rates is closely intertwined with the changing economic role of women. The conventional wisdom is that education (see the later discussion) and the spread of birth control were major contributory factors, but there is evidence from surveys that women themselves delayed marriage and had fewer children in response to economic opportunities provided by the then-expanding economy. Third, the state's role in the provision of educational facilities meant that secondary and tertiary education became readily available in these countries. Moreover, education policy provided both boys and girls with equal access to education, resulting in a rising level of educational attainment among girls in particular. The bulk of the government's education budget was allocated to primary and secondary education. The long-term investment in basic education resulted in relatively high levels of literacy and meant that the workforce was well suited to the more sophisticated production processes found in many of the export-oriented industries relocated to Southeast Asia. This fact was reflected in increased labor-market participation among women.

In the import-substitution manufacturing phase in all these countries, men were the pre-

ferred labor force. However, women were targeted as the workforce in the export-oriented industrialization phase because the very nature of this production niche relied on female labor. It has often been said that women were the preferred labor force because the work involved in the manufacturing processes described above, that is, repetitive work requiring high levels of accuracy, manual dexterity, and a "light touch," embodied the kinds of tasks traditionally carried out by women. However, women's psychological makeup, passivity, docility, controllability, and capacity for hard work were also contributory factors. It is argued here that the manufacturing labor system itself played a pivotal role in women's employment.

What, then, are some of the consequences of manufacturing labor systems for gender roles in development? First, women are concentrated in the industrial and service sectors of the economy. Second, factory work and organization replicate the patriarchal structure of society. Male managers supervise the women, discipline is strictly enforced, and the male "control" of women is but a redefinition of gender roles accompanying the transformation of capitalist relations of production. Third, factory work is also characterized by short contracts and insecurity of tenure (the women work either on fixed contracts or on a subcontractual basis, for example, in the garment industry). When women reach a certain age, their services are often terminated to avoid payment of "seniority" wages. They are also the most vulnerable to dismissal and/or unemployment during an economic downturn.

The nationalist state, like the colonial state, has played a central role in securing the conditions for the exploitation and domination of wage labor. Prior to the Pacific War (1941–1945), segments of wage labor were divided along racial and occupational lines in most Southeast Asian countries. There was no real alliance of class, and class-consciousness was limited and heavily influenced by nationalist ideology. The colonial governments frowned upon worker organization and ensured that only compliant organizations were allowed to survive. There was no general proletarianization process in operation (except in Vietnam). Following independence, the state viewed labor's struggles for industrial and political rights as a threat to the social order and the development process. Con-

sequently, the state has pursued a range of policies and practices designed to ensure that working-class organization, militancy, and opposition remain subordinated to the logic and dictates of capital. In this process, both the nature of industrialization and the specific management practices of employers have aided the state.

Globalization, which has linked almost all parts of the world through open trade and capital and labor flows, has affected the different ways in which labor relations are played out across the Southeast Asian region. Whether “imperial-” or “free market-led” globalization, the internationalization of Southeast Asian economies resulted in rapid growth in the region. Consequently, the interlocking of Southeast Asian economies with the global marketplace, particularly the global marketplace for labor, lies at the very heart of the Asian miracle today, just as it did in the past.

AMARJIT KAUR

See also Chinese Gold Mining Communities of Western Borneo; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Coffee; Indian Immigrants; *Kangani* System; *Kangchu* System; National Trades Union Congress (NTUC); Patron-Client Relations; Rubber; Slavery; Sugar; Tin; Tobacco

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LABUAN (1847)

Situated at the entrance to Brunei Bay, the island of Labuan was annexed by the British in 1847 as a strategy to establish hegemony over the northwestern coast of Borneo. Labuan was a Crown Colony until 1888 when it became part of British North Borneo, then administered by the British North Borneo Chartered Company.

During the early nineteenth century, Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) advocated the establishment of British domination over Borneo to the English East India Company (EIC) to check Dutch influence. James Brooke (1803–1868), an English gentleman-adventurer, on his own initiative had obtained a fiefdom, Sarawak, in 1841 from the ruler of Brunei. As a defense against piratical activities and as a safeguard for shipping and the promotion of trade and commerce, the British mercantile community in Singapore lobbied for the establishment of a British port and naval station on the northwestern coast of Borneo. It was Brooke who proposed Labuan, then under Brunei. In the mid-nineteenth century, Britain’s concern was focused on renewed French and American interests in the South China Sea region. The Anglo-Brunei Treaty of May 1847 formalized the cession of Labuan to Britain.

Labuan failed not only as a naval station but also as an entrepôt. There were extensive coal

deposits on the island, but the string of failed companies that had attempted to work the mineral resulted in the abandonment of Labuan as a coaling station by the Royal Navy in 1886. Ambitions to make Labuan a “second Singapore” were overly optimistic; Labuan was merely a minor entrepôt servicing the northwest coast of Borneo and the western parts of the Sulu Archipelago. European and Chinese traders bypassed Labuan and dealt directly with Singapore.

Nonetheless, Labuan was not forsaken, and its modest colonial administration was attended to by a handful of officials who assumed several posts conjointly. Britain could not afford to abandon Labuan, lest its annexation by another European power undermine British influence over the northwestern coast of Borneo. Proposals to incorporate Labuan into the Straits Settlements came to nothing. In 1888, when Britain granted protectorate status over Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo, Labuan came under the administration of the latter.

During the Pacific War (1941–1945), Labuan served as the administrative center for Imperial Japanese forces, then for the Australian Imperial Forces (AIF), and lastly for Australian and British military administration for Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo.

In 1963, British North Borneo, together with Sarawak, joined the Federation of Malaysia. Labuan was rejuvenated when it was accorded the status of a federal territory in 1984. Efforts to transform the island into an international banking and financial haven and a center for offshore investment proved promising. In late 1989, Labuan was to be accorded the status of an international offshore financial centre (IOFC). Coupled with its function as an entrepôt as well as its free port status, Labuan was set to take off as an important destination.

Toward the end of the 1990s it became apparent that Labuan was not fulfilling its potential as an entrepôt and free port. Regional trade was hindered by a lack of physical linkages with neighboring regions and the hinterland. A shortage of skilled workers in the financial sector and quality supporting facilities (educational, medical, commercial, etc.) slowed Labuan’s aspirations. It also faced stiff competition from well-entrenched IOFCs in the region, namely, Singapore and Hong Kong. The Labuan Development Authority launched an eighteen-year

development plan in 1997 to rectify the island’s shortcomings.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Anglo-Brunei Relations (Nineteenth Century to 1980s); Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); British Interests in Southeast Asia; British North Borneo Chartered Company (1881–1946); Brooke, James, and Sarawak; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Piracy; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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LAGRÉE-GARNIER MEKONG EXPEDITION (1866–1868)

The Mekong River Expedition left Saigon in June 1866, led by two naval officers, Commander Ernest Doudart de Lagrée (1823–1868) and Lieutenant Francis Garnier (1839–1873) as his second-in-command. There were four other principal explorers in the group: Louis Delaporte, a navy sublieutenant; Lucien Joubert and Clovis Thorel, navy doctors; and Louis de Carné, a representative of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, there were three interpreters (one French, one Cambodian, and one Lao), four French soldiers, two Filipino soldiers, and seven Vietnamese militiamen. The expedition’s task was to explore the then largely unknown Mekong River, in hopes that it would be navigable into China and could serve as a route to develop profitable commerce with that country.

In terms of these hopes, the expedition was a major disappointment. Rapids prevented navigation by all but small craft along much of the river's course, and there was a major barrier in the form of the Khone Falls, near the modern border between Cambodia and Laos. Further, hopes for finding opportunities for commerce with China were not realized. Afflicted by sickness and facing political difficulties, the expedition members abandoned travel on or by the river in China's Yunnan Province at Jinghong. Once in China, Lagrée's health deteriorated rapidly, and he died in March 1868. Garnier led the expedition to its end, returning to Saigon in June 1868.

Despite its disappointing results, the Mekong Expedition ranks as one of the great nineteenth-century achievements of exploration. The Mekong River was scientifically charted from the sea to southwestern China for the first time, as the French explorers mapped 6,700 kilometers of the river and its surrounding territory. The results of the expedition were published in four magnificently presented volumes (two consisting of text and two of maps and plates) published in 1873.

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See also Cochin China; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Garnier, Francis (1839–1873); Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Yunnan Province

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LANGKASUKA

Langkasuka was a kingdom located in the region of modern Pattani in southern Thailand

during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries C.E., as well as the name given to a series of states on the Malay Peninsula dating from the early first millennium. The *Liang shu* ("History of the Liang Dynasty") in China (502–556 C.E.) contains a long description of Langkasuka in the early sixth century and records that the inhabitants dated the foundation of their kingdom over four hundred years earlier.

The country of Langkasuka is first mentioned under the name Lang-ya-hsiu, in the record of an embassy sent to China in 515 C.E. This record has survived in some detail. Lang-ya-hsiu's territory was described as being a thirty days' journey from east to west and twenty days from north to south. Aloeswood (*Aquilaria*) and camphor were said to be particularly abundant. Both men and women were described as wearing only a sarong (*pareo*), with nothing on the upper part of the body, although the king and senior officials covered their shoulders with cloth and wore gold earrings and belts of gold cord. Women of high status would also wrap themselves in cotton cloth and wear jeweled girdles about their bodies. The city of Lang-ya-hsiu was described as being enclosed by walls, with double gates, towers, and pavilions. The king would ride on an elephant, shaded by a white parasol and fly whisk, and he was accompanied by flags, banners, and drums (Wheatley 1961: 253–254). Further embassies from this kingdom of Lang-ya-hsiu to China were recorded in 523, 531, and 568, but none were mentioned after the last date.

Langkasuka has also been identified with the kingdom of Lang-ya-hsü, mentioned in the record of a Chinese embassy sent to Southeast Asia in 608 C.E., and it is also probably the kingdom of Lang-chia-shu mentioned by the Buddhist pilgrim I-Ching in the late seventh century. I-Ching described Lang-chia-shu as lying southeast of "Shi-li-ch'a-ta-lo" (the city of Sriksheṭra in the central Irrawaddy Valley of Myanmar [Burma]) and west of "Tu-ho-po-ti" (the kingdom or city of Dvaravati in Central Thailand). This description suggests it was situated along the northern coastline of the Malay Peninsula, but the precise location remains unknown.

The *Chiu T'ang shu* ("Old History of the T'ang Dynasty") (618–907 C.E.) also states that Lang-ya-hsiu adjoined P'an P'an, a country

probably situated on the Bay of Bandon near modern Surat Thani in southern Thailand—but whether it lay to the north or south was unspecified. No further information on Langkasuka was given in the Chinese texts after the seventh or eighth century, although earlier information was repeated in the later histories. However, during the early eleventh century, the Malay Peninsula was raided by the Chola dynasty of southern India, and in an inscription of King Rajendrachola at Tanjore dated to 1030–1031 C.E., Langkasuka is named among the list of conquests on the Malay Peninsula under the name *Ilangashoka*.

Langkasuka may also be the kingdom of *Lochac* mentioned in the *Travels of Marco Polo* and, more convincingly, the *Langashuka* described in Arab texts of the fifteenth century. These later sources placed the kingdom on the east coast of the lower Malay Peninsula, to the south of Songkla. This general location was also corroborated by a map from the Chinese Ming dynasty (1368–1644) showing a kingdom of *Lang-hsi-chia* between Songkla and Pattani and by an account in the Javanese epic poem the *Nāgarakertāgama* (composed in 1365), which placed a city of *Lengkasuka* north of Saiburi. Paul Wheatley (1961: 265) carefully collated these varied references and concluded that Langkasuka must have been situated near the modern town of Pattani.

Some caution, however, needs to be used in our historical reading of Langkasuka. Large temporal gaps remain in our current knowledge of this kingdom, and it is not certain whether the name was consistently applied to the same location at all periods. The kingdom of *Lang-ya-hsiu*, which sent embassies to China in the sixth century C.E., was almost certainly the same as the kingdom of *Langchia-shu* mentioned by I-Ching in the seventh century. But it is uncertain whether this country was the same as that attacked by Rajendrachola in the eleventh century or later described in the region of Pattani in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Indeed, the *Nāgarakertāgama* appeared to imply that Langkasuka was originally situated on the western coast of the peninsula and was only later transferred to the east.

What is certain is that the name of Langkasuka was consistently applied to the Malay Peninsula from the sixth to the fifteenth cen-

turies C.E., and it remains an important element in the local histories of southern Thailand and Malaysia.

WILLIAM A. SOUTHWORTH

See also Chinese Tribute System; Dvaravati; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; I-Ching (I-tsing) (635–713 C.E.); Polo, Marco (1254–1324); *Suvarnabhumi* (Land of Gold); Tun-sun

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LAO

The Lao people of northern Indochina and northeast Thailand are a subgroup of the T'ai peoples. Spoken Lao shares similarities with other T'ai languages, and Lao ethnohistory is also characterized by the historical importance of the T'ai *muang*—a territory defined by the personal allegiance of a number of villages to a local ruler, or *chao*, from whom rights to land were obtained. Yet despite linguistic, political, and cultural similarities with other T'ai groups, the ethnic Lao, particularly those residing in Laos, prefer to trace a separate ethnohistory for themselves.

The origins of the term *Lao* are uncertain, but well before the thirteenth century, small *muang* were established in the Mekong River valley and on the Khorat (Korat) Plateau. This was the area in which a distinct Lao identity was to emerge. The Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century provided an opportunity for the general expansion of T'ai influence in the region, and this included the takeover by T'ai rulers of a small Khmer city called Mong Swa. This city was later renamed Luang Pra-

bang, and it was to become the historical heartland of the Lao people. In the fourteenth century, the Lao ruler Fa Ngum (r. 1357–1371) extended this principality to Vientiane and called the kingdom he established Lan Xang, with Luang Prabang as its capital. This is considered by many to be the first ethnic Lao kingdom and the starting point of Lao ethnohistory proper. Although it was a T'ai state, being based upon the authority of an expanded muang, it was oriented strongly toward the Khmer kingdom of Angkor in Indochina, not toward the powerful Siamese state of Ayutthaya. This orientation has been important in establishing a distinct Lao political identity, and it is restated whenever Thailand appears to have expansionist pan-T'ai aspirations toward modern Laos based on claims of common T'ai ethnicity.

Although the kingdom of Lan Xang was under the control of Burmese kings from 1574, it did not collapse until 1713. It was then divided into smaller constituent parts, which came increasingly under the dominance of Siam. It was only in 1893 that a small territory, conceived as a buffer state, was officially named Laos by the French administration as it sought to consolidate its colonial possessions in the region. The French retained control of Laos as a protectorate until the Pacific War (1941–1945), and it was not until 1954 that a fully independent Laos was established.

Laos was not a coherent ethnic, geographic, or political entity. Large numbers of non-Lao peoples lived (and still live) in this region, and, indeed, most ethnic Lao reside across the Mekong River in Isan in northeast Thailand. Thai policy in Isan has sought to downplay ethnic Lao affinities and to integrate this area as one of the regions of Thailand. This policy seems to have been fairly successful, and there is evidence of a regional Isan identity (*Isan Khon*), rather than an ethnic Lao identity, emerging there. However, this division of Lao peoples between the two states complicates the writing of ethnohistory by nationalists in Laos. It is in this context that the historical recollection of the kingdom of Lan Xang has become so important. Holding sway over an area far greater in extent than the borders of the modern Laotian state, the memory of Lan Xang evokes the idea of a regionally significant, independent Lao ethnohistory.

Laos was embroiled in the regional struggles for power that beset Indochina after the Pacific War, which were also played out as internal power struggles within the new Lao state. In 1973, the main nationalist organization, Pathet Lao, succeeded in gaining full control of the country, and in 1975, the socialist Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) was established. Policies were introduced to forge a stronger identification of the state of Laos with the ethnic Lao people, who dominate the government but constitute a minority of the population. Lao is the official language, and state culture consists of politicized interpretations of Lao "tradition" and ritual. The complexities of the country's ethnic composition are concealed by the use of ethnographic categories (first employed by the French) prefaced by the term *Lao*: Lao Loum (lowland Lao, which includes ethnic Lao people), Lao Theung (midland Lao), and Lao Sung (upland Lao). Many of these communities are neither Lao nor T'ai. Some of the non-Lao minorities, such as the Hmong, have rebelled on a number of occasions in objection to the tendency to equate the kingdom of Laos and the term *Laotian* with the minority ethnic Lao identity.

Laos's closed-door policy has meant that very little foreign historical or anthropological research has been carried out in the country since the Pacific War. However, in recent years, a number of works have been produced, which suggests that a sea change in Lao studies may be taking place. These works differentiate themselves from nationalist rhetoric as well as from still influential French colonial constructions, being more sensitive to issues of Lao identity and history within a complex anthropological and historical setting.

MANDY SADAN

See also Angkor; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767 C.E.), Kingdom of; French Indochina; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Hmong; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Isan; Lao People's Democratic Republic; Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Laotianization; Luang Prabang; Pathet Lao; T'ais; Vientiane

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LAO ISSARA (ISSARAK)

Lao Issara (Issarak), sometimes known as Neo Lao Issara (*Issara* means “freedom” in the Lao language), is the Lao independence movement that crystallized just prior to the capitulation of the Japanese army in Laos in August and September 1945. Dominated by Prince Phetsarath (1890–1959), the Lao Issara, or Free Lao, created the Provisional Lao People’s Government in Vientiane on 12 October. With its members forced into exile in Bangkok by the returning French, the movement was dissolved in 1949, although Phetsarath’s brother, the Red Prince Souphanouvong (1911–1995), merged his Issara faction with the victorious communist Pathet Lao movement.

Modern Lao nationalism was actually promoted by the Vichy French administration to buttress the country against Thai irredentism, as pushed by the Plaek Phibunsongkhram regime in Thailand. The youthful members joined what would be known as the Lao Nhay movement, which took the form of a Lao cultural revival. But this official French crusade to help the Lao save themselves also had a Pétainist character in the way it exulted the family and homeland. Viceroy Phetsarath actually distanced himself from such radical moves as latinizing the Lao script, as did other Lao figures.

The opening shots of an autonomous anti-French nationalism arising from an educated elite was undoubtedly the “coup” staged by fifty students of the Vientiane high school in 1940, although they were obliged to flee to Thailand. But also in the 1941–1943 period, other ethnic Lao in exile in Thailand began to intrigue against the French. They formed a semisecret cadre group called Lao Pen Lao (Lao

for Laos). Certain of them fell in with the Japanese following the *coup de force* of March 1945 against the French administration, and others sided with the Free Thai movement. Phetsarath also lent his support to the movement.

When the provisional Lao People’s government (the Lao Issara government) was proclaimed on 12 October 1945 by Khammao Vilay (1892–1965), the former governor of Vientiane Province, various people’s committees came together, representing diverse nationalist tendencies. The Khammao-Phetsarath group and the Lao Issara group looked to links with Thailand, and the Lao Pen Lao group inclined toward a greater Laos, whereas the Committee for an Independent Laos, led by Prince Souphanouvong, looked to the Việt Minh for support. In the government, Khammao served as prime minister, Souphanouvong as foreign minister and defense minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984) in public works, Nhouy Abhay (1906–1963) in education, and Katay Don Sasorith (1904–1959) in finance, to mention some of the more prominent Lao Issara members.

Robbed of power by the French restoration and faced with recognition of the status quo ante by the king in Luang Prabang, the Lao Issara leadership accepted the hospitality of the left-wing government of Pridi Phamanyong in Bangkok. At the same time, many of their followers joined in armed activities against the French from across the left bank of the Mekong River. But as the French consolidated their control over the Mekong River towns of Laos, armed actions by Lao Issara partisans became increasingly ineffectual. Lacking weapons and material, dispersed and isolated, some of them turned to robbery in order to survive.

Meanwhile, French diplomacy drove a wedge between the Bangkok-based radicals headed by the Red Prince, the neutralists headed by Phetsarath, and the accommodationists led by Khammao, Prince Souvanna Phouma, and Katay Don Sasorith. On 16 May 1949, the Red Prince was expelled. Following the Franco-Lao Convention of 19 July 1949, offering independence to Laos within the French Union arrangement, and following correspondence between Souvanna Phouma and the French authorities, along with French assurances that the Lao Issara would be received back into society, the remaining leaders decided

to dissolve the Provisional Lao Issara Government along with its armed wing. This decision was declared in a statement signed in Bangkok on 25 October 1949. With the notable exception of Phetsarath, the Lao Issara leadership, along with the rank and file, returned to Laos within a short time. Katay and Souvanna Phouma went on to head governments in the kingdom of Laos.

The importance of the Lao Issara lies especially in the way that it offered a means by which a truly autonomous Lao nationalism could surface outside of the Leninist party networks in Laos that were otherwise entirely dominated by ethnic Vietnamese in the pre-1941 period. Domination of the Lao Issara by the educated members of the Lao elite differentiated the movement from the rebellions of ethnic minorities that had challenged French power in the early decades of the twentieth century. But unlike the Lao Nhay movement, which was directed against Thai irredentism, the Lao Pen Lao and the Lao Issara movements, suspicious of Vietnamese intentions, looked to Thailand for support in their independence struggle against France. Although Lao communist historiography incorporates the legacy of the Lao Issara, the memory tends to be overshadowed by the more than thirty years of Lao-Vietnamese communist collaboration.

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See also Free Thai Movement; Indochina during World War II (1941–1945); Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Pathet Lao (Land of Laos); Phetsarath (1890–1959); Plaek Phibunsongkhram, Field Marshal (1897–1964); Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983); Souphanouvong (Red Prince) (1911–1995); Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984); Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (League for the Independence of Vietnam)

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LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR)

The Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), or Sathalanalat Pasathipatay Pasason Lao, is the official title of the state of Laos, which came into being on 2 December 1975. As such, the proclamation of the republic on what is now commemorated as National Day ended the Royal Lao Government (RLG) and the six-hundred-year monarchy.

Power in the LPDR continues to be monopolized by the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), a party that still professes Marxism-Leninism and proclaims solidarity with other communist states, especially with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In July 1977, the LPDR entered a twenty-five-year treaty of friendship and cooperation with Vietnam.

Following Eastern European and, especially, Vietnamese communist precedent, the creation of a socialist state ended the thirty-year-long nationalist revolution and set the course for the building of socialism. The change of regime from constitutional monarchy to communist people's republic was determined at an LPRP congress in December 1975. Unlike the communist victories in Vietnam and Cambodia, achieved through revolutionary violence, the LPRP had entered into a coalition government with the U.S.-backed RLG in April 1974 following a cease-fire brokered in February 1973. This breathing time enabled the triumphant Pathet Lao, a blanket designation for the communist-nationalist movement in Laos, to develop its government base in Vientiane, pending the arrival in the capital of the leadership.

Prince Souphanouvong (1911–1995), the popular titular leader of the Pathet Lao movement, assumed the largely ceremonial presidency in 1976 until stepping down ten years later. Real power, however, continued to remain with the first generation of Pathet Lao leaders. Notably, the staunchly pro-Vietnamese, pro-Soviet LPRP secretary-general and prime minister Kaysone Phomvihane, who also served as president from 1991 until his death in November 1992, wielded enormous power. The influential Nouhak Phoumsavanh, his deputy, also assumed the presidency in 1992 and stepped down in 1997 at the age of eighty-four. Another high-ranking party figure, Phoumi Vongvichit (d. 1994), served as acting president from 1986 to 1991. The current presi-



*Two propaganda posters of the Lao People's Democratic Republic displayed in Vientiane in 1990.
(Geoffrey C. Gunn)*

dent, replacing Nouhak, is Khamtay Siphandone, party chairman from 1996, former prime minister from 1991, and long-serving defense minister. The former RLG prime minister Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984) was appointed adviser to the government, as was the former king Sisavang Watthana (d. 1984?), whose disappearance has never been officially explained.

Institutions in the LPDR reflect the state structures of other socialist countries but equally share features with other modern states. The governing body in Laos is the Council of Government. From its inception, Kaysone headed the council. At the center of government stands the Supreme People's Assembly, comprising the office of the prime minister, twelve ministries, and three state committees. The most powerful ministry, besides interior, is defense. Although tiers of decision making exist, right down to the *muong* or district level, the Leninist principle of democratic centralism also applies. The first elections since the communist takeover were only held in 1989. As in other party states, overlapping membership in state organs is the norm, but in Laos, the dearth of cadres and the failure to promulgate a constitution until August 1991 effectively meant that the party dominated the state. As in other communist states, the employment of mass organizations to mobilize and to transmit instructions also holds in Laos. Aside from youth and women's organizations, the key mass organization in Laos is the Lao Front for National Reconstruction, a successor organization to the semiclandestine Lao Patriotic Front that spearheaded the revolution. But forged in the fires of thirty years of armed struggle, the Lao People's Army remains a special institution in Laos. Not only does army leadership overlap with party leadership but the army also continues to bear the brunt of defense against rebel incursions and ethnic insurgency, especially from the ethnic Hmong (many of whom have never accepted the LPDR) and from Laos's neighbor Thailand, in recurring armed conflict over boundary questions.

Notwithstanding the gradualist, ostensibly legalist, and relatively bloodless accretion of power, the new regime proceeded to remake society with breathtaking speed. Many middle-class and old regime elements fled the country before the consolidation of the revolution, but forced agricultural cooperativization programs,

suspended only in the early 1980s, drove some 35,000 people, or 10 percent of the population, across the border to Thailand (Stuart-Fox 1986: 52). Isolated from the market economies of Southeast Asia and desperately impoverished, the party state only conceded the principles of market incentives in 1979.

Rapprochement with Thailand and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) eventually translated into Laos's membership in ASEAN in July 1997. Promarket policies ushered in by Kaysone's new thinking on reforms, as determined by the fourth congress of the LPRP in November 1986, slowly translated into injections of foreign investment. In any case, with the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, Laos had little choice but to look westward. Even so, to the chagrin of the World Bank and Western donors, the party state has not conceded on issues of major economic reforms, much less democratization. One of the last remaining self-proclaimed communist regimes in the world, Laos remains an enigma—part Buddhist, part socialist, and part market capitalist.

GEOFFREY C. GUNN

See also Hmong; Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Pathet Lao (Land of Laos); Souphanouvong (Red Prince) (1911–1995); Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984)

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LAOS (NINETEENTH CENTURY TO MID-1990s)

In many senses, modern Laos is a European colonial construct. French intervention in the late nineteenth century revived the dominant

politico-royal center of Luang Prabang in northern Laos. It was again the French who were instrumental in incorporating the rest of the thinly populated country and its mixed Lao and ethnic minority populations into a colonial administrative setup with well-defined internal as well as external boundaries. Dating from 1893, French Laos was created out of a loose system of Buddhist kingdoms and principalities. Although France was also drawn into the military pacification of the especially rebellious minority peoples of Laos, the major challenge to colonial rule emerged in the context of the Japanese *coup de force* in Laos in March 1945. Following various political and military vicissitudes engaging the French and the nationalists, Laos gained its independence in 1953 as the Kingdom of Laos. However, the postwar constitutional construction of the kingdom also met the challenge from the procommunist Pathet Lao movement, setting the scene for a highly destructive thirty-year civil war. Laos's traditional status as a buffer state between Thailand to the west and Vietnam to the east came to be reinvented in the context of the Cold War as Laos emerged as a key domino in the Western defense of the free world from communism. Since 1975, Laos has been ruled as a communist people's republic, the Laos People's Democratic Republic (LPDR).

French Colonialism

The arrival in the late nineteenth century of French explorers and empire builders in the Upper Mekong coincided with the high tide of Thai expansionism over the east bank of the Mekong. The prevailing situation placed the ancient capital of Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, along with Vientiane and Champasak in the south, as virtual vassal states. In this venture, France "rescued" the kingdom of Luang Prabang from absorption by, respectively, Thai and Vietnamese encroachments; set down the boundaries of modern Laos; and unified the princelings. With its administrative capital seated in the ancient capital of Vientiane, France also linked Laos to French Indochina in a federal administrative setup ruled by a governor-general in Hanoi.

It can be argued that, insofar as the French protectorate over Luang Prabang respected Lao tradition and bolstered the monarchy, colonial

rule rested lightly upon Laos. And to be sure, Laos was never developed or exploited on the scale of Vietnam. Nevertheless, France expected its colonies to pay for themselves. Colonialism demanded roads, or routes of exploitation for the extraction of forest products and minerals, but to build those roads, France favored *corvée* labor. France also imposed a head tax upon the peoples of Laos, to be paid in cash. *Corvée* and the head tax were bitterly resisted by the minority peoples of Laos, and rebellion flared in the face of armed pacification campaigns mounted by the French and their Vietnamese auxiliaries until the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945). Colonialism also changed the demography of the towns and mining centers of Laos by importing Vietnamese civil servants to staff the administration and Vietnamese manual workers to labor in the tin mines of southern Laos. Lines of communication and economic flows further served to link Laos with Indochina, as opposed to its "natural" or historical hinterland across the Mekong River in Thailand (Siam). Little educational advance was achieved in Laos under French rule, with the exception of certain members of the aristocracy. Alongside Vietnam and even Cambodia, Laos remained a backwater within French Indochina, albeit a useful exporter of tin and, thanks to ethnic Hmong peasant-farmer enterprise, a handy supplier of opium for the French monopoly.

But a challenge to French rule also emerged from student circles in prewar Vientiane, a precursor to the foundation of the Lao Issara nationalist movement. In turn, the Lao Issara founded a government in Vientiane in the period following the surrender of the Japanese (August 1945), until its members were forced into exile in Thailand by the returning French. A more subversive opposition, however, arose from underground members of Hồ Chí Minh's Indochina Communist Party, who made common cause with Vietnamese residents in Laos. Famously, in Lao political history the schism of aristocratic elite reflected the postwar scenario. Two of the sons of Viceroy Boun Kong (t. 1887–1920) lined up behind the Lao Issara-in-exile (Prince Phetsarath [1890–1959] and Prince Souvanna Phouma [1901–1984]), and the other, Prince Souphanouvong (1911–1995), sided with the procommunist, pro-Vietnamese Pathet Lao.

Kingdom of Laos

The following three decades in Laos witnessed a complex diplomatic and military play between the Royal Lao Government (RLG), or the “Vientiane side,” headed by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, and the Pathet Lao side, nominally headed by the Red Prince Souphanouvong. Although the two sides were joined in three coalition governments, the breakdown of the first two Governments of National Union (November 1957–July 1959 and November 1962–September 1963) was accompanied by spiraling violence surrounding outside interventions. On the one hand, the United States replaced France as the dominant military and economic prop of the Vientiane side, whereas Vietnam and the Soviet Union provided major support to the Pathet Lao. China also exercised political and military leverage in the two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. Unknown to the U.S. Congress, Washington supported a “secret war” in Laos by backing Hmong insurgents under the Hmong general Vang Pao, albeit bloodily contested by the Vietnamese-backed Pathet Lao forces. Devastating U.S. air power over the southern Laos panhandle also combined to generate large numbers of internal refugees. Laos lived up to its name as a Cold War buffer state. Sadly, little development occurred under the RLG. Notoriously taking advantage of the windfall aid economy, Vientiane-side warlord generals enriched themselves and their close followers. North-south rivalry also weakened the unity of the RLG, especially between the royal court in Luang Prabang and Prince Boun Oum of Champassak.

Socialist State

Unlike the bloody revolutionary takeovers in Saigon and Phnom Penh in April 1975, the Pathet Lao triumph in December 1975 was gradualist, ostensibly legal, and relatively bloodless. This was, in large part, due to the participation of the Pathet Lao alongside the RLG in the Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU), sworn in on 5 April 1974 following the signing of a cease-fire agreement on 21 February 1973. By December 1975, from a position of political and military strength, the Pathet Lao declared the end to the PGNU and

announced the creation of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR).

Despite the gradualism of the communist takeover in Laos, the regime moved with great haste to make over the country in the image of Lao socialism, borrowing heavily from Vietnamese, Soviet, and Eastern European experiences. Notably, in December 1975, the monarchy was abrogated, cutting the traditional nexus linking the kingship, the Buddhist religion, and the sangha, or religious community. Just as the LPDR assumed full political control, most old regime figures and their families fled the country. Those who remained endured months or years of “reeducation,” or socialization into Lao socialist thinking, often under harsh conditions. Anticolonial, anti-imperialist, and anti-Thai “reactionary” themes were emphasized as communist Laos emerged as a hard-line, pro-Hanoi, pro-Moscow regime. With the Red Prince Souphanouvong appointed to the presidency, real power lay with the party chief and prime minister, Kaysone Phomvihane (1920–1992), with his deputy Nouhak Phoumsavanh, and with other veterans of the thirty-year struggle. At the center of government under the new party state was the Supreme People’s Council and, above that, the State Council. Facing down a low-level insurgency, especially from armed Hmong, and frequently at war with Thailand over a contested boundary, the new regime tolerated no opposition. The first elections conducted after the communist takeover were only held in 1989, and a constitution was only promulgated in August 1991.

Economically, the regime pushed through with broad socialization of the economy, including an attempt to cooperativize agriculture. Laos experienced a major diminution of economic activity as markets dried up, and in addition, the coercive aspects of the program pushed tens of thousands of peasant farmers to join their countrymen and countrywomen in refugee camps across the Mekong in Thailand. Only in late 1979 was the principle of market incentives conceded, a decision echoing Vietnam’s own economic reform program. Nevertheless, it would take a change in the international situation before Laos reaped the benefits of foreign investments. Desperately dependent on aid, Laos forged close internationalist links with Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and the Eastern European countries. It also suspended rela-

tions with China over that country's support for the Khmer Rouge. Laos's isolation from the market economies of Southeast Asia only ended with the resumption of commercial ties with Thailand following the internationally imposed solution to the Cambodia problem from 1991 to 1993. Further, the collapse of the Soviet Union left Laos little choice but to reach out to the West, while once again resuming political and commercial links with China. Rapprochement with Thailand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) eventually translated into Laos's membership within the major regional organization in July 1997. Although the country's new embrace of foreign investment and market capitalism heralds a postsocialist economic future, the party state remains firmly entrenched, with no space granted for political opposition.

Even alongside the experience of many other Asian polities drawn into European world empires, Laos has seen its share of the vicissitudes of war and revolution. But the former French colony and Buddhist kingdom stands out in the way that its elite responded to the drives of anticolonial nationalism. One faction, the Royalists, sought accommodation with the West, whereas the other was attracted to anticolonial Marxism. The anticolonial nationalist variant eventually triumphed around the broad appeal of "patriotism" as opposed to class struggle; further, it sought, through the actions of its political commissars, to radically remake the Lao Theravada Buddhist society in a socialist mold.

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See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Buddhism, Theravada; Champassak; Cold War; Domino Theory; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; French Indochina; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Hmong; Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Jungle/Forest Products; Khmer Rouge; Lao Issara (Issarak); Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR); Laotization; Luang Prabang; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Pathet Lao (Land of the Lao);

Phetsarath (1890–1959); Souphanouvong (Red Prince) (1911–1995); Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (Post-1945); Vientiane

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LAOTINIZATION

Lending its name to the country, the dominant Lao-speaking population of Laos (glossed in Laos today as *Lao Loum*, or Lao of the lowlands) shares space with a mosaic of ethnic minority groups. Historically, the southward-migrating Lao who established Buddhist principalities in the *muong* (bounded districts) of the Mekong River valley have either absorbed, assimilated, or marginalized the indigenous Austroasiatic and Mon Khmer population, glossed as *Lao Theung* (midland Lao), or Lao of the lower mountain slopes, or Montagnards. Later-arriving minorities such as the Hmong and Yao, glossed as *Lao Soung* (Lao Sung or upland Lao), or Lao of the mountain slopes, have been far less receptive to assimilation into Theravada Buddhist culture and continue to strike for autonomy. Yet this tripartite partitioning of the ethnic minorities in communist Laos in the post-1975 period reflects the active construction by the state in building a Laos national identity. To understand the active process of Laotization by the modern state in Laos, we should look to some history.

Modern Laos, defined by frontiers set down by French colonialism, shares boundaries with five countries. Nevertheless, it is the Mekong River valley and the Mekong's tributaries that have served as the cradle of Lao civilization. This was acknowledged by French empire builders who rescued the kingdom of Luang Prabang from Thai overlordship and Vietnamese encroachments. With the sacking of the kingdom of Vientiane by Thailand in 1805, the Lao of the Issan, or northeast provinces, of Thailand were separated from their kin in the east. This

situation left the demographic balance between Lao and non-Lao inside Laos more equal. Nevertheless, the Lao kingdoms and, in turn, the French colonizers designated—and indeed treated—the Montagnard population as *Kha*, or slaves. Indeed, the slave status of the non-Buddhist animist Kha was ceremonially acknowledged in the kingdom of Luang Prabang, to which the Kha were obliged to pay ritual tribute. The rebellious actions of the Kha against the encroachments of the modernizing colonial state, along with crushing tax and corvée obligations, confirmed their marginal status. The sinicized Hmong migrants, no less refractory in their engagement with the Lao kingdoms, nevertheless won their place in the colonial economy as producers of opium.

In their bid to set down the armature of a modern colonial administration, the French actively recruited Vietnamese to staff the civil service. Although representing just 2 percent of the population of Laos, their presence in administrative positions far outstripped their demographic strength; for example, 70 percent of clerks and secretaries employed in the federal administrative services in Laos were Vietnamese (Gunn 1990: 35). According to an official reckoning, the figure for the military was 90 percent, and it was even 30 percent for primary schoolteachers. Although the leading Lao administrator in French Laos, Prince Phetsarath (1890–1959), sought to Laotianize the administrative system in Laos in tune with popular sentiment, the situation would not be reversed until the postwar period.

In the post-1945 period, all the major actors in the Kingdom of Laos, including cabinet members of three coalition governments, were Lao. The Royal Lao Government (RLG) confirmed the hegemony of the Lao Buddhist monarchy. In reality, isolated ethnic communities, from the Lu in the north to the T'ai on the Vietnamese border to the southern Montagnards, lived outside the reach of the modern state.

A major theme running through communist Pathet Lao (meaning “Lao nation”) propaganda during the thirty-year civil war was the rallying of the ethnic minorities to the side of the revolution. This was true of sections of the T'ai and the southern Montagnards, but the Hmong were split. Thousands of Hmong were sacrificed as cannon fodder for the RLG, yet minority, including Hmong, representation in the

Vientiane-side government was never more than token. The exceptions were Touby Lyfong (1919–1978) and Vang Pao (1931–).

Although some ethnic minority leaders—the Hmong leader Faydang (d. 1986) and the Montagnard leader Sithone Kommandan (1908–1977)—achieved prestigious positions within the Pathet Lao movement, the leadership remained ethnic Lao. The personage of Prince Souphanouvong (1911–1995) linked the national movement with Lao history and tradition. The Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) never saw to the creation of minority zones, as experimented with by socialist China and Vietnam, but confirmed the hegemony of Lao culture, Lao language, and Lao state while extending the category of Lao citizenship to all, including the minorities.

So, in the official version, Lao Loum (including T'ai, Lu, and lowland Lao) comprise 56 percent of the population, whereas Lao Theung comprise 34 percent and Lao Soung, 9 percent. The balance is made up of Vietnamese, Chinese, Indians, and others. But though some sixty-five different ethnic groups are acknowledged by the regime—different ethnologists offer different counts—it is clear that the official policy is to homogenize and to blur rather than to celebrate the differences. Even the origins of the Lao as supposed migrants from the north have been challenged in official historiography to give them historically equal status with the “indigenous” Montagnards.

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See also Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; French Indochina; Hmong; Isan; Khmers; Lao; Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR); Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Luang Prabang; Mons; Montagnard; Pathet Lao (Land of Laos); Phetsarath (1890–1959); Souphanouvong (Red Prince) (1911–1995); T'ais; Vientiane

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LARUT WARS (1872–1874)

Larut was a district in the northwest of Perak, a western Peninsular Malay State, and was rich in tin. During the late 1840s the chief, Long Jaafar (d. 1857), had farmed out the mining and felling of timber to other Malay chiefs and some Chinese. It was normal practice for the main leases to be subleased to others. Eventually, various parties would compete with one another for the leases. Since this district was rich, it became a site of contention among several important chiefs, including the sultan who did not observe the right of the Larut chief to collect revenues there. Various interested Malay chiefs then asked the British in Penang to intervene.

Groups of Chinese miners and loggers who were given leases in Larut belonged to secret societies, two of the most important ones being the Hai San and the Ghee Hin. These societies had their stronghold in Penang. They, too, were in rivalry with one another. In the 1860s, they clashed, and when one member was killed, many others fled to the island seeking help from the British. The situation worsened when clashes spread to nearby areas, prompting some Malay chiefs to take sides. Disgruntled chiefs then approached certain British traders with the request that they interfere. This caused consternation for the reigning Sultan Ali (r. 1865–1871), who was also a participant of the feuds. In 1871, when Sultan Ali died, the situation was further clouded because his passing had created conflicts among the chiefs over the accession.

Meanwhile, in the early 1870s, Ngah Ibrahim, the son of Long Jaafar, was in control of Larut. He was a shrewd chief who had been favored by the deceased sultan and was friendly with one of the Chinese secret societies. He had increased the levy on tin that caused others to complain to the British. Ngah Ibrahim also faced rivalry from Raja Abdullah, who was a contender in the accession to the throne. Raja Abdullah had requested help from a British trader from Penang to acquire some revenue from Larut. He had also campaigned for other Malay chiefs to support him in his quest for the throne.

In 1872, clashes broke out among the secret societies in Larut. The apparent cause of the trouble was a woman, but in actual fact, the parties were determined to oust one another for commercial control. In these conflicts,

Ngah Ibrahim and Raja Abdullah, who were directly or indirectly involved, took sides and were supported by secret societies, Malay chiefs, or British traders. Attacks were launched from Penang, at times intermittently on a daily basis. These had caused a good deal of losses, especially in the production and export of tin, of which Penang had become a port of export. The “troubles,” referred to as the Larut Wars, dragged on until 1874 when Raja Abdullah managed to influence Andrew Clarke, the British governor of the Straits Settlements in Singapore, to intervene. This led to the signing of the Pangkor Engagement, which endorsed the installation of Raja Abdullah as the sultan of Perak and marked the beginning of British intervention in the Malay States. The Pangkor Engagement concluded the Larut Wars.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also British Interests in Southeast Asia; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Clarke, Sir Andrew (1824–1902); *Hui*; Imperialism; Kinta Valley; Pangkor Engagement (1874); Penang (1786); Residential System (Malaya); Singapore (1819); Tin; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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LAUREL, JOSÉ PACIANO (1891–1959)**Filipino Nationalist**

José Paciano Laurel was the president of the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic (1943–1945). As president, he attempted to make Philippine independence real, despite the presence of Japanese military occupation forces in the midst of the Pacific War (1941–1945). He pushed for a stronger national character while attempting to solve serious shortages of food and other basic commodities; at the same time, he also tried to balance Japanese pressures and Filipino needs. Aside from being president, Lau-

rel had a distinguished career before and after the Pacific War, serving in important positions in all branches of government.

Laurel was born in the town of Tanauan, Batangas, on 9 March 1891. His father, Sotero Laurel, had served as a member of the legislature established during the revolution against Spain. Laurel studied at the University of Santo Tomas and the University of the Philippines in Manila. He obtained a doctor of civil laws degree from Yale University, where he studied as a government scholar. He also obtained a doctorate from the University of Santo Tomas in 1936, and two years later, he was awarded the honorary degree of doctor of laws, *honoris causa*, by the Tokyo Imperial University.

He became secretary of the interior in February 1923 but resigned in protest five months later after a conflict over the controversial reinstatement by the U.S. colonial governor-general, Leonard Wood (t. 1921–1927), of an American who was under investigation. Laurel's resignation triggered a crisis in government, as other Filipino cabinet secretaries resigned to protest Wood's move. Laurel then served as a senator from 1925 to 1931. He was elected to the Constitutional Convention of 1934 and took a leading part in framing the Philippine Constitution.

From 1936 to 1941, Laurel served as associate justice of the Supreme Court, where he wrote the classic definition of social justice, then a major platform of the Philippine Commonwealth administration of Manuel L. Quezon (t. 1935–1944). With the outbreak of war in December 1941, Laurel was appointed secretary of justice and chief justice of the Supreme Court. He was ordered to remain in Manila as Quezon evacuated the seat of government from Manila.

When the Japanese occupied Manila, Laurel was appointed commissioner of justice in the Japanese-formed Philippine Executive Commission. In December 1942, he became commissioner of the interior. He was shot but not killed by anti-Japanese guerrillas in June 1943. On 19 June 1943, Laurel was appointed a member of the Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence (PCPI) and then became its president. He led the PCPI in framing a wartime constitution in preparation for the independence promised by Japan, a document that established a republican state with a strong executive.

Laurel was elected president of the Philippine Republic and took his oath on 14 October 1943. His was a controversial position; many Filipinos regarded him as a puppet president. Japanese forces continued to stay on Philippine soil, and many Japanese officers treated his administration with contempt. Moreover, Japanese citizens were given the same rights as Filipinos in exploiting natural resources, and Laurel was unable to stop Japanese depredations on the people. Due to Laurel's limited powers and resources, his main focus was to make independence a reality and to try to gain as much power from the Japanese as possible, while also attempting to win the support of Filipinos. Immediate concerns included providing food and combating inflation; longer-term goals were to develop a stronger Philippine culture and identity and to achieve economic self-sufficiency. Trying to balance Japanese demands with Filipino needs, he staved off Japanese calls for a declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain but eventually bowed to Japanese pressure by declaring a state of war, without conscription. Because of his strong nationalistic stand, young Japanese officers plotted to remove him from office and overthrow his wartime government but were not successful.

Laurel was forced by the Japanese to evacuate Manila for the northern Luzon city of Baguio in December 1944. In March 1945, he was taken to Tokyo. With the surrender of Japan, Laurel formally dissolved his administration on 17 August 1945.

He was arrested by the Americans and charged with treason by the returning Philippine Commonwealth government. But on 28 January 1948, President Manuel A. Roxas (t. 1946–1948) granted amnesty to Laurel and others charged with collaborating politically with the Japanese. Laurel ran for president in 1949 but lost in a hotly contested election. In 1951, he won a race for a Senate seat and served for two terms. As a senator, he advocated nationalism in economic and political policies. In 1954, Laurel headed an economic mission to revise economic relations with the United States and strengthen the Philippine economy. Seeing the need for higher education in the Philippines, he founded the Lyceum of the Philippines in 1952. He also established the Philippine Banking Corporation. Laurel died of

a cerebral hemorrhage on 6 November 1959 in Manila. His position as president of the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic is controversial, but his strong nationalist stand before, during, and after the Pacific War was consistent and farsighted.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Collaboration Issue in Southeast Asia; Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1898–1946); Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944)

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LE DUAN (1907–1986)

Striving for One Vietnam

The life story of Le Duan, who for twenty-seven years was the leader of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), merged with the struggle of the party against the Saigon regime and the United States until the reunification of Vietnam after the 1975 victory in the Vietnam War (1964–1975).

Le Duan was born in 1907 in the province of Quang Tri (Central), but little is known about his family and his youth. He arrived in Hanoi in the 1920s and became an early member of the Indochina Communist Party (ICP), which was formed in 1930. However, his activities were severely restricted: arrested in 1931, he spent five years imprisoned at Poulo Condore before being granted amnesty from the French Front Populaire government in 1936. He was a member of the Central Committee of the ICP in 1939 and was arrested anew a year later after attempting an uprising in the South,

and he remained in prison until the August 1945 Revolution.

During the First Indochina War (1946–1954), he was the secretary of the party's Regional Committee and, therefore, the principal leader of the resistance in the South: at first in Nam Bo (Cochin China) in 1946 and then also in South Trung Bo (South Annam) in 1951. The situation became complicated because the Viet Minh soon had only a few "liberated zones" under its control there. Replaced by his deputy, Le Duc Tho (1911–), he was recalled to the North around 1953, where, after the Geneva Agreement of 1954, he reorganized combatants from the South and Central Vietnam who had regrouped there.

From 1956 to 1959, he gained access to the leadership of the communist Labour Party. A member of the secretariat of the Central Committee in 1956 and of the Political Bureau in 1957, he was Hồ Chí Minh's (1890–1969) deputy when the latter personally took over the secretariat after Truong Chinh's (1907–1988) resignation after the excesses of the 1956 Agrarian Reform. He accompanied "Uncle Ho" to the International Communist Party conferences in Moscow in 1957 and 1960, during the rupture between China and the Soviet Union. He remained the man of the South, where he traveled clandestinely around 1956 and at the end of 1958: consequently, he played an important role in shaping the new strategy defined by the January 1959 plenum, which relaunched the armed struggle. In 1959, Hồ Chí Minh named him first secretary, and the Third Congress confirmed his appointment in 1960.

In a divided Vietnam, Le Duan simultaneously followed the socialist transformation of North Vietnam and the armed struggle in the South, where a separate secretariat was installed. Moreover, at the time of the U.S. intervention in 1965, he also had to oversee the complex relationship of the Vietnamese Worker's Party with its Chinese and Soviet counterparts. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) received aid from both parties, but a discreet shift in favor of Moscow had taken place: the negotiations carried out by Le Duan in Hanoi in 1971 with the Soviet delegation led by Nikolay Podgorny were crucial in this case. He did not participate directly in the negotiations in Paris. A year after concluding the Paris agreement (1973), he sup-

ported the secret decision to launch a new military offensive against the Saigon regime in 1975. This offensive, expected to last two years, brought victory for Hanoi in less than two months.

Thus, after having directed the victorious strategy since 1959, Le Duan, who was himself *de facto* “number one” after the death of Hồ Chí Minh in 1969, seemed to favor rapid reunification. In 1976, he continued as secretary-general of the Vietnamese Party, which had again adopted the term *Communist* (at the Fourth Congress). After 1975, he had gone to Beijing (Peking) and Moscow to thank those governments for their aid, but his visits betrayed a visible rapprochement with Moscow. This became apparent in 1977 with the entry of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), a Moscow-dominated organization presenting a communist equivalent of Western Europe’s Common Market, and by the signature of a friendship and cooperation treaty between the SRV and the Soviet Union. Tensions then escalated with Beijing, against the background of the conflict with Pol Pot’s Cambodia; the latter was supported by China and was defeated by Vietnam in January 1979. In the same year, the brief Sino-Vietnamese War that erupted in February and March consecrated the rupture. Thus, it was a Vietnam entirely supportive of the Soviet Union that Le Duan led during the last years of his life. He died in 1986, just before the opening up of Vietnam.

Though he was relatively unknown internationally, Le Duan both personified and directed communist Vietnam in its struggle for reunification. While doing so, he could not prevent the domination of the Soviet Union in terms of political, moral, and material support to Vietnam, hence designating the so-called Soviet era. With the opening of the country since the late 1980s, dictates from Moscow would appear to present a hindrance to Vietnam’s development.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Cold War; Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Kampuchean United Front for National

Salvation (KUFNS); Le Duc Tho (1911–); Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963); Paris Peace Agreement (1968, 1973) (Vietnam); Sino-Soviet Struggle; Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Sino-Vietnamese Wars; Truong Chinh (1907–1988); Viet Cong; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (League for the Independence of Vietnam); Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945); Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, Dang Cong San Viet Nam)

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LE DUC THO (1911–)

Hard-Liner of Vietnamese Communism

Long a discreet figure but of primary importance for the Vietnamese communist movement, Le Duc Tho is known, above all, for having led the secret and decisive talks with Henry Kissinger (1923–) in Paris on the fringe of the Peace Conference that would result in the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement.

He was born in October 1911 in the province of Nam Ha (North) into the family of a civil servant; a number of the children in this family would become important figures in the country’s revolutionary movement (including Mai Chi Tho, interior minister in reunified Vietnam). Little is known about Le Duc Tho’s youth, other than that he joined the Indochina Communist Party when it was founded in mid-1929. Following that, he spent several years in prison, except during the years from 1936 to 1939 when the Front Populaire government in power in Paris decreed an amnesty for the Vietnamese communists (and even authorized their activities). Even before the August 1945 Revo-

lution, he joined the Viet Minh resistance movement in the Hanoi region, rather than in the remote area where Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969) or Võ Nguyễn Giáp (1911–) were to be found. Thereafter, he gained a reputation for being one of the hard-liners of Vietnamese communism.

During the First Indochina War (1946–1954), as well as during the Vietnam War (1964–1975), Le Duc Tho was in the upper echelons of the communist organization. At the end of the 1940s, he was sent to the South as deputy to Le Duan (1907–1986), secretary of the Regional Committee of the party. Even though they both endured the difficult conditions of the anti-French resistance, these two men did not always agree about tactics. Le Duc Tho succeeded Le Duan around 1953 and continued as secretary at least until 1954. After the Third Congress of the party in 1960 (and probably even before it), he was a member of the Political Bureau and of the secretariat of the Central Committee, responsible for the Department of Party Organization. Strengthened by this competence, he would take de facto leadership of the peace negotiations with the United States ten years later.

In the Paris negotiations (1968–1973), Le Duc Tho entered the scene in February 1970 when he secretly met with White House security adviser Henry Kissinger. Thus, a series of negotiations began in a suburban villa near Paris. (The talks continued for nearly two years before their existence would be revealed by President Richard Nixon [t. 1969–1974] in January 1972.) Between suspending and resuming the talks, it took almost a year for the points of view of those negotiating to converge. The preliminary talks had appeared inauspicious: Le Duc Tho, the “special adviser” of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) delegation, contested the legitimacy of President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu (1923–2001) in Saigon, whereas Kissinger, Richard Nixon’s adviser, insisted upon the retreat of the Hanoi troops from the South as the condition for the departure of the Americans. The end of the negotiations would be full of unexpected developments. Thiệu refused to sign the 8 October 1972 agreement as tensions were mounting anew, and the U.S. Air Force would launch a further bombardment campaign on Hanoi in December. However, in January 1973, Le Duc

Tho returned to Paris to sign the agreement. The 1973 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded jointly to Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho; the latter would refuse it because of continuing hostilities.

In 1975, while the ultimate revolutionary offensive was building up in the South under the leadership of General Van Tien Dung (1917–), commander-in-chief of the People’s Army, Le Duc Tho would secretly join the front. In April 1975, from the general headquarters of the “Hồ Chí Minh campaign” situated north of Saigon, it was he who would supervise the operation to “liberate” the southern capital.

After 1975, in reunified Vietnam, the department of which he was in charge had to both reunify the party, once again termed *communist* in 1976 (at the Fourth Congress), hence Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), and supervise the difficult relationship with the Cambodian and Chinese parties. Late in 1978, Le Duc Tho would once more oversee military operations, this time those that overthrew the Pol Pot regime (1975–1979), substituting a replacement regime under Vietnamese control. Still ensconced in powerful functions in 1982 (at the Fifth Congress) but faithful to a hard-line position and unfavorable toward reforms, he had to give up his position in 1986 (at the Sixth Congress) but still preserved some influence until his death in October 1990.

In his own way, Le Duc Tho was one of the Vietnamese leaders who most clearly symbolized the liberation struggles led by their movement. In turn, whether on the military front, in the spotlight of diplomatic negotiations, or in carrying out their duties, these men shaped the Vietnam of our day.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Indochina Communist Party (1930); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Paris Peace Agreement (1968, 1973) (Vietnam); Việt Công; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (League for the Independence of Vietnam); Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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LE DYNASTY (1428–1527, 1533–1789)

The Le Dynasty was one of the long-term dynasties of premodern Vietnam. It is usually divided into two terms—1428 to 1527 and 1533 to 1789—and is also called the Hau Le (latter Le) dynasty to distinguish it from the Ly dynasty of the tenth century.

The first emperor, Le Loi (whose temple name was Thai To, r. 1428–1432), was the chief of Lam Son village in Thanh Hoa Province. After ten years of struggle against the Chinese Ming forces, he came to the throne and fixed the capital at Thang Long (present-day Ha Noi or Hanoi). He and his counselor Nguyễn Trai tried to establish a civilian-controlled state like Ming China. But generals from Thanh Hoa took power in the court, denying the authority of the Le emperor. Furthermore, Emperors Thai Tong (r. 1433–1442), Nhan Tong (r. 1442–1459), and Le Nghi Dan (r. 1459–1460) met untimely deaths. Under the reign of the fifth emperor, Thanh Tong (r. 1460–1497), state control became apparent. His successor, Hien Tong (r. 1497–1504), continued his policies. But subsequently, civil control was lost, and military commanders held to their own sphere of influence. Meanwhile, rural peasant rebellions were endemic.

Against this backdrop, General Mac Dang Dung seized power and established a new dynasty—the Mac dynasty—in 1527. But other generals, such as Nguyễn Kim and Trinh Kiem, refused to submit. Instead, they found the prince of Le, Trang Tong (r. 1533–1548), a symbol to resist the Mac. After the death of Emperor Trung Tong (r. 1548–1556), the direct line of Thai To ceased to exist; the descendant of Le Tru, the eldest brother of Thai To, ascended the throne as Anh Tong (r. 1556–1573). Political power, however, was in the hands of the Trinh king, and the emperors of the Le were politically impotent.

In 1597, the Mac family was defeated and retreated to the mountainous area of northern Vietnam. The emperor of Le returned to Thang Long; from 1647, Le emperors in the latter period were given the title "King of Annam."

Meanwhile, in the southern part of the Indochina peninsula, the Nguyễn expanded their territory and refused to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Le emperor. From 1627 to 1672, the Trinh–Nguyễn civil war continued without any apparent victor.

After the cessation of hostilities, the histories of North and South Vietnam developed separately. In the North, the reclamation of new land reached the northern limit of expansion without encroaching on the lands of the Chinese empire. The rule of feudal lords from manors (*Dien Trang* in Sino-Vietnamese) acting as the administrative arm of the government declined, and peasantry management became popular. The latter refers to the self-rule of peasants, where village councils comprising elders and members of the community undertake to administer the common people. Based on this type of management, an autonomous village society appeared during this period.

In contrast, in the South, the Nguyễn expanded their territory to the Mekong Delta and the Central Highland. Land was vast and population was small; consequently, village society became more open. But because the expansion was so rapid, contradictions between social classes, areas of old land and new reclaimed land, and ethnic groups became severe. In 1771, the Tay Son Rebellion broke out. The Trinh took advantage of the opportunity and destroyed Nguyễn power in Huế. Shortly thereafter, Tay Son forces defeated Trinh. The last emperor of the Le, Chieu Thong (r. 1786–1789), sought the help of the Manchu Qing to fight the Tay Son. Despite their smaller numbers, the Tay Son defeated the Qing army. At last, Chieu Thong escaped to China; the Le dynasty ended in 1789.

It has been estimated that the first term of the Le period (1428–1527) was the golden age of peace and unity. But the latter term (1533–1789) has generally been underestimated. Recently, this latter period has been recognized as the initiation of the early modern era that prepared the new oligarchic kingdoms in mainland Southeast Asia. During this period, the two countries of Vietnam focused

on international commerce, together with internal trade and commercial growth. Port cities such as Pho Hien (Hung Yen Province) in the North and Hoi An (Quang Nam Province) in central Vietnam were prosperous, catering to foreign traders including the Chinese, Japanese, Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese. It was this economic accumulation and the trading network that contributed to the foundation of the Nguyễn dynasty after the disturbance from the end of the eighteenth century to the early years of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, Vietnam sources in those days mentioned little about the activity of international commerce, but foreign sources and archaeological findings point to the importance of this later Le period.

YAO TAKAO

See also Age of Commerce; China, Imperial; Chinese Tribute System; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Hanoi (Thang-long); Huế; Le Thanh Tong (r. 1460–1497); Mac Dynasty (1527–1592); Mac Tien Tu (1700–1780); Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Trinh Family (1539–1786)

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LE THANH TONG (r. 1460–1497)
Vietnamese Imperialist

Le Thanh Tong (Le Tu Thanh or Le Hao) was the fifth emperor of the Le dynasty (1428–1527) of Vietnam. He ascended the throne after the coup d'état against the usurper Le Nghi Dan (r. 1459–1460) by some military officers. He succeeded in furthering a series of policies initiated by his predecessors and in doing so launched the golden age in the premodern history of Vietnam.

In internal affairs, reforms in government administration in accordance with the Ming model were implemented in an exemplary manner by 1471. Reforms included the establishment of six ministerial offices, six offices of security, five chief military commissions, a competitive civil service examination, the adoption of neo-Confucianist doctrines, the enactment of the Le Code (*Hong Duc luat le* in Sino-Vietnamese), and a land registration and redistribution system. Although military officers still maintained power in the court, the emperor endeavored to establish the oligarchy by using both military and civil officers.

In foreign affairs, Le Thanh Tong adopted aggressive attitudes toward the southern and western neighboring countries. In 1470, he occupied the capital of Champa, and nine years later, he launched an expedition to Lan Xang kingdom. In the northern area, he imposed his will over the boundary dispute with Ming China to the extent that Chinese records referred to him as a "greedy and arrogant king."

Le Thanh Tong was also a poet, and he organized a cultural circle in the court, named *Tào dan*. His poems and other kinds of literary articles were recorded in his voluminous collection, *Thien Nam Du Ha Tap*. (Only 10 of the 200 volumes of this work are preserved in Hanoi.)

Although regarded as an expansionist even in Vietnam, Le Thanh Tong is held in high esteem. Indeed, he is considered to be one of the greatest heroes in the history of Vietnam.

YAO TAKAO

See also Champa; Confucianism; Le Dynasty (1418–1527; 1533–1789); Mac Dynasty (1527–1677); Ming Dynasty (1368–1644)

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LEE KUAN YEW (1923–)

Architect of Modern Singapore

Lee Kuan Yew was the first prime minister of Singapore and held that office from June 1959 to November 1990, when he relinquished it voluntarily to Goh Chok Tong (1941–). Under his leadership, Singapore was transformed into one of the most stable, safe, modern, and economically prosperous countries in Asia and a renowned international and regional shipping, aviation, and financial hub. Well respected in Singapore, Lee has also enjoyed a reputation as a statesman of international standing whose views, perspectives, and analyses were often sought.

Born in Singapore on 16 September 1923, Lee received his secondary education at the Raffles Institution from 1936 to 1939. As the top-scoring student in Singapore and Malaya, he was offered a scholarship to study at Raffles College but found his studies interrupted by the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945) and the occupation of Singapore by Japanese Imperial forces. During the war, he worked as a clerk and later as a cable editor in a Japanese propaganda agency. Lee subsequently attributed his political awakening to the occupation years. In September 1946, he proceeded to Britain to study law at the London School of Economics but transferred to Fitzwilliam House, Cambridge University, in January 1947 and graduated with special distinction (a “double first”) in 1949. To qualify as a barrister, Lee joined the Middle Temple in London, where he also became involved in the Malayan Forum, a discus-



Lee Kuan Yew, the premier of Singapore, 1968. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

sion group comprising students from Malaya and Singapore whose objective was to awaken political consciousness and to press for an independent Malaya, inclusive of Singapore. In England, Lee was also attracted to Fabian socialist ideals and campaigned for a Labour Party candidate. Returning to Singapore in August 1950, he joined the law firm Laycock & Ong and campaigned for his boss, John Laycock, a Singapore Progressive Party leader, in the 1951 elections. He became increasingly involved in Labour and left-wing causes when he took on a number of high-profile cases. His growing interest in politics led him to be one of the founding members of the People’s Action Party (PAP) in November 1954. As secretary-general of the party, he contested and won a parliamentary seat in the 1955 elections, as one of the three PAP candidates, and became de facto op-

position leader in the Legislative Assembly. For the next few years, Lee used his public forum in the assembly to establish the PAP as a left-wing and anticolonial party, committed to non-violent constitutional struggle, and he employed his considerable political skills to fend off efforts by the procommunist faction to control the PAP. In May 1959, his party swept the polls, winning forty-three of the fifty-one seats, and Lee became prime minister of a self-governing Singapore.

His efforts to persuade the Malayan premier and leader of the Alliance Party, Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903–1990), to include Singapore in a wider political merger—Malaysia, incorporating the British Borneo territories—bore fruit in 1961. However, this move precipitated a split within the PAP, with the procommunist faction moving into the opposition as the Socialist Front (Barisan Sosialis). Five days after the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963, Lee led his party to another electoral victory in Singapore. He was one of fifteen members of Parliament (MPs) from Singapore to be subsequently appointed to the Malaysian Parliament. But Singapore remained in Malaysia for only twenty-three months, during which time relations between the two sides, marked by political competition and acerbic public exchanges between their leaders and the outbreak of race riots in Singapore, deteriorated over political and economic differences that touched on Singapore's position and role in Malaysia. The resulting political competition and racial tension led Tunku to decide that only by Singapore's separation, which took place in August 1965, could the potentially explosive situation be contained. At his press conference announcing the separation, Lee broke down and wept emotionally at the shattering of his goal of unifying the two territories.

The sense of crisis in the aftermath of separation had galvanized support behind his party and pragmatic programs. Lee led the PAP to six more electoral victories—with the party winning all the seats in the first four—before stepping down as prime minister in November 1990 in favor of Goh Chok Tong. However, he remained influential as senior minister in the cabinet. Lee relinquished his post as secretary-general of the PAP to Goh in 1992. Lee's tenure as prime minister saw the spectacular transformation of Singapore into a modern

city-state, for which he has often been credited as its main architect.

Since resigning as prime minister, Lee has found time to research, reflect, and write his memoirs. The publication of the first volume of his memoirs in 1998, which recounted his perspective on Singapore's failed Malaysian venture, fueled controversy, especially in Peninsular Malaysia.

ALBERT LAU

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Alliance Party (Malayan/Malaysian); Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front); Economic Development of Southeast Asia (Post-1945 to Early 2000s); Goh Chok Tong (1941–); Lim Yew Hock (1914–1984); Malaysia (1963); Marshall, David Saul (1908–1995); People's Action Party (PAP); Singapore (1819); Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Singapore-Malaya/Malaysia Relations (ca. 1950s–1990s)

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LEGAZPI, CAPTAIN GENERAL MIGUEL LOPEZ DE (1500–1572)
Spanish Colonizer of the Philippines

Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was the Spanish conquistador who began the Spanish colonization of the Philippines. He was appointed to lead an expedition to the Philippines, arriving in 1565 to formally lay claim to the archipelago for the Spanish king, Philip II (r. 1556–1598). On arrival, he negotiated with local rulers and was able to take possession of several islands in the Visayas. After subduing resistance by Filipinos, he proceeded to Manila, in Luzon, where he was welcomed by Raja Lakandula and Raja Matanda. With Manila in Spanish hands,

Legazpi formally established it as a city, under Spanish rule. As the leader of the Spanish colonization mission, he was initially given the title “Adelantado” (Advanced Colonial Governor). In 1569, he was appointed as the first Spanish governor and captain general of the Philippines. He was the founder of the first two cities in the Philippines under Spanish rule, Cebu and Manila.

Legazpi (also spelled Legaspi) was born in Zumarraga, Guipuscoa, Spain, and sailed for Mexico around 1530, where he worked with the Spanish colonial government. He had a reputation as an explorer and was known to Friar Andres de Urdaneta, who had gone on an earlier mission to the Philippines. (That mission had failed to establish a settlement for the Spaniards.) Friar Urdaneta recommended to the Spanish court that Legazpi lead a new expedition to the Philippines. Legazpi accepted the appointment and, with five ships, set sail on 25 November 1564, from the port of Navidad in Mexico. At sea, Legazpi opened the sealed orders from the Spanish king and learned that his mission was to claim the Philippines for Spain and lead the conquest of the islands. Legazpi faced some unrest among the expedition’s officers and the Augustinian missionaries on board, but he was able to quell this and proceeded westward across the Pacific. He stopped by Guam and then, on 14 February 1565, reached the island of Samar in the Visayas, Philippines. He took formal possession of the island and then proceeded to Leyte, Limasawa, and the Camiguin Islands, formally taking them as possessions of the Spanish Crown. Legazpi then went into the central Visayas and persuaded the leader of Bohol, Raja Sikatuna, to sign a blood compact. Legazpi next went to Cebu, where he crushed local resistance with Spanish firearms. One of his men found the image of the Child Jesus in one of the houses, reportedly the same image given by Ferdinand Magellan (1480–1521) to the wife of the local leader in 1521. (This image has been enshrined in Cebu and is known as the Santo Niño.)

Legazpi requested assistance from Mexico and Spain to further expand and consolidate Spain’s conquests in the Philippines. Reinforcements arrived in 1566 and 1567, led by two of Legazpi’s grandsons, Juan and Felipe Salcedo. Legazpi consolidated his conquests and then moved on to Panay Island in search of food

supplies and further extended his hold on the Visayas.

In 1569, he was officially appointed by King Philip II as governor and captain general, with authority to conquer the rest of the islands in the Philippine archipelago. In 1571, he returned to Cebu and established Cebu City as the first city in the Spanish-colonized Philippines. Three months later, in April 1571, he proceeded to Manila, in Luzon. Initially, the three native chiefs—Raja Lakandula, Raja Sulayman, and Raja Matanda—welcomed him. Raja Sulayman and Raja Lakandula, however, decided to oppose Spanish colonial rule, and they fought Legazpi and his men. Spanish military might prevailed, and Manila was formally taken by Legazpi for Spain. Under his orders and using local labor, the first Spanish fortifications, buildings, and houses were built for the Spaniards. Legazpi then established Manila as a formal city under Spanish rule, and it became the capital of the Philippine archipelago. Legazpi died of apoplexy on 20 August 1572 in Manila. His remains were buried in the San Agustin Church in Intramuros, Manila, where they lie to this day.

As one of Spain’s most famous conquistadores, he managed, in his seven years in the region, to take possession of most of the major Philippine islands, protect them from Spanish and Muslim incursions, and establish the foundations of Spain’s colonial government in the archipelago.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Manila; Pre-Hispanic Philippines; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Spanish Philippines; Tordesillas (1494), Treaty of

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LIBERAL EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD (1816–1830)

After the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) in Europe, the British let the Dutch re-

turn to the East Indies in 1816. A state commission (*commissie generaal*), consisting of C. T. Elout, A. A. Buyskes, and G. A. P. van der Capellen, was in charge of reestablishing Dutch authority. One of its tasks was to design a new constitution (*Regeeringsreglement*). The activity of European entrepreneurs was an issue that required resolution because the Dutch government wanted clarity about how the colony would be able to repay the debts of the bankrupted (Dutch) United East India Company (VOC).

Van der Capellen (1778–1848) became governor-general in 1819. He initially favored opening up Java to foreign private entrepreneurs, and he handed out tracts of uncultivated land for them to establish plantations to be operated with wage labor. But he came under the influence of those who argued that private enterprise would use its technological superiority to exploit the indigenous population. Van der Capellen then ruled that it would be best for the government to orchestrate the economic development of Java. He banned the sale of land by the indigenous aristocratic landowners to foreign private entrepreneurs and forbade entrepreneurs to lease land in the self-governing principalities in Java. This move infuriated both enterprising Europeans and aristocratic Javanese.

Commissioner-General L. P. J. du Bus de Gisignies (1780–1849) replaced van der Capellen in 1825. His main tasks were to reorganize the colony's finances and to investigate what system of government would be most appropriate. His May 1827 report advocated the development of Java by issuing unused land to private entrepreneurs for agricultural production. He lifted restrictions on the settlement of Europeans in Java. However, du Bus's proposals were not implemented. In 1830, the new governor-general, Johannes Van den Bosch (1780–1844), advocated the Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*), which involved government-controlled development.

Between 1816 and 1830, private entrepreneurs established a range of private estates, mainly in the surroundings of Batavia. Others started sugar mills in the principalities of Java, leasing land and labor from local aristocrats for the production of sugarcane.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*);
Du Bus de Gisignies, Viscount Leonard

Pierre Joseph, (1780–1849); Java War (1825–1830); Kew Letters; Napoleonic Wars in Asia; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley, (1781–1826); Van den Bosch, Count Johannes (1780–1844); Van der Capellen, Baron Godert Alexander Philip (1778–1848); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1600)

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LIGHT, CAPTAIN FRANCIS (1740–1794)

From Trader to Colonialist

Francis Light, an English country trader, played a decisive role in the establishment of a British outpost in 1786 at Penang, an island off the northwestern coast of the Malay Peninsula. Penang was the initial base for the expansion of British influence in the Malay Peninsula (present-day West Malaysia) during the nineteenth century and subsequently for the creation of "British Malaya."

Francis Light was born in 1740 in Dallinghoo, Suffolk, England, the illegitimate child of Mary Light. His father was William Negus, a landowner in the county of Suffolk. Light joined the Royal Navy at age nineteen. As a midshipman, he fought against the French. He left the navy when he was twenty-three to seek his fortune in India. In Madras, he worked for Jourdain, Sullivan and De Souza (JSD) and was given command of one of its ships. Captain Light frequented the ports of call in the northern Straits of Melaka, namely, Aceh (Aceh), Junk Ceylon (Ujung Salang, present-day Phuket), and Kuala Kedah. Besides acting as an agent of JSD, Light undertook trading on his own. He was one of the scores of British country traders

in the Malay Archipelago (present-day Indonesia and Malaysia).

The need to protect the lucrative China trade of the English East India Company (EIC) in luxury goods (tea, silk, porcelain) and to safeguard British military and strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal and the Straits of Melaka led to the acquisition of Penang. The rulers of Kedah—Muhammad Jewa (1710–1773) and Abdullah Muharum Shah (1773–1798)—were willing to cede territories, specifically the island of Penang, in return for British protection against their enemies, notably Chakri Siam (present-day Thailand) and Konbaung Burma (present-day Myanmar).

Having failed to convince the EIC to acquire Junk Ceylon, Light focused his attention on Penang. When acting as Sultan Abdullah's *wakil* (representative) in negotiations with the EIC at Calcutta, he did not faithfully represent the sultan's views about the vital military alliance against Siam and Burma and financial compensation for the loss of trade. Moreover, he did not reveal the fact that Kedah was a vassal of Siam. Calcutta was, in general, agreeable to the sultan's conditions as represented by Light but withheld the decision for military protection and financial compensation pending a ruling from the EIC directors in London.

In February 1786, Burmese forces invaded Siam. Sultan Abdullah sent arms to Burma and letters of loyalty to Siam in the hope of appeasing both parties. Siam expelled the Burmese and turned on its own southern vassals (Patani, Ligor, Pugit, Kedah, and Terengganu) in retribution for their siding with the enemy.

Meanwhile, the EIC appointed Light as the superintendent of Penang. Disregarding stern warnings from Sultan Abdullah that he should not land in Penang pending the decision from London, Light formally took possession of the island in the name of King George III and the "Honorable East India Company." He named it Prince of Wales Island after the heir apparent (later George IV) and designated the township at the promontory on the northeastern part of the island as George Town.

Lord Cornwallis (t. 1786–1793), governor-general of India, was determined that EIC commitments be limited to Penang to avoid straining Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-Siamese relations. Consequently, military assistance to Kedah was denied. Understandably, Sultan Ab-

dullah demanded that the British vacate Penang. Instead, Light proposed to buy or lease the island from Kedah; the sultan was reluctant. Regardless, EIC-Kedah negotiations proceeded with Light as the go-between.

In attempting to settle the protracted negotiations over the compensation issue, the sultan enlisted the Illanun and blockaded Penang. The forts at Prai fronting the island were strengthened. An ultimatum was announced, demanding the settlement of the compensation issue, failing which the British should evacuate the island.

Instead of complying with the terms of the ultimatum, Light launched a swift attack on Prai in April 1791, destroying the batteries and routing the Kedah forces. Sultan Abdullah agreed to the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Alliance on 1 May 1791. According to its terms, the EIC would compensate the sultan 6,000 Spanish dollars per annum as long as the British occupied the island. Neither the cession of Penang nor the EIC's military protection for Kedah was mentioned in the agreement.

During his tenure as superintendent (1786–1794), Light had a stockade erected (which subsequently became Fort Cornwallis) and built a public well that supplied fresh water to the early inhabitants; he also laid down the outline of the pioneer commercial sector of the settlement bordered by main thoroughfares. He welcomed immigrants and settlers from the surrounding vicinity, and within a short period, George Town became a cosmopolitan commercial center. Light instituted the *Kapitan* system, whereby he appointed a headman (*kapitan* or captain) for each community to administer its own affairs.

Light died, apparently of malaria, on 21 October 1794 in Penang and was buried in the Protestant Cemetery in George Town. His estate was divided between his English wife and Martina Rozells, a Eurasian woman with whom he cohabited. One of his sons, William, became the first surveyor-general of South Australia and planned the city of Adelaide.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Burma-Siam Wars; Country Traders; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India

Company (EIC) (1602), English; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Junk Ceylon (Ujung Salang, Phuket); *Kapitan China* System; Penang (1786); Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu)

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LIGOR/NAKHON

Ligor, or the present-day province of Nakhon Sithammarat in South Thailand, was a thriving local power center in the upper part of the Malay Peninsula, most likely as far back as the ninth century C.E. The name *Ligor* is a corrupted pronunciation of the word *Nakhon* by Portuguese traders who came to trade with this entrepôt during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During Śrīvijaya times, Ligor went by the name of Tambralingam, and until the mid-thirteenth century, it formed a part of that ancient maritime empire. From then on, Ligor appeared as an autonomous center within the sphere of influence of the Thai kingdom, whether the latter's capital was at Sukhothai or Ayudhya (Ayutthaya) or Bangkok. It was during the first half of the thirteenth century also that Ligor's great ruler, King Chandrabanu, sent an army to attack Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and brought the Theravada Buddhism of the Mahavihara monastery teachings from Ceylon to Ligor. It was from Ligor that the Theravada Buddhism

of the Ceylonese orientation spread to the ancient Angkorian empire and the Thai world in Southeast Asia.

During the two subsequent centuries (the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries), Ligor evidently transformed itself into a powerful and thriving center on the peninsula. Its prosperity made it an international bone of contention among the budding and old powers in the region, especially among the Malay, Burmese, Khmer, Mon, and South Indian rulers, all of whom wished to control the flow of the maritime trade through their control of Ligor. Amid this scenario, it remains a historical puzzle as to how Ligor was eventually moved into the Thai political sphere. What was clear was that it was during the Thai kingdom of Sukhothai, namely, around the mid-thirteenth century, that Ligor, then known by its Thai name of Nakhon Si Thammarat, became a vassal state of Sukhothai. Historical speculations surmise that Sukhothai most likely acquired Ligor as its dependency not through conquest but rather through a submission of the ruling house of Phetburi, to which Nakhon was then a dependency. King Ramakhamhaeng (r. 1279–1298) of Sukhothai subjugated Phetburi in 1294. It was most likely that a Thai ruling house was established in Ligor around this time as well. From the mid-thirteenth century onward, Nakhon acted most of the time as a principal southern outpost of Sukhothai, from where Siamese authority and prestige expanded into the Malay Peninsula. Most historians believe that when Ligor was brought into the Siamese sociopolitical orbit, it was already a locally powerful center whose sphere of influence had reached as far as Pahang and Singapore. Ligor's vassalage to the Siamese kingdom meant an automatic expansion of the latter's sociopolitical power and prestige into the Malay world.

Both local chronicles and foreign records confirm that from the fifteenth century onward, Ligor was a viceroyalty of Siam in affairs concerning the Malay Peninsula. Malay chronicles repeatedly recorded Ligor's active role in maintaining and expanding Siamese interests in the region. The *Al-Tarikh Salasilah* even recorded, for example, that the traditional sending of the *bunga mas bunga perak* (ornamental gold and silver flowers) by a Malay sultanate to the king of Siam originated from an obligation of the sultanate of Kedah to Ligor. A report by

Joao de Barros, a Portuguese trader in the sixteenth century, stated that “it was to the Payoa [Phraya Nakhon/ruler of Nakhon] that the King of Malaca [Melaka] and governors of Patane [Patani], Calantan [Kelantan], Pam (Pahang) and others all along that coast had to pay the tribute which they owed each year to the King of Siao [Siam]” (De Barros 1960: 23). In fact, the ruler of Ligor was the most trusted viceroy of Siam and the principal player in the lengthy conflict between Bangkok and Kedah from 1821 to 1842—the conflict that led to a temporarily direct Siamese rule of that Malay State. The unchallenged influence of Ligor over Malay affairs only slowly came to an end by the mid-nineteenth century, as the Siamese traditional system of regional administration became increasingly incapable of dealing with the dynamic sociopolitical changes and ceaseless demands of the neighboring British and French colonial empires. As the ruling Nakhon family failed to adjust to the new sociopolitical conditions, its grip on local affairs steadily eroded, and its prime position in the southern region was superseded by those of the new ruling cliques, such as the Khaw/Na Ranong family of the Siamese western seaboard.

In spite of its impressive political credentials, Ligor was not always a good and loyal dependency of the Thai kingdom. A few times, it tried to assert its independence and reestablish itself as a sovereign power in the upper Malay Peninsula region. In 1628, for instance, Ligor refused to accept the suzerain authority of King Prasat Thong (r. 1629–1656) of Ayudhya on the ground that Prasat Thong’s claim to the throne was not legitimate. It took Ayudhya four years to suppress and bring Ligor back into the Siamese political orbit. Again in 1767, Ligor declared itself free from the ties of the Siamese vassalage at the time when Ayudhya fell to the Burmese. And again, it was only by force that Siam was able to reclaim the loyalty of Ligor. However, it was evident that through its long association with the Thai kingdom since the thirteenth century and in spite of its occasional delinquencies, Ligor had proved itself a valuable and capable viceroyalty that was able to effectively defend and expand the authority and interests of the Siamese empire in the Malay Peninsula throughout the traditional period.

The provincial administrative reform introduced in 1896 by King Chulalongkorn

(r. 1868–1910) gradually saw the transformation of Nakhon from an autonomous viceroyalty of Siam in the south to a modern province, the governorship of which is no longer a family heirloom to be passed on from one generation to the next. Only seasoned government officials with personal ability and administrative merit can aspire to become the governor of Nakhon. Now one province among the seventy-six provinces composing the Thai kingdom, Nakhon remains a center of Buddhism and the quintessence of southern Thai culture.

KOBKUA SUWANNATHAT-PIAN

See also Angkor; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767 C.E.), Kingdom of; Buddhism, Theravada; *Bunga Emas* (*Bunga Mas*) (Gold Flowers); Junk Ceylon (Ujung Salang, Phuket); Khaw Family; Penang (1786); Prasat Thong (r. 1629–1656); Rama Kamhaeng (r. 1279–1298); Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Sukhotai (Sukhodava); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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LIM YEW HOCK (1914–1984)**Securing Self-Government for Colonial Singapore**

Lim Yew Hock served as Singapore's second chief minister from June 1956 to June 1959, during which time he led several missions to London to negotiate a self-governing constitution for the colony.

Lim Yew Hock was born on 15 October 1914 in Singapore. After completing his secondary education at the Raffles Institution, he started work as a clerical worker in 1933 and became involved in the trade union movement, becoming the general secretary of the Singapore Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union after the Pacific War (1941–1945). In 1947, he joined the Singapore Progressive Party (SPP) and was nominated to the Singapore Legislative Council in 1948. One year later, he left the SPP to join its main rival, the Singapore Labour Party (SLP), and was one of the organizers of the Singapore Trade Union Congress in 1951, the year he was also elected to the council. But he was expelled from the party in December 1952 following an internal power struggle. Lim, however, successfully contested the 1955 Singapore Legislative Assembly elections as a candidate of a new political party, the Singapore Labour Front, which he helped to establish in 1954. Upon succeeding David Marshall (1908–1995) as chief minister in June 1956, Lim, through a series of meetings with the British in December 1956, April 1957, and May–June 1958, secured their agreement to grant self-government to Singapore. His party contested the 1959 elections under a new name, the Singapore People's Alliance, and won four seats. In the 1963 elections, however, which he declined to contest, his party, which became part of the wider coalition known as the Singapore Alliance, failed to win any seats. With the support of the Malaysian premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903–1990), Lim subsequently served as Malaysia's high commissioner to Australia but resigned in embarrassing circumstances. He converted to Islam, took the name Haji Omar Lim, and moved to Saudi Arabia as an official of the Islamic Conference. He died in November 1984.

ALBERT LAU

See also Marshall, David Saul (1908–1995); National Trades Union Congress (NTUC)

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LINGGADJATI (LINGGAJATI) AGREEMENT (1947)

Linggadjati was a hill resort in western Java. In 1946, the Dutch colonialists and the Indonesian nationalists led by the Republic of Indonesia met there and forged an agreement to settle their differences. These differences related to the Dutch intentions to create a federal state for an independent Indonesia and the opposite aim of the Republic of Indonesia to decide on its own future without Dutch interference.

The main terms of the agreement were as follows. The Netherlands government recognized the republic as the de facto authority in Java and Sumatra (the two main islands of Indonesia). Both The Netherlands and the republican governments promised to establish a sovereign federal state called the United States of Indonesia (USI), which would include the republic. Meanwhile, the republic would recognize all claims by foreign nationals (read Dutch and Western entrepreneurs) for the restoration of their properties within areas controlled by the republic.

The agreement was concluded within a tight time frame. After the Japanese surrendered their occupation of Indonesia to the Western allies (1945), a power vacuum came into existence because the former Dutch colonial authorities were not ready to assume control. Under these circumstances, the Republic of Indonesia seized the opportunity and proclaimed independence, followed by a de facto extension of its authority over large parts of Indonesia. Gradually, the strength of the Dutch colonial forces developed, and conflicts between Dutch troops and Indonesian nationalist supporters of the republic became a daily occurrence. A peace agreement was necessary to prevent an all-out war.

The terms were deliberately ambiguous in order to accommodate different viewpoints. They were subject to reinterpretation by both

sides and were not finally ratified by the Netherlands Parliament until March 1947. The ambiguity was the recipe for the agreement's failure.

YONG MUN CHEONG

See also British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; Dutch Police Action (First and Second); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Renville Agreement (January 1948); Soekarno (Sukarno, 1901–1970); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; Van Mook, Dr. Hubertus Johannes (1894–1948)

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LOMBOK

About 4,600 square kilometers in area, Lombok is a volcanic island with mountain ranges in the north and south. In consequence of this topography, Lombok's population, since time immemorial, has been concentrated in the valley in the center of the island, which runs from west to east. Lombok's indigenous people are the Sasaks, a Malay subgroup that has been under the influence of Islam since the sixteenth century. Islam penetrated the island unevenly, so by the nineteenth century, some of the Sasaks professed an orthodox version of the faith (*Waktu-lima*), whereas others, especially in West Lombok, practiced a form of Islam infused with animistic beliefs and rituals (*Waktu-telu*). Apart from the Sasaks, Lombok has long had minorities of Balinese and Buginese.

The Balinese in particular have played an important role in the island's history. Having settled in West Lombok in the early seventeenth century, the Balinese community remained politically fragmented until well into the nine-

teenth century, divided as it was into a number of descent-groups that were frequently at war with each other. In 1839, however, these conflicts came to an end when one of the descent-groups, the Mataram group, asserted its power over all its rivals, whereupon it brought the entire island, including its majority Sasak population, under its dominion. Around the same time, Lombok entered into the network of international trade as an exporter of rice, most of which was marketed in China via Singapore.

The wealth derived from this export trade in rice, much of which came to benefit Lombok's Balinese rulers, allowed for the emergence of a magnificent Balinese court culture. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, many temples and several palaces were constructed in Mataram and Cakranegara, and in the vicinity of these urban centers, a number of pleasure gardens were laid out, such as those at Narmada, Singasari, and Gunungsari. At the Balinese court, the arts flourished, many being inextricably interwoven with the Bali-Hindu religion, a religion the Lombok Balinese observed more strictly even than their brethren in Bali across the strait. In the 1890s, however, this "golden" period in the island's history was brought to a violent end in consequence of the combined effects of internal Sasak rebellion and external Dutch aggression.

In 1891, the Sasaks of East Lombok raised the banner of Islam and rose in rebellion against their Balinese overlords. Meanwhile, in faraway Batavia (Jakarta), the Dutch colonial government saw in Lombok's internal strife an opportunity to incorporate the island easily into the Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies. After some initial hesitation about which side to support, Batavia decided to back the Sasak insurgents and began to use its naval power to disrupt Lombok's communications with Singapore, thereby preventing the importation by the Balinese rulers of firearms and other war materials. This pressure, however, failed to bring the Lombok Balinese to heel, whereupon the Dutch, in July 1894, decided to send a military expedition to force the issue.

Although the Lombok Balinese made no attempt to oppose the landing of the expeditionary forces when they came to realize, in August 1894, that the Dutch would be satisfied with nothing less than complete sovereignty, some of their leaders decided to resort to

armed resistance. In a surprise nocturnal offensive upon the Dutch army encampments, the Balinese inflicted a heavy and unprecedented defeat on the expeditionary forces, killing or wounding more than 500 soldiers, sailors, and coolies. But though they had achieved a great victory, the attack upon the Dutch expeditionary forces was the beginning of the end for the Lombok Balinese. In subsequent weeks, the Dutch made good their losses, brought in reinforcements in men and material, and began a systematic artillery bombardment of the Balinese strongholds of Cakranegara and Mataram. By November 1894, the last pockets of resistance were crushed. Mataram and Cakranegara lay in ruins, thousands had perished, and the Balinese state, with its vibrant court culture, had ceased to exist.

Following its conquest, Lombok was integrated into the Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies. Administratively, the island came to be linked with Bali, and economically, the colonial government concentrated on promoting rice cultivation, which was very successful. During the colonial period (1894–1942), numerous large and small irrigation works were constructed, rice production increased by leaps and bounds, and the surplus available for export rose steadily. However, colonial Lombok had ceased to be an autonomous participant in international trade. That is, its rice exports no longer went to China via Singapore but were largely used to make good rice deficits in other parts of the Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies. Upon independence, Lombok was linked with Sumbawa to form the Indonesian province of Nusa Tenggara Barat. Rice cultivation continued to be the island's principal economic activity, although since the mid-1980s, tourism has emerged as an important industry, providing employment opportunities for many thousands of Lombok people.

ALFONS VAN DER KRAAN

See also Bali; Bugis (Buginese); Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Islam in Southeast Asia; Kraton Culture; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Rice in Southeast Asia; Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s)

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LON NOL (1913–1984)

Anticommunist Cambodian Leader

Lon Nol was a Cambodian political and military leader who served as prime minister in the short-lived Khmer Republic (1970–1975). The



Lon Nol at Cham Car Mon palace, prior to leaving Cambodia. (Françoise de Mulder/Corbis)

son of a high-ranking Cambodian official in the colonial era, he attended a French-language high school in Saigon, where classmates recalled his interest in mysticism and martial arts. He was a provincial official in Cambodia in the 1930s and became a military officer in the closing stages of French colonial rule. After independence, he earned the trust of Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1922–) for his apparently total loyalty and served for many years as minister of defense and commander of Cambodia's armed forces. Because of his anticommunist stance, Lon Nol was named prime minister by Sihanouk in 1967, and he soon launched a campaign against local communist guerrillas. In March 1970, when Sihanouk was overseas, Lon Nol joined several senior Cambodian officials in orchestrating a bloodless coup d'état against the prince. Because Sihanouk, in Beijing, had allied himself immediately with the Vietnamese communists, Lon Nol's coup plunged Cambodia into the closing phases of the Vietnam War. Soon afterward, leaders of the new government named the country the Khmer Republic and sought to establish a pluralist, relatively democratic regime.

Cambodia's small, poorly equipped army, despite massive doses of assistance from the United States, was torn to pieces by North Vietnamese troops in 1970 and 1971 and barely withstood the Khmer Rouge guerrilla forces that it faced from 1972 to 1975. Lon Nol suffered a stroke in 1971 and became increasingly dictatorial and withdrawn, heeding only the advice of family members and Buddhist monks and barely noticing the country collapsing around him. He went into exile in March 1975, just before Khmer Rouge troops overran Phnom Penh. After spending several years in Hawai'i, he died in California in 1984.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Khmer Rouge; Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–)

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LOOSELY STRUCTURED SOCIETIES

The concept of loosely structured societies, formulated by the American cultural anthropologist John F. Embree (1950: 181–193), was to have a profound influence on the post-1945 study of Thai society. Embree, whose main research experience had been in Japan, contrasted Thai social organization and behavior with that in Japan, which he saw as disciplined, regimented, and formal. In contrast to the Japanese, he argued, the Thais have a high tolerance for variations in individual behavior; they do not commit themselves to the continuing fulfillment of their obligations in the longer term, nor do they have a strong sense of familial duties and responsibilities.

Some of Embree's observations were seen to offer a way of understanding Central Thai society. In particular, the diffusely organized rice-growing village of Bang Chan (Ban Chan, Ban Chiang), close to Bangkok, was studied by a team of American social scientists from Cornell University, in cooperation with local researchers (Sharp and Hanks 1978). The director of the research, Lauriston Sharp, initiated the project in 1947. From then to the 1970s, the Cornell team undertook studies not only of Bang Chan but also of other villages in Central, North, and Northeast Thailand; the Chinese community in Bangkok; Thai history and modern politics; and minority upland groups in northern Thailand. One of their main interests was the social history of small rural communities and the effects on them of post-1945 modernization and nation building. So dominant were the Cornell studies that even in the 1970s, it was remarked that "the world's view of rural Thailand is biased by Bang Chan" (Moerman 1975: 151).

Subsequently, the loose-structure model was criticized as failing to identify those principles of social organization that did give order and coherence not only to social and cultural life in Bang Chan but also to Thai peasant societies generally (Potter 1976).

VICTOR T. KING

See also Ban Chiang

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LOPBURI (LAWO)

Lopburi, now a provincial town in the Central Plains of Thailand, played a very important part in the country's history during four different periods. In old documents, Lopburi was usually called by its ancient name of Lawo (also spelled Louveau, Lavo, Livo, and Louvo).

The Lopburi area has been the site of human settlement since prehistoric times, and traces of Dvaravati (Mon) civilization have been found there, too. But Lopburi reached its first peak of prosperity during the Khmer period in Thai history (ca. ninth to eleventh centuries C.E.).

Hindu or Buddhist art in Thailand that shows strong Khmer influence has even been labeled as being in the "Lopburi style" due to the possibility that the Lopburi area was ruled by indigenous princes or governors under the overall suzerainty of the Khmers. Many Khmer-style monuments still stand in Lopburi town, notably Phra Prang Sam Yod and parts of Wat Phra Si Ratana Mahathat.

During the seventeenth century, Lopburi regained its importance. Although mention may be found in the historical sources of King Prasat Thong (r. 1629–1656) visiting Lopburi, it was his son, King Narai (r. 1656–1688), who revived the town's fortunes by building (or rebuilding) a large palace there. King Narai was fond of catching wild elephants and hunting tigers, so Lopburi became his alternative residence, a place that he eventually preferred to the capital, Ayutthaya.

A Frenchman who visited Siam in King Narai's time described Lopburi as being to the king of Siam what Versailles was to King Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715). This meant not only that the palace at Lopburi was a hunting lodge con-

verted into a palace but also that the court resided for long periods there. King Narai was probably especially fond of Lopburi because he could live a more leisurely life there, less constrained by court routine. It is also possible that the king wished to escape the intrigue-ridden court at Ayutthaya, where his most eminent as well as ambitious officials and courtiers resided and worked. At Lopburi, he was still surrounded by courtiers and officials; however, protocol seems to have been less rigid—for example, the king gave "informal" audiences to members of the French diplomatic mission in 1685.

A figure much associated with both the town of Lopburi and King Narai was the Greek Constance (or Constantine) Phaulkon (d. 1688). A favorite of King Narai, he virtually controlled Siam's foreign affairs during the 1680s and was largely responsible for a pro-French policy on the part of the Siamese court. When the French embassy arrived in Lopburi in 1685, its members were lodged in a grand, European-style mansion that was later taken over by Phaulkon himself. French Jesuits were warmly welcomed, and they watched the lunar eclipse in late 1685 with the king at his residence Thale Chupson, just outside Lopburi.

The pro-French and pro-Catholic policies of Phaulkon and King Narai led to the creation of an anti-French faction at the Siamese court, spearheaded by the Master of the Royal Elephants Okphra (or Phra) Phetracha and his son Okluang (Luang) Sorasak. The situation was exacerbated in late 1687 by the arrival of a French embassy, together with garrison troops that took over the fortresses at Bangkok and Mergui, two key towns in Siam.

If, in choosing to live most of the year at Lopburi, King Narai hoped to avoid having to contend with the internal faction fighting in Ayutthaya, it was to no avail. In 1688, when the frail king fell ill at his palace in Lopburi, Okphra Phetracha formed an alliance of officials, Buddhist monks, and local Lopburi people and seized political power. King Narai became a prisoner in his own palace, and Phaulkon was captured and executed, followed by the king's own half brothers. When the king died, no political rivals remained to oppose Okphra Phetracha, who ascended the throne as the first king of Ayutthaya's last dynasty, the Ban Phlu Luang dynasty (1688–1767).

According to the Siamese *Royal Chronicles of Ayutthaya*, King Narai gave his palace at Lopburi to the Buddhist clergy to use as a monastery. The new king, Phetracha, was not interested in residing at Lopburi anyway, moving the court back to Ayutthaya. Lopburi thus became a historical backwater for around a century and a half.

The nineteenth-century Siamese king Mongkut (Rama IV, r. 1851–1868) rebuilt King Narai's palace and stayed there occasionally. During a period of increased pressure from Western imperial powers, Lopburi was thought of as a possible alternative capital to Bangkok due to its greater distance from the Gulf of Siam.

During the twentieth century, Lopburi became a strategic military town, starting with Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram's time as prime minister of Thailand. Nowadays, Lopburi retains its military significance, with its large army camp, but it is most visited for its many monuments of cultural and historical importance.

DHIRAVAT NA POMBEJRA

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudha, Ayuthia) (1351–1767 C.E.), Kingdom of; Dvaravati; Elephants; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Narai (r. 1656–1688); Phaulkon, Constance (Constantine) (d. 1688); Prasat Thong (r. 1629–1656)

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LOW, SIR HUGH (1824–1905)

Model British Resident

As British resident to Perak from 1877 to 1889, Hugh Low demonstrated how, through diplomacy and tactfulness, the British Residential

System could achieve impressive and beneficial results. During his tenure, the western Peninsular Malay State of Perak achieved rapid economic development.

An enthusiastic botanist, Low first ventured to Southeast Asia in 1845, arriving in Sarawak as a guest of the first White Raja, James Brooke (r. 1841–1868). He had the opportunity to observe firsthand the nature of Brooke rule, which emphasized the protection and promotion of native interests. As a consequence of his sojourn, Low wrote *Sarawak: Its Inhabitants and Productions, Being Notes during a Residence in That Country with H. H. the Rajah Brooke* (1848), dedicating it to Raja Brooke. He served as an officer in the newly established British outpost of Labuan (1847), subsequently rising to the post of colonial secretary. His three decades of Bornean residence made Low knowledgeable about Brunei and the Malay language, culture, and way of life. He was one of the pioneer European explorers of the territory that later became known as British North Borneo (Sabah). In honor of Raja Brooke, Low named his son Hugh Brooke Low (1875–1887); the younger Low served under the second White Raja, Charles Johnson Brooke (r. 1868–1917).

Low was appointed resident to Perak in 1877 in the aftermath of the 1875 assassination of J. W. W. Birch (1826–1875), the first resident. Anglo-Malay relations had been severely strained following the Birch affair, Birch's insensitivity and ignorance of Malay pride and traditions during his residency. His Bornean experience had prepared him with the necessary skills to deal with the Perak Malays. His command of the Malay language and knowledge of the Malays' customs, traditions, and general way of life and their mentality were invaluable assets that complemented his diplomacy in winning over the local peoples.

Low established an efficient system of revenue collection. Its implementation was accomplished by a strong police force. Malay territorial chiefs who had been deprived of their traditional rights and sources of income were compensated in the form of official salaries or pensions, even to the extent of creating a deficit in public funds. A judicial system with European judges assisted by Malay junior magistrates reaching to the grass roots was laid out, emphasizing the rule of law rather than of man. At the *mukim* (cluster of villages), the *penghulu* (head-

man) settled minor offenses and collected land and other taxes from the *rakyat* (masses).

Low invested heavily in the tin industry and tin trade through enacting laws to regulate water control, the alienation of land, and the development of an efficient system of transport and communication. The Taiping–Port Weld line, opened in 1885, was the first railway line in the Malay Peninsula. Appreciating the Brooke practice of using experimental farms in testing new crops for commercial exploitation, Low started the cultivation of para rubber (*Hevea brasiliensis*) at Kuala Kangsar. Commercial agriculture was actively promoted through dispensing loans to planters; facilitating the introduction of immigrant agricultural labor; and providing infrastructure facilities, especially in transport and communication.

Drawing from his observations of Brooke rule, Low understood the importance of consulting with native chiefs on matters of governance. Therefore, when the State Council was instituted in Perak in 1877, Low utilized it to perpetuate the fiction of the resident as a mere adviser to the sultan; in practice, the resident wielded executive power. Imitating Raja Charles Brooke, Low allowed the age-old practice of debt bondage to die a natural death over the span of a decade.

Saddled with a debt of 800,000 Straits dollars upon taking office in 1877, he liquidated the debt within six years through his efficient system of revenue collection coupled with prudent expenditures. And when he stepped down as resident in 1889, the Perak treasury had a credit balance of 1.5 million Straits dollars.

Low's success was attributed to his tactful and unobtrusive approach in introducing and implementing changes and reforms. Acknowledged as the model British resident in the 1880s, he proved the viability of the Residential System as a practical and cost-effective method in exercising British influence over one of the richest Peninsular Malay States of the nineteenth century.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Birch, J. W. W. (1826–1875); Brooke, Sir Charles Anthoni Johnson (1829–1917); Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Pangkor Engagement (1874); Residential System (Malaya); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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LUANG PRABANG

Located on a peninsula formed by the confluence of the Mekong River with the smaller Khan River, the northern Laos city of Luang Prabang exudes a majestic presence and appeal. The city was named after the sacred Phra Bang Buddhist image and known for its numerous Buddhist temples, and its religious symbolism is matched by the natural beauty of the densely wooded encircling mountains. Today a provincial capital of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), Luang Prabang, with a population of less than 20,000, has known better days. It was once the royal capital of the historic kingdom of Lan Xang, the royal capital under French rule from 1893 to 1954, and the seat of the Kingdom of Laos until the liquidation of the monarchy by the incoming LPDR government in late 1975. The architectural heritage of this historical city only commanded major international attention in the closing years of the twentieth century.

Foundation

The royal capital of Luang Prabang, first known as Muong Sua and later as Xieng Dong–Xieng–Thong, is closely associated with the role of King Fa Ngum. In 1353, he founded the kingdom of Lane Xang Hom Khao (“Kingdom of a Million Elephants and the White Parasol”), connoting kingly power. His son, Sam Senthai (“Three thousand Thai”) deposed him in 1393. Fa Ngum, who, according to legend, married a Khmer princess, is believed to have introduced Theravada Buddhist concepts of power and religion to his capital. As a Lao monarch, he also stamped his *muong*, or bounded realm, with the quintessential elements of Lao Buddhist political rule, notably incorporating Indianized elements of kingship. Nonetheless, the enduring

presence of pre-Buddhist elements, especially among the non-Lao indigenous population, was acknowledged in court rituals and ceremonies until the end of the kingdom. Proximity to China has also seen the incorporation of certain Chinese elements. There is no doubt that the ability of Fa Ngum and successors to exact tribute and taxation and to attract trade laid the economic foundations of support for the kingdom at its apogee.

About the year 1560, pending a shift of the capital to Vientiane in 1563 by King Setthathirat, the city became known as Luang Prabang in honor of the sacred Phra Bang, the most venerated Buddhist image in Laos. Believed to be of Sri Lankan provenance, the Phra Bang was undoubtedly imported from the Angkorian capital.

During its history, Luang Prabang suffered numerous foreign incursions and invasions. In 1753, a Burman army invaded, returning in 1771 in league with Vientiane, hence opening up a rift between the two Lao royal centers. In 1778, King Taksin (r. 1767–1782) carried away the palladium of the city, the Phra Bang, to Bangkok. Vientiane invaded Luang Prabang again in 1791 and annexed the northern province of Houa Phan. Thereafter, Luang Prabang underwent a long period of decay.

By the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Chakri dynasty based in Bangkok had imposed its sovereignty over Luang Prabang. Subject to investiture by Bangkok, the kings of Luang Prabang exercised a very restricted power over a limited domain. Also at the same time, Luang Prabang was checked by the action of the court of Annam in occupying the border provinces of Tranninh and Xieng Khouang as well as suffering raids by piratical Ho elements from Yunnan. Luang Prabang barely survived by paying dual tribute to both Bangkok and Hué. It was only in 1867 that the sacred Phra Bang was returned to Luang Prabang by King Mongkut (Rama IV, r. 1851–1868) of Siam.

Colonial French historiography views the action of the French mission as rescuing the kingdom of Luang Prabang from certain liquidation. Successively, the missions of French empire makers such as Henri Mouhot (1861), Doudart de Lagrée and Francis Garnier (1866–1868), and especially Auguste Pavie (1847–1925), who in November 1885 was named French vice-consul in Luang Prabang,

underwrote future French domination over the kingdom, pending its full incorporation into French Laos in 1893.

But agents of Siam and Pavie, who rescued the old king Oun Kham, were unable to prevent the sacking of the city in 1887 by the White T'ai chief Deo Van Tri and the killing of the viceroy Souvanna Phouma. Such historical temples witnessed and sketched by Garnier as Wat Vixun were destroyed. With the signing of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1907 sanctioning new boundaries, peace returned to Luang Prabang. Kingship passed from Zakharine (d. 1904) to Sisavang Vong (r. 1904–1959).

French Laos to Kingdom of Laos

Commensurate with their political support for the Kingdom of Laos based upon the ancient capital of Luang Prabang, the French colonial rulers sponsored the architectural renovation of the ruined city. The French sought to restore the traditional Buddhist heritage where it supported the institution of kingship, and French architects designed and constructed, from 1904 to 1909, an elaborate royal palace and European-style gardens facing the Mekong River. Although the rest of Laos was ruled directly as a colony, the province of Luang Prabang was legally treated as a protectorate, with the king presiding over a part modern, part traditional administration in which all senior positions were occupied by the nobility, albeit answering to the locally established French Commissariat. In many ways, the French “rescue” of Luang Prabang from prolonged decay invested the royal city with an intense aura of traditionalism and culture.

Under the French protectorate, the basic street grid of the royal capital was laid out, administrative buildings were erected, and other basic colonial services were introduced. As the commercial importance of the capital expanded, distinctive two-storied stucco shops also were constructed. Connected by road to central Vietnam in 1936 and to Vientiane in 1944, the city served as the major administrative and commercial center of northern Laos. Even so, the remoteness of the city left it out of the mainstream of political and economic affairs, which served to preserve its traditional institutions from the encroachment of the modern world.

The link between the sacral topography of the city as created by Fa Ngum and the revived version under the French may be tenuous. Nevertheless, the continuity in ritual and remembrance in Luang Prabang was remarkable until the end of the city as a royal capital in December 1975. However, only thirty-two of the original sixty-six Buddhist temples have survived the ravages of history. Singularly representative of the northern Laotian style of religious architecture is Wat Xieng Thong, founded by Setthatharit in 1560 and sited at the confluence of the two rivers. Luang Prabang also hosts the finest examples in Laos of wood sculpture, including gilded Buddha images. The facade of Wat Mai, built in 1796, offers an exquisite example of northern Laotian mural art. Dutch visitors to the court of Setthathirat recalled with admiration the decorated doors of a temple in Luang Prabang. The singular dominating religio-topographical feature of the city, however, is Phou-Sy hill, upon which is built a temple that is unimposing but visible from afar.

Luang Prabang was also the center of an annual calendar of festivals and processions, shared across much of Laos but given special prominence in the royal capital, especially the week-long Pi-May, or Buddhist New Year ceremonies, attended by the king, Buddhist monks, and a procession of royal elephants. Some authors have expressed amazement at the longevity of festivals and the continuity of traditions in Luang Prabang, making it a unique vantage point upon a vanished world, in part because of its geographic isolation. Frank Reynolds (1978: 168–169) isolated three festivals as paramount, each of which reflected a religiousocial ideal that harked back to the period from 1315 to 1550. He argued that though the ideal was hierarchical—and perhaps because it was hierarchical—it structured the entire human environment, even including the animist non-Lao population, who also peopled the city and its precincts. These festivals involved the reestablishment of a purely Lao ideal, outside of Indian or Buddhist tradition.

As war raged over northern Laos, setting French expeditionary forces against the Viet Minh, Luang Prabang was repeatedly threatened with invasion. But the war spared the ancient city, with the communist Pathet Lao declaring its respect for Laos's patrimony.

Nevertheless, the monarchy was abruptly abrogated in December 1975 upon the proclamation of the LPDR, bringing to an end the six-hundred-year-old traditions associated with the court. Indeed, King Sisavang Watthana (r. 1959–1979) died in unexplained circumstances. Many Buddhist activities and ceremonies were proscribed, and the imposition of a socialist economic regime radically changed the rhythm of life and human environment that had existed under the kingdom. In line with the prevailing socialist orthodoxy, the Royal Palace became the National Museum; it houses various royal regalia and works of Buddhist art, including the sacred Phra Bang and the royal throne of Luang Xang kingdom.

Rediscovery

In 1995, the town of Luang Prabang gained inscription as a site protected by the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). In justifying its nomination of the city as a World Heritage site, UNESCO declaimed: "This town reflects the exceptional fusion of traditional architecture and urban structures built by 19th and 20th century European colonial rulers. Its unique township is remarkably well preserved, illustrating a key stage in the blending of these two distinct cultural traditions" (UNESCO 2000). Under the UNESCO plan, new building is limited, and some 600 buildings have been classified as historical; certain of them have been restored. Together, UNESCO protection, official tolerance, and the tourist rediscovery of Luang Prabang appear to have rescued the architectural heritage of the city from further decay. But it will take a most liberal interpretation of cultural policy to reawaken the past and prevent the city from permanently becoming a showpiece museum.

GEOFFREY C. GUNN

See also Buddhism, Theravada; Burma-Siam Wars; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR); Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Pathet Lao (Land of Laos); Pavie, Auguste (1847–1925); Phya Taksin (Pya Tak [Sin], King Taksin) (r. 1767–1782); Vientiane

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LUZON

Luzon is the largest island in the Philippine archipelago, with an area of 104,688 square kilometers. It is separated from the Batanes Islands in the north by the Babuyan Channel and is bordered on the east by the Philippine Sea and on the west by the South China Sea. To its south are the Visayan Islands and the San Bernardino Strait. Characterized by a mountainous interior interspersed with lakes and plains and a long coastal area, Luzon is also the site of the capital of the Philippines, Manila, and its important bay.

Luzon is broken by mountain ranges into different regions, with different cultures, languages, and ethnic groups. Because of its proximity to China and Japan, it has traded and interacted with both countries, as well as enjoyed active relations with the rest of Southeast Asia. It was colonized by Spain and served as the center of its colonial efforts in Asia. It was later taken over by the Americans in 1898 and the Japanese during the Pacific War (1941–1945). During these periods of foreign occupation, Filipinos on the island rose to resist the colonizers, resulting in many revolts—culminating in a revolution in 1896 against the Spaniards, in a war against the Americans (1899–1902), and in active military and guerrilla resistance against Japan (1942–1945). Luzon was the site of heavy fighting and suffered much damage during the Pacific War. As the largest island in the archipelago and containing the nation's capital, Luzon has always figured prominently in the history of the Philippines.

The name *Luzon* originates from the Tagalog word *lusong*, referring to a wooden mortar

used to pound rice. The Chinese called the island *Liusing*, and when Europeans put it on the map, the name became *Luconia*. The hard *c* was changed to *z* to approximate the original Tagalog word.

The island of Luzon is of tectonic origin. Five major mountain ranges run roughly north to south. The Sierra Madre parallels Luzon's east coast from Cape Engaño on the northeastern tip to the middle of the island's east coast, ending in the vicinity of Laguna de Bay. The Central Cordillera traverses most of northern Luzon, running 250 kilometers south as the largest and highest mountain range on the island; Mount Pulog, the highest mountain in the island at 2,930 meters, is located here. The Caraballo Mountains run on a line from northwest to southeast and serve as the northern boundary of Central Luzon; they connect the Sierra Madre and Cordillera ranges. The Zambales Mountains parallel the western coast from Cape Bolinao to the Bataan Peninsula. The Tagaytay range forms the mountainous region immediately south of Manila. A 10-kilometer-wide land bridge joins the Bicol Peninsula with its own mountain range to the main island.

Apart from Mount Pulog, there are other important mountains: Mount Arayat in Central Luzon, Mount Pinatubo in the Zambales range, Mount Banahaw and Mount Makiling in southern Luzon, and Mount Mayon in the Bicol Peninsula. Most are volcanoes, either active or dormant. Taal Volcano is unique in that it is a volcano in a lake.

The major rivers that drain Luzon are the Cagayan River in northeastern Luzon, the Agno and Pampanga Rivers in Central Luzon, and the Pasig River that runs through Manila. There are two major freshwater lakes, Laguna de Bay and Taal, the latter having a volcano in the center. The irregular coastline features many natural harbors, of which Manila Bay is the most famous.

The topography of Luzon divides it into several regions: the Cagayan Valley region, centered on the Cagayan River and the fertile plains it irrigates; the mountainous region in northern Luzon; the Ilocos region of northwest Luzon, which lies between the mountains and the sea. There is the Central Luzon plain, the fertile volcanic south Luzon region, and the Bicol Peninsula. Luzon has a tropical climate and experiences two major seasons a year, the dry season

(caused by the northeast monsoon, from November to April) and the wet season (caused by the southwest monsoon, from May to October).

The population of Luzon as of 2000 was 42.52 million (Republic of the Philippines 2000). Most of the island's inhabitants are Christian. The people of Luzon are mainly of Malay origin and inhabit the lowlands. The mountainous areas are inhabited by Negritos and Igorots. The different races are further subdivided into language and culture groups. The lowland groups are the Ilocano, Pangasinense, Cagayanon, Pampango, Tagalog, and Bicolano. The mountain groups include the Ifugaos, Ivatan, Ibanag, Apayao, Tinggian, Bontok, Gaddang, and Dumagat. The indigenous people of Luzon adapted to the environment and formed their own cultures and groupings according to where they lived. In the lowlands of Central Luzon, rice paddy fields were developed in the plains; in Banawe, the Igorots carved rice terraces on the mountain slopes. Trade with neighboring groups and other Asians enriched their culture; there was active trading with the Chinese and the Japanese, as well as with the other peoples of Southeast Asia, from traditional times. Manila became a flourishing trading port.

The Spaniards reached the Bicol Peninsula in 1569 and conquered Manila in 1570. The lowlands of Luzon were gradually conquered by the Spaniards, led by Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (1500–1572) and Pedro de Salcedo. The Spaniards also created provinces and towns as they began to spread the Christian faith. Manila was made the capital of the colonized Philippines. Spanish control did not extend to the mountain regions, however, where the native peoples were able to resist the colonizers. The Dutch threatened Spain's control of Luzon when they blockaded Manila Bay in 1621 and 1646. The British, too, attacked parts of Luzon, and they took over Manila from 1762 to 1764.

Due to oppressive Spanish colonial policies, several revolts took place in the various colonized regions of Luzon. The regional revolts were crushed by people from other regional groups, as the Spaniards had adopted a divide-and-rule policy for the Philippines. The anti-Spanish sentiment culminated in the revolution of 1896, which started in Central Luzon and rapidly spread to other regions.

With the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the Americans defeated the Span-

ish fleet in the Battle of Manila Bay, and they took possession of the bay. In December 1898, the Americans took possession of Luzon and the Philippines by virtue of the Treaty of Paris (1898). Filipinos fought the American takeover but were eventually defeated.

Under American colonial rule, Manila and other cities were modernized, and the mountain areas were placed under the government. The Americans developed the city of Baguio in the mountains of northern Luzon as the Philippine summer capital and improved roads and ports.

Luzon again became the scene of fighting during the Pacific War (1941–1945), when the Japanese bombed Luzon on 8 December 1941. Japanese Imperial forces invaded the island soon after, and U.S. and Filipino forces withdrew to the Bataan Peninsula in a holding action. The Japanese eventually forced the surrender of the defending forces and placed Luzon under Japanese rule. The three-year occupation was harsh and led to many guerrilla groups rising up. U.S. forces returned to Luzon in January 1945 and fought to retake the island.

After the Pacific War, a peasant revolt (the Huk Rebellion) broke out in Luzon against the government due to unfavorable agrarian conditions. The government was able to quell the revolt in the early 1950s. Luzon hosted the Clark Field and Subic bases, both American installations, until 1992.

Lowland Luzon is basically agricultural, with the major crops being rice, sugarcane, coconut, mangoes, and tobacco. Gold, chromite, copper, iron, manganese, and nickel mines have been developed in the mountainous regions. Luzon's mountains used to be rich in forests, but they were overharvested in a lucrative lumber industry. Along the coastal areas, fishing is the main occupation.

Manufacturing is centered mainly in the Manila metropolitan area, where the major industries produce textiles, chemicals, and metal products. In line with government economic programs, industrial centers have been established in various regions, with specified areas designated as new growth areas. Elsewhere on Luzon are oil refineries, cement plants, wood processing plants, electronics assembly plants, and food processing plants.

The major cities on the island include Manila, capital of the Philippines; Quezon City; Baguio City, the summer capital of the

Philippines; Batangas City, Tarlac; Laoag; and Legaspi. Major ports are Manila, Batangas, San Fernando (La Union), and Legaspi. Subic, formerly a U.S. naval base, was turned into a free port after it was closed as a base. Luzon is administratively divided into seven regions, generally following the geographic and linguistic-cultural regions. These regions and their provinces are: Region 1, the Ilocos Region (Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, and Pangasinan); Region 2, the Cagayan Valley Region (Cagayan, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino); Region 3, Central Luzon (Batangas, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales); Region 4, Southern Tagalog (Aurora, Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Quezon, and Rizal); Region 5, the Bicol Region (Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, and Sorsogon); the National Capital Region (including the cities of Manila and Quezon); and the Cordillera Autonomous Region (Abra, Apayao, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, and Mountain Province). Also, administratively, the islands of Batanes, Mindoro, Marinduque, Masbate, Palawan, and Romblon fall under Luzon's provincial governments.

As the largest island in the Philippines, Luzon has always played a key role in Philippine history, politics, culture, and economics. Its rugged terrain has resulted in a variety of linguistic-cultural groups and regions that form part of the Philippines.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Anti-Spanish Revolts (The Philippines); Bataan Death March; Galleon Trade; Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon) (People's Anti-Japanese Army) (1942); Legaspi, Captain General Miguel Lopez de (1500–1572); Manila; Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1898–1946); Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Spanish Philippines; Spanish–American Treaty of Paris (1899); Spanish–American War (1898); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia

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LY DYNASTY (1009–1225)

Considered the first long-lived patrilineal dynasty in Vietnam, the Ly dynasty forged the independent state that would become the direct predecessor of modern Vietnam. The Ly dynasty was initially established in the present Northern Region in the tenth century C.E. after a millennium of Chinese dominion. Therefore, French and Vietnamese scholars had long believed the Ly polity always followed the Chinese model of centralized state with the Confucianistic system of patrilineal dynasty. Since the 1970s, however, interestingly, U.S. and Japanese scholars have discovered a dramatic change that occurred during the first centuries after independence of a “Southeast Asian” society (with a loosely structured political system based on bilateral kinship and patron-client relationships) developing toward an East Asian (sinicized) model.

Ly Cong Uan (Thai To) (r. 1009–1028) founded the Ly dynasty. Born in present-day Bac Ninh and supported by influential monks there, he ascended the throne after the cruel emperor Le Long Dinh died in 1009. Cong Uan, his son Phat Ma (Thai Tong) (r. 1028–1054), and his grandson Nhat Ton (Thanh Tong) (r. 1054–1072) were all-powerful and charismatic emperors. Therefore, after Nhat Ton died, his six-year-old son Can Duc (Nhan Tong) safely ascended and kept the throne (for fifty-five years, from 1072 to 1127) by virtue of his patrilineal blood. Can Duc's reign was the golden age of the dynasty. Four kings subsequently ascended to the throne in their childhood and maintained it until their adulthood.

During the Ly period, many elements of the framework of the northern Vietnamese polity that lasted to the eighteenth century began to develop, most notably Thang Long (Hanoi), the capital city since 1010 and the state name Dai Viet, employed since 1054. Also, the title “king of the Nation of Annam” was conferred by China in 1174, by which China recognized Dai Viet as a foreign country and no longer a

colony, though it still paid tribute to China. Furthermore, the territorial divide between the northern and southern parts of North Vietnam was established. The northern territory was fixed following the suppression of the Nung clan in Cao Bang from 1039 to 1053 and the successes of General Ly Thuong Kiet in driving back the invasion by the Song dynasty from 1075 to 1077. The establishment of the southern provinces (present-day Nghe An and Ha Tinh) as an integral part of Dai Viet occurred despite the invasions of Champa and Cambodia in the twelfth century. The idea of a “southern empire” on equal terms with the northern empire (namely, China) was already formulated under the Ly emperors. Ly forces attacked Champa’s capital, Vijaya, in 1044 and again in 1069; Champa, Cambodia, and the Lao tribes were regarded by the Ly dynasty as its vassals.

However, the dynasty developed less than scholars have long believed. In the central government, the famous civil service examination system for the appointment of officials (inaugurated in 1075) did not take root. Infant emperors maintained the throne not by virtue of Confucianist ideology and family system but rather thanks to the leadership of females. Mothers of emperors (the most famous being Lady Y Lan, the mother of Nhan Tong) often played a political role even after the emperor had grown up. Likewise, emperors’ wives and daughters also had their own properties and were active politically. In the countryside, the centralized administration system through twenty-four *lo* (provinces) was not effective, the eternal annexation of Champa’s three provinces after 1069 was rather a myth, and the semi-independent local chiefs could be subjugated only with constant marriage alliances and demonstrations of the military and religious power of the imperial family.

In the cultural sphere, the emperors had to mobilize all spiritual powers of the multicultural southern empire, such as Buddha, Indra, dragon, local deities, and spirits, to create the Ly dynasty religion. In the field of economic history, the popular image of traditional northern Vietnam deltas with constant population pressures, intensive agriculture, and developed dyke networks was realized only after the thirteenth century, under the Tran dynasty (1225–1400). Because the central government could not control and exploit sparsely populated villages

rigidly, it had to rely upon still-thriving foreign trade for its financial bases. (Consequently, the port of Van Don was less important than ports in present-day Nghe An and Ha Tinh.)

At the end of the twelfth century, the development of T’ai-speaking people in the western mountains seems to have become critical to the fluid ethnonational consciousness of Dai Viet. Simultaneously, extensive development of agriculture on the delta area reached its peak, and population pressures became serious. These subsequently led to the collapse of Ly power. In 1209, a civil war occurred, involving many local chiefs. Among them appeared the Tran family from the lower delta (present-day Nam Dinh and Thai Binh); the family supported the eighth emperor, Hué Tong (r. 1210–1225), who had married a Tran woman. Opposing local chiefs, many of whom were mobilized by Empress Dowager Dam (Hué Tong’s mother), were defeated one after another. Finally, Tran Thu Do and Tran Thua forced Hué Tong to leave the throne to his seven-year-old daughter Phat Kim and then let her pass the throne to her “husband” Canh (Tran Thai Tong), the second son of Thua, in 1225. The Tran dynasty would build a more centralized state and establish a more clearly defined ethnonational consciousness to solve the challenges that overcame the Ly.

MOMOKI SHIRO

See also China, Imperial; Chinese Tribute System; Dai Viet (939–1407 C.E.); Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Hanoi (Thang-long); *Tam Giao*

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M

MABINI, APOLINARIO (1864–1903) **The Sublime Paralytic**

Apolinario Mabini was the chief adviser of the president of the Philippine Republic, Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964), during the second phase of the Philippine Revolution, from the day of the proclamation of Philippine independence on 12 June 1898 until the first week of May 1899. Mabini was prime minister and minister of foreign relations in the cabinet of the Revolutionary Government from 2 January 1899 until his resignation on 9 May of that year.

Mabini was born in the province of Batangas on 23 July 1864. His parents were poor but his mother was literate, as his maternal grandfather had been a village teacher. He obtained his early education at home but was later able to attend elementary school and a few years of high school in a college founded by a Filipino priest. From 1884 to 1894, while having to earn his living by teaching, Mabini was able to study philosophy in a college and law at the University of Santo Tomas, both in Manila. In 1894 he graduated in law with excellent grades. He briefly worked as a clerk in a court in Manila before joining the Spanish colonial bureaucracy. In January 1896 he contracted a disease, probably polio, that left him paralyzed in both legs.

Since the early 1890s Mabini had been in contact with the Reform Movement, first as a fund-raiser for the journal *La Solidaridad*, later

as a member of the revived Liga Filipina, a clandestine patriotic association. When the Spaniards discovered the existence of the secret association Katipunan in August 1896, they unleashed a wave of arrests and executions of all those suspected of having connections with the revolutionaries. Mabini was arrested in October of that year, but because he was afflicted with paralysis, he escaped the death sentence and was instead confined as a prisoner to a hospital. He was released in June 1897 after the Spanish government declared a general amnesty.

After his release Mabini contacted the revolutionary leaders, expressing his desire to join their struggle. However, within a few months it became clear that the revolution had failed. The Spanish forces had defeated the untrained Filipino rebels, and in December 1897 the leader of the revolution, General Aguinaldo, negotiated a pact with the Spanish government that allowed him and a number of his followers to go into exile in Hong Kong. Several revolutionary groups, however, refused to lay down their arms and were ready to resume fighting. Mabini realized that the revolution had failed for two reasons: first, lack of an ideological direction; and second, lack of a coordinated plan to achieve a revolutionary consciousness among the people (Majul 1964: 46).

In order to remedy these shortcomings, Mabini wrote three important documents that were to have a great influence on the second phase of the Philippine Revolution. The first,

“The True Decalogue,” was an exhortation to Filipinos to develop a civic consciousness, a moral character, and a patriotic and nationalistic attitude. The second, “Constitutional Program of the Philippine Republic,” was an outline of political structure and civil rights of the new republican state. This document, which has never been put into practice, reflected the liberal and republican ideas of nineteenth-century Europe. A salient feature was the separation of state and church and the prohibition of religious associations. Mabini wrote this article because he feared the domination of the state by the church, as had been the case with the Spanish regime in the Philippines. The third document, “Ordinances of the Revolution,” contained a set of practical rules for the coming revolutionary struggle.

The second phase of the revolution started when war broke out between the United States and Spain in April 1898, at which time the U.S. Navy destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. Aguinaldo returned to the Philippines in May, and he invited Mabini to become his adviser. The revolutionary movement faced a complicated situation. On the one hand it was fighting against the Spanish colonial government; on the other it was not sure whether the Americans would recognize an independent Filipino republic or intended to annex the islands. Mabini cautioned Aguinaldo to exercise extreme care in the relationship with the Americans.

Between the U.S. occupation of Manila in August 1898 and the signing of the Treaty of Paris in December of that year, an awkward truce existed between the U.S. forces and the Filipino revolutionaries. The Spanish army and civil service were withdrawing from parts of the country, leaving behind an administrative void. The revolutionary government issued a series of decrees, written by Mabini, inter alia establishing rules for local and provincial governments, the election of officials, the convening of a revolutionary Congress, and the maintenance of public security. In October and November a congress of representatives was convened in Malolos and adopted a constitution. Mabini was instrumental in the drafting of that constitution.

In January 1899 the Americans announced their plan to annex the Philippines, and in February war broke out between the U.S. forces and the Filipino revolutionaries. In May of that

year, under pressure from his enemies in the movement, Mabini resigned as prime minister.

After leaving the government, Mabini stayed for some time in the province of Pangasinan, writing political articles for independent newspapers. The Americans arrested him in December 1899. Because Mabini refused to take the oath of allegiance to the United States, the U.S. government sent him into exile on the island of Guam in January 1900. In January 1903 Mabini was allowed to return to the Philippines, where he finally took his oath of allegiance to the U.S.

Mabini died on 13 May 1903 in Manila, victim of the cholera epidemic in the town. Mabini had become known as “the sublime paralytic” and “the brains of the revolution.” His funeral, in the words of biographer Cesar Adib Majul, was “one of the biggest funerals witnessed in Manila” (1964: 217).

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Aguinaldo, Emilio (1869–1964); Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Friars, Spanish (the Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship; Katipunan; La Liga Filipina; *La Solidaridad*; Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560–1898); Spanish-American Treaty of Paris (1898); Spanish-American War (1898)

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MAC DYNASTY (1527–1592)

Usurper Dynasty of Vietnam

The Mac dynasty was often underestimated as a usurper dynasty of Vietnam. In the first half of the sixteenth century, a general of the Le dynasty named Mac Dang Dung (r. 1527–1541), whose hometown was Co Trai village (now located in the suburb of Hai Phong city), utilized a disturbance in and around the capital to seize the central army, defeat other generals, suppress

rebellions, and subsequently establish a new dynasty at Thang Long (present-day Hanoi) in 1527.

Mac Dang Dung insisted that he was a descendant of Mac Hien Tich (a civil officer and the successful candidate of the competitive examination of the Tran dynasty) and Mac Dinh Chi (also a civil officer of the Ly dynasty, and a successful candidate). But this assertion is denied by Chinese and Vietnamese sources. His ancestors might have been the maritime people living along the coast of the South China Sea.

After coming to the throne at Thang Long, Mac Dang Dung demanded recognition from the Ming emperor as the king of Annam, but the Le emperor Trang Tong also sent a mission to insist upon his own legitimacy and the title of King of Annam. In the Ming court many officers insisted upon sending an army against Mac, but the military power of the Ming was too weak. Finally in 1541, the Ming sent a mission to give the title “capital commandant of Annam” (*An Nam Do thong su*, in Sino-Vietnamese) to Dang Dung; he died shortly thereafter. His son, the second emperor, Mac Dang Doanh (r. 1530–1540; the temple name is Mac Thai Tong), had already died, so his son Mac Phuc Hai (r. 1541–1546) ascended the throne.

In order to win over the people of the Red River delta, Mac rulers did not change the political administration of the Le on a large scale. But in the area from Thanh Hoa to Thuan Quang, under the control of the Le, they reestablished the five-chief military commission system based on the soldiers of four provinces of the Red River delta. Mac family members and their supporters occupied most of these commissions.

Owing to the dependence on civil officers for the maintenance of the administrative system, Mac rulers accepted civil officials who had previously served the Le. In order to increase the number of civil administrators, competitive examinations were introduced every three years from 1529 to 1592 (a total of twenty-two times, selecting 484 persons). In fact, many former civil officers of the Le participated in the Mac government.

The economic base of the Mac is uncertain, owing to their lack of resources, although their homeland—the eastern part of the Red River delta—was a center in the East and Southeast Asian maritime trade, as well as a production

center for ceramics. The land distribution system of the Hong Duc period continued on.

Mac efforts notwithstanding, many people went south to support the restoration of the Le dynasty in Thanh Hoa. Throughout the sixteenth century, Mac–Le animosity was played out on the battlefield. Despite their numerical advantage over the Le, Mac forces failed to be victorious. In addition, the Nguyễn family (also a subject family of the Le, based in the Quang Binh–Quang Tri–Thua Thien area) organized a naval force to attack the Mac’s ports along the coast. In the northern area, semi-independent chiefs also resisted Mac rule. In 1592 the Le army under General Trinh Tung occupied Ha Noi. The last emperor of the Mac, Mac Mau Hop (r. 1562–1592), was killed, and the dynasty was overthrown. But some family members, such as Mac Kinh Cung, escaped into the northern mountain area (Cao Bang, Lang Son, etc.) and maintained their regional power until the second half of the seventeenth century. The Qing court, according to Ming policy, continued to bestow the title of emperor on Mac lords until 1677.

Sources on the history of the Mac dynasty are minimal; consequently, little has been known about this period. Efforts are under way in Vietnam to collect source materials, including inscriptions. Some promising finds were made in the 1990s.

YAO TAKAO

See also Age of Commerce; Ceramics; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (Pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Hanoi (Thang-long); Le Dynasty (1428–1527; 1533–1789); Mac Tien Tu (1700–1780); Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Trinh Family (1597–1786)

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MAC THIEN TU (1700–1780) "King of Cambodia"

Mac Thien Tu was a chief of Cancao (or Hatien in Vietnamese) chiefdom of the second generation. His father, Mac Cuu, was a Cantonese migrant who left China in 1671. He first settled in Phnom Penh and traveled to the Philippines and Java. His success began when he visited Banday Mas, a thriving port town on the Cambodian coast, and saw the many Chinese, Viet, Khmer, and Malay merchants gathered there. He bought the town's gambling den on which the Khmer king levied taxes and set up a gambling farm, thus becoming one of the earliest tax farmers in Southeast Asia. "Gambling farm" was a designated activity (gambling) or commodity (opium, alcohol) where taxes were imposed. "Tax farmers," often Chinese businessmen, bid for the right to collect taxes, for instance for gambling in a certain town. The ruler of the kingdom/sultanate awarded this right to collect taxes to the highest bidder. The "tax farmer" then paid a fixed agreed amount of money to the ruler for the right to collect taxes for a specified period of time, often one year. Mac Thien Tu also discovered buried silver and consequently became very wealthy. Based on this sudden and mysterious wealth, he gathered several more merchants from the region to him, and Banday Mas became a prosperous port, later known as Cancao.

Mac Thien Tu was the only son of the marriage between Mac Cuu and a woman of Viet origin from the Bien Hoa area of the Mekong Delta. He was born in Ream on the Khmer coast when the family was sojourning there. Succeeding his father as chief in 1735, Mac Thien Tu continued his late father's "free port" policy and encouraged merchants from all ethnic backgrounds. This made Hatien a ren-

devous in the trading networks among China, the Mekong Delta, Siam, and the Malay Peninsula. By the 1760s, under Mac Thien Tu's rule, Hatien became the best-known port in the Gulf of Siam long before the founding of Saigon and Bangkok.

Seeking to put Hatien on a firmer footing in the politics of the region, Mac Thien Tu attempted to establish regular trade and contacts with regions both near and far. In his 1742 letter to the Japanese shogunate written in Khmer, he used his Khmer name *Neak Somdec Preah Sotoat* and the title "King of Cambodia." His younger sister, Mac Kim Dinh, was married to the son of the famous Chinese general Tran Thuong Xuyen (Chen Shang Chuan in Chinese), who was most active in the Bien Hoa area in the late seventeenth century. Being a poet himself, Mac Thien Tu invited Chinese scholars to visit Hatien and write poems about the port. When the scholars brought these poems back to China, they aroused strong interest among the literary circle in Canton, inspiring poems about Hatien to be written by those who had never set foot there. The collection of these poems, *Minh Bac Di Du*, was edited and prefaced by Mac Thien Tu in 1737.

As a semi-independent fiefdom, Hatien under Mac Thien Tu paid tribute to the Nguyễn kingdom rather than taxes. In the mid-eighteenth century Mac Thien Tu also reportedly cast coins for Hatien. His multiethnic policy saw Khmer, Viets, and Malays attain high office under his rule. The Hatien army included Chinese, Khmer, and most likely Vietnamese. As part of this policy Mac Thien Tu tolerated, indeed protected, Christians, giving shelter to missionaries of the Missions Étrangères de Paris after the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767. He allowed them to choose Hon Dat as the new site of their college. This religious tolerance was unusual among the Southeast Asian rulers at the time.

Mac Thien Tu played the role of middleman in the Viet-Khmer conflicts (1754–1756) and harbored Khmer refugees. In 1757, when Cambodia was again in chaos, the prince Nac Ton fled to Hatien seeking Mac Thien Tu's protection. Mac adopted Nac Ton as his son and, through the Nguyễn court, made Nac Ton the king of Cambodia. In return Nac Ton ceded Bassac, Tra Vinh, Sa Dec, and Chau Doc to the Nguyễn, the areas immediately to the east and west of today's Hau Giang River. All

the coastal areas of the western Mekong were ceded to Hatien.

Hatien's prosperity and increasing sphere of influence created suspicion not only in Siam and the Nguyễn generals in the Mekong Delta but also among the Teochiu Chinese active in the areas along the Gulf of Siam. With its strategic position, Hatien was forced to play a role in the late-eighteenth-century politics in this area. Its fate, however, was doomed, as the only semi-independent kingdom situated between Siam and Vietnam, the two rapidly emerging modern nation-states. The situation intensified when Chao Chuy, the Ayutthayan prince, fled to Hatien for Mac Thien Tu's protection. Mac sheltered him and refused to send him back despite the pleas of the new Siamese king, Taksin. Meanwhile Mac Thien Tu's adopted son, the pro-Vietnamese Khmer king Nac Ton, refused to send tribute to Taksin. In 1771, Hatien fell under Siamese attack, partly because of the Nguyễn generals' delay in sending Vietnamese reinforcement.

After the fall of Hatien, Mac Thien Tu actively supported the Nguyễn in the Bassac area. In 1777, Mac Thien Tu and his followers moved back to the Kompong Som area, planning to resettle in the Malay Peninsula, but they were stopped by the envoys of King Taksin, who welcomed them to Thonburi. In 1780, Mac Thien Tu was forced to commit suicide and all his followers were killed when Taksin suspected that they were spies of the Nguyễn.

LI TANA

See also Age of Commerce; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Hatien; Phya Taksin (Phya Tak [Sin], King Taksin) (r. 1767–1782)

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MACAPAGAL, DIOSDADO (1910–1997)

Unfulfilled Good Intentions

Diosdado Macapagal was the fifth president of the postwar Philippine Republic, serving a single term from 1961 to 1965. He attempted to alleviate long-standing problems in Philippine society and economy—namely, landownership and economic underdevelopment. However, he was hampered by a hostile legislature and was not able to carry out all his policies.

Macapagal was born on 28 September 1910 in the town of Lubao, Pampanga, Luzon. His parents were both from the tenant farmer class. Macapagal studied at the University of the Philippines, the Philippine Law School, and the University of Santo Tomas, and passed the bar examination in 1936. He practiced law and then went on to obtain a Master of Laws degree from the University of Santo Tomas in 1941. In addition to his legal practice, he had begun teaching law when the Pacific War (1941–1945) intervened. After the war, Macapagal obtained a doctorate in Civil Laws and another in Economics, both from the University of Santo Tomas.

Macapagal joined the newly created Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the

Philippines in 1946. As a diplomat, he negotiated the transfer of the Turtle Islands from Great Britain to the Philippines and served briefly in the Philippine embassy in the United States.

Macapagal entered politics in 1949, winning a seat in the House of Representatives. He was reelected to a second term in 1953. He wrote bills designed to improve social and economic conditions in the rural areas, and he sponsored a resolution calling the British annexation of North Borneo (Sabah) illegal. He was named chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and participated in various foreign conferences and assignments as a member of the Philippine panel. He defended himself and the Philippines from criticism by the delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

In 1957, Macapagal won the election for vice-president. The president, Carlos P. Garcia (t. 1957–1961), however, belonged to the rival political party and thus did not delegate much work to Macapagal.

In November 1961, Macapagal won the presidential election, to become the fifth president of the postwar Philippine Republic. He announced that he aimed to solve immediate problems and build, both materially and spiritually, for the future. Macapagal had inherited an economy in trouble—as well as outgoing president Carlos P. Garcia's last-minute appointment of officials to key government posts.

Macapagal attempted to liberalize the Philippine economy and restore free enterprise by lifting exchange and import controls, and he devalued the Philippine peso to its actual value in the free market. He pushed for a serious land reform program and abolished tenancy, and he embarked on an ambitious nationwide electrification program. His administration built roads and public housing and sought to improve the agricultural sector. To strengthen the Philippine economy, Macapagal also sought to assist income-generating private enterprises. He attempted to restore honesty and pride to government service. Many of his plans, however, were not carried out because of the legislature, which was dominated by the rival political party. Partisan politics severely limited the execution of Macapagal's ambitious plans.

In the field of international relations at the time, Philippine–American relations deteriorated

when the U.S. Congress disapproved further rehabilitation funds for the country. Partly as a result, and also because of a rising sense of nationalism in the Philippines, Macapagal moved the date of Philippine independence from 4 July 1946 to 12 June 1898. He pushed for a Southeast Asian association, and took steps to form the Association for Southeast Asia (ASA) and later, in July 1963, Maphilindo (consisting of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia). He filed the government's official claim to Sabah (North Borneo) on 22 June 1963. Macapagal also tried to shift the thrust of Philippine foreign relations from the United States to Asia, Europe, South America, and Africa.

Macapagal ran for reelection in 1965, but he lost to Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989). After his defeat, Macapagal retired from politics. In 1971 he was elected delegate to the constitutional convention, to which he was named president. The new constitution was ratified in January 1973, but in a questionable manner. Macapagal criticized this act by President Ferdinand Marcos, as well as Marcos's declaration of martial law in 1972. He elaborated his criticisms in a book, *Democracy in the Philippines* (1976). The Marcos government harassed Macapagal by filing a legal case against him.

Diosdado Macapagal died on 21 April 1997. He had far-reaching ideas and the intellectual background to chart a firm foundation for the Philippines and steer the country along a more nationalistic and regional path. He attempted to restore honesty in government. His policies were farsighted, but they were defeated by partisan politics. The roots of a Southeast Asia-wide organization can, however, be traced to him.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Cold War; Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon) (People's Anti-Japanese Army) (1942); Maphilindo Concept; Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989); Martial Law (1972–1981) (the Philippines); Philippines–U.S. “Special Relationship”; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Sabah Claim; Santo Tomas, University of; U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia

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General Douglas MacArthur wades ashore during the initial U.S. landing in the Philippines in October 1944, making good on his famous 1940 promise of “I shall return.” (U.S. National Archives)

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MACARTHUR, GENERAL DOUGLAS (1880–1964)

Wartime General

The son of an army officer, Douglas MacArthur became a soldier, serving in the U.S. Army in the Philippines and in the Great War (1914–1918). After serving as U.S. chief of staff in the early 1930s, he returned to the Philippines as an adviser to and later commander of the Filipino army. MacArthur avoided the humiliation of

defeat when President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945) ordered him to leave the Philippines in February 1942. In doing so he made the famous promise, “I shall return.”

MacArthur became supreme commander of Allied forces in the South–West Pacific Area (SWPA), based in Australia, whose military and economic resources he harnessed to the Allied war effort. Struggling to secure reinforcements and a voice in U.S. strategy, MacArthur directed Australian and U.S. troops in the reconquest of Australian Papua by early 1943. Using strong air and naval forces, he directed an advance to retake New Guinea in a series of bold amphibious landings, advancing closer to his goal, the liberation of the Philippines.

In late 1944, MacArthur’s forces landed on Leyte, where he commanded the Asian theater’s largest land operations. Early in 1945, while his forces attacked Borneo, MacArthur was given command of the projected Allied invasion of Japan. Possibly to deflect his domestic political aspirations, MacArthur was appointed Supreme

Allied Commander in occupied Japan, which under his direction was dramatically transformed.

MacArthur later became commander of U.S. and UN forces in Korea. He was dismissed, however, in April 1951 after opposing President Harry S Truman's (1884–1972) policies. MacArthur was a complex and controversial figure, easy to caricature but difficult to understand. He dominated the Allied war effort in the southwest Pacific theater, crucially influencing the outcome of the campaigns in the region.

PETER STANLEY

See also Bataan Death March; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Korean War (1950–1953)

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MACAU (MACAO)

Long-Lasting Colonial Outpost

A former Portuguese colony at the southern tip of the Pearl River delta in South China, Macau was the oldest European enclave in Asia. Macau has a glorious past as a regional and international trading center for Europeans from the sixteenth century, before Hong Kong superseded it in the mid-nineteenth century.

Macau, consisting of Macau Peninsula and the two islands of Taipa and Coloane, remained an unnoticed and unproductive place until occupied by the Portuguese in 1556, after which time they made strongholds at Goa and Melaka in 1510 and 1511, respectively. The acquisition was prompted by the need for a transshipment base in China for the newly opened Japan market, and it was facilitated by the trust of the Chinese officials in the Portuguese, who displayed astute ability in combating piracy. Shortly after its establishment, Macau developed into an international emporium, an entrepôt serving three lucrative trade routes: Macau–Melaka–Goa–Lisbon; Guangzhou (Canton)–Macau–Nagasaki; and Macau–Manila–Mexico—all the trades being monopolized by Portuguese vessels. An outpost of Portugal's maritime empire, Macau had both international and regional significance, the lat-

ter especially in providing vessels for trading countries such as China, which prohibited its merchants from going abroad.

Macau also served as a religious center spreading Christianity (Catholicism) to China, Japan, and Southeast Asia. It was common practice among Portuguese merchants to seek baptized girls in Melaka and Nagasaki as wives and carry them to Macau, which practice subsequently gave rise to generations of native-born Macanese.

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, Macau had reached the heyday of its commercial history. Thereafter, the Portuguese faced many challenges in maintaining the unique role of Macau. The Japanese trade, the most lucrative, was forced into termination in 1636 when the Portuguese were expelled from Nagasaki on account of the Tokugawa shogunate's hatred toward Christianity. (Apparently, Christian daimyos were suspected of plotting against the ruling shogunate.) Unable to provide China with the much-needed Japanese silver, Portuguese traders were barred from Guangzhou's twice-yearly trade fairs after 1640.

The Portuguese monopoly in the Southeast Asian market broke down after the Dutch displaced the Portuguese from Melaka in 1641, and other European powers (namely, the English) entered the market as competitors. The imperial decree of 1723 that facilitated Chinese merchants' going abroad cut the demand for Portuguese vessels, and the Portuguese monopoly of European commerce became history. But Macau still functioned as the only port in China open to European traders of all nationalities, and it continued to flourish in the first half of the Qing (Manchu) dynasty (1644–1912), when Guangzhou was made the only port open for trade. The city functioned as a logistical base for European traders who went up to Guangzhou during the trading season from October to January.

To Macau, the nineteenth century was a turning point in two ways. The cession of Hong Kong to Britain in 1842 as a Crown colony prompted Portugal to seek from China a formal recognition of the colonial status of Macau, before which the land had been only informally leased to the Portuguese. This resulted in the Luso-Chinese Treaty of Friendship and Trade, ratified in 1888. Another step downward was the replacement of Macau by Hong

Kong, with its deep natural harbor, as an international entrepôt. Hong Kong developed even stronger economic ties with Southeast Asia; it and Singapore (1819) became the two trade centers in the region. Although Macau followed the example of Hong Kong in declaring itself a free port, it was gradually reduced to an appendage of Hong Kong. All kinds of businesses and investments shifted to Hong Kong, even to the extent that the supply of daily necessities in Macau depended upon reexports from Hong Kong.

Macau's fortunes began to revive in the mid-1930s, especially after 1936, when Guangdong imposed a universal ban on gambling; owners of gambling dens shifted their businesses to Macau. The industry earned Macau the nickname "the Monte Carlo in the East" during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), when the Japanese honored the neutrality of Macau and casinos in Macau hosted visitors of every kind, Chinese and foreign. It was also during these brief years that Macau showed a revival of foreign trade, arising from the increasing demand from the influx of Chinese refugees from the mainland after the fall of Guangzhou in 1938 and Hong Kong in 1941.

Postwar Macau developed close trade relationships with Hong Kong, mainland China, Japan, the United States, and Europe after the embargo on Macau was lifted by the United States in 1956. Trade with Southeast Asia was maintained on a very low level.

Macau was returned to China in 1999 following a twelve-year transitional period agreed to between China and Portugal. During the transition, arrangements were made for the handover of sovereignty, and, coincidental with the economic downturn in the region, measures were designed to attract overseas Chinese to Southeast Asia for settlement and investment in Macau.

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also Albuquerque, Afonso de (c. 1462–1515); Catholicism; Hong Kong; Melaka; Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Missionaries, Christian; Portuguese Asian Empire; Qing (Ching/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912); Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Timor

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MADIUN AFFAIR (SEPTEMBER 1948) "A Stab in the Back"

The Madiun affair was a revolt launched by followers of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) to wrest power from the republican government led by Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta. Madiun is a town located in East Java, some 120 kilometers from Yogyakarta.

On the night of 17 September, the Democratic Front government, led ostensibly by Musso (the prewar PKI leader who had just returned from exile), started a rebellion. This rebellion took place at a difficult time. Dutch military forces were poised in strength to invade Republican-held territories in Java. Ongoing negotiations with the Dutch to reach a political settlement on Indonesia's independence had reached a stalemate. The Dutch blockade of the republic resulted in food shortages, which were made worse by the presence of large numbers of soldiers and refugees who had retreated from the front lines.

The dire circumstances contributed to an environment ripe for rebellion. Prime Minister Hatta was forced to launch rationalization measures that would strengthen the republic. Army units were identified for demobilization, and civil servants and general workers faced retrenchment even though alternative jobs were unavailable. Many of those affected were also members of the SOBSI, a pro-PKI trade union, and the PKI naturally regarded Hatta's rationalization program as an anti-PKI measure.

Hatta (1902–1980) was the prime minister succeeding Amir Sjarifuddin (1907–1948), who was the leader of the Socialist Party that was

closely allied to the Labor Party and the communists led by Musso. These diverse factions regrouped to form the PKI, and the leaders embarked on a speaking tour (which included Madiun on its itinerary) to publicize the amalgamation as a reconstructed party. The panicky conditions at the local level at Madiun fed the rebellion. Musso and company, in the vicinity of Madiun, threw in their lot.

The rebellion was quickly brought under control by the Indonesian army. The national leaders—Sukarno (1901–1970) and Hatta—swung into action as soon as they heard about the rebellion. Sukarno went on the air asking the Indonesian people to choose between him and the communist leaders. The question was rhetorical. Sukarno was *the* established leader, while Musso and Sjarifuddin probably had not planned the rebellion itself; they had been surprised by the independent initiatives of lower-level leaders who presented a *fait accompli* for endorsement.

The debacle of the rebellion suggested that the PKI was not in control of events. Indeed, the party was just being reconstructed. The leaders had not yet had the opportunity to work the ground. Generally, Indonesia had just emerged from the Japanese occupation (1942–1945) and was caught in the throes of a life-and-death struggle against the returning Dutch colonialists. It was not too far-fetched to assert that the Madiun affair caught everyone unprepared.

The Madiun affair, despite its brevity, had important consequences for all the parties concerned. The communist leadership was decimated in one fell swoop. Musso was caught and killed very soon after the rebellion. Amir Sjarifuddin and Tan Malaka (1897?–1949) faced the same fate, the latter dying under mysterious circumstances in 1949, although he did not support the rebellion at Madiun. Their deaths marked the end of an older generation of communist leaders and paved the way for the emergence of a set of new and younger leaders who were convinced that the way to power was not via open rebellion.

The Indonesian army became the undying enemy of the PKI. The Madiun affair was blamed on the PKI, which was regarded as stabbing the nation in the back while it faced the Dutch opponents. The army's distrust of the PKI continued well into the postindependence period.

At the national level, the ongoing Indonesian revolution took a turn to the right. The failed Madiun affair made clear that the supporters of the nationalist (as opposed to socialist) goals of the revolution had the upper hand over those who advocated socioeconomic change via socialism or communism.

The Dutch regarded the Madiun affair as vindication that the republican government was not as popular or as influential as it professed. The PKI revolt was a sign of disaffection. This strengthened the hawks among the colonial authorities who saw in the aftermath of the Madiun affair a golden opportunity to launch a military action against the republic. This took place in December 1948, some three months later.

At the international level, the decisive victory over the PKI impressed the U.S. government. At a time when the worldwide struggle against communism was imminent, and the United States was assembling allies against foes, the Sukarno–Hatta government basked in its newly acquired credibility as a reliable anti-communist partner. With U.S. support ensured, its diplomatic front against The Netherlands received a boost. However, U.S. support also meant reliance on the United States in the struggle against the Dutch, instead of greater self-reliance.

YONG MUN CHEONG

See also Cold War; Decolonization of Southeast Asia; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Sjarifuddin, Amir (1907–1948); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); United States Involvement in Southeast Asia

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MADJELIS SJURO MUSLIMIN INDONESIA (MASJUMI) (COUNCIL OF INDONESIAN MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONS)

The abbreviation *Masjumi* has applied to two different Indonesian organizations. The well-known reference is to the political party that was founded on 7 November 1945 and disbanded by Sukarno (1901–1970), president of the Republic of Indonesia (1945–1962), in August 1960. During the Japanese occupation (1942–1945) of the Netherlands Dutch East Indies (present-day Indonesia), however, the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations had been created under the same name. This council could be considered the successor to the MIAI (Madjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia), the Supreme Indonesian Council of Islam, founded in 1937. The MIAI had been abolished by the Japanese authorities, and in its place a new organization, the Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi), was established under Japanese control.

What Putera (Center of Peoples' Power) was to the nationalist movement, Masjumi was to the Islamic movement, with one important difference: the Islamic elite gained much more from the Masjumi than the nationalists did from Putera. The council was set up by the Japanese to strengthen the unity of all Islamic organizations in order to mobilize them in the interests of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. In contrast to the MIAI, the Muhammadiyah and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the two most important Islamic organizations, both participated in the new council. In 1912 modernist religious leaders founded the Muhammadiyah as a nonpolitical reformist association. The NU was set up in 1926 by orthodox *'ulama* to maintain the authority of the traditional Islamic faith characteristic of the Javanese countryside. The leading positions in the new council were distributed among the supporters of both organizations. The founder of the NU, Kiyai Haji Mohammad Hasjim Asjari, was appointed head of the council. These measures taken by the Japanese were of great importance to the Islamic movement. For the first time, its

leaders came into direct contact with government officials at the highest level.

The Islamic movement gained much from the opportunities offered by the Japanese. For the first time the movement had a position in the administrative structure. The establishment of the Masjumi together with the Office for Religious Affairs meant in fact that, besides the secular administration, a religious apparatus had been created. The Masjumi set up branches in each residency and principality in Java. It was the task of the local branches to supervise the local religious leaders and the mosque officials, who earlier had fallen under the authority of the regents. In return, the Masjumi had to make concessions for Japanese favors. The organization was expected to arrange meetings in which people were encouraged to support the Japanese war effort. In the mosques the imam, heads of congregations, had to pray for Japanese victory. Besides the Masjumi, a separate organization had to be set up, on the basis of the Koran, to urge the peasants to deliver the compulsory amount of rice.

At the beginning of December 1944 the Masjumi received permission from the Japanese to establish its own military organization. The Hizbullah, the party of Allah, was meant for Muslim youths. The first trainees came from *peasantren*, religious schools, and after a three-month training course, they spread out over the countryside to set up local units. The Hizbullah played an important role during the revolutionary period, and many of its members later joined the Indonesian army. In the course of 1945 the Japanese granted other long-standing wishes of the Islamic movement. Accordingly, in April 1945, the Japanese authorities decided that from 1 May all government offices would be closed on Friday in the afternoon. In July 1945 the first Islamic university, located in Jakarta, opened its doors. Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980) was appointed head of this institute. In the same month an Islamic Institute with an extended library was also opened in Jakarta.

Supported by Japanese policy, the Islamic movement could entrench itself in a strong position in Indonesian society during the Japanese occupation with a network of local offices all over Indonesia. It was a position that they only might have dreamed of during Dutch colonial rule. At the end of the Japanese occupation, the

Masjumi had become part of the administration itself. The organization was granted an increasing measure of home rule for Indonesian Islam in Java, and the apparatus created offered a basic structure for the establishment of a Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1946. Moreover, for the first time in the history of the Islamic movement, the Islamic elite won a position in the Indonesian political arena and would play an important role in the new political constellation via the Masjumi, which was reorganized as a political party on 7 November 1945.

ELLY TOUWEN-BOUWSMA

TRANSLATED BY ROSEMARY
ROBSON-MCKILLOP

See also Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Islam in Southeast Asia; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); *Kiai*; Muhammadiyah; Nahdatul Ulama; Pusat Tenaga Rakjat (PUTERA) (Centre of Peoples' Power)

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**MADJLISUL ISLAMIL A'LA
INDONESIA (MIAI) (GREAT ISLAMIC
COUNCIL OF INDONESIA)**

Madjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia (MIAI, Great Islamic Council of Indonesia) was a loose federation of Islamic organizations formed in late colonial Indonesia, representing a partial and temporary truce in the struggle between modernist and traditionalist or orthodox Islam. During the Japanese occupation, the MIAI was briefly maintained as a body for the mobilization of Muslims, but it was soon replaced by the Masjumi.

From the mid-1920s, Indonesian Islam had been divided among three principal organizations: the modernist Muhammadiyah, the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama (NU), and the radical

Sarekat Islam, as well as many smaller parties and associations. Sarekat Islam (SI; later Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, PSII) had declined in importance as it became clear that radical confrontation with the Dutch would not end colonialism, but the much larger Muhammadiyah and NU were divided doctrinally and socially. SI had sought to assert its leadership of Indonesian Islam by convening a series of al-Islam congresses, but in 1937, Muhammadiyah and NU jointly organized a congress in Surabaya that agreed to create the Madjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia (MIAI) as an umbrella organization. The immediate purpose of the new council was to oppose a change to colonial marriage laws, which would effectively have banned polygamy. The PSII joined the MIAI in 1939.

The MIAI was part of the broad cooperative stream in Indonesian nationalism that accepted engagement with colonial institutions but sought to marshal both intellectual arguments and the force of public opinion to achieve changes in colonial policy. In 1941 the MIAI joined the political federation GAPI (Gabungan Politik Indonesia, Indonesian Political Union) and an association of government employees to form the Madjelis Rakjat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Council). This coalition pressed the colonial government for an Indonesian parliament and other concessions to national identity similar to those proposed in the Soetardjo Petition (1936) and the Wiwoho Resolution (1940).

After Japan conquered Java in 1942, the occupation authorities reconstituted the MIAI as a body to mobilize Muslims for the war effort. The council's loose structure, however, and the fact that its leadership came into the hands of PSII leaders who, although generally sympathetic to Japan, had a weak popular base, meant that it was not very effective in this role. The Japanese soon decided to develop direct relations with rural Islamic teachers (*kiai*) and to some extent the Muhammadiyah, leaving the MIAI to seek a mainly social role in promoting an Islamic treasury that would collect religious tax (*zakat*) for distribution to the poor. The MIAI was dissolved by Japanese orders in October 1943, and its coordinating role was taken over by the Masjumi in December.

To some extent, the MIAI represented a softening of the modernist-traditionalist divide in Indonesian Islam in the face of common ad-

versaries, but the council was never permitted to create a broad Islamic platform. Its cooperative yet independent-minded relationship with both Dutch and Japanese reflected the perennial difficulties that Islamic organizations faced in deciding the terms of their dealings with non-Islamic authorities.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); *Kiai*; Majelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi) (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations); Muhammadiyah; Nahdatul Ulama; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Sarekat Islam (1912); Soetardjo Petition (1936); Wiwoho Resolution (1940)

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MADURA

Islamic Isle

Madura, the island situated off the northeast coast of Java, is always mentioned in the same breath with Java. For a long time the island has been considered an appendage of Java. In all administrative reports and documents up to the present, Madura can be found under the heading “Java and Madura.” Economically, the island was of little interest to the Dutch, and for a long time Madurese culture and society did not attract attention from scholars. Only in the 1970s did Madura get the attention it deserves. This resulted in a great number of studies and articles about the island and its inhabitants.

The histories of Madura and Java have been inextricably linked for centuries. Before the island was definitely incorporated into the Dutch colonial state in the late nineteenth century, the three principalities of Bangkalan, Pamekasan, and Sumenep had at one time or another been subjugated by various realms and coastal states in Java. Up till about 1500 the principalities fell

within the political sphere of influence of the East Javanese Hindu realms of Kediri, Singosari, and Majapahit. After the introduction of Islam in the sixteenth century, however, they became more or less dependents of the Islamic coastal principalities of Demak, Gresik, and Surabaya, successively. In 1624, Madura became part of the Islamic state of Mataram, until it fell under the hegemony of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) in the mid-eighteenth century. In the course of the nineteenth century, the indirectly ruled Madurese principalities lost their autonomy and became part of the Dutch colonial state. On instigation of the Dutch, the *Negara* (nation-state) Madura, as part of the United States of Indonesia, had been formed in 1948. In 1950 the parliament of Madura abolished the *negara* and merged with the republic of Indonesia.

The inhabitants on the island have always been forced to look for a living outside their island. The soil on Madura is barren, and barely enough crops can be grown to feed the population. Those living on the island itself numbered about 2.8 million in 1976 (De Jonge 1988: 15–20). The majority of the Madurese on the island subsist on agriculture, although fishing, salt production, and maritime trade are also important. Fruit and tobacco cultivation are both important sources of income, and the breeding of cattle and animal husbandry are widespread. There is no large-scale industry on the island.

From the middle of the eighteenth century, Madurese made a practice of migrating to East Java. In 1930 about 2.5 million Madurese were settled outside their homeland, most of them in East Java (Department of Economic Affairs 1947). In the course of the twentieth century, many more migrated to the cities of Surabaya and Jakarta, as well as the port cities of Pontianak and Banjarmasin in Kalimantan. Most of them seek a living in trade, transportation, or handicrafts. On major Islamic holidays, such as *Maulud* and *Id al Fitri*, they return to their homeland to celebrate these festivals with their relatives. Extrapolation from the figures available puts their number at about 13 million in the late 1990s.

Madurese are strict Muslims and adhere to the tenets of the Shafi school. They observe the Five Pillars of Islam: acknowledging no other God but Allah and Muhammad as His Prophet, performing the five daily prayers,

contributing their yearly *zakat*, fasting during Ramadan, and performing the pilgrimage to Mecca. To be a *haji* means not only the performance of the pilgrimage but also an increase of status in the community. Despite the fact that the Madurese are pious Muslims, their religious conceptions are intertwined with non-Islamic elements. To avert evil influences, a *salamatan* (blessings for safety, security, and well-being) is organized on all sorts of occasions—birth, circumcision, marriage, and death—including at the start of a business or before going on a journey. The prayers said during these religious meals are addressed not only to Allah but also to the ancestors.

Traditional values are strong among the Madurese. The rules given by the ancestors represent the *adat*, custom, and must be respected if health and prosperity are to be enjoyed. Despite this, people are expected to be good Muslims. To prevent conflicts as far as possible, the rules of social conduct are very strict. The Madurese are noted for their bull-racing and for their practice of *carok*, which involves eliminating an adversary with a sickle-shaped knife. The threat of *carok* is always present among Madurese when prestige and honor are at stake. The motives for *carok* include adultery, quarrels about goods and cattle, and losing “face” in public.

For a Madurese, the best way to keep up his reputation is to win a bull race. In these competitions, teams of two bulls must pull a sledge and jockey as fast as possible along a track of more than a hundred meters. The Madurese bull races are unique in the world, and because of the folklore attached to them they have long been a tourist attraction.

ELLY TOUWEN-BOUWSMA

TRANSLATED BY ROSEMARY
ROBSON-MCKILLOP

See also Java; Islam in Southeast Asia; Kadiri (Kediri); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Mataram; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Singhasari (1222–1293)

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MAGELLAN, FERDINAND (1480–1521)

See Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia

MAGSAYSAY, RAMON (1907–1957) People's President

Ramon Magsaysay was the third president of the post-Pacific War (1941–1945) Philippine Republic, serving from 1954 to 1957. As president he was extremely popular with the masses and strove to improve their conditions as well as the relationship of the government to them. Anti-communist, during the height of the Cold War he worked for close relations with the United States but was also open-minded enough to see other opportunities for the country. Prior to becoming president, he had been a guerrilla leader during the Pacific War and congressman and secretary of national defense during the turbulent Huk Rebellion of the late 1940s and early 1950s.

Magsaysay was born on 31 August 1907 in the town of Iba, Zambales. His father, Exequiel Magsaysay, was a trade school teacher. Magsaysay obtained a bachelor's degree in commerce from José Rizal College in Manila in 1932. Mechanically inclined, he worked in a bus company in Manila while still studying, and rose to become its chief administrator.

During the Pacific War, Magsaysay joined the U.S.-Filipino defense forces as a civilian. With the surrender of organized resistance in May 1942, he became a guerrilla leader in Luzon, and with the return of the Americans in 1945, he was appointed military governor of the province of Zambales.

In 1946 he entered politics and became a member of the House of Representatives as a member of the newly formed Liberal Party. As a congressman, he was named chairman of the House Committee on National Defense and

headed a Philippine mission to the United States to work for veterans' benefits. He sponsored bills relating to veterans' benefits and military affairs. He was reelected in 1949, but before his term was over, he was appointed secretary of national defense by then-president Elpidio Quirino (t. 1948–1953), on 1 September 1950. At that time, the antigovernment Huk Rebellion seriously threatened the Quirino administration. Staunchly anticommunist, Magsaysay vigorously led the campaign against the Huks, through combined military operations and socioeconomic programs. He paid surprise visits to military camps, reorganized the military high command, and replaced inefficient officers, thereby raising the efficiency of the Philippine military establishment. Through his dynamic efforts, the Huk Rebellion was broken. Luis Taruc (1913–), leader of the Huks, surrendered to Magsaysay in May 1954, after Magsaysay had become president.

In 1953, Magsaysay ran for president against Elpidio Quirino, who was running for a second term. Charismatic and reaching out to the Filipino masses, Magsaysay won by a large margin. He became the first Filipino president to wear the native formal shirt, the *barong tagalog*, at his inauguration.

Magsaysay adopted a propeople policy, opening the presidential palace, Malacañang, to the general public. He pushed land reform programs and developed cooperatives for rural communities. He worked for legislation that clearly defined tenants' rights. He gave the people an opportunity to air their complaints against the government by opening a special office to hear grievances; he also adopted a program of one-centavo telegrams whereby anyone could send complaints against the government to Manila by telegram. He attempted to keep the price of basic goods affordable and introduced a nationwide social security system. He utilized the military for constructive civic action. Through these policies, Magsaysay tried to bring the government to the people.

In the field of diplomacy, Magsaysay worked closely with the United States, taking a strongly anticommunist stance. The anticommunist Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed during his administration. Despite his pro-American stance, Magsaysay worked for adjustments in Philippine-U.S. economic relations, sending Senator José P. Laurel (1891–



Ramon Magsaysay was a guerrilla leader in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation of World War II. He later became president of the Philippines, serving from 1953 until his death in 1957. (Library of Congress)

1959) to negotiate more balanced terms with Secretary James M. Langley. He also sent a representative, Carlos P. Romulo (b. 1899), to attend the Asian-African conference in Bandung in April 1955, a conference that did not include the United States.

Magsaysay did not live to finish his presidential term. He was killed when his presidential plane crashed in Cebu Island on 17 March 1957.

Magsaysay was known as a dynamic, charismatic leader, who was staunchly anticommunist and pro-American. He embarked on programs that attempted to solve the social and economic difficulties of the Philippines, thereby building a stronger foundation for the country while containing the communist menace during the Cold War. His abrupt death, however, put a sudden end to his administration, an administration that showed how the presidency could be brought closer to

the people. Magsaysay's charisma and dynamism set examples for future Philippine presidents to follow. Furthermore, a foundation was organized in his memory, one that awards prizes to Asians who echo Magsaysay's sentiments of integrity in public office and pragmatic idealism in a democratic society.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Asian–African (Bandung) Conference (April 1955); Cold War; Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban Sa Hapon) (People's Anti-Japanese Army) (1942); Philippines–U.S. “Special Relationship”; Quirino, Elpidio (1890–1956); Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (1954); Taruc, Luis (1913–)

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MAHĀBHĀRATA AND RĀMĀYANA Hindu Epics

The *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana* are among the most useful gifts that Southeast Asia received from India. These two magnificent epics of Visnuite origin are the source of innumerable texts and illustrations. Their success derives from the fact that they are in a sense the expression of the ideal origin of royalty, the king being identified as one of the heroes. Thus in Thailand one of the capitals of the kingdom founded by King U Thong (r. 1351–1369) was called Ayutthaya, after the name of the city that Rama, the hero of the *Rāmāyana*, founded at the end of his epic, Ayodhya.

The *Mahābhārata* is an immense poem of 90,000 verses divided into eighteen chapters that describe the struggle between the Kaurava and the Pandava for control of universal power. The *Rāmāyana* is significantly shorter, containing about 30,000 verses divided into seven

books that describe the events surrounding the abduction of Sita, wife of Rama, by the demon Ravana.

The episodes of the *Mahābhārata* are illustrated by reliefs carved on the entry pavilions of Bapuon (Baphuon) (eleventh century) and at Angkor Vat (Angkor Wat) (twelfth century). On the latter temple a striking relief located at the southern part of the west gallery, first story, depicts a principal event of the epic, the battle of Kuruksetra. This panel, despite its carving, is the only one apart from the central motif that does not take account of the movement of the visitor.

The *Rāmāyana* is present on many monuments, such as the great compositions relating the entire epic—for example, at Prambanan (ninth century, Java). The tale is illustrated by reliefs on the inner face of the balustrade of the Siva temple and terminates on the inner face of the balustrade of the Brahma temple. Another great composition depicts the entire epic on the lower register of the main edifice at Panataran (fourteenth century, Java). The *Rāmāyana* in Cambodia forms part of the iconographic program of numerous monuments: the Bapuon, Angkor Vat, and Bayon. It is also the subject of large frescoes decorating the galleries of the royal palaces of Bangkok and Phnom Penh; the passages from this epic are sometimes illustrated in Buddhist pagodas.

JACQUES DUMARCAY

TRANSLATED BY JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Blitar; Hindu–Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Performing Arts of Southeast Asia; Prambanan; *Wayang kulit*

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**MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD, DR.
(1925–)**

Visionary Leader

Born on 20 December 1925 in Alor Setar, Kedah, in Peninsular Malaysia, Mahathir is the youngest of nine children of Muhamad Iskandar, the headmaster of the Government English School in Kedah. Mahathir studied for two years in a Malay school and then enrolled in the Government English School.

When the Japanese occupied Malaya in 1942, Mahathir—or “Che Det” to his family and close friends—started a coffee shop with a friend and began to acquire knowledge of operating a small business. This experience made him realize the weaknesses and backwardness of the Malays and the need for them to improve economically and academically in order to survive.

Like many young Malays of his time, Mahathir opposed the Malayan Union (MU) scheme imposed by Britain in 1946 because it was outright colonialism and contrary to the earlier British-Malay treaties that recognized Britain merely as “protector” of the Malays and their countries. After passing his senior Cambridge examination, Mahathir gained admission to the King Edward VII College of Medicine in Singapore on a federal government scholarship. It was while in Singapore that many of his articles on various issues appeared, especially in the years from 1948 to 1950 in the *Sunday Times* under the pen name C. H. E. Det. At the college Mahathir met Siti Hasmah Muhammad Ali, whom he married on 5 August 1956.

Upon graduation, he served at government hospitals. In 1957, Mahathir left government service and opened his own private clinic in Alor Setar. His frequent visits to rural areas and his constant mingling with the people made his MAHA Clinic popular among Alor Setar Malays; being active in the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), he was nicknamed Dr. UMNO. Mahathir won the parliamentary seat for Kota Setar in 1964 but lost to Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS) candidate Haji Yusuf Rawa in the 1969 general elections. As a politician Mahathir strongly fought for the betterment of the Malays and urged the government to take concrete steps toward giving the Malays a head start in modern economic activities, particularly through education. He was very critical of the Singapore-based People's



Mahathir bin Mohamad. (Embassy of Malaysia)

Action Party (PAP); he regarded the PAP as an extremist Chinese party working for Chinese domination of the country. Holding this view, Mahathir's non-Malay opponents labeled him ultra-Malay.

Mahathir blamed the May 13, 1969 incident on the government, and particularly on the then prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (t. 1957–1970). He accused the Tunku of being simple-minded and lacking proper understanding and planning for a strong and prosperous Malaysia, with the Malays having a reasonable share of its economic stake. Tunku, on the other hand, blamed “extremists” like Mahathir as the cause of the racial clashes following the 1969 elections. As a result, Mahathir was expelled from UMNO. He returned to his clinic as a private practitioner. It was during this time that in 1970 he published his controversial book *The Malay Dilemma*, which attempted to analyze the Malay mind and the root causes of the Malay plight.

When Tun Abdul Razak (t. 1970–1976) became prime minister, he reinstated Mahathir in UMNO in 1972 and appointed him senator in 1973. After winning in the election of 1974, Mahathir was made minister of education and successfully tackled a number of important issues, thereby endearing himself to UMNO members. He was elected as one of the vice-presidents of UMNO in 1975. When Tun Razak died in 1976, Prime Minister Hussein Onn (t. 1976–1981) appointed Mahathir his deputy, and when Hussein retired on 16 July 1981, Mahathir became the fourth prime minister of Malaysia.

As prime minister, Mahathir was businesslike and forthright. Starting with the “clean, efficient and trustworthy,” “instilling Islamic values,” and “clock-in and clock-out” campaigns, Mahathir then embarked on bigger endeavors such as “Buy British Last,” “Look East,” and “Vision 2020” to transform Malaysia quickly into a developed nation. To achieve this objective he launched the “privatization” policy that hinged on close cooperation between the government and the private sectors in industrial and commercial activities. To tap available internal resources and to encourage and facilitate the participation of as many people as possible in national development, various unit trust schemes were launched beginning with those specifically for the *bumiputera* (indigenous, native) and later for all Malaysians. Despite occasional setbacks, in general his policies proved to be fruitful, and by the 1990s the Malaysian economy was less dependent upon export of primary commodities such as tin and rubber; petroleum and natural gas, palm oil, and electronics were gaining momentum as important foreign exchange earners. Domestically pragmatic and forceful, Mahathir was controversial and sophisticated on the international stage. He has been one of the most outspoken leaders of the Muslim and developing countries championing the cause of the “small nations.”

During his twenty-two years as UMNO president, Barisan Nasional chairman, and Malaysia’s prime minister, Mahathir has had four deputies. The third, Anwar Ibrahim (1947–), is serving a total prison term of fifteen years on charges of corruption and misbehavior; the fourth, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (1939–), succeeded him in October 2003.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Abdul Razak, Tun (1922–1976); Barisan Nasional (National Front) (1974); *Bumiputera* (*Bumiputra*); Malayan/Malaysian Education; Malayan Union (1946); Malays; “May 13, 1969” (Malaysia); People’s Action Party (PAP); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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MAHMUD, SULTAN OF MELAKA (r. 1488–1511)

The Last Malay Ruler of Melaka

Better known as Sultan Mahmud Syah, this last ruler of the Malay Sultanate of Melaka was born Raja Mamat (Raja Muhammad) and ascended the throne after his father, Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah, died of poisoning in 1488; his mother was Tun Senaja, the daughter of Tun Ali and sister of the wealthy Tun Muzaahir (Mutahir). As a young boy, Mahmud was bypassed by his elder half brother of royal blood, Raja Munawar, who was sent to rule Kampar in Sumatra. Mahmud was kept under the care and guidance of the powerful and influential Bendahara Tun Perak (d. ca. 1498), but when the latter died, at the insistence of Tun Senaja, Mahmud appointed his maternal uncle Tun Muzahir as the new *bendahara* (chief minister).

Mahmud was an energetic but impulsive man. The Melakan empire reached its peak politically and economically under his rule, and Tun Muzahir contributed significantly toward

it. The whole of the Malay Peninsula and a large portion of areas on the east coast of Sumatra and the Straits of Melaka were under Melaka's control, directly or otherwise. Not only was the Siamese attempt to reconquer Pahang in 1500 foiled but, in addition, Melaka conquered Manjung in the north and Kelantan in the northeast in the same year. If the *Sulalatus-Salatin* (Malay Annals) is to be believed, as a young man Mahmud was notorious as a womanizer who often created anxiety and hatred among caring parents and husbands. It was on one of these philandering errands that Mahmud was nearly killed by one of his own officials, Tun Biajid. Realizing that he was wrong for transgressing Biajid's home, Mahmud compensated the latter by bestowing on him one of his own favorite concubines, despite which Biajid continued to distance himself from the sultan.

The worst tragedy occurred about a year before the Portuguese conquest in 1511. It started when Mahmud discovered that the bendahara had purposely ignored him by marrying his beautiful daughter, Tun Fatimah, to her cousin, Tun Ali, without first presenting her to the sultan as required by the *adat* (law) of the time. Incidentally, the sultan's major consort, the princess from Pahang, had just died. When, about a year later, the sultan received reports that the bendahara was in the midst of a plot to overthrow him, Mahmud immediately ordered the assassination of the bendahara—who curiously did not attempt to prove his innocence. Also killed were the bendahara's accomplices: the state treasurer, Seri Nara Aldiraja; the head of the state security agency, Tun Hassan Temenggung; and Tun Fatima's husband, Tun Ali. The incident robbed Melaka of some of its more capable ministers, weakened its leadership, and contributed to the success of the Portuguese onslaught.

The family dispute, however, continued, and its seriousness is borne out by the fact that after the Portuguese occupation of Melaka (1511), Raja Munawar's son, Raja Abdullah, who succeeded his father in Kampar, attempted to get the Portuguese to recognize him as the rightful successor to the Melakan empire. Abdullah was unfortunately abducted by the Portuguese to Portugal. Mahmud also secretly ordered the assassination of his other half brother, Raja Zainal Abidin, who was fond of deliberately exploiting his extremely good

looks in public, causing havoc among the women of Melaka.

Sultan Mahmud then married Tun Fatimah but abdicated in favor of his son, Raja Ahmad, and lived as a recluse devoted to spiritual self-enhancement. Unable to withstand the Portuguese, Mahmud and Ahmad continued the fight while having to retreat first to Muar in the south of the Malay Peninsula and then to Pahang in the east. He finally moved south to the island of Bintan and stayed there for twelve years, mending his losses and making efforts to retake Melaka.

The war had resurrected Mahmud's interest in politics. Discovering that his son and appointed successor, Sultan Ahmad, was behaving improperly toward the elder officials and thus creating discontentment and disunity in the leadership, Mahmud had Ahmad killed and resumed active reign from Bintan. The Portuguese continued to pursue Mahmud from Melaka and caused him severe losses but failed to defeat him because of his mobility and the support that he continued to receive from the people. Although losing the city-state of Melaka to the Portuguese, Mahmud continued to command the respect of the rest of his empire. From Bintan, Mahmud launched at least two major attempts to retake Melaka before he finally moved his capital to Kampar, where he died in 1529. His son by Tun Fatimah, who succeeded him as Sultan Alauddin Riayat Syah, returned the capital to Hujung Tanah on the peninsula.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Aceh (Acheh); Albuquerque, Afonso de (ca. 1462–1515); Johor-Riau Empire; Melaka; Pahang; Portuguese Asian Empire; *Sejarah Melayu* (*Malay Annals*)

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MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca. 1520s) A Hindu-Javanese Power

Majapahit is the name of a kingdom that had its core territory in more or less the eastern and larger half of the island of Java. The founder of the capital of the kingdom was Wijaya, a prince descendant of Singhasâri's first king, Kèn Angrok (r. 1222–1227), from a patriarchal line. (His name is spelled Dyah Wijaya in the contemporary, fourteenth-century text of the *Nâgarakertâgama*, and Raden Wijaya in the later sixteenth- to seventeenth-century *Pararaton*.) The establishment of the new settlement in the land of Tarik took place while Wijaya, in coalition with the “Tatar” or Mongol troops from China, defeated the usurping Kadiri king, Jayakatwang. While clearing the land, Wijaya's men found a bitter (*pahit, tikta*) *maja* (a kind of *wilwa*) fruit—hence the name “Majapahit.” The name is interchangeable with its synonym, Wilwatikta. Wijaya was the son-in-law of Kêrtanâgara (r. 1268–1292), the last king of Singhasâri. He ascended the throne as the first king of Majapahit in the year 1294 C.E. and assumed the official name Kêrtarâjasa Jayawardhana. He married all the four daughters of Kêrtanâgara, among others the Râjapatnî Dyah Gâyatri, for whom the lavish posthumous ceremony of *śradha* was organized during the reign of his grandson Hayâm Wuruk (r. 1350–1389). Wijaya died in 1309.

Information on the greatness of the kingdom of Majapahit is given by a multitude of sources, including contemporary inscriptions, Chinese chronicles, and literary texts. Worthy of special mention is the unique literary text, at the same time a historical narrative, called the *Nâgarakertâgama* or the *Deśawarjāna*, written by the court poet Mpu Prapañca and completed in 1365.

In addition, a later work of Malay literature, the *Hikayat Hang Tuah* (written between 1641 and 1726 by an unknown author), has an episode related to Majapahit. In this work Majapahit is described, through the many turns of the story of the Malay hero Hang Tuah, as a powerful competitor of Melaka. The story recounts the shift of power in the region, from Majapahit to Melaka. Nevertheless, it also tells that the elements of Hang Tuah's success as a knight of Melaka were “made in Majapahit.” These included the magical knowledge he acquired from Majapahit sages; the holy kris,

Tamias Sari, which he acquired from Majapahit; and the title “Laksmana” (admiral), which he received from the king “Seri Batara” of Majapahit. He was also considered successful in winning the hand of a Majapahit princess for the ruler of Melaka.

Folklore from other parts of Indonesia, outside Java, refers to the Majapahit presence in their respective regions, and there are at least two archaeological remains in Indonesia: one is in Lampung, Sumatra, and the other in Buton, Sulawesi, which local people believed to be the last resting place of the famous Patih Gajah Mada (d. 1364). Gajah Mada, the “grand vizier” of Majapahit during its heyday (t. 1331–1364), took part in the kingdom's imperialistic expansion of achieving political hegemony over all *Nusantara* (see below) and the establishment of its hierarchical administration. In the genealogy of the kings of Bima (Sumbawa) there is also a name, Batara Sang Bima Dewa, about whom it is said that he “went to Majapahit.”

In the contemporary text of the Majapahit era itself, the aforementioned *Nâgarakertâgama* (cantos 13–15), there are tens of names of regions outside Majapahit proper that seek refuge and pay homage to the king of Majapahit. Those places are collectively called *nîus ântara* (*Nusantara*), which, in view of their context in the narrative and evidence from inscriptions, should signify “places across the sea” or “abroad.” Such places in Sumatra include Malayu, Jambi, Palembang, Toba, Manangkabwa (Minangkabau), Siyak (Siak), Rokan, Kampar, Pane, Mandahiling (Mandailing), Parlâk (Perlak), Lwas, Samudra, Batan, Lampung, and Barus. Places in Kalimantan include Tanjung-Nagara, Kapuhas, Katingan, Sampit, Kuta-Lingga, Kuta-Waringin, Sambas, Pasir, Baritu, and Tañjung-Puri; in the Malay Peninsula, places include Pahang, Kalantan (Kelantan), Tringgano (Terengganu), Tumasik, Kêlang, and Kêda. Places in Bali are Badahulu and Lwa-Gajah, whereas those to the east of Bali include Sukun, Taliwang, Dampo, Sapi, Bhîma, Lombok-Mirah/Saksak, Sûmba, and Timûr. In Sulawesi, places include Makasar, Butun, Salaya, Banggawi, and Luwuk; in Maluku, Wandan, Ambwan, and Sera.

The aforementioned place-names were also indicated as *deśântara*, literally translated as “other places.” The uniqueness of Madura is also indicated in the text; although technically

it would fall into the category of *nîus ântara* (“places across the sea”), it was not considered foreign because it had always been one with Jawa, as was already mentioned in Singhasâri inscriptions. Another category is the *mitra satata*, meaning “perpetual friends,” which include the countries Syangka, Ayodhyapura, Dharmagarî, Marutma, Râjapura, Singhanagarî, Campâ, Kamboja, and Yawana. Places of origin of merchants and scholars who came to Majapahit are also mentioned, notably Jambudwîpa (India), Cinâ (China), and specific regions in India such as Karṇâṭaka, Godâ, and Kânçipurî.

The list of these places may perhaps present an idea of a “Majapahit network,” be it in a political or economic sense. In addition, there were foreigners who settled in Majapahit. As Anthony Reid (2000: 56, 59) pointed out: “[W]hen the Portuguese reached Southeast Asian waters they found them dominated by Javanese junks” [from Old Javanese *jong*]; “once established in Malacca, the Portuguese identified Java as the home par excellence of the biggest junks.” The imposing Javanese fleet might have been that of the Demak sultanate on the north coast of Java, the inheritor of Majapahit traditions (apart from its religion).

Demak was reported to have helped Melaka with its ships to check the Portuguese advance, and it may well go back before the culmination of shipbuilding excellence on the part of the Javanese. The earliest account of expertise in shipbuilding was in the Kadiri period (twelfth century C.E.). There was then the profession of *undahagi lañcang* (“master shipbuilder”). Inscriptions of this period also mentioned for the first time the official *senapati saruwajala*, meaning “commander of all water matters.” Having that legacy as a foundation, it is expected that Majapahit, with its increased integrating power, gained success in dominating the Java Sea in the middle of the fourteenth century. The *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai* text, written in the northern part of Sumatra in the mid-fourteenth century, mentions that “people in vast numbers thronged Majapahit; there was a ceaseless coming and going of people from overseas subjected territories . . . bringing their offerings of beeswax, sandalwood, massoia bark, cinnamon, cloves and nutmeg piled in heaps” (ibid.: 62). Apart from shipbuilding and navigation, a notable development in the Majapahit

era was the use of *pisís* (Chinese coins) as official currency, replacing the earlier use of pieces of gold and silver in specified weights. Majapahit even produced *pisís* locally when the supply from China ceased.

The kingdom of Majapahit itself, within its core territory, was presumably structured as an empire, a continuation of what was first ventured during the preceding Singhasâri period. It was in a Singhasâri inscription of the second half of the thirteenth century that a number of minor kingdoms within the empire were mentioned—namely, Kadiri, Lamajang, Madhura, Wurawân, Morono, Hring, and Lwa, with members of the royalty as their respective rulers. In this account the hierarchy of territorial terminology is clear: Kadiri, Lamajang, and other places are indicated as *bhûmi* (“country”), and within them there are the *nagara* or *râjya* (“capital towns”) where the ruler presides. The Majapahit chronicle, however, does not explicitly identify and list these minor kingdoms. There is, though, a reference to the regions in which Hayâm Wuruk placed his close female relatives. Such regions are Pajang, Lasêm, Kabalan/Lodaya, and Lumajang/Wirabhûmi (which must be the same as the Lamajang of the Singhasâri inscription). Mention is made also of the princess of Daha and that of Jîwana (synonym of Kahuripan). These must be taken as additions to the Singhasâri list. Those minor kingdoms were supposedly under the direct administration of the state of Majapahit. After its subjugation in the year 1343, Bali was possibly included within the “internal affairs” administration of Majapahit.

It is also worth noting that aside from the princesses, who were given prominent status, there were two queens who took the highest position as head of state—namely, Tribhûwanottunggadewî (r. 1329–1350) and Suhitâ (r. 1429–1447). The last Majapahit king known from his inscriptions (all issued in śaka 1408 or 1486 C.E.) was Girîndrawardhana Dyah Ranawijaya. How and when he ended his reign is unknown.

The end of Majapahit itself is problematic: later Javanese tradition mentions śaka 1400 (1478 C.E.) as the (symbolic) “end of Majapahit.” But Ranawijaya still issued inscriptions in 1486 C.E., while Pigafetta, chronicler of Ferdinand Magellan’s round-the-world voyage, acknowledged the existence of Magepaher (Ma-

japahit) in 1522 C.E. And a Majapahit inscription of Pabañolan Parî has been alternatively read as having the year śaka 1563 (1541 C.E.). The demise of Majapahit was probably gradual and nondramatic. It is very likely that with the flourishing of trade cities on the northern coast of Java (*pasisir*), and especially the rise of Demak as a strong Islamic sultanate, Majapahit lost its control of the sea trade routes, then became disintegrated and subsequently exited the historical stage.

During its lifetime of more than 220 years, Majapahit achieved several notable accomplishments. One of them is the *kakawin* poetical literature, some of which propounds Buddhism with a suggestion of an identification of the essence of God with that of the Hindu–Saiva creed, while other poems are purely Saiva–Hinduism. The credo *bhinneka tunggal ika*, meaning “it is one (although) it is separated,” was coined to refer to the unity of the highest god. The wording originated with Mpu Tantular, a scholar of fourteenth-century Majapahit. That credo has been transposed to the nationalist movement context of modern Indonesia, to mean “unity in diversity.”

The Majapahit era was an experience in religious tolerance and management. High-ranking officials were charged with assignments to take care of different kinds of religious foundations. The *Dharmādhyaksa* was an organization assigned to care for *dharma i dalēm* or *dharma haji* (the king’s foundations) and was directly controlled by the crown. Other foundations, classified as *dharma lēpas*, were taken care of by the king and tended (day-to-day administration) by the following officials. They were *Śaiwādhyaksa* for *parhyangan* and *kalagyan* (Śivaitic foundations); *Boddhādhyaksa* for *kuti* and *wihâra* (Buddhistic foundations); and *Mantri Her Haji* for *karēsyan* (hermitage). The listing in the *Nāgarakertāgama* has 27 *dharma haji*; 140 *dharma lēpas* comprising 95 Buddhistic, 38 Śivaitic, and 7 *karēsyan*; 11 offshoots for each of the three religious groups; and 41 other kinds of religious foundations. Sculpture and the performing arts flourished in the Majapahit era, establishing their typical Javanese styles.

The decline of Majapahit, the last kingdom and empire of the Hindu–Buddhist period of insular Southeast Asia, ushered in the advent of Islam, which for the succeeding centuries till

the present has dominated Gajah Mada’s Nusantara. But Majapahit’s legacy survived in the literature, the arts, culture, and governance throughout maritime Southeast Asia. Bali, whose inhabitants claimed descent from Majapahit, remained aloof from the Islamic wave and has maintained its Hinduized traditions to this day.

EDI SEDYAWATI

See also Ancient Coinage in Southeast Asia; Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (“Unity in Diversity”); Borneo; Coinage and Currency; Demak; Gajah Mada (t. 1331–1364); Hayâm Wuruk (Râjasanagara) (r. 1350–1389); Hindu–Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Islam in Southeast Asia; Java; Kadirî (Kediri); Kertanagara (r. 1268–1292); Madura; *Nusantara*; *Pararaton* (Book of Kings); *Pasisir*; Singhasari (1222–1293)

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MALACCA

See Melaka

MALANG TEMPLES

Hindu-Buddhist Monuments with Javanese Influence

The city of Malang is located in East Java Province. Its environs contain a wealth of monuments. The four main edifices are Candi Badut, Candi Kidal, Candi Jago, and Candi Singosari.

Candi Badut, the oldest structure in the region, dates from the eighth century and is thus contemporaneous with the Gedong Songo temples, but it has been rebuilt several times. Its present state dates from the mid-thirteenth century. It is a simple structure that reposes on a base and is enclosed within a surrounding wall having an entrance pavilion.

Candi Kidal, intended for a Visnuite cult, was built around 1260 in a rectangular walled courtyard. The ground plan of the site is similar to those of ninth-century monuments—namely,

the center of the courtyard is left unoccupied. The level of the courtyard is perceptibly lower than that of the surrounding ground, thus constituting a basin. The temple itself is composed of a simple tower with an entrance on the west; the superstructures above the body are destroyed above the first false story, but they can be accurately reconstructed.

Candi Jago, meant for Buddhism, was built around 1280 but was reconstructed in 1343. It has a very large base divided into three registers, the upper two of which are decorated with reliefs. The sanctuary would have had a tower like that of Candi Kidal, but everything above the body is now destroyed.

Candi Singosari was built at the end of the thirteenth century in the capital of the Singosari dynasty (1222–1293). Work on it stopped when the city was sacked. It consists of a temple with cruciform plan in which there is a central cella and a west-facing porch. Smaller sanctuaries are at the other cardinal points. The edifice is the base of a tower of which nothing more remains than the body of the structure decorated with four niches. The temple was intended for a cult of Siva, with an iconographic program similar to that of the central temple of Prambanan.

The builders of the thirteenth century near Malang, remaining very close to the architecture of earlier centuries—Candi Sembodro in Dieng has the same plan as Candi Singosari—entirely altered the appearance of the Hindu and Buddhist temples, the decoration becoming more explicitly symbolic.

JACQUES DUMARCAY

TRANSLATED BY JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also *Candi*; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Prambanan; Singhasâri

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MALAY ARCHIPELAGO

See Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); *Nusantara*

MALAY COLLEGE, KUALA KANGSAR (MCKK) **“Eton of the East”**

The sultans of the four Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang) led by Sultan Idris Murshidul 'Azam Shah of Perak, had successfully convinced the British to set up a residential school for the children of the Malay elite. They had felt the need to educate their children so that they could later become efficient bureaucrats. The construction of the school, which was built on a 30-acre (1.2-hectare) site in Kuala Kangsar, the royal town of Perak, was started in 1905 and was completed four years later.

The college employed British educationists to head the college. The first was William Hargreaves, the former head of the Penang Free School, the oldest English school in Malaya. In 1905 the first batch of fifty students was enrolled. This number was gradually increased, and later was also to include children of ordinary Malay subjects who did very well in public examinations set by the government. They were given English education following the syllabus of schools in Britain. Subjects such as British history, literature, geography, and mathematics were taught, using English as the language of instruction. Later, pure science was introduced. The students, as in English schools elsewhere in the country, were being prepared to sit for the Senior Cambridge Examination, which was endorsed and certified by Cambridge University of England. The best achievers in this examination were allowed to continue for further studies at any university in Britain.

Besides learning English subjects in the classrooms, the students were taught Western/European etiquette and ethics, especially in the ways they dressed, ate, spoke, and spent their leisure. The first swimming pool in Perak, constructed in 1924, was built here. Other traditional British sports were also introduced here, and the students were proud to have become champions in rugby, soccer, cricket, hockey, tennis, squash, basketball, badminton, athletics, and swimming.

Enrollment in the college has always been very selective, based on academic excellence. Graduates were very often employed by the government in the Malayan, later Malaysian, Civil Service, forming the Malay bureaucratic

elite. They have constituted the “Who’s Who” in Malaysia up to the present day. The Malay College, Kuala Kangsar, popularly known by its acronym MCKK, is also dubbed the “Eton of the East.”

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also Education, Western Secular; Malayan/Malaysian Education; Penang Free School (1816)

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MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP)

The forty-one-year-old armed struggle of the Malayan Communist Party in Malaya (Peninsular or West Malaysia) ended in 1989. The party dissolved itself and disbanded its armed forces at the Thai-Malaysian border, where they had taken refuge since 1960. The lack of popular support, military reverses, and the collapse of international communism brought about its end. The party had reached an agreement with the governments of Malaysia and Thailand on a ceasefire, and permission was given for its members to return to civilian life in the two countries. The MCP operated mainly in Malaya, one of the three component states that make up the nation-state of Malaysia. The only time it secured official recognition was in 1941, when the British colonial government accepted its offer of volunteers and labor services after the Japanese army began its invasion of Malaya. In 1948 it was prohibited again when it launched an armed rebellion against British rule.

The MCP originally began its activities in the country in 1925 as an overseas branch of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1930 it became an independent organization, under the direction of a Vietnamese communist who was an agent of the Moscow-based Communist International (Comintern), Nguyễn Ai Quoc

(better known as Hồ Chí Minh [1890–1969]). Hồ criticized the CCP's earlier role in fostering the growth of a predominantly Chinese communist movement and urged the MCP to become a genuinely multiracial party to represent the three major races in Malaya: Malays, Chinese, and Indians. Throughout its history, however, the MCP failed to shake off this CCP legacy. It remained to the end a predominantly Chinese party. In 1930, following the coordinated arrest of Hồ in Hong Kong and police arrests of its leaders in Malaya, the MCP's links with the Comintern were cut off until the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945).

The Japanese occupation of Malaya (December 1941 to September 1945) allowed the party to build up its strength and popularity, especially among the Chinese population who suffered from the Japanese army's harsh policies because Japan was at war with China. The British authorities in Malaya had trained the MCP's volunteers as guerrillas to be left behind enemy lines. These volunteers later formed the nucleus of its resistance force, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). In 1944 the wartime British South-East Asia Command (SEAC), based in Kandy in Sri Lanka, reestablished contacts with the MPAJA and requested its assistance in its plan to recapture Malaya. In return, the British provided funds, supplies, and arms to the MPAJA and were allowed to send special forces into its jungle camps. The guerrillas' military services, however, were not needed in the battlefield when Japan surrendered in August 1945, after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

When peace returned to Malaya, the MPAJA disarmed. The MCP was allowed to operate legally for the first time. Many of its members, however, were jobless and had problems adjusting from conditions of war to peacetime. They were frequently involved in street demonstrations and labor strikes that were quickly suppressed by the postwar British Military Administration (BMA). In 1947 rivals in the party exposed the party's secretary-general, Lai Tek (Loi Tek), as a British secret agent. He, however, managed to escape into hiding with all the party's funds. His policies of fostering "peace and cooperation" with the British administration were abandoned. The party's new leaders, headed by Chin Peng (1922–), who was Lai Tek's assistant, adopted a militant line.

The British government returned to Malaya with constitutional plans for a unitary state. It also offered citizenship and political rights and promised self-government to the country's multiracial population. The MCP showed little interest in these proposals, although the majority of the Chinese population stood to gain equal political rights with the indigenous Malays. As social unrest continued to spread throughout the country, the MCP took advantage of these conditions to prepare for revolution. When violence attributed to the work of communist agents escalated, with the murders of Chinese businessmen and European managers in rubber estates, the British government declared a state of emergency in June 1948. In response, the MCP announced an armed uprising against British rule and stated that it would struggle for Malaya's independence. It called on former members of the MPAJA to take up arms again and flee to the jungles.

In 1957, to blunt the communists' propaganda that they were a nationalist movement, Britain granted Malaya independence and handed over power to a noncommunist multiracial government, formed by a coalition of communal parties led by Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (1903–1990), whose members had been elected by the people in the country's first general elections in 1955. In December 1955 the Tunku (the Malay word for prince) held talks with MCP leader Chin Peng. He urged the communists to lay down their arms. Chin Peng asked for the MCP to exist as a legal organization and insisted that communist insurgents who laid down their arms should not be detained and screened by the police. When the Tunku rejected both demands, the talks broke down. Chin Peng and the other communist delegates returned to the jungles to resume their armed struggle.

The guerrillas' biggest success during the Emergency "war" was their assassination of the British high commissioner of Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, in 1951. Gurney was on his way to Fraser's Hill in the highlands of Pahang state when his car was ambushed.

In 1960 the Tunku's government lifted the state of emergency in Malaya, as the communist threat had receded. Most of the communist forces had withdrawn to the northern jungle areas of the Thai-Malayan border. Until 1989 the party made its presence felt in frequent

skirmishes with the government's security forces, in armed attacks on public development projects, and in assassinations of government officials.

CHEAH BOON-KHENG

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Baling Talks (1955); Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front); Briggs Plan; China since 1949; Chin Peng (Ong Boon Hua/Hwa) (1922–); Comintern; Force 136; Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA); Malayan Union (1946); Templer, General Sir Gerald (1898–1979)

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MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960)

Defeating Leftist Insurgency

The Malayan Emergency, which lasted from 16 June 1948 to 31 July 1960, began when the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the government of Malaya. The MCP primarily drew support from the Chinese community, whereas the Malay community actively opposed it. Led by Chin Peng (1921–), the MCP appeared to have the initiative in the Emergency's early years. However, its support base was eroded by the resettlement of half a million Chinese squatters under the Briggs Plan. From 1952 to 1954, Lieutenant General Gerald Templer (t. 1952–1954), as high commissioner and director of operations, galvanized the government resources into victory. His "hearts and minds"

strategy integrated social issues, politics, and the economy into the counterinsurgency campaign against which MCP responses proved inadequate. Under increasing military pressure and denied material support, the MCP's insurgency became increasingly untenable. By 1961, remnants of the MCP finally withdrew to the Thai border area.

The MCP had emerged from the Pacific War (1941–1945) with a committed guerrilla force of over 6,000 and a strong support base among rural squatters. Overwhelmingly Chinese in membership, the MCP had little appeal to Malays, who were fearful of a Chinese takeover.

The MCP gained support during the turmoil of the postwar period, with an economy troubled by shortages of goods, corruption, poor wages, and high prices. Supporters included squatters in forest reserves who resisted, sometimes violently, British attempts to restrict their activities and many Chinese who felt alienated at the defeat of the Malayan Union proposals that had promised them easier citizenship. Under its moderate secretary-general, Loi Tek (Lai Tek), the MCP worked through mainly urban-based front organizations and industrial action, controlling the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions (PMFTU).

After Loi Tek was exposed as a Japanese and British agent in March 1947, leadership passed to Chin Peng, and the MCP adopted a more militant industrial strategy the following November. This change in policy coincided with increasing militancy outside Malaya, with the Soviet foreign minister Andrei Zhdanov declaring the world divided into two ideologically hostile camps. The government reacted with arrests and increasing control of trade union activity.

Early in 1948, the MCP realized that armed struggle was inevitable. At the same time, the government's intelligence network was downplaying the MCP threat. Nevertheless, in June, the government outlawed the PMFTU. Fearing further crackdowns, the MCP commenced preparations to decamp to the jungle. On 16 June 1948, armed elements of the MCP killed three European estate workers at Sungei Siput, Perak. Two days later, the government declared a state of emergency.

The MCP was caught by surprise, and several senior members were arrested. Neverthe-

less, jungle camps were established within reach of the group's support network, the Min Yuen (People's Movement), among some half million Chinese squatters who provided recruits, food, supplies, and intelligence. They obtained arms and ammunition from hidden Pacific War caches or captured from the security forces and relied on couriers or the regular mail for communication. The MCP's military arm, the Malayan People's Anti-British Army (MPABA), which was renamed the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) in February 1949, rapidly gained prominence in western Malaya.

The MCP's strategy was to establish "liberated areas" from which to capture towns and instigate a general revolt. During the ensuing campaign of economic disruption, MCP members slashed rubber trees and destroyed equipment, and they assassinated estate managers, police, and others. In 1948 and 1949, MPABA/MRLA incidents totaled 2,716, rising to 4,739 in 1950 (Short 1975: 507). Recruitment of new MRLA members more than offset the loss of 2,842 individuals from 1948 to 1950 (killed, captured, or surrendered) (Short 1975: 507), and MRLA strength rose from 5,000 in 1949 to 8,200 in 1951 (Coates 1992: 73, n. 46).

Malaya's rubber and tin industries were Britain's largest earners of foreign exchange, vital for both Britain's and Malaya's postwar economic recovery. This fact ensured Britain's active resistance to the MCP's threat. However, the government's response was initially indecisive and hampered by insufficient resources. The new high commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney (t. 1948–1951), was criticized for failing to realize the gravity of the Emergency. The army and police were unprepared to fight a counterinsurgency war. Poor intelligence and a weak police–army liaison seriously limited the ability to make an effective military response.

The government resorted to coercion, detention, and deportation to China. The bulk of this work fell to the police. The Malayan police force, however, was too small and inadequately armed and equipped to fully meet the MCP threat. A new force of over 40,000 special constables (mostly Malays) was established to guard estates and mines, but inexperience and inadequate training limited their effectiveness. The government also recruited police with experi-

ence in Palestine, but their methods alienated many. The MCP appeared to have the initiative.

It was not until 1950 that a director of operations, Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, was appointed. His plan (the Briggs Plan mentioned earlier) addressed the Emergency's underlying social, political, and economic causes and laid the basis for the government's eventual victory. The plan aimed to ultimately starve out the MCP members by eliminating their support base. Squatters were resettled en masse in secure "New Villages"—by 1952, over 300,000 were resettled (Stubbs 1989: 102)—and estate and mine workers were similarly "regrouped." The Police Special Branch was enlarged, and the Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee was established. However, the security forces continued to be hampered by the paucity of high-quality intelligence. Militarily, tactics now avoided broad-sweeping operations in favor of concentrated ones. Briggs's control, however, was frustrated by an indirect command structure.

As the Briggs Plan took effect, reactive MRLA attacks increased markedly and in October 1951 caused the MCP to adopt a major new strategy. The MCP also found its original terror tactics had alienated potential supporters. In order to increase their popular support, MCP members emphasized political work through front organizations above the military struggle (MRLA incidents fell from 564 in October 1951 to just 99 in April 1953) (Coates 1992: 193, 197). They countered the government's operations to deny them food by cultivating food at bases deep in the jungle. They were also able to win over the support of the Orang Asli, various aboriginal groups. The MCP utilized the Orang Asli as a source for food and natural medication, safe havens deep in the forest, and intelligence.

In 1951, after 504 deaths among the security forces and with the MRLA seemingly unchecked, public confidence in the government plummeted. On 6 October 1951, Gurney was ambushed and killed. Briggs retired in November, and both the director of intelligence and the police commander departed Malaya. The fortunes of the government had now reached their nadir, and the British government needed to drastically change its approach.

The British government appointed Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Templer (1898–1979)

as both high commissioner and director of operations, duties he commenced in February 1952. Templer's forceful and inspirational personality injected a new sense of purpose and confidence into the antiguerrilla struggle. By the time he left in May 1954, government forces had secured large areas of Malaya, and complete victory was in sight.

Fortuitously for Templer, the Malayan economy in 1952 was booming. The Korean War (1950–1953) had caused tin prices to almost double and rubber to rise by over 400 percent. The resulting increased revenue helped fund the antiguerrilla campaign. For the general population, rising incomes and low unemployment diminished their sense of dissatisfaction.

Templer considered the "hearts and minds" battle to be even more important than the military battle, and he succeeded in largely neutralizing potential support for the MCP. Conditions in the New Villages greatly improved. Villages that supported the government were rewarded, and recalcitrant ones were punished. The institution of elections for village councils and higher levels of government aided in the building of a united nation of Malaya and eventual independence.

All civil and military resources were coordinated to defeat the MCP. Efficient decision-making bodies and processes were established. A revitalized Police Special Branch provided military planners with high-quality intelligence. Sustained, systematic operations against the Min Yuen complemented smaller-scale patrolling against an increasingly fragmented MRLA. Radio, films, leafleting, and aerial broadcasting disseminated sophisticated propaganda. Constant pressure caused increasing guerrilla surrenders and subsequently more intelligence and further inroads against the insurgent forces. From December 1952, a permanent security force presence was maintained in a system of forts deep in the jungle in order to win over the Orang Asli who still supported the MRLA. Positive contact, security from the MRLA, medical facilities, and trading stores were real inducements that the MCP could not match.

In September 1953, Templer announced the first "White Area" (in Melaka), wherein restrictive Emergency regulations would be lifted. This return to normalcy was a major psychological boost and provided a very good reason to sup-

port the government. By 1956, almost half of Malaya's population lived in White Areas.

The MCP now faced some serious dilemmas. Min Yuen support was removed, the deep-jungle cultivations were being destroyed, and difficulties with north-south communications had caused the MCP to split its command between Chin Peng on the Thai border and Hor Lung in the south. As well, the electoral dominance of the Alliance Party and its promotion of independence had robbed the MCP of its political initiative.

With the wider communist world extolling peaceful coexistence, the climate for negotiations was ripe. On 28 and 29 December 1955, Chin Peng and Tunku Abdul Rahman (1903–1990) met at Baling, Kedah. However, with Chin Peng's insistence on legal recognition of the MCP and Tunku Abdul Rahman's equal insistence on an MCP surrender, the talks broke down.

By 1957, the MRLA, though numbering over 2,000 (Short 1975: 489), was split into isolated groups, and their guerrilla existence was increasingly untenable. This led to a rapid increase in surrenders, which rose from 134 in 1956 to 209 in 1957 and 502 in 1958 (Short 1975: 508), including that of Hor Lung, the MRLA's southern commander.

By 1958, the military conflict was effectively over. Only 868 guerrillas remained with Chin Peng, who had retreated to the Thai-Malayan border area or southern Thailand. The security forces began a protracted mopping-up campaign. On 31 July 1960, the government declared the Emergency at an end. Throughout the Emergency, 6,711 insurgents were killed and 3,993 were captured or surrendered; 1,346 police and 519 soldiers were also killed, and a further 3,283 civilians were either killed or missing (Coates 1992: 202). Finally, on 2 December 1989, Chin Peng signed a peace agreement with Malaysia and Thailand.

The Malayan Emergency quickly became a model for successful counterinsurgency campaigns. In postcolonial Malaya (Malaysia after 1963), the Emergency presaged the formation of a nation-state that denied a role for left-wing politics but had unprecedented authority throughout Malayan/Malaysian society. Communalism retained its importance, but new sociopolitical institutions constrained its potential for divisiveness. The opening of the archival

record has allowed historians new insights into the Malayan Emergency, including its influence on nation building, the government's use of sociopolitical initiatives in counterinsurgency, and the paramountcy of the internal causes of the Emergency.

IAN K. SMITH

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Alliance Party (Malaya/Malaysia); Baling Talks (1855); Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front); Briggs Plan; Chin Peng (Ong Boon Hua/Hwa) (1922–); Cold War; Economic Development of Southeast Asia (Post-1945 to Early 2000s); Korean War (1950–1953); Labor and Labor Unions in Southeast Asia; Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA); Malayan Union (1946); "New Villages" (Malaya); Orang Asli; Rubber; Templer, General Sir Gerald (1898–1979); Tin

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MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION (MCA) (1949)

The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) officially came into being on 27 February 1949 as an outcome of the rapid political changes that took place in Malaya after the Pacific War (1941–1945). The formation of the Federation of Malaya (1948) and the Emergency (1948–1960) adversely affected the Chinese community. This situation prompted sixteen Chinese members of the Malayan Federal Legislative and Executive Councils led by a former Kuomintang administrator and general in China, Leong Yew Koh, to form a united body. The primary objective was to find means to safeguard the interests of the Chinese community and to cultivate the goodwill and confidence of the government and the Malays. It was also to some extent a reaction to cleanse the negative image of the Chinese produced by the terrorist acts of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), whose members were mainly Chinese.

The formation of the MCA was timely and encouraged by the British government, which was looking for ways to solve the complex political and social situation after the war. That the MCA was close to the government is seen in the fact that its constitution stipulated "the Chinese members of the (Malayan) Legislative and Executive Councils would automatically become officers of the Association." That the organization was intended to encompass as many Chinese as possible is seen in the fact that it was opened to "all Chinese above the age of 18 who have lived for at least 5 years continuously in Malaya and intend to make Malaya their permanent home." As a social and welfare organization, the MCA allowed its members to join any political party they chose. The wealthy

English- and Malay-speaking Tan Cheng Lock (1883–1960), who had been active trying to unite the Chinese and had proposed the formation of the Malayan Chinese League a year before, was elected its first president. It was claimed that by the middle of 1951, 300,000 Chinese had become members of the MCA.

The MCA was initially formed to help lessen the predicaments of Chinese squatters harmed by the Emergency. It financed itself through donations and an attractive lottery scheme endorsed by the government. As is indicated in its constitution, its primary aims were promotion of interracial harmony, the welfare of the Chinese, and the peaceful and orderly progress of Malaya. These were the concern of the wealthy progovernment and mainly English-educated founders of the MCA. To achieve these aims MCA demanded that Chinese squatters be given “a real stake” in Malaya, that Chinese be given equal citizenship rights, and that non-Malays be accepted into the Malayan Civil Service (MCS). The MCA became a full-fledged political party two years later, when Tan Cheng Lock drafted a Memorandum of the Reorganization of the MCA toward the end of 1951. Thereafter, the MCA struck a coalition with the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) to form the UMNO-MCA Alliance, which participated in the Kuala Lumpur municipal election in February 1952. Apart from those who had joined the MCP, for the first time a substantial number of Chinese of diverse backgrounds and dialects began to work together toward their common stake in Malaya. For the long-term interest of the Chinese, the MCA incessantly and in various ways worked toward the goal of getting as many Chinese as possible Malayan citizenship. As a result of those efforts, the more stringent prerequisites for citizenship under the 1948 Federation of Malaya Constitution were relaxed, and by 1959 the Chinese population with Malayan citizenship was three times what it had been in 1955.

This new development, however, caused strains in the MCA. As more newly domiciled, Chinese-educated, and younger members became active in the party, they began to question the long-term direction of the MCA and started to make political demands that challenged the very basis of the Alliance that recognized the special position of the Malays and the

Malay language. At the annual Central General Committee meeting in March 1958, Tan Cheng Lock and the old guards were replaced by the younger and more outspoken group led by the newly elected president, Dr. Lim Chong Eu (1919–), and by Secretary-General Too Joon Hing. The new leadership demanded that the MCA be allotted forty seats in the 1959 parliamentary elections, rather than the fifteen they had received in 1955. This was disagreeable to UMNO, which thus supported members of the old guard, resulting in the resignation of Dr. Lim Chong Eu (b. 1919) and the return of the moderates led by Tan Siew Sin (1916–1988) in 1961.

The MCA that had helped to form the Alliance Party in 1954 continued to be an essential and influential member of the ruling party, the Alliance, and, since 1974, the larger coalition, the Barisan Nasional (National Front).

The MCA was often challenged by other Chinese-based parties, including the People's Action Party (PAP) when Singapore was in Malaysia (1963–1965), and the Democratic Action Party (DAP), as well as from other quarters such as the People's Progressive Party (PPP). Despite these rivalries and occasional setbacks from within and without, the MCA managed to survive and retain the favor of UMNO, which considered it the most reliable among the Chinese political parties in Malaysia.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Alliance Party (Malaya/Malaysia); Barisan Nasional (National Front) (1974); Briggs Plan; Federation of Malaya (1948); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); People's Action Party (PAP); Tan Cheng Lock (1883–1960); Templer, General Sir Gerald (1898–1979)

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MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN EDUCATION

There was little to speak of in the way of formal education and schooling prior to the establishment of colonial administration—namely, the British in Peninsular Malaysia, the Brookes (a family of English rajahs) in Sarawak, and the British North Borneo Chartered Company in British North Borneo (Sabah). Consequent of the *laissez-faire* attitude of the colonial governments, there evolved a plural educational setup of four different forms of school systems whose recipients possessed different academic and vocational qualifications, mental outlook and worldview, and long-term loyalties. Compounding the situation were not only the peoples of the three territories segregated into various ethnic communities but also divisions in terms of sociocultural background, religious adherence, socioeconomic status, and spatial distribution. Malaysia constituted the Malay Peninsula (West/Peninsular Malaysia) and the Borneo territories of Sabah (until 1963 referred to as North Borneo) and Sarawak, the latter two referred to as East Malaysia.

Therefore, following independence (Peninsular Malaysia in 1957 and Sabah and Sarawak in 1963), a national system of education with a single school system using a common language of instruction, curriculum, syllabus, textbooks, and served mainly by locally trained teachers, was implemented. The ultimate objective of the Malayan (after 1963, Malaysian) education system is to foster unity through integration of the multiethnic and multicultural population composed of numerous indigenous peoples and long-settled immigrant communities.

The Plural School System of the Colonial Period

During the precolonial period, a common practice among Malay-Muslim communities was the *pondok* (lit.: hut, shack) system, whereby young boys gathered around a *guru* (teacher) to recite Arabic verses from the Koran. Informal education in sustaining a subsistence livelihood was the norm among the var-

ious indigenous communities of hunter-gatherers and shifting cultivators in Sarawak and British North Borneo.

Overall, little interest was paid to the issue of education and schools by the three colonial governments in their respective territories. But of the four school systems that subsequently evolved independently, Malay and English-language education received comparatively more attention than Chinese and Tamil education, the last mentioned being grossly neglected. Political motives spurred the involvement of the colonial authorities in Malay and Chinese education; for English-language education, it was economic concerns.

Malay Education and Government Malay Schools

Curiously, the Malay language was not taught under the *pondok* system. Apparently the Malays themselves regarded its instruction unnecessary, owing to its use in daily secular life. However, admiration for the Malay language by colonial administrators and European Christian missionaries resulted in Malay being formally taught in colonial government Malay schools.

Government Malay schools offered four years of elementary education with instruction in the three Rs—that is, basic reading and writing skills and simple arithmetic. Anything above this elementary level of education was deemed unnecessary, as great care was taken in order that the Malays not be enticed from farming and fishing in the *kampung* (village) by higher ambitions encouraged by their education. Thus products of Malay schools possessed a rudimentary grasp of the three Rs and upon completion of their schooling returned to their *kampung* as literate farmers and fishermen.

Notwithstanding the free education offered by the government Malay schools, attendance remained poor and irregular. The majority of Malays did not see the practical value of secular education. Similarly, attempts by Anglican and Catholic missions to provide education in vernacular schools in the rural districts of Sarawak and British North Borneo using Malay, Iban, and other indigenous languages proved abortive, owing to poor response. Muslim and pagan indigenous peoples were apprehensive of Christian mission schools.

Chinese Education and the Chinese Schools

Scholastic attainment had always been the ultimate aspiration of the Chinese, among whom the scholar-bureaucrat was highly esteemed in the traditional social order. Traditional Chinese communities viewed education in sociocultural terms rather than for achieving economic or political ends.

Until 1920, the Chinese schools were established along dialect lines—namely, Hokkien, Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka (Kheh), and Foo-chow. Books and teachers were imported from China, although the literary-based curriculum had little practical use. Nonetheless Chinese schools in urban and rural settings were well attended by boys and, to a lesser extent, by girls. Dialect schools were built and funded mostly by clan organizations and philanthropists. The London Missionary Society (LMS) and the American Methodist Mission were particularly active promoters of Chinese schools.

Following the May Fourth Movement (1919; student demonstrations against Japan's acquiring German possessions in Shandong province after World War I; a movement toward modernization), the republican government adopted *Kuo-yu*, or vernacular Mandarin, as the national language in place of the classic literary script. Although the changeover was widely adopted, Chinese schools in Sarawak remained as dialect schools.

The Chinese schools generally offered a six-year elementary education with some of the larger urban schools having senior middle three (the third year in secondary education for fifteen- to sixteen-year-olds) and high school level. Students wishing to pursue tertiary education had to go to China. The adoption of *Kuo-yu* was followed by the importation of the new curriculum, syllabus, and textbooks that were introduced by the republican government. The imported textbooks, curriculum, and syllabus taught by Chinese-born and -trained teachers produced graduates who were China-oriented, patriotic toward the motherland, and particularly proud of their "Chineseness." The Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese communists exploited the patriotic vulnerability of the students for their own political ends.

The Chinese schools became hotbeds for anticolonial activities. The colonial authorities responded with greater control (such as regis-

tration of schools and teachers). The colonial governments resorted to providing grant-in-aid to Chinese schools; in return the schools were subjected to government inspection. An inspector of Chinese schools was appointed for the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1924.

There were few employment prospects for products of Chinese schools apart from the limited openings in Chinese businesses that recruited through familial, clan, or dialect relations. Nonrecognition by the colonial governments of the qualifications of Chinese school graduates drove them to seek solace in anti-colonial elements, including leftist groups.

Tamil Education and Estate Schools

Tamil schools catered to the children of South Indian laborers who were brought into the Straits Settlements during the nineteenth century for the sugar, coffee, and tea plantations. The schools were established on the plantation premises and taught a rudimentary level of literacy.

The booming rubber industry during the early decades of the twentieth century brought large numbers of Tamil workers to the FMS. In 1923 the colonial government introduced the Labour Code into the FMS, inter alia requiring estate employers to establish schools at their own expense for the education of the children of their workers. In return for a government grant-in-aid, the schools were subjected to regular inspection. Known as Estate Schools, they were staffed largely by untrained teachers offering a poor-quality elementary education of the three Rs of no more than four years. Despite the appointment of an inspector of Tamil schools in 1930, little was done for Tamil education.

Isolated in the estate environment and receiving little instruction, recipients of Tamil education had little option other than continuing to work on the estates as their illiterate forefathers had done.

English-Language Education and the English Schools

The colonial governments were particularly cautious in offering English-language education, lest aspirations become unfulfilled. Because of this concern, teaching of the English

language was denied to government Malay schools. However, as the colonial bureaucracy and European businesses expanded, there was an apparent need for locally trained English-educated clerical personnel. It was for this purpose alone that the colonial governments took an interest in English-language education.

A number of “free schools”—that is, schools opened to all ethnic groups regardless of religious adherence—were initiated and funded by contributions from philanthropists, public subscriptions, and a token grant from the colonial government. Notable examples were the Penang Free School (1816), the Singapore Free School (1834, later the Raffles Institution), and the Malacca High School (1826). All such schools subsequently became government schools.

There were only a few government English-language schools in the Malay States, notably Victoria Institution (1893) in Kuala Lumpur and the Malay College (1905) at Kuala Kangsar (MCKK). The former had an overwhelming Chinese enrollment, while the latter catered with full boarding facilities to the sons of sultans and chiefs in an attempt to train a Malay administrative elite.

Christian missionary bodies such as the LMS, the American Methodist Mission, the Anglican Church, and the Roman Catholic Church were particularly active promoters of English-language education. Their undisguised objective of propagating Christianity did not deter non-Christian pupils from partaking in the English-language education their schools offered. The missionaries achieved a breakthrough in promoting female education, especially among the conservative Chinese in the Methodist girls’ schools and the Catholic convent schools.

English-language mission schools were urban-based, with a majority Chinese student enrollment with small numbers of Indians, Sinhalese, Sikhs, and Eurasians. Head teachers and teachers were exclusively European; Chinese, Eurasians, and Sinhalese served as assistant teachers.

Prior to 1891 there was no common curriculum or syllabus among the English-language schools. The emphasis then was to teach the three Rs in English. The larger urban schools offered candidates in competitive examinations for the prestigious Queen’s Scholar-

ships, which started in the Straits Settlements in 1885. When the Cambridge Certificate examinations were introduced in 1891, English-language schools began to adopt a common syllabus based on that of secondary schools in England, offering academic-oriented arts and science subjects.

The English-language schools offered eleven years of education (seven at primary level and four at secondary). The handful of students who attained the Senior Cambridge, if sufficiently wealthy, pursued higher education in Britain. The rest of the majority went on to attain socially respectable clerical positions in the colonial bureaucracy or to join European companies and banks.

Products of English-language schools possessed an Anglo-centric worldview far divorced from the local reality. Acquiring English manners and taste, some developed into Anglophiles and proved to be loyalist to the colonial regime.

Unity through Education

The plural school system in the pre-1941 period posed a major hindrance to unity and integration of the multiethnic population. A landmark government report with recommendations that became public policy was prepared in 1956 by a committee chaired by the minister of education of the Federation of Malaya, Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussain (1922–1976). The Razak Report sought to establish a national system of education with Malay, the acknowledged national language, as the medium of instruction. A common syllabus for all schools and the use of Malayan-centric textbooks were imposed throughout the federation.

A similar policy direction (English as the single language of instruction, common syllabus, common textbooks) was adopted by the colonial administrators in British North Borneo and Sarawak after they became British Crown colonies in 1946. The conversion exercise to English as the language of instruction of all secondary schools from the mid-1950s sparked controversy and leftist-backed opposition among the Chinese community. When Sarawak and British North Borneo joined Malaysia in 1963, another changeover in the language of instruction, from English to Malay, was instituted. A longer grace period than in Malaya was given to the conversion.

Following the creation of Malaysia in 1963, two issues dominated the educational landscape. The first was the changeover of the language of instruction from English to Malay in all levels, from primary schools to tertiary institutions. By the mid-1980s, the school curriculum and university courses were conducted in Malay. There was dissatisfaction, particularly among Chinese educationalist groups, but no untoward actions were taken to oppose the government. The second issue was the implementation of the quota system in university placements for *bumiputera*—that is, Malays and other indigenous peoples of Sabah and Sarawak. This affirmative action was in line with the aims of the National Economic Policy (NEP) implemented following the May 13 incident of 1969.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Education, Overseas Chinese; Education, Traditional Religious; Education, Western Secular; King Edward VII College of Medicine; Malay College, Kuala Kangsar (MCKK); “May 13, 1969” (Malaysia); New Economic Policy (NEP) (1971–1990); Penang Free School (1816); Raffles College; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley, (1781–1826); Sultan Idris Training College (SITC); University of Malaya; Winstedt, R[ichard] O[laf], Sir (1878–1966)

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MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN INDIAN CONGRESS (MIC)

The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) was formed in August 1946 at a meeting of about 600 Indian delegates representing various Indian organizations in Malaya. Its constitution was modeled after that of the Congress Party of India, and the resolutions passed were in general Indian in orientation. Among other things it proposed closer India-Malaya economic ties and that Hindi be cultivated as the national language of Indians in Malaya. In November 1946, John A. Thivy (b. 1904), the MIC president, led an MIC delegation to the Congress Party of India annual meeting in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, and in July 1947, Thivy resigned to become India’s representative to Malaya. Budh Singh, the next president, continued the India orientation of MIC and, like Thivy, Budh Singh later returned to India.

Under K. Ramanathan (t. 1950), MIC began to be more Malayan in outlook. The Malayan-born K. L. Devaser, who became president in 1951, followed along the same lines and was responsible for bringing MIC into the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) and later the Alliance in 1954.

The Indian community in Malaya made up about 10 percent of the population but was grossly divided ethnically, educationally, socio-economically, and in political orientation. MIC thus had to compete for support and patronage of the Indian community with other Indian organizations, such as the Malayan Indian Association (1935) and the Federation of Indian Organizations (1950). The situation, however, changed when Veerasamay Thirugnan Sambanthan (1919–1979), a Tamil estate owner from Ipoh, Perak, became president in 1955. MIC was then a full-fledged member of the Alliance. More Indians were acquiring Malayan citizenship, and more Tamils who made up the largest component of Indians in Malaya were becoming active in the leadership of MIC.

Sambanthan's close relationship with Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (1903–1990), the UMNO president and prime minister of Malaya/Malaysia, facilitated MIC's role in the government and paved the way for its continuing existence.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Alliance Party (Malaya/Malaysia); Federation of Malaya (1948); Indian Immigrants (Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries); Onn bin Ja'afar (1895–1962)

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MALAYAN PEOPLE'S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY (MPAJA)

The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army was the wartime armed guerrilla force of the predominantly Chinese Malayan Communist Party (MCP) that fought the Japanese Imperial Army during the latter's occupation of Malaya from 1941 to 1945. Malaya (the Malay Peninsula) is one of three territories that make up the present nation-state of Malaysia, the other two being the Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah. The MCP operated mainly in Malaya.

MPAJA in Chinese was *Ma-lai-ya ren-min k'ang rih-jun*. Among the Malay population it was known as *Bintang Tiga* (Three Stars), because of the three yellow stars on its red flag, which the MPAJA claimed represented the three major communities in Malaya—Malays, Chinese, and Indians. Despite this claim, it succeeded in recruiting very few Malay and Indian members and remained overwhelmingly Chinese. The MPAJA comprised eight semi-independent regiments that were located in eight

different states of the Malay Peninsula. The initial batches were recruited at the last minute, just after the Japanese invaded Malaya in December 1941, by the MCP at the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) Training School in Singapore to fight as guerrillas behind enemy lines. They were later brought under a central command headed by Liu Yau, chairman of the MCP's Military Committee. After the fall of Malaya, Britain's wartime South-East Asia Command (SEAC), based in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), lost contact with the MPAJA, but in mid-1944, SEAC's clandestine Force 136 landed agents by submarine off Malaya's west coast. The agents made contact with the MPAJA in the jungles and reported MPAJA strength at between 3,000 and 4,000 (Mountbatten 1969: 301); when the MPAJA was disarmed at the end of the war, however, some 7,000 members handed over their arms, mostly seized from the Japanese (Purcell 1949: 262). About 2,000 new arms were supplied by SEAC, but not many of these were turned in (Malaysian National Archives); they were believed to have been buried in deep jungle for use in the near future. For the entire occupation period, the MPAJA claimed to have eliminated 5,500 Japanese troops, police, and local volunteers; Japanese records, however, admit to only 600 killed or wounded, and the local police 2,000 (Malaysian National Archives). The MPAJA's guerrilla tactics and training, including the use of women recruits, were patterned on the anti-Japanese guerrilla war of Mao Zedong's Red Army in China. When its members were demobilized in December 1945, the MPAJA formed and enrolled most of them in a MPAJA Ex-Servicemen's Association.

These former servicemen were reactivated in June 1948 when the MCP launched its armed insurrection to "liberate Malaya from British rule" and establish itself as a nationalist movement to fight for independence. Its uprising (termed the "Emergency") in Malaya coincided with other armed communist uprisings in Burma (Myanmar), Indonesia, and the Philippines in 1948. Controversy has raged among scholars over whether local factors or external factors such as the Moscow-dominated Communist International (Comintern) were responsible for these Southeast Asian uprisings.

CHEAH BOON-KHENG

See also China since 1949; Comintern; Force 136; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); South-East Asia Command (SEAC)

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MALAYAN UNION (1946)

A Failed Proposal

The Malayan Union (MU) was a new policy of the government of Great Britain concerning Malaya after the Japanese surrender in August 1945. It was laid out by the Malayan Planning Unit (MPU) set up in London after the Japanese occupation of Singapore in February 1942 and was announced by the secretary of state for the colonies in the House of Commons on 10 October 1945. Although the express aim of the policy was to “promote the sense of unity and common citizenship” in preparation for eventual “self-government within the British Commonwealth,” it was motivated more by Britain’s own strategic and power considerations. To achieve these objectives, Britain had to annul previous agreements with the Malay state rulers and introduce “fresh constitutional measures for the Straits Settlements.” The MU was to consist of the nine Malay States in the peninsula plus the Straits Settlements of Penang and Melaka. For economic, political, and strategic reasons, Singapore was to be a separate colony of the British Crown.

To realize the MU, Sir Harold MacMichael was dispatched as a special representative to Malaya to “invite” the Malay rulers to conclude “a formal agreement by which he [the Ruler] will cede full jurisdiction” of his state to “His Majesty’s Government.” Immediately after arriving in Malaya on 11 October, MacMichael rushed to meet the nine Malay rulers, starting with the sultan of Johor. By 1 January 1946 all

the signatures had been secured and the stage was set for the implementation of the MU.

Two white papers were published—on 22 January and 4 March—detailing the precise nature of the new arrangement. The MU was to have a legislative council composed of a maximum of twenty-two official and twenty-one unofficial nominated members presided over by the governor, who held veto powers in the council. There was to be an executive council of six official and five unofficial members, the latter to be appointed by the governor. No provision was made to introduce the electoral process in the Malayan Union. A council of sultans consisting of the Malay rulers, the chief secretary, the attorney general, the financial secretary, and the governor (as its president) was to be set up and to meet twice a year. The council would consider legislation relating only to Islamic religious matters that had been approved for enactment by the Malay advisory council of any state. The council would also advise the governor on any matter that he might refer to it for discussion or on matters that, with the governor’s prior consent, had been proposed by any sultan.

Every state was to have a council consisting of a resident commissioner as its chairman and of ex officio members, nominated official members, nominated unofficial members, and elected members as might be prescribed by law or regulation. The uniform post of resident commissioner was suggested in place of the prewar post of British resident or advisor in the Federated Malay States and non-Federated Malay States. The state council’s jurisdiction was restricted to local matters only, and its decisions were revocable by the Union Legislative Council. The State Malay Advisory Council comprised the Malay rulers and other Malays appointed by him. Its basic function was to advise the rulers on matters relating to Islam in the state or referred to it by the resident commissioner “with the Governor’s approval,” and to make laws relating “solely to Islamic religion and [that] do not involve taxation or tithes.” Thus at state level, too, even in Islamic affairs, the power of the governor was absolute.

With regard to citizenship, the second white paper provided that all MU or Singapore residents born in either territory before, on, or after the date the order came into force were MU citizens. The same was true of any person

born outside the MU or Singapore but whose father was an MU citizen. Citizenship by naturalization was open to any person eighteen years of age or older who was ordinarily resident in the MU or Singapore on the date the order came into force. Eligibility was accorded those who had resided in either of the territories for ten years during the fifteen years preceding 15 February 1942, on condition that they took the oath of allegiance to the MU.

It is clear from the above that for the first time in Malayan history, there was to be a common citizenship for all in the peninsula and *ius soli* citizenship applicable to all in Malaya irrespective of race, color, or creed. Ironically, although Singapore was excluded from the MU, Singaporeans meeting certain prerequisites were allowed to opt for Malayan Union citizenship.

Reactions and Outcome

The idea of a united Malaya attracted the support of radical politicians and nationalists of all races in Malaya and Singapore. But when the British colonial intentions became more exposed, the radical politicians too rejected the MU. To the Malays and especially to left-leaning political activists, the MU was direct British colonization, and the separation of Singapore was contrary to their struggle for a united and greater Malay polity. For the minority but politically conscious non-Malay activists, the separation of Singapore meant the prolonging of British rule, especially in Singapore, and the diminution of non-Malay influence in the peninsula.

The Malays in general were against the MU for a number of reasons. The MU drastically changed the political status of the Malay States vis-à-vis Britain from “Protected States” of the prewar period to “Colonies.” Political and legislative powers now rested solely with the British government in the person of the governor. Even in Islamic religious matters, the role of the sultan and the Malays was merely advisory. The citizenship provisions of the MU robbed the Malays of their inherent and presumed “political ownership” of Malaya and exposed them to “threats” from the immigrant communities. Very disappointed with the new policy, the Malays accused Britain of betrayal (*khianat* or *pecah amanah*) of Malay trust and loyalty, and of attempting to appease the “immigrants” (namely, Chinese and In-

dians) for its own colonial advantages at the expense of the Malays. The Malays were also annoyed at the manner in which MacMichael attained the Malay rulers’ signatures, which completely surrendered all the political rights of the Malay. The Malay rulers revealed the rather crude nature of MacMichael’s methods not only to the people in Malaya but also to the British public, and in their complaints to the British government. In his letter to Sir Frank Swettenham (1850–1946), former governor and high commissioner, for instance, the sultan of Kedah wrote:

I was presented with a verbal ultimatum with a time limit, and in the event of my refusing to sign the new agreement, which I call the Instrument of Surrender, a successor who would sign it, would be appointed Sultan. Members of the State Council were compelled to sign an undertaking that they would advise me to sign it. I was told that this matter was personal and confidential, and was not allowed to tell my people what had taken place. (Allen 1967: 169)

All the Malay rulers thus insisted that since they had signed the MU agreement under duress, the treaty was null and void. For the first time there was a common political sentiment, peninsula-wide and encompassing all sections of Malay society. Initially peaceful but later aggressive demonstrations involving tens of thousands of Malays started in December 1945, and prewar Malay associations became active again and new ones appeared. In the southern state of Johor, Dato’ Onn bin Jaafar (1895–1962) formed *Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung* (Peninsula Malay Movement), and in the northern state of Kedah, SABERKAS (Unity) and *Kesatuan Melayu Kedah* (Kedah Malay Union) actively campaigned against the MU.

Apart from speeches criticizing the MU and the British government, some educated Malays expressed their disappointment through the press—especially the Malay press, such as *Majlis*, *Utusan Melayu*, and *Warta Negara*, which became the mouthpieces of Malay sentiment. The Pan-Malaya Malay Congress, held from 1 to 4 March 1946 at the Sultan Sulaiman Club, Kampung Baru, Kuala Lumpur, was the first truly all-Malaya Malay gathering of the postwar period. Representatives of forty-one associa-

tions, including *Kesatuan Melayu Singapura* (Singapore Malay Union) and the radical *Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Muda* (PKMM, National Party of Malay Youth), were present. Declared opened by the sultan of Selangor and chaired by Dato' Onn, the congress unanimously rejected the MU and demanded that the prewar status quo be maintained. The congress paved the way for the formation of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), which officially came into being on 11 May 1946.

At another gathering, on 30–31 March, the Malay *rakyat* (masses) successfully dissuaded the sultans from attending the installation ceremony of the MU governor, Edward Gent, on 1 April. They also observed a weeklong period of mourning in protest. The installation of the governor-general of MU and Singapore, Malcolm MacDonald, on 22 May 1946 was similarly boycotted. Reports and recommendations made by the British members of Parliament led by Captain L. D. Gammans and Lieutenant Colonel R. D. Rees-Williams, who visited Malaya in May, were also sympathetic to the Malays and critical of the new policy. At the same time in Britain, many prominent former Malayan Civil Service (MCS) officials such as Frank Swettenham, Richard Winstedt (1878–1966), George Maxwell (1871–1959), and Cecil Clementi also spoke against the MU.

Faced with overt opposition, the governor and the governor-general decided to negotiate with the Malay rulers and UMNO. Their 28–30 May meeting in Kuala Kangsar paved the way for further negotiations, which led to the formation of a working committee on 25 July composed of six British officials, four Malay rulers, and two UMNO representatives. Although agreeing on the need for a strong central government to ensure effective administration and progress of Malaya as a whole, the Malay representatives insisted on the retention of some degree of individuality by each Malay state and the promise of eventual self-government. The draft proposal of the Working Committee issued on 24 December was then tabled for the consideration of a consultative committee composed mainly of influential non-Malay representatives. In April 1947 the working committee published the final draft, which became the basis of the Federation of Malaya (*Persekutuan Tanah Melayu*), which officially replaced the MU on 1 February 1948.

Under the new agreement there was to be a British high commissioner in place of the governor and a conference of rulers in place of the council of rulers. The ruler's assent was required on all bills passed by the state council, and the state executive council was to be headed by a *Menteri Besar* (chief minister). The state council was empowered to legislate on matters relating to Islam and Malay customs, and the conference of rulers was to be chaired by one of the rulers himself. New provisions were also made with regard to citizenship. The new arrangement was essentially a compromise between the Malay insistence on their special ownership over Malaya and British pressure for an administratively united Malaya and the acceptance by the Malays of non-Malays as citizens of the new administrative entity.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Federation of Malaya (1948); Malays; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Newspapers and Mass Media in Southeast Asia; Onn bin Ja'afar (1895–1962); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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MALAYS

One of the principal ethnic groups of Southeast Asia, the Malays are the majority community in the nation-states of Malaysia and Brunei and a significant minority in Indonesia and Thailand. Smaller numbers of people who call themselves Malay are to be found in various other parts of Southeast Asia, as well as in Sri Lanka and South Africa. Exactly how the term "Malay" is defined has continued to be an issue of dispute. In fact, the elusiveness of this ethnicity, together with its rich and influential culture, helps to explain the historical significance of the Malays.

Just who were the "Malays"? In the earliest Malay manuscripts, "Mĕlayu" referred specifically to representatives and close associates of the dynasty who ruled the polity of Melaka (Malacca) before the Portuguese conquest of 1511, and later ruled in Johor. In this period, however, ethnicity was a less developed and less potent concept than it later became. People tended to be identified with respect to their relationship to a ruler or to a particular geographic locality. From the sixteenth century, Chinese and European writings increasingly used the term "Malay" with reference to people in what is now southern Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and this practice may have helped to promote a broader sense of Malay community extending beyond the Johor sultanate.

There had long been good reason for thinking in terms of such a broad community. In speaking of a "Malay nation" (to use Governor Stamford Raffles's [1781–1826] expression), European and Chinese commentators drew attention to a genuine degree of homogeneity among "Malay" groups in the Malay archipelago (present-day Malaysia, Indonesia, and

southern Philippines). Proclaiming the faith of Islam, dressed in jacket (*baju*) and *sarong* (pareo), listening to a similar mythological literature (much influenced by Indian, Persian, and Arabic works), and ruled by rajas and chiefs holding similar titles from one polity to the next were some of the homogenous traits of the Malay. Furthermore, speaking the same language (though with dialectical differences) and writing that language in a remarkably standardized form were the characteristics of a people that conveyed the impression of a cultural community that transcended the multiplicity of often warring rajaships. In the nineteenth century, as the British and Dutch extended their empires across the region, and in an age when "race" came to be employed as a fundamental category in the scientific analysis of humankind, the colonial construction of "Malay" began to crystallize. It further influenced the way Malays thought about their identity.

Colonialists and the new Malay ethno-nationalists also cooperated (and sometimes clashed) in constructing a new historical consciousness—one that incorporated the known narratives of many of the kingdoms of the archipelago, reaching back to seventh-century Śrīvijaya, based in Palembang in South Sumatra. Inscriptions from Śrīvijaya are written in the Old Malay language and use a script based on the Pallava script from India; they contain concepts of allegiance and magic that reveal strong Buddhist and Hindu influence and, in addition, have affinities with the cultural perspectives documented in later Malay States. In the manner of a *boddhisattva*, for instance, the Śrīvijaya ruler offered his "loyal" subjects an "immaculate tantra" and "eternal peace."

Śrīvijaya's influence extended up coastal Sumatra, across to the Riau archipelago and parts of the Malay Peninsula. The achievement of such a wide-flung empire was assisted by Chinese policy: when that country depended on foreign shipping to carry its imports—for example, from the seventh to eleventh centuries—Śrīvijaya was able to establish itself as a tributary state providing a safe base for commerce to China. When Chinese ships began to enter the trade in the twelfth century, going directly to supply centers in the archipelago, the Śrīvijayan entrepôt lost its hegemony.

In the late fourteenth century, when the Chinese moved to restore the tribute system,

there was competition to assume the role of overlord in the western Malay archipelago. A ruling family claiming descent from the rulers of Palembang established a new entrepôt in Melaka on the Malay Peninsula, and eventually they extended their control over a territory comparable to that of Śrīvijaya. Melaka became a thriving port, drawing merchants from China, India, and Southeast Asia and eventually attracting the envy of the Portuguese, who conquered the city-port in 1511. Although pre-conquest Melaka is today presented as a golden age in Malay history, at the time its rulers acknowledged the rivalry of such polities as Aru and Pasai in North Sumatra; such states as Kedah, farther up the peninsula, have not recognized the Melaka heritage in their royal genealogies.

Partly because of the presence of European powers, the kingdoms scattered around the Malay archipelago in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries do not ever seem to have achieved the imperial strength of Śrīvijaya or Melaka. The spread of Malay culture into the Philippines was also halted by the intervention of Spanish power. But Aceh in North Sumatra, Johor (whose rulers claimed descent from Melaka) in the south of the peninsula, Patani to the north, and Brunei in Borneo were all influential polities, or *kerajaan*. They all attracted numerous traders, generated a distinguished corpus of Malay literature, and possessed similar political institutions and ceremonies, legal culture, personal manners, and religious adherence. Although all of these polities had converted to Islam, or were in the process of doing so, much of their royal ritual and popular custom continued to reveal the influence of animism and Hindu-Buddhism. The sultan, like his Hindu-Buddhist royal ancestor—for instance, in Śrīvijaya—offered his subjects spiritual as well as worldly rewards.

The process of Islamization, which had gathered pace in the fourteenth century and continues today, is an important issue in Malay history. Whether Islamic influence came initially from the east or west, the reasons for adopting Islam; the role of commercial, political, and spiritual factors; the social impact of conversion—all are issues of debate. Some have stressed the common ground between pre-Islamic religious beliefs and Islamic mysticism (Sufism) as facilitating conversion; others ob-

serve that the central role of the ruler in the fourteenth-century Muslim world also happened to be congenial to Malay culture at that time. Against these views, it has been argued that conversion constituted a sharp cultural break rather than the gradual development that the above observations imply.

There is no doubt that religious change brought a degree of cultural and social change, and in the long run it had the potential to be revolutionary. From the sixteenth century, for instance, the impact of Arabic on the Malay language increased substantially. In the nineteenth century, Europeans noted the way Sumatran Bataks, who converted to Islam, changed their clothing, learned to speak Malay, adopted Malay customs, and listened to Malay literature. They were engaged in ethnic as well as religious conversion, which is a reminder of just how fluid Malay ethnicity has been. In recent times this “conversion” has continued in many parts of the archipelago. In the Riau Province of Indonesia, for instance, many Kuantan people have redefined themselves as Malay rather than Menangkabau (Minangkabau).

The most radical impact of Islam was evident in the nineteenth century in the growth in influence of *Shari’ah*-mindedness in the archipelago region. Those people who held Islamic law (*Shari’ah*) to be all-important in the life of the community struggled against others (particularly in the royal courts) who defended Malay custom. In Sumatra this involved killing or threatening the Malay rulers. Some Islamic activists saw an advantage in the onset of colonial rule, using in particular the British-governed colonies of Singapore and Penang as safe enclaves from which they could propagate reformist doctrines beyond the reach of the Malay *kerajaan*.

By the nineteenth century it was evident to most Malays that their societies were under threat. Not only the Dutch extending control over one *kerajaan* after another in Sumatra, Borneo, and the islands, and the British moving into the peninsular polities, but also large numbers of Chinese and Indian immigrants presented an economic threat in many regions. Influenced by both Islamic and Western thinking, social critics began to examine the reasons for Malay weakness and to propose a range of measures to revitalize the community. Islamic critics argued that Malays should identify themselves

primarily as members of the Islamic community (*umat*) and eliminate non-Islamic elements from their society, including much of the *kerajaan* ritual and hierarchical structure. At the opening of the twentieth century, Muslim reformists—influenced by Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and others in the Middle East—argued that such a return to Islamic fundamentals was consistent with the acquisition of Western-style scientific learning, and called for the modernization of the Islamic education system. An alternative emphasis, pioneered early in the nineteenth century by the social critic Munshi Abdullah (1797–1854), laid greater stress on the creation of a strong Malay consciousness, focused on the Malay *bangsa* (race), and reaching beyond individual *kerajaan*. This approach also advocated European secular learning. The extent to which there was division or compatibility in these reformist programs for Malay society is a subject of debate. In recent years, especially in Malaysia, Islamic activists have been accused of “dividing the Malay race” because of their insistence on the primacy of membership in the wider Islamic community.

The colonial contribution to the development of Malay consciousness is critical—particularly the potent concept of “race” and the later development of ethno-nationalism (in Japan and Turkey as well as Europe). Not only did Malays increasingly begin to see themselves as members of a race rather than mere subjects of a specific *raja* but, in addition, the characteristics that colonial administrators attributed to the “Malay race” influenced Malay self-perceptions. The “Real Malay”—to use Governor Frank Swettenham’s (1850–1946) phrase—was said to be courteous but also lazy, conservative, superstitious, and vengeful. In seeking to rejuvenate Malay society, both Islamic and Malay nationalist critics committed themselves to changing these characteristics.

Although influenced by successful ethno-nationalism elsewhere in the world, Malay nationalism developed its own specific characteristics, one of which was the appropriation from the *kerajaan* of a rhetoric of loyalty.

Just what was the scope of “Malayness” became a contested issue, and it has often depended on local circumstances. Some Malays (and Europeans) saw it as incorporating the entire archipelago, including the large population of Javanese. The elite that won control of

Malaya at independence in 1957, and was determined to keep the new state separate from Indonesia, tended to restrict the Malay *bangsa* to the people of the peninsula and the *kerajaan* in Borneo and Sumatra. From earlier periods, some people have understood “Malay” primarily in terms of adherence to Islam—in present-day Singapore and Penang, for instance, Malay ethnicity is claimed by a broad range of Malay-speaking Muslims, including people of primarily Indian background.

Certain texts from traditional Malay literature also took a relaxed view toward the idea of “hybrid Malays,” but others (for example, the Malays of Riau who faced intense competition from the Bugis people, especially in the nineteenth century) emphasize the importance of descent. Faced with Asian immigration in early-twentieth-century Malaya, such Malay commentators as Abdul Rahim Kajai (1894–1943) also put a greater stress on blood qualification, in particular questioning the credentials of “Malays” of Arab or Indian (or Chinese) background. The issue of just who ought to be classified as Malay continues today as Malaysia responds to claims to Malay ethnicity on the part of Indonesian and other Muslim immigrants.

The Malays emerged from the colonial period in a stronger position in Malaysia and Brunei, where the sultanates were retained and the Malays continued to dominate government. At the end of Dutch rule in Indonesia, republican forces often dominated by other ethnic groups overturned most of the *kerajaan* there. In Indonesia, the Malays are considered to be just one of a large number of ethnicities (*suku bangsa*) in the nation. In many places they have fared badly in competition with other groups and are sometimes antagonistic to the Indonesian state. The laws introduced in Indonesia in 1999 to facilitate a greater measure of regional autonomy have helped to reopen the whole issue of the *suku bangsa* “Melayu” in the Indonesian state. In this fluid situation there have been moves to carve out a strongly Malay province in Riau, and some Malays even seek a new association with the “Malay homeland” of Malaysia. It is true that Malaysia was constructed as a Malay-dominated nation, and it communicates a pride in Malayness through a Malay International Secretariat and a World Malay Assembly. Furthermore, in the 1990s, un-

der the leadership of Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad (1925–), the Malaysian government invoked the idea of the “Melayu Baru”—the “new Malay”—who has thrown off the retarding ethnic characteristics attributed to Malays in the past and acquired a new entrepreneurial and professional outlook.

ANTHONY MILNER

See also Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir, Munsyi (1797–1854); Aceh (Acheh); Bataks; Brunei Malays; Bugis (Buginese); Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Johor; Johor–Riau Empire; Melaka; Moros; Muslim Minorities (Thailand); Patani (Pattani), Sultanate of; Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Srivijaya (Sriwijaya); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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MALAYSIA (1963)

Malaysia, as a federation consisting of eleven states of British Malaya including Singapore, Sabah (North Borneo), and Sarawak, officially came into being on 16 September 1963 after a nine-member UN mission reported that the majority of the population of Sabah and Sarawak supported its establishment. But since Britain and the four prospective members had already decided in December 1962 that Malaysia be constituted on 31 August 1963, that date (which was similar to the date on which Malaya had attained independence in 1957) was taken as the official date for “Malaysia Day.” With due amendments, the constitution of the Federation of Malaya became the basis for the Federation of Malaysia constitution.

Like Malaya, Malaysia is a unique parliamentary constitutional monarchy headed by an elected monarch designated Yang di-Pertuan Agong (paramount ruler) who is chosen by and among the nine hereditary Malay sultans of Malaya to hold the office for a period not exceeding five years. At the regional level, the nine Malay States are headed by the Malay rulers while Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore, like Penang and Melaka, are each led by a governor with the title Yang di-Pertua Negeri appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong.

Historically, “Malaysia” is not a new concept. The idea that former British colonies and protectorates in the Malay Peninsula and British Borneo should be centrally administered for political, administrative, and socioeconomic reasons had been mooted out since the nine-

teenth century. It became even more popular after the 1940s. However, it was Tunku Abdul Rahman's (1903–1990) speech to the Foreign Correspondents' Association of Southeast Asia in Singapore on 27 May 1961 that started the speedy process toward Malaysia being actualized. The speech enhanced political consciousness and maneuvering among the potential members of the new entity and Britain, and it caused some concern to neighboring countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines.

The motives behind the creation of Malaysia were economics, ethnicity, and security. Singapore's participation would undoubtedly boost the economy of Malaya. But Tunku's fear of a Chinese deluge from the colony might destabilize the ethnic composition of Malaya, where the combined Chinese and Indian populations outnumbered the indigenous Malays. To offset this racial arithmetic, Tunku felt that the inclusion of Sarawak and Sabah with their indigenous ethnic groups (Ibans, Kadazan-Dusuns) would bring equilibrium to the indigenous-nonindigenous equation. The Cold War brought instability to the geopolitical situation. A leftist regime in Singapore would be a nightmarish thought for Malaya, which had managed to defeat communist subversion (the Emergency [1948–1960]).

To encourage the active participation of representatives from Sarawak and Sabah, the British arranged for their presence at the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference in Singapore in July 1961. This led to the formation of the Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee (MSCC), made up of Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei, Singapore, and Malaya, to deliberate further on the views of the prospective members. Chaired by Donald A. Stephens (1920–1976), the leader of the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO) of Sabah, MSCC met four times and came up in February 1962 with the *Memorandum on Malaysia*, which speeded up the process.

The Cobbold Commission (1962), which was set up "to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak . . . and, in the light of these views, to make recommendations," undertook tasks from 19 February to 17 April. Its recommendations were favorable but cautioned that "Malaysia should be regarded by all concerned as an association of partners, combining in the common interest to create a

new nation but retaining their own individualities." Based on the recommendation of MSCC, an Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) was formed in August 1962 consisting of members from Britain, Malaya, Sarawak, and Sabah to look further into the details. Submitted in February 1963, the final IGC report was finally approved by the legislative councils of Sarawak and Sabah on 8 and 13 March, respectively. The sultan of Brunei, too, early in 1962, set up a commission to gauge the prospects of Brunei joining Malaysia. As was indicated by the overwhelming majority won by Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB) in the election, the majority of the Bruneians were more in favor of the unification of the Borneo territories than of joining Malaya and Singapore to form Malaysia.

On 1 September 1962 the People's Action Party government in Singapore held a referendum on how the Singapore-Malaya merger should be instituted. About 71 percent voted for Alternative A, which proposed a Penang-type merger (granted concessions, including autonomy in education and labor policies), and 25.8 percent cast blank votes, presumably in opposition to the merger.

The Malaysia Agreement was signed in London among Britain, Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah on 8 July 1963 and was endorsed in the parliaments or legislative councils of the contracting states. Brunei decided not to participate. The Malaysia Act, amending the Malayan constitution as proposed by the IGC, was passed in the Malayan parliament on 26 August 1963.

Indonesia and the Philippines insisted that an independent commission be sent to assess opinion and the willingness of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak. This insistence was coupled with the Sukarno-Macapagal-Tunku Accord in Manila in June 1963, and a UN Malaysia Mission (UNMM) was sent to Sabah and Sarawak that carried out its assessment between 16 August and 5 September. Malaysia officially came into being two days after the *United Nations Secretary-General Report* of 14 August confirmed that a sizable majority of the peoples of Sabah and Sarawak wished to join the federation.

The UN confirmation notwithstanding, President Sukarno (t. 1945–1967) launched Indonesia's *Konfrontasi* ("Crush Malaysia" campaign) in September 1963. The Philippines pursued the sovereignty claim to Sabah.

Meanwhile conflicts developed within the federation between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore on various issues, and on 9 September 1965 the federation government and Singapore made simultaneous announcements that Singapore had seceded from Malaysia to form a new independent nation, thus reducing the Malaysia federation to thirteen states.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front); British Borneo; British Malaya; Brunei Rebellion (December 1962); Constitutional Monarchy (Malaya/Malaysia); Konfrontasi ("Crush Malaysia" Campaign); Lee Kuan Yew (1923–); Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB); People's Action Party (PAP); Sabah Claim; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Singapore (1819); Singapore, Entrepot Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Singapore–Malaya/Malaysia Relations (ca. 1950s–1990s)

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MALIK, ADAM (1917–1984)

Architect of New Order Foreign Policy

Indonesian political activist, journalist, diplomat, and statesman Adam Malik was affectionately nicknamed *Bung Kancil* (The Mousedeer) in recognition of his wit. (Although small in size, the mousedeer often outwits larger animals such as the tiger and crocodile in Malay fables.) Born in Kampung Keling, Pematang Siantar, North Sumatra, from a Batubara family of Mandailing descent, Malik received his elementary education at the Hollandsch Inlandsche School (HIS). Thereafter he went to an Islamic boarding school in West Sumatra, but he never completed his studies. Instead, at seventeen years of age, the Dutch colonial government jailed him for being a member of the proscribed Indonesian nationalist group Partai Indonesia (Partindo).

After his arrival in Java, he formed a close association with the leftwing group of Tan Malaka's (1897?–1949) underground political party, Partai Indonesia Raya (PARI). This involvement earned him his second sojourn in jail, in 1935. He was, however, released a year later, because as a youth selling books on the sidewalks of Pasar Senen, he seemed to the Dutch authorities too inexperienced to be a member of PARI. They were mistaken, for, on the contrary, the young Malik involved himself in the newly founded nationalist party of Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (GERINDO) in 1937. In the same year, Malik, together with several nationalist-minded journalists, set up a news agency called *Antara*, which aimed to compete with the Dutch news agency *Aneta*. For his recalcitrance Malik was brought, together with hundreds of young nationalist activists, to the concentration camp of Garut in West Java in December 1941. Shortly after, he earned a stay at the reputedly harsh prison of Nusakambangan Island in Central Java, where he witnessed the last day of the Dutch colonial empire after Japanese planes bombarded the area on 7 March 1942 and the Dutch officially surrendered a day after.

During the period of the Japanese occupation, Malik busied himself in Antara, which had



Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik, ca. 1966. (Bettmann/Corbis)

become a part of the Japanese news agency *Domei*. At the same time Malik was also engaged in the underground nationalist movement. Together with Sukarni and Chairul Saleh, he led radical youths to kidnap Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970) and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980) in order to force them to proclaim Indonesian independence as early as possible in Rengasdengklok on 16 August 1945.

From 1945 to 1949, Malik served in different posts in the republican government in addition to his involvement in political parties. His relation with Tan Malaka's leftist group continued. He founded *Partai Rakyat*. At the same time he associated with Tan Malaka's *Persatuan Perjuangan*, a group that was alleged to have abducted Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir in mid-1946. Along with Sukarni, Malik paid tribute to the establishment of Tan Malaka's proletarian party, *Partai Murba*, in 1948.

After 1949, Malik represented *Partai Murba* in the parliament and commenced his diplomatic career. He became Indonesian ambassador

to the Soviet Union and Poland in 1959. He also led secret negotiations between Indonesia and The Netherlands concerning West Papua in 1962. Malik returned to Indonesia in 1963 and then held a ministerial post of economic affairs under President Soekarno. When Soeharto (Suharto) (1921–) took over power after the failure of the September 1965 movement, Malik was brought in to Pejambon to lead a department/ministry in charge of foreign affairs. In his capacity as Indonesia's foreign minister, he was directly involved in the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Malik was also responsible in bringing an end to confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia, to normalize relations with the Philippines and China, to regain for Indonesia a seat in the United Nations, and to negotiate Indonesia's debt. In addition, he was the sole architect of Indonesia's foreign policy during the first fifteen years of the New Order (1966–1981). He was appointed the second Asian (after UN secretary-general U Thant of Burma) to

hold one of two top posts at the United Nations—namely, to be the twenty-sixth president of the General Assembly. His two-year presidency from 1971 to 1972 witnessed the entry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the United Nations, a South Asian war between Pakistan and India, and the appointment of a new secretary-general.

Malik ended his diplomatic career in 1977, when he was appointed speaker of the Indonesian parliament and then Indonesia's third vice-president in 1978. He is well-known for his phrase *semua bisa diatur* ("everything can be easily managed"), reflecting his optimism and pragmatism. He is married and has five children.

BAMBANG PURWANTO

See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Konfrontasi ("Crush Malaysia" Campaign); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Sjahrir, Sutan (1909–1966); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–); Tan Malaka, Ibrahim Datuk (1897?–1949)

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MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS)

The Spice Islands

Maluku is the traditional Malay name for the constellation of small to medium-sized islands in the southeastern corner of Indonesia bounded by New Guinea, Timor, and Sulawesi. Most lie in the region of deep seas known as Wallacea, though a few are located on the Sahul continental shelf. Halmahera, at the far north of Maluku, is its largest island, followed by Seram and Buru in central Maluku, and Aru in the region's eastern corner. The standard name in English is "the Moluccas," which derives from *as*

Malucas, the Portuguese attempt to render the Malay term in a plural form to reflect the numerous islands in the region. Its most widely known name in English is the Spice Islands, in recognition of the two renowned spices native to Maluku: cloves and nutmeg. Maluku falls entirely within 10 degrees of the equator, and, apart from the relief of cooler temperatures in the scattered highlands, variation in the climate is modest. The islands differ in how much rain they receive, whether it falls in a distinct wet season, and, if so, whether the monsoon peaks at around January or May.

The archaeologist Peter Bellwood (Bellwood et al. 1998) has recovered traces of human habitation on Gebe Island, near Maluku's boundary with New Guinea, dating as far back as 35,000 years ago. He believes that the original inhabitants spoke Papuan languages, which is the name given to a diverse array of language families stretching from Timor in the east to the Solomon Islands in the west. These first occupants would have survived through hunting and gathering land and sea resources in a way of life that continued in some parts of Maluku till at least as recently as 2,000 years ago. However, the entry of pottery, polished stone adzes, shell jewelry, and domestic animals (pigs and dogs) at around 3,500 years ago is recognized on the islets of Kayoa in the north and, in less complete form, Ay in central Maluku. This cultural complex is linked to the suspected arrival of Austronesian speakers and their agricultural practices, from islands to the west. Western and central Indonesia is also the probable source of various other technological innovations that arrived in Maluku, after 2,000 years ago, including iron technology and wet-rice agriculture. Nonetheless, Papuan languages have continued to thrive in many parts of Maluku, and the native languages of the powerful Ternate and Tidore sultanates are Papuan, even though the court language was Malay.

Cloves and nutmeg have reached China, India, and the Mediterranean region for more than 2,000 years, from times long before the source of these spices was at all widely known. Presumably, trade between adjacent islands resulted in the movement of cloves from Halmahera's offshore islands, and nutmeg from the Banda islands, to early emporia in Bali, Java, and Sumatra. Scholars have recorded stylistically late Dong-son kettledrums, manufactured in North

Vietnam in the early centuries C.E., on many of the islands of southern and central Maluku. In addition, the Dutch destroyed another kettle-drum on the Banda islands in 1625, and Georgius Everhardus Rumphius sent two further specimens from Maluku to Europe in the late seventeenth century. These drums would seem to be the visible reminder of the ancient trade route from western Indonesia to Maluku, even though intensive archaeological excavations of the Halmahera region and the Bandas have revealed relatively modest finds of early, exotic manufactured goods: metal scraps and glass beads within the last 2,000 years, Chinese ceramics and coins from 1,000 years ago.

Shadowy textual sources trace the origins of the ruling lineages of Ternate and Tidore, the two northernmost clove-producing islands, back to the fourteenth or even the thirteenth century C.E. When Wang Ta-yuan visited the South Seas in the 1330s, he recorded that traders of Chinese origin frequented Ternate and Tidore. This matches information given to the Portuguese in Maluku that Chinese were the first foreign visitors who could be remembered, only later followed by Javanese and Malay traders. The latter emanated from the Javanese empire of Majapahit and the Malay empire of Melaka that successively commandeered the route to Maluku in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and brought Islam to the five spice-producing islands and adjacent coast of Halmahera. Islamic practices gradually became more entrenched among the local populace throughout the period of direct engagement with Europeans, which began with the arrival of Portuguese ships in 1512.

The Portuguese concentrated on Ternate, which, at that time, led Tidore in the competitive rivalry between the two intermarrying, royal houses that jointly ruled Maluku. Tidore for its part welcomed the Spanish, when they arrived in 1521, to offset the stranglehold of the Ternate-Portuguese alliance. Increasingly, Ternate and Tidore settled on complementary spheres of activity: Ternate governed clove production (including new plantations in and around Seram) and foreign trade, and extended its empire westward to include much of Sulawesi; Tidore was suzerain over Halmahera and northwestern New Guinea, bringing cloth and other valuables to its dependencies. This situation persisted into the seventeenth century,

when the Dutch established themselves on Ternate and began to impose a monopoly over cloves. The Netherlands United East India Company (VOC), established largely for the purpose of bringing these spices back to Europe, competed and warred against the Iberian alliance of the Spanish, based on Tidore, and Portuguese traders in league with other mercantile interests opposed to the Dutch.

The VOC succeeded in destroying all of the clove plantations in Maluku except those it directly controlled along the southwest coast of Seram on the Lease Islands and, most important, Ambon. Eviction of the Spanish from Tidore in 1666 and the complete conquest in 1669 of Makassar, in Sulawesi, which had harbored non-VOC traders, granted the Dutch unimpeded monopoly over the clove trade till the late eighteenth century. Ambon remained the world leader in clove production till the end of the nineteenth century; its status as one of the centers of indigenous Christianity and education is closely linked to the nearly 300 years during which Ambon supplied the bulk of the world's cloves. Ternate and Tidore were increasingly consigned to dependence on the Dutch and, in turn, obscurity, apart from a brief interlude around 1800 when Sultan Saifuddin aligned with the English and briefly snatched Ternate and Tidore from Dutch control. With the loss of their singular export, cloves, and increasingly more of Maluku's minor polities establishing a relationship of direct dependency to the Dutch, Ternate and Tidore gradually lost their role as intermediaries between the Dutch overlords and the local populace.

The Bandas were the worst affected area in all of Maluku by the actions of the Dutch. Aided by Japanese mercenaries, Dutch forces massacred, expelled, or enslaved the entire Bandanese population in the 1620s, and usurped ownership of the only nutmeg plantations then operating in the world. The minuscule surface area of the Bandas, about 50 square kilometers in all, rendered its population (estimated at around 15,000 at the time) highly vulnerable to a concerted attack (Muller 1991: 81). Over the previous half century, the Bandanese had engaged in deft diplomacy in allowing an English military presence to contain the Dutch threat and, in the late sixteenth century, in forming an alliance with Ternate against the hegemonic plans of the Portuguese. The Bandanese had become more than

accustomed to the presence of foreigners, with 10 percent of the population estimated to be Javanese traders in 1609, as well as agents from many other Southeast Asian islands. These influences had brought Islam to the Bandas in the fifteenth century, along with the tradition of a wealthy merchant elite (*orang kaya*).

Banda was the emporium of Maluku, and its economy was based entirely on trade. Cloves, feathers of tropical birds, and other lines of Maluku produce could be obtained in its ports, in addition to the locally produced nutmeg. Virtually all of its food, especially sago cakes, had to be imported from larger, surrounding islands in exchange for cloth and other foreign manufactured goods. However, there is no evidence that the Bandas had ever been united under a local ruler. Possibly this was because the lack of an agriculturally productive hinterland stymied the establishment of a power base that could prevent foreign interests from swaying the Bandanese communities in disparate directions. To the degree that the Bandanese exercised an effective resistance against external pressures, it appears to have been in the form of a late persistence of pre-Islamic traditions among communities based in the islands' volcanic uplands and along the sections of the coastline least suited as anchorages. Ritual connections among the Bandanese to their sacred, ancestral places survived the 1621 Dutch massacre, and have experienced a revival in recent times with the return of many Bandanese from the islands where their ancestors had been forced to take refuge.

The commercial schemes of the VOC and, in later centuries, the Dutch colonial government did not extend to less lucrative items such as sea cucumbers, tortoiseshell, earthenware pots (for which the Kei Islands enjoyed some renown), or bird plumage. Makassar traders, who were first attracted to Maluku in the early seventeenth century to "smuggle" precisely those goods that the Dutch strove to monopolize, filled the opening for petty commerce, especially after the 1660s. They were soon joined by Bugis and, later, Butonese traders, also from Sulawesi. Sulawesi traders established quarters in the Dutch-controlled centers of Ternate and Ambon, where they cooperated with the authorities and spread along the coasts of other islands, freely intermarrying with the inhabitants. As followers of Islam, they forged the wide-

spread practice in Maluku of communities of immigrant Muslims who, from their coastal vantages, ruled the roost while the indigenes were often confined to the hinterland. Many of the latter groups are Christian through their long association with the Dutch, coupled with resistance against the newcomers. A close association with the Dutch colonial administration and army developed, especially in Ambon, and a republic of the South Moluccas existed for some months in 1950 before the eventual integration of this area into the Republic of Indonesia. Current tensions and violence in Maluku have very deep roots.

As the home of two spices of international renown over the last 2,000 years, Maluku stimulated early trade, both within the archipelago, and between the archipelago and major population centers in China, Europe, and ports along the Indian Ocean. Tensions between rival commercial interests reached a peak in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as Europe's principal trading nations strove to control the lucrative spice market. The limited landmass and agrarian potential of the Maluku islands have always rendered the indigenous people vulnerable to foreign domination, a state of affairs that has arguably been localized, but not reversed, with Indonesia's independence over the last half century.

DAVID BULBECK

See also British Interests in Southeast Asia; Bugis; Dong-son; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1602), English; East Indonesian Ethnic Groups; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Melaka; Portuguese Asian Empire; Republik Maluku Selatan (RMS, Republic of the South Moluccas); Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Spices and the Spice Trade; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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MANDALAY

City of Burmese Culture

Situated in Upper Burma (Myanmar), Mandalay is the cultural heart of the Myanmar people. It was built as a capital city by King Mindon (r. 1852–1878) in 1853. It was here that King Mindon received the missions of Sir

Henry Yule and Sir Arthur Phayre in 1855, 1862, and 1867. It was to Mandalay that Edward Bosc Sladen was appointed political agent of the British colonial authorities that had dismembered Burma after the First and Second Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852), cutting off its access to the sea. Mandalay was the last capital of precolonial monarchical Burma, the seat of government for the last two Konbaung dynasty monarchs, King Mindon and his son, King Thibaw (r. 1878–1885).

At the heart of Mandalay was the king's palace, one square kilometer in area. It was the scene of the tragic 1866 rebellion by two of King Mindon's sons, the Myingon and Myingondaing princes, who killed their uncle, the crown prince or *Einshemin*, King Mindon's brother, Prince Kanaung, and several others, and nearly killed King Mindon himself. The king escaped on the back of a court official, who, ironically, had been sent to kill him. Consequently, King Mindon did not appoint another crown prince for the rest of his reign, a fact that inspired the revolt in 1868 by the Padein prince, son of the late crown prince. It was at the palace that his successor, King Thibaw, was appointed as a result of the machinations of his mother-in-law, the Alenandaw Queen, who had married her daughters, Supayalat and Supayagyi, to the young king. But the domineering Supayalat soon drove her sister into seclusion and kept a watchful eye on any competitors for the king's graces. It was at the palace that King Mindon's beloved sons and one of his queens were apprehended, imprisoned, and murdered on the orders of the Alenandaw Queen and her supporters in the Hlutdaw (Council of Ministers), including the Kinwun Mingyi. Some eighty royal relatives perished, depriving Burma of much of the talent that might have steered a different course for the country had they lived. Two of Mindon's sons, the Nyaungyan and Nyaung-oke princes, escaped the bloodshed to Rangoon (Yangon). Shortly afterward, under the guise of a prison fire, another massacre carried off other relatives and supporters who Queen Supayalat and her mother thought threatened their power over the young king. The palace and Mandalay could not shake off this legacy of bloodshed.

Mandalay, under King Mindon, was also the scene for the Fifth Great Buddhist Council in

1872. The pious king had the Buddhist texts inscribed on stone tablets at the Kuthodaw Pagoda at the foot of Mandalay Hill. Under King Mindon, the Shwegyin Sect of Burmese Buddhist monks increased its power and independence. King Mindon combined religious pursuits with canny political sense that extended monarchical Burma's independent life by twenty-five years. The years of his reign saw him maintain a balance of friendly relations with both the British and French, enabling European explorers to seek the southwest route to China through northern Burma, yet keeping Burmese independence intact.

His skills were wanting in his successor. On 25 November 1885, at the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Burmese War, Mandalay witnessed the deposition and exile of King Thibaw and Queen Supayalat to British India. The procession from the capital, downriver, was a grievous sight for most Burmese, who realized they were witnessing the end of one of the key Burmese cultural institutions. The victors stripped Mandalay palace, the spoils and thrones going to Calcutta and the jewels entrusted to Political Agent Sladen disappearing. One of the thrones, the Bee Throne, was returned to Burma after the Pacific War in 1945 by Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979), a friend to Burma; it is housed in the National Museum in Yangon.

Mandalay's tragic history continued during the Pacific War (1941–1945), when the palace was burned during hostilities. It is being reconstructed under the current Myanmar government. The Mandalay region during the war was the sight of fierce battles between the occupation Japanese troops and Allied forces.

Today, Mandalay's cultural heritage is continued in the traditions of Mandalay University and the many Buddhist temples rising above the city. Mandalay is known as the religious center of Burma (Mya Maung 1992: 174), to which is attributed the fact that Mandalay escaped the severe civil violence that flared up in other Myanmar cities after the political uprising of 1988. In Mandalay, seven Buddhist monk organizations under the leadership of senior abbots maintained control of demonstrators (ibid.: 175). At the beginning of the third millennium Mandalay is a vibrant commercial center, gateway to the north, that hosts much of the border trade with Yunnan. Its skyline is dotted with satellite communications dishes. It has

a population of over 600,000 people, connected to Yangon by air, rail, road, and water transportation services (Hla 2001).

HELEN JAMES

See also Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Mindon (r. 1853–1878)

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"MANIFEST DESTINY"

"Manifest Destiny" was a phrase used in the United States in the nineteenth century to justify territorial expansion. The phrase carried the belief that such expansion was inevitable and had divine support; it led to U.S. expansion not only in the North American mainland but also to the Caribbean and into the Pacific and Asia.

John Louis O'Sullivan, a U.S. journalist and diplomat, first utilized the phrase to argue for the acquisition of Texas in 1845. "Manifest Destiny" gave the United States a sense of purpose, in which U.S. territorial expansion differed from the European type of imperialism because the United States had a divine mission to spread its religion, culture, and government. The phrase represented American jingoistic sentiment of the late nineteenth century and fueled the expansion to the Pacific coast. From the Pacific coast, "Manifest Destiny" served as

the inspiration and rationale for controlling Hawai'i and taking over the Philippines and Guam. It also underlined the Monroe Doctrine and U.S. policy in Asia until the early twentieth century. Similar to Manifest Destiny was the idea of the White Man's Burden.

"Manifest Destiny" has been seen as a pillar of American foreign policy from the late nineteenth century, justifying imperial expansion with a sense of righteousness and divine mission. To those who came under U.S. control, however, it simply meant an excuse to control other people and lands and impose foreign ideas.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Colonialism; Imperialism; U.S.

Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945);
"White Man's Burden"

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MANILA

Village to Metropolis

Manila, the principal port of the Philippine Islands, is situated on the west coast of the island of Luzon, and on the east shore of Manila Bay, at the mouth of the Pasig River. There was a pre-Spanish Muslim settlement, May-nilad. In 1571 a Spanish conquistador, Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (1500–1572), destroyed it. After assaulting and burning the earlier settlement, he established a new Spanish town in which he died in 1572. After a successful Chinese piratical attack in 1574, serious fortification started in 1590. Eventually a walled city (*intramuros*) was created with a defensive moat crossed by six drawbridges that continued to be raised nightly until 1852. The moat was filled only in 1905.

The Portuguese feared that Manila would threaten their ascendancy in the spice trade, but cooperation soon replaced jealousy. The merchants of Macao illegally sold Chinese silk in Manila in exchange for American silver. In the seventeenth century, when the Portuguese lost their spice monopoly and the Dutch closed the Straits of Melaka to them, the Manila trade sustained Macao's economy. The silver-hungry nature of Asian economies and the abundance of American silver enabled Spanish merchants to

buy silk in Manila so cheaply as to justify the long voyages of the Manila galleons. These ran from Acapulco in Mexico, with a trade wind behind them, to reach Manila in eight to ten weeks. The return journey could take four to seven months and involved struggling northwest into the typhoon belt, before running down to Acapulco.

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, this trade peaked. Exceptionally, in 1597 the bullion sent from Acapulco to Manila amounted to 12 million pesos, which was more than the legally registered value of trans-Atlantic trade (Parry 1966: 132–133). The usual contemporary figure for silver shipped to Manila was less than half of the 1597 figure. The galleons were normally built in the Philippines of local teak. Two-thirds of the bullion came from Peru, which absorbed the largest share of the textiles, transshipped from Acapulco to Lima. Mexico absorbed a good deal, but until about 1640 it was profitable to take silks from Manila across Mexico for transshipment to Spain.

Thereafter, economic decline set in. The dues paid to the Crown by the Manila galleons (there were never more than two any year, and their sailings became increasingly erratic) never covered the annual subsidy to the administration of the Spanish Philippines. Profits from the exploitation of local resources tended to be gathered by immigrant Chinese. Predominantly Tagalog-speaking Manila grew as the colonial administrative, educational, and religious center, styled after 1574 "The Distinguished and Ever Loyal City." It had a seminary, opened in 1601, as well as a Dominican college after 1611. Such developments culminated in the establishment of the University of Santo Tomas. Religious orders built and served churches near the markets in nearby villages that were subsequently swallowed by Manila. The city became the seat of an archbishop. Earthquakes, especially those of 1645 and 1863, retarded its progress.

Acting Governor Archbishop Rojo had to surrender Manila in 1762 to a British attack mounted from Madras, commanded by General William Draper and Vice Admiral Samuel Cornish. Rojo admitted that nobody had anticipated an attack by a European power. The British suffered from delusions about Manila's "Known Wealth and Opulency," hence the nonpayment of the proposterous ransom they



Manila skyline. (PhotoDisc, Inc.)

set. The city was returned to Spain by the peace of 1763. After 1810, Manila became a neglected outpost of a residual imperial system. By 1825 it traded more with the United States and United Kingdom than with Spain, which opened Manila to foreign trade in 1837. After the U.S. occupation of 1898, the removal of tonnage levies helped make it the world's biggest hemp market and a port with extensive hemp, sugar, copra, and tobacco exports, as well as steam-powered processing industries. The population was 219,928 in 1903 (*Encyclopedia Britannica* 1910–1911: 54).

In 1899, U.S. troops repulsed a Filipino nationalist attack, and military government was maintained in the city until 1901. By 1935 it had 620,000 inhabitants and was the capital of a self-governing commonwealth. During the Pacific War (1941–1945), it witnessed the Japa-

nese occupation from early 1942. Following new U.S. landings, fighting destroyed the colonial city in 1944. Shortly after independence in 1946, Quezon City, included in Metro Manila in 1976, became the seat of the independent government. The 1950s saw a revival of Manila as a port and a second wave of industrialization. The Marcos regime actively encouraged immigration from the country to the city, of which Imelda Marcos was governor. This exacerbated terrible slum problems, as well as sewage, power, and (despite light railroad developments from 1984) transport problems. With about 12 million inhabitants, metropolitan Manila in the early twenty-first century is an extreme example of the polluted and overcrowded but vital Southeast Asian metropolis (Nelles Guide 2000: 51).

BRUCE P. LENMAN

See also Galleon Trade; Macau (Macao); Miscegenation; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560–1898); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1900–1941); Santo Tomas, University of; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Spanish Philippines

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MAPHILINDO CONCEPT **Uniting Insular Southeast Asia**

Maphilindo was a plan to create a regional body of Malay States, composed of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The plan was formalized in the Manila Accord of August 1963 and succeeded the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), while preceding the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Maphilindo was a scaled-down version of Philippine president Diosdado Macapagal's (1910–1997) idea of creating a Pan Asian Union (later the Association of Southeast Asia) in 1962. After the Philippines and Pakistan drifted apart, in late July 1962 Macapagal announced his proposal to form a greater Malayan Confederation involving the Philippines, the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, and the British territories of Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo (Sabah). The initial Philippine proposal did not consider Indonesia, which had been lukewarm to the Association of Southeast Asia. However, as the regional concept developed, Indonesia became part of it.

The basis for Maphilindo was discussed in a summit conference held in Manila from 30 July to 15 August 1963, and the concept was formalized in the Manila Accord and the Manila

Declaration of 6 August 1963. The signatories were Tunku Abdul Rahman of the Federation of Malaya, President Sukarno of Indonesia, and President Macapagal of the Philippines.

Maphilindo was supposed to be a regional organization that would attempt to address local problems by consultation, without interference by outside states, based on the principle of “Asian solutions by Asian nations for Asian problems.” In addition, Maphilindo could bring unity among the Malay peoples and restore their historic traditions, ties, and common heritage. In 1964 the Philippines sought to expand Maphilindo to include neutral countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Thailand, and South Vietnam, but this was opposed.

Maphilindo soon ran into difficulties because each country had different intentions, and conflicting interests, disputed boundaries, the Sabah issue, and political leanings all served to prevent Maphilindo from consolidating. Maphilindo was one among many attempts to create a Southeast Asian regional organization. However, conditions were not yet ripe for it to become a success.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also “Asia for the Asiatics”; Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Macapagal, Diosdado (1910–1997); Sabah Claim; Spratly and Paracel Archipelagos Disputes

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MARCO POLO

See Polo, Marco (1254–1324)

MARCOS, FERDINAND (1917–1989) **One-Man Rule**

Ferdinand Edralin Marcos was the sixth president of the post-Pacific War (1941–1945) Philippine Republic, assuming office in 1965. He was reelected in 1969, but during his second term he declared martial law and kept the

Philippines under his rule until 1986, when he was overthrown by a peaceful revolution. His presidency was marred by large-scale antigovernment demonstrations, and his rule under martial law led to human rights abuses and unequal economic and social development.

Marcos was born on 11 September 1917 in the town of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. His father, Mariano Marcos, was a lawyer and congressman, and his mother, Josefa Edralin, a schoolteacher. Marcos graduated from the University of the Philippines College of Law in 1939, but he was convicted and jailed for murdering his father's political rival; subsequently he was acquitted after clearing his name.

During the Pacific War, he fought in the defense campaign against Japan. After release from imprisonment, he joined the guerrillas.

Having served as technical assistant to the president, Marcos began his political career in 1949, when he became a congressman. He was reelected twice, after which he won a seat in the Philippine senate. He left the Liberal Party in 1965 and ran against the incumbent, Diosdado Macapagal (1910–1997), for the presidency. He became president and was reelected in 1969.

The priorities of Marcos's first presidential term (t. 1965–1969) were to achieve rice self-sufficiency and embark on a massive infrastructure program while strengthening industry and education. He also dispatched the Philippine Civic Action Group to Vietnam during the Vietnam War (1964–1975).

Marcos's second term faced a communist resurgence with the birth of the leftist New People's Army (NPA) and student and labor unrest. A proliferation of private armies in the hands of local politicians, graft and corruption, unemployment, and high prices led to strikes, demonstrations, and attacks by the press and opposition politicians that peaked in the first quarter of 1971. Then a bomb explosion in an opposition election rally in August 1971 reflected the increasingly growing threat of Muslim secessionism in Mindanao. In response Marcos suspended the writ of habeas corpus, allowing for arrests and detention without formal charges.

On 21 September 1972, Marcos declared martial law. He closed the legislature and banned all antigovernment organizations, arrested members of the opposition, ruled by

presidential decree, and imposed what he called a New Society. He created a new political party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement), and adopted a new constitution that made him president and prime minister with an indefinite term.

Marcos embarked on land reform, infrastructure building, and industrialization programs, and sought to break up the old order of ruling families (oligarchs) in politics and the economy. Initially, Marcos's policies brought peace and order to the major cities and restored a sense of authority and economic growth. He attracted foreign investors as he tried to make the Philippines a conference and art center in Asia. In foreign relations Marcos opened up to communist countries, without abandoning old allies; he negotiated for a greater say in the running of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines.

But conditions under Marcos later deteriorated, with the economy being hit hard by the oil crisis of the 1970s. Marcos borrowed money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, but only favored business enterprises benefited. Marcos's wife, Imelda (1930–), was given powerful positions in government leading to charges of nepotism and attempting to set up a dynasty. As economic conditions worsened, opposition politicians and media were suppressed. The lavish lifestyle of Marcos's cronies contrasted with that of the poor, and anti-Marcos movements developed in the late 1970s. At the same time, the Muslim secessionist movement in Mindanao became an armed rebellion, and the NPA grew in strength. In response, Marcos used the military to crack down on the opposition. This resulted in human rights abuses that included disappearances, torture, and summary executions.

Facing domestic opposition and international concern, Marcos lifted martial law on 17 January 1981, but that proved superficial, as Marcos could still rule by decree. Marcos was reelected in June 1981 as president for a new six-year term in what many considered a sham election.

Marcos's health began to fail as economic conditions deteriorated. On 21 August 1983 his political rival, Benigno Aquino, Jr. (1932–1983), was assassinated under suspicious circumstances upon arriving from exile in the United States. This plunged the Philippines



Standing with his family, Ferdinand Marcos waves to the crowd after his inauguration as the president of the Philippines on 30 December 1965. (Bettmann/Corbis)

into worse conditions. In 1985, Marcos announced that he would hold a snap presidential election to show that he still had public support. The elections were held in February 1986; challenging him was Corazon C. Aquino (1933–), widow of Benigno Aquino, Jr. Marcos attempted to cling to power as the National Assembly, which was loyal to him, proclaimed him as winner. He took his oath as president on 25 February but lost control of the media and the military and was forced to leave the presidential palace.

Marcos was evacuated to Guam on board a U.S. aircraft and lived in exile in Hawai'i, facing various legal cases for ill-gotten wealth and human rights abuses. Marcos died of cardiac arrest in Honolulu, Hawai'i, on 28 September 1989.

Ferdinand Marcos remains a very controversial figure. Elected as the youngest president at that time in Philippine history, he had sound ideas for Philippine development and could

have carried them out during the period of martial law. Various factors led to his failure to institute meaningful changes, which in turn alienated him from the public and subsequently led to his downfall.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Aquino, Corazon Cojuangco (1933–); EDSA Revolution; Macapagal, Diosdado (1910–1997); Martial Law (1972–1981) (The Philippines); Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); New People's Army (NPA); New Society Movement (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan; KBL); Philippines–U.S. “Special Relationship”; Ramos, Fidel Valdez (1928–); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia

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MARINE/SEA PRODUCTS

In Southeast Asia marine or sea products have long been featured as commodities in regional transactions, as well as in international trade. Majul (1973: 348–352) has shown the regularity of tribute-cum-trade missions that China received over the centuries from Malay kingdoms of insular Southeast Asia.

The greater part of Southeast Asia lies on the shallow Sunda Shelf of less than 200 meters' depth. The South China Sea and the Andaman Sea, the gulfs of Thailand and Tongkin, wash the shores of mainland Southeast Asia. Insular Southeast Asia is surrounded in the eastern part by the Arafura and Banda Seas, the Moluccas Sea and the Makassar Strait, Celebes, and Sulu Sea, and westward by the Java Sea and the Straits of Melaka. Where mountain ranges and hilly terrain tend to divide and hinder interaction among inhabitants, the seas unite. Native craft plied the surrounding seas in the conduct of intra-island trade long before the arrival in these waters of Portuguese carracks and Spanish galleons in the early sixteenth century.

Marine products as trade commodities were as important and at least as valuable as spices (pepper, cloves, cinnamon, nutmeg, sandalwood) and forest products (camphor, dammar, bird's nest). Like forest products, the exoticism and perceived medicinal properties and culinary delights of marine products such as pearl shells, pearls, mother-of-pearl, tortoiseshells, shark's fin, agar-agar (seaweed), and *tripang* (*trepang*) or sea-cucumber (*Holothuria*) were much sought after by Chinese traders as well as European merchants.

Shark's fins are an invaluable ingredient for the famous Chinese soup that has been enjoyed as a delicacy for centuries in China using imported shark's fins largely from Southeast Asia. Tripang as a soup ingredient is a popular Chinese culinary specialty. Agar-agar is a gelatinous substance obtained from certain seaweeds. When mixed with hot water and then cooled, it sets to a firm jelly ready to be consumed. Traditionally, the Chinese believed in the "cooling" effects of agar-agar. Pearl shells, pearls, mother-of-pearl, and tortoiseshells were traditionally valued for their intrinsic beauty and decorative value. Pearls have long been a jewelry item, treasured by Europeans, Chinese, and Japanese alike. Mother-of-pearl, the hard, pearly, iridescent internal layer of oysters, is often used in Chinese and European furniture for decorative inlays. Tortoiseshell is the semitransparent material forming the carapace of the hawksbill turtle; its golden brown or reddish appearance offers aesthetic material for inlaying furniture, or making small decorative items such as jewelry boxes and combs.

The Samal Bajau Laut, the maritime nomadic boat-dwellers found in northeast Borneo, throughout the Sulu archipelago, and Sulawesi (Celebes), were, and still are, the leading procurers of sea products. Tripang and pearl fisheries sustained the livelihood of these communities for centuries.

Fresh fish from the seas and from freshwater lakes (Tonle Sap in Cambodia, for example) and rivers were and continue to be the major source of protein for many Southeast Asian coastal communities. Dried and salted fish, *belachan* (shrimp paste), and *cincolok* (preserved shrimp condiment) remain important sea products in contemporary Southeast Asia.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Bajau; Chinese Tribute System; East Indonesian Ethnic Groups; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Jungle/Forest Products; Orang Laut; Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Tausug and the Sulu Sultanate

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MARSHALL, DAVID SAUL (1908–1995)

First Chief Minister of Singapore

David Saul Marshall served as the chief minister of Singapore for fourteen months in June 1955 and 1956. Born in Singapore on 12 March 1908 to a Sephardic Jewish family, he was educated at St. Joseph’s Institution and St. Andrew’s School, completing his secondary education at Raffles Institution, before studying law in London from 1934 to 1937. Upon his return to Singapore he was called to the bar in 1938, only to find his career in criminal law disrupted shortly after by the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945) and Singapore’s occupation by the Japanese. Marshall, who had joined the Singapore Volunteer Forces prior to the war, was interned and was dispatched to Japan to work in coal mines. Returning after the war in February 1946, he pursued his law career with distinction and became increasingly involved in affairs of the Jewish Welfare Board, becoming its president for seven years. He soon drifted into politics and joined the Singapore Progressive Party in November 1949 but resigned in December 1952 over policy disagreements. News of the impending 1955 elections led to new political configurations, and Marshall was closely involved in the founding of the Singapore Labor Front (SLF) and its predecessor, the Singapore Socialist Party, in 1954. Under his leadership, the SLF won ten of the twenty-five seats it contested in the elections in April and secured additional support to form the government with Marshall as chief minister. He resigned his office in June 1956 after failing in talks in London to secure full independence for Singapore. In April 1957, Marshall resigned his parliamentary seat, and, as a candidate of the Workers’ Party, which he founded in November 1957, he won a by-election in Anson in 1962, only to lose it in the September 1963 general elections, which he contested as an independent candidate. From 1978 to 1993 Mar-

shall served as Singapore’s first ambassador to France. He died in December 1995.

ALBERT LAU

See also Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front); Lee Kuan Yew (1923–); Malaysia (1963); Singapore–Malaya/Malaysia Relations (c. 1950s–1990s)

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MARTABAN

See Tenasserim

MARTIAL LAW (1972–1981) (THE PHILIPPINES)

Marcos’s Trump Card

President Ferdinand E. Marcos (1917–1989) of the Philippines imposed martial law on the country from September 1972 to January 1981. The martial law regime was initially meant to restore order to the Philippines, which had been racked by antigovernment demonstrations and a declining economy, and an attempt to establish a New Society that would break with past evils. Order was initially restored and antigovernment dissent quashed. By the late 1970s, however, economic conditions had declined and anti-Marcos sentiment built up as Marcos exercised one-man rule and favored only those who were close to him. Pressure from abroad led Marcos to grant superficial reforms and lift martial law on 17 January 1981. However, Marcos retained power, and the martial law regime continued on until February 1986, when Marcos was ousted from power.

Marcos placed the Philippines under martial law on 21 September 1972 because of disorder that had resulted in the so-called First Quarter Storm in early 1971, wherein antigovernment rallies peaked. Many of these rallies were violently dispersed, with numerous casualties. The communists were blamed for these demonstrations, and they were likewise accused of bombing a political rally of opposition politicians. Furthermore, there was a growing threat of Muslim secessionists in Mindanao.

Thus, to restore order and governmental authority, Marcos declared martial law. Marcos’s

second—and constitutionally last—term as president was also ending, and the declaration of martial law, which suspended the democratic process, enabled him to stay in power indefinitely.

With the declaration of martial law, Marcos was given dictatorial powers that covered executive, legislative, and judicial fields. He abolished the Philippine legislature and ruled by decree. The news media were either closed or placed under strict censorship, and his opponents were jailed. A curfew was imposed, as was a ban on demonstrations and strikes. Marcos established military courts and placed key private economic institutions under the control of military officers or his friends.

Under the martial law regime, Marcos tried to create what he called the New Society, which would replace the old sociopolitical-economic order in which a few families (the oligarchs) controlled the wealth of the country. The New Society was supposed to bring back discipline and respect for authority, and do away with graft, corruption, and patronage politics.

Initially, the proclamation of martial law led to stable conditions in many cities and towns. One drug dealer was executed to emphasize the government's stand on drugs. Land reform programs were carried out as private armies were broken up and illegal firearms seized. Philippine culture and art were given emphasis and support.

The military fought the communist New People's Army (NPA) and the secessionist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Meanwhile the government pursued negotiations in Libya with the MNLF. The ensuing Tripoli Agreement between the Philippine government and the MNLF seemed to promise peace in Mindanao.

The restoration of peace and order brought in foreign investments and resulted in massive infrastructure development. Marcos tried to make the Philippines a center of Asian and world affairs. Big international events were held, such as meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), international film festivals, and the Miss Universe beauty pageant. The Philippines diversified its foreign relations and opened to China and other communist countries as it actively participated in conferences with Third World nations.

Martial law, however, entrenched Marcos in power, along with his cronies. The New Society

was new only insofar as faces were concerned; the old system of patronage and cronyism remained. Graft and corruption were not eradicated. The strengthened military was used by Marcos and his cronies, resulting in human rights violations. Marcos and his friends lived lavish lives while poverty increased because of misrule and corruption.

A new constitution proclaimed Marcos president and prime minister with an indefinite term. To bring a semblance of democratic process, he created a transitional legislature, the Interim *Batasang Pambansa* (National Assembly). He established a new political party, the *Kilusang Bagong Lipunan* (KBL; New Society Movement), which ensured that the legislature would be loyal to him. The elections, held in 1978, were marred by irregularities and charges of fraud, which would typify other such elections under the martial law regime.

Marcos took out large loans to finance infrastructure development, but much money was misused or lost as a result of corruption. The Philippines was hit hard by the oil shocks of the 1970s; consequently the country's debt grew, necessitating further loans. The Philippine peso dropped in value.

As dissent against Marcos grew, legitimate protest was suppressed and the media censored. The military and its armed citizen paramilitary units treated anti-Marcos activists brutally, resorting to torture and summary execution. To keep the military under control, Marcos retained and promoted officers who were loyal, resulting in demoralization and low professionalism in the armed forces. Military brutality and the absence of due process pushed peasants and others to join the NPA.

Charges of dictatorship and human rights abuses, together with worsening economic problems, led to statements of concern from abroad. To allay fears of one-man rule and abuse of authority, Marcos lifted martial law on 17 January 1981, just prior to the visit of Pope John Paul II. The basic elements of martial law, however, remained—presidential decrees with the force of law, warrantless arrests, and control of media, among others—keeping a de facto martial regime in place until Marcos was overthrown in 1986.

The martial law regime of Marcos in the Philippines seemed to reinforce the idea that authoritarian government was suited to devel-

oping Southeast Asian countries. However, it was contrary to the democratic system that the Americans had tried to develop during their colonization of the Philippines. In a sense, Marcos can be seen as having followed the political style of Manuel L. Quezon (1878–1944) and José P. Laurel (1891–1959), which was founded on strong personal leadership. The martial law regime did not serve its avowed purposes, however; by maintaining the old order among Marcos's cronies and suppressing dissent, it thereby worsened conditions in the Philippines.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Aquino, Corazon Cojuangco (1933–); EDSA Revolution; Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989); Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); New Society Movement (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan; KBL); Patron-Client Relations

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**MẤT NƯỚC
(LOSING ONE'S COUNTRY)**

With the onset of Western imperialism, the Vietnamese found themselves faced with a kind of domination that effected the dislocation of traditional social, economic, and political institutions, processes, and values. Colonial rule precipitated a cultural crisis by questioning the validity of every aspect of the traditional world order, and also by constraining people to find new patterns of expression for their national consciousness. The intricacy of the situation was such that it appeared un-

thinkable to consider conciliating the type of modernity brought by foreign rule or restructuring within the framework of the traditional Confucian monarchy, the only form of political organization that the Vietnamese had ever known.

The moral dilemma was complicated by the fact that the court at Huế adopted a compromising policy, so that open resistance to the French would mean opposition to court policy as well. The traditional supporters of the monarchy, the scholar-gentry, who had been taught by classical political theory that the maintenance of the dynasty was synonymous with the preservation of the country, were then confronted with an impossible choice. The court having surrendered to the enemy, how could the moral principle of loyalty toward the sovereign be reconciled with the duty of resisting the invaders? Moreover, the establishment in 1887 of the Indochinese Union implied the completion of a double dismantlement. First was dismantlement of the territorial unity of the country, now divided into three separate entities of different status. Second came dismantlement of the sociocultural structure, the keystone of which, the monarchical institution, was emptied of its substance and ceased to be perceived as the reference axis around which society was to be organized. Having confiscated the royal functions, France's representatives surrogated themselves to the authority of the king and his mandarins for the effective exercise of power. The governing class of literati thus witnessed the increasing erosion of the social status that had been theirs.

Dispossessed of their rank, questioned by what had become of the monarchy, those representatives of the Confucian ideology were clearly aware of their own degradation. The failure after 1897 of every resistance movement made them gauge all the more the inextricability of the impasse into which they found themselves driven.

The sense of total disaster was associated with what was termed "the loss of one's country" (*Mất nước*) or "national extinction" (*vang quốc*). It was an idea movingly expressed by Phan Bội Châu (1867–1940), who conveyed it in an essay entitled "Lưu Cầu Huyết Lệ Tân Thư" ["Letter with Blood and Tears on the Ryūkyūs"] (1903 or 1904). He feared that the Vietnamese nation, after having lost its sover-

eighty, would be destroyed by the French, just as the Ryukyus had been completely annexed by Japan. Analyzing further the causes of Vietnam's decline and fall in his *Việt Nam Vong Quốc Sử* (*A History of the Loss of the Vietnamese Country*) (1905), Phan demonstrated that, should the Vietnamese fail to improve themselves, France would annihilate them. Yet to refuse to struggle for national survival when one was threatened with extinction would be sure suicide.

This perception was to lead the men of Phan Bội Châu's generation to formulate a new vision for the reconstruction of Vietnamese society. What mattered to them would not be only to overthrow foreign rule but also and more significantly to search for new values and an institutional system that would enable Vietnam at the same time to regain its lost independence and to revitalize its society. They deemed therefore that a sociopolitical revolution was necessary in order to effect radical transformations within Vietnamese society.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also *Can Vương* (Aid the King) Movement; Confucianism; *Cuu quoc* (National Salvation); French Indochinese Union (Union Indochinoise Française); Phan Bội Châu (1867–1940); *Tam Cuong; Tam Giao*; Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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MAT SALLEH REBELLION (1894–1905)

Resisting Foreign Intrusion

An antigovernment resistance of the 1890s, the so-called Mat Salleh Rebellion to a certain extent reflected the inadequacy of the rule of the British North Borneo Chartered Company over its acquisition of North Borneo (Sabah) after two decades of control. The rebellion, led by Mat (Mohamed) Salleh (d. 1899), of mixed Bajau-Sulu heritage, was the culmination of a series of opposition actions

against the authority of the company that had begun in the 1880s.

Mat Salleh, a trader and minor chief in the Upper Sugut on the eastern coast of North Borneo, was described as tall, slender-built with pockmarked features, and of above-average intelligence. His commanding personality and a reputation as a master military tactician, coupled with the belief in his supernatural powers and apparent invulnerability to weapons, made Mat Salleh a great personage among the multiethnic indigenous peoples. He exploited both Muslim and native symbols of authority, such as Islamic standards, colorful flags, enormous silk umbrellas, and insignias of royalty with inscriptions attesting to his invincibility. He commanded prestige and an aura of mystique among Muslim and non-Muslim communities alike.

There was no clear indication as to the right and wrong of the case between Mat Salleh and the company. An initial misunderstanding between the parties escalated into a series of horrific acts and retribution by both sides, creating a tense and hostile situation along the entire western coastal area and in the interior.

The so-called rebellion erupted in 1894 when some followers of Mat Salleh were alleged to have killed two Iban traders in the Sugut River. Mat Salleh refused to surrender the suspected murderers when a force of Iban police was sent to the Sugut. Then in August 1895, Mat Salleh and an armed entourage of boats anchored at Buli Sim Sim, outside Sandakan, then the seat of the government of North Borneo. They presented petitions detailing their grievances toward the company. In the absence of Governor Leicester P. Beaufort (t. 1895–1900), the government treasurer, Cook, petrified by the show of force, requested through a representative that Mat Salleh and the others tender their petition in a formal manner and instructed them to disperse. Cook's request only came after Mat Salleh waited for two days.

While the government attacked his village on Pulo Jambangan and offered a reward of Straits \$700 for his capture, Mat Salleh sacked and burned Gaya Island and Ambong. Government forces captured his fort at Ranau. The tit-for-tat dual came to a deadlock by early 1898.

Then William Clarke Cowie (1897–1910), the managing director to the court of directors of the British North Borneo Chartered Company, arrived from London. He firmly believed

that a settlement could be reached and proceeded to meet Mat Salleh at Menggatal in April 1898. Cowie verbally promised amnesty and to allow Mat Salleh to settle in the Tambunan Valley, pledging noninterference from the government. Mat Salleh acceded, but in the written agreement pardon was denied to some of his followers who were escaped felons. Mat Salleh felt deceived and began to strengthen his position in Tambunan. Beaufort was blamed for the disparity in the written agreement, and he in turn accused Cowie of giving in to Mat Salleh. Meanwhile Mat Salleh raided and pillaged at will in Tambunan. In transgression of the pledge of noninterference, a government station was established in Tambunan in June 1898.

In December 1899 a company expedition attacked Mat Salleh's fort at Tambunan. At noon on 31 December 1899, a chance shot from a Maxim gun hit Mat Salleh in the left temple, killing him instantly. It was, however, another five years before the remnants of Mat Salleh's henchmen surrendered or were killed or captured.

The Mat Salleh episode was the major disturbance faced by the company during its sixty-year administration of North Borneo. A causal factor could have been the discontent felt by the introduction of new taxes, including a levy on rice, the staple food of the population. In its attempt to revitalize the sagging economy, Cowie launched two major projects—the construction of a cross-country rail link between Brunei Bay and Cowie Harbor, and a telegraphic line from Labuan to Sandakan. New levies were imposed to finance these large-scale projects. The lack of manpower and means forced the government to rely on local chieftains as agents for revenue collection; subsequently they abused this privilege and created dissatisfaction among the peoples who, in several areas, rallied to Mat Salleh's cause.

Throughout the protracted, decade-long resistance, there was at no time a consciously unified territory-wide resistance, as well as no semblance or hint in any way of a nationalist-type struggle. It was, in all forms and purposes, a typical and traditional type of resistance to intrusion and curtailment of freedom from without.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also British North Borneo Chartered Company (1881–1946); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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MATARAM

A Javanese Empire Pre-Islamic Period

The history of Javanese courts can be traced back to the fourth century C.E. The first known Javanese kingdom, Taruma, was established in highland West Java. The center of political domination eventually shifted to central Java, where a sophisticated culture flourished between 732 and 918 C.E. Although the possibility exists that more than one polity wielded authority, the idealized picture presented by inscriptions is of a unitary state called Mataram.

The nature of kingship in the ancient central Javanese court is still obscure. The rulers were mainly male, but women held high positions; queens were able to endow temple complexes. Rulers were devotees of both Hindu deities and Buddhism of the Mahayana variety. The rulers paid much attention to religion, but they did not consider themselves gods. The king was considered a *titisan dewa*—a "droplet distilled from the essence of God"—whose function was to maintain contact between the kingdom on the microcosmic scale and the universe or macrocosm. In Indonesia during pre-Islamic times the king was perceived as being directly associated with Mount Meru in its role as axis of the world and was its master.

The king as the royal icon was considered the basis of the kingdom's existence. Therefore the king occupied the pinnacle of the social hierarchy. This view began to change as a result of the spread of Islam, so that belief in the king as a *titisan dewa* was replaced by the idea of a messenger of god, or *Kalifatullah*; nevertheless, other sources termed *Babad* ("Chronicles") show that a cult of royal divinity continued to exist.

After almost two centuries of glorious artistic achievement, Mataram suddenly vanished. A new kingdom was established in East Java, but the name Mataram was not used.

Early Islamic Kingdoms of Java and the Rise of Islamic Mataram

Islam first emerged as the dominant religion in the kingdom of Cirebon in the mid-fifteenth century and Demak in the early sixteenth century. Javanese culture changed gradually but in important ways over the next two centuries. Religious figures became deeply involved in struggles for power and in factionalism.

According to *Babad* tradition, nine *wali* (spiritual guardians of Islam) began to occupy important positions in political life when the last major pre-Islamic kingdom, called Majapahit, fell. The *Babad Tanah Jawi* and *Babad Mataram* describe the important roles played by religious figures in Majapahit's collapse. The *Babad Mataram* tells the story of how Raden Patah of Demak sought the advice and blessings of Sunan Ngampel, who resided in Ngampel, Surabaya, prior to launching an attack on Majapahit. Sunan Ngampel advised him to be patient, for the propitious time had not yet arrived. His advice was that the king of Majapahit should be given one more year to govern. Meanwhile, Raden Patah was advised to prepare himself mentally and spiritually by studying Islam and asking for Allah's consent, as well as the concurrence of the *wali*. Apparently the influence of religious figures was so strong that their advice and blessing were significant for a person who intended to occupy the seat of power.

Demak was the most powerful early Muslim kingdom on Java. Its period of glory was, however, relatively short, between 1518 and 1550. Thereafter two kingdoms emerged, Banten on the northwest coast and Mataram in the central hinterland. In Pengging, south-central Java,

which seems to have been an important province of Majapahit, a kingdom arose that traced its origins to Bajul Sangara of Semanggi, near Solo. The ruler of Kudus on the north coast killed the last king of Pengging in the mid-sixteenth century. In the political chaos associated with the breakup of Demak, another kingdom arose in south-central Java, called Pajang. Pajang's position was never secure either, however, and it was seriously challenged almost from the start by one of its restless vassals, a Muslim kingdom that revived the old name of Mataram. Islamic Mataram, centered at Kerta, founded by a strong figure known as Panembahan Senopati, attempted to extend its rule over all Java but was not acknowledged as supreme sovereign by the coastal authorities.

"Senopati" was a title conferred by the kings of Demak and Pajang on prominent people in rural areas during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—for example, to the rulers of Pasir, in western Banyumas, and also to the head of the Mataram district.

After a peace treaty of 1590, Cirebon acknowledged the suzerainty of Mataram. Meanwhile the popularity of the *wali* had become a political factor that required serious consideration. Thus Sultan Agung (r. 1613–1646) in 1624 took the title "Susuhunan Ngalaga Mataram." Abbreviated to Sunan, this title was adopted by the *wali* and their successors. The word originates from Javanese and simply means "he who is respected, the exalted one," deriving from the root *suwun* ("to carry on top of the head"). The title is close to *panembahan*, from the root *sembah* ("to salute by raising two hands in front of the face in a prayerful manner").

The title "susuhunan" was considered higher than "sunan," even superior to "sultan." Thus Amangkurat I (r. 1646–1677), who succeeded Sultan Agung, did not use the title "sultan" but instead used "sunan" or "susuhunan," which in everyday speech was pronounced *sinuwun*.

Between 1600 and 1640, Islamic Mataram tried to elevate its port at Jepara to the status of a major commercial center, declared a monopoly over the export of rice, and launched attacks against other north coast ports. In the early seventeenth century, Mataram destroyed most of the important coastal cities in central and East Java. At the same time, the Dutch were establishing a foothold in West Java, at Batavia (Jakarta). In 1628 and 1629, after Pati was con-

quered, Islamic Mataram launched attacks against Batavia, with the objective of consolidating its control over the north coast. English and other European merchants moved to Jepara during the attacks but returned when Mataram failed to achieve victory.

The next fifty years were marked by a period of relative calm and stability. Then in the late seventeenth century a series of events began that were to lead to the gradual domination of the Dutch over Mataram.

In 1677 the ruler of Mataram, Amangkurat I (r. 1646–1677), called upon the Dutch for assistance in quashing a rebellion launched by his own son. Mataram gave the Dutch United East India Company (VOC) an extensive area of land as payment. In 1680, Amangkurat II (r. 1677–1703) set up a new capital at Kartasura that lasted for sixty years. In 1703, Amangkurat II died and his son Sunan Mas became Amangkurat III (r. 1703–1704). His uncle, Pangeran Puger, challenged his right to succeed. Pangeran Puger was crowned Paku Buwana I in 1704. In return for Dutch assistance Mataram gave the VOC land and a certain amount of rice annually.

When Paku Buwana I passed away in 1719, his son took the throne but was challenged by several of his brothers. Dutch assistance was again used to quell the rebellion. As a result, Mataram had to pay regular amounts of pepper and wood to the VOC, or what the Javanese addressed as *Kumpeni*.

In 1740 a series of tragic events known as the *Geger Pacinan* took place. The VOC implemented a policy intended to diminish the Chinese population of Batavia (Jakarta) because of fears of their increasing economic power. This policy gave rise to unrest among the Chinese population of Batavia that eventually resulted in open conflict. Many Chinese were massacred. Others fled to the east, where local rulers gave them support and safe haven. The ruler of Mataram, Paku Buwana II, also supported the Chinese, after witnessing the determination of the Chinese resistance in Kartasura. The rebels besieged the Dutch port of Semarang, central Java. However, Paku Buwana II began to hesitate when Semarang did not quickly fall.

The sunan finally decided to return his support to the VOC. However, a Javanese anti-Dutch faction at Kartasura took advantage of the situation to defeat a Dutch garrison there.

In 1742 the palace was attacked and destroyed by a combined army of Chinese and Javanese rebels. Paku Buwana II, however, escaped.

The Sunan's departure created a power vacuum in Kartasura. Paku Buwana II in desperation offered the Dutch rich rewards if they would restore him to his throne: the right to choose the prime minister, and possession of the whole north coast. In 1743 the VOC and regional chiefs, or *bupatis*, expelled the rebels from Kartasura. Although the sunan was back in power, the situation was not yet stable. The Chinese and their allies were still carrying on insurgent activities. The Kartasura Palace had sustained considerable damage. This led Sunan Paku Buwana II to seek a replacement. It was customary whenever a palace was damaged in Java to abandon it because it was judged to have lost a quality known as *wahyu*. This characteristic, literally a kind of divine aura or glow, is associated with a protective quality of a place; once lost, a new site with *wahyu* must be sought. A new palace was completed at the site of Surakarta (Solo) in 1745.

In 1746, an official, Patih Pringgalaya, became envious because of the new division of territory among the various nobles of Mataram. Because of fears that this inequality would give rise to further revolts or antiroyalist attitudes, the sunan agreed to reduce the extent of Pangeran Mangkubumi's appanage. This of course angered Pangeran Mangkubumi. A crisis ensued in 1749, when Mangkubumi left the *kraton* and the sunan's health deteriorated. The VOC seized this moment to achieve another of its goals. When the sunan fell ill, the Dutch ambassador went to Surakarta, bringing with him a new treaty. In his ill and weakened condition, having been roused from his sickbed, the sunan was forced to sign the treaty, which included the stipulation that the sunan surrender the crown of Mataram to the VOC and put the fate of his son in the *Kumpeni*'s hands. The VOC then obtained supreme power over the kingdom of Mataram, for not long thereafter Sunan Paku Buwana II passed away. In 1749, as Pangeran Mangkubumi's rebellion spread and grew stronger, achieving several successes such as taking control of the southern coastal zone, the throne changed hands. Crown Prince Pangeran Adipati Anom was crowned Sunan Paku Buwana. His position was now that of "representative" of the VOC.

The VOC then persuaded the sunan to divide the kingdom of Mataram into two, giving up half to Mangkubumi, in return for peace. On 13 February 1755 a treaty was made in the village of Giyanti, near Surakarta. Thereupon the kingdom of Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat, or Yogyakarta as it is commonly known, came into being. The sunan retained his title, while Pangeran Mangkubumi assumed the throne of Yogyakarta as Sultan Hamengkubuwana. After 1755 the kingdom was no longer referred to as Mataram. Instead the Mataram area was usually termed the Royal Lands (*Vorstenlanden* in Dutch or *Praja Kejawen* in Javanese) to distinguish it from the areas directly administered by the Dutch.

JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also Agung, Sultan of Mataram (r. 1613–1645); Amangkurat I (Sunan Tegalwangi) (r. 1645–1677); Amangkurat II (Adipati Anom) (r. 1677–1703); Banten (Bantam) (1526–1813); Buddhism, Mahayana; Demak; Hamengkubuwono II (r. 1792–1812); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indigenous Political Power; Islam in Southeast Asia; Javanese Wars of Succession (1677–1707, 1719–1722, 1749–1755); Kraton Culture; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); *Pasisir*; Surakarta; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); *Wali Songo*; Yogyakarta (Jogjakarta)

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MAX HAVELAAR (1860)

An Exposé

Max Havelaar is the central character in the novel *Max Havelaar of de koffieveilingen der Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij (Max Havelaar or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company)*, published in 1860. The semiautobiographical novel was written by Eduard Douwes Dekker (1820–1887) and published under the pseudonym Multatuli ("I have suffered a lot"). He had been a public servant in the Dutch colonial administration from 1840 to 1856, with placements in West Sumatra, Bagelen, Menado (North Sulawesi), Ambon (the Moluccas), and Lebak (Banten, West Java).

To an extent the novel describes Douwes Dekker's experiences as an assistant resident in Lebak. The main character in the novel is an idealistic young colonial official who seeks to remedy the wrongs perpetrated by the ruling indigenous aristocracy against villagers in the form of corvée labor and compulsory deliveries. He discovers, however, that his superiors do not share his interest in improving the plight of Indonesian people and fail to support him.

At the time of publication, the novel failed entirely in its aims of rallying Dutch public opinion against the practices of Dutch colonial rule in Java and providing rehabilitation for Douwes Dekker, who had felt compelled to resign from the colonial service in 1856. From a literary perspective, the novel is now a classic in Dutch literature and has been translated into many other languages.

Although the novel is often praised for its anticolonial stance, there are now considerable doubts about its historical and factual accuracy. Inter alia, the author did not propagate an anti-colonial stance but rather advocated a more en-

lightened interventionist colonial government that would protect ordinary Indonesians from the indigenous aristocracy. As such, it inspired a generation of Dutch colonial administrators who arrived after around 1900, when colonial policy in Indonesia changed to what was described as the Ethical Policy.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Ethical Policy (*Ethische Politiek*); Forced Deliveries; Van den Bosch, Count Johannes (1780–1844)

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“MAY 13, 1969” (MALAYSIA)

Sino-Malay Riots

This was the darkest incident in the history of Malaysia, when Malays and Chinese, the two major communities in the country, fought bloody clashes with each other on 13 May 1969. Tensions started to grow during the political campaigns for the general elections that took place on the 10th of the same month when the contending parties brought out racial insinuations against each other. The ruling Alliance Party lost its parliamentary majority when the opposition won several seats. The tension was enhanced by the outward celebrations of the opposition in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur, and subsequently sparked the unprecedented Sino-Malay clashes.

Political, economic, and social differences among the communities in Malaya, which resulted from the “divide and rule” policies of the British, who ruled the country since 1786, are the main reasons for the 13 May incident. The so-called *laissez-faire* policies of the British allowed the people, especially the Malays, who claimed to be the indigenous people, and the Chinese, most of whom were initially immigrants, to grow and develop separately. Although the Malays under the British maintained their nominal power through the sultans, the Chinese were more advanced economically. During British rule political affiliations among the immigrant population were directed to the countries of their origin. Different kinds of educational systems, especially

among the various vernacular schools, separated the ethnic groups. Furthermore, the groups were divided by their different religious beliefs; a majority of the Malays were Muslims, while the Chinese were mainly Buddhists, Taoists, or followers of Confucianism or Christianity. Sino-Malay mistrust could be traced to the Japanese occupation (1941–1945) and the Emergency (1948–1960).

The racial clashes brought chaos to the otherwise peaceful country. Yang Dipertuan Agong, the “paramount ruler” of Malaysia, on the advice of the prime minister, declared a state of emergency on 16 May. On the following day, parliament was suspended and the government was placed under the care of the National Operation Council. Under the caretaker government a Council for Friendship and Integration was set up to ensure better relationships among the different communities.

Thereafter the National Consultation Council was convened to advise the National Operation Council, especially on matters concerning ethnic relations. Loyalty by all citizens to the country was fostered by the formulation of the Rukunegara (“Principles of the State”). Several amendments were made to the constitution that disallowed sensitive issues from being made into public debates. A New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced to ensure that everyone was given equal opportunities. Parliamentary government was reinstated on 23 February 1971.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Abdul Razak, Tun (1922–1976); Collaboration Issue in Southeast Asia; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); New Economic Policy (NEP) (1971–1990); Rukunegara

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McARTHUR, M. S. H. (1872–1934)

British Resident of Brunei

Malcolm Stewart Hannibal McArthur was responsible for setting Brunei on a new course, particularly during his term as the first British resident in the sultanate from 1906 to 1908. He preserved the political and territorial integrity of the sultanate that ambitious neighbors were encroaching upon.

Born at Chatham on 10 March 1872, son of a general, McArthur was educated at Queen's College, Oxford. Joining the civil service in Malaya in 1895, he was sent to Brunei in April 1904 with instructions to make recommendations concerning the sultanate's future administration.

By 1904 the British protectorate of Brunei had reached the nadir of its fortunes. Threatened by expansionist Sarawak and North Borneo, with the loss of Limbang (1890) creating particular bitterness, it seemed that the bankrupt sultanate could hardly survive as an independent unit. Indeed, but for the intervention of the British government in 1905, after receipt of McArthur's final *Report*, it would not have done so.

After a year in Singapore, McArthur returned to Brunei in November 1905 with D. G. Campbell (1867–1918), resident of Negri Sembilan, to obtain the consent of Sultan Hashim (r. 1885–1906) to a new treaty, making provision for the installation of a British resident to govern the sultanate. As the first occupant of the post, McArthur restored political and territorial stability to Brunei and introduced a wide-ranging program of financial and administrative reform. All this was achieved with sufficient tact, unlike the situation in Perak of the first British resident, J. W. W. Birch (1826–1875). The Perak Malay chiefs murdered Birch in 1875, consequent of his manner in implementing policies.

After returning to Malaya, McArthur was appointed acting British adviser to Kedah in

1919–1922. He departed for reasons of ill health in May 1922 and retired on 4 October 1922.

McArthur died on 20 February 1934. His will (1928) reveals that he had married an Italian; there is no mention of any children. His memorial is the continued existence of Negara Brunei Darussalam as a separate country.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Anglo-Brunei Relations (Nineteenth Century to 1980s); British Interests in Southeast Asia; British North Borneo Chartered Company (1881–1946); Brooke, Sir Charles Anthoni Johnson (1829–1917); Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Brunei Oil and Gas Industry; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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MELAKA

A Century of Malay Ascendancy

From the eighth to the thirteenth centuries, the dominant power in the Straits of Melaka and the surrounding area was the commercial empire of Śrīvijaya, centered on Palembang and Jambi on the west coast of Sumatra. In the late thirteenth century the balance of power in the region shifted to East Java, where a succession of Hindu kingdoms gradually superseded Śrīvijaya. The last of these was Majapahit, which by the late fourteenth century had suzerainty over Palembang. Both the *Sĕjarah Mĕlayu (Malay Annals)* and the *Suma Oriental* of Tomé Pires state that sometime before 1403 a prince of Palembang named Paramesvara (the name Paramesvara means "prince consort"), who was married to a Majapahit princess, threw off Majapahit's suzerainty and was driven out, first to Tumasik (Singapore) and thence to Muar, where he was invited by a group of sea-pirates who traded in goods taken from ships captured in the Straits of Melaka to become ruler of a settlement they had founded on the Melaka River.

At this time both Majapahit and the Siamese (Thai) kingdom of Ayutthaya (Siam) claimed suzerainty over the Malay Peninsula, and the

nascent state of Melaka paid tribute to Ayutthaya. In 1403, according to the *Ming Annals*, a Chinese embassy led by a eunuch named Yin Ch'ing was sent to Melaka. In reply Paramesvara sent embassies to China in 1405 and in 1407 to seek Chinese recognition and support against Siamese attacks, and in 1411 he went to China himself with his family and a large retinue. He also sent embassies to Majapahit and to Pasai, a coastal sultanate in north Sumatra. The sultan of Pasai agreed to open trading relations with Melaka on condition that Paramesvara became a Muslim, which about 1414 he did, taking the name of Megat Iskandar Shah and at the same time marrying one of the sultan's daughters.

Iskandar Shah's son and successor, Sri Maharaja (r. 1424–1444), was also converted to Islam, taking the title of Muhammad Shah, and also sent embassies to China (in 1424 and 1431); he also went to China himself. He was succeeded by two of his sons, Abu Shahid Ibrahim Shah, who was assassinated in 1445, and Muzaffar Shah (r. 1445–1458), who, assisted by his *bendahara* (first minister, treasurer, and chief justice) and brother-in-law, Tun Perak (d. ca. 1498), established Melaka as a major commercial power, controlling all the shipping passing through the straits in both directions and providing the principal market in Southeast Asia for the valuable commodities produced in the region, including Sumatran pepper, cloves from Maluku and nutmeg and mace from the Banda Islands, Timorese sandalwood, Chinese silks and porcelain, and Indian cloth. Muzaffar Shah drew up a code of laws, won two notable victories over the Siamese of Ayutthaya, and extended his suzerainty northward in the Malay Peninsula to Kedah and Patani, southward to Singapore and Riau-Lingga, and across the straits to Indragiri, Kampar, and other port states on the west coast of Sumatra. He also maintained relations with Ming China, and in 1456 the emperor conferred the title of sultan on him. Muzaffar Shah's son, Mansur Shah (r. 1458–1477), married a Chinese princess, conquered Pahang, and placed a Melakan prince on the throne. This policy of territorial aggrandizement elevated Melaka to imperial status with political and commercial hegemony over the greater part of the Malay Archipelago (present-day Malaysia and Indonesia).

The numerous Muslim Gujarati merchants who traded with Melaka played an important part in the conversion of Melaka to Islam, and Melaka soon became a center for the dissemination of Islam in the region—notably in the conversion of Java. Melaka depended for most of its supplies of rice and other foodstuffs on Java, and the Javanese dominated the carrying trade in spices, which they brought from the eastern Indonesian islands to Surabaya, Demak, Japara, and other north Javanese ports and shipped thence to Melaka, so that by the end of the fifteenth century the Muslim Javanese were the richest and most influential of the many foreign communities in the city-port of Melaka.

Following their discovery of the sea route to India in 1498, the Portuguese quickly learned the crucial role that Melaka played in the Indian Ocean trading networks. They realized that to gain a monopoly of that trade they would need to have control of Melaka and of the shipping that passed through the straits. In 1509 a small Portuguese fleet commanded by Diogo Lopes de Sequeira was sent to Melaka to open trading relations. But largely as a result of the hostility of the Muslim merchants in the city, the expedition ended disastrously, with the destruction of the *feitoria* (trading post) that Sultan Mahmud Shah (r. 1488–1511) had allowed the Portuguese to set up and the imprisonment of the factor, Rui de Araújo. Therefore in 1511, Afonso de Albuquerque (1453–1515), who had been appointed governor of Portuguese India in 1509, sailed from Goa with a small force of 800 soldiers and 200 Malabar mercenaries and, after some abortive attempts to negotiate with the sultan, on 25 July attacked Melaka (Castanheda 1924–1933: 125–151). By 24 August he was master of the city, and Sultan Mahmud Shah had fled to Pahang.

During the five months Albuquerque spent in Melaka he built a stone fortress, *A Famosa*. Its surrounding wall, 2.4 meters in thickness, was made from materials taken from Muslim tombstones and stones from mosques. He erected a hospital, and sited a church on the premises of the sultan's palace, which became the cathedral of the Melaka diocese in 1557. He also minted a coinage and set up a Portuguese administration. In November 1511 he

left Melaka in the largest of his ships, the *Flor de la Mar*, laden with treasures that he had collected for himself and for King Manuel I (1469–1521). But the *Flor de la Mar* was old and leaky and broke up on a reef off the coast of Sumatra with the loss of its entire cargo. Albuquerque himself escaped with nothing but the clothes he was wearing.

The Portuguese tried to compel all shipping passing through the straits to call at Melaka and to pay anchorage charges and customs duties on all the commodities they brought to the city except food. But they never had sufficient resources to impose an effective monopoly, and the need to use every available vessel for the transport of goods to Goa and Europe meant that there were never enough ships to police the sea-lanes or men to defend the city. Melaka's profitability to the Crown was further undermined by the illicit private trading activities of many Portuguese and their propensity to seize the cargoes of any ships they encountered that did not carry a *cartaz* (safe-conduct) issued by the Portuguese authorities. Moreover, the Muslim merchants soon deserted Melaka in favor of other ports, notably Brunei and the small sultanate of Aceh in northern Sumatra. Aceh became the chief adversary of the Portuguese in the struggle for control of the straits, launching numerous attacks on the city. Johor was also strongly opposed to the Portuguese; ironically, however, they sometimes allied with them against Aceh.

In addition to its commercial importance for the Portuguese, Melaka soon became the principal center for their missionary endeavors in Southeast and East Asia. In 1545, Francis Xavier (1506–1552) first arrived in Melaka and established it as the center for the Jesuit missions in Southeast Asia and Japan. Other orders followed the Jesuits: the Dominicans (1554), the Franciscans (1581), and the Augustinians (1587).

By the end of the sixteenth century the Dutch and the English had arrived in Southeast Asian waters. The Dutch were determined to drive the Portuguese out of all their strongholds in the region and repeatedly attempted to take Melaka; in alliance with the Acehnese, they finally conquered the city in January 1641 after a long siege. They repaired the Portuguese fortress, appointed a governor and council to administer the city, and concluded treaties with

the people living in the vicinity of Melaka who had been subject to the Portuguese. They continued the Portuguese policy of demanding payment of customs duties and harbor fees from all ships sailing through the straits and maintained the sole right to trade in tin, spices, pepper, sandalwood, cloth, and other valuable merchandise. But, like the Portuguese, they could not impose a monopoly in the face of competition from Asian and European traders.

The Dutch failed in their efforts to make Melaka self-sufficient in food. Although Melaka remained a substantial exporter of tin and importer of Indian cloth under Dutch rule, it was soon overtaken by Batavia, since 1619 the headquarters of the Dutch United East India Company (VOC); it became little more than a fortress protecting shipping in the straits. The Dutch themselves increasingly bypassed Melaka altogether, preferring to send their shipping from Batavia through the Sunda Straits. Furthermore, from the late eighteenth century the exodus of many of the Chinese inhabitants to Penang, where a British settlement had been established in 1786, and later to Singapore, similarly a British outpost opened in 1819, accelerated the decline of Melaka. By 1800 the population of the city of Melaka had been reduced to about 1,500, in contrast to Penang, which already had a population of 20,000 (Stone 1966: 85; Fisher 1966: 595, n. 27).

In 1793 the French revolutionary government declared war on Britain and The Netherlands, and the following year the French invaded The Netherlands. This led the British, with the authorization of the Dutch Stadthouder William V, then in exile in England, to occupy Dutch factories and fortresses overseas, including Melaka, to prevent them from falling into French hands. The British were anxious to attract as much of Melaka's remaining trade as possible to Penang, so in 1807 they set about demolishing the fortress *A Famosa* and would have destroyed the rest of the city had not Stamford Raffles (1781–1826), who was then on the staff of the governor of Penang, arrived there to convalesce from an illness and ordered the destruction to cease.

Melaka was restored to the Dutch in 1818 after the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) and then, by the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824, handed back to Britain, along with all the Dutch possessions in India, in exchange for

Bengkulu and the English East India Company's (EIC) other possessions in Sumatra. The British then joined Melaka with Penang and Singapore to form the Straits Settlements, which were initially a presidency under the authority of the governor-general of India, and after 1830 a residency under the Bengal presidency. After the EIC was taken over by the British government in 1858, the Straits Settlements, with all the EIC's other territories, passed to the control of the India Office; in 1867 they became a Crown colony. In 1948, Melaka and Penang—but not Singapore, which remained a colony until 1956—joined with the nine Malay States to form the Federation of Malaya.

JOHN VILLIERS

See also Aceh (Acheh); Albuquerque, Afonso de (ca. 1462–1515); Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Bengkulu (Bencoolen, Benkulen); British India, Government of; British Interests in Southeast Asia; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Catholicism; China, Imperial; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1602), English; Gujaratis; Islam in Southeast Asia; Jambi; Johor-Riau Empire; Kew Letters; Mahmud, Sultan of Melaka (r. 1488–1511); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Miscegenation; Missionaries, Christian; Napoleonic Wars in Asia; Pahang; Palembang; Parameswara (Parameshwara, Paramesvara); Penang (1786); Pires, Tomé (ca. 1465–ca. 1540); Portuguese Asian Empire; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); Visionary; *Sějarah Mělayu* (Malay Annals); Srivijaya (Sriwijaya); Singapore (1819); Straits of Melaka; Straits Settlements (1826–1946); Sumatra; Temasik (Tumasik); Tun Perak; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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**MĚLAYU ISLAM BERAJA (MIB, MALAY ISLAMIC MONARCHY)
National Ideology of Brunei**

The "Mělayu Islam Beraja" concept, the state ideology of Negara Brunei Darussalam, is the sultanate's equivalent to Indonesia's Pancasila or Malaysia's Rukunegara. The public has never been offered a vote on the issue.

The privileged position of Islam and the Malay language had already been enshrined in the 1959 constitution. The proclamation of independence (31 December 1983) declared the sultanate to be "a sovereign, independent and dem-

ocratic Malay Islamic Monarchy.” MIB began to be formulated around the same time, went into recession in 1986–1988, was officially enunciated in July 1990, and became all-pervasive during the 1990s. Globalization makes the defense of “Brunei values” seem all the more imperative.

MIB, which has been declared to be “Allah’s will,” is an exercise in nation-building and regime legitimization. In an implicit social compact, the majority of the Brunei population are reassured that the domination of Malay culture will be upheld, and that non-Muslims (a third of the population in 1991) will be kept in their proper place. The government will provide for every ethnic Malay citizen from cradle to grave; for their part, Malays are expected to bolster the executive monarchical system. Islamic intellectuals must furnish ideological underpinnings for the status quo; in return they derive status, career opportunities, and magnificent mosques in which to exercise their religious obligations. The government will not allow Western-style secularism to gain a foothold. The local Chinese may remain in the sultanate, provided they confine their activities largely to the economic sphere. The animist indigenes, community leaders in particular, are invited to convert to Islam; as a reward, they will be given presents, better housing, and higher-paid jobs. Foreigners are to be thankful for their lucrative contracts and are to refrain from importing their own shibboleths into Negara Brunei Darussalam.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Anglo-Brunei Relations (Nineteenth Century to 1980s); Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Constitutional Monarchy of Malaya/Malaysia; Hassanal Bolkiah, Sultan of Brunei (1946–); Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Malays; Omar Ali Saifuddin III, Sultan of Brunei (1914–1986); Pancasila (Pantja Sila); Rukunegara

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MERDEKA (FREE, INDEPENDENT)

Merdeka, from the Sanskrit *maharddhika* (“great, wise, rich”), is a powerful Indonesian political slogan referring to both political and personal freedom.

The term is known with its Sanskrit meaning from tenth-century Java, but by early colonial times it seems to have referred specifically to freed slaves. The “Mardijkers” of colonial Batavia were the Portuguese-speaking Christian descendants of former slaves, mostly from India. By the early twentieth century, however, the term had acquired a strong political meaning. It referred on the one hand to political independence as an aspiration of the emerging nationalist movement, and on the other to personal freedom. During Indonesia’s struggle for independence, a common commitment to achieving an otherwise undefined *merdeka* was one of the most powerful uniting forces in the national movement.

In Malaysia, *merdeka* is treated as a noun and refers especially to the granting of a somewhat qualified independence by Britain in 1957. In Indonesia, however, the use of the derivative noun *kemerdekaan* to denote formal independence has left the adjective *merdeka* with a richer and more powerful range of meanings. *Merdeka* implies, on the one hand, freedom from vexatious control, whether by colonial or neocolonial powers, bureaucratic rules, or power holders in society in general. On the other, it implies a personal attitude of not being unnecessarily respectful of social hierarchy and

social controls. As a slogan, merdeka still refers most of all to national independence, uncompromised by any kind of subordination to former colonial powers or great powers, and is a call for national solidarity. It also implies a demand for freedom of political expression, freedom to assemble, and freedom from unnecessary regulation that sets it against power holders. It can also be a rather individualistic assertion of personal integrity.

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See also Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia

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MERGUI

See Tenasserim

MESTIZO

Mestizo means "mixed." The word is of Spanish origin and designates individuals born to parents of different ancestries. In Southeast Asian histories, the term means an individual born to an immigrant man and a local woman. In Malay and Indonesian contexts, mestizo signals male ancestry in Europe; in Philippines history, mestizo signals male origins in China. Mestizo also refers to distinctive cultural features of mixed communities that reproduced themselves in Southeast Asia's cities.

The Portuguese entered island Southeast Asia in 1505. The Spanish established Manila as their headquarters in 1571. Dutch men sailed into Indonesian seas in 1595. Europeans injected a new set of foreigners along established trade routes and ports of call. All were men. Like other foreigners (Chinese, Indians, Arabs, and Persians), they sought companionship from local women.

The Portuguese and the Spanish were Roman Catholics. Within archipelago cities there developed small Catholic communities of immigrants, their local wives, children, in-laws, and servants. Not all men came directly from Europe. Many Portuguese had been born in Indian ports and were the sons of Portuguese who had married Asian women.

Foreigners brought a new look into the multiracial ports. European men introduced a clothing style that covered the male body with shirt, jacket, trousers, and hat. They introduced the habit of smoking tobacco, the guitar, and new singing styles. Portuguese became widely used for trade and diplomacy. Europeans introduced a new writing system, the Latin alphabet, and printed books. Their envoys carried gifts of maps and mechanical clocks to Southeast Asian kings and news of intellectual trends circulating in Europe.

The Dutch fought to evict Portuguese competitors. They chased Portuguese ships out of Southeast Asian waters and expelled Portuguese administrations from Ambon (1605) and Melaka (1641). In 1670, Dutch forces captured Makassar, which had a Portuguese community of 3,000. Many mestizos moved to Holland's Asian capital of Batavia in northwest Java. As the Dutch observed it, mestizos were disdainful of manual labor. They had adopted Southeast Asian habits, such as frequent bathing and betel chewing, and Southeast Asian status symbols, such as the parasol. Their women had a languorous deportment and their homes an air of depravity; they lived in semi-purdah, and left to domestic slaves the care of their households and children. To the Dutch who had fought against Spain and Portugal, Roman Catholics represented the enemy. They required mestizos to demonstrate loyalty by converting to Protestant Christianity.

A Portuguese mestizo community survived in Dutch Batavia until the early decades of the nineteenth century. Portuguese-speaking clergy and Portuguese-language catechisms and Bibles kept parishes distinct long after immigration of Portuguese speakers had ceased. In the nineteenth century, Malay superseded Portuguese as the language of interethnic communication. Mestizo came to mean the descendants of Dutch men and Asian or Eurasian mothers.

Mestizo culture in Dutch contexts was characterized by a slow rhythm to daily life, spicy

foods, and a dialect of Malay laced with Portuguese words. Mestizo culture was rooted in pride in European heritage, in Christianity as a badge of European identity, and in a sentimental attachment to Portuguese *kroncong* music, native domestic servants, and Indonesian folklore. Mestizo culture was symbolized by the female costume of batik wrap, lace blouse, bare feet in sandals, and long hair worn uncovered. It was a culture described harshly by outsiders. It remained dominant in Dutch settlements so long as male immigration from Holland and local marriage remained the norm. When Dutch women formed a growing proportion of the wives of senior colonial officials from the 1870s, they replaced mestizo women as arbiters of manners and fashion and fixed Europe as the standard. Mestizo culture retreated to the fringes of European immigrant society; mestizos blended into Indonesian quarters and poverty.

In the Philippines, mestizos were descendants of Chinese men who were Catholic, had adopted local clothing and hairstyles, and had married local women. The community reproduced itself quickly through intermarriage, through the constant influx of Chinese men, and the willingness of Catholic Filipinos to marry daughters into mestizo families. Mestizo communities prospered because the Spanish favored mestizos over Chinese in commerce. They retained a distinct identity through separate corporate bodies established by the Spanish to administer their communities.

Mestizos represent intermediate communities and specific periods in the histories of Southeast Asian societies. Their emergence coincided with the injection of Europeans into Southeast Asia's towns. European investment stimulated local economies, attracting men from Europe and Asia. In the twentieth century, Dutch and Chinese women began immigrating. They inserted themselves into the local bride pool, offering retention or revival of ties to the homeland. Immigration laws of the independent governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines required mestizos to choose citizenship and identity, and they restricted immigration. In the Philippines, mestizos emerged as the Philippine elite. Mestizos remain a tiny Christian fraction of the population in Indonesia and Malaysia. Most have left to settle in Europe, the United States, Canada,

or Australia, where their descendants are forging new identities.

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See also Baba Nyonya; Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Catholicism; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Manila; Melaka; Miscegenation; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Portuguese Asian Empire; Sexual Practices in Southeast Asia; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Women in Southeast Asia

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METAL AGE CULTURES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The most important metals in early Southeast Asia were bronze and iron. Bronze is constituted primarily by copper but usually has a substantial proportion of tin to improve the hardness. Lead, with its low melting point, was often added to

facilitate casting, while arsenic was sometimes also included in the bronze alloy. Iron is a valuable metal for making hard, durable implements when carbon is incorporated into its chemical structure during smelting and forging. Iron oxide is abundant, and its ore sources are spread widely across Southeast Asia, though the quality varies greatly. Copper ore deposits dot mainland Southeast Asia and the main islands from Java and Sumatra to the Philippines, but tin ore is essentially restricted to the “tin belt,” which runs from the Burma–Thailand border through West Malaysia and central Sumatra to the islands of Bangka and Belitung. Gold, extracted through panning in many locations in Southeast Asia, and to a lesser degree silver, were significant in producing ornaments.

The earliest bronze in Southeast Asia dates probably to between 2000 and 1500 B.C.E. Soon after, the benefits of lead to facilitate casting were recognized in North Vietnam. Throughout Southeast Asia, casting was accomplished mainly with the use of bivalve molds of sandstone or clay, but the larger and more complex objects required piece molds and the application of the lost-wax technique (in use along the Mekong Valley after 1000 B.C.E.). The appearance of high-tin bronzes in Southeast Asia after 500 B.C.E. probably reflects early trade of tin from sources along the tin belt. By this time, iron metallurgy was dispersing widely across Southeast Asia, followed shortly by gold. For most of mainland Southeast Asia, we can talk of a Bronze Age when bronze artifacts circulated in variable quantities for approximately a millennium before iron had entered into use. There is some evidence for small amounts of bronze in Malaysia and the Philippines before the arrival of iron, but in Indonesia the two seem to have coincided fully.

Archaeologists recognize four successive cultures in the region of the Red River delta, North Vietnam, that have associations with bronze. A few bronze pieces occur late in the Phung Nguyễn sequence (ca. 2500–1500 B.C.E.), along with jade items imported from the north, suggesting that bronze arrived through interaction between North Vietnam and southern China. During the Dong Dau phase (ca. 1500–1000 B.C.E.), pottery decorations and the production of stone tools continued according to prescriptions established in Phung Nguyễn times, but an increasing num-

ber of traditional implements were being made from locally cast bronze. These include axes, chisels, spearheads, arrowheads, barbed points, and fishhooks. The variety expanded to include awls, knives, and sickles in the Go Mun phase (1000–500 B.C.E.), as did the abundance of bronze implements. The overwhelming evidence for cultural continuity between the Phung Nguyễn, Dong Dau, and Go Mun cultures and with the Dong Son (Dongson) culture that immediately followed makes it quite certain that we are dealing with the early cultural elaboration of the proto-Vietnamese speakers in their Red River heartland.

The Dong Son culture, which persisted for several centuries after the Chinese established their presence on the Red River in 111 B.C.E., is best known for the massive “Heger I” kettle-drums made here and exported widely to the south in the early centuries C.E. The repertoire of bronze wares concurrently expanded to bucket-shaped vessels, bells, bracelets and other personal ornaments, clothing fasteners, swords and daggers, plowshares, and digging-tool blades. Many implements were also made of iron, while a specialty of Dong Son was the production of bimetallic spears with bronze sockets cast onto previously forged iron blades. Numerous burials have been found in boat-shaped coffins, sometimes lavishly decked with grave goods, in agreement with Chinese records of a hierarchical society ruled by local chiefs. A subsistence economy based on rice farming had clearly fueled population growth for millennia, and some settlements had grown into population centers covering many hectares. Decorations on the Dong Son drums reveal a complex society that included warriors, sailors, musicians, and peasants among other occupational groups, and the construction of houses on wooden piles.

Bronze and iron artifacts similar to their Dong Son equivalents, along with glass and carnelian beads, have been recovered from the Plain of Jars in the central highlands of Laos. However, radiocarbon dates from the fields of massive mortuary jars and disks suggest that the masonry that shaped these and related megaliths (notably upright stones, or menhirs) may have begun as early as 1000 B.C.E. Iron slag and bronze-casting molds demonstrate local metallurgy, but archaeologists attribute the flowering of these spectacular megalithic sites to their in-

termediary position in the trade routes between North Vietnam and the Mekong catchment area. One site that could have been involved in this trade is Lao Pako, on the Mekong, where the inhabitants specialized in ironworking and buried the deceased in massive jars beneath the settlement. These and other Metal Age sites in Laos are almost certainly associated with late-prehistoric communities of Mon-Khmer (Austroasiatic) speakers, but attempts at more specific identification would be unwarranted at this stage.

South of Lao Pako lies the Khorat Plateau, where numerous sites have been excavated along the three main rivers (the Mun, Chi, and Sakhon Nakhon) that drain into the Mekong. Most famous are the mounded sites of Non Nok Tha and Ban Chiang, where bronze artifacts first appeared between 2000 and 1500 B.C.E., and Ban Na Di and Noen U-Loke, which display a parallel cultural sequence during the Bronze and Iron Ages. Almost universally across the Khorat Plateau, the dead were buried on their backs, sometimes in clay-lined graves, and flanked by pots and other mortuary goods (jar burials of children and flexed burials of adults were also practiced during the early occupation of Ban Chiang). A variety of bronze axes, iron implements including harpoons and knives, bronze and iron rings, and bronze ornaments including bracelets, belts, and headbands have been recovered from the graves. Shell and marble jewelry is also common, as are spindle whorls and beads of glass, carnelian, and agate in Iron Age contexts. Industrial production of bronze and, later, iron and even glass is evidenced at many sites. Rock salt occurs widely across the Khorat Plateau (and the Laos uplands), and its trade must have played an important part in the local economy.

Pottery during the Bronze Age continued the Neolithic styles of cord-marking and curvilinear incisions, but it began to diversify in the Iron Age. Painted pottery, such as the red-on-buff ware famously associated with Ban Chiang, occurred widely across the Khorat Plateau but seems to have been most persistent at the smaller, more isolated sites on the piedmont. Along the main bodies of the Mun and Chi valleys, monochrome pottery (sometimes cord-marked) came into style, most notably the "Phi-mai Black" pattern-burnished wares. Moated sites proliferated, expanded, and elaborated, evi-

dently related to water control and agricultural intensification as the population rapidly grew. Many of these sites became incorporated into the early Khmer empire, which expanded from its heartland along the lower reaches of the Mekong after the fifth century C.E.

The oldest known Khmer inscription (sixth century C.E.) comes from Angkor Borei, an elevated site immediately west of the Mekong Delta, occupied by 500 B.C.E. Excavations suggest a transition in mortuary practices from inhumations with pots and other grave goods, similar to those on the Khorat Plateau, to cremations buried in brick structures. Angkor Borei is linked by a complex of canals to near-coastal sites associated by Vietnamese archaeologists with the "Oc Êo culture," in honor of Louis Malleret's 1944 excavation of Oc Êo. Malleret recovered numerous exotic goods from as far away as Rome and China dating to the second to fifth centuries C.E.; glass, gold, tin, and many semiprecious stones were utilized in manufacturing jewelry and other goods. Most scholars accept an identification with the Funan kingdom described by Chinese visitors, as early as the third century C.E., as a complex of walled political centers where craft specialists plied their trade, summary justice was administered, stone inscriptions were engraved, and the range of mortuary practices included inhumations. Angkor Borei may have been the "inland capital" of Funan referred to by the Chinese, as its large area (300 hectares) and plethora of brickwork suggest.

At the same time, Oc Êo culture sites reveal a domestic economy based on wet-rice agriculture, undistinguished pottery, and stone tools (including mortars and pestles) that firmly link these sites to much older Mekong Valley traditions. Although poorly reported, Samrong Sen, a large midden on a western tributary of the lower Mekong, bridges the gap between the Neolithic and the early occupation at Angkor Borei. Bronzes including bracelets, arrowheads, a fishhook, and an ax, plus a sandstone mold for an ax, appear in late Samrong Sen contexts. There may also be an association with the "Memotian" circular earthwork sites (2500–300 B.C.E.) located slightly east of the lower Mekong; if true, that could identify the latter sites as proto-Khmer.

To the west of the Mekong, the Chao Phraya basin of central Thailand constituted an-

other cultural hearth. The upper reaches of the Lopburi River, a major tributary of the Chao Phraya, are well endowed with copper sources. Several sites here yield traces of copper smelting and bronze metallurgy, similar to contemporary practices on the Khorat Plateau (which lies across a watershed) immediately after 1500 B.C.E. Bangles and socketed tools of bronze, along with a tin earring, were found among the grave goods in the cemetery, dated to around 1000 B.C.E., at the near-coastal site of Nong Nor. The major efflorescence of Metal Age sites, however, relates to the Iron Age after 500 B.C.E. The cemetery at Ban Don Ta Phet has yielded numerous socketed, tanged, and attachable iron tools, including spearheads, harpoons, arrowheads, fishhooks, axes and adzes, sickles, and digging tools. Bronze ornaments and vessels also abound, including high-tin bowls whose golden color sets off their fine decorations of lotus flowers, domestic animals, and intricate geometric designs. Three thousand glass beads and 600 stone beads, including etched carnelian and agate, as well as a lion-shaped carnelian pendant, reflect regular trade with India.

Near Ban Don Ta Phet, Ongbah Cave was used for extended inhumations (the usual mortuary practice in the Chao Phraya basin); it also contained more than ninety wooden coffins. Six Dong Son drums head the list of grave goods that otherwise resemble those from Ban Don Ta Phet. A transition to cremations may be evident at Chansen, a site near Lopburi that spans the prehistoric and protohistoric periods. Moats, settlement walls, and changes in the pottery and other portable artifacts reflect a smooth transition to the Dvaravati culture that is itself associated with the early history of the Mon, especially at U-Thong, Nakhon Pathom, and other early political centers along the Chao Phraya. If Chao Phraya constituted the proto-Mon heartland, the strong Indian influence on the Mon is clear from the balanced use of both Sanskrit and Mon in Dvaravati inscriptions.

On the eastern outlet of the Mekong River (near Saigon) and in coastal central Vietnam, a distinctive range of mortuary vessels allows archaeologists to recognize Sa Huynh culture sites. The burial urns, with their painted and incised decorations of curvilinear scrolls and geometrically infilled bands, usually contained crouched inhumations in the Saigon region, while in central Vietnam the remains had been

cremated. Mortuary goods include beads of silver, gold, polished stone, and other materials, along with socketed and tanged spearheads of iron, spindle whorls, and distinctive forms of earrings. Based on their geographic distribution and antiquity between ca. 500 B.C.E. and 300 C.E., Sa Huynh sites appear to have marked the establishment of proto-Cham, who are Austronesian speakers whose origins lie in the islands to the east. The Chams were among the earliest groups in Southeast Asia to have adopted Indic religious ideas, incised inscriptions, and latched on to the benefits to be had from the passing maritime trade into and from China. One major site in central Vietnam, Buu Chau, which spans the late Sa Huynh and early Cham cultures, imported large quantities of ceramic tiles from the Red River area (then a southern outpost of the Chinese Empire).

Recognizing the similarity between the Sa Huynh decorations and those on early Metal Age pottery from the central Philippines, Wilhelm (Bill) Solheim (2002) proposed a "Sa Huynh-Kalanay tradition." He extended the concept to cover late Neolithic and early Metal Age decorated wares from elsewhere in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, making a close relationship with the distribution of Austronesian languages. Efforts to identify more tightly defined, regional cultures within the tradition, as portended by the claim for a "Leang Buidane culture" during the early Metal Age in the islands between Mindanao and Sulawesi, have been hard to sustain. Statistically speaking, sites close to each other do tend to produce similar repertoires of pottery decorations, but this is merely the localized expression of the maritime interaction around 2,000 years ago, which allows us to recognize a Sa Huynh-Kalanay cultural horizon. Regional cultures rarely emerged because, evidently, local communities concurrently reinforced their autonomy by replacing particular motifs used by their neighbors with other motifs selected from the common pool. For instance, the late Neolithic/early Metal Age cemetery at Niah Cave contains distinctive wares such as three-colored jars with massive, painted curvilinear scrolls, and double-spouted vases, but these have been found at few other sites in northwest Borneo. Similarly, Sa Huynh-Kalanay sites are often associated with disposal of the pretreated remains of the dead in mortuary jars, but they may also

contain extended inhumations, sometimes placed in boat-shaped coffins, or still other burial types.

Nor did all communities participate in the trend toward decorating their pottery. In Luwu, South Sulawesi, the Lemolang language is a linguistic isolate that appears to have survived as its speakers have occupied a strategic node for the export of high-quality iron from sources in the mountains upstream. Lemolang oral history outlines a settlement history of places that, when excavated, produced traces of ironworking in a continuous sequence lasting 2,000 years and petrologically monotonous, totally plain pottery despite several changes in mortuary practices. This example suggests that the explicit combination of local history with targeted excavations may provide the means to trace the history of particular Austronesian groups back into the Metal Age.

Indonesia's prehistoric megaliths hint at the development of regional cultures of variable geographic extent. The highlands of central Sulawesi contain numerous ancestor statues, sometimes of spectacular dimensions, as well as huge stone vats that strikingly resemble those on the Plain of Jars (Laos). When the less spectacular megaliths are also considered (for instance, menhirs, dolmens, and relief-carved boulders), the closest similarity may be with the equally mysterious fields of megaliths on the Pasemah Plateau in south Sumatra. The latter are dated to the early centuries C.E., based on imported grave goods and the image of a man on an elephant carrying a Dong Son drum. A direct cultural link between central Sulawesi and south Sumatra would be preposterous; instead, we are probably looking at the development of similar ways of expressing prestige through monumental works. The same point would apply to the Metal Age megaliths of Bali (especially stone sarcophagi) and Java (notably, fields of menhirs).

Java and Bali were critical locations in the Metal Age long-distance trade routes, as the site of Sembiran in north Bali shows. This proto-Balinese port (some of the earliest Balinese inscriptions refer to it) yielded direct evidence of visits by Indian traders around 2,000 years ago: a potshard with an incised Indic script, and 120 pieces of rouletted-wheel ware from South India. Sembiran also yielded a fragment of a mold used in making Pejeng bronze drums, an elon-

gated drum that was evidently cast in Bali and traded as far as East Java. The Pejeng style, however, was more widespread, being displayed on early bronzes from Java, southwest Sulawesi, and southern Sumatra. Numerous Metal Age sites in Java reveal evidence for local industrial production of bronzes, ironwares, and wheel-made pottery. The kingdom of Taruma was established in the region of Jakarta in western Java by the fifth century C.E., as testified by a series of Sanskrit inscriptions. It was evidently related to the Buni cultural complex recognized by Indonesian archaeologists from a recurrent body of pottery forms and decorations associated with rouletted-wheel shards and other exotic grave goods. The Buni culture is probably proto-Batawi (Batawi is the Malayic language spoken in the Jakarta region) rather than proto-Javanese, but contemporary developments in central and eastern Java clearly paved the way for the flowering of the Singosari and later Javanese states.

Peninsular Malaysia has one of the most intriguing Metal Age records, and this likely reflects exposure to multifarious outside influences. It lay directly on the great coastal trade route between China and India, and constant exposure to maritime traders would have stimulated the discovery and exploitation of its abundant tin reserves. "Klang" clapperless bells of bronze of local production and the importation of eight Dong Son drums reveal the same fascination with ceremonial bronzes as is found in southern Sumatra, Java, and Bali. In the Kedah region, the entrepôt of Pengkalan Bujang arose, associated with Sanskrit inscriptions dated to around the fifth century C.E. These likely reflect a local presence of early Mon, who seemed to have expanded down the Malay Peninsula in the early centuries C.E. A Mon inspiration is also likely for the socketed and tanged iron artifacts, very similar to those from Ban Don Ta Phet, found as hoards and collections of burial goods at numerous places in Peninsular Malaysia. On the other hand, the southern Perak slab-grave burials (now dated to the early centuries C.E.) probably reflect an early Austronesian influence in their megalithic aspect, even if grave goods of high-tin bronzes, and socketed and tanged iron artifacts, evoke a Mon connection. Kuala Selinsing, an offshore island occupied throughout the first millennium C.E., almost certainly reflects occupation

by Austronesian “boat people,” given the classically Sa Huynh–Kalanay nature of the pottery decorations and the burial of the deceased in boat-shaped coffins. These developments would have preceded the establishment of Malays in Peninsular Malaysia, which occurred essentially as a post-Śrīvijayan phenomenon.

The Metal Age in Southeast Asia was a dynamic period when goods in high demand, traders, and artisans circulated across the region, and when formative local polities came into direct contact with the burgeoning civilizations in India and China. In places where population growth and local artistic traditions were strong, as best exemplified by the Red River delta, it is possible to identify distinctive cultures that can moreover be related to early historical language groups. In places where the language groups were smaller and cultural practices more likely to be adopted than exported (applicable to much of the Philippines), it is only possible to talk of generalized cultural traditions until detailed work is undertaken to set local historical accounts into a reliable archaeological framework. Overall, the Metal Age may be seen as Southeast Asia’s formative period, when the linguistic groups we find in early accounts took on their distinctive, identifying features.

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See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Ban Chiang; Ceramics; Dong-son; Dvaravati; East Indonesian Ethnic Groups; Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; Funan; Gold; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; Metal Smithing; Mon; Oc Êo; Singhasari (1222–1293); Sulawesi (Celebes); Tin

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METAL SMITHING

Like the dyeing and weaving of patterned cloth, metal smithing in Southeast Asia points beyond the mundane and the technological to complex folk understandings of spiritual forces of generativity and creation. Forging and working iron, for instance, have often been imaginatively linked in numerous Indonesian societies to the origin of the world. Gold, a locus of dangerous, even deadly powers, had to be handled with great spiritual care and considerable ritual (sacrifices, the production of stone monuments), lest the gold-smithing activity harm the community. Metal also often formed parts of larger material culture sets. Most prominently, handwoven textiles were often seen as women’s products; the soft, pliable, open-weave,

light cloths are often considered feminine. Dye materials such as natural indigo were linked to the beneficent yet highly charged fertility powers of women's bodies (Hoskins 1989). The symbolic complementary opposite to clothwork and women's bodily creativity was often held to be men's metal smithing. Heavy, dense metal objects such as swords, daggers, and ritual jewelry became the masculine counterpart to feminine cloth. The textile/metal pair worked as a sexual and religious combination. This was given public form in ceremonial costumes, which often combined weaponry with elaborate sarongs and cloaks. Village cycles of gift exchange in upland Southeast Asian societies also demonstrated the metal/cloth complementarity. In one common pattern found in eastern Indonesia, brides brought fertility-enhancing textiles into their marriage and bridegrooms' kin paid bride-wealth payments in metal (gold earrings, chains) to the young women's families. The metal-smithing arts were also long associated with the production of sumptuary goods for rulers who often wished to literally "shine" with splendor in ornate precious metal finery. A core Southeast Asian technology along with weaving and rice cultivation (Reid 1988: chs. 2, 3), the forging and crafting of metal thus have a deeply cultural history.

Bronze working in mainland Southeast Asia may have been present as early as 2000 B.C.E., although that early date is a contentious one among archaeologists (Bellwood 1985: 271–317; Solheim 1968). From about 1500 to 600–400 B.C.E., bronze socketed axes, spearheads, hunting and fishing equipment, and bracelets were produced in northern Vietnam and northern Thailand (Bellwood 1985: 272ff). The classic Dong Son (Dongson) culture of northern Vietnam followed, beginning sometime between 600 and 400 B.C.E. This remarkable metalworking set of societies produced the famous, immense, Dong Son patterned bronze drums (with their peripatetic travels throughout archipelagic Southeast Asia), some ironworking, and what seem to have been funeral feasts to commemorate the dead, events that may have entailed animal sacrifice. Archaeologists assert that Dong Son bronze casting was part and parcel of an innovative Vietnamese ranked society based on intensive wet-rice cultivation, craft specialization, and some urbanization (Bellwood 1985: 274–275). Bellwood goes on to argue that the Austronesian-

speaking Sa Huynh metalworking society of southern Vietnam (at its height in 600 B.C.E. but possibly dating to the second millennium B.C.E.) had an even greater role in spreading metallurgy to island Southeast Asia (*ibid.*: 275–276). Indian trade to Southeast Asia over the period from 200 B.C.E. to 500 C.E., directly before the rise of Indianized kingdoms, overlapped with the intensely creative influence of these early northern metalworking peoples.

Local metalworking centers producing weapons, tools, ornaments, and ceremonial gongs developed in these seedbeds of Dong Son, Sa Huynh, and Indian and also Chinese trade contacts. Southeast Asia's low-grade surface ores of iron, copper, tin, and lead took considerable labor to yield tools and weaponry. This explains the special status of blacksmiths in Southeast Asia and the fact that the region remained a net importer of these metals except for tin, abundant in Malaysia and south Thailand (Reid 1988: 106–119). Iron ore was present in Luwu, Central Sulawesi, and in West Kalimantan, West Sumatra, Cambodia, and Burma (Myanmar), while copper occurred in Java, West Sumatra, Cambodia, and several regions of Vietnam and northern Luzon. Lead was rare, appearing in a few spots in Vietnam. Some individual areas such as Luwu and Minangkabau had active iron industries predating European contact. Metal-poor regions depended on cheap trade iron from China, from as early as the Śrīvijaya period, and on the interregional metal trade. Some hill tribes near rich iron deposits possessed smithing technologies. This pattern existed alongside the connection between metalworking and the rise of states. Great metal-crafting traditions such as Majapahit's *keris* (dagger) industry and subsequent Javanese ironwork depended on extensive trade links to ore-producing areas such as Borneo and Sulawesi. Metallurgy, in other words, was quite cosmopolitan in precolonial Southeast Asia (*ibid.*: 110).

Tom Harrisson and Stanley O'Connor posit an intriguing social and religious complex undergirding one local metal industry, the iron and gold smelting and smithing of prehistoric and recent Borneo (1969a; 1969b; 1970). They assert that metalworking, stone monument building, the ritual manipulation of smaller stone objects, and gold jewelry-making were all part of a seamless ritual system involving feasting cycles among rival "center men." Harrisson

and O'Connor's ambitious claims remain unsubstantiated, but one point is undeniable: the religious undertones to metalwork and smithing in Southeast Asia often played on themes of taking life, creating life, and demonstrating power through profligate feasting. These larger themes should probably be kept in mind when encountering the region's abundant tales about the magical powers of keris and gold royal jewels. More is going on in folk ideology than the story lines alone.

A typical narrative goes as follows, as told in F. M. Schnitger's romanticized but valuable *Forgotten Kingdoms in Sumatra*, a book replete with magic metal stories of this sort (1989: 18–23). In this tale, Sumatra's Jambi was a vassal state to Java's prince of Mataram. Periodically, Jambi had to provide tribute to the prince. A noble from Turkey, Paduka Berhala, rose in importance in Jambi; his fourth, youngest son was Orang Kaya Item. This young man urged his brothers and countrymen to resist Mataram's hegemony by refusing to pay the tribute. He plotted to kill all the emissaries sent by the prince to collect the payments. This went on for several visits by Mataram's warriors, all of whom were dispatched by Orang Kaya Item.

The Prince of Mataram realized that it was no use fighting against such a brave man, and ordered an astrologer from Pamalang to come to him, in order to learn from him how to kill O.K. Item. The astrologer informed him to have a weapon wrought of iron obtained from nine different places and derived from nine different objects whose names should begin with 'Pa.' The iron, however, should be acquired through theft. So some sly thieves went out, and were so lucky to hand to the monarch the desired iron. The astrologer commanded to send for some smiths from Pamaja Pahit, who should make the iron into a sword. These people were set to work by the Prince of Mataram in a deep pit, so that the people in Jambi nor anywhere else should know what was going on. Besides, it had been stipulated that the smiths were only allowed to do a stroke with the hammer every Friday. (Ibid.: 18–19)

The story goes on and on (as Malay world tales often do), with battle scenes and an eventual marriage between Orang Kaya Item and

the prince's daughter. Orang Kaya Item turns his threatening keris into a head ornament by thrusting it into his cloth headdress. The nine-metal dagger is renamed Si Gunjai, and the two kingdoms thenceforth cooperate as marriage alliance partners. Many royal houses throughout the region have similar magic daggers forged through supernatural means as power emblems (Wiener 1995). Narratives about the loss of a noble keris to another kingdom (or to a European colonial power) frequently work as stories about the emasculation of an aristocracy's secular political power.

Beyond these sacred weaponry tales are stories about the special nature of metal smiths: they are crippled, lame, blind, one-eyed, or dwarfs, and thus filled with magic powers. The men who forge perfect metal tools are themselves deformed in body (Eliade 1971). In Southeast Asia, smiths are sometimes allied with jesters and clowns and through those connections with death and black magic.

Deeper religious convictions about metal smithing go beyond heroic tales and claims about magic vulcans to propose more thoroughgoing folk theories of world creation. In an especially insightful study, Charles Zerner (1981) details a local philosophy of ironworking in Toraja, Central Sulawesi, in Indonesia. He reports patterns of thought about forging, smithing, and cosmic, human, and agricultural generativity that may give us a window onto what may be long-standing Southeast Asian epistemologies about metal (Solyom and Solyom 1978; O'Conner 1975).

During Zerner's 1977–1978 fieldwork, Toraja iron smiths used plugs of metal from old railroad ties and Land Rover shocks and springs; Toraja smiths deemed the latter "the best, the strongest, number one" (1981: 91). Much earlier iron sources were open pit mines in Seko to the northeast. Trade for iron ore and nickelous iron with the Palopo region (a vassal state to the Luwu kingdom) was also important. The Toraja highlanders had extensive trade relationships with the coastal Muslim states, and the prestige of goods from "far off Java" (batiks, keris) was also a key part of Toraja political status systems. Seko smiths used forge and pattern welding techniques also employed in creating Javanese keris. Seko forgers' ability to produce decorative nerve patterns on sword blades by forge-welding nickelous iron to iron sponges

was greatly admired by Toraja smiths, Zerner reports. Surface patterning was highly valued in Toraja aesthetics, extending even to their regard for dappled water buffalo.

In the 1970s the Toraja forge consisted of an open-air fireplace banked on three sides with rock walls. Zerner reports that the smith, the bellows pumper, and the hammerer worked together in a kind of rhythmic dance, and “[t]he air itself tastes of smoke and iron, steam and charcoal” (ibid.: 93). Cool water and citrus juice solutions were used to moderate the red heat of the forged metal, as it was shaped into plow blades, ax heads, rice-cutting tools, and ceremonial swords. The latter were loci of power and mnemonics for creation myths.

Zerner terms Toraja iron forging “a generative idiom” (ibid.: 94). Puang Matua, the creator ancestor, “forged the heavens, forged the earth, forged the ancestor of the earth, called Patala Bunga, forged the ancestor of cool water, called Patala Merang, forged the ancestor of fire, called Patala Lamma, forged the ancestor of mankind, called Datu Laukku,” in the words of the Mount Sesean *tominaa* priest Tandi Datu (ibid.: 94). Human iron smiths take on extraordinary qualities given their heirship to these world creation powers. *Tominaa* consecrate the implements of ironworking (a new forge, for instance) and, given the crucial role of iron-tipped tools in tilling the soil, iron-smithing technology is intimately incorporated into farming ritual. This tied ironwork to gender ideas: “It is also said that women were not allowed to stand within the boundaries of the forge. Iron, the raw stuff of forging, constituted a particularly potent material: hard, durable, resistant to change, and yet made into a multitude of tools which could cut down the forest, clear the land for the cultivation of rice, and thus transform the natural landscape on an unprecedented scale” (ibid.: 95).

Ancestral swords, forged elsewhere in places like Seko and Palopo, were costly and part of inalienable house treasures. Pong Sirintik from Seko, the mythical master smith, “sees the mother of iron” (ibid.: 91) and is regarded with special respect because he controls life’s animate forces and forges a tool or weapon from them. This allies him with the *deata* spirits’ control of the land and with (in premodern times) the Toraja aristocrats’ ownership of slaves (ibid.: 100–101).

Zerner observes that ironworking emerged in this context as a kind of writing. “Regarding

iron as animate, the creation of living things as exclusively the domain of the spirits, the Toraja may have seen the man-made furrows on the surface of the blade as a kind of iron writing embodying the mysteries of natural configurations” (ibid.: 102). Ironwork thus became a locus for the conveyance of messages from the distant dead to the living, hence a pattern reflected in the widespread eastern Indonesian belief that certain types of heirloom gold ornaments (for instance, Sumba’s larger *mamuli*) act as contact points between the dead and the living (Rodgers 1985). In some Sumbanese and Flores societies, gold pendants and royal chains of office are thought to occasionally rustle inside their rattan storage cases, anxious to convey warnings to their human possessors. Zerner reports that Toraja ancestral swords play a central spirit possession role of this type in the *maro* ritual, where the iron swords work as mediums for ancestor spirits to visit human supplicants. Certain ritual actions, times, and spaces connected to swords in the *maro* are considered to be “afire” and red hot, like glowing heated iron in the forge (Zerner 1981: 106).

Swords of course recall images of violence, and Toraja iron weaponry evoked war powers and the taking of enemy lives in battle. Much recent anthropological research on head-taking in premodern times in upland Sulawesi, interior Kalimantan, Sumba, Timor, and Luzon in the Philippines documents this connection between metal weaponry and death (Rosaldo 1980; Hoskins 1996; George 1996). Head-taking was often seen as a generative act: to assuage grief, to bring order back to a village after the chaos of war, to demonstrate the “red heat” of young men’s emotions, to complement women’s quieter ground-tilling (and pregnancy) activities.

The spiritual forces assigned to gold and iron may once have also been attached to other metals. A technology indispensable to rice cultivation and to the ranked social orders found from northern Thai villages through Indonesia and the Philippines, metal smithing was a foundational art for the region and a wellspring for religious creativity on themes of origin times, death, and the regeneration of life.

SUSAN RODGERS

See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Dong-son; Metal Age Cultures in Southeast Asia; Textiles of Southeast Asia

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MIAs (MISSING IN ACTION)

The MIA question has haunted relations between the United States and Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam War (1964–1975), for both humanitarian and political reasons. The problem is tragic but simple: the Vietnam war cost the lives of about 58,000 Americans, but some of them—around 2,500—were lost completely and their bodies were not repatriated. A large portion of MIAs disappeared on North Vietnam territory, but some others were lost in the sea or in fights over South Vietnam, even in covert operations. Today, when remains are available, DNA tests make the macabre work easier: since June 1998, for example, we have known the name of the Vietnam War Unknown Soldier resting at Arlington: it is Lieutenant M. J. Bassie, a pilot who crashed near Saigon in 1972. But it is hard to find something to test. During his November 2000 trip to Vietnam, President Bill Clinton (t. 1993–2000) paid a visit to an excavation site near Hanoi where a joint U.S.–Vietnamese team uncovered the remains of Captain L. E. Evert, who was downed there in 1967.

Prior to cooperation between Hanoi and Washington, the MIA question was a matter of conflict. As Article 8 of the Paris Peace Agreement, the MIA issue appeared in all bilateral talks since 1975. The question was a very sensitive one, a preliminary to any discussion for the U.S. side and a matter of bargaining for the Vietnamese. Further complicating the issue is the troubling question of whether the Vietnamese authorities are holding in custody MIAs who are still alive. Hanoi made the restitution very slowly, with solemn reception from the Americans, but the treatment of the issue of MIAs appeared progressively encouraging: first during the 1977 attempt to normalize relations, and second during the Clinton presidency and throughout the 1990s, when Hanoi decided to give more information to Washington and Bill

Clinton and to undertake the normalization. At the present time, more than a thousand soldiers are still missing.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Cold War; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Paris Peace Agreement (1968, 1973) (Vietnam); Tet Offensive (1968); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Viet Cong

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MILITARY AND POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Armies have played a large role in the politics of Southeast Asia for centuries. Prior to the common acceptance of the modern democratic notion that the military should not be involved in politics but rather be the instrument of popular governments, the Southeast Asian context proved the contrary. The kings and other rulers of Southeast Asian polities considered their military forces integral to the instruments of rule at their disposal. Little distinction was made between civil and military roles, and a ruler was the supreme commander of his forces; his other ministers or top officials were also his subordinate military leaders. No distinction was thus made between the government and what would now be seen as a separate institution, the military.

As regards nonofficials in the population, in many societies in the region, the military was an alternative form of obligatory service to the ruler and his standing bodyguard. Thus members of the army were exempt from other forms of obligatory taxation or royal service. At times of war, all of the ruler's subjects could be called upon to augment the ranks of the military. But if the power of a ruler was seen to be waning, a man of prowess, usually from

official classes and claiming a royal lineage, who claimed superior military capacities, could count a challenge and, if successful, seize authority.

During the colonial period, the modern idea of subordinating the military to civilian control became the norm across the region. Colonial armies, pursuing a policy that Southeast Asian nationalists came to see as "divide and rule," tended to be recruited from indigenous minorities or from other colonies. This was the case in the Netherlands East Indies, British Burma, and French Indochina. Siam, which was not formally colonized, established a new form of armed forces under King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868–1910), trained on Western lines with European advisers, but relying, to ensure its political allegiance, on junior members of the royal family. Rivalry among commoner soldiers, who felt their careers were being slighted in favor of members of the nobility, contributed to the political upheaval in Bangkok that ended the absolute monarchy in 1932. The key role of the army in that event allowed the political power of the army to grow during the remainder of the decade, eventuating in Colonel Pibunsongkhram's (1897–1964) being made prime minister in 1938. It was Pibun's military government that changed Siam's name to Thailand in 1939.

The Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia during the Pacific War (1941–1945) provided an opportunity for popular nationalist armies to be organized in Burma (Myanmar), Vietnam, and Indonesia. These became critical in the postwar struggles for independence in all these countries. Whereas in Vietnam, the revolutionary forces accepted their subordination to the political authority of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), neither the Burmese nor Indonesian armed forces accepted more than nominally a superior political authority over them. Rather, they saw themselves as independent actors crucial to achieving independence, and a degree of self-fulfilling conviction about the key role of the army in shaping the post-colonial state began to take shape. However, when these countries attained their independence, their armies initially accepted the formal position of being subordinate to civilian political authority. Nonetheless, from this time on, armies in Southeast Asia developed independent sources of revenue through running their

own businesses and providing some of their financing separate from the government budget. Although all the armies of Southeast Asia were formally under the control of civilian governments at the time of independence, in the cases of Indonesia and Burma that was not true. And in Thailand, the army maintained its grip on government from the 1930s through to the 1970s, except for brief interludes.

The Indonesian armed forces after independence were initially far from being a unified force. Rather they were an amalgam of troops who had served under the Dutch or been raised during the war by the Japanese and fought the return of the colonial rulers. In time the officer corps became convinced that the civilian politicians in Jakarta were venal and self-seeking rather than the selfless patriots they portrayed themselves to be. Many of the troops were facing political rebellions, particularly in the Outer Islands, and they often resorted to smuggling and other illicit activities to support themselves when the central government could not provide them with the wherewithal to fight. When, by the late 1950s, disillusionment with parliamentary government became widespread, the army in 1958 joined with President Sukarno (t. 1945–1967) to impose his system of Guided Democracy on the country. Sukarno and the army, however, rather than working closely together to create a strong government, soon became rivals, and Sukarno turned to the army's main opponents, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party), for support. In 1965, in disputed circumstances that saw the deaths of thousands of people, the army moved to end Guided Democracy and seized power in its own right.

A New Order government was installed under General Suharto, who was to preside until ousted from power in 1998. The New Order attempted to establish its legitimacy by bringing order and prosperity to the country. Thanks to massive Cold War foreign assistance and investment, coupled with escalating oil prices, Indonesia did see improved living standards through much of this period. However, following the economic crisis of 1997, which saw a massive devaluation of the Indonesia rupiah, Suharto's military-backed government came under strong criticism, particularly because of what became known as "crony capitalism," which came with the New Order development

schemes. Popular disgust at a regime perceived as being hopelessly corrupt came at the same time as a crisis arose over the province of East Timor, which, through the use of military force, had been incorporated into Indonesia following the collapse of the Portuguese empire. Suharto was then forced out of office by the parliament that had legitimized his rule for many years. Even the military members of the parliament by then agreed that he had to go. However, while the military has subsequently taken a subordinate role in the affairs of the Indonesian state, its political power is far from negligible.

The rise of the Indonesian army to political dominance has its parallels in the case of Burma. There the army was deeply embroiled in defending the state against communist and ethnic separatist insurgents from before independence. In 1958 the army took power for eighteen months with a caretaker government installed to maintain civil order. In 1962, fearing the possible fracturing of the territorial integrity of the country, the army seized power once more; unlike their Indonesian counterparts, however, rather than turning to the West and foreign aid assistance to bolster their legitimacy, the Burmese army turned to policies of socialist autarky. This attempt to develop Burma as a nonaligned socialist state, while initially popular and effective in keeping the country out of the Cold War tensions of Asian international politics in the 1960s and 1970s, ultimately proved disastrous. By the mid-1980s, the country was on the verge of bankruptcy. The Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), the instrument the army under General Ne Win (1911–2002) had created to rule the country, then faced overwhelming public protest and fell in the middle of 1988.

Rather than a return to democracy, however, which was what the public had been demanding, the army once more intervened. Claiming that the country was threatened by mob rule spawned by both communist and right-wing domestic and foreign enemies of Burma, the army installed itself as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) government. The SLORC, which was renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, was successful in reaching cease-fire agreements with a number of insurgent groups that had been attacking the state for many

years. However, when it refused to acknowledge the results of national elections held in 1990, it was widely condemned for its antidemocratic behavior. In the post-Cold War international climate of the 1990s, the behavior of the military in Burma was seen as unacceptable.

Thailand's military dominated the state until 1973, when student-led public demonstrations forced it from office, only to return in 1976 following a coup d'état. After ruling in a highly arbitrary and dictatorial manner for several years, factions in the army determined that a more accommodating political order needed to be created. New officers took power, and the governments of General Prem Tinsulanond during the 1980s created the conditions for the establishment of a democratic constitution in the 1990s. Following a brief return to military power in 1992, the army was forced to hand back power to a civilian parliament, as the complexities of managing the modern Thai state and economy are now beyond the competence of the military alone. However, a number of former military officers now have leading roles in civilian politics and the army, which has its own radio and television stations and often acts independently of government policy.

The military in the Philippines was known until the 1960s for its apolitical support for the president and the constitution. However, its political role began to grow under President Ferdinand Marcos (t. 1965–1986), especially after he declared martial law in 1972. The army then became a key instrument of his rule; but as its importance to the president grew, so did its political power. When, in February 1986, the army refused to obey Marcos's order to turn back demonstrators demanding his ouster from office for having rigged his reelection but rather joined with them, it demonstrated the military's capacity to make or break Philippine presidents. On several occasions since, the Philippine armed forces, in coalition with favored civilian politicians, have intervened to place in power a president who will pursue policies to their liking.

Militaries rose to political prominence and remained there in large parts of Southeast Asia during the Cold War period as strong anticommunist governments were perceived by the United States and other Western developed nations as essential for maintaining peace and stability in the region. With the end of the Cold War those arguments lost much of their appar-

ent cogency, and armies in power have been on retreat since. Military government has not been installed in societies with developed economies, relatively high living standards, widespread education, and substantial middle classes, as found in Singapore and Malaysia. Militaries have intervened in the postindependence political processes of many Southeast Asian societies that are characterized by the absence of these qualities. In the process of transition from traditional agrarian societies to more complex, urban, capitalist orders, the military has come to be seen as a creator of order during a period of chaos. Many of the arguments that are advanced to justify this condition seem to be rationalizations, but as the maintenance of social order remains the underlying justification for the modern state, the military will intervene where other institutions are too weak to oppose them.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Aquino, Corazon Cojuangco (1933–); Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP); Cold War; Constitutional (Bloodless) Revolution (1932) (Thailand); EDSA Revolution (1986); Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989); Ne Win, General (1911–2002); *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Prem Tinsulanond, General (1920–); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC); Student Revolt (October 1973) (Thailand); Suharto (1921–); Thammasat University; Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal (1911–)

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MIN YUEN (PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT)

See Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Briggs Plan

MINANGKABAU

Minangkabau is the name for a region and a people located in the central highlands of Sumatra. The Minangkabau call their homeland the *Alam Minangkabau*, or “the world of Minangkabau.” The *alam* includes Minangkabau territories in the high plateaus of central Sumatra, the *darat*, and frontier regions or *rantau* that reach down to the coast in both east and west Sumatra.

Numerical divisions abound within Minangkabau, and the highlands are divided between three principal territories or *luhak*: Agam, Tanah Datar, and Limapuluh Kota. The three highland valleys are spread around two sizable lakes, Lake Maninjau and Lake Singkarak, lying, respectively, to the north and south of the towering volcanoes Gunung Merapi (2,891 meters) and Gunung Singgalang. The volcanic soil of these valleys is highly productive and intensively cultivated, supporting a population that has developed a complex and distinctive culture. Over time Minangkabau men have ventured beyond the highlands, traveling into the *rantau* regions and beyond, a process known as *merantau*. In this way the Minangkabau have come to have an influence far beyond their homelands and have settled in many parts of the archipelago.

Minangkabau society has attracted considerable attention from anthropologists, who have frequently focused on a system of descent and

inheritance that is reckoned through the female line. Members of the society are also divided into two moieties, or *laras*: Bodi Caniago and Koto Piliang, which have coexisted, over the centuries, in a relationship of ritualized rivalry that appears to have been governed by local *adat*, or custom. The complexity of Minangkabau social structure is legendary, and descriptions of Minangkabau society emphasize that each of these *laras* is further divided into four *suku*, a term that implies a matrilineal clan or family. The Minangkabau of the highlands have traditionally lived in *nagari*, autonomous settlements governed by elders in accordance with the provisions of the customary *adat*. Family groups focus on an ancestral communal house (*rumah gadang*, “big house”), which passes down through the female line; these houses are famous not just for their elaborate decoration but also for their distinctive shape, which is said to be modeled on the horns of the buffalo. In addition to a distinctive social structure, kinship system, and material culture, the Minangkabau possess their own language, one that is closely associated with Malay, and numerous written and oral accounts of their *adat* and of their legendary ancestors. Despite these sources, known as *Kaba* and *Tambo*, our knowledge of the details of Minangkabau’s history are surprisingly sparse. This is largely due to the fact that the Minangkabau highlands were, until the nineteenth century, largely inaccessible to foreign travelers.

Little is known about the prehistory of Minangkabau. Menhirs, or megalithic standing stones, are found in several districts in the highlands, and some of these are decorated with elaborate, and probably pre-Islamic, carvings. We have little information about the people who erected these stones, but they point to an early connection between Minangkabau and Negeri Sembilan, on the Malay Peninsula, where groups of similar menhirs are also found. The close parallel between Minangkabau *adat* and that of Negeri Sembilan, including matrilineal descent and inheritance, is well established, and it is generally assumed that groups from Minangkabau migrated and settled on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula sometime before the sixteenth century.

Future archaeological work may tell us much more about the early history of Minangkabau, but in the meantime historians are dependent

on written records, which commence in the fourteenth century. Between 1347 and 1375 a ruler named Adityawarman established a series of stone inscriptions in Minangkabau that allow us to make some tentative deductions about the nature of his kingdom. The inscriptions are written in Old Malay, and they indicate that Adityawarman was a devotee of a syncretic form of Siwa-Buddhism known as Kalacakra, which was also practiced by the Javanese kings of Majapahit (to whom it is thought Adityawarman was related) in the same period. In the inscriptions Adityawarman referred to himself as a Great Lord of Rulers (Sri Maharajadiraja) whose dominion was absolute. The inscriptions appear to refer to ritual sacrifice, but also speak of the ruler's benevolence and the blessings that would flow to loyal subjects.

The question arises as to why a ruler practicing Mahayana Buddhism should appear, apparently quite suddenly, in the Minangkabau highlands in the fourteenth century. One reason may have been a change in conditions in the Melaka Straits, close to which earlier Sumatran kingdoms, such as Śriwijaya and Malayu, had been based. Another possibility may be found in Adityawarman's description of himself as "Sovereign of the Land of Gold," an apparent reference to the deposits of alluvial gold that were found in the highlands and for which Sumatra had long been famous among foreign merchants. The scanty evidence suggests that control over the gold-rich interior may have prompted a member of the Malayu dynasty to move inland in this period, but the details remain a mystery. It is interesting to note that the Minangkabau *Kaba* and *Tambo* do not deal with this period. These tend to ignore kingship and to relate instead the history of the two legendary ancestors of the Minangkabau laras, Datuk Perpatih nan Sebatang and Datuk Katumanggungan. This fact, coupled with the absence of any historical information about Adityawarman's immediate successors, has given rise to the perception that kingship was an anomaly in Minangkabau history and that the existence of a royal lineage sat in tension with adat and with the autonomous character of the Minangkabau nagari. The difficulty for historians in trying to substantiate any of these theories is that the local sources are rarely dated, and it is often necessary to rely on meager external accounts for a chronology of

events. While these are scarce before the seventeenth century, Dutch records from that period offer some new insights into circumstances within Minangkabau.

The Dutch United East India Company (VOC), which established itself on the west coast of Sumatra in the 1660s, wanted access to Minangkabau gold and sought a relationship with the rulers inland who, they hoped, could influence the flow of trade. Possibly this intervention gave new currency to the institution of kingship in the period; certainly the VOC encountered an established lineage that had the ability to affect the gold trade. But the Minangkabau court was not as easy to manipulate as the VOC had hoped, and it soon became clear that the prestige of the rulers in the coastal regions (where they were regarded as "almost holy") was a potent political force. Emissaries from the court appeared in the rantau bearing elaborate letters that were treated with veneration by the population and were used as signs of power on which rebellions against the Europeans might focus. Although emanating from a court that was by this period Islamic, these letters, or *surat cap*, recall Adityawarman's language of threats and blessings and assert the king's role as an intercessor with God. The reports of troubled VOC officials reveal a culture of communication between the darat and the rantau that enabled the ruler's presence to be represented in the coastal regions while his person was still hidden inland. Despite his absence, the ruler still offered a source of authority for coastal communities, which were increasingly beleaguered by Dutch trading monopolies around the coast of Sumatra. By the early eighteenth century Minangkabau royal emissaries helped to lead a holy war against the Dutch and encouraged rebellions in other parts of the archipelago.

Despite the idealized picture of social and political organization found in the local sources—the *Kaba*, *Tambo*, and *Undang-Undang*—there is probably no stage of Minangkabau history at which we can point to a static "traditional" society of the type they describe. Moreover the complex balance between different sources of authority in the interior appears to have varied over time. By the later part of the eighteenth century, Minangkabau's gold had been exhausted and new products—crops such as coffee and gambier—were in demand.

These commercial developments brought new groups into prominence and stimulated religious change with the introduction of ideas of Islamic reform from the Middle East (West Asia). The VOC sources indicate that there had been clear friction between the two Minangkabau laras throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, but by the early 1800s that became more acute. Members of Bodi Caniago, who had come into new prominence through coffee cultivation, took up the call of the Wahabbis in Mecca to reform their society and their religion. This internal struggle developed into a civil conflict known as the Padri War, which pitted village against village as members of the laras fought against each other. The royal dynasty, with its claims to intercession with God, was a particular target for reform, and in 1815 the court was massacred and destroyed by fire.

Until the early nineteenth century only a handful of Europeans had ever ventured into the mountainous Minangkabau interior, but the civil strife that took place from 1803 to 1837 provided an opportunity for the Dutch to become more fully involved. They entered the conflict on the side of what they understood to be the traditional adat leaders, and by 1838 Dutch forces had succeeded in overcoming the advocates of reform. There could be no going back from such intensive contact, and colonial rule was extended into the Minangkabau darat, establishing an infrastructure, including rail and roads, that could be used for the extraction of produce. Colonial administrative intervention reached down to *nagari* level with the aim of securing profits from coffee production, and by 1847 a system of compulsory deliveries was introduced that, by the early twentieth century, was replaced by monetary taxation. Historical work on this period emphasizes both the economic and social adaptability of Minangkabau villages in the face of the intrusion of colonial state power.

This adaptation has encouraged a perception of the “modernism” of Minangkabau society in the late colonial period. Analysts point to the enthusiasm with which the Minangkabau people took up new educational opportunities and to the significant role of Minangkabau figures in the Indonesian nationalist movement and in the struggle for independence. Within Minangkabau the reform of Islam advocated by

the Kaum Muda movement in the 1920s gave rise to debates about the relationship between adat and Islam. The Padris had initiated this issue of the uneasy Islam-*adat* relations that have helped to fix these categories as the twin poles of Minangkabau society in many descriptions of the period. The nature and role of Minangkabau *adat* is a subject that has fascinated both external observers and the Minangkabau themselves. One challenge for historians is to understand the process by which *adat* became such a distinct element of Minangkabau identity and to investigate its character and relevance in earlier periods of Minangkabau history. Future research may also trace the evolution of the picture of “traditional” Minangkabau found in the *Kaba* and *Tambo*. The dearth of alternative sources has often led analysts to read the Minangkabau past in terms of these idealized descriptions, but questions remain as to how old these sources are and how they, themselves, might be located.

Two clear themes that do emerge from a brief survey of Minangkabau history are the persistence over time of complex and elaborately articulated divisions within the society and a dynamic relationship between the inner and outer spheres of the Minangkabau world.

JANE DRAKARD

See also Aceh (Acheh); Adat; Bataks; Coffee; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–ca. 1800); Federated Malay States (FMS) (1896); Federation of Malaya (1948); Gold; Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Padri Movement; Padri Wars (1821–1837); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Pepper; Sjahrir, Sutan (1909–1966); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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MINDANAO

The Muslim South

Mindanao is the second largest island in the Philippines, located in the southern portion of the archipelago. Together with Luzon and the Visayas, it constitutes one of the three major geographical divisions of the Philippines. The Philippine Sea washes the eastern coast of Mindanao; on the north sweeps the Mindanao Sea; on the south is the Celebes Sea; on the west is the Sulu Sea. Immediately to the east of Mindanao is the Philippine deep, also known as the Philippine Trench (10,497 m), a deep elongated valley in the sea that extends from Mindanao in the south to Luzon in the north. The island has a mountainous interior, coastal plains, harbors, and major river systems. It has long been considered a land of promise because of its fertile soil, favorable climate, and abundant natural resources. The tallest mountain in the Philippines, Mount Apo (2,954 m), is located there.

Since Mindanao is located in the southern part of the Philippines, it has had a long history of trade and relations with other Asian countries, including China, India, Thailand (Siam), Malaysia, and Indonesia. Because of its diverse geographic features, it was home to several different cultural and linguistic groups. Islam was introduced in the early sixteenth century, and two major sultanates were established. Despite various attempts to assimilate the Muslims into the mainstream colonial or national fabric, Mindanao was never fully conquered by the Spaniards, Americans, or Japanese. Moves for an independent Muslim state were started in the late 1960s, and full-scale military operations erupted in the 1970s. Attempts for a peaceful settlement of the Muslim conflict were never successful in the long term, and they continue today.

In addition to the Muslim population, there is a substantial Christian population in the major cities and towns that had been developed during the Spanish and U.S. colonial periods. There also exist various indigenous minority groups collectively called *lumads*. The native inhabitants of Mindanao include the Maguindanao and the Maranao, both groups that became Muslim and established sultanates. Other native peoples, with their own languages and cultural heritage, are the Bagobo, Bilaan, Bukidnon, Iranun, Mananua, Mandaya, Manobo, Subanon, and Tiruray. The variety of cultures, religions, and historical traditions in Mindanao has led to conflict and tension over the years, although periods of peace and cooperation have also existed.

Mindanao has an area of 94,630 square kilometers, and it constitutes almost 34 percent of the total land area of the Philippines. It has diverse geographical features, including volcanoes, mountains, plateaus, low basins, a fault area, valleys, and canyons. There are four major mountain ranges in the island. The Pacific (Eastern) Cordillera, also known as the Surigao range or the Diuata Mountains, hugs the Pacific coastline. The Butuan range extends from north to south and forms the origin of the Agusan and Pulangui Rivers. The Central Cordillera (or the Bukidnon–Davao range) peaks at Mount Apo. The Southwestern Cordillera commences from west of Iligan Bay and extends through the Zamboanga peninsula until it reaches Basilan Strait. Among the mountains in Mindanao are several active volcanoes, such as

Mount Apo, Mount Balut, and Mount Makaturing.

Major rivers drain Mindanao. Among them the Rio Grande de Mindanao, the longest river in Mindanao, originates from the Central Cordillera range and runs west to the Moro Gulf. Other important rivers include the Pulangi, which runs north and drains into Macajalar Bay, and the Agusan and Tagolon Rivers. The largest lake in Mindanao is Lake Lanao; others are Buluan, Mainit, and Pagusi. Various plateaus, basins, and plains settle between the mountain and water features.

Surigao, in the north, occasionally suffers heavy rains brought by typhoons, but Mindanao itself lies outside the typhoon belt. The Zamboanga peninsula and Misamis do not experience very pronounced seasons, although they are relatively dry from November to April and relatively wet the remainder of the year. The eastern section of the island has no dry season and experiences relatively heavy rains from November to January. The rest of Mindanao has rainfall more or less evenly distributed throughout the year, with mild temperatures all year round. Agriculture in Mindanao thus does not suffer the destruction brought by typhoons.

Mindanao has abundant natural resources and has been considered a treasure house and a land of promise. Fertile soil because of volcanic activity and river silt yields coconut, abaca, rubber, rice, corn, root crops, vegetables, cassava, coffee, cocoa, peanuts, tobacco, bananas, and pineapples. Because of the mild weather and the absence of typhoons, fruits such as lanzones, durian, mangosten, and rambutan grow all year round. Mineral ores such as gold, silver, lead, zinc, copper, manganese, iron, nickel, chromite, and cobalt are plentiful. Timber is also found in abundance. Cattle raising and fishing are other major sources of livelihood.

Mindanao appears under various names in early maps. One of the earliest European maps names the island Vendanao; later maps spelled the name Medanao. The Japanese called the island Mitanao in the early days of trading.

When man first appeared on Mindanao is not known, but archaeological evidence shows that there were wooden boats in Butuan by 320 C.E., and that there was Metal Age pottery in South Cotabato by 585 C.E. The oldest trading materials, as well as metal tools, date back to

around 900 C.E., evident from finds in Butuan. Trade was conducted between the peoples of Mindanao and China, India, Arabia, and Southeast Asia. Major trading centers in Mindanao at that time were Butuan, at the mouth of the Agusan River; Caraga, on the east coast; Maguindanao, next to the Rio Grande; and Dapitan, on the west coast. Missionaries brought Islam to Maguindanao in the early sixteenth century, and a sultanate was established. Islamization continued throughout the century and spread to the Maranao people around Lake Lanao. Maguindanao, as a major Muslim center, traded with Sulu and Ternate, and alliances were forged.

The Muslims in Mindanao were centered in Lanao and Cotabato (present-day provinces of Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao), where the Maranao and Maguindanao sultanates were established, respectively. *Maguindanao* means "people of the foot plains," while *Maranao* denotes "people of the lake."

Magellan's expedition to the Philippines in 1521 may have anchored in Mindanao, as some historians claimed. The arrival of the Spaniards in the Visayas in 1521 witnessed the landing of Ruy Lopez de Villalobos in Mindanao; he explored part of the island but was unable to establish a colony and was driven out.

Islamization in Mindanao continued, as did traditional trade relations, now including the Portuguese, as the Spaniards began colonizing the Visayas and Luzon in the late sixteenth century. Some Spaniards visited northern and eastern Mindanao and attempted to establish settlements and garrisons in Caraga (now Davao Oriental) and Zamboanga. Attempts were also made to penetrate and conquer Muslim areas; Jesuit missionaries began converting the people in northern Mindanao.

The Spaniards were able to establish a garrison in Zamboanga in 1635. Spanish missionaries and soldiers with Filipinos from the Visayas settled in Zamboanga and began conversion and subjugation in the Zamboanga peninsula. A major Spanish military expedition led by the governor-general, Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera, was launched in 1637 against Lanao and Cotabato (where the Maguindanao sultanate was). After eight years of fighting, the sultan of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, signed a peace treaty with the Spaniards, but tensions continued and Sultan Kudarat declared a jihad (holy

war) in 1656, the first jihad in the history of Islam in the Philippines. Fighting continued until 1663, when the Spanish forces were ordered to Luzon to defend against an imminent Chinese attack. Mindanao was largely abandoned by the Spaniards, and the Maguindanao sultanate carried out trade with the Dutch, the British, and Southeast Asia.

In the eighteenth century, the Spaniards re-established their fort in Zamboanga. Other settlements were established in northern and eastern Mindanao. Conflict between the Muslims and the Spaniards started again, and continued sporadically, with major campaigns being launched by the Spaniards in the 1860s and 1890s. The Spaniards also encouraged Filipino migration into northern and eastern Mindanao, as well as to Zamboanga. The Spaniards evacuated from large parts of Mindanao in 1899 during the Philippine Revolution (1896–1898) and the arrival of the Americans.

With the acquisition of the Philippines by the United States in 1898, a military government was established in 1899 to govern Mindanao and Sulu. Initially the Americans tried to win over the Muslims by diplomacy and tact. They soon resorted to force, however, with military operations commanded by Captain John Pershing (1869–1948). In 1903 a portion of Mindanao and Sulu were designated the Moro Province (Jolo, Lanao, Cotabato, Davao, and Zamboanga), which remained under military rule. Military operations continued even as public works and other programs were instituted. Civil government was established in 1914 with the creation of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. In 1920, Mindanao became a regular part of the Philippine civil administration, although the Muslims remained under a separate agency, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes.

Muslim uprisings continued through the U.S. colonial period and through the 1930s during the Philippine Commonwealth. In 1937, heavy fighting between the Muslims in Lanao and the newly established Philippine army broke out, the first serious fighting encountered by that army.

Japanese immigrants had settled in the province of Davao from the early twentieth century and had built up the abaca industry there. Conflict with the native people, however,

broke out sporadically, and the increasing number of Japanese led to suspicion in Manila.

The Japanese invaded Mindanao during the Pacific War (1941–1945). Davao was occupied first in December 1941, to serve as a base for further operations southward. Conquest operations for the rest of the island began in March 1942, and formal resistance by the Filipino-American defense forces ended in May. However, a strong guerrilla resistance movement comprising both Muslim and Christian Filipinos harassed the enemy and were never defeated by the Japanese. The guerrillas received assistance from Australia and were recognized as the 10th Military District. U.S. forces returned to retake the island in March 1945, and with guerrilla assistance had defeated most of the Japanese by June 1945.

Mindanao was a basic part of the country when the Philippines became an independent republic in 1946. Provincial divisions were maintained, but as population grew and towns developed, many of the provinces were subdivided into two or three divisions in the succeeding years.

Muslim disaffection with the government, however, remained, especially with the influx of more Filipinos from Luzon and the Visayas. In 1971, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established by Nur Misuari (1940–), who was determined to fight for an independent Muslim state (Bangsa Moro). Armed clashes began in 1972 and escalated rapidly. In an attempt to stop the fighting, negotiations were held in Libya, bringing forth the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. The agreement provided for a ceasefire and the establishment of an autonomous Muslim region in the southern Philippines to be composed of thirteen provinces. The agreement, however, was not immediately put into effect. Although the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created in 1989, this encompassed only two Mindanao provinces, the Sulu archipelago and Tawi Tawi Island. Fighting continued through succeeding administrations until 1996, when a formal peace agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine government was reached. Misuari won in regional elections as the head of the ARMM. Tensions continued, however, and another group, the Muslim Independence Liberation Front (MILF), was

formed, insisting on an independent Muslim state. Fighting continues up to this writing.

Administratively, Mindanao is divided into six regions, generally following the geographic and religious divisions. These regions and their provinces are: Region 9, Western Mindanao (Basilan, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur); Region 10, Northeastern Mindanao (Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Occidental, and Misamis Oriental); Region 11, Southern Mindanao (South Cotabato, Davao, Davao Oriental, and Davao del Sur); Region 12, Central Mindanao (North Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, and Sultan Kudarat, plus Sarangani Island); the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, plus the Sulu archipelago and Tawi Tawi Island); and Caraga (Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur). Major ports in contemporary Mindanao are Zamboanga, Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, and Iligan.

The population of Mindanao Island (including Basilan, Sarangani, and Camiguin Islands) as of 2000 was close to 13.6 million, of whom about 1.3 million were in the ARMM (National Statistics Office 2000). Mindanao as an intrinsic part of the Philippines is rich in resources and culture. However, the constant conflict in the island has caused it to remain underdeveloped.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Abaca (Manila Hemp); Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Marine/Sea Products; Martial Law (1972–1981) (The Philippines); Misuari, Nur (1940–); Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); Moros; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1900–1941); Piracy; Slavery; Tausug and the Sulu Sultanate

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MINDON (r. 1853–1878)

Postponing Imperialism

The defeat that the Burmese kingdom received at the hands of the British Indian army in the second Anglo-Burmese War in 1852 shocked the conservative court and prompted a revolt against the king, Pagan Min. The victor in the palace revolt against Pagan Min was his half brother, Mindon Min. Mindon Min arrived on the throne at a time of crisis for the Burmese kingdom and immediately launched a thorough review of the practices and methods of the kingdom. His was a forward-looking, progressive, modernizing monarchy that attempted to reform the institutions of the state in order to preserve it and maintain its independence against the overwhelming forces of European imperialism that were encroaching on Southeast Asia at that time. Unlike his Siamese counterparts, Mindon was given neither the time nor the resources to sufficiently strengthen the Burmese state and save the monarchy.

One of the intentions of the British in seizing Rangoon, Martaban, and Bassein was to unite the two British provinces of Arakan and Tenasserim in order to cut the Burmese state off

from the coast and thus be in a position to squeeze further advantages from it. Mindon, realizing the weakened position of his kingdom, sought with the remaining resources at his disposal to try to thwart that plan. But first he had to secure his own position on the throne. Mindon, who held the position of president of the Council of State in Pagan's government, was allied with his brother, Kanaung, one of the king's generals. Kanaung was convinced of the military superiority of the British and insisted on finding a way to end the war before further damage was inflicted on the remaining Burmese empire.

Fearing a plot against him by one of the king's officials who wished to continue pursuing the line of battle, Mindon, together with Kanaung, went up to Shwebo, the seat of power of his grandfather, King Alaungpaya (r. 1752–1760), the founder of the Konbaung dynasty. There he ousted the local ruler and raised an army of his own to march on the capital at Amarapura. The government of Pagan Min now faced two enemies: the British to the south, and Mindon's force of more than 3,000 to the north. Fractured Pagan Min soon submitted to Mindon. Just thirty-nine years old when he seized the throne, Mindon was to govern for twenty-five years, until his death at age sixty-four in 1878. During that time he gained the reputation as a great Buddhist king.

Like his contemporary Southeast Asian monarch, King Mongkut (r. 1851–1868) of Siam, Mindon determined that if Burma was to survive as an independent kingdom, his state would have to move into line more with modern forms of statecraft as represented by Western Europe. A number of his reforms were not completed before his death, but he put in train a number of processes that have had an impact on twentieth-century Burmese statecraft. He faced a number of difficulties in implementing his reforms. These included opposition from older officials at the capital and harassment by the uncooperative British. Moreover, the tax base of his kingdom had been significantly lessened by the loss of the rice surplus in the delta to the south. Now, rather than having a state monopoly on rice to distribute to his subjects, the Burmese king was forced to purchase rice for his subjects in foreign currency at international prices. Also, a large number of his subjects left the country to take up residence in the more prosperous free-market British

Burma, away from the economic constraints imposed by the monarchy.

Mindon apparently was very much involved in the details of his administration. British visitors to his court in the 1850s remarked on his capacity to manage his people, as well as his wisdom and intellectual superiority over almost everyone else in his court. He was known to foreign observers as a man of principle and interested in justice and fairness for his people. On receipt of petitions from his subjects, whom he insisted on seeing personally, he sometimes overturned the decisions of his subordinates.

The heart of Mindon's strategy was to preserve the independence of the Burmese kingdom through blending the awe and majesty of the institutions of the monarchy and the Buddhist faith with the power of modern science, technology, and bureaucratic government. Initially he shared many of the responsibilities of reform with his brother Kanaung. Kanaung oversaw technological innovation, military reform, and the like, while Mindon concerned himself with foreign affairs, administrative reforms, and the economy. The traditional responsibility of a Burmese king to uphold and propagate Buddhism was also a key activity for the king. This he pursued with great diligence, because he was himself a man of religious orientation and scholarship.

Given Mindon's intention to preserve Burma's independence, many of his reforms concerned the military and national defense. He sent some younger members of the officer corps to Europe for training. He ended the traditional practice of rotating corps of troops commanded by hereditary officers, replacing them with a standing army with a salaried, permanent officer corps. Munitions factories were built and heavy guns and steamships imported to improve riverine defense. French and Italian engineers were hired to build fortifications on the Irrawaddy River on the approaches to his new capital at Mandalay. Plans to build a railway to China failed, and Mindon's tiny fleet of steamers could not compete with the better run and better capitalized Irrawaddy Flotilla Company in Rangoon. Mindon did succeed, however, in tying some of the outlying regions of his kingdom to the capital by a telegram system that was in place by 1870.

Some of Mindon's plans were disappointments and probably drained more away from

the treasury than they produced. Among these were a number of state-owned and -managed factories to produce lac, cutch, sugar, cotton, and silk goods. He also developed a mint to fashion coins for the newly monetarized economy. These reforms were perhaps too few and too haphazard to have much of an impact on improving the strength of his state in the short period of time that Mindon had to complete them. But they did demonstrate to the Burmese their capacity to carry out such activities.

Another of Mindon's major reforms was in the field of education. Up until then, most education in Burma had centered on the teaching of Buddhist texts and practices. Mindon, however, saw the advantages of secular and scientific education as practiced by his opponents, the British, as well as other Europeans. He sent a number of junior members of the court or their children to India, Britain, France, and Italy for training. Many returned to take up posts in Mindon's expanded army and industrial efforts.

The heart of Mindon's strategy to strengthen and preserve the monarchy was centralizing political and administrative power. Here he met resistance from the existing nobility, who saw these reforms as threats to their independence and authority. However, gradually, by dismissing hereditary authorities for incompetence or violation of the orders of the government, he was able to replace them with his own salaried provincial officials. Through a process of gradual reform, Mindon was attempting to construct a modern bureaucratic state while ensuring that those who lost out in these reforms did not generate enough power to thwart his plans. He was much more successful in the valley areas near his capital than farther away, where local rulers easily challenged his authority. Mindon also attempted to carry out fiscal reforms in order to centralized tax revenues under his authority. That, too, was resisted by his hereditary subordinates but much favored by the court, which saw that they would benefit from this new order.

Mindon moved the capital of his kingdom to Mandalay. There he lavished large expenditures on building hundreds of religious buildings, including beautiful pagodas and monasteries. He also convened a meeting of Theravada Buddhist monks to correct errors in the texts of his faith. Mindon also insisted on the proper carrying out of royal procedures and protocol.

Court life provided an aesthetic, religious, and political example for his subordinates and local governors to model themselves upon. The role of the state in shaping the ethos of his society was not lost on the king.

Mindon became ill late in 1877, and he was not to live much longer. Reformers in his court, led by the Kinwun Mingyi, or Kinwun minister, saw the prospective succession struggle as their opportunity to continue their reforms, perhaps turning the monarchy into merely a symbol of authority rather than the effective ruling power. The model they had in mind was that of the British constitutional monarchy. Burmese kings had never established a clear line of succession, for fear that those chosen to succeed would perhaps not live to reach the throne. There were three senior princes, brothers of Mindon, who were thought likely to succeed, and the rivalry among them was strong.

In the end, however, the Kinwun Mingyi and Mindon's senior queen managed to place on the throne Prince Thibaw, the twenty-year-old son of a lesser queen. Thibaw had neither the strength of character nor the experience of most of those around him, and it was believed that he would be compliant with the wishes of his senior advisors. What happened was effectively a palace coup. Many of those who opposed Thibaw's accession were forced to flee or were placed under arrest. The Kinwun Mingyi's rivals in the administration were dismissed, and those who supported the coup were given appointments. Many of those arrested were executed. However, the long-term plans of the Kinwun Mingyi to finish the reforms that Mindon had commenced were thwarted when the British invaded less than eight years later, and abolished the Burmese monarchy.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Buddhism, Theravada; Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Reforms and Modernization in Siam

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MING DYNASTY (1368–1644)

The Ming dynasty was established by the Han Chinese to succeed the collapsed Yuan (Mongol) dynasty (1271–1368). Its relationship with Southeast Asian countries operated largely within the confines of the hierarchical tributary system.

The establishment of the Ming dynasty and the expulsion of the Mongols to the Gobi marked the return of Han Chinese legitimacy in ruling China. The first Ming emperor, Hongwu (1328–1398, r. 1368–1398), learned a lesson from the bellicose Mongols and announced the building of a harmonious empire in which the peripheral Asian states were vassals. He sent out missions to Southeast Asian countries decreeing that a new dynasty had superseded that of Yuan, demanding tributes to the new Chinese emperor, and promising that there would be no more military campaigns, which had been perennial during the Yuan dynasty against Vietnam and Java. The traditional Sino-centric tributary system was thus revived. The empire's diplomatic relationship with the Southeast Asian countries became the closest during the reign of Emperor Yongle (1360–1424, r. 1402–1424), with seven naval expeditions commanded by Cheng Ho (Zheng He), a Muslim eunuch, to as far as East Africa. In all the voyages, Cheng with his marvelous fleet called at Southeast Asian ports, pacified local monarchs, and impressed them with the need to pay regular tributes to the Ming emperors in the future. Tributary missions might conduct a limited amount of trade, supervised by the Maritime Trade Supervisorates (*shiboshi*) at Ningbo, Quanzhou, and Guangzhou, the last



Chinese scholar writing in his study. Chinese literature flourished during the Ming dynasty, spurred on by prosperity and the introduction of a dictionary that simplified the written language by reducing the number of signs for characters.

specializing in dealing with Southeast Asian missions. Emperor Yongle, among the successors of Emperor Hongwu, was the only one who had the temerity to break the ancestral rule in sending forces to Vietnam to suppress usurpation against the Trần house.

However, the effect of Emperor Yongle's aggressive policies in bonding the tributary system did not last long. The vassal states' acknowledgment of China's central status and the system's operation grew to be symbolic, especially in the second half of the dynasty's tenure, when the Ming court came to view the southern border of the empire as less strategic than the northern.

The Mongols returned with restored strength, posing a direct threat to Beijing, a new capital established by Emperor Yongle to replace Nanjing but geographically more exposed to military threat across the Wall. National insecurity forged new developments in the dynasty's relationship with Southeast Asia. The attention of the Ming court was diverted from the sea; naval adventures of any scale did not occur after that of Cheng Ho. The tributary system grew loose, which facilitated political changes in Southeast Asia, notably the weakening of Vietnam and the rise of Burma (Myanmar).

More prominent was the expansion of private trade between Southeast Asia and China. In the context of the tributary system, only tributary trade was allowed, which was in the form of gifts from the Chinese emperor in return for the tributes paid. Any trade aimed at seeking profit was disallowed. However, the Ming government grew reluctant to check the expanding activities of private merchants, resulting in private trade exceeding the tributary trade in volume. Although profitable, the increasing traffic with Southeast Asia created a crisis in the stability of the Chinese Empire. The expanding junk trade constantly attracted Chinese emigrants to Southeast Asia, an unlawful act according to Ming regulations. Some of them became smugglers, some even armed pirates in liaison with the Japanese gangs harassing Chinese coastal provinces, Guangdong (Kwangtung) and Fujian (Fukien) in particular. Together with the northern border problem, this maritime crisis forced the Ming court to face a two-front threat. Besides military confrontations, the Ming court intended to uproot the piracy problem, by legalizing foreign trade by the Chinese and by granting coastal residents the right to operate oceangoing ships for trade. It was decreed in 1567 that fifty licenses would be issued annually for oceangoing ships to trade with Southeast Asia. This new legislation worked, and it unleashed further vigor to the junk trade with Southeast Asia. Ports such as Manila and Batavia benefited and developed into important trade cities.

Once the pirates lost the support of the coastal residents, they faced more effective exterminatory campaigns by the government. Some of them fled to Southeast Asia. A Lin Feng reached Luzon with his small fleet, where he joined the locals in combating the Spanish

intruders but ended in failure and was forced to retreat to China.

The lucrative Southeast Asian trade even started a new era for Sino-European relationships. After acquiring Melaka, Portuguese traders verified from the locals the existence of a Chinese Empire with great trading opportunities. They set their sails for China and set up a settlement at Macau (Macao), upon the payment of a sum of land rent to the Guangdong government. The first and only European enclave before the Anglo-Chinese or Opium War (1840–1842), Macau served as an indispensable entrepôt, opening a new Sino-European trade route and providing a regular channel through which Sino–Southeast Asian trade was conducted.

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also Cheng Ho (Zheng He), Admiral (1371/1375–1433/1435); Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Tribute System; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Macau (Macao); Melaka; Nam Viet (Nan Yue); Pagan (Bagan); Portuguese Asian Empire; Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty (1271–1368)

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MISCEGENATION

Miscegenation means union of individuals of different races. Miscegenation may involve change of legal status, nationality, or religion for one of the partners. Like all forms of marriage, it is regulated by governments and religious authorities and is the subject of public debate. In Southeast Asian histories, miscegenation was a vehicle for incorporating the foreign male into

a local community, and for translating a local woman into a foreign settler community.

Malay and Indonesian chronicles often link conversion to Islam with miscegenation. A foreigner of mysterious powers who arrives by ship announces the new religion to a local king. The royal convert then gives a daughter in marriage to the stranger to secure his permanent residence and entry into local society.

In the age before the hotel chain, marriage provided mobile men with places of residence and domestic services. Marriage, preceded by conversion to Islam, offered Chinese men a stake in local communities. Army commanders who took Europeans prisoner in Indonesian sultanates gave them the stark choice of execution or admission into the local community through conversion and marriage.

In Southeast Asian histories, miscegenation is often cast as marriage between European men and Southeast Asian women. European trading networks operated like those of Chinese, Indians, Arabs, and Malays. Small communities of men established themselves in Southeast Asian ports. They maintained connections to other settlements and to Europe through men who traveled the sea highways and put in at port for weeks at a time. Settled and transient Europeans found female companionship among women of the ports. Dutch paintings of seventeenth-century settlements in Asia show mixed-race couples among market crowds and in family portraits. In places where men put down permanent roots and where Europeans became administrators, there was a push to regularize unions and proscribe temporary marriage and prostitution.

Batavia was established in 1619 on the site of the sultanate of Jayakarta to be the Asian headquarters of the Dutch United East India Company (VOC). Its ruling administration set rules for all company settlements in Asia. A priority was to bring public order to private life. Girls were imported from Holland as brides for company employees, but the scheme was soon dropped in favor of promoting settler communities through marriage of immigrant men to local women. Women with ties in Asian communities were expected to keep their European husbands renewing their five-year work contracts with the VOC instead of repatriating to Europe. To promote permanent communities, the company prohibited repatriation by men

with an Asian-born wife and children. It employed boys born from these unions in its offices and armed forces, and encouraged the girls to become brides of immigrants from Holland.

The company and the Batavia church synod established regulations governing mixed marriage. Weddings had to be conducted in the Reformed Church. If the bride was a slave, her husband had to purchase her freedom and have her baptized prior to marriage. Christian name and marriage to a European man gave the bride the legal status and nationality of European. Children born to such unions inherited European status. In the early days, before a mixed community had reproduced itself in sufficient numbers, the company purchased slave girls and housed them in the Women's Court until husbands were found for them. The bride's purchase price was deducted in installments from the husband's monthly salary.

Visiting Europeans condemned miscegenation. They claimed that mixed marriage produced children who were lazy, amoral, and vicious. In narratives published for the reader in Europe, travelers ridiculed the manners and tastes of the part-European. Within company communities, Dutch men honored the Asian and Eurasian ladies married into the ruling clique. Public celebrations marked their anniversaries, and public mourning was observed at their passing.

Miscegenation outlasted slavery. It was the norm until greater numbers of European women began migrating to Dutch outposts in Asia from the 1870s. Steamship connections, the fast route through the Suez Canal, and mass production of quinine made tropical settlements seem less distant and life-threatening to women in Holland, and they coincided with changes in colonial government policy that welcomed female immigrants. Although the proportion of women among Dutch migrants gradually increased, overseas communities remained products of their early roots. When Japan invaded the Dutch East Indies in 1942, 70 percent of the colony's European community were Asia-born (Van Marle 1955).

Miscegenation in Southeast Asian sultanates was a mechanism for enfolding foreign men into local communities. In Europe's Southeast Asian colonies, miscegenation conferred European status on Southeast Asian women. Colonial administrators and legislation classified

people as European, Native, or Foreign Oriental (meaning Arab and Chinese), and devised separate rules and rights for each category, but individuals entering mixed marriages crossed colonial boundaries. Miscegenation produced children who challenged the colonial order because identity and privilege could not be determined by physical appearance. In the independent nations of Southeast Asia, nationality laws required individuals to choose between their heritages. Those choosing Dutch citizenship were expelled from Indonesia in 1959.

JEAN GELMAN TAYLOR

See also Baba Nyonya; Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Islam in Southeast Asia; Mestizo; Portuguese Asian Empire; Sexual Practices in Southeast Asia; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Women in Southeast Asia

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**MISSION CIVILISATRICE
("CIVILIZING MISSION")**

France's *mission civilisatrice*—a civilizing mission that spreads the republican concepts of liberty throughout the world on the back of the French language and cultural genius—was a long-nurtured notion that had guided and justified nineteenth-century French colonial expansion. This ideology derived from the conviction that France, by virtue of its status as an enlight-

ened civilization, had a duty to disseminate these concepts widely. French colonial policymakers felt genuinely that France could and should exert its powerful civilizing influence on the underdeveloped nations of the world, bringing to them the best of Western methods of industrial production, medicine, and fair governance. Thus, committed to reshaping their colonial subjects' lives in ways consistent with a French republican vision of modernity, the French colonial administrators regarded themselves as on a mission civilisatrice—a mission to civilize their colonial subjects.

To be "civilized," therefore, was to rise above the various tyrannies imposed on humans by climate, disease, ignorance, and despotic governments. In the face of such tyrannies, the French colonial administrators saw themselves as liberators whose task was to diffuse the benefits of Western science and education while actively attacking and eradicating native institutions they deemed retrograde. This belief gave rise to the doctrine of *assimilation*, by which was meant the raising of the standards of native life to a level that would eventually permit the colonial territories' absorption into the French Republic and the adoption of the people, individually, as full-fledged citizens of France.

In the early 1900s, the doctrine of assimilation gave way to that of *association*, which envisaged a partnership among races and among their institutions that should be of equal benefit to both parties. The benefits to be shared would extend to the advantages to be derived from an enlightened legal and judicial system and from modern agriculture, mineral and plantation exploitation, from commerce, and perhaps industry. This joint venture, guided and developed by the genius of France, was to be a high moral enterprise. Such were the tone and the direction of the colonial policy set between 1919 and 1939 by Albert Sarraut, governor-general of Indochina (t. 1911–1914, 1917–1919), then minister of colonies (t. 1921–1924, 1932–1933), through a corpus of ideas that very much resembled a liberal reinterpretation of the "White Man's Burden." Sarraut considered the assignment, qualified by him as "Colonial Greatness and Servitude," as part of the responsibilities France could not shirk within the scope of its mission at the service of humankind. It was its duty to bring progress "in the respect of local

beliefs” and to lead to emancipation with sincere but prudent liberalism.

Such an approach, trying to reshape rather than to crush native institutions, was certainly subtler and more culturally sensitive than what had gone before it, but it was still a firm expression of the republican zeal embodied in the mission civilisatrice. One of the goals of the International Colonial Exposition of Paris in 1931, for example, was to demonstrate that the French colonial effort was achieving this mission—and that colonial industry, however primitive, was showing promising signs of advancement from savagery to civilization.

On the other hand, the faith in the mission civilisatrice may explain that, whereas the British hung on to colonial possessions for commercial and military reasons, the French added an emotional and cultural dimension to their attachment. And because the French encouraged their local colonial elites to look upon mainland France as the center of their universe, particularly through higher education, the French cultural penetration was far deeper than that of the British, Dutch, or Portuguese.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also “Asia for the Asiatics”; Colonialism; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Imperialism; “Manifest Destiny”; Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; “White Man’s Burden”

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MISSIONARIES, CHRISTIAN

The world religions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity were not brought to Southeast Asia by armies and colonial occupation alone as according to the so-called *ksatriya*

theory after the Hindu caste of warriors, nor by traders alone (the *vaysha* theory after the Hindu caste for traders). Missionaries also played an important role. Specialized religious knowledge, which was needed for the great temples of Angkor Wat, Prambanan, and Borobudur, was restricted to Brahmin pundits and Buddhist monks. The same was the case with Islam and Christianity. Notwithstanding the historical trio of military, merchants, and missionaries, the latter have to be taken as distinct from the former two groups, although there have often been common interests as well. Therefore the Spanish worked until 1900 in the Philippines, the British in Burma and Malaysia, the French in Vietnam, and the Dutch in Indonesia, with some exceptions such as the Germans, who joined Ingwer Ludwig Nommensen (1834–1918) in Indonesia.

Following is a brief description of the most prominent and best-known foreign missionaries who brought Christianity to Southeast Asia, emphasizing the very different characters and roles in culture and society where they undertook their missionary work.

In Burma (Myanmar) the contributions of three outstanding missionaries are prominent. Paul Ambroise Bigaudat (1813–1894) was in 1865 one of the first Catholic bishops in Burma. He is not only known for preaching his own faith and educating a Burmese clergy; in addition, he wrote one of the best books ever written on Burmese Buddhism: *The Life or Legend of Gaudama, the Buddha of the Burmese* (1858, many reprints). Adoniram Judson (1788–1850) was the pioneer Baptist missionary in Burma, doing the basic work of language studies, working also as a translator for the Burmese independent government after he was imprisoned as a spy. He published a Bible in Burmese in 1834. John Ebenezer Marks (1832–1915) was an Anglican educator in Burma who had nine sons of the monarch in his school and developed St. John’s College, Rangoon (Yangon).

Among Protestant missionaries to Indonesia was Justus Heurnius (1557–1652), who arrived in Batavia in 1624, translated the Heidelberg catechism in Chinese, worked in the Moluccas from 1633 to 1638, and translated sections of the Bible into Malay. Joseph Kam (1769–1833) reorganized the mission in the Moluccas in the early nineteenth century. Nommensen was the first Westerner to live in Batakland (Sumatra).

He had set up a common school system for all children. He was impressively successful, in that 180,000 had converted by the time he died. Albert Kruyt (1869–1949) was among the first missionaries to enter Torajaland (Sulawesi), where he developed the ethnological approach, studying and respecting local culture and language. Hendrik Kraemer (1888–1965) was, in the 1920s and 1930s, the revolutionary missionary to lead the Protestant mission to accept independent churches and be tolerant of nationalist Christians. Among the Catholics of Indonesia, quite a few martyrs are known from the earliest period. The Portuguese Franciscan priest Simon Vaz was murdered in Moro in 1535 and is considered the first of them. Francis Xavier (1506–1552) is without doubt the best-known Catholic missionary: he worked from 1545 to 1547 in the Moluccas and briefly in Melaka. Later prominent missionaries were Frans van Lith (1863–1926), who started the Java mission and made it flourish by the excellent Jesuit schools and their mixture of the best of Western education and a high esteem for Javanese culture. The learned Jesuit Piet Zoetmulder (1906–1995) devoted his life to the study of classical Javanese, composed a dictionary, and published many texts that made available the treasury of Buddhist and Hindu developments in Indonesia. Jilis Verheijen (1908–1997), a missionary of the Society of the Divine Word (SVD) order, was among the most noted scholars of language and culture of West Flores or Manggarai.

The most famous Catholic missionaries of the Philippines are all from the sixteenth century. Juan de Plasencia (d. 1590) was the first to compose a dictionary of Tagalog. His catechism in Tagalog was the first book printed in that language. Martin de Rada (1533–1578) wrote a strong condemnation of colonial policy as executed by the Spaniards. Domingo de Salazar (1512–1594), the first bishop of the Philippines, denounced the satanic coalition of Spanish landlords and traditional nobility. He was the architect of the quick conversion of a large part of the Philippine population. From later periods there was Pedro Murillo Velarde (1696–1753), a learned Jesuit who wrote works on Philippine history and geography, but most of all was known as a legal expert. Jacinto Juanmartí y Espot (1833–1897), also a Jesuit, worked among Christian slaves ransomed from Muslim Magin-

danao. Juan Villaverde (1841–1897), a Dominican friar, became known as the road builder, part of his work among the hill people of Nueva Vizcaya. James Rodgers (1865–1944) is celebrated (and sometimes detested) as the first Protestant missionary in the Philippines.

For Malaysia, Francis Thomas McDougall (1817–1866) is honored as the pioneer Anglican missionary in Sarawak. William Shellabear (1862–1947) is known as a scholar in Malay studies, but also for his work among the Chinese of Singapore and Malaysia.

For Vietnam, the best-known missionary is Alexandre de Rhodes (1591–1660), a Jesuit and gifted linguist who first wrote Vietnamese in Latin script, the way it is written today. Jerónimo Hermosilla (1800–1861), bishop of Tonkin, saw a great increase in Catholics during the thirty-two years he worked there, but also experienced the most severe persecution. He died as a martyr, beheaded in 1861.

KAREL STEENBRINK

See also Catholicism; Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship

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MISUARI, NUR (1940–)

A Moro Leader

Nurullaji (Nur) Misuari is the chairman of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the group that led the Moro (Muslim Filipino) struggle for self-determination in the southern Philippines. As chairman, he was instrumental in obtaining international recognition for the MNLF and in securing foreign assistance that sustained the Moro struggle for years.

Misuari, born in 1940, acquired his college education at the University of the Philippines where, later, he was employed as instructor in the Department of Political Science.

Shortly after the massacre of Moro trainees by military men in Corregidor in 1968, he left the university and decided to be active in the movement against the government. In 1969, when the MNLF was organized, he was chosen

chairman of its central committee, the position he has held since then.

As MNLF chairman, Misuari became a more determined advocate of the Moro struggle for self-determination; even while abroad, he ardently pursued his advocacy through his articulation of the Moro plight and struggle in his fiery speeches before Muslim leaders and intellectuals in international assemblies. Consequently, he earned recognition and more support for the MNLF from the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

In 1996, Misuari, as chairman and representative of the MNLF, concluded a peace agreement with the Philippine government and subsequently accepted the chairmanship of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), a government-created council tasked to monitor development projects in selected areas in the southern Philippines. He also decided to run as a government official candidate, and he won the gubernatorial election in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) held in the same year. As ARMM governor, Nur Misuari has now joined the ranks of politicians running the government he once denounced.

However, his political partnership with the government ended on a sad note. The Philippine government accused him of rebellion and ordered his arrest due to his alleged involvement in the attacks in Sulu in November 2001. In January 2002, after being detained for several days in Malaysia, Misuari was deported to the Philippines, where he is currently under detention.

NORMA A. MARUHOM

See also Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989);
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF);
Moros

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MOHAMMAD HATTA (1902–1980)
Patriot, Muslim Intellectual,
and Administrator

Mohammad Hatta was the vice-president of Indonesia from 1945 to 1956. A Minangkabau, born in Bukittinggi, Hatta was educated in Dutch primary and secondary schools in Padang and Batavia. He was treasurer of the Jong Sumatranen Bond in Padang and Batavia. In 1922 he undertook tertiary studies in Rotterdam, where he remained for ten years. He was involved in the conversion of the Indische Vereeniging (the Indies students' society) in The Netherlands from a social club to the politically active Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI, Indonesian Union). He became chairman of PI in 1926, and contributed to the planning of a new nationalist party in the Netherlands Indies. He also became involved with the League Against Imperialism. In 1927 he was arrested on the charge of encouraging armed resistance to Dutch rule in Indonesia, was tried in The Hague, and was acquitted after using his defense speech to make a sweeping denunciation of Dutch rule and a justification of Indonesian nationalism.

After being expelled from PI in 1931, he returned to Indonesia and took over leadership of the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (PNI-Baru, National Education Club). In February 1934 he was arrested with other PNI-Baru leaders and exiled to the Boven Digul penal settlement in New Guinea, before being removed with Sutan Sjahrir (1909–1966) to the relative comfort of Banda Naira in 1936. He was brought back to Java just before the Japanese invasion. Despite having previously condemned the Japanese occupation regime, serving as vice chairman of its mass organizations and seeking to manipulate events in the interests of Indonesian independence. It was during this period that he renewed his curious and sometimes acrimonious relationship with Sukarno (1901–1970), and the so-called *Dwi-Tunggal* (Two-in-One) was born. He was cosignatory with Sukarno of the Proclamation of Independence in August 1945, and became vice-president, a post in which he served for the next eleven years. Commissioned by Sukarno to head an emergency presidential cabinet in the period 1948–1949, he was imprisoned in the second Dutch "police action" (1948). Then, as prime minister of the republic,

he presided over negotiations with the Dutch and the transfer of sovereignty to the republic. He dominated the Indonesian side of the Round Table conference at The Hague from August to November 1949, where he impressed all the participants.

Disturbed by political trends in the early 1950s, he submitted his resignation as vice-president in 1956, using his final speech to condemn the narrow self-interest of party politicians since independence. Although Hatta was asked by Sukarno to negotiate with the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) rebels in Sumatra, force was used before he could negotiate an end to a rebellion that he may have unwittingly helped to provoke.

In subsequent years Hatta's political activities were essentially covert. Although there were clandestine gatherings of Muslim youths at his villa in Megamendung in 1962, he did not play a direct political role against Sukarno's Guided Democracy. With the fall of Sukarno, Hatta sought to reenter national politics by trying to form a Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia, blending Modernist Muslims and socialists. Suharto's New Order refused to sanction this new party, however. He still remained a potential focus of opposition to the New Order: he was offered the leadership of PNI in 1969 and was effectively sent abroad during the 1971 elections. In 1973 he was involved in the Sawito affair, a plot for a bloodless coup against Suharto. In a notable speech in August 1975 he attacked the government's failure to base itself on the rule of law. Hatta had sought to invoke the Pancasila (the five national principles of Indonesia) in order to condemn the excesses of both Sukarno's Old Order and Suharto's New Order. It was in an attempt to co-opt him that the Suharto regime appointed him in 1975 to the Committee of Five to advise the president on the proper implementation of the Pancasila.

Hatta died on 14 March 1980. He was most famous as the other (and more attractive to most commentators) half of the *dwi-tunggal* with Sukarno: Hatta the dispassionate, Muslim Sumatran intellectual and administrator, juxtaposed with Sukarno, the passionate Javanist nation-builder. This may exaggerate Hatta's dispassionate, intellectual side: he was as much a religious as a revolutionary ascetic, a deeply pious but eclectic Muslim—Modernist, Sufist, and Wahab-

ist. He was fascinated by Marx, convinced of the possibility of synthesizing Islam and socialism, and devoted above all to the principle of popular sovereignty, remaining a committed advocate of the development of cooperatives as a solution to Indonesia's economic problems.

It is customary for commentators to depict Hatta as the social democrat who could have saved Indonesia from the ravages of both the Old and New Orders. But while his ability and integrity have never been doubted, he was short of two essential attributes. His lack of a parliamentary party base, despite his close links to the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations, worked against him. And, second, perhaps the lack of a ruthless streak in him that would have been necessary if he were to have played a decisive political role in the later 1950s and 1960s destined him ultimately to play the part of a universally respected but essentially ineffectual elder statesman.

ANTHONY MILTON

See also Dutch Police Action (First and Second); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Pancasila (Pantja Sila); Sjahrir, Sutan (1909–1966); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–); Van Mook, Dr. Hubertus Johannes (1894–1948)

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MON

Linguistically and genetically an Austro-Asiatic group, the Mon belong to the Mon-Khmer ethnological unit. Archaeological remains have shown that they inhabited the area of the Mekong Delta and Tonle Sap regions of present-day Cambodia, northeast Thailand, and around the Gulf of Thailand from at least the beginning of the Common Era (C.E.). Perhaps they date even earlier, as evidence of an Austro-Asiatic group has been found in western Thailand in Kanchanaburi Province near the village of Ban Kao, dating from Neolithic times (10,000 B.C.E.). Archaeological remains indicate that a Mon civilization based on Theravada Buddhism was present in northeast Thailand up to around the early ninth century, when it was overtaken by the Khmers of Angkor expanding from central Cambodia at the beginning of the reign of Jayavarman II (770/790/802?–834 C.E.). Around the Gulf of Thailand in the lower Chao Phraya valley, Mon Buddhist culture seems to have been centered on the protohistoric cities at U-thong, Nakhon Pathom, Ku Bua, and Phetburi. Evidence of habitation at U-thong extends back into Iron Age cultures (500 B.C.E.), predating the adoption of Buddhist culture.

The Mon civilization extended north into central and north-central Thailand at Haripunjaya (Lamphun), founded by the Mon Queen Chamadevi in the eighth century. It spread eastward into the city-states of the Pasak River Valley, Sri Thep, Sab Champa, and Chansen. The strategic location connecting the cities of the Chao Phraya valley with those of the Mun and Chi Rivers on the Korat Plateau in northeast Thailand may have helped to spread Theravada Buddhism to that part of the country. These cities are considered to be the heart of the Mon cultural polity in Thailand, the Dvaravati culture, known in the Chinese dynastic records as T'o-lo-p'o-ti. Once thought to be a far-flung empire, Dvaravati is now considered a shared culture based on Theravada Buddhism. This culture is apparent in the series of Mon city-states from around the first century C.E. and surviving until Khmer expansion during the ninth to eleventh centuries incorporated them in the Angkorian polity.

How far westward this early Mon polity extended beyond the Gulf of Thailand is a matter of controversy. British colonial scholars created a Mon polity called Rammanadesa based at

Thaton/Pegu contemporaneous with the Dvaravati polity in Thailand. However, recent research by Michael Aung-Thwin, building on some suggestive inferences by earlier scholars C. O. Blagden, Professor Than Tun, and Paul Strachan, challenges this assumption, asserting that there is no empirical evidence for such a polity until much later, in the late thirteenth century. "It was King Dhammaceti who first made the claims about Mon antiquity by shifting the sacred geography, genealogy and chronology of Buddhist India to Lower Burma in his inscriptions. That not only gave the Mon a greater antiquity by taking them back at least to the time of Asoka, but also linked their conceptual system with the most orthodox version of the Buddhist scriptures derived from the Third Buddhist Council via Sona and Uttara" (Aung-Thwin 2001: 20).

The Mon paradigm, as Michael Aung-Thwin has called it, developed the myth that King Anawrahta (r. 1044–1077) of Pagan had conquered the Mon capital at Thaton as a consequence of the refusal of the king of Thaton, Manuha, to give him the Theravada Buddhist scriptures. The victorious Anawrahta carried king, populace, priests, and scriptures to Pagan, inaugurating a cultural efflorescence at Pagan based on Mon Theravada Buddhist culture that also was said to be responsible for the development of the Burmese script and literary tradition. This myth has now been called into question. When colonial scholars deciphered the Kalyani inscriptions, they linked the myth of an early Mon polity called Rammanadesa in Lower Burma with the myth of Anawrahta's conquest of Thaton.

Nevertheless, by the fourteenth century, in the wake of the political collapse of the Pagan polity following the Mongol and Shan incursions in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, a Mon state was developing in Lower Burma around Pegu, Martaban, and Moulmein. When the Burmese from Pagan regrouped at Toungoo, then Ava, the stage was set for Mon-Burmese competition and conflict for control of the Ayeyarwaddy (Irrawaddy) heartland and the revenue from the maritime trade of the coastal lands. At first, the ruler in Lower Burma, Wareru (r. 1287–1296), was of Shan extraction and related to the T'ai king Ramkhamhaeng (r. 1279–1298) at Sukhothai, who laid claim to Martaban and Tenasserim. When the T'ai king-

dom of Sukhothai was weakening in the mid-fourteenth century, the Mon under Byinna Law (r. 1331–1353) and his son Binnya U were able to reassert Mon control. It was under his successor, Razadarit (r. 1385–1423), that a powerful Mon polity developed in Lower Burma. With the assistance of Portuguese mercenaries, Razadarit engaged in a lengthy struggle with the Burmese king, Mingyiswasawke (r. 1368–1401) of Ava, simultaneously holding back the Shans on his eastern flank. The tradition of Mon-Burmese competition may be traced to this medieval conflict.

After the deaths of Razadarit of Pegu and Mingyiswasawke of Ava, the conflict dissolved into desultory border skirmishes. Lower Burma, in the period 1423–1539, was able to develop into a prosperous maritime commercial polity under its renowned king, Dhammazedī (r. 1472–1492), a former monk who had been advisor to the Mon queen Sawlu. While Upper Burma at Ava was beset by internecine troubles and palace plots, Dhammazedī built Lower Burma into a wealthy polity on the base of international trade and the Theravada Buddhist religion. It was the “Golden Age” of Pegu.

In Upper Burma, Minkyinyo (r. 1486–1531) of Toungoo married the daughter of the Ava king, received the rich “rice bowl” Kyaukse area as her dowry, and began to assert Toungoo’s dominance. His son, Tabinshweihti (r. 1531–1550), revived the all-Burma policy of Pagan, defeated both the Mon and his rivals in central Burma, and asserted the preeminence of the First Toungoo dynasty (1531–1599) as supreme rulers of the country. He held a double coronation at both Pagan and Pegu, an act of symbolic significance in establishing him in the line of succession to Anawrahta of Pagan. He also continued the campaigns against the Shan-T’ai peoples, invading Siam in 1548. His conciliatory policy toward the Mon saw Mon customs and culture incorporated into his administration.

Under King Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581) the Mon, often referred to as the Talaings in Burma, were again incorporated into the larger Burmese empire. Like his predecessor, Bayinnaung was sympathetic to Mon culture. He made his capital at Pegu, whose splendor was described by the European traveler Caesar Federicke (Federici) (1588). But the Mon chafed under Burmese control. Revolts and

conspiracies by Mon aristocrats and courtiers were severely punished, leading to a periodic exodus of Mon refugees across the border to Siam (Thailand). One such revolt during the reign of Nanda Bayin (r. 1581–1599), Bayinnaung’s son and successor, in 1599–1600 led to the delta’s being laid waste and thousands of Mon killed. The ravages of civil war destroyed the once-fertile Mon heartland as the Arakanese and Portuguese at Syriam joined forces with those opposing Nanda Bayin. During wars with Siam in the late sixteenth century, the Mon were thought to side with the Siamese, a perspective maintained during the next period of Mon-Burmese struggle in the mid-eighteenth century.

In the first half of the seventeenth century, Kings Anaukpetlun (r. 1600–1628) and Thalun (r. 1629–1648) of the Restored Toungoo dynasty (1599–1752) defeated the Arakanese-Portuguese-Mon federation and moved the Burmese political and cultural center back to Ava in Upper Burma. Repression against the Mon in the latter part of the seventeenth century saw many migrate to Siam; by then Siam had regained control of Martaban, Tavoy, and Tenasserim.

By the early eighteenth century, the Mon at Pegu had recovered their strength; they revolted in 1740 and were able to sack Ava in 1752 and capture and kill the king and most of the royal princes, leaving only two incompetent princes remaining in Ava. The resurgence of the Mon in turn brought a revival of Burmese leadership under a new champion, who took the name Alaungphaya (Alaung-hpaya); he was destined to become the first monarch (r. 1752–1760) of the third Burmese empire and founder of the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1886), the last Burmese dynasty. From his base at Shwebo, Alaungphaya raised the standard against the Mon, driving them from Ava. In a series of swift campaigns punctuated by French and English support, arms, and munitions for the Mon, Alaungphaya captured the delta, taking Negrais, Syriam, and Pegu, which he razed in 1757. When a Mon conspiracy implicated the last Mon king, Binnya Dala, Alaungphaya put him to death along with many surviving Mon nobles. Those who could fled into Siam and fought with the Siamese armies against the Burmese in the Burma-Siam wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (1760–1809).

During the three Anglo-Burmese Wars of 1824–1826, 1852–1853, and 1885, this long tradition of Mon-Burmese conflict was revived. The British anticipated that the Mon would rise in their support during the First Anglo-Burmese War, but such support was sporadic. When the British withdrew from Lower Burma in 1826 instead of annexing Pegu at that time, retribution was exacted against the Mon. Sympathy for the Mon during the British colonial administration, following the incorporation of the entire country into the province of British India after the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1886, led to the creation during the twentieth century of the “Mon Paradigm” by colonial scholars and Burmese scholars of Mon background. The Mon Paradigm was consistent with the British “divide and rule” policy of pitting one ethnic group against another.

After independence on 4 January 1948, ethnic insurgencies soon broke out against the majority Burman central government. One of these was instigated by the Mon, who wished to have an autonomous state and be able to sustain teaching of their own language. Over the past fifty years since independence, these insurgencies have been mostly settled. Both Lieberman (1978) and Aung-Thwin (1996) have discussed how resorting to ethnic politics by various scholars as a means of explaining the dynamics of Burmese history is misleading, a continuation of the colonial-era prejudice against the majority Burman. Under various alternate paradigms, both federalist and centralist, attempts have been made to create a framework that will provide appropriate space for the many ethnic groups in Burma (from 1989, Myanmar) to work and live together harmoniously. Nevertheless, the Mon are a significant proportion of the refugees living precarious lives as displaced persons in other countries, including Thailand and Australia, and they continue to be vociferous, active antagonists of the Myanmar government.

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See also Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760); Anawrahta (Aniruddha) (r. 1044–1077); Angkor; Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Arakan; Ban Kao Culture; Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581); Buddhism, Theravada; Burma under British Colonial Rule; Burmans; Burma-Siam Wars;

Dvaravati; First Ava (Inwa) Dynasty (1364–1527 C.E.); Negrais; Pagan (Bagan); Pegu; Rama Kamhaeng (r. 1279–1298); Shans; T'ais; Tabinshweihti (r. 1531–1550); Tenasserim; Toungoo Dynasty (1531–1752)

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MONS

The Mon people were historically one of the most important ethnic groups in Southeast Asia. Residing in the area spanning southern Burma (Myanmar) to central Thailand (Siam), from the Gulf of Martaban to Nakhon Pathom, they made significant cultural and political contributions to the region, particularly in relation to the development of literate culture and the spread of Theravadan Buddhism.

Mon ethnohistory is usually said to begin in the fifth or sixth century C.E. By this time the Mon language with its own vernacular script had emerged as a distinct branch of the Mon-Khmer group of Austro-Asiatic languages. Small Mon city-states had also started to develop. Inscriptions and archaeological remains from early Mon settlements have been dated to this time in the Menam basin in Thailand. The seventh century is often referred to as the beginning of significant Mon influence in the region. This is because some art historians have associated the city-states of Dvaravati (seventh to ninth centuries C.E.) with an ethnic Mon identity. This viewpoint is, however, also subject to criticism.

In Burma, the earliest Mon city-states were at Thaton, Pegu, and Martaban. The first kingdom was that of Thaton, which according to myth was founded in the early centuries C.E. In 1057 the Burmese king of Pagan, Anawrahta (r. 1044–1077) captured Thaton. Although that led to a decline of Mon political power, it resulted in considerable Mon influence being exerted upon Burmese culture and religion through the medium of Mon monks and artisans who were taken to Pagan. It was by this route that the Theravadan Buddhist canon, the *Tripitika*, is deemed to have entered the Burmese kingdom. The traditional founding date of the kingdom of Pegu is 825 C.E. However, it was after the decline of Pagan following the Mongol invasions of 1287 that Pegu began to establish itself as a powerful Mon political and cultural center. Mon political fortunes in Lower Burma were erratic, however, and during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries C.E., Burmese expansion-

ism ultimately led to the collapse of independent Mon power. In the sixteenth century this also led to the large-scale emigration of Mon people into Thailand. In Thailand, Mon influence during the ninth to thirteenth centuries C.E. centered upon the kingdom of Haripunjaya. This fell to the expansionist T'ai Lan Na kingdom in 1292 and, following that date, there was no independent Mon polity in Thailand.

Although there has been no independent Mon center of political authority in either Burma or Thailand since the eighteenth century, Mon cultural influence remained significant, especially in the nineteenth-century Thai court and in the order of Buddhist monks, the sangha. Mon political revolts also took place over an extended period in Burma. The last Mon uprising in precolonial Burma was in 1838. In 1852 the British annexed Pegu and Lower Burma, the Mon cultural and political heartland. When independence was obtained for Burma in 1948, this did not include provision for a separate Mon state. That was created only in 1974, when a new constitution was introduced. Political upheavals subsequently have led to continuing resistance to the Burmese government by a number of armed Mon nationalist organizations. Many of these demand that full independence be obtained from Burma, citing the extended Mon ethnohistory outlined above to justify their claims. In reality, most would settle for greater recognition and protection of Mon identity and autonomy within the country. The main Mon political organizations have in recent years allied themselves with the Burmese-led National League for Democracy, which won elections in 1990 but was denied power by the military regime. A cease-fire was signed with the Burmese government in 1995 by the largest Mon political organization, the New Mon State Party, but this has been criticized by other Mon groups and the situation remains unstable. In the 1990s, there were significant numbers of Mon refugees in camps along the Thai-Burma border.

Because of the importance attached to Mon literate and religious culture in Southeast Asia, little attention has been given to other aspects of Mon cultural, political, and social identity through which an understanding of Mon ethnohistory should also be constructed. The absence of both archaeological and anthropological research in Burma in particular is critical in

this respect. The emphasis placed upon linguistic identity has also impeded the attempt to get accurate census returns of the Mon population in Southeast Asia. Mon people lived (and live) in close proximity to other communities, such as the Karen peoples, and bilingualism was and is common. These factors conceal the true numbers of Mon people in the region, and have led to a perception that the Mon people have almost disappeared. Although Mon identity is clearly vulnerable, claims relating to the supposed disappearance of the Mon are overstated, as the extended Mon nationalist conflict in Burma reveals.

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See also Buddhism, Theravada; Dvaravati; Mon; Pegu; Tun-sun

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MONSOONS

The term *monsoon* is usually applied to two aspects of the tropical climate—the prevailing wind direction and the rainfall regime—and in Southeast Asia the monsoon regime has had important influences on the environment and human geography of the region. Monsoon wind patterns are primarily a consequence of the large-scale regional displacement of air masses coupled with the role of jet streams in the upper atmosphere. Two dominant patterns exist in Southeast Asia. The northeast monsoon prevails in the period November to February and brings a wet season to the region. From about June to August the southwest monsoon brings somewhat drier conditions.

While the monsoon wind patterns are important in explaining the diversity of climatic conditions, other factors are also important. The length of the dry season varies with latitude. Around the equator, much of Borneo, southern

Malaysia, and Sumatra have no marked dry season. As one moves away from the equator, however, a more distinctive monsoon pattern is evident with longer, more marked dry seasons. In regions such as northern Thailand and parts of the northern Philippines, the dry season can extend for as much as five months. In addition, altitudinal variations influence precipitation and temperature.

The monsoon is important in contributing toward the distinctive environmental conditions in the region and can influence agriculture (the length of the growing season or the need for irrigation, for example) and settlement patterns. In addition, the pattern of winds was significant in controlling the movement of sailing ships in these “lands below the winds.” Thus the northeast monsoon took ships down into the Straits of Melaka from China or India. They would then be becalmed during the transition period between the two monsoons until the southwest monsoon allowed them to continue their journey. This circulation pattern encouraged the emergence of ports in the Straits of Melaka such as Aceh, Melaka, and Singapore to cater to ships moving between Europe, India, and China.

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See also Aceh (Acheh); Ecological Setting of Southeast Asia; Historical Geography of Insular Southeast Asia; Historical Geography of Mainland Southeast Asia; Melaka (Malacca); Singapore (1819); Straits of Melaka

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MONTAGNARD

In the Indochina peninsula, the name *Montagnard* refers specifically to a few dozen highland minority societies belonging to the Mon-Khmer and Austronesian language families, dwelling on moderately elevated valleys and plateaus in the south of Vietnam (*Tây Nguyên*, the Central Highlands), in southeastern Laos (around the Bolovens Plateau), and in northeastern Cambodia. In each country they represent a small minority.

The term *montagnard* is a legacy from French colonial times. Meaning simply “mountain

people,” it applied generically to all mountain dwellers in Indochina and beyond. Its restricted use in English, as in this entry, dates from the U.S. involvement in South Vietnam and is a subject for debate.

It is widely accepted that the Montagnards have inhabited the region since at least the proto-Malay peopling of the peninsula. They were pushed into the highlands over several centuries by the expansion of the successive and more powerful lowland kingdoms. These otherwise culturally and linguistically heterogeneous Montagnard groups eventually came to dwell in the same ecosystem between the Vietnamese coastal strip and the Mekong watersheds.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, social systems among dwellers of the southern Annam Range were for the most part still lineage-based and nonliterate, and the economy was centered on rotational swidden agriculture. In peaceful times, settlement patterns would be stable and the relationship to the natural environment balanced. Trade among neighbors consisted in necessities such as metals and salt obtained in exchange for forest products, basketry, and silver. Tribute was paid to lowland monarchs. Customary law consisted in a system of negotiation between households and lineages, and animistic beliefs implied constant arbitration between the temporal world—the human domain—and the supernatural world inhabited by spirits.

During colonial times, occasional co-optation became politically and militarily expedient for French colonial rule. Outside these specific needs, age-old prejudice was prevalent. The Montagnards were considered by outside observers as savages (*moi* in Vietnamese, *kha* in Lao, *phnong* in Khmer), superstitious, and backward. Later, Vietnamese, U.S., and various pro-U.S. troops stationed in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) needed to ally with the inhabitants of the highlands, as their lands bordered eastern Cambodia and southeastern Laos, where the intricate network of the Hồ Chí Minh Trail was used to bring military support from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) during wartime.

In the process, the South Vietnamese regime tried to suppress customary law and created strategic hamlets and various other resettlement schemes, forcing the highland populations to abandon their usual dwellings and thus inspiring

among many Montagnards armed resistance and nostalgia for “benevolent” colonial rule. With their traditional religious practices outlawed, other Montagnards turned to communism as an act of protest. Against this, Christian missionary work met with some success among the Ede, Jarai, Churu, Koho, and Lat in particular. During the Second Indochina War (1964–1975), the number of Montagnard casualties was estimated at 200,000 in Vietnam alone, while more than 85 percent of the Central Highlands population were forced to flee or resettle at one time or another, often across the border into Laos and Cambodia (Salemink 2002).

In the midst of this ordeal, FULRO (Front Unifié pour la Libération des Races Opprimées) was created in 1964 in the ranks of the U.S. Army Special Forces in Vietnam and became the most important Montagnard autonomy and anticommunist movement. FULRO’s political and military resistance to the communist state after 1975 slowly faded out until the surrender of the last armed group in 1992 in Cambodia.

The highland peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are—most of the time wrongly—blamed for the deforestation occurring in their upland environment. In the Vietnamese Central Highlands in particular, the massive migration of Kinh from the plains, which was officially launched by the state in 1975 under the New Economic Zones scheme, put an immense pressure on the natural resources of that ecosystem. Economic immigration further developed at the end of the 1980s, thanks to the Economic Renovation (*Doi Moi*), and it was soon encouraged by crop substitution schemes aimed at installing ever more farmers. This strategy still goes on today in the form of economic migration from other parts of the country, notably with lowland coffee growers and with other minority peoples from the north. This excessive stress on resources causes social tensions, triggering severe social unrest, as was the case in February 2001, and a deterioration of the environment most dramatically visible in the rapid deforestation and the lowering of the groundwater tables.

In search of a sustainable solution, Vietnamese scholars and their Lao counterparts are conducting research on issues such as customary law in relation to natural resource management, indigenous knowledge and indigenous strategies for improved fallow management, and

community-based forest management institutions. But in the process, preserving cultural identity comes low on the agenda. In Laos and Vietnam in particular, following the Chinese example, “selective preservation” of minority cultures is implemented, in which the state decides unilaterally which aspects of a culture are sufficiently valuable—and politically acceptable—to be retained, and which should be actively discouraged.

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See also Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; Hồ Chí Minh Trail; Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Swidden Agriculture; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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MONUMENTAL ART OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

The monumental art of Southeast Asia is essentially religious but not entirely so; the palaces, even if their vestiges are few, also played a major role. This architecture presented a great unity of conception; whichever civilization it expressed, the basic symbolism was always there. Despite this fact, there was often no connection between the techniques and the forms of the structures. The symbolic weight of a structure could change without any transformation of its form. Thus when Islam became dominant in Java, and it became necessary to build mosques

for common prayers, the masters of works utilized an ancient form for annexes (*pendopo*) of Hindu temples that imparted a visible continuity with the monumental art of the island.

The monuments of Southeast Asia were in large part the expression of the prosperity of the kingdoms of the region; as a consequence, the masters of works sought all possible means to make them seem larger and more sumptuous than their means actually permitted them to erect. These edifices displayed a desire to impose a certain order on the universe, which is true of all architecture, but most particularly in this part of Asia. Power there was equally related to mastery of water, which governed agriculture and the abundance of the harvest; therefore their distribution reaffirmed the authority of the sovereign. This is particularly apparent in Khmer civilization. In developing the Roluos plain in the ninth century, the Khmer kings built at Lolei a very large reservoir that was no more than the enlargement of the older reservoirs on Kulen, with dikes on three sides. Henceforth, this established the model that was used at Angkor and the whole Khmer kingdom until the thirteenth century.

On a smaller scale, and perhaps less closely related to the mastery of water, the monuments of Indo-Javanese civilization also manifested the desire to bring harmony to the universe. For example, the Buddhist complex of Plaosan, which consists of two sanctuaries surrounded by four rows of chapels each bearing the name of the donor and his official function, perhaps also depicts the ideal geography of the kingdom. Without attaining the same scale as in Cambodia, the mastery of water in Java played a certain role. The temple of Prambanan, consecrated in 854 C.E., is connected to a dam on the Opak River the collapse of which had grave consequences for the temple and perhaps led to the abandonment of the site.

The religious monuments of Southeast Asia were modeled on those of India, but most often in an indirect manner. There were some exceptions, in the form of edifices, that were constructed in direct imitation of Indian norms, as in the case of the monuments of Chaiya, Thailand: for example the original state of Wat Kev followed the same model as the Pallava temple of Panamalai in South India.

The influence of India is manifested in several successive waves and sometimes in a very

complex fashion. For example the Khmer in the early period knew of Indian forms only through their Javanese transcriptions. However, after the liberation of the country from the suzerainty of the Javanese kings (at the start of the ninth century), that influence no longer existed. When a new wave of Hinduization took place in Java around 830 C.E. and made the Javanese masters of works aware of new construction methods, these methods were never used in the Khmer country.

The Indian architectural models evolved through wooden structures built in Southeast Asia with unknown methods; for example, curved roofs were translated into stone with inconsistencies seen for example at Angkor Wat, where channeled roof tiles are depicted on a curved roof, which is technically impossible. Indian influence in this case was strictly formal; it was the perception of the model that was exported and not the model itself. The masters of works in south India, at Mahabalipuram, themselves translated the perception that they obtained from their models sculpted into the solid stone edifices.

Monumental art of Southeast Asia is essentially the house of the god, when it was destined for the Hindu religion. The divinity resided in a cave on a mountain that rose at the center of the universe, which partially explains the difference in volume between the very small internal space and the exterior form of the buildings (as well as the rupestrian origin of the Indian sanctuaries). The diverse descriptions of these fabulous mountains indicate prodigious dimensions that it was impossible to consider imitating, so that it was necessary to resort to trickery to enlarge these edifices to the maximum. Thus the masters of works utilized perspective effects. The temple, which would be the pyramid that supported the edifice itself, its elevation divided into horizontal elements of decreasing height, augmented the perspective effect and, as a result, the apparent height of the structure. Sometimes the god was placed in a flying palace; to symbolize this type of edifice, the Garudas (fabulous birds serving as Visnu's mount) or winged lions were sculpted on the structure that they appeared to be holding up in the air.

Buddhist monuments did not assume the image of the house of the god but that of the mound, the stupa, which sheltered relics,

whether of Buddha or a saintly person. But above all else they were directly linked to rites, in particular that of circumambulation, which consisted of walking around the stupa while keeping it on the right side. The masters of works of the Buddhist sanctuaries in Southeast Asia borrowed much from Hindu works even as they endeavored to distance themselves from them. For example, Borobudur, the celebrated Buddhist monument, was built on an unfinished pyramid from a Hindu monument that incorporated perspective effects. The new master of works utilized the structure but destroyed the perspective effects that indicated in too obvious a fashion the origin of the structure.

In the monumental architecture of Southeast Asia one can observe forcing techniques: radiating roof beams where the utilization of enormous stone blocks was executed with a certain lack of care. There are, however, some particularly well-built exceptions—for example, the stonework of Angkor Wat. However, the construction techniques were not very important to the masters of works, since the monuments were not built for themselves but for what they represented. This architecture was not for their makers but for the image of a work quite evidently more beautiful and worthy of the gods, so that its decoration assumed very great importance because it was that which suggested the true meaning of the monument, that which it wished to represent.

The structures followed the evolution of the rituals until the end of the eighth century in the Buddhist monuments of Java. The statues erected in the temples were visible from the outside—for example, at Candi Sewu—which is why they had no doors on their cellas. When the Buddhist cult of the five Jina arrived, the cellas were enclosed, with very important consequences. Not only were doors added to existing monuments but also structures erected after this reform were closed. These effects went beyond Java and affected all of Southeast Asia in more or less obvious fashion. The Khmers, for example, maintained the generally open plan, but they installed doors and false doorways in all their architecture (this dates the influence of Java in Cambodia, which cannot be earlier than the end of the eighth century).

One can observe a similar evolution of the plan in certain later sanctuaries (eleventh century), also related to rituals, when the main

temple of Vat Phu (in Laos near Champassak) was transformed with the addition of a long room in front of the sanctuary. Temples built thereafter had this new plan constructed in a single step—for example, at Nang Sida, near Vat Phu. Not only nearby but also right in Angkor, the temples of Thomanon, Chau Say Tevoda, and even another structure of a very different scale, Banteay Samre, were built on this new ground plan.

We know nothing of palaces except for a few traces, in particular those of the royal palace at Angkor, and through the architecture depicted on reliefs of the Bayon at Angkor and at Borobudur and Prambanan, Java. There were huge complexes built of wood, though according to their form, no section had a specific function. There are, however, some exceptions, where functions can be tentatively determined, such as the compound of the royal palace of Angkor, which was built of stone. Then, thanks to the Chinese traveler Zhou Daquan, we have a description of the audience hall at the Angkor palace, which must have been comparable to that of the palace of Lopburi, Thailand. But this does not permit us to identify its location or the site.

Despite their Indian origin, the Southeast Asian monuments acquired their own unique personality over the course of time. If in the eighth century the monuments on the Dieng Plateau, in Java, were quite similar to those of the Kulen in Cambodia, this was already no longer the case for the monuments built in the following century; the differences became increasingly accentuated only thereafter.

The knowledge that we have acquired of this architecture belongs to a completely different context than that in which the monuments were built, and the monuments have often experienced modifications and damage that render it difficult for us to appreciate them properly. For example, when the surrounding wall has been destroyed, the internal and external views of the structures can no longer be differentiated. Restoration too is a source of architectural modification; the restorer, no matter how careful, imposes a vision on the monument corresponding to the style of that time and place that does not necessarily correspond to that of the original master of works.

JACQUES DUMARCAY

TRANSLATED BY JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Blitar; Borobudur; *Candi*; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Indianization; *Jatakas*; *Mahâbâratha* and *Râmâyana*; Malang Temples; Prambanan

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MORAL ECONOMY

In the context of Southeast Asia, the term was popularized by James Scott's study *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (1976). Based on case studies of prewar Burma and Vietnam, Scott argued that the development of commercial agriculture had a detrimental impact on farmers, particularly in the early 1930s, when colonial administrations faced decreasing tax revenues and enforced tax demands against the local population. With product prices falling and taxes and debts fixed in nominal terms, the rising real debt and tax burden drove rural Southeast Asians into using violent rebellion as anguished protest.

Scott explained this strong reaction by attributing two key traits to farm households that form the foundation of farmers' behavior and traditional institutions: "safety first" and the "subsistence ethic." To subsistence farmers, crop failures are an immediate threat to their bare survival. Their choice of production techniques is guided by risk minimization rather than output maximization. Thus, social institutions of rural communities were traditionally oriented toward stability and the assurance of a minimum standard of living. For instance, there were obligations for villagers to support each other with labor. Reciprocity in exchange relationships protected farm households on the margin of subsistence.

Scott argued that commercialization of farm agriculture and bureaucratic centralization during the colonial period had eroded these traditional relations. New impersonal relationships in a capitalist economy created uncertainties in the subsistence life of farm households, and peasant uprisings were a defensive response to the threat to subsistence and an attempt to resurrect the traditional, precapitalist order.

Scott's interpretation has been widely criticized. Popkin (1979) argued that Scott idealized traditional farming societies and traditional power structures, and ignored the fact that farm households are engaged in a rational pursuit of their own interests. Haggis et al. (1986) maintained that peasant revolts in Asia generally did not start as a reaction to the disappearance of the moral economy, but that richer farmers whose opportunities were restricted often played an important role. Brown (1999) found historical flaws in Scott's argument. For instance, the colonial administration in Burma granted substantial remissions on land taxes, and the violence was more a preemptive strike to destroy administrative records than an enraged response.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Patron-Client Relations; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia

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MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF)

The Moro National Liberation Front is a revolutionary organization that spearheaded the Muslim separatist movement in the Philippines

in the 1970s. In providing leadership to the movement, the MNLF significantly influenced its direction such that the Moro (Muslim Filipino) struggle is oftentimes referred to as the MNLF struggle.

Organized in 1969 by a group of ninety Moro youths who underwent military training in Pulau Pangkor, Malaysia, the MNLF was made public only in the early 1970s, when martial law was declared by President Ferdinand Marcos (t. 1965–1986). Initially the MNLF demanded independence, but with the intervention of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the group opted for autonomy. The clamor for independence was triggered by the Corregidor incident, involving the killing of Moro trainees by military men in 1968. This event, which intensified the Moro resentment toward the government, resulted in the emergence of organizations campaigning for the independence of the Moro homeland, Mindanao and Sulu, in the southern Philippines. These organizations were the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) and the MNLF. The MIM did not last long, but its objective was carried on by the MNLF.

The MNLF organization is governed by a central committee headed by a chairman and assisted by a secretariat consisting of different bureaus and committees. During the height of the struggle the MNLF central committee operated in foreign countries, and its leaders focused their work on attaining recognition and securing support from the OIC, "leaving the task of fighting and organizing to local leaders" (Che Man 1990: 82). In the different Moro provinces, provincial or state revolutionary committees were created to recruit, train, and organize Moro armed groups in their respective areas. MNLF's logistics and financial support came mainly from foreign supporters, but they also received assistance, either in cash or kind, from the Moro masses (*ibid.*: 84).

The OIC was the staunch supporter of the MNLF, generously providing the latter with financial assistance. It passed resolutions affirming its commitment to support the group, and in 1997 it accorded observer status to the MNLF. However, reliance on the OIC had its drawbacks. It made the MNLF susceptible to pressures and interference from the OIC, as demonstrated in the decision of the organization to tone down its independence stance re-

garding autonomy. This was the result of the 1974 fifth Islamic conference in Malaysia, where the OIC passed a resolution urging the Philippine government to find a peaceful solution to the Moro plight within the bounds of the country's national sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also pushed for negotiations between the government and the MNLF. Consequently, through the OIC's mediation, the Philippine government and the MNLF concluded two significant agreements.

The Tripoli Agreement was signed on 23 December 1976 at Libya. This accord was significant not only because it committed the government to establish autonomy in the southern Philippines but also because it "institutionalized the MNLF struggle's international character" and obliged the OIC to defend the MNLF cause (Tan 1993: 81). However, the agreement failed to lure the MNLF members to lay down their arms because of the parties' conflicting interpretations of its equivocal provisions. And with the government's imposition of its interpretation of the accord, the MNLF resumed hostilities. Peace talks were again initiated during the presidency of Corazon Aquino (t. 1986–1992) in 1986, but these did not prosper.

In 1996 the Philippine government (GRP) and the MNLF concluded the GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement, which was the final agreement on the implementation of the 1976 Tripoli accord. It provided for the establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) to monitor and implement peace and development projects in the areas covered by the Special Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD). Consequently, MNLF leader Misuari (1940–) was appointed chairman of the SPCPD and elected governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Other MNLF members were also appointed to key positions in the ARMM and SPCPD. And in compliance with the agreement, Moro combatants who returned to the fold of law were integrated into the Philippine armed forces and national police. With the signing of the 1996 peace agreement and the subsequent participation of the MNLF members in the government, a chapter in the history of the Moro struggle ended. The MNLF still exists, although recently there has been a leadership crisis that resulted in factionalism within the organization.

The significance of the MNLF's role in the Moro struggle in the 1970s lies in the fact that when it provided leadership to the separatist movement, it had become a "Mindanao-wide, disciplined and well-organized" struggle that threatened the Marcos administration (Muslim 1994: 114). Moreover, the MNLF was instrumental in elevating the Moro struggle to an international concern, thus adding more pressure to the Philippine government to find a political solution to the conflict in the southern Philippines.

NORMA A. MARUHOM

See also Islam in Southeast Asia; Mindanao; Misuari, Nur (1940–); Moros; Muslim Minorities (Thailand)

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MOROS

The Moros comprised some thirteen ethnolinguistic Muslim groups found in the Philippine islands of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. In the 1970s their struggle for self-determination was spearheaded by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which posed a serious problem to the Philippine government. This struggle became an international issue when leaders of

Muslim countries, particularly members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), showed concern over the plight of the Moros. The OIC brokered negotiations between the MNLF and the Philippine government, and consequently, two important peace agreements were signed: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Government of the Republic of the Philippines– Moro National Liberation Front or GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement.

As Muslims, the Moros are united by a common religion—namely, Islam—but as ethnic groupings they differ in terms of their languages, customs, and traditional practices. Their subsistence patterns are also varied, but the majority of Moros are involved in agriculture. Despite their adoption of Western political systems, the Moros still retain some of their indigenous political institutions, and they acknowledge and respect their traditional leaders, the hereditary sultans and *datus*.

Of the various Moro groupings, the most popular and numerous are the Maguindanao of the Cotabato region, the Maranao of the Lanao provinces, and the Tausog (Tausug) of the Sulu Archipelago. Numbering close to 4 million (out of a Philippine population of 64 million [1998]), the Moros are considered an ethnic minority.

Arab Muslim traders introduced Islam to the peoples of Sulu during the last quarter of the thirteenth century. The traders were followed by Muslim missionaries who reinforced the teachings in Sulu and later preached the faith to the natives in the island of Mindanao. Islam not only introduced a new way of life but also brought unity among those who embraced it. And alongside the advent of Islam was a new political institution, the sultanate, introduced by one of the foreign missionaries who settled in Sulu. However, Islam did not have a chance to spread to other parts of the country because of the coming of the Spaniards in the sixteenth century.

The Colonial Period: Spanish then American

It was during the second half of the sixteenth century that the Spaniards began their attempts to conquer the Muslims in Sulu and Mindanao. The Spaniards called them “Moros” because of their religious similarity to the Moors

(Berbers), the Muslims from northern Africa who once conquered and dominated the southern part of Spain for more than 700 years (711–1492 C.E.). The Spaniards, in their military campaigns against the Moros, employed, as soldiers, the colonized and Christianized natives whom they called *Indios*, from the other parts of the Philippine archipelago. However, the Moros were never subjugated, as they were able to put up a strong resistance brought about by their unity and commitment to defend their faith and homeland. In addition they had a strong centralized government, the sultanate, which was able to consolidate and mobilize bigger forces as well as seek alliances and support from the neighboring sultanates of Borneo and Ternate.

The Spanish colonial rule, which lasted for more than three centuries, left a legacy that played a significant role in the relationship between the minority Moros and the majority Christian Filipinos, or *Indios*. To justify their military campaigns against the Moros and to stir and inspire the *Indios* to conspire with them, the Spaniards denigrated the Moros by describing them as savages, barbarians, and infidels who deserved death for rejecting colonial rule and Catholicism. These manipulations and imputations lowered the opinion of the Christianized Filipinos toward the Moros. The latter, on the other hand, considered the *Indios* their enemies for supporting the Spanish colonizers. Thus discrimination and prejudice encouraged by the colonizers created barriers between the Moros and the *Indios* that remained even long after the Spanish left the archipelago.

Spanish rule of the Philippines officially ended following the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 10 December 1898. Spain ceded the islands of the Philippines to the United States for U.S.\$2 million. Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago were part of the cession, thus bringing the Americans to the Moro homeland. The Americans, like their predecessors, were determined to conquer the Moros and integrate them into the Philippine political system. Through the force of arms and diplomacy, the U.S. succeeded in attaining this objective.

The Moros, while still painfully adjusting to U.S. rule, were confronted with a perplexing problem: their integration into the Philippine political system dominated by Christian Filipinos from the north. This political develop-

ment was an offshoot of the U.S. Filipinization policy, which called for the systematic transfer of the civil administration to the hands of native Filipinos. In the Moro homeland the civil administration was gradually handed over to Filipinos who, not surprisingly, were predominantly Christians. The Moros resented this, as they perceived these Christian Filipinos to be their enemies.

Moro resentment was expressed through armed confrontation in concert with petitions to Manila and to the U.S. government. These petitions, written in 1921, 1924, and 1935, clearly expressed their sentiments, suspicions, doubts, and fears that their religion, customs, and traditional practices would be disregarded and that their lands would be taken away. They feared that their political, religious, and socio-economic status could not be guaranteed by a government run by people whom they had doubts they could trust. They echoed in their petitions their desire to have their own separate independence and to be known to the whole world as the “Bangsamoro Nation” (Nation of the Moro People).

The U.S., however, did not heed the clamor of the Moros. Thus, when they finally granted independence to the Philippines on 4 July 1946, the Moro areas in Mindanao and Sulu were made integral parts of the Republic of the Philippines. The Moros, as citizens of the Philippines, became Filipinos.

Under the Philippine Republic

Moro concerns were not the priority of the newly established Philippine Republic. Ravaged by the Pacific War (1941–1945), the Philippine government was preoccupied with the economic problems confronting it. One of the probable solutions was to encourage people from the north to migrate and settle in the Moro homeland in the south. Sponsored by the government, these immigrants were able to have easy access to lands claimed by Moros as their ancestral domain. The growing number of Christian migrants trekking south ultimately made the Moros the minority in the areas where they were once the majority. This eventually created friction between them and the new settlers.

During the first few decades of the republic, there was relative peace in Mindanao and Sulu.

Muslims and Christians coexisted peacefully as they learned to understand and accept each other’s cultural and religious ways. However, events during the latter part of the 1960s and early 1970s threatened this harmonious relationship and shattered the peace of those areas.

The postcolonial conflict in the southern Philippines began in the early 1970s, although some of the contributory factors that precipitated this conflict occurred in 1968, when the Corregidor massacre took place in which some twenty-eight Moro trainees were killed by their military trainers. This tragic event revived once again the doubts, suspicions, and fears long nurtured by the Moros. Two months after the massacre, the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) was organized to work for the independence of the Moro homeland. The MIM’s campaign for independence awakened the desire of the Moros for freedom. A year later the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established with a similar objective, but advocating a more militant approach. When the MNLF came to the fore, the situation in Mindanao and Sulu was already critical, such that most Moros felt they needed the protection of the MNLF. In 1971 a series of massacres in Moro areas reached alarming proportions, and as a result some Moros opted for arms and joined the MNLF. The early 1970s witnessed the increasing popularity of the MNLF, which had assumed the leadership of the Moro struggle for self-determination. Others, however, decided to evacuate to safer places—areas where Muslims were dominant.

The declaration of martial law in 1972 by President Ferdinand Marcos (t. 1965–1986) further alarmed the Moros because of allegations that the Philippine military were behind some of the reported massacres. It was during the martial law period (1972–1981) that the plight of the Moros caught the attention and interest of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC created the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission, composed of representatives from four member countries of the organization, to enter into discussion with the Philippine government regarding the condition of the Muslims in the country. The involvement of the OIC facilitated the negotiation between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MNLF that ended with the signing of the Tripoli Agreement on 23 De-

cember 1976. In the implementation of the agreement, the Philippine government created two autonomous regions (Regions X and XII) in Mindanao and Sulu, consisting of ten provinces.

However, in 1969 the two autonomous regions were reduced to a single Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), comprising only four provinces dominated by Muslims. The creation of ARMM was mandated by and within the framework of the 1987 Philippine constitution. The MNLF participated in the governance of ARMM after signing the 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement. Nur Misuari (1940–), chairman of the MNLF, ran in and won the gubernatorial election of the ARMM in that year.

The creation of the autonomous region and the active involvement of the MNLF in its administration failed to provide assurances of peace and economic development among the Moros. Still, poverty reigns in many areas in the region, and the armed struggle for self-determination has been taken over by another revolutionary group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), whose leader, Hashim Salamat, was a former vice chairman of the MNLF. During the first quarter of 2000, when President Joseph Estrada (t. 1998–2000) issued an “all-out war” policy against the MILF, the region again experienced armed encounters between the military and the MILF.

The Moros in general are oftentimes the object of derogatory remarks because of the misconduct and crimes of a few; however, just like the rest of the Filipinos, they desire progress and development, but not at the expense of their culture, religion, and identity.

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See also Filipinization; Hispanization; Islam in Southeast Asia; Martial Law (1972–1981) (The Philippines); Mindanao; Misuari, Nur (1940–); Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1900–1941); Spanish Philippines; Spanish-American Treaty of Paris (1898); Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Tausug and the Sulu Sultanate

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MOULMEIN

See Tenasserim

MOUNTBATTEN, ADMIRAL LORD LOUIS (1900–1979)

Taking Southeast Asia from War to Peace

Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten was supreme commander of the South-East Asia Command (SEAC) from October 1943 to May 1946. His ability to motivate and coordinate Allied forces in the disparate and poorly supported Allied theater was arguably decisive in achieving Allied victory in Southeast Asia in 1945. A cousin of King George VI (1894–1952) and a progressive-minded naval officer since 1914, Mountbatten was both ambitious and talented. A destroyer captain early in World War II (1939–



Lord Louis Mountbatten, newly appointed Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia, at work in his London headquarters, 14 October 1943. (Bettmann/Corbis)

1945), he was made chief of Combined Operations by British premier Winston Churchill (1874–1965), in charge of planning the invasion of Europe; Churchill subsequently appointed him to direct the SEAC. A dynamic leader whose diplomatic skills were suited to leading a coalition at war, Mountbatten effectively coordinated Allied forces in the reconquest of Burma and in the reoccupation of Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. The “troubled days of peace,” as Mountbatten called them, confronted him with a major challenge. He became responsible for the governance of 128 million people liberated from Japanese occupation, and had to disarm and repatriate 738,000 “Japanese Surrendered Personnel” and locate and recover more than 100,000 prisoners of war and civilian internees (Dennis 1987: 225, 227). SEAC’s forces occupied Java and Indochina, encountering active and armed nationalist movements. Although in Java Mountbatten’s forces became embroiled in fighting with Indonesian nationalists, his political acuity and diplomatic flair elsewhere prevented a seri-

ous collision. Mountbatten went on to become the last viceroy of British India, transferring power to an independent India and Pakistan in August 1947. He was assassinated by Irish Republican Army terrorists in 1979. Mountbatten had been equal to the massive task of taking Southeast Asia from war to peace, enabling the European powers to reoccupy their Asian colonies.

PETER STANLEY

See also British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Imphal-Kohima (1944), Battle of; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); South-East Asia Command (SEAC)

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MUHAMMADIYAH

A Modernist Muslim Organization

For much of the twentieth century, the Muhammadiyah (Arabic, “Way of Muhammad”) was the dominant social organization of modernist Muslims in Indonesia. It was linked at times to important Muslim political parties, but never participated directly in politics. Its aim rather was to improve Muslim welfare and to increase Muslim piety through education and social programs.

Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1868–1933), a religious figure in the royal court of Yogyakarta, founded the Muhammadiyah in 1912. Like other Islamic Modernists, Dahlan was disturbed by the political and intellectual weakness of contemporary Islam. The Modernists sought to reinvigorate Islam by stripping away what they saw as un-Islamic practices that had accumulated over centuries. They were optimistic that a reinvigorated Islam would be able both to resist Christian missionary activity and to equip Muslims for a respected and powerful role in the modern world. The Muhammadiyah’s main effort went into education—by 1925 it had established fifty-five schools—but it later also sponsored mosques, libraries, health clinics, or-

phanages, and a women's organization, Aisyiyah. In 1925, Haji Rasul (1875–1949) established a branch in the Minangkabau region of West Sumatra, but branches were soon to be found in most Muslim regions of the archipelago. By the end of the colonial era, it claimed about a quarter of a million members. The Muhammadiyah was especially important as a source of social welfare for Muslims during the Great Depression of the 1930s.

The efforts of the Muhammadiyah to “purify” Indonesian Islam met considerable resistance from traditionalist Islamic leaders, whose authority it undermined, from colonial officials who were suspicious of its links with Middle Eastern Islam, and from believers in the many heterodox forms of Islam found in Indonesia. In 1926 the rift with the traditionalists formalized with the founding of the rival Nahdatul Ulama, but after a decade the two sides somewhat reconciled their differences by forming the *Madjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia* (MIAI) in 1937. Muhammadiyah members were also expelled from the radical political party *Sarekat Islam* in 1929.

Although the Muhammadiyah was formally dissolved along with all other organizations when the Japanese conquered Indonesia in 1942, it continued to function and became one of the bodies with which the Japanese negotiated over their plans for managing the archipelago. In November 1943, the organization's head, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo (b. 1890), was chosen along with prominent nationalist leaders Sukarno and Hatta to fly to Tokyo to receive a decoration from the emperor. Muhammadiyah leaders also dominated the *Hizbullah* (“Army of God”), an armed auxiliary force created in early 1945 under Japanese auspices, and the *Masyumi*, a Muslim umbrella organization created by the Japanese to replace the MIAI.

After the declaration of Indonesian independence in August 1945, the Muhammadiyah stayed on the fringes of politics. Unlike the *Nahdatul Ulama*, which became a political party, the Muhammadiyah became a powerful but informal backer of the modernist *Masyumi* political party. When the *Masyumi* was banned in 1960, the Muhammadiyah distanced itself from politics and focused on proselytization and social work. Many members described their primary task as bringing Islam to those who were only nominally Muslim, especially

peasants whose Muslim belief was mixed with pre-Islamic cultural practices and intellectuals who were considered unduly influenced by Western values. Under the New Order (1966–1998), the Muhammadiyah's nonpolitical stance was rewarded with some state support, but at the cost of having to accept the *Pancasila* in 1985 as its sole basic principle.

At the close of the New Order, the Muhammadiyah claimed 25 million members, most of them in the Outer Islands and the cities. Its membership included both those whose aims were only to purify the faith of Muslims, without changing the legal standing of Islam or impinging upon non-Muslim minorities, and those who wanted some form of Islamic state. Amien Rais (1944–), Muhammadiyah chair since 1995, spoke strongly in public against both Christians and Chinese. In the closing months of the New Order, Rais became one of the most prominent critics of the Suharto regime. He later sought to use the organization as a political base for his new *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN, National Mandate Party) in the 1999 elections. He, however, won fewer votes than expected, probably because PAN's platform of democratic, capitalist, and multiethnic secularism was significantly out of step with mainstream opinions within the Muhammadiyah.

The success of the Muhammadiyah in promoting modernist Islam reflects the broader pattern of Islamization in Indonesia, in which unobtrusive community work by Muslim missionaries has played a more important role in both introducing and strengthening Islam than has direct political action.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Education, Traditional Religious; Great Depression (1929–1931); Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); *Kiai*; *Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia* (*Masjumi*) (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations); *Madjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia* (MIAI, Great Islamic Council of Indonesia); *Nahdatul Ulama*; *Orde Baru* (The New Order); *Pancasila* (*Pantja Sila*); *Sarekat Islam* (1912)

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MUI TSAI Female Servitude

Mui tsai is a euphemism for a form of servitude practiced in China and by Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. In the Cantonese dialect, *mui* means "younger sister," and *tsai* literally refers to "a son," being a diminutive; *mui tsai* is "little younger sister." *Char boh kan*, meaning "female servant," is the equivalent in the Hokkien dialect.

During the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth, China was plagued with political instability, economic dislocation, social upheaval, and natural calamities, resulting in widespread human suffering. Poor Chinese peasant families often willingly transferred a daughter directly, or through an intermediary, to a family of a higher socioeconomic standing with the express purpose that the child be used for domestic duties without payment of wages. In return, her parents would receive a consideration from the host family. In some cases the transfer of the child represented a pledge for a loan, her services as a servant in lieu of interest until the loan was repaid. The details of the arrangement of transfer were drawn up in a document mutually agreed upon by both parties.

Mui tsai offered a safety net of survival for young girls of poor households who otherwise faced certain death from starvation in times of crisis. Host families were obligated to provide the mui tsai with food, clothes, shelter, and general upkeep, like any other family member. And it was expected that when she came of age at eighteen, her host parents would arrange that she be married.

In households in which the mui tsai was treated like an adopted daughter, ill treatment was rare. However, cases of mui tsai being subjected to cruelty and abuse, including sexual assault and rape, were reported. Generally the young girls lived under conditions of tight control; their sense of filial piety and their timidity and low self-esteem prevented them from voicing any ill treatment they may have received.

In Hong Kong, British colonial authorities had abolished the mui tsai system, and there was a similar move in British Malaya during the 1930s. Compulsory registration of mui tsai was enforced, and the age limit for domestic service was fixed at fourteen. Those mui tsai who were found to be victims of cruelty and abuse were sent to the Poh Leong Keok (Poh Leong Kuk), a girls' welfare home administered by a committee of *towkay* (persons of wealth and standing) and presided over by the colonial secretary for Chinese affairs. The increased availability of the Cantonese *amah-chieh*, the professional domestic servant, during the 1930s diminished the need for wealthy households to acquire mui tsai.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Chinese in Southeast Asia; Slavery; Women in Southeast Asia

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MUSIC AND MUSICAL INSTRUMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia's musical cultures portray the mixing of indigenous traditions with cultural influences from India, China, the Middle East (West Asia), Europe, and America.

Contemporary Southeast Asia displays contrasting genres, from the healing songs accompanied by the stamping of bamboo tubes in the upland forests of Borneo and the Philippines to bronze gong ensemble music in the courts of Java and Thailand. Recitation of Quranic verses in Islamic communities coexists with Chinese opera, classical Indian music, popular music, and the symphony orchestra in the cities. Despite the diversity of musical traditions, common traits distinct to the region are evident. Bronze gongs and bamboo instrumental ensembles point to the relationship and common origins in the musical cultures.

Indigenous Music of the Precontact Period Gong-Chime Ensembles

The best-known ensemble indigenous to and prevalent in various styles in Southeast Asia is the bronze gong-chime ensemble. Music played on bronze ensembles is so predominant that Southeast Asian musical cultures are often known as bronze gong or gong-chime cultures (Kunst 1973).

The bronze gong's origins were associated with the bronze drum of the Dong Son (Dongson) period (700 to 100 B.C.E.). These bronze drums were cast in molds and elaborately decorated with a raised star at the top (tympanum). The sides were elaborately decorated with carvings of animals, people, musical instruments, and boats. In Burma (Myanmar), figures of small frogs found on the drumhead associate it with rain-making ceremonies.

Many bronze drums have been found in mainland and island Southeast Asia (except in the Philippines and Borneo), indicating the trade network of the Dong Son community. It is believed that bronze techniques were imported into Java around 300 B.C.E. The Javanese developed skills in hand-forging (a process of alternate hammering and reheating of molten

metal) and produced large suspended gongs with a central boss. Bronze gong music has close relations with animism, the main form of religious belief during the precontact period. This connection is evident in the reverence shown to the musical instruments—rituals associated with the forging of gongs, and the custom of propitiating gongs with flowers and incense—which remain prevalent in Indonesia and Malaysia. The large suspended gong is considered the most sacred instrument of the ensemble and marks the beginning and ending of performances.

Bronze gong ensembles range from a few instruments in the villages to large ensembles of more than seventy performers in the courts. Although the various gong-chime ensembles may vary in the number, size, tuning, quality of bronze, design, and combination of the instruments, they share many similarities.

Instruments and Tuning

The basic instrument is the gong-chime, a set of small, tuned, knobbed gongs placed horizontally in one row (Filipino: *kulintang*; Sarawakian: *engkerumong*; Sumatran: *talempong*; Balinese: *reyong* or *trompong*) or in two rows on a rack (Malay: *keromong*; Javanese: *bonang*). The gong-chimes may also be placed in a circular frame known as a gong circle (Thai: *khong uong*; Laotian: *khong vong*; Khmer: *korng vung*; Burmese: *ciwain*). Gong-chime ensembles usually have large suspended knobbed gongs of various sizes (Javanese: *gong ageng*; Filipino: *agung*), metallophones (Javanese: *saron* and *gender*; Khmer: *roneat dek*), and one or two barrel-shaped or cylindrical drums (Javanese: *kendang*; Malay: *gendang*; Thai: *tapone*; Khmer: *skor thomm*). Other components of the gong-chime ensemble are one or two xylophones (Malay/Javanese: *gambang*; Laotian: *lanat*; Thai: *ranat*; Khmer: *roneat*), cymbals (Thai and Khmer: *ching*; Burmese: *si*), and bamboo or wooden flutes (Javanese: *suling*). Also featured are stringed instruments (Javanese: *rebab* and *celempung*), a shawm (Thai: *pi nai*; Khmer: *sralai*; Burmese: *hne*), and male or female singers.

Most Southeast Asian bronze gong ensembles are tuned to five-note or seven-note modes, but no two ensembles are tuned alike. There is no standard pitch, as is the case in the Western diatonic scale, but rather tuning is in-

ternally cohesive according to the musical aesthetics of each community.

Large ensembles of various sets of bronze instruments (many of them of the melodic percussive type), such as the central Javanese *gamelan*, Balinese *gong kebyar*, Malaysian *gamelan Melayu*, Burmese *hsainwain*, Khmer *pinn peat*, and Thai and Laotian *pi phat*, usually accompany dance, theater, and ritual ceremonies. Smaller ensembles, such as the *kulintang*, *engeromong*, and *taklempong*, which feature one melodic instrument accompanied by other gong and rhythmic timbres, play similar functions among the indigenous groups of Mindanao, Sarawak, and Sumatra, respectively.

Stratification, Temporal Cycles, and Interlocking Rhythms

The music of gong-chime ensembles is stratified. In the large bronze gong ensembles there are several layers of sound produced by instruments playing the main melody, an abstraction of the main melody, elaboration of the main melody, and those punctuating the temporal and rhythmic cycles. In the Central Javanese *gamelan*, the main melody is played by metallophones of various sizes called *saron*. In the Thai *piphat*, the basic melody is played on the large gong-circle known as *khong wong yai*. Below the main melody, metallophones (Javanese: *slen-tem*; Thai: *ranat thum lek*) play an extraction of pitches from the main melody.

Above the main melody, elaborating instruments such as gong chimes, metallophones, flutes, zithers, and spiked fiddles play variations to the main melody based on short melodic motifs of the main melody. The different instruments come together at certain structural points in unison/octaves, fourths or fifths. In Central Java, the *bonang* elaborates the main melody by anticipating or repeating its pitches. The *gender*, *gambang*, *celempung*, *suling*, and *rebab* play variations to the main melody, particularly in the soft-style repertoire of Central Java. In Thailand, the high-pitched *ranat ek* and *khong wong lek* play fast-running parts, doubled by the high metallophone, *ranat ek lek*. The *pi nai* performs variations to the main melody.

The sounding of the gongs punctuates the basic melody and its variations at certain points. The big suspended gong (*gong agung*) marks the end of each temporal cycle and the largest

phrase known as the *gongan* in Java. Smaller gongs known as *gong suwukan* and *kempul* (suspended) or *kenong* (horizontal) subdivide the *gongan* in binary fashion. The number of beats in a *gongan* and the punctuation at specific points by smaller gongs determine the form and its colotomic structure. In the Thai *piphat*, the gong (*mong*) and cymbals (*cing*) punctuate the melody at specific points, depending on the form. Various types of drums (Javanese: *kendang*, *ciblon*, *ketipung*; Thai: *tapone*, *klong that*) play interlocking rhythms framed by the temporal cycle.

Features of stratification, interlocking rhythmic patterns, and temporal cycles are also characteristic of smaller gong-chime ensembles in the region. The basic layers in the Maguindanao *kulintang* music of the southern Philippines are as follows. The main rhythmic pattern/mode is played as an ostinato by a thin-rimmed gong (*babandil*). Another layer witnesses the reinforcement of the rhythmic mode by other gongs (one pair of deep-rimmed, high boss, large *agung*, and two pairs of *gandingan* gongs with narrower rim and lower boss), and a tubular-shaped drum (*dabakan*) interlocking with the *babandil*. Last comes the improvised melody by a gong-chime (*kulintang*), based on the rhythmic mode.

In the *talempong* of the Minangkabau of Sumatra, large and small gong-chime instruments (known as *talempong* and *canang*, respectively) and a pair of two-headed drums (*gandang*) interlock with the shawm (*pupuih*), which plays the main melody.

Many Southeast Asian ensembles that do not use the gong-chime also share the same principles of stratification, interlocking parts, and temporal cycles. The large gong orchestras of the Kadazan of Sabah (*sopogandangan*) and the Kalagan community near the Davao Gulf (*tagunggo*) emphasize the layering of interlocking rhythmic timbres played by various large suspended gongs. The *khruang sai* ensemble of Thailand comprises musical layers performed by bowed and plucked string instruments, flutes, hand drums, hand cymbals, and a small gong.

Bamboo Instruments

Bamboo instruments are the oldest instruments in Southeast Asia, predating bronze gongs. Bamboo, which is found in the tropical jungles,



Sumatra musicians in Indonesia. (Corel Corporation)

hills, and plains of Southeast Asia, has many uses. The stem is used to carry water, cook rice and other foods, build houses, and is woven into baskets and other items. Bamboo musical instruments are common among indigenous communities living in the lowland and highland forests of Southeast Asia, as bamboo is easily available, light, and can be easily transported from one place to another. As these communities practice a dynamic type of animism even where Christian missionaries have been active, bamboo ensembles are used during healing ceremonies and to propitiate spirits during harvest festivals. Nose flutes are often played for the deceased, as the air from the nose is associated with the spirit of man (Roseman 1993).

Solo Instruments

Bamboo instruments can be performed solo or in ensemble. Solo bamboo instruments are usually played for entertainment and courting. The mouth organ is a solo instrument believed to have developed in Southeast Asia. It consists of

a wind box made of gourd with a mouthpiece and tubes of different lengths of bamboo inserted into the box. Each tube has a reed that vibrates freely when the instrument is played. Different pitches are produced by closing holes at the bottom of the tubes or by closing the tubes themselves. The pipes can be arranged in two parallel lines (the *sompoton* of Sabah, *khaen* of Thailand, *khen* of Vietnam, *ken* of Kampuchea, and *khene* of Laos) or in a circle (the *keluri* of Sarawak).

Tube zithers consisting of a body made of bamboo that has been cut from one node to another are also distinct to Southeast Asia. Strings are carved from the cortex, or external strings can be attached. Tube zithers in Southeast Asia include the *krem* (Malaysia), *kullitong* (Philippines), *tueng-tueng* (Thailand), and *tol alao goang* (Vietnam). It should be noted that a few mouth organs or tube zithers could be played at the same time.

Other solo bamboo instruments include a variety of end-blown and side-blown flutes (the Malaysian and Indonesian *suling* or *seruling*, Viet-

namese *tieu*, Thai *khлуй*, and Khmer *khloy*) as well as nose flutes. The jaw's harp (*bungkau* of Sabah, *kang knoch* of Kampuchea, *kubing* of the southern Philippines, and *huen* of North Thailand) is also popular. It is a thin frame with a lamella (tongue) carved from it. The performer plucks the free end of the lamella while placing it in the mouth cavity (which acts as a resonator).

Solo instruments play short, improvised melodic motifs often accompanied by the continuous sounding of one or more tones known as a drone. Maceda (1974) has suggested that the melody and drone may prove to be a basic structure that binds together the music of Southeast Asia that goes back to the pre-Neolithic Age.

Ensemble Instruments

Ensemble instruments constitute mainly bamboo tubes of different lengths and pitches that are stamped on pieces of wood (Jah Hut: *Ding Galung*; Kalinga: *tongatong*) or struck with sticks (Dusun: *Togunggu*; Kalinga: *patangguk*). Percussion and stamping tubes were developed as a result of motor impulses related to work and are considered one of the earliest instruments found in Southeast Asia. They are used in activities related to paddy planting (to frighten mice and other insects away from crops), during healing ceremonies, and to accompany dances, harvest festivals, and the welcoming of guests.

Stratification, interlocking rhythmic patterns, and temporal cycles are characteristics of gong ensembles that are also found in bamboo ensembles. The bamboo tubes are stamped or struck using interlocking patterns that produce resultant rhythms. The repeated timbres and interlocking rhythms of the bamboos (which constitute a type of melodic drone) are emphasized.

Xylophones made of bamboo or hardwood are also common in Southeast Asia. They are hung vertically from a post (Filipino: *luntang*) or set horizontally over a trough resonator (Burmese: *pa'tala*; Thai: *ranat*; Laotian: *lanat*; Cambodian: *roneat*; Indonesia: *gambang*). They can be played as solo or ensemble instruments. The *angklung* ensemble popular in Java and Malaysia (consisting of sets of bamboo tubes in frames that are shaken to produce pitches) is unique to the region.

The importance of bamboo music among the upland and inland communities can be seen

in the wide use of bamboo instruments as substitutes when gongs such as those of the *kulin-tang* ensemble are not available. Over time, gongs acquired greater prestige than bamboo instruments, as they were used in the ceremonial music of the courts.

Influences from India, China, the Middle East, Europe, and America

Southeast Asian countries are also unique in the ways they have adapted to foreign influences. Indian arts and aesthetics, literature, and court practices were introduced into the Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms of Funan, Angkor, Sukothai, Śrīvijaya, and Majapahit beginning in the first century C.E. Musical instruments carved on the walls and panels of Angkor Wat (twelfth century) and Borobudur (eighth century) show that local as well as foreign instruments were performed in these courts. The two Indian epics—*Rāmāyana* and *Mahābhārata*—were adopted and remain central in the shadow and dance theater of Java, Bali, Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia.

When Islam spread along the coastal areas of Sumatra, Java, and the Malay Peninsula from approximately the twelfth century, Middle Eastern instruments and forms were imported. The reeded shawm (Thai: *pi nai* and *pi chawa*; Burmese: *hne*; Malaysian: *serunai*; Vietnamese: *sarunai*; Javanese: *selompret*) came from the Middle East via India with the spread of Muslim culture. The same instrument is known as the *surmay* in Iran, *zorna* in Turkey, and *zurna* in India. The spiked fiddle (*rebab* of Malaysia, Sumatra, and Java) is a variant of the Arabic *rabab*. The *gambus*, a plucked lute with a short neck and large, pear-shaped body, is derived from the Middle Eastern *ud*. The frame drum (*rebana* of Malaysia and Sumatra; *rabana* of Celebes; *ravana* of the Moluccas) originated in the Middle East, where it is also used to accompany Islamic religious chanting. The *nobat* ensemble that symbolizes the sovereignty of the Malay rulers at royal ceremonies is said to have originated from the *naubah* or *naubat* in the Arab countries.

Chinese influence is evident in the mainland Southeast Asian countries because of their proximity to China. The Thai *so duang* and *so u*, Vietnamese *dan nhi*, and Kampuchean *dra u* derive from the Chinese *er-hu* (a two-stringed, long-necked spiked fiddle with the bow passing

between the strings). Vietnamese musical instruments are largely derived from China but modified to suit Vietnamese music and aesthetics. The *dan tranh* zither is similar to the Chinese *zheng*, the *dan ty ba* (pear-shaped lute) derives from pipa, and the *dan nguyet* (moon-shaped lute) resembles the *yue qin/ruan*.

Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, and U.S. colonialism beginning in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has had a strong impact in many Southeast Asian countries. Syncretic musical forms developed as a result of early contact between Portuguese and the locals. The Malaysian *joget/ronggeng* ensemble comprises a vocalist singing Malay verses (*pantun*) accompanied by a Western violin and accordion, two Malay frame drums, and a gong. The *keroncong* of Java is performed by the Western ukulele, banjo, violin, flute, cello, and double bass but features local stratification (as in the gamelan) and *pantun*-singing. In the Roman Catholic areas of the Philippines, local traditions were replaced by Spanish musical traditions such as the *rondalya* (plucked string orchestra), adapted from the Spanish *comparsa*, the brass band, liturgical music, and the *zarzuela* (derived from Spanish opera).

The colonial period also saw the second wave of migration of Chinese and Indian workers to the region. Chinese immigrants first introduced Chinese opera, puppet theater, and instrumental music prevalent in Southeast Asian cities. Similarly, the *sitar* and *tabla* from North India and the *vina* and *mridangam* from South India and other percussion instruments were brought from the subcontinent during this period.

Through new types of media such as film, cassette, video, compact disc, and satellite television, Southeast Asians continue to be exposed to foreign influences. They have been adapting to music of other parts of the world, especially international trends in popular music. Local versions of Hindustani and Tamil film songs, Cantonese pop (Canto-pop), Japanese (J-pop), hip-hop, and heavy metal can all be heard. World music of Southeast Asia incorporates elements of traditional music (stratification, interlocking rhythms, and temporal cycles), musical instruments from the multiethnic communities (Indonesian *Campur Sari*, *Irama Malaysia*; Thai *Luuk Thung*), Islamic fusion with texts praising Allah (*nasyid* pop), and Hindustani singing style and

rhythms (*dangdut*). Western symphony orchestras and marching bands are popular in the cities.

Documentation

A complete history of Southeast Asian music has yet to be written. As many traditions are passed down orally and musical recordings date from the early twentieth century, musicologists have tried to reconstruct history based on the discovery of bronze drums and lithophones (eight to twelve narrow stones unearthed in Vietnam that are each capable of producing pitch). Reference is also made to reliefs of musical instruments found on ancient buildings such as Angkor Wat, Prambanan, and Borobudur. Historical records written mainly by early Chinese and European visitors provide some information. References to Burmese musicians sent to the Chinese court have been found in the Chinese Tang dynasty chronicles. French missionaries have written about theater and ceremonial music in Thailand in the seventeenth century. Dutch scholars have described certain genres such as the shadow puppet theater, dance, and gamelan of the courts of Central Java in the nineteenth century. Vietnam seems to have the largest number of documents written in Sino-Vietnamese.

Local and foreign ethnomusicologists are undertaking research of oral traditions, although fieldwork in Burma, Laos, and Cambodia has been constrained by political uncertainties and war. Emphasis is on the importance of learning to perform in a particular musical tradition and on extended interaction with the performers. The introduction of cassettes, compact discs, and videos has provided a new stimulus to researchers, who now have greater access to regional music.

SOOI BENG TAN

See also Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Borobudur; Dong-son; *Jatakas*; *Mahâbâratha* and *Râmâyana*; Performing Arts of Southeast Asia; Prambanan; *Wayang Kulit*

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MUSLIM MINORITIES (THAILAND)

Islam is the faith with the second largest number of followers in Thailand, a country where some 96 percent of the population are Buddhists. In general, the Muslim community in Thailand is scattered all over the country: in the central region—Bangkok and its surrounding

provinces, the northern region—Chiang Mai (Chiangmai) and the surrounding districts, and the deep south of Peninsular Thailand. It is quite evident that the Thai Muslims are not a homogeneous society. The Muslims in the north are, ethnically speaking, very much affiliated with and influenced by the Muslims of southwestern China. Their brethren in the central region are a mix between the communities of the Shiite Muslims, whose ancestors are often traced back to Iran and West Asia, and those of the Sunni Muslims, whose forefathers came mainly from the Malay Archipelago, Cambodia, and the Indian subcontinent. The majority of Thai Muslims are ethnically Malay, living mainly in the deep south—namely, Peninsular Thailand.

Islam commands the faith of approximately 2.5 million Muslims, or around 3 percent of the total Thai population. At a glance the figure appears insignificant. However, under close scrutiny the picture changes drastically. Of the estimate of 2.5 million, a decided majority of the Muslim Thais live in the southernmost part of the country, concentrated in the five deep southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Satun, and Songkhla (Forbes 1989: 167–182). Other provinces in the south of Thailand with noticeable Muslim communities include Krabi, Phuket, Trang, and Nakhon Sri Thammarat.

Unlike Muslims in the central and northern regions who trace their origin mainly back to the immigrant communities, Muslims in the south are indigenous inhabitants. Other significant facts about the Muslims in the south are these. First, they are a homogeneous society of ethnic Malays. Second, they form an overwhelming majority in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. A qualifying note on the Muslims in Satun must be made. The Satun Muslims form the biggest community. However, the majority of the Muslims there are the Sam-Sam—that is, those of mixed Malay-Thai origin whose ancestors, and they themselves, have embraced Islam but have retained many aspects of Thai culture, of which the most pronounced is the Thai language (Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian 1994). As for Songkhla, it is home to a sizable Thai-Malay Muslim community, though the majority of the inhabitants of that province are Thai Buddhists. Third, unlike their Muslim brothers in the northern and central regions, Muslim communities in the south,

those in Songkhla and Satun excepted, until recently found it impossible to blend in with their Buddhist Thai compatriots. In fact, the deep southern region with the Muslim majority has always been considered a "sensitive" area of the country, particularly from the security, law and order, and sociopolitical perspectives.

Historically, the southern region possessed a large portion of population who shared a common historical heritage and sociocultural identity more with the Malays in the Malay Peninsula than with their Thai compatriots. The three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat were once parts of the old Malay Kingdom of Patani (Wan Kadir 1996). The latter was for a long time regarded as a cradle of Malay and Islamic civilization in Southeast Asia. The traditional relations between Patani and its more powerful northern neighbor had never been really happy. At best, Pattani was allowed to exercise its sovereign power in all matters not affecting the security of its northern neighbor, as clearly displayed during the latter part of the seventeenth century. Step by step, the old sultanate of Patani was forced militarily to accept the tributary relations with Siam, which was represented by Ligor, the present-day Nakhon Sri Thammarat.

Finally, the old Pattani was absorbed by Siam in 1902 as an integral part of the Siamese kingdom, with a special proviso safeguarding the Malay culture and Islam. The *Kadhis (Tòh Kalí)* court, which hears and decides cases concerning Muslim marriage and inheritance, is an outstanding institution representing this special proviso.

Because of political and religio-economic reasons, the post-Pacific War (1941–1945) years saw the resurgence of Malay nationalism among the Thai Malays in the deep south. Most of these nationalist movements demanded virtual freedom of the former Pattani sultanate plus Satun from Thailand. Up to the 1970s, the southern region was generally an impoverished zone, particularly when compared with the central plain or the north. The most negative result of historical and socioeconomic divides in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat was an almost total separation between Thai-Malay Muslim and Thai Buddhist communities. This kind of socioeconomic separation did not (and does not) exist between the two communities living around the Thonburi-Bangkok areas—nor for that matter among the

Muslims and Buddhists living in the Chiang Mai area. By the mid-1980s, a progressive political environment and liberal government policies had succeeded in addressing some fundamental problems of the Thai Muslims in the south. Sociopolitical tranquillity as well as educational and economic progress followed. The violent and armed struggles for a separate and independent Muslim polity for Thai-Malay Muslims subsided.

Presently, the administration of Muslim affairs comes under the National Council for Muslims. The council consists of at least five distinguished Muslim Thais, all of whom are appointed by a royal proclamation. The president of the council, Chula-ratchamontri, is appointed by the king. Provincial councils for Muslim affairs are set up as affiliations of the national council in the provinces that have substantial Muslim minorities to act as a medium between the local community and the government in Bangkok.

KOBKUA SUWANNATHAT-PIAN

See also Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Patani (Pattani), Sultanate of

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MY LAI

A Crisis of Conscience

The tragic affair of My Lai (or Song My), where U.S. soldiers slaughtered Vietnamese villagers without obvious reason, remains symbolic of the Vietnam War, both for itself and for the debate the incident brought out.

The incident took place in a central Vietnam Viet Cong area in the province of Quang Ngai (south of Danang), on 16 March 1968, in the context of the Tet offensive. According to press reports, three sections of infantry headed by Captain Ernest Medina and Lieutenant William Calley, Jr., surrounded the village in the morning, after an initial artillery barrage. Then they gathered the population, 400 to 500, mainly elderly, women, and children, outside the village and shot them. Some rapes were also perpetrated, and the houses were burned.

In 1969, *Newsweek* and the *New York Times* took up the event, which launched a national debate and a crisis of conscience in the United States over questions of ethical behavior, the objectives of the war, and U.S. superiority and civilization. The massacre polarized antiwar

sentiment in the United States. However, according to public opinion polls, 65 percent of the U.S. people thought that such affairs were unavoidable in wartime.

Then came the trial. On 29 March 1971, in Georgia, the Fort Benning military court found Lieutenant Calley guilty of the murder of twenty-two civilians by his own hand and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Veterans and left-wing groups both disputed the verdict. At this time Calley appeared to be an underling, not the person genuinely responsible. Moreover, the day after the verdict, President Richard Nixon (t. 1969–1974) ordered his release from prison and Calley spent the next three and a half years under house arrest in his Fort Benning house while awaiting the outcome of appeals. Even though his conviction was upheld by the Court of Military Appeals, his sentence was reduced to ten years under instructions from the Secretary of the Army. Following a review by the military authorities, who recommended that Calley be paroled, the White House sanctioned the motion. The whole affair was officially closed in the mid-1970s.

In 1977 the U.S. humanitarian group Friendshipment decided to build a hospital at My Lai. And "My Lai" has since entered the U.S. vocabulary as an eponym or is used metaphorically.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Cold War; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Tet Offensive (1968); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Viet Cong

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N

NĀGARAKĒRTĀGAMA

See Gajah Mada (t. 1331–1364); Hayâm Wuruk (Râjasanagara) (r. 1350–1389); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s)

NAHDATUL ULAMA

An Orthodox Muslim Organization

Nahdatul Ulama (Arabic, “Renaissance of the Islamic Scholars”) is a powerful traditionalist Muslim organization in Indonesia that emphasizes the teaching authority of Islamic scholars (*ulama*).

Kiai Haji Wahab Chasbullah (ca. 1884–1971) founded NU in 1926. It represented orthodox Islamic scholars of the Shafi’i school who objected to the growing influence of modernist Islamic doctrines in Indonesia. Islamic modernism emphasized the authority of the Qur’an and Hadiths and stressed the need to refer all Islamic practice to those sources. It regarded much of the cultural and intellectual diversity within the Islamic community as doctrinally suspect. By contrast, orthodox or traditionalist Muslims paid greater attention to the teachings of the four main schools of Islamic law and to the individual teaching authority of Muslim scholars, and they had a tradition of allowing a diversity of thought. In Indonesia, modernism was linked socially to urban Muslim communities, whereas traditionalism was strongly associated with rural Islamic teachers (*kiai*) and their residential schools (*pesantren*), especially in East

Java. The principal spiritual leader of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) was Kiai Haji Hasjim Asjari (1871–1947), an influential East Javanese kiai. Like the modernist Muhammadiyah, the NU established schools and set up welfare organizations to promote its vision of Islam in Indonesian society. Outside Java, the NU was strongest in Kalimantan.

In 1937 the NU joined the Muhammadiyah in the Madjlisul Islamil a’laa Indonesia (MIAI), but modernists and traditionalists grew further apart during the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), when the Japanese authorities set out to cultivate rural kiai as a useful force in mobilizing the Indonesian masses. The NU, which the Japanese had officially dissolved at the start of the occupation, did not take a formal part in this process, but leading NU figures became increasingly important as interlocutors between the Japanese authorities and rural Muslim communities. In 1943, Hasjim Asjari was made head of the new Japanese-sponsored Muslim umbrella organization, Maşjumi, and his son, Kiai Haji Wahid Hasjim (1913–1953), was made its effective head. This rapprochement with the occupation forces began to earn the NU a reputation for political opportunism, an alleged willingness to collaborate with any authorities for the sake of the immediate religious interests of the NU’s constituency. This apparent pliability, however, was belied by the role of rural kiai in several local uprisings against the Japanese and by the swiftness with which the NU de-

clared Indonesia's war of independence after August 1945 to be a Holy War (jihad).

After November 1945, when Masjumi became a political party, the NU remained as a corporate member, but its leaders lacked influence in the party; in 1952 they separated to become a political party in their own right under the leadership of Wahid Hasjim. In this split, the NU took a large part of the Masjumi's constituency in Java, leaving the rump Masjumi very much identified with the Outer Islands. Because the party was interested mainly in controlling the large Department of Religious Affairs, it was a willing participant in successive cabinets in the 1950s.

The NU performed strongly in the 1955 national elections, winning over 18 percent of the vote and emerging as the third largest party in parliament, its support concentrated in East and Central Java. Initially the NU seemed much more willing to accommodate the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) and to take part in Sukarno's semiauthoritarian Guided Democracy than the stridently anticommunist Masjumi, but in the early 1960s, the NU and PKI became increasingly antagonistic. NU leaders feared that the PKI's atheism would secularize the Indonesian state, while in village Java wealthier NU members were increasingly the target of PKI campaigns for land and tenancy reforms. Especially during the PKI's "direct action" for land reform in 1963, the NU youth wing, Ansor, was involved in violent confrontations with communist youth groups in the Javanese countryside. Following the 1965 Gestapu affair, the NU was a key element in the army-dominated "New Order coalition" of General Suharto, and Ansor gangs played a major role in the massacre of communists in Java.

Although the military soon turned on its allies and began to restrict political activity, the NU largely preserved its vote in the 1971 election, winning again just over 18 percent of the vote. In January 1973 it was forced by the government to join other Muslim parties in the new Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, Unity Development Party). In subsequent elections, the NU's core of support in East Java was a mainstay of the PPP, but as in the earlier Masjumi the NU's influence at upper levels of the organization was relatively weak. In the early 1980s, with the New Order increasingly regarding Islam as politically subversive, pressure

grew within the NU to give up formal politics. The formal decision to withdraw from the PPP was made at an NU congress in December 1984. The organization adopted the Pancasila as its sole basic principle and accepted the 1945 Indonesian constitution as the basis for political life, thereby excluding the possibility of an Islamic state. At the same time, however, the NU affirmed its identity as an Islamic organization. This strategic change was spearheaded by Abdurrahman Wahid (1940–), son of Wahid Hasjim, who became NU general secretary.

This disavowal of politics had two immediate consequences. First, the PPP's share of the vote in the 1987 elections dropped from 27 to 15 percent. Second, the withdrawal opened the way for a rapprochement between the NU and the government, which led to a reduction of unofficial harassment and to government support for NU social and religious activities. By the end of the New Order the NU claimed 30 million members, and Abdurrahman Wahid was recognized as a key power broker in the reshaping of Indonesian politics after the fall of Suharto.

The NU did not take direct part in the elections of 1999, but four parties claimed to be standing in its name. The most successful of these, winning 12.6 percent of the vote, was the Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party), aligned with Abdurrahman Wahid, the other three winning less than 1 percent among them. The PKB chose the Pancasila, rather than Islam, as its basis, and presented itself as an inclusive national party open to non-Muslims.

The NU's willingness to compromise and collaborate with the authorities of the day often led to accusations of opportunism and lack of principle by other political forces. This accusation, however, is hard to reconcile with the NU's record of militancy under the extreme conditions of the Japanese occupation and in 1965. The NU's own leaders described their stance as freedom from dogmatism, a willingness to take seriously other points of view in order to come to broadly acceptable conclusions and a pragmatic recognition of the constituted authorities.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Collaboration Issue in Southeast Asia; Education, Traditional Religious; Gestapu Affair (1965); Guided Democracy

(*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); *Kiai*; Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi) (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations); Madjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia (MIAI, Great Islamic Council of Indonesia); Muhammadiyah; *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Pancasila (Pantja Sila); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–)

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NAM TIEN

Southward Expansion

Nam tien is the term for precolonial Vietnam's southward expansion from its original nucleus in the present Northern Region (Bac bo) to

the present Central (Trung bo) and Southern (Nam bo) regions at the expense of Champa and Cambodia.

The traditional view that the Vietnamese were ever expanding to the south is not accurate. The real *Nam tien* started in the fourteenth century as a result of the rapid increase of overpeopled delta villages and the development of the Chinese-modeled polity in northern Vietnam. In 1471, Le Thanh Tong (r. 1460–1497) captured the Champa's capital of Vijaya (in present-day Binh Dinh). The Thuan Hoa (present Quang Binh to Hué) and Quang Nam (present Danang to Binh Dinh) regions were gradually Vietnamized, with military posts and resettled northern peasants under a collective settlement (*don dien*) system.

Opposing the Trinh family in Hanoi, the Nguyễn government put forward the *Nam tien* policy on a larger scale. Champa's remaining territories down to Binh Thuan were incorporated into Quang Nam one by one by the end of the seventeenth century. Meanwhile, since the mid-seventeenth century, the Nguyễn approached the Cambodian territories in present southern Vietnam, along with the Chinese (for instance, the Mac family in Ha Tien) and Malay people. The Nguyễn first occupied Dong Nai-Sai Gon Region (named Gia Dinh) by the end of the century. Gia Dinh's territory was gradually expanded to and beyond the Mekong Delta despite Siamese expeditions. In the nineteenth century, all regions as far as Ca Mau and Ha Tien were Vietnamized under the Nguyễn dynasty (1802–1945), though it failed to dominate the entire territory of Cambodia.

Nam tien brought about two features of modern Vietnamese society. First, it created, on the narrow territory, forms of "Vietnamese-ness" that vary from the north to the south. Second, security in the western neighboring areas became crucial for the whole country because the narrow territory can be easily cut in two if attacked from the west, especially in Central Vietnam.

MOMOKI SHIRO

See also Champa; Le Thanh Tong (r. 1460–1497); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Trinh Family (1597–1786)

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NAM VIET (NAN YUE)

Genesis of Vietnam

Viet (Yue) means the area of the southern part of the lower reaches of the Changjiang (Yangzi) River, and also refers to the native peoples or ancient kingdom that flourished in this area during the pre-Qing (1644–1912) period. *Nam (Nan)* means "south" and thus the term *Nam Viet (Nan Yue)* means "Southern Viet (Yue)." *Nam Viet* is the modern Vietnamese notation, *Nan Yue* the modern Chinese. In historical studies, "Nam Viet (Nan Yue)" is used in this way as either a geographical or a historic concept.

An example of Nam Viet as a geographical concept can be found in the "Shi-ji" (Historical Record) written at the beginning of the first century B.C.E., where it referred to today's Guangdong/Guangxi area in China. Through the subsequent establishment of the Nam Viet kingdom, its meaning was extended to include the present-day regions of Guangdong/Guangxi, Hainan Island, and the northern part of modern Vietnam. Nam Viet as a historic concept means the ancient Nam Viet kingdom (204?–111 B.C.). This Nam Viet kingdom was a polity founded by a Chinese named Trieu Da (Zhao Tuo) and, based on a modern Guangzhou city in the Guangdong province, it controlled the whole area from Guangdong/Guangxi to northern Vietnam and survived five kings for almost a century until its domination in 111 B.C.E. by Han Emperor Wu-di (r. 141–84 B.C.E.).

Historical Background

Modern-day Guangdong/Guangxi became a part of Chinese territory as a result of the expedition of the first emperor of Qin, Huang Di (r. 221–210 B.C.E.). Trieu Da, who established Nam Viet kingdom, was born in northern China, and joined the Qin expedition against this area, later being appointed a county magistrate in Guangdong by the Qin dynasty (221–206 B.C.E.). The Qin fell to Chu troops in 206 B.C., four years af-

ter the death of Huang Di. As a result of the struggle between Liu Bang and Xiang Yu, China was united again under Liu Bang, who became the first emperor of Han in 202 B.C.E. During this period of war, Trieu Da appointed himself as a commandant of central Guangdong, closing the borders and conquering neighboring districts. Trieu Da titled himself "King of Nam Viet," a title that was approved as "King of Nam Viet (of Han)" in 196 B.C.E. by Liu Bang. Relations with the Han were maintained until the fall of the Nam Viet kingdom in 111 B.C.E.

Relations with Neighboring Areas

In addition to its relations with the Han dynasty (202 B.C.E.–220 C.E.) and native "Viet (Yue)" peoples, the Nam Viet kingdom had close relations with the societies of the northern part of modern Vietnam, with local kingdoms in the modern Fujian province in southeastern China, and with the various chiefdoms in the Guizhou and Yunnan provinces. Few historical records remain regarding the relations between Nam Viet and northern Vietnam. According to the available records, during the period of the Nam Viet kingdom, in the northern part of Vietnam there existed the "Au Lac" kingdom, which was governed by "King An Duong (An Duong Vuong)" and which Trieu Da later conquered. Archaeological evidence and historical studies support the existence of this kingdom. Some artifacts, for instance, that belonged to the Dong-son culture of northern Vietnam were found as burial goods in the tomb of the second king of Nam Viet, discovered in Guangzhou City. A bronze seal inscribed "Seal for Captain of Tu Pho (Xu Pu) County" was uncovered at Thanh Hoa in northern Vietnam during the 1930s. Owing to the similarity to seals found at the tomb of the second king of Nam Viet, this bronze seal is recognized as an official seal of the Nam Viet kingdom. Based on these discoveries, the relationship between the Nam Viet kingdom and northern Vietnam consisted not merely of long-distance trade and cultural exchange but also political control.

Political System of Nam Viet Kingdom

The Nam Viet kingdom was characterized by a unique political system. The most symbolic ex-

ample is the existence of the title of “emperor” in the Nam Viet polity. Trieu Da had been formally titled “King of Nam Viet” by the Han emperor, but this was only a formal approval of a *fait accompli*, as Trieu Da had earlier declared himself to be king. The fiercely independent stance of Nam Viet became apparent following the death of the first emperor of Han, Liu Bang. Trieu Da launched offensives in the borderland of Han territory, and challenged the Han world order by calling himself “(Nam Viet) Wu-di Emperor.” As a result of persuasion by the Wen-di Emperor of Han, Trieu Da later apologized for his impoliteness and withdrew the title of “emperor,” showing his subordination to the Han as “King of Nam Viet.” However, it is recognized that he actually still reigned as “emperor” in the domestic context. It has been shown that even the next king called himself “Wen-di Emperor (of Nam Viet),” according to the discovery of the “Wen-di Xing Xi (Royal Seal for Wen-di Emperor [of Nan Yue=Nam Viet])” gold seal in the tomb of the second king of Nam Viet excavated at Guangzhou city in 1983.

In the domestic context, therefore, Trieu Da and his descendants titled themselves “emperor” and influenced neighboring regions such as King An Duong’s Vietnam and several local polities in South China. Based on these facts, it is recognized that Trieu Da actually succeeded in building an original world order that was completely different from that of the Han. The ruler of Nam Viet had two different faces—on the one hand obeying the Han emperor as “King of Nam Viet,” on the other reigning over the Nam Viet empire as domestic “emperor.” This dualistic nature of the polity influenced the political system of Nam Viet society. According to the study of historical records and recent archaeological finds, it is realized that, in the core of Nam Viet territory, the system adopted was basically the same as the Han dynasty’s, reflecting actual diplomatic relations with the Han. For the local chieftains in the peripheral areas of Nam Viet, however, a special system based on Chu traditions such as the title of “Zhi-kui” was adopted by an individual “emperor” who had a different world order. In northern Vietnam, the local tradition was preserved and Nam Viet officers ruled with a soft glove in deference to the actual social situation as a newly conquered region. In the

Nam Viet territory, there thus existed a unique regional structure of concentric circles with several different systems in each region. Furthermore, several local polities such as Dong Yue (Eastern Yue=Viet) in modern Fujian and chiefdoms in southwest China maintained close relations at different levels with Nam Viet. The Nam Viet empire was characterized by such a “Nam Viet Mandala” structure and stood against the Han world order.

Although there have been various opinions, according to current archaeological understanding it is usually accepted that during the period preceding Nam Viet, including that of the Qin dynasty, the southern border of Chinese territory did not reach northern Vietnam. In other words, Nam Viet was the first dynasty established in modern Chinese territory that expanded its domain into northern Vietnam and established a unity over this area by a principle of pluralistic rule deriving from its unique historical background. The Wu-di Emperor of Han who conquered Nam Viet simply inherited this domain and later further expanded the borders of Chinese territory into modern Vietnam.

Nam Viet Influences on Later History

The Nam Viet kingdom fell in 111 B.C.E., but its influence continued afterwards. In the area from Guangdong to northern Vietnam where the ancient Nam Viet “empire” was established, moves for independence appeared again and again during times when one Chinese dynasty changed to another. The fruition of this trend was Vietnamese independence from China in the tenth century. After more than 800 years, “Nam Viet” became an issue again.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Nguyễn (phuc) Anh (the Gia Long Emperor) founded the Nguyễn dynasty after a war of unification. He dispatched a diplomatic mission as “Ruler of Nam Viet” to the Jia Qing Emperor of Qing China and petitioned for approval of “Nam Viet” as the formal name of this new kingdom instead of the conventional “An Nam (An Nan).” However, this name reminded the Qing court of the historical events of ancient Nam Viet. As a geographical concept, this name meant not only the Vietnamese area under Nguyễn’s control, but also regions such as Guangdong/Guangxi in Qing territory. As a

result, the Qing court refused this request, and in 1803 a new name, “Viet Nam,” was given as a compromise. Because the historical views of both the Qing and Nguyễn dynasties with regard to ancient Nam Viet played an important role in the formation of the name “Vietnam,” it can be said that the contemporary name “Vietnam” is an inheritance of “Nam Viet.”

Ancient Nam Viet in Historical Descriptions

Under Chinese dynasties after the Han period, a critical view of Nam Viet as a separatist dynasty was the standard view of orthodox Chinese historians. In thirteenth-century northern Vietnam (Tran dynasty), after independence from China, the Vietnamese court started editing its own historical chronicles. In the oldest history compiled by the Vietnamese court, the “Dai Viet Su Ky (Historical Records of Great Viet)” written by Le Van HUU, the ancient Nam Viet dynasty was viewed as the legitimate starting point, and Trieu Da who confronted the Chinese was described as the first “emperor” of “Viet.” In Le Van HUU’s text, Trieu Da was recognized as the person who formed the foundation of the system of imperial rule of “(Great) Viet” and was given the highest positive evaluation. For a Vietnamese dynasty that reigned domestically as “Emperor of Dai Viet (Great Viet)” and obeyed the Chinese emperor as “King of An Nam,” ancient Nam Viet and Trieu Da were seen as the best models of their own power in Vietnam.

In Vietnam, local history about legendary kings prior to the Nam Viet conquest such as the “Hung Kings (Hung Vuong)” and “King An Duong” came to attract attention, and the legitimate starting point of Vietnamese gradually got older. Trieu Da and the Nam Viet dynasty nevertheless retained their claim to legitimacy. However, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, a unique opinion that criticized Trieu Da as an invader and presented Nam Viet as a foreign dynasty that should be excluded from authentic Vietnamese history was presented by the famous scholar Ngo Thi Si. Nevertheless, under the Nguyễn dynasty in the nineteenth century, descriptions of Trieu Da and ancient Nam Viet were retained as part of official Vietnamese history while Nam Viet was demoted as an illegitimate dynasty. It was the North Viet-

namese historians after World War II who wiped out such vagueness and removed the Nam Viet dynasty from the national history, and established the historical view of Trieu Da as a foreign invader. After the unification of the north and south, this became the official historical view throughout the country.

In China, a unique evaluation of Nam Viet history has also been conducted in Guangdong. Originally, it was viewed as a separatist polity against Chinese rule, but in the first half of the fifteenth century, Huang Zuo, a famous Confucian scholar born in Guangdong, was the first to provide a systematic description of ancient Nam Viet in an official publication. By the mid-fifteenth century, Trieu Da was evaluated at the same level as successive rulers and officers in Guangdong, and henceforth Trieu Da was considered a historical person to be evaluated positively within the logic of the Chinese court. This approach continued afterwards as the typical style of local history and is found in the first half of the nineteenth century in monographs such as the “Nan Yue Wu Zhu Zhuan” (Chronicle History on Five Rulers of Nan Yue [Nam Viet] edited by Liang Ting Nan, a well-known intellectual in Guangdong. In modern China, through later twists and turns, Trieu Da gets the highest evaluation as a pioneer in the development of Guangdong.

YOSHIKAI MASATO

See also China, Imperial; Chinese Tribute System; Indigenous Political Power; Nguyễn Anh (Emperor Gia Long, r. 1802-1820); Qing (Ch’ing/Manchu) Dynasty (1644-1912); Viets; Yunnan Province

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NAN CHAO (NANCHAO) (DALI/TALI)

A T'ai Polity

Nan Chao was the kingdom located in present-day Yunnan Province in south China that lasted from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries C.E. It is believed by some to be the first kingdom founded by the T'ai-speaking ethnic group before their defeat by the Mongols. The Mongol advance led to the migration of the T'ai and the formation of new T'ai states in the plains of the Mekong and the northern part of modern Thailand in the thirteenth century (Williams 1976: 15–16). However, some scholars argue that the inhabitants of Nan Chao were not T'ai, but that the rise and fall of this kingdom created political opportunities for the T'ai to form independent principalities (Wyatt 1984: 35).

The history of Nan Chao can be traced back to the seventh century C.E., when the Tang dynasty (618–907 C.E.) extended its rule to Yunnan in present-day southern China. At the beginning of that period, Chinese emperors installed direct rule over the local people, whom they called Wu-men, or black-skinned barbarians. However, threatened by the Tibetans in the second half of the seventh century, the Chinese made an alliance with the local inhabitants at the beginning of the eighth century and allowed them to form small semiautonomous principalities. The Chinese hoped that these small principalities would form a buffer zone to provide them with territorial security and curb Tibetan invasions (Williams 1976: 15–16). However, one of the leaders of these small principalities, called Pi Lo Ko, proved to be very capable and was able to unite six small states of the Wu-men to form a kingdom around the Tali Lake in western Yunnan in

the 730s. In 738 his kingdom gained recognition from the Chinese court, which called it Nan Chao, or the "southern prince" (Wyatt 1984: 13).

The Tang and Nan Chao were able to maintain peaceful relationships until the 740s, when Ko Lo Feng, Pi Lo Ko's son, became king. Ko Lo Feng was an ambitious and militarily capable king who wanted to extend the rule of Nan Chao. During the 750s, the Chinese frequently sent armies to wage war against Nan Chao, but Ko Lo Feng and his armies defeated them. From then on, Nan Chao was able to control most parts of Yunnan, and he extended its political and military power even further over its neighbors in southern China and northern Southeast Asia. For example, in the early ninth century C.E., it sent armies to break the power of the Pyu kingdom in modern northern and central Burma (Taylor 1992: 165). Furthermore, it attempted to put pressure on small principalities in present-day northern Thailand, Annam, and Chen La kingdom between 846 and 866. However, Nan Chao's military campaigns against neighboring states during this period gave the T'ai opportunities to settle down on the plains of the Mekong River, while their more powerful neighbors, such as Pyu and Chen La, were engaged in defending themselves. However, the T'ai had still not been able to form their own unified state during the ninth and tenth centuries and had to mingle with other powerful ethnic groups in mainland Southeast Asia. Their presence in the region would later enable them to found their own kingdoms in the north and in the Chao Phraya delta of present-day Thailand during the century when the more politically and militarily powerful kingdoms of Nan Chao and Cambodian Angkor were in decline.

The administration of Nan Chao under its *chao* (lit. prince, king) was very well organized and was quite similar to the Chinese court. The king presided over the court, and small principalities of different ethnic groups were incorporated into the kingdom. The board of six ministers and the council of twelve military generals carried out the day-to-day administration at the center. Local administration was under the responsibility of hierarchical officials who were granted land in proportion to their rank as the return for their service (Wyatt 1984: 13–14). Buddhism was the dominant religion

of the kingdom. Its expansion into the kingdom of Pyu in modern Burma linked southern China and northern Southeast Asia to India, which helped the spread of Indian knowledge to the region (*ibid.*: 15).

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Nan Chao was experiencing internal political instability, and its rulers had to focus their attention on internal problems rather than external expansion. More important, by the thirteenth century, the Mongols, who had become the most powerful rulers in China and mainland Southeast Asia, had started to extend their power. By the 1250s, Nan Chao was defeated and occupied by the Mongols, and that eventually led to the collapse of the kingdom (Taylor 1992: 168).

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also China, Imperial; Sukhotai (Sukhodava); T'ais; Yunnan Province

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NANYANG

"South Seas"

Nanyang is the Chinese term for the "South Seas"—namely, the area situated southward of the Chinese mainland that in the post-1945 period became generally referred to as Southeast Asia. The Chinese—especially those from the southeastern seaboard—had since the early times ventured into the South Seas engaging in trade. Chinese Buddhist travelers such as Fa Hsien (fifth century) and I-tsing (seventh century) wrote extant accounts of their visits to territories in the region. During the Ming dynasty (fifteenth to sixteenth centuries), naval convoys were dispatched to the Nanyang to foster relations with indigenous rulers to bring them under the imperialistic fold of the Chi-

nese tributary system. Despite pogroms and discrimination, the Nanyang continued to be economically appealing to the Chinese. Pockets of settled Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia from Rangoon (Yangon) and Batavia (Jakarta) to Manila testified to the attractiveness of the region. Large-scale mass immigration from the southeastern provinces of China to the Nanyang began in earnest in the mid-nineteenth century, as part of an exodus of Chinese coolie traffic to California, the Caribbean, and Australia. The Nanyang was viewed favorably by would-be Chinese immigrants against the background of the destitute conditions in the homeland. The Nanyang Chinese or overseas Chinese of Southeast Asia played significant roles, particularly in trade and commerce, mining, and commercial agriculture. They remained vibrant elements in their adopted homes in the Nanyang.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Chinese Tribute System; I-Ching (I-tsing) (635–713 C.E.); Ming Dynasty (1368–1644)

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NAPOLEONIC WARS IN ASIA

The Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) involved the French and the British as leading protagonists in Europe, but because each was incapable of invading the other's home territory, their warfare became markedly colonial and economic in character, as well as global in range. Napoleon I (Napoleon Bonaparte) (1769–1821) tried to shake British dominion in India, and his Berlin decree of 1806 closed all Continental harbors to British trade, directly damaging Britain's colonial commerce with Europe. Conversely, hostilities with France offered Britain opportunities for seizing control over points of

strategic importance belonging to France and to its Dutch and Spanish satellites in the Mediterranean, Africa, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia. After Napoleon's final defeat (Waterloo, 1815), the British found themselves in unchallenged control of all the main axes of maritime communication linking Europe with Asia, from the Atlantic to the South China Sea.

During this whole period of conflict, Holland and Spain, as much as France, were Britain's adversaries in Asia. Even before Napoleon's rise to power, the Batavian Republic, set up in 1795 by Dutch sympathizers with the French Revolution, incorporated itself into the French system as a satellite. In 1796, Spain also fell under French control. As a result, Dutch possessions situated at the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and Java, together with the Spanish colony of the Philippines, became exposed to potential British attack. On the axiom that "what was a feather in the hands of Holland would become a sword in the hands of France," Dutch Ceylon was declared a British dominion in 1798. Upon Napoleon's arrival in power, the French riposted with a project in the same year to combine forces with Tipu (r. 1782–1799), the sultan of Mysore, to oust the British from India. After capturing Malta as the first stage of this scheme, Napoleon led an army to invade Egypt, intending to ship his forces via the Red Sea to Mauritius, and thence to India. When news of the expedition broke, the British moved to forestall Napoleon, first by attacking and defeating Tipu at Seringapatam and then by sinking the French fleet at Aboukir Bay off Alexandria.

The failure of the Egypt expedition left France's Dutch ally in Asia isolated, making it unnecessary for the British to proceed to the conquest of Java for the time being. Yet the Dutch colonial system would be considerably damaged by the Napoleonic Wars. In 1806 the British seized the Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope. In the same year Napoleon abolished the Batavian Republic, and, after installing his brother Louis as king of Holland, he sent a Bonapartist marshal of Dutch origin, Herman Willem Daendels (t. 1808–1811), to the Netherlands East Indies as governor-general, with special powers to put Java on a war footing. To build up the defense of Java, Daendels stripped Palembang in Sumatra, Makassar in the Celebes, and Banjermasin in Borneo to

strengthen the port capital of Batavia. Daendels's measures were so extreme that he alienated not only the sultans of Jogjakarta and Bantam but also the Dutch residents of the colony. In 1810, after abolishing Louis Bonaparte's new kingdom of Holland, Napoleon absorbed The Netherlands into France, formalizing French ownership of Java. With a French naval force still present at Mauritius and with the defenses of Java recently strengthened by Daendels, the British began to fear the recrudescence of French power, and the East India Company (EIC) was persuaded to undertake an invasion.

The Java expedition established the British in control of Java from 1811 to August 1816. One of the main proponents of this successful expedition, Thomas Stamford Raffles, became lieutenant governor of the territory (t. 1811–1816). Raffles inaugurated a new phase of internal reform by which the Dutch administrative system, recently gallicized by Daendels, was reconstructed along Anglo-Indian lines. A general tax on land was substituted for previous arrangements for compulsory services and forced deliveries. Yet despite undertaking further experimental fiscal measures, Raffles was incapable of resolving the financial difficulties left by Daendels's extravagance. In the wake of Napoleon's abdication, Britain promised, by the Convention of London of August 1814, that they would restore Java to the Dutch, together with other scattered settlements in the East Indies, principally Amboina, Banda, and Ternate. The main purpose of this restitution, which took place in 1816, was to rebuild the Dutch home economy as a bastion against future French expansion on the continent.

By the termination of hostilities, the French had lost Mauritius and the Seychelles, as well as Malta, permanently to the British. But they hung on to some of their Indian footholds—Mahé, Karikal, and Pondicherry. The British, however, emerged in control of the main strategic points in Asia. They retained two of their Dutch conquests, the excellent harbors at Trincomalee in Ceylon, and at the Cape of Good Hope. Although relinquishing Java, Britain's temporary occupation paved the way for another crucial acquisition in Southeast Asia. In 1819, to their moribund settlement at Penang, acquired in 1786, they added Singapore, in an initiative prompted in part by Raffles's impressions of the potential of the region's trade de-

rived from his time as lieutenant governor of Java. Singapore, which became the axis of Britain's India-China trade in the nineteenth century, also came to serve as the focal point of Britain's communications and defense in East Asia in the twentieth century.

PATRICK TUCK

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Century); Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Kew Letters; Manila; Penang (1786); Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); Singapore (1819)

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NARAI (r. 1656–1688)

Opening Siam to International Trade

As king of Siam, Narai ruled at a time of intense trading activity in the kingdom, and in the Southeast Asian region overall. He was an outward-looking ruler who used diplomacy to further his international political and commercial objectives.

The son of the usurper King Prasat Thong (r. 1629–1656) by a queen who was a daughter of King Song Tham (r. 1610/1611–1628), Narai was thus linked by blood to two dynasties. Although he had an elder brother, Chao Fa Chai, and an uncle who had political influence, Narai's own claim to the throne was very strong.

In 1656 he triumphed over both Chao Fa Chai and their uncle Si Suthammaracha in a bloody struggle for the throne, successfully capturing the Royal Palace in Ayutthaya twice. The international tenor of Narai's reign was set by his use of foreign mercenaries in his two assaults on the royal palace in 1656. Records mention the participation of Indian and Persian Muslims, Malays, Chams, Javanese, Japanese, and Portuguese on Narai's side during the fighting.

Narai's reign is remarkable for the international trade and diplomacy engaged in by the Siamese royal court. Foreign trade and diplomacy enriched the king's treasury and spread

his fame. Narai's court traded and had diplomatic contact with Europeans, Indians, Persians, Chinese, Javanese, and Malays. Crown junks fitted out for the Siamese monarch by Sino-Siamese merchants managed to trade in Japan regularly, in spite of that country's seclusion policy.

Another key aspect of Narai's long reign was the employment of foreigners, especially Persians and Europeans, in royal trade and administration. The early and middle parts of his reign were dominated by the ascendancy of Persian as well as Siamese officials, notably the Persian Aqa Muhammad (Okphra Si Naowarat) and the Mon-Siamese minister for trade and foreign affairs, Chaophraya Kosathibodi (Lek). From the late 1670s onward, Europeans entered the Siamese royal service in greater numbers, notably the Greek employee of the English East India Company (EIC) who was to become Narai's great favorite, Constantine Phaulkon (d. 1688). Once entrenched in the Siamese bureaucracy, Phaulkon brought in his friends and acquaintances among the English, such as Samuel White, who was appointed harbormaster of Mergui.

Narai's relations with the European powers have naturally attracted most scholarly attention, especially his contacts with the Dutch, the English, and most notably the French. During the early 1660s Narai's court was involved in a conflict over trading interests with the Dutch United East India Company (VOC). The Dutch company sent two ships to cruise the mouth of the Chao Phraya River and the adjacent coastline to the east. The conflict was resolved by the signing of a treaty in August 1664 that gave extraterritorial powers to the Dutch and also prohibited the use of Chinese to man the Siamese king's junks. The traditional interpretation has been to ascribe Narai's desire to have closer contacts with the English and the French to his fear of the Dutch. Later research, however, has shown that the Dutch and Siamese were on good terms for much of Narai's reign, the blockade and the 1664 treaty notwithstanding. Dutch artisans and experts on everything from medical and military matters to enamellers and goldsmiths were provided by the VOC to the Siamese court.

Constantine Phaulkon played a prominent role in promoting the king's pro-French foreign policy. The peak of this policy was reached with

the exchange of embassies between Siam and France in 1685 and 1686. Under Phaulkon's supervision, the French ambassador Chaumont was given a grand reception in 1685. When Chaumont had concluded a treaty with the Siamese court, he returned to France, taking with him a Siamese embassy. Okphra Wisut Sunthon ("Kosa Pan"), an ancestor of the Chakri dynasty of Bangkok, was the leader of this Siamese delegation to France.

The policies of King Narai and Phaulkon faltered and went out of control toward the end of the reign. A state of war existed between Siam and the EIC as White's friends, in the king of Siam's name, engaged in piratical activities from Mergui, and the EIC's subsequent attempt to take Mergui ended in a massacre of the English there. The French wanted more than was granted to them in the 1685 Franco-Siamese Treaty, and they sent several hundred soldiers along with a second embassy in 1687 with instructions to garrison Bangkok and Mergui, two key localities in the kingdom.

King Narai's last days were tragically spent as a virtual prisoner in his own palace at Lopburi (Lawo). The political problem at the end of his reign revolved mainly around the issue of the royal succession. Narai had no son, and his surviving half brothers were politically impotent. The way was clear for the king's own brother-in-law and commander of the royal elephants, the nobleman Phra (Okphra) Phetracha, to form a powerful faction and seize power. After Narai's death in July 1688, Phra Phetracha became king.

DHIRAVAT NA POMBEJRA

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; British Interests in Southeast Asia; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Firearms; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Lopburi (Lawo); Phaulkon, Constance (Constantine) (d. 1688); Prasat Thong (r. 1629–1656); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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NARESUAN

See Phra Naret (King Naresuan) (r. 1590–1605)

NASUTION, GENERAL ABDUL HARIS (1918–2000)

Soldier-Scholar

Indonesian leading army general and its theoretician, politician, and historian, Abdul Haris Nasution was, like Soeharto (1921–), awarded the rank of five-star general. He was instrumental in bringing the military into Indonesian politics.

A native of the village of Hutapungkut, Kotanopan, Nasution came from an ordinary Batak peasant family of North Sumatra. He spent his secondary and high school days in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, and Bandung, West Java, respectively. After obtaining his double diplomas from Hollandsch-Inlandsche Kweek-school (HIK) and Algemeene Middelbare School (AMS) in Bandung in 1937, he served as a teacher initially in Bengkulu and then in Palembang, South Sumatra. In Bengkulu he met Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970), who was then living in exile. He left Palembang for Bandung and began his military career at the military academy of Corps Opleiding Reserve Officieren in 1940. He was promoted to lieutenant two years later, and then served as infantry in Surabaya fighting in the Dutch colonial army against the invading Japanese.

Nasution first achieved prominence during the Japanese occupation, when he was appointed deputy commander for the paramilitary group *Barisan Pelopor* in Bandung. He also traveled around West and Central Java to train and to create a network among the youths for the Javanese war effort. The period following Indonesian in-

dependence (1945) afforded more room for the young Nasution. He was appointed local commander of the newly established *Tentara Keamanan Rakyat* (TKR, People's Peacekeeping Force) in Bandung, and then chief commander for West Java, later the Siliwangi Division, in early 1946. He held several positions during the Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949), including fighting a communist group in September 1948 and as the commander responsible for the whole of Java during the second Dutch "police action" of December 1948.

During the war years, Nasution was given the responsibility by the Japanese of fashioning modern guerrilla warfare and its relationship with civilian elements, which then became the core of the Indonesian military concept of *sistem pertahanan semesta* (Total People Defense System), the creation of a territorial army that incorporated civilians into the defense system.

His successes during the war were rewarded by a series of rapid promotions. In 1950, when he was just thirty-two years old, Nasution became the youngest officer ever appointed Indonesian chief of the army with the rank of colonel. Two years later, however, he relinquished this post following an action by a military group that demanded the dissolution of parliament on 17 October 1952 as a result of internal military conflict. Three years later he was reappointed chief of the army. During this inactive period, Nasution established the semi-military political party of *Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (IPKI) in 1954, which took part in the first general elections of 1955. He became a strong supporter of Soekarno's policy, particularly concerning the return to the 1945 Constitution, clamping down on regional rebellions, nationalization of Western enterprises, the West Irian campaign, and the confrontation policies against Malaysia.

Nasution, who became a full general in 1960, encouraged many military officers to take up economic and political posts. His statement on the dual function of the Indonesian armed forces (ABRI) in the late 1950s provided a legal and historical basis for the next generation of officers to be actively involved in social and political roles during the New Order.

Abdul Haris Nasution was the main target of military action by the September 1965 Movement. He succeeded in escaping with only minor injuries, but his five-year-old

daughter, Ade Irma Suryani, was fatally shot during the rampage into his residence.

During the transitional period of struggle for power following the failure of the attempted coup, Nasution commenced his political career as chairman of the *Madjelis Permusyawaratan Rakjat Sementara* (MPRS, Provisional Peoples' Deliberative Council). Although he had earlier been dismissed by Soekarno from his position as minister of defense and chief of the armed forces, Nasution was responsible for the removal of Soekarno from his presidential position and brought Soeharto into power in 1967. But the retired general, ironically, was considered the main opponent of Soeharto during his reign, particularly after Nasution was involved with a group, called *Petisi Limapuluh* (Fifty Petitions), that was critical of the New Order.

Besides being an army general, Nasution was a scholar and historian. His eleven-volume work *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan* [*About the War of Independence*] and seven volumes of memoirs reflect his scholarly achievements; he also held honorary doctorates from prestigious universities. Popularly addressed as *Ris* or *Pak Nas*, Nasution was married to Johana Sunarti, who is of Javanese/Sundanese parentage.

BAMBANG PURWANTO

See also Dutch Police Action (First and Second); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Irian Jaya (West Irian); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Konfrontasi ("Crush Malaysia" Campaign); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–)

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NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD)

The National League for Democracy was formed in September 1988 following the establishment of a new military government in Myanmar (Burma) that promised to hold national elections. It quickly grew to become the major legal political party in the country. Brigadier Aung Gyi (ret.), General Tin U (ret.), and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (1945–) initially led the NLD. Much of the party's initial support drew on the public profile of Daw Suu Kyi, who in addition to being its secretary-general was the daughter of Myanmar's national hero, General Aung San (1915–1947). Her prominent role in criticizing the socialist-military regime of her father's successor, General Ne Win (1911–2002), won instant popularity. Brigadier Aung Gyi resigned from the presidency of the NLD four months after its formation, accusing Daw Suu Kyi of having been manipulated by communists. Many of the initial stalwarts of the party were either politicians from a number of pre-1962 political parties or military officers who, like Aung Gyi, had subsequently fallen out of favor with Ne Win. Students provided much of the NLD's organizational energy.

When elections were held in 1990, the NLD won more than 60 percent of the votes and more than 80 percent of the posts in the new national legislature. However, the military refused to hand over power to the league, on the grounds that first a national constitution had to be written. The army then began to arrest a number of NLD members and placed the leadership under house arrest. General Tin U and Daw Suu Kyi had their existing house arrest orders extended. Twelve successful NLD candidates and other party members fled to the Thai border area and established a parallel government-in-exile, known as the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma.

Within the country a stalemate ensued, although secret talks on political reconciliation commenced in 2000.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Aung San (1915–1947); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Ne Win, General (1911–2002); State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC); Suu Kyi, Daw Aung San (1945–)

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NATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING COUNCIL (NPKC) (THAILAND)

The National Peace-Keeping Council was set up after a coup group led by General Sunthorn Kongsompong, supreme commander of the armed forces, together with army, navy, and air force chiefs, overthrew the elected Chatichai government on 23 February 1991. Until the new election, the NPKC then installed a government led by Anand Panyarachun, former permanent secretary of the foreign affairs ministry and an eloquent businessman; the elections installed General Suchinda Kraprayoon, the army commander, as prime minister. The ensuing protest and demonstration against Suchinda led to the bloody May 1992 incident and the end of the NPKC.

The NPKC-led coup was unexpected but quickly gained sympathy, if not outright support, from big-business quarters. The coup group cited five reasons in justifying military intervention in the democratic procedure, which had just started again after the voluntary exit of General Prem Tinsulanond (1920–) from military politics in 1988; Lieutenant General Chatichai Choonhavan was the first elected premier after the 1976 coup. The first reason was that the Chatichai government had notoriously been known as the "buffet cabinet," meaning that cabinet members were involved in corrupt practices. Second, the political officials, including members of parliament (MPs) and their secretaries and appointees, unjustly attacked government officials and bureaucrats. Third, the parliament had become a dictatorship. Fourth, there were plans to destroy the army. Fifth, there were attempts to derail an in-

vestigation into the attempted assassination of the queen and General Prem.

The real cause underlying the NPKC coup, however, was the conflict between the Chatichai government and the army. The latter had increasingly lost its perks in its traditional control over the government as a result of its declining influence over politics.

The NPKC comprised five military leaders: General Sunthorn Kongsompong, chairman; General Suchinda Kraprayoon, army commander, vice chairman; General Kaset Rojananil, air force commander; General Prapat Krisnachan, navy commander; and General Issarapong Noonpakdi, deputy army commander.

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Prem Tinsulanond, General (1920–)

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NATIONAL STUDENT CENTER OF THAILAND (NSCT)

See Student Revolt (October 1973) (Thailand)

NATIONAL TRADES UNION CONGRESS (NTUC)

The National Trades Union Congress, formed in July 1961 and closely linked to the People's Action Party (PAP) government, is the largest association of trade unions in Singapore. The NTUC had its origins in the Singapore Trade Union Congress (STUC), which was established in 1951 as an alternative noncommunist labor movement to the communist-led unions that dominated Singapore's postwar political landscape. The STUC, however, failed to make an impact until the leaders of the PAP, wanting to unify the union movement and harness labor support, revived it after being elected to office in 1959. Faced with mounting unemployment and population increase, the PAP government sought to curb labor unrest, but this ran con-

trary to the party's procommunist faction, which considered strikes and industrial disputes an integral part of its anticolonial and anticapitalist struggle. The break between the two factions surfaced over the Malayan premier's proposal—which was supported by the moderate PAP leadership—for the creation of an enlarged Federation of Malaysia to include Malaya, Singapore, and the British Borneo territories in May 1961. Opposed to the plan, the procommunists left the PAP to form the Barisan Sosialis in July 1961. The STUC was consequently split into the Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU), which supported the Barisan Sosialis, and the National Trades Union Congress, led by PAP members. Several reasons motivated the PAP and the NTUC to work closely together.

Singapore's separation from Malaysia in August 1965 and the need to preserve industrial peace and attract foreign investments to solve its unemployment problem and ensure Singapore's economic and political survival were prominent factors. The PAP and the NTUC lent their support to tough labor legislation enacted by the government in 1968. The NTUC's wage-negotiating role was soon diffused by the formation in 1972 of a National Wages Council, comprising representatives of the government, employers, and unions. To improve the social and economic welfare of workers, the NTUC has established many workers' cooperatives, and its representatives sit on many statutory boards and organizations, assuring it of a voice in Singapore's nation-building process.

ALBERT LAU

See also Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front); British Borneo; Labor and Labor Unions; Lee Kuan Yew (1923–); Lim Yew Hock (1914–1984); Malaysia (1963); People's Action Party (PAP)

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NATIONALISM AND INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

At one level, nationalism in Southeast Asia was about overthrowing Western colonial rule. To achieve that goal, movements of various kinds

were organized. Some adopted independence as their target. Others were more modest. They concentrated on arousing consciousness of Southeast Asians as a people with values as resilient as those advocated by Westerners. The aim was to create awareness and self-confidence with which to face the challenge of the dominant colonial authorities.

Given the diversity and complexity of Southeast Asia as a region, it would not be surprising if the kinds of nationalism and the independence movements that emerged were similarly varied. In this discussion, the various approaches to nationalism will be examined from the causes espoused by the different kinds of independence movements.

The key features that characterized the independence movements can be briefly identified as follows: (1) religious and nonreligious movements; (2) rural and urban movements; (3) backward- and forward-looking movements, or amalgamations of the two; (4) mass and elite movements; (5) movements peculiar to certain contemporary phases of development; and (6) movements shaped by the nature of colonial rule.

Each key feature is itself characterized by peculiarities and exceptions, typical of the regional landscape that often displayed little consistency except for geographical proximity. Any survey of nationalism and the independence movements must necessarily traverse this vast terrain in order to facilitate a comprehensive understanding—clearly a Herculean task. Using the framework defined by the aforesaid key features, a number of propositions can be advanced.

Nationalist and independence movements were often defined in terms of anticolonial responses. They sought independence from the colonial authorities—Spanish, French, Dutch, British, and even U.S.—because the colonial authorities intruded into their social and political space, and not just because those authorities were able to exact economic tribute such as taxes.

Nationalism and independence movements used religion—mainly Islam and Buddhism—to rally support against the Western colonial powers. This resort to religion was almost a default strategy because the Western rulers had shorn off the dynastic powers of the Southeast Asian leaders, leaving untouched their religious

influence. Examples included the Muslim sultans of Aceh. In Vietnam, on the one hand, the monarchs adroitly used Confucianism to protect the fatherland in the face of Western pressure. On the other hand, the religious leadership of the sultans in the Malay States was strengthened by the British colonial authorities in the hope that the sultans could help keep their followers in check, thus preventing Islam from being used as an anticolonial tool.

The issue of religion was also related to the messianic movements usually prevalent in the rural parts of Southeast Asia. There, latent longings for bygone days persisted where local religious leaders presented themselves as messiahs who could not only overthrow colonial authorities (with their power to tax and seize land) but also recover the golden societies that once existed, where peace, harmony, prosperity, and justice once prevailed. These messianic movements served as critical vehicles of nationalism and the independence movements that emerged. In the Philippines, during the Spanish colonial period, there were countless such local movements, not all of which were fighting for “independence” but certainly for the alleviation of local miseries. Other such movements that attracted the attention of the colonial powers because of their strength and popularity were the Samin movement (Java) and the Hsaya San rebellion (Burma), both occurring in the early twentieth century.

Away from the rural areas, nationalism and independence movements adopted different modes. Urban centers were zones of Western education, institutions, and business enterprises. They represented the beachheads of Westernization. Thus it was not surprising that nationalism and early independence movements first emerged in the Philippines, where there was a long tradition of friar-sponsored education. In Java as well, the Dutch were very active in establishing an education infrastructure.

What did education institutions impart in order to heighten consciousness about nationalism and independence? Students were generally more exposed to intellectual trends emanating from abroad. They were challenged by Western secular and spiritual influences. They sought answers to meet those challenges, and such answers were not always available within paradigms of traditional knowledge. Of course, not all education institutions produced students

with this degree of awareness. Schools, after all, were established to produce graduates to serve in the colonial administration, not to undermine the colonial government. But all over Southeast Asia, there were enough anticolonial graduates of the likes of José Rizal (1861–1896), Sukarno (1901–1970), and Aung San (1915–1947) with the mettle to justify the claim that the Western education available in urban areas was vital to the development of nationalism and independence movements.

The encounter with Western learning also led other Southeast Asians to examine how local mores could accommodate the best of Western culture. This was in part an exercise to make tradition more serviceable for modern requirements. In Burma, the Young Men's Buddhist Association searched for a usable Burmese and Buddhist identity. In Java, Western-educated intellectuals founded the Budi Utomo and Taman Siswa, to marry Western learning with tradition. In Vietnam, Pham Boi Chau (1867–1940) performed similar roles.

Although these efforts were secular in essence, the same experiences were taking place in the religious sphere. The religious expression of nationalism and independence movements was represented by organizations such as the Sarekat Islam of Indonesia, together with modernist and traditionalist movements in other Islamic areas. The Sarekat Islam was a mass anticolonial movement founded in 1911. Soon, agitators preoccupied with wider social and political goals captured the leadership. Religion (Islam) had to share space with other influences. In fact, the more religiously inclined found new homes in the modernist Muslim teachings then emanating from the Middle East. Other Muslim leaders faced the challenge of Western influences by developing the traditionalist organization called the Nahdatul Ulama.

These examples of nationalism and independence movements in Java were replicated with modifications in the Malay States across the Straits of Melaka. On the whole, Islam provided a more vibrant environment for the development of such movements than the Buddhist parts of Southeast Asia—namely, Burma (now Myanmar), Siam (now Thailand), Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Unlike Islam, with its spiritual authority in Mecca and Cairo, Buddhism in Southeast Asia

did not experience the kind of dynamic influences originating from those centers. More research is still needed to decide whether the Buddhist parts of Southeast Asia also experienced the cultural divisions found within Islam that resulted in the development of divergent groups actively defending their own turf. One significant exception was the attempt by the Buddhist Chakri rulers of Siam to promote a renaissance for the religion, but it is not clear how this renaissance affected Buddhist institutions in neighboring Laos and Cambodia, if at all. Apart from that initiative in Siam, Buddhism did not provide the lead role in nationalism and independence movements in the other major parts of mainland Southeast Asia—namely, Burma and Vietnam.

In Burma, the British colonial authorities had demolished the ecclesiastical head of the Burmese Buddhist authority. This resulted in the emergence of many small pockets of resistance led by men claiming to be religious icons of sorts. In southern Vietnam, where Buddhism had never sunk deep roots, the syncretistic religious groups—namely, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao—were the principal anticolonial fighters.

It was in the 1920s that more organized anticolonial movements emerged that embraced specific plans about freedom and independence. Again, worldwide influences were important. Radical Marxist and socialist ideas were encouraged by the outbreak of the Russian Revolution (1917). The rise of Japan was much admired. The assertion of Chinese nationalism inspired Southeast Asians. By the 1920s, the number of Southeast Asians who absorbed new ideas after having ventured abroad was increasing. Many studied in colonial institutions; some found their Mecca in Japan. Ferment was the order of the day.

Briefly, there were two types of Southeast Asian returnees from abroad, both distinguished in terms of their contribution to social continuity or social disruption. The first type was the nationalist elites who later assumed power in Malaya, the Philippines, and Cambodia. The second group was prominent in Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The first group sank deep roots in their respective societies, and these societies suffered minimal changes under colonial rule. The second group consisted of leaders who had no vested interest in the continuance of colonial rule, and indeed were the products

of societal changes induced by colonial rule. The outcome of the wave of nationalism and independence movements led by the two groups naturally differed. Malaya, the Philippines, and Cambodia enjoyed relative stability as they made the transition from colonial rule to independence. In contrast, Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam experienced revolution and political turmoil.

What has been attempted here has been an analysis based on patterns that could be discerned, using broad brushstrokes. Other characteristics about nationalism and the resultant independence movements in Southeast Asia that do not fit the earlier patterns must also be mentioned.

The role of minorities in nationalism and independence movements is also important for an understanding of the Southeast Asian context. Many population groups inhabit Southeast Asia. Migrations from India and China resulted in large numbers of Indians residing in Burma, and Chinese settlements were made in all parts of Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, nationalist and independence movements such as the Sarekat Islam embodied a degree of anti-Chinese feeling, inspired in part by business competition with Chinese traders. Elsewhere—for example, in Siam and the Philippines—the Chinese integrated with the local population by marriage, and anti-Chinese feelings were only occasional outbursts within the ambit of nationalist and independence movements. Even in Java, such integration between Chinese traders and local Javanese women resulted in the development of several kinds of Chinese organizations that negotiated very skillfully between Indonesian nationalism and concerns about China. In Burma, anti-Indian sentiments were a rallying cry of nationalism and the independence movements. Minorities also included ethnic groups such as the Shans and the Karens—the non-Javanese people living in the Indonesian archipelago. Although independence movements were prominent at the urban capital level, important developments were taking place at the subnational level as well. The picture was thus uneven, and any broad sweep of nationalism and independence movements such as this survey must be augmented by more in-depth studies.

It is also important to ask what mental image coursed through the minds of nationalist and independence leaders as they developed

their ideas about their goal. What was the “nation” they were fighting for? Was their “nation” the same as that conceived and envisaged by the Western colonial powers? Put briefly, was “Indonesia” the mere successor to the “Netherlands East Indies”? What was the “Philippines”? Did it include the Moro sultanate of southern Mindanao and the present Sabah? What about Burma? Was Burma confined to the central lowlands, or was Burma inclusive of the highlands as well?

Diversity was thus the hallmark of nationalism and the independence movements in Southeast Asia. By way of summary, it will be useful to identify a thread that can weave through the diversities and draw together divergent data as far as possible. One way to achieve this goal is to describe the impact of Western colonial rule on nationalism and the independence movements.

It is often assumed that colonial governments were powerful entities. They could not be otherwise, because how else could they control vast Southeast Asian populations? The historical records passed down to posterity also tend to dignify the colonial governments as strong, stable, and confident. That was not, however, necessarily the case. Often, colonial governments were stretched thin and weak. They remained in power because of strategic alliances negotiated with local rulers. They recruited military units from local populations that were derived from minority groups (either by race or religion). Thus, by the infamous device of “divide and rule,” they could maintain power in the face of immense odds. A telling illustration of the weakness of the colonial authority can be found in the way these authorities dealt with nationalist and independence leaders. The former imprisoned them or tried to drive them away. This gave the impression of power, control, and awe. Actually, the reverse was just as true, if not more so. Imprisonment or exile could be viewed as admission of weakness. Nationalist and independence leaders had to be put away in order to avoid the challenges they posed. Such weakness often meant that colonial governments had to deal with the populations under their authority with kid gloves. They could not embark on major social and political changes, even if they wanted to. There were thus many pockets of indigenous Southeast Asian societies that were left un-

touched by colonial rule, while other areas experienced more change. The nationalist and independence movements thus differed from region to region, depending on the intensity of colonial rule.

Broadly, Western colonial administration came in two forms: indirect and direct rule. Indirect rule denoted those systems of colonial governance whereby precolonial forms were allowed to survive. Direct rule tended to replace native forms of government. Both systems were in force by the late nineteenth century in Southeast Asia. Examples of indirectly ruled areas included Laos and Cambodia, the Malay States, and many Indonesian principalities in Borneo, Celebes, and eastern Indonesia. Directly ruled areas included the lowlands of Burma, Java, and southern Vietnam.

In general, indirect rule aroused less opposition toward the colonial authorities. The latter were less visible. They operated through native rulers using strategic alliances. For example, if taxes were levied, the native rulers were the ones who collected them upon the "advice" of the colonial authorities. Control was disguised. Under this system, only members of the local aristocracy were given access to Western education. There was no need to extend training to others, since an elaborate bureaucracy was not necessary for the maintenance of indirect rule. Indirect rule was also the preferred mode of administration for dealing with ethnic or religious minorities. In this way, the Shans in Burma, the mountain peoples in Laos, and the non-Javanese communities could continue their particular ways of life with a minimum of interference and change.

In contrast, the population in the directly ruled areas experienced major changes. The native institutions of government could not meet the demands of the modern colonial state. The former were not able to serve the colonial authorities adequately, and so they became increasingly irrelevant. The solution then was to provide Western-style training in modern schools and colleges. These opportunities were thrown open to all, and not necessarily confined to the local aristocracy. The intelligentsia that emerged was not always committed to the maintenance of the traditional status quo. At the same time, this intelligentsia felt discriminated against because they had to work with less qualified European offi-

cial drawing better remuneration. Here was a sure recipe for the development of nationalism and the independence movements that preached violence and the overthrow of the existing order.

Thus the mechanics of colonial rule can explain the texture of nationalism and the type of independence movements in different parts of Southeast Asia. However, there are other features that cannot be encapsulated in this explanation of direct and indirect rule. In Southeast Asia, communist leaders and the military elite played major roles in the nationalist and independence movements of both directly and indirectly ruled territories. Certainly, colonial regimes did not contribute much to the development of such elites. Thus in order to explain their origins, it is necessary to turn to other explanations. The popularity of communism can be attributed to the neat and incisive analysis afforded by Marxism to account for the problems of exploitation faced by colonial societies. As for the rise of a military elite, it is necessary to examine the role of Japan and the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945). Clearly, the Japanese military governments of the 1930s attracted the attention of many Southeast Asians who viewed the Japanese as setting an example of how to maintain independence from Western intrusion. During the subsequent Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia, the new masters endeavored to train Southeast Asians in military arts. This included not only the use of weapons but also the mental attitudes of discipline and dedication. The result was the creation of a military elite that subsequently played a vital role in fighting the Western colonial authorities. No longer was opposition expressed only in slogans within political parties. A new dimension became available as a result of the Japanese occupation—namely, the use of arms to drive out the colonial authorities.

One other peculiarity about nationalism and the independence movements in Southeast Asia must also be noted. These movements were almost land-bound and territorially defined. That is, they existed and functioned on dry land. Their concerns included the independence of a nation that was territorial. They agitated over taxes and land; they were angered by unfair land tenure practices. Yet Southeast Asia was and is largely a maritime region. Strangely

enough, there is no evidence that nationalism and the independence movements were concerned about developments overseas while they agitated on dry land. Indeed, Southeast Asians were also a seafaring people before the Western colonial powers established themselves. Even during the colonial period, they maintained trading, travel, and social contacts with counterparts across the seas. The impact, or lack of impact, of such contacts on nationalism and the independence movements has yet to be explained.

Finally, did the nationalist leaders achieve the results they desired—namely, freedom and independence—on their own? The answer is probably not an unequivocal “yes.” Notwithstanding the weaknesses of colonial control, the Southeast Asian leaders could not have succeeded without external assistance from the Imperial Japanese army.

YONG MUN CHEONG

See also Aceh (Acheh) Wars (1873–1903); Aung San (1915–1947); Boedi Oetama (Budi Utomo) (1908); Cao Dai; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Revolution (1911); Communism; Education, Traditional Religious; Education, Western Secular; Hoa Hao; Indian Immigrants (Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries); “Indonesia”; Islam in Southeast Asia; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Moros; Nahdatul Ulama; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Rizal, José (1861–1896); Russia and Southeast Asia; Sabah Claim; Sarekat Islam (1912); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Taman Siswa (1922); Taxation; Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) (1906)

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NE WIN, GENERAL (1911–2002)

Durable Strongman

General Ne Win was the dominant figure in Burmese politics for more than fifty years. Responsible first for the military survival of the Burmese government in the chaotic conditions that followed on the country’s independence in 1948, he subsequently created a political and economic order that returned the country to chaos in 1988. Ne Win served as deputy commander of the Burmese armed forces prior to independence, and after a number of posts in the military he served as prime minister for eighteen months from 1958 to 1960. In 1962 he conducted a military coup, establishing a Revolutionary Council government that ruled until 1974, when it handed power to the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), which he also headed. Not until 1988 did he finally resign from his last political position, but even in retirement and in his nineties, his was a



Burma's General Ne Win, 1966. (Bettmann/Corbis)

name that inspired awe in Burmese political circles.

Born in 1911 in the town of Pyi (Prome), he attended Rangoon University but left before completing his degree. While working at the central post office in the colonial capital, he joined the Dobama Asiayone (We Burmans Association), an active nationalist group that refused to cooperate with the colonial government. In 1940 he was selected by the Asiayone to join twenty-nine other young men to leave the country and receive military training from the Imperial Japanese army on Hainan Island. The famous "Thirty Comrades," led by General Aung San (1915–1947), returned in 1942 as the officer corps of a Japanese-allied Burmese army to fight against the retreating British forces. The Burma Independence Army (BIA) was reorganized and renamed the Burma National Army (BNA), and Ne Win was its deputy commander under General Aung San. The BNA subsequently rebelled against the Japanese and welcomed the returning British back in 1945 as

putative allies. Leading the first Burmese troops into Rangoon at the end of the war, Ne Win broadcast live on the radio to the nation the re-taking of the capital by national forces.

Unlike Aung San and many other of the thirty comrades who resigned from the military to enter politics at the end of the war, Ne Win's subsequent career centered on the army. He became deputy commander, working with the British in preparation for Burma's eventual independence, to meld the nationalists in the Burmese army with troops that they had earlier raised in the country. Following a number of campaigns against his former allies in the Japanese resistance, Prime Minister Nu (1907–1995) appointed Ne Win as commander of the armed forces in 1948. At the height of the civil war following independence, Nu turned to him as deputy prime minister. The Burma army during these years developed a tradition of self-reliance and a deep distrust of the motives and aims of civilian politicians as well as the larger international community. Again in 1958, Ne

Win entered the cabinet, this time as prime minister of the eighteen-month caretaker administration, which had been called to power to allow the noncommunist politicians to resolve their own issues. The caretaker government was noted for its efficiency and skill in tackling a number of the country's economic and social issues. Ne Win negotiated a border agreement and treaty of friendship with China during this period.

Alarmed at the direction that reelected prime minister Nu's government was taking the country in 1962, he conducted a coup, which swiftly replaced the civilian government with a revolutionary council regime dedicated to the establishment of socialism by Burmese means. The Burma Socialist Program Party became the sole legal party and assumed formal control of the state from the revolutionary council in 1974. Ne Win remained president until 1981 and party chairman until 1988. By then, the political consequences of the inability of the government's autarkic socialist policies to create economic growth were evidenced by several months of demonstrations and strikes throughout the country. In an effort to lessen tensions Ne Win resigned, but in the face of continuing demonstrations, the military, under men trained by him, intervened, violently suppressing the demonstrators and reestablishing military rule. Ne Win faded from the political scene at that time.

Ne Win succeeded in keeping Burma from becoming embroiled in major international conflicts, such as the war between India and China (1962). He also restrained involvement in the Second Indochina War (1964–1975), which surrounded the country during his years in office. Nonetheless, Ne Win's political legacy is usually seen in the continuing underdevelopment of the country as a consequence of autarkic socialist policies. His earlier exploits in the nationalist movement, the achievement of independence, and leadership of the armed forces against a number of internal communist and separatist insurgent groups have been largely forgotten.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Aung San (1915–1947); Buddhist Socialism; Burma Independence Army (BIA); Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP); Military and Politics in Southeast

Asia; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Nu, U (1907–1995); Suu Kyi, Daw Aung San (1945–); Thirty Comrades

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NEGRAIS

Negrais, an island south of Bassein in the Burmese delta, in the early eighteenth century was the site of a commercial settlement by the English East India Company (EIC), established in rivalry with the French at Syriam (where the English had also established a factory, 1647–1657). The objective was to secure access to Burmese teak for shipbuilding purposes. With the outbreak of hostilities between the Mon kingdom of Pegu and the Burmese Toungoo dynasty at Ava in 1740, 1742, and 1743, both the French and the English withdrew from Syriam. However, the French returned to Syriam in 1749 to meet the Mon need for military arms and munitions. As a consequence, Anglo-French rivalry in the region motivated the English to occupy nearby Negrais Island. In 1754, Alaungpaya (Alaung-hpaya) (r. 1752–1760) sent a delegation to Mr. Brooke, English resident at Negrais, to secure support. In 1755 and 1757 Alaungpaya granted audiences to Captain Baker and Robert Lester as he sought to obtain arms and munitions from the English to fight the Mon. Intrigues on both sides saw the French and English seeking to sell arms to the opposing parties. Consequently both the French and the English were embroiled in the Burmese civil wars of 1740–1757 between the Mon of Pegu in Lower Burma and the Burmese forces of Alaungpaya. The latter subsequently estab-

lished the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885) when he reunited Burma after the sacking of the Mon capital at Pegu in May 1757.

Finding the Negrais venture not very profitable, as well as too risky in view of the civil war, the EIC withdrew many of its people; Captain Newton, the head of the EIC factory in Negrais, arrived in Bengal with thirty-five Europeans in May 1759. In July 1759, the EIC accepted Captain Southby's offer to go to Negrais to retrieve the company's teak timbers. He sailed in the *Victoria Snow* with Captain Walter Alves. Perceiving that the English (as well as the French) lent support for the Mon, Alaungpaya became infuriated. In July 1756 his forces captured two shiploads of arms aboard French ships (and their entire crews) destined from Pondicherry, India, for Pegu.

In October 1759, Alaungpaya dealt decisively with the French, executing Bourno, the chief of the French factory, whom he suspected of dissimulation; the captain and officers of the French ship, *Galithie*; and a missionary, Father Nerini. Alaungpaya then turned on the English. He destroyed their settlement at Negrais Island, massacring most of the remaining inhabitants, such as Southby and other EIC personnel, including Hope and Briggs. Captain Whitehill had been captured, but he was released on payment of a ransom and later departed on a Dutch ship. Alaungpaya had suspected the Negrais settlement of abetting the 1758 Mon revolt at Pegu, launched while he was occupied in the northwest of the country. Captain Alves, on board the vessel of a Captain Miller, whose assistance he had sought to get the EIC's teak timbers at Negrais on board his own ship, witnessed Alaungpaya's assault force—some fifteen to twenty large boats of twenty to thirty oars each—rowing speedily downriver. Miller weighed anchor and made out of the harbor. As he did so, Alves saw some five hundred men of the assault force land on the beach. Alves, back on his own ship, made for Diamond Island, where he stayed until 23 October 1759, together with Captain Miller. Back in Bengal in November 1759, Alves gave his account of the events.

In May 1760, Alves returned to Burma on a mission to secure the freedom of the survivors and negotiate for the release of the EIC's property seized at Negrais. He blamed the Armenian, Gregory, for the tragedy at Negrais. Gregory, according to Alves, had incited Alaungpaya

with false information about the complicity of the English settlement in the Mon revolt. Alves received an invitation from Alaungpaya for the English to resume trade. Alaungpaya and his successor, Naungdawgi (r. 1760–1763), were anxious for commercial relations to resume in order to obtain munitions, firearms, and cannon with which to pursue military expeditions against their neighbors in mainland Southeast Asia. Alves was successful in gaining the release of the EIC's property and the five surviving English captives who had been on board Captain Whitehill's ship. In view of Alaungpaya's invitation to resume trade, Alves left two of the captives at Syriam to await instructions from the governors in Bengal or Madras with respect to trade. But the EIC did not resume commercial relations with Burma until after the 1795 mission of Michael Symes.

HELEN JAMES

See also Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Burmans; Burma-Siam Wars; East India Company (EIC) (1602), English; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Mon; Pegu

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NEOLITHIC PERIOD OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

European archaeologists originally defined the Neolithic, or “New Stone Age,” as the period before the Bronze Age when stone implements, such as adzes, pestles, and mortars, were shaped by laboriously polishing them. The Neolithic clearly carried associations with agriculture because the adzes suggest forest clearance, and grains could be ground down and refined with the mortars and pestles. This is the essence of the Neolithic, as understood by scholars interested in Southeast Asia: the period of agriculture before the use of metals, as epitomized in Peter Bellwood’s landmark book, *Man’s Conquest of the Pacific* (1978).

Bellwood noted that plant fossils infrequently survive in the archaeological record, especially in the tropics of Southeast Asia, so direct evidence of agricultural activities will rarely be preserved. To circumvent that problem, he observed that the societies of Melanesia, Micronesia, and tropical Polynesia were Neolithic at the time of European contact because agriculture was ubiquitous while metals were effectively absent. Many of these island societies lacked pottery, and some did not produce stone adzes; the great majority, however, had at least one or the other in addition to agriculture. On the other side of the ledger, there were also hunting-and-gathering societies in the region that made pottery (the Andaman Islanders) or polished stone adzes (Australian Aborigines, South Island Maoris), but no hunter-gatherers who made both. Accordingly, Neolithic agricultural groups could be neatly distinguished from stone-using hunter-gatherers in the region based on the presence of at least two of these three indicators: pecked or ground stone adzes, pottery, and evidence of agriculture. In *Man’s Conquest of the Pacific*, Bellwood applied his “two out of three” criterion to recognize Neolithic sites in the Southeast Asian archaeological record.

Considered this way, the Neolithic period for Southeast Asia as a whole lasted from around 8,000 years ago till about 2,000 years ago, although in any locality the Neolithic

lasted only one to four millennia. There are two reasons for this discrepancy. First, the markers of the Neolithic did not arise simultaneously across Southeast Asia but instead appeared some 4,000 years earlier in the borderlands with China than in Indonesia. Second, mainland Southeast Asia had a true Bronze Age that commenced at some point between 2000 and 1500 B.C.E. and lasted till the arrival of iron. However, there is minimal evidence for bronze in southern Thailand or island Southeast Asia before iron reached those places in the centuries after 500 B.C.E. Examples (all dates are approximate) include the following. In North Vietnam and northern Thailand, the Neolithic lasted from 6000 to 2000 B.C.E., whereas in Taiwan it lasted from 4200 to 200 B.C.E. For central Thailand and Cambodia, it occurred between 4000 and 2000 B.C.E.; in the Malay Peninsula and Borneo, 2500 and 500 B.C.E.; in the Philippines, 2000 and 200 B.C.E.; and in eastern Indonesia, 1500 and 1 B.C.E.

The oldest signs of the Neolithic in North Vietnam and northern Thailand are associated with the last local phase of the stone-working tradition known as the Hoabinhian. Hoabinhian tools were made by knocking flakes off river pebbles to leave a tough edge useful for tasks such as woodworking. By 6000 or possibly even as early as 8000 B.C.E., these edges were sometimes made still more durable by polishing them, especially in a group of sites north of Hanoi, assigned to the Bacsonian subtradition. By 5500 B.C.E. pottery was common in North Vietnam. It bore cord markings on the outer surface from being beaten by a paddle wrapped in matting before the vessels were hardened through drying and firing. Also, traces of rice, possibly a cultivated variety, have been found in Xom Trai, a Hoabinhian site near Hanoi. Spirit Cave, located at the far north of Thailand, has revealed similar indications. Fragments of canarium nuts, betel nuts, bottle gourds, and other economically useful plants have been discovered in levels dated to between 7500 and 5500 B.C.E. At about 6000 B.C.E., cord-marked pottery appeared along with polished stone adzes and small slate knives.

The sites referred to above are rock shelters that were occupied most likely by hunter-gatherers who obtained their Neolithic items through exchange with agricultural groups living nearby in hamlets. Archaeologists are very

lucky if they can find hamlets whose traces are preserved in a recognizable form, and the oldest known, open-air Neolithic sites are dated to around 5000 B.C.E. Several sites along the coast of North Vietnam, with pottery and stone tools similar to those found in late Hoabinhian rock shelters, fit the bill. Population growth during later times is suggested by the mounds, of one to three hectares in area, that lie a short distance upstream from Hanoi and that are related to the Phung Nguyễn culture (about 2500 to 1500 B.C.E.). Excavations at these sites have revealed a full Neolithic culture represented by abundant adzes and other artifacts of polished stone, a wide range of pottery styles, and rice grains.

On the Khorat Plateau, in northeast Thailand, pollen records reflect an increase in fires and forest clearance after 4500 B.C.E.; this is evidence left by early slash-and-burn farmers who had colonized the forests of the plateau. Its oldest known villages, Ban Chiang and Non Nok Tha, date back to 3500 to 2000 B.C.E., a period when pots, stone adzes, and shell beads were buried with the dead. Cord-marked pottery is definitely present in the region by 4000 B.C.E., as recovered from Laang Span in Cambodia. In eastern Cambodia and southwestern Vietnam, archaeologists have found upwards of thirty-one circular earthworks with an average area of 3.8 hectares. Radiocarbon dates on charcoal from these ancient villages range from about 2500 to 300 B.C.E.—that is, the Neolithic to the early Iron Age, as supported by the artifacts at the sites. Adzes and other tools of stone greatly outnumber the rare Iron Age finds such as a garnet bead and several glass ornaments. The pottery may be cord-marked, incised, and stamped with geometric motifs, or covered with a red wash of clay after the vessels had been fired (red-slipped). Rice impressions and charred rice husks can sometimes be observed in the vessel walls.

Archaeologists used to believe that bronze metallurgy evolved on the Khorat Plateau by 2500 B.C.E., but its appearance is now dated to between 2000 and 1500 B.C.E. Bronze did not immediately diffuse to south-central Thailand, where two exemplary Neolithic sites—Khok Phanom Di and Ban Kao—were both occupied between 2000 and 1500 B.C.E. Khok Phanom Di is a large mound, five hectares in area, made up of the debris from repeated phases of habitation. Its hundreds (probably thousands) of hu-

man burials were furnished with mortuary pots, some of them true masterpieces; an extraordinary abundance of shell jewelry; pebbles used in burnishing pottery; stone adzes; and the oldest known asbestos cloth in the world. The female master potters may have been held in higher esteem than any other residents at Khok Phanom Di. The subsistence economy was based on the natural resources that abounded in the marine and coastal habitat near the site; rice, either locally cultivated or imported, was also consumed. Ban Kao is a smaller mound (two hectares) renowned for its burials furnished with a wide range of cord-marked and incised pots, including vessel types that are otherwise best known in China and Taiwan, as well as a variety of stone adzes and ornaments of bone, stone, or shell. The concept of a Ban Kao “culture” is often extended to cover similar grave goods dated between 2000 and 500 B.C.E. in the Malay Peninsula.

The Neolithic originated in Malaya (and Sarawak) earlier than the mortuary assemblages related to Ban Kao. By 4000 B.C.E. in Malaya and in Sarawak around 8000 B.C.E., polished edges on pebble tools (similar to Bacsonian examples) were made. In Malaya, Gua Kechil yielded potshards and stone adzes that may date back to 3000 B.C.E., while the huge mounds of shellfish refuse (the vestiges of thousands of meals) at Guar Kepah contained necked adzes of stone and small numbers of potshards. The Guar Kepah middens lie seven kilometers inland and were probably built up during a period of higher sea levels between 3000 and 2000 B.C.E. In Sarawak as well, the full Neolithic used to be dated back to 3000 B.C.E., based on radiocarbon dates from the bones of people buried with pots and stone adzes at the famous site of Niah Caves. True, radiocarbon dates on burial containers and pieces of wood in the graves all postdate 2000 B.C.E., and rice grains found in the pots are younger than 1000 B.C.E. However, another cave in Sarawak, Gua Sireh, contains a Neolithic layer dated to about 2500 B.C.E. from its radiocarbon dates, including one on rice from a potshard. This Neolithic layer has enough rice husks to suggest that rice was locally cultivated. The cord-marked and carved decorations on the pots are very similar to examples from Thailand and Malaya.

Plain and red-slipped rather than cord-marked pottery characterized the Neolithic

sites in the south and east of Sarawak. The immediate origins for this tradition appear to lie in Taiwan. The relevant cultures are the Yüan-shan of north Taiwan (ca. 2500 to 700 B.C.E.), the Lungshanoid of west Taiwan (ca. 2500 to 500 B.C.E.), and the late Neolithic/Iron Age of southeast Taiwan (ca. 1500–1 B.C.E.). Yüan-shan artifacts include stone adzes, spearheads, and arrowheads of polished slate; stone bark-cloth beaters; clay spindle whorls; and red-slipped, stamped, and incised pottery that lacks cord marking. Lungshanoid sites contain red cord-marked pottery in a variety of forms very similar to those found in China at the time, reaping knives of slate, and a material culture otherwise similar to that found in Yüan-shan sites. The late Neolithic in southeast Taiwan has pottery related to the Yüan-shan plain ware. However, jade was the stone of choice in the manufacture of adzes, chisels, projectile points, and ornaments such as earrings, beads, and bracelets. One site, Pei-nan, grew to an area of eight hectares as the inhabitants constructed storehouses and homes of slate and other stone, and buried thousands of family members within the village precincts.

These cultures had apparently evolved from Taiwan's "mother" Neolithic culture, the Ta-p'en-k'eng, established by 4200 B.C.E. Ta-p'en-k'eng pottery is similar to the pottery found in shellfish middens in southeast China at that time, suggesting an origin in China. Neolithic agriculture in Taiwan is indicated by forest clearance at around 3000 B.C.E. in central Taiwan, rice impressions in pottery dated to about 2500 B.C.E. in south Taiwan, and the Lungshanoid reaping knives. Pei-nan, in particular, must have been a permanent settlement based on farming; clay figurines of pigs and dogs probably reflect the farm animals kept at the site.

The Neolithic of northern Luzon at the north of the Philippines can evidently be derived from Taiwan. Plain and red-slipped pottery arrived as early as 2500 B.C.E., in one case associated with the outlines of two small huts, but without evidence of stone adzes or agriculture. Polished stone adzes may have appeared by 2000 B.C.E., based on finds from estuarine shellfish middens. The pottery in these middens has decorations similar to the Yüan-shan repertoire, and some vessels stood on a circular footring (as found on many Taiwan pots). Red-

slipped shards, sometimes with rice chaff in the fabric, as well as ceramic stoves and spindle whorls, are dated to about 1500 B.C.E. at Andarayan. At Arku Cave, beginning at 1500 B.C.E., burials were furnished with a range of goods: pottery similar to the Pei-nan wares, clay spindle whorls, earrings (including two of jade) and beads of stone and shell, a bark-cloth beater, and adzes of stone. In addition, projectile points of slate occur as surface finds in Luzon.

If the Luzon Neolithic can be regarded as a poorer version of the Taiwan Neolithic, this attenuation becomes even more marked south of Luzon. Only the Kalumpang sites on the western coast of Sulawesi echo many of the same features. Kamassi, which probably dates to slightly before 1000 B.C.E., contains a range of stone adzes, as well as knives and spearheads of slate, bark-cloth beaters, and possible reaping knives of stone, clay figurines, and a remarkable range of red-slipped and decorated pottery, including vessels with ring feet. Minanga Sipakko, dated to 1000 to 500 B.C.E., has yielded a smaller range of the same goods. Both sites would have been hamlets about one-tenth of a hectare in area. Domestic pig remains from Kamassi reflect the role that farming played in the economy (in addition to fishing and hunting).

Otherwise, south of Luzon the pattern is one of occasional Neolithic goods being added to the locally established, pre-Neolithic material culture. In the southern Philippines, shell adzes and ornaments appeared before 4000 B.C.E. at Duyong Cave in Palawan, while shell artifacts were made at other sites in Palawan and Mindanao during preceramic times. One Duyong burial dated to 3000 B.C.E. or slightly later was furnished with particularly fine shell goods and a polished stone adze. Lack of evidence for pottery or agriculture in the southern Philippines of the same antiquity prevents the Duyong burial from being considered Neolithic; presumably, the stone adze had been imported from a distant overseas location (Vietnam or Taiwan). Shell adzes were also made prior to 6000 B.C.E. on the tiny island of Gebe, which lies east of Halmahera at the northeastern extremity of Maluku, while in East Timor shell beads were being produced by 4000 B.C.E. In both cases, these fine shell artifacts appeared millennia before the first traces of the Neolithic. Simpler artifacts of shell, with a broken edge evidently used for scraping, frequently oc-

cur in prepottery contexts in Java, southwest Sulawesi, and East Timor. The production of shell artifacts was widespread in the region between the southern Philippines, Indonesia, and East Timor both before and after the Neolithic.

Pottery appeared widely in the Indonesian region at approximately 2000 B.C.E., but with few indications of an immediate change in other aspects of material culture. For example, Leang Tuwo Mane'e, in the islands between Mindanao and Sulawesi, possessed pottery perhaps as early as 2500 B.C.E. In Agop Atas in Sabah, northeastern Borneo, the oldest pottery may date to 2000 B.C.E.; in Ulu Leang 1 and Leang Burung 1 in southwestern Sulawesi, pottery arrived between 2000 and 1500 B.C.E.; in East Timor, the oldest pottery dates to between 2500 and 2000 B.C.E. The earliest pottery at these locations is always plain, or occasionally red-slipped. Domesticated pig is present in East Timor by 1500 B.C.E., and water buffalo (or cattle) in southwestern Sulawesi by 1000 B.C.E.; the oldest polished stone tools or indications of cultivated plants, however, would seem to be later arrivals in both cases.

In other places, however, there are signs of the appearance of a "Neolithic package," which suggests the actual migration of groups of people as opposed to the mere exchange of novel material goods. On Kayoa, a tiny island near Halmahera in Maluku, a clearly intrusive culture appeared by 1500 B.C.E., represented by red-slipped pottery, polished adzes, shell beads and bracelets, and the remains of domesticated pigs and dogs. Especially remarkable is the Neolithic occupation of Bukit Tengkorak in Sabah, between approximately 1000 and 300 B.C.E. In addition to the presence of pottery and stone adzes, the inhabitants operated a shell industry producing the same items found at Kayoa; they imported obsidian from New Britain in Melanesia, approximately 3,000 kilometers to the east. These sites definitely point to a community of maritime traders who were widely established in the South Seas by 1,000 B.C.E. The direct antecedents of this community may have been responsible for the widespread occurrence of pottery by around 2000 B.C.E. in island Southeast Asia.

Since writing *Man's Conquest of the Pacific*, Peter Bellwood has increasingly identified the rapid spread of pottery across island Southeast Asia with the migration of early Austronesian

speakers. If he is correct, these migrating groups would have possessed the material equivalent of the words that can be reconstructed at each stage in the early diversification of Austronesian—words related to agriculture (especially rice), domesticated animals, watercraft, housing, arts and crafts, and so forth. Accordingly, pottery by itself would imply pottery plus agriculture and therefore a Neolithic economy. This is the basis for Bellwood's view that the combination of population growth fueled by agriculture and seaworthy watercraft permitted early Austronesians to migrate from southeast China to Taiwan and the South Seas, before fanning out across the Pacific. A more cautious approach, however, would require archaeological evidence of the items reconstructed as words in early Austronesian to be confident that the site was inhabited by early Austronesians and not people who spoke another language. It can also be pointed out that the tree and root crops that formed the basis for agricultural systems in the Pacific must have originated in island Southeast Asia or Melanesia. Either these crops had been domesticated in these regions before the migration of pottery-making Austronesians, or the Austronesian migrants would have been dependent on local knowledge in rapidly switching from their rice-centered subsistence economy to roots, palms, and other tree crops.

This is a major point of review today—that is, whether the movement of pottery through island Southeast Asia and into adjacent parts of the Pacific is sufficient evidence to identify a migratory movement of farming populations, and if so, the nature of the transformations involved in the movement from Taiwan to the Pacific. A similar debate reverberates on mainland Southeast Asia, where Austro-Asiatic languages are widely spoken, and authorities take different positions on relating Austro-asiatic to the spread of the Neolithic. Sarawak is critical in this discussion, as some of its languages seem to incorporate an Austro-asiatic element, in agreement with the apparent derivation of its Neolithic from the mainland, yet all indigenous Sarawak languages are today Austronesian. A very important technical advance for archaeologists lies in their awareness that phytoliths, the microscopic silica skeletons of plant cells, preserve well in archaeological sites, and in many cases they can be identified as to genus, species, and cultivated versus wild variety. Phytoliths

thus have the potential to reveal the true history of plant domestication in Southeast Asia. This would represent a major advance on educated guesswork based on pottery and stone adzes, the chance recovery of rice grains and other perishable plant remains, and current efforts to lock together Southeast Asia's indigenous languages and its Neolithic period.

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See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Ban Chiang; Ban Kao Culture; Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; Niah Caves (Sarawak); Tabon Cave (Palawan)

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NETHERLANDS (DUTCH) EAST INDIES

The Netherlands East Indies as a territorial unit, like most polities in Southeast Asia, crystallized only toward the end of the nineteenth century. During the days of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), "Indies" was a generic term for this area of operation of the company. According to its charter, the region comprised all seas and countries east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of Nagasaki in southern Japan. The scattered VOC establishments along the Asian coasts formed a maritime trading empire. During the first years of the Dutch East India Company, large territorial conquests were rare, but soon the VOC strived to dominate the production of cash crops and the elimination of competitors. Within several decades, the VOC conquered the main spice-growing areas in the Moluccas (Maluku) and Ceylon (Sri Lanka); it subdued the main commercial centers in the archipelago, and regulated trade in many other products by force.

The VOC maritime empire revolved administratively around Batavia, taken in 1619, and economically around the spice-producing is-

lands and the intra-Asian trade system. Since their first ventures into Asian waters, Dutch interests and forces have always been concentrated in the Indonesian archipelago. A certain sense of *mare nostrum* crystallized in the VOC headquarters concerning the central waters of the Indonesian archipelago. Although virtually uncontrollable, the VOC considered the coasts bordering the Java and Banda Seas as their sphere of influence. Foreign adventures into the archipelago were eyed with suspicion. Thus an embryonic concept of archipelagic integrity already existed far before the Dutch government even aspired—or was able—to conquer and rule all the islands. The only major territorial acquisition in the eighteenth century was along the north coast (*pasisir*) and the western highlands (Priangan, Preanger) of Java.

The period between 1780 and 1825 saw a swift contraction of the Dutch Indies. During the Anglo-Dutch War of 1780–1784 and later during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) the British took over many Dutch posts at the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, the establishments along the Indian coasts, and Melaka. They also occupied most establishments in the archipelago, but these were returned to The Netherlands in 1816. Henceforth, Dutch colonial efforts concentrated on the Indonesian archipelago. The Netherlands East Indies government inherited many of the strategic policies and operations from the VOC, but also extended and refined its system of exploitation. For most of the nineteenth century, Dutch efforts concentrated on Java, in particular the indigo, coffee, and later increasingly sugar, tobacco, and tea production.

The administration of colonial affairs was done by a surprisingly small number of officials. The administrative corps that dealt with most indigenous affairs in Java and Madura, the Corps Binnenlandsch Bestuur, consisted of only 158 men in 1850; forty years later this number had grown to a mere 277 (Van den Doel 1996: 94). More significant was the military, who made up the largest part of the European immigrants until the late nineteenth century. Administration was efficient and had limited aims: to maintain order and extract the produce from the land. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Java acquired its dominant position in the economic policies of the East Indies government. The spice monopolies from the Moluc-

can islands lost their profitability and were abandoned later in the nineteenth century. It was the sugar, indigo, coffee, tobacco, and later tea from Java that constituted the main assets of the Netherlands Indies. These cash crops were to be cultivated by the local inhabitants and delivered to the government as taxes. This so-called Cultivation System had its heyday during the period from 1830 to 1870, but for certain products the system of forced deliveries was stopped only much later.

The period around 1870 brought fundamental changes in the Dutch presence in the archipelago. Technological changes such as steamshipping, railways, and rapid-fire weapons facilitated communications, conquest, and exploitation. These years also brought a transition from the old system of state monopolization and taxation in crops to a more liberal economy. The government retreated from the market and terminated—in gradual stages—the system of forced deliveries. This opened opportunities to private entrepreneurs, who were now allowed to establish estates on unused grounds in Java, but soon also extended their range of activities to other parts of the archipelago.

The Netherlands Indies went through a phase of conquest, which, unlike the imperialistic programs of other European states, remained limited to the existing Dutch sphere of influence, in the so-called Outer Islands of the Indonesian archipelago. Campaigns against local rulers were launched in rapid succession. The territorial conquests were finalized only toward 1910. This meant that large parts of the archipelago had known colonial rule for only one or at most two generations, and that when Dutch rule reached its nadir in the 1940s, many elderly people still had lively memories of pre-colonial times. Besides, many areas outside Java were indirectly ruled, leaving local authority structures at least nominally intact.

Economic interests and military conquest went hand in hand. The Netherlands Indies government issued its first mining and estate concessions in Belitung and in Sumatra from 1850. A new plantation system was established in Deli, in northeast Sumatra, based on contracts between entrepreneurs and the sultan and using imported coolie labor from Java and China. The advent of new products such as oil and rubber from Sumatra and Borneo (Kalimantan) triggered the rise of large capital in the Indies,

which eventually overshadowed the “old,” largely family-based capital of the Java sugar plantations. After (and sometimes preceding) the subjection of the islands outside Java, Dutch and other foreign entrepreneurs and companies moved in. Backed by Dutch capital and a well-developed system of labor recruitment in Java and China, they capitalized on the growing demands for new products in the world. Centers of activity remained largely confined to Sumatra, Riau, and southeast Kalimantan.

Around the turn of the twentieth century, the Netherlands Indies entered a new phase. Rather than exploitation, the tasks of the government were to be directed toward development of the country, to the benefit of its people. Under this so-called Ethical Policy, which was launched in 1901, the Indies government greatly expanded its efforts in building an infrastructure and developing an educational system. The number of schools for the Indonesian inhabitants grew quickly, and the country became the domain of engineers and educators.

Dutch migration to the Indies never became massive, but the increasing presence of Europeans, especially after 1910, had a strong impact on the cities. New architectural styles, motorized traffic, radio, cinema, and the mechanization of daily life were primarily associated with the Western presence, but they also affected Indonesian circles, where these modernisms became the subject of heated debate. Colonial presence remained very uneven throughout the archipelago. During the 1920s and 1930s, Dutch presence became predominant in the big urban centers on Java and Sumatra. In 1930 the European population of the Netherlands Indies numbered about 240,000; 71 percent had been born in the Indies (de Jong 1998: 410). The Indonesians numbered 59 million, and Chinese and others grouped under the label “foreign orientals” 1.3 million (Ricklefs 2001: 197). The great majority of the Dutch lived in the main urban centers on Java. Outside the cities, Dutch presence was felt only indirectly.

Unification and modernization triggered Indonesian nationalism. The first “nationalist” stirrings were still expressions of regional sectionalism and strove for cultural self-assertion in the face of foreign dominance and modernization—for example, the Javanese organization Boedi Oetomo (Budi Utomo, Noble Endeavor, 1908). The first political party that explicitly ad-

vocated independence for the Indies was the Indische Partij (1912), which interestingly had a large Eurasian (Indo-European) leadership and following. In its wake was the Sarekat Islam, which promoted the emancipation of the Indonesian people through education. It succeeded in attracting an enormous following of perhaps 700,000 members in 1916 and had branches in many parts of the Indies (de Jong 1998: 451). Initially the Netherlands Indies government reacted positively on these new appeals. It instituted a *Volksraad* (People’s Advisory Council) and developed plans for further democratization and emancipation of the Indies.

But developments went too slow for many activists, and positions quickly radicalized, resulting in mass meetings and strikes. The government proved to be adamantly opposed to any suggestion of independence or sedition, and it resorted to repression. Leaders of the Indische Partij were exiled, instigators of strikes were imprisoned, and plans for political reforms giving the Netherlands Indies a larger autonomy were shelved in 1920. In these circumstances, the more radical movements of communists and Islamists thrived. After abortive communist uprisings in 1926–1927, all nationalist stirrings were answered by repression. Nationalist leaders spent most of the 1930s in detention or exile.

For the last decade of its existence, colonial inhabitants could live fairly unclouded lives in the colony and close their eyes to the anticolonial ideology. As Governor-General Bonifacius C. de Jonge (t. 1931–1936) remarked in 1936: “Another three hundred years must pass, ere the Indies will perhaps be ready for some form of autonomy” (Van den Doel 1996: 244). With only a token democracy through the *Volksraad* and with Dutchmen dominating the administration, the Netherlands Indies government failed to develop a strong Indonesian civil service. The Indonesian road to freedom was one of anticolonialist struggle, not of an administrative takeover, and this has left an indelible mark on the Indonesian state.

The Netherlands East Indies was lost to the Dutch in the early months of 1942, when Japanese forces invaded the archipelago; the Dutch Indies government surrendered on 9 March at Kalijati. Most Dutch and other Europeans were removed from public life and imprisoned by the Japanese. In the perception of the Indonesian peoples, the Netherlands East Indies had ceased

to exist. Government, media, propaganda, and nationalist leaders referred to “Indonesia,” which had been the accepted name for the archipelago since the nationalist meetings of the late 1920s.

After the surrender of Japan in August 1945, the territories of the former East Indies became even more fragmented. The nationalist leaders proclaimed independence on 17 August and used the power vacuum before the arrival of Allied troops to bring large parts of Java under their control and set up republican organizations in the other islands. The revolutionary republican government controlled large parts of Java until the end of 1948, when Dutch attacks drove them from most of their strongholds. Because of increasing international pressure, the Dutch government consented in new negotiations and eventually transferred its sovereignty to the republic in December 1949. For some years the Dutch kept up the fiction of a Dutch-Indonesian Union, until President Soekarno (Sukarno) (t. 1947–1967) unilaterally cancelled the treaty in 1956. Under both military threat from Soekarno and international pressure, the last remainder of the former Netherlands Indies, Dutch New Guinea (Irian Barat or Papua), was ceded to Indonesia in 1962–1963. The Dutch East Indies had ceased to exist.

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See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Batavia (Sunda Kalapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Boedi Oetama (Budi Utomo) (1908); Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Ethical Policy (*Ethische Politiek*); “Indonesia”; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Irian Jaya (West Irian); Maluku (The Moluccas); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Sarekat Islam (1912); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Spices and the Spice Trade; Sugar; Tobacco; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); *Volksraad* (People’s Council) (1918–1942)

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NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP) (1971–1990)

The New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced in response to the May 13, 1969 incident. One of the reasons given as a cause of the Sino-Malay clashes was disparity in economic opportunities among the different communities. The objectives of the NEP, therefore, were to eradicate the identification of people according to race, geography, and their economic activities. For example, the Malays were often identified as rice growers who lived in rural areas, Indians were associated with the production of rubber in estates, and the Chinese were known as businessmen and entrepreneurs living in urban areas. This generalization created a mindset that affected the different communities

socially as well as psychologically. Second, the NEP aimed at eradicating poverty among all and integrating the different communities.

The government introduced various economic plans to realize the NEP. These were five-year plans, and a midterm evaluation was conducted to monitor each plan. The NEP commenced from the Second Malaysia Plan, which was undertaken from 1971 to 1975. Thereafter followed the Third Malaysia Plan (1976–1980), the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981–1985), and the Fifth Malaysia Plan (1986–1990).

The objectives and approaches of the NEP were varied and changed from phase to phase to achieve specific aims. They were mainly targeted to improve the economy of the Malays, while the interests and welfare of the other communities were not sidelined.

After twenty years of the NEP, the government aimed at achieving 20 percent equity for the Malays. Although clear improvements were shown, a midterm study of the Fifth Malaysia Plan revealed that the target was not attained. Consequently a decade-long Development Plan (1991–2000) with new strategies was then introduced to achieve the ultimate aims of eradicating poverty and increasing Malay participation in the economy.

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See also Abdul Razak, Tun (1922–1976); Mahathir bin Mohamad, Dr. (1925–); Malayan/Malaysian Education; “May 13, 1969” (Malaysia)

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NEW ECONOMIC ZONES (NEZs) (VIETNAM)

New Economic Zones were urban population relocation programs implemented in South

Vietnam and instituted by the revolutionary government after the fall of Saigon in 1975. The program did not attain much success.

One of the first policies undertaken by the communist regime following reunification of Vietnam, this program was based on the post-war situation and an attempt to organize human resources. On the one hand, because of more than ten years of war—the Second Indochina War (1964–1975)—millions of persons were displaced and many were eventually attracted to urban areas. The cities, and especially Saigon (with 4 million inhabitants at this time), were too crowded, accounting for almost two-thirds of the South Vietnamese population. Moreover, the unemployment rate increased with the “liberation,” notably in proportion to the demobilization of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), or Saigon army. On the other hand, the agricultural sector had to be boosted, and many rural areas reconverted from war zone to zone of production.

In theory, the relocation program was simple. Some 1.5 million people had to leave Hồ Chí Minh City (Saigon) by the end of 1976 for new rural settlements located in the north of the former capital urban area—namely, the provinces of Dong Nai, Song Be, and Tay Ninh. The authorities provided transportation, land and a small house, some tools, and rice for the first few months. In practice, despite some well-known achievements, the undertaking was not easy. The land sometimes had to be cleared of land mines or was not very fertile, and the work was always hard. When the task became too burdensome or the obstacles too insurmountable, settlers drifted from the land. Consequently, objectives were periodically downgraded.

New Economic Zones were not a new idea. In the 1960s, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) incorporated a resettlement program in its first development plan. In 1976, too, the program had been set within the new development plan and relocation extended to the national level.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY (NPA)

The New People's Army is the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). It was organized in 1969 and adopted a strategy of protracted people's war. It survived government attempts to crush it and rose to be a serious threat by 1984. With the collapse of the Marcos government (1965–1986) it weakened, but it gained strength in the late 1990s with the failure of President Joseph Estrada (t. 1998–2000) to institute effective government.

The New People's Army was born out of the merger of remnants of the Huk peasant movement and the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1969. Bernabe Buscayno (1943–) led the Huks, while Jose Ma. Sison (1939–) headed the Communist Party of the Philippines. The NPA was officially formed on 26 December 1969, the anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth; it was separate from the pre-Pacific War (1941–1945) Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP, Communist Party of the Philippines), which was based on peasant leadership and Russian communist thought. Sison and Buscayno, unhappy with the PKP leadership, organized the CPP-NPA, which was oriented along Maoist lines and led by young intellectuals, mostly university educated.

The NPA was placed under the leadership of Buscayno, alias Commander Dante, and adopted a strategy of protracted people's war following the Maoist model. It started with only ten rifles, but it soon began ambushing government military forces.

Government forces attacked and almost overwhelmed the NPA camp, but its members moved to Isabela Province, where they established a revolutionary base. Violent dispersals of antigovernment rallies in early 1970 led several student radicals to join the NPA. The NPA was further bolstered by the defection on 29 December 1970 of Lieutenant Victor Corpuz, an idealistic army officer disillusioned with the government. He brought with him several automatic rifles from the armory of the Philippine Military Academy.

Government forces launched major attacks that forced the NPA to hold a "Long March"

along the Sierra Madre Mountains toward the Bicol region of Luzon, a march that lasted for fourteen months. The NPA established contact with sympathetic governments and managed to obtain firearms. The government, however, succeeded in seizing one of those shipments. This, as well as the bombing of a political rally in Manila in August 1971, which was blamed on the NPA, served as one of the reasons for President Ferdinand Marcos to declare martial law in 1972.

In 1974, the CPP leadership centralized party leadership but decentralized NPA operations. NPA guerrilla groups were given autonomy, in view of difficulties in communication. In Metro Manila, so-called Sparrow Units attacked corrupt policemen and seized their weapons. Ambushes of government military forces in the provinces also yielded weapons as the guerrilla army spread throughout the Philippines, thriving on socioeconomic discontent. Following the CPP line, it opposed imperialism, U.S. neocolonialism, the presence of U.S. military bases, and the Philippine government and elite, all of which contributed to social injustice in the Philippines.

Government campaigns during the Martial Law era (1972–1981) under President Ferdinand Marcos (t. 1965–1986) led to the surrender in 1976 of Victor Corpuz, and the capture in 1977 of both Sison and Buscayno. Sison and Buscayno were given the death sentence by a military court, but the sentence was not carried out. Despite their capture, second-generation CPP and NPA leaders carried on. By 1980 the CPP claimed that it had established twenty-six guerrilla fronts nationwide (Mediansky 1986: 1). The Philippine armed forces estimated the strength of the NPA as 16,000 regulars (*ibid.*). By 1984 the CPP claimed that the NPA was operating in sixty-three of the country's seventy-three provinces (*ibid.*: 3). The NPA initiated 2,700 armed encounters, compared with 1,000 initiated by government forces (*ibid.*: 1).

In its operations, the NPA used selective terror against local officials, known criminals, abusive landlords, and businesses, collecting so-called revolutionary taxes. Failure to pay resulted in destruction of property or death.

As Marcos began to lose popularity, increased military operations led to human rights abuses. Paramilitary forces, organized by civilians, exacted revenge against their enemies. De-

teriorating economic conditions further depressed living conditions among the poor, and affected persons sought refuge with the NPA. In 1984 the NPA was rated as a serious threat and no longer merely an irritant.

The NPA remained a threat until 1986, when Marcos was deposed. President Corazon Aquino (t. 1986–1992) began formal negotiations for a cease-fire and released political prisoners, including Sison and Buscayno. Military campaigns led to the capture, in 1986, of Rodolfo Salas, then the NPA commander.

Lack of communications and overly autonomous units resulted in breakaway groups that did not follow the CPP's general strategy. This led to disunity and suspicion, resulting in large-scale purges that cost the NPA several key cadres and revolutionary fighters. Government programs under Presidents Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos (t. 1992–1998) furthered the NPA's decline. Worsening economic conditions brought about by the Asian currency crisis (1997–1998) and misgovernment under President Joseph Estrada, however, have contributed to the revival of the NPA in recent years.

The NPA was a successor to the Huk rebellion of the late 1940s in the sense that it was antigovernment and sought socioeconomic reforms. The NPA is, however, based on Maoism, guided by the *Red Book*. Its founders were not peasants but young intellectual leaders, from leading universities, seeking a revolutionary new order.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also China since 1949; Communism; Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon) (People's Anti-Japanese Army) (1942); Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989); Martial Law (1972–1981) (The Philippines); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia

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**NEW SOCIETY MOVEMENT
(KILUSANG BAGONG
LIPUNAN, KBL)**

The New Society Movement was a political party created by Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos (t. 1965–1986) during the period of Martial Law (1972–1981). It was organized to provide a political party loyal to Marcos for upcoming elections, and to maintain Marcos's hold on the government. It became the dominant power during Marcos's term as president but declined into obscurity after Marcos was ousted from power in 1986.

During the early years of martial law in the Philippines, President Marcos wielded executive, legislative, and judicial powers. With the closure of the legislature, Marcos's decrees and proclamations had the force of law. Following criticisms of Marcos's one-man rule, however, together with the adoption of a new constitution that provided for a national legislature, Marcos decided to establish a transitional national assembly. The national assembly would be called the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP, Interim National Assembly), and its creation would show that Marcos was no longer ruling single-handedly. The legislature, however, would have to be loyal to Marcos.

Toward this end, in February 1978, Marcos formally created the New Society Movement, or Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), which was duly registered with the Commission on Elections. This was just in time for the upcoming elections for the IBP. Marcos claimed that the KBL would be an umbrella organization that would include the pre-Martial Law parties such as the Nacionalista and Liberal Parties. The old political parties did not become absorbed by the KBL, however, and the KBL ended up as a new party.

It derived its name from the phrase *Bagong Lipunan* ("new society"), which Marcos claimed he was establishing with the Martial Law regime: a new society in the sense that it would be rid of the old society's ills, such as graft and corruption, indiscipline, lack of respect for authority, a sociopolitical-economic order dominated by traditional landowning rul-

ing families (oligarchs), and patronage politics. In practice, however, the KBL was composed of old politicians to give a semblance of democracy and normalcy to Marcos's one-man rule.

The KBL was not clearly defined at first, beyond being a political party. It had no organizational by-laws until 1980, and Marcos treated the body as a party or a coalition movement depending on the situation. It became the dominant party and most formidable political organization during the Martial Law period, and its power extended to government employees, who were advised by their superiors to join in order to benefit from political patronage and other favors. As Marcos's own party, it had access to money and other resources for its political campaigns.

Although Marcos claimed that it brought in new politics, it was actually a new manifestation of the old patron-client political system. The KBL's secretary-general was Jose Roño, who was minister of local government and thus in a position to reward patronage and loyalty. "Old Society" politicians reemerged in local politics, although publicly the controlled media criticized such politicians.

The KBL's first political participation was in the 7 April 1978 IBP elections. Led by Marcos's wife, Imelda Romualdez Marcos (1930–), the KBL won 185 seats in the IBP, losing only 14 seats. The election was marred by charges of fraud and irregularities. Three days after the election, only 10 percent of the vote in Manila had been tallied, whereas before martial law the whole Manila area would have been counted within twenty-four hours.

The KBL participated in the next elections held under martial law, an election for local officials held on 30 January 1980. In this election, the first since 1972, sixty-nine of seventy-three gubernatorial posts were won by the KBL. In May 1984, the KBL joined the elections for the regular national assembly. A majority of the seats were again won by the KBL, but opposition politicians made a significant showing, emphasizing the growing disaffection with Marcos.

The KBL machinery supported Marcos in the February 1986 snap election. With Marcos's ousting, the party lost visibility and fell into decline. Pro-Marcos loyalists in the party continued to support Marcos, and they joined in the coup attempts against Corazon Aquino

(1933–). With the crushing of those attempts, the KBL became a relic of Marcos's Martial Law regime.

The KBL was superficially meant to introduce new politics into the Philippines, but it merely served as a tool to legitimize Marcos's Martial Law regime. As such it maintained and even encouraged patronage in government, thus keeping with it the old order.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Aquino, Corazon Cojuangco (1933–); EDSA Revolution; Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989); Martial Law (1972–1981) (The Philippines); Patron-Client Relations

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**"NEW VILLAGES"
(MALAYA/MALAYSIA)**

During the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), Britain realized that the key to defeating the communist forces was to isolate them from their predominantly Chinese squatter support base. Hence, from 1950 to 1954, under the "Briggs Plan," approximately half a million people were resettled in "New Villages." This scheme was pivotal to the defeat of the communist forces in Malaya. It also served as a model for other insurgency wars.

In 1950, as director of operations, Lieutenant General Harold Briggs initiated the Briggs Plan: the consolidation of isolated squatters into secure, economically viable villages in areas away from communist influence. The economic boom consequent of the Korean War (1950–1953) greatly facilitated resettlement, and within a year 331,000 people were resettled in 315 villages (Coates 1992: 99). High Commissioner General Sir Gerald Templer (t. 1952–1954) continued support for the development of New

Villages. He emphasized that the villages should provide a new and better life so that those villagers would become citizens integrated into mainstream society.

Facilities in each village typically included access to agricultural land, water supply, a school, sanitation, a community center, a dispensary, and electricity. A sound village economy was the most important factor for success. However, Malay opposition to the granting of permanent land title to New Villagers limited their access to agricultural land. Many villagers were to switch from farming to better-paid employment on estates and mines. Security arrangements for villages included barbed-wire fences, food rationing and control, searches, and a Home Guard. Intelligence networks identified communist sympathizers.

The communist forces were singularly unsuccessful in opposing resettlement, and, cut off from support, they retreated deeper into the jungle. By 1961, toward the end of the Emergency, 573,000 people had been resettled in more than 500 New Villages (Stubbs 1989: 169, 262; Coates 1992: 104). The United States applied the "New Village" concept in Vietnam in the Strategic Hamlet program, though without the same success.

IAN K. SMITH

See also Briggs Plan; Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Strategic Hamlet Program (Vietnam); Templer, General Sir Gerald (1898–1979)

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NEWSPAPERS AND MASS MEDIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The history of newspapers in Southeast Asia is closely intertwined with the modern political history of the region. Printing presses came with the colonial powers, and the first broad-

sheets served the commercial interests of the colonists. Missionaries focused on the local people and began the vernacular press, which, ironically, by the turn of the twentieth century, had developed into nationalist publications supporting independence movements. The postindependence period has seen a blossoming of the mass media accompanied by a continuing struggle over government control and censorship. The globalization process, with its satellite TV, global news services, and the Internet, is testing the limits of government control. The democratization process is emboldening local civil society to demand the political transparency that only a free press can provide.

In 1593, Spanish friars brought the first printing press to the Philippines. The first newsletter in the region, Thomas Pinpin's *Successos Felices*, appeared in 1637 in Spanish and was so popular that a second edition appeared two years later. The first regular newspaper in the region, *Bataviase Nouvelles*, a weekly produced in Jakarta, appeared in 1744. It was forced to close two years later when it attracted the displeasure of the colonial authorities. The same fate awaited the Spanish-language *Del Superior Gobierno* in Manila, first published in 1811 but discontinued the following year. Other examples of early colonial newspapers in the region included the *Singapore Chronicle* in 1824 and the *Bangkok Recorder* in 1844. Many did not last long. If the authorities did not close them down, lack of profitability often had the same outcome. The oldest surviving newspaper in the region is the *Straits Times*, which first hit the presses in 1845.

The early newspapers were published by and for the colonists, but the missionaries had a different readership in mind. They understood the power of the written word to advance their evangelical purposes. To help bring the Bible to local people, French missionaries romanized the Vietnamese character script in the seventeenth century; the resulting *quốc ngữ* became the national written language, greatly facilitating communications to a mass audience. In Melaka, the London Missionary Society decided to reach Chinese speakers in their own language, and in 1815 they published the world's first Chinese newspaper, *Ch'ai shih su mei yueh t'ung chi ch'uan* (*Chinese Monthly Newspaper*). By 1821 the missionaries were publishing *Bustan Ariffin* in Malay, either in Malay-Jawi Arabic script or in

romanized Malay. The first Indonesian-language newspaper was *Bromartini* in 1855, followed by *Soerat Khabar Bahasa Melajoe* the following year. Thailand was never colonized. The royal palace launched the first vernacular press partly in an attempt to counter the work of the missionaries. King Rama IV (r. 1851–1868) published the *Royal Gazette* in 1856 in the Thai language, and it continues in publication to this day.

Local teachers saw in newspapers the means of bringing education to the masses. Educational newspapers were particularly popular on the Malay Peninsula and in the Dutch colonies in the late nineteenth century. *Sekola Melayu* was published in 1888 to help Malay students, and although it folded in 1893, it was followed by many successors, including *Jawi Peranakan*, *Seri Perak*, and *Bintang Timur*. In Indonesia, *Soeloeh Pengadjar* (*The Teachers' Torch*) was published in 1887 in both Malay and Javanese, followed by *Matahari Terbit* in 1895 and *Taman Pengadjar* in 1897. These newspapers became a forum for teachers and other intellectuals to discuss native education, female education, modernization, and educational progress. The earliest publication of the twentieth century best known for its role in raising Indonesian national consciousness, *Bintang Hindia*, was launched in 1902, ironically with considerable assistance from Dutch colonial authorities. Abdul Rivai, its editor, argued for change and modernization; he urged local intellectuals, as the "aristocrats of the mind," to take the leading role. The first native-owned newspaper, *Soenda Berita*, appeared in 1903. The vernacular press in the region had a popularity that went well beyond the small literate local elites. The oral folktale tradition of the villages was adapted to the new urban setting with storytelling being complemented by readings from the newspapers.

The distinction between supporting progress and espousing nationalism and independence was soon lost. As early as 1889, Isabelo de los Reyes was using his *El Ilocano* to sow the seeds of rebellion against the Spanish. Other Filipino nationalists, such as José Rizal (1861–1896) and Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897), were writing in the periodical *La Solidaridad* and in the underground newspaper *Kalayaan* (*Liberty*), which was secretly printed by the presses producing *El Diario de Manila*. When Spain handed the islands over to the United States under the Treaty of Paris of 1898, the new U.S. colonial masters

promptly suspended some local vernacular newspapers, such as *La Justicia* and *El Nuevo Dia*. The Philippine press was, however, guaranteed its freedom under the Jones Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1916. In Indonesia the vernacular press also played an important role in the independence struggle, with *Pewartu Deli*, first published in Medan in 1910, *De Express* (1912), and *Medan Muslimin* (1915) being prominent. Anticolonialism was channeled into the Sarekat Islam movement supported by newspapers such as *Sarotomo*. The movement soon published its own newspapers, *Oetoesan Hindia* and *Hindia Serikat*.

The involvement of the press in the independence struggle was mirrored throughout Southeast Asia. In Cambodia the first Khmer-language newspaper was *Nagaravatta*, in 1936, which maintained a mildly critical tone against the French colonial authorities and complained of lack of opportunities for educated Khmers. Its main wrath was directed toward the Vietnamese overseers. In Burma (Myanmar) an early critic of colonialism was the *Ludu Kyibwa-yay* press, established in Mandalay in 1938 and directed by Ludu U Hla and his wife, Daw Amar. Throughout the 1940s in Vietnam, underground copies of *Thang* (*Victory*) were printed on jungle presses by the independence movement for distribution to the masses. In Laos in 1950 the Lao Resistance Front published the quarterly *Issara* (*Freedom*) to rival the publications in Vientiane such as *Lao Mai* and *Lao Chaleun*.

The proindependence press of the region operated either underground or in constant fear of censorship or closure by colonial authorities. The Japanese occupation in 1942 was welcomed by some local activists but had few benefits in terms of freedom of the press. The colonial master changed, but not the colonial situation. The fate of the *Straits Times* in Singapore provides a good example. Having renamed Singapore *Syonan-to*, the Japanese took over the newspaper premises and produced an edition called the *Shonan Times*, which was later renamed *Syonan Shimbun*. Its last edition appeared on 3 September 1945. With the fall of Japan the former newspaper staff members emerged from internment, and the *Straits Times* reappeared four days later.

The early years of independence brought a flowering of democracy in Southeast Asia often

accompanied by progressive constitutions guaranteeing freedom of speech. Newspapers such as the *Bulletin* in Manila and the *Guardian* in Rangoon (Yangon) established themselves as vigorous and independent voices. But it was not long before the authorities reasserted control, often adopting the legal and administrative practices of the former colonial rulers. This era coincided with the advent of the electronic media; the trend in most countries of the region was one of government ownership or control of radio and television stations.

In Indonesia, President Sukarno (t. 1945–1967) declared martial law in 1959 and authorized military censorship of the press. President Suharto (t. 1967–1998) maintained the restrictions and in 1982 brought in an onerous licensing system, forcing media outlets to cooperate with the authorities—ostensibly for the economic development of the nation. The banning of popular magazines such as *Tempo*, *DeTik*, and *Editor* in 1994 demonstrated that the New Order regime in Indonesia could not break from its authoritarian roots. President Marcos (t. 1965–1986) in the Philippines also declared martial law in 1972, under which he managed a system of control of the media that ranged from newspaper closures and deals with cronies to the occasional assassination of investigative journalists. Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad (t. 1981–2003) in Malaysia used the inherited colonial press-control laws and added some of his own in 1984 to silence most criticism. In 1987 the *Star* and *Sin Chew Jit Poh* had their licenses revoked. Local and foreign journalists alike today work in fear of criminal prosecution and civil actions being taken against them and heard before a judiciary of questionable independence. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (t. 1959–1990) in Singapore, a notoriously successful libel litigant, was also quick to employ the law as a means of control to institute a subtle system of self-censorship in the city-state.

The communist countries of the region had no interest in freedom of the press, preferring to view the role of the media as one of nation-building through propaganda. The official newspapers they produced were dull and repetitive and lacked credibility. *Nhan Dan*, the Vietnamese party daily, *Pasason* in Laos, and the *Working People's Daily* in General Ne Win's (t. 1962–1988) Burma all unashamedly shared this propagandistic philosophy.

The legitimate concerns in the region over the domination of news by Western news agencies saw a trend toward the establishment of national news agencies. Although succeeding in bringing a focus on local events, the national news agencies too often became apologists for their governments. ANTARA, formed in Indonesia in 1937, became an instrument for the control of the news in the hands of Sukarno and, even more so, Suharto. Marcos also used the Philippine News Agency, established in 1961, to control the content of the news. Similar patterns emerged with the Malaysian News Agency, BERNAMA, established in 1968, and the Thai News Agency, established in 1977.

With the turn of the twenty-first century, the mass media in Southeast Asia finds itself in a ferment of change and reform, buffeted by both the globalization and democratization processes. Competition from satellite TV, global news services, and the Internet has stripped away the national communications borders in which the mass media outlets work. High levels of literacy and growing middle classes are widening the market and attracting new competitors. English-language newspapers such as the *Nation* in Bangkok and the *Jakarta Post*, virtual newspapers such as *Malaysiakini.com*, and syndicated services provided by groups like the Philippine Centre for Investigative Journalism are playing a leading role in raising the standards of journalism in the region. But profitability is no more ensured in this environment than it was in previous eras. Government control of the news is becoming less acceptable to the increasingly strident voices of civil society, as well as more difficult to accomplish technically. Freedom of the Internet has become the litmus test for judging the freedom-of-expression credentials of governments throughout the region. Considerable progress has been made in countries such as Indonesia since the time of President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (t. 1998–1999), Thailand under the 1997 Constitution, and the Philippines of the post-Marcos period, but the battle for freedom, quality, and probity in the mass media of Southeast Asia is far from over.

ROLAND RICH

See also Education, Western Secular; *La Solidaridad*; Missionaries, Christian; Nationalism and Independence Movements

in Southeast Asia; *Quốc Ngữ*; Sarekat Islam (1912)

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NGHE-TINH SOVIETS (1930–1931)

Nghe-Tinh Soviets were organizations in the Bolshevik style, dominated by peasants in the village. They were set up in the central provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh during the Nghe-Tinh Revolt against French colonial rule in 1930–1931.

Inhabitants of central Vietnam have historically been known as the most obdurate and rebellious of Vietnamese, possibly because of their poor living conditions. After the French conquest of Vietnam, Nghe-Tinh became one of the centers of the anti-French resistance movement. In 1929 the Great Depression (1929–1931) affected Vietnam and caused high unemployment among workers, and many peasant families suffered. This resulted in political turbulence. The Nghe-Tinh Revolt began on 1 May 1930. Peasants and workers of the two provinces—Nghe An and Ha Tinh—demonstrated under the leadership of local groups of the newly formed Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). The revolt went on for several months and reached its high point in September, when peasants and workers seized power in some villages of the two provinces. In those vil-

lages, the French regimes were overthrown and peasant councils called soviets were set up. Because of that, the revolt was also called the Nghe-Tinh Soviets Movement. The soviets announced some social and economic reforms and took some measures that benefited peasants, including rent and tax reductions, land confiscation and redistribution, and punishment of some landlords. On 12 September 1930, French aircraft fired at a crowd of 6,000 demonstrators. After that the uprising became clandestine and took the form of assassinations and terror. The French suppressed the uprisings; many communist leaders were arrested, and some of them died in prison. The communist organizations involved were demolished.

In commemoration of the martyrs of the Nghe-Tinh Soviets Movement, the date 12 September has been named “The Commemorative Day of Nghe Tinh Soviets” by the Vietnamese government.

HUANGYUN JING

See also Communism; Great Depression (1929–1931); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, Dang Cong San Viet Nam)

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NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM (1901–1963)

Catholic President of South Vietnam

Ngô Đình Diệm, head of state of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) between the Geneva agreements in 1954 and his overthrow in 1963, symbolized in his country both anti-colonialism and anticommunism, but he failed to build a separate country.

Diệm was born on 3 January 1901 in Huế (central Vietnam) in a Mandarin and Catholic family. Serving as minister of Emperor Thanh Thai (r. 1889–1907), whom the French deposed in 1907, his father, Ngo Dinh Kha, re-

signed from the imperial court in protest. Like his older brother Thuc, who became a bishop, Diệm contemplated the priesthood, but he finally followed in the footsteps of his other older brother, Khoi. A provincial governor like Khoi at twenty-five, Ngô Đình Diệm was named minister of interior seven years later (1933) by Emperor Bảo Đại (r. 1925–1945, 1949–1955) but had no real influence. Consequently, he resigned after only three months and had no further public activity for many years.

In 1942 he approached the Japanese without much success in gaining influence or a public appointment. In 1945, soon after the August Revolution, he was captured by the Việt Minh while traveling from Saigon to Huế and exiled to a settlement near the Chinese border, where he learned of the assassination of his brother Khoi by the Việt Minh. Therefore, when six months later he was taken to Hanoi to meet Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969), he declined the latter's offer of an appointment to serve in his communist-led government. In the following years, he failed in his efforts to muster support from the population, rejected in the late 1940s a new offer to join Bảo Đại in the French-sponsored government of the State of Vietnam, and finally decided in 1950 to leave the country. He traveled through Asia (Japan and the Philippines) and Europe (the Vatican), and he spent two years in a New Jersey seminary, meeting some U.S. personalities. Eventually, in May 1953, he left the United States for a monastery in Belgium, from where he frequently traveled to Paris to meet his younger brother Ngô Đình Luyen, who was then lobbying for him.

His opportunity came in 1954, soon after the French failure at Dien Bien Phu and during the Geneva Conference of that year. On 18 June 1954 he was named prime minister by Bảo Đại. He was then in his French residence; he returned on 26 June 1954 to Saigon, where another brother, Ngô Đình Nhu, arrived to rally supporters. Three weeks later the war was over, but Vietnam faced partition. Diệm, backed by the United States, had to strengthen his rule in Saigon and in the southern part of Vietnam (South Vietnam). That meant that, while the Việt Minh transferred about 100,000 southern activists to the north, according to the Geneva agreements, Diệm had to neutralize the French

influence in South Vietnam. Advised by U.S. colonel Edward D. Lansdale, he secured the agreement of General Nguyễn Văn Hinh, the Vietnamese chief of staff, to leave for France. Then, in 1955, he was faced with the challenge of the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, and Binh Xuyen factions, at the expense of outbreaks of fighting in Saigon. Finally he deposed Bảo Đại in a referendum, claiming that he had won 98.2 percent of the vote. He proclaimed the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), and on 26 October 1955 promoted himself to become “chief of state.”

One strategic issue remained—namely, the general elections for the whole country, scheduled for 1956 in accordance with the Geneva agreements to open the way to reunification. But Ngô Đình Diệm preferred to organize elections only in South Vietnam and without communist parties, on 4 March 1956, in order to give a constitution to the Republic of Vietnam; he refused to consider other proposals.

The Diệm regime was constitutionally a presidential system but in practice authoritarian, under the rule of the celibate and Catholic president, his family, and allies, and especially his brother Nhu and his exuberant wife, Madame Nhu, as first lady. Many U.S. advisers supported the regime's efforts to rebuild an army, to realize a land reform program, and to fight the communist influence. But in the late 1950s, despite strong repression and the establishment of population relocation programs, the regime failed to contain the revival of communist activity. In December 1960 the foundation of the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam gave concrete expression to the communist threat. In facing the “Viet Cong” (VC, Vietnamese communists), Ngô Đình Diệm had no other way than to lobby for more and more support from the United States. Washington viewed Vietnam as a strategic place to contain communism. By 1961, newly elected U.S. president John F. Kennedy (t. 1961–1963) had already involved Special Forces in a “special war” in South Vietnam.

Meanwhile, other opposition forces were growing. In 1960 a military coup failed to overthrow Ngô Đình Diệm, and in 1963 Buddhist demonstrations and self-immolations contributed in destabilizing the regime. Therefore, convinced that Ngô Đình Diệm was not the best tool for fighting the communists, the



A young Buddhist monk stoically keeps a cross-legged posture as flames engulf him in ritual suicide on 5 October 1963. It was the sixth suicide in less than four months by a Buddhist religious to protest the policies of the Ngô Đình Diệm government. Three American newsmen who witnessed the suicide were attacked by Vietnamese secret police. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Kennedy administration and U.S. ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge assisted a new military coup, which succeed on 1 November 1963. Diệm and his brother Nhu were captured and killed in a military vehicle. The end of the Ngô Đình Diệm regime opened the way for massive U.S. involvement in Vietnam—the Second Indochina War (1964–1975), popularly known as the Vietnam War.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Bảo Đại (Vinh Thự) (1913–1997); Binh Xuyen; Cao Dai; Cold War; Domino Theory; Geneva Conference (1954); Hoa Hao; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Strategic Hamlet Program (Vietnam); United States Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Việt Cong; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, League for the Independence of Vietnam)

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**NGUYỄN ÁNH
(EMPEROR GIA LONG, r. 1802–1820)**

Born at Phú Xuân (Huế) in 1762, Nguyễn Ánh, one of the grandsons of the Nguyễn lord Võ Vương, grew up amid the sociopolitical crisis following his grandfather's death in 1765.

The outbreak of the civil war drove the Nguyễn away from their capital. As in 1777 the Tây-sơn had managed to kill nearly all the principal members of the Nguyễn family, except Võ Vương's successor, the fifteen-year-old Nguyễn Ánh, who thus became the leader of the Nguyễn resistance movement. Pursued by his adversaries, however, he was reduced to arduous peregrinations in the Gulf of Siam. Out of despair, he resolved to go to Batavia or to Melaka to seek assistance from the Dutch, and apparently also tried to contact certain Malay sultanates in the view of obtaining help from them. Eventually, King Taksin (r. 1767–1782) of Siam offered him shelter in Bangkok and gave him aid. However, it was the active involvement in Vietnamese political and military life of the French missionary Pierre Pigneaux (Pigneau de Béhaine, 1741–1799), bishop of Adran, who had espoused Nguyễn Ánh's cause from the very beginning, that proved to be decisive in the revival of the Nguyễn dynasty.

During the vicissitudes of the years from 1778 to 1784, Pigneaux constantly urged Nguyễn Ánh to empower him to negotiate a formal treaty of alliance with the French monarchy, but it was not until late 1784, when an attempt with the aid of King Rama I (r. 1782–1809) of Siam to recoup his fortunes had miscarried, that Nguyễn Ánh at last authorized the missionary bishop to leave for Pondichéry to negotiate with the French authorities on his behalf. And, on 28 November 1787, the Treaty of Versailles was ready for signature—by the bishop of Adran on behalf of the “King of Cochin-China,” and the Count de Montmorin on behalf of the French king Louis XVI (r. 1774–1792). The basis of the bargain was the promise of French help for the Nguyễn dynasty against the Tây-sơn in return for the granting to the French of preferential status and the right to found settlements in Vietnam. Nevertheless, the commander of the French possessions in the Indies, with whom it rested whether to launch the intervention provided for in the treaty, did not find it advisable to undertake the expedition. Pigneaux resolved, therefore, to single-handedly raise ships, transport armaments, and recruit European technicians and mercenaries to help in Nguyễn Ánh's war against the Tây-sơn. He then joined Nguyễn Ánh, who had succeeded in the meantime in recovering control of Gia Định; on 7

September 1788, Nguyễn Ánh's forces occupied Saigon, which from then on became their principal base.

Thanks to the missionary bishop, who worked closely with him and sometimes actually accompanied him on campaigns, from his arrival at Saigon in 1789 until his death in 1799 at the siege of Qui Nhơn, the Tây-sơn capital, Nguyễn Ánh had over his adversaries the advantage of benefiting from European assistance. It is possible that he would have defeated his enemies without French aid, but there can be no doubt that the team of French advisers assembled in his behalf by Pigneaux was to a great extent responsible for his victory. In terms of money, men, and materiel the French role was small, but in terms of technical expertise it was highly significant. The military and naval experts brought by Pigneaux indeed introduced something of European organization and equipment to Nguyễn Ánh's army. The naval forces that swept the ships of the Tây-sơn from the seas were organized and trained by Frenchmen, while on land French officers introduced the principles of fortification pioneered by Sébastien Le Prestre Vauban (1633–1707). Nguyễn Ánh had a modernist vision that enabled him to apprehend fully the potentialities of Western technology, and, through the means of his European officers, he could set up a very effective military power.

Nguyễn Ánh's military success, however, did not depend simply on external assistance, important though that was. His method of seasonal expeditions—sending his forces north; leaving with the monsoon in June, to occupy territory, build fortified posts, and establish garrisons; returning to base at the end of the campaigning season—was an effective technique of gradual penetration into Tây-sơn territory. He was skilled too in the use of propaganda, stimulating a movement in the south among those disaffected or simply exhausted by the pressures of the long war and the exactions of the Tây-sơn government, who provided his expanding state with valuable manpower either for military service or for agricultural work. The restoration of agriculture in Gia Định, thus obtaining a food supply sufficient to maintain a long war, and the development of an efficient system of intelligence in the Tây-sơn territories were two of Nguyễn Ánh's positive achievements. His final victory was obtained swiftly:

Qui Nhơn fell in July 1799, Huế in 1801, and Hanoi in July 1802.

It was on 1 June 1802, shortly before the final conquest of Tonkin, at a ceremony in the temple of his ancestors at Huế, that Nguyễn Ánh, at the age of forty, after twenty-five years of continuous warfare, adopted the title of Gia Long. In 1804 he named his kingdom Việt Nam, then proclaimed himself emperor in 1806. He had already received investiture from the Qing emperor. The capital of the restored dynasty was established at Huế, the old capital of the Nguyễn principality, ending Hanoi's 800-year tradition as focus of the system. Gia Long's motive for the transfer was partly the wish to strengthen the central power by acquiring a more central capital, and partly the mistrust of the people of Hanoi and the Red River delta. The new capital was built between 1804 and 1819 on the model of Beijing, with its three cities in one, the Capital City (*Kinh-thành*), the Imperial City (*Hoàng-thành*), and the Forbidden City (*Từ-cấm-thành*).

Laying the foundations of a modern state, Gia Long had first to restore an administration and an economy devastated by thirty years of civil war. Initially he depended heavily on the military commanders who had fought with him in the long war. Until a new generation of mandarins could be trained, there was a severe shortage of officials who could be regarded as politically reliable. The north in particular—where the Nguyễn had never had a political base—presented special problems, and surviving Lê dynasty officials were mainly appointed there. The adoption of the system of regional overlords—one ruling northern Vietnam (Bồc Thành) from Hanoi and the other ruling southern Vietnam (Gia Định Thành) from Saigon—gave rise, however, to internal tensions, since the two overlords, Nguyễn Văn Thành in the north and Lê Văn Duyệt in the south, were old commanders and personal rivals whom Gia Long was able to play off against each other. Lê Văn Duyệt, a veteran of many campaigns who had particularly close and friendly relations with Gia Long, enjoyed an effectively independent command in Saigon, appointing his own officials and managing relations with Siam, Cambodia, and Europe in his own way.

The regime set up by Gia Long was an absolute and centralized monarchy, his conser-

vatism being reinforced by his experience of hardship and danger as a political refugee. One important aspect of the growth of absolutism was the borrowing of Chinese institutions over the whole range of political and administrative life: thus, legislation was revised with the substitution in 1812 of a new law code, inspired by the Chinese code of the Qing, to the old *Hồng Đức* code of the Lê. Administrative, educational, financial, and military reforms were undertaken, and great public works were carried out: roads (in particular the mandarin road linking the Chinese border to Cambodia), canals, dykes, granaries, ports, and citadels. In 1805, Cambodia had again to acknowledge Vietnamese suzerainty, and Gia Long could drive back a Siamese invasion in 1813. His learning from the West notwithstanding, Gia Long took care not to grant any privilege to foreigners, his policy being one of taking advantage of the competencies of Europeans on his own chosen terms and for the profit of the country only. The establishment of the British at Singapore in 1819 made him suspicious, and just prior to his death on 3 February 1820, at the age of fifty-eight, he recommended that his successor, Minh Mạng (r. 1820–1841), treat the Europeans well but not let them acquire any political influence.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Pigneau de Béhaine, Pierre Joseph Georges, Bishop of Adran (1741–1799); Qing (Ching/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912); Saigon (Gia Định; Hồ Chí Minh City); Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Tây-sơn Rebellion (1771–1802)

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NGUYỄN DYNASTY (1802–1945)

Assuming the title Gia Long on 1 June 1802, Nguyễn Ánh founded the dynasty that was to occupy the Vietnamese throne until 1945. After the first sovereigns, from Gia Long (b. 1762, r. 1802–1820) to Tự Đức (b. 1829, r. 1847–1883), however, the imposition of French rule led to the irremediable decline of the dynasty, with successors often being minors and frequently deposed at will. In any case, those who ascended the throne after Tự Đức were emperors in name only, reigning but not governing. Nguyễn sovereigns were as follows: Gia Long (b. 1762, r. 1802–1820); Minh Mạng (b. 1792, r. 1820–1841); Thiệu Trị (b. 1807, r. 1841–1847); Tự Đức (b. 1829, r. 1847–1883); Dục Đức (b. 1852, designed to succeed Tự Đức to the throne, but deposed on 23 July 1883); Hiệp Hòa (b. 1847, r. July–November 1883); Kiến Phúc (b. 1869, r. 1883–1884); Hàm Nghi (b. 1871, r. 1884–1885); Đồng Khánh (b. 1864, r. 1885–1889); Thành Thái (b. 1879, r. 1889–1907); Duy Tân (b. 1899, r. 1907–1916); Khải Định (b. 1885, r. 1916–1925); and Bảo Đại (b. 1913, r. 1925–1945).

The Nguyễn era began as what could be considered a golden age in the history of Vietnam, marked by a considerable extension of Vietnamese territory. Gia Long transmitted a unified kingdom from the China border to the Gulf of Thailand (Siam) to Minh Mạng, who stretched it westward, integrating in particular eastern Laos in 1827–1828 as five new prefectures into the Vietnamese administrative organization. This kingdom comprised three main regions (*Kỳ*): Trung Kỳ, the central part; Bắc Kỳ (Tonkin), with the administrative seat of its imperial governor-general (*tổng trấn*) at Bắc-thành (Northern Citadel, Hanoi); and Nam Kỳ (Cochinchina), with its administrative center at Gia Định (Saigon), also the seat of an imperial governor-general. In order to increase the effectiveness of the administration, Minh Mạng had the power of the northern and southern overlords destroyed, and in 1831 he divided the

country into thirty-one centrally controlled provinces, with the capital, Huế, constituting a special district (*Thừa Thiên Phủ*). A more centralized system of remuneration for the administrative machinery, which replaced the distribution of “allotment lands” on a hierarchical basis with that of cash salaries, was also introduced. The bureaucracy depended upon a communications system that was probably superior to any found in neighboring societies, thanks to the Mandarin Road, built in the first decade of the nineteenth century, and its regular relay stations running from the north to the Mekong Delta.

The structure of power was not actually very impressive. At any one time, probably fewer than 2,000 individuals performed mandarinal functions as full laureates of the civil service examination system, revived by Gia Long in 1807—a rather small number of administrators for a society of perhaps 9 to 10 million people (Nguyễn 1970: 68–76). Yet the substantial extension of the territoriality of the dynasty created problems in the construction of the political order, and contested identities kept on growing at the margins, where the Vietnamese political center controlled imperfectly. (For instance, Vietnam even failed in its bid to annex what remained of Cambodia, which Thiệu Trị had to evacuate in 1841.) And under the first four emperors of the dynasty, southern Vietnam remained a frontier land. Of the 1,024,338 officially recorded male taxpayers in all of Vietnam in 1847, only 165,598 of them lived in the six southern provinces, and southern landholding patterns were not surveyed until 1836 (Nguyễn 1970: 28–29). Nevertheless, in 1839 the Vietnamese court officially changed the name of the country it governed to “The Great South” (*Đại Nam*), with the explanation that Vietnam’s recent territorial thrust south to the Mekong justified this change in the political nomenclature.

Bureaucratic centralization closely modeled on the Chinese pattern, with a severe application of the Confucian code, was the weapon with which the Nguyễn dynasty fought centrifugal trends, military and political, in the provinces. It must be said, however, that the process of borrowing, which seemed to become almost unnecessarily submissive at times, was a reflection of the belief that Confucianism exemplified universal and not simply Chinese patterns of experience, while representing the

most advanced technology for social control and administration. Hence it was not the contemporary Manchu system that the Nguyễn wished to imitate, but the system as it was believed to have existed at great periods in the past. This also explains why the Nguyễn chronicles described the Vietnamese ruler in the nineteenth century as the true custodian of Confucian orthodoxy, culturally superior to the Qing.

Unfortunately, greater bureaucratic efficiency contributed to the aggravation of the country's structural, social, and economic defects. The administrative centers did not develop into commercial urban centers, with the exception of the major cities and ports. Royal monopolies on high-value produce and restrictive taxes on the export of rice, salt, and metals put a brake on earlier moves toward commercial development. In agriculture the lot of the masses remained unimproved, as the problem of landlessness remained unsolved, while compulsory labor service weighed heavily upon the peasants, who were conscripted to construct irrigation canals, city walls, roads, bridges, and, above all, the walls and new palaces at Huế. In other words, the bureaucracy that the Nguyễn strove to build exceeded the needs of an agricultural society based on a subsistence economy. The numerous peasant revolts sparked off by famine and epidemic were evidence that this bureaucracy, for all its relative efficiency compared with other Southeast Asian governments, had failed to create an adequate standard of living or security for its villagers.

The Tự Đức reign (1847–1883), the longest of the Nguyễn dynasty, was especially marked by popular uprisings. But, while his predecessors had confronted insurrections only in the provinces, Tự Đức had also constantly to guard against a coup d'état within his own court and household—a new feature in the history of the dynasty. As the Vietnamese imperial family had grown larger in the nineteenth century, it had begun to lose cohesion and to develop factions, and the process accelerated under Tự Đức. The first attempt to overthrow him was made in 1851–1853 by his half brother, Prince Hồng Bảo, who had hoped to succeed Thiệu Trị in 1847. Then, in 1864–1865 the throne was shaken by another attempted coup, whereas it had not yet recovered from the shock of the French invasion of Cochín China and the signing in 1862 of the Treaty of Saigon, sanctioning

the loss to the French of the three eastern provinces of Cochín China.

In the face of the deliquescence of the regime in conjunction with unprecedented predicaments caused by Western expansion, the basic problem for the Nguyễn court was the reconstruction of social and political order on lines that would enable it to resist the pressures of Western imperialism. But reform proposals submitted to the imperial court during these critical years were in no condition to generate more dynamic changes. Instead, the increasing threat from France induced a new kind of paralysis, which turned out to be fatal for the Nguyễn dynasty. After having been repeatedly forced to give in to France's pressure, the court of Huế resigned itself finally to the humiliating acceptance of French domination.

As a result, French rule in most of Vietnam was based, from 1885 to 1945, on a protectorate arrangement with the Nguyễn dynasty. Under the supreme authority of the French governor-general, the Nguyễn continued to govern throughout northern Vietnam (Tonkin) and central Vietnam (Annam). Therefore, Vietnamese nationalists, when they set to the struggle to win back the independence of the country, had to confront both the dynasty and French colonialism. Paradoxically, they would invoke the liberating values of the French Republic to challenge an instinctively conservative and authoritarian government—the Nguyễn dynasty—whose power was sustained by French colonial rule.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Bào Đại (Vinh Thụy) (1913–1997); Confucianism; Hanoi (Thang-long); Huế; Nguyễn Ánh (Emperor Gia Long, r. 1802–1820); Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Qing (Ching/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912); Saigon (Gia Định; Hồ Chí Minh City); Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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NGUYỄN EMPERORS AND FRENCH IMPERIALISM

The death of Emperor Tự Đức in 1883 without a direct heir, coincident with the attack launched by the French on Vietnam, left the Nguyễn dynasty wholly absorbed by the problem of securing its own survival. Flouted by ministers whose maneuvers had contributed to the making and unmaking of sovereigns at a vertiginous speed from 1883 to 1885, the Vietnamese monarchy could do nothing but yield to the invaders' demands. The protectorate treaty of 6 June 1884 was the first act to submit its authority to French power. Under the terms of this treaty, the Vietnamese emperor surrendered the control of his foreign policy and his armed forces to France. He was to retain autonomy over his domestic affairs; in reality, while he continued to style himself the emperor of Đại Nam, his sovereignty was soon to be permanently recast by the political and governmental transformations that modified the initial agreement.

France at first seemed to have wavered between two lines of conduct: either to satisfy itself with an attenuated form of protectorate, basically more apparent than real, or to try to take in hand by means of more direct and efficient methods the complete reorientation of the country. The drive for more immediate control quickly prevailed over the fair implementation of the protectorate treaty. As a consequence, the Vietnamese monarch found himself increasingly dispossessed of his powers. The devolution of his authority was most clearly demonstrated in the dismemberment of the kingdom. With Nam Kỳ (Cochin China) hav-

ing been transformed into a French colony twenty years earlier, a dichotomy was now introduced into the political regime of the other two parts of the old empire of Đại Nam: while Trung Kỳ (Annam) remained under the nominal rule of the Vietnamese monarch, with the French, however, controlling the local administration as provided for by a special convention, signed on 31 July 1885, Bắc Kỳ (Tonkin) became a fictitious protectorate, increasingly submitting to direct French administration, without the protected government being able to exercise any control. Theoretically, Tonkin remained under the authority of the emperor in Huế, who was represented on the spot by a *Kinh-lược* (imperial high commissioner), empowered to appoint officials and to make all decisions concerning the administration of Tonkin. But as under article VII of the protectorate treaty, mandarins in Tonkin could be dismissed at the request of the French, the *Kinh-lược* was in fact in a subordinate position to the French administration. Tonkin's administrative organization was thus taken away from the Huế court and placed under the discretionary power of the protectorate's agents. This confiscation of the emperor's authority was to be completed ten years later, with the devolution in 1897 of the *Kinh-lược* prerogatives to the French *résident supérieur* in Tonkin; in the different provinces, the Vietnamese mandarins were kept at their posts, but the French *résidents* and their delegates held the real power.

The creation of the Indochinese Union in 1887, which consolidated French rule over Vietnam while transforming the whole of Indochina into a French colonial possession, represented also another step in the dispossession of the Vietnamese monarch's political sovereignty. More than just an administrative framework, the Union constituted a unified collectivity, whose constituent countries were subsumed under its authorities and lost all their sovereign attributes as states. Their public and private law was to a large extent subordinated to the statutory power of the French governor-general.

The Vietnamese monarchy surrendered the final vestiges of its authority by the royal edict of 15 August 1897, which handed over to the French the task of collecting all taxes in return for the payment to the Vietnamese government of the sums necessary for the sovereign's expen-

diture and the upkeep of the imperial court and the royal administration; and by the royal edict of 27 September 1897, which declared that the *résident supérieur* in Annam was henceforward to preside over the emperor's privy council and equally the council of the royal family. Some autonomous statutory power was supposedly reserved to the Vietnamese sovereign: ritual affairs, traditional education, subjects relevant to the kingdom's justice and administration, the fiscal system (but not the treasury), penal law, and the status of individuals in public and private law. But, in order to be enforceable, royal regulations had to be accompanied by the *résident supérieur's* endorsement and the governor-general's approval. Such strict judicial tutelage was therefore tantamount to veritable direction.

The last scraps of political and judiciary power remaining to the Vietnamese monarch were to be taken away from him at the death of Emperor Khải Định by the convention of 6 November 1925, which stipulated that only regulations relating to rituals would form the subject of royal edicts, and the sovereign would henceforth be confined to the celebration of rites. He preserved, besides, the right of pardon and the right of granting honorary distinctions and titles of nobility, posthumous grades, and certificates of appointment of the tutelary spirits to be worshipped in the villages of Tonkin and Annam. All that concerned the control of state affairs would be settled by the representatives of the protectorate. Vietnamese administration was thus definitively replaced by French administrative organization. Policy, laid down in Paris by ministerial decrees, was implemented in Vietnam by the French bureaucracy, which extended downward from the governor-general, the *résidents supérieurs* of Annam and Tonkin, and the governor of Cochin China to a network of lesser officials.

Emptied of their substance and maintained in a subordinate position, the Vietnamese monarchy and its bureaucracy lingered on as ramshackle relics of the past. Even so, the princes placed on the throne after 1884, generally in their nonage and invested or dethroned at will by palace intrigues or the whim of the colonial authorities, still maintained a high conception of their position. The sixteen-year-old Duy Tân, for example, willingly lent himself in 1916 to an abortive attempt to overthrow the

French in central Vietnam, proving through his gesture that the loss of national independence was still gnawing at the conscience of the Nguyễn monarch.

Yet, if Vietnam's political regime had not been altogether transformed, it was because the explosion after 1885 of the *Cần Vương* (Aid the King) movement had warned the colonial authorities about the strength of dynastic loyalty. In the beginning of the twentieth century, this loyalty still manifested itself every time the monarchical institution itself was threatened. For many, kingship was indeed all that was left to symbolize Vietnam as a political entity. Protected and dominated as he was, the monarch still remained a personage who symbolized the traditions and represented the nation; it was therefore indispensable to defend the king's prerogatives, in order to preserve whatever was essential.

For the French, too, the decision to maintain Vietnamese kingship was one of expediency. It would placate those who were faithful to the old order, for whom the abolition of kingship would lead to the establishment of a policy of assimilation, together with the suppression of the institutions, customs, and traditions to which the people remained extremely attached. The colonial administration had to admit that it would be unwise to do away altogether with the Nguyễn monarchy, that the king was still a great social force, and that the conservative components of Vietnamese national tradition were still realities with which the protectorate had to reckon. For the French, then, it was politic to maintain the king as the symbol of Vietnamese authority in Annam, removing him and replacing him with another if he made any show of indocility.

There was another reason for preserving the monarchy. For the French the development of modern revolutionary movements was far more dangerous than the nationalism of the mandarins and the Confucian scholar-gentry, whereas the ancient order and the country's traditional forces could form a useful barrier to revolutionary nationalism. Pierre Pasquier, who was to become *résident supérieur* in Annam in the 1920s and later governor-general, advocated thus a policy of association, declaring: "A king . . . of whose collaboration we may be sure, can be a useful adjutant for our action. He can, through us, ensure the peace of the

people's minds and contain the movements that could arise on the right as well as on the left" (Nguyễn 1985: 154).

Unfortunately, by then the Nguyễn monarchy was generally thought to have gone bankrupt and the king to have become only a screen that the French used to cover their misdemeanors. Therefore the restoration of the ancient regime ceased to appeal to Vietnamese nationalists, as patriotism no longer identified itself with loyalty to the monarchy. This refusal to consider the monarchy as the national symbol was to have far-reaching consequences. It led to a total rejection of the traditional political order, especially Confucianism insofar as it represented governmental ethics. The Vietnamese intelligentsia, faced with the incapacity of the Huế court to oppose the French presence, began to abandon Confucian teaching and react against Confucian ethics, which had dominated Vietnamese public life for centuries. It had become clear to the learned elite that Confucian society and Confucian governmental institutions could not rise to the challenge of Western intellectual and technological competition. National liberation needed therefore to go hand in hand with modernization, not with the veneration of an antiquated past. Pleading for a rupture with the past, reformers advocated the construction of a new educational system and a new society in which there would be no place for the traditional monarchy. Phan Châu Trinh's (1872–1926) action, for example, showing more hostility toward the enslaved monarchy of the Nguyễn than toward the French, was typical of this trend.

By attacking the monarchical regime, Phan Châu Trinh only expressed the prevalent thinking among the majority of Vietnamese nationalists, whose disaffection with the monarchy was total. By the 1920s, young Vietnam, no longer interested in preserving the monarchy, completely spurned the old hierarchical, formal, moralizing Confucian Annam. The new generations, much more concerned with the twin problems of modernization and nation-rebuilding, declared themselves ideologically unattached and in radical rupture with the old attitudes of opposition. Under these circumstances, attempts such as those of Phạm Quỳnh at invigorating anew the monarchy were bound to meet with a hostile reception.

It was then that the revolutionary crisis of 1930 occurred—when the Vietnam Nationalist Party (Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng) launched the mutiny at Yên Bái and the new Indochina Communist Party organized mass demonstrations among the peasantry and strikes among the workers—as the voicing of a general rejection of the colonial order. This crisis was to shake French colonialism in Vietnam to its foundations. Perceiving communism as a new expression of radical nationalism, the colonial power imagined that it should be fought, first through implacable repression, and second by political means, through attempts at depriving it of its possible allies among the upper classes of Vietnamese society and by strengthening the alliance between those classes and the colonial administration through means of limited concessions. In this context, the monarchy became an instrument with which to combat communist insurgency. Consequently, experiments were conducted at consolidating the existing legal and social structure and at reinforcing the prestige and improving the functioning of the mandarin apparatus. The young emperor Bảo Đại was sent back to Huế in September 1932, after ten years of study in France. The 1925 convention, which had deprived the Vietnamese sovereign of his last prerogative, was rescinded on 10 September 1932 in order to preserve the fiction of a protected state.

The concessions made were, however, devoid of political substance, and in no way signified a return of genuine sovereignty to the Nguyễn monarch. The reforms that Bảo Đại was allowed to promulgate in Huế in 1932–1933 aimed only at modernizing the Vietnamese administration; they concerned only the penal code, financial regulations, and the mandarins' status. Conversely, such claims as the demand for a Vietnamese constitution or for the return of Tonkin to an authentic protectorate regime were rejected outright. The plea for a liberal grant of autonomy, perhaps dominion status, as in the British Empire, was firmly refused. On 31 March 1933, the governor-general categorically dismissed the request of the Chamber of the People's Representatives in Annam for an increase of its prerogatives; on 2 May, Prime Minister Nguyễn Hữu Bài, the spokesman of traditionalist opposition, was retired; on 12 July, the minister of the interior, Ngô Đình Diệm, the reformists' leader, had to hand in his resignation. Bảo Đại, realizing that his impe-

rial government had only formal authority and no real power, abandoned whatever desire he might have had for personal government and confined himself to being a figurehead like his predecessors.

The policy of restoration of colonial power was steadily pursued even under the government of the Popular Front (1936–1939) in France, whose colonial policy turned out to be very little different from that of other French governments. Such political measures as were adopted with regard to Vietnam were therefore very limited. None had reference to the status of the country. They simply satisfied some partial demands of the Vietnamese nationalists: amnesty for political prisoners, suppression of the preliminary authorization for publishing Vietnamese newspapers, and the like. In the absence of a new bourgeoisie that could exercise any real influence, the colonial authorities continued to lean on the traditional elite and to consolidate the foundations of their power. This policy also implied that a certain revision of the line that restricted and weakened the powers of the court of Huế was necessary, and that some authority should be restored to the monarchy and its bureaucracy. Governor-General Jules Brévié (t. 1936–1939) specified in 1937: “[P]resently it is in our interest to give back to the Annamese monarch the prestige and authority he may have lost. He is indeed the keystone of this country’s political and social edifice” (Nguyễn 1985: 160–161). This led to a cautious strategy of upgrading the Nguyễn monarchy with a reform project designed in 1939 under the pressure of the Japanese threat and aimed at restoring to the royal government its apparent participation in the administration of Tonkin (creation of an upper house common to both Annam and Tonkin, and the participation of Tonkin in the court’s expenditure). What mattered ultimately was to use the monarchy both as a bulwark against subversion in the countryside and as a pole of consolidation of the Vietnamese ruling class.

Thus far from 1930 to 1945, the successive French governments, regardless of their political coloring, constantly followed the same colonial policy. Even during the Japanese occupation, the concessions were made by the governor-general, Jean Decoux (t. 1940–1945), not at the expense of French authority in the country but to consolidate it. The French colonial power

was not prepared to give up any of its control. This same colonial mentality was still prevalent among French politicians after Bảo Đại had reasserted the desire of the Vietnamese for independence at the end of the Japanese interlude of 1940–1945. In March 1945, Bảo Đại denounced all the treaties that had established the French protectorate, and on 25 August 1945 he abdicated in favor of Hồ Chí Minh’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

That, however, was not the end of the story of the relationship between the Vietnamese monarchy and French colonial power. In 1948, looking for an alternative to the communists, the French again turned to Bảo Đại in the hope of negotiating through him for a political settlement with the Vietnamese nationalists. On 8 March 1949, France recognized Vietnam, with Bảo Đại as chief of state, as an independent state within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Annam; Bảo Đại (Vinh Thuy) (1913–1997); *Can Vương* (Aid the King) Movement; Cochinchina; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; French Indochina; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Indigenous Political Power; Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Phan Châu Trinh (1872–1926); Tonkin (Tongking); Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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Chairman Nguyễn Văn Thieu (left), President Lyndon B. Johnson (center), and Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ (right) salute during the playing of the U.S. and Vietnamese national anthems during welcoming ceremonies at Guam's international airport on 20 March 1967. The Guam Conference was the third summit between U.S. and Republic of Vietnam leaders. (U.S. National Archives)

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NGUYỄN VĂN THIỆU (1923–2001) **Last President of South Vietnam**

South Vietnamese head of state for ten years during the Second Indochina War or Vietnam War (1964–1975), General Nguyễn Văn Thieu was also the last president of the Republic of Vietnam.

Thieu was born on 5 April 1923 in Tri Thuy, a small village near Phan Rang (in the southern part of central Vietnam) of a family of farmers and fishermen. The youngest of five children, he had the opportunity to get his schooling in Saigon. In 1945 he enlisted in the Việt Minh national liberation force and rose through the ranks to become a district chief. However, by August 1946 he became disillusioned with the Việt Minh. After an abortive attempt to become a merchant marine officer, he joined the Military Academy at Huế in 1948, when the French began the training of newly created Vietnamese

army officers. After a few months in the French infantry school in Coetquidan, he obtained his lieutenant's commission in 1949. Two years later, in 1951, he married Nguyễn Thị Mai Anh from My Tho and converted to her religion, Catholicism. At this time, inside the French camp, he participated in the concluding years of the First Indochina War (1946–1954), establishing a reputation as an efficient but cautious officer. He attained the rank of major and became a battalion commander.

After 1954, Thieu embarked on a career as an officer in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)—namely, of South Vietnam. As commander of the 21st Infantry Division and deputy commander of the Second military region (southern-central Vietnam), he became officer-in-charge of the Dalat National Military Academy from 1956 to 1960. He was sent to Texas twice (1957 and 1960) and attended the Joint and Combined Planning School of the Pacific Command in Okinawa. In 1960, by then a colonel, he commanded the First Infantry Division, responsible for the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the two other provinces of the northern part of South Vietnam. Then, in December 1962, Thieu assumed command of the Fifth Infantry Division stationed at Bien Hoa, just north of Saigon.

The eighteen-month period separating the end of the Ngô Đình Diệm regime and the commencement of massive U.S. commitment in Vietnam was decisive. In 1963, then a general, Thieu was one of the military leaders who plotted Diệm's overthrow. In the 1 November military coup, in which the president was killed, he personally led a regiment in an attack on the presidential palace. Amid the complex power struggle, Thieu progressively appeared as a key figure of the South Vietnamese political scene. His credentials then included chief of staff of the army, vice minister of defense, and secretary general of the Armed Forces Council. In 1964 he became commander of the Fourth Army Corps (Mekong Delta area), and, in February 1965, he was appointed deputy prime minister and minister of national defense in the government of Phan Huy Quat (t. 1964–1965). Thus, in June, when the latter relinquished the government to the military, Thieu emerged as the right man at the right place. The ten-officer military body that assumed power in a National Leadership Committee elected him as chair-

man and chief of state, with Nguyễn Cao Kỳ as premier.

Nguyễn Văn Thieu headed the South Vietnamese regime from 1965 to 1975, during the entire period of the Vietnam War. For the first time, he worked with Premier Cao Kỳ to restore the electoral process. On 11 September 1966, more than 80 percent of South Vietnam's registered voters went officially to the polls and elected a 117-member constituent assembly. In accordance with the new constitution, Thieu was elected president on 3 September 1967, with 34.5 percent of the votes, to a four-year term with Nguyễn Cao Kỳ as vice-president. Although the war was worsening, he promised in his inaugural speech, particularly addressed to the Communists, that peace negotiation was always welcomed. He then proceeded to Australia, in December 1967, to confer with U.S. president Lyndon Baines Johnson (t. 1963–1969). But in late January 1968, he had to face the Tet offensive launched by the Việt Cong. During the Paris peace talks he was denounced by the communist side as the main enemy but always maintained his position, as he told President Richard Nixon during their meeting in June 1969 at Midway: no peace agreement before the return of Hanoi's regular troops to the north. Reelected in 1971, he denounced the Kissinger–Le Duc Tho cease-fire agreement in late 1972, but reluctantly he honored its clauses. Nevertheless, he did not abide by the political part of the Paris Agreement, signed in January 1973. In March 1975, when the communists launched their last offensive against the Saigon regime, from Ban Me Thuot, he decided to order the retreat of southern forces from the central highlands. He never recovered the strategic initiative. However, after the fall of Xuan Loc, a small city in the northeast of Saigon, on 21 April 1975, he resigned and left the country. Nine days later, the Popular Army entered Saigon.

During the last twenty-six years of his life in exile, first in London and then in Boston, he never published any declaration or analysis of Vietnam's recent history or contemporary situation. He died on 29 September 2001, aged seventy-eight.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN); Indochina War, First (1946–1954);

Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Le Duc Tho (1911–); Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); Paris Peace Agreement (1968, 1973) (Vietnam); Việt Cộng; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, League for the Independence of Vietnam); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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NIAH CAVES (SARAWAK)

The Niah Caves are a complex of caves located in the Niah–Subis limestone massifs, about 110 kilometers from the town of Miri in Sarawak, Malaysia. The Niah–Subis limestone massifs date back to the Miocene age, with its highest peak called Gunong Subis at 390 meters. The Great Cave is the largest of the caves found in the Niah–Subis limestone massifs. The Great Cave has about twenty-six acres of floor space with several openings, the largest known as the West Mouth. The West Mouth measures more than 60 meters high and more than 240 meters wide. It was used for human habitation as well as a cemetery. The Niah Caves are an important archaeological site, as they provide evidence of the longest sequence of early human existence in Southeast Asia. The whole sequence may span from 40,000 to 2,000 years ago. The Niah Caves are today one of Southeast Asia's major archaeological sites, and also one of the major tourist destinations in Malaysia.

History of Archaeological Research

Since 1864 the Niah Caves and Borneo have attracted the attention of famous natural scientists such as Charles Darwin (1809–1882), Thomas Huxley (1825–1895), and Alfred Wallace (1823–1913), who visited in search of the “missing link” in the evolution of humans. The Niah Caves were believed to contain evidence of the evolutionary development of early hu-

mans. In 1880, Alfred Hart Everett (d. 1898) first visited the Great Cave of Niah, where he searched for fossils of early humans. It was not until 1954 that archaeological explorations and excavations began in the Niah Caves by Tom Harrisson (1911–1976). His work continued intermittently in Niah until 1967. In 1976, Zuraina Majid and the Sarawak Museum resumed excavations at the West Mouth, followed by Graeme Barker, who restudied the stratigraphy and paleoenvironment of Niah in 2000–2001.

Past Environments at Niah

The Niah environment from the late Upper Pleistocene through the Holocene saw marked environmental changes around the caves. The location of the Niah–Subis limestone massifs in relation to the coastline was altered several times by changing sea levels during the late Quaternary. From 40,000 years ago till 11,000 years ago, the Niah–Subis massifs were likely to be further inland. From about 11,000 years ago the sea level rose, and around 5,000 years ago, it was higher than it is today: the Niah–Subis massifs were about 24 kilometers inland. The climate was cooler at Niah, with a submontane environment during the upper Pleistocene, where the Sunda Shelf was exposed. At that time Borneo's climate was probably cooler by 5 to 7 degrees Celsius than today, with half as much precipitation and a winter drought. Many different types of animals roamed in the more open forest; some became extinct, while others have gone through morphological evolutionary changes. With the rise in sea level at the end of the Pleistocene about 11,000 years ago, temperatures and rainfall increased, and the vegetation and fauna became closely similar to the type of rain forest seen today.

Niah's Archaeological Finds

A variety of archaeological artifacts were uncovered during excavations at the Niah Caves. The artifacts included human skeletons, lithic, ceramics, animal bones, shells, and botanical remains. One of the most important finds in the Niah Caves is the “deep skull,” discovered at the West Mouth in Niah. This *Homo sapiens* skull was radiocarbon-dated to 38,000 years ago. Apart from that, the West Mouth also contained more than 200 burials, together with ce-

ramics, dating to about 3,500 years ago. There were also some boat and jar burials at Kain Hitam in Niah, dated to the first millennium C.E., as well as some wall paintings of boats being paddled and dancing human figures.

The Niah lithic assemblage consists of pebble tools, flake tools, charred stones, quartz fire strikers, haematite, and debitage. The pebble tools include chopper, ax-adze, pounder, sharpener, knife, hammerstone, and mortar, while flake tools include end scraper, notched scraper, semilunar scraper, and pointed flakes. The faunal remains suggested that forest and riverine environments were exploited. Hunting and gathering were probably done mainly at forests and streams surrounding Niah. From the forests, a variety of mammals such as the bearded pig, porcupine, Sambar deer, mouse-deer, monkey, monitor lizard, orangutan, bear, tapir, otter, squirrel, rhinoceros, and crocodile were hunted, while from the rivers, streams, and estuaries, fish and shellfish were obtained. Several extinct species were also hunted, such as the banteng, giant pangolin, and Sumatran tapir. Botanical remains at Niah suggest that the *kepayang* (an intoxicating fruit that causes dizziness) was collected for food. Ceramics at Niah include earthenware and stoneware. Two of the most unusual earthenware types are the three-color ware and the double-spouted pottery. The rest of the earthenware was plain, glazed, burnished, or with impressed or incised designs. The impressed designs include net, checked, textile, and cord-marked. The pottery vessels are generally round-bottomed and have a globular body with an everted rim and narrow lip. The pottery are coarse-tempered, low-fired, and usually thick-bodied.

Niah's Culture Sequence

The culture sequence of the Niah Caves is rare and important, because it contained the longest known duration of human habitation in Southeast Asia, from 40,000 years ago till 2,000 years ago. Niah's culture sequence has been divided into two main traditions: ceramic and preceramic. The ceramic tradition dates back to about 3,000 years ago and is characterized by the introduction of ceramics, a decreasing use of the pebble and flake artifacts, and a significant increase in charred and ironstones. The preceramic tradition, on the other hand, dates

between 40,000 years ago and 3,000 years ago and is characterized by flake and pebble artifacts. The preceramic levels contained several extinct species of animals, such as the banteng, Sumatran tapir, and giant pangolin. During this period they utilized the forests, rivers, and estuarine regions to hunt for animals and fish and collect shellfish, while raw stone materials of metamorphic sandstone, jasper, and chert were obtained from more distant places. They also collected food from edible plants such as the *kepayang* *Pangium edule*, and used stone and bone artifacts for food preparation and the manufacture of wooden artifacts.

ZURAINA MAJID

See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; "Java Man" and "Solo Man"; Neolithic Period of Southeast Asia; "Perak Man"; Sarawak Museum; Tabon Cave (Palawan)

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NOLI ME TANGERE (1887) AND EL FILIBUSTERISMO (1891)

Inspiring Novels

Noli Me Tangere and *El Filibusterismo* are the titles of two novels written by Filipino writer José Rizal (1861–1896). Rizal was a participant in the Propaganda Movement, a group of Filipino expatriates in Europe who devoted themselves to the struggle for political reforms in the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines. Rizal's writings have strongly influenced the emergence of nationalism and the independence struggle in the Philippines. The

novel *Noli Me Tangere* (or *Noli*) is a book that, in the words of Rizal biographer Guerrero, “changed the history of a nation” (Guerrero 1963: 148).

Rizal had left the Philippines in 1882 to study in Spain with the financial support of his family in the Philippines. He had observed the injustices of Spanish colonial rule, the political influence and the abuses of the friars, and the repression of any dissidence and opposition among the population. Early on he planned to write a novel to depict the life of his people and the social and political conditions of colonial oppression. He worked on his manuscript for several years and finished the book in February 1887. Although the book was written in Spanish, he could not publish it in Spain, as it was likely to be prohibited by the Spanish government. He therefore had the book printed in Berlin (a press run of 2,000 copies), with financial help from a wealthy Filipino friend. He then sent copies to his friends in Europe and tried to ship the books to Spain and the Philippines. In the Philippines the government and the Catholic Church considered the book subversive and prohibited its importation and banned it. Those who had copies in their house risked arrest and deportation. In Europe, Rizal’s friend Ferdinand Blumentritt, an Austrian professor, passionately defended the book against attacks in several journal articles, describing it as “the greatest literary work ever written by a Filipino, or about the Philippines at all” (Sichrovsky 1997: 51).

Noli Me Tangere in Latin signifies “Touch Me Not,” the first words of the famous phrase spoken by Jesus to Mary Magdalene in the garden after the resurrection: “Touch me not, for I have not yet ascended to my father” (John 20:17). Rizal used these words to express the idea that he was dealing with political and social problems in his country that the Spanish government and the friar orders did not want to be “touched,” mentioned, or discussed. The novel is the story of Ibarra, the son of a wealthy landowner who returns to his hometown in the Philippines. He finds his family oppressed by the friars, and when he attempts to establish a school and work as a teacher, opposition comes from the same members of the clergy. The main message of the book is that the problems of colonial oppression cannot be solved within the setting of a small town.

Rizal returned to the Philippines in 1887–1888. During that year his family in his hometown of Calamba, province of Laguna, was engaged in a bitter conflict with the Dominican order that owned the land they were tilling. The friars demanded a sizable increase of the land rent, and when the Rizal family protested, and the controversial son José became involved in the conflict, the friars ejected the family from their estate. The elder Rizal was deported to the island of Mindoro, and José’s mother was publicly humiliated. As Rizal was in danger of being arrested, his family urged him to leave the country.

Soon after his return to Europe in 1888, Rizal started working on his second novel, *El Filibusterismo*, or *Fili*. The book was printed in Ghent, Belgium, in 1891 with a small circulation. In the Spanish Philippines in the late nineteenth century, the word *filibusterismo* meant “rebellion” or “subversion,” the breaking away of the colony from the mother country; a *filibusterismo* was a rebel. Rizal dedicated his book to the three Filipino priests, Mariano Gómez, José Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora, who were executed by the Spanish government in the Philippines in 1872. He took several hundred copies with him in 1892 when he returned to the Philippines; while in transit in Hong Kong, the British authorities confiscated the novels.

Fili is a romantic and dramatic continuation of the story told in *Noli*, but more pessimistic, as Rizal has incorporated the bitter experiences of his family a few years earlier. The book presents a sharp analysis of the problems of colonialism and discusses the dilemmas of reform versus revolution in a series of brilliant dialogues and debates. The protagonist, Ibarra, has survived an attack and returns under the name Simoun, a dark and vengeful individual who wants to punish the corrupt Spanish rulers and the abusive friars and start a revolution. However, all his plans fail, the revolution does not succeed, and Simoun escapes to the mountains, where he discusses his motives and his disappointment with a priest shortly before his death.

The problem of reform versus revolution continued to haunt Rizal. Although he concluded that the Spanish colonial regime was unwilling to modify its stand and that peaceful reforms were impossible, he rejected the idea of

an armed revolution. He took this position probably for strategic reasons, because he foresaw that the people were ill prepared and that a revolution would fail. He returned to the Philippines in 1892, where he was arrested and deported to Mindanao for four years. In August 1896 the Katipunan movement raised the flag of revolution against the Spanish regime. Rizal had distanced himself from the uprising, but the Spanish government considered him a subversive and had him executed on 30 December 1896.

After his death Rizal became the venerated national hero in the Philippines. His novels have been translated several times and are obligatory reading in Philippine high schools. His hesitancy at the time of the revolution has often been seen as a weakness, and for many Filipinos, Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897), the leader of the Katipunan, is the real nationalist hero. However, Rizal's political and philosophical stance cannot be explained simply by his middle-class background or a lack of courage. In his books he deeply analyzed the pros and cons of revolutionary violence, and he stood for his point of view, as he showed by sacrificing his life for his country.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Cavite Mutiny; Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship; Katipunan; *La Solidaridad*; Max Havelaar (1860); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Newspapers and Mass Media in Southeast Asia; Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Propaganda Movement; Rizal, José (1861–1896)

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NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a group of states representing the interests of developing countries. It has its origin in the Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955 and was formally founded in 1961 as a reaction to the bipolar structure of international relations. For the Southeast Asian members of the NAM, with the exception of Indonesia, it has never been a key instrument of foreign policy, and its importance has further diminished since the 1970s.

As international politics following the end of World War II (1939–1945) became increasingly dominated by the Western democracies and Eastern communist blocs, the first Asian-African conference at Bandung in April 1955 marked the beginning of an independent cooperation movement of Third World countries. All independent Southeast Asian states were among the twenty-nine delegations to the conference. Non-alignment, which had been advocated by the prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), since 1949, did not mean pacifism but independent participation in international relations. It was an expression of a separate identity, with peaceful coexistence, anti-imperialism, and racial equality as its principles and was appealing to newly independent states emerging from the colonial experience. As a discussion forum for common concerns and a platform for developing joint policies, the

NAM has always comprised member states with differing ideologies and could never create an institutionalized administrative structure or a formal constitution. In Southeast Asia, the NAM found its most prominent and active spokesmen in the governments of Indonesia.

The NAM was founded at a summit meeting in the Yugoslavian capital of Belgrade in 1961 by twenty-five countries. Since then, eleven summit meetings have been held, and the NAM today consists of 115 members, including all Southeast Asian states. One of its main objectives is to enhance negotiating power within the UN system, a task assigned to the closely affiliated Group of 77 in the economic sphere.

During its early years, the NAM had a strong base in Asia with its influential members China and India; however, the deterioration of Indian-Chinese relations, the later exclusion of China, and the admission of European and increasing numbers of African states shifted its focus away from Asia. In addition, Southeast Asian states themselves followed different approaches toward international relations. The Philippines and Thailand shared the view that their security against the perceived communist threat depended on defense arrangements with the United States—as expressed in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) of 1954. Indonesia and Burma, on the other hand, strongly advocated an independent foreign policy that implied no military alliances with either of the two superpowers. Nonalignment thereby never more than nominally encompassed Southeast Asia as a whole, but was rather an expression of political tactics pursued by individual Southeast Asian states. From the mid-1960s and particularly in the 1970s, regional cooperation in Southeast Asia came to be seen as a more effective strategy for promoting the interests of states over a loose association such as the NAM. Meanwhile, increasingly militant NAM policies toward the West were often in discord with those of Southeast Asian countries.

At a NAM summit in Lusaka in 1970, Southeast Asia became a focus of attention when Tun Abdul Razak (t. 1970–1976), the prime minister of Malaysia, presented his proposal to make Southeast Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), which was subsequently endorsed by the NAM members. By the mid-1970s—as highlighted during

the first NAM summit after the end of the Vietnam War (1964–1975) in Colombo in 1976—the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries became, however, increasingly alienated by the NAM. Burma and Vietnam used the movement to voice opposition against the ongoing pro-Western regional cooperation process in Southeast Asia. Countries such as Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines were too closely affiliated with the developed Western nations to endorse the NAM's calls for a complete restructuring of the global economy during those years. By the time Burma withdrew from the movement at the Havana summit in 1979 to protest against the alignment of its neighbors with the West, NAM had become rather insignificant for Southeast Asia as a forum for conducting international relations. Finally, by the late 1980s, the NAM changed in reaction to the changed global power structure and decided to focus on the fight for human rights and protection of the environment, rather than on the fight against colonialism. Southeast Asian states were content to go along with this, while strong opposition came from hard-line African and Latin American states. Indonesia demonstrated its unwavering adherence to the principles of non-alignment once more as late as 1992–1995, when it chaired the NAM.

The Non-Aligned Movement was a significant foreign policy initiative for the newly independent states of Southeast Asia, especially for Indonesia, during the first postwar decade. However, it was constantly contested by U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia against communism and became increasingly insignificant, especially through the success of ASEAN.

STEFAN HELL

See also Asian-African (Bandung) Conference (April 1955); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Cold War; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (1954); United States Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) (1971)

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NONG SARAI, BATTLE OF (1593)

See Phra Naret (King Naresuan) (r. 1590–1605); Toungoo Dynasty (1531–1752)

NORODOM, KING (1836–1904)

Juggling Franco-Siamese Influence

As Cambodian king, Norodom reigned from 1860 to 1904. His father, Ang Duong (Ang Duang) (1796–1860), became Cambodia's monarch in 1847 after a period of enforced residence in Siam (Thailand). When Duong died in 1860, Thai patronage of the Cambodian court remained in force, and several claimants jockeyed for the throne. Norodom, although Duong's eldest son, was unable to consolidate his rule. In 1863, a French delegation from their new colony in southern Vietnam (Cochin China) visited the Cambodian capital and promised Norodom protection in exchange for some commercial advantages. Norodom capitalized on the vagueness of the terms (and French ambitions in the region) to counterbalance continuing patronage from Siam, and in 1864, after obtaining the royal regalia from Bangkok, he was crowned king by a team of French and Siamese officials.

Over the next twenty years, the French became dissatisfied with Norodom's autocratic style and his unwillingness to accept their political control or to open Cambodia to French investment. In 1884 a French official came to Phnom Penh aboard a gunboat and delivered an ultimatum to Norodom, demanding that he

abolish slavery in the country, allow French officials to control his finances, and accept resident French political advisors throughout the kingdom. A nationwide revolt against the French soon broke out, probably with Norodom's connivance. It took the French three years to restore order, aided by Norodom's brother, Sisowath Monivong (r. 1927–1941), whom the French had come to favor as Norodom's successor.

The remaining years of Norodom's reign were marked by the intensification of French control and a weakening of royal institutions. At one point French officials tried to have the king declared insane, so as to put a more malleable ruler on the throne. In his last years, Norodom became for all intents and purposes a recluse, baffled by history, perhaps, but proud of his achievements.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Ang Duang (1796–1860); Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–)

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NU, U (1907–1995)

Promulgator of “Buddhist Socialism”

U or Thakin Nu became the first prime minister of the former British colony of Burma (Myanmar) when the country regained its independence on 4 January 1948. Born in the Irrawaddy Delta town of Wakema in 1907, the son of local shopkeepers, he was educated at Rangoon University. While at the university he became involved in student nationalist politics with other future nationalist leaders, including General Aung San (1915–1947) and U Thant (1909–1974), who subsequently became secretary general of the United Nations. Graduating from student union politics, he became involved in the Dobama Asiayone, or We Burmans Association, members of which called themselves Thakin, or Master, in defiance of the British. A man interested in world literature, he was one of the co-organizers of the *Nagani*

(Red Dragon) Bookclub, founded to translate socialist and Marxist writings into Burmese. In 1940 the British interned him for activities in opposition to Burma's assistance to Britain in the war against Nazi Germany.

Upon his release from jail by the Japanese when they invaded the country in 1942, Thakin Nu was chosen by Dr. Ba Maw (b. 1893) to serve as foreign minister in his Japanese-sponsored government in 1942. Hoping to abandon politics for a career as an author in 1945, when the British resumed control of the colony, Thakin Nu was made vice-president of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), the popular political front organization with which the British subsequently negotiated Burma's independence. Nu was elected president of the constituent assembly formed after elections in 1947 to write the first constitution for independent Burma. Upon the assassination of General Aung San in July 1947, Nu assumed the deputy chairmanship of the Governor's Executive Council, effectively the prime ministership, on the eve of independence.

Immediately after independence was regained, the AFPFL splintered and the country was thrown into civil war between Nu's neutralist, Socialist Party-backed government and a variety of communist and ethnically designated separatist and revolutionary groups. Dependent on the army under General Ne Win for protection in the areas of greatest conflict, for a time during 1949 U Nu's government was dubbed the "government of Rangoon," as large areas of the country, including several major cities, were under the control of rebel groups. Nu's AFPFL government rested on the support of various political barons and local bosses in the parliament. Many of these had their own private armies, which often had better weapons and supplies than did the government's army. Disgusted by the squabbling for the spoils of office among his political colleagues and the resultant corruption, Nu resigned following national elections in 1956 to "clean up the party." Resuming office in 1958, the AFPFL soon split between his "Clean" faction and the "Stable" faction of the two deputy prime ministers. Faced with the prospect of renewed conflict, he invited General Ne Win (1911–2002) to form a six-month military "caretaker" government, which, in the event, remained in office for eighteen months.



Portrait of U Nu, the prime minister of Burma. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Although winning reelection under the Union Party label in 1960, U Nu was ousted by Ne Win in a military coup in March 1962. Failing in a comeback attempt with the support of armed insurgents along the border with Thailand in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Nu eventually slipped from political view. He did, however, make a brief but vain resurgence at the time of the collapse of Ne Win's Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) government in 1988. At that time Nu asserted that he was still the only legitimate head of government in the country, a claim that received little support from other politicians and the wider public. His attempted political revival was lost among the many new political voices and groups that had emerged in Burma in the twenty-six years since he had last held office.

Nu is a devout Buddhist, and his years in government were noteworthy for his attempts to bridge the gulf between the West and China at the height of the Cold War. During his period in government, Burma became one of

the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), along with the India of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) and the Indonesia of President Sukarno (1901–1970). In 1960 he advocated making Buddhism the state religion of Burma, antagonizing non-Buddhists as well as some members of Buddhist sects different from his own. Although never a member of the Socialist Party, which formed the intellectual core of his government, he advocated a set of political ideas that attempted to meld Theravada Buddhist and socialist concepts. His last major project, after accepting a pension from General Ne Win in an amnesty in 1980, was to embark on a major translation of Buddhist texts into English. His autobiography, written in the third person by a fictitious nephew, provides candid insight into his life.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Aung San (1915–1947); Ba Maw, Dr. (b. 1893); Buddhist Socialism; Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Ne Win, General (1911–2002); Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Southeast Asia; Thakin; University of Rangoon

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NURUDDIN AL-RANIRI (d. 1658)
Champion of Orthodox Islamic Mysticism
 Writer, historian, and Sufi theologian and critic Nuruddin al-Raniri was the outstanding champion of orthodox mysticism, denouncing the *Wahdat al-Wujud* ("Unity of Being") of Wujudiyah mysticism as heresy. Malay literature was much richer for his prolific contribution, from religious treatises and translations to voluminous historical works.

Nuruddin al-Raniri was of Quraisy parentage from Ranir (Rander), a cosmopolitan Gujarati port not far from Surat in northwest India. His paternal side was descended from the

Humaid of the Hadramaut. Henceforth his full name was Nuruddin bin Ali bin Hassanji bin Muhammad Humaid al-Raniri. The date of his birth is unknown. His travels, sojourns, and writings revealed that he was active during the first half of the seventeenth century. He completed his religious education at Mecca during the early 1620s and apparently in Pahang in the next decade, where he acquired his fluency in the Malay language. (Pahang was then under Acehese rule.)

From 1637 to 1644, Nuruddin was in Aceh. By then the proponents and supporters of heretical Wujudiyah—namely, Hamzah Fansuri and Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani (d. 1630) and the latter's patron, Sultan Iskandar Muda (Mahkota Alam) (r. 1607–1636)—had all died. Nuruddin had gained the support of Sultan Iskandar Thani (r. 1636–1641) and also briefly of Sultanah Taj al-Alam Safiatuddin Shah (r. 1641–1675), paving the way for him to "cleanse" Sufi mysticism of alleged heresies and heretical teachings. At the same time he strengthened the orthodox doctrine of *Wahdat al-Shuhud* ("Unity of Witnessing"). His denunciation of Hamzah and his supporter Shamsuddin were focused on his identification with the Western philosophers, the Zoroastrians, the Brahmins, and others as to the ideas of God, Nature, and Man, and the pantheistic view that God permeates everything that is seen. Nuruddin also condemned Hamzah's belief that God is a Simple Being, that the Qur'an was created, and in the eternity of the World (Al-Attas 1966). Hamzah's *Al-Muntahi* (*The Adept*) was the focus of Nuruddin's 1664 denunciation in his *Tibyan fi ma'rifat al-adyan* (*Explanatory Notes in Knowing Various Religions*), in which he also attacked the heresies of Shamsuddin. The purging in Aceh was also played out in Mughal India, where the doctrine of *Wahdat al-Wujud* ("Unity of Being") faced theological opposition (Johns 1957: 34; Drewes and Brakel 1986: 16–17).

A prolific writer, Nuruddin wrote and translated (in to Malay) no fewer than twenty works of Malay and Arabic. His religious books included *Sirat al-Mustakim* (1628), *Asrar al-insan fi ma'rifat al-ruh wa'l-rahman* (1641), *Akhbar al-akhirah fi ahwal al-kiamah* (1642), and *Jawahir al-'ulum fi kashf al-ma'lum* (1642). Three works on mysticism (*Fath al-mubin 'ala al-mulhidin*, *Hujjat al-siddik lidaf al-zindik*, and *Lata'if al-asra*) and

one on catechism (*Nubdha fi da'wa 'l-sill ma 'a sahibibi*) were apparently lost. Nuruddin's historical *magna corpus* was the seven-volume *Bustan a's-Salatin* ("Garden of Kings") (1638). He also penned *Kisah Iskandar Zulqarnain*, which tells of the exploits of Alexander of Macedonia (356–323 B.C.E.), from whom the Malays claimed descent. He rendered the Arabic *Sharh al-'aka'id al-Nasafiya* into Malay, entitled *Durrat al-Fara'id bisharh al-'ak'id*.

After losing favor at court, Nuruddin left Aceh in 1644 and returned to India. He died in September 1658.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Aceh (Acheh); Hamzah Fansuri; Islam in Southeast Asia; Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani (d. 1630)

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NUSANTARA

The Malay Archipelago

Nusantara refers to the Javanese archipelagic empire outside Java. This Javanese expression gained currency during the thirteenth century


in the ambitious imperialistic plans of the Singahasari ruler Kertanagara (r. 1268–1292), who laid the foundations of the kingdom and empire of Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s). In his efforts to establish Javanese paramountcy over the islands in the vacuum created by a declining Srivijaya, Kertanagara's projected vision, realized through the domination over eastern parts of Java and conquests of Madura and Bali, made Nusantara a realistic ambition. In his footsteps, Majapahit rulers attempted to make Nusantara a reality. Despite the claims in the *Nāgarak-ertāgama*, the poem by the Buddhist prelate Prapanca that glorified Majapahit and that listed virtually the entire present-day Indonesian archipelago as well as Malaysia as within the Majapahit empire, it was highly doubtful that it was factually true. The current historical evidence, however, points to a more restricted boundary of Majapahit's imperial presence, limited to the greater part of East Java and the islands of Madura and Bali. Nonetheless, it was possible that Majapahit's sphere of influence, as against direct domination, extended nominally westward to Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula and stretched as far eastward as the Bandas and the Moluccas. Nusantara, therefore, from this perception was realized. The term "Nusantara" then came to be increasingly identified with the Malay Archipelago—that is, the present-day Republic of Indonesia and the Federation of Malaysia.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Kertanagara (r. 1268–1292); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Śrivijaya (Śriwijaya)

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OC ÈO

A Major Archaeological Site of Vietnam

(*Go*) *Oc Èo*—that is, “(the mound of) *Oc Èo*” in Vietnamese—is the local name for a major archaeological site in Vietnamese territory credited to the polity known as Funan. It is situated in the floodplain of the lower Mekong Delta, halfway between the river and the coast of the Gulf of Siam, some 30 kilometers southwest of the provincial capital of Long Xuyên. In the early 1940s, *Go Oc Èo* was the first site to have been discovered, excavated, and proven to belong to the latter polity, known until then from written sources alone. Vietnamese archaeologists have used this place-name as a generic term to designate the culture that flourished in the lower part of the Mekong Delta during the first half of the first millennium C.E. In Vietnam alone, they have now brought to light more than 300 sites of this “Culture of *Oc Èo*.”

The term “*Oc Èo*” is also most commonly used by archaeologists to designate a complex of sites in the vicinity of the eponymous “Mound of *Oc Èo*.” This complex extends over a good 20 square kilometers, and includes sites dating back to Funan and to the following periods (from the first to the twelfth centuries C.E.). A first group of sites in this complex lies in the floodplain at the foot of the granitic outcrop of Mount Ba Thê; the other group is situated on its lower and middle slopes. Louis Malleret, of the *École Française d’Extrême-Orient*, first discovered this site complex in 1942; he excavated it

only once, in 1944. The long war that was then starting prevented archaeologists from working there till a few years after the reunification of Vietnam (1975). Malleret nevertheless managed to publish and acquire—for what is now the Museum of History of Hồ Chí Minh City—an impressive collection of some 10,000 archaeological artifacts, some 90 percent of which come from the *Oc Èo* area. Finds from recent excavations at *Oc Èo* and surroundings are now kept at the provincial museums of Long Xuyên and Rach Gia.

When Malleret discovered the sites, the floodplain near *Oc Èo* was still a marshy wasteland. He was able to survey and plot—part on the surface and part from aerial photographs alone—a large number of sites and features. Many of these sites were obliterated from the surface when the area was later transformed into modern rice fields and crisscrossed by a dense network of irrigation canals. Recent systematic excavations, guided by modern remote-sensing and geophysical techniques, have nevertheless confirmed many of the earlier assumptions. However, because of intense looting starting in the early 1940s and man-made disturbance after the 1960s for agricultural development, the site of *Oc Èo* may forever keep many of its secrets.

Most of the floodplain sites in the first group fall within a 2,500-by-1,500-meter rectangular area surrounded by moats that were visible only in pre-1960s aerial photographs but have recently been revealed in excavations.



Vietnamese sculpture of the head of Kirti Mukka. This sculpture was excavated from the site of the ancient city of Oc Èo, which was a major trading city in the first to sixth centuries. (Leonard de Selva/Corbis)

Site density and variety are highest within this moat area, indicating an urban concentration. The moat city is bisected by an ancient, man-made canal that runs southwest toward the coast; in the northeast, this canal joins with another ancient canal that connects the Oc Èo complex with the major Funan site of Angkor Borei, some 70 kilometers away, in Cambodian territory. During the first chronological phase of Funan (first to third centuries C.E.), settlement in the floodplain appears to have been limited to low natural mounds, which, under normal conditions, would not have been inundated. Houses on stilts were built of wood; some of these buildings would have been large, judging from the impressive diameter of the wooden piles (up to 30 centimeters), and were covered with terra-cotta grooved, flat tiles. The density of artifacts recovered from this first

phase is high (particularly pottery). Some were imported from India. During the second phase (fourth to sixth centuries C.E.), large brick sanctuaries were erected on the same mounds. Canals were most probably dug during this second phase, allowing flood control and the settlement of a larger number of people in the lower floodplain. This flourishing period of the history of Oc Èo is also the time when an extraordinary variety of artifacts in bronze, tin, gold, and glass were manufactured locally. The main canal would have allowed this industrial production to reach the coast and be exported overseas. Ongoing research may also help document other functions of this canal network: it is quite possible that the drainage of the floodplain and the newly acquired irrigation control helped open up new tracks of land for rice growing. For reasons that are not yet clear, the

urban site in the floodplain was suddenly abandoned toward the seventh century, at a time when the polity of Funan appears to have disintegrated. Future research will have to determine the share of environmental, economic, or political factors that brought about such radical changes in settlement patterns. The changes include silting of the canals, severe change in climate, increasing competition from the Austronesian-speaking states that were fast developing in insular Southeast Asia, growth of agriculture in the interior plains of present-day Cambodia, and a progressive shift inland of the political centers of the southern Indochinese peninsula—or a combination of these factors.

The second group of sites at Oc Èo are situated on the lower and middle slopes of Mount Ba Thê, overlooking the floodplain settlements. Sites situated at the interface between the floodplain and the rising ground of the mound were occupied during the earliest phase of Funan and produced a range of artifacts similar to those found in the floodplain. A jar burial, typical of Southeast Asian protohistorical cultures, was recently brought to light on slightly higher ground. It contained ashes, as well as a few gold and carnelian beads. During the second phase, temples also were built in brick and stone on the slopes of Mount Ba Thê. Very few remains of the earliest structures have so far been found there, as their bricks were systematically reused to build new temples. Remains recently excavated near the modern Buddhist sanctuary of Linh Son appear to indicate that this was the location of a large religious complex of which only surrounding buildings have so far been found. The central shrine most probably lies under the mound on which the modern sanctuary was built early in the twentieth century. The ancient sanctuaries and their extensions were built up and enlarged over the following centuries. Some of these religious structures have been dated to as late as the twelfth century. Indeed, as Funan waned and the pre-Angkorian and later Angkorian polities gained political power in the interior of Cambodia, Oc Èo appears to have turned into an active, albeit peripheral, religious site only.

The archaeological site at Oc Èo presents a good example of the cultural developments occurring in Southeast Asia during the first part of the first millennium C.E. Like other known sites of the coast of western Southeast Asia, it

came into existence in the first or second century C.E. as a dense coastal settlement with far-reaching trade contacts with the rest of Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the South China Sea. During this early phase, its people appear to have clung to indigenous religious practices, as attested to by the recently found jar burial, even if material culture already shows strong influences, mainly from the Indian subcontinent. Ceramic traditions revealed at Oc Èo bring proof of such technological transfers. As in other contemporary sites of Southeast Asia, artifacts from across the Bay of Bengal that belong to the earlier phase of Oc Èo, such as Roman and Middle Eastern medals and intaglios, inscribed Indian gems, beads, and ceramics, bear no witness yet to the Indianization of Funanese society. These artifacts attest only to the remarkable cosmopolitanism of Oc Èo. Soon enough, however—sometime between the late third and the fifth centuries—Indian cultural traits started to be adopted in the political and religious spheres. Indian stately behavior and the notion that rulers can be legitimized by their close affiliation with Hindu divinities gained ground in Funan, as they did in other contemporary polities of Southeast Asia. The statuary and inscriptions recovered at Oc Èo and its surroundings, as elsewhere in other Funan sites in the Mekong Delta, indicate that both Buddhism and Brahmanism were practiced. The latter, judging from rare fifth- and sixth-century inscriptions and from the much larger number of Visnu statues found in the Mekong Delta, appears to have been favored by the rulers. In Oc Èo as on the Malay Peninsula, in South Sumatra, or in West Java, it appears that devotional cults to Visnu, a divinity closely associated with kingship and political power, were the rule. Like the Buddhists, these Brahmanical sects accepted universalist doctrines that were convenient means of proselytizing among foreign people who did not belong to the rigid caste system of India.

PIERRE-YVES MANGUIN

See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Funan; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization

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OIL AND PETROLEUM

The hydrocarbon deposits (oil, petroleum, gas) of Southeast Asia are concentrated in the younger geological formations between the major Tertiary folds that run like an arc through the region. From the north in the central de-

pression of Burma (Myanmar), hydrocarbon deposits extend through eastern Sumatra into northern Java. From there one arc extends through Seram into northern New Guinea; another follows the southern, eastern, and northern coasts of Borneo. The extent to which these geological deposits were actually exploited to produce commercial quantities of hydrocarbons depended on a range of other factors: geology alone cannot explain their development.

While oil had long been part of the local economy and oil deposits had been exploited on a small scale for domestic purposes, it was largely the development of the internal combustion engine toward the end of the nineteenth century that provided the catalyst for hydrocarbon exploitation. The exploration phase began in the 1870s and was largely a product of European interest in exploiting regional resources. In the Dutch East Indies the colonial Mines Service was important in mapping likely deposits, and, by the early 1880s, commercial drilling was under way in both the northern Sumatran fields around Aceh and the Palembang fields in southern Sumatra. A number of smaller fields in central and east Java were also onstream by the end of the nineteenth century. Elsewhere in the East Indies, the important fields of Balikpapan in eastern Borneo were providing almost one-half of the total output of the Dutch East Indies by 1910, alongside smaller fields in Ceram. Other fields outside the Dutch East Indies included those in Sarawak and Brunei around Miri, which had come onstream by the second decade of the twentieth century. Finally, the oil fields of central Burma were an important source of revenue for the British colonial administration by 1910.

A first key feature of the development of the hydrocarbon industry was the dominance of outside interests—it was first and foremost a colonial industry. Partly this was a consequence of the large capital investments and technical expertise required to develop the industry; partly it was the result of a close relationship between colonial governments and overseas firms. In Burma, the Burmah Oil Company quickly dominated the oil industry, while in Sarawak and Brunei it was Royal Dutch Shell that dominated oil prospecting and development. In the Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies,

the large fields and refineries of East Kalimantan were controlled again by Royal Dutch Shell through a monopoly company, Bataafsche Petroleum-Maatschappij (BPM), which was to dominate the region's economy for some thirty years. Royal Dutch Shell also dominated petroleum production in Sumatra. U.S. and Japanese interests were of only minor significance in the colonial period—the relationship between company and colonial administration remained a close one.

A second important feature of the industry was its general lack of impact on other aspects of the economy. In most parts of colonial Southeast Asia, petroleum extraction and processing remained essentially an “enclave” economy. Inasmuch as most of the skilled and supervisory labor was imported from Europe, the impact on local industries and infrastructure was limited, and profits were repatriated to European investors rather than reinvested in the region. By the late 1930s, the industry was vital to significant regions in Borneo, Burma, Java, and Sumatra. In Thailand and British Malaya, by contrast, few easily exploitable resources were available.

In the period after the Pacific War (1941–1945), the nature and structure of the industry were transformed. The process of decolonization has meant changes in the structure of the industry, with partial nationalizations in Indonesia and Burma leading to uneasy relationships between the multinational companies dominating the industry and the new governments of the region. Huge increases in both demand and production have transformed the industry, and rapid upward and downward movements in commodity prices have had important macroeconomic effects in both large countries such as Indonesia and smaller producers such as Brunei. Technical advances in recent decades have extended the industry offshore into new oil and LNG (liquefied natural gas) deposits. These in turn have created a range of new opportunities alongside greater technical and environmental challenges.

MARK CLEARY

See also Borneo; Brunei Oil and Gas Industry; Burma under British Colonial Rule; Decolonization of Southeast Asia; Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Historical Geography of Insular Southeast Asia;

Historical Geography of Mainland Southeast Asia; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Pertamina Crisis (1975–1976); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Sumatra

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**OMAR ALI SAIFUDDIN III,
SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1914–1986)**

Architect of Modern Brunei

His Highness Sultan Haji General Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin III, ruler of the British Protectorate of Brunei from 6 June 1950 until his abdication on 4 October 1967, exercised power when the real benefit of oil wealth first began to be felt in his domain.

His reign, coinciding with the height of the Cold War, was an era of political awakening locally combined with declining British power. Ruling by decree after the revolt of 1962, he resisted democratization and any idea of having his country absorbed into a federation of a “British Borneo.” (On the “Greater Malaysia” issue he was rather more ambiguous.) During his reign Islam was strengthened and the Malay language promoted, welfare services were expanded, and the first national development plans were implemented. A constitution was promulgated in 1959, when internal self-government was regained from the United Kingdom and the detested administrative link with Sarawak was abrogated. He founded the Brunei Malay Regiment, the Brunei Museum, and several orders of chivalry. As “Seri Begawan” (Emeritus) Sultan (1967–1986), he remained the real power in the land, taking particular responsibility for relations with the British, and

he became minister of defense in the first postindependence cabinet (1984–1986).

Born on 23 September 1914, son of Sultan Sir Muhammad Jamalul Alam (r. 1906–1924), Sir Omar was educated at the Malay College, Kuala Kangsar, and became an accomplished poet. Short in stature and soft-spoken, he married three times and was blessed with many children. In 1947 he was promoted to vizier rank and, in 1953, was knighted by Queen Elizabeth II (r. 1952–). Having suffered from diabetes for several years, Sir Omar died on 7 September 1986 at Bandar Seri Begawan, which had been so named in 1970 in homage to him.

The Seri Begawan Sultan enjoys a high reputation as “Architect of Modern Brunei”; many places in the country are named after him, and the anniversary of his birth has been commemorated every year since 1991 as Hari Guru (Teachers’ Day).

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Brunei Oil and Gas Industry; Brunei Rebellion (December 1962); Hassanal Bolkiah, Sultan of Brunei (1946–); Malay College, Kuala Kangsar (MCKK); Malaysia (1963); Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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ONN BIN JA'AFAR (1895–1962)

Founder-President of UMNO

Better known as Dato' Onn, Onn bin Ja'afar is closely linked to the new political developments in Malaya immediately after the Pacific War (1941–1945). Dato' Onn is especially remembered as the leader of the Malays against the Malayan Union scheme imposed by Britain in 1946 and as founder of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), which continues to dominate Malaysian politics today. Under his leadership and partly organized by UMNO, Malays held peaceful demonstrations all over Malaya, forcing Britain to replace the Malayan Union with the Federation of Malaya in February 1948. A founding member of the Communities Liaison Committee (CLC) in 1949 and influenced by its recommendations, Onn ventured to transform UMNO into a noncommunal party. But when his ideas were rejected he left UMNO in August 1951 and formed the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) in September.

Born on 3 February 1895, Onn was the fourth son of Dato' Ja'afar bin Muhammad, the first *Menteri Besar* (chief minister) of “Modern Johor,” by his fifth wife, Rugayah Hanim Abdullah. Dato' Ja'afar (1838–1919) served under Sultan Abu Bakar (r. 1862–1895) and Sultan Ibrahim (r. 1895–1959). Rugayah, a Turkish lady, was first married to Sultan Abu Bakar's younger brother, Tengku Abdul Majid, and then to a rich merchant, Syed Abdullah Al-Attas, before marrying Dato' Ja'afar. Adopted by Sultan Ibrahim, Onn was sent in 1903 to England to accompany the Johor princes in their studies there; he was enrolled at Alderburgh Lodge School, Suffolk. On returning to Malaya in 1910, Onn was sent to the prestigious Malay College in Kuala Kangsar, where he studied Malay language and literature.

Starting as a probationary clerk in the Johor Civil Service in 1911, Onn was promoted and transferred a number of times from one department to another before he was conscripted into the Johor military forces in 1917 and was stationed at Pulau Belakang Mati (today renamed Sentosa Island), Singapore. Back in Johor in 1919 he served in various departments, but being openly critical of the sultan, his job was terminated in 1927. It was while living in exile doing odd jobs in Singapore that, with the help of Syed Hussein Alsagoff and other relatives,

Onn was appointed editor of the newly established *Warta Malaya* in January 1930 and became active as a journalist. He began to get involved in bigger issues, especially those pertaining to the welfare of the Malays in general. Onn left *Warta Malaya* in 1933 and, together with Syed Alwi Al-Hadi, started a new periodical, *Lembaga Malaya*, in 1934. In 1935, Onn began to publish the daily *Lembaga*, and in 1936, at the invitation of Syed Hussein, he started *Warta Ahad*, the Sunday edition of *Warta Malaya*. When he was recalled to Johor and appointed unofficial member of the Johor Legislative Council in January 1936, Onn moved the publication of *Lembaga* and *Lembaga Malaya* to Johor Bahru. In 1939 he was appointed private secretary to the Johor heir apparent, Tengku Ismail.

When Japan conquered Malaya in 1942, Onn was appointed food officer for Johor. In April, Onn became a member of Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM, the Young Malay Union), and he participated in the Kesatuan Rakyat Indonesia Semenanjung (KRIS, Union of Peninsular Indonesians) when it was formed in May 1945. Appointed by Sultan Ibrahim as district officer of Batu Pahat on 19 August 1945, Onn contributed significantly to ending the postwar Sino-Malay clashes in the district. In January 1946 he started the Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung Johor (Johor Peninsula Malay Movement), which participated actively in the 1946 Malay Congress. It was while serving as UMNO president that Onn was appointed acting Menteri Besar of Johor in October 1946. Confirmed as Menteri Besar on 17 September 1947, Onn resigned in 1949 because of some misunderstanding with the Malay sultans over his proposal for the appointment of a Malay deputy high commissioner for Malaya. Onn was made chairman of the newly instituted Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA) in December 1950 and a member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in February 1951. Both responsibilities ended in January 1955.

Onn's debut outside UMNO proved to be a failure. Winning only two seats in the Kuala Lumpur municipal election in 1952 and unable to overcome the growing influence of the Alliance Party in the subsequent local elections, Onn disbanded IMP and formed Partai Negara (PN) in 1954, but he failed to win any seat in the 1955 elections.

With the cooperation of Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), Onn was finally elected to Parliament to represent a constituency in Terengganu in 1959. PN also won 4 of the 24 seats in the state. But by this time Onn was already more than sixty years old and was unwell physically. When one PN representative joined PAS and the other three went over to UMNO on 22 October 1961, the PN had reached its end.

Onn died on 18 January 1962 and was laid to rest next to his father in Johor Bahru. His son, Hussein Onn (1922–1990), was the third prime minister of Malaysia (t. 1976–1981).

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Alliance Party (Malaya/Malaysia); Johor; Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) (Young Malay Union); Malayan Union (1946); Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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OPIUM

Opium was first significant in Southeast Asia as an item of trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as a financial prop to the colonial empires. In the twentieth century, it was produced in, consumed in, and exported from Southeast Asia.

Opium was probably introduced into Southeast Asia not long after the drug was first re-

ported in China, about the ninth century C.E. It may well have first come from India or possibly the Arab world, via the maritime trade route. At that time opium was used primarily as a medicine, but by the time Europeans arrived in Southeast Asia it was also being used by warriors prior to battle and by couriers and others undertaking strenuous tasks in both India and Southeast Asia.

In about 1690, it was reported that in Java opium was being mixed with tobacco and smoked. Prior to that time the drug was generally ingested. Around the same time, Dutch traders and ultimately the Dutch East India Company (VOC) came to dominate the trade in the drug from India to Southeast Asia. Markets for it developed in Java and Sumatra, particularly among miners and pepper planters. Dutch traders may have introduced the drug and the habit of smoking it to the Chinese when they occupied Taiwan. Not long afterward, it seems that some Chinese devised a manner of smoking the drug without tobacco. This was already being practiced before the beginning of the eighteenth century and appears to have provoked the first attempts by the Chinese government to prohibit the use of the drug.

In the latter half of the eighteenth century, the British took control of the opium-producing areas of India and began to develop the trade in a more systematic manner. The English East India Company (EIC) declared a monopoly over the cultivation of opium in Bihar and Benares and began making the drug available to independent traders, the so-called country traders who carried it to China, selling a portion of their cargo in Southeast Asia en route. The traditional Malay market absorbed some portion of this, while Chinese laborers who were beginning to form important settlements during these years consumed increasing amounts. By the nineteenth century, Chinese laborers had become the major consumers of opium in Southeast Asia.

It was to protect the opium trade to China (and the tea shipments coming back through Southeast Asia) that the British settlements of Penang (1786) and Singapore (1819) were established. During the nineteenth century, as the trade to China increased from about 4,000 chests (there were about 60 to 70 kilograms per chest) annually in 1800 to more than 100,000

chests in 1880, Southeast Asian consumption seems to have absorbed about 20 percent of the total (Trocki 1990: 57).

Excise revenue farmers who contracted the privilege of marketing opium from the colonial states sold much of the drug to resident Chinese as well as indigenous Southeast Asians. This monopoly was called an opium farm. Some form of farm existed in every part of the region, and Chinese entrepreneurs almost invariably ran these highly profitable enterprises. Between 1885 and 1910, the farming system was gradually phased out and was replaced by government-run monopolies. During the 1920s, the cost of opium was gradually increased with the intention of reducing consumption.

By this time, however, Japanese pharmaceutical companies had developed a competitive product in injectable morphine. At the same time, cultivation of the poppy had spread throughout China and into neighboring Laos and Burma (Myanmar). Cultivation continued to flourish in China until the early 1950s, when the People's Republic of China (PRC) suppressed it. Retreating Guomindang (Kuomintang, KMT) armies came to dominate the production of opium in northern Burma in the 1950s and 1960s and, with support from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), began to convert the drug to heroin and to export it. This laid the foundation for the traffic in the region currently known as the Golden Triangle (the area straddling Burma, Thailand, and Laos).

Cultivation of the opium poppy has become an important part of the illegal economy of the region. In the 1960s, the Vietnam War (1964–1975) created an opportunity for the trade to flourish, and new markets developed in Saigon and Bangkok. The drug also found markets in Australia, Europe, and the United States. Control of the opium crop in the Shan hills fell into the hands of warlords such as Lo Sing Han and Khun Sa. The warlords increased production to around 2,500 tons of raw opium and made Southeast Asia the major source of illegal heroin in the world by the early 1970s (McCoy 1991: 285).

CARL TROCKI

See also British India, Government of; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Country Traders; East

India Company (EIC) (1602), English; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Shan Nationalism; Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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ORANG ASLI

Orang Asli (Malay: “original people”) is a general term for the still-tribal and recently tribal populations of Peninsular Malaysia (West Malaysia). The term was introduced around 1960 as a replacement for the earlier label “Malayan aborigines.” Closely related populations (sometimes known collectively as “Maniq”) also exist in small numbers in southern Thailand.

The Orang Asli, who numbered at least 119,000 at the time of the Malaysian Census of 1996, do not constitute a single ethnolinguistic population, being differentiated by linguistic affiliation, mode of livelihood, and social-organizational pattern. The majority of the Orang Asli belong within the same generally “Southern Mongoloid” population as most of the other peoples of Southeast Asia.

Orang Asli settlements are found in the rural portions of all states of Peninsular Malaysia (apart from Perlis). Most of their villages are small, with populations ranging from 12 to about 200. In some areas, larger settlements have been formed through government-supported “regroupment” schemes, aimed at concentrating the Orang Asli in permanent settle-

ments more amenable to centralized administration. Increasingly, individual Orang Asli families are also living outside these settlements and in urban areas.

Depending on the criteria employed, the Orang Asli are divisible into fifteen to twenty distinct ethnolinguistic groups. Based on linguistic affiliation, the Orang Asli populations of southern Thailand and Peninsular Malaysia are differentiated into four groups—namely, Northern Aslian (Jahai, Batek, Chewong), Central Aslian (Semai, Temiar, Jah Hut), and Southern Aslian (Semelai, Mah Meri, Semaq Beri), classified under the Mon-Khmer language family; under the Austronesian family is the Malayic (Jakun, Temuan, Orang Kuala).

Modes of Livelihood

Until recently, most Orang Asli subsisted by the swidden farming of tapioca, hill rice, and other crops, supplemented by fishing, trapping, hunting, and the extraction and trading of forest products. A small number of Orang Asli, perhaps not more than 2 percent of the total, spent a significant part of their lives as nomads, moving in family groups every few days or weeks, either hunting and gathering in the forest or along the shore or fishing from dwelling-boats at sea.

More recently, many Orang Asli have moved toward the cash-based petty commodity production of fruits and other items, and to various forms of wage labor and salaried jobs. Increasingly, those with secondary and tertiary educations are entering more formal kinds of career-based employment in the modern sector. A major employer is the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (Jabatan Hal Ehwal Orang Asli [JHEOA]), but few Orang Asli have been appointed to senior positions there.

Religion

The indigenous religions of the Orang Asli display a generally animistic and revelatory outlook. Various entities in the environment (plants, animals, mountains, territories, etc.) are thought of as possessing subjectivities (“souls”) that can be communicated with by ordinary people—privately through dreams and publicly through trance and dance. Spirit-mediumship

Rural Orang Asli Populations of Southern Thailand and Peninsular Malaysia, 2000

LINGUISTIC AFFILIATION							
Northern Aslian		MON-KHMER		Southern Aslian		AUSTRONESIAN	
		Central Aslian				Malayic	
“Maniq”	±200	Lanoh	359	Semaq Beri	2,488	Temuan	16,020
Kensiu	224	Temiar	15,122	Semelai ¹	4,103	Jakun ³	16,637
Kentaq	359	Semai	26,049	Mah Meri ²	2,185	Orang Kanaq	64
Jahai	1,049	Jah Hut	3,193			Orang Seletar	801
Mendriq	145					Orang Kuala ⁴	2,492
Batek	960						
Chewong	403						

NOTES:

1. This includes a distinct group, the Temoqs, not currently listed in governmental sources.
2. Also known as Besisi and other similar-sounding words.
3. Also known as Orang Hulu.
4. Also known as Duano or Desin Dolaq.

SOURCE: “Table 2.1: Tribal Populations of Southern Thailand and Peninsular Malaysia, 2000,” from Geoffrey Benjamin. 2002. “On Being Tribal in the Malay World.” P. 22 in *Tribal Communities in the Malay World: Historical, Social, and Cultural Perspectives*. Edited by Geoffrey Benjamin and Cynthia Chou. Reproduced here with the kind permission of the publisher, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, <http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg>.

(among the northern Orang Asli) and shamanism (in the south) form the basis of religious ceremonial and healing practice. There has been much sharing of religious revelations among individuals in different settlements and among different ethnolinguistic groups.

Since the nineteenth century, some Orang Asli have adopted various world religions: Christianity (Catholic and Lutheran), Baha’i, and Islam. A few communities have even taken up Chinese-religionist practices. In recent years there has been a significant degree of conversion to Islam in some parts of the country, sponsored largely by both central and state governments, but much of this appears to be nominal rather than substantial. In former times, the adoption of Islam by an Orang Asli would be accompanied by assimilation into the Malay community, but that is no longer the case; there are a growing number of “Asli” Muslims. As in

the rest of Southeast Asia, the adopted world religion is usually practiced in a nonexclusive syncretism with the indigenous Orang Asli religion, which is still adhered to strongly.

Languages

Orang Asli languages fall into two distinct divisions. One-third speak Austronesian languages that are, with a single exception, closely related dialects of Malay. (The exception is Duano, spoken by the Orang Kuala of Johor.) In contrast, two-thirds speak distinctive languages belonging to the Southern Mon-Khmer division of the Austroasiatic stock. These “Aslian” languages (as they are called by linguists) fall in turn into four subdivisions: Northern, Central, Southern (each containing several languages), and Jah Hut (consisting of a single language). The Aslian languages, whose wider relation-

ships lie with such mainland languages as Vietnamese and Cambodian, are thought to have emerged within the peninsula over the past 3,000 years or so, providing living evidence for the country's remoter history. The peninsula's Hoabinhian and Neolithic remains, archaeologists believe, were produced by the ancestors of today's Aslian speakers.

Social Organization

Several patterns of social organization are found among the Orang Asli. Three basic patterns have been identified, though not all Orang Asli follow them.

The northern and central Orang Asli deal with each other in an egalitarian manner, based mainly on kinship relations. These relations are extended outward to embrace, in principle, all Orang Asli (and sometimes beyond), so that strangers will usually try to establish some genealogical connection, however distant, before getting to know each other better. Residential and marital preferences play a part in this, too. The northern groups (Kensius, Kentaqs, Jahais, and Mendriqs) tend to associate more closely with relatives connected to them through males, though that is not a formal rule. They also avoid marrying anyone with whom they have a traceable genealogical relationship. This ensures that they maintain social linkages over considerable distances, as is appropriate for a historically nomadic population.

The central groups (the Temiars and upland Semais) avoid marrying consanguineal kin. But (unlike their northern neighbors) they encourage marriage between individuals who are already related by marriage, and they place equal emphasis on relations through males and those through females. This has led to the formation of relatively distinct populations occupying single river valleys, along which are positioned their respective zones of resource utilization.

Among the southern groups (Semelais, Jakuns, and others), kinship relations are not as widely extended as among the northern and central Orang Asli. There is some preference for marrying "cousins"—that is, people already related consanguineally. Residential patterns within the village tend to be based on relations through females, while extravillage activities (such as trading in forest products) tend to be

based on relations through males. Associated with this is a degree of within-village ranking, more concerned with prestige than with economic difference.

Current Circumstances

The great majority of Orang Asli are Malaysian citizens, and as such they are potentially able to reap the usual benefits of citizenship. In addition, they are considered, in some contexts, as *bumiputera* (that is, Malaysians accorded special privileges on the grounds of indigenism). However, that categorization has been applied inconsistently and has so far provided little political or economic advantage to the Orang Asli. Unlike all other citizens, the Orang Asli also fall under a special piece of legislation, the Aboriginal Peoples Ordinance (1954), enacted during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960). At that time the Orang Asli were crucial to the government's military campaign against forest-based guerrillas, and the ordinance was intended to guarantee protection against exploitation in behalf of a population thought of as unable to protect itself.

Authorized by this legislation, JHEOA has for decades acted as the provider of health, educational, and other services to the rural Orang Asli. In practice, however, this has meant that the Orang Asli have had less control over their own circumstances and resources than they might otherwise have attained. Moreover, research has shown that the Orang Asli have become relatively (and in some cases absolutely) poorer in health and wealth than all other peninsular Malaysians.

Pressure to change this situation has come from the Orang Asli Association of Peninsular Malaysia (POASM), founded in 1980, which now claims a membership of more than 15,000. This nongovernmental organization has helped generate a broader sense of pan-"Asli" identity among the Orang Asli, while also ensuring that the rest of the Malaysian public is aware of the problems affecting contemporary Orang Asli life. The largest concern is that of land rights: less than 2 percent of the land occupied by Orang Asli communities is actually guaranteed to them under law, and there have been many cases in which Orang Asli communities have had their land alienated for other

purposes. This no longer goes unchallenged, however; several court cases brought since the 1990s have been decided in favor of Orang Asli complainants.

GEOFFREY BENJAMIN

See also *Bumiputera (Bumiputra)*; Ecological Setting of Southeast Asia; Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; Jungle/Forest Products; Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Malays; Neolithic Period of Southeast Asia; New Economic Policy (NEP) (Malaysia) (1971–1990)

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ORANG LAUT

The Orang Laut once comprised a diverse collection of local groups that together, until the nineteenth century, occupied much of the mar-

itime zone surrounding the Straits of Melaka, including parts of the east Sumatran coast and the islands of the Riau-Lingga and Pulau Tujuh groups. Descendants of these people are still found there, and a small offshoot community, the Urak Lawoi', live farther north, in the islands of southwest Thailand, from Phuket to the Adang group. All speak varieties of Malay. In addition to diverse local names, most identify themselves as "sea people"—either, in Malay, as *Orang Laut*, or by dialect variants as *Urak Lawoi'* or *Desin Dola'*.

Before the arrival of the first Europeans, groups of Orang Laut made their home in the labyrinth of tidal channels that wind through the mangrove forests fringing the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula and eastern coast of Sumatra. Working from small dugout houseboats, they collected crabs and molluscs and trapped and speared fish. The women wove mats and sails from nipah palm leaves, while the men cut mangrove bark for tannin and timber for firewood. To the south, in the Riau-Lingga archipelago, other groups were expert mariners, and many regularly navigated over considerable distances, fishing, gathering crustaceans and other marine life, and hunting sea turtles. At low tide they collected molluscs and bivalves, pearl oysters, and cowrie shells.

Later, in the first centuries C.E., as Chinese trade developed, the list of valued sea products grew. Added were pearl shell, black branching coral (*akar bahar*), tortoiseshell, and, most important, *trepan* or sea slugs. With their swimming and diving skills and intimate knowledge of navigational passageways and seafloors, the Orang Laut knew how to locate and acquire these items for trade. From the fifth century onward, the increasing use of sea transport to carry goods between western Asia and China favored the rise of local ports, with harbors in the Straits of Melaka enjoying a decided advantage. In the seventh century, the great maritime market of Śrīvijaya emerged, based in southeast Sumatra. A major source of Śrīvijaya's power was the relationship its rulers developed with the Orang Laut. Because of their seafaring skills and ability as a naval force to keep open the surrounding sea-lanes, control over these people was vital to Śrīvijaya's rise to power. For nearly six centuries, Śrīvijaya controlled the seas by commanding the loyalty of its Orang Laut allies.

Melaka eventually succeeded Śrīvijaya. In the best-known account, a prince who fled Sumatra, taking with him his followers and a band of Orang Laut, established Melaka. As the first ruler, he rewarded his followers with noble titles, and in acknowledgment of their loyalty, married his son to the daughter of the Orang Laut leader, making the latter his chief minister. Political legitimacy was thus perpetuated. Melaka's power as a port similarly depended upon the loyalty of the Orang Laut. Being Malay newcomers, however, and relatively few in number, the authority of Melaka's rulers had to be confirmed by local aboriginal clans (*suku asli*), including the Orang Laut. In giving their support, the latter accepted, in practice, a Malay system of governance and incorporation in a Malay political and economic ambit.

In 1511 the Portuguese captured Melaka, forcing the sultan to flee to Bintan, then home to a large Orang Laut community. In 1526 the sultan's son established the kingdom of Johor, with its royal residence on the Johor River. Sea people were again an integral part of the new state. During the subsequent seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, various subcommunities of Orang Laut were incorporated in the kingdom by their formalized ties to its rulers. These ties were articulated by means of specific corvée duties assigned to each community, these duties, in turn, being associated with differing degrees of status. Thus, higher-status groups, residing mainly on larger islands or along sea-lanes, were charged with patrolling surrounding waters and protecting traders wishing to trade in Johor, while harassing others; they also served, when called upon, as the naval fighting force. Lower-status groups performed more humble tasks, including caring for the king's hunting dogs. Later, with the intrusion of European colonial power and the breakdown of central hegemony, fighting groups transferred their allegiance to local Malay chieftains, who engaged them as pirate crews. As a result, one of the consequences of the suppression of piracy in the mid-nineteenth century was a rapid sedentarization of a number of these higher-status groups and their assimilation into the Malay population. By contrast, more marginal, lower-status groups have tended to preserve a separate Orang Laut identity, even when they have abandoned boat nomadism and settled ashore.

By the eighteenth century, Malay hegemony was everywhere in decline, and with it the status and fortunes of the Orang Laut. In Riau, effective power passed into the hands of Bugis newcomers, and the Orang Laut were displaced by Bugis seamen whose navigational and fighting skills made them largely redundant. For most, the only role left was fishing and the procurement of sea products. With the English establishment first of Penang (1786) and then of Singapore (1819), Malay commercial hegemony in the Straits of Melaka came to an end. Traditionally, the priority of the Orang Laut had been acknowledged and was symbolized by their participation in court ceremonies. By the nineteenth century, however, the Orang Laut had lost that role and ceased, from that time onward, to play any significant part in Malay politics. Their once-proud status was gone, and by midcentury the Orang Laut themselves were fast disappearing as an identifiable group. Once an important population in the Straits of Melaka, the Orang Laut became thoroughly marginalized, a remnant collection of scattered pariah communities, viewed by their neighbors with disdain and living on the outer fringes of Malay society.

CLIFFORD SATHER

See also Bugis (Buginese); Johor-Riau Empire; Mahmud, Sultan of Melaka (r. 1488–1511); Marine/Sea Products; Melaka; Parameswara (Parameshwara, Paramesvara); Śrīvijaya (Śrīwijaya); Straits of Melaka

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ORDE BARU (THE NEW ORDER)

One might formally date the inception of Indonesia's *Orde Baru* (New Order) at 11 March 1966. That was the date when President Sukarno (t. 1945–1967) signed the famous Letter of Authority of 11 March—the Supersemar (*Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret*)—granting Lieutenant General Suharto (1921–) executive authority to take all necessary measures to ensure security and order. In truth, however, the New Order's origins are more appropriately found in the events surrounding the failed "coup attempt" of 1 October 1965. Those events effectively killed off Sukarno's Guided Democracy and rendered irrelevant both the style of Sukarno's leadership and the ideological content of his regime. They excised a large part of the army's senior leadership. They led, moreover, to the obliteration of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). In time they allowed Suharto, in the absence of any serious elite-level competition, to whittle away and finally destroy Sukarno's power, and to accede to the presidency in March 1968. For the next thirty years, Indonesia was to remain under the sway of Suharto's New Order.

The New Order was slow to take shape, a consequence of the prolonged battle of wills and tactics between Suharto and Sukarno be-

tween October 1965 and February 1967. Only when Suharto, by about mid-1966, had gained the decisive edge in that battle could the construction of the New Order begin. As it gradually developed over the next few years, the New Order assumed some defining ideological and practical characteristics, the most substantial of which were driven by Suharto's own strongly conservative notions—the product of his own reflectiveness on culture and experience, rather than any book learning—about the nature of Indonesian society.

In its mature form, the New Order was a political and social system based around authoritarian corporatism. It was premised upon a set of ideas that had roots both in Javanese conceptions of hierarchy and order and in European fascist notions of the supremacy of the state and the community over the individual and of strong national identity, solidarity, and integration. Under such a framework, individual rights and freedoms were subservient to larger social purposes and responsibilities. The scaffolding for such ideas was provided by a revivification and narrowing of the previously nondescript state ideology of Pancasila, with its five pillars (belief in one God, a just and civilized humanity, the unity of the nation, deliberative democracy, and social justice), and by the Constitution of 1945. The essential spirit of the New Order was pragmatic, programmatic, and professedly nonideological.

Accordingly, the New Order was always fiercely opposed to so-called ideological conceptions of politics and society rooted either in the competitive West or in what were seen as primordial attachments, such as communism, liberalism, and religiously based (especially Islamic) political thinking. Its resistance to such ideas was based on the fear that Indonesia would face decline and even destruction if its old-style political parties, championing varieties of such thinking, were allowed to compete freely with each other; the experience of the 1950s had allegedly shown that such competition brought only governmental paralysis and popular confusion, tension, and division, and put at risk the stability and security of the nation.

The greatest of the New Order's enemies was communism and the party that represented its ideas, the PKI. According to New Order thinking, the essence of Indonesia had been established by tradition and history; the PKI had been

bent on destroying that essence and replacing it with class-based animosity. It was not difficult for Suharto and those close to him to place the blame for the ill-fated “coup” of October 1965 on the PKI. Before he had established an ascendancy over Sukarno, Suharto had already begun the bloody work of extirpating the party. Liberalism, too, was to be opposed, because it championed vigorous, pluralistic competition between competing ideas and worldviews and a sense of individual primacy; it was therefore deemed to be the cause of harmful, wasteful fractiousness. Similarly, those seeking to establish a state based upon Islam had to be opposed relentlessly.

Under the New Order, then, Indonesians were to be relieved of the needless anxieties and discord wrought by totalizing views of the world. By contrast, the acceptance of Pancasila—taught to millions in specially designed courses through the 1980s and after and, by dint of 1985 legislation made the obligatory sole philosophical foundation for all mass organizations and political parties—meant that there was nothing of that disputatious kind to discuss anymore, and that the people could be freed for their real task: economic and social development.

Such development was based (through a rolling series of five-year plans from 1969) on the orthodoxies of neoliberal economic theory propounded by the team of technocrats installed by Suharto to stabilize and then reshape and revivify the economy from the wreckage left by Sukarno. It was sustained first by wind-fall oil profits through the 1970s and early 1980s and then by export-oriented deregulation in the late 1980s, and it led to a period of sustained economic growth the likes of which the country had never before experienced. Notwithstanding frequent claims of widening gaps between rich and poor, it raised the standard of living of the great majority of Indonesians substantially, providing huge increases in agricultural productivity, major success in family planning, near-universal primary education, and the creation of significant physical infrastructure. Its success was grounded, to a considerable degree, on the provision of political stability that provided the means for undistracted focus on economic improvement and an ideal basis (together with the 1967 Foreign Investment Law) for attracting foreign, especially Japanese and U.S., capital.

The technocrats, however, did not enjoy unqualified presidential support in the implementation of their orthodoxies. Suharto was always careful to provide himself with sufficient off-budget funding (much of it from the Pertamina Oil Company and other state-owned enterprises) to shore up his support within the armed forces through the provision of business opportunities, to soften the hard edges of the market-driven economy, and to provide succor to the large and powerful band of economic nationalists in elite circles.

The grand design of the New Order did not rest for its legitimacy upon any significant popular consultation. While, in its earliest years, the regime enjoyed the support of a broad coalition of anticommunist civilian forces, both secular and Islamic, its power came from its physical capacity to enforce its will upon Indonesians. The spine of the New Order regime was the army, employed in Indonesia not as a weapon against internal threat but as a territorially organized force for policing and control. Moreover it is equipped with a dual function, which gave it a significant role in government and in what became a more centralized and efficient bureaucracy. The greatest weapon of the army was the fear it evoked. This fear was grounded first in the remorseless massacres of PKI members and supporters it promoted and permitted in 1965–1966. Furthermore, it was seen in the army’s willingness, evidenced in such incidents as the “Petrus” execution of alleged criminals of 1983–1985 and the killings of rioting Muslims in Tanjung Priok in 1984, to put down opposition ruthlessly and at every turn. It was armed with a highly developed capacity for repression, including a well-oiled intelligence apparatus and the security body Kopkamtib, which had wide-ranging and arbitrary powers of arrest and detention of those allegedly posing a threat to internal security.

The New Order, however, was eager that its rule not rest on naked repression alone. Accordingly, it retooled the existing parties; Suharto was not keen to face the social disruption that might have ensued from an attempt to uproot them totally. Eventually in 1973 amalgamating hitherto disparate parties into two groupings, one secular in orientation (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Indonesian Democratic Party) and the other Islamic (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan—Development Unity Party), he created what was

essentially a state-based party, Golkar, to represent the regime's interests. These three groupings were not intended to stand in competitive relationship with each other; the notion of a parliamentary opposition was always rejected. Rather, their role was to serve as mechanisms of interest articulation to refine and improve government programs, not to challenge them. From the early 1970s, the notion of the "floating mass" meant that no party political activity was allowed in local areas, except for the brief and regulated campaigning space of a month or so before elections. Criticism of the government was outlawed, government officials were pressed to vote for Golkar, candidate lists were carefully screened, and the state bureaucracy acted as a Golkar electoral machine, dispensing propaganda and patronage. In 1971 and at five-yearly intervals from 1977, parliamentary elections were held as expressions of "Pancasila Democracy." Golkar always won, usually with more than two-thirds of the votes and parliamentary seats.

Such tactics always ensured a Golkar majority in that part of the parliament open for elections; the military enjoyed uncontested access to around one-fifth of the parliamentary seats. The parliament itself provided one-half of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR); the remainder were regime appointees based on regional location and social function. The MPR, almost wholly the creation of the regime, met for a week or so every five years in order to reappoint Suharto as president and his candidate as vice-president; there were never any contested elections for these posts, for there were never any alternative candidates. The MPR also endorsed the regime's broad policy plans for the subsequent five years, usually couched in terms of development, unity, struggle, and political security, and clothed in ever more soporific Pancasila-style jargon. The New Order never sought to amend the 1945 Constitution, which accorded wide executive powers to the president and which was deemed sacred and inviolable by Suharto.

The New Order's policy focus was always determinedly domestic. Apart from its efforts to integrate West Irian (1969) and (rather more clumsily) East Timor (1975), for much of its life the New Order's foreign policy interests were governed by pragmatism. They were restricted to strong support for the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations' (ASEAN) regional grouping, seen as the best means for avoiding or limiting regional instability, and the development of those external relationships that promised aid and soft loans for Indonesia's development. Over the last decade or so of the New Order's life, however, Suharto adopted the stance of the world statesman, leading the way in the development of a solution to the Cambodian crisis, successfully acceding to the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1991, eventually embracing the concept of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and even sending peacekeeping troops to Bosnia. Along the way, he reestablished relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC), frozen since 1967. This development was partly a result of Suharto's perception of his own success and his desire to share his governing ideas with the world, and partly of the ending of the Cold War and the gradual evaporation of the West's forbearance of his domestic repression. Indonesia's foreign policy assertiveness sometimes manifested itself as angry rebuttal, particularly as Western criticism of Indonesia's human rights record heightened through the 1990s, and it resulted in such measures as Suharto's 1992 abolition of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) because of Dutch efforts to connect aid to the enhancement of Indonesia's human rights performance.

From the late 1980s onward, domestic dissatisfaction with the New Order increased. Criticism came from the armed forces, which felt that their proper centrality in the New Order was being eroded by Suharto, and from a growing band of middle-class critics, students, and urban workers, themselves the product of the New Order's economic success. Critics focused on three central issues: the question of the presidential succession; the festering sore of New Order corruption, especially of the dimensions indulged in by Suharto's own family and conglomerate cronies; and the need to develop political machinery of a more democratic, pluralist, and consultative kind. Suharto sometimes intimated a desire to respond to these criticisms—thus his efforts to broaden his appeal by his public embrace of Islam in the early 1990s—but in the end he judged that the political costs to himself and his country were too great to entertain any substantial change, and that his country could not afford to dispense with his services.

Although impending breakdown had been signaled by a rash of ethnic and religiously based social conflicts from the mid-1990s and the regime's ever more ruthless and obsessive concern with security, the Asian currency crisis, beginning in July 1997, finally provided the conditions for the collapse of the New Order. The legitimacy that Suharto's economic "miracle" had provided him suddenly disappeared. Although he was unanimously reelected as president in March 1998, his support rapidly ebbed thereafter, so that he had no option but to resign on 21 May 1998. Since Suharto was himself the embodiment of the New Order, and its institutional vitality was inseparable from his own political success, the regime collapsed with him.

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See also Gestapu Affair (1965); Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Pancasila (Pantja Sila); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Pertamina Crisis (1975–1976); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–)

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OSMEÑA, SERGIO, SR. (1878–1961)

Selfless Statesman

Sergio Osmeña, Sr. was a leading Filipino political leader during the U.S. colonial period in the Philippines. He served as president of the Philippine Commonwealth from 1944 to 1946.

Osmeña was born on 9 September 1878 in Cebu City, Cebu. He studied at the Colegio de San Juan de Letran in Manila, but the revolution against Spain (1896–1898) and the Filipino-American War (1899–1902) interrupted his studies, and he joined Philippine revolutionary forces. He edited and published a proindependence Spanish-language paper (*El Nuevo Dia*) in Cebu despite U.S. military censorship.

With the end of the war and the establishment of U.S. colonial administration, Osmeña returned to Manila and studied law at the University of Santo Tomas. He passed the bar exams in 1903 and then served as legal assistant to the governor of Cebu. He was appointed provincial fiscal officer in Cebu and then became provincial governor in 1906. As governor, he suppressed banditry and restored peace and order in his home province.

Moving to national politics, Osmeña co-founded the Nacionalista Party under the banner of immediate independence. He was elected to the first Philippine Assembly, the lower house in the legislature established by the United States, in 1907. Osmeña became the speaker of the assembly, and thus became the highest Filipino official in government at that time. As a political leader, he championed Philippine independence but tempered it with sound legislative leadership to prove to the Americans that the Filipinos had the capability to govern responsibly.

Osmeña served as the leading Filipino political leader until 1923, when he gave way to Manuel L. Quezon (1878–1944). By then the Philippine legislature had been changed to an all-Filipino bicameral body, with the Philippine senate led by Quezon and the house of representatives led by Osmeña. Quezon challenged

Osmeña's leadership and broke away from the Nacionalista Party. Osmeña became senator in 1923 and accepted Quezon's leadership of that body, paving the way for a reconciliation of the Nacionalista Party factions.

Osmeña continued on as senator until 1935, supporting Quezon and subordinating personal ambition to the interests of the party and the nation. He joined some of the Filipino missions to lobby for independence from the United States. In 1933, together with Manuel Roxas (1892–1948), he was able to bring home a U.S. congressional act (the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act) promising independence.

However, Quezon fought against accepting the act, prompting a rift between him and Osmeña. The act was rejected by the Philippine legislature. Quezon brought home an act (the Tydings-McDuffie Act) in 1934 that was hardly any different from the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act; it was approved by the Philippine legislature.

Under the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, an almost autonomous government known as the Philippine Commonwealth was established. Osmeña agreed to run as vice-president together with Quezon, who ran for the presidency.

Osmeña took his oath as vice-president of the Philippine Commonwealth on 15 November 1935. He was appointed by Quezon as secretary of public instruction, the first Filipino to hold that position. Osmeña fought for greater government support for public education, not only for schoolchildren but also for adults.

Osmeña ran again for vice-president after constitutional amendments allowed him and Quezon a second term. The outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945) intervened, however, and the seat of the government had to be moved from Manila to Corregidor Island. There, on 30 December 1941, he took his oath of office for the second term.

With Quezon, Osmeña was evacuated to the Visayas and from there to Australia and then to the United States, where the commonwealth government-in-exile was established.

Under the constitution, Quezon's term would expire in November 1945, and Osmeña would legally succeed to the presidency. However, Quezon argued that the war had suspended the operation of the constitution and that he should remain president until the conclusion of the war. Osmeña did not push the issue and allowed Quezon to remain president.

Quezon died on 1 August 1944, and Osmeña succeeded him as president of the Philippine Commonwealth. Osmeña landed with U.S. forces under General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964) in Leyte on 20 October 1944 and reinstated the government there. On 27 February 1945, he reinstated the government in Manila.

As president of the commonwealth, Osmeña faced major problems as a result of the war. Apart from the loss of lives and destruction caused by the war, there were charges of collaboration with the Japanese and lack of peace and order. Opposition politicians rose and convened the National Assembly, weakening the presidency. Independence, under the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, was scheduled for 4 July 1946, and a presidential election was held for the first president of the postwar Philippine Republic. Osmeña lost the election, and he turned over the reins of government to Manuel Roxas on 28 May 1946. Osmeña then retired to Cebu. He died on 19 October 1961.

Osmeña played a strong role in Philippine political history during the U.S. colonial period. He was a nationalist and fought for independence, but he placed his personal ambitions behind national interests and gave way to his rival, Quezon, for the sake of party and national unity. Osmeña's brand of politics was low-key but serious, which reflected his character.

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See also Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1900–1941); Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944); Roxas, Manuel (1892–1948)

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OTTAMA, U (1897–1939)

See General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) (1920); Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) (1906)

P

PACTOS DE RETRO “Contract of Resale”

A type of land contract prevalent in the Spanish Philippines that combined both the elements of a loan and a sale was known as a *pacto de retro* or *pacto de retroventa* (even *pacto de retrovendendi*), literally “contract of resale.” Under the *Ordenanzas de Buen Gobierno* (1768), indigenous people were prohibited from pledging their landholdings as collateral for loans. *Pactos de retro* evaded these provisions by providing for the conveyance of the borrower’s land to the lender but with the former having the option to repurchase it for the sum of the loan within a fixed period. Until the time of repurchase, the debtor usually continued to work the land, but as the tenant of the lender. These contracts became common to the major rice-producing regions of Central Luzon from the late eighteenth century and in the tobacco regions of northern Luzon during the nineteenth century. More often than not they became outright transfers of land, as borrowers were frequently unable to repay the loan within the required time and lenders often made further encumbrances upon the property, adding to the price of the resale. It was also often difficult to prove a “right” to repurchase, even if a borrower finally accumulated sufficient money, inasmuch as contracts were seldom drawn up in proper legal form. Many indigenous farmers lost their land, house, and even trees through this process. Chinese mestizos, on the other hand, were able

to acquire property in this manner and to eventually consolidate these scattered holdings into more substantial estates by the end of the nineteenth century. A form of this contract still exists today in the *prenda*, or system of property-pawning.

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See also Chinese in Southeast Asia; Hispanization; Mestizo; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Spanish Philippines

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PADRI MOVEMENT

An Islamic Revivalist Movement

The Padri Movement was an Islamic revivalist movement that took place in the Minangkabau region of West Sumatra, beginning in approximately 1803, though with its roots in earlier attempts at Islamic renewal by Muslim brotherhoods in the area. It was one of the most important revivalist movements in the Islamic world in the nineteenth century.

Minangkabau at the end of the eighteenth century was experiencing an economic boom, with European and U.S. demand for its coffee, cassia, and gambier reaching hitherto unprecedented heights. New sources of wealth opened up for the hill villages where these crops were cultivated. At the same time, Muslim brotherhoods were expanding in Minangkabau. These orders sponsored *surau*, or centers for Islamic studies, and as the new commercial wealth entered the areas where the *surau* were located, their *syekhs*, or chief instructors, became interested in Islamic regulations for the conduct of trade. Islamic law (*syariat/syariah*) now became an important field of study in certain *surau*, in an effort to regulate the existing chaos in the marketplace.

Chief among these *syekhs* who took up the cry "back to the *syariat*" was Tuanku Nan Tua, of a large *surau* in the Agam district. Concentrating on the teaching of Islamic jurisprudence from the 1780s, Tuanku Nan Tua took upon himself the special mission of trying to induce neighboring villages to accept Muslim law in relation to trade and dealing with traders.

This domestic renewal movement was interrupted somewhere about 1803 by currents that swept into Minangkabau from Arabia. Those Minangkabau pilgrims who were in Mecca in 1803 lived through the conquest of the city by an army of warriors who did not simply cry "back to the *syariat*." Instead, their cry expressed itself in a demand for a return to the most fundamental practices of the Prophet (s.a.w.) and his Companions. These were the Wahhabis from Nejd in eastern Arabia, and it was Wahhabi teaching that so impressed certain Minangkabau that they determined to launch a full-scale revival when they returned home. They became known as Padris, men of Pedir, after the Acehnese port from which most Minangkabau pilgrims sailed for Mecca.

Wahhabi revivalism was based on the firm distinction made in the Koran between believer and unbeliever. In delineating the characteristics of the true believer, Wahhabis relied on the teachings of the Koran, pure and simple, and the tradition of the Prophet, idealizing the earliest Islamic centuries and deprecating later developments as "innovations." They launched a jihad, or Holy War, in the Arabian peninsula.

Fired by the desire for jihad, sometime in 1803 these Minangkabau pilgrims returned

home. The best known among them is Haji Miskin, who had earlier participated in the renewal movement. He began to preach that force was necessary to establish Islam in Minangkabau. Centering his teaching on Agam, he gained the support of a former student of Tuanku Nan Tua's, Tuanku Nan Rinceh. This Tuanku came to be regarded as the archetypal Padri. He began by attacking villages where the marketplace was disfigured by large, prominent cockfighting rings, undoubtedly a temptation to traders after they had sold their goods. Tuanku Nan Rinceh aimed to turn each village into an Islamic community as rapidly as possible, using the Wahhabi system as a model along the lines of which such new communities were to be organized. Upon conquest or conversion, a regime of extreme Puritanism was instituted. The outward signs of a Padri village were the abandonment of cockfighting, gambling, and the use of tobacco, opium, betel nut, and strong drink. White clothes, symbolizing purity, were to be worn, with women covering their heads and men allowing their beards to grow; no part of the body was to be decorated with gold jewelry, and silk clothing was to be eschewed. Prayer five times a day was made obligatory. Each village converted to the Padri system was obliged to appoint a *kadi*, or judge. In his judgments he was obliged to consult only the Koran, a more extreme position than even the Wahhabis had taken.

The most characteristic mark of the Padri movement was its organized violence against villages that would not submit to the Padri notion of an Islamic community. This violence reached its apogee with the slaughter of members of the Minangkabau royal family by Tuanku Lintau and his followers in 1815. By 1820 the movement had consolidated itself, particularly in the hill villages where coffee and cassia were grown.

The Padri movement was one of the major Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia's history and produced a number of leading Islamic figures. It consolidated the Minangkabau region as one of the most staunchly Muslim areas of Indonesia. Recent research has indicated the importance of the economic basis of the movement and has pointed out that it was not, as had been previously thought, a movement against Minangkabau village heads, many of whom in fact supported the Padris.

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See also Coffee; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Islam in Southeast Asia; Minangkabau; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Padri Wars (1821–1837); Sumatra

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PADRI WARS (1821–1837)

A Manifestation of Minangkabau Nationalism

The Padri Movement was in full bloom when the Dutch claimed the main Minangkabau port of Padang in 1819 as a result of the post-Napoleonic settlement in Europe. They were gradually sucked into the interior as allies of the remaining members of the Minangkabau royal family, some of whom were slaughtered. What followed were the Padri Wars, with the Dutch pitted against leading Padri villages for control of the agricultural export trade. Ultimately the Dutch were victorious, and they imposed compulsory deliveries of coffee on the Minangkabau.

By 1821 the Netherlands Indies government in Java had become fully informed of the flourishing coffee trade that was largely in Padri hands, and an expeditionary force was sent into the interior. Several conquests of Padri villages were made, and the Dutch also occupied the main western coastal ports, in order to cut the Padris off from their trading outlets. However, the opening of Singapore in 1819 by the English East India Company (EIC) led to a flourishing Padri trade by that route.

The Dutch forward movement stagnated by 1824, and the outbreak of the Java War (1825–1830) permitted only consolidation but not advancement in Minangkabau. In 1831, however, the Dutch renewed their penetration. Dutch policy was in the hands of one of the most famous Dutch governors-general, Johannes van den Bosch (t. 1830–1833), who arrived in the Indies with a commission from the king to make the colony financially independent in the shortest possible time. To reach that goal in Sumatra, van den Bosch set up Dutch-spon-

sored marketplaces for trade in the Minangkabau interior.

But the Minangkabau, and the Padris in particular, showed no inclination to trade within the Dutch framework and tried wherever possible to use either the eastern coast routes or ports on the western coast considerably north of Dutch oversight. Van den Bosch came to the conclusion that force could not be discounted, and in mid-1831 the second Dutch conquest of the Minangkabau interior began. By mid-1832 almost all of the country was in Dutch hands, and both Tuanku Lintau and Tuanku Nan Rinceh had been vanquished.

Despite the conquest of the heartland of Minangkabau, Padris were still active in the northern region of the country. The most famous Padri outpost by 1832 was the village of Bonjol, whose leader, Tuanku Imam Bonjol, became one of Indonesian nationalism's greatest heroes. Imam Bonjol made the Bonjol region into an important center of trade, based on the northern ports of Minangkabau and the Batak lands, and on the eastern rivers away from Dutch oversight and duties. The Dutch attacked Bonjol's ports in 1832, and in the same year Bonjol too submitted. It now appeared that all of the Padri forces had collapsed, and the Dutch were in full control of Minangkabau.

In January 1833, however, Bonjol burst into rebellion, and a general uprising throughout Minangkabau followed. Also caught up in this movement were non-Padri villages and even the remaining members of the royal family. The 1833 rebellion can be regarded as an expression of Minangkabau nationalism, as every locality in addition to Bonjol had some grievance or other against the Dutch: Dutch interference with the coffee trade, taxes, and the demand for labor services were just a few. Superior military force enabled the Dutch to restore their position, although the district of Agam, the original Padri heartland, continued to smolder for several years. The northern Padris fought on until 1837, when Bonjol finally capitulated.

Between the outbreak of the 1833 rebellion and its collapse in 1837, Dutch policy continued to be directed by Johannes van den Bosch, who from 1834 was the Dutch minister of colonies. He argued that the overriding Dutch interest was to harness Minangkabau produc-

tivity to the needs of the Dutch state, as had been done with the introduction of the “cultivation system” (*Cultuurstelsel*) on Java. Van den Bosch felt that success in his enterprise required the elimination of most of the traders in the interior—particularly the peasant traders, who had been one of the mainstays of the Padri movement and whom he saw as merely intermediaries, inflating the price of the coffee sold on the coast. He introduced a system of depots in the highlands where a “protected price” was offered for coffee, thereby aiming to cut out the chain of middlemen who plied the routes to the coast. Minangkabau traders proved resistant to the new policy, however, and the plan to eliminate the peasant trader in the interior was a total failure. In 1847 the Dutch adopted the Javanese system of compulsory coffee deliveries to the government.

The Padri Wars provide a classic case of crisis on the periphery of empire to which the imperial power was obliged to respond. The crisis was a confrontation between two polities intent on “modernization,” each in its own terms. The Kingdom of The Netherlands was a newly created European state determined at all costs to industrialize and modernize. Similarly, the Minangkabau world was responding to the new experience of becoming an important producer of agricultural commodities for the nascent world market economy. The transition to an agricultural export economy imposed great strains on the polity that were met by the adoption of an Islamic fundamentalist ideology. Islamic revivalism was Minangkabau’s path to “modernization,” and the Padri Wars were the outcome of two societies trying to maintain a relationship when their basic goals were in conflict.

CHRISTINE DOBBIN

See also Coffee; Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Forced Deliveries; Minangkabau; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Padri Movement; Singapore (1819); Sumatra; Van den Bosch, Count Johannes (1780–1844)

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PAGAN (BAGAN)

The First Burmese Empire

Pagan or Bagan is the name of both the first Burmese empire (ca. 850–1287 C.E.) and its capital city, built in the dry zone of Upper Burma. Known as Arimaddanapura, City of the Enemy Crusher, in the chronicles, Pagan reached its height during the eleventh and twelfth centuries under its kings Anawrahta (r. 1044–1077), Kyanzittha (r. 1084–1113), Alaungsithu (r. 1113–1167), and Narapatisithu (r. 1173–1210), who expanded its power across most of present-day Burma and down the Tenasserim coast. During this time, Theravada Buddhism from the Sri Lankan Mahavihara tradition became the officially sanctioned religious culture, giving rise to the magnificent temples, stupas, mural paintings, and visual arts for which Pagan is famous. Yet these religious monuments have had a precarious history, narrowly escaping becoming a field of battle between opposing forces in 1283, when the Mongol armies of Kublai Khan defeated the Burmese at Ngasauungyan, a battle witnessed by Marco Polo (1254–1324). They narrowly escaped again in 1826, during the First Anglo-Burmese War, and finally at the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945), when the personal intervention of the great British Burmese scholar G. H. Luce protected Pagan from allied bombing as the occupying Japanese army retreated.

Before Luce, Pagan appeared in the journals of Western envoys and soldiers Michael Symes (1795) and John Crawford (1827), Colonel Havelock (1826), Captain Hannay (1835), and Henry Yule (1855), and the U.S. Baptist missionary the Reverend Eugenio Kincaid (1837). The significance of Pagan’s artistic and cultural heritage was evident to the Burmese king Bodawpaya (r. 1782–1819), who appointed his son, the crown prince, as prince of Pagan, with the responsibility of supervising the city’s restoration. Western archaeological study of Pagan commenced with Dr. Emil Forchhammer in 1881 and gathered pace under the British viceroy, Lord Curzon, who in 1901 saw the need for conservation of Burma’s Buddhist art and monuments. When the Sino-Burmese scholar Taw Sein Ko became director of the Burma Circle of the Archaeological Survey of India (1901–1915), restoration of the temples and reports on the monuments were undertaken in earnest. Together with the pioneering



Pagan, Burma. (Corel Corporation)

work of Charles Duroiselle, C. O. Blagden, Luce and his brother-in-law U Pe Maung Tin, Professor Than Tun, and Burmese scholars U Lu Pe Win and U Bo Kay, their research paved the way for the pivotal role of Pagan in the Burmese cultural identity. In 1975, when an earthquake struck the city causing much damage to the temples, UNESCO provided assistance to the Archaeology Department in Rangoon (Yangon) to finance restoration and an inventory of the monuments.

Situated in the dry zone of Upper Burma, Pagan civilization developed an extensive irrigation system based on the rice-growing center at Kyaukse. Daw Mya Sein has shown that King Anawrahta allotted rice-growing lands in the Kyaukse area to his soldiers in lieu of salaries. Later Pagan kings—Alaungsithu and Narapatisithu—extended the canals, and further bequests to the army continued. In the seventeenth century, during the reign of King Thalun (r. 1629–1648), prisoners of war were settled at Kyaukse to help maintain the irrigation system and serve the king as soldiers. The

lands in the Kyaukse “rice bowl” were still worked by the king’s soldiers in the early nineteenth century under King Bodawpaya, a measure of its importance to both the country’s economy and security (Mya Sein 1973: 4–5). The resource demands of maintaining the irrigation system and alienation of substantial tracts of land in this key area, together with the increasing extent of nontaxable temple lands and resources (leading to ongoing tensions between the Crown and the nontaxable sector), may have seriously weakened the economic strength of Pagan and subsequent Burmese administrations (Aung-Thwin 1985).

Pagan civilization was founded on an indigenous Pyu culture, rather than borrowed from the Mon of Lower Burma as the early colonial scholars had projected. The legend of King Anawrahta’s conquest of the Mon city of Thaton in 1057 and the deportation of its king, artisans, priests, and Buddhist scriptures to Pagan to initiate an efflorescence of Buddhist culture in Upper Burma cannot be substantiated by empirical evidence (Aung-Thwin 2001).

Rather, the evidence of the inscriptions, iconography, and literature testify to a close relationship between the Tibeto-Burmans of Pagan and the Pyu, also a Tibeto-Burman people. When in ca. 832 C.E. the Nanchao state sacked the Pyu cities and deported 3,000 Pyu to Yunnan, the Burmese at Pagan began to emerge as the leaders of Upper Burma, but the remaining Pyu continued on in the life and culture of the polity for hundreds of years. Thus Pyu language occurs on the Myazedi Inscriptions of 1112 C.E.; Pagan (and Ava) epigraphy refers to Pyu people, and Pyu script is used on a terra-cotta votive tablet in the relic chamber of the Shwe-sandaw Pagoda at Pagan. Michael Aung-Thwin has shown that the genesis of Pyu-Burman contact commenced most likely by the mid-ninth century, if not earlier, and continued thereafter for the following centuries (*ibid.*). Similarly, Paul Strachan has pointed out that Pagan as a city dates back to Pyu times, contemporary with the great Pyu cities at Sri Ksetra, Halin, and Beikthano, and was initially just one of many centers practicing wet-rice cultivation in the dry zone of Upper Burma (Strachan 1996: 9). The scholar must be cautious, however, not to replace one extreme position with another, to move from the perspective of seeing Mon influence dominant in Pagan culture to that of seeing it as negligible. While the Pyu influence is undoubtedly evident in the Pagan architectural tradition, the Mon contribution in its bequest of the literary tradition of the Buddhist *Jataka* tales is not disputed.

But the most significant inspiration for the popular and artistic expression of Theravada Buddhism at Pagan came from Ceylon. King Anawrahta sent Buddhist monks to Ceylon to assist in the reformation of Buddhism in that country, beginning a close relationship that has continued until the present time. Under King Kyanzittha, a revision of the *Tripitaka*, the Buddhist scriptures, was undertaken, resulting in the Mon recension being replaced by the Ceylonese recension. The study of Pali, the sacred language of the Theravada Buddhist texts, gave a strong impetus to the subjects chosen for mural paintings on the temples. Other influences came from Mahayanist North India, Pala Bengal, through the medium of royal alliances. Brahmanic influence is also evident at the earliest surviving Pagan temple, the Nat-hlaung-kyang, which is dedicated to Visnu. But these

influences were more decorative than dominant, as Pagan's kings sought to encourage the people's support for Theravada Buddhism in the construction styles of the stupas and temples.

It is convenient to divide the architectural and artistic styles of the Pagan temple-building culture into three periods: early, middle, and late. Motivated by piety and the Burmese desire to make merit (accumulate good deeds through righteous actions), the inscriptions show that both monarchs and populace participated in the endowment, construction, and support of religious edifices. In the early period, light is carefully controlled through skylights and narrow passages to allow filtered rays to shine on the Buddha image within. Built in two units, hall and shrine, with an ambulatory encircling the central mass, the style was said to encourage personal communion with the *hpaya*, or Lord (*ibid.*: 17). The middle period, in the early twelfth century during the reign of King Sithu (r. 1113–1155), reflects the Pyu predilection for cosmically oriented structures showing less distinction between hall and shrine and less attention to control of light. During the late period (1170–1300), the temple builders initiated the architecturally innovative five-faced ground plan, a style original to Pagan. Of the many famous structures, stupas, and temples of Pagan, there is space only to mention the Shwe-hsandaw stupa, said to have been built by King Anawrahta to house the Sacred Hair Relic acquired from Thaton; the Shwe-zigon near Nyaung-U north of Pagan, also credited to Anawrahta and now considered a national shrine for Burmese pilgrims to Pagan; the great Ananda temple built on the plan of a Greek cross, also from the early period, probably during the reign of Kyanzittha; the Myinkaba Kubyauk-Gyi, a cave, or *gu*, temple built by Prince Rajakumar, son of Kyanzittha, in 1113 and inscribed on its four faces in the four languages of Pyu, Mon, Old Burman, and Pali; the Thatbyinnyu temple built by King Alaungsithu in 1144; the Sulamani, built in 1183; and the Mingala-Zeidi, the last great Pagan temple, built by King Narathihapate (r. 1255–1287) and completed just ten years before the Mongol invasions destroyed the political power of the Pagan empire. Labeled the Tarokpye Min, the king who fled from the Chinese, King Narathihapate was killed by his son, Prince Thihathu of Prome, initiating a period of turbulence during

which the last Pagan king, Kyawzwa, was deposed in 1298 and the empire divided with centers at Sagaing, Pinya, and Pagan. The Shans, who moved down into the region during the later thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, are considered responsible for much of the physical desecration of the religious structures of Pagan.

Undoubtedly, the remains of some three thousand temples evident today are but a small proportion of the total built. None of the secular architecture, built in wood, survives. Only the religious remains, built in brick, testify to the once great empire with its bustling artisans, monks and novices, traders, soldiers, craftsmen, courtiers, and royal officials. The bronze images of Gotama Buddha, and Metteya the Future Buddha, who inspired later Burmese kings, testify to the piety and artistic skill of the Pagan craftsmen.

Such was the fame of Pagan that the twelfth-century Chinese official Chau Ju-Kua included it in his list of twenty-one kingdoms in Southeast Asia with which the Middle Kingdom, Sung China (960–1279), had commercial relations. Seeking to restore this empire and emulate the *cakravartin* status (exhibition of righteous moral behavior) of earlier Burmese monarchs, King Thadominbya (r. 1365–1368) built a new capital at Ava, but he died before he was able to reunite the whole country under his rule.

Pagan today is central to the Burmese/Myanmar cultural identity, a place of pilgrimage and merit-making for all. As such, significant restoration of certain temples has been undertaken in recent years. In 1998 a national project in the spirit of merit-making saw thousands of trees planted by Myanmar people in this desolate plain, as the “greening of Pagan” transformed the dusty reaches of the Irrawaddy (Ayewaddy) River.

HELEN JAMES

See also Buddhism, Theravada; Burmans; *Cakkavatti/Setkya-min* (Universal Ruler); *Jatakas*; Mon; Mons; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Pyus

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PAHANG

The Largest Peninsular Malay State

Pahang is the largest Malay state (36,400 square kilometers) in the Malay Peninsula. It comprises the basin of the Pahang River (475 kilometers), the longest in the peninsula, and a stretch of the east coast as far south as Endau. Chinese records suggest that more than a thousand years ago there was a trading port at the mouth of the river; the word *pahang* means “tin” in the Khmer language. During the period of the Melaka and old Johor kingdoms, Pahang was one of their outlying dependencies. It became an independent state in the nineteenth century. Until recent times much of Pahang remained undeveloped, but as part of Malaysia it has provided large areas of land for agricultural and industrial use.

To the Chinese, Pahang was a producer of tin, though its deposits are much smaller than

those in the west coast states. In the mid-fifteenth century C.E., the rulers of Melaka detached Pahang from its connections with Siam and established a branch of their dynasty as the rulers of Pahang. In the prolonged power struggle of the ensuing two centuries the Pahang rulers were minor players, owing nominal fealty to Johor as successor to Melaka. They continued to export tin, some of which went to the Portuguese and subsequently to the Dutch.

A new era began in 1806 when Ali, a member of the ruling family, succeeded to the title of Bendahara with authority over Pahang. The Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 cut the link between Pahang and Johor, by allocating them to the British and Dutch spheres of influence, respectively. Bendahara Ali, though not a ruler of royal status, was in fact independent. At his death (ca. 1857), after a reign of half a century, there was a long civil war (1857–1863) between his two sons; in the end Wan Ahmad was the victor and began a long reign until his death in 1914. Ahmad had obtained support from the ruler of Terengganu, who may have been put up to this by Siam, which hoped to extend its influence southward to include Pahang. The Straits Settlements government was also under pressure from Singapore merchants who had obtained large but ill-defined concessions from Ahmad, whose objective was to increase his revenues and wield more authority over the powerful upriver chiefs of the interior (Ulu Pahang). Ahmad, who had assumed the title of sultan in 1882, resisted British pressure for intervention until 1888, when he agreed to accept a British resident.

A number of the Pahang chiefs, particularly those who had risen to power as supporters of Ahmad in the civil war, were bitterly opposed to the imposition of foreign control, and they led a series of revolts in the period 1892–1894 that were suppressed by the use of considerable force. Ahmad gave no open support to the rebels but did not hide his discontent at the loss of his power, and he withdrew from the government of the state, delegating powers to his son, Tunku Mahmud, as regent.

The financial problems of Pahang as a backward and comparatively undeveloped state were one factor in the formation of the Federated Malay States (FMS) in 1896, but Pahang did not benefit significantly from closer association with the more prosperous western states. Pahang had

gold as well as tin deposits, but its limited mineral resources did not produce sufficient revenues to meet the cost of opening up the state by the construction of roads and other works. When the rapid development of the rubber industry began, Pahang still lagged behind, since its land was less accessible. In 1921, Pahang had only 7 percent of the FMS area under rubber, although it made up more than half the total FMS land area. The census of that year showed that 20 percent of the FMS Malay population lived in Pahang, but only 7 percent of its Chinese and 3 percent of its Indian immigrants. The Malayan east coast railway line had reached Kuala Lipis, then the state capital, only in 1917. The northeast monsoon effectively closed the minor ports of the Pahang coast for half the year.

In the second half of the twentieth century, however, Pahang, with the other east coast states (Kelantan and Terengganu), was drawn into a program of rapid development, including major projects such as the port of Kuantan. Some of the largest areas of planned agricultural expansion (such as Pahang Tenggara) were situated in Pahang where, unlike the west coast, there was still abundant land. It remains an agricultural area, not greatly affected by the industrialization of the west coast, but the exploitation of undersea oil and gas deposits off the coast of Terengganu has given some impetus to the development of the east coast region as a whole.

JOHN MICHAEL GULLICK

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Century); Federated Malay States (FMS) (1896); Gold; Johor; Johor-Riau Empire; Melaka; Residential System (Malaya); Rubber; Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Straits Settlements (1826–1946); Tin; Wan Ahmad (1836–1914)

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PAKNAM INCIDENT (1893)

A Taste of French Imperialism

Paknam (lit. the mouth of a river) is a district in Samut Prakarn, a suburban town to the east of Bangkok and home to various light industries. The Chao Phraya River empties itself into the sea at Paknam, hence the name of the district. However, Paknam is better known in Thai history as the venue where Franco-Siamese naval confrontation took place in 1893, referred to as the “Paknam Incident.” This incident led to the Siamese loss of its tributary state of Laos on the left (east) bank of the Mekong River.

Prior to the Paknam crisis, tensions between France and Siam had built up in connection with territorial claims to Laos and Battambang and Siem Reap of Cambodia by both sides. Siam considered the kingdom of Laos on the left bank of the Mekong and Cambodia as its vassal states. In 1867, King Mongkut (r. 1851–1868) concluded a treaty with France by which Siam relinquished its claim to sovereignty over Cambodia, except in Battambang and Siem Reap, and Cambodia became a French protectorate. France claimed that Laos should also be under its sovereignty, inasmuch as Laos sent tributes to Vietnam, which had already been colonized by France.

In the 1890s the French campaign to control the Mekong River and to annex the east bank became more vigorous and was boosted by a French political party called the Colonial Party (*Parti Colonial*) (Tuck 1995: 100, 104). The party was successful in persuading the French parliament to set up the Pavie Mission, led by Auguste Pavie (1847–1925), to work out plans to expand French territory in Indochina, especially a plan to annex Laos. Pavie would later be appointed French resident minister in Bangkok (Wyatt 1984: 203).

By the beginning of 1893, Siam was aware of the possibility that the conflict would break out. In January 1893, in response to Britain’s increasing control of Egypt, some members of the Colonial Party urged the government to increase its control over the Mekong, and they

accused Siam and Great Britain of posing a threat to French security in the region. Moreover, in February 1893 the government also urged the ministry of foreign affairs to absorb the east bank of the Mekong, and in the same month the French parliament eventually approved a military operation against Siam. As a result, in March 1893, Pavie laid French claims to the whole of the east bank of the Mekong (Tuck 1995: 104, 108). In April, French troops were sent to take control of Laos, to which the French now laid claim. Siamese troops in Laos resisted the attempt, which led to the death of a French officer. Pavie used this incident as a pretext to send gunboats to the Chao Phraya in July 1893 to demand reparations. His operation was backed by French naval force from Cochin China.

The initial Siamese response to the French military advance and territorial claims was mixed. In the cabinet, on the one hand, Prince Dewawongse (1858–1923), the minister of foreign affairs, and his younger brother who was a military commander wanted to retaliate by force. The minister of foreign affairs also believed that the British might intervene and that international communities would condemn the French operations. On the other hand, some cabinet ministers were not convinced that Siamese forces would be strong enough to handle the situation. Dewawongse later adopted a more conciliatory solution, after he learned that the British paid little attention to the conflict and even advised Siam to cede some of the disputed territories. But at this stage, King Chulalongkorn (Rama) (r. 1868–1910) himself decided to resist. Furthermore, Rolin Jaequemyns, a Belgian jurist who was the general advisor to the Siamese government and who was known to have strong hostility to the French, also advised the king to resist (*ibid.*: 109, 114).

Fighting broke out on 13 July 1893, after Siamese forces at two forts at Paknam opened fire on the French gunboats. The Siamese government considered the French presence in the Chao Phraya and its attempts to advance to the capital to be an invasion. The fighting caused casualties on both sides, but Pavie used the opportunity to send an ultimatum to the Siamese government on 20 July 1893 demanding the cession to France of all territory on the left bank and of all islands in the Mekong River. Furthermore, Siam had to pay an indemnity of

3 million francs (Wyatt 1984: 203). The French threatened to blockade the Chao Phraya and the gulf if the Siamese government refused to comply. The defenseless Siamese government had to accept the ultimatum (Steinberg 1987: 184–185).

As a result of the Paknam incident, the whole kingdom of Laos was ceded to France. King Chulalongkorn was deeply saddened, and he withdrew from the administration of the kingdom for a while.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also Battambang; Dewawongse, Prince (1858–1923); French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Laos (Nineteenth Century to mid-1990s); Pavie, Auguste (1847–1925); Preservation of Siam's Political Independence; Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Siem Reap

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PALEMBANG

Capital City of Śrīvijaya

Palembang was an indigenous state in South Sumatra until 1825, and a residency in colonial Indonesia until 1949. Currently it is a province in independent Indonesia.

In the seventh century, the city of Palembang on the eastern coast of southern Sumatra became the capital of the Hindu empire of Śrīvijaya. The region of Palembang had grown out of the settlement of Hindu migrants in South Sumatra in the second century. The city's location gave it access to two strategic waterways (the Melaka and the Sunda Straits), and Palembang was an excellent port for the trade between India and China. From Palembang, Śrīvijaya ruled southern Thailand, the Malay Peninsula (present-day Peninsular Malaysia), Sumatra, West Java, and western Borneo, until it was defeated in 1290 by the Javanese Hindu empire of Kediri, which turned it into a vassal.

Muslim traders from India's Coromandel Coast introduced Islam to Palembang in the

thirteenth century. In the mid-fifteenth century, when Hindu rule in Java crumbled, the ruler and the population of the Palembang region converted to Islam and became independent. In 1544 a colony of Javanese moved to Palembang and established a new dynasty under its leader, Gedangsura. Palembang expanded to Rejang and Pasemah. The ruler of Banten subjugated Palembang and regarded the region as a vassal. Palembang itself apparently did not wholly yield, which led at times to intense armed conflict between the states, particularly over influence in the pepper-producing Lampung area. The demise of Banten in the seventeenth century implied the rise of Palembang. Two rulers established their names at the time: Pangeran Sindang Kinayang (r. 1616–1628), who created a set of laws for the region, and Cindai Balang (r. 1649–1694). The latter took the title of sultan under the name of Abdharrahman. He also established the system of government in the region, particularly the rights and obligations of the ruler and his subordinates.

The Dutch United East India Company (VOC) established trade relations with Palembang in 1617. The VOC was given the right to establish a fortified trading post along the Musi River in Palembang as a means of resisting the Portuguese and the sultan of Mataram. A year later the VOC used military force to obtain a pepper-trading monopoly with Palembang, although it did not establish a trading post. Relations between the VOC and Palembang soured. In 1659 the VOC captured Palembang, burned it, and obtained the right to build a fortress along the Musi River. In 1662 the Dutch received a new monopoly on the pepper trade.

In 1710, following the discovery of tin on the island of Bangka, which was part of Palembang, the VOC's trade with Palembang increased rapidly. The tin deposits of Bangka and neighboring Belitung became the main attraction. After Java had been ceded to the British in 1811, consequent of the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), Sultan Mahmud Bahrudin conquered the VOC fortress and killed its occupants. Lieutenant Governor Stamford Raffles (t. 1811–1816) demanded access to Palembang, but the sultan refused until a British force captured the city in 1812. However, newly ascended Sultan Ahmed Najimuddin could not prevent anti-British raids organized from Lampung and Bengkulu. After the reinstatement of

Dutch colonial rule, the sultan asked for Dutch protection in 1818 in return for Dutch colonial control over the area.

A representative of Lieutenant Governor Raffles of Bengkulu persuaded Najimuddin to accept British protection. Incensed, the Dutch dethroned Najimuddin and reestablished Bahruddin. However, Bahruddin used the opportunity to attack the Dutch fortress. A military expedition led by General H. M. De Kock reoccupied the fortress and Palembang in 1821, and Bahruddin was banished to Ternate. The Dutch chose a son of Najimuddin as the new sultan. This allowed Najimuddin to establish himself near Palembang on condition that he would not engage in politics. He defied this condition. In addition, part of the population of Palembang was reduced to grave poverty consequent of the demands imposed by the local rulers.

In 1823 the Dutch agreed with the sultan to take over the government and judiciary in Palembang in return for the payment of a pension to the sultan. However, the sultan reconsidered his decision and unsuccessfully attacked the Dutch in 1824. He was banned to Bangka, his father (Najimuddin) to Batavia. In 1825 the Dutch colonial government ended the sultanate.

The new ruler became the Dutch resident, supported by a *ferdana mantri*, the head of the local nobility. The situation remained a concern, because of the exploitation of the local population by the remaining nobility, who feigned support of the Dutch colonial government imposing its will. The colonial government suppressed local uprisings in 1849. It subsequently took away the powers of the local nobility and established a colonial system of government down to regency level. Unrest continued in later years, such as in 1881, mainly because of the continued influence of relatives of the former sultan and Muslim fundamentalism.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Banten (Bantam) (1526–1813); Kadiri (Kediri); Mataram; Pepper; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); Śrīvijaya (Śriwijaya); Straits of Melaka; Sumatra; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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PANCASILA (PANTJA SILA)

Indonesia's Five National Principles

Pancasila (Pantja Sila, from Sanskrit, "five principles") are the five national principles first propounded by President Sukarno (t. 1945–1967) on the eve of Indonesian independence in 1945 and later developed and transformed by Suharto's New Order (1967–1998) as a corporatist ideology.

The five principles were enunciated by Sukarno on 1 June 1945 in a speech to the committee drafting a constitution for independent Indonesia, which was intended to be declared under Japanese auspices later that year. The principles were: (1) Belief in one supreme God; (2) Just and civilized humanitarianism; (3) Indonesian unity; (4) Popular sovereignty governed by wise policies arrived at through deliberation and representation; (5) Social justice for the entire Indonesian people. They were intended partly to identify a set of noble ideals that united the Indonesian people despite ethnic diversity and social difference. The first *sila*, moreover, was specifically intended as a solution to the issue of the place of Islam. By identifying belief in God as a national principle, Sukarno hoped to satisfy some of those who would otherwise have called for an Islamic state. The Pancasila was incorporated into the preamble of the 1945 Constitution and into its 1949 and 1950 successors.

The Pancasila was unimportant as a political symbol during the revolution against the Dutch. In the early 1950s, however, it became the mainstay of those who argued against an Islamic state in Indonesia, and by the early 1960s the Pancasila had become a symbol of anticommunism. Communists, as atheists, were supposed to be unable to accept the *sila* of belief in God, though some communists argued that

they accepted the Pancasila by accepting the reality that many people believe in God.

From 1966, under the early New Order, the Pancasila again became a symbol of resistance to an Islamic state, but from about 1974 it was increasingly developed by the New Order authorities as a more elaborate corporatist ideology. An official *Guide to Realizing and Experiencing the Pancasila* was issued, all civil servants were required to undergo training in Pancasila, and Pancasila moral education was made compulsory at all levels of the educational curriculum. In 1984 all noncommercial, nongovernmental organizations (including religious bodies) were required to adopt the Pancasila as their “sole basic principle” (*asas tunggal*), in order to ensure that they would not challenge the existing order, sometimes called *Demokrasi Pancasila*.

This New Order Pancasila was a corporatist ideology that denied the possibility of legitimate conflicts of influence within society and that emphasized interdependence of different social groups. It emphasized order, obedience, and confidence in the wisdom of authorities. In particular, it stressed the importance of students and young people deferring to their teachers and elders, wives submitting to their husbands, and workers accepting the conditions offered them by their employers. Conspicuously absent from this elaborated Pancasila was any outline of what standards of behavior might be expected from rulers and authorities, and the government discouraged attempts to explore how the Pancasila might provide such standards. In 1981, figures close to the government suggested that Sukarno had not been the author of the Pancasila, thereby seeking to separate it from Sukarno’s leftist populism.

Immediately after the fall of the New Order in 1998, many new political parties identified the Pancasila as their basis, but the term was somewhat discredited by its association with the Suharto era; only to some extent did it revert to being a symbol of resistance to an Islamic state.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Rukunegara; Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–)

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PANGKOR ENGAGEMENT (1874) Reorienting Anglo-Malay Relations

The Pangkor Engagement, signed on 20 January 1874 on board a British gunboat anchored at Pangkor Island off the western coast of the Malay Peninsula, ushered in a new phase in Anglo-Malay relations. It introduced the British residential system, the so-called system of indirect rule whereby the resident, for all intents and purposes, was the de facto authority that ruled the state in the name of the sultan.

Abiding by Pitt’s India Act (1784), which eschewed involvement in native affairs or territorial acquisition as measures against costly obligations such as wars or burdensome adminis-

tration, the British restricted their activities to their three outposts of Penang, Melaka, and Singapore, which constituted the Straits Settlements (1826). Nevertheless, owing to occasions upon which British interests were threatened, the British acted accordingly, as in the case of Singapore and Johore in the actions of Stamford Raffles, and in Kedah, Perak, and Selangor thanks to the policies of Robert Fullerton, Henry Burney, John Anderson, and James Low. Overall, British administrators in the Straits Settlements officially held to the nonintervention policy. The Pangkor Engagement reversed this nonintervention principle and, in turn, launched a British forward policy toward the peninsular Malay States.

Events and personalities during the early 1870s combined to bring about a shift in official policy toward the Malay States. Economic and geopolitical ambitions, coupled with humanitarian considerations, spurred British action that witnessed the peaceful settlement of the Perak imbroglio. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Perak and other western Malay States were in a state of chaos in which royal Malay succession disputes intermingled with rivalries between Chinese *hui* ("secret societies") over the rich tin fields in the Larut Wars, while pirates plagued the western coast of the Malay Peninsula. Consequently, tin production and tin exports were severely disrupted, and investments by European and Chinese merchants in the Straits Settlements were threatened. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, tin had become increasingly important, owing to the expanding tin-plate industry. Moreover, the British were acutely concerned that anarchy in the Malay Peninsula might offer a pretext to other European powers—notably the newly unified Germany and ambitious France—to stake a claim. Although there was widespread human suffering resulting from the wars, the humanitarian element was secondary to British economic and political designs.

Lord Kimberley, secretary of state for the colonies, instructed Sir Andrew Clarke (1824–1902) first to study the situation in the Malay States and then to report the necessary steps to be adopted to ensure peace and the development and protection of British commerce and interests. He was also instructed to weigh the possibility of a British officer residing in the Malay States, with the intention of

safeguarding British interests. Clarke, who was the newly appointed governor of the Straits Settlements in September 1873, was thought more suitable than the incumbent Sir Harry Ord (t. 1867–1873) to implement a policy of intervention.

By the time Clarke arrived in Singapore in November 1873, he had decided to take the initiative to act first because of the urgency of the situation and then to report afterward to London. He, however, needed a pretext. It came in the form of a letter from Raja (later Sultan) Abdullah Muhammad Shah (r. 1874–1876), one of the three claimants to the Perak throne, who appealed to Clarke to mediate and resolve the deadlock of the succession issue. Furthermore, Abdullah requested the residence of a British officer to show the way of an effective system of government. Abdullah's letter of 30 December 1873 was what Clarke needed to launch his initiative, which culminated in a meeting of all warring factions at Pangkor in mid-January 1874.

In accordance with the terms of the Engagement, the Perak Malay territorial chiefs acknowledged Abdullah as sultan, and the contentious Chinese *hui* agreed to keep the peace. The most significant clause was Abdullah's acceptance of a British officer styled "resident" who was to be accredited to his court and whose advice must be sought and acted upon on all state affairs, excepting those relating to Malay customs and practices and the Islamic religion. Furthermore, revenue collection and the general administration of the country were to be reorganized and regulated under the advice of the resident.

Clarke's decisive action, a *fait accompli*, received the blessings of Benjamin Disraeli's (t. 1868, 1874–1880) Conservative government, which had come to power in Britain in January 1874. Similar Pangkor-style treaties were concluded in that same year with other Malay States, Selangor (February) and Sungai Ujong (December), and later with Pahang in August 1888.

The Pangkor Engagement was a landmark episode in the history of the Malay Peninsula. Through the implementation of the residential system, the beginnings of British colonial rule were established that were subsequently to usher in an era of unprecedented economic growth and development and significantly alter

the landscape and demographic pattern of the Malay Peninsula.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Birch, J. W. W. (1826–1875); Clarke, Sir Andrew (1824–1902); French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Germans (Germany); Residential System (Malaya); Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Straits Settlements (1826–1946); Tin; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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**PARAMESWARA
(PARAMESHWARA,
PARAMESVARA)**

Founder of Melaka

Parameswara was a Palembang prince from the Śrivijaya line who founded the kingdom of Melaka on the western coast of the Malay Peninsula. Corrupted from the Malay *Permaisura*, the name exists in contemporary Chinese (transliterated as *Pai-li-mi-su-la* or *Pai-li-su-la*) records and sixteenth-century Portuguese writings. The well-known *Sejarah Melayu* (*Malay Annals*) uses the Muslim name Iskandar Syah instead, for the last Malay king of Singapura (present-day Singapore) who founded Melaka.

Based on the claims of the Javanese in Melaka, Portuguese writers tended to believe

that Parameswara was a Javanese prince from Palembang who after a brief sojourn in Singapura moved north to found the kingdom of Melaka. According to the *Sejarah Melayu*, Iskandar Syah (Parameswara) was a fifth-generation descendant of the Palembang prince Seri Tri Buana, who founded Singapura in the thirteenth century. After escaping Singapura because of Majapahit's invasion, Parameswara moved north on the peninsula and founded Melaka around 1400. Parameswara named his new home *Melaka* after the tree he was sitting under. Guided by his far-sightedness and supported by his followers, who regarded him as a true king, Parameswara devised ways that quickly developed the strategically located Melaka into a trading port that attracted vessels plying the Straits of Melaka.

Parameswara boosted Melaka's position internationally by having diplomatic ties with China, which he visited in 1405 and 1409. His successors continued that policy. It is not fully established whether Parameswara had actually embraced Islam, but by 1450 Melaka had already become an important center for Muslim trade and religion in Southeast Asia. Based on Chinese records, Wang Gungwu (1981) surmised that Parameswara died in 1414, and the *Sejarah Melayu* says that Iskandar ruled Singapore for three years, stopped at Muar for two years, and ruled Melaka for twenty years.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Islam in Southeast Asia; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Melaka; Orang Laut; Palembang; *Sejarah Melayu* (*Malay Annals*); Śrivijaya (Śriwijaya); Straits of Melaka; Temasik (Tumasik)

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PARARATON (BOOK OF KINGS)

Pararaton is the name of a Javanese traditional historiography. The name means “about the kings/queens”; it is also often said to mean “the book of kings.” The text contains accounts of the rulers of the Singhasari (1222–1293) and Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s) kingdoms, beginning with Ken Angrok (r. 1222–1227); hence the authentic denomination as *katuturanira Ken Angrok*, “a narrative on Ken Angrok.” Both names are mentioned within the text; the name *Katuturanira Ken Angrok* appears at the beginning, and *Pararaton* at the end, just before the colophon.

The text consists of some mythical and legendary elements at the beginning, especially on the exploits of Ken Angrok. A little more than the second half consists of narratives on historical episodes and incidents after Ken Angrok’s time. The colophon of this text mentions the earliest year for the copying of one of the manuscripts as 1522 śaka, equivalent to 1600 C.E., and the last historical incident mentioned is in the year 1400 śaka, equivalent to 1478 C.E.

The story of Ken Angrok begins with his birth as attributable to the god Brahma’s impregnating a village woman, Ken Endok. Ken Angrok grew as a rascal. Despite his misbehavior, he came across kind men who took him as son or foster son. One of them made Angrok learn how to make gold through occult powers; he subsequently possessed supernatural powers. In the *Pararaton* text Angrok is also identified as an incarnation of the god Vishnu, and as a son of Bhatara Guru (= Siva).

Ken Angrok killed Tunggul Amětung, regent of Tumapël, and married his widow, Ken Dědēs. This lady’s sons became subsequent kings: those from the line of Tunggul Amětung became kings of Singhasari, and those from the line of Ken Angrok became kings of Majapahit. Ken Angrok himself became king of Tumapël, a kingdom that can be identified with Singhasari by cross-referencing with other historical sources.

EDI SEDYAWATI

See also Kertanagara (r. 1268–1292); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Singhasari (1222–1293)

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PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA (PCC) (1989 AND 1991)

The Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) had its first session in August 1989 and its second session in October 1991. The two sessions of the PCC formed part of the diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict situation in and around Cambodia. It was at the second session of the PCC that the so-called Paris Agreements on Cambodia were signed. These agreements formally settled the Cambodian conflict.

The conflict situation around Cambodia originated in the bilateral dispute between Cambodia and Vietnam in the late 1970s that led to the Vietnamese military intervention in late December 1978. Following the intervention, the Peoples’ Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was established in Cambodia, whereas the overthrown government—that is, Democratic Kampuchea (DK)—sought refuge in Thailand. The PRK relied on support from Vietnam and the Soviet bloc, whereas DK in alliance with two noncommunist Cambodian groups in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) relied on support from China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States. From 1979 to the mid-1980s the conflict was characterized by confrontation.

The International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK), arranged under the auspices of the United Nations in 1981, failed not only to formulate an acceptable framework for all parties concerned but also to bring the parties to the conflict to the conference table. None of the countries supporting the PRK’s and Vietnam’s position attended the conference. Thus the 1981 conference only highlighted the deep divisions at the global and regional levels, as well as among the Cambodian parties.

The second half of the decade saw important changes in the interaction at both levels. At the regional level, the early steps were bilateral discussions between Indonesia and Vietnam. In late 1987, Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1922–), president of the CGDK, met with Hun Sen (1951–), prime minister of the PRK, in Paris. It was the first high-level meeting between representatives from the two Cambodian governments. The regional dialogue brought about an unprecedented meeting in Indonesia in July 1988 known as the first Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM1), with the participation of the member-states of ASEAN, Laos, Vietnam, and the four Cambodian parties. JIM2 was held in February 1989. It was in this diplomatic context that the first session of the PCC was convened on 30 July 1989.

The first session of the PCC lasted for one month, between 30 July and 30 August. The first session ended without an agreement on how to resolve the Cambodian conflict. Furthermore, the conference did not manage to set up an international monitoring mechanism to supervise the final withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989. However, at this conference all the four Cambodian parties were present; also in attendance were the Soviet Union, Laos, and Vietnam. The presence of several of the states that refused to attend the ICK showed that the contacts between the concerned parties of the Cambodian conflict had improved, but it was also evident that much work remained before it would be possible to resolve the conflict.

Following the first session of the PCC, the diplomatic efforts shifted toward the activities of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—namely, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They held several meetings in 1990, and in late August they managed to agree on mutually acceptable principles for the settlement of the Cambodian conflict and on a proposal entitled “Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict.” The Security Council endorsed the proposal in September and the General Assembly in October. However, the Cambodian parties did not manage to reach a consensus during 1990, despite the establishment of a Supreme National Council (SNC) in September. Eventually they managed to find a formula

for compromises and reached agreements on contested issues between June and September 1991. These developments paved the way for the reconvening of the PCC.

The second session of the PCC was convened on 23 October 1991, and two agreements were signed: the “Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict” and the “Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia.” The following participating states were the signatories: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia (represented by the SNC under the leadership of its president, Prince Sihanouk), Canada, China, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia, which represented the Non-Aligned Movement. Furthermore, a “Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia” was adopted at the conference. The Paris Agreements on Cambodia formally settled the Cambodian conflict.

RAMSES AMER

See also Hun Sen (1951–); Khmer Rouge; Kuantan Principle (1980); Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) (1925–1998); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992–1993)

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PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT (1968, 1973) (VIETNAM)

The Paris agreement “on the suspension of hostilities and the restoration of peace in Vietnam” in January 1973 ended a war that had ravaged the country for nearly a decade, but only after four years of negotiations and without long-lasting effect.

Soon after the Tet offensive, U.S. president Lyndon Johnson (t. 1963–1969) announced that bombardments of North Vietnam would be reduced, and he offered to negotiate (31 March 1968). On 13 May the delegations of the United States and of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) met for the first time in Paris (Harriman–Xuan Thuy). The organization of the negotiations would prove to be problematic at first. However, four delegations representing the two conflicting parties finally agreed to meet at a roundtable on Avenue Kleber in January 1969. On the one side was Washington and Saigon, and on the other, the DRV and the National Liberation Front (FNL). The latter was replaced by the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), headed by Mrs. Nguyễn Thi Binh. The talks, however, dragged. After four years and more than 140 meetings, nothing seemed to have been solved.

Reconciling the different points of view proved to be complicated. President Richard Nixon (t. 1969–1974) progressively withdrew U.S. troops from South Vietnam, among other reasons because the war was unpopular, and he demanded that the DRV do the same; but Hanoi considered the division of Vietnam artificial and rejected that demand. At the same time Hanoi contested the legitimacy of President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu (t. 1965–1975) in Saigon, but the United States did not intend to sacrifice their ally. The peace plans—“7 Points Plan” of the PRG in July 1971, “8 Points Plan” of Nixon in January 1972—were accompanied by important diplomatic maneuvering, notably Nixon’s journey to Peking in February 1972. Meanwhile the war spread to Cambodia (1970) and to south Laos (1971), and it continued in Vietnam with the general revolutionary offensive in the South and the U.S. mining of North Vietnamese ports (1972).

Nevertheless, in February 1970 secret talks near Paris commenced between Henry Kissinger (1923–), Nixon’s advisor, and Le Duc Tho (1911–), one of the communist leaders in

Hanoi. The talks were revealed by Nixon two years later, in January 1972, initiating the final period of negotiations. Suspension and resumption of the talks alternated for a year, with occasional unforeseen developments: each side more or less gave up their demands, and an agreement was almost secured on 8 October 1972, just before the U.S. elections, but it was refused by Thiệu in Saigon. New demands surfaced, and a U.S. bombing campaign on Hanoi began anew (18–25 December). Nevertheless, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho still met in Paris in January 1973, and the agreement was finally signed on 27 January 1973.

This long-awaited agreement included military as well as political clauses. On the military level, it stipulated the end of U.S. intervention: the end of all military activity on DRV territory on the one hand, and the withdrawal of military involvement from the South on the other. It also established a cease-fire in the South, where the boundaries between the different areas controlled by the conflicting parties were entangled. On the political level, the two South Vietnamese parties were asked to constitute a “Council for National Reconciliation and Concord,” composed of three equal parties (the Saigon government, the PRG, and the “third force”), which was supposed to organize general elections.

However, to reach an agreement is one thing, to enforce it another. The U.S. withdrawal from the war was effective, even though it did maintain a discreet presence in Saigon to back the Thiệu regime.

The cease-fire on the spot was established, turning South Vietnamese territory into a “leopard skin” where it was difficult to move about. But the Council for National Reconciliation and Concord would never see the light of day, despite months of negotiations at La Celle Saint-Cloud near Paris. Two years later, at the time the United States seemed to have turned the page following Nixon’s demission after Watergate and the refusal of Congress to vote for new funds for South Vietnam, a last communist offensive was triggered in the spring of 1975 on the high plateaus. In less than two months, the Saigon regime was defeated (30 April).

Did the Paris agreement permit a “decent interval” at the end of which the whole of Vietnam was left to the Hanoi regime? Even if it did not end the state of war in South Vietnam,



Ambassador William H. Sullivan (lower right) and Xuan Thuy (upper right) watch as Dr. Henry Kissinger (lower center) and Le Duc Tho (second from upper right) initial the Paris Peace Accords in Paris on 23 January 1973. (Bettmann/Corbis)

at least it allowed the United States to withdraw from the conflict, although it was not spared the humiliation of seeing its allies easily defeated.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Le Duc Tho (1911–); Nguyễn Văn Thieu (1923–2001); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Việt Cong; Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920)

In the Netherlands East Indies, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) evolved from its predecessor, the Indies

Social Democratic Association (ISDV), established in 1914. A group of ISDV leaders believed that a socialist revolution was feasible in the Netherlands East Indies, even though it was generally held that socialism could only be attained by developed capitalist societies. As the ISDV became more radical, it also gained more Indonesian members, who became the dominant group by 1917. In 1920, the ISDV became the PKI.

The early strategy of the Indonesian communists was to work within the dominant religious organization in the Netherlands East Indies—namely, the Sarekat Islam (SI). By 1922 this strategy was mostly successful, with the communist leaders challenging the noncommunist leaders of the SI for control. In the power tussle that ensued in 1923 the SI was split, with the communists taking away more than half of the SI membership.

In 1926 and 1927, the PKI launched revolts in various parts of the Netherlands East Indies. Two of the areas affected more seriously were Bantam (West Java) and Minangkabau (West Sumatra). The revolts came as a surprise because they took place when the trade recession that hit the Netherlands East Indies during 1921 and 1922 was ending, and the economy was recovering.

For the party itself, the reasons for revolt were political. By 1924 the PKI had resolved to focus attention on the urban proletariat instead of the peasant masses. In 1925 a series of strikes took place as a prelude to a huge uprising. The Dutch colonial government reacted swiftly. Top PKI leaders were detained and given the choice of exile or departure abroad. One of those leaders was Tan Malaka (1897?–1949), who chose the latter option. The right of assembly was severely curtailed. It was clear that dependence on the proletariat would not work yet, and PKI activists dispersed to evade capture. In two areas, Bantam and Minangkabau, PKI leaders manipulated latent dissatisfaction to foment revolt.

Ironically, in Bantam the participants were led by the wealthy and the influential. Religious leaders were convinced that a bright future would follow from a successful revolution, and they brought the poorer members of their flock to support the PKI. There were some grievances over the variety of taxes. Minangkabau was a region with rich economic possibilities, given the introduction of coffee and

rubber cultivation. The PKI-led revolt was supported by the new rich against traditional leaders. The supporters of the revolt included those with local grievances. Employees of the colonial government were spooked by rumors of retrenchment, and there was talk that family homes would be taxed, woodlands delimited and declared off limits, and land taxes introduced.

The failed revolt of 1926–1927 led to a series of arrests. The PKI was crippled, but not driven out of existence. Its leaders fled abroad. Within the Netherlands East Indies itself, it went underground for much of the 1930s and reemerged only at an opportune time—the Indonesian revolution of 1945.

The revolution against Dutch rule was the right time for the communist leaders to return from exile, and the PKI resurfaced. The leaders were now Musso and Tan Malaka. At first the PKI aligned itself with the national objectives of the Indonesian revolution, giving priority to driving the Dutch out from the independent Republic of Indonesia. By 1948, however, the communists had begun to exhibit a more militant anti-imperialist line. They criticized the republican leaders, whom they accused of being overaccommodating, since they were engaged in negotiations with the Dutch. When the negotiations displayed signs of failure, the communists forged links with the opposition to the republican government and launched a revolt in Madiun (East Java) in 1948.

The republican government quickly branded this revolt as stabbing the nation in the back while negotiations with the Dutch had entered a critical phase. In the face of a mighty nationalist swing against the PKI, the communists failed to achieve their goal to seize power through the Madiun revolt. The Indonesian army was the principal instrument for crushing the communists. The PKI's nationalist image was severely tarnished, and party leaders who advocated armed revolution were discredited. From then on the PKI adopted a nationalist strategy, and that was the principal platform of the new leadership that emerged in 1951 under D. N. Aidit (1923–1965) (chairman).

The PKI of the 1950s can therefore be characterized in the following ways:

- Ever mindful of past failures, the PKI chose to identify with nationalist issues, of

which there were many. One was the sense that the republic had not won complete independence from the Dutch, shackled as it was by financial debts and other economic constraints. By championing an anticolonial, anti-imperialist platform, the PKI was able to regain the reputation of being pronationalist—that is, pro-Indonesia.

- The PKI also received endorsement from the Soviet and Chinese attitudes that newly independent countries like Indonesia were still subject to a form of neocolonialism.
- The PKI was careful not to advance too far ahead of the policies of the government of the day and thus risk isolation. Instead it supported most government policies, especially those promoted by the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), which held office during the best part of the four years after 1952. This alignment with the government of the day gave the PKI the legal protection it needed from persecution, as well as the opportunity to work the ground for mass support. In return, the PKI was a loyal ally. The PKI continued to extend its support to President Sukarno (t. 1945–1967) after 1957, when the president gradually overthrew parliamentary institutions that enabled the PKI to flourish and instead introduced his brand of Guided Democracy, with the Indonesian army as his political partner.
- Sensing that President Sukarno also needed a mass base, and requiring protection from persecution by the Indonesian army, the PKI threw in its full support for Sukarno's Guided Democracy.

Using the above platforms as points of departure, the PKI was a reliable crusader against imperialists, colonialists, and neocolonialists. In return for this support, the governments of the day gave the PKI full rein to establish mass support in the countryside and among workers. As a result, the PKI became a household name. In the parliamentary elections of 1955, it was the fourth strongest in the country. In the provincial elections of 1957, it further increased its

reach in Java. By the 1960s, it could count 27 million supporters (Mortimer 1974: 366).

Given its influence in Indonesian politics, what was the next step for the PKI? Would the party continue to play second fiddle to the government of the day? Or would it seize an opportunity to grab power for itself? These questions became important toward the mid-1960s as Sukarno's Guided Democracy showed debilitating results. The economy was floundering, running into triple-digit inflation, and Sukarno's own political influence was at risk. It was not a foregone conclusion that he would retain undiminished power. Moreover, it was noticed from 1964 that he was unwell. Meanwhile, the Indonesian army was also maneuvering into positions of power, especially as Indonesia launched a military confrontation in 1963 against the newly formed Malaysia, which it regarded as a neocolonialist plot designed to subvert fiercely independent countries like Indonesia. With a weakened Sukarno and a strong army, the PKI's political position could be endangered. This dilemma had to be addressed.

In 1965 the world was stunned by the news that the PKI had launched a coup on 30 September to capture power. The motivations are still shrouded in mystery and controversy. Witnesses at the subsequent trials of captured PKI leaders testified that the party made plans for the coup during July and August 1965. A group of dissident army officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, was urged to make the first move. The justification was to protect President Sukarno from a Council of Generals that was plotting to seize power. Six leading generals were kidnapped and murdered by PKI supporters, and the PKI went into action with other coordinated actions as well. The plan misfired, however, because the defense minister, General Abdul Haris Nasution (1918–2000), and General Suharto (1921–), the commander of the Strategic Reserve based in Jakarta, were able to mount a counteroffensive. The army began to round up PKI leaders, and Aidit was killed in central Java. Other leaders, such as Lukman (1914–1965), Njoto, and Sakirman, met the same fate.

Revenge killings against PKI members and their supporters took place in North Sumatra, Java, and Bali. The purge resulted in many people being killed. Estimates range from 40,000 to a million. Early in 1966, a special

military tribunal (*Mahmillub*) was established throughout Indonesia to try the leaders of the coup attempt. Trial proceedings revealed that the PKI had set up a Special Bureau to infiltrate the armed forces that would pave the way for a coup. On 11 March 1966, General Suharto outlawed the PKI and its affiliate organizations.

Anybody observing the massive measures taken against the PKI in the aftermath of the 1965 coup would have drawn the conclusion that the PKI as an organization was history. Hardcore communist detainees and their supporters were exiled to the island of Buru (East Indonesia), where they remained until their release and reintegration into society many years later. The scars still remain, and the most prominent among the former detainees, Pramodya Ananta Toer (1925–), used his skill as a novelist to continue his criticism of the Indonesian government. In the years after 1965, unrest in Indonesia continued to be blamed on the work of PKI remnants, although such explanations have tapered off.

This account has adopted the standard historical approach of origins, growth, and demise; the PKI has been viewed linearly. Yet it is necessary also to consider other circumstances that did not get sufficient exposure in the sweep of chronological events. An important question is why communism continues to be so resilient, even after the party was destroyed each time after an unsuccessful revolt. If the fears of the party's return are to be given credence, then it becomes even more important to explain why the PKI was like a phoenix, rising from the ashes after each denouement.

The answer is speculative at best, but it is reasonable to argue that among the core values of Indonesian society, a streak of social justice exists. Social justice as a goal was addressed in various ways by different sectors in society. Communism could well regard itself as one of the exponents of this core value, ensuring for itself a role in Indonesian society.

YONG MUN CHEONG

See also Comintern; Communism; Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Konfrontasi (“Crush Malaysia” Campaign); Madiun Affair (September 1948); Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (PNI)

(1927); Sarekat Islam (1912); Sino-Soviet Struggle; Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–); Tan Malaka, Ibrahim Datuk (1897?–1949)

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PARTAI RAKYAT BRUNEI (PRB)

Partai Rakyat Brunei (Brunei People's Party) was established by Sheikh A. M. Azahari (1928–2002) in 1956 to voice demands for independence, democracy, and socialism. It was the first genuine political party in the Brunei sultanate and the only one to have won strong support at a time when something approaching free speech was still possible. Inspired particularly by Indonesian *merdeka* (independence), the movement grew out of the new global situation after World War II (1939–1945), the British retreat from empire, and the rapid expansion of the Brunei oil industry that had created inequalities of wealth.

The PRB, originally intended as a branch of the left-wing Partai Rakyat Malaya (1955),

sought registration by the government in January 1956. At that time Brunei was still administered by a British resident. Legal recognition was eventually granted on 15 August 1956, provided that the party confined its activities to Brunei itself. The PRB's manifesto proclaimed the party's desire "to oppose all forms of colonialism in the political, economic and social spheres." The party favored unity "for the Malay homeland" (a nebulous entity, which by 1962–1963 had come to mean *Kalimantan Utara*, a proposed federation of Brunei, Sabah, and Sarawak), providing educational opportunities for the people, and promoting social welfare. Azahari intended to follow constitutional methods but asserted that independence was "a fundamental right of any people."

The PRB established itself as an important player in the sultanate's affairs in 1956–1957. The level of support was fickle, however, and never as great as the party pretended. In fact, the PRB was probably a repository for "protest votes," expanding its base when there was a particular issue on which the people wished to make their voice heard—notably a desire for early independence.

The late 1950s and early 1960s were characterized by a struggle between the party and the sultan to inherit the British mantle. The PRB was largely a Malay-Kadayan party, strong in Kampong Ayer and among Kadayan farmers but with little or no appeal to non-Muslim indigenes or the Chinese community. The PRB's demand that the Chinese "monopoly" of trade be broken alarmed the Brunei Chinese, who were an increasingly important section of the population. Nor did Brunei irredentism appeal to citizens of Sabah and Sarawak.

In March 1957, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III (r. 1950–1967) announced plans for the reform of the State Council (the legislature). The public was to elect ten members to the council, but not directly: the monarch would choose the ten from the twenty-two elected candidates. Azahari denounced the proposed reform, which was abandoned, as a "mockery of democracy"; instead, he demanded that three-quarters of the members of the State Council be directly elected. At the end of March the first annual congress of the PRB drew up a plan of action, including the dispatch of a delegation to London to fix a date for autonomy. The mission duly took place in September

1957, but it ended in failure. For the time being, the party had shot its bolt and remained comparatively quiescent until 1960–1961, when its leaders became involved in interlocking trade union activity.

The constitution promulgated in 1959 represented a very cautious advance, under which the monarchy inherited all the former prerogatives of the resident. Nevertheless, the sixteen elective seats on the Legislative Council gave the people a prospective voice in the running of their country. The PRB, however, argued that control of their country remained in colonialist hands.

Progress toward the creation of a federation of Malaysia in 1961–1962 galvanized the party's fortunes. Following the 1962 elections (held a year behind schedule), the party occupied all the elective seats on the Legislative Council; there was still, however, a nominated majority of one, which meant that the party's measures could be blocked. Proscribed in December 1962 during the Brunei Rebellion, when many of its members were arrested and interned without trial, the PRB sought to continue the struggle in exile.

The next major turning point came in 1973, when eight leading PRB members were released from internment in Brunei and granted political asylum in Malaysia. The party was reactivated in Kuala Lumpur in 1974. A new manifesto was issued, renouncing the party's socialist stand and its demand for Kalimantan Utara. It still championed a nonaligned foreign policy. With Malaysian support, the party took its case to the UN Committee on Decolonization in 1975–1977, and in 1977 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution proposing free elections in Brunei, the end of the ban on political parties, and the return of all political exiles to Brunei. Once independence had been achieved (1984), there was apparently little left for the party to fight for; it had been dropped, meanwhile, by Kuala Lumpur, and once again it faded away. Former party leaders drifted back to the sultanate in the 1990s; after a period of detention and the swearing of an oath of loyalty, they were released.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Azahari bin Sheikh Mahmud, Sheikh (1928–2002); Brunei Oil and Gas Industry; Brunei Rebellion (December 1962);

Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Malaysia (1963); *Merdeka* (Free, Independent); Omar Ali Saifuddin III, Sultan of Brunei (1914–1986)

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PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS)

Officially registered as *Persatuan Islam Se Malaya* (PAS), or Pan-Malaya Islamic Party (PMIP), on 14 June 1955, the party originated from the *Persatuan Alim Ulama Se Malaya* (Association of Pan Malaya Islamic Scholars). The latter was formed by the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) religious wing at a meeting in Muar in February 1951. Headed first by former UMNO Ulama Committee chairman, Haji Ahmad Fu'ad Hassan of Terengganu, PAS came into being on 24 November 1951 at a meeting in Butterworth, Penang, in the midst of an ideological and leadership crisis within UMNO. The name of the party was amended to *Persatuan Islam Se Tanah Melayu* (Pan-Malaya Islamic Association) in December 1958 and af-

ter the formation of Malaysia, *Partai Islam Se Malaysia* (Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party) in 1971.

When Ahmad Fu'ad resigned as president in disagreement with the PAS central committee's decision not to participate in a national conference organized by Dato' Onn bin Ja'afar (1895–1962) and seven chief ministers, his place was filled by a medical officer, Dr. Abbas Abdul Aziz, in November 1953. Under the leadership of the veteran nationalist and former chairman of Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Muda (PKMM, National Party of Malay Youth) and Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Putera, Centre of People's Power), Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmi (1911–1969), who became PAS president in December 1956, PAS secured Kelantan and Terengganu in 1959. However, in October 1961, Terengganu was wrested by UMNO when two PAS representatives and three from the Partai Negara (PN) defected. Kelantan remained a PAS stronghold, and after the May 13 Incident (1969) the party came to terms with the Alliance Party and participated to form the National Front (Barisan Nasional, BN) in 1974. However, UMNO-PAS rivalry continued, and when a serious leadership crisis occurred in Kelantan, a state of emergency was declared by the UMNO-controlled central government; the Kelantan PAS-led state government was toppled in a snap election in March 1978.

PAS views Islam not only as a religion but also as a political ideology and has long showered criticism on UMNO's secularism. After a successful reorganization in the 1980s and rifts within UMNO, PAS recaptured Kelantan in 1990 and Terengganu in 1999, thus continuing to pose a serious challenge to UMNO and BN.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Malays; United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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PARTIDO NACIONALISTA (NATIONALIST PARTY, NP)

The Partido Nacionalista was one of the first Philippine political parties formed under U.S. colonial administration. Based on a platform of immediate independence for the Philippines, the party became the strongest political party at that time. After the Pacific War (1941–1945), it rose and fell in various elections and was eclipsed during martial law by the government-sponsored Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL, New Society Movement).

The Partido Nacionalista was organized on 12 March 1907 by means of the fusion of two existing proindependence parties headed by nationalist Filipino political leaders, including Manuel L. Quezon (1878–1944) and Sergio Osmeña, Sr. (1878–1961). The party's platform stood for immediate independence and the constitution of a sovereign nation under a democratic government. The party also opposed any attempt to dismember the Philippines as defined in the Treaty of Paris (1898).

The party opposed and defeated the Federalista Party, which was initially supportive of U.S. rule, in the elections for the first Philippine Assembly in 1907. It became the dominant Filipino political party after that.

It split into two factions twice, first in 1922 because of the rivalry between Quezon and Osmeña, and again in 1933, over the issue of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. In both cases the party reunited and defeated smaller opposition parties in succeeding elections.

The party was dissolved by the Japanese during the Pacific War, but it was revived afterward under the leadership of Osmeña. Younger politicians, led by Manuel Roxas (1948–1948), however, bolted the party and created a new party, the Liberal Party (LP), which defeated the NP in the 1946 elections.

The NP and LP maintained an adversarial relationship as they traded places in government. Since there was no basic difference be-

tween the two, party shifting became common when personal feuds developed.

During martial law (1972–1981), the party was split on whether or not to participate in elections under Marcos, which were thought to be unfair. The party was eclipsed by the government-supported KBL, but it rose after Marcos was deposed in 1986. The party is still extant and participates in elections, although it no longer is the dominant party.

The Partido Nacionalista is today the oldest existing political party in the Philippines. Its proindependence stand during the U.S. colonial period won it strength, and epitomized a colonial people fighting for independence within a legal framework.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Nationalism and Independence

Movements in Southeast Asia; Osmeña, Sergio, Sr. (1878–1961); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration; Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944)

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PASAI

A Thirteenth-Century Muslim Entrepôt

Pasai, known also as Pasé, one of the twin cities of Samudera Pasai, was an important medieval Islamic entrepôt on the northeast coast of the island of Sumatra. Present-day Pasai is located a short distance southward from the modern city of Lhoksuemawe in eastern Aceh, situated inland about 4.8 kilometers upriver from the mouth of the Krueng Pasai, the Pasai River. The original settlement was near the modern village of Geudong in the regency of Aceh Utara. It was about one hundred kilometers from its rival, Pedir, another contemporary pepper harbor to the northwest on the same coast. To the southeast lay the anchorage of Tamiang and the piratical kingdom of Aru.

Pasai was populated predominantly by Gujarati merchants. It flourished from about the mid-/late thirteenth century to the early sixteenth century, by which time much of its trade

had been lost to Melaka. But for more than two centuries it was the foremost among a number of small harbors on the northeast coast of Sumatra. The history of the founding of Pasai was immortalized in the texts of the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals) and the *Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai*. The first sultan, Malik-al-Saleh, died in 1297. He reputedly named the settlement after his dog, Pasai, who discovered an ant as big as itself at the Cot Astana, "the palace hill."

Marco Polo (1254–1324) is said to have stopped there awaiting the monsoon on his way back to Europe from China. In the early fifteenth century, the Ming Chinese fleet under Admiral Cheng Ho (Zheng He) (1371/1375–1433/1435) visited Pasai on no fewer than three occasions. The Portuguese had a brief but unsuccessful association with it. Tomé Pires (ca. 1465–ca. 1540), writing in the second decade of the sixteenth century, left a full description of Pasai and its neighbors, its trade, and customs before it fell to the Acehnese. Pasai as an independent royal center and a town of 20,000 inhabitants disappeared by the end of the first quarter of the sixteenth century. It was attacked and destroyed in 1522 by Ali Mughayat Syah (r. 1496–1528), the first sultan of neighboring Aceh.

The location of Pasai was such that it was a convenient spot for merchants sailing to either east or west with the monsoon winds. There, Bengalis, Gujaratis, Tamils, Peguans, Siamese, and Malays were able to wait for the seasonal changes in direction, which would take them either through the Straits of Melaka and the Indonesian archipelago and thence north and east to China, or westward to Ceylon (Sri Lanka), India, and the Persian Gulf. Pasai was well supplied with fresh water.

Pires suggests that the original kings of Pasai were heathens worn out by the cunning of the Moorish merchants. The rulers from that point on were Muslims. They brought an unfortunate custom with them: anyone who succeeded in killing the king could become king in his stead. Despite this, Pasai was an important Islamic center. The rulers were fervent Muslims but had little political or religious influence on its immediate mountainous hinterland, which was inhabited by the Gayo, a race of hardy tribal people.

All the products of Sumatra and from emporiums east and west were said to be available in

Pasai. From the immediate hinterland came benzoin, camphor, and gold dust, brought down from the mountains of the Bukit Barisan. But pepper; cloves; nutmeg; precious gaharu wood and other perfumes; sandalwood; stonewares from Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam; Chinese porcelain; silk; silver; and turtle shell were all available. Indeed, in the early sixteenth century Pasai produced from 8,000 to 10,000 *bahar* of pepper (some 1,500 metric tons) annually, some, if not most, presumably produced on the hill slopes of its immediate hinterland. Imported silk was exchanged for cloth and other goods from Cambay in Gujerat.

Because of a shortage of teak for shipbuilding, Pasai built only *lanchara*, or galleys, but had no merchant junks of its own. These were bought from Melaka, which was said to have had an abundance of teak.

Archaeological evidence of the former prosperity of Pasai in and around the modern village of Geudong can be seen from the several ornate marble tombs imported from Cambay, and from numerous grave complexes of Batu Aceh. Supportive evidence is also found in ceramic shards, including Chinese porcelain and glazed stonewares, from the kilns of Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam. Other artifacts include burnished earthenware from India and pottery from elsewhere, glass bangles and beads, and numerous coins of both gold (*dirham*) and fragile but often badly corroded lead (*pitis*), inscribed with Arabic script.

E. EDWARDS MCKINNON

See also Cheng Ho (Zheng He), Admiral (1371/1375–1433/1435); Gujaratis; Islam in Southeast Asia; Pepper; Pires, Tomé (ca. 1465–ca. 1540); Polo, Marco (1254–1324); Spices and the Spice Trade

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PASISIR**The Northern Coastal Strip of Java**

Pasisir, Javanese for “beach,” refers to the northern strip of Java, which stretches roughly from Surabaya to Cirebon. People in the Pasisir did not have a coherent sense of a common identity and certainly no history of political unity. The term *Pasisir* was used primarily to distinguish the coastal areas from the other parts of the island, in particular the central provinces. In the conceptions of the central Javanese kingdoms, the Pasisir was considered peripheral. Control of Mataram over the coastal provinces was less direct than on the heartlands (*negara agung* and *mancanegara*) of the kingdom. But to the rulers and regents of the Pasisir, perspectives were much different.

With the bloom of long-distance shipping in the fifteenth century, these coastal areas became potentially very wealthy and modern places. The Pasisir was Java’s window to the world. It was a tremendously dynamic place, frequented by large numbers of merchants from all corners of the world. In their wake came settlers and foreign worldviews, which added a decidedly cosmopolitan and multicultural atmosphere to most of the large cities along the coast. Thus, from the fourteenth century, the Pasisir became the hotbed of Islam on Java. The graves of the nine famous men who had brought Islam to Java, the *wali sanga* (*wali songo*), are all located in the Pasisir. Although the spread of the new religion did not remain restricted to the coast, it was there that the most vibrant forms of Javanese Islam budded in early modern times.

The political heyday of the Pasisir fell in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the central Javanese kingdom of Majapahit broke down, and many small states emerged along the northern coast of the island. Most prominent among the young Pasisir states was Demak, whose sultan succeeded in establishing his authority over large parts of the coast, and even launched expeditions to Banjarmasin. But Demak’s power soon waned, until its conquest by the emerging power of Mataram in 1588. During the first half of the seventeenth century most states in the Pasisir became subjected to Mataram. This expansion phase was concluded in 1625 with the annexation of Surabaya.

The seventeenth century deeply changed the face of the Pasisir. The continuing violence and hard-handed rule of Mataram stifled local

trade, which dipped in the first half of the century. Susuhunan Amangkurat I (r. 1646–1677) explicitly aimed at destroying the financial basis of the Pasisir nobility by disrupting trade. In 1655 he closed the ports along the Pasisir and destroyed the merchant fleets. Only when Mataram began to show signs of wear later in the century did the coastal areas try to regain some autonomy, but no ruler or regent was strong enough to dominate the entire coast.

Besides, the regulatory policies of the Dutch United East India Company (VOC) made themselves felt in Java’s north coast. After 1619, Chinese junks were forcibly channeled to Batavia, traders from India and farther west disappeared altogether, and the shipping links with the Moluccas (Maluku) were blocked in order to protect the spice monopoly. Real VOC presence in the Pasisir, however, remained slight until after 1678, when Susuhunan Amangkurat II (r. 1677–1730) ceded Semarang to the Dutch. Thereafter the VOC only reluctantly took on administrative responsibilities over other parts of Java, even if it became deeply entangled in every major political ripple in the Mataram territories. Only by 1743 did the rest of the Pasisir, together with western Madura and the eastern part of Java, formally come under VOC rule. The Pasisir became once more politically separated from central Java, and it became a crucial supplier of rice and timber to the VOC headquarters in Batavia. Under VOC suzerainty, Pasisir towns developed into modest centers of timber industry and shipping. Trade picked up after the setbacks of the seventeenth century, but although it almost doubled during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was the VOC that gained most from the expansion of trade.

In the nineteenth century, the economy of the Pasisir regained some of its old vigor, but now almost entirely under the wing of colonial rule. Semarang developed into the major port for exports from the states of Yogyakarta and Surakarta and the sugar industries along the north coast, and it became a financial center for Java’s export economy. Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, Surabaya resurfaced as the most prominent harbor of the island, helped by the Dutch naval establishment and the expansion of the sugar industries and plantation enterprises along the northeastern coast of Java—and especially the tobacco on the

Djember plateau. Other towns were much less dynamic and became sleepy places that long exuded a marked *Indische* atmosphere. In the twentieth century, Surabaya overshadowed all other harbor regions.

REMCO RABEN

See also Amangkurat I (Sunan Tegalwangi) (r. 1645–1677); Amangkurat II (Adipati Anom) (r. 1677–1703); Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Demak; Islam in Southeast Asia; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Mataram; Surabaya; Surakarta; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); *Wali Songo*

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**PATANI (PATTANI),
SULTANATE OF**

According to traditional sources, the sultanate of Patani evolved, probably around the fourteenth century, out of Kota Mahligai, an old settlement along the eastern coast of the upper Malay Peninsula and a village named Pak Tani. The kingdom evidently accepted Islam after that religion had already spread to Sumatra, Melaka, and Kedah. Patani became prosperous and, in fact, replaced Melaka, which fell to the Portuguese in 1511, as a center of maritime trade in the upper region of the Malay Peninsula. It also inherited Melaka's on-off hostility with Siam, its more powerful northern neighbor. In 1563 it was recorded that one Patani ruler, Sultan Muzzafar Shah, learning that the Siamese capital, Ayudhya, was under a Cambodian siege, led his troops in a rear attack of the capital. Although Sultan Muzzafar Shah died soon after the attack, Siamese-Patani hostility

continued in earnest. However, Patani was able to fend off Siamese attacks and grew into a renowned center of commerce, Islamic teaching, and Malay high culture throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At times, Patani was strong enough to challenge the legitimacy of the Siamese ruler, even to the point of refusing to recognize that ruler's credentials as king of Siam.

Patani was well remembered for having three consecutive queens regent as rulers, during whose reigns in the seventeenth century Patani not only became prosperous and well respected within the Malay world but also succeeded in maintaining friendly and close relations with Siam. However, with the change of the ruling dynasty and the political ideology in Siam after the fall of Ayudhya in 1767, Patani gradually and steadily became, in the eyes of the Siamese ruling elite, the symbol of the Malay resistance to Siamese power. During the years 1785–1841, Patani was forced to accept the status of a tributary to Bangkok. Those years in fact spelled the end of Patani as a separate and autonomous polity. From the Siamese perspective, for the security and undisputed politico-military position of Siam in the upper Malay Peninsula, Patani had to be subjugated. It was clear that Patani's ability to project itself as champion of the Malay cause and Islamic teachings among the northern Malay States—Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu—spelled its eventual downfall. It was also clear that Siam, facing continuing attacks from Burma in the west in the early nineteenth century, could not afford to have an independent yet hostile kingdom at its southeastern doorstep.

The last straw for Siam came in 1809, when Patani, inspired by the religious teachings of a certain *syed*, joined forces with Malay pirates from Siak and attacked the Siamese outpost of Singora (Songkhla). As a consequence, Patani was militarily subjugated and divided into the seven small principalities of Tani, Jaring, Saiburi, Legeh/Ra-ngae, Raman Yala, and Nongchik. Each principality had its own raja-governor, and all of them came under the supervision of Songkhla, now promoted to the position of viceroyalty of the south. The breakup of the old sultanate did not quite bring about the tranquillity and order in the deep south that Bangkok had expected. The leaders of the seven principalities—particularly that of Tani—

continued for some time openly, at other times implicitly, to frustrate and undermine Siam's position in the Malay Peninsula. In order to overcome stubborn Malay resistance and the administrative malpractice committed by its own agents, Bangkok decided to transform the seven principalities into inner provinces of the kingdom. Steps were taken to withdraw certain powers of the raja-governors, including those over life and death and confiscation of property. The final step for the incorporation of the seven principalities into Siam proper came in 1902. A year earlier, however, as a response to Bangkok's move to remove the ruler's power to tax and the introduction of a payment of annual allowances to the rulers, the raja-governors of Tani, Raman, and Sai appealed to the British authority in Singapore to assist them against "Siamese abuses." The raja of Tani, Abdul Kadir, whom Bangkok regarded as the ringleader, was swiftly arrested and sent under house arrest in Siam; the other two raja-governors were suspended from their duty. These severe measures convinced other raja-governors to toe the Bangkok line. The 1902 Royal Decree on the Administration of the Seven Principalities ushered in the reform of the administration in the seven principalities. The decree, in practice, stripped the raja-governors of all real administrative powers and put them in the hands of a high commissioner appointed by Bangkok who supervised the whole seven-principality area. By 1907, the old sultanate of Patani was regrouped into three provinces of Pattani (Tani, Jaring, and Nongchik); Yala (Yala and Raman); and Bangnara, later changed to Narathiwat (Legeh and Sai).

The incorporation of the sultanate of Patani, which was completed in 1907, drew a final curtain on the glorious achievements of a Malay kingdom. Since their incorporation, it is evident that until recently, the three provinces in the deep south had posed serious socioreligious and politico-economic problems to the central authority. It was only in the 1980s, after the Bangkok government adopted liberal policies, that relative peace and socioeconomic development were achieved in the former sultanate. Presently, certain privileges related to Islamic teachings are given to the Thai Malay Muslims of the south, particularly the *syariah* laws concerning inheritance and marital affairs.

KOBKUA SUWANNATHAT-PIAN

See also Islam in Southeast Asia; Ligor/Nakhon; Muslim Minorities (Thailand); Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu)

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PATHET LAO (LAND OF LAOS)

Pathet Lao literally means "land of Laos," "Lao nation," or "Lao state." The term was originally applied by the French to refer to the communist-controlled zones in Laos in the immediate post-World War II period, just as the pro-Vietnamese anti-French nationalist movement began to refer to itself under this rubric. Thereafter, *Pathet Lao* became the standard term applied by Westerners and the Western media to the Lao communist movement. The Lao communist movement, in turn, comprised political—including parliamentary and military—sections directed by a secretive Leninist cadre party, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), successfully employing a variety of "united front" tactics. Founded in December 1975, the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) is heir to the thirty-year-long Pathet Lao struggle against the Royal Lao Government and its French and U.S. backers.

Origins of "Pathet Lao" and the Evolution of the Term

In fact, the term *Pathet Lao* was originally quite neutral. But in the context of the prewar Vichy French attempt to buttress Lao nationalism against perceived Thai irredentism, the term *Pathet Lao* first gained a political connotation.

Specifically, the first public use of the term was linked with the surfacing in 1945 of a “Pathet Lao Press” sponsored by the Lao Nhay or Lao Renovation movement, to which a number of prominent Lao nationalist figures contributed.

In 1950, however, the term resurfaced for the first time in an anti-French context in a document issued by the Neo Lao Issara, or Lao Patriot Front, founded in August of that year. Here, Pathet Lao is referred to as “land of Laos,” as in “The establishment of a truly independent and united land of Laos.” In this sense, the Pathet Lao rejected the sovereign claims of the French-backed Royal Lao Government. In the procommunist literature the term recurs in the French-language publication of 1954 as “Le Peuple du Pathet Laos.” Also in 1954, the term *Pathet Lao* commenced to appear in Vietnamese and Soviet communist statements and publications. But the Pathet Lao and the movement it represented especially gained international currency at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, where it was written into various documents. Although not formally represented at Geneva, the Pathet Lao nevertheless were legally awarded control of two northern provinces of Laos as regroupment bases. In any case, as Brown and Zasloff (1986: 47) argue, “[T]he designation Pathet Lao had meanwhile been generally adopted [by Westerners] to distinguish the Neo Lao Issara from the Royal Lao Government.”

Still, the use of the term *Pathet Lao* did not supersede Neo Lao Hak Sat, or Lao Patriot Front, the legal political party of the Lao communist movement formed in early 1956. In fact, the use of the term dropped out of Lao communist vocabulary and never entered the writings of such leading Lao communists as Kaysone Phomvihane (1920–1992) or Phoumi Vongvichit (1909–1994). The reason, no doubt, was the desire of the Lao communist party to distance itself from the Western propaganda use of the term by emphasizing the role of the front as a strictly “patriotic” organization. An additional explanation is that such an umbrella term did not fit well with the communist orthodoxy of the time, which stressed the interlocking role of parties, fronts, and armies.

The Pathet Lao Military

The highest-profile element of the Lao communist movement was simply the Pathet Lao

military. By contrast, the leadership and party were unknown and distant in Royal Lao Government circles, especially with the breakdown of the First Coalition Government (November 1957–July 1959) and Second Coalition Government (November 1962–September 1963). To Western diplomats and newsmen, the best-known symbol of the Pathet Lao military was simply their unique uniform: color-coordinated olive green fatigues, sneakers, Lenin-style cap, and trademark AK-47s. The Pathet Lao military distinguished themselves from their adversaries in the U.S.-backed Royal Lao Army by their guerrilla-style tactics, their discipline, and their political socialization as an army of “national liberation.”

The official birth date of the Lao People’s Liberation Army (LALP) is traced to the Latsavang unit, founded in Sam Neua Province in 1949 by Kaysone Phomvihane, the future party supremo and prime minister of the LPDR. But its origins were in Prince Souphanouvong’s (1911–1995) Lao Army of Liberation and Defence, and in a number of shadowy anti-French resistance elements. Kaysone was in charge of the Pathet Lao military throughout the period of alliance between Pathet Lao and Neutralist forces from 1960 to 1962, relinquishing command in 1962 to Khamtay Siphandone (1926–), a future president of Laos.

A particular feature of LALP recruitment in Laos was the participation of ethnic minorities, including the Lao Theung or Montagnard leader Sithone Kommadan (1908–1977) and his Hmong counterpart Faydang (d. 1986). It was the Pathet Lao military that constantly expanded territorial control of the movement in the creation of “liberated” zones of Laos. By the time of the formation of the Second Coalition Government, the Pathet Lao claimed to have liberated one-third of the national territory, rising to two-thirds by the time of the Third Coalition. By prodigious recruitment efforts the Pathet Lao managed to increase its strength from 20,000 in 1964 to 40,000 or 50,000 in 1971 (Zasloff 1972: 121).

The Party

At the center of the Pathet Lao movement stood the Leninist-style Lao People’s Party (Phak Pasason Lao), formed in March 1955 and tracing its origins to Hồ Chí Minh’s Indochina

Communist Party, which had been dissolved in 1951. Known as the LPRP from February 1972, the Lao communist movement enjoyed close collaboration with its Vietnamese counterpart. Such collaboration ran from doctrinal to tactical to political, including economic and military. Support from other fraternal communist nations, however, never eclipsed the “lips and teeth” (moral and material) relationship of the Lao and Vietnamese communist parties. In July 1977 this “special relationship” was formalized as the Lao-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, binding for twenty-five years and underwriting long-standing Vietnamese defense cooperation with its junior partner.

The Lao Patriotic Front

Under covert party control, the Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Sat, NLHS) was born in January 1956. Prince Souphanouvong was placed in charge of its central committee. In the prince, the front sought to expand its popular influence over a broad section of the Lao and minority population under the banner of “a peaceful, independent, neutral, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos.” A key element in front strategy was to win acceptance as a legitimate political party. In the national elections of May 1958, the NLHS posted thirteen candidates and won nine seats. Souphanouvong was elected to head the National Assembly, and the Pathet Lao military was slated to merge with the Royal Army. The proposed merger was resisted by the U.S. government, which, replacing France as the dominant prop of the “Vientiane-side” government, was on the verge of embarking on its own “secret war” in Laos, unknown even to the U.S. Congress. But in the wake of the Geneva Agreement of 1962, a Second Coalition Government was forged, this time with the Pathet Lao heading a slate of ministerial positions with Souphanouvong serving as acting prime minister. A new factor was the participation of various neutralist forces. Violent events in the capital, however, obliged the Pathet Lao leadership to withdraw within the year to their isolated base in the caves of Sam Neua Province. Breakdown of the Second Coalition Government also heralded a final and “heroic” stage of the struggle that pitted the Pathet Lao military in ground actions against

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–backed Hmong mercenary forces, while simultaneously facing down a massive U.S. bombing campaign directed at the “liberated” zones. Negotiations leading to a cease-fire on 21 February 1973 were conducted in the context only of U.S. withdrawal from the Indochina theater. Such events played into the hands of the Pathet Lao, which successfully parlayed their participation in a third and final government of national union promulgated on 5 April 1974. In the face of creeping united front tactics, the facade of the Third Coalition Government gave way on 1 December 1975 with the proclamation of the LPDR and the abrogation of the monarchy. In a stroke, the Pathet Lao had become the government.

Unquestionably, the umbrella role of the Pathet Lao movement was primordial in winning power in Laos. This was a thirty-year struggle, employing military, diplomatic, parliamentary, and united front tactics. It was also a classic communist strategy that had certain Eastern European parallels. But Pathet Lao military methods were also a “fourth generation” model selectively borrowed from the Chinese, North Vietnamese, and Viet Cong experience—especially the induction of ethnic minority elements into a Maoist-style guerrilla army. Although representing itself as authentically patriotic, the Pathet Lao was undoubtedly successful alongside the U.S.-backed “Vientiane-side” in expanding its popular base. Pathet Lao appeal was also facilitated by the highly charismatic and capable “Red Prince,” Souphanouvong, especially in the governments of national coalition and on the diplomatic front. But at the core of the Pathet Lao stood the party, staunchly wedded to Hanoi’s worldview and resolutely backed by Vietnamese communist power, and, behind it, the military support of the Soviet Union. Having institutionalized itself in the LPDR as a one-party state, the Pathet Lao view of national history in Laos is axiomatic. Just as the institution of the monarchy ended on 1 December 1975, likewise alternate views of Lao nationalism or the Lao state are not entertained in the LPDR.

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See also Hmong; Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Lao Issara

(Issarak); Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR); Laos (Nineteenth Century to mid-1990s); Montagnard; Souphanouvong (Red Prince) (1911–1995); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Việt Cong

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PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS

Patron-client relations serve as bonds that tie leadership to the political economy. In it, patrons grant their clients services and favors in exchange for loyalty and personal services. The relationship is based on mutual obligations and needs, and can result in acts considered illegal by modern law, but it can remain practical and functional in terms of everyday sociopolitical-economic relationships.

Patron-client relations existed in Southeast Asia since traditional times. A *datu* (chieftain) owned land but needed workers and cultivators to develop it. On the other hand, cultivators needed land to work. The *datu*, as patron, granted patronage to the cultivators by allowing them to work on his land. The patron awarded loyalty and hard work with protection and additional benefits. The clients in turn provided the patron with strength; the strength of a *datu* could be measured by the number of followers he had. Both provided each other with a sense of security as long as the reciprocal obligations were met; a favor done had to be repaid.

During the colonial period, the patron-client relationship was reinforced as the colonized peoples who served the colonizers loyally were

awarded powers over other people. Town heads who kept their people obedient were rewarded by their superiors with the power to collect taxes, from which they could obtain a share. Provincial administrators owed loyalty to the governor-general, who in turn was a client of the king, who had appointed him. The relationship continued on even after decolonization.

The web of patronage extended beyond the political sphere, as politicians extended favors to businessmen, such as facilitating government contracts, in return for a share in the proceeds. Although this would be considered corruption under modern law, it was functional to the businessman, because it cut through red tape and ensured approval of the contract. Small-store owners owed loyalty to distributors who provided merchandise. Again, illegal transactions could be entered into but were practical, since they enabled the small business to survive. Military officers hoping for promotion cultivated relations with politicians and senior officers to act as their patrons; they would owe them loyalty and services in exchange, such as protecting the patrons' property or business. Provincial governors cultivated ties with congressmen to receive special funds, while in turn ensuring their patrons of victory at the next election.

The system could break down when the unwritten rules were broken, such as when expected obligations or favors were not met. This could result in militant peasants who opposed their landlords, and labor unions striking against their companies. It was eroded too by the rise of mass mobilization, caused by greater education, media exposure, discontent in the agricultural sector, and public protests. However, for as long as the need remains, and the system relationship remains functional, it can continue to serve as a foundation for socioeconomic political relationships.

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See also *Hui*; *Kongsi*

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PAVIE, AUGUSTE (1847–1925)

French Explorer-Diplomat

Born in Dinan, Brittany, on 31 May 1847 and baptized Auguste Jean Marie Pavie, this noted French explorer came from a social background very different from that of most of his compatriots who explored the territories that came to form French Indochina. Neither a military officer nor a university-trained professional, Pavie was the son of a cabinetmaker. Joining the army as an enlisted man in 1864, he made his first contact with the Indochinese region as a member of a marine infantry unit sent to Saigon in 1869. Returning as a civilian in 1871, he became a telegraphist, first in Cochin China (southern Vietnam) and then in the isolated Cambodian coastal settlement of Kampot. There he developed a fascination with the people and languages of the region that eventually led to his becoming the French vice consul in Luang Prabang in January 1887. His rescue of the king of Luang Prabang from an attack by Chinese and T'ai bandits in June 1887 forged a strong link between this ruler and Pavie. In the following decade this relationship was of great importance in helping France to assume colonial control of Laos at the end of the nineteenth century.

Pavie is best remembered for his remarkable record as an explorer of the Indochinese region. Between 1879 and 1895 he and his assistants undertook a series of expeditions that explored and mapped largely unknown territories in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, traveling in total some 90,000 kilometers. The results of these journeys of exploration, known as the *Mission Pavie* (Pavie Mission), were later published in ten text volumes and an atlas and remain important to the present day for students of history and ethnography. Returning to France in 1895, he retired from public service in 1904. Throughout the remainder of his long life Pavie retained an active interest in the countries of French Indochina, but he never returned there. He died in 1925.

During his posting to Kampot in the mid-1870s, Pavie immersed himself in Cambodian culture, hunting and fishing with villagers of the region and participating in their festivals.

Teaching himself Cambodian, he began a series of journeys through the country, always walking barefoot and wearing a characteristically wide-brimmed hat that became his personal trademark. During his period of employment as a telegraphist, Pavie had supervised the construction of a telegraph line running from the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh, to Kampot. This brought him to the attention of the governor of Cochin China, Charles Marie Le Myre de Vilers (t. 1879–1882), who gave Pavie permission to begin his first official mission, mapping a journey from the Gulf of Thailand to Cambodia's Great Lake (Tonle Sap) and then to the Mekong River. With this task successfully completed, Le Myre de Vilers commissioned Pavie to oversee the construction of another telegraph line, from Phnom Penh to the Thai capital, Bangkok. By this time Pavie's talents had become widely recognized, and in 1886 he was appointed a member of the French diplomatic service and posted to Luang Prabang. He was later French consul in Bangkok at the time of the Paknam Incident (1893), an event leading to Thailand's ceding control of Lao territories to France.

From 1879 to 1895, Pavie and forty associates carried out the remarkable series of expeditions that formed the basis for the eleven-volume publication *Mission Pavie en Indochine, 1879–1895*, published in Paris between 1898 and 1904. Pavie was the driving force behind this remarkable compilation. His appearance belied his energy. Writing of him in the 1880s, a French officer observed: "At first glance his appearance was against him. Thin, with a sickly appearance, below average height, he said of himself that he had the air of being a weak individual." But the same commentator went on to note that "beneath this appearance of physical weakness, there was a wealth of intelligence put to work with an energy and a strength of will without equal" (de Séménil 1900: 52–53). He showed this energy and strength repeatedly in his long journeys on foot and by elephant, or down the Mekong River by raft.

Despite claiming that he had achieved his aims in the Indochinese region through "the conquest of hearts," the title of his autobiography published in 1921, Pavie was a convinced colonialist, a man of his time. He had no doubts about the superiority of European civilization or the desirability of imposing French control

over the peoples of Indochina. What distinguished him from many others was his capacity to understand the values of the exotic societies in which he moved. Some of his descriptions and assessments of the Cambodian court, for instance, provide insights that few of his contemporaries were able to match. As a commentator and explorer, Pavie remains a major figure in the early “heroic” years of French colonialism in Indochina.

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See also Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; French Indochina; Laos (Nineteenth Century to mid-1990s); Luang Prabang; Paknam Incident (1893); Preservation of Siam’s Political Independence

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PEASANT UPRISINGS AND PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asian history is replete with examples of resistance against political authority and representatives of government, including both anticolonial protests and rebellions against indigenous rulers and elites. Uprisings have varied considerably in their character, organization, scale, and duration, and have resulted from a complex combination of factors and processes. At one extreme were sporadic, localized, and sometimes violent religious reactions to perceived injustices and to cultural crises that often flared up suddenly and were rapidly suppressed.

At the other end were large-scale, coordinated, prolonged rural-based uprisings with clear political and economic objectives that were usually led by provincial and urban elites and that posed substantial political and sometimes military threats to colonial regimes. The range of expressions of resistance—from millenarian, nativistic, and revivalist movements to secular protests—defies simple explanation and demands detailed research. The former were led by folk prophets, or by local Muslim, Buddhist, or Christian religious leaders who foretold a “golden age” of plenty and prosperity. Political leaders with defined programs of revolution or reform staged secular opposition.

It was probably the distinguished U.S. scholar Harry Benda (1965) who was the first to attempt to place peasant uprisings in Southeast Asia in a more general conceptual framework and to draw attention to the problems that the study of anticolonial rural resistance poses for the historian. His comments are of particular importance because he raised issues about the study of what was referred to in the historiography of Southeast Asia as “Asiacentric” or “domestic history”—or in John Smail’s words, “autonomous history” (1961). In other words, it is the study and writing of history that place Southeast Asians center stage and examine the lives of ordinary people and the interpretation of their history from a local perspective.

Until the 1960s the Southeast Asian historical tradition had focused primarily on political centers and elites, and on European activities and colonial administrations in the region. Here Benda refers to two main problems in the historical study of the peasant masses. First is the lack of recorded historical information on rural lives; second is the marked tendency for historians to accord the main roles in the making of history not to ordinary people but instead to those, whether native or European, who wielded or struggled for power and exerted influence in the court centers and capital cities. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties in gathering data on rural communities, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed a surge of interest in the writing of the social, economic, and political history of the Southeast Asian masses and a shift away from “court history,” “colonial history,” and “nationalist history.”

Importantly, this change in emphasis was also accompanied by the increasing contribution of

social scientists, particularly political scientists and anthropologists, to the study of rural history and the adoption of theories and perspectives from the social sciences on rural social and cultural organization and on processes of social transformation. Colonial records were sifted, pieced together, and reinterpreted, and hitherto neglected sources were accessed to provide information on rural communities; wherever possible, researchers also collected oral histories and interviewed informants on peasant uprisings of the recent past (Kerkvliet 1977).

One of the first general surveys of agrarian revolt in Southeast Asia was provided by Erich Jacoby (1961 [1949]). However, the detailed study of specific uprisings got under way in earnest from the mid-1960s and was marked by particularly fine pieces of work by two historians: Kartodirdjo Sartono's examination of the Banten peasants' revolt in West Java in 1888 (1966), followed by his more general consideration of agrarian radicalism in Java (1973), and David Sturtevant's series of studies of Philippine protest movements from the mid-nineteenth century (1966, 1969), which were brought together in a general study of popular protest from 1840 to 1940 (1976). Given the more intensive presence of the colonial powers in certain parts of Southeast Asia, these subsequently became "seedbeds of peasant unrest" and generally received the most attention from researchers (Scott and Kerkvliet 1973: 241). Such regions include Central Luzon, Lower Burma, the Mekong and Tonkin Deltas in Vietnam, and large parts of Java.

One of the main preoccupations of students of rural protest, aside from attempting to understand the characteristics of peasant movements, was the underlying reasons for resistance and the complex processes that had resulted in expressions of discontent. Sartono, for example, stated firmly that "agrarian unrest cannot be satisfactorily explained by placing undue stress upon any one factor. . . . [It] can only be explained by a combination of separate causes" (1973: 3). Not unexpectedly, research focused heavily on the social, economic, political, and cultural changes that had been wrought during the colonial period. The most sophisticated analysis of these changes was undoubtedly that presented by James Scott, in his concept of peasant "moral economy" (1976), though his work owes much to the inspiration of Eric Wolf

(1969) and E. P. Thompson (1966). Scott's analysis of the Saya San (Hsaya San) rebellion in the Irrawaddy Delta region of British Burma and the Nghe-An and Ha-Tinh "Soviets" in the northern Annam region of French Indochina led to an enormous outpouring of research on rural unrest in Southeast Asia. Some of it illustrated the validity of Scott's thesis, as in Benedict Kerkvliet's detailed study of the Hukbalahap rebellion in Central Luzon (1977), while other commentators such as Samuel Popkin, in his own examination of Vietnamese anticolonial protest (1979), presented detailed criticisms of Scott's "moral economy" perspective.

A summary of Scott's concept will permit a consideration of the importance of his insights and the ways in which alternative perspectives place emphasis on those aspects of peasant protest that Scott has tended to neglect or underplay. Scott starts from the concrete material circumstances of rural livelihood, specifically the characteristics of peasant subsistence economy. He then links these with various social, cultural, and technical arrangements designed to enhance the chances of a peasant household or family meeting its basic material requirements of existence and lessening the risks of its not meeting them, or averting the risks altogether. He therefore identifies a crucial and overriding concern for certain sectors of the peasantry in Southeast Asia and elsewhere—namely, "the desire for subsistence security" or, alternatively, "the fear of dearth" (1976: vii, 6).

Scott's historical focus is captured appositely in his statement that "the transformation of land and labor (that is, nature and human work) into commodities for sale had the most profound impact. Control of land increasingly passed out of the hands of villagers: cultivators progressively lost free usufruct rights and became tenants or agrarian wage laborers; the value of what was produced was increasingly gauged by the fluctuations of an impersonal market" (ibid.: 7). What is more, the colonial state contributed directly to this process: "Not only did it provide the legal and coercive machinery necessary to ensure that contracts were honored and the market economy retained, but the state was itself a claimant on peasant resources. Much of its administrative effort had been bent to enumerating and recording its subjects and their land for tax purposes" (ibid.: 8). Scott analyzes these processes specifically in

relation to so-called depression or tax rebellions in 1930–1931 in regions of Southeast Asia where the economic deprivation resulting from colonial agrarian policies was especially acute.

The Saya San rebellion, for example, which erupted in December 1930 at the height of the Great Depression (1929–1931), spread rapidly through large parts of the Irrawaddy Delta and lasted until mid-1931. With the collapse in rice prices, mounting debts, and loss of land, peasant cultivators directed their anger at British head and land taxes (*ibid.*: 150–151). Nevertheless, the movement also drew on the ideology of folk Buddhism, and established a cult of invulnerability, with amulets, oaths, and other protective devices. Its prophet and leader, Saya San, claimed to be both the *Setkya-min*, the vengeful ruler of Burmese traditions, and the *Buddha Yaza*, the divinely ordained creator of a Buddhist utopia (*ibid.*: 149–150). The mobilization of large numbers of peasant cultivators was also enabled by the leading roles that village headmen and monks (*pongyis*) played in organizing the rural protests.

Widespread rebellion in Nghe-An and Ha-Tinh in central Vietnam during roughly the same period was rather different in character. As in Lower Burma, protest was closely associated with the deteriorating economic conditions, but the scale of the protest was due in no small measure to the organizational abilities and involvement of the Indochina Communist Party (*ibid.*: 142–149). Nevertheless, this region of northern Annam also had a long tradition of popular protest and, despite modern political party involvement, many peasants continued to follow local cultural traditions and practices. Kerkvliet too, in his detailed study of the Hukbalahap unrest and its antecedents, which emerged in Luzon in the 1930s and raged off and on until the 1950s, employs a “moral economy” framework. He argues that “a major cause for the unrest was the dramatic deterioration of traditional ties between local elites and peasants” and the loss of the protection, sponsorship, and financial assistance that those ties afforded following the development of absentee landlordism and capitalist agriculture (1977: 250).

Although Scott and Kerkvliet do identify some of the mainsprings of peasant discontent, two important considerations in evaluating their work are, first, the extent to which their

findings are generalizable, especially with regard to their concentration on poor peasants and tenants, and second, the degree to which their emphasis on “traditional” values, behavior, and relationships based on the principles of reciprocity and the right to subsistence appropriately captures the nature of rural society in Southeast Asia. Popkin, in his critical commentary on the moral economists, accepts that peasants are preoccupied with security and “the constant threat of falling below the subsistence level”; indeed, some of his data support Scott’s argument (1979: 5, 145–154, 156–157, 165, 182). But contrary to Scott, he argues that the small-scale cultivator, rather than being cooperative, collectivist, and altruistic, is “a rational problem-solver, with a sense both of his own interests and of the need to bargain with others to achieve mutually acceptable outcomes” (*ibid.*: ix). Thus, “exchanges between peasants are shaped and limited by conflicts between individual and group benefits” (*ibid.*: 4). Popkin then sees individual farmers as rational, self-interested strategists, risk-takers, and gamblers motivated by personal gain and applying “investment logic” to short- and long-term as well as public and private investments. He maintains that traditional rural life in Southeast Asia was far from being rosy and harmonious; rather, welfare and insurance arrangements were imperfect and limited, patrons were not essentially paternalistic, and village-based practices and arrangements reinforced rather than leveled social inequalities. Furthermore, local farmers, particularly the better off among them, manipulated and even rejected some colonial decrees in order to maintain former patterns of inequality and exploitation. For Popkin, exposure to a money economy and markets was not necessarily disadvantageous to the peasantry. What Popkin does demonstrate, in his use of examples of peasant responses to change in colonial Vietnam, is that Scott’s framework does not apply to peasant society and peasant movements generally. It is much less relevant to those forms of rural protest that were forward-looking, well organized and led, firmly established, institutionalized, supralocal, and involving richer peasants and other members of the rural and urban elite. These forms, rather than constituting defensive and restorative actions in relation to “traditional” sociocultural values and practices, sought to remake, transform, or replace el-

ements of the local social and cultural order, to grasp the new opportunities on offer, and to engage with capitalism and the market (*ibid.*: 17–31). Popkin concentrates on four antifeudal movements that looked to construct a new Vietnam: the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai religions in Cochin China, the Catholic Church, and the Communist Party. All of them sought to attract rural dwellers to their cause and build a power base by breaking the dependence of the peasantry on landowners and village patrons, and by using their political skills and bureaucratic connections to provide ordinary villagers with alternative means of support and security (1979: 184ff.). Importantly, these movements comprised both rural and urban elements, and leaders emerged from the educated ranks of provincial and urban elites.

Aside from Scott's focus on economic imperatives and material security, and Popkin's interest in peasants as rational risk-takers and in the leadership, political competence, and organizational abilities of peasant movements, historians such as Sturtevant and Sartono draw attention to the specifically cultural and religious dimensions of rural protest. They serve to remind us of the multidimensional character of peasant uprisings and the difficulties of establishing cause and effect in complex historical processes. In his detailed study of Javanese agrarian radicalism, Sartono, while recognizing that some uprisings, which he calls "anti-extortion movements," were clearly prompted by strong economic grievances, suggests that other responses had a much more "messianic" or "sectarian" character and seemed to be primarily religious reactions to colonial intervention (1973: 15–16). In the case of millenarian movements, the emergence of a messiah or prophet with a message of salvation seems to have been generated principally by profound cultural antagonisms rather than economic discontent. In addition, sectarian movements or revivalist and nativistic cults, which tended to be much more oriented to otherworldly concerns than millenarianism, were directed mainly by religious goals; they aimed to revive and regenerate traditional cultural (including religious) values and practices. In other words, when long-established cultural traditions, essential to the identity and integrity of rural communities, were considered threatened by the actions of an external political power, that was sometimes suffi-

cient cause to spark a response. The response could sometimes be violent and millennial in character, or sometimes passive and involving a withdrawal from and rejection of established society.

The sense of cultural deprivation as an important motivation in rural uprisings is explored directly in Sturtevant's studies of Philippine popular protest. He draws attention to the strength and persistence of the Philippine "hamlet dweller's turbulent tradition" and suggests that "nativistic" resistance was not primarily the result of increasing socioeconomic inequalities, tenancy, taxation, and loss of land. Indeed, between 1840 and 1930 there were very few if any movements "organized around purely economic symbols" (1976: 17). Instead, he argues, protest centered on "cultural alienation" and "profound conflicts between deep-seated peasant values and modern urban attitudes" (1969: 29–30); discontent focused on efforts to "revitalize" peasant traditions, and supernatural, mystical, and spiritual themes were frequently emphasized.

Examples of Philippine religious uprisings inspired the Guardia de Honor, a Catholic-based organization that emerged in northwestern Luzon in the 1870s and subsequently incorporated animistic elements and took an increasingly millenarian direction. In 1886 one of its leaders, Julian Baltasar, announced the approach of the Day of Judgment, when floods would sweep away corruption and evil and usher in salvation for the virtuous (Sturtevant 1976: 99). Similar mystical cults referred to under the general term "Colorumism" were widespread in the Philippines and developed rapidly from the later nineteenth century; they also combined Christian and animistic elements, practiced asceticism, and predicted an imminent apocalypse. Following an increase in tensions, a violent encounter between Colorum communities and the Philippine constabulary broke out in Mindanao in January 1924 (*ibid.*: 141–157).

In Java too, protest was closely intertwined with magico-religious beliefs and practices, and the institution of the Javanese "Just King" (Ratu Adil), the messiah who, following some kind of cataclysm, was thought to usher in a period of peace, justice, and abundance and deliver ordinary people from oppression. The leader of the movement would identify himself, or he was

identified by his disciples as the messiah; his position was legitimized by a process of inner conversion or divine revelation (Sartono 1973: 9,15). Javanese pre-Islamic beliefs were also sometimes intertwined with Islamic ones. Consequently, mystical movements also took on the ideology of a holy war (jihad) and were led by local Muslim religious teachers. Some of these leaders declared themselves to be the Mahdi, or Islamic messiah, who would appear at the end of the world and bring in a period of peace and righteousness.

Subsequently, however, with the increasing strength of indigenous nationalism and the development of modern political movements, rural protest began to be integrated into supralocal secular organizations in the early decades of the twentieth century. In Java, Sartono refers to these as local Sarekat Islam (SI) movements because, though some were still predominantly traditional in orientation, they came under the umbrella of a broad-based Islamic political movement that was pushing for realistic socioeconomic reform and Indonesian economic autonomy (ibid.: 141–151). In the Philippines too, the 1920s and 1930s witnessed a shift to much more secular, nationalist responses, such as Sakdalism, led by educated members of the urban-based native elite, though often mobilizing rural support by appealing to more “traditional” cultural and religious themes (Sturtevant 1976: 195–242). Nevertheless, religiomagical responses to the disruptive consequences of economic, cultural, and political change have never been far from the surface of Southeast Asian rural life. Even in the postwar period of political independence, there have continued to be reports from various parts of the region of the emergence of self-styled prophets and cult leaders who carry messages of hope and salvation for the poor and oppressed.

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See also Anti-Spanish Revolts (the Philippines); *Cakkavatti/Setkya-min* (Universal Ruler); Cao Dai; Cruz, Apolinario de la (1814 / 1815–1841); Diponegoro (Pangeran Dipanegara) (ca. 1785–1855); Great Depression (1929–1931); Hoa Hao; Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon) (People’s Anti-Japanese Army) (1942); Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Java War (1825–1830); Mat

Salleh Rebellion (1894–1905); Moral Economy; Nghe Tinh Soviets (1930–1931); Patron-Client Relations; *Ratu Adil* (Righteous King/Prince); Sakdalist Movement; Sarekat Islam (1912); To’ Janggut (1853–1915)

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PEGU**Traditional Stronghold of the Mon**

Pegu, also known as Hanthawaddy, Hamsavadi, or Ussa, was the traditional seat of Mon power in Lower Burma, until its final destruction by King Alaungpaya (Alaung-hpaya) (r. 1752–1760), founder of the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885), in May 1757. It was the capital of a Mon polity from 1369 to 1539, capital of a united Burma under the First Toungoo dynasty (1486–1599) until its destruction in 1599, and again capital of a resurgent Mon polity from 1740 to 1757. Its fate in Burmese history has been integral to the story of the Mon in Lower Burma.

Pegu emerged as the center of a polity in Lower Burma following the eclipse of the polity at Pagan after the Mongol incursions (1283–1287). A Shan, Wareru (r. 1287–1296), brother-in-law to King Ramkhamhaeng (r. 1279–1298) of Sukhothai, held power in Lower Burma, which during the mid-fourteenth century may have been aligned to Siam, if not a vassal state of Siam. The rise to dominance by the Pegu polity is associated in the early fifteenth century with the rule of Razadarit (r. 1385–1423), who brought the city-states of Lower Burma—Pegu, Bassein, and Martaban—into close alliance. During his reign he engaged in military excursions against the Burmese kings of Ava, particularly Mingyiswasawke (r. 1368–1401) and his son, Minkhaung (r. 1401–1422). Exhaustion on the part of both antagonists brought hostilities to a halt in 1417. Pegu's rise to prominence was aided by its proximity to the international trading routes and engagement in maritime commerce.

While Upper Burma at this time was beset with internal troubles, Lower Burma based at Pegu enjoyed a golden age of commercial prosperity and cultural development, attracting European merchants to its markets. One of these, Nicolo di Conti, a Venetian who visited Pegu in 1435, described Pegu as a great urban center 19 kilometers in circumference. In 1496 a Russian merchant, Nikitin, and a Genoese merchant, Hieronymo Santo Stefano, visited Pegu, the latter describing the king at the time, Binnya Ran (r. 1492–1526), as “a great lord who possesses more than ten thousand elephants” (Khin Maung Nyunt 1998: 19). Since he could not visit Ava, with which the city-state of Pegu was at war, Stefano sold his cargo to the king of Pegu, who purchased it for 2,000 ducats. Another visitor, Lu-

dovico di Varthema, a jeweler of Bologna who visited in 1503–1504, was awestruck with the rubies and gems, gold and precious stones he saw at the court of Binnya Ran and with the king's generosity in offering the visitors a handful of rubies. Through Pegu went the forest products, ivory, herbs, lac, musk, pottery, and “Martaban jars” used for storing wine, to the wider markets of international trade.

King Dhammazedī (r. 1472–1492), a former monk and advisor to the previous queen Sawlu (r. 1453–1472), initiated a religious and cultural revival. Recent research by Michael Aung-Thwin credits King Dhammazedī (or Dammaceti) with creating the “Mon Paradigm”—namely, that Theravada Buddhist culture and script were transmitted to the Burmese at Pagan via Thaton in 1057, by displacing the sacred geography, genealogy, and chronology of Buddhist India to Lower Burma in his Kalyani inscriptions (Aung-Thwin 2001). It was this fame as a cultural and commercial center that attracted the Portuguese viceroy in Goa, when the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean trading sphere after 1498, to send an embassy to Pegu in 1511 headed by Ruy Nunez d'Acunha. After the Portuguese seizure of Melaka in 1511, they sought to extend their trading linkages with Lower Burma, sending Andrea Correa there in 1519 to negotiate a commercial treaty with Martaban, one of the vassal states of Pegu.

Pegu was, by the mid-sixteenth century, a wealthy polity based on the revenues of international trade. When Upper Burma, under the house of Toungoo, reorganized its resources, the stage was set for a new confrontation between Upper and Lower Burma. It is more accurate to view this contest as one for the resources and revenues of maritime commerce than as an ethnic conflict. As Victor Lieberman (1978) has shown, in the conflicts of the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, there was no clear-cut Mon-Burman division: Mons fought loyally for Burmese leaders, and Burmese sided with Mon rulers in Pegu. Nor was ferocity limited to one side: the battle was hard fought, and no quarter was given by either.

Pegu in 1539 was the site for one of the coronations of King Tabinshweihti (r. 1531–1581), second king of the First Toungoo dynasty, who, in uniting Upper and Lower Burma, elected to have dual coronations, one at

Pegu and one at Pagan. Under his successor, Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581), of *cakravartin* status (exhibition of righteous moral behavior), the Burmese empire extended across all mainland Southeast Asia from Manipur to Laos. Pegu was made the most brilliant capital, attracting merchants from many lands. It was the dominant port in the region. Caesar Federici, a European traveler who visited in 1569, described Pegu's wealth and beauty. His arrival was during the beginning of the reign of Bayinnaung, and he chanced to witness the king's triumphant return from his victory over Siam. In 1576, Bayinnaung was reputed to have built seven ships carrying some 2,500 men and sent them on an expedition to Sri Lanka (Ceylon). Much of Pegu's wealth went to adorn the famous temple, the Shwe Maw Daw, the new palace of Bayinnaung, and the new city he ordered built as testimony to his prowess. Craftsmen and artisans from the conquered states of Chiang Mai (1558) and Ayutthaya (1564–1569) were deported to Pegu to lend their skills and art in royal construction projects. The grandeur of these structures was described by Federici, and echoed by Casparo Balbi, who visited in 1583–1584 during the following reign.

But civil war during the reign of Bayinnaung's son, Nanda Bayin (r. 1581–1599), and the attacks by the Arakanese and their Portuguese and Burmese allies, laid waste the city and the delta in 1599. The great palace, Kamboza Thadi, was burned. By the time King Anaukpetlun (r. 1605–1628) of the "Nyaungyan dynasty" could rout the invaders and kill the Portuguese Felipe de Brito, self-styled king of Syriam, in 1613, the delta was impoverished. It prompted the English captain Peter Floris, who saw the comparable conditions of Lower Burma and Lower Siam during his round-the-world voyage in 1611–1615, to comment that Siam had "comme uppe again," after being eclipsed by Pegu in the past.

King Thalun (r. 1629–1648) was crowned at Pegu but moved the capital back to Ava in Upper Burma in 1635, a prelude to his far-reaching administrative reforms, which sought to rejuvenate the finances of the kingdom. For the remaining period of the Restored Toungoo dynasty, Ava remained the center of power.

Lying on a fault line, prone to earthquake (such as the one that struck the Shwe Maw Daw in 1931), Pegu, in Dr. Khin Maung

Nyunt's view, had "become geopolitically obsolete" (Khin Maung Nyunt 1998: 31). Furthermore, its access to the ocean had become impeded by silting of its waterways, and trade consequently moved to neighboring ports, such as Patein, Dalla, Syriam, Tavoy, Mergui, and Tenasserim.

Pegu again challenged Ava for supremacy in the eighteenth century as the dynasty weakened. In 1740 the Mon at Pegu rose in revolt against the resource and taxation demands of the monarchs. In 1752 the Mon sacked Ava, deporting its king and most of the royal princes, of whom only two managed to escape. A conspiracy to restore the captive Toungoo king, Mahadammayazadipati, "the king who came to Hanthawaddy," instead ended with his execution and that of his supporters in 1754. It ultimately led to central Burma's deserting Pegu to throw its support behind the new Burmese *minlaung*, charismatic leader Alaungpaya. In a series of campaigns to unite the Burmans, Alaungpaya in 1756 cut off the source of foreign arms and reinforcements to Pegu, and seized Syriam and the delta. In 1757 he invaded and razed Pegu, putting to death the last king of Pegu, Binnya Dala, hence ending Pegu's history as a center of power.

Pegu today is a small rural town where the remains of Bayinnaung's royal palace testify to its glorious past. The province of Pegu, or Bago, is some 37,500 square kilometers in extent, with a population of about 5 million people (Hla Min 2001: 99). It is the center of an agricultural-industrial area that produces cotton, sugarcane, tapioca, crude oil, natural gas, rubber, teak, porcelain, and some light industrial products. Its religious center and symbol of former glories remains the Shwe Maw Daw pagoda.

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See also Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760); Arakan; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581); *Cakkavatti/Setkya-min* (Universal Ruler); Chiang Mai; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); First Ava (Inwa) Dynasty (1364–1527 C.E.); Mon; Mons; Tabinshwehti (r. 1531–1550); Toungoo Dynasty (1531–1752)

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PENAL SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Between 1787 and 1860, the British transported tens of thousands of South Asian convicts overseas to penal settlements in Southeast Asia: Bencoolen (1787–1825), Penang (1790–1860), Melaka and Singapore (1825–1860), and various sites in Burma, including Arakan and the Tenasserim provinces (1828–1862). For a brief time (1847–1856) a much smaller number of convicts were transported from Hong Kong to Singapore.

Over 95 percent of the convicts shipped to Southeast Asia were men. Most had been convicted of serious crimes, such as murder, robbery, or *dacoity* (gang robbery), and were serving life terms. Nearly all the convict women were transported for the crimes of murder or infanticide. Others were transported for anti-British resistance. These included several hundred *adivasi* (tribal) santhals from Bengal, transported for their part in the 1855 *Húl* (rebellion). The British also transported more than a thousand Indian *thugs* (supposed ritual murderers) during their anti-thuggee campaigns in the mid-nineteenth century. Convicts came from all socioeconomic backgrounds, though the majority were poor Hindus. The largest proportion of convicts was from the Bengal presidency, but convicts came from all over India and Ceylon (Sri Lanka). The British be-

lieved that Indians particularly feared transportation, owing to its impact on caste purity. It was widely believed that the crossing of the *kala pani* (black waters, or the sea) in a *jatha juna* (living tomb, or convict ship) was a worse punishment than death.

During the early years of transportation, convicts satisfied labor demands in new British territories and built much of their infrastructure. Indeed, convicts were transported overseas only when there was a demand for them. It was the Southeast Asian authorities, rather than India, that controlled convict supply. Most convicts were put to work at hard labor, in land clearance, road building, and other public works. Others were employed in skilled labor as brick makers, blacksmiths, weavers, gardeners, and printers. From the mid-1820s, the treatment of convicts changed. Convicts were not simply to be punished through hard labor, but trained and reformed. Some remarkable convict-built structures still stand, such as St. Andrew's Cathedral, Singapore (completed in 1862). When F. J. Mouat, inspector general of prisons, Bengal, visited the Straits Settlements in 1861, he declared that the penal settlement there was the most remarkable example of the successful industrial training of convicts in the world.

The changing nature of convict labor was reflected in organizational changes. Until the 1820s, discipline was relatively slack. The first set of convict regulations was not produced until 1824, when Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) devised the Bencoolen Regulations. These had strong parallels with the carrot-and-stick management system already in place in the Australian convict colonies, and they formed the basis of later convict regulations (such as the Penang Rules [1827] and Butterworth Rules [1860]). Convicts were divided into classes, according to length of sentence, time in the settlement, and conduct. The system rewarded convicts for good behavior and punished them for misdemeanors. The prospect of a ticket-of-leave (probation) was held out to all convicts. Meanwhile, convicts who behaved well might receive a gratuity or rise to the position of petty officer. Recalcitrant convicts could be downgraded or punished with flogging or labor in irons.

As only scattered records survive, it is difficult to estimate the total number of convicts sent to the penal settlements in Southeast Asia. Sandhu (1966) and Rajendra (1983) put the

figure at around 15,000. Yet, given that almost 900 convicts were transported to the Indian Ocean colony of Mauritius (together with Aden, another destination for Indian convicts) from Bengal alone from 1815 to 1817, this seems an underestimation. Before 1859, time-expired convicts were not provided with a return passage to India. As a result, most settled in Southeast Asia and married local women. In the Straits, they formed the majority of the *Jawi-Pekan* (Indo-Malay) community. Their influence was particularly strong in Penang, which was a mainly Jawi-Pekan settlement until the second half of the nineteenth century.

After the 1857 Indian Uprising (Indian Mutiny) in India, European residents in the Straits Settlements began to regard convicts as a threat to security. By 1860 transportation to the Straits had mostly ended, though by 1864 there were still more than 3,000 convicts there. In 1873 the penal settlement was abandoned, though approximately 1,800 convicts still remained. The authorities granted pardons to some surviving convicts. Ticket-of-leave holders were permitted to merge into the population; the infirm were maintained at government expense. The few Hong Kong convicts still in the Settlements were returned to Hong Kong to serve out their sentence. At the same time, convict transportation to Burma also came to an end. The remaining Indian convicts were transferred to the Andaman Islands, which had been established as a penal colony in the wake of the 1857 Indian Uprising. An earlier attempt at turning the islands into a penal colony (1793–1796) had failed.

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See also British India, Government of; Indian Immigrants (Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries); Miscegenation; Penang (1786); *Peranakan*; Singapore (1819); Straits Settlements, (1826–1946)

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PENANG (1786)

First British Outpost in the Straits of Melaka

Established in 1786, Penang was the first British outpost that subsequently facilitated the creation of "British Malaya"—namely, British colonial rule over the Malay Peninsula (present-day West Malaysia) and Singapore. A combination of motives (economic, political, and military), coupled with the pivotal role played by an English country trader, led to the settlement of Penang.

The need to protect the English East India Company's (EIC) lucrative China trade in luxury goods (tea, silk, porcelain) and to safeguard British military and strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal and the Straits of Melaka subsequently made the EIC undertake steps to secure Penang. Francis Light (1740–1794), an English country trader, had actively traded at Junk Ceylon (Ujung Salang, present-day Phuket) in southern Siam (Thailand), and along the Kedah coast. The Malay rulers of Kedah—Muhammad Jawa (1710–1773) and Abdullah Muharum Shah (1773–1798)—were willing to cede territories in return for British protection against their enemies—namely, their overlord, Siam, and Burma (Myanmar). By 1785 the EIC had intensified its search for a suitable commercial-cum-naval base. The geopolitical situation then in Southeast Asia witnessed the increasing as-

pendency of Dutch hegemony over the Malay Archipelago; French ambitions in Burma, Annam, and Cochin China; and Austrian interest in Aceh, alarming the EIC. Meanwhile Sultan Abdullah was equally anxious to seek military assistance against his Siamese overlord. Siam was on the verge of being invaded by Burma.

Against this background Light then requested Penang from Sultan Abdullah in return for EIC protection against his enemies and compensation in lieu of the loss of trade. He acted as the sultan's *wakil* (representative) to represent his wishes to the EIC at Calcutta. But Light did not faithfully represent the sultan's views; instead, he was economical of the truth, and certain points were misrepresented. Calcutta was agreeable to the sultan's conditions as intimated by Light, but awaited the decision on military protection and the amount of financial compensation pending a decision from the EIC directors in London.

Meanwhile the EIC appointed Light as superintendent of Penang. Not heeding warnings from Sultan Abdullah that he should not land in Penang pending the decision from London, Light took possession of the island in August 1786. Subsequently two treaties were signed between Kedah and the EIC (1791 and 1800) that formally brought Penang and the mainland territory, Province Wellesley, under British control.

Following the Battle of Trafalgar (1805), the French threat abated. But what was essential of Penang as a naval base was to ensure the protection of British merchant ships in the China trade from piracy. Plans were under way for a naval dockyard, a fort, and a fleet from 1805. In that same year Penang was elevated as the fourth presidency of India, with a governor heading an expanded administration. But shortly thereafter the viability of Penang as a naval base was in doubt. Obstacles like the chronic shortage of hardwood timber and the unhealthy malarial swampland proved insurmountable. All plans for a naval base were dashed when the Admiralty and the EIC directors withdrew their support in the years following 1810.

The British in Penang sought to check the extension of Siamese influence in the Malay Peninsula. The missions undertaken in 1826 resulting in the Burney Treaty and Low Treaty succeeded in limiting Siamese hegemony over the Malay States, particularly that of tin-rich Perak.

In 1826 the three British settlements of Penang, Singapore (1819), and Melaka (1824) were united administratively as the “Straits Settlements.” Penang became its administrative capital. Despite the large volume of trade, owing to “free port” status and the British free trade policy, the Straits Settlements were unable to meet their own administrative costs and had to rely on the Indian government. In 1830 the Indian government decided to lessen the financial burden by relegating Penang, and in turn the Straits Settlements, to a residency under the presidency of Bengal. In 1832, Singapore replaced Penang as the capital.

Situated in the northern part of the Straits of Melaka, Penang could not match Singapore’s strategic focal position in the Malay Archipelago and the command of the east-west shipping route between China and Europe via India. Penang’s city-port of George Town was the port-of-call of the lucrative British China trade, the center of the regional pepper trade, a principal exporter of tin, a base for tin smelting, and a port for rubber exports. Efforts to transform Penang into a “second Moluccas” failed as disease and the market worked against a successful spice plantation sector. However, the sugar plantations in Province Wellesley proved viable and profitable.

In 1867, Penang, Melaka, and Singapore became Crown colonies under the direct control of the Colonial Office in London. Penang remained a Crown colony until incorporation into the Malayan Union in 1946, then became part of the Federation of Malaya in 1948 and Malaysia in 1963. During the late 1940s the Penang Secessionist Movement unsuccessfully lobbied against participation in the Federation of Malaya, arguing that Penang would lose out economically and politically in a Malay-dominated federation.

From its beginnings Penang attracted an immigrant population from the neighboring territories and from afar. Penang became home to Malays, Chinese, Indians, Eurasians, Europeans, Achenese, Javanese, Boyanese, Bugis, Arabs, Siamese, Burmans, Japanese, Armenians, and Jews. The predominant settlers, however, were the Chinese, including the eclectic Baba Nyonya community. Each ethnic group brought with them their unique customs and traditions, characteristic lifestyles (attire, food), colorful celebrations, and religious observances and rituals.

Penang offers a living example of blissful coexistence in a multiethnic and multicultural society.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Baba Nyonya; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Light, Captain Francis (1740–1794); Napoleonic Wars in Asia; Penang Secessionist Movement (1948–1951); Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Singapore (1819); Straits Settlements (1826–1946); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang).

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PENANG FREE SCHOOL (1816)

Earliest English-Medium School in East and Southeast Asia

The Penang Free School was the premier educational institution in British Malaya and continues to be one of the most outstanding government schools in present-day Malaysia. Established in 1816, it was the first English school in Southeast and East Asia. The idea of an English-language school in Penang was mooted and earnestly pursued by the Reverend R. S. Hutchings, the colonial chaplain of Penang. “Free” meant that the school was a secular institution welcoming all children, irrespective of race, religion, creed, or socioeconomic status. Merit-based scholarships were given to deserving students.

The English East India Company (EIC) government granted a piece of land in George Town for a schoolhouse. The school building on Farquhar Street was completed in 1906. Meanwhile the school operated from one of

1050 Penang Secessionist Movement

the Chinese shophouses along Love Lane before moving into the handsome two-story building along Farquhar Street in 1907. In 1927 the school moved to its current premises in the southern suburbs of Georgetown.

Penang Free School began its career on 21 October 1816 with several male pupils. By 1824 there were 104 boys of various ages on the rolls. Plans for a school for girls, vernacular education (Chinese, Malay, and Tamil), and vocational education were aborted within a few years of establishment because of poor response. The demand from the very start was for an English-language school for boys.

Modeled after English public schools in England, Penang Free School emphasized academic excellence, the building of character and discipline, and fair play on and off the playing field. A string of English headmasters and teachers steered the predominantly Chinese student enrollment. Outstanding performance was recorded in public examinations (Junior Cambridge, Senior Cambridge), and its pupils almost monopolized the highly coveted Queen's Scholarship for tertiary education in Britain during the pre-1941 period. Football (soccer), rugby, cricket, hockey, badminton, swimming, and athletics were popular among the boys.

Prominent personalities numbered among the old boys of the school include Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (1903–1990), the architect of Malaya's independence (1957), proponent of "Malaysia" (1963), and its first prime minister (1957–1970). The Old Frees' Association (OFA) has chapters in Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, and London.

Penang Free School continued its tradition of excellence during the postwar (1945) period. As in all English-language schools in independent Malaya/Malaysia, the Malay language replaced English as the medium of instruction. Scholastic achievement and glories in sporting activities remained the forte of Penang Free School.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Education, Western Secular; Malay College, Kuala Kangsar (MCKK); Malayan/Malaysian Education

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PENANG SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT (1948–1951)

Failed Attempt at Separation

The primary objective of the Penang Secessionist Movement was that Penang refrain from joining the Federation of Malaya (1948). Instead, Penang should continue as a British Crown colony of the Straits Settlements with ties within the British Empire.

Led by the Penang Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) and the Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the Penang Secessionist Movement was supported by the majority of the professional and business elite of Europeans, Eurasians, Indians, and Indian Muslims. Straits Chinese leaders, particularly Heah Joo Seang, played pivotal roles.

Economic grievances and political anxieties were the chief concerns of the secessionists. They feared that Penang's commercial and trading interests would be adversely compromised in favor of the peninsular Malay States. Other anxieties arose over the possibility that Penang's free-port status, which was vital to its entrepôt economy, would be abolished. There were fears that Penang would be politically submerged by a Malay-dominated federation, fears that were already evident in the unequal citizenship proposals and the privileged access of Malays to education, scholarships, and the civil service.

Although European members of the movement emphasized the status quo, Straits Chinese leaders considered secession only as the last resort, favoring the inclusion of Singapore in the federation to counter the ethnic ratio and prevent a Malay domination. Only if unsuccessful, the Straits Chinese then proposed secession and joining Singapore in a resurrected Straits Settlements.

In December 1948 the Penang Secession Committee was set up. Its motion for secession was defeated at the Penang Settlement Council in February 1949. A petition to the Colonial Office forwarded in November 1949 and the face-to-face meeting with the secretary of state for the colonies in Penang in May 1950 did not produce favorable outcomes.

The British government, in its formal response of 19 September 1951 to the petition, rejected the demands, stating that Penang should resolve its grievances through negotiations within the federation itself. The British were reluctant to jeopardize the restored Anglo-Malay relations following the Malayan Union (1946) debacle. Moreover, the Emergency (1948–1960), a Chinese-led leftist insurgency, strongly dissuaded the British authorities from alienating vital Malay support in the event of a concession to the appeals of the Penang secessionists.

Thereafter the Penang Secessionist Movement withered away. A new era of interethnic consultations was beginning to develop with the formation of the Communities Liaison Committee (1949). The inauguration of the Malayan Chinese Association (1949), a pan-Malayan Chinese organization, by Tan Cheng Lock (1883–1960) of Melaka preempted the parochial demands of the Penang secessionists. A new Sino-Malay consensus was in the making that encompassed the fate of the entire Federation of Malaya.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Baba Nyonya; Federation of Malaya (1948); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Malayan Union (1946); Penang (1786); Straits Settlements (1826–1946); Tan Cheng Lock (1883–1960)

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PEOPLE'S ACTION PARTY (PAP)

Singapore's Durable Ruling Party

The People's Action Party, which has won every election since forming the government in 1959, is the dominant political force in Singapore and has enjoyed a continuity of gover-

nance that is rare among democratically elected governments. Under its rule, Singapore has been transformed from a turbulent colonial outpost into a modern and economically vibrant city-state.

The PAP was founded on 21 November 1954 by a group of professionals and trade unionists. From its beginning, the party was divided between two factions, with the noncommunist moderate faction, led by Lee Kuan Yew (1923–), and a procommunist radical faction, led by Lim Chin Siong (1933–). They were united only by their common objective of desiring an end to British colonial rule. Both factions initially needed each other. The moderates, many of them English-educated, needed the mobilizing skills of the radical group to attract mass support for the PAP, especially among the largely Chinese-educated population. The procommunists, on their part, needed a left-wing political party to provide cover for their subversive activities after the outlawing of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1948; they found the PAP willing to accommodate. In 1955 the PAP entered the electoral fray and won three of the four seats it contested. Lee Kuan Yew, its secretary-general, became de facto opposition leader.

As prospects for self-government brightened in 1957 after constitutional talks in London, the power struggle within the party also became more intense, and in August the radicals through manipulation captured six of the twelve places in the PAP's Central Executive Committee (CEC), the party's highest decision-making body. The remaining six noncommunists refused to assume office, so as to avoid being associated with the decisions of the CEC. A timely security operation to foil a parallel communist attempt to capture the Singapore Trade Union Congress by the Labour Front government later in the month resulted in arrests. Five of the six newly elected procommunist members of the CEC were taken into police custody, thus paving the way for the moderate leadership to reassert their control. To prevent a similar recurrence, the moderate PAP leaders revised their party constitution in October to create two classes of membership: ordinary membership, which was open to all, and cadre membership, which was given only to proven members of the PAP. Henceforth, only cadre members were eligible to select the CEC.

The procommunist group was not prepared to break with the moderates and supported the PAP in the May 1959 elections, which saw the party sweeping the polls decisively to form the government. But new internal fissures soon surfaced. The first occurred in 1960 as a result of a challenge by the party's treasurer and minister of national development, Ong Eng Guan. Expelled from the party, Ong, who subsequently formed the United People's Party with two other defectors, convincingly defeated the PAP candidate for the seat he had vacated in a by-election in April 1961. The more serious challenge came from the procommunists over their opposition to the proposal by the Malayan premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (1903–1990), to form an expanded Malaysian Federation inclusive of Malaya, Singapore, and the British Borneo territories, a scheme welcomed by the moderates as the means for Singapore to achieve independence. Their sharp differences precipitated an open split within the PAP ranks, with thirteen assemblymen from the procommunist faction defecting in July 1961 to form the Barisan Sosialis, and leaving the moderate faction with a weakened presence in parliament. The PAP reestablished an electoral majority only after the 1963 elections, held on 21 September, five days after Singapore joined the new Federation of Malaysia, when it won thirty-seven of the fifty-one seats.

Conflict soon surfaced between the PAP and the ruling Alliance Party over differences concerning Singapore's role and position in the new federation. Twenty-three months of heightened political competition saw the Alliance campaigning in Singapore against the PAP and the latter contesting the 1964 federal elections in Peninsular Malaysia. Meanwhile, Sino-Malay riots erupted in Singapore, and the PAP-led Malaysia Solidarity Convention was formed. Finally, both sides reluctantly agreed to Singapore's separation in August 1965 to avoid a potentially racially charged and explosive situation.

Following separation the political position of the PAP consolidated considerably, and in the next four elections the party won every seat in parliament until it lost a by-election in 1981. In subsequent elections the PAP's dominant position remained unrivaled, largely because it has amassed immense credibility through its achievements and ability to deliver the goods, and because of the weakness of the opposition.

The PAP lost only two to four seats in the elections it contested from 1984 to 1997. Realizing the need to remain relevant and responsive, it has instituted a process of party and leadership renewal to appeal to the aspirations of a younger, better-educated, and informed population; in 1986 it started a youth wing (renamed Young PAP in 1993), followed by a women's wing in 1989.

ALBERT LAU

See also Alliance Party (Malaya/Malaysia); Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front); Labor and Labor Unions; Lee Kuan Yew (1923–); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malaysia (1963); National Trades Union Congress (NTUC); Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Singapore–Malaya/Malaysia Relations (ca. 1950s–1990s)

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PEOPLE'S INDEPENDENCE FRONT (BARISAN KEMERDEKAAN RAKYAT, BAKER) (1966)

A Rejuvenated PRB

The People's Independence Front, or Barisan Kemerdekaan Rakyat (BAKER), was the main political party in Brunei during the second half of the 1960s. Its principal goal was the eradication of the vestiges of British colonial authority in the sultanate.

BAKER was founded on 31 July 1966, following the union of two existing parties (the

Brunei People's Front and the People's Progressive Party), which had themselves been founded only earlier that year. BAKER aimed to achieve independence by constitutional means. It pledged loyalty to the sultan as Brunei's legitimate ruler and sought to uphold Islam as the official religion and Malay as the national language. The chairman was Pengiran Dato Haji Mohd Ali (1916–), an elected member of the Brunei District Council; the president was a former Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB) activist, Awang Hapidz Laksamana. It was suggested, indeed, that BAKER was the old PRB incarnate, but in fact none of its objectives would be much out of place under the post-*merdeka* Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB) system, apart from the party's call for democratization. In January 1968, BAKER was jolted when Pengiran Dato Haji Mohd Ali lost a legislative council by-election in Temburong district. At nationwide elections later that year the party won only twenty-four seats out of the fifty-five on offer. The 1967 abdication of Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III (1914–1986) in favor of his son, Hassanal Bolkiah (1946–), had the effect of boosting popular allegiance toward the royal family; as a result BAKER achieved limited success in its attempts to rally majority support. In 1969 the party fell into further disarray after several leaders resigned. The Legislative Council was converted by royal decree into a fully nominated body in 1970. No further elections were held.

The focus of political activity shifted overseas to the PRB, which had been reactivated in 1974. There was a call for BAKER to be revived as a counterweight, but in reality BAKER was already defunct. In terms of personnel, however, there was some continuation in the Brunei National Democratic Party (BNDP), founded in 1985.

A. V. M. HORTON

See also Brunei National Democratic Party (BNDP) (1985–1988); Brunei Rebellion (December 1962); Hassanal Bolkiah, Sultan of Brunei (1946–); Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB, Malay Islamic Monarchy); Omar Ali Saifuddin III, Sultan of Brunei (1914–1986); Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB)

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PEOPLE'S PARTY (THAILAND)

See Constitutional (Bloodless) Revolution (1932) (Thailand); Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983)

PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA (PRK)

A Vietnamese-Sponsored Regime

The Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea was the Vietnamese-sponsored regime that governed Cambodia from 1979 to 1989. The PRK was established in January 1979, shortly after some 100,000 seasoned Vietnamese troops, in a blitzkrieg attack, had driven the preceding Cambodian government of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), led by Pol Pot (1925–1998), from power (Gottesman 2002: 11). The new regime in Phnom Penh was established with Vietnamese guidance, and was composed chiefly of figures known for their loyalty to Vietnam. Many of them, including Cambodia's prime minister in the 1990s and 2000s, Hun Sen (1951–) had defected from DK in 1977 and 1978 when purges swept through the eastern part of the country. Others had lived in Vietnam since the 1950s.

During the 1980s, more than 100,000 Vietnamese troops were stationed in Cambodia, along with several hundred political advisors. The troops, alongside a slowly developing Cambodian army, prevented DK forces on the Thai-Cambodian border from regaining power. Despite the slackening of Vietnamese political control over the years, the PRK's foreign relations and continuing one-party rule were inspired by Vietnamese models.

To strengthen its legitimacy and to distance itself from the previous regime, the PRK moved swiftly to reestablish markets and schools that had been closed under DK, and allowed people to return to the cities, towns, and villages from which they had been forcibly evicted by DK. In the process, more than 600,000 Khmer, including remnants of Cam-

bodia's educated class, sought refuge in Thailand and later found asylum in third countries (Ablin and Hood 1987: 223). Inside Cambodia, some Buddhist monasteries were allowed to reopen, but no one under the age of fifty was allowed to become a monk. When money was reintroduced in 1980, social differences, smothered under DK, slowly reemerged, especially between urban and rural dwellers. Throughout the 1980s, however, Cambodia was one of the poorest countries in Southeast Asia, and per capita income, on a national basis, never regained the pre-1970s level. Cambodia in the post-PRK period, despite rapid advances in the urban sector, may well have been even poorer.

In 1979 the PRK staged a show trial in which Pol Pot and his foreign minister, Ieng Sary (1927–), were accused of genocide and condemned to death in absentia. Soon afterward, a Museum of Genocidal Crimes was established on the site of what had been a secret interrogation center under DK, in which some 15,000 political prisoners had been questioned under torture (Chandler 1999: 8). All but a handful of them had been put to death. Annual “days of hate” mobilized ordinary people to ventilate their grievances and relate their sufferings under DK. These campaigns encouraged by the Vietnamese slowed down after the Vietnamese withdrew their forces in 1989.

To gain popularity with ordinary people and to keep them from leaving the country, PRK proceeded slowly with its socialist agenda. Attempts to sustain collectivized farming quickly lost momentum, and discredited terms such as “socialism” and “revolution” were rarely used. On the other hand, following communist models, an independent judiciary was never developed, party members were the most favored members of society, and suspected opponents were dealt with severely.

Nothing that the PRK and its Vietnamese advisors did reduced international pressure on the regime, seen in the West and by China and its allies as a Vietnamese concoction. Throughout the 1980s, DK representatives continued to hold Cambodia's seat at the United Nations, the only government in exile to do so; sorely needed foreign assistance for Cambodia, held hostage to the politics of donor nations, was reduced to a trickle, except for aid from the Soviet bloc. The long-term damage to Cambodia

and its people caused by this sustained indifference is impossible to assess.

In 1989, as the Cold War ended, Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia. Left to its own devices, the PRK sped up a program of economic liberalization while continuing to suppress opposition. As pressures for a Cambodian settlement intensified, the PRK changed its name to the State of Cambodia, altered its flag, and opened negotiations with Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1922–), the ostensible leader of the coalition that had been dedicated to overthrowing the PRK.

The PRK period coincided with the final decade of the Cold War; it also probably marked the last time that Cambodia would be occupied by a foreign power, and the last time in its history when its interests would be subordinated to those of Vietnam.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Hun Sen (1951–); Ieng Sary (1927–); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); *Killing Fields, The*; Kuantan Principle; Lon Nol (1913–1984); Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) (1925–1998); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992–1993)

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PEPPER

The Most Widely Used Spice

Black pepper, the most widely used spice in the world, derives from the dried berries of the *Piper nigrum* vine. After ripening to a reddish color, the harvested berries are dried in the sun to produce the long-lasting black peppercorns. White peppercorns are a variation on the same product, obtained by soaking the berries until they swell and cleaning off the outer skin, which bursts during the process. A third variety of pepper is the long pepper, obtained from the berries of the *Piper officinarum* vine. In early historical times it was as widely sought after as black pepper, but today its use is restricted essentially to the tropics. These two pepper vines were first cropped within their natural range of southern India. However, cultivation of black pepper had probably spread to Vietnam by the third century C.E., and Chinese sources apparently report long pepper grown in Java by the twelfth century. In Malaysia and adjoining regions, a native pepper vine, *Piper cubeba*, was also tended and its berries used as a condiment, but lately they have been regarded as only of medicinal value.

Black pepper was known in southern China as a trade good from India more than 2,000 years ago, and it may well have been one of the Indian products shipped through the South China Sea at that time. By the early fifteenth century, pepper plantations had been established in North Sumatra, then in South Sumatra, West Java, and the Malay Peninsula by the early sixteenth century. Early Islamic sultanates based in Aceh, Banten, and Patani soon established themselves as the outlets for their respective pepper-growing areas of North Sumatra, South Sumatra/West Java, and the Malay Peninsula. Aceh initiated the supply of Sumatran pepper to India's Malabar Coast, whose trade with the West was then dominated by Portugal, and to Islamic ports in the Red Sea. With North Sumatra's pepper then traded westward, Banten and Patani filled the gap to supply China, the traditional market for Southeast Asian pepper and still then the world's largest consumer of pepper.

Dutch and English merchants transformed the structure of the pepper trade at the end of the sixteenth century when they began dealing directly with the Aceh and Banten sultanates and, soon after, purchasing supplies from the

producers themselves. Gradual elimination of the middlemen allowed Holland and England to offer growers better prices, while creaming off higher profits, as these nations dominated the trade to Europe, which now outstripped the market in China. Even as the Dutch East India Company (VOC) brought Aceh and Banten to heel in the late seventeenth century, the English maintained their independent interests with their establishment of a pepper entrepôt at Bengkulu (Bencoolen) in southwest Sumatra. Meanwhile, China continued to be supplied by a medley of Chinese and other merchants, aided by the expansion of Chinese-established plantations across Brunei, the Riau archipelago, and the Malay Peninsula during the eighteenth century.

The unprecedented productivity of the Chinese plantations increasingly attracted English attention, and, after 1800, British occupation in Sarawak, Singapore, and Malaya focused on those places where Chinese growers had been active. England's consignment of Bengkulu to the Dutch, linked to its restitution of Holland's colonies in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), ushered in the familiar geopolitics of the colonial era: Dutch rule over Netherlands India (now Indonesia) and British control over the present territories of Malaysia and Singapore. Aceh reemerged as a thorn in the side of the Dutch, in particular supplying North American traders whose operations rivaled those of the British Empire. Nonetheless a pattern is observable of steady growth in Southeast Asia's production and exports from an increasing array of supply sources throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Sarawak, a late entrant in 1876 when Raja Brooke invited Chinese pepper-growers to settle around Kuching, eventually proved so successful that its export performance matched that from the whole of Indonesia on the one hand, and all of India on the other, from 1968 to 1982.

Southeast Asia has continually supplied about half (or more) of the pepper requirements of the world ever since the middle sixteenth century, a remarkable record of a major agribusiness over the long term. The Lampung district of South Sumatra has persisted as a production center virtually throughout the period, but other centers, especially North Sumatra and the lands

near Penang, have experienced boom-bust cycles in response to opportunities in international trade, exhaustion of local soils, and other factors. Recent studies by historians have particularly focused on attempts by the "pepper sultanates" to maintain the greatest possible autonomy in the face of increasing European company and colonial control over the international market.

DAVID BULBECK

See also Aceh (Acheh); Banten (Bantam) (1526–1813); Bengkulu (Bencoolen, Benkulen); Chinese in Southeast Asia; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Penang (1786); Spices and the Spice Trade; Sumatra

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"PERAK MAN"

A Palaeolithic Human Skeleton

"Perak Man" is a forty- to forty-five-year-old man who was buried in Gua Gunung Runtuh, Lenggong, Perak, around 10,000 to 11,000 years ago. He is the only known prehistoric skeleton in the world that suffered from a congenital deformity in the third digit of the left hand called *Brachymesophalangia Type A2*.

Two features distinguish the Perak Man from skeletons that are contemporaneous with it in

Southeast Asia. He has a chronometric date and is as nearly complete as possible. He was found in situ, and that provided reliable data that allowed for analyses and interpretations of the burial and its rituals.

We rarely get a glimpse of burial rituals from this period. In this case, he was ceremoniously buried in a fetal position, and around him were food offerings and stone tools—almost 3,000 *brotia costula/spinosa* riverine shells, stone tools, and meats. Both his hands were seen grasping meats, and based on the bones remaining, it could have been meat from at least five types of animals—pig, deer, monkey, monitor lizard, tortoise—and maybe also *kijang* (barking deer), leopard, and gibbon.

There was no evidence of death through violence. He could have died of old age or an illness, in or near this cave. His teeth showed severe tooth wear, suggesting a highly abrasive diet. This correlates with the kinds of food he was buried with. Despite being born with a physical handicap, he survived well in a nomadic hunting and gathering life, probably because of the care given to him. He could have compensated for his physical handicap through sharp hunting skills, or perhaps he rarely hunted and instead took on other tasks. In a community in which the average human lifespan was twenty to thirty years, he could have been an elder in the group, and perhaps was also the shaman and the person with the most knowledge about survival, hunting, gathering, and other aspects of a Palaeolithic way of life.

ZURAINA MAJID

See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Hoabinhian; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; "Java Man" and "Solo Man"

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PERANAKAN Eclectic Heritage

In Malay and Indonesian languages, *Peranakan* designates a locally born person whose male ancestors originated in China and whose female ancestors originated in Southeast Asia. In Penang, Melaka, and Singapore, Peranakans were called *Babas*. The terms mark the observer's perception of difference.

Impelled by ambition or poverty and recruited by Chinese brokers, Chinese immigrants transferred to Southeast Asia their skills in agriculture, mining, and trade. Serving and enriching local elites, they mined gold in Kalimantan and tin in Bangka and Selangor, and grew pepper in Singapore and sugar in Java.

Chinese culture dictated that women stay in China, so immigrants found companionship with women from Southeast Asia's ports or the villages bordering mines and plantations. Women gave Chinese men roots, in-laws, and children. Peranakan communities developed, with temples, cemeteries, and a form of Chinese culture divorced from emperor and scholarship. It was perpetuated across generations as Peranakans intermarried or married new immigrants.

In Java, where Peranakan took on the meaning of Chinese Muslim, conversion enhanced their access to the local authority. The convert wound his hair under a cloth wrapper, replaced trousers with sarong, was circumcised, and adopted Arabic or Javanese names. His wife wore a batik cloth wrap with a Chinese blouse. Children spoke the mother's native language with a mixture of Chinese words.

When the Dutch gained control of the archipelago and the British control of the Malay Peninsula, Peranakan leaders offered their expertise and labor to the new rulers. Some converted to Christianity. Most turned away from Islam, now the religion of the subject class. The latter saw Peranakans increasingly as an alien community. In times of crisis Peranakans could become the target of violence. Babas also rejected Islam, identified with their Chinese heritage, and sealed their relationship with the British by sending sons to English-

language schools and finding occupations serving colonial bureaucracy and commerce.

Today, the government of Indonesia restricts the political, educational, and economic opportunities of citizens of Chinese ancestry. Peranakans, while showing enormous variety in cultural orientation, face an uncertain future as Buddhists or Christians in Southeast Asia's Islamic communities.

JEAN GELMAN TAYLOR

See also Baba Nyonya; Mestizo; Miscegenation

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PERFORMING ARTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

The term "performing arts" denotes a broad range of performance practices in the Southeast Asian region, covering dance, drama, and music. "Drama" should not be taken here as referring exclusively to theatrical genres performed by human actors, for it can also be extended to include those forms of performance, such as shadow play, wherein the actors are puppets manipulated by a human agent and a story is enacted.

In general, dance in Southeast Asia cannot easily be separated from acting, and performances always involve a musical accompaniment of some kind, which may or may not include singing. Thus the notion of dance as a completely autonomous art form as understood in the West does not correspond to what in Southeast Asia is regarded as dance, which is the equivalent of "dance-drama," often with spoken or sung dialogue and mimed sections.

Specific forms and genres are different in every Southeast Asian country, but commonalities within the region's performing arts can also be found. They can be traced back to historical interactions and linguistic, ethnic, racial, social, political, religious, and literary affinities. Dance-drama narratives tend for example to be inspired by the ubiquitous *Râmâyana* story, which

came to Southeast Asia from India. Its main character, Prince Rama, became a model of kingship and just rule. Or they may be associated with other Hindu/Buddhist religious tales or narrative cycles focused on a specific character or characters. This can be seen across the whole region, regardless of the main religious practice, for Hindu/Buddhist cults, often simultaneously, have deeply influenced Southeast Asian cultures.

It is fair to say that at some point in their history all performing arts of Southeast Asia were ritualistic or had a strong association with religious ritual. However, those performance genres discussed here, in contemporary Southeast Asia, have come to be considered as secular artistic practices, following a Western classificatory model. These performance genres are today widely adopted in the region, particularly in terms of vocational training, largely in the hands of state academies. These forms are what the various Southeast Asian countries promote as classical performing arts. That is not to say that Southeast Asian performing arts have wholly dissociated themselves from prior conceptualizations linked to specific cosmologies and influenced by specific notions of spirituality. However, that ideational background is not necessarily present in the way performers consciously approach their artistic practice, or in the way it may be perceived by a contemporary Southeast Asian audience.

A standard approach to classification of Southeast Asian performing arts is to divide them into traditional and modern (or contemporary), the latter understood to be essentially a twentieth-century Western import. Whereas this may initially seem to be a helpful categorization, it is not, however, a desirable one, for it produces the impression that modernity is extraneous to the Southeast Asian social fabric and induces views of an unchanging, static, and exotic Southeast Asian artistic heritage in constant need of preservation. In so doing, it fails to take into account the reality of historical intermixture of genres and their organic growth. Another standard approach is to divide the performing arts into folk and classical, the former associated with an imagined authenticity of village life, the latter with past court patronage replaced in modern times by that of the state, following the transition from palace to the urban proscenium theater. This is a classification ac-

tively promoted by Southeast Asian governments and one that forms the basis of academy-based training. Although very useful, this division is not without disadvantages, however, because it risks introducing a hierarchical differentiation that fails to do justice to the high artistic quality of folk performance.

Performance Genres

The different performance genres are here introduced by country and categorized as dance-drama (the two being combined, for all practical purposes, into one), mask performance, and puppetry. In those instances where dance is to be seen as separate from drama, that is specifically indicated.

Myanmar (Burma)

The country of Myanmar is adjacent to India and Bangladesh and borders on China, Laos, Thailand (Siam), and Vietnam. Ethnically mixed, its main religion has been Theravada Buddhism colored by local animism for several centuries to the present. The Burmese themselves developed most performance genres of Myanmar, and many dance-dramas have Buddhist tales as their main inspiration. The *zat pwe* is among the best-known unmasked genres, whereas the erstwhile masked court dance-drama known as *zat gyi* is today taught at the National School of Drama and identified as a classical genre. It is characterized by lavish costumes, and it mixes dancing with singing and mime. Modern dramas and plays are known as *pya zat* and enjoy tremendous popularity. They often address serious issues in the guise of comic interludes, a device used throughout Southeast Asian dramatic genres to articulate political dissent. The *pwe* usually incorporates numbers of solo dancing females, known as *nat* dance, derived and adapted from ecstatic, trance performances for the *nat* spirits and making use of a strong percussive base.

Thailand

Formerly known as Siam, Thailand borders on Malaysia, Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. Its population is also ethnically mixed, and here too the main religion is Theravada Buddhism, with animistic and Hinduistic features. Thai

classical dancing corresponds to the dance-dramas of the court, known as *khon* and *lakon fai nai*, supposedly of Khmer ancestry; the issue of relationship of Thai dance forms with Khmer forms is open to controversy. *Khon* is a predominantly masked dance-drama performed by men who reenact episodes from the *Ramakien*, the Thai version of the story of Prince Rama. The main stance of the dancers is a squat position with the legs turned out. The movements of the puppets of the *nang yai*, the Thai shadow play, provide inspiration to the dancers.

Khon involves fighting sequences and acrobatic leaps, the latter performed by monkey characters. A cast of all-female dancers who also take on male roles performed the *lakon*. The emphasis of the *lakon* is on emotional situations, and the dancing is more restrained than that seen in its male counterpart. These forms receive government support and are taught in vocational institutions.

Another form, the *likay*, is a popular dramatic genre that combines dance, acting, and singing inspired by the classical forms but adapted to more commercial tastes.

Cambodia

Bordering on Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos, Cambodia is inhabited predominantly by Khmers. Theravada Buddhism has been its main religion since the thirteenth century, but the country has a strong base of Hinduism (both Saivism and Vaishnavism) and Mahayana Buddhism as well as indigenous animistic practices. Cambodia's troubled recent political history has had a devastating effect on the country's performing arts, especially those that had received court patronage prior to the Khmer Rouge. It is only since the late 1980s to 1990s, after the Khmer Rouge were defeated and the monarchy reinstated, that effort has been put into revitalizing the performing arts, providing an infrastructure for training, and attempting to re-create classical forms and a classical repertoire. These classical performance genres correspond to the forms that had been previously cultivated in the Khmer court. They include the all-female dance-drama known as *lakon karach boran*, the mask dance-drama known as *lakon khol*, and the shadow play *nang sbek thom*. The *Reamker*, the Khmer version of the *Râmâyana*, provides a source for the stories en-

acted, although not exclusively so. These forms are undoubtedly close to their Thai counterparts, by which they were influenced, because of Thailand's proximity and earlier Thai political dominance over the Khmers, dating back to the fifteenth century. There is, however, a tendency to regard the Khmer forms as more ancient, invoking the presence of temple relief showing dancers as evidence of an older tradition.

There are also affinities with Javanese performance genres. It is believed that King Jayavarman II (r. 770/790/802–834 C.E.), who in the ninth century reportedly spent time in exile in the Indonesian kingdom of Śrīvijaya, must have brought over the Javanese influence. He then returned to Cambodia, where he seized power and introduced the cult of the *devaraja*, "the god-king," which became the foundation of Khmer royal power.

Other performance genres include spoken drama, which is very popular, with hundreds of amateur theater companies throughout Cambodia. This kind of drama often combines Western acting techniques with those derived from Khmer theatrical forms and addresses contemporary issues.

Vietnam

Vietnam borders on Cambodia and also Laos and China, and of all the Southeast Asian countries, it is the one that exhibits most strongly elements of Chinese culture, absorbed through Confucianism and Taoism. In ancient times it was known as Champa, and it was the seat of a rich Hindu-Buddhist culture that left considerable traces on its performing arts. A former French colony, it has only recently begun a slow recovery from decades of war in the Indochinese peninsula. Marxist socialism has left as a legacy the growth of a strongly didactic modern theater.

Water puppetry, known as *mua roi nuoc*, with a comic repertoire based on animal fables, has enjoyed a revival, slowly obtaining international recognition. The shows are staged on ponds, where the puppeteers remain hidden from view, skillfully manipulating the puppets. The former court dances, among which is the *hat boi*, bear a strong Chinese influence in their plot and their style of singing. They have suffered some decline because they tend to be closely linked with imperial culture and impe-

rial values, and that did not find audience favor in socialist Vietnam. *Cai luong* is a popular form of musical theater, highly appreciated by Vietnamese audiences. Since the 1980s, *hat boi*, water puppetry, and *hat cheo*, a form believed to have emerged in the first century C.E. and presenting a mixture of poetry, mime, singing, and dancing, have been taught at the Academy of Theatre and Film in Hanoi; research is carried out there with the aim of reviving other forms of folk theater and training a new generation of accomplished performers.

Laos

The Laotians are closely related to the Thais. There is a strong affinity in the performing arts of Laos and of Thailand, particularly since the Laos court forms were consciously modeled on those of the Thais, down to sharing their names; earlier, they were close to those of the Khmers.

Typically, Laotian is the form of sung storytelling known as *lum pun*, of which there are several varieties, depending on whether they are for courtship or healing. *Lim glawn* is the name given to the courtship forms, whereas the ones for curing disease are known as *lum pee fah*.

Modern drama is based on *likay*, which, in parallel with its Thai counterpart, is a form of musical theater adapted to include elements from the lum pun. Laos also boasts its own version of shadow theater, *nang daloong*, with stories drawn from the *Râmâyana*.

Indonesia

The Indonesian archipelago comprises thousands of islands that make up the modern Republic of Indonesia. They are all known for having their own forms of performance, which are quite distinct. The islands of Java and Bali have a long history of performing art practice, and here the different forms have achieved an unsurpassed level of sophistication and refinement. Although Indonesia is now predominantly Islamic, with the exception of Bali, Hindu/Buddhist culture has had a substantial impact on the growth of the performing arts, intermingled with Islamic mysticism.

A pervasive genre is the *wayang*, the puppet tradition, practiced in many variant forms. This genre is so important that it has given rise to

forms that are performed by human actors whose movements are inspired by those of the puppets. Thus in Java, for example, one finds the *wayang orang*, developed at the courts of the cities of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. *Wayang kulit* is performed with leather puppets. A *dhalang*, accompanied by a *gamelan* ensemble, manipulates the puppets, which project their shadows onto a white screen. In West Java it is the *wayang golek*, rod puppets, rather than *wayang kulit*, that has pride of place. *Wayang kulit* is most spectacular in central Java, where performances take place with a full *gamelan* and two *pesindhen*, female singers, who provide musical interludes. The repertoire is composed of tales from the Hindu epics *Râmâyana* and *Mahâbhârata*, as well as other narrative cycles. Originally a ritual for the ancestors, the *wayang* is today a form of secular entertainment. In the harsh political climate of the former New Order regime, the *wayang* was a major vehicle for articulation of political dissent, through comic interludes enacted by clown characters and through subtle references to contemporary issues in the characters' dialogues.

Among the dance-dramas, apart from the already mentioned Javanese *wayang orang*, one finds the *topeng*, a masked genre practiced in Java and Bali. Dancing styles are classified as *alus* (refined), *gagah* (strong), and *putri* (female), and all dance-drama genres involve a combination of these styles, which are linked with characterization. This is common to Javanese and Balinese forms. There are also dances with no narrative content, which were associated with the courts and were practiced by female corps. In Java one finds the *bedhaya* and *serimpi* of the Yogyakarta and Surakarta courts, very refined and controlled female dance styles of a nonrepresentational kind. In Bali one finds the elegant *legong*, loosely inspired by a tale of doomed love, which is, however, rendered as an abstract dance. Originally the *legong* was performed only by prepubescent girls, but now it is regarded as a classical form that is at the root of a number of new dance compositions, such as *Panyenbrama*, a welcoming dance, choreographed in Balinese dance academies. Male styles of Balinese dance include the *baris*, based on warrior stances and movements. A newer form, very exacting and danced by women in a male-oriented, vigorous style, is the *Terunajaya*. A popular Balinese theatrical form is the *Arja*, which combines dancing, acting, and singing. Equally

popular, especially among tourists, is the *Barong*, whose origin is in exorcistic rites, in which the mythical creature barong fights the evil witch *Rangda*; it has men stabbing themselves with a kris after entering a trancelike state.

New dance-dramas are named *sendratari*, an acronym made up of the words *seni*, *drama*, and *tari*, translated as dance-drama. This is a dance-drama inspired by traditional tales from the *Râmâyana*, performed without dialogue or songs and only to music, in an attempt to make it accessible to non-Javanese and non-Balinese speakers. It is in fact performed at major tourist venues and at the Prambanan temple complex in central Java, where there is a purpose-built open-air theater.

Java is also home to a very lively scene of modern and contemporary dance that makes use of a dance vocabulary drawn from more traditional forms but is entirely modern in choreography and repertoire. Choreographers such as Sardono W. Kusumo and Miroto have received international acclaim and recognition for their innovative work. Modern spoken drama is also highly developed throughout Indonesia in urban contexts, with playwrights such as W. S. Rendra, also a major poet, and the late Arifin C. Noer creating a theater that derives its strength from reworking traditional forms and adapting them to a modern context.

Malaysia and Singapore

Malaysia has a strong Islamic majority. Its population is ethnically diverse and multifaith, with a sizable Indian and Chinese presence. The performing arts therefore include Hindu-Islamic Malay genres, South Indian dance such as Bharata Natyam, and Chinese opera, predominantly Cantonese. Malay genres include storytelling, such as *awang*, and theatrical forms involving acting and singing, such as *bangsawan*, parallel to the Thai *likay*. *Mak yong* is an all-female dance-drama (*mak yong* means “queen”) of court derivation, and *sandiwara* is a theater genre that developed from the 1930s and has a Western origin, in that it uses a script and takes historical themes as its subject matter. Puppet performance is not lacking. Known as *wayang siam*, it is similar to other Southeast Asian shadow theater performances, and the repertoire is based on the *Cerita Maharaja Wana*, a Malay version of the *Râmâyana*.

Singapore has a mixed population of Malays, Indians, and Chinese. With four official languages (Mandarin, Tamil, Malay, and English), its theatrical forms have been inspired by Chinese, Tamil, English, and Malay models, with a fairly strict separation among the different theatrical communities. In more recent years, intercultural performance has received a boost, and there have been attempts to use Asian forms with multilingual pieces, as seen in the productions of the playwright Kuo Pao Kun.

The Philippines

In the Philippine Islands pre-Christian dancing has survived with a number of tribes. Scholars have done extensive research into these forms in order to reconstruct early Filipino traditions, which were recorded in the writings of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European travelers. Side by side with these traditions, which follow a widespread Southeast Asian pattern, there are Hispanic genres that constitute the major theatrical traditions of the Philippines and some Islamic-influenced dancing. The Hispanic forms consist of religious spectacles, such as Lenten and Christmas plays known as *senakulo* and *panululuyan*. The *Komedya* dramas have their origin in Spanish plays, but their stylized movement and set characters are also strongly Southeast Asian and not necessarily a borrowing from Spain. Among the American-influenced genres there is *bodabil*, or vaudeville, and spoken drama.

Modern theatrical forms are also present, following the institution of cultural centers for the arts and of acting schools.

As Southeast Asian performing arts have entered the twenty-first century, one witnesses conscious revivals and reconstruction of forms deemed to be traditional and identified as significant in redefining contemporary ethnic and cultural identities. One also sees experimentation, engagement with interculturalism, and involvement in a global, international culture. This in turn gives rise to cross-fertilization, and new genres are being created that respond more specifically to changing sociopolitical conditions and the changing taste of audiences. There are occasional tensions between those who would like to block all foreign influences, fearing loss of identity and cultural values, and those who want to emphasize internationalism

and interconnectedness. But the rise of the professional performer, trained in academies with an international outlook, has marked an irreversible trend and caused a shift in perception. Contemporary artists increasingly see themselves as professionals playing for a world audience, with inevitable changes and moves in the direction of an international aesthetic standard of performance, linked to international funding and programming policies.

ALESSANDRA LOPEZ Y ROYO

See also Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; *Jatakas*; Music and Musical Instruments of Southeast Asia; *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana*; *Wayang Kulit*

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PERJUANGAN (PERDJUANGAN)

During Indonesia's war of independence against the Dutch (1945–1949), those who rejected compromise and negotiation with the Dutch and who favored a purely armed strug-

gle described their platform as *perjuangan* (Indonesian, "struggle"). They contrasted *perjuangan* with *diplomasi* (Indonesian, "diplomacy"), which they equated with willingness to accept less than full independence in exchange for Dutch recognition.

Tan Malaka (1897?–1949) made especial claim to the term *perjuangan* as he forcefully argued that far-reaching social reform to dismantle the colonial social order would give the Indonesian masses such a stake in independence that they would fight to the death to defend it. Tan Malaka rejected the Sjahrir government's view that independent Indonesia had to accept a place within a basically capitalist world system. The term was also linked to the charismatic army commander General Sudirman (1915–1950), who regarded armed struggle as pure and noble, and to numerous irregular armed units (*badan perjuangan*, "struggle organizations").

The strategy of successive Indonesian governments during the revolution (1945–1949) was to use armed force to back negotiations on the grounds that armed force alone would not win victory. In this strategy, the government was backed by the influential general A. H. Nasution (1918–2000), who aimed to create a small but disciplined army and to eliminate the irregular *badan perjuangan*. Nongovernment parties consistently criticized governments in the name of *perjuangan* for surrendering too much to the Dutch, but they adopted similar policies once in office. In this respect, *perjuangan* was a powerfully expressed opposition slogan rather than a defined policy alternative.

After the revolution, *perjuangan* remained a powerful term in Indonesia's political lexicon, indicating nationalist commitment, steadfastness, and purity of principle. From the mid-1950s it was appropriated to some extent by the armed forces to highlight their role in securing independence and to justify their role in politics, but it retained a sense of populist engagement. In 1998, Megawati Sukarnoputri (1947–) used the term to designate her new party, the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—Perjuangan (PDI-P), following her expulsion from the PDI.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia;

Nasution, General Abdul Haris (1918–2000); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Sjahrir, Sutan (1909–1966); Tan Malaka, Ibrahim Datuk (1897?–1949)

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PERLIS

See Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu)

PERSATUAN ULAMA-ULAMA SELURUH ACEH (PUSA)

Persatuan Ulama–Ulama Seluruh Aceh, or the Association of Aceh *Ulama*, is an organization that unites religious leaders (*‘ulama*) in the Aceh region. It was established in 1939 by several Acehese *‘ulamas* such as Tengku Mohammad Daud Beureu’eh (1906–1987), Teuku Haji Cik Johan Alamsyah, Teuku Mohammad Amin, and Tengku Ismail Yakub. Tengku Mohammad Daud Beureueh was the first chairman of the association.

In the beginning, PUSA was an Islamic organization that had a modern religious orientation, like Muhammadiyah. Therefore it dealt mainly with propagation of the Islamic faith and improvement of people’s education. For those purposes, PUSA had built Islamic schools, one of which was the Perguruan Normal Islam (Schools for Islamic Teachers). However, because of strong Japanese hegemony in Southeast Asia, PUSA gradually developed into a nationalist radical organization as well as an organization of religious elites (Tengku) with strong anti-Dutch colonial government feelings. As a consequence it fought against the Dutch government and traditional aristocrats, *uleebalang* (Teuku), who worked for the Dutch and, considered as the landlords, oppressed the Acehese people.

Fighting against the Dutch and its allies, PUSA sought help from the Imperial Japanese army, which at the same time tried to occupy Indonesian territory. In February and March 1942, the Acehese people, led by several

PUSA leaders such as Tengku Said Abubakar, waged war against the Dutch. In the 1945–1946 civil war, *uleebalangs* were exterminated, and their power fell into the hands of *‘ulama*. The PUSA organization came to an end during the Japanese occupation (1942–1945). However, after Indonesian independence, several former PUSA leaders received high positions in the civil and military governments. Some of them, such as Daud Beureu’eh, were also involved in the fight against the central government of the Republic of Indonesia in the revolt of Darul Islam in Aceh (1953–1959).

AMELIA FAUZIA

See also Aceh (Acheh); Darul Islam Movement (DI); Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Muhammadiyah; Sumatra

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PERSERIKATAN NASIONAL INDONESIA (PNI) (1927)

Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia was a leading Indonesian nationalist party established in 1927 during the Dutch colonial period. After the abortive uprising of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) and its destruction in 1926 and early 1927, a group of Indonesian elites attempted to find a new way of struggle that placed nationalism above both Islam and communism as the dominant ideological position. They reorganized their struggle around an emerging charismatic leader, Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970).

Soekarno had helped to convene the *Algemeene Studieclub* (General Study Club), an overtly political organization for university students in Bandung in 1925. Soekarno, together with some returned members of *Perhimpunan Indonesia* and leading figures in the study club, such as Boediarto, Iskaq, Tilaar, Soenarjo, Soedjadi, Anwari, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, and Sartono, took the initiative of founding a new party. These individuals had previously disagreed with Mohammad

Hatta's (1902–1980) idea on a new political party. Hatta's idea was considered too moderate and was thought to place too much stress on education. They met several times beginning in March 1927 in Jakarta and Bandung to discuss the foundation of the party. The new party, called *Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian Nationalist Association), was finally declared during a meeting in Bandung on 4 July 1927 with Soekarno as the chairman. The party aimed to achieve Indonesian independence through uncooperative methods (a policy of noncooperation with the Dutch colonial authorities) and mass organization based on an ideology of secular nationalism. The radical notions of the party quickly attracted attention among Indonesian nationalist groups, while the colonial government began to monitor the new party closely.

PNI claimed to have branches in all main cities in Java and one in Palembang, with nearly 4,000 members by the time its name was changed to *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party) in a congress in Jakarta in May 1929 (Ingelsohn 1979: 55). PNI received continuous strong support from secular nationalists, particularly in Java. The party claimed to have more than 10,000 members, about half registered in Bandung, by late 1929 (*ibid.*: 106). The colonial government finally reacted against PNI and arrested their leaders on 24 December 1929. They were charged with being a threat to public order, and Soekarno himself was sentenced to four years' imprisonment on 22 December 1930. The leaders of PNI declared the liquidation of its party in April 1931.

BAMBANG PURWANTO

See also Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Muhammadiyah; Nahdatul Ulama; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970)

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PERTAMINA CRISIS (1975–1976)

Devastating Financial Loss

PT Pertamina (short for *Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara*), established in 1968, is Indonesia's biggest government-owned company. It is responsible for the production and sharing agreements that foreign oil companies have to accept if they want to exploit Indonesia's vast reserves of natural oil and gas. Pertamina expanded quickly with the increase of oil exports in the late 1960s, and an official investigation in 1970 criticized Pertamina's lack of efficiency and accountability. The company was widely regarded as a nest of corruption. After 1973 the increase in oil prices accelerated the expansion of the company's activities. Under President Director Ibnu Sutowo, the company's growing profits and an increasing amount of borrowed funds found their way into a range of projects, including telecommunications, real estate, an airline, and PT Krakatau Steel.

The company's lack of accountability led to a major scandal in 1975–1976. The origins of the scandal lay in the government requirement of 1972 that all state enterprises obtain official approval for overseas loans of more than one-year maturity. To elude this, Pertamina embarked on massive short-term overseas borrowing. International lenders were eager to lend because of Pertamina's rising oil revenues and because a global post-1973 slump reduced alternative lending opportunities. However, in March 1975 the company could not meet its short-term obligations. The Indonesian government took responsibility for Pertamina's foreign debts. In January 1976 it became known that Pertamina had external debts of more than U.S.\$10 billion, at that time

30 percent of Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Goldstone 1978: 122; Biro Pusat Statistik 1977). Corruption, undue optimism, and incompetence were revealed as key reasons for the calamity. The government reasserted control over the firm. Sutowo was dismissed, most of the company's nonoil enterprises were divested, and its debts were renegotiated.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Golkar; *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Suharto (1921–)

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
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PHAM VAN DONG (1906–2000)

A Party Stalwart

One of the veteran members and leaders of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Pham Van Dong served as prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) for more than thirty years (1955–1987).

Pham Van Dong was born to a mandarin family in Quang Nai Province (present Nghia Binh Province) of central Vietnam in 1906. His father was a court mandarin and private secretary of Emperor Duy-Tan (r. 1907–1916). Dong was educated at Quoc Hoc (the National Academy) in Hué and the law faculty of the Lycée Albert Saraut in Hanoi. He began his revolutionary activities at the age of eighteen by participating in the students' patriotic movement. In 1926 he went to Guangzhou in southern China and joined the Revolutionary Youth League of Vietnam, the predecessor of the Communist Party, organized by Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969) in 1925. In Guangzhou he took a political training course run by Hồ Chí Minh and studied at the Whampoa Military Academy founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the founder of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT). Dong



Vietnamese prime minister Pham Van Dong.
(Richard Melloul/Corbis Sygma)

gradually came to the attention of Hồ Chí Minh and became one of Hồ Chí Minh's two most trusted lieutenants (the other was Vo Nguyễn Giap [1911–]). In 1927, Dong was sent back to Saigon in southern Vietnam. In early 1929 he was assigned to work for the Youth League's regional executive committee, responsible for revolutionary activities in southern Vietnam.

The French arrested Dong for his political activities soon after he returned from Hong Kong, where he had attended the Congress of the Youth League. He spent several years in jail and joined the Communist Party in the prison on Con Son Island in the South China Sea. In 1937, Dong was granted an amnesty by the French government. Thereafter he served as a journalist in Hanoi during the Popular Front period (1936–1939). He went to China to meet with Hồ Chí Minh in 1940, and was sent back to Vietnam to set up revolutionary bases in northern Vietnam in 1942.

On the eve of the 1945 August Revolution, Dong attended the National People's Congress

in Tân Trao, Tuyên Quang Province, in northern Vietnam, and was elected to the Standing Committee of the Vietnam National Liberation Council, which functioned as the provisional government. He became financial minister of the newly established government of DRV in September 1945. Dong became head of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly in March 1946. In 1949 he was appointed vice premier. As DRV's principal negotiator with external powers, he led the Vietnamese delegation to the Fontainebleau Conference in France for formal negotiations with the French government on peace for Vietnam. In May 1954 he headed the DRV delegation to the Geneva Conference, which resulted in the Geneva Agreements on Indochina issues and ended the Indochina War. Dong was foreign minister from 1955 to 1961. He served as premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam after September 1955, and kept the position of premier after the two Vietnams were merged into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976. During that time he concurrently worked as deputy chairman of the National Defense Council. After 1986 he held the position of chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Dong was elected alternate member to the Party Central Committee in 1947 and two years later became a full member. In the Second National Party Congress, convened in 1951, Dong remained a full member of the Party Central Committee and was elected to the political bureau for the first time. Both positions were secured in the next three consecutive national party congresses in 1960, 1976, and 1982. He worked as advisor to the Party Central Committee in the next three party congresses until December 1997.

Although he continued to serve as chief director of the state's affairs, Dong's power declined first after Hồ's death in 1969, and again after the reunification in 1976. In June 1987, Pham Van Dong retired from all governmental and party offices because of advanced age and ill health. Dong died at age ninety-four in 2000 in Hanoi.

Pham Van Dong is remembered for his talent in administration and negotiation. As a loyal follower of Hồ Chí Minh, he carried out Hồ's organizational and administrative policies faithfully. He was responsible for the creation of the bureaucracy of DRV under Hồ's tutelage. Dong

was moderate in character, and he could reconcile divergent opinions within the party and government leadership. He was neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, maintaining that Vietnam should not ally with either China or the Soviet Union.

HUANG YUN JING

See also Geneva Conference (1954); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Sino-Soviet Struggle; Sino-Vietnamese Wars; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP); Vo Nguyễn Giap, General (1911–)

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PHAN BỘI CHÂU (1867–1940)
Vietnamese Revolutionary Thinker

Among the several scholars of Confucian learning involved intellectually and actively in the struggle against French rule in Vietnam during the first quarter of the twentieth century, Phan Bội Châu stood out as the most representative. He was the revolutionary thinker and strategist behind virtually every party and every agitation that rankled the colonial administration.

Born in a scholar-gentry family in Nam Đàn district, province of Nghệ An, Phan Bội Châu appeared destined to pursue a career in officialdom after having passed the regional civil service examinations in 1900. His reading of the reformist publications of Kang Yu-wei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929) incited him, however, to embark upon a lifetime of anticolonial activities. He thereafter began his political action as an anticolonial proselytizer and organizer, seeking in almost all of his voluminous and passionate writings to arouse patriotism, to denounce French exploitation, and to propose solutions to his country's

quandary. Ideas, however, were treated by him merely as tools of concrete political action: at the same time he directly promoted countless campaigns all aiming at gaining independence for his country—hence his special historical importance as the outstanding revolutionary thinker and strategist of his time.

Admiring the Japanese example of progressive monarchism, he dreamed of a Meiji-style renovation in Vietnam that could keep the Vietnamese monarchy as its symbolic centerpiece. In 1904 he created *Việt Nam Duy Tân Hội* (Vietnam Modernization Association), at the head of which he placed the pretender Cường Để (1882–1951), a direct descendant of Gia Long, the founder of the Nguyễn dynasty. The first of a succession of conspiratorial organizations set up on Phan Bội Châu's instigation, this association aimed at encouraging Vietnam to follow Japan's path in adopting Western science and technology in order to throw off Western domination. Soon after, Phan Bội Châu initiated what was to become an Eastern travel movement (*Đông Du*), going himself to Japan in 1905. His idea was to send Vietnamese youth to study at Japanese schools, to be groomed for the prospect of restoring Vietnam's independence. Japan in those years was a good center for contacts with other Asian, particularly Chinese, reformers and revolutionaries: it was not long before Phan Bội Châu entered into relations there with Liang Qichao and Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925). In October 1907, *Việt Nam Cộng Hiến Hội* (the Vietnamese Constitutional Association) was begun, in which all the Vietnamese students were enrolled. Considered a kind of provisional government of Vietnam in exile, with Cường Để as president and Phan Bội Châu as secretary-general, it helped to develop democratic forms of political organization and the growth of national consciousness among the Vietnamese community abroad.

The shift in Japanese policy to the Franco-Japanese Treaty of 10 June 1907 led to the expulsion of Phan Bội Châu, Cường Để, and the body of Vietnamese students from Japan in late 1908. Disillusioned with Japan as a revolutionary base, Phan Bội Châu, who then paid special attention to the concept of world revolution, settled initially in Hong Kong and then in Guangzhou (Canton). He decided to form pan-Asian associations in order to “establish ties of solidarity between the activists of all the col-

onized countries” (Phan Bội Châu 1997: 161–162). One such organization was *Chấn Hoa Hung a Hội* (League for the Strengthening of China and the Development of Asia), in which the role of China as the “elder brother of the whole of Asia,” with special responsibilities for helping national liberation throughout the continent, was strongly emphasized (ibid.: 201). Indeed, after the October 1911 revolution in China, the Chinese pattern of revolutionary change became more attractive to Phan Bội Châu. Accordingly, in June 1912, with more than a hundred other Vietnamese in exile in South China, he founded a new association called *Việt Nam Quang Phục Hội* (League for the Restoration of Vietnam) that was closely modeled on the Chinese Tung Meng Hui. (Tongmeng Hui) Cường Để was given presidential status within the new structure, but power was entrusted to a deliberative committee of three elder statesmen (with Phan Bội Châu representing Central Vietnam) supported by an executive committee of ten activists with specialist functions. The purpose of the organization was to create a democratic republic in Vietnam similar to the one that Sun Yat-sen was trying then to achieve in China. More important, it decided to create its own army to fight for the recovery of Vietnamese independence. Thus was born the strategy of reconquering the country from China border bases, crucial to the history of Vietnamese nationalism. However, several attempted coups de main in Vietnam failed, in particular spectacular terrorist acts meant to kill Indochina's governor-general, Albert Sarraut (1911–1914, 1917–1919); a succession of desperate and disastrous operations launched in 1913–1914 resulted only in the elimination of much of the movement's leadership. Phan Bội Châu himself was thrown into a Guangzhou jail on 17 January 1914, in the wake of Yuan Shi-kai's (1859–1916) counterrevolution. Upon his release in 1917 he appeared temporarily discouraged, writing in 1918 an essay entitled “Letter of Opinion on Franco-Vietnamese Collaboration” (“Pháp Việt Đề Huê Chính Kiên Thư”, which suggested the possibility of reconciliation with the colonial regime, in the eventuality of an attempt made by Japan to conquer Indochina. In any case he continued to write from Hangzhou, where he was mainly based, on themes relating to the problem of Viet-

namese political, social, cultural, and moral emancipation, but ceased to exercise any political initiative.

In 1925, French security agents kidnapped Phan Bội Châu in Shanghai. After his trial and the substitution of a sentence of house arrest for one of life imprisonment, he spent the rest of his days quietly in Huế. He began compiling works in which he expounded the significance of Confucianism to modern Vietnam, replacing concern for the physical independence of Vietnam with concern for its spiritual vitality. Displaying the dispassionate wisdom of a moral philosopher, he took a step back toward a Confucian vision of society by deploring the final loss of Vietnam's personality, owing to the disappearance of the self-regulating moral education and the social rituals of its classical past. He proclaimed admiration for the type of well-balanced "democracy" of the ancient Chinese sage-emperors in his *Không học đấng* (*The Light of Confucian Knowledge*). But in his second autobiography, *Phan Bội Châu niên biểu* (*Phan Bội Châu's Chronology*), compiled sometime between 1929 and 1937, the moralist viewpoint he adopted in relation to his life led him to emphasize the traditional aspect of his action—for instance, privileging the eulogy of admirable moral deeds over the analysis of events, tactics, and programs. He also acknowledged at the same time the futility of his past enterprises, assessing in a realistic fashion the limits of his endeavors while humbly and earnestly making a request to those of the younger generations to learn from his painful experiences.

He died on 29 October 1940, still exhibiting distress for having massively failed his country and being tortured by a sentiment of indebtedness toward his dead companions whose confidence he blamed himself for having betrayed. Yet later generations have come to regard him as the personification of the very essence of Vietnamese resistance to foreign intervention. He was one who had a particular grasp of the fundamental importance of political and military power, and who largely created modern parties, though without much organization within the country, or programs beyond the immediate objective of liberation and power.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Chinese Revolution (1911); Phan Châu Trinh (1872–1926); Sun Yat-sen, Dr.

(1866–1925); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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PHAN CHÂU TRINH (1872–1926)

Vietnamese Reformer

A younger contemporary of Phan Bội Châu (1867–1940), Phan Châu Trinh endorsed a form of anticolonial movement that sought reform and modernization through the strategy of learning from the West, in order to build a new Vietnamese society.

Belonging to a scholar-gentry family in Quảng-Nam, he passed the civil service examinations in 1901 but resigned an appointment at the Ministry of Rites in 1905. Thereafter he traveled through different provinces of Vietnam with his close friends and associates Trần Quý Cáp (1870–1908) and Huỳnh Thúc Kháng (1876–1947). He reviled the classical studies and examination system of which he was a product, and condemned the disastrous social consequences of the colonial situation in a public letter addressed to the governor-general of Indochina, Jean Baptiste Paul Beau (1902–1907). The association policy proclaimed by the latter induced him indeed to believe in the possibility of compromising with the colonial government, which would make possible a peaceful evolution toward an autonomous regime. He also became strongly involved in the actions of the Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thục (Free School of the Eastern Capital [Hanoi] for the Just Cause). He was one of the most popular lecturers of this patriotic educational organization. The new and exciting aspects were the emphasis on modern subjects—mathematics,

science, history, and geography—as opposed to the Confucian classics, and the insistence on the value of *quốc ngữ* (the romanized script) as an instrument for teaching literacy to, and communicating with, the masses. The cultural revolution it propagandized aimed at fighting conservatism and obscurantism, and at overcoming Vietnamese backwardness. At the same time it focused on building up Vietnamese initiative in industry and commerce, science, technology, and education. The initiative was achieved through the domestication of the ideas of European political and educational theorists by means of the establishment of mutual education societies and the development of a network of agricultural and commercial cooperatives. These objectives concurred with the conviction that Phan Châu Trinh maintained throughout his life that “reliance on foreign help is foolish and violence is self-destructive,” a conviction apparently reinforced following his visit to Hong Kong and Tokyo in 1906 (Huỳnh 1983: 13–14). Disagreeing with Phan Bội Châu and other Vietnamese political activists who tended to count exclusively on foreign help and to consider military resistance the only means likely to lead to the restoration of Vietnam’s national independence, he favored instead gradual domestic reforms within the French colonial system. He hoped that *Đông Kinh Nghĩa Thực* would create the conditions for social and political change and thus eliminate the need for political revolt.

Nevertheless he was active as one of the sponsors of a wide tax resistance movement in central Vietnam in 1908, intended to be a movement of civil disobedience that took advantage of the peasantry’s dissatisfaction to organize a massive trend of opinion capable of influencing the colonial administration. As a result Phan Châu Trinh was imprisoned as part of the colonial government’s campaign of suppression of the dissident scholar-gentry. Released in 1911 at the behest of the French League for the Rights of Man, he spent the years from 1911 to 1925 in France. During this period, he frequently met with Vietnamese students and political agitators abroad, in particular Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969), for whom he played the role of a mentor in the days before the Comintern took Hồ under its wings. Together with the lawyer Phan Văn Trường (1878–1933), in Paris he ran a friendly society

with political overtones called the Association of Vietnamese Patriots. Attracting in this way the attention of the French Sûreté, he was arrested, charged with subversive activity, and incarcerated in the Santé jail for ten months beginning in September 1914.

An uncompromising critic of the collaborationist Huê court and an advocate of republicanism, Phan Châu Trinh was especially famous for his scathing diatribes against the concept of monarchy. In a “seven points letter” (*Thất Điều Trần*), he wrote on 15 July 1922 to accuse the king Khải Định (r. 1916–1925) of “seven major crimes” (Nguyễn 1992: 255). He wrote thus: “The emperor is the man who takes other people’s rights and makes them his own, who takes public powers and makes them private powers” (Steinberg 1987: 317). Also “The emperor, to whom it is forbidden to govern, is nothing more than a well-clothed mannequin, sitting on a carefree throne, doing what he is ordered to do, signing what he is commanded to sign” (Nguyễn 1985: 156–157). Believing that popular fixations regarding the person and position of the king hampered the development of the image of the nation, he was preoccupied with the need for clearing away the relics of the old institutions. In their place, he intended to establish a Western democratic political structure supported by a Western scientific educational system. He believed that the superiority of the West proceeded not only from its scientific and technological advances but above all from the vitality that political democracy imparted to Occidental societies. Subsequently he was increasingly receptive both to the idea of socialism as a dynamic mode of collective action and to social Darwinist criticisms of existing institutions. Yet, remaining a prisoner of his classicism with its elitist values, he was unable to see the problems of building organized communities in terms other than Confucian.

Like his contemporaries, he had received most of his information on Western political and social theories through the reformist writings in literary Chinese by Kang Yu-wei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929). His almost fifteen-year sojourn in France notwithstanding, he still never escaped completely from Kang Yu-wei’s spell. Consequently, he showed a total lack of confidence in the revolutionary capacities of the Vietnamese people, which he combined with a belief in the possi-

bility of the French colonial administration's acting as a progressive force, taking its professed "civilizing mission" seriously. Impressed by the liberal aspects of French culture and humanist philosophy, he thought that the French presence in Vietnam could be a positive force if it led to the introduction of progressive aspects of Western civilization and ultimately to concession of political rights and the ideals of the Enlightenment.

Allowed to return to Vietnam in June 1925, under the express condition that he refrain from any call to violence against the established order and from any offensive polemic against his sovereign, Phan Châu Trinh quickly demonstrated that he remained true to the ideas he had always defended. In the speeches that he gave in Saigon late that year, he addressed himself to the two crucial questions of the synthesis of East and West in Vietnam, and of the form that a future government for the Vietnamese people might take. He maintained that Western democracy was more appropriate for a modern nation, and made a serious attempt to approach the problem of the assimilation of Western values into Vietnamese civilization.

He died in Saigon on 24 March 1926. His funeral was the occasion for national demonstrations of mourning, as well as the expression of an intense patriotic fervor.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also *Mission Civilisatrice* ("Civilizing Mission"); Phan Bội Châu (1867–1940); Sun Yat-sen, Dr. (1866–1925); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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PHAULKON, CONSTANCE (CONSTANTINE) (d. 1688)

Greek Adventurer at the Court of Siam

Constance Phaulkon became a favorite of King Narai (r. 1656–1688) and one of the most important officials in the kingdom. Born in Cephalonia, Phaulkon was employed by the English East India Company (EIC), coming to Siam during the 1670s. He entered Siamese royal service, converted to Catholicism, and married a Roman Catholic mestizo, Maria Guyomar (Guimar). Once in the service of King Narai, he helped the king pursue a monopolistic commercial policy and a pro-French foreign policy. Phaulkon became rich through his trading activities, and he was soon a powerful figure at court. He was first a protégé of the minister for foreign and trading affairs, Chaophraya Kosathibodi (Lek), and after the minister's demise in 1682 he became the de facto minister, although refusing to assume the title formally.

He was mainly responsible for conducting Siam's diplomatic relations with the court of King Louis XIV (1638–1715) of France, culminating in the sending of two embassies from France to Siam in 1685 and 1687, interspersed with an embassy from Siam to France in 1686. The second French embassy (1687), however, also brought many French troops into Siam and resulted in the garrisoning of two key towns in the kingdom: Bangkok and Mergui. Phaulkon thus became increasingly unpopular at court. When King Narai fell terminally ill in 1688, a group of anti-French and anti-Catholic Siamese courtiers led by Okphra Phetracha seized the royal palace in Lopburi. Unable to summon French help from the garrison at Bangkok, Phaulkon was arrested and put to death. His allies the French (with the exception of some missionaries) were by the end of 1688 expelled from Siam.

Phaulkon was able to exert great influence over Siamese foreign and commercial affairs, but his lack of a political power base within the

kingdom left him in a weak position when his royal patron was overthrown.

DHIRAVAT NA POMBEJRA

See also East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Lopburi (Lawo); Narai (r. 1656–1688)

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PHETSARATH (1890–1959)

Nationalist Laotian Prince

Born in 1890 as the third son of Prince Boun Kong (d. 1920), the “second king” of Laos, Phetsarath Ratananvongsa was heir to the cadet branch of the royal family of Luang Prabang, the branch of the family that had been supported by Siam in the nineteenth century. An outstanding and inspiring administrator in French Laos, Phetsarath was also a somewhat tragic figure. Unlike his two younger half-brothers Souphanouvong (1911–1995) and Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984), who played center stage in Lao nationalist politics, Phetsarath was destined to near-permanent exile in Siam (Thailand).

Having been tutored in early life at Luang Prabang, in 1904 the young prince joined other Lao students at the Lycée Chasseloup in Saigon. But Phetsarath was the first of the Lao royal family to receive an education in France, where he spent nearly eight years at the elite École Coloniale and other schools. Returning to Laos in 1913, he took up a number of positions in the French Indochina civil service, as well as in Laos. Beginning his career as clerk in the Royal Treasury at Luang Prabang, a year later he served in the office of the French resident in Vientiane. In 1919 he was appointed director of the Laos civil service, a position of both prestige and trust befitting a demonstrably capable collaborator with the French in the

creation of a “modern” administrative system. From 1919 until 1930, Phetsarath was appointed to the Government Council of Indochina, also joining the Economic Council from 1932 to 1937. Additionally, in 1923, Phetsarath was promoted to inspector of Lao political and administrative affairs, with responsibility for organizing a consultative assembly. This position gave him the authority to expand the number of Lao in the civil service, matching his nationalist inclinations to check Vietnamese domination in this area. His patrician interest in arts and culture also stirred early expressions of nationalism among the Lao elite.

As the most powerful Lao personage in the French colonial service, Phetsarath’s role even eclipsed that of King Sisavang Vong (r. 1904–1959). When, for example, the French sought to bolster the institution of Buddhism in Laos, Phetsarath was appointed head of the Buddhist Council. In 1941 the position of viceroy, abolished with the death of Boun Kong in 1920, was revived for Phetsarath. He also became prime minister of the modernized version of the king’s council.

Phetsarath split with Crown Prince Sisavang Watthana (1907–1984; r. 1959–1975) over collaboration with the Japanese. On 27 August 1945, with the defeat of the Japanese, Phetsarath took control of Vientiane. Dismissed by the king on 10 October for seeking to resist the return of the French and to forge a single independent kingdom, on 20 October Phetsarath answered back by passing a motion in the National Assembly deposing the king. Earlier, on 12 October, Phetsarath had proclaimed himself head of an Independence Committee (Lao Issara). Dynastic rivalry aside, Phetsarath’s ambitions to rule over a unified Laos also ran into the opposition of Prince Boun Oum of Champassak, the traditional leader in the south.

Phetsarath then threw in his lot with the Lao Issara (Free Lao) government-in-exile in Thailand, joined later by the “Red Prince” Souphanouvong, who had been leading the military struggle against the French on the Mekong River front. But unlike the radical elements within the Lao Issara, who followed Souphanouvong back to Vietnam, and unlike the moderates around Souvanna Phouma, who gravitated to Vientiane, Phetsarath, stripped of his positions, vacillated, biding his time in Thailand. Although also entering into negotiations with the French,

reconciliation with the king he had dared to dethrone was a problem.

Phetsarath briefly returned to Laos in 1956 on family business before making a final return in March 1957 upon gaining his reinstatement as viceroy. With his prestige restored, he continued to work with his brothers for a unified Laos. Courted by the British and Americans, he proved no Western lackey, supporting the coalition government and even pressing for diplomatic relations to be opened with communist countries. Nevertheless, his ideals were of an independent and united Laos, geopolitically anchored to Thailand, a view shared by Souvanna Phouma. He died in retirement in 1959.

Neglected in Lao historiography, Phetsarath was undoubtedly a complex figure, a traditionalist connecting with Luang Prabang's precolonial past but, being French educated, a modernist and progressive for his time. Born to rule, he was also an aristocrat who distanced himself from his half brother's international socialist projects. Married to a Thai and spending long years in Thailand, he was also true to his paternal origins and benefactors. As a servant of France in the service of his people, his nationalist inclinations—or vanity—also turned him against France. In communist historiography, Phetsarath has long been viewed as a patriot, but in popular lore he is also revered as a man of merit.

GEOFFREY C. GUNN

See also Lao Issara; Laos (Nineteenth Century to mid-1990s); Luang Prabang; Sisavang Vong (r. 1904–1959); Souphanouvong (Red Prince) (1911–1995); Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984); Vientiane

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PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION (1896–1898)

The Philippine Revolution was a struggle for independence by a group of Filipino revolutionaries spearheaded by the Katipunan, which launched an uprising against the Spanish colonial government in 1896 that rapidly spread throughout the archipelago. The revolution was the culmination of Filipino nationalist aspirations during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, originating from the Propaganda Movement to the founding of the revolutionary Katipunan. Despite failing to attain independence, the revolution heightened the nationalist consciousness that was witnessed during the Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902), when Filipinos fought the newly installed U.S. colonial regime.

Anti-Spanish revolts prior to the mid-nineteenth century were characterized by parochial dissatisfaction toward harsh or unjust treatment at the hands of local Spanish officials or friars. The Muslim Moros had long waged a protracted struggle in resisting Spanish control ever since the inception of Spanish rule over the rest of the archipelago from the late sixteenth century. During the nineteenth century two events had a deep impact on Filipino attitudes toward the Spanish colonial regime. The tragedy of Tayabas in 1840 reflected the oppressive attitude of the Spanish authorities, who were hand in glove with the friars. Racial discrimination was the rule within the clergy: despite their education, Filipino priests were allocated only subordinate positions in the church hierarchy. When Father Apolinario de la Cruz (1814/1815–1841) sought permission to start the cofraternity of San José in Tayabas, he was denied because the Dominicans felt threatened. Nonetheless Cruz went ahead to found his order, with followers coming from Tayabas, Laguna, and Batangas. In 1841 during a meeting at Tayabas, Spanish troops killed many adherents, including Cruz. The following year, Filipino soldiers in Tayabas staged a mutiny; they were ruthlessly suppressed.

Then in 1872, Filipino troops in Cavite mutinied; the mutiny was swiftly suppressed. The Spanish friars, especially the Dominicans, feeling that Filipino intellectuals and clergy had criticized them, instigated the Spanish colonial government to take severe measures, including the arrest, imprisonment, or exile of those in-

tellectuals. Still dissatisfied, the Dominicans demanded the execution of the Filipino priests Jose Burgos, Mariano Gomez, and Jacinto Zamora; the three were executed by garroting.

The Tayabas and Cavite episodes stirred the general population to indignation but also exhibited their impotence at taking further action, owing to the repressive Spanish regime. Meanwhile a group of Filipino students—the *ilustrados*—from well-to-do families living and studying in Spain began what became known as the Propaganda Movement, which sought to convince the Spanish home government to institute reforms in the colonial administration of the Philippines. Through the columns of the newsletter *La Solidaridad*, these reformers proposed moderate demands such as freedom of speech, equality before the law, Filipino representation in the Spanish Cortes, Filipinization of the clergy, and assimilation. The influence of the Propaganda Movement was limited; some Spanish, especially fellow intellectuals, sympathized with them, but the Spanish government showed lack of interest. Airing their reformist views in the Spanish language denied the reformers the needed support from the majority of their untutored countrymen at home. However, it was not the intention of the reformers to rouse the peasant masses to revolt; their objective was to move the Spanish government to take measures to improve the colonial system.

José Rizal (1861–1896), who came from a wealthy family, was an active advocate of reform. His novels *Noli Me Tangere* (1887) and its sequel *El Filibusterismo* (1891) sought to expose the evils of the colonial regime. Rizal was a reformer, not a revolutionary, despite the strong language and damaging criticism he leveled at the Spanish colonial government in his second novel. In *Noli*, his protagonist agitated for reforms utilizing peaceful means. But in *Fili*, the same protagonist was forced to abandon peaceful measures owing to their futility, and turned to radical action including violence to achieve his ends. Rizal returned to the Philippines in 1892. He discussed his plans for reform with Governor Eulogio Despujol (t. 1891–1893), who showed interest. In July he formed La Liga Filipina, an organization that strove for the betterment of the Filipinos. But on 6 July Rizal was arrested and banished to Dapitan, Mindanao.

Rizal's writings, including his two novels, were banned in the Philippines but enjoyed a wide readership among intellectuals. Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897), born of plebeian background, was greatly influenced by Rizal and his works, in particular *El Filibusterismo*, in which force and radical solutions are advocated. Bonifacio and others revived La Liga Filipina. Its objectives were to explore all peaceful ways and legal means to convince the Spanish colonial regime to introduce reforms. When the colonial government did not pay heed to their appeals, La Liga Filipina again disbanded. Two groups emerged: the *Compromisarios* continued to advocate reforms through the support of *La Solidaridad*, and those led by Bonifacio formed the *Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan* (Society of the Sons of the People).

Witnessing the futility of peaceful means and the fruitless emphasis on reform, the Katipunan raised the standard of armed revolt. Through its underground newspaper *Kalayaan* (*Freedom*), edited by Emilio Jacinto (1857–1899), the Katipunan's cause was expressed: expulsion of all Spaniards from the Philippines and complete independence, severing all ties with Spain. An armed revolution was called for.

Only the peasants heeded Bonifacio's and the Katipunan's call for revolution. But support from the moneyed class was lacking; consequently funds were low, retarding efforts to procure arms. Therefore the readiness for an armed revolution in 1896 was premature. In July 1896, when told of the Katipunan's plans for a revolution, Rizal decried its limited resources and its timing and predicted its inevitable failure.

But when the Katipunan's revolutionary plans were betrayed to the Spanish authorities and thousands were arrested and executed, Bonifacio launched the Philippine Revolution on 30 August 1896, with the Battle of San Juan Del Monte as the first clash of arms between the Katipunan-led revolutionaries and the Spanish colonial army. A month later at Binakayan, Cavite, the revolutionaries tasted their first significant victory.

When the revolution broke out, Rizal was on his way via Spain to Cuba, where he intended to volunteer his medical services. The island colony was in the midst of the Cuban War of Independence (1895–1898), led by the writer and patriot José Martí (1853–1895).

Rizal was arrested upon his arrival in Spain and shipped back to Manila. Tried, convicted, and executed on 30 December 1896, Rizal was transformed into a martyr for the nationalist struggle.

Meanwhile, for want of arms and strong leadership the revolutionaries faced repeated setbacks on the battlefield. What is more, within the Katipunan dissension came to the fore. Despite an agreement reached on 12 March 1897, members were split between followers of Bonifacio and those of Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964), a proven military strategist. In May, Aguinaldo had Bonifacio arrested and executed.

The Pact of Biaknabato (December 1897) witnessed a brief cease-fire. In return for Aguinaldo's exile, the Spanish side agreed to grant amnesty to all Filipinos who gave up their arms and indemnify them for war damages. The Filipinos, however, were dissatisfied, as fundamental demands were not addressed: equality, representation in the Spanish Cortes, secularization, and the granting of human rights and civil freedoms. Bad faith on both sides led to renewed hostilities. Francisco Makabulos, a revolutionary leader, achieved some success in Central Luzon.

The Spanish-American War broke out in 1898. At the Battle of Manila Bay (May 1898), the U.S. Asiatic Squadron under Commodore George Dewey (1837–1917) destroyed the Spanish fleet. A Philippine-American alliance was made to defeat the common foe, Spain. On 12 June 1898, Aguinaldo declared the independence of the Philippines. By the end of June, Aguinaldo and Makabulos had secured most parts of Luzon and had laid siege to Manila. Major General Wesley E. Merritt attacked and seized Manila on 13 August 1898. Fearing a massacre, Dewey persuaded Aguinaldo and the revolutionaries not to enter Manila when the Americans launched the assault. The Spanish governor, Diego de los Rios (t. 1898), surrendered to Dewey. On 10 December 1898 the Spanish-American Treaty of Paris witnessed Spain's ceding the sovereignty of the Philippines to the United States in exchange for U.S.\$20 million. Double-crossed and cheated, the Filipino revolutionaries turned on their former allies in February 1899, starting the Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902).

The Filipino revolutionary government did not recognize the U.S. acquisition of the Philip-

pines. Instead, on 20 January 1899, Aguinaldo became the president (t. 1899–1901) of the Philippine Republic. A Congress of Representatives was convened in Malolos (October–November 1899) whereby a constitution drafted by Apolinario Mabini (1864–1903) was adopted.

Reflecting on the revolution, including Aguinaldo's resistance to the U.S. takeover, Schumacher noted: "The Revolution of 1896–1902 was indeed a nationalist revolution in which all classes of society participated. But beneath that common surge of national feeling, a complexity of motives and forces were at work, which no monolithic framework can adequately explain" (1991: 209).

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See also Aguinaldo, Emilio (1869–1964); Anti-Spanish Revolts (The Philippines); Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Cavite Mutiny; Cruz, Apolinario de la (1814/1815–1841); Dewey, Commodore George (1837–1917); *Ilustrados*; Katipunan; La Liga Filipina; *La Solidaridad*; Mabini, Apolinario (1864–1903); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; *Noli Me Tangere* (1887) and *El Filibusterismo* (1891); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Propaganda Movement; Rizal, José (1861–1896); Spanish-American Treaty of Paris (1898); Spanish-American War (1898)

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PHILIPPINE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1899–1902)

The Philippine War of Independence started on 4 February 1899, when U.S. soldiers in Manila fired at Filipino troops surrounding the city. When General Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964) noticed that the Americans intended to attack his troops, he declared war on the United States. The war that erupted was viewed differently by the two warring parties. The Filipino side considered the conflict a “war of independence,” because they had proclaimed an independent republic and saw the Americans as imperialists, bent on occupying their country. The United States did not recognize the Philippine Republic and considered itself the legitimate sovereign of the islands, after Spain had transferred the colony to it. Consequently the United States spoke of the war as the Philippine Insurrection and saw the Filipino freedom fighters as rebels.

The Spanish–American War (1898) concluded with the Treaty of Paris on 10 December 1898. Spain had agreed to cede Cuba, the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico to the United States, and the United States had promised to pay the sum of U.S.\$20 million to Spain for the transfer of the Philippines. By that time it had become clear that the U.S. government was bent on acquiring the Philippines as a colony. On 21 December U.S. president William McKinley (t. 1897–1901) delivered a proclamation, claiming jurisdiction over the Philippines and announcing the intention to rule the islands in accordance with the principle of “benevolent assimilation.”

This went against the wishes of the Filipino revolutionaries, who had proclaimed an inde-

pendent Philippine Republic, with the center of government at the town of Malolos, and had adopted a constitution for the new state. On 21 January 1899, Aguinaldo proclaimed the constitution as the supreme law of the republic, and the next day Aguinaldo was formally inaugurated as president of the new republic. What would later be called the First Republic or the Malolos Republic was now a fact.

When war broke out, the Americans had gathered a sizable army in the islands and were prepared to attack the Filipino troops and conquer the islands. General Aguinaldo had prepared his forces for conventional warfare and had put up lines of defense to block the advancing U.S. troops. However, time and again the Filipino troops were defeated; they had to abandon their positions and retreat. The Americans advanced to the north, because they thought that if they could conquer the town of Malolos, the Filipino revolutionaries would give up their resistance. In May, Malolos fell and Aguinaldo’s troops continued their retreat to the north. As a result of the retreat, the Filipino army disintegrated. In November, by which time little was left of the Filipino army, Aguinaldo and his generals decided to shift to guerrilla warfare. From then on, small Filipino units carried out attacks against U.S. troops.

The U.S. Army was at a level of 40,000 men in the first year, and reached 70,000 in 1900. Initially the soldiers were equipped with outdated rifles, but later they acquired newer ones. The Filipino side probably counted between 80,000 and 100,000 men in regular units, armed with standard European rifles, but they were short of ammunition. The Americans were better trained than the Filipinos. According to historian Glenn Anthony May (1987: 154), difference in weapons, however, was not the decisive reason why the United States had the upper hand. The main reason why the Americans won the war was that they were better trained, and that General Aguinaldo stuck to the principle of conventional warfare, instead of using guerrilla tactics at an early stage of the war. Moreover, the Philippine population was lukewarm in its support for Aguinaldo and his army. In addition, ethnic conflicts and personal rivalry weakened the Filipino military effort. In June 1899, General Luna, a competent military leader, was assassinated, probably with the knowledge of General Aguinaldo, who feared him as a rival.

Fighting continued throughout 1900. In early 1901 many Filipino commanders had been killed or captured or had surrendered. South of Manila, in the province of Batangas, U.S. forces conducted a harsh campaign against Aguinaldo's men, causing large numbers of civilian casualties (May 1993).

General Aguinaldo had withdrawn to the northeast coast, with a small group of Filipino soldiers. In a surprise attack by the Americans, assisted by Filipino auxiliary troops, General Aguinaldo was captured on 23 March 1901 in Palanan, Isabela Province. The Americans brought him to Manila. In April, Aguinaldo issued a statement acknowledging and accepting the sovereignty of the U.S. government over the Philippines and calling upon his fellow countrymen to lay down their weapons. After having taken the oath of allegiance to the U.S. government, Aguinaldo returned to private life. Three Filipino generals continued fighting in the provinces to the south of Manila, but they surrendered in the early part of 1902. On 4 July 1902 the U.S. government declared that the "Philippine Insurrection" was over and that a state of peace existed in the islands. The United States proclaimed a general amnesty for all those who had fought against the Americans. In 1901 the Americans had replaced the military government with a civilian administration. Many Filipinos from the educated stratum and the elite had offered their services to the U.S. administration in the Philippines.

However, the war was not yet over. A number of Filipino commanders with their soldiers refused to take the oath of allegiance and continued fighting against the U.S. occupation. The U.S. government now considered them criminals, who could no longer count on amnesty but could receive the death sentence if captured. In several places cultist sects with politico-religious beliefs rebelled against the Americans. The U.S. government created the Constabulary, a military police force, to deal with these law-and-order problems. By 1906 the Philippines had been brought under U.S. control, except for the Muslim provinces in the south, which took another decade to pacify.

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See also Aguinaldo, Emilio (1869–1964); Mabini, Apolinario (1864–1903); "Manifest Destiny"; Moros; Philippine Revolution

(1896–1898); Spanish–American Treaty of Paris (1898); Spanish–American War (1898)

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PHILIPPINES UNDER SPANISH COLONIAL RULE (ca. 1560s–1898)

Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines started when Captain-General Miguel López de Legazpi (1500–1572), sailing with his fleet of four ships from Mexico to Asia, landed on the island of Cebu on 27 April 1565, claimed the island for Spain, and established a fortified settlement. In 1571 the Spaniards took the town of Manila and transferred their headquarters there. In the following decades most parts of the northern and central islands were explored and brought under Spanish control. In some areas the population was never completely subdued—namely, the Muslim populations in most parts of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, and the inhabitants of the Cordillera mountain areas in northern Luzon. Spanish rule lasted for more than three centuries and ended with the defeat of the Spaniards in the Spanish–American War (1898) and the transfer of the Philippines to the United States at the Treaty of Paris in December 1898.

The Spaniards did not achieve the main objective of their expansion into Asia—that is, getting access to and control over the spice-producing islands of the Moluccas in what is presently Eastern Indonesia. First the Portuguese and later the Dutch repelled Spanish incursions into those islands. The Spaniards also failed in another objective, that of acquiring a

foothold in China and Japan in order to Christianize the inhabitants. The rulers of these countries were not sympathetic to Christian missionary activities. Spain then concentrated on its third objective—namely, Christianizing the people in the Philippine Islands. A moderate degree of Hispanization was the result.

Governing the Philippines was difficult because of the great distance between Spain and its colony. At the top of the Spanish imperial bureaucracy stood the Spanish king and the Royal Council of the Indies. Until Mexican independence in 1821, the Philippines was governed via the viceroyalty of New Spain (Mexico) in Central America. From 1836 until the end of Spanish rule in the Philippines, the colony was under the Ministry of Overseas Colonies in Madrid. The highest official in the Philippines was the governor and captain-general, who represented the Crown and was the head of the colonial government and the commander-in-chief of the army and navy. He was assisted by the *Audiencia*, a tribunal that performed three functions—namely, advising the governor on political and legal matters, initiating legislation, and acting as the highest court of law in important cases.

In the Philippines under Spanish rule the state and the Catholic Church were closely interconnected. The important role of the church originated from an exclusively Spanish institution, the *patronato real*, or the royal patronage. The pope had granted to the Spanish kings the rights and duties of patron of the Catholic Church in the colonies—that is, the obligation to spread the Catholic faith among the conquered peoples, to support the church financially, and the privilege of appointing suitable personages in ecclesiastical positions. The pope had granted this royal patronage because the Holy See did not have at its disposal a missionary organization capable of Christianizing the populations in the newly discovered lands.

As a result the Spanish colonial system was based on two pillars. Parallel to the political and civil administrative machinery ran the ecclesiastical organization. Accompanying the first groups of Spanish conquistadors were members of the main religious orders: the Augustinians, Franciscans, Jesuits, Dominicans, and Recollects. These friars Christianized the people in the areas occupied by the Spanish soldiers, built churches, and organized the provision of reli-

gious services. The head of the church in the Philippines was the archbishop of Manila. In the small towns at the local level, power was in the hands of the local priest, who supervised the local officials, collected taxes, managed the local funds, reported to the higher Spanish officials, and executed public orders.

The Spaniards had been drawn to Asia in the expectation of getting access to potential sources of wealth and to important trade routes. That expectation was not realized. The Portuguese and the Dutch blocked them from entering the profitable trade between Asia and Europe. Contrary to early expectations the Philippines turned out not to have large deposits of precious metals. And the much-sought-after spices, such as pepper, nutmeg, and cloves, did not grow well in the Philippine Islands.

However, after the capture of Manila the Spaniards discovered a profitable trade link. Chinese traders brought silk and porcelain to Manila in exchange for silver. Spanish galleons then transported these oriental goods to Mexico, where they fetched high prices. The returning galleons brought a steady flow of Spanish-American silver to Asia. Manila became the big entrepôt in the China-Manila-Acapulco trade, and once a year the galleon plied the route between the Philippines and Mexico. The profits of this trade benefited both the Crown and private traders in Manila. The first galleon sailed in 1565, and the last returned in 1815 (Schurz 1939).

Until the end of the eighteenth century the Philippines did not produce goods that could be exported. The Spanish merchants were concentrated in Manila, depending for their trade on the annual galleon. They hardly spread out to the provinces, and they were not inclined to take up agriculture. Because local resources did not yield enough money to maintain the colonial administration, the government was constantly running a deficit and had to be supported with an annual subsidy from the Spanish government in Mexico, the *situado*. The Spanish government in the islands was facing high military expenses, combating the threats from the Dutch and the English as well as attacks from Muslim and Chinese pirates. In 1762–1764 the British occupied Manila.

A typical feature of Spanish rule was the emergence of large estates owned by the religious orders. These haciendas were situated in

the provinces adjacent to Manila. The friars claimed that the land had been donated to them by Spaniards or by Filipino chiefs, and that they had the right of ownership. Filipino tenants worked the land and paid rent to the friars. The income from these haciendas supported religious institutions, such as hospitals and schools. The Filipino tenants often protested rent increases and abusive levies by the friars. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the friar estates became the focus of strong resentment among the Filipino middle class (Roth 1977).

Throughout the period of Spanish rule the government had to contend with revolts and rebellions of the indigenous population, the *Indios* as the Spaniards called them. Historians have recorded more than a hundred revolts. Aside from that there were numerous small, local disturbances and uprisings that have not been documented. The causes of these revolts were numerous and diverse. During the first decades, when the Spanish rulers attempted to establish control over areas and to Christianize the population, local chiefs and their followers resisted. In later periods uprisings broke out against the excessive tribute and forced labor requirements imposed by the Spaniards. In several places the local population revolted against the usurpation of land by the friar orders. In 1762–1765 a large-scale revolt took place in the Ilocos provinces, led by Diego Silang and after his death by his wife, Gabriela, against Spanish domination. Indigenous religious movements, even when they were inspired by the Christian faith, became the focus of Spanish repression. In 1841 a Spanish army crushed the cofraternity led by Apolinario de la Cruz, whom they suspected of rebellion against the colonial government; they massacred hundreds of his followers. The general pattern was that the Spaniards crushed the rebellion by military force and with the assistance of loyal Filipino troops, and that the rebel leader was executed.

In the last decades of the eighteenth century the Spanish government became convinced of the need to make the Philippines more profitable. Attempts were made to introduce new crops in the islands, such as indigo, cotton, and pepper, and to start large-scale plantations. In 1785 the government in Madrid created the Royal Philippine Company, a trade company that would ship the new products to Spain and

at the same time carry out trade with Asia and the Americas. Although some of the company's operations had been successful, as an overall enterprise it failed, and in 1834 the company was terminated.

Another attempt to raise income for the government in Manila was the creation of the tobacco monopoly in 1781. Under this scheme the colonial government assumed control over tobacco trade and manufacture in a number of provinces on the island of Luzon. In these areas farmers had to grow tobacco and to sell the produce to the government at fixed prices. The government then sold the tobacco to the Filipino consumers, earning a profit on the sales. During the nineteenth century the system was criticized for its forced labor and the many abuses inherent to it. In 1883 the tobacco monopoly was finally abolished (De Jesus 1980).

During the nineteenth century Philippine agriculture underwent a process of commercialization. Foreign merchants, mainly British and Americans, came to the Philippines to buy agricultural products, such as sugar, Manila hemp (abaca), and tobacco. Filipino landowners produced these crops on an increasingly large scale. Until the end of the century exports were steadily rising. The foreign merchant houses played an important role as bankers, extending credit to Filipino farmers and boosting production, and the foreign firms imported textiles and machinery (Legarda 1999).

The commercialization of the economy brought about changes in the socioeconomic structure of Philippine society. For centuries Chinese traders had come to the islands, and many of them had settled around Manila. The rise of commercial agriculture attracted more Chinese migrants, who fanned out to the provinces. Many of them became intermediary traders between the foreign merchant houses in Manila and the farmers in the rural areas (Wickberg 1965). Chinese mestizos—that is, the children of Chinese fathers and Filipina mothers—became landowners engaged in the cultivation of cash crops. This stratum of relatively well-to-do farmers became a rising middle class, availing themselves of imported luxury goods, and sending their children to study abroad.

In the nineteenth century the colonial government, shocked by the independence struggle of the Spanish-American colonies, grew increasingly nervous about a possible Filipino

uprising. They feared that the newly emerging mestizo class of commercial landowners would take over control of the country. The government considered the Spanish friars to be the most loyal and dependable executioners of the Spanish rule, and it looked at the secular Filipino priests as politically unreliable. In the 1850s and 1860s the government followed a policy of replacing Filipino priests in parishes with Spanish friars. Some Filipino priests protested against this policy. This controversy became the background of the events of 1872. In that year a group of Filipino soldiers in the Spanish army rose in mutiny. The uprising was quickly suppressed. The government then accused three leading Filipino priests—Mariano Gomez, José Burgos, and Jacinto Zamora—of having directed the revolt. The priests were brought before a tribunal, and although evidence was lacking, they were sentenced to death and executed. This made a deep impression on the Filipino population. The three priests, conveniently referred to as “Gomburza,” were considered martyrs and became a rallying symbol in the revolution of 1896.

The 1880s and early 1890s were a period of increasing social and political unrest among the Filipino population. The Spanish government suppressed any attempt at political protest, and even moderate attempts at political reform. The wave of arrests, deportations, and executions in 1872 forced many young Filipinos to leave the country and go to Europe. Filipino expatriates in Spain formed the Propaganda Movement, which aimed at political reforms in the colony. When the Spanish government did not heed their pleas, the attitude among Filipino nationalists became more radical. In the Philippines a secret organization, the Katipunan, was formed, which started a revolution in 1896. Two and a half years later Spain had definitely lost the Philippines.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also *Abaca* (Manila Hemp); Aguinaldo, Emilio (1869–1964); Anti-Spanish Revolts (the Philippines); *Barangay*; Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Catholicism; Cavite Mutiny; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Cruz, Apolinario de la (1814/1815–1841); Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship; Galleon Trade; Katipunan; Luzon; Maluku (The Moluccas); Manila; Mestizo; Miscegenation; Missionaries,

Christian; Moros; Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Pre-Hispanic Philippines; Propaganda Movement; Rizal, José (1861–1896); Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Spanish Philippines; Spanish-American Treaty of Paris (1898); Spanish-American War (1898); Spices and the Spice Trade; Sugar; Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Tobacco; Visayan Islands (Bisayan Islands, the Bisayas, the Visayas)

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PHILIPPINES UNDER U.S. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION (1898–1946)

U.S. colonial administration of the Philippines lasted from 1898 to 1946, broken only by the Pacific War (1941–1945), when Japan occupied the Philippines for three years (1942–1945).

The period of direct civil colonial administration lasted from 1900 to 1941. During this period, the Americans implemented colonial policies attempting to mold Filipinos in their image. The Americans, however, were not fully decided on whether to keep the Philippines or not, and that, together with the Filipino clamor for independence, led to changing political policies. On the one hand, a strong colonial political presence was manifested by Republican administrations; the Democrat administration of Woodrow Wilson (t. 1913–1921) and his governor-general, Francis Burton Harrison (t. 1913–1921), on the other hand, opted for greater autonomy for Filipinos. Policies relating to security, trade, public works, health and sanitation, and education, however, remained consistent, as did the Filipino campaign for independence.

During the U.S. colonial administration, significant developments were achieved in road construction and infrastructure building; the educational level was raised; hygiene and sanitation were greatly improved; and the standard of living in cities and some towns went up. However, because of the U.S. free-trade policy, the Philippine economy remained agricultural and dependent on cash crop production, particularly sugar. The Philippine economy was tied to the U.S. market, and, as a result of the unequal distribution of wealth, the gap between the rich in the cities and towns and the poor rural peasants became increasingly apparent. Peasant uprisings occurred periodically as social tensions escalated.

The campaign for independence by Filipinos, as well as changing U.S. priorities in the 1930s, also brought about acts that paved the way for an end to U.S. rule and Philippine independence. The Tydings-McDuffie Act, which promised the end of U.S. colonial rule after a ten-year transitory period, was passed by the U.S. Congress and was approved by the Filipinos. The Philippine Commonwealth government was inaugurated in 1935, pursuant to that act; the commonwealth was an almost autonomous government that would address the problems of becoming independent, such as national defense, economic restructuring, and changing relations with the United States. Halfway through the transition period, war broke out in the Pacific, and Imperial Japanese forces occupied the Philippines.

U.S. colonial administration of the Philippines had five distinct periods: 1900 to 1913, 1913 to 1921, 1921 to 1927, 1927 to 1935, and 1935 to 1941. The first period, from 1900 to 1913, was marked by the establishment of a civil administration taking over from U.S. military rule that was set up in 1898. The arrival of the Second Philippine Commission, otherwise known as the Taft Commission (headed by William Howard Taft), began the shift from military government to civil administration. The Taft Commission assumed legislative functions and limited executive powers in September 1900, and on 4 July 1901 it took over from the military government. The basic U.S. policy for the Philippines was to create a Philippines for Filipinos, using the American way of life as a model. The initial priorities of the colonial administration were to restore peace and order, subduing anti-American sentiment; to end the Filipino-American War (1899–1902); and to establish U.S. sovereignty through a civil government. Taft's Philippine Commission had both legislative and executive functions; Taft became the first civil governor-general to the Philippines, becoming the representative of the U.S. president in the Philippines. Provincial and municipal governments were set up as the Philippine Constabulary, a national paramilitary force created to crush armed resistance to the Americans, control lawless elements, and maintain order. Laws suppressing the clamor for independence were passed, such as the Flag Law, which prohibited the display of the flag adopted by the 1898 Philippine Republic. The Sedition and Brigandage Acts made utterances and armed uprisings against the Americans punishable as criminal acts. Armed Filipino nationalistic movements were eventually crushed, but the quest for independence continued in other nonviolent ways.

There were five U.S. governors-general during the first period of American colonial rule: William Howard Taft, Luke E. Wright, Henry C. Ide, James F. Smith, and William Cameron Forbes. Taft's influence in Philippine affairs continued even after his term as governor-general expired; he became secretary of war and president of the United States (t. 1909–1913). The Philippines was under the direct authority of the president through the governor-general in the Philippines. In 1902 the U.S. Congress passed the Philippine Act, which served as the basic law for the Philippines until 1916. The

Philippine Act legitimized the president's acts until then and gave him continuing authority over the Philippines.

The first period of U.S. colonial rule saw the introduction of a nationwide public education system, through which American ideas and the English language were taught. The University of the Philippines was founded in 1908 to provide higher education, and selected Filipinos were sent to the United States to study as government scholars.

Health and sanitation measures were taken almost immediately to reduce illness. Mapping of the Philippines and the construction of roads, government buildings, schools, and ports were also a priority of the U.S. colonial administration.

In its operations, the Philippine Commission was also guided by the principle of Filipinizing the administration as much as practicable, and as consistent with U.S. interests. The Philippine Commission, in creating the bureaucracy of government, trained and hired Filipinos in the civil service; provincial and municipal officials were elected to office in most cases. Filipinos were appointed to the Philippine Commission, but they were always the minority during the first period of U.S. rule. The Philippine Act of 1902 provided for the creation of a Filipino legislative body to complement the Philippine Commission, and it was created in 1907. The Philippines thus had a bicameral legislature, with the U.S.-dominated Philippine Commission as the upper house and the Filipino-dominated Philippine Assembly serving as the lower. To give some representation to Filipinos in the United States, the Philippine Bill also created the position of Philippine resident commissioner to the United States.

The advent of Filipinos in politics resulted in the first Filipino political parties being formed. The Americans encouraged party politics following the U.S. pattern, and the first Filipino political party was the Partido Federal (Federal Party), which was founded in December 1901. The Federal Party advocated acceptance of U.S. sovereignty and eventual statehood. It was not popular with Filipinos, however, and nationalist, proindependence parties were formed soon after. The strongest and most successful of these was the Nacionalista Party, formally organized from other nationalist parties in 1907.

Other priorities of the early U.S. colonial administration were the opening of markets for Philippine products, stabilizing the Philippine peso, and attempting to implement a form of land reform by buying lands owned by Spanish religious orders (friar lands) and selling them to Filipinos.

One of the reasons for U.S. acquisition of the Philippines was the opening of markets for U.S. goods in Asia. Preferential relations between the United States and the Philippines could start only in 1909, however, when a provision maintaining the status quo in trade in the Treaty of Paris lapsed. In 1909 the U.S. Congress passed the Payne-Aldrich Act, which allowed all U.S. goods to enter the Philippines duty-free; conversely, the Philippines could export all products without paying duties except on rice, while sugar and tobacco could be exported under fixed quotas. The 1913 Underwood-Simmons Act removed all quotas and established a system of free trade between the United States and the Philippines. This was opposed by Filipinos in the Philippine Assembly, who foresaw a dependency relationship, an unbalanced economy, and a loss of revenues for the insular government.

During the first period of U.S. colonial rule, Mindanao and Sulu with their Muslim populations were constituted as the Moro Province, and they remained under a military governor until 1913.

The second period lasted from 1913 to 1921, with a Democrat administration in the United States under President Woodrow Wilson (t. 1913–1921). The governor-general in the Philippines during this period was Francis Burton Harrison (t. 1913–1921), who advocated greater autonomy for the Philippines and made Filipinization his main priority. By the end of his term, 96 percent of the Philippine government was in Philippine hands, and Harrison had granted Filipino political leaders under Manuel L. Quezon (1878–1944) and Sergio Osmeña, Sr. (1878–1961) great leeway in governing the country. He felt that Filipinization and actual hands-on training were the best way to prepare for independence, particularly with the passage of the Jones Law in 1916, which stated that the U.S. government would relinquish its sovereignty and recognize Philippine independence once stable government had been achieved. Harrison also encouraged gov-

ernment involvement in the economy, through government-owned and -controlled companies, in order to diversify the economy. Filipinization made Harrison very popular with Filipinos, but it made him unpopular among Americans who wanted greater control over the Philippines. It also resulted in inefficiency and corruption.

The third period (1921 to 1927) marked the return of strong U.S. political presence under Governor-General Leonard Wood (t. 1921–1927). Wood clashed with Filipino nationalist aspirations, which resulted in a stormy political relationship. Adversarial relations peaked in the Cabinet Crisis of 1923, wherein most members of the Filipino cabinet resigned over Wood's decision to reinstate a U.S. police agent under investigation. Wood managed, however, to restore efficiency and control corruption in government.

The fourth period (1927–1935) saw a balancing of U.S. interests with Filipino aspirations, with subsequent governors-general—Henry L. Stimson, Dwight F. Davis, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and Frank Murphy—adopting more conciliatory policies.

Filipino politicians campaigned for independence throughout all periods, and in 1933 the U.S. Congress passed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, which provided for Philippine independence after a ten-year transition. Quezon rejected it because of several unacceptable points; he then went to the United States to seek a better bill. The result was the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which resembled the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. This was accepted by the Philippine legislature in 1934.

With the acceptance of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, a constitutional convention was formed that drafted the constitution for the Philippine Commonwealth government and that would serve as the basic charter for the future Philippine Republic.

The last period of U.S. colonial rule was the Philippine Commonwealth government period, from 1935 to 1941. The commonwealth was a nearly autonomous government that would prepare the Philippines for independence after ten years. Elected president of the commonwealth was Quezon, with Osmeña as vice-president. The commonwealth had to face serious problems in order to prepare the Philippines for independence. These

included social reform, land reform, preparing for national defense, economic diversification, and building stronger national consciousness. During the commonwealth years the Philippines remained a colony of the United States, which held power over currency and coinage as well as foreign affairs. The post of governor-general was abolished, and in its stead was created the American high commissioner, who served as representative of the U.S. president but did not have actual legislative or executive functions.

War in the Pacific broke out before the commonwealth period was over; Japanese occupation ended the forty years of U.S. colonial rule abruptly. The impact of those years is still very visible in the Philippines today.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Filipinization; Harrison, Francis Burton (1873–1957); “Manifest Destiny”; Philippines–U.S. “Special Relationship”; Taft, William Howard (1857–1930)

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PHILIPPINES–U.S. “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”

The historical relationship between the Philippines and the United States, spanning more than a century, has been characterized as “colonial” (from 1898 to 1946) and “neocolonial” (from 1946 to the present). It has been variously described as a “special relationship,” a “love-hate relationship,” an “unequal relationship,” a case of “sentimental imperialism,” and “slaying the father.” Advocates for continuing the relationship went so far in the 1950s as to propose U.S. statehood for the Philippines. Those opposed essentially blame the United States for the many political, economic, and social ills that the Philippines suffers to this day. The former group values the sense of freedom and public education that the United States introduced. The latter argues that U.S. exploitation of the Philippine economy made it weaker and essentially dependent on the United States, even long after the Philippines became independent.

The Americans themselves point out that the Philippines was a successful experiment in Western-style democracy with the introduction of representative government and popular institutions such as political parties and elections, due process, checks and balances, and the principle of self-government. Also, they take pride in the fact that they honored their commitment to restore Philippine independence peacefully after a transition period. That was unlike the case of most colonies in Southeast Asia, which had to wage long and bloody struggles against their former colonial masters to regain their independence. Still, Filipino nationalists argue that the political freedoms and practices the Americans introduced benefited mainly the native elite, known as *ilustrados* (the educated class), and were essentially meaningless to the vast majority of Filipinos. The economic foundation of the society, which was dominated by the conservative elite, was not reformed sufficiently to redress the unequal distribution of resources and justice in the feudal system after 300 years of Spanish rule. It remained intact under the succeeding American colonizers.

What is more, the United States established two huge and several medium-size military bases and facilities at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay, as well as in various other parts of the country, ostensibly for technical assistance and mutual security. This effectively embroiled the Philippines in the U.S. war effort and activities in other parts of Asia—notably in Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s. The U.S. bases were a constant irritant in Philippine–U.S. relations. They actually became a major factor in the resurgence of Philippine nationalism in the 1960s. A continuous campaign by nationalist elements to terminate the bases on Philippine soil did not succeed until 1991, when its Senate abrogated the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) with the United States, whose original lease was for ninety-nine years. In 1992 the last U.S. military troops departed from Subic Bay.

But that is not the end of Philippine–U.S. relations. Only the MBA was terminated. Other agreements between the two countries, such as the Mutual Security Treaty signed in 1951, remained. This means that should there be an attack against the Philippines by external forces, the United States is obligated under the treaty to come to the defense of its former colony.

During the short-lived Estrada presidency (1998–2000), the Philippine Senate approved a Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which would allow the United States to conduct military exercises in the Philippines but not to establish basing rights on Philippine territory.

This was essentially used to send 1,000 U.S. troops, including 660 Special Forces or “advisers,” from Hawai‘i to the Philippines. The intention is to train the Filipino military in defeating the Abu Sayyaf (“Bearer of the Sword”), the extremist Muslim group in Basilan, Mindanao, that had been identified as a front for Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist organization. This sparked a political firestorm in the Philippines, with demonstrators claiming that it was an affront to Philippine sovereignty. On the other hand, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (t. 2000–2004; 2004–) has fully supported the U.S. military deployment, vowing to “crush” the Abu Sayyaf. Her administration has hired a foreign secretary who is more compatible with her foreign policy position regarding the United States than her predecessor. In return the Philippine government stands to gain about U.S.\$100 million for the modernization of its

military and to fund projects for poverty alleviation and other social programs.

In effect, Philippine-U.S. relations continue after a lapse of six years during the Clinton administration (1993–1999). The presence of a large Filipino community in the United States, now estimated at 2 million not counting “illegals,” is a major factor in the continuing relationship. They are positively disposed to the continuing role of the United States in Philippine affairs, although a small but vocal minority espouses the need to respect Philippine sovereignty. And the substantial remittances they send back home help to shore up the Philippine economy, which continues to be hounded by a spate of human and natural disasters in addition to the fundamental problems associated with its complex history. The United States continues to be the prime destination of thousands of Filipinos every year, who arrive with immigrant and nonimmigrant visas.

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See also Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration; U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia

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PHNOM PENH

Cambodia's Commercial Heart

Phnom Penh, capital of Cambodia since 1866, is the country's largest city, with a population estimated at approximately 1.1 million in 2000 (United Nations 2002: 46). Founded in the fifteenth century following the abandonment of Angkor, Phnom Penh rapidly became a commercial center, acting as an entrepôt for goods coming south along the Mekong, southeast along the Tonle Sap, and northward from the Mekong Delta. Cambodia's capital during this

period was at Lovek, or at Udong, both north of the city, but in the seventeenth century, the thriving port of Phnom Penh hosted traders and missionaries from Japan, Portugal, The Netherlands, China, and elsewhere. In 1811, when the Vietnamese established a protectorate over Cambodia, Phnom Penh became the royal capital until the court returned to Udong in 1848.

The greatest expansion of the city occurred during the French colonial period (1863–1953). Phnom Penh became Cambodia's capital again in 1866. Under French tutelage swamps were drained; the royal palace, villas, and government offices were built; and tree-lined boulevards, modeled on those of provincial France, were laid out. From the 1940s until 1970, Phnom Penh was arguably the prettiest and most orderly capital city in Southeast Asia. Its population rose gradually in the colonial era, with the largest number of newcomers being immigrants from China and Vietnam, who soon dominated the commercial sector. Cambodia's first high school, the Lycee Sisowath, was founded in Phnom Penh in 1935.

During the early years of independence, Phnom Penh's population continued to grow, reaching approximately 500,000 in 1970. In the Cambodian civil war of 1970–1975, an estimated 2 million refugees from rural areas sought asylum in the city, where they lived (and often died) under horrendous conditions (Chandler 1991: 122).

Following the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975, the entire population of Phnom Penh was evacuated to the countryside as part of the new regime's anti-urban, propeasant policies. Money, markets, and schools were abolished. Under Democratic Kampuchea (DK), fewer than 50,000 soldiers, government employees, and factory workers were allowed to live in the city, under close surveillance (Kiernan 1995: 26). When DK was overthrown in the course of a Vietnamese invasion in 1979, thousands of former residents flocked back into Phnom Penh to find public services nonexistent and much of the city's infrastructure in ruins. In the 1980s services were gradually restored, and the population expanded rapidly, outstripping the capacity of the administration to provide clean water, sewage treatment, electricity, and paved streets. By the mid-1980s, perhaps 200,000 people inhabited the city (Gottesman 2002: 39). When Cambodia opted for a free-market economy in



Rush-hour traffic in Phnom Penh. (Michael S. Yamashita/Corbis)

1989, a modest boom occurred in housing and hotel construction. But the city expanded even more dramatically in the late 1990s, when Cambodia's long civil war came to an end, political stability returned, and Cambodia joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). During these years, a flourishing garment industry, employing over 150,000 people, sprang up on the outskirts of the city (Pottebaum 2002: 36). Phnom Penh's population doubled in these years, as people poured in from the impoverished countryside seeking uncertain economic opportunities (Gottesman 2002: 122). Government services were inadequate in the face of the influx, and many streets in the city remained unpaved and became impassable in the rainy season. Serious traffic problems developed along several major streets, and there were frequent outbreaks of violent crime. Under an energetic mayor, and with infrastructural assistance, largely from Japan, several beautification projects were undertaken in the late 1990s, and the city regained some of its earlier glamour. The city continues to serve as an important freshwater port. Its name, "Penh mountain," refers to a small hill, topped by a Buddhist temple, at the northern edge of the city.

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See also Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Hun Sen (1951–); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); *Killing Fields, The*; Lon Nol (1913–1984); Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK); Pol Pot (Salth Sar) (1925–1998); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–)

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**PHRA NARET (KING NARESUAN)
(r. 1590–1605)**

Siam's Warrior-King

A notable warrior-king of Siam, Naresuan rebelled against the king of Burma (Myanmar) and freed Ayutthaya from the Burmese yoke during the latter part of the sixteenth century.

Naresuan was a son of King Maha Thammaracha (r. 1569–1590), a former ruler of Phitsanulok who sided with the Burmese when they attacked Ayutthaya. Naresuan was descended from the royal family of Sukhothai on his father's side, while his mother was a daughter of King Maha Chakraphat (r. 1548–1569). Even before the Siamese defeat and the fall of Ayutthaya in 1569, Naresuan had been given to the Burmese king as a hostage for his father's good behavior, and he spent part of his youth at the Burmese court.

After his return to Siam, Naresuan was appointed ruler of Phitsanulok. He rapidly gathered followers, declared Siamese autonomy from Burma, and defeated the Burmese in several battles and skirmishes. King Nanda Bayin (r. 1581–ca. 1599) of Burma tried to recapture Ayutthaya in 1586–1587 and later sent large invasion forces to Siam under his son the crown prince, in 1590 and 1592–1593. Under Naresuan's personal leadership, the Siamese armies successfully withstood all Burmese pressure. Naresuan's most famous victory was at the Battle of Nong Sarai in early 1593, when, according to the Siamese chronicles, he killed the Burmese crown prince in a battle on elephant-back while completely surrounded by enemy troops.

Having repulsed the Burmese invaders, Naresuan soon turned the tables and invaded Burma. Although he took several Burmese or Mon towns, the Siamese king failed to conquer Toungoo, running out of provisions after a siege lasting two months. What Naresuan managed to do was to reconquer the key trading ports of Mergui (Tenasserim) and Tavoy on the Bay of Bengal. Right at the end of his reign Naresuan was still involved in a military campaign against Burma. Indeed, he died at Muang Hang while on his way to fight Burma.

Naresuan had also to contend with a constant threat from the Cambodians, who made

raids into Siam to gather captives and increase their manpower. Naresuan launched an invasion of Cambodia in 1593–1594 and managed to capture the Cambodian capital of Lovek. During this campaign many Siamese who had been taken to Cambodia, plus several Cambodian war captives, were brought back to Siam to bolster the kingdom's manpower resources.

Apart from conquering Cambodia, Naresuan also turned his attention northward and succeeded in placing Lan Na under Ayutthaya's suzerainty. Naresuan may be said to have secured, through his military successes, Siam's borders on the western, eastern, and northern sides.

Naresuan's reign was also notable for the contacts with foreign traders, and for diplomacy. The Spaniards and the Dutch came to Siam for the first time during Naresuan's reign, in 1598 and 1604, respectively. The Spanish governor of Manila sent an embassy to Siam and a treaty was concluded, allowing the Spaniards to reside and trade in Siam. But Spanish ambitions in mainland Southeast Asia ended in failure, especially their involvement in Cambodia, and Hispano-Siamese trading relations did not prosper. The Dutch, in the form of the United East India Company (VOC), arrived in Siam hoping to get to China on Siamese ships. Although their hopes were disappointed in this aspect, they stayed on to trade, opening a factory or agency in Ayutthaya during the next reign, that of Ekathotsarot (r. 1605–1610/1611).

Naresuan appeared to have kept well abreast of developments elsewhere in Asia: witness his correspondence with the Chinese court on the subject of the Japanese. The Siamese king suggested to the Chinese that Siam and China join forces to subdue the Japanese shogun Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1537–1598), who had been pursuing an expansionist policy in East Asia. The Chinese did not respond positively to Naresuan's proposal, but the episode shows the Siamese king's high estimation of his kingdom's place in the region.

Historical evidence on this king is full of contradictions. In Thai historiography Naresuan is portrayed as a national hero who liberated the country from Burmese domination. But Western sources are not totally complimentary about Naresuan's way of governing the kingdom. The Flemish diamond trader Jacques de Coutre, who visited Ayutthaya during Nare-

suan's reign, and the Dutch merchant Jeremias van Vliet, writing in the 1630s, both relate that Naresuan's reign was characterized by examples of strict discipline and even cruelty on the part of the king.

King Naresuan's prominent place in Thai history is, however, ensured on account of his military prowess and victories against the Burmese and Cambodians. He died at the age of fifty in 1605 and was succeeded by his brother Ekathotsarot, also known as Phra Ramesuan (r. 1605–1610/1611).

DHIRAVAT NA POMBEJRA

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Burma-Siam Wars; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Pitsanulok (Phitsanulok); Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Sukhotai (Sukhodava); Tenasserim; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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PHYA TAKSIN (PHYA TAK [SIN], KING TAKSIN) (r. 1767–1782)

Unifier of Siam

Taksin, King of Siam, is portrayed in Thai historiography as the unifier of the Siamese kingdom, which had been torn asunder by the Burmese invasion and capture of Ayutthaya. The period of his reign is known as the "Thonburi period" in Thai history, after the city of Thonburi (opposite present-day Bangkok), where he set up his capital.

Born a commoner, Sin was the son of a Chinese father, a tax farmer of Teochiu descent, and a Siamese mother. He was adopted by a noble family and grew up in the capital, receiving his education from a Buddhist monastery there. By 1767 he had risen to the position of governor of Tak, a town to the northwest of

Ayutthaya—hence his being known as “Phya Tak (Sin)” or “Taksin.”

At the time of Ayutthaya’s final capitulation to the Burmese in 1767, Taksin was able to lead a small band of 500 followers out of the doomed capital. Establishing themselves near the mouth of the Chao Phya (Phraya) River, and increasing their power eastward to places such as Chanthabun, Taksin and his supporters became one of five main power groups vying for political supremacy in post-1767 Siam. The other groups were those of Prince Thep Phiphit, a member of the old Ayutthaya royal family, now based in Phimai in northeastern Siam; the governor of Phitsanulok; the priest-prince of Fang (near Phitsanulok); and the governor of the southern city of Nakhon Si Thammarat (Ligor).

Once he had driven out the small Burmese army and set about eliminating his political rivals one by one, Taksin consolidated his status as king and revived the Siamese economy. There was much hardship, even famine, during the first years of Taksin’s reign, and foodstuffs had to be imported. The existence of a Chinese (presumably Teochiu) network of traders in the Gulf of Siam and the Malay and Indonesian archipelagoes facilitated the purchase of provisions and weapons necessary for the continued conduct of war. Taksin bought guns and ammunition from, among others, the Dutch and the Danes, trading with Dutch Batavia via Chinese intermediaries.

His reign was notable for vigorous campaigns to ensure that Siam was no longer vulnerable to outside invasion, and for a first attempt to revive a Siamese Buddhist state. Taksin sent armies to annex Battambang and Siem Reap in Cambodia as early as 1769, and during the 1770s the king and his forces captured Chiang Mai and other northern cities. Control or suzerainty over Chiang Mai was considered essential if Siam was to avoid a repeat of the Burmese invasion that had led to the fall of Ayutthaya.

Taksin conquered the port polity of Ha Tien on the Cambodian coast, a key trading center then controlled by a Cantonese Chinese warlord, Mac Thien Tu (1700–1780). Ha Tien may have been attacked because of its strategic importance in the trade of the region, with its access to the forest products of the Mekong basin.

The major diplomatic initiative undertaken by King Taksin was to reestablish relations with

China, and to be recognized as a legitimate ruler by the Chinese Imperial Court. After several attempts he succeeded in gaining a measure of recognition from China.

Taksin was a Sino-Siamese whose rise to power had more to do with the possession of political charisma and military skills than with any blood ties to royalty or the old nobility of Ayutthaya. Nevertheless he seems to have been able to command the allegiance of the majority of his nobles and courtiers for a considerable time. Two of his staunchest allies were the brothers Chaophraya Chakri (Thong Duang) and Chaophraya Surasi (Bunma), who served as his military commanders. They conducted the military campaigns waged by Siam in Laos and Cambodia, and were instrumental in repelling a major Burmese invasion in 1775.

Following political conflict, King Taksin was dethroned in 1782. Chaophraya Chakri, fighting a campaign in Cambodia, was compelled to rush back to Thonburi and restore order. He ascended the throne as the first king of the Chakri dynasty and is known as Rama I. Taksin was executed. The circumstances of his fall continue to be a point of debate in historical circles. Siamese chronicles and a contemporary French missionary source tell of the king’s descent into madness, owing to an excess of religious zeal. But a revisionist interpretation of King Taksin’s place in Thai history ascribes the monarch’s “insanity” to hostile propaganda written by adherents of the new dynasty. However, Taksin’s vital role in the unification and revival of Siam after its total defeat at the hands of the Burmese in 1767 cannot be doubted.

DHIRAVAT NA POMBEJRA

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Bangkok; Battambang; Burma-Siam Wars; Chiang Mai; Hatien; Isan; Ligor/Nakhon; Mac Thien Tu (1700–1780); Pitsanulok (Phitsanulok)

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PIGNEAU DE BÉHAINE, PIERRE JOSEPH GEORGES, BISHOP OF ADRAN (1741–1799)

Friend to the Nguyễn

From 1787 to 1799, Pierre Joseph Georges Pigneau de Béhaine, French missionary bishop in Cochin China, organized vital military assistance in support of Nguyễn Anh's successful bid to restore his dynasty to the imperial throne of Vietnam.

Born in 1741, Pigneau joined the Société des Missions Étrangères and entered Cochin China in 1765. Driven out of Hatien in 1769, he retreated to the French settlement of Pondicherry in India where, after founding a seminary, he was appointed titular bishop of Adran and vicar apostolic of Cochin China, returning to Hatien in 1775. Here Pigneau encountered the youthful Prince Nguyễn Anh, who was organizing a revolt against the Tayson ruler, and he participated in Anh's seizure and subsequent loss of Saigon. Anh sent the bishop to plead with the French governor at Pondicherry, Conway, for military assistance. Since help was denied, Pigneau embarked for France where, on arrival in 1787, he was lionized at the French court and negotiated a Franco-Vietnamese treaty that he signed on Anh's behalf. Pigneau raised funds mainly from private French donations and returned to Pondicherry with sufficient funds to overcome the reluctance of Governor Conway to organize a military and naval expedition. Equipped with four ships, ample munitions, and a body of volunteers, Pigneau made a highly significant contribution to the success of Anh's bid for power. Arriving at Saigon in 1789 shortly after the prince's recapture of the town, Pigneau helped Anh extend and consolidate control over much of Cochin China during the following decade. Pigneau's

corps of volunteers, especially the naval officer Jean Marie Dayot and the fortress engineer Olivier de Puymanel, played significant roles in the conquest of much of the rest of Vietnam. By the time that Anh ascended the throne as the emperor Gia Long in 1802, Pigneau had been dead for two years, after succumbing to dysentery at the age of fifty-eight.

PATRICK TUCK

See also Cochin China; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; Hatien; Missionaries, Christian; Nguyễn Anh (Emperor Gia Long) (r. 1802–1820); Société des Missions Étrangères (MEP); Tây-son Rebellion (1771–1802)

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PIRACY

"Piracy" is often reported from contemporary Southeast Asia, particularly from the Straits of Melaka. The word has been widely used in Southeast Asia's past, but in a variety of ways.

In the traditional Malay world, there was often a strong political element to robbery and violence at sea, for which the narrow seas and the complicated coastline provided unusual opportunities. It was indeed part of the dynamics of the state system: a means by which an entrepôt's attempts to centralize trade might be effected and sustained, for example; a means, too, whereby it might be challenged or overthrown. Robbery and violence at sea were also a means by which change might be effected within a state, particularly a riparian or archipelagic one. For instance, an aristocracy might condone

them in its adventurous younger sons; a bold man might seek to increase his wealth and status by plunder and his following, in a thinly populated region, by raiding or slave trading. Whatever the impact on those who were plundered or enslaved, it was often not a matter of mere robbery at sea, though no doubt that took place as well.

Some of this would have been familiar to the Europe of the Crusades. With the subsequent breakup of Europe into independent states and the development of interstate diplomacy and international law, different conventions were established. In particular, Europeans drew a distinction between “piracy,” mere robbery at sea on the part of the common enemy of humankind, and acts of violence and plunder authorized by a recognized state through licensed privateering or declaration of war.

The activities of the Europeans who first came to Southeast Asia, J. C. van Leur observed of the Portuguese, were “filled with piracy and naval warfare” (van Leur 1955: 164), and in that sense not dissimilar from activities common in the traditional Malay world. With the successful establishment of their power, they began to adopt the concepts and to enforce the practices authorized by an emergent European international law.

Checking piracy was not a European innovation. China had helped to establish Melaka in the early fifteenth century in order to check it. But from the early nineteenth century the Europeans gave it a new emphasis. That was partly because the establishment of new entrepôts—in particular Singapore in 1819—increased the opportunity to prey on native vessels coming from other parts of the Indonesian archipelago and the Malay Peninsula. It was also because the suppression of piracy was associated with attempts to reorder the Malay world—though not necessarily, indeed, to bring it under formal European control.

In the treaty of 1824, for example, the British and the Dutch committed themselves to the suppression of piracy. It became an argument for expansion, used by the colonial powers but particularly by the British on the spot. Their superiors in India and in London were opposed to the extension of political control. They could not, however, oppose the suppression of piracy. There was as a result a tendency to apply the word widely, in order to justify ac-

tion. It was used in attempts to stop the sultan of Aceh from centralizing trade with Penang on his capital. It was used by James Brooke (1803–1868) to secure naval support for his policy in Brunei and Sarawak. It was used on the Malay Peninsula as a reason for intervention in Selangor in the early 1870s. In the process what were “legitimate” political activities were suppressed and the authority of Malay States denied. That was also in keeping with the advance of the positivist approach to international law. The French were even more creative than the British. The disorder and opposition they faced on land in Tonkin was qualified as piracy.

It was not surprising that historians of the second half of the twentieth century—when states had won independence and imperialism had been defeated—looked at this matter again, anticipating, as historians of Southeast Asia often did, the impact of a fashionable “deconstructionism.” They could draw, indeed, on contemporaries who had criticized the tendency to label the Malays pirates and to extend the ambit of the term. In the 1820s, piracy in the Johor region had been ascribed to the “breaking down of larger Government” (Tarling 1963: 53). Brooke had been criticized and his proceedings subjected to a commission of inquiry in 1853–1855.

Nicholas Tarling’s *Piracy and Politics in the Malay World* adopted what came to be called the “decay” theory. Anne Reber (1966) regarded Tarling’s work as too dependent on observers of the time. According to James Warren (1981), who worked on Sulu and the “pirates” of the Moro regions, the increase in piracy there in the first half of the nineteenth century was seen as a positive attempt on the part of the Sulus and their sultanate to respond to the new commercial opportunities. Two conclusions were obvious: the one enjoined historians to be careful in interpreting words whose meanings shifted over time; the other suggested that “piracy” could have diverse origins, not only in the mind of the beholder but also in the society and polity where it originated.

There were also other “pirates” in Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century: one source was China, following the Taiping rebellion (1851–1864). There were other pirates in the later twentieth century, preying on the boat people from Vietnam, and pouncing on the crews of oil tankers in the Straits of Melaka. Their activi-

ties were robbery, without at least any formal approval from state authorities.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also Anglo-Brunei Relations (Nineteenth Century to 1980s); Brooke, James and Sarawak; Ilanun and Balangingi; Johor-Riau Empire; Moros; Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Penang (1786); Singapore (1819); Slavery; Straits of Melaka; Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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PIRES, TOMÉ (ca. 1465–ca. 1540)

Early Travel Writer

The Portuguese apothecary Tomé Pires is chiefly remembered today as the author of the *Suma Oriental*, a comprehensive report on the economy, trade, and geography of the East that he wrote from 1512 to 1515 for King Manuel I of Portugal (1495–1521). He was born around 1465, possibly in Leiria. His father was apothecary to King João II of Portugal (1455–1495), and he himself served as apothecary to his son Afonso (d. 1491). In 1511 he sailed to India, where he had been appointed *feitor* (factor), and, after nine months in Cannanore and Cochin, he went early in 1512 to Melaka as *feitor*, accountant, and *veador* (controller) of drugs in the Portuguese *feitoria* (trading post) there. While living in Melaka he wrote most of the *Suma Oriental* and traveled to other parts of Southeast Asia, including Java and Sumatra. In 1517 he was sent as Portuguese ambassador to China, where,

through no fault of his own, he incurred the wrath of the Chinese, was arrested in Guangzhou (Canton) in 1521, and was imprisoned. According to some sources he died in prison in 1524, while others maintain that he was banished from Guangzhou to a town called Sampitay, where he died before 1540.

An Italian translation of part of the *Suma Oriental* was published in Ramusio's *Navigazioni e Viaggi* (Venice, 1550), but the complete work was not published until the Portuguese historian Armando Cortesão discovered a manuscript of it in the *Bibliothèque Nationale* in Paris bound in the same codex as the contemporary *Book of Francisco Rodrigues*, and in 1944 published both works in an annotated edition, with English translations, in the Hakluyt Society series.

The *Suma Oriental* contains a vast amount of commercial, geographical, historical, and ethnographic information, much of it firsthand, about the trading world of Asia in the early sixteenth century, and its detailed account of Melaka is the first known in any European language.

JOHN VILLIERS

See also Melaka; Portuguese Asian Empire; Travelers and Sojourners, European

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PITSANULOK (PHITSANULOK)

A Strategic Town

An important town located between the lower north and the upper sector of the central plain of Thailand (Siam), Pitsanulok is also called Muang Song Kwae (lit. town of two rivers) in Thai history, owing to its location. Nowadays Pitsanulok serves the government decentralization policy as the center of administration, higher education, and medical service for the lower northern region.

Its history as a center of T'ai settlements can be traced back to the pre-Sukhothai period (ca. thirteenth–ca. fifteenth century C.E.). In the eleventh century, T'ai communities lived in the area (Tambiah 1976: 79). During the reign of King Rama Kamhaeng of Sukhothai (r. 1279–1298), the town was incorporated into the more powerful Sukhothai kingdom.

Pitsanulok would later play crucial roles in the defense of Siamese (Thai) kingdoms founded in the Chaophraya delta, since its location served as a main passage to and from the upper north, where rivals from the northern kingdoms of Lanna and Burma used it as the main route for waging war against Siamese kingdoms.

During the Ayudhya period (1351–1767), its rulers in the first half of the period paid great attention to expanding territories to the north, especially their attempt to absorb the Sukhothai kingdom. In the reign of King Boromrachathirat I (r. 1370–1388), Ayudhya was able to capture Pitsanulok and other satellite towns that had been under the political control of Sukhothai. When Sukhothai was finally absorbed into Ayudhya in 1438, the political status of the former was deliberately reduced; on the contrary, Ayudhya rulers promoted the status of Pitsanulok, considering its strategic location, which allowed Ayudhya to have access to the north. During the reign of Borommaracha II (Chao Samphraya) (r. 1424–1448), the political status of Pitsanulok became even more important when the king decided to send Ramesuan, his son whom he chose as his heir apparent, to rule the town in order to control the northern territory (Wyatt 1984: 70).

When Ramesuan succeeded his father as King Boromtrailokanat Trailok (r. 1448–1488) and decided to launch military campaigns against his archrival, King Tilokaracha of the Lanna kingdom (r. 1441–1487), Pitsanulok became the capital of Ayudhya, since the king decided to transfer the capital there in 1463 in order to be able to control the northern areas bordering the Lanna kingdom. The war between Ayudhya and Lanna arising from their competition to control the Sukhothai areas lasted for about three decades without a clear-cut victory for either side. However, it was during this period that Pitsanulok became the center of the kingdom. In 1463, King Boromtrailokanat had a new monastery built to the south of the town, where he spent two years as a Buddhist monk and appointed his son as regent to rule Ayudhya (ibid.:78). New constructions and major town expansion also took place between 1463 and 1688. It was not until the death of Boromtrailokanat in 1488 that the capital city was transferred back to Ayudhya; however, Pitsanulok still maintained its political status as the town where heirs apparent were sent to rule.

Pitsanulok was located in a strategically important position, which allowed those who took control of it to have access to the Chaophraya delta and to the northern part of Siam, which had abundant and valuable forest products, manpower, as well as rice supplies; as a result, it was always targeted by Burma, which launched military campaigns against Ayudhya. In both major Burmese invasions of Ayudhya, in 1569 and in 1767, which led to the latter's fall, Burmese armies laid siege to Pitsanulok, captured it, and used it as a base for marching to Ayudhya, depriving the latter of its much-needed manpower and food supplies from the north. After Ayudhya fell to the Burmese in 1767, a local leader of Pitsanulok formed an independent state and proclaimed himself a king. However, he was defeated by King Taksin of Thonburi in 1770 (Steinberg 1987: 112) and, as a result, Pitsanulok was absorbed into the new kingdom. It remained an important town in the following Chakri dynasty, founded by King Rama I (r. 1782–1809), whose father had been a high-ranking official of the town before the second fall of Ayudhya. When King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910) undertook administrative reforms in the 1890s by grouping a number of provinces to form a single administrative unit called *Monthon Thesaphiban*, or circle, Pitsanulok was chosen as one of the circles to rule provinces in the lower sector of the north, until the government abolished the system in 1933.

Nowadays, Pitsanulok still plays an important role as the administrative, economic, and educational center of the lower north of Thailand. Its prosperity began during the 1960s, after the first national five-year economic and social development plan was implemented. Infrastructure, such as new roads and an air base, were built (ibid.: 390), and they help to stimulate economic prosperity and rapid expansion of the town.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Burma-Siam Wars; Sukhotai (Sukhodava)

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PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM, FIELD MARSHAL (1897–1964)

Molder of the Modern Thai

Phibunsongkhram, Phibun for short, was born Plaek Khittasangkha on 14 July 1897 in a humble family. His parents were hardworking durian growers and sellers in Nonthaburi, now a satellite town of Bangkok. Apparently an intelligent child, he was sent at the age of twelve to the prestigious military academy. He graduated in 1915 and served as a sublieutenant in the artillery. His service and academic achievements earned him advanced military training in France from 1924 to 1927. It was in France that Phibun joined a group of young students led by Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983) who began a plan for the overthrow of the Chakri absolute monarchy. Upon his return to Siam in 1927, Phibun served on the army general staff. One year later he was bestowed the rank and title of Luang Phibunsongkhram, a low-ranking noble title commonly granted to those who entered the royal service with an overseas education or training. On the eve of the 1932 coup d'état, Phibun attained the rank of major and was appointed a supervisor in the Ministry of Defense. He was also made an aide-de-camp to the king's uncle, who was a member of the all-influential Supreme Council set up by King Prajadhipok (Rama VII) (r. 1925–1935) in 1925. Phibun thus appeared on the eve of the 1932 Revolution secure and successful in the career of his choice.

During the 24 June 1932 Revolution that brought an end to Siam's absolutist monarchical system and replaced it with that of the People's Party version of democracy, Phibun assumed the role of only a second-rung military leader. Yet he appeared genuinely dedicated to the cause of the revolution. With the success of the coup, Phibun was appointed minister without portfolio in the first "democratic" government. Soon the increasing conflicts between the progressive wing of the People's Party, of which Phibun was one of its leading figures, and its conservative wing, supported by the royalists, resulted in a showdown in June 1933. Phibun

clearly rendered his leadership and support to the cause of the progressive wing. Together with Phraya Phahon, the official leader of the People's Party, and Luang Suphachalasai, leader of the junior naval officers, Phibun staged a coup and seized power from the conservative government led by Premier Phraya Manopakorn-nittithada. The success of the coup ensured that the political power was now solely in the hands of the People's Party. For Phibun, the successful coup also assured him of a leading role in the affairs of the nation. His position was further strengthened after the failure of the royalist-conservative attempt to physically remove the People's Party ruling elite from power in the Boworadet Rebellion of October 1933. Phibun, as the military leader of the government party, was promoted to deputy commander-in-chief of the army and minister of defense one year later. It was evident that with the support of the armed forces and the rapid political changes in the international arena, Phibun's forceful and action-oriented leadership put him ahead of Pridi Phanomyong, his main political rival. In December 1938, when Prime Minister Phraya Phahon decided to step down, Phibun became a natural choice of both the outgoing premier and the National Assembly to take up the role of premier.

Phibun's first premiership, December 1938 to July 1944, covered most of the war years. The period saw Phibun's serious and high-handed attempts to remold the country and the Thai people into what he believed to be the suitable sociocultural and modernized characteristics of the Thai nation-state, based on the principles of democracy, nationalism, and new national identity. It was Premier Phibun who gave the traditional Kingdom of Siam its new name, Thailand. He modernized the Thai language and introduced a "classless" vocabulary into the classical Thai, a most class-conscious language in Southeast Asia. Phibun succeeded in instilling a deep sense of patriotism and nationalism into the Thai masses, and it was he who was responsible for a makeover of modern Thai appearance and mannerisms. All of these accomplishments attributed to Phibun are visible components of contemporary modern Thai identity. It was during this period also that the military assumed an active and high-profile participation in the affairs of state. Phibun himself held both the premiership and commander-in-

chief of the armed forces. He took the country into the Indochinese War against France in 1941 and won. For that, the premier was conferred the rank of field marshal. By mid-1941, Premier Phibun had reached the zenith of his political and military career.

Phibun was blamed for bringing the military into politics, and thus for the bastardization of democracy in Thailand. His firm leadership and administration during the war years led to the eclipse of the monarchy and fostered conflicts with the royalists and the throne. Most damaging of all, Phibun as an “anti-royal” premier brought about uneasy relations with his monarch, to Phibun’s eventual political detriment.

Phibun was compelled to resign his premiership in July 1944 after the National Assembly voted down two government bills. During 1944–1947, Phibun was forced to live in a political wilderness. At the end of the war, he was arrested and charged with war crimes against the Allied Powers and humankind. Phibun evaded the gallows or imprisonment on a technicality but remained a target of political mudslinging and official surveillance under the political ascendancy of Pridi.

The 1947 coup brought Phibun back to power and the premiership for the second time, in April 1948. Although Phibun held the reins of office until September 1957, when he was ousted by another military coup led by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (t. 1957–1963), his erstwhile protégé, his second administration was not noticeable for its positive domestic policies. Instead it was noted for its anticommunist stance and pro-Western foreign policies. Under Phibun’s leadership, Thailand emerged as the staunchest ally of the United States in Southeast Asia against the ideological threats of the Cold War and communism. It was during this time that Thailand identified itself as a member of the Free World/capitalist system against the communist/Iron Curtain grouping by becoming a founding member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). This regional defense pact comprised five Western states—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, and New Zealand—and three Asian nations—Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan.

Until his death in June 1964, Phibun was forced to lead the life of a political exile in Japan. He took a vow of monkhood in the Bud-

dhagaya Temple in India in August 1960. His ashes were brought back from Japan to Thailand and befittingly laid to rest at the temple that Phibun had built, both as a symbol of the victory of the People’s Party against the Boworadet Rebellion and as a mausoleum for revered national leaders.

KOBKUA SUWANNATHAT-PIAN

See also Cold War; Constitutional (Bloodless) Revolution (1932) (Thailand); Khuang Aphaiwong (1902–1968); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983); Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (1954); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia

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PLURAL SOCIETY

John Sydenham Furnivall (1878–1960), the British scholar-administrator, formulated the concept of pluralism in his studies of British Burma and the Netherlands East Indies (1956). He drew attention to the significance of ethnic divisions in colonial society and the importance of the overseas Chinese and Indian trading communities as economic intermediaries between the European and native populations. He conceived of colonial or “tropical society” as deeply divided, comprising distinct “economic castes” or “separate racial groups” (Europeans, Chinese, Indians, and natives), which kept to their own sociocultural worlds, meeting only in the marketplace for buying and

selling. Therefore, for him, competing economic interests were aggravated by ethnic diversity. Furnivall argued that each group was an aggregate of people and not an integrated whole; immigrant populations were mainly temporary residents whose commitment to the territory in which they lived was slight; they sought economic gain and their social life was incomplete. The colonial state, which created the plural society, kept it in being by a policy of divide-and-rule and political coercion because the constituent groups had no shared culture or common social will.

Critics of Furnivall suggest that his image of colonial society is too static, and the relations between race or ethnicity and economic function were much more complex than he realized (Taylor 1987: 123–137). Social class and cultural cleavages divided the constituent ethnic groupings internally. For example, the Indian population in Burma comprised traders, shopkeepers, moneylenders, landowners, and urban and rural workers, and it was often competition between members of different ethnic groups who shared the same social class position rather than the coincidence between ethnicity and class that resulted in ethnic tensions and conflict. In addition, the Indians were divided by religion into Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Jains, as well as by caste, region, and language (Adas 1974: 104–106). The divisions between groups were also blurred by intermarriage, religious conversion, and assimilation, and there were hybrid or mixed populations such as the Anglo-Indians and Anglo-Burmese. Furnivall's ethnic groups were, in effect, stereotypes constructed through colonial policies and practices and assigned certain characteristics that were then used to explain their respective positions in the colonial division of labor.

VICTOR T. KING

See also British Burma; British Malaya; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Colonialism; Dutch East Indies; Indian Immigrants (Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries); Mestizo; Miscengenation

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POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998)

Mass Murderer

Pol Pot was the pseudonym of Saloth Sar, Cambodian communist political leader and prime minister of Democratic Kampuchea (DK) from 1976 to 1979.

Pol Pot was born into a prosperous peasant family that enjoyed the patronage of the Cambodian court, at a time when Cambodia formed part of French Indochina. Several of his relatives worked in the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh, and an elder sister was a minor wife of King Sisowath Monivong (r. 1927–1941).

Pol Pot was educated in French-language schools in Phnom Penh and Kompong Cham, but he made little impression on his fellow students. In 1949 he was awarded a scholarship to study radio and electricity in Paris. After repeatedly failing his examinations and joining the French Communist Party, Pol Pot returned home in 1953 and served briefly in anti-French guerrilla forces controlled by the Vietnamese communist movement.

In the 1950s, Pol Pot was a schoolteacher in Phnom Penh, where he was popular with his students and worked in secret for Cambodia's small, clandestine Communist Party. In 1956 he married Khieu Ponnary, a fellow communist whom he had met in France. The couple had no children. In 1960 he joined the central committee of a newly constituted Communist Party (later to be known as the Communist Party of Kampuchea, CPK), and three years later, fearing arrest, he went into hiding with several colleagues at a Vietnamese army base in eastern Cambodia. He visited North Vietnam and China for several months in the mid-1960s and came away favorably impressed by the Chinese Cultural Revolution but chafing under continuing guidance from Vietnam. In the late 1960s he moved his base of operations into the sparsely populated northeastern part of the country, inaugurating armed struggle against Norodom Sihanouk's (1922–) government in early 1968.



Pol Pot in the Cambodian jungle, ca. 1980. (Bettmann/Corbis)

When Sihanouk was overthrown in 1970, Pol Pot secretly assumed command of guerrilla forces, allied with the Vietnamese communists that sought to defeat the new, pro-American regime holding power in Phnom Penh and headed by Lon Nol (1913–1984). His forces, known popularly as the Khmer Rouge, or Red Khmer, were victorious in 1975.

Soon after their victory, Pol Pot and his colleagues set in motion radical policies inspired by Maoist China that had genocidal effects on Cambodia's population. Their aim was to preside over the swiftest and farthest-reaching Marxist-Leninist revolution in world history. Perhaps Pol Pot succeeded, but from 1975 to 1979 at least 1.5 million Cambodians died of starvation, overwork, and misdiagnosed or untreated diseases. At least 200,000 more were executed summarily as "enemies of the state," and several thousand others died in the war that broke out against Vietnam in 1978 (Chandler 1999a: 3).

A Vietnamese invasion in December 1978 drove Pol Pot from power. For the next twenty

years, aside from brief visits to China and North Korea, he lived with the remnants of his army in bases along the Thai-Cambodian border. This formidable guerrilla force engaged Vietnamese troops stationed inside Cambodia for more than a decade, and laid antipersonnel mines over hundreds of square kilometers of Cambodia's north and northwest.

Although his "retirement" was announced in 1985, when he reached sixty in the 1980s, Pol Pot continued to lecture to soldiers and subordinates, dazzling them with his revolutionary vision. People who worked with him in those years consistently recalled his calm and kindly demeanor, his fervent devotion to the principles of communism (although it was a word he rarely used), and his ability to inspire small groups. During this time, Pol Pot remarried and fathered a daughter.

In the late 1990s, the government originally installed by the Vietnamese in Phnom Penh gained international legitimacy. Several senior CPK figures defected from the movement. Pol Pot, eager to rekindle the revolutionary fervor

that had impelled the CPK in the past, introduced harsh, puritanical policies that were immensely unpopular, and he ordered the assassination of a close associate, Son Sen, whom he accused of treason.

At this point, in July 1997, his colleagues turned against him and put him on trial. A few months later, under house arrest, Pol Pot gave a rambling interview to a U.S. journalist in which he denied responsibility for the horrors of his regime. He was already in failing health, and six months later he died, apparently of heart failure but perhaps a suicide, in a two-room shack without modern amenities. His place in world history is ensured. One Cambodian in seven died from 1975 to 1979 (Chandler 1999a: 3). The Cambodian revolution was thus, on a per capita basis, the most murderous in a century of revolutions.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Democratic Kampuchea (DK);

Hun Sen (1951–); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); *Killing Fields, The*; Kuantan Principle (1980); Lon Nol (1913–1984); Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989 and 1991); Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992–1993)

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POLO, MARCO (1254–1324)

World Traveler

A Venetian merchant-cum-traveler, Marco Polo traveled to Asia and inspired the imaginations of generations of Europeans and further adventures.

In 1254, Marco Polo was born to a Venetian family that conducted business in the Middle East (West Asia). At the age of seventeen, he traveled to China, then under the rule of the Mongols (Yuan dynasty, 1271–1368), via a land route that passed through Central Asia. The young Marco accompanied his father and uncle—who had been appointed by Kubilai Khan (1215–1294), then the emperor of China, as ambassadors to the pope—on their trip back to China to report of their mission. Marco became one of the foreigners who was taken to favorably by Kubilai, and he was sent on several missions to distant parts of the empire as far as Yunnan in southwest China and possibly Tagaung in Myanmar (Burma). He was assigned important administrative duties, such as the governorship of Yangzhou for a three-year term. Altogether he stayed in China for seventeen years. In 1292 he set off on his return trip to Venice from the port of Zaytun (modern Quanzhou/Fujian).

On the way he stopped at Champa, Sumatra, and a number of Southeast Asian islands, then all unknown to the Western world. His accounts of this part of the world, together with the even more amazing descriptions of the vast Mongol empire in his travel writing *Il milione*, conjured an exotic wonderland to his fellow Europeans. His travel accounts were in the first place regarded as heretical as the existence of another world—strong, rich, and culturally different—and simply unbelievable, but they were soon proved to be authentic as more accounts followed.

However, the authenticity of the part of his travels within China has always been a matter of controversy. For such an allegedly high-ranking agent of Kubilai as Marco, there is up to now no direct Chinese evidence available to support his various missions and duties.

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also Champa; Sumatra; Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty (1271–1368); Yunnan Province

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PORTUGUESE ASIAN EMPIRE

There were two chief motives behind the Portuguese search for the sea route to India during the fifteenth century. They hoped to find Prester John, a legendary Christian ruler who was believed to dwell somewhere in the Indies and by the end of the century was generally identified with the emperor of Ethiopia, and to persuade him to join a grand alliance against Islam along with other Christian princes who it was thought there might be in the region. They also hoped to gain direct access to the valuable Indian Ocean trade in gold and ivory from east Africa, horses from Arabia and Persia, silks and porcelain from China, and above all pepper, spices, and aromatic woods from Southeast Asia.

In the early years after Vasco da Gama (1469–1524) first landed near Calicut on the western coast of India on 20 May 1498, the Portuguese confined themselves to setting up a few *feitorias* (trading posts) on that coast. Before long, however, the imperial policy of King Manuel I (1495–1521) evolved into a plan to establish Portuguese power in Asia permanently by creating a chain of *feitorias* and fortresses in the Indian Ocean under a unified administration and to replace Venice with Lisbon as the chief port for the distribution of spices throughout Europe. This policy, which was often accompanied by violence, soon attracted the opposition of the Islamic powers in the region. The naval victory won at Diu in 1509 by Dom Francisco de Almeida, first viceroy and governor of Portuguese India (t. 1505–1509), against an alliance of Islamic powers led by Mameluke Egypt and assisted by Venice marked a turning point. This triumph enabled Almeida's successor, Afonso de Albuquerque (t. 1509–1515), to capture Goa (1510), Melaka (1511), and Ormuz (1515). He failed, however, to take Aden and so gain control of the Red Sea, to lay the foundations of the *Estado da India*, as the Portuguese maritime empire in Asia later came to be called.

Albuquerque's achievements were consolidated by a series of agreements, some voluntary and some imposed by force, between the Portuguese and Asian rulers whereby they were permitted to set up *feitorias* and fortresses in their realms. These included Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (1518), Chaul (1521), Ternate (1522), Diu (1535), Mozambique (1540), Macau (1557), and Daman (1559). Some governors and viceroys—

notably Vasco da Gama (1524), Nuño da Cunha (1529–1538), and Dom João de Castro (1545–1548)—attempted to extend Portuguese territorial power in India by military means, but with no permanent results.

There was fierce opposition by the Muslim powers to Portuguese intrusions, especially by the Ottoman Turks, who in 1516 had succeeded the Mamelukes as the most powerful Islamic state in the western Indian Ocean. The Muslim states of the Indonesian archipelago, notably Aceh, Japara, and Ternate, prevented the Portuguese from imposing a Crown monopoly and from enforcing the *cartaz* (safe-conduct) system by which they undertook to police the sea-lanes and provide convoys for private merchant shipping in return for payment of customs dues.

Under Manuel I's successor, João III (1521–1557), imperial policy in Asia became increasingly directed toward purely commercial objectives. Needless to say, the Manueline crusading ideals of destroying Islam and making Portuguese Asia into a Christian empire did not entirely bear fruit. It is revealed by the heroic theme of *Os Lusíadas*, the national epic of Portugal, written by Luís Vaz de Camões in the 1550s, and by the missionary work of the mendicant orders and of St. Francis Xavier (1506–1552) and his successors in the Society of Jesus.

In 1570, King Sebastião (1557–1578) abandoned the royal trading monopoly, which caused a substantial reduction in the Crown's direct involvement in Asian trade. At the same time, the ability of the Portuguese to cover the cost of maintaining their empire from the income derived from that trade declined. However, the income was reduced by the increase in the number of trading voyages and government offices granted to individuals as a reward for public services, and by the growth of corruption at every level in the administration of the *Estado da India*. This in turn opened increased opportunities for advancement in the so-called shadow empire to Portuguese mercenaries serving in the armies of Asian rulers (such as Pegu, Ayutthaya), and to merchant adventurers engaging in local trade or joining a semiautonomous merchant colony (for example, Hugli, Negapatam, Patani, Macau).

At the end of the sixteenth century the Dutch and English appeared in Asian waters. By 1623 the Dutch had driven the Portuguese out

of the Spice Islands; in 1641 they captured Melaka; and by 1663 they had taken Ceylon and most of the Portuguese possessions in India. By the end of the seventeenth century, only Goa, Daman, Diu in India, Timor (where the first Portuguese governor was appointed in 1702), and Macau remained in Portuguese hands.

Outside these last strongholds, Portuguese influence in Asia was confined to a few scattered Portuguese-speaking, Catholic communities, some of which survive to this day (such as Melaka, Tugu in Java, some of the Lesser Sunda Islands, Bangkok). The final demise of Portugal's Asian empire, however, did not come until the Indian annexation of Goa, Daman, and Diu (1961); the expulsion of the Portuguese from East Timor (1975); and the return of Macau to China (1999).

JOHN VILLIERS

See also Albuquerque, Afonso de (ca. 1462–1515); Macau (Macao); Maluku (The Moluccas); Melaka; Pepper; Spices and the Spice Trade; Timor

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**PRAJADHIPOK
(RAMA VII) (r. 1925–1935)**

Last of the Absolutist Monarchs

The reign of the Cakri (Chakri) dynasty's seventh king is known best for its anomalies. Prajadhipok's reign, from 1925 to 1935, straddled the 24 June 1932 Revolution, making him the last of Siam's absolute monarchs and its first constitutional monarch. His nine-year reign was the briefest of all the Cakri dynasts; he was the only member of his dynasty to abdicate, and the only member to die abroad, in England, at the age of forty-eight.

Prajadhipok was born in Bangkok on 8 November 1893, the child of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910) and Queen Saowapha. He was the younger full brother of the future king Vajiravudh (Rama VI, r. 1910–1925) and the seventy-sixth of Chulalongkorn's seventy-seven children. After spending three months in the Buddhist monkhood, Prajadhipok married his cousin, Princess Rambhai Barni, in 1918.

Prajadhipok received his formal education in Europe; he studied at both Eton and the Woolrich Military Academy in England, and attended the École Supérieure de Guerre in France. He returned to Siam only one year before ascending the throne in 1925.

Prajadhipok was educated for a military appointment, and his rise to kingship was largely unexpected. The heir presumptive to the throne, Prajadhipok's older brother Prince Asdang, died unexpectedly in February 1925. King Vajiravudh produced no male heir; his only child, a daughter (Princess Benjaratana), was born two days before his death. Had this child been a boy, the infant would likely have inherited the crown. This confluence of events thrust the largely unprepared Prajadhipok onto Siam's throne.

The initial challenges faced by the new king were substantial. Because of economic mismanagement and a series of financial and political scandals by the previous administration, the government was in organizational disarray, near bankruptcy, and held in open contempt by many members of Bangkok's emerging middle class. Prince Damrong (1862–1943), the respected elder statesman and brother to King Chulalongkorn, declared the throne a "deplorable inheritance" because of the collapse of royal authority experienced in the previous

reign. Prajadhipok saw two roots of this widespread dissatisfaction—the open favoritism and nepotism practiced by the previous court, and the emergence of a “free press” in Siam capable of openly criticizing such behavior and disseminating dissenting political viewpoints to a large urban audience.

The new king’s answer to this political challenge was the creation of a Supreme Council of State, established just three days after the death of Rama VI. The council was made up of five senior princes who had served in the still-respected government of his father, Chulalongkorn. By design the council was meant to counteract the corrupting tendencies of absolutism by devolving power to a larger group of political leaders. All major decisions of state were to be agreed upon by the king and his council, thereby minimizing the possibility of political favoritism. This new bureaucratic arrangement was greeted favorably by the Bangkok public.

The Great Depression, which began in the United States in 1929, spread to Siam by the following year, posing another major challenge to the Prajadhipok regime. During the period from 1930 to 1932 the value of rice, Siam’s major export commodity, fell by two-thirds, and land values plummeted further still. By early 1932, the government was forced to make deep budgetary cuts, leading to political turf battles that were covered by the capital’s independent print media.

Launched against this background was the June 1932 Revolution, led by the People’s Party, a group of 114 military and civilian persons, the core group of whom had been educated abroad. The coup group was united in their opposition to absolutism, although much divided over the form of rule that should supplant it.

The king received news of the coup while playing golf on a vacation in the south of Siam. He agreed to the coup group’s demands for a new constitutional system for the nation. By 10 December 1932 the king had promulgated a new constitution, and shortly thereafter a prime minister was appointed under the constitution.

Many strains and tensions marked the relationship between the People’s Party and Prajadhipok and his court. These were intensified by a coup within the new constitutional govern-

ment in June 1933, which resulted in the ascendance of a military faction over the civilian and proroyalist factions. In October 1933, Prince Boworadet, the former minister of war in Prajadhipok’s government, led a narrowly defeated reactionary revolt against the new government. Although Prajadhipok was never implicated in this revolt, relatives of Queen Rambhai were deeply involved, and political relations grew still more troubled.

In early 1934, Prajadhipok left Siam for medical treatment in England. The government, interested in the king’s return to Siam, entered negotiations with the monarch. Mutually satisfactory guarantees for a return of royal power could not be reached, and on 2 March 1935, Prajadhipok abdicated. The crown passed to the ten-year-old Ananda Mahidol (Rama VIII) (r. 1935–1946), then attending school in Switzerland.

Prajadhipok lived the remainder of his life quietly in Surrey, England. He adopted a son, his only child, Prince Chirasakti. On 30 May 1941 he died of heart failure. His widow returned his ashes to Bangkok in 1949.

BRUCE BEEMER

See also Constitutional (Bloodless) Revolution (1932) (Thailand); Damrong, Prince (1862–1943); Great Depression (1929–1931); Indigenous Political Power; Plaek Phibunsongkhram, Field Marshal (1897–1964); Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983); Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Vajiravudh (Rama VI) (r. 1910–1925)

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Hindu temples at Prambanan, on the island of Java, Indonesia. (Arvind Garg/Corbis)

PRAMBANAN A Hindu Architectural Marvel

The Prambanan complex of Hindu temples is often called the Lara Jonggrang group, after a Javanese folk term meaning “slender maiden,” which refers to a Durga image in the main shrine. Scholars now believe that the complex was consecrated in 856 C.E. after a construction period of perhaps twenty-five years.

The complex consists of 224 subsidiary chapels symmetrically arranged around a central group on an artificially raised plateau. The main buildings are temples to Brahma and Visnu that flank a shrine dedicated to Siva. Facing this trinity are three auxiliary temples. That facing the Siva temple contains a Nandin statue. The purpose of the buildings facing the Brahma and Visnu temples is still unclear. Earlier theories suggested that they were meant to hold images of the *vahanas* (vehicles) of those gods, but this idea has now been discarded, since other temple complexes with the same basic plan have been discovered, none of them

with the requisite statues of goose and eagle (*garuda*).

The interior of the Siva temple is divided into four cellae. The largest one contains an image of Siva Mahadeva standing on a tall base. The southern cella houses an Agastya, and that on the west, Ganesha, whereas on the north, Durga Mahisasuramardini. This group formed a standardized disposition of images in Javanese Hindu temples for centuries. The other two main temples each contain but a single cella, for the statues of Brahma (on the south) and Visnu (on the north).

In addition to statuary, the three main shrines bear narrative reliefs. Paradoxically, although the Siva shrine is the center of the complex, the relief series on this and the other two main shrines are dedicated to Visnu. The *Râmâyana* is depicted in a series that begins on the inner face (that is, that facing the main shrine) of a low wall on the outer side of a processional path allowing devotees to circumambulate the Siva shrine above ground level. The

reliefs begin on the left side of the main entrance. The opening scene depicts Visnu seated on a serpent in the midst of the ocean with Garuda offering him a flower, while other gods beseech him to incarnate himself as a human in order to rid the earth of some demons. The rest of the reliefs depict Rama's marriage, his banishment with Laksmāna and Sita, Sita's abduction and Garuda's conveying of news of her whereabouts, the forming of the alliance with the monkey army of Hanuman and Sugriva, and the preparations for the storming of Ngālengka. The *Rāmāyana* series then continues on the Brahma temple. The Visnu temple is used as a canvas for another text: the story of Visnu's incarnation as Krisna. These are usually thought to be from the *Krisnayana*, though no text precisely corresponding to the reliefs on the Visnu temple has been identified. The first part of the story can be followed, but interpretation of the latter half of the reliefs continues to defy consensus.

In addition to the *Rāmāyana* and Krisna reliefs, the Siva temple bears two other interesting sets of pictorial art. One of these consists of a set of portraits of Lokapala, guardians of the various directions. The other has been identified as illustrations of dance postures known as *tandava*, based on the *Natyasastra* text. It was believed that Siva himself had performed these postures. Some have suggested that the sequence of dance reliefs replicates an actual dance performance, but this has not been proven. It is also possible that the present sequence of reliefs on the monument is not the original. The site was in a very ruinous state in the late nineteenth century, and the activities of an amateur archaeological group made it impossible to reconstruct the original location of some of the reliefs with certainty.

The central point of the complex lies not beneath the Siva statue but beside the staircase leading into the main cella of the Siva shrine. At this point is a small nondescript shrine that may have been dedicated to the local spirit of the place. An inscription believed to refer to the founding of the site refers to the "evil ones" who had to be placated.

Prambanan shares numerous design elements with Borobudur and other early Javanese monuments meant for Mahayana Buddhism; the ruler who probably instigated its construction, known by the title Rakai Pikatan, was married

to a Buddhist queen, and the royal couple donated to foundations belonging to both religions. There are, however, some elements of Prambanan that are unique, such as the motifs of lions in niches, wishing trees (*kalpataru*) flanked by imaginary animals, and finials often termed *keben* after a Javanese fruit.

The Prambanan complex was one of the most elaborate Hindu architectural projects ever undertaken in Southeast Asia. It incorporates an elaborate cosmology, with reliefs of numerous deities of the various compass directions. An inscription written in 856 C.E. found in central Java probably commemorates its inauguration. It was the last large temple ever built in pre-Islamic Java.

JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also Borobudur; Buddhism, Mahayana; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Indianization; Malang Temples; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana*

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**PRASAT THONG (r. 1629–1656)
Usurper King**

King of Siam during a time of increased international trade, the usurper Prasat Thong was one of the more powerful personalities to have reigned in the Siamese capital of Ayutthaya. His rule was firm, especially as regards the officials

or nobility (*khunnang*) who were potential challengers to his authority. He was also a great builder-king, erecting many religious and secular buildings during his long reign.

Much of what is known about Prasat Thong's rise to power and the first ten years of his reign comes from the Dutch merchant Jeremias van Vliet's accounts of Siam, notably the *Historical Account of the Kingdom of Siam*. Prasat Thong was a first cousin of King Songtham (r. 1610/1611–1628), his father being the eldest brother of the king's mother. As a young page in the royal palace at Ayutthaya, Prasat Thong was said to have been unruly, his exploits often getting him into trouble. Nevertheless he distinguished himself in war and became a high-ranking nobleman with the title of Okya Si Worawong by 1628, when King Songtham fell seriously ill and died. Various factions at court contested the royal succession.

Okya Si Worawong managed to assemble a large following, allying himself with, among others, the strong Japanese mercenary force under Yamada Nagamasa or Okya Senaphimuk. After putting King Songtham's young son Phra Chetthathirat on the throne, he assumed the title of Okya Kalahom (minister in charge of military affairs). The next step was to eliminate Phra Chetthathirat, and Yamada, whose usefulness had expired. An even younger prince, Phra Athityawong, was put on the throne, with Okya Kalahom as regent. The young monarch reigned for only a short time. Okya Kalahom deposed him and ascended the throne as King Prasat Thong. Although he was a cousin of the late king Songtham, he was a commoner and his family is known as the Prasat Thong dynasty.

A master politician, Prasat Thong sought to keep various elements in Siamese politics under close control. Upon his accession, he made some of the wives and daughters of his predecessor, King Songtham, queens and royal consorts. Such action helped to legitimize his irregular accession to the throne by linking him to the previous royal family.

The political group most vigilantly controlled by King Prasat Thong was the nobility, for the obvious reason that he himself had risen to power through the ranks of the nobility. He made the nobles who held governorships of provinces reside in Ayutthaya, and compelled them to come to court every day. Their free-

dom to assemble was severely curtailed, and when they died their inheritances were heavily taxed or even confiscated. The nobility also found themselves confused by the frequent changes of position within the administrative bureaucracy, a tactic the king used to prevent officials from accumulating a power base in any particular department or ministry.

The foreign trade of Siam prospered during the seventeenth century, and King Prasat Thong's reign was one of the high points. Siamese royal trade was conducted to many ports in Southeast, East, and South Asia. Trade was carried on with China, Japan, the Malay sultanates of the archipelago, India, and the Europeans—especially the Dutch.

Relations with the Dutch United East India Company (VOC) play a prominent part in the history of this reign. The Dutch traded principally in sapanwood (a dye wood) and animal skins, with Japan as their major market. They therefore wanted monopolies in these goods. Military cooperation was given in return for trade privileges, when Prasat Thong attempted to subdue his vassal of Pattani in 1634.

Prasat Thong built the great monastery Wat Chai Watthanaram by the Chao Phya (Phraya) River in Ayutthaya, considered to be a masterpiece of Siamese architecture. He also built Prasat Nakhon Luang on the Pa Sak River, and the Phra Wihan Somdet audience hall in the royal palace of Ayutthaya. To be seen as a wealthy and meritorious man served to increase his political legitimacy: the usurper could thus argue that he was justified in seizing the throne on account of his high accumulated merit, or *karma*.

King Prasat Thong died in 1656 and was survived by his younger brother, Si Suthammarcha, and several sons. His eldest son, Chaofa Chai, and another son, Phra Narai, were royal princes. The cycle of Ayutthaya court politics had come full circle. Prasat Thong had seized the throne when the nobles were strong and the princes weak. He had then tried to curb the power of the nobility, with some success. Now, at the end of his reign, his sons and younger brother contested violently for the crown. The struggle ended with the victory and accession of Phra Narai (r. 1656–1688).

DHIRAVAT NA POMBEJRA

See also Age of Commerce; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767),

Kingdom of; Buddhism, Theravada; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Narai (r. 1656–1688); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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PRE-HISPANIC PHILIPPINES

Pre-Hispanic Philippines is generally based on the type of archaeological cultural material remains identified from the various archaeological sites found throughout the Philippine archipelago. The Old World archaeological sequence of Old Stone Age, New Stone Age, Copper-Bronze Age, and Iron Age is adopted to the Pre-Hispanic Philippines, with the Copper-Bronze and Iron Ages lumped together as the Metal Age in the Philippines.

The earliest fossil remains of elephant, stegodon, rhinoceros, large crocodile, giant tortoise, pig, and deer were found in the Cagayan Valley of northern Luzon dating to more than 200,000 years ago. There is speculation that remains of a *Homo erectus* fossil that may be related to Peking Man and Java Man may also be found in this area. Crude stone tools similar to those found to be associated with Peking Man and Java Man have also been observed in the archaeological sites in the Philippines. However, no physical evidence of the fossil *H. erectus* has been found to confirm the existence of a *Homo erectus* there. The type and number of stone tools observed in the archaeological sites suggest that a small group of hominid hunter-gatherers arrived in the Pre-Hispanic Philippines.

The earliest archaeological evidence of humans in the Philippines is the fossil bones of *Homo sapiens* (modern man) excavated at the Tabon Cave in southwestern Palawan Island, Philippines. The fossil bones were recently dated to 16,500 ± 2,000 years ago, by means of

gamma-ray dating techniques at the Institut de Paleontologie Humaine (IPH), National Museum of Natural History in Paris. It has been suggested that modern man from 30,500 to 8,800 years ago continuously occupied the Tabon Cave, based on the various assemblages of stone tool remains in its stratigraphic layers.

Archaeological sites associated with pottery, blade stone tools, and ground-edge or polished stone tools are classified as "Neolithic," or New Stone Age. Ground-edge and polished stone tools may also include the shell of giant clams such as the *Tridacna gigas*, which were used to make boats. The New Stone Age in the Philippines began during the beginning of the Holocene period, or about 10,000 years ago to about 700 years ago, or 500 B.C.E. The Holocene is the period when the sea level rose to its present-day level. People began to move by boat and settled in islands in Southeast Asia. It is usually assumed that Neolithic communities engaged in a sedentary way of life and practiced horticulture and agriculture. However, hunting-and-gathering activities must have persisted, although not as a primary but as a secondary way of living. There is some paleobotanical evidence of plant remains, which showed signs of cultivation in the Neolithic period. Paleozoological evidence of animal bones as well as some other archaeological remains of settlements suggests Neolithic habitations and sedentary activity areas. Large settlement sites with shell middens were located in Lallo, Cagayan Valley, in northern Luzon, Philippines. Red-slipped pottery ware identified in this period suggests the movement of people called the Austronesians from about 6,000 years ago in the Pre-Hispanic Philippines. The Austronesian people had been moving around the mainland and island Southeast Asia, with major settlements in the Philippine archipelago.

Archaeological sites possessing metals such as copper, bronze, gold, and iron are referred to as "Metal Age" sites, dating from ca. 500 B.C.E. to ca. 500 C.E. The earliest metals in the Pre-Hispanic Philippines come in the form of gold, copper, and bronze artifacts and later iron implements, which may have been brought in by the Austronesians themselves and their Chinese associates in the process of their movement in both mainland and island Southeast Asia. Glass, which is a by-product of metalworking, made its appearance during the Metal Age in the

form of beads and bangles such as bracelets, armllets, and anklets. The Metal Age societies began to evolve from simple sedentary agricultural and fishing communities into some kind of groupings with alliances called complex societies. It was assumed that there was expanding population movement during this period, as reflected in the archaeological record of burial practices in the Pre-Hispanic Philippines. There were simple open-pit burials; primary, secondary, and multiple jar burials; and log-coffin burials. In primary burial, the entire corpse was disposed of completely in a particular place. In secondary burial, the bones or fragments of skeletons of the first burial were moved into another container and location. In multiple burial, a number of bones from various skeletons of primary and secondary burials were placed together in either jar burials or log coffins. During the Metal Age, pottery developed with ornate decorations, and was used for both primary and secondary burials, such as those found in Ayub Cave, Maitum, Saranggani Province, in Mindanao, southern Philippines.

A "Contact and Trade" archaeological site has porcelain, glass beads, and metals. The Age of Contact and Trade in the Pre-Hispanic Philippines may have lasted from about 500 C.E. to the coming of the Spanish colonizers in 1521. Archaeological evidence of wooden boats from Butuan site in northern Mindanao suggested dates from the thirteenth century C.E. Continuous population movement and expanding settlements were archaeologically observed in this period on the basis of the wide distribution of various artifacts such as low-fired earthenware pottery, metal tools and ornaments, glass beads, and medium- and high-fired ceramics related to this period. The societies in this period were characterized anthropologically as chiefdoms with a network of trade both international and domestic within the mainland and island Southeast Asian region. An Arabic type of ceramics, dating to about the tenth century C.E., was found in Laurel, Batangas, and central southern Luzon and in Butuan. The ceramics and other cultural material remains of the Chinese dynasties from the Sung-Yuan period (eleventh century), Yueh period (twelfth century), Ming dynasty period (thirteenth to seventeenth centuries), and Ching dynasty period (eighteenth to twentieth centuries) were all represented in both land and underwater ar-

chaeological sites of the Pre-Hispanic Philippines. A number of underwater archaeological sites in the form of shipwrecks were located in the Philippine archipelago and were systematically excavated and studied. The shipwrecks were found intact with their cargoes, which show the complex trade items they carried for distribution and redistribution in the pre-Hispanic Philippines.

The period of Pre-Hispanic Philippines ended in 1521 during the so-called discovery of the islands by Ferdinand Magellan (1480–1521), a Portuguese working under the banner of Spain.

EUSEBIO Z. DIZON

See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; "Java Man" and "Solo Man"; Metal Age Cultures in Southeast Asia; Neolithic Period of Southeast Asia; Niah Caves (Sarawak); "Perak Man"; Tabon Cave (Palawan); Underwater/Maritime Archaeology in Southeast Asia

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PREM TINSULANOND, GENERAL (1920–)

Architect of Thailand's "Halfway Democracy"

General Prem Tinsulanond, who governed from 1980 to 1988, was the second-longest-serving prime minister of Thailand, after Field Marshal Phibulsongkram (Plaek Phibun-songkhram, t. 1938–1944; 1948–1957). As an unelected premier, his government faced challenging problems from both domestic and external sources, including two failed coups engineered by the "Young Turks," two dissolutions of the National Assembly, five major reshuffles of the cabinet, and a decisive devaluation of the baht. Unlike Phibul, Prem was finally able to end his tenure voluntarily without being forced out by some of his comrades in the army. Yet Prem's ability to doggedly hold on to his power helped him to survive and effectively implement the ongoing political change that came to be known as the "halfway democracy" or "semi-democracy"—namely, a political system composed of elected and appointed politicians exercising political power.

Prem Tinsulanond was born on 26 August 1920 in Bo Yang subdistrict, Songkhla Province, in the south of Thailand. His father was a junior-ranking civil servant under the absolutist regime. After finishing primary education in the temple school, he went to Vajiravudh School in Songkhla before coming to Bangkok for higher education. In Bangkok, Prem was enrolled in the prestigious and elite Suan Kularb Witthayalai school. He then chose a career in the military, continuing his studies in the Army Technical School and Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy in the cavalry.

Prem's apprenticeship in politics started with an appointment to the Senate in 1968 and to the Legislative Assembly in 1973. After the 1977 coup, Prem was a member of the Constitutional Convention in 1977. Prem's political star rose swiftly when he became army commander under the Kriengsak government (1977–1980), in which he was also deputy minister of the interior. Then, under pressure from the Young Turks army faction, Kriengsak re-

signed, and Prem succeeded him at the helm of the government.

Even though Prem came to power by means of military influence over the government, and continued to appoint retired officers to key cabinet ministries throughout his tenure in government, he was firmly against open army intervention in politics. Thus his government was instrumental in the preparation for open politics in the coming globalized economy. Under Prem's administration, the Buddha Mandala, once Phibul's major project, was constructed as the symbol of Thai Buddhism. He was appointed privy councilor to the king, and statesman.

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Plaek Phibunsongkhram, Field Marshal (1897–1964)

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PRESERVATION OF SIAM'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

In the nineteenth century, when various Southeast Asian kingdoms had succumbed either directly or indirectly to European colonialism, Siam was the only country in the region to preserve its political independence. This has perhaps come to be the best-known fact in Thai history, as well as the most central to the shaping of Thai national identity by the state.

Siam's feat of escaping the fate of its traditional rivals, Burma and Vietnam, which were colonized by the British and French, respectively, has been attributed to the foresight and skills of its rulers, principally Mongkut (r. 1851–1868) and Chulalongkorn (r. 1868–1910). Mongkut has been credited with discerning that shutting the West out was no

longer possible, as seen from the Opium War (1839–1842, 1856–1860) in China, in which Asia's hitherto mightiest empire was defeated by Western gunboats. He thus relied on diplomacy to handle the new pressures, signing the Bowring Treaty of 1855 with Britain and similar agreements with France, the United States, Germany, The Netherlands, and Japan, among others. These treaties opened Siam to free trade. The only imposts permitted were the 3 percent export tax, and import tariffs based on the then-prevailing rates charged on goods shipped by Siamese vessels. The treaty also granted the subjects of the powers the right to reside in Bangkok, and extraterritoriality, which meant that they were under the jurisdiction of their respective consular courts, and not Siamese courts.

King Chulalongkorn and his brothers continued Mongkut's legacy of accommodation and implemented fundamental reforms to Siam's administrative structure along Western lines. In order to facilitate Western trade and practices, government ministries were restructured along functional lines, replacing the traditional territorial divisions. In addition, the king relinquished his suzerainty over the principalities to the left of the Mekong River to the French, who incorporated them into their colonies of Laos and Cambodia, and its Malay provinces of Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, and Perlis to the British. With their ambitions for control of areas adjacent to their colonies satiated, the two imperial powers were inclined to leave the heartland of Siam intact politically, as a buffer zone. Hence it was a combination of its geographic position in colonial geopolitics and the ability of the Siamese elites to demonstrate their reformist inclinations that convinced the colonial powers that Siam could modernize under its own rulers.

The degree to which Siam's independence was preserved in the age of colonialism bears examination. In particular, the Siamese economy resembled those of colonial Burma and Vietnam. From a basically self-subsistent economy where overseas trade was controlled by the court, Siam became a rice producer for colonial markets and an importer of manufactured goods, with hardly any significant industries. Internal trade was largely in the hands of Chinese merchants, and Western banks, agency houses, and insurance companies dominated the exter-

nal market, controlling about 70 percent of the economy. Export and import taxes were frozen by treaties at the 1855 levels, which were certainly unrealistic with the falling value of the Siamese currency in relation to the British. Furthermore it was untenable, especially by the 1890s, when state revenues were required to fund the administrative reforms and infrastructure development to ensure stability within the newly defined borders of the realm, and to meet the demands of Westerners for improved facilities. However, the treaty powers were not amenable to revision without concessions in return. In addition, with the consolidation of colonial rule in Southeast Asia in the last decades of the nineteenth century, there was an influx of Asian subjects of the treaty powers residing in Siam. In particular, Chinese who claimed to have hailed from the British Straits Settlements and Hong Kong, Portuguese Macao, and the French and Dutch colonies were not subjected to the Siamese legal system. Without the cooperation of the treaty powers, the Siamese authorities had difficulty in verifying that they were indeed colonial subjects. Finally, Siam's rulers absorbed the colonial powers' worldview, selectively equating Europe with civilization and progress and categorizing its highland dwellers as beyond the pale of civilization; rural villagers were seen as backward but potentially of economic value, and Bangkok as the repository of civilization and progress. What really distinguished Siam from its colonial neighbors then was the fact that it was the Siamese ruling house itself that centralized power over the newly created territorial state.

The identification of its rulers as saviors of the kingdom from colonial rule has become a credo of mainstream Thai history, justifying the continued existence of the absolute monarchy before 1932 and, thereafter, the military regimes that built on the myth that Thailand's independence was best ensured by authoritarian leadership. History and culture, and the definition of what is considered "Thai," have remained largely in conservative hands.

HONG LYSA

See also Agency Houses, European; Bowring, Sir John (1792–1872); Chinese in Southeast Asia; Colonialism; Damrong, Prince (1862–1943); Free Trade; Imperialism; Reforms and Modernization in Siam

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PRIDI PHANOMYONG (1900–1983)**Ending Absolutist Kingship**

Pridi Phanomyong was without question one of the two most important leaders of Thailand (Siam) during the Pacific War (1941–1945) and the immediate postwar period; the other was Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (1897–1964). Born on 11 May 1900 to Siang and Lukchan, who were humble farmers in the province of Ayudhya, the old capital of Thailand, Pridi never forgot the heavy and unfair lot of the common people. A highly intelligent youth, Pridi was able to complete his barrister training even before he was twenty years old and had to wait until 1920 before he was admitted to the Thai bar, and with it a position as a legal clerk with the Ministry of Justice. In the same year he won a king's scholarship to study law in France. It took Pridi altogether six years to complete his study and graduate with a doctorate in law and a postgraduate diploma in political economy from the University of Paris. Upon his return to Siam, Pridi was appointed a judge attached to the Ministry of Justice and later was promoted to become an instructor of the Law School, Ministry of Justice.

Pridi was credited for setting up the People's Party, the first meeting of which was held in Paris in early 1927 with seven founding members, including Pridi himself and Phibunsongkhram (then Lieutenant Plaek Khit-tasangha), Pridi's political nemesis. The main

aim of the group was to change the political system in Siam from that of absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy.

Pridi was well recognized as the "brain" of the 1932 Revolution, which replaced the Chakri absolutist rule with that of a constitutional monarchy. It was Pridi who drafted the iconoclastic manifesto of the People's Party condemning the Chakri kings for their delinquencies, which had brought about all the socioeconomic and political ills in the kingdom and the sufferings of the people. Arguably, Pridi's most valuable contributions to the early period of the revolution were the 1932 Constitution and the Economic Plan he drafted and proposed for adoption by both the State Council (cabinet) and the National Assembly as the country's blueprint for socioeconomic development. Both the manifesto and the Economic Plan were more or less regarded as the pillars of Pridi's political credentials at the time. They strengthened his position as the civilian leader of the People's Party.

Pridi's political fortune shone brightly throughout the premiership of Phraya Phahon-phayuhasena (t. 1933–1938). He was first recalled in October 1933 from a short political exile forced upon him by the government of Phraya Manopakorn-nitithada, prime minister (t. 1932–1933) of the first conservative-royalist government after the revolution, on grounds of being a communist or harboring communist sentiments. During the premiership of Phraya Phahon, Pridi was given at different times various portfolios, including the interior, finance, and foreign affairs. His main rivals, Phraya Songsuradej and Luang Phibunsongkhram, appeared subdued. However, during the last years of Phraya Phahon's cabinet, Phibun was able to catch up with Pridi's political influence and in fact managed to edge out Pridi from the running for the premiership. When the assembly selected Phibun as Phahon's successor in December 1938, Pridi was persuaded to serve in the Phibun cabinet. The Pridi-Phibun friction prevailed and eventually led to the promotion of Pridi to the Council of Regency in early 1942. His promotion was due to his pro-Allied sentiments, which had unsettled the Japanese, who had become Thailand's war allies.

Pridi reached his political pinnacle in March 1946. He became prime minister three times,

each time for a very short period. Altogether, Pridi was prime minister for about five months between 24 March and 20 August 1946. Prior to his acceptance of the premiership, the young king Ananda Mahidol (Rama VIII) (r. 1935–1946) honored Pridi on 8 December 1945 with the title of “elder statesman.” It was a clear indication of the royal appreciation of his role as regent and as the leader who helped to steer the country out of the danger of the aftermath of war. As elder statesman, Pridi spent most of his time exerting his power and influence through his handpicked successors in the cabinet and supporters in the assembly. His most noted direct involvement in state affairs was in efforts to settle the territorial dispute with French Indochina after the war.

Pridi and his supporters were ousted from the arena of Thai politics in November 1947 when a group of officers staged a coup d'état that eventually brought the military and Phibun back to power. Pridi spent his life in exile first in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and later in France. He made one serious attempt to regain his political power by force through a failed coup, the Grand Palace rebellion, in 1949.

The remainder of his life was spent mainly in defending his political record and his reputation as the champion of Thailand's democracy. He died in Paris on 7 August 1983.

KOBKUA SUWANNATHAT-PIAN

See also Constitutional (Bloodless) Revolution (1932) (Thailand); Free Thai Movement; Thammasat University

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PRIYAYI

Backbone of the Javanese Civil Service

During direct Dutch colonial rule (1816–1942), the *priyayi* formed the core of the native civil service corps in Java. They were the direct link with the independent kingdoms of Java's past. The cultivation of power by mystical exercises was an important characteristic of *priyayi* culture. The assumed spiritual power of the aristocracy shaped the relationship between the common people and the Javanese elite. In the course of the nineteenth century the *priyayi* became salaried officials, subordinate to the central government. The Java War (1825–1830) made it clear that it was essential to foster the loyalty of the *priyayi* by involving them more in government and treating them with respect. At the end of the nineteenth century the *priyayi* were integrated in the colonial administration, which made them increasingly dependent on the Dutch.

The development of the native corps from the late nineteenth century to the Japanese occupation marked the idea of a paternalist colonial state administered for the mutual benefit of the indigenous people and the Dutch. During the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), things changed profoundly. The Japanese admitted new players to positions of influence, recognizing nationalist and Muslim leaders as legitimate links between the central administration and the people. The Japanese maintained the essential structure of the corps, but the privileged position of the officials was reduced. At the end of the war the relationship between the *priyayi* and the new leaders of the incipient Indonesian state had become very tense.

The postrevolutionary *priyayi* had to function under a new kind of government. The corps was renamed from *Pangreh Praja* (the Rulers of the Realm) to *Pamong Praja* (the Servants of the Realm) in 1946. Now the nationalists were in control, and the *priyayi* had to carry out their instructions. Under the New Order of Soeharto (Suharto) (t. 1967–1998), the local

civil service was almost completely subordinated to the army's territorial organization.

ELLY TOUWEN-BOUWSMA
TRANSLATED BY ROSEMARY
ROBSON-McKILLOP

See also Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Java; Java War (1825–1830); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; *Orde Baru* (The New Order)

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PROPAGANDA MOVEMENT

A Filipino Reformist Movement

The Propaganda Movement was a movement of educated Filipinos in Spain, from about 1880 till 1895, demanding political rights for the people in the Philippines and political reform of the Spanish colonial rule in the country. The propagandists used the means of mass communication available at the time—such as newspaper articles, books, pamphlets, and public speeches—in order to convince the Spanish government of the need to introduce reforms in its Asian colony. They claimed that they voiced the aspirations of the people, but they did so in Spanish, a language that was not generally understood by the majority of the people in the Philippines. The Propaganda Movement failed to obtain liberal reforms from the Spanish government. However, the ideas of the movement deeply influenced the independence movement in the Philippines, which started the Philippine Revolution in 1896.

Two decades earlier, in 1872, the Spanish government in the Philippines had felt threat-

ened by a number of critical priests and discontented soldiers, and it reacted with a wave of terror. Three Filipino priests—Burgos, Gomez, and Zamora—were executed, and many Filipinos were deported to the Marianas Islands. Throughout the 1870s and 1880s the government remained suspicious, ready to arrest, deport, or execute Filipinos on the basis of denunciations by Catholic friars, who indiscriminately accused people of *filibusterismo*, rebellion against the Spanish colonial government. To avoid arrest, many educated Filipinos went abroad. Families sought to protect their sons by sending them to study English in Hong Kong or Singapore, or to study medicine, law, engineering, or the arts in London, Paris, or Madrid. In all these places sizable Filipino communities came into existence. They were called *ilustrados*, educated and enlightened persons, coming from wealthy families.

Filipino self-exiles in Spain observed the freedom and the liberal conditions in Spain and in other European countries, and they wanted the same for their own country. Although these Filipino emigrés belonged to different ethnolinguistic groups in the Philippines, they began to see themselves as Filipinos and to develop a national consciousness. In the early 1880s they started Filipino associations and a Tagalog newspaper. The central figure was Marcelo del Pilar, writer and organizer. In 1882, José Rizal (1861–1896) arrived in Spain as a student and soon played an important role in the movement.

The propagandists demanded a number of specific political and social reforms from Spain. The main demands included that the Philippine people be represented in the Spanish parliament, and that the Spanish constitution be extended to the Philippines. They insisted that primary education be encouraged without any intervention of the friars. They also requested that secular priests replace the friars in the parishes, and that Filipinos be admitted into the priesthood. The propagandists urged the granting of political rights for Filipinos, such as freedom of religion and freedom of the press. Alongside this reformist line, a more strongly nationalist line was discernible. The propagandists wanted to put an end to the racism and arrogance of the Spaniards in the Philippines and the humiliation of the Filipinos. They demanded recognition for the human dignity and the basic rights of the Filipino people.

In their campaign for political reforms, the propagandists followed two strategies. The first was to expose the shortcomings of the colonial administration in the Philippines, criticizing the power of the Spanish officials and the friars. The second was to show that Filipinos were literate and cultured and capable of self-government. The Propaganda Movement was not asking for separation of the Philippines from the mother country, but for assimilation—that is, changing the status of the Philippines from a colony to a province of Spain.

The propagandists used several instruments to achieve their ends. In 1888 they founded the *Asociación Hispano-Filipina*, a Spanish-Filipino association striving for reforms. In 1889 they started *La Solidaridad*, a Spanish-language journal. At the same time several propagandists joined Spanish Masonic lodges, hoping to enlist political support from liberal Spanish politicians in their lobby for reforms. Del Pilar was the organizer in all three fields of activity. He strongly believed in assimilation, and he was convinced that it was in Spain's interest to democratize and modernize the political system in the Philippines and to abolish the rule of the friars.

In December 1889, Del Pilar became the chief editor of *La Solidaridad*, a function that he performed until the journal was closed down in 1895. The journal discussed the general issues pertinent to the reform agenda of the movement, and it criticized social and political abuses in the Philippines. Aside from Filipino propagandists, some foreigners also contributed articles to the journal, the most famous being the Austrian professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, an expert on the Philippines and a friend of Rizal's.

The Propaganda Movement failed, because it was directed at the government and the general public in Spain, neither of which was interested in the political conditions of their Asian colony. Spanish liberals did not keep their promises. The propagandists could not operate in the Philippines, because they were branded as rebels and their publications were banned. In 1892, Rizal drew the conclusion that it was futile to continue the work in Europe, and he decided to return to the Philippines to organize a political movement. Shortly after his arrival he was arrested and deported to Mindanao. On the night of Rizal's deportation Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897) founded a secret society, the Katipunan, which would start the revolution of

1896. Indirectly, the nationalist principles of the Propaganda Movement would inspire the nationalist movement and the independence struggle in the Philippines.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Friars, Spanish (the Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship; Katipunan; *La Solidaridad*; Max Havelaar (1860); *Noli Me Tangere* (1887) and *El Filibusterismo* (1891); Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Rizal, José (1861–1896)

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PUSAT TENAGA RAKJAT (PUTERA) (CENTRE OF PEOPLES' POWER)

After the Triple A movement (support for Japanese leadership in Asia), started in April 1942, began to crumble, the Japanese military administration in Java decided to set up an organization to mobilize the population in Java for their war effort on a far broader scale. PUTERA, as the new organization is known to history, existed from March 1943 to February 1944. Unlike the Triple A movement, PUTERA was meant only for Indonesians. Prominent Indonesian nationalists such as Sukarno (1901–1970), Hatta (1902–1980), Mansur, and Dewantara, all belonging to the *Empat Serangkai*, were asked to take over the leadership and the government of the organization. It was planned that PUTERA would have branches established throughout Java at the residency, agency, and district levels, with a center

in Jakarta. The whole organization was under close control of the Japanese at each level. Despite Japanese control, the nationalists expected that PUTERA would give them an opportunity to intensify their efforts to raise national consciousness among the people and to improve their conditions.

The objectives of the movement were to create a powerful Java as a link in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, by extending aid and cooperation to Japan in order to secure the ultimate victory. The most important activities of PUTERA lay in the field of propaganda. The population of Java had to be stimulated to build up a New Java and actively participate in the defense of a Greater Asia. All American, British, and Dutch influences had to be obliterated. The organization had to promote mutual understanding between the Japanese and the Indonesians. Besides the study of Japanese, the use of the Malay language should be encouraged. In the economic field, agricultural production had to be raised and labor efficiency promoted. Moreover, information on hygiene should be widely disseminated and physical education promoted. The Japanese needed the nationalists to spread the propaganda for their war effort. However, from the beginning they set certain limitations to prevent the influence of the nationalists from gaining too strong a hold among the population.

Branches of the new organization below the level of the district were not planned. In the residencies, permission was needed from the resident, who was often a Japanese, to appoint persons in the local sections. Moreover, the *pan-greh praja* (the Indonesian civil service), which formed the link between the Japanese military administration and the mass of the population of Java, obstructed any efforts the nationalists might have made to get in touch with the local population. Its members did not want to see their position undermined by the growing influence of the nationalists. Another factor preventing the nationalists from making contact with the local youth was the establishment of the *seinandan* (Youth Association) and the *Keibotan* (Civil Defence Corps) shortly after PUTERA became operational. The Japanese made sure that these associations were set up well outside the influence and organizational cadre of PUTERA. Even the Sports Training Movement, *Gelora*, which had been established by

PUTERA, was not given permission to continue and was brought under the control of the Java Sports Association. These measures ensured that the expectations the nationalists fostered of gaining their goal were trimmed back within three months of the existence of PUTERA.

Both the nationalists and the Japanese were disappointed in their expectations of PUTERA. In the matter of food supply, production remained insufficient, especially to satisfy the requirements of the military government. Because of the Japanese policy of treating residencies as largely self-sufficient units, the distribution of rice and other foodstuffs were extremely chaotic and smuggling flourished. Production and distribution of agricultural goods were a persistent problem for the Japanese in Java and contributed to the failure of PUTERA. Labor problems were another complication that made PUTERA's job difficult. The Japanese exerted heavy pressure on the population to be gainfully employed. Large numbers of workers were taken away from Java as *romusha* (members of labor groups recruited, often through coercion, by the Japanese in occupied countries during the Pacific War). Young men were recruited for Peta (the Indonesian Self-Defence Force) or forced to join the *seinandan* to repair roads and prepare land for cultivation. The oppression of the Japanese government and the increasing shortage of food did not improve the popularity of the government, weakening the position of PUTERA even further.

From the beginning it was clear that both the Japanese and the Indonesians had their own agendas for reaching their own goals. This greatly hampered the development of the organization into a Java-wide cooperation between Japanese and Indonesian nationalists. Both were to gain from PUTERA, but it was not to fulfill the real expectations of either group. In the beginning of 1944, dissatisfied with PUTERA, the Japanese announced the formation of a new organization, the *Djawa Hokokai* (the Javanese Service Association). The new organization was placed under firm Japanese control. PUTERA agreed to merge with it, and that marked the end of this short-lived organization.

ELLY TOUWEN-BOUWSMA
TRANSLATED BY ROSEMARY
ROBSON-McKILLOP

See also “Asia for the Asiatics”; Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970)

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PYUS

The Pyu people resided in central and Upper Burma (Myanmar) from the seventh to the eleventh centuries C.E., where they founded a number of city-states. The first of these is usually considered to be Sri Ksetra, traditionally founded in 638 near modern Prome (Pyay). That date also traditionally marks the beginning of the Burmese Buddhist (śaka) era. Over the course of the next century and a half, the center of Pyu power moved northward to Beikthano and Hanlin, near Shwebo. These are today the other main Pyu archaeological sites in Burma. The Pyu appear to have lost power to the Burman city-states in the eleventh century and were assimilated by them.

The most significant Pyu archaeological excavations were carried out at Beikthano in the 1960s. Yet what little we know of the Pyu and their kingdoms is derived mainly from Chinese sources, from epigraphy, and from other limited archaeological finds. The Pyu people had their own script as well as a distinctive religious, artistic, and architectural identity. For this reason most historical writing on the Pyu has tended to concentrate on the contribution made by them to the development of Burma's literary, artistic, and religious history.

The fullest descriptions that we have of the Pyu states are those in the Chinese chronicles of the Tang dynasty (606–910 C.E.). These detail that a number of diplomatic and cultural exchanges were made between the Pyu kings and the Chinese court. They also report that in the ninth century the Pyu kingdom contained eighteen dependent states and nine walled towns. However, the Chinese as well as the Arakanese to the west of Burma used the term *Pyu* in a quite general way. The term could refer to many groups living in this region, which complicates interpretation of these sources. The Chinese chronicles do give quite a lot of information, however, about the city of Sri Ksetra and the kind of government and social organization that flourished there. These accounts emphasize the relatively benign nature of the Pyu ruler's authority and the high degree of artistic accomplishment of the local craftsmen. Excavations at the site of Sri Ksetra also reveal it to have been a city of considerable size. The city walls, which appear to have been both high and strongly built, were apparently far greater in extent than those of the later Burmese kingdom of Pagan. The Pyu people at Sri Ksetra were Buddhist, but it seems that this was mixed with elements from the Vishnu cult of Indian Hinduism, as well as possibly with a megalithic cult and with other pre-Buddhist traditions. Three large pagodas are still visible at the site, and these are remarkable not only for their Pyu-language inscriptions but also for their use of glazed bricks and interior vaulting. In these pagoda-temples most art historians trace the origins of the distinctive Burmese style of pagoda that was later to be developed so dramatically at the Burmese kingdom of Pagan.

The reasons why the Pyu center of power moved northward from Sri Ksetra are uncertain. However, the Chinese chronicles suggest that the Pyu city-kingdoms had influence over an expansive area of central and Upper Burma, having links with Manipur and Arakan to the west and China to the east. Much more research needs to be done on the historical relationship between these areas and their interconnections. By the eighth century, the kingdom of Nanchao in western Yunnan had become powerful and appeared to exert an increasing influence over the Pyu city-kingdoms. The chronicles tell us that in 800–802 a delegation of Pyu musicians accompanied a Nanchao

mission to the Chinese court, and in 808–809 the Nanchao ruler took the title *P'iaohsin* (Pyushin), translated as “Lord of the Pyu.” In the eleventh century this relationship seems to have become much more aggressive and caused the Pyu to lose control of their states. The newly powerful Burmese kingdom of Pagan then absorbed these territories.

Much of the research into Pyu archaeology and ethnohistory is highly politicized. Although the Pyu people are today an entirely historic ethnographic entity, spurious claims are still made by some groups to be descended from them, the “original inhabitants” of Burma. Considerable kudos would be attached to such an ancestry. There are references to individuals making these claims as late as the early twentieth century, but more recently some historians of the Maru or Lawngwaw ethnic group (one of the modern Kachin subgroups in Burma) have taken up the idea. This is based on the premise that the Lawngwaw use the word *Pyu* for “man.” Some Burmese nationalists have encouraged the argument, as it undermines argu-


ments of ethnic unity among the Kachin peoples, who were engaged in armed nationalist resistance to the Burmese government from the 1960s to the early 1990s. Nationalist Burman historical writing also seeks to create continuity between the Pyu and the early Burman polity in the central dry zone. Much more research remains to be done.

MANDY SADAN

See also Arakan; Buddhism; Burmans; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Indianization; Nan Chao (Nanchao) (Dali/Tali); Pagan (Bagan); Yunnan Province

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QING (CHING/MANCHU) DYNASTY (1644–1912)

The Qing (Ching) was the last imperial dynasty of China, ruled by the Manchus, who were regarded by the Han Chinese as alien and barbarian. This prejudicial view prevailed until the collapse of the dynasty, when under a new racial scheme the Manchus were considered part of a conquered and enlarged Chinese nation consisting of Han and other ethnic minorities. For the first half of the dynasty, the relationship between China and Southeast Asia continued to operate within the confines of the tributary system, until the time of the Western encroachment in the nineteenth century.

Generally speaking, the sinocentric tributary system continued to function as the framework regulating the relationship between the Chinese Empire and the Southeast Asian states, the latter being vassal states required to send regular tributary missions to China as a sign of respect to the Manchu, albeit alien, emperors. After fulfilling the tributary obligations, free trade was allowed. Junk trade among China, Cambodia, Luzon, Annam, Sulu, Brunei, Johor, and Batavia was voluminous. The Chinese government received Siamese merchants, especially in Guangdong (focusing on Guangzhou [Canton]), with particular enthusiasm as suppliers of rice, a staple food in South China.

Qing law explicitly prohibited Chinese from going abroad for trade and settlement, as the Ming originally did, to prevent the conglomer-

ation of anti-Qing forces, in view of the resistance movement at Taiwan led by Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong) (1624–1662) and his son during the reign of Emperor Kangxi (1654–1722, r. 1661–1722). However, numerous instances of Chinese emigration to peripheral states in Southeast Asia are known. Patriotic Han Chinese fled to Southeast Asia for refuge after the Manchus succeeded in usurping the Ming regime in 1644 and massacred Han people in a number of cities. Supporters of the anti-Qing Taiping Kingdom (1850–1864) fled to Southeast Asia after this Nanjing regime was eventually overthrown by the Qing army in 1864. By means of the coolie trade, a large number of Chinese went abroad starting in the mid-nineteenth century and worked as indentured laborers in tin mines and rubber plantations in the Straits Settlements, many of them lacking the means to return and thus settling down.

It was the singular circumstances of the nineteenth century that forced the Qing government to fundamentally revise its attitudes toward the overseas Chinese and the vassal states. Traditionally the Chinese government stood aloof to and even antagonized the Chinese overseas, who were regarded as deserters of the Chinese Empire. The imperial court was unsympathetic to them, even in crises such as the Red River Incident (1740), in which more than 10,000 Chinese sojourners in Batavia (Jakarta) were killed by the locals. This negative attitude showed little change until the coming

of the West, when China's various defeats in foreign wars alerted the Qing court to the need for protecting its overseas nationals, a lesson it learned from the West, which would protect their nationals to the extent of launching wars. The overseas Chinese were also increasingly viewed as a potential source of support, especially inasmuch as China was in grave need of funds for various factory and railway projects in its attempt to modernize. The first step taken was to establish a Chinese consulate in Singapore in 1877. Hoo Ah Kay (1816–1880), a prominent local merchant, served as the first consul. Realizing the potential and invaluable source of support (financial in particular) of the overseas Chinese, the Manchu government sought to protect overseas Chinese communities; an initial start was the establishment of a Chinese consulate in Singapore. Against this background of intention to tap and exploit the overseas Chinese, the Manchu court at Beijing also became aware that most of its vassal states, particularly those in Southeast Asia, were increasingly absorbed into Western spheres of influence and many were already under Western colonialism. The number of tribute-bearing states to the "Son of Heaven" was fast declining. Therefore, the increasingly formal representation of China in Southeast Asia symbolized the collapse of the tributary system, which, along with the Chinese Empire, had become weak, useless, and irrelevant in all aspects.

The opening of treaty ports in China for traders of all nationalities in the mid-nineteenth century, which superseded the previous one-port trade policy, with Guangzhou as the only trade port, facilitated trade not only between China and the West but also regionally in Asia. The rise of Hong Kong as an entrepôt, under British colonial rule from 1841 to 1997, wove China more firmly into a Southeast Asian trade and financial network in which Hong Kong and Singapore served as the two nuclei. It was through Hong Kong that Chinese emigrants went to Southeast Asia and remitted funds to their native villages on the Chinese mainland.

Southeast Asia played a special role in the last decade of the Qing's history, wherein Chinese reformists and revolutionaries tested their strength in contending for support from the overseas Chinese there. Singapore became a revolutionary base with branches in Indochina. Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), a renowned Chinese

revolutionary, prepared in Singapore for some important uprisings conducted in South China, succeeding in winning financial and material support from the Chinese sojourners of Singapore. The Wuchang Uprising in October 1911 finally sparked off a nationwide anti-Qing movement, resulting in the establishment of a republic in 1912 and the end of China's dynastic history, which had lasted for more than two thousand years.

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also China, Imperial; China since 1949; China, Nationalist; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Revolution (1911); Chinese Tribute System; Formosa (Taiwan); Hong Kong; Sun Yat-sen, Dr. (1866–1925)

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QUEZON, MANUEL LUIS (1878–1944)

Personifying Philippine Prewar Politics

Manuel Luis Quezon was a leading Filipino political leader in the fight for independence from the United States. He became senate president (1916–1935) in the U.S. colonial administration, and then served as president of the Philippine Commonwealth from 1935 to 1944.

Quezon was born on 19 August 1878 in the town of Baler, Tayabas (now Quezon) Province. His father, Lucio Quezon, had served with the Spanish colonial army and was of mixed Spanish and Filipino blood. Quezon studied at the San Juan de Letran College. During the Philip-

pine Revolution (1896–1898) against Spain and the Filipino–American War (1899–1902), he joined the Philippine revolutionary forces as an officer under General Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964).


After the Filipino–American War (1899–1902), Quezon earned a law degree from the University of Santo Tomas, passed the bar examinations, and practiced law. He entered government as provincial treasury official, and then went to Manila and cofounded the Nacionalista Party, whose platform was immediate independence from the United States.

In 1905, Quezon entered politics when he won the elections for provincial governor of Tayabas. In 1907 he won a seat in the first Philippine Assembly, the lower house of the bicameral legislature in the U.S. colonial government. He was elected majority floor leader of the body. Quezon was chosen by the Philippine Assembly to become resident commissioner to the United States in 1909. As resident commissioner, he represented the Philippines in the U.S. Congress, although he could not vote. While in the United States he campaigned for Philippine independence. He returned to the Philippines in 1916 armed with the Jones Law, which pledged that the United States would grant the Philippines independence once a stable government was established by Filipinos.

The Jones Law established the Philippine Senate as the upper house in the Philippine legislature. Quezon succeeded in becoming a senator for the first Philippine Senate in 1916, and he was elected senate president. He shared Filipino political leadership with Sergio Osmeña, Sr. (1878–1961), who was speaker of the House of Representatives. Quezon asserted his claim as top Filipino politician and triumphed, and from 1923 onward he was the leading Filipino politician. He won Osmeña back to his side and established a coalition government.

In protest against Governor-General Leonard Wood's (t. 1921–1927) interference in internal matters, Quezon resigned his position as senate president after the similar resignation of José P. Laurel (1891–1959). He led a campaign against Wood and the struggle between the two proved costly to his health.

Quezon kept up the campaign for independence under succeeding U.S. governors-general, leading several missions to the United States. He, however, opposed the Hare–Hawes–



Portrait of Manuel Quezon (1878–1944), president of the Philippines. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Cutting Act (1933), which had been brought home by Osmeña and Manuel Roxas (1892–1948). He led a campaign that rejected the act, and then went to the United States the next year to try to obtain a more acceptable independence act. The act finally passed by the U.S. Congress was basically the same as the Hare–Hawes–Cutting Act, but Quezon brought it home in triumph. It was accepted by the Philippine legislature, and Quezon worked to bring back those who had opposed him.

Quezon then was elected president of the Philippine Commonwealth, an almost autonomous government that would prepare the Philippines for independence in ten years. He took his oath of office on 15 November 1935. As president of the commonwealth, Quezon's priorities were to establish a national defense system and a program of social justice, to close the gap between rich and poor, the development of a more diverse economy, and building a stronger national character. The outbreak of war in China (1937) and Europe (1939), as well as the limited time to prepare for independence, led Quezon to ask for emergency powers, which the legislature granted him. His opponents criticized him as fascistic and dictatorial, but Quezon rationalized his position as

being legal and a form of constitutional authoritarianism.

Quezon pushed for constitutional amendments that would revise the legislature and allow him to pursue a second term. These were approved, and Quezon ran for president in November 1941. The outbreak of war in the Pacific intervened, and Quezon was forced to move the seat of government to the island of Corregidor, where he took his oath of office on 30 December 1941.

While in Corregidor, Quezon lobbied for greater U.S. aid to the Philippines and at one point suggested immediate independence and neutrality for the Philippines. Little aid came, and life on Corregidor was unhealthy for Quezon. He was evacuated to the Visayas in February 1942 and then was taken by the Americans to Australia, from which he moved to the United States, where he established the commonwealth government-in-exile. There he worked for greater U.S. attention to the Philippines while trying to keep up the morale of Filipinos in the Japanese-occupied Philippines.

According to the Philippine constitution, Quezon's term as president would end in November 1943. Quezon argued that because of war, the operation of the constitution had been suspended, and that he should remain as president until the end of the war. Vice President Osmeña, who would have succeeded as president, chose to allow Quezon to continue on.

Quezon died of complications caused by tuberculosis on 1 August 1944 in the United States. His remains were transferred to the Philippines in 1946.

Charismatic and dynamic, Quezon personified Philippine politics during the first half of the twentieth century. A skilled politician, he utilized all means at his disposal to attain his ends and defeat his political enemies. Highly emotional at times, he could court the support of Filipinos and exemplified a brand of politics very different from that of Sergio Osmeña (1878–1961), his rival.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Osmeña, Sergio Sr. (1878–1961); Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1898–1946); Philippines–U.S. “Special Relationship”

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QUIRINO, ELPIDIO (1890–1956)

Against the Odds

Elpidio Quirino was the second president of the post-Pacific War (1941–1945) Philippine Republic, serving from 1948 to 1954. He attempted to place the Philippine economy on sound footing, restore peace and order, and establish a firm relationship with other countries during the Cold War.

Quirino was born on 16 November 1890, in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. He earned his law degree at the College of Law, University of the Philippines, in 1915 and passed the bar examination in the same year.

He worked as a clerk and secretary in the Philippine legislature in the U.S. colonial government in the Philippines, and he was noticed by Manuel Quezon (1878–1944), then president of the Philippine Senate. Quezon appointed Quirino as his secretary, but after two years Quirino decided to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in 1919. He won despite having limited financial support. In 1925 he became senator and was reelected in 1931, becoming majority floor leader. He served as secretary of finance (1934) during Governor-General Frank Murphy's (t. 1933–1935) term while keeping his senate seat. He was elected a delegate to the 1934 Constitutional Convention. With the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth government, President Manuel Quezon appointed Quirino as secretary of the interior, in which position he served from 1935 to 1938. He ran for the National Assembly in 1938, but he was not supported by Quezon and lost. In 1941, Quirino was elected senator, but the outbreak of war in the Pacific intervened.

During the Battle of Manila (February 1945), Quirino lost his wife and three children, and barely escaped with his own life.

Quirino assumed his position as senator in June 1945, when the Philippine Senate convened for the first time since the 1941 election. In April 1946 he was elected vice-president on a Liberal Party ticket, together with Manuel Roxas (1892–1948) as president, to serve during the last months of the Philippine Commonwealth and the first years of the postwar Philippine Republic. Quirino was appointed concurrently secretary of finance and secretary of foreign affairs.

Quirino became the second president of the postwar Philippine Republic upon the death of Manuel Roxas on 15 April 1948, taking his oath two days later.

He ran for a full term in 1949, when the first four-year presidential term ended. He ran against José P. Laurel (1891–1959), who had been president of the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic (1943–1945). It was a controversial election, marred by fraud. Laurel refused to concede, but Quirino took his oath as scheduled.

As president, Quirino strove to restore the faith of the people in the government and took steps toward total economic mobilization. He tried to weed out corrupt government employees and sought to build a solid foundation for an industrial economy through the construction of industrial plants, roads, and hydroelectric plants. He worked to stabilize the Philippine *peso*, balance the national budget, and improve the trade imbalance with the United States.

A major challenge for Quirino was the continuing antigovernment Huk rebellion, which had broken out during Roxas's term. Seeking a peaceful resolution of the crisis, Quirino proclaimed amnesty for the Huks and welcomed Luis Taruc (1913–) back to the government in 1948. He attempted to push social programs to uplift conditions of the poor and thus win back the peasantry. However, Taruc and the Huk leadership were not satisfied with the conditions Quirino offered, and they went back underground. Quirino appointed the dynamic Ramon Magsaysay (1907–1957) as secretary of national defense, who fought against the Huks with vigor and combined military and social programs, eventually controlling them.

In the field of foreign relations, Quirino sought a regional security alliance and called an international conference to form a Pacific Pact. The United States did not participate, and the pact did not materialize. Under his administration the Philippine government signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, maintaining its stand on the need to obtain war reparations from Japan. He pardoned and returned convicted Japanese war criminals in order to improve Philippine-Japanese relations. Quirino also sought assurances from the United States that it would come to the assistance of the Philippines in case of war. As a sign of his government's commitment to anticommunism, he authorized the dispatch of Philippine military forces to Korea in 1950.

Despite his policies, Quirino's administration was marred by charges of graft and corruption, and various scandals broke out. Quirino's political enemies, some of whom sought his impeachment, created a crisis in the government that was aggravated by the threat of the Huks. Consequently there was a flight of capital out of the country, necessitating the imposition of economic controls that proved unpopular.

Quirino ran for a second term in 1953 but was defeated by Ramon Magsaysay. Quirino, who had become sick in the last years of his presidency, retired after losing the elections and died on 28 February 1956 of a heart attack.

Quirino's presidency has been misunderstood, and negative aspects such as graft and corruption were highlighted over sound economic and international policies. The period during which he served was particularly difficult, with the Cold War, the economic problems caused by the Pacific War, partisan politics, and an antigovernment rebellion occurring at the same time. His administrative style was criticized as being weak, but only years after his administration ended have the positive aspects been recognized.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Cold War; Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon) (People's Anti-Japanese Army) (1942); Laurel, José Paciano (1891–1959); Magsaysay, Ramon (1907–1957); Peasant Uprisings and Protest

Movements in Southeast Asia; Roxas, Manuel Acuña (1892–1948); Taruc, Luis (1913–)

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QUỐC NGỮ

Literally translated as “national language,” *Quốc Ngữ* was originally developed by European Christian missionaries for the writing of the Vietnamese language in Roman letters. These missionaries came to Vietnam in the seventeenth century for evangelization purposes. A romanized script for the Vietnamese language with no tonal marks was cited for the first time in a book by Christophoro Borri, published in 1631 in Rome. However, the phonetics of the transcription are believed to be based on Portuguese. By 1650 five tonal marks plus a few diacritics had been added to the romanized script. The French Jesuit Alexandre de Rhodes (1591–1660) was credited with systematizing the transcription by using tone marks and dia-

critics to help with vowel pronunciation that is essential for understanding the tonal Vietnamese language. The year 1651 is seen as a landmark, with the publication in Rome of two works in *Quốc Ngữ* by Alexandre de Rhodes, including a Vietnamese-Portuguese dictionary.

During the French colonization of Cochinchina in the second half of the nineteenth century, the French authorities promoted the use and teaching of *Quốc Ngữ* as an alternative to Chinese characters and *Nom* (a demotic system of writing Vietnamese using Chinese characters). The first issue of a government-sponsored magazine in *Quốc Ngữ*, the *Gia Dinh Bao*, was published on 15 April 1864. Petrus Truong Vinh Ky, its editor, was one of the best-known Vietnamese scholars and linguists at the time. He contributed significantly to the development of *Quốc Ngữ* literature. As French colonial rule became established, the use of *Quốc Ngữ* spread to northern and central Vietnam, gradually becoming the accepted script.

TRAN MY-VAN

See also Education, Traditional Religious; Education, Western Secular; Missionaries, Christian; Rhodes, Alexandre de (1591–1660); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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R

RAFFLES COLLEGE

Begun in 1929, Raffles College was one of two nuclei (the other being King Edward VII College of Medicine) of the first university in Malaysia—namely, the University of Malaya. Named in tribute to Sir Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) and in honor of the centenary of Raffles's establishment of Singapore (1819), Raffles College was set up to meet the public demand for tertiary education in the sciences and liberal arts in British Malaya.

The Maxwell Committee (1918) deliberated on the commemoration of the centenary of Singapore and proposed the establishment of an institution of higher learning as a fitting memorial to Raffles, himself a scholar of the Malay world (present-day Indonesia and Malaysia). The Firmstone Committee (1919) implemented the groundwork of what came to be known as “Raffles College.”

Funds for the project came from the Straits Settlements government as well as from the Malay States government. The site (at Bukit Timah Road), buildings, and annual maintenance were borne by the Singapore government. Donations flowed in from the public irrespective of class, ethnicity, and creed. Chinese *toukay* (prosperous businessmen, entrepreneurs) competed with each other in their contributions. The European community and the Jewish sector, despite their small numbers, were equally generous in their financial support.

Construction of the campus buildings commenced in 1922. By the end of the decade Raffles College was operational, offering a three-year baccalaureate program. The disciplines in the arts initially included English, geography, economics, and history. Mathematics, physics, and chemistry catered to the science stream. All the courses were modeled on that of the University of London. In addition a postgraduate course in pedagogy facilitated the training of teachers to serve upper secondary schools. Inasmuch as English was the language of instruction, its students were drawn from government and mission English schools; graduates of vernacular schools (Chinese, Malay, and Tamil) were unable to enter, owing to their poor command of English. The faculty members came mostly from Britain.

The amalgamation in 1949 of Raffles College and King Edward VII College of Medicine provided the foundation for the University of Malaya.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Education, Western Secular; King Edward VII College of Medicine; Malayan/Malaysian Education; Penang Free School (1816); University of Malaya

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RAFFLES, SIR (THOMAS) STAMFORD BINGLEY (1781–1826)

Visionary British Imperialist

Thomas Stamford Bingley Raffles was the founder of Singapore and also the London Zoo—fitting memorials to his twin ambitions to promote free trade and the study of natural history.

Born aboard his father's ship off Jamaica on 6 July 1781, Raffles was forced to leave school at fourteen to support his widowed mother and four younger sisters. Joining the East India Company's (EIC) London office as a junior clerk, he was promoted in 1805 to assistant secretary at Penang, setting sail with his bride, Olivia Mariamne Fancourt (1771–1814), a vivacious and intelligent widow ten years his senior.

Teaching himself Malay on the outward voyage, Raffles embarked in Penang on a lifetime study of the history, literature, flora, and fauna of the Malay world. Persistently he urged the EIC to use the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815) to replace the Dutch economic system of monopoly, protective tariffs, and forced deliveries with more liberal British influence.

Visiting Calcutta in 1810, Raffles succeeded in reversing plans to raze Melaka, and Governor-General Lord Minto (1807–1813) appointed him lieutenant governor when the company occupied Java the following year. Aiming to make British rule permanent, Raffles posted residents (British officers) at Javanese courts, urged Calcutta to appoint agents throughout the archipelago, and began to replace forced labor with money rents. When this brought a substantial loss of revenue, Raffles sold government lands to bolster a shaky paper currency, and in October 1815 he was recalled, still grief-stricken over Olivia's sudden death a few months earlier.

The year 1817 brought better fortune. On 13 February the EIC directors exonerated Raffles from dishonorable motives in Java and

confirmed his appointment as lieutenant governor of the West Sumatra residency at Benkulen. Nine days later he married Sophia Hull (1786–1858), who was to be his steadfast support. Raffles was elected a fellowship of the Royal Society, his two-volume *History of Java* was published to acclaim, and in May 1817 he was knighted by the prince regent, from that time styling himself Sir Stamford instead of the more pedestrian Tom. But he failed to win backing for a chain of stations on the China route, since both the British government and the EIC wanted to return Dutch territories and reduce their commitments in Southeast Asia.

Undeterred, Raffles tried to develop Benkulen as a base for expansion, but when he visited Calcutta once more in September 1818, the governor-general vetoed his ambitious Sumatra schemes. However, he approved a limited proposal for a treaty with Aceh in the north and a trading station at some southern point in the Melaka Straits.

Attracted by Singapore's historical associations as the probable site of the port of Temasek (Tumasik), which was destroyed in the late fourteenth century, on 30 January 1819 Raffles signed a preliminary agreement with the local chieftain permitting the EIC to set up a trading post. Since the sultanate was disputed by two half brothers, with the Dutch supporting the younger claimant, Raffles recognized the elder as sultan and signed a treaty with him on 6 February 1819. Raffles immediately left to negotiate the Aceh treaty, returning briefly in May 1819 with settlers from Penang. In face of vigorous Dutch protests, the British occupation was not recognized until 1824.

Meanwhile, in October 1819, Raffles visited Calcutta yet again to plead in vain to be given control of all the British possessions in Southeast Asia: Penang, Province Wellesley, Benkulen, and Singapore. He then narrowed his vision to trying to turn Benkulen into a model colony, but he decided to leave the East when three of his four children died and both Raffles and Sophia fell seriously ill.

First he visited Singapore, where, from October 1822 to June 1823, he laid down long-term administration on liberal lines, including permanent free trade. In February 1824 he and Sophia left Benkulen for England on the *Fame*,

which caught fire. All on board were saved, but the entire cargo was lost, including irreplaceable scientific papers, original Malay manuscripts, drawings and paintings, live plants, fish, animals, and birds.

In England later that year, Raffles published a *Statement of the Services of Sir Stamford Raffles* (1824), justifying his administration. In 1825 he bought a country estate at High Wood near Hendon and launched a long-cherished proposal for a London zoo and the Zoological Society, to which he was elected president in February 1826.

In his last months he lost most of his capital in a bank failure, and in April 1826 the EIC directors refused a pension, demanding a huge sum in alleged overpayments. On 5 July 1826, Raffles died suddenly from an unsuspected brain tumor. Of his grand strategy only Singapore survived, but he was respected by leading scientists and gave his name to *Rafflesia arnoldi*, the largest flower in the world, which he discovered in Sumatra. His widow published a devoted biography, and Charles Wurtzburg's 1954 *Raffles of the Eastern Isles* is the most complete twentieth-century work; an authoritative modern biography is long overdue.

C. M. TURNBULL

See also Aceh (Acheh); Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Century); Bengkulu (Bencoolen, Benkulen); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Free Trade; Napoleonic Wars in Asia; Penang (1786); Singapore (1819); Temasik (Tumasik); Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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RAJA ALI HAJI (ca. 1809–1869)

Historian and Author

Malay historian and author of the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (The Precious Gift), Raja Ali Haji was the grandson of Raja Haji, the Bugis *Yamtuan Muda* killed by the Dutch at Melaka in 1784. While still a teenager, Raja Ali Haji accompanied his father, Raja Ahmad, on an expedition to Batavia, and by age twenty he had acquired considerable experience of the world outside his homeland, Riau. When he was thirty-two, he was appointed joint regent and ruler of Lingga for the young Sultan Mahmud. A scholar of Malay history, language, religion (Islam), and culture, Raja Ali Haji corresponded with Dutch scholars working in Riau and published in Dutch journals as well as locally. A prolific author, he expressed views held by most educated Malays of the period.

Raja Ali Haji's political influence in Riau's administration spanned four decades, but it is as a scholar that he is remembered. While still a young man, he was regarded as an authority on Islam and an expert on genealogy and court procedure. His published works cover subjects as varied as theology, statecraft, genealogy, history, law, literature, and the Malay language, and include a Malay grammar, *Bustan al-Katibin* (Garden of Writers) and a dictionary, of which only part survives (Abu Hasan Sham 1993). In Riau today, Raja Ali Haji is thought of as the author of the *Gurindam Dua Belas*, twelve short, didactic poems of a religious nature.

Raja Ali Haji's greatest work is the *Tuhfat al-Nafis*, which covers the entire span of Malay history from the descent of the first Malay king, Raja Seri Teri Buana, at *bukit* Siguntang, to the rule of Temenggung Abu Bakar (r. 1862–1895) of Johor. As a historical source it is considered second in importance only to the *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals). The main section of the *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (the name can be read as *Dedication to the Task* as well as *The Precious Gift*) contains a description of events covering nearly two centuries of the history of Johor and its relationship with the wider Malay world. It is believed that the *Tuhfat* was initially started by Raja Ali Haji's father, Raja Ahmad, a keen student of history and author of the *Sjair Perang Johor* (Verses of the Johor War), and was completed by its main author in the late 1860s. The *Tuhfat* is remarkable in that it brings mod-

ern concerns to the writing of Malay history, including factual accuracy, due attention to dates, and acknowledgment of sources; its subjects, as in earlier historiography, are kings and aristocrats.

The *Tuhfat al-Nafis* is a valuable source of information for the history of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and the Malay Peninsula, particularly for the eighteenth century and the first half of the nineteenth. It is based upon a number of manuscripts preserved in court libraries in Riau, Siak, and Kalimantan, and on named oral sources. It is the first Malay history to fully introduce human agency in the making of history. *Takdir* (God's will) is rarely invoked, and only then to explain an inexplicable event, such as the length of a man's life or the outcome of a battle. Instead, through his interpretation of the past, Raja Ali Haji demonstrates how human behavior influences, for better or for worse, the course of history.

The *Tuhfat's* political purpose is to defend Bugis involvement in the Malay world and to justify the status that the Bugis achieved as the protectors of the Malay realm. In accomplishing this objective, Raja Ali Haji is selective of his sources and their interpretation. Importantly, Raja Ali Haji puts forward the view that rulers are appointed by God, and if they are dethroned that is because they have failed to obey God's commands. God thus replaces genealogical descent as the source of political power.

Some of these ideas probably stem from the revivalist movements that swept through the Islamic world in the nineteenth century, which placed greater emphasis on the importance of personal effort in religious matters. Raja Ali Haji's views are derived in large part from Abu-Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazzali's (1058–1111) great work, the *Ihya' 'Ulumal-Din* (The Revitalization of the Religious Sciences), which he translated into Malay. Raja Ali Haji's underlying argument is that the function of the state is to provide a climate conducive to the proper observance of religion, so that the faithful can fulfill their spiritual obligations and prepare themselves for the day of judgment. For this reason, God has appointed kings to set examples of righteous behavior and to assist men in their religious observances. Thus the well-being of the realm reflects the virtue of the ruler, who alone has the power to create the conditions favorable for spiritual well-being and material prosperity.

IAN A. CALDWELL

See also Bugis (Buginese); Johor; Johor-Riau Empire; *Sejarah Melayu* (*Malay Annals*); Sumatra; *Tuhfat al-Nafis* (The Precious Gift)

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**RAMA I (CHAKRI) (r. 1782–1809)
Founder of the Chakri Dynasty (Siam)**

Rama I (Chakri) was the founder of the present dynasty of Thailand—that is, the Chakri dynasty—and of Bangkok, its capital city. During his reign he devoted most of his time to reconstructing and defending the newly established kingdom in order to bring to Siam the same glory that used to be found in Ayudhya before it was destroyed by Burmese forces in 1767.

Rama I was born Thong Duang on 20 March 1736 in Ayudhya during the reign of King Boromkot (r. 1733–1758). During the last two reigns of the Ayudhya kingdom, Rama I served as a junior official at the court until 1761, when he was appointed as a senior judicial official to work at Ratchaburi, a satellite town to the west of the capital city. He served in that position until the fall of Ayudhya in April 1767.

After Ayudhya fell to Burma, Phya Taksin reunited the kingdom and became King Taksin (Thonburi) in late 1767. King Taksin moved the capital city from Ayudhya to a town called

Thonburi, located on the western bank of the Chao Phraya River. During the reign of King Taksin, Rama I held many important positions in the bureaucracy and helped the king to suppress his rivals and to defend the kingdom from Burmese attempts to reoccupy Siam. In 1775 the Burmese king decided to launch a major military campaign to reoccupy Siam. Rama I, with his younger brother, fought against the largest Burmese army at Pitsanulok, one of the most strategically important towns in the lower northern part of the kingdom. At Pitsanulok, Siamese troops under the leadership of Rama I and his younger brother, who were then called *Chaophraya* Chakri and *Chaophraya* Surasi, respectively, were able to prevent Burmese troops from moving further to the south and the capital.

In 1782, Rama I was assigned to lead Siamese troops to wage war against Cambodia after a succession crisis took place there. While he was fighting the war there, Rama I was informed that a rebellion was taking place in Thonburi and that the political stability of the kingdom was at risk because King Taksin was grossly obsessed with Buddhism and was developing aberrant behavior. When he arrived at Thonburi, high-ranking officials invited him to accept the throne, which he did. King Taksin was then executed on 6 April 1782, and Rama I became the new king on the same day (Wyatt 1984: 145). He founded a new dynasty called Chakri and had the capital moved from Thonburi to a town called Bangkok, located on the eastern bank of the Chao Phraya River.

All through his reign, Rama I was faced with the difficult tasks of establishing a strong and unified kingdom and defending that new kingdom from external threats—especially Burmese invasion. In order to reconstruct a kingdom, he decided to follow Ayudhya administration and to build his new kingdom as a strong Buddhist state, with the intention of recreating the glory of Ayudhya in his kingdom. As a result, he reorganized Buddhist administration, which had deteriorated during the final years of the Thonburi period. He issued ecclesiastical laws to restore discipline to the monkhood and appointed to positions of leadership senior and knowledgeable monks who had been demoted by King Taksin. In 1788 he established ecclesiastical commissions to redefine and consider Buddhist scriptures. He also spon-

sored the education of thousands of monks (Tambiah 1977: 183–188). By extending royal patronage for Buddhism, the king also enhanced his own legitimacy.

Other attempts indicating Rama I's determination to restore the glory of Siam were the appointments of legal and literary commissions to work on revisions of law codes and translations of foreign literature. In 1805, Rama I appointed a commission of legal scholars to redefine Siamese law codes of the Ayudhya period, which led to a compilation of state law codes entitled Three Seals Laws. Concerning literary and cultural restoration, the king chaired various commissions to translate foreign literature, such as Indian, Chinese, and Mon, into Thai. This translated literature not only stimulated public literary interest but also was used by the king to give moral lessons to his subjects (Osborne 1995: 52).

Burma still posed a serious threat to the stability of Siam, and in 1785 a Burmese king sent more than 100,000 troops to invade the kingdom. However, Rama I, with help from his younger brother, was able to drive them out. After this war, the king succeeded in strengthening Siamese political control over the north and the south of the kingdom.

When Rama I died in September 1809, he left behind a very well-established kingdom. His political, religious, and cultural achievements laid strong foundations on which his successors could build.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Bangkok; Buddhism, Theravada; Burma–Siam Wars; Phya Taksin (Phya Tak [Sin], King Taksin) (r. 1767–1782); Pitsanulok (Phitsanulok)

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RAMA KAMHAENG (r. 1279–1298) Paternalistic King of Sukhothai

Rama Kamhaeng was a son of Bang Klang Hao, the ruler of Bang Yang in the Sukhothai region who overthrew Khmer rule in the region in the 1240s and founded the Sukhothai kingdom. Under Rama Kamhaeng's rule, Sukhothai became one of the most important and powerful political and cultural centers of the Thai people in the upper part of the Chaophraya (Chao Phraya) delta before Ayudhya eventually superseded its power after his death.

Rama Kamhaeng was born Rama but was given the epithet Rama Kamhaeng (lit. Rama the Bold) by his father when he was only nineteen years old after Rama helped him fight against the forces of the neighboring town of Sot, which had attacked Sukhothai (Wyatt 1984: 53). When Rama Kamhaeng succeeded to the throne in 1279, Sukhothai was still a very small kingdom compared with the kingdom of Lanna of King Mangrai (r. 1259–1317), to the north of Sukhothai. Under his rule, Rama Kamhaeng was able to expand the territory of the Sukhothai kingdom to cover most of the Chaophraya delta, Luang Prabang in Laos, and some parts of the Malay Peninsula. However, Sukhothai's political power over its orbital states was rather uneven. Its sovereignty over its immediate vicinity in the north and the lower Chaophraya delta was strongly felt, while that over the remote areas, such as the Malay Peninsula in the south, was nominal. Although Rama Kamhaeng might have used forces to absorb neighboring towns and to maintain the relationship with Sukhothai, he adopted more peaceful diplomacy of various means, such as marriage or Buddhist bonds, to maintain the relationship with remote towns and states. As a result, the far-flung states accepted the indirect political power of Sukhothai in the form of semivassalage and personal relationships rather than direct control over their sovereignty (ibid.: 56; Taylor 1992: 169). For example, the Mon state of Pegu accepted the authority of Sukhothai because its ruler had married Rama Kamhaeng's daughter, while small states in the Malay Peninsula were absorbed into Sukhothai via Nakhon Sithammarat, which had political control over a significant number of states in the region and had a close link with Sukhothai via Buddhism. On the other hand, to guarantee

peaceful coexistence with powerful neighboring states of Lanna and Phayao in the northern flank of Sukhothai, Rama Kamhaeng concluded an alliance with King Mangrai of Lanna and King Pha Muang of Phayao in 1287.

Another policy that Rama Kamhaeng adopted to rule his kingdom was a paternalistic form of administration. This form of government was in sharp contrast to the autocratic Khmer rule in the Angkorean period, under which its subjects had to pay high taxes and the gap between the rulers and the ruled was extremely wide because of a complicated hierarchical social and political system. A benevolent ruler was a key to success if a small and newly established Sukhothai kingdom was to be able to attract Siamese people in the surrounding regions to settle down in a kingdom that was not particularly fertile in comparison with the lower Chaophraya delta. As a result, Rama Kamhaeng portrayed himself as a benevolent father, or lord, whom his subjects could rely on when they had troubles. The inscription of 1292, which the king himself partly inscribed, indicated clearly how idyllic, peaceful, and prosperous the city of Sukhothai was. For instance, if people needed to seek assistance from the king, they were able to have easy access to him by ringing the bell that Rama Kamhaeng ordered to have hung at the palace gate. The king would then come and help them solve their problems. Moreover, they had freedom to travel and carry out their business activities without having to pay taxes. The dispossessed from other towns were welcome to settle down in Sukhothai, and the king was willing to help them until they were able to stand on their own feet (Wyatt 1984: 53–54).

Theravada Buddhism was firmly established in Sukhothai during the reign of Rama Kamhaeng and since then has become the main religion in Thailand. Rama Kamhaeng was a devout follower of Buddhism and ruled his kingdom according to Buddhist precepts (Tambiah 1977: 84–86). He shared his throne with learned monks who preached *dhamma* (precepts) to his subjects on Buddhist holy days. It was during his reign that unique art forms of Sukhothai closely related to Buddhism first appeared.

Since the political success of Sukhothai under Rama Kamhaeng's rule was based on the

combination of his articulate diplomacy, military might, and personal relationships, it lasted only during his lifetime. When Rama Kamhaeng died in 1298, his successors were not able to sustain the political power of Sukhothai; as a result, by the middle of the fifteenth century it had been absorbed into the more powerful kingdom of Ayudhya.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Buddhism, Theravada; Pegu; Sukhotai (Sukhodava)

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RAMATHIBODI (r. 1351–1369)

Established the Kingdom of Ayutthaya

Ramathibodi (r. 1351–1369), or King Uthong, was the first of the thirty-four kings of Ayutthaya, an important kingdom and capital of Siam. He is reputed to have been the founder of the kingdom, situated on the Menam Chao Phraya River, a rich rice-field plain and the central region of present-day Thailand. He is also known to have sent troops to conquer Angkor, a great and highly civilized kingdom in Cambodia.

In spite of all these accomplishments, the origin of Uthong is rather obscure and surrounded by myth and legend. In the process of Thai nation-building, modern Thai historiography has constructed Uthong as a hero. He is seen as an offspring of an uninterrupted line of Thai ruling families that migrated from the area where four present-day countries meet: China, Burma, Laos, and Thailand. He might

have been of mixed origins, possibly Sino-Khmer. He later married into the two competing ruling houses of Suphanburi and Lopburi, both located in the central plain of Siam. He therefore became a mediator and brought an end to the political fragmentation of the area, and with the foundation of Ayutthaya, a new chapter in the history of Siam had begun.

Uthong was probably born in 1314 and married by the 1330s; he established Ayutthaya in 1351. He reigned for eighteen years and passed away in 1369, at the age of fifty-five.

CHARNVIT KASETSIRI

See also Angkor; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Lopburi (Lawo); T'ais

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RAMOS, FIDEL VALDEZ (1928–)

Protestant General at Malacanang

Elected as president (1992–1998) of the Philippines by a small plurality in 1992, Fidel Valdez Ramos was the first career military officer and Protestant to win election in a predominantly Catholic country. He graduated from West Point in 1950 and saw action in both the Korean (1950–1953) and Vietnam (1964–1975) Wars as a young officer. Rising through the ranks, he became the chief of the Philippine Constabulary (the national police) and later vice chief of staff of the Philippine Armed Forces. He served under his second cousin Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989), who declared martial law in 1972. But in 1986 he defected to the opposition and teamed up with another defector, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, to help overthrow the Marcos regime in the now-famous "people power revolution" of February 1986 in Manila.



Fidel Ramos, prior to the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, when he held the rank of lieutenant general. Ramos was elected president of the Philippines in 1992. (Nik Wheeler/Corbis)

Ramos was installed in the successor Aquino government (1986–1992) as armed forces chief of staff and later secretary of national defense. He is credited with foiling the various military coup attempts against Aquino. In appreciation for his loyalty and support, President Aquino “anointed” Ramos as her successor and campaigned vigorously for him in the 1992 presidential elections.

Ramos is best remembered for his efforts to institute reforms of the country’s institutions to accelerate economic development. He also worked more effectively with the Philippine Congress than did Aquino. He likewise pursued peace negotiations with three dissident groups—the communists, the Muslims, and the right-wing military elements. He offered amnesty to the military insurgents and the New People’s Army (NPA), but only the former accepted it. With the help of Indonesia, Ramos negotiated a peace agreement before the end of his presidential term in 1998 with the Moro National Liber-

ation Front (MNLF), the biggest Muslim rebel movement in Mindanao. He gave the Muslims an autonomous region with a governor.

As president, Ramos made frequent trips domestically and internationally to assess countrywide development and seek foreign aid, earning him the accolade “the flying-est” Philippine president. Now a private citizen, he devotes his time to working for his foundation for peace and development.

BELINDA A. AQUINO

See also Aquino, Corazon Cojuangco (1933–); EDSA Revolution; Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989); Martial Law (1972–1981) (The Philippines); Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); New People’s Army (NPA)

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RANGOON (YANGON) “The Enemy Is Consumed”

Since the time of the Second Anglo-Burmese War in 1852, Rangoon (Yangon since 1989) has been the capital, first of British Burma and then, after the Third Anglo-Burmese War in 1885, of the province of Burma. It remained the capital, after independence on 4 January 1948, of the Union of Burma (1962) and its successor, the Union of Myanmar (1989).

A port city on the Ayeyawaddy (Irrawaddy) River delta facing the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean, it was founded at the village of Dagon opposite the walled city of Syriam. It was established in 1756 by King Alaungpaya (r. 1752–1760), first monarch of the Konbaung dynasty, Myanmar’s third and last indigenous imperial dynasty. Alaungpaya renamed Dagon “Rangoon” or “Yangon,” popularly translated as “end of strife”; Lieberman, however, suggests that a more accurate rendition is “the enemy is consumed,” which is consistent with Alaungpaya’s propensity for psychological war against his enemies (Lieberman 1984: 243). In death, the king’s body in 1760 was laid on a boat at Rangoon to be transported to the capital at Shwebo in Upper Myanmar.

From its early beginnings as a port city to replace the destroyed port/capital city of the Mon at Pegu, which Alaungpaya razed in 1757, Rangoon was frequently the site of Mon rebellions. Occurring in 1758–1759, 1774, and 1783, these uprisings were instigated by their desire to restore the Mon kingdom in Lower Burma and eliminate the exactions of the Burmese governors, or *myowuns*.

Nevertheless, in the late eighteenth century as British-French rivalry climaxed during the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), the port of Rangoon grew in size and wealth. Both British and French were seeking trading privileges and access to Burmese teak for shipbuilding purposes. The British captain Michael Symes visited in 1795 and again in 1802. Another British official, Hiram Cox, observed in 1797 that Rangoon had annual revenues of 150,000 *kyats* of silver from commerce. The Italian missionary

Gaetano Mantegazza wrote that in 1784, two years after King Bodawpaya’s succession (r. 1782–1819), the revenues of Rangoon surpassed all other sources of Crown revenue (Koenig 1990: 120).

When Captain Canning visited in 1810, the cost of his trip upriver from Rangoon to King Bodawpaya’s capital at Amarapura on the Upper Ayeyawaddy River was paid for by a levy of 20 *kyats* per household in Rangoon. By the 1802 *sit-tan*, or royal order, Rangoon was part of the “super-wun” of Hanthawadi, the most important of the four provinces (the others were Martaban, Toungoo, and Prome) accorded such status. The *myowun* of Hanthawadi had the powers, but not the title, of a viceroy (*bayin*) of the realm.

Resentment of government levies and tax exactions led arsonists to burn Rangoon to the ground in 1810, 1812, and 1814. When it was rebuilt, the census of households reported only 1,000 of 2,500 houses listed, an example of the widespread official corruption that reputedly deprived the realm of as much as 40 percent of its revenue (ibid.: 157) through underreporting of tax receipts and appropriation of state lands.

The city of Rangoon is overlooked by the famous Shwedagon Pagoda, whose founding is traced in legend to the early years of Buddhism. Mon kings of Hanthawadi, Pegu, since the fourteenth-century Banya-u (r. 1353–1385) are credited with enlarging and endowing the pagoda, shrine to the sacred hairs of the Buddha. Queen Shin Sawbu (r. 1453–1472), granddaughter of Banya-u, enlarged the pagoda, gilded it, and donated her weight in gold for its beautification, together with some 9,000 hectares of land to support it. Her successor and son-in-law, the former monk King Dhammazedi (r. 1472–1492), continued the tradition and had a large bell cast and installed there. European travelers such as Gasparo Balbi, who saw it in 1583, compared it to St. Marks in Venice. Royal patronage of the Shwedagon became a tradition, with successive Myanmar kings combining religious and political motives so that the pagoda became a symbol of Burmese nationalism and identity. Anaukpetlun (r. 1605–1628) wrested it back from the heretic, the Portuguese Felipe de Brito of Syriam; installed a new “umbrella,” or *hti*, on the spire; and restored it following a severe earthquake in 1620. King Hsinbyushin (r.

1763–1776) further enhanced the pagoda following another earthquake in 1768. He also donated a new umbrella and planned to donate a bell, a wish carried out by his son, Singu (r. 1776–1781), after his death.

In 1824, at the commencement of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826), the British desecrated the pagoda when the commander of the invading forces, Sir Archibald Campbell, commandeered it for his headquarters. The great Burmese general Maha Bandula was recalled from Arakan, but he was unable to dislodge the British, who retained possession until they evacuated Rangoon at the end of the war. In the interim before the Second Anglo-Burmese War in 1852, King Tharrawaddy (r. 1837–1846) made a politico-religious pilgrimage to Rangoon. During his five months' residence there he moved the town inland, away from the river, for better defense, and had an earthen wall erected some 4.9 meters high to protect the city. The Shwedagon was incorporated in the city's defenses. He donated a bell to the pagoda and his queen of the Western Palace had a roof constructed over the western staircase. The politico-religious symbolism of the city and pagoda were evident to the British in the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852). On 14 April 1852 they stormed the pagoda on the eastern side, invested it, pillaged the treasures, and set Major Fraser of the Royal Engineers to construct a tunnel deep inside the pagoda. Lord Dalhousie (t. 1848–1856), governor-general of India, condemned the desecration. The loss of the war meant the loss of Rangoon and the pagoda to the British, who continued to occupy it as a stronghold and fort.

From his new capital at Mandalay in Upper Burma, King Mindon (r. 1852–1878) in 1869 wished to visit the pagoda and donate a new umbrella. But the British, aware of its dual politico-religious symbolism, would not permit the visit, although, after a year's delay, King Mindon's umbrella was installed on the pagoda by citizens of Rangoon on 26 November 1871. Royal patronage of the pagoda ceased with the dethronement of the last Konbaung monarch, King Thibaw (r. 1878–1885), at the conclusion of the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885).

Under British control, the delta became a major rice-exporting region, and Rangoon increased in size and wealth, being the seat of government offices for the province of British

Burma. In 1929 the Shwedagon was restored to Myanmar people. The city suffered much destruction during the Pacific War (1941–1945), when it was bombed by both sides. Since independence and both during and after the socialist era, the Shwedagon has retained its politico-religious symbolism, closely identified with Myanmar nationalism and culture. Pious Myanmar families donate to its upkeep; many thousands of families visit it daily; young monks go there for their Buddhist examinations. It is a living temple, part of the everyday lives of the Myanmar people.

Rangoon today is a city of some 5 million people with beautiful tree-lined streets and gracious colonial architecture, overlooking its two lakes, Inya Lake and Royal Lake, so much a part of its history.

HELEN JAMES

See also Alaung-hpaya (r. 1752–1760); Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Arakan; Buddhism, Theravada; Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885); Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Mandalay; Mindon (r. 1853–1878); Pegu

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**RATU ADIL
(RIGHTEOUS KING/PRINCE)**

The idea of a *Ratu Adil*, the just king who will finally reign over Java, is very closely bound up with the prophecy of Joyoboyo. It was believed that a twelfth-century king, Jaya Bhaya of Kediri, predicted such a phenomenon. According to Javanese tradition, Joyoboyo was a seer who foretold that after an era fraught with disasters

and humiliations, a just king would arise who would reign over Java. This would signal the commencement of an era of freedom, peace, and prosperity. Especially in times of crises, or when hopes of a better world were raised, the prophecy revived among the people. Leaders in their turn used the prophecy to try to convince people that they were the just king who would lead them to peace and prosperity.

The first known leader with whom this legend was associated was Diponegoro (ca. 1785–1855). He instigated the Java War (1825–1830) and saw himself as the Ratu Adil, who would liberate Java from the Dutch and would reign afterward. The people of Java also assumed that he was the long-expected just king. Haji Umar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882–1934), one of the leaders of Sarekat Islam (1912), was sometimes taken to be the Ratu Adil. Just before the Pacific War broke out in 1941, the prophecy circulated again. This time it was thought that the Japanese would free them from the Dutch colonial yoke. The Japanese used the prophecy for their own purposes by accentuating the fact that a Javanese prince had pointed to them as the liberators of Indonesia.

The old prophecy played an important role in the Indonesian nationalist movement whereby Sukarno (1901–1970) led Indonesians to independence. The Javanese people regarded Sukarno, the first president of the Republic of Indonesia (t. 1945–1967), as the Ratu Adil.

ELLY TOUWEN-BOUWSMA

TRANSLATED BY ROSEMARY
ROBSON-MCKILLOP

See also Diponegoro (Pangeran Dipanegara) (ca. 1785–1855); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Java War (1825–1830); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Tjokroaminoto, Haji Oemar Said (1882–1934)

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Prophecy of Djojobojo, the Javanese Nostradamus]. *Tijdschrift voor Parapsychologie*: 146–153.

REFORMS AND MODERNIZATION IN SIAM

As with China and Japan, the two major Asian countries not to have been directly colonized by the West, Siam faced three challenges from the mid-nineteenth century: keeping colonialism at bay, and strengthening the country by learning from the West while retaining what were considered the essential attributes of the society. In Siam it was the royal family rather than intellectuals emerging from new social groups that managed the country's modernization endeavors, which were defined as the implementation of reforms to the administrative system.

According to King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868–1910), who formulated the blueprint for reforms, the traditional institutions of government had become inefficient and corrupt. Noble families had entrenched themselves in territorially defined offices, living off the labor and taxes of the people under them while failing to provide justice and security of livelihood. The king thus moved to dismantle their power bases by introducing a modern bureaucratic system based on functional differentiation, fully accountable to the minister and in turn the monarch. These pivotal reforms have long been understood, in Chulalongkorn's terms, as the demarcation between old and new Siam, the long-drawn battle between the conservatives and modernizers in which the latter eventually triumphed. Had they been defeated, the argument went, Siam would undoubtedly have been colonized along with the other Southeast Asian countries, as the Western powers were intent on supplanting rulers and systems that were opposed to open markets and modern administrations.

Chulalongkorn's reforming zeal was not only a response to the threat of colonialism or a legacy of maladministration; to him, both could only be addressed with the revival of the fortunes of the Chakri royal family. The dynasty had lost out in relative strength to the powerful noble families—in particular, the Bunnag, who were instrumental in the selection of Mongkut (r. 1851–1868), then a monk for twenty-seven

years, to the throne upon the death of his half brother King Nangklao (1824–1851), and whose scion Chuang was regent for five years until 1873, when Chulalongkorn turned twenty.

Chulalongkorn's mark as a modernizer had actually been stamped during the regency. In 1871–1872, Chuang Bunnag arranged for him to visit Java, the Straits Settlements and British Burma, and India to acquaint him with the workings of the colonial possessions. These visits marked the first time that a Siamese monarch had ventured abroad. In 1874, Chulalongkorn announced that all children born into debt slavery at the beginning of his reign who had not been redeemed earlier would be free when they were twenty-one years old. The colonial powers did not fail to take note of this dramatic though long-drawn-out rupture with what they considered one of the worst features of an uncivilized society. At the same time, the control of labor services as the key to resource extraction was growing anachronistic, for the open-market economy functioned on wage rather than *corvée* labor, and monetization meant that taxation became the key source of state revenue.

With the creation of the functional ministries in 1892, the Ministry of Finance had charge of the revenue collection and expenditures of the kingdom, allocating funds for infrastructure development that aimed at the centralization of power, which would also facilitate the operations of the Western businesses. The intertwined interests were manifested in the appointment of foreign advisors not only for their technical skills but also for their policy recommendations: British (financial, British companies having the largest economic interest in Siam); French, Belgian, and Japanese (legal codes); Danish (navy and the gendarmerie); and German (railways and the post office).

The monarchy consolidated its rule through the reforms, in particular those of the Ministry of Interior, that enforced the writ of Bangkok in hitherto remote and autonomous regions, such as forest resource-rich Chiangmai (Chiang Mai). The extension of a uniform taxation system to the subsistent economy of the northeast erupted in millenarian uprisings in 1902 that were put down by the modernized army dispatched expeditiously on newly built railways.

Chulalongkorn controlled the scope and pace of the modernization program tightly, re-

jecting a petition in 1885 from a group of princes and officials for a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary system. The king deemed that the small number of educated Siamese, and the urgency of the colonial threats, meant that political and legislative reforms were premature. Similar calls for reforms made by commoners through the press up to the 1932 overthrow of the absolute monarchy also went unheeded.

The modernization program of King Chulalongkorn was modeled on the colonies where executive institutions were predominant, a legacy that the country's subsequent regimes built upon. The strengthened Siamese absolute monarchy was one of the last significant ones in Asia to survive into the early twentieth century.

HONG LYSA

See also Bunnag Family; Chiang Mai; Colonialism; Damrong, Prince (1862–1943); Imperialism; Isan; Slavery; Taxation

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REJANGS

The Rejangs are a historically important Indonesian minority population inhabiting the Barisan mountain range of southwest Sumatra inland of the coastal port of Bengkulu (Bencoolen, Benkulen). They refer to themselves as “tun Jang” (“the people of Jang”) but are called “Rejang” by the neighboring Malays of South and central Sumatra, from whom they are distinguished linguistically and culturally (Jaspan 1964: 2). This region of Sumatra was an important early focus of European mercantile activity, being a source of pepper, gold, and silver. Gold is still mined and panned sporadically by the Rejangs. From early times Indian traders referred to Sumatra as the “Golden Island” (*Su-*

varnadvipa). Traditionally, the Rejangs were shifting cultivators of hill rice and forest-gatherers. However, that extensive system of cultivation has been gradually replaced from the second half of the nineteenth century by the cultivation of coffee, cloves, and pepper for the market; wherever suitable flat land in valley bottoms is available, irrigated rice agriculture has been established (Psota 1998).

Until the Dutch military conquest and then the occupation of the Lebong valley in the heartland of Rejang country in 1859–1861, most of the Rejangs were a relatively isolated group, although some communities also lived in lowland or coastal settlements. These latter were introduced to the English-speaking world as early as the late eighteenth century in the work of the English scholar William Marsden (1754–1836), who later became president of the Royal Society. Marsden compiled a considerable amount of material on the great island of Sumatra during his residence there from 1771 to 1779, when he was secretary to the president and council at Fort Marlborough, Bengkulu. Bengkulu then was an important British trading settlement and seat of the English East India Company (EIC) in the western Indonesian archipelago. Marsden also spent some time with his elder brother, John, who served in Sumatra as the EIC resident in Lais, a coastal settlement in lowland Rejang country, some 48 kilometers northeast of Bengkulu, where the EIC had a factory and trading outpost.

In his now classic *History of Sumatra* (1783), Marsden provided a general survey of Sumatran peoples and their histories, but he devoted considerable attention to the Rejangs in his chapters on political and economic life, ecology, and social organization; he considered them to be a prototypical Sumatran society. However, even in the seventeenth century there are references to the interior communities in such accounts as the *Sumatra Factory Records* of the English East India Company, given that the EIC had had a long-standing presence in southwest Sumatra at Fort Marlborough from 1685 until 1825. Following the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of London in 1824, the British recognized Sumatra as falling within the Dutch sphere of influence and concentrated their attention on the Malay Peninsula and the Straits Settlements to the north. Nevertheless, the British had had little contact with the interior Rejangs, and it was the Dutch

after 1826 who began to plan for the establishment of a system of direct rule there.

The Rejang region commanded considerable Dutch attention during the late nineteenth century because of the discovery of rich gold deposits, and private Dutch mining companies were active in the Rejang Highlands from 1897 into the 1940s. The Dutch also developed tea and coffee plantations in the interior. The gold and silver deposits in the Rejang area provided the bulk of the production from Sumatra and indeed of the whole of the Dutch East Indies in the late colonial period (Prodolliet and Znoj 1992).

The Rejangs are organized into patrilineal clans, although over time the influence of modernization and change and the gradual spread of Malay culture have undermined this system. Rejangs have several myths of origin; a frequently quoted version indicates descent from four brothers who were said to be princes and Buddhist monks of the Javanese kingdom of Majapahit. According to the myth the four brothers left their homeland sometime in the fourteenth century and, having settled in the Lebong valley in Sumatra, founded the Rejang as a distinct people and bequeathed them their culture and sociopolitical organization. The Rejang were divided into four territories and four patrilineal clans, later referred to as *marga*, each ruled by one of the brothers. The Dutch reorganized this system and transformed the clan and district chiefs (Rej.: *pesirëa*; Ind.: *pasirah*) into salaried colonial officers. It is claimed that this local elite, members of which were incorporated into the Dutch administrative system and received Dutch education, lent this myth of origin an official, authoritative status and claimed their descent from the four brothers (Galizia 1992). They also used it to demonstrate the illustrious ancestry of Rejang and the distinctiveness of Rejang culture, despite later Malay accretions, and their links with the high civilization of Java.

The *pasirah* and *marga* system was abolished in 1979, but well before that, and as far back as the communist rebellions in West Sumatra of 1926, the system established by the Dutch began to face opposition and was gradually undermined. Its fate began to be sealed during the anti-Dutch revolution of 1945–1950, when those members of local elites who had benefited from the Dutch colonial system were con-

fronted by the emergence of new elites committed to the establishment of a postcolonial social and political order.

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See also Bengkulu (Bencoolen, Benkulen); East India Company (EIC) (1602), English; Gold; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Malays; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Sumatra

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RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT AND INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia is home to all the major world religions. The Philippines is the only Christian nation in Asia; Indonesia's Muslim population is the world's largest; and the Theravada Buddhism of Cambodia, Laos, Burma (Myanmar), and Thailand (Siam) is quite distinctive. These world religions have made significant adaptations to the Southeast Asian environment, and many areas hold fast to indigenous beliefs. In

this culturally diverse region, religion can form the basis of ethnic identity and national cohesion. It can equally foster divisiveness and conflict, and galvanize resistance to state authority.

Animism

Any survey of Southeast Asia's religious history must begin with Animism, which sees the natural world as animated by a vast array of spirits and deities. Capable of great kindness or extraordinary malevolence, they can bring about both good fortune and calamity. Elaborate rituals, which sometimes involved animal or even human sacrifice, were developed to propitiate powerful spirits. Although men generally dominated religious ceremonies, through much of Southeast Asia women could also take a leading role. A number of societies accorded a particular place to individuals who took on the accoutrements of the opposite sex, symbolically combining the regenerative powers of both male and female.

As religious influences from outside slowly penetrated the region, they struck an alliance with existing belief systems. Whereas the world religions were concerned with questions of cosmic significance and life beyond death, the assistance of spirits was sought in regard to the concerns of daily life, such as recovery from illness, a prosperous harvest, or success in warfare. Despite challenges from proponents of religious orthodoxy, spirit propitiation has remained relevant for many communities into modern times.

Indian Influences: Hinduism and Buddhism in Southeast Asia

The influence of Indian religious thought in Southeast Asia increased with expanding trade. From the seventh century these influences were especially pronounced in the fertile rice-growing areas of modern Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, central Vietnam, Java, and Bali, where local societies were being organized into larger political units. Nonetheless, the process of localization meant that several aspects of Hinduism, such as caste, were never adopted except in a very modified form.

Numerous religious buildings and temple complexes remain as evidence of the appeal of Indian ideas. The temples of the Khmer capital

of Angkor, established in Cambodia in the ninth century, symbolically represented the world-mountain and were dedicated to the worship of Hindu gods with whom the king was linked. Royal support for Mahayana Buddhism is evident in the later period. Hindu-Buddhist states also emerged in Sumatra and Java, and traces of Indian ideas can be found elsewhere in the archipelago.

The penetration of Islam from the fourteenth century did not eliminate previous ideas, especially on Java. Bali retained its adherence to Hinduism, although this was modified to fit the local environment. Balinese religion provided an important focus for identity in the face of advancing colonialism—as in 1906, when hundreds of unresisting Balinese were killed by advancing Dutch troops in a ritual suicide (*puputan*). In seeking to preserve Bali's "Hindu" culture, however, the colonial regime also helped to re-create what they saw as "traditional" religious practices.

After Indonesia gained its independence, Balinese leaders successfully fought to gain official recognition of their religion by emphasizing its connection with Indian Hinduism. In the process some teachings and rituals were modified to conform more closely with those of India, but the continuing strength of earlier traditions is apparent in virtually all aspects of modern Balinese life.

Theravada Buddhism

From the eleventh century the influence of Theravada Buddhism in Southeast Asia grew because of increased contacts with Sri Lanka (Ceylon), where that school was flourishing. Although remnants of Hindu and Mahayana practices survived, ideas about kingship and government in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos display much Sinhalese influence. According to Theravada theories, a king reigns because of the merit he has acquired in previous lives, and he has the task of protecting Buddhism and supporting the Sangha (the Buddhist monkhood). The royal city of Pagan (Bagan) in Burma is a good example of the role that royalty played in sponsoring Buddhism.

It seems that early societies were drawn to Theravada Buddhism by the ideas of rebirth and merit-making, which offered a devout layperson the possibility of rewards in both this

life and the next. Links between monks and laity were strengthened because it was customary for young men to enter the Sangha during the rainy season. Although nuns disappeared in the Theravada tradition, pious laywomen could also be respected for their spiritual knowledge. Monks and lay nuns taught, studied, and meditated, but they also conducted ceremonies to ward off evil or promote communal prosperity. It was thus possible to blend local cults of spirits with Theravada rituals. In the eighteenth century the strength of Theravada Buddhism in Southeast Asia helped inject new life into the Sri Lankan Sangha, which had suffered after the Portuguese and Dutch conquests.

In all Theravada Buddhist countries there has been an uneasy relationship between rulers and the Sangha, because the spiritual standing of monks was higher and the religious hierarchy was sometimes willing to defy royal commands. One important theme, therefore, concerns the state's continuing efforts to make the Sangha responsive to its wishes. This has been most successful in Thailand, where Rama IV (r. 1851–1868) founded the reformist Thammayut order in 1833. This state-religion alliance, which lessened the likelihood of dissident factions within the monkhood, has been maintained in more recent times; notably, the Sangha Act of 1963 links the Buddhist hierarchy to the state bureaucracy. During the 1980s and 1990s some monks and lay Buddhists were critical of Thailand's rapid modernization and of alleged misconduct in the Sangha. Reformists promote a "socially engaged" Buddhism that espouses moral values. A separate but equally significant development has been the pressure from women for the revival of full ordination.

Historically, authority in the Burmese Sangha has been less regulated, and disputes between different sects were not uncommon. In the late nineteenth century the imposition of British colonialism, the abolition of the monarchy, and the failure to appoint a patriarch undermined the capacity of the monkhood to lead. In Burma (as elsewhere in the Theravada Buddhist world), "holy men" continued to emerge as leaders of popular rebellions, and in 1930 a major uprising was led by Saya San, a former monk. Colonial rule also produced a more politicized Buddhism among the educated elite, and after independence that was manifested in the policies of U Nu (1907–1995). In his three

terms as prime minister between 1948 and 1962, he fostered “Burmese Buddhist socialism” as the basis of state ideology. Since 1962 the military-dominated government in Burma has frowned on spirit propitiation and effectively curbed antigovernment tendencies within the Sangha, although the latter still exercises a major influence in Burmese life.

Although colonialism, civil war, and periods of communist government have weakened the Sangha in Cambodia and Laos, some monks have always been willing to express opposition to the state. After the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989, Buddhism was restored as the state religion; now men below middle age are again permitted to enter the monkhood. Since the 1970s there has been a resurgence of Buddhism in Laos, following a period of repression under the Pathet Lao. Doctrinally, Buddhism has been considerably simplified, and monks are required to study Marxist-Leninist thought. Despite the belief that the inculcation of Buddhist morals will provide a counter to Westernizing influences, the pace of economic and social change throughout Southeast Asia will undoubtedly affect the role that Buddhism plays in the lives of the next generation.

Confucianism

China controlled Vietnam for a thousand years prior to the eleventh century, and even after independence Vietnamese rulers acknowledged their subordinate status. This explains the influence of China’s philosophies and religions, which were amalgamated with Vietnamese beliefs in nature spirits, ancestors, and legendary heroes.

The spread of Mahayana Buddhism dates from around the fourth century, but from the fourteenth century it suffered a long decline as Confucian scholars increasingly accused Buddhism of corrupt practices. Nonetheless, Buddhism remained strong at the village level, where it became closely associated with popular interpretations of Daoism (Taoism). Although the intricacies of Daoist metaphysics were difficult to grasp, Vietnamese were drawn to the ideas of protective immortals and deities. Women as spirit mediums who made contact with the supernatural were able to assume a more prominent role in Daoist ceremonies.

With China as a model, the Vietnamese court in the fifteenth century became an active sponsor of Confucianism. As a result, precepts previously loosely observed were enforced more rigorously. The Chinese heritage was most apparent at elite levels, but even here there was selectivity in what was adopted, particularly in regard to male-female relations. The seventeenth century saw some revival of Buddhism at higher levels of society, and Christian proselytizing attracted numerous followers, especially among court women. Influence from the more Confucian north was further diluted as Vietnamese control spread southward into territory occupied by Chams, Khmers, and non-Vietnamese hill tribes.

During the nineteenth century kings made renewed efforts to enforce Confucianist ideas and were particularly hostile to Christianity, which they saw as a challenge to the social order. Under French colonial rule from the 1860s, Confucian scholarship declined, opening the way for new religious movements, particularly in the south. Founded in 1926, the militant eclectic sect known as the Cao Dai controlled its own zone in the unsettled times after the Pacific War (1941–1945). It aimed for the perfect synthesis of world religions, with a cross-cultural pantheon of saints and spirit medium advisors. The Hoa Hao, essentially a local form of Buddhism with strong millenarianist tendencies, spread through the Mekong Delta in the 1940s. It came to provide the basis for an influential political party. The 1950s saw a revival within Mahayana Buddhism, focusing on opposition to the Catholic Ngô Đình Diệm regime (t. 1955–1963) and its alliance with the United States. This history of political action has meant that since unification in 1975 the communist government has been wary of institutional religion, although restrictions have eased somewhat since the mid-1980s.

Islam

The first trustworthy reference to a Muslim community in Southeast Asia comes from Marco Polo (1254–1324), who visited northern Sumatra in 1291. We know that Islam did not come directly from the Middle East (West Asia) but passed first through India, where it made considerable adjustments to local society and was exposed to Hindu influences. The Shafi’i

school of Islamic law is prevalent in southern India, which explains its dominance in Southeast Asia. It is believed that Chinese Muslims, who had been converted by overland trade with the Middle East, were also influential in spreading Islam in the Philippines, Borneo, and the northern coast of Java.

The Islamization process began to quicken in island Southeast Asia in the mid-fifteenth century, but it never made any significant inroads on the mainland, where Buddhism and Confucianism were already well established. Malay rulers of Melaka, the center of regional trade, became important sponsors of Islam from around 1430. Islam moved easily along trading routes because the Malay language, already a lingua franca for commerce, served as a medium for preaching the faith. Islamic teachings found a sympathetic audience in local courts, since kings were anxious to attract Muslim traders and join a prestigious community that included the rulers of Istanbul and later Mughal India. In explaining this rapid spread, scholars have stressed the attraction of Islam's simple, direct message and its guidelines about conduct in this life. In addition, mystical Islam (Sufism) apparently had considerable appeal because its goal of spiritual communion with Allah resembled existing ideas of communication with the supernatural. There was also a localization process, since practices like cockfighting and gambling were tolerated. Women rarely took the veil, and even among the upper classes female seclusion was limited. The Portuguese conquest of Melaka in 1511 further encouraged the spread of Islam as Muslim traders patronized alternative ports and as important centers such as Brunei and later Makassar adopted the new faith. Perhaps most important, the Hindu-Buddhist Javanese kingdom of Majapahit was defeated around 1524 by a coalition of Javanese northern coast Islamic states. By the latter part of the seventeenth century Islam was more or less established across the Indonesian world, although pockets of Christianity remained in eastern Indonesia under the sponsorship of both the Portuguese and the Dutch.

Although the great strength of Islam was its ability to adapt to pre-Muslim beliefs and practices, periodic waves of reform have tried to rid the faith of accretions. The puritanical Wahabi capture of Mecca in 1803, for example, inspired the so-called Padri Wars (1821–1837) among

the Minangkabau of Sumatra in the early nineteenth century. Reformists often criticized rulers who were seen to be deviating from their role as champions of Islam. In rural areas, especially in Java, this opposition to authority frequently coalesced around charismatic leaders. Here messianic beliefs in the coming of a just king (*ratu adil*) were widespread, and religious schools provided a network that linked teachers and students from many areas.

Colonialism strengthened Islam's role as a focus for rebellion, especially as the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 tightened connections with the Middle East. Growing tensions between Islam and the West, and Turkey's efforts to promote a Pan-Islamic movement, meant that European colonial administrators remained suspicious of Islamic leaders. This was especially so in the Netherlands Indies, where there were numerous anticolonial rebellions that were clearly Islamic-inspired. Although the most prolonged was the thirty-year "holy war" in Aceh, there were other uprisings throughout the archipelago. On the Malay Peninsula Muslims in southern Thailand felt particularly resentful of their position as a religious minority.

Because of colonial surveillance, political Islam was largely kept in check during the first half of the twentieth century. Since the Pacific War (1941–1945), however, the political role that Islam can play has become increasingly evident in the independent states of Southeast Asia. In Brunei, Islam is the state religion, and the sultan wields absolute control; since 1991, however, the national ideology has promoted a "Malay Muslim Monarchy." In multicultural Malaysia, Islam has always been important in the sense of being "Malay," but it has also provided a vehicle for a vehement Malay opposition. In 1999 two states (Kelantan and Terengganu) were under Islamic governments critical of the Malay-dominated national coalition. In the southern Philippines, Islam has similarly provided a rallying point for armed resistance to Manila's policies.

Although around 90 percent of Indonesians profess Islam, a large proportion are considered nominal Muslims, especially on Java. Calls for an Islamic state upon independence in 1945 did not gain national support, although outside Java, resistance to Jakarta has often coalesced around Islam, sometimes in armed rebellion. Political dissension among Islamic groups was blunted

after President Suharto (t. 1967–1998) came to power in a military coup because Muslim leaders were largely coopted into his “New Order.” Non-Muslims became increasingly concerned about the government’s commitment to religious plurality, noting that Islam appeared to be favored and that traditional religions were actively discouraged. From the late 1990s there has been a resurgence of militant Islam, and conflicts between Muslims and Christians have claimed thousands of lives, notably in Ambon. Specialists believe that the return of a more tolerant environment is heavily dependent on the health of the economy and the maintenance of political freedoms.

Christianity

In 1493 the Vatican made it obligatory for Catholic kings to promote the spread of Christianity, and subsequently divided the world into two spiritual jurisdictions—that of the Portuguese and the Spanish. A lack of resources limited Portuguese missionizing in Southeast Asia to pockets of eastern Indonesia such as Timor, but in the Philippines the Spanish were more successful. The first expedition arrived in 1521, but effective missionary work began after 1570, when the Spanish captured Manila. Christianizing efforts failed in the south because of the strength of existing Islamic sultanates, but northward there were no large kingdoms to resist the colonial advance. Having learned from the South American experience, Spanish missionaries were also more tolerant of some local practices, while condemning leaders of indigenous religions as devil-worshippers. Many aspects of Catholicism—such as holy water and the veneration of saints—appealed to the Filipinos, and the conversion of the native elite encouraged their followers to accept Christianity.

Because of its privileged position in Philippine society, the Catholic Church remained highly resistant to social change and refused to accord religious equality to native priests. In the nineteenth century a number of peasant rebellions were led by religiously inspired individuals, but it was the execution of three native clergy as rebels that helped fuel the Philippine Revolution of 1896. From 1902, American colonial control opened the door to Protestant missionary activity, yet although the Catholic

Church lost some of its former wealth, it remained a formidable influence in Philippine society. This was evident during the regime of President Ferdinand Marcos (t. 1965–1986). The Catholic hierarchy generally supported his declaration of martial law in 1972 because it was seen as a move against the communists. However, opposition within the Church steadily grew, and its stand against Marcos was a major factor in his downfall. Evangelical Catholicism has maintained the appeal of Catholicism, despite the increased membership of various Protestant sects, and the Church is still one of the most effective forces for change.

Other areas of Christian activity in Southeast Asia are less studied. From the seventeenth century the Dutch promoted Protestantism in Indonesia, and in Vietnam French missionaries preached Catholicism, despite the suspicions of Vietnamese rulers. Although most missionaries were eventually evicted, Christianity gained ground under French colonialism, especially in the south. The survival of Catholicism under Portuguese rule made Christianity an important focus of anti-Indonesian resistance in the now independent East Timor. In Singapore, Christianity is also common among the English-educated. For the most part, contemporary non-Christian Southeast Asian states forbid missionary work, or limit it to animist groups.

As yet there has been no complete study of Southeast Asia’s religious history, although common themes can be detected. Although belief in spirits is still common, individual faiths also display a trend toward greater conformity with textual teachings. Economic development has not led to an obvious decline in religious loyalties, which remain both a source of potential support for the state and the possible focus of opposition.

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See also *Adat*; Bali; Buddhism; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Buddhist Institute of Phnom Penh; Buddhist Socialism; Cao Dai; Catholicism; Confucianism; Folk Religions; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia (First Century B.C.E. to Thirteenth Century C.E.); Hinduism; Hoa Hao; Indianization; Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Kebatnan Movement; Missionaries, Christian; Muslim Minorities (Thailand);

Sangha; Timor; Tordesillas (1494), Treaty of; Unified Buddhist Church (1963)

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RELIGIOUS SELF-MORTIFICATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The revival of religious self-mortification in Southeast Asia represents a new epoch in the evolution of human ideas about pain, in particular the transformational potential of sacred pain. Religious self-mortification involves deliberate self-infliction of physical pain during a culturally sanctioned, often annual ritual or festival. Following a worldwide decline since the eighteenth century, insular Southeast Asia experienced a singular and synchronous revival of ritual self-mortification from the 1950s, including localized and syncretic interpretations of Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, as well as Chinese popular religion. Massive audiences flocked to witness dramatic ritual performances, in both capital cities and rural provinces, disseminated worldwide by international media and supported as cultural heritage by state and local sponsorship. Yet despite the ongoing commercialization and appropriation of religious self-mortification as a spectacle of cultural exoticism, values integral to the history of Southeast Asia—notably the acquisition of spiritual power—remain at the core of the renaissance.

Ritual Types

There are two major types of religious self-mortification in contemporary Southeast Asia: beating the body and corporeal piercing. The former, such as Christian self-flagellation, involves intentional bloodletting. In contrast, corporeal piercing, which is usually as bloodless as possible, requires participants to enter a trance or an altered state of consciousness prior to ritual performance, as performed in Hindu, Buddhist, and Muslim rites. In both cases the primary objective is to achieve analgesia: not simply to control or even conquer pain, but to feel its absence as a transcendent spiritual experience. However, while protagonists who pierce seek to make the body superhuman and inviolate (via rehearsed trance) in order to negate pain from the outset, bloodletting rituals stipulate a vulnerable, human body. Initially, experiential pain is progressively transcended as divine blessing and protection are procured. Spilling or letting blood—the life force—is essential. The religious body must be weakened, even subjugated, and spiritual resolve tested, before analgesia can be achieved.

Case Studies

Concentrated in and around maritime Southeast Asia, the host of countries involved in the revival of religious self-mortification reflects the historical and cultural influence of India and China, rather than the modern political boundaries of post-1945 Southeast Asia. The Hindu festival of Thaipusam, which originated in South India, was introduced in Malaysia in the late nineteenth century and rose to prominence after the Pacific War (1941–1945) as the preeminent Tamil festival. Although Hindus worship the god Murugan at Thaipusam, across the Bay of Bengal in Sri Lanka, Murugan is revered as the deity Skanda at the Kataragama festival, where Sinhalese Buddhists now perform self-mortification, including hook-hanging, alongside Tamil Hindus, as ritual expressions of *bhakti*, a devotional religiosity.

Although not a major event in the Chinese calendar, the Vegetarian (Nine Emperor Gods) festival in Thailand probably originated in Fujian province and was brought from China to southern Thailand by a Hokkien drama troupe in the nineteenth century (the official, although disputed, date is 1825). Influenced by the rise of Thaipusam in Penang (a short distance south in the Straits of Melaka), the Vegetarian festival expanded rapidly in the 1980s in Phuket and Trang, initially among Chinese Thai immigrants. A similar ritualistic celebration is also an annual affair in Penang, though less extensive in scale than in Phuket. Ritual piercing is now highly ostentatious and competitive, especially among male youths. In contemporary Singapore and Taiwan, Chinese spirit-mediums also practice ritual piercing.

Spanish missionaries introduced Christian self-flagellation in the Philippines in the late sixteenth century. Prohibited by archbishops at the Synod of Calasiao in 1773, the ritual emerged from obscurity in the late 1950s when tens of thousands of Catholic flagellants took to the streets in Central Luzon. In 1961 a new self-mortification ritual was invented: crucifixion by nailing. Both rituals, performed during Holy Week, reenact the passion and death of Jesus Christ two thousand years ago.

There are myriad forms of religious self-mortification in contemporary Indonesia, all of which require further investigation before a widespread revival can be verified. In Sumatra, for example, *dabus* is an adapted Islamic (Sufi)

ritual that originated in Arabia and entered Indonesia (Aceh and Minangkabau, in particular) via Muslim India, probably in the sixteenth century. It involves ritual self-stabbing. Participants attempt to attain union with Allah in a state of mystical ecstasy and corporeal invulnerability, induced by musical performance.

Power and Place

Religious self-mortification is not indigenous to Southeast Asia; almost always it is not aboriginal. Spanish missionaries and indentured Indian laborers, Chinese immigrants and Muslim traders—all introduced ritual self-mortification in the region during colonization. However, one consequence of the revival is that performance is increasingly tied to a sense of place—insular Southeast Asia. Assimilation of ritual difference from regional neighbors—notably Chinese Buddhists in Thailand and Tamil Hindus in Malaysia and Singapore—has led to a vernal hybridity, an emerging indigenous identity and pan-regional cultural heritage. This inventive syncretism is self-consciously postcolonial, yet it taps the ancient spiritual value of potency. Ritual participants might protest the caste system, attempt to mitigate status hierarchy, or make suffering sufferable, but on complex levels access to mystical power is paramount. This primordial divine energy is sought to heal a family member (contracted under supplicatory vow), for community revitalization in times of crisis, or to alleviate state oppression via the ritual empowerment of the powerless. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the revival of religious self-mortification has provided a new medium by which to acquire and accumulate potency, a traditional foundation for political leadership in Southeast Asia.

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See also Aceh (Acheh); Buddhism; Catholicism; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Hinduism; Hispanization; Indian Immigrants (Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries); Indigenous Political Powers; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Minangkabau; Missionaries, Christian

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RENTAP (d. ca. MID-1860s) **Challenging White Raja Rule**

Libau, better known by his praise name (*ensumar*) of Rentap, was the preeminent Iban warrior of the Upper Skrang of the 1850s to 1860s who challenged the rule of James Brooke (r. 1841–1868), the first White raja of Sarawak. "Rentap" is shortened for *rentap tanah*, meaning "earth tremor."

In 1853, Rentap launched a raid on Skrang Fort, a Brooke government outpost at the confluence of the Skrang and Lupar Rivers, established in 1849–1850 to prevent unruly Ibans

from marauding settlers along the coast. In the ensuing battle Layang, Rentap's son-in-law, lanced and killed Alan Lee, the Brooke officer in charge of Lingga.

The killing of Lee increased the prestige and reputation of Rentap as a great warrior. Iban firebrands rallied to his banner, including those from the Saribas River. Attempts at negotiating a peaceful settlement with Rentap were made in the latter part of 1853 but were unsuccessful. An expedition in 1854 succeeded in dislodging Rentap from his base at Sungai Lang.

Consequently Rentap fled to the interior and barricaded himself atop Mount Sadok, a 3,000-foot (900-meter) hill that became his fortress. It took three expeditions (June 1857, July 1858, and August 1861) led by Charles Johnson Brooke (1829–1917), the rajas younger nephew, to defeat Rentap. He, however, evaded capture, and escaped with a few followers to the fastness and inaccessible areas of the headwaters of the Skrang, Katibas, and Kanowit Rivers. There, it was believed, Rentap passed away peacefully sometime in the mid-1860s.

Rentap's involvement in the killing of Lee and his defiance could be seen in terms of the Brooke government's efforts in pursuing a gang of murderers. But his ability to attract disaffected Ibans to Sadok and the portrayal of himself as *Raja Ulu* ("King of the Interior") in opposition to Raja Brooke elevated his struggle to an anti-Brooke rebellion. His refusal to acknowledge the authority of the "White Raja" made him a symbol of resistance. Rentap's opposition was a struggle against the harbinger of change from without, as presented by Raja Brooke's regime.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Brooke, Sir Charles Anthoni Johnson (1829–1917); Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Iban; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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RENVILLE AGREEMENT (JANUARY 1948)

The Renville Agreement of 19 January 1948 was the culmination of efforts to settle the unresolved issues between the Indonesian nationalists and the Dutch arising from the First Police Action of July 1947. The negotiations were conducted at a neutral venue on the USS *Renville* moored at Batavia harbor. The Indonesian nationalists, represented by the Republic of Indonesia, wanted the Dutch to recognize their control over Java and Sumatra. They demanded that Dutch troops withdraw from their territorial gains obtained during the First Police Action. They also pressed for international supervision over any future agreement between the republic and the Dutch. The Dutch objectives were different. The aim was to force the Republic of Indonesia to participate in the proposed United States of Indonesia, the federal government envisaged in the Renville Agreement. Stalemate was almost inevitable, but this time, unlike the earlier Linggadjati Agreement, international actors—namely, the United Nations—were involved as well.

The main terms of the Renville Agreement were:

- The involvement of the United Nations in the political settlement between the republic and The Netherlands concerning Java and Sumatra was reaffirmed.
- The efforts by the Dutch to form more federal states would cease forthwith.
- Dutch troops would withdraw to their positions before the First Police Action.
- Steps would be taken to organize the United States of Indonesia.

Twelve other points were subsequently added by The Netherlands delegation to the Renville discussions. To make the proposed terms agreeable to the republic, the U.S. Department of State also proposed seven additional points that in effect reinterpreted the twelve points proposed by the Dutch. It was

soon clear that the Renville Agreement was hardly an agreement at all.

YONG MUN CHEONG

See also Decolonization of Southeast Asia; Dutch Police Action (First and Second); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Linggadjati (Linggajati) Agreement (1947); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; Van Mook, Dr. Hubertus Johannes (1894–1965)

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REPUBLIK MALUKU SELATAN (RMS, REPUBLIC OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCAS)

The South Moluccan islands comprise Buru, Ambon, Haruku, Nusa Laut, Saparua, and Seram. They are a part of the Indonesian province of Maluku and were involved in a bid for independence from Indonesia in 1950.

The inhabitants of the islands were among the first in Indonesia to be converted to Christianity by Dutch missionaries. Consequently, the literacy rate was much higher than elsewhere in the country. Many Moluccan men entered the colonial army (the *Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger*, KNIL), colonial public service, or private European (mainly Dutch) companies and were stationed in other parts of the country. They adopted Dutch social attitudes and developed an intense loyalty to the colonial regime.

During the Indonesian independence war (1945–1949), the Dutch colonial government established a federal system in Indonesia. Regional governments were instated, including the Republic of East Indonesia (*Negara Indonesia Timur*, NIT), in 1947. The local council of the South Moluccan islands, established in 1946, participated in the NIT. After Indonesia's independence in December 1949 as a fed-

eral state, the Indonesian government started to dismantle the federation by abolishing member states. This disrupted the planned integration of the KNIL forces and the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia (RI), then one of the republics in the Indonesian federation. The RI forces sought to dominate the new federal armed forces (APRIS, Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat [Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Indonesia]), which were opposed by some former KNIL forces. On 5 April 1950, RI forces disembarked in the NIT capital of Makassar (Sulawesi) to attempt the dismantling of the NIT. Former KNIL forces in APRIS stationed in Makassar resisted this move with NIT government support.

Dr. Christiaan Soumokil, a South Moluccan who had been NIT minister of justice, urged NIT president Sukawati to declare the independence of East Indonesia. That did not happen. A new assault by RI forces on Makassar led to the surrender on 21 April of the remaining former KNIL forces. Soumokil fled to Ambon, where he helped the local council of the South Moluccas to organize a people's congress on 24–25 April that declared the independence of the South Moluccas from both the NIT and the federal Republic of Indonesia. On 9 May the South Moluccan KNIL forces stationed in Ambon formed the armed forces of the RMS. The Netherlands refused to recognize the RMS, while the new unitary Republic of Indonesia refused to negotiate with the RMS or accept mediation from the United Nations.

Meanwhile, the reorganization of the KNIL in other parts of Indonesia continued. Some 4,000 South Moluccan KNIL soldiers were still awaiting their future in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Java. After the declaration of the RMS, most refused to join APRIS and demanded their right to be demobilized in RMS territory or in nearby Dutch New Guinea. The Dutch authorities in charge of the KNIL reorganization refused this, because it could inflame the situation. The KNIL was abolished on 26 July 1950. As the status of the South Moluccan former KNIL forces had not yet been determined, they were given the status of the Dutch Royal Army and remained a Dutch responsibility. Their representatives started proceedings in

Dutch courts against the Dutch government. Lower courts—and ultimately in March 1951 the Dutch High Court—found that by law the Dutch government could not demobilize the former KNIL forces in Indonesian territory against their will. The legal wrangling meant that the deadline by which all remaining Dutch forces had to leave Indonesia was approaching fast. For that reason, the Dutch government decided in March 1951 to ship the remaining 3,500 former KNIL forces and their families temporarily to The Netherlands. Against their will, they were demobilized at sea. Most decided to stay in The Netherlands after arrival, trying to find the justice that the Dutch government had denied them.

After the establishment of a unitary state in November 1950, RI forces attacked the RMS in the South Moluccas. The RMS was already weakened owing to regional factionalism and opposition from Moluccans who supported the new Republic of Indonesia. The RMS forces were soon defeated, although remnants continued a guerrilla war in Seram until 1963, when RMS president Soumokil was captured. He was executed in Jakarta in 1966. Support for the RMS continued among the South Moluccans in The Netherlands, where the RMS government in exile was based under Presidents Ir. Johannes Manusama (until 1993) and Dr. F. Tutuhatuwena (since 1993).

In the 1970s, second-generation South Moluccans in The Netherlands tried to renew public attention and support for the RMS cause through several hijackings. They failed to achieve their goals. RMS support is waning in The Netherlands as first-generation Moluccans pass away and third-generation Moluccans now identify themselves more with The Netherlands. In Maluku, support for the RMS waned as a consequence of strong repression and an increase in the share of Muslims in the province who have strong allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia and resent the supposedly Christian RMS. Such strong feelings contributed to the tragic tensions and riots between Muslims and Christians in Ambon from 1999 to 2001.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also East Indonesian Ethnic Groups; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Maluku (The Moluccas); Netherlands

(Dutch) East Indies; United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia

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RESIDENCIA

All officials in the Spanish Philippines faced a quasi-judicial investigation of their activities at the end of their term in office. The *residencia* was an examination to determine whether an officeholder had faithfully executed his duties; it involved a review of his record, performance, and even personal behavior. Such examinations could be rigorous and lengthy affairs, especially for senior officials, lasting up to six months for governors-general and comparatively shorter periods for high court judges (*oidores*) and provincial magistrates (*alcaldes mayor*). The requirement for holding residencias in the case of minor officials was abolished in 1799 and made dependent on allegations of misconduct for *alcaldes-mayor* and military governors (*corregidores*). Theoretically, anyone within an officeholder's jurisdiction had an opportunity to present a complaint or grievance to the presiding magistrate (*juez de residencia*). However, since the latter was usually the incumbent's successor, proceedings were frequently subject to undue personal considerations and corrupt practices. Although a number of senior officials including governors-general were broken and ruined as a result of unfavorable verdicts, most were able to elicit a favorable outcome for a price. The *residencia* system was supposedly supplemented by the regular visits to the provinces of high court magistrates equipped with wide investigative powers. (The activities of all officials might be investigated at any time in cases of substantiated impropriety; such an examination was known as a *pesquisa*.) Minor irregularities were punishable by a series of disciplinary measures that ranged from mere warnings to reprimands involving fines to suspension from duty for a period of three to six months with loss of salary. More serious offenses, as in the case of other public employees, were subject to criminal proceedings.

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See also Galleon Trade; Hispanization; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Spanish Philippines

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RESIDENTIAL SYSTEM (MALAYA)

By the terms of the Pangkor Engagement (1874), the British introduced the residential system to Perak, a western Peninsular Malay State. The most significant article was the appointment of a British officer styled as resident who was to be accredited to the court of the Malay ruler and whose advice must be sought and acted upon on all state matters except those dealing with the Islamic faith and Malay customary practices. Similar treaties were signed with the Malay rulers of Selangor and Sungai Ujong (later Negri Sembilan) in the same year and with Pahang in 1888. A resident was subsequently appointed in each of the states. In practice the residential system effectively made the resident the *de facto* authority that administered in the name of the Malay sultan, ushering in the beginnings of British colonial rule of the Malay Peninsula (present-day West Malaysia).

The earl of Kimberley, secretary of state for the colonies, had instructed in his dispatch of 20 September 1873 to Sir Andrew Clarke (1824–1902), governor-designate of the Straits Settlements, to report whether it was advisable to British interests that a British officer be appointed to reside in the Malay States. He was to be entrusted with the task of promoting the restoration of peace and securing the protection of British trade and commerce with the Malay States. In the Pangkor Engagement (1874), Clarke further widened the responsibility of the resident, who not only possessed advisory functions but also commanded executive authority; in practice he single-handedly administered the country in the name of the sultan.

In the formative years of the residential system, the resident faced a formidable task. He had to disarm the warring factions and restore law and order, including introducing a code of law. In order to ensure the resumption of economic activities (namely tin mining), he initiated the improvement of transport and communication, undertook land surveys, and established an equitable land tenure system. He also had to establish a regular system of revenue collection and to set up an effective centralized administrative structure. On top of all these heavy responsibilities, the resident had to persuade the sultan, the various Malay territorial chiefs, the Malay peasantry, and Chinese inhabitants to accept the new style of government. In carrying out his multifaceted tasks in the absence of instructions or procedures from the Colonial Office, the resident had to be both diplomat and bully, forceful and sensitive, tactful and assertive. Knowledge and understanding of the Malay people, their language, customs and traditions, sensitivities, and mentality were essential ingredients of success.

Although the residential system achieved unqualified success in Larut, Sungai Ujong, and Selangor, it faced violent opposition in Perak and Pahang. Unlike the situation where the Malay chiefs were in no position to act (Larut) or willingly supported the resident (Sungai Ujong and Selangor), circumstances were different in Perak and Pahang. Both Sultan Abdullah Muhammad Shah (r. 1874–1876) of Perak and Sultan Wan Ahmad (r. 1863–1914) of Pahang and their chiefs reacted forcefully to the usurpation of their political power, economic privileges, and social prestige. Aggravating the situation in Perak was Resident J. W. W. Birch's (1826–1875) haughty attitude toward the Malays and insensitivity toward their customs and practices—for example, over the issue of debt-bondage. In Pahang the *rakyat* (masses) was dissatisfied with the imposition of a series of fees, licenses, and taxes that affected their daily lives. Moreover the government police force, comprising Sikhs and non-Pahang Malays who enforced the regulations, created further resentment. Consequently the situation ended in the murder of Birch in November 1875 and the Pahang Rebellion (1891–1895).

Although in theory the resident was to act solely as an adviser, the demands and expectations on him to establish law and order, to organize an effective system of taxation, and to

develop the resources of the country made it impossible for him merely to offer advice. In line with the adamant insistence of the Colonial Office to “advise only,” the facade was kept up in the creation of the State Council in 1877. Although the sultan formally presided over the Council and all bills received his royal assent, the resident wielded the real power in the council: he set the agenda, introduced resolutions, and advised the sultan to pen his approval to the proposed resolutions.

Notwithstanding Birch's assassination and the Pahang Rebellion, the residential system was on the whole a successful exercise in the introduction of British colonial rule in the Malay States. Political stability, law and order, economic prosperity, and infrastructure development (road, rail, and telegraph) were the benefits associated with the British residential system.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Birch, J. W. W. (1826–1875); Clarke, Sir Andrew (1824–1902); Low, Sir Hugh (1824–1905); Pahang; Pangkor Engagement (1874); Swettenham, Sir Frank (1850–1946); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang).

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RHODES, ALEXANDRE DE (1591–1660)

Originator of *Quốc Ngữ*

Alexandre de Rhodes was a French missionary who went to Vietnam and devised the roman-

ized orthography of the Vietnamese language (*Quốc Ngữ*). He was born in Avignon in southern France and became a member of the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) in Rome in 1612. In 1619 he was sent to Asia to serve as a missionary in Japan by the Society of Jesus, but because the Tokugawa Shogunate severely banned the propagation of Christianity, he changed his destination. In 1624 he was sent to the kingdom of Cochin China in central Vietnam and in 1627 moved to the kingdom of Tonkin in northern Vietnam. In 1630 he was banished from Vietnam, but in 1640, 1642, and 1644 he returned to Cochin China and Tonkin and again engaged in missionary work. In 1645 he was sentenced to death; he escaped the gallows, however, and was deported from Vietnam. In 1649 he returned to Rome and afterward wrote some literary works on Vietnamese language, culture, and history. Among his writings, his Annamite (Vietnamese)-Portuguese-Latin dictionary (1651) and the *History of the Kingdom of Tonkin* (1652) are the principal works. He died during his missionary days at Ispahan in Persia.

During his stay in Vietnam, Alexandre de Rhodes mastered the Vietnamese language. Before he came to Vietnam, some Jesuit missionaries, such as Francisco de Pina and Gaspar de Amaral, had tried to devise a transliteration of the Vietnamese language using the Roman alphabet. Rhodes took over their pioneering work and completed the orthography of the Vietnamese language. This orthography, thereafter called *Chu Quốc Ngữ* (national scripts), came into wide use in the early twentieth century under French colonial rule. His dictionary based on this orthography is an invaluable work representing a rare look at Middle Vietnamese of the seventeenth century.

SHIMAO MINORU

See also *Mission Civilisatrice* ("Civilizing Mission"); Missionaries, Christian

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RICE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

At the start of the nineteenth century, farmers in Southeast Asia grew hundreds and probably

thousands of varieties of rice, and much of the region's population ate rice as a staple food.

Rice planting took place in a wide range of environments: upland farmers grew rice in dry fields that depended on rainfall; a majority of lowland farmers planted rice on land inundated by flooding; and in places where the population was dense or the environment particularly difficult, farmers developed terraces fed by elaborate systems of irrigation to increase production. These planting arrangements and the cycle of rice production shaped rural life, influencing housing arrangements, work patterns, and social ties.

The rice seeds that farmers planted in their fields included a mixture of varieties. These plants had different growing seasons, and the harvest was therefore spread out over weeks and even months. Also, each type of rice had different resistance to plant diseases, and a mixture of varieties provided a degree of security against devastating losses.

Cities—the administrative and religious centers of the indigenous states, and the trading ports along the coast—had long provided a modest but steady market for rice. In the eighteenth century new export cultivation in Luzon and Java created a need for rice to feed to the workers involved in the production of crops such as sugar and coffee, and commercial rice cultivation developed in nearby areas.

In the nineteenth century the demand for rice grew in Europe, where it was used as food, in brewing, and as a source of commercial starch. Responding to this opportunity and to overcrowding in Upper Burma, farmers cleared heavily forested land in Lower Burma and began planting rice for export. The Burmese government discouraged exports of food, but the British takeover of Arakan and Tenasserim in 1826 created opportunities for farmers to sell rice, and the British takeover of Lower Burma in the 1850s led to a steady expansion of rice cultivation in the Irrawaddy Delta. By the early twentieth century, Burma had become the major rice-exporting country in the world.

Commercial rice production in Burma, and later in Siam and Cochin China, made it possible for investors to develop plantation agriculture in parts of Southeast Asia where it had not previously been practical. Along the western coast of the Malay Peninsula and the eastern coast of Sumatra there were large tracts of for-

est in areas with small populations. With a supply of inexpensive rice available from Burma, it became feasible to bring workers from southern China and southern India to Southeast Asia to clear the forest and plant commercial crops.

In the early twentieth century the plantations and urban areas of Southeast Asia depended almost entirely on rice imported from Burma, Siam, and Cochin China, but these rice-growing territories produced far more rice than the Southeast Asian and European markets combined could absorb. What made commercial production viable was the existence of vast markets for food in China and India. Both countries produced huge quantities of rice and other grains, but internal demand was so great that they bought surplus rice from Southeast Asia in years when crops there were large and prices low.

By the 1920s farmers across Southeast Asia were beginning to abandon rice farming. Imported rice from mainland Southeast Asia was inexpensive, and farmers elsewhere could spend their time more profitably on other activities and buy rice with the money they earned. Many turned to planting smallholdings of fruit trees or rubber, while others entered the new labor market created by the expanding export sector. The decline in rice cultivation concerned colonial administrations, but they could do little to change a situation that was dictated by local geographical conditions and competitive advantage. By the 1920s many rural areas had become heavily dependent on imported rice.

Colonial governments across Southeast Asia had begun paying attention to rice shortly after 1900. The creation of departments of agriculture dates from this period, and while the primary focus was on export crops such as rubber, researchers also carried out experiments aimed at improving rice production. They planted rice using a variety of techniques on sample plots in an attempt to find ways to increase production, and they tried to improve the strains of rice used in the region through the selection and propagation of plants that showed particularly favorable characteristics.

At first these efforts yielded few results, for the colonial governments did not know enough about rice cultivation to offer useful advice. By the 1920s, however, the situation was beginning to change. In areas where rice planting took place commercially, or where farmers

brought their own rice to commercial facilities for milling, there was pressure to plant pure strains rather than a mixture of varieties as in the past. The reason was that rice mills could handle grains of uniform size only. Mixtures produced poor results—with some grains passing through unhusked, and others shattering between the millstones.

The Depression at the start of the 1930s caused the value of plantation crops to fall sharply. Governments tried to increase domestic rice production in order to reduce the sums spent on imported food, safeguard food supplies, and provide a source of livelihood for farmers. Officials adopted two approaches to stimulating rice production. The first was to introduce scientific and technical improvements to seeds and to irrigation in order to increase yields and improve farmers' profits. The second was to use taxes or quotas to limit the import of foreign rice—but governments needed to avoid sharp rises in food prices, because plantations were a major source of export earnings and depended on cheap food to hold costs down and remain competitive. The economic recovery a few years later would probably have thwarted these efforts, but the Japanese invasion at the end of 1941 completely disrupted regional markets and created an entirely new situation.

Japanese armies captured both the rice-surplus and rice-deficit areas of Southeast Asia at the start of 1942. Production in the region was more than sufficient to meet the needs of the deficit zone, but Japan's resources were badly stretched in prosecuting the war and there was no transport available to move rice into areas where it was needed. By 1945 rice production had declined sharply in the three major exporting countries because crops could not be sold. In rice-deficit areas people were surviving on unhealthful diets heavy with tapioca, sweet potatoes, and other root crops.

Demand for rice was extremely high after 1945, but political turmoil in Burma and Vietnam interfered with the rehabilitation of the rice industries in those two countries. Moreover, newly independent governments in the region pursued policies that were inimical to the restoration of prewar patterns of production and consumption. Chinese business networks had dominated the prewar rice industry, but they had been badly disrupted by the war. In an

attempt to improve food security and promote the interests of non-Chinese businessmen, the new governments kept a tight control on the import and sale of rice, and the old system never recovered. Governments also needed to find sources of income for expanding rural populations, and expanding domestic rice cultivation offered a way of keeping those populations on the land.

By the 1970s high-yielding varieties of rice produced through hybridization were increasing local crops. Many of the new varieties had short growing seasons, and double cropping became the norm in much of the region. As a result of these developments, the number of varieties of rice cultivated in Southeast Asia diminished significantly. High-yielding rice required better water control, however, and more use of fertilizer and insecticides than the older varieties.

Traditionally, people stored rice in household or village granaries and prepared it for consumption daily by pounding the grain in large mortars to remove the husks. By the end of the twentieth century, many farmers were using commercial mills that remove the bran that once enriched rural diets and sell it as animal feed.

Rural diets formerly consisted of rice, vegetables and fruits grown in the villages, fish, and condiments. The latter were often made from chili peppers and fish sauce or prawn paste, both preserved with salt, and were an important source of nutrition. Rice and such condiments, eaten with uncooked vegetables, often constituted a full meal.

Glutinous "sticky" rice also figured in regional diets. Throughout much of Southeast Asia it was used to make sweet cakes, an important dietary supplement given that many people ate just two full meals a day. In northern Thailand glutinous rice was eaten as part of the regular diet, along with fish or meat and vegetables.

With improved transportation imported fruits and vegetables have become widely available, and the consumption of animal protein and fish from the sea has increased. However, older sources of protein, such as freshwater fish caught in rice fields and irrigation canals, have largely disappeared from local diets, owing to the deleterious effects of chemical fertilizer and insecticides.

Although rice is not the only dietary staple in Southeast Asia, it remains the most important, and a wide variety of foods are prepared to be eaten with rice. Farmers today generally plant specially bred dwarf varieties of rice, and they often produce two or even three crops per year. These changes, and increasing mechanization, have raised production levels to keep pace with growing populations. There are signs that dietary preferences in the region may be changing with the availability of large quantities of imported foods, but there is little chance that rice will be displaced from its central place in Southeast Asian cuisine.

PAUL H. KRATOSKA

See also Chinese in Southeast Asia; Great Depression (1929–1931); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Swidden Agriculture

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RIDLEY, H[ENRY] N[ICHOLAS]
(b. 1855)

“Rubber” Ridley

Henry Nicholas Ridley, the “Father of the Malayan Rubber Industry,” was born in Norfolk, England, on 10 December 1855. His lineage came from very prominent personalities, which included historians and politicians who had crossed between Great Britain and North America. He was educated at Haileybury and Exeter College, Oxford. Right from his youth he had shown his interest in research on natural history, but after his appointment to the Department of Botany of the British Museum in 1889, he began to acquire a special interest in the subject. Ridley began to be identified with it, for it was in this field that he made tremendous contributions.

In 1888, Ridley landed a job as the director of the Botanical Gardens in Singapore, which was the capital of the Straits Settlements and the Protected Malay States. It was there that he received some rubber (*Hevea brasiliensis*) seeds from Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and germinated them. He was convinced that these seeds could be planted without much expense and could become a lucrative commercial product. He tirelessly experimented on the planting of the seeds and the extraction of the product, often being ridiculed by other British officers who dubbed him “Rubber” Ridley or “Mad” Ridley.

In the 1890s, however, the tide turned slightly for Ridley, who found some support from fellow botanists from other Malay States, such as Hugh Low (t. 1877–1889), the resident to Perak. They experimented on the trees and found that rubber could be a viable product. In the same decade the British government in the newly established Federated Malay States (FMS) stressed the importance of large-scale agricultural production for export. Several products, such as gambier, pepper, coffee, and sugar, had been produced, but they did not last very long—either they were blighted with disease or could not compete with producers from other countries. The production of Malayan (later Malaysian) rubber, however, found its first market in London in the early 1900s. After that, European and other planters never looked back. British Malaya became the largest rubber producer in the world; next to tin, rubber became the chief product for foreign exchange for Great Britain.

Ridley devised the herringbone method of tapping rubber, which maintained the health and productivity of the tree. Prior to this procedure, latex was extracted by slashing the rubber tree, which easily damaged it. His research and that of others led later to the establishment of the Rubber Research Institute in 1925 in Kuala Lumpur.

Ridley, however, was not known only for rubber but also for other studies on tropical botany. He published numerous articles and books on the subject that are listed in the Exhibition of Ridleyana. For his contributions he was elected a fellow of the Linnean Society and the Royal Society, and he received prestigious medals from the Rubber Planters’ Association, the Linnean Medal, and various other honors. He was still involved in serious research even in his old age.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also British Malaya; Low, Sir Hugh (1824–1905); Rubber; Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia (RRIM)

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RIZAL, JOSÉ (1861–1896)

National Hero of the Philippines

José Rizal is regarded as the most important national hero in the Philippines. He was a nationalist, medical doctor, writer, poet, linguist, sculptor, and man of letters. He played a leading role in the Propaganda Movement of Filipinos in Spain, and his writings inspired the Philippine Revolution of 1896.

Rizal was born in the town of Calamba, Laguna, on 19 June 1861. His father was a relatively wealthy tenant on an estate owned by the Dominican order. His mother was a highly educated woman who deeply influenced the intellectual development of her children. Rizal received his elementary education in the town of Biñang, and went to high school in Ateneo de Manila. He studied medicine at the University of Santo Tomas in Manila.



A writer, physician, and patriot, José Rizal was perhaps the first Asian nationalist. His writing revealed the injustices he saw in the Philippines and so angered Spanish colonial officials that they banned his work and severely persecuted him. (Library of Congress)

In 1882, Rizal left for Spain to continue his studies at the Central University of Madrid. During these years he participated in the Filipino community in Spain, joining the Propaganda Movement and contributing articles to its journal, *La Solidaridad*. He also traveled widely in Europe, continuing his medical studies in Paris and Heidelberg while at the same time meeting up with scholars. An Austrian professor, Ferdinand Blumentritt, an expert on Philippine history and ethnography, became a close friend and companion of Rizal's.

While in Europe, Rizal published several works that criticized the Spanish colonial regime in the Philippines. In 1887 he published a novel, *Noli Me Tángere* (*Touch Me Not*), a satirical story situated in the Philippines, exposing the despotism of the colonial regime and the abuses of the friar orders.

In 1887 and 1888, Rizal was back in the Philippines. A conflict had erupted between the

Dominican friars who owned the estate in Calamba and their tenants, led by Rizal's family, over the payment of rent. Rizal advised his family to oppose the friars. However, the Dominican corporation, supported by the Spanish government, responded with harshness and evicted the Rizal family, which lost its wealth in the process. On the advice of his family Rizal left again for Spain, disillusioned and embittered at the Spanish colonial regime.

During his second sojourn in Europe (1888–1892), Rizal adopted a more radical attitude toward the future of the Philippines, viewing complete separation as the only option. In 1891 he published his second novel, *El Filibusterismo* (*The Subversive*), a sequel to *Noli*, but much more pessimistic and radical. The Spanish authorities in the islands considered Rizal a dangerous firebrand and banned both novels. Rizal wrote a number of essays (“On the Indolence of the Filipinos,” “The Philippines in Hundred Years’ Time”) that attempted to present a positive and dignified picture of Filipino civilization. He gradually grew disappointed with the reformist stance of the Propaganda Movement. In 1892 he decided to return to the Philippines, in order to undertake more direct action for the improvement of his country.

Back in Manila in June 1892, he founded La Liga Filipina, an organization intended for the moral uplift of the Filipinos. Shortly afterward the Spanish authorities arrested him and deported him to Dapitan, a village on the island of Mindanao. He remained in exile for four years. In 1896 he requested that the Spanish authorities grant him permission to go to Cuba to work as a medical doctor in the Spanish army, which was engaged in quelling the Cuban revolution. This permission was granted, and Rizal boarded a ship that would bring him to Spain. In the meantime the Katipunan movement started the revolution in the Philippines. Rizal was arrested and returned to the Philippines, where he arrived in early November. He was incarcerated in Fort Santiago. In early December, Rizal was accused of being the instigator of the rebellion/revolution that was spreading in the country, and a case against him was brought before a military court. On 26 December the court pronounced the death sentence, and on 30 December 1896, José Rizal was executed by firing squad at the field of Bagumbayan in Manila, renamed Rizal Park.

Historians have interpreted Rizal's actions in different ways. In the beginning of the twentieth century several authors depicted him as an assimilationist and reformist who abhorred revolutionary action against the Spanish regime. The U.S. government in the Philippines at that time promoted the veneration of Rizal as a national hero, a man favoring liberal reforms and gradual change. Marxist historians like Agoncillo (1977) and Constantino (1975) have depicted Rizal as a bourgeois reformist who shied away from violent revolution because he could not disengage himself from his elite background. Their real hero was Andres Bonifacio (1863–1897), the leader of the Katipunan movement, who mobilized the revolutionary proletariat. Recent authors such as Quibuyen (1997) and Ocampo (2001), however, have refuted this view, portraying Rizal as a nationalist who advocated separation from Spain and who favored a revolution—but who was against it as long as the people were not sufficiently prepared.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Bonifacio, Andres (1863–1897); Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship; Katipunan; *La Solidaridad*; La Liga Filipina; *Noli Me Tangere* (1887) and *El Filibusterismo* (1891); Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Propaganda Movement

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ROTI (ROTE)

The island of Roti, located off the western tip of Timor, is the southernmost island in the Indonesian archipelago. The island is low-lying and dry, with a relatively high population. In 2001 the Rotinese population numbered just under 100,000. In addition, because of continuing migration from Roti since the early nineteenth century, there are perhaps as many as 80,000 Rotinese settled on the island of Timor, mainly in Kabupaten Kupang.

Rotinese is a central Malayo-Polynesian language related to the other Austronesian languages of Timor. As a language, Rotinese consists of a chain of dialects distributed from east to west across the island. It is possible to distinguish eight dialects (three in east Roti, two in central Roti, and three in west Roti). There is only limited mutual intelligibility between the dialects of east and west Roti.

Rotinese were drawn into relations with the Dutch East India Company (VOC) during the second half of the seventeenth century. The first treaty of contract with local rulers was signed in 1662. Over the next century, subsequent treaties were signed and renewed dividing the island into seventeen separate domains, each domain (*nusak*) with its own ruler. (A separate treaty was signed with the ruler of the tiny island of Ndao, off the western coast of Roti; in dealings with the Dutch, this domain, with its distinct linguistic population, was included as the eighteenth domain of Roti.)

The VOC, and later the colonial government, officially recognized each ruler as a regent, or *raja*. Locally, these rulers held the title of *manek* (from the Rotinese root *mane*, meaning "male"). Each "male lord" was supported by a complementary "female lord" and presided over a court made up of the lords of the clans that composed the domain. The ruler's powers were both judicatory and ritual. The ruler's

“feast of origin” was the most prominent of the origin feasts of the domain. In each domain, however, a clan or group of clans stood opposed to the ruler in representing its first inhabitants and their relationship to the “powers” of the earth.

All of the domains promoted their distinctness by emphasizing social and dialect differences. Drawing on rich oral traditions and a predilection for verbal cleverness, the domain, its court, and its associated rituals provided a forum for “speaking,” which is regarded as a distinguishing feature of Rotinese culture. The Rotinese, to this day, maintain the use of a ritual language based on the canonical pairing of words for the preservation and performance of their most vital traditions.

Early in the eighteenth century, beginning with several ruling families, the Rotinese began to adopt Christianity and shortly thereafter to establish local schools to provide religious instruction in Malay. The ruler of Thie was baptized in 1729, and he established the first school in his domain in 1735, provoking a rivalry among other rulers who attempted to emulate his initiative. By 1756, Roti had more than a dozen schools in different domains, and young Rotinese trained in Malay had begun to replace schoolmasters supplied from outside the island. In the second half of the eighteenth century, Roti had one of the only self-sustaining, locally supported Malay school systems in the Indonesian world. A large number of Rotinese had become Christians long before the arrival of the Dutch missionaries and had fused traditional culture with Christian teachings.

In the early nineteenth century, to settle internal disputes within particular domains and to create a buffer around the still beleaguered Dutch in Kupang, the colonial government began transporting Rotinese to settle around the bay of Kupang and in the Oesau plain. This formed the basis of a migration that has continued to this day. Driven by the limitation on local resources and supported by a strong tradition of local education, Roti has exported a significant portion of its population for almost two hundred years.

In the twentieth century, the Dutch made various attempts to amalgamate domains in larger administrative units. The Indonesian government has continued this process. At present, Roti has the status of a *kabupaten* (region/

province) made up of five *kecamatan* (districts/wards). The domain, or *nusak*, is still a primary identification for all Rotinese on the island, and for most Rotinese who have migrated to Timor.

Because of the advantages of their educational system, Rotinese have figured significantly in Indonesian national life. Thus, for example, the first Indonesian rector of the University of Indonesia and the second rector of Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta were Rotinese.

JAMES J. FOX

See also East Indonesian Ethnic Groups; Education, Traditional Religious; Missionaries, Christian; Timor; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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**ROXAS, MANUEL ACUÑA
(1892–1948)**

**Inaugural President of
Independent Philippines**

Manuel Acuña Roxas was the first president of the post-Pacific War (1941–1945) Philippine

Republic. His administration faced numerous problems related to the dislocation and destruction consequent of the war, plus an antigovernment, communist-led peasant rebellion. He died before his term as president was over.

Roxas was born on 1 January 1892, in the town of Capiz (now Roxas City), Capiz province. He obtained a law degree from the College of Law, University of the Philippines, in 1913.

He became provincial governor of Capiz and in 1922 a member of the House of Representatives, to which he was elected speaker. The position of speaker, which he held until 1933, was strong at that time, and it enabled Roxas to enter the realm of Filipino political leadership together with Manuel L. Quezon (1878–1944) and Sergio Osmeña, Sr. (1878–1961). He participated in the Filipino missions that lobbied for independence in the United States in the 1920s, and in 1933, together with Osmeña, he brought back the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, which pledged Philippine independence after a ten-year transition period. Senate president Quezon, however, opposed the act and orchestrated its rejection by the Philippine legislature. The political battle resulted in two factions, and Roxas was toppled as speaker of the House of Representatives in the process. Nonetheless, Roxas was elected delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1934, where he actively participated in the framing of the Philippine constitution.

With the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth government in 1935, Quezon, who had been elected president, invited Roxas to become secretary of finance in 1938. Roxas became actively involved in economic plans for the future Philippine Republic and directed several government corporations. He was a member of the Joint Preparatory Commission on Philippine Affairs, which strove to resolve problems relating to Philippine independence. Roxas also became a reserve officer in the Philippine army.

Elected senator in 1941, Roxas was unable to take his seat because of the outbreak of the Pacific War. He served as liaison officer with the rank of colonel (later brigadier general) between the commonwealth government and the U.S. Army in the Philippines, commanded by Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964). During the campaign against the



Manuel Roxas served as president of the Philippines from 1946 until his death in 1948. In striving for Philippine independence, he supported American institutions and represented the elite. (Library of Congress)

Japanese, Roxas was responsible for food supplies for the defense forces in the Bataan Peninsula. Quezon appointed Roxas executive secretary in February 1942, and in March named him successor to the president and vice-president of the commonwealth. The Japanese captured him in Mindanao and attempted to use him in the Japanese-sponsored administration, but he evaded appointment, claiming ill health. In 1943 he became a member of the Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence, which was assigned the task of framing a constitution for the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic. José P. Laurel (1891–1959), president of the wartime republic, persuaded him to serve in his government to solve the food shortage.

Roxas established contacts with the underground resistance movement. The Japanese, however, kept a close watch on his activities. He was taken to Baguio with the Laurel government in December 1944 but escaped to U.S. lines in April 1945.

When the Philippine legislature convened on 9 June 1945, Roxas took his post as senator and was elected senate president. He left the Nacionalista Party and formed a new political party, the Liberal Party, so that he could run for president against Sergio Osmeña in the April 1946 elections. He won and became the last president of the Philippine Commonwealth, taking office on 28 May 1946. On 4 July 1946, with the independence of the Philippines, he became the first president of the post–World War II Philippine Republic.

As president, Roxas faced serious problems in rehabilitation of the war-ravaged economy, restoring peace and order, building the government, and establishing foreign relations. The country was divided on the issue of collaboration with the Japanese, and the widening gap between rich and poor. The issue of national security had to be addressed, and Roxas allowed the United States to maintain military and naval bases while providing assistance to Philippine armed forces. Roxas worked closely with the Americans in seeking rehabilitation funds and in resuscitating the Philippine economy. The Americans extended free trade between the United States and the Philippines and provided for rehabilitation funds, but sought a constitutional amendment that would grant U.S. citizens the same rights as Filipinos in exploiting Philippine natural resources (parity rights). Roxas campaigned for parity, while nationalistic groups opposed it. In the emotional campaign for or against parity, Roxas was almost assassinated.

When opposition politicians were deprived of their seats in the Congress and the Huk peasant movement turned to violence against the government, Roxas used an iron fist policy to crush the rebellion, while offering better conditions for peasants. To solve the rift caused by the collaboration issue, he granted amnesty to all suspected political and economic collaborators with the Japanese in 1948.

Roxas established a Philippine diplomatic presence in the United Nations and the United States, and created the Department of Foreign Affairs to handle the new republic's foreign relations. He died before his term was over, after delivering a speech at the U.S. Clark Air Base on 15 April 1948.

Roxas faced immense challenges in steering the Philippines from U.S. colonial administra-

tion to independence while recovering from a war. He has been accused of being overly pro-American in his administration, but given those times, he had his reasons for steering the course he chose.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Bataan Death March; Collaboration Issue in Southeast Asia; Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon) (1942); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Laurel, José Paciano (1891–1959); Osmeña, Sergio Sr. (1878–1961); Philippines–U.S. “Special Relationship”; Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia

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RUBBER

“Miracle” Crop

Natural rubber, produced from the latex extracted from the bark of the *Hevea brasiliensis* tree, is one of the raw materials most vital to the industrial development of the world since the late nineteenth century—for example, in the manufacture of vehicle tires. Southeast Asia contains the major producers of natural rubber, principally Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, with minor amounts coming from Burma (Myanmar) and southern Vietnam. Historically, the growth of this industry underlay much of the movement of migrant labor (notably from India and China) into the region prior to the Pacific War (1941–1945), and it determined the living conditions of a substantial proportion of the population.

The industry was established on the initiative of the British India Office, which in 1876 organized the transfer of specimen trees from the Amazon region of Brazil to Ceylon, Singapore, and Penang, where they were propagated



Girls working in a Malayan rubber factory, ca. 1950. (Horace Bristol/Corbis)

in the government botanical gardens. Some also reached the Dutch East Indies (Java). Seeds from there were subsequently distributed to planters, with rubber gaining widespread popularity as a commercial crop on estates owned largely by Western companies (registered in the United Kingdom, Holland, and France), with substantial Asian-owned holdings (notably Chinese) in Malaya. Seeds also came into the hands of indigenous farmers (smallholders), who found rubber a valuable year-round source of

income to supplement and even replace subsistence crops such as rice. The Chinese assumed a dominant role throughout the region in the collection, transport, and processing of smallholder rubber for sale on world markets. As a result of rubber price booms in 1909–1910 and 1925, the rubber acreage in Southeast Asia by the interwar years totaled roughly 3.5 million hectares. In Malaya, the leading producer at that time, ownership of the rubber area was divided between estates of more than 40 hectares (60

percent) and smallholdings under 40 hectares (40 percent). In the Dutch East Indies, smallholder, or “native,” rubber as it was then known, predominated at 54 percent—though that almost certainly understates the share (Drabble 1991: 1). In Thailand the industry was almost entirely Asian-owned.

The perennial issue facing the natural rubber industry has been the volatile relationship between supply and demand as reflected in market prices. Whereas world supply came from hundreds of thousands of individual producers scattered throughout several countries, demand was highly concentrated in a few industrialized Western countries, notably the United States. Economic conditions in these countries largely determined the state of the international economy, which underwent marked instability, notably the economic depressions in 1920–1922 and 1929–1932. In the latter period the price of rubber stood at one one-hundredth of its peak in 1910. This decimated the economies of producing countries in Southeast Asia, which depended heavily on export earnings from rubber. There was widespread unemployment as estates dismissed workers, and indebtedness among smallholders led to losses of land to their (mainly nonindigenous) creditors. The response of the colonial governments was to impose compulsory restriction on rubber exports under the Stevenson Scheme (1922–1928) and the International Rubber Regulation Agreement (1934–1941), in order to restore market prices to profitable levels.

During the war in the Pacific, the Japanese occupation cut off Western consumers from rubber supplies from Southeast Asia. Synthetic rubber (derived from petroleum) was developed in the United States. After the war this commodity, although not a full substitute for all uses, offered price competition to natural rubber. A further problem for Southeast Asian suppliers was that increasing numbers of the trees, thirty or more years old, were becoming uneconomic to keep in production. National governments in Southeast Asia sought to rejuvenate the industry by using new high-yielding types of tree (producing three to four times as much) to replace the older stock, as well as for new development projects. Malaysia was in the lead until the 1960s. Indonesia did little prior to the Suharto New Order (1967–1998). The

major performer since the 1980s has been Thailand, which has expanded its area under rubber to gain a leading position as a world supplier.

In the late twentieth century, natural rubber production still occupied a very important position in many of the economies of the Southeast Asian region. Some, like Malaysia, have begun to use the commodity in local manufacturing industries, such as rubber gloves, instead of exporting it in a semiprocessed state for manufacturing elsewhere. However, the prime emphasis in national development plans has been on the growth of high-technology industries with a different range of inputs, so that rubber is no longer the leading force in economic growth that it had been for much of the twentieth century.

Recent historiographical studies of the natural rubber industry have focused on such questions as the role of governments, the relative efficiency of estates and smallholders as producers, a shift in ownership away from Western toward local interests, and the impact of new technology.

JOHN H. DRABBLE

See also Chinese in Southeast Asia; Economic Development of Southeast Asia (post-1945 to ca. 1990s); Great Depression (1929–1931); Indian Immigrants (Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries); Labor and Labor Unions in Southeast Asia; Ridley, H[enry] N[icholas] (b. 1855); Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia (RRIM)

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RUBBER RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF MALAYSIA (RRIM)

Established in 1926, the Rubber Research Institute has developed into the world's foremost and largest research center focused on natural rubber (*Hevea brasiliensis*). Headquartered in Kuala Lumpur, RRIM from its beginning undertook to research, develop, and sustain the natural rubber industry primarily for the economic benefit of Malaya (now Malaysia).

The Singapore Botanical Gardens, headed by H. N. Ridley (b. 1855) since 1888, carried out experiments and research on rubber. The efforts in Singapore were complemented by work at experimental gardens in Penang, Taiping, and Perak. Hugh Low (t. 1877 to 1889), the British resident to Perak, among others, tested various species of rubber. Research was also done at the Department of Agriculture set up in 1905 at Serdang, Selangor. Two years later the Rubber Growers' Association was inaugurated. Close cooperation between the association and the Department of Agriculture benefited the rubber industry. But during the 1910s and early 1920s, the colonial government apparently preferred the private sector to initiate the research and development of the rubber industry. Despite achieving important advances, progress in the hands of private enterprise was generally slow and inconsistent, owing to a reluctance to invest funds solely for research that might not bear immediate results.

The exigencies of the Great War (1914–1918) and the increasing importance of rubber to Malaya made the government realize the need for a central research facility for the industry. By the 1920s rubber was one of two major export commodities of British Malaya (the other being tin). As the priorities of the Department of Agriculture reoriented toward food crops, particularly rice, it was imperative that the RRIM be established to concentrate full-time on research and development of rubber aimed at the expansion of the industry. With support from the government as well as occasional input from private enterprises, the work of RRIM progressed steadily. Signatories of the Rubber Regulation Agreement (1934–1938) contributed to a fund to support research in rubber.

Major technical achievements prior to the Pacific War (1941–1945) included improved

planting methods (suitable distances between trees, adoption of fertilizers), high-yield species (bud-grafting, cloning), design of a tapping knife, a tapping schedule to maximize latex output, latex processing, and pest control. Competition from synthetic rubber in the postwar years spurred research into improving the quality and yield of natural rubber.

RRIM has faithfully served the Malaysian rubber industry, contributing to maintaining the country as one of the largest world producers of natural rubber. During the 1990s the primary objectives of RRIM *inter alia* have included improvements in natural rubber materials and products, offering technical support to the manufacturing sector, and promoting greater use of natural rubber.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Ridley, H[enry] N[icholas] (b. 1855); Rubber; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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RUKUNEGARA

Rukunegara, the national ideology of Malaysia, is aimed at the fostering of national unity among the multiethnic population of the country. A combination of two Malay words, *rukun*, meaning “principles” or “rules,” and *negara*, meaning “nation” or “country,” Rukunegara denotes “Principles of the Nation” or “National Principles.”

Proclaimed on 31 August 1970 by the king of Malaysia, Rukunegara is to act as a guide in the attainment of unity of the people, the maintenance of a democratic way of life, and creation of a just society whereby the wealth of the nation is equitably shared. Furthermore it is to ensure a liberal approach to the nation's rich and diverse cultural traditions, and build a forward-looking society oriented toward modern science and technology. The five principles of Rukunegara are belief in God (*Kepercayaan kepada Tuhan*), loyalty to king and country (*Kese-*

tiaan kepada Raja dan Negara), upholding the constitution (*Keluhuran Perlembagaan*), rule of law (*Kedaulatan Undang-Undang*), and good behavior and morality (*Kesopanan dan Kesusilaan*).

The first principle guarantees religious freedom and tolerance, notwithstanding Islam's being the official religion of the country. Nonetheless Rukunegara does not condone ideologies that deny the existence of God. Every citizen is expected in accordance with the second principle to possess undivided loyalty to the king and nation. The third principle emphasizes the responsibility of each citizen to understand and respect the letter, the spirit, and the historical background of the constitution, in particular as relating to the position of the Malay rulers, status of Islam, special privileges of the Malays and other indigenous groups of Sabah and Sarawak, citizenship, and Malay as the country's official language. The fourth principle stresses the rule of law, equality before the law, guarantees under the law relating to inter alia the freedom of speech, religious freedom, basic human rights and freedom, and the right to own property. The fifth principle emphasizes good and tolerant behavior of individuals and groups toward others and eschewing conduct that might lead to divisiveness in society. High morality goes hand in hand with exemplary behavior.

Conceived in the aftermath of the most serious Sino-Malay clashes of 13 May 1969, Rukunegara was one of the strategies employed by Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak (t. 1970–1976) in working toward national consolidation by fostering a common identity, common values, and a sense of loyalty among the multiethnic population. In the absence of a recurrence of the May 13 Incident in the past three decades, it can be said that Rukunegara has effectively played its role.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Abdul Razak, Tun (1922–1976); New Economic Policy (NEP) (1971–1990); Malayan/Malaysian Education; "May 13, 1969" (Malaysia)

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RUSSIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

The earliest information about Southeast Asia is said to have reached Russia by the eleventh century: a monk in a Kiev monastery mentioned an "island country" in his chronicle. A Russian trader of the fifteenth century, A. Nikitin, mentioned Southeast Asian countries in his travel tales. In the seventeenth century Russians received information about Indonesia from The Netherlands, with which Russia maintained regular contacts, especially during the reign of Russian czar Peter the Great (1672–1725).

The first personal acquaintances of Russians with the countries and peoples of Southeast Asia took place early in the nineteenth century. A world sea expedition by two Russian ships, the *Nadezhda* and *Neva*, under command of the famous Russian navigators I. F. Krusenstern and Yu. F. Lisiansky, visited Singapore. They brought to Russia the first true information about the peoples of Singapore and the Malay Peninsula. Later information on the region appeared regularly in the journal *Sea Stories*, which published articles written by Russian navigators who sailed the Straits of Melaka. In the middle of the nineteenth century a Russian naval officer, A. Butakov, visited Penang. He wrote about the nature and the life of Penang's population. In the second half of the century many Russian travelers frequented Southeast Asia: a journalist, V. Krestovsky; a geographer, M. Venyukov (Malaya); a traveler, N. Nenyukov; a diplomat and ethnographer, P. I. Pashino (Burma); and many others.

A well-known Russian scientist, N. N. Mikluho-Maklay, traveled through a number of Southeast Asian countries and stayed for a long time in New Guinea among aborigines, studying their mode of life and culture.

In the closing years of the nineteenth century, Southeast Asia was on the route of the

Russian world tour made by the future Russian tsar, Nicolas II (1868–1918). After his visit to Siam one of the princes of the Chulalongkorn family went to Russia to study in a military school. There he married a Russian girl who returned with him to Siam.

There is information that Konbaung Burma in the 1870s several times attempted to engage Russian assistance in the struggle against British colonial expansion; Russia, however, did not answer Burma's appeals, in order not to antagonize the British government.

After the October Socialist Revolution (1917) in Russia, its relations with Southeast Asia were maintained primarily through Comintern and concerned left-wing and communist groups in the region. A number of local communist leaders studied in Moscow (Hô Chí Minh from Vietnam; Alimin, Musso from Indonesia). A number of representatives of Southeast Asian communists worked in Comintern structures. Stalin (1879–1953) paid a lot of attention to the situation in the region. He did not approve of the Indonesian communist plans to start a revolt against Dutch colonialism in the middle of the 1920s. After the revolt was crushed, the Soviet communists condemned such actions on the part of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI).

At the closing stage of World War II (1939–1945), the Soviet leadership demonstrated only minor interest in the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia: the region was recognized as the British sphere of influence. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States did not lay claims on Southeast Asia then. Both powers sympathized with the national liberation movements, but did not support them openly. At the end of the war Stalin considered the colonial zone of Southeast Asia to have few prospects for the Soviet Union, both economically and strategically.

After World War II two main tendencies influenced the Soviet attitude toward Southeast Asia: the beginning of the Cold War and the national liberation movements. The USSR was interested in diminishing Western influence in the region; therefore it supported the struggle against colonialism and tried to win political influence in the newly independent states. At the same time the Soviet Union intended to spread communism among Southeast Asian peoples and create socialist states. Toward this

end, it provided moral and material assistance to communist and other left-wing parties and organizations of the region in their struggle for state power.

The USSR greeted the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and established diplomatic relations with it in January 1950. It gave wide material, political, and military support to the Vietnamese struggle against French colonialism. Only with massive Soviet assistance could the DRV have developed industry and infrastructure and trained high-skilled specialists. With the completion of its economic recovery in 1958, the DRV began to pay more attention to strengthening the revolutionary movement in the south, but first it had to face the Soviet leadership's unwillingness to plunge into the Southeast Asian conflict. Nevertheless, the new Soviet leadership that came to power in 1964 again oriented itself toward closer cooperation with the DRV. The USSR emphasized moral and political support of the Vietnamese people's war against U.S. imperialism. Soviet material assistance (economic and particularly military) to the DRV expanded and kept on increasing. It could be ascertained that without Soviet material assistance the Vietnamese would not have won and created the united Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in 1976. As a reward, the USSR was permitted to use military bases in Vietnam.

With the disintegration of the USSR, Vietnam lost an important strategic ally. The Russian Federation had not enough material and financial resources for the continuation of its former assistance to the SRV. Nevertheless, Russia still participates in the development of key Vietnamese industries, particularly oil and gas production and other energy sources. Russia remains the only provider of arms to Vietnam. In the political sphere Russia and Vietnam have declared themselves strategic partners. Their approach to key problems of world development, such as polycentrism in international relations and antiterrorism, is similar.

The USSR provided moral and political assistance to Laos and Cambodia in their struggle for national liberation. After they achieved sovereignty in 1954, the USSR established diplomatic relations with these countries. At the same time the Soviet leadership provided moral and material support to communist and left-wing organizations, helping them to seize state

power. The USSR greeted the establishment of procommunist regimes in Laos in 1975 and Cambodia in 1976, the latter with Vietnamese assistance. After the demise of the Soviet Union and Laos and Cambodia shifting to market economies, the Russian Federation nonetheless maintains friendly relations with both countries.

After the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed its independence on 17 August 1945, the Soviet Union supported it in the United Nations in its struggle against Dutch efforts to reestablish the colonial regime. The USSR officially recognized independent Indonesia in January 1950, and between the two states diplomatic relations were established. The Soviet-Indonesian ties intensified after President Sukarno (t. 1945–1967) visited the USSR in 1956. The USSR provided credits to the republic; economic, technical, and scientific assistance in the development of Indonesian industry, agriculture, and the military sphere; as well as assistance in education and sport. In 1960 a long-term trade agreement was signed. The USSR provided every kind of assistance to Indonesia in its struggle for the liberation of West Irian (Irian Jaya) from Dutch colonialism and its return to the republic.

This was also a period of intensive cultural, religious, scientific, educational, and other humanitarian contacts between the USSR and Indonesia. After 1965, when the New Order anti-communist regime was established in Indonesia, Soviet-Indonesian relations drastically diminished. Economic, technical, and scientific cooperation was curtailed; trade exchange was reduced; and cultural, educational, and other humanitarian contacts were practically stopped. A new upturn in Soviet-Indonesian relations began in the closing years of the 1980s. Indonesian president Suharto (t. 1967–1998) paid an official visit to the USSR. The exchange of parliamentary and other high-level delegations became regular. After the demise of the USSR the Russian Federation intensified its contacts with Indonesia. In 1999 several new agreements on economic and technical cooperation and trade were signed between the two countries. The Russian and Indonesian positions often are similar or very close on a number of important international problems, including ecology, narco traffic, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The USSR was among the first states that officially recognized independent Burma in

1948. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on the initiative of the Burmese national hero Aung San (1915–1947). But the relations were developing unevenly. The Soviet Union was helping the Burmese communists in the civil war, which started in the country immediately after the proclamation of independence. Consequently the exchange of embassies took place only in 1951. The year 1955 became the turning point in Soviet-Burmese relations. Soviet and Burmese heads of state exchanged official visits. The development of political contacts occurred side by side with the development of economic, trade, scientific, and technical relations. The Soviet Union provided assistance in rebuilding various Burmese cities and towns, a hotel, a hospital, and a technological institute. Burma delivered rice to the USSR. The mutually beneficial ties between the countries continued during the new Burmese political regime led by General Ne Win (t. 1962–1988). Both countries based their relations on five principles of peaceful coexistence. But with the aggravation of the Sino-Soviet confrontation, the Burmese leadership started to curtail their relations with the USSR, as the People's Republic of China (PRC) was afraid of Soviet influence in this country and exerted moral and political pressure on the Burmese government. In this complicated situation Ne Win's leadership preferred not to antagonize the Chinese. Nevertheless, the Burmese leaders maintained low-level relations with the Soviet Union, mostly in cultural and other forms of humanitarian exchange. After the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian Federation and Myanmar (Burma as it was renamed after 1989) established friendly relations, but their scope is restricted because of the absence of sufficient material resources in both government organizations. Nevertheless, economic cooperation started to develop on the basis of private business contacts.

Thailand was the first Southeast Asian country with which the USSR established diplomatic relations, as early as in 1941. The relations were resumed in 1946 and in 1948, when the first Soviet mission arrived in Bangkok. But until the beginning of the 1970s, Soviet-Thai ties were restricted and kept low-profile, as Thailand was inclined to side with the United States in the Cold War. During civil rule in Bangkok, the USSR and Thailand exchanged a

number of delegations. The second wave in the development of relations between the two countries began in the closing years of the 1970s. Political and cultural contacts widened, and the Soviet–Thailand trade intensified. The rise in Russian–Thai contact continued after the disintegration of the USSR. A new phenomenon was active relations between representatives of private businesses. Thailand became a favorite country for Russian tourists, and Thai students began to study in Russian universities.

The USSR officially recognized Malaysia in 1967. From that time on, political, economic, trade, cultural, and other relations between them grew and widened. Malaysia became one of the most important Russian trade partners in the region.

Soviet–Philippine relations were established only in 1976, and the countries began to develop contacts in many spheres. Since 1991 the two countries have been building relations in various aspects (*Yugo-Vostochnaya Asia* 1989: 320; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

The Russian Federation maintains political and mutually beneficial economic contacts with Singapore and Brunei. It has cooperated with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in political, economic, and security matters.

LARISA EFIMOVA

See also Aung San (1915–1947); Cold War; Comintern; Communism; Domino Theory; Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Indonesian

Revolution (1945–1949); Irian Jaya (West Irian); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Ne Win, General (1911–2002); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Sino–Soviet Struggle; Sino–Vietnamese Relations; Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–); Vietnam, North (post–1945)

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S

SABAH CLAIM **Unsettled Dispute**

The “Sabah Claim” refers to the sovereignty claim pursued by the Philippines to the Malaysian state of Sabah, located in the north-east portion of the island of Borneo (Kalimantan). The basis for the claim pursued by the Philippines is that the area in question formed part of the territory under the control of the sultanate of Sulu, a sultanate that had its center in the southern parts of what is today the Philippines. The Sabah claim has been a disputed issue between the Philippines and Malaysia since the Federation of Malaysia was established in 1963 with Sabah as one of its component states.

In January 1878 an agreement was signed between the sultan of Sulu and representatives of a British commercial syndicate. The agreement stipulated that North Borneo was either leased or ceded to the British syndicate (depending on the translation used) in return for the payment of 5,000 Malayan dollars per year. In 1881 the British North Borneo Chartered Company took over the concession. In 1888 the United Kingdom established a protectorate over North Borneo, but that did not alter the administrative responsibilities of the company. During the Pacific War (1941–1945) North Borneo came under Imperial Japanese forces. Following the end of Japanese occupation, the British North Borneo Chartered Company relinquished its duties, and North Borneo be-

came a colony of the United Kingdom in 1946.

The official claim of the Philippines to North Borneo dates back to 22 June 1962. On that day the Philippines officially declared that there was a dispute between, on the one hand, the Philippines and the sultanate of Sulu and, on the other, the United Kingdom with regard to the ownership and sovereignty of North Borneo. This statement came in response to a diplomatic note addressed to the embassy of the Philippines in London.

When the sovereignty of the colony of North Borneo was transferred to the new Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963, the dispute over Sabah became a bilateral issue between the federation and the Philippines. In fact the Philippines opposed the creation of the Federation of Malaysia on the grounds that Sabah would become a part of the federation. The crisis that followed failed to be contained by both the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), created in 1961 with the then Federation of Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand as members, and by Maphilindo, created in 1963 with Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. In fact the dispute over Sabah prevented the two associations from functioning properly.

The crisis between Malaysia and the Philippines relating to Sabah continued to be very serious into the late 1960s, but open military confrontation was avoided. This implies that the crisis persisted after the establishment of the As-

sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Gradually relations improved between the Philippines and Malaysia during the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos (t. 1965–1986) in the Philippines, but the dispute over Sabah was not formally settled. Filipino presidents Corazón Aquino (t. 1986–1992) and Fidel Ramos (t. 1992–1998) continued to seek to improve relations between the two countries. President Ramos visited Malaysia in January 1993, and Malaysia's prime minister, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad (t. 1981–2003), visited the Philippines in February 1994. High-level contacts have continued, as exemplified by the visit to Malaysia by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (t. 2000–2004, 2004–) in August 2001. Despite these high-level efforts to improve bilateral relations, the Sabah issue has yet to be settled. In the Philippines the Congress has not supported attempts aiming at revoking the sovereignty claim to Sabah and has instead moved to reiterate the claim, thus forcing the Filipino government to do likewise.

The latest development in the Sabah dispute has been the move by the Philippines to safeguard its claim to North Borneo (that is, Sabah). The Philippines sought to intervene in the case concerning the sovereignty of Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by Malaysia and Indonesia. The islands of Sipadan and Ligitan are located off the eastern coast of the island of Borneo. The move by the Philippines is motivated by a concern that its claim may be affected by a ruling by the ICJ in the case. The Philippines has explicitly stated that it is not seeking to become a party to the dispute over the two islands. On 13 March 2001 the Philippines filed an application for permission to intervene in the case. On 23 October 2001 the ICJ decided, by fourteen votes to one, that the application made by the Philippines to intervene in the case could not be granted.

Then on 18 December 2002, the ICJ, in a 16–1 majority, ruled on the question of sovereignty in Malaysia's favor not on the grounds of historical factors but on the basis of *effectivites* (control). How the Philippine government is reacting to this ruling has yet to be seen.

RAMSES AMER

See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); British North

Borneo Chartered Company (1881–1946); Malaysia (1963); Maphilindo Concept; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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SAGO

The sago (*Sagu metroxylon*) palm thrives in coastal peat swamps. Its pith produces a starchy substance that is consumed as food (mainly carbohydrate); following processing, it is used as industrial starch. In Southeast Asia sago was at best a minor trade commodity during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in comparison with pepper and the celebrated rubber.

However, to the Melanau community of the northwestern Bornean coast, sago not only played a significant role as a foodstuff and trade item but also had sociopolitical influence prior to the Pacific War (1941–1945). Owing to the lack of suitable land for rice cultivation, the Melanau turned to the exploitation of the sago palm, which initially grew wild along the lower reaches of the Igan, Oya, and Mukah Rivers. The organization of sago production was based on a three-way mutual partnership of the sexes and the patron-client relationship between aristocrats and peasantry. The man would fell the palms, strip the bark from the trunk, chop the pith, and shred it into smaller pieces. Then it was the woman's turn to wash and trample the pith on a very fine mat in order that the starch together with water percolated through the mat, leaving behind the woody waste on the surface of the mat. The water was then drained, and the solid sago starch was ready either to be boiled and consumed, baked to produce sago biscuits, or further processed to produce starch for in-

dustrial use. Because the Melanau peasant did not own enough land to cultivate his own palms and sustain a living, he had to rely on palms from the larger holdings of an aristocrat who acted as his patron. This traditional structure successfully withstood against Chinese and European interlopers from the 1860s to the 1940s.

The opening of Singapore in 1819 as a British entrepôt free port offered an international market for Melanau sago. Fluctuating world sago prices during the 1950s undermined the traditional patron-client partnership. Consequently both aristocrats and peasants turned to Chinese and European entrepreneurs, who offered more competitive prices for the palms. Chinese-owned sago palm holdings and Chinese and European sago mills reduced the Melanau to secondary players in the industry from the 1950s.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Patron-Client Relations; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo)

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SAIGON (GIA ĐÌNH; HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY) “Paris of the Orient”

In 1623 the Khmer gave the Vietnamese the right to establish a customhouse in Prei Nokor, a small market town of Cambodia. This was the starting point of the Vietnamese settlement in the Mekong Delta, on the Saigon River, a tributary of the larger Đền Nai River. This settlement, called Bến Nghé (Wharf of the Calves), became the administrative outpost of southern Vietnam and a base for trade and tax collecting, as by the end of the seventeenth century the Vietnamese had effectively controlled much of the Mekong Delta. In 1679, Chinese refugees coming from Guangxi (Kwangsi) to seek asylum were allowed by the Nguyễn lord to settle in the Đền Nai basin. Four years later they set up a market at a location 2 kilometers west of

the Vietnamese settlement, calling the place Zhaijun (Saigon). The activities of this urban center as a trading port caused it later to take on the Vietnamese denomination of Chợ Lớn, meaning literally the “Great Market.”

In 1698 the first administrative center in southern Vietnam was formally set up, with the establishment of the prefecture of Gia Định comprising the two military provinces of Trấn Biên (Biên Hòa today) and Phiên Trấn (Saigon area today). A citadel was built on the left bank of the Saigon River to house the area governor and his administrators. From then on, official documents would designate the Saigon-Cholon conurbation under the denomination of Gia Định.

During the civil war of the last three decades of the eighteenth century, the Nguyễn fought a seesaw campaign from 1778 to 1788 with their adversaries the Tây-sơn for the possession of Saigon—and the town changed hands seven times in this period. In September 1788, with Siamese support, Nguyễn Ánh (1762–1820), who later became the first emperor of the Nguyễn dynasty under the reign title of Gia Long (r. 1802–1820), captured Saigon for the fourth and last time, expelling the Tây-sơn from the southernmost bastion of their power. He ordered the rebuilding and reinforcement of the city’s citadel. Surrounded by 4.8-meter laterite walls, the citadel of Gia Định was constructed as a royal residence with royal storehouses. From 1808 on it was the administrative core of the southern third of the country, with an “overlord of the citadel of Gia Định” (*Gia Định thành tổng trấn*) ruling a unit of five southern provinces from Saigon. However, Saigon was probably more important as a commercial center than it was an administrative base. Saigon, since the last decade of the eighteenth century, had become one of the main ports of international trade in the South China Sea, with yearly traffic from China amounting to a hundred junks (Nguyễn 1970: 242–243). The Chinese living there accounted for upward of 10 percent of all the Chinese living anywhere in Vietnam at the time (Nguyễn 1970: 46–48). The embryo of the subsequent “primate” city of modern Saigon could thus already be seen in the traditional metropolis.

Captured by the French in 1859 and formally ceded to France in 1862, Saigon became a modern city under French rule. Following

their conquest of Cochin China, the French immediately opened the port of Saigon to general commerce, largely financed by Chinese merchants in the Straits of Melaka who owned several of the ships that plied between the French port and Singapore. On a strip of marshland near the Chinese trading town of Cholon, the French built a new city in the European style as the central market for all Indochina. Capital of the French colony of Cochin China, Saigon was from 1887 to 1902 the capital of the French Indochinese Union. During the colonial period the port of Saigon grew rapidly to develop into a city qualitatively different in size and importance from the other urban settlements of Indochina: it became two to three times larger than the next largest conurbation in French Indochina.

Assuming the aspect of a European city, Saigon soon acquired a reputation for its beauty and cosmopolitan atmosphere. Possessing large, tree-lined avenues differentiating the residential districts to the north, the administrative and business center to the northwest, and the commercial districts toward the banks of the river, Saigon was dubbed "Paris of the Orient." To the south, spreading more than 5 kilometers on the right bank of the Saigon River, are the port installations, which can accommodate 9,000-ton ships (at present, the harbor is accessible to 50,000-ton vessels). Indeed, owing to the great depth of the river, ships of the largest tonnage can sail upstream to the port of Saigon, from which 824 ships of 1,290,430 tons cleared in 1907 (Trần 1987: 258–262). But Saigon failed to rise from its modest status as a regional port and grow into a port city of significance, as its harbor was unable to compete with the superior facilities of Singapore and Hong Kong.

Cholon, for most of the colonial period much larger than its twin city, Saigon, to which it is connected by road, rail, and canal waterways, has always contained a large portion of Vietnam's Chinese population. The members of the Chinese community, here as elsewhere throughout the peninsula, have held a quasi-monopoly over commerce, particularly the rice trade. Still mainly a Chinese city, it has preserved its charm of yesteryear with its temples and pagodas, its Chinese cultural houses, its wooden shops, and the numerous canals that crisscross the town.

For administrative purposes Saigon and Cholon were merged in 1932; in 1956 the two cities were included in the new prefecture of Saigon, the capital of the state of South Vietnam created in 1954. During the Vietnam War (1964–1975), the city took on the aspect of a giant military complex, with the air base of Tân Sơn Nhất, the highway from Saigon to Biên Hòa, the naval base, and the Nhà Bè storage complex. But throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, at least 1 million refugees from the rural areas poured into the city, creating serious housing problems and overcrowding (Thrift and Forbes 1985: 308). In 1960 the population of the Saigon metropolitan area was more than two million, and by 1970 it had swollen to 3,320,000 (Thrift and Forbes 1985).

After the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, Saigon lost its status as a capital and was renamed Hồ Chí Minh City on 2 June 1976. Its local economy was disrupted during the early years of the new regime, which curtailed foreign investment and promoted collectivization while initiating a harsh clampdown on Cholon and expelling tens of thousands of Chinese. However, conditions improved in the 1980s and 1990s as the Vietnamese government relaxed its economic policy. Gradually adapting to the new system, Hồ Chí Minh City has become Vietnam's booming economic engine, and with a population of 5,250,000 in 1997 it is the largest city, the greatest port, and the commercial and industrial center of the country (*Indochina Chronology* 1999: 28).

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Chinese in Southeast Asia; Boat People; Cochin China; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Hatien; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Nguyễn Ánh (Emperor Gia Long) (r. 1802–1820); Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Tây-sơn Rebellion (1771–1802); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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SAILENDRAS

A Javanese Buddhist Dynasty

The Sailendras were a dynasty of Buddhist kings who ruled the kingdom of Mataram in Central Java from the late eighth to middle ninth centuries C.E., and were later associated with the kingdom of Śri Vijaya (Śrivijaya, Śriwijaya) in southern Sumatra. The title *Sailendra* is often translated as “King of the Mountain,” and it was probably inspired by the volcanic mountains that dominate the landscape of these islands.

The Sailendras were only one of the many dynastic lineages of Central Java, but they appear to have become predominant between the years 760 and 860 C.E. Their renown is based largely on their patronage of Buddhism, in particular the construction of the great Buddhist stupa at Borobudur. Other Buddhist sites associated with Sailendra rule include the related temple structures of Candi Mendut, Candi Kalasan, and Candi Sewu. In addition to their agricultural base in Central Java, the Sailendras seem to have had access to some of the key ports on the northern coast and clearly had

commercial and marital ties with the rulers of the maritime empire of Śri Vijaya, based in southern Sumatra.

This association between the Sailendra rulers of Java and the kings of Śri Vijaya has engendered considerable debate as to the origins of the Sailendras. A stela found at Ligor in southern Thailand commemorated the foundation of a Mahayana Buddhist sanctuary by a king of Śri Vijaya on 15 April 775 C.E. The reverse of this stela also bears an inscription of a Śri Maharaja of the Sailendra line. The Dutch author N. J. Krom thought that the king of Śri Vijaya on the first side of the stela was the same as the Śri Maharaja on the second, and he argued that the Sailendras were a Śri Vijayan dynasty that had later conquered parts of Java. In contrast, W. F. Stutterheim used the same evidence to argue that the Sailendras were from Java, and that Śri Vijaya had come under Javanese domination (Hall 1981: 51).

It is probable, however, that neither of these hypotheses is accurate and that the relationship between the Sailendras and Śri Vijaya was based on commercial interaction and intermarriage rather than conquest. When the rulers of Śri Vijaya funded the construction of sleeping quarters for monks at the Buddhist pilgrimage site of Nalanda in northern India during the late ninth century, they chose to emphasize their Sailendra lineage. This is probably an indication not only of former marital ties but also of the prestige of the Sailendra dynasty among the wider Buddhist community of that time.

The earliest record of a Sailendra ruler in Java is an inscription found at Candi Kalasan to the east of Yogyakarta. It commemorates the foundation of the temple to the Buddhist goddess Tara in 778 C.E., during the reign of King Panangkaran, who is described as an “ornament of the Sailendra dynasty.” J. G. de Casparis (1956) has argued that Panangkaran was not himself a Sailendra, but merely a local ruler under the Sailendra king Vishnu Dharmatunga. The Sailendras were the first to adopt the title *Śri Maharaja* (derived from a Sanskrit compound meaning “Great King”) and claimed the defeat of neighboring kingdoms.

The inscription from Candi Kalasan also lists a number of state officials, relatives of the king, and local nobility who helped to administer clearly defined districts and villages. However, despite this hierarchical structure, it appears that

under the Sailendras the state of Mataram was largely decentralized. Although minor surrounding kingdoms were absorbed into the main structures of the state, local village communities, or *wanua*, remained stable and largely independent from the politics of the court, forming their own village networks for the marketing of agricultural produce (Christie 1995: 275). Sailendra domination in Central Java appears to have weakened during the first half of the ninth century, and the last Sailendra king of Central Java is said to have been defeated in 856 on the Ratubaka plateau.

Our current knowledge of the Sailendras is derived from a very small number of inscriptions, and their interpretation has been the cause of considerable debate. The most influential work on this subject is that by J. G. de Casparis, completed after World War II (1939–1945) and published in two volumes in Dutch (1950) and English (1956). It should be emphasized, however, that even the names of the Sailendra kings remain uncertain, and many of de Casparis's conclusions are necessarily speculative. Attempts to link the title of the dynasty as "Kings of the Mountain" with the Sailodbhava and Pandya dynasties in India have been refuted, and the connection suggested by George Coedès (1968: 89) with the kings of Funan has not been supported by further evidence.

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See also Borobudur; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Java; Mataram; Śrīvijaya (Sriwijaya)

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SAKDALIST MOVEMENT

Antidote to Socioeconomic Ills

The Sakdalist movement was a political and rebellious movement in the Philippines, from 1930 to 1935, opposing the Filipino elite and the U.S. regime in the country. The movement was active on two fronts: as a political party it participated successfully in the elections within the newly emerging political system in the country, and as a rebellious movement it unsuccessfully attempted to grab power in several dozen municipalities in central and southern Luzon. The uprising was an outburst of militant nationalism, fueled by agrarian discontent.

The founder and leader, Benigno Ramos, was born in 1893 in Bulacan to a municipal civil servant. He attended public schools and worked as a government clerk and teacher. In 1912 he went to Manila and started a career as a journalist writing for various newspapers. From 1917 he was employed by the national politician Manuel Quezon (1878–1944) as a translator and later as an assistant and as director of the Senate clipping division, an important position in the Nacionalista Party. In 1930, Ramos's governmental position came to an end. He had participated in a student strike against an American teacher, and this brought him in conflict with Quezon, who dismissed him.

After his dismissal Ramos started a Tagalog weekly newspaper called *Sakdal*, which means "to accuse" or "to strike" in Tagalog. Ramos vehemently attacked the political leadership of Quezon and other politicians and the continuation of the U.S. colonial government. The periodical was critical of the elite of the country, and spoke out in defense of the poor and exploited classes in Philippine society. The periodical attracted a wide readership among the lower and lower-middle classes in the provinces. *Sakdalism* promised to wash the Filipinos of their 400 years of Spanish domination and to prevent their Americanization.

The 1930s in the Philippines was a time of socioeconomic hardship and political unrest. The Great Depression (1929–1931) had reduced the prices of all agricultural export products and brought poverty to the provinces. La-

borers had started organizing themselves to demand better wages. In the rural areas tenants were protesting the power of the landlords, demanding a higher share of the harvest. Politically the country was preparing for independence, the first phase of which would start in 1935 with the adoption of a constitution and the inauguration of the commonwealth, giving autonomy to the Philippines. Quezon was the most prominent and powerful national politician negotiating independence issues with the U.S. colonial administration.

In October 1933, Ramos formed the Sakdal Party and became its president. The party had the following goals: (1) complete and absolute independence by 31 December 1935; (2) abolition of all taxes; (3) equal distribution of land to the landless; (4) natural resources for Filipinos; and (5) fighting the rule of the oligarchs. The new party participated in the legislative elections of 1934 in eight provinces in Central Luzon and was able to win three seats in the House of Representatives, one governorship, and scores of municipal offices. The political triumph, however, was short-lived; the three party members who had been elected quickly defected to one of the factions of Quezon's Nacionalista Party.

After the elections the ruling political elite decided that a plebiscite would be held on the new constitution for the Philippine Commonwealth in June 1935. As the Sakdal Party was strongly opposed to the new constitution, which did not bring immediate and genuine independence, political tensions in the country rose. The government proscribed the newspaper *Sakdal* and made it difficult for the party to conduct meetings. Fearing arrest, Ramos had fled to Japan in November 1934, where he tried to mobilize Japanese support for his movement, though without much success. A leaflet printed in Japan entitled *Free Filipinos* was distributed in the Tagalog provinces, enhancing the mood of rebellion among the *sakdalistas*. The Sakdal Party secretly prepared for action.

The Sakdal uprising was a two-day affair. On the night of 2 May 1935, groups of Sakdal followers, carrying guns and knives, attempted to take control of fourteen towns in central and southern Luzon. In eleven of these towns the local police dispersed the crowds; in three municipalities the Sakdals succeeded in taking over the town hall. The next day the Constabulary (the military police) retook the buildings and

killed or drove out the rebels. The total number of sakdalistas involved in these actions was estimated at between 5,000 and 7,000, both men and women. The total membership of the movement was estimated at 68,000. The total number of people killed or wounded during the action was slightly more than a hundred.

The official view was that the uprising had been instigated by religious fanaticism. But a more thorough investigation undertaken by Joseph Ralston Hayden, a political scientist and the vice governor of the Philippines, discovered that the rebellion was directed against the power of the landlords and the abuses of the Constabulary (Hayden 1942). The rebellion was clearly rooted in socioeconomic inequality and class conflict in the Philippines.

Fearing new outbreaks of violence, the leaders of the Nacionalista Party tried to adopt social reforms. To show the change in attitude, the sakdalistas who had been arrested and imprisoned were released after a couple of months. President Quezon launched a campaign for "Social Justice," proposing minimum wage legislation and agrarian reforms. In the countryside the communist and socialist peasant unions became active, while landlords organized armed gangs to defend their property. Political tensions increased. The outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945) and the Japanese invasion in December 1941 put an end to this period in Philippine history and ushered in a totally new situation.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Great Depression (1929–1931); Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon) (People's Anti-Japanese Army) (1942); New People's Army (NPA); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1900–1941); Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944)

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SAMBAS AND PONTIANAK SULTANATES

The sultanate of Sambas was one of the most important early Muslim sultanates on the western coast of Borneo. It was founded sometime in the sixteenth century along with Sukadana and Landak and had connections with the sultanate of Johor (Irwin 1955: 3). The Dutch East India Company (VOC) attempted to establish a commercial presence at Sambas in the early seventeenth century, but in 1610 their factory was attacked and their representatives put to death. Dutch interest in the western coast languished for much of the century until, in 1698, the sultan of Landak, who was at war with Sukadana, enlisted the support of the Dutch and the sultan of Bantam (Banten) in West Java and sacked Sukadana. From then on the western coast states became clients of Bantam and ultimately the Dutch (Jackson 1970: 3).

In the mid-eighteenth century the sultan of Sambas was recruiting Chinese miners to work in the rich West Borneo goldfields inland of the coast between the Sambas and Kapuas Rivers. The miners began to settle at Seminis, Larah, Montrado, Buduk, and Mandor, and, after a short period under Malay control, the mining communities (*kongsis*) soon established their independence and avoided Malay taxation (*ibid.*: 22–23).

Increasing Anglo-Dutch commercial rivalry in island Southeast Asia in the eighteenth century and the intervention of the Dutch in the affairs of several of the Malay States in Borneo disrupted normal trading relations, and some Malay sultans turned to piracy. Sambas was to become an important center for piratical raids against European and other shipping in the early nineteenth century, and it served as a base for the notorious Illanuns (Ilanuns) from the southern Philippines. At this time Sambas was also vying with the sultanate of Pontianak for political and economic control of the western coast. Pontianak had been established in 1772 with the assistance of the Dutch when an Arab pirate and adventurer, Abdul Rahman, founded a trading colony at the village of Pontianak near the mouth of the Landak River. At that

time the main center of trade commanding the Kapuas Delta was farther upriver at Landak. Although the sultan there complained to Bantam that his rights over this territory had been violated, the Dutch interceded in behalf of Pontianak, secured Bantam's rights over West Borneo, and gave full recognition to the new sultan. The Dutch then established a factory at Pontianak, and the sultan of Bantam ceded all his rights to the western coast to them. Subsequently the company supported Pontianak in attacks against Sukadana and the minor state of Mempawah, and by the early nineteenth century it had become the major entrepôt on the west coast, eclipsing Sambas (Irwin 1955: 24). The Dutch negotiated new treaties with the rulers of Sambas, Pontianak, and Mempawah in 1818, and they formally recognized Dutch sovereignty. Residents were installed at Pontianak and Sambas in 1824, though in 1826, Sambas was reduced in status to an assistant-residency, while a Dutch resident continued at Pontianak. The Dutch channeled all trade through these two ports. Pontianak became the capital of the newly created Western Division of Borneo in 1849.

In the early nineteenth century the West Borneo goldfields were the most important source of gold in the whole of Asia and provided about one-seventh of total world output (Jackson 1970: 2). By 1850 the Chinese gold-mining communities inland of Sambas contained some 50,000 Chinese; they were self-governing districts that raised their own taxes and smuggled in such goods as opium, salt, and gunpowder from Singapore. The sultan of Sambas had no means of controlling them (Irwin 1955: 165–174). The Dutch decided to bring them under direct administration and sent in an armed force of more than 2,000 troops in May 1854. Chinese resistance rapidly collapsed (King 1993: 148). At this time the gold mines were already on the decline, and the Chinese were moving to other regions of West Borneo to take up commercial farming and trade. Virtually no mining activity remained by the 1890s.

During the late colonial period (1930s) the power and authority of the Malay sultans of West Borneo were at an end, though Pontianak in particular enjoyed increasing prosperity as the main administrative and commercial center of the Western Division. Following Indonesian

independence Pontianak became the capital of the province of West Kalimantan, while Sambas remained as a smaller regional market and administrative town serving the agricultural districts of its immediate hinterland (Cleary and Eaton 1992: 69).

VICTOR T. KING

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Century); Banten (Bantam) (1526–1813); Borneo; Chinese Gold Mining Communities in Western Borneo; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; *Hui*; Johor; *Kongsis*; Piracy; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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SAMIN MOVEMENT

Withdrawing from the Modern World

The Samin Movement was a peasant movement founded around 1890 in the Blora area of Central Java by Surontiko Samin (1859?–1914). Although both the Dutch authorities and later Indonesian nationalists interpreted the movement as a form of political opposition to colonial rule, Saminism seems to have been a more general and peaceful reaction to modern life.

Samín and his followers were illiterate, and we depend on colonial reports and court transcripts for our knowledge of their ideas and actions. The movement first attracted attention in 1905, when its followers began to withdraw from the communal village life that Dutch rule had promoted, refusing to contribute to rice banks or to herd their animals with those of other villagers. The Saminists continued to pay tax, but they regarded those payments as voluntary contributions, not obligations. In 1907, fol-

lowing rumors that the Saminists planned a revolt, the colonial authorities arrested Samín and exiled him to Sumatra, where he later died.

The movement survived under a succession of leaders, reaching a peak membership of about 3,000 households in 1914. Although it attracted most attention when it resisted taxes, tax increases, and restrictions on access to the state-controlled teak forests of the region, the movement seems to have been driven by a broader ethical doctrine that emphasized the self-sufficiency of the peasant economy and the centrality of the sexual relationship between husband and wife. Its followers perplexed the colonial authorities by their refusal to be deferential to officials while nonetheless remaining diligent farmers, honest and generous neighbors, and, above all, nonviolent. Officials were especially offended by the fact that the Saminists used low Javanese (*ngoko*) to address their superiors. Saminists called their beliefs “the science of the prophet Adam,” but they rejected the authority of local Muslim officials as calmly and firmly as they rejected that of the Dutch and the Javanese bureaucratic elite. They often resisted sending their children to school, though this may have been because they objected to the fees they were charged, rather than because they rejected education. Although some colonial reports and later scholars describe Saminism as messianic, its followers seem never to have expected a supernatural savior or a future golden age. Rather, they wanted to withdraw from the wider world and live a simple and unregulated agricultural existence, free of the vexations of government and money. Saminism drew little or nothing from Islamic doctrine, but scholars do not agree on whether it drew from older Hindu-Buddhist influences, whether it reflected the most ancient, pre-Indic Javanese peasant traditions, or whether it was a relatively modern reaction to the pressures of colonial modernization—especially the increased intrusion into village customs brought about by the Ethical Policy.

Although the movement persisted into the era of Indonesian nationalism, it developed no ties with nationalist organizations or with later political parties. Saminist areas, however, voted strongly for the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) in the 1955 elections, but it is hard to recognize a primitive socialism in the individualistic self-sufficiency of

the Saminists. Saminist communities survived in the Blora region until the 1970s.

Saminitism's lack of engagement with orthodox religion, ideology, and the modern economy has led scholars to regard it as a reminder of the difficulty that modern scholars face in understanding peasant society.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Ethical Policy (*Ethische Politiek*); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Java; Kebatinan Movement; Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia

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SANDAKAN DEATH MARCH

A Tropical Hell

In 1945 about 2,400 Australian and British prisoners of war died in northwest Borneo in a prolonged atrocity known as the Sandakan Death March. The prisoners of war, who had been captured mainly in Singapore, were sent to Sandakan in British North Borneo to construct an airfield. Although worked hard and treated as badly as other captive labor forces, the Sandakan prisoners were not treated with unusual severity until 1945. Evidently anxious over the approach of Allied forces toward Borneo, early in 1945 the Japanese ordered many prisoners at Sandakan to march westward through the jungle to

Ranau. From January to May a series of "death marches" began, during which about 1,050 prisoners died. Already poorly nourished, weak, and sick, prisoners died on the trail of illness and exhaustion and were shot or bayoneted if they fell out. The survivors were subjected to further mistreatment and heavy labor at Ranau until, by war's end, all the prisoners in Japanese hands at both Ranau and Sandakan were dead. The last prisoner of the 1,300 left at Sandakan was executed on 15 August 1945. Only six prisoners were recovered, all Australians, who had been succored by local people. The Japanese soldiers responsible for the march were tried as war criminals at Labuan; nine were executed, sixty-four sentenced to imprisonment, and eleven acquitted. Despite the common perception that Sandakan has been forgotten or even concealed, the episode has been the subject of more books, films, exhibitions, and radio documentaries than any comparable episode in Australian military history. The dead of Sandakan lie in the Commonwealth War Graves cemetery on Labuan, Malaysia, and there are memorials to them in Ranau, Sandakan, Canberra, and several Australian cities.

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See also Bataan Death March; British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; "Death Railway" (Burma-Siam Railway); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945)

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SANGHA

Buddhist society consists of four categories of people. Most are laymen and laywomen whose religious lives center on the practice and support of Buddhism while they remain in society. Buddhist monks and nuns formally renounce society to live in single-sex, celibate communities. The collective term for these monks and nuns is the *Sangha*, which means "community." As novices they are bound by the ten precepts, to abstain from killing, lying, stealing, sexual activity, intoxicants, wearing perfume or jewelry,

attending dances or singing, eating after mid-day, handling gold or silver, and sleeping on luxurious beds. After higher ordination they are bound by more than 200 monastic rules attributed to the Buddha that are recited collectively once a fortnight. The knowledge and strict observation of these rules vary among the many different monastic lineages, which are often differentiated by apparently minor rules, such as variations in monastic dress. All lineages of monks, however, descend from the Buddha's first five disciples, and the lineage of nuns goes back to the Buddha's aunt. In Theravada the tradition of nuns had died out, but it was restored in Thailand from the Chinese lineage in 2002. Ordination into the *Sangha* has long been a coming-of-age ceremony for men in Southeast Asian countries, most monks returning to lay life after a three-month period.

As well as providing the context in which people may strive for Enlightenment, a goal regarded by many as impossible in this day and age, the *Sangha* preserves and communicates the Buddha's teaching and performs rituals. Traditionally, the *Sangha* has also provided formal education. The *Sangha* has provided political stability and acted as a check on political power, as well as being used by political powers to gain popularity or to influence the population as a whole.

Monasteries where the *Sangha* dwelled are also the location of the main sacred objects of the Buddhist landscape: *stupa*, hemispherical monuments commemorating and often incorporating relics of the Buddha; Buddha images; and the sacred tree, descended from the one under which the Buddha achieved Enlightenment.

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See also Buddhism; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Temple Political Economy

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**SANGKUM REASTRE NIYUM
(PEOPLES' SOCIALIST
COMMUNITY) (MARCH 1955)**

Sangkum Reastre Niyum (often translated as Peoples' Socialist Community) was the mass-

based political movement founded by Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1922–) in 1955. The Sangkum, controlled by the prince, dominated Cambodian political life until March 1970, when Sihanouk was driven from power in a bloodless coup.

In March 1955, soon after Cambodia gained its independence from France, Prince Sihanouk, who had been king of Cambodia since 1941, abdicated the throne and named his father, Norodom Suramarit, to succeed him. As an "ordinary citizen," the "father of independence," as he was popularly known, entered the political fray with a view to ending pluralist politics in the country.

Shortly after his abdication, Sihanouk founded the Sangkum as a national, ostensibly apolitical, movement dedicated to his vision of an independent Cambodia. To become a member of the Sangkum, one had to abjure membership in any other political party. The effect of this regulation was to throw existing political parties competing for a national election into disarray.

Violence and fraud characterized the 1955 elections. Sangkum candidates gained 85 percent of the vote, as well as all the seats in the National Assembly. Candidates in the elections in 1958, 1962, and 1966 campaigned as members of the Sangkum. Candidates in 1958 and 1962, handpicked by Sihanouk, were unopposed, but those in 1966 competed as rival Sangkum representatives.

During his years in power Sihanouk pursued policies of neutralism in foreign affairs and concocted a national ideology that he labeled "Buddhist socialism," which celebrated what he saw as Cambodia's values and the status quo. The prince was immensely popular until the Vietnam War (1964–1975) encroached on Cambodia in the mid-1960s and the economy declined. When he was overthrown by a vote of his National Assembly while he was overseas, the Sangkum movement dissolved. In the 1990s, as pluralist politics reemerged in Cambodia, several candidates banking on the nostalgia of older voters formed parties with the word *Sangkum* in their names.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Buddhist Socialism; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Lon Nol (1913–1984); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–)

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SANTO TOMAS, UNIVERSITY OF Asia's Oldest University

The University of Santo Tomas (UST) is the oldest existing university in the Philippines and in Asia. Bestowed the title of "Pontifical and Catholic University of the Philippines," it is a Dominican institution of higher learning from which many great Filipinos obtained their degrees. The university draws its inspiration from the teaching and philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), the most famous theologian of the Dominican order.

The University of Santo Tomas was originally established as the Colegio de Nuestra Señora del Santísimo Rosario (College of Our Lady of the Sacred Rosary) in Intramuros, the Walled City in Manila, in 1611. It was then a boarding school intended to prepare young men for the priesthood. In 1617 it was renamed the Colegio de Santo Tomas (College of Saint Thomas), in memory of the foremost Dominican theologian, Saint Thomas Aquinas. In 1645 the college was elevated to the level of a university, and in 1680 it was placed under royal patronage. Following the British occupation of Manila, the Spanish king granted UST the title "Royal University" in recognition of its members who had fought to defend Manila. In 1902, UST was made a Pontifical University, and after the Pacific War (1941–1945), in 1947 it was given the further title of "The Catholic University of the Philippines."

Because of the growing student population and the cramped confines in Intramuros, the university moved to a larger campus in the Sampaloc district of Manila in 1927, where it remains to this day. During the Pacific War the Sampaloc campus was initially used as a gathering point for soldiers prior to being sent to fight the Japanese. When the Japanese took over Manila, the campus was used as an internment camp for U.S., British, and Allied nationals. The Intramuros buildings were destroyed during the battle for Manila in 1945.

The university was, and still is, renowned for its courses on philosophy, theology, law, and later, architecture, medicine, and other disciplines. It also has the oldest press in the Philippines, an extensive library, archives, and a museum. The university's graduates form a veritable Who's Who in Philippine history, ranging from scientists, philosophers, and artists to political and nationalist leaders. The university ranks as one of the best in the Philippines today, with the longest tradition and history behind it.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Catholicism; Chulalongkorn University; Education, Western Secular; Hispanization; Missionaries, Christian; Thammasat University; University of Malaya; University of Rangoon

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SANTRI

The term *santri* indicates a devoutly religious, *pesantren*-dwelling student. These rural Koranic schools, *pesantren*, have a long history. Like other such institutions in Java, *pesantren* have their roots in institutions of the Hindu-Buddhist period (from about the second to the sixteenth centuries). A *santri*'s stay in a *pesantren* is part of the general process of his becoming a pious Muslim. A very important person in the life of a *santri* is the *kiyai* (*kiai*), the religious leader of a *pesantren*. The *kiyai* teach religion, direct ceremonies, give advice in the case of illness, and are seen as intermediaries between Allah and the believers. Often supernatural powers to promote prosperity and well-being are ascribed to these religious leaders. After death, some *kiyai* are regarded as saints who can still effect the granting of *selamat*, well-being and blessing. Hence pupils and followers of a religious leader often pray at his grave.

The *santri* adhere strictly to the obligations of Islam. They pray five times a day, pay their religious taxes, and fast during Ramadan. Like every good Muslim, they hope to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their life-

time. However, in some regions of Java and Madura, their religious ideas are mixed up with all kinds of non-Islamic elements. Every transition in their life (birth, circumcision, marriage, and death), must be accompanied by a communal ceremonial meal, a *selamatan*, for only that will ensure the good fortune of the person involved and his family. In fact, these meals are organized on all sorts of other occasions, to ward off evil influences. The prayers at such *selamatan* are addressed not only to Allah but also to the ancestors.

TRANSLATED BY
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See also *Abangan*; Education, Traditional Religious; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Islam in Southeast Asia; Java; *Kiai*

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**SARAWAK AND SABAH
(NORTH BORNEO)**

The East Malaysian states of Sarawak (124,449 square kilometers) and Sabah (76,522 square kilometers), located in the northwest portion of the island of Borneo, had separate historical development from the Peninsular Malay States (West, or Peninsular, Malaysia). Until 1963 these two territories, together with Brunei, constituted "British Borneo"; in that year Sarawak and North Borneo (as Sabah was then known), both British protectorates since 1888 and colonies since 1946, gained their independence through joining the Federation of Malaysia.

The population (2000 census) of Sarawak is 1.6 million and Sabah 1.7 million; that of Malaysia is 23.2 million. But unlike Peninsular Malaysia, where the indigenous Malay predominate over the immigrant Chinese and Indian communities, Sarawak and Sabah have a very small Malay minority and collectively more than fifty indigenous ethnic groups. The Ibans and the Kadazan-Dusuns are the largest indigenous groups in Sarawak and Sabah, respectively. There are more than twenty native communities in Sarawak, including Bidayuh, Bisayah,

Melanau, Kayan, Kenyah, Orang Hulu, Kelabit, Kedayan, Penan, Lun Bawang, and Kajang; in Sabah there are some thirty or more indigenous ethnic peoples, including Murut, Bajau, Illanun (Illanun), Lotud, Rungus, Tambanuo, Dumpas, Maragang, Paitan, Idahan, Brunei Malay, Sulu, Orang Sungei, Minokok, and Tidong. The Chinese community in both Sarawak and Sabah is equally diverse in terms of dialect groups: Hokkien, Teochiu, Cantonese, Hakka, Foochow, Henghua, and Hainanese are the more prominent. Unlike the Hokkiens, Teochius, and Cantonese who migrated to Sarawak from Singapore in the mid-nineteenth century, the Hakkas crossed over from southwestern Borneo in the early 1820s. The Foochows, who dominated the Rejang valley and delta, arrived in the early 1900s directly from South China. The majority of the Chinese in Sabah migrated from China in the 1890s and 1900s. The Islamized indigenous communities include Malay, Kedayan, and some Melanau. The majority of the indigenous peoples of Sarawak and Sabah, including the Chinese, are Christians, both Catholics and Protestants, but native animistic beliefs and pagan practices remained relevant to many ethnic communities. Since the fifteenth century the Malay language has been the lingua franca of trade and communication among the diverse population.

The territories of what are present-day Sarawak and the western part of Sabah were nominally under the sovereignty of the Muslim sultanate of Brunei. The Sulu sultanate similarly claimed nominal overlordship of eastern Sabah. But neither Brunei nor Sulu exercised direct, effective administration over these territories. The genesis of Sarawak occurred with the second arrival of an English gentleman-adventurer, James Brooke (1803–1868), who assisted in putting an end to the anti-Brunei rebellion (1836–1840) and was rewarded with the governorship, styled "Rajah of Sarawak" by the Brunei sultan in 1841. From the original bequeathed territory of the Lundu to the Sadong valleys, Brooke and his successors extended Sarawak's boundary eastward at the expense of Brunei to reach the Lawas in 1905.

Sabah's (North Borneo's) beginning as a modern state originated with several profit-motivated individuals. In exchange for payment, the sultans of Brunei and Sulu gave

grants of territory in North Borneo to the following foreigners: Charles Lee Moses, the U.S. consul general (1865); Joseph W. Torrey and Thomas B. Harris (1865–1866); and Baron Gustav von Overbeck and Alfred Dent (1877). Through the efforts of Dent a royal charter was granted in November 1881, and thus began the British North Borneo Chartered Company and its administration of North Borneo.

While North Borneo was administered by a chartered company with its board of directors in London, Sarawak had a white rajah dynasty. The Brooke rajahs—James (t. 1841–1868), Charles (t. 1868–1917), and Charles Vyner (t. 1917–1941, 1946)—were absolute monarchs. The Malay *datu* (nonroyal chiefs) provided advice to the rajah, who also sought counsel from Chinese communal leaders. European officers termed residents administered large tracts of territory, each subdivided into districts under district officers. Native officers (mainly Malays) assisted the district officers. Chinese and Eurasian clerical personnel handled the skeletal bureaucracy's paperwork. Heading North Borneo's administration was the governor, who was answerable to the court of directors in London. The administrative structure resembled that of Sarawak—namely, residents, district officers, and native officers (mainly Kadazan-Dusuns). The participation of native chiefs, headmen, and village elders in the administration was more institutionalized in North Borneo than in Sarawak.

Both in words and in deeds, James Brooke was exceptionally partial to the indigenous peoples. The Brooke tradition of the rajahs holding the mandate to rule for the benefit of the natives and not for self-enrichment was strongly emphasized in all spheres, particularly in the economy. At the height of the rubber boom (1909–1910), Rajah Charles denied the entry of Western capitalists to open plantations; native rubber smallholdings were the norm, large estates the exception. Although not entirely exploitative of the indigenous population, the company emphasized the pronative policy to a lesser extent than did the Brookes. European capitalists were offered incentives to develop commercial agriculture (tobacco, rubber) and extract minerals. Unlike Sarawak, which was governed like a Brooke family country estate, North Borneo's administrators expected

profitable returns to satisfy shareholders in London with attractive dividends.

The mainstay of Sarawak's economy from the Brooke perspective was agriculture—subsistence swidden hill rice and wet rice, sago, pepper, and rubber. The collection of jungle products (resins, rattan, bird's nests, dammar, wild rubber) was greatly encouraged. Mineral extraction was a non-native industry, with the Chinese involved in gold, cinnabar, and coal, and Western companies concentrating on oil production. Trade and commerce were in the hands of European companies and Chinese enterprise, the latter dominating the distributive trade networks. Jungle products and sea produce were important sources of income to North Borneo's native inhabitants. Natives engaged in swidden rice farming, food crops, and rubber. Commercial agriculture was mainly the preserve of Europeans—tobacco and rubber. The Chinese focused on trade and timber production.

Brooke rule faced numerous challenges, especially during the first three decades: the Iban "pirates" of Saribas and Skrang (1840s), the Chinese assault on Kuching (1857), the Malay conspiracy (1857–1860), and Rentap (1850s). The Brookes exploited traditional animosities between downriver Ibans and their upriver brethren and Iban-Kayan/Kenyah rivalries in pacifying the country. The opposition posed by Bantin (1890s) and Asun (1930) to the Brooke government was the consequence of a personal feud and misunderstanding, respectively. The rajah also brokered peace between antagonistic native groups with the "killing-a-pig-peace-ceremony." The most serious challenges to company rule, however, were the Mat Salleh rebellion (1894–1905) followed by the Runday rebellion (1915). Misunderstanding of intentions between ruler and ruled developed into armed conflict, but neither in North Borneo nor in Sarawak were there millenarian uprisings or nationalistic struggles.

As a move to safeguard its interests in the region vis-à-vis other Western powers, Britain in 1888 granted protectorates over Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei. Defense and foreign relations were handled by Britain, while internal administration remained the purview of the respective territories. Consequently, "British Borneo" was created.

When war became imminent in 1940–1941, only a small Punjab regiment was sent to Sarawak—despite Britain’s promise to defend the territories—with the purpose of defending the airfield outside Kuching and oil installations at Miri. However, only scorched-earth tactics were undertaken in the face of the Japanese landings at Miri in early December 1941. The outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945) ushered in the military occupation of Sarawak and North Borneo by the Japanese Imperial Army. Sarawak’s capital, Kuching, was occupied on 24 December 1941; on 1 January 1942 Labuan fell; and North Borneo’s Jesselton (Kota Kinabalu) followed on 9 January. “Musim Jipun,” or “Masa Jepun” (Japanese Era), made for dark days for the inhabitants. The Chinese suffered the most, physically as well as financially. Although there were no mass massacres as in Singapore, the *sook ching* (purification through deeds) served on the Chinese of Sarawak and North Borneo was in the form of financial contribution to the Japanese war effort. Urban inhabitants suffered from deprivation owing to shortages of food, clothing, and other daily necessities; the subsistence-based population in the rural districts did not suffer as much as townspeople. As in other Southeast Asian countries, Europeans spent the occupation years behind barbed wires and fences inside internment camps. Batu Lintang, outside Kuching, was the largest prisoner-of-war and civilian internment facility in Borneo. The abortive Chinese-led uprising in Jesselton in October 1943 resulted in swift and heavy Japanese reprisals along North Borneo’s western coast. Toward the closing months of the war, the Japanese transferred prisoners of war (mainly Australians) from the Sandakan camp farther inland to another at Ranau. This disastrous death march claimed many lives, owing to malnutrition, exposure, ill treatment, and outright killings by Japanese guards.

By the time of the Australian landings at Brunei Bay and Labuan on 10 June 1945, many districts in the interior had been “liberated” by guerrilla elements from the Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD). There was little opposition to the Australian landings, as the bulk of the Japanese forces had withdrawn inland. Ironically, Allied bombs practically destroyed large parts of Jesselton, Sandakan, and other towns of North Borneo prior to their

liberation. Despite the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, news of the end of the war came only in early September for most parts of North Borneo and Sarawak, owing to the vastness of the land and poor communications.

In the postwar aftermath, the cession controversy swept across Sarawak like a storm, but there were only little drizzles when the issue reached North Borneo. Rajah Vyner Brooke and the court of directors had agreed to transfer sovereignty to the British Crown. The work of postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction in Sarawak and North Borneo proved too huge an undertaking, however, which neither the Brooke government nor the company could handle financially. Although cession met with general acquiescence in North Borneo, the Malay community in Sarawak was split over the issue. The anticeSSIONISTS found a leader in Anthony Brooke, the nephew of the rajah. Sarawak became a Crown Colony in June 1946, followed by North Borneo in July. The anticeSSION groups in Sarawak continued their protests, which climaxed in the assassination of the second colonial governor, Duncan Stewart (t. 1949), at Sibu in 1949. Thereafter the anticeSSION movement fizzled out but left a deep schism in the Malay community and politics.

During the Crown Colony period (1946–1963), the principal objective was to improve and develop the infrastructure of the two territories as a means of spurring economic growth and progress. A series of development programs were implemented with expertise from Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Equal attention was given to education and public health. On the political front, leftist elements began to disseminate anti-imperialistic and anti-colonial propaganda, mainly within the Chinese community. Workers’ strikes and incidents of sabotage were evidence of leftist attempts to disrupt the economy. Conversion to the English language in vernacular Chinese schools sparked a controversy that was readily exploited by the leftist groups. However, pragmatism and utilitarianism overruled cultural sentiments, and the majority of secondary vernacular Chinese schools converted their language of instruction from Chinese (*kuo yi*) to English without incident.

After the proposal for the Federation of Malaysia was announced in 1961, much improved in the social and economic sector, but

much more remained to be done. Politically, the peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo have yet to be awakened. The "Malaysia" proposal was the wake-up call for the various ethnic communities to contemplate their political direction. Several ethnic-based political parties were hurriedly established: United National Kadazan Organization (1961), United Sabah National Organization (1961), United National Pasok Momogun Party (1962), Sabah Alliance Party (1962), Sarawak National Party (1961), Sarawak United People's Party (1959). Except for the socialist-leaning and mainly Chinese-based Sarawak United People's Party, all political factions in Sarawak and North Borneo favored joining "Malaysia." The British government appointed a five-member commission of inquiry (the Cobbold Commission) to ascertain the views of the peoples of Sarawak and North Borneo regarding the proposed Federation of Malaysia, and the findings revealed that the majority of the inhabitants were in favor. Owing to protests by Indonesia and the Philippines to the formation of "Malaysia," the United Nations in August 1963 sent a ten-member delegation to ascertain the opinion of the people of Sarawak and North Borneo on the issue. This UN Commission confirmed that the majority of their populations wished Sarawak and North Borneo to gain independence from Britain by joining "Malaysia." Notwithstanding the vociferous opposition by Indonesia and the claims by the Philippines to North Borneo, Sarawak and North Borneo (thereafter known as Sabah), together with Singapore, joined the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963.

President Sukarno (t. 1947–1967) of Indonesia labeled "Malaysia" a neocolony of Britain and launched his *Konfrontasi*, or "Crush Malaysia" campaign. Diosdado Macapagal (t. 1961–1965) of the Philippines stepped up his claims to Sabah, proclaiming that the sultanate of Sulu, which furnished the concession of 1877, was part of the Philippines. Cross-border incursions by the Indonesian army into Sarawak were pushed back, and Sukarno's fall from grace in 1965 ended *Konfrontasi*. In the Philippines the new presidency of Ferdinand Marcos (t. 1965–1986), though not formally ending the "Sabah Claim," placed the issue in abeyance.

Within Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah have gained tremendously, particularly in safeguarding the interests and welfare of the various indigenous ethnic minorities. The *bumiputera* policy of affirmative action accorded the indigenous Malays of Peninsular Malaysia has been extended to the natives of Sabah and Sarawak, who have since benefited in the economy and in education. The discovery in the 1970s of offshore oil fields and natural gas off the coast of Bintulu, Sarawak, and the lucrative timber extraction industry of Sabah remain important foreign exchange earners for both of these East Malaysian states. Tourism, especially ecotourism, is increasingly developing as an attractive source of revenue for these thickly rain forest-clad territories with exotic flora and fauna.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Anglo-Brunei Relations (Nineteenth Century to 1980s); Borneo; British North Borneo Chartered Company (1881–1946); Brooke, James, and Sarawak; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Jungle/Forest Products; Konfrontasi ("Crush Malaysia" Campaign); Labuan (1847); Marine/Sea Products; Sabah Claim

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SARAWAK MUSEUM

Renowned Center of Bornean Studies

The oldest and one of the foremost museums in contemporary Southeast Asia, the Sarawak Museum is more than a center for showcasing the historical and sociocultural artifacts of Sarawak and Borneo; it also thrives as a scholarly institution for research and development of Bornean-wide studies. Established in Kuching in 1870, the original building, which hints of French-inspired architectural design, remains pristine despite its age; it is complemented by a modern complex linked by a crossroad bridge.

The inspiration for the establishment of a museum came from Rajah Charles Brooke (r. 1868–1917), the second white rajah of Sarawak, who felt that the collection of flora and fauna originating from the research undertaken in Sarawak by the English naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913) should be for public consumption. Wallace spent a sojourn during the 1860s as a guest of the first Rajah Brooke; he independently developed a theory of evolution and published his findings in *Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection* (1870).

Following upon Wallace's collection, materials for the museum gradually came in from Brooke officers serving in the outstations. Amateur botanists, archaeologists, social anthropolo-

gists, mineralogists, and ornithologists, not to mention naturalists, were numbered among European Brooke officers who spent their leisure time exploring their domain. In addition, Rajah Charles insisted that his officers report on anything of interest that happened in their district. The *Sarawak Gazette* (SG 1870), apart from carrying official proclamations, decrees (styled as "Orders") and regulations, and general goings-on throughout the land, featured articles contributed by Brooke officers recounting bizarre tales, and botanical, faunal, and natural wonders. Others contributed treatises on ethnohistory of the many ethnic communities.

The museum staff managed not only the *Sarawak Gazette* but also the *Sarawak Government Gazette* (SGG 1909) and the scholarly *Sarawak Museum Journal* (SMJ 1911). The editorial committee of all three publications relied heavily on museum personnel. All official matters relating to the business of government were the responsibility of SGG, allowing SG to play the role of a semiofficial "newspaper." SMJ was and continues to be a scholarly journal for the dissemination of research findings in the natural sciences, humanities, and social sciences. Archaeology, history, anthropology (social, cultural), geology, zoology, and botany are the forte of SMJ.

The museum headed archaeological works in Niah and Santubong during the 1950s and 1960s. Also, much data on ethnohistory have been recorded, and items of material culture of various ethnic groups have been collected for research and exhibition. The archive section of the museum furnishes researchers and students with documents dating back to the mid-nineteenth century and earlier. The museum library has a fairly good collection of secondary source materials relating specifically to Sarawak and to Borneo in general.

Energetic directors such as E. Banks, Tom Harrisson, Benedict Sandin, and others built on the work initially envisioned by Rajah Charles of creating a museum-cum-institution of Bornean studies.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Burma Research Society (1909); Société des Missions Étrangères (MEP); Straits/Malayan/Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (MBRAS); Wallace Line

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SAREKAT ISLAM (1912)**Mass Muslim Nationalist Organization**

Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Union) was the first large nationalist organization in Indonesia. Sarekat Islam drew on a wide range of grievances against colonial rule to draw an unprecedentedly large following, especially in Java. It was riven, however, by personal conflicts, disagreements over strategy, and a growing conflict between Islamists and leftists. After 1923 the party became a small but durable advocate of an Islamic state.

In 1911, Haji Samanhudi (1868–1956) established the Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI, Islamic Traders' Union) as a cooperative of Javanese batik traders hostile to Chinese traders in the sector in Central Java. The SDI soon spread, changed its name to Sarekat Islam in 1912, and came under the charismatic leadership of Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882–1934), becoming the focus for a wide range of grievances, especially in Java. The organization attracted Indonesians who felt that their way to social advancement was blocked by Europeans and Chinese. It attracted Muslims unhappy with Christian rule. It attracted peasants, who saw in it a potential ally against oppressive local power structures. Its appeal was suffused with a strong messianic element. Many members saw Tjokroaminoto as a future “just king,” or *ratu adil*.

Sarekat Islam's ill-defined opposition to the social order won it a large membership, perhaps half a million (it claimed 2 million in 1919), but it was largely without effective central coordination. Local branches pursued their own agendas, sometimes coming to resemble secret societies, sometimes directly attacking local Chinese traders, sometimes forming something close to a shadow administration in the countryside. The Semarang branch in Central Java came under the influence of the socialist Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV), and in West Java some activists established a secret revolutionary branch called “Afdeeling B” (“B Section”). In 1913 the colonial authorities had given legal recognition to these SI branches,

thus sparing the central organization legal responsibility for their activities but further limiting its control over them.

With the establishment of the partly elected *Volksraad* (People's Council) in 1918, Sarekat Islam began to fall apart over the issue of cooperation. Radicals wanted to boycott colonial institutions and prepare an anticolonial uprising, but others feared that colonial police repression and general bureaucratic intimidation would destroy the organization's mass base if it took a radical path. The murder of a Dutch official in Tolitoli (northern Sulawesi) and the Dutch discovery of Afdeeling B activities in West Java led to restrictions on SI activities and thus sharpened the divisions over strategy. Tjokroaminoto was jailed in 1921.

At the same time, Sarekat Islam began to polarize between the leftists of the ISDV and Islamists led especially by Haji Agus Salim (1884–1954). In 1920 the ISDV became the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) and, following Leninist doctrine, denounced Pan-Islam. A bitter public battle followed that culminated in the SI party congress decision in October 1921 to impose party discipline, thus prohibiting SI members from holding membership in any other party, such as the PKI. Because of the independent status of local branches, this struggle was repeated at branch level, with individual branches following the PKI as “Red SI” or the Islamists as “White SI.” In February 1923, Tjokroaminoto formally transformed the Central SI into the Partai Sarekat Islam, absorbing the White SI branches and creating new local branches to challenge the Red SI branches (which soon renamed themselves Sarekat Rakjat [People's Unions]). A large part of Sarekat Islam's former constituency and many of its leaders, however, went over to the PKI. Under Salim's influence, the Partai SI now adopted a policy of noncooperation with the colonial authorities, withdrawing from the *Volksraad* and in 1929 even expelling members of the Muhammadiyah because their organization accepted Dutch subsidies for its schools. After Tjokroaminoto's death in 1934, however, Salim was expelled from the party, which came under the more radical leadership of Tjokroaminoto's brother, Abikoeso Tjokrosoejoso (b. 1895).

These conflicts, together with increased Dutch repression, sharply reduced the Partai

SI's public support. Whereas both the modernist Muhammadiyah and the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama avoided direct politics and focused instead on building an Islamic society in Indonesia, the doctrinally modernist Partai SI increasingly positioned itself as the main political advocate of the primacy of Islam. Even after it located itself within the nationalist movement in 1929 by taking the name Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), it remained a staunch opponent of the efforts of Sukarno (1901–1970) to promote nationalist unity at the expense of Islamic purity.

Banned by the Dutch in 1940, the PSII re-emerged in 1947 as a breakaway from the Masjumi. It strongly advocated an Islamic state but did poorly in the 1955 elections, winning only 2.9 percent of the vote. In 1973 it was forced to merge into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. The Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia, led by a great-grandson of Tjokroaminoto, won a single seat in Indonesia's 1999 elections.

Sarekat Islam's initial success indicated the deep veins of discontent that existed within colonial Indonesian society. The diversity of that discontent, however, left the organization with no clear path of action. The choice of radical Islamism gave it an enduring but limited role in twentieth-century politics.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Agus Salim, Haji (1884–1954); Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi) (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations); Muhammadiyah; Nahdatul Ulama; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); *Ratu Adil* (Righteous King/Prince); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Tjokroaminoto, Haji Oemar Said (1882–1934); *Vólksraad* (People's Council) (1918–1942)

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SAVU (SABU)

The island of Savu (Sabu; in Savunese: Rai Hawu) is located between the larger islands of Sumba and Timor. In 2000, Savu, including the offshore islet of Rajjua, had a population of just under 65,000. Savu is a dry island with limited water. The population's main sources of subsistence are sorghum, maize, and mung bean, with a heavy dependence on the tapping of lontar palm. Rice can be grown in only a few areas on the island. In recent years, the Savunese have begun cultivating seaweed for export.

Savunese settlements are to be found in east Sumba around Melolo, in Kupang on Timor, and in Ende on Flores. The population of the tiny island of Ndao, off the western coast of Roti, originated from Savu and speaks a language closely related to Savunese.

Savunese is an Austronesian language that is classified as part of the Bima-Sumba subgroup of Central Malayo-Polynesian languages. Within this group, Savunese appears to be more closely related to the languages of Bima and of Manggarai than the languages of Sumba.

The Savunese maintain a complex oral history of their migrations and of ritual and social developments on the island, which is reliant on elaborate genealogical knowledge. The Portuguese had contact with the island before 1600 and may have carried out some mission activities. The first recorded Dutch contact with the island was in 1648. Initially the Savunese resisted Dutch incursions, but by 1756 the island's rulers had signed a treaty with the Dutch East India Company (VOC). This treaty recognized five domains on the main island: Seba, Menia, Dimu, Liae, and Mehara. Menia was

eventually conquered and incorporated within Seba, leaving four domains plus Raijua. To this day, these domains preserve their local ritual identity, although they are now incorporated into three *kecamatan*: Sabu Timur, Sabu Barat, and Raijua within the *kabupaten* of Kupang.

Seba, with its wide harbor, provided favored access to the island for the Dutch. Captain James Cook (1728–1779), who visited Savu in the *Endeavour* in 1770, encountered a Dutch company officer, originally from Saxony, who was stationed in Seba. After the collapse of the company at the end of the eighteenth century, official relations with Savu diminished, and only in the second half of the nineteenth century did the colonial officials manage to settle a shipwrecked Dane, stranded in Kupang, as *posthouder* at Seba.

Savu's relative isolation left it vulnerable to devastating epidemics in the nineteenth century, when closer contact was reestablished. In 1869, Savu is reported to have lost a substantial portion of its population to a severe smallpox epidemic. Then came a cholera epidemic in 1874 and another outbreak of smallpox in 1888. Conversion to Christianity and the migration of Savunese converts to Sumba followed on these epidemic catastrophes. Prior to these migrations only Savunese men had left the island, mainly on a seasonal basis, to serve as armed militia for the Dutch company and, later, the Dutch colonial service.

Savu is notable for the maintenance of its traditional culture. Each domain (*rai*) has its own indigenous priesthood (*mone ama*), who as a group oversee a varied sequence of ceremonies according to a complex lunar calendar. The ceremonial year is divided into periods of sound and silence, associated with phases of the agricultural cycle. Each priesthood group is structured somewhat differently. In Seba, the two highest-ranked priests are the *Deo Rai*, "Lord of the Earth," and *Apu Lodo*, "Descendant of the Sun." The *Deo Rai* in his person and by his required celibacy—generally an elderly figure is selected for this office—epitomizes the sacredness of the earth. Participants in all ceremonies come from the specifically designated localized male origin groups (*udu*) distributed in discrete villages (*rae*).

Savunese recognize a system of bilineal descent. In addition to localized male origin groups, Savu has an islandwide female moiety system. All women belong to one of these moi-

eties: *hubi ae*, "the greater blossom," or *hubi iki*, "the lesser blossom." These "Blossoms" are divided into a number of female origin groups called "seeds" (*wini*). Membership in these women's groups is publicly displayed in the particular coloring and designs of the traditional *ikat* cloths that women wear at ceremonies.

Savu's indigenous ceremonies are not performed outside of the island, because they are specific to places in each domain. Most Savunese are now Christian, and many Savunese regularly migrate to other islands in search of a livelihood. Education has been an important factor in this emigration. Yet local traditions exert a strong hold on most Savunese and continue to define identities and allegiances, as well as the need to return to the island.

JAMES J. FOX

See also Diseases and Epidemics; East Indonesian Ethnic Groups; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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SAYA (HSAYA) SAN REBELLION (1930–1931)

See General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) (1920); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia

SĔJARAH MĔLAYU (MALAY ANNALS)

"History of the Malays"

SĔjarah MĔlayu, literally "History of the Malays," is the modern name for the most fas-

cinating piece of Malay historical writing, generally translated into English as “Malay Annals.” The original title of the book is actually *Sulalat-us-Salatin* or the *Pedigree of the Kings*. Originating from a *hikayat Melayu* (Malay history) believed to have been compiled since the days of the Melaka sultanate in the fifteenth century, the rewriting of the book was officially and ceremoniously decreed by Raja Di Hilir or Raja Bungsu, later Sultan Abdullah Mughayah Syah of Johor, in May 1612. The editorship of the revised version, as indicated in the preface of some manuscripts, is generally ascribed to the Bendahara Tun Muhammad, better known as Tun Seri Lanang. It is not precisely known whether the rewriting was completed in Johor or in Pasai, where the sultan, Raja Di Hilir, and Tun Seri Lanang were prisoners of Aceh from 1613 to 1615.

There are at present no fewer than thirty-two versions of the *Sĕjarah Mĕlayu*, including the romanized form edited and transliterated by modern scholars. Nearly all extant manuscripts are copies made in the nineteenth century. The Raja Bungsu edition—that is, Raffles MS 18—is perhaps nearest to the original. The *Sĕjarah Mĕlayu* has been translated into many languages and is the main indigenous source for the Melaka sultanate and sixteenth-century Johor. Although containing some questionable statements, its contents are generally historically reliable and can be corroborated by other sources, both Chinese and Portuguese. Together with the *Undang-Undang Melayu* (Malay Law) and *Undang-Undang Laut Melaka* (Maritime Law of Melaka), the *Sĕjarah Mĕlayu* contains rich information about social, cultural, and political aspects of Melaka and the Malays in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Aceh (Acheh); Johor-Riau Empire; Malays; Melaka; *Undang-Undang Laut* (Melaka Maritime Laws/Code)

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SEMAOEN (SEMAUN) (1899–1971)

Leftist Leader and Writer

Indonesian leftist political activist, journalist, and writer Semaoen hailed from Gununggangsir, East Java, coming from a family of railway workers. He attended the elementary schools of *Sekolah Angka Loro* and *Sekolah Angka Satu*, which catered to the native population. At the age of thirteen Semaoen started work for a state train company, *Staatsspoor*, alongside his father.

After one aimless year he joined the first mass-based nationalist group of Sarekat Islam (SI) in Surabaya, where he was appointed secretary. After 1915, Semaoen embarked on the study of Marxism and communism. He also became involved in radical labor movements after associating with H. J. F. M. Sneevliet, the founder of *Indische Social Democratische Vereeniging* (ISDV). Semaoen established close contacts with the train worker union of *Vereeniging voor Spoor en Tramweg Personeel* (VSTP). He was deeply influenced by Sneevliet, from whom he learned at a very early age the skills and knowledge necessary for becoming a journalist and a prominent radical labor union leader.

The young Semaoen then moved to Semarang, where he was elected chairman of the local branch SI in 1917. He was editor of *Sinar Djawa* and *Sinar Hindia*, official newspapers of Sarekat Islam Semarang, while he still retained leading positions at VSTP and ISDV. He headed the radical and Marxist-oriented faction within SI. ISDV later changed its name to *Perserikatan Komunis Hindia* in May 1920 and then to *Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI) in 1924, with Semaoen as chairman. Despite opposition from some SI members, Semaoen was also made chairman of the labor organization *Persatuan Perkumpulan Kaum Buruh* in 1920 and a member of the Inter-

national Communist Trade Union founded in 1921. Meanwhile, his career in SI came to end in 1921, when party discipline was invoked to eliminate members with double membership, aimed particularly at those SI members who were also members of PKI. Semaoen and other communist cadres parted with Tjokroaminoto's SI.

After that, Semaoen concentrated his activity among the communist groups, where he published a newspaper called *Pandu Merah*. In 1923, Semaoen left Indonesia for exile in Europe after leading a strike by train workers. He visited Moscow to attend the fifth congress of the Comintern in 1924 and then The Netherlands. In The Netherlands he made contact with radical and communist groups and encouraged the organization of Indonesian students in The Netherlands, *Perhimpunan Indonesia*, to adopt a more radical direction.

After concluding several agreements with Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980) as to future strategy for an independent Indonesia, Semaoen spent most of his life in Russia, where he lived after 1926. He was in Russia during World War II (1939–1945) and returned to Indonesia only in 1956. He held some important posts during the Soekarno (Sukarno) era (1945–1967), and lectured at the Padjadjaran University, Bandung. His novel *Hikajat Kadiroen*, published as a serial in *Sinar Hindia* from 5 May to 22 September 1920, displays his talent as a writer and social critic.

BAMBANG PURWANTO

See also Comintern; Communism; Labor and Labor Unions in Southeast Asia; Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Sarekat Islam (1912); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Tjokroaminoto, Haji Oemar Said (1882–1934)

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SENI PRAMOJ, M. R. (1905–1997) Lawyer, Diplomat, and Politician

M. R. Seni Pramoj was a renowned lawyer whose legal career was overshadowed by his roles in politics, especially during the Pacific War (1941–1945), when he founded the Free Thai Movement in the United States to fight against the Japanese occupation of Thailand. Subsequently, he was made the postwar prime minister. He became one of the key members of the proroyalist Democrat political party, competing with the influential wing of the People's Party under Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983), who received popular support from the Free Thai Movement. The struggle was fierce and bitter, but in the end both groups lost to the army in the Coup of 1948.

Seni was born on 20 May 1905 in Bangkok into a junior branch of the royal family. His father, Prince Khamrob, was former director-general of the police department under the absolutist regime. He received his secondary education from Suan Kularb College and later studied at Trent College in England. He then went to Worcester College, Oxford, for another four years, from 1925 to 1929, graduating with first-class honors. During this time he also studied for the bar at the Gray's Inn, where he earned fame by gaining the bar prize of 300 guineas. After returning to Thailand, Seni began to work in the ministry of justice and soon passed the bar exam to be a Thai barrister-at-law. In 1938, Seni was appointed a judge of the Court of Appeal at the age of thirty-two. He also was a lecturer in a law school.

In 1940 he was appointed minister plenipotentiary to the United States. When he received the Thai declaration of war against the United

States after Japanese troops invaded Thailand in December 1941, he refused to deliver it and founded the Free Thai Movement in the United States. As the postwar premier (t. 1945–1946), Seni accomplished the task of negotiations with the victorious powers, preventing them from punishing Thailand as a belligerent nation. After that, Seni resigned to allow an elected government to rule the country. At that time, without Plaek Phibunsongkhram (1897–1964) active in politics, the political scene was left to Pridi and his allies.

In the postwar liberal political atmosphere, Seni then joined with Khuang Aphaiwong (1902–1968) in establishing the Kaona (Advanced) Party, which grew to be a full-fledged political party in 1948 with the new name Prachatiwat (Democrat). Khuang became the prime minister in 1946, and Seni the foreign minister. Their government, however, lost in a vote of no-confidence a few months later. The political tide turned in favor of Seni and Khuang when the young King Ananda Mahidol (r. 1935–1946) was shot dead soon after his arrival from Europe on 9 May 1946. The Democrat Party attacked Pridi and his party on this issue and became an effective opposition party in the National Assembly (Parliament). The political situation was intense and volatile, especially when the Democrat Party launched the opening of a no-confidence vote on the Thamrong-Pridi government in October 1948. The economic problems and dissatisfaction among the military caused by their discredited position in postwar politics led the army to stage a coup on 8 November 1948. Although Seni and the Democrat Party lent support and cooperation to the Coup Group, they too were soon expelled from sharing power and government with the army.

During the 1950s, Seni returned to his legal career, lecturing in law and writing his political column in the newspaper. Following the death of Khuang in 1968, Seni became the leader of the Democrat Party for the general election of 1969. Under the military-dominated government, the Democrat Party again played the role of opposition. Seni was, however, ineffective on the opposition bench. Then came the student revolt in 1973, and the Democrat was left the political party that had been in existence the longest. Unsurprisingly, Seni became the prime minister again in 1975–1976, when the Democrats won the largest number of seats in the

National Assembly. Quickly Seni's political career ended in tragedy. After a massacre of student demonstrators by military-backed paramilitary forces on 6 October 1976, the military staged a coup, removing Seni from power.

Seni was also well-known for his novel ideas on the origin of the Thai constitution, which, he contested, was first invented by King Ramkhamhaeng (Rama Kamhaeng) of the kingdom of Sukhothai in 1283. He also translated traditional Thai poetry into English. Seni died in 1997, at the age of ninety-two.

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also Free Thai Movement; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Khuang Aphaiwong (1902–1968); Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983); Rama Kamhaeng (r. 1279–1298); Student Revolt (October 1973) (Thailand)

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SERVICES RECONNAISSANCE DEPARTMENT (SRD)

Laying the Groundwork

The Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD) was an Australian special operations unit that helped lay the groundwork for the Australian reoccupation of northwest Borneo (Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo/Sabah) during the Pacific War (1941–1945). SRD activities contributed to the success of the Australian amphibious landings (OBOE 6 operations) at Brunei Bay and Labuan in June 1945.

SRD was an Australian outfit directly responsible to General Sir Thomas Albert Blamey, commander-in-chief of the Australian Military Forces (AMF) based at Allied Land Headquarters in Melbourne. In fact, SRD was a cover name for Special Operations Australia (SOA), which had moved out of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB). Lieutenant Colonel P. J. F. Chapman-Walker commanded SRD, whose members were mainly Australians and New Zealanders with a few British officers.

SRD implemented a series of long-term field operations code-named AGAS (lit. “sand-fly”) and SEMUT (lit. “ant”) in North Borneo and Sarawak, respectively. In March 1945, SRD units were parachuted behind enemy lines in the Upper Baram and Trusan valleys in Sarawak and at Labuk Bay in North Borneo. SRD operations focused on the gathering of intelligence and organizing the local inhabitants, including training and arming them, into resistance groups to wage guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. SRD operations to a considerable extent paved the way for the invasion in the Brunei Bay–Labuan Island area in mid-1945.

SRD long-term field parties succeeded in establishing a semblance of prewar administration over vast areas that came under their de facto authority. Consequently it facilitated the establishment of military administration that was undertaken initially by the British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit (BBCAU), followed by the British Military Administration (British Borneo) or BMA (BB). But of particular importance was the fact that this SRD-sanctioned native administrative structure minimized civil disorder and deterred open ethnic clashes prior to the establishment of stable government.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; Force 136

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SEXUAL PRACTICES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In the sixteenth century, European explorers, religious missionaries, and administrators arrived in the various countries of Southeast Asia with the prevailing ideology that all sexual practices were to be avoided unless they occurred within monogamous marriage for purposes of procreation. This worldview brought the Westerner into conflict with indigenous peoples in the countries throughout the region, in particular in relation to aspects of sexual practice that the Europeans labeled adultery, fornication, prostitution, polygamy, the “sin against nature,” and the various penis pin devices (named *sagra* or *palang*, among others) common in some areas.

Throughout the Southeast Asian region, there was no one common set of rules in relation to sexual practice. Instead, practices tended to be influenced by the different religious ideologies that permeated the areas concerned. There is, however, one commonality that can be established. Before the arrival of Christianity, Sinic, Indic, and Muslim patriarchal traditions tended to impose constraints on sexual practices, especially where women were concerned, whereas those areas in the region that followed the more matrilineally based Animist traditions of the ancestors had few if any restrictions.

This also applied to the literature of the region. Spanish friars in the Philippines burned erotic and explicitly sexual texts. Sensuality was purged from Malay and Thai sources; remaining Balinese texts construct “primarily a world of desire and sensuality” (Creese 2000: 4; Vickers 1986).

There are few, if any, Animist societies throughout peninsular or island Southeast Asia today that have not been directly influenced by a patriarchally based religion or philosophy. Buddhism and Confucianism both were influential in Vietnam before a small band of erstwhile Catholics added their input in the sixteenth century. Although never colonized by Asian or European powers, Thailand was influenced by Hinduism and Buddhism. Islam has increasingly affected the Malay Peninsula and archipelagic Southeast Asia—especially including the greater part of Indonesia. In Bali there is a mixture of religious traditions, with Hinduism and mystical forms of Islam being the

dominant influences. In the Philippines there is evidence that Animist communities borrowed liberally from Indic ideas before Islam made its way from Borneo to Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Hispanic Catholicism colonized the minds and bodies of the rest of the Philippine population in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. East Timor has also been greatly influenced by Catholicism introduced by the Portuguese in the early part of the sixteenth century.

In Southeast Asian communities that followed matrilineal Animist traditions, there was no reason to control women's bodies. Indeed in Minangkabau (Sumatra), where women owned and inherited property, there was no institution of marriage, and throughout their lives men lived in the maternal home with their mother and sisters. This had the added implication that men were financially responsible to the maternal household and psychologically attached to the children of their sisters—rather than their own biological offspring.

While one community at least found no need for marriage, other communities, in which there was a bilateral system of inheritance (that is, where the offspring inherited equally from both parents with no primogeniture), did have the institution of marriage. But that was without the associated control of women's bodies that was consistent with patrilineally based societies. In the non-Muslim Philippine context, for example, virginity was neither valued nor esteemed. Indeed, in 1582, the Spanish conqueror and settler Loarca observed that “the women are extremely lewd, and even encourage their own daughters to a life of unchastity; so that there is nothing so vile for the latter that they cannot do it before their mothers, since they incur no punishment” (Loarca 1582: 118). In making sure that a female's hymen was no barrier to her natural instinct to be sexually satisfied, in some places a form of folk surgery was performed to break the hymen of relatively young girls. As Morga explains, there were men “whose occupation it was to brake [*sic*] in or devirginize the maidens, and they were held in regard and paid for their services” (Morga 1889: 290).

This autonomy relating to sex before marriage spilled over into extramarital sexual relationships—which the Christian commentators pejoratively labeled “prostitution” or “adultery.”

In Animist societies, where there was a bilateral system of inheritance, extramarital sexual encounters were unremarkable events for the indigenes, but they caused consternation for the leaders of various European expeditions. In Cebu in 1521, Magellan complained to a local chieftain that the Europeans “could not have intercourse with their [indigenous] women without committing a very great sin” (Pigafetta in Blair and Robertson 1973, 33: 144–145). Forty-four years later, Legazpi was even more forceful in his protestations about sexual intercourse between Spanish soldiers and Cebuano women. Legazpi's chronicler put the Spanish perspective well by pejoratively labeling as the “evil” of “prostitution” an activity that was for the Cebuano a matter of good manners and hospitality (unnamed military officer, in *ibid.*: vol. 2, 138). Indeed, that which the Europeans labeled “adultery” had little negative baggage throughout Animist Southeast Asia. In pre-Christian Luzon, Plasencia noted in 1589 that a husband was neither offended nor incensed that his wife had had a sexual relationship with another man, adding that neither the adulterous male nor the female involved was in any way disgraced (Plasencia 1589: 181–182).

In regions where sexual practices were restrictive, especially in relation to women—places where the underlying conceptual foundation was patriarchal—the European explorers discovered a high level of control over unmarried women and wives as well as polygamy (multiple wives) and concubinage. In attempting to eliminate this form of “adultery” from indigenous societies, the Christian Europeans insisted that the first wife was the only legitimate wife that a man could have, and that the “superfluous wives” or concubines must be set aside. However, in the Animist Philippines the Spaniards also encountered various forms of polyandry (plurality of husbands). The Jesuit priest Chirino referred to polyandry when he stated that “toward Dapitan, it was the custom for Bissayan women to marry two husbands” (Chirino in Blair and Robertson 1973, 12: 293). In the Philippine archipelago, especially among poorer rural people, a set of circumstances based on economic considerations again reflected a polyandrous relationship whereby, if one man could not afford the bride-price, two pooled their resources and shared one woman (Christie 1909: 57).

In different areas in the region, the practice of penile folk surgery was common. Penis decorations included bells that were not always inserted under the penile skin (Java); small, solid balls, pellets, or spheres (Siam/Thailand); and small, solid nonspherical objects (Sumatra) that were inserted beneath the skin. In addition, in the Visayas, southern Philippines, Borneo, and Sulawesi, pins or bars were inserted crosswise through the penis, with either decorations on the ends of the bar or pin or with the pin holding a ring or rowel-shaped object around the penis (Brown, Edwards, and Moore 1988: 1–4).

In the early sources that relate to the Philippines, Pigafetta suggests that the insertion of the *sagra*, or penis pin, was a significant moment in the life cycle of a young Visayan boy (Pigafetta 1521; Blair and Robertson 1973, 33: 170–173). However, other sources note that the males were older when the insertion occurred, suggesting “puberty, participation in head hunting, or adulthood” as the age or occasion for installation (Brown, Edwards, and Moore 1988: 4).

The reasons for the use of penis decorations differed from region to region. In Thailand it was a status symbol. However, in the Visayas the use of the *sagra* was not limited to elite male personages. Instead “every man and man-child among them” wore one of these devices (Pretty 1904, XI: 332–333). Nevertheless, observers seldom gave men any agency in regard to the insertion and use of penile devices. Instead, in an attempt to explain what Loarca termed this “abominable custom” (Loarca in Blair and Robertson 1973, 5: 117), the writers tended to place the “blame” squarely in the women’s court, from Pigafetta’s mild “they say that their women wish it so” (Pigafetta in Blair and Robertson 1973, 33: 170–173), to Morga’s explanation that “the natives of the Pintados Islands, especially the women, are vicious and sensual, and their wickedness has devised lewd ways of intercourse between men and women. . . . With this device, they have intercourse with women, and for long after copulation they are unable to withdraw” (Morga 1889: 289–290).

Anal sex between men and women and what we today term homosexual practices were also found throughout the region by the European explorers. Reports of these practices were always negatively charged with the label “unnatural vice” (sodomy)—which was (within Catholicism) considered the worst of all the

sins of lust because it was thought to be an act against the ordinance of nature. Little is known about indigenous attitudes toward anal sex and same-sex practices. In 1598 the second archbishop of Manila, Ignacio de Santibáñez, in a letter to Philip II, suggested that the practice of sodomy was widespread among both men and women, although (like adultery) it was not considered worthy of rebuke or censure. Blaming the Chinese for introducing Filipinos to the practice, Santibáñez wrote to his king, Philip II, in 1598 that “the sin of Sodom is widespread among them [the Chinese], and they have infected the natives with it, both men and women, for since the latter are a poor-spirited people who follow the line of least resistance, the Chinese make use of them for their corrupt pleasures; this curse though extensive attracts little public notice” (Santibáñez to Philip II, Manila, 24 June 1598, in Blair and Robertson 1973, 7: 141–152).

Transvestism, or cross-dressing, was another custom that early chroniclers tended to associate with what they called perverse sexual practices. Typical of the descriptions of these men—*bissu* in South Sulawesi and *asog* in the Visayas—was that they were men who wore their hair long, dressed like women, and performed religious rituals. As one commentator put it, they “ordinarily act like prudes, and are so effeminate that one who does not know them would believe they are women” (Quirino and Garcia 1958: 430). However, in relation to sexual practices, there seems to be a great difference between areas where women were, in the main, the religious facilitators (Visayas) and other places where the men who dressed like women had exclusive access to the priestly role. On the western coast of South Sulawesi, where the *bissu* were considered priests to the king, they—as Antonio de Paiva, a Portuguese observer, commented in 1545—“marry, and have sex only with other men because contact with a woman in thought or deed would lead to the destruction of their religion” (cited in Andaya 2000: 10). In the Philippines, however, no such misogynistic thinking prevailed, and the sexual practices of the transvestites there seemed to span the spectrum of possibilities from celibacy to marriage to women or to what we today term homosexuality (Brewer 2001: 229–254).

A significant characteristic of the power imbalance that existed between colonizer and col-

onized was that patriarchal traditions—including those of the Europeans—attempted to impose their own restrictive sexual practices onto the societies with which they came into contact. With the introduction of restrictive sexual practices, the relative gender symmetry of some indigenous societies was also disrupted, inserting in its place the underlying basic assumption that women were “naturally” different from and inferior to men. Therefore, this “biological given” became the foundation on which all other societal relationships were built, and the accompanying homogenized restrictive sexual practices had a deleterious impact on the self-esteem and self-perception particularly of women.

CAROLYN BREWER

See also Bali; Minangkabau; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Pre-Hispanic Philippines; Sulawesi (Celebes); Women in Southeast Asia

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SHAMSUDDIN AL-SUMATRANI (d. 1630)

Distinguished Sufi Theologian

Sharing Hamzah Fansuri's religious convictions of the *Wahdat al-Wujud* ("Unity of Being") of Wujudiyah mysticism, Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani was better adept in deflecting opposition to the extent that he attained the confidence and patronage of Aceh's greatest ruler, Sultan Iskandar Muda (Mahkota Alam) (r. 1607–1636). In the royal court Shamsuddin flourished as the preeminent Islamic scholar.

Little is known of his background, such as his birth date and place. He was also addressed as Shamsuddin bin Abdullah al-Sumatrani as well as Shamsuddin of Pasai, the latter indicating perhaps his hometown. Pasai, located on the eastern coast of Sumatra, was one of the earliest city-ports in Southeast Asia to embrace Islam, in 1295. Emphasizing his Sumatran and Pasai roots, it is probable that he was an Acehnese. Shamsuddin studied with the Javanese teacher Pangeran Bonang and was also influenced by Fadl Allah al-Burhanpuri of Gujerat. But there was no indication, despite his convergence of religious thoughts, that he was ever a student of Hamzah or his contemporary.

Shamsuddin's core ideas are summarized as follows. "Its outstanding features are the doctrines of unity . . . the Unity of Existence and the Perfect Man. . . . [His thoughts] represent the more speculative type [of mysticism], centering around the theory of existence equally . . . [and] it stands midway between the Indian and Javanese forms" (Van Nieuwenhuijze 1945: 236, 239). He asserted that "only Being is real; man, a puppet in God's shadow-play, is but appearance, an image of the attributes of Allah." Therefore, "[to] know one's self is the way to perfect knowledge" (Winstedt 1991: 100).

Capitalizing on royal patronage, Shamsuddin expounded his and Hamzah's brand of Wujudiyah mysticism. In his lifetime, he succeeded in defending *Wahdat al-Wujud* ("Unity of Being") against all opposition. He was fluent in both Malay and Arabic, and more than eighteen works have been attributed to Shamsuddin. However, only a few survived the flames when he, together with Hamzah, was violently denounced as heretical by the Indo-Arab Sufi Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1658) after the death of Sultan Iskandar Muda. The *Mir'at al-Mu'minin* (*Mirror of the Muslims*), dated 1601 in Malay and Sundanese, and a fragment of the *Mir'at al-Muhakkikin* survived. The first section of the latter is entitled "Nur al-daka'ik" ("Light from All Ages"). *Mir'at al-Muhakkikin* contains excerpts from *Dikr da'ira qab qausain au adna*, *Sirr al 'arifin*, and *Mir'al al-Kulub*, apparently lost works of Shamsuddin. His commentaries on Hamzah's poems are *Sharh Ruba'i Hamzah al-Fansuri*.

Shamsuddin was a distinguished Sufi theologian particularly influential within the Acehnese court and throughout the Malay Archipelago. He died in 1630. Notwithstanding criticism of his teachings and the burning of his works, his contribution to Islamic mysticism and Malay literature was undisputed.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Aceh (Acheh); Hamzah Fansuri; Islam in Southeast Asia; Nuruddin al-Raniri (d. 1658)

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SHAN NATIONALISM

Shan nationalism, the belief that the Shan people of Myanmar (Burma) should have their own political autonomy, and perhaps an independent state, evolved from the mid-1950s, when a number of students from the Shan states organized cultural associations at Yangon (Rangoon) and Mandalay universities. The

Shan, who probably number about 4 million out of Myanmar's approximately 50 million population, represent little more than half of the people who live in the Shan state (Smith 1999: 30). The Shan state borders China, Laos, and Thailand in the northeast of Myanmar. Ethnographers and linguists link the Shan together with the Thai, Lao, and Assamese populations of southern China, northern Southeast Asia, and the eastern Indian region to form the T'ai group. The Shan language uses the Burmese alphabet, but the spoken language is very similar to spoken Thai. The Shan are overwhelmingly Theravada Buddhists, as are most of the other population groups in the region.

Prior to the arrival of European colonialism in Asia, petty kings and princes known as *sawbwas* governed the Shan. The sawbwas, whose powers were similar to those of other monarchs in the region, owed allegiance to whoever among the major monarchies in the region could claim sway to them. Thus they might owe allegiance to the Burmese kings, the northern Thai princes, the Thai kings, or perhaps the Chinese emperors. Marriage alliances were often formed between the courts of the sawbwas and the larger kingdoms that sought to exert tributary relations with them. As the power of the larger monarchies waxed and waned, the sawbwas sought to exert their independence.

However, when the British and French came to dominate the region, and the Thai monarchy under King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868–1910) began to dominate northern Thailand from the 1880s onward, relations between the sawbwas and the state began to change. The British, who had conquered the Shan states quickly following the annexation of northern Myanmar to the Indian empire, determined that they would maintain the authority of the sawbwas. A system of indirect rule ensured that as long as the individual sawbwas obeyed the instructions of the British superintendents who were appointed to advise them, they would remain in power. In 1931 the British recognized seventeen sawbwas and nineteen lesser rulers (*myosas* and *ngwekunhmus*, who often claimed the title of *sawbwa*) in the Shan states. The petty kingdoms varied in population at that time from a small community of 2,700 to large settlements of 242,000. The effect of British rule was to isolate the Shan states from the changes taking

place in the rest of Myanmar, where Burmese nationalism was growing apace, by establishing a different form of rule in the Shan states. Moreover, the colonial government forbade people from other parts of the country to travel to the territories of the sawbwas. And the autocratic powers of the sawbwas were enhanced by the more efficient administrative techniques that the British introduced. The result was occasional rebellions, particularly by members of other minority groups, against the sawbwas' taxing powers. Recognizing the anomalous position of the Shan states in the modern world, the British were laying plans in the 1940s to bring the states more in line with an egalitarian form of administration. Such an administration would have lessened the autocratic powers of the sawbwas. These plans were soon superseded by the rise of Burmese nationalism.

Prior to Myanmar's regaining its independence in 1948, the sawbwas and other minority leaders agreed with the British and the Burmese nationalist leaders in the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) to join in a new federal constitution for all of the country. The Shan states and the tiny Kayah state were given the right to secede from the Union of Burma after ten years if they wished to do so. However, before exercising that option, the thirty-four remaining sawbwas agreed to abandon their traditional rights and powers in exchange for a state pension. In the meantime, the central state's army had entered into active administration in large parts of the Shan states where there were Chinese Nationalist troops (KMT, Kuomintang/Guomindang) that had crossed over the border from China. These Chinese Nationalist troops, with the backing of Thailand and the United States, were preparing to invade China. They eventually became involved in the opium and other illegal trades in the region.

Opposition to the central government in Yangon and the rise of Shan nationalism were consequently fueled by a number of factors. Key among them, in addition to opposition to the oppressive behavior of the central government troops, were the efforts of the government to impose the same administrative and political structures on the Shan state as on the rest of the country. The delayed introduction of modern systems of administration was much resented by the local populations, which in-

sisted that they should have the right to develop their own administrative systems. Arguments about the fair distribution of revenues for development projects and other issues also occurred. Soon armed bands in the name of Shan rights arose in opposition to the government. The first armed clash occurred in 1959. Since then a number of legal and illegal political parties and armies, some with connections to the former sawbwas, have arisen. Several of them have become involved in the illicit drug trade in order to support themselves financially.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL); Buddhism, Theravada; Burma under British Colonial Rule; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA); Shans; T'ai

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SHAN UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (SURA)

The Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA) was one of the breakaway factions of the highly fractionalized Shan nationalist movement that arose in the early 1960s in Burma (Myanmar). Led by former Burma Communist Party (BCP) member Gon Jerng (aka Mo Heing), in the Laikha district of the Shan state, SURA refused incorporation in the Shan State Army but entered into an alliance with Chinese Nationalist (KMT, Kuomintang/Guomindang) remnants in 1969. Like all the insurgent groups operating in the Shan states, they became involved in the opium trade across the border with Thailand in order to finance their military activities. SURA was just one of many insurgent groups in the area whose fortunes

waxed and waned as new and different players entered the drug trade.

SURA was rejuvenated in 1996 as a consequence of the surrender to the government of Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA), then the largest of the drug dealers in the region. It was in 2001 led by Yord Serk, who demanded the right to dictate cease-fire terms with the government. This was rejected, and in the early 2000s Yord Serk's SURA was one of the most active of the insurgent groups that had not reached a cease-fire agreement with the government. Claiming that it was not involved in the drug trade and was merely pledged to autonomy for the Shan people, SURA operated on both sides of the Myanmar/Thailand border. A series of government offensives against SURA forced the relocation of 1,500 villages in the central and southwest Shan state, generating thousands of refugees who fled into Thailand (Smith 1999: 447).

R. H. TAYLOR

See also China, Nationalist; Decolonization of Southeast Asia; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Opium; Shan Nationalism; Shans

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SHANS

The Shan are a subgroup of the T'ai peoples. They reside mainly in northern and eastern Burma (Myanmar), where they form the second largest ethnic group. Smaller numbers of Shan people also live in Laos, the Chinese Shan states of Yunnan, and Thailand. Spoken Shan shares similarities with other T'ai languages, and Shan ethnohistory is also characterized by the historic importance of the T'ai *muang*. This comprised a number of villages owing personal allegiance to a local ruler, or *chao*. Yet the Shan people are also distinguished by the degree to which their culture and script have been influenced by contact with Burma. However, the Shan feel that they have historical, literary, religious, artistic, and architectural traditions that can hold their own with those of the majority Burman population in Burma, and that is a source of considerable pride.



Several Shan people at Bhamo, Burma, ca. 1886. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

The earliest significant migrations of T'ai peoples into the valleys of the Salween, Irrawaddy, and Chindwin Rivers seem to have coincided with the rise of the Nanchao kingdom in western Yunnan after 729 C.E. By 832, Nanchao was waging war in Burma, thereby creating opportunities for the expansion of T'ai muang across the region. The term *Shan* (*Syam*) seems first to have appeared in inscriptions in the Burmese kingdom of Pagan in ca. 1120, although Shan chronicles state that Shan communities were established throughout Upper Burma by the tenth and eleventh centuries. Much more archaeological and historical research on early Shan ethnohistory remains to be done.

Under the leadership of Sao Hkan Hpa (r. 1152–1205) it is claimed that Shan muang extended from Assam, across to the Shweli valley, to Sipsong Panna in Yunnan. In 1215 the muang of Mogoung was established, which was an important site for the control of the northern trade

routes between India and China. Throughout the thirteenth century, Shan muang were also consolidated on the eastern plateau of Burma, such as at Mong Nai in 1223. This plateau was later to form the heartland of the Shan states. In 1229 the migration northwest led to the founding of the T'ai kingdom of Ahom in Assam. Shan subgroups, such as the Khamti, then emerged with their own muang in this region.

Traditionally, the fall of the Burmese kingdom of Pagan in 1287 is said to have brought about a Shan dynasty in Burma at Ava, founded by three "Shan Brothers." Recent research has questioned the Shan identity of these brothers, believing it to be a myth invented by the British during the colonial period in Burma (1824–1948). The post-Pagan Burmese dynasty seems not to have had any significant Shan characteristics, but the decline of Pagan did provide opportunities for Shan expansion in the north and east. Only with the emergence of a new Burmese dynasty at Toungoo in 1486

was there a more successful and aggressive policy adopted toward both the Mon and the T'ai kingdoms, especially under King Tabinshwehti (r. 1531–1550) and King Bayinnaung (r. 1550–1581). Although by 1527 a coalition of Shan *chao* (or *sawbwa* in Burmese) had managed to establish a discernibly Shan authority at Ava, that collapsed, and Shan authority fragmented again into numerous muang.

Despite the fragmentation of Shan political organization, Shan nationalist ethnohistory prides itself on the fact that Shan *chao* always retained their independence from the Burmese kings, even though tribute might be paid to them. The British continued this administrative separation from central Burma after they annexed Upper Burma in 1885. They governed the muang of the eastern plateau, which also contained significant numbers of non-Shan and non-T'ai peoples, as the "Shan states" through the leadership of the hereditary *chao*. Greater political unity was created in 1922, when the Shan States Federation was established. The Shan *chao* had the most significant political voice of all the minorities in Burma in the debates leading up to independence, and by the time of the Panglong Agreement in 1947, Shan leaders anticipated that a high degree of autonomy from the Burmese center would continue. At Panglong the future of the Shan states within an independent Burma was outlined, and a promise was given that, after a ten-year period following independence in 1948, the Shan states would be allowed to secede if they felt their interests were not properly represented. Political upheavals meant that this option was never allowed to take effect. In 1959 the *chao* lost most of their political powers, and in 1974 a new Burmese constitution was introduced in which the Shan states lost most of their autonomy. These frustrated ambitions have led to continuing ethnic conflict between Shan nationalist organizations and the Burmese government. Since 1989, various armed Shan nationalist groups have entered into their own cease-fire agreements with the government, although these have tended to exacerbate internal divisions within the Shan nationalist movement. The agreement attracting the most international comment was that of 1996 between the government and the Mong Tai Army, led by Khun Sa. Khun Sa has been at the forefront of international debates about the role of

the drug trade in the financing of ethnic conflict in the region. The cease-fires still stand, but they are fragile; the political future of the Shan states is still uncertain, although calls for independence from Burma are unlikely to be met.

MANDY SADAN

See also Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581); Burmans; Opium; Tabinshwehti (r. 1531–1550); T'ai; Toungoo Dynasty (1531–1752); Yunnan Province

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SHIPBUILDING

During the past 5,000 years the expansion of the Austronesians from Taiwan into Southeast Asia, and from there into the Pacific and to Madagascar, has always been carried out, out of necessity, across the seas and upstream along the rivers of the major islands. At the turn of the first millennium C.E., local and regional maritime exchange networks had expanded into long-distance overseas commerce that brought local ships and traders to harbors of the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. Linguistic, ethnographic, archaeological, and historical research has all contributed to a considerable body of knowledge on Austronesian shipbuilding traditions. Other peoples of Southeast Asia, particularly the Mon, appear in time to have developed their own shipbuilding industries. However, for lack of proper studies, it is not clear how much of it was indigenous, or how much they owed to borrowings during interaction with the neighboring Austronesians (Austronesian nautical terms appear in Old Mon inscriptions).

The typical Austronesian vessel appears to have been developed from a dugout canoe. As its size grew, side-planks were added to the dugout hull, which progressively turned into a keel. In the early stages of seafaring, as in historical and modern smaller and narrower boats,

outriggers were necessary stabilizing devices. As these smaller vessels grew into bulkier, high-seas trading ships with rounded hulls, however, it appears that outriggers were not used: the earliest descriptions of Austronesian ships, in third- to eighth-century Chinese texts, do not mention stabilizing devices. What they do describe are very large ships, carrying hundreds of tons of cargo and passengers, propelled by multiple sails rigged on several masts. According to these early witnesses, no iron was ever used in fastening the planks of these ships, only strings made of vegetal fibers. Archaeological work carried out in Peninsular Malaysia, Sumatra, and the Philippines has indeed brought to light an indigenous tradition of shipbuilding that fully confirms these early texts. Sites from the third to the twelfth centuries C.E. have yielded remains of hulls made of planks fastened together by wooden dowels and stitches of palm-sugar fiber strings. Some of these shipwrecks were as much as 30 meters in length. These sites also yielded some side rudders, a feature described in later ships that survived in twentieth-century Javanese and Bugis traders. Their sails and masts were reconstructed from iconography, as depicted on a few early seals and on the famous eighth-century relief of the Borobudur temple: they carried multiple tripod masts and canted square sails made of matting. This early stitched technique partly survived in seventeenth-century Philippines and Moluccan boats and in modern whaling boats of Lomblen.

By the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, much of the local large-scale trade was carried out in ships known in Malay or Javanese as *jong*, a local term that gave birth to the word “junk” in European languages (later to be used only for Chinese ships). Their hulls were still being assembled without any iron fastenings: wooden dowels had by then completely replaced the earlier fiber lashings to keep the planks fastened together, and the shell was in turn dowelled to the sturdy frames. These were huge sailing vessels, even by European standards of the times: Malay and Javanese *jong* that hauled 500 tons of merchandise and a few hundred people were regularly described in Portuguese sources. Like earlier vessels, they were steered with a pair of side rudders and carried multiple masts, and as many lug sails of fiber matting, including a typical bowsprit sail.

The fleets of large indigenous *jong* were to disappear in the second half of the sixteenth century because of a combination of economic and political factors that laid considerable strain on the capacities of local powers to maintain their own trading fleets. As a result of increased warfare at sea, much of the local capital and energy was then spent on building and maintaining profusely armed war fleets of long craft. The largest were new ships for the region, galley-type craft built according to Mediterranean standards learned from Portuguese renegades and Turkish shipwrights, built in such a way as to allow them to carry and shoot the large cannon necessary for battles at sea.

Shipwreck archaeology has also proved that, by the fifteenth century, indigenous Malay and Javanese *jong* were no longer the only large trading ships built locally. Southern Chinese vessels had conquered their own share of the local shipping. However, the ban on shipbuilding and overseas shipping imposed by the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) appears to have prompted many Chinese to settle in Southeast Asia and to build their ships locally. This contributed to the birth of the so-called South China Sea shipbuilding tradition, a blend of two nautical traditions, Austronesian and southern Chinese.

In Indonesian seas, a significant fleet of lesser coasters (under 100 tons) survived the disappearance of the large oceangoing *jong*. The building of these vessels kept the local shipbuilding traditions alive until modern times. Together with the fishing boats, these fleets of small to medium-size Madurese, Butonese, and Bugis ships were the last to bear witness to the earlier grandeur of Malay world shippers.

PIERRE-YVES MANGUIN

See also Bugis (Buginese); Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; Firearms; Galleon Trade; Malays; Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Mon; Mons; Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Tausug and the Sulu Sultanate; *Undang-Undang Laut* (Melaka Maritime Laws/Code)

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"SHOE ISSUE"

A Clash of Civilizations

The "Shoe Issue" refers to what might be called a "Mexican standoff" between the aggressive British colonial administrators and the last rulers of the Konbaung dynasty, particularly King Mindon (r. 1853–1878) and his son, King Thibaw (r. 1878–1885). In essence, under Burmese custom, it is offensive to wear shoes in the sacred precincts of a pagoda or temple or the king's palace. Shoes are also taken off before entering private homes.

The issue came to prominence only once British delegations began to have audiences with the Burmese monarchs after the Treaty of Yandabo (1826) at the conclusion of the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826), which provided for a British resident to be located in the capital city. Communications, audiences, and formal contacts between the British representatives of the East India Company (EIC), then

the governor-general in India, and the Burmese court were constantly fraught with thorny issues of custom and etiquette: for instance, the question of at which point shoes or hats should be taken off, if at all; how an official letter was to be delivered and received; or where delegations should be housed. On such important issues the fate of an empire balanced.

In 1855, 1862, and 1867, the British delegations to the court of King Mindon compromised: they took off their shoes, under duress, within the palace precincts. By 1875 the official British attitude had so hardened that the last British resident to the Konbaung court, Sir Douglas Forsythe, was ordered not to remove his shoes by the chief commissioner for British Burma, Sir Charles Bernard. As a result, King Mindon could no longer receive him. The incident greatly saddened Mindon, whose policy it had been to try to have amiable relations with the British. It meant that the British resident no longer had access to the royal court, a fact that was very detrimental to British-Burmese relations in the last years of the Konbaung dynasty. By 1879, when King Thibaw was on the throne, the British found a pretext to formally withdraw the British resident from the court at Mandalay altogether.

The "Shoe Issue" surfaced again in the context of awakened Burmese nationalism in the early twentieth century. The Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) at the 1916 All Burma Conference of Buddhists at Jubilee Hall, Rangoon College, examined British religious policy. There was intense controversy as fifty branches of the YMBA took up the Shoe Issue, which led to the colonial government's banning additional discussion. It further increased nationalist sentiment. In 1918–1919, the Prome lawyer U Thein Maung and other leaders of the "no footwear" group drafted memorials to the government on the issue. The revered Ledi Sayadaw published a 95-page book in Burmese entitled *On the Impropriety of Wearing Shoes on Pagoda Platforms*. Shortly thereafter, on 4 October 1919, some Europeans, including women wearing shoes at the Eindawya Pagoda in Mandalay, were attacked by angry *pongyis* (lit. "great glory"; Buddhist monks in Burma). Four monks were arrested, tried, and convicted. Their leader, U Kettaya, was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Shoe Issue became the first overt expression of anticolonial political views in Upper Burma since the pacification of 1895. British refusal to support the Buddhist supreme patriarch, the *Thathanabaing*, was perceived as the attempt of a Christian government to subvert the traditional religion of the country and foster the disintegration of the Buddhist Sangha.

HELEN JAMES

See also Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Mindon (r. 1853–1878); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; *Sangha*; Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) (1906)

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**SHORT DECLARATION,
LONG CONTRACT**

The Short Declaration (a literal translation of the Dutch *Korte Verklaring*) was the formula used by the Netherlands Indies government (the colonial administration in Batavia) to extend its territorial control over the rest of the Indonesian archipelago. Briefly, the Short Declaration empowered the colonial administration to issue instructions to local rulers on how to exercise their authority. The essentials of the Short Declaration remained more or less the same throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. All those who signed recognized subordination to the authority of the Netherlands Indies government in Batavia. All agreed that their relations with foreign powers would be curtailed. In this way, the Netherlands extended sovereignty over the entire Indonesian archipelago. By the time of the Japanese

Occupation (1942), more than 250 such local rulers had signed the Short Declaration. Some of these rulers exercised control over large territories, while others were merely low-ranking village and district chiefs.

The Short Declaration was short and brief because it contrasted with the “long” contracts that were earlier concluded between the Netherlands Indies government and some seventeen so-called self-governing lands. The latter were left under the charge of rulers who were empowered to deal with legislative and administrative matters pertaining to their territories, but they had to ensure that obligations to the Netherlands Indies government were met. The long contracts defined the limits of the competency of both the rulers and the Netherlands Indies government.

Both the Short Declarations and the long contracts were modified during the period just before the Japanese Occupation. In both cases, the subordinate status of the local rulers was reiterated, and all did not regain their autonomy.

YONG MUN CHEONG

See also Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies

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SHWEDAGON PAGODA

See Rangoon (Yangon)

**SIAMESE MALAY STATES
(KEDAH, PERLIS, KELANTAN,
TERENGGANU)**

The term “Siamese Malay States” often refers to four states in Peninsular Malaysia (Malay Peninsula): Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, and Terengganu. All these are situated in the northern and eastern parts of the peninsula. The term is used to indicate Siamese political influence in these states, although Terengganu had very little to do with Siam, except that it shares its borders with Kelantan, which was politically linked with Siam. Kedah, which shares its northern boundary with southern Siam, had had a longer connection politically and culturally with the latter, although that did not necessarily mean that

Kedah was always under Siamese sovereignty. Perlis was originally part of Kedah until the 1820s, when, with the help of Siam, it became autonomous and later became independent. Kelantan was never under Siamese jurisdiction, except in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, especially when the rulers of the state began to invite Siam to intervene in its internal affairs.

Siam-Malay Relationships

Kedah had an old history that started in the fourth century C.E. Being situated on the Isthmus of Kra on the “neck” of the Malay Peninsula, it became the first landing place for Indian traders who crossed the Bay of Bengal on their way to mainland Southeast Asia and China in the East. Archaeological finds at Kuala Muda and the Bujang valley bear testimony to this. It is strengthened by the satires in the *Hikayat Merong Mahawangsa* (Merong Mahawangsa Chronicles), which tell the story of Kedah from local tradition. It is here, too, that the relationship between Kedah and Siam is described as one based on diplomatic relations as “between a younger brother to an older one” rather than as tributary. The sending of the *Bunga Mas* (“Gold Flowers”) and *Bunga Perak* (“Silver Flowers”), which are sometimes interpreted as a form of tribute, is mentioned in this tradition only as a token to “announce the birth of a son of the Kedah ruler” to Siam.

The Kedah relationship with foreign powers, such as Melaka, Siam, Burma (Myanmar), and later the British, was generally based on efforts by the reigning rulers to keep the state from being invaded. Thus Kedah rulers sided with one—and normally the stronger—power over the other to guarantee their political survival. In the early fifteenth century, for example, the ruler extended his diplomatic relations to the upcoming Melaka-Muslim power without having to refer to Siam, which already had some political influence on it. Similarly in the 1760s, Kedah preferred to be on friendlier terms with Burma because it was feared that otherwise the latter might invade it. In 1786, Penang, which belonged to Kedah, was leased to the British independently without referring to Siam. It cannot, however, be completely denied that Kedah was independent of Siam, because there were occasions when Kedah did

send tributes to Siam apart from other gifts. In the period from the 1820s to the 1840s it was clear that Siam ruled Kedah, after the occupation of the state in 1821 and the exile of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin for twenty-two years. In 1841, however, Siam invited the sultan back to the state to resume his sultanate. Kedah-Siam relationships became more discernible, especially when there were internal squabbles among the Kedah ruling families, and when some parties preferred to ask for recognition from the Siamese authorities against their contenders. When the British began to intervene in the other Malay States, they concluded Anglo-Siamese Treaties in 1902 and 1909 with Siam over Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu, showing their recognition of Siamese authority over these states. These treaties were to enable the British to concentrate on the northern states of the Malay Peninsula without Siamese interference. The treaties transferred any Siamese rights over the “Siamese Malay States” directly to the British.

Kelantan in the northeast corner of the peninsula had always been connected with Siam through Patani, a territory in southeast Thailand where the founder of the Kelantan sultanate originated. Kelantan, whose sultanate began in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, became noticeably more politically dependent on Siam. This was apparently inevitable, especially when the heirs of its founder, Sultan Long Yunos, sought Siamese help against their enemies—namely, from Terengganu, its neighbor on its southern border in the first decade of the nineteenth century. Troubles with Terengganu often involved tussles over the throne, because marriages between the Kelantan and Terengganu royal families seemed to open contentions from the latter also to claim rights over the throne. These led to the possibility that Terengganu would invade Kelantan for the purpose. Kelantan would normally send the *Bunga Mas* to Siam, requesting help and protection and also indicating Kelantan’s position as Siam’s dependency. In 1894 a Siamese commissioner was stationed in Kota Bharu, the capital of Kelantan, to help in its administration. As in Kedah, Kelantanese rulers often referred to Siam whenever they faced disputes over the issues on succession or other problems. In return Siam insisted that Kelantan send regular reports and tributes to it. As has

been explained above, Siamese rights over Kelantan and Terengganu were completely removed by the conclusion of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909.

Economic Development of the Siamese Malay States

Kedah, together with Perlis, had long been an entrepôt for traders from India and mainland Southeast Asia to China. Its land was suitable for the production of rice, a staple food for the Asians. But from the fifth to eleventh centuries, Kedah thrived on trade of goods from the surrounding areas. It had also begun to attract traders from Arabia and China and had made Kuala Muda, the estuary of the main river, into an important port of the state, especially when Kedah was under the influence of Śrīvijaya, a powerful kingdom in the seventh through the eleventh centuries. But Kedah's fortunes began to decline at the end of the eleventh century, when it was dragged into warfare with the enemies of Śrīvijaya, whose influence also began to dwindle. In the fourteenth century it was overshadowed by Melaka, which eventually replaced Śrīvijaya in importance. Subsequently Kedah tied trading and political relationships with Melaka, especially when its ruler (presumably Merong Mahawangsa) also became a Muslim. Economically, Kedah became more important as a rice-producing country, although trade continued to play a vital role. In the eighteenth century, when Siam began to play an important role in the politics of Kedah, the latter was reported to have sent tributes and other expensive gifts that included artifacts made of silver and platinum, gold-thread cloth, Japanese and Chinese silk, and boxes of potpourri, probably from India. All these show that Kedah still remained an international port. This phenomenon continued when the Portuguese and Dutch in Melaka also had trading relations with Kedah. When the British took the island of Penang in 1786, Kedah was seen as a major rice-producing state for the increasing number of immigrants who began to inundate Penang. A strip of land opposite the island that belonged to Kedah was later annexed by the British to produce foodstuffs. This acquisition in 1800 was later named Province Wellesley. Besides the production of rice, which is still the major product of Kedah today, some mining ar-

reas were exploited in the south, especially around Kulim. These were developed by Chinese entrepreneurs from Penang.

Kelantan and Terengganu were equally important in rice. But they were also important in jungle products, such as rattan. Pepper, coffee, gold dust, tin, rice, and woven cloth were also produced and exported. Trade was already established with Singapore by the 1820s. They were also reported to have sent their goods for trade via Penang, when the island thrived as an entrepôt. Kelantan and Terengganu were certainly known to have busy ports in the early nineteenth century. It was reported that in the 1830s there were some 40,000 people living in Kelantan, a figure that was higher than that of many other Malay States. In fact, the existence of some ports in these eastern Malay States was already mentioned in Chinese records in the early years of the Christian era. However, these two states were overshadowed economically when the British began to dominate the western coast Malay States (namely Perak, Selangor, and Negri Sembilan), which had begun to develop their tin and rubber industries. During this period Kelantan and Terengganu continued with their traditional economic activities—that is, agriculture and the trade in jungle products. Furthermore, they were comparatively disadvantaged because they were subjected to the stormy northeast monsoons (from November to February).

Siamese Cultural Influences

Unlike the case in the southern Malay States in the peninsula, Siamese cultural influences were discernible in the Siamese Malay States. The titles of rulers were given in Siamese, although they had different kinds of terms in their respective states. Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin, who ruled Kedah from 1803 to 1821 and again from 1841 to 1843, was given the Siamese title of *Chao Phraya Zaiburi*, while his younger brother was known as *Phra Aphainuratraja*. The sultan's assistants were known as *Phra Palat*. These titles were officially used in correspondence between Kedah and Bangkok. All official correspondence was written in both Malay and Siamese.

Kelantan royal titles also had their Siamese equivalents. In 1881, Sultan Muhammad II (r. 1838–1886) was given the title *Phya Pipit Pakdi*,

while his oldest son, who was heir apparent, was called *Phaya Ratsada*. When Sultan Muhammad later allowed his son, Ahmad, to be the full ruler, the former assumed the title of *Phya Lecha* (Senior Sultan).

Other cultural influences are still to be found today in the traditional dances, such as *Makyong*, in Kelantan, and Siamese vocabularies spoken in Kedah, Perlis, and Kelantan. The cuisine and attire to a certain extent have shades of Siamese influence. There are place-names that still bear testimony to Siamese influences in all these states.

The End of Siamese Political Influences

When the British began to expand their influence in the Malay States, they had to face possible opposition from Siam, which claimed that it also had rights in some of these states. To minimize such opposition, they concluded several treaties with Siam. The first was the Treaty of Bangkok (or Burney Treaty), which was signed in 1826. By this treaty the British recognized Siamese sovereignty over Kedah and Perlis, but not making clear the position of Kelantan and Terengganu. British influence became more prominent when Frank Swettenham, the governor of the Straits Settlements and high commissioner of the Federated Malay States, concluded the Anglo-Siamese Treaty in 1902 with Siam. Under this treaty the British proposed to establish foreign relations in Kelantan and Terengganu and offered to aid Siam against other foreign interferences in these states. The British also proposed that an adviser and assistant be appointed to help administer these states. It was, however, the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 that concluded Siamese political influences in Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu. By this treaty the Siamese transferred all their rights in these states to the British, and in return the latter surrendered all their territorial rights in Siam to them.

After 1909 the history of foreign relations of the former Siamese Malay States was more closely linked with the expansion of British rule in the Malay Peninsula. They also endured the Japanese occupation in 1941–1945 and later joined the rest of the Malay States in their fight for independence from the British. They became part of the Federation of Malaya in

1948 and part of independent Malaya in 1957, and later of Malaysia in 1963.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also British Interests in Southeast Asia; *Bunga Emas (Bunga Mas)* (Gold Flowers); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; Isthmus of Kra; Jungle/Forest Products; Melaka; Monsoons; Muslim Minorities (Thailand); Pahang; Patani (Pattani), Sultanate of; Penang (1786); Rice in Southeast Asia; Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Śrīvijaya (Śrīvijaya); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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SIEM REAP

Siem Reap is the provincial capital of the province of the same name in Cambodia. The Siem Reap River, which flows south from the Kulen Mountains into Cambodia's Great Lake (Tonle Sap), turns through the town. To the west, the medieval Cambodian city of Angkor, which survives in the form of more than a thousand Hindu and Buddhist temples, most of

them in ruins, covers an area of over 250 square kilometers. In its heyday in the twelfth century C.E. the city probably held over a million people, making it one of the largest urban centers in the world.

Angkor was gradually abandoned in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, following several Thai invasions and the shift of Cambodia's center of gravity to the region of Phnom Penh. Some of the temples were restored in the mid-sixteenth century, and pilgrims visited the ruins on a regular basis. When Angkor was "discovered" by a French explorer in 1860, however, its fame spread to the outside world. The ruins and the surrounding province, then called Mahanokor (or Great City), had come under Thai control since the 1790s. Under the French protectorate, they were returned to Cambodian jurisdiction in 1907. Over the next sixty years, French archaeologists supervised the restoration of the Angkorean temples, and Siem Reap became a pleasant provincial town. The ruins were fought over briefly in the Cambodian civil war in the 1970s, and tourists did not return in large numbers for twenty years. By 2002, Siem Reap had become a boomtown with dozens of hotels and guesthouses catering to foreign and domestic visitors numbering more than half a million per year.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Angkor; Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Battambang; Cambodia (Eighteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887)

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SIHANOUK, NORODOM (1922–)

Royal Patriot

Cambodian king and political leader Norodom Sihanouk was born into Cambodia's royal family at a time when Cambodia was part of French Indochina. His mother's father, Sisowath Monivong, reigned as king during Sihanouk's boyhood. When Monivong died in 1941, Sihanouk was taken out of high school and crowned king by the French. At the time, Japa-

nese troops were stationed throughout Indochina with the permission of French authorities, Sihanouk was monitored closely by his French advisors, but in March 1945 the Japanese imprisoned all French colonial officials throughout Indochina and encouraged Sihanouk to declare Cambodia's independence.

When the French returned at the end of 1945, Sihanouk welcomed them. Soon afterward the French encouraged political parties to form and a constitution was drafted. For the next eight years, Sihanouk quarreled with the nationalist members of Cambodia's small elite who sought independence on their own terms. In 1953, Sihanouk dramatically embarked on what he called a "Crusade for Independence," threatening to abdicate if the French persisted in political and economic control. The French caved in and granted Cambodia's independence at the end of 1953.

Two years later, Sihanouk abdicated the throne; had his father, Norodom Suramarit, named king; and embarked on a full-time political career. His political movement, the Sangkum Reastre Niyum, remained the dominant political force in Cambodia until Sihanouk was removed from office in a bloodless coup in 1970.

In the twenty-first century, the so-called Sihanouk years are looked back upon as something of a golden age, when Cambodia was at peace and relatively prosperous. Sihanouk, almost unopposed, was immensely popular, especially among Cambodia's rural poverty-stricken peasantry, toward whom he displayed sustained and genuine affection. In the international arena, he flamboyantly pursued a policy of neutrality, which alienated him from the United States, pleased the communist bloc, and kept Cambodia out of the Vietnam War (1964–1975), which was being waged less than 96 kilometers from Phnom Penh.

In the late 1960s, as the war intensified, Sihanouk's behavior became increasingly erratic. He spent much of his time writing, directing, and starring in popular films that dramatized himself and Cambodia's past. His support diminished among Cambodia's elite and also among many younger Cambodians, attracted to the idea of revolution. A civil war directed against communist-led guerrillas (the so-called Khmer Rouge) broke out in 1968.



Arrival of Prince Sihanouk in Phnom Penh after a thirteen-year exile, December 1991. (Michael S. Yamashita/Corbis)

In March 1970, Sihanouk was overthrown in a bloodless coup d'état launched by his National Assembly while he was traveling abroad. The new regime, led by Lon Nol (1913–1984), called itself the Khmer Republic (1970–1975) and plunged into an alliance with the United States and into warfare against communist forces inside Cambodia. Sihanouk took refuge in Beijing and became the titular head of a government in exile, allied with the Communist Vietnamese, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) led by Saloth Sar, alias Pol Pot (1925–1998).

In April 1975, CPK forces defeated the Khmer Republic. The CPK inaugurated a series of utopian economic and political measures that soon led to more than 1.7 million deaths and tore Cambodia apart. Sihanouk was brought to Cambodia but after several months was placed under house arrest. The regime in power named itself Democratic Kampuchea

(DK). When Vietnamese forces overthrew DK in early 1979, following two years of warfare, Sihanouk was flown to the United Nations to plead DK's case. But by 1980 he was expressing anticommunist ideas and presenting himself as an alternative to the Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), the pro-Vietnamese regime in power in Phnom Penh.

Sihanouk's extended marriage of convenience with DK, whose forces formed the backbone of anti-PRK resistance, diminished his popularity among some older Cambodians. However, as the Cold War ended and foreign powers sought to remove themselves as political actors from Indochina, Sihanouk came to be seen, as he had always seen himself, as a crucial unifying element in a new Cambodian government acceptable to foreign powers and Cambodian factions alike.

Under the Paris Peace agreements in 1991, Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh as de facto chief of state, while the country, under UN

auspices, prepared for national elections. He became king again in 1992, under Cambodia's fifth constitution since 1947. King Sihanouk in the 1990s lost the aura and pomp that marked the kingship of pre-1970 Cambodia, where the royal trappings of flag, national anthem, street names, and army uniforms so glamorized the monarchy. Sihanouk often acted as a counterweight to the authoritarian excesses of the new regime.

Although a sincere and hardworking patriot, Sihanouk had a mixed effect on his country. His opponents have justly criticized his personalistic, flamboyant style and his long-term alliance with the Khmer Rouge, while his supporters have pointed to his unquestioned patriotism and his devotion to Cambodia's rural poor unmatched by previous or subsequent Cambodian rulers. An eloquent orator and a fluent writer, Sihanouk has defended his record in several volumes of memoirs.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; Democratic Kampuchea (DK); French Indochina; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); *Killing Fields, The*; Kuantan Principle (1980); Lon Nol (1913–1984); Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Pol Pot (Salth Sar) (1925–1998); Sangkum Reastre Niyum (Peoples' Socialist Community) (March 1955); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992–1993)

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SINGAPORE (1819)

Founded in 1819 as an East India Company (EIC) outpost, in 1826 Singapore formed part

of the Straits Settlements, which became a Crown colony in 1867. After wartime Japanese occupation, it became a separate Crown colony in 1946 and was granted city status in 1951. Achieving internal self-government as the State of Singapore in 1959, it won independence as part of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, and became an independent republic in 1965.

On 6 February 1819 a treaty was signed among Sir Stamford Raffles (1781–1826), the sultan of Johor, and the local chieftain. The terms permitted the East India Company to establish a post situated at a small village at the mouth of the Singapore River, on the site of the long-deserted fourteenth-century port of Temasek (Temasik)/Singapura. Despite vigorous protests from Dutch Batavia, disapproval from Penang, and initial lack of support from London, the British occupation was recognized by the Treaty of London in March 1824, and in August that year the two Malay chiefs ceded the whole island in perpetuity. Two years later Singapore was united with the company's other peninsular possessions to form the Straits Settlements.

Free trade and unrestricted immigration quickly attracted traders, who came initially from nearby settlements at Melaka, Penang, and Riau, and later from the archipelago and other parts of Southeast Asia, China, India, and Europe. In 1827 the population already numbered nearly 16,000 (Turnbull 1989: 36), of whom more than half were Chinese, but for many years it was transitory and shifting, comprising mostly young men, drawn from many ethnic and dialect groups, looking to their own headmen or "secret societies."

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the economic expansion of the region consolidated Singapore's position as the commercial hub of Southeast Asia. The population increased during long years of unbroken peace, gradually becoming more settled under administrative control. But up to the Pacific War (1941–1945) it remained a plural society, with communities living largely separate lives, divided by language, education, religion, ethnicity, and culture. Apart from a mutiny among its Indian army garrison, which was quickly suppressed, World War I (1914–1918) did not directly affect Singapore. In the 1930s it became an important naval and military base but fell to the Japanese in February 1942, after a lightning campaign

down the peninsula and bitter fighting on the island itself.

Following a temporary British military administration, when the rest of the peninsula was incorporated into a Malayan Union in April 1946, Singapore became a separate Crown colony. It remained so when the British, bowing to intense Malay nationalism, replaced the union by a federation in 1948. Although the Malayan communist-led insurgency (the "Emergency"), which broke out upcountry in 1948, did not directly engulf Singapore, the same regulations were imposed, repressing radical politics and masking widespread discontent over poverty, unemployment, housing, and education.

The first polls, held in 1948 and 1951 to elect a few legislative councillors, aroused little popular enthusiasm. But radical politicians triumphed at elections held in April 1955 to implement a new constitution, which provided a measure of self-government. The Labour Front, under lawyer David Marshall (1908–1995), formed a minority government that immediately faced violent strikes and riots, when the communist wing of the rival People's Action Party (PAP) made a bid to seize power through trade unions and Chinese schools. Their leaders' imprisonment under the emergency regulations left moderates, led by lawyer Lee Kuan Yew (1923–), in control of the PAP. The Labour Front government took steps to reform education, extend citizenship, and localize the public services, and the British government agreed to internal self-government.

The PAP won an outright majority in the ensuing May 1959 elections and aspired to achieve full independence through merger with the then-independent Federation of Malaya. This provoked a violent party split that threatened to plunge Singapore into chaos but alarmed the federation into offering merger, and in September 1963, Singapore became a state in a new Federation of Malaysia.

The association proved painful, and in August 1965, Singapore was expelled to form an independent republic. Hitherto considered too small to be viable, it built up its economy and defenses and became a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was formed in 1967. It also

had to create a sense of nationhood while respecting the roots of a multicultural society, of whom 77 percent were Chinese, 14 percent Malay, and 8 percent Indian (Demaine 2002: 1282). The PAP continued in office into the twenty-first century, with a virtual monopoly of power. Lee Kuan Yew handed over the premiership to Goh Chok Tong (1941–) in 1989 but remained as senior minister. Goh continued to exert firm central direction, but the political climate relaxed somewhat; Singapore entered the twenty-first century a stable, prosperous state, with a population of 4 million living in an area of some 255 square miles (6,602 hectares) (ibid.).

C. M. TURNBULL

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Century); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front); British Malaya; British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; Federation of Malaya (1948); "Fortress Singapore"; Free Trade; Goh Chok Tong (1941–); *Hui*; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Lee Kuan Yew (1923–); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Malayan Union (1946); Malaysia (1963); Marshall, David Saul (1908–1995); People's Action Party (PAP); Plural Society; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Straits Settlements (1826–1946); Suez Canal (1869); *Syonan-to*; Temasik (Tumasik)

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SINGAPORE, ENTREPÔT TRADE AND COMMERCE OF (NINETEENTH CENTURY TO 1990s)

For the first fifty years from its opening in 1819 as a British port of call, Singapore depended almost entirely on entrepôt trade, exchanging British manufactures, Indian opium, and Chinese wares for tropical produce from the Indonesian archipelago and other parts of Southeast Asia. The island lacked natural resources, and mid-nineteenth-century agricultural enterprises were short-lived. But trade flourished from the start because of a combination of Singapore's excellent geographical position at the tip of mainland Southeast Asia, well-placed for trade winds in the days of sail, and its unique freedom from commercial tariffs and restrictions. Trade increased more than fourfold from 1823 to 1824 and from 1868 to 1869 (Wong 1960: 194), but it remained the barter of unprocessed goods, requiring little more than simple warehousing. Fearful of challenge from other regional ports, Singapore merchants jealously guarded their free-port status.

With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the growing dominance of steamships, and the expansion of Western colonial rule in the region, Singapore entered a second stage as a staple port: the center for the collection, processing, and re-export of primary commodities, most importantly from Indonesia. Trade continued in exotic tropical produce, such as gambier, pepper, and spices, but increasingly it turned to three staples: tin in the nineteenth century, and rubber and petroleum from the early twentieth century.

These staples required reprocessing, transport, and dock facilities, as well as banking and insurance services. European firms handled most of the overseas trade with Europe, North America, and Australia; family-based Chinese networks largely controlled regional trade. By the early twentieth century Singapore was the world's seventh largest port in tonnage and the leading tin smelter and exporter (Huff 1994: 120). By World War I (1914–1918) it was the world's biggest rubber exporter, and became a major petroleum distributor in the interwar years (*ibid.*: 31, 236–244). Because of its dependence on primary products, Singapore suffered severely from the great international de-

pression of the 1930s, and its economy was battered by the Japanese occupation (1942–1945); it revived as a staple port, however, in the 1950s, profiting particularly from the Korean War boom of 1950–1951. By 1959, Singapore was the largest storage and distribution base for petroleum in Southeast Asia and began refining oil in 1960 (*ibid.*: 279). But rubber made up half its exports, with 80 percent of them coming from Indonesia, and throughout the decade Singapore was the largest market for Indonesian produce (*ibid.*: 281).

Internal self-government in 1959 introduced a third phase, when trade remained the engine of growth but shifted from dependence on staple primary products to manufactures. In 1961, Singapore's first and only development plan saw little room to expand the entrepôt trade. Faced with a spiraling population, unemployment, and regional competition, the government promoted new industries that initially aimed at import-substitution, with the prospect of merger with the federation opening up a wider domestic market. Briefly Singapore aspired to be the "New York of Malaysia," but its trade suffered greatly during the Indonesian Confrontation (1963–1966), and its separation from Malaysia in 1965 erected barriers to its traditional hinterland.

The separation with Malaysia forced a major change in economic policy to promote export-oriented industries led by government-linked companies and multinational enterprises. Singapore continued to be a major exporter of petroleum and rubber, but in 1973 manufactured exports overtook primary commodities; from the late 1970s, services—mainly business and financial—became the third important component in trade. Commerce prospered with the end of the Confrontation, followed by the Vietnam War (1964–1975) boom, although Indonesian trade figures remained confidential into the twenty-first century. In the eight years following independence Singapore's external trade expanded fifteenfold, despite the sudden British withdrawal from its military bases, which had accounted for 20 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) (Turnbull 1989: 297).

Until the last few years of the twentieth century there was remarkable and sustained economic growth, with occasional sharp setbacks: the 1974–1975 Arab oil crisis, the 1984–1986

world recession in the electronics industry, and the 1997–1998 regional financial crisis. Entrepôt trade remained strong, but strict re-exports requiring simple repackaging declined in favor of exports that had been wholly produced or transformed in Singapore. Most of these were also re-exports in that they involved the import and export of similar commodities, notably the import of components and parts and the export of electronic goods. By the 1990s the United States was Singapore's main trading partner, but diversification of markets guarded to some extent against recession, although it remained vulnerable to international and regional crises. Singapore entered the twenty-first century as one of the world's most open economies, with foreign trade equivalent to three times its GDP. Its economy was a unique combination of strong government intervention and international free trade, and Singapore became an enthusiastic supporter of globalization, the ASEAN Free Trade Area, bilateral free trade pacts, and a free-world trade system.

C. M. TURNBULL

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Free Trade; Great Depression (1929–1931); Konfrontasi (“Crush Malaysia” Campaign); Korean War (1950–1953); Malaysia (1963); Singapore (1819); Straits Settlements (1826–1946)

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SINGAPORE-MALAYA/MALAYSIA RELATIONS (ca. 1950s–1990s)

Singapore, a corruption from Malay, *Singapura* (lit. “Lion City,”), was in the old days known as Temasik. It became a territory of the Malay kingdom of Palembang and later, for some time before the emergence of Melaka, was claimed as a vassal state by Siam. Lying at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, Singapura automatically became a part of the Malay sultanate of Johor when the Portuguese seized the city-state of Melaka in 1511. In 1819, taking advantage of the succession dispute and other weaknesses of Johor, Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) acquired Singapore from one party in the Johor conflict on behalf of the English East India Company (EIC). In 1826 the British formed the Straits Settlements and made Singapore its capital and center of British activities in Southeast Asia.

Before the emergence of Singapore as a separate independent nation in 1965, the term “British Malaya” or simply “Malaya,” as used by the British, meant the Malay Peninsula inclusive of Singapore. The governor of the Straits Settlements also acted as the British high commissioner for the Malay States on the peninsula. However, when Penang and Melaka were merged with the Malay States to form the Malayan Union (MU) in 1946, Britain kept Singapore as a British Crown colony. This was one of the reasons why, despite the many advantages to be gained from the MU, the non-Malays, including those in Singapore, were unenthusiastic toward the new setup. Radical nationalists of all shades and ethnicities held fast to the idea of the inseparableness of Malaya and Singapore, and that contributed toward intercommunal negotiations leading to the All-Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA)–Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (PUTERA) conference in 1947, demanding a united Malaya inclusive of Singapore. Similar sentiments were put forth in the Peoples Constitutional Proposal for Malaya, which was presented in the same year. The British, however, rejected the idea and prolonged the Malaya–Singapore separation. For social, economic, political, and security reasons, all chief ministers of Singapore from 1955 to

1963—David Marshall (t. 1955–1956), Lim Yew Hock (t. 1956–1959), and Lee Kuan Yew (t. 1959–1963)—favored merger with Malaya. Accordingly they all made attempts to woo Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, chief minister (t. 1955–1957) and later prime minister of independent Malaya (t. 1957–1963), to agree to a Malaya–Singapore merger. But Tunku and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) were opposed to the idea, because the merger would tip the racial balance in favor of the Chinese and would thus be politically and economically detrimental to the generally rural Malays. However, toward the end of the 1950s, against the geopolitical situation of the Cold War and the prospect of Britain letting go of its colonies in Southeast Asia, Tunku reconsidered his stance. On 27 May 1961 he openly expressed in Singapore the need for Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo, and Brunei to work toward political unification. With Malaya as the key partner, Singapore under the People's Action Party (PAP) played an active role in the formation of "Malaysia" that finally materialized on 16 September 1963. The numerical superiority of the *bumiputera* ("sons of the soil") in Sabah and Sarawak helped to neutralize the demographic advantage the Chinese would have enjoyed had the merger been only between Malaya and Singapore.

Under the Malaysian federal system, Singapore was allotted fifteen federal seats and given jurisdiction over items such as education and labor. Defense, internal security, and foreign affairs came under the control of the federal government in Kuala Lumpur. Differences in political styles soon led to irreparable disputes between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, leading to strains that endangered the new entity. Failing to replace the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) in the alliance, in May 1965 the Singapore PAP formed the Malaysian Solidarity Convention to oppose the alliance and the UMNO-led federal government. Led by the PAP, the convention comprised Chinese-based peninsular parties, the United Democratic Party (UDP) and People's Progressive Party (PPP), and Sarawak opposition parties including the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) and MACHINDA. Finding the Singapore threat intolerable and mindful of potential Sino-Malay clashes, Tunku decided on the Singapore–Malaysia separation that went into effect on 9 August 1965.

The Singapore–Malaysia relationship since 1965 was to some extent determined by the previous experiences of the respective leaders of the two countries. The relationship was rather difficult from 1965 to 1981. Although not always smooth, Singapore–Malaysia relations were better after Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (1925–) became prime minister of Malaysia in 1981. By that time the burden of the past had eased, and both countries had accepted each other's existence as equals. Malaysia and Singapore, together with Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, founded ASEAN (1967), which by the year 2000 had encompassed all ten countries of Southeast Asia and had proven to be a success.

Malaysia–Singapore relations have been likened to those of a husband and wife or Siamese twins, which continue to be interdependent despite occasional hiccups. A causeway and a bridge physically linked the two countries. Furthermore, a sizable number of Malaysians and Singaporeans have relatives or friends across the Teberau Strait. Singapore continued to rely on Malaysia for its water supply and foodstuffs (vegetables and other perishables), and Malaysian states, particularly Johor and Melaka, gained economically from the tourist trade via or emanating from Singapore. Both countries agreed early in 2003 that their overlapping claims over Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Branca) would be resolved through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Johor; Johor–Riau Empire; Lee Kuan Yew (1923–); Malayan Union (1946); Malaysia (1963); People's Action Party (PAP); Singapore (1819); Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford Bingley (1781–1826); Temasuk (Tumasik); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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SINGHASÂRI (1222–1293)

Beginning of Javanese Imperialism

The ancient kingdom of Singhasâri succeeded that of Kadiri (Kediri) in Java, Indonesia. The state formation of Singhasâri was the first attempt at empire building in the history of Java. The culmination of that trend of development was achieved during the subsequent period of Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s). It is this aspect of development that can be considered significant in Southeast Asian history, since similar attempts in this region can be studied comparatively.

The first king of Singhasâri was the fabulous Ken Arok/Angrok (r. 1222–1227), as he is known in later traditional historiography. His official name, however, mentioned in a document closer to his time, the *Nâgarakertâgama* of early Majapahit, is Śrî Ranggalah Râjasa or Śrî Girinâtha. He was considered the dynasty founder of both the Singhasâri and Majapahit line of kings. Old Javanese written sources indicate that this king led significant development efforts for the region "east of the mountain Kawi" in East Java. Singhasâri kings like him and the later Kĕrtanagara (r. 1268–1292) were the initiators of formal admittance of the identification of the "highest truth" of Saivism and Buddhism.

A Singhasâri inscription containing the fact of empirical structure of the kingdom was that authorized by Narâryya Sminingrat (r. 1248–1268), the copper plate inscription of Mûlamaluring, issued in the year 1177 śaka (1255 C.E.). Sminingrat installed members of his family as regents in different territories, mentioned by the names of (fortified) capital towns (called

nagara or *râjya*); some also have the names of the "countries" (called *bhûmi*). The names and their respective territories are as follows:

- An individual (unknown because of a missing plate of the inscription) made to reign as *haji* (= regent, king) in the *nagara* Madhura
- Narâryya Kirana as regent in *nagara* Lama-jang
- The consecrated Śrî Krĕtanagara in the *nagara* Daha of *bhûmi* Kadiri
- Śrî Jayakatyĕng, along with the king's daughter as his consort, at *nagara* Glang-glang in *bhûmi* Wurawan
- Śrî Ratnarâja at *râjya* Morono
- Śrî Narajaya at *nagara* Hring, and
- Śrî Sabhâjaya at *nagara* Lwa

It is conspicuous that the only kingdom known from inscriptions before Singhasâri was Kadiri. No inscriptions from the other six "kingdoms" have ever been found. On the contrary, the twin kingdom of Kadiri, Janggalala, is not mentioned in the above list. Other inscriptions—namely, the so-called ferry charter of 1358 C.E. and the Maribong inscription of 1255 C.E.—mentioned that Sminingrat is also the name of Wisnuwardhana, the fourth king of Singhasâri. In those inscriptions his full name is spelled bhatâra Śrî Wisnuwardhana ikang Pañji Sminingrat, and Śrî Jaya Wisnuwardhana sang Mapañji Sminingrat. It seems that he was the initiator of empire-building.

The succession of kings of Singhasâri is as follows. First came Ranggalah Râjasa alias Ken Angrok, who usurped Tunggul Amĕtung, the *akuwu* (local chief) of Tumapĕl, and then Angrok changed the status of *akuwu*-ship into kingship. Thus the relatively small Tumapĕl was presumably made the center of a new and enlarged scope of a kingdom. Râjasa's successor was Anusapati, a son given birth to by his consort, but actually the son of her previous husband, Tunggul Amĕtung. After him followed Angrok's son Tohjaya, then followed Wisnuwardhana, also called Ranggawuni, the son of Anusapati. Then followed the last king of Singhasâri, King Kĕrtanagara, the son of Wis-

nuwardhana. Kĕrtanagara's daughters played an important part in the history of the next emerging kingdom, Majapahit.

During the Singhasāri period, temple building in stone seems to have gotten a new impetus. Some of these temples, known as commemorative temples for deceased kings, include those in the present village of Kidal (for Anusapati); that in the village of Tumpang, called the *candi* (= temple) Jago (in Old-Javanese sources it is called Jajaghu; for Wisnuwardhana); and that in the present village of Singasari (for Kĕrtanagara). The temple for Rājasa at Kagēnĕngan, and a second temple for Wisnuwardhana at Waleri mentioned in written sources, have not been identified. In fact, the chronicle-poem *Nāgarakĕrtāgama* of the fourteenth century gives the information that the Singhasāri kings Rājasa (r. 1222–1227), Wisnuwardhana (1248–1286), and Kĕrtanagara (r. 1268–1292) were proponents of Śiva-Buddha teachings.

Buddhist statuary and iconography developed markedly during this period. The beautiful statues representing Buddhist deities originating from the temple Jago are now displayed at the National Museum in Jakarta, while three huge Sivaitic Hindu statues originating from the temple at Singhasāri are now in the Ethnographic Museum in Leiden, The Netherlands.

EDI SEDYAWATI

See also Buddhism; Buddhism, Theravada; *Candi*; Java; Kadiri (Kediri); Kĕrtanagara (r. 1268–1292); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); *Pararaton* (Book of Kings)

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SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE

From the end of the 1950s till the end of the 1980s, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR), or the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC) were in a state of deep conflict, embroiled in an ideological and diplomatic struggle and sometimes military confrontation. Previously they had been regarded as tied by monolithic communist unity, fraternal friendship, and stable alliance, and firmly committed to conquering the world for communism.

After World War II (1939–1945) the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) received military aid from the USSR in its revolutionary struggle. The USSR welcomed the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. In the spring of 1950 the two countries signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. But the victorious Chinese revolution created the second great communist power. It became difficult for the USSR and its communist party (Communist Party of the Soviet Union, CPSU) to remain the world center of communism. From the very beginning of its existence the PRC and the CCP wished to maintain complete independence from the USSR and CPSU. Besides, PRC leadership decided that China should become a great Asian power and head the communist camp in the East.

Toward the end of the 1950s, fraternal solidarity between Chinese and Soviet communists was replaced by mistrust and suspicion. The origin of the rift between the USSR and PRC was usually traced to 1958. The first impetus was given by the de-Stalinization process in the Soviet Union initiated at the twentieth CPSU congress in 1956, systematized at its twenty-second congress, and embodied in the new Party Program. Chinese leader Mao Zedong (1893–1976) was displeased with the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's (1894–1971) denunciation of Stalin (1879–1953). Condemnation of Stalin's "personality cult" jeopardized Mao's Stalin-like position in the Chinese Communist Party.

From 1959 to 1963 there were developing between the two communist giants a struggle for doctrinal authority and leadership in the world communist movement, competition for influence on developing countries of the Third World, as well as a power struggle in the international arena, including Southeast Asia. The public face of the Sino-Soviet split was multiple: foreign policy differences, interstate conflicts, and ideological disputes about communist principles and strategy.

First of all the conflict concerned the ideological sphere. Chinese communists did not agree with the Soviet leaders' new conception of peaceful coexistence, which, the Chinese thought, underplayed the role of war and violence in the worldwide struggle for socialism. At the heart of the ideological dispute was the question of what role violence and war play in the revolutionary transition to socialism. The Chinese rejected the concept of a peaceful road to socialism and the idea that the danger of war had lessened in the nuclear age. Leaders and members of other communist parties joined in the argument. The ideological dispute escalated to a formal split in the world communist movement. The great majority of communist parties all over the world supported the Soviet position, but a number of communist parties and factions within parties backed the Maoist line.

In Southeast Asia, communist parties of Thailand, Burma (Myanmar, from 1989), and Malaya became pro-Maoist. The Communist Party of Cambodia and the Philippines split into two, the splinter group of the latter naming itself "The Party of Mao Zedong's Ideas" and creating its military units under the name "New People's Army." Communists in Vietnam and Laos sided with the USSR and CPSU. The Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) formally maintained a balanced middle position, but in practice it was more inclined toward the Chinese side.

By 1963, Beijing and Moscow had completely broken apart after three years of increasingly abusive polemics. The communist parties' leaderships of the USSR and China intended to grasp the command of the international communist and national liberation movements, including those in Southeast Asia. Each side began to accuse the other of undermining the anticapitalist and anti-imperialist struggle. Chinese leaders began vigorously championing—and, where possible, actively promoting—"wars of national liberation" and "anti-imperialist struggles" in the developing world. With the emergence of Sino-Soviet differences, Mao saw China confronting two opponents: the United States and the Soviet Union. To oppose these two foes, Mao proposed the formation of an international united front. China reached out to antigovernment guerrillas in Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, to Norodom Sihanouk (1922–) in Cambodia, and to the leftist

regime under Sukarno (t. 1947–1967) in Indonesia. In Indonesia, China tried to promote a militant "united front" between Sukarno and the PKI. Guided by the thesis that "the rifle gives rise to power," China intensified political, ideological, and material assistance to antigovernment communist rebellions in Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, and the Philippines by supplying arms to them. China was involved in the abortive coup d'état in Indonesia in 1965, in which Indonesian communists played a major role—and consequently paid a high price. In 1975, Chinese leadership succeeded in creating a totalitarian regime of the Khmer Rouge headed by Pol Pot (1925–1998) in Cambodia. Soviet leaders tended to be more cautious. They warned that local Third World conflicts could escalate to a destructive global and nuclear war.

Communist China, the biggest developing nation, was ambitious to become the leader of all the developing countries on three continents, a goal abhorred by the USSR. Each was making efforts to damage the other's image among the developing countries. Beijing was trying to eliminate the Soviet Union as an Asian country in the Afro-Asian bloc by branding it as just another white colonial power. Although the Soviet Union extended over more than two-fifths of the Asian continent, the Chinese leadership had proclaimed the Soviet Union a non-Asian country and had launched the racist slogan "Asia belongs to the Asians." But the countries of Southeast Asia rejected the Chinese thrust as fostering discord between white and colored peoples and preaching racial hatred. They neither accepted the Chinese point of view that the Soviet Union was a white and European country nor endorsed any effort aimed at the political expulsion of the USSR from Southeast Asia. Besides, the mores and methods of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1968) had been discredited in the Southeast Asian countries because communists had tried to instigate disturbances in some of them and to fan racial and territorial disputes in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union criticized Mao's policy of intensifying troubles in the region, and of unceremoniously interfering in the affairs of other countries.

The Vietnam War (1964–1975) contributed to intensifying the rivalry and the breach between China and the USSR, and it became di-

visive. With the completion of its economic recovery in 1958, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) began to pay more attention to strengthening the revolutionary movement in the south. From 1954 to 1963, China was closely involved in the development of Hanoi's policy. In its heyday Sino-Vietnamese friendship was described as "comrades plus brothers." The escalation of the conflict in Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident (August 1964), however, coincided with a certain cooling in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations. This chill, in turn, was partly attributable to the growing differences between the USSR and the PRC, the two chief patrons and supporters of the Vietnamese struggle against the Saigon regime.

The effect of the Sino-Soviet split in Vietnam soon manifested itself as Beijing and Moscow wooed Hanoi to take sides in their ideological dispute. China wanted the Hanoi leadership to side with the PRC in the Sino-Soviet split, and Beijing's extensive aid to the DRV (mostly military) was designed to draw Hanoi into China's orbit. The USSR was competing with China to win the allegiance of the Vietnamese communists; the USSR and the DRV concluded formal military and economic agreements. Through this gesture to Hanoi, Moscow wanted to offset Chinese influence and demonstrate its ideological rectitude on issues of national liberation.

Hanoi was virtually on China's side in the bifurcated international communist movement. The two countries shared a common ideological outlook and a common concern over U.S. intervention in Indochina. But leaders in Hanoi wanted to avoid the danger of submitting to a dependent relationship with China. Besides, China could not protect the DRV from U.S. bombings; therefore, in 1965, DRV decided to rely more on the USSR for protection and military supplies. The Sino-Soviet rivalry over Vietnam provided leaders in Hanoi an opportunity to obtain maximum support from their two communist allies. But Moscow gained greater influence in Hanoi because of the North Vietnamese need for Soviet material assistance. Nevertheless, Beijing continued to assist the DRV. Inasmuch as Mao envisioned China as a spokesman for the Third World cause of independence, by firmly backing the Vietnamese struggle against the United States, China wanted

to demonstrate to Third World countries and movements that it was their only true friend. Victory for North Vietnam's war of national unification with China's support would show the political correctness of Mao's more militant strategy for coping with U.S. imperialism, and the incorrectness of Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence.

The turning point in their relations came in 1968, when Sino-Soviet relations took a decisive turn for the worse. The Chinese now regarded the United States as a potential counterbalance against the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia, but their Hanoi comrades continued to see Washington as the most dangerous enemy.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the two Asian communist states went to war with each other. After the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam and the unification of the country, Hanoi's bilateral disputes with Beijing over Cambodia came to the fore. The political and diplomatic struggle became especially intense after Vietnam invaded Khmer Rouge Cambodia in 1979, overthrew Pol Pot's regime, and created a new pro-Vietnamese government. The dispute between China and Vietnam, backed by the USSR, over Cambodia culminated in a direct clash in 1979.

The USSR was assisting in every way not only Vietnamese but also Laotian communists in their struggle to establish communist regimes in Laos. In 1975, Laotian communists overthrew the royal government and established the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) in 1975.

By the 1970s the Sino-Soviet alliance had virtually dissolved. When the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance expired, it was not prolonged.

Desirous of replacing the former colonial domination in Southeast Asia with its own, China made efforts to undermine Soviet positions in the region. Chinese foreign policy became increasingly defined by its anti-Sovietism; Soviet foreign policy was also aimed against the PRC. In Southeast Asia, China was intimidating local governments with Soviet hegemony and Vietnamese minihegemony, thus trying to draw the Southeast Asian governments—especially Thailand and Burma—into the orbit of Chinese foreign policy. Meanwhile the USSR was "unmasking" Chinese intrigues with similar intentions.

In Burma the Chinese leadership linked amelioration of relations between the two countries with Burma's involvement in the struggle against "superpower hegemonies." The PRC painfully reacted to the Soviet efforts to establish closer ties with this country, which was regarded by China as a zone of its immediate vital importance. As a tool for pressure in the Burmese government the Chinese leaders used Burmese communist insurgents, who were supported by the Chinese Communist Party. In this complicated international situation the Burmese government preferred not to irritate its northern neighbor and refrained from developing close relations with the USSR. At the same time Rangoon (Yangon) tried to play on the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia in order not to fall into Chinese hands.

Although Thailand's government had reestablished formal diplomatic relations with the PRC, it did not wish to become too intimate, because that would have a negative impact on Thai-Soviet links. In the case of the U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia after the Vietnam War, unbalanced relations either with the USSR or with China would be damaging to Thailand's security.

Beijing was very active in developing close ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in trying to involve the association in its anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnam political course in the region. China planned to create a united front with ASEAN countries against the USSR. On its side the Soviet Union, taking into consideration that one of ASEAN's main intentions was to resist Chinese efforts to impose its control on Southeast Asia, changed its negative attitude to the association and did a lot in order to strengthen the anti-Chinese aspect of ASEAN activity.

After Mao Zedong's death in 1976 the Sino-Soviet struggle began to diminish. Reasons for the normalization were the change of leadership in both countries and communist parties, as well as of the political course, aimed now at reforms and the creation of favorable inner and outer conditions for them.

The PRC became interested in peaceful co-existence, proclaimed by the USSR, which had been denounced by previous Chinese leaders. The official normalization of relations between the USSR and the PRC occurred in 1989. Both countries today maintain full indepen-

dence of each other and absolute equality. A number of trade and political agreements were concluded between them, but there is no alliance. The Russian Federation has withdrawn from Southeast Asia, but China is constantly strengthening its position in the region.

LARISA EFIMOVA

See also Burma Communist Party (BCP); China since 1949; Cold War; Comintern; Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon) (People's Anti-Japanese Army) (1942); Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Russia and Southeast Asia; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945); Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, Dang Cong San Viet Nam)

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SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

Few countries share such a long history of relations as China and Vietnam. For more than a thousand years Vietnam was part of the Chinese Empire, before gaining independence in the tenth century C.E. The independent Vietnam remained under Chinese cultural and political influence and a tributary relationship devel-

oped. This close relationship ended with the period of French colonial rule in Vietnam during the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.

After Vietnam regained full independence from France in 1954, official relations between China and Vietnam were officially very close up to the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Thereafter relations gradually deteriorated, leading to open conflict in 1978 and to war in early 1979. Tension remained high for most of the 1980s, but beginning in the late 1980s relations started to improve, leading to full normalization of relations in November 1991. The 1990s were characterized by two contradictory trends, with expanding and improving relations in most fields on the one hand, and with reoccurring periods of tension relating to the border disputes between the two countries on the other. Both countries are making considerable efforts aimed at managing and eventually settling the border disputes.

The history of relations between the two countries has been characterized by long periods of collaboration and shorter periods of military conflict. The developments in the post-colonial period reflect a similar pattern of bilateral relations.

Historical Relations

Two parallel processes marked the period of direct Chinese rule over Vietnam from 111 B.C.E. to 939 C.E. One was the colonization of Vietnam by Chinese migrants and the other was the Vietnamese drive to regain political independence from the Chinese Empire. Apart from a steady migration from China to Vietnam of people such as administrators, farmers, and landlords, there were also persons seeking refuge from political upheavals in other parts of the Chinese Empire.

The first major rebellion against Chinese rule was the Trung rebellion in the first century C.E. Other rebellions and uprisings followed. But it was not until after the fall of the Tang dynasty, in 907 C.E., that the Chinese Empire was weakened enough to allow Vietnam to gain full independence.

After Vietnam's independence, refugees from China continued to arrive there. One wave of migrants came after the fall of the Sung dynasty (960–1279), when the Mongols (Yuan, 1271–

1368) occupied China in the thirteenth century. Another wave came after the fall of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) in the seventeenth century after the Manchus, who had established the Ching dynasty (1644–1911), had overthrown it.

Relations between China and Vietnam remained strong, even after Vietnam had gained independence. Vietnamese emperors paid tribute to the Chinese emperors, for which, in exchange, they received the blessings and the protection of the Chinese state. Chinese culture and thinking continued to have great influence on Vietnam. This can be seen from the prominent role that Confucianism played in Vietnamese society. Chinese influence was also evident in the fields of art and literature. However, relations between China and Vietnam were not always harmonious. For instance, in times of internal strife in Vietnam, there were sometimes Chinese military interventions.

During the period of French colonial rule over Vietnam, Vietnamese nationalists looked at developments in China as a source of inspiration in their anticolonial struggle. Furthermore, after the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, China started to provide the Việt Minh with invaluable support in the anticolonial war against the French. The Chinese support contributed to the Việt Minh victory in that conflict in 1954.

Relations from 1954 to 1975

After Vietnam regained full independence from France in 1954, relations between China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) were very close for the remainder of the 1950s. China provided the DRV with extensive economic and military assistance and sent thousands of advisers to assist the Vietnamese in various fields. China also provided Vietnam with considerable assistance during the Vietnam War in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. However, irritants developed owing to differing perceptions of the Soviet Union and divergent views on relations and negotiations with the United States. After the Paris agreement in 1973, Vietnam claimed that China had advised it to diminish the level of the fighting in the south for a few years—advice perceived as

aimed at keeping Vietnam divided. China rejected this claim.

Sino-Vietnamese Relations: 1975 to 1991

Following the end of the Vietnam War in late April 1975, relations between China and Vietnam went through dramatic changes from seemingly good and normal relations in 1975 to war in 1979. Relations deteriorated over a number of issues. First, there were differences in opinion concerning the Soviet Union and China's uneasiness about Vietnam's relations with that country. Second, there were conflicting interests in Cambodia and China's gradually increasing support for Cambodia in the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia. The Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia in late December 1978 caused further tension in relations with China. A third issue related to the territorial disputes between the two countries: along the land border, in the Gulf of Tonkin, and in the South China Sea. The maritime disputes contributed to the deterioration of bilateral relations by adding two more issues to the deepening differences between the two sides, although it is difficult to discern their specific impact. The clashes that occurred along the border were an indication of divergences with regard to other issues and the overall deterioration of relations, rather than an important issue in themselves. A fourth issue in Sino-Vietnamese relations was the situation of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and the way in which the Chinese minority was treated. It was the mass migration of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam in the spring of 1978 that officially led to the open and public deterioration of bilateral relations between the two countries. The overall deterioration of relations led to a militarized conflict that escalated into China's attack on Vietnam in February and March 1979.

The normalization process began with low-level contacts in the mid-1980s and expanded to high-level meetings from early 1989. In early September 1990 a (then secret) high-level meeting was held in China. Despite this meeting the normalization process lacked momentum on the political front. This situation prevailed up to mid-1991, when the process gained momentum. The increased diplomatic interaction paved the way for a high-level sum-

mit from 5 to 10 November 1991, during which bilateral relations were officially fully normalized.

Sino-Vietnamese Relations since Full Normalization in Late 1991

Since full normalization, the relationship between China and Vietnam has been characterized by two contradictory trends: one positive, with expanding contacts and cooperation in many fields, and the other negative, with continued differences relating primarily to territorial disputes. The positive trend has been prevalent throughout the period but has at times been slowed down by fluctuating levels of tension relating to border disputes—in particular, those in the South China Sea area.

Expanding political, cultural, economic, and military contacts between the two countries illustrate the positive trend in improving and expanding bilateral relations. There are official delegations regularly visiting the other's country to discuss ways of expanding cooperation in various fields. There is a strong political willingness to strengthen and deepen the overall relationship between the two countries. A number of bilateral agreements were signed following the full normalization of relations in late 1991. The growing economic relations can be seen through the growth in bilateral trade, up to U.S.\$1 billion in 1996 and U.S.\$2 billion in 2000. China is also providing loans and assistance to upgrade Chinese-built factories in northern Vietnam. In the political field the relationship between the two ruling parties—that is, the CCP and the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP)—has been expanded through a steady stream of exchange visits at various levels within the two parties. The contacts between the armed forces of the two countries have also expanded through regular visits.

Tension in bilateral relations has primarily been caused by differences relating to territorial disputes and to a lesser degree by problems relating to cross-border smuggling. Since late 1991 sharp differences relating to all the territorial disputes were prevalent from May to November 1992. They include overlapping claims to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos, water and continental shelf areas in the South China Sea and in the Gulf of Tonkin, and areas along the land border. Differences relating to oil exploration in

the South China Sea and the signing of contracts with foreign companies for exploration were prevalent during the periods April–June 1994, April–May 1996, and March–April 1997. During 1998 there were no extended periods of tension relating to border disputes, but shorter periods can be noted, such as in January along the land border and in the South China Sea during the months of April, May, July, and September. During 1999 the focus was on reaching a settlement of the land border dispute, and this resulted in the signing of a Land Border Treaty on 30 December 1999. During 2000 the focus was on settling Gulf of Tonkin disputes, and that resulted in the signing of the Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones, and Continental Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin on 25 December 2000. Since 1999 no periods of tension have been caused by any of the border disputes. However, in 1999 and in 2001, official protests were issued in response to a limited number of actions carried out in or in relation to the South China Sea.

Conclusion

China and Vietnam share a long history of relations that have a strong bearing on the contemporary relationship. Relations during the second half of the twentieth century were characterized by periods of close collaboration and a period of deep conflict. We are currently witnessing a period of close cooperation following a considerable improvement of relations during the 1990s, as compared with the situation that prevailed in the late 1970s.

The future development of the Sino-Vietnamese relationship will be determined by how successfully the two sides handle disputed issues. Deepening bilateral cooperation in different fields and expanding economic interaction contribute to building a more stable bilateral relationship, and the progress in managing territorial disputes in recent years contributes positively to the prospect for long-term stability in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship. However, the unresolved disputes in the South China Sea area remain potential threats to the relationship in the long term.

RAMSES AMER

See also China, Imperial; China since 1949; Cold War; Democratic Kampuchea (DK);

Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Khmer Rouge; Nam Viet (Nan Yue); People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK); Sino-Soviet Struggle; Sino-Vietnamese Wars; Spratly and Parcel Archipelagos Disputes; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, League for the Independence of Vietnam); Vietnam, North (post-1945)

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SINO-VIETNAMESE WARS

China and Vietnam share a history of relations marked by long periods of collaboration and shorter periods of military conflict. The military conflicts have been of a dual nature: first, rebellions by Vietnamese to regain independence from the Chinese Empire during the more than a thousand years when Vietnam was part of the Chinese Empire, and second, militarized conflicts between independent Vietnam and China.

During the more than a thousand years of direct Chinese rule over Vietnam, a number of rebellions occurred. The Trung rebellion, in the first century C.E. (ca. 40–43), was a genuinely Vietnamese rebellion. The Chinese immigration that aimed at colonizing Vietnam gradually led to the emergence of a new Sino-Vietnamese ruling class, a social and economic decolonization of Vietnam, and efforts to establish political independence from the Chinese Empire. That led to new rebellions, but they all failed because of the strength of the Chinese Empire. After the fall of the Tang dynasty in 907 C.E., the prospects for Vietnamese independence increased, and in 939 C.E. Vietnam regained complete independence.

Relations between the independent Vietnam and the Chinese Empire continued to be very close both politically and culturally. However, relations between China and Vietnam were not always harmonious; in times of internal strife in Vietnam, Chinese emperors took advantage of the opportunity to interfere militarily in order to gain direct control. For instance, the Ming emperor gained control over Vietnam from 1407 to 1428. Also, the Chinese imperial court might attempt to assist a threatened or deposed monarch, as in the case of the last Vietnamese

emperor of the Le dynasty in 1788. On both occasions the Vietnamese eventually defeated the Chinese. Another period of militarized conflict occurred in the late thirteenth century, when the Mongols ruled China (Yuan, 1271–1368) and tried to expand political control into Vietnam. Eventually Vietnam won a decisive battle in 1288.

After Vietnam gained full independence from French colonial rule in 1954, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and China enjoyed two decades of extensive cooperation and good relations. However, the end of the Vietnam War in late April 1975 signaled the beginning of a gradual deterioration of relations marked by an escalating number of military clashes along the common land border. These military clashes culminated in a Chinese offensive along the whole land border between 17 February and 16 March 1979. China declared that it was a response to Vietnamese attacks on China and claimed to have captured three out of six provincial capitals in the bordering provinces, Cao Bang, Lang Son, and Lao Cai, as well as seventeen other cities and counties, before announcing the pullout on 5 March. China announced that the withdrawal was complete by 16 March.

Attempts at negotiations between the two states were made from April 1979 to March 1980, but the points of discussion were too far from each other to make possible any agreement. Vietnam wanted to discuss problems solely related to the armed conflict between the two states and ways of reducing tension around the common border. China agreed to discuss those issues but also wanted to discuss the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia and Laos, the situation of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, as well as territorial problems between the two states.

Relations remained tense during and after these talks—especially so along the common border, where both sides had many troops stationed. There were mutual accusations about military incursions, and enemy shelling became part of everyday life in certain areas of the bordering provinces. There seems to have been a link between Vietnamese offensives in Cambodia and increased Chinese military activity on the Sino-Vietnamese border. Up to August 1987 six major flare-ups were registered along the border: in July 1980, in May 1981, in April

1983, in April 1984, in June 1985, and in December 1986–January 1987. In March 1988 the two states clashed around the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The clashes resulted in China's seizing some of the islands. During the second half of 1988 tension along the common land border steadily decreased, and by December 1988, border trade had been resumed.

Following a slow process of normalization during the second half of the 1980s and into the early 1990s, it gained momentum during the second half of 1991. The increased diplomatic interaction paved the way for a high-level summit on 5 to 10 November 1991, during which the bilateral relations were officially fully normalized. Most disputed issues were settled during this process, but not the territorial disputes. During the 1990s, territorial disputes caused a fluctuating level of tension in bilateral relations. However, the tension did not lead to military clashes. Gradually the two countries have developed mechanisms for handling these disputes; through negotiations they resolved the land border and Gulf of Tonkin disputes in 1999 and 2000, respectively.

RAMSES AMER

See also China since 1949; China, Imperial; Cold War; Dai Viet (939 C.E.–1407); Democratic Kampuchea (DK); Le Dynasty (1428–1527, 1533–1789); Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK); Sino-Soviet Struggle; Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Spratly and Paracel Archipelagos Disputes; Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty (1271–1368)

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and Strategies." *China Report* 16, no. 1: 15–32.

SISAVANG VONG (r. 1904–1959)

King of Colonial Laos

Born in 1885 and invested as king in 1904 at the age of nineteen, Sisavang Vong played a largely ceremonial role in the affairs of French Laos, but nevertheless he entered center stage in the crucial months following the defeat of the Japanese and the postwar return of the French. A symbol of the unity of the country, he had a stature that grew as his independent kingdom came to be drawn into international politics surrounding the Indochina wars. However, it was to be his son and heir, Sisavang Watthana, who would increasingly replace him in public life as his health faded in the 1950s.

Following French intervention in upper Laos, especially that associated with the Pavie missions, the French sought to preserve the ancient kingdom of Luang Prabang. Upon the death of King Zakharine on 25 March 1904, the French chose his younger son, Prince Sisavang Vong, in preference to the elder Prince Sisaleumsak as Zakharine's successor. Returning from France, where he had undergone higher education, the Crown prince arrived back in Luang Prabang to officiate at the royal cremation.

As a royal figure associated with the ancient kingdom of Luang Prabang and the Buddhist and mandarin traditions that supported the court, Sisavang Vong inherited great prestige and religious charisma. As a Buddhist monarch, he was not only a person of accumulated merit but in a Laos Buddological sense also a medium connecting to the metaphysical world, such as is celebrated in certain court rituals at Luang Prabang. Nevertheless, his administrative powers were strictly circumscribed by the French resident, and his edicts and titles conferred upon court officials were all subject to approval by the French, just as his royal budget was submitted for approval to the governor-general of Indochina. The French even built his palace.

In 1931, observing the anomalous character of the semiprotectorate semicolonial status of Laos, the king lobbied Paris to place the kingdom of Luang Prabang on the same legal status as Cambodia and Annam. The mixed oriental-Western legal structure of governance continued

virtually to the end. However, in a treaty signed in 1941 between Marshal Petain and the king, in order to compensate the monarch for the temporary loss of Sayaboury province to Thailand, Sisavang Vong was recognized, conceptually, as king of Luang Prabang and the rest of Laos.

On 8 April 1945, following the Japanese *coup de force*, the king, under duress, was obliged to proclaim the independence of Laos from France. There was no question that the Francophile king was coerced into making the proclamation, although the king and Crown prince were also critical of the inability of the French intelligence to track Japanese intentions and protect Laos.

With the French return to Laos following the Japanese surrender of 15 August 1945, the king's declaration of independence under Japanese duress was considered null and void. But, by the end of the month, differences with Prince Phetsarath (1890–1959) and the king on the future of the country were in the open. Charging that the king was no longer a free agent, Phetsarath appealed to the Allies to recognize Lao independence. The Lao Issara (Issarak), the Lao independence movement dominated by Phetsarath, and local Vietnamese communists, who mounted violent street demonstrations and actions in Vientiane and Luang Prabang, agreed. In a historic turn of events the king replied by dismissing Phetsarath from his posts, virtually forcing the latter's hand. With Phetsarath's fateful defection, the die was cast for the subsequent thirty years of civil war.

Despite the modern veneer, Laos under the monarchy upheld many time-bound traditions in a fundamentally Theravada Buddhist and animist culture. For example, the credulous king was not beyond consulting soothsayers even in the face of Việt Minh advances in Luang Prabang in 1953. But his refusal to vacate the royal capital redounded to his favor and popular acclaim. Even so, the focus of the monarchy was in Luang Prabang, as Laos was a deeply divided nation, between north and south where even the name of the monarch was largely unknown.

On 29 October 1959 the king died after a reign of fifty-four years. An official planning session held in Luang Prabang for the royal cremation, however, was the occasion for the Kongle coup d'état in Vientiane on 8 August 1960. Much delayed, 24 April 1961 was chosen as the



King of Laos Sisavang Vong, ca. 1949.
(Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

auspicious day for the king's cremation. Celebrations continued over three days with much pomp and ceremony, notwithstanding the grave international crisis foreshadowing the Geneva Conference on Laos opening the following month.

An image of the king in the form of a statue survives in Laos, in Vientiane, a gift of the Soviet Union from the early 1970s, but undoubtedly the elder king also survives in the memories of an older generation as a man of Buddological merit and as a link with the past.

GEOFFREY C. GUNN

See also Annam; Buddhism, Theravada; Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; French Indochina; Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Lao Issara (Issarak); Laos (Nineteenth Century to mid-1990s); Luang Prabang; Pavie, Auguste (1847–1925); Phetsarath (1890–1959); Việt

Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội)
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SISOWATH (1840–1927)

**Presiding over France's
*Mission Civilisatrice***

Sisowath, king of Cambodia, succeeded his older brother, Norodom (r. 1860–1904), to the throne in 1904. In the 1860s and 1870s, Sisowath ingratiated himself with the French authorities in Cambodia by helping to put down a series of dynastic rebellions—some orchestrated secretly by Norodom and others directed against him. The French secretly promised Sisowath the throne in the 1880s. Soon after he became king, France forced Siam (Thailand) to return two northwestern Cambodian provinces that had been annexed by Bangkok in the 1790s. One of these, Siem Reap, contained the medieval Cambodian ruins known popularly as Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); the other, Battambang, soon became an important source for rice exports.

Under Sisowath's rule, French control over Cambodia intensified, but the French encountered little resistance from the Khmer, who enjoyed an unprecedented period of prosperity and peace. Sisowath presided, benignly, over the partial modernization of his kingdom. His popularity among ordinary Khmer and his acceptance of the colonial status quo helped to maintain royalty as a viable institution and allowed France's *mission civilisatrice* ("civilizing mission") to proceed at a stately pace. Between 1904 and 1927, hundreds of kilometers of paved roads were built; Phnom Penh, the capital, was modernized; the population grew rapidly; and Cambodian exports, particularly of rice, rubber, and corn, improved the livelihood of hundreds of thousands of Cambodian peasant farming families. After his demise at the age of eighty-seven, the French established Cambodia's first high school named after him, on the site of his former palace.

DAVID CHANDLER



King Sisowath with French colonial officials, ca. 1927. (Bettmann/Corbis)

See also Battambang; Cambodia under French Colonial Rule; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; *Mission Civilisatrice* ("Civilizing Mission"); Paknam Incident (1893); Siem Reap

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SJAHRIR, SUTAN (1909–1966)

**Westernized Face of
Indonesian Nationalism**

Sutan Sjahrir was an Indonesian socialist leader, and three times prime minister of the Indonesian republic during the years 1945 to 1947. Born in May 1909 in Padang Panjang (West Sumatra) of Minangkabau ancestry, he was edu-

cated in Medan, Bandung, Amsterdam, and Leiden. While in The Netherlands he made important contacts with young Dutch socialists and was a principal leader of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI, Indonesian Association), but he resigned from it in 1931 when communists gained control of the organization and expelled Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980).

Returning to Indonesia in 1931, he helped to found the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (PNI-Baru, National Education Club) to educate a socialist leadership for Indonesia's nationalist movement, and his interest in labor issues led to his being appointed chairman of the Indonesian Workers' Congress. Consequently he was arrested in 1934 and imprisoned in Batavia and then moved to the notorious Boven Digul camp in New Guinea, before being exiled to the relative comfort of Banda Neira, where he remained from 1936 until he was flown to Java by the Dutch in January 1942.

Sjahrir remained aloof during the subsequent Japanese occupation (1942–1945), building up an underground network of former PNI-Baru members and students, and attempting to make contact with the Allies while still retaining links with Indonesian leaders such as Hatta.

After the declaration of independence (August 1945), Sjahrir engineered a takeover within the Central Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat, KNIP), securing the suspension of the 1945 Constitution in favor of cabinet government. The following month saw the creation of a new cabinet with Sjahrir as prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of the interior, and in the next month (October) the creation of the Socialist Party with Sjahrir as chairman. However, Sjahrir's government base in Jakarta (formerly Batavia) was not only physically, but also culturally and ideologically, divided from the capital of the republic in Yogyakarta, where Sukarno (1901–1970) and Hatta were based. His negotiations with the Dutch generated intense hostility within nationalist circles in Java. He resigned in the face of opposition in March 1946 but was immediately reappointed with a new cabinet, although its contents were more dictated by Sukarno and Hatta.

Local army units in Surakarta who feared a betrayal of Indonesian independence briefly held Sjahrir under arrest in June 1946. As a re-

sult, he resumed his cabinet government only in October in an even weaker position. He resigned in June 1947 for the third and final time as prime minister after failing to gain support for further compromises with the Dutch.

When the Dutch launched the first "police action" (1947), Sjahrir was abroad. He used the opportunity to act as the advocate of the republic, pleading for foreign support through a series of visits to foreign capitals and even addressing the UN Security Council, although he was not officially accredited.

He returned to Indonesia in April 1948, and he remained mostly detached from active politics thereafter. Following a token appearance at the Renville Agreement between the Dutch and Indonesians in January 1948, he refused to sit on any subsequent delegation, and even refused to attend the final Round Table Conference at The Hague in 1949.

He was imprisoned during the second Dutch "police action" in December 1948, being held at Prapat with Sukarno and Haji Agus Salim (1884–1954), but was controversially released before the other leaders and returned to Jakarta. In the same year his supporters founded a new Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), with him as leader. This party was influential in parliament and the civil service until it was banned in 1960, but it fared very badly in the 1955 parliamentary elections. Sjahrir had, however, already effectively withdrawn from active politics after 1950. He was held under house arrest after January 1962 on the flimsy pretext of his supposed involvement in a plot against Sukarno. In 1965 he was allowed to go to Switzerland for medical treatment, but this was too late to save his life. He was given a full state funeral in 1966, attended by enormous crowds, and declared a "national hero" by presidential decree.

Despite his high profile as an Indonesian nationalist figure, Sjahrir actually spent very little of his life in sustained, active politics, often cultivating an impression of detachment and distaste for central politics. Instead he was always more dedicated to cadre formation and education than mass action—values with which he seemed to imbue his followers in the PSI. He always expressed a profound hostility toward feudalism, Hinduism, mysticism, and what he called "the passive East" that

made his relations with Sukarno and some other nationalists seriously strained. He was a practicing if idiosyncratic Muslim but did not see the religion as having any political role, although he valued aspects of modernist Islam as a rationalizing and dynamic force. His political vision was fundamentally Marxist, although with an emphasis on communal solidarity rather than class warfare. In November 1945 he published his most famous and widely translated works, *Perjuangan Kita* (*Our Struggle*), which displayed a commitment to international socialist revolution. Although Sjahrir never enjoyed broad political support in Indonesia, he did inspire a fierce loyalty among his elite followers, and his popularity among Europeans as the acceptable and apparently Westernized face of Indonesian nationalism undoubtedly helped to secure important support for the new republic.

ANTHONY MILTON

See also Agus Salim, Haji (1884–1954); Dutch Police Action (First and Second); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Renville Agreement (January 1948); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970)

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SJARIFUDDIN, AMIR (1907–1948)
Indonesian Communist Leader

Amir Sjarifuddin was an Indonesian leftist nationalist activist, lawyer, and former prime minister. He was born of a Muslim family but converted to Christianity, and then he declared himself a communist. Born in Medan, North Sumatra, Sjarifuddin was recognized as a brilliant student at law school in Jakarta. Playing the violin was his lifelong passion.

His political consciousness began at his boardinghouse in Kramat 106, Jakarta, well-known as *Indonesis Clubgebouw*. From the late 1920s to mid-1930s he stayed at this residence, together with other student activists such as Abu Hanifah, Mohammad Yamin, Assaat, and other senior students of the famous medical school Stovia and law school RHS. He met many young nationalist activists who made this house their rendezvous. The building was also used for the first youth congress, held in October 1928; the congress adopted the three ideals of Indonesian national identity of *Sumpah Pemuda*, or Youth Pledge. As a young activist, Sjarifuddin played an important role during the congress, together with other members of *Perkumpulan Pelajar Pelajar Indonesia* (PPPI, Association of Indonesian Students). The progressive thoughts and writings of French philosophers Karl Marx (1818–1883), Friedrich Engels (1820–1893), and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870–1924) were influential among many young Indonesian nationalist activists at that time, and Sjarifuddin was no exception. His article on Flanders, entitled “De fiere Vlaamsche Leeuw” published in PPPI’s journal was seized by the Dutch secret police.

Sjarifuddin rose as a political leader when he joined Sartono to form *Partai Indonesia* (Partindo) in 1931 after the dissolution of Soekarno’s PNI (Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia). Remaining in Partindo, he paid for his radical articles on the colonial government by spending some years in the Bandung prison (1933–1935). It is believed that Sjarifuddin converted to Christianity in 1935 and joined an illegal communist cell led by Moeso (Musso).

Partindo was dissolved in November 1936. Sjarifuddin, together with other Partindo cadres, formed *Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia* (Gerindo) in May 1937. Gerindo aimed to win a full parliament for Indonesia on the ba-

sis of cooperation with the Dutch against the threat of fascism. Sjarifuddin was appointed Gerindo's chairman in 1939. Shortly afterward he was jailed for his alleged involvement in underground political activity. However, in 1948 he confessed that he had been given 25,000 guilders by the Dutch government just prior to the arrival of the Japanese to facilitate the creation of underground political groups. During the occupation he was incarcerated by the Japanese military in Malang and sentenced to death. Appeals to Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970) and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980) commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment.

Following the proclamation of Indonesian independence in August 1945, Sjarifuddin set up a new party called Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Parsi). He worked with another socialist leader, Sutan Sjahrir (1909–1966), who then became prime minister and his main political rival. He served as minister of defense in Sjahrir's cabinet. In July 1947, he himself became prime minister. As premier he negotiated with the Dutch and signed the Renville Agreement in January 1948. Owing to major opposition to the agreement within the republican government, Sjarifuddin resigned as prime minister, and Mohammad Hatta assumed the premiership.

After separating from Sutan Sjahrir on 13 February 1948, Sjarifuddin formed a radical left-wing group named Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR, People's Democratic Front) on 26 February 1948. FDR became more radical when Moeso, a leader of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), joined in August 1948 upon his return from Moscow. After that, FDR was identical with PKI. Sjarifuddin was trapped between the radical strategy advocated by Moeso and the moderate line advocated by others. Declaring himself a communist on 29 August 1948, Sjarifuddin was in open conflict with Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta.

FDR and PKI were involved in the Madiun affair of September 1948. Sjarifuddin, his wife, Zainab, and other FDR/PKI leaders were apprehended by a military group loyal to Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta in Pati, Central Java, from where they were brought to Surakarta and then executed.

BAMBANG PURWANTO

See also Dutch Police Action (First and Second); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Madiun Affair (September 1948); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Renville Agreement (January 1948); Sjahrir, Sutan (1909–1966); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970)

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SLAVERY

For much of the population, the labor system of Southeast Asia, throughout most of its recorded history, was based on obligations to labor for a master, creditor, or lord. As a form of bondage, slavery existed within a larger pattern that also included debt-bondage and fealty to a ruler, and it was seldom sharply demarcated from these other forms.

A slave is generally someone who is considered the property of another and is required to perform compulsory labor. In Southeast Asia, the person-as-property aspect of bondage was generally secondary to notions of obligation and fealty. As elsewhere in Asia, slaves were not necessarily of lower status than the general population, and might at times attain considerable wealth and power. In the classical Southeast Asian trading states, where most labor and retailing was done by slaves, slaves frequently lived in their own houses, made income on the

side, and owned property, sometimes even possessing their own slaves. Early European observers were surprised to find that affluent Malay slaves in the cities of Melaka and Aceh disdained to perform any kind of manual labor, even when offered payment, leaving such work to recent captives or impoverished aliens. Compared with New World and European forms of plantation slavery, there was generally less social distance between slaves and slave-owners in Southeast Asia, and manumission was more common; after one or two generations, slaves were frequently freed or assimilated into more ambiguous forms of bondage.

War Captives and Debt-Bondsmen

Captives in war or raiding expeditions were usually enslaved, at least temporarily. In Angkor, at its height in the thirteenth century, a large proportion of the population appears to have been slaves captured or bought from nearby hill peoples or neighboring states. In this case, the social and cultural gulf between captive slaves and the dominant Khmer population was great, and vastly different from that which existed between ordinary people and indigenous bondsmen. But such situations were unusual. More often, the position of captives was temporary, so that within a generation or two, they shared the language, religion, and way of life of the dominant population.

In normal times, debts were the most important source of bondage in Southeast Asia. If a person was unable to pay a debt, the debtor became a bondsman to the creditor. In Southeast Asia, judicial sentences were often in monetary form, and when a fine could not be paid, the guilty person—and perhaps his family dependents—became bondsmen. Debt-bondage was widespread in premodern Southeast Asia. In Central Siam during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, debt-bondsmen were believed, for example, to have comprised between a quarter and a half of the population. Even in comparatively egalitarian upland societies, little penetrated by money, debt-bondage was widely reported. The Iban of West Borneo had both captive slaves (*ulun*) and debt-bondsmen (*jaumi*). The latter regularly redeemed themselves, while the former, by the second generation, or upon an owner's death, were freed by adoption

(*betembang*) into the owner's family. Consequently, bondage never became a permanently hereditary status, although families of known slave ancestry tended to suffer social stigma.

Urban Slaves

The large cities of premodern Southeast Asia—Angkor, Ayudhya, Melaka, Aceh, and Makassar—required, in their precolonial heyday, a large labor force that was provided not by spontaneous migration and wage labor, but by the large-scale importation of slaves. Some came in the retinue of traders and officials, as domestic slaves; others were brought back as war captives, to be distributed, sold, or to work for the king; still others were imported by slave traders. Merchants and officials who lived by trade could afford enormous retinues of slaves. For the dominant classes it was imperative to do no manual work and, as a mark of status, to possess large retinues of slaves. Early Western observers noted that slaves were treated as well as, if not better than, servants in Europe. In this cosmopolitan setting, traders were often foreigners, and so could not function without men bonded to them. Hence slaves were the single most important item of property. As in the classical Western world, the institution of slavery reached its peak during the high point of commercially oriented urban development.

With control over persons the major index of power, in many Southeast Asian states there was rivalry between the king and nobles. The king, on the one hand, would seek to maximize the number of people directly obligated to his royal person through *corvée* service, conscription, and taxation; the nobles, on the other, would attempt to withdraw men from such service through “private” bondage or slavery. The burden of royal *corvée* could be heavy, as, for example, in premodern Burma, Siam, and Cambodia. There, for ordinary people, there were three alternatives: bondage to the king, bondage to a monastery or religious foundation, and “private” bondage. Of the three, bondage to the king was usually the most burdensome, entailing in Siam one-half of a man's labor. By contrast, in the Malay world, to be a royal bondsman (*hamba raja*) was a privileged status. Powerful rulers tended to curtail the ability of citizens to control others, so that the

expansion of state power in later centuries coincided with efforts to abolish slavery and limit other forms of private bondage.

Early Modern Period and the End of Slavery

Before indentured labor in the nineteenth century, captives and slaves were the primary source of labor mobility in Southeast Asia. Europeans at first adapted to this system. However, as the Dutch and Spanish found cheaper ways to tap labor, particularly through systems of *corvée*, slaveholding declined.

According to Anthony Reid, the decline of slavery is associated with two structural factors in Southeast Asia. Firstly, the modern state, in both its colonial and national forms, increasingly demanded the undivided control over its people; secondly, a growing number of landless laborers and indentured aliens made wage labor cheaper and more efficient. European governments began to take steps against slavery at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Toward the close of the century, slavery was formally abolished throughout the region.

CLIFFORD SATHER

See also Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Ilanun and Balangingi; Indigenous Political Power; Labor and Labor Unions; Piracy; Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago

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SNOUCK HURGRONJE, PROFESSOR CHRISTIAAN (1857–1936)

Scholar-Bureaucrat of Indonesian Islam

Snouck Hurgronje's contribution to Indonesian history and historiography is still debated, be-

cause of his dual role as orientalist scholar and colonial official. However, his insistence that textual studies be combined with direct observation in the field ensures that his writings are essential sources for any student of the history of Indonesian Islam and society.

Snouck Hurgronje defended a doctoral thesis at Leiden University on the history and rituals of the Hajj (pilgrimage) in 1880. In 1883 he was secretly appointed by the colonial administration to go to Arabia to conduct research into the resident communities of Southeast Asian scholars there, particularly with reference to discovering the political and religious currents disseminated among them. This he did from 1884 to 1885.

In 1889 he was appointed by the Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies administration as adviser for native languages and Islamic law. In 1891 he was dispatched to Aceh to conduct a study with a view to devising policies to put an end to the continuing conflict against Dutch rule. There, he identified the Acehese religious leadership as presenting the most serious source of resistance, and recommended that members of this leadership be pacified by the use of the same guerrilla tactics that they used against the Dutch. Accordingly, General J. B. van Heutsz (1851–1924) aggressively pursued Snouck Hurgronje's proposed course of action.

Snouck Hurgronje remained in the Indies until 1906. He then returned to Holland and was appointed professor in Arabic, Acehese, and Malay at Leiden University. Although holding that position, he continued his role as adviser to the colonial government until 1927. He played a major role in the training of many future Indies officials, inculcating in them the cultural policy of "Association"—that is, educating an Indies elite to share in Western modes of thought and civilization through Dutch education.

M. F. LAFFAN

See also Aceh (Aceh); Aceh (Aceh) Wars (1873–1903); Islam in Southeast Asia; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Van Heutsz, General Joannes Benedictus (1851–1924)

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SOCIÉTÉ DES MISSIONS ÉTRANGÈRES (MEP)

Founded in Paris between 1658 and 1663 by Mgr Pallu and Mgr de la Mothe-Lambert, the Missions Étrangères de Paris (MEP) aimed at promoting the conversion of Asia to Catholicism. To reinvigorate Catholic missionizing, currently stagnating in Portuguese hands, it was necessary to evade the monopoly of episcopal jurisdiction in Asia (the *padroado*) given to the Portuguese Crown by the papacy during the fifteenth century. Bishops of a new type, “vicars apostolic,” were appointed from among missionaries of the MEP, who derived their episcopal powers from extinct sees in Asia Minor, outside the jurisdictional boundaries of the *padroado*. The main directive of the French MEP was to establish autochthonous clergies—that is, national churches with indigenous episcopates and priesthoods. Over the following three centuries this aim was not generally followed, and French clergy were to retain full canonical control of all the apostolic vicariates established by the society in Asia until the twentieth century.

In the seventeenth century the MEP maintained apostolic vicariates in Tonkin, Cochinchina, and Siam (Thailand), extending in the eighteenth century to parts of China and India. The period of the MEP’s greatest growth was the nineteenth century, when despite waves of intermittent persecution in some regions, new vicariates were opened up and existing vicariates grew large enough to require repeated subdivision. In the process the society became responsible for apostolic vicariates in Korea (1831), Mongolia (1840), Manchuria (1840), Melaka (1841), Tibet (1846), Japan (1846), and seven provinces of China (1840–1860), together with more in India, in Ava, and in Pegu (1846). But the MEP’s greatest commitment always remained Vietnam, Siam, and Cambodia, subdivided into eight vicariates from 1846 to 1864. They shared only East Tonkin with the Spanish Dominicans. Despite occasionally intense persecution in Vietnam, they retained their greatest numbers of converts there, mak-

ing Vietnam proportionately one of the most heavily Christianized societies in Asia.

For almost three centuries the MEP declined to respond to intermittent urging from the papacy to accept indigenous clergy as bishops. The devolution of responsibility to native bishops began with the appointment of the first Indian vicar apostolic in 1923, followed by six Chinese bishops in 1926 and a Japanese bishop in 1927. In spite of the huge rise in the size of the Christian population in Vietnam alone—to almost a million before the Great War (1914–1918)—no native bishops were consecrated there until 1933. The MEP’s surrender of ecclesiastical control in China accelerated after 1949, but in Vietnam the transfer of responsibility did not take place until 1960, when apostolic vicariates were finally abolished in favor of a local diocesan system.

PATRICK TUCK

See also Catholicism; Missionaries, Christian; Vietnam under French Colonial Rule

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SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) **Populist Leader of Indonesian Independence**

Soekarno was a highly influential leader of the Indonesian nationalist movement, the first president of independent Indonesia, and closely linked with secular nationalist groups. He is remembered for his famous saying *jangan sekali-kali melupakan sejarah*, or *jas merah*, meaning never to forget history. He was born in Surabaya (Blitar?), East Java, on 6 June 1901 from a lesser *priyayi* (gentry) member of the official class, to a Javanese father and Balinese mother. Soekarno spent his early education in Mojokerto, where his father worked as a



Indonesian president Soekarno (Sukarno).
(Bettmann/Corbis)

teacher, before entering the European school system; there he completed the lower school in 1916. He was initially exposed to political movements while attending the European higher middle school of *Hoogere Burgerschool* (HBS) and while boarding in the house of Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882–1934), who was then chairman of Sarekat Islam (SI) in Surabaya. During this period, Soekarno met other leading nationalist leaders, such as Haji Agoes (Agus) Salim (1884–1954), Semaoen (Semaun) (1899–1971), and Ki Hadjar Dewantara (Dewantoro) (1889–1959) in Tjokroaminoto's house, a center of much political activity. The young Soekarno was even tied in marriage with Tjokroaminoto's daughter.

Soekarno joined Jong Java (Young Java), a Javanese youth movement organization, in 1918 and started to write for Sarekat Islam's newspaper, *Oetoesan Hindia*. He openly attacked capi-

talism, colonialism, and imperialism in his writings; in his oral presentation he also rejected the use of high-Javanese *kromo* and used low-Javanese *ngoko* instead, during meetings of Jong Java. Although Soekarno was very aware of his higher social status than most of the population, further enhanced by his oratorical ability, he also displayed a great interest in the challenges faced by the common people. He always considered himself the "mouthpiece of the people." It is not surprising, then, if his populism often put him into conflict with other nationalist leaders, who took issue with his unrealistic, simplistic, romantic, and, to some extent, ironically elitist views on issues.

Soekarno finished his studies at HBS in 1921. He then joined the newly established technical college *Technische Hoogeschool* (THS) at Bandung, and completed an engineering course in 1926. Unlike most other leading Indonesian nationalist leaders, who were educated abroad, his education and experience were entirely in Indonesia. Living in Bandung, Soekarno lost ties with Tjokroaminoto. He divorced Tjokroaminoto's daughter and then married the widow of his former landlord. He was now closer to secular nationalist leaders such as Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo (1886–1943), Douwes Dekker (Danudirtdja Setiaboedi) (1880–1950), and Ki Hadjar Dewantara, and at the same time he encountered the growing number of Islamic modernists in Bandung. This socialization and intellectual environment contributed greatly toward Soekarno's way of thinking, which became more urbane and sophisticated. Soekarno began to adopt the mindset of most Javanese *priyayi* and *abangan* in matters of religion, Javanese culture, and philosophy. He believed in nationalism and unity and had his own interpretation of the differences among nationalism, Islam, and Marxism as political philosophy. In a series of articles published in *Indonesia Moeda* in 1926, Soekarno argued that there is no real difference among nationalism, Islam, and Marxism as an ideology. All three should be put together as the ideological basis in the struggle for the independence of Indonesia.

After completing college in 1926, Soekarno began his real political activity through Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Association) in 1927. The party changed its name to Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Indonesian Nationalist Party) in 1929.

The radical activities of the PNI resulted in the imprisonment of Soekarno and other leaders by the Dutch colonial government. After his release in December 1931, Soekarno joined the new party, named Partai Indonesia (Indonesian Party), or *Partindo*, founded in August 1931 by former PNI members. But he was soon rearrested, in August 1933, and exiled, initially to Flores Island and then to Bengkulu, without trial. There is controversy over this period of Soekarno's life. Some scholars have argued that Soekarno had written four letters to the colonial authorities appealing for his release and offering his retreat from political activity in return. Others maintain that Soekarno lived in exile under the Dutch colonial authorities in Sumatra; it was then that he met his third wife, the teenager Fatmawati.

When Japanese troops entered Indonesia at the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945), Soekarno returned to Jakarta in July 1942. Together with Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980) and other cooperative nationalist leaders, Soekarno worked for the Japanese authorities in the interest of the greater goal of Indonesian independence. Soekarno also played an important role in a Japanese-sponsored committee for the preparation for Indonesian independence, *Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (BPUPKI), convened in March 1945, about six months after Japanese prime minister Koiso (1880–1950) promised independence for Indonesia. The committee discussed basic philosophy and drafted a constitution for an independent Indonesia. Soekarno proposed his idea about a state ideology *Pancasila* during his speech on 1 June 1945, and had a hand in various aspects of the constitution plan. Together with the chairman, Dr. Radjiman Widioningrat, Soekarno was responsible for retaining the additional phrase “with the obligation to carry out Islamic law for the Moslem” in the first principle of *Piagam Jakarta* (the Jakarta Charter). There was strong opposition from Ki Bagoes Hadikoesoemo, a leading Islamic leader who had initially proposed that Islam be the state ideology for an independent Indonesia but later opposed the idea. Soekarno declined Hadikoesoemo's suggestions in order to appease the Islamic majority by resorting to a compromise. In fact, the phrase was finally removed when the constitution was approved after the declaration of Indonesian independence.

Despite some differences between the old and young groups among Indonesian nationalist activists concerning the right time to declare independence, Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945 in the name of the Indonesian people. They were then appointed the president and vice-president of the Republic of Indonesia by *Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence), which acted as a transitional parliament. However, Soekarno soon realized that the new republic afforded no room for his wishes and ideology to be practiced. His proposal to create a national party was rejected, and subsequently the emerging political scenario headed toward a liberal, multiparty, parliamentary system. His position as the head of the cabinet was changed to the newly appointed position of prime minister, despite there being no provision in the constitution sanctioning such a post. It is interesting to note that despite his historical connection with the secular nationalist party of PNI, Soekarno never declared himself formally a member when most of his companions used a similar name for a newly created party in late 1945.

Soekarno led the Indonesian struggle against the returning Dutch during the revolution by means of his oratorical skills and charismatic personality, but he did not take part directly in most diplomatic negotiations; Mohammad Hatta actively participated in the various discussions with the Dutch. Bereft of military experience, Soekarno possessed no military strategy despite the fact that the Indonesians had to fight by conventional means to prevent a Dutch reoccupation. He also failed to build a strong rapport with individuals within the military, who considered themselves the most meritorious and patriotic group in protecting the country from a reassertion of colonial power. Instead it was his deputy, Mohammad Hatta, who administered and ran the government and signed several important political regulations concerning political parties and internal politics. Soekarno enjoyed his position as head of state, a symbolic figure required by the revolution. Like his former protégé Tjokroaminoto, many Indonesians—particularly Javanese—considered Soekarno a *Ratu Adil* (Righteous King/Prince).

In the second half of the 1950s, Soekarno began to be involved in a complicated contest

of power—particularly after the resignation of Mohammad Hatta as vice-president in 1956 in protest of the way in which Soekarno was running the country. The duumvirate had broken, and Soekarno began to enjoy full control over national politics and continued with his slogan of “unfinished revolution.” He introduced Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*), brought back the less democratic and mystical constitution of *Undang Undang Dasar 1945*, and dismissed the elected parliament with the assistance of the army in 1959. Soekarno then emerged as an authoritarian leader with strong popular support, but he was trapped internally and internationally in the Cold War style of conflict by his *Nasakom* (nationalism, religion, and communism) ideology.

Soekarno brought himself into close contact with the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia), but he was still unable to close the gap with the military, which began to involve itself in daily politics. He was hostile to his opponents, particularly the Islamic reformist party and other socialist–Marxist–based parties, but too tolerant with, and to some extent even showing weakness in the face of, state bootlickers. Despite his involvement as a founding member of the nonaligned movement, Soekarno tended to nurture closer ties with the socialist Eastern bloc countries while at the same time challenging the interests of the Western democracies. In his private life, he was involved in many extramarital affairs and had several wives. Fatmawati, his third beloved wife, asked for and was granted a separation.

Indonesian politics was very tense, but economic growth was sluggish from the early 1960s. The tension came to a head in September 1965, when a group of military officers attempted to seize power by killing some army generals. The coup attempt failed, but it brought severe consequences to the lives of Indonesians. A struggle for power took place but differed significantly from the past, in that the military took the full initiative to acquire the upper hand. Soekarno was blamed for his strong support for the PKI, which was accused as the group behind the attempted coup. Despite the pressure, Soekarno stood by his *Nasakom* ideology and refused to put the blame on the communists. As a result, his own position was in danger. Opponents of communist groups backed by the military continued to

take action both on the street and in the parliament. There was a horrendous bloodbath as communists and their sympathizers were eliminated throughout the country.

After March 1966, Soekarno gradually saw his political power ebb away. The beneficiary of his fall was General Soeharto (Suharto, 1921–). Soekarno lost his presidential seat in February 1967, when a special session of the Provisional People’s Representative Assembly led by General A. H. Nasution (1918–2000) rejected his plea and transferred the presidential power to General Soeharto. Soekarno was held under house arrest until he passed away, on 21 June 1970.

BAMBANG PURWANTO

See also *Abangan*; Agus Salim, Haji (1884–1954); Asian–African (Bandung) Conference (April 1955); Cold War; Gestapu Affair (1965); Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Pancasila (Pantja Sila); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (PNI) (1927); *Priyayi*; *Ratu Adil* (Righteous King/Prince); Sarekat Islam (1912); Semaoun (Semaun) (1899–1971); Suharto (1921–); Taman Siswa (1922); Tjokroaminoto, Haji Oemar Said (1882–1934)

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SOETARDJO PETITION (1936)

Wishful Thoughts

The Soetardjo Petition was an unsuccessful attempt by cooperating nationalists in Indonesia to persuade the Dutch colonial authorities to introduce political reforms.

After the suppression of militant nationalist organizations in the Dutch Indies from 1926 to 1933, much nationalist attention focused on the possibility of reforming the *Volksraad*, the partly elected "People's Council," which had some legislative powers but no other control over government. The appetite for political change was widespread, partly because the examples of Burma (Myanmar) and the Philippines showed that extensive powers could be delegated to Southeast Asian parliaments without leading to chaos or maladministration, and partly also because of discontent with the colonial government's handling of the effects of the Great Depression (1929–1931). Salaries and government spending had been cut, and there was a widespread feeling that the Dutch had allowed these measures to fall most heavily on Indonesians.

The petition submitted to the *Volksraad* in July 1936 by Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo (b. 1892) called for a conference to set a ten-year timetable for Indonesian autonomy within a Netherlands-Indonesian union. Soetardjo envisaged an arrangement similar to the Philippine Commonwealth, but he did not present this arrangement as a precursor to independence. Soetardjo was a Javanese aristocrat and a former colonial bureaucrat, and more radical nationalists were at best lukewarm toward his proposal. The petition, however, was approved by the *Volksraad* and forwarded to the Dutch authorities. Formal rejection was not announced until November 1938, but by early 1937 it was already clear that the petition had not changed Dutch thinking.

The failure of the Soetardjo Petition is generally seen as marking the inability of the Dutch to recognize that global and domestic changes would soon make colonialism impossible. Furthermore, the rejection marked the Dutch failure to forge a cooperative relationship with a moderate nationalist elite to whom

they might have handed independence in a more or less peaceful manner.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Constitutional Developments in Burma (1900–1941); Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Great Depression (1929–1931); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; *Volksraad* (People's Council) (1918–1942)

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SON NGOC THANH (1907–1976?)

Prime Minister of the Khmer Republic

Son Ngoc Thanh, Cambodian nationalist leader, was born into a wealthy Cambodian-Vietnamese family in southern Vietnam. He was educated in Vietnam and in France. He joined the colonial civil service in the mid-1930s and was affiliated with the Buddhist Institute in Phnom Penh and the nationalist newspaper *Nagara Vatta* (*Angkor Wat*). During the Pacific War (1941–1945), he sought Japanese support for his anti-French activities. Fearing arrest following a demonstration in 1942, he went into exile in Japan, returning only in May 1945 after Japan had persuaded the Cambodian king, Norodom Sihanouk (1922–), to declare Cambodia's independence. When the French returned to power later in the year, they arrested Thanh, accused him of treason, and imprisoned him in France. The sentence was later commuted to house arrest, and Thanh was able to obtain a law degree in France.

He returned to Cambodia in 1951 and began agitating for independence before going into hiding in Cambodia's northwest. The Khmer Issarak forces, dominated by communists, refused to ally with him, and he made little headway. He turned against Sihanouk after Cambodia gained its independence, and lived in Thailand and Vietnam, where he received support from the anti-Cambodian, U.S.-backed regimes in power in those countries. During the Vietnam War (1964–1975) he worked with the

United States to recruit ethnic Cambodians living in South Vietnam into the South Vietnamese army. He returned to Cambodia after Sihanouk was overthrown, and served briefly as prime minister in the Khmer Republic. Shortly before the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975, Thanh fled to Saigon where he died, probably a prisoner of the Vietnamese communists, in 1976.

DAVID CHANDLER

See also Buddhist Institute of Phnom Penh; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Khmer Issarak (Free Khmer); Lon Nol (1913–1984); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–)

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SOOK CHING

A “Cleansing” Exercise

Sook ching (Mandarin: *xiao qing*), meaning “cleansing,” refers to the mass massacres of Chinese residents implemented by the Japanese Imperial Army (JIA) in Malaya (present-day West/Peninsular Malaysia), especially in Singapore, soon after its occupation. The objectives were to eliminate anti-Japanese elements lest subsequent military campaigns be hindered.

In Singapore, *sook ching* took place three times at different areas in 1942: 21 to 23 February, 28 February to 3 March, and toward the end of March. Altogether, almost half of the Chinese inhabitants, including women, the aged, and children, were screened. Criteria for identifying anti-Japanese elements were not clear. Those who had domiciled in Malaya for less than five years, could speak English, wore spectacles, came from Hainan, and so forth were regarded as anti-Japanese. Those who were classified as anti-Japanese were taken to isolated places and there executed en masse. According to Singaporean sources, 50,000 to 60,000 people were killed in Singapore (Ward 1992: 175–176). Japanese military sources, on the other hand, insist that it was fewer than several thousand (*ibid.* 148). At the war crimes court, seven Japanese commanding officers went on trial for this wartime execution and two of them were hanged. However, the pivotal initiator of the operation, Lieutenant

Colonel Tsuji Masanobu (1902–1968?), managed to conceal himself until the United Kingdom and the United States decided in 1950 not to prosecute him.

Similar operations took place in the main cities of Peninsular Malaya, such as Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Taiping, Johor Bahru, Muar, and also Kota Tinggi. In Johor, Negri Sembilan, and Melaka, the JIA in early 1942 encircled many small Chinese villages in the belief that anti-Japanese guerrillas were hiding inside. Thousands of villagers were killed at that time. The total number of victims for the whole of Malaya is considered by Malaysians to have been around 100,000.

HARA FUJIO

See also Bataan Death March; “Death Railway” (Burma-Siam Railway); Japan and Southeast Asia (pre-1941); Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Sandakan Death March; *Syonan-to*

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**SOUPHANOUVONG
(RED PRINCE) (1911–1995)**

Leftist Prince of Laos

A scion of the Lao royal family, Prince Souphanouvong was born on 13 July 1911 in Luang Prabang, the royal capital of Laos, to the eleventh wife of the viceroy Boun Kong (d. 1920; r. 1887–1914). Rising to become titular head of the Pathet Lao movement, the Red Prince, as he was known to Western journalists—owing to his cohabitation with the Vietnamese-dominated Lao communist movement—led the anti-French and anti-U.S. struggle in Laos. He was appointed president of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) on 2 December 1975, a role that he held until illness forced him to step down in 1986.

Little is known about the prince’s early life, except his distaste for the court and his passion for self-advancement through education. At the age of twenty-one, a graduate of the Lycée Albert Sauraut in Saigon (class of 1931), Souphanouvong was undoubtedly a privileged student in colonial Indochina. Encouraged by his elder brother, Prince Phetsarath (1890–1959), the young prince continued his school-

ing in Paris at the Lycée Saint Louis and École Nationale des Pompes et Chaussées, where he graduated with a diploma in civil engineering (class of 1937).

Some writers have commented that in France the prince was also exposed to the radical socialist currents of the French Popular Front government of Leon Blum. Upon his return to Saigon in July 1937, the young graduate received his marching orders to report for duty—not in his homeland of Laos, as he had expected, but in the Vietnamese coastal town of Nha Trang. This was to change his life. First, he met and married his wife, Nguyễn Thị Kyi Nam (Pa Viengkham Souphanouvong), who bore him eight sons and two daughters. During the course of his assignment as engineer in 1939–1940, he also experienced at firsthand the iniquitous colonial caste system.

The exact extent of the prince's introduction to revolutionary Vietnamese communism is unclear. But a week after the August Revolution swept the Việt Minh to power in Hanoi in 1945, the prince, in the company of Emperor Bảo Đại (r. 1925–1945), met Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969) in Hanoi. Endorsement of the ideals of the August Revolution and the hopes for a free and independent Laos were established then.

Returning from Hanoi to Hué on 30 September 1945, the prince embarked on his new career. Now at the head of the anticolonial Lao Issara (Free Lao Movement) and the Army for Liberation and Defence of Laos, the prince launched into an unequal struggle with French airpower. He was seriously wounded at the Battle of Thakek on 21 March 1946. Offered a safe base in Bangkok by the left-wing government of Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983), Souphanouvong sought by diplomatic means what he had been unable to achieve by military force. But with the reestablishment of the dictatorship of Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (1897–1964) in 1947, and U.S. support for the anticolonial struggle in Laos not forthcoming, the prince split with the moderate Lao Issara group, including his beloved brother Phetsarath. In this shift, the prince redirected the locus of his military struggle to the Lao-Vietnamese border, drawing upon pledges of support from Hồ Chí Minh.

The period up until 1954 also saw the rise of the Pathet Lao army under Kaysone

Phomvihane (1920–1992) and the creation of two northern provinces of Laos as Pathet Lao base areas, as mandated by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina. In August 1957, in a turn toward electoral politics, the popular prince brought his “patriotic front” into a coalition with the U.S.-backed Vientiane-side royalist government under the prime ministership of his other brother, Prince Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984). The prince participated in this government as minister of planning and won his seat in elections in Vientiane. The unraveling of the coalition, however, led to the prince's imprisonment in Vientiane and dramatic escape from jail in May 1960.

After leading diplomatic negotiations, the prince entered another short-lived coalition government with the royalists from November 1962 to the following April. Just as Laos was drawn into the U.S. aerial war in Vietnam, so the prince raised his international socialist solidarity profile. Following the effective cessation of hostilities in Laos, the prince staged his triumphant reentry in Vientiane in April 1974.

Although serving as president of the Supreme People's Assembly and president of the LPDR, among ordinary Laotians he was reverentially known as “Chao,” or prince. Following his death on 9 January 1995 and Buddhist funeral, along with five days' official mourning, his ashes were placed in That Luang reliquary in Vientiane.

Unlike some other socialist leaders, the prince did not leave behind any body of writings, nor did he seek to develop a personality cult. But unlike many of his comrades-in-arms, he genuinely won the affection of his people, even if many disliked the regime of which he was titular head. He also enters Southeast Asian colonial history as leader of his country's struggle for independence. No substantial biographies exist in Western languages.

GEOFFREY C. GUNN

See also Bảo Đại (Vinh Thuy) (1913–1997); Geneva Conference (1954); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Lao Issara (Issarak); Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR); Laos (Nineteenth Century to mid-1990s); Pathet Lao (Land of Laos); Phetsarath (1890–1959); Plaek Phibunsongkhram, Field

Marshal (1897–1964); Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983); Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984); Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội) (League for the Independence of Vietnam)

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"SOUTHEAST ASIA"

Southeast Asia comprises the mainland states of Myanmar (Burma), Thailand (Siam), Cambodia (Kampuchea), Laos, and Vietnam, and the island or maritime countries of the Federation of Malaysia, Singapore, Negara Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the newly independent Timor Leste (Portuguese), or Timore Lorosa'e (in Tetum, the local language), commonly referred to as East Timor. It is explicitly distinguished from the Indian subcontinent and the Chinese mainland. The concept of a Southeast Asia comprising independent but interrelated states was given greater salience with the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 and its expansion in 1984, 1996, 1997, and 1998 to include ten countries (all but Timor Leste).

Southeast Asia did not always receive wide recognition as a region in its own right. It was not until the 1940s that the United States and its allies acknowledged that the territories between China and India occupied by the Japanese during the Pacific War (1941–1945) constituted an area of strategic and economic importance, rich in such raw materials as oil, tin, rubber, and timber. The term "Southeast Asia" was not in general use until then, although from the turn of the twentieth century

German-speaking scholars referred to broad cultural similarities in "Südostasien" (Reid 1999). However, these cultural traits do not coincide with political boundaries, and populations that belong culturally and linguistically to Southeast Asia are also found in southern China, interior Taiwan, northeast India, Madagascar, and most of the Pacific islands.

Prior to the Pacific War clear evidence of Indian and Chinese influences in Southeast Asia led Western writers to use terms such as "Further India," "Greater India," "L'Inde Extérieure" and "Hinterindien." The terms implied that Southeast Asia was an eastern outlier of the Indian subcontinent, or the "Far Eastern Tropics," suggesting a southern tropical extension of China or "Indochina," a region of mixed Indian and Chinese cultural elements.

Southeast Asia is known as much for its cultural and geographical diversity and political fragmentation as for its unity (Osborne 1985: 1–15). This diversity is the result of its open location straddling the great sea routes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the movements into the region of different populations and cultural traits. The process of cultural and political differentiation was further increased from the nineteenth century when the Western colonial powers carved up the region into separate spheres of influence.

VICTOR T. KING

See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Hindu–Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); *Nanyang*; South-East Asia Command (SEAC)

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SOUTH-EAST ASIA COMMAND (SEAC)

Defeating Imperial

Japan in Southeast Asia

The reorganization of Allied commands following the Quebec conference of August 1943

created the South-East Asia Command (SEAC) from the former Indian Command. It covered Burma, Sumatra, Malaya, and the Indian Ocean as far west as Ceylon, and from August 1945 all of the Dutch Indies and French Indochina. Thailand and Indochina (Sri Lanka) were within SEAC's boundary, but only for special operations. Based in India, though an Allied command, it was primarily a British strategic responsibility, whose forces were mostly drawn from India, Britain, and East and West Africa, with substantial U.S. logistic support. SEAC's supreme commander was Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979). The fulfillment of SEAC's mission was hampered by wrangling between British and U.S. commanders (notably the abrasive American Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell [1883–1946]), by the unreliability of the Nationalist Chinese forces, and by the theater's low priority for troops and equipment. SEAC's war principally involved the protracted and costly campaign against the Japanese in Burma fighting over rugged terrain in an unhealthy climate. The main Allied force in the theater was what became the Fourteenth Army, known with some justice as the "forgotten army." Initially reacting to the Japanese thrust at Imphal and Kohima in mid-1944, in 1944–1945 the Fourteenth Army advanced south down the Irrawaddy valley to liberate Rangoon (Yangon). At Singapore in September 1945, Mountbatten accepted the surrender of Japanese forces in the region, and SEAC was enlarged to take in Indochina and the entire Indonesian archipelago. From 1945, SEAC grappled with the problems of reasserting colonial authority in Southeast Asia, confronting nationalist movements in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and Indochina.

PETER STANLEY

See also British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma Road; Imphal-Kohima (1944), Battle of; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Mounbatten, Admiral Lord Louis (1900–1979)

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SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION (SEATO) (1954)

Anticommunist Containment Pact

The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was established in 1955 to guarantee collective security in Southeast Asia; it existed until its disbandment in 1977. SEATO evolved from the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or Manila Pact, concluded on 8 September 1954. It comprised eight member states: Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan (until 1972), the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Manila Pact and SEATO were consequences of the French defeat in Indochina (1954) and expressions of anticommunist containment policy directed against North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam, DRV) and the People's Republic of China (PRC). In essence, SEATO's *raison d'être* was the defense commitment to Southeast Asia by the United States and the United Kingdom.

SEATO was established with its headquarters in Bangkok; its organizational structure was divided into a military and a civil part, governed by a council of all member states. An international secretariat and the post of secretary-general were added in the following years. Within the civil part of SEATO, its members cooperated on economic and information issues. SEATO's military structure did not achieve more than common military exercises and did not serve as a framework for intervention in Vietnam, essentially because the members of the organization lacked a common strategic interest. From the early 1970s, SEATO became increasingly futile in the changed international political environment, and its military part was consequentially abolished after 1974. A year later the members agreed to dissolve SEATO as a whole by 1977.

The Manila Pact remains in force today, as it constitutes the only formal defense link between Thailand and the United States. Although SEATO was an externally inspired defense organization, it marked an important step toward regional organization in Southeast Asia, much like NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in Western Europe.

STEFAN HELL

See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); China since 1949; Cold War; U.S. Involvement in Southeast

Asia (post-1945); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia

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SOUVANNA PHOUMA (1901–1984)
Neutralist Laotian Prince

Born into privilege, Souvanna Phouma was the son of the second most prominent family in Laos, that of the viceroy Boun Kong (d. 1920; r. 1887–1920). Destined to play a pivotal role as prime minister (1951–1954, 1956–1958, August–December 1960, 1962–1975) in the Royal Lao Government (RLG) until the communist takeover in 1975, the prince was better known in the West than his two no less patrician half brothers, Phesarath (1890–1959) and Souphanouvong (1911–1995).

Like his two brothers, the prince received a privileged education, studying engineering in the *École Nationale des Travaux Publics* in France. He married a French woman (Monique Allard) and, demonstrably, never lost his affection for French culture.

Returning to Laos in 1936, the prince entered government service. Notably, he was placed in charge of restoration of the historic Wat Phra Keo in Vientiane, a cultural project that he reflected upon in later life as particularly edifying.

During the Japanese interregnum, Souvanna Phouma retained his post as minister of public works. Following the Japanese surrender in Vientiane on 1 September 1945, he joined the Lao Issara (Issarak) government headed by his elder brother, Phetsarath, and briefly, in 1946, served as acting prime minister.

Joining the Lao Issara government-in-exile in Bangkok, following the armed French restoration in the Mekong valley, the prince took a post with the Thai Electric Company. Fatefully breaking ranks but not friendship with his left-leaning brother, Prince Souphanouvong,

and his elder brother, Phetsarath, he returned to Laos with his fellow exiles in 1949, essentially accepting the *pax français*.

Although the kingdom of Laos was still linked with France under the French Union arrangement, the prince duly entered the cabinet of Phoui Sananikone (1903–1983) formed in February 1950 (until November 1951) as minister of planning of the RLG. Following elections in August 1951, however, the prince formed his own government. As such, Souvanna Phouma was closely involved with the task of negotiating the final independence conventions of the kingdom with France.

In November 1954, Souvanna served as defense minister in the Katay Don Sasorith government. Reinstalled as prime minister in 1956, Souvanna Phouma was involved in negotiating with the Pathet Lao (Land of Laos) in the post–Geneva Conference (1954) period. In August 1956 the prince visited Beijing and Hanoi seeking respect for Lao’s territorial integrity. Notwithstanding challenges from domestic opponents, the prince also came under pressure from U.S. interests hostile to any accommodation with the Pathet Lao, especially as the United States replaced France as the leading economic contributor and military prop.

In and out of office in the early 1960s, Souvanna Phouma was installed as the head of a neutralist government created by Captain Kong Le (b. 1934; commander-in-chief of neutralist forces, August–December 1960), who staged a coup d’état in August 1960. Shortly thereafter this regime was driven out of Vientiane in a counterattack by rightist General Phoumi Nosavan (1920–1985; minister of defense and deputy prime minister, 1959–1964). In September 1961 the prince formed a neutralist party to strengthen that political tendency.

Returned to power in 1962 by Kong Le, the prince held the post of prime minister virtually without interruption till 1975. In that capacity, Souvanna participated in key discussions leading to the 1962 Geneva Agreements and the First Coalition Government, serving as prime minister and minister of defense.

A figure closely associated with the vicissitudes of Lao political history in the 1960s, Souvanna Phouma was increasingly propped up by the United States as indispensable—but also dispensable if he protested U.S. actions. He agreed in 1964 to the “secret” U.S. bombing

over Laos, not so much because he had abandoned his sense of a neutral Laos but because he feared the Pathet Laos were stalking horses for Vietnamese aggrandizement. Still, he disallowed U.S. ground forces in Laos and kept open channels with Beijing and Hanoi. In 1963 he revisited Beijing, and he visited Moscow the following year.

From 1972, Souvanna Phouma was the pivotal interlocutor for the RLG in negotiations with the Pathet Lao on peace, leading to the fateful cease-fire agreement signed in February 1973 and the formation of a Provisional Government of National Union. Souvanna Phouma, who remained prime minister of the Third Coalition government, also came under bitter attack from rightists. The strains of office took their toll on the prince, who suffered a heart attack in August 1974. But returning from convalescence in France, Souvanna Phouma had the unenviable role of facilitating the Pathet Lao takeover of power, albeit a bloodless one. Together with King Sisavang Watthana (1907–1984; r. 1959–1975), Souvanna Phouma was appointed advisor to President Souphanouvong.

Up until his death at eighty-three years of age on 10 January 1984, he famously indulged his interest in playing bridge and received visitors in his villa in Vientiane, notably including his brother, the prince-president. He was given a state funeral cremation at That Luang in Vientiane, and his remains were interred in the family stupa in Luang Prabang.

Some controversy attaches to Souvanna Phouma's role in accommodating the Pathet Lao takeover. Still, he could have led a bourgeois life in exile at any time during his career, but he chose Laos. In his defense, by not ordering his already weakened forces to oppose the Pathet Lao militarily, the country was spared loss of life. But like others, he was also naive to believe that the Pathet Laos would accept neutrality as a political ideal.

GEOFFREY C. GUNN

See also Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Lao Issara (Issarak); Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR); Laos (Nineteenth Century to Mid-1990s); Pathet Lao (Land of Laos); Phetsarath (1890–1959); Souphanouvong (Red Prince) (1911–1995)

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SPANISH EXPANSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Spanish expansion into Southeast Asia started in 1519, with the expedition to the Pacific Ocean of Fernão Magelhães, or Ferdinand Magellan (1480–1521), a Portuguese captain in the service of the Spanish king Charles I (r. 1516–1556). He sailed via the southern tip of South America. Like the Portuguese at the time, and later the Dutch and the British, the Spaniards were in search of the famous spice islands in Asia, the Moluccas, the source of pepper, nutmeg, and cloves, items in great demand in Europe for food flavoring and preservation.

The Portuguese and the Spaniards were competitors in their discovery expeditions, though along different routes. In 1487 the Portuguese captain Bartolomeo Dias (1466–1500) had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and discovered the route to Asia. In 1492 Christopher Columbus (1451–1506), exploring the western route, had discovered the Americas. To prevent conflict between the two countries, the pope divided the heathen world between them. The Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 drew a line of demarcation running north-south at about 60 degrees west longitude. Territories to the west of that line were assigned to the Spaniards, those to the east to the Portuguese. The Portuguese established a series of strongholds along the South and Southeast Asia coasts, which gave them access to the spice markets.

On the Asian side of the globe a line of demarcation was never settled. Magellan, who had been with a Portuguese fleet in the Indian Ocean, convinced the Spanish king that the famous spice islands were lying within the Spanish territory, and he suggested sending an expedition around South America. He sailed with five ships from Spain, and, after having navigated the strait that would later bear his name (Strait of Magellan), he reached the Philippine island of Samar in 1521, thinking that he had found the Moluccas, and claimed its possession for the Spanish king. He did the same for the

island of Cebu but was killed in a battle with a local chief. One of the Spanish ships picked up a cargo of spices in the Moluccas and returned to Spain in 1522, having circumnavigated the globe in four years.

Spain sent more expeditions to Southeast Asia in the next decades, but they failed to occupy the Moluccas or the Philippines. An expedition under Ruy Lopez de Villalobos in 1542 gave the name *Felipinas* to the islands (later written as *Philippines*), after the Spanish Crown prince Felipe, who would later become king as Philip II (r. 1556–1598). In 1564, Spain sent a fleet under Captain General Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (1500–1572) from Mexico to take possession of the Philippines; it reached Cebu in 1565 and established a settlement. In 1571 the Spaniards conquered Manila, defeating the Muslim ruler there, and established a fortress and a walled settlement called Intramuros at the mouth of the Pasig River at Manila Bay, a natural harbor. Within the Spanish Empire, the Philippine Islands were considered an extension of the viceroyalty of Mexico. By that time the Spanish expansion in Asia had three objectives—namely, to secure a share in the spice trade, to get access to China and Japan, and to Christianize the inhabitants of the occupied territories (Phelan 1959: 7). The Spaniards failed in the first two objectives, but they were able to establish Spanish rule in the Philippines and initiate a process of Hispanization.

Manila became a source of wealth for the Spaniards, not because of spices but because of the galleon trade with Mexico. Chinese merchants brought silk and porcelain to Manila and sold it to Spanish merchants in exchange for silver. Once a year a Spanish galleon shipped the goods to Mexico, where they were in great demand, and returned with a large amount of silver from the mines that the Spaniards exploited in the Americas. The first ship sailed in 1565 (from the island of Cebu) and the last in 1815. Manila thus became an entrepôt in this exchange of American silver for Chinese goods, driven by China's almost insatiable demand for silver, which served as money. The amount of silver shipped via the Pacific Ocean is estimated at 50 to 100 metric tons annually, which was more than that transported via the Atlantic Ocean (Flynn and Gi-

raldez 1994). During the two and a half centuries of galleon trade the British captured four galleons, along with their precious cargoes (Schurz 1939).

After the first expeditions to the Pacific Ocean, the Spanish king claimed proprietorship of the ocean, considering it a “Spanish lake.” For a long time the galleons were lightly armed, because the Spaniards did not expect that their enemies would threaten them in the Pacific. Spanish expeditions explored the ocean and tried to occupy certain parts. For some time the Spanish occupied Formosa (Taiwan), until the Dutch drove them out. Spain maintained a hold on Ternate, one of the Moluccan Islands, but it was forcibly evicted in 1662. Spanish expeditions explored several of the large island groups in the Pacific, but only the Marianas Islands and Guam were occupied. Spain had plans to establish footholds in Japan and China, but those plans failed.

After about the middle of the seventeenth century, the Spanish empire weakened significantly. Spain had lost its struggle against the rising Dutch nation in northwest Europe, and it had been engaged in fighting with the expanding Dutch and English in Southeast Asia. Spain succeeded in maintaining its hold over the Philippines, which it considered vital for the defense of its possessions in the Americas. During the eighteenth century, British, French, and North American ships were crossing the Pacific, in complete disregard of the Spaniards. After about 1790, Spain could no longer prevent foreign ships from trading with the Philippines, and it gradually opened its ports to foreign merchants. In 1815, Manila lost its function as an entrepôt. In 1821, Spain's colonies in the Americas gained their independence. The Philippines remained one of the few Spanish colonies left. After the Spanish–American War in 1898, Spain lost its Asian and Pacific possessions to the United States.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Catholicism; Galleon Trade; Hispanization; Legazpi, Captain General Miguel Lopez de (1500–1572); Maluku (The Moluccas); Manila; Missionaries, Christian; Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Portuguese

Asian Empire; Spanish–American Treaty of Paris (1898); Spanish–American War (1898); Spanish Philippines; Spices and the Spice Trade; Tordesillas (1494), Treaty of

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SPANISH PHILIPPINES

"Spanish Philippines" refers to the Philippines under Spanish rule from the mid-sixteenth century to 1898. The Spanish established their authority over the Philippines beginning with expeditions during the 1560s. Economic (spice trade) and religious (Catholicism) motives dictated Spanish designs over the Philippines. The mission of Captain General Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (1500–1572) set the pace for the colonization of the Philippines. Cebu was seized in 1565 and Manila captured in 1571. Manila served as the eastern terminal of the Philippine–Mexico–Spain galleon trade.

The Spanish capture of Cebu drew protest from their Iberian rival, the Portuguese, then established in the Moluccas. The Portuguese accused the Spaniards of contravening the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). Following the unification of Spain and Portugal under Philip II (1527–1598) in 1580, Portuguese attempts to evict the Spanish from the Philippines ceased. Subsequently the Spanish, from their base in Manila, extended their control over the entire Philippine archipelago, notably the Visayas and Mindoro. But the southern Muslim-dominated islands resisted Spanish colonization. Not until the mid-1870s did the sultanate of Sulu submit to Spanish suzerainty. However, effective au-

thority over all the Sulu territories and Mindanao remained problematic.

Five centuries of Spanish rule created the entity of the "Spanish Philippines," where the processes of Christianization and Hispanization exerted a great influence over the islands. Nonetheless, Mindanao and islands in the Sulu Archipelago maintained the Islamic religion and traditions and strongly resisted the encroachment of the central authority of Catholic Manila.

By the Treaty of Paris (1898), which ended the Spanish–American War (1898), Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States, thereby ending five centuries of Spanish rule.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Galleon Trade; Hispanization; Mindanao; Moros; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Portuguese Asian Empire; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago; Tordesillas (1494), Treaty of

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SPANISH-AMERICAN TREATY OF PARIS (1898)

The Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain was signed by the representatives of both sides on 10 December 1898 and ratified by their respective governments a few months later. The treaty ended the Spanish–American War, which had started on 25 April of that year and had resulted in the defeat of the Spanish forces both in the Western Hemisphere and in the Pacific. In October, peace negotiations started in Paris by commissions from the two

countries; they consisted of four delegates each. Spain quickly agreed to relinquish sovereignty over Cuba, and to cede Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Marianas to the United States. The U.S. government also demanded the transfer of sovereignty over the Philippine Islands. However, it was not clear on what grounds that could be demanded. Right of conquest could not be the legal grounds, because the U.S. Army had occupied only the city of Manila and areas around the bay. In the rest of the country some areas were still under Spanish control, and other parts were under the control of the Filipino revolutionaries who had liberated them from the Spaniards. The head of the Filipino revolution, General Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964), had traveled with the U.S. fleet from Hong Kong to Manila Bay, and the revolutionaries had reason to believe that they were allies of the United States. The other argument was Spain's sovereign rights over the Philippines, but that meant a denial of the rights and the position of the Filipino revolutionary movement. The Spaniards were initially taken aback by the U.S. demand, but when the Americans offered a payment of U.S.\$20 million, they accepted the proposal. The Filipino revolutionaries felt betrayed by the deal, and in February 1899 hostilities broke out between U.S. forces and Aguinaldo's army, leading to the Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902).

Another legacy of the Treaty of Paris continued to cast a shadow over Filipino-U.S. relations. Article 8 of the treaty stipulated that the transfer of sovereignty did not affect private properties in the Philippine Islands. The largest properties were the large landed estates owned by Spanish monastic orders on the islands. These friar lands had been the source of endless conflicts and grievances against the friars and had contributed to the 1896 revolution. As the Spanish government in the Philippines did not have a proper system of land registration, the claims of the friars were questionable, but now the U.S. government recognized these rights without investigating them. From 1902 to 1907 the U.S. government negotiated with the papal chair in Rome over the purchase of the lands, which was settled for U.S.\$7,543,000. The sale and distribution of these lands to the tenants haunted the land issue in the Philippines for many years thereafter.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Aguinaldo, Emilio (1869–1964); Friars, Spanish (The Philippines); Friar-Secular Relationship; Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898)

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SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898)

The Spanish-American War started on 25 April 1898, when U.S. president William McKinley (t. 1897–1901) declared war on Spain; it ended with the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 10 December 1898. The war signaled the emergence of the United States as a colonial power. By the mid-1890s political pressure groups in the United States had started to press for a more expansionist and imperialist role in international politics. From 1895 to 1898 two colonies of Spain—Cuba in the Western Hemisphere and the Philippine Islands in Southeast Asia—were in revolt against colonial rule. These colonies were the remnants of the Spanish Empire, together with Puerto Rico in the Caribbean, and the Carolina, Marshall, and Mariana Islands (including Guam) in Micronesia.

The Cuban revolt against an oppressive Spanish regime led to considerable sympathy among the U.S. public. The United States had economic interests in the island as well, mainly in sugar production, and the U.S. government advocated independence for Cuba. In February 1898 the battleship *Maine*, anchored in the harbor of Havana, exploded and sank, causing the deaths of 266 sailors. The Spanish investigation concluded that the explosion had been internal, but the U.S. investigation claimed that a mine had been the cause. This event fueled the anger of the American public. After the declaration of war, the United States started a naval blockade of Havana, while army troops were landed ashore. On 17 July the Spanish forces in Cuba surrendered. Shortly afterward Puerto Rico was occupied as well. In the meantime a

U.S. fleet under Commodore George Dewey (1837–1917) had sailed from Hong Kong to the Philippines, carrying Filipino revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo (1869–1964), and confronted the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay. On 1 May, during the Battle of Manila Bay, U.S. forces destroyed the Spanish ships. After the arrival of more troops, the Americans besieged Manila and conquered the city on 13 August, unaware of the fact that a day earlier the two countries had signed an armistice agreement. The United States had won the war at a cost of 3,000 lives, mainly as a result of disease, and U.S.\$250 million. After several months of negotiation, the Treaty of Paris was signed. The United States annexed Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, while Cuba gained political independence.

WILLEM WOLTERS

See also Aguinaldo, Emilio (1869–1964); Philippine Revolution (1896–1898); Philippine War of Independence (1899–1902); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Spanish-American Treaty of Paris (1898)

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SPICES AND THE SPICE TRADE

Spices are edible plant derivatives, of little or no nutritional value, that have an aroma or a pungent taste that enhances the flavor of food. The spice trade is usually understood to concern the three world-renowned spices whose zone of natural origins was restricted to Maluku (the Moluccas) in far eastern Indonesia: cloves, nutmeg, and mace. However, pepper, brought to Java from India in ancient times, was also a major Southeast Asian crop by at least the sixteenth century, when Sumatra led the world in production.

Cloves are the dried flower buds from the *Syzygium aromaticum* tree, whose natural range is confined to the offshore islands along the southwest coast of Halmahera. The *Myristica fragrans* tree, whose seeds are ground to yield nut-

meg and mace, was similarly restricted to the tiny Banda Islands. These spices are arguably Southeast Asia's earliest long-distance exports, having been shipped to China, India, and the Mediterranean region more than 2,000 years ago. Indeed, archaeological evidence is claimed for cloves in Mesopotamia by about 4,000 years ago. Despite this early export trade, manufactured wares such as metals and glass beads did not arrive in Maluku until less than 2,000 years ago—later than in many parts of Indonesia. Chinese ceramics and coins probably reached the Bandas and Halmahera region by 1,400 to 1,000 years ago.

Most of the wealth generated by the Maluku spices was evidently appropriated by the succession of island Southeast Asian empires that operated as the gateway between Indonesia and the world's main population centers: Śrīvijaya (Sumatra), Majapahit and its antecedents (East Java), and Melaka (Malaysia). The Portuguese, after taking Melaka in their efforts to dominate the spice trade, proceeded almost immediately to Maluku in 1512. There they found the distribution of cloves controlled by Ternate and Tidore, two island sultanates that had sprung up at the northern limit of the natural range of cloves. Muslims also headed the oligarchy of wealthy traders who operated in the Bandas. Subsequently, intense competition between the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and English to embroil Ternate, Tidore, and the Banda ports in the competing European networks resulted in an extraordinary concentration of sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century forts on these islets.

The Netherlands United East India Company (VOC) exerted a monopoly over the Maluku spices from the early seventeenth to late eighteenth centuries. In the 1620s the VOC established its own clove plantations on Ambon (also in Maluku), and, aided by Japanese mercenaries, decimated the Bandanese population to make way for Dutch planters. The VOC monopoly was complete with its occupation in 1667 of Makassar in Sulawesi, the center for unaligned traders, and its ejection of the last European competitors from Ternate and Tidore by 1666. In the 1770s, French and English traders smuggled clove seedlings to other parts of Southeast Asia and to East Africa; however, the Dutch-controlled plantations led world production until the late nineteenth century, even after financial problems led to the winding up of the

VOC in 1795. The Dutch monopoly over the less important trade in nutmeg and mace was also broken in the 1790s. Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies and, later, independent Indonesia became a net importer of cloves during the twentieth century, particularly after the development of the *kretek* (Indonesia's clove and tobacco cigarette), until the 1980s, when prices encouraged Indonesian farmers to establish clove plantations across the archipelago.

Pepper, the fruit of the *Piper nigrum* vine, has been grown too widely to fall prey to any trade monopoly, but it has always been commercially more important than the Maluku spices. It became a widely available commodity in Rome as early as 2,000 years ago and in China more than 1,000 years ago. Increased demand in China during the 1400s seems to have been the stimulus to expand pepper plantations in Sumatra and Malaysia beyond the small production zone in Java during Śrīvijayan times. A succession of Islamic polities, most famously Pasai and Aceh in North Sumatra and Banten in West Java, based their economies heavily on pepper sales until the late seventeenth century, when the growing dominance of the VOC allowed it to usurp control over the pepper trade in the Indonesian region. Dutch competition with British-aligned sultanates in West Malaysia and northwest Borneo and French-aligned suppliers in Indochina remained a major theme in the world of pepper commerce, right up to the recent independence of Europe's erstwhile colonies in Southeast Asia shortly following the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945).

The spices were truly splendid trifles whose rarity stimulated exploration and opened up the Southeast Asian waterways, whether it was Austronesian traders to India and China or Indians, Chinese, Arabs, and finally Europeans to the archipelago. Recent developments in the historiography of spices include an attempt to quantify their export importance since the fourteenth century and projects in historical archaeology designed to assess their long-term impact on societies within the production zones.

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See also Aceh (Acheh); Age of Commerce; Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Banten (Bantam) (1526–1813); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Bugis (Buginese);

Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Melaka; Maluku (The Moluccas); Pepper; Portuguese Asian Empire; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Śrīvijaya (Śrīwijaya); Sulawesi (Celebes); Sumatra; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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SPIRIT CAVE (THAILAND)

See Hoabinhian

SPRATLY AND PARACEL ARCHIPELAGOS DISPUTES

Overlapping Claims in the South China Sea

The Spratly and Paracel archipelagos are located in the South China Sea. Both archipelagos are disputed territories. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam pursue sovereignty claims to the

whole of the Paracel archipelago. Currently China controls the whole of the archipelago. Six countries pursue sovereignty claims to the whole or to parts of the Spratly archipelago: Brunei Darussalam, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. All claimants except Brunei control one or more of the features in the archipelago.

The Spratly archipelago extends north-south from 11°30'N to 4°N, and west-east from 109°30'E to 117°50'E. The archipelago consists of more than 100 islands, cays, and reefs covering an area of some 1,000 square kilometers. Since the Spratly archipelago covers a fairly extensive area, different approaches have been used to divide the archipelago. One approach is to divide it into four main subcategories: the Western Spratlys, the Southern Shoals, the Dangerous Area, and the Eastern Spratlys. Many of the features in the Spratly archipelago are very small, and some of the features are under water during high tide. Some of the larger features are Thi Tu Island, Itu Aban Island, North-East Cay, and Spratly Island. All four are located in the Western Spratlys.

The Paracel archipelago extends north-south from 15°46'N to 17°8'N and west-east from 111°11'E to 112°54'E. The archipelago consists of fifteen islets covering an area of approximately 3 square kilometers and about fifteen features scattered over an area forming a large oval that has a maximum diameter of approximately 200 kilometers. The Paracel archipelago is usually divided into two parts: the Amphitrite Group, located in the northeastern part of the archipelago, and the Crescent Group, located in the southwestern part. The largest islands of the Amphitrite Group are Woody Island and Lincoln Island. The largest islands in the Crescent Group are Triton Island, Pattle Island, and Duncan Island.

Brunei Darussalam has a sovereignty claim to Louisa Reef in the Spratly archipelago, but Brunei does not control that reef. Brunei's claim to Louisa Reef is based on the fact that it is located within the continental shelf area claimed by Brunei in the South China Sea.

China has sovereignty claims to the whole of both the Paracel and the Spratly archipelagos. Currently China controls the whole Paracel archipelago. China took control of the eastern part of the Paracels in 1956 and the western part in 1974. China gained its first foothold in

the Spratly archipelago in 1988. Since then, China has continued to expand its control over features in the archipelago. It is estimated that it currently controls at least ten features in the Spratlys. China's claims to the two archipelagos are based on historical records and maps that are used to sustain two kinds of claims. First, they show that China discovered the island groups in the South China Sea, and second, they show how Chinese people occupied the islands and developed them.

Malaysia has a sovereignty claim to the southern part of the Spratly archipelago. Currently Malaysia controls at least three features in the Spratly archipelago. Malaysia first took control of Swallow Reef in 1983 and has since then expanded its control. Malaysia's claim to part of the Spratlys is based on the fact that these features are located within the continental shelf area claimed in the South China Sea.

The Philippines has a sovereignty claim to the major part of the Spratly archipelago, with the exception of the Spratly Island itself, Royal Charlotte Reef, Swallow Reef, and Louisa Reef. The Philippines control at least ten features in the Spratly archipelago. The Philippines first took control of five features in the early 1970s and has since expanded its control. The sovereignty claim to the major part of the Spratly archipelago is based on the notion of discovery.

Taiwan pursues the same claims as mainland China in the South China Sea. Taiwan controls Itu Aban Island in the Spratly archipelago. Taiwan does not control any feature in the Paracel archipelago that is fully under China's control. Taiwan's sovereignty claims to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos are based on historical records and maps that are used to sustain two kinds of claims. First, they show that "China" discovered the island groups in the South China Sea, and second, they show how Chinese people occupied the islands and developed them.

Vietnam has sovereignty claims to the whole of both the Paracel and the Spratly archipelagos. Vietnam currently controls more than twenty features in the Spratly archipelago. The control over features in the archipelago has gradually been expanded since the mid-1970s, when Vietnam controlled six of the features. Vietnam does not control any feature in the Paracel archipelago that is fully under China's

control. Vietnam's sovereignty claims to the Parcel and Spratly archipelagos are based on historical records from precolonial times and from the French colonial period. Interestingly enough, the unified Vietnam also relies on documentation from the former Republic of Vietnam (ROV) to substantiate its claims.

China, Taiwan, and Vietnam pursue historical claims to the Paracels and the Spratlys. China and Taiwan pursue what could be termed "Chinese" claims to the two archipelagos. The basis of the claims are historical records and maps displaying that China discovered the two archipelagos and that Chinese people occupied and developed them. Vietnam refers to historical records from precolonial times that show that these two archipelagos were under Vietnamese control during parts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

During the twentieth century the two archipelagos have been contested, and control over them has shifted. France took control of both archipelagos in the 1930s. Japan seized control of both during the Pacific War (1941–1945), and following the Japanese withdrawal, France reestablished control over the major part of them.

Among the current claimants, Taiwan was the first to take physical control of parts of the Paracels and Spratlys in the late 1940s. In the Paracels the French withdrawal in the mid-1950s was followed by the ROV's taking control over the western part of the archipelago and China's taking control of the eastern part. The situation prevailed until January 1974, when China, in a swift military operation, ousted the ROV and seized control of the whole of the Paracels. In the Spratlys the moves to take control of various parts of the archipelago gained momentum in the early 1970s, when both the ROV and the Philippines occupied some of the features. Then Malaysia gained a foothold during the first half of the 1980s. In 1988, China made a decisive move to gain a foothold in the Spratlys, and that led to a naval clash with Vietnam in March. China emerged victorious from this clash and took control over some of the features in the Spratlys. Since then, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and to a limited extent Malaysia have sought to expand the number of features under their control. Such moves have at times caused considerable tension among the claimants. During the first half

of the 1990s there was tension mainly between China and Vietnam relating to disputes in the South China Sea. During the second half of the 1990s and into the early 2000s, tension between China and the Philippines has been more prevalent.

Conflict management approaches to the conflict situations around the Paracels and the Spratlys differ considerably. One reason is that the Parcel conflict is *de facto* considered to be a bilateral issue between China and Vietnam, whereas the Spratly dispute is considered to be a multilateral dispute. Furthermore, attempts at negotiations between China and Vietnam have displayed that Vietnam wants to include the Parcel issue on the agenda, but China is not amenable. China considers there to be no issue to negotiate, since China fully controls the archipelago.

Bilateral approaches to the disputes over the Spratlys relate primarily to talks between China and Vietnam, between China and the Philippines, and between the Philippines and Vietnam. China and the Philippines agreed on a "code of conduct" to be observed in the South China Sea in August 1995, and the Philippines and Vietnam agreed on a similar code in November 1995. Despite the agreement between China and the Philippines, periods of tension have continued to occur because of actions carried out in the South China Sea.

Multilateral approaches to the management of the Spratly conflict can be seen as a multifaceted dialogue process involving both state actors and nonstate actors. The multilateral process at the level of the state includes the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which brings together all the claimants, except Taiwan, alongside other regional powers and the global powers for discussions on security-related issues, including the situation in the South China Sea. Another avenue for discussions is the dialogue between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, which involves talks on the overall situation in the South China Sea.

The role that ASEAN can play is a rather complex one, since four of its member states—Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam—pursue sovereignty claims to all or parts of the Spratly archipelago. This creates a situation in which ASEAN cannot play the role of third-party mediator between China and these claimants. Nevertheless, the situation

in the South China Sea has been brought onto the agenda in the context of the ASEAN-China dialogue. One core issue is the search for a mutually agreeable “code of conduct” for the South China Sea. Thus far, no consensus has been reached.

It can be noted that the Spratly issue as such is not discussed in the multilateral forums outlined above—at least not those involving China. Instead, the references, statements, and declarations relate to the situation in the South China Sea. The reason for this is China’s expressed preference to handle the Spratly dispute bilaterally with each of the other claimants. Thus China opposes multilateral talks on the Spratly issue.

Among the multilateral contacts at the level of nonstate actors are the regular contacts between researchers and other experts at conferences and workshops. In this context it is worth noting the workshops arranged on a yearly basis since 1990 in Indonesia, with Canadian support, which bring together experts from various fields in the countries involved in the Spratly conflict. These workshops provide the opportunity to discuss issues that do not directly touch upon the sovereignty question. Another forum for discussion between scholars and policy-makers is the Council for Security and Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP). Within CSCAP, security-related issues are subject to discussion, including the situation in the South China Sea and the Spratly dispute.

RAMSES AMER

See also Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Sabah Claim; Sino-Vietnamese Relations; United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia

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SRI LANKA (CEYLON)

Sri Lanka (Ceylon), situated a few kilometers off the southern extremity of the South Asian subcontinent, is a country that has been a distinct geopolitical entity, an island civilization with a recorded history going back to the first millennium B.C.E.

The presence of humans dates from at least about 125,000 years ago. Prehistoric peoples occupied a number of different habitats, from the maritime belt and lowland plains to the high plateau and rain forests of the central mountains. An advanced microlithic stone-tool technology is found from an unusually early date (ca. 25,000 B.C.E.). Recent research indicates the early domestication of grasses (ca. 7500 B.C.E.). However, there is little evidence, as yet, of when the important transition (ca. 1000 B.C.E.?) from itinerant food-gathering to settled, village-based food production—involving wet-rice cultivation, irrigation, and the use of iron—took place, or who exactly the agents were who brought about these changes. An important question is: Did these changes take place as a result of large-scale migrations from



Seated Buddha at Anuradhapura, the ancient city that was Sri Lanka's first capital and the citadel of the Vijaya dynasty. (Corel)

the subcontinent, or principally through internal development, or, as is more likely, from a combination of internal and external factors?

The transformation from a preliterate, agrarian society to a literate, historical civilization, marked by the emergence of social classes, advanced political institutions, urbanization, writing, and the adoption of a higher religion, Buddhism, occurred between 500 and 250 B.C.E. The beginnings of the historical epoch date from the reigns of King Devanampiya Tissa (250–210 B.C.E.) and Dutthagamani (161–137 B.C.E.) and their immediate, semihistorical predecessors. Thereafter, the Early (ca. third century B.C.E. to fifth century C.E.) and Middle (sixth to thirteenth centuries) Historical Periods are marked by a dominantly centralized, all-island state. Other characteristics include the development and spread of Buddhism, the widespread diffusion of reservoir and canal irrigation, a flourishing internal and external trade, and the growth of urban and port centers.

Sri Lanka possessed one of the small but distinct civilizations of Asia. Testimony of it can be seen in the ruins of great capital cities and monasteries, together with a complex hydraulic system of man-made lakes and canals. There are also a distinctive architecture, with colossal stupas of the same order of magnitude as the pyramids; the remains of industrial-level iron production centers; numerous rock inscriptions; and a large body of ancient art and literature. This archaeological and historical record is well

represented in the World Heritage cities of Anuradhapura, Sigiriya, and Polonnaruwa, as well as many other archaeological and architectural sites and monuments.

The thirteenth century marks a significant watershed in Sri Lankan history. From this time onward, major changes took place in the nature of historical society: first, as a result (mainly) of internal evolution in the period from the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries; and subsequently, as a consequence of European colonial intervention.

The most visible manifestation of the changes in the Late Historical Period (thirteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries) was the shift in the main centers of political, economic, and cultural activity. Originally centered on the dry zone plains of the north-central, eastern, and southeastern regions, the focus shifted to the wet lowlands of the southwest, the central mountains, and the extreme north.

The island was subjected to European colonial invasions from the sixteenth century. In succession, the Portuguese, Dutch, and British occupied large sections of the coastal region. The British conquered Kandy in 1815, thereby ending the last independent Sri Lankan kingdom. The colonial experience left a lasting impression on the acculturation and modernization of the island, but a rich history and strong internal dynamics ensured the retention of its historic cultural fabric. Sri Lanka is one of the main repositories of Theravada Buddhism, the tradition that is also widespread in Southeast Asia. If the local chronicle literature of both Sri Lanka and mainland Southeast Asia is to be believed, missionaries sent by Asoka (r. 264–238 B.C.E.) of the Mauryan Empire brought Theravada Buddhism to these lands. From the twelfth century the prestige and prominence of the Sri Lankan Mahavihara school was apparent throughout mainland Southeast Asia, where it was readily adopted by Mons, Burmans, T'ais, and Khmers. In Sri Lanka around 70 percent of the people are Buddhists and Sinhala-speaking. A substantial Tamil-speaking population and Hindu, Muslim, and Christian minorities also contribute to make the island a multiethnic and multicultural nation, still trying to find a stable base of national unity, as evidenced by ethnic conflict and insurgency.

Sri Lanka is one of the oldest democracies in Asia, with universal suffrage, an elected legisla-

ture, representative government, and ministerial administration since the early 1930s. It regained full independence in 1948 after nearly 150 years of British colonial rule and 450 years of European colonial intervention. A republic was declared in 1972. A new constitution in 1978 created a presidential system and a parliament elected by proportional representation. Postindependence development in the spheres of nutrition, literacy, education, and health has given Sri Lanka a relatively high regional ranking in the human development index. It was also the first country in South Asia to adopt a liberalized, open-market economy and structural reform.

There were significant cultural manifestations in the twentieth century. Among them have been a modern movement in painting, which has made a significant contribution to the evolution of modern art in Asia, and a Sri Lankan school of contemporary architecture, combining the materials, forms, and spatial organization of indigenous tradition with the vision and aesthetics of the international style. And the emergence in the 1990s of a number of notable Sri Lankan novelists writing in English reflects some of the important cultural achievements.

SENAKE BANDARANAYAKE

See also Architecture of Southeast Asia; Buddhism; Buddhism, Theravada; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; Indian Immigrants (Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries); Metal Age Cultures in Southeast Asia; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Neolithic Period of Southeast Asia

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ŚRĪVIJAYA (ŚRĪWIJAYA)

Overseeing Asian Maritime Trade

As early as the second or third century C.E., coastal polities on the southeastern shores of Sumatra had taken advantage of their position at the crossroads of maritime routes leading to China, India, and the Middle East (West Asia), and to the spice-rich islands of Eastern Indonesia. Changing circumstances in the history of the ancient world during the sixth and seventh centuries C.E. brought about a steady increase of Asian maritime trade. The reunification of China under the Sui (590–618 C.E.) and T'ang (618–907 C.E.) dynasties, and the demise of Persian long-distance trade, exerted a great impact on the burgeoning coastal polities of western Southeast Asia. A huge Chinese market opened with empty niches for Southeast Asian traders and their goods. Southeast Asian shippers, heirs to a mature technical tradition, were in a position to capitalize on centuries-old skills in constructing and sailing large trading vessels. Local resins and aromatics could now replace Indian Ocean commodities, long in demand in China. Camphor, oleoresins, and benzoin from Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula soon became standard trade commodities imported from the region, alongside spices, precious woods, gold, and tin.

A number of small polities in West Java and Sumatra first took advantage of these intense commercial activities in dispersed order. After 670 C.E., however, they coalesced into one single state, which the Chinese identified as *Shih-foshih*. Chinese records soon described this polity as one of the major trading operators of the southern seas. In 1918 epigraphist George Coedès took the brilliant step of linking these Chinese sources, together with later Indian and Arabic texts, to a group of stone inscriptions written in Old Malay. They told about the

foundation times of a polity named *Śrīvijaya*, for which *Shilifoshih* was a regular Chinese transcription. All these crucial inscriptions were carved between 683 and 686, and were found over the years in and around Palembang, in present-day South Sumatra province. Coedès concluded that they marked the birth place and the first political center of the state of Śrīvijaya, which should therefore have been located at Palembang, on the banks of the large Musi River and its tributaries. This is also where a few Buddhist and Hindu statues had been found over the years. All this evidence indicated that Śrīvijaya had been the first large-scale state—of world economic stature—to have prospered in insular Southeast Asia. The wealth and prestige of its ruler, the regional eminence of its capital and harbor-city, and its role as a center for the diffusion of Buddhism were acknowledged by the other world economies of the times, from the Arabs at Baghdad to the T'ang and Song (Sung) (960–1279 C.E.) Chinese.

This prosperous polity thrived from the seventh to the thirteenth centuries and extended its sphere of influence to much of Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, and probably also to West Java and the western part of Borneo. It brought together into a still poorly understood entity a group of formerly autonomous harbor-based trading polities.

For half a century, however, the terrain at Palembang stubbornly refused to provide enough solid archaeological evidence to confirm that this site had indeed played such a major role in Asian history. Over the years, other sites, mainly on the isthmus of the Malay Peninsula, yielded enough archaeological vestiges, in the form of trade goods, inscriptions, monuments, and statuary, to lay claim to the status of capital of Śrīvijaya. This situation nurtured vigorous scholarly debate, often fanned by nationalism. It was only in the late 1980s, after years of intensive surveys, that archaeologists started unearthing in South Sumatra substantial evidence of economic and religious activity dating to the whole period of Śrīvijaya's prominence, thus tilting the balance back to South Sumatra and confirming Coedès's earlier hypotheses. The sites within and in the immediate vicinity of the modern city of Palembang have by now yielded pre-fourteenth-century material evidence for settlement, manufacturing, commercial, religious, and political hubs of ac-

tivity at a level that can only be reconciled with a focally situated large settlement—in other words, a settlement with the political and economic center of the early Malay polity. The settlement pattern revealed so far in archaeological sites at Palembang confirms the evidence provided by contemporary foreign sources, Arabic or Chinese. A riverine urban pattern is by now clearly discernible: multiple hubs of specialized activities have been found scattered along some 12 kilometers on the northern bank of the Musi River and its smaller tributaries. Religious sites tend to have been located on higher, dry land. Judging from the quantity of finds on some of the excavated sites, population density must have been high in some places. Many of these finds clearly indicate active, long-distance trade, and the role of merchants and shipmasters is underscored in local inscriptions. Although no ruler's residence has been located so far, the Sebokingking inscription in East Palembang clearly must have found itself at the hub or close to such a political center, at least at foundation time in the 670s and 680s.

Recent archaeological studies have not equally well documented all phases of the history of Śrīvijaya. Identification of confirmed archaeological sites dating back to foundation times (from the late seventh to the mid-eighth centuries) remains scarce. However, the spatial distribution in South Sumatra of contextless chance finds of seventh- to eighth-century inscriptions and statues, as well as the discovery of remains of Southeast Asian-built trading ships dating to the fifth to eighth centuries, does reveal a clear pattern, ancestral to the much better documented following phase. The late eighth and ninth centuries, in Sumatra as in most of Southeast Asia, remain very much shrouded in mystery. The last embassy sent to China by Shilifoshih/Śrīvijaya dates from 742 C.E. The name *Śrīvijaya* appears again in the late eighth century on an isolated inscription from southern Thailand, where it is associated with the foundation of two Buddhist sanctuaries and, for the first time, with the name of the *Sailendra* dynasty.

A Sailendra prince named Balaputradeva, defeated in Java by a rival of the Sanjaya dynasty in the 830s, appears to have emerged a few years later as a ruler of Śrīvijaya. These events, known from epigraphy, are exactly contemporary to a chronological phase brought to light in most archaeological sites in Palembang,

as well as in the other coastal sites said to be part of Śrīvijaya in southern Thailand and Malaysia (Kedah). This phase is marked by the first massive appearance in Southeast Asian sites of Chinese ceramic wares in industrial quantities, and it bears testimony, in perfect synchronization all over western Southeast Asia, to an outstanding increase in maritime traffic. During this second phase of its history (ninth to tenth centuries), Śrīvijaya reached the pinnacle of its prosperity. Contemporary sources always mention the city-state's king among the powerful rulers that thrived upon the wealthiest of maritime trade routes. The Chinese court again received numerous embassies (official records now use the term *Sanfoqi* to designate this born-again state of Śrīvijaya). Recent archaeological research has also brought to light along the valleys of the Musi River basin, upstream from Palembang, a number of sanctuaries, both Buddhist and Hindu, including a large complex of Hindu temples at Bumiayu. Temples were also built on behalf of the rulers of Śrīvijaya, in both China and India, as if to mark the limits of their sphere of commercial enterprise.

This flourishing state of affairs, however, appears to have attracted the interest of rising neighboring powers. Toward the end of the eleventh century, there were Chinese economic competition at sea and southern Indian (Cola) economic and military inroads into the Śrīvijayan scene. Furthermore, an antagonistic relationship with Java appears to have forced a shift of the center of political dominance from Palembang to the neighboring river basin of the Batang Hari in the Jambi province of Sumatra. It remained for a while an economically vibrant polity, still known to outsiders as Śrīvijaya, and strong enough to build the vast temple complex of Muara Jambi. However, its economic power appears to have quickly deteriorated under the blows received from both east and west. Consequently, so did its political ascendancy and its ability to control the original broad network of city-states. For reasons not yet fully understood, the ancient Malay center of political power that had occupied a coastal position for centuries now began to move inland to the Minangkabau highlands, heralding the final demise of Śrīvijaya.

Because of the paucity of written sources and the still limited amount of intensive and systematic archaeological research, the very na-

ture of the economic and political network that prompted foreign powers and traders to perceive Śrīvijaya as a single entity is far from fully understood. Recent interpretations, however, have clarified a number of moot points.

Early historical interpretations based on inadequate comprehension of the sources available and on the misleading worldview of colonial times pronounced that Śrīvijaya encompassed a vast "kingdom," or even an "empire," ruled from Palembang. Rereading of written sources after assessment of data produced by recent excavations in South Sumatra and on the Malay Peninsula, in both Malaysia and Thailand, now allows a scaled-down image to be reconstructed. At the local level, if the data gathered in Palembang inscriptions are valid for the other Śrīvijaya polities, it appears that politically weighty, but spatially limited, symbolic centers were built around the *datu*—that is, the ruler's palace and its fenced compound (the *kadatuan*). Scholars now understand the term *wanua* in the same inscriptions (also from the Malay linguistic stock) as referring only to the urban environment around the *kadatuan*, which included religious buildings and parks (both alluded to in the inscriptions), markets, and the semirural or riparian villages. As an outer circle, the inscriptions refer to a group of *mandalas*, under their respective datu, described as powerful local magnates ruling over their own wanua, but uneasily recognizing the authority of a *primus inter pares*, the ruler of Śrīvijaya. These outlying mandalas formed the outer reaches of the polity of Śrīvijaya. The overarching pattern that now emerges is that of a network of largely autonomous city-states. The true nature of the hierarchical relationship imposed on those peripheral polities that were drawn into the orbit of the South Sumatra-centered Malay polity remains, however, a matter of debate.

It has also been established by now that Śrīvijaya was composed of more than just a group of harbor-cities with entrepôt functions, passively exacting taxes over compulsory maritime routes. For one, progress in the field of maritime archaeology and history has confirmed that Malay world shippers and merchants played an active role in the Asian commercial scene. In South Sumatra, the expanding city-state exercised some sort of control over the vast river basin of the Musi, establishing

close relationships with upstream and downstream societies, as confirmed by a number of monuments recently brought to light upstream from Palembang. The same could be said for those polities on the Malay Peninsula that were included for a time in the orbit of Śrīvijaya: they must also be understood as true city-states, at the interface between international trade networks and a rich hinterland, which they tapped to increase their revenues.

PIERRE-YVES MANGUIN

See also China, Imperial; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Isthmus of Kra; Minangkabau; Palembang; Sailendras; Spices and the Spice Trade; Sumatra

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A man paints a sign for tourists outside a temple in Mandalay, ready for “Visit Myanmar Year” in 1996. The State Law and Order Restoration Council military regime is now encouraging foreign investment to counter the economic failures the country has suffered while it was closed to visitors. (Howard Davies/Corbis)

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STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC)

Rule of the Generals

The State Law and Order Restoration Council was the name the Myanmar (Burmese, prior to 1989) army adopted for the government it created when it seized power on 18 September 1988, following the failure of President Maung Maung (1925–1999) to restore order. The name was changed to the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. Led by General Saw Maung (1928–1997), who had been minister of defense in the previous Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) government until his retirement in 1992, SLORC and then SPDC

have subsequently been chaired by Senior General Than Shwe (1933–). The other major figures have been General Maung Aye (1940–), the chief of staff and vice chairman of the armed forces, and Brigadier General Khin Nyunt, the head of military intelligence and first secretary of the council.

SLORC came to power following the widespread antigovernment demonstrations of July through September 1988 against the incompetence and bankruptcy of the old socialist regime. Promising to hold elections when order was restored, the new government immediately began to reverse a number of long-standing economic policies, officially abandoning socialism and autarky but not giving up a number of government controls on economic activity. Among its most successful policies was that of reaching military cease-fires with the majority of insurgent armies in the country, including

the Burma Communist Party (BCP), the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), and a number of smaller ethnic autonomy movements. The BCP subsequently dissolved itself. SLORC, however, was roundly condemned internationally for failing to honor the results of general elections held in 1990 that were won by the National League for Democracy (NLD), which was unable subsequently to take office.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Burma Communist Party (BCP);
Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP);
Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO);
Military and Politics in Southeast Asia;
National League for Democracy (NLD); Suu
Kyi, Daw Aung San (1945–)

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STRAITS OF MELAKA

Linking East and West

The Straits of Melaka (sometimes termed Malacca) are one of the busiest stretches of water in the world, extending for about 800 kilometers from north to south between Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. The straits are a narrow and crowded seaway. They are funnel-shaped: at their widest, around Penang Island, they extend for about 120 nautical miles, while at their narrowest, close to the adjoining Straits of Singapore, they are only 9 nautical miles wide. Historically these waters were the scenes of great commercial and naval activity, and along the shores of the straits a number of important cities and polities developed, most notably Melaka, Aceh, and Palembang. In recent times, the straits have remained a major commercial seaway with the port of Singapore at their head.

The straits occupy an important, strategic position within Southeast Asia. Opening out to the north into the Andaman Sea and Indian Ocean, they have long been an important route for shipping coming to the region from India, West Asia (the Middle East), and Europe. From the straits, significant local markets were acces-

sible, together with the historically important China trade. The straits were thus from the earliest times an important route for global trade. We know from Chinese records that as early as the ninth century, Chinese junks were sailing into the waters of the straits, trading with Śrīvijaya on Sumatra and, from the fifteenth century, with Melaka. The rise of Śrīvijaya, as with Melaka itself, was intimately linked with the ability to control and channel the trade and shipping of the straits to their advantage. Melaka was, by the mid-fifteenth century, the most powerful sultanate in the region and an important stopping point and entrepôt for shipping in the region. The pattern of monsoon winds there further enhanced the strategic importance of port cities in the straits.

European interest in the trade and strategic importance of the straits was recognized by the Portuguese, who took Melaka in 1511 in the hope of depriving Venice of its monopoly on the supply of precious spices for the European market. The Portuguese had hoped to seize the trade of the region, but most Muslim traders moved to cities elsewhere. Thus the rise of Aceh, at the northern tip of Sumatra, was due in large part to the migration of traders; others took flight to settlements such as Johor-Riau in the south to continue their trading activity. The Dutch replaced the Portuguese by taking the city in 1641, but, given that the key interests of the Dutch lay farther south in Batavia (Jakarta), they were able to reap little advantage from their efforts to control shipping through Melaka. Other kingdoms, most notably Johor-Riau, were better able to reap the benefits from their trading and sailing skills in the region. For many traders, sea traffic through the straits was important in stimulating the development of the region. European merchants, in particular, were keen to source commodities from the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra (spices, metals, and jungle products) with which to trade on the China market. This so-called country trade was an important catalyst in the growth of trade in the region.

The establishment of the port city of Singapore in 1819 by the English visionary Stamford Raffles (1781–1826) marked an effort to create a strong free port in the region. After the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 effectively divided the straits into Dutch and British spheres of influence, the port of Singapore grew rapidly, and by the early twentieth century it had become

one of the top five global ports. The Straits of Melaka continued to maintain their strategic importance as steamships replaced sailing ships. Global geopolitical forces, reflected in the rise of the Pacific economy (the United States and Japan), meant that control of the straits remained vital, and Singapore was a crucial naval base for the British as well as a vital cog in global trade networks. Not surprisingly, the taking of Singapore was a vital part of the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia; as in the past, control of the straits was vital in controlling the economy and trade of the region.

Economic development in the region after about 1950, with the growth of the economies of Singapore and Malaysia, has continued to ensure that the straits remain a vital shipping artery. In addition, the expansion of demand for hydrocarbons in Japan has meant that some three-quarters of its energy supplies are shipped from West Asia through the Straits of Melaka. The careful policing of the straits, coupled with averting threats of environmental damage caused by collisions and spillage of oil, now is a major preoccupation of the regional powers. The states of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which now share the straits, are increasingly developing international legislation to ensure that the crowded waters of the straits remain safe for international shipping. The success of those efforts will be vital to the economic development of the region.

MARK CLEARY

See also Aceh (Acheh); Age of Commerce; Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Country Traders; Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Economic Development of Southeast Asia (post-1945 to ca. 1990s); Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); “Fortress Singapore”; Johor-Riau Empire; Jungle/Forest Products; Melaka; Monsoons; Palembang; Penang (1786); Pepper; Piracy; Portuguese Asian Empire; Singapore (1819); Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Spices and the Spice Trade; Śrīvijaya (Śrīwijaya); Straits Settlements (1826–1946); Sumatra

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STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1946)

Capitalizing on East-West Seaborne Trade

The Straits Settlements presidency was formed in 1826 by the union of the East India Company’s scattered possessions in the Malay Peninsula; it remained one political entity until it was dissolved in 1946. Initially it comprised Penang (the capital), Province Wellesley, Singapore, and Melaka. The Dindings region was added in 1874 but was transferred to Perak in 1934; the Cocos Keeling Islands were included from 1886, Christmas Island from 1900, and Labuan from 1906.

From the start, the presidency was a financial drain on the company. It derived no revenue from commerce, since Singapore’s free trade status was extended to Penang and Melaka in 1826. No land revenue could be raised from Singapore, where agricultural enterprises failed, nor from Melaka, where overgenerous compensation to former Dutch landed proprietors left the company in debt. The government relied on taxing so-called vices and pleasures, notably opium and alcohol, the collection of which taxes was farmed out to Chinese syndicates. To reduce the deficit, in 1830 the Straits Settlements were demoted to a residency within the Bengal presidency and became a useless burden after the company lost its China trade monopoly in 1833. But commerce flourished with free trade, *laissez-faire*, and unrestricted immigration, particularly in Singapore, which became the administrative capital in 1832 and judicial headquarters in 1855.

The merchants fought off several attempts to levy commercial charges to pay for port improvements and became increasingly critical of administrative inefficiency and the lack of representative institutions. In 1857, in the wake of the Indian Mutiny, the Singapore European merchants supported their Calcutta counterparts in petitioning for the company's abolition; they also requested that the Straits Settlements be brought under direct rule from London. Since the British government refused to accept a financial liability, the settlements remained under the authority of the new government of India, when the company was abolished in 1858.

A stamp duty introduced in 1863 solved the budget problem, and in April 1867 the Straits Settlements became a Crown colony, with a constitution that remained basically unchanged until after World War II (1939–1945). A governor appointed by the Colonial Office ruled with the help of an executive council of senior officials and a legislative council, to which the governor nominated a few “unofficials.” The first Chinese councillor was appointed in 1869, and over the years the number of unofficials and Asians increased, until by the 1920s there were equal numbers of officials and unofficials, with the governor holding the casting vote. No councillors were elected, but from 1924 the Singapore and Penang chambers of commerce were each permitted to nominate a representative. Asians were appointed as justices of the peace and municipal councillors and were admitted to junior professional appointments in Straits civil, legal, and medical services, which were created in the 1930s.

Singapore dominated the colony from the start, and in 1872 the Penang chamber of commerce petitioned unsuccessfully for separation. But resentment largely disappeared as the last thirty years of the nineteenth century brought prosperity to all three settlements. The colony was intimately bound up with the economic development of its peninsular hinterland, which began to come under British protection from 1874. Administratively the colony and the Malay States were linked by the Malayan Civil Service (MCS), which held all senior posts throughout the peninsula, while the governor was also high commissioner of the Malay States.

The settlements varied in their population and economy. Urbanized Singapore was almost entirely devoted to trade after agriculture petered out by the 1860s, whereas the other settlements had large rural populations. As early as 1826 half of Singapore's population was Chinese, rising to three-quarters by 1900 (1901 census). The rural inhabitants of the other settlements in 1826 were Malays, but Chinese peasant farmers moved into Melaka later in the nineteenth century, and subsequently large numbers of Indian laborers were recruited for rubber plantations everywhere. Penang's Georgetown initially had a substantial Indian community, but later it became predominantly Chinese, while Melaka town had a cosmopolitan population of Chinese, Indians, and Eurasians. In the twentieth century, rubber plantations replaced the older forms of agriculture: spices, sugar, and coffee in Penang and Province Wellesley, and coffee and slash-and-burn tapioca in Melaka. Penang never rivaled Singapore as a port but prospered as an outlet for the northern Malay Peninsula and North Sumatra.

The Straits Settlements colony was broken up in April 1946, when Singapore became a separate Crown colony, while Penang and Melaka were merged in the Malayan Union, despite vociferous objections from their non-Malay populations. Labuan became part of North Borneo, while the Cocos Keeling and Christmas Islands remained under Singapore until they were transferred to Australia in 1955 and 1958, respectively.

Two books deal with the Straits Settlements in the pre-1867 period, but no single work spans the whole of their existence.

C. M. TURNBULL

See also British Malaya; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Free Trade; Labuan (1847); Malayan Union (1946); Melaka; Penang (1786); Singapore (1819); Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s)

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STRAITS/MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY (MBRAS)

A learned society established in 1877 by a handful of British colonial officers, the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society is aimed at collecting, recording, and disseminating knowledge of Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei, thereby increasing interest and focus in the scholarly study of the region. It publishes an academic-oriented scholarly journal, holds annual public lectures, and occasionally organizes academic conferences.

Beginning as the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, it had its first name change in 1923, to the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society; in 1964 it was renamed Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. The society's journal also underwent similar name changes, its current title being the *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* (*JMBRAS*).

Although at face value the scholarly pursuit of furthering knowledge of the Malay Peninsula appeared noble and worthy, the ulterior motive apparently appeared to be, as founder-president Archdeacon G. F. Hose explained in his inaugural address (February 1878):

[A] careful study of the religious opinions and practices of the people would be not interesting only, *but directly useful* . . . to the missionary, as shewing [sic] him what ground he has in common with the man whose spiritual life he hopes to benefit, what are the real errors to be eradicated and the real defects in faith and morals that have to be supplied, and useful to the governing class too, as discussing the true character and nature of the people to be governed. (Inaugural Address, 28 February 1878; Choy 1995: 88, emphasis added)

Seeking affiliation with the Royal Asiatic Society (RAS) in London (granted in May 1878), the founding members of the society acted consistently with their counterparts in other corners of the British Empire in establishing "Asiatic Societies." The RAS considered itself "an effectual instrument in bringing into activity the intellectual energies of the inhabitants of our [British] Eastern dominions, in directing them, when so awakened, to proper objects of public utility, and in making known the results

of these exertions to the European world" (*ibid.*: 89).

Notwithstanding its mercenary motives, the society was earnest and sincere in promoting an intellectual interest in the region. Looking through the more than 160 issues of the journal, a score of monographs, and a dozen reprints, one sees that the society has more than fulfilled its objective of disseminating academic-oriented information. The coverage of the journal is immense, catering to works from a variety of disciplines: anthropology, archaeology, botany, history, language, literature, zoology, and others. Malaysian history and Malay literature seem to be the general focus of the journal.

The society since its inception had enjoyed patronage from colonial governors and high commissioners to Malay and Brunei royalty, and premiers of Malaysia and Singapore. Although the majority of the original 150 founding members were mostly British colonial administrators, academics from the region and abroad constitute a sizable number of the membership since the 1960s.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Burma Research Society (1909); Sarawak Museum; Société des Missions Étrangères (MEP)

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STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM (VIETNAM)

The Strategic Hamlet Program was a population relocation scheme undertaken in South Vietnam in the early 1960s by the Ngô Đình Diệm regime (1955–1963) in order to fight the resurgence of communist influence in rural areas.



Women and children of the strategic hamlet of Dá Bàn in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) pose for a military photographer in 1963. The purpose of the Strategic Hamlet Program was to provide security for the rural populace in South Vietnam by settling them in protected villages where the government could carry out political and economic programs. (U.S. National Archives)

Inherited from a first abortive attempt in 1959 (the Agrovillage campaign) and inspired by Sir Robert Thomson, British counterinsurgency expert in Malaya (present-day West or Peninsular Malaysia), the Strategic Hamlet Program was part of the Stanley mission proposal to accompany U.S. military aid to South Vietnam, which was decided in 1961 by the Kennedy administration (t. 1961–1963). The premise was that the Việt Cong (VC, Vietnamese communists) could not survive without the support of the population, “like a fish outside water” (a Mao Zedong image). Therefore the peasants had to be relocated to new and secured villages with, if possible, new land to farm and protection by their own militia. Launched in 1962 by President Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963) and managed by his brother Ngô Đình Nhu, this program aimed to build

more than 10,000 fortified hamlets to house peasants under government control as a means of depriving VC of their support.

But the program had to face many problems, and the first experiences did not appear promising. In March 1962, for example, government troops set up five strategic hamlets in Ben Cat district (north of Saigon), an area where the VC was known to be strong, but failed to convince the peasants to stay there. The program management was apparently too authoritarian—perhaps even more than VC policy. Besides, it did not take realities into account. Vietnam was not Malaya, and the VC was at this time mostly part of the population the Saigon regime wanted to relocate. U.S. military leaders themselves criticized the concept and its implementation. In September 1962, the regime claimed that one-third of the population was gathered

in strategic hamlets—an accomplishment very few believed. In any case, with the overthrow of the Diem regime in November 1963, no one spoke anymore about the program.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Briggs Plan; Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); New Economic Zones (NEZs) (Vietnam); “New Villages” (Malaya/Malaysia); Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Việt Cong; Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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STUDENT REVOLT (OCTOBER 1973) (THAILAND)

The 14 October 1973 uprising came to be known as the “Student Revolt,” since the key actors at that time were student activists and intellectuals. The revolt led to the fall of the military regime (1963–1973) under Field Marshals Thanom Kittikachorn and Prapat Jarusathien, which succeeded the Sarit regime (1959–1963). Under Thanom and Prapat, it looked as if the authoritarian regime would be planted deeper in Thai politics. Comparable to the 1932 Revolution, the October 1973 uprising changed the course of Thai politics, breaking the monopoly of political power by the army and opening the political space to popular participation, in particular to the peasants and labor. Even though the period of democratization lasted about three years, and ended in a tragic bloody coup by the military on 6 October 1976, the political demands of the October Revolt have been accepted as the basic principles that a full democracy must reckon with.

The events started with a group demanding a constitution led by Thirayut Boonmee, former secretary-general of the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT). They distributed

pamphlets on the streets of Bangkok, on 6 October 1973, demanding the promulgation of a constitution by the Thanom-Prapat government; the government hastily reacted by arresting thirteen members of the constitutional group. After a week of peaceful protest within Thammasat University in Bangkok, demanding the release of the thirteen students, lecturers, and politicians, the swelling crowd consisting of hundreds of thousands of ordinary people began to march toward the Government House. Apparently, the negotiations between the NSCT, which became the formal leader of the protest, and the Thanom government failed to reach an agreeable solution. On 12 October, the NSCT issued an ultimatum that the government had twenty-four hours to unconditionally free all the detainees. That night two student representatives and a group of Thammasat lecturers sought an audience with King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX) (r. 1946–) in order to explain the situation and peaceful activities of the students.

At 12 noon on 13 October the demonstrators poured out of Thammasat University in an orderly fashion according to a well-prepared plan. The front rows were women volunteers carrying national flags, the Dhamma Chaka banner (a symbol of Buddhism), and portraits of the king and queen. The politically conscious masses had decided to show their strength and cause to the military-led government for the first time since the huge demonstration against the Phibul government in 1957 that eventually led to its demise.

The whole day long, as the jostling throngs moved along Rajadamnoen Avenue, representatives of the NSCT held their final discussions with Field Marshal Prapat Jarusathien. Finally the government agreed to release the thirteen detainees and grant a constitution within the year. By the evening, Seksan Prasertkul, a student activist who had led the protest march, ordered the demonstrators to move from the Democracy Monument to the parade ground by the equestrian statue of Rama V, awaiting the final words and decisions from the NSCT leaders. The radio broadcast of the agreement between the NSCT and the government could not overcome the rumors that the student leaders had lost their lives. Near midnight Seksan decided to move the demonstrators from the equestrian statue of Rama V toward Jitlada Palace, hoping that he

could “rely on His Majesty’s *barami* [Buddhist power] for protection.”

On the morning of 14 October, while students and other demonstrators began to leave the Jitlada Palace for their homes, they were intercepted by police commandos equipped with nightsticks, wicker shields, and teargas guns. The group of demonstrators reacted by hurling wrapped bags of food at the police. Some threw wood and wounded a policeman. Next, two anti-riot police vehicles and riot police personnel equipped with crash helmets were launched against the crowd. Then the bloodshed began, arousing the vengeance of the people. Beyond all expectations, the minor clashes by Jitlada Palace spread rapidly and widely. The government used the military and the anti-riot police to violently suppress the protesting public. High school and college students, together with the general public, responded by causing chaos—breaking into and destroying various buildings regarded as symbolic of the power of the despotic government. The notorious and hated government buildings that were burned down included the Department of Public Relations, the State Lottery, and the BIFGO (Board of Inspection and Follow-up Government Operation), which was under Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, Thanom’s son and Prapat’s son-in-law. Clashes and attacks on police booths began to spread all over Bangkok and Thonburi and threatened to be widespread in the major provinces, which had been stirred up by news of the demonstrations against the “trio of tyrants.” By dawn Thanom had resigned from the government but still held on to the post of supreme commander of the armed forces. Meanwhile, the king addressed the nation on radio and television requesting all sides to refrain from further violence and appointing Professor Sanya Thammasak, rector of Thammasat University, privy councillor, and president of the Buddhist Association of Thailand, as the new prime minister.

Yet violence and suppression by government forces using tanks, helicopters, and heavy field artillery on the uprising continued on the night of 15 October, when the “trio of tyrants” fled the country. A rift inside the armed forces, in particular when newly promoted army commander general Krit Sivara defied Thanom’s commands and forced him to resign as supreme

commander, eventually forced Thanom-Prapat-Narong to flee the country.

Distinct from other political uprisings in Thai history, the October Revolt was characteristically a youth movement, which became known as the “New Generation.” These young men and women of the New Generation stepped forward to play unprecedented sociopolitical roles from 1969 to 1972, as election observers, village development volunteers, social critics, and a political force pushing for a change in Thailand’s U.S.-dominated policy to one of independent neutrality. The turning point for student involvement in Thai politics was the establishment of the NSCT in 1970.

During the period 14–15 October, no fewer than 77 people were killed and 857 others wounded.

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX) (r. 1946–); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Thammasat University; Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal (1911–)

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SUEZ CANAL (1869)

Bypassing the Cape

The Suez Canal through Egypt connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. Its completion in 1869 significantly decreased travel time between Asia and Europe, which trip previously had meant rounding the Cape of Good Hope. Shipping through the canal increased quickly from 11,000 tons in 1869 to 1.1 million tons in 1872 and 9.7 million tons in 1900 (Farnie 1969: 751). The significance of the

canal for trade took time to materialize, as only steamships could pass through it. During the first two decades, only high-value products such as cotton piece goods, tea, and indigo went from India to Britain through the canal. In contrast, sailing ships continued to carry bulk produce such as rice from Burma and sugar from Java along the cape. The change from sail to steam took until 1900. In the 1870s, British steamers bringing coal to Asia started to carry rice from Burma as a return cargo. By 1880 only 34 percent of Burma's rice to Europe went through the canal, growing to 94 percent in 1895 after rice prices increased and steamer freight prices decreased to levels equivalent to those of sail freight along the cape. Until 1895, 70 to 80 percent of the ships passing the canal were registered in Britain, as only Singapore could accommodate steamships (Farnie 1969: 371–372). The upgrading of the port of Batavia, and also the growth of tobacco production in North Sumatra, increased the share of Dutch ships passing through. The importance of the canal was underlined during Egypt's blockade in 1956, which severely disrupted trade flows between Europe and Asia. The canal's share in world shipping peaked in 1958–1959 at 15 percent (Farnie 1969: 754). Its share has declined since, because new generations of ships, such as supertankers and container ships, cannot pass through it.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Straits of Melaka; Straits Settlements (1826–1946); Trade and Commerce of Southeast Asia (ca. Nineteenth Century to 1990s)

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SUGAR

Although sugarcane was known in Southeast Asia, palm sugar was long preferred for consumption. Cane sugar consumption increased only with the spread of refining techniques from

China after 1600. Cane sugar was traded within Southeast Asia and to South and East Asia. Increasing amounts reached Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Banten (West Java), Luzon (the Philippines), and central Thailand were the key sugar-producing areas.


Sugar production in Java increased under the Cultivation System after 1830. The Dutch colonial government compelled farm households to grow cane that was milled by contracted private sugar mills. Many mills stopped production after the abolition of the system in 1870. Others modernized production plants and produced cane on irrigated leased farmland in the mills' surroundings, especially in Central and East Java. Controversy surrounded land-leasing practices, levels of rent, and preference given to cane in the allocation of irrigation water during the dry season.

The closing of Java's land frontier increased the cost of leasing land. Sugar factories offset this by maximizing cane yields per hectare through high-yielding varieties and using labor-intensive cultivation techniques. A fall in sugar prices forced sugar mills to modernize, increase the scale of operations, and meticulously plan the milling season. By the 1920s the sugar industry in Java was technically and economically the most advanced in the world.

In the Philippines, sugar was produced for export in Luzon in the 1830s, and later in the sparsely populated Cebu and Negros, where Chinese-Filipino and a few Spanish entrepreneurs started large sugar estates (*haciendas*). In Luzon, sugar mills leased land from farmers. In other areas tenant farmers leased land from the large landholders to produce cane. Landholders generally had a stake in the mills. After World War I (1914–1918), investment from the United States modernized the sugar mills. Production and exports, largely to the United States, increased steadily.

In the late 1920s, sugar-importing countries restricted imports to protect their sugar industries. The crisis of the early 1930s compounded this. The Java sugar industry lost markets in India and Japan, and many sugar mills had to close. In contrast, sugar production in the Philippines remained level. Filipino sugar producers had preferential access to the U.S. market, where protection lifted sugar prices above international levels.

Sugar Production in Southeast Asia, 1880–2000 (1,000 tons)



SOURCES: Based on data from Bulbeck, D., et al. 1998. "Sugar." Pp. 124–126 and 132–135 in *Southeast Asian Exports since the 14th Century*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS); *FAO Production Yearbook*. 1980–2001. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization.

During the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), sugar production decreased in Java and the Philippines, because exports were impossible. Many mills were dismantled. In Java, remaining mills were badly damaged during the independence war (1945–1949). Factories and sugar production and exports recovered quite quickly in the Philippines on the basis of investments from the United States and preferential access to the U.S. market.

In Java, many Dutch-owned firms did not recover their mills. Others invested only minimal amounts, because the political climate in independent Indonesia was hostile to foreign enterprise. Exports dwindled, as domestic demand for sugar increased. All foreign-owned sugar mills were nationalized after 1957. The Indonesian government considered sugar an essential product to be sold domestically at low prices. Exports ceased, and mills found it impossible to generate the profits required for maintenance and salary payments. Firms be-

came increasingly dependent on government subventions.

Sugar mills in Java had to phase out renting farmland for cane production and started purchasing cane from smallholders. However, mills had insufficient income to pay high enough prices, and the cane was of poor quality. The Indonesian military used force to make farmers produce sugarcane for the mills under military management. The efficiency of the sugar industry decreased drastically in the 1960s.

Increasing opportunity cost of land in Java and low international sugar prices should have caused the disappearance of sugar production. Instead, the Indonesian government rehabilitated the mills during the 1970s and increased incentives to contracted cane farmers. In the 1980s, new factories expanded production outside Java, where the cost of land for cane production was low. Still, because of persistent inefficiencies, Indonesia's state-owned sugar mills

could produce sugar only with high rates of effective protection.

Sugar production in the Philippines decreased after it gradually lost favorable access to the U.S. market in the 1970s. Sugar mills had to adjust costs to lower sugar prices at a time when international prices continued to slump as a consequence of increased competition in the international market.

Thai sugar exports decreased to insignificance in the nineteenth century, but Thailand reemerged as a sugar exporter in the 1970s. Growing Thai conglomerate companies had been successful in agricultural exports through vertical integration of crop production, processing, and marketing. Encouraged by relatively high sugar prices in the 1970s and early 1980s, they used this strategy to invest in sugar production. Under tight government regulation, they achieved efficiencies in the production, trade, and shipping of sugar. However, inefficiencies in terms of low cane yield and sucrose content plagued cane production by contractors. Sugar prices fell in the 1980s and remained low in the 1990s because of excess production in Cuba and Brazil. Low cane prices caused farmers to turn away from cane contracts, causing cane supply problems. Many Thai sugar ventures experienced problems after a drought-induced fall in cane output in 1997/1998.

Other countries in Southeast Asia remained minor producers of sugar. Vietnam and Malaya produced largely for domestic consumption and exported small amounts before the Pacific War (1941–1942). Malaysia imported most consumed sugar. In the 1970s the Malaysian government supported domestic sugar refining. As a consequence, Malaysia is now a major importer of raw sugar, largely from Australia, and exports refined sugar.

Sugar is a controversial product in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Act (AFTA). High-cost sugar producer Indonesia preferred sugar to be exempted from AFTA; the Philippines wanted the reduction of sugar tariffs to be postponed until 2010; and low-cost sugar producer Thailand wanted neighboring countries to open their borders for sugar in 2002. As a compromise, the Philippines and Indonesia were allowed to delay the start of sugar import tariff cuts.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Java; Philippines–U.S. “Special Relationship”

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SUHARTO (1921–)

The Shrewd Puppeteer

Although he was forced from office in disgrace and tumult, and remained the subject of scorn and derision thereafter, Suharto remains one of the most important figures of twentieth-century Southeast Asia. He ruled Indonesia for more than three decades, initially by virtue of a letter of authority, the Supersemar, received from the hand of President Sukarno (t. 1945–1967) on 11 March 1966, then as acting president (1967–1968), and finally as president for seven consecutive terms (1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998). This long period of dominance of the Indonesian political scene was marked by an astonishing refurbishment of Indonesia’s lackluster economy and, equally, by an authoritarian firmness, sustained both by an extraordinary political astuteness and by Suharto’s corporatist vision of a Pancasila Indonesia. The last of his presidential terms lasted just a few weeks, as Suharto, increasingly the target of criticism for his increasingly authoritarian ways and his obstinate refusal to accommodate growing calls for political and social reform, and ever more isolated by the forces that had kept him in power for so long, was forced to resign on 21 May 1998.

The preeminence that Suharto came to enjoy could not have been predicted from his



Thojib N.J. Suharto ruled Indonesia virtually unchallenged for more than three decades, from 1966 to 1998. During this era, Indonesia shifted its alliances toward the West and rejoined the United Nations. Critics have condemned Suharto for suppressing dissent, ignoring human rights, and enriching his family and friends through cronyism. (Embassy of Indonesia)

lowly and uncertain origins. Born in a hamlet a few kilometers from the royal center of Yogyakarta in Central Java on 8 June 1921, he endured a troubled and uncertain childhood and a disrupted, spasmodic, and undistinguished education. Unable to secure satisfactory employment, he joined the Dutch colonial army (KNIL) in 1940, fled the uniform when Java fell to the Japanese in March 1942, and eventually joined a Peta (Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Fatherland) unit shortly after the formation of that force in 1943. The Japanese surrender in August 1945 saw him joining the infant Indonesian army, where he quickly earned promotion to lieutenant colonel and the

job of commanding the troops responsible for the defense of the Yogyakarta region in the face of the developing threat from Dutch forces seeking to reclaim their former colony. With the fall of Yogyakarta, the republic's capital, to the Dutch in December 1948, Suharto led a local guerrilla resistance and came to notice with a flawed but symbolically important attack on the Dutch-held city in March 1949.

Once independence was won, Suharto's military career developed slowly through the 1950s. It was punctuated by his participation in such exercises as the campaign against regional rebels in South Sulawesi in 1950 and clumsy efforts to subdue an Islamic revolt among his troops in 1951–1952, but it was mainly characterized by steady routine service in a variety of posts in Central Java. Seniority and persistence, more than anything else, brought him to the command of the Central Java Diponegoro Division in 1956, where he developed a strong reputation for looking after the material needs of his troops, mostly through his development of foundations whose wealth came from local levies, military business, and trade. His appointment was followed closely by Sukarno's (1901–1970) invocation of a state of war and siege in March 1957, giving Suharto special political authority in his region, something he exercised so broadly that he was removed in October 1959 following allegations of corruption and smuggling. A period of staff training (1959–1960) finally delivered him, now at the rank of brigadier general, to Jakarta. His reputation as a solid and politically unambitious soldier earned him command of Indonesia's first centrally controlled mobile force, Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command, then called Caduad [Army General Reserve]) (1961), as well as control of the military operations surrounding Indonesia's efforts to "liberate" West Irian from Dutch control (1962). Already standing deputy to the army chief of staff, at the height of the confrontation crisis ("Crush Malaysia" campaign) early in 1965, he was given operational command of fighting units in Sumatra and Kalimantan, although his efforts were directed toward managing and mitigating the conflict rather than expanding it.

The pivotal moment of his career came with the coup attempt of 1 October 1965, mounted by junior officers against the army leadership, probably with the encouragement and assis-

tance of a section of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) leadership. Displaying a shrewd mixture of decisiveness and tactical acumen, Suharto put down the attempt and then created a mood of violent vengefulness that led to an aggressive offensive against the PKI, exterminating the party and many of its members and supporters in rivers of blood. His successes inaugurated a long period of conflict with President Sukarno. Although he harbored no ambition for his country's leadership at that time, Suharto was determined that Sukarno should acknowledge the shortcomings of his rule, and particularly that he should formally disavow the PKI. Sukarno's failure to accommodate Suharto's wishes (expressed as a desperate strategy of minimizing the significance of the coup attempt) in a context of a gathering, army-encouraged crescendo of student criticism of the regime, proved fatal to his hopes of remaining in power. On 11 March 1966, Sukarno was forced to sign the letter of authority that had the effect of ceding sweeping executive powers to Suharto. Within hours, Suharto banned the PKI; within days he arrested a large number of Sukarno's ministers.

Thereafter, Suharto moved slowly and cautiously, but nonetheless relentlessly, to unseat Sukarno. Armed with the authority formally granted him in mid-1966 by the country's highest body, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS), and in the absence of any effective competitor for power, Suharto gradually chipped at Sukarno's declining charisma and legitimacy; in March 1967, Sukarno was unseated and replaced by Suharto in the post of acting president. Almost exactly a year later, Suharto was sworn in as full president.

Once in power, Suharto set to work on the two arenas that were to characterize his long tenure of power. The first was the construction of an economically developed and modernized Indonesia on the ruins wrought by Sukarno's prodigal economic mismanagement. Recruiting a group of Western-educated university economists who formed a formidable technocratic team, Suharto charged them with stabilizing the economy and developing a series of five-year development plans to revitalize the economy. The second was the establishment of a corporatist political and social order, labeled the New Order, based on the ideology of Pancasila, which combined both the repressive capacities

of the army and an incessant ideological barrage that emphasized the primacy of community over the individual and the virtue of toil and struggle, and sought to weave a harmonious whole from the unpromising yarns of Indonesia's diversity.

Suharto had, as well, to shore up his power. This he did by systematic purges of the state bureaucracy and the major state institutions in the late 1960s; by a thoroughgoing cleansing, reform, and centralization of the armed forces; by gathering around him a tightly knit and trusted group of like-minded military advisors and agents, of whom the most formidable was Ali Murtopo; by the calculated allocation of his powers of patronage (including the strategic deployment of off-budget income and by providing officers with access to business opportunities); by a controlled reconstruction of the bases and functions of political parties and electoral contestation; and by the judicious and sometimes ruthless disposal of those who stood in his way or, more rarely, presented a real threat to him. At various times through the 1970s, his regime seemed on the point of crisis, notably early in 1974 when army internal intrigues and inchoate social dissatisfaction at the style of economic development led to wild riots in Jakarta on the occasion of a visit by the Japanese prime minister, and again the following year when the regime's financial powerhouse, the Pertamina oil company, collapsed in a sea of debt.

Having survived these threats, however, Suharto in the early 1980s moved into a period of unparalleled ascendancy. Although his regime was not without its serious problems—notably the crisis caused by the rapid decline of world oil prices that threatened to bring down the economy—Suharto was able to turn these challenges to good account. The end of the oil boom in the early and mid-1980s, for example, forced him to reshape the economy in deregulated, liberalized, and export-oriented ways that led, in turn, to a new surge of economic growth. Suharto met growing dissatisfaction among army leaders at what they perceived as his gathering independence (and their own growing marginalization) with efforts to reshape the basis of his regime by developing Golkar as a powerful civilian-oriented political party, and attempts to strengthen his identification with growing Islamizing tendencies within Indonesian society.

By the early 1990s, as Suharto reached his seventies, there was a mounting social clamor focused on the problem of the presidential succession and the possibilities it might present for a more open society. Moreover, the kinds of social transformation that Suharto's economic policies had delivered (he had been named "Father of Development" by the People's Consultative Assembly in 1983) had created new social classes and developing political expectations that entertained notions of enhanced participation and the lifting of characteristic New Order repressiveness.

Suharto, however, had reached that point in his career when he identified the success of his own political career with the success of the nation. He was, he thought, indispensable to Indonesia's well-being. Paradoxically, he was unable to adjust his mode of rule so that it might accommodate new political demands, simply because such accommodation could have no other effect than to diminish his near-total control. Increasingly distanced from the society he ruled, tired, surrounded by sycophants and cronies, and burdened by a greedy and unpopular set of children, his one weapon was to apply unremitting repression—but without the political sophistication and artistry he had displayed earlier.

In the end, the Asian currency crisis of 1997–1998 was the immediate occasion, though not the fundamental cause, of his ousting. It laid bare the fact that the New Order that Suharto had created was now stagnant and immobilized, and its elite hopelessly addicted to corruption and unable to address realistically the reforms that resolution of the crisis demanded. Accordingly, the political legitimacy that Suharto's developmental successes had engendered withered away. In the end, as students occupied the parliamentary complex, and calls for fundamental political reform increased in shrillness, one by one his supporters deserted him, and his regime simply ceased to exist.

It would be wrong to characterize Suharto by the way of his going. He was one of Asia's most crafty and masterful politicians. Apparently unskilled and unpracticed in politics, Suharto took to the challenges of leadership as though born to them. Stubbornly pragmatic in securing the goals he had set himself, he was a master at delicate maneuvering, balancing contending political forces and individuals, and isolating or confusing

them so thoroughly that any threat they might have presented was dissipated. He was often slow to act, waiting until he had tested support and probed for any weaknesses, and hiding his intentions behind a broad but impassive smile. Once he decided to act, however, he did so with an efficiency and ruthlessness that gave his enemies no chance of recovery.

Undistracted by matters of the mind, and buoyed by an inner calm and resolve built upon his attachment to aphoristic principles of life and living derived from Javanese thinking, he was entirely consumed by what he saw as his duty and destiny: to reshape Indonesia economically, politically, and socially. In this effort he enjoyed significant but only partial success. Indonesia had, by the mid-1990s, enjoyed nearly three decades of rapid growth that had utterly transformed the country. At the political and social level, however, his efforts to create a corporatist Indonesia succeeded only because of the repressiveness of his New Order, not from any kind of popular inner conviction. His obstinate belief, more and more evident with the passage of time, that only he held the key to Indonesia's success meant an inability to prepare for his own passing and, more important, a devastating failure to construct strong institutions of governance that might have provided his fractious nation with the resilience it needed.

Once overthrown, Suharto fought off efforts to bring him to trial through the successful claim that a series of strokes had left him unable to defend himself. Increasingly frail and ill, he was left to contemplate his fate and that of his country, which showed signs of increasing incapacity in the years following his departure.

R. E. ELSON

See also Gestapu Affair (1965); Golkar; Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*); Irian Jaya (West Irian); Konfrontasi ("Crush Malaysia" Campaign); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Oil and Petroleum; *Orde Baru* (The New Order); Pancasila (Pantja Sila); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Pertamina Crisis (1975–1976); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Timor

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SUKARNO

See Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970)

SUKHOTAI (SUKHODAVA)

The Cradle of T'ai Culture

Sukhotai (Sukhothai) was a kingdom of the T'ai (Siamese) located in the upper sector of

the Chao Phraya plain. It was founded in the first half of the thirteenth century as a small, local kingdom before it became the political center of the T'ai in the last two decades of that century. Sukhotai eventually lost its might and was absorbed by the more powerful kingdom of Ayudhya (Ayutthaya) in the fifteenth century. It is known in T'ai history as the kingdom that originated T'ai art and culture.

Before the kingdom of Sukhotai was founded, the T'ai had already settled themselves in the northern region and the Chao Phraya plains. However, they were not able to form their own independent kingdoms, and most T'ai principalities in the Chao Phraya delta, such as Lopburi, Sankhaburi, and Rat (in modern-day Uttaradit province), were semivassal or vassal states of the powerful Angkorian empire. Sukhotai was one of the Khmer Angkorian outposts in the upper sector of the Chao Phraya plain (Taylor 1992: 169). However, after the death of King Jayavarman VII (r. 1181–1220?) of Angkor in the 1220s, the political and military power of the Khmer kingdom was in drastic decline. This created an opportunity for local T'ai leaders in the Chao Phraya delta to form their own independent states.

Sukhotai was also founded during this period. In the 1240s, Pha Muang, who ruled the principality of Rat as an Angkorian fringe area, joined forces with his ally Bang Klanghao of Bang Yang, near Sukhotai, to attack the Khmer outpost at Sukhotai. The Khmer resisted, but they were defeated. However, Pha Muang, who might have realized the superior power of Bang Klanghao, did not want to become the ruler of the newly independent kingdom of Sukhotai and thus passed on his royal title of Sri Indraditya and the power to rule Sukhotai to Bang Klanghao. Wyatt suggests that, as a vassal ruler of Angkor, Pha Muang may have felt guilty about rising up against his Khmer lord; as a result, he did not want to rule Sukhotai (Wyatt 1984: 52).

During the reigns of Sri Indraditya and his son Ban Muang (r. 1240s–1270s), Sukhotai was still a local power and did not have expansive territories. However, during the reign of Rama Kamhaeng (r. 1279–1298), the younger son of Sri Indraditya, Sukhotai increased its political power and rose to be the political and cultural center of the T'ai in the Chao Phraya delta. Its success was closely associated with the charisma

and diplomacy of Rama Kamhaeng. Rama Kamhaeng, who was born Rama, demonstrated his military prowess from the age of nineteen, when he successfully helped his father fight against the troops of Sot (in modern Tak province) who attacked Sukhotai during the reign of Sri Indraditya. Rightly his epithet pronounced him *Rama Khamhaeng* or *Rama the Bold* (ibid.: 53). When he eventually ruled Sukhotai, Rama Khamhaeng adopted various means to enable him to extend his rule over a vast territory. In 1287 he concluded a triple alliance with Mangrai of Lanna and Pha Muang of Phayao, two equally powerful neighboring kingdoms. This mutual alliance allowed him to rest assured that the northern flank of Sukhotai would be safe from invasions, while it allowed Mangrai to concentrate on defending his kingdom from the Mongols.

Via his Buddhist connections, Rama Kamhaeng established peaceful relationships with Nakhon Sithammarat, a thriving port city in the south that controlled many small principalities in the Malay Peninsula. The consequence of these relationships was Sukhotai's access to maritime trade routes. The Mon kingdom, which had just gained independence from Pagan, was also a tributary state of Sukhotai via a marriage link of the Mon king with Rama Kamhaeng's daughter. Although the far-flung regions were absorbed into Sukhotai's political power by peaceful means, the immediately surrounding areas of Sukhotai in the Chao Phraya delta were brought under Rama Kamhaeng's rule by military power. It is likely that while Sukhotai maintained strong political control over its immediate vicinity, the more far-flung regions enjoyed greater autonomy, and Sukhotai controlled them only nominally. But more important, Sukhotai's relations with the fringe areas hinged on the personal relations between Rama Kamhaeng and his vassal rulers. As a result, when Rama Kamhaeng died in 1298, the power of Sukhotai over the fringe areas disappeared.

Sukhotai was a Buddhist state. It accepted Singhalese Buddhism from Ceylon via Nakhon Sithammarat. At the early stage, Hinduism probably played a vital role in the kingdom; Sukhotai was once part of the Angkorian empire. Temples built in the earlier period clearly demonstrate Hindu influences. However, from the reign of Rama Kamhaeng, Buddhism be-

came the state religion under royal patronage. The close relationship between polity and Buddhism can be clearly demonstrated by royal support of activities in relation to Buddhism. The tradition of having important temples built adjacent to palaces originated from the reign of Rama Kamhaeng (Tambiah 1976: 86). Moreover, the king shared his throne with revered monks who sat on the throne on Buddhist holy days to preach *Dharma* (Buddhist precepts) to Sukhotai's inhabitants.

Sukhotai was not a fertile state in comparison with other kingdoms or principalities in the northern plain or the Chao Phraya delta, as far as land and natural resources were concerned. It had a limited amount of low land, while its larger part was hilly or mountainous. Thus rice, its main staple, was produced only in sufficient quantities for local consumption. This explains why Rama Kamhaeng adopted a free trade policy in order to attract more people to settle in Sukhotai to conduct trade. In 1292 he made a stone inscription that portrayed his kingdom as a land of freedom in which its inhabitants enjoyed the right to undertake economic activities freely. Whoever wanted to trade did so without being required to pay taxes (Wyatt 1984: 54). Interstate commerce also became an important economy of Sukhotai. From the late thirteenth century to the fifteenth century, high-quality porcelain, especially celadon from Sukhotai and Si Satchanalai, its major satellite city, was exported widely throughout Southeast Asia (Reid 1988: 105).

In his stone inscription of 1292, Rama Kamhaeng describes himself as a king who ruled his subjects as a father rules his children. A bell was hung at the palace gate; people who wished to seek an audience with the king and obtain his assistance would ring this bell, and the king would readily come to meet them, listen to their complaints, and try to solve their problems (Wyatt 1984: 54). The inscription also clearly narrates how close the ruler and the ruled of Sukhotai were, in contrast to the very strict and hierarchical nature of Khmer rule, in which the gulf between the king and his subjects was very wide. This paternalistic rule, as well as the free trade policy, was an attempt by the rulers of Sukhotai to attract more people to the kingdom, who would provide much-needed manpower for the newly established state. It also portrays how idyllic Sukhotai was

in comparison with the Angkorian empire, whose subjects had to pay onerous taxes. There was also one highly significant cultural development during the reign of Rama Kamhaeng: the development of the T'ai script.

After the death of Rama Kamhaeng in 1298, his successors were not capable of maintaining the political power of the extensive kingdom. The king of Mon no longer accepted the sovereignty of Sukhotai. Suphanburi and Phetburi in the Chao Phraya delta also broke away from Sukhotai rule. As a consequence, the size of Sukhotai contracted substantially, and it became once again a small kingdom that had the power to rule only in its immediate vicinity. However, it was during this decline in political power that Sukhotai was known as a very strong Buddhist state. During the reign of Lo T'ai (r. 1298–1346) and especially the reign of Lu T'ai (r. 1346–1374), the kings extended their patronage and strong support of Buddhism. New city and forest temples were built as centers of Buddhist learning. T'ai art and culture also flourished. For instance, the unique architectural form of Buddhist buildings known as the lotus bud spire (*Phum Khao Bin*) on top of a *Chedi* (a cone-shaped building in which Lord Buddha's relics are believed to be kept) originated in Sukhotai. Many elegant and distinctive images of the Buddha in the walking posture were also cast during the Sukhotai period (*ibid.*: 58).

When the kingdom of Ayudhya was founded in 1351 in the lower Chao Phraya delta, Ayudhya kings—especially those from the Suphanburi house—considered Sukhotai their archrival. Starting from the reign of Boromracha I (r. 1370–1388), the more powerful Ayudhya launched repeated military campaigns against Sukhotai. In 1378, King Mahathammaracha II of Sukhotai was forced to accept Ayudhya's sovereignty and to swear allegiance to the latter. Even though Sukhotai tried to break away from Ayudhya from time to time, it never succeeded in gaining its independence. In 1396, Ayudhya was able to impose its legal system upon Sukhotai and in 1412 appointed one of its officials to be the resident of Sukhotai; this reduced its status to that of a vassal state of Ayudhya. Eventually, when Mahathammaracha IV (r. 1419–1438) of Sukhotai died in 1438, it was completely absorbed into Ayudhya and its status was reduced further to that of a provincial town (*ibid.*: 68–69). Thereafter, the Sukho-

tai region became a buffer zone that Ayudhya used as a base from which to launch military campaigns against the kingdom of Lanna in the north.

For almost two hundred years Sukhotai was the major political and cultural center of the T'ai in the northern sector of Chao Phraya delta. Although its paternalistic rule did not help the kingdom to survive, its strong belief in Buddhism and its artistic and cultural creativity laid solid foundations on which the T'ai kingdoms founded after its collapse would be built.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also Angkor; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767 C.E.), Kingdom of; Buddhism, Theravada; Jayavarman VII (r. 1181–1220?); Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Rama Kamhaeng (r. 1279–1298); T'ais

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SULAWESI (CELEBES)

Along the Spice Trade Route

Sulawesi is the Indonesian name for the island generally known in the West as Celebes. Its total surface area is 72,890 square miles (approximately 189,000 square kilometers), roughly the size of Great Britain. Despite its great length of coastline (3,000 miles; 4,830 kilometers), much of it is not conducive to safe anchorage. Moreover, offshore are widespread and treacherous

coral reefs posing an ever-present danger to shipping. It is the peculiar shape of the island (described as an orchid, a demented spider, a wobbly K, among other things), with a high mountainous center and four arms stretching outward to form peninsulas, that made early European explorers believe that Sulawesi formed separate islands. They therefore called the island "The Celebes," though there is no consensus among inhabitants or scholars regarding the origin or meaning of this name.

Sulawesi is characterized by the general angularity of its relief and many lakes located in valleys. With its steep slopes and a climate noted for its dry season, heavy downpours lead to soil erosion in much of the island where shifting agriculture continues to be practiced. In addition to the shortage of flat or low-lying land, a hot climate and high annual rainfall discourage extensive and intensive agriculture. Except for areas in the southwestern and southeastern peninsulas, almost the whole island can be characterized by rugged uplands of more than 1,500 feet (450 meters).

Some of the earliest of prehistoric records have been found in the southwest peninsula, today known as the province of South Sulawesi. Excavations at three caves near Maros reveal a hunter-gatherer, at times cave-dwelling, culture termed "Toalean," dating to between 30,000 and 8,000 years ago. Another major prehistoric find, which dates from 4,500 to 6,000 years ago, is at Lake Tondano in North Sulawesi. Both sites reveal the use of stone tools and various occupations, as well as a wide range of habitats. In Central Sulawesi there is evidence of a megalithic culture sometime after the Neolithic period. These megaliths are worked stone formed into large cylindrical vats, statues, urns, and mortars. But who created them and what they signify are not yet known.

Sometime about 2000 B.C.E., Austronesian speaking people arrived on the shores of Sulawesi from the southern Philippines, after a lengthy period of movement from southern China to Taiwan and then down through the Philippines. In general these Austronesian speakers spread rapidly along the coastal areas throughout the region before attempting to settle in the interior. The differences that arose over time within this group in language, lifestyle, and even beliefs were a result of adaptation to particular environments and isolation

from one another. Descendants of these migrants inhabited the island of Sulawesi during the historical period that began in the first millennium C.E.

Of the four peninsulas in Sulawesi, it is the northern and the southwestern arms that have had the greatest impact on the history of the region. Two factors may have contributed to this. The first is the presence of good agricultural land in these areas. The Minahasa region at the northeastern tip of Sulawesi is blessed with rich volcanic soil and is hence able to produce sufficient quantities of rice. On the opposite end, in the southwest peninsula, the area around Makassar also is noted for its volcanic soils and great agricultural productivity. A second factor is that both areas were on an international trade route to and from the Spice Islands of Maluku. A southern route favored by most traders went from the western half of the archipelago along Java and the southern end of Sulawesi, then onward to Maluku. A northern route, used mainly by the Chinese and later by the Europeans, went from northern Borneo to the northern end of Sulawesi to Maluku. Both routes therefore touched one part of Sulawesi and helped to bring that island into international commerce. Ports at both ends—Menado in the north and Makassar in the south—therefore became major windows to the outside world for the inhabitants of the northern and southwestern peninsulas of Sulawesi.

There are four major ethnic groups in the modern Indonesian province of South Sulawesi, which incorporates the entire southwest peninsula. The largest is the Bugis, who occupy almost the entire eastern half and part of the western half of the peninsula. The Makassar people are the next largest in population and are found mainly in the west and the south. The next in size are the Sa'dan Toraja, who are found in the mountainous areas in the north, and finally the Mandar people, located in the coastal and mountain areas of the northwestern part of the peninsula. From early times the Bugis and Makassar peoples occupied the most fertile agricultural lands on the peninsula and had access to some of the most favorable port sites. These advantages enabled these two ethnic groups to become dominant through much of the history of South Sulawesi.

Very little is known about the early history of the island, though some argue that the major

Bugis epic cycle, the *I La Galigo*, provides a picture of South Sulawesi society prior to the fourteenth century. The epic depicts a hierarchical society of kings, nobles, commoners, and slaves, as well as a developed religion under native priests known as *bissu*. Equally noteworthy are the links between Sulawesi and the outside world described in the epic. This depiction can be substantiated by archaeological finds of large quantities of ceramic material dating from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries from China, Vietnam, Thailand, and elsewhere, demonstrating South Sulawesi's thriving international trade.

From the sixteenth century the historical record becomes fuller, with evidence from both the Bugis and Makassar chronicles, as well as from European sources. The Makassar people of the kingdom of Gowa became a major force in the sixteenth century and dominated the other ethnic groups in the peninsula, particularly their chief rivals, the Bugis. Gowa's ability to control the trade in the "trinity" of spices—cloves, nutmeg, and mace—made Makassar a thriving entrepôt. Gowa's traders sailed the seas around eastern Indonesia collecting spices and removing any competitors. It met its match in the Dutch East India Company (VOC), whose aim also was to monopolize the spice trade. In the long and bloody Makassar War of 1666–1669, the VOC defeated Gowa with the major assistance of the Bugis under their leader Arung Palakka. The latter became ruler of Bone (1672–1696) and remained a major ally of the Dutch until his death.

The Makassar War marked a major point in South Sulawesi history. The Treaty of Bungaya, signed in 1667, established the dominance of the VOC in the affairs of South Sulawesi. With Dutch support, Arung Palakka became the undisputed leader of the peninsula and was able to take revenge on his former enemies. For the remainder of the century and into the eighteenth, there was a steady stream of refugees leaving South Sulawesi to seek to settle elsewhere in the archipelago. Some went to the nearby islands of Borneo and Sumbawa, while others sought refuge in Java, Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula. The Makassar refugees were eventually eliminated from their positions of strength in Java and Sumatra and forcibly returned to Sulawesi. Others, including many Bugis, remained abroad and became influential

in local politics. The most famous cases of Bugis success were on the Malay Peninsula, where Bugis refugees founded the kingdom of Selangor in the eighteenth century, established the uniquely Bugis Raja Muda institution in the kingdom of Johor, and married into every royal family on the Malay Peninsula. In addition to establishing dynasties, the Bugis diaspora provided the basis for the creation of a widespread South Sulawesi trading network that spanned the entire archipelago.

From the late seventeenth century, South Sulawesi affairs were inextricably linked to events in the outside world. The permanent presence of the VOC at Fort Rotterdam in Makassar made the Dutch a significant part of the politics of South Sulawesi. Although there were a number of rebellions challenging the dominance of the VOC–Bone alliance, the latter continued to dominate affairs in the peninsula until the demise of the VOC at the end of the eighteenth century. The Dutch colonial state assumed the position of the VOC in the nineteenth century, but the generally excellent relations with their former Bugis allies were never again achieved. On the contrary, the nineteenth century saw major conflicts between the kingdom of Bone and the Dutch. It was not until 1905 that the Dutch succeeded in controlling all opposition and incorporating the Makassar and the Bugis kingdoms into the newly created Netherlands East Indies.

In the northern peninsula the Minahassans have been the dominant ethnic group, and the port of Menado the principal harbor. The northern, northeastern, and southeastern peninsulas face toward the east and have therefore been historically closely linked to the kingdom of Ternate in the present-day province of North Maluku. Located between Ternate and the powerful Bugis and Makassar kingdoms of South Sulawesi, these three peninsulas became a bone of contention in a power struggle between these two loci of political power from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. The replacement of the VOC by the Dutch colonial state in the beginning of the nineteenth century brought an end to this struggle. Under the Dutch, Menado became particularly favored because of its Christian population. Its many Dutch-speaking inhabitants came to staff the lower levels of the colonial bureaucracy, and the Menadonese Christians formed an important

part of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL).

During the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), Sulawesi was placed under the administrative jurisdiction of the Japanese Imperial Navy, which was more oppressive and restrictive of nationalist activity than was the case in the army-administered areas. In the revolutionary period (1945–1950) the Bugis and Makassar areas in Sulawesi opposed the reestablishment of Dutch colonial control. Dutch troops under the command of Raymond “Turk” Westering committed terrible massacres of the local population. Then, in April 1950, Andi Aziz of the KNIL attempted unsuccessfully to preserve the Dutch-created state of East Indonesia, which included the island of Sulawesi. All Dutch-led opposition to Indonesian independence failed, and in 1950 the unitary Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed. The young republic faced a number of challenges, one of which was the PERMESTA (“Universal Struggle Charter”) movement of 1957–1958, based principally in North Sulawesi. That and other opposition movements in Sulawesi were put down by the central government, and the island subsequently became a loyal part of the Indonesian republic.

In modern Indonesia members of the different ethnic groups from Sulawesi have made their mark in the national arena, and the port of Makassar continues to be an important regional center for eastern Indonesia. Nevertheless, there has never been an islandwide identity. Instead, groups tend to identify with their ethnic origins and with their provincial unit. Sulawesi is a meaningful unit only to scholars.

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See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Bugis (Buginese); Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia from 1800; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Johor; Johor-Riau Empire; Maluku (The Moluccas); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Spices and the Spice Trade; Torajas; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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SULTAN IDRIS TRAINING COLLEGE (SITC)

Stirring Malay Nationalism

Sultan Idris Training College was established as a teacher-training center. R. O. Winstedt (t. 1916–1924), assistant director of education of the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay States, mooted the idea of centralizing all Malay teacher-training centers in one venue; such an institution would train Malay intellectuals and bureaucrats. Sultan Abdul Jalil (r. 1916–1918) of Perak agreed to have it built in Tanjong Malim, a town in the south of the state, in memory of the late sultan Idris ibni al marhum Raja Iskandar Shah (r. 1887–1916), his predecessor. In November 1922 the college was opened by Sir George Maxwell, the chief secretary of the government, who welcomed the first batch of 120 students arriving from all states in the Malay Peninsula, Brunei, and Labuan.

O. T. Dussek was the first principal of the college, and he remained as such for the next fourteen years. He was assisted by three European and seven Malay teachers, and one basketry instructor. Dussek was succeeded by other British educationists until 1958, when Zainal Abidin Ali became the first local person to hold the helm.

The curriculum of the college was based on what the British thought was the practical need

of the Malays—namely, to train them to be better farmers, fishermen, and craftsmen. Classes on gardening and craftsmanship were made compulsory, besides the teaching of arithmetic, geometry, geography, Malay language, history, teaching methodology, health science, drawing, writing, basket weaving, religion, and general studies. The most prominent department was the Translation Bureau. Outstanding Malay scholars who became well-known writers and Malay language specialists emerged from the college. One of them was Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad (1895–1973), better known as Za’ba, who also served as a staff member of the college.

True to its aim, graduates from this college taught Malay children at the government Malay primary schools, mostly in the rural areas—not only school subjects but also the spirit of nationalism. Graduates became very vocal fighters for the independence of Malaya through their political campaigns and writings. Some of them became pioneer ministers of independent Malaya. SITC was used first as a hospital during the Pacific War (1941–1945), and was later used as a Japanese military base when the latter occupied Malaya (1941–1945).

In February 1987 the status of SITC was upgraded from that of a teachers’ college to an education institution, thereby taking on the name Sultan Idris Education Institute; it then also offered higher degree programs for students who had graduated from other institutions of higher learning and wished to become teachers. In May 1997 its status was further upgraded to that of a university that trained students in educational studies, absorbing all education degree programs that used to be offered by other public universities in the country.

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See also Malayan/Malaysian Education;
University of Malaya; Winstedt, Sir R[ichard]
O[laf] (1878–1966)

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SULU AND THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO

Extending 288 kilometers from Basilan Island to the northeastern coast of Borneo, the Sulu Archipelago is bounded on the west by the Sulu Sea and on the east and south by the Celebes Sea. Its 400 named and more than 500 unnamed islands are grouped into five major island clusters: Samales, Pangutaran, Jolo, Tapul, and Tawi-Tawi.

Jolo Island, 59 kilometers long by 16 kilometers wide, is the largest in the archipelago. Fertile volcanic soils make possible intensive dry-field cultivation of over approximately half its area. The rest is nonarable mountain land, remnant forest, and former farmland turned to *imperata* grass. Rainfall is abundant—some 178 to 254 centimeters annually—but erratic, particularly during the northeast monsoon (November–March). Jolo Island is the principal home of the Tausug, the dominant ethnic group of the archipelago. This island was also the former residence of the Sulu sultanate, the Islamic polity that dominated the political and economic life of the region from the fifteenth until the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

For the Tausug, the name of both Jolo Island and the Sulu Archipelago derives from the same term, *sug* or *suug*, meaning literally “sea current.” The historical importance of the Sulu Archipelago is linked to its strategic location on sea-lanes connecting China and the Philippines, Borneo and the western Malay world, and Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia. The archipelago also forms a major zone of contention between the Philippine archipelago to the north, agrarian and long Christianized, and the Muslim maritime world to the south and west, rooted in trade and connected by religion.

For the past 400 years, Spanish and other Philippine sources have referred collectively to the Tausug and other Muslim peoples of the Sulu-Mindanao region as “Moros,” meaning “Muslims,” derived, by association, from the Iberian “Moors.” Relations for much of this period have been marked by conflict, with Moro raids during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries devastating large areas of the Visayan Islands and coastal Luzon. Since the

beginning of the 1970s, relations between Manila and the Muslim south have been dominated by a renewal of violence and the emergence of secessionist movements, some of them advocating the creation of a separate Muslim nation.

Trade and the Early History of Sulu

The Tausug are comparative latecomers to Sulu, first appearing in the islands in the eleventh century. As trade with China expanded, this community grew in size and political importance, becoming, by the end of the thirteenth century, the dominant population. Sulu is mentioned in Chinese sources as early as the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), and an account of a tributary mission from Sulu appears in the Ming Annals. Genealogical sources place the founding of the Sulu sultanate in the mid-fifteenth century. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, regular diplomatic relations existed between China and the sultanate; the sultan of Sulu dispatched at least five tribute-bearing missions to the Chinese court between 1727 and 1763.

By the late seventeenth century, an expansion of Western commercial activity in China, connected to the China tea trade, enormously stimulated Chinese demand for maritime products, particularly *trempang* (*tripang*), or sea slugs (*Holothuria* spp.), an important ingredient in Chinese soups and medicinal preparations. Trempang fisheries were developed throughout the Sulu island chain, as well as along the eastern coast of Borneo, southward to the Maratua Islands in present-day East Kalimantan. The collection and drying of holothuria for export were, and remain, labor-intensive. At the height of the trade, some 20,000 persons in Sulu were believed to have been involved in trempang production. Pearls were another major item of trade between Sulu and China. Alexander Dalrymple, a servant of the English East India Company (EIC), writing at the end of the eighteenth century, described the coral reefs surrounding Tawi-Tawi Island as being the most valuable pearl fishery in the world. Pearls were supplanted, in the nineteenth century, by mother-of-pearl, as the second most valuable commercial product after trempang. Other items included shark fin, rattan, camphor, and birds' nests.

Sulu's trade grew rapidly between 1768 and 1848. Foreign traders brought mainly war supplies, cotton cloth, and opium to Jolo, and Sulu responded by intensifying its procurement trade in maritime and jungle produce. From the mid-eighteenth century, the Sulu market was supplied increasingly by private English merchants from Calcutta and Singapore, Manila Chinese, and Portuguese from Macao. Sulu's chief rivals were the Maguindanao and Brunei sultanates. However, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Sulu surpassed them both, with the key to its success being its ability to control the surrounding sea-lanes. By 1768 the Sulu sultanate had become the center of a great intersocietal exchange network, extending from Mindanao and southern Palawan, through the Sulu Archipelago, to the northern coast of Borneo, and, from there, southward into the Celebes Sea. For a time, Jolo emerged as the principal coordinating center for slave raiding throughout Southeast Asia. In Jolo harbor, Ilanun and Balangingi vessels were outfitted, supplied with cannons, muskets, and munitions, and slaves were traded, mainly for cloth and firearms. The economic ascendancy of Sulu was linked to slave raiding, which, in turn, helped make possible the expansion of Sulu's export trade.

The Demise of an Independent Sulu

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the Tausug, under growing pressure from Manila, sought to diversify their commercial relations with Western powers. Their success in doing so created anxiety in Manila and led to a series of punitive expeditions that marked a critical turning point in Sulu's history. In 1848, James Brooke (1803–1868), in his capacity as governor of Labuan (t. 1848–1851), signed a treaty of friendship with Sultan Muhammed Fadl (r. 1844–1862). The Spanish government in Manila, in retaliation, sent gunboats that laid waste to Balangingi Island and the following year attacked settlements at Tunkil, Bukutua, and Bulan. In 1851 the Spanish fleet returned and attacked Jolo. Sultan Muhammed Fadl and his *datus* (nonroyal chiefs) withdrew to their *kotas* (forts) in the mountains, but their defenses were overrun; the sultan was forced to sign a treaty that, if honored, would have made the sultanate part of the Spanish colony of the Philippines.

The treaty, however, was largely ignored. In 1871, Spain renewed its efforts to subjugate Sulu. Gunboats bombarded Sama villages in the Tawi-Tawi island group and blockaded Jolo. The Spanish then began a systematic campaign to destroy all Sulu shipping. Gunboats cruised the archipelago, destroying all boats they encountered and sending the crews to Zamboanga or Manila to labor in irons on public works. They also destroyed coastal villages, burning houses and boats. In this way, Spain gradually imposed a complete blockade of Sulu, destroying native shipping and preventing commercial vessels from reaching Labuan and Singapore.

Sulu remained defiant. In 1875, Manila sent an expeditionary force of 9,000 soldiers. They attacked and destroyed Jolo Town, then Maimbung, Parang, and finally Tausug strongholds on Tapul and Lapac Islands. On Jolo they built a garrison and began to rebuild Jolo Town along European lines as a walled city. These events, together with the immigration of Straits Chinese into Sulu, brought about a total collapse of the former Sulu trading sphere. With the destruction of Jolo and the deliberate annihilation of native shipping, Sulu lost its ability to control the seas, and so the era of long-distance slave raiding came to an end. By the end of the 1880s, the Chinese, too, had begun to depart, with the result that Sulu ceased to be a significant regional entrepôt.

Following Spain's defeat in the Spanish-American War (1898), U.S. troops occupied Jolo Town in 1899. Sulu was made part of Moro Province in 1903, but, owing to continuing unrest, it remained under military rule until 1914. In 1915, Sultan Jamal ul-Kiram II (r. 1894–1915) relinquished all claims to secular power, and sovereignty over Sulu formally passed to the Philippine state.

Politics and Current History

Today, Sulu, including the provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, together with Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao, composes the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

The 1970s opened with an upsurge of violence in the southern Philippines in which the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a Muslim secessionist movement, emerged as a serious challenge to the Philippine state. In

clashes with government troops, the secessionists were initially successful. However, in 1976 the movement was temporarily neutralized by the Tripoli Agreement, brokered by Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi (1942–) of Libya. This agreement split the MNLF, and fighting soon resumed. In 1986, after the fall of President Ferdinand Marcos (t. 1965–1986), President Corazon Aquino (t. 1986–1992) sought to end what had become a sixteen-year secessionist war between the MNLF and the Philippine government. In August 1986 the president's brother-in-law met with Nur Misuari (1940–), the chairman of the MNLF, under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), and agreed to grant autonomy to four mainly Muslim-populated provinces, including Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, in return for an agreement by MNLF leaders to relinquish demands for complete independence. A new Philippine constitution was ratified in 1987 that made specific provision for the creation of an Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, and in 1989 ARMM was formally established. From the outset, however, it enjoyed little public support, power, or funding.

In western Mindanao, fighting resumed. In 1992, President Fidel Ramos (t. 1992–1998) revived negotiations with the MNLF. The eventual outcome was a peace agreement signed in Jakarta in September 1996. This agreement was intended to implement the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and called for the creation of an executive council, legislative assembly, and administrative system. Nur Misuari was elected unopposed as governor.

Severe problems with the agreement soon emerged. It generated anxiety among non-Muslims in Mindanao, while among Muslims it was widely felt that autonomy had not brought the benefits promised. Furthermore, the 1996 peace agreement was concluded without the participation of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which, consequently, dissociated itself from the agreement and vowed instead to continue the armed struggle. After President Joseph Estrada (t. 1998–2000) came to office in 1998, negotiations with the MILF continued, but in 1999 there were clashes with the military and peace talks broke down. The military then escalated its campaign against the MILF, culminating in the overrunning of some fifty MILF camps.

Although this campaign was taking place, another, more shadowy group, the Abu Sayyaf, attracted considerable publicity following a series of hostage-taking incidents. Suspected of links with radical groups in the Arab world, including Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf made "commercial insurgency"—kidnapping for ransom—its hallmark. In March 2000, fifty-three people were taken hostage. Although negotiations were under way, a further twenty-one were kidnapped, including nineteen foreign nationals, from the Malaysian island of Sipadan in Sabah. Foreign ministers from Germany, France, and Finland flew to Manila to discuss the crisis, and, in the end, seventeen foreign hostages were released upon payment of an estimated U.S.\$25 million. Later, a tourist resort in the Philippines was attacked and an American missionary couple were taken hostage. The attackers were said to have escaped using a high-powered vessel purchased with ransom money from the Sipadan kidnappings. In September 2001 the Philippine Armed Forces began an assault on Abu Sayyaf strongholds on Basilan and Jolo Islands. More than 100 Abu Sayyaf members were reportedly killed, and about 50,000 civilians are said to have fled to Malaysia.

Internationally, these events brought worldwide attention to the tenuous nature of Philippine rule in Sulu. The Malaysian government increased naval patrols along the Sabah-Sulu border. Following elections in November 2001, Nur Misuari led a failed uprising and, in the aftermath, fled to Sabah. There he was detained by Malaysian authorities and later deported to the Philippines. In January and February 2002, 650 U.S. advisers were sent to the southern Philippines to begin counterterrorism exercises with the Philippine armed forces. Thus, a hundred years later, U.S. troops were once again back in Sulu.

CLIFFORD SATHER

See also Bajau; Borneo; Brooke, James, and Sarawak; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Ilanun and Balangingi; Labuan (1847); Marine/Sea Products; Mindanao; Misuari, Nur (1940–); Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); Moros; Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Piracy; Slavery; Tausug and the Sulu Sultanate

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SUMATRA

Sumatra is a large and relatively sparsely populated island that lies to the west of Java and the Malay Peninsula, enclosing the western rim of island Southeast Asia. At first glance it is hard to determine clear patterns of either unity or continuity in Sumatra's history, yet this island provides important keys to understanding the history of the Indonesian-Malay archipelago. From early times northern Sumatra was a landfall for sailors crossing the Indian Ocean. From this point merchant ships might sail down the western coast of the island in search of camphor, benzoin, gold, or pepper on their way to the Sunda Strait, or they might navigate the eastern shores of Sumatra leading into the Straits of Melaka. Sumatra's geography has thus had an important impact on its history and has influenced the rise and fall of Sumatran port kingdoms that took advantage of its position on the trade routes.

The internal geography of the island has also helped to shape its history. A ridge of mountains, the Bukit Barisan, runs down the western part of the island in a line that effectively separates the west and east coasts along the length of the landmass. In earlier days the inaccessibility of the mountainous interior of Sumatra meant that it was often quicker for foreigners

to sail around the coast than to cross the island by land; coastal communities oriented themselves toward this seaborne trade. The interior of Sumatra, however, is rich in resources, and throughout the island's history it is possible to discern a distinctive pattern of coastal-hinterland interactions. Large tracts of the upland are covered in tropical forest and are largely uninhabited. But the high volcanic plateaus offer fertile soil and are much more densely populated by groups such as the Batak and the Minangkabau, who have developed distinctive cultures and their own forms of interaction with the coastal zones. Although Sumatra, today, forms an important part of the Republic of Indonesia, the history and culture of its inhabitants cannot be understood in isolation from those of the wider Malay world of which the island forms a part. In this sense Sumatran history forces us to look beyond recent political developments and beyond colonial boundaries in order to understand other patterns in the history of island Southeast Asia.

The record of Sumatra's earliest history is fragmentary and depends in large part on the descriptions of foreign travelers. The Greek geographer Ptolemy (90–168 C.E.), working probably from the accounts of Indian merchants, mentioned the Barousai islands, and scholars have sought to identify this toponym with northern Sumatra. But it is seventh-century Chinese sources that offer a first glimpse of Sumatra and many other Southeast Asian kingdoms that had involved themselves in the Chinese tribute trade. The most famous of these is the kingdom of Śrīvijaya, the center of which was located in southeast Sumatra. The late professor Oliver W. Wolters has shown how Śrīvijaya came to commercial prominence in the seventh century by inserting itself in the established seaborne trade between China and the Middle East (West Asia). The rotating pattern of the monsoon winds meant that no journey between China and the Middle East could be accomplished in one season, and merchant ships needed a safe harbor in which to wait for the winds to change. Through their dominance of the Straits of Melaka, Śrīvijaya's rulers were able to provide such a haven. Moreover, by gradually substituting local camphor and benzoin, gathered in the wooded hills of the Sumatran interior, for the prized "Persian" resins, the inhabitants of this early entrepôt involved themselves

in a dynamic way in the life of one of the world's great early trading routes.

Śrīvijaya's dominance of the Melaka Straits lasted for four centuries. The significance of this kingdom for Southeast Asian history, however, lies not just in its economic power but also in the emergence of a dynasty of Malay rulers who were claimed as ancestors by the rulers of Melaka and Minangkabau, among others. Details about Śrīvijaya's system of government are scarce. A number of important royal inscriptions in the old Malay language have been found in the vicinity of Palembang, and these provide insight into the way a Sumatran ruler of the seventh century exercised his authority. Several of these inscriptions take the form of oaths, which seem to have been administered by drinking liquid that was poured over the inscription; they contain elaborate royal curses that outline the terrible consequences of disobedience to the ruler, and the blessings that might flow to loyal subjects. The wording of these royal oaths makes it clear that the ruler's subjects were enjoined to believe in his sacred authority and his power to exact terrible punishments from a distance. This type of authority, based on a shared understanding of sacred power that was reinforced by royal messages to the outlying regions, seems to have been particularly appropriate in the context of a far-flung empire like Śrīvijaya. It is also the first example we have of a pattern that emerges in later periods of Sumatra's history.

Scarcity of sources means that it is difficult to trace the chronology of Sumatra's history following Śrīvijaya's decline in the eleventh century. Archaeological evidence suggests that authority in southeastern Sumatra passed to Malayu on the Batang Hari river system in the interior of Jambi, but we still know little about that kingdom. By the fourteenth century the dynasty that ruled Malayu moved inland to the Minangkabau highlands. Thanks to a series of inscriptions erected between 1347 and 1375 by a ruler called Adityawarman, we have the impression of a king who, like the rulers of Śrīvijaya, used inscriptions to announce his authority in spiritual terms, incorporating both fearsome and benevolent aspects.

Until this period it is possible, to some extent, to write about Sumatra's history as a development on the theme of Śrīvijayan authority, but by the thirteenth century the appearance of

numerous coastal centers with claims to independent status makes that impossible. Whether the rise of these new port states, particularly in the northern part of Sumatra, should be considered a new theme in Sumatran history or the continuation of an old one is a matter of judgment. The adoption of Islam by the rulers of centers such as Samudra-Pasai from the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries clearly gave an added impetus to trade with the Indian and Arab merchants who frequented north Sumatran ports in this period. Yet well-established centers, such as Fansur-Barus in northwest Sumatra, had also traded for centuries with Arab and Indian merchants prior to adopting Islam.

In thinking about the extent to which conversion to Islam signified far-reaching change in the Sumatran coastal regions, one must also consider the matter of deepening levels of conversion within these societies over time. What is clear is that north Sumatran ports such as Samudra-Pasai provided an important base for the spread of Islam to other parts of the archipelago. By the sixteenth century, the Islamic religion was sufficiently deeply absorbed in this region that the kingdom of Aceh became a major center for Muslim trade and, by the early seventeenth century, an important center of Islamic religious thought. Two of the best-known teachers of Islamic mysticism in this period, Hamzah Fansuri (d. 1590?) and Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani of Pasai (d. 1630), were Sumatrans whose ideas received patronage from Sultan Iskandar Muda of Aceh (r. 1607–1636). Under this ruler Aceh developed into a wealthy sultanate. It had links with the Ottoman Empire, launched attacks on other parts of the archipelago as well as non-Islamic parts of the coast and interior of Sumatra, and succeeded in dominating the trade of much of the west and northeast coasts of Sumatra. In his letters Iskandar Muda claimed to be ruler over all of Sumatra, and, while the rulers of Aceh failed to convert the Batak peoples of inland north Sumatra to Islam, for a period the Acehnese name was regarded with fear throughout most of the island.

Following the decline of such forceful rule in Aceh, the premodern history of Sumatra can perhaps be most easily summarized as one of interaction between coastal ports and the producers of the interior. This theme is highlighted, in particular, by the European push for trade in the coastal regions. The seventeenth-

and eighteenth-century records of the Dutch and English East India companies provide a picture of local rulers in coastal regions such as Barus, Pariaman, Inderapura, Benkulen, Palembang, Jambi, Inderagiri, and Siak, who sought to establish their small kingdoms as centers of local trade. The records also illustrate European attempts to monopolize this trade in items such as pepper, gold, and resins. Although the Europeans interfered in the structure of authority within these kingdoms, they also found that they were dependent on prestigious local intermediaries. The latter could provide safe and culturally acceptable conditions of trade for the inland peoples of the Batak regions, of Minangkabau, Pasemah, and Lampung, when they brought their goods to the coast.

Coastal rulers complained about the decline of their trade in the face of European competition. In the late seventeenth century a movement of resistance, led by a Minangkabau prince, took on the form of a holy war to drive the Europeans from the archipelago, and it gained support in several parts of island Southeast Asia. Letters from the inland Minangkabau court at Pagaruyung in this period make it clear that the descendants of Adityawarman's inland kingdom also made claims to preeminence over other Sumatran rulers. The frequency with which these letters were sent to the coastal regions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the impact that Dutch officials noticed they had among the population suggest the importance of a culture of communication that recalls the inscriptions issued by earlier Sumatran kings.

These hints of continuity between the earliest Sumatran kingdoms and the seventeenth-century kings of Minangkabau, and perhaps also of Aceh, remain suggestive. They may, however, help us understand ways in which the category "Sumatra" might have been understood in certain periods. Another theme, the theme of resistance to hierarchy and to overarching authority, is also clearly present in the cultural history of more than one Sumatran society. This trait manifested itself in central Sumatra during the late eighteenth century, when economic change and the impact of Islamic reformers helped to stimulate an internal division within Minangkabau society that culminated early in the nineteenth century in the Padri Wars (1821–1837); it was then that the royal dynasty

was all but eradicated. This internal conflict opened the way for the intrusion of Dutch forces. The mountainous interior of central Sumatra by the 1840s was brought under the control of the Netherlands Indies government. Elsewhere in Sumatra the colonial advance was accomplished by means of armed force and treaties that facilitated the development of an extensive plantation economy in the East Coast Residency surrounding Medan. It was in Aceh, however, that the most serious movement of resistance developed. It took the imperial power some thirty years of warfare to subdue the Acehnese people, and sporadic guerrilla resistance in the region continued until World War I (1914–1918).

Colonial boundaries have helped to shape the history of many parts of modern Southeast Asia. The agreements made between Britain and The Netherlands in 1824 and 1871 to divide the archipelago into two separate colonial spheres on either side of the Straits of Melaka ignored old cultural and political ties and reinforced new ones. The incorporation of Sumatra into the colonial state structure of the Dutch Indies in the nineteenth century undoubtedly had a profound impact on the later shape of the island's history. It provided the context for many of the common experiences and shared understandings that contributed to the development of an Indonesian nationalist movement in the early twentieth century. In this sense Sumatra's recent history has been written and understood within the paradigm of Indonesian nationhood, and "Sumatran" themes, as such, are much harder to detect. Nevertheless Sumatran leaders played a major part in the twentieth-century formation of broadly nationalistic movements, in the struggle for independence, and in the early years of the republic. On the other hand, there have been occasional Sumatran movements of resistance to the central government, as in the regional revolts of the 1950s and more recently (1990s) in Acehnese demands for independence from the republic.

JANE DRAKARD

See also Aceh (Acheh); Aceh (Acheh) Wars (1873–1903); Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Bataks; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Hamzah Fansuri; Iskandar Muda, Sultan (Mahkota Alam) (r.

1607–1636); Islam in Southeast Asia; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Jambi; Jungle/Forest Products; Malays; Minangkabau; Padri Movement; Padri Wars (1821–1837); Palembang; Pepper; Shamsuddin al-Sumatrani (d. 1630); Śrīvijaya (Śrīwijaya); Straits of Melaka; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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
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SUN YAT-SEN, DR. (1866–1925)

Father of Chinese Republicanism

A famous Chinese revolutionary, Dr. Sun Yat-sen was renowned as the "Father of Modern China," particularly among the Kuomintang (KMT, Guomindang; Chinese Nationalist Party), which survived the military defeat by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 and continued its rule on Taiwan (Formosa). In the second half of the 1900s, Southeast Asia served as a crucial revolutionary base for Sun's uprisings against the Qing (Ching/Manchu) dynasty (1644–1912).

Born in a Guangdong county, Sun received his medical training at the Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese, and practiced in Macau. After his reform petition to the Qing court was ignored in 1894, he became a deter-



Dr. Sun Yat-sen, widely acknowledged as the father of modern China. (Bettmann/Corbis)

mined revolutionary. He formed Xingzhonghui (Revive China Society) in 1895 and Tongmenghui (Chinese United League) in 1905. His *sanmin zhuyi* (“Three Principles of the People”) formed the revolutionary ideology of Tongmenghui and the subsequent Kuomintang founded in 1912. (The three principles are nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood.)

Outlawed from entry to the Chinese mainland, Sun and his revolutionary comrades established their operational headquarters overseas, notably in Japan and later in French Indochina and the British Straits Settlements. Actually, Sun’s connections with Southeast Asia began early in 1898 with his support of the Philippine Revolution (1896–1898). From 1900 onward, Southeast Asia grew to be an important operational base of the Chinese revolutionary movement in terms of funding contributed by the Chinese sojourners there and the clandestine

planning of uprisings in South China, with Singapore and Penang being two outstanding centers. Sun had helped found organs such as *Thoe Lam Jit Poh* and *The Chong Shing Press*. The period from 1908 to 1910 marked the zenith of his planning efforts in Southeast Asia. It was there that he assembled the Chinese revolutionaries for meetings in Penang to organize last-ditch fights against the Qing.

Sun was appointed provisional president of the Republic of China at Nanjing in 1912 after the success of the Wuchang Uprising in October 1911. However, the founding of a republic did not mark the final realization of his dream of republicanism; Yuan Shikai (1859–1916), Sun’s successor, attempted to restore monarchism. From 1913 till his death in 1925, Sun conducted numerous abortive military campaigns, usually based in Guangzhou, to overthrow the regimes of Yuan and his successors at

Beijing, and to bring China back to the track of republicanism based on his political agenda. He died in 1925 before the Kuomintang under General Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) achieved the reunification of China a year later.

HANS W. Y. YEUNG

See also China, Nationalist; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Revolution (1911); Formosa (Taiwan); Kuomintang (KMT); Qing (Ching/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912)

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SURABAYA

Freedom in Blood

Java's second major city, the economic and political capital of the province of East Java, and an important naval base and port, Surabaya is also a focus of regional trade for the islands of Eastern Indonesia. In 1995 its population was about 2.5 million.

Legend says that the city earned its name, *sura ing bhaya* (“bravery in the face of danger”), from its part in the successful challenge to Mongol invaders who attempted to invade Java in the late thirteenth century. In other versions, *Surabaya* comes from a meeting of the *sura*, or shark, who rules the sea, with the *buaya*, or crocodile, the king of the river, a metaphor for its location where the great River Brantas, with its rich agricultural hinterland, meets the ocean.

Although the Dutch occupied the city in the early seventeenth century, they only began to develop the site two centuries later, founding a military base there in 1835. Urban construction displaced the indigenous settlers, who not only came from parts of Java but also included migrants from Madura, Sulawesi, and other islands; the colonial city soon had separate living areas for Europeans, Chinese, and natives. Port traffic expanded. The racial division of neighborhoods has broken down since Indonesian independence, but vestiges remain. Most native

Indonesian residents still live in crowded *kampung* (villages) surrounded by more tidy shops and houses that line main streets.

Important nationalist movements arose in Surabaya in the twentieth century. Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882–1934), chairman of the Sarekat Islam from 1912 to 1921, came from Surabaya. Indonesia's first president, Sukarno (1901–1970), lived in Tjokroaminoto's home as a young man, finishing his schooling and gaining political experience there. Early communist leaders were active in the city, especially among its harbor workers. Raden Dr. Sutomo (1888–1938), an influential secular nationalist, helped organize young educated people to think about a future, united, and multiethnic “Indonesia.”

Surabaya's long-established Chinese minority came in part from old *peranakan* (Java-born) families who had lived in northeastern Java for generations; others were recent immigrants. Among the temples they built is the Boen Bio (*wenmiao*, Temple of Confucius), which reflects one of the beginnings of a modern Confucianist movement among the Chinese in Java in the late nineteenth century.

Above all, Surabaya is known for its role at the onset of the Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949). The Japanese, after their surrender to the Allies in August 1945, had been charged with maintaining order and safeguarding the European population, thousands of whom had been interned in camps during the wartime occupation. Word of the Proclamation of Independence on 17 August 1945 led many young people to join the cause of the new republic. The city's youth showed their revolutionary spirit in mass rallies, but also in fights with Europeans and Eurasians. Released internees were rounded up and reimprisoned, and *kampung* mobs attacked Europeans or Japanese. Inflammatory radio broadcasts by Sutomo or Bung (brother) Tomo (1920–1981) urged youth and *kampung* masses to violence to prevent a return of colonialism, crying “Freedom or death.”

Allied forces had received the task of maintaining order, rounding up the Japanese, and evacuating former civilian internees. When they tried to land in the city on 25 October 1945, some 6,000 British troops, many from India, met resistance from the population. President Sukarno and Vice President Mohammed

Hatta (1902–1980), flown in from Jakarta, brokered a cease-fire, but on 30 October, the British commander, Brigadier General Mallaby, was killed in a standoff with Indonesian units. The British, with strong reinforcements, determined to occupy the city, issuing an ultimatum on 9 November, following with air and naval bombardment the next day. The British met fanatical resistance from perhaps 20,000 regular troops and several times that number of irregulars; three weeks passed before the entire city fell, at a heavy cost. Thousands of defenders and civilians were killed, most Indonesian residents fled, and the city was reduced to ashes.

Indonesians commemorate this battle each year on 10 November, Heroes' Day, but, in a bitter account entitled "Surabaya," the writer Idrus recalled the human suffering such heroism brought forth. The Battle of Surabaya cost the defenders great, perhaps irreparable, losses, but it was a turning point for the revolutionary situation. Its resistance convinced the British, who were responsible for turning Java over to the Dutch, that they could not carry out their tasks without the cooperation of the Indonesian republican leaders, with whom the Dutch did not want to deal. As a result the Allies negotiated with Sukarno and Hatta and, halfheartedly, the Dutch followed. Despite negotiations, fighting between Dutch and Indonesian forces recurred over the next years, but never was there such fanatical resistance as in Surabaya. Although the Dutch recognized independent Indonesia only in December 1949, Surabaya had provided an indelible symbol of the Indonesians' will to be free.

MARY SOMERS HEIDHUES

See also British Military Administration (BMA) in Southeast Asia; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Peranakan; Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Tjokroaminoto, Haji Oemar Said (1882–1934)

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SURAKARTA

Sanctuary of Javanese Cultural Heritage

Surakarta, also known as Solo, is a city in Central Java and a seat of the Javanese Susuhunan since 1746, as well as a center of traditional arts and culture. The transfer of the Javanese capital had become necessary after the Kartasura *kraton* (royal courts) had been conquered by insurgents during the so-called Chinese War. After the division of the Mataram realm in 1755, two competing courts existed, that of Surakarta and that of Yogyakarta. Besides the Susuhunan, a minor court, that of Mangkunagara, was established there. Solo was more amenable to Dutch colonialism, whereas the more martial Yogyakarta started several major revolts. After independence the power of the Susuhunan was curtailed, falling only within the premises of the royal compound. The city itself developed rapidly, at present having more than half a million inhabitants (Daniel 2002: 548). It experienced a major wave of destruction in May 1998, when the Suharto regime (1967–1998) came to an end.

The establishment and growth of Surakarta took place within the framework of Dutch indirect rule, which allowed for a flourishing of Javanese culture but without any real political power. This setting was prolonged after the end of the Java War in 1830, when the Susuhunan had to relinquish the outer provinces of his realm (the so-called *mancanagara*) to the Dutch. Indo-European entrepreneurs leased the lands of Javanese courtiers and established sugarcane, coffee, and later, tobacco plantations in the area. In 1870 a railway link was established with Semarang that allowed for the rapid movement of goods toward the north coast of Java. After 1900, Surakarta lost some of its characteristics as a classical Javanese town and region. Between 1903 and 1926 the Dutch overhauled the Javanese agrarian, legal, and administrative systems, thus introducing more direct colonial rule. When in 1915 and 1920 the plague hit the region, many quarters with bamboo houses were simply torn down. Main roads were met-

aled and public health was improved by the construction of sewerage. For this, however, local taxes were increased, which meant an additional burden for the Javanese population.

In its original layout, Surakarta as a city corresponded to Javanese cosmological principles, with the kraton as the center of the world, built on the junction of the north-south and east-west axes. The various halls and buildings within the palace walls were likewise situated. A complex set of rituals and ceremonies had to ensure the balance between good and negative forces. The practicing of dance, music, and other fine arts furthered the legitimacy of the ruler.

The social structure of Surakarta was complex. Although more than 90 percent of the population were Javanese, the European and Chinese minorities played a very prominent role (DNA 1922; Houben 1989: 210–211). After 1755 a Dutch fort was constructed close to the kraton that became the center of a Eurasian quarter, since many soldiers married local women. As the number of Europeans grew in the course of the nineteenth century, they opened up a club, a Protestant church, and a Masonic lodge. There existed a lot of intermarriage between local Eurasian families, of which the elite were big plantation owners. In the twentieth century their social position was challenged by the increasing presence of European newcomers (*totok*). The Chinese, constituting about 5 percent of the city's population, dominated local trade and moneylending, whereas they also became increasingly involved in batik production (Houben 1989: 210–211; DNA 1922). This provoked opposition from the Javanese, who in 1912 founded in Solo the Sarekat Islam, the first nationalist mass organization.

During the era of Indonesian nationalism and at the time of the Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949), the situation in Surakarta was in transition. Susuhunan Pakubuwana X (r. 1893–1939) allowed several court members to be engaged in nationalist organizations. His successors, however, were weak. During the struggle for independence Pakubuwana XII (r. 1945–1946), troubled by internal court disputes, was faced with a radical popular movement against princely rule that had already started before the Pacific War (1941–1945). In 1946 a revolt was started against the government of the Indonesian republic, which resided

in Yogyakarta. In March 1950 the power of the Susuhunan and Mangkunagara outside their palaces was abolished by decree. In 1983 the kraton of the Susuhunan was partly destroyed by fire but afterward rebuilt. Nowadays Surakarta is known as a tourist destination, a cultural and educational city, and a center of small industry.

Surakarta played an important role in Javanese and national Indonesian history, but it remains secondary to its rival, the court town of Yogyakarta. Despite this the arts of Surakarta are considered more refined than those of Yogyakarta.

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See also Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Kraton Culture; Mataram; Miscegenation; Peranakan; Sarekat Islam (1912); Yogyakarta (Jogjakarta)

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**SŪRYAVARMAN I (r. ca. 1002–1049)
A Revolutionary Reign**

The reign of Sūryavarman I marks the midpoint of the Angkor period, both in time and as a period of transition. It may even be called a period of revolution, because a dynasty that had held power since the ninth century was displaced by new leaders whose family relation-

ships with the former royalty are unclear. Sūryavarman himself seems to have come from a high-ranking family of officials, and it was this class that fought with the old royalty for state power.

Contrary to what is still found in most textbooks, Sūryavarman was not a foreigner from the Malay Peninsula who conquered Cambodia, nor was he a Buddhist. All historical interpretations that depend on those conceptions are to be disregarded.

The Angkor inscriptions—which begin in 877 in the reign of the third king, Indravarman, after a break of more than seventy years, including the reigns of Jayavarman II and III—increase in number, and with ever greater administrative detail, until the end of the eleventh century. There is increasing use of the Khmer language rather than Sanskrit, and they show a gradual growth in the number and influence of nonroyal officials relative to the royalty. There is also evident a panoply of new titles and ranks different from those found in the pre-Angkor inscriptions of the seventh and eighth centuries—for example, the titles *vap*, *loñ*, and *teng*, which then disappeared in the twelfth century. During the tenth and eleventh centuries, a time of great temple construction, it was these officials who were responsible for much of the work, and their inscriptions, although referring to kings, claim credit for themselves.

There are at least seventeen family history inscriptions set up from the tenth century through the reigns of Sūryavarman and his sons, which list the ranks, positions, and property of the families, usually beginning from the time of Jayavarman II. From these inscriptions it is clear not only that the official class was becoming more influential than the royalty, but also that there were tensions within this class itself. Some of the family inscriptions show disagreement among families over responsibilities and control of landholdings.

The tensions exploded at the very end of the tenth century, following the reign of the last king who belonged with certainty to the old royalty, Udayadityavarman I, with an ephemeral reign in 1001. He was followed at Angkor by a King Jayaviravarman, whose antecedents are totally obscure, and who was then attacked by the future Sūryavarman and his supporters.

Sūryavarman's first base was in eastern Cambodia, while Jayaviravarman controlled Angkor

and the western parts. The events of this period may be summarized as follows. In 1001, when Udayadityavarman was king, there were two inscriptions made in the east with Sūryavarman's name, one on the Mekong and one in Chikreng. From 1001 to 1003 there are three more inscriptions in the east, from Kompong Thom and Kompong Cham. The first inscriptions naming Sūryavarman all come from east, northeast, and southeast of Angkor, and they are records of officials who referred to him as their chief.

Jayaviravarman is named in inscriptions from 1003 to 1006 at Angkor, and his other inscriptions were in Kompong Thom, Battambang, and Siemreap (Siem Reap). Fighting occurred in 1005–1007, and perhaps as late as 1010. After 1006, Sūryavarman was in Angkor, and in 1011 he had long inscriptions with oaths of allegiance from provincial officials engraved in the Phimeanakas and the Khleang temples. The Sdok Kak Thom inscription inscribed just after Sūryavarman's reign in the northwest (now in Thai territory) says that the war caused much destruction to temples and sacred images, which had to be repaired later. That family continued to serve Sūryavarman, even though they had been in Jayaviravarman's territory when the war began.

As a result of the war some of the great families were destroyed, and Sūryavarman had more concentrated power than before, as seen in the oath inscriptions. None of the previous kings had made such inscriptions, and obviously Sūryavarman wished to ensure the loyalty of provincial officials after a time of political division and war.

Angkorean influence expanded at this time into what is now central Thailand and the Thai northeast, but not necessarily through aggression. Those areas had a Khmer population, and Angkorean expansion into them was probably no different from expansion within Cambodia from the new capital established at the turn of the eighth to ninth centuries.

The new dynasty established by Sūryavarman lasted only through the reigns of his two sons, Udayadityavarman II and Harshavarman III, until 1080, and Sūryavarman's revolution may have led to instability. Inscriptions from his sons' reigns show political unrest within Cambodia, possibly the result of opposition from groups unhappy with the dynastic change, and

the beginning of struggles with Champa that were to continue until early in the thirteenth century.

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See also Angkor; Champa; Jayavarman II (r. 770/790/802?–834 C.E.)

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SŪRYAVARMAN II (r. 1113–1145?)

Builder of Angkor Wat

Sūryavarman II belonged to the new Mahidharapura (an unknown location that they gave as their place of origin) dynasty, which came from north of the Dangrek Mountains in what is now northeastern Thailand. This new dynasty assumed power in Angkor around 1080—not necessarily through conquest, for there are records to show that their first kings were being served by high officials from the previous dynasty of Sūryavarman I (r. ca. 1002–1049), including his sons. Sūryavarman II, however, explicitly came to the throne after an intrafamily war. The Mahidharapura are known first of all from inscriptions in their own temples in what is now northeast Thailand, especially the temples of Phimai, Phnom Rung, and Nom (Phnom) Wan.

Their dynastic and ritual traditions were different from those of previous royalty. They did not trace their families back to Jayavarman II,

who is hardly mentioned henceforth; and the *kamrateng jagat ta raja* (*devaraja*) is rarely seen in their inscriptions. The first two kings, Sūryavarman’s immediate successor, and Jayavarman VII seem to have preferred varieties of Buddhism different from that known in Cambodia previously, but Sūryavarman instituted Vishnuism as the predominant faith, contrary to the Saivism of nearly all kings of the previous dynasties.

Perhaps Sūryavarman is most famous today as the builder of Angkor Wat. Other important constructions of his reign are Boeung Mealea, Banteay Samre, and the last phases of Preah Khan of Kompong Svay and Preah Vihear. Particularly, these works of Sūryavarman lack foundation steles identifying their dates and constructors, which must be inferred from comparison of architectural styles with Angkor Wat. The latter may be identified with Sūryavarman through pictorial bas-reliefs of royal and military activities in which important individuals, including the king, are named in short inscriptions. The most important bas-relief is the so-called Historical Gallery of Angkor Wat. There we can see King Paramavishnuloka (posthumous title of Sūryavarman II) together with nineteen high officers on elephants in a parade. Four of these officers have names identifying them with places in central and northeastern Thailand, including the temples of Phimai and Phnom Rung.

In general the epigraphic record of this period is poor compared with that of the tenth to eleventh centuries. From the 47 years of the reign of Sūryavarman I (1002–1049), ninety-seven inscriptions are extant, but from the 117 years (1050–1167) from Udayadityavarman II through the successor of Sūryavarman II, in which six kings reigned, there are only sixty-three inscriptions, and only twenty from Sūryavarman II. This lack of inscriptions, taken together with the very impressive work of construction, must indicate still another difference from the traditions of the previous dynasty, and possibly important changes in society.

There is indeed some interesting evidence of enforced changes in society. People with titles *loñ* (male) and *teng* (female), who came into prominence after Jayavarman II and who were active in the temple construction of the time, held important middle-level official positions until Udayadityavarman II (1049–1066). But during the period of Sūryavarman II, they be-

gan to be reduced in status to the level of *khñum* (servants or workers); in one inscription *teng* are paired with *gho*, a type of male laborer, as serving personnel.

The reasons for this change are not clear. It may mean that the new Mahidharapura dynasty wished to eliminate the influence of those classes of people who had controlled the bureaucracy under the old dynasty. It is certainly apparent that the constructions of Sūryavarman II seem to show growth of royal power against the mid- and upper-level officials who dominate in the epigraphic record of the reign of Sūryavarman I and of his sons.

The reign of Sūryavarman II shows some evidence of expansion in commercial interest for such purposes. Thus, after a centuries-long break, relations with China were renewed, with missions sent from Angkor in 1116 and 1120. Sūryavarman also attempted several times to attack Vietnam, and succeeded in subjugating Champa, which then occupied what is now central and southern Vietnam. Both areas, of course, were important for their coastal access. Unfortunately the Angkor epigraphic record reveals no detail about this aspect of state activity, and inference is all that is possible.

The seaward expansionism of Sūryavarman II fit precisely into the terms of the relationship between China and Southeast Asia. Sūryavarman's reign coincided almost exactly with the first years of the Southern Sung (1127–1279), whose dependence on the sea impelled them to open trade with Southeast Asia beyond the level allowed by previous Chinese dynasties.

If Sūryavarman II was indeed trying to take advantage of the new China-oriented commercial opportunities to expand his control over the coasts of Vietnam and Champa, in the end he failed. His initiatives in that direction may have been a cause for the thirty-year period of troubles, bereft of inscriptions and still little understood, that followed his death, the date and circumstances of which are unknown.

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See also Angkor; Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Champa; China, Imperial; Monumental Art of Southeast Asia

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SUU KYI, DAW AUNG SAN (1945–) Championing the Good Fight

The only daughter of Burma's (Myanmar's) assassinated national hero General Aung San (1915–1947), Daw Aung San Suu Kyi became the main leader of, and symbolic referent point for the international media to, the Myanmar prodemocracy movement that threatened to topple the country's military leaders in the late 1980s and 1990s. Born on 19 June 1945, she left Myanmar as a teenager to live in New Delhi, where her mother was ambassador. Subsequently she moved to England, where she studied at Oxford University. Prior to her marriage to Dr. Michael Aris in 1972, she worked briefly at the United Nations in New York. She also raised two sons and published a biography of her father, entitled *Aung San* (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1984).

In 1988 she returned to Myanmar to attend to her ailing mother. During her visit demonstrations against the Burma Socialist Programme Party government broke out across the country. She quickly became a popular spokesperson for the prodemocracy forces that included students and others disgruntled at the poor economic and social conditions in the country. She became one of the three founding members and secretary-general of the National League for Democracy (NLD) when the army government announced that elections would be held in 1990. However, she was not allowed to stand in the election because of her marriage to a foreigner and long residence abroad. She was

placed under house arrest prior to the election and remained there until 1995. The NLD subsequently won a majority in the election but was denied office. In 1991 she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her advocacy of nonviolent opposition to continued military rule in Myanmar.

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See also Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP); National League for Democracy (NLD); State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)

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SUARNABHUMI (LAND OF GOLD)

Suvarnabhumi, meaning “Land of Gold,” was a Sanskrit name used in India during the first century C.E. to describe Southeast Asia. The *Sasanavamsappadipika*, an early Indian text, asserts that the Mauryan emperor Asoka (r. 264–238 B.C.E.) sent the Buddhist monks Sona and Uttara on a religious mission to Suvarnabhumi in the third century B.C.E. The name is also mentioned in the *Samkha Jataka* and the *Mahajanaka Jataka*, which describe the early lives or incarnations of the Buddha.

Attempts have been made to identify a specific location for Suvarnabhumi, but these have not been conclusive. Early scholars identified it with Burma, which is closest to India, while Paul Wheatley (1980 [1961]: 285) has suggested an association with the island of Sumatra, which is rich in gold deposits. It is probable, however, that the name implies only a general reference to the riches of Southeast Asia as a whole.

The existence of an early maritime trade between India and Southeast Asia has been demonstrated by archaeology: Indian etched beads made from carnelian and agate have been found at the site of Ban Don Ta Phet in west-central Thailand, among graves dated to the early fourth century B.C.E.; an Indian ivory comb was discovered at Chansen in central

Thailand, in a context dated from the first to third centuries C.E.; and Roman coins, alongside other medallions, beads, and gemstone intaglios from India and the Mediterranean, have been found at Oc Êo in southern Vietnam and at Khuan Lukpad in southern Thailand, dating from the first to seventh centuries C.E.

These finds suggest that by the early centuries C.E., Southeast Asia had become integrated into a pattern of trade linking the Roman Mediterranean, via the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, to southern India and ultimately to China.

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See also Hindu–Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Indianization; *Jatakas*

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SWETTENHAM, SIR FRANK (1850–1946)

Creator of British Malaya

Frank Athelstane Swettenham (1850–1946) was one of the most outstanding British colonial administrators of the Malay States and greatly instrumental in creating the political entity of “British Malaya.” Armed with a fluency in the Malay language and culture, diplomatic skills, and personal charm, Swettenham distinguished himself in shaping the destiny of the Malay Peninsula.

At age twenty-four Swettenham participated in the drafting of the historic Pangkor Engagement and witnessed its signing in 1874. Shortly thereafter he became assistant British resident (1874–1876) to the court of Sultan Abdul Samad (r. 1857–1898) of Selangor, then assistant colonial secretary (native affairs) (1876–1882) and resident to Selangor (1882–1889) and to Perak (1889–1895). He brought much economic progress, particularly in mining and commercial agriculture and development in land transport and communication.

Swettenham was a prime initiator of a federated scheme aimed at centralizing the then-disparate political entities of the Malay Peninsula, thereby hastening economic development. He successfully secured the consent of the Malay rulers to sign a treaty in 1895 that brought into being the Federated Malay States (FMS) with himself as resident-general (1896–1900).

He was a prolific writer, producing no fewer than ten publications (books and journal articles) from 1880 to 1942. In his writings he exhibited a sympathetic view toward the Malays and an admiration of the Malay culture and way of life. In *British Malaya: An Account of the Origin and Progress of British Influence in Malaya* (London: John Lane Bodley Head, 1907), Swettenham sought to justify British imperialism and colonialism in the Malay States.

Swettenham retired in 1904 and assumed the chairmanship of several rubber companies. In 1909–1910 he served as chairman of a royal commission on Mauritius (1909–1910). He remained concerned with Malayan affairs and publicly aired his views during the decentralization debate of the 1920s and over the Malayan Union controversy of 1946.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also British Malaya; Federated Malay States (FMS) (1896); Malayan Union (1946); Pangkor Engagement (1874); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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SWIDDEN AGRICULTURE

Swidden agriculture is the scholarly and less derogatory term for "shifting cultivation" or "slash-and-burn agriculture." It refers to a diversity of agricultural systems, in that fields are cleared and prepared using sword, adze, or ax,

and fire; they are cultivated for a short period and then fallowed for a longer one (Conklin 1957: 1). Swidden agriculture is still today the dominant upland farming system in Southeast Asia and has been practiced there for millennia. It is practiced by tens of millions of farmers in the region and is well suited to its tropical ecosystems with high rainfall and poor soils.

This cultivation system is characterized by a cycle of clearing and burning vegetation, planting cultigens, weeding, harvesting, and fallowing (ibid.; Dove 1985; Freeman 1970; Izikowitz 1951). Burning of cleared vegetation creates a temporary niche for cultigens by eliminating competing plants, and it sustains these cultigens by converting the biomass to nutrient-rich ash. After these nutrients are exhausted, the field is permitted to return to fallow under forest cover, and the farmer "shifts" to another plot in the forest to begin the cycle again. It is the fields rather than the farmers that are shifted in this system. Once a field has been fallowed, natural processes of afforestation usually can restore nutrient levels to the point that cultivation is again possible, provided that the fallow period exceeds the cultivation period in length. The differentiation between the periods of cultivation and fallow is not as clear as was once thought. Recent research has demonstrated that fallow period regrowth is also managed for economic ends, which may include the planting of perennial crops such as rubber, rattans, sugar palms, and fruits (Conklin 1957; Pelzer 1978).

An oft-documented but widely misunderstood characteristic of swidden agriculture is its ability to produce relatively high returns per unit of labor if not land (Conklin 1957; Boserup 1966; Dove 1985), which gives farmers the time to simultaneously engage in other livelihood activities. Thus swidden agriculture is typically part of a broader portfolio that can include gathering of forest products, hunting, wage labor, agroforestry, home gardening, and permanent-field agriculture—all of which show how inadequate and essentializing the term "swidden cultivators" is when applied to such peoples. Furthermore, despite the popular perception of swidden cultivators as historically cut off from the rest of the world, some of these economic pursuits have for centuries connected swidden peoples to international markets through trade in both cultivated com-

modities such as pepper and rubber and forest products such as latexes and resins (Pelzer 1978). The misconception of their being isolated is exemplified in that the Indonesian government has long called swidden people *suku terasing*, meaning “the most isolated people.”

There is limited evidence on the prehistory of swidden agriculture in the region. Archaeological evidence on agricultural evolution in Southeast Asia suggests that there have been two major dimensions of agricultural evolution in Southeast Asia. One involves the initial development of wetland followed by dryland agriculture; the other, overlapping the first, involves the development of vegetatively reproduced crops in perennial gardens and then the seed-based reproduction of crops in swidden fields (Bellwood 1997: 203). This general developmental picture is supported by contemporary evidence from ritual and myth among swidden peoples. It suggests that in agricultural prehistory tubers such as taro (*Colocasia esculenta*) preceded grains, and that among the grains, Job’s tears (*Coix lachryma-jobi*) and foxtail millet (*Setaria italica*) preceded rice (Dove 1999).

Throughout recorded Southeast Asian history, views of swidden agriculture have been imbricated with culture, politics, and morality. Thus the region’s lowland states traditionally characterized upland swidden peoples as the cultural/ethnic “other” (Burling 1965). Similarly, colonial writers often referred to swidden cultivators as backward, irresponsible, and wasteful, with the Dutch referring to swidden agriculture as *roofbouw*: “robber agriculture.” The absence of any empirical basis for these views was revealed by the mid-twentieth-century publication of pioneering, monograph-length studies of swidden cultivation in the region (Condominas 1977 [1957]; Conklin 1957; Freeman 1970 [1955]; Izikowitz 1951). These studies demonstrated that swidden agriculture could be a highly sophisticated and productive use of the environment. What’s more, it may indeed be the only sustainable form of agriculture yet devised for tropical rain forest habitats (Kleinman, Pimental, and Bryant 1995); the less sustainable forms often represent not archaic and obstinate traditions but recent adaptations to urban road-building, markets, and capital. Its adaptability to market opportunities as well as to the tropical environment, plus its marked labor efficiency, helps to explain the remarkable



A Kantu swidden cultivator in West Kalimantan taps one of his rubber trees (Hevea brasiliensis) for cash income during a slack period in the swidden cycle. (Michael Dove and Steve Rhee)

persistence of this system of agriculture in the face of a century-old developmental teleology that insists that it is about to “disappear.” Swidden agriculture today supports as many as 1 billion people—some 22 percent of the population of the developing world in tropical and subtropical zones (Thrupp, Hecht, and Browder 1997).

In spite of half a century of systematic scholarship, the same century-old myths about the backwardness of swidden peoples and their system of cultivation persist in development and policy circles. The practice of swiddening continues to be treated by the governments of the region as perhaps the most powerful symbol of a condition of underdevelopment that requires corrective government intervention. Current scholarship on swidden agriculture focuses on why these misunderstandings and misrepresentations

tations of swidden agriculture persist and how they are deployed in debates about rural peoples and environments (Bryant 1994; Dove 1983, 1993). The fact that state antipathy toward swidden agriculture is uniform across the region, among governments of the left as well as the right, suggests that the source of this antipathy lies in the challenge that the “illegibility” of swidden agriculture poses to state efforts of control and extraction (Scott 1998: 282–283).

Many of the political and cultural dynamics most characteristic of the region are reflected, thus, in the way that swidden agriculture has been interpreted and represented, reflecting as it does both historic contests over ideals of kingdom and colony and contemporary contests over visions of nationhood and modernity.

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See also Borneo; Chins; Dayaks; Hmong; Iban; Jungle/Forest Products; Kachins; Kadazan-Dusun; Montagnard; Rice in Southeast Asia; Shans; Sumatra

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SYAHBANDAR (SHAHBANDAR)

Syahbandar (*Shahbandar*) was a position given to a Melakan noble during the Melaka sultanate. He was one of the Eight Nobles of the administrative hierarchy. This position was first introduced during the reign of Muzaffar Syah (r. 1446–1459).

When Melaka became an entrepôt at the beginning of the fifteenth century, and it was reported that no fewer than 2,000 ships anchored at its harbor for trade at any one time, it became necessary to introduce an office responsible to these traders. That was the office of the *Syahbandar*. Perhaps it could be compared to the modern-day office of the harbormaster. Four officers, or *Syahbandar*, were appointed, each to be responsible to traders from one region. For exam-

ple, one Syahbandar was appointed to be in charge of those from the Gujarats, who formed the biggest number of traders. Another was for other Indian traders from the south and from Bengal, Burma (Myanmar), and Pasai in Sumatra. The third was for those from the islands of Southeast Asia, such as Java, Maluku (the Moluccas), Banda, Palembang, Borneo, and the Philippines. The fourth was for traders from Champa, China, and the Ryukyu Islands. Although these Syahbandar were mostly indigenous Malays, there were also Syahbandar who were appointed from foreign lands.

The Syahbandar was the first officer to be contacted by ships' captains. The former would then make arrangements for the captains to see the *Bendahara* (chief minister). He would also provide the captains with elephants with which to transport the goods from the ships to specific godowns for storage before trade could commence. The Syahbandar would then examine weights and measurements used and collect the official customs duties as specified by the *Undang-Undang Laut* (Malay Maritime Code). He was also responsible for the arrangements of giving "presents" to high-ranking officers of the state, such as the *Bendahara*, *Temenggong* (chief of police), and also himself.

The appointment of Syahbandar provided a systematic, orderly, and efficient functioning of trade and commercial transactions at Melaka. With the help of the Syahbandar, working in concert with the *Temenggong*, who maintained security in the port-city, and the *Laksamana* (admiral of the fleet), who ensured safety in the straits, Melaka flourished for the greater part of the fifteenth century.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also *Kapitan China* System; Melaka; *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals); *Undang-Undang Laut* (Melaka Maritime Laws/Code)

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SYED SHAYKH AL-HADY (1867?–1934)

Propagator of Islamic Modernism

Syed Shaykh al-Hady was a prominent leader in Islamic modernism and a pioneer of modern Malay literature.

Born in Melaka, Syed Shaykh came from an Arab family that had become established in the Malay world over a number of generations. He studied in Terengganu and Riau, both renowned centers of Islamic learning, and enjoyed close associations with the royal families of both Malay States. In journeys to the Middle East (West Asia), and then living in Singapore from 1901 to 1909, he began to be influenced by the teachings of such Islamic modernists as the Egyptian Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and became a major proponent of these views in Southeast Asia.

In 1906 he became a founder of the pioneering magazine *Al Imam*, which had a wide circulation in the Malay Archipelago and was influenced by the Egyptian journal *Al Manar*. In 1909 he moved to Johor to work as an Islamic lawyer and later began a school in Melaka. Facing opposition to his teaching, he moved to Penang in 1918 (or 1919), where he helped to set up the *Madrasah Al-Mashor*, which became a prominent religious school teaching secular as well as religious subjects and attracting teachers of high caliber and healthy numbers of students. In Penang, Syed Shaykh was soon involved again with journalism: in 1926 he was a founder of the journal *Al-Ikhwān* and in 1928 the weekly newspaper *Saudara*. In 1925–1926 he published *Hikayat Faridah Hanum*, a love story often considered to be the first Malay novel. Thereafter the many books he produced covered not only texts on religion (including commentaries on the Koran) but also a series of detective novels, the *Rokambul* stories, which have been described as portraying the ongoing struggle in this world between good and evil. In 1927 he established the *Jelutong Press*, which published his own translations and writings (including the influential *Islamic Religion and Reason*) and which, by the time of his death in 1934, became the largest publisher of Malay works in Malaya (West, or Peninsular Malaysia).

As an Islamic leader and of Arab background, Syed Shaykh focused on the "Muslim Brethren in the East," rather than merely on the

Malays. He was concerned about Muslim weakness at a time when the British and Dutch Empires in the archipelago were being consolidated, and when large numbers of industrious Chinese and Indians were settling on the Malay Peninsula and surrounding territories. He nevertheless saw the advantage of the colonial settlements of Singapore and Penang as enclaves from which to propagate reformist views beyond the reach of the conservative Malay sultans on the peninsula and the surrounding islands.

Syed Shaykh criticized the Malay rulers, believing them to be preoccupied with ceremonies and entertainment rather than the welfare of their subjects. He saw their traditional religious administrations as being too concerned with miracles, saints, and fine points of religious ritual. The old Islamic leadership, the *Kaum Tua* ("the old ones," traditionalists), conveyed a sense of resignation and despair rather than the determination to exploit the opportunities of the modern world. Syed Shaykh and other *Kaum Muda* ("the young ones," modernists) saw the essential doctrines of Islam as being in harmony with much modern scientific and constitutional thought. They sought, on the one hand, to eliminate irrational beliefs that had polluted Islamic religious teachings over the centuries and, on the other, to foster a new scientific learning. Syed Shaykh argued that apart from teaching law and tradition, Islamic schooling should provide curriculum matter found in modern secular education, including the teaching of English, and stressed the importance of rational thought. The education of women, he also suggested, was essential to the reform of Muslim society.

Writing in Penang and Singapore, Syed Shaykh was conscious of the challenge of secular liberal thought—of the concepts of individualism, nationalism, egalitarianism, and Darwin's "survival of the fittest." But he stressed the scientific, architectural, and other achievements of early Islamic society to remind his readers that it was not the Islamic religion itself that was responsible for their malaise. Islamic doctrines and practice continued to have a great "usefulness" for modern societies. The Friday prayer, the fast, the pilgrimage to Mecca, and the paying of the Muslim tithe (*Zakat*) could also be of assistance to promote progress in the Muslim community.

In advocating reform within Islam, and in defending his religion against the challenge of secular liberalism, Syed Shaykh employed a vigorous rhetorical style with an evocative vocabulary. Some have suggested that he wrote the novel *Faridah Hanum* to make money to publish his more serious religious works. But it can also be argued that introducing the novel genre into Malay literature was a deliberate strategy for spelling out Islamic modernist doctrines in a way that would make sense to people unlikely to read conventional religious texts. The novel offered the opportunity to elucidate modernist Islamic views in the context of a realistic human narrative.

However, by the 1930s such Islamic leaders as Syed Shaykh faced increasing competition from Malay nationalists, who gave Malay ethnicity and specifically Malay problems priority over the concerns of the broader Muslim community.

ANTHONY MILNER

See also Education, Traditional Religious; Education, Western Secular; Islamic Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Malays

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SYONAN-TO

Singapore was renamed *Syonan-to* during the Japanese occupation (1942–1945). *Nan* means "south," while *Tō* is "island." The Imperial Japanese government discussed on 14 February 1942 how to rename two strategic Southeast

Asian places, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, in imminent expectation that these territories would be conquered by the Japanese Imperial Forces (JIF). As for the former, the names *Syonan-to* and *Kaname-tsu* (meaning Keystone Harbor) or *Kaname-shima* (Keystone Island) were proposed. *Syonan* means “clear definition of the South,” “Southern territory of Showa” (the Japanese calendar changes when a new emperor is enthroned; Showa commenced in 1926), or “lighting up the South.” *Syonan-to* was adopted unanimously. Two days after the British surrender in Singapore—that is, on 17 February 1942—the JIF headquarters officially announced the new name. (The Syonan Shrine built by the Japanese community in Singapore in 1939 had no direct connections with Syonan-to. The Chinese characters of both “syo”—and thus their meaning, although not their sound—were different.) As for the Dutch East Indies, though “South Indies” and “Sub-South Islands” were proposed, nothing was decided.

Likewise, the Japanese military administration of Malaya decided to rename Penang *Tōjo-to*, commemorating the visit in 1942 of Hideki Tojo (t. 1941–1944), the prime minister of Ja-

pan. The name was so unpopular among the local people that the authorities dared not enforce its use. Labuan Island off Brunei was renamed *Maeda-to* in February 1943, commemorating the commander-in-chief of the Borneo garrison force, Lieutenant General the Marquis Maeda Toshinari (1885–1942), who had died in a plane crash in September 1942. In December 1942 the term *Malai* replaced “Malaya,” “Malay,” and “Melayu.” Ironically enough, the Japanese government occasionally proclaimed that it would revive the original native place-names that had earlier been replaced by the Western colonial names.

Nonetheless, for the peoples of Singapore, the days of suffering under Japanese rule have been symbolized by the name *Syonan-to*.

HARA FUJIO

See also Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Yamashita Tomoyuki, General (1885–1946)

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T

TABINSHWEIHTI (r. 1531–1550)

Tabinshweihti was the second ruler of the First Toungoo Dynasty (1486–1599). Extending his power from its base at Toungoo in Upper Burma to the maritime provinces of Pegu, captured in 1539, he used Portuguese mercenaries together with Muslim soldiers (Lieberman 1984: 29). Taking Martaban (1541) and Prome (1542), he attempted unsuccessfully to subdue Arakan and Ayutthaya (1548), where perceived troubles at the succession of King Chakkraphat encouraged him to launch an attack through Three Pagodas Pass. Marching via Kanchanaburi and Suphanburi, his forces headed for Ayutthaya, but he was forced to retreat by the Siamese armies supported by their Portuguese mercenaries. The Siamese queen Suriyothai herself led the attack on the Burmese. In retreat, Tabinshweihti's forces captured the Siamese Crown prince, Ramesuan, and King Chakkraphat's son-in-law, Maha Thammaracha, viceroy of Phitsanulok, who were exchanged in return for safe passage for the Burmese forces. Tabinshweihti's attack was part of a wider strategy to draw into his polity the revenues of the international trade around the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Siam.

Tabinshweihti and his successor, Bayinnaung (1551–1581), for the first time since the decline of the classical Burmese empire of Pagan in the late thirteenth century, attempted a synthesis of Burman-Mon cultural traditions in a determined effort to create a multicultural society. From their capital at Pegu, they established an

empire similar in extent to that of modern Burma. Modeled on the pattern of Pagan, it had core areas (Pegu in the First Toungoo empire) and subsidiary centers at Chiang Mai, Martaban, Ava, Prome, and Toungoo in charge of a *bayin*, usually a near blood relative, who functioned as subking. Their autonomy and ambitions often led to challenges to the throne. The marriage between the agricultural heartland and the maritime provinces was an uneasy one, punctuated with rebellions at the end of each reign. Returning to Pegu from his failed Ayutthaya campaign, Tabinshweihti was said to have come under the influence of alcohol and to have been killed by his Mon courtiers (Wyatt 1984: 92).

HELEN JAMES

See also Arakan; Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Burmans; Burma-Siam Wars; Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Mon; Mons; Pegu; Tenasserim

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TABON CAVE (PALAWAN)

A Pleistocene Site

Tabon Cave faces the South China Sea, along the western coast of the long northeast-southwest orientation of Palawan Island, in the Philippines. It is an important complex of caves and rock shelters collectively called "Tabon caves." The name Tabon Cave is derived from a *Megapodius* species (locally called *Tabon* bird) that leaves its eggs in the cavities of the cave's floor. The Tabon complex was intensively studied by the National Museum of the Philippines under the direction of Robert Fox, who carried out more than thirty excavations from 1962 to 1966. The most famous cave, called Tabon Cave, was the first site to unquestionably establish the presence of humans in the Philippines during the Pleistocene period, or the last Ice Age.

The most complete publication concerning Tabon Cave still remains the excavation report written by R. Fox (1970). It includes a collection of carbon-14 dates completed during the 1960s at the University of California (Los Angeles) that document a continuous occupation of the cave between at least some 30,000 and 9,000 years ago. Fox's excavation results were often quoted in the archaeological literature, since Tabon Cave is one of the very few sites in Southeast Asia that have yielded a Pleistocene fossil *Homo sapiens* (modern man). Such places are of the utmost importance for the study of the dispersion and movement of the Southeast Asian *Homo sapiens*.

Nevertheless, excavations and archaeological activities in Tabon Cave were discontinued shortly after Fox's first publication for various reasons, among which was the shift of interest to the open sites in the Cagayan Valley (Luzon Island) in the search for possibly earlier human remains. Therefore, little analytical work was carried out on the Tabon data. Reportedly, several scholars took samples from the archaeological deposits and also on the human fossils themselves, although no report was published on those materials.

Recently, the Archaeology Division of the National Museum of the Philippines decided to undertake new studies of Tabon Cave. As a preliminary phase, seeking to validate the older data gathered by Fox, it undertook radioisotopic dating and simultaneous anthropological study of the still almost undescribed human remains whose stratigraphical position is under discus-

sion. The most recent analytical work of Tabon data was undertaken in collaboration with the Institut de Paleontologie Humaine (IPH), National Museum of Natural History in Paris, France. Such a study is intended to provide new chronological data on the Pleistocene *H. sapiens* settlement at the margins of Sundaland.

The dimensions of Tabon Cave are 40 meters long, 15 meters wide, and 8 meters high, with a northwest-southeast-oriented karstic cavity situated in a limestone cliff of about 35 meters above present-day sea level. According to Fox (1970), the surface of the Tabon Cave is a jar burial site dating back to 500–200 B.C.E. Below the surface is the excavated Palaeolithic horizon, which may be divided into six levels. This horizon expands to about 2.5 meters of excavated stratigraphic layers and is named from the youngest to the oldest Flake Assemblages: IA, IB, II, III, IV, and V. This classification seems based more upon the stratigraphical distribution of the artifacts than on their typotechnological characters.

Although Fox does not document any conspicuous difference between the assemblages, his detailed description of Flake Assemblage III reflects some interesting behavioral features of the prehistoric groups that occupied the cave. The cave obviously sheltered a lithic workshop oriented toward the production of irregularly shaped and sized flakes, less than 20 percent of them used or retouched as actual flake tools. These tools are mainly regular and denticulated scrapers for which Fox proposes the name of *Tabonian* artifact tradition. All the operating stages are present in the cave, from the raw chert lumps to the flake tools, via the cores, hammerstones, waste flaking, unretouched flakes, and used flakes. The used raw material—namely, chert—is noted to be common in the riverbeds near the cave complex. But Flake Assemblage III also yielded several basalt trimmed choppers, together with basaltic and quartz pebbles likely to have been used as hammerstones.

Fragmented faunal remains, but no bone artifacts, were recovered in the layers related to Flake Assemblages IA, II, and, to a lesser extent, III and IV. Pig and deer, the latter being extinct today in Palawan, were the only large mammals that could be determined.

Although the precise geochemical history of the fossil is not fully known, recent isotopic dat-

ing procedures measured on the Tabon fragmentary skull strongly suggest a late Pleistocene age. It confirms Fox's (1970) suggestion about the antiquity of that fossil, but cannot give any more precision about its stratigraphical position within the published scheme.

It confirms, however, that *Homo sapiens* settled on Palawan Island well before the Holocene, most probably via the very narrow, several-kilometer-long straits that still separated the island (extended to Balabac Island) from Borneo during the Upper Pleistocene eustatic drops of sea level.

EUSEBIO Z. DIZON

See also Archaeological Sites of Southeast Asia; Human Prehistory of Southeast Asia; "Java Man" and "Solo Man"; Niah Caves (Sarawak); "Perak Man"; Pre-Hispanic Philippines; Underwater/Maritime Archaeology in Southeast Asia

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TAFT, WILLIAM HOWARD (1857–1930)

Molder of U.S. Colonial Policy toward the Philippines

William Howard Taft was the first American civilian governor-general of the U.S. colonial government in the Philippines; he later became president of the United States. As governor-general from 1901 to 1903, he established the civil government following the end of U.S. military administration, and carried out the first U.S. policies toward the Philippines. These policies centered on creating a stable government for the Philippines and Filipinos, setting up a system of public education, and constructing public works under U.S. rule. After his term as governor-general, he continued to exercise policy control over the Philippines as secretary of war (1904–1908), and then as president of the United States (1909–1913).

Taft was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, on 15 September 1857. He graduated from Yale University and earned his law degree from the Cincinnati Law School. He had a distinguished career as judge before he was appointed by



William Howard Taft, ca. 1908. (Library of Congress)

President William F. McKinley (t. 1897–1901) in 1900 to head the Second Philippine Commission, also known as the Taft Commission. Although he had personally opposed the U.S. conquest of the Philippines, with the formal acquisition of the archipelago through the Treaty of Paris (1898), he felt that it was the duty of the United States to give good government to the Philippines. The commission was to carry out U.S. policy toward the Philippines and set up a civil government. The Taft Commission arrived in Manila on 3 June 1900.

Taft's instructions were to establish a civil government for the Philippines that conformed to Filipino customs, habits, and prejudices, while following U.S. principles of government. The new government would embody the U.S. Bill of Rights (except for trial by jury and the right to bear arms). The Taft Commission would establish a civil service system and local government under U.S. supervision. The commission would also establish a system of free public education, with English being taught throughout the Philippines. Taft and his

commissioners traveled around the Philippines and met with Filipinos, to assess their readiness for self-government, and began establishing the foundations of local governments staffed by Filipinos.

Taft and members of his commission were not well received by the U.S. military government headed by General Douglas MacArthur (1880–1964). Taft and his commissioners persevered, however, and aside from meeting Filipinos, also accumulated information on the islands and the people that was necessary for administrative preparation; problems were identified and tentative solutions planned. Taft, apart from overseeing the work of the commission, also gave himself the task of studying the judicial system and landownership—in particular land owned by the Spanish friars.

In September 1900 the Taft Commission assumed legislative functions, taking over from the military governor. Taft guided the preparation and implementation of laws relating to taxes, appropriations, tariffs, and appointments. He instituted the insular civil service and provincial governments, even as the military had executive functions.

On 4 July 1901, Taft took the post of civil governor and became the direct representative of the U.S. president in the Philippines as U.S. military rule ended. Taft and his commission had executive and legislative functions, and set up a judicial branch founded on a criminal code the commission enacted. Taft then set out to establish basic policies that would govern the Philippines for most of the U.S. regime. He created the Philippine Constabulary to maintain domestic peace and order, approved legislation that fixed the peso exchange rate at two pesos to the dollar, set down the procedures for elections, established the public school system for mass education, and supervised health and sanitation projects as well as road and infrastructure construction.

Although Filipinos staffed government positions at local and national bureau levels, they did not have a hand in determining national policies, since all legislation during the period of Taft's administration as governor-general was handled by the Philippine Commission. The commission was initially all American, but Taft appointed three Filipinos to it near the end of his term. The majority remained in the hands of the Americans.

Taft's term as governor-general lasted until 1903; thereafter President Theodore Roosevelt (t. 1901–1909) appointed him secretary of war. The Philippines was, at that time, directly under the Department of War, and Taft thus continued to make and carry out policy for the islands. Taft became the twenty-seventh president of the United States in 1909, and thus continued to influence Philippine policy. When Taft's term as president ended in 1913, his role in shaping U.S. policy toward the Philippines came to an end. Taft later became chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, a post he held until his death on 8 March 1930.

Taft played a key role in formulating and implementing U.S. policies for the Philippines. The period from 1901 to 1913 would become known as the "Taft Years," wherein U.S. administration over the Philippines was established. The basic policies established by Taft would change only with the coming of a Democratic administration in 1913, which opted for a more lenient rule and favored early independence for the Philippines.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Filipinization; Harrison, Francis Burton (1873–1957); Philippines–U.S. "Special Relationship"

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T' AIS

The T'ai peoples reside mainly in Burma (Myanmar), Thailand (Siam), Laos, northern Vietnam, and south and southwest China. With a population today estimated at more than 70 million, they are one of Southeast Asia's principal ethnic groupings, and have significantly in-

fluenced the cultural and political development of the region. The identity "T'ai" is primarily linguistic. However, there are also cultural and social aspects to T'ai identity, and many groups share myths of common ancestry. Recent research emphasizes the significance of the *muang* in T'ai ethnohistory. The *muang* comprised a number of villages, associated mainly with wet-rice agriculture, that owed personal allegiance to a local prince, or *chao*, from whom they received their rights to land. It is believed that historically all T'ai polities developed from this type of sociopolitical organization.

The ethnohistories of the various T'ai subgroups such as the Shan (Burma), the Thai (Thailand), the Black Tai (Vietnam), and the Tai Lue (Yunnan) differ according to the varied political and cultural environments into which each group migrated. For example, the Thai of Thailand were able to establish an independent, majority, ethnic T'ai nation-state, while the Shan peoples are today only a "national minority" in Burma—although since 1948 they have had their own regional state. The Black and Red Tai of northern Vietnam remain a relatively marginalized, upland-dwelling minority, while the Dai of Yunnan have their own prefecture, Xishuangbanna (Sipsongpanna). Furthermore, the T'ai Ahom of Assam are thought to have disappeared completely following the collapse of the Ahom kingdom at the beginning of the nineteenth century, while the T'ai Khampti peoples still live in this region as one of the "scheduled tribes" (those recognized by the government) of Arunachal Pradesh.

Much research remains to be done concerning the origins of the T'ai peoples. Most of the early evidence is from Chinese chronicles from the beginning of the last millennium onward. It is generally believed that the T'ai peoples originated in southern China and gradually migrated south and west following the river valleys. At some point the T'ai of the Black River region in northern Vietnam became separated from the main T'ai migration westward. For many years the kingdom of Nanchao, which rose to power in the eighth century C.E., was considered the first politically significant T'ai state in Southeast Asia. However, recent research suggests that the Nanchao rulers were not T'ai. Nonetheless, the T'ai peoples benefited from the greater trade, communications, and migration opportunities that arose at this

time, leading to the expansion of T'ai *muang* across a wider geographical area of Southeast Asia.

T'ai ethnohistory proper may be said to start in the early twelfth century. At that time a number of influential local *muang* developed to form small kingdoms or principalities. The Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century further assisted this development, leading to a number of important T'ai *muang* being formed: in 1215 the *muang* of Mogoung was established in Upper Burma; 1223 saw the creation of Mong Nai in eastern Burma; and in 1229 the Ahom kingdom was founded in Assam. In 1238 the T'ai attacked and defeated the powerful Khmer rulers, and this led to important political developments in northern Thailand. King Rama Kamhaeng (r. 1279–1298) established the kingdom of Sukhothai, and under him the first T'ai script was developed. Most important, in 1287, the kingdom of Chiang Mai was established under King Mangrai out of a treaty of friendship between the most important *chao* of the Menam river basin. In 1351, under King Ramadhipati (Ramathibodi) (1351–1369), this *chao* developed into the powerful kingdom of Ayuthia (Ayutthaya), from which the origins of the modern state of Thailand are usually traced.

Yet the thirteenth century also saw the establishment of the *muang* of Luang Prabang (Muang Swa). In 1353, the T'ai ruler Fa Ngum developed this into what is considered by some to be the first Laotian state. He had the support of the Khmer rulers of Angkor and had a clear orientation toward Indochina rather than to the T'ai states of Siam. It is from this point that attempts to trace a common T'ai ethnohistory usually cease; instead, the regional and local ethnohistories of the various T'ai groups are usually traced separately.

Pan-T'ai nationalism has been of much significance only in Thailand. In 1939 the kingdom of Siam changed its name to Thailand, and some politicians aspired toward the unification of the Thai (T'ai) peoples. This led to problems with neighboring countries, especially the modern state of Laos, which was created only in 1947. The Lao government has long been suspicious of Thai expansionism at their expense under the guise of pan-T'ai nationalism. In recent years such aspirations appear to have lessened, and that has enabled some academic researchers, especially anthropologists, to consider the T'ai

peoples in a broader and more comparative context that spans national boundaries.

MANDY SADAN

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Chiang Mai; Luang Prabang; Nan Chao (Nanchao) (Dali/Tali); Rama Kamhaeng (r. 1279–1298); Shans; Sukhotai (Sukhodava); Yunnan Province

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TAM CUONG

Relationships of Submission

Tam Cuong crystallized the three basic teachings of Confucianism that concern the relationships between *Quan* (ruler) and *Than* (subjects), *Phu* (father) and *Tu* (son), and *Phu* (husband) and *Phu* (wife). According to these teachings, subjects, son, and wife must absolutely obey the ruler, father, and husband, respectively; in the meanwhile, the ruler, father, and husband should serve as role models for his subjects, son, and wife.

Tam Cuong were the basic moral principles of Chinese feudal society put forth by Confucians in the early years of the feudal period. They gradually became the basic ruling theory of feudal absolutism, and were promoted by rulers of various dynasties. These principles helped restrict people's minds and behaviors and regulated social relationships. With the domination by the Chinese in Vietnam, Confucianism was introduced into Vietnam; *Tam Cuong* also became the moral criteria of the Vietnamese in the dynastic period. Confucianism obtained a dominant role in ideology in the Le dynasty (1428–1789) and the Nguyễn dynasty (1802–1945) of Vietnam. *Tam Cuong* were especially emphasized by rulers such as Emperor Le

Thanh Tong (1460–1497) of the Le dynasty and Minh Manh (r. 1820–1841) of the Nguyễn dynasty. Emperor Minh Manh even ordered the issuance of the Confucian teachings, including *Tam Cuong*, in the form of allocutions, and demanded that everyone recite and comply with the teachings.

Tam Cuong reflected the special relationship between the ruler and the subjects, the father and the son, and the husband and the wife in the narrow sense; but they virtually reflected the relationship between people in the broader sense. *Tam Cuong* penetrated into Vietnamese society deeply in the last years of the feudal period and had a tremendous influence on the life of the Vietnamese people; this influence can even be found today.

HUANG YUN JING

See also Confucianism; Le Dynasty (1428–1527; 1533–1789); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945)

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TAM GIAO

Vietnam's Religious Traditions

The three traditional religions of Vietnam—Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism—were introduced into Vietnam during the early years of *Thoi Bac-Thuoc* (the Chinese colonial period, 111 B.C.E.–968 C.E.).

Strictly speaking, Confucianism is not a religion but a social ethic theory and life philosophy. Confucianism and Taoism came from China, and Buddhism was introduced into Vietnam simultaneously via sea from India (Theravada Buddhism) and overland from China (Mahayana Buddhism). Before Vietnam became independent of China, these three religions spread throughout the country at varying paces and set the ground of Vietnamese national traditional culture. After Vietnam became independent, these three religions played different roles in domestic affairs in different periods. In the Dinh dynasty (968–980 C.E.) and the First or Earlier Ly dynasty (980–1009 C.E.), Buddhism was regarded as the state/offi-

cial religion, while Confucianism was suppressed. From the time of the Le dynasty (1428–1789) onward, the three religions were practiced equally. The Le and Chen dynasties were known as the *Tam Giao* period, when all three religions prospered, which was reflected in the imperial examinations during that period. Examination subjects included Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism, and examinees included Buddhists, Confucians, and Taoists, among whom rulers selected civilian officials. During the late Chen period, Confucianism developed gradually and was promoted as the dominant ideology, and Buddhism and Taoism declined.

Tam Giao penetrated each other and inclined to integration, although they disputed sometimes after the three religions were introduced to Vietnam. The introduction of the three religions enriched the native culture, and Tam Giao eventually became a major part of Vietnamese traditional culture, retaining today an influence on contemporary Vietnam.

HUANG YUN JING

See also Buddhism; Buddhism, Mahayana; Buddhism, Theravada; Confucianism; Le Dynasty (1428–1527; 1533–1789); Ly Dynasty (1009–1225)

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Tran Ngoc Them. 2001. *Tim Ve Ban Sac Van Hoa Viet Nam*. [A Search of the Essence of Vietnamese Culture.] Ho Chi Minh City: Ho Chi Minh City Press.

TAMAN SISWA (1922)

Promoting Homegrown Sociocultural Values

Taman Siswa (Indonesian “Garden of Pupils”) is an Indonesian educational association founded to develop indigenous social values and to resist Western and Islamic modernist influences.

The question of how Indonesia might achieve modernity was central to political debate in Indonesia in the early twentieth century. The main contending paths were Western-style developmentalism, socialism, and Islamic modernism, all of which, formally at least, regarded traditional Indonesian cultures as having little to contribute to a modern society. The

first Taman Siswa was a school founded in Yogyakarta in 1922 with the aim of infusing traditional Javanese values into a modern, Western-style education to achieve a kind of synthesis between Eastern values and Western technology; this idea had been widely discussed in Japan, China, and Korea.

The founder of that Taman Siswa was Ki Hadjar Dewantoro (1889–1959), previously called Suwardi Surjaningrat, who had been a leader of the radical Indische Partij (Indies Party) and had been exiled to The Netherlands from 1913 to 1919. While in The Netherlands he had developed an interest in educational movements, especially the ideas of Maria Montessori (1870–1952) and Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941).

The Taman Siswa movement expanded rapidly. It established a teachers’ training college and by 1932 had 11,000 pupils and 166 schools. As a matter of principle, Taman Siswa refused to follow the official colonial curriculum and so received no subsidies from the government. The movement was never directly political, but its encouragement of Indonesian cultural self-confidence played an important role in promoting nationalism. In 1932–1933, moreover, Dewantoro led an archipelago-wide campaign against the colonial government’s “wild” (that is, unofficial) schools ordinance, which required unsubsidized private schools to obtain official permission to operate. The depth of public opposition to the move, introduced at a time when the government was cutting its own spending on education, led the governor-general to suspend the ordinance.

Taman Siswa’s educational role declined sharply after independence (1949) with the expansion of government education and an official emphasis on technical training, rather than personality development. Still reluctant to accept state subsidies, the Taman Siswa system generally had poorer facilities than other state and private schools and attracted fewer capable students, though leaders such as Dewantoro remained respected and influential in educational circles. Lower social status and a hostility to both Islamic modernism and technocratic elitism drew parts of the Taman Siswa movement closer to the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) during the 1950s, and the organization remained deeply divided until the 1965 Gestapu affair.

Taman Siswa was the first major articulation of a stream of Indonesian political thinking that valued indigenous culture ahead of foreign (Western and Islamic) ideas. It took the view that an individual would best achieve a sound personality development in an educational environment that encouraged a love of learning and a familiarity with national culture. It emphasized the importance of the family as a model for social relationships, and played a major role in having “Bapak” (father) and “Ibu” (mother) accepted as the standard terms of address for older people. Taman Siswa ideas directly influenced the thinking of Sukarno (1901–1970), and indirectly that of Suharto (1921–). Both these presidents believed that it was possible to create a polity based on traditional values that would incorporate only what was appropriate from outside Indonesian culture. The family model, in which a father commands his children in love and wisdom and the mother’s duties lie primarily in the home, could be the basis for social organization in general. The perennial difficulty faced by this stream of thought was how to handle the enormous cultural diversity of the Indonesian archipelago. In practice, Taman Siswa, like Sukarno and Suharto, tended to draw most strongly on elements of Javanese culture, thus limiting its appeal in other regions.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Education, Traditional Religious; Education, Western Secular; Gestapu Affair (1965); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Suharto (1921–)

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TAMBRALINGA (TAN-LIU-MEI)

Early Trading Kingdom on the Malay Peninsula

Tambralinga, or by its Chinese name, Tan-liu-mei, was a kingdom situated on the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula, around the Bay of Ban Don near modern Surat Thani in southern Thailand. It flourished from the eleventh to the early thirteenth centuries as an important trade center in the maritime commerce between India and China.

An embassy was sent from Tambralinga to China in 1001 C.E. Its independence was later challenged by the western extension of the empire of Sūryavarman I (r. ca. 1002–1049), based at Angkor in Cambodia. During this period (the eleventh century) it formed part of a trade network linking the ports of South India, controlled by the Chola dynasty, with the western capital of Sūryavarman I at Lopburi in Central Thailand.

A further embassy from Tambralinga was sent to China in 1016. In 1024–1025 the Cholas raided the Malay Peninsula. Tambralinga then may have been identified with the kingdom of “Madamalingam,” listed as one of the conquests of the Chola king Rajendra I (r. from 1014) in an inscription at Tanjore in South India. A second Chola raid on the western coast of the peninsula occurred in 1067. Shortly thereafter, in 1070, an embassy was sent from Tambralinga to China reasserting its independence.

During the twelfth century, Sri Lanka and the kingdom of Pagan in Burma (Myanmar) increasingly dominated the politics of the Malay Peninsula. It is clear, however, that Tambralinga remained an important commercial center. According to the *Ling-wai-tai-da* (a Chinese trade encyclopedia compiled in 1178), Tambralinga was famous for a high-quality *gharu* wood used in the production of incense sticks. In this connection it is interesting to note that two inscriptions from the town of Chaiya in southern Thailand, dated to 1230, were ordered by a King Candrabhanu, “The Lord of Tambralinga.”

Much of our information on Tambralinga has been derived from Chinese sources, collected and discussed by the historian O. W. Wolters.

WILLIAM A. SOUTHWORTH

See also Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Lopburi (Lavo); Pagan (Bagan)

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TAMBRALINGAM

See Ligor/Nakhon

TAN CHENG LOCK (1883–1960)

"A True Malayan"

Tan Cheng Lock was a fourth-generation Malayan Chinese born on 5 April 1883 of a prominent and long-established Melakan family. His great grandfather, Tan Hay, was a navigator from Fukien, China, and his grandfather, Tan Choon Bock, established himself in shipping and tapioca and gambier planting.

Educated in English, Tan Cheng Lock first became a teacher but in 1908 joined the growing rubber industry, ending up being director of about twenty rubber and industrial companies. Although proud of his Chinese descent, he was a true Malayan who urged the Chinese in Malaya to regard Malaya as their permanent home and the object of their singular loyalty; he laboriously worked toward that end.

Tan Cheng Lock was appointed to various bodies, including the legislative and executive councils. He was partly responsible for the appointment of Asians to the Melaka Executive Council beginning in 1933, the creation of a separate Straits Settlements Civil Service that admitted Asians in 1936, and the introduction of the Civil Marriage Ordinance in 1940.

Generally in favor of the Malayan Union scheme (1946) and opposed to the Federation of Malaya Agreement (1948), Tan chaired the formation of the All-Malaya Council of Joint Action (AMCJA) in 1946 and contributed to

the AMCJA-PUTERA (Pusat Tenaga Ra'ayat, Centre of People's Power) "Peoples Constitutional Proposal for Malaya" of 1947. It was through the Communities Liaison Committee (CLC), formed in 1949, and the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), which appointed him president, that important aspects of his ideas began to be accepted by the Chinese, the British, and the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). He later endorsed the formation of the Alliance Party in 1954, participated in the Baling Talks (1955) with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), and contributed significantly to the "sociopolitical contract" that paved the way for independent Malaya.

Tan Cheng Lock, who was knighted by both Britain (as "Sir") and Malaysia (as "Tun"), died on 8 December 1960 at the age of seventy-seven.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj,

Tunku (1903–1990); Alliance Party (Malaya/Malaysia); Baling Talks (1955); Briggs Plan; Federation of Malaya (1948); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Malayan Union (1946); Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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TAN MALAKA, IBRAHIM DATUK (1897?–1949)

Communist and Nationalist Leader

A prominent Indonesian communist leader, Tan Malaka was an ideologist, a teacher, and considered one of the most controversial nationalist political activists in history. The son of a Minangkabau village chief, Tan Malaka was a native of Pandan Gadang, West Sumatra. In his youth he spent his earlier education in Suliki in 1903 and then went to a teacher-training school near Bukit Tinggi until 1913. An intelligent teenager, he was awarded the honorific title "Datuk Tan Malaka" in 1912. His promi-

ment intellect attracted the Dutch teacher G. H. Horensma, who brought him to The Netherlands in 1913. He was sent to a teacher-training institution in Haarlem and then to Bussum, where he became acquainted with the thoughts of the German philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900) and longed to join a military academy. Still in Bussum after the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, he started to read more about Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895). It was not until 1919 that he considered himself a communist. In the same year, he returned to Indonesia.

Tan Malaka was struck by the reality of impoverished coolie labor at the Senembah tobacco plantation of Deli, East Sumatra, where he served as teacher after his return to Indonesia. In his spare time he wrote articles in Dutch for a newspaper owned by a Bolshevik group and published in Semarang. Tan Malaka left Deli for Jakarta a few months after a group of radical labor unions started a wave of strikes in September 1920; he, however, expressed pessimism over the success of the action. He then decided to stay in Semarang, together with a leading communist leader, Semaoen (Semaun) (1899–1971). In June 1921, Tan Malaka started his school for children of Sarekat Islam members. He was also engaged in the newly established Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia, 1920) and was appointed chairman in late 1921, replacing Semaoen, who went abroad. Tan Malaka also opened a similar school in Bandung. There on 13 February 1922, he was arrested by Dutch secret police, who accused him of involvement in several radical labor movements; he was ordered to leave Indonesia.

Tan Malaka went to The Netherlands and then Russia, from where he traveled to many countries as a Comintern agent for Southeast Asia and Australia. During his exile, Tan Malaka organized communist groups all over East and Southeast Asia, and wrote many books and articles using different pseudonyms. His book on the rising Indonesia, entitled *Indonezija: Ejo Mesto na Proboezjdajoesitjemsu Vostoke*, was written under orders from Comintern in 1924. While in China in 1925 he wrote a book entitled *Naar de Republiek Indonesia*. Tan Malaka expressed his disagreement with the decision of PKI to rebel in 1926 through his book *Massa Actie*. A year later he organized a group of In-

donesians to form a party called Partai Republik Indonesia (PARI, Indonesia Republic Party) in Bangkok, and he did similarly in the Philippines and in the British colonies. When Japan occupied Southeast Asia, Tan Malaka was still able to write an interesting book entitled *Madilog*—an acronym for materialism, dialectic, and logic—to express his new way of thinking. Tan Malaka returned to Indonesia in the middle of the Pacific War in 1944, when Indonesia was under Japanese occupation.

After the Indonesian proclamation of independence in August 1945, Tan Malaka was soon considered an alternative leader to Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970), particularly within the circle of young radicals. However, Tan Malaka soon realized that he was unwelcome, including within leftist groups. Soekarno brought a young socialist, Sutan Sjahrir (1909–1966), to negotiate with the Dutch, and also to challenge Tan Malaka. Meanwhile Tan Malaka set up Persatuan Perjuangan (Union of Struggle), an organization that demanded full and complete independence, and rejected any negotiations with the Dutch. When the Sjahrir cabinet resigned in February 1946, Tan Malaka was asked to form a cabinet; he failed, however, particularly on account of strong opposition from the inner circle of socialist-Marxist groups and the lack of support from Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980). He was briefly jailed in March 1946. He was re-arrested on 6 July, accused of being the mastermind behind the attempted coup of 3 July 1946. Under such allegations, he spent about thirty months in jail without trial. During his incarceration he composed his monumental three-volume autobiography, *Dari Penjara ke Penjara [From Prison to Prison]*. He was finally released in the middle of the chaotic situation following the Madiun affair of September 1948.

He lent his support to the creation of Partai Murba (Proletarian Party), which derived its strength from the mass organization of Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat (People's Revolutionary Movement), which he had set up earlier. When the Dutch attacked Yogyakarta, the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, in December 1948, Tan Malaka was in East Java. He organized a military group around Kediri. But he was captured and fatally shot by republican troops. His "assassination" reflected the continuous ideological conflict among the Indonesians themselves.

BAMBANG PURWANTO

See also Comintern; Dutch Police Action (First and Second); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Madiun Affair (September 1948); Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980); Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); Sjahrir, Sutan (1909–1966); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970)

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TARUC, LUIS (1913–)
Peasant and Labor Leader

Luis Taruc was a Philippine peasant leader from Central Luzon, and continues to be active in peasant affairs. He led the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap, People's Anti-Japanese Army) against the Japanese during the Pacific War (1941–1945). After the war, he led the peasant movement against the government until his surrender in 1954.

Taruc was born on 21 June 1913, in the town of San Luis, Pampanga province. He was the son of peasants. He became aware early on of the difficulties and injustices in Philippine peasant society, seeing how landlords controlled society and the injustice in his barrio. He graduated from high school and entered National University and was soon involved in peasant and labor protest movements. He joined the Aguman ding Maldang Talapagobra (AMT,

League of Poor Laborers) and became close to Pedro Abad Santos, head of the Socialist Party, with which the AMT was affiliated. Taruc organized peasant strikes and demonstrations in the late 1930s. He was imprisoned four times from 1937 to 1941 but continued to lead peasant and labor strikes. He became the political director of the league's newspaper, *AMT*.

By 1940, Taruc and his comrades recognized that international fascism superseded domestic problems, and thus he began speaking about its dangers. With the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945), Taruc mobilized peasants to resist the Japanese invaders. In early 1942 he attended a series of meetings on how best to oppose the Japanese. Working under the slogan "Anti-Japanese Above All," he and other peasant leaders dissolved their prewar organizations and, on 29 March 1942, formally established the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap, People's Anti-Japanese Army). Taruc was chosen to be chairman of the military committee of the Hukbalahap. He later became commander-in-chief, or *Supremo*, of the Hukbalahap.

With the end of the Pacific War, Taruc ran for Congress under the Democratic Alliance Party and won. He openly opposed the parity amendment called for by the Philippine Trade Act (Bell Trade Act) and supported by President Manuel Roxas (t. 1946–1948). Members of the Philippine Congress questioned his victory at the polls and alleged that he had used terror, intimidation, and electoral fraud. The majority of the Congress unseated him and other members of the Democratic Alliance in June 1946.

Taruc openly turned against the government as a result, and reorganized the Hukbalahap into the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (People's Liberation Army). Huk forces under his command attacked government forces and spread their influence in Central Luzon. They were later able to spread to other areas in Luzon and into the Visayas and Mindanao.

In 1948, President Elpidio Quirino (t. 1948–1953) offered amnesty to the Huks and invited Taruc to a dialogue with him. Quirino offered Taruc the chance to regain his seat in the Congress as well as reforms that would improve the life of the peasants. Taruc met with Quirino, took his seat in the Congress, and negotiated with the government. However, feeling that the government was not serious in its offers and did not meet all his reforms, on 15

August 1948 Taruc again went underground and resumed the Huk attempt to overthrow the government.

The Huk offensive was checked by vigorous military operations, in conjunction with socioeconomic governmental programs, led by Secretary of National Defense (later President) Ramon Magsaysay (1907–1957). Taruc surrendered to the government on 17 May 1954, facilitated by *Manila Times* reporter Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino, Jr. (1932–1983). He was charged with rebellion and sentenced to twelve years in prison. Murder charges were later filed against Taruc, resulting in his being sentenced to life imprisonment.

Taruc was eventually released and turned away from armed rebellion. He became leader of the National Farmer’s Organization, an affiliate of the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines. During the period of martial law (1972–1981) under President Ferdinand E. Marcos (t. 1965–1986), Taruc supported Marcos’s land reform programs. The government recognized the Huk veterans of the Pacific War, including Taruc, as a legitimate anti-Japanese guerrilla movement.

Taruc writes for newspapers and broadcasts on radio; he is still active in programs—particularly the establishment of cooperatives designed to ease the plight of the peasants.

Taruc was a genuine peasant leader who rose against the government in the 1930s. He led the anti-Japanese Huk movement and led them against the government after the Pacific War. He served as an inspiration to peasants and labor leaders throughout the world.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Hukbalahap (Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon) (People’s Anti-Japanese Army) (1942); Martial Law (1972–1981) (The Philippines); Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Quirino, Elpidio (1890–1956)

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TAUSUG AND THE SULU SULTANATE

The Tausug (*tau*: “people of the current”; *sug*: “sea current”), also known historically as “Suluk,” “Sulu,” or “Joloanos,” compose the dominant ethnolinguistic group in the Sulu Archipelago of the southern Philippines. Jolo Island, located near the heart of the archipelago, constitutes the cultural and political center of Tausug society. However, major concentrations of Tausug are also present on Pata, Tapul, Lugus, and the Siasi islands; on the north and east coasts of Basilan; and in the Mindanao provinces of Zamboanga del Sur and Cotabatu. In addition, during the last three decades, increasing numbers of Tausug have migrated to eastern Sabah (Malaysia), chiefly to escape secessionist violence on Jolo and Basilan. Today, they are found from the Labuk-Sugut districts southward to Tawau.

In the Sulu Archipelago, the Tausug typically occupy the larger high islands, suitable for intensive agriculture, leaving the low, soil-poor coralline islands to the more maritime Sama. The Tausug is a culturally unified group, and regional differentiation is minimal. On Jolo Island, coastal-dwelling Tausug refer to themselves as *Tau Higad* (*higad*: “seacoast”) and to inland dwellers as *Tau Gimba* (*gimba*: “hinterland”), whereas both groups refer to Tausug living on islands other than Jolo as *Tau Pu* (*pu*: “island”). In Sabah, the Tausug are commonly known as “Suluk.”

The Tausug population of the Philippines was estimated at 325,000 in 1970, of whom 190,000 lived on Jolo Island. Following the destruction of Jolo Town in 1974 in the course of fighting between Muslim Tausug separatists and government Christian soldiers, that figure probably declined, as considerable numbers of Tausug were evacuated or fled, many to Basilan, Zamboanga, and Sabah. Although some have since returned, fighting has continued on both Jolo and Basilan Islands. In Sabah, locally born Tausug numbered 44,389 in 1991. Current estimates of their number, together with recent refugees, run as high as 150,000.

The language spoken by the Tausug belongs to the East Mindanao subgroup of central

Philippines languages. Its closest affiliation is with Butuanun, an East Mindanao language spoken at the mouth of the Agusan River. The two languages are believed to have separated some 900 years ago. It also exhibits extensive linguistic convergence with Sama/Bajau, indicating a long historical association. Tausug shows little dialectal variation, and the language served historically as the lingua franca of the Sulu sultanate. A Malay-Arabic script is used for religious and other writings, and, according to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European visitors, Malay served as a second court language.

History and Cultural Relations

The Tausug appear to have come to Sulu from northeastern Mindanao as a result of contact with Bajau/Sama traders. This movement probably began sometime in the tenth or eleventh century and was related to the growth of Chinese trade during the Sung (960–1279 C.E.) and later Yuan (1271–1368) periods. Linguistic evidence suggests that a Tausug-speaking community may have originated from a bilingual population established in Jolo by Bajau/Sama traders and their Tausug-speaking wives and children. By the end of the thirteenth century, the Tausug emerged as a regionally powerful commercial elite.

The date of the earliest Islamic penetration is uncertain, but initial contact possibly began in late Sung times, when Arab merchants opened direct trading links with southern China by way of the Sulu Archipelago. There also seems to have been some early proselytizing by Chinese Muslims. Sufi missionaries, who came to the area from Arabia or Iraq via Malaya (West Malaysia) and Sumatra, reinvigorated Islam in Sulu.

The Sulu sultanate was established in the mid-fifteenth century, putatively by the legendary Salip (Sharif) Abu Bakkar or Sultan Shariful Hashim. Its establishment consolidated the ascendancy of the Tausug in the Sulu Archipelago and appears to have furthered their social and economic differentiation from an earlier Bajau/Sama-speaking population. The sultanate attained the height of its power comparatively late, in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when most other indigenous states in the region were in decline. At its zenith, its influence extended from Sulu

through the coastal foreshores of Mindanao and northeastern Borneo. Jolo emerged during this time as a major center of trade and piracy and as an entrepôt for slaves, most of them taken from the central Philippines. In addition to Tausug raiders, Ilanun and Balangingi Sama fleets under the commission of Tausug aristocrats also carried out slave raiding. Following Spain's colonization of the Philippines in the sixteenth century, warfare with the Spanish was almost continuous for the next 300 years. The first Spanish attack on Jolo Town occurred in 1578. The town was occupied briefly in the seventeenth century, and a permanent garrison was established for the first time in 1876. The Spanish presence was at best tenuous, however, and never extended to the countryside.

After Spain's defeat in the Spanish-American War (1898), U.S. troops occupied Jolo Town in 1899, but stiff resistance prevented them from gaining control over the interior of the island until 1913. The Pax Americana that followed saw the abolition of slavery, confiscation of firearms, and a temporary curtailment of piracy and feuding. In 1915, under the terms of the Carpenter Agreement, Sultan Jamal ul-Kiram II (r. 1894–1915) relinquished all claims to secular power, although retaining his religious role as an Islamic sovereign. Since the Pacific War (1941–1945), indigenous forms of armed conflict have revived. In addition, modern weapons have flowed into the area since the early 1970s.

Today, Sulu is a major center of Islamic separatism in the Philippines. It is the birthplace of many of the founding leaders of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and its offshoots, and it has witnessed some of the most destructive fighting of recent years between secessionists and government troops.

Settlements and Economy

Except for towns and coastal fishing villages, Tausug communities are typically dispersed, with individual houses located close to fields. The household, or cluster of two or three adjacent households, constitutes the smallest territorial grouping. The next larger unit is the hamlet (*lungan*). Still larger is the community (*kauman*), having a common name and headman. The unity of the kauman depends upon intermarriage, the existence of a core kin group, attendance at a common mosque, his-

tory of past conflicts, and the political skills of the community's headman. Boundaries between kauman tend to be ill defined, varying, at any given time, according to the dynamics of alliance and feuding.

Subsistence is based primarily on agriculture, fishing, and trade, with some livestock raising (cattle, chickens, ducks). The Tausug practice a distinctive form of intensive dry-field rice farming. Permanently diked but nonirrigated fields are prepared by plowing, using cattle or water buffalo as draft animals, and are planted in dry rice. Rice is intercropped with corn, cassava, and a small amount of millet, sorghum, and sesame. There are three annual harvests: first, corn and other cereals; second, rice; and third, cassava. The harvesting of cassava continues until the following dry season. Farms are typically fallowed every third year. Other crops, generally planted in separate gardens, include peanuts, yams, eggplants, beans, tomatoes, and onions. The principal cash crops are coconuts (for copra), coffee, abaca, and fruit. Fruit, some of it wild, is an important source of seasonal cash income and includes mangoes, mango-steens, bananas, jackfruits, durians, *lanzones*, and oranges. Today, many coastal Tausug are landless and make their living from fishing and petty trade. Fishing, as either a full- or a part-time occupation, is practiced in coastal waters, generally close inshore, mainly using nets, hook-and-line, or traps. In recent decades some coastal Tausug have taken up agar-agar cultivation, bringing them into conflict, in some areas, with Sama fishermen. In the past the manufacture of bladed weapons was an important local craft, and traditionally women produced pandanus mats and woven headcloths, the latter for both sale and domestic use.

From the founding of the Sulu sultanate until the mid-nineteenth century, the Tausug conducted an extensive trade with China in pearls, pearl-shell, birds' nests, *trepan*, camphor, and sandalwood. Historically, considerable interisland trade also existed within the Sulu Archipelago. Today, copra and abaca are sold primarily through Chinese wholesalers, while Tausug or Sama traders handle most locally consumed products. Although it is now in decline, throughout the twentieth century smuggling between Sulu and nearby Malaysian ports in Sabah constituted an important economic activity, giving rise to significant local differences

in wealth and power. Both men and women engage in trade, although interisland trade and smuggling are largely male occupations.

Politics and Society

The major cultural focus of Tausug society is on conflict, politics, law, and litigation. Tausug society is hierarchically stratified and has been since at least the founding of the Sulu sultanate. Three major ranks were formerly recognized: nobles, commoners, and slaves. The nobility consisted of *datu*, men holding patrilineally inherited titles who exercised regional power, and *salip*, religiously revered men and women who claimed descent from the Prophet (s.a.w.). As in other Malay polities, those of *datu* status were differentiated into "royal *datus*" and "ordinary *datus*" (namely, those directly related to the line of the ruling sultan and others related only distantly or not at all). Commoners, who constituted some 80 percent of the population, lacked ascribed titles and ranking. The law defined the position of each category. Commoners and slaves were required to pay allegiance to a particular *datu*, although they exercised some choice in the matter, as individual *datus* lacked unambiguously bounded territories. To a considerable degree, wealth and power were achieved independently of inherited titles, so that men of humble origin could gain influence and, in acknowledgment, received bestowed titles and positions of prominence in the alliance hierarchy. The system has thus been characterized as one of "status-conscious egalitarianism."

Although centralized as a polity, political power within the traditional Sulu sultanate operated primarily through networks of interlocking leader-centered alliances. Person-to-person bonds of friendship and patronage linked smaller alliances to larger ones in a ramifying network that extended from community headmen and local factional leaders to the sultan and his kindred at the apex of the system. Within the archipelago, the sultan's authority was strongest at the geographical center of the state, on Jolo and neighboring islands, and diminished to symbolic hegemony at its peripheries. Recognition of a leader's position in the alliance hierarchy was expressed through ranked titles (*panglima*, *maharaja*, *orangkaya*, *parukka*, etc.). Part of the sultan's authority de-

rived from his powers of investiture and control over the title system. At each level of the alliance network, leaders acted as representatives of the law, performing legal functions, mediating feuds, and imposing fines. They also offered their followers physical protection and, from the sultan downward, were responsible for administering religious law and for appointing local and regional religious officials. At the capital, a state council (*ruma bichara*) made up of religious advisors and leading datus advised the sultan. In addition to its advisory role, this state council reserved the right to determine succession. Today, traditional political values remain largely intact. Minimal and medial alliances still operate, whereas maximal alliances are now led by acculturated Tausug operating within the setting of Philippine electoral politics or secessionist factions.

Sulu is divided into two provinces, Sulu (Jolo) and Tawi-Tawi, both of which are part of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which was granted partial autonomy by the Philippine government in 1989. Jolo, in turn, is divided into eight municipalities, each with elected officials, mayors, vice mayors, and municipal councillors.

The Tausug recognize three categories of law: pure Quranic law; interpreted religious law (*sara*), codified by the sultan and other religious officials; and customary law (*adat*), including offenses of honor. Armed feuds were, and remain, endemic. The pattern is chiefly one of individual revenge.

Religion

The Tausug are Sunni Muslims. Most preadolescent children attend Quranic school, or study the Quran with a private tutor, and when proficient, demonstrate their skill at recitation in a public ceremony called *pagtammat*. This is typically a festive occasion. Boys are circumcised (*pagislam*) in their early teens; girls undergo a similar rite (*pagsunnat*), but without ceremony, when they reach the age of five or six. The *imam*, the local religious leader, is an important community figure. He officiates at life crisis rites, offers religious counsel, and leads the faithful in prayer. Religion is central to Tausug identity and in the past played an important role in maintaining the hierarchical structure of the Sulu society. The sultan, as head

of an Islamic polity, was invested with religious authority. Official genealogies traced his descent from the Prophet (s.a.w.), and in his person he was expected to exemplify qualities of virtue and religious devotion. Paralleling the political pyramid was a religious one, conjoined at its apex in the sultan's person, and consisting, from state to community level, of religious advisors and mosque officials.

CLIFFORD SATHER

See also Bajau; Borneo; East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities; Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; Ilanun and Balangingi; Mindanao; Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); Moros; Piracy; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Slavery; Sulu and the Sulu Archipelago

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TAVOY

See Tenasserim

TAXATION

People in Southeast Asia long paid tax to local rulers as tribute, often because the point of a sword or the barrel of a gun forced them to. Some taxes were paid in currency, but tax revenues mainly took the form of a head or poll tax in kind, in the form of either requisitioned goods or labor. The amount of money in circulation was small, and few people earned cash incomes that could be taxed. Most of the population was engaged in sedentary agricultural production, and crops and rural labor were therefore the main sources of taxable surplus. Southeast Asia's most powerful states in the past—Angkor, Majapahit, and Pagan—depended on the ability of rulers and their tax collectors to extract agricultural surplus (particularly rice) from peasants and requisition their labor for the construction and maintenance of public works. Tax revenues were used to maintain the royal households and the bureaucracy. Often corrupt behavior by local tax collectors minimized the net revenues to the rulers.

Taxes were paid in currency in cities, where more people earned cash incomes. Cities expanded when trade increased in the seventeenth century. The tax farming system was widely used to collect urban taxes. In essence, tax farmers kept the revenues, particularly from port and customs duties. However, taxes on markets, gambling, and alcohol (arrack) production; road or river tollgate revenues; and from government monopolies on pawnshops and salt and opium sales, after having paid the ruler a fixed sum in advance, were secured often through competitive bidding among tax farmers. Earlier forms of tax farming involved an indigenous *syahbandar* (*shahbandar*, intermediary between traders and a ruler), but beginning in the seventeenth century tax farming by ethnic Chinese businessmen became more prominent. The Chinese as tax farmers functioned initially in the port cities under Dutch East India Company (VOC) control, and later in cities under control of the British and indigenous rulers. Tax farming was widely used, because rulers, unlike Chinese tax farmers, had limited knowledge of the taxable base and the degree to which it could be taxed without inhibiting economic

activity. Their bureaucracies were also too small. Ethnic Chinese tax farmers knew the tax base, understood what a tax farming license was worth, and offered the highest bids for the right to collect taxes.

During the process of colonization in the nineteenth century, governments of the budding nation-states seized prerogatives from indigenous rulers, including that of levying various taxes. Land tax in kind and corvée labor remained important, although it became possible to pay cash in lieu of corvée. In Java the colonial government forced small farmers to produce export crops, which earned them an income that they used to pay land tax.

Governments gave themselves an expanding mandate. Colonial governments, but also the government of King Chulalongkorn (r. 1868–1910) in Thailand (Siam), increasingly used tax revenues to improve and intensify public administration, and to provide more public goods such as roads, irrigation head works, port facilities and later railways, education, and health-care. Governments found new ways to tax commercial activities through the expansion to a greater array of taxable activities and the fine-tuning of the tax farming system. Leasing tax farms was not always the main source of government revenue, as monopolies (including export monopolies of tobacco, tin, etc.) were often more important.

Two main changes took place after 1900. First, taxes in kind were gradually scaled back. They were cumbersome, subject to annual fluctuation, and yielded relatively low net revenues. As economies diversified and monetization increased, it became easier to levy taxes in currency in some parts of Southeast Asia faster than in others. Consequently, corvée labor was replaced by a head tax. For instance, in Thailand the obligation on farmers to make available three months of labor or more for the king was replaced with a direct tax in 1899, and in colonial Java all compulsory labor was abolished in 1902. Still, some forms of corvée labor continued to be demanded by local administrations and rulers.

Second, tax farming was abolished as governments gained confidence in the capabilities of their administrations, which gathered more information about the taxable base. Thus a growing range of indirect taxes became levied and administered by government taxation ser-

vices. For instance, in Thailand the Royal Treasury Department was established in 1875 as the central agency for revenue collection; it became the Ministry of Finance in 1933. In the Philippines, tax collection was professionalized with the establishment in 1904 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which still exists today.

There were some antitax rebellions, such as the 1908 tax revolt against a new tobacco tax in Minangkabau (West Sumatra), the 1908 antitax rebellion in Annam, the 1927 Datu Tabil-led uprising in the Philippines against land taxation and the *cedula*, and the 1931 Saya San uprising in Burma (Myanmar). Although concerns about the tax burden may have been a trigger, these rebellions tended to have other causes, such as religious dissatisfaction. In Indonesia, several investigations in the 1920s addressed concerns about the tax burden on the Indonesian population.

Tax revenues increased quickly between 1900 and 1930. Economic expansion broadened the tax base. Revenues from taxes that had been less significant (such as stamp duties) increased. The efficiency of tax collection improved. However, tax systems became increasingly unwieldy and complex to administer. The cost of enforcement and administration was still relatively high. Taxes also had many anomalies and inequities. For instance, not all income-generating activities were taxed. Many taxes, such as the head tax or the company establishment tax, took no account of income generated. Not all forms of consumption were taxed, nor were they taxed at the same rate. The next challenge was simplification of tax systems, which involved a gradual change away from dependence on a wide range of indirect taxes toward direct taxation of personal and company income with progressively increasing rates. Flat-rate income taxes had been introduced in Burma in 1886, Indonesia in 1908, and the Philippines in 1913. The Philippines and Indonesia were the first to introduce progressive income taxes in 1920 and 1921, albeit with a high tax threshold that exempted most people. Malaya did not introduce an income tax until 1947.

The only significant change involved the introduction of several ad hoc taxes in the early 1930s in an effort to stem the fall of public revenue caused by crisis. The share of foreign trade

tax revenues increased, as exports of basic commodities were taxed in order to encourage processing before export, and imports were taxed at higher rates in an effort to further import-replacing manufacturing.

After the Pacific War (1941–1945), revenue systems in the region suffered from several problems. They were still haphazardly structured, showing the influence of historical accident, emulation of foreign tax systems, and ad hoc responses to specific situations such as the crisis of the early 1930s and the austerity of the late 1940s. There were many practical problems with taxation, particularly in Indonesia, Burma, and South Vietnam after independence—and to a lesser extent elsewhere. For instance, the myriad ad hoc alterations in tax laws had increased in complexity, inconsistency, and confusion. Moreover, uncertainty about new legislation and selective enforcement resulted in considerable tax evasion by concealing income, shipping capital overseas, or the exploitation of loopholes. In addition, economic stagnation reduced civil servant salaries and made tax collectors susceptible to corrupt behavior. As a consequence government revenue was low, at an average of 10 to 15 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), during the 1950s (Pierre Van Der Eng).

The accompanying table shows that in the 1950s, governments, except for that of Singapore, relied primarily on the revenues from taxing foreign trade. Even more than in the 1930s, governments used tariffs to protect domestic industry and used export taxes on exports of primary commodities either to encourage domestic processing or as an easy source of revenue. For instance, the state-owned rice marketing boards in Burma and Thailand served that purpose. In second place came revenues from taxes on domestic trade, particularly excise and sales taxes, while revenues from taxes on income and wealth were not as important.

The table reveals that dependence on taxation of foreign trade gave way to greater reliance on taxation of income and wealth after the 1950s. Countries shed import-replacing industrialization strategies and reduced tariffs and export taxes. The state coffers in all countries still benefited from the improved export performance in most of the region, because they taxed the increasing incomes of persons and companies. For instance, the table shows a

Shares in Public Revenues 1950–1990

Average 1950s	Indonesia	Malaya	Burma	Philippines	Thailand	S.Vietnam	Singapore
Taxes on foreign trade	55%	60%	50%	21%	46%	40%	0%
Taxes on domestic transactions	20%	10%	17%	45%	35%	41%	51%
Taxes on income/wealth	19%	14%	19%	19%	7%	5%	27%
Other revenue	7%	17%	15%	16%	13%	14%	22%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Per capita public revenue (\$U.S.)	5.2	26.2	5.0	10.7	8.7	2.9	57.0
1990		Malaysia				Vietnam	
Taxes on foreign trade	6%	18%	14%	24%	22%	25%	2%
Taxes on domestic transactions	24%	18%	24%	26%	40%	19%	10%
Taxes on income/wealth	64%	31%	17%	28%	27%	18%	27%
Other revenue	6%	33%	45%	22%	10%	38%	62%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Per capita public revenue (\$U.S.)	127.7	614.5	11.2	115.7	288.1	14.3	3,914.2

NOTES: Where possible converted with black market exchange rates to approximate the purchasing power of currencies. Vietnam 1990 refers to 1995.

SOURCES: *ECAFE Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1960*; *IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1992*.

significant increase in the share of income tax in Indonesia. This was in part due to an overhaul in 1984–1985 of the income tax legislation. The main reason was the growth of income taxes paid by oil- and gas-exporting companies, particularly state-owned Pertamina. In contrast, in Malaysia the oil and gas export windfall mainly took the form of export taxes and dividend subventions by state-owned Petronas. Singapore's profitable state-owned companies also contributed to the government's income through dividend subventions.

The tax systems of Indonesia in the late 1980s, Vietnam in 1990, and the Philippines in 1997 underwent comprehensive reforms aimed at simplifying procedures. In contrast, Thailand still uses the 1938 Revenue Code, which has

been changed frequently and remains less comprehensive than tax legislation in the other countries. Still, around the region governments abolished many small indirect taxes and introduced value-added taxes. Countries also enhanced their ability to tax the incomes of persons and companies through progressive income tax systems. This was supported by significant improvements in the capabilities of the taxation offices. Hence, since the 1950s, government revenue increased faster than economic growth to an average of 15 to 20 percent of GDP in the 1990s.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Chinese in Southeast Asia; Labor and Labor Unions; Peasant Uprisings and Protest

Movements in Southeast Asia; Pertamina Crisis (1975–1976); *Syabandar* (*Shahbandar*); Trade and Commerce of Southeast Asia (ca. Nineteenth Century to the 1990s)

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TÂY-SƠN REBELLION (1771–1802)

In 1771 a revolt broke out that was to plunge Vietnam into three decades of civil war. Its leaders, Nguyễn Nhạc, Nguyễn Huệ, and Nguyễn Lữ, were three brothers living in the An Khê foothills of the Trường Sơn range, 48 kilometers west of Qui Nhơn on the coast—whence their collective designation as the Tây-sơn (western mountains) brothers. They belonged to a section of the population composed essentially of peasants but with useful petty-bourgeois commercial connections. Nguyễn Nhạc was himself at one time a betel trader, before becoming a tax collector. Like the bulk of their followers, the three brothers were men of diverse experience, but it was Nguyễn Huệ, the second, who proved to be the military genius and charismatic figure.

The Tây-sơn insurgency was a social movement developing at the moment when, in the principality of the Nguyễn, an all-powerful regent, Trương Phúc Loan, managed the state from 1765 in the name of the minor lord and

oppressed the people. Initially directed against Trương Phúc Loan's usurpation and asserting the claim of the legitimate heir, the movement rapidly gained momentum and mass support. It developed the basic characteristics of a peasants' revolt. The customs stations on the frontier were attacked and plundered; callous officials and village chiefs were punished, their property confiscated and redistributed; land and tax registers were seized and burned; public granaries were ransacked and their stored rice distributed to the poor. The original nucleus of the movement consisted of mainly poor and landless peasants, deserters, exiles, and runaways. Criminals, thieves, and pirates numbered among its supporters, according to later Nguyễn sources. But it also attracted bonzes; progressive scholars; low-ranking mandarins and village officials; cattle dealers and merchants; Cham princes, who were offered restoration of their former dignities; and the hill peoples, who were promised various advantages.

By 1773 the Tây-sơn movement, after having seized Qui Nhơn and made it its capital, had developed into a serious threat to the stability of the Nguyễn state. But in the following years, the Tây-sơn leaders found themselves faced with a Trịnh invasion from the north that occupied the Nguyễn capital of Huế. This began an extremely troubled period, during which the whole of Vietnam was plunged into a three-cornered war, with the Trịnh and the Tây-sơn competing for domination and the Nguyễn struggling to survive in a few strongholds still remaining in their hands in the extreme south. To avoid having to fight a war on two fronts, the Tây-sơn leaders made a tactical alliance with the general commanding the Trịnh army. Shortly after, with the withdrawal of the Trịnh army, they were free to deal with the war in the south. By 1778 they were in effective control of the whole south, after having managed to kill nearly all the leading members of the Nguyễn family, with the exception of one prince, Nguyễn Anh. He managed to escape to Pulo Panjang in the Gulf of Siam, where he was able to rally his supporters. Meanwhile Nguyễn Nhạc proclaimed himself emperor.

In North Vietnam, a succession dispute among the Trịnh and an economic crisis aggravated by famine facilitated the spread of the Tây-sơn movement. In 1786, Nguyễn Huệ de-

feated the Trịnh, occupied much of North Vietnam, and assumed the imperial title that had once been that of the Lê dynasty, taking the title Quảng Trung in 1788. After almost two centuries of division Vietnam appeared consequently reunified, with the exception of some southern localities that still held out under Prince Nguyễn Ánh. However, severe strains were becoming apparent in the structure of the Tây-sơn state. Nguyễn Huệ's successes aroused the jealousy of his elder brother Nguyễn Nhạc. They also provoked Chinese intervention on behalf of the old Lê dynasty that saw in the collapse of the Trịnh the last chance for the revival of its ancient power. Nguyễn Huệ besieged Nguyễn Nhạc in the latter's capital at Qui Nhơn but was forced to accept an uneasy truce under the pressure of the Chinese intervention in North Vietnam. In early 1789 he repulsed the Chinese attempt to take Hanoi and was recognized by the Qing emperor in 1790 as the legitimate successor to the Lê.

Nevertheless, on Nguyễn Huệ's death in 1792, his power had by no means been consolidated. He left a ten-year-old son, Quảng Toàn, to succeed him, under the regency of a powerful mandarin, Bùi Độc Tuyên. The country was then divided into three parts. The kingdom of Quảng Toàn extended from Quảng-Nam province to the northern borders. The territories of Nguyễn Nhạc, with his capital at Qui Nhơn, lay to the south of Quảng-Nam. In the extreme south were the forces of Prince Nguyễn Ánh, who had been fighting a seesaw campaign with the Tây-sơn for the possession of Saigon. He finally succeeded in September 1788, with Siamese support, to capture the town, expelling the Tây-sơn from the southernmost bastion of their power. When Nguyễn Nhạc died in late 1793, his possessions were taken over by Bùi Độc Tuyên in the name of the young Quảng Toàn.

By this time the country had been devastated by more than two decades of war, and the Tây-sơn rulers had abandoned many of those altruistic principles that had made them so attractive to the peasantry and the merchants in the 1770s. Furthermore, the lack of strong leadership contributed to the success of Nguyễn Ánh's counterrevolutionary movement. By mid-1802, Hanoi fell; Nguyễn Ánh thereupon proclaimed himself emperor of all the Vietnamese territories.

Yet, despite the remarkable beginnings of reform under Quảng Trung, the Tây-sơn were reluctant to break completely with the past. Rather, a compromise was attempted between tradition and the assertion of a new indigenous identity. For instance, the traditional mandarin examination system was retained, but proficiency was required in the composition of prose and verse in *nôm* script. Agrarian reforms were attempted through conventional land redistribution and by bringing fallow lands into cultivation. At the same time, communal registers were introduced in order to induce the large floating population to settle. But there was no radical restructuring of society so as to resolve the perennial agrarian problems. Fundamental problems of agriculture remained. Trade and merchant activities were still in their infancy. Efforts were made to stimulate craft production and trade. Meanwhile, ironically, countermeasures were taken against the privileged position of the commercial class, such as the massacre in 1782 of thousands of Chinese traders living in southern Vietnam. The introduction of a unified currency system prompted the increased circulation of cash and the development of wage labor in the main commercial centers.

Although the Tây-sơn movement did not result in the creation of a new and lasting political order in Vietnam, in retrospect it can be seen to have foreshadowed developments that were later to change Vietnamese political life radically. What was especially remarkable about this popular rebellion, drawing its support from a peasantry oppressed by the demands levied on it by state officials, was that it did not rely upon millenarian religion to mobilize the large numbers of discontented peasants it attracted. Instead, the Tây-sơn invoked the memories of the ancient sage emperors whom Mencius (ca. 372–289 B.C.E.) had praised; by such invocations, and the declaration of the equality of the rich and the poor, they announced the beginning of the end of the old order in Vietnam. Despite its ultimate failure by 1802, the Tây-sơn rebellion thus inaugurated modern Vietnamese history.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Le Dynasty (1428–1527; 1533–1789); Nguyễn Ánh (Emperor Gia Long) (r. 1802–1820); Peasant Uprisings and Protest

Movements in Southeast Asia; Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Trịnh Family (1597–1786)

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TEMASIK (TUMASIK)

The place-name *Temasik* appears in several sources of the fourteenth century. It can be localized in the area of the south coast of the island of Singapore. Closely associated with it was the name *Long Yamen*, “Dragon’s Tooth Strait,” whence a mission was sent to Yuan-dynasty China around 1320.

Later fourteenth-century sources concerning this chiefdom include a reference in the *Desawarnana* (*Nāgarakertāgama*), a Majapahit court poem written in 1365 C.E., that lists Temasik as one of the Javanese kingdom’s vassals. Another mention is found in a memorial to a Vietnamese prince who could speak “the language of the envoys from Temasik” (Wolters 1982: 48, n. 45). A monk from Chiaochieh (north Vietnam) even in the seventh century was said to have been fluent in Malay (Wheatley 1983: 372). The two most important references, however, come from a Chinese document and a Malay source. The Chinese source is the *Dao Yi Zhi Lue*, written by a merchant named Wang Dayuan around 1349. Wang does not single out Temasik for special prominence, since it was not a particularly rich or powerful port. He did know the place rather well, however. For instance, he was able to report that “a few years ago” (perhaps around 1325) the “Siamese” besieged the place; they, however, did

not succeed in breaching its defenses (Rockhill 1915: 100). He also records that Chinese merchants lived here “mixed up among the natives” (Wheatley 1961: 82). This is the only port in Southeast Asia for which he records the existence of a resident Chinese community.

Wang also portrays the Dragon’s Tooth Strait as a dangerous place, a lair of pirates. Chinese ships sailing through this narrow waterway (the modern strait between Sentosa Island and Labrador Point) had to be on guard against canoes of warriors armed with blowguns shooting poisoned darts.

The Malay Annals (*Sejarah Melayu*) depict Temasik (under its modern name Singapore) as the first great Malay trading city. Five kings ruled the place, once repelling an attack from Majapahit, the second time being defeated by treachery. The last king, however, escaped and a few years later founded Melaka. This latter individual, Iskandar Syah, is a historical personage whose existence is confirmed by the Ming Annals. Combining information in the Ming Annals and the *Sejarah Melayu*, we can calculate that Temasik’s first ruler set up his kingdom there in 1299 C.E., while Iskander Syah de-camped around 1395.

Archaeological excavations have succeeded in uncovering some details of the fourteenth-century port. The hill now known as Fort Canning has yielded a wide range of local earthenware and Chinese porcelain, stoneware, glass, and coins, as well as gold jewelry. Some of the Chinese objects are of elaborate types unknown from other sites, attesting to a close connection between the inhabitants of the site (probably the ruling elite) and China. British reports of the early nineteenth century record numerous brick ruins on the hill, which have now entirely vanished. Sites along the bank of the Singapore River have yielded more objects of the same nature, plus Sri Lankan coins and proof of copper-working. A large inscription once stood at the mouth of the Singapore River written in a pre-Islamic, Indic-derived script palaeographically dated to the period of the ninth to fourteenth centuries, but this was destroyed in 1843.

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See also Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Parameswara

(Parameshwara, Paramesvara); *Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals)*

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TEMPLE POLITICAL ECONOMY
State-Sangha Relations during the
"Classical" Age

It was during the "classical age" of Burma (ninth to fourteenth centuries C.E.) that state-Sangha relations were institutionalized to become a recurring phenomenon throughout premodern Burmese history, and in some ways, to continue into the twenty-first century. In order to understand the history of the political economy of the temple and other religious buildings, the origins and growth of the state and the first unified kingdom of Burma must also be understood.

"Burma" is the colonial term for the country known indigenously since 1102 as Myanma (Myanmar), whose spoken colloquial name is Bama, from which probably came "Burma." "Burmese" is also a colonial term referring to the citizens of the country and culture; it refers to all ethnic groups belonging to that nation.

The state, whose major feature is urbanization, saw its beginnings around the first century C.E. with the culture we have come to call the Pyu. That culture dominated what was to become the area we know today as Myanmar or Burma, whose center was located in the dry zone of the country, the "heartland" of Burmese state and society, the nucleus of its demographic, economic, and political resources for nearly two millennia. After almost nine centuries, the Pyu polity and society were subsumed or replaced by the Burmese speakers

who in the mid-ninth century became the leaders of that state, to rule almost continuously for more than another millennium, until today. Their first kingdom, which unified the country as we know it today, was centered at the walled city of Pagan, and their dynasty was known as the Pagan dynasty, which lasted for nearly five centuries. It was during this Pagan period, from the mid-ninth to the mid-fourteenth centuries, that an intimate relationship between the state and Sangha (Buddhist church, monkhood) was born, grew, and became institutionalized in Burmese society.

The city of Pagan survives today as an ancient archaeological site of roughly 26 square miles (65 square kilometers), dotted with nearly 3,000 religious buildings, many of them still in use by devotees of Burmese Theravada Buddhism. Like nearly all the capital cities of Burma during premodern times, it is located in the dry zone of Upper Burma, so called because it receives an average of 45 inches (1,143 millimeters) of rain a year.

Although the walled city of Pagan was most likely built sometime in the mid-ninth century, it was not until the mid-eleventh century with King Aniruddha (r. 1044–1077), known as the first unifier of the country, that the material and human resources of the dry zone were successfully harnessed. This enabled him subsequently to expand and consolidate the rest of what was to become much of what is today's Burma. He did this by building defenses against the traditional route of invasion in the north and by constructing irrigation works on perennial rivers that flowed into the dry zone from the higher and wetter mountains surrounding it. As the soil in the dry zone was very fertile, only water was needed, and so his harnessing of these perennial rivers enabled Pagan to reap sometimes three crops of *sawah* (wet rice)—the economic foundation of the kingdom—a year. Thus agriculture was vital to the survival of Pagan, as it was to virtually every other dynasty and kingdom in premodern Burmese history. This fertile and flat plain created by the three major rivers—the Irrawaddy, Chindwin, and Sittaung (Sittang)—became the economic mainstay of the Pagan kingdom for several centuries, wherein lay its human, economic, cultural, political, and social resources.

Aniruddha's expansion was continued by his successors. Kings Kyanzittha (r. 1084–1113),

Alaungsithu (r. 1113–1167), and Narapatisithu (r. 1173–1210) expanded the kingdom to nearly what it is today, but, more important, consolidated and institutionalized what Aniruddha had done.

They stretched the kingdom from the upper reaches of the snowcapped mountains in the north to the sweltering delta at the Gulf of Muttama, a Y configuration that runs right down the middle of the country. This Y was attached to a long “leg,” the Tenasserim peninsula and its coastal cities that were important for foreign ideas and long-distance trade.

Thus, by the twelfth century, for the first time in Burma’s history, much of the country as we know it today was politically, militarily, and administratively governed by a monarchy from a single center: Pagan. By then, it included peoples and lands, cultures and languages, in the areas east and west of the Y configuration. But the core of the Burmese polity and the center of its power remained in and around the juncture of the Y created by the confluence of the Chindwin and Irrawaddy Rivers.

Equally important, the physical and military expansion and consolidation of the lands and human resources by Aniruddha and his successors were integrated with an ideology, perhaps best described as Burmese Theravada Buddhism, that became the predominant conceptual system of the state. Other beliefs founded in supernaturalism, based on human and non-human spirits, and Indic as well as local ideas concerning power, leadership, legitimacy, and authority were integrated with those of “orthodox” (that is, canonical) Theravada Buddhism of various schools, to create a Burmese political ideology.

In a state whose legitimacy was tied to the promotion and well-being of the Buddhist church, and a society whose people deeply believed in doing “good deeds” for the religion, this ideology was paramount. (The performance of “good deeds” shall in turn provide the merit needed to be reborn in the next life as a higher being.) As Burmese Theravada Buddhism became structurally and conceptually entrenched in state ideology and society at large, the Buddhist Sangha also became a prominent and regular socioeconomic and political force within that state and society. But it led, inadvertently and eventually, to a situation whereby, on the one hand, the legitimacy of

state and society was based on promoting the religion, and, on the other, the growth of the religious sector was weakening that very same state’s material wherewithal to remain viable as a Buddhist state. Consequently there was a “structural contradiction” difficult to resolve.

In other words, the legitimacy of state and society depended on the patronage of the Sangha, and that patronage was expressed in economic and material ways. Notably, this translated into the construction of temples, monasteries, rest houses, libraries, wells, irrigation canals, and the donation of productive rice lands and labor in perpetuity (often believers and all their family were donated as “servants of the Lord Buddha”). Over time, the number of temples, monasteries, and monks, along with the human and material wealth that supported them (particularly productive land and labor), grew enormously.

Initially, the integration of Theravada Buddhist ideology with the economy, polity, and society created a tremendous force that stimulated the social, economic, and political growth of the state. Subsequently, however, this relationship between state and church became a drain on the kingdom’s wealth, as land, people, and money flowed ceaselessly and permanently into the religious tax-exempt sector. Once that wealth became church property, it could no longer be used for what were considered state purposes. All this resulted in serious repercussions by the late thirteenth century, when nearly 63 percent of the then-cultivated land and a large amount of hereditary labor, along with much silver and gold, had become tax-exempt religious property (Aung-Thwin 1985: 186).

There were mechanisms by which the state could recover some of this loss without, at the same time, undermining the king’s role as chief patron of the religion. Although he could not and did not, as in Japan and China, use military force to take back the material wealth that the church possessed, he could and did use legal and ritual procedures sanctified by religious law. At the same time, the monarch could slow down the process of runaway wealth flow into the Sangha. One such procedure was called *sasana* reform—that is, the reform of the religion by “purifying” the texts, and with it, the monkhood as well. The complicated procedures, the magnitude of the process, and its kingdomwide implications needed the prestige

and might of the state to be successfully implemented; it allowed, in effect, the state to proclaim the current church “impure” for not following the important religious vow of poverty that was part of doctrine. Once declared “impure,” a monk and his property were no longer legally tax-exempt, and the state could confiscate the property and defrock the monk. At the same time, the state would create a new, smaller order of monks who were reordained in the more “orthodox” tradition of poverty. Such reform suited not only the needs of genuinely reform-minded monks who lived by the tenets of orthodoxy but also the needs of the state, which was concerned with the perpetuation of a large tax-exempt sector. Thus the relationship between the state and the Sangha was both ideologically cooperative and economically adversarial.

But sasana reform was only a temporary measure, for the more “pure” the new order was, the better the merit one accrued by patronizing it—so that once again, more and more people donated more and more wealth. Indeed, successors of reformers would donate even more to the new order to prove that they were more legitimate than their predecessors, ultimately measured by the growth and well-being of the church. In time, the once “pure” Sangha would become much like its predecessor that had been reformed—wealthy and powerful—and the whole process of wealth flow to the church and tax-exempt sector, along with the problems associated with it, would begin again.

During the last several decades of the thirteenth century, a weakened state and a wealthy church attracted invasion by external forces, most notably the Mongols. Although ultimately unsuccessful in either taking the capital city of Pagan or destroying the kingdom directly (after three successive attempts), the Mongols nevertheless exacerbated the problem of central weakness and the ever-present factionalism at court, ultimately accelerating the kingdom’s downward spiral. The resources and energy spent in the defense of the kingdom exacted a tremendous toll, which, when combined with the already depleted treasury, was more of a burden than the dynasty could recover from. Although the monarchy was resurrected by members of the royal family following the Mongol troubles for several decades, after the

invariable struggles for power, the dynasty and kingdom—toward the middle of the fourteenth century—finally became only one of several competing regional powers. The whole had returned to its parts.

This “structural contradiction” plagued the Burmese state beyond the Pagan dynasty and throughout its premodern history, and continued even into the twentieth century. For as long as the society’s beliefs and the legitimating system encouraged the economic growth of the church, the economic and political problems would remain to plague each new dynasty. Because institutions and the principles upon which they stood, as well as the material environment, remained relatively the same (that is, agrarian), post-Pagan state and society were affected in much the same way. More specifically, the merit path to salvation and the criteria for political and social legitimization in a society with finite agrarian resources and a stable, demographic growth rate continued to create the economic problems of tax-exempt revenues.

The problem was exacerbated in subsequent centuries, for gifts of land and labor to the Sangha made in perpetuity meant all new donations were added to those already extant, thereby creating a continual and cumulative problem. Donations to the Sangha continued at a relatively constant level in the First Ava dynasty that immediately followed Pagan. In the next period, the Toungoo (fifteenth to sixteenth centuries), donations of land per se may have declined somewhat. However, added to the already large amounts of exempted land in Upper Burma, where all the prime agricultural lands were, it was an increase in the total and only worsened the problem for the state. Since the Toungoo period saw increased commercial activity, the state may have donated less land and more cash, for it had less land to begin with and more cash. Indeed, one of the reasons Toungoo kings shifted their center from an agricultural to a commercial setting—the only time in premodern Burma’s history—may well have been the pressure exerted by the increasing loss of productive lands in Upper Burma. This pattern continued with the next dynasty to rule Burma, the Second Ava dynasty, which moved its capital back to Ava after about seventy-seven years in Lower Burma. Finally, at the time the British conquered and annexed Burma, the last Konbaung dynasty was strug-

gling with the same problem of wealth flow to the tax-exempt Sangha. Even after Burma became a modern nation, this intimate political and economic relationship between the state and Sangha continued in both the parliamentary and military periods. Today, although the economic consequences on the economy as a whole are not as significant as they once were when the latter was based almost entirely on agriculture and land, the political relations between state and Sangha are still very important.

The legacy of the Pagan kingdom lies in the principles and institutions that it established—particularly the relationship between state and church—which became the standard, the model, for Burmese society thenceforth.

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See also Anawrahta (Aniruddha) (r. 1044–1077); Buddhism, Theravada; First Ava (Inwa) Dynasty (1364–1527 C.E.); Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885); Pyus; *Sangha*; Tenasserim

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TEMPLER, GENERAL SIR GERALD (1898–1979)

Winning "Hearts and Minds"

General (later Field Marshal) Sir Gerald Templer was Britain's most controversial postwar high commissioner of its protectorate the Federation of Malaya, serving from 1952 to 1954. He is best remembered for bringing a military approach to civilian problems in the multiracial society of Malaya.

After 1948, Malaya had been in a state of emergency to combat the armed insurgents of the predominantly Chinese Malayan Communist Party (MCP). In 1951 communist insurgents had assassinated Sir Henry Gurney (t. 1948–1951), Templer's predecessor, while he was on his way to the holiday resort of Fraser's Hill in the Pahang highlands. Although the situation in Malaya was getting out of the control of the civil and police authorities, the British government refused to impose martial law in the country and decided instead to continue civilian administration by using to the full the emergency powers it had acquired.

Templer's military regime succeeded in checking a difficult, deteriorating situation and turning it around, although this apparent military success was due largely to the change in communist strategy decided upon four months before he arrived. He, however, restored morale to the administration and got the military, police, and civil authorities to work together.

The impact of Templer upon Malaya was immediate. His tough and abrasive personality and no-nonsense approach, together with his rigorous direction of affairs, seemed to meet with early successes against the communist insurgents in the field. His tendency to speak bluntly, sometimes with foul language, shocked both European and Asian communities. His speeches frequently made the headlines, and even ruffled racial sensitivities. But in the second year of his administration he showed more tolerance and understanding of the complex problems of Malaya's multicultural society, so that by the time he left he had become subdued and benign.

Initially, the lull in hostilities between the communist insurgents and the government se-

curity forces had been credited to his strategies, but it was soon discovered that it was due to a change of policy by the MCP in urging its insurgents to avoid or reduce the number of public acts of violence and engagements with government troops. The communists were instructed instead to adopt legal and constitutional forms of struggle, including infiltration and subversion of political organizations. Templer's most notable strategy to counter the communists was to regard the war against them as a battle for the "hearts and minds" of Malaya's multiracial population. The strategy entailed the use of the stick and the carrot. Initially, the stick appeared to be given more prominence.

Templer's harsh policies became notorious when he began deliberately using collective punishment as a weapon of warfare on the local population, and greatly stiffened the penalties imposed on them. His showcase treatment of Tanjong Malim in Perak state, with the imposition of a twenty-four-hour curfew and reduced rice ration for the town, was unusually tough in response to the ambush and killing of a British patrol of twelve men—but it bore results. Shortly thereafter, information came from the inhabitants leading to the apprehension of twenty-eight suspects.

His actions raised a hue and cry in the local Chinese newspapers and in the British media, in the British Parliament, and in telegrams and letters to the British prime minister in London. But the British government defended his action. Tanjong Malim became only the first of a series of reprisals that continued until 1953. This not only increased Templer's unpopularity among the Chinese population, it also made the government's task of winning the psychological war—the battle for hearts and minds—against the communists more difficult. In spite of the obvious failure of collective reprisals to achieve their purpose, it was not for another fifteen months that he was persuaded to abandon them. In September 1953 he followed this up by declaring the existence of "white areas"—that is, areas free of the most irksome Emergency regulations, including food controls, curfews, limited hours of business, and restrictions on the movement of goods and people. The first deregulated state was Melaka.

Templer's strategy of the carrot was applied to some 500,000 squatters (men, women, and

children, 85 percent of whom were Chinese), who had been moved out forcibly from settlements at jungle fringes and resettled in about 500 "New Villages" (Stubbs 1989: 262). The authorities had regarded these squatter communities as the communists' main source of food supplies and a part of their network for obtaining shelter and protection. Removing the squatters to controlled areas with barbed-wire fences cut off the residents' contact with the communists. Although the resettlement move was seen as a punitive measure, the New Villages were provided with social and medical services. Templer ensured that money was spent to provide schools, roads, drains, electricity, and reasonable conditions of sanitation and public health, which had previously been lacking.

Despite this, Templer's relations with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), a political party formed at the initiative of his predecessor to represent the Chinese community and their interests, worsened and never improved. Although the MCA was contributing a lot to welfare work in the New Villages, Templer in June 1953 banned all lotteries run by political parties; he said that in their place government welfare lotteries would be increased. The MCA promptly retaliated by closing down all their welfare work in the New Villages.

Given his verbal and punitive strictures toward the Chinese community, Templer failed to get enthusiastic support for his call to the community to produce their right quota of recruits for the embryonic Federation Army. Although new citizenship legislation was introduced during his regime, under which by 7 May 1952 some 1.2 million Chinese and 180,000 Indians had automatically become federal citizens, the legislation allowing this was not of his making, for it had been prepared before he arrived (Cloake 1985: 304; Stubbs 1989: 115, 185; Purcell 1954: 218–220). But Templer did get the Malay rulers to agree to open the ranks of the Malayan civil service to Chinese and Indian citizens of the federation on the ratio of 4:1, Malays to non-Malays.

The British government in London, however, realized that the war against the communists could not be fought in the military field alone. Templer was urged to introduce political reforms, but he moved rather slowly, misjudging the mood of the people for immediate self-government and national independence. He

frequently stated that they were not yet ready for it. He also failed to recognize the potential leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj (1903–1990), the president of the leading Malay nationalist party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), who later emerged as the country's prime minister and a leading world statesman. He tended to support more conservative and pro-British politicians such as Datuk Onn bin Ja'afar (1895–1962), who agreed to delay the advent of Malaya's independence after he stepped down from the leadership of UMNO. As many of his activities and energies were directed at the Chinese population, especially the resettlement squatter program, the Malay community generally felt that their interests were neglected.

It was when he saw the political tide turning that he grudgingly conceded to some constitutional reforms, such as the holding of federal elections. It was when the UMNO/MCA alliance demanded that federal elections be held by the end of 1954, to be followed by self-government, that he became aware that the end of British rule would come faster than he had expected.

The UMNO/MCA alliance, which was soon enlarged to include the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), representing members of the Indian community, swept the federal elections that were duly held in July 1955, winning fifty-one of the fifty-two contested seats. The alliance was allowed to form the government and successfully negotiated and secured national independence from the British government on 31 August 1957.

After his departure from Malaya, Templer was promoted to overall head of the British army and later elevated to the title of field marshal in recognition of his military services. He died in 1979.

CHEAH BOON-KHENG

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Briggs Plan; Chin Peng (Ong Boon Hua/Hwa) (1922–); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Malayan/Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC); “New Villages” (Malaya/Malaysia); Onn bin Ja'afar (1895–1962); United Malays National Organization (UMNO) (1946)

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TENASSERIM

Lying on the southeastern littoral of modern-day Myanmar (Burma) facing the Indian Ocean, Tenasserim province has been fought over by Siamese and Burmese kings since at least the fourteenth century C.E., owing to its strategic location. Situated facing international trade routes and ports, it enjoys strategic proximity to the transpeninsular portage routes on the Isthmus of Kra linking the Indian Ocean with the port cities of Siam (Ayutthaya and later Bangkok), and the trade of the South China Sea. Consequently and inevitably, there were fierce conflicts to control the trade and revenues of Tenasserim. Its chief cities—Mergui, the hinterland city of Tenasserim on the river of the same name, Ye, Tavoy, and Martaban—have been regarded as the homeland of the Mon and Karen people, but their populations have also included the Mawken, Sea Gypsies, as well as Arakanese, Muslims, Indians, Portuguese, and many other nationalities. Mergui, protected by the offshore islands, provided a safe harbor in which trading ships sheltered from the monsoons. It was only after the rise of Singapore in the mid-nineteenth century diminished the strategic importance of Tenasserim that it ceased to be a conflict zone for the contesting states—namely, Siam (Thailand) and Burma. In 1826, as a result of the Treaty of Yandabo concluding the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826), Tenasserim, with Arakan, was annexed to the administration in British India. Tenasserim proved more trouble than the British thought it was worth, costing more to administer than it produced in revenues. Upon establishment of the residency in Ava, one of the conditions of the Treaty of Yandabo, in 1837 the British attempted unsuccessfully to sell Tenasserim to the Burmese. In the words of J. A. Mills, Tenasserim, from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, swung from “central-

ity to marginality” (1997: 35–58). Since Burmese independence from British colonial rule on 4 January 1948, Tenasserim has been beset by Mon and Karen insurgencies. However, recent explorations in oil and gas may restore Tenasserim to a place of importance in the region.

Since prehistoric times the ports on the Tenasserim coast have hosted a cosmopolitan population of merchants, traders, missionaries, and invading armies. Human occupation in this region, as shown by the cave site at Lang Rongrien in Krabi province, has been continuous since 38,000 to 27,000 years ago. In 245–250 C.E., a Chinese mission led by K’ang T’ai and Zhu Ying recorded ten “states” in Siam, Burma, the peninsula, and the archipelago that traded with Chin China (265–308 C.E.). Through the peninsula “states,” dependencies of the Funan polity centered in the Mekong Delta (first to sixth centuries C.E.), Chin China maintained trading relations with Ta-ch’in (Persia) via Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and South India. Tenasserim in these records is identified as Tien-sun. In the third century, its forest products, coral, ivory, pearls, glass, and precious stones made their way to the markets of the Chin capital as part of the Nanhai trade. The area around Tavoy and Mergui was rich in tin, apparently worked since prehistoric times. Following the widespread adoption of Buddhism in China in the fifth to eighth centuries C.E., many Chinese Buddhist pilgrims stopped at ports on the Tenasserim coast en route to India. The trade products changed accordingly to the trade in religious paraphernalia of the Buddhist faith, notably fragrant woods, incense, and candle wax. As Funan’s political power waned in the sixth century, the peninsular city-states asserted their independence, growing wealthy on the revenues of the international trade. One of these, Klong Thom in Krabi province, had for centuries held a special relationship with Ari-kamedu on the Coromandel coast of South India and was renowned for beads and glassware. Ko-lo near Mergui on the Tenasserim coast, and Takua Pa, P’an-p’an, and Ch’ih-t’u from the fifth to the eighth centuries, during Wheatley’s (1966) “Isthmian Age,” hosted Buddhist pilgrims, travelers, and merchants from many lands.

In the eighth and ninth centuries, as the Burmese and T’ai began to assert political

power in the mainland, Tenasserim was considered a wealthy province. It came under Pagan hegemony in the twelfth century. King Narapathisithu (r. 1173–1210) of Pagan drew Tenasserim more closely into the Pagan orbit in the late thirteenth century, when the region was the focus of predatory intentions from Ceylon and Angkor. By that time, the Tenasserim region had been drawn into the history of the mainland rather than the island world of the Srivijayan confederacy. In the early fourteenth century, the new T’ai state at Sukhothai sought to exert hegemony over Tenasserim through Martaban. The Siamese by 1460 had drawn Mergui and Tenasserim into the *mandala* of the new Ayutthaya polity. In 1488, King Trailok (r. 1448–1488) of Ayutthaya took Tavoy, thereby giving Ayutthaya direct access to the ports and trade of the Indian Ocean, the revenues from which helped to make Ayutthaya wealthy. Tenasserim’s importance to Ayutthaya was acknowledged in the sixteenth century by its being raised to the status of a vice-regal autonomous province. Muslim traders who were formerly based at Melaka, after that city’s fall to the Portuguese in 1511, flocked instead to the ports of the Tenasserim coast, through which flowed Indian textiles, minerals, opium, and dyestuffs to Ayutthaya in exchange for tin, Chinese porcelain, gums, and Thai Sawankhalok ware.

Tenasserim’s destiny as a field of conflict was marked in the mid-sixteenth century. In 1548, following his attack on Ayutthaya, King Tabinshwehti (r. 1531–1550) of the First Toungoo dynasty (1531–1599) demanded the customs duties of Mergui as ransom for the return of some royal prisoners. Mergui came under formal Burmese control in 1569 when Tabinshwehti’s successor, King Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581), seized Mergui and conquered Ayutthaya. Mergui’s importance to the Burmese empire now established at Pegu was such that Bayinnaung made special provisions for shipping and merchants from India (Lieberman 1980: 216–217). Lieberman (1980) has estimated that by the late sixteenth century, some 18 percent of India’s trade eastward flowed through Mergui and Pegu. The Siamese under King Naresuan (Phra Naret) (r. 1590–1605) recaptured Tavoy and Mergui in 1593 after the defeat of the Burmese forces at Nong Sarai. In 1614 the Burmese recaptured Tavoy, but Mergui

remained in Siamese hands, a conduit for the trade revenues flowing to Ayutthaya. Nicolas Gervaise in 1688 noted Mergui as one of the first eight cities in the kingdom of Ayutthaya (Gervaise 1989). Its importance to the Siamese in the mid-seventeenth century was such that English merchants Richard Burnaby and Samuel White, friends of the Greek-born prime minister of King Narai's (r. 1656–1688), Constantine Phaulkon (d. 1688), were made governor and *sharbandar* (*syahbandar*, harbormaster) of Mergui. But their outrageous behavior led to a massacre of the English community at Mergui by the Siamese in 1687. Through Mergui in 1685–1687 the French priests, ambassadors, and soldiers came in their ill-fated attempt to establish dominance at the court of King Narai. In the early eighteenth century Mergui ranked second to Pegu in the elephant and tin trade with Madras. Mergui remained under Siamese control until 1760, when King Alaungpaya (r. 1752–1760) of the Konbaung dynasty seized Mergui en route to Ayutthaya; it was recaptured by the Siamese together with Tenasserim in 1761, only to be lost to the renewed Burmese invasion under King Hsinbyushin's (r. 1763–1776) commanders in 1765. One of three Burmese invading forces moving along the coast took Tavoy, Mergui, and Tenasserim, then advanced northward to Ayutthaya. Despite Siamese attempts to retake Mergui after the fall of Ayutthaya to the Burmese in 1767, from 1793 it remained part of the Burmese kingdom, until the British annexed Tenasserim in 1826. In 1809, Tavoy was selected by the Burmese king Bodawpaya (r. 1782–1819) as the staging ground for what was to be the last attempt to invade Siam from Tenasserim during the Konbaung dynasty.

In the First Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826) the Siamese forces of King Rama III (r. 1824–1851) were poised ready at the border to take advantage of any opportunity presented by the British invasion to bring Tenasserim once more under Siamese control; in particular, they sought Tavoy. From 1830 the Tenasserim region, especially the Karens of Tavoy, Ye, and Moulmein, were the object of intense missionary activity by the American Baptist Mission in Burma from their headquarters at Amherst in British Burma. Mergui's declining importance as an international port was hastened in 1757 by the founding of Rangoon (Yangon), whose

trade revenues by 1797 were three times those of Mergui (Koenig 1990: 120). Throughout the nineteenth century, despite various schemes to improve the infrastructure of the province under its first British commissioner, Maingy, Mergui's economic fortunes continued to decline, overtaken by other places on the peninsula and changing international events.

Tenasserim's strategic importance was again highlighted during the Pacific War (1941–1945). Its three airfields, a priority for the Japanese as staging points for the invasion of Burma and Singapore, were seized on 23 January 1942. Mergui harbor was mined. Japanese naval forces at Mergui surrendered on 19 October 1944 to Allied forces in their reoccupation campaign.

Since 1948, Tenasserim has been the center of various insurgent groups—the Burma Communist Party (BCP), under Thakin Ba Thein Tin, was headquartered in the Tavoy area; the Karen National Union (KNU); and the Mon State Party—funded by the sale of Tenasserim's natural resources, particularly timber. In the past three decades, the area has been the scene of fishing rights disputes. Its pearl beds were in the hands of Sanda Win, General Ne Win's (1910–2002) daughter, and her husband (Lintner 1990: 62). In the 1990s exploitation of Tenasserim's oil and natural gas reserves saw increasing cooperation between Thailand and Myanmar punctuated at times by border disputes. Growing Chinese influence in the area and use of ports for Chinese naval operations in the Indian Ocean have been of concern to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). These security interests, and Myanmar's membership in ASEAN in 1997, underpin Tenasserim's increasing importance to regional interests.

HELEN JAMES

See also Alaung-hpaya (Alaungpaya, r. 1752–1760); Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581); Burma Communist Party (BCP); Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma-Siam Wars; Funan; Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Narai (r. 1656–1688); Pagan (Bagan); Phaulkon, Constance (Constantine) (d. 1688); Phra Naret (King Naresuan) (r. 1590–1605); Sukhotai (Sukhodava); Tabinshweihti (r. 1531–1550);

Toungoo Dynasty (1531–1752); Trailok (r. 1448–1488); Yandabo (1826), Treaty of

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TEOCHEW (TEOCHIU)

See Chinese Dialect Groups

TERAUCHI HISAICHI, FIELD MARSHAL COUNT (1879–1946)

Conqueror of Southeast Asia

Field Marshal Count Terauchi Hisaichi was commander-in-chief of the Southern Army of Japan, which ruled occupied Southeast Asia during the Pacific War (1941–1945).

His father, Field Marshal Count Terauchi Masatake (1852–1919), was Japanese prime minister from 1916 to 1918. It was quite rare for both a father and his son to become field marshals in Japan.

Terauchi joined the army in 1897. He graduated from the Army College in 1909 and gained rapid promotion to senior appointments: chief of staff of the Korean Army in 1927, commander of the Taiwan Army in 1934, and commander of the North China Area Army in 1937. Meanwhile, immediately after the 26 February Incident of 1936, an abortive coup d'état staged by young extremist officers, Terauchi became minister of the army with the job of reconsolidating the army. Under his one-year tenure, the army widened its intervention into politics and strengthened its political power. His appointment in fact reinaugurated a system whereby an officer in active service could assume the post of minister of the army.

Prior to the commencement of the Pacific War (1941–1945), Terauchi was appointed commander-in-chief of the Southern Army in November 1941 and dispatched to Saigon, French Indochina. On 8 December 1941, the 1 million-strong Southern Army launched the war in Southeast Asia and by the end of May 1942 had occupied virtually the whole region. During the war his headquarters shifted from Saigon to Singapore in June 1942, to Manila in April 1944 (Terauchi himself moved in May 1944), and again to Saigon in November 1944. Tragic incidents such as *sook ching* in Singapore



Terauchi Hisaichi served in the Japanese army as the commanding general in North China during the early phases of the Second Sino-Japanese War and as field marshal in the southwest Pacific during World War II. (UCSB Davidson Library)

and Malaya (early 1942), the construction of the Thai-Burma “Death Railway” (1942–1943), the Imphal campaign (1944), and the “Death Marches” at Bataan (April 1942, Philippines) and at Sandakan (January 1945, North Borneo [Sabah]) took place with his approval.

Terauchi was promoted to field marshal in June 1943. He was said to have not always concurred with the Tokyo government; a notable example was his vain opposition to the secession of the four northern Peninsular Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Terengganu) of Malaya to Thailand. Despite a seizure of apoplexy in Saigon in April 1945, he continued in office. Despite setbacks in most theaters, he was determined to continue the war. However, upon hearing the broadcast of the emperor on 15 August, he persuaded his aides to surrender.

Interestingly, the British government removed his name from the list of war criminals in January 1946. The British took him into custody to Singapore in March 1946. Terauchi died of a cerebral hemorrhage in Rengam, Johor, Malaya, on 12 June 1946.

HARA FUJIO

See also Bataan Death March; “Death Railway” (Burma-Siam Railway); “Fortress Singapore”; Imphal-Kohima (1944), Battle of; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Sandakan Death March; *Sook ching*; *Syonan-to*; Yamashita Tomoyuki, General (1885–1946)

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TERENGGANU

See Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu)

TET OFFENSIVE (1968)

A Turning Point

The Tet offensive in early 1968 marked a decisive moment in the Vietnam War (1964–1975), as well as the turning point.

This offensive took place three years after U.S. military intervention began in Vietnam. At the time, almost 500,000 men were deployed in South Vietnam; North Vietnam was being bombed constantly by the U.S. Air Force; and the chief commander in Saigon, General William Childs Westmoreland (t. 1964–1968), displayed optimism. Therefore the Americans were caught completely by surprise, especially since the Việt Cong (VC, Vietnamese communists) had launched a series of actions to divert their attention close to the 17th Parallel. Begun ten days before, the siege of Khe Sanh was regarded by the Americans themselves as crucial.

The conception of the offensive has been attributed to General Võ Nguyễn Giáp (1911–), minister of defense in Hanoi, rather than to the leader of the resistance in the south, Nguyễn Chi Thanh, who died in late 1967. Rather than laying siege to cities by occupying the countryside around them, like the Chinese, the Viet Cong preferred to trigger uprisings in the midst



Black smoke from fires set during the Tet offensive clouds the air over Saigon in 1968. The Viet Cong set the fires during attacks on the city on the Tet holiday, which is the celebration of the Vietnamese lunar new year. (U.S. National Archives)

of urban areas. Aided by the north and the communist camp, the “liberation forces” carried on a national tradition: in 1789, the chief rebel Quang Trung had attacked Thang Long (Hanoi), controlled by the Chinese, at the moment of Tet. A traditional Vietnamese festival, Tet celebrates the welcoming of the lunar new year. The night of the new lunar year always corresponds to a pause in activities, and the explosions of firecrackers rendered operations easier.

Was the 1968 Tet offensive really conceived to be successful? It would seem so, because the first banknotes distributed in the south in 1975, after “liberation,” were all marked by the date 1967. However, other reasons could have justified the offensive.

On the night of 30–31 January, surprise attacks were launched in the major cities. In Saigon, where the necessary means had been smuggled in, several operations were launched simultaneously—for example, on the army and police headquarters and radio facilities. The most spectacular was the attack on the American embassy at about 3 o’clock in the morning: nineteen members of a commando unit managed to enter the buildings and resisted counterattacks for more than six hours. At the price of extremely violent combat in the city and bombardments on the outskirts, the Saigonese–U.S. forces were able to retain control of the terrain. It was different in Huế, however, attacked at the same time; the Việt Cong captured the Imperial City and hoisted their flag. Determined to recapture the symbolic city at any price, U.S. units, supported by repeated artillery fire and aerial bombardments, took more than three weeks to accomplish this.

Violence spiraled out of control, illustrated by the photograph of the head of the Saigon police, General Loan, shooting a Việt Cong prisoner point-blank in the head with a revolver right in the center of Saigon. In Huế the bodies of more than 2,500 government officials and of several foreigners were found near the city after the battle. Even if some of these killings were the work of Saigonese Special Forces, most seemed to have been that of the liberation forces. Shortly afterward, in mid-March, three U.S. platoons at My-Lai exterminated hundreds of farmers without any justification.

Speaking in strictly military terms, the Tet offensive ended in a draw. However, beyond the

tens of thousands of registered deaths, its consequences were important. The conflict initiated a new phase in the media: fighting in the city was broadcast live, bringing about skepticism as to the outcome of the conflict. The U.S. commander-in-chief was replaced, and, despite new reinforcements having been brought in, the war came to a standstill. In his speech broadcast over radio and television on 31 March 1968, President Lyndon Johnson (t. 1963–1969) announced decreased bombings over the north, agreed to open negotiations, and indicated that he would not run for the next presidential term. Most important to the Việt Cong, however, was that another change was shaping up. The elimination of many of their leaders and militants, caused by the offensive and the repression that followed, would induce the north to send new leaders and fresh troops to the south—thus changing the nature of the relationship between the forces.

The Tet offensive revealed how vigorous resistance remained after three years of U.S. intervention, but also how crippling the situation was, inasmuch as none of the parties were able to bring about a decisive result. It modified not only the structure of U.S. engagement, now more inclined to seek a nonmilitary solution, but also that of the resistance, more than ever dependent on the north. Nevertheless, the war was to last another five years.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Nguyễn Văn Thiệu (1923–2001); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Việt Cong; Vietnam, South (post-1945); Vo Nguyễn Giáp (1911–)

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TEXTILES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

Trade and commerce have influenced much of the history of Southeast Asia, owing to the key position of the region on land and sea trade routes. Of the items traded, textiles and associated products have played a major part.

The earliest textiles produced in the region were made from bark cloth. Later, weaving employed fibers from indigenous plants such as hemp, abaca, and wild swamp grass. Spindle whorls have been found in excavations of pre-historic sites on the mainland.

The use of indigo for dyeing blue-black probably predates Indian influence, and bark and tree roots such as morinda and sappan for reds and browns were also available at an early date. In mainland Southeast Asia, red was also produced from stick lac, the residue from insect deposits in tree bark.

The oldest form of loom found widely in Southeast Asia was the body tension loom, on which the warp forms a continuous loop; this type was probably introduced to the islands during the third millennium B.C.E.

The influence of Indian culture beginning early in the first millennium C.E. was associated with changes in textile technology and design as well as in costume. The use of words derived from Sanskrit to refer to the spinning wheel, silk, and cotton in most parts of the region suggests that Indians introduced them. Chinese records refer to the weaving of cotton in Sumatra from the sixth century. Frame looms, found widely in the Malay world and among the Cham, may also have been introduced from India.

Silk cloths are first mentioned in the maritime region in the sixth century C.E., worn by a king in Sumatra, and silk skeins were imported from early in the Śrīvijayan period; there is no mention, however, of sericulture until the thirteenth century. Chinese accounts of the fourteenth century refer to the trading of Indian double-ikat silk *patolu* cloth in the region. Silks continued to be prominent in trade, mentioned by the Spaniards as cargo items on Chinese ships in the Philippines in the sixteenth century. Muslim Gujerati traders continued to use the highly prized *patolu* as a medium of exchange, and they became an essential part of Javanese court costume. *Patolu* motifs were copied onto cloths from Bali to Rote and Sumba. Indian artisans may have in-

roduced the double-ikat technique used in making Balinese *gringsing* cloths. Imported Indian block-printed cotton cloths were also widely copied, and Sumatra's *pelangi* cloths owe a debt in technique to Indian *bandhani*. However, many elements of Indian trade cloths were copied from local textiles. That was certainly the case for textiles for the Thai market.

By the fifteenth century, Arab, Indian, and Chinese cloths were being traded in Melaka in return for spices, drugs, and precious woods. After Portugal took Melaka in 1511, the British and the Dutch set up trading factories in India where they produced textiles in order to compete for spices in the East. It is likely that *batik* was developed as a substitute for luxury Indian textiles in the Javanese courts when imports were disrupted as a result of Dutch interference in trade during the seventeenth century following the demise of the empire of Majapahit.

The Portuguese or Spanish might have introduced to the Philippines the pineapple leaf fiber as a weaving material for *piña*. In the sixteenth century a tribute imposed on the inhabitants payable in *piña* gave impetus to *piña* production. The influx of skilled Chinese artisans also encouraged the growth of the textile industry. Manila became the entrepôt for an exchange of fine fabrics and luxury articles from Asia for silver from the Spanish possessions in the Americas. The industry flourished for the next 300 years.

Textiles continued to dominate Southeast Asian trade with Europe until the nineteenth century, but European influence on the form of local textiles was limited. When European textiles began to be exported to the East in the nineteenth century, they continued to follow market demand as the Indian traders had done. However, some Eurasian batik designs remain popular, especially in Malaysia. European influences also include various types of embroidery and lace-making.

Dress codes in the region were affected by Islam and by European Christian missionaries, both advocating the adoption of clothing for the upper part of the body. During the nineteenth century male rulers and high-status officials adopted aspects of Western dress, such as trousers and military uniforms, often combined with local forms of dress. Although with globalization that trend has spread to wider sections of society, official encouragement has been

given to the wearing of local materials, partly to help develop the textile industry locally and partly to express national identity. Both aims have met with some success, especially in Indonesia and Thailand.

FIONA G. KERLOGUE

See also Gujaratis; Hindu-Buddhist Period in Southeast Asia; Indianization; Kraton Culture; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Srivijaya (Sriwijaya)

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THAKIN

Thakin is a transliteration of an old Burmese word that came to have great political significance in Burma (Myanmar) nationalist politics in the 1930s. Originally having the meaning of “master” or “lord,” it had become used in such an indiscriminate manner by the 1840s that it was often thought to have no more connotation than the word *mister* in English. However, with the rise of British colonialism, the Europeans who held sway over Burma at that time took to expecting that Burmese would address them obsequiously by using the term. Like the word *sahib* in Hindi, it became a symbol of the racial domination of the Burmese peoples by the West.

Subsequently, in the early 1930s, Burmese nationalists who rejected what were perceived to be Western ways and values appended the term *Thakin* to their names to indicate that they were the rightful masters in Burma. The first to do so was Thakin Kodaw Hmaing, a fa-

mous poet and essayist of the period. He was one of the founders of the Dobama Asiayone (We Burmans Association, or DAA). Members of the DAA all marked their strong nationalist political posture by referring to themselves as Thakins. Soon the British authorities came to see the Thakins as a major threat to continued colonial rule. Among the leading Thakins were Aung San (1915–1947), who eventually led the Burma Independence Army and the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League; U Nu (1907–1995), who was the first prime minister of independent Burma; and Than Tun and Soe, key Burma Communist Party (BCP) leaders during and after the struggle for independence. The term is no longer in use in present-day Myanmar, except by the few remaining figures from the 1930s political era.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Aung San (1915–1947); Burma Communist Party (BCP); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Nu, U (1907–1995); University of Rangoon

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THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY

Palladium of Democracy

Thammasat University was the second state university (after Chulalongkorn University) set up by the first constitutional government to instill democracy among the citizens. The birth and development of Thammasat University are intertwined with those of the People’s Party, in particular Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983), the intellectual leader of the party, who took it as his personal goal to establish a university for the future of a democratic nation.

Established by the Thammasat University Act in 1933, the university was inaugurated on 27 June 1934 as an “open university” with the objective of propagating the learning of law and politics to all. The university was then named “Thammasat Lae Karn Muang” (lit. The University of Morals and Political Science).

Throughout the 1930s to the eve of the Pacific War (1941–1945), Thammasat provided opportunities for higher education to all, especially those from the lower classes and from the provinces. The courses emphasized law and politics, which were the principal philosophy of the establishment of the institution—that is, to implement the rule of law in the country. By 1949 there were four major fields of study: law, commerce and accounting, political science and diplomacy, and economics.

Thammasat has been referred to as a “hotbed of radicalism” in Thailand. From 1934 to 1947, when the People’s Party was in control of the government, the university and its students were active in various political roles, particularly in the Free Thai Movement from 1941 to 1945; Thammasat was used as the headquarters for that underground movement.

After the 1947 coup, which ended Pridi’s political career for good, Thammasat was also brought under the control of the military-led government. In 1952, the name was changed to Thammasat University, leaving out “Political Science.” The fierce struggle by students resisting its subjugation to military power led to the creation of the famous slogan in 1952—that is, “Thammasat is a symbol of dhamma [right] protection,” the protection of the right or true (Buddhist) law. The slogan has since inspired subsequent generations of students to uphold the principles of liberty, equality, and justice well into the period of the October Student Revolt of 1973.

The most important event in the history of Thammasat was its involvement as a center for two October incidents: 14 October 1973 and 6 October 1976. The former was hailed as the “Day of Freedom” and the “Great Joy,” while the latter became its darkest page when students were massacred by government forces in its compound.

In 1962, Thammasat University introduced liberal arts education as an antidote to developmentalism, which increasingly has encapsulated Thailand. Since then, liberal arts education has spread to all universities in Thailand, providing what is called foundation core courses for all undergraduates. Thammasat thus has been regarded as the leader in the social sciences and humanities, not in pure and applied sciences. The shift from traditional courses, however, came in the age of globalization in the 1990s,

when medical schools and engineering were added to the university curriculum.

In 2001 the administration decided to move the whole campus to a new site at Rangsit, north of the Bangkok airport. The move incited protests from faculty and students as well as people who regarded the relocation as a destruction of the most quintessential symbol of democracy and the history of the people’s struggle to protect it.

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also EDSA Revolution; Free Thai Movement; Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983); Student Revolt (October 1973) (Thailand); University of Rangoon

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**THANOM KITTIKACHORN,
FIELD MARSHAL (1911–)**

Tainted by Students’ Blood

Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn was the tenth prime minister of Thailand, whose tenure was terminated by the famous Student Revolt on 14 October 1973. Thanom succeeded Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat as premier in 1963, at which time the country had entered into an “American Era,” with U.S. troops and bases built up in Thailand to fight the war in Vietnam (1964–1975). It was a time of social ferment especially among the youth, which made it harder for Thanom to perpetuate the army’s control of the government and politics. His failure spelled the end of the army as a dominant factor in Thai politics and allowed for more political competition among other groups and classes of the population.

Thanom was born on 11 August 1911 in Tak province, where he received primary education before joining the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy in Bangkok. He participated in the 1947 coup, which inaugurated a quarter-century of almost unbroken military

government. Unlike the 1932 “Bloodless Coup,” the coup group’s members were local graduates of the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy. The subsequent reaction was the Grand Palace Coup of 1949, led by Pridi Phanomyong (1900–1983). Thanom led his army to seize the Grand Palace, which had become the headquarters of the rebel group. Afterward Thanom rose with Sarit to attain control over the army and in turn command more shares in the Plaek Phibunsongkhram (Phibul) government. The government was increasingly divided between the two rival army and police chiefs, both funded and supported by the U.S. Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the Cold War era in Asia. After Sarit toppled Phibul in a September 1957 coup, Thanom was named prime minister of the provisional government, which he was able to run for only nine months. In October 1958, freshly back from a medical operation in the United States, where he got ideas on developing the country, Sarit overthrew the government and established the first absolutist (namely, nonconstitution) regime in Thailand since 1932. Thanom was appointed deputy minister of defense and was seen as Sarit’s secondhand man.

With the death of Sarit from cirrhosis of the liver in 1963, Thanom succeeded as prime minister and minister of defense. By then people had begun to demand a return to constitutional government. The new constitution was granted, and Thanom established the Sahaprachathai (United Thai People) Party (UTPP) to run in the election of 1969. As expected, Thanom became the premier when the UTPP won the majority of seats in the National Assembly. Unable to control the members of parliament, he made a coup against his own government in November 1971 and ruled for a time by means of a Revolutionary Executive Council before issuing another constitution in December 1972, one that allowed for the military-dominated government without an elected assembly.

Unable to solve economic problems caused partly by the U.S. pullout from Thailand, the Thanom government lost its political trust with the people, and in particular with government officials. Corruption and abuse of power in his government were rife. The biggest protest against the government came from the students and intellectuals, who exploded in an uprising on 14 October 1973. Public resentment was fo-

cused on the triumvirate of Thanom, Praphat, and Narong. Field Marshal Prapat (Praphat) Jarusathien was the deputy prime minister. Colonel Narong Kittikachorn, Thanom’s son and Prapat’s son-in-law, headed the much-hated Board of Inspection and Follow-up Government Operation (BIFGO). Subsequent street protests led by students drove the notorious “trio of tyrants” to flee the country.

Two years later, Prapat and Thanom returned to Thailand in August and September 1976, a move that had been orchestrated to pave the way for intervention by the disgruntled army. As expected, the return of Prapat immediately ignited strong protest led by the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT), and the Seni Pramoj government finally escorted Prapat out of the country. Before leaving, Prapat made a quick visit to see the king and queen. Learning of Prapat’s departure, Thanom entered the country as a Buddhist novice and was escorted by the immigration chief to Wat Bovornives, a royal temple, where he was ordained by the Supreme Patriarch as a monk. Heavy protest by students and others exploded as a result. The right-wing groups led by Kittivudho Bikkhu turned the issue into a religious one, accusing the students and protesters of destroying Buddhism.

The protest was met with more violence when two protesters were hanged in Nakornpathom province, allegedly by the police. The Seni government was unable to control the heated situation and was manipulated by right-wing coalition parties and politicians. The final straw was the student drama put on at Thammasat University depicting the story of the two murdered protesters. The play was viewed as *lèse-majesté* by right-wing newspapers and radio stations, which had been mobilizing the village scouts and Nawaphol (New Resolve) group, as well as the Red Gaur, to come out against the NSCT-led student movement. On 6 October 1976 the border patrol and other police units, together with right-wing groups, stormed Thammasat, where thousands of students were holding a protest against the return of Thanom. The onslaught led to a carnage of lynching and burning students to death, before the coup group finally took over the government again.

Since then Thanom has lived a private life with his family in Bangkok. The attempt by the

relatives of 14 October Heroes to bring him to court for his role in the suppression of 14 October has not been successful. Yet every time Thanom and his family have tried to clear up his role in that incident, the attempt has been met with protest from people demanding justice in the case.

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Student Revolt (October 1973) (Thailand); Thammasat University; U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia

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"THE JEWS OF THE ORIENT"

"The Jews of the Orient" was an article written by King Vajiravudh (Rama VI) (r. 1911–1925) in July 1914, published in both Thai and English newspapers in Siam (Thailand). Writing under the pen name Asvabahu, the king intended to instill an awareness of Thai patriotism and to criticize what he saw as the dangerous characteristics of the Chinese by comparing them to the Jews of Europe. As a consequence, the famous phrase "Jews of the Orient" became a stigma of racism against the Chinese in Thailand for years to come.

The article was prompted by domestic and external political changes after Vajiravudh inherited the throne in 1911. The republican revolutions in China and Turkey made quite a stir among Thai government officials and urban middle classes, especially the Chinese community in Bangkok. The signs of warning were seen from the riot and strike organized by the Chinese secret societies (*hui*). Newspapers also

carried and published news and comments about social change and political revolution elsewhere, implying that Siam should follow in that direction. The failed coup of 1912, spearheaded by junior army officials aiming at replacing the absolute monarchy with a republican form of government, confirmed in Vajiravudh's mind that the country was at a crossroads.

Based mainly on the king's experiences while a student in England, the article traced the origins of anti-Semitic feeling among Europeans, in particular Russia, Germany, and France. The Chinese, he states, like the Jew in Europe, is always Chinese, wherever he goes and lives. He never changes or adopts the characteristics and beliefs of the host country. The problem with the Chinese is that, while he shares the wealth of the country where he lives, he never shares in its duties or sorrows. This pride of race and superciliousness toward non-Chinese thus leads to his attitude of superiority and selfishness.

The second reason the article cites for the comparison is the similarity between the moral contempt displayed by Jews for Gentiles and that of the Chinese for the *Huan* ("savages"). By relegating Gentiles and savages to the lower ranks of humankind and civilization, the Jews and Chinese, he says, feel no qualms about cheating those peoples, since they lack moral equality.

The third reason the article gives for the comparison is the extraordinarily acute money-making instinct, and all the negative consequences arising therefrom, in the Jews and Chinese.

Finally, Vajiravudh states that the difference between the two races—Jews and Chinese—is that the former had no country of their own, whereas the latter possessed a homeland. Although that fact made the Jews preferable to the Chinese, for spending their wealth in their adopted countries, they also, he says, attempt to grasp at political power, whereas the Chinese do not care much for political power.

The immediate impact of the article was limited to urban educated circles, in which many of the businessmen and government officials were Thai-Chinese or descendants of Chinese immigrants. The anti-Chinese ideas presented were not put into practice by the government. Such a negative stereotype of the Chinese, however, be-

came more pervasive in the next few decades and among a wider populace—among middle- and low-ranking officials.

However, in 1938, as part of the strategy of mobilizing Thai nationalism, Luang Wichit in the Phibul government utilized this idea of “the Jews of the Orient.”

THANET APHORNSUVAN

See also Bangkok; Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Chinese Dialect Groups; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Tribute System; Kuala Lumpur (KL); Manila; Penang (1786); Rangoon; Saigon (Gia Định; Hồ Chí Minh City); Singapore (1819)

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THIRTY COMRADES

Striving for Burma’s Independence

The Thirty Comrades were the group of Burmese patriots led by General Aung San (1915–1947), the father of Burmese independence, who trained in Japan in 1940–1941 with the active support of the Minami Organ, a group of Japanese intelligence officers led by Colonel Suzuki. The Thirty Comrades belonged to the Thakin group of Burmese nationalists who had led the anticolonialist student strike of 1936. Many had been students at Rangoon University. They took the term *Thakin*, which means “Lord,” as an ironic jibe at the British colonial administration that compelled Burmese to address Britishers by that term.

Many of the Burmese nationalist leaders were arrested in 1940, but Aung San escaped, hiding on a Chinese boat and going first to Amoy, then to Japan. With the assistance of Colonel Suzuki and the Minami Organ, Aung

San secretly returned to Burma in 1941 and founded the Thirty Comrades. Suzuki arranged for their military training in three groups, much of it on Hainan Island. Under the colonial administration, Burmese (as distinct from Karen, who were favored by the British) were not allowed to bear arms or have military training. The Thirty Comrades formed the nucleus of the Burma Independence Army (BIA), dedicated to achieving Burmese independence from British and Japanese alike. Their actions were quite mercurial, at times appearing to be both anti- and pro-Japanese, and anti- and pro-British, depending on the situation and how the cause of Burmese independence could be best served. In March 1945, following disillusionment with the Japanese, Aung San threw the forces of the Burma Independence Army behind the Allied war effort.

There were various factions within the Thirty Comrades from the outset. The main lines were drawn among socialists, communists, and a group that might generally be called nationalists. After the Japanese surrender, these factions developed into the major political alignments in postcolonial Burma. The socialist group included Thakin Aung San (Bo Teza), Thakin Shu Maung (Bo Ne Win), U Kyaw Nyein, Thakin Chit Maung, U Ba Swe, and Thakin Mya. The communists included Thakin Soe, Thakin Ba Tin, Thakin Ba Hein, U Thein Pe, and Thakin Than Tun, Aung San’s brother-in-law, who joined the faction after the Japanese occupation. Thakin Nu belonged to the nationalist group, which preferred to be considered nonaligned. One member of the Thirty Comrades, Thakin Than Tin, died of appendicitis in Taiwan in 1941. Others were assassinated in the decades after independence as part of the continuing factionalism in Burmese national politics. These included Thakin Than Tun, who died in 1968. General Ne Win (1910–2002) led a military coup on 2 March 1962 that terminated the country’s twelve years of parliamentary democracy. He retired in 1988 and died at age ninety-two.

HELEN JAMES

See also Aung San (1915–1947); Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Burma Independence Army (BIA); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Nationalism

and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Ne Win, General (1911–2002); Thakin

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TIMOR

A Divided Island

Timor is the main island in the Nusatenggara group. The western part of Timor now belongs to Indonesia, and the eastern half became an independent state in 2002.

When the Portuguese established themselves on Timor in the area of Oekusi around 1520 for the trade in sandalwood, the island consisted of many small feuding fiefdoms. Portuguese Dominican monks established a fortress on Solor Island in 1561. In 1613 the Dutch took this fortress to use as a trading post for the Dutch East India Company (VOC). A treaty with the raja of Kupang allowed the VOC to build a fortress in Kupang and maintain a small battalion.

After the Dutch republic concluded peace with Portugal in 1641, the VOC and the Portuguese established spheres of influence on Timor: the Dutch in the west, the Portuguese in the east. Relations remained acrimonious, in part because both occasionally took sides in feuds between local rulers. The main challenge to Dutch presence came from the so-called black Portuguese (or *Tupassi*), descendants of mulattoes in the town of Oekusi, who turned the surrounding area into a Portuguese enclave in West Timor. Dutch military prowess forced the Portuguese in 1769 to leave the town of Liphao for Dili, the new capital. The VOC concluded a series of treaties with various rulers of Timor and the neighboring islands of Roti, Solor, and Sumba in 1756, which formed the formal basis for Dutch influence in West Timor.

In 1797 two English warships largely destroyed Kupang, when the Dutch refused to surrender. The English returned in 1810 with military reinforcements and took Kupang, Dur-

ing the English interregnum, the Portuguese increased their influence in Timor—for instance, by taking Atapupu port. The Dutch returned in 1816. Various small conflicts between the Dutch and Portuguese continued until treaties in 1859 and 1893 formally established spheres of influence.

Actual rule on Timor remained in the hands of the many indigenous rulers. The Dutch had insufficient manpower to exercise close administration themselves. Timor remained an outpost of limited relevance to the government in Batavia. Economic development remained minimal. The semiarid conditions, mountainous terrain, and sparse population prevented foreign enterprise from establishing plantations. The economy was dominated by subsistence agriculture. Sandalwood, livestock, and hides were the main export commodities. The same applied to the Portuguese half, which also exported coffee, tea, rubber, and copra. Until 1896, East Timor was ruled from Macao; it has since been ruled by a governor, but it remained an outpost in the Portuguese colonial empire. In 1917 there were about 330,000 Timorese on the Dutch side, 2,000 ethnic Chinese, and 350 Europeans (Stibbe and Ulenbeck 1921: 341). In 1919 there were 386,000 Timorese on the Portuguese side, 1,000 Chinese, and 900 Europeans, Tupassi, and Mestizos (Schlicher 1996: 246).

The Japanese military occupation of Timor in 1942 was disastrous, as drought struck in 1944 and at least 40,000 people died (Telkamp 1979: 75). After Indonesia's independence in 1949, West Timor became part of the province of Nusatenggara, later East Nusatenggara. East Timor became a province of Portugal in 1953. Both remained poor and underdeveloped.

The military regime that ruled Portugal ended in 1974, and Portugal decolonized its overseas possessions. In June 1975 it announced a three-year transition to full independence for East Timor, including a general election in October 1976. Two major political parties emerged: FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente, Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), which supported independence, and Timor Democratic Union (UDT), which supported integration with Indonesia. UDT secured the support of the territory's police for a coup on 11 August 1975. FRETILIN in turn secured the support of the Timorese sections of the territory's army and re-

sisted the developments instigated by UDT. FRETILIN forces drove UDT supporters over the border into West Timor, and FRETILIN declared independence as the Democratic Republic of East Timor on 28 November 1975.

UDT supporters organized insurgencies from West Timor. Indonesian concerns about the left-leaning FRETILIN led to support for UDT and to an Indonesian attack on 7 December 1975. Indonesian armed forces captured Dili and soon occupied the core areas. UDT and other anti-FRETILIN groups formed a provisional government, which in July 1976 achieved integration into Indonesia as its twenty-seventh province, Timor Timur (East Timor). The legality of Indonesia's administration of East Timor remained disputed by the United Nations, however, and FRETILIN continued resistance through a guerrilla war. It became known that Indonesian troops had committed atrocities in December 1975 against the civilian population, as well as continued systematic violence with the aim of subduing resistance. The military forced the resettlement of the rural population. The ongoing war and the destruction or abandonment of food crops caused the deaths of possibly 100,000 people (Cribb 2001: 82–98).

During the next twenty-two years, East Timor experienced political repression, until after the regime change in Indonesia in 1998; then a popular referendum about East Timor's future was allowed on 30 August 1999. It resulted in overwhelming support for independence. Others, however, opposed independence. Consequently Timorese militia with the support of the Indonesian armed forces went on a rampage that lasted until Australian troops entered the territory on 20 September and forced the militia to withdraw to West Timor. In the process, some 250,000 East Timorese were forced to flee to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia, where they remained in refugee camps, often as hostages of the militias (*Jakarta Post*, 5 October 1999). UN-sponsored elections for a government of the territory were held on 30 August 2001, in which FRETILIN took 63 percent of the parliamentary seats. In August 2002, East Timor became an independent state.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Cold War; East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; East Indonesian Ethnic

Groups; FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Portuguese Asian Empire; Spices and the Spice Trade; Suharto (1921–); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (Post-1945)

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TIN

Southeast Asia's "White Gold"

Southeast Asia produces more than half of the world's tin. A belt of tin deposits runs from Yunnan in China through mainland Southeast Asia, ending at the east coast of Sumatra in Indonesia. Rich sites occur in southern Thailand, West Malaysia, and the Indonesian islands of Bangka and Belitung (Biliton). Deposits of tin ore, or cassiterite, may be primary or lode deposits, usually embedded in granite rock, or secondary, so-called alluvial, deposits formed when weathering causes the rock to break down and water carries off the material. The heavy particles of ore concentrate along water-courses, not far from the surface, where they are easy to find and separate, even with simple technology. Historically, most tin mining in Southeast Asia has exploited alluvial deposits in open-cast mines; only in the twentieth century was mining of primary tin of interest.

Tin is also fairly easy to smelt, and for centuries Southeast Asians used the metal, often combined with other metals, in bronze. A major market for tin was in China, where it was used, alone or combined with other metals, in a variety of household objects and in tinfoil money burned in religious ceremonies; India was another destination. Following the example of Asian traders, early Portuguese and Dutch merchants traded tin from the Malay Peninsula, sometimes in Europe, but mostly in Asia.

During the eighteenth century, the expanding market for tin, above all in China, led to changes in tin production. Local rulers imported Chinese laborers to mine the tin in their domains. These outsiders, using technology from China or new devices, mined for tin in greater amounts and more cheaply than native workers. Organized in cooperative groups

called *kongsis* under bosses of their own choice, they pooled their labor, dividing the profits when the tin was sold. Because they worked more efficiently and more continually than local people, production increased, at first benefiting native rulers. Later much tin was smuggled and sold to independent European or Chinese traders prowling the nearby waters.

With the Industrial Revolution, demand for tin in Western countries rose; they soon replaced China as the major market for Southeast Asian tin. Tin plate, tin cans, and other products made all or partly from the metal came into widespread use; tin was also a base for dyes. Dutch colonial authorities took control of Bangka and its important production in 1818. In the Malay Peninsula in the 1860s, unrest in tin-mining areas and fighting among Chinese miners provoked British intervention and extension of colonial control, but the importation of thousands of coolies remained in Chinese hands, with some British supervision. Southeast Asia's mines continued to recruit in southeastern China to fill the expanding demand for laborers.

In the late nineteenth century, introduction of steam-driven pumps and other modern machines made it possible to mine deeper and larger sites, but at first that meant hiring more labor for the tedious work of hacking the soil and carrying out the pay dirt. After 1900 came more labor-saving devices: gravel pumps (giant water hoses to remove the dirt) and, above all, floating dredges that worked on flooded mine sites or on offshore deposits, digging the dirt and separating the tin ore.

Capital expenditures for mechanization gave Western investors an advantage over Chinese mine owners; they now came to control much large-scale production in British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. Only after the 1940s, however, did native laborers break the near monopoly of Chinese mine workers.

Before and during the Great Depression (1929–1931), tin markets collapsed. Coolies were sent back to China or took up other occupations—petty trading or farming, usually on plots to which they had no clear title. During the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945), despite the conquerors' hopes of controlling production, little tin was produced, and former workers planted food crops to survive.



British Malaya once led the world in tin production. Here, at a Chinese tin mine, a primitive work hut and modern mining equipment offer a study in contrast. Water is pumped into a tin-bearing area and tin ore is then sifted from the mud. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Although over the years most coolies returned to China, the hundreds of thousands who stayed changed the demographic balance where they lived. Ethnic Chinese became, by 1940, about 40 percent of the population in British Malaya and in Bangka and Belitung (Heidhues 1992: 178; Fukuda 1995: 40). Another effect of mining was ecological: large man-made lakes, surrounded by infertile soil and waste, remain when open-cast mines are abandoned.

Tin had been, after rubber, British Malaya's most important export product (and Malaya was the world's largest tin producer); in Siam (notably Phuket) and the Netherlands East Indies it was a major commodity. After the Pacific War (1941–1945), prices fluctuated with changing international demand, Cold War stockpiling by the United States, better recy-

cling, and competition from alternatives such as plastic, aluminum, and steel. Attempts to raise prices through a cartel failed in the 1980s.

Malaysia's new economy turned to new crops and industrial exports, discarding its dependence on tin, but it still has vast reserves. Indonesia, a low-cost producer, continues to export tin, despite generally sluggish world demand.

MARY SOMERS HEIDHUES

See also Agency Houses, European; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Great Depression (1929–1931); *Hui*; Junk Ceylon (Ujung Salang, Phuket); *Kongsi*; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Phang)

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TJOKROAMINOTO, HAJI OEMAR SAID (1882–1934)

Bringing Nationalism to the Masses

Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto was a leading Indonesian nationalist and Islamic leader. Born in the village of Bakur, Madiun, East Java, Tjokroaminoto was a charismatic figure, an enthralling public speaker, and the first father-in-law of Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970), who was the first president of Indonesia. Son of a Javanese aristocrat, Tjokroaminoto enjoyed a first-class colonial education then available for the native population. After obtaining a degree from a training school for native officials called OSVIA (Opleidingschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren) in 1902, he spent a brief period as a civil official before turning his back on government service. In 1906, Tjokroaminoto moved to Surabaya, where he worked for private companies, continued his education at *Burgerlijke Avondschoon*, and started his political career as the leader of the local Boedi Oetomo (Budi Utomo) branch.

In 1912, Tjokroaminoto joined Sarekat Islam (SI), a growing Islamic nationalist group that previously was known as Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI). He soon rose rapidly within SI. He was elected as deputy chairman of Sarekat Islam in 1913 and then appointed chairman to succeed Samanhudi in 1914, although it caused a serious row between both supporters. Tjokroaminoto set out to win the hearts and minds of hundreds of thousands of people, not only from

the traditional supporters of SI among Muslim traders of urban centers but also from peasants in rural areas. Tjokroaminoto was regarded as a messianic figure—*erucakra*, *ratu adil*, or *imam mahdi*—who was believed to possess mystical power to bring people into the golden age following the demise of colonial government domination. He also enjoyed close contact with many young nationalist activists, including the charismatic Soekarno; they usually gathered and stayed in his house in Surabaya. His article on Islam and socialism was widely read by young people who adopted a more radical stand against the Dutch. Consequently, under his leadership SI became the first mass-based nationalist movement in Indonesia, in contrast to groups that tend to attract only the elite.

Tjokroaminoto supported the creation in 1918 of the pseudo-parliament, the *Volksraad*. He served as a representative of SI together with Abdul Muis until he was jailed by the colonial government in 1921 on a charge of perjury in connection with the Garut affair. He was then replaced by another leading figure in SI, Agus Salim (1884–1954). Later, in 1927, he refused a seat in that body. Inside the party, Tjokroaminoto had to fight against internal conflicts when some party leaders such as Semaen (Semaun, 1899–1971) brought into SI socialist revolutionaries who embraced communism. In 1921 those who opposed communism, led by Agus Salim, succeeded in expelling communists and their sympathizers from SI. Although Tjokroaminoto finally attained the recognition and position he so desperately sought in the early days, he later found himself being displaced by the more radical younger generation of nationalist leaders who classified him into the cooperative faction because of his pragmatic acceptance of some colonial policies.

Tjokroaminoto penned many articles and served as editor of several Islamic publications. He died in Yogyakarta before finishing his controversial book *Tafsir Al Quran*, an interpretation and explanation of passages of the Holy Quran. His passing deprived the Islamic political groups of a commanding leader; consequently it brought about disintegration and further schism.

BAMBANG PURWANTO

See also Agus Salim, Haji (1884–1954); Boedi Oetama (Budi Utomo) (1908); Islamic

Resurgence in Southeast Asia (Twentieth Century); Muhammadiyah; Nahdatul Ulama; Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) (1920); *Ratu Adil* (Righteous King/Prince); Sarekat Islam (1912); Semaoen (Semaun) (1899–1971); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); *Völkstraad* (People's Council) (1918–1942)

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TO' JANGGUT (1853–1915) "Freedom Fighter"

To' Janggut ("The Bearded Elder") was the respectful nickname of Haji Mat Hassan of Pasir Puteh in Kelantan, who in 1915 led a brief revolt ending with his death. Kelantan came under British colonial rule in 1909 following the transfer from Siamese authority.

The underlying causes of the revolt were mainly the resentment of Engku Besar, the traditional chief of Jeram near Pasir Puteh, at the loss of privileges and authority caused by the appointment (from 1905) of a district officer to administer and collect taxes, and the resistance of the peasants to stricter enforcement of tax collection and the proposed introduction of a new land tax.

To' Janggut was a commanding figure, six feet tall (1.8 meters) and with a long white beard. He claimed to be invulnerable, a claim apparently believed by many. Like his father before him To' Janggut was a prominent supporter of Engku Besar, who probably encouraged him to mobilize the local peasantry in a successful

campaign against the payment of taxes. A Malay police sergeant was sent to arrest To' Janggut, who drew his *keris* (dagger) and killed him. He and his followers then pillaged the small town of Pasir Puteh and forced the district officer, an unpopular Singapore Malay, to flee.

There then followed a month (29 April to 24 May 1915) of confused colonial government action to deal with the uprising. Troops were brought in from Singapore; concurrently, Kelantan court officials were sent to negotiate with the rebels. The revolt, however, had lost its momentum at the time of an assault on a village near Pasir Puteh in which To' Janggut was killed by a stray bullet. His body was hung up in the town for several days before being given a decent burial. Nonetheless, in modern times To' Janggut has been added to the roll of Malay "freedom fighters" against colonial rule.

JOHN MICHAEL GULLICK

See also Peasant Uprisings and Protest

Movements in Southeast Asia; Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Taxation

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TOBACCO

Profitable Crop

Tobacco is one of the many products that, once peculiar to Meso-America, spread to the rest of the world following the Iberian "explorations" and conquests. It came into use in Europe in the course of the sixteenth century and made its way to Asia along the trade routes in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In Meso-America it was associated with the ceremonial, even the sacred, though it was also a means of personal gratification. In Europe and Asia, it lost any religious overtones, though smoking it retained an element of ritual; while the emphasis was on personal gratification, it was initially used for medicinal purposes. Nicot introduced it to the French court as a medi-

nal herb, and Francis II (r. 1544–1560) found that, in the form of snuff, it cured his headaches. Chewed or smoked, it was recommended as a precaution during the Great Plague in England in 1665.

By contrast, King James I (r. 1603–1625) condemned smoking as harmful to the brain and dangerous to the lungs. But only in more recent decades—and only in the most prosperous societies—has it been widely condemned as a threat to health, and not without some hypocrisy. Like King James I, modern governments find it a useful source of revenue.

Tobacco grows on a variety of soils, but its quality varies with the soil. Both its cultivation and its preparation are labor-intensive. In Southeast Asia it was amenable to peasant cultivation. When plantations were introduced, it was still necessary to ensure personal attention.

“For home use, it is grown almost everywhere,” as John Crawford put it in 1856 in *A Descriptive Dictionary of the Indian Islands and Adjacent Countries*, “but it is only in the most fertile islands, as Java, Bali, and Luzon, that it is produced largely as an article of trade.” That of Luzon, he added, was exported, in the form of cigars, to India, Europe, and America (1961: 436–437).

In the Philippines the Spaniards had begun tobacco cultivation in the late sixteenth century, and it spread even to the mountain areas and the Muslim islands that they did not control. The threat to the continuance of their rule signaled by the British conquest of Manila in 1762 prompted a series of reforms. But the most successful, so far as the raising of revenue was concerned, was the creation of a government tobacco monopoly on the lines of the one recently instituted in Mexico. It enabled the Philippine government to do without the *situado*, or subsidy, from New Spain (Mexico). But it involved suppressing cultivation in some areas, so that tobacco grown in authorized *collecciones* could be disposed of to maximum advantage. That prompted smuggling and increased banditry.

Initially, too, cultivation was suppressed in one of the regions in fact most suited to producing high-quality tobacco, Cagayan. Only in the early nineteenth century was the ban dropped. When the government in Madrid asked for shipments of Philippine tobacco in the 1830s, it was found that Cagayan tobacco

was equal to that of Cuba and superior to that of the United States. The monopoly was, however, unable to meet the subsequent requisitions of the home government. Because of its contribution to revenue, however, it was not abolished till 1880.

Only in its latter phase had the tobacco monopoly in the Philippines—in origin a sumptuary tax—come to resemble the cultivation system in the Dutch East Indies to which the German traveler Friedrich Jagor had compared it. At the time, indeed, the Dutch were beginning to abandon the Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*) and turn to private enterprise.

In Java—where the habit was to hold tobacco between lips and gums after the initial salivation produced by the traditional betel, rather than to smoke or chew it—it was grown on dry-season *sawah* or *tegalan*, particularly in Kedu and Rembang. Brought under the Cultivation System—though never a major component—it tended to lower the yields of succeeding rice and other crops. It also, of course, made heavy demands on labor, in return for a scanty remuneration set against the land rent.

In 1861 private merchants in Rotterdam sent out Jacobus Nienhuys to establish a tobacco plantation in Java. He was attracted by the accounts he was given about Deli, one of the territories on the eastern coast of Sumatra over which the Dutch had just begun to establish their control. Indeed the wrapper leaf produced by the plantations he and others established in Deli turned out to be of special quality. The foundations of the east coast's prosperity were also based, however, on oppression. On the one hand, the area became notorious for harsh treatment of imported Chinese and Javanese laborers. On the other, the symbiotic relationship the peasantry developed with the planters inhibited its developing new crops or responding to new markets.

Tobacco may have saved the fledgling state of North Borneo (Sabah). Planters from Deli were among those who established tobacco plantations on the northeast and east coasts and upriver in the 1880s, and the duty on tobacco enabled the governing Chartered Company to pay its first dividend. The prospect that Brunei would also benefit from the tobacco boom was one reason for Raja Charles Brooke's (1829–1917) preemptive strike on the Limbang in 1890. But the protectionist U.S. McKinley tariff

of 1892 struck the Borneo plantations a blow from which they never recovered.

In contemporary Southeast Asia, however, smoking flourishes. In Indonesia it displaced betel in the decades following the introduction of the “white” cigarette in the 1840s. That shift also, however, led to the emergence or re-emergence of a native style of cigarette, *kretek*: Indonesians added clove to their cigarettes, as they had added spice to their betel. Kretek was the basis of one of Indonesia’s most successful industries, though with its high nicotine content, it was a health hazard.

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898); Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Sumatra

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TONKIN (TONGKING)

In the very beginning of the seventeenth century, the Vietnamese territories, although placed under the nominal authority of the Lê dynasty (1428–1527, 1533–1789), were actually divided into two sharply opposing principalities. In the north, the Trịnh lord held power in the name of the Lê sovereign. In the south, in the former possessions of Champa centered in the region of the present city of Huế, the Nguyễn lord maintained an independent government out-

side of the Trịnh’s control, continuing all the while to profess allegiance to the Lê. Open warfare broke out in 1627. The Nguyễn claimed to liberate the Lê sovereign from the usurpation of the Trịnh, while the latter declared their purpose was to punish a rebellious vassal and to recover for their emperor his lost territories. After almost fifty years of warfare, with an interminable series of military and naval attacks and counterattacks, a stalemate was apparent in 1672, and the Trịnh had to accept the existence of a virtually separate kingdom on their southern frontier. A system of walls built on the 18th Parallel clearly delineated the boundary between the two domains. Westerners had come to distinguish the “Kingdom of Tongking” (a transliteration from Đông Kinh—“the eastern capital”—the denomination of Hanoi) and the “Kingdom of Cochin China.” To the Chinese and the Japanese, the latter was known as Guangnan.

These two states were reunited in 1802 under the rule of the heir of the Nguyễn, who took the reign title of Gia Long (r. 1802–1820). The new empire of Vietnam comprised three main regions (*Kỳ*), each with its administrative headquarters. The old patrimony of the Nguyễn formed the central part of the empire (Trung Kỳ), comprising nine provinces placed under the sovereign’s direct administration. Tonkin (Bắc Kỳ), with the administrative seat of its imperial governor-general (*tổng trấn*) at Bắc Thành (the Northern Citadel, or Hanoi), had thirteen provinces. Away in the extreme south Gia Định (present-day Saigon), the administrative center of the six provinces of Cochin China (Nam Kỳ) that had been progressively conquered at the expense of Cambodia, was also the seat of an imperial governor-general. This tripartite division of Vietnam was perpetuated at the end of the nineteenth century by the French occupation.

In order to control access to South China and to open the Red River to French trade, French expeditions were sent into Tonkin in 1873 and 1882; the latter resulted in a full-scale colonial war, complicated by Chinese intervention, and the establishment of a French protectorate in 1884. Vietnam had to concede to France a more direct control over Tonkin than over Trung Kỳ (Annam), where the court of Huế preserved its administrative structures. Tonkin thus fell increasingly under direct

French administration, without the protected government being able to exercise any control. Theoretically, Tonkin remained under the authority of the Vietnamese emperor in Huế, who was represented in Hanoi by a *Kinh-lược* (imperial high commissioner). However, by the royal edict of 10 June 1886, royal attributions were delegated to the *Kinh-lược*, thereby empowering him to appoint officials and to make all decisions concerning the administration of Tonkin without reference to the court. In practice, this authority was devoid of significance. As under Article VII of the protectorate treaty with France, officials in Tonkin could be dismissed at the French authorities' request; the *Kinh-lược* was in fact in a subordinate position to the French *résident supérieur* of Tonkin. Tonkin's administrative organization was thus taken away from the Huế court and placed under the discretionary power of the protectorate's agents. This confiscation of the king's authority was completed ten years later, with the abolition in 1897 of the *Kinh-lược*'s office, and the devolution of his prerogatives to the *résident supérieur* of Tonkin, who combined from then on in his person the powers of decision and of command. The Vietnamese district mandarins were kept at their posts, but their acts were controlled by the French résidents, who thus had virtual direction of the political, judicial, and financial administration of the interior, while taking no part in the details of the local government. Tonkin's constitutional evolution from then on depended entirely upon the French high official placed at the head of both the protected administration and the protectorate.

During the Pacific War (1941–1945), the region was occupied by the Japanese, whose immediate objective was to gain bases and a strategic position in northern Vietnam, and to sever the Red River route that had been used to send supplies to Nationalist China. But the French colonial administration was not actually displaced until March 1945, while most of Tonkin was devastated by a cataclysmic famine. The Việt Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam, formed on the initiative of the Vietnamese Communist Party) had in 1941 launched a guerrilla war against the Japanese from bases near the Chinese border. They seized this opportunity to assume effective control in Tonkin and in parts of Annam and Cochinchina (now renamed, respectively, Bắc

Bộ, Trung Bộ, and Nam Bộ). On 2 September 1945, the establishment of a “Democratic Republic” of Vietnam was proclaimed in Hanoi. But France's will to restore its colonial power led to a full-scale confrontation, with the Việt Minh taking to the hills and calling the population to arms for a general uprising to liberate the national territory. After December 1946, Tonkin was torn by guerrilla warfare between the French and the Việt Minh. The French defeat in 1954 and the Geneva agreements led to a de facto partition of Vietnam along a line—the 17th Parallel—about 50 miles (80 kilometers) to the south of that which had once divided the Trịnh and Nguyễn lands.

After 1975, Vietnam's northern provinces were again the scene of fierce combat when thousands of Chinese soldiers crossed the border to “teach Vietnam a lesson” for its Christmas 1978 invasion of Cambodia. But normalization of relations between China and Vietnam is at present the rule. Therefore, in December 1999 the two countries reached a historic agreement on their land boundary. A year later, the Agreement on the Demarcation of the Bắc Bộ (Beibu in pinyin) Gulf resolved the Gulf of Tonkin question by drawing the equidistant line between Vietnam and Hainan Island. Recently, the two countries have furthermore pledged to complete follow-up steps in negotiations relating to the Agreement on Fisheries Cooperation in the Bắc Bộ Gulf as soon as possible. Moreover both parties resolved to actively accelerate the process of fixing the border and the installation of markers on the land border, “making the Vietnam–China border one of peace, friendship and durable stability” (Nguyễn Thế Anh 2002).

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Annam; Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Nguyễn Ánh (Emperor Gia Long) (r. 1802–1820); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Sino-Vietnamese Wars; Trịnh Family (1597–1786); Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, League for the Independence of Vietnam); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, Dong Cong San Viet Nam)

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TORAJAS

The term *Toraja*, meaning "People of the Highlands," is used by lowland populations such as the Buginese and Makassarese to refer to the inhabitants of the remote and rugged interior uplands of central and southwest Sulawesi, who grow rice on rain-fed hill terraces. Anthropologists distinguish three subdivisions of Toraja—Western, Eastern (or Central), and Southern—on the basis of cultural and linguistic differences, though there are also more specific linguistic and territorial designations, such as Sa'dan and Bare'e (Nooy-Palm 1979: 6). In the early accounts of travelers, explorers, and missionaries, the Torajas were characterized in especially exotic terms for their headhunting practices; elaborate funeral rituals for noble families, which involved the sacrifice of large numbers of water buffaloes and pigs, carved effigies of the dead (*tau-tau*) displayed in rock-shelters, and massive commemorative stones or megaliths; and their colorful, carved, gable- and saddle-roofed ancestral houses (*tongkonan*) and rice-granaries. Traditional Torajan origin-houses, particularly those of the nobility, were important foci of communal rituals (Waterson 1990: 236).

The Torajas' main contacts with the outside world, until the Dutch pacification of the hinterlands, were mediated through the lowland Muslim Buginese, and the Buginese language served as a lingua franca among the Torajan elite. Torajan-Buginese relations were some-

times expressed in violence and conflict, with the periodic formation of alliances between lowland rulers and Torajan chiefs. Inter-marriage resulted in some Torajans converting to Islam, and that process accelerated in the later nineteenth century. The coastal Buginese states such as Bone and Luwu' also undertook slave raiding into Torajaland. However, the main medium of contact was trade, and itinerant Buginese traders exchanged imported Indian cloths, Dutch coins, weapons, and salt with the Torajas in return for such items as forest products, slaves, and, from the nineteenth century, coffee, the main Torajan cash crop. Imported cloths came to have sacred significance in Torajan culture (Nooy-Palm 1976: 2499).

The Torajas, who until the end of the nineteenth century remained virtually unknown to the Dutch colonizers, then received special prominence in the early-twentieth-century historical and ethnographic literature on the Dutch East Indies through the work of Albert Kruyt and Nicholas Adriani. Albert Kruyt was one of the great colonial missionary ethnographers. He spent many years among the Bare'e Toraja and, with Nicholas Adriani, another missionary, wrote an encyclopedic three-volume work on their history and culture (1912–1914). He also wrote a four-volume study of the Western Torajas (1938). Kruyt arrived in Torajaland in the 1890s and lived there for more than forty years. Missionary conversion went hand in hand with the Dutch movement to pacify and bring into an administrative framework the remote interior populations following the occupation of the lowland Buginese states of Bone and Luwu' in 1905. After assaults by Dutch troops on the highlands in 1906, they managed within the space of two years to establish a presence in highland Sulawesi, though only after bitter Torajan resistance (Bigalke 1981: 101–116).

The distinctive and dramatic elements of Torajan culture have been preserved and re-created for the purposes of the tourism industry, but one should not overlook the profound changes that have affected Torajas since the establishment of Dutch colonial rule. These include conversion to Christianity, particularly following the arrival of representatives of the Dutch Reformed Church in 1913, the introduction of the Malay-Indonesian language to replace Buginese, the abolition of slavery and

headhunting in the early twentieth century, the strengthening of Torajan ethnic identity with the standardization of their language and culture, and the increasing migration of Torajas to coastal towns and other parts of the Indonesian archipelago in search of work and for education.

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See also Bugis (Buginese); Missionaries, Christian; Netherlands (Dutch) Indies; Slavery; Sulawesi (Celebes); Textiles of Southeast Asia

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TORDESILLAS, TREATY OF (1494) Half the World Each

The Treaty of Tordesillas was signed on 7 June 1494 at Tordesillas in northwest Spain, by King João II of Portugal and Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, following the voyage of Christopher Columbus (1451–1506) across the Atlantic and his discovery of the New World. The treaty was aimed at addressing the rival claims of the two kingdoms to lands already discovered, or yet to be discovered, in the Atlantic. These claims had previously been defined in a series of papal bulls promulgated after 1452 and then confirmed, with papal approval, by the treaty of Alcáçovas-Toledo (1479–1480).

At Tordesillas were recognized Spain's claim to all lands west, and Portugal's claim to all lands east, of a line drawn from pole to pole 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands (about 46 degrees west latitude). At this stage, four years before Vasco da Gama (1459–1524) discovered the sea route to India (1498), the problem of conflicting Spanish and Portuguese claims in Southeast Asia lay in the future. It was not until Ferdinand Magellan's (1480–1521) circumnavigation of the globe in 1520–1521 that it became apparent that the line of demarcation drawn at Tordesillas through the Atlantic emerged on the other side of the world at 134 degrees east latitude. Consequently it placed the coveted spice islands in Maluku, to which Spain and Portugal both laid claim, in the Spanish hemisphere, although they had already been discovered and occupied by the Portuguese. A Luso-Spanish commission was set up in September 1522 at Badajoz-Elvas to resolve this question, and that eventually led to the Treaty of Zaragoza (1529), by which Maluku was placed in the Portuguese hemisphere and the Philippine Islands in the Spanish, and the provisions of Tordesillas were thus extended to cover the whole world.

JOHN VILLIERS

See also Albuquerque, Afonso de (ca. 1462–1515); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Gama, Vasco da (1459–1524); Magellan, Ferdinand (1480–1521); Macau (Macao); Maluku (The Moluccas); Melaka; Portuguese Asian Empire; Spanish Expansion in Southeast Asia; Spanish Philippines; Spices and the Spice Trade; Timor

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TOUNGGOO DYNASTY (1531–1752) A Mighty Burmese Power

The Toungoo dynasty established the second Burmese empire, successor to Pagan. Founded by Minkyinyo (r. 1486–1531), who married the daughter of the king of Ava and received as dowry the rich "rice bowl" lands around

Kyaukse, the empire's expansion under his son, Tabinshweihti (r. 1531–1550), saw the recommencement of campaigns against the Shans and the T'ai (Siamese). Conciliatory to the Mon, whose manners and customs he liked, Tabinshweihti had a double coronation ceremony, at both Pegu, the Mon capital, and at Pagan, as a clear sign that he united both Upper and Lower Burma. After his unsuccessful invasion of Siam in 1548, he returned to Pegu, where he is said to have fallen under the spell of a Portuguese adventurer and become dissolute before being assassinated.

Under his successor, Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581), the Toungoo dynasty presided over an empire even more extensive than that of Pagan, taking in Manipur in the west to Laos, Siam (Ayutthaya), and up to the borders of Cambodia in the east. It was an extent that carried within it the seeds of its own demise, for such a vast territory was impossible to administer effectively. Both Tabinshweihti and Bayinnaung made their capital at Pegu in Lower Burma, which was built into a wealthy commercial city attracting merchants from the Mediterranean to China. After his successful campaign against Siam in 1569, Bayinnaung, Lord of the White Elephants, took the stance of a *cakravartin* (*cakkavatti*, “wheel turning” monarch) or “Universal Ruler” in the Buddhist tradition. He established suzerainty over conquered lands, deporting their royal families to ensure continued loyalty. However, Prince Naresuan (Phra Naret) (r. 1590–1605) of Phitsanulok (Pitsanulok), Siam, by a ruse escaped from Burmese control and raised the standard of rebellion. In 1593, at the battle of Nong Sarai, the Burmese were defeated, the Burmese Crown prince was killed in a famous duel on elephant-back with Prince Naresuan, and Siamese independence from Burma was regained. Under Bayinnaung's son, Nanda Bayin (r. 1581–1599), what the father gained the son lost, and by 1599 the wealth of Pegu and the delta was squandered in the ravages of civil war. A federation of Mon, Arakanese, Portuguese, and Burmese ended the First Toungoo dynasty.

The Restored Toungoo dynasty (1597–1752) commenced with the crowning in Pegu of Nyaungyan, half brother of Nanda Bayin. His death in 1606 ushered in the reign of his son, King Anaukpetlun (r. 1605–1628), who commenced clearing the delta of the Arakanese

and their Portuguese and Mon allies. Following the campaign against Prome in 1608, by 1613 he had ended the pretensions of the Portuguese adventurer Philippe De Brito, who had installed himself as king at Syriam. Martaban and Ye were retaken in 1614 and Chiang Mai in 1615. By 1626 he had reestablished control of an area stretching from Kengtung and Kenghung in the east to the Arakan border in the west, to Tavoy in the south and Hsenwi (Mogaung) in the north (Koenig 1990: 7). King Anaukpetlun's untimely murder by his son in 1628, and that son's brief installation as monarch, are a measure of the anarchy rampant at the time. In 1629 one of the most able of the Restored Toungoo dynasty monarchs, King Thalun (r. 1629–1648), son of Nyaungyan, ascended the throne. He re-established the capital at Ava in 1635 and instituted wide-ranging administrative and financial reforms in 1635–1638, to put the empire on a sound basis again. His census or inquest in those years included the entire Ayewaddy (Irrawaddy) River valley. To enhance the revenues and power of the Crown, he concentrated the Crown service population groups in the core area around the capital, rather than in the provinces where the manpower would be under the control of the *bayins*, royal relatives who often rebelled against the Crown.

However, in the late seventeenth century, palace intrigues and undermining of royal prerogatives by ministers and their patronage networks sapped the strength of the dynasty. The transfer of power upon the death of a monarch was always a problem, for there were many contenders for the throne owing to the practice of polygamy. The sons of the major queens frequently contested the succession. Factions at court meant that by the time of Minye Kyawdin (r. 1673–1698), the monarch no longer exercised actual power; he reigned but did not rule (*ibid.*: 10), for real power was in the hands of the ministers. In the early eighteenth century, as the power of Upper Burma weakened, vassal states such as Chiang Mai and Manipur defected. A major conflict between the two factions at court in 1735 led to the destruction of one by the other and paralysis of the administrative system. With disorder apparent in Upper Burma, the resurgent Mon revolted in 1740, spurred on by heavy taxation demands from the north, and challenged the power of the last monarchs of

the dynasty. They sacked Ava in 1752, taking its king, Maha Damayazadipati (r. 1733–1752), and royal princes to Pegu. Known as “the king who came to Hanthawadi,” his execution—just as the new Burmese leader, King Alaungpaya (Alaung-hpaya, r. 1752–1760), was rallying his forces to attack the Mon at Pegu—led to a revolt at Prome in 1754. Support from this area contributed to Alaungpaya’s successful campaign in the delta. He razed Pegu in 1757 and established the Konbaung dynasty (1752–1885), the third and last of Burma’s dynasties.

HELEN JAMES

See also Alaung-hpaya (Alaungpaya, r. 1752–1760); Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581); Burma–Siam Wars; *Cakkavatti/Setkya-min* (Universal Ruler); Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885); Mon; Pagan (Bagan); Pegu; Phra Naret (King Naresuan) (r. 1590–1605); Tabinshweihti (r. 1531–1550)

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TOWKAY

Towkay is a Chinese term in the Hokkien dialect that literally means “head of a family” or “patriarch.” Commonly its use is extended to refer to an owner and proprietor of a shop, a mine, or a plantation—in all instances, a person

of wealth and standing. Therefore *towkay* came to mean a prosperous merchant, a big-time trader, or a wealthy businessman. It is also used as an honorific to show respect and even awe for a person of standing and influence.

In Southeast Asia where Chinese communities were concentrated, *towkay* constituted the social elite in the absence of the traditional Chinese scholar-bureaucratic class. They dominated the various commercial bodies such as the chambers of commerce and excise farm syndicates. The *towkay* provided the leadership of the Chinese *hui* organizations, clan houses, and dialect group and district associations. In these pivotal decision-making positions, the power and influence of the *towkay* elite was dominant and far-reaching. As sponsors of Chinese educational institutions and governors of the boards of management of schools and colleges, they commanded considerable influence in curricula and the appointment of teachers. Likewise they served on management committees of hospitals and hospices.

In rural agricultural and mining communities, the *towkay* provided the communal leadership in interethnic interaction as well as with the local indigenous monarch or colonial authorities. The position of *Kapitan China* was appointed from among one of the *towkay* elite.

Basically, members of the *towkay* elite possessed a conservative and traditional outlook on social and cultural affairs. In the political and economic spheres, they abided by the principle of caution. In general they are reluctant and slow to change, often preferring to adopt a wait-and-see attitude and meanwhile consolidating the status quo.

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Banks and Banking; Chinese in Southeast Asia; *Kapitan China* System; Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Taxation; Trade and Commerce of Southeast Asia (ca. Nineteenth Century to the 1990s)

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TRADE AND COMMERCE OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (ca. NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE 1990s)

As economies develop, they rely increasingly on the exchange of goods and services between people and firms. Domestic and international trade allows producers and countries to specialize in the production of the goods and services they can produce efficiently. Over time, international trade increased because of technical improvements in overland transport and international shipping, which lowered the cost of transporting goods and people.

In premodern Southeast Asia, the flow of goods and people was relatively small because of transport impediments. Local communities were self-sufficient to a high degree. Intraregional trade occurred, and Southeast Asia benefited from its location between the main centers of economic activity in Asia: India, China, and Japan. Given the cost of transport, goods traded over longer distances tended to be luxury products with a high price/weight ratio, such as spices (pepper, nutmeg, cloves, mace, etc.) and silk. Some basic commodities such as rice, dried firs, and salt were also traded, mainly within the region.

Islamic rulers controlled the route by which Asian luxury products reached Europe. Portuguese and Spanish explorers broke this monopoly, and direct trade started in the sixteenth century. It gradually increased during the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries. The main products of the region involved in the trade with Europe were spices and sandalwood from Eastern Indonesia and later also coffee (from Java), gambier (leaves used as tannin or dye, from Malaya), and sugar (from Java and the Philippines).

The main institutions in Southeast Asia's trade were the European chartered trading companies, such as the Dutch East India Company (VOC). Using superior military technology, they established strongholds in the region, such as Batavia, from where they aligned themselves with native rulers to gain permission to purchase goods or to demand tribute in the form of goods in return for protection. The Spanish were active only in the Philippines (which was an entrepôt for shipments of silver from South and Central America to China, and silk and porcelain from China to Europe). The

Portuguese, English, and Dutch had strongholds throughout Asia. Intra-Asian trade was as important as intercontinental trade, if not more so. European companies competed in intra-Asian trade with Asian traders, often Chinese.

Expansion of Exports, Nineteenth Century

In the late nineteenth century, export of commodities to Europe and North America became more important than intra-Asian trade, and production for export diversified. Industrialization in Western Europe and North America spurred world trade; trade with Southeast Asia was of minor importance to them. Still, in absolute terms, trade between Western countries and Southeast Asia increased. Sustained economic growth in Europe and North America increased demand for luxury products such as spices, tea, tobacco, and coffee. It also increased the demand for products with a lower price/weight ratio, used as raw materials in manufacturing industries—in particular, minerals such as tin and petroleum, and products such as copra, used by the soap and margarine industries. After 1870 the export mix of Southeast Asia changed toward bulk products.

Facilitating this shift was a decline in long-distance transport costs, as a consequence of the construction of railways and of increasingly larger steamships. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 reduced the need to ship goods around the Cape of Good Hope. The Suez Canal also benefited trade with North America, most of which went to America's eastern seaboard via Europe until the construction of transcontinental railways in the United States and the opening of the Panama Canal in 1915.

The increasing trade of bulk produce, such as rice from Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand (Siam), benefited more from technological changes in shipbuilding and organizational changes in the international shipping industry. The shift from sailing ships to ships propelled by steam increased the speed of travel. Ships no longer depended on the wind or on the season of the year (important for crossing the Indian Ocean). Steam engines became so powerful that they could propel increasingly larger steel ships, which soon replaced wooden vessels on long hauls. Within fifty years, international

shipping costs per ton declined to about one-fifth of their initial levels.

Major international shipping companies emerged that maintained regular shipping lines that spanned the globe. This benefited Southeast Asia, because the Straits of Melaka became one of the busiest thoroughfares of the world, linking East Asia with South Asia and Europe. While this happened, smaller steel steamships gradually replaced wooden ships on increasingly regular main intraregional shipping lines, many of which called on Singapore as the main link to international lines. Wooden ships were relegated to feeding the main intraregional lines. An increasingly dense shipping network spanned the region, with the ports of Rangoon, Belawan, Penang, Singapore, Bangkok, Cholon, Danang, Haiphong, Manila, Makassar, Banjarmasin, Tanjung Perak, and Tanjung Priok as nodes.

Exported Products

From 1900 to 1940, Southeast Asia's exports were dominated by bulk produce: tin, petroleum, rubber, sugar, copra, coconut oil, palm oil, hemp, rice, and teak. These remained important until the 1980s. There were, however, some changes. Exports of rubber, copra, and tin languished after the Pacific War (1941–1945), while rice exports from Burma and South Vietnam plummeted. Indonesia ceased to export

sugar, and Thailand exported increasing quantities of cassava and sugar. Exports of petroleum, gas, and forestry products from Indonesia and Malaysia increased rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s.

Primary commodities dominated until countries encouraged export-oriented industrialization after the 1960s and the share of manufactures in exports increased. First came textiles, later a range of other labor-intensive simple manufactures, initially in Malaysia and then in Indonesia. Today manufactures make up most of the region's exports, except in Burma, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

The Value of Trade

The accompanying table shows that, except for Malaysia, per capita export values were long low. The growth of exports from Southeast Asia accelerated after the 1900s, when exports per capita often more than doubled, particularly in Malaya, a sparsely populated country that rode a tin boom after 1870 and after 1910 an enormous rubber boom supported by massive inward migration. It embraced export-oriented industrialization in the 1970s, after which manufactures sustained its superior export performance.

As the value of exports from Southeast Asia increased, countries were able to pay for increasing imports. This trend was reinforced by the

**Per Capita Value of Merchandise Exports (f.o.b.),
Current U.S. Dollars (Ten-Year Averages)**

	1870s	1900s	1910s	1920s	1930s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Burma	4	7	11	16	11	11	8	7	10	19
Thailand	1	4	5	8	5	13	19	58	188	746
Indonesia	2	3	6	10	5	11	7	51	129	211
Malaysia*	16	37	82	119	69	133	133	373	1,026	2,888
Indochina**	1	2	4	6	3	3	3	3	12	72
Philippines	3	4	7	11	9	18	22	52	104	252

NOTE: Converted to U.S. dollars with official exchange rates.

* Malaya (excluding Singapore) before World War II.

** After 1954, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam together.

SOURCE: Calculated/compiled by the author from various sources.

fact that manufacturing industry developed, in Europe and later in Japan. Technological change and economies of scale in manufacturing lowered production costs and the price of manufactures. Up until the mid-nineteenth century, European countries offered little of interest to Asia, except for silver. The Industrial Revolution allowed Europe and later Japan to mass-produce goods, some of which were exported to Southeast Asia. Textiles dominated Southeast Asia's imports in the nineteenth century. Steel products and a range of manufactures from the engineering industries came second, followed after 1900 by a growing range of manufactures, including household utensils and bicycles, for the growing mass market in the region.

Organization of Export Production

Mass markets gradually took shape in the region, as growing exports created new income opportunities in export production, trade, and transport. Throughout the nineteenth century, smallholder products dominated exports. Western companies processed some of these products: for instance, sugar factories in Java processed smallholder cane. After 1900 the share in exports of Western mining and plantation companies increased. They specialized in products that required investment in processing facilities to achieve good-quality produce, such as tobacco, or that needed investment in transport equipment, such as petroleum. Some products were produced by both small producers and foreign companies, such as tin in Malaya and rubber in both Malaya and Indonesia, but with different production techniques. During much of the twentieth century, a significant share of exports continued to consist of products of small producers, such as rice, copra, rubber, and tin.

Different support networks evolved for large firms and smallholders that supported their production for export. Western agricultural enterprises (producing rubber, tin, palm oil, tea, tobacco, sugar, etc.) relied on specialized trading companies, the biggest of which also provided finance and market information. For instance, in colonial Indonesia, these were the so-called *kultuurbanken* (Cultivation Banks). In contrast, smallholders relied on ethnic Chinese traders for information about distant markets, purchase of produce, and credit to bridge the period un-

til the next harvest. The Chinese traders were part of extensive rival networks that were important in the development of the key smallholder export products: rice from Burma, Thailand, and South Vietnam, and rubber from Malaya and Indonesia. Before the Pacific War, several of the networks had Singapore as their hub. Chettyar (Chettiar) moneylenders were also crucial in the development of rice exports from Burma.

The role of Western companies and ethnic Chinese or Chettyar middlemen was controversial. In Vietnam, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines, fervent nationalists saw Western firms as tools of colonial oppression. Both colonial regimes and local people regarded Chinese middlemen as monopsonistic extortionists. After the Pacific War, Western companies were nationalized in North Vietnam, Indonesia, and Burma. Governments established "monopoly marketing boards" and supplied subsidized formal credit to smallholders in order to stabilize and maximize farm prices, to eliminate the Chinese and Chettyar middlemen. Nationalization often proved disastrous, while the experiences with subsidized small credit and marketing boards were at best mixed. The development of manufactured exports since the 1960s owed much to inward direct investment by foreign companies.

Trade as "Engine of Growth"

Why didn't the successful development of export production after the late nineteenth century contribute to a higher rate of general economic development and to a higher general standard of living? The growth of trade may have been significant, but trade can only have an impact to the extent that an economy depends on it. Except for small economies, international trade is generally merely a "handmaiden" of growth. Except for Malaya and Singapore, Southeast Asia's trade dependence was for some time low. The countries in the region were long exporters of primary commodities. The backward linkages of primary exports are small compared with manufactures. For example, apart from labor, rubber production does not require a lot of inputs in the form of machinery and tools. In contrast, textile production uses labor, cotton as a raw material, and capital goods in the form of spinning machines

and weaving looms that must be constructed, maintained, and replaced, giving rise to a domestic machinery and engineering industry. The backward linkages differ between commodities. For instance, sugar production in Java and the Philippines was more capital intensive than rubber.

Furthermore, it is said that exporters of primary products around the world have suffered from a structural decline in the price of such products vis-à-vis the price of manufactures. The evidence, however, is not overwhelming for Southeast Asia. Changes in the terms of trade were at times significantly adverse (for example, rubber in the 1920s and 1930s), but also favorable (notably rubber in the 1910s and petroleum from Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1970s). When they were adverse, producers could still offset them, for example, by increasing the level of processing of their produce before export and thus increase the unit value of produce. The same was true with remilling of smallholder rubber after the 1930s. In addition, they could apply new technologies to raise productivity. For example, sugar plantations in Java used high-yielding cane varieties to reduce per unit production costs in the 1920s and remain competitive. Rubber producers in Malaysia replanted their tree stock in the 1950s and 1960s with high-yielding rubber varieties that increased labor productivity and helped producers to offset the fall in rubber prices.

Another option was protection. Throughout most of the twentieth century, the Philippines could continue to export sugar on increasingly favorable terms to the highly protected U.S. market because of a reciprocal tariff arrangement. The terms of trade of the Philippines plunged when the United States withdrew this favor in the 1970s.

Lastly, although at a cost, producers could change from one product to another. In Malaysia many rubber plantations, in the light of sustained low rubber prices, switched to palm oil production; many smallholders changed to cocoa production in the 1980s.

Trade Surpluses/Deficits

The limited impact of foreign trade on economic development may have been caused by the trade surplus that most countries had before

the Pacific War. This is often referred to as the "colonial drain," although Thailand was never a colony and Malaysia and Indonesia also had large trade surpluses after the war. The trade surplus paid for overseas remittances and was not used for investment in Southeast Asia.

As a percentage of exports, the export surpluses of especially Burma, Thailand, and Indonesia were very significant at 30 to 40 percent of exports during the period between 1870 and 1940, less so for Malaysia, Indochina, and the Philippines. The surpluses were used for payment of dividends, interest, pensions, and transfers—as dividends (or profits after reinvestment) to overseas shareholders in Western firms (particularly from Indonesia, Malaya, Indochina, and the Philippines as recipients of foreign direct investment). They were also used for interest, mainly on government bonds held overseas; private remittances by foreign nationals (Europeans, Americans, Chinese, Indians, and others); the pensions of Europeans and Americans who retired overseas from public service or private enterprise; and transfers, particularly of budget surpluses from Java to the Dutch treasury during the years 1830 to 1870 under the Cultivation System and from the Burmese province to the treasury of British India (until the time of Burma's fiscal independence in 1932). Except for the last, these payments were income that was earned through the productive use of foreign labor and foreign capital.

After the Pacific War, Burma, Thailand, the countries of Indochina, and the Philippines struggled with trade deficits, mainly because they became net recipients of overseas remittances. It was in the form of economic and military foreign assistance (particularly to the countries of Indochina) and from nationals working overseas (particularly Thais working in Malaysia and the Middle East, Filipinos working in Hong Kong, and Vietnamese who had fled the country after 1975). They also received growing amounts of foreign investment (except for Burma). Such inflows allowed countries to sustain a trade deficit. Indonesia and Malaysia maintained a trade surplus, which for Indonesia amounted to 50 to 60 percent of export earnings in the 1970s and 1980s. The surplus was caused by the fact that both were recipients of large amounts of foreign investment. The surplus sustained the required payments of dividends and interest.

Intraregional Trade

Intraregional trade has long been minimal in Southeast Asia, after export production for distant markets increased in the nineteenth century. Normally, neighboring countries tend to trade more with each other as their economies evolve. That was the case in Southeast Asia, but apart from transit trade via Singapore, intraregional trade increased more slowly than trade with the rest of the world.

The main product in intraregional trade was rice. It was traded from mainland Southeast Asia to island Southeast Asia, where it was the main staple food in areas that depended on export production of other products. Apart from that, countries in the region were on the whole more competitive than complementary. To a large extent they produced similar export products.

After the Pacific War, intraregional trade decreased as Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines sought to achieve self-sufficiency in rice, and Burma and South Vietnam virtually disappeared as rice exporting nations. Thailand took over, but it exported most of its rice to outside the region. In addition, countries embraced import protection in order to encourage industrial production for domestic markets.

Since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, efforts to encourage intraregional trade have had at best modest effects. The share of intra-ASEAN trade in total export initially increased but has since fluctuated around 20 percent, which was the same as in 1938. The volume of intra-ASEAN trade has increased substantially owing to Singapore's key role in the transshipment of cargo and containers to and from the rest of Southeast Asia.

Key Role of Singapore

Singapore has facilitated the region's international trade since its establishment in 1819 because of its location in the Straits of Melaka, one of the busiest shipping routes in the world. The Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 brought political stability to the region. Singapore was also a free port, where no government discriminated between traders and ships of different nationalities. In the nineteenth century, Singapore became the main port for the international trade of regional smallholder produce (nutmeg, pepper, cloves, rattan, copal, sago, copra, and

later rubber) and of tin produced in Malaya by Chinese migrants.

Smallholders in Malaya, Sumatra, and British and Dutch Borneo relied on networks of Chinese middlemen who operated out of Singapore to purchase produce; provide advice about market conditions, international prices, new technologies, new seeds, and the like; and extend credit. They brought small quantities of produce to Singapore, where it was repacked into bigger assignments for shipment to Europe or North America. The products were often of poor quality. For instance, forest products such as gums and resins had to be refined for export. Gradually an important industry emerged in Singapore, which processed smallholder produce to exportable quality.

The Chinese networks also handled imports. Large batches of textiles imported from Europe, but increasingly also from India and Japan, were cut up into smaller batches for distribution via networks of Chinese middlemen to small shopkeepers (often also Chinese) in the region. In addition, simple manufactures such as household utensils and rice from Thailand increasingly found their way into the region.

Until 1870 sailing ships from China to Europe bypassed Singapore, but steamships started to bunker coal in Singapore, using the occasion to load extra cargo. They enhanced Singapore's regional entrepôt role. This was the structure that absorbed the enormous expansion of activity caused by the rubber boom of the 1910s and 1920s. In terms of volume and value of produce, the remilling and export trade of smallholder rubber from Malaya and Sumatra in Singapore defeated all previous processing and export of smallholder produce.

Singapore fully occupied the attention and participation of Western companies, in particular in trade, transport, and banking. Again, Singapore did not perform that role only for the Malay Peninsula but also for the wider economy of which it was the hub. For instance, plantation companies in both Malaya and Sumatra conducted much of their financial business in Singapore.

The business interests of Western companies and Chinese entrepreneurs did not compete in Singapore. For instance, Western companies were not involved in rubber remilling. Likewise, Chinese banks were not involved in financing plantation companies. Both Western

and Chinese companies were, however, involved in shipping. But Chinese involvement was based on small ships operating on short intraregional routes, while Western firms engaged in intercontinental shipping.

Singapore continued to provide trade-related services after the Pacific War. Around the region, governments started to intervene in trade in order to further import-replacing development strategies (see below). Government intervention in Singapore was conducive to private enterprise and foreign trade. For instance, financial regulations created a sound banking system that services private enterprise in the region. Singapore's port facilities were improved to keep up with the demands of regional and international shipping. It has remained a business-friendly haven of free trade.

Trade Regulation

The region had virtually free trade until the 1930s. Import duties existed mainly to raise public revenue, not to protect domestic producers. The colonies in the region traded relatively more with their colonizers, and trade regulations supported that. For instance, the 1892 French tariff law applied to goods entering Indochina, while French goods entered duty-free. The 1928 French tariff law did away with exemptions and allowed Indochinese goods to enter France duty-free. Likewise, the 1909 and 1913 U.S. tariff acts implied a reciprocal free trade arrangement with the United States for the Philippines. The crisis of the early 1930s reinforced such arrangements. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (1930) increased U.S. tariffs, and the Philippines benefited from preferential access to the U.S. market. The British Empire abandoned its long-established free trade principles, when it embraced the system of Imperial Preferences in 1932. Trade contacts between the U.K., Burma, Malaya, and Singapore strengthened. The Netherlands and colonial Indonesia also granted each other preferential tariffs. Apart from the sale of Dutch textiles in Indonesia, this had few implications, as only 15 percent of Indonesia's trade was with The Netherlands.

All countries imposed tariffs to strengthen trade relations with preferred partners or to stimulate domestic industrial production in an effort to combat the impact of the crisis. Partic-

ularly in Indonesia, where trade preferences had little effect, tariffs and quotas were used successfully to spur the domestic production of rice, textiles, processed foods, and so forth in the late 1930s.

After the Pacific War, import restrictions were continued in Southeast Asia. In the late 1940s they were necessary in the face of drastic foreign exchange shortages. But in the 1950s they protected local markets in an effort to diversify economies away from dependence on exports of primary commodities, to further domestic industrial production, and to create new income and employment opportunities.

The results of this import-replacing policy stance were mixed in the 1950s and 1960s. Depressed commodity markets caused foreign exchange shortages that continued to limit imports of machinery, equipment, spare parts, and raw materials for the budding industries. Markets for manufactures were generally small, and firms had insufficient opportunities to achieve scale economies to become competitive. Many upstream industries—such as steel and petrochemicals—were established as state-owned enterprises. Except in Singapore, such firms were under few pressures to become competitive. The high prices of their produce weighed down the development of other industrial sectors.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Export-Oriented Industrialization

The discouraging results of import-replacing industrialization led governments to change tack and encourage export-oriented industrialization. Singapore was the first to encourage FDI into an export-oriented, labor-intensive textile industry in the 1960s, followed by Malaysia in the 1970s. Both countries attracted increasing amounts of FDI from Europe, the United States, and Japan, initially into industries that produced simple, labor-intensive manufactures for export. Singapore soon progressed to more technologically demanding export industries. Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia also opened up to FDI in the 1980s.

ASEAN countries pursued strategies furthering export production with fervor in the 1980s and 1990s. The various economic sectors were deregulated and opened to foreign investment. Trade regimes were liberalized, and restrictions on foreign trade in the form of taxation, quotas,

and red tape were lifted. Incentives were put in place to attract foreign investors, including tax holidays, export-processing zones with superior infrastructure, duty drawback schemes, and unrestricted remittance of dividends.

The countries experienced an unprecedented FDI inflow. Much of it found its way to labor-intensive export-oriented manufacturing, although the capital-intensive extractive industries producing petroleum, gas, coal, copper, and other minerals in Malaysia and Indonesia and the high-tech and services industries of Singapore also attracted export-oriented FDI. Exports of manufactures increased fast during the 1990s. They gradually diversified away from simple manufactures such as textiles, garments, footwear, and toys to more technology-intensive products such as consumer electronics.

Manufactured exports have more significant backward and forward linkages than primary commodities. They depend to a greater degree on raw materials, parts, and components from suppliers, and producers in other economic sectors use them as inputs. Hence FDI and export-oriented industrialization had a more significant impact on economic development in the region than had been the case in the past.

The relatively small markets in the region caused foreign firms like assemblers of cars and consumer electronics to take advantage of preferential tariffs to purchase parts and components in neighboring ASEAN countries. FDI thus reinvigorated intraregional trade. When China diverted FDI away from Southeast Asia in the late 1980s, the ASEAN countries agreed on a process to abolish quotas and reduce tariffs to less than 5 percent within the region, in an effort to make the single ASEAN market more attractive to foreign investors. The process of eliminating all tariffs and achieving the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) commenced in 1993. Although the 1997–1998 economic crisis slowed it down, the AFTA goals were brought forward from 2008 to 2003.

Since the 1960s, Japan emerged as a major trading partner of all countries in the region at the relative expense of Europe, although the Philippines continued strong trade contacts with the United States. Japan increased its imports of petroleum, gas, metal ores, and timber. Japanese companies also emerged as prominent investors in the region when they relocated their labor-intensive industries to the region.

South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong followed Japan's lead in the 1990s.

The recent ASEAN members are exempted from AFTA. Their export performance has been poor, partly because of the wars fought in the region, but also because of inward-looking socialist regimes. In Burma the cause was policies that kept the country reclusive. Teak and opium smuggled from Burma are not included in the table, but regardless, Burma's per capita exports were low. Vietnam attracted FDI after 1986 and increased its exports of manufactures. It is still a long way behind the ASEAN-4 and Singapore. The export performance of Laos, Cambodia, and Burma has remained poor.

Domestic Trade Development

Foreign trade is but a "handmaiden" of growth. Most of the economic development in the countries in the region involved a rapid increase in production for domestic markets by private firms, although often in conjunction with foreign companies. As economies grew, they diversified away from dependence on agriculture for employment and income, and became more complex. The growing complexity of domestic trade was sustained by the development of transport facilities—particularly road transport and intraregional shipping—within each of the countries and the development of commercial infrastructure, such as trading firms and banks.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Agency Houses, European; Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Chettiars (Chettyars); Chinese in Southeast Asia; Cocoa; Coffee; Economic Development of Southeast Asia (post-1945 to early 2000s); Jungle/Forest Products; Pepper; Philippines–U.S. "Special Relationship"; Rice in Southeast Asia; Rubber; Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Spices and the Spice Trade; Suez Canal (1869); Textiles of Southeast Asia

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TRAILOK (r. 1448–1488)

Institutionalized a Hierarchical Society

Trailok, or Borommatrailokanat (lit. "great king of the three worlds") was one of the greatest kings of Ayudhya (Ayutthaya). He was born Ramesuan and succeeded his father, Borommaracha II (r. 1424–1448), when the former died in a military campaign against the Lanna kingdom. Trailok's major contributions were his administrative reforms, which helped to strengthen Ayudhya's bureaucratic institutions, and his attempt to secure the northern territory, which led to continuous war with Lanna (Lan Na) until the end of his reign.

Trailok's administrative reforms began in 1454, when he issued two laws of military and civil hierarchies to divide Ayudhya bureaucracy into two grand divisions, military and civilian (Taylor 1992: 171; Andaya 1992: 382; Wyatt 1984: 73). Military affairs were the responsibility of the defense minister, Kalahom, while civil affairs were the responsibility of the minister of the interior, Samuha Nayok. Both ministries were subdivided into departments, or *krom*. Furthermore, the reform laws helped organize the relationships between Ayudhya subjects through ranking individuals by *sakdina* or "field power." The amount of land credited to each person was calculated according to his position and responsibility. Ordinary freemen were entitled to twenty-five *rai* (two and a half *rai*

equalled one acre), while junior officials were ranked from fifty to four hundred *rai*. Those who ranked above four hundred became *khun-nang* or nobility. However, the *sakdina* also symbolized responsibilities, the higher the greater. Punishments and fines also varied according to *sakdina* (Wyatt 1984: 73).

Trailok is also famous for his continuous war campaign against the Lanna kingdom during the reign of his archrival, Tilokracha (lit. "king of the three worlds," r. 1441–1487). Both parties were engaged in warfare from the 1450s to the 1480s in an attempt to control the Sukhotai kingdom and other towns located between the Chao Phraya delta and the northern plain. The war reached an impasse in 1486 without any clear-cut victory.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Reforms and Modernization in Siam; Sukhotai (Sukhodava)

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TRAVELERS AND SOJOURNERS, EUROPEAN

Travelers and sojourners have provided us with a wealth of historical, ethnographic, and geographical material on Southeast Asia. The theme of travel in Southeast Asia immediately evokes images of expanding colonialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It conjures a time when the Western powers were competing for territories in the region and consolidating their hold on the remoter hinterlands and uplands of mainland Southeast Asia as

well as the great islands of Borneo, Sumatra, Sulawesi, New Guinea, Luzon, and Mindanao. However, from the early years of the first millennium C.E., the region was the site of long-distance travels by Southeast Asian traders and mariners, as well as, successively, by Chinese, Indian, Arab, and Persian merchants, pilgrims, and diplomats. Our knowledge of pre-European Southeast Asia comes especially from the chronicles of Asian and Middle Eastern travelers, though such an illustrious observer as Marco Polo (1254–1324) in the late thirteenth century was an early contributor to the creation of Western images of the East.

Information on the region increased appreciably from the Portuguese and Spanish voyages of discovery in the sixteenth century, then increasingly from Dutch, English, and French sources in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Yet it is decidedly from the 1850s that we witness a surge of European exploration and travel in Southeast Asia and a corresponding increase in descriptions of places, peoples, customs, landscapes, and architecture. These explorers and travelers were both the agents of the policies, decisions, and plans generated in the European metropolitan centers, and the makers of their own and their countries' histories (King 1995: viii). However, there are different categories of travel. Some travelers experienced only a brief encounter with strange peoples and places. There were those who came for a longer sojourn in the country and, like colonial administrators, particularly those who were stationed in upcountry outposts traveled extensively in their assigned districts. Some Europeans embarked on dangerous journeys of exploration for specific scientific purposes; to open up remote populations to commerce; to map, survey, and fix territories and boundaries; or to pacify so-called untamed tribes and plant the flag in unclaimed terrain. As European administrations became firmly established, wealthy travelers visited developing tourist destinations such as Bali in the 1920s and 1930s for relaxation and recreation.

Very often, superficial encounters were made in the context of maritime trade and discovery. Good examples are Thomas Forrest's visit to Brunei, the "Venice of the East," in 1776 (King 1999: 1–11) and Erskine Murray's attempt to establish a British presence in the sultanate of Kutai on Borneo's east coast in 1844 (*ibid.*: 45–68).

Joseph Conrad's description of his visit to Indonesia's Bangka Island in 1883 (Saunders 1998: 3–7) is similar. Accounts of residence in the East and brief excursions from home bases are numerous. Examples include Ladislao Székely's description of his life as a rubber planter in East Sumatra from 1902 to 1918 (1937) and Emily Innes's rather tedious sojourn with her assistant-resident husband at Bandar Langat in the Malayan sultanate of Selangor in the 1870s (1885). Also there is Noel Wynyard's account of her life in northern Thailand in the mid-1930s with her "teak-wallah" husband (1939) and Henry Cochrane's experiences as an American missionary in Burma in the late nineteenth century (1904). An illustrious sojourner was Anna Leonowens, of "King and I" fame, who took up an appointment in Bangkok as the English governess of the Siamese king Mongkut in 1862 and stayed in the royal household for five years (Smithies 1995).

Among the most famous of the nineteenth-century explorers was the Frenchman Francis Garnier (1839–1873). Appointed in 1862 as the official in charge of Cholon, the twin city of Saigon, in the recently established French colony of Cochin China, Garnier held a passionate belief in the need to spread French culture, government, and commerce to the "unenlightened" and uncivilized populations of the East. With his colleague Doudart de Lagrée (1823–1868) and four other Frenchmen, he was the first European to explore 6,000 kilometers of the great Mekong River basin, from its delta in South Vietnam to its headwaters in southern China in 1866–1868 (Osborne 1975). Another notable French traveler was Henri Mouhot. Although he was not the first European to discover the majestic ruins of Angkor Wat, he did bring them to the attention of a European audience in his now famous and arresting account of his travels in Siam, Cambodia, and Laos from 1858 to 1860. Sadly, in a later expedition to northeast Thailand in 1860–1861, he was to meet his death (Mouhot 1989).

In other parts of mainland Southeast Asia, Sir J. G. (George) Scott is among the best known explorers. He traveled over much of the eastern borderlands of Burma in the late 1880s and early 1890s to conclude treaties and alliances with local rulers, to undertake mapping and surveying, and to fix territorial boundaries between the British, French, Thai, and Chinese

possessions in this region (Dalby 1995). Someone who secured a reputation for adventure and travel in several locations in Southeast Asia, and provided some dramatic descriptions of “savage” and “exotic” peoples and customs, was the Norwegian Carl Bock. He was commissioned by the Dutch governor-general Johan Willem van Lansberge (t. 1875–1881) to explore southeastern Borneo in 1879–1880, after his zoological collecting trip to Sumatra in 1878 sponsored by the Marquis of Tweeddale. He subsequently traveled independently through Siam and Laos in 1881–1882 (Reece 1995). Of undoubted importance was also the extended journey of the great English naturalist and evolutionist Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913), who spent an extraordinary eight years of scientific discovery (1854–1862) in the islands of Indonesia, during which time he collected more than 125,000 natural specimens (Wallace 1869).

These serious travelers progressively gave way to the forerunners of modern tourism. But the nineteenth-century explorers of jungles, exotic fauna, tropical landscapes, and culturally diverse peoples had already created images of Southeast Asia that remain to this day.

VICTOR T. KING

See also Angkor Wat (Nagaravatta); Borneo; Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries); Ecological Setting of Southeast Asia; Garnier, Francis (1839–1873); Historical Geography of Insular Southeast Asia; Historical Geography of Mainland Southeast Asia; Ibn Battuta (1304–1377); I-Ching (I-tsing) (635–713 C.E.); Kutai (Koetei); Lagrée-Garnier Mekong Expedition (1866–1868); Monumental Art of Southeast Asia; Polo, Marco (1254–1324); Sumatra; Wallace Line; Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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TRỊNH FAMILY (1597–1786)

Lord of North Vietnam

The Trịnh family was one of the most powerful families in the latter term of the Le dynasty (1533–1789) that substantially ruled North Vietnam from 1597 to 1786. Thanh Hoa was the base of the family.

After the Le dynasty was weakened by Mac Dang Dung (r. 1527–1541), General Nguyễn Kim of the Nguyễn family (also a prominent family of Thanh Hoa) helped Le Ninh (Le Trang Tong) to the throne and resisted the Mac army in Thanh Hoa. But after the death of

General Nguyễn Kim, his son-in-law, Trịnh Kiem succeeded his work in 1545. Kim's son, Nguyễn Hoang, was afraid of Trịnh Kiem's power and decided to go to the south. The Trịnhs' power in the Le court became decisive and continued to fight against the Mac.

In the period of Trịnh Kiem's son, Trịnh Tung (r. 1570–1623), the Le army triumphed and returned to the capital (present-day Hanoi) in 1597. Because of his distinguished services he was given the title of king (*vuong* in Sino-Vietnamese; *chua* in Vietnamese) by the Le emperor, and he set up the “Princely Establishment” beside the Le royal palace. After him their descendants succeeded the title, and the establishment gradually absorbed the function of the Le government.

After the conclusion of the civil war with the Mac, another conflict began with the Nguyễn lords in central Vietnam. Initially, Nguyễn Hoang obeyed the orders of the Le emperors—namely, the orders of the Trịnh—and cooperated and contributed to overcome the Mac. But because the Trịnh oppressively demanded tribute and intervened in domestic matters, Nguyễn Phúc Nguyễn, son of Hoang, decided to oppose the Trịnh.

In 1627 the Trịnh-Nguyễn war began. The Trịnh's army was much bigger than that of the Nguyễn, but along the Nhat Le River (in present-day Quảng Bình province), the Nguyễn had built the fortresses of Truong Duc and Dong Hoi. Neither side was able to decidedly claim victory. The civil war ended inconclusively in 1672.

After the war, the Trịnh changed their policies. Many civil officers from the Red River delta participated in the government. From the second half of the seventeenth century to the early decades of the eighteenth century, under the reigns of Trịnh Tac (r. 1657–1682), Trịnh Can (r. 1682–1709), and Trịnh Cuong (r. 1709–1729), many reforms were carried out. For example, the administrative system was reformed in 1663–1665, the land-redistribution system was reorganized in 1711 based on a different format from that of Le Thanh Tong (r. 1460–1497), and a new taxation system (including that of private lands) was imposed in 1722. In the cultural sphere, civil officers were ordered to compile a new chronicle named *Dai Viet Su ky Tuc Bien* (A History of Vietnam from 1532 to 1662), and a revised version of the *Lam*

Son Tuc Luc (A History of the Le Struggle for Independence of Vietnam).

But the effect of these reforms was limited. Increased population caused poverty and starvation. In northern Vietnam many peasants left their villages and became refugees or bandits. To defend against them and the exploitation of the Trịnh government, villages demanded the right of self-control and became autonomous communes, which character they generally maintained until the August Revolution of 1945.

In addition, from the period of Ming-Qing changeover in China (ca. 1640s), many Chinese laborers and brokers came to Vietnam by sea or land. The Trịnh tried in vain to control this flow of immigrants. Chinese immigrants worked as mine laborers, as in the case of the Tu Long copper mine in Tuyen Quang province. The newcomers were resented, and quarrels and clashes broke the public peace. Aggravating the situation, rebellions against the Trịnh regime continuously occurred, such as that of Le Duy Mat (who belonged to the Le royal family) from 1738 to 1770. The Trịnh could not easily overcome these troubles; it exposed the poverty of Trịnh power.

Meanwhile in the Nguyễn south, in the Binh Dinh area, the Tay Son brothers launched a major rebellion. They occupied almost all the south and south-central areas of Vietnam. Seizing this chance, the Trịnh sent an army that subsequently crushed the Nguyễn regime. But before long, Tay Son troops marched to the north and defeated the Trịnh in 1786.

In Vietnam, the Trịnh and the Nguyễn families have been underestimated as the lords who were directly responsible for disunion and disruption in Vietnam. But as the progenitors of the sociocultural traditions of early modern Vietnam, their contribution is gradually being reevaluated.

YAO TAKAO

See also Hanoi (Thang-long); Le Dynasty (1428–1527; 1533–1789); Mac Dynasty (1527–1592); Nguyễn Anh (Emperor Gia Long) (r. 1802–1820); Nguyễn Dynasty (1802–1945); Tây-son Rebellion (1771–1802)

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TRUONG CHINH (1907–1988)

In Mao’s Footsteps

One of the leaders of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), Truong Chinh was known as the best party theoretician and a leader of a pro-China faction within the VCP.

Truong Chinh’s real name was Dan Xuan Khu, but he was better known under the pseudonym of Truong Chinh, which is the literal Vietnamese translation of the Chinese expression meaning the “Long March.” This name indicates that he admired the Chinese Communist Party led by Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and its army’s successful long march of 25,000 *li* (12,500 kilometers), which took place in 1934–1936.

Truong Chinh was born in a well-known scholar-gentry family in Nam Dinh province (present Ha Nam Ninh province). His father was a local schoolteacher who expected his son to follow in his footsteps. Chinh was educated in Nam Dinh and Hanoi. Under the influence of the traditional patriotic spirit, which was prevalent in his native place, he became an ardent revolutionary when he was very young. After receiving his French baccalaureate degree at the Lycée Albert Sarraut in Hanoi, he enrolled in the School of Commercial Studies. His first job was as a schoolteacher, but soon he

gave it up. He joined the Revolutionary Youth League of Vietnam in 1927 and the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1930. He was arrested and put in prison in 1930 for his political activities.

It was in Con Son Prison on an island in the South China Sea that he systematically studied Marxism-Leninism from smuggled materials. Chinh was released in 1936. After that, he worked for the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) as a journalist in Hanoi under the pen name Qua Ninh. He was appointed chairman of the North Vietnamese regional committee of the ICP in 1940. In 1941, Chinh was formally elected secretary-general of the ICP. He also served as the chief editor of *Liberation Banner*, the organ of the ICP, and the *Journal of Communism (Tap Chi Cong San)*, a political publication of the party. Chinh remained a member of the politburo during the Vietnam War (1964–1975).

In November 1945, when the ICP was dissolved in order not to harm national unity, and a substitute “Association of Marxist Studies” was set up, Truong Chinh served as the chairman of the new organization. In fact, the ICP still existed, but it went underground. In February 1951 the Second Congress of the Communist Party was held in Tuyen Quang province of North Vietnam; the party was renamed the Vietnamese Worker’s Party (VWP) and became public. Chinh was elected general secretary. In March 1951, Chinh became the editor-in-chief of the *People’s Daily*, the organ of the VWP. Chinh was dismissed from the position of general secretary in 1956 for the mistakes he committed during the land-reform movement, but he retained his seat on the politburo. The VWP launched the land reform movement as a means of winning peasant support for the fight against the French. Chinh reestablished his political influence soon thereafter. In 1958–1960 he was appointed vice premier and president of the Scientific Research Council. From 1960 to 1986 he served as a member of the Vietnam Worker’s Party Politburo and as chairman of the Defense Council. He regained the position of general secretary of the VCP for several months after Le Duan’s death in July 1986, yet resigned at the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986. After his retirement, Chinh served as an adviser to the party politburo until he died in 1988.

Chinh also served as a member of the constitution committee in 1946 and 1959. From 1959 to 1981 he was chairman of the standing com-

mittee of the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In 1981 he became chairman of the new Council of State, which functioned as a collective presidency under the 1980 Constitution. He supervised legislation, contributing to the construction and consummation of the Vietnamese law system.

Chinh was one of the most trusted colleagues of Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969) and one of the best organizers of the Communist Party. He was one of the few communist leaders of Vietnam who had written on the Vietnamese revolution, and as a leading theoretician, he wrote extensively. His writings include *Oppose Reformism* (1935); *On Peasants' Issues* (1937–1940), in cooperation with Vo Nguyễn Giap; *The August Revolution* (1946); *The Resistance Will Win* (1947); *Marxism and Vietnamese Culture* (1948); and *On National United Front and Great Unity* (1954). He made far-reaching contributions to the revolutionary theory of the Vietnamese and the international communist movement. Coming from a scholar-gentry family himself, he respected scholars and intellectuals. He was considered a hard-liner in domestic matters and pro-China in the Sino-Soviet dispute. He favored full cooperation with China in every period. As a leader of the pro-China faction and an admirer of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Chinh devised the political and military strategies of Vietnam on the basis of the experiences of Mao Zedong and the CCP.

HUANG YUN JING

See also Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1869); Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Pham Van Dong (1906–2000); Sino-Soviet Struggle; Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Sino-Vietnamese Wars; Vietnam, North (Post-1945); Vietnam, South (Post-1945); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, Dong Cong San Viet Nam); Vo Nguyễn Giap, General (1911–)

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TUH FAT AL-NAFIS (THE PRECIOUS GIFT)

A Breakthrough in Malay Historiography

Second only to the *Sulalat-us-Salatin* or *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals) as the most important piece of Malay historical writing, *Tuhfat al-Nafis* is indeed a “precious gift,” not only to Malay history but also, even more importantly, to Malay historiography. The *Tuhfat* offers a realistic and accurate narrative of events and personalities of the Malay archipelago—in particular of the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, and West Kalimantan—from the late seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth century.

Beginning with a brief recollection of early fifteenth-century Temasik (Singapore) and Melaka, the *Tuhfat's* main focus is on the historical developments in the Malay Archipelago throughout the eighteenth century. Specifically this historical work concerns itself with the Johor-Riau-Lingga empire, successor to the Melakan Malay sultanate after the Portuguese seizure in 1511, and also with the role and influence of the Bugis in the affairs of Johor-Riau-Lingga and the Malay Peninsula, and West Kalimantan. The Minangkabau intrusion in Johor-Riau-Lingga and consequent Bugis-Minangkabau antagonism are subject matters of importance of the *Tuhfat*. Details about the expansionist designs of the Dutch, another major player in the Malay Archipelago, are featured, including Anglo-Dutch relations to the mid-nineteenth century.

Unlike the case with its predecessors, the authorship of the *Tuhfat* is clear and undisputed: Raja Ali Haji Ibn Raja Ahmad (ca. 1809–1869). But it is believed that Raja Ahmad (b. 1773), the father of Raja Ali Haji, had a hand in the composition of the *Tuhfat* to the extent of being responsible for its first drafts (Matheson and Andaya 1982: 5). But there is no doubt that Raja Ali Haji himself completed the task. Besides establishing its authorship, the *Tuhfat* exhibits three further innovations or breakthroughs in Malay historiography—namely, the

emphasis on truth and accuracy of factual contents, clear indication of dating, and the identification of source materials. The *Tuhfat* is a refreshing work in that it is unlike previous "histories," such as the *Sejarah Melayu*, which are punctuated with fantasies and legends, an admixture of facts and fiction, and complete disregard for the enumeration of sources and authorship. Despite offering a Bugis perception of events, the historical narrative is neither hagiographic nor biased to the extent of being Bugis-centric. But the didactic tradition remains where the author emphasizes the principal role of human responsibility in the making of history lies: "intended to be a lesson for the present . . . as a guide for the future generations" (ibid.: 6). A drawback, if it can be seen as one, is that Raja Ali Haji "lacks the psychological insight and graphic pen of the author of the *Malay Annals*" (Winstedt 1991: 115).

OOI KEAT GIN

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Bugis (Buginese); Dutch Interests in Southeast Asia; Johor; Johor-Riau Empire; Melaka; Minangkabau; Raja Ali Haji (ca. 1809–1869); *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals); Sulawesi (Celebes); Temasik (Tumasik); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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TUN PERAK (d. ca. 1498)

Melaka's Finest Chancellor

Tun Perak was the most capable and best-known *bendahara* (chancellor/chief minister) of the Malay sultanate of Melaka in the fifteenth century. This son of Bendahara Seriwa Raja of the bendahara line was at first, at the insistence of the people, made *penghulu* (chieftain) of the district of Kelang to the north. Having proved his courage and ability in the defensive war against the first Siamese invasion in 1445–1446, Tun Perak was brought to the capital and given the title *paduka raja*, which placed him next in authority to the bendahara, Tun Ali. To resolve the enmity between the two that was splitting the Melakan population into opposing camps, Sultan Muzaffar Syah divorced one of his wives, Tun Kudu—incidentally Tun Perak's elder sister. She was then married to the elderly schemer Tun Ali, who retired; unity was restored after Tun Perak was made the bendahara.

A capable man, Tun Perak survived the reigns of Sultans Muzaffar Syah (r. 1446–1456) and Mansor Syah (r. 1456–1477) and lived through a major period of the reign of Alaud-din Ri'ayat Syah (d. 1488). Under his wise, strong, and charismatic leadership, Melaka was able to ward off repeated Siamese attacks and expanded its territory. Territorial expansion went beyond the Malay Peninsula to the adjacent islands, such as Bengkalis and Karimun, and a number of principalities on the eastern coast of Sumatra such as Jambi, Rokan, Tungkal, Kampar, Inderagiri, Siak, and Haru. In the peninsula, Pahang, Terengganu, and Johor became Melaka's vassals during Mansor Syah's reign. By the 1460s, Melaka was able to defend itself against foreign invasion and was less dependent on Chinese protection.

Better known by his coveted title *Bendahara Paduka Raja*, Tun Perak himself headed a number of successful military campaigns and contributed a great deal toward the rapid expansion of Melaka and its effective control of the Straits of Melaka, thus facilitating the phenomenal growth of Melaka into a political and commercial center that attracted a growing number of traders sailing between India and China. Favorable commercial policies and tariffs offered by Melaka enhanced this city-port's role as a halfway house and meeting place of various peoples and cultures.

As a wise man of principle, Tun Perak on a number of occasions made hard decisions that seemed to challenge even the wishes and wisdom of the sultan himself. Because of Tun Perak's disapproval, Sultan Mansor Syah had to send the heir apparent and his preference, Raja Muhammad, into exile in Pahang when the latter killed the bendahara's son, Tun Besar, in a game of *sepak raga* (akin to volleyball but using legs instead of hands).

Although ordered by Sultan Mansor Syah to recapture Pasai, and despite being capable of fulfilling the command, Tun Perak stayed adamant not to execute the order. He had Melaka in mind, as he later revealed to the sultan that he had ample evidence that the candidate favored by the sultan was a traitor who would not be loyal to Melaka.

Melaka attracted an increasing number of traders from the Middle East (West Asia) and India and soon became the nucleus in the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia and via the Malay language. Tun Perak was probably the man behind the compilation and promulgation of the Melaka Laws (*Hukum Kanun Melaka* or *Undang-Undang Melayu*) during the reign of Muzaffar Syah. The Melaka Laws became the basis for law and order throughout the Melakan empire and helped to boost Melaka's growth as a political and commercial power in the region. It also became the basis for the laws of other Malay States that emerged after the demise of Melaka in 1511.

In *Sulalat-us-Salatin* (*Sejarah Melayu*), Tun Perak is regarded as one of the three outstanding men in the Malay world, comparable to Aria Gajah Mada of Majapahit and Raja Kenayan of Pasai. He was an all-rounder who even headed the building of Mansor Syah's new palaces after the Hang Jebat rebellion. When his in-law Tun Ali died, Tun Perak became the custodian of the former's children, two of whom, Tun Muzahir (also read as Tun Mutahir) and Tun Zahir (also read as Tun Tahir), later became bendahara and *penghulu bendahari* (head of the state coffers), respectively.

When Tun Perak died his younger brother, Tun Perpatih Putih, was made bendahara, and on the demise of the latter, Sultan Mahmud (r. 1488–1528) assigned the post to Tun Muzahir. In contrast to Tun Muzahir, Tun Perak was not an advocate of blind loyalty to the ruler. He had

even forewarned Muzahir that by sentencing to death a man for a minor offense, Muzahir "was teaching a tiger cup [Mahmud] to eat flesh. One of these days he himself will be caught by the tiger." Muzahir was indeed put to death by Mahmud in 1510 on the charge of treason. Tun Perak's son, Paduka Tuan, was made bendahara when Sultan Mahmud finally established his new capital in Kampar in the 1520s.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Chinese Tribute System; Gajah Mada (t. 1331–1364); Islam in Southeast Asia; Mahmud, Sultan of Melaka (r. 1488–1511); Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); *Sejarah Melayu* (Malay Annals); Straits of Melaka; Sumatra; *Undang-Undang Laut* (Melaka Maritime Laws/Code)

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TUN-SUN

"The Market Where East and West Meet"

Tun-sun was a kingdom situated on the Malay Peninsula during the early part of the first millennium C.E. The *Liang shu*, or *History of the Liang Dynasty* (a Chinese text of the fifth century), describes it as "the market where East and West meet"—suggesting it was situated on one of the most important trade routes across the peninsula and attracting merchants from both India and China. The maritime contacts with India are emphasized by the assertion that more than a thousand Indian Brahmins (*p'o-lo-men*) resided there, and that the people of Tun-sun not only followed their religion but also gave them their daughters in marriage. George

Coedès has doubted whether the p'o-lo-men of the Chinese text were all of Brahmin caste (1968: 271, n. 55), but the presence of Hinduism on the Malay Peninsula at this date is undoubted.

Tun-sun is described in the *Liang shu* as a dependency of Funan, a kingdom located in the lower Mekong valley of what is now Cambodia and southern Vietnam. It can probably be identified with the kingdom of Tien-sun, named among the naval conquests of the king Fan Shi Man of Funan during the early third century C.E.

The name "Tun-sun" may be of Mon origin, with the original meaning of "five states"—perhaps indicating a confederacy of small trading kingdoms. The Mon languages appear to have been dominant at this time in central Thailand, and Paul Wheatley has suggested a possible connection between Tun-sun and the early historical sites of P'ong Tuk and Nakhon Pathom, later associated with the

kingdom of Dvaravati (1961: 15–21). The exact location of Tun-sun is uncertain, but it appears to have been in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula, possibly on both shores of the Isthmus of Kra.

WILLIAM A. SOUTHWORTH

See also Chenla; Dvaravati; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Funan; Hinduism; Indianization; Isthmus of Kra; Langkasuka; *Suvarnabhumi* (Land of Gold); Tambralinga (Tan-liu-mei)

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U

U OTTAMA (1897–1939)

See Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) (1906)

U SAW AND THE ASSASSINATION OF AUNG SAN Indeed, to What End?

U Saw, Burmese right-wing politician and leader of the Myochits (Patriots) Party, was the instigator of the group of assassins who planned and carried out the slayings of the paramount Burmese independence leader, Bogyokegyi General Aung San (1915–1947), and others on the morning of 19 July 1947. Eight others, six of whom were members of Burma's Executive Council, were also killed. This assassination was an inestimable tragedy for postindependence Burma.

U Saw was tried and hanged in Insein Prison, Rangoon, for the crime on 8 May 1948. Five of the gunmen and accomplices who carried out the killings were also hanged in May 1948, while another three had their death sentences reduced to twenty years' imprisonment. Another perpetrator, Ba Nyunt, who had been assigned to kill U Nu (1905–1995) but changed his mind and turned king's evidence, was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

Together with Bogyokegyi Aung San, those shot to death in the secretariat building that fateful morning were Deedok U Ba Choe (councillor for information); Thakin Mya

(councillor for finance); U Abdul Razak (councillor for education and national planning); U Ba Win, the elder brother of Aung San (councillor for commerce and supplies); Mahn Ba Khaing (councillor for industry and labor); and Sao Sam Htun (councillor for frontier areas). Ohn Maung and Ko Htwe were also killed. The former was the deputy secretary for the Department of Transport and Communications, who was delivering a report to the Executive Council. Ko was the young bodyguard of U Abdul Razak, who, upon hearing the gunshots, was killed by the assassins as he went to help his master.

Of the eleven-member Executive Council, five survived; two of them had not been present at the meeting on 19 July 1947. One of the survivors, U Shwe Baw, secretary of the Executive Council, provided an eyewitness account of the shootings.

Meanwhile, U Saw stayed at his home at No. 4 Ady Road, on Inya Lake, while the killings were being carried out, and waited for the assassins to return, which they did by 11:00 A.M. They had made no attempt to conceal their actions or identities and were arrested with U Saw the same day, 19 July 1947. Credit for the speed with which the culprits were apprehended went to Major General Tun Hla Oung, deputy inspector general of the Criminal Investigation Department, who was tipped off by Captain Khan, a neighbor of U Saw's, who had almost collided with the assassins' jeep

as it turned into U Saw's compound. A search of U Saw's house and garden revealed, in addition to guns and ammunition, freshly printed stationery and seals and stamps with U Saw's name and the title prime minister (Kin Oung 1996: 16). By dusk that same day, U Saw and his accomplices were lodged in Insein Jail.

The motivation for the killings was at first thought to have been political rivalry. U Saw, an experienced politician who had been prime minister from 1940 to 1942, was known to want to take over the reins of government from Aung San. He stayed at home after the killings and confidently expected a call from Governor Sir Hubert Rance (t. 1946–1948), to form a new cabinet in the wake of Aung San's death. Instead, Thakin U Nu was invited to become prime minister (t. 1948–1956, 1957–1958, 1960–1962) and form a cabinet.

Investigators found a huge cache of weapons in Inya Lake near U Saw's home. There were boxes of ammunition and automatic weapons, far more than would have been necessary for the murderous task. Questions were raised as to why so much weaponry had been concealed in such a manner, and for what purpose. Investigations soon tracked its source to middle-ranking British officers then in Rangoon. They were identified as Major Peter Daine (Intelligence Branch, Burma Command Headquarters, and commander of the Base Ammunition Depot north of Mingaladon, Rangoon); Major J. A. Moore (officer commanding base ammunition depot, Botataung); Captain David Vivian (seconded from the Indian army as arms advisor to the Burma Police); and Major C. Henry Young (commander of the Indian Army Electrical and Mechanical Engineer Workshop Company). Vivian was arrested on 20 July, charged with selling arms to U Saw, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. Freed by Karen insurgents in 1949, he joined them for several years and finally returned to Britain in the mid-1950s. He died at Swansea in the late 1980s. Young was arrested on 24 August for supplying arms to U Saw and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment, but he was acquitted on appeal.

The involvement of these British military personnel naturally raised the question of British knowledge of the planning of the assassinations. The trail led to other Britishers, notably the British council representative in Rangoon, John Stewart Bingley. U Saw wrote

several letters to him from his prison cell, seeking and expecting help. Suddenly Bingley left Rangoon on 4 September 1947 and disappeared from history. The questions of the extent of British involvement, and whether U Saw had other accomplices who escaped punishment, have never been satisfactorily answered.

Furthermore, other related questions also remained unanswered, such as why the assassins wore the insignia of the 12th Burma Rifles on the day they set out to kill Bogyokegyi Aung San. Why did a telegram of 19 July 1947 to Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, deputy undersecretary of state for Burma, 1947–1948, from R. W. D. Fowler, private secretary to the acting governor, identify the assassins as belonging to the 4th Burma Rifles? Did senior British politicians in Whitehall know of the plot, or were the arms sales to U Saw a unilateral and unauthorized activity of middle-ranking British officers in Rangoon acting on their own initiative? Were British commercial interests in Rangoon involved? Why was U Saw so confidently expecting to be appointed prime minister as a consequence of his actions?

These questions and many more may never be satisfactorily answered, but few think that U Saw acted on his own initiative. As a result of U Saw's actions, Burma lost many competent, experienced leaders, even before independence on 4 January 1948.

HELEN JAMES

See also Aung San (1915–1947); Burma during the Pacific War (1941–1945); Constitutional Developments in Burma (1900–1941); Nu, U (1907–1995); Thirty Comrades

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UNDANG-UNDANG LAUT (MELAKA MARITIME LAWS/CODE)

Undang-Undang Laut, or the Melaka Maritime Laws/Code, is one of the six component parts

of the *Undang-Undang Melaka*, or the Melaka Laws. The latter is one of the most important of Malay legal digests. The *Undang-Undang Laut* must have been drafted during the reign of Sultan Mahmud Syah (r. 1488–1511), not long after the Melaka Laws were codified.

Melaka became one of the greatest emporiums of the East from the beginning of the fifteenth century. It was a strategic port of call for traders from India, West Asia (the Middle East) and Europe, Southeast Asia, China, and Japan. Situated in the Straits of Melaka, the main sea route between the East and West, it was also blessed as being the place where the monsoons meet.

Melaka thrived on international trade and became the market for spices, Chinese silk and porcelain, Indian cotton and precious stones, as well as perfumes from West Asia. Maritime trading became the lifeline of Melaka. Hundreds of ships from various places anchored at the port. Issues on trading as well as shipping became major concerns of the Melaka ruler. Hence it was thought necessary that a maritime code be introduced.

The *Undang-Undang Laut* contains rules and regulations for ships' captains and their crew and the harbormasters and their officers. They were to observe the rules strictly, or face consequences and penalties. Generally, the *Undang-Undang Laut* is divided into eleven volumes, the result of discussions with traders—especially the Bugis—in Melaka. It aims to regulate and strengthen the laws in Melaka. The laws stress the issues of discipline on board ship and incidents of crime, immorality, and accidents on the seas. It also conveys the application of Islamic law, especially in cases of adultery.

The laws give details on the responsibility of port officers to observe correct rules regarding weights and measures, such as the *gantang*, *cupak*, *kati*, and *tahil*. These officers were also given jurisdiction to settle quarrels and feuds among traders. The laws also prohibit anyone rescued at sea from being enslaved. They further specify that a reward must be paid to anyone who recovers a boat at sea, except when it is proven to be stolen property.

The *Undang-Undang Laut* aimed to regulate and strengthen the laws in Melaka at the time. Later, other versions of the *Undang-Undang Laut* emerged, such as the *Undang-Undang Laut Aceh* and *Undang-Undang Patani*. Just like the

main *Undang-Undang Melaka*, the *Undang-Undang Laut Melaka* became the principal maritime laws of the Malay Archipelago.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Melaka; Monsoons; Spices and the Spice Trade; Straits of Melaka

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UNDERWATER/ MARITIME ARCHAEOLOGY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia encompasses a vast area of water, including the Indian Ocean, Andaman Sea, Gulf of Thailand, South China Sea, Celebes Sea, and Philippine Sea. In this setting, maritime travel of people from the early period of perhaps 5,000 years ago to the present was a way of life in the Southeast Asian region. There has been archaeological, anthropological, and historical evidence to show that maritime contact among cultures in Southeast Asia prevailed. The material culture from the prehistoric, protohistoric, and historical periods may be compared between countries in Southeast Asia, and similarities and differences may easily be noted from their basic characteristics. Even before the advent of underwater and maritime archaeology in Southeast Asia, similarities were found among archaeological artifacts and features in Southeast Asian countries, suggesting contact among peoples within the region. Although the use of boats may have begun quite early, it evolved for long-distance maritime travel over vast areas of water in the Southeast Asian region.

In 1975, Dr. Wilhelm G. Solheim II, a prominent archaeologist-prehistorian specializing in Southeast Asian studies, claimed the

Southeast Asian maritime culture to be Austronesians or Austronesian speakers (1975: 151–157). He realized, however, that the use of the word *Austronesian* or *Malayo-Polynesian* for a people and culture is both awkward and incorrect. Both terms are for a language family, just like the word *Malay*, which means a language; it should not be used for other purposes. Solheim believes that because these people share both a basic culture and a language, it should not be difficult to coin a word for the people and culture from reconstructed protoforms of the language. As these are the people of the islands, Solheim proposed the term *Nusantao* for these people and culture. *Nusa* is a root word for “island,” according to George Grace, a linguist, and *tau* or *tao* means “man” or “people.”

Solheim’s concept of *Nusantao* refers to the natives of Southeast Asia—an area that includes southern China, which covers the Yangtze watershed to the south and their descendants with a maritime-oriented culture originating probably in southeastern island Southeast Asia before 5000 B.C.E. (Solheim and Higham 1996). A majority of the people of this culture probably spoke Malayo-Polynesian languages; minority groups spoke unrelated languages. The *Nusantao* were directly associated with the development and spread of the Malayo-Polynesian languages. At any one time there also existed other Malayo-Polynesian speakers living in the interior of the larger islands who were not maritime oriented and whom Solheim would not consider as *Nusantao*. The *Nusantao* and the nonmaritime Malayo-Polynesian speakers were constantly mixing genetically, culturally, and linguistically. Their genetic ancestry varied through time and places that include Southern Mongoloid, probably as the majority influence, and Melanesoid.

The *Nusantao* maritime traders were probably trading to the west and with the eastern coast of India by 700 B.C.E. The evidence for this is carnelian beads, and slightly later other varieties of stone beads made near Madras, which started appearing at about this time at sites in the Philippines and in mainland Southeast Asia. This trade may have started earlier with sugarcane, reported in India long before it was probably domesticated in New Guinea, and chickens, first domesticated in Southeast Asia

and which were also present west of India well before this time (*ibid.*).

Within Southeast Asia itself, Solheim feels that the most compelling evidence for a widespread maritime trading network during the first millennium B.C.E. is the distribution of jade earrings, called Lingling-O, and the much rarer but related probable earring pendant and two-headed animal figure jade artifacts. In addition, there is the overlapping in time and distribution of carnelian and the early glass beads and bracelets, probably at first brought in from India. These jade artifacts are distinctive and have been found in Botel Tobago, the southernmost part of Taiwan, the northern Philippines, Sarawak, coastal central and southern Vietnam, south-central Thailand, and the eastern coast of Peninsular Thailand.

There were extensive maritime activities in the South China Sea well before 1000 B.C.E. These maritime traders were Southeast Asian sailors until the entry of the Muslim maritime traders from the Middle East (West Asia) around 1000 C.E. There were no state boundaries during this time, only spheres of influence. The somewhat indefinite boundaries of Imperial China could be said to have come into existence in Southeast Asia early in the present era. The sailors and ships claimed by the present-day Chinese government to be Chinese from this period are Southeast Asian in culture, technology, and orientation until about the Tang dynasty (618–907 C.E.). Solheim (1984–1985) has argued that previous to that time the area of the Yangtze River drainage and the south was Southeast Asian and should not be considered as part of China for cultural purposes. The maritime activities in the South China Sea, including the small island groups therein where contact had been made, were Southeast Asian. Without international boundaries during that time, it could be said that any of these small island groups were a part of any of the relatively established states of Asia. The sailors making use of these islands had their bases in the areas that would become the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Cambodia. It is these countries, as a Southeast Asian consortium, that should work out how the resources of the island groups should be developed.

Underwater and maritime archaeology in Southeast Asia, both mainland and island, is a rather recent development compared with the

land-based archaeology in the islands, which started quite early in the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Underwater archaeology makes use of scuba-diving equipment or other forms of diving apparatus for research. Maritime archaeology, on the other hand, can be done without the use of scuba-diving equipment on marshland, shallow riverbanks, and former coastlines and waterlogged deposits. Other archaeological researches include the reconstruction of ancient maritime lifeways, such as the development of boat-building technology, maritime adaptations and the traces of trade route patterns, as well as the volume of goods transacted by the merchants with local inhabitants. In many regions of Southeast Asia, a number of underwater archaeological sites such as shipwrecks have already been documented in Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines. Among these countries, the Philippines has been the most active in the pursuit of underwater/maritime archaeology. Attempts have been made to integrate underwater and maritime archaeology with land-based or terrestrial archaeology in the Philippines.

The Philippine archipelago is a country with a strategic position in island Southeast Asia. It is a group of islands where the vast Pacific Ocean meets the South China Sea. Located in the tropics, it is frequented by strong storms and typhoons. Given the strategic position of the Philippines in Southeast Asia, it is most likely the place where maritime technology like boat building was developed. Historically, it is a country that Ferdinand Magellan (1480–1521) claimed to have “discovered” on 16 March 1521 and subsequently named after King Philip II (r. 1556–1598) of Spain. After that, the Philippines was one of several countries in Southeast Asia regularly visited by the early European maritime explorers and colonizers.

As early as the ninth century C.E., and long before the time of Magellan, there was already existing trade and culture contact between Southeast Asian neighbor countries, including China, Japan, India, and other Arabian nations (Guy 1986). The Philippine group of islands was already known to Southeast Asian mariners and traders, such as the Thai, Vietnamese, Malay, Indonesian, Cambodian, as well as Southern Chinese peoples. Chinese traders were going as far as the Indian Ocean and to the South China

Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Since their trade goods, such as ceramics, silk, and iron, were quite popular in many areas of the world, it was commonly believed that these materials were carried by “Chinese junk” type boats (Green and Harper 1987). This culture and trade contact between the Philippine archipelago and the rest of the Southeast Asian world including China is known based on the archaeological material remains found in the Philippines even before the advent of underwater archaeology.

The underwater archaeological remains of ancient shipwrecks, both of Chinese and Southeast Asian origin, suggest that people in the Philippines were actively involved in long-distance maritime trade with people in the Southeast Asian region. The presence of imported non-Chinese ceramics indicates that people from the Philippines also imported commodities from neighboring areas. Otherwise, these imported goods would not have reached the Philippine territorial waters.

Ethnohistoric and archaeological evidence suggests that protohistoric Philippine societies actively participated in commercial exchanges between mainland Southeast Asia and island Southeast Asia as early as the tenth century C.E. Ethnohistoric texts, composed mainly of the Chinese dynastic annals and eyewitness travel accounts written by travelers who accompanied trade voyages to the Philippines, refer to Philippine maritime trading polities that traveled to Chinese courts and offered tribute to gain favored trade status. Eyewitness travel accounts also provide considerable information on local trading ports, commodities, and exchange patterns. Archaeological research in land archaeological sites over the last century reveals a tremendous number of tradeware ceramics in burial and habitation sites, in coastal as well as interior upland areas. From the recorded collection activities of Alfred Marche in the late nineteenth century up to the systematic archaeological excavations conducted today by the National Museum of the Philippines, ceramics and sherds constitute a significant portion of the artifacts recovered. Moreover, evidence from underwater archaeological activities over the last twenty years reveals that various shipwrecks, including Spanish galleons, Chinese junks, and other vessels carried in their cargo holds a variety of trade commodities, including trade ceramics that

originated from China and other areas of Southeast Asia.

Ceramics, along with other imported goods such as gold, iron pots, lead, colored glass beads, iron needles, and silk textiles, were the subject of a highly complex network of maritime trade in the Southeast Asian region. These foreign commodities were traded by foreign merchants in exchange for locally available beeswax, cotton, pearls, tortoiseshell, medicinal betelnuts, abaca, cloth, and coconut heart mats (Scott 1984: 69–70). Recent underwater archaeological activities throughout Southeast Asia have provided the material cultural evidence for the extensive trade pattern in the region.

EUSEBIO Z. DIZON

See also Ceramics; China, Imperial; Chinese Tribute System; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; Galleon Trade; Pre-Hispanic Philippines; Shipbuilding

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UNIFIED BUDDHIST CHURCH (1963)

Upholding Buddhism

The Unified Buddhist Church was an independent Buddhist organization that instigated a series of protests against the Ngô Đình Diệm regime (t. 1955–1963) in South Vietnam in the summer of 1963. The government's brutal suppression of the protests stimulated the fall of Ngô Đình Diệm in November 1963.

Under the rule of the Catholic Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963), Buddhists were discriminated against. They were ousted from key positions and Catholics were appointed in their place. Tensions arose on 8 May 1963 after the government banned the flying of Buddhist flags in commemoration of the Lord Buddha's birthday (Sagar 1991: 61). Buddhist monks in Huế formed the Unified Buddhist Church and organized protests against the oppression of Buddhists. Ngô Đình Diệm and his brother Ngô Đình Nhu (1910–1963), who were both suspicious of communist support for Buddhist protests, ordered troops to fire at protesters; this led to the deaths of nine people. On 11 June 1963, Thich Quảng Duc, an elderly monk, burned himself to death in a public square in Saigon. Demonstrations spread from Huế and Saigon to other major cities and were supported by students and the disillusioned urban elite. On 16 June Diem compromised with the protesters and acceded to their demands for religious and political freedom (Smith 1987: 148–149). However, the government failed to keep its promise and continued to persecute leading Buddhist monks and nuns.

In August, Buddhist demonstrations again took place in major cities. Ngô Đình Nhu suppressed the demonstrations violently and arrested more than 1,400 people. In Huế about thirty monks and nuns were killed in a raid (Sagar 1991: 62).

The government's brutal suppression of Buddhists was strongly criticized by Washing-

ton. It also gave a pretext for anti-Diem military leaders to seek Washington's support to topple the Diem regime in November 1963.

SUD CHONCHIRDSIN

See also Buddhism, Mahayana; Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) (1946)

Unifying Malay Nationalism

The United Malays National Organization (UMNO), or *Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu* in Malay, was officially formed on 11 May 1946 in Johor Bahru. Its formation followed a series of meetings of representatives of more than forty Malay organizations in reaction to the Malayan Union scheme imposed by the British in the aftermath of the Pacific War (1941–1945). The first meetings, attended by representatives of forty-one Malay organizations from all over Malaya including Singapore, were held at the Sultan Sulaiman Club in Kuala Lumpur from 1 to 4 March. A second “Congress” took place on 30 and 31 March to urgently decide on ways to counter the scheme that was to be officially established on 1 April. Headed by Dato’ Onn bin Ja’afar (1895–1962), the leader of the *Pergerakan Melayu Semenanjung Johor* (Johor Peninsula Malay Movement) and later chief minister of Johor, UMNO became a strong united force of the Malay people against the Malayan Union. Started as a conglomeration of existing societies, UMNO gradually replaced its sister organizations when it opened its branches throughout the country as provided for by its 1949 amended constitution.

Differences in the ideology, long-term strategy, approach, and political orientation of the leaders, however, led to UMNO’s incompatibility with the *Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya* (PKMM), the Pan-Malaya Malay Nationalist Party, which therefore left UMNO in June 1946 to struggle separately to achieve independence from Britain. Led by the upper middle class and traditional aristocrats, UMNO

joined forces with the Malay sultans and was regarded more favorably by the British than the more radical and socialistic PKMM. The declaration of the Emergency (1948–1960), a leftist insurgency and the mass detention of leaders of rival organizations including PKMM and the newly formed *Hizbul Muslimin* in 1948, facilitated UMNO’s rise to dominance and its participation in the government.

As a member of internal affairs in the government (1951–1955) and a founding member of the Communities Liaison Committee (CLC) established in 1949, Dato’ Onn had political views that were influenced by the British and the non-Malays. Consequently, he was insistent from 1949 that UMNO be opened to the non-Malays and that its name be changed to “United Malayan National Organization” to reflect a multiracial identity. Failing to convince UMNO members, Dato’ Onn left UMNO in August 1951 and formed the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) on 16 September.

Despite his commitment to the idea that “Malaya is a Malay country,” the next UMNO president, Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj (1903–1990), too could not avoid taking the immigrants into consideration in his planning for the future. Tunku, a prince from Kedah, had to consider the condition imposed by the British government as well as the recommendations of the CLC in formulating UMNO’s future direction; however, the single most important factor was the reality that Malaya was a multiracial country. The Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council election in February 1952 started the process of UMNO’s involvement in the less communal politics when the Kuala Lumpur branch of UMNO and the Selangor chapter of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) struck a deal to face the noncommunal IMP. The success of the UMNO-MCA alliance in Kuala Lumpur and subsequent local elections finally led to the formal establishment of a stronger alliance in 1954 when the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) left Dato’ Onn’s camp and joined UMNO-MCA. As a member of the alliance and strongly influenced by the British, UMNO, led by Tunku, gradually succumbed to the demands of the non-Malays for less restrictive conditions in acquiring Malayan citizenship and equal political rights for the non-Malays. Through the alliance, favored by the British, and in collusion with the sultans, UMNO played a

major role in the negotiations with Britain, which subsequently led to Malaya achieving independence on 31 August 1957. Since then the posts of prime minister and deputy prime minister of Malaya (after 1963, Malaysia) were always in the hands of the president and deputy president of the UMNO.

In the first general election for Malaya in 1955, UMNO was allotted less than 70 percent (thirty-five of fifty-two) of the seats for contest, although Malays made up about 84 percent of the electorates. MCA, on the other hand, was allotted nearly 30 percent, although Chinese made up only 11.2 percent of the eligible electorate (Andaya and Andaya 2001: 276). UMNO secured all but one seat, which was won by Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), which began to increasingly challenge UMNO's influence among the Malays. Although UMNO continued to be the strongest party in terms of seats, in 1959 the two northeastern states of Kelantan and Terengganu were wrested by PAS, and UMNO's influence in some other states also declined. By some political maneuvering UMNO managed to retake Terengganu in 1961, but PAS's challenge continued; assisted partly by rifts within UMNO, Terengganu was recaptured by PAS in 1999.

Started as a Malay-Muslim organization to safeguard the interest of Malays in Malaya, UMNO gradually developed into a *bumiputra* (native, indigenous) party that also admits non-Muslim indigenous peoples and lately even some non-Muslim Chinese in Sabah as members. Being the most senior member of the alliance, and since 1974 the Barisan Nasional (National Front), UMNO has played a significant role in the political and historical development of Malaysia since 1946.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj, Tunku (1903–1990); Abdul Razak, Tun (1922–1976); Alliance Party (Malaya/Malaysia); *Bumiputera (Bumiputra)*; Federation of Malaya (1948); Mahathir bin Mohamad, Dr. (1925–); Malayan Emergency (1948–1960); Malayan Union (1946); Malayan/Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) (1949); Malayan/Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)

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UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

An Unenviable Task

One of the primary purposes of the United Nations (UN) is the maintenance of international peace and security. Since its creation in 1945, member states have called on the United Nations to resolve numerous conflicts among states. Through its Security Council and the General Assembly, the UN has also undertaken to resolve some of the major conflicts in post-war Southeast Asia. UN intervention has included the armed conflict between The Netherlands and Indonesia, the conflicts over Borneo, Irian Jaya, and East Timor, and the process of democratic transition of power in Cambodia, by far the organization's major peace-keeping operation. The United Nations cannot claim undisputed success in these activities, but it has been an indispensable factor in resolving each of the complex conflicts.

The Struggle for Indonesian Independence

When the Netherlands government remained unwilling to grant independence to Indonesia in the years following the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945), the United Nations became the public forum to examine and protest against Dutch actions in the archipelago. The conflict had been on the agenda since 1946,

and the first Dutch “police action” in Indonesia prompted debates in the Security Council in July 1947. On 2 August the United Nations called for a cease-fire, in a resolution promoted mainly by the United States, Australia, and India, that was accepted by both Indonesia and The Netherlands. The UN’s Good Offices Committee (GOC) was then instrumental in bringing about the subsequent so-called Renville agreement to end hostilities in January 1948. In the GOC, Belgium represented the interests of The Netherlands; Australia represented those of Indonesia; and the United States, as a neutral power, acted as chairman. But the cease-fire lasted only until the Dutch, in blatant violation of the agreement, launched a second “police action” on 18 December 1948 that led to open outrage in the United Nations. Now the United States and United Nations took a more resolute stance against Dutch action: in January 1949, the Security Council adopted a strong resolution demanding the immediate release of the imprisoned Indonesian leaders, establishment of interim government, and full transfer of sovereignty. The Netherlands had no choice but to bow to international pressure now, and negotiations between the two hostile parties were opened in The Hague in August 1949 under UN auspices. On 27 December 1949 The Netherlands officially transferred sovereignty over the territory of Indonesia, excluding Irian Jaya. The United Nations has proved an effective forum for international protest and, with the backing of powerful member states, was able to put through its resolutions.

The Borneo Dispute

In July 1963, the Malayan prime minister met with the presidents of Indonesia and the Philippines in Manila to discuss the imminent establishment of a Malaysian Federation, which was to include, besides Malaya and Singapore, the two British territories of Sabah and Sarawak in Borneo. As all three countries laid claim to the Borneo territories, the United Nations was approached to ascertain the popular will of the inhabitants. A UN mission of assessors was to prepare a study to this effect rather than to conduct a formal plebiscite. They began their work on 26 August 1963, and the UN secretary-general announced the findings on 13

September. The outcome was in favor of joining Malaysia, but the establishment of the new federation—including the Borneo territories—had already been announced on 29 August and had been set for 16 September 1963, irrespective of the outcome of the UN mission. This disregard for the authority of the United Nations provided the pretext for the Philippines and Indonesia to refuse recognition of Malaysia and the Indonesian policy of *Konfrontasi* (confrontation) against the new state, which even saw Indonesian incursions into the Malay Peninsula. When Malaysia was elected as a non-permanent UN Security Council member, Indonesia left the UN in January 1965 in protest. The confrontation ended only the following year after the usurpation of power by Suharto (1921–), and Indonesia finally rejoined the United Nations in September 1966.

Irian Jaya

When Indonesia attained independence in 1949, The Netherlands kept control over Irian Jaya, the sparsely populated western part of the island of New Guinea, and thereby laid the basis for a conflict that was to last for more than a decade. The Hague’s only concession to Indonesia was the prospect of holding further talks in the future. The Indonesian government under Sukarno (1901–1970), however, began a fierce diplomatic battle against the former colonial ruler, which led to U.S. mediation efforts and eventually, on 15 August 1962, to an agreement on Irian Jaya. This agreement provided for the monitoring of a cease-fire by and the temporary transfer of administration to the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) from October 1962 and then to Indonesia from May 1963. In addition, however, the agreement foresaw a UN-controlled determination of the will of the inhabitants of Irian Jaya, whether or not they wished to remain under Indonesian authority. This determination took place several years later, in July–August 1969, and was strongly manipulated by Indonesian authorities. UN officials overseeing the expression of opinion were allowed to question only village leaders, who all voted in favor of Indonesia. The report presented to the UN General Assembly confirmed the outcome but also contained clear reservations and was met by heavy criticism. The General Assembly, nonetheless, en-

dorsed the report, and Irian Jaya was subsequently incorporated into the Indonesian Republic on 17 September 1969. Since then Indonesia has pursued a policy of transmigration, whereby nearly 200,000 settlers had been transferred to Irian Jaya, while the “Free Papua Movement” continued to contest Indonesian authority on New Guinea.

East Timor

After the revolution in Portugal in April 1974, the Lisbon government decided to pull out of its colony of East Timor in January 1975. A weak coalition government of the right-wing Timorese Democratic Union and the militant Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN) quickly broke down and gave way to civil war in August 1975. In November 1975, FRETILIN declared unilateral independence, and before the end of the year Indonesia intervened by sending forces to support the pro-Indonesian Timorese Democratic Union, despite UN protests. In July 1976 the government in Jakarta declared the territory of East Timor to be the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia, but FRETILIN resistance continued, as well as protests by the UN Security Council and General Assembly. The UN continued to recognize Portugal as the legitimate administering power in East Timor, but the de facto acceptance of the new situation by major states deprived the UN’s resolutions of effectiveness. After 1982 the United Nations tried to bring about a solution through informal consultations with the governments of Indonesia and Portugal, and in 1997 the UN secretary-general appointed a personal representative for East Timor to demonstrate the importance of the question. However, only since the fundamental political changes in Indonesia in recent years has the situation come closer to resolution. Faced with open violence in East Timor early in 1999, the Habibie government indicated that it might consider independence for East Timor; in June the United Nations deployed an advance mission (UNAMET) to prepare a popular consultation of the inhabitants of East Timor. In a referendum overshadowed by violence in August 1999, the population of East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia. Late in the same year, the territory was finally placed under direct control of the UN

Transitional Administration (UNTAET), and Indonesian troops withdrew. On 31 October 2001 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to the effect that East Timor was to attain formal independence as of 20 May 2002.

Cambodia

The active involvement of the United Nations in the conflict in Cambodia in December 1978 was triggered by the Vietnamese invasion of the country. In July 1981, the organization sponsored a first international conference on Cambodia in New York, for which ASEAN states had been pressing, but no decisive progress was made—due mainly to the absence of Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, already at this event the plan for a transitional authority followed by general elections was developed, as it was to be followed a decade later. Throughout the 1980s the UN General Assembly continued to recognize the ousted Khmer Rouge regime as legitimate representative of Cambodia and to condemn Vietnamese action. A second international conference, now with the participation of all involved parties, was called under UN auspices for July 1989 in Paris, as Vietnam was preparing to withdraw from Cambodia. It took the conference participants until 23 October 1991, including a long period of suspension of the conference altogether, to reach a comprehensive settlement. The agreement, which was signed by all rival Cambodian factions and nineteen foreign governments, stipulated the transfer of authority to the United Nations and general elections, once internal stability was restored. The United Nations deployed an Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), which was transformed into the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in March 1992. UNTAC became the UN’s largest and most ambitious peacekeeping operation, with 22,000 civilian and military personnel.

UNTAC assumed control of the key sectors of Cambodia’s administration, including defense, security, foreign affairs, and finance, in order to establish a stable environment for general elections. Faced with continuing violence among Cambodian factions, mainly from the Khmer Rouge, and acting under a mandate that did not allow the use of force, UNTAC managed commendably. UNTAC succeeded in registering 4.2 million voters, overseeing an election campaign,

and conducting general elections in May 1993 without grave disruptions—and with a voter turnout of around 90 percent. In September of the same year, a new constitution was put into place, King Sihanouk resumed the throne, and in October a coalition government under Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh was sworn in. UNTAC's mandate officially ended in September 1993. During this time, the United Nations also managed to repatriate and resettle some 360,000 refugees and displaced persons. UN agencies have remained in Cambodia ever since, and monitors were sent again in 1997, when renewed fighting between rival factions broke out, and in 1998 to oversee general elections.

In addition to its efforts to promote economic and social development, and besides providing the most important global forum for newly independent states, the United Nations has played a significant role in resolving conflicts in Southeast Asia ever since the end of the Pacific War.

STEFAN HELL

See also Dutch Police Action (First and Second); FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Irian Jaya; Khmer Rouge; Konfrontasi (“Crush Malaysia” Campaign); Kuantan Principle (1980); Malaysia (1963); Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Renville Agreement (January 1948); Sabah Claim; Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); Soekarno (Sukarno) (1901–1970); Timor; United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992–1993)

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UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC) (1992–1993)

The peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1991–1993 was one of the largest operations of that nature carried out by the United Nations. Although UNTAC was formally established in February 1992, peacekeeping by the United Nations was initiated in late 1991. The mandate for the operation was far-reaching, including such fields as administration, military functions, and elections. The Paris Agreements on Cambodia signed on 23 October 1991 formally settled the Cambodian conflict. The Paris Agreements included provisions for the initiation of a peacekeeping operation in Cambodia to be carried out by the United Nations.

The Cambodian conflict originated in the bilateral conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam in the late 1970s. This conflict escalated and led to the Vietnamese military intervention launched on 25 December 1978. Following the intervention the Peoples' Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) was established in Cambodia, whereas the overthrown government—namely, Democratic Kampuchea (DK)—in alliance with two noncommunist Cambodian groups in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), combated the PRK. Vietnam and the Soviet bloc supported the PRK, whereas the parties to the CGDK relied

on support from China (PRC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States. The developments between Vietnam's military intervention and settlement of the conflict through the signing of the Paris Agreements on Cambodia can be divided into three phases. First was the confrontation phase, 1979–1986, followed by the dialogue phase, 1987–1989, and finally the conflict-resolution phase, 1990–1991.

On 16 October 1991 the UN Security Council adopted a resolution in which it was decided to establish the UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), to be sent to Cambodia immediately after the signing of the Paris Agreements on Cambodia. The formal decision to set up the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was made by a unanimous vote of the Security Council on 28 February 1992. UNTAC was officially established with the arrival in Phnom Penh of Yasushi Akashi, the personal representative of the secretary-general of the United Nations, on 15 March 1992. The withdrawal of UNTAC from Cambodia took place from August to December 1993. On 24 September, Cambodia's new constitution was promulgated and the Constituent Assembly was transformed into a legislative assembly. This formally terminated UNTAC's mandate in Cambodia.

In the administrative field UNTAC was given extensive powers to supervise the existing administrative structures in Cambodia. For example, all bodies acting in the field of foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security, and information would be under direct UNTAC control. Other units could also come under direct UNTAC control, if deemed necessary. Furthermore, all police would operate under its supervision and control.

In the military field, UNTAC's mandate covered three major aspects. First, it was to supervise, monitor, and verify the withdrawal of foreign forces and their nonreturn to Cambodia, as well as the cessation of foreign military assistance to the Cambodian parties. Second, it was to supervise the cease-fire, which was to be observed by the Cambodian parties upon the signature of the Paris Agreements in October 1991. Third, during the demobilization and cantonment process of the armed forces of the Cambodian parties, UNTAC should supervise the regrouping and relocating of all forces to

cantonment areas, and control and guard their military equipment.

In regard to the elections, UNTAC's role was to be fully and exclusively in charge of the organizing and conduct of the general elections to be held in Cambodia during the peacekeeping operation.

In assessing the peacekeeping operation, the major positive feature was the success of the general elections, carried out on 23 to 28 May 1993, both in terms of registration of voters and of the impressive turnout in the elections. In fact, 89.56 percent of the nearly 4.7 million registered voters participated in the elections. Another notable success was the repatriation of some 365,000 Cambodian refugees ahead of the general elections. Despite major efforts to promote respect for human rights and to combat politically motivated violence in the country, the United Nations did not succeed in creating a truly politically neutral climate for the elections. It also failed to adequately address the problem of the regular occurrence of armed attacks against the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia. To a certain extent the actions taken by the United Nations had the effect of worsening the situation of the ethnic Vietnamese. Another shortcoming was the decision to pay salaries to the peacekeepers in U.S. dollars, thus contributing to the dramatic depreciation of the local currency and causing a sharp increase in the cost of living for the Cambodian population. However, the most serious shortcoming was in the military field, where the demobilization and cantonment of the military forces had to be abandoned because the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer Rouge) refused to join in the process. As a consequence, the stage was set for continued civil war in the country following the withdrawal of UNTAC.

RAMSES AMER

See also Hun Sen (1951–); Khmer Rouge; Kuantan Principle (1980); Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) (1925–1998); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia

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UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA

Malaysia's Oldest University

The birth of the University of Malaya was the result of recommendations made by a commission chaired by Sir Alexander Carr-Saunders concerning the development of a higher learning institute in Malaya. In 1947 the legislative councils of Malaya and Singapore passed an ordinance to set up the university. It was first agreed to amalgamate two existing institutions in Singapore as its base. They were the King Edward VII College of Medicine, set up in 1905, and Raffles College, which housed the arts and science faculties and was opened in 1919. In 1956 political developments in both Malaya and Singapore initiated considerations that the university be expanded also in Kuala Lumpur. New faculties were introduced in the Singapore campus, such as engineering and law. In 1958 the arts faculty started the first sessions in Kuala Lumpur, followed by the engineering faculty. In the following year the governments of Malaya and Singapore agreed that both campuses should be given individual autonomy—that is, the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur (formally established in 1962) and the University of Malaya in Singapore. (Later the name of the campus in Singapore was changed to the National University of Singapore.)

After 1958 the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur began to expand, with faculties such as the arts, engineering, science, Malay studies, Indian studies, and mineralogy. In 1960

the university offered a degree course in agriculture. This was followed by the introduction of additional faculties, such as the Faculty of Medicine, the School of Education, the Faculty of Economics and Administration, and the School of Biological Sciences. All were instituted in the 1960s. Since then various other faculties and institutes have been set up, such as the faculties of arts and social science, business and accountancy, dentistry, the Institutes of Post-Graduate Studies and Research and the Asia and Europe Institute, and computer science and information technology.

The University of Malaya continues to expand under the various five-year development plans that extend to the second decade of the twenty-first century. As Malaysia's oldest university it maintains its standing as a center of excellence for research and development. The School of Medicine, for example, has its own hospital and often hosts specialists of international standing. To date it houses one of the biggest libraries in the country, if not the region. It runs more than twenty faculties and provides many facilities for sports, cultural, and recreational activities catering to staff, students, and the public. It is the alma mater of many prominent figures in politics, the economy, the professions, and academia.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also Chulalongkorn University; King Edward VII College of Medicine; Malayan/Malaysian Education; Raffles College; Santo Tomas, University of; Thammasat University; University of Rangoon

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UNIVERSITY OF RANGOON

Part and Parcel of Myanmar Politics

The University of Rangoon was the first institution of higher education in Burma (Myanmar). The university's institutional predecessors were Rangoon Baptist College, which had

been founded by American missionaries in 1875, and Rangoon College, a branch of the University of Calcutta, founded in 1885. The Baptist College was renamed Judson College in 1918, and the two were brought together in 1920 to form the university. The university was reorganized following independence in 1948 and, under the 1964 University Education Law, renamed the Yangon Arts and Sciences University. Always a source of suspicion to the political authorities since its founding, the university progressively lost its autonomy and by the 1960s was controlled by the minister of education. Standards were progressively lowered because of political pressure, and the university is now a shadow of its former self.

The formation of the University of Rangoon was surrounded by political controversy. In 1920 students went on strike in protest at what was considered the elitist education being provided by the new institution. The politicization of student life continued in the 1930s, when the Student Union became dominated by nationalist youth who believed that the education they were receiving was "slave education." After independence, communist, socialist, and ethnic minority political movements all found the student body a fruitful source of recruits for their respective causes. Even after the establishment of tight government control under the military, the university remained a center of political discontent, particularly during the prodemocracy demonstrations in the late 1980s and 1990s.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Aung San (1915–1947); Burma under British Colonial Rule; Education, Western Secular; Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Nu, U (1907–1995); Thakin

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U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (POST-1945)

A Fruitless Endeavor

By this phrase we usually refer to the various forms of participation by the United States in military actions in Indochina (Laos, Cambodia,

and especially Vietnam) for almost thirty years following the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945).

Before the Pacific War, U.S. leaders knew and cared little about the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, which were controlled by France. These territories were of minimal economic, political, or strategic importance to the United States. American leaders discovered Indochina early in the war, when the Japanese intruded on French Indochina. Toward the end of the war, when the retreat of Japanese forces from the region was imminent, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (t. 1933–1945) suggested that the peoples of these countries be put under a UN trusteeship rather than subjected anew to French colonialism.

Toward the end of the Pacific War there already existed in Indochina a well-organized anti-Japanese resistance movement. As the French were determined to reassert their control in the region, the anti-Japanese resistance movement became transformed into a national liberation movement against the French, because the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia had no intention of submitting to them. But many leaders of the national liberation movement, especially in Vietnam, were communists; therefore French leaders warned that U.S. opposition to French colonialism in Indochina would drive the region into the arms of the communists and the Soviet Union. The United States, pursuing a policy of containing communism, began, by 1953, to extend massive aid to the French in their effort to suppress the national liberation movement of Indochinese peoples led by communists.

When the French failed in Indochina and were forced to come to terms with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in 1954, the United States was determined to do the job itself. The containment policy was extended to Southeast Asia. Indochina became enormously important to the United States, primarily because it was perceived in 1954 as the site of the next round of battle with the Sino-Soviet bloc. The so-called Domino Theory was applied to the situation in the region: Indochina alone may have lacked strategic and economic importance, but if Indochina fell to the communists, then all of Southeast Asia would follow.

The most ambitious U.S. undertaking was in South Vietnam. Following the French withdrawal in 1955, the American administration sent scores of advisers and spent billions of dollars in the effort to create an independent non-communist state that could stand as a bulwark against communist penetration in Southeast Asia.

But the South Vietnamese regime, created by the Americans, proved to be an imperfect instrument for achieving U.S. ends. It alienated much of rural Vietnam and antagonized Buddhist activists, intellectuals, and politicians. In the countryside, land reform promoted by U.S. advisers was less attractive to the peasants than the more radical programs that had been instituted by the North Vietnamese communists. The Kennedy administration (1961–1963) drastically stepped up aid to the government of South Vietnam, which was threatened by an internal insurgency supported by the communist DRV. Americans also tried to create a pro-Western, anticommunist regime in Laos, but those efforts proved counterproductive.

President John Fitzgerald Kennedy (t. 1961–1963) and his advisers indicated a determination to take their stand in Vietnam. They began by increasing the number of U.S. military “advisers” in South Vietnam, including four hundred members of the Special Forces, in direct violation of the limits set up by the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Kennedy demanded more aggressive tactics and did not flinch when these required Americans to engage in combat. Later Kennedy authorized the dropping of napalm (a jellied petroleum product that clings to the skin while it burns) and herbicidal defoliants (chemicals that denude the forest, destroy the productivity of the soil, and have unpredictable effects on humans who come into contact with them). Kennedy also decided to send U.S. “support” units to Vietnam. These forces dribbled in by the hundreds and thousands. There were approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel in Vietnam when Kennedy took office in 1961. That figure had grown to some 15,000 by the end of his administration in 1963 (DeConde 1976: 278).

On 2 August 1964 there occurred an incident in the Gulf of Tonkin. A U.S. destroyer was attacked by DRV torpedo boats while patrolling in the gulf, allegedly on the high seas,



Napalm bombs explode on Viet Cong structures south of Saigon in 1965. One of the U.S. military's primary incendiary weapons in Vietnam, napalm attracted public protest as a weapon of terror. (U.S. National Archives)

off the coast of North Vietnam. This Gulf of Tonkin Incident gave the Johnson administration (1963–1969) the desired excuse to attack North Vietnam. It also provided the occasion for President Lyndon Johnson to ask the U.S. Congress for authority to take whatever steps were deemed necessary, including the use of force, to protect any endangered state in Southeast Asia.

From 1965 to 1968 the Johnson administration launched a full-scale war in Vietnam, initiating regular bombing raids over the DRV and sending a half-million men to maintain the governments of South Vietnam. The Soviet Union responded by sharply increasing its assistance to the DRV. North Vietnamese regular army troops were beginning to cross into the south. Evidence of large numbers of northern Vietnamese regulars in Laos led to secret U.S. bombing runs against suspected communist positions in Laos.

Unhappiness with the U.S. involvement in Vietnam manifested itself as early as March 1965 as student activists, religious pacifists, and academics specializing in Southeast Asian affairs

began to challenge the administration. Opposition to the war grew in intensity as the Americanization of the struggle continued, slowly drawing more and more ordinary Americans into the antiwar coalition.

The massive use of U.S. airpower failed. The bombing had not significantly affected North Vietnamese morale or ability to send men and materials south to the forces opposing the Saigon regime, supported by the United States, and the Soviet Union and China replaced equipment destroyed by U.S. bombing raids. The Soviet Union had remained virtually uninvolved until 1965, when the massive attacks on the DRV began. After that the Soviet Union demonstrated its commitment by sending Hanoi large quantities of modern military equipment.

The sequence of events in Indochina demonstrated that the United States could not win and could not seem to end the war. Popular dissatisfaction in the United States and around the world grew. As American casualties multiplied, antiwar demonstrations, draft resistance, and desertions from the military increased. The war was costing the American people a lot of money, not to mention the high toll in military casualties. There were demands that funds being used in Vietnam be used for a war on poverty at home. During the late 1960s the majority of Americans thought that the war in Vietnam was a mistake. Pressure on the U.S. government to end the war intensified.

In 1968 there began peace negotiations between the United States and both Vietnamese governments. The Soviet Union assisted as an intermediary. On 31 October 1968, President Johnson ordered the cessation of all attacks on North Vietnam. But that was only a part of the war. The struggle for control of the south continued. The United States was still determined to deny it to the communists. Consequently the peace talks and the war went on and on.

President Richard Nixon's administration (1969–1974), in searching for a way to get out of Vietnam without surrender yet quickly enough to stay ahead of antiwar sentiment at home, decided to transfer the main burden of the unpopular war onto their South Vietnamese ally. This step was called "Vietnamization" of military actions. Gradually, on a fixed schedule, U.S. troops were pulled back from combat and

out of the country. But in support of South Vietnamese troops, the air war was stepped up. It extended to staging areas in Laos and to infiltration routes (parts of the so-called Hô Chí Minh Trail) in neutral Cambodia.

Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk (1922–) had been remarkably adept at protecting his people from the war in neighboring Vietnam. To accomplish this he was forced to tolerate the presence of North Vietnamese bases on his territory. In 1969, Nixon authorized bombing raids on North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia. Besides, early in 1970, Sihanouk was overthrown by a military coup led by officers friendly to Washington. In May, U.S. troops invaded neutral Cambodia, determined to destroy North Vietnamese bases. The results were disastrous for Cambodians and led to anti-American demonstrations around the world. In Cambodia, control gradually passed to a group of ultra-radical left-wing insurgents known as the Khmer Rouge.

In February 1971, South Vietnamese forces, supported by U.S. planes and helicopters, struck at North Vietnamese bases in Laos.

To a North Vietnamese conventional attack across the demilitarized zone in March 1972, the United States responded with massive air attacks on the DRV and ultimately with the mining of the North Vietnamese harbor of Haiphong. The North Vietnamese attack stopped short of the collapse of the Saigon government. The renewed military stalemate, additional U.S. concessions, and pressure from the Soviet Union and China finally led Hanoi to accept a diplomatic arrangement short of victory in the autumn of 1972. But after his reelection Nixon demanded changes in the agreement. The representatives of the DRV balked. Nixon then ordered the most devastating bombing of the war, the "carpet bombing" of parts of North Vietnam, a series of raids in which more bombs were dropped in twelve days than had been dropped in the two years from 1969 to 1971. At the same time massive supplies of military equipment were delivered to the Saigon regime. Finally, in February 1973 a cease-fire agreement was signed. The agreement led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Indochina. The war had ended for the Americans. Congress restricted the president's power to reinvolve the United States in the war in

Vietnam, and U.S. support for the Saigon regime declined.

However, the war between the DRV and the Saigon regime continued. Throughout 1973 and by mid-1974, operations of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)—that is, the South Vietnamese Army—had to be curtailed for lack of adequate supplies. The departure of the Americans and the reduction of U.S. aid affected morale in South Vietnam, and the will to fight had ebbed by early 1975. In July 1976 the country was unified as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). After a war of roughly thirty years, the Vietnamese revolution had triumphed over the French, the Americans, and all internal opposition. But the dominoes of Southeast Asia did not fall.

More than 58,000 Americans and more than 3.2 million Vietnamese died in the American phase of the war in Indochina (“The Cold War in Asia” 1995/1996: 232). Defeat in Vietnam proved to be of little consequence, without impact on the strategic balance between the United States and its adversaries in the Cold War.

LARISA EFIMOVA

See also Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN); Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), Battle of; Domino Theory; Geneva Conference (1954); Gulf of Tonkin Incident (August 1964); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Hồ Chí Minh Trail; Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR); Laos (Nineteenth Century to mid-1990s); Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); Paris Peace Agreement (1968, 1973); Sihanouk, Norodom (1922–); Tet Offensive (1968); U.S. Military Bases in Southeast Asia; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945); Vo Nguyễn Giap, General (1911–)

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U.S. MILITARY BASES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The Cold War and the victories of national liberation movements in Southeast Asia created a power vacuum in which both the communist powers and the Western powers were eager to win support in the region and deny it to their rivals. Thus, military bases and base rights in Southeast Asia became part of a global system that was envisaged by the United States as a means of policing the world. Furthermore, these military installations were regarded as forward bases in a global contest with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as the leader of world communism.

The rise to power of the People’s Republic of China, or Communist China, and its alliance with the Soviet Union created a situation in the East that was not conducive to American interests. Consequently, the importance of the military bases in Southeast Asia grew.

The first American military bases in the region were built in the Philippines, a U.S. colony since 1898. After the Philippines acquired independence in 1946, the Military Bases Agreement between the United States

and the Philippines was signed in March 1947. The agreement gave Washington the right to maintain military facilities on the islands—twenty-three naval and air bases, large and small, active and inactive—for ninety-nine years. The United States also gained broad legal jurisdiction over the bases and their personnel. The most important of the bases were the Subic Bay/Cubi Point naval and air complex and Clark Field Air Base. These were supplemented by small facilities elsewhere on the country's main island, Luzon: John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, the Naval Radio Station at Capas, the U.S. Naval Communications Station at San Miguel, and the Wallace Air Station at Poro Point. In October 1959, a memorandum of agreement was signed, whereby the term of the lease was reduced from ninety-nine to twenty-five years. U.S. operations were consolidated in four "active bases." The reduction of the effective length of the lease was confirmed in the 1966 revisions of the Military Bases Agreement, when some changes were made in the jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters in the base areas. The amendments of 1979 provided for a Philippine commander of each base site, and the area under U.S. command was substantially reduced. According to the amendments of 1983, the Philippine government assumed responsibility for the integrity of the bases, including perimeter security, although the U.S. commander remained responsible for internal security. After the term of the lease expired in 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the request to prolong the base agreement. As a result, the U.S. military forces were withdrawn from the bases in 1992.

The so-called domino theory, which dominated American strategic thinking on Southeast Asia, focused during the 1960s and 1970s on South Vietnam. In order to fight the communists, a number of military air and naval bases were built in the area: at Pleiku, Phu Cat, Tuy Hoa, Nha Trang, Phan Rang, Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, and Cam Ranh Bay. After the U.S. defeat in the Vietnam War, all these bases were lost.

Thailand was an important country in the U.S. security policy in Southeast Asia. With its central location in the area, it was ideally suited to become a secure, strategically placed, and extensive base. On 27 and 29 December 1951, in an exchange of notes between the United

States and Thailand, Thai officials offered the assurances necessary for the kingdom to receive military aid under the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The Southeast Asia Defense Treaty (Manila Pact) was signed on 8 September 1954.

This agreement was the legal basis for the stationing of U.S. troops on Thai soil and the initiation of reconnaissance and offensive air operations from Thai bases; the development of an extensive intelligence network in Thailand related primarily to the Indochinese conflict. The treaty also allowed the use of Thailand by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other U.S. government agencies for the logistical supply of anticommunist forces in the region. Furthermore, it enabled the development of patterns of Thai-American security cooperation that carried on well into the 1970s.

In 1961, U.S. Air Force personnel began their operations in Thailand by establishing an aircraft control and warning system at the Don Muang airport (Bangkok). A second major air facility was developed at Takhli, and an air center was established at Korat. Bases were developed also in Nakhon Phanom, Udorn, Ubon, and U-Tapao. For naval bases, the Americans used the port of Bangkok and a deepwater port at Sattahip. From 1965 onward, Thailand was to serve as a principal base for American reconnaissance as well as tactical and strategic air missions over Indochina.

In 1973, the Thai civil government moved toward an accelerated withdrawal of U.S. military forces from the country. The withdrawal started in 1974, and by 20 June 1976, all the bases had been turned over to Thailand. Today, the United States enjoys access to facilities in Singapore—the air base, the Sembawang naval base and shipyard, and other military facilities on the island.

LARISA EFIMOVA

See also Anglo-Malayan/Malaysian Defense Agreement (AMDA); Aquino, Corazon Cojuangco (1933–); Asian-African (Bandung) Conference (April 1955); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Cold War; Domino Theory; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989); Military and Politics in Southeast Asia; Non-Aligned Movement

(NAM); Student Revolt (October 1973)
(Thailand); Thanom Kittikachorn, Field
Marshall; Vietnam, South (post-1945); Zone
of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN)

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V

VAJIRAVUDH (RAMA VI) (r. 1910–1925)

Advocate of Thai Nationalism

King Vajiravudh, the sixth king of the Chakri dynasty, is by far that dynasty's most controversial ruler. He was the first Thai king to be educated abroad, and his reign (1910–1925) is notable for its many important modernizing programs. Prominent among them were the compulsory primary education law, the foundation of Chulalongkorn University, and exhortations to improve the status of women in Thai society. In addition, following the Great War (1914–1918), Vajiravudh's government scored a major international political success, ensuring the kingdom's legal sovereignty through treaties signed with the major European powers. Yet these achievements are largely overshadowed by a series of financial scandals that weakened the state's long-term economic stability and by personal missteps that lowered Vajiravudh's esteem among other royalty and many in the kingdom's emerging urban middle class.

Vajiravudh was born in Bangkok on 1 January 1881, the eldest son of King Chulalongkorn (Rama V) (r. 1868–1910) and Queen Saowapha. King Chulalongkorn wisely promoted the education of his numerous sons and brothers to fill professional positions in the kingdom's rapidly expanding bureaucracy, and Vajiravudh benefited greatly from this policy. Vajiravudh arrived in England in January 1894 at the age of thirteen to begin a remarkable education. He stud-

ied with private tutors before attending Sandhurst in 1898 for military training, and then, in 1900, continued on to Oxford, where he studied history and law. Vajiravudh acquired an impressive fluency in English and proved himself an imposing intellect.

More notable still was Vajiravudh's self-education in the culture and arts of Europe. Many scholars have noted that Vajiravudh left England as a fully formed Victorian gentleman. The young prince mingled with European royalty and other elite. He took tea with Queen Victoria (r. 1837–1901) and represented his father at various functions throughout Europe, traveling to France, Belgium, Hungary, Italy, and Spain. He learned tennis, horsemanship, and other elite European pastimes. His greatest love, perhaps, was the European theater. Vajiravudh took to writing, staging, and acting in European-style plays, recruiting members of his entourage to help him carry off these amusements. Vajiravudh is remembered for his beautiful translations of several of Shakespeare's plays, including *As You Like It* and *The Merchant of Venice*, from English into Thai. This love of theater continued throughout Vajiravudh's life and remains a controversial hallmark of his reign.

Significantly, during Vajiravudh's lifetime the Thai rules of royal succession changed. The traditional system was one of dual kingship in which an elite council appointed both a primary and a secondary king, each with independent, though unequal, powers. This political

arrangement, dependent as it was on the personalities of the two rulers, could promote rivalry and infighting, as it did during the early years of King Chulalongkorn's reign. For these reasons, the death in 1886 of Second King Wichaichan inspired Chulalongkorn to replace this arrangement with one more resembling the European system of primogeniture. Vajiravudh was named Crown prince in early 1895, and was thus the first Thai monarch to inherit the throne in this manner.

In 1902, Vajiravudh chose to return to Siam before receiving his degree and to take up his duties as Crown prince. His return journey brought him to both the United States and Japan, where he met with President Theodore Roosevelt (t. 1901–1909) and the Japanese royal family, respectively.

Vajiravudh ascended the throne in November 1910, following the unexpected death of his father a month earlier. The new king made the interesting choice to have two coronation ceremonies. The first was a brief and economical affair. The second coronation, held a year later, however, was a lavish thirteen-day ceremony attended by delegations from fourteen nations, including royal representatives from Japan, Great Britain, Russia, Greece, Denmark, and Sweden. This second coronation marked two prominent features of Vajiravudh's reign—namely, the use of Western-style theatrical spectacle to promote the Thai monarchy and the profligacy of his government. The coronation was budgeted at 500,000 baht but ended up costing nearly 5 million, which amounted to 8 percent of Siam's budget for that year.

The king faced a number of unprecedented political challenges in his reign. Most notable was the abortive coup of 1912 by mid-ranking military officers, the first instance of a Siamese king being challenged by commoner bureaucrats. This event marks the emergence of the anti-absolutist ideologies that would eventually inspire the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in June 1932. A second major challenge was the emergence of a free press in Siam capable of openly criticizing the monarchy and its political policies. Vajiravudh's response to this criticism is surprising. He often answered his critics directly, by writing strongly worded essays that appeared in the local press, though often under pseudonyms. He also secretly purchased leading critical newspapers and con-

verted them into advocates for his reign and policies.

Bangkok's emerging middle class publicly criticized the king for his political favoritism, the widespread political corruption of that era, and the government's unchecked expenditures, which pushed the nation into a dangerous spiral of foreign indebtedness. However, dissatisfaction was not limited to the commoner class; fellow royalty also levied private criticism against Vajiravudh. They, too, resented the king's obvious political favoritism, as it often benefited commoner men to whom the king established personal attachment. More important, many were distressed by Vajiravudh's personal behavior, believing it diminished the long-term standing of the monarchy. Particular ire was aimed at the king's beloved theatrical activities, which were dismissed as game playing below the dignity of a monarch, and his disinclination to marry.

To this day, Vajiravudh is most noted for his tireless efforts to develop a new mode of nationalist sentiment among the Thai populace. To this end he wrote and published numerous nationalist tracts and plays. He also formed a voluntary military organization called the Wild Tigers, also designed as a vehicle to advance this new ideology. Most famously, he promoted the trinity of nation-Buddhism-monarchy, established as the three pillars of Thai society. To demonstrate disloyalty to one of the three elements, argued Vajiravudh, was tantamount to disrespecting them all. Scholars have labeled this ideology as elite or official nationalism, because it was designed to stave off emerging ideologies such as republicanism, constitutionalism, and other belief systems that challenged the foundation of the absolute monarchy in Siam.

The king's greatest political achievement came during the Great War, or World War I (1914–1918). The king argued forcefully for entering the war on the side of the Allies, building consensus for this position by writing and disseminating political essays through the local press under a pseudonym. Siam entered the war in July 1917, sending a 1,300-man expeditionary force to France. Following the war Siam was able to parlay the gratitude of the Allies into a number of hard-won diplomatic victories. Over the next several years new treaty arrangements with the United States and the European powers reestablished the legal sover-

eignty of Siam and the right of that state to negotiate and establish trade tariffs.

Vajiravudh died young, from a stomach ailment, on 26 November 1925, at the age of forty-four. His only child, Princess Benjaratana, was born to Queen Consort Suvadhana only two days before the king's death. He produced no male heir, thus the kingship passed to his younger brother Prajadhipok (r. 1925–1934).

BRUCE BEEMER

See also Chulalongkorn University;

Prajadhipak (Rama VII) (r. 1925–1935);

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VAN DEN BOSCH, COUNT JOHANNES (1780–1844)

Ensuring Profitable Colonial Possessions

Van den Bosch served in the army in the Dutch East Indies from 1798 to 1810. Back in The Netherlands, he contributed to the organization of the Dutch and Dutch East Indies armies. In his 1818 study of the Dutch possessions in Asia, America, and Africa, he argued against a liberal colonial system along lines established by the British lieutenant governor Stamford Raffles (t. 1811–1816) of Java. He proposed a paternalistic colonial system, maintaining that people in the colonies were unaccustomed to hard work and needed strong guidance. Under the Dutch king's auspices, he also established a society that employed urban paupers for the development of unused land in the north of The Netherlands.

Van den Bosch was appointed by the king as commissioner general to the Dutch West Indies in 1827 to advise on the reorganization of government. He also provided advice on a report of Commissioner General Du Bus de Gisignies's about opening Java to European entrepreneurs and free labor. Van den Bosch argued that Java could not compete with coffee produced with free labor against coffee produced with slave labor in Brazil. Based on this advice, Van

den Bosch was appointed governor-general of the Dutch East Indies in October 1828, a position he assumed in January 1830.

As governor-general (t. 1830–1834), he developed the Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*), which aimed to maximize revenues for the colonial government by compelling farm households to produce export crops such as coffee that were sold to government agents. During his term as governor-general large parts of the principalities of Surakarta and Yogyakarta were brought under colonial rule. Van den Bosch focused his attention on Java and Sumatra, and did not favor expansion of influence in other parts of the archipelago.

As minister of colonial affairs (t. 1834–1839) he designed the positive net revenue (*batig slot*) policy, according to which the Dutch East Indies had to produce a budget surplus for remittance to the Dutch treasury. He became a member of the Dutch parliament in 1842.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Cultivation System (*Cultuurstelsel*);

Du Bus de Gisignies, Viscount Leonard

Pierre Joseph (1780–1849); Java; Java War

(1825–1830); Netherlands (Dutch) East

Indies; Raffles, Sir (Thomas) Stamford

Bingley (1781–1826); Surakarta; Yogyakarta

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VAN DER CAPELLEN, BARON GODERT ALEXANDER PHILIP (1778–1848)

Addressing Colonial Challenges

Born in Utrecht on 15 December 1778, Van der Capellen obtained a doctorate in law from the University of Utrecht. He had a prominent career involving various positions in the Dutch public service (1803–1814) and a brief period as minister of religion and the interior (1809–1810). He was appointed on 22 September 1814 as a member of the State Commission (*Commissie Generaal*), which had to reestablish Dutch authority in the colonies that had been taken over by the British during the war against

France. Van der Capellen was also appointed governor-general of the Indies (t. 1816–1825), in charge of the day-to-day government of the Indies and the implementation of the decisions of the State Commission. He did not leave for the Indies until 1816, as he attended the Conference of Vienna.

The State Commission started its work in the Indies on 19 August 1816, and until 16 January 1819, Van der Capellen governed the Indies together with the other members, C. T. Elout and A. A. Buyskes. Various administrative issues dominated during the rule of the State Commission, including the design and establishment of various institutions required to govern the colony, and in 1815 a new constitution (*Regeeringsreglement*). Van der Capellen's solitary rule since 1819 was characterized by various wars. The Java War started with the Diponegoro uprising of 1825. Various military expeditions were sent to Sumatra to subdue the ruler of Palembang and fight fundamentalist Muslims in the Padang area. In West Borneo the Dutch troops fought Chinese settlers, and in Sulawesi they fought against the local states of Boni, Tanette, and Supa.

After the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), The Netherlands was impoverished and unable to finance the running of a colony. It expected that resumption of colonial trade would reinvigorate the Dutch economy. The State Commission had to make that happen. The members were in agreement about the main principles by which the Indies would be governed. However, Elout and Van der Capellen disagreed about opening up Java to foreign private entrepreneurs. Van der Capellen was initially favorably disposed, but after the departure of Elout and Buyskes he came under the influence of those who argued that private enterprise would use its technological superiority to exploit the indigenous population. He then argued that it would be best for the government to orchestrate the economic development of Java itself.

Van der Capellen banned the sale of land by local aristocratic landowners to foreign private entrepreneurs and also forbade private entrepreneurs to lease land in the self-governing principalities in Central Java. This infuriated many enterprising Europeans in Java. In 1823 he even ordered the Javanese aristocrats to reclaim the land they had sold or leased and pay indemnities for improvements. The aristocrats

felt their authority challenged. This sparked the Diponegoro uprising in Central Java and the outbreak of the bloody Java War (1825–1830).

Van der Capellen also prohibited the sale of opium in Priangan in West Java. Van der Capellen journeyed to Sulawesi and the Moluccan islands in 1824 to renew agreements with self-governing rulers there. Faced with revolts in the Moluccas, he abolished the centuries-old Dutch spice export monopoly there. He also took several measures to reinforce the influence of indigenous rulers in Java, and implemented the Dutch-English treaty of 1824, which involved exchanges of territory in the Malay Archipelago. Lastly, he took initiatives to improve and extend Java's road network and build bridges.

Van der Capellen's downfall came after he defied a request from Elout, who had become the Dutch colonial minister, to grant a monopoly to the ailing *Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij* (NHM) for the trade of coffee from Priangan. The wars, and the relatively costly administrative infrastructure Van der Capellen designed and implemented, were initially financed with the returns that high coffee prices generated for the treasury. But when world coffee prices slumped in 1823, the coffers of Van der Capellen's government were soon exhausted. The chaotic administration of government finances did not help. In 1824 the Dutch treasury reluctantly supported the Indies financially. To finance further current expenditure, Van der Capellen borrowed 8 million florins from the NHM and £60,000 from the English banking firm Palmer and Company in Calcutta on the basis of a promise to supply Java's produce, such as coffee, in years to come. However, the Dutch king did not approve the loan from Palmer and Company. He dismissed Van der Capellen as of 1 January 1826, ordered him to hand over the governor generalship to the vice-president of the Council of the Indies, General H. M. De Kock, and return to The Netherlands.

After his return to The Netherlands, Van der Capellen was given various honorable duties, but he did not return to the Dutch public service. He died on 10 April 1848 in De Bilt, The Netherlands.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Coffee; Cultivation System
(*Cultuurstelsel*); Diponegoro (Pangeran)

Diponegara) (ca. 1785–1855); Java; Java War (1825–1830); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies

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VAN DIEMEN, ANTHONY (1593–1645)

Expanding and Consolidating Dutch Power in Asia

Van Diemen was born in Culemborg in 1593 and started his professional life in 1616 as a merchant in Amsterdam. After bankruptcy in 1618, he enlisted under the assumed name of Thonisz Meeuwiszoon as a Dutch United East India Company (VOC) naval cadet and left for the Dutch East Indies. Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen (t. 1617–1623, 1624–1629) recognized his abilities and appointed him as a clerk at the secretariat of the VOC in 1619, ignoring instructions from the VOC's board of directors not to engage Van Diemen, because the VOC was not allowed to employ bankrupts. Coen promoted Thonisz Meeuwiszoon in 1619 to his assistant, and in 1620 to company merchant. In 1623 he promoted Van Diemen to chief merchant under his true name. In 1625, Van Diemen became a councillor of the Indies (*raad van Indië*) and accountant-general. When Coen became governor-general for the second time (1624–1629), Van Diemen supported him as the VOC's director-general of trade during 1627–1629. Van Diemen commanded a fleet to The Netherlands in 1631; he returned to the Indies in 1633 to be appointed deputy to Governor-General Hendrik Brouwer (t. 1632–1636). In 1636 he became Brouwer's successor as governor-general.

Van Diemen's time as governor-general (1636–1645) was characterized by an expansion

and consolidation of VOC activities in South Asia. In 1636 he ordered the blockade of Goa, the hub of Portuguese activity in the region. Two years later, he ordered the VOC attack on Portuguese strongholds in Ceylon (Sri Lanka). With the support of the Maharajah of Ceylon, the VOC captured Ceylon's key cinnamon-producing areas in 1644. In the process, the VOC increased its posts along the Coromandel coast of India.

In the meantime, the VOC renewed its efforts to capture strategically located Melaka from the Portuguese. With Goa blockaded and Portuguese forces tied up in Ceylon, few reinforcements could reach Melaka and trade from Melaka dwindled. In 1640, Van Diemen ordered the siege of Melaka, which was captured a year later. During his rule, the VOC used its foothold in Formosa (Taiwan) in 1642 to capture the whole island, driving out the Spanish in the process.

Under Van Diemen's administration, the VOC intensified relations with Japan. Portuguese efforts to convert the Japanese to Christianity had already led to their confinement to the island of Deshima, while the Dutch continued to operate freely from Hirado. The VOC exploited the fact that the Japanese shogun forbade Japanese merchants to go overseas; therefore the Dutch took over the lucrative silk trade between Tonkin and Japan in 1637. After a Christian-inspired uprising in Japan, the Portuguese were expelled in 1639, and the VOC obtained a monopoly on trade with Japan. By the end of Van Diemen's rule, the VOC had entrenched its political and commercial presence throughout Asia.

Within the East Indies, Van Diemen expanded and consolidated Dutch rule. He inherited ongoing unrest in Ambon. Its sovereign, the sultan of Ternate, had granted the VOC a monopoly on cloves, but Macassarese and Bugis continued to smuggle cloves. Dutch efforts to end this smuggling resulted in local uprisings. In 1637 and 1638, Van Diemen sailed to Ambon with a military force to subdue the resistance. He signed a treaty with the sultan of Ternate to reconfirm the VOC's clove monopoly and enable the company to suppress the Ambon uprising. That was the start of a war of conquest (1638–1643) in order to strengthen VOC rule in the Moluccan Islands and enforce the Dutch spice monopoly. In ad-

dition, soon after the takeover of Melaka, Van Diemen in 1641 concluded a treaty with the ruler of Aceh, who granted the VOC a monopoly on the trade between areas controlled by Aceh along the coast of West Sumatra and Europe. Within Java, Van Diemen successfully continued Coen's policy of keeping the rulers of Mataram and Banten apart so that they would not conspire against the Dutch in Batavia.

In 1640, Van Diemen ordered the lawyer Joan Maetsuycker to bring consistency in the numerous decrees and ordinances issued by the VOC in Batavia. Maetsuycker compiled the *Bataviasche Statuten*, which formed the code of law in the areas of the Indies under direct Dutch rule. It remained in force until the introduction of a new code in 1848. In addition, in 1639 and 1643 Van Diemen organized voyages of discovery to areas east and north of Japan and south of the Indies. The first voyage of Abel Tasman led to the discovery and exploration of a large part of eastern Australia and New Zealand. Tasman named the island of Tasmania Van Diemensland. Lastly, Van Diemen oversaw the completion of the construction of Batavia, which his predecessor Coen had started. Batavia grew as a city of residence and trade, and with its canals it took on a typically Dutch appearance. Van Diemen established a Latin school and two Protestant churches and a hospital in Batavia. He died in Batavia on 19 April 1645.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Banten (Bantam) (1526–1813); Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Coen, Jan Pieterszoon (1587–1629); East India Company (EIC) (1600), English; Formosa (Taiwan); Maluku (The Moluccas); Mataram; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Portuguese Asian Empire; Spices and the Spice Trade; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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VAN HEUTSZ, GENERAL JOANNES BENEICTUS (1851–1924)

Militarist Face of Dutch Expansionism

Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz, as governor-general of the colony (t. 1904–1909), oversaw the expansion of the Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies to include within its boundaries all the territories that would subsequently become the Republic of Indonesia.

Van Heutsz was first posted to the Indies in 1873 and saw action in Aceh (1874–1876). After advanced training in The Hague (1881–1883) and promotion, he returned for a second tour in the Indies (1883–1893). This tour included further periods as a staff officer in Aceh (1889, 1890–1891). There and in Batavia (1892–1896), he associated closely with a professor named Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936), the colonial government's expert on Islam. He returned to Aceh for the 1896–1897 military campaign. On the basis of his record, he urged his own appointment as military governor there and served in this capacity from 1898 to 1904. During this term and with the continuing advice of Snouck Hurgronje, he mounted a vigorous military campaign, which, with the submission of the aspirant Sultan Muhammad Dawot (Muhammad Daud) in 1903, appeared to have been successful.

Although the war was, in fact, far from won, van Heutsz had secured an outstanding reputation. Thus, "the pacifier of Aceh" was appointed governor-general in 1904, a year in which the Indies faced a putative threat from Japan. His term was marked by controversy about continuing atrocities in Aceh, and he made use of the Malay press to bolster his position against his many Dutch detractors.

His governor-generalship witnessed the annexation of Central Sumatra, South Sulawesi, Bali, Sumba, Flores, and Ceram. For many, van Heutsz symbolizes the aggressive, militarist face of Dutch colonial rule. Nevertheless, his incumbency coincided with the expansion of public education in the Indies and the implementation of the ideals of the Ethical Policy, largely as a result of the initiatives of the then minister of colonies and his successor as governor-general, Alexander W. F. Idenberg (t. 1909–1916). An English-language biography of van

Heutsz has yet to be written. A good study in Dutch is that by J. C. Witte (1975).

M. F. LAFFAN

See also Aceh (Acheh) Wars (1873–1903); Bali; Education, Western Secular; Ethical Policy (*Ethische Politiek*); Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies; Snouck Hurgronje, Professor Christiaan (1857–1936); Sulawesi (Celebes); Sumatra

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VAN MOOK, DR. HUBERTUS JOHANNES (1894–1965)

Aspiring for a “Federal Indonesia”

Hubertus Johannes Van Mook was born in 1894 in Semarang (Central Java). Although Dutch in ancestry, he identified himself with the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) as distinct from The Netherlands. He regarded the NEI as his home, and himself as an “Indies-man.”


In 1930 he formed the *Stuw* (Stimulus) movement to promote the future development of the NEI as part of a commonwealth with The Netherlands. In the world of Dutch colonialism, this was a liberal position to take, especially during the 1930s when the Indonesian nationalist movement, struggling for independence, was severely curtailed. As a civil servant (Van Mook rose to the position of director of economic affairs in the NEI administration in Batavia), he endeavored to protect the Indonesians against private exploitation. In 1941, after the Japanese began their invasion of Southeast Asia, Van Mook was appointed lieutenant governor-general and left for Australia, where he organized an administration in exile, returning only in 1945 after the Japanese surrendered.

The NEI of 1945 was vastly different from the situation before 1942. As lieutenant governor-general, Van Mook was compelled to rely on his own ingenuity and political resourcefulness. He had no troops to deploy at a time when brute force would have been relevant. Yet he had to deal with the widespread nationalist support for the Republic of Indonesia led by Sukarno (1901–1970), Mohammad Hatta (1902–1980),

and Sutan Sjahrir (1909–1966). Van Mook’s strategy was to negotiate with Sjahrir (the prime minister). At the same time, when the Dutch military forces had regained sufficient strength, he deployed his troops in the First Police Action (July 1947) to assert Dutch control. He personally believed that a “police” action was needed because the disorderly conditions in Java and Sumatra were the result of criminal elements among the supporters of the republic who were preventing genuine political leaders from taking control. Van Mook felt that there were many Indonesians who were against the dominant position of the Republic of Indonesia. This led him to believe that a federal Indonesia, of which the Republic of Indonesia was merely one constituent state, would be the best political solution for a future independent Indonesia. He was also convinced that even among the ranks of the republic, there were many reasonable leaders who were not rabidly anti-Dutch and were willing to enter into negotiations with the Dutch regarding the political future of Indonesia.

Such sentiments led him to identify Indonesian leaders from territories outside Java and Sumatra where the influence of the republic was not so prevalent. He found them in West Java, Bali, and what was called the “Great East,” that vast stretch of seas and islands from Borneo to Celebes. These leaders he cultivated in the hope that they would provide the necessary support for an independent but federal Indonesia. Toward that end he organized several conferences (from 1946 to 1948) with prospective federal leaders to help them to counterbalance the dominance of the republic. This focus on federal leaders met with pitfalls. Some of the federal leaders harbored their own agenda and aspirations. Not all were puppets of the Dutch, and certainly there were some who clearly did not want to be puppets, although such were the allegations made against them. There were also conservative Dutch military officers who supported the anti-republican leaders and behaved as if Van Mook were not in charge. They embarrassed Van Mook, and undermined his relations with the republican leaders with whom he was trying to maintain links for further negotiations.

Faced with all these problems, the feasibility of a federal state for Indonesia was not bright.



Hubertus J. Van Mook. (Bettmann/Corbis)

Van Mook was blamed for the lack of progress in curbing the power and influence of the republic. The Netherlands government also distrusted his relatively progressive inclinations. At the same time, the Republic of Indonesia leaders had no choice but to regard him as the archenemy of an independent Indonesia. The federal states he supported turned out to be damp squibs. In 1948 he resigned and left Indonesia.

Shortly afterward, the ideal world he cherished of an Indonesia that offered a place for “Indies men” like himself fell asunder. The government in The Netherlands changed hands and launched the infamous Second Police Action, an exercise that Van Mook probably did not support wholeheartedly, although there were no more options left for the Dutch except to surrender to republican demands. In this Second Police Action (December 1948), Van Mook’s policy of negotiating with republican

leaders was abandoned. Instead, the republican leaders with whom Van Mook dealt were arrested and exiled.

Disillusioned, he turned his back on Indonesia and also The Netherlands. He accepted an assignment with the United Nations, and shortly thereafter died in France.

At the time when Van Mook departed from Indonesia, the esteem of the Dutch in Indonesian eyes was extremely low. Thus it was not surprising that one of Van Mook’s principal political initiatives—namely, the federal system—was stillborn. Federalism, the federal states, and federal leaders were all tarnished simply because they enjoyed support from Van Mook and the Dutch. Yet the idea of greater autonomy for Indonesian states became the vogue at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Perhaps it is too soon to write off Van Mook’s contribution to the constitutional lexicon of Indonesia today.

YONG MUN CHEONG

See also Decolonization of Southeast Asia; Dutch Police Action (First and Second); Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Netherlands (Dutch) East Indies

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**VEREENIGDE OOST-INDISCHE
COMPAGNIE (VOC)
([DUTCH] UNITED EAST
INDIA COMPANY) (1602)**

**Presiding over a
Seaborne Mercantile Empire**

The Dutch United East India Company (VOC) was established in 1602 under pressure of the government of the United Provinces of The Netherlands. It concentrated all Asian commerce into the hands of one enterprise, thus making an end of prior fierce internal competition and gaining strength against other European forces in Asian waters. The VOC had a complicated decision-making structure. Because of its birth out of several trading companies in different cities in The Netherlands, the United Company was composed of so-called chambers, established in six cities in the maritime provinces of The Netherlands, that had previously been home to companies in Asia: Amsterdam, Middelburg (Zeeland), Hoorn, Enkhuizen, Rotterdam, and Delft.

The VOC derived its capital of almost 6.5 million guilders from shareholders (Bruijn et al 1987: 9). In contrast to previous companies, the VOC did not have to remit deposits plus dividends after each expedition or trading season. This enabled the directors in The Netherlands and the officials in Asia to make huge investments without the necessity to make immediate profits. Partly because of its firm financial basis the VOC remained the largest European trading company in Asia until the late eighteenth century. During the 196 years of its existence, the VOC expedited 4,720

ships to Asia and almost a million personnel (ibid.: 143).

The company was an institution with two faces: an enterprise in the Dutch republic and a (mercantile) state in Asia. In the company charter of 20 March 1602, the company was given the right to wage war, build forts, employ armies, and conclude treaties with Asian rulers—privileges that were usually the prerogative of states. Company power in Asia was based on the application of selective violence, which enabled it to gain control over the main production areas of the major spices, to monopolize or control trading routes and commodities, and to marginalize competitors. One secret of the VOC's financial success was its ability to engender profits in Asia itself by usurping the trade in luxury items between different regions around the Asian seas. It enabled the company to purchase products for the European markets (primarily spices, but later also coffee and tea) without having to ship enormous amounts of bullion from Europe.

By its peculiar combination of naval and military power and commercial strategy, the company deeply affected the commercial relations and political balance in Southeast Asia. Within decades of its first appearance in Southeast Asia, the company had become the strongest power in insular Southeast Asia. Its naval power was far superior to that of most indigenous states. Especially after the capture of Melaka from the Portuguese in 1641 and the conquest or submission of the major trade hubs—namely, Makassar (1668) and Banten (1682)—the VOC had few serious contenders in the archipelago. Consequently it was able to police international affairs in a fairly efficient manner through diplomacy, garrisoning, patrolling, and warfare. The company, which fairly regularly assessed the profitability of its individual trading posts, limited its territorial possessions to strategic control posts and harbors and the production areas of cloves, nutmeg, and cinnamon. Only in the Moluccan Islands and (after the late seventeenth century) on Java did the company engage in a form of extensive territorial rule.

In the late eighteenth century, things went sour for the company. One immediate cause of the company's bankruptcy was budgetary problems, caused by declining returns and mounting debts. The financial deficiency made it difficult

to send enough ships to Asia, let alone to bolster up new commercial initiatives. The Anglo-Dutch War of 1780–1784 was a severe blow to the company's delicate financial situation: Dutch ships were taken, establishments were occupied, and transportation between the Indies and The Netherlands was disrupted. But in the background of the demise of the VOC was a more structural problem: the incapacity to adjust to the shifting balance between returns of the spice trade and the rising costs of administration. The policies of the VOC never departed from the axioms established in the first half of the seventeenth century. To a certain extent, the company was able to broaden its range of products. In particular the introduction of coffee in West Java and the participation in the tea trade of China were major departures from the seventeenth-century reliance on spices, but the trade conditions were much less favorable. In contrast, the English East India Company (EIC) succeeded in a triple modernization: a transition from trading company to tax-extracting government, the annexation of large parts of the immensely profitable tea trade in China, and the encouragement of private merchants.

On 31 December 1799 the VOC was formally liquidated. The VOC enterprise was nationalized in 1798, but to the peoples in Asia, the company lived on, as formal Dutch rule continued. In the Indonesian archipelago, the people often referred to its successor, the East Indies government, as *Kumpeni* until late in the nineteenth century.

REMCO RABEN

See also Anglo-Dutch Relations in Southeast Asia (Seventeenth to Twentieth Centuries); Banten (Bantam) (1526–1813); Batavia (Sunda Kelapa, Jacatra, Djakarta/Jakarta); Country Traders; East India Company (EIC) (1602), English; Economic History of Early Modern Southeast Asia (pre-Sixteenth Century); Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Heeren Zeventien (Gentlemen Seventeen); Maluku (The Moluccas); Melaka; Spices and the Spice Trade

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VIENTIANE

“City of Sandalwood”

Political capital of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), the city of Vientiane (Vieng Chan, or “City of Sandalwood”) sprawls along the east bank of the middle Mekong River (population approximately 300,000 [Cummings 1994]). Tourists in the twenty-first century are impressed not only with its rich cultural heritage—a reference to its numerous Buddhist temples as well as its pseudo-French colonial bungalows, triumphal arches, and palaces—but also with its being one of the least transformed national capitals in a region of dynamic social and economic change. As the administrative capital of French Laos and the independent kingdom of Laos, Vientiane was also the site of major political developments shaping national politics and Laos's future political destiny.

Historical Foundations

In 1563, King Setthathirat (r. 1548–1571) transferred the capital of the kingdom of Lane Xang from Luang Prabang to Vientiane. Most likely, the site of Vientiane was chosen for its more central location, the king's desire for links with the Siamese (Thai) kingdom of Ayutthaya, its defensibility, and its ecologically optimum site on broad and cultivable floodplain. Enclosed by

a moat and wall, the ancient city hosted a royal palace including a temple repository of the Phra Keo (Emerald Buddha), the palladium of the kingdom, itself captured from Chiang Mai in 1548. Legend dates the foundation of Wat Phra Keo to 614 C.E. Home to some eighty temples, the centerpiece of the royal capital was and remains That Luang, constructed from 1566. Up until 1900, vestiges of the original ramparts of the newly founded capital could be observed. The reign of Settathirat is seen as the apogee of the kingdom of Lane Xang.

It was during the reign of King Souvigna Vongsa (r. 1637–1694) that Vientiane was first visited by European travelers. Dutchman Gerrit van Wuysthoff, who visited in 1641, left behind a glowing account of the city, as did Portuguese Jesuits visiting in 1666. Wuysthoff was received by soldiers mounted upon war elephants at That Luang, which he described as covered with gold. If Wuysthoff is to be believed, Vientiane was vastly populated at that time, including refugees from Luang Prabang, decimated by a cholera epidemic. In this epoch Vientiane ruled over an enormous territory including the western bank of the Mekong. Siam attacked Vientiane in 1778, looting the Phra Bang and carrying off to Bangkok the Emerald Buddha, later returned by King Mongkut (r. 1851–1898) in 1867. Chao Anou, who mounted the throne in 1827, left his legacy in the form of Wat Sisakhet (inaugurated in 1824). He also made an ill-advised attack on Siam, only to be routed. Siam responded by sacking Vientiane and reducing it to vassalage. Wat Sisakhet would be the sole surviving religious edifice in Vientiane at the time of the French arrival in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Damaged in 1873 by an invasion of Yunnanese adventurers, That Luang underwent some minor restoration in 1897–1889, before being elaborately restored in 1930 by the *École Française d'Extrême-Orient* (French School of the Orient). That Luang long remained the sacred reliquary of the kingdom and a place of pilgrimage.

Colonial Capital City

In July 1899, the French chose Vientiane as their administrative capital, while Luang Prabang remained the royal capital and seat of the king. The French restored historical monuments and temples in Vientiane destroyed by

Siam. Notably, Prince Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984) was in charge of the restoration of Wat Phra Keo, a tourist site in Vientiane today. Similarly, That Luang has undergone several renovations but serves as the focal point of socialist state anniversaries and ceremonies.

As the administrative and commercial capital of French Laos, Vientiane hosted the central bureau of the civil service. Although a small cadre of metropolitans residing in Vientiane dominated this bureaucracy, Vietnamese overwhelmingly staffed the technical services. The Vietnamese community in Vientiane also comprised merchants and petty traders. Otherwise, as in other Southeast Asian countries, Chinese dominated the import-export business, stamping their character upon the urban landscape. But as a colonial backwater, Vientiane was little more than an urban village, a collection point for agricultural surplus from the countryside.

Postwar Vientiane

In 1953 the French designated Vientiane the administrative capital of the kingdom of Laos, with Luang Prabang remaining as the royal capital. As the capital of an independent country, Vientiane came to host foreign embassies and missions. Under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina, Vientiane also hosted a French military mission. France retained its cultural mission in Laos. French remained the language of higher education of the Lao elite. But also, as the commercial center of the country, Vientiane confirmed its position as a primate city. Although the Mekong was not yet bridged, the city was connected to Bangkok and the world by the railhead at Nong Khai on the Thai bank of the river. Prior to communist rule, Vientiane was always open to Thai cultural influences, just as the river boundary remained porous to the many Lao who maintained family links across the Mekong.

The most striking monument of this era erected in Vientiane was undoubtedly the Arc de Triomphe-style edifice known as the Monument des Morts, opposite the National Assembly building, a marriage of French symmetry and Lao Buddhist ornate architecture. Also called the “vertical runway,” it is widely believed to have been constructed by money si-

phoned from aid funds allocated for the construction of the airport.

By the 1960s, Vientiane had undergone major physical changes, in part as a result of the war, in part stemming from an economy dependent on foreign aid, a reference to the windfall aid economy supported by the U.S. government. Notably, Wattay Airport was developed as a dual civilian–military airfield. A new suburb complete with sprawling bungalows, schools, and swimming pools served the American community who, in turn, serviced the parallel government in Vientiane.

Swollen by job seekers and refugees from the war-torn interior, Vientiane was a veritable haven during the war. But Vientiane was also known for its decadence. As a major beneficiary of rents derived from the U.S. aid economy, Vientiane enjoyed an artificial prosperity. Some elements—the elite, military families, and the bourgeoisie—enjoyed lifestyles hardly commensurate with their incomes. Since the 1950s, Vientiane had earned a reputation as an international center of gold and opium smuggling. The social costs of this freewheeling environment were not just drug addiction and prostitution, as frequently referenced in communist propaganda, but also a lifestyle that resembled more urban Thailand than Laos's traditions. But in a society lacking a social safety net outside of the family, Vientiane came to host an underclass of not only drug addicts but also the war-wounded and handicapped veterans, scavengers, beggars, criminals, day laborers, and a small army of the unemployed.

In contrast to the heavily bombed interior of Laos, and unlike Phnom Penh under the radical communist Khmer Rouge, Vientiane suffered little damage from war or revolution; its national patrimony of temples and libraries suffered only from long-term neglect. Otherwise, Vientiane celebrated a calendar of cultural and religious events of which the That Luang festival, officiated over by the king, with prayers recited by monks, was the most important.

Revolutionary Vientiane

Probably fewer than 100,000 people remained in Vientiane when, in December 1975, the Pathet Lao ordered all family members to assemble at the That Luang grounds to usher in the new order (Stuart-Fox 1997). The departure of

the Americans and leading officials of the “Vientiane-side” government had been orderly. The former American suburb now became the headquarters of senior military and party figures. President Souphanouvong (1911–1995) occupied the former French resident's palace. The departure of the middle and commercial classes, including many Chinese and Indian merchants, left almost all businesses and shops in Vientiane shuttered. The few remaining hotels and restaurants belonged to the state. Commercial and even market activity withered. There were no tourists. Private cars disappeared, replaced by military traffic and truck convoys arriving from Vietnam. Bicycles began to reappear only in the early 1980s. A new social element was the presence of Soviet and Eastern European technicians. The English-language boutiques of the old regime were now replaced with Russian-language schools. But foreign missions, most of which recognized the new regime, offered another international connection. Gone also was the cross-Mekong River trade, as relations with Thailand dimmed.

A major feature of urban Vientiane, lingering on into the 1990s, was the ubiquitous socialist poster art, featuring such themes as working elephants, ethnic minorities, hammer-and-sickle insignia, bountiful harvests, and even smokestacks. The new cultural themes emphasized in schools and workplaces in Vientiane were patriotic and socialist virtues. The new version of Lao history was also written into the new museums of the revolution as well as textbooks, replacing the old monarchical themes. To further draw a line between Thailand and the West, Lao music and dance were encouraged at the expense of imported forms. Until the 1980s, Vientiane remained a derelict, even depressing, town, although not lacking in charm.

Postsocialist Vientiane

The abandonment of hard-line socialist policies in 1978 and the progressive announcement of new market-oriented policies began to change the face of Vientiane. But the reorientation awaited the resumption of good relations with Thailand, the obvious source of foreign investment. By the late 1980s and through the 1990s, Vientiane reinvented itself as a postsocialist economy, just as Thai consumer goods once again flooded across the border and commercial

life rebounded. To the alarm of the regime, many once-discredited cultural practices also saw a reentry in the city. And so, when an Australian-built bridge spanning the Mekong River—dubbed the “AIDS Bridge”—was completed in 1994, the regime took care to monitor new arrivals closely. International tourism also made a revival in the 1990s, making Vientiane and the former capital Luang Prabang exotic travel destinations in the new century. But as Vientiane has been the major beneficiary of foreign investment and has achieved the highest national growth rates, so the gap between the city and the countryside has widened.

GEOFFREY C. GUNN

See also Ayutthaya (Ayuthaya, Ayudhya, Ayuthia) (1351–1767), Kingdom of; Chiang Mai; Chinese in Southeast Asia; École Française d’Extrême-Orient; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR); Laos (Nineteenth Century to mid-1990s); Luang Prabang; Pathet Lao (Land of Laos); Souphanouvong (Red Prince) (1911–1995); Souvanna Phouma (1901–1984); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945)

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VIỆT CONG
“Charlie,” “VC”

The expression *Việt Cong*, for *Việt Nam Cong San* (Vietnamese communist), was used between the early 1960s and 1975 in South Vietnam to designate the forces that resorted to using arms to oppose the Saigon regime.

Contrary to *Việt Minh*, the Vietnamese abbreviation for the League for the Independence of Vietnam, established in 1941 by Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969), the term *Việt Cong* was a nickname attributed by its enemies. The nickname appeared around 1961 and became a convenient term with which to designate an insurrection that spread quickly and led to a confusing situation. Following the Geneva partition in 1954 and the creation of a Republic of

Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel, given the fact that the general elections scheduled for 1956 did not take place, this new state became the arena for growing unrest. Throughout the succeeding years, several rural regions rebelled and broke away. There were many reasons for this, including opposition to the return of former landlords and exasperation with the demands of the new power or doings of clandestine militants (former *Việt Minh* who stayed on after 1954). *Việt Cong* was thus the convenient term under which to regroup all those opponents who resorted to rising up in arms against Saigon or who acted in this sense with the benevolent complicity of the North Vietnamese regime.

In vast areas of the central high plateaus or of the south (the region of Saigon, Mekong Delta), communist-inspired guerrillas had de facto forbidden the Saigon government to function where they themselves were established. During the entire length of the Vietnam War, the region to the south of the 17th Parallel appeared to be divided into three different zones, among which circulation proved to be particularly difficult: the “governmental” zone essentially regrouping the big cities and the national highways; the so-called liberated zones (*Việt Cong*) often situated on the border regions; and the contested zones, at stake in the conflict and the terrain where the battles took place—the main highways, rarely safe and at night more or less taken over by “the other side” (*Việt Cong*). But who were these *Việt Cong*? On the one hand they were those southerners who had joined the maquis against the regime; on the other, above all because of the U.S. intervention, and in the border regions with Laos and Cambodia, combatants from the north. After the 1968 Tet offensive and the harsh repression that followed—in particular the extremely efficient operation of the Phoenix Program (collating intelligence to track and eliminate members of the *Việt Cong* infrastructure [VCI])—the proportion of combatants from the north seemed noticeably to have grown.

The organization in charge of the maquis had itself evolved over the years, at least in its visible structure. A National Liberation Front (NLF) presided over by the lawyer Nguyễn Hữu Thọ was born in December 1960 “somewhere in South Vietnam.” At the beginning of 1968, this NLF was joined by the Alliance of Democratic Forces, which regrouped several



*A young Việt Cong member posing in front of a house with a gun. July 1970, Cambodia.
(Bettman/Corbis)*

dissident Saigon personalities after the Tet offensive to constitute a provisional revolutionary government (PRG) presided over by the architect Huynh Tan Phat. But the real leaders of the Việt Cong kept to the background. The decision to support or to activate the maquis of the south had been secretly made in Hanoi in May 1959 by the fifteenth plenary session of the central committee of the Labour Party, stressing that “the fundamental path of the Vietnamese revolution in the South is that of violence.” A north-south communication axis was then put into action, bypassing the 17th Parallel (the famous Hồ Chí Minh Trail), and a part of the central committee was soon given the mission to direct resistance in the south. This branch of the central committee for the south (U.S. forces referred to it as COSVN, Central Office for South Vietnam) was clandestinely installed there throughout the war under the direction of Nguyễn Chí Thanh (from 1965 to 1967) and of Phạm Hùng (from 1967 to 1975). Their operational headquarters were situated north of Tay Ninh (northwest of Saigon), among rubber plantations that straddled the Cambodian border.

The Saigon regime and the United States never wanted to distinguish between the Việt Cong and North Vietnam—a partially justified decision as the resistance organization was secretly directed by the Labour Party: this analysis justified their war and their strategy. However, if the latter had not been successful, it was precisely because it was not only a question of an “invasion” of an ideological nature, but also of a fundamentally political and national dimension.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Geneva Conference (1954);

Hồ Chí Minh Trail; Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Saigon (Gia Định; Hồ Chí Minh City); Strategic Hamlet Program (Vietnam); Tet Offensive (1968); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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
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VIỆT MINH (VIỆT NAM ĐỘC LẬP ĐỒNG MINH HỘI, LEAGUE FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF VIETNAM) “A Magic Weapon”

Việt Minh was a national united front organization established by the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) in 1941 to solicit mass support in their struggles against first Japan and then France.

In May 1941, the Eighth Plenum of the Indochina Communist Party Central Committee was held at Pac Bo, Cao Bang province, in North Vietnam. It was at this meeting that the ICP formed new strategies and policies for the coming struggle. One of the new strategies was to set up a broad, national united-front organization to unite as many people as possible in order to fight against the Japanese and the French. On 19 May 1941, according to the resolution of the Eighth Plenum and the suggestion of Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969), Việt Minh (short for Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, League for the Independence of Vietnam) was set up in Jingxi, a bordertown in Guangxi province, China. It proclaimed that the organization would unite all patriotic compatriots, regardless of class, age, gender, religion, or political standpoint, in order to defeat Japanese and French fascism, obtain the nation’s liberation and existence, and establish a revolutionary government according to a new democratic spirit. Hồ Chí Minh was elected chairman of Việt Minh. The organ of Việt Minh was *Bao Việt Nam Độc Lập (Vietnamese Independence)*.

Việt Minh successfully conjoined all patriot groups, such as the national salvation societies for workers, peasants, women, students, artists, and religious organizations. Việt Minh set up the first base in Cao Bang province; it greatly extended its base during the Pacific War (1941–1945), and before the August Revolution of 1945, its force had spread over central and North Vietnam and eventually all over the



Under the guard of communist Việt Minh troops, French and Vietnamese prisoners of war march from the battlefields of Dien Bien Phu, the fallen French fortress in Indochina, on 28 July 1954. This was one of the first pictures to reach the outside after the communists stormed over the bastion in May. (Bettmann/Corbis)

country. Branch committees of various levels of Việt Minh were set up all over Vietnam. After the establishment of Việt Minh, the anti-French and-Japanese fascist movement was called the Việt Minh movement.

During the Pacific War, Việt Minh tried to contact agents of the U.S. Office of Strategic Service (OSS), the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Việt Minh also sought the French resistance government led by General Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970) as well as the Kuomintang (KMT) government of China headed by Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975), in order to garner support for its resistance movement. On 16–17 August 1945, Việt Minh convened a National People's Congress. The Vietnamese Nation Liberation Council, which functioned as the provisional government, was set up at this meeting. Hồ Chí Minh was elected chairman, and Tran Hui Lieu vice chairman. The standing committee consisted of

five members: Hồ Chí Minh, Tran Hui Lieu, Nguyễn Luong Bang, Pham Van Dong (1906–2000), and Duong Duc Hien. The same meeting passed the decision to launch an immediate general uprising and to carry out ten programs, including seizing power and establishing a revolutionary government named the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). This congress also passed a resolution about the national flag of the coming DRV.

Since the goal of Việt Minh was to win the nation's liberation, it began to prepare for a general uprising as soon as it was established, and by the eve of the August Revolution, Việt Minh had controlled most of the villages in central and North Vietnam. In August 1945, the ICP launched a nationwide insurrection and seized power in Vietnam following the Japanese surrender. After the victory of the August Revolution, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was established in Hanoi and a provisional gov-

ernment led by Hồ Chí Minh was set up in the name of the Việt Minh. Việt Minh dominated in the first National Assembly of DRV and the united government formed in early 1946. Hồ Chí Minh was elected president of DRV. When the First Indochina War (1946–1954) broke out, Việt Minh called on all circles to unite to fight against the French. It was via Việt Minh and its attendant mass societies that DRV obtained mass support in the struggle against the French.

On 3 March 1951, Việt Minh was merged into a broader front organization, *Lien Việt Front* (League for the National Union of Vietnam), which was created by Việt Minh in May 1945 to win increased support from the masses. The new organization was named the *Front of Lien* (Vietnam National United Front).

Việt Minh represented the successful united-front strategy of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) in gaining mass support to win revolutionary victory. Việt Minh gathered all kinds of patriotic organizations, and also established contacts with the Allies. Hồ Chí Minh and the VCP concluded that to set up a broad united front was a magic weapon for reaching their victory.

HUANG YUN JING

See also Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), Battle of; Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945); Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP)

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VIET NAM QUOC DAN DANG (VNQDD, VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PARTY) (1927)

Radical Nationalist Organization

Established by Nguyễn Thái Học in 1927 in Hanoi, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang was a radical political party of Vietnam with some socialist colors. The party was based on Sun Yat-sen's (1866–1925) Three Principles of the People (*San Min Chu I* [*Sanmin Zhuyi*]—Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood) and copied the organizational structure of the Revolutionary Youth League of Vietnam. It was one of the major rivals of and co-operators with the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) in the early years of the twentieth century.

On 25 December 1927, Nguyễn Thái Học and other radical nationalists organized Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, and Học was elected chairman. The new organization had the same name as the party that had transformed itself from the Restoration Society, led by Phan Bội Châu (1867–1940) in 1924, and some of its members came from Phan's party or were Phan's sympathizers; strictly speaking, however, it was independent of Phan's party, which collapsed after Phan was arrested in 1925. The members of VNQDD came mainly from the middle class, such as petty bourgeoisie; bourgeoisie intelligentsia; and patriotic gentlemen, young teachers, students, and journalists; some peasants and workers also joined the party. In addition, VNQDD established branches among the Vietnamese soldiers who served in the French army, in order to prepare for an uprising and to seize power by force. At the very beginning, however, the French authorities had already penetrated the party, and that resulted in its disastrous failure later.

The goal of VNQDD was to evict the French regime, achieve national independence, and establish a democratic republic in Vietnam; it also claimed that it worked for other suppressed nations, especially small and weak nations. Communist influence could be found in VNQDD's principles mentioned above, but VNQDD rejected the Marxist concept of class struggle. VNQDD also looked to China for inspiration and received financial support from the Kuomintang of China (Chinese Nationalist Party, founded by Sun Yat-sen).

The governing body of VNQDD was the National Headquarters, and there were eight committees under the headquarters: propaganda and training, organization, finance, information, military, judiciary, supervising, and assassination. VNQDD established branches at all levels—region, province (city), county, and village. Its official organ was *Cach Mang Hon (Revolution Soul)*.

The development of VNQDD may be divided into three periods. In the first period (from 1927 to early 1929), VNQDD expanded quickly; its apparatus spread all over the country. But VNQDD committed itself to violent revolution and assassination, pursued personal heroism, and scorned building up a mass organization with popular roots. VNQDD's clandestine activities, such as the stockpiling of weapons and making bombs, alerted the French authorities. When a Frenchman was assassinated in Hanoi, VNQDD was suspected of being involved in the plot, and that resulted in most of its cadres being arrested; the organization system of VNQDD was destroyed.

In the second period (from early 1929 to February 1930), although VNQDD had not recovered from the damage done to it, its leaders—who were being pursued by the French—decided hurriedly to launch a general uprising. The uprising was fixed for the night of 9 February 1930. The insurrection proceeded as planned at Yen Bay and several other military posts in and around Hanoi. Meanwhile, however, the French authorities interrupted preparations at other venues. Nonetheless, all the insurrection was frustrated, owing to poor coordination and last-minute preparations. Nguyễn Thái Học was arrested five days after the uprising while trying to make his way to China. He died on the guillotine on 17 June 1930, together with twelve of his comrades. Most of the party's leaders were captured and executed.

In the third period (after the failed insurrection), some VNQDD members escaped to southern China, where they split into two factions—one still held the original radical strategy of fomenting an armed uprising, while the other inclined toward a reformist approach. Both factions continued their activities under the title of VNQDD based in China and received financial support from the Kuomintang. As for those members of VNQDD who stayed

home, some engaged in assassination plots, others joined the Indochina Communist Party (ICP). In general, after 1930 the influence of VNQDD on Vietnam's nationalist movement declined. The failure of VNQDD paved the way for the ascension of ICP to the leadership of the Vietnamese nationalist movement.

After the Japanese surrender at the conclusion of the Pacific War (1941–1945), VNQDD returned to Vietnam with the support of the Kuomintang and participated in the united government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam led by Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969). After Chinese troops withdrew from Vietnam, VNQDD lost its backing and quickly waned. In the south, VNQDD survived after 1954 but only as a minor party. VNQDD was later disbanded.

HUANG YUN JING

See also China, Nationalist; Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Phan Bội Châu (1867–1940); Vietnam under French Colonial Rule; Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP)

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VIETNAM, NORTH (POST-1945)

The northern half of Vietnam is the cradle of the Vietnamese nation, and also, for a long time, its unique territory. However, since 1945, North Vietnam has been identified with an almost permanent state of war and with communist power, which first withstood the French and then U.S. armed forces, before uniting the entire nation in 1975.

A French protectorate since 1883, formerly composed of Tonkin and northern Annam, and in 1945 boasting a population of some 10 million, of which the majority were peasants living in the Red River delta, North Vietnam was to experience serious upheavals. In the 9 March 1945 coup, Japan, fearful of the progress made

by the United States in the Pacific, decided to end the privileged position of the French, with whom it had been collaborating since 1940. Japan conferred strictly controlled independence on the states it was “protecting.” U.S. bombardments seriously hampered communications, particularly the distribution of rice, causing a spectacular famine in the north.

The end of World War II (1939–1945) was close at hand when the Potsdam Conference (17 July–2 August 1945) constituted *de facto* North and South Vietnam as distinct territories, by dividing Indochina along the 16th Parallel in order to disarm the Japanese troops. As requested, China sent 200,000 men under the command of General Lu Han. He discovered a complicated situation and an OSS (U.S. Office of Strategic Service) team backing the Hồ Chí Minh insurrection. In fact, in August 1945, the Việt Minh (the League for the Independence of Vietnam) seized power, owing to a revolution that upset the entire country. On 2 September, Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969) proclaimed independence and the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Hanoi in front of the assembled crowds. The Indochina Communist Party (ICP) withdrew in November.

In order to reestablish themselves north of the 16th Parallel, the French, who had been able to take over the command of the south, under British military control, negotiated simultaneously with the Chinese and the Vietnamese. The 6 March 1946 Hồ Chí Minh–Sainteny agreement recognized Vietnam as a free state within the French Union, but it remained cautious about the status of the south. The return of French troops to the north, where they would be stationed together with the new Vietnamese army, was permitted, but such proximity between these two, a year after France was “chased” away from the north, was antagonistic at best and did not last long. On 24 November the Haiphong “incidents” provoked the death of several thousands, while on 19 December 1946 the Vietnamese show of force signaled the beginning of war.

A spirit of reconquest and resistance suffused the beginning of the Indochinese war in the north. It took the French a month to recapture Hanoi, whereas the Vietnamese government, entrenched in the mountains to the north of the capital, controlled the entire territory down to the 16th Parallel. This Tonkin hideout

would never be seized or controlled permanently and the rare attempts to negotiate with Hồ Chí Minh would not bring about any results. The reconquest itself would also remain incomplete: several provinces, notably in the center-north (Thanh Hoa, Nghệ An), remained under his authority without interruption. The entire north was thus subject to two political forces: that of the French Union on one side—France and the associated state of Vietnam (Bào Đai), established in 1949 as a counterweight to Hồ Chí Minh and the DRV—and that of the latter, which directly administered some provinces and whose influence was strongly felt in others.

The Indochinese conflict lasted eight years, with the main theater of combat in the north. The first military operations had to contend with a scorched-earth policy. The French had a hard time trying to gain control; time and again the Chinese frontier towns were recaptured before being abandoned anew. The Red River delta, the main producer of vital rice crops, rapidly turned into a murderous terrain of “hide-and-seek.” In those areas where the French marked an advance, the guerrillas were hidden in the vicinity, careful not to engage in combat unless they were sure of themselves, and striking by night. The two sides seemed to be inextricably entangled.

From 1950 onward, after China became a communist state (People’s Republic of China, PRC), offering a secure rear for the DRV, the north became the scene of more spectacular battles. The French suffered their first defeat at Cao Bang in October 1950, but in January they defeated the troops of General Vo Nguyễn Giáp (1911–) at Vinh Yen. In 1951 the French commander-in-chief General de Lattre constructed a network of fortifications around the delta of the Red River that was supposed to resist enemy attacks. Fortified camps were soon strengthened in the mountainous regions, tempting enough to lure the enemy but also strong enough to withstand attacks and inflict heavy losses. This method proved successful for the French in Na San in December 1952, but not at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954.

The July 1954 Geneva Agreement restored the status quo of 1945. For the time being a new demarcation line, this time along the 17th Parallel, 100 kilometers north of the 16th, was to separate the adversaries (DRV and French

Union). The French forces evacuated Hanoi on 10 October 1954 and the port of Haiphong on 20 May 1955, while numerous refugees, mainly Catholics, abandoned the north. Việt Minh combatants undertook exactly the opposite itinerary from the south. However, elections planned for 1956 were never carried out, and until 1975 the DRV continued to function in the north.

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam rapidly organized itself as a state with its own currency—stemming directly from the maquis—and its own constitution (1959). The country then functioned as a “popular democracy,” within which the Labour Party (*Dang Lao Dong*), refounded in 1951, was actually invested with political power. During this period, at first directed by Truong Chinh (1907–1988), and then temporarily by Hồ Chí Minh himself in 1956, the Labour Party convened only a single congress, the so-called Third Congress in 1960. Le Duan (1907–1986) became the secretary-general until after reunification, while Hồ Chí Minh was president of the republic, seconded by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong (1906–2000).

The economic reconstruction of the DRV was handicapped by loss of relations with the south and areas where French interests were unable to be maintained. Nevertheless the DRV enjoyed the presence of French industrial infrastructure, the rich mineral resources such as coal (Hong Gai) and metals, and the support of both China and the entire Communist bloc. Therefore North Vietnam attempted to establish a veritable industrial base (the iron and steel-making complex of Thai Nguyên). As for agriculture, the agrarian reform that had been on the agenda since 1953 in the north, but had suffered from an excess of zeal as in Maoist China, provoked a serious crisis in 1956. A revolt broke out in the province of Nghệ An, and the secretary-general of the party, Truong Chinh, was forced to resign. Following that event, land collectivization began anew. Conversely, the liberal intellectual movement, similar to the Communist Chinese Hundred Flowers movement—part of the de-Stalinization process in motion in the communist world—would not perdure.

After the first decade of establishing the foundation of socialism (1954–1964), the north was again faced with the prospect of war. The north, considered by the United

States to be responsible for the reactivation of the maquis in the south and also designated responsible for the July 1964 incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, again paid heavy tribute to the war, albeit in a new way. Besides providing a growing number of young underground fighters in the south via the Hồ Chí Minh Trail, from 1965 to 1968 the north also suffered a severe escalation of U.S. bombing raids. Despite the fact that the DRV was not the Indochinese territory that suffered the heaviest bombing, the ever-increasing and audacious U.S. raids nevertheless dropped 425,000 tons of bombs there. Accordingly, destruction was clearly evident in all the important towns between the 17th Parallel and the Red River delta, as well as in a majority of industrial installations. Politically, the principal result of this onslaught was to reunite the population of the north, which was entirely mobilized behind its leaders in facing this threat. From 1968 onward, after a brief period of relative calm and after the final air raid on Hanoi in December 1972, before the signature of the Paris agreement, the North Vietnamese skyline returned to normal. Two years later—Hồ Chí Minh having died in 1969—on 30 April 1975 the People’s Army’s entry into Saigon was celebrated by enthusiastic crowds in Hanoi.

The north then proceeded to reunite the country. After designating a sole and unique national assembly in 1976, its political structure was extended to cover the entire territory. The moment of national integration had come, not only in the south but also in the north, where the “autonomous regions,” which since 1954 were supposed to guarantee special status to the minorities, were disbanded that same year. Yet the north did not enjoy immediate and complete peace, because in February 1979, in retaliation for Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attacked it along the entire land frontier; within a month it had devastated all the towns there (Lang Son).

However, the north remains the decision-making center of the country, as it is the most populated area, with more than 40 million inhabitants today; it is also probably the most impoverished. After a decade of Soviet influence (1976–1986), united Vietnam did not escape major challenges in the north that the policy of

“renovation” (*doi moi*) had to face. One of these problems was to relieve the congestion of the countryside, more densely populated than ever, especially in the Red River delta, or address the deficit in international investment, indispensable for maintaining equilibrium with the south, which was traditionally more open to the outside world.

Long disparaged if not feared, birthplace of the country as well as of the revolution, and veritable national matrix, the north was able to enduringly uphold its preeminence, despite the upheavals of colonialism and East-West confrontation. The cradle of Vietnam remains the ruling core of the nation.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also China since 1949; Cold War; Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), Battle of; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*); Geneva Conference (1954); Gulf of Tonkin Incident (August 1964); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Hồ Chí Minh Trail; Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS); Le Duan (1907–1986); Le Duc Tho (1911–); Paris Peace Agreement (1968, 1973); Pham Van Dong (1906–2000); Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Sino-Vietnamese Wars; Truong Chinh (1907–1988); Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, League for the Independence of Vietnam); Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP, Dang Cong San Viet Nam); Vo Nguyễn Giap, General (1911–)

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VIETNAM, SOUTH (POST-1945)

South Vietnam has been the most disputed part of the country since 1945. At war until 1954, and in varying degrees from 1959 to 1975, it has endured practically every kind of political regime in the past fifty years.

Southern Vietnam, originally the French colony of Cochinchina and the southern part of Annam, experienced numerous upheavals after 1945, beginning with the Japanese takeover by force on 9 March. Governor-General Jean Decoux (t. 1940–1945) and the entire French colonial administration were arrested in Saigon by the Japanese authorities they had been collaborating with until then. Thereafter the August Revolution established Vietnamese authority over the city (Tran Van Giàu) and the rest of the region, but that was not to last long. After the Potsdam Conference (17 July–2 August 1945), the British army took control of Indochina south of the 16th Parallel, while the Chinese did the same in the north, and let the French representatives reinstate French sovereignty in the south on 23 September. With some difficulty,

General Leclerc then progressively retook the southern towns where Vietnamese power had been established. Nevertheless, security would never be ensured there again.

The question of Cochin China—namely, that of the actual south (Saigon and the Mekong Delta)—envenomed relations between France and Vietnam, as well as between Saigon, where High Commissioner Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu (t. 1945–1947) was established, and Hanoi, capital of the insurrectionary Hồ Chí Minh government. The Hồ Chí Minh–Sainteny agreement of 6 March 1946, which permitted the return of French forces to the north, recognized Vietnam as a free state within the French Union. The agreement, however, did not actually settle the question of the south, because France exercised direct sovereignty in Cochin China as opposed to the rest of Vietnam—Annam and Tonkin, which were protectorates. France wished to preserve its sovereignty in Cochin China, but neither the Dalat Conference (April–May) nor that of Fontainebleau (July–August 1946) permitted an agreement regarding the novel status of Indochina. On 1 June 1946, France even permitted an autonomous Republic of Cochin China presided over by Vietnamese Dr. Nguyễn Văn Thinh to be proclaimed. This territorial bone of contention, combined with the fact that Hanoi and Saigon found little to agree about, was directly responsible for the tension that led to open war on 19 December 1946.

From 1946 to 1954, the south was one of the two most important theaters of the Indochinese war. Insecurity was widespread, and during the first few years land transport was conducted by armed convoys, which occasionally were victims of ambushes by Việt Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam). The zones controlled by both sides were inextricably enmeshed. War took on multiple guises—for example, a “rice war” began in 1949, which was the reason why French forces blockaded the Transbassac—the southern half of the Mekong Delta and an important rice-producing region. French military operations, more or less lengthy and effective, permitted the partial loosening of the guerrilla stranglehold.

Meanwhile on the political level, the Cochin Chinese south progressively lost its own identity, as France, which opted to install Bảo Đại (1913–1997) to act as a counterbalance to Hồ

Chí Minh (1890–1969), transferred power to the former emperor. Action was undertaken stage by stage. In October 1947, the Republic of Cochin China became the “provisionary government of South Vietnam.” But Bảo Đại, who relied on the principal nationalist leaders of the country (north, central, and south), laid claim and obtained from France that which Hồ Chí Minh was refused—namely, the unity of the country. An agreement was reached on 8 March 1949, and Bảo Đại became the head of the Associated State of Vietnam (t. 1949–1955), with jurisdiction over the entire national territory. Soon the French National Assembly voted Cochin China back to Vietnam. Thus, in opposition to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), there emerged a “Franco-Vietnamese” camp that had the southern territory better under control than the north. Bảo Đại established his capital in Dalat.

The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and the partition of Vietnam on both sides of the 17th Parallel sealed in a demilitarized zone that was soon impossible to cross. It virtually immobilized this division that covered a territory larger than it had been in 1945 south of the 16th Parallel—this time comprising the region of Huế and Danang at the center of the country. The south was the regroupment zone for French Union forces, while the forces of the DRV held the north. This division, meant to be temporary, was accompanied by two changes in the south. Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963), who in June 1954 had become the prime minister to Bảo Đại, then in France, would instead rely upon the United States, which maintained a military mission in Saigon after 1950 and whose influence in the conflict was growing. At the end of a confusing period of conflicts of influence in Saigon, the deposition of Bảo Đại was announced in May 1955, and in October, following a referendum, the Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed, presided over by Ngô Đình Diệm. The last French forces left the south in April 1956, and the general elections scheduled by the Geneva Agreements were never held.

Under the regime of Ngô Đình Diệm (1955–1963), which benefited from U.S. assistance, South Vietnam, populated by about 10 million, established itself like the north as a state (1956 constitution). But increasing disturbances were felt, first in the countryside and then in the urban areas. Saigon responded by trying to

regroup the rural population into “strategic hamlets.” Meanwhile, “somewhere in South Vietnam” the creation in December 1960 of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF), under the presidency of the lawyer Nguyễn Hữu Thọ, kindled these movements of revolt and reactivated the former guerrilla Việt Minh. One would soon talk of “Việt Cộng” (Vietnamese Communists): the Labour Party of Hanoi had actually secretly created an entirely clandestine “southern branch” of its central committee. (The Labour [or Workers’] Party was the adopted name of the Vietnamese Communist Party [VCP]. The VCP came under this guise in 1951 when Hồ Chí Minh resurrected it.) From May to September 1963, tensions pitted Ngô Đình Diệm, whose family was Catholic, against the Buddhists of Huế and Saigon; demonstrations, confrontation, and suicide by fire followed each other in rapid succession, in particular after the old monk Thích Quảng Đức set himself on fire and died. On 1 November 1963 the United States, convinced of the necessity to change leaders, encouraged a military coup in which President Diệm and his brother and principal adviser, Ngô Đình Nhu, were assassinated.

During this prelude to the direct intervention of the United States in Vietnam, and in a south now in a state of war, the personality of General Nguyễn Văn Thiệu (1923–2001) rapidly emerged from the military junta in power, while a new constitution was adopted (1967). He would preside over the Republic of Vietnam from 1967 to 1975. From 1965 onward, U.S. troops displayed their presence in the south and pursued the Việt Cộng, or VC. The south would live according to the pace set by the U.S. presence, numbering up to 500,000, and the airlifted operations carried out against the guerrillas. Two important offensives from the maquis would mark this period, that of the Tet (New Year) 1968 and 1972. The Tet offensive was when war broke out in all the southern cities that had been spared until then, even wracking Saigon; neither side obtained a decisive success. The scenario of 1972 resembled the more conventional method of waging war. As a reaction to the harsh repression that followed the Tet offensive, the presence of northern fighters was reinforced in the south. Although negotiations were taking place in Paris (1968–1973), the south became an immense

battlefield. The Saigon regime was able to control most of the towns and national roads, which were moreover often cut, whereas the guerrillas, who had established a Provisional Revolutionary Government (GRP) in 1969, wielded authority over the countryside and the more remote regions. Even if the 1973 Paris agreement did establish a cease-fire, it did not bring about any political solution, nor did it modify this geographical situation.

The last communist offensive, which started from the central plateau of Ban Me Thuot in March 1975 under the direction of important leaders sent from Hanoi (Van Tien Dung, Le Duc Tho), brought about the demise of the southern regime. Deprived of U.S. support, its provinces and military forces collapsed like a house of cards. The Republic of Vietnam, abandoned by Nguyễn Văn Thiệu a week before, ceased to exist on 30 April 1975, when the People’s Army entered Saigon, which had been evacuated at the eleventh hour in an emergency operation by the last Americans still stationed there. No bloodbath took place, but the situation was completely unprecedented.

Because of the long period of separate development and in view of its privileged contact with Western powers (France, the United States), the south, with its population of 20 million, had evolved into a consumer society fed by imports and enjoying a level of life slightly superior to that in the north. A new chapter was to begin within a unified Vietnam under the leadership of the communist regime of the north. Admittedly, reunification was not officially and immediately made part of the agenda while a military committee ran Saigon. Only when a National Assembly was elected in April 1976 was reunification proclaimed. However, the south had to comply without fail to the new standards. Austerity gained ground after the relative affluence: reeducation in diverse guises, especially for those who exercised a post of responsibility under the old regime, or forced departure toward the “new economic regions,” which were not always very welcoming. Quite a few of those who had not managed to leave the country then attempted to do so. Tensions reached a climax during the triangular conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia of the Red Khmers (Khmer Rouge) on the one hand and between Vietnam and China on the other. The more or less tolerated departure of the “boat

people” in 1979–1980 led hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, partly of Chinese origin, to leave Vietnam under great risk and peril.

The opening of Vietnam and the *doi moi* (renovation), from 1986 onward, partially restored dynamism to the south. This part of Vietnam had always been more open to the world, if only because of its geographic situation. When Vietnam was forced to abandon its adherence to the Soviet camp and began its integration into the new Asia of international investment and export-oriented industrialization, the south was the most adapted to meeting the challenge because of its fairly recent capitalist past. Thus it became one of the driving forces of this integration.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN); Bảo Đại (Vinh Thự) (1913–1997); Boat People; Cold War; Domino Theory; Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Le Duc Tho (1911–); My Lai; New Economic Zones (NEZs) (Vietnam); Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–1963); Nguyễn Văn Thiệu (1923–2001); Paris Peace Agreement (1968, 1973) (Vietnam); Saigon (Gia Định, Hồ Chí Minh City); Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Sino-Vietnamese Wars; Strategic Hamlet Program (Vietnam); Tet Offensive (1968); U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945); Việt Cong

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VIETNAM UNDER FRENCH COLONIAL RULE

If the southern part of Vietnam, Cochinchina, became in the 1860s a fully ceded colony under direct French administration, the central and northern parts, Annam and Tonkin, were formally occupied twenty years later as protectorates. However, there was not very great statutory disparity between Cochinchina, where a policy of assimilation was followed, and the protectorate of Annam-Tonkin, where a policy of association was supposedly tried. The difference became still smaller after the creation of the Indochinese Union in 1887. Integrated into a greater entity, the Vietnamese territories completely lost their individuality, while the unity of the whole, which had essentially the same boundaries as in the mid-nineteenth century, was progressively in-

creased by the improvement of communications. Despite considerable regional diversity, Vietnam was transformed into a more unified country and society. The prevailing idea of the reorganization attempted by Governor-General Paul Doumer (t. 1897–1902) in 1897 was to make the colony self-sufficient in economic terms and not a burden on France. Doumer also started a program for the modernization of the country, which included the construction of railroads (the *Transindochinois*, linking Hanoi to Saigon, was to be completed only in 1936), transport canals, roads and harbors, and the drainage of the Mekong Delta to expand the cultivated area. Two principal dimensions shaped the subsequent economic development: expansion and control of trade, and investment in production for export. But during the entire colonial period (1885 to 1945) the Vietnamese were in no position to prevent the French from dominating all these spheres, with the Chinese also playing an important role in trade, both internally and externally. It can be argued that by the late 1930s, Vietnam was still in part a “traditional” society and economy, but in part a component of the economy of the French empire. Vietnam did not really possess a “national” economy of its own. Nor were the French concerned to promote Vietnam’s balanced economic development as a country.

Substantial French investments transformed both the infrastructure of Indochina and its capacity to produce primary commodities for export. The building of canals, allowing more effective water control in the Mekong Delta, opened up large new areas for rice production. Although the French probably owned no more than about 15 percent of the rice land there, they benefited hugely from the expansion of exports (Nguyễn 1970: 187, 191). They also developed rubber planting on a large scale, as well as coffee plantations, while French investment in mining led to the exploitation of coal, tin, zinc, wolfram, and phosphates. On the other hand, businessmen in France actively discouraged significant investment in manufacturing in Vietnam, with the result that only a few factories were allowed to produce textiles, matches, and cement. The precolonial pattern of industrial handicrafts in Tonkin was still represented in 1934 by around 250,000 peasants

(7 percent of the labor force) engaged in small-scale industries (Gourou 1940: 312–314). But for the most part Vietnamese consumer demand was met by imports from France and elsewhere.

These developments, however, introduced sharp socioeconomic contrasts between the Mekong Delta and the Red River delta: differences in demographic densities were reflected in the growth of two opposite economies—one founded on the exportation of agricultural products, the other of a character already less colonial and more differentiated. The south (Cochin China), being the area most recently conquered and settled by the Vietnamese, as well as the first to be dominated by the French, was doubly different from the north (Tonkin) and the center (Annam). Originally part of Cambodia, the south had only gradually been brought under Vietnamese control between ca. 1660 and ca. 1840 and remained something of a frontier region even in the second half of the nineteenth century. The French were thus able, to a remarkable extent, to shape the pattern both of its economic exploitation and of its continued settlement by the Vietnamese. An engineering approach to development, which endeavored to get control of the waterways, drastically increased transportation capability and agricultural productivity. Already in the 1890s the digging of canals was allowing large new areas of rice production to be opened up, on the basis of government concessions to large landowners.

This process continued until the 1920s, producing in some areas a pattern of landownership and tenure quite uncharacteristic of traditional Vietnam. Two social groups were formed, the *điền chủ* (landowners) and the *tá điền* (tenant farmers). The former included the absent large landowner, often arousing discontent by lack of responsibility, and the small landowner. Interestingly, the small landowner’s living conditions were not necessarily very different from those of the *tá điền*, squeezed between the Chinese rice monopoly, the Indian moneylenders, the French colonial authorities, and the large landowners. But the Mekong Delta emerged in a short time as one of the major rice-exporting areas of the world, and rice production increased steadily, as shown in the following table.

Rice Cultivation and Export

Year	Area of Rice Cultivation	Export (metric tons of cleaned rice)
1880	1,282,000 acres	284,000
1900	2,656,000 acres	747,000
1920	4,572,000 acres	1,200,000
1939	5,450,000 acres	1,454,000

SOURCE: Nguyễn Thế Anh. 1970. *Viet-Nam duoi thoi Phap do ho* [Vietnam under French Domination]. Saigon: Lua Thieng, p. 184.

In the early twentieth century, comparable French encouragement was given to large-scale rubber, coffee, and tea planting in the northern part of Cochin China. Rubber production, which was enough to satisfy practically all the metropolitan needs, was controlled by French societies. On the eve of the Pacific War (1941–1945), rubber export reached 60,000 metric tons per year, representing 18 percent of Indochina's exports (Nguyễn 1970: 208). These developments contributed in turn to the growth of Saigon-Cholon as a major commercial center, with Saigon itself becoming a predominantly French-style city at its core.

Another significant feature of the society and economy of the south was the much higher percentage of Chinese residents there than elsewhere. Over the centuries Chinese settlement had contributed a great deal to the life and culture of Vietnam as a whole, but the south was unusual in that Chinese communities had already existed at Biên Hòa, Mỹ Tho, and Hà Tiên, even when the Vietnamese first established administrative control. Further migration occurred in the colonial period. By the mid-1930s, out of a total of 217,000 inhabitants counted as Chinese, as many as 171,000 lived in Cochin China (ibid.: 232, 238).

The acute congestion of the Red River delta forbade any possibility of exportable agricultural surplus such as in Cochin China. In the north, the French had to look for other forms of enterprise, drawing energy, raw materials, and manpower from the country's reserves. Large amounts of capital were injected in mineral exploitation—namely, in the coal mines of Hon Gai and Đông Triều, and in the zinc and

tin mines of the higher region. Capital was expended in the spinning and weaving mills of Nam Định and Hải Phòng, in the cement manufactures of Hải Phòng, and in the distilleries and breweries of Hanoi. Mining industries expanded the most: in 1939 the production of anthracite was 2,615,000 tons, 1,780,000 of which was exported (ibid.: 217). The impact of European industrialization, nevertheless, induced the emergence of new social categories, in particular of a somewhat unstable proletariat, even though the peasantry still constituted the bulk of the population.

Industrial activities, however, entirely accomplished under the sign of private initiative and free enterprise, did not seem to contribute efficiently to the solution of the problems brought about by population increase. For instance, on the eve of the Pacific War, factories employed all in all only about 90,000 workers (ibid.: 256). Likewise, temporary migrations of laborers going to work on the plantations of the south could in no way lighten the burden of overpopulation, since the growth rate of Tonkin's population amounted to 100,000 inhabitants per year (ibid.: 234). The healthy population growth owed much to French vaccination and inoculation programs, as well as the greater tranquillity that French rule brought to certain rural areas. In spite of positive economic progress, however, the living standard of Tonkin's peasantry remained miserable, and one should not wonder at the paradox that greater economic production went hand in hand with greater poverty at the lowest levels.

The populations of North and central Vietnam, living in complete deprivation, exasper-

ated by fiscal abuses (especially salt and alcohol monopolies) and by the systematic exploitation of manpower by the urban industrialists and the rural landowners, would easily listen to nationalist propaganda. Ever since France had intervened in Vietnam, national emancipation had been the goal of Vietnamese patriotism. But the tutelage imposed upon the Vietnamese monarchy by the French had dispossessed the Nguyễn dynasty of any nationalist influence and marked the defeat of traditional society. Rebellions against French rule, led previously by men loyal to the imperial government at Huế, were replaced by rural uprisings, which were virtually leaderless protests of discontented peasants. In any case, the traditional opposition of the Confucian mandarins, characterized by total refusal of the French presence solely because it was alien, had subsided even before World War I (1914–1918). Although still versed in Confucianism, a new generation of scholars advocated Westernization, and many tried to push for national modernization within a framework of cooperation with France. Even the old revolutionary Phan Boi Châu (1867–1940) had to go back on his long anticolonialist past to underline the sterility of regrets for an elapsed past in a brochure entitled “French Vietnamese Collaboration,” published in 1925. More and more young intellectuals with new ideas would wish for a closer association with the French, in the hope that France would engage their country on the path of administrative, social, and economic renovation. This young intellectual group mostly had attended Franco-Annamite schools concentrated in urban centers for their secondary education; some undertook advanced study at the University of Hanoi, founded by the French to offer training in medicine, law, and teaching. A small minority, usually the children of wealthy southerners, were sent to France for university training.

This new intelligentsia, a product of the French-controlled educational system, aimed to address the dilemmas of youthful alienation with calls for the re-creation rather than reform of the moral and social order in Vietnam. Belonging to the first real generation of intellectuals produced by French cultural influence and so attached to liberal ideas as to be intolerant of traditional forms altogether, these young radicals sought to break with the Confucian past and colonial present. A “Cultural Revolution”

thus took place in the 1920s–1930s. It waged a literary war—because it was difficult to attack the colonial regime frontally—against what was considered the decrepit institutions of traditional Vietnamese society, with the hope of bringing, through literature, the spirit of reform into all spheres of Vietnamese life.

In any case, placed in a subordinate position in auxiliary offices of the French administrative apparatus, the new leading class was only poorly associated with a superstructure that they did not belong to, and that notwithstanding, were uprooting it from its fundamental traditions. (Without exception, metropolitan Frenchmen held every important post in Indochina’s civil service, and even at lower levels, Frenchmen still staffed much of the bureaucracy.) But, steeped in the feeling of their racial superiority and set on safeguarding their privileges, the French *colons* urged the administration to maintain a despotic and exclusive (read pro-French colonist) policy. All attempts at reform were blocked, including the demands for a constitution presented by Bùi Quang Chiêu in the name of Cochinchina’s bourgeoisie (1923), and the proposals relating to the respect of Vietnamese identity and a genuine protectorate spirit formulated by Phạm Quỳnh (1924–1930). Many a discouraged Vietnamese moderate patriot was thus driven to parties influenced by Asianism or by communism. One of these was the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng), which represented a new stage in Vietnamese revolutionaries’ efforts to forge new forms of integration, embracing a wider variety of social groups. It was a clandestine organization aimed at incorporating in the party’s program the three democratic principles of Sun Yat-sen’s Guomindang and at “realizing a national revolution, using violent means to overthrow the imperialist regime so as to establish an independent republic in Vietnam” (ibid.: 328–330). Communism attracted a large number of the urban, educated population, whose immediate support appeared to be best obtained by a communist appeal directed toward their frustration over the limited opportunities offered to a modern elite under French rule. Indeed, discouraged by the incomprehensive policy of the colonial administration, Vietnamese intellectuals were in search of any new anticolonial ideology that was unconnected with the past or the values of colonial-

ism. For want of an alternative mobilizing ideology, they turned toward communism, or at the very least sympathized with it. In part this was because the Indochina Communist Party, founded in mid-1929 and defining itself as a revolutionary organism of struggle against the colonial regime, appeared capable of offering at the same time “scientific” revolutionary techniques for political liberation and an ideological solution to replace the obsolete Confucian value system.

In the decade preceding the Pacific War, most of the Vietnamese elite had become fervent advocates of independence, albeit the failure of different revolts fomented by the Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng or the communists. The nationalist movement was now expressed through two principal tendencies. Cochin China’s bourgeoisie was rather partial to the evolution toward a dominion status for Vietnam. The Indochina Communist Party, although compelled to go underground, implanted all over Indochina syndicates and unions that laid claim to democratic liberties and the improvement of living conditions for all, while the ultimate goal remained the overthrow of French rule. It had become clear, however, that a more comprehensive, structured, and enduring movement was required to put an end to French domination. The opportunity for such action appeared to arise when the Japanese wartime occupation broke the French hold on Vietnam.

NGUYỄN THẾ ANH

See also Annam; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Cochin China; Communism; Confucianism; Education, Western Secular; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; French Indochinese Union (*Union Indochinoise Française*) (1887); Hanoi (Thang-long); Hatien; Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Phan Bội Châu (1867–1940); Saigon (Gia Định, Hồ Chí Minh City; Sun Yat-sen, Dr. (1866–1925); Tonkin (Tongking); Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, League for the Independence of Vietnam); Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party)

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VIETNAM WAR (1964–1975)

See Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975)

VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY (VCP) (DANG CONG SAN VIET NAM)

The Vietnamese Communist Party is the Vietnamese communist political organization and the current ruling party in Vietnam.

The VCP’s predecessor was the Thanh-Nien (Revolutionary Youth League of Vietnam), which was organized by Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969) in 1925, in Guangzhou, China. In 1929 the first—which was also the last—congress of the Youth League was held in Hong Kong. During that congress the league split, and three communist organizations were set up in three separate regions. They were Dong Duong Cong San Dang (Indochinese Communist

Party, or CPI) in the north, Dong Duong Cong San Lian Doan (Indochinese Communist League) in the central region, and An Nam Cong San Dang (Annam Communist Party, or ACP) in the south. Hồ Chí Minh merged the three organizations into one in 1930 according to the directives of the Communist International (Comintern). He convened the meeting as the representative of the Communist International, and named the new party the Vietnamese Communist Party on 3 February 1930 in Hong Kong. Tran Phu was named the temporary general secretary of the party. Several months later, in October 1930, VCP was renamed the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) under the instructions of Comintern, and Tran Phu was formally elected secretary-general of the party.

The principles of the party included a crack-down on imperialism and feudalism during the period of bourgeoisie democratic revolution in order to achieve national independence and effect the equal redistribution of land. Initially the headquarters, the Central Committee of the party, was located in central Vietnam and then was moved to Saigon (Hồ Chí Minh City). In spring 1931, most of the members of the Central Committee, including Tran Phu, were arrested in Saigon after the failure of the Nghe-Tinh Soviets Movement, which was agitated by local party members. Tran Phu died in prison several months later.

In the following years, ICP recovered gradually. Ban Chi Huy Hai Ngoai (the Overseas Executive Committee), which functioned as a temporary liaison bureau between Dabluro (short for Byuro Dalnego Vostoka, the Far Eastern Bureau, a branch of Comintern) in Moscow and the domestic party apparatus, was established in 1934 in Macao with the help of the Comintern. Its head was Le Hong Phong, a communist returned from Moscow. In 1935 the First Congress of ICP was held in Macao, which indicated ICP's recovery. During the Popular Front period (1936–1939), the Communist Party became public, and it was given a legal position. But soon after the end of the Popular Front period, in 1939, the French arrested more than 200 party leaders and drove the party underground.

In February 1941, Hồ Chí Minh came back to Vietnam and began to guide the Vietnamese revolution directly. In May, he presided over

the Eighth Plenum of ICP at Pac Bo. The primary task of the meeting was to establish the united front organization Việt Minh. Truong Chinh (1907–1988) was formally elected general secretary. ICP played a leading role in the August Revolution in 1945. To minimize the communist image and for the sake of unity, Hồ Chí Minh officially dissolved ICP on 11 November 1945 and set up a Society of Marxism Studies, whose president was Truong Chinh. In fact, ICP moved underground and continued to exist. The Second Congress of the party was held in February 1951 in Tuyen Quang province in North Vietnam, and ICP was renamed Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam (Vietnamese Worker's Party). Hồ Chí Minh was elected chairman of the Central Committee; Truong Chinh continued to serve as general secretary. The Third Congress of the party was held in 1960; Le Duan (1907–1986) was formally elected first secretary, and Hồ Chí Minh remained party chairman. In December 1976 the Fourth Congress was held in Hanoi, the two Vietnams were united, and the Vietnamese Worker's Party was renamed the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), the name that continues in use today. After Le's death in July 1986, Truong Chinh replaced him and served as head of the party until December 1986. At the Sixth Congress of the VCP, in 1986, Nguyễn Văn Linh was elected general secretary. At that congress, the VCP adopted the policy of *Doi Moi* (innovation), which started the course of reform and opening to the outside. In spring 2001, Nong Duc Manh became general secretary of the party.

As of the year 2000, the VCP had a total membership of 3 million. Its supreme body is the National Congress, which meets once every five years to approve important decisions and elect a Central Committee. The Central Committee meets twice a year to approve key decisions and functions during the adjournment of the National Congress. The ruling body of the party is the Politburo, elected by the Central Committee.

HUANG YUN JING

See also Comintern; Communism; Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Nghe Tinh Soviets (1930–1931); Truong Chinh (1907–1988); Việt Minh (Việt Nam

Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, League for the Independence of Vietnam); Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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VIETS

The Viet people are the principal ethnic group in the modern state of Vietnam. Vietnamese, the official language, belongs to the Viet-Muong branch of the Mon-Khmer language family. The Viet people pride themselves on having some of the oldest political, literary, religious, and cultural traditions of any group in Southeast Asia. The region from the Red River to the Mekong Delta, some 1,500 kilometers in length, historically constitutes the principal area of Viet occupation. Ethnic Viet social organization is traditionally associated with wet-rice farming, and the search for suitable land led to their gradual migration southward.

Viet ethnohistory is sometimes traced from the kingdom of Van Lang in the Red River delta region from the seventh century B.C.E. onward. The Hung dynasty kings are considered the first “Viet” monarchs (to ca. 279 B.C.E.). However, the emergence of the Chinese Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.–220 C.E.) led to a period of significant Chinese influence, which lasted until the tenth century C.E. Initially, Chinese rule did not interfere greatly with Viet forms of kingship, but soon Chinese influence dominated the Viet political and social elite. At lower levels of society, non-Chinese traditions persisted. Some Viet rebellions took place in the sixth century C.E., but under the Tang dynasty (618–907) a more oppressive form of Chinese

rule was introduced, which increased the social divisions between the sinicized elite and local people. One example of this was the emergence of a distinct Viet religious identity, which contrasted with Chinese Confucianism. This local religion merged spirit cults with Buddhism, introduced as a result of closer trading contacts with mainland South Asia and Southeast Asia.

In 679, the protectorate of Annam was created in central Vietnam. Rebellions by non-Viet Annamese minorities, especially ethnic Muong and T'ai, took place until the eighth century. However, their defeat led to the further marginalization of these groups from the Viet people, who were able to take over their lands. When Chinese authority in the delta finally collapsed in 939, it was a Viet general called Ngo Quyen who was able to establish himself as leader of the independent kingdom of Nam Viet.

Viet political and cultural identity now consolidated itself. For example, by the thirteenth century Vietnamese vernacular literary culture was well established. The new state also engaged in wars against non-Viet neighbors—namely, the Indianized powers of Champa (Cham) and Cambodia (Khmer). This enabled southward migration, but it also brought tensions in the nature of Viet kingship. Little control could be exerted from the northern capital over the competing noble families, who were constantly at war with each other from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. The country was politically divided throughout much of this period, and only in 1802 was a new, more central capital located at Huế. However, these political divisions did not result in the fragmentation of Viet ethnic identity, which was based upon the ideas of common language and shared cultural heritage and social organization.

In the nineteenth century Vietnam could not resist French colonial expansionism, and the country was divided from 1858 to 1873 into three political regions—namely, Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin. Vietnamese nationalist movements grew under colonialism, but it was not until the rise of the communist nationalist leader Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969) at the beginning of the twentieth century that one of these movements managed to integrate the peasantry. However, during this period a num-

ber of competing Viet identities did emerge that challenged the traditional underpinnings of Viet society in ways that other historical political divisions had not. For example, there was widespread Catholic missionary activity in the south, leading to the creation of a Viet Christian minority. This period also saw the development of a new Vietnamese script, *quốc ngữ*, which used roman letters rather than Chinese characters and was associated with the missionaries in the south. After the Pacific War (1941–1945), the communists under Hồ Chí Minh struggled to wrest control of the country from France, which was not achieved until 1954. At the Geneva Conference of that year, Vietnam was divided between the communist government in the north and the pro-Western regime in the south. Another twenty years of civil war followed. In 1975 the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was created with its capital in the north at Hanoi.

Divisions in the country from 1954 to 1975, and the emergence of two such different political systems, have undoubtedly made the writing of a unified Viet ethnohistory more difficult. However, problems in the relations between ethnic Viet people and other ethnic groups in the country were also made worse during this time. North and south introduced different policies for dealing with minorities, based on different interpretations of interethnic relations and majority Viet histories. Since reunification the fears of the minorities in relation to Viet hegemony have increased. This has been reflected particularly in the policy of population relocation. Ethnic Viet communities have been moved into many minority areas, such as the Central Highlands, in the effort to maximize agricultural and industrial production. Many feel that this is at the expense of the rights of other ethnic groups whose ancestral lands are being forcibly taken as a result.

MANDY SADAN

See also Annam; Buddhism; Champa; Cochin China; Confucianism; French Indochina; Geneva Conference (1954); Hanoi (Thanglong); Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Huế; Indigenous Political Power; Khmers; Missionaries, Christian; Montagnard; Nam Viet (Nan Yue); *Quốc Ngữ*; T'ais; Tonkin

(Tongking); Vietnam, North (post-1945); Vietnam, South (post-1945)

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**VISAYAN ISLANDS
(BISAYAN ISLANDS,
THE BISAYAS, THE VISAYAS)**

The Visayan Islands, otherwise known as the Bisayan Islands, the Bisayas, or the Visayas, are the central part of the Philippines, located between the islands of Luzon in the north and Mindanao in the south. They are bordered on the east by the Philippine Sea and on the west by the South China Sea. The combined area of the Visayan Islands is 61,077 square kilometers. Among the major islands, largest to smallest, are Samar, Negros, Panay, Leyte, Cebu, and Bohol. The sea area around the islands is called the Visayan Sea. Located in the middle of the Philippines, the Visayan Islands had active relations with other peoples of Southeast Asia, and also traded with China and Japan. They served as a link between Luzon and Mindanao. The islands were colonized by Spain and were made part of the Philippine Islands.

The Visayan Islands form the central portion of the Philippines and were, like Luzon and Mindanao, of tectonic origin. They are mountainous with coastal plains. Samar is the largest of the Visayan Islands, with an area of 13,080 square kilometers. Facing the Philippine Sea, it is exposed to typhoons and torrential rains. It is a rugged, mountainous island, with narrow coastal strips of land. Negros is the second largest, with an area of 12,705 square kilometers. Shaped like a boot, it is split by a mountain range that runs from north to south, peaking at Mt. Kanlaon, rising to 2,450 meters. Mt. Kanlaon, an active volcano, is the tallest mountain in the Visayas area.

Panay is the third largest Visayan island, with an area of 11,515 square kilometers. Mountains

break the island into four distinct areas—namely, Aklan, Antique, Capiz, and Iloilo. The highest mountain on the island is Mt. Nangtud at 2,049 meters. Next in size is the island of Leyte, of 7,214 square kilometers. Three mountain systems partition Leyte into three areas, the northeastern, the northwestern, and southern Leyte. Cebu is fifth largest in the Visayas area, with an area of 4,422 square kilometers. It is a long and narrow island with a mountain range running through the length of it. Cebu is geographically the center of the Visayan Islands. Lying south of Cebu is Bohol (3,865 square kilometers), which has the so-called Chocolate Hills, a group of small, rounded hills. Other islands in the Visayas region but considered under the administration of Luzon provinces are Palawan, Mindoro, Masbate, and Romblon.

Three distinct regions can be discerned among the Visayas Islands, characterized by different ethnolinguistic traditions. The Western Visayas speak Hiligaynon or Ilonggo, and comprise Panay and western Negros (Negros Occidental). Central Visayas speaks Sugbuanon, or Cebuano, and consists of eastern Negros (Negros Oriental), Cebu, and Bohol. Portions of western Leyte and northern Mindanao also speak Cebuano. The Eastern Visayas speak Waray-Waray and cover the islands of Leyte and Samar. A separate language is spoken in Aklan, island of Panay.

The people are called Visayans or Bisayans, and are generally of Malay origin. Mountain peoples of different ethnicity and languages are considered to have been the indigenous peoples; these consist of variants of the Negritos, among them the Atis in Panay, the Agta in Negros, and other groups. Legend has it that Bornean *datus* (chieftains) settled in the coasts, pushing the indigenous Negritos inland. Diverse but unique cultures emerged as local sociopolitical systems developed. Traditions of folk medicine, religion, and nobility arose.

The peoples in the Visayan region traded with each other, and also with neighboring peoples in Southeast Asia. By around 900 C.E., Chinese traders began to arrive, followed by Japanese. Several coastal towns emerged, with Cebu and Iloilo becoming particularly important.

The Spaniards arrived in March 1521, led by Ferdinand Magellan (1480–1521). Samar was the first island seen by the Spanish fleet sailing

from the Pacific. Magellan landed off Leyte and went on to Cebu. Filipinos led by Lapu Lapu killed Magellan in the island of Mactan, just off Cebu, when he attempted to subjugate the island. In 1565 the Spaniards returned under Miguel Lopez de Legazpi (1500–1572) and established their foothold in the Visayas. Filipinos resisted the Spanish onslaught, but they were defeated by force of arms. The Spaniards colonized the Visayan Islands, establishing the colonial capital in Cebu, before moving to Panay and then to Luzon. Cebu City became the first city in the Philippines, being established in 1565. The Spaniards formally divided the Visayan Islands into provinces, and established cities and towns.

Because of Spanish abuses such as forced labor, high taxes, and maltreatment, several revolts occurred during the Spanish colonial era in the Visayas. In 1621 the Tamblot revolt broke out in Bohol, while the Bankaw revolt occurred in Leyte. The Sumuroy rebellion erupted in 1649. The longest revolt against Spain was the Dagohoy revolt in Bohol, which lasted from 1744 to 1829. Not surprisingly the Visayas joined the anti-Spanish revolution that broke out in Luzon in 1896. When the United States assumed the colonial reins from the Spanish in 1898, the Visayans resisted the colonization, but the Americans were able to subdue this resistance and enforce their sovereignty over the islands.

Economic reforms during the late Spanish era and the American colonial period resulted in export crops being cultivated in the Visayas. This resulted in Negros and Panay having sugar plantations, while coconut farms were established in the other islands. Minerals (copper, iron) were also exploited on a small scale.

At the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945), the Japanese invaded the Visayan Islands. Filipino and U.S. soldiers were defeated in conventional warfare against the Japanese in 1942. Visayans then turned to guerrilla warfare, which limited the Japanese occupation to the major towns and cities. Japanese reprisals, however, led to many atrocities. The Americans returned to the Philippines, landing first on the island of Leyte in October 1944.

Agriculture and fishing are the major sources of livelihood for the Visayas. Panay Island plants sugar and rice, and is the main source of rice to the region. Negros until re-

cently was a major sugar producer. The sugar industry, however, resulted in serious socio-economic problems because of a large gap between the wealthy landowners and the poor and landless seasonal farmworkers. Coconut is also grown in the Visayan Islands. The area is rich in mineral deposits, with copper, iron, and pyrite mines. Manufacturing exists in the various islands, and an international processing zone was established in Mactan. Fertilizer, cement, and smelting plants provide employment and income.

Cebu is the center of economic activity in the region, with Cebu City second in importance only to the capital, Manila. Other major cities are Iloilo, Bacolod, and Tacloban, which are also important ports. The San Juanico Bridge, the longest bridge in the Philippines, joins the islands of Leyte and Samar. The Visayas area hosts a number of educational institutions, among them Silliman University in Negros Oriental, Central Philippines University in Iloilo, and the University of San Carlos in Cebu. The major international airport is located in Mactan. As of 2000, the population of the Visayan Islands was 15.14 million (National Statistics Office 2000).

The Visayas are presently divided into three administrative regions, each with the following provinces: Region 6, Western Visayas (Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Guimaras); Region 7, Central Visayas (Bohol, Cebu, Mactan, Negros Oriental); and Region 8, Eastern Visayas (Leyte, Southern Leyte, Samar, Eastern Samar, Northern Samar, Biliran).

The Visayan Islands possess rich historical and cultural traditions that exist to this day. They form part of the sociocultural diversity of the Philippines.

RICARDO TROTA JOSE

See also Anti-Spanish Revolts (The Philippines); Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia; Legazpi, Miguel Lopez de, Captain General (1500–1572); Malays; Philippines under U.S. Colonial Administration (1900–1941); Philippines under Spanish Colonial Rule (ca. 1560s–1898)

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VO NGUYỄN GIAP (1911–)

“Hero of Dien Bien Phu”

Comrade-in-arms of Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969), Vo Nguyễn Giap is famous for having defeated the French forces at Dien Bien Phu (May 1954) at the end of the First Indochina War (1946–1954). He then continued to lead the defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV, North Vietnam) in the war against the United States.

Both nationalist and communist from the very beginning, Vo Nguyễn Giap was born into a family of literate farmers in 1911 in a village in the central Vietnamese province of Quảng Bình. He attended Quoc Huc College in Huế, from which he was expelled in 1927 for having instigated a strike. While still an adolescent he belonged to one of the revolutionary groups formed in Vietnam. Arrested during the clamp-down following the 1930 upheavals and imprisoned for some time, he joined Hanoi and the Indochina Communist Party (ICP) in 1933. Although becoming a militant of the revolution, he pursued his studies in law and graduated in 1937 to become a history teacher.

The period during World War II (1939–1945) was decisive for him. In 1939 he went into exile in China, meeting up with Hồ Chí Minh and, after the 1941 foundation of the Việt Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam), stayed with the leader in the frontier zone. While in this frontier region, he rallied the numerous ethnic minorities to the revolutionary cause and began to form a military force. On 22 December 1944 he founded the Armed Propaganda Brigade for the Liberation of Vietnam, which, with other groups derived from the ICP, would constitute the People's Army of Vietnam.

The Revolution of August 1945 broke out less than a year afterward. As the right-hand man of Hồ Chí Minh, Vo Nguyễn Giap became minister of interior in the latter's first



General Vo Nguyễn Giap rejoicing, 29 May 1969. (Bettmann/Corbis)

government, besides occupying the post of vice-president of the Defense Council. He asserted himself as one of the key men during this decisive period that triggered the war. His first wife having died in prison, he remarried at that same time. However, some confusion in the division of tasks hinted at tension among leaders of the DRV. He became minister of defense in November 1946; war broke out the following month, and he left the post in June 1947 to assume the post of commander-in-chief of the People's Army. Then he regained the ministry of defense the following year and kept both posts, with the title of senior general.

During the First Indochina War, General Giap thus appeared to be the principal military leader of the resistance. He forged an efficient tool out of the People's Army with regular units and, from 1950 onward, was thus able to confront the French expeditionary corps directly. Although he was defeated, as at Vinh Yen in January 1951, he finally brought about a

brilliant victory in May 1954 at Dien Bien Phu, where he led the battle personally. After that battle, he became the strategist of the people's war.

In the divided Vietnam after 1954, he remained one of the main leaders of the DRV: member of the political bureau of the Labor Party (after its overhaul in 1951), vice-prime minister, minister of national defense, and commander-in-chief of the People's Army. In 1956 notably, he was the one to criticize the excesses of the agrarian reform in North Vietnam that was carried out by Truong Chinh (1907–1988). However, the “hero of Dien Bien Phu” was caught unprepared in the 1960s when the war was relaunched in the south and hit the north by the escalation of U.S. bombardments. His personal role in the decisions pertaining to the revolutionary war in the south is not well-known, but the 1975 victory, carried out by General Van Tien Dung, his deputy since 1953, is certainly also due to him.

After the reunification of Vietnam, while retaining all his functions, he took over responsibility for the “scientific and technical revolution” and presented a report on the subject at the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party (which by then had regained that name). Yet four years later, in 1980, after Vietnam’s double conflict against Cambodia and China, he lost his post of minister of defense and, in 1982, during the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party, he was evicted from the political bureau. After that he ceased to play any major political role.

General Giap might have seemed destined to enjoy the highest position in his own country, but he left the political scene following the demise of “Uncle Ho” when Vietnam, in open conflict with China, seemed yet again to have entered a difficult phase in its history.

HUGUES TERTRAIS

See also Dien Bien Phu (May 1954), Battle of; Hồ Chí Minh (1890–1969); Indochina Communist Party (June 1929); Indochina during World War II (1939–1945); Indochina War, First (1946–1954); Indochina War, Second (Vietnam War) (1964–1975); Kampuchea United Front for National Salvation (KUFNS); Sino-Vietnamese Relations; Sino-Vietnamese Wars; Truong Chinh (1907–1988); Việt Cong; Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh Hội, League for the Independence of Vietnam)

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VOLKSRAAD (PEOPLE'S COUNCIL) (1918–1942)

The Dutch colonial government started to implement a gradual process of decentralization after 1905. Democratization was part of the process, as more and more responsibilities were delegated to local councils that were partly elected. The establishment of the *Volksraad*, a unicameral parliament, in 1916 was also part of the process.

It first assembled in 1918 with a membership of thirty-nine, which was extended to sixty in 1931. Members were selected on the basis of ethnicity. Initially all of its thirty-nine members (fifteen ethnic Indonesians, twenty-three Europeans and “foreign orientals,” and a chairman) were appointed. Membership was expanded to forty-nine in 1921 and sixty in 1927. After 1931, membership consisted of thirty ethnic Indonesians, twenty-five Europeans, and five “foreign orientals.” Of them, twenty Indonesians, fifteen Europeans, and three “foreign orientals,” respectively, were elected for four-year terms by the members of city, town, and regional (*kabupaten*) councils combined by ethnicity as electorates.

The Volksraad was initially intended to provide advice to the colonial government. In 1925 it also obtained limited legislative powers, and in 1931 the budget of the Dutch East Indies required its assent. However, the governor-general and the departmental heads were not responsible to it.

The ethnic Indonesian members often had a conservative *pangreh prajah* (indigenous civil service) background and were at best moderately nationalistic. However, as members of the Volksraad, they held parliamentary immunity. During the 1930s, when Indonesian nationalists were increasingly impeded from public speaking, several Volksraad members started to use their position as a platform to draw attention to the issues that occupied nationalist groups.

With the Japanese occupation of Java in March 1942, the Volksraad was abolished.

PIERRE VAN DER ENG

See also Ethical Policy (*Ethische Politiek*);
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W

WALI SONGO

The Founders of Islam on Java

The *Wali Songo* are the nine founders of Islam on Java. The term *wali* describes a personage who is regarded as a special “friend” of Allah—hence the translation “saint” is generally used to describe a wali. Contemporary tradition identifies nine such saints, although in the nineteenth century in East Java, there was a tradition of eight saints (*wali walu*).

The *Babad Tanah Jawi* is the oldest Javanese source to recount the activities of these wali. This babad gives prominence to four wali who formed part of a larger council convened in the kingdom of Demak after the fall of the great kingdom of Majapahit. These four wali are Sunan Giri from Gresik, Sunan Bonang from Tuban, Sunan Kudus from Demak, and Sunan Kalijaga from Adilangu. In the babad, Sunan Giri’s authority among the wali is given particular recognition; Sunan Bonang is a critical intermediary and teacher; Sunan Kudus is the defender of Demak, while Sunan Kalijaga’s role is to safeguard the spiritual foundation of the kingdom of Mataram.

Other babad sources, as well as a lively oral tradition, provide a rich repertoire of tales about the wali. These tales combine historical narrative with exemplary accounts of the wali’s powers intended to portray the virtues of Islam. As such, they embody Sufi traditions that have contributed to the formation of Islam on Java. In recent years, a substantial popular literature,

consisting of booklets, pamphlets, and locally stenciled brochures, has developed to recount the lives of the wali.

Solichin Salam’s influential *Sekitar Wali Songo (Regarding the Wali Songo)*, first published in 1960, is principally responsible for consolidating the tradition of the Wali Songo around specifically named figures. Each of these nine saints is designated by title and personal, usually Arabic, name. They are: (1) Maulana Malik Ibrahim: Syeik Maghibi, (2) Sunan Ampel: Raden Rakmat or Raden Ainul Yaqien, (3) Sunan Bonang: Raden Maulana Makdum Ibrahim, (4) Sunan Giri: Raden Paku or Prabu Satmata, (5) Sunan Drajat: Raden Syarifuddin, (6) Sunan Kudus: Ja’far Sodiq, (7) Sunan Kalijaga: Raden Mas Syahid, (8) Sunan Muria: Raden Umar Said, and (9) Sunan Gunung Jati: Faletahan or Raden Syarif Hidayatullah. Both genealogical and teacher–student relationships establish connections among these figures.

The discovery at the beginning of the nineteenth century of an early Islamic gravestone at Gresik, dating from the first part of the fifteenth century, led to the inclusion of Maulana Malik Ibrahim in the core group of the wali. The *Babad Dipanegara* was the first babad to include this figure in the genealogies of the wali.

Each of these figures has a recognized tomb, associated with a mosque, that is the site for local pilgrimage (*ziarah*). Visitors come, at specific times determined by the intersection of cycles according to Javanese calendar reckoning, to

pray and carry out acts of religious piety. Tomb visitation may take place at any time, and many tombs have become the focus for local tourism. Proper visitation, however, is deemed more auspicious if it occurs at night, and that is thus the norm at most tombs. Friday night is often an appropriate time for such a visit. In East Java, the Friday night that coincides with Legi in the Javanese calendar is auspicious, whereas in Central Java, the Friday night coinciding with Kliwon is considered so. Five of the nine wali have their tombs in East Java, three in Central Java, and one in West Java.

Besides the nine wali, there are many other holy men who, according to local tradition, are regarded as wali. Many of these wali, such as Sunan Tembayat, Sunan Geseng, and Syaikh Abdul Muhyi, have tombs that are important sites of visitation. In fact, the whole of the Javanese countryside is filled with potential ziarah sites.

Each wali's tomb has a custodian called a *jurukunci*, "the keeper of the key," who informs visitors about the wali and guides them in various associated pious practices. At some large tombs, there is an entire hierarchy of the jurukunci. These jurukunci maintain the local traditions associated with the tomb. Many custodians are descendants of the wali or of disciples associated with the wali. They are themselves a prime source of local knowledge about the lives of wali.

Visitors to the tombs of the wali believe that they gain blessing (*baroka*) from the rituals they perform as *ibadah* during their visit. On their return to daily life, they look for signs of this blessing, and many return to offer thanks if they feel that they have obtained the blessing they sought.

JAMES J. FOX

See also Demak; Islam in Southeast Asia; Java; Mataram

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WALLACE LINE

A Biogeographical Divide

The Wallace Line is an imaginary line devised by the British botanist and explorer Alfred Russel Wallace (1823–1913) in the mid-nineteenth century to divide the biogeographical zone of Asia from that of Australia. In its earliest form it ran from the most southerly islands of the Philippines to the west of Sulawesi and on to the island of Lombok. More recent work has suggested that much of the Philippines is a transition zone between Asia and Australia rather than strictly within an Asian biogeographical zone.

The line thus seeks to delineate the boundaries of a distinctive Asian pattern of flora and fauna. Thus the flora of the Asian zone to the west of the Wallace Line is dominated by varied forms of tropical rain forest, secondary forest, and grassland, modified by elevation and by human influence. In that same zone distinctive fauna are evident, with the tiger, elephant, orangutan, and rhinoceros being characteristic marker species. To the east of the Wallace Line, it is argued, the flora change in type and composition, albeit rather slowly. The faunal boundaries are, however, much more distinct, with relatively few crossovers between the Asian and Australian zones. For fish, birds, and insects, the value of the line is much less clear—their boundaries are much less restrictive.

The Wallace Line has value as a useful way of conceptualizing the biogeographical character of a large and distinctive area and distinguishing it from neighboring zones. It is evident, however, that advances in our understanding of sea-level change and the role of land bridges between the Asian and Australian zones are testing the sustainability of this demarcation. Furthermore, coupled with the increasingly important role of humans in the dispersal of plants and animals, the concept of sharp boundaries of flora and fauna is much more difficult to sustain than

was the case in the mid-nineteenth century, when the line was first devised.

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See also Ecological Setting of Southeast Asia; Historical Geography of Insular Southeast Asia; Historical Geography of Mainland Southeast Asia; Monsoons

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WAN AHMAD (1836–1914)

Traditional Malay Ruler

Wan Ahmad was a younger son of Bendahara Ali, ruler of Pahang from 1806 to 1857. At Ali's death (ca. 1857) Ahmad engaged in a long and hard-fought civil war (1857–1863) with his elder half brother, Tun Mutahir. In the end he was victorious and so secured the throne of Pahang to himself. In 1888 he reluctantly submitted to British control of his state. During the Malay risings of 1892–1894, Ahmad refrained from giving open support to the Malay rebels, but he took little part in the government of his state under the new regime; he died, a sick and embittered old man, in 1914.

Before his death, Bendahara Ali had designated his eldest son, Tun Mutahir, as his successor, granting him executive power in his lifetime. But Mutahir denied to Wan Ahmad (born on 23 May 1836, and so only twenty-one at the time) their father's legacy to Ahmad of the revenues and (as Ahmad asserted) control of the Kuantan and Endau districts. Ahmad owed his victory in the war partly to his outstanding ability as a field commander, and partly to support from Terengganu, acting for Siam. Ahmad seems to have founded his rule on the promotion, at the expense of traditional chiefs, of men of humble birth who had served under him with success during the war. He gave decisive support to Tunku Kudin in the later stages (1872–1873) of the Selangor civil war, partly because Kudin's opponents had given aid to Wan Aman, son of Tun Mutahir, in the latter's attempts to oust Ahmad. For these services Ahmad obtained reward, and his forces remained for some years in the Ulu Selangor district, to enforce payment.

Ahmad had been in conflict with Maharaja Abu Bakar (r. 1862–1895) of Johor, who had

supported Tun Mutahir and his sons against Ahmad. However, the two rulers were both in control of what had been outlying provinces of the Johor-Riau sultanate, and had a common problem of securing British and Malay recognition of their pretensions to be independent royal rulers. With the consent of his chiefs, Ahmad assumed the title of sultan in 1882, and Abu Bakar did the same in 1885. Abu Bakar gave Ahmad some support in his relations with Britain, which in the early years of his reign had been suspicious of Ahmad's association with former sultan Mahmud of Riau-Lingga, regarded as a puppet of Siam. Later Ahmad feared that Britain would support his brother, Engku Mansur, against him.

By the 1880s, fending off British intervention in Pahang, where Ahmad had granted extensive concessions to Straits Settlements' commercial interests, was becoming his most pressing problem. He was obliged to accept Hugh Clifford (1866–1941) as consular British agent at his capital in 1887, and then John Pickersgill Rodger (t. 1888–1896) as British resident late in 1888. The early reports of these officials disclose a tense relationship between Ahmad and his chiefs, and his reliance on men such as To Gajah, who had risen to power by royal favor. Ahmad also imposed a variety of heavy taxes that retarded economic development.

British moves toward the type of protectorate in Pahang that already existed in Perak and other states caused much resentment, both in the royal circle and among the chiefs. When some of the latter rose in revolt in the mid-1890s, Ahmad stifled his sympathy and gave active, though not sustained, support to clumsy British military moves to suppress the revolt and drive out its leaders.

From the start of British intervention Ahmad had adopted a policy of distancing himself from the unwelcome new system, withdrawing to hunt and indulge in amusement upriver. Nonetheless, step by step, he was obliged to accept what he saw as encroachment upon traditional privileges, such as losing the services of debt-bondsmen, and his inability to continue his authoritarian and sometimes cruel treatment of his opponents. In his last years, growing ill health immobilized him in embittered isolation. He kept some key elements of his authority in his own hands but left the new rou-

tine of Malay monarchy to his eldest son and ultimate successor, Tengku Besar Mahmud.

Clifford and others have left vivid accounts of Ahmad's lifestyle and personality, from the period in the late 1880s when he was still a much-feared autocrat to the later years of frustration and resentment. Clifford, who had been at Ahmad's court in the last year of his independence, described him in his prime as a mighty warrior and a keen hunter of big game. His contemporaries, a modern historian (Milner 1982) noted, admired his courteous and urbane manner, the outward model of what a Malay ruler in the traditional style should be. It was Ahmad's misfortune to outlive those days and to survive into an uncongenial environment.

JOHN MICHAEL GULLICK

See also Abu Bakar, Sultan of Johor (r. 1862–1895); British Interests in Southeast Asia; Johor; Pahang; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Residential System (Malaya); Western Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang)

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WATANIAH

A Malay Guerrilla Anti-Japanese Force

Wataniah (also *Tentera Wataniah*) was a Malay anti-Japanese resistance force started in Bentong, Pahang, in Peninsular (West) Malaysia in 1942 by a Malay Administrative Service officer from Perak, Yeop Mahyuddin Muhammad Sharif. Having secured approval of the sultan of Pahang, Yeop Mahyuddin (alias Mahidin) estab-

lished a jungle training camp at Batu Malim about 16 kilometers from Raub, beginning with some 250 recruits including some former members of the Pahang volunteer force. Among those who also joined the Wataniah were Abdul Razak Hussein (1922–1976) and Ghazali Shafie, who later became prominent in Malaysian politics. When the Allied Force 136 landed in Pahang toward the end of 1944, it met with the Wataniah and the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). The primary task of Wataniah then was to assist Allied landings by obstructing the movement of Japanese supplies from the east coast to the western part of the peninsula.

Fearing the abduction of the Pahang sultan by elements of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), on 17 August 1945 the Wataniah, assisted by Force 136, took Sultan Abu Bakar Ri'ayatuddin Al-Mu'adzam Shah (r. 1932–1974) under protection. Consequently, a Japanese search operation was under way that saw some Chinese being killed and notices posted by the Japanese claiming that the communists had abducted and killed the sultan. To avoid racial clashes, Wataniah's men tore down the notices.

On 8 September 1945, led by Colonel Headley of Force 136, a detachment of Wataniah escorted the sultan back to the capital, Pekan. Pending the arrival of regular troops, and backed by Ghurkha paratroops of Force 136, Wataniah took control of large areas in Pahang to avert an MPAJA takeover.


British skepticism and belated support, however, stunted the effectiveness of the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare of Malay forces such as Wataniah and *Askar Melayu Setia* (Loyal Malay Soldiers) of Kedah and Perak. Wataniah was disbanded as a military force in November 1945, and many of its members joined the *Peratuan Melayu Pahang* (Pahang Malay Association) in 1947.

ABDUL RAHMAN HAJI ISMAIL

See also Force 136; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); Malayan Communist Party (MCP); Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA); Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD)

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Gilt and leather puppets performing shadow play with musical ensemble (gamelan) in front. Java, Indonesia, between 1900 and 1923. (Library of Congress)

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WAYANG KULIT “Shadow Theater”

The *wayang kulit* (“shadow theater”) is a performance genre involving flat leather puppets casting a shadow over a white screen illuminated by a lamp. The puppets—mounted on a horn rod and with moveable arms—are manipulated by a puppet master enacting stories mostly

taken from the Hindu epics *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana*. *Wayang kulit* is known primarily from Indonesia, but also Thailand and Malaysia.

The ancient *wayang kulit* was a shamanistic ritual, indigenous to Southeast Asia, with the puppets representing ancestors. This ritualistic background lives on in contemporary *wayang kulit*, although present-day urban performances are most likely to occur in secular contexts. The most spectacular form of *wayang kulit* is from central Java. Here accompanying the *dhalang* (puppet master) is a full gamelan orchestra, with *pesindhen* (female vocalists) providing song interludes. In the *wayang* of Java a *dhalang* is a man well versed in music and classical Javanese literature, with mastery over voice production and ability to improvise dialogues. Performances involve several characters. Puppets are said to be “dancing” when manipulated on the screen. Highly stylized, their iconography is complex. Their face and feet appear in profile, whereas the body is partly turned to the front. Among the characters, the *panakawan* (servant

clowns) are very important and feature in every performance. They provide a social commentary through their jesting. Possessed of magical powers, their role is that of counselors to the heroes of the story performed. An essential prop is the *gunungan*, or *kekayon*, used at the beginning and end of the performance and as a scene marker.

Contemporary Javanese wayang kulit is increasingly being performed in the world capitals by non-Indonesian dhalangs in Indonesian, English, Dutch, and other languages, in an attempt to make the genre accessible to international audiences while retaining the traditional performance format.

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See also Hindu-Buddhist Period of Southeast Asia; Kraton Culture; *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana*; Performing Arts of Southeast Asia

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WESTERN MALAY STATES (PERAK, SELANGOR, NEGRI SEMBILAN, AND PAHANG)

The Term

The term "Western Malay States" is a loose one, used to identify the first four Malay States in the Malaysian peninsula, which were ruled by the British after 1874. These states were Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang. They were situated on the western part of the peninsula, hence the term. (Pahang's inclusion was purely for convenience; first, it came under the British only from 1888, and second, Pahang is situated on the central and eastern part of the peninsula.) During this time (1870s), the whole Malay Peninsula (present-day Peninsular/West

Malaysia) could be divided politically into three zones. First was the Straits Settlements, which consisted of Penang, Singapore, and Melaka, ruled by a British governor. The second was the Western Malay States, which were individually administered by a British resident who was responsible to the Straits Settlements governor. The third was the rest of the Malay States, which were not under the British. They consisted of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu (collectively referred to as the Northern or Siamese Malay States), and Johor, which were ruled by independent Malay rulers.

The Western Malay States

The British had formed the Straits Settlements in 1826. Their main office was first set up in Penang, but it later moved to Singapore when the latter became more successful economically. Penang and Singapore became important entrepôts, serving to export the thriving tin industry from the Malaysian hinterland as well as trading ports for neighboring mainland and island Southeast Asia, East Asia, India, and Europe. The four Western Malay States, which were rich in the production of tin, had constant civil wars among the rival Malay rulers and chiefs, who were exasperated by rivalries among Chinese tin mine lords and workers that led to bloodshed and closure of mines. When some Malay chiefs or rulers began to side one Chinese group (*hui*) against another, the ones that were left to fend on their own urged the British either in Penang or Singapore to intervene. Moreover some Malay and Chinese chiefs began to invite British officers in the Straits Settlements to help settle their problems. Eventually, when a series of wars between the Malay chiefs and Chinese took place in Perak in the 1860s and early 1870s and jeopardized the trade in tin in the ports of the Straits Settlements, this prompted the governor in Singapore, Sir Andrew Clarke (t. 1874–1875), to intervene. Consequently the Pangkor Agreement (Engagement) was concluded in 1874. The sultan who was chosen to rule Perak as the result of this agreement would receive a British resident to advise him on matters concerning the administration of the state and all other affairs, excluding matters concerning religion (Islam) and customs. The Pangkor Agreement became a precedent for the British to establish their in-

fluence in Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang, which was completed in the 1880s. These states were rich in tin, or presumed to be rich in the mineral. Later they also became the world's biggest exporters of natural rubber.

The Expansion of British Influence

After having successfully put down the wars among the Malay chiefs and Chinese societies, the British set to work to develop the Western Malay States politically, economically, and socially. Each state had received a British resident as its chief administrator, although the sultans remained as constitutional monarchs. The traditional bureaucrats, such as the Malay nobles and *penghulu*, or district chiefs, were absorbed into the new system of administration. New district boundaries were created in each state, and each district was administered by a British district officer. These district officers were answerable only to the state residents. They began to introduce new legislation for the states, new land laws, and new methods of taxation, including on imports and exports, as well as economic, political, and social policies. The traditional Malay chiefs, who were absorbed into the administrative system, including the sultans, were given allowances. This was a drastic change from the past, when they had had the right to impose taxes on the people and extract free labor for public works. Consequently these traditional Malay leaders lost their authority, status, and influence on the *rakyat* (common people), a phenomenon that was felt greatly by the Malay chiefs, some of whom launched armed resistance against the British. The first such campaign was launched in Perak, where the first British resident was killed in 1875. This prompted the British to double up their security and act against those involved swiftly and severely.

After having been able to settle problems with the local people and set up the administration in each state, the British set about to fully exploit the wealth of the economy. The Western Malay States were geologically rich in tin, which was available in such abundance that it could be seen with the naked eye in the valleys and riverbanks. The British then introduced incentives—such as facilitating miners in the use or acquisition of mining lands and imposition of easy taxes to encourage both Euro-

pean and Asian (mainly Chinese) entrepreneurs. The immigration of laborers was encouraged. Since many Chinese were already involved in tin mining in the Malay States even before the imposition of British rule, it was quite natural that they responded to this “open door” policy in large numbers. Large tin miners were permitted and encouraged to organize the immigration and welfare of their workers. Thousands came and dominated the mining scenes, which also began to change the demographic patterns of the states. Inasmuch as there was a great demand for tin by the industries in the West (the tin-plating industry), the Western Malay States became the chief world producer of the mineral, especially from the 1880s to the late 1970s (long after Malaysia achieved its independence, in 1957).

Besides tin, the British also discovered, through experimentation, that the Western Malay States were very suitable for the large-scale planting of natural rubber (*Hevea brasiliensis*). The first rubber seeds were taken from Brazil and were successfully planted in Perak. The person responsible for spreading these seeds was R. N. Ridley (b. 1855), nicknamed “Mad Ridley” for his enthusiasm about the plant. His efforts were not wasted, for some people who believed in him took up his suggestions and began to plant rubber commercially. The first such person was Tan Chay Yan from Melaka, who became the first person to produce rubber and sell it to the market. The product was an instant success, for it fetched lucrative prices in Britain and in particular the United States, where the motorcar industry was booming by the early twentieth century. This encouraged British and other European entrepreneurs and companies to set up plantation industries in the Western Malay States. Just as in the tin-mining industries, the British administration provided facilities and incentives for entrepreneurs to involve themselves in the industry. As a result, these states became the most important world producer of natural rubber and continued to be so until the 1980s, when market prices could no longer support the industry.

The growth of the rubber industry also helped change the demographic scenery of the Western Malay States. Unlike the tin-mining industry, where the majority of the workers were Chinese, in this highly labor-intensive sector the majority of the workers were im-

ported from southern India. This was because many of the capitalists in this industry were Europeans, who could not provide their own labor force. Here the British administration took its own initiative to help estate owners to introduce Indian immigration policies with the agreement of the British Indian government. They also provided funds to facilitate Western entrepreneurs in the rubber plantations. Consequently, thousands of Indian immigrants came and dominated the estates.

The development of both the tin and rubber industries increased the population of the Western Malay States to an unprecedented level. The numbers of both Chinese and Indians, although many were transient workers, obviously overwhelmed the indigenous people, most of whom remained by their own choice, or as the result of British policies, as subsistence farmers producing rice. This became a major factor in the growth of a plural society in the Malay States.

The intensive development of the tin and rubber industries in the Western Malay States also initiated other infrastructural development. Roads, railways, bridges, and river transportation were built, initially to facilitate the development of these export industries. These roads and railways were built to connect towns and cities where mining and rubber estates were located with export ports. Thus the major lines for roads and railways were constructed almost parallel to the western coastlines, with the ports of Penang in the north and Singapore in the south.

The development of roads and railways also initiated the growth of urban areas that centered on tin-mining and rubber industrial areas. That also explains the presence of important towns and cities in the region. These towns and cities were dominated mostly by the Chinese and Indians attracted to the tin-mining and rubber industries. This factor also helped to strengthen the growth of the plural society.

The growth of urban areas also initiated other infrastructural development, such as the introduction of modern banking systems, insurance, postal and telegraphic facilities, as well as a few educational systems. These educational systems were not integrated but were introduced to serve individual communities. Except for the education of the Malays that was supported by the colonial government, there were different systems of education for the Chinese, Indians, and the English-language schools that were run

by Christian missionaries. Chinese schools were allowed to be organized and administered by their own communities. Tamil schools, which were made solely the responsibility of estate owners, were least attended to. Such educational differences also resulted in the presence of literacy gaps among the different communities in the Western Malay States.

Conclusion

It is undeniable that administratively, economically, and physically, the Western Malay States developed more prominently than the other parts of Peninsular Malaysia, with perhaps only Johor, in the southern tip of the peninsula, as an exception. The development became more coordinated after 1896, when all of the four states were placed under a central administration in Kuala Lumpur and were known as the Federated Malay States (FMS). Prior to that each state was administered separately by the individual resident, creating some unevenness in the administrative, economic, and political developments among the states. Difficulties sometimes arose, especially when development projects needed to cross state boundaries, such as in the construction of roads and railway lines and the opening up of tin mines and rubber plantations. It must be remembered that the individual state still had its own Malay sultan who held the sovereignty of his state. After the formation of the Federated Malay States, all residents of the four Western Malay States were responsible to the resident general based in Kuala Lumpur, who in turn was responsible to the British governor of the Straits Settlements in Singapore. Economic and other developments now became more integrated and coordinated. Under this political unit British influence in the peninsula became more effective, especially after World War I (1914–1918), when they were also able to place British advisers in all the other Malay States, which were later collectively known as the Unfederated Malay States (UMS). In these states the Malay rulers seemed to be more independent than those in the FMS. Such a situation had created uneasiness among the sultans of the former Western Malay States, who demanded that some of their powers be returned to them. The issue of decentralizing the power became a continuous debate among the Malay sultans and British officers

until the outbreak of the Pacific War (1941–1945). These issues became irrelevant after the war, when all the Malay States in the peninsula, including Penang and Melaka, were united under the Federation of Malaya in 1948. Undoubtedly, the formation of this union took root from the development of the Western Malay States.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also Birch, J. W. W. (1826–1875); British Malaya; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Federated Malay States (FMS) (1896); Federation of Malaya (1948); Highways and Railways; *Hui*; Indian Immigrants (Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries); Low, Sir Hugh (1824–1905); Malayan/Malaysian Education; Pahang; Pangkor Engagement (1874); Penang (1786); Residential System (Malaya); Ridley, H[enry] N[icholas] (b. 1855); Rubber; Siamese Malay States (Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu); Singapore (1819); Singapore, Entrepôt Trade and Commerce of (Nineteenth Century to 1990s); Straits Settlements (1826–1946); Swettenham, Sir Frank (1850–1946); Tin

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“WHITE MAN’S BURDEN”

“Take up the White Man’s Burden.” The opening line of Rudyard Kipling’s (1865–1936) poem, first published in February 1899, stood for a view of responsibility and a view of race relations now almost impossible to recapture.

In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, most of Africa and Southeast Asia had come under the control of European powers. To rule its peoples—its “new-caught, sullen peoples, / Half devil and half child”—was a duty for which no thanks could be expected: those who took up the burden could reap only “The blame of those ye better, / The hate of those ye guard.” The reward was in fulfillment, “The judgment of your peers.”

The previous year, the United States had acquired the Philippines as a result of its victory in the Spanish–American War (1898), and the poem

has been interpreted as an invitation to share the imperial “burden.” Kipling indeed sent an advance copy to Theodore Roosevelt (1858–1919), and publication in fact took place on the very day that the subsequent war between the United States and the Philippine Republic began. The poem had its genesis, however, in 1897, before the war began or Roosevelt sent Commodore George Dewey (1837–1917) to Manila.

It was connected with Queen Victoria’s golden jubilee. “As to the Jubilee, I loathe it,” Kipling had written (Ricketts 1999: 232), his attitude to empire always ambiguous, but certainly not encompassing its pomp and circumstance. A lunch with the premiers of the self-governing colonies prompted him to start the ode, which was nevertheless expected of him, and he began “The White Man’s Burden.” Realizing that it would not be well received amid the jubilee celebrations, he laid it aside. What he produced was “Recessional.” Empires did not last forever. “Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet, / Lest we forget—lest we forget!” Its message, as Walter Besant put it, “went home to all our hearts” (ibid.: 237).

NICHOLAS TARLING

See also Colonialism; Imperialism; “Manifest Destiny”; *Mission Civilisatrice* (“Civilizing Mission”)

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WINGATE, MAJOR-GENERAL ORDE CHARLES (1903–1944)

See Chindits

WINSTEDT, SIR R[ICHARD] O[LAF] (1878–1966)

Scholar and Author of Malay Subjects

Richard Olaf Winstedt, promoter of Malay education, was born in Oxford in August 1878 and received his tertiary education at New College. Later he sat for the joint examination for the home, Indian, and civil services, and afterward was sent to Malaya as a cadet officer in the British colonial government in 1902. He landed in Perak and became interested in the

beliefs and customs of the Malays, which became a lifelong passion for him.

Winstedt served as an assistant district officer in several districts in Perak, including Tapah and Matang. Later he was posted to Kuala Pilah in Negri Sembilan. It was his zeal in learning the Malay language and customs as well as his insatiable thirst for knowledge that commanded him respect from his fellow officers and superiors. Subsequently he was appointed as the assistant director of education for the Federated Malay States and the Straits Settlements in 1916. He later assumed the directorship (t. 1924–1931). He served as a member of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council and the Federal Council of the Federated Malay States.

During his tenure at the Department of Education, he undertook the establishment of the Sultan Idris Training College (SITC) in Tanjong Malim and the Raffles College in Singapore. He was the first president of the latter from 1921 to 1931. He was also responsible for the opening of Malay vernacular schools. For his vast experience and knowledge in the field of education in Malaya and Singapore, he was made a member of the Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Education following his retirement in 1935.

He was one of the few British officers who became very interested in Malay subjects and became expert in their language and customs. He wrote books based on his studies and keen observations that covered a large range of disciplines concerning their history, beliefs, customs, arts, folklore, and literature.

Winstedt collaborated not only with other fellow officers who shared similar interests, such as R. J. Wilkinson, but also with local folklorists, such as Raja Ali Haji and Pawang Ana. His works include *The Literature in Malay Folklore*, *Awang Sulong*, *An English-Malay Dictionary*, *Colloquial Malay: A Simple Grammar with Conversations*, *A History of Johore*, *A History of Malay Literature*, *A History of Malaya*, *The Malays: Cultural History*, *Malay Grammar*, and various others.

For his valuable contributions, Winstedt was elected a fellow of the British Academy, a member of the board of governors of the School of Oriental and African Studies, and president of the prestigious Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. He was conferred a Companion of the Order of St.

Michael and St. George (CMG) in 1926 and made a Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire (KBE) in 1935.

BADRIYAH HAJI SALLEH

See also Malayan/Malaysian Education; Raffles College; Straits/Malayan/Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (MBRAS); Sultan Idris Training College (SITC); University of Malaya

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WIWOHO RESOLUTION (1940)

The Wiwoho Resolution was an attempt by moderate Indonesian nationalists in 1940 to persuade Dutch authorities to reform the constitution of the Netherlands Indies by introducing responsible, representative government.

During the second half of the 1930s, as the expansionist intentions of fascist governments in Europe and Asia became clear, moderate and leftist Indonesian nationalists increasingly pressed the Dutch authorities for political concessions, which, they said, would keep the Indonesian people in the antifascist camp. At that stage, the Netherlands Indies lagged far behind Burma and the Philippines, where the British and Americans had granted a high degree of responsible government. In Indonesia, the *Volksraad* (People's Council) was only partly elected, and it had only legislative power: no part of the colonial administration was responsible to it. The colonial government had rejected out of hand the Soetardjo Petition (1936), which called for Indonesian autonomy on the Philippine model. But a far more imminent threat of fascism in 1940 encouraged an Indonesian *Volksraad* member, Wiwoho Poerbohadidjojo, to propose a new motion calling for a more representative council and for department heads to be responsible to that council. The motion was passed in February 1940 but was rejected in August by the Dutch government, which was by then in exile in London. Later, on 10 May 1941, Queen Wilhelmina (r. 1890–1948), the Dutch

monarch, promised unspecified changes to the constitution after World War II (1939–1945).

The Netherlands' rejection of the modest requests of the Wiwoho Resolution played a significant role in persuading all Indonesian nationalists that no significant concessions could be expected from the Dutch. After the Pacific War (1941–1945), memory of the outcome of the Wiwoho Resolution contributed to the widespread belief that the Dutch would never negotiate in good faith with the independence movement.

ROBERT CRIBB

See also Constitutional Developments in Burma (1900–1941); Constitutional Developments in the Philippines (1900–1941); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Soetardjo Petition (1936); *Volksraad* (People's Council) (1918–1942)

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WOMEN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

It is commonly accepted that Southeast Asian women traditionally enjoyed a relatively high status in relation to men, although it is often difficult to generalize across the region because of cultural variation, differences in historical experiences, and the dearth of comparative research. Although one must avoid depicting premodern Southeast Asia as a kind of golden age for women, a long-term perspective does suggest that females have often been adversely affected by the rise of larger states, the spread of the world religions, and the demands of the global economy.

Women in Premodern Southeast Asia

Historical evidence indicates that relationships between men and women in premodern Southeast Asia were generally more equitable than in neighboring "cultural zones" such as East and South Asia. This is attributed to several factors, the most frequently cited being the importance of females in food production, especially rice cultivation; their prominence in mar-

keting and the domestic economy; complementary gender roles in ritual and the role of women as healers and spirit mediums; the prevalence of bilateral kinship patterns, matrilineal residence, and bride-wealth; traditions of female inheritance and independent income; low population densities that placed a high value on women's work and female fertility; and the absence of a strong state structure and a low level of urbanization. Although early political centers adapted political-religious models from India and China that accorded men a substantially higher place than women, these gender constructions had only limited influence beyond the upper classes. Leaders in small kinship-based village societies were normally male, but women continued to wield considerable influence because of their roles in the domestic economy. In all societies, older women whose reproductive days were past and who had thus become more "male" could also exercise some authority in communal discussions and often assume important positions as ritual leaders.

The expansion of historical sources from the fifteenth century means that research on women is more feasible than for earlier periods. The influence of the new power centers that emerged during this period was more far-reaching than that of earlier kingdoms, a critical factor because the alliance between political power and imported religions and philosophies entailed the promotion of certain ideas about gender roles. Not only did Theravada Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity, and Islam view females as subordinate, but religious specialists were often actively hostile to women's position as propitiators of the ancient spirits. This gender hierarchy was reinforced by law codes and other pronouncements that, even if representing the ideal rather than lived reality, still affirmed male superiority.

On the other hand, it is apparent that outside influences underwent considerable modification as they penetrated local populations. Despite their patriarchal bias, the actual practice of religion often emphasized aspects that continued to attract women, such as the elevation of motherhood and the promise of protection in childbirth. Furthermore, ordinary women were still influential in community rituals dealing with fertility, and in the domestic economy. Even at elite levels, where female seclusion and wifely fidelity was more evident, women re-

mained critical in the marriage and family alliances that were the basis for male authority and prestige. In numerous instances a dowager queen assumed control of the government, although by the eighteenth century such cases had become much more rare as ruling elites endorsed the view that "good" women should be secluded from public life.

Women, Colonialism, and Nationalism

The expansion of global commerce from the sixteenth century had far-reaching effects on gender relationships in Southeast Asia. The new market demands for cash crops such as pepper, the growth of port cities, and the presence of large numbers of foreign men, both European and Asian, all impinged on the relationship between the sexes. Economic changes were particularly visible in the cosmopolitan port towns that were proliferating all along Southeast Asia's coastlines. Whether they were under European control, like Manila and Batavia, or indigenous rule, a sizable portion of the population in these ports was composed of single Chinese men. Inter-marriage and sexual liaisons at all levels led to a creolized urban society, in which the life of wealthy women contrasted markedly with a growing feminization of poverty caused in large part by the manumission of domestic slaves on the death of their owners.

Until around 1800 the impact of the growing European presence was felt primarily in the island world, especially on Java and the Philippines, where European interests were concentrated. By the 1890s, however, the entire region except for Thailand had fallen under European colonial control. Although there was considerable variation in the extent and nature of European penetration, the changes associated with colonization exercised far-reaching effects on gender relations. The expansion of capital-intensive ventures, such as long-distance trade and plantation agriculture, was almost invariably a male concern dominated by Europeans, Chinese, and other foreign Asians. As peddlers and petty traders, the Chinese also began to dominate local economies and displace women in many areas of small marketing. By the mid-nineteenth century women were being increasingly recruited as cheap labor on plantations and in processing plants. At the village level traditional gender relations were further under-

mined as colonization “reformed” the customary laws that gave women considerable autonomy in daily life. It goes without saying that the meager political concessions introduced by colonial powers in the first half of the twentieth century rarely addressed women’s concerns. Even in Siam (Thailand), the region’s only noncolonized country, enactments intended to “modernize” the country affirmed patrilineality and protected the existing class structure.

The male leaders of the nationalist movements that developed across Southeast Asia in this period focused on attaining self-government, but writings by educated women also indicate a deep-seated concern with issues such as polygamy, divorce, domestic abuse, and the financial responsibilities of fathers. Although more radical men occasionally espoused ideas about the position of women in a future independent state, such issues were generally seen as irrelevant because the primary goal was independence. Despite their involvement in anticolonial activities, sometimes as fighters but more often as strike organizers, journalists, couriers, and clandestine agents, women were always regarded as auxiliaries rather than partners. Such attitudes were still evident when independence movements exploded with new energy after the surrender of the Japanese, who occupied most of Southeast Asia from 1942 to 1945. In the male-dominated environment of revolutionary warfare there was little talk of the specific ways in which a future independent state would address the needs of its female citizens.

Women in Contemporary Southeast Asia

World War II represents a watershed in Southeast Asia because it effectively brought colonialism to an end. Theoretically, all the newly independent states were committed to gender equality, but that was not easily translated into reality. A major reason has been the fragility of regional democracy, which has severely limited the political rights of all Southeast Asians, men as well as women. The effective quashing of the left wing outside the communist states has weakened political groupings normally supportive of women’s rights. A second reason for the lack of attention to gender concerns has been official promotion of women as “mothers, wives, and helpers.” That is largely true even in

the socialist states, despite the sexual equality that is one of communism’s basic tenets. A third factor has been economic policies that have sought to attract foreign investment in manufacturing, textiles, clothing, and electronics by offering a cheap and compliant workforce composed largely of young unmarried women. In pursuit of this goal contemporary Southeast Asian governments have been quite willing to ignore workplace issues such as maternity leave and equal pay.

There is understandably some debate about the extent to which Southeast Asian women have benefited from the new employment opportunities. On the one hand, it has been argued that social norms that make women subject to family and patriarchal controls have been retained in the workplace, and that gender hierarchies have simply been transferred to the factory floor. Some authorities also contend that increased mechanization and rural development programs have privileged men and disadvantaged women, while migration to cities has drawn attention to urban poverty and the likelihood that unskilled, uneducated, and unemployed women will drift into prostitution. On the other hand, depictions of women as victims of globalism, patriarchy, and capitalism have been challenged by research that traces patterns of resistance that assert female worker solidarity against a male management. There has also been an increase in the number of female professionals as well as middle-class entrepreneurs and employers, an important development in light of a common pattern whereby a woman maintains her own finances independent of her husband.

There have been other changes over the last twenty years, as women have become more alert to the implications of state policies in relation to female concerns such as birth control and workplace benefits. Throughout Southeast Asia, there is little doubt that greater political acumen has been fostered by the increase in Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which have blossomed in number since the 1980s. Through these associations women otherwise excluded from the political process have acquired knowledge and organization skills, an important factor in societies in which men are preferred as leaders. The increased availability of tertiary education for women is another factor contributing to greater political awareness and wider economic opportunities. Educated women can also

provide a rallying point for those who desire change, even when they obtain leadership positions through their male connections, since there is a tendency to see women as less venal than men and more likely to govern in the people's interest. Yet despite encouraging signs, women have yet to attain the 25 percent political representation considered necessary for any meaningful political participation to occur. Nor can it be assumed that those who do gain positions of political influence will be willing to stand as advocates of women's issues, for that risks alienating their male colleagues or the male electorate. Nonetheless, the resilience and pragmatism of Southeast Asian women and their undoubted influence in the community provide good reason for optimism regarding the expansion of their political presence.

Conclusion

The academic study of women in Southeast Asia has been dominated by anthropologists and sociologists, and has been largely concentrated on the twentieth century. Most research concentrates on specific countries, and comparative work is rare—even though the “high status” of women is commonly cited as a regional characteristic. Until recently there has been very little investigation of the historical basis for this assertion, or of how the alleged “female autonomy” may have varied over time and among different Southeast Asian cultures. Despite the frustrating absence of sources, we are now beginning to build up a bank of studies that will provide a more solid basis for generalized comments about the ways in which economic and social changes affected the lives of Southeast Asian women over the past 500 years. For the period before 1500, however, the dearth of data means that historians can only offer glimpses of what it meant to be born a woman rather than a man.

BARBARA WATSON ANDAYA

See also Economic Transformation of Southeast Asia (ca. 1400–1800); Miscegenation; Peranakan; Sexual Practices in Southeast Asia

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WORLD ECONOMIC DEPRESSION (1929–1931)

See Great Depression (1929–1931)

WUNTHANU ATHIN

Peasant Nationalists

The *wunthanu athin* were village nationalist and self-defense organizations founded in rural Burma (Myanmar) during the 1920s. *Wunthanu*, in common usage as early as 1915, means “supporting own race.” The word *athin* denotes “organization” or “society.” Affiliated with the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA), a large anti-British nationalist movement, they received leadership and education from politically motivated Buddhist monks. The movement grew rapidly as peasants attempted to organize themselves to defend their interests against the heavy taxes imposed by the colonial government and the interest rates charged them by moneylenders. The nationalist politicians in the cities, who were now entering into electoral politics, saw the athins as a source of political support for their campaigns as well.

Organized in parallel with the official government’s administrative hierarchy, there were athin organizations at village, circle, and district levels. The athins were particularly active in the organization of boycotts of government-sponsored activities such as the elections for the na-

tional legislature and auctions for the right to fish or to cultivate fallow lands. Their initial motivation was defense against the so-called punitive police that the British established to punish whole villages for the nonpayment of taxes. They also tried to pressure the Indian moneylenders, to whom many of the Burmese peasants were indebted, to lower their repayment obligations. Supporters of the *wunthanu athin* were active supporters of Hsaya San during the peasant revolt that he led in 1930. Many of the ideas that motivated the politics of the movement’s supporters grew out of traditional Buddhist ideas of statecraft, which the British colonial government was said to have violated.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Burma under British Colonial Rule; General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) (1920); Nationalism and Independence Movements in Southeast Asia; Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements in Southeast Asia; Taxation

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Y

YAMASHITA TOMOYUKI, GENERAL (1885–1946)

“Harimau (Tiger) of Malaya”

General Yamashita Tomoyuki commanded the Japanese 25th Army, which conquered Malaya and received the surrender of Singapore, and later the 14th Army, which administered the Philippines.

Yamashita was the second son of a medical doctor in a small village on Shikoku Island, southwest Japan. The Chinese character of his personal name “Tomo” was meant to dedicate him to the Japanese emperor. Graduated from Hiroshima Military Preparatory School 1903, Yamashita could count many among his classmates who later played prominent roles in Japan. For instance there was Anami Korechika (1887–1945) who was army minister, April–August 1945, who committed suicide on the day Japan surrendered, and Yamawaki Masataka (1886–1974), commander of the North Borneo Defense Army (later 37th Army), September 1942–December 1944. After graduating from the Central Military Preparatory School in 1904, Yamashita enrolled in the Military Academy in 1905. He entered the Army College in 1913 and graduated in 1916 with the highest honors.

From 1918 to 1922, Yamashita served as a military attaché in Switzerland and Germany. Having witnessed a defeated and devastated Germany, it was said that he resolved never to wage a war that had no prospects of success. His senior officer in both postings was Tojo Hideki

(1884–1948). Although cordial at that time, their relations later became strained and were not restored till the end. On his return to Japan, Yamashita was promoted to major and in 1925 to lieutenant colonel. He then served in Vienna as a military attaché from 1927 to 1929. Further promotions followed. A month before going home, he became a colonel. In 1934 he attained the rank of major general. In the same year he succeeded Tojo as head of the Research Department of the army ministry. He was sympathetic to the young militant officers to the extent that he had a hand in instigating them to assassinate Prime Minister Okada Keisuke (1868–1952). Shortly after the 26 February abortive coup d'état of 1936 he was demoted to a brigade commander in Korea, a Japanese colony at that time. When the Sino-Japanese War began in July 1937, his brigade participated in the battles in China. Promoted to lieutenant general in November 1937, Yamashita became the chief of staff, North China Area Army, whose commanding officer was Terauchi Hisaichi (1879–1946) in 1938, then commander of the 4th Division stationed in Manchuria in September 1939.

Back in Japan, and succeeding Tojo again, Yamashita became director-general of the Aviation Department of the Army in July 1940. In this capacity he visited Germany from December 1940 to June 1941 to inspect the European war and to meet Adolf Hitler (1885–1945), the German führer. He was appointed commander of the Manchurian Defense Headquarters in

July 1941, and within four months, on 5 November 1941, Yamashita assumed command of the 25th Army. In his war preparation, he first went to Saigon, then to Taiwan.

On 8 December 1941, the 25th Army landed at three places on the Malay Peninsula and rapidly advanced southward. Yamashita himself landed in Singorra (Songkhla), South Thailand. In less than seventy days his army of 50,000 defeated the British defense forces of more than 100,000, comprising Indian, Australian, Malay, and British (Tsuji 1988: 37; Mant 1992: 12; Department of Self Defense Japan 1966: 626–627). Lieutenant General A. E. Percival, the general officer commanding Malaya, surrendered on 15 February 1942; Malaya, including Singapore, came under Japanese occupation. The accomplishment of this swift Malayan campaign earned Yamashita the reputation as “Harimau (Tiger) of Malaya.” It was widely reported that at the surrender negotiations with Percival he coerced the latter to immediately answer “Yes” or “No.” According to him, however, he was so irritated by the inappropriate translation of a Japanese interpreter that he shouted at him that “you only need to ask him yes or no” (Oki 1968: 225) The notorious *sook ching* (“cleansing”)—namely, mass massacres of Chinese residents—and the forced donation of 50 million Straits dollars imposed on the Malayan Chinese were implemented with his official approval. Lieutenant Colonel Tsuji Masanobu (1902–1968?), Yamashita’s chief operation staff, and Colonel Watanabe Wataru (1896–1969), deputy chief military administrator to Tsuji, initiated these policies.

In July 1942, Yamashita was transferred to Manchuria as commander of the First Area Army. It was, however, rumored that his friction with Prime Minister Tojo brought about this transfer. Nonetheless he was promoted to full general in February 1943. In September 1944, when Japanese forces suffered severe setbacks in the southern areas (notably Southeast Asia), he was entrusted with commanding the 14th Area Army based in the Philippines. On his way to Manila, he spent a brief week in Japan. His war strategies were expected to change the situation. However, he lost such decisive campaigns as Leyte and Luzon. From April 1945, to avoid detection, his headquarters were forced to move frequently about the mountainous areas.

A fortnight following the general surrender of Japan, he officially signed the surrender treaty on 3 September 1945. At the War Crime Trials held by the United States from October to December 1945, Yamashita was sentenced to death by hanging for widespread crimes committed by troops under his command. British War Crime Trials in Singapore started in the latter part of January 1946. He was not tried there, because the British court had insufficient time to demand that the United States hand him over to British prosecutors. He was executed on 2 February 1946 in Manila.

HARA FUJIO

See also “Fortress Singapore”; Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia (1941–1945); *Sook ching*; *Syonan-to*; Terauchi Hisaichi, Field Marshal Count (1879–1946)

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YANDABO, TREATY OF (1826)

Prelude to British Burma

The Treaty of Yandabo formally ended the first Anglo-Burmese War (1824–1826). Signed on 24 February 1826, it was named after the village of Yandabo, located above the confluence of the Chindwin and Irrawaddy Rivers in central Burma (Myanmar), one day’s march from the capital, then at Ava. This was the farthest north that British troops penetrated the country during the season of fighting. The treaty was emblematic of the conflicting ideas and interests that dogged relations between the forces of the expanding British Indian Empire and the Burman court for nearly a century before the final annexation of Burma to India in 1885.

Relations between Burma and British India had been tense since about 1800, when the expanding influence of Britain in India came up against the power of the empire of Konbaung Burma under King Bodawphaya (r. 1782–1819). Although the British took the view that there could be only one sovereign in any piece of territory, the Burmans, in keeping with the existing norm in Southeast Asia, argued that multiple, overlapping sovereignties were possible. The kings of the Konbaung dynasty also objected to being dealt with by the British East India Company (EIC) rather than having direct relations with the British monarch in London. The inequality expressed by the British was a cultural affront that the Burmans found most hurtful. The contrasting Asian and European principles of statecraft came into conflict along the River Naaf, which now divides Burma from Bangladesh, in 1824. The petty principalities of Manipur and Assam had come under the sway of the Burman court as well as the province of Arakan, which Bodawphaya had annexed in 1784. Arakan remained rebellious, however, and the king was forced to send military expeditions to the region in 1797 and 1811 to restore his authority. Burman troops made continual forays into Manipur and Assam, thus threatening British commercial penetration of these regions, which they perceived as part of their possessions. The Burman court had sent diplomatic missions to Calcutta until 1811, but after that time, faced with the intransigence of the British, relations were effectively severed until war broke out in 1824.

King Bagyidaw (r. 1819–1838), who succeeded Bodawphaya in 1819, sent General Maha Bandula to govern Arakan as well as to suppress revolts in Manipur and Assam. The British, however, by this time were assisting the anti-Burman rebels in these areas, much to the annoyance of the Burman authorities. Bandula, who subsequently became a military hero, attempted to assert the authority of the court over this territory. In 1823, in hot pursuit of Arakanese rebels who fled across the River Naaf into British territory, Bandula threatened the British protectorate of Cachar and occupied an island in the middle of the river. The British responded in force. A large seaborne expedition sailed to the mouth of the Irrawaddy and took Yangon, then a small fishing town, by force.

The British plan was to force the Burmans to capitulate, but when their resistance stiffened, they were forced to send an expedition up the Irrawaddy River in 1825–1826, capturing a series of Burman towns along the route. When they reached Yandabo, the Burman side was forced to agree to the terms of the treaty, though they found its terms humiliating by the standards of Southeast Asian statecraft. The treaty required Burma to yield the provinces of Arakan and Tenasserim to Britain, as well as to abandon its claims to Manipur and Assam. Furthermore, Burma was expected to pay an indemnity of \$5 million to the EIC in Calcutta. An additional commercial treaty was also agreed upon between the EIC and the Burman court. The provisions gave the EIC extensive commercial privileges, and the British gained the right to station a permanent representative at the Burman capital.

The terms of the treaty marked the beginning of the slow process of Burma's eventual loss of sovereignty to Britain. The terms of the treaty not only undermined the prestige and power of the Burman government but also made clear Burma's inferior military and economic prowess in comparison with the growing power of imperial Britain. The imposed indemnity nearly bankrupted the Burman state, which eventually was able to agree to terms that allowed for the sum to be paid in four installments. John Crawford, who came to Ava to negotiate the commercial treaty, found the Burmans unwilling to compromise further, and while relations between Britain and Burma improved briefly following the First Anglo-Burmese War, the conflicting perceptions of the two sides made future wars seem, in retrospect, inevitable.

R. H. TAYLOR

See also Anglo-Burmese Wars (1824–1826, 1852, 1885); Arakan; British India, Government of; British Interests in Southeast Asia; First Ava (Inwa) Dynasty (1364–1527 C.E.); Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Tenasserim

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YEN BAY MUTINY (1930)

See Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party) (1927)

YOGYAKARTA (JOGJAKARTA)

Consequence of Javanese Disunity

The name Yogyakarta is derived from Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat, a sultanate established in 1755. The toponym now refers both to a city and to the Special District (*Daerah Istimewa*) of Yogyakarta, which was established after Indonesia became independent of The Netherlands. The Special District forms an enclave surrounded on the landward side by the province of Central Java, and on the south by the Indian Ocean.

The Special District of Yogyakarta contains several important monuments from the kingdom of Mataram, the capital of which lay nearby. Important Buddhist shrines include Kalasan, consecrated in 792 C.E., and Candi Sari. Candi Sambisari is a Hindu monument of the early ninth century. To the west of the Progo River lies the fertile Kedu plain, site of the world-famous Borobudur monument, while to the east, just beyond the Opak River, is the major complex of Hindu monuments at Prambanan.

The ancient kingdom of Mataram vanished in the early tenth century C.E. The name was, however, revived in the early Islamic period of the sixteenth century, then referring to a kingdom the capital of which lay at various sites in the Yogyakarta and Central Java regions. In 1742 a combined force of Javanese and Chinese rebels destroyed the palace of Mataram at Kartasura. One of the nobles who remained faithful to Pakubuwono II (r. 1725–1750), the Mataram ruler, was Pangeran (Prince) Mangkubumi. Eventually order was restored with Dutch assistance. The price of Dutch support was high, however, including the cession of significant areas of territory. This loss of part of the kingdom required the reapportionment of vari-

ous appanages among the nobles of the kingdom, who drew from these lands their main source of income. The first allocation of appanage lands favored Mangkubumi, but when other nobles protested, the ruler, or *Susuhunan*, of Mataram revised the distribution of lands. Now Mangkubumi became upset, withdrew from court, and threatened to mount a challenge to the ruler.

Gradually more and more courtiers took the side of Pangeran Mangkubumi. Matters in the kingdom came to a crisis in 1749, when the Susuhunan's (Sunan) health deteriorated. The Netherlands East India Company (VOC in Dutch, *Kumpeni* in Javanese) seized upon this moment to achieve another of its goals. When the Sunan fell ill, the Dutch official Hogendorp went to Surakarta, bringing with him a new treaty. In his ill and weak condition, having been roused from his sickbed, the Sunan was forced to sign the treaty, which included the stipulation that the Sunan surrender the crown of Mataram to the Kumpeni and put the fate of his son, Pangeran Adipati Anom, in the Kumpeni's hands. The Kumpeni then obtained supreme power over the kingdom of Mataram, for not long thereafter Sunan Paku Pakubuwono II passed away.

The VOC then successfully persuaded the Sunan Pakubuwono III (r. 1750–1788) to divide the kingdom of Mataram into two, giving half of his kingdom to Pangeran Mangkubumi, in return for peace. On 13 February 1755 a treaty was signed between the Sunan and Pangeran Mangkubumi in the village of Giyanti, near Surakarta. Thereupon the kingdom of Ngayogyakarta Hadiningrat, or Yogyakarta as it is commonly known, came into being. The Sunan retained his title, while Pangeran Mangkubumi assumed the throne of Yogyakarta as Sultan Hamengkubuwono. After 1755 the kingdom was no longer referred to as Mataram. Surakarta and Yogyakarta became Dutch vassals whose main functions were to provide obligatory labor and deliveries of commercial commodities.

Competition was to intensify over the years as the rulers of Yogyakarta and Surakarta vied to be the sole legitimate king of Java. Unlike the Surakarta rulers in general, the sultans of the Yogyakarta court did not try to cultivate the friendship of the Dutch. Among the sultans of Yogyakarta who reigned during the high and

late colonial period, only Hamengkubuwono I (r. 1755–1795) was able to both maintain the autonomy of his kingdom and appease the Dutch.

The 1755 division of Mataram into two kingdoms, the kasunanan of Surakarta and the sultanate of Yogyakarta, as a result of the Treaty of Giyanti, considerably strengthened the Dutch position in Java. Instead of a unified kingdom controlling a large area and population, Central Java was divided between two rival kingdoms that were more likely to fight each other than to band together to resist the Dutch.

This situation brought some benefits to the common people. For the first time in many years there was relative peace in Central Java—a calm that lasted for seventy years. Economic conditions in villages improved, and the population grew, particularly in the *pasisir* (coastal area). This was the longest period of peace in Central Java in centuries, so the Javanese did not at first perceive the division of Mataram to be oppressive. This situation persisted until 1825, when hostilities known as the Java War broke out.

At the end of the Pacific War (1941–1945), the sultan of Yogyakarta threw his support to the nascent Republic of Indonesia. For a time, Yogyakarta became the capital of the nation. Republican forces were later forced to withdraw, but in a famous surprise attack republican units succeeded in retaking the city briefly. Although they withdrew soon thereafter, this success proved that the revolution was still a vital force to be reckoned with. The brief reoccupation of Yogyakarta is seen as one of the main turning points of the Indonesian revolution. In recognition of the unswerving support of the sultan, Yogyakarta was granted Special District status by the Republic of Indonesia, giving it greater autonomy than other provinces.

JOHN N. MIKSIC

See also Borobudur; Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949); Javanese Wars of Succession (1677–1707, 1719–1722, 1749–1755); Mataram; *Pasisir*; Prambanan; Surakarta; Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) ([Dutch] United East India Company) (1602)

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YOUNG MEN'S BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION (YMBA) (1906)

Initiating Burma's Nationalist Struggle

The YMBA was the earliest of the Burmese Buddhist associations that were the forerunners of the Burmese nationalist—and later independence—movements. Established in 1906 by students from Rangoon College—Maung Ba Pe, Maung Gyi, Maung Hla Pe, Maung Sein Hla Aung, and Maung Ba Dun—its membership soon expanded to include senior Burmese civil servants, Burmese who had just returned from education in England, and members of the Governor's Council. Modeled on the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), the YMBA initially sought to revive and restore Burmese Buddhist culture. The deposition and deportation to India of the last Burmese monarch, King Thibaw (r. 1878–1885), at the end of the Third Anglo-Burmese War (1885), and the subsequent British refusal to appoint a *thathanabaing*, supreme head of the Buddhist Sangha, had severely and adversely impacted on Burmese sociocultural heritage. Without king or Buddhist patriarch, Burma had lost the two poles of its traditional Buddhist culture. In addition, educational reforms under the colonial administration severely undermined the traditional role the Buddhist Sangha had played in education, particularly in rural areas. Two decades after the annexation of Upper Burma (1 January 1886), the YMBA aimed to revive and preserve Burmese Buddhist culture and language in the face of an alien Western colonial culture.

The YMBA may be compared to Budi Utomo (formed in 1908) in Indonesia. Neither the YMBA nor Budi Utomo was a political association initially, yet they both demonstrate the enduring strength of religion in mobilizing opposition to an invader. In both Indonesia and

Burma “religion was the matrix from which a nationalist movement took shape” (Trager 1959: 242). In the face of repression of all political dissent by the colonial administration, the YMBA in its public expressions was careful to enunciate loyalty to the British Crown and “appreciation for the blessings of the British administration of Burma” (Maung Maung 1980: 4). It organized annual conferences, produced a weekly newspaper in English, *The Burman Buddhist*, and by 1917 had fifty branches. A second newspaper, *The Sun*, a triweekly launched on 4 July 1911 with Rs (Indian rupees) 5,000 donated by friends, received financial support from a wealthy Burmese lady, Ma Ma Tin, and became an important outlet for nationalist aspirations.

After the YMBA's third annual conference in 1915, it became more political in orientation. Its political agenda included pressuring the British government in India for more rights and liberties. It demanded the appointment of Burmese to key posts, including Burmese deputy commissioners, district magistrates, land records department offices, customs officials, and Chief Court magistrates, to enable Burmese to have a voice in the formulation of national policy and the corridors of power. The transformation to overt political activities occurred with the release of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report in 1917, whereby Edwin Samuel Montagu, secretary of state for India (t. 1917–1923), announced a policy of gradual self-government for India but not for Burma. Outraged at being considered inferior, Burmese nationalists in the YMBA, and equivalent women's organizations, began pressing for constitutional reforms in Burma. A visit to Lord Montagu in India by U Ba Pe to press the case for separation from India was sunk by the Karens, beneficiaries of the colonial administration, who thought that Burma was not yet ready. The delegation urged the establishment of a legislative council of seventy-five members, of whom sixty were to be elected.

The YMBA split into the old guard loyalists and the Young Turks. Led by the barrister Maung Thein Maung, following the 1916 All Burma Conference of Buddhists at Jubilee Hall, Rangoon College, the “no footwear” campaign was launched, echoing the “shoe issue” of precolonial times. Under Burmese custom, shoes had to be removed in the precincts

of Buddhist temples and pagodas, and also upon entering a private house. The British sought to thwart the campaign by not visiting the Shwe Dagon pagoda in Yangon, or any other pagoda. However, that was not before an ugly incident had occurred at the Eindawya Pagoda in Mandalay, where irate monks attacked a group of Europeans, including women; four of the monks were tried and convicted. Their leader, U Ketya, was sentenced to life imprisonment. The revered Ledi Sayadaw, in support of the YMBA, published a ninety-five-page book in Burmese entitled *On the Impropriety of Wearing Shoes on Pagoda Platforms*. This radical turn brought stricter police surveillance and open defiance of the British administration, the first overt expression of anti-British political views in the nascent nationalist movement.

Up to 1920, Burma had experienced rapid economic growth, much immigration from India, extreme exploitation of its arable lands, and widespread indebtedness to foreign investors. There was little opportunity to develop the skills needed for self-government in the Legislative Council. With the establishment of Rangoon University in 1920, the nationalist movement gained a new dimension from the activities of students such as U Nu (1907–1995), president of the Students Union. With the support of two leading monks, U Ottama (1897–1939) and U Wizara, from 1920 onward, agitation against the colonial authorities became more focused.

U Ottama, known as the Gandhi of Burma, on returning from India in 1918 facilitated the involvement of Buddhist monks in the politics of the nationalist movement. Born in Akyab in 1897, U Ottama had declined an opportunity to study in England; instead he entered the Buddhist priesthood and as a young monk went to Calcutta to study, then to Tokyo, returning in 1911. His writings in *The Sun* contributed to the political awakening of the nationalist movement in its early stages. He preached widely in small towns, wrote letters to Governor Reginald Craddock (t. 1917–1922), and became a national hero. He was arrested in 1921 and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment. Subsequent periods of his imprisonment from 1921 to 1927 set the tone for nonviolent noncooperation in the Gandhian mode. People were incensed and protested, and the Buddhist Sangha led the campaign of polit-

ical agitation. Through the YMBA and U Ottama, the early nationalist struggle prepared the way for demands for home rule and self-government, which marked the movement during the 1920s. U Ottama died in penury in 1939. By then the nationalist movement was well on the way to independence.

In 1920 the YMBA became the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA). Its president, U Chit Hlaing, advocated noncooperation with the British-appointed Legislative Council and followed an overtly political program that gave rise to the Rangoon University strike in 1920. The newspapers and journals first launched by the YMBA contributed to the significant political awakening of the 1920s. The YMBA and its successor organizations contributed a lasting legacy of political debate to Burma's cultural life.

HELEN JAMES

See also Boedi Oetama (Budi Utomo) (1908); Buddhism, Theravada; Burma under British Colonial Rule; General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) (1920); Karens; Newspapers and Mass Media in Southeast Asia; *Sangha*; "Shoe Issue"; University of Rangoon

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
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YUAN (MONGOL) DYNASTY (1271–1368)

The Yuan or Mongol dynasty was the Chinese portion of a Mongol empire that at its peak strength had dominated Europe and Asia. This expansionist dynasty was related to Southeast Asia in two distinctive ways: launching of numerous expeditions in an attempt to put Asian countries under its domain, and prosperous trade with such countries, whether turned into Mongolian vassal states or otherwise.

In 1271, Kubilai Khan (1215–1294), already elected in 1260 by other Mongol khans the *khaghanate* ("khan of khans"), founded the Yuan dynasty at Ta-tu (modern Beijing). The Yuan dynasty coexisted with four other khanates, all of which constituted a nominally unified Mongol empire formed by Genghis Khan (1162–1227), paternal grandfather of Kubilai Khan. Kubilai had to spend another eight years to conquer the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279), a Chinese regime situated south of the Yangzi (Yangtze) River. However, the virtue and ability of Kubilai, which made him a great conqueror and then enlightened ruler of China (r. 1260–1294), were unfortunately not inherited by his successors, whose increasingly racist dispositions and inflexible fiscal policies caused government corruption. That in turn agitated the Han Chinese into an antigovernment mood, infrequently translated into riots throughout the fourteenth century, before the dynasty's collapse. Finally, Zhu Yuanzhang (1328–1398), a peasant leader, expelled the Mongols to Mongolia in 1368 and became the first emperor of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), although in Mongolia some Mongol princes still adopted the title Yuan for their regime, which coexisted with the Ming and imposed continuing threats to its southern neighbor for another thirty years.

To a Mongol khan, military achievement was the cost of legitimacy rather than a prize, and Kubilai was no exception. Therefore, after the Southern Song were eliminated, Southeast Asia would naturally be the next target of invasion. Countries in the region had probably felt the imminent threat of the Mongols' military presence as early as 1253, when Kubilai conquered Dali (Tali), in modern Yunnan and bordering northern Indochina; he had a view to encircling the declining Southern Song China before a full-scale invasion began. After the



Kublai Khan and soldiers. Kubilai Khan (1215–1294) was a Mongol emperor and the grandson of Genghis Khan. Kubilai Khan founded China's Yuan dynasty and established Mongol power in China. (Corbis)

founding of the dynasty, three expeditions were sent to Champa (1281, 1286, 1287), two to Pagan (1281, 1287), and one to Java (1289). Some successes were achieved: the Pagan king was overthrown in 1287; Champa king Tran Nhon-ton acknowledged himself as Kubilai's vassal in

1288. All the remaining expeditions, however, suffered defeats. Therefore, the territory of the Yuan dynasty was no larger than part of Mongolia and land inhabited by the Han Chinese.

The alien nature of the Yuan dynasty implied less reliance on Chinese tradition in

making decisions, which contributed to the regime's openness in receiving visitors of virtually every ethnicity and religion—including Christians like Marco Polo (1254–1324) and Arabs like Ibn Battuta (1304–1377). This open disposition also led to a substantial reversal of the traditional Chinese bias against trade. Many restrictions previously imposed on merchants were lifted. External trade was regulated by the institution of Maritime Trade Supervisorates (*shiboshi*) at some port cities, with Quanzhou (in Fujian) and Guangzhou (Canton) handling the largest volume of trade. The “Spice Road,” a sea trade route connecting the Chinese ports with Persia with the Malay Archipelago as important calling ports en route, became a supplement to the Silk Road across Central Asia. For both routes Arab merchants were crucial agents. Champa, Palembang, and Java, where the influence of Islam was enhanced by the presence of such Arab traders, established strong trade connections with Quanzhou and Guangzhou and imported Chinese products, notably chinaware and silk. Wang Dayuan (b. 1308 or 1311?), a Chinese traveler during the Yuan dynasty, gave an amazing account in his travel writings of the Chinese products he saw in nearly every port he called on during his travels to and from Africa.

Migration followed trade, and coastal residents in South China (especially the Fujian province) were the most active immigrants to Southeast Asia. Because of their connections with China, Chinese immigrants gradually became influential and were employed by local rulers to serve as interpreters, often in tribute missions sent to China during the Ming dynasty; sometimes they even served as envoys for such missions. On the other hand, there were also cases of naturalized Arabians in China. Pu Shougeng, a Fujian shipowner and millionaire after naturalization, hired by the Yuan government as a trade representative, is a notable example.

The wealth of the empire and a bellicose khan constituted an admirable and fearful Cathay—as China was then known to Westerners—an image set before the Europeans by Marco Polo. However, Marco Polo did not see the disgraceful treatment of the subjugated Han Chinese, especially the subjects of the former Southern Song Chinese, who were at the lowest social stratum. The regime lasted for less than a

century, much shorter than the subsequent Manchu dynasty (1644–1912), which ruled China for 268 years with a stronger disposition to racial toleration and even assimilation.

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See also Champa; Chinese in Southeast Asia; Chinese Tribute System; Ibn Battuta (1304–1377); Java; Majapahit (1293–ca. 1520s); Ming Dynasty (1368–1644); Nan Chao (Nanchao) (Dali/Tali); Pagan (Bagan); Palembang; Qing (Ching/Manchu) Dynasty (1644–1912)

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YUNNAN PROVINCE

Back Door to China

Yunnan literally means “south of the clouds.” Yunnan province is a southeastern Chinese province that is bordered on the south by Myanmar (Burma), Laos, and Vietnam, traditionally an important gateway to Indochina.

Among other provinces in China, Yunnan province has the most diverse ethnic minority population, consisting of twenty-five out of the fifty-six ethnic groups in the country. They came from the descendants of troops drawn from various parts of the Chinese Empire to fortify the borderland. Indigenous groups such as the Dai people have maintained strong ethnic affiliations

with Indochina throughout their history. Strong fortifications were needed not only to prevent ethnic conflicts and safeguard the strategic land route to Indochina but also to protect Sichuan—a neighboring Chinese province that has traditionally been one of China's granaries—from falling into the hands of enemies.

The discovery of a section of the Great Wall, a monolithic creation during the Qin Dynasty (221–206 B.C.E.) and a symbol of national unity, in Yunnan in the late 1990s does not alter the fact that the early history of Yunnan was made up largely of autonomous tributary regimes. During the Tang dynasty (618–906), Nanchao reigned over the region, but during the Song dynasty (960–1279), Dali was preeminent. It was not until the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) that Yunnan, conquered by Kub'lai Khan (r. 1260–1294), was permanently incorporated into the Chinese Empire as one of the then eleven provinces. This territorial amalgamation, however, did not end the status of Yunnan as a seedbed of disputes, both internal and external. In spite of the flexible policy adopted by the central government in dealing with Yunnan's ethnic complexity, conflicts between the dominating Han people and other ethnic groups remained unresolved. Consequently the ethnic minorities launched antigovernment revolts; the best-known uprising was led by Du Wenxiu, a Muslim, who managed an autonomous regime in Yunnan from 1856 to 1874.

Yunnan was regarded as an entry point to China by the Western powers, which were eager to gain concessions there in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1875 a British vice consul, Augustus Margary, entered Yunnan from Burma without formal permission from the Chinese government and was killed by the local people. This Margary Incident was capitalized upon by Britain to gain further concessions from China through the Chefoo Convention in 1876. Another treaty in 1897 between Britain and China leased Nankan, Yunnan, to British Burma, and the lease was turned into a permanent acquisition in 1960. A more prominent foreign interest came from France, whose ambition in gaining Annam led to the Sino-French War from 1883 to 1885, resulting in Vietnam, traditionally a Chinese tributary state, being turned into a French protectorate. France's new territorial gain paved the way for its claiming Yunnan as a French sphere of influ-

ence in the late 1890s, with the right of constructing and managing the Haiphong-Kunming railway, completed in 1910.

As a landlocked and mountainous province, Yunnan is more accessible from Indochina than from the neighboring Chinese provinces, especially during civil wars. In the 1910s and 1920s, Chinese travelers to Yunnan always got a Vietnam pass from the French consulate, then went aboard a Hong Kong-bound liner, changed at Hong Kong to another passenger liner for Vietnam, and reached Yunnan after crossing the Sino-Vietnam border. The unique geographical setting of Yunnan vis-à-vis British Burma and French Vietnam rendered the province a very special role during the Sino-Japanese War in the late 1930s. It developed into a strategic transportation center, importing much-needed war supplies from Indochina to China and distributing them to the front, when Japan was imposing an embargo along the long Chinese coast. Yunnan thus benefited and prospered as a haven for traders of every kind until 1940, when Britain and France closed the borders under Japanese pressure.

Another round of border disputes concerning Yunnan took place after the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949) between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party), resulting in the latter's retreat to Taiwan. The remnant Kuomintang army, led by General Li Er, moved into Burma and established a military base at what is now known as the Golden Triangle. This agitated both Beijing and Rangoon (Yangon), as border guerrilla warfare imposed a threat to the national security and sovereignty of both newly emerging regimes. The problem was not solved until a large portion of the army retreated to Taiwan, where the Kuomintang government was seated, and Beijing ceded to Rangoon in 1960 part of the borderland with considerable Kuomintang military influence.

Yunnan became more peaceful after 1978 under Deng Xiaoping's policy of reform and openness. The large number of overseas Chinese with Yunnan as their native land became an important source of investments, and the colorful ethnic cultures render Yunnan a unique asset for the development of tourism, an important source of income for the province.

HANS W.Y. YEUNG

See also British Burma; British Interests in Southeast Asia; Burma Road; French Ambitions in Southeast Asia; French Indochina; Konbaung Rulers and British Imperialism; Kuomintang (KMT); Lagrée-Garnier Mekong Expedition (1866–1868); Nan Chao (Nanchao) (Dali/Tali); Nguyễn Emperors and French Imperialism; Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty (1271–1368)

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Z

ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM, AND NEUTRALITY (ZOPFAN) (1971)

On 27 November 1971 the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted the *Kuala Lumpur Declaration*. This declaration called for the creation of a *Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)* in Southeast Asia. The Declaration of ZOPFAN states ASEAN's peaceful intentions and its commitment to build regional resilience free from interference by external powers. However, conflicts and tensions within Southeast Asia—for example, the Cambodian conflict—prevented the establishment of ZOPFAN for more than two decades.

The declaration of ZOPFAN was adopted in a regional context that was marked by intensifying militarized conflicts in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The progress of the leftist forces in the three countries leading to total victory in 1975, coupled with the gradually diminishing U.S. involvement and later total withdrawal, created a totally new situation in Southeast Asia, bringing the perceived threat of international communism to the doorstep of the ASEAN members, in particular Thailand. However, the ZOPFAN concept failed to bring about a full rapprochement between ASEAN and the Indochinese countries, and Vietnam continued to perceive ASEAN as closely associated with the United States in the post-1975 years. Vietnam's military intervention in Cambodia and the ten-

sions between ASEAN and the three Indochinese countries in connection with the Cambodian conflict prevented any progress toward the establishment of ZOPFAN.

Developments in the 1990s, with the resolution of the Cambodian Conflict in 1991 and the gradual expansion of ASEAN membership to include all ten Southeast Asian countries, gradually brought the region closer to the conditions envisaged by ZOPFAN. Furthermore, in December 1995 in Bangkok, the ten Southeast Asian countries adopted the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone. The decision to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone is an important step toward the full establishment of ZOPFAN.

RAMSES AMER

See also Asian-African (Bandung)

Conference (April 1955); Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (1967); Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and Southeast Asia; Paris Conference on Cambodia (PCC) (1989, 1991); United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia; U.S. Involvement in Southeast Asia (post-1945)

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
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
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APPENDIX


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
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
Contemporary Southeast Asia




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
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
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
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
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East Timor




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


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
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Laos




Laos




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Vietnam



Vietnam




Myanmar



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Myanmar




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
Bay of Bengal

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
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
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


Indonesia




Indonesia





Brunei




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Malaysia



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Malaysia




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
Singapore



Singapore



Philippines



Philippines

APPENDIX

Country Fact Tables

Words that appear entirely in capital letters represent entries in the A–Z section of the encyclopedia.

ICJ: International Court of Justice

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

N.A.: Not available

BRUNEI

Name:

Official: Negara Brunei Darussalam (Abode of Peace)

Common: Brunei

Area: 5,765 square kilometers

Climate: Equatorial

Population: 358,098 (July 2003 est.)

Ethnic Groups: BRUNEI MALAY 67%, CHINESE 15%, BRUNEI ETHNIC MINORITIES 6%, others 12%.

Religions: ISLAM (official) 67%; BUDDHISM 13%, Christian 10%, indigenous beliefs and others 10%.

Languages: Malay (official), English, and Chinese.

Literacy Rate: 87.9%

Life Expectancy: 71.8

Capital: Bandar Seri Begawan

Government: Constitutional monarchy termed as MĒLAYU ISLAM BERAJA (MIB, MALAY ISLAMIC MONARCHY).

Administrative Structure: Composed of four districts (*daerah-daerah*; singular, *daerah*), namely, Belait, Brunei and Muara, Temburong, and Tutong.

Independence: 1 January 1984 from U.K.

Legal System: Generally English common law. Binding for Muslims is Islamic Shari'a law; the Shari'a supersedes civil law in various areas.

Natural Resources: Primarily petroleum, natural gas, and timber.

Agricultural Products: Include rice, vegetables, fruits, chickens, and water buffalo.

Industries: Mainly OIL AND PETROLEUM, petroleum refining, liquefied natural gas, and construction.

Exports: Focus on crude oil, natural gas, and refined products.

GDP per Capita: Purchasing power parity: U.S.\$18,600 (2002 est.)

Currency: Bruneian dollar (BND)

CAMBODIA

Name:

Official: Kingdom of Cambodia

Common: Cambodia; Kampuchea

Local language: Preahreacheanachakr Kampuchea

Previous names: DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK); PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA (PRK).

Area: 181,035 square kilometers

Climate: Tropical; wet season from May to November.

Population: 13,124,764 (July 2003 est.)

Ethnic Groups: KHMERS 90%, Vietnamese 5%, CHINESE 1%, others 4%.

Religions: THERAVADA BUDDHISM 95%, others 5%.

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Languages: Dominated by Khmer (official) 95%; some French and English are spoken.

Literacy Rate: 35%

Life Expectancy: 51.1

Capital: PHNOM PENH

Government: A constitutional monarchy established in September 1993 oversees a multiparty democracy.

Administrative Structure: There are twenty provinces (*khett*, singular and plural) and four municipalities (*krong*, singular and plural). The provinces are Banteay Mean Cheay, BATTAMBANG, Kampong Cham, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong Spoe, Kampong Thum, Kampot, Kandal, Kaoh Kong, Kracheh, Mondol Kiri, Otdar Mean Cheay, Pouthisat, Preah Vihear, Prey Veng, Rotanah Kiri, SIEM REAP, Stoeng Treng, Svay Rieng, and Takev. The municipalities are Keb, Pailin, PHNOM PENH, and Preah Seihanu.

Independence: 9 November 1953 from France.

Legal System: Basically a civil law mixture of French-influenced codes from the UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC) period, royal decrees, acts of the legislature, customary law, and remnants of communist legal theory; there is an increasing influence of common law in recent years.

Natural Resources: Include timber, gemstones, some iron ore, manganese, phosphates, and hydropower potential.

Agricultural Products: Rice, RUBBER, corn, and vegetables.

Industries: Mainly tourism, garments, rice milling, fishing, wood and wood products, RUBBER, cement, gem mining, textiles.

Exports: Main items are timber, garments, rubber, rice, and fish.

GDP: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$19.7 billion (2002 est.)

GDP per Capita: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$1,500 (2002 est.)

Currency: riel (KHR)

EAST TIMOR

Name:

Official: Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste

Common: East Timor

Local language: Republika Demokratika Timor Lorosa'e [Tetum]; Republica Democratica de Timor-Leste [Portuguese]

Previous names: Portuguese Timor; Propinsi Timor Timur

Area: 15,007 square kilometers

Climate: Tropical; wet season stretches from December to March.

Population: 997,853

Note: Other estimate 800,000 (July 2003 est.)

Ethnic Groups: Largely Austronesian (Malayo-Polynesian), Papuan, with a small CHINESE minority.

Religions: Mainly CATHOLICISM 90%; others include Islam 4%, Protestant 3%, HINDUISM 0.5%, BUDDHISM, Animism (1992 est.).

Languages: Official are Tetum and Portuguese; both Bahasa Indonesia and English are used.

Note: Some sixteen indigenous languages remain current; the more widely used include Tetum, Galole, Mambae, and Kemak.

Literacy Rate: N.A.

Life Expectancy: N.A.

Capital: Dili

Government: Republic

Administrative Structure: There are thirteen administrative districts: Aileu, Ainaro, Baucau, Bobonaro (Maliana), Cova-Lima (Suai), Dili, Ermera, Lautem (Los Palos), Liquica, Manatuto, Manufahi (Same), Oecussi (Ambeno), and Viqueque.

Independence: Proclaimed independence from Portugal on 28 November 1975. 20 May 2002 marked the international recognition of East Timor's independence from Indonesia.

Legal System: In the process of formulation.

Natural Resources: Mainly gold, petroleum, natural gas, manganese, and marble.

Agricultural Products: Include COFFEE, rice, maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, soybeans, cabbage, mangoes, bananas, and vanilla.

Industries: Focus on printing, soap manufacturing, handicrafts, and woven cloth.

Exports: Largely COFFEE, sandalwood, marble.
Note: Potential for oil and vanilla.

GDP: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$440 million (2001 est.)

GDP per Capita: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$500 (2001 est.)

Currency: Indonesian rupiah (IDR)

INDONESIA

Name:

Official: Republic of Indonesia

Common: INDONESIA

Local language: Republik Indonesia

Previous names: NETHERLANDS (DUTCH) EAST INDIES; DUTCH EAST INDIES

Area: 1,919,440 square kilometers

Climate: Tropical; wet season generally from December to March except in MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS), where it is from June to September.

Population: 234,893,453 (July 2003 est.)

Ethnic Groups: Javanese 45%, Sundanese 14%, Madurese 7.5%, coastal MALAYS 7.5%, other 26% (Sundanese, Balinese, BATAKS, MINANGKABAU, DAYAKS, BUGIS [BUGINESE], EAST INDONESIAN ETHNIC GROUPS). There is a very small CHINESE minority.

Religions: Predominantly ISLAM 88%, Christianity (Protestant 5%, CATHOLICISM 3%), HINDUISM 2%, BUDDHISM 1%, others 1% (1998).

Languages: Bahasa Indonesia (a variant of Malay) is the official; English, Dutch, local dialects (Javanese being the most widely spoken).

Literacy Rate: 83.2%

Life Expectancy: 62.9

Capital: JAKARTA (BATAVIA [SUNDA KELAPA, JACATRA, DJAKARTA/JAKARTA])

Government: Republic

Administrative Structure: Twenty-seven provinces (*propinsi-propinsi*; singular, *propinsi*), two special regions (*daerah-daerah istimewa*; singular, *daerah khusus ibukota*). The provinces are Bali, BANTEN (BANTAM), BENGKULU (BENCOOLEN, BENKULEN), Gorontalo, JAMBI, Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, Jawa Timur, Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan Selatan, Kalimantan Tengah, Kalimantan Timur, Kepulauan Bangka Belitung, Lampung, Maluku, Maluku Utara, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Papua, Riau, Sulawesi Selatan, Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi Tenggara, Sulawesi Utara, Sumatera Barat, Sumatera Selatan, and Sumatera Utara. The special regions are ACEH and YOGYAKARTA. Jakarta Raya is the special city district.

Note 1: From 1 January 2001 when decentralization came into operation, 357 districts (regencies) became key administrative units that undertook the provision of government services.

Note 2: As a result of the 30 August 1999 provincial referendum for independence that returned an overwhelmingly affirmative response of the people of Timor Timur, followed by the concurrence of Indonesia's national legislature in October 1999, the name East Timor was adopted

as the provisional name for Propinsi Timor Timur. On 20 May 2002 East Timor attained formal independence.

Independence: Proclaimed on 17 August 1945, but contested by the Dutch colonial government. Indonesia finally became legally independent from The Netherlands on 27 December 1949.

Legal System: Primarily based on Roman-Dutch law with substantial influence from indigenous traditional concepts of justice, and by new criminal procedures code. It has yet to abide by compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

Natural Resources: Largely petroleum, TIN, natural gas, nickel, timber, bauxite, copper, fertile soils, coal, GOLD, and silver.

Agricultural Products: Include rice, cassava (tapioca), peanuts, RUBBER, cocoa, COFFEE, palm oil, copra, poultry and eggs, beef, and pork.

Industries: Petroleum and natural gas; textiles, apparel, and footwear; mining, cement, chemical fertilizers, plywood; RUBBER; food; and tourism.

Exports: Mainly oil and gas, electrical appliances, plywood, textiles, and RUBBER.

GDP: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$663 billion (2002 est.)

GDP per Capita: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$3,100 (2002 est.)

Currency: sian rupiah (IDR)

LAOS

Name:

Official: LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR)

Common: Laos

Local language: Sathalanalat Paxathipatai Paxaxon Lao

Area: 236,800 square kilometers

Climate: Tropical monsoonal; wet season falls from May to October.

Population: 5,921,545 (July 2003 est.)

Ethnic Groups: Mainly Lao Loum (lowland) 68%; Lao Theung (upland) 22%; and Lao Soung (highland), including the HMONG ("Meo") and the Yao (Mien) 9%; and ethnic Vietnamese/CHINESE 1%.

Religions: More than half practice THERAVADA BUDDHISM 60%; animism and other 40% (including various Christian denominations 1.5%).

Languages: Lao is the official; French, English, and various ethnic languages.

Literacy Rate: 55.8%

Life Expectancy: 54.2

Capital: VIENTIANE

Government: A communist state

Administrative Structure: Partitioned into sixteen provinces (*khoueng*, singular and plural), one municipality (*kampheng nakhon*, singular and plural), and one special zone (*khetphiset*, singular and plural). The provinces are Attapu, Bokeo, Bolikhamxai, CHAMPASSAK, Houaphan, Khammouan, Louangnamtha, LUANG PRABANG, Oudomxai, Phongsali, Salavan, Savannakhet, Viangchan, Xaignabouli, Xekong, and Xiangkhoang. Viangchan is the only municipality and Xaisomboun is recognized as a special zone.

Independence: 19 July 1949 from France; 1954 recognized by international community (contested by Thailand and France; under French colonial domination since late nineteenth century).

Legal System: Largely reliant on traditional customs, French legal norms and procedures, and socialist practice.

Natural Resources: Timber, hydropower, gypsum, TIN, GOLD, gemstones.

Agricultural Products: Sweet potatoes, vegetables, corn, COFFEE, sugarcane, TOBACCO, cotton, tea, peanuts, rice, water buffalo, pigs, cattle, poultry.

Industries: TIN and gypsum mining, timber, electric power, agricultural processing, construction, garments, tourism.

Exports: Wood products, garments, electricity, COFFEE, TIN.

GDP: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$9.9 billion (2002 est.)

GDP per Capita: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$1,700 (2002 est.)

Currency: kip (LAK)

MALAYSIA

Name:

Official: Federation of Malaysia

Common: Malaysia

Previous names: Federation of Malaya, Sarawak, North Borneo (Sabah)

Area: 329,750 square kilometers

Climate: Equatorial; northeast monsoon season October to February and southwest monsoon May to September.

Population: 23,092,940 (July 2003 est.)

Ethnic Groups: MALAY and EAST MALAYSIAN ETHNIC MINORITIES (IBANS,

KADAZAN-DUSUNS, BAJAU) 58%, CHINESE 24%, Indian 8%, others 10% (2000 est.).

Religions: Official is ISLAM; others include MAHAYANA BUDDHISM, THERAVADA BUDDHISM, CONFUCIANISM, Daoism, HINDUISM, CATHOLICISM, Protestantism, Sikhism.

Note: Animism is widely practiced in East Malaysia.

Languages: Official and national is Bahasa Malaysia (a variant of Malay); English, CHINESE DIALECT GROUPS (Cantonese, Teochiu, Hokkien, Hakka, Hainan, Foochow), Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Punjabi, and Thai.

Note: A multitude of indigenous languages are spoken in East Malaysia; the more significant are IBAN and KADAZAN-DUSUNS.

Literacy Rate: 83%

Life Expectancy: 70.7

Capital: KUALA LUMPUR

Government: CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY OF MALAYA/MALAYSIA

Note: Nine Malay sultans, each from the nine Peninsular Malay States, take turns serving as the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, or Supreme Head of State/Paramount Ruler (King), for a maximum five-year term.

Administrative Structure: There are thirteen states (*negeri-negeri*; singular, *negeri*) and three federal territories (*wilayah-wilayah persekutuan*; singular, *wilayah persekutuan*) The states are JOHOR, KEDAH, KELANTAN, MELAKA, NEGRI SEMBILAN, PAHANG, PERAK, PERLIS, PENANG (Pulau Pinang), SABAH, SARAWAK, SELANGOR, and TERENGGANU. The federal territories are LABUAN, Putrajaya, and Wilayah Persekutuan (KUALA LUMPUR [KL]).

Note 1: The capital city of KUALA LUMPUR (KL) is within the federal territory of Wilayah Persekutuan; hence these terms are not interchangeable.

Note 2: Federation of Malaya (presently Peninsular or West Malaysia) came into being on 31 August 1957; Federation of Malaysia (Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore) was created on 16 September 1963 (Singapore, however, seceded from the federation on 9 August 1965).

Independence: 31 August 1957 from U.K.

Legal System: Primarily based on English common law; judicial review of legislative acts in the Supreme Court at request of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. It has yet to acknowledge compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

Natural Resources: Mainly petroleum, TIN, timber, copper, iron ore, natural gas, and bauxite.

Agricultural Products: For Peninsular Malaysia mainly RUBBER, palm oil, COCOA, and rice; for Sabah largely subsistence crops, RUBBER, timber, coconuts, and rice; and for Sarawak, RUBBER, PEPPER, and timber.

Industries: In Peninsular Malaysia mainly RUBBER and palm oil processing and manufacturing, light manufacturing industry, electronics, logging and processing timber; in Sabah, logging and petroleum production; and in Sarawak, agriculture processing, petroleum production and refining, and logging.

Exports: Largely semiconductors and processors, electronic equipment, petroleum and liquefied natural gas, wood and wood products, palm oil, RUBBER, textiles, and chemicals (2000).

GDP: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$210 billion (2002 est.)

GDP per Capita: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$9,300 (2002 est.)

Currency: ringgit (MYR)

MYANMAR (FORMERLY BURMA)

Name:

Official: Union of Myanmar

Common: Myanmar

Local language: Pyidaungzu Myanma Naingngandaw

Previous names: Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma

Note: Since 1989 the military authorities in Burma have promoted the name Myanmar as a conventional name for their state; this decision was not approved by any sitting legislature in Burma, and the U.S. Government and others did not adopt the name, which is a derivative of the Burmese short-form name Myanma Naingngandaw.

Area: 678,500 square kilometers

Climate: Tropical monsoon; dry zone around MANDALAY.

Population: 42,510,537 (July 2003 est.)

Ethnic Groups: A diversity of peoples including BURMANS 68%, SHANS 9%, KARENS 7%, Rakhine 4%, CHINESE 3%, Indian 2%, MONS 2%, other (CHINS, KACHINS, PYUS) 5%.

Religions: Mainly THERAVADA BUDDHISM 89%; Christianity 4% (Baptist 3%, CATHOLICISM 1%), ISLAM 4%, animism 1%, others 2%.

Languages: Burmese is widely spoken and for official usage; the various ethnic minorities possess their own languages.

Literacy Rate: 82.7%

Life Expectancy: 54.7

Capital City: Yangon (RANGOON)

Government: Military regime

Administrative Structure: Partitioned into seven divisions (*taing-myar*; singular, *taing*) and seven states (*pyi ne-myar*; singular, *pyi ne*). The divisions are Ayeyarwady, Bago, Magway, MANDALAY, Sagaing, Tanintharyi, and Yangon (RANGOON). The states are Chin State, Kachin State, Kayin State, Kayah State, Mon State, Rakhine State, and Shan State.

Independence: 4 January 1948 from U.K.

Legal System: Has yet to acknowledge compulsory ICJ jurisdiction. Basically military rule by a military junta fashioned as STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC), established in 1988. In November 1997 SLORC was replaced by a State Peace and Development Council (SPDC); the key leaders drawn from the military remained the same.

Natural Resources: Rich in minerals including petroleum, timber, TIN, antimony, zinc, copper, tungsten, lead, coal, some marble, limestone, precious stones; also natural gas and hydropower.

Agricultural Products: Mainly rice, pulses, beans, sesame, groundnuts, sugarcane, hardwood, fish, and fish products.

Industries: Largely agricultural processing; knit and woven apparel; wood and wood products; copper, TIN, tungsten, iron; construction materials; pharmaceuticals; and fertilizer.

Exports: Chiefly natural gas, wood products, pulses, beans, fish, and rice.

GDP: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$70 billion (2002 est.)

GDP per Capita: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$1,660 (2002 est.)

Currency: kyat (MMK)

THE PHILIPPINES

Name:

Official: Republic of the Philippines

Common: The Philippines

Local language: Republika ng Pilipinas; Pilipinas

Area: 300,000 square kilometers

Climate: Tropical; wet season from June to November.

Population: 84,619,974 (July 2003 est.)

Ethnic Groups: Mainly Filipinos; MESTIZO (Sino-Filipino, Spanish-Filipino, and American-Filipino), ILANUN AND BALANGINGI, MOROS, SULUS, and TAUSUGS. There is a mainly urban-based small CHINESE minority.

Religions: Predominantly CATHOLICISM 83%; Protestant 9%, ISLAM 5%, BUDDHISM and others 3%.

Languages: Official are Filipino (based on Tagalog) and English. There are eight major dialects: Tagalog, Cebuano, Ilocan, Hiligaynon or Ilonggo, Bicol, Waray, Pampango, and Pangasinense.

Literacy Rate: 94.4%

Life Expectancy: 66.6

Capital City: MANILA

Government: Republic

Administrative Structure: Altogether seventy-eight provinces and sixty-one chartered cities. The provinces are Abra, Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Aklan, Albay, Antique, Apayao, Aurora, Basilan, Bataan, Batanes, Batangas, Benguet, Biliran, Bohol, Bukidnon, Bulacan, Cagayan, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Camiguin, Capiz, Catanduanes, Cavite, Cebu, Compostela, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Compostela, Davao Oriental, Eastern Samar, Guimaras, Ifugao, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Iloilo, Isabela, Kalinga, Laguna, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, La Union, Leyte, Maguindanao, Marinduque, Masbate, Mindoro Occidental, Mindoro Oriental, Misamis Occidental, Misamis Oriental, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, North Cotabato, Northern Samar, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Palawan, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Quezon, Quirino, Rizal, Romblon, Samar, Sarangani, Siquijor, Sorsogon, South Cotabato, Southern Leyte, Sultan Kudarat, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, Tarlac, Tawi-Tawi, Zambales, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and Zamboanga Sibugay. The chartered cities include Angeles, Bacolod, Bago, Baguio, Bais, Basilan City, Batangas City, Butuan, Cabanatuan, Cadiz, Cagayan de Oro, Calbayog, Caloocan, Canlaon, Cavite City, Cebu City, Cotabato, Dagupan, Danao, Dapitan, Davao City, Dipolog, Dumaguete, General Santos, Gingoog, Iligan, Iloilo City, Iriga, La Carlota, Laoag, Lapu-Lapu, Legaspi, Lipa, Lucena, Mandaue, Manila, Marawi, Naga, Olongapo, Ormoc, Oroquieta, Ozamis, Pagadian, Palayan, Pasay, Puerto Princesa, Quezon City, Roxas, San Carlos (in Negros Occidental), San Carlos (in Pangasinan), San Jose, San Pablo, Silay,

Sulu, Surigao, Tacloban, Tagaytay, Tagbilaran, Tangub, Toledo, Trece Martires, and Zamboanga.

Independence: 20 January 1899, creation of the Philippine Republic, from Spain. Not recognized and contested by the United States. 4 July 1946 from the United States.

Legal System: Mainly based on Spanish and Anglo-American law. Abides by compulsory ICJ jurisdiction despite reservations.

Natural Resources: Mainly timber, petroleum, nickel, cobalt, silver, GOLD, salt, and copper.

Agricultural Products: Largely rice, coconuts, corn, sugarcane, bananas, pineapples, mangoes, pork, eggs, beef, and fish.

Industries: Mainly textiles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, wood products, food processing, electronics assembly, petroleum refining, fishing.

Exports: Focus on electronic equipment, machinery and transport equipment, garments, coconut products, and chemicals.

GDP: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$356 billion (2002 est.)

GDP per Capita: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$4,200 (2002 est.)

Currency: Philippine peso (PHP)

SINGAPORE

Name:

Official: Republic of Singapore (City of Lions)

Common: Singapore

Previous name: TEMASIK (TUMASIK) (ancient)

Area: 692.7 square kilometers

Climate: Equatorial

Population: 4,608,595 (July 2003 est.)

Ethnic Groups: Mainly CHINESE 76.7%; MALAYS 14%, Indian 7.9%, others 1.4%.

Religions: MAHAYANA BUDDHISM (Chinese), CONFUCIANISM, Daoism, ISLAM (Malays), CATHOLICISM and Protestantism, HINDUISM, and Sikhism.

Languages: Official and national is Malay; other official are English, Chinese, and Tamil; English official for administration and education.

Literacy Rate: 91%

Life Expectancy: 78.8

Capital: Singapore

Administrative Structure: None

Government: Parliamentary republic

Independence: 16 September 1963 from U.K.; 9 August 1965 seceded from Federation of Malaysia.

Legal System: Based on English common law. It has yet to accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

Natural Resources: Fish and deepwater ports.

Agricultural Products: Mainly RUBBER, copra, fruit, orchids, vegetables, poultry, eggs, fish, and ornamental fish.

Industries: Focus on electronics, chemicals, financial services, oil-drilling equipment, petroleum refining, rubber processing and rubber products, processed food and beverages, ship repair, entrepôt trade, and biotechnology.

Exports: Largely machinery and equipment (including electronics), consumer goods, chemicals, and mineral fuels.

GDP: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$105 billion (2002 est.)

GDP per Capita: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$24,000 (2002 est.)

Currency: Singapore dollar (SGD)

THAILAND

Name:

Official: Kingdom of Thailand (Land of the Free)

Common: Thailand

Previous name: Siam

Note: The name Thailand was adopted in June 1939.

Area: 514,000 square kilometers

Climate: Tropical; wet season June to October, cool season November to February, and hot season March to May.

Population: 64,265,276 (July 2003 est.)

Ethnic Groups: Majority are Thai (T' AIS) 75%; CHINESE 14%, others 11% (including MUSLIM MINORITIES).

Religions: Predominantly THERAVADA BUDDHISM 95%; ISLAM 3.8%, Christianity 0.5%, HINDUISM 0.1%, others 0.6% (1991).

Languages: Official and widely used is Thai; English is the secondary language of the elite; ethnic and regional dialects.

Literacy Rate: 93.5%

Life Expectancy: 69.2

Capital: BANGKOK

Government: Constitutional monarchy

Administrative Structure: There are in total seventy-six provinces (*changwat*, singular and plural): Amnat Charoen, Ang Thong, Buriram, Chachoengsao, Chai Nat, Chaiyaphum, Chanthaburi, CHIANG MAI, CHIANG RAI, Chon Buri, Chumphon, Kalasin, Kamphaeng Phet, Kanchanaburi, Khon Kaen, Krabi, Krung Thep Mahanakhon (Bangkok), Lampang, Lamphun, Loei, LOPBURI (LAWO), Mae Hong Son, Maha

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Independence: Has never been colonized; 1238 C.E. is commonly adopted as the traditional establishment of the country.

Legal System: Adopted civil law system with influences of common law; has yet to accept compulsory ICJ jurisdiction.

Natural Resources: Mainly TIN, RUBBER, natural gas, tungsten, tantalum, timber, lead, fish, gypsum, lignite, fluorite, and arable land.

Agricultural Products: Focus on rice, cassava (tapioca), RUBBER, corn, sugarcane, coconuts, and soybeans.

Industries: Mainly tourism; textiles and garments; agricultural processing; beverages; tobacco; cement; light manufacturing, such as jewelry; electric appliances and components; computers and parts; integrated circuits; furniture; and plastics.

Exports: Computers, transistors, seafood, clothing, rice, tungsten, and tin (2000); world's second-largest tungsten producer and third-largest TIN producer.

GDP: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$429 billion (2002 est.)

GDP per Capita: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$6,900 (2002 est.)

Currency: baht (THB)

VIETNAM

Name:

Official: Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SV)

Common: Vietnam; Viet Nam

Local language: Cong Hoa Xa Hoi Chu Nghia Viet Nam

Previous names: Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) (NORTH VIETNAM [POST-1945]);

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Republic of Vietnam (SOUTH VIETNAM [POST-1945])

Area: 329,560 square kilometers

Climate: Tropical in the south; subtropical in the north; May to October is generally the wet season.

Population: 81,624,716 (July 2003 est.)

Ethnic Groups: VIETS 50%–90% as the majority; CHINESE, T' AIS, KHMERS, Cham, and mountain groups such as the HMONG and MONTAGNARD.

Religions: MAHAYANA BUDDHISM, HOA HAO, CAO DAI, Christianity (predominantly CATHOLICISM, some Protestantism), indigenous beliefs, and ISLAM.

Languages: Vietnamese is the official; English is increasingly being favored as a second language; others include some French, Chinese, and Khmer, and mountain-area languages (Mon-Khmer and Malayo-Polynesian).

Literacy Rate: 64%

Life Expectancy: 68.1

Capital: HANOI (THANG-LONG)

Government: A communist state

Administrative Structure: Divided into fifty-eight provinces (*tin*, singular and plural) and three municipalities (*thu do*, singular and plural). The provinces are An Giang, Bac Giang, Bac Kan, Bac Lieu, Bac Ninh, Ba Ria–Vung Tau, Ben Tre, Binh Dinh, Binh Duong, Binh Phuoc, Binh Thuan, Ca Mau, Can Tho, Cao Bang, Dac Lak, Da Nang, Dong Nai, Dong Thap, Gia Lai, Ha Giang, Hai Duong, Ha Nam, Ha Tay, Ha Tinh, Hoa Binh, Hung Yen, Khanh Hoa, Kien Giang, Kon Tum, Lai Chau, Lam Dong, Lang Son, Lao Cai, Long An, Nam Dinh, Nghe An, Ninh Binh, Ninh Thuan, Phu Tho, Phu Yen, Quang

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Independence: 2 September 1954 from France.

Legal System: Basically a combination of communist legal theory and French civil law.

Natural Resources: Phosphates, coal, manganese, bauxite, chromate, offshore oil and gas deposits, forests, and hydropower.

Agricultural Products: Include rice, corn, potatoes, RUBBER, soybeans, COFFEE, tea, bananas, SUGAR; also poultry, pigs, and fish.

Industries: Focus on food processing, garments, shoes, machine-building, mining, cement, chemical fertilizer, glass, tires, oil, coal, steel, and paper and paper products.

Exports: Largely crude oil, MARINE/SEA PRODUCTS, rice, COFFEE, RUBBER, tea, garments, and shoes.

GDP: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$183 billion (2002 est.)

GDP per Capita: purchasing power parity: U.S.\$2,250 (2002 est.)

Currency: dong (VND)

Sources:

CIA World Factbook. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>.

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CHRONOLOGY

Ooi Keat Gin John Barnhill

Terms appearing in all capital letters are entries in this encyclopedia.

I. INDOCHINA (CAMBODIA, LAOS, VIETNAM)

ca. 8000 B.C.E.

LAO people begin their continuous presence in Laos.

3rd century B.C.E.–1st century B.C.E.

Van Lang nation in northern Vietnam; the most notable king is Hung King.

206 B.C.E.

The kingdom of NAMVIET (NANYUE).

179 B.C.E.

Au Lac nation falls to NAMVIET, who in turn falls to the Han empire. By 111 B.C.E. the Han is secure in the domination of the Au Lac nation, a dominance that lasts over a thousand years through Chinese dynasties including the Sui (590–618 C.E.) and Tang (618–906 C.E.). This period strongly influences the culture, religion, and virtually all aspects of life in Vietnam. CONFUCIANISM and MAHAYANA BUDDHISM are two major Chinese imports. Rebellions are many, but none succeed.

111 B.C.E.–936 C.E.

Chinese dominate NAMVIET, organizing it in line with other Chinese provinces under the Han dynasty (202 B.C.E.–220 C.E.).

ca. 2 B.C.E.

Central Vietnam is home to the kingdom of CHAMPA, which developed out of Sa Hyun culture.

1st century C.E.

Fiefdoms associated with the BAN CHIANG culture develop an economy based on wet-rice cultivation in the middle Mekong valley.

1st–6th centuries

INDIANIZATION in Southeast Asia is a slow and gradual process. The oldest Indianized polity in Southeast Asia, the era of the kingdom of FUNAN, is the time in which Cambodia's language develops, as does its religion, which incorporates HINDUISM and BUDDHISM, and its culture.

6th–mid-8th centuries

CHENLA kingdom flourishes in Cambodia.

7th century

T' AIS migrate from northwestern TONKIN (TONGKING) to Laos.

7th–8th centuries

THERAVADA BUDDHISM reaches Lao through the MON kingdom of DVARAVATI.

8th century

The most prevalent group, the T'AI-Kadai, migrate to Laos. Chiefs of this people are known as *jao meuang*.

Late 8th century

Jawa kingdom in CAMBODIA.

9th–15th centuries

Cambodia regains sovereignty and enters the prosperous ANGKOR period, empire of the KHMERS. With the ascendancy of King JAYAVARMAN II (r. 770/790/802?–834 C.E.), the Khmer empire begins a period of 600 years during which it dominates mainland Southeast Asia from Burma (Myanmar) to the South China Sea to Laos. The period is noted for the construction of the Khmer temple complex—ANGKOR WAT. Kings JAYAVARMAN II, Indravarman I (r. 877–889), SURYAVARMAN II (r. 1113–1145?), and JAYAVARMAN VII (r. 1181–1220?) construct the complex irrigation system of lakes and canals that allows up to three rice crops each year. Parts of the system remain in use in the early twenty-first century.

At its peak, ANGKOR has a population of 70,000 to 80,000, but the Thai and Vietnamese invasions of the later years diminish the kingdom. With the fading of the ANGKOR era, Cambodia shifts capitals south to Longvek, then to Udong, and finally to PHNOM PENH. This period also sees the waning of HINDUISM and the rise of THERAVADA BUDDHISM.

936

Victory over the Chinese at the Bach Dang River frees Vietnam from IMPERIAL CHINA.

939

Vietnam becomes an independent country and adopts the name DAI VIET (939 C.E.–1407).

939–1009

Independent Vietnam manages to repulse many attempts by the Chinese to retake the land. Rulers are, inter alia, the Ngo (939–954), Dinh (968–980), and Early Ly (980–1009) dynasties.

1009–1400

Vietnam under the LY DYNASTY (1009–1225) followed by the Tran dynasty (1225–1400).

Vietnam progresses in agriculture, trade, and culture. Buddhism and Confucianism are the dominant religions. Military competence is sufficient to hold off the efforts of the Sung dynasty (960–1279) of China in 1075–1077 and the Mongol assaults.

Mid-13th century

A large but peaceful Austro-T'AI migration from the north gradually occupies large areas of Laos, easing out the indigenes without violence.

1258

The first Mongol invasion of Vietnam results in the sacking of the capital, but the second Mongol invasion is repelled.

1287–1288

In China, the Mongols establish the YUAN (MONGOL) DYNASTY (1271–1368). For a third time, the Mongols fail to take Vietnam.

14th century

Chao Fa Ngum takes Wieng Chan for the Khmer empire. His other conquests include the kingdom of Xieng Khuang, the Korat Plateau (northeast Thailand or ISAN), and Meuang Sawa (later LUANG PRABANG).

1353

Chao Fa Ngum declares himself king, naming his lands *Lan Xang Hom Khao* (“Million Elephants and White Parasol”). Technically a Khmer state, this polity is the first Lao nation. Fa Ngum also makes THERAVADA BUDDHISM the state religion. Lan Xang’s symbol is the golden statue of the Buddha, the Pha Bang, in Meung Sawa, later LUANG PRABANG (or Phabang), translated as “Great Pha Bang.”

15th–17th centuries

CAMBODIA becomes a source of contention between Siam and Vietnam.

1400

The Tran dynasty of Vietnam enters a period of decline; subsequently replaced by the Ho dynasty (1400–1413).

1408–1428

Ho is unable to hold out against the MING DYNASTY (1368–1644), whose armies occupy the country. For two decades, the Chinese rule. When the Chinese army loses at Lam Son, the Vietnamese rid themselves of the Chinese. The new Vietnamese house is that of Le Loi (r. 1418–1420), who establish the LE DYNASTY (1428–1527, 1533–1789).

1428–1788

Under the LE DYNASTY (1428–1527, 1533–1789), for over three and a half centuries, Vietnam flourishes. Strides occur in literature, culture, trade and industry, and agriculture. In the sixteenth century, the country splits into two feudal states: TRINH FAMILY in the north and Nguyễn in the south.

1520

King Photisarath relocates the capital to Wieng Chan (modern VIENTIANE). Despite its size and power, Lan Xang never conquers the highland tribes.

Late 16th century

The Portuguese include Vietnam on their trade routes.

1614

CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES propagate CATHOLICISM, with the Jesuits entering Vietnam.

1614–1682

Vietnam becomes involved in European rivalries: PORTUGUESE ASIAN EMPIRE, NETHERLANDS (DUTCH) EAST INDIES, BRITISH INTEREST IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, and FRENCH AMBITIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

1694

When Sulinya Vongsa dies without an heir, the LAO kingdom falls apart in the ensuing struggle for power.

Early 1700s

Sulinya Vongsa's nephew, steward of ANNAM, controls the river valley around Wieng Chan. Sulinya's grandsons control the kingdom of LUANG PRABANG, and a Siamese surrogate

establishes the kingdom of CHAMPASSAK in the south.

1763–1800s

Burma from the north and Siam from the south periodically send armies into Laos. Wieng Chan is also under pressure from the Annamites to pay them tribute. A considerable number of the inhabitants of Laos migrate to Thailand.

1787

The Nguyễn sign a treaty with France; the terms, however, are not implemented.

1788–1802

Three Nguyễn brothers lead the TÂY-SON REBELLION (1771–1802) in the late eighteenth century. They overthrow both the feudal states of Trinh and Nguyễn and the LE DYNASTY (1428–1527, 1533–1789), establishing the dynasty of Tay Son. After fourteen years, this dynasty falls to NGUYỄN ÁNH (r. 1802–1820), backed by French mercenaries procured by PIERRE JOSEPH GEORGES PIGNEAU DE BÉHAINE, BISHOP OF ADRAN (1741–1799).

1789

Vietnam defeats forces of the QING (CHING/MANCHU) DYNASTY (1644–1912).

Under the NGUYỄN DYNASTY (1802–1945), Vietnam enters yet another positive period, with an expanding economy, irrigated agriculture, literature, and culture. Vietnam opens trade contacts with European powers including France and England. In addition, trade grows with India and Indonesia. Friction develops with neighbors.

1804

NGUYỄN ÁNH (r. 1802–1820) officially gives the name “Vietnam” to his country.

1847

French forces bombard ĐÀ NẴNG (TOURANE).

1857

Vietnam closes its doors to foreign influence and expels European diplomats. This is an uneasy period of NGUYỄN EMPERORS AND FRENCH IMPERIALISM. FRENCH

1498 Chronology

AMBITIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA lead to France subsequently conquering Vietnam, imposing protectorates over CAMBODIA and LAOS, and eventually creating FRENCH INDOCHINA.

1858

The French take ĐÀ NẴNG.

1859

The French take SAIGON (GIA DINH, HỒ CHÍ MINH CITY).

1862–1867

Vietnam cedes three southern provinces to France in the Treaty of Saigon. The French colony of COCHIN CHINA is created.

1863

In the mid-nineteenth century CAMBODIA is under strong pressure from European imperialists. In 1863, Cambodian KING NORODOM (1836–1904) accepts a treaty of protection from the French.

1866–1868

LAGRÉE-GARNIER MEKONG EXPEDITION (1866–1868) aims to explore the possibility of the river as a “back door” to YUNNAN PROVINCE, southwest IMPERIAL CHINA, where it is popularly believed to offer profitable trade.

1867–1940

PHAN BÔI CHÂU (1867–1940), a Vietnamese revolutionary thinker and strategist, has a hand to play in every party and every agitation that opposes and criticizes the colonial administration in Vietnam.

1872–1926

PHAN CHAU TRINH (1872–1926), a Vietnamese reformer who advocates an anticolonial struggle that seeks reforms and modernization through learning from the West in efforts to create a modern Vietnamese society.

1874

When Tu Duc (r. 1847–1883) signs the Treaty of Saigon, he acknowledges that the French are sovereign over COCHIN CHINA.

1884

The French establish a protectorate over ANNAM and TONKIN (TONKING) through the Treaty of Hue.

1885

Emperor Ham Nghi (r. 1885–1886) leads the fight against France in the Battle of Hue.

1887

Creation of the FRENCH INDOCHINESE UNION (*UNION INDOCHINOISE FRANÇAISE*) (1887).

1888

The French capture Ham Nghi and exile him to Algeria, then under French colonial rule.

1893

France forces Siam to sign a treaty following the PAKNAM INCIDENT (1893) whereby the French gain territory east of the Mekong.

Late 19th century

France begins working on creating FRENCH INDOCHINA. One element is a Laotian protectorate. As Siam cedes the eastern side of the Mekong, LAOS unites into a single colony. Boundary commission establishes the borders of LAOS (which the French then establish as the colony's name by pluralizing the name LAO, which the inhabitants use to define themselves and their country). Under French control, LAOS is a buffer state between Burma and British-influenced Siam and the economically important ANNAM and TONKIN. Laotian exports include opium, RUBBER, COFFEE, and TIN. LAOS receives only 1 percent of French exports.

1897

France dominates Vietnam. FRENCH INDOCHINA (Vietnam, LAOS, CAMBODIA) comes into being. France takes thirty years to pacify Vietnam in the face of strong guerrilla resistance. The government of Indochina is reorganized and centralized under Governor-General Paul Doumer (t. 1897–1902). The NGUYỄN DYNASTY (1802–1945) remains a figurehead with the impotent royal court at HUE. French rule is characterized by exploitation through mining and development of plantation agriculture in tea, RUBBER, and COFFEE. The Lower Mekong becomes a vast

rice-producing and -exporting region. Vietnamese who adapt to the French have a chance of prospering; those who remain Vietnamese generally suffer.

1904

Vietnamese land reform causes higher taxes for farmers, leading to rebellion. Harsh suppression, including executions, keeps the rebels in check for decades. Failure to address the underlying problems, however, keeps them festering.

PHAN BÔI CHÂU establishes the Reformation Society.

1908

Tax revolt in Annam; uprising in HANOI (THANG-LONG).

1916

Annam and COCHIN CHINA in rebellion.

1925

PHAN BÔI CHÂU stands trial in HANOI.

1930

TONKIN-ANNAM witness significant anti-French uprisings. Nguyễn Ai Quoc, better known as HỒ CHÍ MINH (1890–1969), establishes the VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY (VCP).

1940

Fall of France to Nazi Germany. Imperial Japanese forces enter Indochina.

1941

With Japanese backing King SISAVANG VONG (1885–1959) declares the independence of Laos. Anticipating a French return, Prime Minister Prince PHETSARATH (1890–1959) forms LAO ISSARA (ISSARRAK), a resistance movement.

1945

9 March

Japan drives France out of CAMBODIA, VIETNAM, and LAOS.

2 September

HỒ CHÍ MINH declares independence of Vietnam.

With the war over, France relieves Prince PHETSARATH (1890–1959) of his functions and reinstates the protectorate of LAOS.

October

LAO ISSARA declares independence and deposes the king of Laos.

1946

April

King SISAVANG VONG (1885–1959) is back on the throne, the first Laotian king of all Laos. Two days later the LAO ISSARA (ISSARRAK) falls to Lao and French forces, and Phetsarath sets up a government-in-exile in Thailand.

Late 1946

France asks LAO ISSARA (ISSARRAK) to join an autonomous Laos. LAO ISSARA (ISSARRAK) is split three ways. There is Prince PHETSARATH's (1890–1959) independence movement. Also there is the leftist group under his half brother, Prince SOUPHANOUVONG (RED PRINCE) (1911–1995), which wants to link with the VIỆT MINH of HỒ CHÍ MINH. Then there are the supporters of the compromising half brother SOUVANNA PHOUMA (1901–1984), ready to negotiate with the French for an independent Laos.

1949

Mao Zedong (1893–1976) announces the People's Republic of China (PRC) following the defeat of NATIONALIST CHINA in the civil war (1945–1949) by the communists. As in the past, CHINA SINCE 1949 seeks the support of the CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

19 July

LAOS becomes independent as an “associated state” within the French Indochinese Federation.

1950

The VIET MINH lends support to Neo Lao Issara, which was established by Prince SOUPHANOUVONG (1911–1995) as an anti-French movement.

1953

As part of the U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (POST-1945), the United

1500 Chronology

States, to counter the influence of the VIỆT MINH, begins supplying aid to LAOS.

October

LAOS gains full sovereignty under the Franco-Laotian treaty. The constitutional monarchy and in turn the monarchy itself are abolished on 2 December 1975.

9 November

After intense agitation led by King NORODOM SIHANOUK (1922–), CAMBODIA gains independence as the Kingdom of Cambodia. Under Sihanouk, CAMBODIA attempts to remain neutral, despite pressure from its neighbors and the superpowers. The COLD WAR gradually affects CAMBODIA.

1954

May

After nearly a decade of fighting, the French face defeat at the BATTLE OF DIEN BIEN PHU (MAY 1954) and withdraw. Under pressure from the staunchly anticommunist United States, the GENEVA CONFERENCE (1954) splits Vietnam into a communist NORTH VIETNAM (POST-1945) and a democratic SOUTH VIETNAM (POST-1945). War continues sporadically.

1956

Vietnamese elections canceled.
The Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) forms the “Neo Lao Hak Sat.”

1957

LPF forms the coalition government of national union under Prince SOUVANNA PHOUMA with the Royal Lao Government. The government collapses, and the LPF leadership, including SOUPHANOUVONG, is arrested. They escape to the countryside and establish a resistance movement. The new prime minister is Phoui Sananikone.

1960

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) is formed in the United States. National Liberation Front (NLF) is created in SOUTH VIETNAM.

August

Neutralists under the command of General Kong Le stage a coup, and SOUVANNA PHOUMA

returns from France, where he has been ambassador, to be prime minister.

December

Rightist general Phoumi Nosavan attacks VIENTIANE. Khong Le flees to the combined PATHET LAO and North Vietnamese forces in Xieng Khouang.

1961

U.S. vice-president Lyndon Johnson (1908–1973) visits SAIGON. SDS issues the Port Huron Statement.

1962

May

A new agreement establishes Laos as neutral and independent. The government of National Union includes Prince Boun Oum for the right, Prince SOUPHANOUVONG for the PATHET LAO, and Prince SOUVANNA PHOUMA for the neutralists. This government does not hold together long.

1963

1 November

South Vietnam's president NGÔ ĐÌNH DIỆM (1901–1963) (t. 1955–1963) is killed following a coup that overthrows his regime.

22 November

U.S. President John F. Kennedy (t. 1961–1963) is assassinated in Dallas, Texas.

1964

After several coups, the Laotian government splits with the PATHET LAO against the rightists and neutralists. The PATHET LAO, assuming it will lack a voice in any government, boycotts elections.

The GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT (AUGUST 1964), in which U.S. warships and North Vietnamese naval units are involved in naval exchanges, is used as a pretext for major U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gives President Lyndon Johnson (t. 1963–1969) a free hand in Vietnam. Free Speech Movement begins at University of California, Berkeley.

1964–1973

U.S. bombers en route to raids on North Vietnam and the HỒ CHÍ MINH TRAIL trespass

Laotian air space to bomb the PATHET LAO and North Vietnamese in LAOS. On a per capita basis, Laos receives more bombs than any other nation in history. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) begins training HMONG and others to fight communist guerrillas. The leader of that army is General Vang Pao.

February

U.S. begins bombing NORTHVIETNAM.

March

U.S. Marines land at ĐÀ NẴNG.

July

U.S. draft calls increase.

1965

Antiwar demonstrations and marches in Washington, D.C., begin in the United States. In an antiwar protest, Alice Herz and Norman Morrison immolate themselves.

1966

June

U.S. bomb vicinity of HANOI.

1967

September

NGUYỄN VAN THIEU (1923–2001) elected president of SOUTHVIETNAM.

November

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (t. 1961–1968) secretly advises that the bombing of NORTHVIETNAM should cease.

1968

January

TET OFFENSIVE and siege of Khe Sanh begin.

February

General William Westmoreland (t. 1964–1968), commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, requests 206,000 more troops. With 535,000 already committed, his request is denied.

March

Westmoreland leaves Vietnam.

16 March

MY LAI massacre. U.S. soldiers shoot in cold blood some 400 to 500 Vietnamese, mainly the elderly, women, and children, of the village of MY LAI.

31 March

President Lyndon Johnson announces his decision not to seek another term and a limited halt to the bombing of NORTHVIETNAM.

April

Agreement for preliminary peace talks between HANOI and Washington.

4 April

Martin Luther King (1929–1968), leader of the nonviolent movement for racial equality in the United States, is assassinated in Memphis, Tennessee.

October

Halt to U.S. bombing on NORTHVIETNAM. Peace talks open in Paris.

November

Richard Milhous Nixon (1913–1994) elected as the thirty-seventh U.S. president (t. 1969–1974). He promises that he has a plan to end the war in Vietnam.

1969

Antiwar march in Washington, D.C., brings out half a million people. President Nixon says that too much haste in withdrawal would be disastrous. A provisional revolutionary government forms in SOUTHVIETNAM.

September

HỒ CHÍ MINH dies, age seventy-nine.

November

U.S. public learns of the MY LAI massacre.

1970

Cambodian prince NORODOM SIHANOUK deposed.

30 April

President Nixon orders the invasion of CAMBODIA; troops remain until May/June. The incursion into CAMBODIA results in the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the passing of the Cooper-Church Amendment,

1502 Chronology

which restricts the U.S. president's activity in CAMBODIA.

May

Kent State and Jackson State killing of university student protestors, following national student protests in the United States.

In CAMBODIA, Defense Minister LON NOL (1913–1984), a conservative pro-American, leads a coup d'état. Shortly afterward, LON NOL falls to the forces of POL POT (SALOTH SAR) (1925–1998).

1971

The Chinese presence in northern LAOS reaches 6,000 to 7,000, mainly in air defense forces.

China is also building roads in northern LAOS. ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) invades LAOS; Nixon commits only a token force. U.S. troops have mostly been withdrawn from the region.

1972

Henry Kissinger (t. 1969–1975), U.S. national security adviser, assures U.S. of imminent peace in Vietnam.

Democrat George McGovern runs against Nixon as the antiwar candidate but loses overwhelmingly.

Christmas

U.S. bombing of Haiphong and HANOI hits civilian targets.

1973

PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT (1968, 1973) concludes a cease-fire and the departure of the last U.S. combat troops from Vietnam. U.S. congressional hearings on the issue of the invasion of CAMBODIA begin. When Henry Kissinger and LE DUC THO (1911–) share the Nobel Peace Prize, the latter declines, noting that Vietnam does not yet enjoy true peace. Cease-fire in LAOS and a provisional government are set up.

1975

April

SAIGON falls to communist forces. ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) collapses in the assault of SAIGON by the North Vietnamese Army.

PATHET LAO seize a major crossroad on the LUANG PRABANG–VIENTIANE Road and begin pressing non-PATHET LAO military and civilian leaders to resign. Several do.

30 April

Vietnam is reunited as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (12 July 1976).

May

Lao refugees begin crossing the Mekong into Thailand as the PATHET LAO take Pakse, Savannakhet, and CHAMPASSAK.

23 August

Without fighting, VIENTIANE falls.

December

The Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) becomes the ruling party in the LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (LPDR). Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane holds the post until he dies in November 1992. Replacing him is Defense Minister Khamtay Siphandon, who becomes president in 1996.

1975–1979

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA (DK), POL POT's regime under the KHMER ROUGE, is a reign of terror, beginning with the executions of LON NOL's government and other political figures and soon extending to intellectuals, workers, and even children. It is estimated that as many as one-third of the Cambodian population die in the massacres, depicted in an American-made film entitled *THE KILLING FIELDS*. Vietnam invades, and the pro-Vietnamese HENG SAMRIN (1934–) ousts POL POT. The KHMER ROUGE wages guerrilla warfare from the jungles.

1975–ca. 1997

Harsh political and economic decisions by the leadership cause many LAO to become refugees.

1977

King Sisavang Watthana (r. 1959–1984?) loses his figurehead status when the anticommunist rebels implicate him in the battle for the town of Muang Son. Sent to a reeducation camp at Vieng Xai, the king and his family are rumored to have died a few years later (1984?) in northern LAOS. Reeducation camps and

prisons reportedly hold 70,000 Laotians until they finally close after 1989.

1982

July

Forces of POL POT, NORODOM SIHANOUK, and Son Sann (derivative of Lon Nol) establish the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).

1987

Détente between the Soviet Union and the United States eases the friction of the COLD WAR and gives CAMBODIA space to pursue peace. CAMBODIA continues to suffer large casualties from left-behind civil war land mines, and has difficulty arranging the return of refugees.

1990

CGDK renamed the National Government of Cambodia, but the civil war continues.

1991

PARIS CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA (PCC) (1989, 1991) is able to resolve some outstanding issues among the contending factions.

1992

UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC) begins work in CAMBODIA.

1993

The United Nations oversees a general election and the inauguration of a new government in Kampuchea.

1995

Vietnamese-U.S. relations are normalized despite unresolved issues such as MIAs (MISSING IN ACTION). Vietnam becomes a popular travel destination for Western tourists. Vietnam gains admission to the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967).

1997

July

LAOS joins ASEAN.

1998–1999

ASEAN admits CAMBODIA as a member.

2000

U.S. president Bill Clinton (t. 1993–1998) pays official visit to Vietnam.

2001

November

The ratification of a trade agreement by Vietnam's National Assembly signals the restoration of normal relations between Vietnam and the United States.

2002

February

In CAMBODIA, elections are held at the level of communes (*khum*). The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) wins the local elections with 1,597 out of 1,621 *khum*.

Attempts to bring to trial former leaders of the KHMER ROUGE for genocide and crimes against humanity are disrupted when the United Nations surprisingly withdraws from negotiations with the Cambodian government. Even without the participation of the United Nations, the Cambodian government intends to set up a tribunal to hold the trials. The first to be brought to trial is Ta Mok, former military commander of the KHMER ROUGE. He faces charges of crimes against humanity.

July

Vietnam's National Assembly reelects Tran Duc Luong for a second term as state president.

2004

An outbreak of avian influenza hits Asia. By mid-February, Vietnam has suffered fourteen fatalities and has culled 35 million chickens. Poultry farmers suffer heavy losses. It is equally devastating for neighboring Thailand.

II. BURMA (MYANMAR)

ca. 3000 B.C.E.

MONS establish settlements in central Burma and along the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal.

The MONS construct irrigation systems and establish commercial and cultural ties with INDIA. MONS of Burma also influence their brethren in neighboring Siam.

628 C.E.

The PYUS establish a capital near modern Prome.

1504 Chronology

800 C.E.

Migrants from Tibet and China populate Burma. The groups include the MONS from Cambodia, Mongol BURMANS from the Himalayas, and T'AI tribes.

Mid-9th century C.E.

BURMANS absorb communities of PYUS and MONS with which they come into contact.

1044–1077

King ANAWRAHTA (ANIRUDDHA, r. 1044–1077) unifies Burma under the PAGAN (BAGAN) kingdom, comparable to a Hindu kingdom, financed by household taxes.

1102

The term “Myanmar” is in use to refer to what is the Union of Burma and, since 1989, is the Union of Myanmar.

13th century

Burma begins to decline on account of its major investment of time and money in pagodas and the inherent weaknesses of the TEMPLE POLITICAL ECONOMY.

1253–1287

YUAN (MONGOL) DYNASTY (1271–1368) launches invasion that ends the PAGAN kingdom, leaving Burma disorganized and fragmented for the next 250 years.

1287

Kublai Khan (1215–1294) ransacks PAGAN, and Burma experiences continual internal conflict for centuries.

Mid-14th century

The so-called “period of Shan domination” is ushered in with the establishment of the FIRST AVA (INWA) DYNASTY (1364–1527 C.E.).

1500

The BURMA-SIAM WARS break out for control of the trade across the ISTHMUS OF KRA, upper Malay Peninsula, and along the Gulf of Siam. It is a protracted conflict over the next centuries until the first decade of the nineteenth century.

1531–1752

The TOUNGOO DYNASTY (1531–1752) expands under TABINSHWEIHTI (r. 1531–1550), uniting Upper Burma with Lower Burma. PEGU becomes the center of administration.

1551

BAYINNAUNG (r. 1551–1581) further enlarges the power of the TOUNGOO DYNASTY (1531–1752), which stretches from Manipur in the west to Laos in the east, Ayutthaya to the borders of Cambodia.

1597–1752

After Nandabayin's death, chaos reigns until Bayinnaung's grandson, Anaukpetlun (r. 1605–1628), establishes the Restored Toungoo dynasty (1597–1752) with its base at Ava, Upper Burma.

Mid-18th century

The twilight decades of the TOUNGOO DYNASTY (1531–1752) see the drifting away of the MONS and hill tribes—SHANS, CHINS, KACHINS, KARENS—which establish independent kingdoms, fragmenting Burma.

1752

The MONS of Lower Burma launch a rebellion and capture Ava, besides destroying much of the lands of Upper Burma.

Out of these troubled times emerges a chieftain of the BURMANS, ALAUNG-HPAYA (r. 1752–1760). In a series of campaigns, he reunites the fragmented country under the KONBAUNG DYNASTY (1752–1885), Burma's last and most powerful dynasty.

1767

BURMANS sack the capital of the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA (AYUTHAYA, AYUDHYA, AYUTHIA) (1351–1767 C.E.).

1767–1809

The BURMA-SIAM WARS are at their peak.

1782

BANGKOK is the new capital built by RAMA I (CHAKRI) (r. 1782–1809), the founder of the Chakri dynasty.

19th century

As the European demand for rice grows, farmers in Lower Burma begin clearing the forests and growing rice as an export commodity. The Konbaung rulers oppose the exports, but after the British takeover of ARAKAN and TENASSERIM in 1826, the policy shifts in favor of exports. Rice cultivation expands throughout the century, especially after the British takeover of Lower Burma in the early 1850s. At century's end, Burma is the world's major rice exporter.

British influence on Burma is minimal until internal conflicts involve the GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA in Bengal. KONBAUNG RULERS AND BRITISH IMPERIALISM represent a struggle between two proud, imperialistic powers. Consequently in a series of conflicts—ANGLO-BURMESE WARS (1824–1826, 1852, 1885)—the British annex the entire country, referring to it as BRITISH BURMA.

1824

First Anglo–Burmese War (1824–1826) is consequent of unresolved border incursions and refugee issues.

1826

TREATY OF YANDABO cedes ARAKAN and TENASSERIM to the British.

1852

The British invade again, owing to diplomatic breakdown caused by misunderstanding and cultural differences (the “SHOE ISSUE”). Victorious in this second war, the British annex PEGU and Lower Burma.

1853–1878

Anglo–Burmese relations enjoy a cordial footing throughout the reign of MINDON (r. 1853–1878). He plays a balancing game of using the French to offset British influence.

1885

British fear of French influence in Upper Burma leads to its annexation following the Third Anglo–Burmese War (1885). This final conflict ends the KONBAUNG DYNASTY (1752–1885).

It is another two decades before pacification is achieved. Burma is administered as part of British India.

20th century**BURMA UNDER BRITISH COLONIAL**

RULE witnesses the transformation of the country into a world exporter of rice. Southeast Asia's plantations and cities are almost totally dependent on rice from Burma, Siam, and COCHIN CHINA. The supply exceeds even the Southeast Asian and European demand. The surplus feeds INDIA and NATIONALIST CHINA, both of which have large populations. INDIAN IMMIGRANTS often exploit the Burmese. The CHETTIARS (CHETTYARS), a South Indian moneylending caste, play a decisive role in the expansion of Lower Burma's rice industry in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Social decline during the British period leads to a rise in nationalist feeling.

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN

BURMA (1900–1941) seek to establish a Westminster system of governance with leaders remaining loyal to Britain.

1906**The YOUNG MEN'S BUDDHIST**

ASSOCIATION (YMBA) (1906) is set up by a group of educated Burmese who seek to reconcile Buddhist traditions with WESTERN SECULAR EDUCATION.

1909

Burmese intellectuals and British civil servants support the establishment of the BURMA RESEARCH SOCIETY. It is devoted to the study of Burmese culture.

1914–1918

The GREAT WAR (1914–1918) impacts Burma's economy, which relies heavily on rice exports. When prices fall owing to the war, many Burmese farmers who owe CHETTIARS have their rice lands foreclosed. Absentee landlordism and tenant farmers are the norm in Lower Burma. Dissatisfaction and frustration of the Burmese are directed toward the British colonial government and the immigrant Indian community.

1506 Chronology

1916–1917

A “No-footwear-in-pagodas” campaign is launched. It targets Europeans. It is the subtle Burmese way of fighting against the wrongs they suffered under the colonial regime.

1917–1918

The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms promise self-government to India and Burma.

1920

The GENERAL COUNCIL OF BURMESE ASSOCIATIONS (GCBA) (1920) is formed.

December

UNIVERSITY OF RANGOON is officially opened.

1929–1931

The GREAT DEPRESSION (1929–1931) hurts Burma with falling prices of rice, the mainstay of the economy. Consequently there appear peasant landlessness, widespread unemployment, anti-Indian riots, and general social unrest.

Early 1930s

Burmese nationalists use the term *THAKIN* to emphasize that they alone are the rightful masters of the country, and not the British colonialists.

1930–1931

The Saya San rebellion seeks to overthrow the British colonial government and in its place to rejuvenate the Burmese monarchy. Dr. BA MAW (1893–) gains public prominence as the defense counsel in the trial of Saya San. The India Round Table Conference is convened.

1931–1932

The Burma Round Table Conference makes no headway, owing to divergent expectations from the Burmese and British delegates. The Burmese expect a discussion on the drafting of a constitution; the British are willing only to hear opinions for future consideration.

1935

The Constitution of 1935 does not grant complete self-government, but a positive start has been initiated.

1937

Separation of Burma from British India leads to anticipation of self-rule. DR. BA MAW (1893–) becomes the prime minister (t. 1937–1939).

1941

BURMA DURING THE PACIFIC WAR (1941–1945) witnesses Japanese attempts to gain political support from the Burmese, for instance, the military training accorded to the THIRTY COMRADES. Tempted by the prospect of independence, Burmese instead opt for resistance.

1942

At the onset of the Pacific War, AUNG SAN (1915–1947) creates the BURMA INDEPENDENCE ARMY (BIA), and the Japanese train it. The BIA supports the Japanese occupation. Fighting little, they grow in strength until they are strong enough to topple the weak Japanese government at war's end. Their new name is the ANTI-FASCIST PEOPLE'S FREEDOM LEAGUE (AFPFL). AUNG SAN remains their leader.

1943–1944

The CHINDITS, commanded by Major General Orde Charles Wingate (1903–1944), undertake guerrilla operations behind Japanese lines in Burma.

1947

April

After postwar negotiating with the British over independence, the AFPFL wins a majority in the constitutional assembly. Within three months occurs the incident of U SAW AND THE ASSASSINATION OF AUNG SAN and most of his cabinet. The new postwar leader of independent Burma is U NU (1907–1995).

1948

Burma is independent and struggling to cope with internal problems because of revolts by Muslims, MONS, communists, and the hill tribes.

1960

U NU initiates the official program of BUDDHIST SOCIALISM.

1962–1987

GENERAL NE WIN (1911–2002), left-winger, overthrows the democratic government of U NU and imprisons him. Burma embarks on the socialist path and twenty-five years of a crumbling economy, with even retail stores nationalized. Meanwhile a black market booms. GENERAL NE WIN attempts to salvage something by giving the presidency to San Yu, but life remains bleak. Also, a government ruling establishes “associate citizens,” people of ancestry other than the original races. Specifically targeted are Sino-Burmans and Indo-Burmans. Although they can vote, they cannot run for office above a certain level.

1987

Protests and demonstrations against GENERAL NE WIN lead to clashes between prodemocracy advocates and the army. Over a six-week period, 3,000 perish. NE WIN’s appointment of several puppets probably instigates a military coup.

1988

In preparation for the election in 1988, DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI (1945–), the daughter of independence hero Bogyoke AUNG SAN, forms a coalition, the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD).

July

GENERAL NE WIN finally leaves after antigovernment riots in March and June by a people fed up with devaluation of currency (*kyat*) that destroys their savings and squeezes their budgets. GENERAL WIN’s departure is followed by months of protests, looting, and death.

September

The failure of President Maung Maung (1925–1999) to restore order sees General Saw Maung and the STATE LAW AND ORDER RESTORATION COUNCIL (SLORC) take charge, promising elections in 1989.

1989

“Burma,” the colonial term, is replaced with the indigenous name “Myanmar” (in use since 1102 C.E.).

Despite DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI’s being under house arrest, the NLD wins easily, garnering 80 percent of the seats, 60 percent of

the vote. But SLORC declares that there can be no nonmilitary government until a new constitution is drafted.

The junta continues to fight the KARENS rebels. KARENS organizations include KAREN NATIONAL DEFENCE ORGANISATION (KNDO), KAREN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (KNLA), and KAREN NATIONAL UNION (KNU). For the KACHINS there is the KACHIN INDEPENDENCE ORGANISATION (KIO). SHAN NATIONALISM demands a separate state. The SHAN UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (SURA) is involved in the drug trade to finance its separatist agenda.

1990s

Khun Sa, the notorious drug kingpin, is rumored to have made a deal with the military junta that allows him to live in luxurious house arrest while his “Heroin Inc.” remains in operation.

1991

Under house arrest while Tin Oo and other NLD leaders are in prison, DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI wins the Nobel Peace Prize.

1993

Constitution drafting begins. SLORC orders that the military must have a major role, so the NLD walks out, leaving Myanmar without a new constitution; the military junta continues to hold the reins of power and government.

1995

SLORC releases AUNG SAN SUU KYI but bars her from leaving RANGOON (YANGON). When she tries to leave in September 2000, she is arrested once more.

1996

SLORC arrests more than 200 NLD members going to a party congress.

1997

To change its image, SLORC is disbanded. The old SLORC leadership leads the new State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).

1508 Chronology

2002

March

Consequent of the uncovering of an alleged coup attempt, orders of arrest are served on the relatives of GENERAL NE WIN, including his son-in-law and grandsons. Later his daughter is also detained and GENERAL NE WIN himself is placed under house arrest. Major General Soe Win, the chief of police, and Major General Myint Swe, the commander of the air force, are both removed from their positions for their alleged involvement in the coup.

May

DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI is granted unconditional release from more than twenty months of house arrest. After negotiations with the government through a United Nations mediator, DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI wins the right to go about her business without the previous restrictions. Democracy seekers and the government enter into reconciliation discussions and the junta promises to make reforms.

August

DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI, in her campaign to secure the freedom of all political prisoners, demands that the SPDC hasten their unconditional release as evidence of the SPDC's good faith in working toward building a democratic Myanmar. Consequently fourteen political prisoners are released, six of whom are from the NATIONAL LEAGUE FOR DEMOCRACY (NLD).

2003

30 May

DAW AUNG SAN SUU KYI, accused by the military government of instigating unrest, is taken into "protective custody" following clashes between NLD supporters and pro-junta groups in northern Myanmar.

III. SIAM (THAILAND)

3600 B.C.E.

A Bronze Age culture, perhaps the world's first, exists at BAN CHIANG, near Udong.

600 B.C.E.

T' AIS migrate from China.

300 B.C.E.

INDIAN IMMIGRANTS bring trade as well as sociocultural influences and the beginnings of the INDIANIZATION process.

1st century C.E.

HINDUISM is established in Siam by Indian traders traveling to Indochina.

650–1250 C.E.

The T' AIS establish a kingdom, NAN CHAO (NANCHAO) (DALI/TALI), in southern China. Thereafter they migrate into the Menam Central Plain, then under the Khmer empire.

10th century

From Burma, the MONS migrate into central Siam and establish several Buddhist kingdoms from Nakhon Pathon on the Korat Plateau to CHIANG MAI.

1150

In Cambodia, situated to the south and east of Siam, SŪRYAVARMAN II (r. 1113–1145?) builds ANGKOR WAT (NAGARAVATTA).

1238

T' AIS establish SUKHOTAI (SUKHODAVA), the first independent kingdom not dominated by the Khmer.

SUKHOTAI period (1238–1378). Breaking from the Khmer and Mon kingdoms, T' AIS enjoy the "Dawn of Happiness," their golden era of enlightened and benevolent kings, most notably RAMA KAMHAENG (r. 1279–1298).

Based on Mon, Indian, and Khmer scripts, the Siamese (Thai) alphabet comes into use.

1350–1767

Ayutthaya period (1350–1767). King RAMATHIBODI (r. 1351–1369) establishes the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA (1351–1767 C.E.). The Ayutthayan kings are culturally Khmer. Rather than paternal, they are absolute god-kings. Early in the period, Ayutthaya extends its control over neighboring principalities. The capital city of Ayutthaya is some 55 kilometers north of modern BANGKOK.

1498

VASCO DA GAMA (1459–1524) rounds the Cape of Good Hope and crosses the Indian Ocean. That lays the setting for the establishment of the PORTUGUESE ASIAN EMPIRE.

1500–1809

The protracted BURMA-SIAM WARS begin with a Burmese invasion of Siamese territory.

1516

The Siamese court receives a Portuguese envoy and signs a treaty of friendship and commerce.

1571

Established in MANILA, the Spaniards spread CATHOLICISM, embark on a HISPANIZATION process, and economically dominate the Philippine archipelago. SPANISH EXPANSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA develops alongside the PORTUGUESE ASIAN EMPIRE and influence in Asia.

1576

The Burmese sack the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA.

1584

Siam declares its independence. BURMA-SIAM WARS persist.

1593

In a duel on elephants, PHRA NARET (KING NARESUAN) (r. 1590–1605) bests the Burmese Crown prince at Nong Sa Rai near Suphan Buri. This duel temporarily resolves the BURMA-SIAM WARS.

1594

PHRA NARET defeats Cambodia.

1598

Spain and Siam sign a treaty of friendship and commerce. Terms are similar to those of the treaty signed with the Portuguese in 1516.

17th century

Siam establishes commercial and diplomatic links with various European powers.

PHRA NARET gives the VEREENIGDE OOST-INDISCHE COMPAGNIE (VOC) (1602) permission to build a trading station in

the south. In 1604 the Dutch arrive in the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA and meet with the king.

1607

Siam sends an ambassador to The Netherlands. After a seven-month voyage, the ambassador becomes the first Siamese representative in Europe.

1610–1628

Kings Ekatotsarot (r. 1605–1610) and Songtham (r. 1610–1628) and the Japanese Shogun, Ieyasu Tokugawa (1543–1616), exchange ambassadors. This ushers in the beginning of Siamese-Japanese relations.

1611

The ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY (EIC) (1600) establishes a factory in Siam.

1617

Siam's first treaty with the Dutch gives no exclusive trading rights.

1661–1664

The Dutch, dissatisfied with their commercial treaty with PHRA NARET, implement a warlike policy against Siam. Their actions include the taking of a merchant vessel by force, a blockade of the Chao Phraya River, and a forced treaty granting them a monopoly on the trade in cow and deer hides.

1662–1687

The French presence begins under the reign of King NARAI (r. 1656–1688). Louis XIV (r. 1643–1715) receives the Siamese ambassador and sends the first French ambassador in 1685. The second ambassador arrives in 1687 with 1,400 French soldiers and 300 craftsmen. This offers a foretaste of FRENCH AMBITIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

1682

CONSTANCE (CONSTANTINE) PHAULKON (d. 1688), a Greek adventurer, is a favorite of King NARAI and a prominent official at the Siamese court. Through his influence, Siam adopts a monopolistic commercial policy. He is de facto foreign minister who pursues a pro-French foreign policy.

1510 Chronology

1687

Because the British want to use Indian OPIUM in Siam as they do in China, King NARAI (r. 1656–1688) declares war against the EIC.

1688

To counter Dutch influence, NARAI turns to the French. The Dutch sign a new treaty reaffirming the terms of 1617. Once the renegotiations are finished, NARAI expels the French.

1767

Burmese forces capture the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA. The occupation lasts only seven months as a result of the exploits of PHYA TAKSIN (PHYA TAK [SIN], KING TAKSIN) (r. 1767–1782), who escapes to Chantaburi and returns to expel the Burmese garrison.

1767–1772

Thon Buri period (1767–1772). Under PHYA TAKSIN, the capital relocates to Thon Buri, nearer the sea, thereby facilitating foreign trade. The new location aids the procurement of arms, defense, and withdrawal should the Burmese return. This period is characterized by an effort to revive the kingdom by bringing back provinces that have declared their independence and have gone their own ways after the fall of the KINGDOM OF AYUTTHAYA.

1782–1809

Rattanakosin period (1782–1809). General Chakri becomes RAMA I (CHAKRI) (r. 1782–1809), founder of the Chakri dynasty. He moves the capital to BANGKOK in 1800 and builds the Grand Palace.

1794

BATTAMBANG and SIEM REAP in Cambodia are ceded to Siam.

1809–1824

Rama II (r. 1809–1824) continues the restoration, a reassertion of Siamese sovereignty over neighboring territories including the peninsular SIAMESE MALAY STATES (KEDAH, PERLIS, KELANTAN, TEREANGANU).

1824–1851

King Nang Klao, Rama III (r. 1824–1851), seeks to reestablish relations with the West. Trade with IMPERIAL CHINA begins.

1833

The United States sends its first envoy to the court of Siam.

1833–1847

Thai-Vietnamese war after Rama III invades Cambodia to remove the Annamese (Vietnamese). Cambodia has a pro-Thai prince on the Khmer throne but continues to pay tribute to the Annamese emperor. When in midcentury France begins its imperial expansion in Vietnam, this mixed Cambodian behavior muddles Thai-Cambodian relations.

1850

Rama III's refusal to accept Western bullying angers the British and Americans, who threaten to take drastic measures against Siam.

1851–1868

King Mongkut, Rama IV (r. 1851–1868), lays the foundation of a modern Siam. PRESERVATION OF SIAM'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE is Mongkut's prime concern. He makes treaties with European nations and begins REFORMS AND MODERNIZATION IN SIAM.

1855–1868

Mongkut's aggressive diplomacy produces treaties with most of the world's powers. Assisted by SIR JOHN BOWRING (1792–1872), who initiates a treaty with Britain in 1855, Siam by the 1860s has treaties with the United States, France, Portugal, Denmark, The Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Norway, Belgium, and Italy.

1868–1910

King Chulalongkorn, Rama V (r. 1868–1910), continues his predecessor's policy of instituting reforms: abolishing SLAVERY (1905), improving public welfare, and the reorganization of the administrative system. The royal princes, notably PRINCE DEWAWONGSE (1858–1923) and PRINCE DAMRONG (1862–1943), are instrumental in initiating, implementing, and ensuring that the various reforms are carried through to fruition.

1886–1907

Four times France demands Siamese territory. To avoid losing its independence completely, Siam

cedes large tracts of territory to France, including BATTAMBANG and SIEM REAP.

1893

The PAKNAM INCIDENT (1893) witnesses French imperialism over Siam. The Siamese give in to French demands and cede their tributary state of Laos on the left/east bank of the Mekong River. The French protectorate of LAOS is created.

1897

King Chulalongkorn becomes the first Siamese monarch to visit Europe. On his European tours (1897 and 1907) he attempts to promote friendly relations in hopes of arresting European IMPERIALISM in Siam and Indochina.

1898

Siam contracts a treaty with Meiji Japan.

1907

The French demand that Siam return BATTAMBANG and SIEM REAP to Cambodia. The two provinces come under Cambodian jurisdiction.

1909

British pressure sees the transfer of the SIAMESE MALAY STATES (KEDAH, PERLIS, KELANTAN, and TERENGGANU) to become protectorates of Britain. In return Siam is granted a preferential loan from Britain for railway construction.

1910–1925

Under King VAJIRAVUDH (RAMA VI) (r. 1910–1925), educational reform, including compulsory elementary education, begins. Penned by the king, “THE JEWS OF THE ORIENT” warns of the economic threat the Chinese pose to Siam; it fuels anti-Chinese feelings and heightens Siamese nationalist consciousness.

1917

22 July

Siam joins the Allied effort in the GREAT WAR (1914–1918). This is partly an attempt to increase Western awareness of Siam and in turn reduce European imperial influence.

1925–1935

KING PRAJADHIPOK (RAMA VII) (r. 1925–1935) oversees the conversion from absolute to constitutional monarchy. Prajadhipok abdicates in 1933, and his nephew, Ananda Mahidol (r. 1935–1946), ascends the throne in 1935.

1932

24 June

A CONSTITUTIONAL (BLOODLESS) REVOLUTION (1932) culminates in the replacement of the traditional absolutist monarchy with a constitutional king. PRIDI PHANOMYONG (1900–1983), a law professor, is instrumental in the revolution and drafts Siam’s constitution.

1939

FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK

PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964) assumes the premiership. He effects the country’s name change: Siam adopts the name Thailand, meaning “Land of the Free,” emphasizing the country’s freedom from foreign domination, unlike neighboring territories throughout Southeast Asia.

1940–1941

Thailand demands that France return some of its Indochinese territories. France refuses, and fighting begins. With Japanese mediation, in May 1941, Thailand regains BATTAMBANG, SIEM REAP, CHAMPASSAK, and Lanchang.

1941

With the onset of the Pacific War (1941–1945), Thailand allies with Japan.

1941–1945

The JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (1941–1945) witnesses several hardships and cruelties. Forced labor is utilized for the construction of the “DEATH RAILWAY” (BURMA–SIAM RAILWAY), where thousands of Thais, Malays, Chinese, and Allied prisoners of war (POWs) perish under extreme conditions.

1942

25 January

Thailand declares war against Britain and the United States. Because the Thai ambassador,

1512 Chronology

M. R. SENI PRAMOJ (1905–1997), refuses to serve the declaration of war to U.S. secretary of state Cordell Hull (t. 1933–1944), one perception is that Thailand is actually neutral. Instead, he heads the FREE THAI MOVEMENT in the United States.

1946

9 June

BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (r. 1946–) is recalled from his studies in Switzerland after Ananda Mahidol dies under mysterious circumstances.

16 December

Thailand becomes the 55th member of the United Nations.

1948–1957

Following a coup, FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGKHRAM (1897–1964) assumes the premiership.

1950

After four years of regency, Bhumibol ascends the Chakri throne as Rama IX. He is the longest-ruling monarch in Thai history. His rule is largely ceremonial and his popularity is great. He is a spokesman for development projects and a stabilizing force in a turbulent political environment.

1951–1957

U.S. financial aid enables Thailand to achieve strong economic growth.

1952

The FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGHRAM government proscribes the Communist Party of Thailand.

1955

Thailand joins the SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION (SEATO) (1954). Other member nations are Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan (until 1972), the Philippines, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States. This military organization is a response to the French defeat in Vietnam.

1957

Sarit Thanarat seizes power and becomes Thailand's prime minister. Unlike FIELD MARSHAL PLAEK PHIBUNSONGHRAM, who

distanced the government from the palace, Sarit Thanarat emphasizes close ties with the Thai monarch.

1963

FIELD MARSHAL THANOM

KITTIKACHORN (1911–) becomes prime minister of Thailand following Sarit's death.

1967

Thailand is one of the founding members of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967).

1973

14 October

The STUDENT REVOLT (THAILAND), with huge street demonstrations in BANGKOK, overthrows the military government of FIELD MARSHAL THANOM KITTIKACHORN and Prapat Jarusathien. The revolt breaks the military hold on Thai politics.

1975

M. R. KUKRIT PRAMOJ (1911–1995) is prime minister from March 1975 to April 1976. SAIGON falls to the communists.

1976

M. R. SENI PRAMOJ (1905–1997) holds the premiership from April 1976 to 6 October 1976.

U.S. forces withdraw from Thailand.

1980

GENERAL PREM TINSULANOND (1920–) serves as prime minister until 1988.

1980s

Thailand becomes a leader in supplying the world's natural RUBBER.

1985–1995

Thailand's sustained growth rate of almost 9 percent per year is the highest in the world.

1988

Thailand elects its first prime minister since 1977, its first civilian since the 1975 coup.

1990s

With Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, Thailand is one of the leading economic successes during the first half of the decade.

1997–1998

In 1997 the baht crashes, bringing on the Asian Financial Crisis and economic downturn. The baht's lowest point comes in January 1998, when it drops to fifty-six to the U.S. dollar, far from the twenty-five to the dollar it enjoyed for years before the government floated it. The economy shrinks more than 10 percent.

1999–2000

Renewed economic growth is recorded at over 4 percent. Optimism is rife.

2000

King BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (r. 1946–) becomes the longest-reigning monarch in the world.

The Bangkok Sky Rail opens. However, much of the construction begun during the boom of the early 1990s remains either unfinished or empty.

2001

The economic growth rate slows to 1.4 percent because of poor performance in the financial sector, tardy corporate debt restructuring, and a generally weak world economy.

December

King BHUMIBOL ADULYADEJ (r. 1946–) publicly criticizes Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his government for favoring certain quarters over others.

2002**April**

Talks are held between Thailand and Myanmar over the issues of border tensions and the smuggling of illegal drugs.

October

Cabinet reshuffle is undertaken by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra with the appointment of six additional ministers to head newly created ministries consequent of reforms of the government bureaucracy.

2003

Major Thai industries include tourism, textiles, light manufacturing, and agricultural processing. Thailand remains the world's second-largest producer and exporter of tungsten, and third largest for tin.

2004**January**

A spate of bombings, arson of schools, and several killings allegedly by Muslim separatist groups lead to the declaration of military rule in three provinces of southern Thailand, namely Yala, Narathiwat, and Pattani. MUSLIM MINORITIES (THAILAND) have long resented the Buddhist-dominated central government at BANGKOK; they advocate for greater autonomy, if not outright cession.

February

An avian influenza adversely impacts Thailand's poultry industry. Culling of chickens by the tens of thousands is undertaken. By mid-February, six persons succumb to the virus.

IV. INDONESIA INCLUDING EAST MALAYSIA, BRUNEI, AND EAST TIMOR

1 million–500,000 B.C.E.

“JAVA MAN” (*Homo [Pithecanthropus] erectus*) is reputed to be the first human fossil discovery in Southeast Asia from the Lower Pleistocene period. It is estimated to be from 500,000 to 1 million years old. This find in Trinil, East Java, by Eugene Dubois in 1891 offers a glimpse into Indonesia's past when the archipelago was a part of the Asian mainland.

100,000 B.C.E.

“SOLO MAN” (*Homo sapiens soloensis*) refers to fossilized human skeletal remains uncovered in Sambungmacan and Ngandong. They are believed to be from the Upper Pleistocene period of about 100,000 years ago.

40,000 B.C.E.

The NIAH CAVES (SARAWAK) offer the longest sequence of early human existence in Southeast Asia, ranging from the oldest artifact, from 40,000 years ago, to more recent findings from some 2,000 years ago.

1514 Chronology

3000–500 B.C.E.

Ice melts and raises the sea level, creating islands—the Indonesian archipelago. Indonesia’s population is a mix of Asian migrants intermarried with indigenes.

1000 B.C.E.

Intermingling of Indonesia’s inhabitants with migrants from the Indian subcontinent.

78 C.E.

Indian prince Aji Caka introduces the Sanskrit language and Pallawa script to Indonesia. The language incorporates Javanese words and phrases. Indonesia and South India possess a trading relationship. SUMATRA is known as SUVARNABHUMI (LAND OF GOLD), whereas JAVA is the “rice island.” There is cultural and diplomatic intercourse between Indonesia and INDIA.

1st–2nd centuries

HINDUISM and Indian BUDDHISM, both THERAVADA BUDDHISM and MAHAYANA BUDDHISM, spread to the Indonesian archipelago. The HINDU–BUDDHIST PERIOD OF SOUTHEAST ASIA witnesses the establishment of Indianized kingdoms, Buddhist centers of scholarship, and flourishing monumental art as exhibited in palaces and temples: MALANG TEMPLES, PRAMBANAN, BLITAR, and BOROBUDUR.

1st–7th centuries

INDIAN IMMIGRANTS, mainly Brahmins and some merchants, settle in various places throughout the archipelago, largely in SUMATRA and JAVA. Javanese at all levels incorporate HINDUISM, but the other islands maintain their original beliefs—except for the upper classes, which embrace HINDUISM. The INDIANIZATION process influences virtually all aspects of living, including intellectual discourse, philosophy, culture, and religion. Concepts of kingship impact on INDIGENOUS POLITICAL POWER.

Native rulers adopt HINDUISM and/or BUDDHISM, as well as accepting the cultures associated with those religions, incorporating them with local culture.

132 C.E.

JAVA and IMPERIAL CHINA establish diplomatic relations.

400 C.E.

Inscriptions at KUTAI (KOETEI) show Indian influence. East Sumatran polities are influential on the western coast of BORNEO.

413–414 C.E.

The Chinese Buddhist traveler Fa Hsien, on a pilgrimage to India, encounters a storm and lands on JAVA. There he finds an Indonesian Hindu culture. Similarly, indigenous Hindus rule BORNEO.

ca. 670 C.E.

ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA), with its center in present-day PALEMBANG, is established, gaining increasing popularity among Indian and Chinese traders.

671 C.E.

I-CHING (635–713 C.E.), Chinese Buddhist pilgrim on his voyage to India, visits ŚRIVIJAYA.

689 C.E.

ŚRIVIJAYA, is a major center of Buddhist learning, with strong links to INDIA. Its influence spreads throughout the archipelago as BUDDHISM gains in popularity.

8th–9th centuries

SAILENDRAS, translated as “King of the Mountain,” refers to a dynasty of Buddhist kings who rule the kingdom of MATARAM in Central JAVA.

778–824

SAILENDRAS rulers build BOROBUDUR.

991–1007

King Dharmavamsa (r. 991–1007) codifies laws and translates Hindu works into Javanese.

1006

ŚRIVIJAYA defeats Buddhist MATARAM.

1019–1049

AIRLANGGA (r. 1019–1049) rules over the greater part of East JAVA.

1025

The Cholas from INDIA invade and occupy SRIVIJAYA from 1026 to 1045.

1042

Airlangga divides MATARAM into Janggala and KADIRI (KEDIRI).

1135–1157

King Jayabhaya (r. 1135–1157) of KADIRI prophesies in his book that Indonesia will fall under the rule of first a white and then a yellow race before regaining its independence. This prophecy seemingly comes to pass with Dutch colonial rule, then the Japanese wartime occupation, followed by postwar independence.

1222–1293

SINGHASARI represents the first attempt at creating an empire in JAVA.

1290

KERTANAGARA (r. 1268–1292) defeats SRIVIJAYA.

1293

YUAN (MONGOL) DYNASTY (1271–1368) launches an assault on SINGHASARI.

13th century

Trade contacts are established between Persians and GUJARATIS with north Sumatran ports. These Muslim traders bring Islam to Southeast Asia. Largely through merchants and some missionaries, Islam spreads throughout the *PASISIR*, coastal regions of SUMATRA, and JAVA. Muslim city-ports flourish; Muslim sultans become politically ambitious. ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA begins to spread and flourish, particularly throughout the Malay Archipelago (present-day INDONESIA and MALAYSIA).

The Indianized kingdoms in the interior of JAVA, such as MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca. 1520s) and MATARAM, hold on to HINDUISM and Hindu traditions. BALI too remains steadfast to HINDUISM.

1293–ca. 1520s

The process of empire building culminates in MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca. 1520s), reputedly the greatest and last of the Indianized states in insular Southeast Asia. Under the ambitious and

able GAJAH MADA (t. 1331–1364) as grand vizier, the control of all *NUSANTARA*—lands beyond Java, the entire Indonesian archipelago—comes under MAJAPAHIT's rule.

14th century

Negaradipa, an Indianized kingdom, is established in the hinterland of present-day Bandjarmasin sometime in the mid-fourteenth century.

Early 15th century

The Malay Muslim sultanate of MELAKA emerges and strategically commands the East–West trade route through the international sea route—the STRAITS OF MELAKA.

1479

Raden Patah (r. 1479–1513) proclaims DEMAK an Islamic kingdom. DEMAK develops into a major Muslim power on JAVA and southern BORNEO with close ties with PALEMBANG.

Late 15th century

Muslim Malay BRUNEI principality begins to develop in northeastern Borneo.

16th century

Javanese *PASISIR* Muslim states claim sovereignty over south BORNEO. DEMAK exerts strong influence over Negaradipa.

1511

The Portuguese, having defeated the Muslim kingdom of MELAKA, arrive in Indonesia seeking SPICES AND THE SPICE TRADE. Their erstwhile rivals, the Spaniards, also attempt to corner the lucrative trade in spices. Both propagate CATHOLICISM. The Portuguese are successful in MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS), where they receive a warm welcome. They maintain this spice trade for close to a century. However, their hold begins to decline when they try to monopolize the trade in cloves and nutmeg, and because of their general contempt for local practices and customs.

1512

The Dutch presence in Indonesia begins. Individual Dutch traders undertake trade in spices with local rulers.

1516 Chronology

ca. 1520

The Portuguese conduct trade in sandalwood with TIMOR. They set up a trading post in the area of Oekusi.

1521

The Portuguese visit BORNEO. Shortly afterward, the Spanish begin trading with BRUNEI.

1526

The Muslim kingdom of BANTEN (1526–1813), a PEPPER port, flourishes after the fall of MELAKA to the Portuguese. Likewise, many Muslim traders shift to ACEH, the SULTANATE of BANDJARMASIN, and BRUNEI.

1527

Muslim forces from DEMAK capture the capital of West JAVA, Sunda Kelapa. A Portuguese attempt to take the city is foiled.

1530

Pangeran Samudra, ruler of Negaradipa, embraces Islam with a new title, Sultan Surian Allah. It marks the beginning of the SULTANATE OF BANDJARMASIN.

The sultanate of BRUNEI exercises control over the coasts of northern and northeastern BORNEO, and SULU AND THE SULU ARCHIPELAGO of the southern Philippines. Eventually, BRUNEI declines owing to sustained royal succession problems, PIRACY, and the expansion of European COLONIALISM. BRUNEI from the late seventeenth century struggles to meet challenges from European adventurers and colonizers.

1561

Portuguese Dominican monks build a fortress on Solor Island, TIMOR.

Late 16th century

Contemporaneous with Malay MELAKA is ACEH (ACHEH), a Muslim polity in northern SUMATRA. Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah (r. 1496–1530) strengthens ACEH as a power in the STRAITS OF MELAKA.

MATARAM embraces Islam.

17th–19th centuries

The British and Dutch try to take over BORNEO's trade, especially in PEPPER.

1600

ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY (EIC) is established to oversee trade and commerce in South, Southeast, and East Asia.

1602

The VEREENIGDE OOST-INDISCHE COMPAGNIE (VOC) ([DUTCH] UNITED EAST INDIA COMPANY) (1602) is set up to trade in Indonesian spices. This amalgamation of all the individual Dutch trading community seeks to maximize business efficiency, and hence profits. Dutch warships protect the merchant fleets from PIRACY.

BRITISH INTERESTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA are based at BANTEN (BANTAM).

1605

The Dutch capture Ambon, one of the more important islands in MALUKU (THE MOLUCCAS).

1607–1636

ACEH reaches the zenith of its power during the reign of SULTAN ISKANDAR MUDA (MAHKOTA ALAM) (r. 1607–1636). ACEH dominates large parts of SUMATRA and the Malay Peninsula, including the JOHOR-RIAU EMPIRE. PEPPER is ACEH's economic mainstay. As a center for Islamic teaching and learning, ACEH attracts well-known Sufi scholars such as HAMZAH FANSURI, SHAMSUDDIN AL-SUMATRANI (d. 1630), and NURUDDIN AL-RANIRI (d. 1658).

1610–1630

Muslim MATARAM and the VOC struggle for political and economic ascendancy.

1613

The Dominican fort on Solo Island, TIMOR, is converted into a trading post of the VOC.

Through an agreement, the ruler of Kupang allows the VOC to build a fortress in Kupang, as well as to station a battalion-strong garrison there.

EIC opens a factory at Makassar dealing in textiles via BANTEN. The Portuguese deal in sandalwood from MACAU (MACAO) via

Makassar to the producing areas of TIMOR and Solor. At the same time the Portuguese also trade in textiles from India's Coromandel Coast via MELAKA to Makassar. The BUGIS (BUGINESE) of Makassar profit from intercourse with the Portuguese and English. Apart from this the BUGIS trade with the spice archipelago of MALUKU. Makassar's prosperity brings enmity with the VOC.

1613–1645

SULTAN AGUNG (r. 1613–1645) is the greatest ruler of Muslim MATARAM. From his base in Central JAVA, he expands MATARAM's hegemony over most of Java. A formidable opponent is the Dutch.

1616–1669

BUGIS–VOC struggle. Makassar falls to the Dutch in 1669. Many BUGIS who refuse to bow to Dutch control flee. The Bugis diaspora extends westward to JOHOR, where they play influential political roles.

1619

The Dutch expel the Muslim ruler of Sunda Kelapa. Establishing the city-port as their base, they later rename it BATAVIA (SUNDA KELAPA, JACATRA, DJAKARTA/JAKARTA). From this base, JAN PIETERSZOOM COEN (1587–1629) builds the NETHERLANDS (DUTCH) EAST INDIES.

1620s

After dividing the Indonesian island kingdoms, the Dutch destroy interisland and international commerce, making Indonesian agriculture a supplier to European markets through Dutch traders. They also act as middlemen in the China-Indonesia trade, replacing it with Dutch-dominated trade.

1623

The Dutch take Banda Island. The AMBON MASSACRE (1623) hastens the British withdrawal from Indonesia to focus on the Indian subcontinent.

1625

Dutch destruction of the clove plantations on Huwanmohel generates strong dislike, culminating in the uprising of 1635 and a

guerrilla war lasting until 1646. The Dutch reconstitute the clove plantations on Ambon and the Uliasers.

1629

The Dutch at BATAVIA repulse SULTAN AGUNG's forces.

1641

TIMOR is partitioned into spheres of influence: the Dutch in the West, the Portuguese in the East.

The Dutch acquire MELAKA after defeating the Portuguese. JOHOR assists the Dutch against the Portuguese. By then MELAKA has lost much of its advantage as a preeminent port-of-call; silting affects the once-deep harbor, and patronage by Muslim traders dwindles after the Portuguese takeover in 1511. Dutch interests, on the other hand, focus on BATAVIA and hegemony over the Indonesian archipelago.

Mid-17th century

To control the production of cloves, the Dutch annually check their islands for illegal trees or for evidence of smuggling, utilizing armed patrol boats. Such operations are referred to as *hongji* expeditions.

1650

With the market saturated and no outlet for non-VOC cloves, native growers and pirates rise against the Dutch, generating an unstable situation until late in the century. Eventually the Ambonese become loyal to the Dutch Crown, later fighting for the Dutch in wars in Indonesia and against the Japanese.

ca. 1665

The English reach BORNEO.

1674–1680

Prince Trunajaya (Trunojoyo) of MADURA begins a major uprising against AMANGKURAT I (1646–1677). The VOC assists the latter.

1677

AMANGKURAT II (ADIPATI ANOM) (r. 1677–1703) signs a treaty with the VOC. With VOC support, the Trunajaya uprising is crushed in 1681.

1518 Chronology

1685

The British establish an outpost at BENGKULU (BENCOOLEN, BENKULEN), on the western coast of Sumatra.

1704–1705

With Dutch support, Pangeran Puger ousts Amangkurat III (r. 1703–1704). As Paku Buwana I (r. 1704–1719), the victorious Puger signs a treaty with the Dutch. It marks the loss of MATARAM's sovereignty.

1704–1755

In a series of JAVANESE WARS OF SUCCESSION (1677–1707, 1719–1722, 1749–1755), MATARAM is weakened until finally it is divided into two kingdoms. Dutch intervention in supporting one contentious party against its foe results in the strengthening of Dutch power in JAVA.

1740

The Dutch crush a rebellion of Chinese and native Indonesians in BATAVIA. Ten thousand Chinese die.

ca. 1750s

CHINESE GOLD-MINING COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN BORNEO exist as independent, self-governing polities described as an *imperium in imperio*.

1755

The Third Javanese War of Succession (1749–1755) concludes with the division of MATARAM: the eastern half with its capital at SURAKARTA under Pakubuwono III and the western part with its center at YOGYAKARTA (JOGJAKARTA) under Mangku Bumi (as Sultan Amangku Buwono).

1762

EIC has an outpost on Balambangan Island, off northeast BORNEO. It lasts less than a year, owing to pirates. It is reestablished in 1773–1775 and 1803–1805.

1775

BRUNEI offers LABUAN (1847) to the EIC in return for protection against Sulu PIRACY. This offer is repeated in 1803.

1798–1799

The Dutch government nationalizes the VOC. The Dutch administration in BATAVIA takes over all company territories in Indonesia after the VOC drops into bankruptcy because of mismanagement and corruption.

19th century

Significant anti-Dutch revolts occur in Indonesia (1821–1837, 1825–1830, and 1873–1903).

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Dutch acquire large territories from rulers on the south and west coasts of BORNEO but have little influence in the interior.

ca. 1803

The PADRI MOVEMENT, a revivalist Islamic movement, seeks to bring Muslims to the true teachings of the faith. Beginning in the MINANGKABAU region of West SUMATRA, its influence spreads to some territories of the BATAKS.

1803–1815

The NAPOLEONIC WARS IN ASIA witness the EIC assuming control over Dutch territories in Indonesia. MELAKA in the Malay Peninsula and JAVA come under EIC administration. SIR (THOMAS) STAMFORD BINGLEY RAFFLES (1781–1826), during his tenure as lieutenant governor of JAVA (t. 1811–1816), abolishes the slave trade, allows limited self-government, and replaces the Dutch forced-agriculture system with a more palatable land-tenure system. Possessing a keen interest in the Malay Archipelago, RAFFLES undertakes research on JAVA's history and oversees the restoration of temples and other monuments.

1821–1837

Members of the PADRI MOVEMENT almost massacre the Minangkabau royal family. Taking the side of the latter, the Dutch launch an offensive against the PADRI MOVEMENT, erupting into the full-scale PADRI WARS (1821–1837).

1825–1830

The JAVA WAR (1825–1830) is financially devastating for the Dutch government. DIPONEGORO (PANGERAN DIPANEGARA) (ca. 1785–1855), the prince from the royal house of YOGYAKARTA who

heads the revolt, is known by the populace as the *RATU ADIL* (RIGHTEOUS KING/PRINCE).

1830–1870s

The Dutch introduce the CULTIVATION SYSTEM (*CULTUURSTELSEL*) in JAVA, whereby agricultural produce is cultivated for export as a source of income. It proves successful. Despite safeguards devised by the initiator, COUNT JOHANNES VAN DEN BOSCH (1780–1844), abuses set in, overshadowing the overall positive outcome.

1839–1841

JAMES BROOKE AND SARAWAK is the romantic tale of an English gentleman-adventurer who assists the sultan of BRUNEI in ending a rebellion. In return, Brooke becomes raja of Sarawak in 1841.

1847

BRUNEI finally cedes LABUAN to Britain; the island becomes a Crown colony. ANGLO-BRUNEI RELATIONS are established on a firm footing.

1853

Brooke and his heirs—SIR CHARLES ANTHONI JOHNSON BROOKE (1829–1917) and Charles Vyner Brooke (r. 1917–1941, 1946)—enlarge Sarawak at the expense of BRUNEI.

1854

The Dutch destroy CHINESE GOLD-MINING COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN BORNEO. The Chinese switch to farming and trading. Some flee across the border to Sarawak, where they settle as farmers.

1860

Eduard Douwes Dekker (1820–1887), under the pseudonym Multatuli, publishes the novel *Max Havelaar of de koffieveilingen der Nederlandsche Handelmaatschappij* [*Max Havelaar or the Coffee Auctions of the Dutch Trading Company*]. *MAX HAVELAAR* (1860) is a semiautobiographical novel, and Dekker draws from firsthand experience as a civil servant in the Dutch colonial administration to expose the myriad baneful effects of the CULTIVATION SYSTEM on the Javanese peasantry. The book

creates debate and controversy among the Dutch public regarding Indonesia.

1870s

Demise of the CULTIVATION SYSTEM in Indonesia.

1873–1903

ACEH (ACHEH) WARS (1873–1903) cost the Dutch more than 10,000 men besides a heavy financial burden as the Acehnese staunchly resist the erosion of their independence.

1879

Birth of RADEN AJENG KARTINI (1879–1904), regarded as a forerunner in Indonesian nationalism, is an advocate of women's rights and female education and careers.

1881

A royal charter is granted to the BRITISH NORTH BORNEO CHARTERED COMPANY (1881–1946) to undertake the administration of a territory known as North Borneo on the northeastern corner of the island of BORNEO. Acquired from both the sultanates of BRUNEI and Sulu, North Borneo is rumored to possess rich mineral resources, but in reality timber is the only viable export besides plantation agriculture (TOBACCO in the nineteenth century and RUBBER in the twentieth).

1888

SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO), together with BRUNEI, are made British protectorates. The three territories constitute BRITISH BORNEO.

1900

The Dutch colonial administration in Indonesia adopts the ETHICAL POLICY (*ETHISCHE POLITIEK*).

1904

RADEN AJENG KARTINI (1879–1904) enters Indonesia's pantheon of national heroes by presidential decree in 1963, fifty-nine years after her death in the Dutch colony then known as the NETHERLANDS (DUTCH) EAST INDIES. In her homeland today, KARTINI is honored rather than studied. Republican

1520 Chronology

Indonesia shed KARTINI's inherited titles, Raden Ajeng, in favor of *Ibu* (mother), and imprinted her on the national consciousness as a nationalist and patriot.

1905

With the transfer of Lawas to Sarawak, the final boundaries of BORNEO are defined. Sarawak under the Brookes, North Borneo administered by the BRITISH BORNEO CHARTERED COMPANY, the Malay sultanate of BRUNEI, and the remainder of the island constitute DUTCH BORNEO.

1906–1908

After the early 1840s many areas of BALI come under Dutch control. Badung and Klungkung hold on to their independence. In September 1906 the Dutch send an expeditionary force to Badung. More than 3,000 Balinese commit *puputan*, or ritual suicide. Similarly, in Klungkung two years later, *puputan* is again committed.

1908

BOEDI OETAMA (BUDI UTOMO) (1908) is Indonesia's first significant political association. Its name means "high endeavor." It attempts to strengthen and rejuvenate Javanese aristocratic culture and emphasize educational pursuits.

1912

SAREKAT ISLAM (1912) is the first mass nationalist organization in Indonesia. It has a huge following, particularly in JAVA.

1913

The Dutch acquire West TIMOR; East TIMOR remains under Portuguese colonial rule.

1920

The PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA (PKI) (1920), or the Communist Party of Indonesia, is established.

1926–1927

Dutch colonial authorities crush a PKI uprising. Many PKI members and sympathizers are killed or imprisoned; others go underground or flee abroad.

1927

The PERSERIKATAN NASIONAL INDONESIA (PNI) (1927) is set up by a group of Indonesian elites who place nationalism as the dominant ideological principle. They organize their struggle around SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970).

1930s

Under the leadership of PNI and the charismatic and consummate orator SOEKARNO, Indonesian nationalism gains momentum.

1942–1945

The JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (1941–1945) includes the NETHERLANDS (DUTCH) EAST INDIES (present-day Indonesia) and BRITISH BORNEO. During the Japanese occupation, Indonesians carry arms for the first time. BATAVIA is renamed Jakarta. While SOEKARNO and MOHAMMAD HATTA (1902–1980) work with the Japanese but pursue nationalist objectives, SUTAN SJAHRIR (1909–1966) heads an underground resistance movement.

1945

17 August

SOEKARNO proclaims the independence of Indonesia. He assumes the presidency and MOHAMMAD HATTA the vice presidency of the Republic of Indonesia.

One of the most notorious Japanese atrocities of the Pacific War is the SANDAKAN DEATH MARCH. Of some 1,300 Australian prisoners of war, only six survive.

1945–1949

The INDONESIAN REVOLUTION (1945–1949) witnesses the armed clash between republican forces and the returned Dutch colonial government.

1946

SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO) are declared British Crown colonies. Brunei remains a British protectorate.

A section of the Malay community of Sarawak opposes the cession of Sarawak to Britain. The anticeSSION movement loses its momentum following the assassination of the British governor by a young Malay in Sibu.

1947–1948

Despite the conclusion of agreements and cease-fires—the LINGGADJATI (LINGGAJATI) AGREEMENT (1947) and RENVILLE AGREEMENT (JANUARY 1948)—fighting continues between the Dutch and republican forces. The DUTCH POLICE ACTION (FIRST AND SECOND) takes place in July 1947 and December 1948.

1949**December**

The Dutch, under pressure from the United Nations, recognize an independent Indonesia. This is one of the earliest tests for the UNITED NATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

1949–1955

Political instability in Indonesia, with frequent turnover of prime ministers and changes in form of government.

1950

The Republic of Indonesia as a unitary state is born.

DUTCH BORNEO becomes part of Indonesia; it reverts to its ancient name, Kalimantan.

1955

Indonesia holds its first and only general election.

April

In hosting the ASIAN-AFRICAN (BANDUNG) CONFERENCE (APRIL 1955), SOEKARNO and Indonesia gain much political mileage on the international stage. The Bandung meeting initiates cooperation among countries of the Third World and the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. The NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) AND SOUTHEAST ASIA seek to distance the region from the COLD WAR.

1957–1959

SOEKARNO voids the 1950 Constitution, advocating the return of the 1945 version under which he balances the communist party, the army, and himself. He introduces GUIDED DEMOCRACY (*DEMOKRASI TERPIMPIN*) in an attempt to strengthen his position as president.

1960s

SOEKARNO increasingly tilts to the left while trying to lead the Third World. There is economic decline, along with intense struggle and open, armed clashes between noncommunists (backed by the army) and communists (the resuscitated PKI).

1961

The MALAYSIA (1963) proposal is mooted by Malaya's prime minister, TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990). Its goal is containing COMMUNISM, balancing the ethnic ratio, and facilitating independence from Britain for the Crown colonies of SARAWAK AND SABAH and SINGAPORE.

1962**December**

The PARTAI RAKYAT BRUNEI (PRB) launches the BRUNEI REBELLION (DECEMBER 1962). The PRB is led by SHEIKH AZAHARI BIN SHEIKH MAHMUD (1928–2002). In opposing Brunei's participation in Malaysia (1963), the PRB seeks to establish Kalimantan Utara, a proposed federation of Brunei, Sabah, and Sarawak. British Gurkha troops from Singapore rapidly suppress the uprising upon the request of OMAR ALI SAIFUDDIN III, SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1914–1986). PRB leaders flee abroad, seeking political asylum. SHEIKH AZAHARI BIN SHEIKH MAHMUD lives for many years in Jakarta.

1963

SARAWAK AND SABAH join the Federation of MALAYSIA with Malaya and Singapore. Indonesia strongly objects, labeling "Malaysia" a neocolony of Britain. Soekarno launches KONFRONTASI ("CRUSH MALAYSIA" CAMPAIGN).

1964

The Indonesian army conducts guerrilla raids into Sarawak, and several parachute forces land in Johor. Intrusions and small-scale skirmishes continue until August 1966.

1965**1 October**

The GESTAPU AFFAIR (1965) is a coup attempt, but there is uncertainty over who are the "real"

1522 Chronology

perpetrators: the communists, or the army, or both. The coup kills seven generals and between 300,000 and 500,000 communists and sympathizers. The coup is thwarted by General SUHARTO (1921–) and the army, who blame it on the PKI. Acting on this pretext, a horrendous purge of communists is undertaken.

1966–1998

The *ORDE BARU* (THE NEW ORDER) is officially dated 11 March 1966, when SUHARTO takes the reins of power from the deposed SOEKARNO. It represents a political and social system ordered around authoritarian corporatism.

1967

Indonesia, together with Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, forms the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) (1967) to promote greater cooperation.

HASSANAL BOLKIAH, SULTAN OF BRUNEI (1946–), ascends the throne when his father, OMAR ALI SAIFUDDIN III, retires.

1968

SUHARTO formally assumes the presidency of Indonesia. He realigns his foreign policy toward the Western democracies and shifts priorities, emphasizing economic development. Indonesia becomes a major producer of natural RUBBER for the first time.

1971

The first general election is held during SUHARTO's presidency. With political parties banned at the village level, SUHARTO's GOLKAR, or Functional Groups, win 62 percent of the vote against ten other parties. *ORDE BARU* is under way. GOLKAR holds elections once every five years but allows no real opposition for the next twenty-five years.

1974

Students protest against Japanese investments.

1975

28 November

FRETILIN (FRENTE REVOLUCIONÁRIA DO TIMOR-LESTE INDEPENDENTE) declares the independence of East Timor after seizing power.

7 December

The Indonesian army undertakes a suppression of this nationalist uprising in Dili, East TIMOR. FRETILIN conducts a protracted guerrilla struggle for independence from Indonesia.

1975–1976

The PERTAMINA CRISIS (1975–1976) reveals massive corruption in Indonesia's biggest government-owned company, PT Pertamina (Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara).

1976

July

East TIMOR is incorporated as the twenty-seventh province of Indonesia.

1978

Students protest against SUHARTO's running for a second presidential term. The movement is crushed, leaders arrested, newspapers and magazines closed. With opposition ended and the army fully involved in the running of the country, the state protects businesses, including those belonging to ethnic Chinese, as economic growth soars. State-sheltered or ersatz capitalism creates racial tension from within and bitterness from without.

1984

Brunei gains independence from Britain. Because of the flourishing BRUNEI OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY, the country possesses one of the highest per capita GDPs in the undeveloped world.

1991

Massacre of civilians at Dili, East TIMOR, by Indonesia's military in an effort to clamp down on dissent.

1997

The Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998) sweeps across Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, the deteriorating economic situation with the dramatic devaluation of the *rupiah* turns into a political crisis when SUHARTO decides to run for his seventh term in March 1998.

31 March

In Warton, England, at the Hawk fighter jet factory, four East Timorese are arrested for

protesting. The Hawk is the jet used by the Indonesian air force in East TIMOR.

12 May

Four university students are slain after a peaceful demonstration. Massive riots occur in six Indonesian cities, 13–15 May, with street demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of students and others.

1998

Instead of going for his seventh term, SUHARTO steps down, handing over the presidency to B. J. Habibie (1936–), the vice-president. President Habibie (t. 1998–1999) faces independence movements in Ambon, East TIMOR, Kalimantan, and IRIAN JAYA.

1999

East TIMOR votes overwhelmingly for independence. Militias believed to be Indonesian army-sponsored rampage through the country. General disturbance leads to the introduction of a United Nations and Australian peacekeeping force. Eventually East TIMOR separates, and the government and army of Indonesia change hands.

7 June

In the new Indonesian general election, 48 parties compete for 462 seats, with 38 seats retained for the military. This, the first contested election since 1965, sees the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokratik Indonesia [PDI] Perjuangan) of Megawati Sukarno Putri (1947–) win 35 percent of seats but fail to attain the presidency or the post of speaker. Abdulrahman Wahid (1940–), a traditionalist *KIAI*, becomes the fourth president of the Republic of Indonesia (t. 1999–2001). Megawati, daughter of SOEKARNO, settles for the vice presidency.

2000

Abu Sayyaf, a MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) faction, kidnaps twenty-one Western tourists and Malaysian resort workers from Sipadan Island, off Sabah. They are taken as hostages to Jolo Island. Protracted negotiations secure the release of the hostages; it is unclear whether any ransom money is paid or political demands are met as a precondition for the freeing of the hostages.

2001

23 July

Indonesia's relations with Australia are tense; the economy is in bad condition. Abdulrahman Wahid gives way in favor of his vice-president, Megawati Sukarnoputri. She faces immediate problems in ACEH and IRIAN JAYA.

22 September

The KUTAI (KOETEI) monarchy returns. The Indonesian government recognizes as a largely ceremonial ruler the eldest son of the last ruling sultan. The new monarch is Sultan Haji Aji Mohammad Salehuddin II.

5–6 November

Bandar Seri Begawan plays host to the ASEAN+3 meeting. The ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS holds its annual summit, to which three East Asian nations are invited to attend: People's Republic of China (PRC), Japan, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). This event witnesses an ASEAN-PRC free trade agreement; it also further enhances ties between them.

20 December

A ten-point agreement is signed between opposing factions of Muslims and Christians in Central SULAWESI (CELEBES), aimed at ending the religious strife that has been going on since 1998.

2002

January

IRIAN JAYA assumes the official name of Papua following the granting of autonomous status to this province by the Indonesian government.

12 February

The signing of a peace agreement ends three years of Christian-Muslim clashes in MALUKU.

March

"Tommy" Mandala Suharto, son of former president SUHARTO, is charged with the murder of Syafiuddin Kartasmita in July 2001. Kartasmita was the presiding judge who upheld "Tommy's" prison sentence of corruption. He also faces a charge for illegal possession of firearms. For both capital offenses, as well as for fleeing from justice, he is given a fifteen-year prison term.

1524 Chronology

Akbar Tandjung, leader of GOLKAR and speaker of the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakjat (MPR, People's Deliberative Council), is held on corruption charges.

East TIMOR promulgates its inaugural constitution.

April

After most parties sign the Malino Peace Accord in March, the radical Islamists reject the pact. A roused Muslim crowd kills twenty-one people in a massacre in Ambon. Religious unrest and disharmony persist.

May

In the fight against terrorism, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines embark on a trilateral pact whereby they agree to the sharing of intelligence and joint police operations to eradicate terrorism and terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia.

The Indonesian government holds talks with the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, Free Aceh Movement) in Geneva, Switzerland.

The KUALA LUMPUR (KL) meeting of ASEAN ministers (of home and security affairs) on terrorism declare in a joint statement ASEAN's commitment to eradicating terrorism in the region.

August

East TIMOR gains independence following elections held under UN auspices. José Alexandre "Kay Rala Xanana" Gusmão, former FRETILIN leader, is unanimously the choice for president.

The MPR approves fourteen amendments to the 1945 Constitution. Inter alia, provisions allow for direct presidential and vice presidential elections from 2004, and the removal of thirty-eight parliamentary seats hitherto reserved for military appointees.

September

Sentenced to a three-year prison term for corruption, Akbar Tandjung launches an appeal. Despite his conviction, he remains the speaker for the MPR.

East TIMOR becomes the 191st member of the United Nations.

12 October

Terror comes to BALI when a bomb explodes, killing 202 foreign holiday-makers, mainly Australians.

2003

March–April

Indonesian Muslims, led by President Megawati Sukarnoputri, protest the unilateral invasion of Iraq by the United States.

June–July

Trial of suspects involved in the BALI bombing.

V. MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE

ca. 9000 B.C.E.

"PERAK MAN" is discovered in Lenggong, central Perak, West Malaysia.

1st century C.E.

Malaysia's predecessor states become important to international trade. INDIA's two main sources of GOLD at the time are the Roman Empire and IMPERIAL CHINA. Huns cut the overland route from China at about the same time that Emperor Vespasian (r. 69–79) ends GOLD shipments to INDIA. Seeking alternative sources, INDIA sends ships to Southeast Asia, including the Malay Peninsula (West/Peninsular Malaysia), known to them as SUVARNABHUMI (LAND OF GOLD). Not finding GOLD, the Indians find TIN instead. For centuries thereafter the tin of Malaya (West Malaysia and Singapore) circulates through the Indian Ocean trade, and Malaya flourishes economically. Malay ships sail to the Middle East, INDIA, and IMPERIAL CHINA, carrying spices and tropical woods, and Malay ports transship the goods of their Southeast Asian partners. SPICES AND THE SPICE TRADE have long been the economic mainstay of the Malay Archipelago (present-day Indonesia and Malaysia). For the region known as MALAYSIA (from 1963), there is also a resulting Indian influence—INDIANIZATION—in culture, politics, religion, and the economy.

3rd century C.E.

SINGAPORE (1819) is referenced in a third-century Chinese account as the "island at the end of a peninsula."

4th century C.E.

Sanskrit inscriptions as well as Hindu and Buddhist images in Kedah point to a possible trading outpost with shipping links to INDIA.

7th century C.E.

Panhang is the Arab reference to present-day PAHANG. The Chinese call it Peng-Feng or Peng Keng. TIN in the Lembing valley is PAHANG's asset.

9th–13th centuries

ŚRIVIJAYA (ŚRIWIJAYA), an early Buddhist Malay kingdom centered in present-day PALEMBANG, SUMATRA, is the dominant power on the Malay Peninsula.

13th century

Chi-lan-tan is reported by a traveler of the YUAN (MONGOL) DYNASTY (1271–1368), referring to present-day Kelantan.

Chinese accounts mention Teng-Ya-nung or Ting-Chia-lu, referring to present-day Terengganu.

14th century

The Java-based Hindu kingdom of MAJAPAHIT (1293–ca. 1520s) takes control of the Malay Peninsula. Terengganu is mentioned in a list of polities and trading centers conquered by MAJAPAHIT.

1320

Mongol court sends for ELEPHANTS at Long Yamen (Dragon's Tooth Strait), probably present-day Keppel Harbor, SINGAPORE.

1330

Wang Dayuan of China visits Pancur (spring) and notes that it is already inhabited by Chinese.

1365

Javanese *Nāgarakterāgama* and a Vietnamese source refer to Singapore as TEMASIK (TUMASIK) ("Sea Town").

ca. 1380s

According to tradition, MINANGKABAU immigrants settle in Negri Sembilan.

Late 14th century

The Sanskrit place-name Singapura, or "Lion City," is in common use. SINGAPORE is caught between Siam and the MAJAPAHIT

empire of JAVA, which fight for control of the Malay Peninsula. The *SEJARAH MELAYU* (MALAY ANNALS) record that PARAMESWARA (PARAMESHWARA, PARAMESVARA), a prince of PALEMBANG, deposes the local ruler of TEMASIK and rules the island himself until the Siamese force him to flee to the Malay Peninsula. There he establishes the MELAKA sultanate. SINGAPORE is part of the sultanate, a fief of the admirals (Laksamana).

15th century

MELAKA becomes a rising force, serving as a major regional entrepôt for the exchange of Chinese, Arab, Indian, and Malay and Southeast Asian trade goods. Under a Malay Muslim monarch, MELAKA propagates Islam to the rest of insular Southeast Asia. Territorial expansion under the leadership of Bendahara/Chief Minister TUN PERAK (d. ca. 1498) results in Melakan influence over the STRAITS OF MELAKA, the Malay Peninsula, and the eastern coast Sumatran Malay States.

ARABS note the place-name Kalandan, whereas Chinese records relating to the voyages of ADMIRAL CHENG HO (ZHENG HE) (1371/1375–1433/1435) clearly show the name Ko-lan-tan. Both apparently refer to Kelantan.

16th century

MINANGKABAU immigrants from SUMATRA settle in Naning and Rembau, close to the Melakan hinterland.

1511

The Portuguese find MELAKA attractive. A Portuguese fleet conquers MELAKA, opening Southeast Asia to European expansion. SULTAN MAHMUD OF MELAKA (r. 1488–1511), the last Malay ruler, flees southward; his descendants establish the JOHOR-RIAU EMPIRE. Malay attempts to recapture MELAKA fail.

1528

Perak's first ruler is Sultan Muzaffar Shah (r. 1528–1545). In fact, he is the heir apparent of the JOHOR-RIAU EMPIRE following the demise of SULTAN MAHMUD OF MELAKA. But lacking political influence at court, he instead is sent to Perak, where a sultanate is established.

1526 Chronology

17th century

Triangular struggle for control over the STRAITS OF MELAKA among the Portuguese in MELAKA, the MALAYS of JOHOR-RIAU, and ACEH.

1641

The Dutch take MELAKA from the Portuguese after a long siege. By then MELAKA has lost its glory and importance. Moreover, apart from attempting to monopolize the peninsular TIN trade, the Dutch preoccupation is with BATAVIA and JAVA.

1699

Sultan Mahmud (r. 1685–1699) dies without an heir; Bendahara Abdul Jalil, claiming descent from a sayyid, usurps the throne. His death marks the end of the Malay MELAKA royal line.

1700

BUGIS immigrants who have settled in Selangor request that their JOHOR-RIAU EMPIRE overlord appoint a *Yam Tuan* (chieftain) to rule over them.

1773

Sri Menanti becomes the royal capital of MINANGKABAU settlements in present-day Negri Sembilan.

1786

One of the English COUNTRY TRADERS, CAPTAIN FRANCIS LIGHT (1740–1794), acting as a go-between for the Sultan of Kedah and the ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANY (EIC) (1600), establishes for the latter an outpost on the island of PENANG (1786); he renames it Prince of Wales Island, and the settlement George Town. LIGHT has for the past decade been trading along the western coast of the ISTHMUS OF KRA and Kedah from his base on JUNK CEYLON (UJUNG SALANG, PHUKET).

1795

During the NAPOLEONIC WARS IN ASIA, William V (1748–1806) of The Netherlands requests in the KEW LETTERS that the British assume control over Dutch possessions in the East Indies lest they fall to the French.

MELAKA then comes under British administration.

1816

PENANG FREE SCHOOL (1816), the first English school in Southeast and East Asia, is established by the Reverend R. S. Hutchings, PENANG's Anglican chaplain. By "Free" it means that it welcomes all children irrespective of race, religion, creed, or socioeconomic status. The school's tradition of excellence is displayed both in the classroom and on the playing field—not unlike English public schools.

1818

SIR (THOMAS) STAMFORD BINGLEY RAFFLES (1781–1826), lieutenant governor of BENGKULU (t. 1817–1819), receives permission from Lord Hastings, governor-general of India, to set up a trading station in the southern vicinity of the Malay Peninsula.

29 January

RAFFLES lands on SINGAPORE (1819) after a survey of the other islands.

1819

30 January

RAFFLES and Temenggong Abdul Rahman agree that Raffles can establish a trading post. Unfortunately, Temenggong is subordinate to Sultan Abdul Rahman of Johor, who has a treaty granting the Dutch control of the entire Johor-Riau sultanate, including Singapore.

6 February

RAFFLES knows that the current sultan has problems with legitimacy, so he smuggles in the exiled elder son of the former sultan, proclaims the pretender the rightful sultan, and signs a treaty giving the British exclusive rights to a factory in Singapore. When the Dutch protest, Hastings sends reinforcements from PENANG to SINGAPORE.

August

A treaty signed by both Sultan Hussein and Temenggong Abdul Rahman in August gives Britain the island of SINGAPORE in return for cash and pensions.

1824

The GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA supports RAFFLES'S actions. By then the ENTREPÔT TRADE AND COMMERCE OF SINGAPORE are a clear asset. By 1823, SINGAPORE proves more profitable than PENANG. ANGLO-DUTCH RELATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA enter a new stage with the Treaty of London (1824).

March

Under the Anglo-Dutch Treaty (the Treaty of London), the Dutch accept the British presence in Malaya and give the British their bases on the peninsula and in INDIA. Britain gives the Dutch control of SUMATRA. The two spheres of influence meet at an imaginary line through the STRAITS OF MELAKA, south of SINGAPORE. The split ends the Johor-Riau sultanate by giving the British the states of JOHOR and SINGAPORE, now severed from each other. And the Dutch get the Riau archipelago, now part of Indonesia.

1826

The British create the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1946) from their settlements on MELAKA, PENANG, and SINGAPORE.

Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century the British expand their area of influence in INDIA and their trade with IMPERIAL CHINA. The creation of the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS offers safe harbors for their merchant fleet plying the lucrative China trade. Controlled from the GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA, it is the British base in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for the establishment of protectorates over the Peninsular Malay sultanates.

PENANG is the seat of government of the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1941).

1832

SINGAPORE replaces PENANG as the administrative center for the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS.

1867

Dissatisfaction with the GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH INDIA in the administration of the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS leads to representations made to London for a transfer.

Consequently the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS become a Crown colony under the British Colonial Office in London.

1869

The opening of the SUEZ CANAL and the advent of steamships in the 1860s make SINGAPORE, and to a lesser extent PENANG, major ports in the trade between East Asia and Europe.

1870s

Succession disputes, PIRACY, and secret society rivalries in the western Peninsular Malay States threaten life and property and disrupt tin production and trade. The influential European mercantile community in SINGAPORE urges the British government to diffuse the chaotic situation. An appeal for assistance from one of the Malay claimants to the Perak throne presents a justification for SIR ANDREW CLARKE (t. 1873–1875), governor of the STRAITS SETTLEMENTS, to adopt a forward policy.

1874

The British intervene in the WESTERN MALAY STATES. The PANGKOR ENGAGEMENT (1874) establishes the RESIDENTIAL SYSTEM (MALAYA); the resident advises the sultan on all aspects of governance except relating to Malay customs and practices or to the Islamic faith. The British next intervene in PAHANG in 1885. The PANGKOR ENGAGEMENT serves as a model for initiating the establishment of British protectorates over the Peninsular Malay sultanates.

1873–1913

A fourfold increase in SINGAPORE'S trade generates unprecedented prosperity. The prosperity attracts immigrants from around the region. TIN and RUBBER are the main commodities produced in the WESTERN MALAY STATES.

1876

The British India Office brings RUBBER seedlings (*Hevea brasiliensis*) from Brazil to SRI LANKA (CEYLON), SINGAPORE, and PENANG. Some also reach Dutch JAVA.

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1890s

RUBBER increasingly replaces COFFEE in the Malay States, owing to disease and poor world prices consequent of surplus output from South American producers. H[ENRY] N[ICHOLAS] RIDLEY (b. 1855) enthusiastically promotes RUBBER among planters and devises the efficient herringbone tapping method to extract the latex without damaging the tree.

INDIAN IMMIGRANTS—mostly Tamils from South INDIA—are recruited as workers on the rubber estates.

1896

FEDERATED MALAY STATES (FMS) (1896) form from the WESTERN MALAY STATES and PAHANG. FMS coordinates infrastructural development, particularly HIGHWAYS AND RAILWAYS, more centralized administration based in KUALA LUMPUR (KL), and the poorer states supported by the richer ones.

20th century

1909

By the Treaty of Bangkok, Britain assumes protectorates over the former SIAMESE MALAY STATES (KEDAH, PERLIS, KELANTAN, TERENGGANU). Although styled advisers instead of residents, the British officers appointed to these sultanates perform similar functions—namely, holding the reins of administration, including revenue collection, in the name of the Malay sultan.

1909–1910

First world RUBBER boom. The WESTERN MALAY STATES become the chief RUBBER producer in the world, and SINGAPORE the main RUBBER-exporting port. RUBBER plantations are mostly European-owned, but Chinese also have holdings. Almost half the RUBBER cultivated in the Malay States is from smallholdings, largely family-owned, of Malays and Chinese.

The bulk of INDIAN IMMIGRANTS as labor for the RUBBER industry are recruited through the *KANGANI* SYSTEM. Most of them arrive during the early decades of the twentieth century.

ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (TWENTIETH CENTURY) witnesses the emergence of the *Kaum Muda* (modernist, reformist) challenging the *Kaum Tua* (traditionalist) in the Peninsular Malay States.

SYED SHAYKH AL-HADY (1867?–1934) utilizes the print media to propagate modernist Islamic thoughts. In fact NEWSPAPERS AND THE MASS MEDIA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA play a prominent role in the ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

1909–1941

The British colonial period is characterized by systematic public administration, expansion of social services (schools and hospitals), a good network of HIGHWAYS AND RAILWAYS, and extensive development of RUBBER and TIN production for the export market. SINGAPORE and PENANG possess port facilities that are second to none. A multiethnic, multicultural, and multireligious society rapidly develops, with cosmopolitan urban centers such as SINGAPORE, KUALA LUMPUR, and PENANG.

1920–1922

Enthusiastic oversupply of RUBBER, coupled with a trade slump following the conclusion of the GREAT WAR (1914–1918), leads to declining RUBBER prices.

1921

The British build a naval base on SINGAPORE, followed shortly by an airfield. “FORTRESS SINGAPORE” gradually emerges.

1922–1928

The Stevenson Scheme restricts RUBBER production and exports in an attempt to stabilize falling prices.

1929–1931

Dramatic fall in commodity prices in the GREAT DEPRESSION to 1 percent of the 1910 peak price. Closure of RUBBER plantations and TIN mines; repatriation of Indian and Chinese labor to avoid social unrest.

1934–1941

International Rubber Regulation Agreement controls exports to stabilize prices. Smallholders are penalized with small quotas.

1938

KESATUAN MELAYU MUDA (KMM, YOUNG MALAY UNION) is formed by Malay nationalists to struggle for political

independence from Britain. Its leader, IBRAHIM YAACOB (1911–1979), looks to the Indonesian nationalist struggle for inspiration.

1941

8 December

Japanese invasion begins with landings at Kota Bahru, Kelantan, assisted by KMM members. KMM views the Japanese as allies and liberators from the colonial yoke. Japanese bombs fall on PENANG and SINGAPORE.

1942

15 February

SINGAPORE falls to the Japanese. The British surrender is unprecedented in military history and severely damages British prestige. SINGAPORE is renamed SYONAN-TO (“Island of the South”). The Japanese occupy it until September 1945.

1942–1945

Japanese invasion and occupation during the Pacific War bring hardships and deprivation. Unknown numbers of Chinese—probably in the thousands—are killed in *SOOK CHING*, “cleansing” operations in SINGAPORE and PENANG. The Chinese business community is extorted out of huge sums of money as punishment for its anti-Japanese stance prior to the war, such as supporting and contributing to the CHINA RELIEF FUND. The Chinese-based MALAYAN PEOPLE’S ANTI-JAPANESE ARMY (MPAJA) conducts a guerrilla war in the jungles, organized and led by members of the MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (MCP). Similarly, WATANIAH, composed of MALAYS of PAHANG, undertakes a guerrilla war against the Japanese assisted by the Allied FORCE 136.

1945

15 August

Japan surrenders unconditionally after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

September

BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION (BMA) oversees food supply, medicine, and other essential commodities; the release and repatriation of internees and prisoners of war; disarming and repatriation of the Japanese

military; and keeping law and order. Incidences of Sino-Malay clashes.

1946

PENANG and MELAKA join the MALAYAN UNION. UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO) protests against the MALAYAN UNION. UMNO, under the leadership of ONN BIN JA’AFAR (1895–1962), gains support of the Malay sultans in its opposition.

March

Military administration ends. STRAITS SETTLEMENTS (1826–1946) dissolve.

1 April

SINGAPORE converts to a Crown colony.

1947

The legislative councils of Malaya and Singapore pass an ordinance to set up a university, later known as UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA. It is to comprise the amalgamation of the KING EDWARD VII COLLEGE OF MEDICINE and RAFFLES COLLEGE, set up in 1905 and 1919, respectively.

20 March

Singapore’s first election.

July

Because SINGAPORE after the war is more stable, less a country of transients, the merchant class and others want more voice in their government. The initial arrangement of a governor and advisory council switches to one of executive and legislative council in July 1947. Although the governor remains dominant, the council is subject to popular vote.

1948

June

The MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960) is declared because the MCP attempts by force to take over SINGAPORE and Malaya.

Several measures are implemented to combat the communists: military operations; enlisting the assistance of the ORANG ASLI, a propaganda war of winning the “hearts and minds” of the population; the BRIGGS PLAN of removing Chinese squatters from jungle fringes to “NEW VILLAGES,” thereby severing the communist’s

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supply line of food and medicine, information, and recruits.

The harsh measures imposed by GENERAL SIR GERALD TEMPLER (1898–1979) gradually begin to bear results. His “carrot and stick” strategy and campaigns to win the “hearts and minds” of the people, especially the Chinese, are effective and successful.

FEDERATION OF MALAYA (1948) replaces MALAYAN UNION. The federation comprises the Peninsular Malay States and the former STRAITS SETTLEMENTS of PENANG and MELAKA. SINGAPORE remains a British Crown colony.

1953

Sir George Rendel leads a commission that reviews Singapore’s constitutional structure. When the government accepts the commission’s recommendations, Singapore has a new constitution that grants it greater self-government.

1955

The ALLIANCE PARTY (MALAYA/MALAYSIA), comprising cooperation between UMNO and the MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION (MCA), wins fifty-one out of the fifty-two contested seats in the election for the Federal Legislative Council. PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) manages to win the remaining seat. Automatic registration increases eligible Singapore voters to more than 300,000 from 75,000. For the first time the Chinese are politically active. In a hotly contested election, the Labor Front wins ten seats, and the PEOPLE’S ACTION PARTY (PAP) wins three of the four seats it contests.

The 1955 Constitution offers a limited measure of self-government for Malaya. TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ (1903–1990) is appointed chief minister of Malaya.

6 April

DAVID SAUL MARSHALL (1908–1995) becomes the first chief minister of Singapore. His coalition government includes his Labor Front, UMNO, and MCA.

28–29 December

The holding of “peace” talks at Baling between TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ, Malaya’s chief minister, and CHIN PENG

(1922–), the secretary-general of the MCP, is an attempt at ending the MALAYAN EMERGENCY. Other participants are DAVID MARSHALL, Singapore’s interim self-government chief minister, and TAN CHENG LOCK (1883–1960), president of the MCA. Accompanying CHIN PENG are Chen Tien and Rashid Mydin. The discussions fail, and the insurgency continues for another five years.

1956

6 June

When talks with London about full internal self-government for Singapore fail, DAVID SAUL MARSHALL resigns. LIM YEW HOCK (1914–1984) takes over as chief minister of Singapore.

MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN EDUCATION that supports a pluralistic school system promotes divisiveness in the multiethnic population. TUN ABDUL RAZAK (1922–1976), the minister of education of Malaya, chairs a committee that formulates a national education policy. The Razak Report emphasizes a national school system utilizing a single language of instruction, common syllabus and textbooks, and locally trained teachers.

1957

March

LIM YEW HOCK successfully negotiates a new constitution, signed in London on 28 May 1958.

31 August

Postwar sentiment is for independence, and finally, after a dozen years of effort, Britain grants independence to the FEDERATION OF MALAYA with TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ as the first prime minister. The ALLIANCE PARTY—UMNO, MCA, and MALAYAN/MALAYSIAN INDIAN CONGRESS (MIC)—forms the government. Malaya becomes a leading producer of RUBBER as Southeast Asian RUBBER growers begin using higher-yielding trees in place of the older stock. Malayan planters also expand into previously unused areas with the new trees. Malaya maintains its lead as the world’s largest natural RUBBER producer into the 1960s.

1959

SINGAPORE becomes self-governing.

May

Singaporeans choose fifty-one representatives to their first fully elected legislature. PAP wins 53.4 percent of the vote and forty-three seats.

June

Governor Sir William Goode proclaims Singapore a self-governing state under the new constitution. Goode is *Yang di-Pertuan Negara* (“Head of State”); the first prime minister is LEE KUANYEW (1923–).

1960**31 July**

The Malayan government announces the end of the MALAYAN EMERGENCY.

1960–1961

PAP and communists had worked together against British COLONIALISM. Communist control is strong in many mass student and worker organizations. The balance is uneasy between PAP’s desire for an independent SINGAPORE within a noncommunist Malaya and the communist push for a communist takeover. In 1960 the factional conflict intensifies, and they split in 1961, with the communists creating the BARISAN SOSIALIS (SOCIALIST FRONT).

1961–1963

In order to overcome the communist threat, Malaya agrees to federate with Singapore as well as the BRITISH BORNEO territories of SARAWAK AND SABAH (NORTH BORNEO). Singapore’s foreign affairs, defense, and internal security remain the responsibility of the British.

On 27 May 1961, TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ, prime minister of Malaya, proposes MALAYSIA (1963)—a political and economic merger of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak. He and LEE KUANYEW agree to central responsibility for foreign affairs, defense, and internal security, with local autonomy regarding labor and education. BRUNEI remains out of the confederation but under British protection.

1962**1 September**

Singapore voters overwhelmingly approve the merger in “Malaysia.”

December

BRUNEI REBELLION (DECEMBER 1962) is launched by PARTAI RAKYAT BRUNEI (PRB) under the leadership of SHEIKH AZAHARI BIN SHEIKH MAHMUD (1928–2002), better known as A. M. Azahari. British forces swiftly suppress the rebellion.

1963**16 September**

MALAYSIA comes into being. It includes Malaya, SINGAPORE, and SARAWAK AND SABAH. The Philippines and Indonesia oppose; the former harbor the SABAH CLAIM, while the latter view Malaysia as a neocolonial plot. President SOEKARNO (SUKARNO) (1901–1970) of Indonesia launches three years of KONFRONTASI (“CRUSH MALAYSIA” CAMPAIGN). British and Commonwealth troops fight a low-key conflict on the Sarawak-Indonesia border.

1964

The United States accepts the creation of MALAYSIA in return for British support in Vietnam.

1965

Singapore joins the United Nations (21 September) and the Commonwealth (15 October).

9 August

Singapore leaves Malaysia on account of tensions between ethnic Malays and Chinese. SINGAPORE-MALAYA/MALAYSIA RELATIONS remain uneasy for many years, owing to various unresolved issues.

22 December

With Yusof bin Ishak as president, Singapore becomes a republic.

1966

Indonesia and Singapore resolve the political dispute that has raged since the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia. Indonesia had broken trade ties with Malaysia, thereby adversely affecting Singapore, whose second-largest trading partner had been Indonesia. Resolution of the dispute restores trade link.

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1967

Britain decides to end its military presence in Malaysia and Singapore, effective from 1971, as part of its withdrawal of military commitments “east of Suez.” Singapore institutes compulsory military education.

August

Formation of the ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN), which initially comprises Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

1969

13 May

Sino-Malay riots take place in KUALA LUMPUR and other major urban centers in Malaysia, sparked by electoral gains by non-Malay opposition parties in the general elections. “MAY 13, 1969” witnesses the suspension of parliament and rule by decree of the deputy prime minister, TUN ABDUL RAZAK, as head of the National Operations Council.

A Department of National Unity is created that formulates a national ideology, RUKUNEGARA. A long-term measure to address the socioeconomic imbalances between *BUMIPUTERA* (*BUMIPUTRA*) (Malays and other indigenous ethnic groups) and non-bumiputera is the implementation of the NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP) (1971–1990).

1970

TUNKU ABDUL RAHMAN PUTRA AL-HAJ steps down as prime minister; TUN ABDUL RAZAK assumes the premiership. TUN ABDUL RAZAK shifts Malaysia’s foreign posture away from the Western democracies and establishes relations with Afro-Asian Third World countries. Malaysia supports the NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

1971

Mid-year, Malaysia reverts to parliamentary rule. NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (1971–1990) commences, with focus on eradicating poverty and rural development.

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration by ASEAN calls for a ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY (ZOPFAN) (1971).

1972

ANGKATAN BELIA ISLAM MALAYSIA (ABIM), or Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, is formed in response to a worldwide ISLAMIC RESURGENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Basically an educative and reformist organization, ABIM is set up by a group of young Muslim students and intellectuals under the leadership of Anwar Ibrahim (1947–).

1974

TUN ABDUL RAZAK visits the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and establishes diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the PRC.

BARISAN NASIONAL (NATIONAL FRONT) (1974) is formed. UMNO and MCA are the main components of this coalition.

1976

TUN ABDUL RAZAK dies in London. Hussein Onn (1922–1990) becomes prime minister of Malaysia. He appoints DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD (1925–) as deputy prime minister.

1979

The two oil crises of the 1970s force the government of Singapore to restructure the economy by changing education policy, emphasizing technology and computer education, providing financial incentives to industry, and emphasizing productivity. Another area of focus is public housing, with new towns and subsidized apartments and liberalized loan policies for home and apartment buyers.

1980

March

The KUANTAN PRINCIPLE (1980) is an Indonesia-Malaysia joint statement that is less confrontational toward Vietnam over the Cambodian situation.

1981

DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD becomes prime minister of Malaysia upon the retirement of Hussein Onn (1922–1990).

The Mahathir administration continues with the NEW ECONOMIC POLICY (NEP) and also introduces the “Look East” policy or orientation (learning and imitating East Asian models of productivity, particularly those of Japan), the national car program, and industrialization.

1989**December**

The Malaysian government signs a peace agreement with guerrillas based on the border with Thailand. These guerrillas are the remnants of communist insurgents, mostly Chinese, from the MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960).

1990s

Malaysia enjoys its position as a “Tiger,” with rapid economic growth in a society delicately balancing its many ethnic groups. Opposition to the Mahathir government comes mainly from the DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (DAP) and PAS.

1990**October**

A small-scale communist insurgency in Sarawak, dating from the mid-1960s, finally ends with a peace settlement at Simanggang, thereafter renamed Sri Aman.

1993

Anwar Ibrahim, the former president of ABIM and a vociferous critic of UMNO and the Mahathir administration, is appointed deputy prime minister after holding several ministerial portfolios in Mahathir’s cabinet. The Islamization policy shifts into high gear with Anwar instrumental in setting up the Bank Islam.

1997–1998

Malaysia’s *ringgit* falls to almost half its value as the Asian Financial Crisis takes its toll on Southeast Asia. The Mahathir administration opts for capital control to stabilize the *ringgit*, fixing it at RM3.80 to U.S.\$1.00.

1998**August**

Malaysia’s deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, is sacked from the government and expelled from UMNO over various charges, including corruption, abuse of power, and sex offenses, that carry heavy imprisonment terms under the country’s penal code.

Pro-Anwar supporters establish Parti Keadilan (Justice Party) and embark on a *Reformasi* (Reformation) campaign.

1999

In the general elections PAS makes inroads into rural Kedah, retaining Kelantan and Terengganu. DAP and Parti Keadilan have a poor showing.

2001**December**

Nineteen members of al-Ma’unah, an Islamic cult, are convicted of treason for plotting against the Malaysian government. They are arrested in July 2000 following clashes with government security forces; cult members kill two hostages during the confrontation.

Singapore authorities arrest fifteen people suspected of connections with planned bomb attacks on various U.S. and Western targets within the island republic. It is believed that thirteen of those arrested belong to the Jemaah Islamiah, a known terrorist organization. Some of the suspected terrorists are believed to have been trained at al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, others at a base in the southern Philippines.

2002**January**

Twenty members of the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), a fundamentalist Islamic group, are arrested for allegedly plotting activities with the ultimate aim of overthrowing the government of Malaysia.

April

The Malaysian government invokes the Internal Security Act (ISA) on another fourteen alleged members of KMM.

13–15 May

During a visit to Washington, D.C., Malaysian prime minister DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD is well received by President George W. Bush, who personally expresses his gratitude to Malaysia for its support and continued cooperation in the ongoing campaign against terrorism led by the United States.

20–21 May

Malaysia hosts an ASEAN meeting on terrorism at KUALA LUMPUR, participated in by ministers of home and security affairs. A joint statement is issued reiterating ASEAN’s commitment to cooperate in the fight against terrorism in the region.

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22 June

DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD announces his resignation as prime minister of Malaysia, a post he has held since 1981, during his presidential address to the UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION (UMNO). He was dissuaded from making this momentous decision. Nevertheless a week later, he reaffirmed his intention to step down in October 2003. His anointed successor is Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (1939–).

23 June

Abdul Hadi Awang assumes the interim presidency of PARTAI ISLAM SE MALAYSIA (PAS) following the demise of Fadzil Noor.

July

Terengganu Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) Abdul Hadi Awang, who is also acting president of PAS, announces the imposition of Islamic Shari'ah law in the state.

Former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim loses his final appeal against his conviction for corruption.

2003

Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the mystery viral disease, begins spreading into Singapore, with six dead by late March.

Quarantine measures with isolation of affected individuals are undertaken in designated public hospitals to contain the disease. Screening at entry points limits the spread.

The SARS outbreak adversely affects the travel trade and tourism sector of Singapore and Malaysia.

October

As promised, DR. MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD relinquishes the premiership to his deputy, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who becomes Malaysia's fifth prime minister.

2004

Despite Thailand's and Vietnam's openness to the adverse impact of the avian influenza, the contagion has yet to spread to Malaysia and Singapore.

VI. THE PHILIPPINES

30,000 B.C.E.

The first settlers in the Philippines cross land bridges from BORNEO and FORMOSA (TAIWAN). Evidence of human occupation in TABON CAVE on Palawan Island.

3000 B.C.E.

MALAYS migrate from Indonesia and Malaysia.

3rd century C.E.

The Philippines opens contacts with other nations of Southeast Asia, including SUMATRA, Indochina, and BORNEO.

Mid-14th century C.E.

A Chinese sphere of influence begins under the MING DYNASTY (1368–1644).

ca. 1405

Beginning of a century of Islamic influence from BORNEO on the southern half of LUZON and the islands south of LUZON. In northern LUZON, the Japanese have a trading post at Aparri and a loose influence in the area.

16th century

Cultivation of ABACA (MANILA HEMP) begins. Closer to the banana than to hemp, the fiber is valuable for items from marine ropes to hats.

1521

Ferdinand Magellan (1480–1521), during his circumnavigation expedition, lands in the Philippines, claiming them for Spain.

27 April

Magellan dies in a battle against Chief Lapu-Lapu of Mactan.

1542

In honor of the Crown prince of Spain (later King Philip II of Spain, r. 1556–1598), Ruy Lopez de Villalobos names the archipelago *Las Philipinas*.

1565

On Cebu, CAPTAIN GENERAL MIGUEL LOPEZ DE LEGAZPI (1500–1572) establishes the first permanent Spanish settlement, a town later known as San Miguel.

ca. 1560s–1898

The PHILIPPINES UNDER SPANISH COLONIAL RULE is harsh and oppressive of the native people. The twin processes of Christianization (CATHOLICISM) and HISPANIZATION (sociocultural heritage) provide CHRISTIAN MISSIONARIES and SPANISH FRIARS with enormous power over the common people. Spanish colonists (*encomendero*) seize land and demand tribute/taxes from the native farmers (*encomienda*). The FRIAR–SECULAR RELATIONSHIP is often strained.

MINDANAO remains primarily Muslim and opposed to Spanish control and influence, thereby establishing a tension and violence that persist to the modern era. Spanish economic impacts include emphasis on TOBACCO as a cash crop as well as the GALLEON TRADE in luxury goods between MANILA and Acapulco, Mexico, which remains under tight government control until MANILA becomes an open port in 1837.

ca. 1565–ca. 1837

The Spanish galleons try to avoid hostile powers, so they sail mostly across the Pacific to Mexico, then across the Caribbean and Atlantic to Spain. In Southeast Asia, the Spanish encounter Chinese pirates, who are occasionally bold enough to lay siege to MANILA, as well as European rivals Holland and Portugal and the indigenous peoples. Late in the sixteenth century the Japanese claim the islands, and Spain pays tribute to the Japanese under Hideyoshi Toyotomi (ca. 1536–1598), not only to protect the GALLEON TRADE but also to safeguard the Jesuit missionaries in Japan.

1570

Spain conquers the native city, MANILA, and declares it a Spanish city.

1596

The MOROS defeat the Spaniards. This victory encourages Moro raids on Spanish-occupied VISAYAN ISLANDS (BISAYAN ISLANDS, THE BISAYAS, THE VISAYAS).

17th–19th centuries

ANTI-SPANISH REVOLTS (THE PHILIPPINES) are commonplace. The uprisings prior to those during the last quarter of the

nineteenth century are localized, small-scale, short-lived, and the result of local grievances; they are easily suppressed by the Spanish colonial authorities and prove inconsequential. Armed rebellions in the latter part of the nineteenth century have nationalistic goals, with greater impact culminating in the PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION (1896–1898).

1637–1638

The MOROS suffer defeat, but the Spaniards are unable to occupy territory owing to insufficient troops.

1762

The British take MANILA but fail to extend their influence outside the city. The Treaty of Paris (1763) returns MANILA to Spain.

1840–1841

APOLINARIO DE LA CRUZ (1814/1815–1841) cofraternity of San José attracts large followings in Tayabas, Laguna, and Batangas. The Dominican friars oppose this religious organization. Consequently, Spanish troops attack and kill many followers during a meeting in Tayabas.

1861**19 June**

JOSÉ RIZAL (1861–1896) is born in Calamba, Laguna, of a wealthy family. Rizal is the most prominent nationalist who plays a major role in the struggle for Philippine independence. His writings inspire the PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION.

1869

SUEZ CANAL (1869) opens in Egypt, shortening travel time to Spain from the Philippines, bringing Europe closer, and allowing Filipinos of the upper middle class, the *ILUSTRADOS*, to pursue studies in Europe.

1872

CAVITE MUTINY breaks out when Filipino soldiers rebel against their Spanish superiors. Blaming the native clergy as prime instigators, the Spanish colonial authorities sentence to death three Filipino priests. Their martyrdom stirs and heightens Filipino nationalist consciousness.

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1878

The MOROS are finally decisively defeated by Spanish forces. But hostile attitudes and strained relations characterize Moro-Spanish relations.

1880–1895

PROPAGANDA MOVEMENT demands political rights for the people in the Philippines, and that Spain introduce political reform in the country. Its members are drawn from educated Filipinos living in Spain; the propagandists utilize newspaper articles, books, pamphlets, and public speeches to propagate their cause.

1887, 1891

The publication of Rizal's novels *NOLI ME TANGERE* (1887) AND *EL FILIBUSTERISMO* (1891) explore the dilemma of reform versus revolution. The latter novel is a sequel to the former. Notwithstanding a ban by the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines, the novels are circulated clandestinely.

1889–1895

LA SOLIDARIDAD is a journal published by Filipino expatriates and exiles in Spain that advocates political reforms in the Spanish colony of the Philippine Islands. Lopez Jaena establishes this fortnightly Spanish-language journal. Later, Marcelo del Pilar assumes the editorship when its office moves from Barcelona to Madrid. It is a mouthpiece for the PROPAGANDA MOVEMENT.

1892

ANDRES BONIFACIO (1863–1897) establishes KATIPUNAN, a revolutionary society that seeks the separation and independence of the Philippines from Spain. It is the main organized nationalist group behind the PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION.

1896

Betrayal leads to the discovery of the revolutionary plans of the KATIPUNAN by Spanish colonial authorities. Bonifacio is forced to launch the revolution. Revolutionaries are able to control several parts of the Philippines; MANILA remains in Spanish hands.

1897

May

Following a factional struggle within the KATIPUNAN, ANDRES BONIFACIO is executed by the newly elected leader, EMILIO AGUINALDO (1868–1964).

1898

Outbreak of the SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR (1898). U.S. COMMODORE GEORGE DEWEY (1837–1917) leads the naval assault in Manila Bay. EMILIO AGUINALDO leads the ground forces against Spain, which surrenders.

12 June

Filipinos under EMILIO AGUINALDO declare the independence of the Philippines. With AGUINALDO as president, congress writes and approves a constitution. APOLINARIO MABINI (1864–1903) plays an important role in the drafting of the constitution. The U.S. government opposes, and President William McKinley (t. 1897–1901) declares EMILIO AGUINALDO an outlaw.

10 December

The SPANISH-AMERICAN TREATY OF PARIS (1898) witnesses the cession of the Philippines by Spain to the United States. EMILIO AGUINALDO and the revolutionaries feel betrayed by the United States.

1898–1946

The PHILIPPINES UNDER U.S. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION (1898–1946) adheres to the basic objective of transforming the people and country in the image of the United States.

1899

4 February

EMILIO AGUINALDO declares war on the United States, beginning the PHILIPPINE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE (1899–1902).

1900–1941

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES (1900–1941) prepare the country for eventual self-government and subsequently full independence.

1901

U.S. troops capture EMILIO AGUINALDO at Palanan, LUZON. Apparently he is forced to declare his allegiance to the United States.

1902

Despite the end of the war with U.S. control of the cities and coastal areas, a large occupation force is maintained for a decade-long mopping-up operation. The cost in Filipino lives is estimated to be as high as 250,000.

1907

Election of the first legislative assembly, bicameral and mostly under Filipino control. Another element of self-rule is a civil service, which the Filipinos control by the end of the GREAT WAR (1914–1918). Also, the church is reformed; the government purchases church estates and redistributes them to landless Filipino farmers.

1913–1921

The administration of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson (t. 1913–1921) shifts U.S. Philippine policy. Republican administrations regarded the Philippines as a colony, but the Wilsonians begin a slow process intended to end in independence. Emphasis is on establishing institutions that promote free and democratic government. Important tools for that end are a good system of public education and a solid legal system. Wilson gives the Philippines free trade status, bypassing the tariff barriers that keep Philippine goods noncompetitive in U.S. markets.

1916

Filipino House of Representatives is established.

1934

Under the Tydings–McDuffie Act, the Philippines is to become independent by 4 July 1944.

1935

MANUEL LUIS QUEZON (1878–1944) wins the newly created office of president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and forms a government based on the principles of the U.S. Constitution. His political rival, SERGIO OSMENA, SR. (1878–1961), becomes vice-president.

1937

The official language is established as Tagalog, despite the fact that it is known to only half the population; the other half speak Visayan.

1938

By this time the Philippine economy is intimately tied to the U.S. market and taking advantage of the tariff-free exchange of goods. Philippine exports to the United States constitute primary commodities such as SUGAR, copra and coconut oil, ABACA, timber, cigars, and TOBACCO. The PHILIPPINES–U.S. “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP” is basically built on such economic ties, political patronage, and military dependency of the colony on the metropolitan power.

1941**7–8 December**

The U.S. Pacific Fleet is attacked by the Japanese. Simultaneously, the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia begins with amphibious landings in the Malay Peninsula and southern Thailand, HONG KONG, and Miri (Sarawak).

20–21 December

From their base in Vietnam, the Japanese launch an invasion of the Philippines with landings on north and south LUZON. MANILA is declared an open city. U.S. forces under GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR (1880–1964) withdraw to Corregidor and Bataan.

1942**2 January**

MANILA falls to the Japanese.

March

GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, MANUEL LUIS QUEZON, and SERGIO OSMENA, SR., escape to Australia, thence to the United States. Prior to his departure MACARTHUR promises the Philippine people, “I shall return!” Urged by MACARTHUR, resistance in the form of guerrilla warfare persists throughout the war, making Japanese control tenuous, especially on LUZON.

LUIS TARUC (1913–), peasant leader from central LUZON, organizes and leads the HUKBALAHAP (HUKBO NG BAYAN LABAN SA HAPON) (PEOPLE’S ANTI-

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JAPANESE ARMY) (1942) against the Japanese.

9 April

U.S. forces in Bataan surrender. The BATAAN DEATH MARCH, in which thousands die, is among the many human tragedies of the Pacific War (1941–1945) and the JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA.

6 May

Corregidor surrenders to the Japanese.

1942–1945

Japanese wartime policies of “ASIA FOR THE ASIATICS” and their GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE have little appeal and impact on the Filipinos, who await the return of the Americans.

1943

October

Keeping to the promise made in January 1942 by Japanese prime minister Tojo Hideki (t. 1941–1944) guaranteeing independence of the Philippines if the Filipinos cooperate with the occupation force, the Japanese declare the Philippines independent. JOSÉ PACIANO LAUREL (1891–1959) becomes the president of the Republic of the Philippines. The Japanese-sponsored government is unpopular and enjoys little support or recognition.

1944

20 October

GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR and SERGIO OSMENA, SR., who became president when MANUEL LUIS QUEZON died, return to the Philippines. Fighting continues.

1945

2 September

GENERAL YAMASHITA TOMOYUKI (1885–1946), commander of the 14th Army, administering the Philippines, surrenders. The war kills more than a million Filipinos and leaves MANILA and other cities and towns in ruins.

1945–1953

The Huk Rebellion, a communist-inspired peasant revolt, is led by the wartime guerrilla movement, the HUKBALAHAP.

1946

4 July

The United States grants independence to the Philippines and provides reconstruction aid. MANUEL ROXAS (1946–1948) of the Liberal Party becomes the first president of the newly independent Republic of the Philippines.

1953

President RAMON MAGSAYSAY (1907–1957) during his tenure (t. 1953–1957) utilizes a combination of humane measures (land reform and land redistribution, rural development) and military operations, finally suppressing the Huk Rebellion.

1957–1965

President Carlos P. Garcia (t. 1957–1961) increases involvement with Asian neighbors, institutes internal reforms, and attempts to create a stronger and more diversified economy. DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL (1910–1997) during his single-term presidency (t. 1961–1965) attempts to address the problems of land ownership and economic underdevelopment; however, he faces many obstacles from within and without the government.

1965

Partida Nacionalista candidate FERDINAND MARCOS (1917–1989) is elected the sixth president of the Philippines.

1969

The NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY (NPA), military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), launches a protracted people’s war against the Philippine government. Several attempts to crush the NPA fail.

In the southern Philippines spearheading the Muslim separatist movement is the MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF). Initially fighting for cession and independence from the predominantly Catholic Philippines, MNLF, after the intervention of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), seeks autonomous status from the Manila regime. NUR MISUARI (1940–) is a prominent figure of the MNLF.

1972

Citing increased lawlessness and communist rebellion, Marcos declares MARTIAL LAW in

the Philippines and imposes a new constitution in the place of the commonwealth constitution of 1935. The period is characterized by diminished civil liberties and democratic institutions as well as rule by decree and popular referendum.

1981

17 January

MARTIAL LAW ends. Slowly the government normalizes. FERDINAND MARCOS wins a six-year term. Despite the lifting of martial law, the Marcos regime retains sweeping powers of arrest and detention and a low regard for human rights. There is economic decline, widespread corruption, and cronyism.

1983

After a long exile, Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino (1932–1983) returns to the Philippines. His assassination provides a focus for popular discontent and begins the process that ends in the election of February 1986.

1984

NPA becomes a serious threat, challenging the authority of the central government of the Philippines.

1986

25 February

In an election characterized by widespread fraud, FERDINAND MARCOS faces CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO (1933–), the widow of Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino, and Salvador Laurel of the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO). Faced with criticism from international observers and a peaceful uprising of both civilians and military officers—the EDSA REVOLUTION—demonstrating the strength of “People Power,” FERDINAND MARCOS flees the Philippines. CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO becomes president (t. 1986–1992).

1987

11 February

The Philippines has a new constitution, under which CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO begins revitalizing democracy and civil liberties. Critics regard the CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO administration as weak and fractious.

Political stability and economic growth are hamstrung by several attempted military coups.

1992

FIDEL VALDEZ RAMOS (1928–) succeeds CORAZON COJUANGCO AQUINO as president (t. 1992–1998). He is the first career military officer and Protestant to assume the presidency in a predominantly Catholic Philippines. Ramos legalizes the Communist Party and prepares for talks with the military rebels, Muslim separatists, and communist insurgents represented by the NPA.

U.S. MILITARY BASES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA are a sensitive and controversial issue. The Subic Bay naval complex and Clarke Airfield base in the Philippines generate much opposition from Filipinos. Finally, the U.S. military presence in the Philippines ends with the closure of its last bases.

1994

June

General amnesty for all rebels and all military and police who committed crimes while fighting the insurgencies (mainly the NPA).

1995

October

NPA insurgency appears to have ended.

1996

The Philippines government signs a peace accord with the MNLF. Based on MINDANAO, the separatists have waged war for a quarter of a century, costing 120,000 lives. Because not all Muslim groups recognize the treaty, fighting continues on LUZON and elsewhere.

1997–1998

The Asian Financial Crisis impacts on the Philippine peso, reducing its value rapidly, which seriously retards the economy.

1998

May

Election of Joseph Ejercito Estrada as the president of the Philippines (t. 1998–2000). Estrada promises to reduce crime and poverty.

1998–2000

President Estrada’s failure in presiding over an effective government witnesses the NPA again

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gaining strength, especially in the rural provinces.

2001

Foreign tourists vacationing on Sipadan Island off Sabah, Malaysia, are kidnapped by Muslim terrorists, the Abu Sayyaf, a splinter group of the MNLF. They are held hostage on Jolo Island, southern Philippines. Their release after several months of prolonged negotiations remains clouded: whether ransom monies are paid or there is a political compromise.

January

President Estrada is charged with corruption, but his impeachment trial breaks down. Popular protest leads to his replacement by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

November

Outgoing governor NUR MISUARI of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), with some supporters in the MNLF, launches a revolt. The MNLF hence breaks a five-year peace agreement with the government of the Philippines and again destabilizes the country's southern provinces. Following the failure of the uprising, NUR MISUARI flees to neighboring Malaysia.

Farouk Hussein is elected governor of the ARMM. His candidacy was earlier endorsed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Also elected is a twenty-one-member assembly for the ARMM.

2002

January

Malaysian authorities detain NUR MISUARI (1940–) shortly after his arrival in Malaysia; subsequently he is extradited to the Philippines to face charges of staging a rebellion.

February

To control the increasingly difficult Islamic fundamentalist groups collectively known as

Abu Sayyaf, the United States sends “advisers” to assist the Philippine military. Critics claim this action, especially having U.S. troops in combat environments, violates the Filipino constitution.

In accordance with the agreement between the Philippines and the United States, a 650-strong contingent of U.S. troops participates in joint counterterrorism operations with the Philippine military on the island of Basilan in the southern Philippines. Basically the U.S. personnel are entrusted to train the Philippine armed forces in counterinsurgency tactics.

April

Not only has the number of U.S. troops in the southern Philippines increased (from 650 to 1,000), the duration of their presence is lengthened to more than the six months originally envisaged.

Consequent of several bombings, which kill fifteen people in the city of General Santos, MINDANAO, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo declares a state of emergency in the city.

May

Peace agreements are contracted between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Malaysia hosts the formal signing ceremony.

June

In the midst of rescue operations by Philippine troops, two hostages are killed and a third (a U.S. citizen) is freed. The Abu Sayyaf captured the three hostages in May 2001.

July

Withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Basilan marks the conclusion of joint counterterrorism operations with their Philippine counterparts.

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Seni Pramoj, M. R. (1905–1997)
Student Revolt (October 1973) (Thailand)
Thammasat University
Thanom Kittikachorn, Field Marshal
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“The Jews of the Orient”

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Philippines–U.S. “Special Relationship”
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New Economic Policy (NEP) (Malaysia)
(1971–1990)
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Consulado
Friars, Spanish (The Philippines)
Friar-Secular Relationship
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Cambodia (Eighteenth to Mid-Nineteenth
Centuries)
Cambodia under French Colonial Rule
Chea Sim (1932–)
Democratic Kampuchea (DK)
FUNCINPEC (United National Front for
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Heng Samrin (1934–)
Hun Sen (1951–)
Ieng Sary (1927–)
Kampuchean United Front for National
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Khieu Samphan (1931–)
Khmer Issarak (Free Khmer)

Khmer People's National Liberation Front
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Killing Fields, The
Lon Nol (1913–1984)
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Phnom Penh
Pol Pot (Saloth Sar) (1925–1998)
Sangkum Reastre Niyum (Peoples'
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Damrong, Prince (1862–1943)
Dewawongse, Prince (1858–1923)
Huē
Isan
Nan Chao (Nanchao) (Dali/Tali)
Paknam Incident (1893–)
Pitsanulok (Phitsanulok)
Rama I (Chakri) (r. 1782–1809)
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Unified Buddhist Church (1963)

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Gestapu Affair (1965)
Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*)
"Indonesia"
Konfrontasi ("Crush Malaysia" Campaign)
Madjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia (MIAI)
(Great Islamic Council of Indonesia)
Merdeka (Free, Independent)
Muhammadiyah
Nahdatul Ulama
Pancasila (Pantja Sila)
Perjuangan (*Perjuangan*)
Samin Movement
Sarekat Islam (1912)
Soetardjo Petition (1936)
Taman Siswa (1922)
Wiwoho Resolution (1940)

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 Suharto (1921–)

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 FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionária do
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Laotimization
Luang Prabang
Pathet Lao (Land of Laos)
Phetsarath
Sisavang Vong (1885–1959)

Souphanouvong (Red Prince) (1911–1995)
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“Comfort Women”
“Death Railway” (Burma-Siam Railway)
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Japan and Southeast Asia (pre-1941)
Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia
(1941–1945)
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Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and
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Brunei (Sixteenth to Nineteenth
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Brunei National Democratic Party
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Brunei National Solidarity Party (BNSP)
(1985)
Brunei Oil and Gas Industry
Brunei Rebellion (December 1962)
Hassanal Bolkiah, Sultan of Brunei (1946–)
Kampong Ayer (Brunei)
McArthur, M. S. H. (1872–1934)
Melayu Islam Beraja (MIB, Malay Islamic
Monarchy)
Omar Ali Saifuddin III, Sultan of Brunei
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People's Independence Front (Barisan
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Tam Cuong
Tam Giao
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Việt Minh (Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh
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Anawrahta (Aniruddha) (r. 1044–1077)
Arakan
Bangkok
Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581)
Buddhist Socialism
Burma-Siam Wars
Chindits
General Council of Burmese Associations
(GCBA) (1920)
Hludaw
Hsinbyushin (r. 1763–1776)
Konbaung Dynasty (1752–1885)
Mandalay
Mon
Negrais
Pagan (Bagan)
Pegu
Rangoon (Yangon)
“Shoe Issue”
Tabinshwehti (r. 1531–1550)
Tenasserim
Thirty Comrades
Toungoo Dynasty (1531–1752)
U Saw and the Assassination of Aung San
Young Men's Buddhist Association
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Anti-Spanish Revolts (The Philippines)
Barangay
Bataan Death March
Cavite Mutiny
Constitutional Developments in the
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Dewey, Commodore George (1837–1917)
Filipinization
Harrison, Francis Burton (1873–1957)
Hukbalahap (Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa
Hapon) (People’s Anti-Japanese Army)
(1942)
Laurel, José Paciano (1891–1959)
Legazpi, Captain General Miguel Lopez de
(1500–1572)
Luzon
Macapagal, Diosdado (1910–1997)
Magsaysay, Ramon (1907–1957)
“Manifest Destiny”
Maphilindo Concept
Marcos, Ferdinand (1917–1989)
Martial Law (1972–1981) (The Philippines)
Mindanao
New People’s Army (NPA)
New Society Movement (Kilusang Bagong
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Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist Party, NP)
Patron-Client Relations
Philippines under U.S. Colonial
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Quezon, Manuel Luis (1878–1944)
Quirino, Elpidio (1890–1956)
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Dayaks
East Malaysian Ethnic Minorities
Ethnolinguistic Groups of Southeast Asia
“Imagined Community”
Jungle/Forest Products
Kutai (Koetei)
Loosely Structured Societies
Peasant Uprisings and Protest Movements
in Southeast Asia
Plural Society
Rejangs
Sambas and Pontianak Sultanates
“Southeast Asia”
Torajas
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(1898)
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Indochina during World War II
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