
Master Class



Typical Mistakes

International Master NEIL MCDONALD

Series Editors: IM Byron Jacobs
IM Andrew Martin

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Introduction

If both sides play perfectly, there can be no winners or osers in chess. Chess has maintained its appeal precisely ecause it cannot be fully mastered. It is simply too omplicated!

No player has ever succeeded in totally eradicating rrors from his play. Kasparov still makes many inaccuracies though fewer than his contemporaries). In fact, the only way of avoid mistakes is to give up chess! Since we are not repared to resort to this extreme measure, it is necessary to ind ways of reducing the frequency and seriousness of our rrors.


I hope the following guide to 'Typical Mistakes' will elp you in your quest towards the 'illusion of perfect play'.

Neil McDonald Gravesend June 1990

<u>Chapter One</u> Basic Technical Mistakes

i) Simple Oversights

Once he avoids leaving pieces and pawns *en prise*, the beginner has completed the first stage of his chess development. Of course, this does not mean that the strongest players are immune from simple errors.



Lasker v Euwe Nottingham 1936


Here, rather than move his knight, Euwe counterattacked with 23 ... as Euwe records that Lasker wrote 23 ... as?!' on his scoresheet, thought a few seconds, added another question mark and then played 24 b4! Euwe resigned after 24 axb4 25 ac2 etc., winning a piece by double attack.

The beginner has to learn about the power of pins and forks. This is a somewhat painful business. The knight in particular is a terror to the tyro.

Andersson v Dowell
School Match, St Andrews 1968
1 e4 e5 2 f3 #f6 3 fc3 fc6 4 fb5 #b8!

At least he saw the main threat.

S ᡚxc7+ \$\d8 6 ᡚdS \d6 7 ᡚg5



'Having been foiled on the queenside White tries again on the kingside. Oddly, Black, although he apparently saw the first fork coming, completely misses the much more dangerous one (king, queen & rook) and merely tries to make the knight move from gS, which White was intending in any case'—David Wallace.

7 ... h6 8 幻xf7+ 當e8 9 幻xd6+ 當d8 10 幻f7+ 當e8 11 幻xh8 幻ge7 12 幻c3 b6 13 始h5+ 當d8 14 幻f7+ 當e8 15 幻d6+ 當d8 16 始e8+ 當c7 17 幻cb5 mate.


As soon as we have learned to avoid throwing away pieces, problems of development and rudimentary strategy come to the fore. The 'sins' here are:

ii) Pawn Snatching

This is usually associated with premature development of the queen. A school game went:

1 e4 e5 2 \\\ h5 \cdot f6 \) (not falling for 2 ... g6 3 \\\\ xe5+ winning the rook on h8. But 'best' is 2 ... \cdot c6 3 \\\\\ c4 and now not 3

... 幻f6 (as many a beginner has played) but 3 ... 營e7! followed by 4 ... 幻f6) 3 尝xe5+ (a partial victory for White) 3 ... ②e7 4 ②b5 (ruling out 4 ... d6, attacking the queen) 4 ... 公c6 5 尝f4 d5 6 ed 幻xd5 7 尝e4 幻f6 8 尝f4 ②d6 9 尝g5 0-0 10 h4 置e8+



Ms X v Mr Y

The triumph of Black's strategy. He has five main pieces in play (including the queen which — in marked contrast to White's — is actively placed without having pranced around the board). He is safely castled and has a ready target in White's king.


11 ②e2 ②g4 12 分f3 (White is forced to develop a piece ...) 12 ... 尝e7 13 0-0 (and now the threat of mate provokes castling. Normally a good idea, but here 13 公c3 was better) 13 ... 尝xe2 14 a4 ②xf3 15 gf 尝xf3 16 h5 公g4 17 h6 ②h2 mate!

So White was only one move away from fulfilling her strategy (18 \upsur xg7 mate). Look at her queenside. Not one piece contributed to the game. Meanwhile, all Black's pieces are working (except the queen rook).

Even very strong players can misjudge the fine balance between 'rash' pawn snatching and healthy capitalism. In the following game, grandmaster Tolush thinks he can safely win a pawn.

Tolush v Botvinnik Leningrad 1939

1 d4 分f6 2 c4 g6 3 分c3 d5 4 处f4 处g7 5 e3 0-0 6 置c1 c5 7 dc 營a5 8 cd 置d8 9 營d2 分xd5 10 处c7 This is Tolush's clever idea. Botvinnik, however, refutes it in brutual fashion. 10 ... 營xc7 11 分xd5 置xd5! 12 營xd5 处e6 13 營d2 分c6 14 置d1 置d8



Note how much time Black has gained by harassing White's queen. White is still three moves from castling. But Botvinnik must play energetically or White will develop his pieces and win with his extra material 15 觉c1 觉a5+ 16 買d2 買d5! (a fine move. Now, since 17 分f3 買xc5 18 份b1 ②xa2 19 營a1 買c2 20 ②d3 買xb2 is disastrous, White loses his whole queenside) 17 ②e2 買xc5 18 公c3 ③xc3 19 bc 買xc3 20 營b2 買a3 21 營b5 營c3 22 營b2 營c5 23 營b1 ③xa2 24 買xa2 營a5+ 25 買d2 買a1 26 ③d3 買xb1+ 27 ③xb1.


Now Black's passed pawns ensure his victory. The game finished: 27 ... 令e5 28 ⑤e2 쌍b5+ 29 ②d3 公xd3 30 買xd3 a5 31 舀d1 쌍c4 32 ⑤f3 b5 33 舀d7 b4 34 舀a7 a4 35 舀d8+ ⑤g7 36

ূida8 a3 37 g3 份b5 0-1

iii) Exposing the King to Attack

Morphy v Bird London 1858


1 e4 e5 2 分f3 分c6 3 众c4 众c5 4 b4 众xb4 5 c3 众c5 6 d4 ed 7 cd 众b6 8 0-0 d6 9 d5 分a5 10 e5 分xc4 11 營a4+ 众d7 12 營xc4 de?



Position before 12 ... de

Black has the two bishops and an extra pawn. If he succeeds in developing, he will inevitably win. 12 ... de breaks the fundamental rule that if you are behind in development you should keep the position closed. Don't open up lines for your opponent's pieces (especially if your opponent is Morphy!) Instead of 12 ... de, 12 ... ②e7! is correct: developing and keeping the position closed. Then, if 13 e6 fe 14 de ②c6 15 ②g5 0-0 with good chances. After 12 ... de, Morphy is in his element. The position is dynamically balanced, but Black faces a difficult defence. He finally cracks ... 13 ②xe5 營f6 14 ②xd7

雪xd7 (14 ... 営xa1 15 買e1+ gives a winning attack) 15 営g4+ 営e8 16 Qg5 営g6 (16 ... 営xa1 17 買e1+ ①e7 18 買xe7+ wins quickly) 17 ②c3 ②f6 18 買ae1+ 衛f8 19 営b4+ 党g8 20 Qxf6 営xf6 21 ②e4 営g6 22 営h1 h5 23 f4 h4 24 f5 営h5 25 買f4 f6?




26 分xf6+! gf 27 買g4+ 尝xg4 28 尝xg4+ and wins.

iv) Castling 'into it'

Malachi v Bjornsson Dresden 1969

1 e4 g6 2 d4 Qg7 3 gc3 d6 4 Qe3 gf6 5 f3 0-0?



A basic error. White is obviously preparing a standard kingside attack with $\mbox{$\mathscr{w}$}d2$, 0-0-0, h4-h5 etc. It was imperative for Black to seek counterplay BEFORE subjecting his king to this dangerous attack. 5 ... c6 was correct. Then Black can expand on the queenside with ... b5, ... $\mbox{$\mathscr{w}$}a5$, etc. If White castles queenside, then he must worry about his own king's safety. This will distract him from his automatic kingside attack. If, on the other hand, White decides to castle kingside, then his kingside attack will be weakened. The king rook is needed on the h-file. And besides, advancing pawns in front of your own king is always double-edged.

In the game, Black is quickly flattened: 6 尝d2 c6 7 0-0-0 bS 8 点h6 b4 9 公ce2 a5 10 h4 尝c7 11 h5 e5 12 点xg7 ⑤xg7 13 hg fg 14 尝h6+ ⑤g8 15 de de 16 公f4! ef 17 点c4+ 買f7 18 点xf7+ ⑤xf7 (18 ... 尝xf7 19 買d8+ wins) 19 尝xh7+! 1-0 (19 ... 公xh7 20 買xh7+ and 21 買xc7 wins easily.)

Black never had a chance after his premature 5 ... 0-0? We shall now consider more advanced technical mistakes.

Chapter Two More Advanced Technical Mistakes


i) Why do you lose?

Make a list of your 'difficult' openings. Are you much stronger with Black? If so, why? Is it because you prefer a defensive game, or because you overpress with White? Do you panic when attacked? Are you stronger when the queens are exchanged?

ii) Bizarre Mistakes

The most difficult moves to forsee are backward moves by bishops and retreats by well placed pieces (especially knights). Many 'inexplicable' blunders have been made in grandmaster chess because players forget that pieces don't only go forwards (this is not draughts!).

In one game, Short sacrificed a piece, because he thought his bishop was a rook,



Nogueiras v Short Rotterdam 1989


it was on e8 --- a normal square for a rook, not a bishop! He lost because he could not play $\underline{\mathbb{Q}}(\underline{\mathbb{Z}})$ xe1+! Short played $\underline{\mathbb{Q}}$ cxd4 and then resigned.

iii) The Danger of 'Obvious' Moves

Emms v Hodgson

British Championship 1989

1 e4 d6 2 d4 වf6 3 වc3 c6 4 f4 🛱 a5 5 🛱 f3 d5 6 e5 වe4 7 Qd3 වa6 8 වge2 වb4




With a lead in development and a strong centre, White saw no reason why 9 ②xe4 de 10 營xe4 should not be good. 'All moves, no matter how obvious, should be checked' said Capablanca. And such is the case here. Furthermore, when a strong grandmaster offers you a pawn "for nothing", shouldn't you think twice? 9 ②xe4 de 10 營xe4 f5! 11 ef ②f5 12 營f3 ②xc2+ 13 ⑤f2 0-0-0! With a winning position. The game finished: 14 g4 ②xa1 15 gf 營xf5 16 黨d1 ef 17 ②e4 黨e8 18 ②2c3 ⑤b8 19 d5 ②b4 20 dc bc 21 ②d2 ②c2 22 營d3 ③xc3 23

방d6+ \$b7 24 公xc3 單d8 25 방e7+ 필d7 26 방e4 방xe4 27 公xe4 필d5 0-1

iv) Allowing the Opponent a Central Breakthrough

Geller v Smyslov Moscow 1965

1 d4 分f6 2 c4 g6 3 分c3 d5 4 cd 分xd5 5 e4 分xc3 6 bc <u>Qg</u>7 7 <u>Q</u>c4 c5 8 分e2 0-0 9 0-0 分c6 10 <u>Q</u>e3 尝c7 11 <u></u>Cc1 <u></u>Cd8 12 f4 e6 13 由1



Now Black should **BLOCK** the kingside with 13 ... ②a5 14 ②d3 f5. Smyslov neglects this vital precaution and Geller's attack breaks through: 13 ... b6? 14 f5! ②a5 (too late!) 15 ②d3 ef 16 ef ②b7 17 世d2 買e8 18 ②g3 世c6 19 買f2 Black's basic problem is that his knight on a5 is cut off from the vital action on the kingside. White therefore has an extra piece on the kingside. The conditions are perfect for an attack en masse against Black's king. 19 ... 買ad8 20 ②h6 ②h8 21 世f4 買d7 22 ②e4 c4 Geller gives 22 ... 世c7 23 買e1 ③xe4 24 買xe4 買xe4 25 世xe4 as a better try for Black. When attacked, you must try


to exchange off pieces. After 22 ... c4, Black's knight never succeeds in getting back into the game. 23 ②c2 ②de7 24 ②cf1 ③xe4 25 fg!! (if now 25 ... 资xf4 26 gxh7 is mate) 25 ... f6 26 營g5! 營d7 27 登g1 ②g7 28 资xf6 ②g4 29 gh+ 资h8 30 ③xg7+ 登xg7 31 營xg4! 1-0 (if 31 ... 營xg4 32 ②f8+ is the end)

v) The Weakness/Strength of a Pawn Centre


After studying the Geller v Smyslov game, one would think that a pawn centre is a wonderful asset. That is exactly what Tal thought in the following game.

Nezhmetdinov v Tal Moscow 1957

1 e4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 分c3 ℚb4 4 e5 c5 5 ℚd2 分e7 6 a3 ℚxc3 7 ℚxc3 b6 8 b4 ⇔c7 9 分f3 分d7 10 ℚe2 分c6 11 0-0 0-0 12 bc bc 13 dc



Here Tal was tempted to take the e-pawn, and create a pawn centre. With hindsight, better was 13 ... 2xc5 14 2d3 2e4 15 2e1 2b7! White can then win a pawn with 16 2xe4 etc, but Black has strong pressure down the c-file and the a8-h1




Hereabouts Tal realized that his pawn centre was in fact a liability. It will be subjected to intense pressure by White's bishops and rooks. Either the d or e-pawn will inevitably be forced to advance, and then a deadly diagonal will be opened for one of White's bishops. As long as the pawns are maintained abreast on e5 & d5, they are strong; but White (threatening 23 Oxc6 對xc6 24 對xe5, when 24 ... 對xc5 is no longer check) #e8 23 h3 @a8 (Black can do nothing but bide his time. His game has no dynamic potential.) 24 Qa4 Qb7 25 党h1 Qa8 26 買f5 e4 27 微xc7 買xc7 28 買fxd5 (finally Black's centre collapses, and White's bishops become terrible monsters. The rest is gory) 28 ... e3 29 \mathbb{\mathbb{G}}d7 e2 30 \mathbb{Q}b3+ \mathbb{\mathbb{G}}e6 31 0xe6+ \$f8 32 0xg7+ 1-0 Just in time to stop 33 0f7 mate. A game in fine 'hypermodern' style. Pieces acting from the wings destroy a classical pawn centre.

vi) Underestimating the Opponent's Tactical Chances

It is easy to be bound up in one's own plans and overlook the opponent's threats. On the other hand, players rarely overlook combinations favourable to themselves.

Fischer v Smyslov Bled 1959

1 e4 c5 2 分f3 e6 3 d4 cd 4 分xd4 分f6 5 分c3 d6 6 ②c4 ②e7 7 0-0 a6 8 ②b3 b5 9 f4 0-0 Now theory gives the circumspect 10 a3. But the young Fischer is eager to attack: 10 f5?! b4! 11 分ce2 e5 12 分f3 ②b7 White's crude play has left his pieces scattered and his centre is indefensible. Already he is losing a pawn. But Fischer presses on ... 13 分g3 分xe4 14 分xe4 ②xe4 15 尝e1 ③xf3 16 質xf3 分c6 17 尝e4 分d4 18 買h3 ②f6 19 ②d5 置c8 20 c3 bc 21 bc 分b5 22 ②d2 置c5 23 资h1 尝d7 24 ②b3 d5 25 尝f3 分d6 26 置f1 分e4 27 營h5 h6 28 ②xh6



Black's pieces are so well centralised that there would be no justice in chess if White's primitive wing attack won the game. Smyslov is not ruffled. 28 ... gh 29 ②c2 (29 營xh6 gets nowhere after 29 ... 当fc8, etc) 29 ... ③g5 30 f6 当b8 31 ②xe4

de 32 直g3 營f5! (a complete answer to all White's threats.) 33 **资g1 營g6** and Black won easily after another fifteen moves. This game also illustrates the danger of attacking prematurely with an unsafe centre.

vii) Planless Play/Implementing the Wrong Strategic Plan

Too often a player has a sound grasp of theory, but as soon as the opening phase ends his play degenerates into one move threats. Learning theory without understanding the ideas is useless. It merely delays defeat a few moves longer.

If you want to play the Ruy Lopez (for instance) as Black, don't limit yourself to memorizing the first 12 moves in an opening text book. Instead, study Karpov's Ruy Lopez games. See how he coordinates his pieces in the middlegame, how he parries White's threats and eventually counterattacks in the centre. You must get a 'feel" for archetypal Spanish (Ruy Lopez) positions, or any other opening you wish to play.


<u>Chapter Three</u> Psychological Mistakes

This important chapter is split into twelve sections.

i) 'Believing' your Opponent

Often one cannot believe that the opponent has made a simple blunder. If Kasparov leaves a piece *en prise* we immediately smell a trap; if Joe Bloggs, who we know is always blundering away pieces, does the same thing, we take the piece without a second thought.

In both cases we are applying our knowledge of the individual to make subjective judgements about what should be a purely logical game. This can be a good idea. At Nottingham, 1936, the English master Winter thought for half an hour and then offered a piece against former world champion Lasker.




Winter v Lasker Nottingham 1936 The shrewd old man replied with a safe move that declined the sacrifice. When asked what would have happened if he had accepted, Lasker replied "I don't know. But if a strong master thinks for half an hour and leaves a piece *en prise*, I think I had better not take it." The half hour that Lasker gained on the clock proved useful in the game.

Lasker's pragmatic approach was justified since he could decline the sacrifice and have a good position. But if he had been losing when Winter offered the piece, perhaps he would have taken his chance and accepted. Also, Lasker was 67 years old: this was a good reason not to waste energy on calculation when there was a safe & simple continuation.

But believing the opponent often leads to disaster. The following game illustrates this point.

Szabo v Reshevsky Zurich Candidates 1953


1 d4 分f6 2 c4 e6 3 分f3 d5 4 分c3 c5 5 cd 分xd5 6 e3 分c6 7 公d3 分xc3 8 bc ②e7 9 營c2 g6 10 h4 h5 11 当b1 当b8 12 ②e4 營c7 13 0-0 ②d7 14 d5 ed 15 ②xd5 ②f6 16 分g5 分d8 17 c4 ②c6 18 分e4 ②g7 19 ②b2 0-0 20 分f6+ ②xf6




At the time this game was played, Reshevsky was one of the world's leading players. Furthermore, in candidates tournaments no one allows mate in two. Therefore, Szabo played the natural 21 Oxf6 (cf section (iii) in chapter 2, 'the danger of obvious moves'!) The master tactician overlooks the simple 21 岗xg6+ Qg7 22 岗xg7 mate! Nor was this the end: after 21 ②xf6 Qxd5 22 cd 始d6 23 始c3 始xd5 24 買fd1 始f5 25 e4 始e6 26 △g7 b6 opportunity knocked again. White could win a rook with 27 Qh6 f6 (forced) 28 營g3, threatening both 29 營xb8 and 29 尝xg6+. Instead Szabo chose: 27 Oxf8? 尝xf8 and agreed a draw in disgust, after sitting at the board for half an hour in a daze. Which win had he suddenly spotted - 21 尝xg6+ or 27 Oh6? After this experience, Szabo's tournament went downhill. The half point he lost in this game was not so important; worse was the psychological depression which his bad play had invoked. Szabo, a strong grandmaster, would have undoubtedly spotted 21 微xg6+ in a simultaneous display. But when facing the formidable Reshevsky ...

ii) Underestimating the Opponent

Many (but not so many) years ago, a ELO 2040 (BCF 180) graded player faced a ELO 1540 (BCF 117) grade 'kid' in the first round of a weekend tournament. The game opened: 1 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 ©c3 ©f6 4 Qg5 c6



a ha! The stronger player was Black. The Cambridge Springs variation (an astute choice against an inexperienced player, since it is much sharper than other lines of the Queen's Gambit Declined. Often the bishop on g5 drops off). 5 e3 \bigcirc bd7 6 \bigcirc f3 $\mbox{\em bd7}$ 6



7 Qe2?! The usual passive reaction. 7 Qxf6 was better. 7 ... Qb4 8 0-0 Now simply Qxc3 wins a pawn 'for nothing'. But Black was feeling lucky and still hoped to win the bishop on g5. He wanted to get the game over with as quickly as possible and have a rest before the next round. After 8 ... Qe4 the game was indeed over very quickly, but not the way

Is he therefore to be regarded as world champion? Of course not! But this curious record shows that even the strongest players have a *bête noire*.

When Tal was at his peak, he would always lose as White against Korchnoi, and draw with Black. The reason Korchnoi gives for this is to be found in their first meeting. At the time, Korchnoi was an established master, while Tal was only a promising young player. In his first game, according to Chess is My Life by Korchnoi, Tal offered a draw when a pawn down (such was his optimism!) Korchnoi refused and ground him down in a gruelling rook and opposite coloured bishop endgame. From then on, Tal was helpless against Korchnoi. Korchnoi had absolute psychological ascendancy. It is interesting that nowadays Tal often beats Korchnoi. Perhaps it does not matter so much these days.

In turn, Korchnoi says that he had a 'personal' problem when facing the late Paul Keres. He was in absolute awe of his reputation and was beaten before the game had started.

What lesson is to be drawn from this by the club player? Make sure you play the younger members as soon as possible, and give them a good hiding! It will take years before they recover and challenge for your place in the team.

More seriously, it is necessary to 'play the board' and make an effort to shut out all thoughts of who you are playing. Moves, not personalities, are important.

vi) Overestimating the Opponent

This is not as serious as underestimating your opponent, but is also not recommended. If you are afraid of your

opponent, you will take half an hour over moves that should have been made in minutes; if he moves a piece vaguely in your king's direction, you will dream up a slashing kingside onslaught; and when he offers a draw (a pawn down) your hand will shoot out with obvious relief.

As usual, the advice is: Play Chess! Why should you blunder just because you are playing a strong opponent?

vii) Setting Yourself Unrealistic Aims

If before a tournament or club competition you aim to win all your games, how will you maintain concentration after five consecutive losses?

Psychologists point to the necessity of having a 'coping plan' available in such situations. Thus, before a tournament your (optimistic) plan may be to win first prize; your realistic plan is to score 4/6; and your coping plan is to play at least one very good game to show off to your friends.

The very best players in the world sometimes go to pieces after an early loss. Ljubojevic will win one tournament and then come dead last in another. Ivanchuk lost four consecutive games at a recent tournament after something (or someone) spoilt his mood. Clearly pyschology is at work here. Note that Karpov and Kasparov rarely let one loss lead to another (though both have loss three games in a row — one in a world championship match, the other in a world cup tournament. No one is immune!)

vii) Resigning too Early


Anything can happen in chess. It is never too late to

resign! After the following game Portisch admitted that on every move during the middlegame he was expecting Tal's resignation, and this had disturbed his play!

Portisch v Tal


Amstersdam 1964

1 分f3 分f6 2 g3 d6 3 d4 g6 4 公g2 公g7 5 0-0 0-0 6 c4 公g4 7 分c3 營c8 8 舀e1 舀e8 9 營b3 分c6 10 d5 分a5 11 營a4 b6 12 分d2 公d7 13 營c2 c6 14 b4 分xc4?! (the first piece to go) 15 分xc4 cd 16 分a3 d4 17 公xa8 (now Tal 'loses' the exchange) 17 ... 營xa8 18 分cb5 舀c8 19 營d1 分e4 20 f3! (this should win easily)



20 ... a6 21 公xd4 營d5 22 Qe3 召c3! 23 公dc2 (the simple 23 fe 營xe4 24 Qf2 looks good enough. Portisch is totally confused by Tal's play and almost manages to lose) 23 ... 營f5 24 g4?! (an unnecessary weakening of his king's position, which Tal immediately exploits.) 24 ... 營e6 25 Qd4 h5! 26 Qxg7 hg 27 公d4 (27 營d4 or 27 Qxc3 g3! is Tal's idea, e.g. 27 Qxc3 g3 28 fe 營h3 29 hg 營xg3+ 30 ⑤h1 份h3+ with perpetual check.) 27 ... 營d5 28 fe 營xe4 (Black is a rook and two pieces down, but suddenly has some dangerous threats. The main one is 29 ...

Qc8! followed by Qb7, when White faces death on the a8-h1 diagonal.) 29 分f3 營e3+ 30 登h1 Qc6 31 買f1 買xa3 32 營c1 gf (Black regains his pieces. Now 33 營xe3? f2+! wins — 34 營f3 買xf3 35 ef? Qxf3 mate) 33 營xc6 營xe2 34 買g1 壹xg7 35 買ae1 營d2 36 買d1 營e2 37 買de1 營d2 38 買d1 營e2 39 買de1 Draw




White cannot win. Black's four extra pawns — especially the monster on f3 — and much safer king fully compensate for the rook).

Players are often unwilling to defend passively. Too often they lash out when they should be defending solidly. This is another form of premature resignation. Be patient!

ix) Panicking in the Opponent's Time Pressure

One is bound to get more nervous when the opponent is short of time. In a clearly winning position, it is pointless trying to rush the opponent. You will win anyway with sensible moves.


Dedicating this section to one of the joint series editors of *Master Class*, Byron Jacobs, the following two grisly examples are typical.



Jacobs - Schulz Benidorm 1989

Black is a piece up for very little, but mesmerised by White's horizontal clock flag, he cracks up completely ... 33 ... d3 34 ②e3 ③xb4 35 a7 公c7 36 ②e4 置c8 37 置a1 公a8 38 ③g1 ④e7 39 ④f2 ⑤d8 40 ②b7 d2 41 ②xc8 ⑤xc8 42 ③xd2 ②xd2 43 置a2 ②b4 44 置xc2+ ⑤d7 45 置b2 ②c5+ 46 ⑤e2 ⑤c7 47 置b8 and White won.

Just to show that *Master Class* series editors don't always have things their own way -



Jacobs - Depasquale Lloyds Bank 1986


White is winning fairly comfortably, but the sight of less than a minute on his opponent's clock to reach move 40 again serves only to warp his judgement:

26 ... g5 27 b4 cxb4 28 買xb4 h5 29 買c4 營d7 30 營a8 夕g6 31 買c8 ②d4 32 買d8 營e7 33 ②e4 營c5 34 買g8+ 党f6 35 營d8+ 夕e7 36 買e8 ②xf2+ 37 含f1 ②g3 38 買xe7 營f2 mate

Too often an advantage that has been carefully nurtured for the whole game is blown in a wild time scramble. Some players deliberately get short of time to intimidate opponents. You should be aware of this.


x) Blunders in Time Pressure

Regarding your own play, the best advice is: DO NOT GET SHORT OF TIME! But if you do (and virtually all players at sometime or other get short of time), act as if you are NOT in time pressure. Just move faster.



This position was reached in Garcia v Ivkov, Havana 1965. White is 'totally lost', but Black was in serious time trouble. Pachman points out that Ivkov could simply shuttle his rook backwards & forwards along the first rank and wait for the

important than strategic maneouvring - a situation favourable to Korchnoi. The continuation of the game justifies this approach. 23 20 4 g6




24 h3? Black's gamble pays off. 24 黛xh5! gxh5 25 質f6! would have led to a powerful sacrificial attack, but Geller shies away from taking the plunge. The upshot of this is that Korchnoi consolidates his kingside position and obtains reasonable chances. The game continued 24 ... 以f8 25 以h2 以g7 26 至e3 公c5 27 營e1 公c6 28 公xc6 營xc6 29 營h4 至d7, and Black was fine and went on to win.

However, be sure you know your opponent well. Korchnoi would not have played this way against Tal!

Ask your friends what they think of your style. You may be surprised at their answer!

Note that we are talking about maximizing immediate results. If you want to improve your actual chess ability, then you must learn both strategy & tactics. If you are uncomfortable when attacked, you could play passively on purpose, just to get used to defending passively. But most players want immediate results.

I wish my readers the best of luck in improving their play!



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