

Mastering the French

Neil McDonald and Andrew Harley

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© Neil McDonald and Andrew Harley

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For Jean and Noah

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Symbols

+	Check
++	Double Check
#	Mate
!	Good move
!!	Excellent move
?	Bad move
??	Blunder
!?	Interesting move
?!	Dubious move
+-	Winning advantage for White
±	Clear advantage for White
<u>±</u>	Slight advantage for White
<u></u>	Level position
∞	Unclear position
7	Slight advantage for Black
Ŧ	Clear advantage for Black
-+	Winning advantage for Black
1-0	White wins
0-1	Black wins
1/2-1/2	Draw
Ch	Championship
tt	Team tournament
OL	Olympiad
Z	Zonal
IZ	Interzonal
Ct	Candidates event
Cht	Team championship
Echt	European team championship
Wcht	World team championship
jr	Junior event
wom	Women's event
rpd	Rapid game
corr.	Postal game
(n)	nth match game
(D)	Diagram follows

Preface

To master a chess opening, it is essential to grasp the underlying strategic and tactical ideas. Questions of a strategic nature range from the general 'On which side should I castle?' or 'Where should I attack?' to more specific problems such as 'Should I exchange the dark-squared bishops here?' or 'Do I meet the threat to the kingside with g3 or h3?'

We believe that tactical ideas are best understood in the context of the overall strategic plans. Thus in the final strategic question mentioned above, whether the correct decision is to play g3 or h3 can depend on the tactical ideas that thereby result. The highest quality in a chess player is his overall 'sight' of the board. A master with his instant judgement of a position doesn't sift out tactical and strategic themes. Therefore, we have not sought to do so either.


It is also vital to have a detailed knowledge of some concrete opening variations. Players with considerable natural talent are frequently beaten by opponents armed to the teeth with detailed opening preparation. Unless the deluge of theory is stemmed by Fischer's suggestion that pieces be shuffled at the start of a game, it will always be necessary for the serious player to combine his knowledge of strategic and tactical themes with some memorising of opening variations.

As far as is possible within the nature of this work, we have attempted to give the latest theoretical verdicts. However, we do not expect the theory of the French Defence to come to an abrupt end with the publication of Mastering the French. Our opening will continue to be played in tournaments. New ideas will be introduced. moves which at the moment seem promising will be discarded as 'unsound' and old and rejected variations may be brought back to life. No one can predict how theory will develop. We hope to be able to reveal the basic principles behind the French Defence and describe the state of theory at the time of writing, but we are not gifted with prescience! Therefore, we advise you to keep up to date with theory as revealed in publications such as Informator. But we do hope that when you meet an unexpected move, be it a theoretical novelty or just a move that is a novelty to you, your study of this book will help you to work out a good reply.

> Neil McDonald Andrew Harley

Introduction

The material in this book is not classified according to the traditional subdivision of variations but on the basis of central pawn structures. After the defining initial moves of the French Defence, 1 e4 e6, play normally continues 2 d4 d5 (other possibilities are briefly considered in Chapter 10).




Three main types of centre can then arise. Firstly, White can advance with e4-e5, when Black usually responds with ...c7-c5. This type of centre is analysed in the first six chapters, while lines where Black defers ...c7-c5 are looked at in Chapter 10. Secondly, White can preserve the tension and allow Black to play ...d5xe4. The type of centre reached after this exchange is looked at in Chapter 7. Finally, White can exchange pawns on d5. This type of

centre is analysed in Chapters 8 and 9. In more detail, the chapters are divided as follows:


Chapter 1


White plays e4-e5. Black responds with ...c7-c5 and White then secures his d-pawn with c2-c3. We term this the 'Advance centre'.



Chapter 2


A refinement of Chapter 1, looking in detail at the positions that arise after Black exchanges pawns on d4 and then attacks the central pawn chain with ...f6, and after exf6, recaptures on f6 with a piece (see diagram overleaf). We then reach a situation where White has a weakness on d4 and Black a weakness on e6.





Chapter 3

Another refinement of Chapter 1, looking in detail at positions that arise after White plays an early f2-f4, securing his central pawn chain:




Chapter 4

After e4-e5 and ...c7-c5, White may choose not to (or may be unable to) support the d4-pawn with c2-c3, and either exchanges on c5 or allows an exchange on d4. We term the resultant structure the 'Classical centre' (see following diagram).


Chapter 5

After 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 &b4 4 e5 c5 5 a3 2xc3+6 bxc3, the distinctive 'Winawer centre' is reached, characterised by White's doubled cpawns:




Chapter 6

Following on from Chapter 5, exchanging the dark-squared bishop weakens the kingside and can enable White to play 幽g4, 幽xg7 and (after ... Zh8-g8) 豐xh7. Black in turn normally gets to play ...c5xd4 and ...d4xc3, reaching the following typical structure, which we term the 'Poisoned pawn centre':




Chapter 7

White allows Black to play ...d5xe4 (or alternatively plays e4xd5 and Black recaptures with a piece). We term this the 'Rubinstein centre'.




Chapter 8

White plays e4xd5 and Black responds ...e6xd5. We term this the 'Exchange centre'.



Chapter 9


A refinement of Chapter 8, looking in detail at the positions that arise after Black plays ...c5 and exchanges the c5-pawn for the d4-pawn, leaving an isolated queen's pawn on d5. We term this the 'IQP centre'.



Chapter 10

An assortment of centres that don't fit elsewhere, especially those lines where Black does not respond to e4-e5 with an immediate ...c7-c5, and those lines without an early d2-d4.

1 Advance Centre




General observations

After the moves 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 White can immediately establish a cramping pawn chain with 3 e5. This is the Advance Variation. The pawns on d4 and e5 give White a substantial space advantage, which basically means his pieces have more freedom of action than Black's. Therefore, if White succeeds in developing his pieces to good squares then he will have most of the dynamic chances in the coming middlegame. For example, he could begin an attack on the black kingside with a well-planned pawn advance.

So Black seeks to put maximum pressure on White's centre, trying in the first instance to dismantle it with blows from the flanks. (In this chapter we examine the positions after Black's 'blow' ...c5 and White's reply

c3.) If he proves successful and White's centre is demolished, then Black's pieces will spring to life with tremendous force. However, against a good player Black doesn't really expect his plan to enjoy such complete success. Instead he is satisfied if in order to maintain his pawn centre White is obliged to contort his queenside pieces in an unnatural manner and perhaps even give up castling. A rather tortuous development of the white queenside pieces will negate the benefits of a space advantage. Or so Black hopes! Let's look at what normally happens in practice. Here is a run-down of typical attacking and defensive moves.

The battle for d4




Black can attack d4 directly by bringing his knights to c6 and f5 and

his queen to b6. White can defend d4 directly in a number of ways. The queen, on d1, and king's knight on f3, always figure in the defence. Then White can play 23-c2 and/or bring the queen's bishop to the defence by \$\delta e3\$, \$\delta d2-c3\$ or (after b3 or a3 and b4) \$\delta b2\$.


A few comments about \$\omega\$e3. It is of course only possible if Black cannot play ... \$\omega\$b6xb2, and either has to be preceded by a3 and b4 or quickly followed by \$\omega\$d2. It would be inconsistent to play b3 and \$\omega\$e3 as the a5-e1 and a3-c1 diagonals would then be weak. White does not especially fear ... \$\omega\$xe3 as after fxe3, the d4-pawn is secure and the f-file open.

©c3-e2 makes sense in similar positions (in other chapters), but in the Advance Variation, White rarely has time for such a manoeuvre, as Black gets to attack d4 so quickly. White would first have to play £d3 to develop his bishop, and this leaves d4 unprotected by the queen.

White can defend d4 by tactical means, for example:




Here White does not fear ... ②fxd4 due to ②fxd4 ②xd4, ②xd4 ③xd4 ⑤xd4, ②xd4 ⑥xd4, ②b5+ winning the queen – a standard beginner's trap. But after ... ②d7, defending against that tactic, White could try the more subtle 0-0 (or ⑤f1!?). Then if ... ②fxd4 White responds ②fxd4 ②xd4, ②e3 ②c5, b4! winning a piece.



White can also defend d4 indirectly by eliminating attackers or potential attackers, in particular the knight on (or coming to) f5:

White plays &xh6


By playing bishop takes h6-knight, White weakens Black's kingside and only at the cost of his 'bad' bishop. What could be wrong with that? Well, first, White has to be sure that Black cannot get away with the zwischenzug ... \subseteq xb2; in some variations, White can retreat the bishop and trap the black queen on a1, but in others, White just finds himself an exchange and a pawn down for nothing.



Secondly, Black's kingside is not all that weak and ...gxh6 even frees the g7-square for his bishop to exert more pressure on d4 after a later ... f6. The manoeuvre ... \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}g8-g4 is also possible for the brave-hearted.


White plays &xf5

White can also capture the f5-knight, usually with a bishop on d3. After **≜**xf5 exf5, **√**2c3 **≜**e6, a blocked position is reached in which White probably has a slight advantage, as Black's e6-bishop is acting as little more than a giant pawn:



However, White has to watch out for the freeing pawn sacrifice ... f4 or a sudden black attack with ... \(\hat{\omega}\)e7 and ...g5, utilising his kingside pawn majority.

White plays g4




When is a pawn advance such as g4 space gaining and attacking, and when weakening? That is up to the judgement of the player. White is happiest when he can quickly follow up with f4 (after 2el or 2h4). Black can respond to g4 with ... 包fe7 (satisfied at creating a weakness and maybe later to continue with ...h5!?), ... 2h4 (exchanging a defender of d4) or ... 42h6 (immediately confronting the rogue pawn).

Black plays ... £xa3


Similarly, Black can attack d4 indirectly by eliminating defenders or potential defenders, for example by ...**\D**xa3 (D):

Black weakens White's pawn structure (and if White had already played



全3, could win a pawn immediately by ... ¥a5+) but at the cost of his good dark-squared bishop.

Black plays ... 4 b4




Black plays ... Db4 threatening by ... Dxc2 to remove two crucial defenders of d4. White can choose to play De3 Dxe3, fxe3 but not 2xe3 as Black can respond with ... Dc6 (threatening ... Wxb2) followed by ... 2b4(+). If White responds Dxb4 then ... 2xb4+ forces White to play 2f1 as 2d2 loses the d-pawn. White need not worry too much about this

as he can manually castle by playing g3 (or g4) and \(\delta\)g2. White gains some tactical benefits from having his king on a square where it can't be checked by a knight on d4 (as seen above under 'the battle for d4'), but has to beware of a lightning attack down the f-file.

Black plays ... f6

The reader should note the value of ...f6 for Black in almost every variation.




After playing ...f6, Black can seek to eliminate the f3-knight either with his queenside bishop (after ... 2d7-e8-h5) or by sacrificing the exchange after exf6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf6 and ...\(\mathbb{Z}\)xf3.

Should White answer ...f6 with exf6, then Black has succeeded in reducing White's space advantage. Normally Black will choose to recapture with a piece, thus opening the way for further pressure down the f-file (e.g. after exf6 2xf6) and on White's d-pawn (e.g. after exf6 2xf6). This type of pawn structure

(after the exchange of pawns on d4) is looked at in detail in the next chapter.


However, in an endgame (or in the middlegame when the centre is blocked, and especially when the cfile is closed, so that Black can safely castle queenside), it may be possible for Black to recapture ...gxf6 and, under favourable circumstances, continue with ...e5, conquering the centre with his pawns.



Finally, instead of playing exf6, White can allow Black to play ...fxe5. If pawns have already been exchanged on d4, then White's recapture dxe5 eliminates the weak d-pawn and gains the important d4square (e.g. after b4-b5 and 2f3-d4). In return, Black can concentrate pressure on the not so weak pawn on e5, and hope to make use of the halfopen f-file and the passed d5-pawn.


White plays a3

White sometimes plays a3 with the intention of a later b4. This clears b2




so that \(\mathbb{L}\) b2 is possible, adding a defender to d4. Moreover, it also rules out ... ♠b4+ and ... ②a5. Thus Black is deprived of space on the queenside.

White usually combines a3 and b4 with the manoeuvre 2b1-c3-a4c5 (on the way often chasing away an attacker of d4, the black queen on b6). A white knight at c5 can be very intimidating for Black, especially if Black has played ...a6 (e.g. to stop b4-b5) when ...b6 is not a serious option, and especially after ... f6 when the e6-pawn is vulnerable.




So if there has not yet been an exchange of pawns on d4, Black often replies to a3 with ...c4. This gives up all pressure on d4, but on the other hand it stops b4. Black's plan is to keep the position blocked. In particular he wants to prevent or make ineffective any white breakthrough on the queenside with b3. For example he puts his queen's knight on a5 and plays his king's knight from g8 via c8 to b6 and then plays ...\$\alpha\$a4.




Alternatively the black queen can go to c6 and then a4 or even to h7 via g8, to act in combination with a bishop on a4. Typically, Black castles queenside in this line. White's plan is to try to force through b3, or else to stage a breakthrough on the kingside while Black's pieces are preoccupied with preventing this move.

Black's queenside play

Black generally has more pieces on the queenside and forces White to defend b2 and d4 in particular. Black often uses that pressure to try to



swap his 'bad' light-squared bishop for White's 'good' one by playing ... 2a5 and then ... b5 supported, of course, by a queen on b6. The a5-knight is also ready to leap to c4 with support from a rook on c8.



White of course doesn't make things so easy, but even if he has succeeded in gaining space with a3 and b4, Black can still aim for the c4-square by the more convoluted manoeuvre ...a5, b5 2a7, a4 2c8, and then ... 2b6 and ... 2c4. Note that Black has to free the squares c8 and b6 to make this manoeuvre effective.

White's a4 also leaves the b4-square free for Black's bishop.

The move ...a5 can be useful even if White hasn't moved any queenside pawns, as it enables Black to play a piece to b4 and plan to recapture with the a-pawn opening the a-file onto the a2-pawn; if White responds a3 or b3, then ...a4 could be good.

Illustrative games

Game 1 Sieiro-Gonzalez – M.Gurevich

Hayana 1986 Advance Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	e5	c 5
4	c 3	②c6
5	2)f3	

Kupreichik's move 5 \(\)e3!? need not cause Black too many worries, e.g. 5... 包h6! 6 &d3 Yb6 7 Yd2 包g4 8 2f3 2xe3 9 fxe3 2d7 10 0-0 c4 11 \(\mathbb{e} \)e2 0-0 12 \(\mathbb{e} \)h1 f6 13 \(\alpha \)f6 = Shaked-J.Watson, USA 1996.

The most fashionable move-order. The 'main line' 5... \$ d7 and the classical 5... 對b6 will be examined in later games. Note that an immediate 5...f6 is well answered by 6 & b5! taking control of the e5-square. Finally, Sveshnikov has shown that 5... 4 h6!?, aiming to force White to play 6 2d3 rather than 6 2a3, can be well met by 6 dxc5.

6 9 a3

Against this move-order, White can choose to play 6 2d3 cxd4 7 cxd4 2f5 8 2xf5 exf5 reaching a blocked position that is not particularly pleasant for Black. Two possible continuations are 9 ②c3 \$b4!? 10 &d2 &xc3 11 &xc3 &e6 12 營d2 a5! = Sveshnikov-Chernin, Sochi 1986, and 9 0-0 \(\)e7 10 \(\)c3 \(\)e6 11 ②e1 (11 ②e2 g5!) 11... 對b6 12 ②e2 0-0 13 \$\disph1 \disph8 14 ②d3 \pm Thipsay-Gdanski, Manila OL 1992.


6	•••	cxd4
7	cxd4	包f5
8	②c2	⊈d7
9	҈е2	②b4

9... **岁**b6 and 9... **岁**a5+ will be discussed in Games 2 and 3.

10 (7)xb4

In the game Sveshnikov-Dreev, St Petersburg 1993, White tried 100-0 and gained a crushing advantage after some eccentric play by Black: 10... ②xc2 11 營xc2 h5?! (played with the idea of solidifying the knight on f5 by ruling out g4; however, this move is rarely good in the French Advance because it seriously weakens the kingside, particularly the g5square, which means Black's king won't find a safe haven; at Biel 1995 against Campora, Dreev played the improvement 11... 對b6 12 對d3 單c8 13 Id1 h6!? 14 h4 a6 15 a4 兔b4 and went on to win) 12 2d2 2e7 (12... **對**b6 13 **&**c3 **&**b5 is only **±**) 13 单d3! 響b6?! (13...罩c8 is better; a bizarre possibility is 13...g5!? when 14 \(\hat{\omega}\)xf5 exf5 15 \(\beta\)fc1 is claimed as ± by Sveshnikov, but the barbaric 15...f4!? 16 h4 gxh4 17 &xf4 h3 is obscure) 14 2xf5 exf5 15 2g5! (carrying out a favourable exchange of dark-squared bishops) 15... 2xg5 16 ②xg5 營xd4 17 單fd1 營h4 18 營d2! 營c4 (18... 鱼e6? 19 f4! and the black queen is trapped) 19 罩ac1 營b5 20 a4! 營b3 21 罩c3 營b6 22 營xd5 0-0 23 a5! (23 營xd7?? 罩fd8) 23... 營xb2 24 營f3! (the weakness on h5 finally destroys Black, the threat of 25 營xh5 giving him no time to save his bishop) 24...g6 25 罩xd7 and White won easily.

	_	
10	•••	.⊈xb4+
11	≜ d2	幽a5
12	êxb4	₩xb4+
13	幽d2	当xd2+
14	\$xd2	②e7 (D)



W

15 **Ehc1**

More natural was 15 Hac1 since the king's rook could prove useful in the centre.

Black begins a thematic attack on the white centre.

16 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{H}}\)c5

A shot in the dark. Of course, if 16 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c7? then 16...\(\mathbb{L}\)c6 traps the rook. However, it was better to use the queenside pawns to constrict Black:

16 b4! would give White the option of answering a later …包c6 with b5. This will prove very important, as we shall see.

16 ... \&d8!

This covers c7 and prepares to bring the bishop from d7 to e8 and h5.

17 &d3

A good move which ties the rook to h8 by attacking the h7-pawn; and 17... 15 can be answered by 18 2xf5 exf5 19 2xd5.


Better was 18 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xc8+ since in the game White is left with a misplaced rook on c5. Then after 18...\(\mathbb{Z}\)xc8 19 b4! White can answer 19...\(\mathbb{Z}\)e8 with 20 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e1! when the threat of 21 exf6 is difficult to meet (unless of course Black retracts his 19th move with 20...\(\mathbb{Z}\)d7). For example, 21...\(\mathbb{Z}\)d7 22 \(\mathbb{L}\)b5+ \(\mathbb{L}\)c6 23 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xc6+ bxc6 (forced) 24 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e3! \(\mathbb{L}\)h5 25 \(\mathbb{Z}\)a3 with a good endgame for White. Alternatively, if 19...\(\mathbb{L}\)c6 then 20 b5! \(\mathbb{L}\)a5 21 \(\mathbb{L}\)c3 followed by 22 \(\mathbb{L}\)b4 (21...a6 22 a4) and the knight is out of play on a5.

18 ... <u>Exc5</u>
19 Exc5

If 19 dxc5 then 19... © c6 20 Ze1 (he doesn't want to play 20 exf6 gxf6 when after 21...e5 Black will have a strong centre) 20... © e7 followed by ... © e8-h5 attacking f3 and forcing White to give up control of e5.

19 ... **Qe8!** (D) **20 包e1**

This allows Black to break the white bind on the centre, but it was too late for 20 b4: 20... \$\oldsymbol{\pm}\$h5 21 \$\oldsymbol{\pm}\$e3



W

≜xf3 22 **\(\extrm{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$x}}\$} \) fxe5 23 dxe5 \(\extrm{\$\text{\$\ext{\$\exitit{\$\ext{\$\ext{\$\exititit{\$\ext{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exit{\$\exitititit{\$\exititit{\$\exititititit{\$\exit{\$\exititit{\$\exititit{\$\exiti** wins a pawn. This variation shows that the white rook is misplaced on c5 (it cannot defend e5). It also reveals how crucial it was for White to advance b4 when he had the chance. so as to give himself the option of b5 to stop the black knight pressurising his centre from c6.

> 20 **2**0c6 21 exf6 gxf6

So Black has achieved the desired pawn centre. He doesn't yet have a significant advantage, but all danger is certainly past.

> 22 **\delta**e3 **⊉e7** 23 f4

It is a good idea to prevent ...e5.

\$d6 23 **ℤg8** 24 ℤc1 25 &xh7?


This bad mistake lets Black's rook penetrate into White's position. After 25 g3! Gurevich intended 25...罩g7 26 包f3 罩e7 27 包h4 息d7 according to his analysis in Informator 41. Black is slightly better as he has the chance to prepare ...e5 while White can only wait, but a draw would be the natural result.

> 25 Ih8 26 &c2 置xh2

Now Black has a very powerful rook to add to his advantage in pawn structure. Soon he gets his bishop to a dominant square on e4 and it all proves too much for White:

27 \(\mathbb{2}\) a4 \(\mathbb{2}\)g6 28 \(\mathbb{2}\)xc6 bxc6 29 **\$f2 \(\) \(\) h4** 30 **\(\) \(\) e3 \(\) \(\) e4** 31 **\(\) \(\) C3 \(\) \(\) g4** 32 🖺 a3 🖺 g3+ 33 🗹 f3 🗒 xg2 34 🖾 d2 **Zg3+35 &e2 Zxa3 36 bxa3 c5 0-1**

The Advance centre can actually arise from a number of openings. The next example, which illustrates well how White can contain ... f6 in an endgame like the above, actually started as a Sicilian with 3 \& b5+.



W

Short - Miles

Master Game 1981

It is White's move. Black is threatening 24...f6! when, as we saw in the example above, he escapes from his constricted position if White is forced into the capture exf6 (but note that exf6 would have to be answered by ... £xf6 rather than ...gxf6; the latter move is positionally more desirable, but unfortunately it loses a pawn to ②g4!). So the sixteen-year-old Short played the unlikely retreat:

24 Øg1!

This allows the centre to be supported with f4 should Black play ... f6. Hence Black is kept in a bind. White's general plan is now to advance his kingside pawns and prepare a breakthrough with f5 or g5, depending upon circumstances. The g1-knight will be re-deployed to e2 to help defend the centre.

24 ... **2**a8

Black also hopes to improve his chances with an unusual retreat, but there are no white targets on the queenside.

25	②e2	⊘b6
26	f4	\$e8
27	g4	\$d7
28	Eg1	②a4
29	6)d1	¤h8

Dissuading 30 g5, which would either have given White a potential passed h-pawn after 30...hxg5 31 fxg5 or allowed the rook to penetrate by 31 gxh6 gxh6 32 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g7. But White has another pawn advance.

30 f5!

The thematic move in this variation. White opens the f-file, and his superior minor pieces (whose superiority, of course, is due to the extra mobility given by the space advantage) will ensure that his rook gains control of it.

30	•••	Db6
31	9f4	里f8
32	5)e3	Ecs

33	fxe6+	fxe6
34	②g6	∲e8
35	Zf1	වු d7
36	Ø)02	

Intending 37 \(\Omega \) 2f4, when Black will be completely tied up.

36	-	. <u>∲</u> g5
-	€)2f4	±xf4
-	Ľxf4	a5
39	ව්)h8!	

Another fine manoeuvre by Short. The knight is heading for d6.

39		b6
40	包f7	⊈e7
41	g 5	hxg5
42	L f1	

Threatening 42 ≜xg5+ \$\displace{2}\delta e8 43 ②d6 mate. However, 42 \displace{2}\displace{2} t2! was better, as will be seen.

42	•••	⊘b4 +
43	⊈e2	¤c2
44	⊈d1	≝xb2

If White had played 42 \(\mathbb{Z}\)f2 then this counterplay would have been impossible because of 45 \(\mathbb{L}\)xg5+ winning a rook. Black would have been totally lost.

48... Ig2! was necessary, though White has winning chances after 48 Ixd7 Ixg5 49 Dxe6.

48 h6!

Winning a piece. This time there were no slip-ups and White won:

48...gxh6 49 &xh6 罩g2 50 罩xf8+ 含h7 51 &d2 包d3 52 包xe6 包b2+ 53 含c1 包c4 54 &c3 罩g1+ 55 含c2 罩g2+ 56 含b3 b5 57 包f4 罩f2 58 e6 b4 59 e7 包d6 60 包xd5 罩e2 61 e8營 a4+ 62 營xa4 1-0

Game 2 Guido - Foisor Montecatini 1994 Advance Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	e5	c 5
4	c3	②c6
5	包f3	⊉d7
6	. ⊈.e2	

White can choose not to bother about the d-pawn, with either 6 dxc5 (analysed in Game 16) or Milner-Barry's 6 2d3, gambiting the pawn after 6...cxd4 7 cxd4 \bigwedge b6 8 0-0!?. White plays in carefree style, giving up a pawn in order to gain a lead in development and attacking chances, and hoping to land a knockout blow before Black can develop. However, the closed nature of the position makes it hard for White to achieve more than dynamic equality. Such a direct approach has never been very popular at the highest echelons of chess, but there are lots of club players and some internationals who favour the Milner-Barry. So beware!

After 8... ②xd4 9 ②xd4 豐xd4, best play seems to be 10 ②c3 (10 營e2 f6! **∓ Keres, or 10 □e1 □e7** 11 **□c3** a6 **∓** Estrin) 10... 響xe5 11 罩e1 響b8 12 ②xd5 Qd6 13 Wg4 含f8 14 Qd2 h5 15 營h3 and in Pyhälä-McDonald, Oslo 1990, Black got the advantage after 15... 2h6!? 16 2e3 \$g8 17 2c4 Qc7 18 豐xh5 包f5 19 豐g5 Qxh2+ 20 含f1 息b5! 21 b3 營d8 22 息xf5 exf5 23 豐xd8+ 罩xd8 24 息c3 息a6! 25 a4 **\$**c7 26 **\$**e2 **\$**h4 −+.

②ge7

Also possible is 6...f6, e.g. 70-0 fxe5 8 ②xe5 ②xe5 9 dxe5 豐c7 10 c4! 0-0-0! 11 cxd5 營xe5 12 息f3 exd5! 13 Ze1 Wd6 ∞ Sveshnikov-Vaiser, Sochi 1984.


7 9 a3

The main alternative is 7 0-0 🗹 f5 (7...cxd4 8 cxd4 2) f5 allows 9 2 c3)8 单d3 包h4! 9 包xh4 豐xh4 10 单e3 營d8! = Vasiukov-Levitt. Græsted 1990.

> cxd4 8 **约f5** cxd4

Transposing to Game 1. A different plan is 8... 2g6, e.g. 9 h4 2e7 10 g3 0-0 11 h5 2h8 12 2c2 f6 13 exf6 $2 \times 14 \text{ b3} / 2 = \text{de la Villa-Korch-}$ noi, Pamplona 1990.

> 9 ②c2 **씱b6** 10 0-0(D)



B

10 ... ¤c8

Black's idea is to delay ... \(\exists e7\), so that if White stabs at the f5-knight with g4, it doesn't have to retreat into exile on h6: it can return to e7, from where it can be re-deployed to the g6-square and maintain influence Another attempt to profit from delaying ...\$e7 was seen in the game Sveshnikov-Dolmatov, USSR 1988, where Black tried 10...\$\Da5!?. After 11 g4 \$\December e7\$ 12 \$\December fe1\$ \$\December b5\$ 13 \$\December d3\$ h5! (the standard idea to break up White's pawns and win control of f5) 14 gxh5 \$\December f5\$ 15 \$\December e3\$ \$\December c4\$ there was a very sharp battle. 10...\$\Da5\$ has the added virtue of ruling out 11 \$\December d3\$, since it can be answered advantageously by 11...\$\December b5\$.

11 **2d3**

It turns out that all Black's pressure on d4 doesn't prevent this move. In an earlier game Black scored a lovely victory because White could not find a plan: 11 營d3?! a6! (intending ... 2b4 and then ... 2b5) 12 g4 2) fe7 13 a4 2) a5! 14 b4 2) c4 (one by one Black's pieces find their best squares) 15 曾b3 ②c6 16 罩b1 兔e7 17 里d1 0-0 18 全e3 習d8! (a regrouping move, planning to reinforce the c4-knight) 19 h3 b5 20 axb5 axb5 21 La1 f6! (now begins the thematic dissolution of White's centre) 22 (24 ②xe3 or 24 ₩xe3 drops the b4pawn) 24... 幽c7 25 e4 罩f2!! (and here is the tactical finish) 26 \$\dispxf2\$ 豐h2+27 含e3 全g5+28 含d3 公xb4+! and White resigned since 29 營xb4 dxe4+30 \$xe4 \bigwe2+ will lead to mate (Yanovsky-Kindermann, Biel 1991).

Of course we cannot ignore the possibility of 11 g4 here. Although it misses its mark in driving the black knight to a bad square, it is nevertheless still a space-gaining move and one of White's fundamental ideas in the variation. Play could go 11 g4 Dfe7 12 Dfe1 (planning to bring the knight to e3 via g2 and then power through with f4 and f5; an alternative way to clear the path of the f-pawn is 12 2h4, when Black does well to avoid 12... 2 g6 13 2 g2! - a key idea - 13...f6 14 f4 \(e7 \) 15 \(e3 \), and White has a big space advantage; therefore in the game Sveshnikov-Ulybin, Russia 1992, Black continued 12... Db4 when after 13 Dxb4 ₩xb4 14 f4 ②c6 15 @e3 @e7 16 ②g2 Sveshnikov thinks Black should have played 16...f5, blocking the white pawn expansion on the kingside) 12...h5 (12...42a5!?) 13 gxh5 Øf5 14 &e3 and now rather than 14... **②**b4 (as in Sveshnikov-Skalkotas, Athens 1983) Black should try 14... **如a5** 15 b3 **息**b5, with obscure play, or even 14... 對xb2!?.

11 ... a5!?

Not 11... Dfxd4? 12 Dfxd4 Dxd4 13 &e3 &c5 14 b4! winning a piece. Here 11... &e7 is inconsistent with the spirit of Black's opening: 12 g4! Dh6 (of course the d-pawn is still immune because of &e3, while 12... Dh4 13 Dxh4 &xh4 is risky because 14 g5 cuts off the bishop's retreat and threatens to win a piece with 15 \mathbb{U}g4 or 15 \mathbb{U}h5) 13 h3! and the h6-knight is a problem piece. Playable alternatives are 11... Db4 and 11... Da5.

12 a3

Reintroducing the idea of b4! should Black now capture the d-pawn.

Aiming to take advantage of the weakened light squares on his opponent's queenside, especially b3. The idea is ... 2a5, followed by ... 2b3 or ... 2xd3 and ... 2c4, when the knight is a formidable piece.

13 **≜**xf5


The exchange of this bishop will considerably weaken White's influence on the light squares. It will therefore be necessary to strike a brave, violent blow upon Black before he manages to complete his development, in which case he will naturally have the better chances.

An unnatural move, but if instead 14... 2e6 then 15 \(\mathbb{W}\)xa4. Now, if he is given time, Black will consolidate with ... 2e7, ... 2e6 and ... 0-0, when he is ready to play ... \(\Darksymbol{\Phi}\)a5 and ... \(\Darksymbol{\Phi}\)c4 with good chances. So White has to act quickly.

15 b3!

Exploiting the awkward position of the black queen. Now 15... 對xb3 16 對xb3 axb3 17 公xd5 is disastrous for Black, because his centre is smashed.

Black could try to hold onto his extra pawn (or rather hold on to it long enough to buy time to finish his development): 16... 2a5 17 2d2?! 2e7 18 2xb3 0-0. However, 17



В

18 ... g5??

A catastrophic plan. Black should prepare a thematic pawn sacrifice: 18...f4! 19 ②c2 when the e6-bishop has tremendously increased scope. Black can play soundly with 19...②e7 20 ②xf4 0-0 intending 21...②a5 and 22...②c4 or, if 21 ②e3, then 21...②xa3. Otherwise he can play actively with 19...②f5!? 20 ③xf4? ②a5 21 ⑤b2 ②c4. In both cases his firm grip of the light squares would fully compensate for the missing pawn (though probably no more).

The move in the game seeks to counterattack with ...g4, but the centre becomes open and Black lack of development proves fatal.

So Black has achieved one of his principal aims, as expounded in the introduction to this chapter: he has won control of d4. However, it is important not to forget more mundane matters such as the virtues of development, king safety and pawn structure, since Black clearly forgot them in this case.

20 ②xe6 fxe6

Guido gives a nice variation in *Informator 61* to show that Black is demolished after 20... ①xb3: 21 ②xd5! (threatening 22 ②c7+ winning the queen) 21... ¥xe6 22 \$\frac{1}{2}\$g5! when, besides other things, White intends 23 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c7+! and mate on d8.

21	營h5+	Ġd7
22	豐打+	⊉.e 7
23	②xd5!	②e2+
24	ф h1	avd5

If 24...②g3+, then 25 hxg3 營xf1+26 含h2 exd5 27 置xb7+ is carnage.

25 \(\text{\(\text{\) \exiting \exiting \text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\) \exiting \exiti

The b7-pawn drops and then it is all over.

Game 3 Cifuentes – I.Sokolov Dutch Ch 1994 Advance Variation

1	e4	c 5
2	c3	e6
3	d4	d5
4	e5	Dc6
5	包f3	≜d7
6	.⊈e2	②ge7
7	⊘a3	cxd4
8	cxd4	包f5
Q	G)c2	₩a5.


The purpose of 9... \alpha a5+ is to entice the white queen's bishop from the c1-h6 diagonal and leave it on the

slightly clumsy square c3. Additionally, after White's g4-pawn push has chased the black knight from f5, it can retreat to h6 without fearing 2xh6.

10	Ձd2		營b6
11	£c3		⊈e 7
12	₩d2	1	

In the game Marković-I.Sokolov, Yugoslavia 1987, 12 0-0 a5 13 g4 2h6 14 2fe1 was played, and now Sokolov suggests 14...f5 15 h3 0-0 16 f4 fxg4 17 hxg4 g5! 'with complex play'. This looks rather good for Black.

12 ... a5 (D)



W

The idea of this move is to play ... \$\\delta\$ b4 at an appropriate moment, when if \$\(\text{\text{\text{\$a}}}\) xb4 in reply then ... axb4 and the white a2-pawn is weak. Such an exchange would also give Black more chances of gaining counterplay along the c-file by removing the obstacle on c3.

13 0-0 0-0


Sokolov suggests 13... 2b4 immediately. This would clear e7 for

the f5-knight should it be attacked by g4.

> ⊈h1 **\$**h8 14 15 g4! **2**h6 16 **Eg1** ②g8

Preparing ...f6. Naturally not 16...f6? 17 exf6 when White wins material whichever way Black recaptures.

> **17 g5!** (D)



B

This effectively rules out ... f6 as, after the subsequent gxf6, the open g-file would give White very dangerous attacking chances. White's move is excellent and is an important part of his kingside attacking scheme.

At last. The g8-knight will get to e7 after all, and then f5 - the chink in White's armour, a key square which cannot be defended by a pawn.

≜d3 18

Anticipating the fight for f5.

②ge7 18 19 **Eg4?**

In a double-edged position, a single inaccuracy can have a decisive effect. We shall soon see why White should have played 19 \modelgg g3 here.

> 19 20 **Z**ag1

Cifuentes continues his massive build-up. He plans h4 and h5 or \square_g1g3-h3.

> 2f5! 20

The black knight reaches its ideal square. It has to be eliminated as otherwise it will paralyse White's attack.

> exf5 21 **≜xf5** 22 \(\mathbb{H}\)h4

If this rook were on g3 here rather than g4 (i.e. if he had played 19 置g3), White could play 22 包e3! (22...f4? 23 2xd5), and then after 22... 2e7 23 2g2! &xc3 24 bxc3 White would be ready to play 1/2 f4 followed by an all-out attack with h4 and h5. His piece deployment would be almost ideal, for example if Black played 24... **宣**c6 25 **②**f4 **罩**fc8? then 26 e6! **≜**xe6 27 **②**e5 would be very strong. (This analysis is based on Sokolov's commentary in Informator 61.) Therefore Black would have to play 25... 2e6 first, keeping the epawn blocked, and only then ... Ifc8. White could always counter the pressure against c3 with 2e2.

In conclusion, a very sharp game would have resulted from 22 2e3 if White's rook had gone to g3 at move 19. However, with the rook at g4 as in the game, 22 ©e3? would of course simply lose a rook to 22...fxg4.

≜xc3 22 **②e7** 23 bxc3

The fact that the white knight is on c2 rather than on g2 heading for

f4 (as in the analysis above) makes an enormous difference to the balance of the game. White has grave problems. 24... \$\subsection{\subset}{24}\$ b2 is one threat, as is 24... \$\subset{2}\$ g6 followed by ... f4, opening up the diagonal of the d7-bishop and leaving the white rook precariously placed on the h-file.


24 e6!?

This desperate try proves futile against Black's accurate defence.

24	•••	.⊈xe6
25	②e5	f4!

Temporarily returning the pawn to free his position.

26	₩xf4	Dg6
27	②xg6+	fxg6
28	₩e3	£f 5 (D)



An incredible transformation has taken place. White's pawns are hopelessly weak and his pieces scattered, while all Black's pieces are on excellent squares, including the bishop, which until now has played no active role in the game. Yet ten moves ago, the game was 'unclear' with White

apparently well co-ordinated and

W

ready to start a promising attack on Black's king! Such is the effect of a good strategy – and a bad one – in turning around a game.

29	包e1	쌀b2
30	②g2	≅xc3

The positional collapse is rapidly followed by the material collapse. Black won after 31 營e7 置cc8 32 置f4 置ce8 33 營c7 營d2 34 營xb7 全e4 35 置xf8+ 置xf8 36 營e7 營xf2 37 h3 置g8 38 營a3 置c8 0-1.

Game 4 **Sveshnikov – Casper** *Moscow 1987*Advance Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	e5	c5
4	c3	Øc6
5	包f3	譽b6
6	а3	

6 & e2 has proved relatively harmless against this move-order. After 6...cxd4 7 cxd4 \(\text{\text{D}}\)h6! (7...\(\text{D}\)ge7 8 \(\text{D}\)a3! transposes to the same system as the previous games), White can play neither 8 \(\text{L}\)xh6 \(\text{W}\)xb2! nor 8 \(\text{D}\)a3 \(\text{L}\)xa3! and has not achieved much after the following moves either:

a) 8 b3 ②f5 9 ②b2 ②e7!? (after 9...②b4+10 ③f1 0-0, the placing of White's king enables him to play 11 ②c3) 10 0-0 ②d7 11 g4 ②h4 12 ②xh4 ②xh4 13 ②a3 0-0 14 f4 f6 15 ③g2 fxe5 16 dxe5 〖f7 17 ※d2 〖af8 18 ②c2? g5! gave Black a decisive advantage in Kupreichik-Hertneck, Debrecen Echt 1992.

b) 8 ②c3 ②f5 9 ②a4 豐a5+ 10 **盒d2 盒b4 11 盒c3 b5! 12 a3 盒xc3+** 13 ②xc3 b4 14 axb4 豐xb4 15 息b5 皇d7 =.

Black doesn't have to close the position in this way. An important alternative is 6... 心h6, when play usually continues 7 b4 (though 7 2d3!? deserves more attention) 7...cxd4 and White then has three options of how to use his queen's bishop:

- a) 8 2xh6 gxh6 9 cxd4, when Fressinet-Korchnoi, Cannes 1996 continued 9...\$\d7 (9...\$\mathbb{I}g8!?) 10 **Qe2 罩c8 11 0-0 Qg7 12 Yd2 0-0** 13 ②c3? ②xd4! 14 ②xd4 皇xe5 demolishing White's centre. However, Black already had a comfortable position, despite his fractured pawn structure: his kingside was very secure and he was ready to play ...f6 breaking up White's centre when the g7-bishop would exert considerable pressure on d4.
 - b) 8 cxd4 \$\angle\$f5 and then:
- b1) 9 **\$b2 \$e7** 10 **對**d2 (10 **\$d3** a5! 11 &xf5 exf5 12 2c3 &e6 13 b5 a4! was unclear in Sveshnikov-Moskalenko, Norilsk 1987) 10...0-0 11 \$d3 (11 \$e2 f6!? 12 g4 \$\tilde{2}\$h6 13 exf6 **L**xf6 14 g5 **L**xf3 15 **L**xf3 **公**f5 ዿe7 14 b5 ②a5 15 ②c3 (15 ②d2 ②d7 16 a4 a6 17 h4 f6! ∓) 15...②c4! 16 2xc4 dxc4 17 d5 f6 18 \(\mathbb{U}\)xc4 fxe5 19 0-0 罩f4! 〒.
- b2) 9 \(e^3 \) \(e^7 \) 10 \(e^4 \) \(\frac{10}{2} \) \(\frac{10}{2} \) \(e^3 \) \(e^7 \) 11 fxe3 0-0 (11...f5 12 exf6 2xf6 13 ②g5!) 12 0-0 f5 13 ②c3, and here John Watson gives 13... 省d8! with the idea of 14 2) a4 b6 or 14 2) e2 a5

15 b5 ②a7 16 a4 **2**d7 followed by ... 2a7, ... 2c8 and ... 2b6.

It is worth noting that ... ¥b6 is particularly inappropriate against 6 a3 as Black often has to retreat the queen to d8 or c7; correspondingly 6 a3 is not so dangerous against other systems. For example, after 5... 2d7 6 a3, Adams-Epishin, Ter Apel 1992 continued 6...f6!? (6...\Dge7 is also good, e.g. 7 b4 cxd4 8 cxd4 2 f5 9 Speelman, Linares 1992) 7 2d3 11 h4 &e8! 12 b3 cxb3 13 &xb3 Ձh5! 14 Øbd2 fxe5 15 dxe5 Ձc5 16 **瞥b1 ②ge7 17 c4 罩hf8 18 皇h2 皇xf3** 19 ②xf3 基xf3! 20 gxf3 ②d4 21 當g2 包ef5 22 息g3 營f7 23 f4 g5! 24 cxd5 gxf4 25 dxe6 \hbar h5 26 e7 \hbar xh4+ 0-1.

7 9 bd2

Beginning the thematic battle for b3.

2)a5


Uhlmann's favoured 7...f6 is well met by 8 2e2! fxe5 9 2xe5 2xe5 10 dxe5 \(\mathbb{Q} \) c5 11 0-0 \(\mathbb{Q} \) e7 12 b4! axb3 $13 \triangle xb3 0-0 14 a4 \pm .$

8 **Qe2**

Another plan is g3 with the idea of h4 and 2h3 immediately seizing space on the kingside. The game Hodgson-Arkell, Surrey 1996 continued 8 h4 2d7 9 h5 0-0-0 10 g3 f5! 11 exf6 gxf6 12 \(\Delta \h3 \) \(\Delta d6 13 0-0 e5 \) with a fine position for Black.

> **⊈d7** ②e7 9 0 - 010 **E**e1 (D)

Now White plans, after due preparation, \$\alpha\$f3-g5-h3-f4-h5. The idea behind this manoeuvre is to tie the



black bishop on f8 to the defence of the g7-pawn, unless Black plays ...g6, whereupon the knight enters on f6. Such a repositioning of the knight would be the prelude, after considerable preparation, to a general pawn advance on the kingside by g4, f4 and f5.

B

10 ... h6

Black rules out this plan. However, the other white knight can set off for the h5-square via f1 and g3. We shall see the highly subtle alternative 10... \cong c6! in the next game.

11 \(\mathbb{I}\)b1!

The rook side-steps a potential attack by ... Db3. This is a necessary precaution before the manoeuvre Df1-g3-h5. If 11 Df1 immediately then 11... Db3 12 Bb1 2a4 gives Black a stranglehold on the square b3 and leaves White's queen precariously placed on d1 – the b3-knight may suddenly move with a devastating discovered attack. 12... Dxc1 would also be a good trade for Black. Although the position is blocked, if White ever wants to win he will have


to open lines sometime, and then he would prefer still to have his queen's bishop rather than a knight.

11	•••	0-0-0
12	營c2!	\$b8
13	⊉d1!	

The bishop is brought into the fight for control of a4 and b3, and the e2-square is cleared for the queen, so that she has a secure retreat square. This will prove to be important at

¤c8 13 14 **Df1 ⊘b3 Qf4 \$28** 15 ②g3 **⊉a4** 16 **幽e2 쌀b5 17** 18 ②h5 (D)

move 17.




B

Accomplishing the first stage of his plan of attack on the kingside. Now if 18...g6, 19 ② f6 when the knight is a thorn in Black's side.

The second stage begins. White intends to put his queen's knight on

e3, play 2g3 and f4, and then engineer an f5 breakthrough. Black can stop this with ...g6 - then White's plan would be \(\mathbb{Q} \) g3, \(\mathbb{Q} \) g2, h4 and h5, answering ...g5 with If 1 and f4. Eventually, he would pressurise and hope to win the f7-pawn.

20		②c8
21	.⊈xa4	₩xa4
22	Df1	②b6
23	£g 3	쌀b3
24	②e3	②a4? (D)



W

This is completely pointless because no breakthrough is possible on the queenside. Black has placed his queen and both knights on such impotent squares that White is able to switch from his methodical plan to a violent tactical onslaught.

25	②xd5!	exd5
26	e6	≝e7
27	②f4!	⊘ b6
28	WF3	

28 exf7!? would have been spectacular but risky, e.g. 28... Exe2 29 置xe2 a6 30 包g6 包d7 31 包xh8 皇xa3 32 Lee1! 皇f8 33 包g6 包c6 34 ②xf8 ②xf8 35 &d6 with a clear advantage.

豐b5 28 If 28...fxe6, then 29 \(\Delta \)g6 wins for

White. **29** exf7 **ℤxf7**

Now White has a forced winning sequence:

30 ②xd5! **罩xf3** 31 ②c7+ \$b8 32 ②xb5+ \$c8 33 ②xa7+ \$d7 34 \(\mathbb{Q}\) c6 35 \(\mathbb{Q}\) b5 ②xa7 36 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xb6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c8 37 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e1 \(\mathbb{Q}\)c6 38 d5 1-0

The black rook on h8 and bishop on f8 never moved! Sveshnikov's play in the game above illustrates White's chances very well, mainly because his opponent played from move to move with no guiding plan and let White do almost as he pleased. Now we will see how Black can undertake some concerted action to resist his opponent's strategy:

Game 5 Sveshnikov – Eingorn Palma de Mallorca 1989 Advance Variation

1 e4 c5 2 c3 e6 3 d4 d5 4 e5 当b6 5 4 f3 4 c6 6 a3 c4 7 4 bd2 4 a5 8 \$e2 \$d7 9 0-0 \$e7 10 \$e1


Here Casper played 10...h6. Eingorn played much more purposefully:

₩c6!

A very clever move, as will soon be revealed.

> 11 **營c2** ②c8! (D)

Rather than the 'sensible', 'developing' 11...0-0-0, which is both insipid and planless, Black continues with his well-thought-out strategy, which involves bringing his knight to b6 straight away.



W

12 包g5

Why should White deviate from the plan that brought him such success in the game above? Let's see: if 12 \(\text{2}\)d1 \(\text{2}\)b6 13 \(\text{2}\)b1 (not 13 \(\text{2}\)f1 \(\text{2}\)b3 14 \(\text{2}\)b1 \(\text{2}\)xc1!), White is ready for 14 \(\text{2}\)f1 when 14...\(\text{2}\)b3 can be met by 15 \(\text{2}\)f4. However, Black has prepared 13...\(\text{2}\)a4! when the white queen has no retreat. After 14 \(\text{2}\)f1 \(\text{2}\)xc2 \(\text{2}\)a4! 16 \(\text{2}\)xa4, the exchange of queens and bishops has greatly eased Black's game, and 14 \(\text{2}\)xa4 \(\text{2}\)xa4 15 \(\text{2}\)e2? is no better for White since the black bishop is very strong after 15...\(\text{2}\)c2.


12	***	h6
13	包h3	②b6
14	②f4	0-0-0

Only now does he castle, having improved his piece deployment considerably.

15	②h5	≝c 7
16	a4!	

The pawn is a target on this square and so gives Black something to aim at. But how else is White to develop his game? If 16 2f1 then 16...2b3, or 16 2b1?? 2a4. Note how inferior White's set-up is to that achieved in the previous game, where he was able to develop his bishop to f4 with impunity.

16	•••	≜c6
17	\$d1	\$ b8
18	#e3! (D)	



B

White finds a way to force Black to allow the knight into f6...

18	•••	Ic8
19	≝g 3	g6 **
20	€)f6	公d7 !

...but Eingorn has also prepared for this eventuality. In the Casper game, the black knight was wandering the edge of the board, while here it has been kept to expel the intruder from f6.


21	②xd7+	幽xd7
22	Zf3	ℤc7
23	幽b1	幽e8
24	h4	h5

Not allowing the h4-h5 thrust. Black has enough counterplay and the game eventually concluded in a draw:

25 **Eg3 &d7** 26 **Df3 Db3** 27 \$\doldar{1}\$xb3 cxb3 28 a5 \$\doldar{1}\$b5 29 \$\doldar{1}\$g5 \$\doldar{1}\$e2 30 &f6 **Eg8** 31 **2**g5 **2**h6 32 **2**h3 **\$294!** (eliminating the white knight,

the minor piece that most thrives in this blocked position) 33 \(\) g5 \(\) xh3
34 \(\) xh3 \(\) xg5 35 hxg5 \(\) d8 36
\(\) \(\) 37 \(\) f1 \(\) a6 38 \(\) b5 \(\) e8 39 c4 dxc4 40 \(\mathbb{Z} c3 \) \(\mathbb{Z} c6! \) 41 \(\mathbb{Z} xc4 \) 罩xc4 42 쌀xc4 쌀xg5 43 a6 罩c8 44 豐xb3 Lc1+ 45 Lxc1 豐xc1+ 46 含h2 **營f4+** 1/2-1/2

2 e6 weakness vs d4 weakness



General observations

In Chapter 1, we discussed the value of White's cramping pawn centre. With the advance e5, he seizes a considerable amount of space, thereby depriving his opponent's pieces of squares and generally boxing them in behind the d5- and e6-pawns. White's winning plan, depending on the specific circumstances, is to use the superior mobility of his pieces either to launch an all-out attack on Black's king or, if such a direct approach is inappropriate, to subject his opponent to intense positional pressure.

We have seen that Black must oppose White's plan in a determined way. It is usual, indeed almost imperative, to contest White's grip on the centre with ...c5, attacking the d4-pawn. Another key advance is

...f6, further undermining the white centre. In the present chapter, we shall examine positions in which Black has carried out both thematic advances, ...c5 and ...f6. If we assume that White responds to ...f6 with exf6, answered by a recapture on f6 with a piece, and that the exchange ...cxd4, cxd4 has also occurred, then we reach the pawn structure to be discussed in this chapter.


The weakness of e6

First, we notice the weakness of the e6-pawn. It is for all practical purposes an isolated pawn, since it can never be supported by another pawn, unless, of course, Black achieves the advance ...e4, which is however unlikely. It stands on an open file and as a result it can be attacked frontally by White's queen and rooks. Not only is the pawn weak, it also blocks in the c8-bishop.

The weakness of e5

The main drawback to an isolated pawn (and, as stated above, we may as well regard the backward e6-pawn as isolated) is usually the square directly in front of it. An enemy piece can be placed on the square without fear of attack by the opponent's

pawns. Thus in our specific situation, the e5-square would make an excellent outpost for a white knight.



This is the sort of endgame Black allows at his peril. White's knight on e5 entirely dominates the 'bad' black bishop, which is hemmed in by its own centre pawns. These pawns are permanently blocked on light squares.

An impregnable knight on e5 would also prove powerful in the middlegame. However, against a black player who understands the pawn structure and deploys his pieces correctly, it will be very difficult for White to achieve total control of e5 whilst at the same time safeguarding d4.

The weakness of d4

From the above discussion, we can conclude that White's d4-pawn, although isolated, is not as serious a liability as the e6-pawn. The d-file is blocked, and so the pawn cannot be attacked frontally by Black's queen and rooks. And perhaps more importantly, there is no weak square in front of the pawn. Black can't put a knight on d5 since his own pawn blocks the square.

The battle for e5


In My System, Nimzowitsch extolled the virtues of 'over-protection', that is defending a key point more times (or even many more times) than is necessary to guarantee its immediate safety. His theory was that in focusing on an important central square the pieces would 'almost by accident' find themselves well placed for the coming battle, of whatever nature it proved to be.

Something similar happens here, though here there is a real tussle for control of squares, not quite overprotection. All Black's pieces must be used to reinforce key points in the centre, notably e5. Then they will be ready for whatever plan the position later demands, whether it is the freeing ...e5 or an attack on White's king. Having a weakness on an important central square can almost be a virtue: in this instance, it helps Black find the correct deployment of his pieces!

White tries to win control of e5 whilst at the same time keeping d4 adequately defended. Even if the game ends with a violent attack on Black's king, in all but exceptional cases White will have conquered the centre as a first step. It is a wellknown general principle that central supremacy is the prerequisite of a successful attack.


The ... Ixf3 sacrifice

A white knight on f3 is well placed for the coming struggle. It protects d4, observes e5 and may suddenly become aggressive with 2g5 or 2e5 when appropriate. It also has an important defensive value: it shields the f-file and defends the h-pawn.



Therefore it is not surprising that this exchange sacrifice is a common motif. If it can be followed advantageously by ... Dxd4, then Black has succeeded in destroying the white pawn centre in return for a small material investment. If White is obliged to recapture gxf3, then in addition his kingside pawn structure is destroyed. With the black queen on c7 and bishop on d6, ... \ xh2+ may be a possible follow-up. In general, the open position of the white king gives Black sufficient counterplay; but during a real game the player has to use his judgement (or theoretical knowledge) to determine whether the counterplay is insufficient, adequate or winning.


A standard plan for Black is to play ... 對c7, followed by ... g6 and ... 對g7.



The queen is beautifully placed here. She attacks d4, has influence on the e5-square and helps solidify the kingside. She also supports a possible ...g5 and ...g4 dislodging the f3-knight. It is hardly necessary to point out that such a pawn advance weakens Black's king's cover. Therefore Black has to be securely placed before he can contemplate such a pawn advance. In favourable circumstances, the ... g4 advance can be a precursor to over-running the white centre or launching a kingside attack.


Black plays ... &h5

With the manoeuvre ... \(\mathbb{L}\)d7-e8-h5, Black attacks and often pins the key knight, while activating his bishop. However, this manoeuvre is rather laborious and not always possible to achieve. Also, Black has to beware



that the e6-pawn doesn't become too vulnerable after it loses its natural guardian.


Black plays ... 學b6



This places the queen on what is her ideal square in other lines of the French. Indeed, there is no obvious objection to the move here: Black attacks d4 immediately and if White wants to move his bishop from c1 he has to worry about ... 幽xb2. Furthermore, there are sometimes tactical tricks based on uncovering an attack on f2 after ...e5.

Yet for some reason ... 對b6 is rather less popular than ... \u20acconv c7 at the highest levels. The only apparent drawback is that the queen may prove less well placed to defend the kingside and second rank. However, Grandmaster Farago, a French Defence expert, always prefers ... 學b6 to ... **幽**c7 and never seems to experience any problems in his games!


Black manoeuvres his knights



Black can be very creative with his knights. One possible plan is ... 2 g4 perhaps supporting ... e5, perhaps attacking h2 or f2, perhaps just intending ... Th6 and ... Tf5 adding more pressure to d4. The c6-knight can also be played to f5 via e7. This can free the queen's bishop for a later ...\$b5. Finally, ... De4 is also often possible, sometimes even as a pawn sacrifice for active play. If, for example, 2xe4 dxe4; Wxe4, then Black's bishop on d7 would seize an excellent diagonal by ... \(\textit{\pmatrix} c6.

Black plays ...e5

If Black can achieve ...e5 without falling prey to an immediate tactical blow or incurring a structural weakness besides the resulting isolated pawn on d5, then he should achieve full equality or even more.




While this pawn structure is similar to isolated queen's pawn positions discussed later in Chapter 11, there are very important differences. The lack of a white c-pawn makes the d-pawn passed, more difficult to blockade and easier to advance, but does give White the opportunity to use the c-file as well as Black. The lack of a black f-pawn can give Black attacking chances down the f-file or White attacking chances against Black's more open king.

Since there is not much to choose between the two sides in terms of structure, the assessment of the position is entirely dependent on the activity of the pieces. After an ...e5 advance, Black's pieces often are strongly placed in the centre, but if White can firmly blockade the dpawn without allowing any counterplay along the open files, he could then start play against the d-pawn.

White exchanges darksquared bishops

It is generally advantageous for White to exchange dark-squared bishops. Since Black will then be left with the 'bad' bishop on c8 which cannot directly fight for control of e5, White will have a clear advantage in most endgames.




Black's bishop is normally developed to d6. Then there are two ways for White to try to exchange bishops. Firstly, he can play 2g5, 2h4 and ♠g3. Black then has the unenviable choice of allowing the exchange or relinquishing his bishop's influence on e5 by retreating it to e7. Black does best to pre-empt this plan with ...Øh5! as soon as White plays ♠h4. Then if White persists with 2g3 he can play ... \(\Omega \text{xg3} \), acquiring the two bishops.

At the time of writing the alternative method of exchanging bishops is very popular: with an early 2f4 White practically obliges Black to exchange. However, things are not so simple because the f4-knight (after ... 2xf4, 2xf4) may allow Black to generate some immediate tactical chances on the f-file or to use his queen to staunch up the dark squares by taking the bishop's place on d6 (or going to f6).

Sometimes, White plays g3 to support a bishop or knight on f4. This also secures the h2-pawn against pressure on the b8-h2 diagonal. The drawback to g3 is that it undermines the f3-knight by removing its pawn support.


Action against the c6-knight



Black's knight on c6 attacks d4 and defends e5, so it is no surprise that it often receives unwelcome attention from White's pieces. White may try to dislodge it from its post by means of b4 and b5, when the white knight could jump in at e5, perhaps as the prelude to a kingside attack. With the black queen on c7, Ic1 can be an irritation, pinning the knight.

White could play \$b5xc6 but normally prizes his light-squared bishop and is loathe to part with it for a mere knight. In exceptional circumstances, the exchange sacrifice \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1xc6 is played as part of a tactical sequence, especially when Black has advanced ...e5 and the follow-up dxe5 is possible.

White plays 40c3




A white knight is well placed on c3. Firstly, it holds back ...e5 (by the attack on d5). Secondly, it threatens 句b5 (especially if the black queen is on c7). Most importantly, White can continue with 2a4 (perhaps hitting the queen on b6) and 2c5. This is especially effective if Black has played ...a6, either due to the threat of 42b5 or b5 (see 'action against the c6knight' above). Sometimes, 204-b6

is also possible. It is important to note that White is quite happy to play 2xd7 or 2xc8, swapping off the 'bad' bishop but leaving e6 much weakened and White with the two bishops.

The only problem with ©c3 is that it can't really be combined with the other effective plans of £f4 or △f4. It's usually a question of 'either ... or'.

Other restraining moves




He1 puts pressure on e6 and restrains Black's attempt to free his game with ...e5. However, White is weakening the f2-square and has to be careful that Black cannot exploit this with a sacrifice.

②g3 blocks the diagonal attack on the h2-pawn, rules out a later ... h5 pin and bolsters the kingside generally. On the other hand, the knight has little dynamic value on this square as e4 and f5 are both inaccessible. Occasionally, 2h5 may be possible.

2d2-c3 (or b3 and **2**c1-b2) bolsters b2 and d4 and adds more control to e5. While this may indeed allow White to play De5 securely, the misplaced 'large pawn' bishop on c3 (or b2) will make it difficult to exploit that circumstance.

White plays f4



If White has played f4 before Black's ... f6 (as in the next chapter), he will only rarely consider playing exf6, reaching the pawn structure above. White does, however, have strong control of e5, and after 2e5 could continue with a kingside pawn onslaught by g4 and g5, though this plan is slower than the corresponding piece attacks. Thus Black should counter quickly on the queenside, taking advantage of the extra tempi, and the weakened e4-square and a7gl diagonal. Also, it is hard for White to find an effective role for his darksquared bishop. If Black should succeed in freeing his game (e.g. by ...e5), the weaknesses created by f4 could prove fatal for White.

Illustrative games

Game 6 Beliavsky - M.Gurevich USSR Ch 1986 Tarrasch Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	包d2	Df6
4	e5	包fd7
5	⊈ d3	

For 5 f4 see the next chapter.

c5 Ø)c6 6 c3

Black develops his pieces ready to break in the centre with ...f6. If he wishes to keep the position blocked, he can instead continue 6...b6 with play much as in the last two games of the previous chapter (or, after f2-f4, the games of the next chapter).

7 ②e2

7 夕gf3!? can lead to the Korchnoi Gambit after the continuation 7... 學b6 8 0-0 cxd4 9 cxd4 ②xd4 10 ②xd4 **豐xd4** 11 **②f3**. White sacrifices his d-pawn in the hope of obtaining lasting positional pressure. Black is unlikely to be mated but, on the other hand, it is by no means easy to free his pieces from White's bind. Notably, he has to waste a lot of time getting his queen to a safe square. White has a far better version of the Milner-Barry Gambit (looked at in the previous chapter) with e5 secure and the d7-knight impeding Black's queenside development.

Black does not have to be so cooperative, though the 'normal' 7...f6 is no better. After 8 exf6 2 xf6 9 0-0 cxd4 (9...\$d6 10 dxc5! \$xc5 11 b4 ± Ehlvest-Andersson, Reykjavik 1991) 10 cxd4 2 d6 11 2 b3 0-0 12 皇g5 豐e8 13 皇h4 豐h5 (13...包h5!?) 14 \(\hat{\text{\text{g}}} \) \(\hat{\text{x}} \) \(\hat{\text{xg}} \) \(\hat{\text{x}} \) \(\hat{\text{x}} \) \(\hat{\text{w}} \ comfortably better in G. Moore-Harley, Thames Valley League 1991.


Rather, Black should seek to take advantage of White's rather congested development, in particular the d2-knight, which doesn't play any useful role. It doesn't defend d4 as a knight would do on e2, and it blocks the queen's bishop in. Black can try to take direct tactical advantage with ideas involving ...g5!? and ...g4, or play more strategically with ...g6, deploying the bishop to g7, whence it pressurises e5 and d4, and taking advantage of the fact that White is not in a position to exploit the darksquared holes thus created.

After 7...g6!? 8 0-0 (8 h4!? **쌀**b6) 8... 2g7 9 里e1 0-0 10 包f1, Black can then think about playing ... f6. However, in Agnos-Dittmar, Bad Wörishofen 1993, Black failed to exchange pawns on d4 first and faced a devastating kingside attack: 10...f6 11 exf6 豐xf6 12 包e3! cxd4 13 包g4 ₩e7 14 cxd4 ②xd4 15 ②xd4 &xd4 16 鱼xg6! 營c5 17 鱼xh7+! 含xh7 18 Better is 10...cxd4 11 cxd4 f6 12 exf6 \wxf6 13 \&g5 \wf7 14 \&e3 e5 15 **≜**c2!? e4 16 **△**g5 **₩**e7 (Quillan-Harley, Liverpool 1995) 17 &b3! ②f6 18 f3 exf3 19 ②xf3 with equality.

> cxd4 7 cxd4 **f6** exf6

We should mention two other moves here, both of which gambit the d-pawn in exchange for attacking chances:

- a) 9 f4 fxe5 10 fxe5 2xd4 11 0-0 (11 Øxd4 Wh4+ is very bad for White) 11... 對b6 12 當h1 ②xe5 leaves Black two pawns up but his king is still in the centre and his development has suffered somewhat. Kupreichik analyses the obscure line 13 ව්f4 g6 14 විb3 වxb3 15 axb3 🙎 d6 16 4 h5 (White must do or die) 16...gxh5 17 Wxh5+ 含d7 18 &xh7.
- b) 9 2 f4!? is a sharp and popular move. Black is virtually forced to sacrifice the exchange and has to leave his king in the centre. On the other hand, he is able to destroy White's centre and has good counterplay. Play normally continues 9... 2xd4 10 **省h5+ 含e7** 11 exf6+ 包xf6 12 ②g6+ hxg6 13 豐xh8 當f7 (D).



W

Then White has a choice: 14 營h4 e5 15 Of3 Oxf3+ 16 gxf3 of5 17 鱼xf5 gxf5 18 鱼g5 a5+ 19 鸴f1 g6! 20 & xf6 \wa6+ 21 \&g2 \warefur xf6 22

₩xf6+ �xf6 was dynamically balanced in Van der Wiel-Timman, Brussels 1986. Black has a bishop and pawn for the rook, and a far healthier pawn structure. The alternative is 14 0-0 when play usually continues 14...e5 15 \$\hat{2}\$ f3 \$\hat{2}\$ xf3+ 16 gxf3. Here 16...e4!? is interesting, while Stanton-McDonald, London 1990 went 16... 包h5 17 皇xg6+! \$xg6 18 \$h1 \$\mathbb{W}\$h4 (no other defence against 罩g1+) 19 豐xf8 當h7 20 Wa3 &h3? (tempting, but 20... &d7 followed by ...d4 and ... 2c6 was better, with unclear play) 21 罩g1 豐xf2 22 **省**d3+ (here 22 **省**e3! forcing the exchange of queens was good for White) 22...\$h8 23 &d2 (23 營e3!) 23... If8 24 Ig5 If5 25 Iag1 Ixg5 26 皇xg5 d4! 27 豐e4? 皇g2+! 28 罩xg2 豐f1+29 罩g1 包g3+!30 hxg3 **營h3#**.

9)xf6

Interesting is 9... wxf6 10 0-0 奧d6 11 包f3 h6 12 臭b1 0-0 13 營d3 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d8 14 g3 e5! 15 dxe5 \(\overline{Q}\)dxe5 16 ②xe5 &xe5 17 ②f4 ②e7 - Kinsman. White always has a check on h7, but with any luck it's never going to be mate!


10 **Df3**

10 0-0 &d6 11 f4!? 0-0 12 🖒f3 瞥b6 13 �h1 息d7 14 a3 罩ac8 15 ②e5 &e8 15 g4 當h8 16 &e3 ②e7 18 罩c1 罩xc1 19 &xc1 &b5 left Black better in Afek-Agdestein, London 1986.

營c7 10

A finesse in move-order, avoiding the variation 10... 2d6 11 2f4. Now 11 \(\extstyle f4 \) can be met by 11...\(\extstyle b4+ \) with interesting play.

11 0-0 皇**d6** (D)



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Gurevich has, for the moment, prevented the exchange of his darksquared bishop, but Beliavsky is persistent.

12 **②c3**

This piece can also go to the kingside, e.g. after 12 \(\Delta g5 \) 0-0 13 \(\Delta c1 \) (another possibility is 13 2h4 when Black can try to take advantage of the loss of time with 13...e5 leading to an unclear isolated queen's pawn position) 13... 2g4, White can bolster his kingside with 14 2 g3. Then play typically continues 14...g6 (intending ... wg7) when Smagin-Dolmatov, USSR Ch 1986, went 15 2h4 e5 16 &e2 2 f6 17 dxe5 & xe5 18 b4 皇f4 19 皇xf4 豐xf4. Karpov claims that this position is equal, but Geller argues instead that White is better!

12

Dealing with the positional threat of 13 405, which would exchange Black's good bishop for a knight.

≜g5 13 0 - 0**⊉h4** 9)h5! 14

Once again Black ensures his d6bishop remains on the board. This move deals with White's intended **⊉**g3.

15 **Zel**

In the game I.Gurevich-Klovsky, New York 1994, White played 15 Ic1 and emerged from the complications with a big advantage after 15...g6 16 ②a4 豐g7?! 17 ②b6 罩b8 18 ≜xa6! ②xd4 19 ②xd4! bxa6 20 公xc8 單bxc8 21 單xc8 單xc8 22 **豐g4!** (not 22 ②xe6 豐e5). Matulović recommends 16...2d7 not letting the knight in at b6; then after 17 \$\overline{\Omega}\$c5 ■ae8 Black completes the development of his pieces.

15 ≜g3? allows the exchange of White's dark-squared bishop for Black's knight and led to a quick defeat in T.Upton-McDonald, London 1986: 15...包xg3 16 hxg3 g6 17 營d2 **幽g7 18 幽e3 单d7 19 里ad1 里ae8 20** \$c2 (not 20 ②e5? \$xe5 21 dxe5 d4) 20...會h8 21 營d2 息b8! 22 單fe1 奧a7 23 奧a4 b5 24 奧b3 罩xf3! 25 gxf3 ②xd4 26 營d3 單f8 27 f4 g5! (Black's exchange sacrifice has destroyed White's centre and now the direct attack on White's king commences - note the enormous power of the a7-bishop against f2; if 28 fxg5, 28... ②f3+ wins) 28 ②e2 ②xe2+ fxg3 0-1. Black will capture on f2 leaving White with a ruined position.

> g6! 15


The prescribed plan, clearing the way for the queen. On g7 she will be excellently placed.

16 **Qf**1 **營g7 约a4** 17

Exploiting the weak b6-square, as in the I.Gurevich-Klovsky game mentioned at move 15.

17 ... **Q**d7 18 **Q**b6 **B**ae8 19 **Q**g3?

The reader should compare the subsequent play for both sides to the finish of the game T.Upton-McDonald given at move 15.



B

20 ... \&c7

Intending to deploy the bishop to a square where it attacks the d4pawn, and at the same time forcing the b6-knight to declare its intentions.

23 **對b3 臭a7**Not 23...**臭**xd4 24 **罩**xc6.
24 **罩ed1 豐g7**25 **豐a4**

25 對d3 is also bad due to 25...g5! 26 g4 (or 26...g4 follows) 26...單f4.

Now, however, Black is able to over-run the d4-square and expose the f2-pawn to attack.

An unexpected and powerful retreat. White must try 29 g4, though M.Gurevich analyses 29... 2h6 30 g5 2g4 31 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c2 e5 and ...e4 as terrible for White. The move he chooses leads to a quick defeat.

29 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c8 \(\overline{\text{\text{\text{29}}}}\) The triumph of Black's strategy!

White can only avert 30... \widehat{\text{\tin\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\t

⊈d7 ≌xd7 30 **幽7**7 31 **豐xe6+ Exf8**+ 32 \$xf8 33 **We5** 9)e4 **≜**xf2+ 34 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 35 **⊈h1 警f6** 36 **Zc8+ Ġg**7 0 - 1

Game 7 **Timoshenko – Gleizerov** *Cheliabinsk 1989*Tarrasch Variation

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 2 d2 2 f6 4 e5 2 fd7
5 2 d3 c5 6 c3 2 c6 7 2 e2 cxd4 8
cxd4 f6 9 exf6 2 xf6 10 2 f3
10 ... 2 d6

11 0-0 0-0

Black doesn't want to commit himself yet to ... Wc7 (Game 6) or ... Wb6 (Game 8), but this allows White to swap dark-squared bishops.

12 **2f4**

Ŷxf4

13 ②xf4

②e4

Alternatively:

- a) 13... ②g4 14 營d2! 營d6 15 g3 e5 16 dxe5 營h6! (Veinger-Hertneck, Munich 1987) 17 h4! with advantage.
- b) 13... **營**d6 14 g3 e5 15 dxe5 ②xe5 16 ②xe5 **營**xe5 **±**.
- c) 13... ****** b6!? 14 ****** b1 (14 ****** d2 can be met by 14... g6 or 14... ***** b8!?) 14... ***** xd4?! (14... ***** d7!) 15 ***** xd4 e5 16 ***** xd5! leaves White better as 16... ***** xd5 is answered by 17 ****** h5 ***** 2f6 18 ***** xe5.

14 ②e2

White also has three alternatives:

- a) 14 ②h5 g6 15 ②g3 ②xg3 16 hxg3 ₩b6 gives Black few problems.
- b) 14 營c1 ②g5 15 ②xg5 營xg5 16 &xh7+!? 含xh7 17 ②xe6 營f5 18 ②xf8+ 營xf8 and Black can hold.
- c) 14 g3 營f6 15 h4 h6 16 兔xe4 dxe4 17 包e5 單d8 18 包xc6 bxc6 19 營c2 g5 was unclear in Kotronias-Ulybin, Khalkidhiki 1992.


The most promising move. Black wrecks White's kingside pawn structure and generates enough counterplay for the exchange.

15 gxf3

②g5 (D)

16 \$\polength{\phi}{\phi}\text{h1}

After 16 f4, 16... ②h3+ 17 含h1 当h4 18 当d2 ②xf2+ 19 含g2 ②xd3 20 当xd3 全d7 was unclear in the



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game Heyken-Gleizerov, Loosdorf 1993, and also possible is the wild 16... ②f3+!? 17 🌣 g2 ②h4+ 18 ❖h1 e5! (Solozhenkin-S.Ivanov, Leningrad 1989) followed by 19... ♠g4.

16 ...

e5!

Opening the diagonal for the bishop.

17 dxe5

 \mathcal{G} xf3

18 \(\mathbb{Q}\xh7+\)

The conservative 18 包g1 leads to dynamic equality after 18...包fxe5 19 鱼c2 d4 20 星e1 (or 20 鱼e4 鱼e6 Rublevsky-Gleizerov, USSR 1991) 20...鱼e6 21 鱼b3 鱼d5+ 22 f3 營d6 23 星e4 星d8 Popović-Kindermann, Vienna 1994.

18 ... **\$h8**

19 **Dg1**

White plans to answer 19...包xg1 with 20 營h5!. The only other possibility is 19 包f4!?, as suggested by Gleizerov and Samarian.

19 ...

②cd4!


Keeping up the tempo of the attack. On 19... 2cxe5?, 20 2xf3 2g4 21 ②xe5! &xd1 21 ②f7+ wins.

20 ②xf3 **Q**24

21 ②xd4

The only move since 21 營xd4 **2**xf3+22 **2**g1 **2**g5+ mates.

> 21 **£xd1 Eaxd1** 22 **\$xh7** (D)



W

The dust has settled and it is time to take stock. In exchange for the queen, White has a rook, an excellently centralised knight and a mobile passed pawn. In all, he has slightly the better chances.

23 **Ed3**

This position was reached again in Kramnik-Ulybin, USSR Ch 1991. White tried to utilise his pawns immediately and a sharp draw resulted: 23 f4 **對**b6 24 f5 **對**xb2 25 **基**d3 **基**c8 26 f6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 27 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h3+ \(\preceq\)g6 28 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g3+ $h5^{1/2-1/2}$.

23	•••	₩b6
24	b3	ℤc8
25	f4	₩g6
26	≝e3	₩b6

27	≌d1	營h6
28	I f3	豐g6
29	⊈e1	当b6
30	ℤd3	幽b4
31	≝dd1	豐c3
32	e6	ģg8 ?

Black has succeeded in activating his queen, and to equalise fully he only has to bring his rook into play. 32... \$\delta g6! was correct here when, according to Gleizerov, after 33 f5+ 當f6 34 萬g1 萬h8! Black has sufficient counterplay.

33	ġg2	ℤe8
34	≝e2	∲f8
35	≝e5	∳e7
36	≅xd5	¤h8
37	≝d7 +	∲f 6
38	≝f7 +	Ġ g6
39	到f3 ?	

This allows Black to escape to a draw. White could maintain winning chances with 39 f5+ \$g5 40 罩xg7+.

> 39 罩xh2+! 40 \$\dot xh2

If 40 ②xh2, then 40... 營c2+ picks up a rook. Now the white king is completely exposed and he cannot avoid a draw by perpetual.

40...₩xf3 41 \(\mathbb{L}\)g1+ \(\delta\)h6 42 \(\mathbb{L}\)gxg7 쌀e2+ 43 �h3 쌀e3+ 44 �h4 쌀e1+ 45 **堂g3 豐xe6 46 罩xb7 豐f6+ 47 雲h3 豐e6+48 曾h2 豐e2+** 1/2-1/2

Game 8 Tseitlin - Schulz Berlin 1992 Tarrasch Variation 1 e4 **e6** d4d5

②f6

Ød2

4 e5 **②fd7** 5 c3 **c**5 6 **2**df3

This transposition of moves has no real significance. Perhaps by delaying 2d3 White wanted to dissuade Black from ...b6 since after 6...b67 2e3 2a6?! (7...cxd4 is better) 8 2xa6 2xa6 9 2e2 White has gained a tempo on the standard line by playing axa6 'in one go'.

(2)c6 **學b6 ⊈d3**


7... ¥a5!? planning 8...cxd4 may show the weakness of White's moveorder. On 8 2d2, Black simply retreats the queen to b6, while on 8 \$1, Black can play 8...b5 or simply 8...b6 followed by 9...\$.a6.

> 4)e2 8 cxd4 9 cxd4 **f6** 10 exf6

Interesting here is the pawn sacrifice 10 ②c3!? fxe5 11 dxe5 ②dxe5 12 ②xe5 ②xe5 13 豐h5+ ②f7 14 **2**b5+ **2**e7 15 0-0 with a strong attack, but Black can improve with 11... 2e7 or 11...g6, leaving White with a slightly uncomfortable pawn on e5.

> **∮**)xf6 10 0-0**全d6**(D) 11 **②c3** 12

If White tries to exchange darksquared bishops as in the previous game by 12 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xf4 13 \$\frac{1}{2}\$xf4, Black can simply and safely grab the b-pawn with 13... \wxb2 providing he doesn't mind a quick draw by repetition after 14 單b1 豐xa2 15 包g5 0-0 16 **基**a1 **對**b2 17 **基**b1 as 17...**對**a3 18 豐c2! is dangerous (Uhlmann). For



W

the more adventurous, 13...0-0!? is also possible, transposing to analysis in Game 7. If White defends b2 first, by 12 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b1 or 12 b3, Black can, after 12...0-0, answer 13 &f4 by the trick 13... ②xd4! 14 ②xd4 e5, but not 13... 2xf4 14 Øxf4 Øxd4 transposing to the analysis in the previous game, when White can take the advantage by 15 2xd4 e5 16 2xd5!.

White can try to use his advantage in development to pressurise the weak e6-pawn, but after 12 Ze1 0-0 13 **②**f4, Black can simply ignore the threat since 13... 2d7 14 2xe6 (anything else allows 14... Zae8 with a fine position) 14... Ife8 15 If 15 leaves White precariously placed; Black just needs to get his knight and bishop out of the way to add the queen to the attack on e6.

Besides the move in the game, White could also consider playing the e2-knight to the kingside, normally after first fianchettoing the queen's bishop to secure the pawns on b2 and d4 as well as the e5square. After 12 b3 (or 12 2d2 and

13 全c3) 12...0-0 13 全b2 全d7 14 包g3, Black has to be careful not to get slowly squashed after 14...置ae8 15 包e5!, which Serper assesses as ±. This verdict seems somewhat pessimistic for Black, but in any case better is 14...全h8! planning to meet 15 包e5 by 15...包xd4. Then, 15 罩e1 罩ae8 16 全c2 包g4! 17 營d3 (17 全xh7 e5! Uhlmann) 17...g6 18 營d2 含g8! 19 罩ad1 e5 was very good for Black in the game Minev-Brüchner, Bulgaria-E.Germany 1953.

12 ... 0-0

12....Qd7 sets the subtle trap 13 a3 公xd4! 14 公xd4 營xd4 營xd4 15 兔g6+?? hxg6 16 營xd4 兔xh2+ winning, but White can keep things very unclear with 15 公b5 as in Zapata-Kuijf, Amsterdam 1986.


13 a3

Freeing the queen's bishop as now a ... \(\mathbb{\text{W}}\)xb2 capture can be met by \(\text{D}\)a4 trapping the queen, and also planning in the longer term for the advance b4 followed by \(\text{D}\)a4-c5, a plan already encountered under the Advance centre.

White can, however, try to do without this move. Van der Wiel-Short, Biel IZ 1985 continued 13 里el 全d7 14 全g5 (14 全e3) 14... ②g4!? (not 14... 營xb2? 15 ②b5! but the simple 14... 營h8 is fine, e.g. 15 ②a4 營a5 16 a3 ②xd4!) 15 全h4 (seeking to swap dark-squared bishops and threatening 16 全xh7+; Black's idea was 15 h3? ②xf2! 16 全xf2 ②xd4) 15... ②h6?! (Van der Wiel suggests 15... 全h8!, attacking the d-pawn and planning to meet 16 全xh7 with 16... ②xh2! 17 ②g5 營xd4 18 營h5

13 ... \$\dispha \text{h8}(D)\$

Black forces White to defend the d-pawn immediately. Also possible was 13...\$\times d7\$ when, if White continues 14 \$\times e3\$, Black can try to do without ...\$\times h8\$ by playing 14...\$\times e8\$ taking advantage of the fact that White has blocked the e-file and that 15 \$\times e1\$ therefore doesn't attack the e-pawn. Bernard-Schmidt, Poznan 1987, continued 15 \$\times g5!? \$\times e7!\$ 16 h3 \$\times b8\$ 17 \$\times c2\$ h6 18 \$\times f3\$ \$\times h5\$ =.



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14 **⊈**e3 a6

Now White has defended d4 and b2 (indirectly), Black prepares to return his queen to active play in the centre or on the kingside. As a first measure, he ensures that his queen can go to c7 without being molested

by 5, which would force the exchange of Black's valuable darksquared bishop. Since Black plans ... Wc7, it may appear that the attempt to profit by ... Wb6 has failed. Shouldn't the queen have gone immediately to c7 and thereby saved time? However, this is not the case. The b2-pawn is only immune because White has been obliged to spend a tempo on 13 a3. Also, in conjunction with 13... \$\dispha h8, which rules out a later & xh7+, the queen on b6 has allowed Black to threaten a double capture on d4. This threat has forced White into a somewhat passive development of his bishop to e3 rather than the aggressive and popular 皇g5. So clearly, ... 對b6 has been a useful enterprise for Black, even if he now considers it best to re-route his queen.

> **幽c7** 15 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1

15... 当xb2? still fails after 16 包a4 豐xa3 17 里a1 豐b4 18 鱼d2.

16 h3

Ruling out 16... 2g4 when after 17 h3 ②xe3 Black would acquire the two bishops.


> 16 **劉f7 17** ②g5

A good plan was 17 2 a4, intending 18 2b6 and 19 2xc8. If Black replied 17...\(\dot\)c7, covering b6, then after 18 Dc5 the knight is well placed. White apparently intends to carry out this manoeuvre in the game, but first he tries to rule out Black's freeing ...e5 advance forever by clamping down on the e5-square.

幽e7 17 **⊈d7** 18 f4

The attempt to break out with the immediate 18...e5 fails to 19 fxe5! ②xe5 20 ②xd5! ②xd5 21 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf8+ the text Tseitlin thinks White should play 19 幽e1! ruling out Black's next move. Instead he was careless.

> 19 Da4?! e5!! (D)



W

An explosive move! Black breaks free from the bind, and now it is White who must tread carefully.

20 **Exc6!**

The only move. 20 fxe5 is bad: ②f4 Yd4+) 22...Yh2+ 23 含f1 ②e4! 24 ②xe4 dxe4 25 😩xe4 😩b5+ winning (Tseitlin).

> 20 exf4?!

In his analysis in Informator 55, Tseitlin gives this move an exclamation mark since 20...exd4? is disastrous after 21 &xd4 &xc6 22 Axh7! 2xa4 23 2xf8! 2xd1 24 2g6+. However, he overlooks the strength of 20...e4!:

a) 21 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd6 exd3 (attacking d6 and e3) 22 \(\tilde{2}\) b6 \(\tilde{\text{w}}\) xe3+ 23 \(\tilde{\text{ch}}\) 1

置ad8 leaves White's pieces uncomfortably placed, e.g. 24 置f3 豐e7 25 ②xd7 豐xd6 26 ②xf8 置xf8 27 罩xd3 h6 28 ②f3 ②e4.

- b) 21 \(\alpha \text{xe4} \(\alpha \text{xc6!} \) leaves White in a fatal pin on the e-file.
- c) If 21 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c3 exd3 22 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd3, 22...\(\mathbb{L}\)b5 wins the exchange.

21 **Exd6!**

Now White can save himself.

Here 23...f3!? 24 ②xf3 ②e4 was an energetic alternative, but after 25 ②xe4 dxe4 26 bxa4 營xa3 27 單d7 exf3 28 罩xf3 罩xf3 29 營xf3, it is Black who has to prove the draw.

Bad are 25 **L**e6? **W**g3 and 25 **W**b1? **Q**e4 26 **Q**xe4 dxe4 27 **L**e1 **W**g3 followed by 28...f3 (Tseitlin).

25 ... 響e7 26 罩e6 響xa3 27 罩xf4 h6

Black is a pawn up but White's pieces are very active. Perhaps Black

should have forced the exchange of queens with 27... al, though he would be unlikely to win the end-game after 28 \square xa1 \square xa1 + 29 \square h2 intending 30 \square b6, etc.

28 夕f3

28 Lexf6 would rebound after 29...Lxf6! 29 Lxf6 gxf6 30 營h5 營c1+.

28	•••	②e4
29	¤xf8+	ℤxf8
30	⊈h2	₩h2

It was best to force a draw with 30... If 6 31 Ie8+ If8 32 Ie6, etc. since White's pieces now become very active.


31 **②e5** 單f6 32 豐g4

This leads to a draw. It was even possible for White to play for advantage with 32 \(\mathbb{Z}e7\) intending 33 \(\mathbb{Z}g4\).

32	•••	≝ xe6
33	₩xe6	營f2
34	₩e8 +	\$ h7
35	₩g6 +	⊈g8
36	₩e6+	∲h 7
37	₩26+	1/2-1/2

An interesting tussle.

3 f4 Central Clamp



General observations

White's fundamental long-term plan in an Advance centre is to achieve the f4-f5 pawn breakthrough. This advance could be the prelude to a violent attack on Black's king (we assume Black has castled kingside or, perhaps, left his king in the centre), or it could be part of a campaign of sustained pressure which aims to constrict Black's pieces until they have insufficient space to function properly.

Black, naturally, does everything possible to prevent the f5 advance, either through fortifying the f5-square itself or through using diversionary tactics to distract White from his aim — such as exerting enormous pressure on d4 or, less frequently, beginning a counter-attack on the queenside.

A necessary prerequisite for f5 is, of course, f4. This prior move is often difficult to achieve once White has played 263 - if Black has countered well, White will find that a retreat such as 261 or a decentralising move such as 264 will have unpleasant consequences: most probably, the d4-square (and the pawn upon it) will be over-run by Black's pieces.

But what happens if White tries f4 before 2f3? Then later in the game he won't have to worry about how he can unblock the f-pawn: he can get on with preparing f5 with no more ado. This sounds plausible in theory, but the problem is that White is making a lot of pawn moves in the opening and he may be overwhelmed before he finds time to develop his pieces. For example in the Advance Variation after 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 e5 c5 4 c3 \(\frac{1}{2}\) c6 White could play the strategically desirable 5 f4. However after 5... 數b6 6 包f3 包h6 (5 f4 stops 2d7! or 7 2 a3 cxd4 8 cxd4 2 xa3 9 bxa3 Øf5 winning a pawn) 7...cxd4 8 cxd4 &b4+ 9 &f2 f6 Black is well placed.

In fact, in few lines can White play f4 before 包f3 with impunity. One is 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 包d2 (or 3 包c3) 3...包f6 4 e5 包fd7 5 f4. The present chapter looks at lines where


White keeps a pawn on d4, and thus concentrates more on 3 2d2. Lines where a white piece occupies d4 (usually after 3 2c3) are looked at in the next chapter, on the Classical centre. The key fact that allows White to boldly seize space with f4 in both these lines is that the black knight on d7 cannot be used to attack d4, and this means that White's centre is far safer than in similar variations where the black knight is within easy reach of d4.

White's aim is to achieve good development, whilst at the same time beating off all attacks and avoiding weaknesses. If he is successful in this then he will have good chances of a win: his space advantage will confer freedom and power upon his pieces just as at the same time it hinders and restricts the movement of his opponent's men. Moreover, as stated above, he will be in a position to carry out the important f5 advance without first having to prepare f4.

Black attacks in the centre


Even with the knight ineffectively placed on d7, Black can still attack the white centre with great force. In effect, with 3... 266, Black has provoked his opponent into seizing a vast amount of space (4 e5 and 5 f4) and now hopes to prove that White is unable to defend all this territory adequately against the onslaught of the black pieces.

By attacking d4, Black can make it difficult for White to develop



naturally. This typical situation, from the Tarrasch Variation, illustrates White's difficulties in this line. If he defends the pawn on d4 by 2gf3, then the d2-knight has no natural home: on b3 it would be out of play and vulnerable to attack by ...a5-a4; the very fact that White could even consider the manoeuvre 2d2-b1-c3 illustrates the absurdity of White's situation. White ideally would like to play his knights to e2 and f3, but in such a way that he can still develop his king's bishop to d3 as well.

So White's first 'unnatural' move is 2df3, moving the same piece twice in the opening before moving any others. Now, after Black's response ... b6, White still cannot play 2d3, thanks surprisingly to Black's knight on d7 (blocking a later 2b5+). In fact, it is difficult for White to find a constructive move if he wants to stick to the set-up of a bishop on d3 and a knight on e2. Note that if White plays 2f2 (e.g. after ... 2b4+), Black has some tactics in mind:




...g5 aims to decoy the knight from defence of d4 (for example after ...g4) or the f-pawn from defence of e5 (after fxg5) which will then fall thanks to the pin on the d-pawn (though it has to be said that the change in pawn structure might then actually be in White's favour). Similarly, ... f6 threatens to win the e5pawn. If White manages to meet that immediate threat, then Black plans to castle kingside and open the f-file onto White's king. Then wherever White moves his king (to the g-file or the e-file) Black can open more lines with a knight sacrifice either on d4 or e5, when Black's queen and rook can combine with fearsome effect (for example by giving mate on f2).

Of course, it is not as simple as all that. A piece is a piece, and sacrifices like ... 2xe5 and ... 2xd4 are not always sound but require careful calculation. White could instead develop his king's knight to h3 (perhaps after h2-h4), or just play 2e2 anyway, and develop the king's bishop to h3 after g2-g3.


Black plays on the queenside

Alternatively, Black can use his advantage in development to try to create play where he doesn't have a space disadvantage: on the queenside. Black has two different approaches: the first is to play ...cxd4 and then ...a5:



Black intends to play for ...a3, securing the important b4-square for his knight and creating a strong endgame asset in the a3-pawn. By playing ... 4b6-c4 before ...a3, Black can try for more immediate tactical advantages with ... 4 b2. If White plays a3, then Black can make use of the b3 and c4-squares, while if White plays a4, Black again has the b4square. Perhaps White's best plan is the rather slow b3 and a3, intending to meet ... a4 with b4, but even then Black has the c4-square for his knight, though not quite so much space to go with it.


The second approach is not to exchange on d4, but to play for ... b5 and ...b4, with the intention of playing ...bxc3, bxc3 and then attacking the weak end of the pawn chain on c3 rather than d4:



Now obviously White does not sit and wait against either plan but continues to press for the f5 breakthrough on the kingside (e.g. with g2-g4 and 22g1-e2-g3). Therefore Black has to combine queenside play with some kind of blockade on the kingside.

Black blockades with ...f5

After ...f5 White can still try to storm the kingside with g4. One possible plan is h3 and g4, so that after ...fxg4, hxg4, White's h1-rook is well placed on the open h-file. However, Black would by no means be obliged to play ...fxg4, and since White may wish to carry on his attack with h4 and h5, h3 may prove a wasted tempo. So \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}}g1 and g4 may be best, assuming that Black can't quickly grab the f5-square for his pieces after ...fxg4, \mathbb{Z}xg4.




Assuming White has played g4, he will then try to put pressure on g7 in order to force Black to play ...g6. Then he can use his h-pawn to attack the g6-pawn with h5. In this way he would soften up Black's kingside and gain good attacking chances.

That is why we recommend that Black adopt the manoeuvre ... & c8-d7-e8-g6. On g6, the bishop shields the sensitive g7-pawn and makes h5 harder for White to achieve. If White then plays gxf5, Black should usually recapture ... exf5, despite the fact that this gives White a protected passed pawn on e5. The game will most probably be decided by the cut and thrust of a struggle between Black's pressure on the queenside and White's on the kingside. The fact that White has a potential endgame advantage is of little relevance.

Black blockades with ...h5

An older method of blockade is the Leningrad System with ...h5 and



...g6. This has rather gone out of fashion in recent years, probably because White can choose to concentrate more on the queenside, happy at having created a weakness in the black kingside, including a gaping hole on g5 for White's knights. White can also still proceed with a well prepared h3, g4 and f5, particularly if Black castles kingside. The pawn structure is much the same as that in the recently popular Gurgenidze System (1 e4 g6 2 d4 \(\mathbb{L} \)g7 3 \(\overline{Q} \)c3 c6 4 f4 d5 5 e5 h5) but with the difference that Black usually manages to swap his light-squared bishop after ... 2 g4 in the Gurgenidze, whereas in the Leningrad System it remains undeveloped and 'bad'.

Illustrative games

Game 9 Pyda - Likavsky Czechoslovakia 1991 Tarrasch Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5

3	②d2	Df6
4	e5	包fd7
5	f4	c 5
6	c3	Dc6
7	包df3	cxd4

Plans without this exchange can be met by comfortable theoretical responses:

- a) 7... a5 8 e3! cxd4 (8...b5 has been tried but Black doesn't seem to have sufficient counterplay after 9 dxc5 b4 10 a3! b3 11 營xb3 ②xc5 12 曾b5) 9 ②xd4 ②xd4 10 2xd4 and now the re-deployment worth remembering. However, White seems to have a clear edge in a rather dull position after 10... 4b8 11 2f3 ②c6 12 **≜**e3.
- b) 7...c48g4b59@e2@b6(9...h5 10 gxh5 基xh5 11 包g3 基h8 12 f5!) 10 2 g3! (10 2 e3 h5! 11 gxh5 2xh5 12 2g3 Zh8 and Black will follow up with ...g6 ruling out the f5 advance) stops ...h5 and leaves White better.

8 cxd4 **쌀h6**


See Game 11 for the alternative plan of blockade.

9 **g**3

This unusual-looking move is not played with the intention of \$\Delta\$h3 (although White sometimes does play that) but with the idea of 'manually castling' the king to safety on g2. The 'natural' 9 De2 is perfectly playable but rarely chosen here, the position more commonly arising from the Steinitz Variation after 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 2 c3 2 f6 4 e5 2 fd7 5 ②ce2 c5 6 c3 ②c6 7 f4 對b6 8 ②f3 cxd4 9 cxd4. Black's position is fine after the continuation 9...f6 10 g3 ♠b4+ 11 ②c3 0-0.

9 ... **臭b**4+

The other sharp approach is 9...f6. At the moment this is under a theoretical cloud after 10 总h3 (10 总d3 总e7 11 含f1 0-0 12 含g2 含h8 13 总b1 当f7 14 当d3 公f8 is solid enough for Black, if a little passive) 10...fxe5 11 fxe5 总b4+ 12 含f1 0-0 (D).




W

Taking the e-pawn is almost always inadvisable for White in this type of position. For example, if 13 £xe6+ here then 13...\$\dot{\$\dot{\$}}\dot{\$}\dot{\$}\dot{\$}\dot{\$}\dot{\$} (threatening 14... (2xd4) 14 (2g2 (2)dxe5! 15 ⊈xc8 ⊈xf3 is good for Black. 13 2xe6+ \$\delta\$h8 14 2xd7 would be positionally disastrous because after 14... £xd7 the black bishop on d7 will dominate the light squares. White's plan should be to constrict Black's pieces, and a mere pawn is too little compensation for allowing them such freedom. After all, in the main line below, Black is willing to give up a whole piece in order to activate his forces! White therefore plays 13 \(\delta \)g2!, bringing his king to relative safety.

If Black does nothing active now he is quickly reduced to passivity, e.g. 13...\$\delta\$8 14 \$\overline{9}\$4 \$\overline{0}\$d8 15 h4 \$\overline{0}\$f7 16 \$\overline{0}\$e2 \$\overline{0}\$h6 17 \$\overline{9}\$h3 \$\overline{0}\$f5 18 \$\overline{0}\$c2 and in an early Adams-I.Gurevich game (World U-16 Ch, 1987), but with the black bishop at e7 rather than b4, Black could find nothing better than 18...\$\overline{0}\$c6 19 \$\overline{0}\$d3 \$\overline{0}\$c4 entering a bad endgame after 20 \$\overline{0}\$xc4 dxc4 21 \$\overline{0}\$f4. If Black hadn't exchanged queens, then Adams had planned to build up his attack with \$\overline{0}\$xf5 followed by \$\overline{0}\$g5 or \$\overline{0}\$g5.

Black is virtually compelled to sacrifice a piece with 13... addxe5 14 fxe5 2xe5 destroying White's pawn centre and freeing his pieces (of course 15 @xe5?? allows mate in one on f2). However, a critical position that seems in White's favour is reached after 15 We2 (15 Wb3 is interesting) 15...2xf3 (15...2c4 16 b3 皇c3 17 里b1 皇f6 18 包g5!) 16 包xf3 e5 17 \(\ell\) xc8 \(\mathbb{Z}\) axc8. Black's piece activity has reached its highest point, but sample variations such as 18 ②xe5 We6 19 2f4 and (perhaps stronger) 18 單d1 豐g6 19 皇d2 罩c2 20 \subsection xe5 are good, maybe winning, for White. The reader interested in adopting this line as Black should consult the analysis in a more detailed theoretical book on the French and then do some independent work of his own! However, the authors fear that the verdict on this line will remain unchanged.

10 **\$f2 g5!** (D) 11 **\$e3**



11 ②xg5 營xd4+ shouldn't trouble Black.

The main alternatives are:

- a) 11 fxg5 ②dxe5 12 ②xe5 ②xe5 13 \(\delta g2 \) (13 \(\delta e3 \) ②c4!) 13...②c6 14 ②f3 \(\delta f8 ! \) 15 b3 \(\delta g7 \) 16 \(\delta b2 \) \(\delta d7 \) 17 \(\delta c1 \) and now with 17...h6!, as in the game Gruzman-Glek, correspondence 1986, Black reduces White's space advantage on the kingside and gets rid of his potentially weak h-pawn.
- b) 11 h3 gxf4 12 \(\overline{9}\)xf4 (if 12 gxf4 then 12...f6 13 2e3 2e7! intending ... 2d7-f8-g6, ... 2d7, ... 0-0-0 with strong pressure on White's centre) 12...f6! 13 曾g2 皇f8! 14 罩b1 (if 14 罩h2!? then 14... 對xb2+ 15 含h1 對a3 16 \(\exists b5\) leads to an unclear game, while 14... 2g7 15 \$\disphi\$h1 0-0 is sound for Black) 14... 2g7 15 2d3 0-0 and now 16 \(\mathbb{U}\)c2 fails to 16...fxe5 17 ≜xh7+ \$h8 18 dxe5 ©dxe5 when the collapse of White's centre is more important than the loss of the black king's pawn cover. Therefore White has to play 16 exf6 when 16...夕xf6 looks at least OK for

Black (Yudasin-Moskalenko, Lvov 1984).

11 ... f6

In Yakovich-Machulsky, USSR 1985, Black played 11...g4! and obtained a clear advantage: 12 ②d2 (12 ②h4 鱼e7! 13 罩b1 鱼xh4 14 gxh4 h5 15 h3 f5! maintains the blockade on the kingside with obscure play—Yakovich) 12...f6! 13 ②b3 (13 營xg4? 鱼xd2 14 鱼xd2 營xd4+ is bad for White) 13...fxe5 14 dxe5 鱼c5 15 ②xc5 ②xc5 16 鱼g2 (White should play 16 鱼xc5 營xc5+ 17 鱼g2 ∞) 16...d4! 17 鱼c1 (17 鱼xd4 ②xd4 18 營xd4 ②d3+ 19 鱼e3 營xd4+ 20 查xd4 ②f2 ∓ Yakovich) 17...h5 ∓.

12 **Qh3** fxe5

The most accurate move-order as it rules out the variation 12...0-0 13 ♠xe6+ ♦h8 14 ☐e2 fxe5 15 ☐xg5!, which proved good for White in Dobrovolsky-Tibensky, Czechoslovakia 1988.

13 fxe5 0-0 14 \(\mathbb{H}\)c1


Black scored a crushing victory in Emms-Kosten, British Ch 1985 after 14 皇 g4?! 皇 c5!! 15 皇 xe6+ 曾h8 16 dxc5 劉xb2+ 17 皇 d2 g4! 18 皇 xd5? (18 皇 xg4 劉d4+ 19 曾 g2 劉xg4 is only slightly better for Black) 18...②dxe5 19 皇 xc6 bxc6 20 国 b1 劉d4+ 21 皇 e3 ②d3+ 22 曾 e2 gxf3+ 23 ③xf3 劉e4 and White resigned on move 32. This sudden and devastating attack reveals the potential of the black pieces if they can escape from the stranglehold of the white centre.

14 ... \$\ddotsh8?

A considerable improvement is 14... 2e7! (14...h5 is well met by

William Watson's suggestion 15 g4! h4 16 鱼f1) 15 營b3 營xb3 16 axb3 包b6 followed by ...a5 and ...a4.

15 皇g4! 皇e7 16 h4! gxh4 17 公h3!(D)



B

A very direct method by White. He strips away the cover of the black king, confident that his great advantage in firepower in the crucial sector of the board will prove decisive.

The requisite response to a wing attack: a counterattack in the centre. Nevertheless the odds are overwhelmingly against Black here, because he is playing without his queen's rook and bishop. Meanwhile, every white piece is ready to join the onslaught.

19 **Ang** Exf3+

He must prevent h7 collapsing.

Clearing the queen's route to h5.

If 25...dxe4 then 26 營h5+ 當g8 27 營xg6+ 當f8 28 置h1 and mate follows.

26 \wg4 \wg4

If 26...dxe4 then 27 \(\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{W}}}\xg6+\text{ wins}\) as in the note above. The game continuation isn't much better. Black soon has to part with a piece in order to stave off the mating attack which persists in spite of the exchange of queens:

27 對xg6+ 對xg6+ 28 息xg6 當f8 29 單h1 ②e7 30 單h8+ ②g8 31 息e5 息d7 32 罩h7 息e8 33 息d6+ ②e7 34 息xe7+ 當g8 35 息b1 罩c8 36 息g5 罩c4 37 息e3 e5 38 dxe5 d4 39 息d2 d3 40 罩e7 息c6+ 41 當f2 罩h4 42 兔xd3 1-0

Game 10


Conquest – M.Gurevich

Clichy 1993

Tarrasch Variation

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 公d2 公f6 4 e5 公fd7 5 f4 c5 6 c3 公c6 7 公df3 營b6 8 h4 (D)

This is White's main alternative to 8 g3 and it is a very logical move. White reasons that since ...g5 is ruled out, Black will probably play ...f6, as only in this way can he attack White's centre. However, after ...f6, White will be able to develop his bishop to d3, its strongest square because the d4-pawn is taboo, e.g. 8...f6 9 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d3 cxd4 10 cxd4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)xd4 \(\frac{1



not possible with the pawn on f7. So, argues White, why should he prepare ♠h3 with g3 when he can achieve 2d3 simply by preventing Black's variation with ...g5 and waiting for ...f6? The slight drawback to this is that the white king may be in greater danger than in the g3 variation, since there is no hiding place on g2 should Black manage a breakthrough in the centre.

> 8 cxd4 cxd4 **f6**


In view of our comments above, it makes sense for Black to consider avoiding ...f6, thereby denying the white bishop its strongest attacking square on d3. With this in mind, 9... 2e7 suggests itself. White then has no useful way to wait for ... f6 unless 10 h5!? is good. After 10 g3, 10...f6 seems to offer good counterchances after 11 &d3 fxe5 12 fxe5 0-0:

- a) 13 \(\exists xh7+? \(\delta xh7 \) 14 \(\delta \)g5+ \$\delta\$g8 15 \$\delta\$h5 \$\delta\$b4+! turning the tables.
 - b) 13 **②h**3 **②**b4+ 14 **含**e2 **罩**xf3!.

- c) 13 鱼f4 豐xb2 14 單h2 豐c3+ 15 曾f1 ②b4 16 息b1 b6.
 - d) 13 a3 ②dxe5! 14 dxe5 ②xe5.

Instead, Ferguson-Harley, Abergavenny 1996 continued 10...a5!? 11 a3 a4 12 2h3 Wa7 (here 12...f6 13 ②e2 fxe5 14 fxe5 0-0 15 &xe6+ 🖢 h8 16 💂 xd5 ② dxe5 17 dxe5 ② xe5 fails after 18 2f4!) 13 De2 Db6 14 ②c3?! (weakening d4; the simple 14 0-0 was good, while 14 g4 was the most enterprising, planning 2g3 and f5) 14... 2 d7 15 0-0 2 a5 16 f5!? exf5 17 **≜**g5 **≜**xg5 18 **€**xg5 and now 18...g6 19 g4 may have been slightly better for Black.

Another way to temporarily stop **2**d3 is 9...**2**b4+ 10 **2**f2 f6 threatening to win a pawn on e5 thanks to the pin on the d4-pawn. Then 11 \(\mathbb{L} e3 \) **Qe7 12 對d2 0-0 13 罩d1 leads to un**clear play. In Ljubojević-M.Gurevich, Linares 1991, White tried 11 \$g3?! and after 11...0-0 played the much desired move 12 \(\delta\)d3? (D).



B

However, he had made insufficient provision for his king's safety,

and Black was able to sacrifice a piece to obtain an overpowering attack: 12...@xd4! 13 @xd4 fxe5 14 fxe5 2xe5 15 &c2 2g6! 16 &xg6 hxg6 17 Øde2 (getting his knight away from attack after ... 2d6+ and ...e5+) 17... 響f2+ 18 會h3 皇d6 19 **当b3 e5+ 20 含h2 当xh4+ 21 包h3** ♠xh3! 0-1. This sharp defeat is a reminder of how carefully White must play in these f4 central clamp positions. A single slip can spell defeat. However, this is only just: if the punishment for careless play is more severe, then so is the reward for good play correspondingly higher. There are few draws in this variation!

> 10 &d3 &b4+ 11 &e2

Gurevich's move-order has forced the king to e2 rather than f2. Although the king appears safer on e2, it is one square further from shelter on the kingside and, perhaps more importantly, it deprives the g1-knight of its best developing move \$\mathscr{D}\e2.

11 ... **\$e7**

Played to hinder 12 &e3 which would bolster White's centre (it can now be answered by 12... wxb2+). If instead Black plays passively, he could find himself facing a big attack. For example, Psakhis-Franke, Berlin 1988 went 11...0-0 12 &e3 a5 13 wc2 f5 14 g4! Odb8 (14...fxg4 15 &xh7+ &h8 16 wg6! gxf3+ 17 Oxf3 gives White a quick win since there is no answer to 18 h5 mating) 15 a3 &e7 16 f2! &d7 17 gxf5 exf5 18 Oe2 Oa6 19 ag1 and Black had serious problems, e.g. 19... h8 (19... d8 20 Og3 wc8 looks the

best chance) 20 ②g3 g6 (the only way to defend f5) 21 h5 with a crushing onslaught.

12 h5 0-0


13 \(\text{\tince{\text{\te}\text{\tetx{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\t

14 a3

This avoids 14 g4? ②b4 and sets the trap 14...②xd4+ 15 ②xd4 營xd4 16 全e3 winning the queen.

This clears the d4-square and prepares to develop with ... 2b6 and ... 2d7, when Black will be ready to generate counterplay with ... 2c8 and eventually ... 2c4.

16 gxf5 exf5(D)



W

17 **包h3**

Capturing the pawn with 17 axf5 would be bad since 17... xf5! 18 xf5 axf5 axf5 axf5 axf3 20 axf3 ag4 would give Black good counterplay for the exchange, as pointed out by Gurevich. White's intention is not to win material (unless it can be done very favourably) but rather to keep Black's pieces bottled up by his

space advantage. He hopes that as a consequence of their lack of mobility the black defenders will be unable to beat off an eventual attack on Black's kingside, while the attackers will be unable to achieve any real counterplay on the queenside.

> 17 4)b6 Фe3 **&e6** 18 **幽d7** 19 4hg5 20 **≝ag1** €)c4

The first sign of counterplay from Black.

> **⊈f2 ¤ac8** 21 22 **幽b1**

A prudent retreat, getting out of the way of any discovered attack on the c-file.

> 22 а4

Fixing the white queenside pawns and preparing ... b5-b4, opening lines on the queenside to compensate for White's pressure on the kingside.

23 Dh4?

White tries for an immediate win, but his position was not yet strong enough to justify this. Instead he should continue his build-up with pawns but hoping to achieve a deadly breakthrough on the g-file. A very hard battle would have been in prospect if White had chosen this path.


> **≜xg5** 23

Dealing with the immediate threat of 24 ②xe6 and 25 ②xf5.

> 24 **Exg**5 ②e7!

This move bolsters the kingside defences and, just as importantly, opens the way for ... ¥b5 with pressure on b2.

25 **H**hg1 罩f7 **≝1g2 營b5!** (D) 26



W

Just in time before White played the g-file. Now 27 幽g1 can be answered by 27... 對xb2+, e.g. 28 \$f3 **營**c3 29 **基**xg7+ **含**h8 30 **基**xf7 **營**xd3+ 31 2e3 2xf7 and Black has won a piece. So we can conclude that Black has won the opening battle because White wasted a vital move with 23 2h4 when he should have been increasing the pressure on the g-file. In such a double-edged position the loss of a single tempo can turn a promising position into a lost one.

27 b4!?

This spirited try succeeds in confusing Black.

②xa3? 27

This gives White a chance. Gurevich believed that he should have ¤xg7+ \$\dispha h8 when the fearsome passed pawn on b2 far outweighs White's chances on the g-file.

28 \(\mathbb{Z}\xg7+!\)

This wins the black queen, though Black's passed pawn ensures he keeps all the winning chances.

28	•••	¤xg7
29	≝xg7+	⊈xg7
30	幽g1 +	⊈ f8
31	.⊈xb5	②xb5
32	Df3!	

This begins an excellent regrouping of White's pieces. If instead 32 豐g5?, then 32...堂e8! 33 豐f6 堂d7 and the a-pawn rushes forward.

32	•••	a 3
33	⊉h4!	a2
34	£ f6	≝c2 +
35	\$d3	≝c3 +
36	⊈d2	9)c6

37	ᡚg 5	②cxd4
38	②xh7+	⊈e8
39	₩g7	Dc6
40	₩b8+?	

In time pressure, White allows the black king to escape from the enemy pieces, when the a-pawn is unstoppable. It was possible to draw with 40 皇g5! a1營 41 ②f6+ 曾d8 42 ②xd5+曾c8 43 營f8+曾d7 44 營g7+ with perpetual check (as noted by Gurevich in *Informator 58*).

· IVII .	111 119011100001	$\sigma\sigma_{j}$.
40	•••	\$ d7
41	②f8+	⋭c7
42	②xe6+	\$ b6
43	⊈d8 +	\$a7
44	包c7	②xc7

0 - 1


Game 11

Ye Jiangchuan – Short

Lucerne Wcht 1989

Tarrasch Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	Ød2	Df6
4	e 5	包fd7
5	f4	c 5
6	c3	②c6
7	包df3 (D)	



B

7 ... f5!?

If Black wishes to solidify the position in this way, he should do so now. Inferior is 7... 当68 g3 f5?! 9 ②e2 a5 10 鱼h3 鱼e7?! (the last chance to play 10...cxd4 when if 11 ②exd4, ... ②c5 and ... ②e4 gives counterplay; so White would probably play 11 cxd4 ±) 11 g4! ②db8 (11...g6? 12 gxf5 gxf5 13 ②g5 and 当h5+ is disastrous) 12 gxf5 exf5 13 dxc5! 当d8 14 鱼e3 ②a6 15 当d3 0-0 and now 16 里d1 would have given White a clear advantage in Short-Reefschläger, Plovdiv Echt 1983. 7... 当b6 makes

White 'waste' a move with, e.g., 8 g3, but leaves the black queen misplaced on b6, a useful square for the d7-knight, so after a later ... Wd8 it is in fact Black who has wasted a move.

As mentioned in the first half of the chapter, Black can also try to blockade with 7...h5!?, but White maintains an edge after 8 2d3 cxd4 9 cxd4 40b6 10 40e2 (10 40h3 2d7 11 0-0 g6 12 \(\frac{1}{2}\)hg5!? - Bareev) 10.... dd7 11 0-0 a5 12 a3 a4 13 We1 g6. Instead, Wade-Uhlmann, Skopje 1968 continued 13... 2 a5? 14 f5! exf5 15 e6! fxe6 16 置g3 含f7 17 2)f4 winning.

8 **⊉d3**

Of course, White will always choose to develop his bishop to this square if there is no apparent drawback.


cxd4

Black exchanges before White plays 9 2e2 and has the option of establishing a knight on d4, for example 8... 2 e 7 9 De 2 cxd4 10 Dexd4. It is not clear that White would take up this opportunity but why should Black give him the choice?

> 9 cxd4 **⊉e**7 10 **②e2** 6)h6

Now Black's ideas include ...a5a4-a3, when if b3 in reply then ... Db4 puts the knight on an excellent post. A comparable plan can be seen in Ljubojević-Hübner, Wijk aan Zee 1986, which went 7... ¥b6 8 g3 \$e7 9 ②e2 0-0 10 \$h3 cxd4 11 cxd4 a5 12 0-0 a4. Ljubojević responded with 13 a3 ¥a7 14 ¥c2 whereupon Hübner went wrong with

14...f5? when both Ljubojević's 15 exf6 and 15 g4 look good. In Informator 41, Hübner provides detailed analysis to show that Black should ignore the threat of f5. His main variation is 14... 4b6! 15 f5 4c4 (D).



W

Now after 16 f6? gxf6 17 exf6 \$xf6 18 \$h6 Øxd4 19 Øexd4 2xd4+ 20 \$\dot{\$\dot{\$\dot{\$\dot{\$\dot{}}\$}}\$1 \$\dot{\$\dot{\$\dot{\$\dot{\$\dot{}}\$}}\$21 \$\dot{\$\dot{\$\dot{\$\dot{}}\$}\$5 22 **≜**xg7 **\$**xg7 23 g4 h6! 24 gxf5 hxg5 25 fxe6 We3! it seems that Black has defended successfully and should win. Therefore White does best to play safely with 16 \$\ding{\deck}g2\$ or 16 \$\ding{\deck}h1\$ when 16...exf5 17 2xf5 2xf5 18 豐xf5 豐b6 prepares to bring the queen over to the kingside for defensive duty if it proves necessary. Chances would then remain balanced.


11 h3

White prepares an immediate g4. Instead in the game Tagnon-McDonald, Cappelle la Grande 1991 White tried 11 0-0 when play continued 11...0-0 12 \$\psi h1 \&d7 13 \pm g1 \&e8 14 h3 皇g6 15 ②g5?! 皇xg5 (Black could also play 15... \$\mathbb{U}\$d7 preparing for a long siege) 16 fxg5 and now 16... \$\mathbb{U}\$e8! 17 \$\mathbb{L}\$b1 (intending \$\mathbb{U}\$f4) 17... \$\mathbb{L}\$h5 18 g4?! fxg4 19 \$\mathbb{U}\$f4 (19 hxg4 \$\mathbb{L}\$xg4!) 19... \$\mathbb{L}\$xf4! 20 \$\mathbb{L}\$xf4 gxh3 would have favoured Black.

All according to plan. Ye thinks White should prefer the restrained 12 a3 answering 12...a5 by 13 b3 a4 14 b4, but in any case after the subsequent 14...ad7 preparing ...ac4 and ...ac8 Black has little to fear unless White reverts to the g4 plan.

12 ...
$$a5(D)$$

12... h4+ would be wrong since after 13 \$\delta f1\$, Black would have to retreat the bishop to save it from capture after g5. Then White's king would be safer on h1 than e1 after \$\delta g2\$, \$\mathbb{Z}g1\$ and \$\delta h1\$. It is important to note that 12...g6 would be far too passive, providing White with a target on g6 and stopping Black from playing his bishop to g6 or h5 later.



W

13 a4

Here Clarke-McDonald, Dublin 1991 went 13 會f2?! a4 14 gxf5 exf5 15 h4 单d7 16 单e3 ②b4! 17 ②g3 (17 单b1 ②c4 18 单c1 a3 19 b3 ②b2! is excellent for Black) 17...②xd3+ (a very favourable exchange for Black) 18 豐xd3 ②c4 19 單ab1 a3 20 b3 ②b2 21 豐e2 豐b6 and Black (who threatens ...单b5) had a clear advantage.

The text-move restrains the further advance of the black a-pawn. However, it was perhaps better to safeguard his king with 13 0-0!? and follow up with \$\alpha\$h1 or \$\boxed{\sigma}\$g1. Black would then have continued with ...a4 or ...\$\alpha\$d7.

White's previous move has made this a fine outpost for the knight, since it can no longer be dislodged by a3.

Ye doesn't want to slow down his attack by playing 15 0-0 since it would then take two moves to get the rook to g1. Nevertheless, the king proves so exposed on f2 that Ye plays it to the h-file anyway, thus spending four moves rather than three to achieve the desired set-up.

As described in the general observations at the start of the chapter, Black counters the pressure along the g-file by bringing his bishop over to g6.


18 **⊈**h2?!

18 \$\dotsh1\$ was better.

18 Ձg6 19 **②c3 幽e8!** 20 De1 **幽f7**

Black's queen manoeuvre has further bolstered the kingside.

21 \mathbb{Z} g2 (D)



В

White's attack has ground to a halt and Black can now seize the initiative on the kingside.

> 21 fxg4 22 \(\precent{\precen ₩xg6 ₩h6+ 23 hxg4

If White's king were now on h1 (see the note to move 18), this check could be countered by 24 單h2 豐g6 25 單g2 豐h6+ drawing by repetition.

24 **⋭**g1 g5!

This breaks up White's kingside pawn structure and gives Black a clear advantage.

> 25 **\mathbb{H}h2** ₩g6 **II**f7! 26 De2 27 **Za3!**

The rook arrives in time to stop a complete collapse on the kingside.

> 27 \mathbb{\math 28 **ℤah3** gxf4

29 ②xf4 **幽b1!**

Here after 29... \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf4?! 30 \(\mathbb{L}\)xf4 罩xf4 31 罩xh7+ 豐xh7 32 罩xh7+ \$\delta \text{xh7 33 \Qg2 \Beta f8 34 g5 (stopping)}\$... g5! dominating the g2-knight) exposed black king should give White enough counterplay to secure a draw. Short's move should win easily because there is no defence to 30... **二**xf4. If 30 **白**e2 then 30... **二**f1+ 31 ★g2 ¥e4+ wins easily.

30 包c2 **\$g8?** 30... ■xf4 wins after 31 ■xh7+

當g8 32 單h8+當f7 33 g5 當e8!, etc. 31 **②**a3!

White finds an unexpected drawing resource...


> 31 ... ₩a1 **豐xa4?** 32 Øc2

...which becomes a winning attempt. There was a choice of draws by repetition after the mundane 32... **對**b1 33 **②**a3, etc., or the spectacular 32... 2xc2 33 對xc2 互c8 (33... **以**xf4 34 **以**xh7#) 34 **以**g6+! \$f8 (34...hxg6?? allows mate in two) 35 ②xe6+ \$e8 36 ②g7+, etc. (Ye Jiangchuan).

> 33 b3! **營c6** 34 ②xb4 axb4 35 g5! (D)

Suddenly White is in control. Now Black should try 35... Xxf4 when there is no obvious win for White, e.g. 36 & xf4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf4 37 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xh7 (37 \(\mathbb{W}\)h5? ₩c1+ mates first) 37...\$xg5 38 \(\mathbb{L}\)h8+ 會g7 39 **2**2h7+ 會g6 and 40 營h5+ 會f5 41 單f7+ 當e4 or 40 單g8+ 當xh7 41 里xg5 里h4 42 Wd3+ 含h8 43 Wg6 **營**c1+.

> 35 £xg5?



B

Now Black gets into a fatal pin along the g-file.

36 **里g2** h6 37 **里xh6 里g7** 38 **夕g6 单xh6**

The lesser evil is to give up the queen, but it is hopeless all the same.

39 ②e7+ 曾f7 40 ②xc6 罩xg2+ 41 曾xg2 罩g8+ 42 曾f2 息xc1 43 智h5+ 曾g7 44 ②e7 罩f8+ 45 曾e2 罩f7 46 智g4+ 曾f8 47 ②g6+ 1-0

Game 12 Short – Psakhis Moscow OL 1994 Classical Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	②c3	Df6
4	e5	包fd7
5	£Λ	

5 ②ce2 c5 6 c3 ②c6 7 f4 營b6 8 ②f3 transposes into a line analysed earlier, in Game 9.

5	•••	c5
6	包f3	②c6
7	҈e3	營b6

For other moves here, see the following chapter.

8 **②**a4 **₩**a5+ 9 c3

Now White threatens 10 dxc5 when Black dare not recapture with a piece because of the b4 fork. So Black has to choose between a very passive and a very aggressive line. Unfortunately for Black the aggressive line seems dubious: 9...cxd4 10 b4 2xb4 (retreating the queen leaves Black in an unpleasant bind after 11 2xd4 so this piece sacrifice is more or less forced) 11 cxb4 2xb4+ 12 three pawns for the piece and a solid position, but is his position really good enough? In the game Short-Timman, Amsterdam 1994, Black tried to destroy White's centre with 13...g5 but was soon in serious difficulties after 14 \(\mathbb{L}\)b1 gxf4 15 \(\mathbb{L}\)b5 **罩b8** 16 ②c5 豐c3 17 ②d3.


> 9 ... c4 10 b4!

Against a routine move, for example 10 \(\mathbb{L} e2 \), Black intended to continue 10...b5, when 11 \(\mathbb{L} c5 \) \(\mathbb{L} xc5 12 \) dxc5 b4 attacking c5, is evidently good for Black. So Short rules out this possibility.

10 ... 響c7 11 象e2 象e7

If 11...b5, then 12 ②c5 and Black has the unenviable choice of either tolerating the knight on its outpost or giving White the better pawn structure after 12...②xc5 13 bxc5 (or 13 dxc5, when d4 is a good square for White's pieces).

12 a3! (D)



В

A subtle move. It would be natural to castle, but Short sees that the best way to exploit his space advantage is to keep his king in the centre and prepare a wing assault against Black's kingside. Such an attack would culminate in the breakthrough f5, which may require preparation by g4 and the support of White's king's rook on the g1-square. The white king's presence on the kingside would only interfere with such an attacking operation.

12 **f**5

A critical moment. It seems Black has no fully satisfactory continuation. A survey of his possible plans will clarify this. First, if 12...b5 then the answer is still 13 \$\omega\$c5 as in the note at move 11. Another alternative is 12...b6 intending 13... 2b7 and 14...0-0-0. However, although the king would be very safe on the queenside, Black's basic problem would remain how to meet White's positional threat of f5.

Nor would 12...f6 help much, since after 13 \dd (for example)

13...fxe5?! 14 fxe5 Black's game is still congested and an attempt at freedom with the piece sacrifice 14... ②dxe5? is doomed to failure as it hardly disrupts White's game at all: after 15 dxe5 2 xe5 16 0-0, Black can resign. In fact, in playing 12...f6, Black would actually be helping White in his quest to open lines on the kingside.

If we compare the situation in the diagram above with those positions usually reached in the Tarrasch Variation with 5 f4, it will easily be understood why Black's chances are in this instance so unpromising. Here, Black has failed to achieve any counterplay against White's queenside or the d4-square. White's queenside is totally solid and without weakness. Black has no activity, and can only plan to build a solid defensive fortress and await White's attack. He begins this with 12...f5, blocking the further advance of White's f-pawn in direct style, but now the f5-pawn can be undermined.

Nevertheless, we shouldn't exaggerate the size of White's advantage. He may have all the chances to play actively, but on the other hand if Black defends resolutely there is no good reason why he should lose. In the early days of French theory, the great world champion Botvinnik often undertook to defend such positions where Black had closed the game with ...c4 (though admittedly not usually this passively). He handled them with virtuoso skill, and even occasionally won when White overpressed!

13 **Eg1**

A critical moment. White had a choice of two approaches to engineer a breakthrough with g4. The first was the one carried out by Short in the game: he plays 13 \(\mathbb{\mathbb{H}}\)g1 and 14 g4. This allows him to achieve strong pressure with his rook down the g-file. However, there is a drawback to this plan since after 14...fxg4 the f5-square no longer has any white pawn protection, and rather than a possible breakthrough square for White's attack eventually becomes a strong point for an enemy knight.

The alternative plan was to leave the rook on h1 and play 13 h3!?. This aims to play g4 without giving up pawn control of f5 after the sequence 13...包f8 14 g4 fxg4 (now a very bad move) 15 hxg4; White can build up for an f5 advance. Black would do better to answer 14 g4 with 14...g6 in this sequence, but then after 15 Wd2 or another non-forcing move the f8knight would have little scope. White's plan would involve moves such as 2f2 and 2h4, exchanging off Black's good bishop; 2b2-d1-e3, deploying the knight to its best square; and only then gxf5, when the reply ...exf5 is answered with a quick h4 and h5, attacking g6. The alternative recapture ...gxf5 meets with a breakthrough by the rooks on the g-file.

Note that White would make every possible strengthening of his position before releasing the tension with gxf5. One reason is that after the plausible recapture ...exf5, Black gains the e6-square for his knight, and White doesn't want to allow him this luxury until it is absolutely necessary.

Finally, Black could try 14... 296, but then 15 gxf5 exf5 16 h4! (ruling out the attempt to ease his congestion by 16... 2h4) gives White strong play. Whichever plan was better (and it is by no means clear), Short's decision to delay castling was fully justified, since the white king's rook's optimum square proves to be either g1 or h1.


White could still play 14 h3 and 15 g4 as in the other plan, when 14... 2 g6 15 g4 2 h4 16 2 xh4 2 xh4+17 2 d2 2 d8!? (avoiding being trapped with 18 g5) is one possible continuation.

This exposes the g-pawn to a possible h4-h5 attack and takes away the g6-square from the f8-knight. Nevertheless, it was difficult to avoid and at least has the virtue of fortifying f5.

16 **£f2!**

This good positional move clears the e3-square for the a4-knight and prepares 2h4, thereby carrying out the thematic exchange of Black's 'good' dark-squared bishop.





B

continue 20... Wa7! threatening to capture twice on b4. Thus White would probably be compelled to block things up with 18 b5 2a7 19 a4. However, it is doubtful if his kingside pressure alone would then be sufficient to win the game. White needs to keep the possibility of pressurising Black on both wings: that is the way to exploit the greater mobility of the pieces that a space advantage confers. However, Psakhis evidently had no wish to be tortured in such a position.

17 **⊈d7** 18 a4 **a6**

It was still possible to play 18...a5 when after 19 b5 (forced since 19 axb5? is clearly bad after 19... 2xa5 and then 42b3) 19...42d8 should be sufficient to hold the game.

₩b1 **幽h7** 19 20 4)d1 **b5!** 21 axb5

A blocked position doesn't appeal to Short and so he avoids 21 a5. Now, however, Black has a chance to activate his game...

21 ... axb5?

A routine recapture. Instead the alternative 21... 響xb5! keeps the apawn to stab at White. After 22 2e3 a5 23 bxa5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xa5 24 \(\mathbb{Q}\)d1, as given by Short, Black is unlikely to have any problems, e.g. 24... ₩a6 25 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xa5 Wxa5 attacking c3. Looking back, it will be seen that Black could have avoided 18...a6, and begun the sequence with ... b7 and ... b5! one move earlier.

Few positions can survive total passivity, but at least the reader gets a valuable lesson in positional play, since White is, as they say, 'playing without an opponent'. All his ideas are therefore crystal clear.

> 22 De3 **¤xa1**

Giving up the open file looks wrong, but things were already unpleasant. For example, if 22... Ig8 23 Ïg1 Ig7, 24 f5! looks strong.

23 Wxa1 &b.⊈ 24 **⊈**d2

The king gets out of the way of a manoeuvre to bring the g4-rook over to the queenside, and defends the e3knight.

€)e7 24 25 **食h4**


Finally carrying out the thematic exchange of bishops.

> 25 **2**15 .⊈xd8 &bxæ 26 g8 27 **ℤg1 ≜d1!** 28 Ïg7 29 **2**.c2

The bishop has been re-deployed to the most open diagonal on the whole board. Now Black has to reckon with 30 2xf5, since knights are more valuable in blocked positions than bishops. However, White would hesitate to play this move since it opens up e6 for the 'dead' knight on f8. Most likely Psakhis played his next move because he couldn't find any constructive plan.

White's plan is to attack g6, using the h-pawn as a battering ram. First he brings the queen to h6.

_	_	
31	***	₩e7
32	₩g3	\$c8
33	Z a1	&c6
34	營h3	Ġ b7
35	₩h6	Zg8
36	h4	£e8
37	≝ g1	₩g7
38	≝g5 (D)	



В

38 ... h5

A horrible move to have to make, but otherwise 39 h5 is crushing, e.g. 38...\$c7 39 h5 \$b7 40 \$\overline{\Phi}\$h4 \$\overline{\Phi}\$c8 41 f5! and Black will be mangled. Now, however, the weakness on g6 and the massive dark square holes are fatal.


39 **幽d8**

White's king can only penetrate along Black's weak dark squares if the queens are exchanged. Therefore White needs to bully Black into exchanging queens by the threat to attack down the a-file with 40 \(\mathbb{Z}\)al, etc. If earlier Black had taken his chance to block the queenside, such a plan would now be unavailable to White. But it is too late for regrets...

This breakthrough proves decisive.

42...exf5 43 &xf5 &f7 44 &h3 &e6 45 &g5 &xh3 46 &xh3 &e6 47 If1 Ia8 48 If7+ (in Chess Monthly, Hodgson gives this move as 48 If2, and then wonders why 48...Ia3 wasn't played!) 48...&c6 49 If6 &d7 50 &f4 &xf4 51 &xf4 &c7?! (here 51...Ia3 was a better fighting chance according to Short, but White would still win after 52 Ixg6 Ixc3 53 Id6+, etc.) 52 Ixg6 If8+ 53 &e3 If1 54 Id6 Ih1 55 Ixd5 Ixh4 56 Ixb5 Ih3+ 57 &e4 1-0

4 Classical Centre




5 e5 2 fd7), we have the standard cramping pawn centre but with White, temporarily at least, unable to support his centre with c3. Therefore, a quick ... c5 advance by Black will dissolve White's pawn occupation of d4.

If we assume White bolsters his important e5-pawn with f4, we have the distinct pawn structure of the Classical and Steinitz variations:

General observations

In Chapter 1, we examined positions where White played an immediate 3 e5. We saw that an integral part of White's plan was to answer ...c5, attacking his centre, with c3, maintaining a pawn on d4. In Chapters 2 and 3, White also established his cramping pawn chain, but this time (usually) after the preliminary moves 3 2 d2 2 f6, and only then 4 e5. Again, it was an important part of White's strategy that he could answer a subsequent ...c5 with c3, keeping his pawn centre intact.

In the present chapter, we look at positions that most typically arise when White plays 3 ②c3. This is a natural and good developing move, but after the reply 3...②f6 (3...②b4 is the subject of the following two chapters) 4 e5 ②fd7 (or 4 ②g5 ②e7



We see that White has kept his e5-pawn and therefore has a space advantage in the centre. However, the elimination of his d4-pawn means that Black's pieces have more freedom of action than lines in which White retains a pawn on d4. Notably, they have access to the c5-square and it is possible that Black will be able to take advantage of White's slight weakness along the a7-g1 diagonal.


Furthermore, the e5-pawn, which is deprived of its 'natural' d4 defender is vulnerable to dissolution by ...f6, when White's space advantage will evaporate. However, there is a big plus point for White in the position: the d4-square.

The fight for d4


It is clear that the d4-square is an excellent square for a white knight. Here it would be safe from pawn attack and well centralised. If White can establish a knight on this square unmolested by the black pieces, then he will have good chances. Therefore Black will naturally try either to exchange off this knight or, once it reaches d4, make life uneasy for it. To this end, he will play moves such sometimes he will avoid the immediate capture ... c5xd4 to delay the arrival of the knight on the d4-square. In reply, White will bolster the d4knight with a development such as ♠e3, ₩d2 and 0-0-0 (bringing the queen's rook to the defence on d1).

If in the next diagram Black exchanges three times on d4, he will ease his game. Nevertheless, the continued possession of d4 will still be a trump for White: any white piece, if unchallenged, would thrive on this centre square. Even the king would be well placed there in an endgame. However, we repeat that it is best of all to have a knight on d4.

Black's queen bishop is his problem piece in this structure. It is notably the only minor piece which




cannot join in the fight for d4. Above all, Black must avoid exchanging off pieces too quickly when he may be left in a bad bishop endgame. The worst scenario is shown in the diagram below:



Such an endgame is without prospect for Black since his bishop can attack nothing and his dark squares are very weak. In the diagram, it is too late to do anything except put up stubborn resistance, but in the discussion below we will show how Black can try to activate this bishop before things get so bad.

White's kingside attack


White often castles queenside, consolidates his hold on the centre, and then, assuming Black has castled kingside, begins a direct assault on Black's king. This attack can take three distinct forms. First, White can launch an all-out pawn onslaught using all his kingside pawns.



Secondly, White can play f5! planning f6 and Wg5 with a quick mate. If Black replies ...exf5, then N(c3)xd5 will break up Black's centre. Alternatively White may have played his king's rook to g3 (via h3) and after ...exf5 continue **營h6** with a winning attack.

Incidentally, we should point out that White's king's rook is often excellently placed on the third rank, where it is ready for operations on the kingside, queenside or in the centre. Therefore, the manoeuvre h4 and \(\mathbb{I}\) h3 is well worth noting.


White's third attacking method is the famous 'Greek Gift' sacrifice. White plays &xh7+ when ... \(\delta \) xh7,



②g5+ 含g8, Yd3 (or Yh5 if the queen is on d1) followed by Wh7+ hounds the black king. Whether this is good or bad for White depends on the specific tactical circumstances.


Black plays ... f6

This good all-purpose move liquidates the e5-pawn and so negates White's Greek Gift idea.



However, Black has to make sure that after the exchange exf6 響xf6 (or a recapture with another piece), he has enough piece activity to fight for control of the central dark squares, d4 and e5. Otherwise, White may gain a strong dark-square bind in the centre, in which case the d5- and e6pawns will be sickly and vulnerable.

Black's queenside attack



If White does castle queenside (in preparation for a kingside attack), Black can make use of his queenside pawns and the half-open c-file to launch a rival attack on White's king, by utilising the half-open c-file, his queenside pawns and/or his knight pair via the key squares c5 and c4. It has the added virtue that, if Black achieves the advances ... b4 and ... a5, the problem bishop on c8 can emerge to active play via a6. Very precise calculation is needed in such a tactical race, which bears some of the hallmarks of certain lines of the Open Sicilian.

By leaving his king in the centre (where it is fairly safe behind the blocked pawns), Black rules out the Greek Gift and reduces the value of White's advances such as f5. The immediate utilisation of the queenside pawns either dissuades White from castling queenside (in which case Black can castle kingside with no fear of a pawn attack) or, if White persists in castling queenside, places the white king speedily under attack. Sometimes Black even castles queenside. This can wrong-foot the white set-up, which is geared to attack on Black's kingside after the anticipated ...0-0. At the time of writing, theory regards this as one of Black's most promising approaches to the Classical centre.


White castles kingside

This is a more modest approach to the position than 0-0-0. White renounces any attempt to mate his opponent with a direct pawn attack. Instead, he simply develops and waits for Black's ...f6, which is more or less necessary if Black is to break White's pawn hold on the centre. Then White hopes that after e5xf6, he can utilise the e5-square as an outpost square for a knight. It is not all plain sailing though: the f4-pawn leaves the dark squares around White's king slightly weak, and furthermore, if it has to be defended by g3, then this also means rather weak light squares.

White avoids f4

So far we have considered positions in which White supports his pawn on e5 with f4. However, sometimes he avoids this advance and instead bolsters his pawn with £f4. The advantage of this method is that the weakness created on the a7-g1 diagonal after f4 is avoided. Also, the c1-bishop isn't shut in behind its pawns, as is the case after f4.

Aron Nimzowitsch was particularly fond of this set-up and used it to illustrate his principle of over-protection, to which we have already alluded in Chapter 2. In My System, he wrote that just as "we have the enigmatic circumstance that blockading squares prove themselves as a rule to be in every respect good squares; and the pieces detailed for dull blockade duty find, unexpectedly, their reward in the possibility of a heightened activity from their blockading station, just as in a fairy-tale where good deeds are always rewarded. The idea of over-protection is ... no other than that ... though in an expanded form", i.e. each piece used to protect the chosen strong point (here e5) will more than likely find itself well placed for the ensuing play.



The strategic drawback here is that White's space advantage in the centre can easily be eliminated by a timely ... f6. There are tactical disadvantages too: Black can play ... 2e7g6, gaining time by attacking the f4-bishop, or perhaps disrupt White with ... \begin{aligned} \begin{aligned} \text{with in b6}, attacking b2. Also, after \end{aligned} \end{aligned} ...f6 and the opening of the f-file, the f4-bishop may find itself the target of a rook on f8.

Illustrative games

Game 13 Kasparov - Timman Horgen 1995 Steinitz Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	包c3	 ∕∆f6
4	e5	②fd7
5	f4	

This is the standard move. It also follows the advice of the first world champion, Wilhelm Steinitz: "When you have advanced e5, support it as soon as possible with f4." White can instead choose to support the pawn with his bishop: 5 \$\Q\$f3 (the line 5 ②ce2 c5 6 c3 ②c6 7 f4 is analysed in the previous chapter) 5...c5 6 dxc5 ②c6 7 ♣f4. Then, the game Spassky-Petrosian, Moscow Wch (19) 1966 continued 7... 2xc5 8 2d3 f6 9 exf6 ②xf6 10 0-0 0-0 11 ②e5 **堂d7 12 ②xc6 皇xc6 13 豐e2 豐e7** (13...42e4!?) 14 Zae1 Zae8 15 Lg3 a6 16 a3 營f7 17 b4 皇d4 18 皇e5 鱼xe5 19 營xe5 ②d7 20 營g3 e5 21 f3 and now Black should have played 21... **当**f6!? or 21... **当**e7 with satisfactory chances.


> 5 **c**5 6 **Df3** 9)c6

Almost automatic, but at Tilburg in 1993, Korchnoi tried to bamboozle Beliavsky with 6... ¥b6!?. For a time, the game continuation justified the delayed development of the queen's knight: 7 20a4 (the only direct attempt to punish Black because 7 \(\ell \)e3 \(\tilde \)C6 transposes to normal lines; alternatively, Black could try to avoid main-line theory by answering 7 2e3 with 7...a6 8 2a4 ₩c6 or 7... 響xb2!?) 7... 響c6! 8 包xc5 包xc5 9 dxc5 &xc5 10 &d3 **쌀**b6 11 c3 a5 12 Wb3 and now Korchnoi should have played 12... 位c6 finally developing his knight, when chances are equal. Instead, he took one liberty too many, playing 12... Wa7?, avoiding the exchange of queens. Perhaps he hoped that he could exploit White's apparent inability to castle kingside. If White has to castle queenside then he will face a strong attack. However, Beliavsky found a clever way to seize control of d4 and get his king to the kingside: 13 \delta c2! (attacking twice on d4 allows \wxc8+) 15 \&e3 (fortifying d4; now 15... \Dxd4 16 cxd4 鱼xd4? loses to 17 ₩a4+) 15...鱼xd4 (if 15...0-0 then 16 包b5 **數b6** 17 is a good endgame for White) 16 cxd4 包b4 (not 16... 包xd4 17 營a4+, but Black must do something fast or White will consolidate with 17 当f2 and 18 0-0 when he has a space advantage and the two bishops) 17 2b5+

&d7 18 &xd7+ &xd7 19 ₩a4+ &e7 20 0-0 (the defeat of Black's strategy) 20... Thc8 21 f5! and, because 21... 2c2 achieves nothing after 22 国ac1 ②xe3 23 營a3+ and 24 營xe3, White eventually exploited the precarious position of the black king to force a win.

7 **Qe3**(D)

We know that White aims to achieve firm control over d4 in the Classical centre so this move is natural and good. With the same idea, 7 2e2 has been tried, hoping to establish a knight on d4 after 7...cxd4?! 8 Dexd4, and if Black refrains from 7...cxd4, White may choose to set up an 'f4 central clamp' with 8 c3. However, in Yudasin-Glek, Tilburg 1994, Black responded with the vigorous 7...b5!. Now White has no effective plan since Black is ready to answer 8 c3 with 8...b4 followed by ... 2a6 and ... ₩a5. So Yudasin chose 8 a3 but, after 8... \(\mathbb{Z}\)b8 9 \(\mathbb{L}\)e3 b4 10 axb4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xb4, Black had plenty of activity on the queenside.



cxd4

For 7... \begin{aligned}
\begi Game 12 in the previous chapter. Black's main alternative is 7...a6. The idea is to utilise the queenside pawns to dissuade White from adopting the aggressive stance of queenside castling. If White perseveres with this plan, his king soon finds itself in danger. For example, Chandler-Andersson, Haninge 1988 went 8 **幽**d2 b5 9 dxc5 (if 9 0-0-0 then 9...c4 intending 10...b4 looks strong) 9... 全xc5 10 0-0-0?! 習b6 11 全xc5 ②xc5 12 &d3 b4 13 ②e2 a5 14 ②ed4 ②xd4 15 ②xd4 0-0 16 �b1 a4 and the black pawns were already menacing the white king.

Thus White does better to castle kingside. However, at the time of writing Black seems to achieve comfortable equality by forcing the exchange of light-squared bishops. For example, Mainka-Glek, Recklinghaven 1995, went 8 Wd2 b5 9 dxc5 皇xc5 10 皇xc5 ②xc5 11 營f2 營b6 12 \(\text{d} d \) 3 \(\text{d} e \) a5 14 0-0 \(\text{d} a \) 6 15 ing 17 2h5 - 16...g6 17 2e2 2b8 18 🔔 xa6 ② xa6 19 ② ed4 ② c5 led to unclear play in Lutz-Glek, Germany (the beginning of a bad plan; Glek recommends 18 ②b3 with equality) 18... Za7 19 g4? (our old friend the g4 advance, but here it is not properly supported by the white pieces and so merely leads to the break-up of White's kingside) 19... 20g6! 20 £xg6 fxg6 21 f5 Zaf7! and Black's pieces were poised to take advantage of the open lines on the kingside.

8 ②xd4 **⊈c5**

Far sharper is the alternative 8... 對b6. Then in Hübner-Korchnoi, San Francisco 1995, White's attempt at a knockout blow with 9 Dcb5 rebounded: 9...a6! 10 \$\alpha\$f5 \$\alpha\$c5 11 \$\textbf{xc5} [Editor's note: Nunn analysed 11 ②bd6+ 曾f8 12 豐h5 ②d8 13 **營h6+ 含e7 16 營g5+ as leading to** a draw] 11...2xc5 12 2bd6+ (12 ②xg7+ 含f8) 12...含f8 13 習h5? (13 ②xc8 was forced but Black is better) or die, as a retreat allows 14...\wxb2) 14... **營**b4+! (not 14... **含**xg7 15 **營**g5+ 當f8 16 營h6+ 當e7 {16...當g8? 17 ②e8} 17 当f6+) 15 c3 当xb2 16 2d1 豐xc3+ 17 罩d2 h6! 18 包ge8 包e4! and White resigned since after 19 ②xe4 dxe4 he cannot prevent both 20...e3 and 20... *xe8.


So White should reply to 8... 對b6 with 9 \delta d2. Now White threatens 10 ②xe6, which virtually forces Black to take the b-pawn. The question is how poisoned it is. The dose proved lethal in the game de Firmian-Hübner, Polanica Zdroj 1995: 9... 對xb2 10 罩b1 營a3 11 鱼b5 ②xd4 12 鱼xd4 &b4 13 罩b3 a5 14 a3 &e7 15 f5!? exf5 16 ②xd5 &h4+ 17 含d1 營d8? (17... **營xd2+18 含xd2 2d8!** defends satisfactorily according to de Firmian) 18 2)f6+!! (this amazing move leaves Black defenceless) 18...gxf6 19 exf6 0-0 (there was no way to avert the threat of 20 We3+ &f8 21 營h6+ 含e8 22 罩e3+ mating; de Firmian was planning to answer 19...h6 with 20 **岁**b4! intending 21 **罩**e3+) 20 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g3+! \(\delta\)h8 (or it is mate in two) 21

We have seen two complete games emanating from 8... Wb6: one is a crushing win for White, the other an even more crushing win for Black. You may be wondering why such attention is given to a sideline? No, we do not have a vendetta against Hübner, who happened to be the victim in both cases. Rather, we think he is to be praised for testing the most critical variations and thereby developing theory in the process. Instead, we wish to warn of the danger of playing a sharp line with insufficient knowledge. If a super-grandmaster such as Hübner can be beaten so quickly, then care is obviously needed!

9 ₩d2 &xd4

This leads to a simplified position with a small edge to White. Instead, 9...0-0 would maintain the tension. Kasparov-Short, Amsterdam 1994, continued 10 0-0-0 a6 11 h4 2 xd4 12 **≜**xd4 b5 13 **≌**h3 b4 14 **②**a4 魚xd4 15 xd4. Here Short played the logical 15...f6, planning to break up White's centre, but unfortunately for him there was a tactical flaw. Af-parently all is well for Black) 18 f5!!, Short was left facing a typical Kasparov attack, since 18...exf5? 19 **營xd5+ wins, as does 18... 營xf5 19** 置f3 曾g4 20 罩xf8+ ②xf8 21 ②b6. So Short tried 18... 對h6+ but 19 當b1 罩xf5 20 罩f3 罩xf3 21 gxf3 徵f6 22 鱼h3 當f7 23 c4! proved too strong. Black was unable to develop his pieces as the a4-knight, rather than misplaced, was always ready to swoop into b6 should Black try …包f8.

You should always remember to investigate the specific tactical features of a position before embarking on a plan. In our introduction, we pointed out the virtue of Black's ...b4 chasing the white knight 'offside' to a4. We also eulogised ... f6 to attack White's centre. In this instance, Short carried out both ideas and was soundly thrashed! However, it should be mentioned that the a4knight only became a monster because of 15...f6?. If Black had played 15... Ya5, answering 16 b3 with 16... **2**b7 and then 17... **2**c6, Black would have had adequate play. So the only 'culprit' was Black's 15th move – and Kasparov's brilliant play of course!



W

An interesting idea from the world champion. In the earlier game

Short-Timman, Novgorod 1995, White had tried 12 wxb6 but he achieved nothing against Black's active defence: 12... 2xb6 13 a4 \ 2e7! (the king is needed in the centre) 14 a5 42d7 15 g3 g5! (beginning to un-gxf4 17 gxf4 f6! 18 exf6+ 2xf6 19 单d3 单d7 20 包e2 單hg8 21 單hg1 \$d6 22 c3 and a draw was agreed. The f4-pawn is weaker than anything in Black's position.

Another idea is 12 4 b5, as seen in Gofshtein-Chernin, Brno 1993. After 12... 對xd4 13 包xd4, Black quickly fell into a bind: 13... \$\div e7 14 h4 h5 15 \(\mathbb{L}\)h3! (our familiar move but with a new twist) 15...a6 16 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c3! and Black couldn't free his game with 16... 4 b8 due to 17 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c7+ winning the b7-pawn after 17... dd7, so he tried 16... Za7 hoping to play 17... ②b8 next move. However, White maintained the pressure with 17 b4! ready to answer 17... 42b8 with 18 b5 axb5 19 \triangle xb5 and then 20 \square c7+, etc. Black was boxed in after 17...f6 18 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c7 fxe5 19 fxe5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)a8 (or else 20 ②c6+ follows) 20 c4 罩e8 21 cxd5 exd5 22 Zac1 but somehow wriggled out to a draw. After the game, Gofshtein suggested that Black should challenge the d4-knight as soon as possible: 13...a6 (ruling out Db5 ideas) followed by ...Db8, ...**≜**d7 and ...**∮**)c6.

Kasparov prefers to keep queens on the board.


€0c5 12

Black could win two pawns with 12... **幽xb2** 13 **以b1 幽a3** 14 **包b5** (or Black consolidates with 14... 響c5)

14... **營**xa2. Then after 15 **②**d6+ **쉏**f8 16 罩b3 (16 b4 a5! 17 b5 xc2) 16... 2c5, there is no clear line for White despite his evident pressure. However, snatching pawns against Kasparov is a risky business and it is no surprise that Timman declines the chance for glory.

> 13 0-0-0 **⊈d7** 14 **營d4!!**(D)

A paradoxical return to the centre. However, Kasparov realises that normal development with 14 \(\Delta\)e2 allows 14... 2a4! when after 15 2xa4 2xa4, the exchange of knights has freed Black's game and he is ready to attack c2 with ... \models c8.



B

14 ... **a6**

An interesting moment. According to his notes in Informator 65, Timman thinks this may be superfluous. During the game, he was apparently afraid of the line 14...0-0-0 15 17 \sum xd4 \& xa4 18 b5 wins a piece. However, in the calm of his study he concludes that 16... axa4 17 對xb6

axb6 18 2d3 is in fact only slightly better for White. But instead of 18 2d3, 18 b5 d4 (or 18...\$c7 19 Id4 Id8 20 h4 Id5 21 Id4 followed by Id4-a3 is ±; Editor's note: Black may be able to survive this; there is also 18...\$d7, which deserves attention) 19 2c4! (preventing 19...Id5) 19...\$c7 20 Id3 followed by Id3 is ±. Perhaps we can philosophise that a good player's intuition is often more dependable than his post-game rationalisation of why he played certain moves!

15 h4

Here 15 b4 would miss its mark after 15...②a4 16 ②xa4 營xd4 17 置xd4 皇xa4.

White has a ready-made attack on the black king after 15...0-0 16 h5 or perhaps better 16 f5!? intending 17 f6. Therefore Black prefers the relative safety of the queenside as the home for his king. Of course, his pawn structure there is loosened but on the other hand there are many black pieces at hand to offer their services to the king, and no threat of a white pawn storm.

16 Zh3!

The standard manoeuvre to bring the king's rook into active play. Now Black has to reckon with 17 ②xd5 exd5 18 Zc3.

If he is given time, Black will play 17...\$c7 followed by 18...\$De4 with a good position. White's following manoeuvre is destined to prevent this, or at least to render it less effective. An important part of White's

plan is to deploy his knight to the key d4-square.

17 ②e2! 當b8


17... 含c7 allows White a small advantage after 18 單c3 ②e4 19 豐xb6+ 含xb6 20 罩b3+ 含c7 21 ②d4.

18	≝c3	②a4
19	營xb6	②xb6
20	②d4	≜d7

21 b3?!

Kasparov realises he has achieved all he can with his pieces and now tries to strengthen his position with his pawns. However, here, according to Timman, White should have increased his space advantage on the kingside with 21 h5. The text-move wastes an important tempo, which allows Black to re-deploy his knight to a more effective square.

This is not to stop ...g6, which is positionally unjustifiable, but to stop ...h5, which would be the strong reply to 22 g4?.



В

22 ... **©e**7

From here the knight is able to challenge its white counterpart with ... Dc6 but its main function is to deter a white breakthrough with f5 (after the preparatory g4).

23 g4

If White hadn't squandered a tempo with 21 b3 it would now be his move and he could play 2h3, answering ... \(\mathbb{I}\)df8 with f5, obtaining a good position.

> 23 #df8 24 g5!?

White still keeps an edge after 24 **②h**3 f6 25 exf6 (or 25 **□**e3) 25...**□**xf6 26 Zel.

Avoiding the trap 24...f6? 25 h6! when, as 25...fxe5 loses to 26 hxg7, Black has to enter a positionally lost game after 25...gxh6 26 gxf6.

25 **Zh3**

25...f6 is bad due to 26 exf6 gxf6 27 g6 e5 28 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e3! (or 28 g7). It is imperative for Black to break up the white pawn phalanx if he hopes to escape from his constricted position.

> 26 hxg6 **Dxg6** 27 \(\mathbb{Z}\x\)

27 gxh6 ②xf4 28 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h2 f6! is clearly good for Black since the h6pawn is indefensible after 29 exf6 ¤xf6.

②xf4? 27

Timman points out that 27... 異xh6 28 gxh6 \(\mathbb{L}\)h8 wins the h6-pawn and therefore equalises. It seems that Black was trying for the advantage by proving that the g5-pawn is weak.

> 28 &d3 **H**hg8 29 **Eg1** Ïg7 30 **\delta**d2 **¤fg8**

31 **Qh7!**

This unexpected blow is the refutation of Black's plan, as 31... \sum xg5 32 If1! wins material.

> 31 Xh8 32 **∲e**3?

White would maintain a small advantage after 32 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)gxh7 33 ¤xf4 (Timman).

32	•••	≌hxh7
33	¤xh7	≝xh7
34	Ġxf4	∐h4 +
35	≝g4	äh1

Of course Black avoids the bad bishop versus good knight endgame after 35... \(\mathbb{Z}\)xg4+? 36 \(\delta\)xg4. Instead he activates his rook, preparing to attack the white queenside pawns as quickly as possible.

> 36 **Df**3 ¤c1 37 **Eg2 \$c7 \$**d8 38 a4

The black king rushes over to the kingside to dissuade any attempt at a breakthrough with g6.

> 39 **H**h2 **.**⊈e8 40 **⊈**e3 1/2 - 1/2

It is fortunate for Black that his rook is so well placed. Otherwise, the wretched light-squared bishop would seriously compromise his game. But all is well, and at this point Kasparov gave up the game as a draw since progress is impossible.

Game 14 Wedberg - Korchnoi Haninge 1989 **Classical Variation** 1 e4 **e6** 2 d4 d5

3 Dc3 **Df6** 4 **Qg**5

White aims to exchange darksquared bishops before playing e5. But this gives Black extra options. Black can (and often does) play 4...dxe4 escaping from the material in this chapter and reaching a position discussed in Chapter 7 (under the Rubinstein centre). Thus when White plays 4 \(\overline{\pi}\)g5, he has to be ready to play two completely different pawn structures. Furthermore, Black also has the less frequently used option 4... \$\\\\\$b4, which is discussed in Chapter 5 (under the Winawer centre). In contrast, after 4 e5 we definitely remain within the boundaries of this chapter.


> **⊈e**7 4 **创fd7** 5 **e**5

Occasionally 5... De4 has been tried here, but the variation 6 2xe4 dxe4 (6... 全xg5 7 包xg5 豐xg5 8 包f3 is rather passive for Black) 7 2xe7 豐xe7 8 豐e2 b6 9 0-0-0 (9 豐xe4 ₩b4+ and ... ₩xb2) 9... 2b7 10 g3! seems unsatisfactory for Black, because the e4-pawn is a liability after 11 \(\mathbb{Q} \) g2, and if 10...e3, 11 f3.

6 **≜**xe7

White can also choose to gambit a pawn with 6 h4!? 2xg5 (6...c5!? is very complex but probably equal) 7 hxg5 \wxg5. Then the game Khalifman-Gulko, Reykjavik 1991, continued 8 2h3 We7 9 2f4 2c6 10 **曾g4 ②xd4 11 0-0-0 ②f5 12 ②fxd5!** exd5 13 ②xd5 對xe5 with an unclear position.

> ₩xe7 f4(D)



B

White has reached the same kind of structure as in the previous game but with the dark-squared bishops already exchanged. There are several plus points to this. First, he has avoided his bishop being trapped inside his pawn structure by the f4 advance, when, theoretically at least, the dark-squared bishop becomes a 'bad' bishop. Moreover, the exchange of bishops has disposed of Black's 'good' bishop - the one that can fight for important squares such as d4 and slightly misplaced the black queen. The queen ideally wants to go to b6 (after ...c5) to attack d4 and b2, and so has been dragged off course to e7.

However, there are also disadvantages. First, as already mentioned, there is the practical difficulty that the move-order needed to reach this position gives Black extra options, in particular the popular 4...dxe4. Secondly, a big empire requires a lot of defenders, and conversely, a little kingdom can suffer through overpopulation. Thus, it is not entirely

logical for White, who is seizing a lot of space in the centre, to have eased the congestion in Black's position by an exchange of bishops. Why not keep the bishop to help defend the crucial d4-square? Theory has not vet reached a decision as to whether White should exchange bishops first or not. Perhaps both 4 2g5 and 4 e5 are equally good (and bad).

0-0

An important decision. The ideal strategic move for Black is 7...c5, striking immediately at the white centre. Unfortunately for Black, this would allow 8 45! when, in view of the twin threats of 9 2c7+ and 9 ☑d6+. Black is in serious trouble.

Therefore Black elects to castle. when he can follow up with ...c5 without worrying about 405. However, in committing his king so early, Black makes it easier for White to form a plan. Notably, a white pawn storm on the kingside would be much less effective if the black king were still in the centre, especially if castling queenside were still an option. Also, there would be no Greek Gift sacrifices with an early 2d3 and ⊈xh7+.

In view of this, Black has tried delaying castling with 7...a6. The reasoning is that 7...a6 not only prevents Db5 after ...c5, but it also prepares ...b5 as part of a queenside demonstration, assuming that White has castled queenside, as he usually does. Should things ever get dangerous for the black king in the centre, then ...0-0-0 is an option (though this is unlikely to be combined with ...b5). Usually, Black will eventually castle kingside after 7...a6, but he hopes that in not revealing so quickly where his king will live, he is reducing his opponent's possible attacking plans.

At Reykjavik in 1991, the American grandmaster Yasser Seirawan tried 7...a6 three times. All the games continued 8 包f3 c5 9 曾d2 包c6 10 dxc5 Øxc5.

Now Chandler played 11 0-0-0 when the value of 7...a6 over 7...0-0 became apparent: 11...b5! 12 2d3 b4 13 ②e2 a5 and in view of the menacing advance of Black's queenside pawns, White tried for counterplay with 14 f5. However, he ended up in a bad position after 14...②xd3+ 15 豐xd3 全a6 16 豐e3 全xe2! (it is a good sign for Black that he can get rid of his bad bishop) 17 響xe2 0-0! at last Black castles and the weakness of e5 gives him the advantage. White managed to scrape a draw but it wasn't pleasant for him.

The other two games continued 11 2d3 0-0. Then Hjartarson played 12 0-0 but this was well answered by 12...f5!. Now 13... മe4 is an intolerable threat, so White was forced to give up his space advantage with 13 exf6. After 13... 對xf6 14 g3 息d7 15 Hael. Seirawan claims that Black has full equality with 15...h6 (ruling out 2g5 ideas) followed by ... 2e8 and then ... h5 or ... and and ... 2 g6. Ljubojević did best, delaying castling, playing 12 We3 f5 13 exf6 ②xd3+ 14 劉xd3 劉xf6 15 g3 皇d7 16 包g5! 豐f5 17 豐xf5 置xf5 and only then 18 0-0-0 ±.

Df3 c5 **幽d2**


9 dxc5 normally indicates that White plans to castle kingside. One possible continuation is 9... 2xc5 10 夏d3 f6 11 exf6 豐xf6 12 g3 ②c6 13 0-0 全d7 14 營d2. White would like to gain control of the weak dark squares in Black's centre, maybe beginning with Zael followed by 2e5. However, Black's pieces are well mobilised and he should have nothing to fear as long as he plays actively. In the game Arnason-Bareev, Sochi 1988, Black went on to obtain excellent play by means of a pawn sacrifice: 14... 2xd3 15 cxd3 e5!? 16 Lae1 exf4 17 ②xd5 Wd6 18 ②xf4 食g4 19 豐e3 罩ad8 with dynamic play.

White's king is not altogether happy on the kingside in this variation: after the necessary g3 (to support f4) his kingside pawn structure is rather flimsy.

> 4)c6 10 $\operatorname{dxc5}(D)$

Also possible is 10 0-0-0 when in McDonald-Crouch, Douai 1992, Black played the radical 10...c4!?. This completely changes the normal course of the struggle, since the centre is now firmly blocked. In the game, White gained a strong attack: 11 Db5 (heading for d6 and mechanically blocking the advance ...b5) 11...單b8 12 h4 包b6 13 罩h3 âd7 14 Øc3! (a paradoxical retreat but the knight has served its duty on b5 - the advance of Black's b-pawn has been held up - and 14 20d6 20c8! helps Black after 15 Øxc8 ■fxc8 followed by ...b5, etc.) 14...\@a8?! 15 f5! and the threat of 16 f6! obliged Black to play 15...f6 when his central position collapsed after 16 He1 fxe5 17 2xe5 2xe5 18 Exe5 Exf5 19 置xf5 exf5 20 ②xd5, etc. Nevertheless, Black's idea to 'punish' White for omitting dxc5 is interesting and Black's play in the game above can almost certainly be improved.

In the game Larsen-Bareev, Hastings 1990/1, play continued along more normal lines: 10 0-0-0 cxd4 11 ②xd4 ②b6 12 豐e3 单d7 13 曾b1 빨c5 14 h4 里ac8 15 里h3 ②a5?! 16 ②b3! 豐xe3 17 單xe3 ②ac4 18 單f3 f6 19 exf6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf6 20 \(\overline{Q}\)d4 and White had an endgame advantage. A better bid for equality is 15... axd4 16 豐xd4 (16 罩xd4 ②a4!?) 16... ②a4!? exploiting the weakness of the c2square to force some favourable exchanges.



 \mathbf{B}


Wxc5 10 ...

The other recapture 10... 2xc5 also has its advocates, but it seems that White keeps the advantage after

11 0-0-0 a6 12 \delta b1 (or the immediate 12 全d3) 12...全d7 13 營e3!. This is a key move with many tactical points. First, White plans 14 2d3 followed by the Greek Gift sacrifice 15 &xh7+. Second, he is ready to answer 13... Zac8 with 14 f5! threatening to overload the black queen, which must guard the c5-knight, with a subsequent f6. Finally, after 13...b5 White has the interesting sacrifice 14 \(\mathbb{Z}\xd5!\)? exd5 15 \(\Omega\xd5\) followed by 16 對xc5 with the initiative. Nevertheless, this last variation is the one Black should probably choose. Instead, in the game Dolmatov-Draško, Sochi 1988, Black continued 13... Ifd8 and found himself in a worse endgame after 14 2d3 ②xd3+ 15 cxd3 (15 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd3 is also good) 15...f6 16 De2 fxe5 17 Dxe5 ②xe5 18 Yxe5 Yf6 19 ②d4 Yxe5 20 fxe5 \(\mathbb{I}\)f8 21 \(\mathbb{I}\)hf1, etc. Black has a bad bishop and White's knight is on an optimal square where it is well centralised and safe from attack. It is no wonder that the second player was slowly ground down.

The reader should compare this line with the note at move 7 above. It is apparent that 10... 2xc5 fits in much better if Black has postponed ...0-0, since then there is no Greek Gift sacrifice and Black has an extra move for a queenside pawn attack on White's king. This is well illustrated by the Chandler-Speelman excerpt at move 7, but as we also saw at move 7, White can delay 0-0-0 and wait for Black to castle, when the plan of ₩e3 and &d3 will once again be a good response to ... \Dxc5.


11 0-0-0 (D)



B

4)b6 11 ...

The Greek Gift sacrifice proved fatal for Black in Chandler-Agnos, London Lloyds Bank 1989, after 11...a6 12 2d3 b5? (he had to try something like 12... 4b4 or 12... 4e8) 13 &xh7+! 含xh7 14 包g5+ 含g8 15 **營d3 罩e8 16 營h7+ 含f8 (D).**




W

17 營h5! ②d8 18 ②h7+ 含g8 19 Id3 We7 20 Ih3 f6 21 公xf6+! ②xf6 (21...gxf6 22 營h8+ quickly mates) 22 exf6 and Black resigned because both 22... 對xf6 23 對xe8+ and 22... 当f7 23 營h8# are winning for White.

12 **②d4**

This is not White's most dangerous idea. Greek Gift themes are still critical. White can play a prophylactic 12 &b1 or immediately jump in with 12 &d3 &d7 13 &xh7+ 含xh7 14 **公**g5+ **當**g8 15 **劉d3 宣**fe8 16 營h7+含f8(D).



W

Black has the annoying threat of 會e7 18 豐xg7 豐e3+ 19 會b1 豐xf4 20 Ihf1 Ig8!, so Van der Wiel-Korchnoi, Amsterdam 1991 continued 17 罩he1 but, after 17... 当b4 18 營h8+ 含e7 19 營h4 含d8 20 ②xe6+ \$\delta c8\$, Black's king had escaped to the relative safety of the queenside. White still has attacking chances but Black eventually consolidated and won.

Thus it makes sense for White to play \$\delta b1\$ before sacrificing on h7. The position in the diagram above

but with the extra moves \$\displand\$ and ... Zac8 was reached in the game Sax-Timman, Rotterdam 1989. Like in Chandler-Agnos in the note to Black's 11th move, Sax continued with 18 Wh5. Timman replied with 18... \$e7!, a defence that was not available to Agnos as his knight was still on d7, allowing \wxf7+ \&d8, ②xe6+. After 19 ②xf7 ②a5! 20 **②**d6, a draw was agreed disappointingly early. Timman gives the possible continuation 20...\$\d8 21 f5 exf5 22 ②xe8 &xe8 23 豐xf5 with obscure play.

The other idea is Wh8+. Again returning to the diagram above, but this time adding the moves \$\ddots\$ b1 and ...a6, Sieiro-Gonzalez - Paneque, Cuba 1989, continued 18 Wh4!? 罩ec8 then 19 營h8+ 含e7 20 營xg7. With 20... We3+ not available, Paneque replied 20...當d8 21 豐xf7 豐e7 when, according to Paneque, 22 h4 is unclear. Instead, the game continued 22 **幽**g6 and Black consolidated and won after 22...當c7 23 h4 罩g8 24 劉d3 Zac8, etc.

So, assuming Black has played ... d7 before the Greek Gift sacrifice, he seems to have at least equal chances. Therefore, it is no surprise that White has tried more restrained methods to keep a slight advantage in the position. Besides 12 2d4 in our illustrative game, White has experimented with the manoeuvre ②c3-b5 hoping to jump in at d6. Z.Almasi-Sermek, Bukfurdo 1995 saw 12 单d3 单d7 13 曾b1 單ac8 14 ②b5!? f6!? (the black queen could find itself embarrassed for squares after 14...a6? 15 20d6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c7 16 c3! and 17 b4) 15 exf6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf6 16 \(\O\)bd4 \(\O\)xd4 17 Øxd4 Øa4 (the d4-knight is of course immune) 18 **②b3 數b6** 19 The1 and White achieved a good game by seizing control of the d4and e5-squares. Instead of 14...f6, 14... a4 is an interesting reply to 14 گاه5. Then the Greek Gift rebounds: 15 &xh7+ 含xh7 16 包g5+ 含g8 17 營d3 單fd8 18 營h7+ 含f8 19 營h8+ 會e7 20 營xg7 包xe5! (threatening ... 對xc2+ with mate to follow on b2) 21 營xe5 營xb5 and Black wins. Therefore White should probably answer 15 包d6, although 15... 數b6 16 c3 (16 c4!?) 16... \(\mathbb{Z}\)c7 gives Black counterplay.

12	•••	⊈d 7
13	Ġb1	Z ac8
14	҈e2	②xd4
15	豐xd4	₩a5?

Korchnoi is playing for a win and so avoids the exchange of queens. However, in the resulting middle-game, White's attack on the black king proves more potent than any counterplay Black can create on the queenside. Thus Black should have satisfied himself with 15... \subseteq xd4 16 \subseteq xd4 f6!, undermining White's centre and achieving equality.


The rook arrives in time to bolster the c3-knight and so rule out variations with ... ②a3+.

If 18...bxc4 then 19 f5 (threatening 20 f6) 19...exf5 20 🖾 xd5 is very strong.

19 **曾d2**

With the incidental threat of 20 ②xd5! 營xd2 21 ②e7+ 含h8 22 置xd2.

19	•••	b4
20	②e2	Zfc8
21	€)d4	營c7 (D)



W

22 **Zd3**

Black threatened 22... \(\sigma x d 4!\). So far Black has played the aggressive moves and White has had to defend precisely. But Black's attack with his heavy pieces is now stymied. The c2square is firmly defended and there are no other potential breakthrough points in White's position. Therefore Black now resorts to advancing his queenside pawns in an attempt to open lines. However, White can also begin a pawn onslaught against the black king and his chances of a successful outcome are far better as the kingside is denuded of black defenders. It is obvious in all this that White's knight is a far superior piece to Black's bishop. From d4, the knight can orchestrate both defensive and aggressive manoeuvres, while the d7-bishop can do little either to help his own king or attack White's.

> 22 23 **Ee1** а4 24 g4

At last White decides all is ready and begins his attack.

h6

This creates a target for White's pawn advance but if Black does nothing then White will continue (after allowing for the exchange sacrifice ... \(\mathbb{Z}\) xd4) with f5 and f6 followed by **\y**g5 and a quick mate.

> 25 h4 **幽**a7 **¤a8** 26 h5 27 hxg5 **g**5 28 f5! exf5

幽xg5! 29

So the white queen gets to g5 after all. This piece sacrifice leads to an unstoppable attack.

29	•••	¤xd4
30	ℤg3	g6
31	hxg6	≝g4
32	≅xg4	fxg4
33	gxf7+	⊈f8
34	₩h6+	⊈xf7
35	₩f6 +	1-0

After 35...\$e8, 36 \$\mathbb{Z}\$h1 leads to a quick mate.

Game 15 Hebden - McDonald British Ch 1989

Winawer Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	包c3	≜ b4
4	e 5	c 5

5 &d2

White plans to recapture on c3 with his bishop after ... 2xc3, thereby avoiding the shattering of his queenside pawns that occurs after 5 a3 ≜xc3+6 bxc3. However, the drawback of this move is that White, temporarily at least, neglects to fight for the d4-square. This should allow Black to equalise easily. Other types of Classical centre arise after:

- a) 5 a3 皇a5 6 b4!? (6 皇d2 公c6 7 ②b5 ②xd4! =) 6...cxd4 7 ②b5 (for 7 ₩g4, see Chapter 6) 7... 2c7 8 f4! ②h69 ②f3 皇d7 10 ②xc7+ 豐xc7 11 **2**d3 a6 12 a4! ± Atlas-Kindermann. Ptuj 1995.
- b) 5 dxc5 2c6 6 2f3 2ge7 7 \$d3 d4! 8 a3 \$a5 9 b4 \$\times xb4 10 axb4 &xb4 11 0-0 &xc3 12 \bullet b1 h6! 13 Ød2 &xd2 14 &xd2 &d7! 15 罩xb7 Qc6 16 罩b4 習d5 ∞ Hodgson-S.Arkell, London 1988.
- c) 5 \(\mathbb{g}\)g4 \(\overline{Q}\)e7 6 \(\overline{Q}\)f3 (6 dxc5 ②bc6 7 &d2 transposes to analysis at move 6 below) 6...cxd4 7 2xd4 ②g6! ∓.

9)e7

The most natural move. Instead, 5...cxd4 runs into trouble after 6 42b5 threatening 8 2d6+.

6 f4!?

Ouite a rare move. White has three alternatives:

a) 6 a3 is consistent since, after 6...\(\extit{\omega}\)xc3 7 \(\extit{\omega}\)xc3, White has acquired the two bishops without allowing the break-up of his queenside pawns. However, he cannot stabilise his centre in time to consolidate this positional advantage. For example,

Black won spectacularly in Ljubojević-Nogueiras, Wijk aan Zee 1987 after 7... 2bc6 8 2f3 cxd4 9 2xd4!? ②xe5 10 ②xe6 ②xe6 11 ②xe5 0-0 12 \(\text{d} d \) \(\text{Q} \) c6 13 \(\text{d} c 3 \) d4 14 \(\text{d} d 2 \) ②e5! 15 &xh7+? 含xh7 16 肾h5+ **\$g8 17 Yxe5 Ze8 18 Yg3 &c4+.**

- b) 6 ②b5 **Q**xd2+ 7 **W**xd2 0-0 8 c3 (after 8 dxc5 2)d7 Black regains his pawn with equality) 8... Dbc6 9 ②f3 a6, and since 10 ②d6 cxd4 11 cxd4 f6! 12 2xc8 (best) 12... xc8 favours Black, White has to play 10 2a3, when Black equalises after 10...cxd4 11 cxd4 2 f5 or 11...f6.
- c) 6 dxc5 ②bc6 7 劉g4 0-0 8 0-0-0 (better is 8 2d3 2g6 9 2f3 2xc5 10 0-0 ±) 8...包g6! (8...f5 9 exf6 罩xf6 10 \(\(\pa\)d3 e5 11 \(\begin{array}{c}\)b4 h6 12 \(\pa\)e4!? \(\infty\)) 9 2f3 2xc5 (9...d4! may be even better) 10 当h5! 皇d7 11 皇d3 2b4 12 **Q**xg6 fxg6 13 **W**g4 **Z**f5 14 h4 ♠e7! ∓ Harley-B.Martin, Cheltenham 1995.


6 ... **Dbc6**

Now White is obliged to give up his pawn occupation of d4.

7 dxc5

If 7 **②**b5, then 7...**皇**xd2+8 **豐**xd2 ②xd4 9 ②d6+? \$f8.

The bishop is no longer interested in attacking c3. Now Black has three pieces covering the vital d4 centre square. It is now Black who hopes to prove Nimzowitsch's maxim that pieces engaged in over-protecting a key centre square will find themselves well placed almost 'by accident' for other important tasks that arise in the course of the struggle.



W

9 **拿d3** 9)h4!

Not allowing 10 &xf5. Instead, after the exchange of knights on f3, Black remains in firm control of d4.

10 **幽e2**

In the game W.Watson-Harley, British Ch 1994, White improved with 10 ②xh4 豐xh4+ 11 g3 豐d8 (11... **省**h3!? W.Watson) 12 a3! stopping ... 40b4. The game then continued 12...f5?! 13 exf6 營xf6 14 營e2 0-0 15 0-0-0 **全**d7 16 **肾h**5!? (16 g4! is better) 16...g6 17 We2 2d4 18 **当g2 里ac8 19 h4 当e7 20 含b1 魚xa3!** 21 ②xd5! ±. Instead of castling kingside into an attack, Black should have followed the principles discussed in the notes to the previous game and considered 12...a6!? followed by ...b5 with good chances. If 13 ₩g4 then 13...\$f8!.

> 10 ••• Θ xf3+ **Yxf3** 11 9)h4!

After 11...0-0? 12 a3! (preventing ... 40b4) White would have a readymade attack on Black's king. So Black delays castling and instead seeks to eliminate White's strong

light-squared bishop. However, he doesn't hurry to carry out his idea of ... ②xd3+ since if the bishop retreats then other problems would loom for White.


> **⊈d7** 12 0-0-013 **♣b1 쌀b6** 14 **Zhe1** 0 - 0 - 0

If 14...0-0 then White would still have an attack, perhaps with 15 f5!? straight away. The black king is far much safer on the queenside, where it is surrounded by black defenders.

15 De2

If 15 \(\delta\)f1 then 15...\(\delta\)c6 planning 16...d4 looks awkward for White.

15	•••	②xd3
16	cxd3	\$b8 (D)



W

Having safeguarded his own monarch, Black now prepares an assault against the white king. The first stage in his plan is to double rooks along the c-file.

17	Zc1	ℤc8
18	⊈a1	≝c7
19	f5	ãhc8
20	g4	a5!

The real attack begins. Black uses his a-pawn to break up the white queenside.

> 21 **響f4** a4 22 fxe6 fxe6 23 d4

White has managed to regain the d4-square, but only with a pawn rather than a piece, and too late in the day.


> 23 **a3** 24 **≝**b1?!

24 b3 was better because now Black's onslaught proves irresistible.

24	•••	. €e7
25	bxa3	₩a6
26	營e3	≜b 5
27	2 f4	¤c2
28	Hec1	
29	Exc2	¤xc2
30	Wh3	

There was no good answer to the threat of ... \(\exicat{\psi} \c4.

單xd2 **30 營xb5** (D) 31



B 臭b2+! 31

A tactical trick which wins the white queen.

32 \widetilde{\pi}\text{xb2}

Or 32 罩xb2 罩d1+ 33 罩b1 豐xb5.

¤xb2 32 33 \$xh2 **g**5 0 - 1

Game 16 Ivanović – Beliavsky

Yugoslavia 1994 Wade Variation


1	e4	еб
2	d4	d5
3	e 5	c 5
4	c3	

Another Classical centre hybrid is reached after 4 2f3 2c6 5 2d3 cxd4 60-0. White is almost certain to regain the d4-pawn and then hopes to use the d4-square as an outpost for a knight. In Levenfish-Botvinnik, Moscow-Leningrad 1937, play continued 6... 2c5 7 4 bd2 4 ge7 8 4 b3 \$b69\$f4 Øg6 and now instead of 10 2xg6 fxg6!, White should have maintained the tension with 10 \(\Delta \) g3.

幽b6

Black plans to exchange the lightsquared bishops as soon as possible. After the main variation 4... \(\Ocdot \) c6 5 ②f3 单d7, White can play 6 dxc5!?, arguing that it is just too much trouble to defend the d-pawn and instead seeking to develop his pieces to healthy squares. In Dunworth-B.Martin, London 1995, play continued 6... 2 xc5 7 b4 2 b6 8 b5 2 a5 9 单d3 包e7 10 0-0 罩c8 11 a4 包g6 12 Ze1 0-0. As Dunworth pointed out after the game, White has kept his space advantage and has attacking chances on the kingside. On the other hand, his queenside, notably c3, is somewhat compromised. He cannot develop his b1-knight without dropping the c3-pawn. Here, Dunworth recommends 13 Za2!? intending Zae2 reinforcing the epawn, following Nimzowitsch's famous principle of over-protection. In the game, after 13 2a3 2c5 14 congested, though White later won a nice game through exploiting the dark-square holes in Black's centre. It is clear that 6 dxc5 deserves more attention.

> **创f3** 5 皇d7 (D)



W

6 **⊈e**2

It is difficult for White to stop Black's idea. 6 2 a3!? is possible but allows 6...cxd4 7 cxd4 2xa3 8 bxa3. while after 6 a4?! Black could successfully transfer to normal lines with 6... 20c6 7 2 b5!? cxd4 8 cxd4 a6 9 &xc6 bxc6 followed by a quick ...c5.

> **≜b**5 6


7 dxc5

88

A far sharper move is 7 c4!? when 7....皇xc4 8 皇xc4 豐b4+ 9 包bd2 dxc4 10 0-0 is a critical position. In Informator 61, Beliavsky recommends 10...cxd4 11 2xd4 2e7? for Black, but this loses to 12 a3! 營c5 13 ②e4 劉xe5 14 ②xe6! and Black has no good line, e.g. 14... 對xe6 15 Ød6+ \$d7 16 Øxf7+, 14...fxe6 15 ②d6+ 含d7 16 ②f7+ 省d5 17 省e2! ②bc6 18 \(\text{\ti}}\text{\tetx{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\texi}\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\text{\t In all cases Black is material down or facing a winning attack (or both). Black's alternatives at move 11 also seem unsatisfactory, for example the piece sacrifice line 11... 2d7 12 ₩e2 豐c5 (12... 全c5 13 a3) 13 ②xc4 豐xd4 14 單d1 幽h4 15 兔e3 is very dangerous for Black. If 15...0-0-0, then 16 2xa7, while otherwise 16 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d4, 16 possible. So instead of 10...cxd4, Black tried 10... 2c6 in Adams-Illescas, Las Palmas 1994. Nevertheless. White had a clear advantage after 11 dxc5 &xc5 12 a3 對b5 13 ②e4 ②ge7 14 **Qe3! Zd8** 15 **Ye2 Qxe3** (there is no choice) 16 **②**d6+ **罩**xd6 17 exd6 兔xf2+ 18 里xf2 包f5 19 里d1, etc.

Unless the line above is strengthened for Black, we suggest the interested reader play 6...cxd4 and only after 7 cxd4 continue 7....\(\text{\text{\text{\$\text{\$}}}}\) b5, when White has no option of c4. The slight drawback to this method is that White is able to play \(\text{\text{\$\tex{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$\text{\$

7	•••	≜xc5
8	0-0	.⊈xe2
9	₩xe2	幽a6 (D)



W


Black has achieved his objective of exchanging light-squared bishops, and now wants to swap queens. This will weaken any white initiative on the kingside, since Black's king will no longer be in serious danger of being mated.

10 **幽**xa6

An important decision. Should White have avoided the exchange of queens? A plausible refusal is 10 ₩c2 when the game could continue 10...包e7 11 单f4 包g6 12 单g3 (the bishop willingly entombs itself on g3, since it overprotects e5, and if Black tries to negate White's space advantage with a subsequent ... f6 then after exf6 the bishop will suddenly command a key diagonal; besides, the g6-knight is not so well placed either) 12...2c6 13 2bd2 0-0 14 h4 h6 (preventing the sacrifice h5 and h6!, which would break up the black kingside) 15 Zab1 (with ideas of b4 and b5) 15...b5 16 包b3 单b6 with an interesting game in prospect. White could try to prove that the queen is misplaced on a6.

After the exchange of queens, Black has to lose time bringing his a6-knight to a reasonable square. In the game White proved unable to exploit this, but only because he chose an inferior plan.

> 10 9)xa6 11 4)bd2 ②e7 (D)




W

White needs a plan in this position. An attack with pawns on the kingside is inappropriate, e.g. 12 g4 h5! 13 h3 (13 g5 allowing ... af5 is horrible but best) 13...hxg4 14 hxg4 **②g6 (14...f6!?) 15 ②b3 (guarding** f4 against invasion) 15...4 h4! 16 ②xh4 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xh4 and White either loses a pawn after 17 \(\Oxc5 \)\(\Square xg4+\) or has to play the ghastly 17 g5.

Attempts to use the f-pawn actively are also bad, for example 12 ②d4? 皇xd4 13 cxd4 罩c8, and Black will penetrate down the c-file. Or 12 ②b3 **2**b6 13 ②cd4 ②c6 14 f4 ②xd4 15 ②xd4 (15 cxd4 ②b4) 15... 2xd4+ 16 cxd4 ②b4! and the knight returns to active play with the awkward threat of 17...22c2.

A much more promising plan is to use his pawns to gain space on the queenside, e.g. 12 b4! 2 b6 13 a4! (D) and now:



B


- a) 13...d4 14 b5!? dxc3 15 bxa6 cxd2 16 axb7 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b8 17 \(\mathbb{L}\)xd2 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xb7 18 a5 (18 \(\mathbb{Z}b1 \) 18...\(\hat{\delta} d8 \) 19 \(\mathbb{Z}fb1 \) \(\mathbb{Z}xb1 \) 20 Exb1 and Black has a difficult position since White will attack the a7pawn before he can develop.
- b) 13... Ic8 14 \(\(\beta \) b2 0-0 15 \(\text{Ifc1} \). Normally such positions are good for Black - White has a backward pawn on an open file - but here two black minor pieces are bunched clumsily on the queenside. The black knight on a6 has trouble finding a good square: it is at least five moves away from ever getting to its ideal square, c4. Nor can Black easily double rooks against the c3-pawn, as both 15... Ic7 16 a5 and 15... Ic6 16 b5 lose a piece. The attempt to break out with 15...d4 is well met by 16 a5, while 15... Db8 (regrouping) 16 c4 gives White a clear edge. Finally, if 15... Ifd8 then 16 包b3 keeps the

advantage, e.g. 16... \(\mathbb{L}\)c4 17 a5 \(\mathbb{L}\)c5? 19 \(\alpha\)xc5 \(\mathbb{L}\)xc5 20 \(\mathbb{L}\)a3.

In the game White misses the plan of using his queenside pawns to constrict Black. Instead he opts for positional play in the centre. He plans first of all to gain control of the d4-square. Then he will gradually push his pawns on the kingside. However, he never succeeds in carrying out his plan – Black doesn't let him!

12 **2**b3 **2**b6 13 **E**e1 0-0

14 a4?! (D)



In the game this proves a pointless weakening of the queenside, but only because White avoids the natural follow-up. Instead, Beliavsky gives 14 \(\alpha \) e3 \(\alpha \) c7 15 \(\alpha \) c5 as leading to equality.

14 ... ②c6 15 单e3?

The consistent move is 15 a5 when 15...\$c7 16 \$\mathbb{H}\$a4!? is interesting. The trick 15 a5 \$\omega\$c5 would be unclear after 16 \$\omega\$xc5 \$\mathbb{L}\$xc5 \$\mathbb{L}\$xc5 17 b4 \$\mathbb{L}\$e7 18 b5, etc.

15 ... \&c7!

Avoiding the exchange of bishops, when White could prepare of fd4 and a kingside pawn advance. Now the e5-pawn becomes vulnerable.


16 Qf4

More or less forced, but now two white pieces block the f2-pawn, ruling out any kingside pawn advance.

16 ... \@ab8!

A well-known manoeuvre. The horse seeks greener pastures.

17 ②c5 b6 18 ②d3 (D)




В

Not only reinforcing e5, but also adding a defender to the bishop on f4, to discourage ...f6. It would be a cliché to say that Nimzowitsch would have been very proud of White's position since the e5-pawn is many times overprotected. But what else can the white pieces do?

18 ... ②d7 19 ②d4 ②a5! (D)

Another crucial avoidance of an unfavourable exchange: 19...\(\Omega\)xd4 20 cxd4, besides strengthening e5,

would open the c-file for White, and deprive the d7-knight of c5 (an important square, as the game will disclose).



W

20 b3?

White's use, or lack of use, of his queenside pawns has led to the gradual deterioration of his position. This move keeps the black knight out of c4, which is 'traditionally' the key square in this type of position. However, the c5-square is in fact more important here, so 20 b4! is better, when after 20... Dc4 Beliavsky recommends 21 \(\mathbb{Z}\) a2 \(\mathbb{Z}\)fc8 22 \(\overline{Q}\)c6 with complications. However, 21 2g3 looks more worthwhile than Beliavsky's 21 \(\mathbb{Z}\)a2, for example 21...\(\mathbb{Z}\)fc8 22 f4 g6! (he must prevent f5) 23 \$\dots h4\$ **2**d8 24 **2**xd8 **2**xd8 25 g4 **2**ac8 26 f5 and White has achieved his ambition of a kingside pawn attack.

> Ifc8 20 **£d8** 21 **¤ab1 ≜d2** ②c5! 22


The fortunes of this knight have improved dramatically. The threat is

now to jump in at e4, attacking c3 and d2, so White's reply is virtually forced.

23 ②xc5

This horrible-looking move fortifies Black's pawn centre and leaves the b3-pawn very vulnerable. Now Black has a strategically winning position.

> 23 bxc5(D)



W

2b5 \mathbb{\mathbb{Z}cb8} 24 25 b4

Another unpleasant move to have to make, but Black was threatening 25...a6.

> ②c4 25 26 **\$f4 g5!**

Giving the bishop a miserable choice of either being buried on the kingside after 27 2g3 h5 29 h3 h4 30 \$\darkappa h2, when it can't help the queenside, or retreating passively to c1, when it is more an obstruction than a useful defender.

> 27 **⊈c1** cxb4 28 cxb4 a5! h6! 29 h4


No chances for the opponent! White might gain some counterplay after 29...gxh4 30 2h6 and 31 2b3.

- 32 **兔e**3
- 32 Za1? allows 32...Zbxb5. So Black finally wins one of the weak queenside pawns.

He gradually exploited his advantage:

32... \(\mathbb{Z}\)xa4 33 \(\overline{Q}\)d6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xb1 34 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xb1 \(\overline{Q}\)g7 35 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b8 \(\overline{Q}\)xe3 36 fxe3 \(\overline{Q}\)e7 37 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b7 \(\overline{Q}\)xd6 38 exd6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)a8 39 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d7 \(\overline{Q}\)f6 40 \(\overline{Q}\)f2 \(\mathbb{Z}\)f8! 41 \(\overline{Q}\)f3 \(\overline{Q}\)e5 42 \(\overline{Q}\)g4 f5+! 43 \(\overline{Q}\)h5 (43 \(\overline{Q}\)xg5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g8+ and 44...\(\mathbb{Z}\)xg2) 43...f4 44 exf4+ gxf4 45 \(\overline{Q}\)g6 d4 46 \(\overline{Q}\)g7 \(\mathbb{Z}\)b8 0-1.

5 Winawer Centre



General observations

The pawn structure on the queenside is definitely in Black's favour. The c2- and c3-pawns are particularly weak; on the other hand, they provide more support for the central pawn chain (d4 and e5) than in other variations. White's compensation lies in the two bishops, especially the dark-squared bishop which has no rival (this makes it difficult for Black to defend the a3-f8 diagonal and the g7-square), the kingside space advantage created by the strong e5pawn, and the open b-file. As a result Black is particularly eager to reach the endgame in this variation, when his advantages should at the very least cancel out White's; but first of all he must survive the middlegame.


These factors explain why it is unusual nowadays for White to play an

early f2-f4 in this variation, although it was played in early games with this line. The move f2-f4 places a pawn on a dark square, where White already has control, and supports an already strong point on e5. White would generally only play f2-f4 with the intention of f4-f5 as a quick follow-up, and that will not be easy with Black's knight on e7 and bishop on c8 or d7.

In My 60 Memorable Games, Fischer wrote "I may yet be forced to admit that the Winawer is sound. But I doubt it! The defence is anti-positional and weakens the kingside." Yet his results against the variation were not overly convincing, so the debate goes on.

The a4-square


The advance a3-a4 has always been one of White's key ideas in this line. The idea is to grab the a3-f8 diagonal by playing the dark-squared bishop, or sometimes the queen, to a3. With no black dark-squared bishop to counter it, the a3-bishop can exert immense pressure: on the c5-pawn, often forcing ...b6 or ...c4; on e7 and f8 if Black castles kingside; coming in on d6 or c5 if Black castles queenside. Incidentally, the a4-pawn can support a bishop on b5 and help in a queenside attack directly after a4-a5.




Black can try to stop a4 by placing his queen or bishop on that very square. There, they exert some pressure on c2 and (the queen only) d4. White may wish to play a3-a4 just to stop Black placing a piece there; however, modern practice has shown that things are not so simple. A black piece on a4 can be rather out of play. White may actually want to use his dark-squared bishop on the kingside. In an endgame, the a4-pawn can be easy prey. In the opening, a3-a4 played too early may waste an important tempo if Black can quickly open play in the centre or on the kingside. For these reasons, it has now become much more a matter of debate whether White does want to rush into playing a3-a4.

White opens the centre

White has the two bishops and it is in his interests to open the centre. This can be achieved by a combination of c3-c4 and d4xc5, ending up with this pawn structure assuming that Black recaptures on c5 with a piece:



White still hasn't solved his structural problems. He still has a weak pawn on c2, and has now also weakened his e5-pawn. On the other hand he has gained lots of open lines for his two bishops, and an open d-file for his rooks. Black has a good square for a knight on d5, but this can be dislodged at an appropriate moment by the advance c2-c4.




Black will seek to pressurise e5 with a knight on c6 or d7 and his queen on c7. If Black has castled kingside, it is often best to recapture on c5 with the b-pawn (after an

earlier ... b6). While this blocks the c-file, it more importantly blocks White's dark-squared bishop's control of the a3-f8 diagonal. White can gain compensation on the b-file but then 🖾 d5-b4 can help Black.

Black exchanges on d4


One way to stop White opening the centre is to exchange pawns on d4. This opens the c2-pawn to attack down the half-open c-file. However, the exchange itself opens the a3-f8 diagonal for White's dark-squared bishop; and a bishop on d3 both defends c2 comfortably and menaces the black kingside, while Black has no option of ...c4. So Black generally swpps on d4 only if he can thereby win the d4-pawn (in some gambit lines) or exchange queens to reach a more endgame-like position where Black's positional advantages can compensate for White's two bishops:



This position is equal. White can try to play for \$\mathbb{L}\$b4 and a5, or to cramp Black with \$b5 or \$a6 (after ...b6); but Black can play ... 2a5-c4, ...b6 and perhaps ...Øe7-c6-a5 and ...f6, followed by ... f7, ... c7 and ... Ihc8. Black should be careful about playing the natural-looking ... \$\Omega f5\$ as both knights may well be better placed on the queenside.


Black plays ...c4

The other way to stop White opening the centre is to close the position with ...c4. This is usually (but not always) combined with queenside castling; kingside castling is more commonly associated with pressure down the c-file.




It is interesting to compare this position with an equivalent position from the Advance variation already considered in Chapter 1, by moving the pawn from c2 to b2 and adding an extra minor piece to each side. White here has the two bishops and already has an open b-file. On the other hand, White only has the c1square to move his pieces between the kingside and the queenside; and

control of the b-file, even combined with control of the a3-f8 diagonal, is rarely enough to break through decisively. So White needs to combine kingside and queenside play much as in the equivalent Advance variation. One key idea is to play a knight to h5, not just to restrain Black's kingside breaks (...f6 or ...g5), but also to follow up with f4 and an eventual f5. Black will generally try to get ... f6 in before the knight is firmly ensconced on h5, even though this opens the position for White's two bishops. After exf6 gxf6, Black can continue with ... \mugges g8, ...e5 threatening ... h3, and increase the pressure by bringing a knight to h4.




Timing is of key importance. Does White have time to play a4? Has Black time to play ...c4? Does ...f6 allow White's bishops into the game too soon? Is that knight coming to h5 already?

The importance of the a4-square has already been discussed. If Black has chosen to play ... \(\mathbb{L} a4 \), then he certainly hinders White's queenside




play but he also makes it more difficult to start active kingside play or defend against White's kingside play. One enterprising plan that has been tried in recent years is to play ...h6, then manoeuvre the queen to h7, thus increasing the pressure on c2 and getting all the major pieces prepared for active play on the kingside.



In many positions, Black has to watch out for ②xc4 opening lines for a bishop on g2 or f3. In this particular position, it is the stray bishop on a4 that is in trouble. After ②xc4

dxc4, ₩xc4 the bishop has no squares and ...b5 is met by 豐xc6 (or 豐xa4 thanks to the pin). Note that if the rook were on a2, 2xc4 would fail to ...**£**b5.


White advances the h-pawn



White often chooses to gain space on the kingside by advancing his hpawn. If Black doesn't respond with ...h6, White intends to play h6 himself, disrupting Black's kingside pawns and creating a hole on f6. Nevertheless, Black can allow this, hoping to gain from the three tempi White has expended on his h-pawn. More usually, Black does play ...h6, which is often a very useful move anyway because it prevents 25. On h5 the pawn does somewhat cramp Black and allow White to play his rook to h4 or h3; if instead White castles, the h5-pawn could become vulnerable to attack from a bishop on e8 after ...f6. One more subtle point is that White is no longer able

to play his knight to the square h5, but his space advantage gives him other options.

White plays ₩g4




Black's lack of a dark-squared bishop makes it very difficult for him to defend the g7-pawn. The move ₩g4 seeks to take immediate advantage of this fact. Black's options are:

- 1) to gambit the pawn, leading to play considered in the next chapter;
- 2) to play ...g6, accepting a darksquared weakness on f6;
- 3) to play ... \$\alpha\$f5; but \$\alpha\$d3 then repeats the threat to g7;
- 4) to play ... 2g6; but then after h2-h4 the response ...h7-h5 leaves a dark-squared weakness on g5;
- 5) to play ...0-0 and hope to withstand a kingside attack by White's pieces;
- 6) to play ... \$\delta f8\$ and eventually 'castle' by ...h7-h6 and ... \$\displays f8-g8-h7, the point of this roundabout manoeuvre being that ... \$\delta f8\$ creates no pawn weaknesses, and the rook on h8 may actually give Black more chances of


surviving a kingside attack than after castling.

Kingside castling (option 5) has become a popular option in modern play, as White, despite some spectacular wins, has not been able to force mate in every variation. One group of players have played it as a solid option aiming to reach a rather dull endgame after playing ... f5, exf6 \mathbb{Z} xf6. and then ...c4:




It is very difficult for White to build up enough pressure to win the e6-pawn (or d5 by a pin). While in theory the pressure on e6 should enable White to use his extra space on the kingside to launch an attack with the major pieces, in practice Black turns out to have sufficient pressure on the f-file. Black can also threaten to play a rook to a6 and consume White's weak queenside pawns; for this reason, White often seeks to force ...b6 at an earlier stage with a timely **\B**b1.

Another group of players have played ...0-0 intending a wild tactical mêlée, from where, armed with home preparation, they hope to emerge victorious. The tactical ideas range over the whole board, as illustrated by this position:




Black's ideas include ...e5 (with the double threat of ... 2xg4 and ...e4), ... \was (threatening ... \was xc3+ winning the rook on a1), and sacrificing the exchange by ... Ixf3 or by just leaving the rook on f6 in some lines, the soundest being ... 42d7 with the idea of £xf6 Dxf6, when the black knights on e7 and f6 combine together beautifully, heading for f5 and e4, exploiting the white queen cut off on g4 and White's weakened queenside with no bishop or queen to defend it. White, seemingly far more poised for the attack, only really has one tactical stroke, 2xh7+. Black never used to play ...0-0 because it was thought that 2xh7+ would always prove too powerful. It is indeed a dangerous threat but a well-prepared player will now find adequate resources as Black.

One way White has managed to avoid some of these tactical ideas is by moving his queen yet again, from g4 to h5, threatening mate in combination with a bishop on d3:



Black has now missed his opportunity to play ...f5, so has to find some other way to counter the threat. ... 15 has been found wanting after g4 can be met by ... Wh4, but that 句f3 c4, g4! cxd3, gxf5 leaves White on top.) ...h6 can be met by &xh6 if White can bring a rook or knight into the attack quickly enough. Therefore, as ...g6 is clearly too weakening (with White's dark-squared bishop still on the board), only ... 2g6 remains. Then, when Black plays ...c4, White will reply 2xg6 when Black must respond ... fxg6, reaching a position of the form shown in the next diagram.

White aims to break open the kingside with the h-pawn. Black in turn will play ... If aiming to exchange off a pair of rooks if h5 is ever played, and meanwhile hoping to create counterplay by doubling on the f-file.



Illustrative games

Game 17 de Firmian - Chernin Tunis IZ 1985 Winawer variation

1	e4	еб
2	d4	d 5
3	包c3	Ձb 4
4	e5	©e7
5	a3	≜xc3 +
6	bxc3	c 5
7	ହାର ବିଷ	

An immediate 7 h4 can be quite dangerous. Black can choose between:

- a) 7... **營**c7 8 h5 h6 9 **罩**h3 (9 **②**f3 transposes to lines similar to the following game, in some of which the h5-pawn can be a liability) 9... 4 bc6 10 a4 (10 曾g4 包f5 11 皇d3? cxd4! &a3 b6 12 &b5 0-0! 13 f4! f6 14 ②f3 Zae8 ∞ Steinbacher-Harley, London Lloyds Bank 1992.
- b) 7... 響a5 8 **Q**d2 cxd4 9 cxd4 ₩a4 10 h5! ②bc6 11 &c3 (11 ②f3 ②xd4 12 &d3 is a complex gambit

line) 11...b6 12 h6 gxh6 13 營d3 a5 14 營d2 ②f5 = Short-Korchnoi, Wijk aan Zee 1987.

7 ... **②bc6**

It is funny how early on in this line, White would happily play 7 a4, reasoning that his dark-squared bishop would always be going to a3. Later White realised that the bishop could sometimes prove useful on the kingside and that it may prove better to develop the kingside quickly; then Black started playing 7...\$\text{d}7\$ to try to force White to play a4 by threatening a blockade with ...\$\text{d}4\$. White generally does respond to 7...\$\text{d}7\$ with 8 a4 but has also tried:


- a) 8 dxc5 ②g6 9 **Q**d3 ②c6 10 0-0 ②cxe5 11 ②xe5 ②xe5 12 **Q**f4 **** f6 13 **** d2 ②xd3 = Chandler-Beliavsky, London 1985.
- b) 8 单d3 单a4 9 h4 營c7 10 h5 h6 11 dxc5!? ②d7 12 單h4 營a5 13 单e3 罩c8 14 罩b1 单c6 = Short-Ivanchuk, Horgen 1995.

8 \(\mathbb{Q}\)e2

de Firmian has decided to reply to ... \$\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{M}}} a5\$ with \$\mathbb{\mathbb{\mathbb{M}}} d2\$ rather than \$\mathbb{\mathbb{M}} d2\$, so sees no reason to hurry to play a4, which in some lines can just prove a waste of a tempo. After 8 a4 \$\mathbb{\mathbb{M}} a5\$:

a) 9 \(\begin{aligned}
\text{doesn't see much hope of advantage in the endings analysed earlier, which arise after 9...\(\beta\)d7 10 \(\beta\)e2 \(\beta\)c8 (Black can also continue here with ...f6 and ...0-0-0 but White's pieces are better placed than after \(\beta\)d2) 11 \(\beta\)a3 (11 dxc5 \(\beta\)g6 12 0-0 \(\beta\)cxe5 13 \(\beta\)d4 a6! \(\beta\) J.Watson) 11...cxd4 12 cxd4 \(\beta\)xd2+ 13 \(\beta\)xd2.

b) 9 2d2 2d7 10 2b5. White is happy to exchange his 'good' bishop and lose the advantage of the two bishops, in return for weakening still further Black's control of the a3-f8 diagonal. Chandler-Ivanchuk, Manila IZ 1990 went 10...0-0-0 (Black probably does best to loosen White's control of the dark squares straight away with the central break 10...f6) 110-0 c4 12 2c1 f6 13 2e1 2he8 14 2a3 2b8 15 2xc6! 2xc6 16 2e3 2a8 17 2fb1 2c8 18 2d6 2d7 19 2b5 2d8 20 a5 g5? (20... 2xd6 was necessary) 21 2c5! g4 22 2b6! (D)



B

An important thematic idea. After 22...axb6 23 axb6+ \$\cong b8 24 \$\cong c1\$, Black cannot stop mate down the afile. Ivanchuk, seeing that 22...\$\cong c7 23 exf6 \$\cong xf6 24 \$\cong c5 \cong g7\$ would be clearly better for White, offered an exchange to try to quell the attack: 22...\$\cong c7 23 \$\cong c1\$ fxe5 24 dxe5 \$\cong c4\$ dx

8... ₩c7 9 0-0 (9 a4 cxd4 10 cxd4 ②b4! ∞) 9... 2d7 10 a4 reaches a similar position to the game, but with the important difference that White can play a quick 2a3.

9 **皇d2**

Wd2 is generally the main alternative to this move, but here makes less sense as White has not yet played a4 (preparing a later ♠a3). In fact, Black could try to take immediate advantage of this fact by responding to 9 ₩d2 with 9...b6! and a quick ...♠a6. If White had played 8 a4 ₩a5 9 ₩d2, then 9...b6 would be met by 10 ♠b5 ♠a6 (10...♠d7 11 ♠a3! ♠xe5? 12 ♠b4! wins the queen) 11 ♣b1 0-0 12 0-0 cxd4 13 ₩d3! ♠xb5 14 axb5 ± Shishkin-Zilber, USSR 1978.


Note that 9 0-0 is also possible, as 9... 營xc3?? 10 皇d2 營b2 11 單b1 營xa3 12 罩b3 營a2 13 營c1 營a4 14 皇b5 營a2 15 罩a3 wins the black queen. It would appear that 7... 營a5 is probably slightly more accurate than 7... ②bc6, since after 7 ②f3 營a5, 8 皇e2?! is unwise on account of 8...cxd4, and 8 營d2 gives Black the sound alternative 8...b6 (which is even better if Black has not played ... ②bc6 yet).

9 ... **2**d7

An interesting modern gambit line arises after 9...cxd4 10 cxd4 營a4 11 單b1! (11 全c3 b6 12 營d3 a5! =) 11...公xd4 12 全d3. The assessment of this line will determine whether White needs to play an early a4 or not. Current best play is 12...公dc6! 13 罩b3! 公f5 (13...0-0

14 **k**xh7+!) 14 0-0 (Dolmatov-Oll, USSR Ch 1989) 14...a6!?.

Planinc beat Timman twice in 1974 after 9...c4 10 包g5! h6 11 包h3 包g6 (to stop 包h3-f4-h5) 12 0-0 全d7 13 皇h5 包ce7 14 a4 0-0-0 (D).



W

The first game continued 15 f4 f5 16 exf6 gxf6 17 f5! but in the second, Planinc tried a slower plan: playing \delta d1-e1, a2-a3, \delta d2-c1-a3, \delta d2-c1-a3 and f2-f4-f5. He won both games by combining kingside and queenside play.

10 0-0 響c7

An interesting retreat. Black is happy despite the apparent loss of a tempo as the d2-bishop will almost certainly want to retreat to c1 and then go to a3 at some stage.

A very open game arises after 10...f6 11 c4 \(\mathbb{U}\)c7 12 cxd5 \(\mathbb{D}\)xd5 13 c4 \(\mathbb{D}\)de7 14 exf6 gxf6 15 \(\mathbb{L}\)c3 0-0-0. Note how irrelevant the move a4 would be in a position like this. The difference here could well be critical: 16 d5 exd5 17 cxd5 \(\mathbb{L}\)e6 18 \(\mathbb{L}\)xf6 \(\mathbb{L}\)hg8 19 dxc6! \(\mathbb{L}\)xd1 20 cxb7+ \(\mathbb{D}\)b8

21 單fxd1 ②g6 22 罩ab1 a6 23 皇d3 皇d5 24 皇xg6 皇xf3 25 罩e1 1-0 Makarychev-Lputian, USSR 1979.

11 Zel c4 12 &f1

On 12 包g5, following the Planinc plan, Black could try 12...h6 13 包h3 0-0!? 14 包f4 f6 15 exf6 異xf6 16

②h5 \(\mathbb{I}\)f7 with pressure on f2.

 12 ...
 h6

 13 g3
 0-0-0

 14 全h3
 全b8

 15 a4
 響a5

Amazing or stupid? Black is in no hurry and decides to return to a5 (for a few moves!) to stop White playing \(\text{\(\text{\gents}\)} c1.


16 **幽c1**

White starts moving his pieces over to the queenside. It was probably better to follow Planinc's example and try to create more pressure on the kingside first with 16 2h4. White could follow with f4 and If1 (Black's move-order has made this plan psychologically difficult for White to follow) or 2g2 and 2e3.

After 19 a5, 19...a6! is good here.

19 ... &c8 20 &g2 (D) 20 ... f5

Black could instead play 20... 20a5 21 20ec6 22 2a3 when we reach a position where White cannot break through with a4-a5-a6 or 20f3d2xc4 and would always have to worry about a potential ...f6 break. The threat can often be greater than



В

its execution. After 20...f5 21 exf6 gxf6, White has to worry about ...e5 but can contain this with pressure on d5, play £f4 and use the f4-b8 diagonal, and even play against the weakness on e6, all while keeping up the queenside pressure. Christiansen criticises 20...f5, claiming that White should be happy to keep the kingside blocked and decline to play exf6, but White has to be careful as he only has c1 through which to manoeuvre all his pieces if Black breaks through on the kingside, e.g. 21 \(\mathbb{\mathbb

21 exf6 gxf6 22 a5!

A risky move, giving away the b5-square, but 22 \(\mathbb{U}\)c5 is well met by 22...\(\Dar{2}\)a5.


22 ... a6?!

Black grabs the b5-square but at the cost of the b6-square; this should have proved tactically premature. Black would also have been wrong to play an immediate 22...e5, when after 23 dxe5 fxe5 24 \(\mathbb{E}\)c5 followed by \(\mathbb{L}\)e3, it would prove impossible

for Black to defend c4, d5 and e5 and the queenside. Black would have done better simply to wait or proceed slowly on the kingside with a move like 22...h5.

23 **里b6 ②a7** 24 **豐c5 ②ec6**

24... ②b5 would be met by 25 ②d2 (25 皇f4!?) 25... ②ec6 (25... ②xc3 26 ②xc4! dxc4 27 罩xa6+ with a strong attack) 26 ②xc4! dxc4 27 皇xc6 bxc6 28 營xc6+ 含a7 29 皇f4 e5 30 dxe5 fxe5 (30... 營d7 31 罩xa6+!) 31 皇e3 winning.




W

27 **gh3**?

White has to contain ... ②b5. He should have chosen between 27 罩ab1 ②b5? (27... 罩h7) 28 罩1xb5 axb5 29 a6 and 27 ②d2 ②b5? (27... 罩d8 28 全f4 e5!?) 28 ②xc4 dxc4 29 罩xb5 axb5 30 a6.

27	•••	②b5
28	≜f4	②xc3
29	£ f1	②e4
30	₩a3	②g5!

21	March	l <i>E</i>
	②xg5	hxg5
32	⊈d6	e5
Why no	ot 32@xd41	?
33	≝ ab1	≝e6
34	≜ c5	②xd4
35	£xd4	exd4
36	豐c5	幽h7
37	h3	≅ xb6
38	≝ xb6	幽e4
39	⊉g2! (D)	



B

Setting a diabolical trap. Black could still win by 39... 營e5 40 營xd5 (40 魚xd5? 營e1+ 41 含h2 營xf2+ 42 魚g2 基xh3#) 40... 營xd5 41 魚xd5 d3 and pushing the d-pawn.

40...₩e5 would have kept Black in the game but after 41 \(\oldsymbol{\omega}\)xd5 it would have been very messy.

 41 置xa6+!
 bxa6

 42 營xd5+
 含b8

 43 營d6+
 1-0

Did either player really understand what to do? It shouldn't have been enough for White just to attack on the queenside – he needed to

balance it with play in the centre and the kingside, as for example by the suggested 16 ©h4.

Game 18 **Harley – Whiteley** *London League 1994*Winawer Variation

1	e 4	e6
2	d4	d 5
3	②c3	Ձ b4
4	e5	c 5
5	a3	≜xc3 +
6	bxc3	幽c7

The variation 6... 2e7 7 2f3 b6 is related to that seen in this game, and has become very popular recently, since ... 2c7 is far from being an essential part of the strategy. White has three main approaches:

- a) 8 象 b5+ 象 d7 9 象 d3 c4 (the line 9... ② bc6 is similar to the game, though White could choose to omit a4 altogether) 10 象 f1 象 a4 11 g3 ② bc6 12 h4 h6 13 象 h3 (interestingly preserving h5 for a piece) 13... 曾 d7 14 ② h2 營 g8 15 ② f1 全 c7 16 ② e3 ± Chandler-Harley, London 1991.
- b) 8 ②g5 h6 9 營h5 g6 10 營h3 營c7 11 a4 營f8 12 營d1 (A.Sokolov-Yusupov, Riga Ct (13) 1986) and now 12... 2a6! 〒.
- c) 8 a4 皇a6 9 皇xa6 (9 皇b5+ 皇xb5 10 axb5 h6 11 0-0 0-0 12 營e2 ②d7 13 皇a3 a6 14 bxa6 營c8 with equality, Apicella-Hertneck, Uzes 1990) 9...②xa6 10 0-0 ②b8 11 dxc5 bxc5 12 c4 0-0 13 cxd5 ②xd5 14 營d3 h6 15 c4 ②e7! 16 營e4 ②d7 17 罩b1? 營a5 18 罩d1 罩ad8 19 營c2 ②xe5! won

a key pawn in A.Sokolov-Yusupov, Riga Ct (3) 1986, e.g. 20 ②xe5 營c3! exploiting the back rank.

Hertneck has since come up with the even more refined 6... 2e7 7 2f3 h6!?, aiming to get the best of all worlds. After 8 a4 b6 9 \$b5+ (9 a5!? \$b7 10 \$b5+ 2d7 = Anand-Hertneck, Munich 1991) 9...\$d7 10 \$d3 2bc6, White has committed himself to a4 but Black has not had to play ... *e7. Perhaps 8 dxc5!? is worth a try.

7 2)f3

The point of 6... ****** 67 is revealed after 7 ****** 94 f5 (7... f6 8 ***** 8 ***** 85+! ***** 87 9 a4!? is very messy) 8 ****** 93 cxd4 9 cxd4 ② e7 10 ② d2 0-0 11 ② d3 b6 12 ② e2 ② a6 13 ② f4 ****** d7 =.

7	***	©e7
8	a4	b6
9	≜b5 +	≜d7
1Λ	& 43	

After 10 0-0 ≜xb5 11 axb5, the oft-recommended 11...a5 seems dubious after 12 dxc5! bxc5 13 c4 dxc4 14 ②d2 c3 15 ②e4! (Korchnoi).


11...0-0? allows the Greek Gift sacrifice 12 \(\exists \text{xh7+!}\) \(\exists \text{xh7}\) 13 \(\exists \text{g5+}\) winning.

12 **Ze1**

After 12 2 a3 2 a5 13 2 d2 0-0 14 dxc5 bxc5 15 2 b3 2 xb3 16 cxb3, crucial is 16...a5! = stopping further white expansion with b4.

Castling queenside is not out of the question after the preparatory 12...c4.

13 **Qa**3



W

The bishop may actually prove more useful on the kingside. An alternative is 13 \(\text{2}\) f4 \(\text{2}\)g6! (13...f5 14 exf6 \(\text{2}\) xf4 14 fxe7 \(\text{2}\)xe7 15 \(\text{2}\)b5 was slightly better for White in Timman-Ljubojević, Amsterdam 1991) 14 \(\text{2}\)g3 cxd4 15 \(\text{2}\)xd4 (15 cxd4 \(\text{2}\)b4!) 15...\(\text{2}\)a5 16 \(\text{2}\)e3 \(\text{2}\)c4 \(\text{2}\) Nunn-Nikolić, Amsterdam 1988.

13 ... **⊘**a5 14 **⊘**d2!


A nuance of move-order, because after 14 dxc5 bxc5 15 ②d2 Black has the additional option of 15...②g6 16 營h5 皇e8 17 營e2 (Hartston-Portisch, Nice OL 1974) 17...f6 18 exf6 黨xf6 19 ②f3 黨c8 with equality.

If now 14...包g6, 15 豐g4! is very strong.

14 ... \&xa4

After 14...f6?! 15 exf6 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf6, White no longer has the e-pawn to worry about and can safely break open the position with 16 dxc5 bxc5 17 c4! as in Gligorić-Marović, Osijek 1978.

Premature. Hertneck held on to the pawn successfully against Chandler (Bundesliga 1994) after 17... Lab8 18 皇 c1 堂 h8, but instead of Chandler's 19 營 h4 ② g8 20 ② g5, better was 19 營 h3 ② g8 20 g4!? with a continuing attack.



B

20 ... d4?

A previous game between the same players (London Lloyds Bank 1987) continued 20.... 全8 21 全c1?! ②d6 22 營h3 ②ef5 23 g4 ②e4! but better was 21 cxd5 exd5 22 c4! smashing open the position for the two bishops.

With the intention of 22 營h7+? 含f8 23 營h8+ 包g8 24 兔h7 兔f7 leaving White's queen rather embarrassed. If instead 21...單f5, then 22 包xd7 營xd7 23 營xe6+ 營xe6 24 型xe6 單f7 25 兔e4 單b8 26 單b1 包f5 27 兔xc5 wins.

White has not only regained his sacrificed pawn but won another and gained decisive control of the seventh rank. It is as good as over.

24	•••	&1
25	≝ea1	£c6
26	Dxc6	¤ хс6
27		₩d6
28	c5!	Exc5
29		

Much better than 29 罩xc5 豐xc5 30 罩a8+ 含f7 31 豐b8 e5 32 豐f8+ 含e6 33 豐xg7.

29	•••	₩d8
30	≝ a8	②c8
31	≝ 6a7	1-0

Game 19 **Tal – Short**Subotica IZ 1987 Winawer Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d 5
3	Dc3	≜ b4
4	e 5	c 5
5	a3	. <u>\$</u> .xc3-

6	bxc3	②e7
7	₩g4	0-0

A modern alternative is 7...\$f8, planning to castle by hand with ...h6 (also ruling out \$\overline{\text{D}}g5\$ manoeuvres), ...\$g8 and ...\$h7. This may seem slightly nonsensical since Black can

just castle, saving plenty of tempi, but then, as the variations below show, Black's castled king is very open to attack. Here, Black keeps the kingside closed, rather than seek counterplay there. His play is down the c-file, with an important theme being ...b6 and ... \(\) a6 to exchange off White's bishop.

The exchange ...c5xd4 is crucial. Either it allows White's a3-bishop to become a killer, bearing down on the pinned e7-knight, or it allows Black play on the c-file. Also, Black must beware lest after ...c5xd4, c3xd4 White is able to play c2-c4! opening the game when the black rooks are still disconnected. The b-file could also become a source of danger for Black if White is allowed to seize it after he plays d4xc5, etc.

Black plays ... \$\widetilde{\pi}a5\$ usually to attack c3, hoping after \$\widetilde{\pi}d2\$ that the white bishop is not heading for a3. Black also tries to get in ... \$\widetilde{\pi}a4\$, attacking c2 and blocking the white apawn, thereby preventing a4 and \$\widetilde{\pi}a3\$. White, however, may stop this by playing a4 before Black has time for ... \$\widetilde{\pi}a4\$.

In short, the drawback of 7...\$f8 is not that White gets an immediate raging attack on the kingside (as happens after 7...0-0). Rather, it is the problem of how to co-ordinate his pieces. It takes a long time to get the h8-rook into the game. In the meantime, White may be breaking through on the queenside – which Black opens!

White used his extra co-ordination to good effect in Videki-Vareille,


Toulouse 1995, starting first with pressure on the kingside and then moving nimbly over to the queenside: 7...會f8 8 h4 營a5 9 皇d2 營a4 10 單h3! ②bc6 11 h5 h6 12 營f4 cxd4 13 單f3 ②d8 14 cxd4 b6 15 皇b4 a5 16 皇xe7+ 曾xe7 17 ②e2 皇a6 18 ②c3 營c6 19 皇xa6 罩xa6 20 a4 罩a8 21 ②b5! with advantage.

A less fashionable alternative is 7...包f5 8 鱼d3 h5 9 營f4 (or 9 營h3 with the idea of g4) 9...營h4 10 包e2 營xf4 11 包xf4 包e7 12 鱼e2 h4 13 包h5! ± Tal-Petrosian, USSR Ch 1983. For 7...營c7 or 7...cxd4, allowing 8 營xg7, see the next chapter.

8 **Df3**

8 \(\delta \)d3 is more accurate:

- a) 8...c4?! 9 h6 2g6 10 xg6 fxg6 11 e3 followed by h4 and h5. Black's best defensive plan is ... f5.
- b) 8...②bc69 ₩h5! (9 兔g5 ₩a5 10 ②e2 ②g6! ∞) 9...②g6 (Black has to be very careful: 9...②f5 10 ②f3 c4 11 g4! cxd3 12 gxf5 f6 13 ℤg1 and 9...h6 10 兔xh6! are both devastating) 10 ②f3 ₩c7! (with the idea of 11 ②g5 h6 12 ②xf7 ₩xf7 =) 11 兔e3 c4 12 兔xg6 fxg6 13 ₩g4 with play much as in 'a' above. Black has gained the extra move ... ₩c7, and White can no longer develop his knight to e2.
- c) 8...f5 9 exf6 基xf6 10 營h5 (10 全g5 至f7 11 包f3 包bc6 transposes to the game) 10...h6 (10...g6 11 營d1! is like the game but with the queen better placed on d1!) and if 11 g4 then 11...包bc6 12 g5 g6! is fine for Black.
- d) 8... ②d7?! 9 ②f3 f5 10 營h3! (D) leaves the d7-knight misplaced:



B

10...②b6 11 a4 (11 置g1 ②c4! 12 g4 營a5!) 11...c4 12 鱼e2 a5 13 置g1! 營e8 14 g4 with a strong attack (Sax-Dolmatov, Clermont Ferrand 1989).


8 ... **Dbc6**

Wild variations arise after 8...f5!? 9 exf6 單xf6 10 兔g5 營a5 (the alternative 10...包d7! is sounder) 11 兔xf6 營xc3+ 12 含e2! and now our new suggestion is the temporary rook sacrifice 12...營xc2+!? 13 包d2 包g6 14 兔e5 (14 h4 h5!) 14...c4 15 含e1 ②xe5 16 dxe5 c3 17 營d1 cxd2+ 18 營xd2 營e4+ 19 營e3! 營a4 with compensation for the exchange.

9 **Qd3** f5

Black has to play this as White threatened the Greek Gift sacrifice 10 2xh7+ 2xh7 11 4h5+ 2g8 12 2g5. If White now tries to keep the game blocked with 10 4h3 as in 'd' above, Black's best response is probably 10... 4b6 counterattacking in the centre.

11...e5! 12 鱼xh7+(12 当g3 互xf3!) 12...含xh7 13 当h5+含g8 14 鱼xf6 gxf6 15 dxe5 營f8! is more adventurous.



W


White exchanges now to restrict Black's options, as 12... 對xe7 is met by 13 包g5. After 12 對h4 h6 13 兔xe7 對xe7! 14 對g3 (14 對xe7 至xe7 15 0-0 兔d7 16 dxc5 至c8 =) 14...c4 15 兔g6 至f6 16 0-0 兔d7 17 至fe1 兔e8 18 兔xe8 至xe8, Black's pieces are more comfortably placed than in the equivalent line after ... 至xe7.

12 ... **Exe7**13 **Wh4 g6**

Or 13...h6 14 0-0 c4 15 \(\text{\(\)}}}} \)} \end{\(\text{\(\)}}}} \)} \end{\(\text{\(\)}}}} \)} \end{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\)}}}} \)} \end{\(\text{\(\text{\(\)}}} \end{\(\text{\(\)}} \)} \end{\(\text{\(\)}} \end{\(\text{\(\)}} \end{\(\text{\(\)}} \)} \end{\(\text{\(\)}} \end{\(\text{\(\)}} \end{\(\)} \e

14 0-0 c4 15 &e2 &d7 16 ⊈fe1 ₩f8 17 &d1!

A new move in this game. The idea is to improve on 17 \(\Delta f1 \) by planning a later \(\Delta g4 \) as well as temporarily defending c2.



W

20 **全f3?**

White should have defended c2 first, even though the immediate 20.... 2xc2? now fails to 21 里ae1 h6 22 2xd5 g5 23 里xe6!. Better was 20 豐g5 含g7 21 豐d2 followed by 2g4.

20		ġg 7!
21	₩g5	≜xc2
22	≌ae1	營f6
23	營e3	∲ f8
	1/ 1/	- Address

1/2 - 1/2

Game 20

Kovaliov – Vaiser

Clichy 1991

MacCutcheon Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	©c3	②f6


4 **\$g**5 **\$b**4 5 **e**5

For 5 exd5, see Chapter 8.

5 ... h6

6 &d2

White can choose to hold on to his dark-squared bishop with 6 全e3!?, e.g. 6...②e47 營g4 全f8 8 a3 全xc3+9 bxc3 c5 10 全d3 ②xc3 11 dxc5 ②c6 12 ②f3 f5 13 exf6 營xf6 = Klovan-Shereshevsky, USSR 1977.



B

8 ... g6


Positionally weakening but the main line. 8...\$f8 is obviously more positionally sound, and at least at present seems to survive tactically after 9 h4 c5 10 \$\mathbb{L}\$h3 \$\overline{\Omega}\$c6 11 \$\overline{\Omega}\$d3 \$\overline{\Omega}\$xd2 12 \$\overline{\Omega}\$xd2 c4 13 \$\overline{\Omega}\$e2 b5 14 \$\overline{\Omega}\$g8 (Yurtaev-Shabalov, Riga 1988). The only super-grandmaster encounter in recent years was Anand-Ivanchuk, Linares (8) 1992, which continued 9 \$\overline{\Omega}\$f3?! c5 10 \$\overline{\Omega}\$d3 \$\overline{\Omega}\$xd2 \$\overline{\Omega}\$11 \$\overline{\Omega}\$xd2 \$\overline{\Omega}\$c6 12 \$\overline{\Omega}\$f4 \$\overline{\Omega}\$e7 13 a3

单d7 14 罩hb1 b6 15 e3 ②a5! 〒 but would Ivanchuk risk it again?

11 h4 ②c6

One general idea in this line is 11... Wc7 12 Wf4 f5! but here White can try 12 Wf3!?, 12 Lh3 or 12 h5 g5 13 f4!.

12 **營f4 臭d7**



В

15 ... **營xf6**After 15...0-0-0 16 **營xe7** ②xe7,
White could try 17 dxc5. After an earlier ...c4 and 兔e2, Madl-J.Horvath, Hungarian Cht 1992 continued 16...0-0-0 17 **營**xe7 ②xe7 18 ②h2 **基**df8 19 **基**he1 ②g8 20 兔g4 f5 21 exf6 ②xf6 22 f3 ±.

16 exf6 c4

17	⊈ f1	0-0-0
18	≝e1	⊈c7
19	②e5	②xe5
20	¤xe5	b 5

An alternative plan is 20... 2e8!? and ... 2d6-a6, keeping one of the white rooks on the defensive.

21	⊈e2	\$d6
22	g4?	


White should have played 22 \(\frac{1}{2} \)e3 and 23 f4 straight away, preserving the option of bringing a rook to the g-file in front of his g-pawn.

22	•••	≝b8
23	a3	a5
24	∐b1	£ c6 ⋅
25	∲e3	≜ d7
26	f4	gxf4+

Now Black could have played 26... #Bbg8!, when White would never have been able to break through.

27	Ġ xf4	&c6
	⊈g3!	&d7
29	\$ h4	& c6
30	⊈f 3	⊈d 7
31	⊈d1	&c6
32	⊉e 2	⊈d7 (D)
33	Tf1!	, ,

After 33 g5 hxg5 34 \(\mathbb{I}\)xg5 \(\mathbb{I}\)h6 35 \(\mathbb{I}\)f1 \(\mathbb{I}\)bh8 36 \(\mathbb{I}\)g7 \(\mathbb{L}\)e8 Black holds, but now in the event of 34 g5 hxg5 35 \(\mathbb{I}\)xg5 \(\mathbb{I}\)h6 36 \(\mathbb{I}\)g7 \(\mathbb{I}\)f8 37 \(\mathbb{L}\)g5 \(\mathbb{I}\)h8 38 h6 White would win.




W

34	cxb4	axb4
35	axb4	¤xb 4

So the threats on the kingside force Black to open the queenside to create counterplay. White can now make progress (analytical comments by Kovaliov):

36 里a1! (36 g5? c3!) 36... 皇c6 37 里e3 里g8 38 里a7 皇b7 39 里e5 里b1 40 皇f3 堂c6 41 g5! 里f1 42 里a3 堂d6 43 皇g4 hxg5+ 44 里xg5 里h8 45 里f3! 里h1+ (45... 里xf3 46 皇xf3 里h6 47 里g6!) 46 皇h3 皇c6 47 里g7 e5 (47... 皇e8 48 里fg3!) 48 dxe5+ 堂xe5 49 里xf7 d4 50 里e7+ 堂d6 51 里e6+ 堂c7 52 里g3 d3 53 cxd3 c3 54 d4! c2 55 里c3 里xh5+! 56 堂g4! 里5xh3 57 里exc6+ 堂d7 58 里c7+ 堂e6 59 里7c6+! 堂f7 60 里xh3 c1營 61 里xc1 里xc1 62 堂f5 1-0

6 Poisoned Pawn Centre



General observations

In the previous chapter we saw Black responding to White's early queen thrust \(\mathbb{Y} \) g4 with ...0-0. This dealt with the threat of \(\mathbb{Y} \) xg7 and held the kingside intact. However, as we saw, it exposed Black's king to a rather dangerous, although by no means overwhelming, onslaught from the white queen and minor pieces. In defending against the threats, Black was often forced to simplify into an ending where he stood very slightly worse and had no real winning chances.

In the present chapter Black is much more ambitious. He wants to seize the initiative and create dynamic chances for his pieces. So he allows White to wreak havoc on his kingside pawns by ignoring the threat of \subseteq xg7. Instead he develops

his pieces rapidly, puts immediate pressure on the white centre and spirits his king away to the queenside.

This strategy depends for its success on exploiting the precarious situation of the white king in the centre, both directly and indirectly. Directly, Black plans a massive attack on White's pawn centre, hoping to demolish it with some heavy blows. Then, once the white king is stripped of its cover, it will be easy prey to Black's massed pieces. Indirectly, Black will try to prove that the white king's presence in the centre severely hampers the co-ordination of the white pieces. Indeed, if in the endgame it is possible to speak about 'pawn islands', then here we can talk about 'piece islands': Black's pieces come together and act in unison, whereas the white pieces are divided into two separate groups, those on the queenside and those on the kingside, which are bisected by the white king. In particular, it is difficult for White to co-ordinate the action of his rooks.

Staying in the centre is therefore not ideal for the white king, but there is usually no good alternative. Seeking refuge on the queenside, with its mangled pawn structure, looks risky. The kingside, although a more plausible haven, also has its drawbacks. In particular, Black may be able to utilise the open g- and h-files to launch a big attack. Also, White's own winning strategy often requires the utilisation of his extra passed pawn on the h-file. If he houses his king on the kingside then it may interfere with the implementation of this plan since a rapid advance of the kingside pawns may expose the monarch to attack.

So, although at first glance the white trumps are more apparent – an extra passed pawn and a pair of bishops, especially a dark-squared one with no rival – Black can actually generate a lot of counterplay.


The clash is particularly sharp because, in order to attack White's king, Black is striving to open the position, despite the fact that his opponent has the two bishops, which thrive on open lines.

At club and lower international levels, Black often succeeds in crashing through the white centre and mating the enemy king because White loses control of the position or makes a tactical oversight. It is by no means easy to co-ordinate the white pieces. However, at the highest levels, where players have a sophisticated knowledge of defensive technique and understand the tempo of the battle, Black often struggles to prove the validity of his sacrifice.

White forces queens off

Since an integral part of Black's strategy is to attack White's king, the


exchange of queens can be fatal to him. In fact, when White has two bishops, an extra pawn and the passed h-pawn, swapping off queens can be enough to force Black's resignation. When Black's queen is on c7, White can oppose with his queen on c3 (similarly ... \$\square\$b6 is met by \$\square\$b3), 'pinning' a black knight on c6.



The battle for e5

The e5-pawn holds White's game together but is out on a limb, with no d4-pawn left to protect it. White has to choose either to defend it with the


f4-pawn or with his pieces (皇f4 and 夕f3).




Even if White does get time to defend e5 with his pieces, it can still be very difficult to hold on to it, though a pin by a bishop on g3 against a knight on e5 and queen on c7 can be a useful counter-idea. More importantly, White's pieces are tied down to defence and Black need not fear them being used actively elsewhere (e.g. in capturing the c3-pawn).

If White defends with f4, he wastes an important development tempo, blocks in his dark-squared bishop (which can't then help the h-pawn reach h8) and leaves potentially crucial holes on e3 and g3 (if the h-pawn tries to advance). Black can still destroy White's centre with ...f6 or the more radical piece sacrifice ... (2) xe5.

The following diagram shows an ideal scenario, where ... 2xe5 wins the exchange after fxe5 \(\mathbb{W}\xe5+\) or ...\(\mathbb{W}\xe3+\), but the sacrifice can often be playable without such immediate tactical benefits.




Black defers ...dxc3



By deferring ...dxc3, Black can often disrupt White's development. Here, the threats of ... 對xe5+ and ... 對xc3+ force White to either play ②e2, blocking his bishop in and not defending e5, or waste a move with ③d1. Note that after ③d1, White need not fear an immediate ... 對xe5 (②f3 and cxd4) or ... 對xc3 (單b1) but Black can instead exploit the early king move by playing ...dxc3, ②f3 ②c6, ②f4 對b6! attacking the undefended f2-pawn as well as threatening ... 對b2.

Black plays ...d4




By playing ...d4 (with or without a pawn on c3), Black opens the long diagonal for his bishop (which is certainly not 'bad' in this variation) as well as freeing the d5-square for a knight. With no dark-squared bishop, Black has to be careful not to let White get a knight to d6 via e4 as a result.


Black sacrifices the exchange

Black is often only too happy to sacrifice the exchange even when already a pawn down. An active minor piece can often be more valuable than a passively placed rook in these types of middlegame. The following are typical examples, illustrating how a rook can be sacrificed for any of White's minor pieces.

In the following diagram Black counters the threat to f7 by playing ... Exg5!?. After the forced recapture fxg5, e5 is bound to fall in compensation, e.g. after ... 266.




Now consider the next diagram. It appears that the g2-pawn is invulnerable.




However, Black plays ... Lxg2 not fearing \(\text{2g3} \) and \(\text{2f1} \) trapping the rook, as then ... Lxg3 removes one of the defenders of e5.

Next, consider the diagram on the following page.

Black plays ... Zxd3 with no immediate tactical benefit, simply believing White's light-squared bishop more important than a rook. Black would follow up such a sacrifice with play on the light squares.



White plays g4



It has already been mentioned that if White plays h4 and f4, he leaves a hole on g3; it is also difficult to see how the h-pawn can advance successfully. If it reaches h7, it becomes more of a liability than a threat as White has no easy way of controlling the h8-square. Therefore the most effective way of pushing forward on the kingside (after f4) is by playing g4. Unlike other systems, White is not intending to play for f5 (when e5 would be fatally weakened) but is rather gaining space for his kingside pieces (e.g. \(\mathbb{Z}\)g1-g3, \(\mathbb{L}\)f1-h3, \(\mathbb{L}\)e1f2) while only leaving one hole for Black's knights on the rather out-ofthe-way square h4.

If Black does try to smash open the centre with ...f6, exf6 e5, then White's g- and f-pawns can often be worth as much as a rook or more, as some grandmaster examples have shown. Material then becomes irrelevant and the battle is one of time between White's charging pawns and Black's attack down the central files.

Illustrative games

Game 21 Stefansson – Kaminski Linares 1995 Winawer Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	包c3	≜ b4
4	e5	

If White plays for the g7-pawn immediately, Black can reply with ...dxe4 and ... 2)f6 preserving the h7pawn. It therefore becomes a simple swap of e4 for g7 which, if anything, is to Black's advantage. Examples are:

- a) 4 a3 \(\hat{\omega}\)xc3+ 5 bxc3 dxe4 6 **豐g4** ②f6 7 豐xg7 **罩g8** 8 豐h6 ②bd7 9 包h3 b6 10 包g5 罩g6 11 豐h4 息b7 12 ②xh7 ②xh7 13 豐xh7 豐f6 ∞ Degraeve-Djurhuus, Arnhem jr Ech 1988.
- b) 4 \(\empty \) d2 dxe4 5 \(\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{\ 0-0-0 包f6 (6...f5!?) 7 豐xg7 單g8 8 **營h6 全f8! =.**

c) 4 **曾g4 ②f6 5 曾xg7 国g8 6 曾h6 国g6 7 曾e3 c5 8 息**d2 **②g4!** 9 **曾d3 ②c6 元**.

4 ... c5 5 a3

Inferior is 5 豐g4 ②e7 6 豐xg7?! (6 a3?! 豐a5!) 6... 置g8 7 豐h6! (defending c1) 7...cxd4 8 a3 皇xc3+(8...豐a5 9 axb4 豐xa1 10 ②b5! with compensation) 9 bxc3 豐c7 with a good version of the game, as White has not captured on h7.


For 7...0-0, 7...\$\delta f8 and 7...\$\delta f5 see the previous chapter, while for 7...cxd4 see the next game.

8 **營xg7**

Other moves give Black the option of keeping the position closed, for example 8 &d3 (8 營d1 0-0!) 8...c4 (8...cxd4 transposes to the next game) 9 &e2 ②f5 (or 9...0-0) 10 ②f3 ②c6 11 營h5 &d7 12 g4 營a5 13 &d2 ②h6 14 營g5 0-0 = Leko-Beliavsky, Belgrade 1995.

8 ... **罩g8** 9 **谬xh7** cxd4 10 **②e2**

White has to block his own development if he wishes to defend both c3 and e5. Black gets a lot of play after 10 曾d1?! ②bc6 11 ②f3 dxc3 12 ②g5 (12 息f4 營b6! ∞) 12...②xe5 13 f4 f6 (13...里xg5 14 fxg5 ②5g6 ∞) 14 fxe5 fxg5 15 營h5+ 曾d8 16 皇xg5 營c5! 17 h4! 皇d7 18 單h3 曾c7! 早 Popović-J.Watson, New York 1981.



W

A standard position for this line. White now normally chooses to capture on c3 in spite of the potential play this gives Black along the c-file. Otherwise, Black just plays ...d4 (usually after a preparatory ...0-0-0 or ... (2) (5) when Black's central control and open lines on the kingside give Black plenty of play without the cost of a pawn.

13 **營xc3**

This line has gone in and out of fashion and will quite probably continue to do so! The main alternatives are:

- a) 13 ②xc3 a6 14 罩b1 ②f5 (not 14...0-0-0? 15 營xa6!) 15 ②e2 (15 g4!? intends 15...罩xg4 16 魚h3 but Black is able to counter-sacrifice with 15...②xe5!∞) 15...②a7! 16 營c3 兔c6 17 ②d4 ②xd4 18 營xd4 ②b5 19 營c5 d4 20 罩b3 營d8! 21 罩h3 罩c8 〒 Ehlvest-Nikolić, Reykjavik 1991.
- b) 13 單b1 d4! (13...分f5?! 14 h3! 罩c8? 15 g4 ②h4? 16 營h7! 1-0 Harley-Carton, London League 1995) 14 ②xd4 (14 罩g1 0-0-0 15 ②xd4 ②xd4 16 營xd4 兔b5! with balanced

play in Aseev-Eingorn, USSR Ch 1989) 14... ②xd4 15 營xd4 ②f5 16 營f2 ②c6! 17 罩g1 0-0-0 18 g4!? (18 ③d3 b6 19 含f1 罩xd3! 20 cxd3 營d7 干 Harley-Levitt, London Lloyds Bank Masters 1985) 18... ②d4 19 罩g3 罩xg4!? 20 罩xc3 ± (20 罩xg4 ②f3+21 含e2 ②d4+ gives Black at least a draw).

c) 13 ② g3 0-0-0 14 ② e2 ② f5! 14 ② xf5 exf5 16 0-0 d4 =.

13 ... **Ø**f5

In some ways this seems illogical as it encourages White to gain time and space later on with g4; yet this is in fact an idea straight out of the hypermodern school, hoping that such a thrust leaves White badly over-extended. Against other lines White has tended to play more placidly with g3 but this can still be very effective, e.g. 13...0-0-0 14 \(\bar{2}\) b1 d4 (or 14...\$b8 15 g3 &c8 16 &g2 b6 17 營d3! d4 18 0-0 ±) 15 營d3 幻d5 16 g3 f6 17 exf6 2xf6 18 2g2 e5 19 fxe5 ②xe5 20 營b3 ± Balashov-Agdestein, Dortmund 1987, But more recently, J.Polgar, playing against Motwani at the Isle of Lewis 1995, just ignored the fact that Black had not played ...包f5 and carried on regardless (after 13...0-0-0) with 14 耳g1!?d4 15 幽c5 鱼e8 16 g4 包d5 17 Ig3! intending ≜g2 and g5! (preventing ...f6) later on, and won nicely.

14 **Lb1**

An important move to grab the open file and stop ... ¥b6. If 14 罩 g1, then 14... ¥d8!?.

14 ... d4

More aggressive than 14... **二**C8 15 **2**d2 b6 (15...a6 16 **2**g1! **2**d8 17 **2**d3

營h4+ 18 g3 營xh2 19 罩xb7 with a slight advantage to White, Schmidt-Schäffer — Walter, Baden 1993) 16 g3! (16 罩g1 營d8! ∞ Short-Timman, Belfort 1988) 16... 營b7 17 營d3 ②ce7 18 罩g1 罩c4! 19 g4 ②h4 20 罩g3 並 Karpov-Farago, Wijk aan Zee 1988.

15 **警d3**

15 營c5?! gives Black two extra tempi on a perfectly playable plan: 15...b6 16 營c4 0-0-0 followed by ... 全b8 and ... 全d7-c8-b7, ... 營c8 and ... 全a6. 15 營c4 is answered by either 15... 營a5+ or 15...0-0-0 16 罩g1 f6 17 exf6 ②d6!.

15 ... 0-0-0 16 **Eg1!**

White takes up the challenge but has little choice. Black threatens both to break through in the centre, e.g. after 16 2d2 f6! 17 exf6 e5! 18 f7 2g7 19 g4 (Ki.Georgiev-Rasidović, Sarajevo 1986) when 19... d6 would have left Black clearly on top, or on the queenside, e.g. after 16 g3 2a5 17 2b4 a6 18 a4 2c6 7 (Garber-Wallace, Guarapuava 1991).


16 ... **Qe8!?**

Maybe not best. Better chances are perhaps offered by:

- a) 16...f6 17 g4 ②h4 18 exf6 e5 19 f7 (19 h3 鱼e6! and ...鱼d5 or 19 f5 e4! 20 營xe4 單de8 21 營d3 鱼xf5!) 19...單xg4 20 罩xg4 鱼xg4 21 鱼h3 營d7 22 鱼xg4 營xg4 23 營g3 營h5 24 罩b3! e4! 25 營g8 營d5! 26 營g7 ②f3+ 27 營f2 營h5 28 f8營 營xh2+ 29 營f1 ½-½ Brenke-Rummele, correspondence 1994.
- b) 16...②a5 17 \(\bar{2}\)b4 (17 g4 \(\bar{2}\)a4!) 17...②c6 18 \(\bar{2}\)b2 \(\bar{2}\)a5 19 g4 \(\bar{2}\)e3 20 \(\ar{2}\)xe3 dxe3 21 \(\bar{2}\)d4!? \(\ar{2}\).

17	g4	②h4
18	≝g3	f6
19	exf6	£g6

Harley-B.Martin, British Ch 1993 instead went 19...全f7 20 全h3 單ge8 (20...e5 21 g5+ 全b8 led to a quick black win in Sznapik-Nogueiras, Thessaloniki OL 1988, but instead of Sznapik's 22 fxe5? White should push forward fast with 22 f5 全d5 23 g6 e4 24 智b5 全e5 25 全f4 全hf3+26 單xf3 exf3 27 f7!) 21 g5 全g6 22 豐c4 全f5 23 全xf5?! exf5 24 單h3? 星e4! and Black won. White should have tried the very risky 23 罩gb3 全d6 24 全xe6+! 全b8 25 豐d5 (D).



B

A typical scenario for this line where White hopes his pawns will queen before Black mates him in the centre! Here, the tactics just seem to be in White's favour:

a) 25... 異xe6!? 26 營xe6 星e8 27 f5!! 異xe6 (27... 皇f7 28 皇f4! 皇xe6 29 異xb7+!) 28 fxe6 b6 (28... 皇xc2 29 f7 營e7 30 異f3 營f8 31 皇f4 全c7 32 異xb7+) 29 皇f4 皇xc2 30 f7 營e7 31 異f3!.

- b) 25... ②xc2 26 f7! 罩f8! (or 26... 罩e7 27 f8營! 罩xf8 28 f5!) 27 f5! ③xb3 (27...d3!? 28 ②f4! ②xb1 29 罩xb1 dxe2 30 g6 ②e7 31 ②xd6 罩xd6 32 罩xb7+ 營xb7 33 營xd6+ ③a8 34 ②d5!) 28 營xb3 ②xf7 29 ②xf7 營xf7 30 營xf7 罩xf7 31 ②g3 罩h8 32 罩b2.
- c) 25...b6 26 f5! ②xf5 27 身f4 ②d6 28 f7!? 罩xe6 29 f8豐! 罩xf8 30 豐xe6.


20 f5!

Instead, Ernst-Kaminski, Groningen 1992 continued 20 營c4 全f7 21 營a4 e5 22 f5 e4 and Black went on to win.

20 ... exf5

Knaak analyses 20... ②e5 21 營e4 exf5 22 gxf5 急xf5 23 營xh4 營xc2 24 f7 as winning for White.

21 **Qf4**(D)



В

Hellers-Djurhuus, Skei 1993, resulted in a quick white win after 21... 營a5+ 22 含f2 營d5 23 營b5! 營d7 24 單gb3 b6 25 營a6+ forcing

the exchange of queens. Tisdall gives the variation 21...包e5 22 &xe5 (22 營b5!?) 22...營xe5 23 營c4+ 營c7 (or 23...含b8 24 基xb7+!) 24 營xc7+ 含xc7 25 g5 as clearly better for White.

22 g5 **h**5

The other way to get this bishop into the game is 22...全f7 23 全h3 全d5 but then White could try 24 公xd4! 公xd4 25 營xd4 單ge8+ 26 全f2 罩e2+ 27 全g1, planning to hang on and then exploit his extra pawns.

23 **全f2 里ge8**23...**包**g6 is simply met by 24 **全**h3.

24 &d2!?

A strange-looking move, seeking to use f4 for the knight. An alternative was 24 單h3 兔xe2 (24...②g6 25 罩xh5 罩xe2+ 26 兔xe2 ②xf4 27 營f3 ②xh5 28 營xh5 or 24...單h8 25 罩xh4! 兔xe2 26 罩xh8 兔xd3 27 罩xd8+ 營xd8 28 兔xd3 +-) 25 兔xe2 ②g6 26 兔d2 ②ge5 27 營b5 罩h8 28 罩xh8 罩xh8 29 含g1, when 29...d3!? 30 cxd3 營d4+ 31 含g2 營h4 32 營xb7+ 含d8 33 兔a5+ ②xa5 34 營b8+ 含d7 35 營xa7+ wins by force.

24 ... De5

White consolidates after either 24... ②g6 25 ②f4 ②xf4 26 皇xf4 罩e4 27 營d2 罩de8 28 皇d3 or 24... ②f3 25 罩xf3 ②e5 26 營xf5 ②xf3 (26... 皇xf3 27 營xd7+ 罩xd7 28 ②g1!) 27 營xd7+ 罩xd7 28 皇f4.


25 **岁b5** d3 26 **岁xd7**+

26 營c5+? would have been a bad mistake, hoping for 26...營c7 27 營xc7+ 含xc7 28 公f4 公g4+ 29 置xg4! dxc2 30 公d5+ 置xd5 31 罩c4+

winning, because Black has instead 26...堂b8 27 皇f4 dxe2 28 皇xe5+ 堂a8 29 皇xe2 皇xe2 30 堂xe2 f4! turning the tables.

26 ...

 \mathbb{Z} xd7 (D)



W

27 Øf4?

White has succeeded in exchanging queens but now makes a fatal mistake. Better are 27 cxd3 ②xd3+28 \$\times g1 ②f3+29 \$\times xf3 \times xf4 \times 29 \$\times xf4 \times xf4 \times 29 \$\times xf4 \times xf4 \times xf4 \times xf4 \times 29 \$\times xf4 \times xf4 \ti

27 ... 28 **\$g1** ②g4+

It is all over. 28 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xg4 loses after 28...dxc2 29 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd2+.

28 ... dxc2

29 \(\mathbb{I} \text{c1} \)

30	②xh5			
Or 30 🖺	c3+ \$h8	31	②xh5	包e3!.
30	•••		ℤe3	
31	≝g2		②f3+	
32	&h1		②f2 +	
33	Exf2		∐xf2	
34	⊉g2		②xg5	
	0-1		Ů	

Game 22 Geller – Sokolsky USSR Ch 1950 Winawer Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	包c3	⊉b4
4	e5	c5
5	a3	≜xc3 +
6	bxc3	②e7
7	₩g4	cxd4
8	⊉d 3	

This move has recently come back into fashion against 7... \$\mathbb{U}\$c7 but it is particularly appropriate against this older move-order. The theme is that instead of winning a pawn, White sacrifices one.

If instead 8 營xg7 置g8 9 營xh7, Black gains little by playing his queen to a5 instead of c7 (as there is then no double attack on c3 and e5), e.g. 9...營a5 10 置b1! ②bc6 11 ②f3 ②d7 12 置xb7 營xc3+ 13 ②d1 ②a5 14 罩b4! 罩c8 15 ②g5 ± Short-Timman, Amsterdam 1988. Finally, it should be noted that White can play the innocuous 8 cxd4, when Black can happily revert to play in the style of the previous chapter after 8...營c7 followed by 9...0-0 or 9...②f5.

Black forces the white knight to e2 rather than f3, where it could quickly leap to g5 with devastating consequences. 8... \$\widetilde{\pi}\) a5 allows Black to defer ... dxc3 after 9 \$\widetilde{\pi}\)e2, but as Black is inevitably going to play ... dxc3 at some stage anyway, the temporary gain of time is unlikely to be worth the slight misplacement of the black queen.

9 De2 dxc3

Geller analyses 9... 對xe5 10 全f4! (10 cxd4 h5! 11 對h4 對c7) and then:


- a) 10...h5 11 營h4 包f5 12 營g5 營f6 13 營xf6 gxf6 14 鱼xf5 exf5 15 鱼xb8 置xb8 16 cxd4 and "White gained an advantage in the endgame" in the game Bonsch-Osmolovsky – Rovner, Lvov 1951.
- b) 10... 響f6 11 cxd4 h5 12 響g3 ②bc6 13 鼻g5 ②f5 14 鼻xf6 ②xg3 15 鼻xg7 罩g8 16 hxg3 罩xg7 17 罩xh5 again with the better ending.

By comparison with the previous game, White has managed to develop much more harmoniously, but effectively at the cost of two pawns as instead of being a pawn up, he is now liable to be a pawn down with both e5 and g2 hanging.

11 ... ₩xe5!?

The main alternative is 11... ②bc6 (11... ②d7 12 皇f4 ②c5 13 ②d4! 並 J.Watson) 12 皇f4 (12 f4 營b6! A.Rodriguez) 12... 皇d7 13 0-0 0-0-0





B

14 皇g3! ②xe5 15 罩fe1 ②7c6 (or 18 里xe5! 里xg3 19 豐xf6 ②g8 20 豐f4 罩g4 21 豐e3 ± Nunn) 16 ②xc3 ②d4 17 ②e2! (A.Rodriguez-Paneque, Havana 1990) 17... 2dc6 18 **身b5!?** ±.

> **⊉f4** 12 **營f6** 13 h4

White shoves forward the h-pawn, hoping of course to queen it with the help of the two bishops, but more immediately to gain control of important squares like g5. Note that White need not fear 13... Th8 because of 14 2g5 (even before h4). Instead, Madl-McDonald, Oakham 1988 continued 13 營h5 ②bc6 14 h4 **2**d7 15 **2**b1 0-0-0 16 **2**b3 e5 and Black went on to win.

> 13 ... **②bc6?!**

The critical line is probably the pawn grab 13... \(\mathbb{Z}\)xg2. Black is quite happy to sacrifice the exchange if in return he gets central control and plenty of tempi, e.g. 14 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f1 e5 15 \$\prescript{\prescrip F Popescu) 15...exf4 16 \$\frac{1}{2}\$f1 (16) 豐h5 ②bc6 17 豐f3 ②g6 ∞ Milu-Popescu, Bucharest 1992) 16... 42bc6 17 \\hbar h5 f3 18 \\Dag1 \\Dag1 \\Dag4 \infty Vidarsson-Blees, Iceland 1995.

> 14 **£g**5 15 **營h6**

White prepares to manoeuvre his queen back into play, clearing the way for the h-pawn.

> **15 ⊈d7** 16 **響f**6 單c8?

A strange move, aiming to improve the position of his worstplaced piece, but in fact fiddling while Rome burns. White cannot play h5 without swapping queens, which would bring Black's knight to e5 before White plays \$16. However, White is not so obliging. Black should have exchanged queens, although White still has good chances after the continuation 16... 對xf6 17 2xf6 e5 18 2h7 (getting outside the pawn chain, not trying to win the exchange) 18...d4 19 h5 2f5 20 2xf5 ②xf5 21 h6 含d7 22 h7 罩h8 23 g4 and f4 (Korchnoi).

> 17 f4! **警e3**

Now after 17... ₩xf6 18 \(\Delta xf6, Black can't even play ...e5.

> 18 h5 **e**5 19 h6

It's nice to have a plan!

19 **e4** 20 **≜b**5 Xxg5 21 **h**7 **⊉g4** 22 ₩xg5 **幽d2+** 23 **曾**们 **≜xe2**+ 24 **≜**xe2 ②d4 25 h8幽+ 1-0

Black does have to watch that hpawn in these variations.

Game 23 M.Müller – Vaganian

Bundesliga 1994 Winawer Variation

1	e4	е6
2	d4	d5
3	包c3	≜ b4
4	e5	c 5
5	a3	≜a 5

6 b4!?

6 ... cxd4


Worthy of further analysis is 6...cxb4!? 7 ②b5 ②c6 8 axb4 皇xb4+9 c3 皇e7 10 皇a3 ②h6 11 皇xe7 營xe7 12 ②d6+ 曾f8 13 皇b5! ± Topalov-Ermenkov, Bulgaria 1994.

7 **營g4**

White's other main plan is 7 5 b5 \(\doldo c7 \) 8 f4, which is analysed under the Classical centre.

The main alternative is 8 bxa5 dxc3 9 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)xg7 \(\mathbb{\text{g}}\)8 10 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\)xh7 \(\mathbb{\text{b}}\)bc6 (D), when a position of a very similar nature to that in the first two games of this chapter is reached. The differences are that White has an extra

pawn on a5 (which can prove a nuisance for Black after a5-a6) and that Black has already played ...dxc3 so White can choose ②f3 (with the possible follow-up ②g5) rather than ②e2. In return, Black has approximately an extra tempo.



W

White has to defend e5. His first option is to follow the structure of Game 21 and play 11 f4. Then one recent game continued 11... 2d7 12 ②f3 (12 罩b1 公xa5 13 公f3 營c7 14 Ød4 ± Shirov-Ljubojević, Monte Carlo 1996) 12... 響xa5 13 包g5!? 0-0-0 14 ②xf7 ②f5! 15 ②xd8 豐xd8 16 当h3 公cd4 17 当xc3+? (17 息d3 型h8 18 g4 罩g8 =) 17...\$b8 18 a4 [Editor's note: this unfortunate novelty was actually part of Ernst's preparation] 18... **營**h4+19 g3 **基**xg3 20 hxg3 營xh1 21 含f2 營h2+ 22 鱼g2 包e2 23 豐f3 包fd4 0-1 Ernst-Kinsman, Gausdal Troll 1995.

His second option is to use his pieces to defend e5 rather like Game 22. Recent theory has continued 11 包f3 營c7 12 皇f4 皇d7 13 皇d3 0-0-0

14 a6 f5! 15 exf6 營xf4 16 fxe7 Lde8 17 皇g6 罩h8 (17... 包e5 18 皇xe8 罩xg2 19 单xd7+ 含c7 20 e8分+ 含b8 21 會f1 罩xf2+ 22 含xf2 豐xf3+ 23 含g1 ₩e3+ 24 當f1 ₩f4+ 25 當g2 ₩f3+ 1/2-1/2 Dolmatov-S.Ivanov, Russia 1995) 18 **曾g7 曾g4!** 19 axb7+ **含**xb7 20 罩b1+ 含a8 21 夏xe8 豐xg6 22 2xd7 2xe7 and Black stood well in Strange-Kinsman, Sheffield 1996.


> **⊈c7 幽xg7 ℤg8 幽xh7 a6** 10

Too optimistic was the 10... 2 xe5 11 包f3 罩h8 12 豐d3 皇g7 13 皇f4 ②g6 14 ②c7+ 當f8 15 鱼g3 e5 16 ②xa8 ②c6 of Sion Castro-Arencibia, Leon 1991, though Black managed to trick his way to a draw.

11 ②xc7+ **幽xc7 ♠**b2 12

If White plays 12 De2 first, Black can try 12...Qd7 13 Qb2 a5! 14 ②xd4 \wxe5+ 15 \ 2e2 \ ②bc6 ∞ Yermolinsky-Vaganian, Tilburg 1993.

₩xe5+ 12 13 De2 (D)



A rather different structure has arisen. White has a healthy queenside pawn formation, which makes castling queenside possible. Also, he has good prospects of being a pawn ahead after winning d4. However, Black has won the important pawn on e5 and after retreating the queen can threaten ...e5 activating his pieces with good chances.


13 **智f6**

The alternative retreat is 13... 對c7 14 f4 ②bc6 15 豐d3 ②f5 16 0-0-0 单d7 (16...包e3 17 罩e1 包xc2! 18 wxc2 d3 ∞) 17 Ie1 Ic8 18 &b1 Oce7 19 Øxd4 Øxd4 20 \$\textit{\textit{x}}\text{d4} (Nunn-Kinsman, London Lloyds Bank 1993) 20... **Qa4!** 21 c3 **Y**xf4 but White's two bishops give him the edge.

14 f4

White has to stop 14...e5. Instead, Čabrilo-Vaganian, Manila IZ 1990 continued 14 Wd3 e5 15 f4 2 f5 16

> 4)bc6 14 **幽d3** 9)f5 15 16 **營h6!** (D) 0 - 0 - 0



Creating tricky pins on both the f4- and h2-pawns.

17 當b1?!

If instead 17 \(\mathbb{Z} = 1\$, then 17...e5 18 \) \(\mathbb{Z} \) \(

17 ... **2**d7

Wrong would be 17... 2e3 18 Ze1 2xg2? (better is 18... 2c4) 19 2xg2 Zxg2 20 Zhg1 with strong compensation: the g-file is more important than the g-pawn.

Little better is 19 g4 ②e3! (or 19... 三xg4 20 息h3) 20 g5 營h4 21 三c1 e5 22 fxe5 息f5 23 營d2 三xg5!? 〒.

An important improvement over 19... \$\displays f8 20 h4 \$\overline{\Omega}\$ce7 21 \$\overline{\Omega}\$xd4 \$\overline{\Omega}\$xg3 \$\infty\$ Yudasin-Lputian, USSR Ch 1986.


20 ②xd4

If White now continues as in Yudasin-Lputian above with 20 h4, Black can launch a surprise queenside attack with 20...公xc2! 21 營xc2 公xb4 22 營d1 營g6+ 23 含a1 公c2+ 24 含a2 公xe1 25 營xe1 營e4 winning. Yudasin suggested 20 宣c1 but this is well met by 20...e5! 21 fxe5 全f5 22 營d2 全e4 23 宣g1 營xh2.

20	***	②xd4
21	臭xd4	②xc2
22	≝c1	②xd4
23	≝xc8+	&xc8
24	₩xd4	≝xg3

This crucial capture at the end of the tactical sequence leaves Vaganian a clear pawn up. He now consolidates well:

7 Rubinstein Centre




General observations

Black has eliminated White's epawn and so prevented him from setting up the cramping pawn chain with e5, which is the characteristic pawn structure in the main lines of the French. However, Black has by no means solved all his problems. He still has, at least temporarily, a bad bishop which is difficult to develop, and a space disadvantage – three ranks as opposed to White's four.

Setting up Fort Knox

One radical approach to this problem is to swap off the bad bishop for a knight as quickly as possible and then keep the position closed, trusting that White will not be able to break open the position and thereby exploit his space advantage, lead in development and two bishops. This is done by the long-winded manoeuvre ... \(\alpha \) c8-d7-c6 followed by capturing a knight on e4 or f3, arriving at the following structure:




Black plays ...c6 to build up a solid fortress on the light squares, in particular hindering any white breakthrough with d5 and protecting the b7-pawn from attack along the h1-a8 diagonal. This pawn structure is identical to positions that arise from the Scandinavian and Caro-Kann, though in the latter particularly Black hasn't usually given up the two bishops, and should really be discussed fully in a book on Mastering the Scandinavian. It is indeed a very solid set-up, well deserving the name Fort Knox Variation, and its soundness is confirmed by the fact that Anatoly Karpov is one of its most recent converts. On the other hand, because Black has conceded the two bishops, he has to accept a permanently cramped, but playable position.

Often White will play c4 to seize more space. If White succeeds in advancing d5, it is natural to suppose that the centre will be opened after a double exchange on d5. Such a breakthrough would greatly increase the power of White's light-squared bishop by opening up the diagonals a2-g8 and h1-a8. This bishop has no enemy rival. Once the advance has occurred, the bishop could be used to terrorise the black pawn on b7 (if the general plan is an attack on the queenside) or as part of a kingside attack by pressurising f7. If White is allowed to advance d5, then everything has probably gone wrong for Black. His strategy depends on the centre remaining closed.

White's most natural plan is to prepare a direct attack on the enemy king (which is more often than not on the kingside). Such a plan would be abetted by the advantage of the two bishops and the greater freedom of action which his pieces enjoy. White can also attempt to force a weakness in Black's queenside pawn structure by following up with b2-b4-b5 or a2-a4-a5-a6. Ideally the light-squared bishop would be at f3 or somewhere else along the h1-a8 diagonal to help pulverise Black's queenside.


Of course, Black doesn't have to let this happen. Basically, Black has to be alert to danger and try to neutralise his opponent's threats. Every



exchange of pieces of more or less of equal value tends to favour him. His priority is to avoid weaknesses: there is little scope for immediate active play. He must try to wear down White's position rather than expect to demolish it quickly.

A key question is whether Black should try to eliminate White's dpawn by preparing ...c5 followed by ...cxd4. Such a plan is normally a good idea if this basic structure is reached. For example, it is the principal idea in the main-line Caro-Kann. However, things are different in the Fort Knox. Black no longer has his light-squared bishop, and in advancing ...c5 he may well expose the soft under-belly of his position the b7-pawn. In general, it is unwise to open the centre when your opponent has the two bishops. Therefore a better approach by Black is to remember Nimzowitsch's advice about an enemy passed pawn: "first restrain, then blockade, and finally destroy". The white d-pawn deserves the same treatment. Here is an ideal strategy for Black:

First, Black achieves a vice-like grip on d5 to prevent White advancing his d-pawn. Then if possible he exchanges off dark-squared bishops, so that there is one fewer white piece able to defend d4. A quick word about Black's king's bishop. Normally it goes to e7 (rather than d6). Sometimes Black plays ... Ife8 and ...\$18, or even ...\$6 and ...\$27. In the latter case, the bishop will exert pressure against d4 while also bolstering the defences of the kingside. Ideally Black would like to exchange it for its white counterpart.




If White plays b3 and \(\mathbb{L}\)b2, a good plan is ... \subseteq a5 and then ... \subseteq a3 to exchange bishops. Black's rooks are well placed defensively on e8 and d8, but if possible, perhaps after the exchange of a pair of minor pieces, they can be doubled on the dfile against the white d-pawn.

If possible, perhaps by putting the queen on b6, Black will try to provoke White into advancing c5, when the d5-square becomes an excellent outpost for a black knight. However,


Black wouldn't hurry to occupy this outpost, as then the d4-pawn is sheltered. Alternatively, Black could try ...b5 to break up White's pawns and win control of d5 that way. If White has played badly, he will find that the d4-pawn becomes indefensible. If on the other hand he has been vigilant, then he will be able to avoid being provoked into c5 and have bolstered his d-pawn, in which case an impasse is reached.

Black plays ...c5

As already mentioned, if Black has not given up the two bishops, Black's key liberating advance is the move ...c5. This means that he achieves the exchange ...cxd4, which eliminates White's space advantage.



Thus Black has no need to worry about his pieces being constricted by his opponent's pawn centre, as occurs for example in the standard cramping centre when White plays e5. However, Black's development will have suffered somewhat and with the disappearance of the centre pawns, the white pieces will easily find healthy attacking squares. In the meantime, it is difficult for Black to deploy his c8-bishop to a good diagonal. In fact, a central theme of the white strategy is to keep this bishop from active play.




Because White's pawn centre has vanished, he cannot play a patient game, hoping to squeeze Black's pieces: there is nothing to squeeze them with! Instead, he has to try to exploit the superior deployment of his pieces with an attacking plan. In the idyllic scenario above, White has positioned his pieces perfectly for an attack on Black's kingside: bishops to d3 and g5, queen to e2, knight to e5. Note that Black cannot play ...b6 because of \(\Delta xf6\) \(\Delta xf6\), \(\Delta e4\) winning the exchange by the double attack on h7 and a8.

By castling queenside and playing h4, White can quickly counter ...g6 with h4-h5, or ...h6 with g2-g4-g5. White can of course also choose to castle kingside, when he can use

his c-pawn more aggressively, either to support a knight on d4 or to deny the black pieces the d5-square.


Against queenside castling, Black either has to accept a slight disadvantage by castling queenside himself (if it is not too late to do so), or has to launch a violent attack against the white king.



Black's attack is easier to play in some ways as he has fewer options, generally having to play in Sicilian style with moves like ... \$\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}} a5, ... \$\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}} d7, and ... \$\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}} c8, but he has to be very inventive in defence if he is going to counter White's usual lead in development. One important idea is the manoeuvre ... \$\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}} f8-d8, ... \$\mathbb{\mathbb{Z}} c8-d7-e8 defending the f7-pawn.


Against kingside castling, Black has more options. With a kingside pawn advance unlikely, he can try to defend accurately and slowly neutralise White's slight advantage.

On the other hand, and given time, he can play ... 學c7 and ... 全d6 attacking h2 (usually after ... a6 to stop 包b5 ideas). If Black has castled



queenside, this can be followed up by ... 2g4 and ... h5 (but White can also advance his queenside pawns very quickly). Whichever side he has castled, he will seek to bring his light-squared 'problem' bishop into the attack with often devastating consequences, either by ... \(\delta \cdot c8 - d7 c6 or by ...b5 and ... \(\Delta b7.


Black plays ... b6



It may seem that the simple plan of ... b6 and ... b7 is the solution to all Black's problems. If only it were so simple! The move ... b6 weakens

the b5- and c6-squares, and White can normally take advantage of this by moves like \$\oldsymbol{2}\$b5 or \$\oldsymbol{1}\$c6. It also fails to challenge White's space advantage, but if Black can get in ... b6 and ...c5 without falling too far behind in development, then he may well reach comfortable equality.


Black plays ...gxf6



White's knights can often make good use of the 'semi-outposts' e5 and e4 as the pawn move that could dislodge them (...f6 or ...f5) would leave the e6-pawn uncomfortably backward. This is part of the reasoning behind the recapture ...gxf6 after a 2xf6 capture - White's two knights have fewer central squares. Black also gains the g-file for his rooks, which can be very useful when White has castled kingside. A rook on g8 and bishop on b7 or c6 can combine against g2. Black often combines ...gxf6 with ...0-0-0 for seemingly obvious reasons, but the capture can be surprisingly effective after ...0-0 as well. The king on h8

defends the weak h7-pawn and is fairly secure after ... f6-f5, though Black must watch out for piece sacrifices on f5.

Black plays ...e5



Black can sometimes play the alternative central break ...e5, freeing his light-squared bishop, providing he very carefully considers the consequences of both the simplifying dxe5, when White's lead in development could prove awkward, and the advance d5, when a very complex position arises in which White's space advantage on the queenside would usually be easier to exploit than Black's on the kingside, assuming both players have castled kingside.

In summary, in the Rubinstein Centre, Black has fewer winning chances then in the various Advance Centres after e5. However, he has a safe position with fewer weaknesses. White in turn is allowed smooth development of his pieces and a space advantage. However, this can easily evaporate into sterile equality.

Illustrative games


Game 24 **Shirov – Hübner** *Munich 1993*Fort Knox Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d 5
3	包c3	dxe4
4	9)xe4	⊈d7

Black seeks to get rid of his problem piece in an immediate and radical manner. Ignoring all the classical rules of rapid development, he plays his bishop from c8 to c6 and then seeks to swap it for a white knight on e4 or f3. 4...b6 is inferior due to 5 \(\mathbb{H}f3!\) \(\mathbb{L}b7\) 6 \(\mathbb{L}d6+\) with advantage. For 4...\(\mathbb{L}d7\), see the following game.

7 全g5?! leads to exchanges that help Black, who has a cramped position, for example 7...全e7 8 全xe7 当xe7 9 当e2 全xe4 10 全xe4 (10 当xe4 当b4+) 10...包gf6! 11 0-0 (11 全xb7?? 当b4+) 11...包xe4 12 当xe4 c6 = Enders-McDonald, Budapest Elekes mem 1995.

One alternative is 8 Ded2 planning to manoeuvre the knight to e5 via either c4 or f3. Black must react actively: 8... Dd5! 9 Dc4 Db4 10 De2 De4! 11 c3 Dc2 12 Db1 Dxd4 13 Wxd4 Dxb1 14 Dg5 f6 15 Dxb1 fxg5 is uncomfortable but an exchange and a pawn is a lot of material! The game I.Rogers-McDonald,



London Lloyds Bank 1993 continued more sedately: 9 單e1 鱼e7 10 c4 ②f4 11 鱼f1 0-0 12 營b3 ②g6 13 營e3 鱼xf3 14 ②xf3 c6 15 b3 營a5! 16 鱼d2 鱼b4 =.

W

Another alternative is 8 ②eg5 hoping for tactical ideas with ②xf7 or ②xe6 but Black has no problems after 8...②d6!, e.g. 9 Iel h6 10 ②h3 (10 Ixe6+ ②f8!) 10...②xf3 11 Ixf3 c6 12 ②f4 If a5 (stopping the knight going to h5) 13 c3 0-0 = Harley-McDonald, Cheltenham 1994.

8 ... \&e7 9 b3 0-0 10 \&b2 \&xf3

In the game Adams-Dreev, Manila OL 1992, Dreev attempted to immediately exploit White's queenside weaknesses with 10...a5 11 a3 b5! 12 Le1 b4 and succeeded in both preserving his bishop and creating a hole on c3. However, in Bologan-Kramnik, Khalkidhiki 1992, White played the better 11 c4! a4 12 De5 ±, and Bologan later suggested the logical improvement 10...b5!?.


12	c4	ℤe8
13	Efe1	2 f8
14	h4	≝c7
15	Zac1	Øg6!

Black continues with his standard manoeuvre regardless of the threatening pawn on h4, as he cannot afford to waste any time. With a white rook lined up on the c-file against the black queen, d5 is a strong threat, for example 15... \(\mathbb{Z}\) ad8?! 16 d5! cxd5 17 cxd5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)d7 18 d6! \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd6 (18... \(\mathbb{Z}\)xd6? 19 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf6 \(\mathbb{

16 h5

Now after 16 axg6 hxg6 17 d5, Black can play 17...exd5 18 cxd5 ac8 (Hübner).

16 ... ②h4 17 營e3 _ ... ②d6! (D)



W

Black threatens 18... £ f4, winning the exchange. Rather than move his rook from c1. which would allow

Black to simplify the position with 18...\$\,\preceq\$xg3 and 19...\$\,\preceq\$f5, Shirov preferred to keep the initiative, and not the rook:

18 De4!?

Black now has no choice, since 18... 2xe4 19 \text{\text{\text{W}}}xe4 \text{\text{\text{D}}f5 20 g4 is bad. So:

An essential part of White's plan. He provokes 20...f5 for two important reasons: first, the diagonal a1-h8 is weakened, so that White is forever poised to play d5! unmasking the b2-bishop. The bishop will have no natural adversary once Black has played ... xc1 so Black will always be faced with the possibility of White's queen and bishop arranging a mating dénouement on g7. Secondly, after 20...f5, the h4-knight suddenly finds its escape route cut off, and is vulnerable to attack by g3, or by White's queen.

Note how thoroughly unpleasant is Black's defensive task. Not only has he to deal with direct threats (such as g3 winning the knight), he also has to worry about White's more vague ideas involving d5. Regardless of whether Shirov's sacrifice is sound, it is certainly very dangerous.

22 ... f6!

An excellent move. The knight on h4 can't be saved so Hübner bolsters the a1-h8 diagonal and prepares to utilise the g-file for a counter-attack against White's king.

23 g3 **含f7** 24 gxh4 **學f4!**

Black is battling for the initiative. He has blunted the power of White's bishops and is now ready to dismantle White's kingside with ... \wxh4 and ... Ig8+. However, the material balance has now swung firmly in White's favour. If we remove the queens from the board, White would have a very advantageous endgame. (He would prepare d5, breaking up the centre, when the two bishops would far outweigh a rook.) This means that White can gain time to shepherd his king to the safety of the queenside by 'bullying' Black with an unacceptable offer to exchange queens. The more immediate 24... 其g8+ 25 當f1 營h2 26 當e1 營f4 27 \$\displaysquare displaysquare with the 27 and 27 job for him.


25 **Le1 Lg8+** After 25... Wxh4 26 Wf3 White's queen would be too dominant.

White has safeguarded his king and is ready to begin a strong attack with d5. Black therefore has to force an exchange of queens, however disagreeable this may be.

Of course 31 \(\mathbb{\text{\mathbb{W}}}\xg5?\) fxg5 would greatly increase the value of Black's kingside pawns.

Not 33... **当**h2?? 34 **当**h5+! winning at once.

34 🙎 xf3 (D)



В

34 ... \$\displays{g}6?

A false trail. As Shirov points out, Black should bring his king to the centre to bolster his pawns against d5. The king does nothing on g6, since the penetration squares g5 and h5 are inaccessible. Furthermore, the king blocks the g-file, and so prevents any active play with ... \(\mathbb{Z}\)g8 and ...\(\mathbb{Z}\)g1.

35 **全e3 基d8** 36 **全c3 学f7**

Correcting his mistake, but valuable time has been lost.

37 a4!

Rather than rush the d5 breakthrough, White strengthens his position further. He intends to attack the black queenside pawns with a5 and a6.

37 ... **∲**e7

38 a5 **\$d**7

If 38...a6, then 39 b4 intending to break up Black's queenside with 40 b5. Shirov suggests 38...\$\dot\delta\

39	d5!	exd5
40	cxd5	exd5
41	£xf6	Zf8
42	⊉h4!	

Keeping the d8-square covered, so that Black can't defend the d-pawn with ... \(\mathbb{L}\)d8. Thus the centre is swept clear and the bishops become a deadly force.

42	•••	Ġc6
43	Ġd4	\$ b5
44	≜xd5	ġ xa5
45	êxb7	Lb8
46	₫ 45	h5

If Black had managed to advance this pawn to h3 or h2 at an earlier stage of the endgame, the outcome may have been different. As it is, the passed pawn proves irrelevant.

47	. €.e6	\$ a6
48	&c4 +	ġ b6
49	⊈e 5	a5

The f5-pawn is doomed. Meanwhile, White's own f-pawn has a glorious future.

50	\$ xf5	-	\$ c5
51	ģe5		1-0

Game 25

Hector - L.Hansen

Copenhagen Open 1995 Rubinstein Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	②c3	dxe4

In the game Beliavsky-Vaganian, Tilburg 1993, White tried the novel 5 g3!? and gained some advantage after 5... \(\Delta\) gf6 6 \(\Delta\) xf6+\(\Bar{B}\) xf6 (6... \(\Delta\) xf6 may be better) 7 \(\Delta\) g2 \(\Delta\) d6 8 \(\Delta\) e2 e5 9 0-0. The g2-bishop far outstrips its counterpart on c8. Rather than Black's routine fifth move, 5... b6 was an interesting response. Then 6 \(\Delta\) g2 \(\Delta\) b8! (not 6... \(\Delta\) b7 7 \(\Delta\) d6+!) 7 \(\Delta\) e2 \(\Delta\) b7 (threatening 8... f5!) 8 0-0 \(\Delta\) gf6 9 \(\Delta\) xf6+\(\Delta\) xf6 10 \(\Delta\) xb7 \(\Delta\) xb7 11 c4 \(\Delta\) e7 and Black is ready to castle followed by ... c5, with an equal position.

5 ... **Dgf6**

5...\$e7 6 \$d3 \$\times gf6 7 \$\times e2 c5 8 \$\times xf6+ \$\times xf6?!(8...\times xf6 transposes to the game) 9 d5! proved good for White in Timman-Granda, Amsterdam 1995.

6 ②xf6+


In Anand-Vaganian, Riga 1995, 6 2d3 proved effective after the continuation 6... 2xe4 2f6 8 g5!

ge7 9

gxf6. Here Black would like to play 9...\$\&\textit{xf6}\$, but then 10 ₩d3 looks awkward, since if 10...0-0 then 11 2xh7+, while 10...h6 (recommended by Anand!) allows 11 鱼xb7!? 鱼xb7 12 当b5+ and White will win a pawn or at least have rather the better of the game. In the game, Black chose 9...gxf6, but after 10 ₩e2 c6 (countering any idea of 11 \(\exists xb7\), but Anand points out that 10... Wd6! was much stronger, when the queen covers some important dark squares) 11 0-0 **豐**b6 12 c4 Black's bishop on c8 was a miserable piece and White was ready to exploit his space advantage, perhaps with the breakthrough d5 (after suitable preparation). So Black does best to answer 6 \(\text{\text{\text{\text{2}}}}\)d3 with 6...c5, when play will probably transpose to the game after 7 \(\text{\text{\text{2}}}\)xf6+ \(\text{\text{\text{2}}}\)xf6.

6 ... ②xf6
7 ≜d3 c5

Black has also tried 7...b6, a noble attempt to solve the problem of the c8-bishop before challenging the white centre with ...c5. However, in Topalov-Vaganian, Riga 1995, after 8 \(\mathbb{W}\)e2 \(\Delta\)b7 9 \(\Delta\)g5 \(\Delta\)e7 10 0-0-0 (D) Black found that it had become difficult to enforce the ...c5 advance because of a potential attack on his queen by the d1-rook.



B

Vaganian continued 10... ₩d6 but after 11 ②e5 0-0 12 �b1 Zad8 13 c4! (taking away the d5-square from Black's pieces) 13...h6 14 ₤f4 he found that his queen was in deep trouble. Topalov succeeded in exploiting his material advantage after 14... ₩xd4 15 ₤h7+ �xh7 16 Zxd4.


Rather than 10... 省d6, the alternative 10...0-0 looks a better try. If White plays 11 h4, then 11...c5!? 12 dxc5 Wc7 looks an interesting pawn sacrifice, for example 13 cxb6 axb6 14 \$\delta\$b1 \$\delta\$d5 and Black has attacking chances against White's king. However, White does not need to hurry to start a kingside attack. He can keep a solid advantage with 11 &b1. In all, 7...b6 looks suspicious.

dxc5

An alternative is 8 0-0 cxd4 9 2xd4, when Tseshkovsky-Kholmov, Akmola 1993 continued 9... 2e7 10 c3 0-0 11 Ze1 a6 (11...b6 12 2)c6 acquires the two bishops) 12 2g5 Ze8. Here, Kholmov gives 13 \forall f3! as best and suggests the line 13... 對d5!? 14 We3 ②g4 15 Wh3 &xg5, overlooking 16 豐xh7+ \$f8 17 包f5! winning; therefore Black needs to improve.

More incisive is 9...\$\(\bar{2}\).c5, challenging the d4-knight. Then after 10 c3 &xd4! 11 cxd4 h6!? (ruling out the \$25 pin, but the simple ...\$d7 is also possible) Black is ready to complete his development with ... 2d7c6. White can also meet 9...\$c5 by 10 **≜**e3. Now 10...**②**d5? would be bad after 11 & b5+! & d7 12 @xe6! ②xe3 13 營xd7+, so Black should choose between 10... 2b6!? (intending 11... 2d5) and 10... We7 when play could continue 11 Ze1 0-0 12 c3 b6 13 \(\mathbb{Q} g5 \) \(\mathbb{Q} xd4 14 \) cxd4 \(\mathbb{Q} b7 15 \) 皇c2 單fd8 16 劉d3 h6 17 皇h4 罩ac8 with balanced chances.

This is the main-line position in the Rubinstein. Black has achieved much. He has entirely eliminated



White's pawn centre without conceding any weaknesses in his own pawn structure. Nor is he dangerously behind in development. So why doesn't everyone play the Rubinstein variation? The problem is, of course, the c8-bishop. If Black could play ...b6 and then ... \$\dots b7 without anything nasty happening, he would have a good position. But this proves a very big 'if' - so big that all White's strategy is based on Black's inability to carry out this simple plan.

9 **쌀e2**

This is the usual aggressive plan. White prepares to castle queenside and launch a direct attack on Black's king.

This apparently forces the bishop either to break the pin on the knight or retreat to h4, when ... \wad a5+ is more effective. But White has a surprise for Black. Note that 10...b6?? loses trivially to 11 2xf6 \wxf6 12 **營e4** picking up a rook.

11 h4!

In the earlier game Smirin-Yudasin, Israel 1995, White continued 11 hah4 whereupon 11... \$\sum_{a5}+!\$ disrupted the build-up of White's attack. After 12 c3 \$\sum_{d5}!\$ 13 \$\sum_{d2}\$ (not 13 b4 \$\sum_{a3}!\$, while 13 \$\sum_{e4}\$ meets with 13...f5, and if 13 0-0 then 13... \$\sum_{f4}\$ will swap off White's strong bishop on d3; that is why Black drove the bishop away from g5 with ...h6! at move 10) 13...\$\sum_{e7}\$ 14 \$\sum_{xe7}\$ \$\sum_{xe7}\$ 15 0-0 \$\sum_{c7}\$, Black had equalised.

11 ... Wa5+

12 &d2

This would of course be impossible if White had played 12 2.h4 rather than 12 h4.

12 ... &b4 13 0-0-0! &xd2+ 14 \Qxd2

White is playing in a vigorous attacking style. He wants to begin a direct onslaught on Black's king before Black is able to develop his queenside. He is prepared to gambit his a-pawn, as although 14... 2xa2 leaves the black queen excellently placed for a counterattack on the queenside, she lacks the support of the other black pieces and is therefore ineffective, while White can quickly blast open the kingside with 15 g4 and 16 g5, e.g. 14... 2xa2 15 g4 a5!? (15... 2xd5 16 g5 2xd7 17 gxh6 2fc8 18 2g4 wins) 16 g5 a4 17

gxf6 (17 &c4 營a1+ 18 包b1 a3 19 bxa3 包d5 20 &xd5 exd5 21 gxh6 &f5 is very messy) 17...a3 18 包e4 營xb2+ 19 含d2 and White will win.

14 ... e5

Resisting the temptation of the apawn. Black realises it is more important to develop his queenside and slow down White's kingside play.

15 a3

Of course 15 g4? can now be met by 15...\$xg4.


15 ... **L**e6

16 Dc4

16 The1 may have been better.

16 ... &xc4

18 **ab3** (D)



В

White now has a minimal edge because his bishop is better than the knight and he has the potential to attack with g4.

18 ... e4

Clearing the fourth rank so that from a5 the queen deters the projected g5.

19 g4 **Zfd8**

Black's pieces are actively placed and he is ready to counter White's kingside aspirations with counterplay in the centre and on the queenside.

> 20 f4 響c7! 21 里xd8+ 里xd8 22 里f1 ②d7! 23 g5

Here 23 營xe4 ②c5 24 營e3 營b6 (with the threat 24...②d3+) 25 含b1 ②xb3 26 營xb3 營xb3 27 cxb3 is ± (Hansen).

The counterplay Black now generates along the d-file gives him equal chances.

26 **萬c1** b6 27 f5!? hxg5 28 hxg5 **豐**xf5 29 **豐**h2?

A tempting move: attacking the d6-rook and preparing the lethallooking 30 \$\mathbb{L}\$h1. However, White's real attacking chances were against f7. After 29 \$\mathbb{L}\$f1 \$\mathbb{L}\$xg5 30 \$\mathbb{L}\$xf7 (or 30 \$\mathbb{L}\$xf7+ \$\mathbb{L}\$f8) the position is dynamically balanced according to analysis by Hansen.

Black defends the rook and is ready to meet 30 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h1? by 30...\(\mathbb{Z}\)d1+. Therefore White's attack falters and the counterattack, as is usual in such games, proves decisive.

30 当h5 g6 31 当h6 公e6 32 当h4 显d1!

With this move and the next Black clinches the game:

33 營xe4 營d2 34 魚xe6 罩xc1+ 35 含a2 營xg5 36 營a8+ 含g7 37 營xa7 營f6 38 魚b3 營f1 39 魚d5 罩a1+ 40 含b3 營b5+ 0-1

Game 26 **Hector – M.Gurevich** *Antwerp 1994*Burn Variation

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 ②c3 ②f6 4 皇g5 dxe4 5 ②xe4 皇e7

5...②bd7 6 ②xf6+ ②xf6 7 ②f3 reaches the Rubinstein Variation by a clever move-order, where White has played 兔g5 rather earlier than he might have liked. Black can take advantage of this by playing an immediate 7...h6!, e.g. 8 兔h4 c5 9 兔b5+ 兔d7 10 兔xd7+ 營xd7 11 營e2 兔e7 12 0-0-0 0-0 13 dxc5 營c6 = Anand-Ivanchuk, Linares 1992.


6 &xf6 &xf6

6...gxf6!? is currently a very popular option. It leads to complex play, but if Black is not careful, he will be annihilated by a well-timed d4-d5 advance, as in the game Gdanski-Babula, Odorheiu 1995: 7 ②f3 b6 8 总d3 (it is amazing how often White loses a tempo by playing 8 总b5+; Black has every intention of playing ...c6 anyway to hinder a d5 advance) 8...总b7 9 營e2 f5? (mixing plans; better is 9...c6 10 0-0-0 營c7 11 总b1 ②d7 12 c4 with a slight advantage to White, Becerra Rivero-Borges Mateos, Cuban Ch 1995) 10 ②c3 c6 11 0-0-0 營c7 12 Zhe1 ②d7

13 當b1 (13 皇xf5?? 營f4+) 13...②f6 14 ②e5 (White grabs the e5-square, so freely given) 14...單f8 15 d5!!. Black's position now collapses because 15...exd5 is met by 16 皇xf5 and 15...cxd5 by 16 皇b5+ 當d8 17 ②xf7+! 單xf7 18 營xe6 with a crushing attack.

- a) 10 0-0-0 cxd4 11 象b5+ 象d7 12 象xd7+ ②xd7! 13 ②xd4 ②b6 14 營d3 營c7 15 ②cb5 營f4+ 16 含b1 0-0 17 營g3+ 營xg3 18 hxg3 罩 Lukin-Kiriakov, Moscow 1995.
- b) 10 d5 e5!? 11 0-0-0 e4!? ∞ Loskutov-Belozerov, Moscow 1995.
- c) 10 鱼b5+ 鱼d7 11 dxc5 a6 12 鱼xd7+ ②xd7 13 0-0-0 營c7 14 營d6 旦c8 15 ②d5 營xc5 = Romero Holmes-Sion Castro, Leon 1996.
- d) 10 dxc5 ₩xd2+ 11 Øxd2 \$\din 67\$ 12 0-0-0 \$\dangle\$d7 13 Øb3 \$\dangle\$xc3!? 14 bxc3 a5 \$\ddots\$ Gaponenko-Kiriakov, Groningen 1995.

Returning to the game continuation, $6... \triangle xf6 (D)$.



Black has virtually forced White to exchange his dark-squared bishop for a knight, which is a significant positional achievement for Black. However, the liberating advance ... c5 now becomes particularly problematic. The e4-knight is as good as on an outpost, safe from pawn attack and difficult to exchange.

7 Df3

In Topalov-Bareev, Linares 1994, White tried delaying 2 f3 so that he could gain space in the centre with a later f4. Play went 7 c3 ②d7 8 豐c2 e5! (Bareev is alert and avoids the stereotyped 8...0-0, when 9 f4!, preventing the freeing move ...e5, justifies White's opening experiment) 9 dxe5 (Bareev suggests 9 0-0-0 here) 9... 2xe5 10 f4 2g6 11 g3 0-0 12 全d3 省d5! and Black had achieved comfortable equality. Now White should play the modest 13 2e2, giving up all hope of advantage. Instead, Topalov blundered with 13 a3?? forgetting that time is important in such an open position. Punishment was swift: 13... (2)xf4! 14 (2)xf6+ (if 14 gxf4 then 14... 2h4+ 15 \$f1 f5! regains the piece with a clear advantage) 14...gxf6 15 \(\mathbb{L}\xh7+ \displies g7 16 營e4 星e8!! 17 營xe8 皇f5 18 xa8 e4+ 19 啥f2 竇g2+ 20 \$e3 ②d5+21 含d4 曾d2+22 含c5 曾e3+ 23 堂c4 包b6+ and White gave up since he is soon mated.


White plans to play his queen to c2, where it eyes h7 and is not in the way of a d1-rook. The most important alternative is 8 \d2. Then 8...b6

9 ②xf6+ 豐xf6 10 单d3 has caused problems for devotees of this variation after both 10... 2d7 11 2g5 g6 12 0-0-0 **\$**b7 13 h4 h6 14 **②**e4 Wxd4 15 Wxh6 Wg7 (forced) 16 We3 with the makings of a strong attack on Black's fragile kingside in Yudasin-Dreev, Lyons 1994, and 10...单b7 11 包g5 h6 12 包h7 瞥xd4 13 包xf8 會xf8 14 c3 曾h4 15 g3! 曾f6 16 罩g1 and though Black has a solid position he doesn't quite have compensation for the exchange (Chandler-Prasad, Novi Sad OL 1990). This didn't stop Bareev, the leading expert in this variation, from repeating that whole line with Black against Kindermann at Pardubice 1994 – and losing!

So it seems that Black does better to play 8... 2d7 first to answer 9 ②xf6+ with 9... ②xf6, or just 8... & e7 immediately. Topalov-Dreev, Linares 1995 continued 8... 2 d7 9 0-0-0 2e7 10 2d3 (ideas with d5 don't seem effective in this line so it seems better to place the bishop on d3, pointing at h7, rather than on c4) 10...b6 11 h4 (11 營f4 兔b7 12 包eg5 鱼xg5 13 ②xg5 ②f6 14 ②f3 Wd6 15 ②e5 c5! 16 dxc5 營xc5 = J.Polgar-Lputian, Biel IZ 1993) 11... 2b7 12 c3 2)f6 13 2)eg5! (D).

Here Dreev played 13... xf3?!, underestimating the strength of the recapture 14 gxf3!, which bolstered White's attack by opening the g-file.

Dreev's suggestion of 13...c5 is critical. Then 14 dxc5 h6 (14...2xc5? 15 **營**c2!) 15 **營**c2 **營**c7 16 cxb6 axb6 17 \$b1 \$d5!? and Black has play for his pawn, or 14 營e2!? (threatening a Greek Gift sacrifice 15 @xh7!



B

②xh7 16 &xh7+ \$\text{\$\text{\$\geq}\$}\$xh7 17 ②g5+ dxc5! 營c7 16 ②xe6!) 15 營xf3 (15 gxf3!? cxd4) 15... 曾d5. So 13...c5 seems satisfactory for Black.

> 4)d7 幽c2 9 **e**5

Taking advantage of the fact that White hasn't castled yet. 9...b6 10 2d3 2b7 11 0-0-0 followed by h4 just gives White a superior version of the line given for 8 \dd2.

10 d5

Instead, White can allow the dissolution of the centre by playing 10 0-0-0 exd4 and then:

- a) 11 ②xf6+ is ineffective after 11...豐xf6 12 罩xd4 ②c5 13 Qc4 夏f5 14 營d2 (Ljubojević-Dreev, Linares 1995) and now Black gains the advantage in Dreev's variation 14... De6 15 \(\bar{\text{L}}\) d7 \(\bar{\text{L}}\)g5! 16 \(\bar{\text{L}}\)xc7 \(\bar{\text{L}}\)xf3 17 gxf3 兔g6!, threatening 18... 幽f5.
- b) 11 ②xd4 豐e7! (breaking any potential pin on the d-file and so freeing his d7-knight to challenge the e4-knight with ... (2)c5) 12 (2)d3 (in Glek-Lputian, Antwerp 1993,

12 h4 ②c5 13 ②xc5 營xc5 14 皇d3 h6 15 皇h7+ �h8 16 皇e4 a5 should have been OK for Black) 12...h6! and both 13 星he1 ②c5 (Hübner-Chernin, Groningen 1993) and 13 ②f5 營e6! 14 ②xf6+ 營xf6 15 星he1 ②e5 16 皇e4 ②c4, as given by Chernin in *Informator 59*, are satisfactory for Black. A particularly wild possibility is 14 g4 營xa2 15 h4 皇e5 16 g5 皇f4+ 17 ②e3 ②e5 18 gxh6 皇f5 19 hxg7 肇xg7.

10 ... \&e7!?

This leads to hair-raising complications. Black can choose the more solid 10...g6 11 0-0-0 (11 h4 全g7 12 h5 公f6 intending ...全f5 is unclear) 11...全g7 12 全c4?! (12 h4 h6 intending 13...f5 maybe) 12...公b6 13 全b3 a5 〒 Hellers-Vaganian, Reykjavik 1990.


11	0-0-0	&d 6
12	h4	€)f6
13	包fg5	g6
14	f3	-

14 h5 is recommended by Dreev, but 14... ②xe4 15 ②xe4 g5! 16 单d3 f5 17 ②xd6 營xd6 18 g4 e4 17 单c4 fxg4 18 營xe4 单f5 19 營e3 h6 20 国he1 罩ae8! is good for Black.

14	•••	⊘h 5
15	g4	Ø)f4
16	h5	f5 (D)
17	②xh7	fxe4
18	hxg6	II f6
10	€\a5	

Threatening 20 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h8+! with mate to follow.

In the game Minasian-Dreev, St Petersburg 1993, White blundered



W


with 20 營xe4? when Black beat off the attack with 20...包f8! (threatening 21...單f4) 21 單h5 單h6!. 20 ②xe4 was Dreev's suggested improvement.

20	•••	I f7
21	Z h6	≝ g7
22	₩h2	_

22	•••	₩f8
23	Wh5	₩xf3

24	ℤxg6	幽xe4
25	⊉d3	≝f4 +
26	Ġ b1	₩xg4
27	Zxg4	≜xg4 (D)
10	6 k7 (1	• • • •

Black probably didn't realise the strength of this check.



W

28	•••	알h8
29	幽h4	≜e7
30	₩h2	≅xh7
31	幽xe5 +	IIg7

Now the simplest win was 32 d6! but White took longer:

32 單g1 皇d6 33 營f6 皇e7 34 營h6+ 會g8 35 單xg4 罩xg4 36 營e6+ 會h7 37 營xg4 皇d6 38 營d7+ 會g6 39 營b5 b6 40 營a6 含f6 41 營b7 單f8 42 營xa7 含e5 43 營b7 罩f1+ 44 含c2 罩f2+ 45 含b3 罩d2 46 c4 含d4 47 營c6 罩g2 48 a3 含d3 49 營e8 含d4 50 營a4 皇e5 51 c5+ 含e3 52 cxb6 cxb6 53 營d7 罩xb2+ 54 含c4 罩c2+ 55 含b5 含d4 56 營g4+ 含c3 57 含xb6 皇d6 58 a4 罩d2 59 營e6 皇h2 60 a5 罩b2+ 61 含c6 含b4 62 營e1+ 1-0

Game 27 **Barber – Harley**

Hastings Challengers 1988/9
Winawer Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	Øc3	⊉b 4

4 De2

4 全d3 leaves the wrong piece on e4 after 4...dxe4 5 全xe4 ②f6 6 全g5 ②bd7 followed by 7...h6. 4 營d3, however, is a different matter entirely: after 4...dxe4 5 營xe4 ②f6 6 營h4, the white queen is well placed, so 4...②e7 is better.

4 ... dxe4

Not the most accurate continuation, because it opens the position for White's congested pieces. Best is 4...公c6! 5 a3 皇a5 6 皇e3 ②f6 7 e5 ②g4 8 皇d2 (8 ②f4 ②gxe5!) 8...0-0 9 f3 ②h6 10 皇xh6 營h4+ 11 g3 營xh6 12 f4 g5!? ‡ Van Mil-B.Martin, Oakham 1994.


5 a3 **2.**e7

Also possible is 5... 2xc3+6 2xc3 2c6 7 2b5 2e7 8 2g5 8 2xe4 2e5 8 2e5 2e5

Interesting but unsound is the idea 5...\$\omega\$7! 6 b4 \$\omega\$67 \$\omega\$xe4 e5 8 c4! \$\omega\$xd4 9 \$\omega\$xd4 \$\omega\$xd4 \$\omega\$xd4 10 \$\omega\$xd4 acd4 11 \$\omega\$f4 \$\omega\$ McDonald-A.Martin, British Ch 1994.

6 ②xe4 (D)

We have now reached a position just like the Rubinstein Variation but where White has developed his king's knight to e2 rather than f3. This leaves White temporarily tangled up, and with little control of e5;



B

but on the other hand, the e4-knight can be bolstered by ②2c3 or ②2g3.

6 ... ②c6

This move temporarily hampers White's development but 6...包f6 gives Black more options, e.g. 7 量d3 0-0 8 全f4 包bd7.

7 **皇f4**

The most popular choice, controlling the ...e5 break. Also possible are $7 \ 2 \ e3 \ 2 \ f6 \ 8 \ 2 \ e3 \ 0 - 0 \ 9 \ 2 \ g3 \ 2 \ d5$ $10 \ 2 \ xd5 \ exd5 \ 11 \ 2 \ d3 \ f5! = Dvoret-sky-Vaganian, USSR Ch 1974 and <math>7 \ c3 \ 2 \ f6 \ 8 \ 2 \ e3 \ e5 \ 9 \ 2 \ xf6 + 2 \ xf6$ $10 \ d5 \ 2 \ e7 \ 11 \ c4 \ \pm \ Tseitlin-Vilela, Trnava 1979.$

7 ... ②f6 8 ₩d3 0-0 9 0-0-0 ②d5

Better is 9...b6 10 ②2c3 and only then 10...②d5 11 ②xd5 exd5 12 ②g3 ②e6 13 營c3 ②d6! with an equal position, Mokry-Short, Thessaloniki OL 1984.

11 ②2c3 f5!? 12 ②xd5 exd5 13 ②c3 f4! followed by ... ₤f5 is unclear,

but best is 11 c4! \triangle xe3 12 fxe3 b5 13 c5 \pm .


11 ... b5 12 ②xd5 exd5

So we now have an Exchange centre, but with Black's queenside attack well under way.

13 h4?

White has to start untangling his pieces, for example by 13 ②f4, before launching an attack.

13 ... b4! 14 a4 (D)



B

14 ... b3!

15 cxb3

Or 15 營xb3 罩b8 16 營c3 心b4 17 全b1 全f5 18 罩d2 營d7 with a strong attack.

15 ... **②b4** 16 **劉b1**

Tucking the queen away, but 16 營d2 皇f5 17 ②c3 皇c2 18 星e1 皇xb3 is no better.

16 ... g6

16...c5 seems visually tempting but the doubled b-pawns help keep the c-file blocked after 17 ©c3.

17 **2**f4

After 17 ②g3 Black could then choose between 17...c5, 17...f5 and 17...②xh4. Interesting is 17 g4 with the idea of 17...②xg4 18 〖g1 ②f5?? 19 ¥xf5, but 17...③xh4 should be good enough.

17	•••	⊈f 5
18	≜d3	②xd3+
19	包xd3	c5!
20	dxc5	d4
21	₫ f4?!	

More testing is 21 **Qh6 Qxc5** (21... **Ee8** 22 b4 a5!) 22 **Qxf8 Qxf8 Q**

21	•••	£.xc5
22	⊈d2?	

Better was 22 \(\mathbb{I}\)del del followed by \(\mathbb{O}\)dl, but now it is all over.

22	•••	ℤe8
23	Zc1	幽e7
24	Exc5	幽e2+!
25	⊈c1	≜xd3
26	營a2	ℤac8
27	幽a3	豐xf2
28	g3?	≝e1 +
	0-1	

Game 28 **Adams – Dreev** *Wijk aan Zee 1996*Tarrasch Variation

1	e4	e 6
2	d4	d5
3	包d2	c5
4	exd5	

After 4 ②gf3, Rubinstein centres can arise as follows:

a) 4...cxd4 5 ②xd4 (5 exd5 ₩xd5 transposes to the game) 5...②f6 6

- b) 4...②f6 5 exd5 ②xd5 6 ②b3 cxd4 7 ②bxd4 ②e7 8 ②d3 0-0 9 0-0 ②f6 10 □e1 ②b4 = King-Dolmatov, Reykjavik 1990.
- c) 4...②c6 5 **\$**b5 dxe4 (5...a6 and 5...cxd4 are sound alternatives) 6 ②xe4 **\$**d7 7 **\$**g5! **¥**a5+ 8 ②c3 cxd4 9 ②xd4 (Tal-Uhlmann, Moscow 1971) 9...**\$**e7 10 **\$**e3 **¥**c7 ±.

4 ... **幽**xd5

Black chooses to concede the centre. The main alternative, 4...exd5, is analysed in the next two chapters.

5 **包gf3** cxd4 6 **全c4 豐d6**

Petrosian preferred 6... 48. If the queen is going to go to c7 in the end anyway, it may not make all that much difference.

7 0-0


An important point about this variation is that White has to castle kingside. If 7 包b3? then 7... 對b4+.

7 ... ②f6 8 ②b3 ②c6 9 ②bxd4

White can try to confuse Black by delaying the capture on d4 with 9 \$\mathbb{Z}\$e1. Then the most accurate reply is probably 9...\$\mathbb{Q}\$d7 10 \$\overline{D}\$bxd4 (10 g3 \$\alpha\$e7 11 \$\alpha\$f4 \$\mathbb{Z}\$b4 with equality, Ljubojević-Nikolić, Tilburg 1987) 10...\$\overline{D}\$xd4 11 \$\overline{D}\$xd4 \$\mathbb{Z}\$c7, but it is very tempting to set a trap with 11...\$\alpha\$e7, when 12 \$\alpha\$g5? \$\mathbb{Z}\$c5! wins a piece but 12 c3 is \$\pm\$ (analysed below).

9 ... ②xd4 10 ②xd4 (D)

White has also tried the capture 10 \wxd4 here. By allowing the trade of queens White foregoes any attempt to exploit his lead in development with a mating attack. However, he hopes that he will be able to force a weakness in Black's queenside before his opponent completes his mobilisation. The game Tiviakov-Chernin, Podolsk 1993 continued 10... **曾xd4** 11 **包xd4 全d7** 12 **全e2**!? (re-aligning the bishop to attack b7) 12...皇c5 (12...里c8!? 13 皇f3 皇c5 14 ②b3 & b6 15 c3 & c6 = J. Watson) 13 ②b3 &b6 14 a4 a6 15 &f3 0-0-0 (the king comes to the rescue of the b7-pawn) 16 2d2! and White had slightly the better chances after 16... \(\delta \) c6 17 \(\delta \) xc6 bxc6 18 \(\delta \) c3. Maybe Black should try 16...包d5, e.g. 17 2 a5 2 xa5 18 2 xa5 2 c6 19 ②xc6 bxc6 and there is no good reason why Black should lose.



B

A Rubinstein centre has been reached, but with all the pieces on different squares from the illustrative games we have seen thus far and with White well ahead in development. Nonetheless, this line, with its Sicilian-like qualities, has proved one of the most popular French variations for Black in recent years. Black's 'compensation' lies chiefly in the fact that White has already castled kingside, but also in the fact that White's already developed pieces are not on ideal squares: the d4-knight would really rather be on e5, and the c4-bishop would rather be on d3.

10 ... a6

Though behind in development, Black fails to develop a piece! The most obvious continuation at first sight would appear to be to develop with ... 2e7 and ... 0-0, but White's lead in development then gives him an easy advantage, e.g. 10... 2d7 11 c3 2e7 12 2e1 0-0 13 2f3 2c7 14 2d3 2fe8 (A.Sokolov-Nogueiras, Brussels 1988) 15 2f4 56 16 2e2 ±.

Therefore, to make sense of the whole variation (at least as an active weapon), Black has to try to develop his king's bishop more actively. The obvious plan is ... 幽c7 (gaining time by attacking the c4-bishop) and ... 2d6 (gaining time by attacking the h2-pawn), but first Black has to deal with the counter 455. Besides the game continuation, Black has also experimented a lot with 10... 2d7 11 c3 幽c7 12 幽e2 息d6 13 包b5 息xb5 14 **≜**xb5+ **\$**e7 15 g3, but the conclusion has been that White's two bishops give him the edge despite the simplified position.

An interesting idea is 10... 2c7, aiming to meet 11 2b3 by 11... 2d7

avoiding transposing to the main game, and 11 We2 with 11...a6 avoiding the line above. However, the queen serves a useful purpose on d6, attacking the d4-knight, and White can try to take advantage of Black's move-order after 11 We2 a6 by omitting c3, as the knight no longer needs to be defended, e.g. 12 \(\text{\text{\text{\$g5}}} \) \(\text{\text{\$d7}} \) 13 \(\text{\text{\$h4!?}} \) 0-0-0 14 \(\text{\text{\$g3}} \) \(\text{\$\pm\$} \) Kotronias-Hassan, Moscow OL 1994.

Finally, Black has also tried quickly castling queenside but this is a very risky strategy, e.g. 10....全d7 11 b3 0-0-0?! 12 a4! (12 全b2 營c7 13 營e2 h5! 14 包f3 包g4 15 h3 全c6 16 星fd1 全c5! justifies Black's strategy) 12...h5 13 包b5 營b8 (13...營xd1) 14 營f3 a6 15 全e3! with a strong attack (Dimitrov-Miljanić, Mataruška Banja 1996).

11 Ze1

White has several other moves here, against all of which Black can try the same plan:

a) 11 a4 \(\mathbb{U}\)c7 12 \(\mathbb{U}\)e2 \(\mathbb{L}\)d6 13 包f5 is an aggressive attempt to exploit White's lead in development. After 13... 2xh2+ 14 \$\disphi\$h1 it is risky to play 14...0-0, when 15 2xg7! \$xg7 16 f4 \$2g3 17 \$\mathbb{Z}\$a3 regains the piece for White with good chances to exploit the weak dark squares in Black's kingside. If 17... h4, 18 国h3. This version of the ②xg7 sacrifice is far superior to that seen in our illustrative game, because White's queenside rook gets into play so quickly. However, Black can avoid all this with 14... \$18! when in the game Van der Wiel-Glek, Tilburg 1994, he had good counterplay against White's own king after 15 2g3 h5 (15...2xg3 is risky, if not exactly bad) 16 2xh2 h4 17 2g1 hxg3 18 fxg3 e5.

- b) 11 b3 營c7 12 兔b2 兔d6 13 包f3 b5 14 兔d3 兔b7 15 罩e1 0-0! 16 包e5 罩ad8 17 營e2 包d5! 18 營g4 f5 19 營h4 包b4 20 罩e2 包xd3 21 包xd3 兔e4 22 罩ae1 罩fe8 = Tiviakov-Psakhis, Rostov on Don 1993.
- c) 11 c3 營c7 12 營e2 Qd6 13 h3 0-0 14 Qg5 ②e4! 15 Qh4?! ②d2! 〒 Kosashvili-Holzke, Biel 1989.
- d) 11 &b3 Wc7 12 Wf3 &d6 13 h3 0-0 14 &g5 Ød7! 15 c3 b5! 16 Wxa8? &b7 17 Wxf8+ Øxf8 and Black's queen and active pieces proved far stronger than White's two rooks in Ernst-Wiedenkeller, Swedish Ch 1989.

After 12 2d3 2d6 13 2f5!? 2xh2+14 2h1, Black should play 14...2f8! keeping the rook on the hfile; ...h5 is always in the air.


12 ... Qd6!?

This may be the losing move! If no improvements can be found, Black will have to play 12...\$\\dangle d7\$ first instead, losing the chance to develop the bishop to the long diagonal (at least immediately). White should not then be tempted to play 13 \$\dangle g5\$ as after 13...\$\dangle d6\$ 14 h3 0-0-0 15 \$\dangle f3\$, the exposed position of the g5-bishop enables Black to equalise with 15...\$\dangle c5!\$. Instead, better is 13 c3 \$\dangle d6\$ 14 h3 0-0-0 (14...0-0 is better but the d7-bishop is then misplaced) 15 \$\dangle e2\$ \$\dangle b8\$ 16 a4 \$\dangle c8\$ 17 a5 \$\dangle hg8\$ 18 \$\dangle f3\$ h6 19 \$\dangle e3\$ \$\dangle d7\$ 20

②a4 ②c5 21 b4 ③xe3 22 ৺xe3 g5 and White's attack should have been the quicker in the game Adams-Akopian, Khalkidhiki 1992.

13 **Df5!**

The exclamation mark is dependent on Adams's idea holding up in future theoretical tussles! Adams has also had success playing more calmly: 13 h3 0-0 14 c3 b5 15 兔g5 兔b7! 16 兔c2 (16 兔xf6 gxf6 17 營g4+ �h8 18 營h4 置g8 19 營xf6+ 置g7; the g-file counterattack is a very important theme) 16...②d5 17 營h5 g6 18 營h4 兔h2+ 19 �h1 兔f4 20 兔e4 置ab8?! 21 罩ad1 兔xg5 22 營xg5 (Adams-Gulko, Groningen 1993) 22...營f4 23 營xf4 公xf4 24 公c6 兔xc6 25 兔xc6 ±.



B

14 ... 0-0

In other similar lines (illustrated above), 14...\$f8 is frequently the critical response, but here it can be met by the brilliant 15 \$\mathbb{

15 ②xg7! **Zd8!**

An important zwischenzug before capturing White's knight. 15... 堂xg7 16 營d4!, with ideas such as 17 总h6+ 堂g6 18 營h4 threatening mate on g5, would be very dangerous for Black.

16 **營f3**

16 We2 has also been tried, but Black seems OK after 16... 堂xg7 17 g3 鱼xg3 18 fxg3 Wc5 19 鱼f4 Wh5+ (Vorontsov-Savchenko, St Petersburg 1993).

This is White's idea. Black's reply is forced, because he is soon mated after 17... 當xh6 18 營xf6+ 當h5 19 置e4 or 19 g4+, etc. Also possible is 17 g3, when in Yandemirov-S.Ivanov, Minsk 1995, Black had promising counterattacking chances after 17... b5! 18 當xh2 皇b7 19 營e2 營c6 20 置g1 置ac8.

17 ... **学g6** 18 c3!

An insidious move, which plans to bring the b3-bishop into the attack with a lethal \(\extit{\pi}\)c2+.

After 18 c4 ②h5 19 &e3, Black managed to defend successfully in Gufeld-Ravi, Calcutta 1994 after 19...f5 20 g4 ②f6 21 gxf5+ exf5 22 \text{

18 ... **公d**5

Bad would be 18...e5 19 \(\mathbb{L} \c2+ \) e4 20 \(\mathbb{L} \xe4 + \alpha \) xe4 21 \(\mathbb{L} \xe4 \) \(\mathbb{L} \) f5 (or

21...f5) 22 單h4 兔e5 23 營h5+, etc. A possible improvement is 18...包h5 when Gulko recommends 19 兔e3.


19 **Zad1!** (D)

A very important improvement over previous play, bringing White's final piece into the attack. Black's position is far more resilient than it might look at first sight, e.g. 19 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e4 \$xh6 20 \(\mathbb{Z}\)g4! (cutting off the black king's escape route and threatening 21 營h3#; much weaker would be 20 to save the king) 21 g3 Zd3! (both 21...包g6 22 曾f6! and 21...包h5 22 置h4 are bad, while 21... 營c6 exchanges queens but leads to a bad endgame after 22 響xc6 bxc6 23 gxf4; instead, Black forces a simplification that is very much on his own (Black is also better after 23 Exf4 皇xg3 24 fxg3 f5!) 23...罩h3 24 當g2 罩h5 25 罩h1 臭d7 26 罩xh2 臭c6+ 27 항g1 Ixh2 28 항xh2 Id8 29 f5 (White is forced to play this sacrifice because Black threatened 29...\(\beta\)d2) 29...exf5 30 Id4 Ie8 31 2xf7 Ie2 32 曾g3 罩xb2 33 臭d5 臭xd5 34 罩xd5 罩xa2 35 罩xf5 當g6 36 罩c5 and although Black has fair winning chances, White managed to escape with a draw 20 moves later in the game Khalifman-Gulko, Lucerne Wcht 1993.

19 ... f5

The key point is that 19...當xh6 can be answered by 20 罩xd5! and 20...當g7 21 罩g5+ or 20...罩xd5 21 豐f6+ 當h5 22 罩e3.

A detailed discussion of this position on the Internet came up with the



B

20 &c1


≜d6?

After this Black is definitely lost. The last chance at improvement is to return the piece by 20... 全e5! 21 c4 (21 g4!? 星f8!) 21... 包f6 22 星xd8 豐xd8 23 星xe5 包g4 24 豐f4! 豐f6!.


23 **營h3!**

Far stronger than the obvious 23 Hed1?! Le6 24 Hxd6+ Hxd6 25 Wg3+ Lf7 26 Hxd6 Hd8, when Black retains some drawing chances according to Adams.

23	•••	.2.f8
24	≝e3	Ġ g7
25	ℤ g3+	\$h8 (D)



8 Exchange Centre




General observations

The Exchange centre has always been dismissed as drawish, but this is only the case if both sides are amenable. Although the pawn structure is symmetrical, White still has the advantage of the move, while Black can use the 'advantage' of going second to unbalance the position at any point: for example, if White develops with 2g1-f3 Black can respond ... 2g8-e7 and answer 2g1-e2 by ... 2g8-f6.


If one player castles kingside and the other queenside, both players will usually launch violent pawn storms against their opponent's king. (White's extra tempo could then prove critical.) Even if both players castle on the same side, the fact that the centre is blocked and therefore counterplay limited means that the more actively placed player can launch an attack, with pieces or pawns, against his opponent's king in relative safety.

Exchanging on f5/f4



The exchange of pawns on d5 has liberated Black's 'bad bishop'. Nonetheless, it is still not fully redeemed, as the d5-pawn is set firmly on a light square. Therefore Black almost invariably seeks to exchange it for White's good bishop, usually by playing ... £ f5 supported by a knight on e7. Sometimes, when White has greater control of f5, it will first be necessary to play ... 全e6 and ... 對d7 and only then ... \$15. Naturally, White can use the same method (2 f4 after 20e2) to seek to exchange off his bad bishop, but this is unlikely to bring White any advantage.


Early white queen development




If Black has played ... 28-e7 before White has developed his king's knight, White can safely play his queen to the kingside without fearing the response ... 26 (followed by ... 294). A queen on f3 or h5 controls the important f5-square as well as adding annoying pressure to such squares as d5, f7 and h7, and there is no easy way for Black to chase the queen away. Again of course, Black can use the same strategy if White plays 291-e2 before Black has developed his king's knight.

Advancing the c-pawn

One way either side can unbalance the position is by pushing their cpawn forward two squares. Then if the c-pawn is exchanged for the enemy d-pawn, an IQP centre results. The position of interest to this chapter arises if the pawn continues its advance. We will assume it is Black playing ...c5 and ...c4, but obviously the same principles apply when White plays c4 and c5.




Black has clearly gained a space advantage on the queenside, and it is important for White to challenge this immediately with b3. If Black then replies ...b5, White's best approach is to ease his cramp on the queenside by exchanging one pair of pawns after a4 a6, axb5 axb5 ...



... and then to use his queen and queen's bishop to exploit the darksquare holes on b4 and c5 and exert pressure against the weakness on b5, usually after first fixing the pawns by playing a preparatory c3.

Another possibility for Black is exchanging pawns on b3 instead of playing ... b5, when White will recapture with the a-pawn (capturing towards the centre and opening the a-file for the undeveloped rook), reaching the following pawn structure:



White can then try to exchange off his bad bishop by means of 2a3, though must be careful not to waste too much time. If White plays too slowly, Black can happily build up pressure on the c-file against White's backward c-pawn. Playing c2-c4 doesn't help, because the b3- and d4pawns are then weakened and b4 becomes a useful hole for Black's pieces. White's best plan is to play c2-c3 controlling b4 and creating some manoeuvring room for his pieces. An essential part of White's strategy is the manoeuvre of his queen's knight to the kingside via d2 and f1.

Illustrative games

Game 29 Tal - Korchnoi USSR 1955 **Exchange Variation**

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	exd5	exd5
4	∳ ∂3	

Tal admitted that he was playing for a draw, and claimed that it was the only time in his life he had done so as White. In view of his previous results against Korchnoi, this was understandable but nonetheless not very wise. It is far easier to draw as White if you come out of the opening with the advantage! Mikhail Gurevich fell into the same trap at the Manila Interzonal in 1990, when needing a draw to qualify for the Candidates, against Nigel Short, who needed to win. He played the Exchange and sought to quickly exchange off pieces, but after 4 包f3 2g4 5 h3 2h5 6 2e2 2d6 7 2e5 皇xe28 營xe2 ②e7 9 0-0 0-0 10 皇f4 盟e8 11 **当**g4 **\$**xe5 12 **\$**xe5 **②**g6, Black had gained a slight advantage and went on to win.

White does not have to play for a draw. A number of top grandmasters, including Kasparov, have experimented with 4 \$\hat{Q}\$f3 recently. 4...\$\alpha\$c6 is met by 5 2b5, 4...2d6 by 5 c4!, taking advantage of the fact that the bishop is not well placed on d6 for the resulting IQP positions (see the next chapter), and Short's 4... 2g4 by the more aggressive 5 h3 2h5 6 쌜e2+! 쌜e7 7 호e3 ②c6 8 ②c3 0-0-0 9 g4 **\$**g6 10 0-0-0 **5**b4 11 a3 **5**xc2 12 \(\(\frac{1}{2}\)f4 \(\frac{1}{2}\)a1! 13 b4! \(\pm\) Ulybin-Vilela, Santa Clara 1991. Black's safest reply is 4... \$\alpha\$16. Then, another point of White's move-order is that 5 \(\frac{1}{2}\)d3 c5 60-0! c47 \(\mathbb{L} = 1 + \\ \mathbb{L} = 7 \) \(\mathbb{L} = 1 \) is better for White, e.g. 8...0-09 2g5 2g4 10 h3 &xf3 11 豐xf3 ②c6 12 c3 ± Kasparov-Korchnoi, Tilburg 1991. But Black need not fear: both 5...\$d6 and 5... 2e7 give Black Petroff-like positions with an extra tempo (as Black doesn't have to play the retreat ... De4-f6), and the Petroff itself is renowned for its solidity!

4 ... & d6
For 4...c5!? see the next chapter.
5 c3

Bannik-Korchnoi, USSR Ch 1956, instead went 5 包f3 包e7 6 包c3 c6 7 0-0 皇g4 8 罩e1 營b6! 9 皇d2?! 包d7 10 包a4 營c7 11 h3 皇h5 12 a3 b6 13 罩b1?! 包f8 14 包c3 包e6 15 皇e3 h6 16 包a2 0-0 17 c3 罩ae8 18 包b4 a5 19 包c2 皇g6 20 皇xg6 包xg6 21 營d3 包gf4 22 皇xf4 包xf4 23 營d2 罩e4! 24 罩xe4 dxe4 25 包e1 f5 and Black continued his attack with ... 營f7 and ... 營h5 and went on to win.

5 ... ②c6

Of course 5...c6 is also possible.
6 ②f3

After 6 ②e2, Black can safely move his queen to the kingside with 6... Wh4 or 6... Wf6. In some ways it is easier for White to make a mistake than Black in the Exchange Variation. Here White's extra tempo gives him the chance to develop the queen before Black's king's knight,


which is not such a good thing, e.g. 6 營f3 ②f6 7 h3 0-0 8 ②e2 罩e8 9 兔g5 兔e7 10 兔e3 ②e4! 11 兔xe4 dxe4 12 營xe4 ②b4! ∓ Malaniuk-Psakhis, Moscow 1983.

6 ... ②ge7

Now Black's one less tempo enables him to develop his knight to e7 (controlling the important f5-square) without fearing a white queen invasion on the kingside.

7 0-0 **Qg4** 8 **公bd2 營d7**

9 **Ze1** (D)



B

9 ... 0-0


Many players would automatically castle queenside here. White has dared to indicate he's happy with a draw, so they'll show him! However, White's queenside pawns are ideally poised for the attack, the c3-pawn supporting a potential b4 advance. And don't forget that White here is the awesome attacker Tal, not that that would have frightened the master defender Korchnoi. Korchnoi realised that he could still get plenty

of winning chances just by castling kingside. Nonetheless, 9...0-0-0 is quite playable too, e.g. 10 b4 2 g6 11 b5 2ce7 12 a4 2h4 13 &e2 Deg6 = (Bardwick).

10	h3	£ f5
11	Df1	Hae8
12	♦ √85	

White can try to exchange bishops with the familiar plan 2g5-h4-g3, but after 12 2g5 h6 13 2h4 (13 2xf5 豐xf5 14 皇d2!?), Black can play 13... ②g6 14 皇g3 ②f4 〒 (J. Watson).

12	•••	營xf5
13	②e3	当d7
14	≜d2	Ød8
15	幽c2	c6 (D)



W

The pawn structure is now virtually symmetrical but Black has two slight but distinct advantages: Black has kept his 'better' bishop and the white h3-pawn is a potential target.

Black has to be prepared to play this move and risk the hole on e5 if he wishes to play for the win. This anti-positional looking move can often be a key idea in Exchange centres.

18	ℤe2	Dg6
19	2xg6	hxg6
	man 1	_

White has achieved his aim: he has doubled rooks on the e-file and now just awaits the mass exchanges and subsequent draw, but Black will have nothing of it.


20	•••	Деб
21	2)d1	營f7
22	幽c1	b 6

Black first threatens to break with ...c5, dxc5 bxc5 and ...d4, so White keeps the position blocked:

23 b4 g5!

The queen being on c1 didn't stop this break after all. Now 24 &xg5? would be met by 24...f4! 25 & h4 g5 winning a piece.

A tactical error. 26... \wg6 keeps the pressure on.



27	¤xe6!	.⊈xg3
28	Exe8	≜xf2 +
29	②xf2	₩xf2+
30	⊈h1	$\frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{2}$

Korchnoi had probably planned 30...g3? and only now realised that 31 2xf8+2xf8 32 2e8+12xf8 (32...2xf7 33 2xf8+2xf8 32 2xf8+12xf8 (32...2xf7 33 2xf8+12xf8 wins for White. Therefore he has to settle for a draw – a fortunate escape for Tal.

Game 30 **Hickl – Uhlmann** *German Ch 1991*Exchange Winawer

1	e4	e 6
2	包c3	d5
3	d4	≜ b4

By delaying the creation of an Exchange centre, White can add a bit more venom to the position. Besides the game continuation, other dangerous possibilities are:

- a) 3...②f6 4 鱼g5 鱼b4 5 exd5 exd5 (5...豐xd5!? 6 鱼xf6 gxf6 7 豐d2 豐a5 8 鱼d3 c5! with an equal position, Kindermann-M.Gurevich, Budapest 1987) 6 豐f3! ②bd7 7 a3 鱼e7 8 鱼d3 0-0 9 ②ge2 c6 (Schmittdiel-Dreev, Groningen 1991) 10 0-0 ±.
- b) 3...②c6 4 ②f3 ②f6 5 exd5 (5 e5 ②e4 6 ②d3 ②b4 7 ②d2 ②xd2 8 Wxd2 f6 9 a3 ②xc3 10 Wxc3 fxe5 11 dxe5 0-0 12 h4 with a slight advantage to White, Hjartarson-Rozentalis, Tilburg 1994) 5...exd5 6 ②b5 ②e7 7 ②e5 ②d7 8 0-0 0-0 (Rogovsky-Borovikov, Pavlograd 1995) 9 □e1 ±.

4	exd5	exd5
5	≜d 3	Øe7

Similar play to the game arises after 5... ②c6 6 a3! ②xc3+ (6... ②e7 7 ②f4 a6 8 ②ce2 = Janowsky-Huster, Dortmund 1993, or 6... ②d6!? 7 ②xd5 ②xh2) 7 bxc3 ②ge7 (7... 營f6 8 營h5!) 8 營f3 ②e6 9 罩b1 b6 10 ②e2 營d7 11 h3 ②f5 12 0-0 0-0-0 13 a4 ②xd3 14 營xd3?! ③b7 (14... ②a5? 15 營a6+ ⑤b8 16 營xa5) 15 c4 dxc4 16 營xc4 營d5 〒 Chandler-Harley, Warwick 1996.

The immediate 5... 響f6 is well answered by 6 ②e2 c6 7 象f4! since 7... 象xc3+ 8 bxc3 象f5? allows 9 象e5 響g6 10 象xf5 響xf5 11 象xg7, but best may be 5...c6 6 響f3 響f6! =.

6 **響f3**

After 6 h5, Black can try to take advantage of the decentralised white queen with 6...c5!? 7 dxc5 d7! (7...d4 8 a3 a3 favours White after both 9 axb4 and 9 b1) 8 ge2 xc5 9 b5+ d7 10 0-0 0-0 11 xd7 xd7 12 g5 xc3 13 xe7 xe7 14 xc3 d4 = Gdanski-Socko, Poland 1996.

6 ... **≜**e6

6...c5!? is again worthy of consideration.


7 ②ge2 **營d7** 8 0-0 ②bcδ

8....童f5? fails to the tactic 9 ②xd5! 鱼xd3 10 ②xb4 鱼xe2 11 營xe2 (but not 11 營xb7? 鱼xf1 12 營xa8 0-0 13 查xf1 營b5+14 堂g1 ②bc6-+) 11...a5 (11...營xd4 12 營b5+) 12 ②d3 營xd4 13 鱼f4 ±. 8...c6 is interesting, not worrying about the temporary difficulty in developing the queen's knight.

11 **2**g3 **2**xd3

12 $\operatorname{cxd}3(D)$

After 12 \wxd3 \overline{0}a5, Black has a lovely knight outpost on c4.



B

12 ... 0-0?!

Black would like to castle queenside, but if 12...f6, then 13 \(\text{\Omega}\) h5 \(\text{\B}\)g8 14 \(\text{\Dm}\)h6! is strong.

13 h4 Hae8 14 h5 h6 15 a4!


An earlier game between the same two players (W.Germany-E.Germany 1988) reached the same position but with the moves \$\mathbb{Z}\$b1 and ... b6 inserted. White gained no advantage after 16 a4 \$\mathbb{Q}\$d8 17 \$\mathbb{Q}\$a3 \$\mathbb{Q}\$e6 18 \$\mathbb{Q}\$xe7 \$\mathbb{W}\$xe7 19 \$\mathbb{W}\$xd5 \$\mathbb{Q}\$f4 20 \$\mathbb{W}\$f3 \$\mathbb{Q}\$e2+21 \$\mathbb{Q}\$xe2 \$\mathbb{W}\$xe2, as White didn't have the option of 20 \$\mathbb{W}\$xb7.

15 ... ∲h7?!

15... 2d8 was still a better option, though White would have an advantage.

16 & a3 g5?! 17 Efe1 f5 18 Øf1! f4 19 **公h2 工f7** 20 **公g4 学g7**

21 He2 (D)



В

White has kept Black's pawn onslaught under careful control, and now plans to double rooks on the efile, creating intolerable pressure on e7. Therefore Black tries to complicate things:

Knaak gives 23...②h4 24 營e4! (24 ②e5 罩f5 25 營d7+ 營xd7 26 ②xd7 g4 ∞) 24...營c8 25 ②e5 as winning.

24 ②xh6! ②xh6

Or 24...曾xh6 25 豐xf7.

25 ₩xg5+ �h8

25...含h7 26 **曾**g6+ 含h8 27 **曾**xh6+ transposes.

 26
 豐xh6+
 臺g8

 27
 豐g5+
 臺h8

 28
 豐g6
 1-0

Game 31 **Kr.Georgiev – P.Nikolić**


Elenite 1993
Tarrasch Variation

1	e4	е6
2	d4	d5
3	包d2	a 6
4	包gf3	c5
5	exd5	

For 5 dxc5 \(\hat{L}\)xc5 6 \(\hat{L}\)d3, see Chapter 10.

5	•••	exd5
6	≙ e2	

For 6 dxc5, see the next chapter, on the 'IQP centre'.



W

The point of this move is to gain space on the queenside and to avoid the IQP positions that occur after 6...cxd4 or 6...\(\) 1670-0 \(\) e78 dxc5. However, Black has yet to mobilise his pieces and this leads to a critical struggle over the next few moves. Black will try to stabilise his queenside and keep the position blocked, whereas White will try to exploit

his advantage in development by breaking up Black's queenside pawn structure, perhaps even employing a piece sacrifice.

7	0-0	. ⊈.d 6
8	b3	b5!?

This is the most ambitious move. Instead, the resolution of the tension with 8...cxb3 9 axb3 ②e7 10 Ze1 ව්bc6 11 c3! (11 විf1 0-0 12 ව්e3 ₾b4!, clearing the d6-square for the queen, led to equality in Tseshkovsky-M.Gurevich, USSR Ch 1986 after 13 全d2 全xd2 14 当xd2 当d6 15 c4 单d7) 11...0-0 12 包f1 单e6 13 ②g3 營d7 14 ②g5 gave White the slightly better chances in Wahls-Landenbergue, Biel 1994. The pawn structure is virtually identical to that in a line of the c3 Sicilian after 1 e4 c5 2 c3 e6 3 d4 d5 4 exd5 exd5 5 \$\frac{6}{3}\$ f3 ②c6 6 &e3 c4 7 b3 cxb3 8 axb3, but here White has not had to expend a tempo on \(\mathbb{L} e3, \) and Black's ...a6 is not particularly useful.

9 a4?!

After this move, White is committed to a piece sacrifice that appears somewhat dubious. Instead, he should play more solidly, e.g. 9 c3 ②e7 10 a4 ②b7 11 ②a3 ②xa3 (11...0-0 12 營c2 ②g6 13 罩fe1 罩e8 14 營b2 ③xa3 15 營xa3 ②d7 16 ②f1 營c7 17 axb5 axb5 18 營b4 \pm Chandler-Dolmatov, Minsk 1982) 12 罩xa3 ②d7 13 axb5 axb5 14 罩xa8 ②xa8 15 bxc4 bxc4 16 營a1 0-0 17 ②d1 ②c6 18 罩e1 ②c8 19 營a3 \pm Ivanchuk-P.Nikolić, Moscow OL 1994.

The careless 9... \$\&\delta 57?! allowed White a devastating sacrifice in the

game Geller-Dreev, New York 1990: 10 bxc4 bxc4 11 \(\mathbb{L}\)xc4! dxc4 12 ②xc4 &e7 13 罩e1 營c7 14 罩b1 (here we see why 9... \$\oldsymbol{2}\$b7 was disastrous - White brings his final piece into the attack with the threat of 15 置xb7 豐xb7 16 包d6+, and Black therefore never succeeds in castling into safety) 14... 對xc4 15 罩xb7 包c6 16 ②d2! 響xd4 17 &b2 with a crushing attack. In our illustrative game, White's piece sacrifice proves much inferior. Although he gains three pawns for the piece, Black is prevented neither from castling nor completing the development of his pieces.

10 axb5


10 ∅b1? leaves the white queenside entombed after 10...b4.

10 ... cxd2 11 &xd2 ②f6

12 c4(D)

12 ... dxc4!

A key move. It seems slightly strange to concede control of the d5-square and straighten out White's pawn structure, but it is essential to eliminate the b3-pawn, because if



 \mathbf{B}

Black plays the automatic 12...0-0? then, after 13 c5 & e7 14 b4! with the threat of bxa6 followed by b5, Black would be crushed on the queenside by the advance of the white passed pawns. The b3-pawn proves more valuable than the d5-pawn! In the game, White carries out a similar queenside pawn advance to that described above but the absence of a pawn on d5 lets Black use that square for his pieces.


13 bxc4 0-0 14 c5?!

White is already in trouble but after this move, giving up the d5-square, he is lost.

- ,		
14	•••	≜e 7
15	L e1	≜e6
16	幽b1	. ⊈d 5
17	≜a 5	₩c8
18	bxa6	≜d8
19	&xd8	≅xd8
20	a7	Dc6
21	營b6	包d7

0 - 1

9 IQP Centre



General observations

An isolated queen's pawn is a standard feature of many opening systems. In all of them, the side playing against the IQP seeks to exchange off to an endgame, while the side with the IQP seeks to preserve the tension, hoping either to generate attacking chances thanks to the extra central control provided by the IQP or to exchange off the d-pawn in as favourable circumstances as possible.

The most common IQP positions are those that arise from openings such as the Queen's Gambit Semi-Tarrasch, Queen's Gambit Accepted, Nimzo-Indian, Caro-Kann Panov Attack and Sicilian 2 c3. In all these systems it is White who has the IQP. While an endgame would without doubt be unpleasant for him, the

middlegame comes first and practice has shown that White's dynamic chances on the kingside and in the centre offer him fully adequate compensation for his structural weakness. This strategy was demonstrated in world championship and qualifying matches by Kamsky, who used the power of the IQP to score crushing victories over Short and Karpov with the central breakthrough d4-d5.

In the French Defence, IQP positions are most usually reached via the Tarrasch Variation after 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 🖾 d2 c5 4 exd5 exd5. To those who don't play them (and perhaps those who do!), these systems tend to be seen as a hard defensive slog offering Black very few winning chances. Why is this, when the same IQP in White's hands allows him to fight for the initiative, not just equality?

Well first, there is a psychological difference. If Black has the IQP, he is assumed to be on the defensive and therefore heading towards that inferior endgame. Yet we must remember that we are only talking about a difference of one tempo.

Secondly and more importantly, there is a structural difference. In the most common positions mentioned above where White has the IQP, Black has a pawn on e6 which shuts in the light-squared bishop on c8.

This means that Black cannot play ... 24 pinning the knight on f3 and thereby making the d-pawn more vulnerable. Also, in a general sense, the c8-bishop is 'bad' and the attempt to develop it with ... b6 and ... 2b7 can be fraught with danger, especially if White can blast open the centre with d5 before the plan is implemented.


In contrast, when Black has an isolated d-pawn in the French Defence, there is no white pawn on e3 blocking the path of the c1-bishop. This means that the bishop enjoys an open diagonal and White can develop it to g5, attacking a knight which we assume is on f6, defending the d5-pawn. Hence, Black's centre is put under more immediate and severe restraint than Black can achieve in the equivalent situation against a white IQP.

However, all is not doom and gloom for Black! The absence of a white pawn on e3 in the French IQP version means that Black's pieces have access to the f4-square and the 'soft underbelly' of White's position—the f2-pawn—is more vulnerable to attack.

White can choose to play the same IQP structure in the French Exchange after 1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 exd5 exd5 4 c4, but though a tempo up on the French Tarrasch (by virtue of being White), Black has the option of the more active ... \(\tilde{\Delta} \) c6 as opposed to ... \(\tilde{\Delta} \) d7, and providing Black delays ... dxc4 until White has developed his king's bishop, Black will end up gaining a tempo over lines of the

Petroff (e.g. 1 e4 e5 2 Øf3 Øf6 3 Øxe5 d6 4 Øf3 Øxe4 5 d4 d5 6 Ød3 Øxe7 7 0-0 Øc6 8 c4 Øf6) and Queen's Gambit Accepted (1 d4 d5 2 c4 dxc4 3 e3 e5 4 Øxc4 exd4 5 exd4). For the sake of simplicity, we assume throughout this chapter that Black is playing with the IQP.


The d4-square



In IQP positions, the focus of the battle is the square in front of the isolated pawn. Normally, White tries to establish a knight on d4 both to blockade the pawn and also to reduce any attacking chances Black may have against f2, the weakest square in his position. A typical white manoeuvre would be \Db1-d2-b3-d4, perhaps in conjunction with c3.

Exchanging the darksquared bishops

We have already seen this idea in our discussion in Chapter 2. White puts his bishop on g5, then drops it back




to h4 and g3, challenging the darksquared black bishop on d6. In exchanging bishops, White removes one of the black pieces that could fight for control of d4 and also attack the f2-square. He also safeguards h2 against possible attack.


Exchanging the lightsquared bishops

Classically, this exchange is supposed to favour Black because he gets rid of his 'bad' light-squared bishop and avoids any chance of ending up in a bad bishop vs good knight scenario. However, things are not so simple, since every exchange reduces the dynamism in Black's position and brings him closer to an unpleasant endgame. Also, the bishop is not actually so bad: it can generate counterplay, perhaps with the pin ... 2g4, which lessens White's control of d4. In general, White is therefore happy to swap light-squared bishops. As Suba has stated, in the middlegame bishops are not good or bad, just well placed or badly placed.

White exchanges bishop for knight




As part of his plan to gain control of d4, White sometimes 'sacrifices' his light-squared bishop for a knight with £xc6 (in situations where the recapture ...bxc6 is not advantageous for Black). Then he hopes to exchange off to an endgame in which his knight outstrips the light-squared bishop.



There are dark-square holes in Black's position and the bishop is

hindered by the d5-pawn. White has good winning chances.


On the other hand, if White exchanges his dark-squared bishop for a knight and an endgame with knight vs dark-squared bishop is eventually reached, then Black is almost always OK.



Here the bishop shores up any dark-square holes in Black's structure and is unimpeded by the pawn on d5. White has a minimal advantage, but is unlikely to be able to win.


The c4 and e4-squares

The main plus point of an isolated pawn is the support it gives to the two squares diagonally in front of it. With an isolated pawn on d5, Black has, in effect, outpost squares for his knights on c4 and e4. This is because if White tries b3 to prevent ... Dc4 or f3 to prevent ... De4 then he obviously creates a weakness in his queenside or kingside respectively. However, it is by no means easy for



Black to manoeuvre his knights to c4 and e4 without compromising his position in some way. For example, ... 166-e4 may jeopardise the safety of his d-pawn.


White plays h3



Since White wants to fight for control of d4, it makes sense to play h3, preventing ... \(\extit{g} \) g4, which would pin the knight, a defender of d4, against the queen.

However, the drawback to h3 is that it weakens the kingside, and Black can take advantage of this in a number of ways. Firstly, Black can line up his bishop and queen on the b8-h2 diagonal, by ... \$c7 and ... ₩d6 (followed by ... 2)h4), as Black cannot block ... Wh2+ by g3 without losing the h3-pawn. Secondly, Black could try to manoeuvre his knight to f4, where it introduces the idea of a sacrifice on h3. It cannot easily be expelled from f4 since playing g2-g3 would almost certainly be ruinous. Thirdly, with a black bishop on the a7-g1 diagonal pinning the f2-pawn, Black can suddenly jump in on g3 with his queen, maybe after ... 2xh3. Finally, Black no longer need fear the manoeuvre 2g5-h4-g3 mentioned above, which would probably just lose a pawn on g3.


Black plays ...h6



Black can play the equivalent of White's move h3. With ...h6, he prevents £g5, which would undermine the defence of his d5-pawn by pinning the knight on f6 (or e7). Or more likely, he would play ...h6 in response to £g5. This would force

the bishop to give up control of one long diagonal, either c1-h6 (after \$\ddots\$h4) or h4-d8 (after, e.g., \$\ddots\$f4 or \$\ddots\$e3). Also if White played \$\ddots\$h4, then the follow-up ...g5!? would sometimes be possible, breaking the pin on the f6-knight in radical fashion. Of course such a move weakens the kingside and so would require careful consideration.


White plays g3



This reduces the scope of a black bishop on d6 and rules out ... 14 or ... 14 hasn't played h3, his kingside remains fairly solid. However, the pin ... 12 may prove more annoying (since it cannot be challenged with h3 any longer) or perhaps Black could try to exploit the slight weakening of the kingside with ... 15 h3.

Black plays ...f6

Black can sometimes consider playing ...f6, creating a weakness on e6 but also a strong-point on e5 for a



knight. White cannot usually then play axe5 because ...fxe5 would leave Black with two strong central pawns.

Illustrative games

Game 32

Ivanchuk – Yusupov

Brussels Ct (1) 1991

Tarrasch variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	包d2	c5
4	exd5	exd5
5	Def3	Øc6

For 5... 266 see the following game. An important sideline is 5... a6 6 dxc5 (for 6 2 e2 c4 see the previous chapter) 6... 2xc5 7 2b3 2a7 8 2g5 2e7 9 2d2 2bc6 10 2e3 2xe3 11 2xe3 0-0 12 0-0-0 2f5! with a slight advantage for White, Van der Wiel-Seirawan, Biel IZ 1985.

6 &b5 &d6 7 dxc5

An alternative is 7 0-0 cxd4 8 2b3 2e7 9 2bxd4 0-0 10 c3 (10

童g5 f6!? 11 童e3! ②e5 12 罩e1 a6 13 童f1 �h8 = Geller-Uhlmann, Amsterdam 1970) 10...童g4 11 營a4 �h5 12 罩e1 營c7 13 h3 童g6 (13...a6 14 童d3!) 14 童g5 a6 15 童f1 h6 16 兔xe7 ②xe7! 17 罩ad1 ②c6 18 兔d3 �h5! (refusing to swap bishops until White makes some concessions) 19 g4 童g6 = Karpov-Korchnoi, Moscow Ct (8) 1974. It should be mentioned that 20 兔xg6 fxg6 21 ②e6 now wins the exchange, although 21...營f7 22 ②xf8 罩xf8 gives Black the initiative.


7	•••	£xc5
8	0-0	②ge7
9	②b3	&d6

9...\$b6 10 Ze1 0-0 is met simply by 11 \$\delta\$e3, aiming to exchange dark-squared bishops; then if Black responds ...\$\delta\$c7, \$\delta\$c5 is a possibility.

10 **He**1

A surprisingly important move. If White tries to play without this move then after 10 \(\Delta g5 \) 0-0 11 \(\Delta h4 \), Black can play 11...\(\Delta b6! \) as e7 is not en prise after 12 \(\Delta xc6 \) bxc6, and after 12 \(\Delta d3 \) a5! 13 a4 \(\Delta f5 \) Black has full equality.

White starts the standard manoeuvre \$\omega\$5-h4-g3. The main alternative is 11 \$\omega\$d3 whereby White stops Black developing his bishop to g4 (because of \$\omega\$xh7+) without immediately weakening his kingside by 11 h3. After the alternative bishop development to f5, White would reply with c3 (stopping any ...\$\omega\$b4 ideas and solidifying d4) and \$\omega\$bd4, forcing Black to waste time exchanging



W

bishops. So Black's main tries have been:

- a) 11...包f5 12 c3 全c7 13 g3!? (13 營c2 包h4! 14 包bd4 皇g4 gave Black a strong attack in the game Yandemirov-Kovaliov, Minsk 1995) 13...h6 14 全c2 皇b6 15 營d3 g6 16 全f4 含g7 17 包e5 黑e8 18 營d2 生 Emms-Mortensen, Hastings Challengers 1995/6.
- b) 11...h6 12 h3 ②f5 13 c3 &c7 14 &c2 ₩d6 15 ₩d3 g6 16 ₩d2 (16 g4 &b6! 17 &g2 &xf2! ∞ Yudasin-Moskalenko, Norilsk 1987) 16...h5 17 &xf5 &xf5 18 ₩h6 &e4! 19 ②bd2 f5 20 g3 罩f6 ∞ Tolnai-Schmittdiel, Dortmund 1989.

11 ... **Qg4**

Tellingly, Yusupov later in the match diverged here with 11...豐c7 12 c3 (12 全h4 包f5) 12...a6 13 全e2 全d7 14 全e3 (intending to play 全c5) 14...包d8 (keeping pieces on) 15 豐d4 包f5 16 豐xd5 包xe3 17 fxe3 全c6 reaching a position where Black had some compensation for a pawn.

Another way to stop the exchange of bishops is to play ...f6 followed by

...②e5, e.g. 11...f6 12 **Qh4 ¥b6** 13 **Qe2 Qe6** 14 **Qg3 ②e5** 15 **②fd4 Qd7** 16 a4 a6 17 a5 **±** Gipslis-Korchnoi, Amsterdam 1976.

12 2h4

12 全xe7 would be premature, but an interesting alternative is 12 h3 全h5 13 全xc6 bxc6 14 公bd4 里c8 15 c4!? seeking to take immediate advantage of Black's weakened queenside and f5-square. Black has to react accurately: 15...h6 16 全xe7 (16 全h4 營c7) 16...全xe7 17 g4 全g6 18 公e5 全h4! 〒 Adams-Vandendriessche, Ostend 1989.

12 ... **E**e8

Black cannot now stop \(\mathbb{L} \)g3, so plays this useful developing move, adding another defender to e7.

13 \(\mathref{L}\mathref{g}3 \) \(\mathref{L}\mathref{xg}3 \)

In view of the game continuation, Black should probably try 13...a6 14 & d3 h6 (defending against the threat of & xh7+) transposing to Kruppa-Lputian, Irkutsk 1986, which continued 15 c3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$d7 16 \$\frac{1}{2}\$e3 \$\frac{1}{2}\$ad8 17 \$\frac{1}{2}\$c2 d4!? 18 cxd4 \$\frac{1}{2}\$d5 with compensation. The threat of ...\$\frac{1}{2}\$xf3 doubling the f-pawns is stronger if Black hasn't exchanged bishops on g3. White in turn can improve by retreating his light-squared bishop to e2 rather than d3 on move 14.

14 hxg3 ₩b6

The game A.Sokolov-Portisch, Bugojno 1986, was immediately agreed drawn after 14...d4!?, but this was presumably either due to pre-arrangement or shock. After 15 \(\Delta\)bxd4 \(\begin{arrange}{2}\)bx d4 b6 16 c3 White should be able to hold on to the extra pawn without too much difficulty.

15 a4!

An important improvement over 15 \(\text{2}\) d3 a5! 16 \(\text{2}\) xh7+ \(\text{2}\) f8 17 \(\text{2}\) d3 a4 18 \(\text{2}\) bd2 \(\text{2}\) f5 (A.Sokolov-Vaganian, Minsk Ct (6) 1986) when Black's play was more than worth the rather irrelevant h7-pawn.


15 ... h6

In the game Ivanchuk-Vaganian, Novgorod 1995, Black moved the pawn a square further but with little success: 15...h5 16 營d3 急f5 17 營d2 急e4 18 ②fd4 ②xd4 19 營xd4 ②c6 20 營xb6 axb6 and White had a clear advantage in the endgame.

16 **營d2 总**xf3

Black seeks to gain counterplay against White's disrupted kingside pawns.

17 gxf3 **Zad8** (D)



W

18 f4

White could have kept a comfortable advantage by simply playing 18 \(\dot{\pm}\)d3 (stopping ...\(\overline{\pm}\)f5) followed by doubling rooks on the e-file.

18 ... a6 19 \(\frac{1}{2} \) \(\frac{1}{2} \) \(\frac{1}{2} \) \(\frac{1}{2} \) \(\frac{1}{2} \)

20 a5?!

Unnecessarily weakening. Doubling rooks on the e-file was still the best plan.

20	***	豐c7
21	包c5	h5!
22	ℤa 3	h4
23	g4!?	

23 \(\frac{1}{2}\) g2 was safer, but this tries for more.

23 ... **I**f6 24 **2**d3 **2**d4?

Black should now have grabbed the e-file himself. After 24... **E**e6 25 **E**xe6 fxe6, he would have successfully 'unisolated' his d5-pawn and achieved equality.

25 De5 Dec6

25...公xc2?? loses to 26 罩c3. Ivanchuk gives the brilliant variation 25...公e6 26 f5 公c5 27 罩c3 營xa5 28 公d7! 罩c6 (28...公xd7 29 罩xe7! 罩xe7?? 30 罩c8+) 29 公xc5 罩xc5 30 營g5! f6 31 營h5 winning.

27... Ixf4 28 Wxe1 Ixg4+ 29 Sh1 Ixd4 would have forced a position similar to the game, but with the important difference (to White's advantage) that the f-pawn is still on f2.


28 Øf5?

28 De2 would have saved giving back a pawn, and not allowed Black the option of sacrificing the exchange for another pawn.

Ivanchuk criticises this sacrifice, considering Black to have more chances after 29...d4!? preventing \(\mathbb{L} \) c3. 30 \(\mathbb{L} \) xd4? \(\mathbb{L} \) c5 followed by

... \(\mathbb{L}\) xf3 is fine for Black but 30 \(\overline{\Delta}\) xh4 should be OK for White – eventually.

30 gxf5 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xf5 (D)



W

31	≝c3	₩g3+
32	₩g2	₩e1
	\$h2	쌀e5 +?!

34 **\$h1** ■g5?!

This allows White to consolidate. Better was 34... Wel trying to repeat.

35	豐f2	₩f4
36	≌d3	≝g 3
37	≌d4	₩g5
38	ℤg4?	

Unnecessary. Black has no threats, but it is easy to say that after a time scramble.

38	•••	≝xg4
39	fxg4	₩xg4
40	⊈d3	g6
41	₩e3	₩a4
42	學b6	⊈g 7
43	b4	₩a1 +
44	⊈g2	₩e5

45	豐f2	g 5
46	Wf3	₩d4
47	營f5	幽e3
AQ.	With T. O	

Yusupov showed that Ivanchuk could still have won here after the brave 48 營xd5! h3+ 49 含h2 g4 50 營e4! 營f2+ 51 含h1 f5 52 營xb7+ 含f8 53 營c8+ 含g7 54 營c7+ 含g8 55 營d8+ 含f7 56 含c4+ 含g7 57 營g5+ 含h7 58 營xf5+!! 營xf5 59 含d3 含g6 60 b5!.

48	•••	⊈f8
49	營h6+	⊈e7
50	Wh5	1/2-1/2

Game 33
Adams – Short

English Ch 1991
Tarrasch Variation

1	e4	e 6
2	d4	d5
3	包d2	c5
4	exd5	exd5
5	6) of 3	E)166


The most popular continuation in modern grandmaster chess.

6	≜ b5+	≜ d7
7	∲xd7 +	

7 營e2+ will transpose to the next game.

7	***	②bxd7
8	0-0	⊈.e7
9	dxc5	②xc5 (D)
10	Ø)d4	

The main alternative plan is 10 Let 0-0 11 包f1 Let 12 Let. In Tiviakov-Dreev, Wijk aan Zee 1996, Dreev played the new 12...包fe4 13 c3 图d6 14 包g3 全f8 15 图c2 图a6!? 16 Led1 Lad8 and went on to draw.



10 ... **७**d7

Black meets the threat of ②f5.

11 ②2f3

Two popular alternative set-ups arise after 11 ②2b3 ②ce4. White can seek to control the important c4- and e4-squares with 12 f3!? ②d6 13 ②c5 ③c7 14 ②d3 0-0 15 b3, or to play his pieces to the kingside with 12 Uf3 0-0 13 ②f5 ②d8! (note how Black judiciously avoids any further exchanges) 14 ②e3 g6 15 ②g3. Both lines are still receiving many tests at the top level.

11 ... 0-0 12 \$f4

The immediate 12 ②e5 is best met by 12... 營c8! (avoiding the h2-b8 diagonal and still preventing ②f5) 13 營f3 單e8 14 皇f4 ②ce4 15 ②d3 a5!? 16 罩fe1 罩a6 = Kr. Georgiev-Bareev, Novi Sad 1990.

12 ... **基fe8** 13 **基e1 公ce4**

Karpov-Bareev, Linares 1994 instead went 13....皇f8 14 ②e5 營a4 15 c3 營a6 16 營e2 營xe2 17 置xe2 皇d6 18 ②d7! 皇xf4 (not 18...置xe2? 19

②xf6+ gxf6 20 ②xd6 ± Karpov) 19 Exe8+ Exe8 20 ②xc5 ②c7 21 ②d3 and White had a minuscule advantage. This game had a dramatic finish when, in sight of a draw, Bareev allowed Karpov a mate in one!


> 15 ②d3! 單c8 16 c3 桌f8 17 響b3 ②h5

Short is prepared to swap a knight for a bishop.

18 **≜g3?!**

Adams should have refused, since he had more chance for advantage after 18 2e3. Unwise would have been 18 \subseteq xb7 \Oz5! 19 \Oxc5 \Oxf4 with plenty of compensation.

18 ... **心hxg3** 19 hxg3 **營d7** (D)



W

A similar pawn structure to the last game has arisen, but here Black has the bishop rather than White. If this were the light-squared bishop, White could still hope to be well on top. But here it is the dark-squared bishop, and all Black's pieces are well placed. We looked at Karpov-Bareev above (at move 13); this position has similar material and is again very slightly favourable for White.

20	≌ad1	≝cd8
21	包f3	營c8
22	≝e2	Øc5

Short exchanges off a pair of rooks to stop White building up any pressure by doubling on the e-file.

23	豐c2	≝xe2
24	學xe2	②e4
25	₩c2	g5?!

An impatient move which is typical of quickplay games. Instead of this rash attacking plan, 25...g6 would have been a far sounder way to continue.

White must pressurise d5.

A further over-ambitious move which Adams punishes with precision. Short could still have bailed out with 27...公xg3! 28 fxg3 a5 29 公f5 營c5+30 含h2 axb4 31 營d2 息f6 32 cxb4 營c4 ± (Adams).

28	幽d3!	Ġh8
29	豐f3	a5
30	②bc2	Zf8
31	5)e3	∳ vď4

Now the d5-pawn falls. The alternative 31...f4 32 ②xd5 fxg3 33 營xe4 gxf2+ 34 含f1 營c4+ 35 營e2 營xd5 ends in a win for White after 36 ②e6 (Adams).

32	≝xd4	f4
33	②xd5	②c5

34	gxf4	Де 6
35	幽e4!	gxf4
36	වe7!	1-0

Game 34 **Karpov – Korchnoi** *Baguio City Wch (22) 1978*Tarrasch Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5
3	②d2	c 5
4	exd5	exd5
5	≜ .b5+	≜d7

After 5... 20.6, White can transpose to Game 1 with 6 20.63 or try 6 20.2 blocks the e-file so allows Black to improve on the strategy of Game 32 by 6... 20.46 7 dxc5 20.5 20.5 20.69 20.0 20.69 6... 20.7 dxc5 20.68 20.59 20.69

6 **幽e2+**

6 ≜xd7+ ②bxd7 7 ②gf3 ②gf6 transposes to the previous game.


6 ... \(\preceq \ext{e}^7\)

Earlier in the match, Korchnoi had held on to draw after 6... 營e7 7 全xd7+ 包xd7 8 dxc5 包xc5 9 包b3! 營xe2+ 10 包xe2 包xb3 11 axb3 but clearly did not trust the line enough to repeat it here.

7	dxc5	Df6
8	∕ ∆b3	0-0
9	⊈e3	≝e8
10	包f3 (D)	

10 0-0-0 is well answered by 10...a5! 11 a4 ②a6 12 单xd7 (12 c6?! 单xc6 13 ②f3 ②c7 with the initiative) 12...豐xd7 13 豐b5! 豐xb5 14 axb5 ②c7 15 ②h3? (15 c6! =) 15...a4 16 ②d4 单xc5 17 ②f5 a3

with a clear advantage to Black, Gurgenidze-Psakhis, Volgograd 1985.



B

10 ... \(\pm \pm xc5?!

Black exchanges off his darksquared bishop for White's lightsquared one. Modern practice has shown a preference for 10...a6. Then 11 Axd7 helps Black's development so 11 \(\textit{\$\textit{d}}\)3 is better. Then 11...a5?! (11... **a**4 12 包fd4 包bd7 13 0-0 ②xc5 14 罩fd1 Qxb3 15 axb3 g6 ± Wahls-Schmittdiel, Bad Endbach 1995; note how Black prefers to exchange his light-squared bishop rather than his knight for the b3knight) 12 a4 2 g4 13 0-0 2 a6 14 c6! 2xc6 15 2d4 proved good for White in Karpov-Bareev, Tilburg 1994, since Karpov succeeded in neutralising all his opponent's active play. Bareev was left with compromised pawns on the queenside besides the isolated pawn on d5. As a general rule, in such endgames one weakness in the pawn structure is tolerable, but two weaknesses are fatal.

11 2xc5

White could have exchanged another pair of pieces with 11 &xd7 ②bxd7 12 ②xc5 ②xc5 but Black's lead in development then gives him full equality: 13 營b5 單c8 14 0-0 a6 15 營b4 單e4 16 營d2 ②e6 = Tseshkovsky-Uhlmann, Manila 1976.

11	***	幽a5 +
12	Wd2	營xb5
13	0-0-0	b6


Unlike the previous note, the further exchange of pieces does not now come with a corresponding lead in development for Black, so Black just has a slightly worse endgame. Korchnoi often seemed happy to play such uncomfortable positions, obviously not rating White's winning chances so highly. Uhlmann showed that Black could play more actively: 13... g4!? 14 ad4 (14 h3 皇xf3 15 gxf3 ②c6 16 Zhg1 ②e5! 17 \(\textit{\Delta}\)d4! \(\textit{\Delta}\)g6 is the critical variation) 14... ②e4 15 豐f4! 鱼h5! (15... 鱼xf3 16 gxf3 වxc5 17 Lhg1! වe6 18 耳xg7+!! wins) 16 耳hel ②c6! 17 ②xe4 dxe4 18 基xe4 基xe4 19 營xe4 **夏g6 20 幽e3 ②b4 21 幽e5 幽xe5 22** 魚xe5 兔xc2 〒Stoica-Uhlmann, Bucharest 1979.

14	②xd7	②bxd7
15	Ġ b1	②e4
16	幽d3	

Not 16 \(\mathbb{\text{w}}\text{xd5??}\) \(\overline{\text{Q}}\text{c3+.}\) White is very happy to force the exchange of queens, thus diminishing Black's chances of counterplay.

16	***	Wxd3
17	Exd3	Ddf6
18	h 3	包c5
10	ከ ለለ1	Ø)e6

20 c3 (D)



B

20 ... b5?!

It is difficult just to sit and wait in such positions – Black may well be lost then anyway. Korchnoi makes the practical decision that the extra complexity added to the position by this advance is worth the weaknesses thus created.


21	€)d4	a6
22	②c2	a5
23	≝d3	Zab8
24	¤hd1	h6
25	f4	,

White plays for g5, attacking the all-important defender of the d-pawn.

Korchnoi can see no good answer to the threat of g5. Therefore desperate remedies are called for.

26 ... d4!

The d-pawn makes a bold kamikaze lunge, freeing crucial squares for the black knights by giving White the isolated d-pawn!



B

27 cxd4

The tactical points are 27 ②xd4 ②c5! and 27 ②xd4 ③xf4. However, Karpov's choice of capture should win.

27	•••	ව d5
28	I f1	b4
29	⊈d2	≝e 7
30	f5	

White still has to be vigilant. Here he creates another hole for a black knight, but there was little choice: 30 ②e3? ②exf4 31 \(\)

30	•••	∕ 2)g5
31	②e3	②f6
32	d5!	Ø\xh3

An understandable decision in time pressure, but 32... ②ge4 offered more hope.

33	d6	≝d7
34	包d5	②xd5
35	ℤxd5	ℤa8
36	&e3	②g5?

Losing the queenside pawns. 36... Za6 was essential.

37	≜ b6	⊘e4
38	⊈fd1	a4

39	≝5d4	$\Xi e8$
40	¤xb4	Exd6
41	Exd6	②xd6
42	≜c7?	

An unbelievable mistake by Karpov, who presumably missed the coming ... 20e8. After 42 2xa4, Korchnoi would almost certainly have had little choice but to resign at adjournment.

42	•••	Ze1 +
43	\$c2	②e8
44	2 a5	a3
45	Hb8	≌e7
46	臭b4?	

Karpov now appears to miss the coming ...axb2. Even the strongest players get exhausted after five hours' play. The game concluded:

46... \(\begin{align*} \delta \delta

Game 35 **Lhagvasuren – Ulybin** *Cheliabinsk 1991*Exchange Variation

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5

exd5

4 **å**d3

exd5

3

White can himself play an IQP position by playing 4 c4 here, but one of many effective replies is 4...包f6 5 包f3 象b4+ 6 包c3 0-0 7 象e2 dxc4 8 象xc4 星e8+ 9 象e3

2e6!? 10 ₩b3 ②c6 with an equal position.

So as discussed in the previous chapter, Black does better to meet 4 2f3 with 4...2f6 5 2d3 2d6 (5...c5 6 0-0 c4 7 2e1+ 2e7 8 2f1 2). Then 6 c4!? dxc4 7 2xc4 transposes to the game but with colours reserved. Considering the result of this game, that may not be so bad though!

4 ... c5!?

This leads to more double-edged play than is usual in the French Exchange. It is especially appropriate in that White has already committed his bishop to d3, so that he longer has the options of \$\Delta b5(+)\$ or \$\Delta e2\$ (which is better in that it doesn't block the queen's control of d4 and d5, and could be followed eventually by B(x)f3, increasing the pressure on d5).

5 dxc5

In the game Tatai-Korchnoi, Beersheba 1978, White played carelessly and was overwhelmed by the dynamism in Black's position: 5 \$\Q\$f3 \$\Q\$c6 (5...c4!?) 6 \$\y\epsilon 2+?\$ (this puts the

queen on an exposed square) 6... e7 7 dxc5 包f6 8 h3? (much too slow; 8 c3 followed by ≜e3 and Øbd2 was best in the circumstances) 8...0-0 9 0-0 Qxc5 10 c3 罩e8 11 營c2 營d6 12 ②bd2? (overlooking the threat) 12... **世**g3! 13 **皇**f5 **里**e2 14 **②**d4 **②**xd4 0 - 1.

5	•••	.⊈.xc5
6	Df3	Df6
7	0-0	0-0
Q	h29	

He wants to prevent the aggressive development of Black's queen's bishop to g4. However, as in Tatai-Korchnoi above, White has underestimated Black's dynamic chances. It was better to develop with 8 ②c3 ②c6 9 皇g5 皇e6 10 豐d2 皇e7 11 罩ad1 **營a5** = Marco-Schlechter, Nuremberg 1896, or 8 4bd2 4c6 9 4b3 **\$b6 10 c3 \$g4 11 \$e2 \begy d6 = Mol**dobaev-Orlov, Belgorod 1989.

Ω	•	M . C
8	***	②c6
9	包bd2	幽d6
ın	E)h3	


If 10 c3 then 10... **營**g3! is devastating.

11 \$\disphi\$h1 was better, breaking the pin on f2.

With the text, White plans to answer 11... 置g3 with 12 包bd4 but has overlooked the strength of Black's coming sacrifice.

11	•••	⊈xh3!
12	gxh3	幽g3 +
13	\$h1	₩xh3+
14	Ø\h2	

Knaak analyses 14 &g1 when Black maintains an attack after both



 \mathbf{B}

14...包g4 15 皇f4 包xf2 16 罩xf2 **豐g4+ 17 當f1 鱼xf2 18 當xf2 豐xf4** and 14... 2 c7!? 15 ■e1 ②g4 16 2 e3 ②ce5! 17 ②bd4 ②xe3 18 \(\mathbb{Z}\)xe3 ②g4.

> 14 Ø)e5 15 **Qe2 Df3!**

An elegant move. After 16 \(\Delta\) xf3?, 16... \ c7 would mate since the white f-pawn advance is blocked by its own bishop.

> 16 4)h4 **£f4** 17 **皇f3**

Or if 17 **Bg1** then 17... ②e4! 18 ∮g3 ∮xf2 wins (Knaak).


> 17 **≜g3** (D) 18

18 **譽xg3!**

19 **Zg1**

If 19 fxg3 then 19... xg3 is mate. After the text Black regains all his sacrificed material with substantial interest.


19	•••	≜xf2!
20	≜xh5	.⊈xg1
21	₩xg1	₩e5
22	£f3	②xf3
23	E)vf3	Wh5+




 \mathbf{B}

Black's three connected passed pawns mean that any endgame is hopeless for White while in the middlegame he has to worry about his exposed king. The game finished as follows:

10 Miscellaneous Structures






General observations

In this chapter, we look at a number of pawn structures that don't fit neatly elsewhere. Rather than give many varied general observations here, we advise the reader to use this chapter more as a revision aid, as themes from previous chapters will constantly reappear!

Black plays ... b6


Black can choose to meet e5 by ...b6 before ...c5, trying first to swap off his 'bad' light-squared bishop. White does not have to acquiesce in this plan and can play \(\mathbb{L}\)b5(+) intending after ...c6 to retreat the bishop to a4. Black in turn can play ...a5, threatening to trap the bishop after ...b5, \(\mathbb{L}\)b3 a4, but White can usually escape by playing either a3 or c3.

Black plays ... 40c6



Black can choose to answer e5 with ... 20c6 before ... c5. Black intends to challenge the pawn chain by means of ... f6 as soon as possible. After exf6 and a piece recapturing on f6, we reach a set-up similar to that analysed in Chapter 2 but with c-pawns for both sides. This difference


certainly favours White: he can support his d4-pawn with c3, but the black e6-pawn remains weak and backward.



Black can also combine ... 206 with rapid queenside development by ...b6, ...**\$**b7, ...**₩**d7 and ...0-0-0, followed by a kingside pawn storm, or by playing a deferred ...c5 (after ... \(\) \(course is left free to do as he likes!

Black plays ...c5 before White advances e5

Various centres can arise if Black plays ...c5 before e5. Usually White captures immediately on d5, when we reach either an IQP or Exchange centre (after ...e6xd5) or a Rubinstein centre (if a piece recaptures on d5). On the other hand White can instead exchange the d4-pawn for the c5-pawn and then defend the e-pawn. A situation of tension then arises where both sides have to place their pieces with all the potential central pawn structures in mind. An e4-e5




advance will lead to a Classical centre, an exchange on e4 to a Rubinstein centre, or an exchange on d5 to a Rubinstein or IOP centre.


White omits d4

White can choose not to play d4, but Black then is far freer to choose from many alternative plans of action, including grabbing the centre with ...d5 and ...c5. After ...d5, an Exchange-type centre after exd5 or a Rubinstein-type centre after ...dxe4 offer White little, so White has to choose between playing d3, supporting the e4-pawn and preserving the central tension, or playing e4-e5 immediately, with a type of Classical centre where White still has his dpawn but Black has control of the d4square after ...c5.

If White defers e4-e5 and supports his e-pawn with d3, the battle then rages around the e5-square. White may try to force the e5 advance later, while Black can seek to control the e5-square with a knight on c6, a bishop on d6 or g7, and even




a pawn on f6. Black may sometimes choose to play ...d4 and ...e5, providing White's pieces are not well placed for an f2-f4 counter break.



Black can also choose to provoke the e5 advance by playing ... 166. Then on e5, Black plays ... 166-d7 attacking the e-pawn. With no pawn on d4, White will have to resort to moves like 162, 161 or 164 to defend the e-pawn. Unlike the Classical centre, White doesn't have the d4-square as compensation, but then neither does Black have a half-open c-file or the c5-square. White does

have a clear space advantage on the kingside, while Black has a clear space advantage on the queenside.



White normally chooses a King's Indian set-up, fianchettoing his king's bishop and castling kingside. Black's safest option is to castle queenside and try to undermine e5. On the other hand Black can choose to castle 'into the attack' on the kingside. White will then manoeuvre his pieces to the kingside, one key idea being h2-h4, \(\frac{1}{2}\) b1-d2-f1-h2-g4 and then h4-h5-h6. Black in turn will launch a queenside pawn storm, aiming to open any lines he can so that his pieces can use all their extra space on the queenside to advantage.

Illustrative games

Game 36 **Kasparov – Ivanchuk** *Horgen 1995*Winawer Variation

1	e4	е6
2	d4	d 5


3 Øc3

There has been some discussion as to whether Kasparov said "3 2 d2 is good enough to win, but 3 2c3 is the best move."

Similar positions to the game can arise after 3 e5 b6, except that White does not have to move his knight out of the way to play c3 (and 4 c3 2a6?? 5 2xa6 2xa6 6 \ a4+ wins a piece), and also has the additional option of playing 4 c4!? if he likes the resulting positions.

3	•••	≜b 4
4	e5	b6
5	a3	£ f8

We should point out a controversial variation after 5... 2xc3+6bxc3 豐d7 7 豐g4 f5 8 豐g3 兔a6 (the simple 8...2c6 followed by 9...2b7 and queenside castling is a less active but certainly safer option) 9 2 xa6 2 xa6 10 De2 Db8 11 Df4 Dc6 12 Dxe6!? **營xe6 13 營xg7 營g6 14 營xh8 0-0-0** (best) (D).



W

White, of course, has a massive material advantage: two pawns and

the exchange. But the queen is entombed on h8, and the outcome of the game depends on whether he can successfully extricate her. In Play the French (1984) John Watson believed the queen would perish, giving many variations. The critical one was 15 2e3 Ad7! with the idea of 16...h5 and 17... Th7. He noted that 16 e6 now failed to 16... Id8!: the rook retreats back again with the threat of 17... 2ge7 or 17... 2f6, as now 18 營f6 is no longer an answer. White has no defence since pawns, unlike rooks, can't move backwards!

Then Schiller came along and showed that after 15... Zd7, as given by Watson, White can play 16 0-0-0 when 16...h5 17 g4!! allows the queen to break out in all lines, e.g. 17... Zh7 18 gxf5 or 17...fxg4 18 f4! **Z**h7 19 f5 **營f7** 20 e6! and the black queen is overworked, having to defend g8 and h7 simultaneously. Schiller then proposed 16...f4!? when 17 & xf4 h6 18 h4 **Zh7** 19 h5 **Yf7** wins for Black since the bishop is attacked: 20 e6 Wxf4 is check. Schiller thought that White should answer 16...f4 with 17 еб.

A third analyst became involved. In an article in Inside Chess in 1988 Michael Valvo began by castigating Schiller for recommending 17 e6?? since 17... Id8! (as in Watson's original idea) wins at once. Then he attempted to improve on Schiller's line with 16...f4 17 2xf4 h6 by now recommending 18 g4 Ih7 19 Wxh7 white plans a when White plans a massive pawn advance on the kingside. However, he thought that after

20... 如a5! the threats to White's king "tip the balance in Black's favour". John Watson, the original analyst, then intervened here and gave 18 Id3! (instead of Valvo's 18 g4) ₩xf4+ 21 &b1 "when White has material for his exposed king". His conclusion was that it was unclear. Valvo attempted to improve on all this with 16 f4 (instead of 16 0-0-0). This rules out Black's f4 idea. After Valvo's variation 16... 公d8 17 g4 ②f7 18 gxf5 幽g2 19 罩g1 幽xg1+ 20 2xg1 2xh8, White has excellent compensation for the piece and "is probably winning" (Valvo).

Yet all these analysts were barking up the wrong tree of analysis. Right at the beginning simply 15 2d2 (rather than 15 2e3) avoids the bishop being attacked by a tempo gaining f4. White wins easily, for example 15... Id7 16 0-0-0 2 d8 (if 16...h6, 17 g4! and since the bishop is on d2, not e3, Black no longer has the Schiller recipe with ...f4; here 17...f4 could be answered by 18 h4 置h7 19 h5 營f7 20 e6! and the black queen is again overworked) 17 h4 ②f7 18 h5 幽g4 19 f3 幽xg2 20 豐xh7 intending both 21 豐xf5 and 21 \hg1.

6 විf3 ව්e7!

Black's thinking is as follows: "6...\(\preceq\) a6 would allow me to exchange my bad bishop for White's good one, which is pretty desirable. But I shouldn't hurry to make this move! Why not? Well, in order to develop his game and castle White must bring out the f1-bishop at some

point. So I will wait until he moves out this bishop, either to e2 or d3 as he chooses, and only then will I challenge it with ... \(\alpha \) a6. Therefore I will be a tempo up over the immediate 6... \(\alpha \) a6 7 \(\alpha \) xa6 \(\alpha \) xa6 8 0-0, when White hasn't wasted a move on a preliminary \(\alpha \) d3 or \(\alpha \) e2."

Note that in the suggested sequence 6... \(\alpha \) a6 7 \(\alpha \) xa6 Black hasn't gained time by developing his knight on a6: rather, it is very badly placed there, and will almost certainly have to be re-deployed via b8 to c6 or d7 if it is to make a telling contribution to the game. So having to recapture on a6 with the knight loses, rather than gains, time.

7 h4!

Kasparov is not a player to make a superfluous bishop move. He finds a way to gain space on the kingside, and the onus once again is on Black to find a waiting move.


Black responds with a rook pawn move of his own, gaining space on the side of the board where he is strongest. Now White has run out of useful waiting moves, and so rather than be bullied into 9 \(\Delta = 2 \) or 9 \(\Delta d3 \), when ...\(\Delta a6! \) would come in a flash, he decides to preserve his good bishop, even at the cost of time.

9 **≜**b5+ c6

If 9...包bc6, then 10 營e2! and White has the last laugh since ... 象 a6 is prevented.

10 \(\partial a4 (D)

White's plan is to meet 10... 2 a6 by 11 2 e2!, a move with at least two



B

good points. It makes possible 12 0-0, which completes his development. It vacates the c3-square and so prepares c3. This simple pawn move not only adds support to the centre, but also prepares \$2, returning the a4bishop to the fray. So it is by no means in Black's interests to provoke 11 ②e2 with 10... \$\dot{2}a6.

There are some rather paradoxical features in all this. The first is that both sides' strategy has revolved around a move (... 2a6) which, although never actually prevented, has never proved worthwhile for Black to play. Who has won this phoney war? I don't know what a computer would make of it. It certainly proves the adage that the threat is stronger than its execution.

The second curious feature is the importance of White's rook's pawn being on a3 rather than a2. This means that White can carry out his grand strategy with 10 2 a4 without losing a piece after 10...b5 11 \(\textit{\pm}\)b3 a4, since he has a retreat square on a2. How convenient: and yet when he played 5 a3, was White thinking about this future need?

And thirdly, if Black continues 10... a6 and White answers 11 2e2, Black would be reluctant to play ... \(\) xe2, either immediately or later on. For all our talk about 'bad' bishops, it seems there is some truth in the adage that the worst bishop is better than the best knight!


> 10 ---4)d7 11 De2

The white knight goes to e2 of its own accord, without the prompting of 10... 2a6. See the note above for a description of the virtues of 11 Фе2.

> 11 **b**5 12 **£b3 c5** 13 c3

Bolstering the centre. 13 dxc5? is bad after 13... 2xc5 or, even better, 13... ②c6 and 14... 營c7, when e5 is indefensible.

> 13 **Dc6** 0-0**幽c7** 14 **ℤe1** 15 c4(D)



At last Ivanchuk commits himself to a definite plan. He will advance on the queenside (eminently logical as he has more space there) and try to undermine White's pawn chain, perhaps leaving White with a vulnerable pawn on c3 after ...b4 and exchanges.

And what of White's plan? In the British Chess Magazine, Chandler points out the drawback to White's advance h4 and h5: White cannot now play the standard manoeuvre 2)f4 or 2)g3 followed by 2)h5. For example, if we put the white h-pawn back on h2 then after 16 \(\textit{L} \c2 \tilde{2}\) b6 (as in the game) play could continue 17 包f4 單b8 18 包h5! 单d7 (here 18... d8 would be better, slowing down White's initiative) 19 4 h4! b4 20 axb4 axb4 21 幽g4 and White has a dangerous attack. Since the white pawn is really on h5, and so White can't create such threats against g7, he must find another idea.

An alternative strategy is to prepare the advance f5! which is the logical plan in the position: after all, White has a space advantage in the centre and on the kingside, and so should be looking to make a pawn breakthrough there. Furthermore, such a plan would justify the position of the pawn on h5: it dissuades Black from playing ...g6, which would normally (i.e. with the white pawn on h2) be a powerful fortification against a threatened f5. Ivanchuk, as befits a world-class player, has made some provisions against this plan.

First of all, he has avoided castling kingside. This implies that should things ever begin to look very dangerous for his king he can always castle on the queenside, where he will be surrounded by his own pieces. However, the presence of the black king on the queenside would interfere with the active operations of the other pieces there, so it is not something Black would wish to happen. Rather, he would hope that his defences would hold firm in the centre and on the kingside.

Secondly, Ivanchuk maintained the tension in the centre until White played 15 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e1. Only then did he bypass the d4-pawn with ...c4 and look for play on the queenside. The reason is that the e1-rook would be much better placed back on f1 for supporting the advance f4 and f5 (after preparatory moves), and so Black waited until White moved the rook away before closing the position with ...c4.

Why then did White play 15 \(\mathbb{Z}\)e1? Well, he was reluctant to commit himself to an attack on the wing as long as the situation in the centre was unresolved. If with the black pawn still on c5 he had played moves such as 2h2, f4, and 2g3, all supporting the f5 advance but decentralising his knights, Black would have been able to open the position with ...cxd4 and put severe pressure on the d4-pawn. White's play would have been too one-sided with an insecure centre. But now that Black has played 15...c4 White's centre is no longer under pressure, and he can afford some 'one-sided moves'. Let's see how the game continued.

With the black king in the centre, the attack on Black's kingside cannot be carried out just with pieces. It also requires the use of pawns. Here White should consider a sequence of moves such as 2h2, 2g3, If1 and f4, preparing the f5 advance. A good way to start would be the paradoxical 17 \frac{\mathbb{E}}{2}f1!?.

The game move re-deploys the bishop to the kingside, but it is no better placed there than on the queenside. Furthermore, it obstructs the f-pawn and whether it goes to h2 or g3 it will be taking a useful manoeuvring square away from a white knight.

There is no white attack in sight and therefore Black prepares his own breakthrough. Note that 18...0-0?? would be suicidal, since White could play 19 鱼b1 and 20 營c2 with a quick mate, or even 19 & f4 and 20 ₩d2, followed by a winning sacrifice on h6. The black king is safe in the centre, even though Kasparov has a strong wish to disturb him there...

4)h2 **警d8!** 19

An excellent move. White's plan was to play 20 f4 and then 21 f5! achieving the desired advance and answering 21...exf5? with 22 e6, when there is a discovered attack on Black's queen from the g3-bishop. So the black queen side-steps this possibility.


20 2g4

Here 20 f4 was consistent, when 20... h4 was an interesting reply

20	•••	b4
21	axb4	axb4
22	cxb4?	

Kasparov doesn't seem to have been in a mood for a hard struggle. However, it is by no means easy to draw simply by eliminating Black's queenside pawns, since their places are taken by tremendously active pieces. Besides, it is against the logic of the position for White to seek to seize the initiative on his weaker side. It was still possible to prepare the build-up to f5 with 22 \(\mathbb{Z}\)f1 or 22 f4, etc.

22	***	②xb4
23	L b1	⊈d7
24	b3	Ľa8
25	¤xa8	₩xa8
26	bxc4	②xc4 (D)



W

27 Dc1?

White's position was very uncomfortable, but with 27 2f4! (Chandler) he would reactivate his bishop and could hope to defend. Black's build up on the queenside looks overwhelming, but on the other hand he is playing without his h8-rook: 27...0-0? would still allow White a decisive attack. So perhaps Black would answer 27 £f4 with 27...£a4 28 ¥c1 \$\delta d7!? threatening 29...£c8 when the white queen is in terrible danger. In any case it would be a hard fight, whereas after 27 \$\delta c1?

the battle is over.

It is now safe to castle as White's pieces are hopelessly passive. There is no defence against the advance of the c-pawn, and so White resigned.

0 - 1

Game 37 Geller – Karpov USSR Ch (Moscow) 1976 Winawer Variation

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 \(\alpha \)c3!

Along with the study of labyrinthine variations and intricate winning schemes, the reader should practise the art of surprise in the opening. Karpov has never been a connoisseur of the black side of the French Defence, neither at the present time of writing nor as a young man when this game was played. So obviously he had something prepared against Geller's habitual 3 2d2. Geller quite sensibly switches to 3 2c3 and asks "What do you know about this line?" Not much, is the answer given by the following moves.

3 ... **臭b4** 4 e5 **營d7**

When Black plays 4... 曾d7 his idea is to meet the attacking \yuge9g4 with ...f5! uncovering a defence of the g7-pawn by the black queen. On the other hand, if he plays an immediate 4...b6 here then his reply to **豐g4** will be ... 全f8. Which method of defending g7 is better? As usual it is a question of pros and cons. In playing ... £ f8 Black is wasting a lot of time, whereas the alternative ... f5 weakens the dark squares in Black's position, a factor that increases in significance after the subsequently more or less forced ... 2xc3 and the disappearance of his dark-squared bishop.

5 **2**f3 b6 **2**d2!

The reader will recall from the first game in this chapter that White does well to delay developing his f1-bishop. Here 6 2d3 loses a tempo: after 6...2a6, White has to exchange bishops anyway. 6 2d2 is a useful move, dissuading Black from playing the variation with ...2xc3 since now White can recapture with his bishop and avoid weakening his pawns. It also prepares to retreat the knight from c3 and then start an attack on Black's position with 2c1 and c4.

6 ... **2a6**For 6...**2**f8, see the next game.

Dxa6 £xa6 8 0-0

As Geller points out, White could play 8 幽e2, more or less forcing the reply 8... \Db8. However, the knight on c3 needs the square e2 to carry out White's plan, so it is not wise to obstruct it.

Db8

Black makes this retreat anyway. Geller suggests 8... 2xc3 9 2xc3 2e7 when Black is ready to castle kingside. Black would then have a sound position, but White maintains the advantage: he has more space, a bishop which should prove of more value than a black knight once the game opens up, and a plan (an eventual \(\mathbb{Z} c 1 \) and c4) to clear lines and increase the pressure on Black's centre.

9 ②e2 **≜e7?**

This is altogether bad, and shows the young Karpov's lack of experience with this variation. The bishop takes away the e7-square from the g8-knight and so prevents Black developing his kingside. The alternative 9... £f8 was better, but still dangerous because White can break through very quickly with 10 \(\mathbb{Z}\)c1 and 11 c4, before Black has time to mobilise his kingside pieces with 10...Øe7, 11...Øg6 and 12... e7. Therefore it was essential, as noted by Geller, to play 9... £xd2 10 ₩xd2 ②e7.

¤c1 10 **b**5

A valiant attempt to thwart the line-opening 11 c4. Black must at all costs attempt to keep the position closed.

11 **Df4** h5

To prevent 12 4 h5. Black's plight is desperate since he cannot even develop with 11... වh6: 12 වh5! answering 12... 265 with 13 g4 (Geller) is unacceptable.


12 b3

Geller thinks it was even stronger to play 12 a4! when 12...bxa4 13 c4 breaks through and 12...a6 13 axb5 axb5 14 Za1 will penetrate on the queenside.

> 12 **⊈a3** 13 \(\mathbb{\mtx\\\\a **a**5

13... 2e7 was the last chance, according to Geller.

14 c4! (D)



B

The long-awaited breakthrough. Geller was planning a massive attack on Black's king after 14...bxc4 15 bxc4 dxc4 16 d5 exd5 17 e6 fxe6 18 ②e5. Therefore Karpov has to maintain the blockade, but then finds his a3-bishop is cut off from the rest of his pieces, and can only be saved from eventual capture by doing what he wants to avoid: opening lines!


14	•••	с6
15	c5	Ձb4
16	⊈c1	a4

The aforementioned necessity to open lines.

17	包d3	≜a 5
18	bxa4	bxa4
19	幽xa4	₩a7
20	. ⊈.g 5	⊈c7
21	TvhQ_!	Mir

The concluding attacking phase, as in the next game against Petrosian, gives the impression that Geller is primarily an outstanding tactician. However, only a brilliant strategist could lay the necessary ground work to crush 'invincible' players like Karpov and Petrosian.

21	•••	劉xb8
22	₩xc6+	&18
23	Ðf4	≌a7
24	包h4! (D)	



B

With a brilliant and unanswerable threat.

24	•••	₩e8
25	₩xe6!!	fxe6
26	②fg6 +	₩xg6

After 26...\$f7 27 ②xh8+\$f8 28 ②4g6+ Black will nevertheless have to part with his queen. After the text Black suffers a fatal loss of material and despite his stubborn resistance there is no hope. The game finished:

27 ②xg6+ \$\delta\$e8 28 ②xh8 \$\textstyre{\tex

Game 38 **Geller – Petrosian** *Moscow 1963*Winawer Variation

1	e4	е6
2	d4	d5
3	包c3	≜b 4
4	e5	b6
5	Df3	幽d 7

6 &d2 &f8

The alternative plan to Karpov's 6... \(\alpha \) a6.

7 a4!?

In Geller's game against Karpov we mentioned how important it was to surprise your opponent. Here we may add another 'rule' of chess psychology: if you know your opponent's style and preferences, try to play in a way that is disagreeable to him. In the present instance, Geller

knew that Petrosian had played many games in this variation with Black and always castled queenside. So, by threatening a pawn storm on that wing, Geller tried to force Petrosian away from his familiar lines of play. Generally speaking, if the former World Champion had a weakness, it was when facing a headlong attack. Polugaevsky mentions this in his classic work Grandmaster Preparation: "In those rare instances where he did lose, or obtained an inferior position, it was when his opponents played directly and sharply, because Petrosian, at times fearing something at the board, would avoid a critical dispute in the opening." So Geller's enterprising 7 a4! suits the psychological situation perfectly.

7 ... Dc6

The alternative is 7... 2 a6 8 2 xa6 2 xa6. Then 9 a5?! b5 keeps the position blocked. (Karpov tried this plan as Black in the previous game, but under much less favourable circumstances.) If White should play 9 We2 then 9... 2 b4 is awkward, so the simple 9 0-0 would be best. With his actual move, Petrosian is following his standard scheme in this variation.

8 \(\mathbb{Q} \) e2

Now this bishop can be mobilised without fear of challenge.

8 ... ②ge7 9 0-0 f6?


Normally, Petrosian would continue 9... b7 and 10...0-0-0 in such a position, playing according to his tried and trusted strategy in this variation. However, he is worried by White's possible pawn storm on the

queenside, so instead he attacks White's centre. This is a dangerous policy since it leads to an opening of lines which favours the better developed player. As an alternative, Geller discusses the solid 9...f5, but then Black has no counterplay, and must wait to see if White finds a way to break through. Geller notes that he would have prepared b4, perhaps combined with some play on the kingside if the opportunity arose. Nevertheless, Petrosian was a maestro in such blocked positions, so it would have been very hard for Geller to force the win.

10 **E**e1 fxe5?

It wasn't too late for 10...f5 or 10...\(\overline{b}\)7, but Black expects to have time for ...\(\overline{b}\)57 after White recaptures on e5...

11 **Qb5!** (D)



 \mathbf{B}

An unexpected and lethal blow. Now Black's hold on the centre collapses. If 11...e4, trying to keep the position blocked, 12 ②e5 ¥d6 13 £f4 is fatal. Geller also points out

the ghastly 11...exd4 12 ②xd4 徵d6 13 ②xc6 ②xc6 14 皇f4 徵d7 15 徵xd5.

11 ♣b5 is also a reminder that tactics and strategy go hand in hand. If Geller had played a routine recapture on e5, for instance 11 ②xe5 ②xe5 12 dxe5, he would have lost most of his advantage. You can only play good positional chess if you are alert to tactical nuances.

11	•••	∕ 2)g6
12	②xe5	Øgxe5
13	Txe5	a6

There is no adequate way of defending d5, since 13... 2e7 fails to 14 2f6 15 2xd5 2xe5 16 2f6+.

14	≜ xc6	Wxc6
15	包xd5	≜d 7
16	⊉g 5	≜ d6
17	₩h5+	⊈fΩ

17...g6 is answered by 18 營e2 全xe5 19 營xe5 winning. The game concluded:

18 \(\psi f3 + \psi g8 19 \) \(\psi xe6 \) \(\psi f8 20 \)
\(\phi e7 + \psi xe7 21 \) \(\psi xc6 \) \(\px c6 22 \) \(\px e7 23 \) \(\psi ae1 \) \(\px xa4 24 b3 \) \(\px c6 25 \)
\(\pm f6 \) \(\px d5 26 \) \(\pm e8 + \) \(\pm f8 27 \) \(\pm 6e7 h6 \)
\(28 \) \(\pm xf8 + \pm xf8 29 \) \(\pm xc7 \pm g8 30 \)
\(\pm f4 g5 31 \) \(\pm e5 \) \(\pm h7 32 \) \(\pm c8 + \pm f7 \)
\(\pm f5 36 \) \(\pm f3 \) \(\pm f6 + \pm g5 38 \) \(\pm f5 36 \) \(\pm f3 \) \(\pm f6 \) \(\pm e4 40 \)
\(\pm f5 39 \) \(\pm xb7 42 \) \(\pm f5 1-0 \) (time)

Game 39 A.Petrosian – Panchenko

Odessa 1973
Guimard Variation

1	e4	e6
2	d4	d5

3 2d2 2c6

An underestimated move! After 3... 266 4 e5 or 3...dxe4 4 20xe4 White has a space advantage while 3...c5 4 exd5 exd5 leaves Black with an isolated pawn. So is it really worse to develop the queen's knight immediately and attack White's centre? True, the advance ...c5 is now difficult to achieve, but there is always the alternative ...f6 to pressurise White's centre, as will be seen.

Another variation is 3...a6 4 2 gf3 c5. The play after 5 exd5 exd5 6 dxc5 2xc5 and 6 2e2 c4 has already been analysed in previous chapters. White can instead choose to preserve the tension by playing 5 dxc5 2xc5 6 **Ad3**. Then a number of different centres can arise: 6...\\ 20c6 7 0-0 ②ge7 (7...②f6 8 exd5 ②xd5 9 ②e4 鱼e7 10 c4 包f6 11 a3 豐c7 12 b4 ± Anand-M.Gurevich, Wijk aan Zee 1990, is a Rubinstein centre) 8 c3 (8 e5 Øg6 9 Øb3 **≜**a7 = Smirin-Nikolić, Paris 1994, is a Classical centre) 8...0-0 9 **Z**e1 **2**g6 10 exd5! exd5 11 Db3 with a slight plus for White, Speelman-Schussler, Thessaloniki OL 1988, is an IQP centre.

4 **包gf3**

An important alternative is 4 c3, when complex play, somewhat in White's favour, arises after 4...e5!? 5 exd5 營xd5 6 包gf3 exd4 7 皇c4 營f5 8 包xd4 包xd4 9 cxd4 皇e6 10 營a4+ 皇d7 11 營b3 0-0-0 12 0-0.

4	•••	⊘f6
5	e5	包d7
6	е̂e2	

White simply develops. Black clearly plans ... f6 so maybe \$\Delta h5+

will be strong at some point. 6 \Db3 is an alternative. Then Qi Jingxuan-Johansen, Jakarta 1987, continued 6...a5 (6...\$e7 7 c3 0-0 8 \$d3 f6 is recommended by ECO, but 9 \blue{2} c2 looks dangerous) 7 a4 b6 8 c3 \(\hat{L}\)b7 9 \$g5 (9 \$d3 is better according to Johansen) 9... 響c8! 10 单d3 h6 11 **幽a6 14 幽d2 ②e7! 15 鱼xe7! (or else:** 15... **②**f5 will be awkward) 15... **ዿ**xe7 16 Del (preparing f4) and now Johansen claims that Black could equalise with 16...h5 17 f4 g6. Black has combined ideas from the last three games, and the Leningrad System in Chapter 3.

> 6 **f6** ₩xf6 (D) exf6


The most dynamic move. Black recaptures with his queen, planning to break in the centre with ...e5. If successful, he would solve one of the chief problems in this position: the development of his c8-bishop, which at the moment is entirely shut in. Instead, 8... 2xf6 would offer Black little compensation for his weak epawn.

2)f1! e5?!

Consistent but not quite sound. 8... 2d6 is better, though White maintains some advantage after 9 ②e3 0-0 10 0-0: Black cannot easily achieve the ...e5 advance since his d5-pawn will hang.

9 dxe5?

After 9 ②e3! e4 10 ②xd5 ¥d6 11 \$c4! (but not 11 c4 exf3 12 \$£f4 fxg2! 13 Ig1 Wxf4! 14 2xf4? 2b4+ Schellingerhout-De Vries, correspondence 1981) 11...exf3, White has



a fierce attack for the piece after either 12 0-0 or 12 \(\textit{\$\textit{\textit{\textit{e}}}\)f4.

White seems to have been taken by surprise by his opponent's variation and fails to find the strongest move. Sometimes it pays to have a dangerous, if unsound, opening repertoire.

4)dxe5 10 **資xd5**?


Zak, from whose book *Improve* Your Chess Results we have quoted this illustrative game, points out that it was dangerous for White to accept the pawn sacrifice since Black would clearly have studied the resulting position at home prior to the game. More 'street-wise' was 10 ②e3.

> **\$e6** 10 **쌀b5** 11 a6! 12 **幽a**4

the queen, so she is forced to a square from which she has less influence on the centre.

> 0 - 0 - 012 **Yxe5** 13 9)xe5 14 c3(D)

Preventing ... 2d4. If given one free move, White will now play 15 2e3 with a safe game, but he is denied this luxury.



B

14 ... **Qb4!!**

Completing his development in some style.

15 cxb4 **\$**c4 16 **∅**g3

In the later game Makarychev-Vaganian, Tbilisi 1973, White repeated all(!) these moves but then played 16 ②e3. Evidently he thought this was the refutation of Black's attack. But not for long: after 16... ②xe2 17 ③xe2 ②d4+ 18 ⑤e1 〖he8! 19 ②d2 ⑥e4! the twin threats of ... ⑥xg2 and ... ②c2+ couldn't be parried. White resigned after 20 ⑤d1 ⑥d3 21 〖e1 ②b3 22 〖e2 ⑥xa1 23 ⑤e1 〖xe3! 24 fxe3 ⑥c2+ 25 ⑤d1 ⑥xe3+ 26 ⑤e1 ⑥b1+ 27 ⑥f2 ⑥g4+. White fares no better in our main game.

16 ... **臭b5** 17 **營a3 基d3**!

Threatening both the queen and ... Ixg3. White has no defence.

18	£f4	豐e6
19	b 3	≝xg3
20	0-0	¤xg2+
21	Ġxg2	≜xe2
22	ន	

 22 ...
 算68

 23 臭g3
 營e3

 24 營c1
 臭xf3+

25 **Exf3**

If 25 當h3, 25... 營e6+ mates next move.

25 ... 響xf3+ 26 會g1 星e8 27 響f1 響e3+ 28 會g2 響e4+

A wonderfully energetic display by Panchenko.

Game 40

Lau - Uhlmann

W.Germany – E.Germany 1988 King's Indian Attack

1 e4 e6 2 d3

White defers from grabbing the centre. A rarer alternative is 2 **2 5** d5:

- a) 3 e5 c5 4 b4!? (4 d4 cxd4 transposes to analysis in Chapter 4) 4...cxb4 5 d4 (5 a3 d4!) 5...\(\Delta\)c6 6 a3 \(\bar{4}\)a5!? (Motwani).
- b) 3 ②c3 d4!? (3...②f6 4 e5 ②fd7 5 d4 again transposes to analysis in Chapter 4) 4 ②e2 c5 5 c3 ②f6 6 d3 ②c6 7 g3 e5 \pm leaves Black two tempi down on the white side of a King's Indian Defence.

2 ... d5

Black can also choose to play a Sicilian after 2...c5.

3 2d2 2f6

Black can instead develop the knight to e7 after 3...c5 4 2 gf3 2 c6 5 g3 and:


- a) 5...g6 6 \(\text{\(\text{\(\text{g}}\) 2 \(\text{\(\text{g}}\) 7 7 0-0 \(\text{\(\text{\(\text{Q}}\) ge7}\) 8 \(\text{\(\text{E}\) e1 h6!}\) (waiting to see which side is best to castle on) 9 c3 (9 e5 g5!? 10 \(\text{\(\text{Q}\) b3 b6 11 d4 c4 12 \(\text{\(\text{Q}\) bd2 g4}\) 9...b6 10 exd5 exd5 11 \(\text{\(\text{Q}\) b3 0-0 12 d4 c4 \(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{Q}\) bd3 o-0 12 d4 c4 \(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{Q}\) bd3 o-0 12 d4 c4 \(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{Q}\) bd3 o-0 12 d4 c4 \(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{Q}\) bd3 o-0 12 d4 c4 \(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{Q}\) bd3 o-0 12 d4 c4 \(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{\(\text{Q}\) bd3 o-0 12 d4 c4 \(\text{\(\) \\ \text{\(\text{\\ \text{\

4 22f3 c5

An interesting plan is 4... 5c6!? with the idea of 5 g3 dxe4 6 dxe4 \$\\\\\$c5 7 \\\\\\$g2 e5 8 0-0 0-0 9 c3 a5, when Black gets to play the white side of a Classical Pirc (1 e4 d6 2 d4 ②f63 ②c3 g64 ②f3 ዿg75 ዿe20-0 6 0-0 c6 7 a4 \(\Delta \) bd7 8 dxe5 dxe5 9 **\(\preceq\$c4!?\)** one tempo down (only one because the tempo spent on ...e6-e5 is cancelled out by the bishop moving to the useful c5-square in one move). But White can cross this plan with 5 c3!? a5 6 e5 (6 \(e^2 \) e5 is a reversed Philidor's Defence with White two tempi up, but that should not be enough to muster much advantage) 6... 2d7 7 d4 with a position much like the previous game, though Black has gained a useful tempo: 7...f6 8 2b5 (8 4)h4 We7! 9 单d3 fxe5! 10 營h5+ 營f7 11 臭g6 hxg6 12 Wxh8 e4! ∓ Ljubojević-Vaganian, Belgrade 1974) 8...fxe5 9

with an unclear position, Filipović-Langeweg, Lugano 1989.

5	g3	Dc6
6	≜g2	⊈e7
7	0-0	0-0
8	≝e1	b 5
9	e 5	②d7
10	Øf1	a5
11	h4	2a6 (D)



W

Both sides carry on with their respective attacking plan, more or less regardless of each other. White plans 21-h2-g4 bringing another piece to the kingside, while Black intends ... b4, ... a4 and ... a3 opening lines (or holes) on the queenside.

12 **1h2**

White has also tried 12 全f4 b4 13 包g5!?, when Bronstein-Uhlmann, Moscow 1971 ended abruptly after 13... 營e8! 14 營g4 (14 營h5 全xg5 15 hxg5 f5! 干) 14...a4?? (you have to

take some notice of White's threats) 15 ②xe6! (winning two pawns for nothing) 1-0.

12 ... b4

13 **②g4**

Slightly inaccurate. 13 2 f4 a4 14 IC1 a3 15 b3 is better, as in Polugaevsky-Guyot, France 1993. Polugaevsky kept the queenside blocked and slowly ground away on the kingside.

13 ... ②d4!

Removing one of White's attacking forces, and taking advantage of the fact that White's knight on g4 can't quickly come to f3.

14 c3?!

After 14 ②xd4 cxd4, the halfopen c-file would compensate for the weak pawn on d4, but the move played makes it easy for Black to open lines.

> 14 ... ②xf3+ 15 兔xf3 墨b8 16 兔f4 a4 17 豐d2

1/ 質U2

17 ₩xa4 ♠xd3 is great for Black, who wants to open lines.

17 ... a3

18 b3

18 bxa3 would be answered by 18...bxc3! with advantage.

18 ... bxc3 19 對xc3 單b4


19...c4 picks up the exchange after 20 dxc4 兔b4, but White has some compensation after 21 營e3! 兔xe1 22 罩xe1 dxc4 23 bxc4 營b6 24 營xa3 兔xc4 (Uhlmann).

23 Wc2

23 皇xb4? fails to 23...d4! 24 皇a5 豐b8 26 豐d2 皇xf3 27 豐f4 皇xd1 28 〓xd1 h5 29 ②h2 豐xe5 winning a pawn.

23 ... d4?!

Giving away the e4-square. The simple 23... \(\mathbb{L}\) b6 is better.



W

29 **Eh1**

White has to go all-out for the attack as Black's advantage on the queenside is clear.

White has to give up his b-pawn. After 32 營d1 單eb8 33 營h1, Uhlmann gives 33... 異xb3 34 異xh7 身f8! 35 f3 異xd3 holding on to win.

32 ... **Z**xb3 33 **Q**h6!? **W**a6?

An understandable move in time pressure, but Black should have accepted the desperado sacrifice, e.g. 33...gxh6 34 ②xh6+ (34 ¥d2 2g5!) 34...會g7 35 ②g4 單h8! 36 營d2 會f8 escaping.

34 @xg7! **Wxd3**

Now 34... \$\prescript{\prescript{\prescript{g}}{2}}\$ \$\prescript{\prescript{g}}{2}\$ \$\prescript{\prescript{g}}{2}\$ \$\prescript{g}{2}\$ \$\prescript{g}{2}\$ \$\prescript{g}{3}\$ \$\prescript{g}{3}\$ \$\prescript{g}{2}\$ \$\prescript{g}{2}\$ \$\prescript{g}{3}\$ \$\prescript **当h6+ 含g8 37 ②f6+ \$\text{\$\text{\$2}}** xf6 38 exf6 forces mate.

> ¤xd3 35 **營xd**3 36 \(\partial \text{16}\)?

White misses a very clever drawing opportunity: 36 ②f6+! \$\oldsymbol{2}\$xf6 37 exf6! c4 38 \(\textbf{Z}\) eh4! \(\textbf{\infty}\) xh4 39 \(\textbf{X}\) xh4 c3 40 **Qh6** c2 41 **Eg4+ Ph8** 42 **Qg7+** and White delivers perpetual check (Uhlmann).

36		81 <u>\$</u>
37	≝e1	Zf3
38	⊈g2	Zf5
39	≝h3	h5
40	¤eh1	c4

Not, of course, 40...hxg4 41 \(\mathbb{Z}\)h8+ △xh8 42 □xh8#. Black has now managed to safely reach the time control and consolidated smoothly:

41 Exh5 Exh5 42 Exh5 c3 43 할f3 d3 44 효g5 효g7 45 할e3 d2 46 \$e2 Ic8 47 Ih1 ②xe5 48 ②f6+ \$f8! 49 \$\angle\$h7+ \$\disperse\$e8 50 \$\angle\$f6+ \$\disperse\$xf6 51 兔xf6 罩c5 52 f4 包f3! 0-1

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