KASPAROVS OPENING REPERTOIRE



Leonid Shamkovich Eric Schiller



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Si alguien estuviese interesado en unirse al grupo nos pueden escribir a: caissa_lovers@yahoo.com.

Saludos!

Caissa Lovers

Kasparov's Opening Repertoire

LEONID SHAMKOVICH and ERIC SCHILLER

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Preface

World Champions exert a strong influence on fashion in opening play, and Gary Kasparov is no exception. His advocacy of such variations as the Tarrasch, Catalan and Grünfeld has brought these openings from the back pages of opening manuals into the forefront of theoretical discussion. The purpose of this book is to explore the development of Kasparov's opening repertoire and to present the core of a repertoire which the reader can apply in his own games. All recent theoretical developments have been incorporated into the work, so that the most important variations of these openings are critically up to date as at 30 May 1988.

It is not our intention to present deep analysis of the middlegame and endgame portions of Kasparov's games. The World Champion has done that himself in a number of places. We will, on occasion, add our own corrections and improvements to the published canon, but the games are included primarily to illustrate the themes of the openings. It is interesting to note the number of top players who have adopted portions of this repertoire. Jan Timman, Tony Miles and Valery Salov are just three of the players whose games will be examined in our book. We have attempted to analyze critically all important positions, and have introduced a number of new ideas in familiar positions.

The authors have worked together over many months to collect and analyse the relevant material. Some of the analysis by Grandmaster Shamkovich first appeared in the American publication Chess Life. Older material on the Tarrasch was used in our book Play the Tarrasch (Pergamon Press, 1984). Both the first and second editions of Eric Schiller's Catalan (Chess Enterprises, 1983 and 1988) and Grünfeld Defense: Russian Variations (Chess Enterprises, 1985 and 1988) were used for the preparation of this work, as well as research notes and analysis for his forthcoming works on the Closed Spanish and Hedgehog openings. We are grateful to Bob Dudley for permission to use all Chess Enterprises materials. To sort out the web of transpositions in the Spanish and Hedgehog lines, the remarkable piece of software from Bookup was employed. ChessBase was consulted to keep the manuscript up to date. Chessworks Unlimited provided the special software used in preparation of the manuscript on its Macintosh computers. The manuscript underwent a thorough proofreading at the hands of Ian Kingston.

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1 Introduction

What is an opening repertoire?

An opening repertoire is the set of opening lines which a player feels comfortable playing at any time against any level of opposition. At amateur levels it often consists of only a single approach for White, say, 1 d4, and a few basic defences, for example the Sicilian and the Benoni. At professional levels there is usually an additional system held in reserve in the event that one's main weapon misfires and important games need to be played before there is time to remedy the defect.

How is the repertoire built? At all levels of play the repertoire is generally constructed by calculating all probable responses to the moves one chooses and determining a variation which will be an effective reply to each.

We can offer a few guidelines which should be observed while building one's repertoire. Naturally, the advice given here is just a set of guidelines. There is plenty of room for individual variation. But there are certain principles which should always be followed:

DON'T RELY ON UNUSUAL AND TRAPPY OPENINGS. They may earn points in tournaments but will not provide a good base on which to build your repertoire. Don't blindly copy the REPERTOIRES OF the BEST PLAYERS. Some middlegames must not be entered without a great deal of knowledge of certain pawn structures and endgames.

DON'T BE LAZY. If an opening involves complicated lines which must be learned, that should not scare you. These lines can be assimilated quickly without embarrassment if one has access to a chess computer. In fact, software is being developed for microcomputers with the specific goal of teaching openings! If you do not have access to such technological marvels, study the lines the same way you prepare(d) for tests at school. DON'T LIMIT YOUR STUDY OF GAMES TO MATERIALS INVOLVING JUST THE OPENINGS YOU PLAY. One day you will want to change openings, and the more experience you have with a wide range of variations

the easier that task will be. Don't BLINDLY **FOLLOW** ANALYSIS FROM BOOKS. This even applies to our own writings! Examine everything you read with a critical eye. If the author claims that one side has an advantage, try to find out what it is. In fact, when you are learning an opening from a book it is a good idea to scribble notes in the margins articulating the advantages and disadvantages of certain positions. Keep in mind that some annotators, especially in Informant-type publications, give incorrect analysis to mislead future opponents! IGNORE 'STATISTICS'. Some books provide statistical analyses of openings. Remember, 'there are lies, damned lies and statistics'! Many of these books count a game played between two beginners as having the same statistical value as a World Championship game, or a game between a GM and a beginner.

How is it maintained?

There are a number of ways of staving current with the latest opening trends. There are reliable journals, such as Chess Informant and New In Chess, which can supply not only raw data but also Grandmaster opinions. Of course, one must be careful, as sometimes 'recommendations' are actually traps which are baited with exclamation marks to catch the unwary. Trust no-one yourself, and double check every move you intend to incorporate into your repertoire. Faster access to new ideas is available via telecommunications networks like LeisureLINC, which can be accessed from all over the world and which tries to provide information and games as soon as events are finished. There are several computerized databases which are available to the public and which contain a great deal of useful information. Finally, there is the seemingly endless flow of monographs on the openings, produced by theoreticians all over the world. Books by active grandmasters are likely to contain the most accurate information, although there is always the possibility that some material, especially original analysis, has been withheld for personal use. Valuable research is also carried out by less exalted players, but one should keep in mind that their ability to evaluate positions is more limited.

When should it change?

Some players stick with a small repertoire throughout their career. Grandmaster Lev Alburt, for example, has rarely strayed from his combination of Alekhine Defence and Benkö Gambit as Black, Wolfgang Uhlmann was slavishly devoted to the French Defence, and a number of players have made a living off the Sicilian Dragon.

Other players change openings almost as frequently as they change their clothes. Universal players such as Boris Spassky, Oleg Romanishin, Bent Larsen and Mikhail Tal can never be predicted in the early stages of the game. Gary Kasparov falls into this group.

Most players, however, maintain a preference for a small group of openings while experimenting on occasion with a select group of alternatives. We recommend this approach to most players. No player should deny himself some experience of the classic openings such as the Spanish Game or Queen's Gambit, preferably on both sides of the board.

Nevertheless, some personalities are better suited toward the hypermodern play of the Pirc, or quiet handling of the Caro-Kann, or wild complications of the Sicilian Defence. With White, the strategic tranquility of the Catalan may be more appealing than the brawling nature of the king pawn games.


The time to change openings is signalled by a change in overall attitude toward the game and a certain boredom with familiar positions. Nothing rekindles the chess fires like an abrupt change of scenery, which can be brought

about by a radical change in approach to the openings. One should not fear the complexity of a new variation, or the accumulated mass of theory. Many openings can be handled quite well with only a basic knowledge of the principles of the opening. This applies to variations as different as the Modern Defence and the Closed Spanish. Of course not all openings are amenable to this kind of treatment. One can hardly recommend an innocent foray into the jungle of the Poisoned Pawn variation of the Naidorf Sicilian, or the Marshall Attack!


Kasparov's Opening Repertoire

In the following sections we will discuss the development of Kasparov's opening repertoire. For the moment, let us consider the overall composition of his repertoire. Viewed without regard to colour, the chart overleaf shows the distribution of openings throughout his career. We have chosen to use pictures rather than words because we don't put much stock in mere statistics. After all. many openings are chosen for a particular occasion or opponent. and the exact number of times an opening has been played is not of great significance.

The overall picture reflects a reliance on the more orthodox Sicilian Defence and Queen's Gambits, despite considerable experimentation on the flanks.



When Kasparov has the advantage of the first move, the picture is a bit different:



His reliance on 1 d4 has reduced the proportion of Sicilian Defences, and there is a broader range of Semi-Open games even when 1 e4 does occur. The Oueen's Indian figures more prominently.

When playing Black the Sicilian Defence is dominant. The seemingly large number of games in the King's Indian reflects his preference in the past, but we cannot tell how he feels about it now because few players would adopt that opening against Karpov, though Kasparov did risk it once in their fourth match, coming away with a draw.

Kasparov's early development: **Becoming a Grandmaster**


No great player of the present era can disclaim the influence of Bobby Fischer, In Kasparov's case, the most obvious ramification of Fischer's play can be seen in Gary's use of the King's Indian Defence. This fighting opening has brought Kasparov numerous spectacular victories. He enriched the theory of the opening with new moves and new ideas, but temporarily abandoned it for more classical defences. Here are a few impressive examples:

Tukmakov - Kasparov, USSR 1981: 1 d4 ♠f6 2 c4 g6 3 ♠c3 ♠g7 4 e4 d6 5 \(\text{\text{d}}\) e2 0-0 6 \(\text{\text{\text{d}}}\) g5 c5 7 d5 b5?! 8 cb a6 9 a4 h6 10 \(\textit{\textit{A}}\) d2 e6 11 de \(\textit{\tit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\texti

0-0 包c7 15 莒e1 包×b5 16 包×b5 d5 17 ed 公×d5 18 公e5 莒e8 19 莒c1 鱼f5 20 幻c6 曾d7 21 闰×c5 闰×e1+ 22 營×e1 莒e8 23 營c1 幻b6 24 b3 買e2 25 Qa5 Qe4 26 包e5 營e7! 27 **②d4?** (27 營f1±) 27 ... 国a2 28 鱼×b6 鱼×e5 29 營e3? (29 營e1 =) 29 ... 對×c5! 0-1.

Vaiser - Kasparov, USSR 1981: 1 d4 🗗 f6 2 c4 g6 3 🗗 c3 🚊 g7 4 e4 d6 5 f4 0-0 6 € f3 c5 7 d5 e6 8 \(\textit{\textit{L}}\)e2 ed 9 e5 2g4 10 cd de 11 h3 e4 12 hg ef 13 gf 闰e8 14 f5! 曾b6? 15 总h6 $\forall \times b2 \quad 16 \quad \triangle \times g7 \quad \Rightarrow \times g7 \quad 17 \quad f6+?$ (17 闰c1!) 17 ... 當g8! 18 皆c1!皆b4! 19 當f1? (19 皆d2!) 19 ... 包d7 20 Qb5 皆d4! 21 當g2 囯e3! 22 包e2 **營e5 23 營f2** 莒×e2+ 24 **总**×e2 **⑤**×f6 and White's attack ran out of steam (0-1, 40). For exceptionally deep and incisive commentary on this game, see Fighting Chess (Kasparov and Wade), where Kasparov and Vaiser conduct an analytical dialogue.

Kavalek - Kasparov, Bugoino 1982: 1 c4 g6 2 ②c3 Дg7 3 d4 ②f6 4 e4 d6 5 \$\alpha\$f3 0-0 6 h3 e5 7 d5 \$\alpha\$a6! 8 <u>Ae</u>3 <u>Ah</u>5 9 <u>Ah</u>2!? (9 <u>Ad</u>2) 9 ... 쌀e8 10 요e2?! (10 g4 & f4 11 쌀d2) 10 ... 包f4 11 点f3 f5 12 h4 曾e7! (Typical of Kasparov's style. Timman pointed out that a positional player would probably prefer 12 ... \$\oldsymbol{\infty} \c5 \text{ with a comfortable game.) 13 g3 \(\Delta \)b4!! 14 對b3?! 到fd3+ 15 當e2 f4 16 且d2 fg?! (Co-author Schiller was present at this game, and saw this move shoot out without using even a full minute of thought.



Such rashness was the source of immediate frustration, as the brilliant and effective 16 ... \(\D \times \f2!! \) presented itself to Kasparov as soon as he let go of his pawn.) 17 fg \(\mathbb{Z}\times \text{f3!}\) (Kasparov regained his balance quickly, and found the best move.) 18 \(\Delta \times 13 \) \(\Delta g4 19 \) \(\Delta af1 \) 国f8 20 包d1? (Kavalek could have saved the game with 20 \(\mathbb{Q} e3! \) 20 ... **營**f7! 21 **总**e3! **总**×f3+ 22 **含**d2! **含**d7 23 闰hgl 營h3! 24 a3 总×e4 25 $\Xi \times f8 + \Delta \times f8$ 26 ab $\Theta h2 + 27 \Theta c3$ \$\c1! 0-1.

Belyavsky - Kasparov, Moscow (m/8) 1983: 1 d4 2 f6 2 c4 g6 3 2 c3 Qg74 e4 d6 5 f3 0-0 6 Qe3 a6 7 Qd3 c5 8 dc dc 9 🕮 x c5 🕏 c6 10 🕏 ge2?! 2d7! 11 2f2 2de5 12 2c1 2h6! 13 ②d5?! (13 ♠e2) 13 ... e6 14 ♠b6 營g5! 15 0-0! ed! 16 f4 (16 cd!?) 16 ... 對h4 17 fe d4! 18 包e2 总e3+ 19 當h1 회×e5 20 요c7 (20 요×d4 회g4 21 h3 Д×d4) 20 ... ₩e7 21 Д×e5 ₩xe5 and Black went on to convert his substantial advantage into a win.

With White, 1 d4 became the standard opening for the young player, and the Exchange Variation of the Grünfeld was joined by the out-of-fashion Petrosian Variation (4 a3) of the Queen's Indian. The latter opening not only enjoyed a revival due to Kasparov's advocacy, but can now be said to be the main line of the Oueen's Indian Defence. Even though the World Champion has switched his attention to the Hybrid and Nimzo-Indian lines,

he has not entirely abandoned his former love. For example:

Kasparov - van der Wiel, Amsterdam 1988: 1 d4 5 f6 2 c4 e6 3 ♠f3 b6 4 a3 ♠a6 5 ⇔c2 ♠b7 6 ②c3 c5 7 e4 c×d4 8 ②×d4 ②c5 9 2b3 2c6 10 2g5 (The most topical continuation.) 10 ... a6 11 0-0-0 營c7 12 當b1 0-0-0 13 營d2 d6 (At the time this game was played, Black was considered to have a fully playable position.) 14 f3! h6 15 Af4 De5 (15 ... g5? 16 D×c5 g×f4 17 分×b7 含×b7 18 增×f4++ Kristiansen.) 16 h4 當b8 17 h5 互d7 18 耳c1 耳c8 19 Qe2 當a7 20 耳hd1 国dd8 21 g4 包g8 22 鱼g3 包e7 23 f4 ⑤5c6 24 总f3 莒b8 25 总h4 莒d7 26 \triangle b5+! a×b5 27 c×b5 \triangle a5 (Or 27 ... ᡚd8 28 ፫×c5! b×c5 29 ᡚ×c5, Δ 会xd7. 對xa5 Kristiansen.) 28 会xa5 bxa5 29 ☐xc5 dxc5 30 營xd7 營×f4 31 闰d6 1-0. On 31 闰c8 32 罝a6+ 當b8 33 益×e7±+; 31 ..., 當a8 32 曾c7 耳c8 33 耳a6+±±.

Challenging the crown

The ascent to the Olympus of the chess world (to use the standard Russian metaphor) is often accompanied by innovations in the opening. Kasparov brought the Tarrasch Defence back from obscurity just at the time when its leading advocates, most notably John Nunn, were about to abandon it. In addition, he took the Catalan (an opening played extensively by Margeir Petursson. who was also a Tarrasch exponent) and brought it back into the

Grandmaster ranks. These two openings had suffered from neglect for some time, as evidenced by the fact that no important literature on either opening had appeared since the 1960's. The authors wrote Play the Tarrasch in 1983, the same year co-author Schiller published his monograph on the Catalan. Kasparov had access to both manuscripts at the time he was preparing these openings, but had decided to examine the lines before receiving the material. We mention this only because some of our critics have accused us of making a living off of Kasparov's openings, a charge they are free to level at this book, if they wish! But a serious point is that the World Champion has always shown a willingness to examine material from all sources. from Grandmaster down to amateur games. He understands that creative ideas appear in a wide variety of chess contexts, not merely in top level play.

World Champion Kasparov

Unfortunately, the political problems which plagued the chess world in the mid 1980's have prevented Kasparov from participating in large numbers of tournaments. He has spent most of his time either preparing for or playing against his arch-rival Anatoly Karpov, and his choice of openings on other occasions must be viewed in that light. He was not

about to expose his match preparation in minor tournaments and training matches, and often seemed to choose lines just for fun, for example his use of the Meran Defence against Tony Miles.

His faith in the Grünfeld Defence is indisputable, and he has always considered the 'Spanish Inquisition' one of the highest forms of chess art. They are likely to remain staples of his repertoire. Recent experimentation with the Najdorf may bring that variation into his primary repertoire. Kasparov's penchant for complicated positions has seen the King's Indian return recently. particularly against lower ranked opposition. The Réti, which brought him success in the critical 24th game of the 4th match against Karpov, will probably be reserved for similar situations in which a small amount of annoying pressure is required. Interestingly, Tal adopted the same opening for a critical last round game in the 1988 National Open in Chicago, and the opening may become a favourite weapon in these sorts of cases.

Some final advice: What to do when things go wrong

Of course, it would be incorrect to suggest that Kasparov's preparation is always correct. In the opening of this game Kasparov recovers from an experiment gone

awry. He found himself in a critical position as a result of his fifth move - a dubious try. Then he took extraordinary measures to improve his position. He decided to seek active counterplay with a heavy dose of tactics. As a result he almost managed to equalize the game. This attitude carried over into the endgame, where Kasparov sacrificed his weak pawn in order to make the rest of his pieces active. In spite of considerable simplifications Black achieved sufficient counterplay, forcing Karpov to return his surplus material.

Karpov-Kasparov Brussels 1987

€)f6 1 d4**g**6 c4 3 **g**3 c5 **分**f3 cd 多×d4 曾c7?! (1) 分分

It is hardly likely that Kasparov will ever repeat this dubious and rather strange move. Black places his queen in a very unsafe position and lacks control over the critical

d5 square. True, he does attack the pawn at c4, but White can afford to ignore the threat and reply 6 \(\Dc3! \) If 6 ... 皆xc4 then 7 e4 皆c7 8 邑c1 and Black gets into trouble. Kasparov, a clever psychological player, probably knew that Karpov would not accept the proffered gift.


b3 6

This is not as principled, but a good enough move.

> ⊈g7 6 d5! **⊈g2**

Black seizes the first opportunity to create complications, because after the trivial 7 ... a6 8 2c3 d6 9 2b2 Black would be facing an uphill climb in the endgame.

cd €)×d5 9 0-0! (2)



Now what should Black do? His poorly placed queen hampers normal development or further counterplay. If, for example, 9 ... ₩b6, trying to exploit the pin of the 2d4, then 10 2b2 2c6 11 鱼×d5 分×d4 12 e3! 分f3+ 13 營×f3 鱼×b2 14 龄×f7+ 當d8 15 囯d1 當c7

(15 ... Q×a1 16 Qe6+ 當c7 17 營f4+ \$\c3! \(\text{\(\)}}} \ext{\(\text{\(\)}}} \ext{\(\text{\(\text{\) \exiting \exiting \text{\(\text{\) \exiting \exitin \exiting \e 17 闰acl wins.

Also in White's favour is 9 ... 9 ...皆e5 10 总b2 0-0 11 包d2. Kasparov finds a wonderful opportunity to keep the game balanced.

₩d7!?

Black withdraws his queen from the danger zone and takes control of the important b5 and d5 squares. The \(\Omega\) c8 will become free later. Despite the 'ugly' nature of the move, Kasparov finds the true value.

> **⊉b2** 0-0 10

Some commentators criticised this move and suggested 11 \(\mathbb{\text{d}}\)d2. although after 11 ... \(\mathbb{A}\)d8 12 \(\mathbb{A}\)d1 ₩e8! 13 ©a3 ©a6 and Black holds on. With the text. White is freeing dl for his rook and protects the △b2 as well. This is a very logical plan.

11 ₽d8 12 Ϊd1 €)c6! 13 €)×c6 **₩**×c6 **₩**×c6 bc 15 .Ω×g7 **\$**×**g7** (3)

The curtain rises on the second act, an endgame with a weak backward pawn at c6. In addition, the **2**d5 is pinned and White's bishop is now much stronger than Black's. How can he create serious counterplay?

16 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1

White could not play 16 e4

since 16 ... \(\mathbb{Q}\)g4! 17 f3 \(\alpha\)e3! 18 萬×d8 萬×d8 19 ⑤c3 萬d2 gives Black a strong counterattack. It is only one tactical nuance of Kasparov's dynamic plan in this seemingly quiet position.

> 16 ... **Qg4!**

A passive defence of the weak pawn with 16 ... \(\Q\) b7 is counterindicated for Black. Kasparov sacrifices the pawn for genuine counterplay.

17 **\$**f1 a5! 18 h3


The pawn on c6 is doomed, but the immediate 18 \(\mathbb{\pi} \times c6\)? would fail to 18 ... **公b4!** 19 闰c1 闰ac8 20 公c3 (20 萬×c8?? 萬d1 mate) 20 ... 国d2! 21 h3 (if 21 f3 then 21 ... ⊈e6!) 21 ... ઈc2 22 ઈe4 ઈ×a1 23 $\Xi \times a1 \ \Xi \times a2!$ and it is White who has to save the game.

> 18 **⊈e6** 19 €)c3

Karpov shows his customary caution. The pawn at c6 is still inedible due to 19 \(\mathbb{\pi} \times c6 \&\times b4 \) (or 19 ... a4).

19 4)×c3 20 ¤×c3 耳d2

20 Kasparov's Opening Repertoire




Black's well-placed rook is full compensation for his missing pawn. It is curious that only in the endgame was Black able to improve his position, which deteriorated quickly as a result of his poor choice at move 5.

23	Ïcb1	∄dd2
24	≅×b2	¤×b2
25	⊈e1	∆f5
26	₿ d1	g 5
27	∆ d5	& f6
28	⊈c4	e6
29	g4	⊈g6
30	a 4	\$e5!

White found himself in zugzwang, and quickly dropped a couple of pawns. Black's choice of active counterplay proved to be a most effective strategy.

1 Queen's Gambit



This venerable opening has seen many waves of fashion for play on both sides. It can lead to the wild complications of the Semi-Slav or to the quiet positional play of the Orthodox Variation. Kasparov has enjoyed both sides of the opening, and we will deal with two systems, the Tartakower Variation and the Tarrasch Defence in Chapter 12.

Here we will discuss the following variations:

Variation 1: The Petrosian System 2 ... e6 3 ₺c3 ₺f6 4 ₺g5 ₺e7 5 ₺f3 0-0 6 e3 h6 7 ₺xf6 ₺xf6

Variation II: The Botvinnik System 2 ... e6 3 \$\infty\$c3 \$\infty\$f6 4 \$\infty\$g5 c6 5 \$\infty\$f3 dc 6 e4 b5

Variation III: The Geller Gambit 2 ... dc 3 \$\alpha\$f3 \$\alpha\$f6 4 \$\alpha\$c3 c6 5 e4

Variation I: The Petrosian System

The authors found the pamphlet Developments in the Orthodox Queen's Gambit 1984-1987 by Julian Way most helpful in compiling the relevant games for this chapter. All analysis is our own, unless otherwise indicated.

1	d4	€)f6
2	c4	e6
3	ᡚc3	d5
4	⊈ g5	⊈e7
5	ᡚ ß	h6
6	∆ ×f6	∆ ×f6
7	e 3	

Recently the World Champion has chosen another variation. Kasparov-Timman, Amsterdam 1988: 1 d4 包f6 2 c4 e6 3 包f3 d5 4 包c3 鱼e7 5 鱼g5 h6 6 鱼×f6 鱼×f6 7 皆b3 c6 8 e3 0-0 9 邑d1 皆b6 10 皆c2 dc 11 鱼×c4 c5 12 包e4 鱼e7 13 dc 鱼×c5 14 0-0 鱼e7 15 鱼e2 鱼d7 16 包e5 邑c8 17 皆d3 鱼e8 18 包c4 皆c7 19 包ed6 邑d8 20 包×e8 邑×e8 21 鱼f3 邑d8 22 皆b3 包c6 23 g3 鱼f6 24 雷g2 邑ab8 25 邑×d8+ 邑×d8 1/2=1/2.

This is by far the most common move, although a number of alternatives have been tried:

(a) 8 ... a6 is also seen, but after 9 a3 Black has nothing better than 9 ... c6 anyway, and now 10 \(\overline{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}}\)d3 (10 c5!? should also bring White a better position.) 10 ... 2d7 11 0-0 makes the inclusion of the a-pawn moves better for White unless Black does something like 11 ... b5, but then after 12 cd cd 13 2e2! White is better, for example 13 ... **鱼b7** 14 **鱼b1 鱼e8** 15 **營d3**, Karpov-Short, Brussels SWIFT 1987 which saw White obtain a small advantage.

(b) 8 ... b6 is an interesting option, but it seems that Black is really mixing systems here, for example Gulko-Shamkovich, New York Open 1987: 9 **△**d3 dc!? 10 \(\text{de4} \) (if 10 \(\text{d} \times c4 \), then Black plays $10 \dots \triangle b7 \triangle \triangle d7$ and c5) 10 ... c6 11 ②d2 Qa6 12 營f3 b5 13 a3 $\triangle \exists c8 \text{ and } \triangle d7) 14 \triangle \times c6 \exists b8$ 15 0-0 ∞.

White can also play the thematic 9 cd ed 10 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)d3, although after 10 ... \(\Omega b7 11 0-0 \) Black might adopt Neishtadt's idea 11 ... \(\mathbb{Z}\)e8!? or 11 ... **②**d7 △ 12 ... c5.

- (c) Former World Champion Boris Spassky has seen both sides of 8 ... \$\infty\$c6. But his experience as Black encouraged him to prefer the White side, as demonstrated by his 1968 USSR encounter with Zhukhovitsky: 9 \(\textit{De2}\) e2 dc 10 \(\textit{Q}\times c4\) e5 11 d5 De7 12 De4 Af5 (12 ... 6)f5 was seen in Portisch-Campora, Amsterdam 1984, but 13 쌀c2!? ②d6 14 Qd3 is a strong idea from Belyavsky in ECO.) 13 $\triangle \times f6 + gf 14 \triangle h4 \triangle h7 15 0-0 and$ Black is suffocating. Perhaps Black can revive Spassky's idea with 11 ... ②a5!? 12 Qe2 e4 e.g. 13 ②×e4 **Q**×b2 ∞ or 13 **Q**d2 **Q**×c3 14 **Q**×c3 **&**×d5 ∞.
- (d) 8 ... \(\textit{\Pi} e^7\) returns a tempo a bit too early, as demonstrated in Petrosian-Hübner, m/4 1971: 9 a3 c6 10 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}} \) \(\text{\text{\text{d}}} \) \(\text{\text{\text{d}}} \) \(\text{\text{d}} \) \(\text{d} \) \(\text{\text{d}} \) \(\text{d} \) \(\text{\text{d}} \) \(\text{d} \) \(**Qb7** 13 闰fd1 對b8 14 cd ed 15 岛f5±.
- (e) 8 ... \(\mathbb{A}\) = 8 9 \(\mathbb{A}\) = 2 dc 10 \(\mathbb{A}\) × c4 ②d7 11 0-0 c5 12 ②e4 cd 13 ed ≛. Furman-Bukhman, USSR Ch. 1965.

9 ₽d3 €)d7 10 0-0 dc

(a) Black is not forced to capture here. 10 ... \pounderer e7!? is possible, leading to unclear complications, e.g. 11 a3 \(\mathbb{A}\)d8 12 \(\mathbb{A}\)e1 g6 13 c5 e5 14 e4 ed 15 ed, where instead of 15 ... \\delta \times e1+, which failed to 16 份×e1+ dc 17 闰×c3! Д×c3 18 掛×c3 cd 19 h4 in Rashkovsky-M. Gurevich, USSR Ch. 1987, Black can play 15 ... \\ c5 \infty \text{...} Belyavsky suggests 11 闰e1 闰d8 12 皆b3 dc 13

- (b) Black tried the retreat 10 ... \(\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\sigma}\$}} \) in Petursson-Large, Hastings, 1986/87, but after 11 ₩e2!? a6 12 e4 dc 13 🕮×c4 b5 14 鱼b3 c5 15 闰fd1 曾b6 16 e5 鱼b7 17 d5 c4 18 Ω c2 ed 19 $\Omega \times$ d5 $\Omega \times$ d5 20 □×d5 White was slightly better. Somewhat less logical, but also good is 12 \(\textit{\textit{L}}\)b1 f5 13 a3 \(\textit{\textit{L}}\)d6 14 鱼d3 曾e7 15 曾h1 曾h8 16 包d2 包f6 17 f4 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)d7 18 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)f3±, Epishin-Kuporosov, Tallinn 1986.
- (c) After 10 ... b6 11 e4 White has a traditional advantage. Agzamov-Vaganian, USSR 1982.

e5

11 ... c5 12 曾e2 a6 13 耳fd1 cd 14 **∆**b8 17 **\dd**d2 b5 18 **\dd**e2 **\dd**f6! brought Black equality in Kasparov-Karpov, London m/12 1986. But after the match the World Champion improved with 16 營h5!, which is much better for White: Kasparov-H. Olafsson, **鱼f1 鱼b8 18 쌀a5! b6 19 쌀c3 鱼b7** 20 ᡚc6 ᡚ×c6 21 徵×c6±.


11 ... b6?! was demolished in Karpov-Spassky, Lucerne 1985: 12 Qd3 c5 16 <a>\times \text{b5} cd 17 <a>\times \text{e4} \text{Q} \text{×e4} 18 \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \exe4.

12 h3! (7)

This is Kasparov's innovation, which revitalized the line.


> 12 ed 13 ed €\b6

13 ... c5 is one alternative and now:



- (a) Timman has recently tried 14 De4 but after 14 ... cd 15 Ee1 (15 ②×f6+ ②×f6 16 營b3 營b6! = Kasparov.) 15 ... **2**b6 16 **2**b3 鱼d7 17 ⑤×f6+ 增×f6 18 增×d4 ₩×d4 19 ᡚ×d4 Black had full equality in Timman-Korchnoi. Amsterdam 1987, with 19 ... 互fc8, while Black was also fine after the other rook move 19 ... Aac8 in Dohosian-Pigusov, USSR 1986.
- Karpov, London m/10 1986, saw 14 ... cd 15 €\d5 b6 16 €\×d4 €\×d4 17 **公**×d4+.
- 13 ... \(\mathbb{H}\)e8 has also been seen. Browne-Abramović, New York Open 1987 continued 14 營b3 里f8 (14 ... 莒e7 15 d5 包b6 16 dc 包×c4 17 龄×c4 bc 18 耳fd1 龄a5 19 幻d4 △×d4. Yriölä–Jonsson, Revkiavik 1986, would lead to an advantage for White after 20 營×d4.) 15 營c2 分b6 16 单b3 单×d4 17 耳cd1 c5 18 **⑤b5 夏d7 19 ⑤b×d4 cd 20 莒×d4** ★f6=, but White can strive for the initiative with 19 \(\Delta f \times d4!? \) cd 20 **幻d6 总c6 21 莒×d4**基.

⊈f5



Again Black has explored a number of paths:

- (a) 14 ... \(\textit{\Omega}\)g5 was tried in Ribli-Short, Dortmund 1986 but after 15 国c2 点f5 16 国e2 点f4 17 目fel the doubled rooks secured a strong advantage which was demonstrated after 17 ... 2d7 18 d5! 2c5 19 \(\mathbb{Q}\)c2 \(\pm\).
- (b) 14 ... 呂e8 is another possiblity which was tried in Kasparov-Karpov, Moscow m/23 1985. After 15 闰el 总f5 (15 ... 闰×e1+16 營×e1 Qf5 17 De4 \rightarrow e7 18 Dc5 ± Epishin-Faibisovich, USSR 1986. A recent try was 16 ... Ad7 but White was still able to exploit his advantage: 17 營e4 營e7 18 營f4 買e8 19 買e1 Qe6 20 Q×e6 f×e6 21 쌀g4 & d5 22 & xd5 cxd5 23 g3 쌀f7 24 h4 Qd8 25 h5 目f8 26 當g2 且e8 27 闰e3 Qb6 28 a4 闰e7 29 幻h4 17 皆d2 皆d7 18 闰e1 闰d8 19 皆f4 22 萬×e5 White held a small but persistent advantage. Perhaps the other capture, 22 \subseteq xe5, is even more promising (Tal-Grigorian,

Yerevan 1986).

(c) 14 ... a5 is likely to transpose below after 15 a3 Af5 16 Hel.


15 Ae1

Here there are a number of alternatives:

- (a) 15 ... **Qg5** is met by 16 **国a1!**, for example, Kasparov-Short, Brussels 1986: 16 ... 2d7 17 d5! 耳c8 (17 ... 包c5 18 总c2 总×c2 19 營xc2 cd 20 \ \ adl would only have been slightly better for White according to Kasparov.) 18 2d4 এg6 19 ②e6! fe 20 de \$\frac{19}{2}\$h7 21 徵×d7 對b6 22 e7 頁fe8 23 對g4 對c5 24 夕e4 曾×e7 25 点c2! 且f8 26 g3 營d8 27 闰ad1 營a5 28 h4 Qe7 29 公c3! A×c2 30 萬×e7 萬g8 31 萬dd7 요f5 32 闰×g7+ 含h8 33 皆d4 1-0. 17 ... \$\infty\$c5 is relatively better, but Black is still worse.
- (b) 15 ... **曾**d7 robs the **⑤**b6 of its natural development. After 16 營d2 a5 17 a3 a4 (or 17 ... 互fe8 18 \(\mathbb{A}\)e3 a4 19 \(\mathbb{A}\)a2 \(\mathbb{A}\)e6 20 \(\mathbb{A}\)×e6 耳×e6 21 包e4 总e7 22 包c5 总×c5 **曾f5 26 自e5 曾g6 27 g3** ½-½ Ljubojević-Andersson, Wijk aan Zee 1987.) 18 Qa2 耳fe8 19 營f4 Black nevertheless managed to equalize with 19 ... \(\Qec{6} \)! 20 \(\Q \times 6 \) 三×e6 21 三×e6 對×e6 22 對c7 對b3! in Rashkovsky-Belvavsky, USSR Ch. 1986. 16 De5 is more promising, for example 16 ... $\triangle \times e5$ 17 de 營×d1 (17 ... 莒fe8 18 營f3 且g6 19 耳cd1 省f5 20 省e3 h5 21 耳d4 c5 22 耳f4 曾c8 23 句b5 囯e7 24 句d6 曾c6 25 **曾g3 国d8** 26 **曾**×**g6** 1-0 S. Ivanov-Krivov, Jaroslavl Teams

- 1986.) 18 闰c×d1 闰fd8 19 g4 总d3 20 e6!? fe $\triangle \times$ e6+ \pm Andersson-Belyavsky, Reggio Emilia 1986/87.
- (c) 15 ... 皆d6 16 皆e2 且ad8 17 Acd1 h5 18 De5 Axe5 19 dxe5 ₩g6 20 ₩e3 was better for White in Dlugy-Ornstein, New York 1987.
- (d) 15 ... 且e8 is a solid move. ₩d7 18 \ \ el and now:
- (d1) 18 ... a5 19 \(\text{\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tin}}}}}} \ext{\tin}\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tinit}\text{\ti}}}}}}}}}}}} \eximiniminftileftent{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}}}}}}}} \eximiniminiftileftent{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\t 20 Q×f7+±) 20 包e4 Qg7 21 營c1 ②×e4 22 □×e4 a4 23 总c2 □e8 24 쌍e1 三×e4 25 쌍×e4 쌍e6 16 쌍×e6 fe 27 **G**fl both 27 ... **G**f7 G. Garcia-Geller, Sochi 1986, and 27 ... 2f8 28 2e2 a3! M. Gurevich-Belyavsky, USSR Ch. 1987, seem adequate for Black.
- (d2) 18 ... 互d8 19 皆f4 包d5 20 ᡚ×d5 cd 21 ᡚe5 transposes to note (b) to Black's 14th move.
- (d3) 18 ... \(\mathbb{A}\) e8 is to be avoided. however, because of 19 \(\mathbb{Z}\times 8+\) ₩×e8 20 ₩f4! with a strong attack. according to Gligoric.

16 a3 (9)



An interesting alternative is 16

②×a4 18 ②×a4 ②e6 19 ③c2 □e8 20 \ddd g6 (Hiartarson-H. Olafsson. Reykjavik 1987).

> ∄e8 16 ...

16 ... 曾d7 is inferior: 17 名e5 **△**×e5 18 □×e5! ±, e.g. 18 ... □fe8 19 營e2 莒ad8 20 莒el 莒×e5 21 營×e5 a4 22 營c5! ± Karpov-Belyavsky, CSKA v. Trud, European Team Championship 1986. Belvavsky suggests 18 ... 226!?


> 17 \(\mathbb{Z}\times e8+\) ₩×e8 18 **省d2** ₩d7

18 ... **公**d7!? 19 營f4!? was seen in Kasparov-Karpov, Leningrad m/22 1986. After 19 ... Ag6 20 h4 曾d8 21 和a4! h5 22 耳e1 b5 23 和c3 ₩b8 24 ₩e3 White held a slight advantage, but 22 ... 對b8!? might be better.

Äe1 ∄e8 19 This is an improvement on 19 ...

a4 20 且a2 且d8 21 營f4 且g6 22 \triangle e5! \triangle ×e5 23 \triangle ×e5 \mp Epishin-Pigusov, Sevastopol 1986.

> **營×e8** (10) 20 🗒 × e8+



₩f4 21 **⊉e6** 22 $\Delta \times e6$ **₩**×e6

23 ₩c7

The alternative is 23 \bar{4}b8+ but

Black seems to equalize on 23 ... 曾c8 24 曾a7 名c4 25 b3 名×a3 M. Gurevich-van der Sterren, Baku 1986, or 25 營c5 營e6 Ftačnik-H. Olafsson, New York Open 1987.

23	•••	€)c4
24	⇔ ×b7	$\triangle \times d4$
25	₩b8 +	

25 ᡚ×d4 is met by 25 ... ₩e1+ 26 當h2 皆e5+27 g3 皆×d4 28 皆c8+ \$\delta h7 29 \$\delta f5+ \frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2}\$ Chernin-M. Gurevich, USSR Ch. 1987.


25	,	⊈h7
	***	<u> </u>
26	�⊇×d4	₩e1+
27	當h2	份×f2
28	₩c8	

and a draw was agreed in H. Olafsson-van der Sterren. Wiik aan Zee 1987.

Variation II: The Botvinnik System:

1	d4	d5
2	c4	с6
3	ᡚ ß	Ð f6
4	එ ය	e6
5	⊈g 5	dc
6	e4	b 5
7	e5	h6
8	₿h4	g5 (11

This position has been analyzed for years without a definitive conclusion being reached. Kasparov scored two impressive back-toback victories in the 1981 USSR Ch. which seemed to bury the line for Black. A couple of years later I (ES) asked him if he thought the line was pretty much out of commission, and he expressed the




opinion that although he was doing well as White, there was still plenty of uncharted territory to be explored. The 1980s have seen a new wave of explosions in the accepted theory, and the general opinion is still that the variation is unclear. Practical experience, however, has clearly favoured the player of the White pieces.

9 €\×g5!

9 ... \$\alpha\$d5 is now considered to strongly favour White after 10 ②×f7! 營×h4 11 ⑤×h8 总b4 12 耳c1! 皆e4+ 13 Qe2 包f4 14 a3 $2 \times g2 + 15$ f1 2 e3 + 16 fe $4 \times h1 +$ 17 **\$f2 \$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}}\$\text{\$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}}\$} \text{\$\frac{1}{2}\$} \te** 19 &d2 ± Timman-Ljubojević, Buenos Aires 1980.

12 ... c5 remains a viable alternative: 13 d5 \triangle h6 14 \triangle ×h6 第×h6 15 Ag2 b4 16 包e4 包×f6 17 營×d5 公×d5 20 莒c1 莒c8 21 莒×c4 包b6 22 国c1 led to an equal position in Azmaiparashvili-Dolmatov, USSR Ch. 1986.



12 ... \(\mathbb{Z}\)g8, once a popular line. has disappeared in view of 13 h4 c5 17 ②a4 ± Chandler-Westerinen. Wiesbaden 1981.

13 ... 0-0-0 14 0-0 De5! is a playable alternative, for example 15 de Exdl 16 Eaxdl b4 17 包e4 營a5 18 总f4 呂h5 19 呂d4 c5 20 \(\mathbb{\pi}\) and now instead of 20 ... \(\mathbb{\pi}\)a6? Ermolinsky-Machulsky. 1982, Black should have played 20 ... Qd5 21 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c2 c4 22 \(\alpha\)d2 c3 with an unclear position according to Machulsky. 15 \delta e2!? might be met by 15 ... 2d3 16 2c3 c5 17 $\triangle \times b7 + \triangle \times b7$ 18 dc $\triangle \times c5$. since 19 Q×c5? 邑×h2! wins for Black.


14 d5 0-0-0

Black can try 14 ... b4 15 0-0 bc. where 16 de \(\frac{1}{2} \) e5 is unclear, but 15 ... 0-0-0 simply transposes below.

This is the starting point for most of the contemporary analysis of the Botvinnik line.

16 4 84 ₩h5

The two alternatives have van-



ished from the scene:


- (a) 16 ... 皆a6 17 a3! b3 18 公c3 ව්b6 19 @g4 ව්×d5 20 ව්×d5 ව්×d5 21 ②×d5 □×d5 22 □ad1 □d3 23 ₩e4! ± Razuvayev-Vaiser, USSR 1981.
- (b) 16 ... 皆d6 17 de 皆×e6 18 囯el 曾f5 19 总xb7+ 含xb7 20 总f4 營×f6 21 邑e8! ± Agzamov-Timoshchenko, USSR 1982.

17 a3 ed

17 ... Db8 was the subject of considerable debate in 1981. In the USSR Ch., both Timoshchenko and Dorfman (later to become Kasparov's seconds) prepared new ideas, and each had a chance to display his wares against Kasparov - in consecutive rounds no less! The move 17 ... \$\delta b8 had been introduced a few rounds earlier in the game Anikayev-Sveshnikov, which continued 18 耳×d5 21 皆e2 幻c6 22 耳fc1 (14)

In this critical position Black has tried a number of moves:

(a) Here Sveshnikov played 22 ... \$\delta b7\$ and found himself in difficulty after 23 耳×c4 包a5 24 b3!




(b) 22 ... c3 is another try, but Rashkovsky-Timoshchenko saw 23 曾×b5 莒×b5 24 ā×c3!! bc 25 耳×c3 當d7 26 耳a6 幻d8 27 耳×a7+ 當e8 28 萬c8 ♣d6 where White could have played 29 h4! 耳b8 30 三×b8 三×b8 31 三e7+ 當f8 32 b4 ±、 while Novikov-Ivanchuk, USSR 1983, continued 26 ... \(\Delta \) e5 27 耳×a7+ 當d6 28 点f4 當d5 29 点×e5

(c) The latest attempt is 22 ... De5 but after 23 D×a7 Dh6 24 **⑤b6+ ⑤c7 25** 囯el ⑤d3 26 ⑤×d5+ **\(\text{\tin}\xi{\text{\ti}}}}\text{\tex** △×e3 29 \subset ×e3 White had a clear advantage in Salov-Shabalov. Leningrad 1983. Less effective is the path chosen by Kasparov against Tal in the 1983 USSR Spartakiad: 23 b3 c3 24 < x < 3 bc 25 □ xc3+ 當b8 26 當c2!? 且d6 27 △×a7+ \$b7 28 b4 \$\(\)c6 (Black could have played for the draw with 28 ... 耳d3!) 29 Qe3 Qe5 with an unclear position.

(d) Our tale concerns 22 ... 2a5 23 b3 c3! (23 ... 公×b3 24 耳×c4+ 當d7 25 包c3! bc 26 買×a7+ 當d8 27 舀×c3! ±) 24 ⑤×c3 bc 25 舀×c3+

當d7 26 營c2 总d6 27 闰c1 營b7 (15) 28 b4! 對×b4! 29 耳b1 皆g4.



We are still not out of the theoretical jungle. Both of Kasparov's games reached this position and he played 30 $\triangle \times a7!!$ and now the first game, Kasparov-Timoshchenko, concluded 30 ... e5 31 曾a2! 莒d1+32 莒×d1 曾×d1+33 當g2 皆h5 34 皆a4+ 當e6 35 h4! 皆e2 36 對×a5 耳a8 37 對a4! 對×f6 38 營d7 當g7 39 闰f3 營c4 40 營×d6 買×a7 41 對×e5+ 當h7 42 買f5 \(\text{c}}}}} \end{end} of}}}}}}}}} the game, the position after 30 △×a7 was hotly disputed, with Sveshnikov claiming that 30 ... De5 would have given Black a good game. Kasparov was frustrated by his inability to 'defeat' Sveshnikov in the post-mortem and worked until the wee hours of the morning satisfying himself that the line was still good for White. His hard work paid off the next day when the position quickly reappeared on the board in Kasparov-Dorfmann, adopting Sveshnikov's move: 30 ... Qe5 31 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c5! (This was the move that had

escaped the notice of the kibitzers at the post-mortem!) 31 ... 罩×c5 (31 ... 耳a8 32 耳×a5! 耳×a5 33 耳b7+ 當e8 34 囯e7+ 當f8 35 營h7 ++) 32 Q×c5! 公c6 33 營d3+ 營c8 34 闰d1 幻b8 (34 ... 闰d8 35 營a6+) 35 耳c1! 營a4 36 总d6+ 幻c6 37 鱼×e5 耳d8 38 份b1! 耳d5 39 份b8+ **當d7** 40 當c7+ 魯e8 41 徵×c6+ 對×c6 42 買×c6 買×e5 43 買c8+ 1-0. These two games have discouraged Black from playing 17 ... 包b8.

> 18 ab cb 19 ₩**2**4

White can also play 19 \(\Omega\)e3. with an unclear position arising on 19 ... \$\oldsymbol{\infty} c5 20 \$\oldsymbol{\infty} \cc5 \oldsymbol{\infty} \cc5 20 \$\oldsymbol{\oldsymbol{\infty}} g4\$ **७**b8 Kharitonov-Dorfman, USSR 1982, but we feel that the immediate pin is stronger.


19	•••	d4
20	<i>⊈</i> ×b7+	&×b7
21	쌸e4 +	&c6
24	& ×d4	₽d6
23	∄fe1	∄de8
24	Ë×e8	Ï×e8
25	⊈e 3	⊉b8

This position was reached in Zarubin-Andrianov, USSR 1982. The position is still quite complicated and the chances are roughly level. Further developments can be expected.

Variation III: The Tolush Gambit

1 ₫4 **d5** 2 c4 ch

This can also be reached via the Queen's Gambit Accepted: 2 ... dc 3 2f3 2f6 4 2c3 c6. \$B **€**)f6 €)c3 dc



This gambit continuation has a long history. It earned respect as a serious weapon in the hands of Soviet players in the early postwar years. The first critical encounter was Tolush-Smyslov, USSR Ch. 1947. Efim Geller was the leading proponent of the line for many years, scoring many impressive victories including a gem of a win against Unzicker (the complete game is included below). Gary Kasparov was responsible for the great renaissance in interest in this gambit continuation in the early 1980s. The state of the theory was both described and considerably enhanced by the American theoretician IM John Watson in his 1985 book 4 \(\frac{1}{2} \) c3 Gambit in the Queen's Gambit Accepted & Slav. The 1987 edition of ECO contains no improvements and merely cites a few of his ideas and a couple of more recent games. In this section we critically examine both the existing theory and Watson's contributions.

5 ... b5

Black must accept the gambit, as to decline will allow White to achieve an ideal centre and a great lead in development without any balancing considerations for Black.

White must increase the pressure at every turn or he will fail to reap sufficient rewards for his investment. By this move White prepares to exchange at b5, opening up the long diagonal which will be exploited by his queen and light-squared bishop.


There are a host of alternatives, but they do not lead to a playable game for Black.

- (a) 7 ... b4? 8 ②e4 weakens the 全4 and increases White's control of the centre. After 8 ... e6 9 ②xc4 ②d7 10 0-0 ②b7 11 ②fg5 ②7b6 12 ②d3 a5 13 營h5 營d7 14 ②c5 White was much better in Bondarevsky-Kalantar, USSR 1947.
- (b) 7 ... \triangle b7? 8 e6! forces 8 ... f6 (8 ... fe 9 \bigcirc g5 \pm) and then White clamps down on the light squares with 9 g3 \bigcirc d6 10 \bigcirc h3 \bigcirc a6 11 0-0 \pm Najdorf-Ojanen, Helsinki 1952.
- (c) 7 ... **Qe6** is best met by Taimanov's 8 **Qg5! Q**×c3 9 bc **Qd5** (9 ... **\text{ \text{ **

₩g4.


- (d) 7 ... ②×c3 8 bc h6 (8 ... 且e6 9 ②g5 see above (c)) 9 g3 且e6 10 且g2 且d5 11 且a3! e6 12 且×f8 ⑤×f8 13 0-0 △ ⑤h4, f4-f5 Watson.
- (e) 7 ... h6 is a new move which led to an unclear position in Ermolinsky-Kupreichik, Kuibyshev 1986: 8 ab ②xc3 9 bc cb 10 Qa3 (10 Qe2!? ECO) 10 ... Qe6 11 Qe2 ②c6 12 0-0 Qd5 13 ②d2 a5 14 Qf3 因b8 (14 ... e6 is a playable alternative) 15 e6! g6 16 Qe4 (16 层e1!? ECO) 16 ... Qxe4 17 ②xe4 增d5 18 ef+ ③xf7 19 层e1 ⑤g7 20 ②c5 b4 21 ②e6+ ⑤h7 22 ②b2 Qg7 23 份g4 ဩb5.
- (f) 7 ... Af5 8 ab Db4! (8 ... Dxc3? 9 bc cb 10 Dg5! (△ \$\frac{1}{2}\$\frac{1}{3}\$) 10 ... e6 11 g4! Ag6 12 Ag2 Dd7 13 f4! Ae7 14 \$\frac{1}{3}\$ 0-0 15 h4 Ad3 16 f5! \(\frac{1}{2}\$\frac{1}{3}\$\frac{1}{3}\$ Uses White full compensation, according to Lilienthal. Although White has a large material deficit, he has a strong attack, as shown by Watson. It would be impolite, to say the least, to replicate all of his analysis here, as none of it has been played, but his main lines run:
- (f1) 11 ... 鱼d7 12 e6 fe 13 包e5 cb 14 鱼×b5 a6! 15 鱼×d7+ 包×d7 16 邑d1! 包b3! 17 鱼e3!? or 17 營×b3 包×e5 18 de.
- (f2) 11 ... 包d7 12 營×a1! 包b6 13 鱼b3 cb 14 包×b5 and if 14 ... e6? 15 鱼a4! or 14 ... a6 15 包c3 e6 16 邑d1! followed by d5.

That no one has yet dared to defend the Black side of this line demonstrates the convincing nature of Watson's investigations.



8 ab \$\times \c3

8 ... 鱼b4 seeks to address the question of Black's lagging development. But after 9 營本4! a5 (9 ... 鱼×c3+10 bc3 氫×c3 11 營×c4 氫×b5 12 營本4 ±) 10 凰d2 0-0 (10 ... 氫b6!? 11 營c2 氫×c3 12 bc cb 13 氫g5 壺 Petursson) 11 bc ⑤b6 12 營c2 f5! 13 ef gf 14 凰e2 (14 g3!?) 14 ... ⑤×c6 15 0-0 凰b7 16 莒ad1 ± Petursson-Valkesalmi, Hamar 1983/84.




11 ... g6

The standard move, but 11 ... dd is a significant alternative. After 12 ♣e2! Black has:

- (a) 12 ... Q×g2? 13 莒g1 Qd5 14 ②×h7 含d8 15 ②×f8! 莒×f8 16 Ξ×g7 ± Watson.
- (b) 12 ... ②a6 13 d5! g6 (13 ... ed 14 e6!; 13 ... ②c7 14 d6 ②d5 15 ②×h7 ± Prandstetter; 13 ... ②c5 14 d6 Watson.) 14 de fe (Trapl-Mokry, CSSR Ch.1982) 15 ∰g4! ②c7 16 0-0 h5 17 ∰g3 ± Prandstetter.
- (c) 12 ... h6 13 \(\Delta f3 \) \(\Delta c6 (13 ... hg 14 營h3 公c6 15 公e4 总e7 16 0-0 a5 Orendy, Hungarian Championship 1961.) 14 0-0! was introduced in Kasparov-Petursson, Malta Of 1980: 14 ... 20d8 15 20e4 a5 16 12g5 Qd5 17 闰fe1! 包c6 (17 ... 曾b7 18 ②xd8! ③xd8 19 ⑤c5! ②xc5 20 $\triangle \times d5 \cong \times d5 21 dc \pm Kasparov) 18$ Qh4 且a7 19 曾g4 目h7 (19 ... Q×e4 20 $\triangle \times e4 \pm 1$ 20 $\triangle d6+ \triangle \times d6$ 21 Q×d5 Qe7 22 Qe4 g6 23 Qf6! 當f8 24 皆f3 包d8 25 d5! ed 26 Q×d5 皆f5 27 營e3 囯d7 28 囯ad1 Q×f6 29 ef 三×e1+32 皆×e1 gf 33 皆e5 曾g8 34 ₩g3+ 1-0.
- (d) 12 ... 鱼d5! was suggested by Kasparov, and seen in Mc-Cambridge-Choobak, US Open 1983: 13 ②×h7 (13 鱼f3!? Watson.) 13 ... ②c6 14 ②×f8 萬×f8 15 豐g5 a5! (15 ... b4 16 0-0 b3 17 鱼a3 ½-½ Rogers-Kirov, Bor 1984, but everyone agrees that this is better

for White.) 16 0-0 營e7 17 營×g7 **2**d7! and White's attack ran out of steam. Watson's suggestion of 16 h4!? is critical. He gives the following line: 16 ... 營e7 17 營×g7 △ Ag5; or 16 ... f6 17 ef gf 18 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}6+}} \) 當d8 (18 ... 皆f7 19 点h5) 19 点h6 (19 h5 may be a better choice.) 19 ... 皆f7 20 h5 皆×g6 21 hg 呂g8 22 **鱼h5 鱼×g2 23 国h4!**?

(e) 12 ... \(\) c6 deserves consideration, for example 13 Af3 2d8 14 2e4 2d5 ∞ or 13 2×h7 三×h7 14 份×h7 ②×d4! 15 cd Q×g2 16 国g1 鱼b4+ 干



12 **⊈e7** ...

Again Black has a series of inadequate replies:

- Kasparov-Kakageldiev, USSR 1981 saw 12 ... 2d5?! 13 h4 h6 14 De4 De7 15 De2 Oc6 16 Df3 (16 0-0!?) 16 ... 皆d7 17 0-0 a5 18 \(\textit{\alpha}\)a3?! (\(\textit{\alpha}\)f4! \(\textit{\alpha}\)d6+) 18 ... h5 19 皆f4 Q×e4 20 營×e4 日a6 21 Qc1 Qd8 22 Qa3 Qe7 23 Qc1 Qd8 24 皆f4!, e.g. 13 ... 皆d7 14 皆f6 且g8 15 ②×h7 Qe7 16 曾f4 ±.
 - (b) 12 ... **公**d7 13 **国**b1! Watson.

(c) 12 ... 2a6? is a blunder: 13 莒×a6! Д×a6 14 營f3.

(d) 12 ... h6 13 De4 Dd7 (13 ... **盆**×e4 14 徵×e4 徵d5 15 徵f4 ±) 14 且e2 (Watson suggests 14 旦b1, but 14 ... a6 15 $\triangle \times$ c4 $\triangle \times$ e4 looks better for Black.) 14 ... 2.d5 (14 ... a5 can be met by Ermolinsky's 15 闰b1 or simply 15 0-0, which will likely transpose below.) 15 0-0 \black b6 (15 ...a5!? 16 Af3 \$66 was seen in Svenn-Setterqvist, Swedish Ch. 1984. Now 17 **②**d6+ is very strong. e.g. $17 \dots \triangle \times d6 \ 18 \triangle \times d5 \ ed \ 19 \ ed$ 營×d6 20 Qa3 營c6 21 □fe1+ Ermolinsky.) 16 **Qf3** 曾c6! 17 **Qa3** △xa3 is Watson's suggestion. After 18 \(\mathbb{Z}\times a3\) 0-0 White still has plenty of compensation for his pawn. Instead. Ermolinsky-Podgaets, USSR 1982, saw 17 ... a5?! 18 \(\Delta\)d6+ \(\Delta\)×d6 19 \(\Delta\)×d5 營×d5 20 Q×d6 包f6 21 ef 營×d6 22 国fb1 0-0! (If 22 ... 皆d5, then 23 ₩f4! and White is better.) 23 □×b5 目fd8 24 目e5 ±.


13 **△e2**

Simagin gives 13 h4 h5 14 皆f4 \(\textit{\Omega}\times\gamma\text{g5 15 hg \opin\), while Watson adds 14 **曾g3 总d**5!

13 ... **€** d7 (20)

13 ... Ad5 is a formidable alter-(15 ... Axe4 15 省xe4 省d5 17 省g4 b4 18 总f3 曾d7 19 0-0 b3 20 寫fd1) 16 Qg7 国g8 17 Qf6 Q×e4 18 營×e4 營d5 19 營f4 Q×f6 20 Qf3 營d7 21 then 23 目fd1 ②×f3+24 營×f3 營c8 25 \\ xc3 with a dangerous

initiative.) 23 Q×c6! E×c6 24 d5! 營×d5 25 營b8+ 營d8 26 營b5. It is worth mentioning that ECO fails to note 14 De4, despite liberally quoting Watson in the coverage of the line.



買b1! 14

Watson's discovery, motivated by the fact that 14 \(\Omega f 3 \), the normal move, may have difficulty against Geller's 14 ... \delta c8! The most recent example is Rogers-Kostić. Kraljevo 1984: 15 h4 (another Geller suggestion) 15 ... h5 16 ₩f4 显×g5 17 hg 显×f3 18 營×f3 ⑤b6 19 国h4 国g8 20 d5 ②×d5 21 Qa3 營a6 22 闰f4 闰g7, and White does not have sufficient compensation for his material. 16 \deg3!? is also possible, although 16 ... a5 seems an adequate reply.


The game Geller-Unzicker, Stockholm IZ 1952 saw 14 ... \cong c7. originally suggested by Flohr, 15 ②e4 ②b6 16 Qh6 国g8?! 17 Qg5 $\triangle \times e4$ 18 $\triangle \times e4$ $\triangle d5$ 19 $\triangle \times d5$ ed 20 **△**×e7 營×e7 21 0-0 營f8 22 闰fb1 a6 23 營f3! 營e6?! (23 ... 含g7 ±) 24 **省6!** 省c8 25 f4 省b7 26 頁a5 名e8 27 闰bal b4 28 cb 對×b4 29 耳×d5

₩b7 30 e6 1-0.

14 ... **\$**c6

14 ... Д×g5 15 Д×g5 ≌a5 16 0-0 요d5 17 요f3! &b6!? 18 쌓f4 ± Watson-Orton, San Jose 1984, But the simple 14 ... a6 deserves attention. e.g. 15 ≜xc4 \delta c8 16 息b3 營×c3+ 17 息d2 營d3 〒. or 16 £×e6 fe 17 \ \ ×e6 \ \ \ 18 \ ∞.

15 AB ₩c8 0-0 (21) 16



This is the critical position to which Watson devotes two full pages of analysis in his book.

> 16 ... **a6**

This seems to be the best of the lot:

- (a) 16 ... \$\dagger\$b6? 17 \$\dagger\$e4 \$\dagger\$×e4 18 $\triangle \times e4 \pm Watson.$
- (b) 16 ... h5?! 17 營h3 勾b6 18 ව්දේ ව්d5 19 බුදු5! Watson.
- (c) 16 ... a5 17 筥e1 0-0!?, but not 17 ... 2b6? 18 2e4! Watson.
- (d) 16 ... 0-0 17 \(\beta\)e1 a5 18 d5! ed was seen in Watson-Bohn. Rohnert Park 1985. Here 18 5 × f7!? would have been the best try (Watson)

17 汽e1

Control of e4 is the most

important factor and the source of White's compensation. The rook on the e-file assists in this cause and also sets up the central break d4-d5 at a later point.

17 ... 0-0

17 ... ②b6 18 ②xc6 ⊌xc6 19 ②e4 gives White sufficient compensation for his pawn.

18 d5

Watson also gives 18 \text{\text{\$\section}}h3!? as an interesting alternative.

18 ... ed

18 ... $\triangle \times d5$ 19 $\triangle \times d5$ ed gains


control of e4 for Black, but allows 20 $2\times7!$? $2\times5!$ 21 e6 2×4 22 $2\times6!$ with attack' (Watson)

19 ... \(\sigma \ccsic 5 \) 20 e6 is good for White, because of the weak dark squares on the Black kingside.

20 e6

White has more than sufficient compensation for his pawn, for example 20 ... 萬g7 21 ed 鱼×d7 22 鱼×d5+ 當h8 23 營d4 鱼c5 24 營h4 萬a7 25 鱼h6 (Watson)

2 The Catalan



Kasparov adopted this opening for his match against Korchnoi during a period where Icelandic IM (now GM) Margeir Petursson was its leading exponent and when the literature on the opening included only an old book by Neishtadt and a small monograph in English by co-author Schiller. He retained the opening for occasional use against Karpov. Current recommended literature includes books by Neishtadt (1986), Moiseyev & Ravinsky (1984) and Schiller (1986, 1988).

Before the Korchnoi match he had used the opening only once as White — against Andersson at Nikšic 1983 — and even then he claims that he was quite sure of the defensive system Andersson would choose. It was an interesting choice, since Korchnoi was

a known expert in handling the White side of the opening, and it would certainly come as a surprise. But perhaps there was an additional appeal, in that Kasparov had only recently abandoned the King's Indian as Black and might have felt some comfort in fianchettoing his bishop.

Kasparov adopted the Catalan in his marathon 1984-5 match against Karpov, and later in the 1985 match against Ulf Andersson, he brought new life to the Catalan by adopting a new move order.

We examine four variations:

Variation I: 5 ... c5

Variation II: 5 ... Qd7

Variation III: 5 ... △e7 6 0-0 Variation IV 5 ... △e7 6 ⇔c2

Variation I:

1	d4	ᡚ ſ6
2	c4	e6
3	g3	d5
4	₽g2	dc
5	2 13	డ్

In the 9th game of the match against Korchnoi, Black played 5 ... 5bd7 6 0-0 \$\mathbb{H}\$b8?!, but after 7 a4 b6 8 \$\mathbb{H}\$fd2! White had already secured an advantage.

6 0-0 ②c6
In Kasparov's first Catalan


Kasparov-Korchnoi, (m/5) 1983, his opponent tried 6 ... 包bd7, but after 7 包a3 包b6 8 包xc4 包xc4 9 營a4+ Qd7 10 營xc4 b5 11 營c2 巴c8 12 dc Qxc5 13 營b3 0-0 14 包e5 營b6 15 Qg5 宣fd8 16 營f3 Qe7 17 包xd7 互xd7 Kasparov could have obtained a significant advantage with 18 宣fc1!, instead of 18 国ac1 as played in the game.

7 ₩a4

In the 1985 match against Andersson, Kasparov obtained a small advantage with 7 De5 2d7 8 Da3 and now:

- (a) 8 ... cd 9 ②a×c4 罩c8 10 營b3 ②×e5 11 ②×e5 Kasparov-Andersson (m/1) 1985.
- (b) 8 ... 2d5 9 2axc4 cd 10 2xc6 2xc6 11 2xd4 2b4 12 2xc6+ 2xc6 13 2c3!, Kasparov-Andersson (m/3) 1985.

7 ... cd!? (23)



Kasparov has no fear of the wild complications introduced by this move. 7 ... 2d7 is a calmer alternative.

8 ②×d4! 增×d4

Black has no choice. After 8 ...

△d7 9 ⑤×c6:

- (a) 9 ... 鱼×c6? 10 鱼×c6+ bc 11 쌀×c6+ 包d7 12 쌀×c4 包b6 13 쌀c6+ ±+ Toran-Miagmasuren, Lugano Ol 1968.
- (b) 9 ... 營b6 10 包d2 总xc6 11 总xc6+ bc 12 乞xc4 營b5 13 營c2 总e7 14 b3 ± Cobo-Vasquez, Skopje Ol 1972.

10 \(\mathbb{I}\)d1 \(\mathbb{U}\)×d1+

Black is virtually forced to give up his queen, since 10 ... 2xc6 11 #xc6+ bc 12 Xd4 does not give Black sufficient compensation for his material:


(a) 12 ... c5 13 莒×c4 and now: (a1) 13 ... 鱼d6 14 ⑤d2 含d7 15 b3 並 Kavalek-Radulov, Montilla

1974.

- (a2) 13 ... 0-0-0 14 包c3 包d5 15 包e4 包b6 16 邑c2 邑d1+ 17 當g2 f6 18 包xc5 鱼xc5 19 邑xc5+ 當b7 20 b3 ± Szymczak-Franzen, Poland 1979.
- (b) 12 ... 包d5 13 闰×c4 營d7 14 b3 总d6 15 总b2 f6 16 包d2 a5 17 包e4 总e7 18 总d4 並 Vuković-Nikolov, Mezdra 1984.

12 **②d2**

12 營c2 can be adequately met by 12 ... h5!



The text, an idea of Tukmakov later worked on by Gutman, is the most popular move, and is favoured by Kasparov. There are two common replies:

b5

A 12 ... b5 B 12 ... c3


12

13 ... **Qe7**13 ... a6 14 ab **Q**×b5 ±, but
not 14 ... ab 15 耳×a8+ **Q**×a8·16

17 **\arrowc** c2 ±

②×c4 ±.

12 c3!? (26) This is the primary alternative.



Black gives up the pawn without a fight, and loses time into the bargain. But there is a definite advantage to this move—it breaks up the White queenside pawns and creates a useful target for Black's operations.

13 bc

Is this obvious move necessary? Neishtadt (1986) points out that after 13 包含 置d8 14 營b3 cb 15 鱼×b2 White stands better.

13 ... 0-0-0

13 ... 道d8 14 營b3 总c5 15 幻f3 ②e4 16 幻d4 总d5 17 營b5+ 道d7 18 \triangle e3 \pm Neishtadt (1986).

14 ⇔b3 Ac5 15 \$\B!

This new move improves on 15 h3 which gave White a microscopic advantage in Gutman-Kraidman, Ramat Hasharon 1980.

> 15 6)e4 ... 16 €)d4 ¤×d4

It seems that there is nothing better. Helgi Olafsson gives

- (a) 16... \(\textit{Q}\)d5 17 \(\textit{\textit{C}}\)c2 e5 18 \(\textit{Q}\)e3! \(\pm\).
- (b) 16... \(\maxra{Q}\times\)d4 17 cd \(\maxra{Q}\times\)d4 18 \(\maxra{Q}\)b2 or 18 \(\textit{Q} e3 \(\pm \).
- (c) 16 ... e5 17 2×6 $2 \times f2 + 18$ **曾g2 bc 19 曾a4 ++**.

17 cd $\Delta \times d4$ 18 Дb1 $\triangle \times 12+$ ₽f1 19 h5

19 ... 耳d8 20 營c2! 囯d5 21 囯b3 +.

20 \(\text{\text{de}} \)e3 \(\pm \)


Hjartarson-Hardarson, Neskaupsstadt 1984 saw further 20 ... h4 21 g4 Qg3 22 闰c1 Q×h2 23 闰×c6+ bc 24 \a4 ++.

Variation II:

d4 €)f6 c4 **e6 d5 g**3 ₽g2 dc **4)**13 **△d7** (27)

Black's fifth move was introduced in the 7th game of the Kasparov-Korchnoi Candidates match, London 1983. In the press room Miguel Najdorf immediately asserted that he had played it sometime in the middle of the present century.

> 6 \\degree c2 c5



Parma considered this position unclear in New in Chess.

6 ... \(\textit{\text transposes to more familiar lines where White obtains only a minimal advantage.

7 0-0

△d5 10 \blackbox b5 was equal in Sosonko-Karpov, Wiik aan Zee 1988, while 8 0-0 \Delta bd7 transposes below.

An interesting alternative is 7 \$\,\text{e5}, e.g. 7 ... \$\,\text{c6} 8 \$\text{\$\sigma} \times \text{c6} \$\text{\$\frac{1}{2}} \times \text{c6}\$ $9 \triangle \times c6 + bc 10 dc \triangle \times c5 11 0 - 0$ 對d4 12 ②c3 ≅. Vaganian-Portisch, St. John (m/6) 1988.

> 7 **\$**c6 •••


This position also arises from the move order 4 ... dc 5 \(\frac{1}{2} \) f3 c5 6 ₩a4+ Qd7 7 ₩×a4 Qc6 8 0-0.

€)bd7

8 ... **Qd5** 9 **Yd3 Qe4** 10 **Yd1** \triangle c6 11 dc \triangle xc5 12 \triangle c3 \pm Neishtadt (1986). Kasparov remarks that Black can already be satisfied with his position.

9 **∆g**5 ₽c8 Neishtadt (1986) recommends 9 ... cd (actually Kasparov's suggestion) 10 $\triangle \times d4$ $\triangle \times g2$ 11 當×g2 Qe7 12 国d1 0-0 13 公c3 国c8 14 \delta 4 \delta 6. as in Opočensky-Prukha, CSSR 1945, where 'White can hardly count on an advantage'.

10 \(\textit{\Omega} \times \textit{f6} \((28)\)



10 ... €)×f6

Kasparov considers this dubious. There are two other ways to recapture:


- (a) 10 ... 對×f6 11 公c3 is better for White, for example 11 ... \(\Omega e 7 \) 12 e4 0-0 13 d5 ±.
- (b) 10 ... gf! 11 dc (Spiridonov) 11 包c3 b5 12 皆d3 c4 13 皆c2 b4 is no more clear, Inkiov-Pinter, Zagreb IZ 1987.

∆×ß 11 dc

Neishtadt (1986).

Gligoric and Krogius suggest 11 ... 皆d5 12 皆×d5 ⑤×d5 13 ⑤e5 △×c5 14 △×c6 bc (14 ... 耳×c6? 15 2c3), but Neishtadt (1986) points out that White is better in the endgame after 15 & d2.

12 **△**×**ß** $\triangle \times c5$ (29) Keene's comment in this pos-



ition is appropriate: 'Strategically, Black has accomplished everything which he should, in theory, strive for in the Catalan. First of all, he has liquidated the central pawns, then he has achieved near parity in development and finally he has established an opposite bishop situation, which normally facilitates a drawn outcome. The only problem he faces is the slight exposure of his b7 pawn to White's kings's bishop operating along the a8-h1 diagonal'. Kasparov lost no time in exploiting his single resource.

> 13 **份b5+ 公d7**

14 6)c3 份×b5

14 ... 0-0 15 營×b7 營×b7 16 △×b7 耳b8 17 ♀a6! △ 17 ... 耳×b2 18 **②a4** □c2 19 □d3 Kasparov.

> ♠×b5 15 **⊈**e7

b4!! $\Omega \times b4$ 16

17 કો×a7 ±

Korchnoi now should have settled for an uncomfortable position after 17 ... 日 a8 18 日 fb1 日 xa7 19 罩×b4 罩b8 20 a4, but instead chose 17 ... 耳c7, and after 18 耳fc1 国d7 19 国ab1 Qd2 20 国c2 国hd8

Against Karpov, Kasparov finally had an opportunity to explore the main lines of the opening.

Variation III

1	d4	ᡚf6
2	c4	e6
3	g3	d5
4	⊈g2	dc
5	2 13	.⊈e7
6	0-0	0-0
7	₩c2	a 6
8	₩×c4	b 5
9	⊌c2	⊈ b7
10	$\triangle d2$.≙e4

Four years later Karpov tried 10 ... ②c6?!, but after 11 e3 ②b4 12 ②×b4 ②×b4 13 a3 ②d6 14 ②bd2 ③c8 15 b4! White was clearly better (Belyavsky-Karpov, Brussels 1988).

11 \\delta c1 \\ \overline{\Omega} b7

Black invites a repetition of the position after 12 &c2 &c4 13 &c1 &b7 etc. Alternatively, he can try 11 ... &bd7, e.g. 12 &a5 &c8 with unclear complications in Belyavsky-Vaganian, Brussels 1988 or 11 ... &c6 12 &c3 &b4 12 &bd2 Korchnoi-Kasparov, London (m/4) 1983 where White might be able to obtain a small advantage with 14 &b3!?

12 <u>Ae3</u>

Probably best, although 12 a3!? is worth trying.

a4 15 5)c5 ±.

13 2c3 2d7

13 ... ②×e3 14 營×e3 leaves White with control of the central files.

14 罩d1

14 $\textcircled{2}\times d5$ $\textcircled{2}\times d5$ 15 2e1 (Yusupov). After 15 ... $\textcircled{2}\times g2$ White can choose between the quiet 16 $\textcircled{2}\times g2$ c5 = and 16 $\textcircled{2}\times g2$ 2c8 17 2c6 2b6 which is unclear.

14 ... 罩c8 15 多e5

Dorfman's suggested improvement on 15 ②×d5 ②×d5 16 ②e1 c6! 17 ②d3 ⊎b6 = Kasparov-Karpov (m/8), 1984.

15 ... 4\(\times c3\)

If 15 ... ②×e3 16 ②×b7 ②×d1 17 ②c6 ②×c3 18 營×c3 營e8 19 ②×c8 ②c5 20 ②×e7 營×e7 21 營×c5 White is much better (Shamkovich).

17 **②**×d7!

If 17 當×g2, then 17 ... ②×e5 18 de 쌀e8 brings equality.

17 ... 皆×d7

18 \$×g2 ±

Analysis by Josef Dorfman.

Variation IV

1	d4	216
2	c4	e6
3	g 3	d5
4	⊈g2	₽e7
5	a B	0-0
6	營c2 (30)	

This system enjoyed a surge in popularity in 1985-1986.

A 6 ... dc B 6 ... 2c6

C 6 ... b6 D 6 ... c5

6... Dbd770-0 transposes to the Closed System of the Catalan.

6 ... dc 7 ₩×c4 a6 8 Qf4!

This is the only plan which will secure an advantage for White.

8 ... 2d5 9 2c3 b5

9 ... ②×f4 10 gf 鱼d6 11 e3 ②d7 12 0-0 ②b6 13 營b3 f5 14 呂ac1 c6 15 ②a4 ②×a4 16 營×a4 鱼d7 17 營b3 營e7 18 ②e5 ±, Adamski-Velimirović, Bela Crkva 1984.

10 **\d3** \d3×f4

10 ... 鱼b7 11 ②×d5 Q×d5 12 0-0 ②d7 13 莒fd1 c5 14 e4 Qb7 15 d5 ed 16 ed Qf6 17 營c2 莒e8 18 h4 h6 19 ②d2 生, Dorfman-Bönsch, GDR 1984.


12 **②e4!** ± Analysis by Zoltan Ribli.

R

6 ... **£)c6**

7 0-0 **公b4** 8 營d1 (31)

8 對b3!? dc 9 對xc4 對d5 10 對xc7 益d6! 11 對c3 氫xa2 12 對d2 ∞, Sveshnikov-Klovans, Pinsk 1986.



8 ... c5 8 ... dc 9 \(\Delta \)a3! \(\pm \), Gavrikov-Speelman, London 1985. The players agreed a draw here.

9 **a**3 **€**)26 10 cd $4 \times d5$ 11 €)c3 2ac7 12 €D×d5 多×d5 13 dc $\triangle \times c5$ 14 **e4**

14 ②e5!? is suggested by Vilala.

14 ... **2**b6

15 龄c2 ±

 \mathbf{C}


Vera-Vilala, Cuban Ch. 1985.

6 ... b6 7 cd ed 8 €\a3

Now if Black plays 8 ... \(\Omega b 7\), then after 9 0-0 White stands better. Black should therefore try to put pressure on the centre immediately.

c5 8 9 0-0 €)c6! (32)

Black should again avoid the simple 9 ... \\(\Omega\)b7, as after 10 \(\Omega\)d1! White is better, according to Razuvavev.



⊈f4 10

Razuvayev suggests two alternatives 10 \(\mathbb{H}\)d1 and 10 \(\mathbb{O}\)e3

03, 10	□ar and	IU ageus.
10	•••	⊈b 7
11	dc	bc
12	ᡚe 5	و×e5
13	$\Delta \times e5 =$	

Razuvavev-Vaganian. Sochi 1986.

D


7 ... \checkmark 2c6!? 8 cd (8 dc d4!? ∞) 8 ... ②×d4 9 ②×d4 cd 10 de △×e6! 11 **②**×b7 **□**b8 12 **□**g2 **⊎**b6 **≅** Kengis.

> 8 **€**)×d4 €)c6

- (a) Not good is 8 ... **②**a6 9 cd 公xd5 10 囯d1 幻db4 11 皆b3 皆b6 12 Qe3 幻c5 13 對c4 幻d5 14 ②f5! ef 15 △×d5 ±, Kurajica-Groszpeter, Oberwart 1984.
- (b) 8 ... \black b6 is an interesting alternative, for example 9 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d1 ②c6 (9 ... △c5!?) 10 ②×c6 bc 11

②c3 營a6 12 ②a4 □b8 13 b3 and now:

- (b1) 13 ... e5 14 \(\textit{D}\)g5 dc 15 \(\textit{D}\)b2 \(\textit{T}\) Gulko-Georgadze. Tashkent 1984.
- (b2) 13 ... dc 14 总f4 罩b4 15 总d2 cb 16 ab \(\mathbb{H}\)d4 \(\infty\) Georgadze.



This position has been heavily discussed lately.

a5 10 ...

There are several alternatives:

- (a) 10 ... e5 11 \(\text{\(\ext{\) \}}}}} \end{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\) \ext{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\) \ext{\(\text{\) \ext{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\) \ext{\} \text{\(\ext{\) \ext{\(\text{\(\text{\) \ext{\(\text{\(\text{\) \ext{\(\text{\(\text{\) \ext{\(\text{\(\text{\) \ext{\(\text{\\ \ext{\) \ext{\(\text{\) \ext{\(\text{\) \ext{\(\text{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\) \exitinity}\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\} \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\} \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\} \ext{\\ \ext{\} \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \exi}\\ \ext{\\ \exi}\ext{\\ \exi}\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \ext{\\ \exi}\}\\ \ext{\\ \exi}\ext{\\ \ex seen in Dautov-Pigusov, USSR 1986. Now Dautov gives 12 <a>♠c3!? **益**b7 13 闰fd1 闰c8 14 e3 營e7 15 cd cd 16 \delta e2 e4 \delta.
- (b) 10 ... **Qb7** 11 **Qb2 營a5** 12 公式 單fd8 13 e3 intending 單fd1 — Ribli. This is better than 13 2a4 **②d7** 14 闰fel 闰ac8 15 e3 **②b6** = Korchnoi-Lengyel, Havana Ol. 1966.
- (c) 10 ... \(\textit{\textsq}\)b4 is the latest word, from Tukmakov-Belyavsky, USSR Ch. 1987: 11 \(\textit{\textit{L}}\)b2 \(\textit{\textit{E}}\)e7 12 a3 \(\textit{\textit{L}}\)d6 13 夕c3 乌b7 14 闰fd1 闰ac8 14 e4 dc 16 bc e5 17 **公a4 国cd8** 18 **国d3** Qc7 19 闰ad1 ½- ½.

11 **△b2**

The bishop does not have to be developed in this direction. Sterren, der Kurajca-van Thessaloniki Ol. 1984 saw instead 11 包c3 且a6 12 包a4 且c8 13 且d1 ₩c7 14 Qe3 c5 15 cd ᡚ×d5 16 A×d5! ed 17 国ac1 国fe8 18 營d2 **幽a7 19 幽×d5** ±

⊈a6 11 ... 11 ... a4!? is interesting, for example 12 2d2 a3 13 2d4 dc! 14 e3 cb 15 <a>\infty\$\infty\$\text{xb3} \emptyseta Kengis.

> **ᡚd2 分d7** 12 Äfd1 ₽c8 13 €)B ⊈f6 14 15 ∄ac1

15 ... 營e7?! 16 总×f6 生, H. Olafsson-Geller, Reykjavik 1986. After the game Geller, who was involved in a lot of heavy theory in this event, suggested 15 ... $\triangle \times b2$

16 營×b2 營b6. Word spread quickly, and in Kengis-Klovan, USSR 1987 this variation was put to the test.

> $\triangle \times b2$ 15 쌀×b2 ₩b6 16 €)c5 17 e4


17 ... △×c4 18 萬×c4 dc 19 萬×d7 買fd8 20 買×d8+ 買×d8 21 營c2 並 Kengis.

龄d4! dc 18

White now should have played 19 bc, with good prospects, instead of 19 De5?!

Kasparov seems to have set aside the Catalan for the time being, but it may be that he feels it is not the appropriate weapon against Karpov. As the return to the three-year cycle gives him more time to play in tournaments, we may see its return.

3 Hybrid Nimzo-Queen's Indian



Kasparov adopted this opening for his 1985 KRO match against Timman in Hilversum.

1	d4	€]f6
2	c4	e6
3	DB	b6
4	ᡚ c3	£b4

If Black chooses 4 ... 2b7 then he is back in the main lines of the Queen's Indian Defence, but is unable to exercise the same number of options. For example, if 5 a3, then the Petrosian System cannot be sidestepped as in the case of 4 a3, where 4 ... a6 and 4 ... c5 are available.

But White need not enter the theoretical frying pan with 5 a3. He can instead opt for less charted waters, for example Korchnoi's 5 \(\Omega f4 \), which has not had sufficient tests. Two examples:


(a) 5 ... Qb4 6 \b3! a5?! (6 ... c5

is stronger.) 7 e3 2 e4 (7 ... d6 8 Qe2 Qe4 9 0-0 Qxc3 10 bc has been played, but Black will have to improve on 10 ... g5 11 2×g5! ②×g5 12 對b5+ ②d7 13 對×g5 曾×g5 14 ②×g5 ②×g2 15 曾×g2 ± Korchnoi-Tarian, Lone Pine 1981.) 8 \(\mathbb{Q}\)d3 \(\infty\)\(\text{c3}!!\) (8 \(\text{...}\)\(\mathbb{Q}\times c3 + \text{...}\) 9 bc d6 is recommended by Ribli and Kallai, although it is by no means clear that their suggested plan of 10 ... 0-0, 11 ... \(\Delta\) bd7 and 12 ... f5 will bring about full equality.) 9 bc \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)e7 10 e4! \(\pm\) Korchnoi-Hübner, (m/10), Merano 1980/81.

(b) 5 ... \(\textit{\textit{A}}\) e7 (A bit passive, but possibly more accurate.) 6 \(\preceq \cong 2!\)? 4)h5? (Black overreacts to the threat of e2-e4. The bishop retreats to a reasonably useful post while the knight is left dangling.) 7 \(\text{d} d2 \) d5 8 cd ed 9 g3 0-0 10 \(\text{d} \) g2 better, since as in some lines of the Catalan the \(\Delta b7 \) is blocked in by its own pawn, which has no way of releasing the diagonal. This means that the d5-pawn will be under pressure for a long time. If Black advances ... c7-c5, then White can also develop pressure along the c-file.

Black is committing himself to an expansion of the kingside which will weaken the area surrounding his king. In return, he will achieve a powerful outpost for his knight at e4. A lively game is virtually guaranteed!

In the United States, 6 ... $\triangle \times c3+$ 7 bc d6 has been seen. trying to avoid the weakening effect of the kingside pawn advances.



Here we examine two lines:

II 7 ... g5!


> $\triangle \times c3+$ bc d6

This is an alternative which pits the classical central control on White's part against the hypermodern flexibility of Black's pieces. It was seen in the 18th Game of Kasparov-Karpov III which we follow here.

9 5 d2

g5 9 ... e5 10 f3 曾e7 11 e4 分bd7 12 $\triangle d3$ $\triangle f8$ 13 c5 \pm , Tal-Hecht, Varna Ol 1962, or 9 ... \(\D\)bd7 10 a4!? a5 11 莒b1 0-0 12 总d3 皆e8 (12 ... △×g2?! 13 ∃g1 gives White a strong attack.) 13 0-0 e5 14 e4 \pm Toshkov-Kosten, Yurmala 1987.

10 Ag3 (36)



10 ... 台e7!?

10 ... abd7 is a more logical plan which brought Black at least equality in Miles-Sokolov. Bugojno 1987, after 11 h4 国g8 12 hg hg 13 當c2 當e7 14 e4 0-0-0 15 \(\textit{Q}\)e2 e5. Better is 11 f3 \(\textit{D}\)h5 12 \(\textit{Q}\)f2 f5 13 总d3 皆f6 14 皆a4! 皆g7 15 $0-0-0\ 0-0\ 16\ h3 \pm Miles-Seirawan$. Saraievo 1987.

11 94

The promising sacrifical line 11 ≅h6! g4 15 Qh4 was successful for White in Bareyev-Dolmatov. USSR Ch. 1987.

> 11 ... **a**5

11 ... 2c6 12 2b3 2e4 13 2d3 ②×g3 14 hg is better for White. according to Kasparov.

12	h4	∄g8
13	hg	hg
14	₩b3!	ᡚa6
15	Äb1!	₹18
16	₩d1	

White already holds a clear advantage.

16	***	£c6
17	国h2	⊈ g7
18	c5!	bc
19	∆ b5	2 b8
20	dc	d5
21	⊈e5	\$18
22	Ah6	6)e8

Here Kasparov erred with ... 23 ₩h5?

23 c4! would have been quite strong. Kasparov gives the line 23 ... 2×b5 24 cb 2d7 25 2b2 2×c5 26 \cong c2 where White's positional superiority is far more convincing than Black's pawn. The opening battle is now over, and we present the rest of the game in abbreviated form.

23 ... f6 24 \(\beta\)h7 \(\oldsymbol{\partial}\)g7?

Karpov should have settled for with a probable draw.

25 曾63 曾67 26 曾h5+ 曾68 27 曾63 當f7 28 闰h6 ②e8 29 e4 g4 30 營f4 ②×b5 31 □×b5 ○d7 32 ②×c7 ②×c5 33 \delta e3 \overline{\pi} \times e4?

33 ... 夕×c7 34 Д×c5 圭.

34 $\triangle \times$ e4 de 35 $\triangle \times$ a5 f5 36 \triangle b4 營d7 37 營d4! Ξa7 38 Ξh7+?

Time trouble, 38 \delta e5! would have been devasting.

38 ... 夕g7 39 a5?? 當g6?

39 ... 曾×b5! 干.

40 營×d7 萬×d7 41 萬h4 萬gd8 42 c4 耳d1+ 43 當e2 耳c1!? 44 a6?? 耳c2+! 45 魯e1 耳a2 46 耳b6 耳d3! 47 c5 耳a1+ 48 當e2 耳a2+ 49 當e1 g3 50 fg \(\beta\times\gamma\g Qel 国gc2 53 c6 国a1 54 国h3 f4 55 耳b4 當f5?! 56 耳b5+ e5 57 耳a5 耳d1?

57 ... \ Act ! would have secured victory.

58 a7??


A horrible oversight! 58 c7! would have saved the game.

One of the worst played games of the many Kasparov-Karpov encounters, but one which illustrates the complexity of the positions arising from this line.

H

7 g5!

7 ... c5?! 8 \(\text{\alpha}\) d3 cd 9 ed \(\text{\alpha}\) xf3 10 ₩×f3 2c6 11 ₩e3 2e7 12 2g3 € b4 13 € b1 € h5 14 0-0 0-0 15 a3 Tukmakov-Salov, USSR Ch. 1987.



From this position we examine games from the Kasparov-Timman match held in Hilversum, 1985.

8 **②e4**

Kasparov-Timman (m/2): This saw a new and typically

Kasparovian gambit line:

9 4 d2 €)×c3

9 ... $\triangle \times g3$ 10 hg $\triangle f8$ was tried in Kasparov-Miles, Dubai Ol. 1986. After 11 f4 2g7 12 2a4 2e7 13 0-0-0 White held a small but welldefined advantage.

> 10 bc $\triangle \times c3$

The authors feel that 11 \(\mathbb{H}\)b1!? deserves serious attention, since it prevents the bishop from drawing back to b4. But the position after 11 ... d6 12 營c2 总×d2+ 13 營×d2 dangers for both sides.

11 ... **⊉b4** 12 h4 gh

hg hg 14 \subseteq c2 is an alternative.

∆d6 14 **₩g4** $\triangle \times g3$

14 ... 曾e7 15 c5 总×g3 16 曾×g3 &c6 ∞ Plaskett-Short, Brighton 1984.

> €)c6

15 ... €\a6 would be met by 16 c5 with a strong attack, according to Adorian.

16	d5	
17	⊈d3	d6
18	₩g7	∐g8
19	₩h7	月18


Not 19 ... ed 20 cd $\triangle \times$ d5 21 \triangle e4 $\triangle \times e4$ 22 $\Xi \times e4$ winning for White.

·		111119 101 "
20	€]e4	ᡚf5
21	ãh3	₩e 7
22	g4	ᡚh4
23	₩g7	0-0-0
24	€)f6	ed
25	cd	&b8

Ä×h4 $\triangle \times d5$ 26 27 **g**5

White has a won position and finished up with 27 ... $\triangle \times a2$ 28 gh d5 29 h7 營a3 20 囯d1 囯h8 31 勾g8 且b3 32 □a1 曾c5 33 曾×h8 d4 34 買×d4 營c3+ 35 營e2.

Kasparov-Timman (m/4)



9 \\c2

This is the more conservative route, reinforcing the centre and relying on the solidity of the pawn structure.

- $\triangle \times c3+$ 9
- 9 ... d6 10 \triangle d3 \triangle ×c3+ 11 bc transposes.
- 9 ... f5 10 \triangle d3 \triangle xc3+ 11 bc is better for White:
- (a) 11 ... $4 \times g3$ 12 hg $4 \times c6$ 13 d5 York 1981.
- (b) 11 ... d6 12 d5! ed 13 cd $\triangle \times$ d5 14 Ød4 ₩f6 15 f3 which has seen two impressive wins for White, separated by two decades:
- (b1) 15 ... ②×g3 16 hg ②d7 17 ④×f5 ⑤c5 (17 ... 0-0-0 18 ≌a4! is good for White after either 18 ... 營e5 19 當f2 a5 20 g4 嶌he8 21

□ae1 □b7 22 □×h6 or 18 ... a5 19 當f2 h5 20 耳ab1 h4 21 e4 点b7 22 gh gh 23 De6.) 18 Db5 19 19 Qg6+ \$d7 20 Qf5+ Qe6 21 (Slightly better was 22 ... \@xd4 23 ed c5, although after 24 0-0-0 White would still have a clear advantage.) 23 營f5+ 當e7 24 營d5 營f6 25 0-0-0 草af8 26 e4 營f7 (26 ... h5 27 e5! ±) 27 \$\frac{1}{2}f5+ \$\frac{1}{2}d7 28 ♠xh6 and White went on to win (Tal-Dückstein, Zürich 1959).

(b2) 15 ... ac5 16 axf5 abd7 17 ②b5 0-0-0 18 \ \ d1!! \ \ de6 19 \ \ de4 費b8 20 買×d6! 包e5 21 買×d8+ 耳×d8 22 0-0 Qd7 23 幻d4 Qa4? 25 △xe5 1-0 (Ribli-Seirawan, Malta Ol. 1980).

10 bc d6


10 ... ②×g3 11 hg ②c6 was the standard continuation until 12 \(\Bar{\text{B}}\)h5! provided a clear advantage in Ionescu-Kengis, Timisoara 1987.

11 Ad3 f5

11 ... ②×g3 12 hg! ②d7 (12 ... ₩f6 13 Qe4! ±) 13 Qe4 Q×e4 14 쌀xe4 & f6 15 쌀d3 g4 16 & d2 쌀e7 17 a4 a5 18 闰b1 ± Christiansende Firmian, USA 1985.

12 d5 (39)

An interesting alternative is 12 c5!? Black should reply 12 ... dc 13 2e5 with an unclear position in which White has full compensation, but not 12 ... bc 13 \bar{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$b}}\$}}3} after which it is very difficult for Black, for example 13 ... \(\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{Black}}}\) 8 14 £xe4! fe 15 €d2 cd 16 cd €d5 17 台c2 台b7 (17 ... 名c6 18 0-0 台a6 Barevey-Saloy, USSR Ch. 1987.) 18 0-0 h5 (18 ... 0-0?! 19 f3 ± Basin-Agzamov, Pitsunda 1985, or 18 ... **公d7** 19 **宫fcl** ± Agzamov-Bibilashvili, Pitsunda 1985.) 19 h4 g4 20 f3! ± Kapengut and I. Botvinnik.



12 ... **②c5**

Other paths have been explored, and new ones sought,

- (a) 12 ... ed 13 cd $\triangle \times d5$ 14 $\triangle d4$ transposes to Ribli-Seirawan, above.
- (b) 12 ... **2**d7 13 **2**×e4 fe 14 營×e4 營f6 15 0-0 0-0-0 has been suggested by Kharitonov as an improvement on 15 ... \$\oldsymbol{\infty} c5 16 \oldsymbol{\text{\infty}} d4 ± Kharitonov-Vaiser, USSR 1984. But Kharitonov supplies his own remedy: 16 對×e6 對×e6 17 de 公c5 18 2d2 2xe6 19 f3 where White stands better.
- (c) 12 ... \forall f6 was introduced in Salov-Timman, St. John (m) 1988: 13 <u>A</u>×e4 fe 14 <u>\(\text{\text{W}}\) ×e4 (14 \(\text{\text{Q}}\)d4 ed)</u> 14 ... 曾×c3+15 曾e2 曾b2+16 包d2 營f6 17 h4 g4 18 h5 (18 營×g4 ed) 18 ... **公d7** 19 **总h4** 曾f5 20 曾×e6+

營×e6 21 de 幻c5 22 e7 當d7 (22 ... $\triangle \times g2$? 23 $\Xi hg1 \Omega h3$ 24 e4 intending 25 含e3, 且g3.) 23 f3 且ag8 24 e4 gf+ 25 gf 国g2+ 26 魯e3 国hg8 27 且afl 白e6 28 且f2 且×f2 29 當×f2 회f4 (29 ... 회g5 30 회f1) 30 회f6 회c6 31 2b3 Be8 32 2d4 2d7 33 2b5 當f7 34 Qh4 国g2+ 35 當e3 包e6 36 ②c3 c5 37 ②e2 Qa4 38 ②c3 Qc6 39 De2 Da4 40 Dc3 Dc6 41 Db5 Q×b5 42 cb 包d4 43 Qf6 E×a2 44 ②×d4 \(\mathbb{A}\)a3+ 45 \(\mathbb{A}\)f4 cd 46 \(\mathbb{A}\)g1 當×e7 47 耳g7+ 當e6 48 耳g6+ 當e7 49 萬×h6 萬b3 50 萬h7+ 當e6 51 国h6+ 當e7 52 国h7+ 當e6 53 国×a7 闰×b5 54 h6 闰h5 55 h7 闰h3 56 国b7 国h1 57 国g7 當f6 58 国b7 當e6 59 萬×b6 萬×h7 60 萬b5 萬h1 61 国d5 国d1 62 国h5 国d3 1/2-1/2.


13 h4

13 de would be met by 13 ... ⑤×d3+ 14 份×d3 份f6 15 份d4 頁f8 with unclear complications.

13 ... **g4**

13 ... ②×g3 14 fg is significantly better for White.

14 6 d4 **₩f6 15 0-0** (40)



15 ... 6 ha6 15 ... ②×d3 16 對×d3 e5 has also

been seen with some regularity. but both Kasparov and Tony Miles have been quite effective in dealing with it. 17 <a>\(\pri \times f5\) is the strongest move, and on 17 ... \(\Omega c 8. \) then, with the brilliant 18 f4!! (Kasparov-Timman, Hilversum (m/6) 1985 saw 18 2d4 ed 19 cd 營f5! 20 e4 營g6 21 營c3 0-0 22 耳fe1 ②d7 23 e5 Qb7 24 且e3, but now with 24 ... \(\mathbb{A}\) ae8! 25 \(\mathbb{A}\) ae1 de 26 de ②c5 27 e6 ☐e7 the situation would be unclear, not much better for Black, as some authorities have claimed. White plays 28 \(\text{Qe5!}, e.g. $28 \dots$ $\triangle \times 66$ $29 \triangle g3$ or 29 de where Black would have to avoid 29 ... ₩×e6? because of 30 \(\textit{Q}\)d6, and adopt 29 ... $\Xi \times e6$ 30 $\Delta \times c7 \equiv$), White breaks through to score the point:

- (a) 18 ... 對×f5 19 e4 對h5 20 fe de 21 c5 當d8 22 d6 曾e8 23 dc+ 當×c7 24 曾d5 公c6 25 闰f7+ Qd7 26 闰af1 国d8 27 国1f6 當c8 28 cb ab 29 皆b5! 1-0 Miles-Belyavsky, Tilburg 1986.
- (b) 18 ... $\triangle \times f5$ 19 e4 $\triangle h7$ 20 fe ₩g7 21 ed cd 22 🚨×d6 🖾d7 (Nunn).
- (c) 18 ... gf 19 \(\mathbb{Z}\times f3\) \(\mathbb{Q}\times f5\) 20 且×f5 曾g7 21 요×e5! de 22 d6 公c6 23 曾d5 曾d7 24 莒×e5+ ⑤×e5 25 曾×e5曾f726 亘t1+曾g827 罝f6! cd 28 曾g3+ 曾g7 29 国g6 国h7 30 $\forall \times d6 \pm is but one line of$ John Nunn's extensive analysis of this position in New In Chess Yearbook 6.

16 €)×e6 ف×e6 ک **ᡚ**27

Miles-Timman, Tilburg 1986 saw instead 22 ... ②c5 23 总xf8+ 总xf8 24 營xh6 營f6 25 总f5 总xf5 26 營xf6 总xf6 名7 exf5 总a6 28 总f2 总xc4 29 总d4 总f7 30 f6 and now instead of 30 ... 总h7? 31 总xc5!, the best move was 30 ... ②d7, after which the chances would have been equal.

23 萬×8

Kasparov claimed that 25 g5 leads to a substantial advantage for White but Timman gives 25 ... 包c5 26 邑fl 邑×fl+27 營×fl 鱼a6 28 蛩g1 鱼×c4 intending 29 ...

⑤xe4 30 ⑤xe4 ७xe4 31 ७xg7 ⑥xd5 and Black wins.


26	***	쌀f6 !
27	cd	Дh 5
28	65	

If 28 dc+, then Black would reply 28 ... \$\delta 57.

28		偿×g6
	•••	0
29	₩×g6	.⊈×g6
30	e6	ᡚc5
31	d7	包×d7
32	ed	≅d8
33	1 e6	

Here Timman erred with 33 ... ②h5 and the game eventually ended in a draw. He should have played 33 ... ②f5, where his analysis runs 34 闰f6 ②×d7 (34 ... □×d7 35 ②e5) 35 딜f7 ⑤f5 36 ⑤f4 ③c8 37 h5 딜h8 38 g4 ⑤h6! 39 ②×h6 ⑤×h6 40 딜g7 ②×g4! 41 □×g4 ⑥×h5 42 c4 闰f5 with an endgame that Black should win.

4 Modern Benoni



Kasparov, once an advocate of this opening for Black, has been devastating against it with White. Watson (1985) is a good survey of the theory.


1	d4	€)f6
2	c4	c5
3	d5	e6
4	D c3	ed
5	cd	d6
6	e4	g 6
7	f4	<u>∆</u> 27

White is preparing to blast open the centre so Black must not be tardy with his development, e.g.

(a) 7 ... a6? 8 e5! ②fd7 9 ②f3 ②g7 10 ②e4! d×e5 11 ②d6+ ⑤f8 12 ②e2 (Kapengut) or 12 ②g5 ef 13 ②d×f7 ⑥e7+ 14 ②e2 intending 15 ③×f4! ± Sishkin-Volovich, USSR 1960.

 1958.) 9 e5! de 10 fe ②×e5 11 ②b5+ ②ed7+ 12 當位 ②g4+ 13 當g3 ②e5 14 ②×e5 營×e5+ 15 ②f4 ± Shamkovich-Zhelandinov, USSR 1959.





Here Black usually chooses between:

I 8 ... **幻fd7**


II 8 ... **2**bd7

8 ... \(\text{\ti}\text{\texitex{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\t

8 ... **5**fd7 9 a4 (43) 0-0

This sensible move is practically forced:

(a) 9 ... a6 10 \(\text{\textit{Le}}2! \(\text{e}}}}}}e2! \\ \text{\tinte\text{\tin}}}}}}}}}}}e16 \text{\texi}}}}}}}}}} \end{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tex




쌀d8 12 회f3 0-0 13 0-0 트e8 14 쌀c2! ± Cebalo-Lobron, Reggio Emilia 1985/86, and although perhaps Black is safe after 14 ... \$\overline{2}\$f6, e.g. 15 2d2 Ah3, 15 f5! gf 16 ef 2g4 17 € g5 leaves White with an advantage.

- (b) 9 ... 2a6 10 2f3 2c7 (10 ... **a**b4? led to a quick kill in Kasparov-Nunn, Lucerne Ol. 1982: 11 0-0 a6 12 🚨×d7+ 🚨×d7 13 $f5! \pm 13 \dots 0-0 14 \Omega g5 f6 15 \Omega f4 gf$ 16 <u>Q</u>×d6 <u>Q</u>×a4 17 <u>Z</u>×a4 <u>B</u>×d6 18 分h4 fe 19 分f5 對d7 20 分×e4 當h8 21 $\triangle \times c5$ 1-0) 11 0-0 (11 $\triangle e2!$ may be a significantly stronger move) and now:
- (b1) 11 ... **5**×b5 12 ab 0-0 13 △d2 △b6 is level, according to Kapengut.
- (b2) 11 ... a6 12 $\triangle \times d7 + \triangle \times d7$ 13 f5! 0-0 14 Qg5 Qf6 (14 ... f6 15 Qf4 ±) 15 皆d2! 包e8 16 皆f4 皆e7 17 ₩h4! ± Baumbach-Danner, corr. 1985.
- (b3) 11 ... 0-0 12 Qd3 互b8 13 Qe3 a6 14 Qf2 b5 (14 ... 2f6 15 Ah4 對d7 16 對d2 b5 17 ab ab 18 ②×f6 ○×f6 19 e5 ○ g7 20 ○ e4 de 21 d6 ± ± Vaganian-Hausner,

Athens 1971) 15 ab ab 16 \(\mathre{\Pi}\)e1 (16 $\triangle h4!$? $\triangle f6$ 17 $\triangle g3$ intending e5 -Schranz.) 16 ... b4 17 2a4 2b6 18 分×h6 耳×h6 19 對b3 且a6 20 e5 ±± Zerlinsky-Lipiridi, corr. 1985.

(c) 9 ... 皆h4+ 10 g3 皆e7 11 包f3 0-0 12 0-0 \$\alpha\$a6 13 e5! de (13 ... \$\alpha\$b4 14 \(\mathbb{A}\)e1 a6 15 \(\mathbb{A}\)f1 de 16 d6 \(\mathbb{\overline}\)e8 17 fe b6 18 e6 fe 19 \(\text{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}\$}}}}}}}}} \exititilitiles \exititit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\text{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\tex{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex{ Velimirović, Moscow IZ 1982, where 19 ... Ab7! 20 Exe6 曾f7 21 \$\preceph{8}\$ would have led to unclear according complications Keene. So perhaps White should simply play 18 2g5 with a comfortable advantage.) 14 d6 \dd d8 15 ②d5 ± Kouatly-Hulak, Toluca IZ 1982.

> ᡚf3 (44) 10



€)a6 10

Again there are a number of alternatives, but with precise play White comes out way ahead:

(a) 10 ... b6 11 0-0 \triangle a6 12 \triangle ×a6 ♠xa6 13 f5! gives White a strong attack. Hollis-Hammar, corr. 1977/78. If 13 ... De5, then 14 ②×e5 Q×e5 15 \forall f3 intending 16 **∆**h6.

- (b) 10 ... **£** f6 11 0-0 **£** g4 is met by 12 e5! 2h5 (12 ... de 13 fe 2fd7 14 e6! fe 15 de $\triangle \times$ e6 16 \triangle g5 \pm) 13 쌓e1! a6 14 요c4 ± Dobosz-Streitberg, Prague 1981.
- (c) 10 ... 互e8 11 0-0 a6 12 总d3 ± ECO.
- (d) 10 ... a6 11 \(\text{Qe2} \) (11 \(\text{Qc4}! ?) comes into consideration.) and now:
- (d1) 11 ... **2**f6?! 12 0-0 **2**g4 13 e5! \(\Delta \times f3 \) 14 \(\Delta \times f3 \) de 15 fe \(\Delta \) fd7 16 e6! ± Semkov-Popov, Bulgarian Ch. 1980/81. A striking example is 12 ... 曾c7 13 e5! 包e8 14 e6! fe 15 এc4 \end{a}e7 16 de \overline{1}c7 17 f5! \overline{1}c8 18 Qg5 Qf6 19 De4! Q×g5 20 Df×g5 gf 21 $6 \times d6 \pm Kasparov-Kuiipers$. Dortmund 1980.
- (d2) 11 ... 營c7 is dubious as well as White has a clear advantage after 12 0-0 c4 13 2 d2 b5 14 ab **⑤b6 15 ⑤h1 (Li Zunian-Sax, Biel** IZ 1985). But 13 Ae3! Dc5 14 e5 is even stronger.
- (d3) 11 ... 莒e8 12 0-0 勾f8 13 △e3!? is unclear, e.g. Petursson-Stefansson, Icelandic Ch. 1987: 13 ... Qg4 14 營d2 包bd7 15 Qd3 Ec8 16 \$\precent{\mathbb{G}}\text{h1} where instead of 16 ... ₩a5? 17 ②g5 ±, Black could have created interesting complications with 16 ... c4 17 \(\text{Q} \) c2 \(\text{Q} \times \text{f3} \) 18 \(\text{Z} \times \text{f3} \) 2c5. Better is 13 e5! 2bd7 14 2g5 de 15 f5 \$16 16 fg hg 17 \$\textit{Q}\$e3 \$\textit{Q}\$8h7 18 $\triangle \times h7$ $\triangle \times h7$ 19 $\triangle \times c5 \pm$ Barbero-Szalanczi, Bundesliga 1987.

(d4) 11 ... a5 12 0-0 2 a6 13 2 b5 \$\f6 14 e5 de 15 fe \$\infty \times d5 16 \textit{\textit{Qg5}} \dotsigned delta 1982.

€)b4 11 0-0

Kapengut suggested 11 ... 2c7!? here but after 12 \(\Omega c4 \) (12 \(\Omega d3 \) is a viable alternative, e.g. 12 ... a6 13 Дез! ± Federau-Tringov, Berlin Open 1985.) and now:

- (a) 12 ... 耳e8 13 耳e1 幻b6 14 △b3 White stands better, according to Kasparov.
- (b) 12 ... a6 13 闰e1 闰b8 (13 ... b5 14 ab ± Horstmann-Soos, Lugano 1984.) 14 e5 b5 15 e6 (Watson's 15 △a2 is also good.) 15 ... bc 16 e7 營e8 17 f5!! 當h8 18 ef(皆)+ 皆×f8 19 fg hg 20 \(\delta g5 \pm \) Cherepkov-Mochalov, USSR 1983.
- (c) 12 ... \$\overline{2}\$ b6 13 \$\overline{2}\$ a2 \$\overline{2}\$ g4 14 h3 鱼×f3 15 營×f3 ②a6 16 a5 ②d7 17 এc4 2b4 18 2b5 \fo f6 19 \fo b3 a6?! 20 公c7! 且ac8 21 包e6 目fe8 and in Pergericht-Grünfeld. Brussels 1986 White broke through with 22 f5! fe 23 fe \\dot{\text{\text{d}}}\d8 24 \\\dot{\text{\text{Q}}}\g5.

12 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e1 **a**6


12 ... 且e8 (12 ... 包f6 13 h3 ± Watson.) 13 h3 a6 14 \(\Omega c4 \(\Omega d4 + 15 \) ⑤×d4 cd 16 ⑤a2! ⑤×a2 17 ☐×a2 營h4 18 b3! worked to White's advantage in Meyer-Einarsson. Revkiavik 1984.

13 Aft (45)

The bishop must retreat all the way home, to avoid being further harrassed by the black knights.

13 ... ∄e8

13 ... **公**f6 14 h3 且e8 15 **以**c4! **②d7 (15 ... b6 16 曾b3 莒a7 17 e5** あd7 18 あe4 de 19 むd6 耳f8 20 $\triangle \times 17! \triangle \times 17 = 21 = 60$



+ Pevenka-Jandovsky, corr. 1984.) 16 Qe3 Qb6 17 Qf1 Qd7 18 Qf2 国c8 19 g4 c4 20 a5 2a8 21 e5 gives White a dominating position (Horvath-Bönsch, Kezthely 1980).

14 h3 ₽b8

Alternatives are not sufficient:

- (a) 14 ... 皆c7 15 皆b3 f5 16 总d2 \$\)f8 17 e5 was crushing in Nyepomavaschy-Agapov, Leningrad 1980.
- (b) 14 ... b6 15 \(\text{Q} e3 \(\text{Q} b7 \) 16 \(\text{Q} f2 \) 寬c8 (Ree-Hulak, Wijk aan Zee 1983) 17 曾b3 ± Ilić.
- (c) 14 ... **2** f6 15 **2** c4 transposes to Horvath-Bönsch, above.


15	⊈e3	b6
16	省d2	∆ b7
17	⊈f2	₩e7
18	⊈c4	₩8
19	₽g3	∆ h6
20	₩f2	

This position is clearly better for White (Enevoldsen-Filipowicz, Siegen Ol. 1970)

II

€)bd7 (46) Kasparov (BCO 2) proclaims this line pretty much dead after:

9 e5 de



₩h4+ 11 е6 11 ... fe 12 de 0-0 13 af3 ad4 14 **2**e3 or 14 **2**g5!

12 g3

Co-author Shamkovich proposes 12 \(\mathref{a}\)d2!, e.g. 12 ... fe 13 de 쌀g5+ 14 當c2 쌀f5+ 15 쌀d3 쌀×e6 16分分 with a decisive attack, since 16 ... 0-0 is met by 17 \(\textit{\ti otherwise 17 \(\mathbb{E}\)e1 is coming:

12 €2×**g3** 份×h1 13 hg

It is possible, however, that recent developments may rehabilitate the line:

14 **\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}}}e3}**

Another alternative is 14 ed+ 鱼×d7 15 鱼×d7+ (15 營e2+!? 當f8 16 鱼e3 邑e8 favours Black) 15 ... 當×d7 16 皆g4+f5 (Not 16 ... 當d8?! 17 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)g5+ f6 18 0-0-0! \(\pm\)++ Plaskett-Norwood, Chester 1983.) 17 \alpha a4+ \$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}\$}}}}\$}}} \end{times \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}}}}\$}}}} \ 19 **总**×c5 曾g2 20 曾c4! with better chances for White; Burgess-J. Anderson, London 1985) 19 bc 掛×d5 20 闰d1 皆c6 (Riemersma-Bezemer, Hilversum 1986) 21 營×c6!? bc 22 幻f3 ∞ Norwood.

£×c3+! 14 ... 14 ... 0-0 15 ed \(\mathbb{Q}\times d7 \) 16 \(\mathbb{Q}\times d7\) 買ae8 17 鱼×e8 買×e8 18 營e2! 鱼d4 Littlewood-Norwood. London Docklands 1985, and now 20 世c2! would have secured a significant advantage.

₩e4 15 bc ₩**13 公X** 16 €)×f3 17 fe 0-018 de ⊈xd7 19 ed $\triangle \times d7$ 買×ß 20

This position was supposed to be clearly better for White, according to Norwood, but 21 △d4+ \$f8 24 \$d2 b6 brought Black equality in G. Nikolić-Lindemann, Harkany 1987. So White should play ...

¤×c3 21 \(\text{\ti}\}\text{\ti}\}\etx{\text{\tetx{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\tetx{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\t

當f8 24 总d6+ 當e8 25 當d2 leads to a similar advantage as that presented below.


> Де6+ **\$18** 22 **⊈**e8 23 **∆d6+** ĦВ 24 **⊈**d2 ¤e1 **闰12+** 25

Or 25 ... 曾d8 26 总d5 莒f2+ 27 當c3 當d7 28 Q×c5 国h2 29 国e7+ 32 \(\textit{\textit{d}}\)d6 ±±.

> 26 **⊈**c3 **月13+** 27 **\$**c4 **\$**d8 28 **∆**×c5

White has a winning position analysis bv co-author Shamkovich.

5 King's Indian



Kasparov was an advocate for the Black side of this opening for some time in the early stages of his career, and seems to be rediscovering it now. This may have something to do with the fact that Anatoly Karpov is one of the leading exponents of the White side of the opening! As Karpov no longer employs the defence as Black, we have had little opportunity to see how Kasparov reacts to it these days. Nevertheless, his brave gambiteering interpretation of most of the common systems is of great interest to modern chess players, being part of a long creative tradition which has featured such players as Boleslavsky, Bronstein, Geller, Stein and Fischer. We recommend that you study his brilliant handling of this opening in games against Vaiser

(Moscow 1981), Kavalek (Bugojno 1982). Belvavsky (m/8 1983) and Tukmakov (USSR Ch. 1981), all of which are annotated in detail by Kasparov in *The Test of Time*.

1	d4	€]f6
2	c4	g6
3	ᡚc3	g7
4	e4	d6
5	∮ I3	0-0
6	∯ e2	e5

Other moves are not considered to be sufficient for equality:

(a) 6 ... Qg4 7 Qe3 Qfd7!? 8 包gl! ±, e.g. Kasparov-Vukic, 9 ②g×e2 e5 10 0-0 a5 11 \dd2 ②c6 12 f3 ed 13 ②×d4 ②c5 14 莒ad1 ②e6 15 ②db5! 莒e8 16 曾c1 曾b8 17 ♣h6 ♣h8 18 ♠d5 ♠b4 19 a3 ♠a6 洹e7 24 总f4 莒d7 25 ⑤×d6 營d8 26 **全**b5 **全**c5 27 **些**e3 b6 28 b4 ab 29 ab ②a6 30 Qg5 \bar{4}b8 31 d6 \sqrt{2}×b4 32 Qe7 曾b7 33 耳×f7 當×f7 34 耳f1+ $\triangle f6 35 \triangle \times f6 1-0$.

(b) 6 ... 2c6 7 d5 2b8 8 2g5 h6 9 \(\text{de3} \) c5 10 \(\text{dod2} \)! \(\text{da6} \) 11 0-0 \(\text{dd7} \) 12 f4 ± Naidorf-Cordovil, Siegen Ol. 1970.


(c) 6 ... c5 7 d5 e6 8 0-0 罩e8 9 **Q**f4! ed 10 ed **Q**e4 11 **Q**×e4 □×e4 12 對d2 ± Sosonko-Keene. Hastings 1975/76.

Дe3 7

It is this fairly conservative treatment which has brought Kasparov significant success as White. White postpones castling in favour of rapid development, with an eye toward an early queenside battle.

Black has no fewer than eight defensive tries:

7 ... 2c6 II 7 ... 2g4 Ш 7 ... **幻bd**7 IV 7 ... ed V 7 ... c6 VI 7... 曾e7 VII 7 ... ₩e8 VIII 7 ... h6!? T



9 ... **②**d7 10 b4 f5 11 f3 and now: (a) 11 ... f4 12 \(\textit{\textit{L}}\)f2 a5 (12 ... g5 13 c5 2 f6 14 2 c4 2 e8 15 cd cd 16 **2**b5 b6 17 a4 ± Gligorić-Nagendra, Lucerne Ol. 1982) 13 a3! g5 14 c5 ②f6 15 cd cd 16 ②c4 ab 17 ab ∃×a1 18 營×a1 ②e8 19 營a5! was decisive in Wirthensohn-Valiente, Lucerne Ol. 1982.

且a8 14 c5 ± Magerramov-Lechtynsky, Baku 1980.

(c) 11 ... 包f6 12 c5 h5 13 h3 當h8 14 ②c4 ②e8 15 曾d2 Qd7 16 0-0-0 ②g8 17 \$b1 \$b8 ∞ Stone-Gurevich, World Open 1987.

> 10 g4 €)e8

 $10 \dots \triangle \times g4$ runs into $11 \triangle \times g4$ f5 12 h3!? fg 13 hg a6 14 a4 \(\textit{\textsub}\)d7 15 f3 ± Polugayevsky-Rodriguez, Toluca IZ 1982.


> ₽h3 11 g5

11 ... f5 creates serious kingside weaknesses: 12 gf xf6 13 h4 a6 14 h5 ± Petkevich-A. Petrosian. USSR 1974.

12	∐gl	a 6
13	a4	∄b8
14	₽g4!	$\Delta \times g^2$
15	₩×g4	b6
16	₽h1	

White has a much better game (Portisch-Andersson, Siegen Ol. 1970).

П



If any move were to directly refute White's plans it might be

this one, since it attacks the strong △e3. But White can attack the Black queen with tempo, and this leaves the 2g4 looking a bit silly. Nevertheless, this is a popular option for Black these days.

> 8 \(\textit{\Omega}\)g5! 9 ₽h4 €)c6

If Black continues the assault with 9 ... g5 then after 10 \(\mathbb{Q} \) g3 \(\infty \) h6 either 11 h3 or Geller's interesting idea 11 c5!? intending 11 ... g4 12 ♠h4 is sufficient to guarantee an advantage for White.

- 9 ... c6 10 曾c2 幻d7 11 闰d1 曾e7 12 0-0 h5!? 13 h3 \$\infty\$h6 seems inadequate for equality after 14 c5!? dc 15 de ②×e5 16 ②×e5 쌀×e5 17 Werner, Germany 1987.
- 9 ... 2d7 is a more reasonable plan. After 10 0-0 \$\times h6 11 \$\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\$\geq}}}} c2,} 11 ... g5 is playable, for example 12 Ag3 g4 13 Ah4!? 14 Ab5 f5 ∞ Garcia Palermo-Klundt. Germany 1987.

10 d5 ②e7 11 **ad2** €)h6

11 ... h5 allows White to take charge on the queenside with 12 0-0 包h6 13 f3 c5 14 罩b1! f5 15 b4 b6 16 bc bc 17 \\dot{\psi}\a4 \dot \text{Grefe-} Ouinteros, Lone Pine 1976.

> 12 f3 **g**5

12 ... c5 13 闰b1 f5 14 0-0 幻f7 15 b4 b6 16 bc bc 17 a4 also gives White a strong queenside initiative (Spassov-Doncey, Bulgarian Ch. 1981).

> 13 ₽12 f5 14 0-0 **€**2g6

14 ... c5 (via transposition) was seen in Ki. Georgiev-Damlianović, Vršac 1987: 15 a3 g4 16 fg \$\infty\$ xg4 17 \$\infty\$ xg4! fg 18 b4! b6 19 ♣h4 ±.

> 15 c5 包f4 16 cd cd 17 ⊈h1

White stands better (Podgaets-Legky, USSR 1981). Although the Black pawns seem to be advancing toward the White monarch, White can exchange on f5 and then use e4 as a base of operation for his knights.

Ш

②bd7 (50) 分 统 允 **分** 8 0-0 c6

As might be expected there are a large number of alternatives. We cannot go into great detail in a book of this size, but refer the reader to Keene et al. (Forthcoming).

(a) 8 ... ed 9 公×d4 罩e8 10 f3 c6 11 ②c2 ⑤b6 12 ☆d2 ②e6 13 b3 d5 14 ed cd 15 c5 \pm Cobo-Hulbrandsen, Siegen Ol. 1970.

(b) 8 \rightarrow e7 9 de de 10 \rightarrow d5 \(\perp\)d8 (10 ... \(\pri \)×d5 11 cd would also leave White in control) 11 \begin{array}{c} \text{dec} 2 \$\,\text{g4} 12 \text{\textsq} \text{g5} \,\text{f6} 13 \text{\textsq} \d2 \,\text{c6} 14 \text{\textsq} \text{e3} \,\text{f5} 15 ef $\triangle \times e3$ 16 $\triangle \times e3$ gf 17 c5 is better for White, but Antunac suggests 14 ... 2c5.

- (c) 8 ... \(\mathbb{Z}\) e8 appears sensible, but it is hard for Black to achieve equality after 9 d5! e.g. 9 ... 2g4 10 Qg5 f6 11 Qh4 h5 (11 ... 2f8 12 ରd2 ରh6 13 f3 ରf7 14 b4 🖺 h6 15 \triangle f2!? f5 16 c5 \triangle d7 17 c6!? is given by Gligorić.) 12 2d2 2h6 13 f3 திர 14 b4 இh6 15 திb3 c5 16 dc bc ②d5 ± Reshevsky-Kavalek, Netanya 1971.
- (d) 8 ... a5 is a premature flank action which is countered in the centre with 9 de de 10 \(\precentre \operatorname{1} \operatorname{1} \operatorname{1} \operatorname{2} \operatorname{1} \operatorname{2} \operatorname{1} \operatorname{2} \op 2d2 c6 12 2a4 h6 13 h3 2gf6 14 △e3 ± Uhlmann-Knaak, Leipzig 1980.
- (e) 8 ... 2g4 9 2g5 f6 10 2d2! is probably the best path to the advantage, e.g. 10 ... c6 11 b4 f5 12 d5 f4 13 Ac1! c5 14 Db5 Odf6 15 Og5 ± Uhlmann-Knaak, Leipzig 1977 13 闰ad1 台e7 14 总e3 f5 15 de de 16 ef gf 17 目fel 當h8 18 点fl ± Miles-Ciocaltea, Montilla 1978.


9 d5

It seems that this is the best available move, in light of:

- (a) 9 ... ②g4 10 ②g5 f6 11 ②d2! ₩e7 12 De1 f5 13 ef gf 14 \(\textit{\textit{L}}\times g4 fg 15 2e4 is better for White, according to Tseitlin.
- (b) 9 ... c5 10 Del De8 11 Dd3 a6 12 a4 營e7 13 營d2 包c7 14 a5 f5 15 f3 f4 16 Q f2 Q f6 17 b4 cb 18 2 a4

gave White a tremendous game in Polugayevsky-Nunn, Toluca IZ 1982.

2]g4 10 cd ₽g5 **f6** 11 $\triangle d2$ (51) 12



12 ... €)c5

Also inadequate is 12 ... \$\times\$h6 13 闰c1 a6 14 a4 包f7 15 營c2 Qh6 16 b4 ± Vogt-Kaspaer, Leipzig 1982.

13 b4 **②a6** 14 a3

White's spatial advantage on the queenside, combined with the lack of Black counterplay on the kingside, gives the first player much better chances (Yusupov-Gavrikov, Yerevan 1982)


IV

ed 8 ②×d4 (52)

The surrender of the centre is rarely a good idea so early in the opening.

> 8 ₿e8 f3 9 **c6** 10 A.12

10 0-0 d5 11 cd ᡚ×d5 12 ᡚ×d5 cd was roughly level in Damljanović-Byrne, New York



Open 1987.

V

10 ⊌d2 d5! 11 ed cd 12 0-0 ac6 13 axc6 bc provided equality in Portisch-Bouaziz, Szirak IZ 1987.

10 ... d5

If Black does not aim for this central counterplay he will sit by idly while his opponent continues to improve his position.

11	ed	cd
12	0-0	ᡚc6
13	c5!	

White stands better, for example 13 ... 2h5 14 2d2 2e5 15 g3 2g7 16 2fe1 2e6 17 2e6 2e6 18 f4 2e6 19 bc 2e6 Hort-Gligorić, Tilburg 1977.


8 d5!

Once again this central advance is the correct response to the move ... c6.

8	•••	cd
9	cd	₽]g4
10	∆g5	f6
11	∆ d2!	≨]h6
12	0-0	217
13	②e1	f5
14	€]d3	

White is better, for example 14 ... ②d7 15 \(\tilde{\text{\tilde{\text{\te}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tetx{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi{\text{\texi}\text{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\texi{\tex{\texi{\texictex{\texi}\tint{\texi}\texi{\texi{\texi}\tilint{\te

VI



₽h4

€)d2

h5

10

11


包f5 a6 22 h4 包h7 23 闰g1 曾f8 24 曾e2 闰a7 25 a4 b6 26 曾h5 曾h8 27 闰g6 闰d7 28 闰ag1 闰ab7 29 曾g4 闰bc7 30 闰g2 闰b7 31 當f1 闰a7 32 雷g1 闰f7 33 包e2 曾c8 34 f4 b5 35 ab ab 36 cb 闰ab7 37 h5 包f8 38 曾h3! 包×g6 39 hg+ 當g8 40 gf+當f8 1-0.

11	•••	c5
12	dc	bc
13 .	b 4	⊈e6
14	0-0	ᡚd7
15	€]b3	g5!

In Kasparov-Morrison, Graz World Youth Team Championship 1981 15 ... ②×h2? led to rapid disaster: 16 登×h2 g5 17 ②a5! ②b8 18 夏g3 h4 19 夏g4 盈×g4 20 登×g4 hg 21 fg a6 22 ②d1! d5 23 ②e3 迢a7 24 cd 登×b4 25 登e6+ 迢af7 26 ②ac4 登e7 27 ②f5 1-0.


Chances are roughly level, but the position holds plenty of possibilities for White.

VII



10	$\triangle d2$	و×e5
11	€]d5	કો×13+
12	∆ ×f3	₩ 48
13	∆c3	$\Delta \times c3$
14	∮ો×લ3	

White stands better (Ivkov-Byrne, Bugojno 1978).



This is a new and popular variation.

8 d5

The point of Black's strategy is revealed if White goes pawnhunting: 8 de ②g4! 9 ed ②xe3 10 fe ②xc3+! 11 bc cd 12 0-0 ②c6 and Black has plenty of compensation for the pawn (Glek-Khalifman, Leningrad 1985). 9 ②f4 may be a bit better, e.g. 9 ... ②xe5 10 營d2 ⑤h7 11 ②d4 (11 0-0 ⑤bc6 = Renet-van der Wiel, Budel Z 1987) 11 ... c5?! 12 ⑤c2 ②e6 13 ⑤e3 ⑤bc6 14 0-0 and White was slightly better in Douven-Riemersma, Amsterdam 1987.

White has tried 8 h3, to keep the knight off g4, but he has been getting beaten up lately.

8 ... 2g4

62 Kasparov's Opening Repertoire

8... 2bd792d2 should be slightly better for White, as Black's 7th move seems irrelevant.

> 9 **≜c1** f5 €)d7 10 0-0

10 ... f4 11 Del is better for White, according to Lukacs, who gives 11 ... h5 12 h3 \$\alpha\$h6 13 \$\alpha\$d3 \pm and 11 ... ②f6 12 ②d3 g5 13 g4! ±. 11 g3!

2gf6


12	€)h4	ۈ∆×e
13	ا×و4	fe
14	﴿ك×g6!	罩f7
15	<u> </u>	ᡚf6

This position was reached in Lukacs-Sinkovics, Hungarian Ch. 1986. Now White could have intending h3 and g4, according to Lukacs.

Dutch Defence

Kasparov has not had to face the Dutch Defence very often, so it is hard to investigate his repertoire against this opening. We examine two lines available to Black, both of which have increased in popularity over the past few years, presenting lines which we consider to be favourable for White.

1 d4 f5 c4 (57)




Now we examine: I Modern Stonewall (with bishop developed at d6) II Leningrad Variation

I Modern Stonewall

2	•••	e6
3	g3	€)f6
4	∯g2	d 5
5	4)13	c6
6	0-0	∆ d6
This is the contemporary hand-		

ling of the Stonewall, with the bishop keeping an eye on the e5-square. It enjoys the patronage of Grandmasters Agdestein, Karlsson, Yusupov and Short.



8 ... \$\text{hd7!? 9 \ \mathbb{Q}a3 b6 10 \ \mathbb{G}c2 Δb7 11 cd cd 12 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)c1 0-0 13 \(\mathbb{\pa}\)×d6 營×d6 14 營c7 營×c7 15 莒×c7 Qa6 16 a5 日ac8 17 ab ab 18 日×c8 日×c8 19 $\Xi \times a6$ $\Xi c1 + 20$ $\Delta f1$ $\Xi \times b1 =$ Bischoff-Nascimento, Lucerne 1985.

0-0

9 **⊈a3** $\triangle \times a3$ 10 **€**)×**a**3 €bd7

Inferior is 10 ... Ad7?! 11 &c2 요e8 12 ②ce1! 요h5 13 ②d3 ②bd7 14 營c2 dc 15 營xc4 = Hort-Marić, Vinkovci 1970.

11	a5	b6
12	省d2	ᡚe4
13	₩b2	<u>⊈</u> b7

Here Kasparov-Short, London (m/1) 1987 saw 14 b4?! ba 15 ba 国ab8 16 国fb1 c5! 17 曾c1 国fc8 18 營e3 cd 19 營×d4 營c5 20 買b5 ₩×d4 21 ᡚ×d4 and now Goodman suggests 21 ... dc 22 ව×e6 🗗 7.

Instead, Goodman's 14 2c2 should still leave White with a small advantage.

II Leningrad

2 ... **g6** 夕f6 3 **g**3

3 ... 2g7 4 2g2 d6 5 2f3 2h6 is favoured by IM Michael Basman. White should neither castle. which practically removes his option of attacking on the kingside with h4 and h5, nor adopt the 'recommended' 6 h4, which is premature until Black castles. Instead, he should play 6 \(\frac{1}{2} \) c3 0-0 7 h4 with a strong attack. Black cannot delay castling for too long: 6 ... c6 7 \(\mathre{c} \)c2 \(\mathre{c} \)c7 8 b3 \(\Data \)a6 9 \(\Data \)b2 0-0 10 h4! ±.


> ₽g7 4 🚨 g2 5. 包的 0-0 6 0-0 d6 \$ c3 (59)

On 7 ... c5, 8 dc dc 9 營×d8 莒×d8 10 Qf4 or 10 Db5 Da6 11 Qf4 looks strong.

> 7 ... ₩e8

(a) 7 ... ② c6 8 d5 and now:

(a1) 8 ... De5 9 Dxe5 de 10 e4 f4 (10 ... e6 11 ef ef (11 ... gf!? was suggested by Botvinnik.) 12 Qe3 e4 13 Qd4 里e8 14 里e1 b6 15 f3 ± Collins-Sherwin, New York 1952



and now: 12 ... 全f5 13 營e2 營d7 14 鱼g5 闰f7 15 闰ael Menchik-Seitz. England 1930 or 12 ... 2h3 13 \(\mathbb{H}\)e1 營d7 14 Qe3 Qf5 15 營c2 Radulov-Kolarov, Varna 1968.) 11 b4 g5 12 트e1 a6 13 点b2 曾e8 14 三c1 匀g4 Budapest 1975.

(a2) 8 ... ②a5 9 \d3 c5 (9 ... e5 10 de $\triangle \times$ e6 11 b3 \triangle c6 12 \triangle b2 \triangle e4 13 国acl 国e8 14 目fd1 Qf7 15 e3 g5 16 h4 h6 ± Scheeren-Chernin, Amsterdam 1980) 10 b3 a6 (10 ... ⑤d×e4 fe 14 爲×e4 bc 15 bc 莒b8 ≛ Udovcić-Matulović, Yugoslavia 1960.) 11 总b2 罩b8 12 罩ae1 b5 13 **Q**al bc 14 bc **□**b4 15 **Q**d2 **Q**g4 16 a3 且b8 17 曾c2 且d7 18 e3 名e5 19 ②e2 ± Nikolac-Bertok, Yugoslavia 1969.

(b) 7 ... c6 8 d5!:

(b1) 8 ... 皆e8 9 闰b1 包a6 10 b3 △d7 11 △b2 and Mikhalchishin-Lerner, USSR 1983, saw 11 ... ②c5?! 12 b4 ②a6 13 a3 ②c7 14 營d2 當h8 (14 ... 莒d8 intending ... e5 was a bit stronger) 15 闰fel 營f7 16 e4 fe 17 2g5 \(\text{gg} \) 8 18 2c×e4 2g4

19 公×d6!! cd (19 ... 罩×f2 20 營×f2 ⑤×f2 21 ⑤df7+ ±) 莒e7+ ±.


(b2) 8 ... 營c7 is an important line, since it can also arise from the move order 2 ... \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f6 3 g3 d6 4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ g2 c6 5 **2**f3 **2**c7 6 d5 g6 7 **2**c3 **2**g7 80-00-0. White should play $9 \triangle d4$ ± (Gaprindashvili-Gurieli, USSR) 1980).

(b3) 8 ... e5 9 de (The automatic reply, although Tukmakov's 9 dc!? deserves tests.) 9 ... $2 \times e6$ 10 $2 \times d3$ ②a6 (10 ... h6 11 △f4 d5 12 □ad1 ②a6 13 cd ± Amado-Tempone, Buenos Aires 1983, or 10 ... 4 bd7 11 点f4 包b6 12 b3 包e4 13 包d4 ± Kasparov.) 11 Af4 De4 (11 ... De8

12 **②g5 曾d7 13 b3 Yusupov** or 11 ... 對b6 12 包g5 囯fe8? 13 Q×d6! ± Hulak-Gazic, Montpellier 1985) 12 ②×e4 fe 13 營×e4 ②c5 14 營e3 **△×c4** 15 莒ad1 莒e8 16 營c1 **△×e2** 17 闰×d6 營a5 18 总d2 ± Yusupov-Barbero, Mendoza 1985.

After 7 ... \text{\text{\$\text{\$\geq}}} e8, Kasparov (BCO2) gives 8 \triangle d5 \triangle ×d5 9 cd 營b5 10 包e1 (10 營b3 營×b3 11 ab cb 12 Qg5 \(\mathbb{G}\)e8 \(\infty\) Zhukovitsky-M. Tseitlin, USSR 1986) 10 ... **全**a6 11 e3 Qd7 12 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{0}}}}\) d3 c5 13 dc6 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{0}}}}}}\) xc6 14 总×c6 bc 15 龄b3+ 耳f7 16 龄×b5 cb 17 $\triangle d2$ e5 = Balashov-Malanyuk, USSR Ch. 1986.

Grünfeld (Modern Exchange Variation)



Even a little bit of thought will suffice to demonstrate that no matter how one structures one's repertoire there must be at least one position which one must play for both sides. Perhaps the most prominent overlap in Kasparov's repertoire is the Grünfeld, which he has had to face frequently as White ever since taking up 1 d4, and which he now also plays as Black. Now if it were a simple matter for White to obtain an advantage against the Grünfeld, Kasparov would hardly make the defence his primary weapon with Black. So it is not surprising that we are no more successful in establishing an edge for White than Kasparov's opponents! But the lines in this chapter lead to rich, if balanced play and are by no means drawish. They remain extremely

popular at all levels of play.


In Chapter 8 we examine the Grünfeld from Black's point of view, but here we examine the system which Kasparov has used very successfully to defeat Natsis at the 1980 Malta Olympiad. Although he has recently adopted a fianchetto approach, his most impressive victories have come in the Modern Exchange Variation.

1	d4	€]f6
2	c4	g6
3	ᡚc3	d5
4	2 13	⊈g 7
5	cd	ව×d5
6	e4	ۇ>×c3
7	bc	c5

If Black plays an immediate 7 ... 0-0, then 8 \triangle e2 c5 9 0-0 \triangle g4 10 △e3 e6 11 △b1 achieves a position which holds even more promise than the text, for example 11 ... 曾c7 12 曾b3 b6 13 耳fd1 幻d7 14 h3 $\triangle \times f3$ 15 $\triangle \times f3$ \pm Chekhov-Tomaszewski, Moscow 1986.

8 \(\mathbb{B}\)b1!? (61)

This move was introduced by co-author Shamkovich in his game against Gheorghiu, played in Cleveland 1975, a fact not mentioned by Adorian in his recent book on the Grünfeld.



The alternatives have dropped from sight:

(a) 8 ... 對a5 9 耳b5! 對×a2? allows White to establish a strong attacking position with $10 \ \Xi \times c5$. for example 10 ... 0-0 11 \(\mathbb{Q} \)c4 \(\mathbb{Q} \)a1 12 <u>△</u>×f7+! **⑤**×f7 13 **⑤**g5+! (Our suggestion, which we feel is stronger than 13 對b3+, as suggested by many pundits.) 13 ... $\Xi \times f8 + \Delta \times f8$ 16 0-0 is also hopeless for Black.) 15 \begin{aligned}
b3+ with mate to follow.

If instead of taking the a-pawn, Black tries 9 ... \\ xc3+, then 10 **2**d2 \(\text{\text{\text{d}}}\) a3 11 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{c}}}\) c4 12 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{L}}}\) × c4 is much better for White (Gaprindashvili-Khadilkar, Lucerne Ol. 1982).

- (b) 8 ... 6) c6 9 d5 4×c3+ 10 4d2 $\triangle \times d2 + 11 \bowtie \times d2$ $6 \times d4$ 12 $6 \times d4$ cd13 營×d4 營a5+ 14 營d2 營×d2+ 15 Sexd2 gave White his customary endgame advantage in Ksieski-Szitkey, Trnava 1986.
- (c) 8 ... cd 9 cd 對a5+ 10 對d2 d5! also secures a significant endgame advantage for White, for

example 13 ... \(\mathbb{H}\)e8 14 0-0 b6 15 \square bcl \square a6 16 de \square ×c4 17 \square ×c4 ± van der Sterren-Sokolovsky, Dortmund 1986.

- (d) 8 ... a6 9 **Qe2 Ya5** 10 0-0 is a perfectly sound gambit, e.g. 10 ... 營×a2 11 Qg5 營a5 12 d5! h6 13 14 c4 \rightarrow c7 15 \rightarrow d2 where White is clearly better. (Petursson-Gutman, Biel IZ 1985).
- (e) 8 ... \(\mathbb{Q}\)g4 9 \(\mathbb{Q}\)a4!+ \(\mathbb{Q}\)d7 10 **△**b5 0-0 11 0-0 **△**c6 12 d5 a6 13 $\triangle \times c6$ bc 14 dc $\triangle e8$ 15 $\triangle f4 \pm$ Rashkovsky-Veingold, USSR 1981. On 9 ... 2d7, Rashkovsky gives 10 2 e5 2 x e5 11 de 0-0 12 h3 鱼e6 13 f4 ⑤b6 15 營c2 鱼c4 15 $\triangle \times c4$ $\triangle \times c4$ 16 0-0 \pm . We find 16 笆×b7!? 包b6 17 鱼e3 to be a good alternative.

9 **≜e2** 9 ... cd 9 ... \a5 II 9 ... b6 Ш 9 ... 2c6 IV V 9 ... 🚉 g4

No longer seen is 9 ... \(\preceq\) c7 10 0-0 \(\textit{\tit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\texti 營c2 c4 15 罩b5 ± Yusupov-Kouatly, Toluca IZ 1982.

9 ... **2**d7 10 0-0 **2**f6 11 **2**d3 leaves White holding the initiative (Danner-Wittman, Caorle 1985).


> 9 cd 10 **≌a5**+ cd

The best move, according to both Kasparov and Karpov.

11 \\delta\d2

The pawn sacrifice 11 $\triangle d2!$?

" a2 is still unclear, but in our opinion it is probably not quite correct. The critical position arises after 12 0-0 (62)




(a) 12 ... b6 13 \(\mathbb{G} \) c1 \(\mathbb{G} \) e6 14 \(\mathbb{Q} \) c4 營d7 (14 ... 營×e4 15 莒el 營b7 16 且b4 且e6 17 闰×e6! fe 18 包g5 當h8 19 **②**×e6?! **②**d7 ∞ Gelfand-Dorfman, Minsk 1986, but 16 △h6!? and 19 罩b3 are two possible improvements for White.) 15 2e5 $\triangle \times e5$ 16 de $\triangle a6!$ 17 $\triangle h6$ $\triangle \times c4$ 18 b5 21 闰×b5! 乌×b5 22 乌g7! f6 23 Qh8!! \$f7 24 \$\text{\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}}}}}}}}}} \end{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}}}}}}}}} \end{\tex 쌀g8+ \$d6 26 쌀d8+ \$e6 27 쌀g8+ \$\d6 28 \$\d8+ \\\2-\\2\cdot\2 Ftacnik, Tallinn 1981.

(b) 12 ... 皆e6 13 皆c2 皆d7 14 d5 b6 15 營a2 (15 总b5!? 皆d6 16 闰fc1!?) 15 ... 曾d8?! (15 ... 皇b7! intending ... \(\mathbb{I}\)fc8) 16 \(\mathbb{Q}\)e3 \(\alpha\)d7 17 ♠d4 ♠b7 and now instead of 18 包c6?! (Conquest-Korchnoi. Lugano 1986), White could have obtained a superior position with 18 耳fc1! **公c5** 19 f3.

(c) 12 ... **公**d7?! 13 **总**b4 曾e6 14 賞c2 ②b6 15 Qb5 Qd7 16 d5 資e4 17 h3 \(\text{\ti}\}}}}}} \ext{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tex

質fe8 20 d6 ± R. Short-Moraza, Dubai Ol. 1986.



12 e6!

Also playable is 12 ... b6 13 0-0 (13 宮c1 Qb7 14 Qd3 2a6 15 當e2 \(\mathbb{I}\)fc8 16 a4 \(\alpha\)c7 17 \(\mathbb{L}\)e3 e6 with roughly level chances; de Boer-Mikhalchishin, Cascais 1986) 13 ... △b7 (13 ... \(\mathbb{I}\) d8 14 \(\mathbb{I}\) bc1 \(\mathbb{Q}\)a6 15 $\triangle \times a6 \triangle \times a6 16 \square c4! \pm Samo-$ Lputian, Geneva 1986) 14 d5 2a6 $15 \triangle \times a6 \triangle \times a6 16 \triangle e3$ with about equal chances, according to Karpov. Schmidt-Bañas. Trnava 1986, continued 16 ... 互fe8 17 **公d4** $\triangle \times d4$ 18 $\triangle \times d4$ e6 19 de $\Xi \times e6$ 20 f3 闰d8 21 总e3 闰d3 22 闰b3! 闰ed6 23 闰c1 曾g7 24 曾f2 幻c5 25 总×c5 bc 26 \(\mathbb{Z}\times c5\) with a better endgame. so clearly there is still reason for White to adopt this line.

13 0-0 **b6**

Black has already achieved equality. But that does not mean that the whole line must be abandoned.

14 耳fd1

Perhaps 14 \(\mathbb{I}\)fc1 is a better try.

Our only example involves mismatched players, so it is not surprising that White obtained an edge in Gaprindashvili-Erenska, Dubai Ol 1986 after 14 ... 2a6 15 △×a6 △×a6 16 ☐c4 ☐fc8 17 ☐bc1 国c4 h6 19 h4 国d8 20 a4 當h7 21 ∆f4 ∆f6 22 g3. Further tests were awaited.

14	•••	⊈b7
15	d5	ed
16	ed	ᡚd7
17	₫b4	∄fc8
18	Ø e7	

Gufeld suggested 18 2d4, but after 18 ... \$\overline{2}\$f6! Black has a strong position, for example:

- (b) 19 **②**b5 **△**×d5.
- (c) 19 d6 Qe4! 20 \(\mathbb{Q}\) bc1 \(\alpha\)d5 21 耳×c8 耳×c8 22 f3 ⑤e3! 王.

18 ... ⊈f6! 19 d6 **⊈**g7

In this unclear position Black's chances are to be preferred. We now follow Karpov-Kasparov (m/ 13) 1987.

20 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ |

According to Karpov this was a dubious move, and either 20 \(\Omega\) b5 or 20 20d4 would have led to equality. Gligorić prefers the latter course.


> 20 Дc5 21 ₽b5 Ac6 22 $\Delta \times c6$

Karpov suggests that at this point he had nothing better than 22 $\triangle \times 66 + \triangle \times 66$ 23 $\triangle d4$, but he felt that it was a bit drawish and did not wish to bring the game to a close so soon.

¤×c6 22 23 Ead1 **∆c3** 24 ∏e3 f6

The game continued 25 g4 g5 26 h4 h6 27 hg hg 28 2d4 2×d4 29 耳×d4 耳h8 30 耳e1 耳c2 31 a4 a5 32 f4 魯g6 33 fg 魯×g5 34 耳f1 魯g6 35 国f2 国hc8 36 国df4 国×f2 and a draw was agreed. Note that 37 當×f2 當g5? 38 耳×f6! ⑤×f6 39 d7 would have won for White, but Karpov no doubt realised that his opponent was unlikely to fall into that trap!

П



10 0-0

10 営b5 資×c3+ 11 总d2 資a3 was seen in the seminal game Shamkovich-Gheorghiu, Cleveland 1975. Recently this line has scored well, with White choosing 12 **国a5**, for example 12 ... **省b2** 13 耳×c5 對×a2 14 0-0 對e6 15 点c4! ± Delmas-Gorlinger, corr. 1984, or 13 ... \$\oldsymbol{\infty} c6 14 d5 \$\oldsymbol{\infty} d4 15 \$\oldsymbol{\infty} \times d4 **△×d4** 16 **△c4 △g7** 17 0-0 b6 18 耳c2 曾d4 19 요c3! ± DannerSchmidt, Wroclaw 1985.

∯×a2 10 ...

An alternative path is 10 ... \\ xc3 11 Qd2 (11 d5 營a5 12 Qg5 呂e8 13 **當cl** a6 14 **adl ad7** gives Black adequate counterplay: Raetsky-Konopa, USSR 1985.) 11 ... \arraycolor a3 12 ₩c2 Дd7 13 🗒 × b7 (A more ambitious path is 13 dc \(\textit{\textsuper}\)c6 14 鱼b5 包a6 15 闰fcl 包c7 with unclear complications in Belyavsky-Tukmakov, USSR Ch. 1983) 13 ... ②c6 13 □b3 ②a4 15 □×a3 ②×c2 16 dc ≜xe4 with roughly even chances in Miniböck-Konopka, Eger 1985.

11 Ag5

11 d5!? deserves consideration.

11 **₩e6**

12 e5?!

More promising is 12 \(\mathbb{H}\)e1!?. since 12 ... $\times \times$ e4 is met by 13 \triangle b5 ± although 12 ... b6 13 d5 leads to an unclear position where White has a strong initiative in compensation for his material.

> 12 ₽d8 ---h6

13 ... 皆c6 14 皆b3 皇e6 15 c4!! is better for White, for example 15 ... cd 16 Q×e7 互d7?! 17 Qd6 營e4 18 Qd3 曾f4 19 闰e1 ± Ubilava-Georgadze, USSR 1984, or 17 ... ₩c8 18 ᡚg5 Дf5 19 c5! ᡚc6 20 Qc4 ± Ehlvest-Stohl, Leningrad 1984.


14	d5	₩g4
15	₩×g4	$\Delta \times g4$
16	∆×e7	≅×d5
17	h3	∐d7
18	∆ ×c5	.⊈f5

¤bd1 ¤×d1 19 ¤×d1 20 €)c6

21 **∆**d6

1/2-1/2 Yonov-Zernitsky, USSR 1985.

III



⊉b7 10 0-0

The immediate 10 ... cd is met by 11 cd and now 11 ... ♠b7 12 \dd3 transposes below, but 11 ... e6 allows White to seize the initiative with 12 皇g5 營d6 13 營d2 皇b7 14 營e3, Lputian-Lalić, Sarajevo 1985.

> cd

11 ... Qa6 12 營e3 營c8 13 d5 ∴×e2 14 \ ×e2 is slightly better for White, as the Black queen seems misplaced. An interesting example is Whitehead-Fernandez, New York 1987, which saw 14 ... c4!? 15 單b4 幻d7 16 罩×c4 **營a6** 17 囯e1 包c5 18 ቧg5 囯fe8 19 e5 呂ad8 20 呂d4 營×e2 21 呂×e2 f6 with some, but probably not enough, compensation for the pawn.

11 ... \dd d7 12 \dd g5 h6 13 \triangle f4 f5 14 \triangle e5! \triangle ×e5 15 \triangle ×e5 clearly favours White (KengisTseshkovsky, Minsk 1985).


12 cd **∆**2a6

12 ... e6 13 **皇g**5 曾d6 14 曾e3 罩c8 15 罩fd1 was clearly better for White in Lputian-Lalič, Sarajevo 1985.

13	₩e3	₩d7
14	∆ ×a6	ᡚxa6
15	₩a3	쌀b7
16	⊈e3	e6
17	h4	

This led to a complicated position with chances for both sides in Cvitan-Gavrikov, Vršac 1985.

IV



 $10 \dots \triangle \times c3 + 11 \triangle d2 \triangle \times d2 + 12$ 對×d2 and now:

(a) 12 ... **2** a5 13 h4 is currently held to favour White:

(a1) 13 ... $\triangle g4$ 14 h5 $\triangle \times f3$ (14 ... $\triangle \times h5$? 15 $\triangle h6$ intending 16 $\triangle g5$, 16 g4 ±+) 15 gf e5 (15 ... b6 16 營h6 營d6 17 hg 營×g6 18 營h2! 營h8 19 當d2 曾g7 20 e5! ++ or 16 ... g5 17 對×g5+ 當h8 18 囯gl 囯g8 19 營×g8+ 營×g8 20 萬×g8+ 萬×g8 21 $f4 \pm 1000 16 \text{ hg! fg } 17 \text{ d6!} \pm \text{Novikov}$ Danailov, Poznan 1985.

(a2) 13 ... f6 14 h5 gh 15 2g5 fg 16 營×g5+ 當h8 17 營×h5 罩f7 18 對×f7 對g8 19 對×e7 b6 20 点d3 23 皆f6+ 皆g7 24 e5 1-0 Frank-Sildmets, 6th US corr, Ch.

(b) 12 ... ∮d4?! 13 ∮xd4 c×d4 14 \\delta \times d4 is clearly better for White:

(b1) 14 ... 皆a5+ 15 皆d2 皆×d2+ 16 當×d2 罩d8 17 當e3 gave White a dominating endgame advantage in Kasparov-Natsis, Malta Ol. 1980.

(b2) 14 ... e6 15 d6! \(\preceq\)a5+ 16 쓸d2 쓸×d2+ 17 當×d2 e5 18 當e3 and again the endgame was much better for White (Popescu-Stefanov, corr. 1983).

≜×e5 11 $\oint \times e5$ e6

An interesting option is 12 ... b6 13 f4 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)g7 14 0-0 e6 15 d6 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)b7 16 $@f3 e5 17 c4 ef! 18 <math>@\times f4 @d4 + 19$ 當h1 f6 20 点b2 点×b2 21 三×b2 with a complex middlegame (Olafsson-Ftačnik, Esbjerg 1985).

13 f4 **⊈g**7 14 c4 ed


14 ... \(\mathbb{A}\) e8 15 e5! is better for White, for example 15 ... f6 16 d6 fe 17 \(\text{\ti}}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{ 闰f8! (19 ... e5 20 d7! 營×d7 21 ₩×d7 Д×d7 22 Д×b7 Дad8 23 Qg4! 闰e7 24 闰d1 ±) 20 闰×f4 三×f4 21 營×f4 營f6 Tal-Vaganian, USSR Ch. 1984, and now White should have played 22 \delta e.g. 22 ... 互b8 23 互f1! 曾d4+ 24 曾×d4 cd 25 闰b1! Qd7 26 Qf3 b6 27 c5 闰c8 28 c6! Q×c6 29 国c1 Qd7 30 国×c8

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①×c8 31 ②c6 intending 32 d7 (Gligorić). Instead, the game ended in a draw after 22 營e3 b6 23 營e4.

15	cd	∆d4
16	∆b2	₩b6!
17	∆d3	c4!
18	∆×c4	≌e8

... and it is not clear who stands better (H. Olafsson-Helmers, Gjovik 1985).



10	0-0	£xß
11	∆×ß	cd
12	cd	∴±×d4

12 ... 營×d4 led to a slight advantage for White in Lerner-Vatnikov, USSR 1983, after 13 E×b7 公c6 14 全e3 營×d1 15 E×d1 目fc8 16 全e2.

13	¤×b7	ᡚc6
14	₩a4	₩d6
15	⊈a3	


According to Gligorić, White might pursue 15 \(\mathbb{B}\)b5 here.

... with a balanced game in Rubinetti-Sax, Lucerne Ol. 1982.

Although White cannot find an easy advantage against the Grünfeld (that's why Kasparov plays it as Black!), these lines provide interesting dynamic play.

Grünfeld Defence (Black)

Kasparov adopted this opening for his 1986 match against Karpov. When it was first seen there was pandemonium in the press room.



The opening became the centre of a theoretical debate in the third and fourth matches.

In spite of failures in the first part of match III, Kasparov maintained his faith in the opening and it carried him to victory in both matches. Altogether, the matches saw 19 Grünfelds, applying a variety of systems. Kasparov also used the opening with success in games against Hübner, Seirawan and others. As in the case of the Tarrasch Defence, Kasparov's advocacy of the opening brought many other players' attention to it.


Because of the wide range of variations in which Kasparov has made significant contributions, we shall examine a number of lines

lines.			
[Whi	ite fianche	ttoes
II	Whi	ite plays 🗳	Lc1-f4
III	Rus	sian Syste	ms
	with	₩d1-b3	
[V	Clas	ssical	
	Exc	hange Var	iation
V	Whi	ite plays 🗳	Lc1-g5
VI	Whi	ite plays 🖞	d1-a4+
Į.			
	1	d4	€)f6
	2	c4	g6
	3	ᡚ ਿ3	⊈g 7
	4	g3	c6
	5	Øg2	

A recent example of the immediate central capture (after 4 ... d5 instead of 4 ... c6) is 5 cd ②×d5 6 ②g2 ②b6 7 ②c3 ②c6 8 e3 0-0 9 0-0 三e8 10 三e1 e5 11 d5 ②a5 12 e4 c6 13 ②g5 f6 14 ②e3 ②ac4!? 15 dc ②×e3 16 營×d8 三×d8 17 cb ②×b7 18 三×e3 ②h6 19 三ee1 ②c4 20 三ad1 (After 20 b3 ②a3! 21 三ed1 ②c2 22 三ab1! ②a3 23 三a1 ②c2 with a draw, since 22 三×d8+ 三×d8 23 三f1 三d3 24 ②d5 ②×d5 25 ed 三×d5 gives Black a slight advantage — Kristiansen.) 20 ... 答f8 21 h4 三ac8 22 ②h3 三×d1 23 三×d1

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②×b2 24 闰d7 闰×c3 25 闰×b7 ⑤c4 26 包h2 包d6 27 闰×h7 **Qg7** 28 h5 ②e6 ②×e4 32 ②g4 □d2 33 ②b3 a5 34 耳f5 幻d6 35 耳h5 幻e4 36 耳f5 ②d6 37 闰h5 ②e4 ½-½ Karpov-Kasparov, Amsterdam 1988.



This is the move order that was applied in games 3 and 13 of the third Kasparov-Karpov match. In the fourth match, games 1 and 3 saw the move order 3 g3 c6 4 \(\frac{1}{2} \) f3 Ձg7 5 Ձg2 d5. What is the difference between the two approaches? The main point is that after 3 g3 c6 White can play 4 d5!? if he wishes, even though this is not known to bring any significant advantage after 4 ... cd 5 cd d6. With the delayed fianchetto this is not possible, since 5 d5 would have been met by 5 ... cd 6 cd \delta 5+ 7 包c3 包×d5!


On 7 0-0 0-0. 8 De5 is less effective. Kasparov has played 8 ... 2 g4. After 9 2×g4 2×g4 10 2c3 2c6 it is not easy for White to obtain an advantage: 11 h3 \(\textit{\textit{d}}\d7!\) 12 e3 e6 13 b3 營a5 14 总d2 營c7 15 闰c1 闰ac8 = Polugavevsky-Kasparov, Moscow 1981. Or 11 <u>Q</u>×d5 <u>Q</u>×d4 12 <u>Q</u>×b7 ⑤×e2+ 13 ⑤×e2 營×d1 14 爲×d1 $\triangle \times e^2$ 15 $\triangle \times a^8$ $\triangle \times d^1 =$ Velićković-Henley, Tbilisi 1983. But one notes that he didn't choose to play this line against Karpov!

This is the most accurate manoeuvre. After 8 0-0 \@e4! 9 \@b3 2c6 Black equalizes very easily and faces no problems, according to Kasparov.

This is not the first time that the variation has seen action in World Championship play. Botvinnik-Smyslov, (m/21) 1957 saw 8 ... \(\Omega f5 90-0 \$\text{\$\text{e}}\$ 10 \$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\exitin{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}\$}}}}\$}}}}}} \eximinfines \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\$}\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex 12 Qe3 幻d7 13 幻×d7 對×d7 ½-½. One must keep in mind, however, that Botvinnik had just lost a critical game which had broken Botvinnik's spirit and left him too tired to try to overcome an $11\frac{1}{2}-8\frac{1}{2}$ score. The next, final game of the match was drawn in just eleven moves. Geller tried 10 \(\text{Qe3} \) \(\text{\text{\$\sigma}} \) \(\text{\$\color o} \) 11 bc 夕c6 12 夕×c6 bc 13 營a4 against Fischer at Palma de Mallorca 1970, but came away empty handed after 13 ... \begin{aligned} \text{\$\psi}\$ b6. Larsen notes, however, that White was not obliged to throw away first a pawn, and then a possibly tenable endgame.

9 0-0

This is better than 9 \(\mathbb{Q} \)g5 \(\mathbb{G} \)b6! 10 曾d2 包fd7 11 包f3 包c6 (Karpov-Timman, Bugoino 1986) played before the match, where White did not achieve any advantage.



From this position experience has been varied. Karpov-Kasparov, (m/3) 1986 went:

A good alternative is 11 ... \b6, seen in Akhmilovskaya-Chiburdanidze, match 1986, which continued 12 分a4 營a5 13 耳c1 b5 14 夕c5 夕×c5 15 耳×c5 单d7 with equal chances.

12	∳)e5	⊈ d7
13	₩d2	ક્⊇×e5
	M =	

14 **Q**×e5

If 14 de, then 14 ... 2g4! 15 e4 d4! 16 對×d4 总c6 17 對d6 對b6 intending 18 ... \(\mathbb{I}\)fd8 (Dlugy).

14	•••	∆c6
15	∄fd1	ᡚd7
16	<u>.</u> ⊈×g7	\$ ×g7
17	∄ac1	€)f6

Black has already equalized, according to Kasparov.


18 **省 ₩P8** ∄a×b8 19 ₩×b8 20 ß ₽fd8 **₽**f2 21

The methodical 21 e4 can be met by 21 ... de 22 fe e5! 23 d5 \triangle d7. according to Kasparov. With the text move White concedes equality. In the next example, Karpov tries a more ambitious plan.

21	•••	∄bc
22	e 3	De8
23	Äd2	⊘d6

and Black had no problems.

In game 13 of the same match, Karpov tried:



Boleslavsky recommended 10 ... ②×e5 11 fe f6, and this has been passed on uncritically in the literature. Each co-author of this book separately found the simple 12 ef. after which it is difficult for Black to equalize: 12 ... $\Xi \times 6613 \Omega 64 \pm or$ 12 ... $\triangle \times f6$ 13 $\triangle h6 \pm$. The obvious nature of this line has no doubt contributed to its failure to apppear in praxis.

11 ... \$\oldsymbol{\infty} c6 has disappeared as a result of Kasparov-Nunn.

Brussels 1986: 12 e4! de 13 \(\text{\$\text{de}}\) e3 f5 14 ef $\Xi \times f6$ 15 $G \times e4$ $\Xi \times f1 + 16$ 營×f1 (±) ⑤×d4?? (16 ... △×d4 17 A×d4 營×d4+ 18 當h1 intending 19 \(\beta\)d1 or 19 \(\Delta\)f6+ or 16 ... \(\Delta\)d7 17 国ad1 h6 18 包c5 曾c7 19 Qe4.) 17 国d1 e5 18 包g5! 1-0

> 11 **DB** €)c6

12 ₿e3

Keene and Goodman suggest 12 e4, an interesting move, but one which lacks punch after 12 ... de 13 ②×e4 ⑤b6.

> 12 €)b6 13 **⊈**f2

White prepares two strong advances: e4 and g4-g5. Black stops both.

> 13 ... **f**5


More exciting was 13 ... \(\Delta \cdot 4!? \) followed by 14 b3 (14 \bar{2} serves consideration) 14 ... 2d6! seizing control of the important e4-square. But 14 e4!? **⑤**×b2 15 unclear, though perhaps in White's favour, Meanwhile, 13 ... \(\textit{\textsuper}\)d7 is dubious on account of 14 e4! (Kasparov).

> 14 De5 ₽d7 15 ₩d2 €)c8 16 ₩e3! 當h8 (72)


Not 16 ... **2**d6? 17 **2**×c6 **2**×c6 18 \\ e6+. The text prevents this manoeuvre because Black will have the resource ... 罩f8-e8.

17 單fd1

Some commentators, including Eduard Gufeld, recommended the sharp thrust 17 g4, intending 17 ... $\triangle \times e5$ (17 ... $\triangle 8e7$ g5 \pm) 18 de fg



19 曾g3 h5 20 h3!? (73). The resulting position is very important for the evaluation of the entire variation starting with 13 ... f5.




White has clear compensation for the pawn after 20 ... gh 21 $\triangle \times$ h3 ②e7 (or 21 ... \@e8 22 e4!) 22 \@c5 as well as after 20 ... g5 21 e3 2e7 22 hg h4 23 \begin{array}{c} \text{h2} \text{\text{Q}g6 24} \text{\text{Q}e2} \text{\text{\text{Q}b5 25}} \end{array} ♠d4. It is easy to understand why Kasparov declined to enter this variation in the fourth match.

After the text Kasparov not only equalized, but even seized the initiative:

> 17 €\d6 ... 18 **b3** ∄c8 19 Zac1 ₽e8 20 ⊈e1 **£**16! ∓


Karpov-Kasparov, (m/3) 1987: 10 f4 2c6 (74)



⊈e3 **ᡚb6** 11

11 ... **②d**×e5 is dubious: 12 fe f6 13 ef \(\mathbb{Z}\)×f6 was unclear in Karpov-Chiburdanidze, Bilbao 1987: 14 **營d2 总d7 15 含h1** 三×f1+ 16 三×f1 營e7 17 囯d1 with a slight advantage for White. In Soviet Sport 17 Ag1 is suggested, but after 17 ... $\square d8!$ 18 e4 de 19 $\triangle \times e4 \triangle \times d4$ 20 **△×d4 △c6** 21 **△c5 冯×d2** 22 **△×e7** 置×g2! we feel that it is Black, if anyone, who holds the advantage.

12 Af2 (75)



White is ready to advance in the centre. In Karpov-Kasparov, (m/1) 1987. Black entered unclear complications with 12 ... Add 13 e4! ⑤e7 (13 ... de 14 △×e4 would have given White a slight advantage due to his control of the 16 \(\mathbb{E}\)c1 \(\Q\)f8 17 \(\Q\)f3 (17 g4 is interesting here, for example 17 ... ♣h6 18 ♣h4 \$\oldots c4 19 \oldots e2 \$\oldots c6 20 \(\mathbb{Z}\)cd1 b5 21 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d3 ∞, with an initiative for White.) 17 ... 罩c7! 18 b3 且ac8 19 皆d2 公c6 20 皆b2 a6 and Black had equalized.

> કોe7! 12 ••• 13

Here 13 e4 would have been met by 13 ... de, equalizing.


13	•••	a 5
14	₩b3	⊈ d7
15	∃fc1	Д c6
16	ව b5	Dbc8
17	e3	ᡚd6
18	ව×d6	&×qe
19	⊈e1	∄ 688
20	Ωn	f6
21	DB	₩d7
22	₩c2	ᡚf 5
23	₽d2	€]d6

Black can claim more than equality, so it seems that Kasparov has solved the problems posed by this opening system.

1	d4	ᡚf6
2	c4	g 6
3	ᡚ c3	d 5
4	⊈f4	Qe7 (76

When Karpov was first confronted by Kasparov's use of the Grünfeld Defence, he chose to adopt a fairly mild system in reply.

5 包f3 5 e3 В



A

5 **4**13

This position can also arise from the move order 4 2f3 2g7 5 ⊈f4.


c5!? (77) 分量 分量

This is a typical counterthrust in the Grünfeld Defence, but often Black delays it until after 5 ... 0-0 6 \cl

> 6 dc ₩a5 7 Ξc1

Theoreticians have concentrated on the line 7 cd $\langle x \rangle \times dS$ now:

(a) 9 ... **△**×d2+ 10 **∀**×d2 **∀**×c5 11 罩cl 營f5, seen in Petrosian-Shamkovich, Moscow 1966, is no



longer appropriate because of Botvinnik and Estrin's 12 2d4! 份d7 13 份h6!

- (b) 9 ... \(\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{e}}}}\) 10 \(\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{e}}}}\) \(\textit{\textit{\textit{e}}}\) 10 \(\textit{\textit{e}}\) \(\textit{\textit{e}}\) 10 \(\textit{\textit{e}}\) \(\textit{e}\) 10 \(\textit{e}\) \(\textit{e}\) 10 \(\textit{e}\) \(\textit{e}\) 10 \(\textit{ 且×c3 營×c3+11 營d2 營×c5!=) 10 ... $\triangle \times d2 + 11 \triangle \times d2 0-0$ and now:
- countered by 12 ... Ad8! 13 Ad1 (13 b4!? 對×b4 14 單d1 萬×d2=) 13 ... <u>A</u>d5 ∓.
- (b2) 12 e4 is also possible, but Drevev-Yepishin, Tallinn 1986, saw 12 ... 包c6! 13 營a6 營xc5 14 對b5 對d6 15 ②c4 對d4 16 Qe2 耳fc8 17 0-0 耳ab8 18 營a4 營×e4 19 闰fel 幻d4 20 点fl 皆f4 21 b3 闰c5 22 營×a7 罩h5 23 h3 罩×h3 24 營×b8+ 營×b8 25 gh 到f3+ 26 當g2 **∆**d5 0-1.

(b3) 12 b4 營a4 13 e4 包d7 14 份b5 份a3 15 c6 分f6 16 总e2 份c3 17 囯d1 囯fd8 (17 ... ⑤×e4 18 皆d3 ±) 18 f3 a5! gives Black counterplay, according to Belvavsky. 13 \\ ×a8!? is more principled. After 13 ... 206 14 曾b7 囯d8! 15 囯d1 (15 囯c1 ₩a3) Black can go for the draw 15 ... **②**×b4 16 e3 (forced) 16 ... 分c2+ 17 當e2 点d5! (Co-author Shamkovich originally suggested 17 ... \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)g4+? 18 f3 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)×e3 but Robert Ciaffone came up with 19 營b3!!. refuting the line. 17 ... h5 may be playable.) 18 \delta c7 or 18 \delta ×e7.

Summing up, it is clear that Karpov avoided the 7 cd line out of respect for 9 ... \(\textit{\textit{\textit{2}}} e6.

> dc **e**3 掛×c5 **₩a4+**


Jon Tisdall gives both 9 2d2 ♠c6! but in this latter line White could play the much stronger 10 \doldright d5!, so in our opinion 9 \delta e5 is best met by 9 ... \(\delta \) c6.

> 9 €)c6

An interesting alternative is 9 ... 且d7!? 10 對×c4 對b6 11 且e2 (11 Qc7 對×b2 12 買b1 對a3 13 買×b7 0-0 and 11 ②b5 ②a6 12 Qc7 \equiv e6! are acceptable for Black, according to Kasparov.) 11 ... 0-0 12 0-0 and now 12 ... \(\tilde{\mathbb{Q}}\)e6! is equal, but not 12 ... 互c8? 13 對×c8+! Q×c8 14 幻d5 營e6 15 買×c8+ 总f8 16 国fc1 with a very dangerous attack (Kasparov).

> 0-0 11 0-0 **△d7** (79) 12 ₩b5

Kasparov has not mentioned Taimanov's suggestion of 12 42b5 intending 13 $\triangle \times f7+$), but Black can reply 12 ... \text{\text{\text{\text{h}}5 13 } \text{\text{\text{\text{d}}e2 e5! 14}} ቧg3 (14 匂fd4 匂×d4! 15 ቧ×h5 △×b5 〒) 14 ... a6 15 ②c3 ②d4 16 ②×a4 ②×g3 19 hg ed ∓.




∯×b5 12

Karpov-Kasparov, (m/1) 1986 now went 13 Q×b5 国ac8 14 国fd1 耳fd8 15 h3 h6 16 當f1 a6 17 总e2 ②e6 18 ¬×d8+ ¬×d8 19 ⑤e5 $\triangle \times e5$ 20 $\triangle \times e5$ $\Xi d2$ 21 b3 and a draw was agreed.

B

e3 (80)



5 **c**5

Here the central thrust is the normal move for Black.

> ₩a5 6 dc dc

This is safer than 7 ... De4, as played in Karpov-Kasparov, (m/5) 1986. After 8 cd ᡚ×c3 9 \d2 \d2 \a2 10 bc Kasparov chose 10 ... \\delta \times d2+!? (Petrosian-Fischer, (m/2) 1971, saw 10 ... \abla a5 11 \alpha c4 \alpha d7 12 \alpha e2 (12 ♠f3!?) 12 ... ♠e5 13 ♠a2 ♠f5? Fischer could have kept the balance with 13 ... \\ xc5 14 \(\oldsymbol{0}\)d4 b5!) 11 🕾 xd2 🖾 d7 12 🚨 b5 0-0 13 $\triangle \times d7$ $\triangle \times d7$ 14 e4 f5!? 15 e5 e6!? (W. Schmidt-Gross, Nalechov 1984, saw 15 ... 呂ac8 16 c6?! bc 17 d6 ed 18 ed and now Black could have obtained an advantage with Adorian's 18 ... \(\mathbb{I}\) fe8! The Hungarian theoretician also gives △b3! as leading to an advantage for Black, but Kasparov showed that 16 c4 \(\mathbb{Z}\times c5 \) 17 \(\mathbb{Q}\times a^2\) actually leaves White in charge, and we feel that 16 De3 Dxe5 17 Df3 is also promising. So while we agree with Kasparov that the line played in the game with $10 \dots \forall \times d2 + is$ not refuted, nevertheless it is not clear that Black will be able to achieve equality. We can say, however, that 10 ... $\forall \times d2 + \text{ has been}$ rehabilitated, at least for the time being.

8 \(\text{\Omega} \times c4\)

Black has nothing to fear on 8 쌀a4+ 쌀×a4 9 ᡚ×a4 요d7 10 邑×c4 包d5!, seen in Wexler-Foguelman, Buenos Aires 1964.

8 ... 0-0

Now 9 De2 is interesting, for example 9 ... 對×c5 10 對b3 對a5 11 0-0 \$\overline{\infty}\$c6, Kraidman-W. Schmidt, Nice Ol. 1974, where ECO recommends 12 h3 with a slight advantage to White. We feel that 10 ... 包c6 is significantly stronger,

intending 11 ... \Da5, for example 11 對b5 對×b5 12 Q×b5 (12 <0×b5 ②a5!∓) 12 ... ⑤b4 13 0-0 a6 14 ②c4 b5 ∓.

ᡚ13 (81) 9



9 ₩×c5

There is no particular reason why 9 ... \(\oldsymbol{2}\) c6 cannot be played here, delaying the capture until the following move.


10 **△b**3

The aggressive 10 \(\Delta \) b5?! allows easy equality with 10 ... \begin{aligned} \text{\$b4+11} \end{aligned} ⑤d2 ⑤d5 or 11 இe2 ඬe6! 11 ... ♠e4. which occupied the attention of the press room during the 1986 London match, is also a very interesting idea.

11 ... ₩h5 is an alternative which we feel is in no way inferior to the text. After 13 h3 Ad8 White can choose between 13 and 2 ale 8. correctly evaluated as even by Boleslavsky, and 13 \delta e2, which led to an unclear position in Ageychenko-Gik, USSR 1966.

12 h3 **∆f5** (82)

13 ₩e2




The normal move. Karpov-Kasparov, (m/9) 1986, saw instead 13 ②d4 △d7! 14 ₩e2 ⑤×d4! (Kasparov's improvement on 14... e5 played in Gulko-Tseshkovsky. Sochi 1975.) 15 ed e6! 16 ad2 對b6 17 \(\mathbb{G}\)fd1 \(\mathbb{G}\)c6 18 \(\mathbb{G}\)e3 \(\mathbb{G}\)a5 19 \(\mathbb{G}\)d2 **對b6 20 皇e3 對a5 ½-½.** The feeling in the press room at the time was that Black would have had the better chances had White not opted for the draw by repetition.

- 14 $2 \times e4$ leads to equality:
- (a) 15 \(\mathbb{I}\)fd1 \(\mathbb{Q}\times f3\) 16 \(\mathbb{Q}\times f3\) \(\textit{\tit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\texti \(\text{Q}\) e4 \(\text{Q}\) e5 20 \(\text{W}\)e2 \(\text{A}\)ad8 = Hansen-Wiedenkeller, Helsinki 1986.
- (b) 15 包g5 Qd5 16 Qc7 對×c7 17 ②±×d5 ₩e5 18 ₩b5 ②d8 where Black's chances are no worse (Sahović-Lanka, Jurmala 1978).
- (c) 15 **公**d2 **公**d5 16 **公**×d5 **公**×d5 and a draw was agreed in Hort-Uhlmann, Moscow 1971.

15 耳×c6!?

Tremors were felt in the



analysis room when this move was played in Karpov-Kasparov (m/11) 1986. Amazingly, it seems to have been a novelty. Tisdall suggested that the effect on Kasparov was more psychological than 'chessic', but we are not so sure.

The alternative 15 2h2 is an abject retreat which can be dealt with by 15 ... Qe6 16 耳fd1 耳ad8 17 ₩c4 ᡚd6 18 ₩e2 (Moran-Wittmann, Dubai Ol. 1986) 18 ... ②e4 = Gipslis.

- 15 ef 15 ... bc 16 **②**e7+ **②**h8 requires some analysis:
- (a) 17 ②×e5 △×e5 19 ⑤×c6 份d2! 〒.
- (b) 17 <u>\$\pi\$\xc6</u> **\pi**b6 18 **\pi**cxe5 Qe6! leads to unclear complications, according to Kasparov.
- (c) Co-author Shamkovich has proposed 17 $\Delta \times e5!$, where White has more than sufficient compensation for his exchange, for example:
- (c1) 17 ... **△**×e5 18 **△**×c6 (intending 19 ②c×e5) 18 ... ♠h2+! 19 ②×h2 (19 ⑤×h2? 份c7+ ∓) 19 ...

병선2! with an unclear position, e.g. 20 트e1 트ac8 (20 ... 쌀×e2 21 트×e2 트ac8 22 신d4 트c1+23 신f1 요d7 24 요c2! 트e8 25 신b3 트×f1+26 불×f1 요b5 27 신d4 실×e2+28 불×e2±) 21 신d4 쌀×e2 22 트×e2 트c1+23 신f1 (intending 24 g4) ±.

(c2) 17 ... f6 18 ᡚ×f5 fe 19 ᡚ×g7 蛰×g7 20 쌀c2 ᡚc5 21 ᡚg5!

The text is not necessarily inferior (despite Gipslis's pejorative comment in *ECO*), and allows Black to hold the balance with precise play.

Gipslis (in ECO DII) gives this ?! and claims that 17 ②e7+ 當h8 18 Ifc1 is ± even though after 18 ... ②×b3 19 ab (19 ef?! 且d5 干) 19 ... fe 20 營×e3 ②d6 21 營f4 国ad8 22 ②g5?! h6 23 ②e6 g5! 干 or 22 營h4 h6! Black is no worse in a rather unclear position. So the choice between 17 ②e7+ and the text is more a matter of taste, and we find Karpov's choice more appealing.

An inferior alternative is 17 Exb7? 包d6! 18 包e7+ 智h8 19 包c6 營c5 20 鱼xe6 營xc6 21 臣e7 fe 22 ef 包f5 干 Szilagyi-W. Schmidt, Budapest 1986.

19 ef would fail to 19 ... **2**g3!! 20 fg **4**b6+.

The game resembles a prolonged duel of the sort popular in MGM movies of the 1930s.

21 **2**h4 **2**×h3+!?

This move may be good enough to survive, but Karpov is correct when he points out that 21 ... fe! would have led to a draw after 22 ②×g6+ hg 23 ②×g6+ ⑤g8 24 ⑤e7+. That may prove to be the final word on this line.

The Russian Systems

1	d4	ᡚf 6
2	c4	g6
3	ીલ્ડ	d5
4	ᡚ 13	Ag7
5	₩b3	_


The Russian Systems have been a consistently popular reply to the Grünfeld for many years, and they are considered the main lines in the ECO classification. After the standard 5 ... dc 6 \(\subseteq \times c4 0-0 7 e4\), Black has a wide range of choices. Adorjan, in his recent book on the Grünfeld, thinks highly of 7 ... a6, but the World Champion clearly

doesn't share his confidence, preferring the classical 7 ... ≜g4 and the modern 7 ... €a6 lines.

Karpov-Kasparov, (m/17) 1986:

5	•••	dc
6	偿×c4	0-0
7	e4	₽g4
8	⊈e3	∮∫fd7
9	ãd1	€]c6
10	⊈e2	Ð b6
11	₩c5	₩d6
12	e5	\ \$×c5

13 dc (84)



At the end of 1986 this was the critical position.

13 ... \(\frac{1}{2} \cdot \c8

13 ... 包d7 is tempting, even though Kasparov points out 14 h3!:

(a) 14 ... $\triangle \times f3$ 15 gf $\triangle d \times e5$? 16 f4 \pm or 15 ... $\Xi fd8$ 16 f4 \pm .

(b) 14 ... 鱼e6 15 包g5 包d×e5 16 包×e6! (16 f4 包c4 17 鱼c1 包a3!) 16 ... fe 17 f4 包f7 18 鱼c4! e5 19 0-0 ef 20 鱼×f4 鱼d4+ 21 雷h1 鱼×c3 22 bc 雷g7 23 邑d7!

Nevertheless, in the latter line Shamkovich found 17 ... Ah6!, a move which Kasparov missed. After 18 0-0 呂ad8 19 呂×d8 呂×d8 (intending 20 ... 公d3) 20 呂d1 呂×d1 21 公×d1 公d7 22 요c4 全f7 23 公c3 요g7 24 公e4 h6 or 24 g4 公d4 the chances are roughly level.

14 h3!

In Karpov-Kasparov, (m/15) 1986, where Karpov first employed was seen, but 14 ... \Bb8! proved a strong reply, as after 15 <a>\&\text{xc7} \text{ e6}! the knight was forced to retreat right away, or else risk being trapped by ... a6. After 16 2b5 solidity of Black's position. After considerable thought (at the London Press Centre we thought our telex link had broken down!) Karpov found 17 罩d2! but Kasparov answered boldly with 17 ... b6!?, and after 18 cb ab 19 \(\textit{\textit{Qg5}!}\) quiet down: 20 b3 h6 21 \(\Omega f6 \(\Omega \times f3 \) 22 🚨×f3 ⑤×e5 23 Д×e5 Д×e5 24 0-0 買fd8 25 買td1 買×d2 26 買×d2 闰c8 27 g3 闰c1+ 28 當g2 當f8 29 ሷe4 \$e7 ½-½. With 20 ᡚfd4! ②×d4 21 ②×d4 ②×d4 22 □×d4 $\triangle \times e2$ 23 $\triangle \times e2$ $\triangle \times e5$ a lot of pieces come off the board, but 'White has slight pressure' (Kasparov).

Sacrificing a pawn, White obtains strong play in the centre, especially along the d-file. Karpov does not like to sacrifice material unless it is clearly worked out in advance. The speed with which he played this game (5 minutes used for the first 14 moves) shows that it was.

14 ∆×ß ∆×ß ∆×e5 15

In the London Press Centre we were sure that Kasparov would not 17 c6 with strong pressure. Kasparov gives 17 ... 2c4 18 2d5! ②xe3 19 fe ②d6 20 ②xe7+ \$\delta\$h8 21 耳×d6! cd 22 當e2 Д×b2 23 耳b1 ⊈f6 24 €\d5 \alpha d8 and now either 25 c7 $\triangle \times$ c7 26 $\triangle \times$ c7 f5 27 \triangle a6 or 25 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1.

16 **∆**×c6

Forced, according to Karpov. Kasparov analysed 16 罩d7 e6 17 **△**×c6 bc 18 f4 **△**g7! 19 耳×c7 耳e8 20 日×c6 包e7 21 日a6 日eb8 22 包a4 2d5 23 ac1 e5!

16 ... bc 17 **⊈d4**

We do not award the customary exclamation mark here. Shamkovich presents strong arguments in favour of 17 f4!?:

- (a) 17 ... $\triangle \times c3 + 18$ bc $\Xi b8$ 19 0-0 f5?! (19 ... f6 is much better. although Black is still fighting to hold the position.) 20 呂b1 呂×b1 21 耳×b1 耳d8 22 耳b7 耳d7 23 耳b8 国d8 24 Qd4 含f7 25 Qe5 ±.
- (b) 17 ... Qg7 18 0-0 互b8 19 互f2 f6 (19 ... f5 20 営d7 営b7 21 営fd2

and 22 总d4) 20 闰d7 闰b7 21 闰fd2 \$17 22 g4 intending f5.

Maybe Black can hold, but it certainly isn't pleasant!

17 ... ⊈f4

It is obvious that Black cannot afford to exchange bishops because this would allow immediate infiltration of the seventh rank by the white rook, where the pawns on the c-files must eventually fall. The bad position of the 2c8 causes Black too many problems. In London, we analysed 17 ... △×d4 18 □×d4 □b8 19 b3 f5 (or else 公c3-e4) 20 闰d7 闰b7 21 當e2 e6 22 \(\mathbb{I}\)hd1 \(\mathbb{I}\)e8 23 \(\mathbb{I}\)d8+ and Black is very passive. Kasparov looked at 19 ... a5 20 買a4! Eventually, he concluded that after the trade of bishops, 18 ... a6 would have been relatively best, but even so Black would be uncomfortable.

18 0-0 25??

18 ... e5! equalized in Karpov-Timman. Tilburg 1986: 19 \(\Omega\)e3 鱼×e3 20 fe 包e7 21 囯d7 包f5 22 買×c7 買fc8=.

18 ... 罩e8 19 罩fe1 當f8 would have been better than 18 ... a5, which was tantamount to resignation.

19 耳fe1

19 ... f6 20 闰e6 闰a6 21 勾d5 is easy. Perhaps 19 ... Ze8 should have been tried, although White is still clearly better (20 De4 18 21 △c3). Karpov had only consumed 30 minutes to this point.

> 20 Äe4 ⊈h6 21 ₿e5 **a**3

22 b3

In Leningrad, the press had already given up the game as hopeless. In London, we all agreed with Jon Speelman, who said of the pawn on a3: 'This pawn either lives (which means that Black successfully sacrifices on b3 or wins the a2 pawn; then he would have adequate counterplay and would wriggle out of a serious problem) or dies. If it dies, then Black is totally lost.'

22 ... €)a7

Kasparov decided to jettison his pawn on c7 and seeks counterplay. If 22 ... \(\mathbb{Q} \) g7 23 \(\mathbb{Q} \times \) g7 24 \(\mathbb{Q} \) d7 用a7 Black is totally tied down and White can go after Black's stranded pawn with \(\mathbb{I}\)d7-d4-a4 etc.

23 萬 47!

23 $\triangle \times c7$ $\triangle g7!$ gives Black chances.

₿c1 23

None of the published analysis has addressed Basman and Ravikumar's suggestion of 23 ... 闰fd8!? e.g.:

- (a) 24 $\Xi \times e7$ Ω f8 25 $\Xi \times c7$ $\Omega \times c5$;
- (b) 24 $\Xi \times c7$ f6 25 Ω f4 $\Omega \times f4$ 26 嶌×f4 嶌d3;

(c) 24 闰ed4! 闰×d7 25 闰×d7 ±. This was published in the London Press Centre bulletin, but copies are rare because some British Chess Federation (BCF) officials refused to allow reprints due to their unhappiness with some of the editorial comment.

> ¤×c7 24 ₿b2 25 €)a4!

Kasparov remarks that '25 ≅×e7 would also have won.' In London, a Psion computer program gave 25 ... 耳fd8 26 罩e2 幻c8 27 耳c7 耳d3 28 耳c2 Q×c3 which it evaluated as much better for White, But Karpov notes that 25 ≅×e7 would have been dubious, because of 25 ... $\triangle \times c3$ 26 $\triangle \times c3$ **⑤b5** intending 27 ... **⑤fd8-d2×a2**.


罩d5

A last trap: 28 ②×b2? 罩×e5! 29 買xe5 ab.

28 Ag3 Ac3 29 A×c3 A×c3 30 c6 益d4 31 罩b7 1-0

IV The Classical **Exchange Variation**


1	d4	€)f6
2	c4	g6
3	් ධ ය	d5
4	cd	و×d5
5	e4	த்×c3
6	bc	⊈g 7
7	Oc4 (85)	•



In Chapter 5 we discussed the Modern Exchange Variation, where White develops his knight at f3. Here we discuss the older variation, which Karpov used against Kasparov in the fourth match.

7	•••	c5
8	②e2	€]c6
9	⊈e3	0-0
10	0-0	⊈g4

This is more accurate than 10 ... cd 11 cd \(\textit{Q}\)g4.



12

This was perhaps the most surprising move in Karpov-Kasparov IV, where it was introduced in the fifth game and repeated in the next three games in which Karpov had White. Karpov, whose opening preparation for this match was absolutely excellent, introduced both new moves and new ideas at a frightening pace. Modern opening theory has not taken this move very seriously, because White disrupts his own pawn structure while giving Black counterplay. It is unlikely that this judgement will change as a result of the games in this match, although it is clear that Kasparov had to work quite hard

to obtain a playable game. Grünfeld players can be grateful to World Champion demonstrating the correct plan for Black.

The first critical position arises after

¤×f7

12

Reacting at the board to the first use of 12 $\triangle \times f7+$ in game 5. Kasparov thought for over an hour before playing this move.

Kasparov did deviate from this plan once, in Karpov-Kasparov (m/9) 1987 14 ... cd 15 cd \begin{aligned}
begin{aligned}
begin{a was played. After 16 \$\displayed g1 \$\displayed e6 17 營d3 營×g4 18 囯f1 囯c8 19 h3 營d7 20 d5! Karpov demonstrated that the formation with pawns at d5 and e4 was superior to that with pawns at d4 and e5. Black was unable to equalize and after 20 ... ②xg7 ⑤xg7 24 ⑤f4! White held a clear advantage.


Then he returned to this principled move in the 11th game. The basic questions facing the players in this position are:

- (1) Should Black be trying to regain the pawn?
- (2) Should White hold on to the pawn at all costs?
- (3) What positional price will be paid by White if he advances his epawn to e5?
- (4) Is it necessary for Black to transpose to somewhat better known positions by $c5 \times d4$?

As a result of the four games played in the match, we can conclude that each question can be answered in the negative, but such questions had not been discussed before the match, and most people had forgotten about the Spassky-Korchnoi encounter in the 1955 Soviet Championship, which saw (with the inclusion of 10 ... cd 11 cd) 15 ... 皆d7 16 h3 皆e6 17 皆d3 쌀c4! 18 쌀d2 쌀a6 (intending 19 ... ②b3) 19 營c2 公c4 20 營b3 營h8 21 Black equalized. It is not clear why Kasparov did not follow Korchnoi's plan, although he did get his queen to c4 in the 11th game. Let us now examine the Karpov-Kasparov games, beginning with game 5.

15 e5?! (88)

This concedes the central light squares to Black, although it is not easy to exploit this circumstance. Nevertheless, with correct play Black can take advantage of this dubious move.



Georgadze, comes strongly into consideration. The idea is to lock Black's bishop into the King's castle. Tisdall gives 17 ... \delta e4 18 ②g1! ②c4 19 ②f3 ②e3+ 20 Д×e3 對×e3 21 對b3+ 當h8 22 耳e1 where 22 ... \(\mathbb{Z}\times f3+\) doesn't seem to work alternative. Correct is 17 ... \(\text{\textit{\text{\til\exitit{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\til\exitit{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\til\exitit{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\til\exitit{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tiliex{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texitex{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\te}\tiliex{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texitit{\texit{\texit{\texitit{\texit{\texi{\texi{\texi}\tiliex{\texi}\texi{\texi{\texi{\texit{\texi}\texit{\texit{\texi}\texin 쌀el 쌀f5 19 h4 h6!, applying the same sort of strategy as in game 7. If 20 ᡚg3, then 20 ... \\ g4 21 ᡚe4 (or 21 \$\mathref{B}\$g1 hg) 21 ... \$\mathref{B}\$\times h4 22 \$\mathref{B}\$g1 ₩g4 with counterplay.


17 ₿h6! All of Black's pieces are involved in the game.

18	h4	₩f7
19	Дg3	⊈e3 +
20	ॐh2	₩c4
21	罩b1	b6
22	≌b2	₩d5!
23	&q3	€]c4
24	萬 b1 (89)	

This is the critical position of a magnificent battle. Black has seized key central positions and

has more than enough compensation for his pawn. At the same time, however, he lacks any concrete attacking plan. Kasparov chose ...

It is possible for Black to 'take the bull by the horns', as Campomanes might put it, and crush the White opposition immediately: The best method is 24 ...g5!! (90).



This absolutely unexpected kingside foray was suggested by Kasparov after the game. Strangely, however, commentators have not mentioned this in published analysis to date. The rationale of the move is to seize control of the critical f4 square in order to renew the threat of Af2 and De3 (The immediate 24 ... Af2 fails to 25 2f4.) Here are the main variations:

- (a) 25 h5 总f2! 26 总×f2 罩×f2 27 国gl ②×e5 28 曾g3 耳×e2 29 de 買×a2 30 買e1 買d2 and Black wins.
- (b) White also loses on 25 hg £xg5 26 €g1 (26 ∃g1 \(\text{\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\exit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\exit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\exitit{\$\exititit{\$\exitit{\$\e 耳f2!! or 27 耳b2 c4! 28 曾b1 耳f1.
- (c) 25 国d1 would be met by the strong reply 25 ... gh 26 $\triangle \times$ h4 \triangle f2 27 對h3 對e4! 28 总×e7 闰f7 29 总f6 ②e3 ∓ Zaitsev.
- (d) Another interesting line is 25 當h3!? 皇f2 26 皇×f2 (against the threat of 27 ... 包e3) 27 罩×f2 27 用g1 ②×e5 28 營e3 and now Black plays 28 ... <a>\infty <a>xg4!! launching a punitive action against the White monarch. If 29 \times g4 then 29 ... **營f5+30 營g3 (If 30 營h5 then 30...** 闰f4!! wins) 30 ... 闰×e2 31 營×e2 **省4+ 32 當h3 營×h4 mate. 29** ₩xe7 also fails because of 29 ... 소f6 30 소g3 (30 쌀e5 g4+ 31 含h2 對×e5 32 d×e5 幻d5 33 囯e1 幻e3 wins) 30 ... g×h4 31 當×h4 罩f4+ ends the game.

What is the final conclusion concerning the critical position of the game? In spite of Black's clear positional superiority, only one paradoxical move is capable of exploiting it, and that is 24 ... g5!! Cruder methods will not succeed. The move actually played in the game, 24 ... b5, is not nearly as strong and gives White real

chances to survive after 25 \(\mathbb{\pi} \times b5!\). permitting a forced draw after 25 ... ⑤×e5 26 ⑤×c5 ⑤×g4+ 27 ⑤h3 쌀e6! 28 쌀c4 회f2+ 29 \$h2 회g4+ etc. If instead 25 ... 2d2!?, then 26 買bl! should hold.

25 \$\dispharent{B}\h3?!

This seemed, at first glance, a cautious and reliable move, very much in keeping with Karpov's style. Now Kasparov's chances for creating any successful attack were vastly reduced. He then played the late middlegame inexactly and fell into deep time pressure, eventually giving up the full point after the next poor move.

25 a6?!

Some analysts. including Kasparov, later found the very strong reply 25 ... b4!, demolishing White's pawn centre. After the virtually forced 26 cb cd we have:

- (a) Jon Tisdall suggested in $\forall \times e3 \quad \triangle \times d1 \quad 29 \quad \forall \times d4 \quad with the$ conclusion that Black faces considerable technical difficulties. but it is he who is playing to win. We haven't found any serious obstacles after 29 ... \\div \times d4 30 \&\times d4 **到**2 31 **总**×f2 闰×f2 ∓.
- (b) Tisdall is right in pointing out that 27 對b3 fails to 27 ... d3 28 囯d1 d2 29 幻c3 營e6 30 幻e4 囯d8! 31 $\triangle c5$ $\triangle \times c5$ 32 bc $\square d4!$ and Black is better.
- (c) 27 分c3 \(\precedef{e}\)e6 28 分e4 h5! (Better than 28 ... $\langle 5 \rangle \times e5$ 29 $\langle 2 \times e5 \rangle$ ₩xe5 30 g3 with real chances to

hold.) 29 sh2 $\textcircled{a} \times e5 \mp$. It is curious that in this analysis the White king is shuttling between h2 and h3.

Against Tisdall's 25 ... 2d2!?, White should play 26 2g1! (not 25 舀×b5? 營e6! ∓) 26 ... ⑤×b1 27 ₩×e3 with an unclear position.

26	ఓ]gl	cd
27	2 13	ãd8
28	a4!	dc
29	₩×c3	₩e6

Better was 29 ... 皆d3! 30 皆×d3 寬×d3 31 ab 幻a3! ±

30 **♣**h2 ba

An interesting alternative was 30 ... **△**a7!? intending ... **△**e3.

31	∄b4	€]d2
32	≅×a4	ବ୍ରମ+
33	⊈h3	Äd1

Kasparov was down to his last minute here

34	₩c2		Дc	1	
35	₩e2		h5		
36	Æe1		₩ď	7?	
The d	lecisive	error.	36		Дa

T would have given Black real drawing chances.

Now let us look at the next game, Karpov-Kasparov, (m/7) 1987 *(91)*:


16 ... 買 48!?

Kasparov may have been afraid of Georgadze's 17 g5! in reply to 16 ... \Bigs f8 as played in game five.

17 \\delta e1

The two players renewed their dispute of this variation at the European Options Exchange

90 Kasparov's Opening Repertoire



Tournament, Amsterdam 1988. In this position, Karpov produced the innovation 17 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{e}}}}\)c2!?, but did not succeed after 17 ... \delta c4! 18 \delta b2 (if 18 營e4 包c6!, seizing either the d- or e-pawn) 18 ... ♣h6 19 h4 \(\psi\)f7 20 曾g1 (if 20 g5 公c4 21 曾c1 耳f8 干干) 20 ... 買f8 21 包g3 (21 買f1? ②c4 ∓) 21 ... ②c4 22 쌀e2 쌀×f2+23 對×f2 鱼e3 24 對×e3 氫×e3. The game is even, as 25 g5 is met by 25 ... cd 26 cd \(\mathbb{I}\)f4 27 \(\mathbb{I}\)c1 \(\alpha\)d5 =. Karpov took the second pawn, but destroyed his pawn structure: 25 de 寬c8 26 闰b1 闰×c5 27 闰×b7 ⑤×g4 28 闰b4? h5 29 ⑤e4 闰×e5 〒 $(\frac{1}{2}-\frac{1}{2})$ 57). Keene suggested 28 罝×e7 罝×c3 29 幻f1, but 29 ... 罝a3! should give Black even chances in the ending. Thus Kasparov succeeded again in Karpov's latest attempt to improve White's plan with $\Delta \times f7+$.

17 ... ₩e4

White would react to 17 ... Ah6 by playing 18 h4 followed by 19 g5. Black decided to regain his pawn, but this gives White time to regroup his pieces and seize the initiative. Since Black will not be able to deploy his bishop at h6, the plan with 16 ... \(\bar{\pi}\)d8 seems faulty.

18	g5	₩f 5
19	h4	ᡚc4
20	₽g1	₩g4
21	a4	h6!
22	ቯa2!	

22 gh $\triangle \times h6$ would free the Black bishop and enable it to join in a strong attack.


Now White has a slight initiative.

23	•••	gh
24	⊌b3	₩e6
25	ᡚf4	省17
26	﴿2)×g6!	∦×g6
27	營×c4+	&h8
28	貫 b2	cd
29	cd	₩g4

The position appears to be balanced, although Tisdall main-**△×d4 ⇔×d4+32 闰f2 ⇔×e533 闰f5** 쌀e1+34 営f1 쌀e5 Karpov, instead of playing 35 \$\mathbb{G}\$h1?, could have continued 35 \delta f4! which 'would probably push Black over the brink ...'. After the move played in the game Kasparov was able to draw in 79 moves.

Game 11 saw Karpov choose to keep his centre intact and support it with his queen.

This is better than 16 2g3 cd 17 cd 罩d8 which would have given Black strong pressure for the pawn.




White offers the g-pawn to Black, who spurns it, preferring to exchange queens.

16 ... cd 17 cd 營×g4 18 罩f1! would transpose back to the 9th game of the match, an experience Kasparov would certainly not wish to repeat.

18 \(\textit{\textit{g}}\)5 h6! 19 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\times e7 cd?\) 20 cd 用e8 21 用c1! あa5 22 用c7 ± was played in Seirawan-Lputian, St. John 1988. But 19 ... 罩e8! 20 总×c5 b6 21 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)b4 a5 (Gligorić) was a better try.

Now Kasparov managed to bring the bishop into the game.

This is a critical position for Black's imaginative bishop tour. The Black forces are very active and there is a concrete target at e4 (for example 22 a4? **2**d6 23 **2**g3 国c8 followed by ... 国c4), and



White's extra pawn at g4 plays no role at all. We consider this position dynamically balanced.

a5!?

The bishop may be overindulging in sightseeing. 22 ... b5 seems more logical.

23	Äcl	b5
24	≅c2	ᡚd6
25	≨)g3	ᡚc4
26	an	∳]d6
27	∳]g3	ᡚc4
28	g5	

Inviting a draw by repetition. Now 28 ... a6 should give Black sufficient counterplay, for example 29 當f1 耳f8 30 當e2 耳f4 31 h5 Ξ g4 32 hg hg = (33 Ξ f3 Ξ f4+). In the actual game, the nervous play on both sides is not of interest to the discussion of the opening.

So what can we conclude from the theoretical battle over 12 ∆xf7+? Karpov demonstrated that the old handling of the line is not sufficient for equality, but Kasparov demonstrated that any disruption of White's pawn centre is very dangerous indeed. The best course of action for Black seems at present to be to get the queens off the board and not to worry about the extra pawn at g4.

All of this is very interesting, but is likely to remain a footnote to the main theory of the line. which we follow here, starting from diagram 86.

This is the standard position of the Classical Exchange Variation.

14 \(\mathbb{H}\)c1

The long controversial exchange sacrifice 14 d5 $\triangle \times a1$ 15 " xal f6 is not seen as frequently at the top level these days. The main lines run:

- (a) 16 \(\mathbb{B}\)b1 \(\mathbb{D}\)f7 (16 \(\ldots\) b6, 16 \(\ldots\) g7, and 16 ... \(\textit{\alpha}\)d7 are all reliable alternatives.) 17 Ah6 Ze8 18 Ab5 營d6 (or 18 ... 營b6+ 19 公d4 莒ed8 20 Qe3 營c5 21 包f5 營a3 22 Qc1 營c5+ 23 总e3 營a3 24 总c1 營c5+ ½-½ van Gaalen-van der Wiel, Utrecht 1986) 19 $\triangle \times e8$ $\triangle \times e8$ 20 曾c3 b6 21 耳c1 分b7 22 皇e3 曾f7 23 **營d2 營d8 24 分d4** 耳c8 25 耳f1 **營d6** = Pinter-Přibyl, Sochi 1981.
 - (b) 16 \(\textit{\text{\ti}}\text{\tetx{\text{\tetx{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\tex{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\te

equalize anymore: 16 ... \(\mathbb{Z}\)e8 1/ 到f4 且f7 18 耳e1 對b6 19 當f1 耳ed8 20 e5 A×d5 21 ef ₩×f6 and Black is better, according to Boleslavsky.

- (c) 16 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}}\) d4 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}}\) d7 17 \(\text{\text{\text{f}}}\) b6 18 2d2 \(\text{\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$d}\$}}} \) c7 19 \(\text{\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\exittit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\texi\}}}\\ \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\e 21 皆b5 Q×a6 22 皆×a6 且fc8 23 2e6 with compensation (Toften-Martin, London 1984).
- (d) 16 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}} d2 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}} d7 17 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{e}}}} \) b6 18 Qh6 目f7 19 皆g3 e5 20 f4 皆e7 21 Tallinn 1986.

15 d5 is also seen, but after 15 ... 益b3 16 營e1 e6 17 營b4 ed 18 闰c5 鱼c4 19 鱼×c4 ⑤×c4 20 萬×d5 **営×d5** 21 ed 分×e3 22 耳c1 分×d5 Black has full equality in this line which was originally proposed by co-author Shamkovich.

18 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{Q}}}}\) a6 (Spassky-Shamkovich. Sochi 1967, was agreed drawn here.) 18 ... $\triangle c8!$ 19 $\triangle \times c8 \ \square \times c8$ 20 耳×c8 資×c8 21 資×e7 資c2 led to an equal position in I. Sokolov-Kapetanović, Yugoslavia 1984, which was agreed drawn after 22 耳e1 幻c4 23 点f2 a5 24 d6 龄d2 25 d7 包e5 26 包d4 包d3 27 耳f1 包×f2! 28 d8 (營) 包d1! (intending 28 ... 쌀e3+) 29 當h1 회f2+.

18 ... e6

It is possible that 18 ... 罩c8!?, introduced in 1987, is a stronger move. For example:

- (a) 19 公c3 公b7 20 Qa6 其c7 21 e5 包c5 22 总c4 對b8 23 對a3 耳cc8 24 目fd1 (Vizhmanavin-Ivanchuk, USSR 1987), and now 24 ... \$\&\text{\$\text{\$h8}!}\$ gives Black a solid position.
- (b) 19 **Q**a6 **E**×c1 20 **E**×c1 e6 21 d6 \$\oldsymbol{\phi}\$c6 22 \$\oldsymbol{\phi}\$d2 e5 23 f5 \$\oldsymbol{\phi}\$b8! 24 Db7 gf 25 ef D×f5 26 Dg3 De6 27 ⑤h5!? (Gligorić suggests 27 萬c7) 26 ... $\frac{1}{2}$ h4 27 $\frac{1}{2}$ ×g7 $\frac{1}{2}$ ×g7 = Dolmatov-Gavrikov, USSR Ch. 1987.

19 d6 €)c6 19 ... e5 20 f5 耳c8 21 幻c3 总c6 22 **包b5 營d7 (Or 22 ... 总×b5 23** □×c8 對×c8 24 □×b5 with a big advantage for White.) 23 f6! 4h8 24 Qe2 耳fd8 25 耳cd1 耳b8 26 h3 h5 27 \(\mathbb{I}\) d2! This is stronger than 27 \$\delta_h2, seen in Balashov-Hansen, Malmö 1987/88. White has a clear

20 \array{20} as comes into consideration.


advantage in the final position.

This position was reached in Dolmatov-Gavrikov, USSR Championship 1986. After 21 ... 對h4! intending 22 ... Ah6 the position is unclear, eg.:

- (a) 22 f6 Ah6;
- (b) 22 g3 曾h3:
- (c) 22 Af2 \(\text{g5}\) 23 \(\text{Qc3}\) \(\text{Qd4}\) \(\infty\). These last two games do not by any means constitute a refutation of Black's opening strategy, although they have presented Grünfeld practitioners with new obstacles to overcome. Kasparov

clearly preferred to steer clear of these waters, but may choose to navigate them in the future.

d4 €)f6 2 c4 **g6** 4)c3 d5 **5**13 **∆**27 Ag5 (95)



This was the approach adopted by Seirawan against Kasparov at the Dubai Olympiad, Kasparov has employed the White side as well, against Smyslov in the Candidates' finals of 1984.

> 5 €)e4 ... cd

If White does not wish to give up the bishop pair then he can play 6 ♠h4, but after 6 ... ♠×c3 7 bc dc Black has a good game, for example:

(a) 8 e3 2e6 9 de2 (9 年b1 b6 10 包d2 0-0 11 包×c4 Qd5 12 曾d2 曾d7 13 ②a3 c5 14 f3 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{9}}}}\) a4 \(\infty\) Mecking-Fischer, Buenos Aires 1970) 9 ... 0-0 10 0-0 ad7 11 ag5 ad5 12 e4 h6 13 ed hg 14 Q×g5 2b6 15 \d2 Ξ e8 16 Δ h6 Δ f6 = Groszpeter-Ftačnik, Trnava 1983.

(b) 8 營a4+ 營d7 9 營×c4 b6 10 e3 **△a6** 11 對b3 △×f1 12 對×f1 c5 13 當e2 cd 14 cd 公c6 15 耳hd1 0-0 16 Polanica Zdroj 1982.

6 \(\text{\texts} f4 \) is no more effective, e.g. a5 10 e3 c5 11 \triangle c4 cd 12 ed \triangle c6 = Bronstein-Suetin, USSR Ch. 1965.

8 \dd d2 is a major alternative, but it appears that after 8 ... ed 9 \delta e3+ \$18! White cannot obtain any advantage. An example is 10 皆f4 ⊈f6 11 h4 h6 12 ∮f3 c6 13 e3 ⊈e6 14 总d3 包d7 15 0-0-0 對b8 16 對×b8 \(\mathbb{Z}\times b8 = \text{Bisguier-Korchnoi, Lone}\) Pine 1979.

8 \(\frac{1}{2} \) a4+ c6 9 dc \(\frac{1}{2} \) × c6 10 \(\frac{1}{2} \) \(\frac{1}{3} \) deserves thorough practical testing.

9 b4 對d6 10 a3 0-0 11 e3 c6 12 \(\textit{Q}\)e2 \(\textit{Q}\)f5 13 0-0 \(\textit{Q}\)d7 gave Black equality in Seirawan-Kasparov, Dubai Ol. 1986.

10 b4

10 \(\text{\te}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\t One secure equalizing line is 10 ... 三e8 11 0-0 点f8 12 包e5 c6 13 点f3 Qd6 14 包d3 Qf5 15 囯e1 包d7 16 包e2 曾b6 17 包g3 Q×d3 18 曾×d3 ②f6 19 置ab1 a5 = Gurgenidze-Zilberstein, USSR 1974.

- (a) 11 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\) e2 a5 12 b5 a4 13 0-0 ₩a5 14 ₩d2 Qg4 15 bc bc 16 h3 △×f3 17 △×f3 △d7 was equal in Ostermeyer-Korchnoi, Biel 1984.
- (b) 11 \(\text{\(\)}}}} \) \\ \end{\(\text{\(\)}}}} \) \\ \end{\(\text{\(\)}}}} \) \\ \end{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\)}}}}} \) \\ \end{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\)}}}} \) \\ \end{\(\text{\(\text{\(\)}}} \\ \end{\(\text{\(\)}} \\ \end{\(\text{\(\text{\(\)}}} \\ \end{\(\text{\(\)}} \) \\ \end{\(\text{\(\)}} \\ \end{\(\)} \\ \end{\(\text{\(\)}} \\ \end{\(\)} \\ \end{\(\) \\ \end{\(\)} \ a4 \(\text{\tinit}}}}} \ext{\texi}\tex{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\ **2**b2 17 **2**b1 **2**f6 18 cb was seen in Seirawan-Korchnoi, Brussels 1986, where Black could have equalized with 18 ... \\delta \times b6.

12 Qe2 ②d7 13 0-0 g5 14 国ac1 a5 gives chances for both sides (Bogdanov-Gulko, USSR 1973).

₽d3 13

13 Qe2 f5 14 0-0 a6 15 耳fe1 當h8 16 **△**f1 f4 17 ef **□**×f4 18 **□**×e6 $\mathbb{Z}\times f3!$ 19 gf \mathbb{Z} g5+ \mathbb{T} was seen in Cebalo-Kavalek, Reggio Emilia 1985/86. 18 2 a4 would have limited the damage.

13	•••	₩e 7
14	0-0	Ïfc8
15	€]a4	b6

In this unclear position chances about equal (Browne-Timman, Buenos Aires 1980). VI

> d4 **ᡚf6**

	2 3 4 5	c4 ව්ය3 ව්13 ∰a4+	g6 d5 <u>∆</u> g7 (97)
97 B			

This is a thoroughly innocuous line, with which Kasparov has had no difficulty.

5	•••	∆d7
6	₩b3	dc
7	₩×c4	0-0
8	e4	b5!
9	€)×h5	

9 \begin{aligned}
9 \begin{aligned}
b 3 c5 10 e5 \begin{aligned}
c 4 11 \begin{aligned}
\times b5 cd
\end{aligned}

12 ②×d4 ∴×b5 13 ②d×b5 a6 14 ②a3 皆d4! 15 皆c2 ②c6 16 皆e2 ₩×e5! gave Black a substantial advantage in Hübner-Kasparov, Brussels 1986.


> 9 ②×e4 10 ≰⊇×c7

Kengis points out that 10 \dd5 c6 11 \\ exe4 fails to 11 ... \(\infty \text{f5!} \) ∓.

10		€]c6
11	ᡚ × a8	₩a5 +
12	₿d2	وَ×d2
13	≰⊇×d2	$2\times d4$
14	₩c7	⊌×c7
15	ᡚ×c7	ᡚc2+
16	&d1	ව×a1
17	∆d3	<u> </u>
18	\$2e2	

In Bönsch-Jasnikowski, Harkany 1985, White obtained some compensation for his material after 18 ... 宮c8?! 19 宮b1 Qe5 20 幻d5, but after 18 ... \(\textit{\Omega}\) c6! Black would have had a clear advantage.

9 Sicilian Defence



Kasparov has relied on the Sicilian Defence for most of his career. We will concentrate on two systems which have played a major role in his repertoire - the Scheveningen (including the Keres Attack) and the Taimanov Variations. We will also note some significant contributions to the theory of the Richter-Rauzer and Naidorf Variations.

> **c**5 1 e4 2 包含

Scheveningen Variation


This variation was especially important in the first two Kasparov-Karpov clashes, before Karpov switched to 1 d4 as his primary weapon. Kasparov has written an entire book on the subject (available in an English translation by co-author Schiller).

together with his trainer Nikitin, who has been a leading Soviet expert on this system for many vears, and who had already written profusely on the subject.

It is not really possible to give a full Sicilian repertoire for Black such a task would require at least a full volume by itself. The authors have endeavoured to provide significant coverage of the major. popular lines. There are many good sources for the less familiar lines, some by Kasparov himself.

2	•••	e6
3	d4	cd
4	ક્⊇×d4	ᡚf6
5	ᡚc3	d6
6	⊈e2 (99)	


6 g4, the Keres Attack, is generally sidestepped by Kasparov, who employs a variety of move orders to avoid it.



6 ...

Black can adopt a number of move orders, but this one, which can also arise from the Naidorf move order 2 ... d6 3 d4 cd 4 $\triangle \times$ d4 ②f6 5 ②c3 a6 6 △e2 e6, is a solid one, as Black generally chooses to include the advance a7-a6 in his plans. One example where Kasparov omitted the move is his game against Kupreichik from Kislovodsk 1982: 1 e4 c5 2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f3 e6 6 Qe3 Qf6 7 Qe2 Qe7 8 f4 0-0 9 \(\preceq\)d2?! (intending 0-0-0) 9 ... e5! 10 ♠f3 (10 ♠f5 ♣×f5 11 ef ef 12 $\Delta \times f4 d5!$ gives Black the initiative. according to Kasparov.) 10 ... 2 g4! 11 f5? (11 **2**d5! would have led to a level position according to Kasparov.) 11 ... 4 b4! 12 4d3 (12 0-0-0 d5! and 12 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)g1 d5! both give Black a strong initiative.) 12 ... d5! $\Xi e8 \mp 16 \ 0-0-0 \ \Omega f6 \ 17 \ \Omega g5 \ \Xi \times e4$ 18 h3 De5 19 D×f6 ₩×f6 20 N×e5 ≅×e5 21 g4 \(\textit{Q}\)d7 and, as Kasparov noted, 'the rest was a matter of technique'.

This is a typical starting point for the analysis of the Scheveningen material. White has developed his pieces, staked a claim in the centre, and shuttled his king to safety. Black has developed calmly and has maintained his flexibility with regard to the deployment of his queenside pieces.



10 **a4**

This policy of restraining Black's queenside has occupied centre stage for the last ten years. White can, of course, delay this move, and Kasparov has faced three alternatives:

- (a) 10 \(\text{Q} \) \(\text{e3} \) \(\text{2} \) \(\text{c6} \) 11 a4 iust returns to the text.
- (b) Karpov-Kasparov, (m/5) 1984-5: 10 \(\textit{\Omega}\)f3 \(\textit{\Omega}\)c6 (Kasparov has never employed the more passive 10 ... **包bd7.**) 11 a4 **Ee8** 12 **Qe3** 国b8 13 国e1 (Kasparov had an unpleasant experience with 13 \(\Omega f2 \omega f8 \) 14 \(\omega e1 \) in an encounter with Razuvayev in the 1978 USSR Ch.: 14 ... 幻d7 15 營e2 引×d4 16 $\triangle \times d4 \ b6 \ 17 \ e5!? \ de \ 18 \ fe \triangle b4? \ 19$ 国adl 到f8 20 目f1 到g6 21 到e4 ±. but 18 ... \(\Qc5! \) would have been much stronger.) 13 ... \(\Omega\)d7 14 \(\omega\)d3 (This entails an old-fashioned idea of redeploying the White forces with \allaal-d1 and \allae3-c1. Kasparov experiences no difficulty in achieving full equality.) 14 ... $\triangle \times d4$ 15 $\triangle \times d4$ e5! (A typical Kasparov counter-thrust. The previously standard 15 ... \(\Omega\)c6

allowed White to obtain advantage with 16 a5.) 16 **Q**a7 **B**bc8 17 △e3 (Karpov prevents Black from advancing his b-pawn, which would have been possible on 16 2e3.) 17 ... \(\text{\text{\$\tex{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\texitex{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex{ prophylactic move, as the immediate 18 ... 2 f8 would have been met by 19 fe de 20 \(\textit{Qg5!} \) 19 h3 \(\textit{Qf8} \) 20 **Qd2 對d4 21 Qe3 對b4 ½-½.**

(c) Karpov-Kasparov, (m/43) 1984-5: 10 營e1 (This introduces a well-known offensive formation with 10 ... \$\omega c6 11 \omega e3 \omega d7 12 ₩g3. but Karpov actually intends to place his queen at f2. Kasparov chooses an active counter-strategy on the queenside.) $10 \dots b5! 11 \Delta f3$ △b7 12 e5 △e8 (In their monograph, Kasparov and Nikitin suggested that 12 ... de 13 fe 4 fd7 is a playable, if risky alternative.) 13 f5 de 14 fe <u>A</u>×f3 15 ef+ <u>H</u>×f7 16 分×f3 分d7 17 且g5 (17 且e3 營c6 19) $\exists d1 \triangle b4 20 \triangle d2 \triangle d6 = Kasparov$ and Nikitin.) 17 ... 2f8 18 a3 2d6 19 幻d2 邕×fl+ and a draw was agreed after a couple more moves. A rather relaxed 'book' game which was a sort of time-out in the gruelling marathon match. In game 7 the protagonists returned to consideration of the main line (below). But there was every reason for Karpov to respect Kasparov's ability to defend the main line, based on the following examples:

(c1) 9 ... 2c6 (In the Scheveningen, it is often better to study positions grouped thematically,

rather than by specific move orders. In our book, all of our branchings refer to the boldfaced main move order. In other words, this line (c1) departs from the position after 9 \$\mathbb{B}\$h1 in the boldfaced text.) 10 \(\mathbb{Q} e 3 \(\mathbb{Q} d 7 \) 11 \(\mathbb{Q} e 1 \) b5 12 a3 營b8! (Better than 12 ... 營c7 where White could play 13 \(\text{\textit{g}}\)3 \(\Pi\)ab8 14 e5! de 15 fe \(\Delta\)×e5 16 闰×f6! Д×f6 17 且f4 〒 Kasparov-Korsunsky, USSR 1978.) 13 \dig g3?! b4! 14 ab 曾×b4 15 闰fd1 曾×b2 16 $\langle x \rangle \times c6 \stackrel{\triangle}{=} \times c6 17 \stackrel{\triangle}{=} d4 \stackrel{\triangle}{=} b7 18 \stackrel{\triangle}{=} ab1$ 營c7 19 e5?! (Too late: better 19 △d3 〒.) 19 ... de 20 △×e5 營c8 21 闰d4 g6 22 闰c4 營e8 23 f5!? ef 24 買b6 買c8! 25 買×a6 ⑤e4 26 ⑤×e4 **£**×e4 ∓.

(c2) 9 \(\text{de} 1 \overline{1} \overline 11 总×d4 b5 12 闰d1 皆c7 13 e5! de 14 fe 외d7 15 외e4 요b7 16 외f6+! 當h8 17 皆h4 (17 皆g3! would have been more precise, for example 17 ... h6 18 \(\pm \)d3 \(\pm \) or 17 ... gf 18 ef $\triangle \times 6$ 19 $\triangle d3!$ with a strong attack.) 17 ... h6 18 營h3 莒ad8! 19 對d3 分×f6 20 ef ∴×f6 21 罩×f6 e5! and Kasparov successfully repelled the attack. Nevertheless, in his subsequent games in this line he avoided the premature capture at d4.

> 10 €)c6 ∄e8 11 ⊈e3 12 **A**f3

Geller's 12 Ag1!? was seen in Karpov-Kasparov, (m/10) 1985: 12 ... \ \ Bb8! (improving on 12 ... e5? 13 分b3 ef 14 a5! 幻e5 15 耳×f4 Qe6 16 \$\d5 which allowed Geller to over-


run Polugayevsky in the 1983 USSR Ch.) 13 營d2 (Kudrin-Arnason, Bor 1984, saw White gain an advantage with 13 \dd d3 after 13 ... ②×d4?! 14 Q×d4 e5 15 Qa7 日a8 16 \(\overline{\Pi} e^3\), but after 13 ... \(\overline{\Pi} b^4\) Black would lay claim to equality, at the very least, for example 14 \g3 e5! or 14 曾d2 d5!? 15 e5 勾e4.) 13 ... e5 (The prosaic 13 ... ≰)×d4 is good for White, while 13 ... 2d7 14 5b3! gives Black a lot of trouble, since he has to contend with the threat of 15 a5, but 14 ... b6? fails to 15 △×a6 and 14 ... ②a5 is met by 15 e5!) 14 Db3 Da5!? (Black must navigate these tricky waters with great care. This move must be played right now, as it creates the threat of capturing at b3, thus taking White's attention away from the centre. If, for example, 15 fe. then Black does not have to recapture immediately with 15 ... de, although that is playable provided that on 16 2d5 he plays 16 ... **②**×b3! and not 16 ... **②**×d5?? 17 ≝×d5, but he can also interpose 15 ... ②×b3!, as 16 ed ②×d2 is fully playable.) 15 🗈 ×a5 🛱 ×a5 16 🚨 a7 \(\mathbb{A}\)a8 17 \(\mathbb{A}\)e3 \(\mathbb{B}\)b4!? Once again. Kasparov heads for complications. In his comments, he gives 17 ... ef 18 $\triangle \times f4$ $\triangle e6$ or 18 $\Xi \times f4$ $\triangle e6$ 19 $\triangle d4$ $\triangle d7$ as equal, but 18 $\triangle \times f4$ △e6 19 △d5 is, in our opinion, not so clear, since 19 ... $\forall \times d2$ 20 $\triangle \times e7 + \Xi \times e7 21 \triangle \times d2$ is better for White, e.g. 21 ... d5 22 e5 2 e4 23 Qb4 or 21 ... 2d7 22 Qb4 2c5 23 e5. Therefore the text move was.

at least from a psychological and perhaps from an objective viewpoint as well, the correct choice. The remainder of the game contained a number of errors by both players, but Kasparov managed to survive.

12 g4!? ②×d4 13 營×d4 ②d7 (13 ... e5!? =) 14 g5 b6 15 \triangle f3 \triangle b7 16 Qg2 Qf8 17 皆d2 呂ac8 18 f5 皆c4 19 g6 hg 20 fg fg 21 營f2 公f6 22 營g3 e5 with a roughly level position which was agreed drawn (Tal-Kasparov, SWIFT Blitz 1987).

12 包f3 b6 13 營e1 包b4 14 莒c1 \triangle b7 15 \triangle d3 e5 16 fe de = Tal-Hansen, Wijk aan Zee 1985. If 17 \(\textit{\tit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\texti \(\mathbb{Z}\) ac8 18 \(\mathbb{L}\) h6 \(\mathbb{L}\) h5 19 \(\mathbb{L}\) g4 g6 ∞.

12 ... 罩**b8** (101)



13 \\ddata d2

13 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e1 would transpose above to Karpov-Kasparov, (m/5) 1984-5.

13 \(\text{\text{\text{el}}}\) e1 e5 14 \(\text{\text{\text{ef}}}\) 5 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{ef}}}}\) ef e4 16 Qe2 d5 17 皆f2 **公b4 18** 国ac1 h5 19 h3 b6 20 g4 \triangle c5 21 g5 ∞ with a slight initiative for White (Basanta-Hernandez, St. John 1988).

> 13 **≜d7**

Karpov-Kasparov, (m/45)1984-5, saw instead 13 ... ②×d4 (A reasonable move. 13 ... 2a5 should be met not by 14 \text{\text{de2}} \text{\text{2c4}} 15 Qcl e5! 〒, but by 14 b3 d5!? 15 e5 \(\text{D} \) b4 16 \(\text{D} \) de2 \(\text{D} \) e4 17 \(\text{D} \times \) e4 de 18 2d5!, a possibility overlooked by the theoreticians and commentators.) 14 $\triangle \times d4$ e5 15 $\triangle a7!$ (Geller-Timoshchenko, USSR 1986, saw the eccentric 15 \(\textit{\Omega}\)g1!? ef $16 a 5 \triangle e 6 17 \triangle b 6 \cong c 8 =$, although the consistent 15 ... b5 is also worthy of consideration. Karpov's move was an innovation.) 15 ... 用a8 16 鱼e3 鱼d7! (Taimanov suggested 16 ... ef 17 $\triangle \times f4$ $\triangle e6$ but 18 耳fd1 囯ed8 19 包e2! intending 20 \(\Delta d4 \) gives White a very pleasant position.) 17 a5 \(\mathbb{Z}\) ac8 18 2e2 (Preventing Black from transferring his queen to b4.) 18 ... active post for the bishop than e6. But what if White plays 19 \(\textit{D}\)d3, intending to attack on the kingside? Dorfman suggested during the game the wild variation 19 ... ef 20 点b6 皆b8? 21 莒×f4 d5 (21 ... 4 d7!?) 22 ed $4 \times d5$ 23 $4 \times d5$ $4 \times d5$ 24 頁f5 Qc6 25 頁h5 h6 26 Qd4 with a formidable intiative. But 20 ... 對d7! 21 罩×f4 對e6 is a superior option.) 19 營d3 營d8!? (By threatening 20 ... ef 21 $\triangle \times f4$ d5, Kasparov encouraged the White rook to transfer to d1.) 20 罩fd1. If 20 ab6 曾d7 21 国ad1, as suggested by Taimanov, Black would obtain a playable game with 21 ... ef 22 耳×f4 營e6 23 囯df1 (23 单d4 包d7)


23 ... 自d8 24 自d4 包×e4!?

Kasparov has successfully solved his opening problems in the Scheveningen, even when he found himself in rather difficult situations.

14 **2**b3

It took Karpov some time to appreciate the value of this move. In Karpov-Kasparov, (m/2) 1985, an interesting alternative.) 15 $\triangle \times d4$ e5 16 $\triangle e3$ $\triangle e6$?! (A rather bold and adventurous solution, leading to a position rich in positional and tactical possibilities which appeal to Kasparov's fighting spirit. 17 \(\triangle b6\) is playable for Black, Kasparov suggests 17 ... 쌉c4 18 Qe2! 쌉c6 19 a5 and now 19 ... \(\Q d8! \) is best. Objectively, we must prefer 16 ... ef 17 △×f4 and now 17 ... \(\textit{Qc6!}\) followed by 18 耳fdl 鱼f8 or 18 里adl 里bd8. Sometimes psychological considerations override objective evaluation. In this game, it turns out for the best, as far as Kasparov is concerned.) 17 f5 \(\textit{Qc4}\) 18 \(\textit{Qb6}\) ₩c8 and now we come to a position of considerable interest (102).

19 呂fcl (Kasparov, as well as Averbakh and Taimanov, suggested 19 \(\mathbb{I}\)fdl! as the refutation of Black's dubious plan initiated with 16 ... \(\textit{\$\textit{\Omega}\$e6. It is truly} \) a powerful and logical move, but Black can survive his trials and tribulations if he avoids 19 ... d5 20 ed 營×f5 21 b3 Qb4 22 2a2! and




chooses instead 19 ... 2d7! 20 b3 ②xb3! or 20 ♀a7 ☐a8 21 ♀e3 b5 where White is only slightly better. Karpov's move created the immediate threat of 20 b3, but allowed Kasparov to create tactical counterplay.) 19 ... d5! 20 b3 △b4 21 △a2 △a3! (Kasparov either overlooked or underestimated this zwischenzug.) 22 bc Black was able to make good use of his strong passed pawn at e4.

14 ... **b6** (103)

Now that White has eliminated the possibility of an exchange of knights in the centre. Black must determine what sort of queenside formation is appropriate. 14 ... because 15 <a>\omega \times a5 allows the strong break 16 e5!

15 g4!

In Karpov-Kasparov, (m/18) 1985, Karpov played 15 \(\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{Q}}}\textit{\textit{f2}}\), but after 15 ... 2c8! (Not 15 ... 2a5 because of 16 2×a5 ba 17 e5!) 16 △g3 (This manoeuvre seems a bit artificial and is in any event too slow. Now Kasparov managed to



without difficulty.) 16 ... 2d7 17 17 ... **②**a5 is met by 18 e5! with an initiative for White, and he is certainly correct, as after 18 ... ♠xb3 19 cb de 20 fe ♣b7 21 ♠e4 $\triangle \times e422 \triangle \times e4$ (Kasparov), Black's position is not pleasant, for example 22 ... 互bd8 23 皆位 互f8 24 managed to effectively restrict Black's plans involving ... (2)c6-a5.) 18 e5 罩bd8 19 皆f2 罩f8! (Now it was Karpov who had some problems to solve.) 20 \(\textstyle e4 \) de 21 fe \triangle c5 22 \triangle x c5 bc! 23 \triangle f4 and here a draw was agreed even though Kasparov claims that his position would have been the stronger one after 23 ... ②d4 24 \deg3 \deg h8. Why agree to the draw, then? We know that psychological points can play a big role in a match, and Kasparov was no doubt content simply to survive once again with Black.

The text was introduced in the most critical game of the match the final one. In Karpov-Kasparov, (m/24) 1985, the then World Champion made up his mind to

adopt a classical attacking posture. This was no doubt due to the match situation, which required a win in order to retain the title. One notes that when Kasparov found himself in an identical situation in Seville, he chose a quite different approach, adopting the unambitious Réti Opening.

The advance of the g-pawn is in keeping with Karpov's general approach to the Scheveningen. He frequently employs the Keres Attack, which we will discuss below. The introduction of this move creates a typical, rich, Sicilian position which makes all of the previous examples pale by comparison. The game has been subject to so much scrutiny that we will concentrate on the main points and introduce a few new ideas of our own.


Both players were aware of the recent game between Sokolov and Ribli, where the Russian 'Sicilian Knight' played 17 Qg2 2a5 18 ₩f2, allowing his lines of communication to be cut after 18 ... \$\c4 19 \(\mathreat{Q}\)c1.

17 ... \$\a5 is still not on, because of 18 Aad1!

Black cannot prevent the transfer of the rook to h3.

Kasparov suggested 20 ... 2c5 to stop 国d3-h3, but 21 国del!? is a reasonable try (Kasparov considered only 21 <a>2xc5). Perhaps the rook would reach the h-file after all.

Kasparov noted that 22 ... f5!? should give Black good chances to hold the draw. This means that White's attack initiated by 15 g4 is strong, but not necessarily decisive. Black is not lost even after the text, however, as we shall see.



⊈e3 23

All of the commentators, including Kasparov, criticised this move as too timid, and suggested 23 f5 instead. On the other hand, Kasparov himself demonstrated that White does indeed maintain an advantage with this move, thanks to the weakness of the d-pawn. Now 23 f5 is fully in the attacking spirit of this variation, but even so Black could maintain a shaky and unclear balance with 23 26 曾g1 宫c4! 27 fg 囯g4+ 28 囯g3 □×g3+ 29 hg ②e5 30 gh+ ⑤h8 with compensation for the pawns. So White's choice in this position was more a matter of taste than an objective mistake.

23 **罩e7!** 24 **₽g1** ∄ce8 25 罩fd1! f5!

Otherwise White will play 26 d6.

> 26 gf ②×f6!

By sacrificing the pawn. Kasparov achieves full counterplay. The opening and early middlegame have come to an end, and Black is no worse for wear, so the attack with 15 g4 does not seem to have achieved its objective. The rest of the game is extremely interesting, but it has been extensively analysed elsewhere so we present the moves with just a few comments: 27 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g3 **闰f7 28 总×b6 營b8 29 总e3 心h5 20** 国g4 (30 国f3 would have led to material loss for White after 30 ... **△×c3 31 bc △a2!) 30 ... △f6 31 □h4** (Obviously a repetition of moves would have left Karpov without his title, so there really wasn't much choice. On 31 罩g5 Black would have played 31 ... Ah6 32 国g3 和h5 33 国f3 国ef8 34 Ah3 ②c8.) 31 ... g5! 32 fg ②g4! 33 \d2 $\triangle \times e3 34 \implies \times e3 \triangle \times c2 35 \implies b6 \triangle a8!$ 36 $\Xi \times d6$ (This hastens the end. but the title had already slipped away many moves ago.) 36 ... \(\mathbb{B}\)b7 37 營×a6 汽×b3 38 汽×e6 汽×b2 39 對c4 當h8 40 e5 對a7+ 41 當h1 $\triangle \times g2 + 42 \otimes \times g2 \otimes d4 + 0 - 1.$


Taimanov Variation

1	e4	c5
2	DB	e6
3	d4	cd
4	કો×d4	ᡚc6
5	∮]b5	d6
6	cA.	

6 Af4, as seen in Fischer-Petrosian, match 1971, is no longer so popular. Kengis-Romanishin, Jurmala 1987: 6 ... e5 7 \(\overline{4}\)e3 \(\overline{5}\)f6 8 \(\textit{\textit{Qg5}}\) \(\text{\textit{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{Qg5}}}}}}}\) \(\text{\ti}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\ti}\text{\texitt{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\tint{\text{\tex was better.) 9 營d2 ②xe4 10 營xa5 ②×a5 11 \(\overline{\text{Q}}\)e3 ∞.

> 6 **ᡚf6** €1c3 **a**6 8 2a3 (105)

This system is one of the Maroczy Bind formations which Kasparov has been willing to defend. In the next chapter we will examine another. If Black wishes to play the Scheveningen, but does not want to face the Keres Attack. then he must either adopt the Najdorf move order (see below),



d5!? (107)

or allow White to seize the centre as in this line.

8 ... ⊈e7


A number of players, including co-author Shamkovich, prefer 8 ... b6, for example 9 \(\text{Q}\)e2 \(\text{Q}\)b7 10 0-0 Qe7 11 f4 0-0 12 Qe3 \(\text{\text{D}}\text{b8!}\) A recent example of this approach is Geller-I. Sokolov, Pančevo 1987, which saw 10 ... De5 11 f4 Ded7 12 鱼f3 鱼e7 13 營e2 0-0 14 g4!? d5 15 ed ed 16 g5 呂e8! 17 營g2 ②e4 18 $\triangle \times d5$ $\triangle \times d5 =$. Geller gives 18 cd ±, but in our opinion Black actually has a fully playable game after 18 ... $\triangle \times a3$ 19 $\triangle \times e4$ $\triangle f8$.

But Kasparov's most striking contribution to opening theory is the so-called 'Gary Gambit' with 8 ... d5!? We will examine that line at the end of this section.

Kasparov could still have chosen the strategy employed against Tseshkovsky, at Minsk 1979, if he had played instead 11 ... 2e5. That game continued 12 f4 包ed7 13 Qf3 Qb7 14 營e2 營c7 (Kasparov criticised this move in The Test of Time and recommended 14 ... \(\mathbb{A}\) e8 instead. We feel that 14 ... 氧c8 is a good alternative as well, for example Hebert-Shamkovich, Lone Pine 1981: 15 g4 ②c5 16 \(\preceig g2 \overline{0}\)e8 17 g5 f5! with plenty of counterplay for Black.) 15 闰acl 囯ac8 16 g4 幻c5 17 營g2 d5!? (This is the consistent move, but Kasparov has also proposed the fantastic variation 17 ... g5:: 18 fg &fd7.) 18 e5 (On 18 ed or 18 cd. 18 ... 包d3! is very strong according to Kasparov.) 18 ... 2 fe4 19 cd ed 20 b4 分×c3 21 萬×c3 d4! and even though Kasparov was not proud of his 14th move, he must surely have been happy with this position.

12 **對b3** (106)

12 Ac1 allows Black to play 12 ... 幻e5, e.g. 13 f3 且c8 14 皆d2 皆c7 15 耳fd1 始b8 16 쌍e1 立d8 17 쌍f2 Ded7 18 Afl Ac7 and Black has secured d6 (Hernandez-Semkov St. John 1988).



12 €)a5?! •••

This was introduced in the game Karpov-Kasparov, (m/3) 1984-5: Not all of Kasparov's departures from known theory are to he held as models of correct decision making. In this case, the have been a better choice, but Kasparov decided that the terrain would have been too familiar to his rival.

> ⇔×p6 وَ×e4 13 14 ②×e4 ∆×e4

份×d8 8b×Q 16 Zad1! d5?!

An impatient move. White is already in possession of a clear advantage, thanks to the weakness of the Black pawns at a6 and d6. Nevertheless, Black does hold one trump card — the offside position of White's 2a3. His position was therefore tenable, after, for example, Gufeld's 16 ... 2b7 17 2b1 2f6, since 18 b3 (18 b4 a5 19 b5 a4! leads to a complicated position with chances for both sides.) 18 ... 互fd8 19 f3 点c6 intending ... d4. The pseudo-active break 16 ... d5 created an unbalanced position which Karnov found uncomfortable.

> 17 ß **⊈f5** 18 cd ed 19 Ä×d5 ₿e6 20 ∄d6 **∆**×a2?

Polugayevsky showed that more resistance could have been offered by 20 ... Qe7 21 A×a6 三×a6 22 乌×a6 三b8 23 乌d4 幻c6 24 \(\mathbb{Q} \)c3 \(\mathbb{Q} \)c5+ 25 \(\mathbb{Q} \)h1 \(\mathbb{Q} \) \(\times a2, but Black would still have been in deep trouble.

> 21 Ä×a6 ₿b8 22 **≙**.c5 ãe8 23 ₽b5!

and White won after a few more moves. It was a rough defeat, particularly because it involved the failure of a prepared innovation. Kasparov did not try to improve this particular line. Instead, he developed a new idea, inspired by bitter experience.

In Karpov-Kasparov, (m/12) 1985, the bomb was dropped:

8

•••


This remains the most sensational innovation of the Karpov-Kasparov matches. The idea of such a sacrifice is nothing new (indeed, the move was first played in Honfi-Dely, Hungary 1965, and promptly forgotten; Kasparov discovered the idea independently). Kasparov was surely aware of the line of the Dragon Sicilian: 1 e4 c5 2 2 5 3 2 c 6 3 d 4 c d 4 2 × d 4 g 6 5 2 c 3 Qg76 Qe3 2f67 Qc40-08 Qb3 a5 9 f3 d5!? 10 ed **2**b4, and also the games in the Taimanov which see this motif applied later in the game, a recent example of which is Haba-Mokry, Prague 1986: 8 ... b6 9 \(\text{Q} e 2 \) \(\text{Q} e 7 \) 10 0-0 0-0 11 \(\text{Q} e 3 \) \(\text{Q} e 5 \) 12 f3 \(\text{\tin}\exiting{\text{\texi}}\\ \text{\text{\text{\te\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\ti}}}\tittt{\text{\text{\text{\tex 包ed7 15 目fd1 日ac8 16 日d2 目fe8 ②×d5 20 cd ②d6 21 \$\disph1 b5! \opi \text{. A} similar idea also appears in the English Opening: 1 c4 c5 2 263 $2 \text{ f6 } 3 \text{ d4 cd } 4 2 \times \text{d4 e5 } 5 2 \text{ b5 d5!}$? 6 cd \(\Omega\)c5, with sufficient counterplay, e.g. 7 e3 0-0 8 \$25c3 a6 9 \$\textit{Q} e2

e4 10 0-0 \(\exists e8 11 \(\int \text{d2} \) \(\exists f5 12 a3 \) ②bd7 13 ②b3 Qd6 〒/表, Antunas-Shamkovich, New York 1981. But the early advance of the d-pawn is still a striking original idea. Kasparov has noted that although it seems to lack sufficient foundation, one must keep in mind that the White (a) a3 is offside and will serve as one of the focal points of Black's attack.

Most of the members of the professional chess community have branded the experiment as a failure, on the basis of a single, impressive victory for White. But if the refutation were that simple. why did Kasparov and his team fail to find it during their extensive preparation for the match? Coauthor Shamkovich devoted considerable effort to the investigation of this mystery, and the present section may be considered our 'interim report' on the subject, which we expect has not permanently disappeared from the public arena.

Karpov-Kasparov, (m/12) 1985 saw 11 \(\mathbb{Q} \) c4 \(\mathbb{Q} \) g4! (11 \(\text{...} \) b5 12 0-0 bc 13 Ξ e1+ Δ e7 14 d6 \pm was given by Kasparov, and T. Horvath-Szabolcsi, Budapest 1986, failed to improve: 12 ... Qe7 13 Qf4 Qg4 14 ②e2 ②b×d5 15 ②×d5 ②×d5 16 <u>Q</u>×g4 <u>Q</u>×f4 17 **\ \ ** f3 <u>Q</u>g6 − 17 ... **曾b8** 18 莒fel ± - 18 莒fd1 with a decisive advantage for White.

Also inadequate is 12 ... \(\textit{\textit{A}}\)d6 13 戶e1+ 當f8 14 点f1 ±.) 12 点e2 (12 ₩d4!? was tested in Santo-Roman-Kouatly, Cannes 1986: 12 ... b5 and now instead of Kasparov's 13 \(\Delta b3? \(\Delta c5 \) \(\Text{\text{White}} \) chose 13 $\triangle c \times b5$ ab 14 $\triangle \times b5 + \triangle d7$ 15 d6! ②c2+? 16 ②×c2 ≌a5+ 17 $\triangle d2 \cong \times b5$ 18 0-0-0 with a strong attack. But Black could have played more strongly, for example 15 ... 皆a5! and now 16 皆e5+ 當d8 17 0-0 幻d3! ∓ or 16 总d2 營×b5! 17 ②×b5 ②c2+ 18 含d1 ②×d4 19 4×10^{-4} 4×10^{-4} Black is still in business here.) 12 ... A×e2 13 ∀×e2+ ∀e7 14 Ae3 6b×d5 15 6c2 (15 6)×d5 6)×d5 16 0-0 6! = Kasparov.) 15 ... 2×e3 16 ②×e3 ♥e6 17 0-0 ½-½.



11 ... ₽e7!

11 ... \(\Q\)c5?! was seen in Karpov-Kasparov, (m/16) 1985: 12 0-0 0-0 13 \(\textit{L} \)f3 (13 \(\textit{L} \)g5 leads to a roughly level position.) 13 ... Ω f5! 15 Ω g5 耳e8 15 對d2? (15 公c4!? 总d3 16 a3 would have given White counterplay, according to Kasparov.) 15 ... b5! (Black clearly has full compensation for his material and


probably stands better already.) 16 国ad1 包d3! 17 包ab1? (17 d6!? Kasparov.) 17 ... h6 18 2h4 b4 19 ②a4 \bigcirc d6 ∓ 20 \bigcirc g3 \bigcirc c8 21 b3 g5!! 22 总×d6 營×d6 23 g3 幻d7 24 总g2 (24 \(\frac{1}{2}\) b2 would have allowed the brilliant reply 24 ... \\displif6!! Kasparov.) 24 ... \(\frac{1}{2} \)f6 25 a3 a5 and Black went on to win.

But, as Kostiuchenko pointed out, 12 \(\text{\(\text{\(\text{Q}}\) e3! \) would give White a substantial advantage. This was confirmed in the famous game Karpov-van der Wiel, Brussels 1986: 12 ⊈e3! ⊈×e3 13 \adata a4+ \alpha d7 (13 ... b5 14 營×b4 Qb6 15 0-0 Qa5 $16 \triangle \times b5+!$ with a winning attack. or 13 ... Qd7 14 營×b4 營b6 15 $\forall \times$ b6 $\triangle \times$ b6 and, according to Kasparov, 'White's superiority is obvious because Black is condemned to a difficult defence. although the endgame can probably be held.' Van der Wiel gives 16 公c4 总d4 17 闰d1 ± and 16 ... \mathfrak{Q} c5! 17 \mathfrak{Q} f3 \pm , which is probably an overstatement, since on 17 ... 0-0 18 0-0 Black might try 18 ... \triangle b5!?, e.g. 19 \triangle ×b5 ab 20 \triangle e5 △d4 21 ⊘d3 De8! 22 a3 Dd6 with compensation. So this variation may still be alive.) 14 \\ ×b4? (The correct line, as van der Wiel pointed out, is 14 fe! \bigs\text{\text{h4}+ 15 g3} ₩e7 16 \(\mathbb{Z}\) ad1 a5 \(\pm\), to which we add 17 \triangle c4 0-0 18 a3 \pm .) 14 ... \triangle c5 15 \(\po\)e4+ \(\precent{2}\)f8 16 0-0 b5 and van der Wiel eventually saved the game.

There are still other options for Black, but they do not seem to be adequate:

(a) 11 ... 4 b×d5 12 0-0 4e6 (12 ... 总×a3? 13 營a4+! or 12 ... 总e7 13 ②×d5 ②×d5 14 ②f3 ②e6 15 ②c2! ±/± Kasparov.) 13 \(\Quad \text{14}\) \(\Quad \text{14}\) $2 \times d5$ $2 \times d5$ 15 $2 \times d5 \pm /\pm$.

(b) 11 ... b5 12 \(\infty \c2! \) (12 0-0? 且d6 13 包c2 包×c2 14 徵×c2 徵c7 followed by either 15 ... $\triangle \times h2 + or$ 15 ... b4) 12 ... ②×c2+ 13 資×c2 ± since 13 ... $\triangle d6$ is met by 14 $\triangle \times b5!$ and 13 ... \(\text{\texts}\) b7 runs into trouble on 14 **⊈**f3.




We feel that this position may be playable for Black.

13 🖺 🕽

13 ②c2 ⑤b×d5 and Black is not worse.

Now the 2a3 is cut off and if 15 国d1 ②d3! ∓. Further tests are still needed to determine the validity of Kasparov's idea, but in our opinion rumours of its death have been greatly exaggerated.

Najdorf Variation 1 e4 **c**5



When Black chooses this method of avoiding the Keres Attack, he must be prepared to face the formidable main line of the Najdorf with 6 Ag5. But Kasparov, like Fischer before him, is not afraid of fights! His opponents, however, have not been so bold, and only Najdorf guru John Nunn has dared to employ the main lines.

6 ⊈g5 e6 7 f4 ₩b6

The dreaded Poisoned Pawn Variation.

8 ₩d3

We must wait for examples of the normal continuation 8 營d2, which Kasparov used as White in his younger days. At the time this game was played (Brussels 1986), White's 8th move was fashionable.

	.11 1110 10 1	· us rusilionas
8	•••	\&×b2
9	∄b1	₩a 3
10	f5	⊈e 7!
11	⊈ e2	

As Kasparov has noted, 11 fc ic 12 營c4 0-0! 13 氫xe6 b5! wins for Black, but 13 氫f5!? 氫c6 is less clear.

11	•••	ᡚc6
12	fe	fe
13	و£×c6	bc
14	e5!?	

14 0-0 is a more normal move.

Nunn's intended improvement on van der Wiel-Gavrikov, London 1985, which saw 17 0-0 e4! 18 ₩h3 f5 ∓.

Kasparov suggested that 17 쌀e3!? 買g8 18 쌀h6+ 買g7 19 買b3 쌀a5 20 0-0 f5 would lead to unclear complications. On 21 ②e4!, Black must avoid 21 ... 買a7? 22 買b8 쌀c7 23 쌀×e6 ±±, but 21 ... ④h4 22 ②f6 is still messy.

Black has fully consolidated his position.

21 \\delta\h6


The last chance, hoping to get in $22 \ \Xi \times 66$.

21	•••	₩q8
22	 ②e4	f5
23	⊈f 7	
23 闰h	3 ⊈g5!	
23	•••	₩18!

 27 萬f2 萬d8 0-1

With this brilliant example of counter-attack we must conclude our brief foray into the forest of the Sicilian Defence.

10 Hedgehog



This is one of the most popular. but at the same time most mysterious opening systems. Its labyrinth of transpositions baffles opening classifiers and authors, and to date no monograph has appeared on this prolific line. Black seems to play passively during the opening, hoping for an explosive middlegame break. The variation is rather like a coiled spring, which can burst out at any moment. Black can play for breaks in the centre (with ... e5 or ... d5) or on the flank (usually with ... b5).

There is some resemblance to the Taimanov System of the Sicilian and other Maroczy Bind positions, but here Black has more pronounced pressure on the a8-h1 diagonal. The position was not considered playable until the 1970s, when it became clear that White's vice-like grip on the centre was not of a permanent nature. Many players have adopted a positional approach as Black, but Kasparov has preferred to engage in tactical brawls. The defence played a significant role in his repertoire in the early 1980s.

As we have mentioned, this is not an opening which leads itself to clear organization and discussion of individual lines. We will present a selection of significant games by Kasparov, with some general discussion of the ideas behind the Hedgehog.

There are a number of paths into the Hedgehog complex, and the preceding moves represent a fairly pure move order which allows Black to choose between deploying his \$\times 18 at g7 or e7. But this flexibility is rarely needed, as Black generally has a preference which he need not disguise in the opening. So in the examples below, we will show the actual move order used in each game and discuss the significance of each

choice. We will place our commentary in the context of each game, rather than adopt a variation-based format, because the depth of transpositions and bewildering variety of moveorders cannot be captured in a brief chapter.

Karpov-Kasparov, USSR Team Ch. 1981, was the second meeting of the two giants and it started off with Karpov adopting the English move order:

1	c4	€]f6
2	ᡚ c3	c5
3	ᡚ ß	e6
4	g3	b6

Black could also opt for the Tarrasch Defence with 4 ... d5, but this game was played before Kasparov 'discovered' that opening.

		5 6	⊈g2 0-0		≜b7 ≜e 7	(112)
112 W	三土		省 1	含 L L	1	Ĭ
				1 2		
		<i></i>	Î Î) <u>Ç</u>	
	宜	Ĭ	表 基		(<u>\$</u>	<u>î</u>
		7 8	d4 ₩×d4		cd d6	

Black can develop with tempo lowed by \(\mathbb{I}\)dl Black comes under some uncomfortable pressure.

This is just one of many strategies tried by White in the early 1980s. White must find some way of exploiting Black's only real weakness - the d-pawn.

9	•••	a 6
10	∆ × f6	$\Delta \times \mathbf{f6}$
11	쌀f4	0-0
12	₿fd1	⊉e7
13	€)e4	$\Delta \times e^4$
14	쌀×e4	¤a7
15	€]d4	₩c8
16	b3	Ïe8!
17	a4	⊌ c5
18	Ïa2	⊈f6
19	≅ad2	≌c7
20	쌀b1!	⊈ e7
21	b4!?	

This is the only way to obtain active play, but the c-pawn is weak. and Kasparov will be able to take advantage of this. This rather risky approach is not in keeping with Karpov's usual style, but even at this stage Karpov recognized in Kasparov a potential challenger who should be put in his place (in a 1981 interview, Karpov said of Kasparov that 'he does not play as well as he thinks he does.) It is not clear whether Karpov still holds this opinion.

21 ... **₩h5** Not 21 ... \\ xc4?? which loses to 22 宮c2.

Ïc2 22 ãec8 23 b5?

Perhaps Karpov was trying to confuse his young opponent. The correct plan was 23 \bar{2}b3, as White

has nothing to fear from 23 ... d5 24 cd 耳xc2 25 axc2 增xe2, because White obtains an overpowering position with 26 2 d4. At the same time, 23 ... e5 24 \$\alpha\$f3 b5 is met by 25 闰dc1. Black's best plan would be to settle for equality with 23 ... c5 bc 25 ∮xe6 fe 26 \\ e6+ doesn't work, with 26 ... \forall f7 providing the refutation.

23 ab 24 ab 買×c4 25 ¤×c4

On 25 \$106 Kasparov had prepared 25 ... 耳×c2 26 ⑤×e7+ 當h8! (protecting the h-pawn) 27 \(\textit{\Omega} \text{f3}\) 掛e5 28 ⑤×c8 莒×c8 ∓.

> 25 ¤×c4 ₩a2! **坐c5** 26 **₩a8** ¤×d4 27 81<u>@</u> 28 **⇔×b8+** 29 Äa1

Here, instead of 29 ... d5?!, Kasparov claimed that 29 ... h6! 20 用a8 用d1+ would have brought a clear advantage for Black. So far as the opening is concerned, Kasparov was clearly successful in one of his first attempts at defending the Hedgehog.

In the strong Tilburg International of 1981 Kasparov defended the Black side against Hübner, who varied with:

9 b3

White prepares to deploy his bishop on the queenside. He can choose to place it in the centre as well. 9 \(\text{Q} e3 \) was seen in Korchnoi-Hjartarson, (m/4) 1988: 9 ... 0-0 10


用ad1 到bd7 11 到b5 d5 12 且f4 且c5 13 始d3 dc 14 始xc4 a6 15 包c3 b5 with plenty of counterplay for Black.

9

Korchnoi-Hiartarson, (m/6)1988, saw instead 9 ... 4 bd7, to which Korchnoi chose a forceful and original reply: 10 \(\D \)b5!? and now Hiartarson went wrong with 10 ... ②c5?! (10 ... ②e4 11 對×g7 Af6 12 \h6 \ \alpha \times a1 13 \alpha \g5 \pm 11 且d1 d5 (11 ... 包fe4 12 營×g7 且f6 13 對h6 Q×a1 14 包g5!! 對f6 15 $\triangle \times e4$ $\triangle \times e4$ 16 $\triangle \times e4$ $\triangle \times e4$ 17 $\triangle \times d6 + \pm 1$) 12 cd ed 13 $\triangle h3! 0-0 14$ ♣b2 a6 15 ♠c3 Ḥe8 16 Ḥac1 Korchnoi easily won this critical match game. So Black had better castle immediately.

10 e4 10 \(\Omega a \) as a common alternative.

分bd7 10 ₩e3 11 **a6** (113)



€)d4 12

The Hedgehog is a slowmoving opening, and White can afford to take time out to redeploy his forces on more promising squares.


12 **台c7** 13 ∯b2 ₽fe8 14 h3 81<u>@</u>

Black's position is already preferable in view of the potential breaks at d5 and b5 (or even e5). White must exercise caution here. For example, he would find himself in trouble after 15 f4? e5! 16 分f5 d5! (Kasparov).

(1	rasparo 1).	
15	∐fe1	∄ad8
16	Ëe2	g6
17	∃ae1	₩ b8
18	省d2	⊈g7
19	₩d1	ᡚc5
20	Ac1?	

20 \(\mathbb{I}\)d2 was a more promising alternative, according Kasparov. White is swimming. playing without a plan, and soon found himself in difficulty.

20	***	Ëc8
21	∆ g5	h6
22	⊈c1	∄ed8
23	∆b2 (11	(4)
N. C.		CD



b5! ••• 24 cb d5!

Two methodical breaks in a row - an unusual sight! Black has firm control of the initiative.


25 ed

There is not much choice, since 25 e5 is met by 25 ... ② fe4 ∓.

25	•••	ᡚ×d5
26	ঠ⊗d5	$\Delta \times d5$
27	b4!	$\Delta \times g2$
28	উ ×g2	e5!
29	bc	ed
30	耳d2?!	

30 \daggeddd ddd would have limited the damage, according to Kasparov.

30	•••	ã×c5
31	ba	₩a8 +
32	₩ 13	₩ × a 6
33	∄ed1	Äf5
34	₩e4	₩a4! (115)



Black clearly stands better. even though material is still equal. His passed pawn at d4 is considerably stronger than White's a-pawn. Kasparov was able to convert his advantage into a full point:

35 a3

35 $\triangle \times d4$ is not on because of 35 ... 耳fd5!

> 35 買e8?!

35 ... h5 would have been more effective, according to Kasparov.

> 36 **₩b**7 用d8!

After this move the win is simple. 39 \$\mathbb{G}\$ h2 should have been played.


One of Kasparov's more impressive victories with the Hedgehog came at the expense of former World Champion Smyslov, at the 4-team Match tournament held in Moscow 1981.

White declines the invitation to the Sicilian Defence with 2 e4.

2	•••	ᡚf6
3	g 3	b6
4	∯g2	⊈b 7
5	0-0	e6
6	2 c3	⊈e7
7	b 3	

There is no reason why White cannot delay the advance of his d-pawn.

In this way White prepares to advance d2-d4, and if Black captures, then recapture with a pawn is possible, maintaining strong central pressure.



11 \\delta e2

In a dramatic encounter at the World Youth Team Championship at Graz, 1981, Kasparov demonstrated his skill with the Black pieces against Jon Speelman, who chose 11 \(\mathbb{Z}\)cl. Now instead of the normal 11 ... 臣c8, Kasparov once again bravely entered a web of complications with 11 ... b5!? 12 d5 (On 12 dc Kasparov intended the wild 12 ... お×c5 13 cb ab 14 ②×b5 単×a2 15 $\triangle \times 66$ $\triangle \times 66$ 16 $\triangle \times d6$ $\triangle a6!$ 17 買×c5 Qe2!! 18 \b1 \B2! and the result of the devastation is an overwhelming advantage for Black!) 12 ... ed 13 $\triangle \times d5$ $\triangle \times d5$ 14 cd $\triangle f6$ 15 Kasparov exploited his advantage in the endgame.

11 ... ②e4

This prevents White from playing e3-e4. 11 ... \(\mathbb{E}\) c8 is also possible, as on 12 e4 Black can capture at d4, and White will have wasted a tempo in the slow march of his e-pawn.

12 **當fd1 營b8!?**A rather provocative choice. 12 **營c7** is more cautious.

13	ව×e4	∴×e4
14	ᡚe5!?	⊈ × g 2
15	�∑×d7	⊎b7
16	ᡚ × f8	⊈f3
17	₩d3	
hite	hopes for	18 쌀 ×h7+.

18 **\(\beta\)**d2 f5

Kasparov sacrifices the exchange in order to obtain a strong attack along the al-h8 diagonal. Still, this bold action may not be justified, and if Smyslov had chosen here 19 a3!, Kasparov might have regretted his decision. Instead, Smyslov embarks on a series of poor moves.

19	Ïe1?	&c8
20	ક્ષલ?	≌f6
21	a3?	₩e8
22	dc	쓸 ከ5!
23	h4	₩g4
24	₽h2	bc
25	ãh1	Ïg6
26	₽g1	$\Delta \times h4$
27	₩a5	h6
	0-1.	

Was Kasparov lucky? Sure, but fortune favours the brave!


Where does the Hedgehog stand in contemporary practice? It is still extremely popular, and White has been seeking improvements in a number of ways. One popular idea is the return to recapturing at d4 with the knight, after first supporting the centre. A recent example is Vaganian-Co.

Ionescu, Sochi 1986:

1	2B	c5
2	c4	€)f6
3	ᡚ c3	e6
4	g3	b6
5	∆g2	⊈ b7
6	0-0	a 6

6 ... 鱼e7 7 萬e1 d5 was seen in Vaganian-Portisch, match 1988, but we feel that 7 ... d6 is a more cautious approach, and play should therefore transpose below.

7	₿e1	⊈e′
8	e4	d6
9	d4	cd
10	②×d4 (.	117)



This is a classical Maroczy Bind position.

11 ... 包bd7 was met in Ivanov-Shamkovich, St. John 1988: 12 国口 国名 13 f4 0-0 (13 ... 曾b8! is more accurate, and if 14 g4, then 14 ... h5 is a strong possibility.) 14 g4! 包c5 15 鱼f2 包e8 16 g5 g6 17 曾d2 包g7 18 f5!? gf 19 ef 鱼×g2 20 含×g2 曾b7+ 21 智g1 ef 22 国×e7 世×e7 23 包d5 曾d8 24 包f6+ 智h8 25 曾f4 and now Black should have

played 25 ... 包e4 ∞/〒, instead of 25 ... 包e8 26 包×h7 整×h7 27 營h4+ 管g8 28 邑c3 包e4 29 邑h3 營×g5+ 30 邑g3 f6 31 鱼e3 and now Black blundered with 31 ... 營×g3?? instead of 31 ... ⑤×g3 ∞.

12	Ïc1	_ €]bd7
13	f4	∄fe8
14	g4!?	

This is a typical Sicilian attacking idea.

14	•••	h6
15	g 5	hg
16	fg	⊘h7
17	g6!	Ðhf8
18	gf+	\$ × f 7
19	買f1+	₿ g8

20	⊘d5!!	ed
21	cd	₽ 48
22	€]c6	∆g 5
23	ᡚ × d8	<u></u>
24	\$ h1	≌a×d8
25	ℤc7	

and after this spectacular display White managed to win after a few more moves.


Of course this game was hardly the refutation of the resilient Hedgehog, and Black still has a wide range of valid plans from which to choose. Kasparov's contributions to this opening are important, greater in quality than in quantity.

11 Spanish

Kasparov played the Spanish game a bit in his early years, but put it aside until 1985, when he started to play it for both sides. At the Hilversum match against Timman, co-author Schiller asked him how he had managed to absorb all of the theory so quickly as to be able to employ it in serious play. He replied that it was not necessary to know all of the latest moves in order to play the Spanish. An understanding of the underlying principles is sufficient. because the Spanish is primarily a positional opening.

To discuss even the Zaitsev variation alone in any depth would require an entire book (co-author Schiller has written such a book, published by Chess Enterprises in 1989) and so we will confine ourselves to the two principal variations which have featured prominently in the World Champion's play.

P	p.a.j.	
1	e4	e5
2	ᡚ ß	ᡚc6
3	⊈b 5	a 6
4	⊈ a4	ᡚf6
5	0-0	₽e7
6	Äe1	b5
7	⊉b 3	d6
8	cЗ	0-0



In this position we find the World Champion continuing with 12 a4 as White and often defending the Black side after 12 a3.

I 12 a4 II 12 a3

A dubious innovation is 12 \(\tilde{\tilde{D}} \)g5 \(\tilde{B} = 7 \) 13 f4?! h6 14 \(\tilde{D} \)df3 \(\tilde{B} = 8 \) and White was on his way to being pasted in Arnason-Geller, Reykjavik 1986. After the more normal 13 d5, Black can play 13 ... \(\tilde{D} = 35! \) 14 \(\tilde{D} < 2 \)c6 15 b4 \(\tilde{D} < 4 \) 16 \(\tilde{D} \times c4 \) bc 17 dc \(\tilde{D} \times c6 \) with good play (Timman-Karpov, Bugojno 1980).

Against 12 d5 the best retreat is 12 ... \Darksymbol{2}b8, e.g. 13 \Darksymbol{2}f1 \Darksymbol{2}bd7 14 \Darksymbol{2}g3 g6 and now:

(a) 15 c4 \(\textit{\Omega}\)g7! 16 cb ab 17 \(\textit{\Omega}\)e3 \(\textit{\Gamma}\)e7, as proposed by Lev Gutman.

(b) 15 ②h2 ②g7 16 a4 ₩e7! 17 ②g4 ②×g4 18 hg was seen in Elen-Gligorić, Portorož-Ljubljana 1977, where Gutman recommends 18 ... c6 19 ②f1 with sufficient counterplay for Black.


On 12 \(\textit{\textit{L}}\)c2, then 12 ... g6 is playable, but Black can also choose to enter the Breyer Variation with 12 ... \(\textit{L}\)b8.

12 a4 h6

Karpov tried 12 ... \dd d7 in Karpov-Kasparov (m/46) 1984-5, but after 13 ab ab 14 \(\mathbb{Z}\times a8 \) \(\mathbb{Q}\times a8 15 d5 幻d8 16 幻f1 h6 17 幻3h2 he found himself in a difficult position. Convinced of the strength of the line, he later adopted it as White against Smeikal at the 1986 Olympiad in Dubai, obtaining a smaller, but still significant advantage after 15 ... 2b8 16 2f1 ②a6 17 Ag5 Ae7 18 ②g3. Smejkal had previously defended 15 ... 2e7 16 c4 \\$\text{\pi}b8 against Popović at Zagreb 1985, but was probably afraid to repeat the line because of 16 of 1. In the meantime, however, Karpov found the improvement 15 ... 2a5!, which he introduced in Karpov-Kasparov, (m/5) 1985: 16 Qa2 c6 17 b4 2b7 (17 ... ②c4? 18 ②×c4 bc 19 △g5 cd 20 $\triangle \times 66$ de 21 $\triangle \times 65$ and 19 $\triangle \times 64$ cd 20 ed \(\mathbb{Z}\)c8 21 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b3 are both very good for White.) 18 c4 罩c8 19 dc ₩xc6 with equal chances. But it is not clear that Black will be able to equalize against 18 2f1, as 18 ... cd 19 ed 呂c8 20 **Qg**5 呂×c3?! runs

13 \(\textit{\textit{Lc2}} \) (119)

It is not wise to block the centre with 13 d5, because Black can then obtain favourable Brever-type positions with 13 ... 2b8 (13 ... 2a7 14 Aft c6 15 A3h2 left the initiative in White's hands in Nunn-Smeikal, Dubai Ol 1986, and 13 ... De7 14 c4 allows White a free hand on the queenside, Jansa-Nikolić, Esbierg 1982.) and now if 14 c4, then 14 ... c6! puts strong pressure on the White centre (but not 14 ... bc? 15 \(\Delta \times c4 with a comfortable advantage for White in Kindermann-Greenfeld, Beersheva 1984.) If White then trades rooks with 15 ab ab 16 \(\mathbb{Z}\times a8\) $\triangle \times a8$, and then grabs the pawn with 17 dc. then Black obtains counterplay with 17 ... b4! (17 ... bc leads to a more prosaic equality after 18 2×c4 2xc6 19 2a4.) 18 $\triangle a4$ $\triangle \times c6$ and now White's kingside play is balanced by



Black's queenside opportunities, for example 19 包f1 營b8 20 g4 (20 包g3 g6! followed by ... 呂c8 is better for Black.) 20 ... 呂c8 21 包g3 包d8 22 g5 hg 23 ②×g5, as seen in Kasparov-Dorfman, USSR Ch. 1978.


13 ... ed

Karpov prefers to move pieces to b8 here, but he fails to equalize:

- (a) 13 ... 包b8 14 Qd3 c6 15 包f1 包bd7 16 包g3 營c7 17 Qd2! g6 (17 ... 互ad8 18 ab ab 19 c4 △ Qa5) 18 營c1 營h7 19 b3! 並 Kasparov-Karpov, (m/9) 1985. After 19 ... Qg7 20 營c2 包f8 21 Qe3! 包e6 22 互ad1 互ac8 23 Qf1 Qf8 24 互d2 受b8 25 營b1 Qa8 26 b4 Qb7 instead of 27 ab?! ab 29 互ed1 White should have played 27 營a2!, intending 互b2, de, c4 (Kasparov).
- (b) 13 ... 当b8 allows White to open the a-file without exchanging rooks: 14 ab ab 15 总d3 总c8 16 公f1 and White was better in Timman-Karpov, Tilburg 1986.
- (c) 13 ... \delta d7 seems out of place here, as after 14 d5 \delta e7 15 b3 Black is left without a clear plan (Spassky-Balashov, Toluca Zonal 1982).

Theory has settled on this as the best move in view of the failure of the alternatives to achieve a playable game for Black:

(a) 15 ... 曾d7 16 邑a3 ba 17 邑×a4 a5 18 邑a3 曾b5 19 包h2 g6 20 包g4 包×g4 21 曾×g4 and despite the time wasted by the White rook,



Black still lacks sufficient counterplay (Dvoris-Lerner, Kharkov 1985).

- (b) 15 ... g6? allows the aggressive try 16 e5!? In Matulović-Lukacs, Vrnačka Banja 1985, play continued 16 ... de 17 de 包h5 18 ab ab 19 萬×a8 營×a8 20 包e4 萬d8 21 營e2 包d5 22 營×b5 包hf4 23 鼠×f4 包×f4 24 包f6+ 含g7 25 鱼e4 鼠×e4 26 萬×e4 包d3 27 萬a4 營b8 28 包e8+ 萬×e8 29 營×d3 營×b2 30 萬c4 c5 ½-½. Therefore we prefer 16 d5, e.g. 16 ... 負g7 17 營b3 並.
- (c) 15 ... ba 16 罩×a4 a5 17 罩a3 is also insufficient:
- (c1) 17 ... 闰a6 18 幻h2 並 Sax-Bañas, Balatonberenyi 1984, where Black committed suicide with 18 ... 營a8? 19 闰ae3 營a7 20 e5 幻fd5 21 闰g3 de 22 de 闰ae6 23 纪e4 ⑤h8 24 幻f3 營b6 25 幻fg5 hg 26 幻xg5 g6 27 營h5+ 1-0.
- (c2) 17 ... g6 18 閏ae3 並 Sax-Belyavsky, Moscow Interzonal 1982.
- (c3) 17 ... 營d7 18 公h4 with an initiative for White (Ehlvest-Belyavsky, USSR Ch. 1984). The game continued 18 ... 營b5 19 宣f3

②h7 20 国g3 ②g5 21 ②hf3 ②×f3+ 22 公×f3 曾h5 23 总d2 莒e7 24 曾cl 當h8 25 d5 c5 26 莒g4 总c8 27 莒f4 當g8 28 e5 g5 29 囯f6 de 30 总×b4 ab 31 皆c2 皆g7 32 d6 當×f6 33 de Д×e7 34 \degree e4 1-0.

16 d5

Kasparov tried 16 dc dc 17 e5 against Balashov in a game played in the Soviet Union in 1982, but after 17 ... \$\alpha\$d7 he wasn't able to achieve anything.


16 b3 is also too slow, as after 16 ... cd 17 <a>□×d4 ba 18 <a>□×a4 a5 the game was level in Tseshkovsky-Balashov, Minsk 1982, a tournament notable for its contributions to the theory of the Spanish Game.

16 ... €)d7

The immediate fianchetto is also possible. After 16 ... g6 17 2f1 Qg7 18 国a3! ba 19 国×a4 a5 20 \(\mathbb{A}\) a3 \(\mathbb{A}\) a6 21 \(\mathbb{A}\) g3 Black was feeling the pressure in Asevey-Dorfman, USSR Ch. 1984, although Sax and Hazai suggest here 21 ... 2d7! and Black should be safe.

17 \(\mathbb{A}\) a3 (121)

The standard plan with 17 2f1 runs into the surprising counter



17 ... f5!, leading to an unclear position in which Black's chances are to be preferred (de Firmian-Belvavsky, Tunis Interzonal 1985).

c4! 17 •••

18 **2**d4

Kasparov-Karpov (m/14) 1986 saw 18 ab ab 19 **公d4** 萬×a3 20 ba ②d3 21 Д×d3 cd 22 Дb2 ≌a5 23 ②f5 ②e5 24 ②xe5 (24 f4 is interesting: 24 ... ©c4 25 ©×c4 bc $\triangle \times g7$ $\triangle \times d5!$? 27 $\triangle a1$ $\Xi \times e4$ 28 $\Xi \times e4$ $\Xi \times e4$ 29 $\Xi \times f8$ c3) with an unclear position with chances for both sides.

Sax-Short, match 1988, tried to improve with 22 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e3 \(\delta\)e5 23 ②×b5 營a5 24 ②d4 營c3 25 ②2b3 2a6 26 2d2 8b2 27 2b4 g6 28 f4 (28 曾d2 包c4 29 曾xb2 包xb2 30 ♠c6 is better for White, but 28 ... $\forall \times d2 \ 29 \ \triangle \times d2 \ \bigcirc g7$ is less clear.) 28 ... 夕c4 29 耳×d3 耳×e4 30 骨f3 트e8 31 當h2 且g7 32 幻c6 皆e2 33 **⑤bd4 營×f3 34 莒×f3 莒e4 35 ⑤b3** 囯e2 36 勾cd4 囯e4 37 勾c6 囯e2 38 **\$23** (An attempt to win, but it doesn't work) 38 ... 2e3 39 h4 耳×g2+ 40 當h3 总c8+ 41 f5 总×f5+ ②e7+ \$h7 45 \$\text{Qc5} \$\text{Qf6}\$ 0-1.

18 ... **省f6** (122)

Recent attempts to improve upon this advance have proven fruitless:

(a) 18 ... \begin{array}{c} \text{b}6?! 19 \overline{\Delta}f5! \text{ was} \end{array} crushing in Sax-Nikolić, Lugano 1987: 19 ... **白e5 20 国g3 曾h7 21** \$\f3 \(\mathref{Q}\)c8 (21 ... g6 22 \(\mathref{Q}\)×h6 \(\mathref{Q}\)×h6 23 A×h6 S×h6 24 Sd2 ±) 22 A×g7 **△**×g7 23 曾d2.


- (b) 18 ... **2**e5 19 ab **4**b6 and now:
- (b1) 20 22f3 2bd3! (This is better than 20 ... Ded3 since 21 Qe3!? ②×e1 22 ②×e1 當c7 23 當d2! a5 24 Def3 ≅ gives full compensation for the exchange.) 21 $\triangle \times d3$ ⑤×d3 22 ⑤×d3!? cd 23 徵×d3 ab 24 曾×b5 (Ernst-Bjerke, Malmö 1987-88) 24 ... 曾×b5 25 ⑤×b5 莒a1 (intending 26 ... **△**×d5) 26 **△**c3 **∆**a6 ∓.
- (b2) 20 $\triangle \times$ c4!? was seen in Sax-Short, Subotica 1987. After 20 ... ②×c4 21 国g3 Qc8! (21 ... ab 22 公f5 g6 23 營h5! 營h7 24 公×h6!! gh 25 e5+ wins for White) White has two options:
- (b21) 22 $\triangle \times h6$?! ab 23 $\triangle f3$ (Weaker is 23 \Darks)b3, suggested by Petran, since 23 ... **②e5** 24 **\mathbb{\text{24}}}}}}d2}}** ②a6 25 Qe3 曾d8 26 Qd4 ②c5! 〒.) 23 ... \(\mathbb{A}\) a1 (Sax-Short), and now. instead of 24 2g5, stronger would have been 24 b3 2e5 (24 ... 2a3 25 **營d2** ±) 25 **營d2 ②g6** 26 **②**f4 ±/≅ (Petran), but 24 ... 2a6 seems more sensible to us.

(b22) 22 b3!? De5 23 De3 (intending 24 \(\Delta \)c6) 23 ... \(\Delta \)g6 24 f4! **省**d8 25 f5 ②e5 26 **省**d2 a5 27 **△**×h6 營h4? (27 ... Qd7!? ±) 28 含h2 Qd7 29 **鱼g**5 **對h**5 30 耳f1! ± (A. Sokolov-Portisch, Brussels 1988; move numbers given here differ from the actual game, in which there was an early repetition.).

This gambit line (20 $\triangle \times c4!$?) needs more detailed analysis and examination. Hence we cannot be

sure that Black's opening strategy has been refuted by the knight sacrifice. It is interesting to note that Kasparov did not play 1 e4 at all in the fourth match against Karpov, but in the Amsterdam Options Exchange Tournament in 1988 he played it twice.

(b3) Pliester recommends 20 quickly gain the upper hand with 20 ... **幻bd3 21 Q**×d3 **Q**×d3 22 **E**e3 ab ∓.



€2f3 **ᡚd3** 19

19 ... \$\overline{2}\$c5 20 ab ab 21 \$\overline{2}\$\times\$b5 ≅×a3 22 ②×a3 △a6 led to an unclear position where there is plenty of compensation for the material in Kasparov-Karpov, (m/16) 1986.

20 **≜**×d3

20 闰×d3!? cd 21 ab!? is an interesting line which deserves practical tests. Black might be able to play 21 ... \$\(\omega\$c5, e.g. 22 b4 \$\omega\$\times e4 d5 ∓.

> 20 **b4**

21 国a1 cd 22 曾×d3 包c5 23 曾c4


a5! 24 **公b5 罩ac8** is definitely better for Black.

21 ... ba 22 b3

In this state-of-the-art position both sides have chances, according to analysis by Kasparov. It is entirely possible that White is slightly better here. For example:

- (a) 22 ... 包e5 23 总×a3 包×c4 24 bc g6 25 營d3 总g7 26 邑b1 ±.
- (b) 22 ... 包c5 23 皆c2 a2 24 Qb2 皆g6 25 包d2 莒ac8 26 Qc3 Qe7 ∞. Ⅱ

12 a3 (123)



Kasparov has handled this position from the Black side. White does not attempt to attack the Black king but rather keeps his eye on the queenside, preparing the advance of his b-pawn.

12 ... h6

This transposition into the Smyslov system is considered the only playable option at present.

(a) 12 ... 皆d7 13 요c2 呂ad8 14 包b3 h6 15 d5 包e7 16 包a5 c6 17 c4 gave White the advantage in Psakhis-Balashov, USSR Ch. 1980-81.

(b) 12 ... g6 13 \(\text{\textit{a}} a2 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}}} g7 (Black \) can try 13 ... \dd7 now but it seems that after 14 b4 a5 15 d5 White has secured an advantage, for example ⑤×c6 19 cb 罩×b5 20 a4 罩a5 21 4)c4 用a6 22 且g5 Lukin-Polovodin, USSR 1984.) 14 d5! with an initiative for White, for example 14 ... 2b8 (14 ... 2e7 15 $c4! c6 16 b4 bc 17 dc \pm Gutman.) 15$ b4 c6 16 c4 罩a7 (Gutman provides 16 ... bc 17 dc! $\triangle \times$ c6 18 $\triangle \times$ c4 \triangle d4 ②b3 ab 19 ab ±. 16 ... ②bd7 17 dc $\triangle \times c6$ 18 $\triangle b2$ is slightly better for White.) 17 \(\overline{Q}\) b2 bc (17 ... \(\overline{Q}\))bd7 18 罝c1 營a8 19 dc! 鱼×c6 20 營c2! ± Gufeld-Asevey, USSR 1986) 18 dc $\triangle \times c6$ 19 $\triangle \times c4$ and White stands better.

13 Ac2

13 **Q**a2 can be met by the interesting move 13 ... **Q**a7!?, or by 13 ... **Q**b8 14 b4 ed (14 ... **Q**bd7 15 **Q**b2 g6 16 **B**b1 **Q**g7 17 c4 was agreed drawn in Dobrovolsky-Plachetka, Trnava 1983.) 15 cd **Q**xe4 16 **B**b3 **B**f6 17 **C**2 **Q**xd2 18 **E**xe8 **Q**xf3+ 19 gf **Q**c6 with compensation (Mortensen-Hjartarson, Copenhagen 1985). After 20 **E**xa8 Black should have simply recaptured, saving the knight move for later.

13 ... **2**b8

Probably best, although an interesting alternative is 13 ... g6!? 14 aft as 15 ag ac 4 16 b 3 ab 6 17 ad ag 7 with unclear complications (Aseyev-Timoshchenko,

Irkutsk 1986).

14 b4 (124)


14 b3 is a major alternative. Black plays 14 ... \delta\text{bd7} and now:

- (a) 15 鱼b2 g6 16 a4 might be met by Hjartarson's 16 ... 包h5, while 16 邑c1 c6 17 c4 ed 18 鱼×d4 鱼g7 19 b4 營c7 20 c5 dc 21 bc 包h5 led to unclear complications in Romanishin-van der Sterren, Tallinn 1987.
 - (b) 15 d5 c6 16 c4 \(\text{\text{d}} \) c7 and now:
- (b1) 17 \(\textit{\Omega}\) b2 \(\textit{\Omega}\) eb8 18 dc \(\textit{\Omega}\) ×c6 19 cb ab was agreed drawn in Smyslov-Gligorić, Sochi 1986.
- (b2) 17 ②f1 ☐eb8 18 ②g3 ②c8 19 a4 is a bit slow, e.g. 19 ... bc 20 bc ②c5 21 ②a3 ②fd7 22 ②e2 cd 23 cd a5 24 ②c3 ②a6 with a decisive queenside advantage (Liang-Sun, China 1986).

(b3) 17 a4 莒ec8 18 莒a2 ba 19 ba a5 20 夏a3 夏a6 21 包h2 g6 22 包hf1 cd 23 cd h5 24 營f3 夏e7 25 夏d3 夏×d3 26 營×d3 營c3 27 營×c3 三×c3 28 莒b1 包c5 29 夏×c5 三×c5 30 包e3 莒ac8 31 莒b7 夏f8 32 包b3 莒c1+ 33 ②×c1 莒×c1+ 34 營h2 包h6 35 g3 ②×e4 36 營g2 ②c3 37 莒d2 ②×a4 38 莒d7 夏f8 39 莒a2 包c5 40 莒c7 夏h6 41 莒c6 夏×e3 42 fe 莒e1 43 莒×d6 莒×e3 44 營h2 邑b3 ½-½ Sax-Short, match 1988.


It is hard to pass judgement on 15 ... 置b8 16 c4 ed 17 cb ab 18 ②×d4 c5, since the game was abandoned as drawn in Byrne-Geller, Reykjavik 1986.

16 c4



Unclear complications arise after 16 對 1 皇 g7 (16 ... 包h5!? 17 g3 c5 is also unclear.) 17 包b3 邑c8! 18 包a5 鱼a8 19 d5 包b6 20 a4 對 d7 21 ab ab 22 鱼d3 (Psakhis-Portisch, Sarajevo 1986).

16 ... ed 17 cb ab 18 ②×d4 c6 (125)



19 a4

Neither of the alternatives lend any clarity to the picture:

- (a) 19 罩c1 營b6 20 总d3 总g7 21 ②2b3 Sokolov-Izeta, Bilbao 1987.
- (b) 19 包2b3 宣c8 20 包a5 Qa8 21 營d2 營b6 22 包db3 c5 Klovan-Goldin (m/1) USSR 1987.

This was Kasparov's original contribution to the theory of the variation. Here Timman had to find methods of pursuing White's initiative.

21 &c2

21 b5?! was seen in the first game of Timman-Kasparov, match 1985, but after 21 ... cb 22 △×b5 d5! 23 △×a8 △×a8 Black had more chances in the unbalanced position.

This is more exact than 22 ... \(\textit{\textit{a}} a6 23 \textit{\textit{E}} c1 \textit{\textit{\textit{Q}} g7} \) which led to an unclear position in Timman's third game against Kasparov: 24 \(\textit{\textit{e}} e3 \textit{\textit{Q}} b5 \) and Black held the

initiative.

23 ≝×a1 ⊈g7 24 ⊈c3 ᡚe5 led to equality in Hübner-Portisch, Tilburg 1986.

23	•••	∆g 7
24	②e3	c5
25	bc	ᡚ ×c5
26	∆ ×f6	∆×f6

This unclear position was agreed drawn in Timman-Karpov, Bugoino 1986.

The Closed Variations of the Spanish Game are among the most profound in all of chess, and we can be confident that the World Champion will continue to enrich the theory of these lines.


12 Queen's Gambit

Kasparov has explored a variety of defences within the domain of the Queen's Gambit Declined. We will concentrate on two variations which have played a significant role in his repertoire — the Tarrasch Defence and the Tartakower Variation.

The Tarrasch Defence

This defence became unfashionable in the post-war years until Boris Spassky resurrected it for his match against Petrosian in 1969. It fell into disfavour again, until a few stalwarts, led by John Nunn, brought it back in the early 1980s. and Kasparov picked it up a bit later. The authors have written a monograph on the subject (Play the Tarrasch, Pergamon 1984.) References to 'Shamkovich' in the new edition of ECO D refer to that work. In this book we cover the basic variations and incorporate the critical developments of the last five years.

1	d4	d5
2	c4	e 6
3	ᡚ c3	c 5
4	cd	ed
5	₽ 13	ᡚc6
6	g 3	€)f6
7	₽g2	⊈ e7



Kasparov's defeats at the hands of Karpov have put a damper on the general enthusiasm the Tarrasch enjoyed in 1983-84, although Icelandic GM Margeir Petursson and Murray Chandler remain faithful to the opening.

I 9 dc
II 9 ₾g5
III 9 b3
IV 9 ₾e3
I

9 ... d4 is now out of commission, and this is the only move seen in contemporary praxis.

10 Ag5


10 ②a4 has fallen from favour. After 10 ... Qe7 11 Qe3 (White should avoid 11 ②d4 ②e4! 12 ②xc6 bc 13 Qe3 營a5 14 吕c1 Qe6 15 a3 Qf6 16 Qd4 Qxd4 17 營xd4

幻d2!. Weltmander-Aronin, 1958.) 11 ... 宮e8 12 宮c1 (12 公d4 Qg4 13 ②×c6 bc 14 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e1 \(\mathbb{Q}\)b4 15 \(\mathbb{Q}\)d2 \(\mathbb{Q}\)d6 16 闰c1 闰c8 17 a3 匀e4 18 点e3 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)d7 \(\pi\) Chamrak-Vaganian, USSR 1957.) 12 ... **\(\Pi**g4 \) and now:

- (a) 13 h3 **A**h5 14 **A**d4 **B**d7 15 夕×c6 bc 16 闰e1 总b4 17 总d2 $\Delta f8 = \text{Ree-Petursson}, \text{Reykjavik}$ 1984.
- (b) 13 皆b3 皆d7 14 Qc5 包e4 15 A×e7 ∃×e7 16 ∃fd1 d4 led to an unclear position in Kukuk-Marjanović, Yugoslav Ch. 1984.
- (c) 13 \(\text{2c5} \) \(\text{2} \times c5 \) 14 \(\text{2} \times c5 \) (14 $\Xi \times c5 \cong d7$ led to an equal position in Szabo-Parma Palma de Mallorca 1969.) 14 ... \dd7 (This is the new line, replacing 14 ... De4 15 总e3 營d7 16 營a4 莒ad8 17 莒fd1 h6 Hort-Ivkov, Palma de Mallorca 1970.) 15 闰e1 闰ad8 16 幻d4 h5 17 ②c6 bc 18 Qd4 ②h7 19 \d2 \d2 \d8 20 f3 \(\textit{\Omega} f5 \) and chances were equal in Partos-Petursson, Biel IZ 1985.

d4 (127) 10 ...

The older 10 ... \(\textit{\Omega}\)e6 is still playable, but less frequently seen.



 $\Delta \times 16$ 11

This is now the standard move.

(a) 11 ∮a4 ♣b6! 12 ∮×b6 ab 13 a3 h6 14 总f6 營×f6 15 包el 莒e8 = Bagirov-L. Grigorian, USSR 1967.

(b) 11 De4 De7 12 D×f6 D×f6 13 耳c1 耳b8 (13 ... 耳e8 14 包el ②e7 15 ②d3 ②f8 16 \d2 a5 17 耳fd1 鱼g4 18 幻dc5 鱼×c5 and now 19 罩×c5? 營e7 gave Black the advantage in Nikolić-Kasparov, Nikšić 1983, so White must play 19 $6 \times c5$ with roughly level chances.) 14 2e1 2e7 15 2d3 4b6 16 a3 \(\textit{Q}\)g4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)-\(\frac{1}{2}\) Adamski-Rogers, Valievo 1984. Or 13 \dd \delta de 7 14 耳fd1 Qg4 15 營f4 Q×f3 16 營×f3 **對b6** 17 **對b3 對×b3** 18 ab ± Palatnik-Klinger, Havana 1985.


> 11 ₩×f6 ••• 12 **€**]d5

12 包e4 曾e7 13 包xc5 曾xc5 does not bring White any advantage, for example 14 \(\precedge\)d2 鱼f5 15 曾g5 f6 16 曾h5 包e7 with an equal game, according to Keres.

8b⇔ 12 ...

12 ... \delta\delta\delta!? is an alternative, e.g. 13 2d2 2e6 14 2f4 2b6 15 買c1 (15 營a4 囯ac8 16 囯fc1 幻a5 17 Trabattoni-Defize, Malta Ol. 1980.) 15 ... 耳fd8 16 a3 耳ac8 17 b4 a5 18 b5 包e5 19 总×b7 闰×c1 20 營×c1 d3 21 e3 舀b8 22 ⑤×e6 營×e6 and there is clear compensation for the pawn (Dealune-Southam. St. John 1988), although 23 &f3 耳×b7 24 ⑤×e5 耳c7 25 ⑤c6 瞥b3 26 對bl 對×a3 27 單dl would be clearly better for White.

13 **名d2** (128) **国e8**



13 ... a6?! 14 闰c1 Qa7 led to one of the World Champion's most spectacular victories — Kasparov-Gavrikov, USSR Ch. 1981: 15 2c4! 旦b8 (15 ... 阜h3 16 阜×h3 營×d5 17 \(\Omega\)g2 \(\omega\)e6 \(\pm\) would have been wiser.) 16 ②f4! b5? (16 ... 鼻f5!? 17 營d2 旦c8!?) 17 幻d6! 營×d6 (Black is sliding rapidly downhill, 17 ... ♠e5 might have slowed the pace a bit.) 18 罩×c6 營d8 19 營c2 罩e8 20 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 a5 21 \(\mathbb{Q}\)d5! (Keep your eve on this peripatetic cleric!) 21 ... \(\triangle b6\) 22 \oplus b3! (22 $\triangle \times f7 + \text{ would also}$ have been good, e.g. 2×17 23 對×h7 d3 24 ②×d3!) 22 ... 買e7 23 **鱼f3** 邑e5 24 **鱼h5!!** g6 25 **鱼**×g6! hg 耳cc6! 耳f5 29 骨f3! 鱼c7 30 骨e4+ 且e5 31 包g6+!! fg 32 且h7+ 當f8 33 ****\$×g6 1-0.

14 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{H}}\)c1

14 Ξ el is a major alternative. but after 14 ... a6 (14 ... \(\textit{\$\textit{\Def}}\) e6 is also playable, but Kasparov failed to equalize against Miles at Nikšić 1983, and it has fallen from alternatives are:

(a) 16 2c4 2e6 17 2f4 2f5!

where Black will equalize with ... **⊈**f5-e4:

- (b) 16 **公**b3 **总**f5 17 **省**d2 **总**e4 18 $\triangle \times e4 \ \Box \times e4 = \emptyset$ gaard-Petursson. Gausdal 1984.);
- (c) 16 曾b3 莒b8 17 a3 (17 公f4 罝e5! 18 幻c4 罝b5 19 營a3 幻b4! = Miles-Hiorth, London 1984) 17 ... 罝e5! 18 勺f4 罝a5 19 骨b3 ជb5 20 (Miles-Chandler, West Germany 1984).

14 ₽pe 15 **5**b3

There are a few other moves which are seen in tournament play:

- (a) 15 闰e1 Qe6 (15 ... Qg4!? is an interesting alternative, e.g. 16 ②c4 Qa5 17 ②×A5 營×a5 18 b4!? ②×b4 19 營d2 ②c6 20 營×a5 ⑤×a5 21 © c7 d3! = Spraggett-Leski, San Francisco 1987.) 16 \$\infty\$ f4 \$\omega \times a2 and now:
- (a1) 17 $\triangle \times$ c6 bc 18 b3 \triangle a5 19 Ξ c2 $\triangle \times$ b3 20 $\triangle \times$ b3 d3 21 $\triangle \times$ a5 dc 22 \delta al (Miles considers this position better for Black, while Ribli and Kasparov claim that it is better for White! We consider it equal.) 22 ... 莒e4 23 莒c1 營g5 24 e3 (24 h4!? was suggested by Rogers.) 24 ... 皆b5! = Spraggett-Chandler, Hong Kong 1984.

(a2) 17 b3 Qa5 18 耳c2 (18 Qd5 d3! 19 e3 包e5 20 當f1 莒c8 21 莒a1 $\exists c2! 22 \ \exists \times a2 \ \exists \times a2 \ 23 \ b4 \ \triangle \times b4!$ 24 Q×a2 營a5 25 公×d3 (25 營b3 $\triangle \times d2$ 26 $\triangle \times d3$ $\triangle \times e1$ $\mp \mp$) 25 ... 公×d3 26 骨b3 骨f5! 27 耳e2 分c1 28 營c4 莒c8 29 g4 莒×c4 0-1 KingChandler, Reykjavik 1984.) 18 ... Q×d2 19 E×d2 營a5 20 Eb2 d3 21 ⑤×d3 呂ad8 = Christiansen, or 18 ... <u>Ø</u>×b3 19 **Ø**×b3 d3 20 **Ø**×c6! ②xe1 (20 ... bc 21 ⑤xa5 營xa5 22 $\triangle \times c6$ d2 23 $\exists f1 ++$ Chandler) 21 寬c1 (Chandler) 21 ... d2 22 罩b1 a5 23 \(\Delta d3 \) \(\pm \) Karpov-Chandler, London 1984.

- (b) 15 \$\alpha\$f4 \$\alpha\$g4 16 h3 \$\alpha\$f5 17 分b3 且e4 18 且×e4 耳×e4 19 皆d3 ፱e5 20 ©d2 ©b4 = Seirawan-Frev. Mexico 1980.
- (c) 15 Dc4 De6 16 Df4 Df5 17 用el 用c8 18 a3 且e4 = Psakhis-Lputian, USSR Ch. 1985.

No more effective is 16 \(\D \times b6 \) 쌀×b6 17 &c5 Qg4 18 &a4 쌀b4 19 a3 營e7 = Palatnik-Legky, USSR 1981.

省d6 (129) 16 129

> 17 **a**3

This is the only move that denies Black easy equality:

(a) 17 a4 国ad8 18 ②×e6 營×e6 19 <u>a</u>×c6 bc 20 a5 <u>a</u>c7 21 <u>a</u>×d4 쌀e5 22 e3 c5 23 쌀c2 cd 24 ed 쌀×a5 25 徵×c7 徵d2! 26 徵×a7 徵×b2 = Knaak-Groszpeter, Trnava 1983.

(b) 17 <a>S <a>e <a>e 19 国d2 h5 20 a4 (20 a3!? is an interesting suggestion by Lputian, aiming to redeploy the knight at d3. but 20 h4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)f6 21 a3 \(\frac{1}{2}\)e5 22 \$\infty c1 \ \text{g5} \ 23 \ \text{hg} \ \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g5}}}} 24 \ \text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{Qd3}}}} \ \text{\text{\text{\text{g6}}}} (24 ... 2g4!? is a good alternative.) 25 闰c2 h4 led to unclear complications in Spiridonov-Groszpeter, Polanica Zdroj 1985, and we do not feel that Black's chances are any worse.) 20 ... 皆c4 21 &×c6 bc 22 a5 &c7 23 \degree c2 (but gave Black the advantage in Knaak-Lputian, Berlin 1982) 23 ... 曾×c2 24 $\mathbb{A} \times c2 \mathbb{A} d5 25 \mathbb{A} \times c6 \mathbb{A} \times a5 =$.

17	•••	≌ad8
18	Ϊe1	⊈g4
19	ᡚd3	∄e7
20	Dbc5	⊈ ×c5
21	EV05	h6

The position holds chances for both sides (Jansa-Chandler, Plovdiv 1983). II

> 9 **≜**g5 cd

The co-authors of this book thought that 9 ... c4 had been buried.


To begin with there is Kasparov-Hjorth, Dortmund 1980: 10 De5 Qe6 11 f4 Φ×e5 12 fe! Qe4 13 鱼×e7 ⑤×c3 14 bc 營×e7 15 e4 營d7 16 a4!, but Bekelman has come up with 16 ... de 17 $\triangle \times$ e4 \triangle d5 where Black is only slightly worse.

We had tried to resurrect 11 ... 회g4, an old Lasker idea, but found 12 5×g4 0×g4 13 0×d5 0×g5 14

fg 營×g5 15 互f4 互ad8 16 營f1! unpleasant. Nogueiras-Lputian, Sarajevo 1985, confirmed our judgement, but saw 16 \dd2 instead. In either case one would not wish to be playing the Black pieces. But 15 ... 2e6 16 2g2 2ad8 17 \$\disphi \text{h1 h6 18 \displays g1 \overline{2}e7 19 e4 \overline{2}g6} 20 \(\mathbb{A}\) af1 \(\mathbb{A}\)g4 21 h4 \(\mathbb{A}\)h5 led to unclear complications in Salov-Lputian, 1986-87, so it isn't dead vet.

White may therefore return to 11 ᡚ×c6 bc 12 b3 ≌a5 13 ᡚa4. which is still very slightly better for him.

> 10 ②×d4 (130)



A popular alternative in the 1980s is Margeir Petursson's 10 ...

\(\mathbb{\mathbb{H}}\)e8. although Kasparov does not seem to have much confidence in it.

- (a) 11 對a4 Qd7 12 e3 夕e4 13 **怡**b6 16 莒fd1 莒ac8 17 **怡**a3 **且**g4 18 Ad3 and White held a slight advantage in Suba-Zysk, Dortmund 1984.
 - (b) 11 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 h6 12 \(\mathbb{Q}\)f4 \(\mathbb{Q}\)g4 13 h3

2e6 14 **2**×e6 fe 15 e4 d4 16 e5 dc 17 ef \(\mathbb{Q}\times \)f6 18 bc \(\mathbb{Q}\times \)d1 19 \(\mathbb{Q}\times \)d1 買ad8 20 c4 買×d1 21 買×d1 買d8 22 $\Xi \times d8 + \Delta \times d8 = Lalic-D$. Ross. St. John 1988.

11 **⊈e**3

The standard reply, as others fail to secure any sort of opening advantage:

- (a) 11 🗓×f6 🗓×f6 12 🖒 b3 d4! 13 ②e4 Qe7 14 闰c1 對b6 15 ⑤ec5 国d8 16 国c4 Q×c5! 17 公×c5 營×b2 Seirawan-Kasparov, Nikšić 1983.
- (b) 11 Qf4 Qg4 12 h3 Qh5 13 €b3 a5 14 €1×d5 €1×d5 15 €1×d5 a4 16 ②c1 ②f6 17 ☐b1 ②d4 and Black has full compensation.

11 ... 罩e8 (131) 允

Here there are five significant paths:

A 12 皆b3

B 12 \to a4 C 12 \c2

D 12 罩c1

E 12 a3


A

12 ₩b3 €)a5 ₩c2 13 **₽24** 14 €)f5 (132)

14 h3 and now:

(a) 14 ... \(\textit{\textit{a}}\)d7 15 \(\textit{\textit{B}}\)ad1 \(\textit{\textit{a}}\)e6 is an interesting line suggested by Mikhail Tal.

(b) 14 ... **Qh**5 15 **国ad1** (15 **国fd1** ± Monokroussas) 15 ... ♠b4 16 g4 Qe6 17 分f5 營c7! 18 Q×d5?! (18 roughly level.) 18 ... $2 \times d5$ 19 買×d5 Д×f5 20 營×f5 互×e3! 21 fe (21 闰d7 營e5 =) 21 ... 營g3+ 22 當h1 營×h3+ 23 當g3 營g3+ ½-½ Grivainis-Monokroussas, Las Vegas 1984.



₿b4 14

14 ... 耳c8 15 Qd4! (15 ②×e7+ 耳×e7 16 耳ad1 營e8 17 h3 皇h5 18 **Q×d5 Qg6** 19 曾c1 **Q×d5** 20 **Q×d5** 分c4 21 总d4 営ec7 ≅ Karpov-Kasparov, (m/7) 1984-5) 15 ... $\triangle c5$ 16 总×c5 耳×c5 17 名e3 总e6 18 \(\mathbb{A}\) adl was better for White in Karpov-Kasparov, (m/9) 1984-5.

15 h3 is an alternative and now: (a) 15 ... 鱼×f5 16 營×f5 鱼×c3 17 bc seems slightly better for White, e.g. 17 ... 公c4 18 总d4 罩×e2 19 闰fe1!? ±/= Kouatly-Martin, Thessaloniki Ol. 1984.

買ad1 罩c8 = Korchnoi-Ivkov, Zagreb 1970.


 $\triangle \times c3$ 15 ... ¤×e2 16 $\triangle \times c3$ ₩d3

White stands better, for example: 17 ... \(\bar{\Pi}\) e8 18 \(\Delta\)e3 \(\Delta\)e6 19 對b5! b6 20 \ ad1 a6 (Portisch-Chandler, London 1984) 21 \(\mathre{a}\)a4! ≅ Timman.

> **曾a4** (133) 12

17

B



12 **⊈d7** ••• 13 ¤ad1

13 耳fd1 and now:

13 ... **包b4** 14 **曾b3** a5 15 **包**×d5 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)g4 \(\pm\) La Plaza-Schiller, corr. 1983.


13 ... 包a5 14 曾c2 呂c8 15 包f5 Qe6 16 分×e7+ 耳×e7 17 Qd4 耳d7 18 国acl 包e8 19 曾d3 包c6 20 e3 $\triangle \times d4$ 21 $\triangle \times d4$ \triangle Cvitan-Handoko, Zagreb 1985.

> 13 €)b4 ... **a**5 ₩b3 14

15 a4! (134)

15 闰d2 a4 16 曾d1 a3 17 曾b1 (Belvavsky-Kasparov (m/2) 1983) 20 名c2! 名×c2 21 萬×c2 **Q**c6 22 耳d1 包e4 23 包×e4 de 生.

15 ②×d5 ②b×d5 16 **△**×d5 ②×d5 17 ≝×d5 ♣h3 ∓ Vaganian-Ivkov, USSR v. Yugoslavia 1975.



Äc8 15 ... 15 ... ♠f8 16 ♠c2 ♠e6 17 ♠d4 ව්e4 18 ව්×b4 ab 19 ව්b5 🗳 a5 20 A×e4 de 21 \delta e3 (Vaganian-Nunn, Buenos Aires 1978) 21 ... 對×a4 22 包c7 Qb3 23 囯c1 Qc2 24 ⟨□×e8 □×e8 25 □a1 □b5!
□ Shamkovich and Schiller (1984).


16 **adb**5

16 ②c2 b5! 17 ②×b4 ba 18 ②×a4 $\triangle \times b4$ 19 $\triangle b6$ (19 $\triangle c3$ $\triangle \times c3$ 20 bc a4 ∓ Majorov-Ehlvest, USSR ₩×b2 24 🚉×d5 (Korchnoi-Kasparov, Herceg Novi Blitz 1983) 24 ... 對×e2 (Keene).

16 ... **⊈e6** The position is roughly equal. C

> 12 曾c2 (135) Qg4 13 \(\mathbb{I}\)fd1 **公d7?!**

13 ... 鱼f8 14 国ac1 国c8 15 包×c6 bc 16 Qd4 Qb4 17 囯d2 營e7 18 a3



a5 was seen in Belvavskv-Kasparov, (m/6) 1983, and now with 19 h3! Ah5 20 b4 Ab6 21 e3 Belyavsky claims White could have claimed an advantage. But 14 ... $\Xi \times e3!$? 15 fe g6 intending ... Ah6 deserves serious consideration, and may be Black's best option in this line.

14 **Db3** Hac8 14 ... 買ad8 15 買ac1 **Qe6** 16 **Qc5** $\triangle \times c5$ 17 $\triangle \times c5$ d4 18 $\triangle b5$ $\triangle b4! =$ Sandström-Broitigem, Berlin 1985.

15 Aac1

15 $\triangle \times d5$? is met by 15 ... $\triangle d4$!

15 **∆**d6 16 **a**3 ₿e5 17 5 c5


17 ⟨∑×d5!? is possible, for example 17 ... **②d4?** 18 **쌀**×c8!, or 17 ... **公×d5** 18 **A×d5**, where ... Db4 19 \subset xc8 ± are acceptable for Black, so it seems that 13 ... 218 is a better choice for Black.

> 17 ₩e7 श्च×d5 $18 \quad \text{ } \text{ } \times \text{d5}$ **b6**

The position is unclear, according to Kasparov in ECO D II.

D

12 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 (136)



∆f8 12 •••

13 ₩c2

The alternatives fail to provide White with any advantage:


- (a) 13 **②**a4 **營**a5 14 a3 **②**e5 15 \(\textit{\tit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\texti Gligorić, Lone Pine 1980.
- (b) 13 闰el 包g4 14 包×d5 包×e3 15 fe $\triangle d7$ = Garcia Gonzalez-Gligorić, Buenos Aires Ol. 1978.
- (c) 13 \(\text{\text{D}}\) b3 \(\text{\text{e}}\) e6 14 \(\text{\text{Q}}\) c5 \(\text{\text{Q}}\) \(\text{c}\) 5 15 ②×c5 \rightarrow e7 = Mecking-Spassky, Palma de Mallorca 1969.
 - (d) 13 ②×c6 bc and now:
- (d1) 14 2a4 2g4! 15 2c5 2a6! (Better than 15 ... $2 \times c5$?! 16 $2 \times c5$ ± Timman-Gligorić, Nikšić 1978.) 16 闰el 皆f6 17 皆d4 皆×d4 18 $\triangle \times d4$ $\triangle \times e2 = or 17$ $\triangle \times d4$ $\triangle \times g6$ 18 டுc5 இ×c5 19 月×c5 月e6 =.
- (d2) 14 总d4 总f5!? 15 皆d2 and in Adorjan-Gligorić, Vršac 1983, a draw was agreed after 15 ... \delta\delta 6 16 臣fel: Kasparov gives further 16 ... a5 17 b3 \equive e6 18 \(\alpha a4 \) \(\alpha a3 19 \) \(\alpha b2 \) **∆**b4 =.

Де6 13 14 ₿fd1 ₩e7!?

An untested Kasparov suggestion in ECO D II. He gives further 15 \$\oldot b\oldot s\oldot g\oldot 4\oldot 6\oldot \oldot feel that after 17 e3 \text{\text{\text{\text{bh}}6}}\text{ 18 h3} ②ge5 there is a double-edged position with chances for both sides.

14 ... 2g4 is weak, because 15 $\triangle \times e6$ 17 fe allows 16 $\triangle \times d5 \pm .$ E

12 a3 (137)



This move was seen frequently in the Smyslov-Kasparov Candidates' final, 1983.

> 12 ... ₿e6

Kasparov has analysed 12 ... △g4!?, but there is no practical experience as vet. Nevertheless, White should stand better after either 13 \(\preps_b3 \opin_a5 14 \opin_a2 \) or 13 ₩a4.

In our opinion the best move is 12 ... 点f8, e.g. 13 對b3 罩e5 14 国ad1 目h5 15 **A**h3 **A**a5 16 ₩a2 Ag4 ∞ Ki. Georgiev-Kindermann, Plovdiv 1984.

13 **⊈**h1

13 ₩b3 ₩d7 14 ⑤×e6 fe 15 \(\mathbb{A}\) ad1 \(\mathbb{A}\) d6 16 \(\mathbb{A}\) c1 \(\mathbb{B}\) h8 \(\infty\) Korchnoi-Kasparov, (m/2) 1983. At present, 13 ②×e6 fe 14 \ a4 is considered best, for example 14 ... 買c8 15 買ad1 當h8 16 當h1 a6 17 f4 ♠a5 and now instead of 18 f5 b5 19 當h4 包g8 20 當h3 包c4 21 Qcl ②g5 22 fe ③×c1 23 □×c1 ②e3 ≅ Smyslov-Kasparov, (m/12) 1984). Kasparov recommends 18 2d4 followed by 18 ... 公c4 19 皆b3 요c5 20 e4!? ±.

> 13 ... **£g4**

13 ... \dot d7 14 \dot \times \text{e6 fe 15 f4!} 耳ed8! 16 鱼g1 耳ac8 17 營a4 營h8 (m/2) 1984.

14 f3 ₽h5

15 €\×c6

15 Qg1 曾d7 16 曾a4 Qc5! 17 \mathbb{A} adl \mathbb{A} b6 18 \mathbb{A} fel \mathbb{A} g6! = Smyslov-Kasparov, (m/8) 1984.


15 bc 16 €)a4 ₩c8 17 ⊈d4 台e6 18 Ϊc1 6)d7 19 ДCЗ

and now instead of 19 ... \$\alpha f6?! 20 e3 Ag6 (Smyslov-Kasparov, (m/10) 1984), where White could have obtained an endgame advantage with 21 ≜×f6 \subseteq ×f6 22 ₩d4! ₩×d4 23 ed, 19 ... Qg6! would have equalized, according to Kasparov. Ш

b3

The variation with 9 b3 has been an infrequent visitor to the tournament scene ever since a new defence with an early ... b6 appeared.

€)e4 10 ₿b2 **△16** (138)



11 2 24

11 $\triangle \times e4$ de 12 $\triangle d2$ $\triangle \times d4$ 13 Ξ e8 = Mestel-Nunn, London 1984.

> 11 ... **b6!** 12 **営c1** ∄e8

12 ... Qa6 13 dc Q×b2 14 \(\delta \times b2 \) bc 15 公d3 莒e8: see 12 ... 莒e8 13 dc $\triangle \times b2$ 14 $\triangle \times b2$ bc 15 $\triangle d3$.

> 13 dc $\triangle \times b2$ 14 **②**×b2 bc

15 \$ 24

15 Ød3 ♣a6 16 Øf4 Øb4 (16 ... d4!?) 17 2 d2 2 xa2 18 2 xe4 2 xc1 (18 ... de 19 營×d8 莒a×d8 20 莒×c5 国d2 ∞) 19 ⑤c3 g5 20 營×c1 gf 21 \(\Delta \times d5 \) (Arencibia-Perez, Cien-

> 15 **∆a6** 16 ∄e1 c4 17 €)h4

(a) 17 **2** d4 **2** e5! ∞ Kasparov.

(b) 17 **2** d2 **4** f6 18 **2** × e4 de 19 bc 国ad8 20 皆b3 (20 皆c2 e3!?) 20 ... e3! 21 fe 和e5 22 耳f1! 增h6 23 闰f4 (Novikov-Sturua, USSR 1984) 23 ... g5! 24 闰d4 闰×d4 25 ed ରg4 26 h3 ରe3 ≅ Sturua. 27 ରb2 would be met by 27 ... \delta\delta d6!

17 ... **₩a**5

包d7 (141)


18 **分f5** g6 19 **2**d4 Hac8

This position was reached in Larsen-Kasparov, Nikšić 1983, 22 \dd d7 would have brought a level position.

IV

⊈e3 c4!? (139)

This move has moved in and out of fashion over the past two decades.



10 h6! Black's fortunes have been greatly improved by this recent discovery.


> 11 b3 ch 12 €)×c6 bc 13 ab **a**5 14 ₩c2

Timoshchenko-Kasparov, USSR 1983, saw Black gain the upper hand after $14 \Omega c1 (14 \Omega d2 \Omega f5! =)$ 14... Qb4 15 分a4 單e8 16 Qd2 Qa6 17 月e1 皇f8 18 曾c2 包e4 19 包c3 $40\times d2$.

2a6 14 15 €)a4 ∯ b5 Black has equalized (Kasparov). The Tartakower Defence

1	d4	d5
2	c4	e6
3	ᡚ c3	€ 2f6
4	⊈g 5	⊈e 7
5	e3	0-0
6	2 13	h6
7	∆h4	b6 (140)

This defence has featured prominently in the World Championship matches of the last decade. In the most recent match in Seville, there were two games in a row played with the line, with Karpov and Kasparov changing sides!



8 ⊈e2 I 8 龄c2 H 8 \b3 III 8 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 IV 8 **≜**d3 V VI 8 cd I

8 ⊈e2

We begin with the most popular line, seen in the Seville match.

8 ... **∆b7** 8... dc is premature, e.g. 9 \(\textit{\Omega} \times c4\) \$\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\te\ $\mathfrak{Q}_{\mathbf{g}3}$ c5 13 dc $\mathfrak{Q}\times$ c5 14 \mathfrak{Q} e5 \pm Groszpeter-Lein, St. John 1988.

 $\Delta \times \mathbf{f6}$ **∆**×f6 9 10 cd ed 11 b4

This principled move sets up a characteristic of the Tartakower Variation, by establishing 'hanging pawns' for Black.

11 0-0 was Karpov's choice in the 19th game of the 4th match.

(a) After 11 ... **2**d7 12 b4 c5 13 be he avoided transposition below (14 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b1) by introducing 14 **對b3!?** Kasparov replied by simplifying the central situation with 14 ... cd 15 $\triangle \times d4$ $\triangle \times d4!$ 16 ed $\triangle b6$ and after 17 a4 \(\mathbb{\pi}\)b8 18 a5 \(\alpha\)c4 19 鱼×c4 dc 20 對×c4 對d6 Karpov found the only move which preserved the advantage – 21 \begin{aligned}
\text{def}c5!
\end{aligned} After the exchange of queens White held a slight advantage, but Karpov-Kasparov, (m/19) 1987, was eventually drawn after excellent defensive play by Kasparov.

(b) Another popular reply is 11 ... 汽e8, for example 12 曾b3 c6 13 用ad1 2a6 14 目fel 2c7 15 2d3 ②e6!? (15 ... g6 is safer) 16 △b1 g6 but White is better after 17 \begin{array}{c} \text{ but} \text{ Wc2} (Belyavsky-Karpov, Tilburg 1986). Or 12 b4 c6 13 8b3 8d6 13 De1 ②d7 14 ②d3 ± Torre-Lalić, St. John 1988.

11 ... There are two alternatives:

(a) 11 ... c6 12 0-0 皆d6 13 皆b3 幻d7 14 耳fd1 耳fd8 15 耳acl 鼻e7= Farago-Ki. Georgiev, Wijk aan Zee 1988.

(b) 11 ... 2c6 12 \bar{2}b3 2e7 13 0-0 營d6 14 闰acl a6 15 b5 ± Groszpeter-Garcia, St. John 1988.

> 12 bc bc 13 Ab1 Ac6

13 ... \\delta a5 14 0-0 cd 15 \\delta \times d4 分c6 16 分db5 分e7 17 曾a4 曾×a4 18 分×a4 总c6 19 公c5 闰fc8 20 闰fc1 \(\mathbb{Q}\times \text{b5} \) 21 \(\mathbb{Q}\times \text{b5} \) d4 22 \(\alpha\text{d7}\) de 23 $\oint \times f6 + gf 24 \text{ fe } \square ab8 25 \square a4 gg7$ Timman-Karpov, Amsterdam 1988.

14 0-0

15 **⊉b5 ₩c7** 16 ₩d3

16 營c2 was seen in games from the marathon match:

(a) 16 ... 互fd8 17 互fc1 互ab8 18 a4 偿d6 19 dc 幻×c5 20 Д×c6 營×c6 21 分b5 且e7 22 幻×a7 (22 營f5 營e8 23 包e5 耳b7 24 包d4 耳c7 25 包b5 Ξ b7 $\frac{1}{2}$ - $\frac{1}{2}$ Kasparov-Karpov, (m/38) 1984-85) 22 ... \\dia a6 23 \dia b5 徵×a4 24 徵×a4 ②×a4 25 ⑤fd4 並 Karpov-Kasparov, (m/39) 1984-85.

(b) Kasparov-Karpov, (m/42) 1984-85: 16 ... 耳fc8 17 耳fc1 点×b5 18 分×b5 份c6 19 dc 公×c5 20 份f5 발e6 21 회fd4 발×f5 22 회×f5 회e6 23 耳×c8 耳×c8 24 夕×a7 耳c2 25 \$\b\b \B \xa2 26 h3 \B a5 ½-½.

16 ... \(\mathbb{I}\)fc8


Kasparov gives 17 ... △×b5 18 ♠×b5 \(\text{\tikitet{\text{\ti}}}\tint{\text{\text{\tin

18 h3 cd

Kasparov's suggested improvement on Karpov-Kasparov, (m/18) 1987, which saw 18 ... g6? 19 Q×c6 E×b1 20 營×b1! 營×c6 21 dc 營×c5 22 ②e2 營f8, where Karpov missed 23 ②f4 ②b6 24 h4! which would have given him a significant initiative.

8 ₩c2 (142)

II



ed


10 cd

11	0-0-0	c5
12	dc	≨)d7
13	•D×d5	ᡚ × c5
14	Ac4	b5
15	•्2)×f6+	& ×f6
16	∆d5	
	*	*

Not 16 **总**×b5? **总**e4 17 **皆**c3 耳fc8! 干干.

± Kasparov-I. Zaitsev, Baku 1980.

Ш



8	•••	⊈ b7
9	∆ ×f6	<u>∆</u> ×f6
10	cd	ed
11	Äd1	∄e8
12	a3	

12 Ad3 c5 13 dc 2d7 14 c6 A c6 15 0-0 2c5 16 ₩a3 d4? 17 2 cd4 A cd4 18 ed ₩g5 19 d5 succeeded in Kasparov-Belyavsky, USSR Ch. 1978, but Black can equalize with 12 ... 2c6 13 0-0 2a5 14 ₩c2 c5! Polugayevsky-Tal, Alma Ata 1980.

12 <u>Qe2</u> c6 13 0-0 **2**d7 transposes to Variation I.

12 ... c5 13 dc 公d7 14 cb 營×b6 15 營×b6 ②×c3+ 16 bc ab 17 ②b5 圭 Petursson-Li, Biel IZ 1985.


13	₽́d3	ᡚd7
14	0-0	€]f8
15	∆ b1	g6
16	∐fe1	ᡚe6
17	Д a2	∆g 7!

18 ₩a4 b5! 19 ₩c2 a5

Black has a good game, for example 20 ②e2 b4 21 ab ab 22 ②c1 營b6 23 ②b3 莒ac8 24 ②d3 c5 = Agzamov-A. Petrosian, USSR Ch. 1985.

IV

8 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 (144)



8 ... <u>△</u>b7 9 <u>△</u>e2 <u>△</u>bd7

Black can also capture immediately: 9 ... dc 10 ♣×c4 ₺bd7 11 0-0 c5 12 ₩e2 (12 dc ₺×c5 13 ₩e2 a6 14 ☐fd1 ₩e8 15 ₺e5 b5 ∞ Szilagyi-Bönsch, Bundesliga 1987) 12 ... a6 13 a4 cd 13 ₺×d4 ₺c5 and now:

(a) 15 呂fdl 皆e8 16 且g3 幻fe4

17 ②×e4 ②×e4 18 ②e5 ②f6 19 ③×f6 ②×f6 20 營c2 邑d8 21 ②e2 邑d6 22 營c7 營b8 23 h3 was agreed drawn in Yusupov-Karpov, Bugojno 1986.

(b) 15 f3 ②h5!? 16 ②f2 ②d6 17 虽fd1 營e7 with an unclear position in Portisch-Hjartarson, Reykjavik 1987, or 15 ... 營e8 16 營c2 虽c8 17 ②a2 ②d5 = Portisch-Vaganian, match 1988.

10 cd

10 0-0 c5 11 \triangle g3 a6 12 cd \triangle ×d5 13 \triangle ×d5 \triangle ×d5 14 dc \triangle ×c5 15 b4 \triangle e4 16 \triangle c7 \triangle e8 17 a3 a5! = Karpov-Kasparov, (m/17) 1984-85.

10	•••	ed
11	0-0	c5
12	dc	bc
12	Ö ~2	

13 ৬c2 互c8 14 互fd1 ৬b6 15 ৬b1 互fd8 16 互c2 ৬e6 17 Qg3 ⑤h5 18 互cd2 ⑤×g3 19 hg ⑤f6 20 ৬c2 g6 〒 Korchnoi-Karpov, (m/1) 1981.

13 ... ₩b6!?
14 �a4 ₩a5

Safer is 14 ... 발e6 15 b4! c4 16 소 d4 발a6 = Timman-Belyavsky, Thessaloniki Ol. 1984.

15 ©h4 g6
Karpov evaluates this position as unclear.


16 ₩c2! Qc6 16 ... \$g7 17 Qd3 threatening Q×g6 gives White a strong attack.

22 **DC3**

White has more than sufficient compensation for his material.

8 Ad3 (145)

This is presently a very popular line.



8 ***

9 0-0

9 \(\Delta \times f6 \) \(\Delta \times f6 \) \(\Delta \times f6 \) 10 cd ed 11 0-0 c5 15 耳fd1 耳b8 16 皆c2 皆a5 17 幻d2 was better for White in Portisch-Vaganian, (m/3) 1988.

> 9 **包bd7** 10 ₩e2

10 Ag3!? c5 11 Ac1 a6 12 cd 2×d5 13 2×d5 2×d5 14 e4 2b7 15 △b1 ± Romanishin-Ki. Georgiev. Leningrad 1987.

10 **c5** ...

\(\mathbb{I}\)fd1 11

11 Eacl De4 12 Dg3 Dxg3 13 hg = Torre-M. Gurevich, Leningrad 1987.

11	***	ᡚe4
12	⊈g3	cd
13	وَ×d4	ᡚ×g3
14	hg	ᡚf6
15	∃ac1	⊉b4

16 cd $\triangle \times c3$ $6)\times d5$ 17 Ã×c3 ∄cc1 月c8 18 19 **∆a6**


and a draw was agreed in Novikov-Lputian, USSR Ch. 1984. VI

> cd ed (146)

8 ... **②**×d5 is also playable:

(a) 9 鱼×e7 營×e7 10 氫×d5 ed and now Winants-Kasparov, Brussels 1987, saw 11 闰c1 Qe6 12 쌍a4 c5 13 쌍a3 耳c8 14 요e2 常f8 15 dc bc 16 0-0 a5 with chances for both sides.

(b) $9 \le \times d5$ ed $10 \le 23 \le 411$ a3 c5 12 dc bc 13 \triangle e2 \triangle f6 = Agdestein-van der Sterren, Wijk aan Zee 1988.



₽d3 9 **₽b7**

This is an old and traditional line which Karpov feels offers the best chances for White to gain the advantage (ECO 1987).

10 0-0

10 ... De4 11 Axe7 \\exists xe7 12 쌀b3 (12 De5 Dd7 13 f4 Dxe5 14 fe c5! 15 曾el 莒ad8 16 莒d1 曾g5 17 用f3 f6! equalized in Kasparov-Belyavsky, (m/7) 1983.) 12 ... 罩d8 13 国acl c5 14 Qb1 公c6 15 国fd1 $\triangle \times c3$ 16 $\triangle \times c3$ cd = Gligorić-Kurajica, Rovinj/Zagreb 1970.

The text was seen in games 1.3 and 5 of the 1983 Kasparov-Belyavsky Candidates' match.

11 **De5!** 4)bd7 Kasparov-Belvavsky. (m/1)1984 continued 11 ... ②c6 12 ②a6! **2**×f6 15 **2**g4! **2**d8! 16 **2**×d5 ②×d4! 17 ②df6+ White held a slight advantage.

12 \(\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{12}}}}}\)

12 \degree f3?! cd 13 ed \delta ×e5 14 de ₩×e5 17 De7+ \$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$h8!}}}\$ led to equality in Kasparov-Belyavsky, Moscow (m/3) 1984.

> 12 ... ♦)×e5?!

12 ... 冱e8 would have been only slightly better for White.

13 de €)e8

14 ₽g3 **ᡚc7**

15 **₩g4**

This gave White a large advantage in Kasparov-Belyavsky, (m/5), 1983.

13 Keeping Up with Kasparov

Keeping up with the World Champion is quite a task! As this book proceeded through the production stages, many interesting developments have taken place. Rather than rewrite entire chapters, we have placed the new material here, at the end of the book.

Sicilian Defence

Important developments have occurred in both the Scheveningen and Keres Attack.

Scheveningen

1 e4 c5 2 \$\infty\$ f3 d6 3 d4 cd 4 \$\infty\$ \times d4 \$\infty\$ f6 5 \$\c3 e6

Kasparov has also faced the popular systems with \(\textit{Q}\)e3 and 對d2: Khalifman-Kasparov, USSR Ch. 1988: 1 e4 c5 2 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f3 e6 3 d4 cd 4 ②×d4 ②f6 5 ②c3 d6 6 ②e3 a6 7 발d2 Qe7 8 f3 公c6 9 0-0-0 0-0 10 g4 日b8 11 h4 公×d4 12 **Q**×d4 **公**d7 13 g5 b5 14 當b1 當c7 15 h5 b4 16 De2 De5 17 Dg1 f5 18 gf x66 19 h6 g6 20 b3 \(\textit{\Q}\)b7 21 \(\textit{\Q}\)h3 \(\textit{\\@}\)e7 22 国h2 a5 23 国e2 幻f7 24 A×f6 增×f6 25 f4 闰bc8 26 勾f3 營c3 27 囯e3 營×d2 28 萬×d2 萬c3 29 萬×c3 bc 30 国d3 **Q**×e4 31 **Q**×c3 **Q**×f3 32 **Q**×e6 鱼h5 33 闰c7 g5 34 fg 闰e8 ½-½.

> 6 ... 26

In Yudashin-Kasparov, USSR Ch. 1988. White tried a more aggressive plan, but it did not meet with success: 7 \(\textit{Q}\)e3 b5 8 \(\textit{\textit{M}}\)f3 \(\textit{\textit{Q}}\)b7 9 单d3 分bd7 10 a3 耳c8 11 0-0 单e7 12 月ae1 0-0 13 始h3 幻c5 14 Qf2 分fd7 15 當h1 点f6 16 用d1 用e8 17 2d4 2f6 21 \deg3 e5 22 fg hg 23 \triangle e3 \triangle f×e4 24 \triangle ×e4 \triangle ×e4 25 $\triangle \times e4$ $\triangle \times e4$ 26 $\triangle c3$ $\triangle b7$ 27 h4 洹c4 28 夏g5 營e6 29 囯d2 囯g4 30 **省d3 f6 0-1.**

Ehlvest-Kasparov, USSR Ch. 1988. saw instead 8 a4 營c7 9 0-0 0-0 10 曾el 包c6 11 **Qe**3 e5 12 **包**b3 ව්b4 13 ජිf2 ව්×c2 14 වීb6 ජිb8 15 用ad1 **Qe6** 16 fe **分d7** 17 **分d5** Д×d5 18 Д×d5 Дb4 19 Дdd1 ②×e5 20 ②d4 g6 21 △a5 ⑤bc6 22 요c3 ②×d4 23 □×d4 營a7 24 營h1 闰ac8 25 总d1 \begin{array}{c} \text{\text{\$\ext{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}\$}\$}}\$}\text{\$\text{\$\tex{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$ **国b4 公d3** 28 **省d4 国**×c3 29 bc ②×b4 30 cb d5 31 ♣b3 de 32 \\ ×e4 **營d7 33 營d5 營×d5 34 益×d5 益×b4** $35 \triangle \times b7 \triangle \times a5 36 \triangle \times a6 h5 37 \triangle c4$ 雷g7 38 闰a1 乌b6 39 闰b1 闰d8 40 g3 \(\mathbb{G}\)d6 41 \(\mathbb{Q}\)e2 \(\mathbb{Q}\)c7 42 \(\mathbb{G}\)c1 \(\mathbb{C}\)-\(\mathbb{G}\).

Kasparov delayed this move in van der Wiel-Kasparov. Amsterdam 1988, and equalized 15 Qg5 Qe7 16 Qh6 Qf8 17 Qg5 Qe7 ½-½.

11 **≜e**3 罩e8 (147) 公允员

12 Ag1!?

This is Geller's idea from the 10th game of the 1985 Karpov-Kasparov match (see p. 98).

In van der Wiel-Kasparov, Amsterdam 1988, Kasparov again expanded his repertoire, greeting 12 \(\tilde{\Omega}\)f3 with the old fashioned 12 ... \(\textit{\textsq}\)d7 intead of his trusty 12 ... \(\textit{\textsq}\)b8. Play continued 13 2b3 (13 2de2!? is an interesting alternative.) 13 ... 2a5!? 14 2×a5 (Against 14 e5 Kasparov suggested 14 ... 2c4! 15 ef ᡚ×e3 16 ₩e2 ᡚ×f1 17 fe ᡚ×h2 18 ♣×h2 ♣c6 with unclear complications, an evaluation with which we agree.) 14 ... 資×a5 15 資d3 且ad8 16 營d2 且c8 17 e5 de 18 fe 營×e5 19 益×b7 莒cd8 20 鱼f4 營a5 21 曾e2 皇c8 22 皇c6 皇f8 23 皇f3 對b4 24 Qc7 囯d7 25 Qe5 Qb7 26 a5 耳fd8 27 耳a4 鱼×f3 28 營×f3

營c5 29 总×f6 gf 30 闰h4 f5 31 闰h3 ₩c4 32 g4 f4 33 g5? (time pressure) 33 ... 莒d4 34 莒f2 Д×g5 35 營g4 f6 36 目hf3 當h8 37 耳g2 耳d2 38 h4 耳×g2 39 當×g2 Qh6 40 當h3 耳g8 41 省h5 省c6 42 省h2 总f8 43 耳f2 f5 44 營e2 国g4 0-1. This was a very complicated tactical game, with White's central advance being countered with play along the c- and d-files.

This is a novelty, replacing 13 **省d2**.


13	***	,Q.d7
14	ᡚb3	b6
15	g4	∆ c8
16	g5	ᡚd7
17	∆g2	£1 £
18	₩ß	

Sokolov is regrouping his forces in a novel manner, choosing 2g1 and \delta instead of \delta d2-f2.

For his part, Kasparov has chosen a classical plan since White does not have 19 \(\Omega e^3 \) available because of 19 ... \$\infty\$c4 20 \$\infty\$c1 △b7 with a big edge for Black.

19	ව d2	⊉ b7
20	份h5	g6
21	份h3	∄bc8
22	f5	ઈe5 (148)
23	fo?1	., .

After this exchange Black could easily repel all threats and grab the initiative. A more promising plan would have been 23 \(\mathbb{I}\)f4!? for 25 日af1 (25 日h4 is not on because



of 25 ... h6 26 gh \$\mathre{G}\$h7) 25 ... \$\overline{Q}\$e5 26 △d4! and Black is in considerable danger, e.g. 26 ... \cdot c4?! 27 fg fg 28 £xe5 de 29 \ and White wins, or 26 ... Qg7 27 闰f4! But 23 ... 營e7! is playable, as well as 24 ... \\delta × c4! in the previous variation.

If 25 ... 對×g5 then 26 罩×f8+! 買×f8 27 對×e6+ 當h8 29 買×f8+ 耳×f8 29 營×d6 with an attack that provides plenty of compensation for the exchange.

26 耳h4 ₽h8

Now after 27 Ad4 Dac4 28 分×c4 耳×c4 29 总e3 耳cc8 30 总c1 b5 Black had an excellent game.

Keres Attack

1 e4 c5 2 \$\infty\$ f3 e6 3 d4 cd 4 \$\infty\$ \times d4 \$\infty\$ f6 5 Dc3 d6 6 g4

Kasparov seems to have been ducking the Keres Attack ever since his 1984/85 marathon match, employing the Naidorf and Taimanov move orders. But recently he has shown a willingness to defend the Black side, for

Liubojevic-Kasparov, example Belfort 1988:

> €)c6 6 ...

Kasparov follows his own advice as he calls this move 'the most logical answer to White's flank attack' in his book on the Scheveningen.

7	g5	2d7
8	Ïg1	.⊈e7
9	⊈.e3	0-0

An interesting choice, considering that Kasparov recommends 9 ... \(\Delta \) b6! in his book, giving 10 對h5 g6 11 對e2 e5 12 到b3 且e6 with a better game for Black, and he also examined 10 \(\mathbb{I}\)g3, 10 f4 and 10 \(\textit{D}\)b5. But here, for some reason, he chose to go another wav.

> ₩d2 **a6** 10 $\triangle \times d4$ 11 0 - 0 - 0₿×d4 **b**5 12 h4 f4 13

A typical Sicilian strategy.

14 De2

This is a novelty. Kasparov has provided analysis only of 13 2a4 ₩a5 14 b3 ♠b7 15 ♠g2 e5! with good counterplay for Black.


Black has achieved a very good game, which is aided by a series of blunders by Ljubojevic: 16 Af2 \$\oldot c5 17 \oldot e3 \oldot e6 18 \oldot c1 ef 19 營×f4 耳ac8 20 Qd4 耳fe8 21 包b3 皆a4 22 点f6 点f8 23 邑g3 皆c6 24 €)×c5 dc 25 \(\text{Qe5} c4 26 \(\text{Qd6} b3 27 \) c3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)cd8 28 e5 \(\mathbb{Q}\)×d6 29 ed \(\mathbb{Z}\)×d6 30 耳c1 皆c5 31 當a1 囯ed8 32 囯e3

耳d1 33 耳e1 耳×e1 34 耳×e1 皆a5 35 a3 營d5 36 Qe2 g6 37 h4 營d2 38 告f1 Ah3 39 告g1 三e8 0-1.

Grünfeld Defence

Kasparov's Not surprisingly, favourite reply to 1 d4 has seen quite a bit of action, and there are a number of new developments to report.

1 d4 \$\infty\$ f6 2 c4 g6 3 \$\infty\$ c3 d5 4 cd \$\infty\$ \times d5 5 e4 2×c3 6 bc 2g7 7 2c4 c5 8 2 e2 ♠c6 9 de3 0-0 10 0-0 (149)



of 0-0, Instead 10 Polugayevsky's idea 10 \(\mathbb{Z} \text{c1} \) is fashionable, e.g. Polugavevsky-Kudrin, New York Open 1989: 10 ... cd 11 cd \(\mathre{a} 5 + 12 \(\mathre{a} f1 \) \(\mathre{Q} d7 13 \) h4 用ac8 14 h5 e5! 15 hg hg 16 d5 **公**d4! 17 公×d4 莒×c4? 18 闰×c4 營a6 19 營d3! ed 20 요×d4 요b5 21 營h3! and White won. Huzman and Vainerman found a significant improvement, however: 17 ... ed 18 $\triangle \times d4$ $\triangle b5!$, for example 19 $\mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{Q}$ 7 $\mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{C}$ 4 20 $\mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{C}$ 4 $\mathbb{Q} \times \mathbb{C}$ 4+ 21 當e1 當×e7 22 皆d4+ f6 23 皆×c4 쌀e1+ 24 쌀fl 쌀xe4 and Black is better. Another interesting idea was seen in Nogueiras-Ljubojevic,


Barcelona World Cup 1989: 13 ... 囯fc8!? 14 h5 ②d8! 15 hg hg 16 Qd2 ₩a3 17 Ab3 ₩a6 18 ☎g1 ₩d3! where Black is clearly better. Kasparov is not convinced, apparently, since he gives 10 ... b6 13 0-0 \$\overline{1}\$b7 14 c4 \$\overline{1}\$d6 with equal chances, though this has not vet been tested. In any event, we can conclude that Polugayevsky's idea is not particularly dangerous for Black.

Korchnoi-Kasparov, Reykjavik World Cup 1988, saw a different new try for White in the form of 10 闰b1!? (The point of this move is clear. After 10 ... cd 11 cd \\alpha a5+ 12 All Black will have to expend an important tempo to protect his pawn at b7.) 10 ... 2a5! 11 2d3 cd 12 cd b6 13 0-0 (On 13 h4, Kasparov suggested 13 ... e5! 14 d5 f5.) 13 ... e6! 皆a4?! (14 皆d2 looks more logical here, for example 14 ... **Qb7** 15 **Qfc1 😭d7 =) 14 ... Qb7** 15 目fd1 目c8 16 Qd2 包c6 17 Qc3 營h4! 18 Qe1 耳fd8 19 f3 營e7 20 ∆b5?! (20 \\ \(\text{\ti}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texit{\tex{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\te suggested by Kasparov, while 21 △b5 ⊘a5 gives Black full equality.) 20 ... a6! 21 2×a6 2×a6 22 \\ \alpha \times a6 \&\infty \times d4! and Black's initiative is significant. Kasparov then demonstrated his tactical mastery and brilliant intuition in the middlegame, following on from the opening in a thoroughly logical manner, collecting the point against yet another world class player.

10 ... ₿g4 11 f3 €)a5

Here there are two popular lines:

Α	12 2	2 .d3	
В	12 2	2 ×f7+	
A			_
	12	.⊈.d3	cd
	13	cd	⊈ e6
	14	Ëc1	<u> </u>
	15	≌a4	.⊈e6
	16	d5	⊈d 7
	17	份b4	e6 (150)



This has become the main line of this subvariation, replacing 17 ... b6, though that move has not been refuted and is still considered to lead to unclear play.

18 & c3

Here Yusupov uncorked the novel 18 \(\mathbb{I}\)fd1 in Yusupov-Kasparov, USSR Ch. 1988, and the game continued 18 ... ed 19 ed \(\mathbb{Z} e 8 \) 20 \(\textit{Q}\)f2 b5 (20 \(\text{...} \) \(\text{Q}\)f5 is not so strong because of 21 $\triangle \times 65$ $\Xi \times e2$ 22 Qe4 国b2 23 曾e1 followed by 24 d6, according to Kasparov.) 21 ᡚd4 ᡚc4! 22 ᡚc6 (22 Д×c4 a5! 23 營c5 bc 24 徵×c4 a4 25 幻c6 徵f6 = and 22 ᡚ×b5 ᡚb2! are given by

②×d1 25 c7 \d5 26 \d>×e8 \d>×f2 27 c8(營) 闰×c8 28 闰×c8 匀h3+ 29 gh

This was a very important game for opening theory, but Kasparov withstood the difficult test provided by his well-prepared opponent. Another test lay ahead, involving the text continuation 18 €)c3.

18 ... ed


18 ... b6 comes strongly into consideration.

19 ed

For some reason the commentators neglected 19 $4 \times d5$ 4 = 620囯fd1 &×d5 21 ed 對×d5 22 &e4 對b3 23 且d2 b6 24 且×a8 耳×a8 25 營e7 分c4 26 点f4 h5 27 營e4 耳c8 28 耳d7 骨b5 29 耳×a7 骨c6 30 骨e7 ₩c5+ 31 Дe3 ₩×e7 32 Д×e7 Дc6 33 **A×b6 Ah6** 34 耳e8+ **Bh7** 35 $\triangle d4+ f6 36 \triangle \times f6 1-0 Wilder-$ Kudrin, U.S. Ch. 1988. Instead of the risky 21 ... \\delta \times d5, a stronger move is 21 ... \(\mathbb{Z}\)e8, for example 22 Qf2 Qf8! 23 \artilde{\text{\tint{\text{\te}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\tex $25 \, \Omega f2 =$

On 20 De4 Yusupov suggested 20 ... f5! 21 Qg5 \b6 22 \b×b6 ab 23 **②**f6+ **②**xf6 24 **③**×f6 **③**f7 and Black stands quite well, for example 25 Qg5 \(\) e5 26 \(\) d2 \(\) ac8.

This is one of the positions of the gambit system initiated by 14 闰c1. 20 ... b6, 20 ... b5 and 20 ... \$\textit{\Omega} e5!? have all been seen here, but



Kasparov, contrary to his usual practice, followed the most conservative path with

If 21 皆f4 then 21 ... g5!? 22 皆g3 ②b3 23 旦b1 ②c5 24 Qc2 f5 with a clear advantage for Black according to Belyavsky, but we find this analysis unconvincing in view of 23 De4 D×c1 24 D×g5! Dg7 25 ≅×c1 with a very strong attack for White, so 21 \begin{aligned}
\$ & f & deserves further \end{aligned}\$ consideration.

21	•••	<u> </u>
22	₩b4	∆ f8
23	⊌b2	1/2-1/2

USSR Belyavsky-Kasparov, Ch. 1988. Truly a game which raised more questions than it answered.


Discussion of the Seville Variation of the Grünfeld continued in Karpov-Kasparov. Belfort 1988, where the former World Champion introduced 17\\a4!? to which Kasparov did not react correctly, playing 17 ... b6?! and after 18 \(\text{\text{\text{W}}}\)c2 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{L}}}\)f8 (18 ... 世c4?! 19 世e4! prevents 19 ... 幻c6.) 19 當g1 皆c4 20 皆d2 皆e6 21 h3 ②c4 22 ₩g5! and Kasparov was unable to hold the position. The game concluded 22 ... h6 23 ₩c1 營f7 24 Qg3 g5 25 營c2 營d5 26 Qf2 當f8 30 名e4 三×f2 31 含×f2 bc 32 **省5+ 省88 33 省c8+省h7 34 省xc5** 曾f7+ 35 曾g1 c2 36 包g3 皇f8 37 包f5 曾g8 38 囯c1 1-0.

So Karpov won the most recent. but by no means last, set in this theoretical match. The move 17 ₩a4! was highly praised, but we feel that 17 ... \(\mathbb{E}\)f8! should provide adequate counterplay, for example 18 當g1 (18 營×a5 營f7!) 18 ... \$\forall f7 19 \textit{Qh4} (19 \textit{Qg3} is met by 19 ... Ah6) 19 ... 2c4 20 h3 2e3 with the deadly threat of 21 ... ± xg2! The obvious drawback to 17 \dot{4}a4 is the decentralization of the white queen.

Thus it should come as no surprise that Karpov has since reverted to 17 \(\text{\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\texit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\texitit{\$\text{\$\}}\$}\text{\$\text{\$\exititit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}}} game against Timman from the Rotterdam World Cup 1989.

17	***	₩c4
18	₩b2	∆ h6
19	h4	旦18!? (152)

Timman introduced this novelty but it did not work out as he had planned.



g5 **\dd3!?** 20 21 \bullet b1

21 gh 公c4 22 營c1 also favours White, e.g. 22 ... \forall f5 23 \(2\)f4! or 22 ... 夕e3+ 23 魯g1 夕×g2 24 曾g5!

21	•••	₩e3
22	₩e1	<u></u> ⊈g7
23	⊈g1	₩e4
24	ᡚg3	偿×h4
25	②e4	¤×f2

If 25 ... \degree g4 26 \@xc5 b6 then 27 營e4! ±. After 26 毫×f2 cd 27 罩d1! Karpov prevailed.

The last word on the Seville Variation remains to be said, and perhaps Kasparov will make the next contribution.

Dutch Defence

There is not too much to report here. In the Modern Stonewall, Kasparov achieved an advantage against Short at Brussels SWIFT 1987 after 1 d4 f5 2 g3 (avoiding lines with ... 2f8-b4+) 2 ... 2f6 3 \(\text{\textit{Q}}\) \(\text{2}\) \(\text{e6}\) \(4 \) \(\text{f3}\) \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{d}}}}} \) \(5 \) \(c4 \) \(d5 \) \(6 \) \(0 - 0 \) 0-0 7 **⑤**bd2 (7 b3 is normal.) 7 ... c6 8 包e5 인bd7 9 인d3 인e4 10 쌀c2 且f6 11 分f3 當h8 12 b3 營e8 13 且a3 国 g8 14 国 ac1, where control of e5 and the spatial advantage play a significant role.

In the Leningrad, Kasparov tried a new move which did not prove much of a success: 3 ... g6 4 \$\(\overline{6}\)f3 \(\overline{9}\)g7 5 0-0 0-0 6 b3 (More common is 6 c4 d6 7 (2)c3) 6 ... d6 7 **ab2** 曾e8 8 c4 **a**a6 9 d5 **a**d7 10 公c3 c6 11 囯c1 h6 12 e3 囯c8 13 ②d4 \frac{1}{2}f7 and in Kasparov-Malanyuk, USSR Ch. 1988, Black had a fully playable game which was eventually drawn. One assumes that Kasparov will be better prepared next time he meets this opening!

English Opening

1 c4 2f6 2 2f3 g6 3 2c3 d5 4 cd ⑤×d5 5 營a4+ is a modified Grünfeld which was seen in Korchnoi-Kasparov, Brussels SWIFT 1987: 5 both come into consideration) 6 ... \(\text{\tinc{\tinte\text{\tin}\text{\tetx{\text{\tetx{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tet simul. 1988, saw instead 7 \delta d4 f6 8 e4 ⑤×c3 9 bc 營×d4 10 ⑤×d4 ♀d7 11 f4 c5 12 \(\overline{2}\)b3 e6 13 d4 \(\overline{2}\)c6 14 \triangle d3 f5 15 \triangle ×c5 \triangle ×c5 16 dc fe) 7 ... Qg7 8 Qg2 2d7! (Korchnoi had probably prepared some innovation in the main line with 8 ... 0-0, but the World Champion equalized quickly on 9 \(\tilde{2} \) d4 (9 0-0 is well met by 9 ... e5! and Black is better.) 9 ... $\triangle \times d4$ 10 $\triangle \times d5$ (10 ₩×d4 is also met by 10 ... e5! while on 10 $\triangle \times d5$, 10 ... $\triangle f6$ gives Black the edge.) 10 ... \(\Q \text{g7} 11 0-0 \text{ e6 } 12 ₩×d8+ ₩×d8 13 ᡚc3 Д×g2 14 \$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}\$\text{\$\geq}\$\$2 \$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}\$e7 15 d3 \$\text{\$\geq}\$\$hc8 16 \$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}\$g5+

₾18.

On the White side, Kasparov has slacked off a bit in his enthusiasm for the English, but he can still be devastating at times:

Kasparov-Ivanchuk, USSR Ch. 1988: 1 c4 \$\alpha\$ f6 2 \$\alpha\$ c3 e5 3 \$\alpha\$ f3 \$\alpha\$ c6 4 g3 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g2}}}}} \) 0-0 6 0-0 e4 7 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g5}}}} \) **△**×c3 8 bc 莒e8 9 f3 ef 10 **△**×f3 d5 11 d4 句e4 12 曾c2 dc 13 耳b1 f5 14 g4 營e7 15 gf ②d6 16 ②g5 營×e2 17 且d5+ 當h8 18 營×e2 買×e2 19 且f4 ②d8 20 闰bel 闰×el 21 闰×el 总d7 22 <u>△</u>×d6 cd 23 <u>□</u>e7 <u>△</u>c6 24 f6 1-0

Kasparov-Sokolov, Belfort 1988: 1 c4 2 f6 2 2 c3 e6 3 e4 c5 4 e5 2 g8 5 \$\infty f3 \$\infty c6 6 d4 cd 7 \$\infty \times d4 \$\infty \text{e5}\$ 8 **②db5** a6 9 **②d6+ ②**×d6 10 **營**×d6 f6 11 Qe3 Qe7 12 Qb6 Qf5 13 \(\text{\text{\text{\$\geq}}}\)c5 d6 14 皆a5 皆e7 15 0-0-0 0-0 16 f4 ②c6 17 쌀a3 e5 18 g4 ②fd4 19 ②d5 營f7 20 f5 g6 21 闰g1 gf 22 g5 當h8 23 gf Qe6 24 \\ d×d6 Q×d5 25 cd 曾×f6 26 曾×f6+ 耳×f6 27 曾b1 幻d8 28 Ac5 Ac8 29 Ae7 Af7 30 Ad6 到 31 国 g3 e4 32 且 e2 国 f6 33 且 f4 買g6 34 Q×f3 買×g3 35 Q×e4 fe 36 hg 當g7 37 囯d4 勾f7 38 耳×e4 囯d8 39 闰e7 闰×d5 40 闰×b7 h5 41 耳a7 a5 42 a4 1-0

King's Indian Defence

As Black, Kasparov has returned to his old stomping ground, and has been stomping plenty of opponents along the way! He has been scoring points with both colours. Let's begin with the Classical System:

1 d4 \$\alpha\$ f6 2 c4 g6 3 \$\alpha\$ c3 \$\alpha\$ g7 4 e4 d6 5 €13 0-0 6 de2 e5 7 0-0

A battle of the greatest theoreticians took place in Kasparov-Nunn, Revkiavik 1988: 7 \(\text{Q} e3 \) \(\text{h6} \) 8 0-0 \(\text{Q} \) g4 9 \(\text{Q} \) c1 \(\text{Q} \) c6 10 d5 De7 11 Dd2 f5 12 D×g4 fg 13 b4 b6 14 2b3 g5 15 a4 2g6 16 a5 2d7 17 c5 bc 18 bc a6 19 2d2 2f4 20 国b1? (As Nunn points out, 20 c6! would have given Kasparov a significant advantage.) 20 ... dc 21 且a3 目f7 22 包c4 皆f6 23 且×c5 且f8 且e6 27 包d5 且×d5 28 ed cd 29 目b6 單d7 30 罩×a6 營g6 31 罩e1 包d3 32 ②×e5 ②×e5 33 □×e5 曾f6 34 □e2 耳e7 35 耳c6 耳×e2 36 對×e2 對a1+ 37 營f1 營×a5 38 萬×d6 萬e8 39 萬e6 三×e6 40 de 營e5 41 營c1 營g7 ½-½.

Yusupov played 7 d5 against Kasparov at the Barcelona World Cup 1989. After 7 ... a5 8 \(\text{\textsq} \)g5 h6 9 ♣h4 ᡚa6 10 ᡚd2 ₩e8 11 0-0 ②h7 12 a3 △d7 13 b3 Kasparov introduced 13 ... f5!? instead of the more normal 13 ... h5. Kasparov achieved plenty of play after 14 ef gf 15 Ah5 營c8 16 Ae7 耳e8 17 £xe8 \\ \text{\ti}\text{\tex{ 營h5 20 Qg3 三e8 21 Qf4 營g4 22 g3 Yusupov should have played 23 $\triangle \times g5$ hg 24 f3 ef 25 $\triangle \times f3$ f4 26 ₩g6 with an unclear game, but Kasparov later blundered away his position and lost.

> 7 €)c6 8 d5 **②e7** 9 €)d2 **a**5 10 a3!

Improving on 10 b3 c5 11 a3 ②e8 12 罩b1 f5 13 b4 ab 14 ab b6 15

₩b3 &16 with equality in Karpov-Kasparov, (m/17) Seville 1987. After 16 Ad3 Ah6 17 Ab2 Tal suggests 17 ... f4! instead of 17 ... 罩a1.


> €)d7 10 ...

10 ... c5 11 \Ab1 is better for White, as is 10 ... △d7 11 🗒 a2 ⑤e8 12 b4 f5 13 c5 ab 14 ab 呂×a2 15 ♠×a2. Salov-Khalifman, USSR Ch. 1988.

> 罩b1 f5 11 \$\h8! 12 **b4**

This frees the g8-square for the De7. 12 ... b6 13 f3 f4 14 Da4 was seen in the complicated game Kasparov-Smirin, USSR Ch. 1988, but Kasparov and Nikitin point out that after the simple 14 \Db3!? ab 15 ab g5 16 c5 White would stand better. Of course such positions are embraced by Kasparov for their strategical and tactical richness, and even if an objective advantage cannot be obtained, the complex nature of the middlegame favours his style. So in what follows, we find him on the Black side of the same line!

13 f3 (153)



13 \(\text{\text{\text{d}}}\)c2 b6 14 \(\text{\text{\text{b}}}\)b3 ab 15 ab fe!?

(15 ... Ah6 also comes into consideration.) 16 ∮xe4 ∮f6 17 ⊈d3 ②×e4 18 ②×e4 ②f5 19 皆d3 皆h4 provided Black with good counterplay in Gavrikov-Kasparov, USSR Ch. 1988.

> 13 ... **2** g8!

A fantastic conception on the part of the World Champion. 13 ... **△h6 14 分b3 △×c1 15 △×c1 ab 16** ab \$\int_0 f6 17 c5 g5 is considered to provide Black with adequate counterplay, for example 18 2d2?! f4 19 5b5 g4! 20 fg \(\mathbb{G}\)g8 21 \(\mathbb{G}\)f3 ②×g4 22 \$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\}\$}}\exittt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\exitit{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\ 国g1 包g3+!! 25 hg fg 26 国g2 包g6 and Black won quickly in Lukov-Sznapik, Tbilisi 1988. But perhaps Sznapik's suggested 18 \begin{aligned} \text{\$\exiting{\$\text{\$\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}\exititt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\tex{\$\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\}}}\exittt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\e convincing to Kasparov in home analysis. We follow Karpov-Kasparov, Skelleftea World Cup 1989.

14	ᡚb3	ab
15	ab	€)df6
16	∯ d2	€)h5

Already White's position is near collapse.


17 g3

17 c5 ②f4 18 ②c4 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{g}}5!}} 19 \) g3 ②h3+ 20 當g2 f4 gives Black a strong attack.

17	•••	Ðhf6
18	萬12	Ðh6
19	≅a1	Ä×a∃
20	₩×a1	ହାମ!
21	營c1	f4!
22	σA	

If 22 gf ef 23 $\triangle \times f4$, then Black is still on the warpath after 23 ... \$\Delta\$h5. 22 ... h5

23 h3 6)h7! Дe1 24 **∆**f6 **₽**22 25 **₽27** ΠĦ 26 2hg5 国h1 (154)



27 ②×h3!! ••• **ᡚg5**

Black has sacrificed the piece for a single pawn, but he has a very strong attack.

29 耳h2

The point is that after 29 Ahl hg 30 fg f3+! 31 $\triangle \times$ f3 $\triangle \times$ f3 32 營h6+ 當f7 33 當×f3 呂h8 Black is winning.

White is willing to return the material, but 31 \(\mathbb{\operator}\) ×h8 \(\mathbb{\operator}\) was hopeless. His real problem is that his pieces are disorganized.

31	***	ß+
32	£×ß	•£xß
33	&×f6+	骨×f6
34	¤×h8	\$ ×h8
35	∰ g3	

And now instead of 35 ... g5?. Kasparov should have played 35 ... **\$g7!**, for example:


(a) 36 包e2 曾h4+! 37 當xf3 £xg4+ 38 \$e3 \$\text{\ti}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tin} **公**×b3:

(b) 36 ge3 ad4! 37 ad2 g5 38 ②e2 \(\frac{1}{2} \)f4+! or simply 37 ... \(\Delta \)c2.

Now let's take a look at Kasparov on both sides of the Sämisch: 1 d4 \$\alpha \text{f6 2 c4 g6 3 }\alpha \text{c3} Ag7 4 e4 d6 5 f3 0-0

Before proceeding further, we take note that the sacrificial idea to be seen below has its origins in Spassky-Bronstein, Amsterdam 1956: 5 ... e5 6 d5? (6 \(\)ge2!?) 6 ... 2h5 7 Qe3 2a6 8 쌀d2 쌀h4+ 9 g3 ②×g3 10 營f2 ②×f1 11 營×h4 ②×e3 b3 Da3 14 Dge2 Dc5 with good counterplay for Black.

£e3 e5 6 d5 (155)



7 €h5!?

As Black in Timman-Kasparov, Reykjavik 1988, the World Champion chose 7 ... c6 8 \(\text{\texts} \) d3 b5 9 cb (9 2 ge2 gives White a slight advantage, according to ECO) 9 ... cd 10 ed (Here, too, 10 Dge2!? is probably best.) 10 ... e4! Kasparov is in his element and introduces a fine new move. The methodical pawn sacrifice frees his long diagonal and the e5-square.) 11 ②×e4 ②×d5 12 Qg5 營a5+ 13 營d2 $\forall \times d2 + 14 \quad \triangle \times d2 \quad \triangle \times b2 \quad \text{with a}$ good game. Play continued 15 且b1 **Qg**7 16 **Qe2 Qd7** 17 **Q**×d6?! 2c5 18 2c2 2e6 (Black has full compensation here.) 19 包e4 里ac8 20 0-0 2xe4 21 2xe4 f5 22 2d3 到b6 23 到c1 買fd8 24 具g5 買d7 25 且el 當f7 26 且e2 h6 27 且h4 幻d5 28 $\triangle d1$ $\triangle d4+$ 29 $\triangle f2$ $\triangle \times f2+$ 30 當×f2 包c3 31 **Qb3 Q×b3 32 E×b3** ②d1+ 33 萬×d1 萬×d1 34 ②d3 罝d2+35 當e3 罝×g2 36 罝a3 罝e8+ 37 當d4 單e7 38 ⑤e5+ 當f6 39 ⑤c6 耳d7+40 當c4 耳c2+41 當b4 耳×h2 42 \(\mathreag{\mathreag}\) a6 \(\mathreag{\mathreag}\) a7 a4 h5 44 \(\mathreag{\mathreag}\) xa7 買×a7 45 ⑤×a7 0-1.

Gheorghiu-Kasparov, Thessaloniki Ol. 1988, varied with 8 \dd2 cd 9 cd 2bd7 10 2ge2 a6 11 2c1?! ②h5 △d3 (a novelty) 12 ... f5 13 ②1e2 ②df6 13 ef gf 15 ②g3 and the same theme re-emerged: 15 ... e4! 16 2×h5 2xh5 17 fe f4 18 2 f2 2 g4 19 h3! 单d7 20 0-0-0 单e5 21 當b1 ₩f6 22 Дe2 Дg3 23 Д×g3 (23 Zhel would have maintained the balance.) 23 ... fg 24 \(\(\mathbb{Q} \)f3 \(\mathbb{Z} \) ac8 25 ②e2 and here with 25 ... 罩c5! Black would have had a clear advantage.

itage	·•	
8	₩d2	₩h4+
9	⊈f2	₩f4
10	⊈e3	₩h4+
11	g3	த்×g3
12	₩12	ᡚ×¶
13	₩×h4	ව×e3
14	⊉e2	وَ×c4

	15 16 17 18	블c1 신d1 신e3 신h3	©a6 ©b6 ⊈d7 f6
156 W	Ĭ		夏魯
"	I I		
		Î	
		<u> </u>	
			I

This is the critical position. According to theory, White stands better.

19 \$\frac{1}{2}

19 闰hg1 闰ad8 20 b3 c6 21 dc bc? 22 幻f5! gf 23 耳×g7+! is well known from Karpov-Velimirovic, Skopie 1976. But better is 21 ... △×c6!, where Black can follow up with ... d6-d5.

19	•••	ᡚc8
20	∄d3	
21	∄hc1	∄ac8
22	₿b3	≌b8
23	ᡚd3	

Here, in Kasparov-Seirawan, Barcelona World Cup 1989, White had a clear advantage. After 23 ... 囯f7 24 曾e1 ②c8 25 曾a5 ②b6 26 □×c7! f5 he misplayed with 27 Ξ c2? fe 28 fe Ξ bf8 29 Ξ ×b6 and a draw was agreed, although there was the possible continuation 29 ... ab 30 營×b6 总h6! 31 營×d6 耳f3 32 尚×d7? □×e3+ 33 曾d2 ⑤b4! winning for Black. Instead,

Kasparov should have played 27 国cl fe 28 fe 国bf8 29 国gl with a clear advantage, for example 29 ... 鱼h6 30 闰×b6! 鱼×e3 31 當×e3 耳f3+ 32 當e2 ab 33 營×b6, where Black lacks sufficient compensation for the material.

Kasparov started off in the fashion of the Modern Defence in Ljubojevic-Kasparov, Thessaloniki O1. 1988: 1 c4 g6 2 2 c3 2 g7 3 g3 d6 4 d4 c5 5 \triangle e3 cd 6 \triangle ×d4 but transferred to a more normal King's Indian with 6 ... \$\square\$16 7 \$\square\$d5 4bd7 8 4f3 0-0 9 Ag2 e5 and the game continued 10 \(\omega\)c3 \(\omega\)×d5 11 cd 公c5 12 0-0 Qd7 13 公d2 耳c8 14 耳c1 f5 15 包c4 Qb5 16 包a3 Qe8 17 世d2 耳f7 18 ♣b4 囯fc7 19 囯c2 幻a6 20 点c3 e4 21 点×g7 含×g7 22 目fc1 Qf7 23 g4 fg 24 Q×e4 \frac{1}{2}66 25 \sqrt{2}b5 耳×c2 26 耳×c2 耳×c2 27 對×c2 幻c5 28 b4 ②×e4 29 營×e4 h5 30 a3 g5 31 20d4 a6 32 20e6+ \$\disphe h6 33 \$\dispe g2 \textit{\$\textit{Q}}\def{g6}\$ 34 쌀e3 쌀f5 35 쌀d4 쌀e4+ 36 當g1 ₩×d4 37 ∅×d4 Qe4 38 f3 gf 39 ef △b1 40 ⇔f2 ⇔g6 41 b5 △a2 42 ba ba 43 包c6 當f5 44 包b4 总c4 45 當e3 a5 46 2c6 2×d5 47 2d4+ 2e5 48 ରe2 ଛମ୍ପ 49 ରହା ଛପ 50 ର h3 ଓ୍ରୀ 51 包f2 d5 0-1

Oueen's Indian

Kasparov-Ehlvest, Belfort 1988: 1 d4 \$\infty f6 2 c4 e6 3 \$\infty f3 b6 4 a3 \$\infty b7\$ 5 公c3 d5 6 ed axd5 7 쌀c2 axc3 8 bc \(\text{\textit{Q}} e7 \) e3 \(\text{\tint{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\ti}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\tin} 鱼b5+ 勾c6 12 0-0 0-0 13 鱼d3 當h8 14 龄e2 龄c7 15 莒ad1 莒ad8 16 e4 2a5 17 Efel Qf6 18 e5 Qe7 19 €)d2 cd 20 cd \(\Omega\)d5 21 \(\Omega\)e4 f5 22 ef

②×f6 23 ⑤×f6 莒×f6 24 Qc1 闰df8 25 f3 \triangle c6 26 \triangle e4 \triangle × e4 27 fe e5 28 d5 幻d4 29 皆d3 皆f7 30 Qb2 幻f3+ 宫f2 34 宫g1 營h6 1/2-1/2.

Queen's Gambit

Probably the big news here is the addition of the Exchange Variation to the repertoire as White. The attacking play characteristic of his style flows naturally in the middlegames which arise from this venerable line. It should come as no surprise that he prefers to keep the play to the kingside rather than go after the minority attack on the queenside. We ought to point out that this approach to the Exchange Variation was successfully employed by Botvinnik back in the 1950s and 60s, especially in his well known games against Pilnik (Budapest 1952), Keres (USSR Ch. 1959) and Larsen (Nordwijk 1965). The Keres game is particularly close to Kasparov's spirited play. In the examples below. Kasparov displays a great deal of flexibility in his approach to the positions, attacking wherever circumstances permit, on the queenside, in the centre, or on the kingside.

1	d4	d5
2	c4	e6
3	Dc3	ᡚf6
4	\$ 05	

Kasparov has also played (by transposition) the quiet system with 4 \(\Delta f3 \) and an early \(\Delta c1 - f4: \)

Kasparov-Eingorn, USSR Ch. 1988: 1 2f3 2f6 2 c4 e6 3 2c3 d5 4 d4 ②bd7 5 cd ed 6 ②f4 ⑤b6 7 \(\text{\text{\$\tex{\$\text{\$\}\exitt{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$ 8 e3 总f5 9 总d3 总×d3 10 徵×d3 c6 11 0-0 Qg7 12 b4 0-0 13 b5 罩e8 14 bc bc 15 Qg5 曾d6 16 包d2 包fd7 17 a4 \end{added}e6 18 \(\textit{\$\texti $6e2 \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2}$

But he was more successful in Kasparov-Short, Thessaloniki Ol. 1988: 1 c4 e6 2 ②c3 d5 3 d4 ♠e7 4 cd ed 5 \(\tilde{Q}\)f4 c6 6 \(\tilde{Q}\)c2 g6 7 e3 \(\tilde{Q}\)f5 (a novelty) 10 ... cd 11 ed a6 12 g4! ②e6 13 ②ge2 ②bd7?! 14 △g2 ②b6 15 b3 耳c8 16 0-0 耳c6 17 h3!, where White already held a clear advantage. After 17 ... 2fd7 18 최d1 트g8? 19 회f2 f5? Black could not recover: 20 \(\mathbb{A}\) ae1 g5 21 gf \(\mathbb{A}\) f7 22 2g4 Ah5 23 2g3! 1-0.

Of course the World Champion has not entirely abandoned the non-Exchange systems: Kasparov-Timman, Amsterdam 1988 1 d4 \$\f6 2 c4 e6 3 \$\fambda f3 d5 4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e7 5 Qg5 h6 6 Q×f6 Q×f6 7 \begin{aligned} \text{\$\text{\$\text{\$}}\$} \text{\$\text{\$\$}\$} \text{ 0-09 国d1 曾b6 10 曾c2 dc 11 Q×c4 c5 12 2e4 2e7 13 dc 2xc5 14 0-0 Qe7 15 Qe2 Qd7 16 包e5 国c8 17 쌀d3 요e8 18 &c4 쌀c7 19 &ed6 耳d8 20 公×e8 耳×e8 21 单f3 耳d8 22 對b3 包c6 23 g3 且f6 24 當g2 耳ab8 25 耳×d8+ 耳×d8 ½-½.


Black was not so quick to commit himself in Kasparov-Smyslov, USSR Ch. 1988, and was rewarded with an early declaration of peace: 6 ... c6 7 ᡚf3 ᡚbd7 8 \cdot\cdot c2 ②h59 Q×e7 份×e7 10 0-0-0 ②b6 11 h3 g6 12 g4 2g7 13 2d3 2e6 14 包e2 0-0-0 15 包f4 當b8 16 且e2 包e8 17 2d2 2d6 18 h4 2c8 19 2b3 €e4 20 £f3 f5 ½-½.

The most aggressive continuation.

In Kasparov-Andersson, Belfort 1988. White castled kingside: after 9 ... c6 10 0-0 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ f8 11 f3! (improving on Botvinnik's 11 罩b1.) 11 ... Qe6 12 月ael 月c8 13 當hl 幻6d7 14 鱼×e7 耳×e7 15 包f4 耳c7 16 營f2 ②f6 17 e4 de 18 fe ☐cd7 19 d5 cd 20 Qb5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c7 21 ed \(\mathbb{Q}\)d7 22 \(\mathbb{Q}\)e2 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c8 23 ≝×a7 b6 24 ≌a6 ᡚe4 25 d6 ⑤×d6 26 ⑤fd5 莒e5 27 營×b6 ⑤f5 28 對×d8 耳×d8 29 且d3 耳×e1 30 耳×el 包g6 31 a4 包d4 32 a5 當f8 33 ②×g6 hg 34 ∃d1 ②e6 35 ②b6 △c6 36 耳×d8+ 氫×d8 37 b4 ⑤e6 38 b5 1-0

11 ... 呂c8!? would have been wiser. With the kings on opposite wings time is of the essence, and the attacks must be launched without delay.

Again, as in the Andersson game, this move is the prelude to



a strong attack.

14	***	c5
15	g4	cd

As Kasparov notes, 15 ... c4 16 Qf1 \(\text{\ti}\text{\texi}\text{\tex{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\tint{\text{\ti}\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\tex crushing game.

ed	₩d6
省d2	a 6
②ce2	∄e7
ᡚg3	ᡚg6
∮]g2!	包d7
∄hg1	∃ee8
且df1!!	
	₩d2 ᡚce2 ᡚg3 ᡚg2! ৣ hg1

And now Black's position was very shaky. After 22 ... 2gf8 23 এe3 &h8 24 @h5! g6 25 f4! gh 26 f4 h4 27 fe fe 28 g5 且e7 29 包g4 且g7 30 包h6 曾b6 31 g6 hg 32 包f7+ 曾g8 33 營h6! 且h7 34 且×g6+ 包×g6 35 對×g6+ 且g7 36 對h6 1-0 in Kasparov-Campora, Thessaloniki Ol. 1988.

Tolush-Geller Gambit

We have a rare example of Kasparov playing against a nonhuman opponent in Kasparov-Computer, Rotterdam simul, 1987: 1 2f3 c6 2 c4 2f6 3 2c3 d5 4 d4 dc

5 e4 b5 6 e5 2 d5 7 a4 e6 8 2 25 2 b4 9 \delta h5 \delta e7 10 \overline{D} d2 h6 11 \overline{D} ge4 Qa6 12 Qe2 0-0 13 0-0 ☐d8 14 ab cb 15 🚨×h6 gh 16 €1×d5 ed 17 到f6+ 當g7 18 f4 皆b7 19 耳f3 皆c6 20 f5 目h8 21 目af1 且d2 22 e6 目f8 23 包g4 曾b6 24 f6+ 曾h7 25 e7 營×d4+26 當h1 公c6 27 買h3 營×b2 28 (5)×h6 1-0

Other recent games of interest

Nimzoindian

In the Nimzoindian, Kasparov has not escaped the lure of the popular 4 營c2, which has proven such an effective weapon in the hands of his arch-rival Karpov. Kasparov-Sax, Reykjavik 1988, saw 1 d4 2f6 2 c4 e6 3 包c3 Qb4 4 曾c2 0-0 5 a3 ᡚbd7 9 e3 ፭e8 10 ᡚh3 h6 11 ቧh4 c6 12 cd ed 13 Af2 c5 14 Af4 cd 15 徵×d4 徵a5+ 16 b4 徵b6 17 徵d2 a5 18 b5 包c5 19 国d1 包b3 20 曾b2 a4 21 Qe2 營a5+ 22 營f1 Qd7 23 Qh4 d4 24 \(\textit{\Omega} \times f6 \) gf 25 ed \(\textit{\Omega} \times b5 26 \) \(\textit{\Omega} f2 \) 29 目hdl 目ae8 30 包g3 f5 31 當f1 營h4 32 d5 公c5 33 耳d4 營×h2 34 d6 莒e3 35 當f2 莒×f3+ 36 當×f3 罝e3+37當×e3 營×g3+38當d2 1-0

French

One doesn't find Kasparov on either side of the French Defence very often, so the following game is of interest: Kasparov-Kharitonov, USSR Ch. 1988: 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 2d2 c5 4 2gf3 2f6 5 ed ed 6 $\triangle b5+$ $\triangle d7$ 7 $\triangle \times d7+$

Torre Attack

How does the World Champion handle the Torre Attack? A clear example was provided in Torre-Kasparov, Thessaloniki Ol. 1988:

1 d4 \$\overline{0}\$ f6 2 \$\overline{0}\$ f3 g6 3 \$\overline{0}\$ g5 \$\overline{0}\$ g7 4 c3 d5 5 2bd2 2bd7 6 e3 0-0 7 b4 c6 8 Qe2 Ee8 9 0-0 e5 10 a4 h6 11 ♣h4 a5 12 b5 c5 13 de ♠×e5 14 ②×e5 旦×e5 15 Q×f6 Q×f6 16 旦c1 b6 17 **Qg4 Qb7** 18 **Qf3 @e7** 19 c4 耳d8 20 台c2 d4 21 总×b7 台×b7 22 ed 莒×d4 23 莒cel 莒×el 24 莒×el 발d7 25 包fl h5 26 g3 h4 27 包e3 쌀e6 28 쌀e2 딜e4 29 gh 요c3 30 且dl 且×h4 31 曾f3 且d4 32 包g2 国h3 33 皆d5 皆f6 34 包e3 目f3 35 當h1 莒×f2 36 包g4 曾f3+ 37 曾×f3 買×f3 38 囯e1 囯a3 39 囯e8+ 當g7 40 買b8 買×a4 41 買×b6 買×c4 42 買a6 耳b4 0-1