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Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean
c. 525 to 479 B.C.

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PREFACE

In this volume we come to the transition from the archaic to the classical period in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is marked by the major events by which the Achaemenid empire of Persia came into conflict with the Greek city states, events which brought the concepts of Greek and Barbarian, freedom and despotism into the sharpest focus. But collision did not rule out influence, before and after the two years, 480 and 479, in which battle was most closely joined.

We begin by considering the geography and earlier history of the Iranian uplands where the Persian empire originated; it is now possible to do more than has previously been done in setting the archaeological against the literary picture; in the process it becomes clear how little we can say with confidence about the Median kingdom which Cyrus overthrew. But Cyrus' stature as a great leader can be more closely placed in its historical context and more justice than usual done to his son Cambyses.

That the empire survived for more than a generation was the work of Darius, who rescued it from disintegration and gave it solid institutions which carried it through the reverses sustained by his son Xerxes. The Persepolis excavations and the new texts which they produce are now making it possible to draw a picture of these institutions and their attendant culture which is at least partly independent of the Greek authors through whose eyes the empire has usually been seen.

The empire came to comprise many and varied areas, some with long histories of their own, and the composite Chapter 3 examines the impact of Persian rule upon them and what they in their turn brought to the empire; these stories will be resumed in Volume VI.

While Persia's empire grew in the last decades of the sixth century, the city states of the Greek mainland were warring with one another and incidentally gaining much experience of warfare on land and sea. By the turn of the century two states were pre-eminent. One was a newcomer to this position, Athens. Her prosperity under the long dictatorship of Pisistratus and his sons provided the economic base for a daring development towards a balanced and moderate form of democracy,

devised by Cleisthenes. The citizens were inspired with enthusiasm and vigour by the freedoms they enjoyed under their new constitution. They defeated their neighbours on land, crossed the Euripus to win possession of Chalcis and held off Aegina at sea. But Athens attracted only one adherent, Plataea. The other great state, Sparta, was the acknowledged leader of a large coalition of states. Her citizen soldiers had an unrivalled reputation in set battle, and in the last decade of the century she revised her method of consulting her allies in the coalition – so successfully that she was at once acclaimed as leader by the states which decided to defend themselves against Persia in 481 B.C. These developments are described in Chapters 4 to 6.

The civilization which the Greeks were to defend differed radically from the customs of the primitive tribal states of Europe and from the older civilizations of the Near East and Egypt. Chapter 7 provides some insight into the various aspects of this civilization: religious, political, social, literary and philosophical on the one hand, and artistic, architectural, economic and commercial on the other. It was the creation not only of the Greeks of the mainland and the Aegean islands, but also of the Greeks of the outer world, who had faced their own problems and grown to maturity with remarkable speed. Indeed the Ionian states of Asia Minor and their offshore islands led the way in maritime commerce, the development of coinage, monumental architecture, practical engineering and intellectual emancipation. Rational thinking, untrammelled by traditional tenets and prejudices and insistent on attaining the truth, was born in Ionia. The Greeks of the West laid the first foundations of medical theory, practised dissection of animals and realized that the human brain was the storehouse of knowledge.

The greatest contrast between the Greek city state and the Persian state lay in the freedom of the individual citizen and his participation in the making of political decisions. As long as the citizen of a Greek state worshipped the civic divinities, he was free to believe in whatever god or goddess he desired, but in his actions he was subject to the laws of the state. Moreover, the citizen body was free to change those laws and to conduct the foreign policy of the community. The Persian state, though recognizing a multiplicity of divinities, accorded primacy to Ahura Mazda, and his vicegerent on earth, the Great King, exercised absolute authority over all his subjects in all matters of religion, law and politics. A city state might aim to acquire some border territory from a neighbour. The ambitions of the Great King were limitless. He claimed to be ‘the King of the lands of all peoples’, and his aim was to bring all peoples under his own dominion. Where he succeeded, his rule was not necessarily harsh. But obedience to his authority was to be unconditional, and disobedience was punished with severity.

The contrast between Greek freedom and Persian authoritarianism was accentuated when the Great King supported or imposed pro-Persian dictators in the Greek city states which were within his empire. There was a very real fear that such dictators had come to stay; for, although the Scythians of south Russia eluded him, the Great King's forces advanced as far as Mt Olympus with very little opposition, and his ships sailed to attack Naxos, in the centre of the Aegean Sea. It was now or never if the Greek states of Asia Minor were to make a bid for their freedom. With immense courage they rose in rebellion. In the end they were defeated, but their rising was not in vain. For it showed to the city states of the Greek mainland what principles were at stake and what weaknesses there were in the war machine of Persia. So when Darius demanded their submission, a majority of them refused and fought and won. They turned back the tide of authoritarian rule, and they enabled the Western World to shape its own future on the principles of individual enterprise and political liberty. These epic struggles are described in Chapters 8 to 11.

The *Histories* of Herodotus of Halicarnassus in Asia Minor provide most of the information available to us about the Persians and the Greeks and the world of their time. Ever since he wrote some have regarded him as the father of history, an honest enquirer and reporter within the limits of the age; others have condemned him as simplistic, biased and even dishonest. Judgements of him vary also according to the subject about which he was writing. It is inevitable that the various authors who have contributed to this volume express different evaluations of his history. The editors have not thought it proper to suggest or impose an editorial line.

In Part III we turn to the countries of the Western Mediterranean. The early prehistory of these countries was described in Chapter xxxvii of Volume II, Part 2, and the transition from the Bronze Age to the Iron Age and the beginning of the historical period in Italy are described now in Chapter 12. The centre of attention becomes Italy, which was destined to play the leading role in the West, where the Phoenicians and the Greeks were in competition with one another. The stimuli to progress were provided by three enterprising peoples: the Etruscans, the Carthaginians and the Western Greeks.

Our knowledge of the Etruscans, being based almost entirely on the results of systematic excavation, has increased greatly since the subject was treated in the corresponding volume of this history in 1926. We are now in a much better position to judge whether this talented people was indigenous to Italy or had come, as Herodotus believed, from the Eastern Mediterranean. The study of the Italic peoples in Chapter 14 and of their languages in Chapter 15 has made equally great strides, and it has become possible to gain a firmer understanding of the Italic background

from which Rome was to emerge as a city state of remarkable vitality and administrative abilities. That emergence will be the subject of Volume VII, Part 2.

The coming of Phoenician and Greek settlers to the Western Mediterranean and the growth of their colonial foundations were narrated in Volume III, Part 3, and we resume the story when Carthage had become the leading Phoenician state and the Greeks of South Italy and Sicily shared the distinctive civilization of the Greeks of the mainland and Asia Minor. The Phoenicians and the Greeks had been rivals from the start of their history in the Mediterranean world, and that rivalry reached a climax when Carthage invaded Sicily in the year when Xerxes invaded the Greek mainland. The Phoenician cities made common cause against the Greeks; but the Greek states weakened themselves by internecine strife both in Italy and in Sicily. One result of that strife was the establishment in many states of autocratic rulers who took advantage of unsettled conditions and hired mercenary soldiers. The rulers too fought against one another, and it was two of them who invited Carthage to mount her invasion. But the invasion failed disastrously. For Gelon ruler of Syracuse and Theron ruler of Acragas, who were linked to one another by dynastic marriages, combined their forces at Himera and won a resounding victory. The freedom of the Greek states in Sicily was assured for what proved to be a period of seventy years before the Carthaginians returned to the attack.

The scope of this volume differs in some respects from its predecessor of 1926. The activities of Solon and Pisistratus are not included (they figured in Volume III, Part 3). We felt that if we began with the tyranny of the Pisistratidae it would be easier to understand the interaction between the expansion of Persia westwards and the awareness of an increasing threat by the leading states of the Greek mainland. Since 1926 competent histories of Greek and Latin literature and Greek philosophy have been published, and we have abandoned the first edition's practice of providing separate chapters on literature and philosophy. Instead, we have included the ideas of literature and philosophy in the chapter or chapters which describe the developing culture of each period in this and succeeding volumes. We hope thereby to relate the political and military events more closely to their cultural background. The bibliographies of the first edition were quite short. Much larger bibliographies are needed in this volume in order to cope with the huge amount of scholarly publication over the last sixty years. In some subjects such as the Persian Wars in Greece we do not aim to be comprehensive, and we refer the reader to the first edition for most works of the period before 1926. In subjects on which less has been written it is possible to provide a fuller bibliography. We continue our practice of including a map reference

after a name in the Index, instead of compiling a separate index of names in the maps.

Dr I. E. S. Edwards and Dr E. Sollberger helped to plan the contents of this volume, and the present editors express their gratitude. The editors are also grateful to Professor E. T. Salmon who undertook the writing of Chapter 14 after the tragic death of Mr M. W. Frederiksen. He wishes to express his thanks to Drs A. La Regina (Rome), Gabriella D'Henry and G. De Benedittis (Campobasso) and A. Adamesteanu (Lecce) for their help. We express our sorrow at the death of Dr C. M. Kraay, and we are grateful to D. Nash and M. J. Price for revising Dr Kraay's section of Chapter 7. The typescript of the volume was already with the Press, when we were deeply grieved to hear of the death of Dr L. H. Jeffery. Dr J. D. Ray wishes to thank Dr I. E. S. Edwards and Dr A. B. Lloyd for their advice, and Professor M. Ostwald wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Homer A. Thompson for his help with archaeological matters. We have received nothing but courtesy and consideration from Miss Pauline Hire and other members of the Staff of the University Press; and this has greatly lightened our editorial load.

Line-drawings have been included throughout the volume where their presence was felt to enhance the text. Fuller illustration of the topics covered here will be found in the Plates Volume to accompany Volume IV.

The editors have again to thank David Cox of Cox Cartographic Ltd for the maps; and Marion Cox for preparing most of the illustrations throughout the volume.

The index was compiled by Lucy Pollard.

1986.

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CHAPTER 3*b*

SYRIA–PALESTINE UNDER ACHAEMENID RULE

I. EPH^cAL

I. INTRODUCTION

In 539 B.C. Cyrus overcame Nabonidus, the last king of Babylonia; as a consequence, Syria–Palestine fell into the Persian king's hands, and thus began the period of Persian rule in the history of these countries, a period that was to last more than two hundred years. To the best of our knowledge, Cyrus fought no battles in this region; neither was his domination of Syria and Babylonia achieved in stages.¹ In view of the way in which a transfer of imperial power is usually effected – a single, decisive battle (sometimes two or three battles), with the administrative system remaining intact and only the actual reins of government changing hands – it is a reasonable assumption that Cyrus' chief concern was to ensure a decisive victory over Nabonidus in Babylon (where the Persian king apparently enjoyed considerable local support). His success in this enterprise made him master of a territorial complex which, under the Chaldaeans, had extended 'from Gaza at the border of Egypt (and) the Upper Sea (= the Mediterranean) beyond the Euphrates up to the Lower Sea (= the Persian Gulf).'² Until 525, Palestine marked the farthest limit of Persian rule; beyond Sinai lay Egypt. However, as a result of Cambyses' conquest of Egypt in that same year,³ the entire region west of the Euphrates took on a unique geopolitical significance in the context of the Persian empire, which was to increase in time as the conflict between the Persians and the Greeks gained momentum. Syria–Palestine was now to be a vital bridge – both by land and by sea – for the maintenance of Persia's power in Egypt and for her struggle with Greece, much of which took place at sea.

The area extending from the Euphrates to southern Palestine is designated in the Eastern sources from the Persian period by the

¹ Cf. B 267, 84–7.

² B 302, 220, Nabonid no. 1. i 39–42; Cf. Nab. H₁B i 42–4; Nab. H₂A & B iii 18–20 (B 270, 48, 52, 64).

³ Polybius (xvi. 22a) lauds the heroism of Gaza: whereas all the cities had surrendered to the Persians (not to Cambyses!), Gaza surrendered only after a siege. This information is not corroborated by any other source.



Map 5. Syria-Palestine.

territorial term ‘Beyond the River’ (Akk. *ebir nāri*, Aram. *‘abar nabārā’* / *nabārāh*, Hebr. *‘ēber hannāhār*), which is Mesopotamian in origin. The term also occurs in a Babylonian chronicle of the first years of Chaldaean rule (the reign of Nabopolassar and the first years of Nebuchadrezzar’s reign), and it is already used in Assyrian inscriptions dating from the end of the eighth century and from the seventh.⁴ Greek sources employ the general appellations ‘Syria’, ‘Coele-Syria’ and ‘Syria and Phoenicia’.⁵ In Persian (or in Elamite) there is no special designation for Syria–Palestine; when scribes writing in these languages had to refer to ‘the people of Beyond the River’, they had recourse to the term ‘Assyrians’ (OP *Aθuriya*; Elam. *Āš-šū-ra-ap*).⁶

In conformity with the plan of this volume, this chapter will survey the history of the region in the general context of the Achaemenid Empire – from the standpoint of the imperial authorities. The detailed internal history of the province of Judah and its neighbours in the Persian period will be discussed in Volume vi.

The history of Syria–Palestine in the Persian period is extremely difficult to reconstruct, primarily because of the paucity of our information concerning the region – compared with the previous, Assyrian period and, even more, with the later, Hellenistic period. Moreover, what little information we do possess is unevenly distributed, in respect of both territorial extent and chronological span: the Persian royal inscriptions provide little if any data about the region; the Greek historians describe Persian contacts with the Greeks in Greece, Asia Minor and the Mediterranean, with all their references to Syria–Palestine limited to the coastal strip; finally, the relevant biblical material deals mainly with Judah, though touching indirectly upon her neighbours, in the first generation of the Restoration (c. 538–516) and the time of Ezra and Nehemiah (second half of the fifth century). Archaeological research, too, with its epigraphical and material finds, has focused hitherto on Palestine and – to a lesser degree – Phoenicia. In the historical picture derived from these data, most of Syria (up to the Euphrates) is shrouded in almost complete darkness throughout the period surveyed in this chapter (one might say that the beginnings of this ‘dark age’ date

⁴ Cf. B 320, 116; *CAD* E, 8.

⁵ The territorial extent of these three terms is identical in the pre-Hellenistic sources; see B 307. On the derivation Assyria > Syria, see B 305.

⁶ Compare the trilingual (Persian, Elamite and Babylonian) inscription from Darius’ palace at Susa (DSf; on its different versions see B 110, 143; B 96, 3; B 175, 8). The fact that it mentions Mount Lebanon as the source of the cedarwood brought to Susa indicates that ‘Beyond the River’ in the Babylonian version is a primary geographical term, whereas the designation ‘Assyr(ians)’ in the Persian and Elamite versions is secondary, necessitated by these languages’ lack of a special term for the region in question. It is doubtful, therefore, whether anything can be inferred concerning the administrative relation between ‘Beyond the River’ and Babylonia from the proximity of *Aθurā* and *Bābirū* in the inscriptions of Darius I and in an inscription of Xerxes (XPh).

back to the completion of the Assyrian occupation of Syria in the second half of the eighth century); we have some basic knowledge of Phoenicia and its city states; while events in Judah and the neighbouring countries are relatively well documented. Under these conditions, our idea of the political and military events that took place in the region, based on the available written evidence, is meagre indeed. Nevertheless, the variegated information that can be gleaned from epigraphic finds in Palestine, Phoenicia, Babylonia and Egypt, and from the Bible, illuminates our picture of the empire's administration and of the status of various ethnic and demographic groups during the Persian period; various details of this chapter can undoubtedly be applied to other parts of the Persian empire.

II. OUTLINE OF POLITICAL HISTORY

By the time 'Beyond the River' came under Cyrus' dominion, the imperial system had already taken complete control of the entire western part of the 'Fertile Crescent', a process that lasted more than 150 years. Indeed, Syria and northern Palestine (the Kingdom of Israel) had been absorbed into the Assyrian provincial system in the second half of the eighth century. The semi-independent kingdoms in southern Palestine (Judah and the Philistine kingdoms of Gaza, Ascalon, Ashdod and Ekron) and Transjordan (Moab and Ammon), whose political existence as vassal entities continued until the sixth century, were dissolved during Nebuchadrezzar's reign and they too were incorporated into the Chaldaean provinces (there are no records of the circumstances attending the collapse of the Kingdom of Edom, but it must have occurred during the Babylonian period). Only in Phoenicia did the city states of Tyre, Sidon, Byblos and Aradus continue to exist throughout the Persian period. It may well have been due to these specific political conditions – the lack of ready-made political structures or of well-entrenched local leadership cadres – that the region experienced few uprisings during the Persian period. In fact, the only incontrovertible evidence for local hostilities comes from Phoenicia, in the last generation of Persian rule. Under these circumstances, it appears that the military and political events known to have occurred in Phoenicia and Palestine during the Persian period (as stated previously, we have no information relating to other parts of Syria and Transjordan) are reflections of external phenomena, much broader in scope, whose roots lie mainly in Egypt, rather than independent undertakings of local elements.

The sources relating to Darius I – in particular, the Bisitun Inscription – which report revolts and serious disturbances at the beginning of his reign (522) in various parts of the empire (including Babylonia, Persia,

Media, Elam and Egypt), provide no evidence of unrest in 'Beyond the River'. Concerning Judah, one may indeed discern echoes of messianic hopes centred on Zerubbabel son of Shealtiel in Haggai's prophecy (2:20–3), given in the winter of 'the second year of Darius' (521),⁷ concerning that scion of the House of David, who was then serving as 'governor of Judah'. However, these hopes never reached fulfilment. In fact, it has been suggested that Zerubbabel's disappearance from the stage of history after 521 was due to his deposition by the Persian authorities, who were concerned lest such authority entrusted to the representative of a local dynasty inspire unrest, as had happened in other districts of the empire.

In the year 487/6, some time before Darius' death, Egypt revolted, to be put down two years later by his successor Xerxes. Not long thereafter Babylonia also rebelled, first under Bel-shimanni and subsequently under Shamash-eriba. Xerxes, preoccupied with intensive preparations for his great campaign against Greece, quashed the rebellion with an iron hand, destroyed the city of Babylon and abolished its special status as an imperial centre. In Ezra 4:6 we find a brief statement to the effect that 'in the reign of Ahasuerus (= Xerxes), in the beginning of his reign, they ['the adversaries of Judah and Benjamin'] wrote an accusation against the inhabitants of Judah and Jerusalem', presumably emphasizing the seditious nature of the latter (compare the letter addressed to Artaxerxes in connexion with the restoration of the walls of Jerusalem, Ezra 4:12–16). It has even been suggested that the passage in Nehemiah 1:2–3 concerning the ruined wall of Jerusalem and 'the Jews, the remnant who have survived the captivity' – and possibly other passages too – hint at anti-Persian activities in Judah in those critical years, activities that forced the authorities to take stern action, possibly with the willing participation of Judah's neighbours.⁸ However, this suggestion is hardly tenable, if only for the reason that the biblical passage in question seems to be referring to an event much closer in time to Nehemiah's arrival in Jerusalem. The surviving sources are silent as to the influence exerted on 'Beyond the River' by other events in the Persian empire – above all, by the failure of Xerxes' great campaign against Greece, in which Phoenician ships played a prominent part (see below, pp. 144, 156).

Phoenician ships continue to be attested in the struggles with Athens which followed, at the battle of the Eurymedon (Thuc. 1.100.1), in the Athenian expedition to Egypt (M–L 34), and in Cimon's last expedition to Cyprus in 450, when the Athenians fought the battle of Cypriot Salamis against the Phoenicians, Cypriots and Cilicians (Thuc. 1.112.4). The importance to the Persians of the Phoenician fleet is also evident

⁷ And not 520, the generally accepted date. On this method of calculation see B 478.

⁸ B 498.

from the sarcophagus inscription of Eshmun'azar II, king of Sidon. In this inscription, Eshmun'azar reports the annexation to Sidon of 'Dor and Joppa, the great corn lands in the field of Sharon', which he had received from the king of Persia ('the Lord of Kings') as a reward for 'the important deeds which I did' (*KAI* 14. 18–20). Opinions are divided as to the precise dates of Eshmun'azar II's reign. According to scholars who place him around the mid-fifth century, the inscription is referring to the above-mentioned events in the 60s of that century. On the other hand, if one dates his reign a few decades earlier, the reference to 'important deeds' recalls the prominent role of the Sidonian fleet in Xerxes' Greek campaign (in 480), cf. *Hdt.* VII.96, 99; VIII.67.⁹

One clear piece of evidence shows an impact of Athenian imperialism on our area. The gravestone of those Athenians of the Erechtheid tribe who died in the first year of their Egyptian expedition – 460 or 459 – names among the places where they died Cyprus, Egypt and Phoenicia (M–L 33). Nothing more need be involved than a skirmish at a landing on a coasting voyage from Cyprus to Egypt, and it would be wild to guess from the order of the names at a raid from Egypt up the Palestinian coast. More substantial claims have been made from a weaker piece of evidence. Craterus, the early third-century collector of decrees, quoted the name of Δῶρος under the heading of 'Carian tribute' (*Καρικὸς φόρος*) (*FGrH* 342 F 1). That this is a reference to an Athenian tribute-list seems certain, and there is something of a case for attributing it to an Athenian assessment of tribute for 454.¹⁰ A Carian Doros is unknown, and some authors identify this city with the port of Dor, south of the Carmel coast, on the assumption that it served the Athenian fleet as an important station *en route* to Egypt to help Inaros (and perhaps also Amyrtaeus) and during the fleet's sojourn there. However, this hypothesis, based as it is on toponymic identity alone, raises difficulties and should probably be rejected, on the grounds that it implies a far-reaching conclusion, namely, that the Athenians maintained a foothold for several years at a point quite far up the Palestinian coast, in a hostile region, under undisputed Persian domination and in close proximity to the main bases of the Phoenician fleets.

The 'Peace of Callias' (449) debarred the Athenians from acting in the Eastern Mediterranean, a provision that undoubtedly facilitated the Persians' control of Egypt, Cyprus and 'Beyond the River'.

Hints of tension in Palestine during the reign of Artaxerxes I – but before Nehemiah's advent to Judah (i.e. between the years 464 and 445) – may be discerned in Ezra 4:7–23, concerning the letter of accusation despatched to the king by Rehum the commissioner, Shimshai the scribe

⁹ Concerning the date of Eshmun'azar II's reign, see B 485; B 499.

¹⁰ C 43, I 203–4, 483, 496, III 9–11, 174–7, 260–2; B 487; A 38, 420–1.

and 'the rest of their colleagues, who dwell in Samaria'; this letter prompted the authorities to halt the building of the wall 'by force and power'. It would appear, too, that the text of Nehemiah 1:2-3; 2:3, 17 refers to the events of that period.¹¹

In the second half of the Persian period, particularly during the reign of Artaxerxes II (404-358), the empire was weakened by strife both within and without. The salient features of the history of 'Beyond the River' at this time are Egypt's independence (404-342, XXVIIIth to XXXth Dynasties) and the extension of that country's domain of influence and military might in Palestine and Phoenicia, on the one hand, and Persia's abortive attempts to re-subjugate Egypt, on the other.

Full narrative is reserved for Volume VI, but various points relevant to our general understanding of the region must be noted here. In the attempt on the throne by the younger Cyrus in 401, the route of his march - from the Syrian Gates at Mount Amanus to Thapsacus, where he was to cross the Euphrates - led him past the palace and 'paradise' of Belesys (= Belshunu, Bēl-šunu), 'the ex-governor of Syria' (concerning this title see below, p. 154), which he destroyed (*Xen. An.* 1.4.10); mysteriously, the immense army of Abrokomas (the new governor? his title is not specified¹²), the Persian commander in Phoenicia, played no effective part in the campaign.¹³

Once Egypt had thrown off the Persian yoke at the end of the fifth century, it quickly turned its attention to Asia. In fact, it would appear that the Egyptians seized control of the entire coastal strip of Palestine and Phoenicia for a time. That this is the case follows from Diodorus' account (xv.2.3-4) of the alliance between Evagoras, king of Cypriot Salamis, in rebellion against the Persians, and Pharaoh Achoris (393-380), in whose name Evagoras seized Tyre and other Phoenician cities, and from inscriptions of Pharaoh Nepherites I (399-393), found at Gezer, and of Achoris at Acre and Sidon.¹⁴ But in 373 we find Acre once again under Persian control, serving as the main base for an attack on Egypt by the Persian commander Pharnabazus (*Diod.* xv.41.3; ? [Dem.] 52.20). A further invasion of Phoenicia was made by Pharaoh Tachos in 361 (*Diod.* xv.92.3-5).

Under Artaxerxes III (359-338) there was a major rising in Phoenicia, not surprisingly backed by Egypt. According to Diodorus (xvi.40-5), the immediate cause was provocative behaviour on the part of senior Persian officials towards the Phoenician delegates - natives of Aradus, Sidon and Tyre - who had convened at Tripolis. The revolt was led by

¹¹ B 155, 313.

¹² On the assumption that Abrokomas was the new satrap of Syria, see B 490, 311-17 [155-61].

¹³ For speculation about the role of Abrokomas' force, see B 155, 373; B 824, 76-7.

¹⁴ B 870, 374, 382, 384.

Tennes, king of Sidon, and Sidon's wealth ensured speedy acquisition of the mercenaries, ships, equipment and provisions necessary for the war. The insurgents destroyed the 'King's Paradise', set fire to the grain stored for the Persian cavalry, and took vengeance on the offending Persians. Artaxerxes eventually took the field himself. Tennes betrayed the cause, and the Sidonians proceeded to seal off their besieged city and set it on fire, together with themselves and their families. According to Diodorus, 40,000 people died at Sidon and the king sold treasure-seekers the privilege of searching among the ruins for melted gold and silver, going on himself to a successful reconquest of Egypt.¹⁵ There is no doubt that this story of the city's destruction is exaggerated, since Sidon is mentioned as a city of some importance when Alexander arrived in Phoenicia in 332 (Arr. *Anab.* II.15.6, 20.1; Curt. IV.1.15ff).

According to accounts by late authors (Eusebius, Solinus, Syncellus; and cf. Josephus, citing Hecataeus of Abdera, in *Ap.* I.194), Artaxerxes III, on his way to regain Egypt, exiled rebellious Jews, some to Hyrcania near the Caspian Sea district and others to Babylonia; he also subdued Jericho. These data may well be connected with Tennes' rebellion; if so, they tell us something of its extent.¹⁶

The political and military pendulum that swung back and forth over the region for the last sixty years surveyed above could not but have left its mark on the pattern of human habitation in Palestine and Phoenicia; it therefore provides a major basis for interpreting various salient archaeological phenomena. Thus, destruction levels in many cities along the coast and coastal plain of Palestine, dating in general to the years 400–380, may be attributed to the Persian–Egyptian struggle for hegemony in the area in those years.¹⁷ Similarly, the destruction evident at such sites as Hazor, Megiddo, Athlit, Lachish and Jericho has been associated with the Persian reaction to the revolt of Tennes.¹⁸ However, since our historical picture of this stormy chapter in the history of Palestine lacks adequate detail, one cannot accurately determine the circumstances which brought on the destruction or the identity of those who wrought it.

The last stage in the history of Persian domination of 'Beyond the River', unlike the first, was one of major military activity. Although the rulers of Aradus and Byblos surrendered to Alexander on his arrival and the people of Sidon welcomed him with open arms, Tyre refused him entrance and resisted a siege for seven months.

The war on Tyre was accompanied by military and political measures

¹⁵ *ABC Chronicle* 9 reports the arrival of Sidonian prisoners in Babylon, apparently in October 345, but there is some doubt about the year; see Sollberger *ap.* B 479.

¹⁶ Cf. B 511, I 43, II 421–2. ¹⁷ B 510, 245–5, and, in detail, B 509.

¹⁸ B 474; see, however, B 510, 255.

in other parts of the country: Parmenion fought the ‘Syrians’ (south of Damascus?), who were opposed to Macedonian rule, and Alexander invaded the Anti-Lebanon, waging war on its ‘Arab’ inhabitants (Curt. IV.1.5; Arr. *Anab.* II.20.4). Josephus relates that at that time the Samaritans (= the residents of the province of Samaria) submitted to Alexander, and their leader, Sanballat (III), put an auxiliary force of 8,000 men at Alexander’s disposal during the siege of Tyre. On the other hand, Alexander’s appeal to the Jews to provide auxiliary forces and food supplies for his army was denied by the high priest, who declared that the Jews’ oath of allegiance to Darius was binding as long as the latter was alive (*AJ* XI.317–21).

By the time Alexander left Tyre, he was already in control of ‘all the rest of what is known as Syrian Palestine’ (Arr. *Anab.* II.25.4). The only city still resisting him was Gaza. This city was led by a (Nabataean?) eunuch named Batis, at whose disposal stood ‘Arab’ mercenaries and sufficient supplies to sustain the city during a lengthy siege. Gaza was overcome by storm after a two-month siege. Its defenders fought to their deaths, the women and children were sold as slaves, and the city was resettled with people from the neighbouring (Bedouin?) tribes. It is noteworthy that the opposition to Alexander at Tyre and Gaza, which delayed his final victory over the Persian king and cost him considerable military effort, came from local elements (the reasons for this behaviour on their part are unknown and can only be conjectured), rather than from the political and military might of Persia. It would seem that by this time Persian rule in Syria–Palestine was at the most nominal.

III. DEMOGRAPHY AND PERSIAN POLICY TOWARDS ETHNIC GROUPS

The administrative and territorial subdivision of ‘Beyond the River’ under Persian rule was conditioned by two principal factors: (1) the diversity of ethnic and national groups, exhibiting various patterns of relationship *vis-à-vis* the Persian authorities; (2) considerations of administrative efficiency, with allowance for the interests of the local groups. The official recognition of ethnic-national units – as distinct from political-territorial units – as a significant factor in the delineation of imperial policy and administrative practice, an innovation in the history of Syria–Palestine, emerged for the first time under the Persians and was to reappear in later periods. It became possible largely because most of the local political entities in the area had been obliterated by the Assyrians and the Babylonians, and also because the Persian authorities tended to base their control of the multinational empire on existing alternative frameworks.

Among the various appellations for population groups in 'Beyond the River', we find certain general terms: 'Syrians', 'Phoenicians' and 'Arabs'. The first two derive from territorial definitions. The broadest of them, 'Syrians' (which does not figure in Hebrew or Aramaic sources), is applied in the Greek sources to the population inhabiting most of 'Beyond the River' (with occasional references to subgroups such as 'Syrians of Palestine'; Hdt. II.104; VII.89) and even farther afield: northern Sinai, on the one hand, and the left bank of the Euphrates and Cappadocia in Asia Minor, on the other.¹⁹ The term 'Phoenicians', which is also unique to the Greek sources, encompasses the inhabitants of the coastal region of Lebanon and northern Palestine – the people of Aradus, Byblos, Sidon and Tyre. As to the 'Arabs', this term is merely a general noun, applied from the mid-ninth century onwards to various 'Bedouin' groups within the limbs of the 'Fertile Crescent'. Reckoned among the 'Arab' groups in the area of Syria–Palestine in the Persian period we find the Kedarites (cf. the inscription of 'Qainū son of Geshem, king of Kedar' from Tell el-Maskhuta, fifth century);²⁰ some of them were apparently the '(Arab) Nabataeans', first explicitly mentioned in Diodorus XIX.94–100, in connexion with the year 312, and well known since the beginning of the Hellenistic period in Transjordan, southern Palestine and northern Sinai. The 'Arabs' in the Anti-Lebanon, mentioned as the target of one of Alexander's operations (Arr. *Anab.* II.20.4), may possibly be identified with the Ituraeans, who figure in the classical sources for that region from the end of the second century B.C. and onwards; they are also known from the Bible (Gen. 25:15; I Chron. 5:19).

More specific designations of ethnic groups occur in the book of Nehemiah: in addition to the Jews, we find – in the middle of the fifth century – Tyrians, Sidonians, Ashdodites, Ammonites and Moabites.

One question of paramount significance for the history of Palestine in the Persian period concerns the ethnic composition of the population of the province of Samaria. One possibility is that they were mostly descended from the original inhabitants of the area, prior to the destruction of the kingdom of Israel by Tiglath-pileser III and Sargon kings of Assyria, while only a relatively small group, mainly the ruling class, was descended from the exiles who were settled in Samaria during the Assyrian period.²¹ Alternatively, the bulk of the population may have consisted of the descendants of those exiles. In actual fact, this question

¹⁹ On the Syrians of Northern Sinai see, e.g., Hdt. III.5; of the left bank of the Euphrates, Arr. *Anab.* III.8.6; and of Cappadocia, Hdt. I.72, 76, II.104, III.90, V.49, VII.72.

²⁰ See Pls. Vol. pl. 93; B 875; *TSS I* II no. 25.

²¹ On deportations from the kingdom of Israel, see II Kings 15:29; 17:6; I Chron. 5:6, 26; *ANET* 283–5.

should be extended to include the whole of Syria–Palestine. The Assyrian policy of mass deportation (which actually continued into the Babylonian empire, though based on different principles and more limited in extent) affected the ethnic-demographic make-up of the entire region;²² quantitative evaluation of the changes it wrought is of crucial importance in defining the ethnic character of the population of Syria–Palestine in the Hellenistic period – the next point at which our knowledge of the history of the region begins to fill out again.

It is quite evident that the members of Sanballat's family, which provided the governors of Samaria from the mid-fifth century until the end of the Persian period, worshipped Yahweh, as did the Jews in Judah. However, the authors of the letter of accusation to Artaxerxes, the purpose of which was to prevent the reconstruction of the Jerusalem wall, describe themselves as 'the men of Erech, and of Babylon, and of Susa – that is, the Elamites – and other peoples whom the great and glorious Osnappar (= Ashurbanipal) deported and settled in the city of Samaria, and the rest of the province of Beyond the River' (Ezra 4:9–10), in an obvious effort to emphasize their distinctness from Judah and its people. Clearly, then, there was in Samaria some kind of ethnic-religious stratification, the details of which lie beyond our ken.

Conclusions may sometimes be drawn with regard to ethnic and related questions by examining the structure of proper names, and particularly of their theophoric components. Thus, for example, the Arab and Idumaeen names occurring in the dozens of fourth-century ostraca discovered at Beersheba and Arad²³ testify to the infiltration of southern Palestine by a population group from Transjordan which was to constitute the majority of the inhabitants of the eparchy of Idumaea in the early Hellenistic period. Now, it is presently known that the Wadi Daliyeh papyri and seal-impressions (dating to 375/365–335) contain names with theophoric elements that testify to Idumaeen (Qos), Moabite (Chemosh), Aramaean (Šahar), Babylonian (Sin, Nabu) and Jewish (YHW) origins;²⁴ however, as long as the names have not been fully published and the statistical frequencies of their different elements remain unknown, it would be premature to draw unequivocal conclusions concerning the ethnic make-up of the population of Samaria.

Although the general correlation between the provincial administrative units in 'Beyond the River' and the territorial span of the ethnic blocs is clear, it should be emphasized that, during the Persian period, these two forms of organization did not always imply territorial coincidence. That is because the territorial demarcations characteristic of the ethnic

²² On deportations to the province of Samaria, see II Kings 17:24; Ezra 4:2, 9; *ANET* 284, 286. On Assyrian deportation policy, see B 310; on some features of Babylonian deportation policy, see B 267. ²³ B 502–4. ²⁴ B 480, especially 52.

groups, though fluid, generally shifted slowly and gradually, whereas an administrative unit could be expanded or contracted in the brief time required to issue a government decree. Thus, for example, one can infer from the book of Nehemiah that there were Jewish settlements between Hebron and Beersheba in the mid-fifth century (Neh. 11:25–30), while the Jewish population of the area to the south of the Tekoa–Beth-zur–Keilah line, in the southern part of the Judaeen Hills, was in a state of decline and retreat during the Persian period. By dint of this progressive decline, the ethnic-demographic character of Idumaea – the district to the south and west of the above-mentioned line – had, as we have already stated, stabilized by the fourth century.

Similarly, it follows from the *Periplus* of Pseudo-Scylax that, around the middle of the fourth century,²⁵ Phoenicians were occupying the entire coast south of the Thapsacus (= Orontes) River²⁶ in northern Syria, as far as Ascalon in southern Palestine. A comparison of the information gleaned from this source with that conveyed by the inscription of Eshmun^cazar, king of Sidon, might tempt one to suppose that, during the century prior to the composition of the *Periplus*, one of the Phoenician city states had extended its domain to the south, from Joppa to Ascalon. However, the picture outlined by Pseudo-Scylax is different; we find Tyrian and Sidonian settlements alternating along the coastal region south of Phoenicia proper: Adarus (= Athlit?), Dor and Joppa are inhabited by Sidonians (as we know, Dor and Joppa are also mentioned in the Eshmun^cazar Inscription); Crocodeilonopolis and Ascalon by Tyrians. It would seem, therefore, that the pattern is not one of a complex subdivision into relatively numerous, small, territorial-political units,²⁷ but rather one of colonies – perhaps only quarters or emporia – distributed alternately between Tyrians and Sidonians, depending on the exigencies of coastal shipping and trade. If this approach be accepted, the *Periplus* cannot be seen as reflecting the administrative-territorial organization of the coastal region, but only an arrangement – involving no demarcation of boundaries – whereby the Tyrians and Sidonians benefited from various (extra-territorial) economic privileges.²⁸

²⁵ On this source, see B 486, 185–210; B. 490, 356–85 [200–29].

²⁶ The name of this river bears no geographical relation to the North Syrian city of Thapsacus, near which Cyrus the Younger and Alexander the Great crossed the Euphrates. The west Semitic toponym *tiṣṣah* is derived from the root *ṭṣḥ*, ‘to cross, pass’, and it denotes a ford or crossing-place of a river; cf. B 491, 286–8. Hence it may well have been the name of numerous places, among them the mouth of the Orontes.

²⁷ The territorial pattern becomes even more complex if one locates the province of Ashdod to the north of Ascalon.

²⁸ In this connexion, cf. the term *kāru(m)* in Neo-Assyrian documents, particularly those relating to the Phoenicians and the Palestinian coast (such as *NL* 12; *ABL* 992; B 241, 108 iii 18–30). Cf. also B 483, 101–2, nn. 339–40.

Our information concerning the policy of the Persian authorities *vis-à-vis* the people of the satrapy 'Beyond the River' relates mostly to the Jews and the province of Judah, mainly up to the middle of the fifth century (owing to the nature of the available sources). Nevertheless, as it is rather improbable that the Jews received preferential treatment, one can assume that other ethnic-national groups were dealt with similarly.

Cyrus' Edict (in both its versions, Ezra 1:2–4; 6:3–5)²⁹ and the biblical accounts of several waves of Jewish returnees, from the issuing of the Edict until Ezra's journey to Jerusalem in the time of Artaxerxes I, indicate that Cyrus and his successors maintained a policy of repatriation for some eighty years. Babylonian legal documents discovered at Neirab in northern Syria – the latest of them date from the first years of Darius I's reign – imply that members of other ethnic groups, such as the Neirabaeans, were allowed to return home from their places of exile.³⁰

The restoration of the Temple at Jerusalem and the resumption of worship there were sanctioned by royal decree. First, Cyrus granted permission to rebuild the Temple – and even returned the holy vessels pillaged by Nebuchadrezzar. And Darius and Artaxerxes I went even further, commanding that the expenses involved in building the Temple and maintaining its cult be defrayed from 'the resources of the king derived from the taxes of the province of Beyond the River'; the Temple personnel would be exempt from payment of the taxes (tribute, poll tax and land tax) to which all citizens of the province were liable; sacrifices would be offered up in the Temple to 'the God of Heaven' and prayers uttered for the life of the king and his sons (Ezra 6:8–12; 7:20–4). The honour rendered 'the God of Heaven', his Temple and his priests accords well with what we know of the attitude of Cyrus and his successors to other central temples in their realm, such as the Temple of Apollo at Magnesia.

Those of the governors of provinces whose names we know were members of the local ethnic groups. Thanks to the names occurring in the Wadi Daliyeh finds, combined with previously known data, culled from the Bible, Josephus and the Elephantine papyri, it is possible to reconstruct a local ruling dynasty, the House of Sanballat, who served as governors of Samaria from the mid-fifth century until the advent of Alexander.³¹ There was no ruling dynasty in Judah (it will be recalled

²⁹ Regarding the historical authenticity of this document, see B 477.

³⁰ B 267, 84–90. A legal document was recently discovered at Tell Tawilan in southern Transjordan (Edom), which was written at Harran in 'the accession year of Darius King of the Lands'; see B 383. It follows from the king's title that the document dates from the time of Darius II (423) or III (335). Accordingly, any attempt to draw conclusions from it about the policy of restoration in the first generations of Persian rule is extremely dubious. More probably, the document testifies to internal mobility within the empire, in the second half of the Persian period.

³¹ B 480; B 481, especially 15–18.

that the House of David lost its leading role during the first years of Darius I's reign, with the disappearance of Zerubbabel); however, what we know of the activities of the governors – and even some of their names (Nehemiah, Yehizkiyah) – indicates that they were Jews. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume, on the basis of the Elephantine Jews' appeal to Bagohi, governor of Judah, in the year 408, requesting that he intercede for the restoration of 'the Temple of YHW the god which is in Elephantine' (Cowley, *AP* 30), that the same Bagohi was also a Jew, despite his Persian name. Among the local leaders who certainly enjoyed some official status *vis-à-vis* the authorities we find Nehemiah's adversaries, Geshem the Arab and Tobiah 'the servant, the Ammonite'. Nehemiah's derogatory epithet for the latter (2:10, 19) implies that Tobiah had an official title ('servant of the King?'), and it seems logical to associate him with the dominant dynasty of the 'Land of Tobiah' in Transjordan during the third century B.C.³²

Another indication of the significance of ethnic-national groups in the political life of the Persian period is the presence in Judah of leadership bodies whose authority clearly stemmed from their position among their own people rather than their backing from the authorities. Thus, at the beginning of the Persian period we find an executive body known as the 'elders of the Jews', the 'heads of fathers' houses', negotiating with the 'adversaries of Judah and Benjamin' and with the Persian authorities, in connexion with the rebuilding of the Temple and the completion of the work. Towards the end of the Persian period we have evidence of the enhanced political standing of the high priest, as against the declining prestige of the governor. There is literary evidence for this process in the traditions concerning Alexander the Great's negotiations with the Jews, and, in particular, in the emergence of the high priest, at the beginning of the Hellenistic period, as the leader of Judah and its exclusive political representative. Decisive testimony to this effect comes from a recently discovered small silver coin, dating from the end of the Persian period, which bears the inscription *ywhn[n] hkwbn* (= 'Yohanan the priest') (Fig. 2).³³ This coin is similar to those struck by Yehizkiyah, one of the last governors of Judah; however, in place of the well-known inscription *yhzqyb hphh* ('Yehizkiyah the governor') we have, as just stated, the name of the high priest. It is clear from this exceptional find that Yohanan the high priest also wielded secular authority. By way of conjecture, one might associate this situation with one of the grave crises experienced by the Persian authorities in 'Beyond the River' in the last generation of its existence – e.g. the revolt of Tennes, or perhaps Alexander's siege of Tyre – during which Persian rule in Judah collapsed and its representative, the governor, could not maintain his position.

³² B 492. ³³ B 475.



2. Coin of Yohanan the priest. Fourth century B.C. Obverse, owl and inscription; reverse, mask (?). (Israel Museum, 8790; after B 475, 167.)

IV. IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

The title ‘Governor (*lūpīhātu, bēl pīhāti*) of Babylonia and Beyond the River’ as applied in Babylonian legal documents from the years 535–486 (see below, p. 154), indicates that in the early days of Persian rule Syria–Palestine were subsumed together with Babylonia under one administrative authority. ‘Tattenai, governor of Beyond the River’, who is known from the first half of Darius’ reign, was subordinate, therefore, to the ‘governor of Babylonia and Beyond the River’.

According to Herodotus (III.89–95), Darius I organized his empire for taxation purposes into twenty districts (*νομοί*), called satrapies. The fifth satrapy in Herodotus’ list includes Cyprus, Phoenicia and ‘that part of Syria which is called Palestine’, from Posideum (present-day el-Baṣīṭ, south of the mouth of the Orontes) to Lake Serbonis (Sabkhat Bardawil) on the Egyptian border, omitting the ‘Arab district’ in the south, which was ‘exempt from tax’ (III.91; on the delineation and administrative-economic status of this territory see below, pp. 161–2). The tax (*φόρος*) imposed on the fifth satrapy was 350 silver talents per annum. Like later Greek historians, Herodotus refers throughout this account to points in the coastal region, giving no details of the territorial extent of the fifth satrapy. The exact relationship between the territorial terms ‘Beyond the River’ and ‘fifth satrapy’ is not clarified in the sources at our disposal.

At first sight, Herodotus’ account implies that it was Darius who separated ‘Beyond the River’ from ‘Babylonia’, shortly after he had suppressed the extensive revolts marring the beginning of his reign. However, this conclusion is directly contradicted by the references to the governors of ‘Babylonia and Beyond the River’ in the Babylonian legal documents. We must conclude, therefore, that Herodotus is referring to an administrative measure carried out before he wrote his History, but after 486. This measure is most probably to be associated with the drastic

action taken by Xerxes in response to Shamash-eriba's revolt in Babylonia (482).³⁴

After Artaxerxes III (Ochus) had subdued the revolt of Tennes, the satrapy 'Beyond the River' was annexed to the realm of Mazaeus (who, it will be remembered, had participated as governor of Cilicia in military operations against the rebellious Sidonians). Testimony to this arrangement is provided by (undated) coins which bear the Aramaic inscription *mzdy zy 'l 'br nbr' whlk*, 'Mazaeus who is over Beyond the River and Cilicia' (the inscription *b' l trz*, 'Baal of Tarsus', on the reverse testifies to their Cilician origin).

Following is a list of those governors of 'Beyond the River' whose names and titles occur explicitly in the sources (the dates are those implied by the documents):

(a) *Governors of Babylonia and 'Beyond the River'*

Gubar(r)u	535–525 ³⁵
Ushtani	521–516 ³⁶
<i>Hu-ta-[x-³]</i> son of	
<i>Pa-ga-ka-an-na</i>	486 ³⁷

(b) *Governors of 'Beyond the River' / Syria*

Tattenai	c. 518–502 ³⁸
Belshunu = Belesys I	407–401 ³⁹
Belshunu = Belesys II	369–c. 345 ⁴⁰
Mazaeus	343/2–332 ⁴¹

Note: On the basis of Ctesias 37, it has been suggested that the governor of Syria in the year 460 was Megabychus; Herodotus III.160, however, refers to him as military commander only.

The residence of the satrap of 'Beyond the River' is not specified in our sources. The text of Strabo XVI.2.20 – 'Damascus is a noteworthy city, having been the most famous of the cities in that part of the world [i.e. in Syria] in the time of the Persian empire' – and some additional references to Damascus (cf. Arr. *Anab.* II.11.9; Driver, *AD* 6) lend credence to the

³⁴ As suggested by B 155, 237, 293, without proof. See also above, pp. 130–1.

³⁵ An.Or. 8/1 43 (Cyrus VIII/1/4); TCL XIII 168 (Cambyses, VI/27/5); B 331, 54–7.

³⁶ Dar. 27 (Darius, XII/18/1); BRM 1 101 (not later than Darius, III/–/6); B 331, 57–9.

³⁷ BM 74554 (courtesy D.A. Kennedy; collation J.A. Brinkman).

³⁸ Ezra 5:3–6:15; VS IV 152 (Darius, II/23/20); cf. B 314.

³⁹ B 311, 316–17 (23 June 407); B 458 no. 25 (16 January 401). At the time of Cyrus the Younger's march in North Syria (July 401), Belesys was already the 'ex-governor of Syria' (Xen. *Anab.* I.4.10). On the complex of legal documents relating to this official – but with no additional data regarding his position as governor of 'Beyond the River' – see now B 512.

⁴⁰ ROM CT 2, 48, cf. B 367, 73–5 (*contra*, B 512, 398–400); Diod. XVI.41.1.

⁴¹ Undated coins with the inscription 'Mazaeus who is over Beyond the River and Cilicia' (*mzdy zy 'l 'br nbr' whlk*); and coins bearing the name *mzdy* (Mazaeus), with no title, and the year numbers 16–21 (reign of Artaxerxes III) and 1–4 (reigns of Arses and Darius III). On these year numbers and the question whether Mazaeus held his double position until the advent of Alexander the Great, see B 490, 386–410 [230–54]. Arrian (III.8.6) states that at the battle of Gaugamela (331) Mazaeus commanded the Syrians from Coele-Syria and Mesopotamia in Darius' army.

view that it was the satrapy's capital. Less convincing are proposals to locate the capital in other cities, such as Tripolis in Phoenicia (following Diod. xvi.41.1–2) or Thapsacus in northern Syria (following Xen. *An.* 1.4.10–11).⁴²

Some information is forthcoming with regard to various functions of administration and government in the satrapy 'Beyond the River'. In the area of tax collection we have the terms 'the tribute of the province of Beyond the River' (Ezra 6:8) and 'the treasures of the province Beyond the River' (*ibid.* 7:21). The existence of military bodies charged with the maintenance of internal security in the satrapy follows from such references as 'the army of Samaria' (Neh. 3:34) and probably also the *dgl* 'bdny ('the "detachment" of 'Abdnany') in *mdynt* š[*mryn?*] ('the province of Sa[maria?]',) of which ten ass-drivers passed through Arad and obtained there fresh supplies (B 504 no. 12; cf. also no. 18). Further evidence of a well-established imperial system of transport and communications is provided by the dozens of records of barley supplied to horses, asses and camels, unearthed at Arad; and by the letter entrusted to Neḥtiḥur, official of Arsham (Arsames, satrap of Egypt at the end of the fifth century), addressed to the latter's officials in administrative centres from Arzuḥina, east of the Tigris, to Damascus, and ordering each of them to provide Neḥtiḥur, his companions and their pack-animals with food on their way 'from province to province' to Egypt (Driver, *AD* 6).

Evidence is lacking as to procedures – at the level of the satrap of 'Beyond the River' – for dealing with the disputes that broke out between the governors of provinces, such as Nehemiah's conflict with Sanballat and his companions. Nevertheless, there are indications – though from a period predating Nehemiah – that in matters of prime political significance, influential circles in the provinces would appeal directly to the king, who controlled satrapal affairs from a distance. Thus, during the years of tension in Palestine under Artaxerxes I – i.e., before Nehemiah's time – the reconstruction of the wall of Jerusalem was suspended (by the 'army of Samaria'?) after the letter of accusation from the 'adversaries of Judah and Benjamin' had elicited an explicit command to that effect from the king (Ezra 4:8–23). A passage in Diodorus (xv.41.5), though most probably rather exaggerated, provides largely reliable testimony as to the centralized nature of the regime of the Persian king, who limited his senior functionaries' authority to make on-the-spot decisions, and therefore exerted a paralysing influence (Diodorus is referring to the circumstances of Pharnabazus' abortive Egyptian campaign in 373): 'Indeed it is the usual custom for the Persian commanders, not being independent in the general conduct of war, to

⁴² On these proposals see B 486, 192; B 490, 310–11 [154–5].

refer all matters to the King and await his replies concerning every detail’.

The local political entities in the satrapy ‘Beyond the River’ may be divided into three main categories, according to their political and administrative status *vis-à-vis* the Persian authorities: the Phoenician city states, the provinces and the ‘Arabs’.


1. *Phoenician city states*

In the Persian period this category consisted of Tyre, Sidon, Byblos and Aradus. The political units in Phoenicia maintained their existence as vassal kingdoms throughout the periods of Assyrian, Babylonian and Persian rule, except for brief interludes due to revolts, followed by speedy revival. Whereas the Assyrian and Babylonian monarchs measured the importance of these cities in terms of economic factors – marine and land commerce – their status under the Persian imperial rule was determined for the most part by their possession of fleets of warships, on which the Persians were dependent in the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea.

Herodotus (III.19) relates that the Phoenicians willingly yielded to Persian domination (presumably, once Cyrus had gained control of ‘Beyond the River’) and that they were indispensable to the entire Persian army, never adapted for naval warfare. From the same passage we learn of the extent of the Phoenicians’ independence and the influence they wielded from the very beginning of the Persian period: Herodotus claims that they refused to co-operate with Cambyses in his plans to attack Carthage, thereby obliging the king to cancel his projected campaign. When Darius and Xerxes invaded Greece, the participation of the Phoenician fleets (of which the Sidonian one was pre-eminent) was of paramount importance, and they played a major role in Artaxerxes I’s military action against the Athenian fleets (Fig. 3).⁴³ True, on various occasions during the fifth century the Persians could also call on Cypriot and Egyptian fleets, but it should be remembered that Egypt and Cyprus rebelled more than once in the course of that period and even allied themselves with the Athenians, whose fleets had reached their shores. Under these circumstances, the Phoenicians were irreplaceable as a naval arm, of vital importance to the maintenance of Persian power and policy throughout the west of their empire.

The four Phoenician city states, therefore, enjoyed a unique political

⁴³ Under Darius I: Hdt. v. 108, 112, VI.6, 14; Thuc. I.16. Under Xerxes; Hdt. VII.89, 96, VIII.67; cf. also Thuc. I.100; Diod. XI.17.3, 18.1, 60.5, 62.3, 75.2, 77.1. Under Artaxerxes I: Thuc. I.110, 112; cf. Diod. XII.3.3, 27.4.



3. Phoenician trireme. Sealing from the treasury, Persepolis. Second quarter of the fifth century B.C. (After B 178, 30, pl. 2 (PT 4 704) and A 12, pl. 105.)

status, involving a considerable degree of independence within the Persian empire: they were ruled by local royal dynasties (the term ‘kings’ is used in the Phoenician inscriptions and in the works of the Greek historians),⁴⁴ and moreover we have no evidence that they were in any way answerable to the Persian authorities. From the mid-fifth century, they were permitted to strike their own silver coins, with Sidon preceding her sister cities by a few years.⁴⁵ Concerning the territorial reward accorded Eshmun‘azar II, king of Sidon, for his ‘important deeds’, see above, p. 144. Diodorus (xvi.41.1–2) makes mention of Tripolis, an association of three closely located townships, inhabited by natives of Aradus, Sidon and Tyre respectively,⁴⁶ in which the Phoenicians convened their councils to discuss crucial matters, and in which the Persian satraps and commanders (having arrived to negotiate with the Phoenicians?) lived (in the Sidonian quarter). He also refers to the ‘King’s Paradise’ in Phoenicia and to granaries for the use of the Persian cavalry (the grain stored therein was presumably intended for transport by both sea and land; thus, for example, Acre served as a base when the Persian army prepared for its sea and land campaign against Egypt in 373, Diod. xv.41.3).

The sources at our disposal provide no explicit information as to the Phoenician city states’ obligations towards the Persian authorities, over and above their placing of their fleets under the king’s command and, of course, their political allegiance to him.

⁴⁴ See, for example, *KAI* nos. 9–11, 13–16; Byblian coins of the fourth century (B476, 116–21); Hdt. viii.67 (cf. also vii.98); Arr. *Anab.* II.15.7, 20.1, 24.5. ⁴⁵ B 476.

⁴⁶ A similar description of Tripolis occurs in the *Periplus* of Pseudo-Scylax; see B 486, 191–2, 204.

2. *The provinces*

The provincial subunit of a satrapy was known in Aramaic and Hebrew as *mēdīnāh*, generally translated as ‘province’. The only provinces of ‘Beyond the River’ – these constituted the bulk of the area of the satrapy – mentioned in our literary and epigraphic sources are Judah and Samaria (the term ‘sons of Pahath-moab’, lit. ‘the governor of the province of Moab’, used in the lists in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah to designate a certain group of persons – see Ezra 2:6; 8:4; Neh. 3:11; etc. – refers apparently to some pre-Exilic title; it can hardly be invoked as proof for the existence of a province Moab in the Persian period). The conjectural existence of other provinces, such as Ammon and Idumaea, is based on the situation in the Hellenistic period, coupled with the assumption that the Hellenistic rulers in general adopted the administrative and territorial system that they found when they took over the country. Besides the names of the provinces *yhd* and *šmryn* (= Judah and Samaria) (Fig. 4), silver coins from the fourth century also display the names ʾšdd and ʿz (Ashdod and Gaza).⁴⁷ Permission to strike local coinage testifies to the economic and administrative standing of the two last-named cities; however, it seems preferable to await further finds for a more accurate determination of their official status.⁴⁸

The West Semitic designation of the ruler of a province is *peḥāb* (pl. *paḥōt*, *paḥawātā*), the same title as that of the governor of a satrapy (though the latter is also called, following the Old Persian *xšaçapāwan*, Akk. *lūaḥšadrapannu*, Hebr. *ʾaḥašdarpan*, Gr. *σατράπης*); compare, for example, ‘Tattenai, the governor of Beyond the River’ (Aram. *paḥatʿabar naharāb*) (Ezra 5:3); ‘Zerubbabel the son of Shealtiel governor of Judah’ (Hebr. *paḥat yeḥūdāb*) (Haggai 2:2); []*yhw bn [snʾ] blt pḥt šmr[n]*, []yahū son of [San]ballat, governor of Samaria’ (Wadi Daliyeh, Papyrus 5). Whereas the Assyrian empire reserved the title *lūpīḥātu/bēl pīḥāti* (Hebr. *peḥāb*) for provincial governors alone, Persian imperial terminology applies it not only to satraps but also to governors of provinces and apparently to even less senior officials.⁴⁹ A similar development may be observed in the title *lūšaknu*, specific during the Assyrian period to governors of provinces, which in time came to designate relatively low-level officers and officials; cf. ‘the prefects (Heb. *baššēgānīm*)’ in Neh. 5:7; 12:40; 13:11; and cf. the Aramaic title *sgnʾ* in the Wadi Daliyeh finds.

The taxes imposed on the subjects of a province were ‘tribute tax’

⁴⁷ B 493, 55–8.

⁴⁸ Similarly, we cannot accept the assumption that the naming of ‘Sanballat and Tobiah and the Arabs and the Ammonites and the Ashdodites’ in Neh. 4:1 indicates that each of these bodies enjoyed the status of a province (cf. below, pp. 161–4, on the ‘Arabs’); *contra*, B 471.

⁴⁹ Concerning the lexical and administrative problems raised by the Aramaic term *pḥwʾ*, and its relationship to the Akkadian and Hebrew terms discussed here, see B 472, 6 n. 5.



4. Coin of the province of Judah. Fourth century B.C. Obverse, falcon and inscription *yhd*; reverse, lily. (After B 510, no. 375.)

(Aram. *mindāh*/*middāh*, cf. *middat hammelek*, ‘the king’s tax’, Neh. 5:4), ‘poll tax’ (*beḥlō*) and ‘land tax’ (*halāk*), Ezra 4:13; 7:24 (cf. the Babylonian origin of these terms, *mandattu*/*maddattu*, *biltu*, and *ilku*), which were levied by the satrapal authorities (cf. ‘the tax of the province of Beyond the River’, Ezra 6:8); in addition, there were payments for the maintenance of each governor and his retinue (‘the governor’s food’, lit. bread, Neh. 5:14–19). Moreover, the people of the province were obliged to provide *corvée* labour. The roster of builders of the wall of Jerusalem under Nehemiah (Neh. 3) lists the teams responsible for specific sections of the wall, led by foremen whose titles refer to the names of major sites in Judah, such as ‘chief of the *pelek* [generally translated ‘district’] of Mizpah’, ‘chief of half the *pelek* of Beth-zur’. This roster has inspired various theories concerning the territorial and administrative subdivision of the province of Judah; however, it has recently been suggested that *pelek* should be interpreted not as a definite territorial term, but rather as a ‘task force’ (presumably organized on a territorial basis).⁵⁰

Some idea of the governor’s standing and the extent of his authority in the province may be gained from Nehemiah’s description of his activities in his memoirs. He was appointed by the king. By royal decree, he enjoyed the protection of ‘the governors of Beyond the River’ and was accompanied, on his way from Susa to Judah, by army officers and cavalry; ‘the keeper of the King’s Paradise’ was enjoined to provide him with timber for his building projects in Jerusalem (2:7–9). He organized task forces (*peḥlākīm*) to build the walls of Jerusalem. He populated the city by forcibly settling there a tenth of the inhabitants of the other Judaeon cities (7:4; 11:1–2; there are contemporary parallels for this method of settling a city by legislation (*synoikismos*) in Greek cities); the whole undertaking was presumably preceded by a census (cf. 7:5). At his disposal stood ‘servants’ (Hebr. *ne‘ārīm*), who executed his orders (4:10; 5:10, 15). He enacted regulations affecting major areas in the life of the

⁵⁰ B 482.


people of the province and its institutions: prohibition of trading on the Sabbath, divorce of foreign wives, organization of the Temple income and the priestly and levitical gifts, remission of debts and leaving fields fallow during the sabbatical year. These regulations were implemented partly by persuasion and partly by force, actions which caused clashes with influential circles in the Temple establishment and with the higher echelons in the hierarchy of 'Beyond the River'. Although some of these activities might possibly be attributed to Nehemiah's character and his personal characteristics, they clearly convey some information as to the far-reaching authority of the governor of Judah in his province.

Judging from the sum total of our information about the provinces of Judah and Samaria, from the time of Zerubbabel to that of Nehemiah and Ezra, we can assert that, in effect, they enjoyed a wide measure of autonomy as regards internal religious and social affairs. One guarantee of the implementation of this policy was the fact, already mentioned above, that the governors came from the local ethnic-national group – they were not foreign officials imposed upon the province by the imperial authorities.

That Persian rule in Palestine was on the decline is attested, to some extent, by the coins struck in the area dating from the beginning of the fourth century. Unlike the coins of the satrapy of Cilicia, adjoining 'Beyond the River', the local coins do not feature the satraps' names – only those of local figures: 'Yehizkiyah the governor' (*yh'zqyhb hphb*) and 'Yohanan the priest' (*ywhnm hkwbn*) in Judah, 'Jeroboam' (*yrb'm*) in Samaria.

Whereas Samaria certainly existed as a province from the time of Sargon II, king of Assyria (720), and after, and moreover we know certain details of its history, it is not explicitly known under what circumstances, and when, the province of Judah was constituted. The almost complete absence of sources for the history of Palestine under the Babylonians after the destruction of the Kingdom of Judah (586), and the fact that the event is not mentioned in our sources for the Restoration, have given rise to a theory that Judah was a sub-province of Samaria for over 140 years and did not become a self-contained administrative unit until Nehemiah's appointment and arrival in Palestine (445).⁵¹ However, this view, which has attained some prominence among scholars, should be rejected for several reasons. First, the title 'governor of Judah' is applied in the Bible to Sheshbazzar and Zerubbabel, at the very beginning of the Restoration (Ezra 5:14; Haggai 2:2; etc.). Second, bullae and seal-impressions have been found with inscriptions containing the name of the province, *yb(w)d* ('Judah'), dating from the end of the sixth century and the beginning of the fifth

⁵¹ B 470.



5. Seal impressions on jars from Ramat Rachel bearing the name of *yhd* (the province of Judah) and names of officials (governors?); c. fifth century B.C. (After B 510, 202 no. 332.)

(Fig. 5);⁵² third, there is no hint whatsoever in our source of Samaritan hegemony over Judah. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the theory in question is limited to Judah and Samaria alone. However, if one takes the other conquests of Nebuchadnezzar (and his successors?) in Palestine and Transjordan into consideration (for these had virtually annihilated all the remaining vassal kingdoms in the region) it is a logical assumption that, by the Babylonian period, the entire region (including Judah) had already been organized along the well-defined administrative lines that Cyrus and his successors were to inherit.

3. The ‘Arabs’⁵³

Subsumed under the general category of ‘Arabs’ in the sources for the Persian period are nomadic tribes and tribal alliances inhabiting the area between Egypt and the Euphrates. These did not constitute, in the period under consideration, a uniform political-administrative entity; as a result, any information we have concerning the status of the ‘Arabs’ in one district does not necessarily apply to ‘Arab’ groups in other districts.

Herodotus’ account reveals the presence of Arabs in the fifth century near the eastern border of Lower Egypt. Silver bowls bearing a votive inscription to the Arab goddess han-³Ilāt (cf. Ἀλιλάτ in Hdt. III.8), whose temple was unearthed at Tell el-Maskhuta – one of the bowls also specifies the name of the donor, *qynw br gšm mlk qdr* (‘Qainū son of Geshem, king of Kedar’)⁵⁴ – bear witness to Arab habitation at the approach to Wadi Tummulat. The Arabs’ presence there presumably enjoyed the sanction of the Persian authorities, who probably relied on their assistance to guard this important approach. The archaeological finds imply that the fall of han-³Ilāt’s temple at Tell el-Maskhuta was connected with the Persians’ loss of Egypt at the end of the fifth century. This evidence is, of course, to be added to our information as to the presence of Arabs throughout northern Sinai, in an area that had been frequented by nomads in previous times.

⁵² B 472; B 489; *contra*, B 510, 202–6, 237. ⁵³ See, in detail, B 483, especially 192–214.

⁵⁴ B 875.

Herodotus, in his description of the fifth satrapy, mentions the ‘Arab district’ to its south, which was not included in the satrapy and was exempt from taxes (III.91). This territory stretched the length of the coastal strip from Gaza to Ienysus (Khan Yūnis?), and the emporia on its coast belonged to the king of the Arabs (III.5). According to Herodotus, the Arabs in this district were regarded as ‘friends’ (ξείνοι), rather than subject peoples like the other inhabitants of the satrapy.

The wide expanses of the Arabs’ domains in southern Palestine and northern Sinai possessed immense strategic and economic importance in the context of the Persian empire: they constituted a vital element in the control of Egypt and also a terminal for Arabian trade. Herodotus’ story of aid rendered Cambyses by the king of the Arabs, who supplied water to the Persian army on its way to Egypt (525), and the remark that ‘without this service the (Persian) invasion of Egypt would have been impracticable’ (III.4–9; 88) illustrate a geopolitical fact that remained valid as long as the Persians ruled Egypt. It would seem, then, that the Persian authorities, in granting the local Arabs various benefits, including exemption from the *φόρος* tax (which was imposed on the entire population of the empire, except for the Persians themselves) and the status of ‘friends’, were motivated by their dependence on these Arabs’ good will. On the other hand, after his reference to the Arabs’ exemption from taxes, Herodotus adds that they brought ‘gifts’ (δῶρα) to the royal treasury, to the tune of one thousand talents of frankincense every year. As these ‘gifts’ were fixed in quantity and due by a certain time, they hardly accord with Herodotus’ implication that the Arabs were receiving preferential treatment. We should rather see them as some kind of fixed tax, differing from the *φόρος* in its mode of collection. Most probably, in view of the difficulty of supervising the well-developed western branch of the spice trade from Arabia, through the Negeb to the Mediterranean coast, the Persian authorities preferred to grant control of all the emporia along the coast, from Gaza to Ienysus, to the ‘king of Arabs’, and also entrusted him with collection of the customs duty for spices. In return, they would receive from him fixed (and large) amounts of frankincense every year. It is this customs duty, delivered by the ‘king of the Arabs’ to the Persian royal treasury, that Herodotus calls ‘gifts’.

Our sources do not specify the exact identity of the ‘Arab mercenaries’ who fought under Batis, commander of Gaza during its stand against Alexander, or of the ‘neighbouring tribesmen’ who were settled in that city after it had fallen to the Macedonian king (332). Judging from Plutarch’s figures for the tremendous quantities of myrrh and frankincense that Alexander seized in Gaza (*Alex.* xxv.4–5), the city must have been quite prominent as a centre for the spice trade at the close of the Persian period. It may be surmised that the identity of these Arabs, and

their interests, resembled those described by Herodotus, who is referring to the situation over 150 years before.

There are no written records of the history of Transjordan from Nebuchadrezzar's war against Ammon and Moab (582) to the beginning of the Hellenistic period. The fact that we have no evidence for the continued existence of Edom and Moab as well-defined states after Nebuchadrezzar, and the striking decline of material culture in southern Transjordan in the second half of the sixth century, support the view that the region was then being ravaged by groups of 'People of the East' infiltrating its breached borders (cf. Ezek. 25). The next few generations were to witness a gradual intermingling of the local inhabitants and the Arabs, with the latter accounting for an ever-increasing proportion of the population – a process whose details are unknown. At the beginning of the Persian period the region was still viewed as part of the empire, by virtue of Cyrus' victory over Nabonidus (who was residing in Teima, northern Arabia, till shortly before the fall of his empire). Testimony to Persian rule in northern Arabia comes from an inscription discovered north of the oasis of el-^cUlā (Dedan), which lists the names of 'Gashm b. Shahr and ^cAbd the governor of Dedan (*šht ddn*)'.⁵⁵ When we again hear of southern Transjordan, in the early days of the Hellenistic period, we are struck by the fact that this region – and *a fortiori* northern Arabia – was not included in the empire created by Alexander and his successors. The precise circumstances under which the Persians withdrew from these areas are unknown. In general terms, they may well be linked with Egypt's throwing off of the Persian yoke and with the anti-Persian activity in Palestine and Phoenicia after the death of Darius II; a major contribution came from the internal strife that weakened the central government's control and finally caused the Persian empire to crumble. The northern border of the region that slipped from Persian hands may be inferred from the extent of Ptolemaic rule in Transjordan. Roughly speaking, it ran north of the Brook of Arnon (Wadi el-Mujib), while the cleruchy of 'the Land of Tobiah', known from the Zenon Papyri, was settled by soldiers who held the boundary against desert nomads. During that period, the region to the south was inhabited by the Nabataean Arabs, who were not subjugated until the Roman period.

The book of Nehemiah reckons the Arabs among the 'adversaries of Judah', who attempted to interfere with the rebuilding of Jerusalem's walls in the middle of the fifth century (4:1ff), and Geshem the Arab is mentioned as one of Nehemiah's three opponents, together with Sanballat the Horonite and Tobiah 'the servant, the Ammonite' (2:19;

⁵⁵ B 487A, 524–5. The date formula of the inscription *KAI 228 from Teima* is problematic (see B 501, 57 n. 157), and it is doubtful whether one can make any inference from it about Persian rule in northern Arabia.

6:1–2, 6). Extra-Biblical sources reveal that Sanballat was the governor of Samaria, and it would seem that Tobiah was a high-placed officer in Transjordan. Hence there are good grounds for the conjecture that Geshem the Arab also ranked high in the Persian administrative hierarchy. The determination of his position depends largely on how one defines the demography and administrative status of the region south of Judah, which came under Geshem's sphere of influence (or government). As stated previously, it follows from the proper names in the Beersheba and Arad ostraca that much of the population living south of Judah in the fourth century was Edomite-Arab. As to the administrative status of the region, Diodorus (xix.95.2), referring to the year 312, defines it as an eparchy called Idumaea. However, we do not know if its definition as a province dates back to the Persian period.

While the rivalry between Sanballat and Tobiah, on the one hand, and Nehemiah, on the other, may be explained on the basis of the latter's isolationist religious policy, we have no hint whatever of Geshem's interest in Jerusalem and its Temple. There is, therefore, a growing tendency among scholars to see the friction between Geshem and Nehemiah as rooted in economic and administrative factors, and thus as related not to internal developments in Judah but rather to the commercial activities of the Arabs. According to this economic approach, Geshem's realm need not necessarily have been adjacent to the province of Judah; one can even locate him at a distance from Palestine as a whole, assuming merely that he had certain interests in southern Palestine, such as the far-flung trade from northern Arabia, which might have been adversely affected by an overly strong Judah. It is this approach that justifies the identification of Geshem the Arab with the father of Qainū son of Geshem, king of Kedar, whose name appears on a silver bowl from Tell el-Maskhuta (above, pp. 148, 161); or even with Geshem son of Shahr, mentioned together with 'Abd the governor of Dedan in the inscription from the region of el-'Ulā (above, p. 163). However, although, as we have implied, the prominent economic standing of the Arabs in southern Palestine, northern Sinai and northern Arabia is an incontrovertible fact, one should note that the title 'king of Kedar' does not appear together with 'governor of Dedan' in the above inscription; it is also worth remembering that 'Geshem' is a not uncommon name in ancient Arab inscriptions. Under these circumstances one can state, in sum, that although the proposed identifications are chronologically possible, they cannot be confirmed without further proof.

CHAPTER 3c

CENTRAL ASIA AND EASTERN IRAN

HENRI-PAUL FRANCFORT

I. CENTRAL ASIA ON THE EVE OF THE ACHAEMENID CONQUEST

1. *Geographical survey*

Central Asia consists of three hydrographic basins, namely the Aral Sea to the north, Lake Hamun to the south of the Hindu Kush, and the Lob Nor and Tarim east of the Pamirs. To the first belong the great rivers Syr Darya (Jaxartes) and Amu Darya (Oxus) and the important tributaries of the latter whose waters sometimes run to waste before they join the main stream. The Helmand and the Farah Rud, with their tributaries, belong to the second basin; the Atrak and the area of the Caspian belong to a separate system. The territory is bounded by the Mongol, south Siberian and Kazakh steppes, the Caspian Sea, the desert of Seistan, the Indus basin, the Pamirs and the Himalayas, and the part relevant to the Achaemenids is situated between 55° and 75° longitude east and between 30° and 45° latitude north.

This area can best be divided into a highland and a lowland zone. The mountains include the Hindu Kush, the Pamirs, the Alai, Tian Shan, Altai and their foothills, while the lowlands stretch out along the banks of the Amu Darya and in Seistan, in Xinjiang, Djungaria, Tuva and Mongolia.

Within the highland zone, we must distinguish, because of their different natural resources, between the valleys on one hand and the mountains and plateaux on the other. The high, cool, plateaux provide pasture, means of communication and mineral resources; irrigation in the valleys results in a stable and dense population. In the lowlands, in spite of semi-arid conditions, large-scale irrigation in the broad valleys, deltas and foothills leads to the creation of extensive oases which can support a high density of population over a wide area. Beyond the irrigated zones, the steppes offer the possibility of a little dry farming and of immense areas of grazing. Although this is necessarily a broad outline, it enables us to situate the different satrapies.¹

NB: References to sources and materials are very selective and drawn from recent publications which themselves contain numerous references; preference has been given to works written in a western European language.

¹ B 44, 191–6.



Map 6. Central Asia.

The highland and steppe zone to the north included the territory of the Sogdians (Curtius VII.10.1–3), the Saka *baumavarga* and the Saka *tigrakbauda*. The lowland oases were the territory of the Chorasmians, Bactrians (Curtius VII.4.26–30), Arians, Drangians, Arachosians, Parthians and Hyrcanians. The Sattagydiens, Gandarans and Indians inhabited the boundaries of the sub-continent, while the Gedrosians and Carmanians lived on the coast of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Central Asia north of the Syr Darya (Jaxartes) and east of the Pamir, peopled by Saka and Saka-related tribes, remained outside the administrative divisions of the Achaemenid empire.

2. *The historical background and the Achaemenid period*

In order to establish the historical background, we must rely on written sources and on archaeological evidence, still far from full and incompletely studied.² The written sources are both Greek and Iranian (the Avesta). There are references to Central Asia in the Avestan literature, and in the *Mihr Yasht* (13–14) we read:

The whole land was inhabited by Iranians where gallant rulers organize many attacks, where high, sheltering mountains with ample pasture provide, solicitous for cattle; where deep lakes stand with surging waves; where navigable rivers rush wide with a swell towards Parutian Iškata, Haraivian Margu, Sogdian Gava, and Chorasmia.³

According to the first chapter of the *Videvdat*, the country of the Aryans included Aryanem Vaejah, Sughda, Mouru, Bakhdhi, Haroiva, Harakhvaiti, Haetumant.⁴ Generally Parutian Iškata is identified as part of the Hindu Kush and then, to follow the order of the *Videvdat*, Eran Vež would be Chorasmia (rather than Seistan),⁵ followed by Sogdiana, Margiana, Bactria, Aria, Arachosia and the Helmand. Furthermore, according to other texts, ‘the river Dâtyä (Oxus) comes from Eran Vež (Chorasmia) and goes to Subdastan (Sogdiana)’⁶ and ‘the land of Gopat (Sogdiana) has a common border with Eran Vež on the banks of the river Dâtyä.’⁷ These fragments seem to go back to a period when, in the early years of the first millennium, Chorasmia was culturally important and may have harboured the beginnings of Zoroastrianism.⁸ Later (eighth to sixth centuries?), when Bactria had become the dominant political power, it also claimed to have been the cradle of Zoroastrianism and the

² See B 561; B 535; B 68, 45–63. ³ Tr. Gershevitch (B 68A, 80–1). ⁴ B 8.

⁵ B 563–4; B 617; B 75A; B 565. ⁶ B 8; G.Bd., 87.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Dad. i Den. 89. ⁸ B 19, I 275, II 278.

Bactrians maintained that Kavi Vishtaspa, the prophet's protector, had been one of their early kings.⁹

The Greek historians, Ctesias and, above all, Xenophon, also knew of a powerful Bactrian kingdom. According to them, this kingdom entertained relations with Assyria and Media. The Assyrian king Ninos, the husband of Semiramis, is said to have led an expedition to Bactria with a vast army, which at first met with defeat in mountainous terrain.¹⁰ Later, the Bactrian king, Oxyartes, was besieged in Bactra, which Semiramis carried by assault. Bactria was rich and well populated, and Ninos captured the Bactrian treasury which consisted of large quantities of gold and silver (Ctesias, *FGrH* 688 F 1.5–7; Just. *Epit.* 1.1–2; Arr. *Anab.* vi.24). According to Xenophon (*Cyr.* 1.5.2, v.1.3), there were Assyrian expeditions in the time of Cyaxares and, under his successor Astyages, the Assyrians sent embassies to the king of Bactria. The Bactrians sided with the Medes against the Assyrians and took part in the capture of Nineveh (Diod. II.26.1–2). Finally, Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 9.2) tells us that the Bactrians submitted to Cyrus only because they considered him Astyages' rightful heir.

From these half-legendary fragments we can nevertheless deduce that during the first half of the first millennium a Bactrian 'kingdom' may have been one of the political powers of which the Assyrians and Medes had some knowledge.¹¹ The Achaemenids, therefore, were not venturing into unknown and virgin territories when they set out to conquer Central Asia. Diodorus' account (II.6–7, following Ctesias) of the campaigns of Ninos and Semiramis implies that the Bactrian kingdom was well known for its numerous and warlike population, for its cities, fortresses and riches.

This view of the situation is not confuted by archaeology, although it is not always easy to define the characteristics of the culture which immediately preceded the Achaemenids.¹² Achaemenid culture in Central Asia is rooted in a distinctive local tradition and differs markedly from what we find in Persia.¹³ The Achaemenids did not found Bactra, they did not invent irrigation, they did not create the civilization of Central Asia, but they coveted its riches when their time came. When they moved into Central Asia, it was not to raid and pillage, in the old Assyrian way, nor to colonize, after the Greek fashion, nor was it an invasion in the Kushan manner. We shall now consider the form which the Achaemenid incursion did in fact take.

⁹ References in B 108, 186–8; Yt. 5.109, 112f; 9.29f; 13.101; 17.49f; 18.87; (Justin, *Epit.* v.1; Zoroaster king of Bactria). ¹⁰ See B 144; B 604. ¹¹ B 24, 13–43.

¹² B 611 on Bactria; B 597 on Turkmenistan. ¹³ B 541; B 588.

II. THE ACHAEMENID CONQUEST, ORGANIZATION,
ADMINISTRATION AND EXPLOITATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

1. *The conquest of Central Asia by Cyrus II*

Some authorities have dated this conquest to between 547 and 540 on the basis of a passage in Herodotus (I.178), which states that, when he conquered Babylon in 539, Cyrus had already brought 'into subjection every nation without exception' and this must therefore have included Central Asia.¹⁴ There are two major drawbacks to this earlier date: first, this would mean that Cyrus had to undertake two major campaigns against Central Asia, one before and one after the capture of Babylon; secondly, this contradicts another passage by Herodotus himself. In this other passage (I.153), the 'Father of History' states that Babylon, the Bactrians, the Sacae and the Egyptians were on Cyrus' route. Here the order in which the regions are listed seems to conform to the sequence of Achaemenid conquests: Babylon (539), Bactria, Saka (530 and death of Cyrus), Egypt (Cambyses, 525). For this reason we would favour putting Cyrus' expedition into Central Asia between 539 and 530 B.C.

The whole of Central Asia was not won by conquest, however; between 550 and 547 the remnants of the Median empire fell into the hands of Cyrus. In this way, after the defeat of Astyages, 'when the rule of the East passed from the Medes to the Persians', Parthia came into the victor's possession (Just. *Epit.* xli.1.4). According to Xenophon (*Cyr.* I.1.4), Hyrcania transferred its allegiance voluntarily. The historians of antiquity make no mention of Aria, but control of this region was an essential preliminary to any conquest, whether to the north or to the south of the Hindu Kush.

South of the Hindu Kush, it is the later authors, Arrian and Pliny, who give us some glimpse of Cyrus' movements. The former tells us (*Anab.* III.27.4-5; cf. Curt. VII.3.2) that in the land of the Zarangians (Drangiana) Alexander came across a people named the Ariaspae, also known as the Euergetai ('benefactors') as a result of the help they had given Cyrus in his expedition against the Scythians. The latter (*NH* VI.92) refers to Cyrus as capturing Capisa, a city of Capisene or Arachosia; according to legend, in so doing he was yet again following in the footsteps of Semiramis who also came to Arachosia (cf. Steph. Byz. s.vv. 'Αραχωσία, Θύαμυς).

North of the Hindu Kush, Bactria, as we have seen, was said to have been a monarchy at the time Cyrus gained control of it. We do not know what became of this kingdom, but Ctesias tells us that the Bactrians and

¹⁴ On the conquest see B 155, 48-9, with references to the relevant ancient sources; B 144, 51-73.

the Persians fought an indecisive battle and the Bactrians, seeing in Cyrus the heir to Astyages, rallied to him of their own accord (cf. above, p. 169). These brief references may perhaps reveal an earlier political situation in which a Bactrian kingdom was linked by a system of political alliances or allegiances with the Assyrians and the Medes; from the moment they rallied to Cyrus, however, the province of Bactria was part of the Persian empire and was governed by satraps. Margiana was incorporated into the empire at the same time and is always referred to as a dependency of Bactria.¹⁵ In Sogdiana Cyrus founded the city of Cyropolis on the Jaxartes (also Cyreschata = *Kuruškatha, present-day Leninabad¹⁶), together with seven fortresses for the defence of the northern frontier against the nomadic Saka (Strab. xi. 1.1.4; Arr. *Anab.* iv. 3. 1; three cities in Just. *Epit.* xii. 5). Chorasmia appears in the list of provinces entrusted to his younger son (Ctesias, *FGrH* 688 F 9.8). After he had conquered Bactria, he subdued the Amyrgians.

The Saka *haumavarga*, as they are called in Old Persian inscriptions, or Amyrgian Saka (Hdt. vii.64.2), joined the Achaemenids after their king (Amorges according to Ctesias) had been captured by Cyrus and then released thanks to the intervention of his wife Spharetra (*FGrH* 688 F 9.3). Some authorities believe that the Saka lived in an area not far from the north west of India, in the mountains near present-day Afghanistan, towards Badakhshan and the Pamirs.¹⁷ Ctesias (F 9.7–8) tells us that 20,000 Saka *haumavarga* cavalry joined Cyrus on the expedition against the Derbikes which was to cost him his life. The Derbikes and their Indian allies used elephants in the battle and were defeated, but Cyrus was mortally wounded by a spear. He lingered for three days during which he organized his empire and appointed a satrap, Spitaces son of Sisamas, over the Derbikes who thereupon disappear from the history of this area. According to Berossus (*FGrH* 680 F 10), Cyrus was killed in the valley of Daas (Dahae?), while Herodotus (i.204–14) tells us that he met his end when he was fighting the Massagetae of Queen Tomyris, after crossing the Araxes (= Amu Darya?); 200,000 Persian soldiers died with him and he was beheaded. It is difficult here to separate fact from fiction, and we shall therefore abstain from opting for one version of Cyrus' death in preference to another.¹⁸

Three points emerge from the little we know of Cyrus' conquest, the importance of the Median heritage, the political strength of Bactria, and the warlike potential of the Saka in the north-east corner of the empire. These last two points will remain valid throughout the political history of Central Asia.

¹⁵ The Bisitun inscription, paras. 38–9, provides the earliest evidence.

¹⁶ B 529; B 599.

¹⁷ B 590, 156–74. ¹⁸ B 557.

2. *Cambyses and the accession of Darius I: the revolts of 522–521*

Cambyses devoted the greater part of his reign to the conquest of Egypt, and only once do his actions have any bearing on the history of Central Asia. This is when he assassinated his brother Bardiya (see above, p. 53) who, since the death of Cyrus, had been governor (*despotes*) of the Bactrians and their country, of the Chorasmians, Parthians and Carmanians,¹⁹ or, alternatively, of the Medes, Armenians and Cadusii.²⁰ After Darius came to the throne in September 522, some of the series of risings which faced him took place in Central Asia: in Parthia, Margiana, Sattagydia and Scythia (DB para. 21).

In Parthia and Hyrcania, the revolt was crushed by the satrap Hystaspes, father of Darius, in the battles of Vishpauzatish (8 March 521) and Patigrabana (12 July 521) (DB paras. 35–6). In Margiana, a certain Frada was proclaimed king, but was overthrown by Darius' satrap in Bactria, the Persian Dadarshish, in a battle on 10 December 522. 55,000 Margians were killed, and 8,500 captured; 'this was what was done by me in Bactria' concluded Darius (DB paras. 38–9).²¹ Meanwhile, the satrap of Arachosia, Vivana, inflicted a series of defeats on the Persian Vahyazdata, calling himself Bardiya, one of which, at Kapishakanish in March 521, was decisive (DB para. 45). Many historians have attempted to elucidate the reasons for these revolts, behind the Achaemenid royal propaganda which is given full rein in the Bisitun inscription. A possible reason lies in the dynastic struggles between the senior and the cadet branches of the Achaemenids, but, on a political and social level, we cannot rule out the part played by anti-Persian and, perhaps, anti-aristocratic feelings among some subjugated peoples.²² Some have used the huge number of 55,000 Margian dead as evidence of a popular revolt.²³ This point remains obscure; what is clear is that Bactria fulfilled a 'policing' role for Darius and brought Margiana back to its traditional state of dependence. South of the Hindu Kush, Arachosia, under its satrap Vivana, was also a stronghold for Darius, but it is possible that the fighting there involved only Persian troops.

3. *The stabilization of Central Asia under Darius I and Xerxes I (520–465)*

The final round of Achaemenid conquests in Central Asia was accompanied by a more efficient organization of the empire. These conquests involved Saka territory and the Indus Valley. Darius'

¹⁹ B 621, 26, interpreting Ctesias F 9.8.

²⁰ B 155, 92, following Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.7.11.

²¹ The figures are from the Babylonian version. The Aramaic version (B 78, 34–5) has [5]5,24[3] killed, 6,972 prisoners. ²² B 49. ²³ B 49, 207 n. 937.

campaign against the Saka took place in 519;²⁴ an account of it is given in the Bisitun inscription (DB para. 74, only in the OP version) and by Polyænus (*Strat.* VII.11.6).²⁵ Darius attacked the Saka *tigrakhauda* (“pointed-hat Scythians”), who lived around the Aral Sea, and made his army cross the Amu Darya on a bridge. Skunkha, the Saka chief, was captured, and Darius appointed another chief to lead the tribe. Thenceforth, these Saka *tigrakhauda* appear in Achaemenid inscriptions.²⁶ On the other hand, the Saka (*tyai*) *paradraya* (Saka beyond the sea) who are mentioned in some inscriptions (e.g. DNa 28–9, A?P 24) cannot be precisely located within the great Eurasian steppe which lies to the north of the Caspian and the Aral.²⁷ The Dahas of Xerxes’ ‘Daiva’ inscription (XPh) are perhaps to be situated to the north of Hyrcania where the Dahas mentioned by more recent writers are later to be found; the name may also be an alternative term for the Saka *paradraya*.²⁸ The Saka *para Sugdam* appear only in two inscriptions of Darius (DPh; DH) and their proposed location in Ferghana or east of the Pamir is not certain.²⁹ Expansion in the Indus basin is discussed in the next section (below, pp. 201–5).

Side by side with conquest and exploration (see above, p. 98) went the reorganization of the empire along more efficient lines, which confirmed the original role of Bactria as the mainstay of the empire in Central Asia.³⁰

An Irdabanuš is apparently satrap of Bactria in 500/499 (PF 1287, 1555).³¹ In a late version of Xerxes’ accession (Plut. *Mor.* 173B, but see 488D) the rival claimant Ariamenes is said to come from Bactria.³² In the campaign of 480 Xerxes’ army included a contingent of Bactrians and Amyrgians under the command of his full brother Hystaspes (Hdt. VII.64). Another brother, Masistes, whom he gravely offended,

went to Bactria with his sons and others to secure the revolt of the province and do the king great harm. And in this, I think, he would have succeeded, had he reached the Bactrians and Saka; for he was beloved by them and was governor (*hyparchos*) of the Bactrians.

But Xerxes had him assassinated on the way (Hdt. IX.113). Finally, after the death of Xerxes in 465, Artaxerxes I was obliged to quell a Bactrian rising. After one indecisive battle, the Bactrians were defeated because the wind blew dust in their faces (Ctesias F 14.35). According to Ctesias their general was called Artabanus, a name which occurs in the royal

²⁴ B 155; B 49, 130. Other datings, e.g. 517 (B 620), rest on outdated readings of DB.

²⁵ According to B 41, against the Scythians of Europe, the same expedition as that of Hdt. IV.83ff; this new interpretation discussed by B 88. ²⁶ See B 104; B 44, 239 n. 8; B 145.

²⁷ See B 590, 160–1, B 181; cf. B 234, discussed by B 41, 85–6. They are possibly in Europe: B 547, 97–8. ²⁸ B 595, 143–5. ²⁹ B 590, 169–70. ³⁰ Cf. B 578, 89 n. 1, 93.

³¹ A 35, 19 n. 96. ³² B 155, 231–2.

family, and probably the same name as that of the satrap of 500/499; Diodorus (XI.69.2), who does not have the revolt, makes Hystaspes son of Xerxes satrap of Bactria at the time.³³

It seems, therefore, that Bactria, as the political mainstay of the Achaemenids in Central Asia, was frequently the apauage of princes of the blood. This was, however, a policy which cut both ways, since the Bactrians were always willing to give armed support to the claims to the throne of their satrap who was, to some extent, their 'suzerain'. Nevertheless, the Achaemenid rulers found this policy successful since their younger brothers could find an outlet for their frustrations and the whole of Central Asia remained within the same administrative framework – a framework which we can define best during the reigns of Darius and Xerxes.

In a reconstruction of Achaemenid administrative geography, our principal sources are Achaemenid cuneiform and hieroglyphic inscriptions and the lists of Herodotus. In Table 3 the order of the columns is that of the Bisitun inscription. From this table, the principal fact to emerge is the great stability of the empire and its provinces, once Darius had added India, the Saka *tigrakhandā* and, briefly, the Saka *paradrāya* and *para Sugdam* to what he had inherited from Cyrus. The omission of Arachosia from Herodotus' lists and the absence of the Sattagydiāns from Xerxes' army should not be construed as a defection of these provinces from the empire, but merely as a lack of accuracy on Herodotus' part or in the information at his disposal, leading to the omission of a word or perhaps its replacement by the Sagartians, Thamanāeans, Utians and Paricanians whose exact location is in doubt.³⁴ The absence of Gandara in the list on Darius' statue may mean that it was included with India or Sattagydiā.³⁵ The provinces of the empire, corresponding as they did to entities of population,³⁶ remained remarkably stable, and this provides the justification for studying the economic role of Central Asia in the Achaemenid empire as a whole, regardless of chronological evolution.

4. *The part played by Central Asia in the Achaemenid empire*

The Achaemenids made Central Asia one of the bastions of their power. For this purpose, they called on the human and material resources of these regions which could be exploited thanks to an excellent level of communications.

³³ B 155, 290; A 35, 19 n. 96.

³⁴ These controversial problems relating to historical geography have been discussed by B 553; B 546; B 602; B 95; B 530; B 603; B 590, 156–74; B 22, 185–90.

³⁵ See the discussion in B 167. ³⁶ B 40.

The men of Central Asia were recruited by the Great King as soldiers and as workmen. The Persepolis Fortification Tablets mention Bactrian workmen (perhaps used for irrigation works) receiving flour from Darius' administration (PF 1947:59–63) and rations given to Sogdians (PF 1118, 1132, 1175, 1629). Darius also enrolled Saka into his army and, at the battle of Marathon, these soldiers, together with the Persians, broke through the Athenian centre (Hdt. vi.113). After this campaign had ended in failure, Darius ordered recruitment on a vast scale throughout the empire and this was completed by Xerxes (Hdt. vii.61–99). The huge army set out with its infantry contingents of Bactrians, Amyrgian Saka, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarans, Dadicae, Caspians, Sarangians, Pactyans, Utians, Mycians and Paricanians. Sagartians, Bactrians, Caspians and Paricanians also served in the cavalry, while Saka were used as marines in the navy. Saka, Bactrians and Indians are particularly mentioned among the troops left in Greece with Mardonius in winter 480/79 (Hdt. viii.113). It is probable that Central Asia was not particularly affected by the heavy military, particularly naval, losses of 480–479 and that most of the soldiers returned peacefully to their homes. Special levies like this and the few garrison troops here and there in the empire, for instance, Saka at Deve Hüyük in Syria,³⁷ and in various other theatres of operation,³⁸ did not seriously affect the man-power of Central Asia. On the other hand, the exploitation of natural resources for the profit of the Achaemenids weighed much more heavily on the inhabitants of the eastern satrapies.

At first, under Darius, taxes seem to have been paid in kind, but this impression may be due to our lack of information about actual tribute as opposed to the symbolic tribute, such as the participation of all the nations in the building of the palace at Susa or at the 'New Year Festival' at Persepolis. Later, under Xerxes, contributions are in precious metals, perhaps because we are now dealing with actual tribute. It is difficult to interpret this difference in economic terms, as marking the progress of a monetary economy.³⁹ However this may be, these taxes show that the Achaemenid exchequer was well aware of the resources of Central Asia.

Taxes in kind are listed in the foundation documents of the palace at Susa (DSf, DSz),⁴⁰ and are depicted on the reliefs of the Apadana at Persepolis; for the identification in these we shall adhere to the most widely held views.⁴¹ The Bactrians (Delegation XIII) brought gold,

³⁷ B 588, 204; B 496 (north Iranians according to him); B 547.

³⁸ B 543, 197: Persepolis, Gordium, Al Mina, Carchemish, Marathon. Dargman the Chorasmian stationed at Elephantine; Cowley, *AP* 6. Military colonists from Central Asia in Babylonia: B 547, 95–105; in Asia Minor: B 537, 89–96.

³⁹ B 34, 2–4, exaggerating the sharpness of the change to silver in Persepolis' texts; see B 81.

⁴⁰ B 207. ⁴¹ B 214; B 101, 95–113; discussion of the identifications by B 140.

Table 3. *The Central Asian provinces: evidence and identifications*

	Darius (522–486 B.C.)			Xerxes I (486–465 B.C.)		Artaxerxes I (465–423 B.C.)
DBI Bisitun	DPe Persepolis	DNa Naqsh-i Rostam	Statue of Darius at Susa	XPh Xerxes	(Hdt. vii.64f) Army of Xerxes	(Hdt. iii.221f) Herodotus' list of tributaries
Marguš <i>Μαργιανή</i>	—	—	—	—	—	—
El'ken-Tepe (?) Parthava <i>Παρθία</i>	Parthia	Parthia	x	Parthia	Parthians	Parthians
Dahan-i Ghulaman (?) Zranka <i>Δραγγιανή</i>	Drangiana	Drangiana	x	Drangiana	Sarangians	Sarangians
Herat (?) Haraiva <i>Ἁραεία</i>	Aria	Aria	x	Aria	Arians	Arians

Kalaly-Gyr (?) Uvarazmiš Χωρασμίη	Chorasmia	Chorasmia	x	Chorasmia	Chorasmians	Chorasmians
Balkh (?) Bakhtriš Βακτριανή	Bactria	Bactria	x	Bactria	Bactrians	Bactrians (as far as as the Aegli)
Afrasiab (?) Suguda Σογδιανή	Sogdiana	Sogdiana	x	Sogdiana	Sogdians	Sogdians
Saka	Saka <i>para Sugdam</i> (DPh 6) Saka	Roshan (?) Saka <i>baumavarga</i> (DNa etc) Saka <i>tigrakhauda</i> (DNa etc) Čirik Rabat (?) Saka <i>paradraya</i> (DNa)	Saka of the marshlands and plains	Saka <i>baumavarga</i> Saka <i>tigrakhauda</i>	Amyrgian Scythians	Sacae (+ Caspians) Orthocorybantes (?)
Thataguš (?) Σατταγυδία	Sattagydia	Sattagydia	x	Sattagydia	—	—
Kandahar (?) Harauvatis Ἀραχωσία	Arachosia	Arachosia	x	Arachosia	—	—

camels, metal vessels wrought by goldsmiths; the Sogdians (Delegation xvii) lapis lazuli, carnelian, daggers, bracelets ornamented with protomes, axes and horses; the Saka (Delegation xi) horses, bracelets ornamented with protomes, three-piece garments (trousers, tunic and coat); the Chorasmians turquoise (DSf); the Arachosians (Delegation vii?) stone mortars and pestles,⁴² ivory, vessels, camels, feline skins; the Arians (Delegation iv) the same; the Parthians (Delegation xv) vessels and camels. This list enables us to gain some impression of the huge accumulation of riches which filled the Achaemenid treasuries.⁴³

Taxes in precious metals (silver talents) are also eloquent testimony, and are sometimes supplemented by donations in kind. Herodotus' list (iii, 90–6) dates from the reign of Artaxerxes I. Bactria alone brought 360 talents; the Sattagydiens, Gandarans, Dadicae and Aparytae 170 talents; the Sagartians, Thamanaeans, Utians and Mycians 600 talents; the Paricanians and the Ethiopians of Asia 400 talents; the Saka and the Caspians 250 talents; the Indians 360 talents of gold dust (see below, p. 204); the Paricanians and Orthocorybantens (together with Ecbatana and Media) 450 talents. In spite of these surprisingly large figures, such as 600 talents from the present Seistan, and in spite of the appearance of Paricanians in two different parts of the text, it seems very likely that Herodotus drew his information from an official Persian fiscal document.⁴⁴ We must therefore give some credence to this list and can thus obtain some idea of the huge scale of Achaemenid exploitation which produced 2,530 talents of silver from the eastern satrapies.

A good network of communications was an essential prerequisite for draining these resources. The countries 'paid me tribute. What I commanded, whether by night or day, this they did,' proclaimed Darius on the rock inscription at Bisitun (DB para. 7). Thanks to the roads and the secretariat, riches travelled to the treasuries at Susa and Persepolis, and men marched to battle.

Details 'from Ephesus to Bactria and India: the number of stages, days and parasangs' were given in a lost fragment of Ctesias (FGrH 688 F 33). The Avesta (Yt. 10,15) praises the roads and bridges of the land of the Aryans; the Greeks admired the Great King's postal system (*angareion*) (Xen. *Cyr.* viii.6.17). Bactria and India, which marked the end of the great royal road to north and south of the Hindu Kush, are referred to on the Persepolis tablets. Travellers carried sealed documents from Bactra to Susa (PF 1555), from Susa to Gandara (PF 1440, 1450), from Arachosia to Susa (PF 1351, 1439, 1953:34), from Arachosia to the king (PF 1443, 1474, 1484), from the king to Arachosia (PF 1510) and to Aria

⁴² B 18, B 12, discussed by B 51. See also above, p. 85 n. 63.

⁴³ On these treasuries, see B 21, 48–98; B 22, 204–26.

⁴⁴ *Contra*, B 1, 127–37, holding that Herodotus worked from the map of Hecataeus of Miletus.

(PF 1361, 1540). Royal officials gave them rations for the journey, and some travelled with their guides or a large escort (588 men and 100 mules from Aria to Susa; PF 2056; see below, p. 205).

Military contingents, riches and information travelled rapidly towards the capitals of the empire, but the traffic was not only in one direction, and people were sent by the Achaemenid kings to Central Asia, in addition to administrative officials maintaining liaison with the satraps.⁴⁵ First, there were exiles from the Greek world who travelled along the road to Bactria (Hdt. vi.9.4). The Branchidae of Miletus sided with the Persians in 494 and had to be moved to safety from Greek reprisals. They were sent to Sogdiana, where they settled and thrived (Curt. vii.5.28–35; Diod. xvii, contents table).⁴⁶ The Barceans of Libya, under Darius, were also settled in Bactria (Hdt. iv.204), but there is no further mention of them.

However, the material traces of the Persian presence in Central Asia are slender. Some darics have been found at Samarkand and Kerki;⁴⁷ eighteen Athenian coins in the Oxus Treasure (*IGCH* 1822),⁴⁸ while the hoard of the Chaman Huzuri of Kabul contained 8 Achaemenid sigloi, 14 Indian punch-marked coins, 64 Greek coins and 29 of a previously unknown type (*IGCH* 1830).⁴⁹ 170 Athenian coins were found at Balkh (*IGCH* 1820),⁵⁰ bent bars at Mir-Zakah and Jalalabad,⁵¹ and, finally, an Achaemenid bronze at Kyzyl Tepe.⁵² These few finds indicate that a monetary system had not yet been fully imposed on Central Asia and that Greek coins played an important part when such exchange took place.⁵³

In Chorasmia, at the huge site of Kalaly Gyr, archaeologists have excavated a palace which probably belonged to a Persian (the satrap?) or to a Chorasmian influenced by Iranian culture (Fig. 6). A hypostyle hall has been unearthed, of which the columns have torus moulding and stand on a stepped plinth; a rhyton decorated with the protome of a horse and the cast of a fragment of a griffin's head in the style of Persepolis have also been found.⁵⁴ To the catalogue of Persian objects found in Chorasmia there can only be added another rhyton,⁵⁵ a ring adorned with a lion,⁵⁶ and a seal.⁵⁷ The inventory for the whole of Central Asia can be completed with the mention of a few column-bases in Persian style but often of Hellenistic date⁵⁸ and of finds of Achaemenid style from the

⁴⁵ B 537, 66–8. ⁴⁶ Cf. B 520, 159–61; B 531, 123–5. ⁴⁷ B 595, 158.


⁴⁸ B 641, 18–21, known in Tadzhikistan only 16 Athenian coins and adds 3 from Acanthus, 3 Byzantium, 1 Celenderis, 6 Aspendus, 15 imperial Achaemenid, 11 from local rulers (1 of Pixodarus, 2 from Ephesus (Memnon), 1 Tiribazus, 1 Pharnabazus, 2 Datames, 4 Mazaeus), and, from Phoenicia, 1 Aradus, 2 Sidon and 2 Tyre. ⁴⁹ B 176, 3–6, 31–45. ⁵⁰ B 630.

⁵¹ B 519, 203. ⁵² *Arkh.Otkr.* 1977, 533. ⁵³ B 176, 18–19; B 641, 20.


⁵⁴ B 627, 141f. ⁵⁵ B 628, 111 with fig. 47.

⁵⁶ B 635, 84 no. 4. ⁵⁷ B 631, 210–11: Cirik Rabat.


⁵⁸ For instance at Gyaur Kala in Chorasmia and Ai Khanoum in Bactria.



a



b



6. Kalaly Gyr: site (a) and palace (b), plans and reconstruction (c). (After B 607, 142 fig. 1, 145 fig. 2, 148 fig. 4.)

Hellenistic excavations at Ai Khanoum,⁵⁹ at Takht-i Sangin,⁶⁰ and from the Saka tombs at Issyk in Kazakhstan,⁶¹ at Tuura-Suu in Qirghizia⁶² and at Pazyryk,⁶³ where *kurgans* II and V contained objects with Achaemenid affinities (Fig. 7). A small bronze statue discovered in a destroyed *kurgan* in Xinjiang also finds parallels in the art of the Achaemenid empire (Fig. 8),⁶⁴ as do some petroglyphs from the upper Indus.⁶⁵ Some chance finds of small objects such as the Oxus Treasure,⁶⁶ one gold bowl from Altai and the Bukhtarma deer⁶⁷ can be mentioned; see p. 191. In spite of the gaps in our information, it seems that Persian cultural influence, outside the field of administration, extended to architectural style (at least in the satrapal capitals), to the minor arts, and perhaps even to the adoption of Aramaic writing, although no surviving inscribed material from this region is earlier than the Hellenistic period, except for one fragmentary Elamite tablet from the Kandahar excavations. It is uncertain whether what we have are survivals of a more extensive civilizing influence or simply provincial reflections of the art of the court and the chancery practices of the great capitals. The examination of the civilization of Achaemenid Central Asia will correct the old theories which credit the King of Kings with the introduction of irrigation, urban development, indeed civilization into Central Asia.

⁵⁹ B 556, 26–7 pls. 15, xiv (rhyton), 32–4 pls. 16, xv no. 20 (frieze of lions, painting), 58–9 pls. 21, xxii, no. 29a,b (bronze *repoussé* plates), 78–9 pls. 27, xxxv, no. 0.397 (Greco-Persian chalcidony scaraboid), 122–3; B 571. ⁶⁰ B 605; B 591 (arrow-heads, bronzes, ivories).


⁶¹ B 516, 89 (fig.) 114–15, etc. ⁶² B 585, 73–6, fig. 27 (gold figurine of an antelope).

⁶³ B 575, 80–138; B 610, pl. 174 (Pazyryk V, carpet); p. 297, fig. 139 (Pazyryk V, cult scene); pl. 177, p. 298, fig. 140 (Pazyryk V, frieze of lions) etc.

⁶⁴ B 639, fig. 90; found in the valley of the Gongnaisi, an affluent of the Ili. But it may be a product of the early Hellenistic period. ⁶⁵ B 577, 13–14, pls. 4, 5.

⁶⁶ B 545; to which can be added some isolated objects: a seal from Kabul, B 554; others at Merv and Afrasiab, *VDI* 1947, 4, 127–35; a weight found near Bust, *East and West* 1968, 277–80.

⁶⁷ B 619, 196–7, nos. 189, 190.



7. Carpet from Pazyryk, *Kurgan V*. (After B 575, fig. 103.)



8. Bronze statue from a *kurgan* in Xinjiang. The pose and features seem western, the helmet a version of the Greek 'Phrygian' helmet. Fourth century B.C.? Height 0.42 m. (After B 639, fig. 90.)

III. THE ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE OF CENTRAL ASIA IN ACHAEMENID TIMES

The beginning and the end of the Achaemenid phase will not be discussed here; the dating of the finds is not precise enough for that. According to many writers, the so-called 'Achaemenid' assemblage in Central Asia could begin as early as the beginning of the seventh or even the eighth century. This period is characterized by the appearance of a distinctive type of white wheel-made pottery whose distribution coincides with Central Asia as we have defined it. Parthia–Hyrcania and Seistan are within the Iranian sphere of influence (pottery of the plateau);⁶⁸ the northern and north-eastern borders belong to the steppes (hand-made wares), while the pottery of India is again different. It is therefore Bactria, Margiana, Sogdiana, Aria, Arachosia and Chorasmia which form the kernel of this cultural entity.

1. *Irrigation agriculture*

The economy of these regions rests, first and foremost, on irrigation agriculture, but animal husbandry and arts and crafts are not to be ignored.⁶⁹

The irrigation network of this period was not new and a large part of it dated back to the Late Bronze Age.⁷⁰ In Chorasmia, towards the middle of the first millennium, two zones of irrigation can be distinguished, one along the lower Oxus (on the left bank, that of Kalaly Gyr and Kjuzeli Gyr, and, on the right bank, that of Dingil'dže and Kanga Kala) and one along the lower Jaxartes (the area around Babiš Mulla and Ćirik Rabat).⁷¹ In Margiana, the oasis of Merv, Aravali and Jaz Tepe were irrigated.⁷² In Arachosia, at least Kandahar⁷³ and Mundigak⁷⁴ were occupied, as were Dahan-i Ghulaman⁷⁵ and Nad-i Ali⁷⁶ in Drangiana. In Bactria, the deltas of the rivers in the piedmont zones were all occupied, in the oases of Bactra, Altyn,⁷⁷ Kutlug Tepe,⁷⁸ At Chapar,⁷⁹ Tillja Tepe⁸⁰ and, in eastern Bactria, the valleys of the Oxus tributaries such as the Kunduz river and the Kokcha, with the site of Kunduz and the plain of Aĭ Khanoum respectively.⁸¹ North of the Oxus, the valleys of the Vakhsh, Kafirnigan, Surkhan Darya and Sherabad were occupied (Kobadian, Džandavlat,

⁶⁸ B 541.

⁶⁹ See in general B 584, 178–203, which gives an up-to-date and complete overview from archaeological data; 338–40, on the importance of irrigation (figs. on pp. 455–7).

⁷⁰ At least in the Murgab, the oasis of Bactra and in Chorasmia.

⁷¹ B 521, 35 fig. 6, 151–63, 116–25, 185–200. ⁷² B 595; B 594, 63–8.

⁷³ B 638, 32–3; B 592, 44. ⁷⁴ B 540. ⁷⁵ B 616. ⁷⁶ B 544.

⁷⁷ B 613, 107ff; Altyn Dilyar: B 586, 12. ⁷⁸ B 613, 107ff. ⁷⁹ B 615.

⁸⁰ B 612. ⁸¹ B 560, 132–7.

Kučuk, etc.) where such large sites as Kyzyl Tepe and Bandykhan Tepe were situated.⁸² In Sogdiana, the Zerafshan valley at Afrasiab (Marakanda),⁸³ the lower Zerafshan⁸⁴ and the valley of the Syr Darya⁸⁵ were also inhabited. At this period irrigation canals were about 10 m wide, shallow and up to 30 to 60 km long. The networks are made up of successive offshoots from the main canal with secondary, tertiary and quaternary channels defining the boundaries of the fields.⁸⁶ The fertile loess, when properly irrigated and worked, produced generous quantities of wheat, barley, millet, oats, sesame and grapes (analyses from Dingil'dže and Kučuk). Grain would be stored, at a domestic level, in silos dug below the floors of farms and in jars, thus taking care of daily requirements and of surpluses.⁸⁷ Animal husbandry, as practised by the sedentary population of Chorasmia, involved cattle, sheep and goats, pigs, donkeys, horses and camels. It has been held that cattle, predominant in the seventh century, had declined, by the fourth century, in favour of sheep and goats, but no explanation has been offered.⁸⁸ As for horses and camels, there is no need to stress the importance of Central Asian stock, well known from the Persepolis reliefs as well as post-Achaemenid texts. These animals were reared, not only on stubble and fallow land, but also on the vast uncultivated steppes which separated the oases and were traversed by nomads.

Some light has been thrown by the antiquities of their tombs on the pastoral economy of these nomads, from Chorasmia to Mongolia. The Saka of Chorasmia (*tigrakbauda*, Massagetae?) seem primarily to have been engaged in horse rearing and sheep rearing,⁸⁹ and so were the Saka of the Pamirs and of Ferghana (*haumavarga*?) in the high upland pastures.⁹⁰ The Saka and related peoples of Qirghizia,⁹¹ Tian Shan,⁹² Altai,⁹³ Tuva,⁹⁴ Mongolia,⁹⁵ Xinjiang,⁹⁶ etc. and the Saka of Kazakhstan (*paradraya*? *para sugdam*?)⁹⁷ seem to have the same economic system. The animal rearing regions of the steppes and the mountains, and the agricultural regions of the plains and the valleys interlocked in such a way that it is difficult to trace a true frontier between them.⁹⁸

The arts and crafts of Central Asia were based on the exploitation of mineral resources (clay, stone, metals) and on the treatment of organic materials, which in too many cases have left no trace. Clay was abundant

⁸² B 551; B 632; B 608, 265; B 596, 19-24, 25-30, 93-103; B 523; B 609. ⁸³ B 538, 7-59.

⁸⁴ B 572.

⁸⁵ B 640; B 528 (culture of Čust and Eylatan); B 600; B 552, 164-76 (Šaštapa, culture of Burguluk and Kaunši). ⁸⁶ B 521; B 562, 116-25. ⁸⁷ B 635, 207f, 52-83.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*; B 539, 108; B 523, 82-4 (different conclusions). ⁸⁹ B 626; B 633, 127ff.

⁹⁰ B 590, 174f, reaching the upper Indus valley. B 577, 13-15. ⁹¹ B 585; B 623.

⁹² B 533, 40-5, 185f; B 582. ⁹³ B 610. ⁹⁴ B 568; B 570. ⁹⁵ B 634; B 601.

⁹⁶ B 636. ⁹⁷ For the latter see DPH; B 517, 129ff; B 518, 50-5.

⁹⁸ And between nomadism and simple transhumant pastoralism; B 575, 126-8; B 22, 203-25; B 566.

in all areas and was the material from which the 'Achaemenid' pottery was made. This pottery was so widespread that the repetition of similar shapes – for instance, the goblet – appears to indicate common feeding habits. Kilns were situated in specialized areas of the oases (Margiana, Chorasmia).⁹⁹ Stone was little used in architecture, and we shall confine ourselves to semi-precious stones. Chorasmian turquoise was worked where it was mined or in the neighbouring oases (Dingil'dže), and also near other sources in Sogdiana, in the craftsmen's quarters of Marakanda.¹⁰⁰ The lapis lazuli of Sogdiana is attested by numerous bead finds, but no lapidary's workshop of this period has been discovered in Central Asia. Carnelian was also extensively used and may have come from Chorasmia.¹⁰¹ Alabaster and serpentine were quarried in Arachosia.¹⁰² Metals are the material for jewellery, weapons and tools. Bactrian gold was doubtless obtained by panning the mud deposits of the Oxus, and silver was mined in the same province (Ctesias, *FGrH* 688 F 45.26).¹⁰³ Gold was also extracted in Kazakhstan and southern Siberia.¹⁰⁴ Copper had been exploited for millennia throughout Central Asia, but not one deposit worked at this period has been located, except in Kazakhstan (Džezkasgan for example), South Siberia and Tuva, in areas which are supposed to have had a nomadic population, and in the neighbouring Ili valley of Xinjiang.¹⁰⁵ Iron mines are no better known, but foundries have been discovered in Chorasmia (Dingil'dže),¹⁰⁶ in Parthia (El'ken Tepe)¹⁰⁷ and in Sogdiana (Marakanda),¹⁰⁸ and the manufacture of weapons, jewellery, tools and pieces of harness by Central Asian smiths is well attested.

Besides trade and exchange within the borders of the Achaemenid empire, it seems that the part of Central Asia under Achaemenid rule was in contact with Saka tribes who were in touch with China (see the finds of *kurghans* II and V of Pazyryk and of Xinyuan and Alagou in Xinjiang). On the other hand, a general northern exchange-route has been supposed to have existed *outside* the limits of the empire, linking Europe and Central Asia¹⁰⁹ in a way that is far from clear.

The economic production of Central Asia cannot, therefore be compared to the fabulous wealth of India, Babylonia and Egypt. Nevertheless, the high level of production, and the balance which seems to have existed between the exploitation of agricultural and of mineral resources, supported a large population, and this population was kept militarily active by a permanent and dangerous contact with the turbulent world of the nomads of the steppe. These conditions led to the

⁹⁹ B 595, 26–7; B 635, 212. ¹⁰⁰ B 635, 58–9; *Arkb.Otkr.* 1976, 524–5.

¹⁰¹ B 635, 211; B 532. ¹⁰² B 12. ¹⁰³ B 532. ¹⁰⁴ B 575, 184–203.

¹⁰⁵ Margulian in B 518, 3–42; B 637. ¹⁰⁶ B 635, 211–12. ¹⁰⁷ B 579.

¹⁰⁸ *Arkb.Otkr.* 1976, 524–5. ¹⁰⁹ No decisive arguments are given by any author.

creation of a surplus in production and of a warlike potential which the Achaemenids could not ignore and which they were able to turn to good account. A famous passage in which Herodotus describes the Great King profiting by irrigating a plain belonging to the Chorasmians (III.117) illustrates this. More light can be thrown on these matters by a closer study of the social organization of Central Asia.

2. *Social organization: nomadic tribes and sedentary 'feudalism'*

We can gain some idea of how the society of Central Asia was organized by studying settlement patterns, architecture and the information supplied by texts. Only the settlement patterns of sedentary populations are available for study, and among them we can distinguish between fortified and open settlements. Fortified settlements may be cities or fortresses.¹¹⁰ True cities (occupying an area of more than 15 hectares) were to be found in the principal oases of Central Asia: Erk Kala in Margiana, El'ken Tepe (Vishpauzatish?) in Parthia, Bactra (Zariaspa) and Altyn Dilyar in Bactria, Kyzyl Tepe, Bandykhan Tepe and Talaškan Tepe in northern Bactria (in the Surkhan Darya valley), Kunduz (Drapsaka?) in eastern Bactria, Afrasiab (Marakanda) and Cyropolis in Sogdiana, Kyuzeli Gyr, Kalaly Gyr, Bazar Kala in Chorasmia, Ćirik Rabat in the territory of the Aral Saka, Kandahar (Kapishakanish?) in Arachosia, Artakoana in Aria, Eilatan and Shurabashat in Ferghana. Charsada, in Gandara, was also fortified. The ramparts of these cities were often circular. The walls which have been excavated consist of several superimposed galleries and are punctuated by semi-circular towers with arrow-slits for defence by archers. The cities were densely populated, and in some of them investigators have found a palace (Kalaly Gyr) (Fig. 6), a monumental building (at Kyzeli Gyr, covering 285 sq. m), a citadel (Talaškan Tepe); elsewhere we know that they functioned as administrative centres (Marakanda and Bactra, for example).

The fortresses are known as such both from textual references in the Alexander historians and from excavation. Government strongholds, such as that founded by Cyrus on the Jaxartes (above, p. 171), can be distinguished from the forts of the Sogdian lords,¹¹¹ where a whole population could seek refuge in time of danger, together with its flocks and supplies. Thus the fortified settlement may be for the officials and troops of the Great King or for local lords and their retainers.

The greater part of the population lived in unfortified oasis villages and townships. There are 285 settlements known for Chorasmia alone, each grouping eight to fifteen houses set fifty to a hundred and twenty metres

¹¹⁰ B 555; B 584; see nn. 77–9 above. ¹¹¹ B 520, 168–9.

apart.¹¹² In Margiana¹¹³ and in the delta of the Tedžen,¹¹⁴ many small settlements of about a hectare have been discovered, but we know little of the open settlements of Bactria. Nevertheless, the general principle of the structure of this rural settlement, detected by all investigators, is that it develops along irrigation canals and is never far from an important locality, which might be a citadel or at least an administrative centre, when it is not a true town.¹¹⁵ Canals and administrative centres were the two poles round which settlements seem to have gravitated.

Civil, religious and funerary architectures provide some indication of social life and hierarchy. Unbaked pisé or mud-brick was the universal building material. Civil architecture in Chorasmia shows great variations in the size of properties (from 600 to 3,000 sq. m including courtyards and gardens) and of actual houses (from 100 to 200 sq. m). The traditional Chorasmian house, measuring 16 by 10 m, consisted simply of two or three rooms set on either side of a passage. The farm excavated at Dingil'dže qualifies as a small manor, for it has six rooms,¹¹⁶ and houses of a similar size have been found in Drangiana at Dahan-i Ghulaman.¹¹⁷

In Bactria,¹¹⁸ the 'Summer Palace' at Altyn (4,400 sq. m) (Fig. 9) and the 'Winter Palace' (1,296 sq. m) are large houses with a simple layout, consisting, in one case, of rooms arranged around a courtyard and opening off a passage and, in the other, of a range of rooms to one side of a colonnaded courtyard.¹¹⁹ In its earliest form, the site of Kutlug Tepe near Bactra consisted of a single rectangular room.¹²⁰ Kučuktepa, north of the Amu Darya, had eleven rooms within a rampart which enclosed some 60 to 125 sq. m.¹²¹ The Kyzylcha-6 manor has eight rooms surrounding a courtyard (c. 400 sq. m).¹²² There are therefore marked differences in the forms of private houses, and these are merely a reflection of differences of fortune, power and rank.

Religious architecture is little known with the exception of a stepped cult-platform found at Pačmak Tepe in Bactria¹²³ and of a fire temple at Dahan-i Ghulaman in Seistan, where altars and a columned building were excavated.¹²⁴ One possible cult-building with evidence of cremations has been excavated at Pšaktepa (Uzbekistan).¹²⁵ These tell us nothing about the priestly castes. Funerary architecture is more illuminating, though our knowledge is almost confined to the Saka. On the lower Jaxartes, at Tagisken, there are mausolea of the seventh to fifth centuries, consisting of a square room inscribed in a circle.¹²⁶ At Čirik Rabat there are two monumental mausolea, one square and one circular,


¹¹² B 635, 212f. ¹¹³ B 595, 63–92; B 635. ¹¹⁴ B 515, 2, 58f.

¹¹⁵ B 595, 151–63; B 635, 3–15. ¹¹⁶ B 635, 212f. ¹¹⁷ B 616. ¹¹⁸ In general see B 611.

¹¹⁹ B 613; B 614, 101–3, figs. 45–6. ¹²⁰ *Ibid.* ¹²¹ B 523, 18, 20, 24.

¹²² B 584, 351, 187–9. ¹²³ B 606, 32–8, fig. 2. ¹²⁴ B 616; B 618. ¹²⁵ B 522.

¹²⁶ B 626, 77–88, 202–3.



9. Altyn-10, structure II; reconstruction of Summer Palace. (After B 614, fig. 45.)

which recall the first, fourth-century, state of the mausoleum of Koj Krylgan Kala in Chorasmia.¹²⁷ At Uġarak, Saka, probably nomads, were buried in pits covered by tumuli.¹²⁸ In the Pamirs, burials took place in pits or cists,¹²⁹ while in Kazakhstan, on the Ili, archaeologists have excavated Saka *kurgans*.¹³⁰ The necropoleis of the Ili, Tian Shan, Alai, Altai, Qirghizia, Mongolia, Tuva, Siberia, Xinjiang and Ferghana are all considered to have belonged to nomads;¹³¹ the *kurgans* can be very elaborate, with heights of up to 6 m and diameters up to 60 m, with internal wooden chambers and wooden sarcophagi. On the other hand, no necropolis has been found in satrapies where the population was sedentary (except the Pšaktepa building (?) and burials in Ferghana and in the Bukhara oasis).

The Saka of the lower Jaxartes (*tigrakhauda?*, *paradraya?*), who were not all nomads, have left monumental funerary structures which indicate important hierarchical differences, but differences in wealth, which was probably reckoned in terms of horses and sheep, were only reflected in the contents of the nomadic tombs by the presence of funerary deposits of varying quality and quantity. In Kazakhstan, Siberia and in the Altai, the differences in the funerary inventories are better attested by

¹²⁷ B 626, 139–54; B 628. ¹²⁸ B 633.

¹²⁹ B 390, 7–27, 132–4. Burials in cists are thought to be earlier. ¹³⁰ B 317; B 316.

¹³¹ The literature is abundant and concerns the cultures called: Saka; Wusun; Xiongnu; Aldy-bel'; Saglyñ (Tuva); Pazyryk, Maïemir (Altai); Tasmola (Kazakhstan); Tagan (South Siberia).

excavations and much more substantial (including a number of sacrificed horses). Fortunately, textual evidence can be drawn upon to supplement the information obtained from excavation and to throw light on the society both of nomadic and of settled peoples. Nomadic society was tribal,¹³² and in certain tribes women seem to have enjoyed a privileged social position differing from that of their sedentary counterparts.¹³³ Among the settled population, the irrigation networks created one type of functional hierarchy and dictated another – that of the settlement patterns based on these networks and grouped round centres. These functional hierarchies are reflected in a social hierarchy which can, by analogy, be termed ‘feudal’.¹³⁴ In 329 in Bactria and Sogdiana, Ariamazes, Chorienes, Catanes, Haustanes, Spitamenes and Oxyartes were aristocratic local lords who could call on substantial resources of fighting men and material goods.¹³⁵ These fighting men were mobilized in the service of their ‘suzerain’, the satrap, whom they followed in all his undertakings, or, in normal times, in the service of the King of Kings who levied tribute and contingents of troops.¹³⁶ In the same hierarchical manner, the four circles of primitive Iranian society can be listed in ascending order as follows: *khvaetu* (*nmana*), the family; *verezana* (*vis*), the village and clan; *šoithra* (*zantu*), the tribe, and *dahyu*, the nation.¹³⁷ Each circle was most probably led by a chief, and Darius gave himself the title “King of the Nations (*dahyu*)” which can be understood as Persia, Media, Bactria etc.¹³⁸ Seen as a whole, therefore, the social hierarchy of Achaemenid Central Asia seems clear, but there were other functional divisions relating to priests, warriors, farmers and herdsmen.¹³⁹

3. Central Asian culture in Achaemenid times

The functional tripartite division into priests, warriors, farmers and herdsmen, forms a convenient basis for this discussion. As the economy (agriculture and animal husbandry) has already been reviewed in the previous two sections, together with crafts, we shall now consider in greater detail war, religion and art.

Thanks to the Persepolis reliefs¹⁴⁰ and the statuettes from the Oxus Treasure, our knowledge of the costume and weapons of Central Asian warriors is fairly detailed. They all wore clothing suitable for riding, otherwise worn only by the Medes and the Cappadocians. Essentially, this consisted of trousers which were close fitting around the ankles or

¹³² Cf. B 580–1. ¹³³ B 548. ¹³⁴ B 13; ‘barons’; B 21.

¹³⁵ A 59, I 60–72; B 21; B 537, 84–8.

¹³⁶ At the battle of Arbela, the Saka came because of their *symmachia* with Darius III (Arr. *Anab.* III.8.3). ¹³⁷ B 11, 293–319. ¹³⁸ *Ibid.* ¹³⁹ B 67, 85; B 11, 288–9; B 19, I 5–7.

¹⁴⁰ B 214; B 167 (see n. 41 above for the problem of identification).

were fitted with straps under the feet. They were shod with moccasins (Parthians, Saka, Sagartians, Sogdians and, sometimes, Bactrians) or with boots (sometimes Bactrians, and Arians, Drangians and Arachosians). They wore a knee-length tunic, which was either straight and closed or open with lapels, cut like a frock-coat (Sogdians, Chorasmians, Saka *haumavarga* and *tigrakbauda*), but was always fastened by a belt at the waist; sometimes a cloak with long, narrow sleeves was added. They wore a cap which covered the ears and which generally had a drooping point (*bashlyk*), though the Saka had caps with upright points¹⁴¹ and a simple hairband is also found. This was the costume of the steppe horsemen, also known by the Issyk and Pazyryk finds, adorned with gold and embroideries. Gandarans, Indians and Maka, who were not among them, wore simple kilts.

All soldiers carried the *akinakes* or Scythian dagger, picks, cane or Scythian bows, and for the Saka and Sogdians there was the war-axe (*sagaris*). The excavation of tombs of the Aral, Kazakhstan, Altai and the Pamirs has brought confirmation of this description¹⁴² and has produced evidence of parts of the breastplates¹⁴³ and scale armour (Çirik Rabat)¹⁴⁴ which must have completed the panoply of the cataphracts of Central Asia.¹⁴⁵ Various items of jewellery, such as ear-rings, bracelets and metal ornaments (belt buckles, etc.) in the animal style, will have enhanced the appearance of some of these fierce warriors.¹⁴⁶ Some fought on foot, though precise details are lacking, but mostly they fought on horseback. Their horses belonged to breeds of repute, and were harnessed and decked out in style, as is amply demonstrated by tomb materials and artistic representations. They rode without stirrups, seated on rugs, and either charged the enemy with spears or harassed them with showers of arrows.¹⁴⁷

The religion of the peoples of Central Asia can be to some extent deduced from their funerary customs, from the archaeological evidence of a few cult centres, and the written evidence of the Avestan religious tradition. The Saka buried their dead, sometimes directly, sometimes after removing their flesh, or embalming or cremating them.¹⁴⁸ Removal of the flesh without inhumation is attested textually (Strab. x. 11. 3) for Bactria of the late Achaemenid period, but we must once again stress the fact that no 'Achaemenid' necropoleis are known except in the Saka marches of Central Asia. The most ancient ossuaries (fifth to third centuries B.C.) have been discovered at Tarym-Kaja in Chorasmia.¹⁴⁹ Among these Saka, horse burials, cannabis-smoking installations,¹⁵⁰ and

¹⁴¹ B 628; B 516, 47. ¹⁴² B 633, 83-119; B 590, 83-131; B 516; B 610.

¹⁴³ B 590, 125-31 (doubtful). ¹⁴⁴ B 626, 148-50. ¹⁴⁵ See B 567, 87.

¹⁴⁶ B 516, 43-53; B 610. ¹⁴⁷ A 61; the absence of stirrups makes the charge problematic.

¹⁴⁸ B 626; B 633, 64-6; B 590, 132ff; B 610. ¹⁴⁹ B 574, 6, 94-100.

¹⁵⁰ Hdt. iv. 73-5; Pazyryk *kurgans*.

various symbols are also known; this evidence is difficult to interpret in terms of solar, chthonic or shamanistic cults, and we only touch on it here.

Not many cult centres are known: there is a stepped platform in Bactria, a fire temple at Dahan-i Ghulaman, and some structures which are, for convenience, dubbed 'temples' or 'fire-altars'.¹⁵¹ To these can be added the evidence of figurative art: the Oxus Treasure contains representations of figures in local dress decorated with beaded braid, who advance holding bundles of sticks (*barsom*?) (see Pls. Vol., pl. 42);¹⁵² a comparable scene appears on a piece of tapestry from Pazyryk V.¹⁵³ Furthermore, Berossus (*FGrH* 680 F 11) records that Artaxerxes II erected a statue of Anahita at Bactra. Iranian texts give us an oral tradition, so far as we can reconstruct it from the slow Avestan accretions, according to which Aryanem Vaejah, Zoroaster's ancient Aryan homeland, was situated in Central Asia. From then onwards, all the old Iranian beliefs are to be found in Central Asia at one time or another. Unfortunately, representational art and textiles are so rare in Central Asia that we cannot demonstrate, in Achaemenid times, the existence of any definite religion, particularly Zoroastrianism, nor the presence of priestly castes. It is a fact that the whole of East Iranian mythology is linked to a concept of mounted warriors, but we cannot discuss it here, since it is too rich, complex, and so inextricably entangled with subsequent additions and borrowings foreign to Central Asia that it cannot easily be unravelled. This vague and heterogeneous information nevertheless seems to indicate the existence of a classical form of Mazdaism or even Zoroastrianism in the southern part of Central Asia,¹⁵⁴ which, in the border areas of the north and east, existed side by side with a form of Iranian paganism or shamanism.¹⁵⁵

The 'artists' of Central Asia belonged, like all their contemporaries, either to the nomadic or the sedentary communities. They did not shine in the major arts, as witnessed by the Susa charters (DSf, DSz) which mention craftsmen from Ionia, Lydia, Cappadocia, Babylonia, Egypt and Media, but none from further east. Their means of expression was through the minor arts, and, above all, in an oral literary tradition. The minor arts of the nomads are well known: the animal art of the steppes, in metal, and that of textiles, rugs, weaving, felt, wood and leather;¹⁵⁶ the

¹⁵¹ At Kutlug Tepe in Bactria (B 613), at Džanbas Kala in Chorasmia (more recent), at At Chapar in Bactria (B 615). Religious and political centres probably existed among the Saka, B 576.

¹⁵² B 545, 19–23, nos. 48, 51, 70, with pls. xiv–xv. ¹⁵³ B 610, 297 fig. 139.

¹⁵⁴ B 223; B 58; B 19, 1 166–7, 274–6. Characteristic are the absence of necropoleis, fire cults, cult platforms.

¹⁵⁵ Among others, see B 607; B 589. Characteristic are the mythological importance of animals and connexions between funerary architecture and mythology, B 587.

¹⁵⁶ B 525; B 518, 45–55; B 633, 105–19; B 590, 30–82; B 610; B 575; B 569; B 619.

colourful compositions of the Altai and the numerous rock-engravings from Pakistan to Mongolia can be added to the gold and bronze plaques of the steppe art, which decorated dress and armour.

The most 'monumental' Saka objects are the bronze cauldrons and the offering tables or stands.¹⁵⁷ Once again, it is the sedentary people whose crafts are less well known unless we are prepared to accept that some, at least, of the objects in the Oxus Treasure were made locally,¹⁵⁸ especially after the Takht-i Sangin discoveries.¹⁵⁹ However, opinions differ as to the date and interpretation of the various pieces from this important chance find. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Bactrians, on the Apadana reliefs at Persepolis, carry worked metal vessels, and we should therefore seriously consider the possibility of the existence of a Bactrian school of goldsmiths between the sixth and fourth centuries.

The evidence for oral literature is both firmer and less precise. Everything does indeed combine to point to there having been a long and continuous tradition of oral literature in Central Asia, but proof of its existence in Achaemenid times is sadly lacking. The tradition is two-fold, and consists of religious and epic poetry. The Gathas of Zoroaster were created, it seems, about 900 B.C., possibly in Chorasmia. Subsequently the Yasht, of which certain parts were composed in eastern Iran (in Bactria?), were progressively added. These poems were committed to writing only at a much later date. They probably deeply influenced the thought and the moral and religious practice of the inhabitants of Central Asia, but in a way to which we have no means of giving precision.¹⁶⁰ In the same way, the Saka epic, traces of which can be found in Herodotus and even exist among the Ossetians of the present, was known in sedentary Iran from a time which we cannot determine.¹⁶¹ The Iranian epic, in which there is a confrontation between Airya and Tuirya (Iran and Turan)¹⁶² which takes place in Central Asia, is to be found in the Avesta in the form of ancient fragments in which the heroic Kayanid kings appear.¹⁶³ Local tradition was responsible for the transmission of this epic, over a period of centuries, to the courts of the Sogdians,¹⁶⁴ Samanids¹⁶⁵ and later of the Ghaznavids,¹⁶⁶ still in Central Asia, where it was written and where it is still rooted in its country of origin by the toponyms which appear there.¹⁶⁷ We may recall once again (see above, p. 168) the Mihr Yasht which described Central Asia as follows: 'the whole

¹⁵⁷ B 534; B 575, 178; discoveries in China.

¹⁵⁸ B 526; B 588, holding that one seal (no. 105) represents Gopatshah with an inscription reading 'Vakshu' or 'Rakshan'; the cylinder seal no. 114 shows a fight between Persians and Saka.

¹⁵⁹ See above n. 60 (Takht-i Sangin). ¹⁶⁰ B 19, I 104-7. ¹⁶¹ B 550; B 535, 57-63.

¹⁶² B 19, I 104-7. ¹⁶³ B 542; B 536. ¹⁶⁴ B 524. ¹⁶⁵ With Daqiqi.

¹⁶⁶ With Firdausi.

¹⁶⁷ E.g. Takht-i Kobad, Takht-i Rostam, Afrasiab, Kej-Kobad-Šah, Shahr-i Zohak: B 598, 215ff.



10. Cylinder-seal from the Oxus Treasure showing Persians fighting Saka. (?Fifth century B.C. (After B 597A.)

land inhabited by Iranians where gallant rulers organize many attacks, where high, sheltering mountains with ample pasture provide, solicitous for cattle . . . ' The *Yasht* is dated to the second half of the fifth century B.C.¹⁶⁸ but nevertheless describes an earlier state of affairs when mounted warriors were probably settled in the fertile plains of the eastern satrapies of the Great King.¹⁶⁹ It has been tempting to speak of an ethic of chivalry.¹⁷⁰ In any case, the two oral literary traditions of Central Asia, the religious and the epic, became an integral part of *Iranian* literature. This process may well have started in Achaemenid times.

Central Asia in Achaemenid times was thus a land with an ancient civilization, where a stable and prosperous economy, an important military potential and a rich and powerful oral literature were drawn on by the Persian court, using as intermediary a social hierarchy of 'feudal' type.

¹⁶⁸ B 68A, 3-22.

¹⁶⁹ No text of the period proves it, but the epic must have been transmitted in this period too, and historians agree on the existence of this aspect of the culture of ancient Central Asia.

¹⁷⁰ B 223A; B 535, 50-3; B 583.

CHAPTER 3d

THE INDUS LANDS

A. D. H. BIVAR

During the sixth century B.C., northern India was divided between a number of local republics and kingdoms, traditionally reckoned as sixteen.¹ Along the Ganges lay the four states most centrally placed, which at first had competed among themselves for dominance. To the north west, above the sacred river, was **Kośala**, with its cities of Śrāvastī, and Sāketa/Ayodhyā. South of the river, and towards the east, lay **Magadha**, centring around Rājagṛha (Rajgir) and later Pāṭaliputra (now Patna). To the south west was **Kāśī**, the country of Vārāṇasī (Benares). To the north east lay **Vṛjī**, with the capital at Vaiśālī, the modern Besarh. Though in earlier times Kāśī, and later Kośala had enjoyed brief pre-eminence, it was finally Magadha which was to emerge as the paramount power, and impose a unitary administration on the sub-continent.

More outlying *janapadas* (as these regional states are designated in Indian literature, on some coins, and in current historical writing) were, towards Bengal, the state of **Aṅga**; upstream, along the River Yamunā (or Jumna) lay **Vatsa**, with its capital Kauśāmbī, in recent years the site of excavations; and beyond, again, was **Śūrasena**, centred round Mathurā. In present-day Malwa lay **Avanti**, with its centre at Ujjayinī (Ujjain). This in turn was flanked to the east by **Ceḍi** in Central India, and to the north west by **Matsya** with its capital at Virāṭa (Bairat) in present Rajasthan. Further to the north lay **Pañcāla** on the upper Ganges, and the region of the **Kurus** on the upper Jumna around Indraprastha (now Delhi). Away to the north west, **Gandhāra** (non-Skt form Gandara) amongst the Indian borderlands apparently included at this period, east of the Indus, Kashmir and the city of Taxila; yet otherwise its principal centre was Puṣkalāvati, west of the Indus and above Peshawar. Also in the north west, but of debatable location, was **Kamboja**, to which some, as we shall see, have ascribed Persian connexions. Here we are hardly concerned with the short-lived state of **Malla** between Kośala and Vṛjī,

¹ *CHInd* 1 172 lists the sixteen nations (citing *Anguttara Nikaya* 1 213, IV 252, 256, 260) in their traditional order, and in their Pali forms, as follows: 1, Anga; 2, Magadha; 3, Kāśī; 4, Kosala; 5, Vajji; 6, Malla; 7, Ceti; 8, Vaṃsa; 9, Kuru; 10, Pañcāla; 11, Maccha; 12, Śūrasena; 13, Assaka; 14, Avanti; 15, Gandhāra; 16, Kamboja. We shall here consider them in geographical order. See now v 665A.

soon absorbed by its powerful neighbours. Nor yet, save for a moment, with **Aśmaka** in the Deccan.

In fact different authorities, ancient and modern, give slightly differing lists of the *janapadas*: occasionally including, for example, **Kalinga**, south of Bengal in Orissa, which anyway during the third century B.C. was to play an important role. Mentioned also is **Mūlaka**, in what is now Hyderabad State. Numismatists indeed have made use of the names of the *janapadas* to provide attributions for some of the so-called 'single type silver coinages'. Concerning these the opinion is widely held that they represent issues of states existing as early as the second half of the sixth century B.C. Indeed as convenient *labels*, indicating the regions of India in which 'single type' coinages have been found, this use of the names of the *janapadas* serves a practical purpose. Yet the chronology of the issues, known only from isolated chance finds, is no less uncertain than that of the historical development of the *janapadas* themselves. It would therefore be misleading to conclude that the coin issues can be associated with specific epochs and events in the history of the states; or even that the extent of the states which issued them coincided precisely with the boundaries of the historical *janapadas*. Naturally, isolated hoards of silver coins may have travelled in trade, so that only by plotting such finds in substantial numbers could an indication of the true circulation-areas be obtained, an analysis that the scantiness of the present evidence precludes. Even as labels, the current rather arbitrary use in numismatics of the names of the *janapadas* seems unsatisfactory. For example, silver coins of the 'pulley-wheel' type are known only, so it seems, from a single find near Wai, south of Bombay in Satara district. They have alternatively been ascribed to the *Aśmaka janapada*² and to Avanti.³ Yet though the evidence of the 'single type' coinages seems at present not well defined, with further and more detailed study they could shed useful light on the north Indian states of the sixth, and early fifth centuries B.C.


With regard to the origins of these ingot-like Indian currencies, a case could be made that they derive from the same economic system that produced a currency of silver bar-ingots in the sphere of Assyrian control during the eighth and seventh centuries B.C. Bar currencies, of increasingly sophisticated shape and consistent metrology, evidently continued in use in the Iran of the Medes,⁴ and later in that of the Achaemenids. Especially informative in this regard is the carefully shaped bar-ingot at Kabul⁵ weighing precisely 8.34 gm, the Babylonian shekel of Darius' currency reform. There is a marked similarity between these straight Iranian bars, and the well-known bent-bar coinage of early Gandara, which has been thought to represent the standard of a double

² B 658, 11.

³ B 665, 80 and pl. IV, 1-5.

⁴ B 646, 106.

⁵ B 647, 59.



Achaemenid *siglos* ($2 \times 5.56 \text{ gm} = 11.12 \text{ gm}$). Economic links between that region and the eastern plateau-lands might be expected, in view of their proximity. At the same time, the earliest sure dating evidence for the presence of bent-bar currency itself is the Chaman Huzuri find at Kabul (*IGCH* 1830), fixed by associated Greek coinage towards 380 B.C. Attested finds of bent-bar coinage are anyway so few that one could not deduce from an absence of earlier evidence that this currency was unknown in Gandara already in the fifth century B.C. or even earlier. Sanskrit literary sources are quoted, in particular the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini, which seems to describe the use of metallic currency, possibly even a form of coin, as early as the fifth century. On account of these allusions, scholars in India have tended to ascribe very early dates to some of the single-type coinages, and by placing them in the sixth or even seventh century B.C., have been able to claim priority over the Lydian invention of coinage.⁶ At the same time, these early coins are devoid of legible inscriptions, and the meaning of their punch-marked symbols is still problematical. Thus their historical implications are no less open to debate than are the conflicting chronologies of early rulers suggested by the religious sources, Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina.

The first rulers of Magadha to emerge prominently on to the historical scene were Bimbisāra and his unfilial son Ajātaśatru. Their importance in the records results as much from the fact that these two rulers were contemporaries of the Buddha Siddhārtha, and of Vardhamāna Mahāvīra the founder of Jainism, as from the powerful role played by both in establishing the centralized administration of Magadha. According to a Jaina tradition, the decease of Mahāvīra took place 470 years before the Vikrama Era of 587 B.C.: that is to say, in 527 B.C. On the other hand, another of their records⁷ maintains that Mahāvīra died 16 years after the Buddha. However, Buddhist sources consider that Mahāvīra predeceased the Buddha, whose *nirvāṇa* is traditionally reckoned 218 years before Aśoka's consecration; which, if placed in 265 B.C., would fix that event in (or about) 483, a figure which has received the wide, but not universal acceptance of scholars.⁸ There is a further well-established tradition that the decease of the Buddha took place in the eighth year of the reign in Magadha of Ajātaśatru, whose accession would consequently be placed in 491; and who is said to have survived the Buddha for 24 years, and thus reigned for 32 years in all, which would place his demise in 459 B.C. Reckoning back from Ajātaśatru's accession therefore, the reign of Bimbisāra is variously given by Buddhist sources as 52 years,⁹ or by Hindu records as 28 years,¹⁰ which would place the accession of Bimbisāra either in 543 or in 519 B.C., depending on the

⁶ Recently B 658, 5-7. ⁷ B 669, 23.

⁸ *CHInd* I 312; B 673, 13-14.

⁹ *CHInd* I 184. ¹⁰ *CHInd* I 312.

calculation preferred. A degree of approximation therefore prevails as to the earlier chronology of the kings of this Śaiśunāga dynasty in Magadha. There is agreement, however, that during the reign of Bimbisāra, Pradyota ruled as king of Avanti; and that Puṣkarasārin (Pali Pukkusāti) was their contemporary as king of Gandara.

It is hardly surprising that several historians of India¹¹ have seen the rise of centralized government in Magadha as reflecting the inspiration of the rising Achaemenid monarchy in Iran. In 550 B.C. Cyrus the Great of Persia had united the kingdoms of the Medes and Persians, and was building up the greatest kingdom seen up to that time. The first decades of his reign were occupied with campaigns in the west: the conquest of Lydia and Ionia, soon followed by the overthrow of Babylon. By 538 B.C. Persia had become the paramount power of Asia, an empire of unparalleled resources and extent. In this and the following year, Cyrus appears to have been residing at Ecbatana (the modern Hamadan). With regard to his expeditions in the east, information comes from derivative and shadowy sources, yet the resulting picture is consistent. The Alexander-historians record that when the Macedonians were travelling eastwards from Prothasia (presumably modern Farah in Afghanistan), they encountered as it seems upon the River Helmand the Iranian tribe of the Ariaspae, who had become known as the Benefactors on account of the services they had rendered to Cyrus during his expedition against the Scythians (Arr. *Anab.* III.27.4, Curt. VII.3.1). They had assisted his army, afflicted by cold and hunger, with warm clothing and supplies. On account of their services to Cyrus, and out of respect for their stalwart character and liberal customs, Alexander not only confirmed their liberty, but benevolently endowed them with some of their neighbours' land. The narrative thus suggests, if it does not explicitly prove, that Cyrus had been marching eastwards up the Helmand by the same route as Alexander. Of course, legends of Cyrus were common currency in Achaemenid Iran, and the Kur rivers in Persis (cf. Strabo xv.2, 6) and in Georgia recall such memories. Arrian's tale (*Anab.* VI.24.2–3) of a retreat through Gedrosia by Semiramis, and later by Cyrus, is in the first case at least no more than a reminiscence by Greeks of the legend in Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 1§20);¹² and in the second (if not an episode from the same campaign as the story of the Ariaspae), a mere fable to flatter Alexander. Yet the Persian king's northward march through Arachosia is confirmed by the statement of Pliny (*HN* VI.92) that Cyrus destroyed the city of Capisa, the archaeological Begram near the southern flank of the Hindu Kush. Though the source for this statement is unknown, it must be

¹¹ B 645, 47.

¹² Since Arrian clearly represents Nearchus (*FGrH* 133 F 3), the beliefs go back as far as Alexander's circle. On the Semiramis legend, see now B 144.

allowed that Pliny had access to authorities lost today. What else Cyrus the Great might have accomplished in present-day Afghanistan, beyond attaching the country to the Persian empire, is nowhere stated. By 530 B.C. he had passed northwards to the Jaxartes and his death. Yet Arachosia was to remain a Persian province.

Among the *janapadas* of the Indus region we have already noticed that of the Kambojas. Many attempts have been made to locate this people with precision. According to the *Mahābhārata*, the capital of the Kambojas was at Rājapura, which was once identified¹³ from Hsüan Tsang with the town of Rajaori, in the south east of Poonch district. Yet this position, eastward of Gandara, lacked confirmation, and disagreed moreover with other literary indications. Recently¹⁴ the *Nirukta* of Yāska (c. 300 B.C.) has been cited for the statement 'the word *śavati* is a verb of motion . . . among the Kambojas', a statement that would be correct for speakers of an Iranian dialect. Other passages from the *Mahābhārata* link the Kambojas with the Bāhlikas 'Bactrians', the Yavanas 'Greeks', the Śakas '(Indo-)Scythians' and the Gandharans. Likewise in Aśoka's Third Rock Edict the Kambojas are coupled with the *yonas* 'Greeks' and the *gamdhāras* 'Gandharans'. E. Benveniste,¹⁵ in his discussion of the Aśokan Greco-Aramaic inscription from Kandahar, suggested that it may have been addressed to the Yonas and Kambojas in that region, though no mention of such peoples is made in the text. Others have sought to connect the name Kamboja in the Indian sources with *Kambūjiya*, the Old Persian form of the name of the Achaemenid king Cambyses.¹⁶ One might infer that Persian colonists had been settled in parts of Arachosia, Gandara or Bactria, and perhaps even in all three, by Cambyses the son of Cyrus the Great, and the settlements named after him. This would have been a measure, perhaps, to consolidate the annexation of these provinces by Cyrus. Yet though this hypothesis would provide one explanation of the Iranian idiom ascribed to the Kambojas, any link with Cambyses is admittedly speculative, and only fresh archaeological evidence will provide a clear solution to the problem of the Kambojas.

Not indeed until after the death early in 522 B.C. of Cambyses, a ruler who in eastern Iran will have been represented as viceroy by his brother Bardiya (Gk. Smerdis), and subsequently by the Magian impostors who supplanted him, does a clear historical picture emerge of events on the borders of India. On 29 September of that year, the future Darius the Great mounted his coup against the Magians, while on every side rebels

¹³ B 653, 148.

¹⁴ B 643; for the older literature, see B 95, 344–5 (recognizing the name in the *Τάμβυζοι* of Ptolemy ii.11); B 657, 271 and 183 n. 4.

¹⁵ B 667A, 45. ¹⁶ B 95, 344–5; B 657, 271.

arose to dispute his accession. In southern Persis at Tāravā (modern Tarum) a certain Vahyazdata raised the flag of revolt, securing the adherence of local Persian forces. Though twice defeated by Artavardiya, the commander sent by Darius to Persis, the rebel had been able to detach an unnamed lieutenant with a force to Arachosia, with the aim of effecting the revolt also of that province. Vivana, the Persian satrap in Arachosia, remained loyal to Darius, and defeated the rebels at Kapishakanish within those provincial borders. It is tempting, of course, to identify that site with Capisa, a locality, however, not actually included in Arachosia according to the geography of later centuries. One could, none the less, contend that in the earliest period of Persian rule the Arachosian province had been regarded as extending further north into a thinly-held region; and that it was only later that the new province of Paropamisadae was organized, with its capital at Capisa. On the other hand, Herzfeld¹⁷ preferred an etymological identification of Kapishakanish with the later Qayqān in Baluchistan, a theory that would transfer the whole campaign to that area.

The subsequent operations between Vivana and his anonymous opponent have thus received differing topographical interpretations. A battle at Gandutava (now known to have been in Sattagydia) was followed by another at Arshādā in Arachosia. For Herzfeld the first was once more in Baluchistan at present-day Gandava. But a recent article develops the location of Kapishakanish at Capisa,¹⁸ and using evidence from the Babylonian version of the Bisitun inscription, places Sattagydia on the Indus west bank, with its capital possibly at Akra Dheri near Bannu. The reconstruction is naturally to some extent an argument *ex absentia*, since the terrain and possible alternatives are insufficiently explored. Thatagush has been explained as 'having hundreds of cattle', and could thus plausibly be located near the Rival Gomal (Gomatī 'Rich in cattle'); though later (below, p. 204) we shall be considering a different etymology.

Gandutava, in the Babylonian text *gan-da-ta-ma-ki*, was tentatively identified by von Voigtlander with Gandamak in Afghanistan, a location which is topographically conceivable, but depends on no more than a vague similarity of names. The Babylonian text shows that this place was in Sattagydia, a province therefore already under Achaemenid rule. By 519 B.C., therefore, when the Bisitun text was being drafted, Darius was in control of that province, besides Arachosia and Gandara. Whether, however, Puṣkarasārin, the king of Gandara contemporary with Bimbisāra and the earlier years of the Buddha, survived as a feudatory

¹⁷ B 95, 334.

¹⁸ B 656, 102-3, citing B 212, 36, 59 'in the territory of Gandatamaki, by name, in Sattagydia, they fought a battle'.

under Achaemenid overlordship or was replaced by a Persian satrap remains uncertain. However other indications soon confirm that Darius was systematically building up the Achaemenid position along the Indus.

It was in 517 B.C., after the reconquest of Egypt by Darius, that the king put in hand a reconnaissance of his eastern frontier, now effectively defined by the River Indus, which so often in subsequent centuries was to represent the boundary between India and Iran. Among reliable agents to whom he entrusted this task was Scylax of Caryanda in Caria, the navigator whose story later became known to the Greek world, and was reported by Hecataeus and in the surviving text of Herodotus (IV.44). The narrative is straightforward enough, though a false reading in the transmitted text of the later historian long hampered precise understanding of the geographical situation:

The greater part of Asia was explored by Darius. Wishing to know where the River Indus, which is one of the two rivers that harbour crocodiles, discharges into the sea, he sent with ships persons on whom he relied to discover the truth, and in particular Scylax, a man of Caryanda. They set out from Caspatyrus and the land of Pactyica, and sailed downstream to the eastward and the rising of the sun as far as the sea. Then across the sea sailing westward in the thirtieth month they arrived in the land whence the king of Egypt dispatched the Phoenicians, whom I mentioned earlier, to circumnavigate Africa. After [Scylax and his men] had made the transit, Darius subjugated the Indians and made use of this sea. Thus the rest of Asia, except the part lying to the east, was explored in the same way as Africa.

The exact details of the voyage of Scylax have long been a subject of debate among historians in Europe, amongst some of whom the geography of the upper Indus may have been no better known than it must have been to the scribes who transmitted the text of Herodotus. It has first to be noted that no such place as Caspatyrus is known in ancient times along the Indus. A better reading of the name is however provided by Stephanus Byzantinus in his entry under Caspapyrus.¹⁹ ‘Caspapyrus is a city of Gandara, on the coastline of the Scythians. So (says) Hecataeus, in (his account of) Asia.’ The allusion to the Scythians is likely to arise from a later gloss, referring to the period of the Indo-Scythian empire in India. That Stephanus used a source (presumably Apollodorus of Artemita, whom he cites by name) in which ‘Scythia’ had this sense is supported by his entry ‘*Ῥών, πόλις τῆς Γανδαρικῆς Σκυθίας*, ‘Rhōn, a township of Gandaran Scythia’. Although we cannot immediately locate

¹⁹ *Κασπάπυρος πόλις Γανδαρικῆς, Σκυθῶν δὲ ἀκτῆ*. Jacoby (*FGrH* 1 F 295) accepts the conjecture *ἀντίη*. *Contra*, B 95, 338, who omits *δέ*, and comments: ‘*ἀκτῆ* must not be “corrected” . . . into *ἀντίη*, for it is in Hecataeus’ idiom a kind of parallel running along a coast line. *ἀκτῆ* shows that Hecataeus’ map put Scythia and Paktyiké under the same latitude.’ Both interpretations present their difficulties, but we prefer the reading of the MSS.

a settlement of this name in or near Gandara in the Classical period, in Muslim times the ethnic of the Ghaznavid panegyrist Abu 'l-Faraj Rūnī has a similar form, and may be relevant, though its origin is subject to debate. But a passage of al-Bīrūnī shows²⁰ that Caspapyrus could well represent Kāśyapapura, an early name of the city of Multan, which could very probably have been visited by Scylax. Multan, however, does not conform to the geographical characteristic specified by Herodotus for the starting-point of Scylax, since his voyage was said to have commenced towards the east, while at Multan the rivers flow south westward. Moreover, Maricq calls attention to a fragment from Scylax cited in Athenaeus,²¹ which describes the Indus passing between towering cliffs covered with wild forest and thorny plants. This description fits the river as it flows through the Attock gorge, but is inappropriate to Multan, which lies in the plain. Furthermore, according to Hecataeus Caspapyrus lay in Gandara, and according to Herodotus 'Caspapyrus' belonged to Pactyica, both upstream provinces.

The decisive clue to the solution seems to be provided by a much later inscription, the Greek and Parthian version of the text carved by the Sasanian king Shāpūr I in about A.D. 260 on the Ka'ba-yi Zardusht near Persepolis (the text known in specialist literature as *Shāpūr KZ*).²² Here with reference to the Kushan empire of Central Asia, mention is made of a city *pškwr* (in Greek script, and in the genitive case Πασκιβούρων), which can only refer to Peshawar, capital of the Kushans already under their second founder Kanishka I (c. A.D. 128–56). Clear documentation of this name enables us to re-examine the texts of Hecataeus and of Herodotus, and restore the true reading of Scylax's starting-point as Paskapyrus, an earlier spelling of the same name. The Kabul River, tributary of the Indus, is navigable to a point a little above Peshawar, a city which today lies only a few miles away from the main channel. Thence Scylax would have travelled eastward to the confluence with the Indus, and through the towering gorges below Attock into the Punjab plain. No doubt he may in due course have visited Kāśyapapura (Multan), in Greek script Caspapyrus, a reading which a Greek scribe may have been tempted to substitute for Paskapyrus (a very similar outline in cursive Greek letters) earlier in the narrative. Thus we may conclude that Scylax began his voyage from the vicinity of Peshawar, a city which was either in Gandara, as Hecataeus claims, or else nearby in

²⁰ *Alberuni's India* (ed. Sachau, London 1887) 149: *Inna asma' al-bilād tatagbayir wa-khāṣatan fī al-jūgāt, ja-inna Mūllān kānat tasammā Kāshpāpūr* . . . ; tr. Sachau I (London, 1910) 298 'The names of the countries change, and particularly in the *yugas*. So Multan was originally called Kasypapura . . .'

²¹ Ath. 70C (= *FGrH* 709 F 4) Ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ὄρος παρέτειρε τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ καὶ ἐνθεν καὶ ἐνθεν ὑψηλὸν τε καὶ δασὺ ἀγρίῃ ὄλῃ καὶ ἀκάνθη κυνάρῃ. Cf. B 665 A.

²² B 670; B 660; B 658A, 53; B 664.

the adjoining tract of Pactyica following the version of Herodotus. (Perhaps both statements would have been true at different moments.) But in either event, already in 517 B.C. Paskapyrus would have been situated in territory controlled by the Persian empire. It appears that Pactyica lay along the south bank of the Kabul River, and extended south westwards apparently towards modern Kohat and the Kurram Valley, an important highroad to Iran. Recent Afghan administrative usage has revived the Herodotean name as Paktiya, applied to Gardez province in eastern Afghanistan; but on no stronger evidence, it seems, than that of general probability. The discovery of the Mir Zakah hoard not far east of Gardez, with its punch-marked coins and Achaemenid bar-coins, is evidence, as we have already seen, for historical activity along this route during the fifth century B.C. A further indication of Achaemenid interest in the area may be provided by the unexpected – if admittedly isolated – find in 1914 of a gold Croeseid coin at Mari Indus,²³ an important crossing of that river to the east of Bannu. So far as the name of Pactyica is concerned, distinguished authorities have denied that there could be any etymological connexion with the name of the present-day Pakhtuns or Pathans of the trans-Indus region.²⁴ Yet the territory as we have defined it lies in the heartland of the present-day Pakhtuns. Another puzzling coincidence with a modern name is that of Herodotus' Aparytae (III.91) with the present-day tribe of the Afridis. In the tribute-list the Aparytae are grouped with the Sattagydiens, Gandarans and Dadicae, an association which need not place them far from the habitat of the modern Afridis, in the highland of Tirah westwards of Peshawar. Here an identification may be conceivable,²⁵ while that of the Dadicae with the medieval and modern Daradas, mountain peoples of Gilgit and Indus Kohistan, whose distribution in ancient times seems to have been more extensive than today, is often accepted. That the Gandara grouping in the Herodotean list consisted largely of tribal peoples is substantiated by the low tribute-assessment of 170 talents.

As the Herodotean narrative concerning Scylax makes clear, after that mariner had explored the channel of the Indus, Darius proceeded in 515 B.C. to subjugate a further province, the 'India' of the Greek historian's account, beyond Gandara and Sattagydia. This region was soon to appear as Hiⁿduš in the Old Persian inscriptions, first in that known as DPe at Persepolis, and later regularly in the lists of provinces.²⁶ Transparent though the name appears at first sight, its location is not

²³ B 667.

²⁴ B 644 and *Encyclopaedia of Islam*² s.v. Afghān; *contra*, B 95, 338: 'No linguistic aspect of the problem would make me doubt the historical connexion of Paktyes and Pašto, paχtō, and it would be strange if these names were unconnected.'

²⁵ Differently, B 95, 340–1, linking the name with Parvata, a peak in central Afghanistan.

²⁶ B 110, 214 for references; for the identification with Sind, see likewise B 657, II 196.

without problems. Foucher, Kent, and many subsequent writers have identified Hiⁿduš with its etymological equivalent, Sind, thereby placing it on the lower Indus towards the delta. In antiquity, of course, the Indus flowed far to the east of its present bed, and it was on this eastern course that Alexander found a city of Patala at the head of a triangular delta. So it is plausible to place the centre of a possible Achaemenid province in eastern Sind, perhaps in the neighbourhood of Bahmanabad, and the former Arab capital of al-Manšūra.²⁷ However, detailed topographical work has hardly begun on the pre-Muslim antiquities of Sind, lying as they do well to the east of the heavily populated area around Karachi; and no material evidence of Achaemenid activity in this region is so far available. It is to his 'Indian' province that Herodotus (III.94) ascribes the phenomenal tribute of 360 talents of gold dust, a figure which has no doubt some relation to his celebrated fable of the gold procured from ants in the Indian Desert (III.102–4). Gold indeed has been panned from the upper Indus in medieval and modern times – near Und,²⁸ in Chilas,²⁹ and along a northern affluent of the Indus, the Hunza River.³⁰ Yet there seems no evidence at present of gold production around the Indus delta, so this detail seems to weigh against the location of the Hiⁿduš province in Sind. The wording of his text certainly suggests that Herodotus imagined the tribute paid to have been 360 *talents of gold by weight* (each 30.24 kg), which as we have observed is a prodigious sum. Surely here the text represents a misunderstanding. Bearing in mind that the eastern Achaemenid treasuries employed bulk silver as their medium of account, one might suppose the underlying source to have intended that the gold dust paid was *equivalent in value* to 360 talents of silver, a far more credible situation.

The alternative location to Sind for an Achaemenid province of Hiⁿduš is naturally at Taxila and in the West Punjab, where there are indications that a Persian satrapy may have existed, though no clear evidence of its name. Taxila under the Achaemenid dispensation was apparently distinct from Gandara, but could of course have been included in Sattagydia, if there is truth in Herzfeld's etymology of the name as Indo-Aryan,³¹ signifying the 'Seven Rivers', and effectively synonymous with our Punjab.

In any event, the Achaemenid provinces of Arachosia, Sattagydia and Gandara, with the tribal lands of Pactyica, the Aparytae and the Dadicae, and finally (however located) the province of Hiⁿduš, all lay along the eastern Achaemenid borders, and were neatly skirted by the voyage of

²⁷ The best survey of Sind is perhaps still B 652; see also B 661, 88 and map; cf. B 655, 27, 189, who places Patala near Nasirpur rather than so far east as Bahmanabad, but on purely theoretical grounds.

²⁸ Al-Biruni, *Kitāb al-jamāhir fī maʿrifat al-jawāhir* (Hyderabad, 1355/1936–7) 236.

²⁹ B 671, 18. ³⁰ E.g. B 663, 271; B 668, 35. ³¹ B 95, 342.

Scylax on the Indus. We shall maintain that Gandara also is intended in a group of Persepolis Fortification Tablets concerned with the issue of rations to travellers from Susa to an eastern destination. In 500 B.C. (PF 1440) an 'elite guide' (*barrišdama*) Zišanduš set out from Susa to *Kan-daraš*, escorting a single unnamed woman and five 'boys'. Towards the end of April at some stage of her journey through Persis she received a quart of wine. Her ration scale, three quarts of flour per day against her courier's quart-and-a-half, or the commoner's ration of a single quart, suggests a person of modest yet reputable station. One thinks of a children's nurse or confidential harem servant, since her journey was authorized under the king's own seal. It may be relevant that (as we shall see below, p. 209) the Gandaran contingent in the invasion of Greece fifteen years later was led by a cousin of the king, so that the royal connexion here, found of course in many provinces, could have lasted in Gandara for several decades.

Another tablet (PF 1358) records the travel from *Kan-da-ra* to Susa of an official with the excellent Persian name of Nariyamana (cf. NP Narīmān). His travel authority was sealed by Megabazus (El. *Bakabaduš*), who elsewhere (PF 1351) authorized a journey originating in Arachosia, and may therefore have been the satrap of that province. Probably he was the father of Pherendates, who later commanded the Drangian contingent in Xerxes' invasion of Greece (Hdt. vii.67). This coincidence led Hallock to conclude that *Kandaraš* represented modern Kandahar in Afghanistan, a line of reasoning that presents difficulties. At the Arachosian city the name Kandahar is unknown until the fourteenth century A.D., and it is equally possible that Megabazus merely renewed the travel permit of a party originating in a more distant province. Arachosia (*Ha-ra-u-ma-ti-iš*, with variants), moreover, has its own quite distinct and substantial series of documents (PF 1351, 1385, 1439, 1443, 1474 and 1510), which otherwise make no mention of *Kandaraš*. It therefore seems best to take the three *Kandaraš* documents (PF 1440, 1550 and 1358) as relating to the province of Gandara.

So far as India is concerned, the Fortification Tablets attest an active and substantial traffic, though they shed no light on the geography of that province. An earlier writer³² called attention to the movements of Abbatema the Indian, who was clearly a person of consequence. In April–May of 499 B.C. he is travelling through Persis on his way from India to Susa, carrying a sealed authority from the king, and under the care of the 'elite guide' Išbaramištima (PF 785). On this occasion Abbatema's ration was thirty quarts of flour, but one day in the following month he received seventy quarts, and each of his twenty

³² A 35, 5 with n. 14.

companions two quarts (PF 1318). Described here as his daily ration, it was more than double his previous issue. We may wonder whether it included some compensation for, or provision against, lean stages on the journey: yet even his minimum ration of thirty times the commoner's scale suggests an elevated status. On this or another occasion during the same month (PF 1558), he also received seventy quarts of wine. Later in the month, we find him in the care of a new courier, Miramana, who obtains for his animals 174 quarts of grain, forming two days' rations. Each of the nineteen horses receives three quarts per day, and the fifteen mules each get two quarts. Perhaps it is strange that there is one fewer horse than the members of the party, but one could suppose the drover of the baggage-train rode one of the mules. In any event the group made up a substantial cavalcade. In June–July Miramana again obtains grain for the animals from Barušiyatiš, a namesake of the later queen Parysatis and perhaps a royal lady from whose estates the court could draw to supply official guests. The quantities issued to each animal are on the same scale. Finally, in the same month, thirty quarts of wine are issued to Abbatema, now explicitly on his return journey from Susa to India, with Išbaramištima once more acting as his guide. It is not hard to guess that Abbatema would have been some feudatory Indian chief, or diplomat from a neighbouring state, yet – despite the tempting resemblance to Sanskrit princely names in -deva – efforts to explain his name as Indo-Aryan were not successful, and the Iranian rendering *Apa-daiva- not wholly satisfying.³³ Furthermore the exact purpose of his journey remains obscure.

Other records from the Persepolis Fortifications mention parties of Indians, and arrangements made for their supply. In PF 1425 supplies were issued at Uzikurraš, a place often mentioned and possibly not far from Persepolis, for ten Indian gentlemen and twenty boys, through Mādatika (their 'elite guide?') who carried a travel authorization from Irdubama. In PF 1529 the decidedly generous ration of sixteen quarts of beer was issued to (another guide?) Mupušda for four Indians, one of whom received ten quarts and another four. Again the travel-permit was issued by Irdubama, and both records relate to 499 B.C. Though the quantities are much lower than for Abbatema, they suggest that the travellers were respectable persons. Also authorized by Irdubama is PF 1491, under which in January 498, Mipušda seemingly supplies the same party, with the addition of two more men and 65 boys, though in this case it is not actually stated that any were Indians. Nor are Indians specified in PF 1362 and 2051, covering humbler parties whose journeys again relate to Irdubama. Since the presumption exists that the officers issuing travel

³³ B 131, 121, with previous references.

passes on the royal roads were satraps of the provinces in which the journeys originated, these records imply that in 499 B.C. Irdubama was satrap of Hi^oduš.³⁴ It is true that in the relevant documents it is never said that the Indians authorized by Irdubama actually set out from India, but that inference is a fairly natural one, and in PF 1572 a party of Indians travelling on the king's authority have, as one would expect, that destination.

Apart from the special cases relating to Abbatema and Irdubama, at least nine records refer to journeys by Indians, or of parties travelling to or from India. In June 498 B.C. (PF 1397) one Karabba the Indian was sent by the king to India, with a party of 180 'passengers' and 50 'boys', but with only three horses and three mules. Of this party no member received more than 1½ quarts of flour per day, but the large numbers suggest activities of more than routine importance. The previous year, 499 B.C. (PF 1552) one Bakatanduš, described as a *tidda*-maker, was travelling from India to Susa with three Indian men and twenty-three 'boys'. If the Elamite word represents the Old Persian *didā* 'fortress', as Hallock believed, this man may have been a military architect with his team, returning from building Achaemenid fortresses in India. His name indeed is transparently Iranian, despite some discussion of the etymology of the second component. That his Indian assistants accompanied him suggests that they were soon to be employed in the military operations projected in the west.

Other, less picturesque travellers described as Indians may be noted summarily. They included Hapiziš (PF 1437: October 501 B.C.; ration 20 quarts), Bakdadda (PF 1410: [no date]; 3 quarts), Aššara (PF 1383: March 498 B.C.; ration 2 quarts), and Šakšaka (PF 1511: February 498 B.C., ration 1 quart). Though some of these names have not yet been decisively etymologized, and exotic names might be expected, two at least are manifestly Iranian, despite their owners' categorization as Indians. These are Bakdadda (OP **Baga-dāta*, Gk. *Μαγαδάτης*, Appian, *Syr.* 49), and, as already noted, Bakatanduš; while Šakšaka also has a good Iranian analogy.³⁵ Perhaps all these are further instances of the usage whereby Iranians residing in the provinces were designated by the provincial name,³⁶ rather than their ancestral ethnic. Yet whatever the explanation of such nomenclature, and the degree of acclimatization it implies for Persian residents in India, the high rank of several personages recorded in these documents, and the considerable number of documents referring

³⁴ D.M. Lewis, by letter.

³⁵ Šakšabanuš, of which it could be a diminutive; cf. B 131, 229.

³⁶ Cf. Nepos, *Dat.* 1: Datames, patre Camisare, natione Care. The fact that Datames served with the king's retinue in Iran suggests that he was Persian by language and descent. Also Gobryas (Gaubaruva) in Darius' inscription DNe is called Pātišuvarīš 'a dweller in the Caspian province', but is apparently the same person as the helper of Darius in DB IV.84, where he is called 'a Persian'.

to India, suggest lively traffic with that region around 500 B.C. In contrast the province of Sattagydia is but sparsely attested. The sole representative seems to be an individual known as *Sa-da-ku-iš* 'the Sattagyidian' (PF 789, 2018 and 2020), charged with distributing agricultural produce at Shiraz, and most likely a freedman or a slave official.³⁷ A captive from military operations might be expected for the rugged and embattled regions round Bannu, but otherwise the only inference possible for this province seems to be that journeys to Sattagydia were rather sparse.

Of the eastern provinces mentioned in the Fortification Tablets, all but the Arachosians figure in the tribute-list of Herodotus (III.91–4). For them the name of the Thamanaioi has apparently been substituted. On the other hand, the Fortification Tablets make no explicit mention of Drangiana. The name of the Thamanaioi has been thought to represent the Avestan *Sāma*,³⁸ originally a tribal name which survived for centuries as a title or personal name in the area of Arachosia. In respect of some other groupings, however, the Herodotean account presents problems. The repetition of the names *Paricanii* and *Caspīi* in Hdt. III.92–4 requires attention, but there is clearer evidence of dislocation since no rationalization can intelligibly group *Pactyica* among the Indian borderlands with Armenia and the Black Sea (III.93). Possibly a lacuna is to be assumed following III.92, but there are other difficulties earlier in the chapter which suggest that the disturbance may have been more deep-seated.

Evidence concerning these eastern provinces also exists in the sculptures at and around Persepolis. At Naqsh-e Rostam many of the cuneiform inscriptions designating throne-bearers on the tomb of Darius are now illegible, so that not all of the eastern representatives can be immediately distinguished. However, a duplicate façade with similar labels exists on the tomb of Artaxerxes II, where only a few of the figures have been reproduced on a large scale.³⁹ It seems clear, however, that representatives of the eastern provinces are present on both monuments. Moreover Arachosians, Sattagydiens and Indians, though *not* the Gandarans, are depicted and named on the statue-base of Darius I from Susa with accompanying labels in Egyptian hieroglyphics;⁴⁰ so that though details and dress are rather schematically rendered, actual identifications are not open to dispute. The omission here of the Gandarans evidently results from factors local to Egypt. India and the

³⁷ A 35, 12 'known by his ethnic instead of his strange and no doubt unpronounceable name, just as the Greeks habitually called slaves Skythes or Kar', which applies just as well to 'the Sattagyidian' as to the Greek Yauna. ³⁸ B 95, 333.

³⁹ The good details of other figures in B 101, pls. 41–8, do not include the Sattagydiens and their neighbours. B 179, 108–9, identifies nos. 10–13 as the Arachosian, Sattagyidian, Gandaran and Indian on all six tomb façades. ⁴⁰ B 922, 256.

other provinces could have been better known in the west from their position on the sea route, and it should not be supposed that Gandara had become detached, since the sculpture has been dated shortly after 500 B.C. A recent study furthermore contends that it is the Arachosians who figure at Persepolis as the seventh delegation of the Apadana east staircase (see Pls. Vol., pl. 40) and in the Tripylon and the Hall of 100 Columns as the seventh throne-bearer.⁴¹ In the first location, the Gandarans and Indians are identified as the fourteenth and eighteenth delegations; in the second and third as the fourteenth and nineteenth throne-bearers. At the Hall of 100 Columns, moreover, the twenty-first throne-bearer has been identified as the Sattagyidian. On the Apadana staircase, unexpectedly, the Gandarans and Indians are shown entering the palace with weapons, a characteristic which they share only with the Saka. The detail has been explained as indicating that these peoples were the trusted allies of the Persian monarchy, serving constantly in its armies perhaps as mercenary troops. The monuments thus attest their continuing adherence to the empire, since the Apadana reliefs seem to have been planned shortly before the death of Darius in 486 B.C., and work upon them continued after his death. In 480, among contingents of the grand army led to Greece by Xerxes (Hdt. vii.66–7; 70), several of these nationalities are again mentioned. On the one hand, ‘Indians’, on the other Gandarans and Dadicae, and again the Pactyes were reviewed by the king at Doriscus early in the campaign. The ‘Indians’ were led by Pharnazathres son of Artabates; the Gandarans and Dadicae by Artyphius son of Artabanus, the last therefore presumably a cousin of the king.⁴² The Pactyes served under Artayntes son of Ithamitres. We may reasonably assume that such high Persian officers had experience of service among the subject peoples whom they led to battle. Some may have been satraps, and since their number seems to have included a royal cousin, first-hand information about conditions on the eastern frontier would have been available to the court. When, later in the campaign, these contingents were encamped in the region of Thebes, they may be suspected as a source of the malaria which later was to assume epidemic proportions in that swampy region.⁴³ In this, at least, the presence of the eastern borderers in the Achaemenid army may have had an unexpected effect. Yet we do not hear that the large number of Indian dogs

⁴¹ B 101, 110–1; B 167, 149, takes the seventh Apadana delegation as the Drangians, on the evidence of their boots (cf. Hdt. vii.67 *πέδιλα δὲ ἐς γόνυ ἀνατείνοντα εἶχον*), while allowing (p. 115) that the figures could represent *both* the Arachosians *and* the Drangians; here he follows B 179, 149 with n. 42.

⁴² Cf. Hdt. iv.83 Ἀρτάβανος ὁ Ὑστάσπεος, ἀδελφὸς ἐὼν Δαρείου. This personage seems to be identical with the father of our commander, who in vii.67 also has a brother Ariomardus, who commands the mysteriously recurrent Caspians.

⁴³ Onchestus, north of Thebes on Lake Copais, was proverbially malarious; cf. c 33, 40.

accompanying the army⁴⁴ caused, as might have been expected, any marked upsurge in the local incidence of rabies, which seems not to have been reported in Greece before the time of Xenophon.⁴⁵

After the participation of their contingents in the Greek wars, little was reported concerning the history and peoples of the easternmost Achaemenid provinces by the Classical historians. Ctesias, it is true, at the end of the fifth century B.C., passed on his share of travellers' tales concerning India, and from him Aristotle (*HA* 501a26), Pausanias (*IX*.21.4), and especially Aelian (*NA* IV.21) derive their account of the *martichoras* (Old Persian **martiya-xwar* 'man-eater'), a man-eating Indian tiger equipped with a triple row of teeth, and for good value a scorpion's sting, and quills shot from the tail! The Old Persian term for an Indian beast, and the typical courtly hyperbole of the description, leave no doubt of the setting from which the tale arose. Ctesias indeed claims to have seen the beast brought as a gift to Artaxerxes II (just as lions had once been brought to Darius). Such an event indicates at least some exercise of authority in the Indus region. Yet Ctesias seems to preserve no echo of real historical events in the eastern provinces: how far they may have remained under direct Achaemenid control, or how far a purely 'indirect rule' and local autonomy were evolving into complete separation.

Thereafter the only hint of historical states existing in the area comes from the evidence of numismatic finds. The two Afghan hoards of Mir Zakah and Chaman Huzuri (above, pp. 196–7) contained, mingled with bent-bar coins of Gandhāra, in the first case Iranian bar-ingots, including one adjusted to the exact Babylonian standard of Darius the Great; and in the second, strange countermarked flans bearing a crowned lion, confronted bull's heads, a spindly bird and a curious outline reminiscent of a water-beetle, which last finds analogies on the later Maurya *kārṣāpaṇa*. Such symbols appear to indicate some administration at once distinct from that of Gandhāra and from the central Achaemenid government. Yet to label such flans 'coins of the Kambojas', though convenient, would certainly be premature. Fresh discoveries will be needed in an area archaeologically still all but unknown before any real picture can be formed of the political situation on the Indus towards the close of the fifth century B.C. Yet it appears that any Achaemenid presence here had grown increasingly thin, and that independent forces were increasingly asserting themselves in the region.

⁴⁴ Hdt. VII.87, noted in *CHInd* I 340 n. 2. ⁴⁵ A I, 141.

CHAPTER 3e

ANATOLIA


M. MELLINK

The Persian rule over Anatolia under Darius and Xerxes was a continuation of the take-over initiated by Cyrus when he pushed across the Halys to Lydia and captured Sardis, the residence of the Lydian dynasty and *de facto* capital of Western Anatolia after the Phrygian collapse in the early seventh century B.C. The Lydian kings gradually had claimed a small empire beyond their own ethnic boundaries, extending their authority over the Phrygian plateau west of the Halys and making use of what must have been a traditional system of control through garrisons in citadels, tax collection and safeguarding of roads.

The major problem of controlling Western Anatolia was symbiosis with the Greeks. This is also an old story. Land-bound rulers of the Anatolian plateau need to come to an understanding with the coastal and island dwellers of the Aegean to live in mutual peace and prosperity; they have to make their political status clear and strong along the borders. This was true in the second millennium B.C. of the Hittites and their Aegean neighbours (including Ahhiyawa). It was also evident to every Lydian king from Gyges on that the Ionians and Carians had to be made into constructive allies as seafaring merchants and soldiers. Struggles with the Ionians marked the rules of the kings before Croesus, concentrating on the great harbour city of Miletus with which Alyattes finally established a peaceful alliance. Miletus–Millawanda had been the key site also in the days of the Ahhiyawa and Hittites, and the major troubles of those days came from the Achaean allies of Miletus overseas in Greek territory.

The Persians inherited the Aegean problem that the Lydians had begun to resolve. Neither Persians nor Lydians were sea-farers; the Ionians and Carians were needed by both; culturally the Ionians had an enviable heritage; an ambivalent situation existed which could be swung into hostilities by outside interference from the Greek side. The Persians fell victim to this, resulting in a major defeat when their kings attempted to extend their land-bound empire to the Aegean realm. As before, the troubles centred on Miletus and its Greek allies.

When Cyrus conquered the Lydian kingdom, he wisely continued to



Map 8. Anatolia.

rule Lydia and its West Anatolian realm from the capital at Sardis, situated well inland in the fertile Hermus valley along the main road descending from the Anatolian plateau to the west coast. The Lydian network of communications was kept intact. The acropolis and fortified lower city of Sardis with their spectacular terraced buildings were repaired and kept in use. The principal spoken and written language remained Lydian. Greek was prominent especially from the time of Croesus, and Aramaic was making its way as the administrative language for official usage by the Persians.

In Sardis, and from the cultural synthesis the Lydian kings had promoted in their openness to the Greeks as well as Egyptians, the Persian kings drew inspiration for their own creation of a cultural *koine* which was Ionian–Lydian–Achaemenid, especially in the realm of art and architecture. The West Anatolian process of cultural assimilation had been in progress for millennia, but the Lydians had given it new vigour in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. The art of the Persian empire owed a basic debt to the cultural satrapy centred on Sardis.

The various lists which give us the Anatolian peoples or administrative satrapies under Darius' control¹ emphasize the prominence of Sardis. The Bisitun inscription lists the peoples of Sparda–Sardis, Yauna–Ionia, Armina–Armenia, Katpatuka–Cappadocia; at Naqsh-e Rostam, Karka–Caria is added and the Ionians are divided in two groups. Herodotus III.89–97 lists a total of twenty satrapies with their financial obligations. The first satrapy includes Ionians, Magnesians, Aeolians, Carians, Lycians, Milyans and Pamphylians, a series of inhabitants of the west coast south of the Hellespont, then the Carians on the south-west coast, and on the south coast, the Lycians, Milyans (upland but in traditional close contact with the Lycian coast) and Pamphylians; all of these peoples partly Greeks overseas, partly hellenized Anatolians or vice versa. The second satrapy consists of Mysians, Lydians, Lasonians, Cabalians, and Hytenneis. These are the indigenous Lydians and their inland neighbours to the north (Mysians) and to the south east (the Cibratis and part of Pisidia, with Luwian contingents). Sardis was in this satrapy. The third satrapy included the south shore of the Hellespont, the Phrygians and Asiatic Thracians, Paphlagonians, Mariandynians and Syrians (i.e. Cappadocians). This is the Daskylitis of Thucydides I.129.1, with the satrapal residence at Dascylium. The people belonging to it are those dwelling on the south shore of the Hellespont and Propontis, in the Pontic zones of Bithynia and Paphlagonia, and the inland zones of former Phrygia and Cappadocia which would have bordered on the Euphrates and Armenia. This then is

¹ B 44, 58, 77–90; B 45, 200–91; B 40, 47–56.

a large part of the non-Lyidian plateau, including sites which had been developed as strategic centres by the Phrygians in the eighth century B.C. The Phrygians and Thracians were Iron Age newcomers, the Pontic and Cappadocian peoples were largely of Bronze Age stock. It is noteworthy that the residential and administrative centre of this large and mixed district was in Dascylium, south east of Lake Manyas, on the north-west periphery of the third satrapy, a site whose early credentials remain unknown to us at this stage of exploration.

Herodotus' fourth satrapy was greater Cilicia which he does not define geographically. The region across the upper Euphrates, the former Urartu, with its Pontic neighbours was in the thirteenth satrapy, principally consisting of Armenia. Some East Anatolian tribes, the Moschoi and Tibarenoi, are listed in the nineteenth satrapy, along with the Makrones, Mossynoikoi and Mares who lived in Colchis.

Ethnographically these lists are important because they emphasize the persistence of the old tribal elements in the peripheral districts of Anatolia. Tribal distinctions would also be maintained in dialects, beliefs, customs and equipment, as noticeable again in Herodotus' listing (VII.72–94) of the Anatolian contingents in the army and navy of Xerxes.

Herodotus knows the western satrapies and satraps best, and it is through him that we know of individual satraps before Darius' reorganization of the system, and of their behaviour after the death of Cambyses when Oroetes, satrap at Sardis, took advantage of the interregnum and assassinated Mitrobates, satrap at Dascylium, and his son Cranaspes in 522 B.C. (Hdt. III.126). Darius had Oroetes executed by a special stratagem (III.128).

Oroetes is said to have resided also at Magnesia on the Maeander (III.122); this would be a border zone between Herodotus' first and second satrapy. A satrap Gadatas was apparently ruling here later in Darius' reign, to judge by a letter known indirectly from a late copy of the Greek translation, in which Gadatas is praised for the planting of trees from Syria, evidently in the development of an exotic botanical garden, but is told not to tax the sacred gardeners of Apollo and not to make them till profane soil against the policy of the Achaemenid dynasty.²

After the Scythian campaign Darius left Megabazus in command of military operations in Thrace and proceeded to Sardis (Hdt. V.11) where he may have spent the winter of 513/12 waiting for the completion of the campaign. Megabazus joined him in 512. Darius appointed his half brother Artaphernes to be the satrap in Sardis and made Otanes, son of Sisamnes, general of the coastal forces as successor to Megabazus (V.25). Otanes, like other Persian generals who operated in Anatolia, was a son-in-law of Darius. Darius departed for Susa taking Megabazus and

² M-L 20–2, no. 12.

Histiaeus along with him, leaving Artaphernes in charge of the satrapy.

In Dascylium, Oebares, son of Megabazus, appears as satrap before 493 (vi.33), but Herodotus has no detail on his rule except for the submission of Cyzicus. In 479 Xerxes appointed Artabazus to the satrapy in Dascylium, which then became hereditary (Thuc. i.129).

Greek information on the individual rulers appointed as satraps in Anatolia is meagre. The organization and relative wealth of the Anatolian districts becomes somewhat clearer through Herodotus' report of the tribute paid by each satrapy and through his listing of the Anatolian army and navy contingents in the early summer of 480, where the ethnic identifications of the infantry appear and summary descriptions of their attire are given. The number of ships and the names of the captains are important indications of the continuing nautical strength of the first satrapy and of Cilicia (Hdt. vii.72–99).

The first, coastal satrapy is represented by 30 ships from Pamphylia, 50 from Lycia with Kybernis(kos), son of (Kos)sikas in command, 70 from the Carians, whose leaders were Histiaeus son of Tymnes, Pigres son of Hysseidomus, and Damasithymus son of Candaules. Most famous of all was Artemisia daughter of Lygdamis of Halicarnassus, who brought five splendid ships. From Cilicia, the fourth satrapy, Syennesis came with 100 ships.

The second, Sardis satrapy sends infantry, Lydians with their neighbours to the north, Mysians, and to the south, Cabalians, Lasonians and Milyans (here grouped with the inland people). The other contingents of foot soldiers came from the Daskylitis, the third satrapy. Here we find Asiatic Thracians and Bithynians, Paphlagonians, Mariandynians as well as plateau dwellers of Phrygia and Cappadocia. From East Anatolia the thirteenth satrapy is represented with Armenians, and from the nineteenth we find Moschoi, Tibarenoi, Makrones and Mossynoikoi from the far shores of the Black Sea.

How all these troops of Xerxes marched to assembly points such as Critalla in Cappadocia (Hdt. vii.26), and where we are to locate this otherwise unknown strategic juncture of the Persian road system, is a matter of topographical analysis and reconstruction. We have a few more indications about the routes used in 480 than about the march of Mardonius' infantry from Cilicia to the Hellespont in 492 (Hdt. vi.43). Herodotus has Xerxes' troops cross the Halys from Cappadocia to south Phrygia and proceed to Celaenae-Dinar near the sources of the Maeander, where Xerxes later built a palace and a fortress on the acropolis (Xenophon, *Anab.* i.2.9). Pythius, the wealthy Lydian who entertained Xerxes' army at Celaenae, is a symbol of the region's prosperity. From there the road led to Colossae and westward to a boundary stone between Phrygia and Lydia at Cydrara, with an

inscription by Croesus. Here Herodotus is on familiar territory and describes the two branches of the Lydian road, the southern one into Caria, and the northern one to Sardis, along which Xerxes crossed the Maeander, and found occasion to honour a fabulous tamarisk-tree at Callatebus (VII.31).

I. COMMUNICATIONS

The fame of the Persian road system is based on efficient improvements of an existing network of natural communications. In Anatolia, roads had begun to develop in the aceramic period of obsidian trade, and were taken over by the rulers of the copper and bronze era, with special attention to the routes that served the Old Assyrian trade in the twentieth to eighteenth centuries B.C. Tablets from Kanesh-Kültepe give evidence of the controlled caravan system that depended on security of the roads and political agreements with the rulers of the areas traversed.³ The Hittites inherited the road system of the 'Cappadocian' trading period and expanded it to the districts of their kingdom and empire. Movements of Hittite armies and messengers were efficient and controlled; messengers were housed and supplied with sustenance by the communities *en route*.⁴

When the Phrygians under Midas began to rebuild a central Anatolian kingdom extending to the former Hittite capital and the cult-city at Alaca Hüyük, they used the northern road on the plateau via Ancyra; their connexions with the southern road were made at Celaenae, Iconium-Konya and Tyana. The Lydians under Alyattes moved their army to the Halys and to Pteria (former Hattusha) along the northern, Gordium road. Cyrus took this road westward and followed in the footsteps of the retreating Lydian army all the way to Sardis in 547 B.C. The Phrygian and Lydian control system must have been underdeveloped compared to what the Persians established, but the major roads had a long history and prehistory, and were increasingly used for the movement of troops by the Hittites, Phrygians and Lydians.

The fame of the royal road (Hdt. v. 50-3) is its systematic provision of caravanserais and post stations for official messengers and travellers.⁵ It served the efficient movement of armies as well as the special messenger service with relays of horses and riders (Hdt. VIII.98). Its exact course is a matter of continuing topographical research. The sections of a northern road excavated at Gordium and identified at other Phrygian sites, such as Pessinus to the west and Yenidoğan to the east *en route* to Ancyra belong to the Roman period in their final form, but may be technical successors of the Persian royal road, as stratification of road-beds suggest.⁶

³ B 303, 5. ⁴ B 706, 9. ⁵ B 44, 108-9. ⁶ B 749; B 741-2.

For an analysis of the regional impact of Persian rule, taxation and requisition of military contingents in the era of Darius and Xerxes we must consult the general archaeological record, which can take us beyond the horizon of Herodotus. Even if the garrison-system, the administrative centres and the satrapal palaces have not yet been identified and excavated, we can explore the Anatolian inland regions and the old sites along the roads, as well as the Anatolian coastal peoples with their stubborn heritage to examine traces of Persian action and interaction.

II. SARDIS AND LYDIA


Sardis is the key site for Western Anatolia and now proving to be the most promising to yield archaeological evidence of Persian rule and organization (Fig. 11). Current excavations have brought to light the material record of Cyrus' conquest of the lower city, which was fortified with a massive mud-brick rampart.⁷ After the breaching of this wall with the aid of a siege-mound at the north-west side of the lower city, and the sealing-in of Lydian ceramic inventory of 547/6 B.C., the fortification was repaired with a stone wall set on top of the mud-brick stump. This repair has not yet been dated precisely but is likely to be early Persian.

The attack on Sardis by the Ionians in 499 did not find the lower city unfortified in spite of Herodotus v. 100–2. Artaphernes remained safe in the acropolis with a large force. Herodotus' term 'acropolis' may have included the large terraces discovered in the lower city from 1982 on, built of rubble with ashlar masonry facing of over 12 m in height. Their construction may date to Croesus, but they certainly existed in early Persian times. The lower city with its monumental terraces extended at least 800 m east of the Pactolus river and north of the modern highway.⁸

In 499, Herodotus reports, the burning of reed huts and mud-brick houses with thatched roofs forced the inhabitants to flee to the agora area near the Pactolus and also affected the temple of Cybebe. The Cybebe shrine probably stood outside the fortified city, as shrines of Phrygian Cybele did. The excavators of Sardis have tentatively identified burnt strata of 499 B.C. in built-up areas along the east side of the Pactolus and in less densely occupied territory west of the river, both zones most likely to have been outside of the lower city fortifications.⁹

In the cemetery area to the west of the Pactolus, many chamber-tombs were excavated in 1910–14; they show continuity from the Lydian to the Persian period, with tomb gifts including Attic and Corinthian pottery, alabastra, jewellery and stamp-seals. A chamber-tomb with tall limestone

⁷ B 709; B 734, 12–14. ⁸ B 708. ⁹ B 714, 101.



11. Sardis in the Lydo-Persian period. (After B 714, plan 1.)

stelae in front, crowned by palmette anthemia, had one burial dated to 500–480 B.C.; a cylinder-seal of onyx, mounted in gold, is Achaemenid of late Darius date.¹⁰ Pyramidal seals of the Achaemenid period still carry Lydian inscriptions, and there is evidence for an active production of stamp-seals of this shape at Sardis, starting in the Persian era (Pls. Vol., pl. 76).¹¹ Gold jewellery of Achaemenid design is also found in the tombs.

Evidently the burial customs of the Lydians at Sardis did not change under Persian rule. For Bintepe, the tumulus cemetery north of the Hermus river, we have no specific proof of finds after 546 B.C., but tumuli may have continued to be erected over the graves of prominent Sardians in the later sixth and early fifth centuries B.C.

The Persian imprint on the city of Sardis is the less noticeable because

¹⁰ B 715, 25, no. 47, n. 109; B 700, 39f, no. 104. ¹¹ B 694.

the Lydians were among the instructors and craftsmen of Achaemenid architects. The upper acropolis at Sardis has preserved some of the terrace walls of its monumental buildings, built and finished in what we understand increasingly well as the Lydian style. We do not have the satrapal inventory, furnishings, carpets, archives and treasury; even so, we know that under the rule of Darius Lydians continued to be respected advisers and a source of expert craftsmen as they had been in the era of Cyrus. The foundation tablets of Darius' palaces at Susa record the work of stone-cutters and wood-carvers from Sardis, confirming in writing what a technical examination of the buildings at Pasargadae revealed as Lydian workmanship under the auspices of Cyrus.¹²

Economically, in the issue of coinage, Darius followed the lead of Croesus, and continued minting croesids for some time, but gold darics as well as silver sigloi were minted at Sardis before 500 B.C. The early types show the king half-length with bow or shooting with the bow. Both of the early types of sigloi were represented in a hoard from Bayraklı–Old Smyrna dated to c. 500 B.C.¹³

The cultural and spiritual impact of the Persian presence may gradually have increased through the presence of Persian holders of royal land-grants in fifth-century Lydia, but most of the pertinent evidence here and elsewhere post-dates Darius and Xerxes. The same is true for the introduction of Persian cults. Documents of a cult of a Persian 'Zeus Baradates' at Sardis, of Anahita at Hypaipa and Hieracome refer to the fourth century, typical though they may be of earlier, gradual penetration by privileged Persian settlers in regional concentration, and through them, the introduction of Iranian religious practices and concepts into Lydia.¹⁴ Herodotus v. 102 reports that a rescue force came to Sardis in 499 organized by Persians who had districts west of the Halys. These must be the generals Daurises, Hymaios and Otanes, also referred to in v. 116, rather than fief-holders. They caught up with the Ionians in Ephesus and defeated them thoroughly. Survivors of the battle were pursued by the generals.

Among the Persians in Sardis there were apparently elements conspiring with Histiaeus. These traitors were caught and punished by Artaphernes (Hdt. vi.4).

III. DASCYLIIUM, GRECO-PERSIAN MONUMENTS

The second known satrapal capital, Dascylium, has now with confidence been identified with the site of Hisartepe on the south-east shore of Lake Manyas, Daskylitis limne, near the village of Ergili.¹⁵ Excavations took

¹² B 110, D S f; B 207, 53–9 (D S z). ¹³ C 621, 31–3; B 15, 616.

¹⁴ B 713, 33; B 736; B 735, 150. ¹⁵ B 678; B 679, 171, fig. 115.



12. Bullae from Dascylium. (After B 679, figs. 122, 123; B 678, pl. 12.2.)

place from 1954 to 1959; the upper, Hellenistic levels contained walls with many spolia, including architectural blocks from what must have been the satrapal palace. From a level below the Hellenistic structures came a hoard of about 300 bullae with stamp- and cylinder-seal impressions.¹⁶ About 30 of these have cuneiform legends in Old Persian, about 10 have Aramaic legends, and on one is a fragmentary Greek legend. The cuneiform legends point to Xerxes; one of his cylinder-seal impressions shows the 'royal hero' grasping a lion-griffin by the horn; the hero holds a dagger in his right hand; behind him is a palm tree (Fig. 12a). Another has an antithetical group of royal sphinxes below a winged disk. On the stamp-seals the familiar scene of the royal hero and the lion-griffin reappears, the hero either grasping the monster or stabbing it with his dagger. Other bullae show a Persian figure in trousers, cloak and headgear, holding staff and rods (Fig. 12b), and an impression from a Greek seal shows Greeks fighting (Fig. 12c). The range of dates of this hoard of bullae has not yet been determined; so far the seals do not seem to be matched on impressions found in Persepolis.

It is evident that an administrative part of the satrapal residence was located here. The site is of the appropriate scenic attraction for the Persian palace and garden known from the later reference in Xen. *Hell.*

¹⁶ B 686; B 679, fig. 122; B 692, 52-3.

IV.1.15–16. It deserves detailed excavation of the residential area and cemeteries. Much fifth-century material has come to light through chance discoveries, most of it belonging to funeral monuments.

Tomb stelae of typical ‘Greco-Persian’ style were found reused in a Byzantine tomb in 1965.¹⁷ The Aramaic inscription on one stela¹⁸ identifies the tomb owner as ʾElnāp son of ʾšy. If the inscription is primary, the ʾElnāp stela shows that foreign (Aramaic-Arab?) members of the Dascylium administration followed the same burial customs and iconography for their monuments as the local officials. ʾElnāp’s reliefs show typical funerary rites known from other stelae; the traditional repertoire of funerary procession and banquet may be expanded by a hunting-scene, as on a newly found stela from Sultaniye east of Manyas Lake.¹⁹

The art to which these stelae belong develops in the western satrapies. It is technically dependent on paint, since the relief is often flat and lacks detail. It shows funerary rites of Anatolian type, preparatory to burial of the body in a chamber-tomb or tumulus. Stelae and some of the relief slabs with anathyrosis found at Ergili must have been set up in front of the tombs. The iconography emphasizes the status of the tomb-owner and often his horsemanship. Some of the attendants on the Dascylium stelae wear Persian costume (see Pls. Vol., pl. 82), but not the tomb-owner, nor the servants at the banquet. One of the reliefs from Dascylium illustrates a Persian rite performed by two men in Persian attire in front of a structure which may be a tomb (Pls. Vol., pl. 45).²⁰

Such reliefs must have belonged to the tombs of prominent individuals, whose life-style was gradually Persianized in the fifth-century satrapal capital. The tumulus burial proper continued in Anatolian fashion. The art of this stratum of Persianizing officials, also represented in wall-paintings from northern Lycia and ruined tomb-chambers of tumuli in the greater Lydian area, develops its own iconography with mannerisms in the rendering of horses and chariots which are equally apparent in Achaemenid art at Persepolis. The syncretism of Greek, West Anatolian and Persian art is noticeable from Thrace to inner Lycia.

The precious contents of the tombs to which the Greco-Persian sculptures belonged are not known for Dascylium, and were looted in Sardis. A looted tomb near Kırkağaç in the upper Caicus valley once had a painted klinē with sphinxes, and wall-paintings with a chariot procession.²¹

Tumuli in the upper Hermus valley, at İkiztepe near Güre, 20 km west

¹⁷ B 681; B 695; C 551, nos. 3–4; C 521, 265–88. ¹⁸ B 698. ¹⁹ B 739.

²⁰ B 695, 201–3, pl. 57; C 545, no. 1357.

²¹ B 719, 81, n. 15; and personal communication from C. H. Greenewalt.

of Uşak, were looted, and their remaining contents salvaged in the 1960s. In one tumulus a double limestone tomb-chamber was plundered; it had two marble klinai. Among the confiscated loot were about 30 silver vessels, oinochoai, plain bowls, omphalos bowls, dishes, ladles and fluted small jars; there also were many alabastra and clay lydia. One silver omphalos bowl has a repoussé design of antithetical bull-protomes set above a winged disk supported by a palmette. A silver incense-burner is similar to those known from Persepolis reliefs. Another incense-burner was made of iron. In the dromos a siglos of Darius was found. Some of the inventory of these and other Güre tomb-chambers is now in New York. Several pieces have Lydian or Phrygian graffiti on the base.²²

These tumuli are in Lydian-Phrygian territory, and must have belonged to wealthy land-owners under the spell of Persian manners. A tumulus set on a hill at Çeçtepe, c. 20 km north west of Celaenae–Dinar, had a relief cut in a ledge of the rock, showing two horsemen and a chariot in procession.²³ This relief is again Greco-Persian and shows the variety of exterior commemorative monuments associated with early fifth-century tumulus burials in Lydian–Phrygian districts.

The most explicit iconography in this Persianized manner is preserved in the wall-paintings of the chamber in the Karaburun I tumulus near Elmalı in northern Lycia, the Milyad perhaps at this stage of geographic definition. A commemorative monument stood on a base on the outer slope, and the architecture betrays Phrygian affinities.

The paintings are typically Greco-Persian in the banquet scene, on the main wall and in the chariot procession (see Fig. 41 below, p. 479) on one of the lateral walls, but offer much more detail, variety and colour than the abbreviated Dascylium stelae. The precious metal vessels painted in the drinking scene of the tomb must have had their counterparts in tomb offerings set on the floor and table of the chamber, anciently looted. The appearance of a battle scene on the third wall emphasizes the new role of the local nobleman as an ally in the Persian army. He appears on horseback spearing a Greek hoplite whose comrades and auxiliary archers are being dispatched by local soldiers not quite from Herodotus' catalogue, wearing short tunics, puttees and shoes, equipped with daggers and fighting with short spears. The date of the paintings (c. 475 B.C.?) is hardly as late as the battles against Cimon's forces in Lycia and Pamphylia, but the local grandee may have aided the Persians in other territory against the Ionians and their allies.²⁴

As in Lydia and presumably in Dascylium, the actual burial customs are not Persianized, but at Karaburun the servants in the chariot procession and those in the banquet scene appear in Persian costume. The nobleman himself wears a purple Persian tunic, trousers, kandys and

²² B 743, 391–7; B 745. ²³ B 703; B 697. ²⁴ B 723.

bashlyk as he rides in his chariot. On horseback he appears in the purple tunic and trousers and red Persian shoes. His black horse is also rendered in the Persian manner and wears a red ribbon in the topknot. For the banquet the tomb-owner is attired in semi-Greek costume (see Pls. Vol., pl. 81). His chiton has rosette borders; his green cloak is purple- and silver-edged; his diadem is made of chequered cloth and beads; his jewellery, gold ear-rings and lion-head bracelets, is of good Achaemenid type. His wife, the only woman rendered in the friezes, looks entirely Greek.

What these tomb-paintings and sculptures show is an external adoption of Persian fashions and mannerisms by the wealthy Anatolians of Lydia, Dascylium, Phrygia and the Milyad. In most instances, leaving aside monuments with Aramaic inscriptions, we are not looking at tombs of Persian officials resident in Anatolia, but at those of regional noblemen who collaborated with the Persian regime and compromised with Persian fashions, although their art continued to have strong ties with Greece. A *koine* of manners develops among the privileged classes of the west Anatolian plateau. The artistic expression of their world was achieved with the aid of Ionian and Lydian artists (and some Attic help at Karaburun), who trained apprentices in local workshops. On a much higher level, and under royal auspices, the artistic compromise between the Ionian–Lydian and Persian–Elamite tradition was being brought about at Persepolis.

IV. THE SOUTH COAST: CARIA, LYCIA, PAMPHYLIA

1. *Caria*

The districts along the south coast of Anatolia, from Caria to Pamphylia, with their orientation to the Mediterranean and their Bronze Age heritage, did not change radically under Persian rule, any more than they had been culturally dominated by Hittites, Phrygians and Lydians. The Carians continued their maritime activities. Carian ships and sailors provided services to Darius and Xerxes in the Aegean, the east Mediterranean and the Near East. Carians (Karkā) and Ionians ferried Lebanese timber from Babylon to Susa for the palace of Darius.²⁵ Scylax of Caryanda was entrusted by Darius with the exploration of the Indus downstream and the passage westward to Egypt (Hdt. iv.44).²⁶ Carians were involved in the Naxian expedition of Aristagoras in 500 (Hdt. v.37) and contributed 70 ships to Xerxes.

Artemisia, the Carian–Cretan daughter of Lygdamis of the Halicarnassian dynasty, played her conspicuous role at Salamis.

²⁵ B 110, D S f and z. ²⁶ B 44, 14, 61–2.

The Carian aristocracy continued to rule various towns and districts and formed a loose alliance in times of need, such as on the occasion of the invasion of Caria by Daurises, Darius' son-in-law, during the Ionian Revolt. The meeting of the chieftains at the White Pillars and the River Marsyas was known to Herodotus (v.118) who singles out Pixodarus, son of Mausollus and son-in-law of the Cilician king Syennesis, for praise (v.118). After an initial defeat, further deliberation took place in the sanctuary and sacred grove at Labraunda. The Persians, victorious at Mylasa, were later ambushed and defeated at Pedasa–Pedasus by the Carians under Heraclides, son of Ibanollis of Mylasa.

This Carian kind of confederacy and dynastic leadership still has a Bronze Age flavour, and some of the Greek component in Caria may be of the same tradition.

We hear of other aristocrats under Xerxes' rule, such as the admirals of the Carian fleet, among them Pigres son of Hysseldomus, perhaps of the Syangela dynasty,²⁷ and Aridolis of Alabanda, captured by the Greeks (Hdt. vii.98 and 195). A Halicarnassian by the name of Xeïnagoras was appointed to the governorship of Cilicia by Xerxes after 480 (Hdt. ix.107) perhaps in view of Carian–Cilician ties among Halicarnassian nobility.

The effect of the subjugation of Caria after the fall of Miletus is noticeable in the appearance of Karka in the lists of subject lands at Naqsh-i Rostam. Carian workers are listed in the Persepolis Treasury and Fortification Tablets.²⁸ At Halicarnassus, the ruling family continued in charge and probably owned the alabaster vessel with cuneiform and Egyptian hieroglyphic inscriptions of Xerxes, the Great King, found under the Mausoleum.²⁹

2. *Lycia*

The political structure of Lycia under Darius and the early rule of Xerxes must still have been dominated by the Xanthian dynasty, nominally under Persian authority. The kings of the other Lycian towns were linguistically and traditionally close enough to maintain an informal alliance. Xanthus probably was the administrative intermediary for Persian rule, but we have hardly any reference to the mechanism of Lycian–Persian contacts. Kybernis, who was the Lycian admiral (Hdt. vii.98), remains a puzzle as to his ancestry.

Xanthus, which had borne the brunt of the attack of Harpagus, has some good archaeological evidence from excavations of the acropolis. After the destruction, the citadel was rebuilt in local style. Both

²⁷ B 687, 128.

²⁸ B 34, 142, PT 37; B 82, PF 123, 1123.

²⁹ B 110, X V s.



13. Silver coin of Kuprlli. (After c 625, fig. 649.)

residential and sacral buildings have been excavated for the period of c. 530 to 470 B.C., when another destructive attack is evident from the archaeological record, presumably to be connected with the campaign of Cimon against Persian garrisons.³⁰ The levels underlying the destruction can be dated by an abundance of Attic black-figure and red-figure pottery which continues to be imported.

Lycian monumental tombs of pillar type are erected without reference to the Persian overlords. The Harpy monument, probably built in the decades 500–480 B.C., has Lycian overtones in its symbolism of winged figures, although in style and execution it is indebted to Ionian (Milesian?) artists.³¹ The typical Greco-Persian manner of Dascylium and the Lydian interior is not to be seen in Xanthus, although it came close in the Karaburun tomb near Elmali by 475.

Lycian silver coinage of uncertain rulers dates back to 500 or even earlier. The coinage of Kuprlli may have started as early as 485 B.C.³² These coins were struck at Xanthus and Limyra, and perhaps elsewhere; the iconography is Lycian and Greek (Fig. 13). Persian traits appear on few of these coins, and may have been introduced by Greek rather than Lycian artists. This is plausible in view of the non-Persian character of Xanthian architecture and sculpture c. 500–480.

3. Pamphylia

This was a district with a different ethnic and linguistic composition, having absorbed a large number of Achaean–Argive refugees in the Dark Ages, but maintaining a linguistic stratification of Luwian (?), Achaean and Doric elements.³³ We know little about the Persian rule of Pamphylia, which lasted until 469 B.C. The Pamphylians had to pay their share of the assessment of the first Herodotean satrapy, along with the Carians, Lycians and Milyans.

The principal cities are Aspendus and Perge, accessible via the Eurymedon and Cestrus rivers. Aspendus, the leading city, appears as

³⁰ B 725, 80–2; B 726, 195.

³¹ B 699, 39–45.

³² B 727; C 636; C 645.

³³ B 696, 145–50, 194–7.

ΕΣΤΦΕ on its early fifth-century coinage, which may not have started until after Cimon's campaign. The name of the city may be linked to Asitawata who founded Karatepe in Cilicia. Neither Aspendus nor Perge has been archaeologically investigated for the classical or pre-classical period, although Perge is now being excavated extensively. The status of the Pamphylian cities in pre-Persian and Persian times is still to be examined. Herodotus, who knows of the post-Trojan diaspora of the Achaeans under Amphilochous and Calchas, reports a contingent of 30 ships for Xerxes (VII.91). The native traditions and the legends of the Achaean settlers survived into the Hellenistic and Roman periods, as is attested by the dedications to the founders (*ketistai*) Mopsus and Calchas at Perge as late as A.D. 120.

The town of Side at the mouth of the Melas river was on the border of Cilicia Tracheia. It had a small harbour of some importance. This town maintained its own language and script into the Hellenistic period, clearly proud of its un-Greek past. Its coinage started early in the fifth century. As at Perge, the earlier strata are thoroughly covered by the spectacular remains of the Hellenistic and Roman periods.

V. CILICIA

The neighbours of Pamphylia were the inhabitants of the mountainous stretch of Cilicia. In 557/6, the Neo-Babylonian king Neriglissar had campaigned in Cilicia–Hume against Appuashu, king of Pirindu.³⁴ The pursuit went into mountainous territory as far as Ura (this Bronze Age harbour city may be at the mouth of the Calycadnus), Kirshi and Pitusu, which were captured and destroyed. This brought Neriglissar to the border of Lydia, as his chronicle states, i.e. the Pamphylian plain, which then formally belonged to Croesus' domain (Hdt. 1.28). A year later, Nabonidus also campaigned in Hume.³⁵

The key zone of Cilicia was the coastal plain which had been active in east Mediterranean and Levantine trade through its cities with harbours on the rivers Cydnus (Tarsus), Sarus–Seyhan (Adana) and Pyramus–Ceyhan (Mallus, Mopsouhestia) and overland routes through the Taurus passes to the North and Amanus Gates to Syria. Like the Lycians, the Cilicians tended to maintain their independence, but had to conform to major powers whose economic interests needed their co-operation: Hittites, Assyrians and Neo-Babylonians. The Phrygians tried in vain to penetrate the Assyrian-held territory of Cilicia, and the Lydians never controlled it. (Hdt. 1.28).

A local dynasty seems to have survived the tribulations of foreign garrisons and campaigns. The kings are named or titled Syennesis; the

³⁴ B 359, 74–7, 86–8; B 274, 103–4; B 718, 17–44.1 ³⁵ B 274 Chron. 7.7.

first known Syennesis helps to reconcile Alyattes and Cyaxares in 585 (Hdt. I.74); we hear of a daughter of a Syennesis as the bride of the Carian prince Pixodarus, son of Mausollus in c. 494 (Hdt. v.118), and (the same?) Syennesis, son of Oromedon, is the commander of the 100-ship contingent for Xerxes (Hdt. VII.98); Aeschylus reports his death at Salamis (*Pers.* 326–8).

We are not sure where the Syennesis dynasty resided. Appuashu seems to be based in western Cilicia. Tarsus would have had the historical prestige for a centre of the kingdom, but there seems to be a gap in the excavated part of the principal mound after 520 B.C.³⁶ Appuashu may have been a 'Syennesis'. A citadel in the Calycadnus valley, at Gülnar–Meydancık, has tantalizing references to the Achaemenid period in the presence of a relief with a procession of Persian dignitaries as well as fragmentary statues flanking the entrance of a gabled built tomb of the fifth century B.C. An Aramaic inscription identifies this citadel as Kirshui.³⁷

Cilicia's importance to the Persian kings is evident in its separate status as Herodotus' fourth satrapy. Darius uses coastal Cilicia as his base for the attack on Cyprus in 497/6 (Hdt. v.108). At the battle of Lade Cilician ships were among the Persian contingents (Hdt. VI.6). In 492 Mardonius assembled his fleet off the Cilician coast (VI.43) and moved his army overland from Cilicia to the west, probably via the Calycadnus road. Darius, after the failures at Athos and in Thrace, had his new commanders assemble their forces in the Aleian Plain between the Sarus and Pyramus rivers to prepare for embarkation on the fleet and troop transports to carry them from the Cilician coast (at Mallus?) to Ionia (VI.95). The modern coastline has changed considerably since prehistoric and classical times, but the estuary of the Pyramus–Ceyhan was clearly of strategic and economic importance through early history. The crucial position of Cilicia as a safe entry area and naval base for the Persians is evident, as is the compliance of the Cilician kings, who provided 100 ships to Xerxes.

The Cilician plain had long been a wealthy area of farmers, traders and manufacturers. The tribute noted by Herodotus in his list of nations III.90 consists of 360 white horses, one for each day, and 500 silver talents, 140 of which went for the cavalry guard. The white horses, on which Herodotus has no further comment, must have been destined for ceremonial service, such as pulling the chariot of Ahura Mazda (Hdt. VII.40). The territory of the satrapy extended across the Taurus mountains to the north and north east in the direction of Commagene. Epigraphic discoveries and archaeology will have to expand our horizon.

³⁶ B 707, 145.

³⁷ B 721 and personal communication from A. Davesne.

VI. PHRYGIA


The pattern of Persian domination in the heartland of Phrygia, part of the satrapy of Dascylium, can now be reconstructed tentatively from the excavations of the *citadel and tombs of Gordium*. As noted in *CAH* III².2, ch. 34a (Pls. Vol., pl. 226) the citadel was in process of rebuilding when captured by the Cimmerians in c. 696 B.C. After the looting and conflagration of the occupied part of the citadel and after battles in which Midas may have been killed, a mud-brick rampart was built around the east and south side of the citadel, protecting a large residential suburb. This rampart and its superstructures were attacked and burnt during Cyrus' march to Sardis in 547/6 B.C., probably with the aid of a siege-mound, as at Sardis. After the Persian victory most of the 12 m high wall at Gordium was razed, leaving one monument as a tumulus to the south east. By c. 600 B.C. the old citadel had been rebuilt.

The Persians took over this archaic Phrygian citadel, leaving little architectural imprint of their own, since the citadel built under Lydian auspices had borrowed its layout from the Old Phrygian predecessor, with minor modifications but improved masonry (Fig. 14). As before, the citadel buildings were *megara*, grouped in separate courts. The East gateway was now entered at right angles between symmetrical towers. To its south west, the original plan called for a solid rampart, but the design was changed to incorporate a large stoa-like storage building (building A) set on a terrace which doubled as the core of the outer rampart. Building A was destroyed by fire, and over its south part a different type of structure was erected, this time of non-Phrygian plan, with a paved court to the north, giving access to a porch with two columns in antis, the red-painted base of one remaining in situ.³⁸ Behind the porch was a narrower room with a place for a throne or ceremonial base against the centre of its rear wall. Both porch and throne-room had a simple mosaic of maeanders in regular rows of pebbles; the base was set off by dark glassy pebbles. This building may have been the official mansion of the Persian representative at Gordium.

There was little preserved inventory. Colourful terracotta revetments and sima fragments lay in the debris.³⁹ In the robbed foundation trench was found a carnelian cylinder-seal of fine Achaemenid style and composition: a symmetrical group of royal heroes set on bearded royal sphinxes, facing an Ahura Mazda above an altar and roundel; the frieze is bordered by a lotus-band above and below, and an Aramaic inscription gives the name of the owner Badag, son of Zatchi (?). The seal is dated to the early fifth century.⁴⁰

³⁸ B 746, 11–12; B 751, 6, plan. ³⁹ B 676, 143–61.

⁴⁰ B 746, 15, fig. 10; personal communication from E. Porada.



14. Map of Gordium in the archaic period. Courtesy of Gordion Excavations. See the text. The new gateway is at the right. Building PH ('Painted House') between megara G and C had its main room walls covered with painted friezes on white plaster.

This mosaic building is continued by similar structures to the south, and may be part of a small palace. The date is not securely established. The excavator suggested 475–450, but the terracottas have earlier parallels in Sardis. The sequence of Persian actions against and in the main citadel needs further study. The burning of building A may be connected with the entry of the Persians, and the Persian mosaic building may have been constructed before 500.

Many *megara* in the citadel of Gordium stood in their Phrygian form through the era of Darius and Xerxes. A chronological marker is the small 'heroon' inserted between *megara* C (already rebuilt once) and G not later than 530 B.C., as is attested by its archaic wall-paintings.⁴¹ These paintings, of strong East Greek affinity, hardly betray Persianizing fashions or Greco-Persian traits. In the minor arts and artefacts from Gordium the Persian presence is barely noticeable, with the exception of

⁴¹ B 724, 91–8.

a number of seals and rare occurrences of silver tableware and pottery imitations.⁴² The Greek contact is steady, as evidenced by East Greek and Attic pottery imports before and after 500 B.C.⁴³ Tumuli continue to be made for prominent cremation burials until early in the fifth century B.C., following Lydo-Phrygian burial patterns.⁴⁴

One hoard of 110 sigloi was found in the Persian level at Gordium, buried in a fragmentary local lekythos.⁴⁵ This has not yet been studied. The sigloi show considerable wear but seem to be of the same type. A fragmentary bulla from a mid-fifth-century context shows a hunter on horseback pursuing a deer; the style is not Achaemenid.

The overall impression of this era of Persian rule at Gordium is one of benevolent control of a citadel and community consisting largely of Phrygian and Lydo-Phrygian residents continuing their original lifestyles but becoming somewhat wealthier in material effects such as gold jewellery, and in amenities such as wall-paintings of East Greek affinity, paying taxes now to a Persian official residing in the citadel whose communications went east and west along the royal road. The road itself must be embedded in the stratification of the stretches of its Roman successor excavated among the Phrygian tumuli and heading toward the citadel from the plain. The road in all periods of Gordium's existence must have crossed the Sangarius river by a bridge.


In greater Phrygia, within the Halys bend, there is less archaeological evidence of Achaemenid occupation. At the former Hittite capital, now probably Pteria, a burial in the crevices of Yazılıkaya was accompanied by a provincial Achaemenid cylinder-seal carved of bone.⁴⁶ It shows that the image of the royal hero was known in these regions. On the pottery of the later Phrygian period at Boğazköy, as well as at Alaca Hüyük, painters of bichrome ware illustrate variants of Achaemenid sphinxes with crowns. Similar iconographic allusions are noticeable at Alişar (Fig. 15),⁴⁷ Kültepe, and most strikingly at Maşat Hüyük, 20 km south west of Zela–Zile,⁴⁸ where the wild bichrome style was vigorous; on the other hand, a very fine version of Achaemenid bichrome painting appears on a white-slipped bowl, with the representation of a horse of thoroughly Persian appearance, with topknot and ribbons, bridle and head shape as at Persepolis, as part of a procession (Fig. 16). This was found in a late-sixth-century context, and must be related to the best workshops of this period close to official Achaemenid centres. The proximity to Zile, a famous cult centre of Anaitis, may be relevant, although the date of introduction of this cult is unclear. The horses on the white-ground cup

⁴² B 748, 154, pl. 41, figs. 1 a, b; B 750, 281, pl. 84, figs. 8–9. ⁴³ B 737; B 53.

⁴⁴ B 720, 65–89. ⁴⁵ B 747, 141. ⁴⁶ B 691, 234, fig. 146.

⁴⁷ B 738, 43–5, fig. 46, a 824; B 677, 54, pl. 32b.

⁴⁸ B 732, 123, colour pl. F-1, pl. 64, 1 a-b; pl. 78, 3 a-b, fig. 162.



15. Bichrome vase fragment from Alişar. (After B 677, pl. 32b.)



16. Bichrome vase fragment from Maşat Hüyük. (After B 732, pl. 64.1.)

found at Maşat resemble the royal horses rendered on the Apadana reliefs at Persepolis, although details such as the ornamented headstall and the knotted tails are less refined at Maşat. The Maşat horses have already entered Persian service somewhere in the district of Maşat and Zile.⁴⁹ We are looking at a provincial counterpart in minor art of the official iconography of Persepolis.

VII. PONTUS, CAPPADOCIA, COMMAGENE, ARMENIA

The Persian penetration of the Pontic zone and Cappadocia is reflected on the popular level in bichrome pottery decoration, mixed, as always, with Greek inspiration. A Pontic blend of Greek and Persian art decorated façades of rock-cut tombs in Paphlagonia in the later fifth and fourth centuries B.C.⁵⁰ A curious mixture of tribal tradition and hybrid cultural overlay (Hittite, Phrygian, East Greek, Persian) developed in the Pontic zone. The presence of rich local chieftains is indicated by the occasional finds of Achaemenid silver ware along the coast, probably originating from plundered tombs near Ünye and elsewhere.⁵¹

In Cappadocia, where the satrapal residence may have been at Mazaca (later Caesarea), Persian land grants may have had some influence on regional culture. The altar from Bünyän, some 35 km to the north east, with the figure of a Persian performing the fire-cult rite carved in relief on all four sides (see Pls. Vol., pl. 43), is a document of Persian religious rites practised in the later fifth century B.C.⁵² The red paint on the background of the reliefs is typical of Greco-Persian sculpture.

Further East, in Armenia and what used to be Urartu, we approach a land with a closer relationship to Iran and the Achaemenids. Darius and

⁴⁹ B 214, 104-6, pls. 83-5; A 36, 148-9. ⁵⁰ B 703, 13-56.

⁵¹ B 680, 218, fig. 67; B 682; B 683, 38-52; C 481, 260-70, nos. 175-81; B 728.

⁵² B 688; B 679, 173, fig. 120.

Xerxes built on the citadel at Van, where Xerxes left a trilingual inscription (XV). Building remains of the Achaemenid period have been identified at Erebuni–Arin Berd in Soviet Armenia, but the apadana in western Urartu at Altintepe near Erzincan seems to be of the late Urartian period.⁵³ Persian silver ware was allegedly found at Erzincan.⁵⁴ Some of the pottery at Patnos north of Lake Van may be of Achaemenid date, and there is no doubt that the Persians reoccupied several of the Urartian citadels.

The Euphrates region and Commagene in East Anatolia are also likely to have been readily put under Achaemenid control. In the recent rescue excavations along the Turkish Euphrates the mound of Lidar on the east bank, *c.* 8 km upstream from Samosata, has yielded Achaemenid fifth-century building levels. A mud-brick tomb-chamber contained a burial in a bronze tub; among the tomb gifts was a bronze openwork attachment with the figure of a man in Persian costume.⁵⁵ Lidar was fortified in the sixth and fifth centuries. At Tille, west of the modern river crossing of the Adıyaman–Diyarbakır road, the entire surface of the small mound was occupied by a well-planned probably Achaemenid complex.⁵⁶ The Achaemenid period was also represented in building levels on the large citadel of Samsat–Samosata under the palace of the Commagenian dynasty.⁵⁷

To the south, in cemetery II at Deve Hüyük west of Carchemish, soldiers of an Achaemenid garrison were buried with characteristic weapons (see Pls. Vol., pls. 68, 74); the earliest graves date to *c.* 480 B.C.⁵⁸

Along the Euphrates the presence of Achaemenid rule is noticeable protecting the river crossings and the water way. The royal road crossed the Euphrates somewhere between Samsat and the Malatya region. Herodotus refers in general terms to the stretch through Cappadocia to the borders of (greater) Cilicia with two passes and control stations, from where three stations and fifteen and a half parasangs take the traveller to the boat-crossing of the Euphrates, and the border of Armenia (v. 52). The crossing at Samosata–Kummuh was clearly of age-old importance and part of the rationale for the long prehistoric and historical development of the city. Several other crossings were functioning along the Euphrates from Carchemish to Malatya.

In this area, as in the districts of central and western Anatolia, we may under-estimate the administrative and cultural impact of early Persian rule. Historical evidence for the period of Darius and Xerxes, with its vigorous technical and military projects, will be forthcoming from systematic excavations of sites of the rank of Sardis and Dascylium. Many of the other important sites show much less of the Persian impact

⁵³ B 731, 44–6. ⁵⁴ B 497, 140. ⁵⁵ B 716. ⁵⁶ B 704. ⁵⁷ B 730. ⁵⁸ B 497.

(Gordium, Xanthus, Pteria) because they were perhaps garrisoned but initially left to their own traditions. The diffusion of a Greco-Persian artistic idiom and iconography is for the time being best known through the category of funeral monuments, which begin to show the intrusion of Persian rituals in what largely are traditional Anatolian burial practices. This process continues in various forms in later ages, with a climax in the gigantic tumulus complex of Antiochus I of Commagene.

CHAPTER 3*f*

PERSIA IN EUROPE, APART FROM GREECE

A. FOL AND N. G. L. HAMMOND

I. THE NATURE OF OUR INFORMATION

We rely almost entirely on Herodotus. Some have despaired of his account, for instance, of Darius' advance into Scythia, but others have claimed to make some sense of parts of it. We have to be on our guard against Herodotus' own outlook. He saw the actions of Darius as 'precedents' for those of Xerxes, the centrepiece of his history; and it was in all matters his habit to look for 'precedents', e.g. to Cleisthenes' invention of ten Attic tribes. These 'precedents' included the revenge-motive for the war (IV.1; VII.5.2-3), the real aim of conquering all Europe (IV.118.1; VII.8.22 and 54.2), the disregard of Artabanus' wise advice (IV.83 and VII.10), the levy from all nations of the empire and conscription in areas newly conquered (IV.83.1 and 96.2; VII.185), the bridging of the waters which separate the two continents (III.134.4 and IV.118.1; VII.33.1), the loyalty to Persia of most but not all Ionian Greeks (IV.137 and VIII.85.1), the failure and flight of the Persian king (IV.135; VIII.115), and his escape only because the Greeks failed to accept the advice of a leading Greek to destroy the bridge which led to Asia (IV.137.1; VIII.108.2; cf. VIII.97.1).

Some of these 'precedents' have rightly been suspected. The revenge-motive arising from Scythian attacks on the Medes in Asia a century or so earlier will hardly account for a Persian king attacking Scythians in Europe. The failure of Darius seems greatly exaggerated. The story of Miltiades advising the destruction of the bridge over the Danube cannot be true in the light of his subsequent history (see below). Another weakness of Herodotus' account is that it is Hellenocentric. Darius is said to have envisaged the invasion of Greece soon after his accession (III.134). A Greek doctor, Democedes, and a Greek commander, Coes, are represented as swaying the policies of Darius (III.133*f*; IV.97.2-6). The Ionian Greeks 'led' the Persian fleet (IV.89.1); and the debate at the bridge over the Danube is presented as critical for Darius, whereas his fleet was there in any case to ferry his men over the river (IV.141).

Herodotus used three kinds of informants, when he was collecting his

data *c.* 460–455 B.C., some fifty-five years after the campaign of Darius. Ionians and Greeks from cities of the Hellespont, Propontis, Bosphorus and Black Sea could have told him of their fathers' experiences in the service of Darius, and a few participants could still have been alive. The Greeks of these cities also told Herodotus a lot about the Scythians, because they traded far up the rivers into Scythia; but they knew next to nothing about the inland peoples of Thrace. The Ionians especially were anxious to magnify their own importance. Secondly, Herodotus consulted Scythians, when he travelled far up the navigable river Borysthenes (Dnepr), and in particular he got information from Tymnes who was familiar with the Scythian court and knew the early history of the Scythian royal families (iv.81.2–4; iv.76.6). The Scythians had every reason to exaggerate their own cleverness and minimize their own losses. Thirdly, Herodotus had access to Persian information, sometimes given to Greeks in Asia by friendly Persians like Ariaramnes (viii.90.4), sometimes given to Herodotus by Persians whom he met, and sometimes drawn from official Persian documents. It was difficult to weave these three strands of information into a convincing narrative, and we can sometimes see the traces of each strand.

He had little to say about the geography and ethnography of Thrace (v.3–8), a country generally hostile to Greeks and outside his personal experience. His account of Scythia is surprisingly full, because he had access to Hecataeus' work on geography, he had information from Greek traders and from Scythians, and he had personal experience of the area.

II. THE EXPEDITION OF DARIUS *c.* 513 B.C.¹

The real intention of Darius was made clear by the building of a bridge across the Bosphorus, an amazing feat, unrivalled until 1973; for the span is over a kilometre, the current some four knots and the winds often very strong. The bridge was said to have been at the narrowest point.² It was a pontoon-bridge with some 200 ships supporting the roadway. For a come-and-go campaign his fleet would have ferried his army across very easily. This permanent bridge was an extension of the permanent roads of the Persian empire, and it was intended to lead to a satrapy about to be acquired. Darius commemorated the bridge by erecting two columns of white stone with inscriptions in cuneiform and in Greek letters. Therein he recorded 'the nations that he was leading, from all the peoples under his rule, and they were enumerated in tens of thousands; there were seventy myriads including the cavalry and apart from the

¹ The date is disputed. C 43, 1429; *IG* XIV 1297.22–6; B 95, 291f; B 6, 76. Campaign *v.* eastern Saeae in Polyae. vii.11.6 and vii.12. ² Polyb. iv.43.2.



Map 9. The Black Sea area.

fleet, and the assembled warships were six hundred' (iv.87). The epic poet Choerilus may have drawn on this record for the names of the peoples; for the fragment from his 'Crossing of the Bridge' has survived, which mentions the eastern Sacae: 'And sheep-herding Sacae, Scythian by descent but living in wheat-bearing Asia. They were colonists of the Nomads, a law-abiding people.'³

The figures which Herodotus gives are encapsulated within his account of the columns. The implication, then, is that the figures had been on the columns, which were of course read at the time by Greeks. The numbers which were placed there on the orders of Darius may not have corresponded fully to the actual forces. But there is no doubt that the Persian kings put great faith in large numbers, and it should be noted that Napoleon set off in 1812 with more than 500,000 men.⁴ Herodotus gave six hundred as the number of warships at the battle of Lade and on the expedition against Athens and Eretria; it was evidently the norm for an imperial fleet set by Darius, and it was easily ascertained by Greek sailors. Since Darius had ordered 'some to provide foot soldiers and others to provide warships' throughout his empire (iv.83.1), there were Phoenician, Cypriot and Egyptian squadrons as well as a Greek squadron. He needed also supply-ships and pontoon-ships for the Danube. The expedition was mounted on the grand scale which was characteristic of Darius. The crossing of the host from Asia to Europe was a moment of religious significance; for the waters which divided the two continents were sacred – those of the Tanais (Don), the Black Sea, the Bosphorus and the Hellespont. Darius sat upon his throne and watched the army march past him and over the bridge. Its designer, Mandrocles of Samos, commissioned a painting which depicted the scene (iv.88).

Darius had already proved himself to be a most capable commander. He had the choice now of two alternatives. Whether his ultimate objective was Greece or Scythia, he could advance *either* along a coast and use his fleet to supply his army *en route*, or separately with his army inland and send his fleet forward to some rendezvous. According to Herodotus iv.89 Darius ordered the Ionian squadron, together with ships of the Greek cities of the Hellespont, Propontis and Bosphorus (iv.138), to sail into the Black Sea, enter the Danube delta, build a bridge over the Danube and await his coming. Herodotus did not mention any orders for the rest – presumably the major part – of the fleet; but we may assume that it was to sail to the Danube mouth and prepare for or make a further advance. Darius himself marched not along the coast but inland. His intention was thus to conquer eastern Thrace and to make Scythia his further objective.

³ Str. vii.3.9 (c 303). ⁴ J. Marshall-Cornwall, *Napoleon* (London, 1967) 220.

'Darius marched through Thrace, and on coming to the springs of the Tearus he encamped for three days' (iv.89.3). He was now in the catchment area of the Hebrus, the largest river of central Thrace, and crossing to its western bank he occupied part of the valley of the Artescus, which was the homeland of the Odrysians, the strongest tribal group in central Thrace. Here he controlled the main trade route overland from the Aegean Sea to the plain of central Thrace and its outlets on the Black Sea;⁵ and he sent a detachment south to garrison its Aegean terminal, Doriscus (vii.59.1). That he came to occupy was made clear by his setting up of an inscribed column, recording his presence at the springs of the Tearus, and by ordering his army to build great cairns of stones in the valley of the Artescus. Herodotus' informant for this march was probably a Persian; its correctness is assured by the survival until *c.* 1830 of an inscribed column in cuneiform near the Tearus (Semerdere).⁶ Herodotus jumped next to the Getae, living between Mt Haemus and the Danube, 'the first people he subdued'. The Thracian tribes to the east of his army (iv.93) had accepted his rule, as had the tribes of the Hebrus plain, which lay across his route and was a rich source of fodder and supplies. The Getae were punished for their resistance by having to provide troops (iv.96.2). The next stop was at the Danube bridge. He had a rich satrapy behind him as a base of operations.

What did Darius aim to do beyond the Danube? Herodotus was much concerned with the dividing line between Asia and Europe, which Darius had already crossed at the Bosphorus and was to cross again at the river Tanais (Don); for him it had great religious significance. But if one was interested in strategic and economic considerations, there was no dividing line at all. Rather, the area from central Thrace to Georgia and from the Ukraine to the north-east Mediterranean formed a whole with mutual economic interests between Scythians and Ionians or Thracians and Iranians. In strategic terms Darius must have seen that some Scythian-type peoples extending from the Ukraine to Uzbekistan formed a continuum of dangerous nomadic raiders, and that naval control of the Black Sea recognized no continental divisions.

Darius was thoroughly familiar with the tactics of Scythian cavalry, for he had campaigned successfully against such cavalry in an area east of the Caspian Sea *c.* 519 B.C., and had gained experience there of steppe country. He was in a position to obtain information about the Ukraine from Greek traders and from Scythian contacts, and the Persians and the Greeks had a common interest in seeking to control the source of Scythian exports of gold, grain, hides and furs. We are told by Ctesias, a Greek doctor at the Persian court *c.* 400 B.C., that before the expedition by Darius a satrap of Cappadocia called Ariaramnes crossed the Black Sea

⁵ B 758. ⁶ B 760, 43; B 763; B 132, 16 § 3.10; B 758.

from the satrapy with a fleet of thirty penteconters, raided Scythian territory and returned with Scythian men and women, including the brother of a Scythian king (*FGrH* 688 F 13.20). Ctesias is far from dependable. On the other hand, the report is probable; for a reconnaissance in strength was a natural preliminary, if Darius intended to take a fleet as well as an army on his expedition, and we know that Darius sent a small reconnaissance group into the central Mediterranean area later (III.136). The silence of Herodotus does not weigh much against Ctesias' report; for Herodotus was highly selective in the material which he incorporated in his history, and it happens that Ctesias' Ariaramnes may have been connected with Herodotus' Ariaramnes, 'a friend of the Ionians' (VIII.90.4). On the whole it is probable that Ariaramnes did lead a foray into Scythian territory.

What was the aim of Darius? Some have supposed that he wanted to ravage the lands of the Scythians and then to return to the Danube and Thrace; but the erection of the bridge seems to show that more was intended. As the Scythians had no navy at all, his fleet could have transported his forces across the river without any danger. Others have thought that he planned to campaign round the Black Sea coast and then from Georgia to return to Media. Such a speculation might find support in the story in IV.97 that Darius intended to break up the bridge over the Danube and take all his forces into Scythia; but the story seems very improbable. If we limit ourselves to what Herodotus has to say, we may conclude that Darius intended to defeat the main Scythian tribes and to control the cultivated regions and the outlets of the southern Ukraine.⁷

Herodotus described the campaign from the Scythian point of view, which shows that he relied chiefly on Scythian informants. His picture is of three Scythian divisions, each under a separate commander. In the first part of the campaign one division deliberately retreated eastwards, drawing the docile Darius after it, first to the Tanais, then beyond it into the lands of two loyal allies, the Sauromatae or Sarmatians and the Budini, and so up to the edge of a great desert. The Scythian division then disappeared from Darius' sight; for it doubled back to join the two inactive divisions in the western part of the Ukraine (IV.122-4). This Scythian tactic, as presented by Herodotus, is senseless; for it resulted in the loss of their best territory and of damage to their loyal allies. The fact is rather that Darius held the initiative; it was he who drove eastwards through the cultivated lands of the Scythian agriculturalists (IV.52.2; IV.54), using his fleet to bring supplies up the navigable rivers and living to some extent off the country. The Budini too were a settled people; he captured their large fortified city (IV.108.1) and burnt it. He began to

⁷ Summary of views in A 27, I 43of.

build 'eight great forts, some eight miles distant from one another' at the edge of the desert, no doubt as a frontier defence, comparable to the six forts erected later by Alexander the Great in Margiana. This evidently was as far eastwards as Darius intended to go, at least for the time being.⁸

He had failed to bring the Scythians to battle, and until he did so he had no means of securing the territories which he had overrun. The initiative still lay with him. He did not linger to complete the forts, but he turned westwards in the hope of bringing the Scythians to battle. In this the second part of the campaign he found the two other divisions and pursued them at speed at a day's distance (IV.125.1), first through Scythian lands, then into the lands of those peoples who had refused alliance – Melanchlaeni, Androphagi, Neuri – and finally to the border of the Agathyrsi, who stood firm and caused the Scythian divisions to return to Scythia, with Darius in pursuit. So far the Scythian plan had been to stop him by fouling the wells, spoiling the pasture and removing all stock (IV.120.1 and 121). They had failed completely; but Darius too had failed yet again to bring them to battle.

Herodotus did not mention the season of the year. However, we can infer that, if Darius marched from Susa in spring, like Xerxes, he would have reached Chalcedon in May and mustered his forces on the European side in June. We may allow some two months for the campaign in Thrace and the organization of the satrapy as a base. So he may have started beyond the Danube in late August. If we accept the calculations of Herodotus at IV.101.2, he took about a month to reach the edge of the desert and begin building his forts. Thus it was early October when he turned westwards. Time was not on his side; for the winter weather, which caused Napoleon to turn back on 19 October 1812 from farther north at Moscow, might fall upon him during the next month.

It was a war of swift movement. The Scythians and their allies were operating mainly with cavalry, and Darius must have relied on his own cavalry to catch up with them. When the Scythian cavalry prevailed, the Persian cavalry fell back on the infantry, which offered protection with its archery and was not attacked by the enemy cavalry (IV.128.3). Herodotus stressed the speed of Darius' army on the march in the second part of the campaign (IV.125.1–2). At first he may still have been supplied by river, but not when he approached the land of the Agathyrsi, who were close to the Carpathian mountains.

The third part of the campaign began with the Scythian turn southeastwards into Scythia and Darius' turn in pursuit. He came near to disaster. The Scythians now concentrated all their forces and some allied troops, and their cavalry harassed the Persians day and night (IV.128.2–

⁸ For locations of tribes see *CAH* III².2. In this chapter the Budini are placed farther east than in *CAH* III².2, Map in ch. 33*b*. River-estuaries have changed radically since antiquity.

3). They were apparently drawing Darius into 'the flat waterless desert of the Getae' (Strabo c 305). At the same time the single Scythian division and a Sarmatian force rode to the Danube bridgehead. Herodotus supposed this was only to negotiate with the Ionians there – unsuccessfully in fact (iv. 133). But such a large force had another purpose surely, to cut an overland line of supply; for convoys of wagons were presumably using the bridge and establishing advanced supply points. When this Scythian force returned to the main body, troops of the Sarmatians, Budini and Geloni arrived to increase the harassing of Darius' foraging parties. Thereupon he decided to break away, before his army collapsed for lack of water and food. Leaving the sick behind to stoke the campfires, and donkeys to bray to the moon, he slipped away and gained a lead. His troops were mainly on foot now, after the exhaustion of many horses, but the Scythians' respect for the Persian archers was such that they did not engage. Herodotus repeated a Scythian account that the Scythians failed to find the Persians – an incredible idea – and he had the Scythians make a second approach to the Ionians. Darius' army reached the bridgehead, unscathed by enemy action but weakened by privations, and found the fleet ready to ferry the men across and make good the temporary gap in the bridge (iv. 141).

The second approach to the Ionians at the bridge was made, according to Herodotus, by some Scythian horsemen who urged the Ionians to break up the bridge and sail away. In a meeting of captains, Miltiades alone proposed to do this; the others remained loyal to Darius, but to mislead the Scythians they removed the Scythian end of the pontoon-bridge. This story, inspired no doubt by a relative of Miltiades, cannot be true; for if it were, Darius would have punished Miltiades (his opponents had every reason to inform on him), but he left Miltiades in control of the Chersonese.⁹ Another report by Herodotus, due no doubt to a Greek informant, was that on setting out from the bridge Darius had tied sixty knots in a leather strap, ordered the Ionian captains to undo a knot a day, and when no knot was left to sail away home. The ideas that the barbarians had no calendar but calculated by knots, and that Darius was to be out of touch and communication with his base for two months are unacceptable. Nor are the sixty days and a few to spare (iv. 136.3) likely to be correct. They might fit in with Herodotus' own estimate of distances in terms of a day's travel at 25 miles (iv. 101.2), but on a modern map as the crow flies Darius covered more than 2,000 miles and for this distance he needed more like three months, allowing for days of rest.

Darius inflicted widespread damage on the Scythians and their allies, weakened the prestige of the Royal Scythians especially and upset the


⁹ Miltiades fled two years later from the Scythians (vi.40); see c 247, 118f.

balance of power among the various peoples of the Ukraine. But because he failed to bring the Scythians to battle, he was unable to secure any territorial gains and he did not even complete the building of the forts at what could have been a frontier. The campaign was little more than an expensive stalemate. As winter had now come, Darius did not return to the attack. He 'marched through Thrace to Sestus in the Chersonese' (iv. 143), presumably by the easiest route through the central plain, which had plenty of supplies, and down the Hebrus valley to Doriscus, from which the best route was via Sestus to Abydus in Asia. The fleet ferried his men across and then disbanded for the winter. Megabazus was left as 'general in Europe' with a large army, 80,000 strong according to Herodotus (iv. 143. 3).

The Scythian campaign was decisive in that the Persians abandoned, as it proved for ever, the attempt to subjugate the Scythians in Europe. Herodotus was correct in his assessment that the Scythians owed their escape to their mobility, their lack of inhabited centres and the skill of their mounted archers (iv. 46–47). Their refusal to yield to Persia was due to such factors as the authoritarian power of the kings, the widespread hatred of foreigners (iv. 76. 1) and the ordinary man's belief that what brought him and his tribe honour was the killing of his enemies (iv. 66). The Scythian tribes co-operated with one another in offering a planned resistance to the invaders, and they managed to win the support of some of their neighbours. In these respects they showed more sense of community than the Greek city states were to show.

III. THE EXTENSION OF THE SATRAPY IN EUROPE

During the winter months Megabazus subdued the Hellespontine cities which had not yet submitted to Persia, and also Perinthus which resisted without success. Thereafter 'he marched the army through Thrace, reducing to the king's rule every city and every tribe of those who lived there; for the orders of Darius were these, to make Thrace subject to him' (v. 2. 2). What did Herodotus mean by 'Thrace'? He defined it in the next sentence as the country with a greater population than any other, except India, and in his description he took it from the Danube (iv. 49. 1) to the Aegean coast, and from the Bosphorus to the Axius valley (the Crestonaei of v. 3. 2 being just east of the river). Some two years later, when Megabazus returned to Asia with his captured Paeonians, he left a situation which Mardonius was to inherit in 492 B.C., wherein 'all the tribes east of the Macedones [i.e. east of the Axius] had become subject to Persia' (vi. 44. 1). In 480 B.C. Xerxes recruited for the campaign against the Greeks large numbers of Thracians from the hinterland as well as those who inhabited the coast of Thrace (vii. 185. 2). The tribes which



Map 10. Thrace and north Greece.

held out successfully in 511 B.C. and did not figure in Xerxes' forces were 'the Paeonians around Mt Pangaeum, Doberes, Agrianes, Odomanti and Lake Prasias (Butkova)' (v.16.1); these lived mainly in the Strymon valley above the Rupel pass.¹⁰ In such a satrapy the centre lay in the Central Plain of the Hebrus valley with main lines of communication to the Danube valley, the Black Sea coast, and Doriscus, where the coast road from Macedonia met that from the Chersonese.

There are two views about the extent of this satrapy in Thrace. One view is based upon the statements of Herodotus in the preceding paragraph, and it is that of one of the authors of this chapter; he has argued it elsewhere.¹¹ The other view is that the satrapy consisted only of coastal areas and did not include central Thrace. This view, which has been argued recently and is held by the other author of this chapter, rests upon the individual conquests which Herodotus did mention.¹² The first conquests, those of Megabazus, were 'the coastal parts' (v.10); then Darius ordered him to dispossess the Paeonians of their lands (v.14.1), which extended from the Strymon basin to the sources of the Scius (Iskar), a tributary of the Danube (iv.49.2). The Paeonians concentrated their forces near the sea, expecting the Persians to attack there; but taking Thracian guides the Persians took an inland route, surprised the Paeonian cities and defeated the Paeonians piecemeal (v.15). They deported the Paeonians from the Strymon basin,¹³ and gave their lands to the Thracians. It was probably at this time that Paeonian tribes were replaced by Thracian tribes in Crestonia, Mygdonia and the hinterland of Chalcidice. Thus the Persians changed the balance of power between Paeonians and Thracians. In 492 B.C. Mardonius brought a large fleet and army along the coast from the Hellespont and re-affirmed Persia's control of the coastal area of southern Thrace. There was apparently no resistance, and the offshore Greek island Thasos surrendered at the approach of the Persian navy.

In considering the two views of the Persian conquests in Thrace it should be noted that the operations of Mardonius were necessarily along the coast, because he was using his fleet in conjunction with the army. As regards the campaigns of Megabazus Herodotus knew little and seems to have cared less about inland Thrace. His interest was primarily in the fate of the Greek cities and their immediate neighbours, the Paeonians and the coastal Thracians. We must also wonder how Persia was able to hold this satrapy in Europe for so long. If she held only the coastal fringes, she would have needed to maintain naval superiority continuously; but in fact she brought a fleet into operation only in the course of major

¹⁰ Retaining the MSS. c 248, l 193f and 202; B 759, 57. ¹¹ B 759.

¹² B 753; B 754, 270.

¹³ These Paeonians may be among the 'Iskudrap' of the Fortification Tablets at Persepolis.

campaigns. On the other hand, if she held central Thrace, her military forces were well placed to control both the interior and the Thracian coastal areas which faced the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea.

The advance into the kingdom of Macedonia, which lay west of the river Axios, was an important step in expansion; for the great river might have formed a defensible frontier. Probably in 510 B.C. Megabazus demanded and received the submission of Amyntas, king of the Macedones, who made the best of the situation by giving his daughter's hand in marriage to the Persian representative, Bubares, a son of Megabazus (v.18.1 and 21.2, and vii.22.2). In one respect Amyntas benefited from the expansion of Persia; for he gained at the expense of the Paeonians a strip of Amphaxitis and some territory east of the Axios delta. Herodotus retailed a story that Alexander, Amyntas' son and heir, murdered the Persian envoys when they first came to his father's court (v.18–21); but the details are palpably false, and the motive for the fabrication is obvious, to show Alexander anti-Persian and pro-Greek.¹⁴ When Mardonius campaigned westwards in 492, there was no resistance by the Macedones, and they were no doubt benefited by Mardonius' defeat of the Brygi, a Thracian tribe to the north of the Crestonaei (vi.44.1 and 45.1). Alexander I, coming to the throne c. 495 B.C., was then continuing the policy of his father, and by his loyalty he won the favour of Xerxes, who enabled him in the 480s to add to his kingdom the whole of Upper Macedonia (Justin vii.4.1).¹⁵ This extension of Persian power into the hinterland was intended to safeguard Persian control of the route through Lower Macedonia, which was to be all-important for Xerxes in his invasion of Greece. The only serious disaster which Mardonius suffered was due to the north wind which drove his fleet onto the rocky cliffs of Mt Athos, with the loss of 20,000 lives according to Herodotus vi.44.3. The decision to build a canal through the neck of the Athos peninsula was taken when the invasion of Greece by land was intended.

IV. THE ORGANIZATION AND THE INFLUENCE OF PERSIAN POWER IN EUROPE

The existence of a satrapy in Europe, called 'Skudra', is known from Persian inscriptions (B 44, 58f). 'Lands beyond the sea', that is beyond the waters of Asia Minor from the Persian point of view, were recorded in an inscription on the terrace-wall of Persepolis c. 513 B.C., and a satrapy 'Skudra' was mentioned in an Egyptian record of c. 498–7 B.C. and then on a list on Darius' tomb at Naqsh-i Rostam, c. 486. The name 'Skudra' was probably Phrygian for the homeland, later called Thrace, which the

¹⁴ C 248, II 98ff. ¹⁵ C 248, II 63f.



17. Coin of Alexander I. (After c 625, fig. 556.)

Phrygians had left in migrating to Asia.¹⁶ The peoples of the satrapy were named c. 492 B.C. as three: ‘Saka *paradraya*’, meaning ‘Sacae [a general name for Scythian-type people] beyond the sea’, probably the Getae, who resembled the Scythians in customs and equipment; the ‘Skudra’ themselves, mainly Thracians; and ‘Yauna *takabara*’ or ‘Ionians [viz. Greeks] with a shield-like hat’. The last were mentioned also on glazed bricks at the palace at Susa. Some scholars have supposed that the Sacae ‘beyond the sea’ were Scythian peoples of the Crimea whom Darius had subjugated; but it seems improbable that Persia did hold that area, and that if she did it was assigned to ‘Skudra’ rather than to the territories in Georgia, centred on Tbilisi.¹⁷ Envoys from ‘Skudra’ bringing tribute carried two javelins, a long knife and a small round shield, which were characteristic of Thracian troops later (see Pls. Vol., pl. 40, XIX). The Greek-speaking people with the shield-like hat were the Macedones, renowned for wearing the sun-hat, as Alexander I did on his fine coins from 478 B.C. (Fig. 17) onwards.¹⁸ The Greek-speaking citizens of the colonial city states on the seaboard were not mentioned; nor did they wear a sun-hat.

The Getae in the north of the satrapy escaped from Persian rule at some time between 492 and 480 B.C.; for they were not among Xerxes’ troops. The absence of the ‘Saka *paradraya*’ from the list of Xerxes’ subjects supports the view that they were probably the Getae. Thereafter the Haemus range was a defensible frontier. If the satrapy included central Thrace, the capital was in the plain of the Hebrus river, perhaps at the natural fortress rock of Plovdiv (later Philippoupolis); for that plain was the centre of a road-system which the Persians may be assumed to

¹⁶ C 248, I 414 and II 59f; B 95, 348 and 365.

¹⁷ B 221, 72–5 and 150; B 234, 258ff; B 33; B 95, 348f; B 44, 239 no. 8; B 755, 92f.

¹⁸ B 95, 349.

have built, and it was also the richest part of Thrace. To the south the garrison at Doriscus was maintained; one of its governors, Mascames, held it still in the late 460s (VII.105–6). Other governors (*ὑπαρχοί*) were posted elsewhere in the satrapy (VII.106.1). The same term was used by Herodotus to describe the king of the Macedones (V.20.4); but since he was subject to the Persian satrap, he was comparable rather to a king set up by Darius at the north-eastern limit of the empire – some 3,000 miles away.

All parts of the satrapy paid tribute (III.96.1 ‘as far as Thessaly’). In time of war they provided troops (VII.185). The Greeks in Thrace and the subject islands, namely Thasos and Samothrace, provided ships. It seems that the Greek cities on both sides of the waterway which connects the Aegean with the Black Sea formed a separate region for purposes of administration; for Otanes operated as ‘general of the men of the sea’ (V.25.1), in contrast to Megabazus ‘general in Thrace’ (V.14.1), and the Hellespont was differentiated from Thrace at VII.106.1.

The satrapy had strong frontiers: the Danube in the north, crossed as far as we know only by the Scythians *c.* 511 B.C., when they raided as far as the Chersonese and expelled Miltiades (VI.40), and the Peneus in the south with the bastion of Mt Olympus. It was vulnerable to attack from the sea. It was rich in mineral wealth. Gold and silver were obtained in many places in the southern part of the satrapy and also on Thasos (VI.46–7). The silver was exceptionally pure; it was in great demand, especially in Asia and Egypt, where large silver coins have been found in hoards. Silver coinage began *c.* 550 B.C.; it has been called ‘Thraco-Macedonian’ wrongly, for it came from Thrace, South Illyria, Greek colonial states and Thasos.¹⁹ The homeland of the Macedones had no gold or silver; it was only in 478 B.C. that Alexander acquired a mine and began to coin.²⁰ Tribute to Persia was paid in precious metals or/and in cereals, livestock, timber and animal products. The satrapy became part of a stable community of trade, which included the Danube valley, the north Aegean, the Black Sea and much of Asia Minor; and beyond these regions goods, and silver in particular, travelled westwards via Trebenishte to south Italy, via the Danube valley to the inner Adriatic coast, across the Black Sea to Georgia and Iran and the East, and overseas to mainland Greece, the Levant and Egypt. Exchange went both ways; the commonest foreign coins in Thrace were those of Cyzicus and Parium. This expansion of trade was made possible only by Persia’s control, which imposed peace on the unruly tribes and the quarrelsome Greek city states. The Persians themselves contributed by making roads, bridges and the Athos canal, and their labourers provided

¹⁹ B 766; B 752; C 248, II 69–91; C 633, 3. ²⁰ C 606, 251 with n. 35.

a demand for local markets (vii.23.4). In the same way the Greek city states of the Black Sea entered a phase of greater prosperity in the last quarter of the sixth century. Skudra was not to enjoy such prosperity again until the Hellenistic period.

In developing their control of the satrapy the Persians certainly favoured the Thracians and the Macedonians rather than the Greek city states. These two peoples gained new lands at the expense of the Paeonians, and they became immediate neighbours of one another (Strabo c 329 fr. 11). The graves of Thracian chieftains were rich in gold jewellery, for instance those found recently at modern Sindos.²¹ There was already a strong antipathy between Greeks and Thracians before the Persians came; and when Persian forces withdrew from Greece and Macedonia in 478 B.C., it was a combination of Thracians and Persians which resisted the aggression on the one hand of the Macedones and on the other of the Athenians, in the Strymon basin and in the Chersonese especially (Plut. *Cimon* 14.1).

The military and political effects of the Persian presence were far-reaching. Macedonian and Thracian aristocrats learnt to emulate Persian cavalymen in hunting and in war, and they bred large horses of Nesaeian stock. Macedonian and Odrysian kings may have adopted some practices from the Persian court. Persian favour enabled Alexander to acquire Upper Macedonia, and with that added strength he made his kingdom powerful after the Persian withdrawal. The Odrysians profited from their position on the main trade route along the Hebrus valley, and they achieved a leading authority among the Thracian tribes after the withdrawal of the Persians, which was a gradual process and was not completed until late in the 460s.

In cultural terms Thrace looked not to Greece but to Scythia, Asia Minor and Persia, as she had done even before the expedition of Darius. In the last decades of the sixth century large tombs with gifts of gold and silver vessels and jewellery, and sometimes bronze helmets and cuirasses, became much more frequent, and the earliest example of such a vessel – found in a royal burial at Kukuva Magila near Duvanli – was certainly inspired by Persian art, c. 500–475 B.C. Other indications of Persian influence in this period may be seen in *phialai*, ear-rings at Kukuva Magila and Mushovitsa, pectorals of gold with flying birds at Mushovitsa and a silver greave at Vraca. ‘This flood of Persian motifs and objects into Thracian art’, wrote I. Venedikov and T. Gerassimov, ‘is apparent in the number of artefacts in which purely Achaemenian and pre-Achaemenian motifs are to be seen.’²² (For these see Pls. Vol., pls.

²¹ See *Arch. Rep.* 1980–81.29; 1981–82.35; 1982–83.37; 1983–84.44; *Catalogue of the Exhibition ‘Sindos’* (Thessaloniki, 1985). ²² B 765, 111.


104–13.) The Persian influence in Europe was both enlivening and longlasting.

The excavation of a cemetery of the archaic and early classical period at modern Sindos has given a new insight into the prosperity and the taste of the ruling class.²³ The ancient site to which the cemetery belonged was situated close to the river Gallikos (as it is today) and probably close also to the Axios at the turn of the sixth century B.C. In any case it was evidently the chief port of the Thermaic Gulf. When the Persians drove the Paeonians inland, this region was taken over by the Edones, the royal Thracian tribe, and the Gallikos river was named the Edonus by them. From the beginning of the cemetery late in the sixth century the Edones imported fine pottery, bronze dishes and jugs, 'Illyrian' helmets and terracotta figurines from mainland Greece, Ionia and Rhodes, no doubt in exchange for the fine timber of the hinterland and for any surplus of *mineral wealth and agricultural produce*. The influence of Persian art is lacking. The Thracian character of the richer burials was apparent in the gold death-masks, the thin gold plaque placed over the mouth and sometimes over the eyes of the corpse, the gold decorations sewn onto the clothing of the corpse, the fine gold and silver jewellery, and small models in iron of furniture and carts. The men were buried as warriors, each with a helmet, sword (or knife) and two spears and occasionally with a bronze shield. See Fig. 18.


In these respects the burials at Sindos resemble those of the same period at Trebenishte, just north of Lake Ochrid,²⁴ and we may attribute the resemblance to a Thracian element in each case, as well as to trade-relations between them. The abundance of gold and silver at the burials at Sindos was due probably to the skill of the Thracians in mining the gold deposits in Crestonia and washing gold in the waters of the Gallikos, of which the Greek name was 'the gift-bearer', Echedorus, and in developing the silver mine in Bisaltia, to which Herodotus referred (v.17.2).

The gold and silver in the burials at Trebenishte were derived from deposits of silver at Damastium nearby and deposits of gold and silver in the southern provinces of Yugoslavia called Metohija, Polog and Kossovo. Fine bronze vessels of Corinthian workmanship, 'Illyrian' helmets and imported Greek pottery indicate that Trebenishte tapped the trade-route (on the line of the later Via Egnatia) from the Corinthian colonies on the Adriatic coast to the head of the Thermaic Gulf. The influence of Trebenishte reached southwards to Dodona in Epirus. The extension of trade across the Balkan range and indeed to Italy across the Adriatic waters was due to the growing prosperity of the Persian satrapy in Europe.


²³ B 762B. ²⁴ See c 526; c 248, II 63 and 91ff.



a



b



c



d



e

18. Select finds from the graves at Sindos (about 20 km west of Thessaloniki). Late sixth century B.C. (a) gold plaque with animal friezes, 26 × 30 cm; (b) bronze 'Illyrian' helmet with gold mask, height 22 cm; (c) miniature iron furniture – table, chair, fire-dogs, bundle

of spits, cart, height of cart 9.5 cm; (d) silver phiale with gilt navel, diameter 17.3 cm; (e) gold necklace with granulation. (Thessaloniki Museum; after I. Vokotopoulou, et al., *Sindos* (1985) nos. 183, 239/40, 295–9, 374, 511.)



19. Coin of the Oresskioi. (After c 625, fig. 376.)

A remarkable development was the issue of coinage in a fine silver by Thracian and Paeonian tribes from c. 550 or from c. 530 B.C., the dating being controversial,²⁵ and an increase in the quantity during the period of Persian occupation. These coins in large denominations, usually carrying no lettering, have been found more in hoards in Asia and Egypt than in Europe,²⁶ and it is clear that they were issued perhaps mainly for the market which developed first with the extension of Persian rule to the coast of Asia Minor and later with the formation of the Persian satrapy. It is probable too that some of the tribes paid their tribute in bullion or in coin to the Persian government. The mines of the Thracian tribes were in Crestonia, Bisaltia, Paroreia, the region of Mt Pangaeum (Hdt. VII.112) and the region of Crenides–Philippi, all within the Persian satrapy. The Paeonians were the earlier owners of some of these mines, but after their defeat in the coastal sector they maintained their independence in the hinterland and coined large denominations in the upper Strymon and the upper Axios areas in the names of the Laeaei and the Derrones. The tribes of both groups portrayed gods with horses or oxen (Fig. 19) or figures of religious significance, and minor emblems were cranes, frogs and salamanders. Three cities, Paeonian in origin, issued similar silver coinages.²⁷ When lettering appeared on the coins, it was in Greek, cut by Greek craftsmen. For many Greek cities in Chalcidice and on the Thracian coast were coining at this time and benefiting from the Persian market. The period of prosperity to which these coinages testify owed much to the imposition of peace and the provision of markets through the presence of Persian power. Decline came with the expulsion of Persia from Europe.

The Macedonians had no deposits of precious metals in their territory;

²⁵ See c 606, 245 and c 636, 119.

²⁶ See Pls. Vol., pl. 313a.

²⁷ See c 606, 245–51.

and when they ousted the Paeonians from Ichnae, its coinage ceased. They were less wealthy than the Paeonians and the Thracians, and the main ports of the Thermaic Gulf were outside their control. But through the favour of Darius and Xerxes, the capable kings Amyntas and Alexander gained additional territory and exercised some form of rule over the tribes of Upper Macedonia. The foundations of the greater Macedonian state were laid under Persian suzerainty, and when the Persian army fled in disarray Alexander was quick to seize the mine in Bisaltia and issue his fine coinage (see Fig. 17). In retrospect one can see that the Persian presence in Europe, imposing peace on many tribes and favouring economic growth, was in many respects beneficial.

CHAPTER 3g
EGYPT 525–404 B.C.

J. D. RAY

The historian's life may have few pleasures, but one of its compensations is that he is allowed to eavesdrop. Let us therefore take advantage of this to read the thoughts of Cambyses, as he waits at Acre early in 525 B.C., on the eve of his invasion of Egypt. As doubts begin to overwhelm him, he surveys the difficulties ahead. 'I am undertaking', he thinks to himself, 'something more hazardous than the Medes and the Persians have ever attempted: the conquest of a land six hundred miles long, fed by a river whose very origins are unknown, and whose antiquity is beyond grasp. Worse than this, it contains some three million people, and perhaps more, not to mention its foreign communities, all of whom will need to be governed wisely if they are not to revolt and cause us interminable problems. Its cities are strongly fortified with ramparts, and there are twenty thousand towns; the mouths of its strange river flood unpredictably, and can be controlled by canals and dykes without our knowledge. Whole armies could perish there. True, the Assyrians before us invaded this puzzling country, but that was a short-lived affair and produced nothing but a few obelisks. They did not even dare to dismiss the local governors, who revolted as soon as their backs were turned. The Babylonians came to grief three times at least on its north-east frontier.¹ If this were not enough, there are also the trackless deserts, which few of our men have ever seen. And when we have conquered Egypt, how will we govern it? Shall we do it ourselves, at endless expense and in complete ignorance, or shall we entrust it to the natives? Either way, how shall we know who are our friends? And what will become of our occupying forces? Will they keep sending for new wives from home, or will the women of Egypt take their place? Will our children and grandchildren start worshipping dog-headed gods and eating crocodiles? Will we become Egyptians ourselves? Even if we avoid these pitfalls, this new province will be so far from Persia that some day we will be forced to leave it to its own devices. We will have to allocate large numbers of

*For a discussion of the sources, see below, pp. 285–6.

¹ The Assyrians invaded Egypt in 671 and 666 B.C.; unsuccessful Babylonian attempts are known from 601/600, 582 and 567 B.C. The Persians themselves were similarly to fail in 374 and 351 B.C. For a different view of the Assyrian booty from Memphis see B 831.


troops to holding it down, and we will have to control its governors as best we can. And what of the satrap we appoint? With a province like Egypt, he will effectively be a viceroy, and what is to prevent him from imagining that he is Pharaoh come back, or even the Great King himself?’

But then Cambyses rallies himself, reminds himself that he is the Great King, and the son of Cyrus, and that his esteem is at stake. He thinks of the proverbial wealth of Egypt, its agriculture and its temple industries, and the rich trade with Africa which flows along the Nile. He recalls that this great country is ruled by a young and inexperienced monarch, Psammetichus III (Psamtik), son of Persia’s constant enemy Amasis. He remembers too that Egyptian officials have been known to desert, and that collaborators will certainly be found, since corruption is endemic. Above all, he reflects that as long as Egypt is free the Persians will never hold Syria-Palestine, because Pharaoh can always subvert and cause rebellion along that coast, and offer a refuge to traitors. Therefore he recovers his courage, and goes to offer sacrifice to whatever gods will aid his victory.

This may be fanciful, but it is no more fanciful than the personal motives ascribed to Cambyses by Herodotus, and some combination of both may have been present in the king’s mind. Whatever the truth, the conquest itself seems to have been easy enough (Hdt. III.1–5). The Persian forces marched south to Gaza, and were helped to cross the desert by the nomadic Arabs; passing by the desolate Lake Serbonis (Sabkhat Bardawil), they reached Pelusium, where the decisive battle took place. Herodotus records that Greek and Carian mercenaries were present on both sides, and that he himself saw the bones of the fallen on the battlefield some seventy-five years later, a sight which gave him the opportunity for some physical anthropology.² After victory at Pelusium, the Persians followed the river to Memphis, which surrendered after some resistance, and Pharaoh himself soon fell into the hands of the invaders. A visit to the temple of Neith at Saïs may well have set the seal on the conquest, which was over by late spring, 525 B.C.

It is hardly surprising that Cambyses attracted an intensely hostile tradition, in which his name is synonymous with madness and atrocities. Insane rulers certainly exist, and there are certainly indications that the conquest itself was not without its elements of lawlessness. Even Udjahorresne (Uzahor-resenet), Cambyses’ devil’s advocate, cannot disguise in his autobiography that the temple of Saïs had been occupied by soldiers and profaned, and an Aramaic papyrus, admittedly of later date (Cowley, AP 30, of 408 B.C.) states that Cambyses’ conquest

² He compared the skull thicknesses of the shaven-headed Egyptians and the cap-wearing Persians (III.12), and claims to have repeated his observations on the battlefield of Papremis. But were Egyptians really left unburied?



Map 11. Egypt.

signified disaster for all the native temples of Egypt. It may well be that Persian soldiers did riot and sack temples for their precious objects. Psammetichus III and his son were certainly eliminated, although not necessarily in the way described by Herodotus; they could not be allowed to survive as a focus for insurrection. It may well be that Cambyses was hostile to the memory of Amasis, whose cartouches must have been obliterated at about this time. He may even have desecrated the burial of Amasis in some way, though there is no real proof of this, but it is difficult to convict Cambyses of much else. We must certainly call as a defence witness the Udjahorresne already mentioned, whose statue, now in the Vatican, bears an idealized autobiography in hieroglyphs (Fig. 20).³ Udjahorresne of Saïs is effectively commander of Psammetichus III's navy (which does not seem to have put to sea), but he is also a chief physician and a royal chancellor. He describes Cambyses' visit to Saïs as an act of benevolence and piety, and while he makes no attempt to disguise the fact that foreign troops were quartered in the sacred precinct, even referring twice elsewhere to 'the great misfortune which had befallen the entire land', he portrays the king as ordering the immediate restoration of the holy place. Udjahorresne was obviously an arch-collaborator, and he openly states that Cambyses advanced his career and listened to his advice, but the statesmanlike behaviour he ascribes to the conqueror makes political sense, much more so than the lurid picture given by Herodotus. Udjahorresne was called upon to draw up the king's titulary as a regular Pharaoh – a more important act than it seems, since it implies that Cambyses was crowned as such, and must therefore have realized that this was the only way to govern Egypt with any success. The act described by Udjahorresne (Cambyses is the only Persian king to possess a complete titulary as Pharaoh) is also significant in another way: in the Egyptian collaborator's mind the reality of the conquest, something which cannot be assimilated to Egyptian religion and patterns of thought, is being psychologically denied. Cambyses has revealed himself as Mesuti-Rē, the divine offspring of the sun-god. This may not seem very realistic, but such an attitude went a long way towards ensuring the continuity of Egyptian civilization in its greatest crisis. This may or may not be the reason why a posthumous cult of Udjahorresne existed two hundred years later at Memphis.⁴ A much later and romanticized version of the conquest exists in Coptic, in which Egypt is represented by a wise counsellor named Bothor, who may possibly be Udjahorresne in a later disguise.⁵ Perhaps he deserves to be seen as such,

³ B 873, 1–26 no. 1; B 857, 169–73; commentary, B 836.

⁴ B 773, 1 98–100 and pls. 36, 37a-c. The statue was restored after 177 years by a pious individual named Minertais.

⁵ B 909, but there are philological problems.



20. Green basalt statue of Udjahorresne of Saïs, represented as holding a model shrine. Height 0.7 m. Restored in fourth century B.C. (Vatican Museum; after O. Marucchi, *Cat. del Museo Egizio Vaticano* (1902) pls. 1–2.)

and to merit the comparison with the biblical Ezra sometimes made for him.

Some details of Cambyses' immediate organization can be guessed. A satrap was doubtless appointed, arrangements for tribute and indemnities made, and garrisons established, which may well have occupied the old strategic points of Marea (north-west Delta), Pelusium and Elephantine. The larger cities like Memphis would presumably have been garrisoned, and there is a possibility that the fort of Babylon (Old Cairo) was also brought into use.⁶ Memphis was certainly the seat of government, and was the centre of several important religious cults. Most prominent was that of the Apis bull, who played the role in the animal world that Pharaoh himself did in the human, and was the centre of quasi-royal ceremonies and emotions. It is therefore almost inevitable that the monstrous Cambyses, subverter of the religious order, would be shown as the enemy of Apis; tradition adds to the wounding of the Apis

⁶ So Josephus (*AJ* 11.15.1), although Diod. 1.46.3 and Strabo xvii.1.30 imply that it existed earlier. The traditions may be compatible.


the animal's lingering death and clandestine burial.⁷ The hieroglyphic records scarcely bear this out. The current Apis, which had been born in the twenty-seventh year of Amasis (543 B.C.), died in September 525, and was duly buried in the hypogeum at Saqqara. The following Apis, born in 526, died in 518 under Darius (Fig. 21). Signs of haste have been detected in the burial of the former Apis, but this proves little, and attempts to produce an ephemeral successor in order for it to be stabbed by Cambyses seem to be doomed to failure. The fact that the same story is told of Artaxerxes III Ochus does not inspire confidence, and the motif sounds like the equivalent of the child-murder of Ptolemy VIII and El-Hākīm. It is a piece of folklore. 'Not proven', or even 'not guilty', is the necessary verdict.⁸

An excellent clue to the hostility engendered by Cambyses is contained in a copy of a decree concerning the finances of the Egyptian temples, which is preserved in a demotic papyrus of the third century B.C.⁹ The conquest needed to be paid for, and the temples were a major source of requisitionable funds. Economies were therefore imposed. All temples were to have the revenues that they had received before the conquest reduced; raw materials, such as wood, were to be obtained from one area in the Delta and another in Upper Egypt, and birds for offering to the gods were to be reared by the temples themselves. Other restrictions were also enforced. Three temples are said to be exempt: that of Ptah at Memphis, the Heliopolitan temple of the Nile (Pi-ḥa^cp-en-Ōn, which may well be the site of Egyptian Babylon) and that of Wenkhem, immediately to the north of Memphis itself.¹⁰ The unpopularity of such measures is obvious; a similar confiscation is ascribed to Xerxes, and even when they were performed by a native pharaoh such as Tachos, the result was permanent execration by the priests. The hostile tradition also extends to Cambyses' other military activities. A campaign into the Nubian kingdom of Meroe succumbed to a failure of logistics; Meroe never became part of the Persian empire. The 'Nubia' mentioned in Herodotus (III.97–8) as paying tribute is the area between the first and second cataracts of the Nile, which was generally an annexe of Egypt.¹¹ An army sent to the oasis of Siwa was lost in a sand-storm near Kharga, and no trace, in spite of occasional newspaper reports, has ever been found of it. It is difficult to know what to make of such tales; more

⁷ See the list of classical references, ranging from Herodotus (III.29,64), Plutarch (*De Is. et Os.* 368E), and Aelian (*NA* x.28) to the Christian fathers, gathered together in B 825, 28 n.8; also B 824, 57–9. ⁸ See B 873, 173–4; B 817, 85–6; for the chronology, B 858, 301. ⁹ B 901, 32–3.

¹⁰ See B 921, 9–10 for the garrisoning of the Memphite nome in general and Wenkhem in particular. The readings of the three names in this text are far from certain.

¹¹ The name *Cambysi Aerarium*, however, which appears in Ptolemy's map of the Sudan, is interesting enough; cf. B 799, fig. 3; P-W x, col. 1823 (Forum Cambusis, near Old Dongola). There is also Pliny's *Cambysu*, near Suez, which suggests an interest in the Isthmus traffic.



21. Epitaph of an Apis from Memphis, 518 B.C. Height 0.8 m. (Paris, Louvre; after B 873, pl. 3.)

revealing is the rather grotesque story that Cambyses was really the son of Apries' daughter (Hdt. III.2), which may have been used as Persian propaganda to discredit Amasis, but which looks like a very Egyptian attempt to integrate Cambyses into their own culture, a foreshadowing of what was to be done to Alexander in later legend. Certainly, Herodotus makes it clear that this is an Egyptian version.

Cambyses died mysteriously on his way home from Egypt, and the

subsequent usurpation by Darius is described elsewhere. Egypt may have recognized Darius from 522 onwards;¹² but the uncertainty surrounding the change of ruler was an obvious incentive to rebellion of some sort, and it looks as if the satrap, Aryandes, was expelled (Polyaenus VIII.11.7). A native dynast named Petubastis may have tried to seize power at this point. There is even a document dated to the first year of his ‘reign’, but he is an extremely shadowy figure.¹³ Udjahorresne may well have thought it wise to go as well, since he describes how later Darius, who was in Elam, ordered him to return to Saïs and set about restoring the ‘House of Life’, the temple library and medical school, which had fallen into decay, adding that the king recognized ‘the usefulness of this act, so that all the sick should be restored to life, and the names of the gods preserved . . . for ever’. He probably also recognized Udjahorresne’s usefulness as a diplomat. Darius himself set foot in Egypt for the second time in the winter of 519, the first time having been during the conquest, when he had been a spear-bearer in the king’s retinue (Hdt. III.139).¹⁴ The revolt was put down without much difficulty, and Aryandes reinstated. The latter tried to regain the confidence of his master by a rather inconclusive expedition to Cyrenaica, but it was not until 512 that Libya itself was formed into a satrapy.

A greater memorial to Darius is his codification of the laws of the empire, a process which reached Egypt in the king’s fourth year (518), when the satrap was instructed to assemble ‘the wise men among the warriors, priests, and all the scribes of Egypt’, in order to codify the law of Egypt as it stood in the final year of Amasis, presumably the last period of normal life in Egypt (*Dem. Chron.* Vo. Col. c6–16). The commission sat until the nineteenth year of Darius, and after this the entire findings were sent to Susa, there to be copied on to papyrus in Aramaic (the official language of the empire) and Egyptian demotic. The benefits of this to the satrap’s administration are obvious; a summary was also made in Aramaic for the guidance of officials in general, similar perhaps to the *Gnomon* of the Idios Logos, which was used in Roman Egypt. Diodorus (I.95) represents this as a reaction to the anarchy caused in the temples of Egypt by Cambyses, but this must be an over-simplification; however he also adds that the measure earned the king divine honours. This is strictly meaningless in Egypt, where all kings were divine, but the underlying point is clear. The image of Darius as an ideal pharaoh was taking shape.

A more spectacular, though perhaps less permanent, achievement was the construction of a canal between the Nile and the Red Sea. A waterway of some sort had existed in pharaonic Egypt, and a major undertaking was begun by Necho in about 600, but now the project was once again

¹² For the date of accession, see B 859. ¹³ B 923.

¹⁴ B 859 argues for a visit to Egypt in late 519 or 518; B 819, 116, prefers the date 518/17.

taken in hand, with the resources of a world state. According to the commemorative stelae, the king conceived of the scheme while he was still at Pasargadae, and later (perhaps in 510) summoned a conference of architects at Persepolis. Reconnaissance-ships were sent into the Red Sea, and it was reported that for a length of eight *itrw* (about 84 km) there was no water in the original channel. According to Herodotus (II.158) the new canal was to be wide enough for two triremes to pass each other – say about 45 m – and it can be estimated that twelve million cubic metres of earth were excavated in order to construct it. It was lined with at least a dozen stelae, over three metres high, inscribed in three cuneiform languages and hieroglyphs, complete with lists of the satrapies of the empire. According to the best preserved examples, a flotilla of twenty-four ships, laden with Egyptian produce, was sent to Persia by Darius in person, who had travelled to Egypt for the opening of the great canal. ‘I ordered this canal to be excavated from the stream of the Nile, which flows through Egypt, to the sea which comes from Persia . . . and ships sailed from Egypt through this canal to Persia, as was my wish.’ So says the Great King, and a pliant courtier responds: ‘What your majesty decrees is Truth (*mꜣꜥt*), exactly as with everything that issues from the mouth of Rē, the sun-god.’ Elsewhere in the text, Darius is the son of Neith of Saïs (in other words, again identified with the sun-god), and we can see that the psychology of Udjahorresne has triumphed over the conqueror. The canal ran from Bubastis on the Nile towards modern Ismailiya, then turned south east to debouch into the Gulf of Suez. Wells for drinking-water were also constructed. This noonday of the Persian empire must have been in 497–6, when the king visited Egypt for the third and last time.¹⁵ An interesting by-product of this activity was discovered in 1972 at Susa: a statue of Darius himself, in full robes, with inscriptions in hieroglyphs as well as the standard cuneiform languages, together with a hieroglyphic list of satrapies on the base (see Pls. Vol., pl. 22). The Persian text runs: ‘This is the stone statue which Darius the king ordered to be completed in Egypt, so that whoever beholds it in future times will know that the man of Persia has gained possession of Egypt.’ The original statue probably came from the temple of Rē at Heliopolis, and it seems that similar representations of Darius were placed in several of the temples of Egypt.¹⁶ Opinion is divided whether the statue we possess is the Egyptian version or a Persian copy;¹⁷ but the original may well have been sent from Egypt by Xerxes as an act of piety. The purpose

¹⁵ B 819. The canal stelae use the ‘late’ form of Darius’ name, which is first encountered in his twenty-fifth year (497 B.C.). Ancient sources referring to the canal: Hdt. II.158, Diod. I.33, Strab. XVII.1.25. ¹⁶ Cf. Hdt. II.110. Other temples were more co-operative.

¹⁷ B 922, with the preceding article (made in Persia); however, B 128A argues for an Egyptian origin, and B 910, 397 n.1, maintains that the stone is Egyptian greywacke. Other such statues are now known.

of the canal was not merely ceremonial; it was an attempt to integrate Egypt more closely into the great communications of the empire, but in this respect it was only a limited success, and may soon have silted up.

The dangers of the outlying province must have been obvious to Darius, for it was about this time that he deposed Aryandes, the satrap. The reasons put forward for this vary noticeably – a version that Aryandes minted his own coinage seems groundless, although he may have been profiteering in some way – but there are really too many reasons given; the fundamental cause must have been the fear of a declaration of independence by the viceroy of Egypt, as even Alexander was to find with his trusted Cleomenes, and as Ptolemy the satrap realized to his great advantage. But in the meantime Darius may have been free to travel to Kharga oasis, where the great temple of Hibis was in construction, in which he was shown as the universal high priest, sacrificing to Amun like the pharaohs of old. The temple was finished some ten years later, in 486 B.C., and was clearly a cherished project. The view that Kharga had become important because of Greek Cyrenaica is probably too Hellenocentric; the Persians had a marked interest in the caravan trade, notably with Siwa, and Kharga was also notorious as a place for political exiles from the Nile valley.¹⁸ Other temples were embellished by Darius the benefactor, and the chances of time have preserved at least four: Elkab, Edfu (an important donation), Abusir in the central Delta, and the Serapeum of Memphis (Fig. 22). Building at Saïs is also mentioned by Udjahorresne.¹⁹ It is hardly surprising that Darius' willingness to behave like a traditional pharaoh is reflected in our sources, and the story of 'Sesostris' preserved in Herodotus has long been recognized as a thinly-disguised portrait of the son of Hystaspes, whom the Egyptian mentality had naturalized when bringing the legend of its greatest conqueror up to date.²⁰ The reasons for Darius' interest in Egypt were no doubt political, but this does not mean that they were not personal as well; Darius, with his statues, and Egyptian doctors, and collections of Egyptian *objets d'art*, may well have shared Herodotus' love of that mysterious land.²¹ And even the events of the next four reigns were unable to erase the impression that he left in Egypt.

The administration of Achaemenid Egypt is particularly interesting, because it shows the imposition of an alien system of government upon a country that was already highly developed. Over all was naturally the king, as pharaoh, although he was, for the first real time in Egypt's history, an absentee landlord. Cambyses, as we have already seen, was given a titulary by Udjahorresne. With Darius this is not so, and

¹⁸ For the caravan trade, see B 835, II 135. The temple of Hibis is published in B 920.

¹⁹ B 824, 61–2.

²⁰ B 872 also sees strong Achaemenid influence in the story of the princess of Bakhtan, and quotes parallels with Darius which are not entirely fanciful.

²¹ B 823, 140–1.



22. Stela to Darius (as falcon) from the Faiyum. Fifth century B.C. Height 0.29 m. (Berlin, Äg. Mus. 7493; after B 789, pl. 8.1.)

Udjahorresne refers to him as ‘great king of every land, great ruler of Egypt’. Elsewhere he is *hꜥꜥ hꜥꜥw* ‘King of Kings’, but his name is invariably enclosed in the traditional cartouche. Two throne-names of this ruler are known from the temple of Hibis in Kharga oasis (an earlier attempt to ascribe these to Darius II is to be discounted), but they have a suspiciously improvised look to them. Nevertheless, it is possible that Darius I went through a coronation ceremony during one of his visits to Egypt.²² Artaxerxes I on his ceremonial vases is regularly ‘Pharaoh the great’, which is presumably a translation of *ḥšāyathiya vaṣarka*. But the later kings are rather poorly represented in the hieroglyphs, and temple-building in their names is scarce and merely routine. No Persian king in our period after Darius is known to have visited Egypt. Papyrus documents, however, are invariably dated to them, whether in demotic or Aramaic, with a double year-date in the period between December and the following April when the Egyptian calendar was one year ahead of the Persian. With Cambyses, two systems were eventually in operation, one dating from the conquest in 525, one dating from the beginning of his rule in Persia, the two systems being five years apart.²³

But for everyday purposes the ruler of Egypt was the satrap, who was regularly either an important aristocrat or a member of the royal family

²² Prenomina of Darius: B 920, 1 7–9; B 811, 148, 154–5 (ascribed to Darius II).

²³ B 858, 298–301; for Cambyses, compare the summary in B 860, 209 n.3.

itself. In demotic the title appears as *ḥštrpn*; attempts to find other names for the satrap have not met with success. The Aramaic word *peḥāb* ‘governor’, known from Syria-Palestine, was apparently never used in Egypt.²⁴ In general, however, he is referred to by phrases such as ‘our lord’. The satraps of our period are, firstly, Aryandes or Aryavanda, appointed by Cambyses, expelled after 522, restored in 518, and deposed about 496. His successor, Pherendates or Farnadāta, is known only from three demotic letters addressed to him by the priests of the god Khnum at Elephantine, in which they request him to regulate their affairs for them. Appeals to pharaoh, and therefore the satrap, were a regular feature of Egyptian life at all periods.²⁵ Pherendates may well have lost his life in the trouble of 486–5, though it would be interesting to discover which side he was fighting on, and Xerxes, shortly after his accession in November 486, appointed his own brother Achaemenes (Haḥāmaniš) to the office. The revolt was soon brought under control. Achaemenes fought with the Egyptian contingent at Salamis, and was killed fighting against the rebel Inaros at Papremis (459). After this, the problems begin. Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 14, 38) mentions a satrap named Sarsamas (there are variant spellings), appointed by the general Megabxyus after the suppression of this revolt. Sarsamas is commonly identified with the well-known satrap Arsames, who is attested in Aramaic documents from 428 or at least 424, where he seems to be the satrap named by Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 15, 50) as Arxanes. This spelling may reflect the underlying Persian name Aršāma. The period of time intervening is a large one, and it is probably better to accept the mysterious Sarsamas and to admit that we know next to nothing of the satraps of Egypt between 460 and 430. With Arsames of the Aramaic documents we are at least on safer ground: in several of the Nakhtihor letters (Driver, AD 2, 3 and elsewhere) he is called *bar baytā* ‘son of the (royal) house’; a condition frequent with satraps of Egypt. Passages in the Elephantine correspondence, written during his absence in Persia from 410 to 407/6, hint that his authority was not confined to Egypt; certainly he is known to have had large estates in Babylonia. Arsames doubtless owed his position, or its continuation, to his support for the successful coup of Darius II in 423, but even this did not prevent his being summoned back to Persia. He may have died before the final revolt of Egypt in 404.²⁶ The frequent recalling of Arsames, if such it

²⁴ For *peḥāb* see B 862A, 182 (following Griffith). For the title used in P. Rylands 1x see B 908, 30–2; it probably refers to a financial officer.

²⁵ B 902. The name appears in the demotic texts as ‘*Prndd*, to whom Egypt is entrusted’, and ‘*Prnt* the lord’. These may in fact be different persons. See Postscript below, p. 286.

²⁶ For Arsames in general, see B 804, app. 3; B 833, 394–7. An earlier Arsames was killed at Salamis (Aesch. *Pers.* 36–7, 308; he is described as ruler of Memphis), but there is no reason to see him as a satrap; the name was common in the Persian royal family. Herodotus (VII.69) describes an Arsames, son of Darius I by his favourite wife Artystone, who commanded the Arabian and Ethiopian troops during this battle (see now B 126, 110). The two could be the same man, but, even alive, he is unlikely to be the Arsames of the Driver correspondence.

was, shows at least one check upon the ambitions of the satrap; others can be found in the division of powers within the administration as a whole, and the institution of fast dispatch-riders (*angaroi*), who carried intelligence reports unceasingly back to the capital.²⁷

Beneath the satrap, the immemorial division of Egypt into provinces, or *nomes*, was naturally retained. There is evidence, however, that grouping of nomes into larger areas, a feature which is known from other periods, was also practised. In the Aramaic archives from Elephantine there is frequent reference to an area called *Tštrs*, which is certainly the Egyptian Tshetrēs ‘the southern region’, a term which is found in demotic.²⁸ There is evidence that this extended from Aswan in the south downstream to Armant, rather like the Saïte *p3 ʔ3 rs* ‘the southland’. Thebes, too, seems to have been a region in its own right, and there may well have been others. Each province was governed by a *frataraka* (*prtrk* in Aramaic), who corresponds generally to the traditional nomarch, and was accompanied by an army of other officials, notably the ‘royal scribe’, who was responsible for land-registration and taxes, and who may well have had more effective power than the *frataraka* himself. At the highest level, a similar official may have been imposed upon the satrap as well (Hdt. III.128).

The legal administration of the country had to take account of the fact that there was now a dominant foreign presence within Egypt. A chancellor accompanies the satrap, who is known from Aramaic sources as *bēʿēl ʔēēm* ‘lord of command (?)’, and various investigators appear, employed to cut through the endless business of pleas, counter-pleas, paperwork and bribes.²⁹ One such is the *patifrāsa* or *frasaka* ‘inquisitor’. Under the satrap, each provincial governor has his own dual system, one for native Egyptians, one for foreigners, and it is likely, on analogy with the Ptolemaic administration, that the criterion would have been one of language – whether the documents were in Aramaic or demotic. ‘King’s judges’ appear, as do their provincial counterparts; also *tipati* ‘sheriffs’ and the sinister *gašʾaka*, who may well be the ‘ears’ of the king (cf. Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.2.10). The latter seem to have fascinated the Greeks more than they did the Persians.

Egypt was sixth in the list of satrapies, and was assessed at an annual tribute of 700 talents (Hdt. III.91), a sum which was hardly punitive. It had also to maintain the non-Persian troops stationed there, and the Persian ones (probably a corps of commanders) who were in the garrison at Memphis, together with providing 120,000 measures of grain, the profits from the fisheries of Lake Moeris, and some salt and Nile water for the king’s table; the latter were merely symbols of submission.

²⁷ B 155, 299. ²⁸ P. Rylands IX, P. Berlin 3110, etc.; cf. B 816, index ad loc.

²⁹ For the administration in general, see B 830, 27–40; B 867, 28–61. B 103, 310–11 sees the *bʾlʿm* as a rank half way between chancellor and secretary; cf. B 389, 22–3; A 35, 10 n.38.

Athenaeus (1.33) adds the colourful detail that the obscure city of Anthylla in the northern Delta was to provide shoes, girdles and needles for the Persian queen. Was this a spontaneous gesture made during a royal visit, or was it a tradition taken over by the new rulers? One gains the impression that the whole imposition was carefully assessed, in order to extract the maximum without provoking undue resentment; whether this worked is another matter. Responsibility for its collection was the satrap's.

The Egyptian economy was distributive, and even in our period coinage was a hesitant new arrival. Each province, as well as the central court, had a treasury, with its accompanying bureaucracy; also a 'king's house', which acted as a distribution and collection centre, and paid monthly rations to mercenary soldiers stationed in the region. Accounts were kept in the time-honoured Egyptian fashion; one papyrus (Cowley, *AP* 26) shows a detailed inventory of every nail, thread and splinter on a boat. One letter, sent from Migdol in the Delta to Elephantine, describes a body known as the *paḥūta*, who are responsible for determining payment to some members of a Jewish military colony.³⁰ The dual administration of the country was reflected in its monetary system. The pharaonic system of weights of metal was retained, the standard unit being the *deben* (c. 91 g), subdivided into ten *ḳite*. Silver was the usual metal, although the Egyptian word for silver had not yet come to mean 'money', as it did later. The phrase 'weight of Ptah', which appears even in some Aramaic documents, implies a standardized system guaranteed by the temple at Memphis, and does not mean that the documents in question were written during periods of Egyptian rule; it is simply an agreed way of proceeding. The standard non-Egyptian unit was the *shekel*, although those in circulation in Egypt seem to be Phoenician, rather than the Median variety. The *shekel* was slightly lighter than the Egyptian *ḳite*, and was sub-divided into forty *ḥallurīn*. A Persian weight, the *karsh*, was grafted on to this system as the rough equivalent of ten *shekels*, or an approximation in *ḳite*. Such units are found measured against 'the stones of the king', a reference to a government system of weights. Greek coins appear in Egypt at least from 520 B.C., and towards the end of our period the *stater* is mentioned, sometimes described as 'silver of Yavan (Ionia)'. This is doubtless the Athenian tetradrachm or 'owl', which was equated with two *shekels* of the type used in Egypt; such coins may well have been paid to mercenaries in the first instance, before testing by rows of teeth led to their general adoption.³¹ There is an indication, however, that the Persian government may have gone further than this: at least two tetradrachms are known with the legend in demotic

³⁰ B 815, no. 14. B 810, 223–4, sees the word as a plural of *peḥāb* 'governor' (cf. n.24 above).

³¹ See the account in B 867, 62–72 with app. 1; also B 815, 80–1.



23. Silver tetradrachm with test-cuts. (?) Fourth century B.C. Obverse, head of Athena; reverse, owl, with demotic legend 'Artaxerxes, Pharaoh'. Weight 17.06 gm. (Copenhagen, from Iraq(?); after B 895, 5 and pl. 1.7.)

'Artaxer[xes] Pharaoh' (Fig. 23). The use of demotic should mean an attempt to promote this currency in the country at large, and the possibility that these coins date from the first Persian occupation, rather than the second, should certainly be borne in mind.³² Another, and more successful, innovation was the introduction of the Persian *artaba* 'bushel', as a measure to replace the old *oipe*, and which was equated to sixty *bin*. The word survives in modern Egyptian Arabic.³³ Parallel systems such as this can be operated more easily than we imagine, although the reality was certainly intricate.

The military side of the occupation was equally complex. Herodotus' figure for the rations to be provided by Egypt (Hdt. III.91) could suggest an army of 12,000 men, but this is only a guess; what is certain is that most of them were non-Persian mercenaries. Commanders seem regularly to have been Iranian, and several appear in the papyri. Very senior officials are rarely mentioned, although an interesting quadrilingual text survives from a certain Pissouthnes (?), chief of the great barracks (?) of Xerxes. The use of hieroglyphs here is interesting.³⁴ A demotic papyrus, which may date to our period, is written by an Egyptian, Petamūn, to an army commander at Memphis whose name could well be Mithraḥā.³⁵ More information can be obtained from the archives of the Jewish mercenary colony at Elephantine. Here too the local commander bears an Iranian name, the notorious Waidrang (Vidranga), who seems to be a garrison-commander in 420, a 'chief of the seven' (*ḥaṣṭahopātā*) in 416, and a full-grown *frataraka* by 410 B.C. The garrison (*ḥaylā*) at Elephantine was divided into companies (*degetin*), which were further subdivided. Each one was named after its commanding officer, who almost invariably has a Persian or Babylonian name. The Jewish *ḥaylā* was stationed on the island of Elephantine itself, while Phoenician and Aramaic contingents were quartered at Syene on the opposite bank. The overall commander

³² B 895. Recent evidence favours the later date.

³³ B 793A, 128–31. For the word itself see B 889, 112–18.

³⁴ B 873, text 36 (almost illegible). ³⁵ B 897.

(*rab ḥaylā*) may well have had authority in a large part of Upper Egypt, and an interesting stela from Syene records building activity by a particular *rab ḥaylā*, whose name is lost, in the seventh year of Artaxerxes (June 458).³⁶ These military terms are known from elsewhere, notably the capital, and a page survives from the day-book of the arsenal in Memphis, dating from 472/1 B.C.³⁷

It should not be forgotten that there was also a substantial Egyptian military class, the ‘warriors’ (*machimoi*), who may well have been employed as local militias. Their importance is made clear by Herodotus (II. 165–6), where they are said to number 410,000 and to own two thirds of the Delta, and by their mention as one of the three classes consulted in the edict of Darius on the codification of the native law. This estimate of the number of *machimoi* could suggest a figure for the whole warrior population of 1,600,000 or more, allowing for four or five persons per household.³⁸ Egyptian *degelin* are known from Syene, and there is no doubt that Egyptians could, and did, rise to considerable heights in the army. One such is the general Ahmosi (Amasis), who is known from two stelae from the Serapeum, in one of which he claims to have placed respect for the Apis bull ‘in the heart of every person, and of the foreigners from every land who were in Egypt’ – no mean achievement.³⁹ Notable too is the architect Khnemibrē, who served under Darius I, and whose military titles were an essential accompaniment to quarrying-work. He had held office in the final year of Amasis, but was still active in the Wadi Hammamat, east of Koptos, during the years 496–492. Khnemibrē must have been among those who gained considerably from the occupation.⁴⁰ There were others: the Wadi Hammamat is particularly rich in inscriptions from our period.

The polyglot nature of Achaemenid Egypt is nowhere better shown than in the accounts of the Memphite dockyards, which survive in several fragmentary Aramaic papyri, including the newly-discovered ones from Saqqara.⁴¹ Memphis was a major dockyard from the New Kingdom onwards, and ports tend to be international. Overall control of the navy rested in the hands of the satrap, who took over the powers of the Saïte ‘masters of shipping’.

One Egyptian institution created almost intractable problems for any foreign administration: the temples. They were, of course, major landowners, and Herodotus gives the impression that in this respect they

³⁶ For this text, see B 867, 27 n.107. In general, see the account in B 830, 41–8.

³⁷ B 778; for the date, B 858, 295–8.

³⁸ Since warriors held over half the agricultural land of Egypt, a total population of some three million is implied, but the density of population in towns may well have been greater than in the countryside. See B 791, 76–92, and B 836A, 299–301. ³⁹ B 873, no. 6.

⁴⁰ B 873, nos. 11–23. For a general review of the Egyptian evidence, see B 780, 147–53; B 30, 502–28. ⁴¹ B 767; B 778; B 887, *passim*.

fell not far short of the *machimoi*. The truth may even have been the other way round. Estates, even of an obscure temple like that of Amun at Teudjoy, seem to have been considerable, and the moveable wealth of the temples was equally impressive. There is evidence that the Persian administration took a keen interest in temple affairs; the correspondence with Pherendates reveals this, and Papyrus Rylands IX shows us an official, the *lesōnis*, who acted as an administrative head, answerable to the central authorities. The institution is not an Achaemenid invention, but it does become common in our period. We have already seen Cambyses' attempt to impose economies on the temples in general, and the hostility which he seems to have provoked. Xerxes, too, according to an inscription known as the Satrap stela of 311 B.C., confiscated from the temple of Buto in the northern Delta a large tract of land known as 'the land of Edjō', which was later restored by the obscure Pharaoh Khababash. Xerxes' name is not even in a cartouche.⁴² Similar fates befell Tachos and Artaxerxes III Ochus in the fourth century. The Persian king, however, certainly seems to have had the right to make such confiscations, and a certain amount of land redistribution was Achaemenid policy.⁴³ The operation of the agricultural system, however, must have been seen as a priority, and the government probably was reluctant to interfere with it. Herodotus (II.99.3) noticed the maintenance of the dykes near Memphis, and was suitably impressed.

Considerable light on the upkeep of at least one great estate comes from a remarkable group of letters published in 1954. They cover the years 411–408 B.C., during the absence of the satrap Arsames in Susa and Babylon. They are written on leather, and were found in a sort of 'diplomatic bag', and they deal with the administration of the satrap's personal estates back in Egypt. These domains, largely in the western Delta, are under the management of an Egyptian steward (*paqīd*), who at first is called Psammetichus, but who is soon succeeded by one Nakhtihor. The latter is important enough even to have his own militia. One is reminded irresistibly of Zeno, agent of Apollonius the *dioiketes*,^{43a} except that Nakhtihor is a native Egyptian. Other Persians are shown as owning lands and property in Egypt: a lesser prince, Varōhi, who is possibly a relative of Arsames, and an official named Varfiš, who has his own servants. There is also the important figure of Artavant, who may even be Arsames' deputy and acting satrap. The whole archive is invaluable.⁴⁴

Even more important is the single most informative text to survive from ancient Egypt: the petition of Petiēse, or Papyrus Rylands IX. By a coincidence, this comes from the same site, El-Hiba in Middle Egypt, as

⁴² B 788. Later attempts to emend the names of the kings in question are unnecessary.


⁴³ B 717, 142–3. ^{43a} See *CAH* VII².1, 366–9. ⁴⁴ Driver, *AD passim*.

the well-known ‘Misfortunes of Wenamun’. The rambling demotic text, which covers twenty-five columns, begins in the ninth year of Darius I (513 B.C.), when a stranger, Ahmosi the master of shipping, arrives in Teudjoy (El-Hiba), demanding his share of the temple income. This leads to enquiries which concentrate upon Petiēse, the elderly narrator, whose family affairs have led to the bankruptcy of the entire community. A quarrel between Petiēse’s ancestors and the local priests, which is traced back to 661 B.C., has developed into a blood-feud, which is still active. Petiēse appeals either to the satrap, presumably Aryandes, or to his chancellor, and the narrative introduces us to a world of bribery, arson, prejudice, corrupt officials, interrogation by torture, and endless procrastination; and when we leave Petiēse, he is still putting his case in writing. The ramshackle administration of Papyrus Rylands ix might be thought degenerate, but it does correspond to the high-water mark of Achaemenid Egypt, and there are enough parallels in the rest of Egyptian literature to make us realize that what we have before us is the eternal Egypt. It is a system chaotic, infuriating, lubricated by chicanery and promises, but redeemed by a certain feeling for the human. Above all, it faces the conqueror with a stark choice: join it, or leave it. The Achaemenids left it. The whole papyrus is full of illuminating details: note among many others the dismissive contempt for southerners at the satrap’s court. This is endemic in Egypt, but the passage in question unintentionally explains how the officials of a largely Memphite administration may have acquiesced in the gradual eclipse of Thebes, which is one of the characteristic features of our period.⁴⁵

It must have been impossible, even if it was desirable, to exclude Egyptians from the administration. Certainly, in the early period of the occupation, native expertise must have been vital, particularly in agricultural and religious affairs. We have already encountered Udjathorresne, as well as the generals Ahmosi and Khnemibrē, and we can recall the Egyptians who fought with bravery at Salamis. Particularly interesting is the chief of the treasury Ptahhotpe, whose statue in Brooklyn shows him in the characteristic robes of an Egyptian official but with a Persian necklace, which may have been a gift from a grateful sovereign (see Pls. Vol., pl. 58). Ptahhotpe is also known from a stela in the Serapeum, dated to year 34 of Darius, by which time he could hardly be called a collaborator.⁴⁶

A parallel development – one we have already imagined Cambyses fearing – is the Egyptianization of the conquerors. A vivid example is given by two brothers named Atiyawahi and Ariyawrata, whose inscriptions were carved in the Wadi Hammamat. Atiyawahi, described

⁴⁵ B 816, III 60–112; B 915, *passim*; B 780, 174–6. Contempt for southerners: B 816, III 86 n.6; B 915, 265–7. ⁴⁶ B 794.



24. Stela from Mitrahine (Memphis) showing prothesis of a foreigner with mourners and, over the bier, two siren 'soul-birds'. Around 500 B.C. Height 0.23 m. (Berlin, Äg. Mus. 23721; after F. W. von Bissing, *ZDMG* 84 (1930) pl. 1, and K. Parlasca, *Staatl. Mus. Berlin Forsch. u. Berichte* 14 (1972) pl. 3.1.)

as a son of Artames and a Persian (?) lady named Qanju, is a *saris* of Persia and governor of Koptos,⁴⁷ and his repeated visits cover the years 486–473, while those of his younger brother extend from 461 to 449. In the latter case '*saris* of Persia' is replaced by Egyptian translations, and Ariyawrata himself now has an Egyptian name, Djeho, or Tachos.⁴⁸ This was a regular feature among some communities who considered themselves royal employees; its extension to a Persian magnate is remarkable. A certain creeping Egyptianization is seen too in some Aramaic letters, especially in the opening formulae. An example runs: 'To my lord Mithravahišt, your servant Pahim, greetings; may my lord live, be happy, and prosper exceedingly.'⁴⁹

Achaemenid Egypt was a richly cosmopolitan state. The Persians are already familiar to us from the Arsames correspondence and the Jewish archives. A funerary stela, now in Berlin, shows a foreigner in 'Median' costume being laid out by mourning women, and although the date is early in our period, the representation could be taken as a likeness of Atiyawahi or his brother (Fig. 24).⁵⁰ The artist may have been East Greek. Most Iranians were in Egypt in a military capacity, and it is no accident that the word *matoi* 'Mede' is regularly used in later Egyptian to mean 'soldier'.⁵¹

⁴⁷ *Saris* is sometimes translated 'eunuch', although it seems to be closer to the Turkish 'pasha'. The name *Pibris* 'the *saris*' is given as that of the father of a dedicant (B 885, 95–6), where the conventional translation is obviously inappropriate.

⁴⁸ B 873, nos. 24–34; B 858, 287–8. ⁴⁹ Cowley, *AP* no. 70.

⁵⁰ East Berlin 23721, discussed by Nicholls in B 843, 66–7, who dates it to the period 510–482 B.C.

⁵¹ B 889, 124–31.

Another community, living in Egypt for military and commercial purposes, were the Ionians. These had been in the country since the reign of Psammetichus I, when they had been called in as mercenaries, and by the time of the conquest they had been stationed in Memphis for almost fifty years. There may well have been considerable numbers of Greeks in other cities, notably Naucratis in the Delta, as well as in more obscure localities, since trade was no longer restricted.⁵² Closely associated with the Ionians were the Carians, who had arrived at the same time and shared their history, which can now be documented by the remarkable stelae from Saqqara discovered by the Egypt Exploration Society. These too may be the result of Greek workshops in Memphis.⁵³ Evidence for the close involvement of the Carians in naval affairs has been growing recently: a happy emendation in one Aramaic text sees the phrase *mwpty* *zy krky*, not as ‘captains of the fortress Karkh’, but as ‘captains of the Carians’.⁵⁴ Carians appear in several of the new Saqqara papyri. There is also a Carian dedication on a bronze lion, with strong Achaemenid traits, from an unknown temple in Egypt.⁵⁵

Memphis in particular was also the site of a large Phoenician community, the *Phoinikaigyptioi*, although Phoenicians are known in other large cities such as Syene. The Memphite community is known from funerary stelae discovered in the cemeteries of south Saqqara and elsewhere, and a good example is the Egyptianizing stela of Aba and Ahatbu, which dates from the fourth year of Xerxes (482), and which also bears hieroglyphic inscriptions like some of the Carian ones.⁵⁶ Associated with the Phoenicians are the general mass of Aramaic speakers, who, like others, were attracted to the wealth of the Nile valley and the ease of communication created by the occupying forces. A vivid picture of these communities is seen in the Hermopolis letters, which were discovered in a jar in the ibis-galleries at Tuna el-Gebel in Middle Egypt. They were found near a painted wooden shrine with the cartouches of one of the Dariuses. The letters stem from a colony of Syrian or even Mesopotamian origin living in or near Memphis; eight letters are addressed to a related colony at Syene, and a further six to some of the inhabitants of Opi, or Luxor. The whole collection must have been abandoned at Hermopolis. Stelae, sarcophagi and inscribed statues are also known from this community at Syene, and its cults include Nabu, Banit, Bethel and Malkat-shemayīn, the ‘Queen of Heaven’, who may be ‘Anath or Ishtar.’⁵⁷ A letter from El-Hiba, a place which was seen in rather lugubrious light in Papyrus Rylands IX, mentions Elamites,

⁵² C 5, 33–4. For the form of the word ‘Ionians’ (*Yawanīn*, *W’eyenīn*) used in Egypt, see B 889, 131–3. ⁵³ B 843, *passim*. ⁵⁴ B 722, 410–11. The text is Cowley, *AP* no. 26, [2–3], 8.

⁵⁵ B 842, dating it c. 500 B.C. ⁵⁶ B 843, 66–7.

⁵⁷ B 821. The Hermopolis papyri (B 787) are re-edited in B 815 and *TSSI* II no. 27.

Cilicians and Medes in a local setting,⁵⁸ and a papyrus from Saqqara contains a plethora of foreign names alongside Egyptians.⁵⁹ The day-book of the Memphite arsenal even introduces us to a Moabite, and a Lycian inscription from Egypt has also been published. While we are in the realm of the obscure, but none the less interesting, it is worth recalling the hoard of silver bowls found at Tell el-Maskhuta near Ismailiya, the Egyptian Tjeku (see Pls. Vol., pl. 93). One of these is a dedication by a ruler of the north-Arabian kingdom of Qedar to the goddess Hanilat. A date of *c.* 400 B.C. or slightly earlier is provided by associated Athenian tetradrachms, and some of the silver bowls represent a distinctive contribution to the art of our period.⁶⁰ Other ‘Arabian’ tribes, such as the Agriai of the eastern desert, are also encountered, and we should not forget the Nubians, who were such a standard feature of life in Egypt that they go largely unmentioned. The xenophobia of the Egyptians, which is often referred to, must be viewed as the attitude of people who had seen too many foreigners, rather than none at all.

The reaction of the Egyptians to foreign conquest was obviously complex: a mixture of injured pride, prejudice, corresponding cultural superiority, and refuge in religion. Self-interest was also a factor. Udjahorresne and Ptahhotpe clearly were able to do well out of the conquest while retaining their own sense of values. Egyptian slaves are even known to have worked for Jewish masters at Elephantine. Egyptian wives were common in foreign communities in Egypt; indeed they were inevitable. Egyptians, too, discriminated almost entirely on the grounds of culture: any one who spoke Egyptian, and who behaved in a recognizably Egyptian way, was Egyptian, no matter what his origin. Nevertheless, the desire for independence is not merely an innate feature of mankind, but it is also a useful recourse when one can think of nothing else. Egyptians of the Achaemenid period consciously revive the grandiose names involving those of the Saïte kings, including even the unpopular Necho.⁶¹ No such names are known glorifying Xerxes or Darius. The Carians, conversely, cease to use the name Psammetichus. Racial or cultural insults are always available for those who wish: Seth, in the later mystery play at Edfu, insults Horus by calling him a Mede, and in Cowley, *AP* 37 the local administrator is referred to contemptuously by the Egyptians as a Mazdaean, although this translation has been challenged.

The latter part of our period is marked by native revolts. The first seems to have broken out in 486, and is normally ascribed to the aftermath of Marathon, but the main factor was probably the prospect of

⁵⁸ B 851, correcting Bresciani. ⁵⁹ B 767. Line 6 mentions ‘tribute of the *haylā*’.

⁶⁰ B 875 (*TSSI* 11 no. 25); cf. B 894. ⁶¹ B 777, 81.

a change of ruler. It was put down by the new satrap, Achaemenes, and was followed by a policy of greater repression (Hdt. vii.8), which in itself guaranteed more trouble. Early in the reign of Artaxerxes I (c. 463–2), revolt broke out in the western Delta, the site of the old royal capital, and the centre of the native warriors' influence. The leader was Inaros, son of Psammetichus (a name which may have been chosen deliberately), and an appeal to Athens, the acknowledged source of expert manpower, led to the diversion of a fleet from Cyprus to Egypt (459). Memphis was taken, although not until after a prolonged siege, but the citadel itself was held by Persians and their sympathizers (Thuc. i.104). A battle at the strategic site of Papremis, in the western Delta, led to the death of Achaemenes the satrap, but it was clear that Inaros had failed to capture the popular support necessary for complete victory. Megabyxus, satrap of Syria, retook Memphis for the Great King, and blockaded Inaros and the Greek navy on the island of Prosopitis (Thuc. i.109). Few escaped, and an Athenian relief force which had entered the Mendesian arm of the Nile, unaware of the turn of events, was annihilated by the new satrap Arsames or Sarsamas (454). Inaros was taken to Persia and later executed: but the tradition which says that an engraved seal shows him prostrate beneath the feet of the Great King is unfortunately fictitious. The revolt was at an end, but the sons of Inaros and his associate Amyrtaeus were reinstated in their fathers' provinces; this is said by Herodotus (iii.15) to have been a Persian practice, but it looks very much like a sign of weakness. The peace of Callias in 449 may well have given the Persians the confidence to be generous.⁶² Inaros, whose name is Egyptian, appears as the hero of a later demotic epic, but only the name and the martial atmosphere suggest any real identification.⁶³ Amyrtaeus continued his resistance until 449, and another dynast, known surprisingly enough as Psammetichus, is found sending a substantial quantity of grain to Athens in 445/4; this fact in itself speaks for his independence of action.⁶⁴ Various dynasts called Psammetichus are known from our period, and are listed rather optimistically in the *Lexikon der Ägyptologie*, but it is clear that not all of them claimed to be kings of Egypt.

From 411 it seems that Egypt, taking advantage of Persia's increasing difficulties, was fast recovering its independence, but we are badly informed about the details. All we know is that the process ended in the revolt of Amyrtaeus, the second of this name, in 404. With the exception of the last, however, the rebel leaders seem to have been isolated from the population as a whole; Egyptians fight in Memphis against Inaros, there

⁶² B 824, 69–73. See also the sources collected in B 804, 92–6.

⁶³ Inaros is the Egyptian *'Irt-n-ḥr-r-w* 'the eye of Horus is against them'; Amyrtaeus is *'Imn-ḏ.ḏr-ḏl-s* 'Amun has given him'. The two sons, Pausiris and Thannyras, are *P-n-Ḥsir* 'he of Osiris' and possibly **T3-n-n3-wbrw* 'offspring of the (sacred) hounds'. ⁶⁴ B 824, 73; B 835, 1 49.

are few, if any, documents dated by them, and the inscriptions of the Wadi Hammamat show that Upper Egypt was untouched by their revolts. They seem essentially to be disaffected warriors, perhaps with personal grudges, rather than leaders of a genuine ‘liberation movement’, but their alliance with a foreign power, Athens, was in itself a persistent source of trouble to the whole empire.

Another episode which can be superficially ascribed to Egyptian xenophobia is the well-known destruction of the Jewish temple on the island of Elephantine, an event which took place in July or August 410 B.C. But here again the underlying causes must have been complex. The Jewish community at Elephantine had mercenary origins, and had probably entered the country in Saïte times. They lived on the northern part of the island, with their own quarter, and a temple of Yahu, the God of the Old Testament. In general, although some cultural exclusiveness is remarked upon both by Herodotus (II.41) and in the story of Joseph (Gen. 43:32), relations with the Egyptians must have been reasonably good, and Egyptian servants and possibly even wives appear in the Jewish community, although perhaps not as commonly as in some other Jewish settlements.⁶⁵ There is evidence, too, that the colony was not strictly orthodox, at least as this would have been understood later, but that certain ‘fringe’ deities, such as Bethel and his consorts, had been admitted alongside the worship of Yahu.⁶⁶ It is therefore difficult to see that the Jews were irreconcilably at conflict with the society in which they lived, although they may have been quite capable of matching Egyptian feelings of superiority with some of their own. It is true that the Jewish sacrifice of lambs to the deity in a city devoted to the worship of the ram-god Khnum was unfortunate, to say the least; but it is difficult to see why the Egyptians should have waited a century and a half before taking offence. But it may have been a grievance ready for use when need be. Another source of friction must have been the regular pro-Persian policy of the Jews, a natural reaction to the circumstances of their life in Egypt. The community even kept a well-thumbed Aramaic copy of Darius’ autobiography, which they later recopied, complete with lacunae; and the interest of the Persian kings in Jewish religion is shown not only by the experience of Ezra and Nehemiah but by an Aramaic papyrus (Cowley *AP* 21), which preserves an instruction from Darius II to the colony, regulating the observance of the Passover and the feast of Unleavened Bread. The date is 419 B.C., perhaps after the reform of the cult in Palestine. This closeness between Jew and Persian could become a stigma, especially in a period of general Egyptian unrest. There may also have been local circumstances – perhaps the summer of 410 at

⁶⁵ Cf., e.g., B 867, ch. 5, and 248–52.

⁶⁶ B 830, 83–99.

Elephantine was unusually hot, even for that place – but enough has been said to show that the destruction of the Elephantine temple was not a simple case of ‘native revolt’. This is not to say that such incidents did not raise the Egyptians’ consciousness of their own identity.

The circumstances are narrated in Cowley, *AP* 30. The Egyptians, taking advantage of the absence of the satrap in Persia, induced the governor, the unspeakable Waidrang or Vidranga, to help them desecrate and ransack the temple. Waidrang is represented as a monster of depravity, but in reality he was probably a harassed official who wanted peace and quiet, and who in a critical moment for the Persians, or in the absence of clear orders from above, chose to alienate the minority of his subjects, rather than the majority. Nevertheless the Jews prayed in sackcloth, and ‘the dogs tore off the anklet from his legs’. Later editors prefer to translate, ‘that dog of a Waidrang had his insignia of office removed’.⁶⁷ The Jews appealed to Bagoas (Bagohi), the governor of Judaea, who may conceivably have been a Jew himself, and action was taken. Bagoas’ reply (Cowley, *AP* 32) is a masterpiece of diplomacy: the pre-conquest nature of the shrine is recalled, Waidrang referred to disparagingly (but nothing more), the rebuilding of the temple approved, and sacrifices laid down, but with animals, interestingly enough, omitted. The latter compromise had already been suggested by the Egyptian Jews. A happy ending: but the rule of the Persians was almost over, and with it the archives of Elephantine.

Yet it is not merely the Aramaic papyri which are valuable to us. The Achaemenid period marks the beginning of that wealth of demotic documents which characterizes later Egypt, and sheds so much light on its everyday affairs. Letters to officials have already been mentioned, such as the Pherendates correspondence and Papyrus Rylands IX, but there is also a marked increase in the number of legal documents and family archives, recording sales, receipts, transfers, leases, marriages, divorces and personal memoranda. These can be said to show a greater sense of legal abstraction than the few surviving documents of earlier periods, and in general reveal a society not greatly different from that which is seen in the fourth century, although lists of legal witnesses are still rare and seem to be dispensable, and (perhaps by coincidence) no examples are found of offices being sold or permanently transferred. The new Saqqara texts can add a magnificent marriage document of the eleventh year of Darius, and an interesting record of self-sale or hire to a temple, a practice not otherwise known until much later. These demotic legal texts exist alongside a similar body of contracts in Aramaic, and the question of influence obviously arises. Many of the standard legal

⁶⁷ B 830, 105 n.15; B 815, 410 n.5.

formulae in demotic, such as ‘you have satisfied my heart (with payment etc.)’, are also found in Aramaic, and seem to have a long history in Mesopotamia, but the wisest conclusion seems to be that both traditions were now being applied to the same society, and that they influenced each other creatively during our period.⁶⁸ We should also begin to look here for the origins of the large number of Aramaic and the smaller number of Persian words which are known for Coptic; the Sasanian period is too short, and too late, for this purpose.⁶⁹

Egyptian reaction to the conquest shows a characteristic mixture of consolidation on the one hand, and assiduous borrowing on the other. The stiffening of the sinews can be seen in the desire for continuity, and the growth of the hereditary principle, although this was a tendency and not a hard-and-fast rule, as Herodotus supposed (vi.60). Genealogies also appear with increasing frequency on votive statues and similar objects, and this mentality lies behind the episode of the priests’ statues which Herodotus gleefully reports in ii.143. In the preceding section, the historian records 11,340 years of Egyptian history, as claimed by the priests. This looks very much like the response of a culture that feels itself on show, or even under threat, and it is no coincidence that the features of Egyptian religion which grow under the occupation are those which the Egyptians felt were distinctively their own. The new devotion to Osiris and the goddess Isis may be one of these, but the concentration upon animal cults is even more certainly a sign of the times. The cult of the Apis flourishes, and the burials of his mother-cows are continued and probably developed; one ostrakon from Saqqara shows an Egyptian pleading to Isis, mother of the Apis, to take his side against a Persian named Bagafarna (Megaphernes), who had had the audacity to gain the confidence of the goddess’s husband. We do not know the outcome of this cosmic duel. This is not the only foreigner who succumbed to the carefully-fostered attractions of Egyptian religion. We have already seen the general Ahmosi impressing visitors with the mysteries of the Apis, and a person named Harkhēbi, whose father bears a semi-Persian name, dedicated a bronze ex-voto to the bull-god, possibly in 469 B.C.⁷⁰

However, this phenomenon is not confined to Egyptian texts. The Aramaic evidence also shows a considerable number of foreigners who make dedications to the gods of Egypt. In a world where religious exclusivity was not an ideal, this is not surprising, and it does not necessarily mean that these aliens abandoned their own gods. Sometimes it is a question of a visit; one letter from 417 B.C. records how, ‘On the third of Kislev, or the eleventh day of Thoth, year seven of Darius the king, Abdbaāl the Sidonian, son of Abdsedeq, came with his brother

⁶⁸ B 833, ch. 6. The whole volume is very sensible.

⁶⁹ Lists in B 793, 377–83.

⁷⁰ B 885, although the dating is optimistic.

Asdrubaal to Abydos before Osiris the great god.⁷¹ This must have been a pilgrimage, since there was no economic reason for visiting Abydos, and the temple of Osiris there bears many graffiti left by pious visitors in several languages. The syncretism of the Hermopolis letters has already been mentioned. Other manifestations of religious feeling are an ostrakon from Elephantine recording a dream or vision,⁷² and a strange text recorded in a rarely-visited tomb at Sheikh Fadl in Middle Egypt, which may be historical – it seems to mention Taharqa and some Saïte Pharaohs – but which, in this setting, might be religious too.⁷³ Yet in some cases, in particular the Aramaic funerary stelae, it appears that Egyptianization has gone further. The stela of Aba and Ahatbu, already discussed, contains a benediction before Osiris, and other examples of this practice are known.⁷⁴ Obviously, burial in a strange land must invoke the gods of that place, but a text such as the Carpentras stela clearly reflects more than this. ‘Blessed be Taba daughter of Tahapi’, runs the Aramaic, ‘devotee of the god Osiris. Nothing evil did she do, nor utter calumny here against any man. From before Osiris be thou blest; from before Osiris receive water. Serve the lord of double Truth (*nm^sty*), and live among his favoured ones (*hsy*).’⁷⁵

The mother of this girl is Egyptian, and the words in italics are pure Egyptian too. The use of the word *hsy* could mean that Taba was drowned in the Nile. The stela obviously incorporates the ‘negative confession’ before Osiris, known from the Book of the Dead, and it dates from the end of our period.

If foreigners were absorbing Egyptian religion, there are clear signs that the Egyptians were beginning to think seriously about foreign culture, particularly Mesopotamian. Here borrowing seems to have taken place on an advanced level. A demotic papyrus now in Vienna, dating from the Roman period, contains a series of prognostications derived from eclipses and the appearance of the moon, in which the Babylonian influence is unmistakable. It seems more than likely, from the calendrical system used, that the original text was Achaemenid; it is also possible that Darius I was mentioned in the text, which ought to antedate 482 B.C.⁷⁶ In the recondite field of mathematics, too, it seems that much appears in later Egyptian literature which is derived from Mesopotamia, such as the so-called theorem of Pythagoras.⁷⁷ Above all, astrology is one of the most characteristic borrowings of our period, and one which took firm root in its new home.⁷⁸

Most remarkable, however, and still something of a mystery, is an

⁷¹ B 815, no. 83; *TSSI* II no. 29. ⁷² B 815, no. 21; *TSSI* II no. 26.

⁷³ B 768; B 501, 40–1. Republication is desirable, if the text still exists.

⁷⁴ E.g. Tummā, daughter of Bokonrinef; B 834. ⁷⁵ B 815, no. 86; B 892.

⁷⁶ B 861, 29–30. ⁷⁷ B 864, problems 24–31. ⁷⁸ B 801.

Aramaic text now in the Pierpont Morgan Library in New York. It covers some twenty-two columns, and seems to be an elaborate incantation-text involving deities from north Syria as well as others clearly from Mesopotamia. It is written, however, in the demotic script, and rather ingeniously adapted to the underlying language. The hand, conversely, does not look particularly Egyptian. This use of demotic ought to imply that the text was designed to be recited by Egyptians, but until the whole document is published it is impossible to say more. Nevertheless, it is certainly one of the more intriguing products of our period.⁷⁹

In a wider context, there are indications that certain colophons at the end of pleas or donation texts may have been influenced by ideas borrowed in the Persian period, and in the realm of literature there is at least one obvious example. The demotic wisdom text of Onkhsheshonqy has an introduction and an overall structure based on the story of Ahiqar, which survives in Aramaic among the Jewish archives from Elephantine. The work was still current in Roman Egypt.⁸⁰ There are signs too that another demotic literary work, the tale of Neneferkasokar and the magicians, has a strong Achaemenid flavour.⁸¹ What we are seeing here is not merely the random copying of appealing ideas, but something deeper. Egypt in the late period acted as a great absorber of foreign inventions, which it reinterpreted and in some ways perfected, until it seemed that Egypt was their real home. It is the counterpart of the insistence upon the country's unique history which we have already seen, and it was extremely convincing. By the time of the Roman empire the religious tradition of Egypt was still a living force, when that of Phoenicia, Babylonia and even Greece was already moribund.

In the realm of Egyptian art there is not so much to be said. There is certainly a growth in realistic sculpture, which may be part of the tradition which saw the temple statue, surrounded by its ancestors or peers, as the natural symbol of stability, but it also seems that the Achaemenid period saw a great development of individualism in its portraiture, and in this respect too the age is one of genuine originality.⁸² One innovation, however, cannot be claimed: the so-called 'Persian garb', a depiction in sculpture of a garment corresponding to something worn in everyday life, is in fact known from the closing years of the Saïte dynasty.⁸³

⁷⁹ Preliminary notices, B 779; B 855. B 155, 463–5, prefers a later date, but the Achaemenid influence would still be undeniable.

⁸⁰ B 812, xii, gives other reasons for an Achaemenid date, or slightly later. For Ahiqar, see B 797, 204–48; B 830, 97–9; B 902A, 962. On the other hand, Cowley, *AP* no. 71 is a very interesting literary or prophetic text which looks as if it has been translated from Egyptian.

⁸¹ B 904. ⁸² B 777, 71–86, with some useful comments. ⁸³ B 784.

It is possible that there was some Achaemenid influence on Egyptian art, but it is hard to trace, and seems to be largely ‘courtly’. The necklace worn by the treasury official Ptahhotpe has already been mentioned, and from Leontopolis in the Delta there have come at least six lions in serpentine, holding jars and inlaid with glass in a characteristically Persian fashion; the type seems to have influenced Egyptian art’s later treatment of lions in general.⁸⁴ A strange faience rhyton, also in the form of a roaring lion, is in the same collection.⁸⁵ An interesting product of our period is a faience *shabti* from Saqqara with a bearded head, long thought to be fourth century.⁸⁶ Achaemenid jewellery has certainly been found in Egypt, and may have been made there, and there is an interesting perfume lid from the Michaelides collection, bearing the name of one Ariyāršan son of Aršāma, who could be the satrap Arsames.⁸⁷ A cylinder-seal, now in the British Museum, was found in Egypt, and may well have been used by a Persian governor.⁸⁸ A military standard can complete this list of curios (Fig. 25), and in the British Museum there is also a steatite bowl, of very hybrid appearance, with a dedication to Min, ruler of Koptos, by an Egyptian devotee.⁸⁹ Something of the background to this mixture can be seen from Driver, *AD* 9, where Arsames the satrap commissions a Babylonian(?) sculptor named Hinzani to model a horse and rider, presumably for his estates in Egypt.


In spite of Egypt’s distance from the centre of government, and that government’s increasing preoccupation elsewhere, there is no doubt that Egypt itself had a marked influence on the rest of the empire. The Red Sea canal may have contributed to this, but it is also certain that there were many Egyptians abroad, particularly in Babylonia, where they are found at several levels of society, even under Cambyses. We may recall the case of Harmakhi, father of the innkeeper in whose house the head of the Murashu banking firm stayed in Babylon in 423 B.C. A more illustrious figure is the Egyptian general Usiris, who fought for Artaxerxes I against the rebel satrap Megabyxus in Syria.⁹⁰ In addition to this, the art of Egypt had long exerted a fascination in the Near East, both in itself and through Phoenician imitations, and Achaemenid cylinder-seals in particular have regular Egyptian motifs, even hieroglyphs, which must in some cases have been based on portable objects such as amulets. Alabaster vases were a collector’s item in the Achaemenid courts, often inscribed in various languages (Fig. 26); Posener published six bearing the name of Darius, thirty-five that of Xerxes, and five that of

⁸⁴ B 794–5. ⁸⁵ Brooklyn 48.29. ⁸⁶ A 6, 137, with fig. 160.


⁸⁷ B 849; cf. B 130. The same collection features a range of Achaemenid objects, some of which may be genuine. ⁸⁸ B 486A, 298. Other Archaemenid seals from Egypt are listed here.

⁸⁹ Standard: B 829. Bowl: B 893.

⁹⁰ B 250, 79. For Harmakhi see B 155, 356; for Usiris, Ctesias, *FGrH* 688 F 14,40.



25. Military standard: bovine head with hieroglyphic inscriptions from Persepolis. Sixth century B.C. Bronze with gold traces. (Tehran Museum of Iran; after B 829, 127–8, fig. 18.)



26. Fragmentary alabaster vase from Susa dated to year 34 of Darius, 488/7 B.C. (Paris, Louvre; after B 789, pl. 8.4.)

Artaxerxes, and others are now known, including one quadri-lingual vessel with the name of Artaxerxes, ‘Pharaoh the great’, found in 1971 at Orsk in southern Russia. Others are reported to have come from Syria and Babylonia, and one is now in the treasury of St Mark’s, Venice. Most remarkable of all is the vase with the name of Xerxes found at the foot of the western staircase in the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus, perhaps a gift from a satrap’s collection.⁹¹ Some of these vases may have contained the Nile water sent to Persia as ‘tribute’. It is certain, too, that Egyptian artists worked with others at Susa; according to a foundation inscription of Darius, Egyptians worked alongside Medes as goldsmiths, and on the citadel, and they are also found together with Lydians as carpenters. Texts from Persepolis confirm a similar picture, and an Egyptian even appears as a beer-maker.⁹² Egyptian architectural devices have long been recognized at Persepolis, for example in the pylons with cavetto cornice from the palace of Darius; the doors in the harem-palace of Xerxes are likewise unmistakable.⁹³ These are only elements in an overall design, but it is not surprising to find later Egyptian tradition ascribing all the palaces of Media and Persia to the influence of their own artists (Diod. 1.46). This too is an example of the ‘conquest mentality’ which we have already seen successfully at work.

The reign of Darius II was clearly a period of unrest for the whole empire, and in its second half Persian control over Egypt seems to be vanishing. We are badly informed about the details, but have already

⁹¹ B 873, nos. 37–99; B 883; B 870, 399; for Orsk, see also B 132, 28. For a cylinder-seal with the Ahura Mazda emblem and hieroglyphs bearing the name Petiēse, see B 916.

⁹² B 168, 70–2. ⁹³ B 155, pls. 28, middle, 40, 70.

noticed the prolonged absence of the satrap Arsames from 410 to 407/6. The Elephantine papyri hint at considerable disturbances from 412/11 onwards. In Cowley, *AP* 27, written about 410, the Jews declare, ‘When detachments of the Egyptians rebelled, we did not leave our posts, and nothing disloyal was found in us.’ It is equally clear that among this community at least the rule of the next king, Artaxerxes II, was observed down to 402. Whether the Egyptians themselves thought this way is extremely doubtful. A striking passage in Diodorus (XIII.46.6) refers to events of 411 B.C., in which a ‘king’ of Egypt is described as intriguing with the ruler of the desert Arabs to cast envious eyes on the coast of Phoenicia, doubtless to forestall a repetition of the conquest of 525. This native ruler is otherwise unknown, but we have seen similar characters before in our period. The combined evidence of the Arsames correspondence (Driver, *AD* 5, 7 and 8) makes it clear that serious disturbances had occurred, in which troops could change allegiance and whole farms be abandoned; but the details are lost to us, and even the date of the archive has been questioned.⁹⁴ Nevertheless it is obvious that Persian rule in Egypt was coming to an end, and the rebel Amyrtaeus of Saïs, possibly a grandson of his namesake, was soon to be recognized by the native population as Pharaoh. One Aramaic papyrus (Cowley, *AP* 35) is dated to his fifth year; on the assumption that Amyrtaeus seized power on the death of Darius II in 404, this text would date to July 399. The ‘Demotic Chronicle’ refers to Amyrtaeus as the first Pharaoh to come after the Medes, and as such he is sometimes allotted a dynasty of his own. But Amyrtaeus himself did not long enjoy the throne of the pharaohs; a sadly fragmented letter, Kraeling, *AP* 13, describes how ‘they brought to Memphis the king Amyrtaeus’. Was this for burial, or for execution? A new king, Nephertites, follows in the same line of the text. There is even a last glimpse of Waidrang, who may have been made prisoner somewhere. The rest is unknown.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to give an impression both of the importance and of the fascination of this period. The Persian conquest left its impression on the following century, shaping the whole of Egyptian foreign policy and determining many of its national attitudes. Aramaic survived in Egypt as a commercial language until

⁹⁴ The best summary is B 833; see also his A 35, 133. He sees in the dynast of Diodorus a second ruler named Inaros, basing this on a variant reading in Driver, *AD* 5, where a recalcitrant known by the Babylonian name Anu-daru (*n[d]rw*) could equally be read as Inharou (*n[h]rw*), equated with the rebel of 411. This is extremely tempting, but independent evidence is really essential here. B 828, 41, prefers the conservative view; but the names Inaros, Psammetichus and Amyrtaeus are likely to have recurred among the princelings of the Delta. For the possibility of an earlier dating of the Arsames correspondence to the period of the first Inaros (460–450), see B 833, 395. But, on balance, this is less convincing.

after 300 B.C., and a quarter of Memphis was still named *Syropersikon* in 258 (PSI v.488). But the real significance of the Persian conquest was surely greater than this. It is tempting at the end to draw up a balance-sheet, but we must recognize that our sources scarcely allow it. Economically, for example, Egypt may well have suffered from the overtaxation and stagnation remarked upon in other parts of the empire; but our texts, as we at present understand them, neither confirm this nor refute it. Yet it would be hard to deny that intellectually and culturally Egypt gained much from the conquest, and it is now clear that 525 B.C. is one of the critical dates in her history. Persia, on the other hand, lived to see Cambyses' fears realized, and in 525, unwittingly, she dealt herself a wound through which she began to bleed to death. The Athenians quickly realised, by 460 if not 486, that one of the quickest routes to Persepolis lay through Memphis, and Persia was condemned to hold a country she could hardly govern, yet could not afford to lose.

A NOTE ON SOURCES

Greek

First place must be given to Herodotus, particularly Books II and III. Herodotus probably visited Egypt shortly after 450 B.C., and saw Memphis and the western Delta, with a brief visit to upper Egypt. His account is so important that, whatever his faults, all modern histories of the period are essentially a commentary on him. The fragments of Ctesias which have survived are enough to make us regret the loss of the whole, at least for the record of events after 450, if not always for his treatment of them. There are also scattered references in Thucydides, Polyaeus, Xenophon, Strabo, Diodorus Siculus and others.

Hieroglyphic

A list of sources was published in Posener's *Première domination perse* (B 873); for the little which has appeared since, one can consult de Meulenaere in *Textes et langages de l'Égypte pharaonique* II (Cairo, 1972) 137–42 and Vercoutter, *ibid.*, 143–9. A useful list of monuments is contained in Bresciani's *Satrapia* (B 780).

Demotic

See the lists in Zauzich, *Textes et langages* III 93–110; Bresciani, *Satrapia* 153–73, 184–6; Seidl, *Rechtsgeschichte* (B 888), appendix, 90–4.

Aramaic

The situation is rather better. The main collections of Aramaic papyri are Cowley, *AP* (B 797) and Kraeling, *AP* (B 830). The Arsames correspondence is in Driver, *AD* (B 804), while most of the Hermopolis papyri (B 787) are

republished in Grelot (B 815). There is a useful selection of texts in J. C. L. Gibson, *Textbook of Syrian Semitic Inscriptions* II (Oxford, 1975) nos. 21–9.

Secondary Sources

The best modern histories are those by Kienitz (B 824) and Drioton and Vandier (B 803). There is a useful archaeological repertory in Bresciani, *Satrapia* 177–88. Herodotus, Book II should be read with Lloyd's commentary (B 835). There are also chapters in other reference works, not all of which were available when this chapter was written: Lloyd, in *Ancient Egypt: a social history* (B 836A), on the late period in general, and by Bresciani in *CHIran* II (B 30) 502–28, and *CHJud* I (B 31) 358–72, on the Achaemenid period in particular. The account by Bianchi in *Lexikon der Ägyptologie* IV is useful for the art of the period.

POSTSCRIPT 1985. The chapter on the Jews in Egypt by Porten in *CHJud* I 372–400, is full of interest. Segal's *Aramaic Papyri from North Saqqâra* (B 887) sheds light on some of the foreign communities within Egypt. There is also an important study on the Pherendates papyri: G. R. Hughes, *Grammata Demotika* (Wiesbaden, 1984) 75–86. The literature on the Aramaic-demotic text in the Pierpont Morgan Library shows no sign of abating, although it is not yet published.

CHAPTER 4

THE TYRANNY OF THE PISISTRATIDAE

D. M. LEWIS

Pisistratus died in spring 527,¹ but tyranny survived at Athens until 510. For most of these seventeen years we have no connected narrative source and a disproportionate amount of our direct evidence is concerned with one day in 514, the day on which Hipparchus was assassinated, and the implications of its events. On these, differing views were held from an early date, most strongly by Thucydides in his most combative mood.² A further difficulty is caused by occasional uncertainty as to whether the sources, in statements about ‘the tyrants’ or ‘the Pisistratidae’, intend to exclude or include Pisistratus. This and other ambiguities of the evidence go to obscure the question of whether the tyranny changed its character after Pisistratus’ death.

Pisistratus left three legitimate sons, Hippias, Hipparchus and Thessalus (Thuc. vi. 55.1 as against Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 17.3). Of Thessalus little was known and the accounts of his character are contradictory and worthless (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 18.2, Diod. x.17.1). There is now general agreement that Hippias and Hipparchus were well into their forties at their father’s death,³ but no certainty is possible as to which was the elder. Thucydides (1.20.2, vi. 55.1–2) was sure that it was Hippias and that the general Athenian belief, preserved only by Plato (*Hipparch.* 228b) and possibly by the Parian Marble (45), that it was Hipparchus was mistaken. The evidence with which he supported the oral tradition which had reached him is not convincing,⁴ and a further difficulty arises from the archon-list fragment, shortly to be considered, which shows Hippias as archon in 526/5. Did Hipparchus never hold the eponymous archonship or had he been archon already? The latter possibility cannot be excluded and, if he had been archon already, he was presumably the elder.

For Thucydides this point was indissolubly linked with the more important one, the Athenian belief that Hipparchus was *tyrannos* when he

¹ For the year see C 81, 109, for the time of year C 229, 84.

² Thuc. 1.20.2, vi. 53.3–39. The most satisfactory treatment is A 17, IV 317–29.

³ C 85, 446. C 229, 94–5, argues that Hippias was born c. 582, which seems a little early.

⁴ As A 4, 1.2.295 saw, the argument from the childlessness of Hipparchus, over 50 at his death, is illegitimate.

was killed in 514. Though he himself sometimes falls into the language of joint rule (VI.54.5–6, 53.3), he conducts the argument on the basis that the question which brother was the *tyrannos* is a meaningful one. Given the extra-constitutional nature of tyranny, this is not obviously true, either in fact or in terms of contemporary usage.⁵ Though Herodotus once (V.55) refers to Hipparchus as ‘brother of Hippias the tyrant’, his normal usage is to speak of *tyrannoi* or Pisistratidae in the plural, even after Hipparchus’ death (V.55, 62.2, 63.2–3, 65, 90), and his general concept seems to be that of rule by the whole family, just as he speaks of Bacchiadae or Aleuadae. In the fourth century, it was taken for granted that Hippias and Hipparchus had been joint rulers (Arist. *Pol.* 1311a36, 1312b31, 1315b30, *Ath. Pol.* 18.1 (with the compromise that Hippias was the politically active partner), Diod. x.17.1), and it appears that, in insisting that Hippias was the *tyrannos* even before Hipparchus’ death, Thucydides may well have been trying to prove too much. It is in any case noteworthy that the tradition provides no hint of disagreement between them. Tyrannical brothers elsewhere in Greece exhibit much less stable partnerships (Sicyon, *FGrH* 90 F 61; Samos, Hdt. III.39.2).

Pisistratus’ notion of tyranny had certainly included efforts to reach friendly relations with at least some noble families (*CAH* III².3,406) and there is one clear case of his having recalled an exile, Cimon, towards the end of his life (Hdt. VI.103.2). For his sons’ relationships with the nobles, little material existed until the publication in 1939 of a fragment of the archon-list for the first years of their rule (M–L 6), which has thrown valuable light on their use of the eponymous archonship for control and conciliation. It appears that the first partially preserved name on the list, Onetorides, from a rich but rarely conspicuous family from the city itself, had already been nominated for 527/6 by Pisistratus and was left undisturbed. He was followed in 526/5 by Hippias himself. The most immediately spectacular gain from the fragment was the name of the archon of 525/4, Cleisthenes, certainly the son of the Alcmaeonid Megacles, with whom Pisistratus had had varying relations, and the later reformer, perhaps by now already the head of the Alcmaeonidae. No trace of a reconciliation between him and the Pisistratidae had previously survived; the Alcmaeonidae had created the impression that their exile had been continuous from the Battle of Pallene in 546 to their return in 510 (Hdt. VI.123.1). It cannot be excluded that he had returned under Pisistratus, but the brothers are certainly showing him favour. Herodotus did know of their favourable treatment of the archon of 524/3, Miltiades, son of the triple Olympic victor Cimon, recalled by Pisistratus at the end of his life, and nephew of the Miltiades who had

⁵ Consider the wording of the epitaph for Hippias’ daughter quoted by Thuc. VI.59.3.

established the settlement in the Thracian Chersonese, in which the tyrants took a continuing interest (*CAH* III².3,404). In this case, the association with the tyranny was not obscured by later events, but it was asserted that Cimon had been assassinated by night-assailants set on by Hippias and Hipparchus, who, however, continued to treat Miltiades well (*Hdt.* vi.39.1, 103). The truth of this story, not public at the time of the murder or for some time after, can hardly be assessed.

We have no means of identifying Calliades, the archon of 523/2. The fragment breaks off with the archon of 522/1, a name in which five missing letters are followed by -strat-. There should be no doubt that Hippias' son, Pisistratus the younger, was archon under the tyranny (*Thuc.* vi.54.6–7). His building activity in his year will be considered later, but there is good reason to think that one item, the Altar of the Twelve Gods, already existed in 519 (*Hdt.* vi.108.4 with *Thuc.* iii.68.5). The temptation to restore his name as the archon of 522/1 is therefore strong, and it would hardly have been questioned, were there not unfounded doubts as to whether another dedication of the year (M–L 11) can be dated so early. It is certainly surprising that he should be archon only four years after his father, but consideration of the dates has shown that he could well have been thirty, generally taken as the legal minimum age, in 522.

Thucydides gives the information about the younger Pisistratus' archonship as illustration of his statement that the tyrants maintained the existing laws, except in so far as they generally took care that one of their own number should hold magistracies. There has been some tendency since the discovery of the archon-list fragment to widen the interpretation of *σφῶν αὐτῶν* to mean 'one of their own people', and to speak of the list as showing how the tyrants broadened that concept. This does not seem to be what Thucydides says, and there is no evidence that he ever saw the complete list. The question remains whether the list shows the tyrants as genuinely tactful. The general attitude has been that it shows them honouring some of their more prominent subjects at the same time as they gave themselves what they considered to be their due, but it has recently been urged⁶ that the list shows that Hippias had a different attitude to the archonship from his father, and that, if he had still not held it at his father's death, it was because Pisistratus had wished to keep his family in the background. Hippias by contrast will have thrust himself forward at the earliest possible moment and compounded his error by promoting his son at an excessively early age. Since we have next to no evidence for Pisistratus' nominations and remain uncertain when, if ever, Hipparchus held the archonship (see above), the matter must be left open. After 522/1 we are deprived even of this documentary evidence.

⁶ *C* 229, 89–91.



27. Owl tetradrachm of earliest series: obverse, head of Athena wearing crested Attic helmet and circular ear-ring; reverse, owl in incuse square, Α ⊕ Ε. Weight 16.94 gm. (British Museum (BMC 26); after *B* 625, pl. 116, 351.)

The lack of a continuous narrative means that much of our information is hardly more than anecdotal. To Thucydides' statement that the brothers maintained a five per cent produce-tax (vi.54.5; see *CAH* III².3,407), the *Oeconomica*, an early Hellenistic work, falsely attributed to Aristotle, adds a string of stories about Hippias as a deviser of economic stratagems (1347a4–17). These are mostly trivial or anachronistic, though they presumably point to a tradition that Hippias was interested in finance, but one deserves attention. Hippias, it is said, demonetized Athenian coinage, fixing a price at which he would accept the old coinage. It was expected that he would mint a new one, but he reissued the old; it is to be understood that he had taken it in at a discount. Though the point of the story is that there was no new coinage on this occasion, there is good reason to attribute to the reign of the brothers the change of Athenian coinage from the old armorial coinage (*CAH* III².3,408–9) to the famous owls, which bore Athena's head on the obverse and an owl on the reverse and remained the Athenian coinage, hardly changed, for three hundred years (Fig. 27). Earlier dates for the change have been affirmed in the past, partly based on mistaken ordering of the coins, but, as the evidence from coin-hoards has accumulated, it has become clear that a date earlier than 525–520 can hardly be right.⁷ The temptation has always existed to associate so marked a change with a historical event, the fall of the tyranny in 510 or the foundation of democracy,⁸ but this produces a very crowded timetable of issues before 480, and there is also the substantial objection that there is an obol with Athenian types but the inscription *HIP* (Fig. 28). This must have been struck by Hippias in exile at Sigeum, and, if the new coinage was thought

⁷ *c* 617, 43ff; *c* 619, 417ff; *c* 621, 60ff. ⁸ *c* 647, 23ff; *c* 636, 65 (on which see *c* 622, 195–6).



28. Obol struck by Hippias at Sigeum: obverse, head of Athena; reverse, ear of corn, owl, and inscription *HIP* (Paris; after A 6, fig. 312.)

of as democratic, he will hardly have chosen this method of stressing his Athenian origins.⁹

The new issue marks a considerable break with its predecessors and was clearly deliberately planned. The standard size of Athenian coin was doubled to a tetradrachm, and the earliest series has no fractions. Henceforward there was a standard type, which will have promoted long-term confidence. The type was a national type, reinforced by the inscription *A ⊕ E*; such an inscription was very rare, possibly unparalleled, at this date. All this points to a coinage designed to win and maintain confidence in overseas transactions, to which the smaller denominations for domestic everyday use were a later addition. Some evidence, as yet not cogent, may point to the association of the coinage with new strikes or new techniques in the Attic mines, since tests with the gamma-ray spectrometer seem to show that the metal of the owls was much purer than that of the armorial coinage; there is a further possibility that some of this silver was being exported to Corinth as well.¹⁰ It would be perilous to infer too much about economic thinking behind the coinage, but the existence of the Laurium mines was ultimately a substantial factor in Athens' ability to pay for the imported corn she needed and the institution of the owl coinage played its part in making her silver acceptable abroad. The process by which the mined silver was turned into state coin and the financial rewards for individual and state remain opaque in all periods, but no doubt under the tyranny the tyrants profited (perhaps cf. Hdt. 1.64.1). That they actually owned a part of the mining area which remained an identifiable unit after their fall is hardly demonstrable.¹¹

No other material exists for attributing economic policy to Hippias and Hipparchus. The red-figure style in vase-painting continued its rapid development in this period, but the economic importance of fine pottery and its relative importance in Athenian trade can easily be exaggerated,¹² and no measures on trade are attributed to them.

⁹ The view of C 636, 132 n. 92. ¹⁰ C 624. ¹¹ C 128, 19–31; C 535, 208–9.
¹² C 517.

The activities attributed to Hipparchus are of a more artistic nature. Apart from a dedication in the sanctuary of Apollo Ptoos, north west of Thebes (Ducat, *Les Kouroi du Ptoion* (1971) 251–8 n. 142), of which the base survives with an inscription in the same hand as the younger Pisistratus' altar in the Pythion (M-L 11), our information comes from Plato's *Hipparchus* (228b–229d; see also Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 18.1). That this dialogue is Plato's has generally been denied by Platonists.¹³ It would be a mistake to think that its author was trying to be factual. He was rather spinning a story about Hipparchus as a great educator from the available material, behaviour which seems to me characteristic of Plato himself. His starting point is a moral tag from one of the herms which, he says, Hipparchus set up at the mid-point of the roads between the city and various demes. One of these has survived (Fig. 29) on the road to Cephale. Although Hipparchus' name has not survived, there seems no reason to doubt the attribution, and we may allow ourselves the further guess that the tyrants paid some attention to the road-system of Attica. One possible reason might be the need to transport building materials, and the road to Steiria named by Plato leads to a source of stone (*IG* 1³ 395.8).

Plato attributes to Hipparchus the introduction of Homer to Athens and the institution of the custom of the performance of his works in relays by rhapsodes at the Panathenaea. The statement is by no means incredible.¹⁴ The attractions of the Panathenaea (cf. *CAH* III².3,410–11) would be greatly enhanced, and there would be a minor attraction to the ruling house in the extensive attention given by Homer to their ancestors, Nestor and his equally intelligent youngest son Pisistratus (*Hom. Od.* iv.204–6).

Contemporary literature was not neglected. Hipparchus sent a penteconter to bring to Athens Anacreon, most personal of poets, but unrivalled in the symposium, presumably from Samos in 522 after the death of his former patron Polycrates (cf. *Hdt.* III.121.1); Anacreon's stay in Athens is attested by at least one fragment (67 Page) as well as by the attention he received from Athenian vase-painters (below, p. 430).¹⁵

The more versatile Simonides also came to Athens under Hipparchus' patronage, but it is curiously hard to find work to be attributed to this period of his long connexion with Athens. It is tempting to think that some of the fifty-six dithyrambic victories which he had won by 476 (79 Diehl) belong to this period, but the next paragraph will point the difficulty. A notably ambiguous fragment (102 Page) described Pisistratus as a Siren (*CAH* III².3,416), and although the attribution to him of an epitaph on the daughter of Hippias, 'a notable man in Hellas of

¹³ But see C 437, 119–28. ¹⁴ C 88, 10–13. ¹⁵ C 588, 54–5.



29. Herm of Hipparchus from Koursala, Attica. 525–514 B.C. Height 1.29 m. [ἐ]ν μὲν σοῖσι Κεφαλῆς τε καὶ ἄστεος ἀγλαῶς βερμῆς, 'bright Hermes in between Cephale and the city'. (Now Brauron Museum, much damaged; after Kirchner, *Imagines Inscriptionum Atticarum*², pl. 5.11.)

his time', goes back to the fourth century (Arist. *Rhet.* 1.9, 1367b19; Thuc. vi. 59.3 gives no author), it will have been written long after the end of the tyranny. Modern scholars have worried how his relations with the tyranny are to be reconciled with later activity in the service of the democracy and Themistocles, but there is no trace of criticism on this score in antiquity, which was more concerned with his notorious love of money; Plato notes that Hipparchus had to pay him well. The epitaph praises Hippias' daughter for her lack of presumption despite her tyrant birth and marriage, and though the tradition (e.g. Xen. *Hiero*) brought him into contact with tyrants, it did not make him a flatterer.

Fifth-century tradition (Ar. *Vesp.* 1410–11) described Simonides in competition, apparently in dithyramb, with Lasus of Hermione, and this leads us to figures not reported by Plato. Lasus' connexion with Hipparchus is attested by Herodotus (vii.6.3). The *Suda* (s.v.) credits him with the introduction of dithyramb. Although this is not stated to be at Athens or under the Pisistratids, one or both inferences are frequently drawn; the difficulty is that the Parian Marble (46) dates the first men's choruses at Athens to 509/8. A more certain Athenian fact about Lasus is that he wrote about Bouzyges (4 Page), perhaps already a lawgiver in Athenian mythology. His service to Hipparchus was that he detected Onomacritus, 'an expounder of oracles (*χρησμολόγος*) and arranger of the oracles of Musaeus', in inserting a false oracle into Musaeus. Hipparchus therefore expelled Onomacritus from Athens.¹⁶

Onomacritus may have dealt with more of Musaeus than the oracles (cf. Paus. 1.22.7), and sufficient is visible of the Pisistratid interest in Eleusis (cf. *CAH* III². 3, 412–13) to make it likely that the family would be interested in the father of Eumolpus, ancestor of the Eumolpidae and hence of every Eleusinian hierophant (texts in D–K I 20–2). But their interest in oracles and dreams is abundantly clear. That a *chrēsmologos* accompanied Pisistratus at the Battle of Pallene (Hdt. 1.62.4) is not unusual, but thereafter there is a quite abnormal assembly of evidence. Hipparchus had a dream the night before he died which he immediately submitted to specialist interpreters; it is not clear what they said (Hdt.


¹⁶ Although he had made his peace with the exiled Pisistratidae by the 480s, he had not become more honest; Hdt. vii.6.4.

v.56). The Pisistratidae maintained a collection of oracles on the Acropolis (Hdt. v.96.2). Hippias was of all men the one who knew oracles most exactly (Hdt. v.93.2), and at the end of his life, before Marathon, he interpreted and reinterpreted his own dream (Hdt. vi.107). There should be no doubt that the brothers were deeply concerned with these matters. If Hipparchus had considered oracles a mere political tool, he would not have been so cross with Onomacritus' forgery. The intellectual gap between them and their elder contemporary Nabonidus of Babylon (*CAH* III².2, ch.27) may not have been as great as we are accustomed to think.

That the Pisistratidae were not modern rationalists needs to be borne in mind when we consider their building activities. These may not simply have been intended for the beautification and aggrandizement of Athens, and are not very likely to have been intended to keep their subjects poor and busy (so Arist. *Pol.* 1313b23, working a familiar line of interpretation). Men interested in the future are likely to have been interested in Apollo, but here we come up against the silence which surrounds the relations of the house with Delphi, a silence broken only by the late, but symptomatic, slander that the Pisistratidae had burnt the Delphic temple down (Philoch. *FGrH* 328 F 115) and Plato's jocular suggestion that Hipparchus' moral herms were in rivalry with Delphi (*Hipparch.* 228e) until the oracle came out openly against the Pisistratids at the end of their reign. If this silence indicates a coolness between the house and the Delphic priesthood, we cannot know its origin, but it was a quarrel with Delphi and not with Apollo. It was not even a quarrel with Apollo as Pythios. It has been seen (*CAH* III².3,413) that Pisistratus, besides his attentions to Apollo on Delos, worked on the Pythion at Athens.¹⁷ The cult was continued by his grandson Pisistratus, who dedicated a surviving altar in the precinct to commemorate his archonship in 522/1 (Thuc. vi.54.7, M-L 11) (Fig. 30); no other dedication by an archon naming his office is known until 393, and his behaviour seems to be more than that of an ordinary citizen. That Hipparchus patronized the minor oracle of Apollo Ptous has already been seen. Since it was a Theban shrine (Hdt. viii.135.1), it too may have been closed to the brothers after 519 (see below).

Work at Eleusis and on the Acropolis has already been considered (*CAH* III².3,411-13). We cannot date the work on the Athena temple precisely enough to exclude the hand of the elder Pisistratus. Honour to Athena even on this scale will have been unexceptionable, but a similar dating problem raises larger issues when we come to consider the

¹⁷ The view has been held that local cults of Apollo Pythios (cf. Schol. Pind. *Nem.* ix.20) were insults to Delphi. One can only say that the point had not occurred to Polycrates of Samos (Suda s.v. ταῦτά σοι καὶ Πύθια καὶ Δῆλια).



30. Altar for Apollo Pythios dedicated by younger Pisistratus. c. 521 B.C. (cf. Thuc. vi. 54.6–7). Width 1.5 m. (a) reconstruction (b) left-hand fragment of inscription: *μνῆμα τὸδε ἔς ἀρχῆς Πεισίστ[ρατος ἠππίου]ς θεκεν Ἀπόλλωνος Πυθ[ί]ω ἐν τεμένει*, ‘Pisistratus son of Hippias put this memorial of his archonship in the sanctuary of Apollo Pythios’. (Athens, Epigraphical Museum 6787; (a) by courtesy of Mme D. Peppas-Delmousou and W. B. Dinsmoor Jr, (b) after Kirchner, *Imagines Inscriptionum Atticarum*², pl. 5.12.)

grandest building project of the tyranny, the temple of Zeus Olympios,¹⁸ on a low ridge south east of the Acropolis towards the Ilissus. The cult and its site were surely ancient (Thuc. ii. 15.4) and remains of an earlier temple have been found on the site. At some time in the tyranny the decision was taken to double its size to 41.11 × 107.89 m and to build a double peripteral Doric temple with eight columns on the outer fronts and twenty-one on the flanks. Nothing on anything like this scale had yet been conceived on the mainland (it is almost exactly twice the size of the Apollo temple at Corinth) or, as yet, in Sicily, and it can only be assumed that its patrons were going into demonstrative competition with the

¹⁸ See c 523, 91, c 590, 161–79, c 581, 402–11.

Artemisium at Ephesus, begun under the patronage of Croesus, and the Heraeum of Samos, advanced by Polycrates. In this, at any rate, the Athenian tyrants showed no moderation. But was it planned before or after the death of Pisistratus? That excavations of the 1920s found sherds then dated to around 530 is of no help now. The general opinion has been that Aristotle's attribution of it to the Pisistratidae (*Pol.* 1313b23) fixes it to the reign of the sons, but there seems no reason to distrust Vitruvius' attribution to Pisistratus himself (*De Arch.* Pref.7.15, a much more explicit account, naming four unknown architects) and certainly none to compromise by assuming that he meant the younger Pisistratus. It now seems that quite a considerable amount of work was done before, as Vitruvius says, the fall of the tyranny suspended the operation, which was only taken up again by Antiochus IV around 175 B.C. Even after that, not a little was left for the Emperor Hadrian to do before its dedication in A.D. 132 after a 'great struggle with time' (Philostr. *VS* 1.25.6). It does not seem legitimate to draw a line between father and sons on this matter with any confidence. One point in favour of Pisistratus is that he at least had been proclaimed an Olympic victor, if only by the generosity of Cimon (Hdt. vi.102.2-3).¹⁹

Zeus Olympios was at least an old cult, though not, according to Thucydides (i.126.6), the principal Zeus cult in Athens. Hipparchus' road-system was completed by the dedication by the younger Pisistratus in his archonship (Thuc. vi.54.7) of an altar of the Twelve Gods at a focal point in the Agora, now mostly obscured by the railway.²⁰ This cult seems to be new at Athens. The concept, possibly Anatolian in origin,²¹ was probably older at Olympia (Pind. *Ol.* x.49) and may have been borrowed from there. But the Twelve at Olympia were very different in their composition. There would be scope for choice in their selection and in the reliefs with which the altar seems to have been decorated, and, since the one certain fact about Athenian cult at the altar is that the choruses at the Dionysia danced at it (Xen. *Hipp.* iii.2), presumably Dionysus, not on the later canonical list, found a place here as he did later on the Parthenon frieze, as suits the interest of the dynasty in him (*CAH* iii.2.3,412). The altar was surely from the first the point from which road-distances were measured (Hdt. ii.7.1, *IG* ii² 2640), and rapidly became a place for suppliants to take refuge and make their plea.

The only other permanent building operation attributed specifically to this period is a wall of Hipparchus at the Academy (Suda s.v. τὸ Ἰππάρχου τείχιον). A good deal more has been attributed to it, and the latest investigator²² has insisted, not without some circularity, that Pisistratus' sons were far more ambitious than he in their building

¹⁹ Whether this victory was in 532 or 528 continues to be disputed; see C 224, 156-8; C 229, 84-5.

²⁰ C 519, 82-103; C 549, 129-36. ²¹ C 426, 199-200. ²² C 506, 19-27.

programme. Again, clarity is not yet attainable, and even projects with archaeological dates around 525 could well have been initiated by Pisistratus.

In foreign policy, it will be recalled (*CAH* III². 3,402–3) that Pisistratus had been in alliance or friendly relationships with Thebes, Argos, Eretria and Naxos. The Thessalian alliance enjoyed by his sons (Hdt. v.63.4, 94.1) is presumably also his, since he called a son Thessalus. The house enjoyed close guest-friendship (*ξείνοι ἐς τὰ μάλιστα*) with Sparta (Hdt. v.63.2), but we have no indication how or when this began. To the north east, Sigeum was a dynastic possession under Hegesistratus, half-brother of Hippias and Hipparchus (Hdt. v.94.1) and the Thracian Chersonese was in Athenian hands under Miltiades (Hdt. vi.103.4). In the north, there were still dynastic interests in the mines of Mount Pangaeum east of the Strymon (Hdt. i.64.1, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 15.2), perhaps also further west in northern Chalcidice, opening relations with Macedonia (Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 15.2, cf. Hdt. v.94.1). Under Hippias and Hipparchus these assets were substantially lost or neutralized.

In the Aegean no direct link connects Pisistratus with Polycrates of Samos, with whom no Greek tyrant, except for the later tyrants of Syracuse, could be compared for splendour (Hdt. III.125.2). Polycrates had been assisted to power by Pisistratus' friend, Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos (Polyaen. 1.23.2), and the policies of both Polycrates and Pisistratus had brought them into conflict with Mytilene (Hdt. III.39.4, v.94). The interesting point is the control of the Cyclades and particularly of Delos, of major religious importance to all Ionians. It would appear that Pisistratus' activities at Delos (Hdt. i.64.2, Thuc. III.104.1) were in association with Lygdamis; Naxian interest in Delos had always been strong.²³ Polycrates had been prepared to leave his benefactor's position undisturbed. While Polycrates was coping with new problems caused by the arrival of Persia on the coast of the Aegean, he was attacked in 525 by Sparta and Corinth (the reasons for the attack are controversial). The attempt failed, but it seems likely that this was the occasion on which Sparta deposed Lygdamis (Plut. *Mor.* 859D, Schol. Aeschin. II.77).²⁴ Polycrates will have moved into the vacuum thus created, and he asserted his interest in Delos even more spectacularly than Pisistratus (Thuc. III.104.2) shortly before his death in 522.²⁵ There is no indication that the brothers took any notice of all this beyond sending the ship to rescue Anacreon. These matters would, one would have thought, have concerned their father.

Thucydides does say that the brothers conducted wars (vi.54.5), and there is no conclusive reason to remove from them the one war which we

²³ C 31, 291–2; C 240, nn. 6, 36.

²⁴ C 253, 272–5.

²⁵ C 255, 106ff.

can date to this period. In 519 (Hdt. vi.108 with Thuc. iii.68.5) Plataea, a small state (600 hoplites in 479, Hdt. ix.28.6) close to Thebes, under pressure from Thebes to join the Boeotian Confederacy, offered itself to King Cleomenes of Sparta, who was in the neighbourhood (perhaps at Megara). Cleomenes advised them to seek the nearer aid of Athens, not, Herodotus' Athenian informant added, out of goodwill to Plataea, but to make trouble between Athens and Boeotia. The Plataeans became the first suppliants on the new altar of the Twelve Gods, offering themselves to the Athenians, and the Athenians went out to help them against a Theban attack. At first, battle was avoided by a Corinthian arbitration, but, after the Corinthians had left, the Boeotians attacked the Athenian force as it went home. The Athenians won and enforced even better terms for Plataea. They had won the permanent loyalty of Plataea at the cost of incurring the bitter hatred of Thebes, which had been outstanding in its support for Pisistratus. Consideration of the phrase 'offering themselves' and of Greek attitudes to supplication may suggest that men of piety had had little alternative.

Nothing further is heard of Eretria in this period or indeed until 498, but it needs to be noted that the growing Peloponnesian League had established good relations with her rival Chalcis by 506 (Hdt. v.74.2) and probably well before.

In about 516²⁶ bad news came in from the north (Hdt. vi.38–40). The elder Miltiades had been succeeded by his nephew, Stesagoras son of Cimon. While engaged in an outbreak of his house's continued trouble with Lampsacus across the straits, Stesagoras had been killed in circumstances apparently suggesting treason. The Thracian Chersonese was important to Athens, as much perhaps for its own corn as for its position on the Black Sea corn-route, and the brothers played the card at their disposal, the younger Miltiades, brother of Stesagoras. They despatched him to the Chersonese on a trireme, the first Athenian trireme of which we hear, and he took prompt and ruthless measures to establish himself. Their interest in the region may have been more extensive, since the oracle forged by Onomacritus had been concerned with Lemnos, but it seems likely that Miltiades' capture of Lemnos, which he handed over to the Athenians (Hdt. vi.136.2–140), belongs to the period of the Ionian revolt.

All Greek freedom of action in this part of the world was shortly to be restricted by Darius' decision to expand into Europe (see above, ch. 3f). Miltiades had no alternative but to join his Danube expedition in 514, perhaps already with the five triremes he possessed by 493 (Hdt. vi.41). Although he seems afterwards to have maintained that he had done his best to let Darius down on this occasion (Hdt. iv.137, vi.41.3), this may

²⁶ There can be no certainty about the chronology of Miltiades' movements. The date in the text rests on Dobree's emendations of Hdt. vi.40.2; see c 224, 161–3.

not have been true. Persian hostility to him in 493 (Hdt. vi.41.3, 104.1) would be amply motivated by his capture of Lemnos.

One possible supporter of the tyranny had thus left Athens, and there are other signs of the erosion of its support. The earliest man to attack the tyranny was one Cedon, of whom tradition preserved almost nothing (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 20.5). At some stage the Alcmaeonidae went into exile again and set up a fort at Leipsydrium (Hdt. v.62.2, Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 19.3). Its position in north Attica suggests Theban support and a date after 519; the view that Herodotus dates the affair firmly after 514 is overconfident. Some supporters came from the city to join the venture, but the tyrants enforced the surrender of the fort, leaving nothing but a lament for the death 'of the *agathoi* and *eupatridai* who showed of what fathers they had been born'.

The turning-point came in 514, with a conspiracy ending in the murder of Hipparchus at the Panathenaea of that year. The conspirators were Aristogeiton and his younger relative Harmodius from the *genos* of the Gephyraei and Aphidna in north-east Attica (Hdt. v.57, Plut. *Mor.* 628D).²⁷ The *genos* was in some sense not Athenian in origin, but there is no reason to think that its arrival was at all recent. That the motive for the murder was political and its object the end of the tyranny seems to have been the general Athenian view. Herodotus does not deny it and almost implies it (vi.123.2), but Thucydides held with some violence that it originated from 'an erotic occurrence', though it developed a political character. This was in broad lines accepted by Aristotle (*Pol.* 1311a36–9, *Ath. Pol.* 18), though the account in the *Ath. Pol.* differs in several major details and directly contradicts Thucydides on one point.

Thucydides' version is that Hipparchus made unsuccessful advances to Harmodius, who complained to his lover Aristogeiton. Aristogeiton was already considering vengeance, when Hipparchus made matters worse by a public insult to Harmodius' sister, alleged to be unworthy to be basket-bearer in a public procession (perhaps cf. Men. *Epitr.* 438–41 Sandb.), a silly story, comments Plato (*Hipparch.* 229c), who substitutes another, wilder, but more Platonic, version for it. The conspirators determined to wait for the Panathenaea, at which their small numbers might be reinforced at the moment of action by the citizens armed for the solemn procession. Hippias was at the start of the procession in the Ceramicus, Hipparchus inside the walls by the Leocoreum, of which the site has not yet been located with certainty. Suspecting that their conspiracy was being betrayed to Hippias, Harmodius and Aristogeiton struck down Hipparchus. Harmodius was killed at once by Hipparchus' guards, Aristogeiton died under torture. Hippias disarmed the citizens by a ruse and regained control of the situation.

²⁷ c 85, 472ff.

Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 18) exonerates Hipparchus by making Thessalus responsible for the insult, thinks a larger number of persons were involved in the plot, reverses the positions of Hippias and Hipparchus in the procession, and flatly denies that the citizens were armed for the procession at this period. He adds two accounts of Aristogeiton's behaviour under torture, a popular account by which Aristogeiton made up names of accomplices to confuse Hippias (a version apparently followed by Ephorus, *Diod.* x.17.2) and another by which he gave the true names.

To assess the variants is hardly profitable. There must have been different versions from the beginning, quite apart from possible distortions arising from the later cult of the Tyrannicides and arguments about how effective their action was (*Hdt.* vi.123.2). Thucydides was enraged by such manifestations as the 'Harmodius-song', which proclaimed how Harmodius and Aristogeiton had killed *the* tyrant and made Athens *isonomos* (893–6 Page; see below, p. 324), and brought himself well within the scope of the law forbidding insults to their memory (*Hyp. c. Phil.* col. 11). But only in the most extravagant claims for pederasty could it be maintained that they had ended the tyranny (*Pl. Symp.* 182c), and Thucydides' assertion that the Athenians knew that it was the Spartans who had done this (vi.53.3) is evidently correct (*Ar. Lys.* 1150–6).

Thucydides was perhaps unusual in his emphasis on the mildness of the brothers' rule before this (vi.54.5–6, 57.2; *Pl. Hipparch.* 229b goes even further), but all sources agree that the subsequent period was a great deal more severe (*Hdt.* v.62.2, vi.123.2; *Thuc.* vi.59.2; *Pl. loc.cit.*; *Arist. Ath. Pol.* 19.1). Aristotle seems to trace this to the effect on Hippias of Aristogeiton's revelations under torture and speaks of many executions and exiles. Thucydides says that Hippias was now more fearful and executed many citizens, while at the same time he looked abroad for a source of safety if there should be revolution. In pursuit of this, he married his daughter Archedice to Aeantides, son of Hippoclus tyrant of Lampsacus, 'an Athenian to a Lampsacene', 'perceiving that they had great influence with King Darius'. For an Athenian to marry a Lampsacene was noteworthy, given the continued warfare between Lampsacus and the Athenians of the Chersonese. In his troubles, Hippias thought Hippoclus (cf. *Hdt.* iv.138.1) more likely than Miltiades to serve him with Darius. To this period too we may reasonably assign the strong point in the Pelasgic wall, well provided with food and drink, where the tyrants would eventually make their last stand (*Hdt.* v.64.2–65.1), as well as the more closely dated fortification at Munychia in the Piraeus (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* 19.2; Boersma 150 no. 2).

Meanwhile, the Alcmaeonidae had been promoting their position at

Delphi. Plans to rebuild the burnt temple of Apollo there had been actively canvassed since well before 526 (Hdt. II. 180), though the precise period of building remains controversial. The Alcmaeonidae became involved and showed great generosity (Hdt. v.62.3). In one version (Hdt. v.63.1) they reinforced the credit which this brought them with an actual bribe to the Pythia herself.²⁸ The consequence was that all Spartans consulting the oracle, on public or private business, were told to free Athens. Despite their *xenia* with the Pisistratids, the Spartans eventually took action.

To determine their motive is primarily a matter of analysing Spartan policy and the degree to which one is prepared to accept irrational motives in its making. Two lines of rational policy can be considered. The first would hold that some groups at Sparta had inherited from the previous generation a consciousness about the rise of Persian power and that, although the fiasco of the Samian expedition of 525 led them to reject earlier possibilities of taking anti-Persian action as profitless or impractical (Hdt. III.148, VI.84), they were prepared to take action against the prospect of a pro-Persian ruler in Athens, which had been opened by Hippias' marriage-alliance with Lampsacus; no ancient source alludes to such a possibility. Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 19.4) saw the decisive point in Pisistratid friendship with Argos. The importance of this friendship is not particularly clear to us, but it would be possible to attribute to a Spartan campaign against a power-bloc linked with Argos the break-up we have seen in Pisistratus' chain of friendships. Of the two possible irrational motives, the first, hostility to tyranny, runs up against the statement that the Pisistratids had been *xenoi* of Sparta, and we can hardly date the stage at which the Spartans developed the belief (first implied in Hdt. v.92a1) that they were hostile to tyranny as such, rather than to individual tyrants. Perhaps we should not too hurriedly reject the simple view that the Spartans were obeying the instructions of the oracle.

Their first attempt, perhaps in 511, was an expedition by sea under one Anchimolius. The force involved can hardly have been large, and no doubt it was hoped that the Athenians would rise against the Pisistratids. But they had sufficient warning of its approach to summon help from their Thessalian allies, who came with a thousand cavalry, and could still control enough manpower and enthusiasm to clear the ground near Phalerum for their deployment. Anchimolius and many others were killed, and the surviving Spartans fled to their ships (Hdt. v.63).

Spartan prestige was now thoroughly involved and in early summer

²⁸ Later versions become increasingly complicated and think in terms of the Alcmaeonids using money intended for the temple to bribe Sparta and hire mercenaries. For source-analysis see c 103, 277–86; c 136, 179–90; c 34, 193–204. The account of Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 19.4 is a misguided compromise.

510 King Cleomenes was sent by land with a much larger force. This time the Thessalians failed against a full Spartan hoplite phalanx and, after losing more than forty men, made straight for home. There is no indication of a hoplite battle, and Cleomenes began to besiege the tyrants in their fortified position under the Acropolis, supported by 'those of the Athenians who wanted to be free', a phrase which hardly suggests a mass rising. His prospects were poor until the chance capture of 'the children of the Pisistratids' while they were being sent to safety. Negotiations followed. For the return of their children, the Pisistratids agreed to leave Attica within five days, and withdrew to their base at Sigeum (Hdt. v.64–5). Though they still retained friends in Macedon and Thessaly (Hdt.v.94), and hopes of return at the hands of Sparta or Persia flickered for thirty years, the tyranny at Athens was at an end.

When Pisistratus first came to power, Attica had been a country in which the local power of the great dynasts had been all-important. Athens itself had been not much more than the largest centre of population and the seat of some of the more important generally accepted cults. Except in times of extreme emergency, little power had been exerted from there. By 510, it was much more notable architecturally, and the development of its festivals will have contributed considerably to its position as a unifying focus. It was, however, relatively small. If, as seems reasonable, we may take the allocation of seats on Cleisthenes' new *boule*²⁹ as an indication of the distribution of Athenian population in 507, less than six per cent of the citizen-body lived within the city wall, and even Cleisthenes' wider concept of the *asty* (roughly the southern part of the area between Aegaleos and Hymettus) included barely a quarter of the population. Attica was still basically rural and agricultural, as it remained until 431 (Thuc. II.16), and probably already a community of smallish farmers. The present writer would be inclined to attribute more to Pisistratus in the breaking up of large estates and the encouragement of small farmers than the author of *CAH* III².3, ch. 44, but we would agree that long exiles of noble families had played a part in the breaking up of patterns of deference in the country, and that the tyranny had encouraged the growth of new patterns in which it was more readily expected that Athens was the source of justice and decision. The next phase is the story of how the gap left by the departure of the tyrants might be filled acceptably in a way which could combine centrality and diversity.

²⁹ C 215.

CHAPTER 5
THE REFORM OF THE ATHENIAN STATE BY
CLEISTHENES

MARTIN OSTWALD

There is little contemporary evidence for the history of Athens in the decade following the fall of the Pisistratid tyranny. Some drinking songs with political overtones, preserved by the littérateur Athenaeus, who lived some seven hundred years later, possibly belong to this period, a few inscriptions have survived, and there are vases and other material remains which, though they cannot be dated with precision, provide some additional hints. For coherent information we depend entirely on Herodotus and on Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*,¹ supplemented by occasional pieces of information in later authors. Herodotus wrote some sixty or seventy years after Cleisthenes' reforms, and the internal history of Athens is for him incidental to other concerns. His narrative has been shown to underlie the historical part of Aristotle's account, written some century and a half after the event, which adds to it the only detailed description of Cleisthenes' constitutional measures which has survived. From these sources the following picture can be reconstructed.

I. EVENTS 511/10 TO 507/6 B.C.

The power vacuum left by the expulsion of the Pisistratids did not make itself felt immediately. Since the tyrants had left the old Solonian constitution substantially intact and were content to have the important magistracies filled by their relatives and friends (Thuc. vi.54.6), the archon Harpactides, though elected while Hippias was still in power, presumably served out his term of office, and it is likely that the machinery of government continued to function. If the old rivalries among noble families, which earlier in the sixth century had helped Pisistratus rise to power, began to re-assert themselves at once, we do not hear of it, and the years up until the election of Isagoras as archon for 508/7 B.C. seem to have been given over to removing the most troublesome features of the Pisistratid administration from the public life of Athens.

We hear of altogether six measures which, though they cannot be

¹ Hdt. v.66, 69–77; vi.131.1; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 13.5, 20–22.2.

fitted into a chronological sequence, probably belong to these three years. Of these at least two had important repercussions on the reform of Cleisthenes. The first is the re-enactment of an old law, possibly of Draco's time, which declared an outlaw any person and his descendants attempting or abetting the establishment of tyranny at Athens (*Ath. Pol.* 16.10). Connected with this re-enactment is almost certainly the publication of the names of the Pisistratids and of the ban pronounced against them of which we learn from Thucydides (vi. 55. 1-2). A further measure which was to have an impact on Cleisthenes' reform was the revision of the roll of citizens (*diapsephismos*), of which we learn from Aristotle that it took place soon after the expulsion of the tyrants and was directed at 'people of impure descent', 'since it was alleged that many were enjoying citizenship without being entitled to it' (*Ath. Pol.* 13.5). Who these were and how they were disfranchised can only be guessed. Since membership in a phratry constituted the only proof of citizenship before Cleisthenes, the *diapsephismos* is likely to have instructed the phratries to prepare or revise registers of their membership, and to have excluded from citizenship anyone not so registered. Aristotle tells us that the disfranchised were people who had joined Pisistratus 'through fear', presumably because they needed his protection. They may have included foreign mercenaries or bodyguards, whom Pisistratus had employed in his rise to power, and whom he may have given permission to settle in Attica,² as well as descendants of skilled artisans, whom Solon had encouraged to settle with their families in Attica.³ That Solon had formally recognized them as citizens was a problem already for Plutarch; but both they and Pisistratus' mercenaries may well have in fact exercised such citizen rights as attending meetings of the Assembly and the Heliaea with the explicit or implicit approval of the tyrant without ever having been accepted into the phratries. Understandably enough, these people will have been vulnerable after the fall of the tyranny, and by confining citizenship to those on the phratry rolls, the *diapsephismos* will have deprived them of what privileges they had exercised.

Two events of this period are dated. Not much can be made of the fact that the *Parian Marble* (ep. 46) places the introduction of contests in men's choruses, presumably at the Panathenaea, in the archonship of Lysagoras in 509/8 B.C., except perhaps that the festival which Pisistratus had turned into the major patriotic celebration of Athens was retained as such, possibly with some modifications, after the fall of the tyranny. Of greater interest is the statement by Pliny (*HN* xxxiv. 17) that statues of the 'tyrannicides' Harmodius and Aristogeiton, no doubt identical with

² Hdt. 1.61.4, 64.1; Thuc. vi. 55.3, 57.1, 58.2; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 15.2, 18.4.

³ Plut. *Sol.* 24.4.

those ascribed to Antenor by Pausanias (1.8.5), were set up in Athens in 509 B.C. For even if the date inspires no confidence, it seems appropriate that the overthrow of the tyrants should have been publicly commemorated in this way soon after the event.⁴

Finally, a decree prohibiting the torture of Athenian citizens and dated by Andocides (1.43) in the archonship of Scamandrius, is generally assigned to this period on the grounds that such torture had been meted out by the tyrants. Since there is no independent evidence to determine the year in which Scamandrius was archon, 510/9 B.C., the year immediately following the expulsion of the tyrants, is commonly accepted as the date of this legislation.

With the overthrow of the tyranny, rivalries among the great families (*genē*, sg. *genos*) erupted again. What issues divided them we do not know, nor do we know whether *genē* other than those headed by Cleisthenes and by Isagoras were involved. Cleisthenes, an Alcmaeonid, had been an archon under the Pisistratids, in 525/4 B.C.⁵ But he had fallen out with them, and together with his *genos* spent the last part of the tyranny in exile. He had led the Alcmaeonids back to Athens in 511/10 B.C. to help the Spartans under Cleomenes in overthrowing the rule of the Pisistratids. Isagoras, son of Teisander, on the other hand, belonged to a *genos* which, we have reason to believe, had not fallen foul of the tyrants and had stayed in Attica throughout the tyranny. Our only certain information is that his family worshipped Zeus Carius, a cult whose locale has not yet been satisfactorily located. When we first hear of a power struggle between Cleisthenes and Isagoras, its first stage has already ended in a defeat for Cleisthenes in that Isagoras has been elected to the archonship for 508/7 B.C. There seem to have been no ideological issues separating these two chiefs. The fact that both Herodotus (v.66.2) and Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 20.1) suggest that they had the support of their *betairoi* or aristocratic intimates indicates that no more than a struggle for political dominance was involved. It was not a contest between opposing principles of government.

The character of their struggle changed after Isagoras' election to the archonship. Cleisthenes, attributing his defeat to the inadequacy of his aristocratic intimates, took the unprecedented step of seeking a power base in the common people, or, as Herodotus (v.66.2) puts it, of taking the common people 'into partnership' by making them his *betairoi*. That this was a revolutionary step to take is shown by Herodotus' further statement (v.69.2) that up until that time 'the Athenian commons had been spurned' presumably by Cleisthenes as well as by other power-

⁴ Argued in detail in c 176, 132-4.

⁵ This was first established by B. D. Meritt, *Hesp.* 8 (1939) 59-65. See *CAH* 111².3, 406.

seeking aristocrats. We are not told how Cleisthenes went about winning the commons over to his side, nor even how precisely he used them for his political ends. We are merely given to understand that he turned to them after Isagoras' election to the archonship with the assurance that he wanted the state run by the people as a whole (*Ath. Pol.* 20.1).

However, some details can plausibly be inferred from a reconstruction of the sequence of events. This has to start with the observation that there is little contradiction between our two main sources, once it is recognized that Aristotle closely follows Herodotus' narrative of events (v.66–73.1), except that he separates the account of the content of the reforms (*Ath. Pol.* 21) from the story of the events of which they formed part (20.1–3).⁶ Cleisthenes had no official standing in Athens during the archonship of Isagoras, except that his archonship in 525/4 B.C. will have made him a life-long member of the Council of the Areopagus. Whether this entitled him to propose legislation in the Assembly without first submitting it to the Council of the Four Hundred, which since Solon had had the task of preparing all agenda for the Assembly, we do not know; it is also unknown whether he had to win over to his side either the Four Hundred or the Areopagus before he could take the common people 'into partnership'. That he took his fellow-Areopagites into his confidence is improbable, because a majority of them will have owed their membership in that Council to their tenure of an archonship under the tyrants, and perhaps also because the Areopagus may have represented the aristocratic Establishment to which Isagoras had owed his election. The fact that Isagoras reacted by calling upon Cleomenes to intervene shows that Cleisthenes' procedure was intended to defy the archon's authority, and our sources indicate that Cleisthenes submitted his measures for approval to some popular body, presumably the Assembly. The enthusiasm with which approval was given makes it unlikely that Cleisthenes proposed his political reorganization immediately, for this was far too complex to be grasped by Cleisthenes' average man. He will have had a better chance of enlisting the support of the common people by promising them from the outset that measure of political equality (*isonomia*) which, as we shall see, his reforms actually gave, namely the assurance that henceforth popular approval by the Assembly would be required to validate any major political decision.⁷

There is a further indication of the extent of Cleisthenes' success. The archon elected for 507/6 B.C., the year following the archonship of Isagoras, was Alcmaeon, whose name suggests that he was a kinsman of Cleisthenes, and his election will mean that Cleisthenes had succeeded in winning the people over to his side by the late spring of 507 B.C., when

⁶ First seen by C 223, 17–19.

⁷ Argued in detail in C 176, 121–36, 153–5.

the election for the archonship for the following year will have taken place. It is probable that the reforms had been worked out earlier in the course of Isagoras' archonship and were presented to the Assembly shortly before or after Alcmaeon's election. This will explain the panic which came to light in Isagoras' reaction. The double blow of having a member of his rival *genos* elected to succeed him and of seeing Cleisthenes' reforms enthusiastically acclaimed in defiance of his own authority by so unconventional a method caused him to appeal for help to Cleomenes, with whom he had established friendly relations at the time of the expulsion of the Pisistratids in 511/10 B.C. (Hdt. v.70.1, *Ath. Pol.* 20.2). Cleomenes responded by sending a herald to Athens to demand, on instructions from Isagoras, the immediate exile of Cleisthenes and other Athenian families who were under the curse incurred by the Alcmaeonids more than a century earlier at the time of the Cylonian conspiracy. Why Cleisthenes complied at once we do not know, but it took the arrival in Athens of Cleomenes at the head of a small force shortly before mid-summer 507 B.C. to make the other seven hundred families whose expulsion had been demanded leave Athens.⁸

Cleomenes next tried to dissolve the Council – presumably the Council of the Four Hundred, which had probably played a role in the adoption of Cleisthenes' proposals – and to entrust the government of Athens to a group of three hundred of Isagoras' adherents. To interpret this step as an attempt to set up an oligarchy is justified only in the sense that Isagoras reacted against Cleisthenes' use of the Assembly, and probably also of the Council, for the forming of major political decisions, and that he tried to deprive these bodies of all political power by vesting public authority entirely in the hands of aristocrats loyal to himself. However, the scheme met unexpected resistance on the part of the Council, which will have felt its own integrity threatened, and it bespeaks the appeal of Cleisthenes' proposed reform that the Council was spontaneously joined by the people at large. For two days Cleomenes and Isagoras were besieged on the Acropolis. Forced to capitulate on the third day, Cleomenes and his men were permitted to leave Attica under safe conduct, and some of Isagoras' partisans were arrested and executed. Isagoras himself, however, and others of his supporters escaped punishment, presumably by fleeing from Attica. He may have been among those Athenians who, having joined Cleomenes at Eleusis a year later, had their houses destroyed, their property confiscated, and were themselves condemned to death (schol. Ar. *Lys.* 273). The road was now clear for the implementation of the reforms proposed by Cleisthenes, and as a first step their author and the seven hundred exiled families were recalled home (Hdt v.73.1, *Ath. Pol.* 20.3).

⁸ The chronology adopted is that of c 69, 246–7.

Alcmaeon will have been among those exiled by Cleomenes. With his return and accession to office Cleisthenes' reform was put into effect at once (Pollux VIII. 110). But at the same time the Athenians had to protect themselves against external threats. There was reason to believe that Cleomenes, smarting under his defeat, was contemplating retaliation. For help against that eventuality, the Athenians turned, perhaps on Cleisthenes' advice, to Sparta's traditional enemy, Persia (Hdt. v.73.1). An embassy was dispatched to Sardis, where the Persian satrap Artaphernes was willing to offer an alliance but on condition that Athens submit by offering earth and water to Darius. The ambassadors accepted, but Herodotus' assertion (v.73.2-3) that they 'incurred great blame' upon their return to Athens probably means that their acceptance was disavowed, probably because the threat of a Spartan attack had been dispelled by the time of their return.

The attack had come in the spring of 506 B.C. and had been orchestrated to strike Athens simultaneously from three sides. Cleomenes and a force gathered from the entire Peloponnese was to attack from the south west, while Boeotia and Chalcis were to invade from north and east. The objective was to punish the Athenian people and to set up Isagoras as tyrant (Hdt. v.74.1). The Peloponnesians had advanced as far as Eleusis, the Boeotians had captured Oenoe and Hysiae, and the Chalcidians were busy raiding the north-east coast of Attica, when the Athenians decided to face their opponents one at a time, beginning with the Peloponnesians. They were saved from that part of their task by the sudden withdrawal of the Peloponnesian force: the Corinthians refused co-operation when they learned Cleomenes' purpose, and they were soon followed by Cleomenes' royal colleague Demaratus and by the rest of the allies (Hdt. v.75.1 and 3). The Athenians were now free to deal with their other enemies. Their plan to tackle the Chalcidians first was changed when they heard that the Boeotians were marching toward the Euripus to help Chalcis. They intercepted the Boeotians at Oenoe and inflicted a crushing defeat on them, taking as many as seven hundred prisoners; on the same day of victory, we are told, they crossed over into Euboea to defeat the Chalcidians. Land was taken from the wealthiest Chalcidians, the *hippobotai*, to be settled by four thousand Athenian cleruchs, and the prisoners taken from both Boeotians and Chalcidians were later ransomed at two mnai each. The prisoners' fetters were dedicated on the Athenian Acropolis, and a tithe of the ransom went into a bronze four-horse chariot as a votive offering to Athena (Hdt. v.77).⁹ There was no need now for an alliance with Persia.

⁹ For surviving fragments of the dedicatory inscription, see M-L 15.

II. THE REFORM OF THE CONSTITUTION

Herodotus (v.78) regards this stunning victory as evidence for the excellence of *isegoria*, freedom of public speech, in that it enabled the Athenians to assert their military superiority over their neighbours in a way in which they had not been able to do under the tyranny; a free person, he continues, is eager to accomplish things for himself, whereas a person working for a master will not do his best. It remains questionable whether 'freedom of public speech' had a place in Cleisthenes' propaganda analogous to his slogan of 'political equality' (*isonomia*); but it is clear that in Herodotus' opinion a combination of the end of tyranny with the Cleisthenean reforms had brought a new sense of liberty to Athens. What did the reforms involve? What was the purpose behind them? Only by answering the first of these questions can an answer to the second be attempted.

It is not remembered often enough that the governmental structure forged by Cleisthenes continued to function essentially unchanged for some three hundred years. Different scholars tend to see the secret of this durability in different aspects of the system, some emphasizing the tribal reform, others the political use of demes or their grouping into trittyes, and others again the Council of the Five Hundred, which was to become the most visible manifestation of the system as a whole. Conservative features, such as the continuation of Solonian and pre-Solonian traditions, are stressed by some, innovations by others. There is justification for all these views, but their multiplicity proves that the genius of the reform lies in its being all of one piece. Each part is so closely integrated with every other part that no single aspect dominates all others; only the totality can be understood, and the totality indicates negatively that the political basis which the old four Ionian tribes had provided for Athens was no longer viable. The rise of Pisistratus had demonstrated that the old system had taken no account of the need to translate social and economic differences and tensions among different regions of Attica into political terms, and the struggle between Cleisthenes and Isagoras, prefigured as it was by the dynastic rivalries which had brought Pisistratus to power, had shown that the preconditions for a renewal of tyranny still existed. We know of no constitution outside Attica which might have served Cleisthenes as a model; the presumption is that the new Athenian system was his creation alone.¹⁰

¹⁰ On this point see c 151, 63–75, and c 176, 161–73. The resemblance of the Cleisthenic trittyes to the districts of the Boeotian Confederacy in 395 B.C., noted in c 204, 145–7, suggests Athenian influence on Boeotia rather than Boeotian on Athens.

1. *Demes*

The four Ionian tribes were gentilician in structure, that is, they were kinship-based, dominated by old and distinguished families (*genē*), whose wealth, ownership of land, or control of important cults gave them that influence, each in its own locality, on which they could and did base their political power. On the most basic level, their control of the phratries will have ensured their authority to determine who was and who was not a citizen, an authority which the *diapsephismos* following the end of the tyranny will only have served to confirm. In the government of Attica at large, these families, by commanding a following and by concluding alliances with other prominent families and their retainers, will have competed only with one another to secure the highest offices of state, to which they alone as members of the highest census-class were eligible. This had led to tyranny and disastrous consequences for those families who had fallen foul of the tyrant earlier in the sixth century, and a similar situation was threatening to develop again, unless dynastic rivalries were to be curbed.

Cleisthenes realized that this could be done by neutralizing the political use to which social, economic and religious prestige had been put.¹¹ Accordingly, he confined the role of the gentilician organs such as *genē*, phratries and priesthoods to religious matters (*Ath. Pol.* 21.6), and created a new political substratum on the local basis of the *deme*.¹² Demes were natural geographical entities (see Fig. 31), consisting of smaller or larger settlements, which had grown up all over Attica from time immemorial, and members of the same *genos* will usually have lived scattered over several of them. Cleisthenes retained the local names which most demes will already have had; where named demes did not exist, or where scattered settlements had to be united into new demes, he had to find new names (*Ath. Pol.* 21.5). In many known instances he did so by adopting patronymic forms of *genē* or other local associations, and these are probably the small demes whose names end in *-idai*. In some known cases, he will have changed an old name into a new for political reasons. For example, Brauron, the home of the Pisistratids, was given the deme-name Philaïdae after the name of a *genos* known to have been hostile to them. There will have been other similar cases whose memory has not been preserved. A result was an undermining of the local kinship organization at least in those instances in which it now had to compete for recognition with a new deme that bore the same name or the name of an old rival. For it was the deme affiliation which henceforth mattered

¹¹ The fundamental work on this aspect of Cleisthenes' reform is C 153, 22–40.

¹² The Greek term is *demos*; it is conventionally rendered as 'deme' to differentiate it from *demos* in the sense of '(common) people'.

for official purposes: the residents of the same locality were regarded as *demotai* or fellow-demesmen of one another, and they elected a demarch each to be its presiding officer. In the fourth century, the demarchs were appointed for a term of one year and were subject to an audit upon the expiration of their term. Demes had their own cults and shrines, which competed with the old gentilician local cults; they kept a register of their membership (*lexiarchikon grammateion*) and had officers of their own. The *demotai* probably met normally in their demes rather than in the city for their own assemblies.¹³ It is doubtful that Cleisthenes gave them this elaborate structure, but it surely would not have developed if Cleisthenes had not assigned to the demes a central function in his reforms.

Moreover, membership in a deme constituted henceforth the most important indication of Athenian citizenship. A by-product of this will have been to offset the effects of the *diapsephismos* of 510/9 B.C.; for we may assume that those affected by it will have continued to reside in the demes in which they or their parents had settled, and that they became *demotai*, and thus citizens, in the same way in which all other deme-residents were admitted to citizenship. These are probably the 'new citizens' (*neopolitai*) mentioned by Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 21.4), and they may well be identical with the 'many foreigners and slaves' resident in Attica, whom, he says, Cleisthenes admitted into his new tribes (*Pol.* III.2, 1275b36–7). There is no reason to believe that their admission to citizenship had the central importance in the reforms which Aristotle attributes to it; it seems to have been only incidental to them.

Deme-membership was made hereditary; regardless of where a person had his residence in the centuries that followed, his name was entered into the register of the deme of which his ancestor at the time of Cleisthenes had been a resident. This simplified the system and contributed to its durability. For the two centuries from Cleisthenes' reform to the Macedonian reorganization of 307/6 B.C., the number of official demes remained steady at 139.¹⁴

2. Regions and *trittyes*

The substitution of the deme for the phratry as the smallest political unit was one way in which the influence of the noble families was fragmented; another was the way in which a *trittys* was formed of a number of demes usually, but not invariably, located in the same general area. 'Trittys' means 'a third', and each *trittys* was to make up one third of one of the new Cleisthenic tribes (*phylai*, sg. *phylē*), that is, each new tribe was composed of three *trittyes*. Before dealing with this aspect of the

¹³ C 120, 14–15. ¹⁴ C 215, 6–24, with 109–12.

reforms, it will be necessary first to explain the organization of the trittyes, the most artificial and crucial element in the structure of Cleisthenes' system.

The old political rivalries among aristocratic families had grouped Attica into two regions, to which Pisistratus had added a third. This much can be inferred from Herodotus' narrative (1.59.3) that in the 560s Pisistratus had organized a faction of 'hill-men' (*hyperakrioi* or *diakrioi*) to oppose the factions of 'plains-men' (*pediakoi*), led by the Boutad Lycurgus, and of 'shore-men' (*paralioi*), led by the Alcmaeonid Megacles, Cleisthenes' father. These three regions were natural divisions of the farm land of Attica (*Ath. Pol.* 13.4–5) and had no official standing. They were created by the dominance and influence of the most prominent families in them, and there is no evidence that they had played any part, directly or indirectly, in Athenian politics after the accession of Pisistratus. Cleisthenes seems to have had the insight that the formation of the three regions in the first place was evidence of different and conflicting interests within Attica, which a stable constitution would ignore at its peril. He therefore divided the whole of Attica into regions which, though three in number, did not coincide with the three old regions, but took cognizance of social and economic factors other than domination by noble families. One of these regions was the city (*asty*). It stretched beyond the city walls to encompass the territory enclosed between the Aegaleos and Hymettus ranges in the north west and east, and included to the south of these two mountain-ranges the shoreline, of which the harbours of Athens, Phalerum and the Piraeus formed a part. The plain north of Athens, to the east of Hymettus and to the south west of Parnes, became the inland region (*mesogeia*), and the coastal areas bordered by Parnes in the north and by Aegaleos in the south east, as well as the eastern, southern, and south-western shore of Attica, together formed the coast (*paralia*).

Within each of these three new regions, a number of demes was grouped into a trittys in such a way that each region would contain ten trittyes, and that the whole of Attica, accordingly, would have thirty trittyes. The number of demes making up a trittys varied. After all, the demes, too, varied in size, and it would have created too large a discrepancy in the size of different trittyes if the same number of demes had been schematically assigned to each trittys without considering the population of each deme. In five cases, one single large deme constituted a trittys; in other cases, it took as many as nine demes.¹⁵ In most instances, the demes grouped into a trittys formed a compact district.

But there were anomalies. The system of geographically cohesive

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 70–2.

trittyes is disrupted in a number of instances by the existence in each of the three regions of enclaves, of which some twenty have been identified.¹⁶ Some of these are located in the same region as the other demes with which they form a trittys but are geographically separated from them, e.g. Halimous is separated from Scambonidae, Leuconeum and Upper and Lower Potamus despite the fact that all five demes constitute the city trittys of Leontis (iv). In other cases, demes are assigned to the trittys of a region to which they do not belong geographically, e.g. Probalinthus, though in the coast region, was attached to the distant city trittys of Pandionis (iii); and in other instances a deme, though geographically close to demes of the same tribe, was allocated to a trittys different from that of its neighbouring demes, e.g. Aegilia was part of the inland trittys of Antiochis (x), even though its neighbours Anaphlystus and Atene belonged to the coast trittys of that tribe. The existence of enclaves has been taken to prove that Cleisthenes aimed at the creation of trittyes, each of which would contribute approximately the same number of Councillors – sixteen or seventeen – to the tribal contingent of fifty (*prytany*) which each tribe sent to the Council of the Five Hundred (below, p. 319, n. 26). While this might conceivably account for enclaves such as Halimous and Aegilia, which remained in the same tribe as their regional neighbours, it does not satisfactorily explain Cleisthenes' motive. First, it does not account for enclaves such as Probalinthus, which were joined to a remote trittys of another region; second, there is no evidence and no need to assume that a system, attested not very clearly for the fourth century (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 44.1), in which the prytanies were recruited in approximately equal numbers from each of the three trittyes of a tribe, was the creation of Cleisthenes. It is difficult to envisage such a complex system as the work of one man at one point in time, and more reasonable to regard it as a later development or adjustment due to imbalance caused by shifts in population.¹⁷ A more convincing explanation of Cleisthenes' purpose in creating enclaves must be sought elsewhere.

It is remarkable that the deme Probalinthus was isolated from neighbouring Marathon, Oenoe and Tricorynthus, with which it had formed and continued to form the old cult-organization of the Tetrapolis.¹⁸ To the last three demes Rhamnous was attached, which had totally different local cults, and these four formed the coast trittys of the tribe Aeantis; Probalinthus, however, was linked to the city trittys of the Pandionis tribe, whose centre was far removed to the south, when it could equally well have been linked to the adjacent coastal trittys of

¹⁶ For the following see C 204, 27–8, 105–22. ¹⁷ C 191, 533, and the literature cited there.

¹⁸ For the following, see C 153, 50–3.

Aegeis. But to have attached Probalinthus to the coastal trittys of Aegeis would have meant to shift it from one Pisistratid stronghold to another; by making it part of city Pandionis, Cleisthenes succeeded not merely in undermining the Tetrapolis but also in interposing an enclave between two formerly Pisistratid districts. Similar considerations may have motivated the weakening of the cult centre of Athena Pallenis at Pallene by attaching to its trittys the deme Eitea, located far north of it in what had been Pisistratid country.

Similarly, the deme Hecale was attached to the rather distant demes with which it formed the inland trittys of the Leontis tribe, rather than to the closer inland trittyses of Aegeis, Cecropis, or Antiochis. The probable reason here was to break up an important cult-centre in the home district of Isagoras, on which Isagoras may have depended for support in his dynastic struggle with Cleisthenes. There will have been other instances in which the political influence of old cult-centres was broken without creating the kind of obvious enclaves, whose presence permits us to draw this inference about one purpose of Cleisthenes' reforms. But we can only guess, since no adequate evidence is preserved.

One further observation needs to be made about the demes and their assignment to trittyses. There will have been few problems in organizing the coastal and inland regions, where population centres and districts will in most cases have defined themselves. There will have been no problem in defining demes within the city walls, either, for the identity of Cydathenaeon, Scambonidae, Melite, Collytus and Coele will have been of long standing, and similarly the suburbs now included in the city region will always have had names of their own, which would now identify them as demes. In allocating demes to trittyses, the greater density of the population made possible a larger number of one-deme trittyses in the city than could be formed in the coastal or inland regions: of the five known one-deme trittyses, three are located in the city.

Like the demes, the trittyses were given property and cults of their own, so that they could do on a regional level what the demes were designed to do in their own localities, that is, the new trittyses were to compete with the local gentilician cults so as to eliminate the influence through which they had made internal politics a struggle of different dynasties.¹⁹

¹⁹ On the entirely different trittyses in the Solonian state, see *CAH* III², 366–7. Siewert's view (c. 204, 139–59) that the trittyses were created as military units and were deliberately arranged so that the demes of a given trittyses tended to be located along a common road to Athens to facilitate the mobilization of the Athenian army fails to carry conviction not only because trittys-*lochoi* are only conjectural in Athens (below, n. 46), but also because considerations of internal policies outweighed the needs for mobilization at the time of Cleisthenes. Moreover, the reform of the army seems to have followed the reform of the state by several years (below, pp. 332–4).

3. *Tribes*

The trittyes constituted the link between local and state government. Three trittyes, one from each of the three regions, were united to form one new tribe, and the ten tribes which resulted performed those functions in the political life of Athens which the four Ionian tribes had fulfilled under the Solonian system. The Solonian tribes were not abolished but continued to exist for religious purposes only. Each of the ten new tribes was assigned an Attic hero to be the mythical ancestor and patron saint, whose name that tribe henceforth bore ('eponymous hero'), and cults in honour of its hero were established for each tribe.²⁰ We are told that the assignment was made by the Delphic Oracle from a list of one hundred submitted to it (*Ath. Pol.* 21.6). Only the number one hundred is open to question; that Cleisthenes, like all creators of a new social and political order in ancient Greece, sought the approval of Delphi to sanction his reform cannot be doubted. Some time before the middle of the fifth century, the sequence of tribes was officially regulated on a basis whose purpose remains obscure to us. A casualty list of c. 447 B.C. (M–L 48) is the earliest piece of evidence we possess for an order from which there are few divergences: I Erechtheis, II Aegeis, III Pandionis, IV Leontis, V Acamantis, VI Oeneis, VII Cecropis, VIII Hippothontis, IX Aeantis and X Antiochis.²¹

Each tribe contained, accordingly, a cross-section of the whole of Attica, since every region was represented in it. It embodied yet transcended the limits imposed by locality, and will have helped each member of a tribal assembly to view Attica as one whole. What regional differences there were could thus be settled at tribal meetings, so that they would not surface on the state level and cause the constitutional structure to be riven apart by disparate local interests. This was a further precaution against any one family dominating a given tribe and exploiting it politically to further its own interest. The way in which the trittyes were assigned to form each tribe presents no discernible topographical pattern. In most cases, the three trittyes forming each tribe lived more or less far removed from one another. But there are instances in which part of the inland trittys of a tribe lies adjacent to the coastal trittys of the same tribe, and there are even a few examples in which such contiguity seems to contravene the purpose of breaking up aristocratic strongholds, which we have seen as one motivating factor in the

²⁰ While shrines of each hero probably existed already in various parts of Athens or Attica, the cults are likely to have developed gradually, each on its own pattern; see c 143 and the evidence cited by S. I. Rotoff, *Hesp.* 47 (1978) 205–7 with nn. 46–53. That the eponymous heroes ever had a common cult in Athens is doubtful.

²¹ For variants in the tribal order, see c 187, 281, with the criticisms of Pritchett, c 375, 146–8.

Cleisthenean reforms. For example, there is contiguity between the inland and coastal trittyes of the Aeantis tribe, which contain Aphidna and Marathon, respectively, of which the latter had been Pisistratid territory but was removed from Aphidna by a steep climb, and the same applies to the inland and coastal trittyes of Aegeis. Even if the Tetrapolis trittys will have been weakened by detaching Probalinthus from Marathon, it will hardly have been the deliberate policy of the reformer to place into the same tribe two trittyes formerly dominated by the Pisistratids. The simplest way to explain these and similar phenomena in Cleisthenes' reforms is to accept Aristotle's statement (*Ath. Pol.* 21.4) that the lot was used in assigning the trittyes each to its tribe. An argument against that tradition has been the fact that there were considerable variations among the trittyes in population: if Cleisthenes wanted his ten tribes to be approximately equal in size, could he have left it to the chance of the lot to combine three large or three small trittyes into one tribe?²² Apart from the fact that the Cleisthenean system could easily absorb some discrepancies in the size of different tribes, in the event the probability that one tribe would be extraordinarily large and another extraordinarily small was so remote²³ that it was politically safer for Cleisthenes to entrust the combination to the impartial decision of the lot than to lay himself open to the charge of deriving personal or political advantage from it by his own manipulation. After the trittyes had been constructed in such a way that they eliminated the old gentilician and local cult-organizations from the political scene, it did not matter which trittyes went into the making of a new tribe. The fact that each of the three trittyes was selected from a different region was enough of a safeguard against special regional interests leading to the dominance of one tribe over another. Apart from that, there would always be nine other tribes to offset whatever regional preponderance might result within one tribe. There is, therefore, no reason to reject the only information on the method of selection that has come down to us from antiquity, especially since the lot would lend greater durability to the new order than the knowledge that the composition of the tribes had been manipulated by Cleisthenes and his men.

A technical aspect remains to be discussed. The Cleisthenean reforms were complex and the new groupings presuppose an amount of detailed preliminary work tremendous enough to make one doubt Aristotle's statement (*Ath. Pol.* 21.1) that the whole package was passed in the archonship of Isagoras. For that statement implies that within one year Cleisthenes not only took the people, heretofore rejected, into his partnership, but also that he drew up a list of demes, defined the extent of

²² For this argument, see C 95, 141–5, and especially C 204, 79, 86 and 126–8.

²³ C 215, 71 n. 31 calculates a probability of 1/100.

the three regions, determined the composition of each of thirty trittyes, designed the structure of the tribes and the identity of the tutelary heroes, and assigned each trittys to its tribe. And this does not yet take account of the organization of the Council of the Five Hundred and the changes in the election of magistrates, which his creation of the tribes involved. How could he do all that in one single year?

This question, which has baffled scholars for many years, has recently been answered in a convincing manner,²⁴ even if the silence of our sources leaves it conjectural. Cleisthenes will have had no trouble in persuading the Council and Assembly that a new political substructure was needed in order to avoid dynastic politics, and that, accordingly, the political substructure of Attica needed to be changed from a kinship to a territorial basis. The idea of substituting the deme for the phratry as the smallest political unit will have ensured an immediate and enthusiastic popular following. At the same time, he may have proposed a general outline of his scheme, namely that ten new tribes were to be constituted to play the political role which the four Ionian tribes had played, each to consist of three trittyes to be allotted to each tribe, taken one from each of the broad geographical regions into which Attica was naturally divided, and which may have been conventionally recognized from time immemorial. The initial step in the reform may have stipulated further that each trittys was to have a number of demes as its constituent units.

There will have been difficulties in the preliminary work that preceded the actual presentation of the scheme, but none of this is insurmountable. The most basic problem was to get the entire population of Attica enrolled in demes, a formidable problem, if we assume that boundary lines separating one deme from another had first to be drawn. But there is no need for this assumption once we realize that demes were units of population rather than geographical areas. Outside the city walls no one needed a surveyor to tell him the name of the locality in which he lived, and the political unit could be established by the simple instruction that each man should register in his home village.²⁵ Inside the city, its five major districts will have been identifiable entities long before the reforms, demarcated clearly enough to be designated as demes, and also the suburbs will have already possessed an identity of their own. The few cases in which isolated settlements required to be united into a deme will have been taken care of without great difficulty. To compile a list of demes will not have taken long, and it will not have taken long, either, to appoint a demarch for each to draw up a roll of his demesmen.

Similarly, it will not have been difficult to determine the names and general areas of the trittyes and to cast the lots by which one from each

²⁴ C 69, 241–8. ²⁵ C 213, 72–9.

region was to constitute a new tribe. In most cases, the grouping of demes into trittyes may have dictated itself, as is evident from the fact that most trittyes were named after the most important demes included in them. What will have been difficult was to make the specific assignments of demes into trittyes, and any specific proposal by Cleisthenes, when he first presented his reform, is likely to have encountered opposition strong enough to undermine the success of the programme as a whole. But once the general outline had been approved, it could be left to a comparatively small group of individuals to work out the details. If, as is likely, Hecale was separated from its natural neighbours in order to undermine the power base of Isagoras, it is improbable that this particular would have been included in the original reform bill presented to the Assembly while Isagoras was still archon. If any manipulation took place, it will have been only after the general outline of the reforms had already been approved.

4. *Council and magistrates*

Obviously, the division of the citizens into demes, trittyes and tribes was not an end in itself, but was to serve as the basis for restructuring the government of Attica. But when we raise the question in what the restructuring consisted, there is very little we can answer. Since he had removed the basis on which the Solonian Council of the Four Hundred had been elected, Cleisthenes had to reconstitute the Council (*boulē*), and he did so by having each of the ten tribes select fifty members to raise it to a total of Five Hundred (*Ath. Pol.* 21.3). Still, there was a difference: in order to ensure that no region of Attica would be unrepresented in each tribal contingent, each deme was assigned a quota of the fifty members which it was entitled to send to the Council each year.²⁶ The manner of appointment is uncertain. The lot, by which Councillors were elected before 411 B.C. (Thuc. VIII.69.4, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 32.1), is not likely to have been used for their election before the middle of the fifth century. More probably, they were chosen, during the first few decades of the Cleisthenean constitution, by direct election, as the archons were until 487/6 B.C. Other requirements for the eligibility of Councillors, of which we have more or less certain indications only later in Athenian history, may have been either initiated by Cleisthenes or left unchanged, as, for example, a minimum age of thirty years (Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.35; Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 4.3, 30.2, 31.1), and a limit of two non-consecutive annual terms of office in a life-time (*Ath. Pol.* 62.3). It is also possible that membership in the Council remained restricted to the upper three census classes, that is,

²⁶ See Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 62.1 and 3, with c 215, 56–8.

that the thetes were excluded, as they seem to have been barred from membership in the Solonian Council. But the purely negative nature of the evidence beclouds the issue. Aristotle's report (*Ath. Pol.* 7.3) that Solon opened only the Assembly and the lawcourts to the thetes merely implies that they were not eligible for membership in the Council, and there is no statement in any other ancient author which permits the inference that they were ever admitted at a later stage. Conjecture, therefore, has to take the place of knowledge: probability favours the view that the Council functioned without the thetes for the first decades after Cleisthenes, but it is hard to imagine that a restriction of two annual terms in a life-time could have been enforced for long without extending eligibility to the thetes.

We are not told what effect, if any, Cleisthenes' reforms had on the election of the nine archons. No mention is made of them in either of our sources on the reform, except that Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 22.5) says in connexion with the introduction in 487/6 B.C. of sortition by tribe among the successful candidates of a primary election by demes that the archons had previously been chosen by direct election. But direct election from among whom? There is no reason to believe that Cleisthenes changed the Solonian requirement that archons must belong to the highest census class, the pentakosiomedimnoi (*Ath. Pol.* 7.3, 8.1), or possibly to the highest two. Moreover, regardless of whether we accept Aristotle's report that the lot played a role in the election to the archonship under Solon (a procedure which will have vanished under the tyranny, anyway), he speaks of two stages in the election of archons, the first of which consisted in the election of candidates by each tribe (*Ath. Pol.* 8.1). Did this pre-selection survive the tyranny until the time of Cleisthenes? If it did, we shall have to assume that Cleisthenes adjusted it to his new tribes by having each tribe choose by direct election a fixed number of candidates, from among whom the people as a whole would vote nine into office, again by direct election. The alternative is that the tribes played no part in the election of archons and that there was only one direct election, namely in the Assembly.

It has been conjectured that Cleisthenes introduced one innovation into the procedure of appointing archons.²⁷ We learn from Herodotus (VI.109.2) that Callimachus, the Athenian commander at Marathon, had become polemarch 'by the lot of the bean'. This has been convincingly interpreted as indicating that Callimachus and his eight colleagues may indeed have become archons by direct election, but that the lot was used in assigning each to the archonship he was to occupy. It is possible, but not necessary, to surmise that Cleisthenes introduced this feature, which

²⁷ For the following, see c 71, 21–7, anticipated partly by c 39, 88.

will have paved the way for the adoption of a mixture of election and lot three years after Marathon. But the silence of our sources permits us to assume this procedure even for the Solonian constitution.

III. MOTIVES AND EFFECTS

We know too little about the mechanism by which political decisions were made and implemented before the middle of the fifth century to be certain about the effects which Cleisthenes' reforms had on the government of Athens. Apart from his reform of the tribal structure, the institutional and functional innovations attributed to him add up to little or nothing. The chief executive power in the state, which must have been held by the tyrant from the final accession of Pisistratus to the expulsion of Hippias, will have reverted to the archon eponymous after 511/10 B.C., as the position of Isagoras indicates, and there is no evidence that Cleisthenes stripped the office of its functions. There was no change in the number of archons, none in the competence of their various offices, and the Solonian census classes remained a criterion for eligibility to public office, barring all but the rich and high-born. The Council of the Areopagus retained, in addition to its jurisdiction in cases of homicide, which it never lost, the sole jurisdiction in crimes against the state and the right to call magistrates to account for their conduct in office (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 8.4); and the functions of the newly-constituted Council of the Five Hundred will initially have been no different from the probouleutic functions exercised by the Council of the Four Hundred under Solon. The Solonian Heliæa, that is, the Assembly constituted as a court of law, will have retained its power to accept appeals (*epheseis*) from decisions made by the magistrates. With the possible exception of demarchs, who were needed to lead the demes as local political corporations, no new offices seem to have been created, save probably the generalship.²⁸

What, then, was so novel about Cleisthenes' reforms that later generations could credit him with the establishment of the Athenian democracy?²⁹ The most decisive impact of his reforms was on the manner in which legislation was to be enacted in the future and on the role of the Assembly in that process. It is reasonable to assume that the enactment of legislation, as well as success in an election, in an Assembly dominated by the four Ionian tribes was determined by the support a small number of *genē* could muster from among their friends and retainers. By 'taking the people into his partnership' Cleisthenes managed to break the hold which the dynasts had had over their following, and by placing local

²⁸ Androton 324 F 5 (*FGrH*) mentions the replacement of *kolakretai* by *apodektai* and Hdt. v.69.2 the appointment of *phylarchoi*. The former is demonstrably wrong, and the latter confused.

²⁹ So, e.g., Hdt. vi.131.1, Isoc. vii.16, xv.232 and 306, xvi.27.

administration into the hands of demes organized into trittyes, he undermined the political dependencies which the noble *genē* had forged without at the same time eliminating the social and economic prestige through which they alone had access to high office.³⁰ That this was the salient negative purpose of his reforms is indubitable. At the same time, it is clear that his positive aim was not to put the effective control of the state into the hands of the common people, else he would have opened the archonships and other high magistracies to them. Nor was it, as is sometimes alleged, to secure power for himself and his Alcmaeonid *genos*. If that had been the case, he could have used his strong popular support, evinced by the resistance offered by Council and people to Isagoras and Cleomenes at a time when Cleisthenes was himself in exile, to greater advantage than having his kinsman Alcmaeon elected as archon for 507/6 B.C. and securing a state funeral for himself upon his death (Paus. 1.29.6). For no other personal advantage is perceptible in the reforms. If the trittys-groupings left the Alcmaeonids henceforth in three different tribes, the same will have been true of other *genē*, and it might as easily have resulted in a neutralization of their influence by new fellow-tribesmen as in their domination over them. In any event, the reforms do not explain the prominence or obscurity of any *genos* in the fifth century.

If there is a positive goal noticeable in Cleisthenes' reforms at all, it is a desire to eliminate from the public life of Athens the dynastic rivalries which he saw as the cause of disunity harmful to the political life of Athens. He achieved this goal by giving the common people a greater voice in public affairs than they had enjoyed before, and he did so by a method which had been tried before in the sixth century: tribal reform. But unlike his grandfather, Cleisthenes of Sicyon, who had gathered the underprivileged into a new tribe and had given offensive names to the tribes into which Sicyonian society was organized (Hdt. v.68.1), and unlike Demonax, who had created new tribes on the basis of ethnic provenance at Cyrene (Hdt. iv.161.3), Cleisthenes adopted the 'mixing' policy, which Aristotle rightly regards as his greatest achievement. This 'mixing' is for Aristotle the purpose behind the substitution of ten tribes for the gentilician four, 'so that more people should have a share in the state' (*Ath. Pol.* 21.2), and behind the composition of each tribe of deme-based trittyes 'so that each tribe should have a share in each region' (*ibid.* 21.4). Moreover, the use of deme-names in place of patronymics is described as designed to inhibit discrimination between citizens of old and more recent standing (*ibid.*), and the net effect of the reforms was that Cleisthenes gave a share in the determination of public affairs to all citizens, regardless of birth or wealth.³¹

³⁰ The fundamental discussion of this theme is c 165, 12–22.

³¹ Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 20–1: ἀποδιδούς τῷ πλῆθει τὴν πολιτείαν.

The 'mixing' is thus a social as well as a regional process, the effect of which will have been felt most strongly in Council and Assembly. The Assembly had elected the most important magistrates ever since the reforms of Solon, but it will have made a difference that under Cleisthenes the electorate was organized in local deme-based tribes and trittyes, whose allegiances would differ from those that the *genē* had been able to command under the Solonian system: a candidate for office could no longer count on being able to mobilize his friends, retainers and neighbours to vote for him, but he had to appeal also to fellow-tribesmen from the two regions other than that in which his own trittys was located. The loyalties which he could hope to command were not his by birth but had to be gained by persuading fellow-tribesmen from all walks of life. Only the wealthy and high-born were eligible for office, but a cross-section of the people as a whole in the Assembly elected them to office.

Furthermore, the new tribal organization will have had an impact on legislation and policy-making. Even if equal freedom of public speech (*isegoria*) was every citizen's right as early as Cleisthenes, it is doubtful that the common people would or would wish to propose new legislation. They would be likely to leave that to the members of rich and noble families, who had long experience in running the country and continued to occupy the magistracies responsible for the implementation of whatever policies were voted. Under the old dispensation, alliances or collusion between two or more powerful *genē*, confident in the following they controlled, would have been sufficient to secure the passage of a desired measure. But with the elimination of such a following, the issue was unpredictable. By requiring the submission of each piece of legislation to the Council of the Five Hundred, which included representatives from every deme, and by making its validation contingent upon the affirmative vote of the Assembly, of which every citizen regardless of social or economic status was a member, Cleisthenes created in the power of Council and Assembly a counterweight to the executive power, which remained vested in the upper classes through their sole eligibility to high office. The Cleisthenean system was, therefore, neither a democracy nor an aristocracy, if by these terms we understand the control of the machinery of government by the common people (or by the majority) or by the upper classes, respectively. Its principle was rather that no legislation was valid unless it had the approval of Council and Assembly as expressing the will of the people as a whole, that is, as equals politically to the nobles to whom the implementation of policy was still exclusively entrusted. *Isonomia* is the Greek term for this principle of political equality, and it is perhaps no accident that it enters the Greek language for the first time, as far as we

know, about the time of Cleisthenes' reforms. Since it is the most fitting single term to define the principle embodied in his reforms, it may well have originated as a propaganda slogan by means of which Cleisthenes managed to make the common people his partners in reforming the Athenian state.

The establishment of *isonomia* in Attica seems to have been accorded an enthusiastic welcome by Cleisthenes' contemporaries. In that it had been achieved by the creation of ten tribes, each of which incorporated all regions of Attica, it seems to have been regarded as a second synoecism. Literary and artistic monuments are hard to date in the absence of external evidence. We have such external evidence for Antenor's statues of the 'Tyrannicides', which indicates that their valiant but fruitless attempt was celebrated soon after the overthrow of the tyranny and before the archonship of Isagoras. But we have no external evidence for dating four stanzas of a drinking song (*skolion*) which has come down to us commemorating the same exploit.³² References to it in other authors make it virtually certain that at least some of them were composed shortly before or shortly after 500 B.C., and it may well be that they are related to Cleisthenes' reforms. Two stanzas credit Harmodius and Aristogeiton not only with having slain the tyrant but also with having brought *isonomia* to Athens, and the fact that both credits are undeserved make the precise date and the political purpose of this song controversial. Non-controversial, however, remains the fact that it celebrates *isonomia* about the same time in which Cleisthenes' reforms brought it to Athens.

It is tempting to relate the sudden popularity of Theseus in Greek art from the late sixth century on to the reforms of Cleisthenes. The facts are easily stated: Theseus appears only rarely on vase-paintings of the earlier sixth century, and of his exploits only the slaying of the Minotaur and the fight against the Centaurs are commonly depicted. But from the end of the sixth century on, an intense interest in his adventures on his way from Troezen to Athens comes into evidence, that is, in those exploits which are focused on his activities at home rather than abroad. Moreover, an astonishing number of Attic vases, the so-called 'Theseus-cycle' vases, of this period combine all or some of the following adventures on the same vessel: his victories over Sinis, the Crommyonian Sow, Sciron, Cercyon, Procrustes and the Marathonian Bull.³³ About the same time, the 'cycle' appears in sculpture on the impressive metopes of the Treasury of the Athenians at Delphi.³⁴ On the basis of this evidence, an epic poem on Theseus, attributed in antiquity to one Diphilus, of which we know only that it mentioned Theseus' fight against the Amazons, has been dated in

³² Preserved in Ath. xv.695A-B; see D. L. Page, *PMG* nos. 893-6.

³³ See c 510, 210-58. On Theseus in general, c 445, 1045-1238.

³⁴ The basic publication is c 520. Cf. also c 509, 1-28.

the late sixth century also.³⁵ Now, artefacts are notoriously hard to date with any precision, and precision is of the essence in a period where only a few years separate the reforms of Cleisthenes from the final period of the Pisistratid tyranny, and where the battle of Marathon was fought only a decade and a half after the Athenian victory over Boeotians and Chalcidians. Do the Theseus-cycle vases begin already under the late tyranny and just happen to gain in popularity in the early fifth century, or do they reflect the celebration of Cleisthenes' reforms as a second synoecism of Attica? Was the Treasury of the Athenians built only after the battle of Marathon, as its excavators believed, supported in part by the authority of Pausanias (x.11.5), or are we to date it with the majority of modern scholars to the period 506 to 490 B.C., erected perhaps in gratitude for the help given by Delphi to Cleisthenes' efforts to oust the tyrants? And is this evidence strong enough to support a late sixth-century date of a *Theseid*, of which nothing is heard before Aristotle (*Poet.* 8, 1451a20)? Obviously, no statement on the possibility of a political context, to say nothing of its date, can be made with any confidence at all. We can merely state that the facts do not rule out our taking this sudden interest in Theseus the Athenian as inspired by a new vision of Attica, encompassing all its people rich and poor, organized in tribes, each of which was the result of a new kind of synoecism, namely of its demes into trittyes.

It is remarkable that none of the ten new tribes was named after Theseus, even though his father Aegeus, his grandfather Pandion, his son Acamas and his half-brother Hippothoon had tribes named after them. A possible reason is that Theseus, as author of the union of Attica, was too much revered as the hero of all Attica to give one single tribe the signal honour of worshipping him as its mythical forebear. Theseus belonged to Attica as a whole.

IV. IN THE WAKE OF THE REFORMS: ATHENS 507/6 TO 480 B.C.

As a result, the constitution became much more populist than it had been under Solon. For disuse under the tyranny had brought about an eclipse of Solon's laws and had made Cleisthenes enact new legislation in his attempt to gain the favour of the masses. It was in this connexion that the law on ostracism was enacted. First of all, in the fifth year after the establishment of this system, in the archonship of Hermocreon, they formulated the oath for the Council of the Five Hundred, which they still swear today. Next they began to elect generals by tribes, one from each tribe; but the polemarch had the command over the army as a whole. After their victory at Marathon, in the twelfth year after this, in the

³⁵ See G. Kinkel, (ed.) *EGF* pp. 217–18. On Theseus see also below, p. 422.

archonship of Phaenippus, the commons had gained sufficient self-confidence two years after the victory to apply for the first time the law on ostracism, which had been enacted out of suspicion of those in power, inasmuch as Pisistratus had established himself as tyrant through his position as popular leader and general. The first person to be ostracized was a kinsman of his, Hipparchus son of Charmus of Collytus, the very man on whose account Cleisthenes had enacted the law, because he wanted to expel him. (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* 22.1–4)

This terse statement constitutes the only coherent account we possess of the immediate impact of Cleisthenes' reforms on the internal life of Athens, and any reconstruction of the two decades following 507/6 B.C. must start from it. With the valuable information it provides, it also poses a number of intractable problems. We are told that Cleisthenes himself enacted the law on ostracism, but we are not told at what point he enacted it, and the narrative implies rather than states that a considerable time elapsed between enactment and its first application in 488/7 B.C. Cleisthenes is credited with other 'new legislation', but we are not informed what it was. Two further measures are treated as appendages to Cleisthenes' reforms, the formulation of a new oath for the Council of the Five Hundred and the adaptation of the military organization of Attica to the new system. Are these measures also to be attributed to Cleisthenes? Or were they introduced by men committed to his programme after the main reforms had been consolidated? Since we know nothing whatever about Cleisthenes' activities after the reforms, not even when or where he died, we cannot answer this question.

The most vexing problems posed by Aristotle's account concern chronology. The structure of *Ath. Pol.* 22.1–4 suggests the following sequence of events: enactment of the law on ostracism, formulation of bouleutic oath, military reorganization, battle of Marathon, the first ostracism. We are given firm archon dates for only two of these events, the introduction of the bouleutic oath in the archonship of Hermocreon and the battle of Marathon in the archonship of Phaenippus. Independent evidence secures the date of Phaenippus for 490/89 B.C., and counting inclusively from it, we get 488/7 B.C. for the first ostracism and 501/0 B.C. for the military reorganization. Hermocreon's archonship is defined only by Aristotle's statement that it fell 'in the fifth year after the establishment of this system', presumably referring to Cleisthenes' main reforms, which Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 21.1) had dated in the archonship of Isagoras (508/7 B.C.). This would give us 504/3 B.C. as the year of Hermocreon's archonship and the formulation of the new bouleutic oath. But there is good external evidence (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* v. 37.1) that Acestorides was archon for that year. Since Aristotle usually dates events both by archon and by an inclusive count of their distance from other salient events mentioned, the problem is generally solved by

assuming that the new bouleutic oath and the military reorganization belong in the same year, the archonship of Hermocreon, which is correctly dated by reference to Phaenippus to 501/0 B.C., whereas the distance from Isagoras' archonship is wrongly defined as the fifth year instead of the eighth. This solution is not entirely satisfactory, but there seems to be no other way out of the difficulty short of assuming that in this passage alone in the *Ath. Pol.* Aristotle abandoned his inclusive time count and dated the bouleutic oath in 503/2, and perhaps also the tribal election of generals in 502/1 B.C. However, as the emendation of a numeral does less violence to the tradition than the assumption of an unexplained deviation from Aristotle's normal way of counting, it is safer to accept 501/0 B.C. as the date of Hermocreon's archonship. Whatever the true dates may be, it is clear that Aristotle believed the new bouleutic oath to have been introduced before the reorganization of the military, and the first implementation of the law on ostracism to have followed the battle of Marathon by two years. We shall, therefore, discuss these matters in this sequence.

1. *The Council and the people*

On the analogy of the oath taken by the archons, which included a reference to its institution under King Acastus (*Ath. Pol.* 3.3), it is reasonable to assume that the new bouleutic oath explicitly mentioned the archonship of Hermocreon. What specifically the oath contained we do not know. Aristotle's assertion that it was still sworn in his day need not mean more than that the fourth-century oath still included some or all of its original formulae; it cannot mean that it was identical with the original oath, for we know that some new clauses were added to it at various times in the fifth century.³⁶ It is peculiar that the oath should be singled out for special mention, when so many other aspects of the functioning of the Council of the Five Hundred go unmentioned. Nothing Aristotle says suggests that there was no oath sworn by the Councillors before the archonship of Hermocreon, and nothing indicates that the new oath added to or subtracted from the functions of the Council. And yet, it will have constituted some kind of a landmark to set the seal of completion upon the Cleisthenes reforms. What will it have sealed?

We get some limited help from a document which, though it is about a century younger than Cleisthenes' reforms, suggests that the bouleutic oath may have been the coping stone of legislation defining the powers of the Council of the Five Hundred. It is an inscription which seems to

³⁶ For details, c 190, 194–5.

have been part of the larger enterprise of revising the laws in the last decade of the fifth century by collecting previously scattered and independent enactments into an authoritative whole. The stone is badly mutilated, but enough remains intelligible to recognize in it a law defining certain prerogatives, mainly judicial, of Council and Assembly. Moreover, archaic words and phrases suggest that it includes legislation originally enacted in the early decades following the reforms of Cleisthenes.³⁷ For our purposes, it is of special interest that it included an oath to be taken by the members of the Council. Since none of the details of the oath are preserved, we cannot tell what relation, if any, it had to the bouletic oath first formulated in the archonship of Hermocreon, especially since we know nothing about its content, either. However, the juxtaposition of oath with legislation permits the inference that the formulation of the oath in 501/0 B.C. was also accompanied by legislation defining the powers of the Council. The fact that in other similar instances an oath follows rather than precedes the legislation enacted is no obstacle to this inference. For we know neither what preceded the oath on *IG* 1³ 105, nor whether another oath may have followed what is preserved on the stone. In addition, the conglomerate nature of the legislation it contains makes the question of conventional sequence appear irrelevant. In short, it is likely that legislation concerning the powers and procedures of the Council of the Five Hundred followed its organization by some six or seven years. However, we remain ignorant about the nature of its powers. Until the reforms of Ephialtes, it was probably entrusted with no task other than preparing the agenda and the business for meetings of the Assembly.

Other measures, too, will have been necessitated by the reorganization of the Council of the Five Hundred on the basis of demes and ten tribes. There will have been the need to find a suitable meeting place, but no building has as yet been convincingly identified as having been erected for that purpose about this time. It used to be thought that a roofed Bouleuterion, discovered in the excavations of the south-west side of the Agora, was built to house the Cleisthenic Council.³⁸ But a re-examination of the evidence now inclines its excavator to the view that this building is more likely to be associated with the reforms of Ephialtes.³⁹

³⁷ *IG* 1³ 105 (= *IG* 1² 114). For discussion and bibliography, see C 190, 183–4 and 195–9.

³⁸ The basic publication of this building and of the *Metron* associated with it is C 574, 127–40. Cf. also C 579, 29–38.

³⁹ I am indebted to Professor Homer A. Thompson for the following communication: ‘The evidence for dating the Old Bouleuterion is very slender. Its walls were of sun-dried brick, and consequently we have no above-ground architectural members, while the foundations were set down for the most part in existing fill. But I now realize that the surviving interior foundations are made entirely of re-used blocks, some of which had been damaged by fire before re-use, hence there can be little doubt that the building is post-Persian. It is, I now believe, more likely to be associated with Ephialtes than with Cleisthenes. The Tholos will have followed very closely on the Old Bouleuterion’ (Letter of 10 October 1978).

In the decades following Cleisthenes' reforms, possibly in connexion with the reforms of Ephialtes, the work of the Council was made more efficient by the introduction of the 'prytany' system. Instead of requiring the presence of all five hundred members for the transaction of even routine business, the fifty members sent to the Council by each tribe took turns, in an order determined by lot, in serving as the executive committee on the Council for one tenth of a year each. The resulting terms of thirty-five or thirty-six days (*Ath. Pol.* 43.2) were called prytanies, and for the duration of his service on the executive committee a Councillor became a *prytanis* (pl. *prytaneis*). The *prytaneis* selected by lot one of their number to be president (*epistatēs*) for one day to preside over any meeting of Council or Assembly to be held on that day. As the *prytaneis* were expected to be on constant call for conducting state business during their prytany, a special building, the Tholos, was erected near the Bouleuterion before the middle of the fifth century, in which they lived and ate.⁴⁰

We indicated above that the law published about 410 B.C. contained not only a bouletic oath but also regulations defining certain judicial prerogatives of the Assembly in language indicating that these were based on legislation originally passed soon after the reforms of Cleisthenes. The linguistic feature which most strongly suggests the antiquity of the original is the phrase *ἀνευ τῷ δέμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων πλεθύοντος*, 'without a full meeting of the people of Athens', which is never again found in Attic and has its closest analogue in two bronze inscriptions from Olympia, which belong to the late sixth or early fifth century.⁴¹ Some form of this phrase can be recognized in eight places of the inscription, including in the only three clauses which the mutilated stone leaves intelligible. These clauses stipulate (1) that no war can be declared 'without a full meeting of the people'; (2) that no death penalty can be inflicted 'without a full meeting of the people'; and (3) that no fines (for certain religious offences?) can be imposed 'without a full meeting of the people'.⁴² Now, the phrase 'without a full meeting of the people' implies that the function of 'the people' in these matters is merely to validate, approve, or reject decisions first taken by another body; it does not mean that the matter must have been initiated before the assembled people. In other words, the phrase implies two procedural steps, the second of which takes place before a 'full meeting of the people'. Although the poor condition of the stone has not preserved a statement identifying the venue of the first procedural step in these three cases, there is little doubt that it took place before the Council of the Five Hundred, not only because there are more traces of references to it

⁴⁰ C 375, 126–8, dated *c.* 470 B.C., but concedes that it may be Ephialtic; see C 190, 19 with n. 1, and n. 39 above. ⁴¹ C 31, 218 and 220, nos. 5 and 9 (with plate 42).

⁴² *IG* 13105, lines 35, 36, and 41.

preserved on the stone than to any other official organ, but also because all matters discussed in the popular Assembly had first to be discussed and put on the agenda by the Council of the Five Hundred (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 45.4).

The principle that war cannot be declared without a popular vote is likely to be so old that it could have been articulated at any time in Athenian history even before the reforms of Cleisthenes. But there is something peculiar about stipulating a popular vote before a death penalty can be imposed. Such a regulation makes sense for 410 B.C., just after the Athenians had experienced a Council which had exceeded the normal powers of a Council on more than one occasion, but it makes no sense for any other period in Athenian history, earlier or later, when, Aristotle's remark to the contrary notwithstanding (*Ath. Pol.* 45.1), the Council of the Five Hundred never had that kind of judicial power. Only a popular body, such as the Assembly or the lawcourts, could ever inflict the death penalty, except possibly the Areopagus. How, then, can we explain the archaic language?

It can be explained by a simple hypothesis, which can be strengthened by several parallels. Ever since Solon, there had been two Councils in Athens, the anciently powerful Council of the Areopagus and the Council of the Four or Five Hundred. We know that Ephialtes had transferred some of the powers of the former to the latter: is it not conceivable that, in collecting and republishing old laws relevant to defining the powers of Council and Assembly, the legislators of 410 B.C. included among the laws concerning the Council of the Five Hundred laws which had originally been enacted to limit the power of the Council of the Areopagus? We know that, apart from its jurisdiction in cases of homicide, which it never lost, the Areopagus had been entrusted from the time before Solon with the jurisdiction in crimes against the state, empowered to impose any fine or punishment which it saw fit and without the right of appeal (*Ath. Pol.* 8.4). After the middle of the fifth century, only the lawcourts or the Assembly could impose the death penalty or fines in excess of five hundred drachmas: our sources do not tell us at what point the Areopagus relinquished this power to them. There is no reason to believe that the Areopagus lost its jurisdiction in crimes against the state before the reforms of Ephialtes, but there are indications that it did not pass the verdict in certain crimes against the state, which we know to have been tried between 493/2 and 462/1 B.C. Phrynichus was fined one thousand drachmas by 'the Athenians' in 493/2 B.C. for producing his *Capture of Miletus*; in the same year Miltiades was acquitted by a 'lawcourt' of tyranny in the Chersonese, and was four years later prosecuted before 'the people' on the capital charge of deceiving the Athenians; Hipparchus son of Charmus is said to have been

condemned *in absentia* by ‘the people’; Themistocles was condemned for treason by ‘the Athenians’; and at Cimon’s trial before ‘a jury’ in 462 B.C. for accepting bribes, his prosecutor Pericles demanded the death penalty.⁴³ Although some of the evidence for these six cases is late, and although a system of lawcourts (*dikasteria*) is not known in Athens before the reforms of Ephialtes, it is remarkable that in no instance is the Areopagus mentioned as the competent tribunal for passing judgement, but in every case it is a body which was or represented the *δῆμος πλεθύων*, a ‘full meeting of the people’. Moreover, the death penalty or heavy fines are the punishment upon conviction in all these cases.

Since the case of Phrynichus seems to be the earliest of the six, can we infer that by 493 B.C. the jurisdiction in certain crimes against the state had passed from the Areopagus to a ‘full meeting of the people’? Not quite, for, as we have seen, the phrase *ἄνευ τῷ δέμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ πλεθύοντος* describes only the second of two procedural steps; what we can infer is that a first hearing in crimes against the state was still conducted before the Areopagus, but that it could dispose only of minor cases in its own right; if conviction would carry the death penalty or a heavy fine, it would have to refer the case for final disposition to ‘the people’ (*demos*). In the six cases mentioned, tradition coloured by later developments has preserved the memory of the final and decisive step only.

But what is the meaning of ‘the people’? Solon’s introduction of an appeal procedure (*epheasis*) had enabled litigants to have an adverse decision of a magistrate’s tribunal heard again before the Assembly sitting as a lawcourt and called in that capacity *Heliaea*;⁴⁴ both Assembly and *Heliaea* can be described as the *δέμος πλεθύων*, the ‘people in full meeting’. The hypothesis that Cleisthenes or his immediate successors made the appeal procedure mandatory in the most serious crimes against the state heard by the Areopagus would explain why we hear of such cases tried by ‘the people’, ‘the Athenians’, or a ‘popular lawcourt’ from 493 B.C. on. It would also be in character with the rest of his reforms. For by introducing the popular court as a second step in some trials of crimes against the state, he will have applied to the judiciary the same principle of *isonomia* which he had introduced in legislative matters in the requirement that nothing could become law without the validation by Council and Assembly.

If this hypothesis is right, the establishment of the people as a counterweight also to the political jurisdiction of the Areopagus may have been among the ‘legislation enacted by Cleisthenes in his attempt to gain the favour of the masses’ (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.1). There is another

⁴³ For detailed discussion, c 190, 199–202.

⁴⁴ See *CAH* III², 388–9.

undated law whose language suggests that it belongs to the same general period, and whose tenor makes the Cleisthenean reforms an appropriate context. We learn from Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.7.20) of a decree of Cannonus, which stipulated that 'if anyone has committed a crime against the Athenian people, he shall make his defence individually before the people; and if he is found guilty of the crime, he shall be killed by being thrown into the pit, his property shall be confiscated and a tithe of it given to the Goddess'.⁴⁵ If this is part of the measure which first gave the people a voice in trying crimes against the state and at the same time first guaranteed each person accused of such crimes an individual trial, it may well have been part of the same legislation of which traces are preserved in *IG* 1³105, perhaps the only surviving section of a law, the first part of which defined the part to be played by the Areopagus in crimes against the state.

2. *Generals and army*

Greek armies of the classical period consisted predominantly of non-professional troops commanded by non-professional officers, so that the organization of Greek armies reflected the structure of the citizen body and its classes. We know too little about the organization before 501/0 B.C. to be able to say whether the appointment of generals as such was a constitutional innovation or not. However the army may have been organized early in the sixth century, the fact that Pisistratus had been his own commander and had depended largely on the support of mercenary soldiers will have made a new organization desirable, even if the citizen army was still well enough organized and commanded to repel simultaneous Boeotian and Chalcidian attacks in 506 B.C. Regardless of whether the office of general was an innovation or not, there can be no question that the election of generals, one from each tribe, brought the organization of the army command in line with the tribal reforms of Cleisthenes. Aristotle does not state whether each tribe elected its own general, or whether it merely put forward candidates to be chosen by the people as a whole. Probability, corroborated by Herodotus' statement on Miltiades (VI.104.2), favours the second alternative, because, unlike the Councillors, the generals were expected to represent not regional interests but the interests of the army as a whole. It is also possible that at the same time, if not earlier, the army was organized into ten tribal regiments (*taxeis*, sg. *taxis*), each possibly subdivided into three *lochoi*, each representing the contingent contributed by a *trittys*,⁴⁶ and that each

⁴⁵ On the strength of Ar. *Ecol.* 1089–90 and the paraphrase of the decree at Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.34, I believe that the *δεδεμένον* of the manuscripts should be corrected to *διαλελημμένον*. That the decree of Cannonus is Cleisthenean was first suggested by C 7, I 205–8. ⁴⁶ Suggested by C 74, 20–1.

general commanded his own tribal *taxis*. But the evidence is extremely tenuous. In any event, it was not until later, when the growth of the navy enlarged the scope of a general's duties, that taxiarchs took their place as regimental commanders.

Moreover, like all other important magistrates, the generals were elected for a one-year term, but, unlike the rest, a general was eligible for re-election to an indefinite number of successive terms. This gave the office the potential of continuity which other magistracies, including the office of polemarch, lacked. It was henceforth possible to keep a competent general as long as his services were useful to the state; the cumulative expertise of a successful commander could now be utilized indefinitely. This continuity was to raise the importance of the generalship in the decades which followed, and it consequently eclipsed the real power of the archonship, a fact which was recognized when in 487/6 B.C. the lot was instituted to select the archons from among candidates chosen by direct election by the tribes. Generals, because theirs was the only potentially continuous magistracy, were soon elected for political as well as for military ability, facilitating the consistent pursuit of a given policy, especially under Pericles, who owed his influence to his continuous tenure of the generalship from 443/2 B.C. until his death in 429/8 B.C.

Aristotle's statement that the polemarch held 'the command over the army as a whole' has been thought to conflict with Herodotus' account (VI. 109–10) of the relation of the polemarch Callimachus to the generals at Marathon, where his sole function seems to have consisted in casting the decisive vote, when the generals were evenly divided on a vital issue. However, Herodotus' description does not easily lend itself to generalization, and further, the inscriptional evidence of a memorial dedication of Callimachus on the Athenian Acropolis (M–L 18) suggests that his function corresponds closely to Aristotle's description. But the deeper meaning of the army reform is that it applied the principle of *isonomia* to the armed forces: ten generals, elected from each tribe, now commanded the tribal regiments and acted as a counterweight to the polemarch who, as one of the nine archons, had been elected without regard to the tribal distinction from among the highest census class. For the generals we know only of a general requirement to have children and own land in Attica to be eligible for office (Din. 1.71): but the military capacity demanded by their position makes it likely that only men from the higher census classes served. The earliest elected general of whom we know is called by Herodotus (IV.97.3) 'a man prominent among the citizens in every respect'. Elected by the people as a whole and enjoying absolute equality with one another, the generals constituted a democratic element in the constitution in that the command of the armed forces was

determined by popular election; while the position of the polemarch as supreme commander and member of the board of nine archons will have safeguarded a unified command, even when there was dissension among the generals.

But membership in the army was not open to all. From Cleisthenes to at least the battle of Marathon, only men capable of providing their own arms as hoplites were admitted to the tribal regiments, so that the thetes, the lowest census class, who at that time constituted about two thirds of the citizen body,⁴⁷ were not permitted to fight and in that sense did not enjoy full participation in the affairs of state, even if they could make their influence felt in voting for the army commanders.

3. *Ostracism and internal politics 507/6 to 480/79 B.C.*

Unlike the formulation of the bouletic oath and the election of generals by tribes, the law on ostracism is explicitly attributed to Cleisthenes himself by Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 22.1 and 4),⁴⁸ and dated vaguely as part of the 'establishment of his system', that is, as part of his reforms, dated by Aristotle in the archonship of Isagoras, 508/7 B.C. Aristotle (*ibid.* 3-4) also tells us that the law was not applied until 488/7 B.C. and that Hipparchus son of Charmus of Collytus was its first victim, thus assuming a gap of twenty years separating enactment of the law from its implementation. The 'customary mildness of the people' toward the 'friends of the tyrants' is given as the only explanation of this peculiar delay, and those who doubted the fact of the delay and Aristotle's explanation for it took comfort from Harpocraton's quotation of a statement by the fourth-century Attidographer Androtion, which seemed to date the enactment of the law on ostracism just before its first use in 488/7 B.C. But it can now be regarded as established that Harpocraton's is a garbled version of a text which, far from contradicting Aristotle, was actually his source.⁴⁹ Still, even if this leaves no doubt that our best ancient authorities date the enactment some twenty years before implementation and regard Cleisthenes as the author of ostracism, we have either to accept the 'mildness' alleged to be the cause of the twenty-year gap, or find a better explanation.

Unfortunately, no ancient source is of much help, and the explanations given depend almost exclusively on the views taken of Cleisthenes' reforms: scholars who see in Cleisthenes primarily a politician eager to gain for himself and his *genos* whatever power he could, tend to dismiss Aristotle's date and assume enactment of the law shortly before the first

⁴⁷ For this figure, C 123, 8.

⁴⁸ It is ascribed to Cleisthenes by Philochorus 328 F 30 (*FGH*) and Ael. *VH* XIII.24, cf. also Diod. XI.55.1

⁴⁹ C 214, 11-60, based on C 91, 256-7, and C 207, 79-86.

ostracism; scholars who believe Cleisthenes to have been primarily a far-sighted statesman, interested in the good of his country, credit him with sufficient foresight in 508/7 B.C. into perils which were only to beset Attica twenty years later to have enacted precautionary legislation to meet them. In other words, we have here one case where the date to be assigned to a measure depends on the purpose behind it, and it is, therefore, to the problem of the purpose of the law on ostracism that we shall have to address ourselves.

Aristotle's statements on the purpose lend fuel to both views. He alleges, on the one hand, that suspicion of those in power was its motive, and that behind it lay the perception that Pisistratus had been able to gain the tyranny by using his position as a popular leader and a general (*Ath. Pol.* 22.3). A motive similar to this is advanced in the *Politics* (III.13, 1284a17–22, cf. v.3, 1302b15–21): it is to safeguard equality by the temporary banishment of men 'who are thought to exceed in power by reason of their wealth, popularity, or some other kind of political strength'. But, on the other hand, Aristotle is also aware that it is open to misuse for factional purposes (1284b17–22), and those who attribute such motives to Cleisthenes can find support in the statement (*Ath. Pol.* 22.4) that he enacted the law to send Hipparchus into exile.

A look at the procedure of ostracism will give us some insight into its purpose. In the fourth century, the question whether an ostracism should be held was a regular item on the agenda of the main meeting of the Assembly for the sixth prytany; if the vote was affirmative, the ostracism itself (*ostrakophoria*) was held in the Agora in the eighth prytany under the supervision of the nine archons and the Council. A debate was permitted to precede only the first step. Even if the prytany system does not go back to Cleisthenes, we may assume that the same two steps formed part of the procedure from its inception. A total of six thousand voters had to write the name of their candidate on a potsherd (*ostrakon*) for formal deposition to make the ostracism valid, and a simple majority seems to have sufficed to compel a prominent citizen to depart from Attica within ten days and not return for a period of ten years. During this time, he retained control of his property and his revenues: his exile was not regarded as a personal punishment, and he was not barred from contact with his family and friends, so long as he remained outside the borders of Attica.


Ostracism took place, if at all, only once a year at a predetermined time. Not more than one person could be sent into exile in any given year, and upon his return could freely resume all the prerogatives of citizenship. The quorum of votes cast to make the ostracism valid was large, and special precautions were taken to let each citizen cast not more than one vote. These safeguards make it hard to believe that the procedure was initially devised for party-political purposes. Not only are

there simpler and more permanent ways of eliminating political opponents, but also there could be no guarantee that the same procedure would not backfire or be used in a subsequent year against the very person who first instituted it. If Cleisthenes was its originator, he must have been aware that he could also be its first victim, for the kind of popular favour that had helped him carry his reforms could not be counted on to last. Admittedly, once invented, ostracism could lend itself to abuse, if two or more influential politicians were to join forces against a third; but it is no accident that the only occasion on which we know this to have happened was also in fact the last ostracism ever. Once it had been shown that it could be used to remove Hyperbolus as a mere political rival, it was never used again.

Furthermore, ostracism could not be used to stifle political opposition as such, but at best to inhibit rivalry on a given issue for a limited time. For once a political opponent was banished, his adherents would still be present in Athens, and it would take several more ostracisms, with the popular majority presupposed by each, to still their voices. But of course the system would be effective in eliminating from the political scene a prominent person whose activities and methods would arouse suspicions that he might wish to establish himself as a tyrant, or whose charismatic personality might put him in a position to advocate policies detrimental to the state at a particular time. Could it have been the purpose of ostracism to inhibit the rise of such a person?

The one hope of finding an answer to that question consists in examining the possible motives behind the earliest ostracisms, those held between 487 and 480 B.C. The study of ostracism has been enriched in recent years by the discovery of more than eleven thousand ostraca between 1870 and 1966, of which nine thousand came to light in the Kerameikos excavations of 1966. As a result, we now know the names of more than 130 persons against whom votes were cast in the seventy years of the functioning of ostracism, and ostraca have come to light bearing the names of all persons, except Nicias, whom we know from the literary tradition as proposed victims of ostracism (see Fig. 32). The Kerameikos excavators thought that the majority of their find belonged to the ostracisms of the 480s, which concern us here, but serious doubts have been cast on this conclusion.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, some surprising correctives to the literary tradition about the 480s emerge from other ostraca finds: we know that Themistocles, who was in fact not ostracized until 471 B.C., was a favourite candidate for ostracism already in the 480s; one Callixenus, son of Aristonymus of Xypete, and one Hippocrates, son of Alcmaeonides of Alopece, both Alcmaeonids and both unmentioned

⁵⁰ For the Kerameikos view, see C 214, 69–80 and 92–108; the doubts of Lewis, C 154, 1–4, are not removed by Williams C 233, 103–13.



32. Ostraca from the Agora of Athens; for (a) Aristides, (b) Hippocrates, (c) Themistocles, (d) Xanthippus, (e) Callixenus. (After E. Vanderpool, *Ostracism at Athens* (1970) figs. 5, 40, 20, 8 and *Hesperia* 19 (1950) 383, fig. 5.)

by our literary sources, seem to have been serious candidates for ostracism about the same time; and most surprising of all is the large number of 'scatter votes' for persons unknown to us, which will have been cast at almost every ostracism, indicating that there were many more issues which determined the way an individual citizen would vote than we can fathom.

Thus the ostraca finds are a warning how little the literary tradition has preserved about the identity of even prominent men in the internal politics of the 480s, to say nothing of the issues which moved them. And yet, we have no other guide. Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 22.6), our main source for dating the ostracisms of this period, divides them into two groups: for the first three years, 487–485 B.C., the 'friends of the tyrants' were ostracized, Hipparchus son of Charmus, Megacles son of Hippocrates, and an unnamed person;⁵¹ thereafter, any person regarded as too powerful. Xanthippus son of Ariphron (Pericles' father) is named as the victim for 484 B.C. and as having had nothing to do with the tyrants, followed two years later by Aristides son of Lysimachus.

⁵¹ Identified by the excavators of the Kerameikos as Callias son of Cratius of Alopece; but see *C* 154, 3.

Of Hipparchus Aristotle tells us that he was the 'leader and spokesman' of the 'friends of the tyrants', and that the law on ostracism was directed against him (*Ath. Pol.* 22.4 and 6). Who was he? Were there any 'friends of the tyrants' left in Athens after the expulsion of the Pisistratids? Further, since Aristotle also attributes the enactment of the law to Cleisthenes, are we to assume that Hipparchus was sufficiently prominent in Athens twenty years before he was ostracized to have Cleisthenes enact the law with him in mind?

That the tyranny still had sympathizers left in Athens after 511/10 B.C. is not incredible. Cleomenes would not have tried in 506 B.C. to install Isagoras as tyrant (*Hdt.* v.74.1), and again, after the failure of that expedition, the Spartans would not have tried to bring Hippias back from Sigeum to resume the tyranny over Athens (*ibid.* 91.1, 93–94.1), if they could not have counted on some residual support for their plans among the people of Attica; similarly, it is possible that the latent sympathy for the Pisistratids among the local population made the Persians select Marathon as their landing place in 490 B.C. (*Hdt.* vi.102, 107.1). But it is unlikely that Hipparchus, though probably married to Hippias' daughter, was prominent enough before his election to the archonship for 496/5 B.C. to have spearheaded support for Hippias, and it is inconceivable that such support still existed in 487 B.C., when Hipparchus was ostracized, unless we make the unwarranted assumption that ostracism was invented and first used as an expression of vindictiveness for now-discredited policies. In itself, the term 'friends of the tyrants' provides, therefore, no satisfactory explanation of Hipparchus' ostracism.

But it is possible to relate an attitude to the Pisistratids to an attitude toward Persia in a way which may supply an acceptable explanation why the first *ostracisés* are identified as 'friends of the tyrants'. We noted earlier that before Cleomenes' attack in 506 B.C. Athenian ambassadors had accepted the terms of an alliance offered them by Artaphernes, but were disowned upon their return home, probably because the alliance was no longer needed. A second Athenian embassy was sent to Artaphernes a few years later to counteract the machinations of Hippias to have himself reinstated in Athens under Persian sponsorship. Artaphernes took Hippias' side, and the refusal of the Athenians to do his bidding spelled, according to Herodotus (v.96), open enmity between Athens and Persia. We do not know precisely the year in which the second embassy was sent. But it is probable that the antagonism toward Persia which it had evoked provided a major reason why Athens acceded to Aristagoras' request in 499 B.C. and dispatched twenty of its fifty available ships to aid the Ionian revolt against Persia (*Hdt.* v.97.3). However, a year later, after the sack of Sardis and their defeat at Ephesus, the Athenians withdrew from further participation in the Ionian Revolt.

This shows that by c. 498 B.C. the Athenian attitude toward Hippias had become closely entwined with their policy toward Persia. We know nothing about the motivation underlying the events described, but it is clear that fear of Persia and the determination to resist her demands will have made for many a hard decision in Athens, and each decision will have been preceded by debates, the record of which is lost. Still, the question whether the restoration of Hippias or another Pisistratid to Athens would be acceptable doubtless entered many of these debates. The dispatch of the twenty ships attests a desire to resist; their recall a year later shows that fear overtook that desire, and Hipparchus' election to the archonship for 496/5 B.C. may mean no more than a restraint on overt provocations of Persia. Frustration resulting from fear paralysing the will to resist can also be read into two events which happened in 493/2 B.C. Phrynichus' punishment for 'having reminded the Athenians of their own misfortunes' by dramatizing the capture of Miletus by the Persians in the preceding year (Hdt. vi.21.2) is at least an expression of frustration at being compelled to be idle bystanders when the greatest city of their Ionian kinsmen fell. The second event was the arrival in Athens of Miltiades as a refugee from the Chersonese with the Phoenician fleet, in Persian service, hard on his heels (Hdt. vi.41). It is unthinkable that the return of this distinguished noble, who had left Athens under the Pisistratids, did not arouse deep animosity against Persian encroachments on Greek lands in north-western Asia Minor; and yet, upon his arrival his 'enemies' brought him to court on the capital charge of having established a tyranny (over Athenian citizens?) in the Chersonese (Hdt. vi.104.2). Since we do not know who his accusers were, we cannot tell whether the trial was motivated by personal vendetta, by rivalry with another *genos* jealous of its own power in Athens, or by considerations of public policy; we are consequently also unable to interpret the significance of his acquittal. But the mere fact that a victim of Persian expansion could be put on trial for tyranny at all may attest an effort to dissociate a hostile attitude against Persia from the hostility toward the tyrants, with which it had come to be identified.

The achievement attributed to Themistocles' archonship in that same year (Thuc. 1.93.3; Dion. Hal. vi.34.1) reminds us that relations with Persia and the attitude toward tyranny were not the only problems facing Athens in the 490s. The development and fortification of the Piraeus with its three natural harbours as *the* harbour of Athens by Themistocles at this time had been doubted, because the project was not completed until after the battle of Salamis. However, that fact does not argue against its inception a decade earlier especially by a man endowed with unusual foresight (Thuc. 1.138.3), and its immediate cause may well have been the war between Athens and Aegina. This war, described as 'unheralded' by Herodotus (v.81.2), began in the last years of the sixth century and did

not end until the general settlement of all wars among Greeks shortly before Xerxes' invasion. It was an intermittent war, consisting in raids and skirmishes between Athens and her maritime neighbour, which flared up into serious action after the Athenian victory over Boeotia and Chalcis in 506 and again before the Persian invasions of 490 and 480 B.C.⁵² If Themistocles' Piraeus project was intended to show that the Saronic Gulf was closer to Athens than Persia, events soon proved that the two problems could not be separated. When, together with all the islands and many of the cities of the mainland, Aegina gave earth and water to Darius' heralds in 491 B.C., Athens interpreted it as a hostile act directed against herself and asked Sparta to intervene (Hdt. VI.49.2); Sparta's intervention secured ten prominent Aeginetans as hostages for Athens (*ibid.* 73.2); but this did not forestall a sea battle of Athens against Aegina, from which the Athenians emerged as victors only because Corinth had sold them twenty ships at five drachmas each (*ibid.* 89).

All this happened about the same time at which Miltiades was elected as one of the generals for 490/89 B.C. If his election is taken as proof that the determination to resist Persian attacks had eclipsed fear of Persian power, there are signs that the voices of accommodation with Persia were not yet silenced, and that Athens might go the way Eretria had gone (*ibid.* 100–1). The strange speech addressed by Miltiades to the polemarch Callimachus on the battlefield of Marathon (*ibid.* 109–10) may reflect the content of heated debates in Council and Assembly whether an engagement against the Persians should be risked. Moreover, the shield signal given to the Persians once the army had marched out and the city was undefended shows that there were men in the city 'who wished the Athenians to be subject to the Persians and to Hippias' (*ibid.* 115, 121, 124), and Herodotus' protestations show that the Alcmaeonids were widely suspected of being these men. We cannot know whether these suspicions were justified or not, and, if justified, we cannot explain them. It is tempting to relate this charge against the Alcmaeonids to an incident which happened a year later. Upon his return to Athens from his ill-starred expedition to Paros, Miltiades was prosecuted before 'the people' by Xanthippus, who had married into the Alcmaeonid *genos*, for 'deceiving the people'. The death penalty demanded by Xanthippus reveals acrimony; the reduction of the punishment to the hefty fine of fifty talents in consideration of Miltiades' past services to the state shows that justice was felt to be on the accuser's side but that it was tempered with mercy (Hdt. VI.132–6). Are we to interpret this as a continuation of conflict over policy toward Persia, in which the victor over the Persians at Marathon was to be humiliated by an in-law of the *genos* which had

⁵² A 22, 406–9. For a different chronology, see c 67.

favoured accommodation with Persia? Was a family feud the real motive? Or was Xanthippus merely an ambitious politician, who wanted to earn his spurs by shooting down the great old man? There is not even a hint in our sources to enable us to guess the answer to any of these questions.

The political issues of the period between 506 and 489 B.C. provide the background and therewith the only clues toward an understanding of the ostracisms of the 480s. Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 22.6), as we saw, tells us that its first three victims, Hipparchus, Megacles and an unnamed person, were ostracized as being 'friends of the tyrants' in conformity with the original purpose of the law. Taken literally, this reason does not carry much conviction. No Athenian will have wanted as tyrant an octogenarian Hippias, whose cause had been discredited at Marathon, not even his kinsman Hipparchus. Still, we have seen that the attitude toward tyranny had come to be conflated with the attitude toward Persia by c. 498 B.C. Equipped with the hindsight furnished by the events of 480 B.C., we may guess that after the first flush of victory, in which the building of the pre-Parthenon may have been begun,⁵³ preparations for a possible return of the Persians may have become a dominant theme of internal politics. Those who had not expected the Athenians to win at Marathon may have attributed the victory to unrepeatable luck and may have favoured a policy of peace with Persia at all costs, even at the cost of subjection without bloodshed, and even if it would involve the appointment of Persian henchmen as tyrants, as had happened in Ionia after the Persian conquest of Lydia. Others may have advocated, even before 483/2 B.C., a policy of rearmament and of forging alliances with other Greek states to resist any Persian attack that might come. Herodotus is too preoccupied with the Persian preparations for the attack to vouchsafe us even a glimpse at what went on inside Athens before the time when the Persian forces were marshalled at Sardis, ready to start their march. But the various options open to the Athenians, which Herodotus (VII.139.2–5) mentions in support of his contention that their decision to resist had prevented a Persian conquest of Greece, will surely have been discussed in considerable detail in Council and Assembly well before 481 B.C.; similarly, the preliminary negotiations for the formation of the Greek League, including the dispatch of envoys to Sicily, will have begun earlier than Herodotus' narrative suggests (VII.145–63).

Both Hipparchus and Megacles were prominent Athenian citizens and both will have been influential in any discussion of public affairs. After all, Hipparchus had served as archon eponymous and was a member of the Areopagus; Megacles, though still young, belonged to an old family distinguished in Athenian politics ever since the Cylonian revolt, and his

⁵³ c 217, 444 with bibliography on 445.

victory at the Pythian games soon after his ostracism reflects eminence enjoyed already before that time (Pind. *Pyth.* vii). If both men urged the Athenians not to offer resistance to a possible Persian onslaught but to try to get the most favourable terms possible from Persia before it came to another armed conflict, it is conceivable that the advocates of resistance, knowing that the presence of these men in Athens would undermine any serious effort at rearmament, invoked the law on ostracism to give the people an opportunity to decide whether resistance or accommodation should be the official policy of Athens. The fact that it took three successive ostracisms to curtail the influence of the 'friends of the tyrants' in Athens indicates how evenly divided the citizens were in their attitude toward Persia, but also that the will to resist prevailed and did have a clear field after 485 B.C.

The ostracism of Xanthippus a year later is the hardest to interpret. Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 22.6) explicitly sets him apart from the friends of the tyrants and says that he was the first person to be ostracized for his great influence alone. This suggests that the reasons for his ostracism were different from those which had sent Megacles into exile two years earlier, and that they had nothing to do with his marriage into the Alcmaeonid *genos* and nothing to do with the suspicions cast upon the Alcmaeonids after Marathon. But can we trust Aristotle's assertion? Is it not likely that he was tarred with the same brush as his brother-in-law Megacles? After all, the ostraca finds have given us the names of two other Alcmaeonids, Callixenus and Hippocrates, as candidates for ostracism in the 480s: was there an open season on Alcmaeonids in the 480s? And if so, was it connected with discussions of policy toward Persia? We know too little about Xanthippus' career to identify a motive, and the most interesting of the ostraca cast against him (M-L p. 42) merely states that he did 'most wrong of all the cursed leaders'. Apart from his successful prosecution of Miltiades, we can feel confident that he was recalled to Athens, together with all other *ostracisés*, on the eve of Salamis, and that he was elected as general a year later, a sign that people had sufficient faith both in his competence and in his patriotism to entrust to him the mopping-up operations against Persia in the Aegean. This ability must have been in evidence already before his ostracism: was it feared that he might exploit it to satisfy personal ambitions or the ambitions of the Alcmaeonids? Were family rivalries at play? Or were other matters of principle involved, internal issues such as the introduction of the lot at the second stage of the election to the archonship in 487/6 B.C., or external issues such as the conduct of the war against Aegina? We simply cannot tell.

The large number of pre-480 ostraca bearing Themistocles' name have made some scholars suspect machinations of this wily statesman-politician behind some or all of the ostracisms of the 480s. If that was the

case, Themistocles will have staked his own political future, since the ostraca found will have been cast against him. Moreover, this belief rests on the dubious assumption that a single individual had the power to get year after year on the agenda of the sixth prytany the question whether an ostracism should be conducted, and was able to make a majority among six thousand citizens cast their votes against his opponent. It is difficult to believe that Themistocles should have been able to do this more than once to satisfy personal ambition or to eliminate the members of a rival *genos* from the political scene. It is credible only if we assume that Themistocles had made himself the spokesman for a line of action, which was repeatedly but unsuccessfully challenged by opponents of that policy (or proponents of a different line of policy), among whom were many prominent Alcmaeonids.

What Themistocles' policy may have been down to 484 B.C. we cannot know precisely. But it certainly had something to do with his project of developing Athenian naval power, which he had initiated as archon in 493/2 B.C. with the development of the Piraeus as the harbour of Athens, and which reached its climax with the passage of his naval bill in 483/2 B.C. Under the provisions of this bill, revenues coming to the state from its silver mines at Laurium, where a new vein had just been discovered at Maronea, were to be used for bringing the Athenian fleet up to a strength of two hundred triremes for deployment against Aegina.⁵⁴ These were the ships with which in the event the battle of Salamis was fought and won, and it is likely that Themistocles envisaged their use against Persia as much as their immediate use against Aegina. It will have been in connexion with this bill that the last known ostracism of the 480s took place: Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 22.7) reports merely that Aristides was ostracized 'about this time', and Plutarch adds (*Arist.* 25.10) that it was because of Themistocles. But what was the issue which divided them? Plutarch has much to say about the political rivalry between Themistocles and Aristides (*Arist.* 2-3, 7.1) but little that is illuminating or convincing on this point. Did Aristides object to building up the navy, perhaps in the belief that it might weaken the army and what it stood for? Or did he object to spending the Maronea revenue in the fashion proposed by Themistocles? Can we infer from the fact that he was on Aegina at the time of his recall (Hdt. VIII.79.1, Plut. *Arist.* 8.2) that he preferred a peaceful settlement with Aegina to building up a naval force against her? Whatever the motive behind his ostracism may have been, it is a reasonable assumption that Themistocles was one of the other candidates for ostracism in 483/2 B.C. Plutarch (*Arist.* 3.2) reports that Aristides was overheard saying one day, as he was leaving an Assembly

⁵⁴ Of our chief sources, Hdt. VII.144.1 speaks of two hundred ships, while Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.7 and Plut. *Them.* 4.1-3 mention only one hundred.

meeting in which he had managed to prevent the passage of an important measure introduced by Themistocles, that there was no hope for the survival of Athenian interests, unless both he and Themistocles were to be thrown into the pit. It is indeed true that Themistocles' naval policy could not have been implemented if it had been consistently exposed to the vigorous challenges of as strong a person as Aristides. Under the Athenian system only ostracism could decide – before it was too late – which of two or more mutually exclusive policies was to prevail.

We must now draw the balance and try to extract what insights we can into the purpose of the institution. It is remarkable that, in the period in which we have been following it, ostracism was not used as a punishment of crimes against the state: the upset evoked by Phrynichus' *Capture of Miletus* was dealt with by a lawcourt, and so were the charges of tyranny and deceiving the people levelled at Miltiades; if the Alcmaeonids ostracized in the 480s owed their fate to the suspicions cast upon them by the shield signal, the delay between act and punishment is too remarkable to merit credence; an ostracized person could be prosecuted for treason *in absentia*, as Hipparchus and Themistocles were, but treason was never a reason for ostracism. Moreover, we have seen no clear evidence that ostracism was – or could be – used as a device to get rid of a political opponent, in order to get a clear field for the deployment of one's own power or for the implementation of one's own policies. Any politician attempting this would be risking his own political future, since there was no guarantee that he would not become its victim instead. To the extent that a truth can be ascertained, it seems to be that ostracism was used in cases in which several courses of political action lay open, only one of which could be consistently pursued, unless the state was to be rocked with dissension. For example, after Marathon the Athenians were faced with the decision of pursuing a policy *either* of seeking to come to terms with Persia *or* of arming to resist her; only the future could tell which would be the better policy, but for the time being the progress of rearming and seeking alliances could not be jeopardized by influential citizens reopening past decisions and challenging that policy at every turn. Similarly, once Themistocles' initiative had led to the decision to make Athens a major naval power, the welfare of the state demanded that that policy be given a chance without any obstruction. It is one of the earliest signs of the democracy that was to come that the Athenians solved the problem of a possible policy-deadlock in the state not by killing or permanently exiling the proponents of an unpopular policy, as the tyrants had done, but by establishing a due process through which the people as a whole would decide which of two or more opposing policies should be given the chance to develop fully into *the* policy of the state. Thus ostracism is another example of *isonomia* in the sense that the

choice between different courses of political action, espoused by prominent and influential citizens of the upper classes, was made to rest in the hands of none but the people as a whole, rich and poor alike.

If this character of ostracism is consonant with the other Cleisthenean reforms, it remains to find an answer to our final question: is it credible that the law on ostracism was enacted by Cleisthenes to remain unused for twenty years? Cleisthenes is the only serious candidate for the authorship of the law of all those to whom ancient authors attribute its origin. That he lived long enough to have enacted it shortly before 488/7 B.C. is highly improbable. The circumstances of which the reforms were born made legislation of this sort desirable. Cleisthenes had appealed to the people when he could not have his way against Isagoras in the conventional manner; Isagoras had brought Cleomenes to Athens, when he was frustrated by Cleisthenes; would not Cleisthenes be the logical author of a procedure by which the people could, if they so voted, regularly decide on the banishment for ten years, without loss of rights or property, of any Isagoras or Cleisthenes who might arise in the future and do so without risking foreign intervention? Much can be said in favour of the suggestion that Cleisthenes invented ostracism precisely to prevent the recurrence of the kind of situation caused by his rivalry with Isagoras.⁵⁵ And would the same measure not also discourage anyone from attempting to establish a tyranny? Since Cleisthenes could himself become a candidate for ostracism, his honesty in proposing legislation of this kind will have been unimpeachable.

If, then, Cleisthenes did devise ostracism, why was it not used until 488/7 B.C.? Obviously, our almost complete ignorance of internal Athenian politics between 507/6 and 488/7 B.C. makes it impossible to give a well-substantiated answer, and insubstantial speculation must try to search out plausible situations which can explain the gap. If we have correctly identified the conditions to prevent which ostracism was devised, similar conditions did not arise in Athens until after the battle of Marathon. In any event, we know of no outstanding figure in that period who could have rallied around him an impressive segment of the citizenry to support a given political issue. For that matter, the vacillations in policy toward Persia, of which we detected traces in the 490s, suggest that there were no strong issues around which to rally. But all that changed with the return to Athens of Miltiades in 493/2 B.C. The ambivalent feelings with which he was received, enigmatic though they are to us, must give us pause. A distinguished noble, who had spent the last three decades abroad, returns to his city as a refugee from the Persians at a time when feelings are running high after the sack of Miletus; he is

⁵⁵ C 205, 180–3.

welcomed almost at once with a prosecution for tyranny; he is acquitted soon to be elected as one of the ten generals, and in that capacity is responsible for the victorious strategy of Marathon: a grateful people complies with his request to supply him with forces for an expedition whose destination he did not disclose immediately, but this gratitude became only a mitigating factor in the trial to which he was subjected for failing to conquer Paros: a fine of fifty talents was inflicted in place of the death penalty demanded by the prosecution for the victor of Marathon. Obviously, Miltiades was a figure about whom feelings positive and negative ran high, and who could easily have mustered a following around himself to support whatever political cause he favoured, had he not died soon after his conviction from wounds sustained on Paros. Is it not plausible that his appearance on the scene reminded the Athenians that 'Pisistratus had established himself as tyrant through his position as popular leader and general' (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.3), and that they remembered that Cleisthenes had left them a device which might prevent a repetition of the past in the most humane way in which that could be done? By using the law on ostracism for the first time in 487 B.C., the Athenians saved others 'who were thought to exceed in power by reason of their wealth, popularity, or some other kind of political strength' from sharing the fate of Miltiades.

CHAPTER 6

GREECE BEFORE THE PERSIAN INVASION

L. H. JEFFERY

This chapter concerns the general situation in Greece (apart from Attica and Ionia) during the last quarter of the sixth century and the start of the fifth: the years when Persia's defeat and annexation of the non-Greek kingdoms which bordered the Aegean to east and south, with their various Greek settlements, brought the power of her empire significantly near to the Greeks of the Aegean and the mainland itself. For those on both sides who would be thinking in terms of land engagements by hoplites – the standard Greek system of fighting at that period – the focal point in Greece was Sparta. From the mid-sixth century onwards her military League had been developing within the Peloponnese, and even tried to influence states outside it such as Athens; but, since Sparta herself did not produce historians or orators, we are left to infer from the patchwork of surviving evidence firstly, how far her policy-makers were foreseeing and trying to guard against any coming danger to Greece herself, and how far they were merely making *ad hoc* decisions to protect or increase the image of Spartan power; and secondly, what was the general situation elsewhere, in the Aegean islands and the mainland north of Attica. The *Historiai* ('Enquiries') of Herodotus, collected and compiled by him within the years c. 465–430 B.C., are the main and best source for the events. Modern strategists and diplomatists sometimes criticize his reconstructions of battles and councils (for, holding no resident citizenship of any city during his prime, the crucial period of his travels, he could get no personal experience of military command or service on city-councils and embassies); but the insight overall of this widely-travelled reporter of mixed Greek and Asiatic (Carian) ancestry remains unsurpassed. Apart from this, scattered references survive from other Greek literary sources, poets and a few Ionic prose-writers,¹ mostly later. Archaeology has contributed some first-hand evidence, such as victory-dedications at Olympia, Delphi and other sanctuaries, and alliances which are indicated by coin-types (p. 358, below); and in vase-

¹ The extant fragments of these are published in A 31, I–III.



Map 12. Central Greece and the Peloponnese.

painting (mainly Attic), flashes of the social history of city and countryside.

The whole political, economic and social outlook of the Greek mainland and Aegean islands must have been affected, sharply or remotely, when the advance westward of Persian power under Cyrus had engulfed the kingdom of Lydia c. 545 B.C. The Lydian monarch Croesus had early sent enquiries to the Greek oracular shrines, and two, those of Apollo at Delphi and the hero Amphiaraus at Oropus, were deemed to have passed an initial test which proved their infallibility (Hdt. 1.46–53). It is uncertain whether the Lydian authorities really took oracular inspiration in major matters as seriously as the Greeks believed that they did, or whether, meaning in any case to seek a Greek alliance against the Persians, they simply approached the subject in this diplomatic way. Both oracles answered as one: that if Croesus attacked Persia he would destroy a great empire, and, concerning alliances, that he should make friends with the most powerful of the Greeks. The word *symmachia* (offensive and defensive, i.e. full) alliance was avoided, and the Lydians were left to take the responsibility for their choice of the ‘friends’. They sought an alliance with Sparta and her military League of allies: an obvious choice, for the coming Lydian battles would be on land, and trained hoplite forces had proved their value in the past, when they had helped to put new monarchs into power in the seventh century – Gyges in Lydia herself and Psammetichus in Egypt.

The Spartans pledged a treaty of friendship and full alliance. They owed gratitude to Croesus for a past gift of Lydian gold which now sheathed their great Apollo-image at Thornax, and they were flattered that he had taken the oracle’s description to mean themselves; in effect, it was a matter of prestige – as leaders of the League they could not afford to lose face. Yet this pledge was clearly an embarrassment to them. When the Persians laid siege to Sardis and the calls for aid arrived at Sparta, the response there was not immediate, allegedly because of trouble in the Thyreatis. By the time that the troops and ships for a landing overseas were ready, Sardis had fallen, Croesus was a captive, and the Persian forces were already advancing to the western coast. Miletus, the great trading city which already had a non-aggression pact with Lydia, reacted to the emergency by obtaining a similar treaty from the Persians; and the other Ionic and Aeolic cities were not slow to see their danger. Again Sparta was approached, this time by an Ionic delegation headed by a Phocaeen; but, too wary to risk sending troops, Sparta sent only a diplomat, who got very little change out of Cyrus. The Persians duly reached the Greek coastal cities and brought them into the empire (Hdt. 1.54–174).

I. SPARTA AND THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE

In the rest of Greece some city states and their leaders may still have believed that the Persians would be no more marine-minded than the Lydians. But the longer-sighted ones could see that the advance would continue once the Persians had got not only the East Greek and Carian ships, but the fleets of Egypt and Phoenicia under their control as well. The attitude of the Aegean islands and, above all, of the leading cities on the Greek mainland must be ascertained. First and foremost, how would Sparta now react? Her own line of policy could always be influenced by her perpetual fear of revolts among her Helots of Messenia or Laconia. As for her League, given that any timely opposition to Persia must depend heavily on sea-power, its voting on the matter could be crucial, for it now included several maritime states – Corinth, Sicyon, possibly Megara (p. 352), the cities of the Argolid, perhaps Achaea, and possibly Aegina. Their respective dates of joining are not precisely known, though it is likely that most had become members soon after the battle of Tegea, i.e. at some time in the second half of the sixth century (for Corinth see below, p. 351). Nor is it sure that at this early date the formula of the oath of loyalty sworn at the time of enrolment was identical for all members: ‘to follow the Lacedaemonians wherever they lead’, a surviving phrase, is first directly attested in the fifth century.² It appears suitable for cities enrolled after being defeated (as Tegea), but less suitable for a large free sea-power (as Corinth) – except, naturally, when the League was actually mustered for an agreed campaign, when obedience must be sworn to the *hegemon*; and even then Corinth could be awkward (below, pp. 351, 360, 361). The bulk of the League’s fleet which would have to face any Persian force in the Aegean was provided by its coastal members. The Persians were in the Aegean coastal area by the late 540s, and ‘the Ionians of the islands’ gave in (Hdt. 1.169; that is, presumably, those nearest the coast; for Samos in particular, see *CAH* III². 3, 199).

Sparta herself had recently been expending her military resources in challenging successfully the power of Argos for control of the districts north and east of Parnon: the Thyreatis and Cynuria down to and including Cythera (see *CAH* III². 3, 356). By the end of the third quarter of the sixth century ‘most of the Peloponnese had been subdued’ (Hdt. 1.68.6). In this uncompromising statement the exceptions are, presumably, Argos herself, perhaps Megara, probably Achaea and (though within the League) Corinth. The operations against Argive-controlled areas must have involved many casualties, and in any case the League

² c 18, 102–5 and, for the actual phrase in a fifth-century inscription found at Sparta, c 256, 6–7.

itself, from Sparta downwards, was not geared technically, nor perhaps psychologically, to oppose a big naval advance.

This was an attitude for which it can hardly be blamed, in view of its mixed composition. Corinth, the most influential city after Sparta, was, we suppose, already in alliance when the League attacked Polycrates (see *CAH* III². 3, 357); and her decision to become a long-term ally of Sparta may not have come immediately after the Cypselidae had been finally exiled with Spartan aid, traditionally *c.* 582. Whatever was the exact date, the aristocratic merchant-families who provided her ruling Council probably signed chiefly because of the perpetual danger from Argos. Later, as more cities signed up, through defeat (as Tegea had) or agreement, the Corinthians would be well aware of their own value to the League; their shipping provided one of the biggest contingents to its fleet, and their hold on the Isthmus was highly important for any moves which such a League might contemplate making outside the Peloponnese. The outcome of the crisis between Plataea and Thebes later (below, p. 360) illustrates the power which Corinth held in the League by that time.

Sicyon, which also had a record of hostility to Argos, may have joined the League for the same reasons as Corinth, perhaps at about the same time; for, though these two states were neighbours with a plain between them, there seems no sign that they had any border-quarrels. As for the small towns or villages strung along the north coast which formed Achaea west of Sicyon, we do not know just when or how they joined the League – perhaps it was not until the fifth century. In any case, they counted for little in power-politics until the 460s, when Athens demonstrated that a grip on both Achaean Patrae and Naupactus on the Aetolian coast meant control of Corinth's direct sea-route for her western trade, the direction in which her colonies lay. That trade had been building up her economic power since the eighth century (Thuc. I. 13. 1–5). Many aristocratic Corinthian families probably had *xeniai* (host/guest friendships) with similar families on Samos, and lost their contact with the island when Polycrates seized power there as *tyrannos*; certainly, when *c.* 525/4 the exiled Samian aristocrats persuaded the Spartans to mount a League attack on Samos and restore them to power, Corinth strongly supported their cause.³ By that time she was evidently a League member; her ships were prominent in this unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Polycrates (Hdt. III. 44–56). Indeed, by the last quarter of the sixth century her authority in the League was apparently second only

³ According to Herodotus, Corinth joined in this attack because two generations earlier the Samians had sided with her rebel colony Corcyra in the famous incident of the Corcyrean boys (III. 48–9); but an action, and a barbaric one at that, by the then tyrant of Corinth (Periander) is unlikely to have been the sole cause of the Corinthian decision in 525/4.

to that of its *hegemon*. She was chosen by its members to arbitrate between Thebes and Plataea in 519 (below, p. 360), and in 507/6 her contingent of troops disrupted the whole League army by refusing to follow Cleomenes into a campaign in Attica (above, p. 308).

We shall return later (below, pp. 358–60) to affairs in Boeotia; but an acute modern suggestion⁴ holds that it may have been during this expedition north into Boeotia in 519 that Megara, Corinth's intermittent enemy, became a member of the League; so her situation may be considered briefly here, before a more general review of the actions of the League under the leadership of King Cleomenes. Megara suffered the natural destiny of a corridor-state, cramped between three borders which allowed her no comfortable surrounding *chora* (countryside), and, naturally, no *peraia* (land for expansion carved from an adjacent mainland) such as the island-states offshore often possessed. She was hemmed in by Attica, Boeotia, Corinth and the sea. The island of Salamis, which she did indeed see hopefully as a kind of *peraia* in reverse, was claimed equally stubbornly by the Athenians, who finally won it, after long dispute, around the end of the sixth century, and stocked it with cleruchs, henceforth to be a part of Attica.⁵ Salamis was no great gain economically. Like Cythera, its importance was strategic: it could be an appalling menace when in the wrong hands. Indeed, Megara's own importance to the League was of a like kind, since she was the corridor between the Peloponnese and Boeotia. There seems to be no record of any Megarian trouble with the Boeotians during the sixth century, whereas between Megara and Attica there was rancour and raiding from early times, because the plain contested between them was fertile, and there were Attic allegations of Megarian sacrilege to the venerable Eleusinian cult there, which added fuel to the smouldering situation.

Nor was Megara's boundary with Corinth a peaceful one. The serious border-dispute in 460 B.C. (Thuc. 1.103.4), which drove the Megarians to leave the League and actually ally themselves with Athens and Argos, was foreshadowed late in the sixth century, when Megara defeated Corinth in a victory which was rich enough for her to build the Megarian Treasury at Olympia (below, p. 354); for this victory over Corinth was made possible by supporting forces from Argos. Megara *may* have been already a member of the League (above, p. 350), but in-fighting among the Allies could still occur, because they did not automatically swear loyalty to each other when they joined. It was a circle centred on Sparta, with the spokes of a wheel but not necessarily with the added cross-links of a web. However, all members swore loyalty to Sparta as the

⁴ A 11, 171.

⁵ M-L 14, an Attic decree concerning the settlement of Salamis, datable on lettering around the end of the sixth century or start of the fifth.

hegemon, and since League meetings convened to vote on a proposed declaration of war could be held only at Sparta, this meant that normally, as summoner, she had a controlling part in the initiation of any Allied project – though in 432, if Thucydides is correct (1.66–7), she had to be pushed by Corinth into summoning the meeting.⁶

Argos, outside the League, was a constant problem; indeed, for many of the states a common anti-Argive attitude may well have been the cause, or at least the cement, of their membership. Otherwise, as independent states they were free to quarrel with each other when not occupied in some common project under Spartan leadership. Megara and Corinth were far away from the League's leader. Sparta was likely to intervene in such border-disputes only on a powerful appeal, or else if they occurred at critical times when it was vital that there should be unity within the League. Megara, its most northerly member, was never an easy one, as her history showed in the fifth century; her crucial position as a small corridor-state forced her into a policy of opportunism, and her defection to democratic Athens *c.* 460 was a major factor in the outbreak of the First Peloponnesian War.

II. ARGOS AND THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE

Enmity between the two states of Argos and Sparta was always there, as their populations expanded and the fertile land dwindled correspondingly. The long-standing feud over boundaries had boiled over during the previous generation in a struggle for the Thyreatis, which lay between them. Sparta had won that dispute, and had gone on to extend her grip on the land beyond Parnon, which meant that finally she controlled the whole coastal area southwards, including Cythera. There was bound to be another clash as soon as a later generation of Argives was old enough to fight. As was said above, some of Sparta's League-members to her north, those which bordered on Argive land, may have joined the League mainly to be sure of getting help against Argos in the irregular but persistent matter of raid and counter-raid. Corinth in particular was basically anti-Argive. Rivalry for control of the rich and famous cult of Zeus at Nemea may have been a major cause of this, since the southern border of Corinthian land lay thereabouts, and the area influenced by Argos reached up to meet it; so that the small states of Phlius and Cleonae, which contended for the actual administration of this great sanctuary lying between them, turned, respectively, to Corinth and Argos for support. The religious and political authority which was signified by the control of any one of the panhellenic sanctuaries usually

⁶ *c.* 18, 105–23, 339.


concerned, and reflected on, the 'big brother' even more profitably than the small state. For the Spartans the political value of Elis as a member of the League lay mainly in the influence which Sparta had acquired there through her early successes in the Olympic Games. The struggle for the control at Delphi is described elsewhere (*CAH* III².3,316); of the four chief sanctuaries it had the greatest authority, because of the secular power inherent in its oracle. The festival of Poseidon on the Isthmus was the least notorious in political terms. Its administration by Corinth could be justified historically and geographically, and Poseidon's chief spheres of power (the sea and earthquakes) remained more primitive, less susceptible to political influence than were the cults at Delphi and Olympia.

Hence it is not surprising that an Argive force helped the Megarians in their victory won over Corinth somewhere near the end of the sixth century. We know of it from the topographer Pausanias (VI.19.12–14). At Olympia in the second century A.D. he saw the treasury built by the Megarians from their war-spoils. He speaks of the pedimental sculpture, a gigantomachy which still survives in part (Fig. 33),⁷ and also of a shield fixed to the apex of the gable, which bore a dedication naming the Corinthians as the conquered; 'and', he adds, 'the Argives are said to have helped the Megarians against the Corinthians', a fact which was probably stated in the dedication, since it is not clear otherwise how his guide at Olympia would know this detail in a border-battle fought so long ago.

Nor was the external influence of Argos confined to the Peloponnese. There was also a connexion, perhaps a *xenia* between leading families rather than an official agreement, between Argos and Athens in the third quarter of this century. The Athenian noble Pisistratus had married an Argive lady as his second wife, and when he made his final, successful bid to gain control of Attica part of his forces were Argive mercenaries (*CAH* III².3,402). But the two cities were too far apart for troop-movements to be easy between them, though it was certainly done again in the fifth century (*via* Epidaurus and the Saronic Gulf) when Athens and Argos were in alliance.

Given this perpetual hostility between Argives and Spartans, it was likely that in the late sixth century their respective attitudes towards a possible advance by Persian forces would be diametrically opposed. Croesus, when he asked for armed help against Persia, had taken the oracle's phrase 'the most powerful of the Greeks' to mean Sparta – an inevitable affront to Argos, which may have influenced the Argive state

⁷ Cf. the latest study by P. C. Bol, c 506A.



33. Reconstruction of the façade of the Megarian Treasury at Olympia. (After A. Furtwängler, *Olympia* II. pl. 36.)

in its decision subsequently (the precise date is unknown) to make some kind of compact, perhaps of *philia kai xenia* (inter-state friendship and host/guest friendship), with Persia, symbolized by the propagandic myth that Argive Perseus was their common ancestor. The Argives certainly claimed later, and perhaps truly, that they had had advance information from the Persians of the Great King's proposed expedition against Greece in 481. They said also that, not long after the disaster to their forces at Sepea in 494 (below, p. 364), they had consulted the Delphic oracle as to their future policy, and were warned to stay on guard against 'danger from their neighbours' – in effect, to stay neutral within their own borders and risk no ambitious military alliance with either Greeks or non-Greeks until they had an adult fighting-force once more (Hdt. VI.77; VII.148–52).

This is one of several cases in which the Apolline oracles at Delphi and Miletus (Didyma) appear to have uttered veiled warnings, or positively advised non-resistance to Persia when Greek states asked them for the

god's advice. At various points in his narrative Herodotus instances examples: Cyme-in-Aeolis, Cnidus, Miletus, Athens, Crete (I.158–9, 174; VI.19; VII.139, 140, 169); and a late copy of a royal letter from Darius I to Gادات (satrap of the province of Ionia),⁸ after praising his zeal in certain matters, continues:

But, in that you are ignoring my instructions on behalf of the gods – if you do not mend your ways, I will give you a taste of my mind when it has been wronged. You taxed the holy plant-growers of Apollo, and you gave instructions for them to till profane soil, ignoring the attitude of my forebears to that god who spoke absolute truth to the Persians and . . . [here the stone breaks]

III. THE REIGN OF CLEOMENES

C. 521 the Agid (i.e. senior) Spartan king, Cleomenes, inherited the leadership of this military League which owed its existence mainly to the exertions of two powerful predecessors, his royal father Anaxandridas and the ephor Chilon. He was the eldest son of the king, but from a morganatic wife who appears to have been of Chilon's family and who, according to Herodotus, was forced on the king when his queen seemed unlikely to produce a male child as heir. Herodotus' reporting on this is vivid but sometimes inconsistent in its comments, a fact which may well owe something to the contradictory versions of the matter which were inevitably issued by the two royal families: inevitably, firstly, because Anaxandridas' queen later bore three sons, of whom the eldest, Dorieus, though the rightful heir, had to be sent off as oecist (founder) of a colony (which soon failed) by the river Cinyps in Libya, and then to Sicily, where he was killed (Hdt. v.39–48); and secondly, because Cleomenes later tampered with the Eurypontid succession by a trumped-up charge which removed his co-king Demaratus and presumably put Demaratus' replacement, Leotyichidas II, under a pressing debt of gratitude (Hdt. VI.51–72). Thus the two versions, hostile and favourable, would combine to confuse and discolour the later tradition. But the roots of that tradition must lie also in some reality: in Cleomenes' unhappy family background, which, added to the pressures of a royal – indeed almost imperial – position as leader of the League at this particular time, may have acted together in forming a powerful but unstable character which ended in madness and an appalling suicide, at least according to the story given to Herodotus at Sparta (below, p. 366).

His early actions as leader suggest (despite the patchiness of our sources) that he did not wish to involve the League in any long-distance military commitments, partly, perhaps, through apprehension that some

⁸ M–L 12.

powerful and vocal member (as Corinth) might balk: but more cogently, because he feared that Sparta's own security would be at risk from the Messenians and other helots, if the expeditions were lengthy or their outcome involved any serious loss of men. For example: in 517, backed by the ephors, he refused aid from the League to Maeandrius in Samos, aid allegedly against the Persians. Yet for some generations back the high families of Samos and Sparta had evidently maintained a state of mutual *philia* and *xenia*, backed by gifts and trade-exchanges (direct or indirect) which brought to Sparta luxuries from East Greece, Lydia and even Egypt, in exchange presumably for the distinctive 'Laconian' pottery and bronzes. Then, c. 532, Polycrates had overthrown the Samian government and ruled as *tyrannos* for about ten years, with a fleet of warships of a new type which achieved a Samian thalassocracy in the Aegean. Herodotus' account hints that his foreign policy aimed at avoiding any direct unpleasantness with the Persian overlords; for he broke off trade-relations with Egypt when Cambyses was starting to force her into the empire, and even supplied ships to the Persian fleet, a service which cost him little because they were manned by some remaining Samian oligarchs, who presumably were anxious now to leave Samos at any cost. Others of them had already fled to their *xenoi* in Sparta, where they succeeded in getting the League's fleet mustered for action, thanks partly to strong backing from Corinth (p. 351 above). Probably she too missed some lost trade-contacts with aristocratic Samos; and perhaps she foresaw also the potential danger to Greece from Persian naval power as soon as the Egyptian and Phoenician fleets were added to its strength. Corinthian ships were prominent in the League fleet which was dispatched, but Samos resisted capture by either storm or siege, and, according to Herodotus, the League's losses in ships and men were severe. Polycrates ruled until his murder by Oroetes, the satrap at Sardis. In Herodotus' account it remains uncertain to the reader whether the man who then came to the fore, Polycrates' able and undoubtedly subtle secretary Maeandrius, was a good patriot, or secretly pro-Persian, or possibly had a foot in both camps. Maeandrius evidently wished to take over the government from Syloson, Polycrates' brother and the Persian choice for successor; but he failed to persuade the equally subtle Cleomenes of his honesty, and fades finally from the story (Hdt. III. 39. 1, 44-48. 1, 54-7, 120-3, 142-9).

Again, c. 513 Cleomenes rejected a request from the Scythians to support them in a proposed pincer-movement intended to catch the Persian forces in their retreat after the disastrous Scythian expedition (above, pp. 235-43). Finally, in 499, he refused an appeal for support made by the East Greek leaders of the Ionian Revolt (below, p. 482).

IV. BOEOTIA AND EUBOEA

The most extended and complicated foreign policy which was broached under Cleomenes' command occurred early in his reign, in 519,⁹ and concerned Attica and her border-foe Boeotia, leading thence to Euboea and the Cyclades. In the big, sprawling Boeotian countryside the grazing ground for flocks and herds was superior to most of that elsewhere in the Greek peninsula, except for Thessaly; the place was rightly named 'cattle-country', though Attic wit might maintain that the title applied even better to the people. But Boeotia had a stretch of sea-coast at two places, both potentially valuable to her more active allies. One stretch was on the Gulf of Corinth, important for ships plying to Delphi and further west to Sicily and Italy; the other was north east, on the Euboean Gulf, and the Boeotians evidently had economic and social links with Chalcis from early times, and perhaps political ones also, as they certainly had in the late sixth and fifth centuries. The local Boeotian variation of the common Greek alphabet resembles that of Chalcis. Also, Herodotus says that the Attic family called 'Gephyraei' ('Bridgers') claimed that it came originally from Euboea (Eretria), though Herodotus himself maintains that it was from Tanagra in eastern Boeotia. This could mean that originally there were two branches of the family, 'bridging' the Euripus channel between Boeotia and Euboea, before the final move to settle in Attica. A more cynical view¹⁰ suggests that the family, when finally settled in Athens, disowned their Boeotian origin because of the deep Boeotian-Attic antipathy, and claimed to be Eretrian because that city had long had close relations with both Attica and Tanagra.


Apart from the tradition of an early Boeotian ruler of Euboea named Tynnondas (*CAH* III. 3², 249), our first clear evidence of joint Boeotian-Euboean affairs comes in 507/6 (below, p. 361). At that time Thebes was already asserting her authority over many of the smaller Boeotian towns. By the late years of the sixth century something like a federal coinage was being struck, stamped with the 'Boeotian' figure-of-eight shield, and the first letter of the name of the town concerned;¹¹ and in Olympia parts from hoplite panoplies survive which bear dedicatory inscriptions datable roughly to this period, from victories in local battles: Thebes defeats Hyettus (Fig. 34); Tanagra's name survives separately as victor and as defeated (opponents unknown); Orchomenus defeats Coronea.¹²

⁹ For the date, cf. *Hdt.* vi.108 and *Thuc.* iii.68.5. For modern views in favour of altering Thucydides' text here to read 509, or 499, see the objections to them raised by A 17, III 358.

¹⁰ C 85, 472-3.

¹¹ C 621, 109-10. For the historical arguments in favour of this view that the Boeotian League under Thebes came into being *after* the middle of the sixth century, see C 241, 94-101 and C 244, 59-73. On the working of its system before the developed organization of 447 onwards, cf. C 41, 27-31.

¹² Panoplies: *SEG* xi.1202, 1208; xv.245; xxiv.300.



⊕ ΕΒΑΙΟΙ ΤΟΝ ΑΥΤΕ Τ' ΟΝ

34. Bronze greave dedicated at Olympia by the Thebans for victory over Hyettus. (Olympia Museum B 4743; after E. Kunze in *VIII. Bericht, Olympia* (1967) 98–100, fig. 34.2, pl. 47.)

On the Attic side of the common border, already *c.* 546 Pisistratus' takeover in Attica had been financed partly by large funds from Thebans (Hdt. 1.61.3). The Theban government did not send troops – but after all, a deep-rooted country aristocracy might well decline to support openly a risky bid at tyranny in another city. An aristocratic Athenian, Alcmaeonides son of Alcmaeon, whose Boeotian driver had won him a prize in the Panathenaic chariot-race, made a gift *c.* 540 to Apollo Ptous at Acraephia in Boeotia; but was this politically-motivated – an Alcmaeonid exile's bid for Theban help to re-establish him? Or was it merely a compliment to his driver offered by an Alcmaeonid who (like his fellow-clansman Cleisthenes) may have continued in Athens, even held office there, during the tyranny?¹³ In short, it may be that at this period no Boeotian city was much interested in any ambitious affairs outside Boeotia. They did not breed inter-state diplomats; we may recall the resigned comment by the historian E. A. Freeman on a diplomatic event in the late fifth century: 'the whole story gives us a very poor

¹³ See *c.* 524, 242–51 for a full discussion of the inscription on the pedestal; the offering itself has not survived.

impression of the management of the Boeotian Foreign Office'.¹⁴ Nor would any neighbouring state lightly disturb them, for their fighting-force was as formidable as it was varied: at the battle of Delium in 424 (Thuc. v.19–21) there were hoplites and *psiloi* (light-armed men), horsemen and *hamippoi* (armed men trained to run alongside riders), peltasts (light-armed javelin-throwers), and even chariots.

In 519 Cleomenes and the League entered Boeotian politics. He had brought troops over the Isthmus for some purpose which Herodotus does not specify; it has been suggested (p. 352, above), that it was to bring Megara into the League, whether before or after her quarrel with Corinth. Plataea was under the usual Theban pressure at the time, and she appealed to Cleomenes for immediate aid. Presumably he thought her too remote and small to be worth her keep as a future League member; at any rate, he advised her to shift her appeal to Athens, thus ingeniously creating grounds thereafter for a lasting Theban hostility to Athens instead of to Sparta. Shortly afterwards Plataea had concluded this Athenian alliance. But any immediate clash between Theban and Attic forces was averted by the appointment of Corinth as an arbitrator. Her ruling was against Thebes: any Boeotian city must be left free to resign from the Boeotian League if it wished. The Thebans refused to accept this, and attacked the Athenian force; but they were beaten, and lost some land south of the Asopus river to the Plataeans (Hdt. vi.108).

This office of arbitrator was a suitable one for Corinth. We know little about the policy of her oligarchic governing body at this time, but it is unlikely to have favoured any extremes, since her prosperous economy depended on the preservation of her key-position linking the east–west sea-lines and the north–south land-route over the Isthmus. Her government continued to favour Athens in an unobtrusive way, for again in 507/6 Corinthian troops refused to attack the Athenians; c. 504 their ambassador Socles successfully opposed the Spartan authorities who now wished to restore Hippias (Hdt. v.90–3); and Corinth provided the Athenians with twenty hulls for their fleet during the 'Unheralded War' between Athens and Aegina in the late 490s (Hdt. vi.89).

V. CLEOMENES AND ATHENS

In the years c. 514–510 the forces of the League were turned upon the situation at Athens, where the tyrant Hippias and his family still ruled the city. The exiled Alcmaeonidae, headed by Cleisthenes, had poured lavish funds into Delphi – the temple of Apollo, burnt through mischance years earlier, was rebuilt and decorated in marble by


¹⁴ A 16A, 128.

their aid – until the oracle was moved to direct the Spartans to evict this tyranny (and thus, presumably, bring Attica into the League). A sea-landing at Phalerum was attempted, but was routed by the cavalry of the tyrant's allies from Thessaly. (The start of this alliance may have been somewhere round the mid-sixth century: the tyrant Pisistratus (b. c. 600, d. 527) named his third son Thessalus, presumably to mark the occasion.)¹⁵ The second and larger invasion, led by Cleomenes himself, was made by land over the Isthmus; the tyrannic family and its party were evicted, but the Alcmaeonidae were not politically the gainers, for Cleomenes contracted a *xenia* with Isagoras, another leading aristocrat in the city, whose wife was said to be wanton (so Herodotus; or had she had orders from her ambitious husband?). In the political rioting which followed between the parties of Cleisthenes and Isagoras the latter called on Cleomenes for armed aid again, but the king brought only a small detachment, which was defeated and ejected. This humiliation sparked off a full League attack on Athens, led by both the kings. If, as Herodotus says, Cleomenes himself now intended to make Isagoras tyrant there, this was totally against the standard propaganda of the League. At all events, the allies – again led by Corinth – disregarded the oath of allegiance and withdrew; the co-king Demaratus also balked, an alarming situation which was said later by Sparta to be the reason why the Spartan law forbade any such joint command thereafter (Hdt. v. 62–76. Cf. pp. 306–8).

But Athens was still in danger, for this League attack had been one part of a concerted, three-pronged drive against her: on her northern border Thebes and her federated towns (above, p. 360) were already up in arms because of Plataea's defection; and Chalcis was in a military alliance with Thebes which brought her in too, to ravage Attica.¹⁶ The Boeotians had already captured Oenoe and Hysiae on the Attic border, while the forces of Chalcis were harassing Attica with tip-and-run raids from across the channel. Thanks to some brilliant timing, the Athenians defeated both enemies: the Chalcidians having finished raiding and crossed back, the Athenians advanced as if to follow them over the Euripus, then faced about and caught the Boeotian force while it was still moving up to support its ally. The Boeotian losses were serious, and the Athenians went on, traditionally on the same day, to cross into Euboea and defeat the Chalcidians so heavily that the surviving Hippobotae (the aristocratic families who formed the government of Chalcis) had all their

¹⁵ Cf. c 85, 448–9.

¹⁶ To this alliance probably belongs their joint issue of a coinage in the late sixth century, on the Euboic standard of Chalcis. The few surviving specimens bear (obverse) the 'Boeotian' shield, emblazoned with a *chi* († in their local script), and (reverse) the chariot wheel of Chalcis (Fig. 35). Some numismatists have dated the issue to this alliance-year 507/6, others prefer an earlier date for technical reasons; thus, the alliance could be earlier than 507/6, if they are right. See c 621, 109 n. 12 and pl. 15.



35. Silver coin of Chalcis (Bocotian Federation). (Berlin; after E. Babelon, *Traité des Monnaies grecques et romaines* II.1, 973–4, no. 1372.)

estates confiscated, and four thousand cleruchs ('allotment-holders', Attic citizens) were planted there as settlers, though they may not have stayed there for very long (Hdt. v.77).¹⁷ From the spoils the Athenians made and dedicated a bronze quadriga (normally a pre-eminently Boeotian/Chalcidic military speciality) on the Acropolis. A fragment from its inscribed stone base has survived the Persian destruction, and fragments also remain from the base of a bronze replacement which the Athenians erected to commemorate a similar victory over the Boeotians fifty years later, at Oenophyta; it is this replacement which Herodotus describes, and quotes *verbatim* from the inscription on its base – the same epigram which had been composed in 507/6.¹⁸

VI. THE AEGEAN ISLANDS

The new, enterprising Attic type of settlement, citizen 'allotment-holders' abroad, was possible because Eretria, traditionally the foe of Chalcis, could provide a geographic link between north-eastern Attica and the new Attic enclave on Euboea. The trading and cultural links between Attica and Euboea went back many centuries. Pisistratus, whose estates at Brauron were not far by sea from Eretria, spent his ten years' exile there, and his mining interests at Rhaecelus in the Chalcidice lay in an area which was fringed by early Eretrian settlements. While still in Eretria he met another tyrant there, Lygdamis of Naxos, who lent troops and funds to him on the occasion of his successful return to

¹⁷ The exact timing of all the tactics is uncertain, as Herodotus' account is condensed. For the settlement, cf. c 79, 87–9. The cleruchs returned to Attica in the crisis of 490 (Hdt. vi.100–2); *some* 'Chalcidians' served as crews of Attic ships in 480 (Hdt. viii.1.2 and 46.2), and these should surely be the men of Chalcis, since the cleruchs are specifically called 'Athenians' in Hdt. vi.100.3. For a different view see c 215, 261 n. 3 and below, pp. 558 and 569.

¹⁸ M–L 12. The varied inter-state relationships and attitudes to Persia which were developing beyond Boeotia (that is, in the large area where the city state, as a pattern, made little headway against either baronial rule in the Thessalian plain, or modest villages and isolated farms in the hilly states south of Thessaly) are discussed in *CAH* III².3, ch. 41.

Athens in 546. Probably this was not a chance meeting; old ties were involved here. Athens–Eretria–Naxos was the western half of a chain, geographically and politically linked, which continued eastward across the Aegean to Miletus. It was evidently the basis of the old Eretrian thalassocracy, when she rivalled Chalcis and controlled ‘Andros, Tenos, Ceos and other islands’ (Strabo 448). Certainly Eretrian influence over Delos, the great Ionic cult-centre of the Aegean, extended back beyond the seventh century.¹⁹ The chain shows fitfully in Herodotus’ account of the events in the late sixth century which led up to the Ionian Revolt. The argument which he puts into the mouth of the Milesian Aristagoras (v. 31) may be exaggerated in other ways, but the linked geographic line is clear: ‘the power which holds Naxos can also get Paros, Andros, and the other Cyclades, which depend on her; and the easy step thence is to Euboea’. This was the bridge across the central Aegean, and hence these places were crucial for any power in the Aegean, Greek or Persian, which had ambitious military or trading intentions. Eretria had actually made a military alliance with Miletus at some date before 500/499, the year when this alliance bound her to support Miletus in the Ionian Revolt against Persian authority. But at the earlier time with which we are now concerned, the 540s, the ties of Eretria with Pisistratan Athens were strong, which suggests that then, like her Attic *xenoi*, she was, at least, not anti-Persian. Hippias’ son Hegesistratus ruled Sigeum, and his daughter Archedice was married into the ruling family of Lampsacus, both Greek cities in Persian-held territory (Hdt. v. 94; Thuc. vi. 59. 3). Lygdamis was deposed from his tyranny in 517 by the League under Cleomenes. But the aristocratic government which succeeded him still had a *xenia* with Histiaeus the tyrant of Miletus, who was a Persian subject until the Ionian Revolt. With the Persians now established along the eastern Aegean seaboard, their influence in this chain between Asia Minor and the Greek mainland could have been serious. The commons of Naxos arose and ejected the aristocracy, but the predictable result of this was that c. 500 the exiled aristocrats asked for aid from Aristagoras of Miletus, who was officially a pro-Persian ruler, standing in for his uncle Histiaeus while the latter was at Myrcinus in Thrace. The momentous results of this move are treated in Chapter 8, below.²⁰

VII. SPARTA AND ARGOS

Meanwhile, as commander of the League, King Cleomenes had suffered a public humiliation in the failure of his machinations with Isagoras at

¹⁹ A 34, 179–81 and notes 1–2.

²⁰ For the remarkable ‘Thalassocracy-List’ preserved by Eusebius (*Chronographia* 1.225, ed. Schoene), which includes these islands in its list, see Forrest (C 26) who argues for its basic authenticity, and Jeffery (A 34, App. III, pp. 252–3) for the view of those who dispute its claim.

Athens in 508/7 (above, pp. 306–8, 361), and the League's relationship with Boeotia and Chalcis may well have been damaged by the collapse of their joint strategy against Attica in the following year. His next important military action recorded by Herodotus was in 494, and on more familiar ground – an attack on Argos which was brilliantly successful. His father's army had won the Thyreatis and Cynuria from Argos; obviously he was committed to hold that valuable district for Sparta at all costs, and the reason for this aggressive campaign of 494, according to modern conjecture, may have been the termination of a fifty-year truce between Argos and Sparta, such as might well have been signed in the 540s when Argos lost the Thyreatis. He now defeated the Argive army, thoroughly and savagely, inland at Sepea near Tiryns, in a battle which was said to have cost Argos the lives of six thousand hoplites. This would mean, if true, that six *lochoi* (regiments) were completely wiped out; at all events, the army must have suffered very heavily. The Argive government cited these losses as one of its reasons for refusing military aid not long afterwards to Greek embassies which came seeking pledges of aid against the threat of a Persian invasion (Hdt. VI.76–81; VII.148–50).

VIII. AEGINA

The Aeginetans had provided some of the ships which had brought the forces up the east coast to land at Nauplia for this campaign (Hdt. VI.92). This does not of itself prove that Aegina was a member of the League at the time (she claimed that she had been coerced). In fact it is not clear from the ancient evidence whether and, if so, just when Aegina did become a proper member of the League, as distinct from (a) siding with it if its aims and her own happened to coincide, or (b) being coerced in a crisis.²¹ The bulk of her population were merchant seamen (Arist. *Pol.* IV.4, 1291b24); the whole flourishing economy of this small, vigorous island depended on her long trade-lines north, south and west to non-Greek areas. She was one of the founding states of Naucratis in Egypt early in the sixth century, and c. 519 a band of Aeginetans drove out a Samian settlement and occupied Cydonia at the western end of Crete, a site overlooking the sea-route to the Egyptian Delta (Hdt. III.58–9). In 481 Xerxes observed her ships passing briskly through the Hellespont carrying grain and other food-supplies from the rich barbarian lands of the north (Hdt. VII.147); and in recent years archaeologists have picked up the tracks of Sostratus of Aegina, the merchant whom Herodotus describes as the richest Greek of all time (IV.152.3), and have

²¹ In the seventh and sixth centuries her Peloponnesian ties seem to have been with Argos rather than with states which became League members; but a strong case for her membership is made by 18, App. xvii.

demonstrated that his wealth came from the west, from Italy. The impressive quantity of fine Attic red-figured ware datable c. 535–505 B.C., bearing a graffito trademark ‘SO’ and found in Etruria, is now attributed to his trading; and in Graviscae, the port of Tarquinia from the sixth century onwards, a Greek sanctuary of the sixth century has yielded a dedication c. 500 B.C., inscribed: ‘I am (the property) of Aeginetan Apollo. Sostratus made this offering, the son of [—].’²² (See p. 457, Fig. 39.) Aegina’s mercantile activity is also attested on the east Italian coast, at the important Greek site of Adria; here, among the wealth of superb Greek pottery, are graffiti of the sixth to fifth centuries in the local Greek script of Aegina; and Strabo attests (375) that there were Aeginetans ‘in Umbria’. Umbrian slaves and Venetian horses, it has been suggested, would be two valuable exports: also timber, grain, and the fine goldsmiths’ work of Etruria.²³ It was perhaps the profits of such far trading north, south and west that paid for the superb pedimental sculptures of the temple of Aphaia on Aegina.

One of Aegina’s Greek markets may well have been the rich agricultural state of Thebes, Athens’ border-enemy. Some kind of association is embodied in the myth that Theba and Aegina were sisters, daughters of the river Asopus (Hdt. v.80.1). It is not clear how old this myth was, but it sounds propagandic; and a commercial link may be indicated by the earliest Boeotian coinage (above, p. 358) which, marked by a Boeotian shield on its obverse, has on the reverse a ‘mill-sail’ incuse of the type already used on the Aeginetan coins. This could indicate that technical experts from Aegina were called in to start the first Boeotian coinage.

In the late 490s the ‘war without heralds’, *polemos akeryktos*, as Herodotus (v.81) describes it, broke out between Athens and Aegina, these two mercantile states. The phrase is variously interpreted. It could perhaps be paraphrased as meaning a state of hostility which was like an unhealed sore: it had not the formality of a land-war started officially with proclamations by heralds at the borders of the opposing cities. It was a war which was waged chiefly either in the sea-lanes, by ships of each side attacking each other on sight, or on the coasts, by continual surprise-landings and raids. The Saronic Gulf was a vital area not only for the shipping of Athens and Aegina, but also for the eastern trade from Corinth’s port of Cenchreae; so enmity to piratical Aeginetans may well have been a common bond for Corinth and Athens. Certainly the Corinthians provided Athens with twenty ships for this ‘unheralded’ war. Aegina on her side appealed to Argos. Back in the seventh century, in the time of King Pheidon, there seems to have been some commercial

²² Cf. D 302, especially pp. 55–9, and (for identification of Sostratus’ ‘trade-mark’) C 249. See also below, pp. 456–7. ²³ See D 113.

connexion between Argos and Aegina – indeed, some Argive control there – though anachronistic details concerning alleged coinage at the time have corrupted the ancient evidence; and it is easy to imagine that the busy Aeginetan traders would have continued to foster economic links with the landed aristocracy of rich agricultural Argos, just as they did with Thebes. But now, in the late 490s, Argos was no longer an oligarchy. Her leading families had been crippled by their heavy loss of men at Sepea, and the succeeding government was on more democratic lines, so that its opponents called it ‘government by slaves’ (Hdt. vi.83; Arist. *Pol.* 1303a). No official Argive aid was allowed to the Aeginetans, but a regiment of one thousand volunteers came to help them. These were presumably aristocrats, not in sympathy with their own government or with Cleisthenes’ moderate democracy at Athens. They were defeated with serious losses. It is not surprising that shortly after this Aegina was among those cities which offered earth and water in token of submission to the heralds of Darius. Trade was her life-blood. She was a founder-member of Naucratis, and her Egyptian connexions must have been badly hit by the Persian conquest of the country.

At the request of Athens, King Cleomenes undertook to arrest the Aeginetan medizers. He went, apparently, with little or no military support, and this gave his opponents at Sparta, foremost among them his co-king Demaratus, the chance to stiffen the Aeginetan resistance. He returned home in disgrace, having achieved nothing there, and started intrigues to get Demaratus removed as illegitimate. This was done, though it involved bribing Periallos, the current priestess at Delphi; and Demaratus left Greece for Persia, where he was received and generously treated, among the other dissatisfied exiles to whom the Persian court gave sanctuary and hospitality. A rival Eurypontid claimant, Leotychidas, now succeeded him, and the two kings handed ten Aeginetan hostages over to Athens; but soon afterwards Cleomenes himself left Sparta abruptly. According to Herodotus it was because his illegal actions against Demaratus became known. He went first to Thessaly, then to Arcadia, where he attempted to rouse the people ‘to follow him wherever he led’ (Hdt. vi.74.2). The Spartan government, rightly nervous as to the intended goal of such an army, persuaded him to return home and ‘be king once more’; but once back in Sparta, Herodotus says, he became hopelessly mad, attacking the citizens on sight, until his family confined him in stocks and he died from self-mutilation, slashing his whole body with a knife borrowed from his Helot guard (Hdt. vi.49–75). It is open to us, if we choose, to suspect that this report was invented by people hostile to him, in order to conceal what was really an assassination; but perhaps we should think also of the crisis likely to be induced in an unstable and overwrought mind, harassed

by the rigid Spartan code of behaviour and finally broken by the intolerable situation of a paramount war-leader now in the abyss of disgrace. Whatever the truth here, he had clearly been an embarrassing problem for the other Spartan authorities and his family, as an abnormal type which could not be recast to fit the Spartan system.

Meanwhile the trouble between Athens and Aegina was still alive in 482 (see below, p. 525), for in that year Themistocles persuaded the Athenian Assembly to forgo its citizen-rights in the share-out of a vast bonus from a recent rich strike in the silver-mines at Laurium, and to spend it instead on ships 'to use against Aegina' (Hdt. VII.144.1). Thanks to his foresight, these were available for use two years later against the Persian fleet at Salamis. On the threat of that fleet's arrival Athens and Aegina were among the many Greek states which shelved their mutual boundary-problems to unite against the common danger; and after Salamis, in the awards for valour (*aristeia*) the first and second went to Aegina and Athens respectively. Three captured Phoenician triremes were offered as dedications, at Salamis, Sunium and the Isthmus – none in Aegina, and perhaps the Aeginetans resented this unfair share-out, for Apollo at Delphi complained later that he had had no victory-tithe from them. They sent him then a rich and appropriate one from their famous bronze-foundries, a bronze mast with three golden stars at the masthead (Hdt. VIII.93, 122).²⁴

²⁴ I.e., two stars represented the Dioscuri, protectors of ships (whether St Elmo's fire was here intended, or, more likely, the actual constellations), and the third perhaps stood for Apollo Delphinios himself; see C 346, II.ii, p. 549, on this passage.

CHAPTER 7a

RELIGION AND THE STATE

J. K. DAVIES

In a well-known story, Herodotus records how the Samians rescued three hundred boys whom Periander of Corinth was sending from Corcyra to Alyattes of Lydia to become eunuchs.

They first instructed the boys to grasp the shrine of Artemis, and then refused to allow the Corinthians to drag them away from the shrine. When the Corinthians deprived the boys of food, the Samians created a festival, which they still now celebrate in the same way. At nightfall, as long as the boys were suppliants, they created groups of boy and girl dancers, and instituted a custom that they should carry cakes made of sesame-seed and honey, so that the Corcyraean boys could snatch them and keep themselves alive. This went on till the Corinthians who were guarding the boys gave up and went home. (Hdt. III.48.2-3)

As history, the story rates low, not just because Herodotus' chronological indications are notoriously incompatible with each other, nor because an alternative tradition credits the Cnidians with the rescue (Plut. *Mor.* 860c), but because the story reads like a classic aetiological legend, repeated none too critically by Herodotus from his Samian friends and informants. Yet the story also has great value, in two different ways. First, it is a concentrated vignette of Greek religious ideas and customs. Age-groups of boys and girls (or youths or men or women) who dance and sing together in *choroi* in honour of a god recall the final scene on the shield of Achilles (*Iliad* XVII.590-616), provide context and subject matter for Alcman's *Partheneion*, form the basic element in the performance of all dithyrambic and dramatic poetry, and throughout Greece carry the social weight of symbolizing membership of a community.¹ The choice of Artemis as goddess of refuge, within one of a set of local systems of deities which show both differentiation (of powers, functions and attributes) and considerable overlap,² is not arbitrary, but emerges naturally from her role as Mistress of Hunters and Hunted and of the young unmarried. So too, all over Greece, seed-and-honey cakes (*panspermia*) co-exist as a form of sacrifice with the much more costly sacrifice of animals, and their diversion to feed the boys

¹ C 178, *passim*; C 448, 421ff; C 426, 167ff. ² C 473, 101ff.

exploits the general understanding that after their dedication to the deity such food-offerings would go to persons (often but not always the priest) connected with the cult.³ Most basic of all is the underlying assumption, common to all parties, that contact with the god's sanctuary as a suppliant affords divine protection, or *asylia*,⁴ since the sanctuary may not be polluted with death or birth or sexual intercourse.

The story, then, illustrates the vocabulary and syntax of Greek ritual. More important, it throws light on the relationship between two ways of defining a community. On the one hand the political decision which the Samians have by implication taken is portrayed as one taken purely within the matrix of cult and ritual. That is, like all societies of archaic Greece their society is embedded in religion: at some level of consciousness actions which express or reflect the solidarity of the community are transformed into 'religious' terms. A family is defined by its cults: 'Isagoras son of Teisandros was of a reputable family, but I cannot indicate its origins: his kinsmen sacrifice to Carian Zeus', says Herodotus of Cleisthenes' opponent.⁵ Or a family (or a phratry, or a tribe) can be explicitly a lineage, defining itself as the descendants of a god or hero in a way signalled by an endless series of patronymic titles such as Aegeidae or Demotionidae, Clytidae or Prossaridae, expressed by participation in an exclusive cult, and celebrated by Pindar and Theognis as the basis of a whole aristocratic value-system. By extension a whole polis could be defined as a descent-group in the same way: that it was descent from Apollo via Creusa and Ion which comprised being an Athenian was not just poetic imagery but accepted belief, already implicit in Solon's reference to Athens as 'the eldest land of Ionia' and still part of the definition of citizenship in the 320s.⁶ Conversely, in the literary tradition of Dracon's homicide laws, 'to be kept away from holy water, from libations, from mixing bowls, from sacrifices, from the market' *is* to be excluded from the community.⁷ Yet on the other hand the story represents the political society of the Samians as being in full charge of their own religious practices. It is assumed that they can on occasion innovate in cult (though it is also assumed that such rituals, once instituted, must be kept up in the same way): the attitude is semi-detached, even manipulative. Neither Samos nor any Greek state was controlled by priests or prophets.

³ C 29. ⁴ C 426, 106 n. 33 and 146; C 441, 82.

⁵ Hdt. v.66.1. Cf also his characterization of the Gephyraei in terms of cult (v.61.2) as well as in terms of origin (v.57-61). ⁶ Solon F 4a West; *Ath. Pol.* 55.3.

⁷ Dem. 20.157; C 426, 382ff. The inclusion of the word 'market' signifies not that the *agora* is envisaged as a separate zone of activity but rather the converse, that the *agora* is itself sacred and that exchange takes place within the framework of a cult and at a cult-spot (C 18, 271 for further references). Cf. *IG* 13104, lines 21 and 26ff for *agora* in the epigraphical tradition of Dracon's law, and note the phrase [ἀγορᾶ]ς ἀφορᾶ[α]ς in lines 27-8. For *agorai* at other festivals and cult spots cf. Justin XIII.5.3, C 471, no. 92, lines 32ff, and Ph. Gauthier, *Symbola* (Nancy, 1972) 227f.

It is this relationship between a society conceived of as embedded in cult and ritual and the same society conceived of as an autonomous political actor, which is the concern of this section. It was not a relationship of identity. It is said indeed that 'For the Greeks of the Classical Period, State, people and religion were indissolubly united', or that 'The gods became one with the state . . . Religion became a dependent appendage of national sentiment, and individual piety received an out and out deathblow.'⁸ These are over-simplifications. Even in the fifth century the field of attraction of many institutions which were important components of Greek religious life did not coincide with polis-type boundaries. Much cult, and perhaps that which was most important in terms of everyday piety, was carried on in local groups or communities – phratry, *genos*, village or locality – and was not necessarily, or not easily, integrated into the cult life of the polis: the relative autonomy of *genē* at Athens till the mid-fifth century, or of phratries at Delphi as late as 400–390, is clear from surviving documents.⁹ Again, many religious customs had little or nothing intrinsically to do with political life. The reflexes of popular superstition,¹⁰ such social customs as libation before any wine-drinking,¹¹ and much household religion¹² remained autonomous areas largely outside the scope of public law. So too immigrant communities worshipped immigrant gods, only some of whom were ever naturalized or nationalized in the sense of being included in rosters of public sacrifices or of having public officials participate in their rituals. Again, there were always private cults, whether 'sects' such as the Orphics have been argued to be or those created by 'god-possessed' or 'nymph-possessed' individuals.¹³ Most important of all, many cult centres lay well away from the old Mycenaean palace-sites or newer urban agglomerations which were coming in the sixth century to be the seats of polis-organization, and sites such as Dodona, Thermum, Olympia, Delphi or Bassae were major shrines and temples long before there was a cohesive polis in the vicinity.

Equally, however, the relationship was not one between separate entities such as 'church' and 'state' or whatever. Rather, it turned on the different social purposes which might be served by the same group, custom, or institution. A tribe, for example, could be an army regiment, or a constituency for the selection of political office-holders, while also being a descent-group, defined by linkage with god or hero, and a cult-group with its own precincts (*temenē*) and rituals. The relationship could

⁸ C 455, 36; C 460, 729ff at 733.

⁹ Athens: IG 136c (Ceryces and Eumolpidae, before 460 B.C.) and 7 (Praxiergidae, 460–450 B.C.). Delphi: C 471, no. 77 (Labyadae, c. 400 B.C.). ¹⁰ Theoph. *Char.* 16; C 460, 725, 796ff, 817f.

¹¹ C 426, 121ff. ¹² C 465. ¹³ C 460, 248 and 251.

even turn on different aspects of the same man's personality; hard though it may be for secularized man to comprehend it, we have to accept that the pious gratitude which led so many to dedicate offerings to this or that deity 'having prayed-and-vowed a tithe-offering'¹⁴ could be turned, in the hands of a Pisistratus, a Hieron, or a Themistocles,¹⁵ into an ostentatious exploitation of cult for political purposes without implying thereby the least hypocrisy or qualification of belief. Nor of course was the relationship static. That was not just because new forms of ritual might gain in attractiveness or become more economically accessible,¹⁶ or because a deity hitherto local or minor might take on a greater or wider importance (cf. the emergence of Asclepius or Dionysus), though such shifts could well prompt responses from the organs of political society (e.g. sumptuary laws) which themselves help to define or to extend the community's sphere of political involvement. Rather, as will be argued in greater detail below, it was because we can detect a double movement: first, a gradual and partial emancipation of 'the state' from the rhythms and institutions of cult, and second, an equally gradual and partial reorientation and redefinition of cult activities and institutions in ways more convenient for civic organization. These movements were not foregone conclusions. Polis did not have to prevail over shrine, and Greece could have become a culture of temple-states and priestly leaderships analogous to some Near Eastern societies. We shall therefore have to identify some of the reasons why the direction of change was towards secularization. However, the first need is to define the scale of the movements, and because of the nature of our evidence this has to be done in chronologically reverse order, working backwards from the later and more visible stages of the movements as we can see them in the late archaic and early classical periods.

This emancipation and reorientation seems to have taken six main forms. First comes (as in Samos) the freedom to innovate in cult, especially with respect to the cults of heroes. Admittedly, such powers were not to be used arbitrarily. An innovation had to be in accordance with the will of Zeus, as ascertained via oracle, divination, or oblique omen: the interests of priestly families had to be recognized or circumvented, and in any case due regard had to be paid to ancestral custom. Yet these were only partial hindrances. Our tradition tells us that Cleisthenes' modes of seeking

¹⁴ C 466, 328ff; C 189, 429f. For the explicit connexion cf. C 31, 94 no. 1, pl. 7: *Μαντικός μ' ἀνεθεκε Φεκαβολῶν ἀργυροτοχοῦ τας {δ}δεκάτας· τυ δε Φοίβε διδοι χαριφεται* [αν]: C 474, 168.

¹⁵ Pisistratus – Olympieum (Arist. *Pol.* 1313b23), purification of Delos (Hdt. 1.64.2). Hieron – temple of Demeter and Persephone (Diod. xi.26.7; Pind. *Ol.* vi.95). Themistocles – temple of Artemis Aristoboule (Plut. *Them.* 22.2–3).

¹⁶ Cf. the elaboration of funerary monuments, or the conspicuous consumption involved in setting aside as *τραπέζοματα* portions of the sacrificial animal for the god (C 29).

divine approval in 508/7 for his creation of a new tribal structure at Athens was to submit to Delphi the names of one hundred heroes, from which the Pythia chose ten as tribal eponyms (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 21.6): here, as so often in consulting Delphi, the decision asked of the god was minor in substance and all but pre-empted his approval of the major decision, which had in fact already been taken autonomously and politically. The same picture, of comparative freedom to act, emerges even more clearly from the ease with which cults could be transferred from one place to another or grafts taken for transplantation elsewhere.¹⁷ Superficially the practice looks much like the transfer of the relics of Christian saints, and the analogy is the closer in that in Greece such transfers concerned the cults of heroes rather than the Olympian or chthonic gods, but in Greece the instigators were nearly always tyrants or whole communities and the purpose nearly always overtly political. Of course there were exceptions, the most famous and best documented being perhaps the introduction of the cult of Asclepius to Athens in 420/19 B.C., where no strictly political dimension is visible, but the late archaic period regarded such transfers as part of politics. They could be carried out by diplomacy, as with the transfer on Delphic prompting of the bones of Teisamenus from Helice to Sparta c. 560,¹⁸ the transfer of the bones of Minos from Acragas to Crete in the 480s or 470s (Diod. iv. 79.4), or the Theban request for help c. 505 which prompted the Aeginetans to send them the Aeacidae (Hdt. v. 80–1). This last instance reveals how severely practical the matter was: they proved useless in the Theban war with Athens, and were promptly sent back with a request for something more effective (Hdt. v. 81.1). Such transfers could equally well be done by subterfuge, as with the moving of the bones of Orestes from Tegea to Sparta c. 560 (Hdt. i. 67–8), or even by force, as with the transfer of the bones of Theseus from Scyros to Athens in 476 (Plut. *Cimon* 8.5–7). We are here close to the Roman practice of *evocatio*, whereby a Roman attacking force called upon their opponents' gods to forsake them and come over to Rome.¹⁹ Most drastic of all was the act of Cleisthenes of Sicyon c. 590 in effectively abolishing the cult of Adrastus by requesting and receiving the hero Melanippus from the Thebans, and transferring the sacrifices and festivals of Adrastus to Melanippus or Dionysus (Hdt. v. 67). Granted, cult politics were not usually so highly coloured, but the underlying assumption of autonomy and public supervision is clear.

The way in which such supervision developed comprises a second aspect of change. For Athens, at least, it is possible to trace some of the stages of this process and to identify the officials through whom it came

¹⁷ C 424. ¹⁸ Paus. vii.1.8, with Leahy, *Historia* 4 (1955) 26ff.

¹⁹ E.g. during the siege of Veii (Livy v. 21.5): Macrobius iii.9.

to be exercised. The starting point is the description in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 56–8 of the responsibilities in the sphere of cult exercised by the archon, the archon basileus, and the polemarch in the 320s. Relevant here are the archon's responsibilities (*a*) for appointing *choregoi* for the Dionysia and Thargelia and organizing the contests at them, (*b*) for appointing the *choregoi* and *architheoros* to Delos and (*c*) for superintending the processions for Asclepius, Dionysus, for the Thargelia, and for Zeus Soter; the responsibilities of the basileus for superintending (*d*) the Mysteries, (*e*) the Lenaea, and (*f*) all the torch-races, (*g*) for 'administering virtually all the traditional sacrifices', (*h*) for receiving writs of impiety and those arising from disputed priesthoods, and (*i*) for arbitrating all disputes between *genē* and priests over priesthoods: and the responsibilities of the polemarch (*j*) for performing sacrifices to Artemis Agrotera and Enyalios, (*k*) for organizing the contest at public funerals, and (*l*) for making offerings to Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Various layers are detectable here. The basileus' task (*g*) corresponds precisely to Spartan practice²⁰ and continues the role which, generally and probably correctly ascribed to the kings of the early archaic period, was inherited elsewhere by officials called *basileis*.²¹ His responsibilities (*b*) and (*l*) presumably stem from the same origin, and the fact that the cultic entities with which the basileus dealt in his role as arbitrator, viz. the *genē*, were themselves in large part unquestionably archaic suggests that this role was of long-standing antiquity. So does the fact that the legal process involved, the *diadikasia*, bears a close resemblance to the most plausible model of the early, semi-ritual stages of judicial process.²²

Other responsibilities, however, suggest a rather different horizon. The sacrifices performed by the polemarch derive respectively from a vow made at Marathon in 490 (*j*)²³ and from the political impulse to canonize the 'liberators' (*l*) in or by 477/6,²⁴ while his responsibility for public funerals (*k*) will hardly go back into the sixth century and certainly not beyond Solon.²⁵ Much the same is true for the festivals actually run by public officials, whether archons or others. Admittedly, the era-date for the public management of some of them is not ascertainable (e.g. the Thargelia, the Brauronia, or the *theoria* to Delos), but the others offer a distinctive pattern. The basileus' role in the Mysteries is hard to take back beyond the period, probably the later seventh century, when Eleusis became fully part of Athens and the *genē* concerned, the Ceryces and

²⁰ References in C 14, II 674. ²¹ Arist. *Pol.* 1285b4ff: C 14, I 326, 348 n.2, 352.

²² C 451, 40; C 438; C 480; C 439; C 443, 69ff. ²³ C 432, 209.

²⁴ Simonides F 76 Diehl (omisit Page, *PMG*); C 189, 481ff and 513ff; C 579, 155ff; C 560, 185ff.

²⁵ C 447. The earliest public gravestones are still those of the 460s, as Pausanias observed (I.29.4: C 78, 3 no. 1), but the subject now needs reconsideration in the light of the fuller publication of the Kerameikos material and of the suggestion by U. Knigge, *Kerameikos VII: Der Südhügel* (Berlin, 1976) 10f n. 26, that Mound G at the Kerameikos was set up by the state c. 550 B.C.

Eumolpidae, relocated themselves in the Cephissus valley as part of the Athenian ruling class.²⁶ For the Panathenaea there is a mythical era-date of 1506 B.C.²⁷ and a historical one of 566, the latter wholly credible as that of its new guise under public management, in the light of the three mid-sixth-century dedications by *hieropoioi*, one set of whom proudly say that they 'were the first who arranged the contest in honour of the owl-eyed Maiden'.²⁸ For the Dionysia, Capps' final reconstruction of the *Fasti* made it highly probable that, whatever Thespis may have done in 534, the date which mattered was that of its public sponsorship as a 'festival at public cost' (see below, p. 379) in 502/1. Other festivals were brought under public auspices and management even later – the Heracleia shortly after 490, the Lenaea not much before 440, the Hephaestia from 421/0 – while the archon's procession for Zeus Soter is not attested before the 390s, that for Asclepius possibly even later.²⁹ In brief, the evidence suggests that at Athens the movement of public officials into the active direction of festivals is a phenomenon which may have begun in the seventh century but gathered pace noticeably as the sixth century progressed. It concentrated to some extent on new or reorganized cults, festivals and sacrifices, and among them especially on those such as the dramatic and dithyrambic festivals, where the actual ritual of prayer and sacrifice did not play a preponderant part and where pomp, display, procession, participation and competition mattered much more.

The Athenian *hieropoioi* mentioned above are first attested for the Panathenaea in the 560s. A century later their sphere of action as treasurers of monies and as sacrificers included the Eleusinia³⁰ and by the 320s other festivals too (though by then the Panathenaea had been transferred to *athlothetai*). When these extensions took place is not known. The existence and activity of these officials do not stand alone, for other public officials, concerned with cult matters and usually having the root *hiero-* in their title, begin to be attested throughout Greece from the sixth century onwards. At Athens, besides the *hieropoioi* we know of the 'stewards of the sacred objects of Athene' from the 550s onwards:³¹ the decree of 485/4 defining their responsibilities (*IG* 1³4) shows that they are nearer being vergers than priests and that they are officials under very firm public control. *Hieropoioi* are conjecturally attested at Epidaurus

²⁶ c 98, 127, but cf. c 464, 6f for doubts about the date.

²⁷ Marmor Parium, *FGrH* 239 A 10. The suggestion of Wade-Gery, c 223, 29, that that date 'reflects perhaps some especial solemnity in the celebration of 506' deserves wider currency.

²⁸ c 189, 350 no. 326.

²⁹ Dionysia – E. Capps, *Hesperia* 12 (1943) 1ff; c 179, 101ff. Heracleia – *IG* 1³3. Lenaea – c 85, 34. Hephaestia – *IG* 1³82. Zeus Soter – Lys. 26.6ff and Ar. *Ecll.* 79f. ³⁰ *IG* 1³5 and 6c, lines 6ff.

³¹ c 31, 77 no. 21, pl. 3; and c 189, 364 no. 330. The reference to these stewards in the 'constitution of Dracon' (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 4.2) is no evidence of their existence in the 620s, and the fact that their office was confined to *pentakosiomedimnoi* (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 47.1) does not prove that they existed before Solon.

c. 500–475 and widely thereafter,³² as are other offices such as *hierarchai*, *hierotamiai*, *hierothytai*, *hierapoloï*, *hieronomoi*, *theokoloï* and *epimenioi*, all concerned in various combinations with performing sacrifices on behalf of the community, administering shrines and running festivals.³³ Much the same is true for *hieromnemones*, attested at Tiryns at the end of the seventh century, at Mycenae c. 525 and later at Argos from c. 480–475 onwards and then elsewhere;³⁴ as officials of communities they must be distinguished on the one hand from the purely secular-legal *mnemones*, ‘recorders’ or ‘remembrancers’,³⁵ and on the other from the *hieromnemones* who served as delegates to the Delphic Amphictyony from the *ethnē* concerned. These variously-named officials seem to represent a further kind of movement by the state into the active administration of cult. Since the roles they performed could have been filled by priests (and often were), their creation must reflect a series of individual decisions that the role of priests was not to be thus extended and that this or that matter of cult administration should be dealt with by the state, not however by enlarging the sphere of competence of existing magistrates but by creating new public officials for the purpose. Unfortunately, nowhere save for Athens can any even tentative dates be assigned to these decisions. All that can be said is that they are being made by the late sixth century and that they both reflected the emergence of, and helped to define, an area of activity which was simultaneously *hieron*, the province of the gods, and within the public domain.

Such decisions, and the area of overlap they created, can be traced in another way, through the flow of documents from the late seventh century onwards which are known for convenience, but misleadingly, as *leges sacrae*, and which represent the recording on stone of rules of conduct in cult matters. Their emergence as fixed and codified norms paralleled the early ‘laws’ or codes about political procedures or the administration of justice, and like them presents the problem of deciding by whose authority they were uttered. It is convenient to distinguish four kinds. A first group comprises the expression of standard taboos or purification requirements.³⁶ These are as it were timeless, and their utterance is no more an innovative or public legislative act than was the action of the priestess of Athens in 508/7 in refusing Cleomenes of Sparta access to her shrine on the ground that ‘it is not righteous (*themiton*) for

³² C 31, 182 no. 12, pl. 34, with 180 n. 1; C 14, 1 500.

³³ Evidence most conveniently collected in C 14, 1 500.

³⁴ Tiryns – C 264, nos. 3 and 5, with comments on pp. 194f. Mycenae – C 31, 174 nos. 1 and 3, pl. 31. Argos – C 31, 169f nos. 21, 32 and 36. Elsewhere – C 14, 1 489 n. 1.

³⁵ C 14, 1 488. Cf. the functionally comparable *poinkastas* now attested c. 500 at Lyttus (?) on Crete (C 449).

³⁶ E.g. C 31, 214 no. 2, pl. 40 (Pheneos in Arcadia, c. 525?) or *ibid.* 150 no. 6, pl. 25 (Cleonae, c. 575–550?).

Dorians to enter here' (Hdt. v. 72.3, cf. *DGE* 773). The second and third groups are represented by the so-called 'calendars of sacrifices', documents listing the sacrifices to be performed in a particular context. The distinction between the two groups is that some of them specify the sacrifices for a particular shrine,³⁷ while others contain specifications for sacrifices at several shrines, or for several or many gods or festivals, in such a way as to suggest that the entity concerned is no longer a shrine but rather either a magistrate, whose cult duties are being laid down, or a whole community whose cults are being brought together, considered as a whole, and marshalled into the chronological sequence of the festival year.³⁸ Granted, both groups will have represented no more than what proper practice had been, currently was, and should be henceforward, and documents in both groups could be thought of simply as *aides-mémoire* for the priest or magistrate or *hieropoios* currently in post. However, the difference signalled by the presence or absence of a degree of remarshalling is crucial, even if often hard to perceive, since such remarshalling implies a shift of context away from the particular festival or cult-centre or shrine and the creation of a framework of reference outside it, usually that of the 'lay' community, polis or canton or deme. This process of remarshalling was to reach its culmination in Athens' greatest inscription on stone, the calendar of sacrifices compiled by Nicomachus and his colleagues between 410 and 399,³⁹ but the process had already reached deme level by c. 460 (*IG* 1³244) and was probably under way in Attica by Solon's time, since his lawcode had certainly moved into the area of cult.⁴⁰

With the fourth group of *leges sacrae* what was implicit in this aspect of Solon's code, the ability of the state to intervene in its legislative capacity in cult matters, becomes explicit. Two documents may serve to illustrate the relationship. The first, from the Temple of Athene Polias on the Larisa at Argos c. 575–550 B.C., lays down

When the following men (names omitted) were *damiorgoi*, these things were made in (the temple) of Athene. The works and the objects and the [–] they dedicated to Athene Polias. The things (which are) the utensils of the goddess a private citizen is not to use outside the precinct of Athene Polias, but the state may use them for the sacred rites. If anyone damages them, he is to make reparation, and the *damiorgos* is to impose how much. The *sacristan* is to take care of these matters.⁴¹

The second, from Olympia c. 500, lays down

³⁷ E.g. *IC* IV 65 = C 31, 315 no. 5, pl. 59 (Gortyn, c. 500–450); *IG* 1³ 231 (Athens, c. 510–500) and 232 (Athens, c. 510–480).

³⁸ E.g. C 31, 343 no. 33, pl. 64 (Miletus, 525–500); *IG* 1³ 234 (Athens, 480–460) and 247 (Athens, 470–450) *IC* IV 3 = C 471, 247 no. 146 (Gortyn, early fifth century).

³⁹ C 434. ⁴⁰ C 122. ⁴¹ C 11, 283 no. 83 = C 31, 168 no. 8.

If someone commits fornication (?) in the precinct, he is to pay a penalty by (the sacrifice) of an ox and by complete purification, and the *theoros* in the same way. If anyone gives judgement contrary to the written regulation (*graphos*), the judgement is to be void, but the decree of the people is to be final in deciding. One may make any change in the written regulations which seems desirable in the sight of the god, withdrawing and adding with (the approval of) the Council of Five Hundred as a whole and the people in full assembly. One may make changes up to the third time (?), adding and withdrawing.⁴²

If the first document shows how cultic arrangements have fallen within the purview of the state, the second brings out even more sharply how taboo has become written law, and potentially alterable law at that.

If we turn from state officials and their responsibilities, or from the widening radius of public law, to a fourth aspect, the gods themselves and their imputed functions and 'profile', much the same picture emerges. First and foremost is the role which came to be given to some gods as the protector or 'patron saint' of this or that city. Athena as the protector of Athens is the best attested, vivid in poetry from Solon onwards (F 4 West, lines 3–4), but Zeus or Hera or Poseidon could be seen in much the same way. For Athena at least (but for no other god) such a role is already prefigured in Homer, in Hector's unanswered prayer to her as *ἔρυσίπτολις*, 'protector of the city (of Troy)' (*Iliad* VI.305): it is probably not her function as the personal guiding goddess of Homeric heroes such as Odysseus or Diomedes which is in point here, so much as the fact that, unlike, e.g., Hera, her cult-spots tended to be on the (*akro*)*poleis* which were becoming the centres of civic life. This latter fact gave her the widespread cult-titles *Πολίας*, 'of the acropolis', and *Πολιοῦχος*, 'acropolis-guarding',⁴³ which denoted her role as civic goddess. True, other gods were also accorded the titles *Πολιεύς*, *Πολιοῦχος* or *Πολίαρχης*. Zeus was widely so called⁴⁴ but also Poseidon at Troezen (Plutarch, *Theseus* 6.1) and Artemis,⁴⁵ but it seems to have been easier in the case of Athena to identify her so closely with 'her' city that her profile as 'Athena who rules over Athens' (*Ἀθήνη Ἀθηνῶν μεδεούσα*) could become by the mid-fifth century a cult of the god of the Imperial state, serving the same purpose as the cult later offered to Lysander or Hellenistic kings.⁴⁶

A further step could be taken. The citizens of a particular area could

⁴² C 11, 261 no. 44 = C 31, 220 no. 5, pl. 42.

⁴³ E.g. C 31, 107–8 no. 7 (Halai, c. 600–550?); C 11, 283 no. 83 = C 31, 168 no. 8 (Argos, c. 575–550?); Hdt. I.160 (Chios, late sixth century); C 31, 201 no. 52, pl. 38 (Sparta, mid-fifth century). On the general theme see C 422. ⁴⁴ C 436, I 161, nn. 108–9; C 429, I, II.2, III.2, indices s.vv.

⁴⁵ Ap. Rhod. I.312 (*πολιόχοος*). C 436, II 469 notes that this epithet is not known to have belonged to any actual cult of hers, but the information deserves credit in the light of Apollonius' antiquarian knowledge, 'hardly inferior to Callimachus' (P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* (Oxford, 1972) I 632). ⁴⁶ C 272.

come to regard themselves not simply as being under the protection of a god but as his or her descendants. Such a role as mythic ancestor was denoted especially by the epithet *Patrous*, 'ancestral', though other epithets such as *Genesisios*, *Genethlios*, *Patrigeneios*, or *Progonos* may have meant much the same. Apollo was widely cast in this role,⁴⁷ but Poseidon and Zeus are attested too as well as Dionysus (at Megara, Paus. 1.43.5) and even Artemis, *per impossibile* for a virgin goddess (at Sicyon, Paus. 11.9.6). In no case can a certain date be offered for the crystallization in civic cult of this aspect of gods. However, even though Pausanias describes some of the cult images as *xoana* or as archaic (as at Megara, *loc.cit.*), such cults cannot have been of immemorial antiquity. In the view of the state which they imply, the old-established idea of a god as mythical ancestor of a family or clan has been extended and transformed so as to accommodate the political need to express the 'familial' unity of a very much wider community, that of the citizen body. Consistently, the one such cult whose institution can be tentatively dated, that of Apollo *Patrous* at Athens, is most plausibly regarded as a creation of Solon.⁴⁸

That cult also exemplified a fifth aspect of the process of change under discussion. As is well known, at Athens in particular but also elsewhere⁴⁹ priesthoods were commonly held by members of wealthy aristocratic lineages, the *genē*, each priesthood being transmitted within a lineage by loose hereditary succession. Priesthoods with their responsibilities, privileges and perquisites were therefore a form of property,⁵⁰ the inheritance of which buttressed other inheritable forms of property-power (mainly those based on land) and was itself validated by the claims of the lineage to descend from god or hero. In this way, though there were some lineages within the political class with which no cult can be associated,⁵¹ cult-status was instrumental in determining the limits of the political class, the Eupatridae, from its crystallization round the office of archon in 682 till its erosion by Solon (*CAH III*².3, ch. 43). We are not here concerned with how this pattern came into existence, but rather with the reaction against it. It took various forms. One, discussed above, was the growing transference of custom in cult matters to written form. As with the transformation of custom into law in other spheres of public life, the effect, if not the intention, was to fix in permanent form what had previously been susceptible to change. Besides posing the question, in a new and acute form, whether change was legitimate at all, and if so by whose sanction, this transference limited the power of priests to alter

⁴⁷ C 436, IV 152–62; C 460, 556f. ⁴⁸ C 446.

⁴⁹ E.g. at Gela where the family of Gelon held a hereditary priesthood of Demeter and Persephone (Core) (Hdt. VII.153).

⁵⁰ Cf. Herodotus' phraseology at VII.153.3: ὅθεν δὲ αὐτὰ ἔλαβε ἢ αὐτὸς ἐκτήσατο, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν; or at VII.154.1: οὕτω μὲν νῦν ἐκτήσατο τοῦτο τὸ γέρας. Similarly Hdt. IV.161.3 and 162.2 (the γέρεα of the kings of Cyrene). ⁵¹ E.g. the Alcmaeonidae (C 85, 369f).

rituals or offerings and thereby subjected cult practice to community-made law much more obviously and explicitly.

However, it is the second form which the reaction took that is of interest here, namely the creation of sacrifices, cults and festivals which were explicitly 'public' (*demiosios*) or 'at public expense' (*demoteles*). *Demiosios* seems to have been the older word, and was normal Attic use in the fifth century and later,⁵² but *demoteles* came to prevail, perhaps when fiscal aspects came to matter more, and became a technical term in the lexicographers.⁵³ The main point is indeed fiscal, that sacrifices, rituals and festivals so designated are provided by the state from its revenues rather than by individuals, and the financial implications will need further exploration below: but there is evidence that the underlying idea was not primarily financial. The case turns primarily on the Athenian *Genesis*, explicitly said to have been *demoteles* and dated on 5 Boedromion on the authority of 'Philochorus and Solon in the *Axones*' (*Antiattikistes* 86.20 Bk = *FGrH* 328 F 168). Following a hint of A. Mommsen, Jacoby argued that this information revealed the institution by Solon of a public festival of commemoration of the dead, and that it offered an alternative to the displays at burial or at later commemoration which rich families were currently making and which Solon certainly desired to control and restrict directly.⁵⁴ The case might not stand by itself, but is supported by the sixth-century evidence for the cult of Aphrodite Pandemos, by the evidence linking Apollo Patrous as the god of all Athenians with Delphi, and by the evidence that the cult of Athena Nike, certainly *demoteles* by the 440s (*IG* 1³35), was created in the 570s or 560s,⁵⁵ even apart from the clearer evidence for the Panathenaea in 566 and the Dionysia in 502/1 (pp. 374, above). The likelihood is that this developing series of festivals 'at public cost' met needs or catered for tracts of the population, or expressed aspects of religious feeling, which could not be fully met or reached by the cults of the lineages and which better expressed that self-conscious corporate identity which was a defining part of the developed Greek polis. As such, the impetus for them was more political than religious, but their impact in changing the profile of religious activity was none the less profound.

Much the same can be said of the remaining aspect of change, namely the way in which, and the extent to which, cults and festivals came either genealogically or geographically to define the 'space' of the polis.⁵⁶ The

⁵² E.g. *IG* 1³35, lines 10–11 (c. 448); 1²55, lines 17 and 21 (c. 430); 1¹36, line 32 (413/12?); *Hesp.* 7 (1938) 1 no. 1, lines 20–1 and 87 (363/2).

⁵³ *Antiattikistes* 86.20 Bk.; Harp. s.v. δημοτελή και δημοτικά ἱερά; *Lex.Rhet.* 240, 28 Bk.

⁵⁴ A. Mommsen, *Feste der Stadt Athen im Altertum, geordnet nach Attischem Kalender* (Leipzig, 1898), 174; C 446, 69; Plut. *Solon* 21.4–5.

⁵⁵ Aphrodite Pandemos – C 189, 318 no. 296. Apollo – Dem. 18.141. Athena Nike – C 189, 359 no. 329. ⁵⁶ For this concept cf. C 151.

cult of Apollo Patrous is one example of the first category. Here, that sense of 'space' is transmuted into descent-group terms, and one 'lineage', that of the descendants of Apollo via Ion, is made to coincide with another, the actual and perpetually self-renewing group of those who are deemed at any one moment to constitute the *demos* or the polis. Similarly the festival of the Apaturia, common to Athens and Ionia (Hdt. 1.147), was at least in its Athenian form⁵⁷ the festival above all others which reflected and formalized the sense of belonging to the group. It was at this festival that boys born during the previous twelve months were presented to the phratry by their fathers (sacrifice of the *meion*), that the newly adult ephebe was again presented to the phratry (sacrifice of the *koureion*), and that the new husband presented an offering (*gamelia*) on behalf of his bride. Behind the format of this festival lies a revealing paradox. Since it was not a single celebration, nor a festival in honour of any one god in particular,⁵⁸ but was conducted separately in each phratry, it has justly been called a *Geschlechterfest*.⁵⁹ Yet the apparent complete uniformity of practice shows that each phratry was acting as a segment of a larger whole. We can see why. Since until 508 there was no other criterion for membership of the polis save membership of a phratry, the rituals of the Apaturia were simultaneously family *rites de passage* and decisions of public importance. It is no surprise either that the paradox was signalled at an unknown date by making the Apaturia a festival 'at public cost' (Schol. Ar. *Ach.* 146) or that when the documentation begins to allow us to see phratries in action we see them preoccupied above all else with enforcing the proper qualifications for membership.⁶⁰

Some other cults and festivals are better considered geographically, since their core is a cult-spot or shrine instituted as, or transformed into, a place of assembly for a certain number of political units. That description covers a wide spectrum. At one end stand the amphictyonies of Delos, Calauria, Anthela-Delphi etc., long established and perhaps rather old-fashioned by the late sixth century. To judge from those we know most about, Delos and Anthela-Delphi, their main activity seems to have comprised a periodic *panegyris* attended by delegates (*hieromnemes*) from the participant *ethnē* or *poleis*. Repeated attempts were made to make the amphictyonies carry a greater political load and even to turn them into cohesive political units by themselves. That they were by and large failures is a fact about the growing particularism of the Greek polis rather than about Greek religion. All the same, it is an important fact of Greek history that Greeks found it extremely hard to create institutions above

⁵⁷ C 432, 232f; C 426, 261; C 463, 88ff.

⁵⁸ Zeus Phratrios, Athena Phratrria, Dionysus, Artemis, Heracles and Hephaestus are all attested. C 432 in despair gave it a chapter on its own.

⁵⁹ C 426, 261. ⁶⁰ C 86, 376.

the level of the polis which were not, in intention or in practice, instruments of subordination or hegemony. It was because *panegyreis* or Leagues based on shrines as neutral ground were the least unacceptable expedient that they went on being the basis of interstate action, *faute de mieux*, well into the fifth century, as the choice of Delos and Apollo for the Aegean League of 478/7 makes clear.⁶¹ Further along the spectrum stood areas such as Boeotia or Phocis which enjoyed rather greater geographical and ethnic unity than those embraced by the amphictyonies but were still little more than geographical expressions in the late archaic period. Though the available evidence for that period is scanty, it does suggest that they too tended to focus on a cult-spot as a symbolic expression of such cohesion as they had managed to give themselves. Likely examples are the sanctuary of Zeus Homarios (or Hamarios) and Athena Homaria near Aegium for Achaëa, that of Athena Itonia at Coronea for Boeotia, and that of Zeus on Mount Lycaeus for Arcadia. Here too the cult was rarely a strong enough attraction by itself to bear the political load placed upon it or to withstand the countervailing ambitions of constituent *poleis*, with consequences in the fifth century in the form of schism (as in Arcadia and Thessaly) or of the creation of tighter and more secular arrangements (as in Boeotia).

Matters were otherwise at the other end of the spectrum, with the cults and festivals of areas which had long since managed to transform themselves into cohesive *poleis*. Here, the symbolic expression of links between centre and periphery took various forms, all of them serving to reinforce the authority of the centre and to express the convergence between political and geographical space. Prominent in this context is the use made of one of the most characteristic forms of ceremonial, the procession.⁶² Sometimes it was used in order to link a political centre with a major outlying shrine, as with the procession of the crownbearers from Miletus to Didyma.⁶³ Or a branch shrine of an outlying cult could be established in the political centres, such as the shrine of Artemis Brauronia on the Athenian Acropolis or that of Demeter and Persephone in the Eleusinium beneath it:⁶⁴ as is well known, it was from the latter that the great procession to Eleusis began.⁶⁵ Or a cult could be brought from the periphery to the centre, as was later done with many of the cults of southern Arcadia at the foundation of Megalopolis in 370.⁶⁶ Lastly, cults might be instituted as explicit reflexions of synoecism. Some of these are undatable or are later than our period,⁶⁷ but the classic and most explicit example is well attested. This was the Athenian *Synoikia*, understood by

⁶¹ Cf. also the continuation of the same mode of thinking in the Italiot League of Croton, Sybaris and Caulonia, created in the 440s (?) round the newly established shrine of Zeus Homarios (Polyb. II.39.6, with Walbank ad loc.). ⁶² C 426, 163ff. ⁶³ C 469, 129 no. 50, lines 18ff.

⁶⁴ C 174, 154f. ⁶⁵ C 432. ⁶⁶ Paus. VIII.30.2 and 7, with C 459, 18ff. ⁶⁷ C 459, 18ff.

Thucydides (II.15.2) to reflect the dissolution by Theseus of local council-chambers and magistracies and the concentration of power in Athens itself. That explanation will hardly have been historically true, and its formulation is most plausibly to be dated in the late sixth century when Theseus was emerging in art and in literature as a major Athenian folk-hero.⁶⁸ What matters is that the festival, explicitly called *demoteles* in our sources, certainly existed by c. 460 B.C.⁶⁹ and that the fifth century itself saw it in the way relevant for us, as a symbolic representation of the geographical and political unification of the space of the polis.

It remains to attempt some explanation, however summary, of the pattern of change which has been described here. It so closely reflects the development of the late archaic state that pressures and influences detectable in Greek society as a whole can legitimately be invoked. For example, the decisions of the tyrants to work through and to strengthen the institutions of the state in order to unify the community and to project its (and their) prestige outwards may well have been forced on them by circumstances, but had clear effects in directing the development of Greek societies away from the temple-state or priest-state systems that they might otherwise have become. Again, the colonizing experience may well have had a feedback effect on the states of older Greece not just in terms of power-relationships or of the broadening of geographical and mental horizons but also in cultic or even theological terms, for the notion of god as Founder or *Archegetes* goes back to a very early stage in colonization (Thuc. VI.3.1) and only later appears on the mainland as a way of defining a political society.⁷⁰ However, more visibly of effect on the relations between religion and the state were two other long-term phenomena, the slow and partial emancipation of the human moral order from being embedded in theology and the divine order, and the impact of increased wealth.

To explore the first phenomenon fully would take us far beyond the confines of this section (see above, Chapter 4; and *CAH* III².3, chs. 44 and 42). This is therefore not the place to explore the contradiction between gods as amoral agents and gods as upholders of justice⁷¹ or to try to estimate whether the actual practice of invoking divine protection of the moral order preceded or followed the sort of theodicy which is visible in Hesiod (especially *Theog.* 902 and *WD* 256, the filiation of Dike as a daughter of Zeus). We need rather to start from the various ways in which, right from the start of our documentation, the gods bore much of the structural load of policing social relationships. This went far beyond,

⁶⁸ C 572, 97ff; C 560, I 126 and 163f. ⁶⁹ Thuc. II.15.2: *IG* I³244C, line 16.

⁷⁰ The position accorded to Zeus Syllanios and Athena Syllania in the Great Rhetra of Sparta (Plut. *Lyc.* 6.2) can plausibly be so interpreted: cf. L. H. Jeffery, *Historia* 10 (1961) 144f.

⁷¹ C 426, 371ff.

e.g., the role of Zeus in protecting beggars and suppliants, important though that was in giving some minimal protection to those most at risk because they had no kin and no status in the group.⁷² First and foremost, the gods' imputed power to witness an oath and to referee its sincerity was and remained fundamental from Homer onwards.⁷³ It was enough by itself to decide the matter when Menelaus as aggrieved party after a chariot-race challenged Antilochus to deny his guilt on oath by Poseidon (*Iliad* xxiii. 581ff): for Menelaus and the poet, as for archaic society as a whole, that was *themis*, 'ordered propriety'. It was certainly so for Hesiod (*Theog.* 231f, 395–401), or for those who developed the moral tale about Glaucus of Sparta, visited with a seven-line sermon from Delphi and then with total annihilation of his lineage for having dared even to contemplate forswearing his oath to return a sum deposited with him for safekeeping (Hdt. vi.86). More significant still, it was intrinsic to legal procedure at Gortyn c. 500–450 B.C.:

if the bondsman disappears, the judge is to make the creditor swear that he was not responsible, either himself or with another person, nor that the bondsman is sojourning with another person. If the bondsman should die, the creditor is to display him before two witnesses. If he does not swear as is written or does not display, he shall pay the simple (blood-) price. (*IC* iv, 47 lines 16–26)

Other legal systems such as the Athenian exacted oath and counter-oath from opposing parties, and oaths from witnesses, judges, magistrates, councillors and officials. By extension too, when relationships began to be created between *poleis* as jural entities rather than between individuals, the gods were invoked as guarantors of the stability of agreements. One early treaty of c. 550–525 B.C. may serve as illustration:

The Sybarites and their allies and the Serdaioi made an agreement for friendship faithful and without guile for ever. Guarantors, Zeus, Apollo, and the other gods and the city Poseidonia. (M–L 10)

The word translated here as 'guarantor', *proxenos*, had been borrowed from the world of guest-friendship and status-protection; interestingly, the signatories prudently employ both belt and braces by invoking as guarantor a human community as well. A similar coupling of divine and human is attested on one of the few documents which show a god as judge. A sacrilegious affray at the temple of Athena Alea at Mantinea c. 450 B.C. led to the utterance:

Inasmuch as we, the goddess and the judges, have passed judgement upon the guilty parties as follows, namely that, having given up their inheritance, they shall forever be excluded from the temple, in the male line, it shall be propitious.

⁷² Cf. c 441, 90ff.

⁷³ c.451 remains basic: cf. also R. Hirzel, *Der Eid* (Leipzig, 1902); Latte, P–W 15.1 (1931) 346ff 'Meineid', reprinted in c 455, 367ff; c 426, 377ff.

But if anyone permits anything else, contrary to these things, it shall be impious.⁷⁴

Here it was an oracle which had issued the condemnation, and the direct involvement of the goddess is understandable since it was her own house which had been abused.

Less specific, but more far-reaching was the role of gods as the authors of, or authorities for, legal or constitutional enactments. Their role was not always so subordinate as may have been the case by the later sixth century (above, pp. 371–2). Just as all versions of the Great Rhetra at Sparta have in common its status as an oracle of Apollo, so too Zaleucus of Locri was alleged to have had his law code vouchsafed to him by Athena in a dream.⁷⁵ Both instances represent extensions, the one of Apollo's role in suggesting or sanctifying a colony, the other of the image for poetic inspiration used by both Homer and Hesiod, and neither was strong enough in the long run to establish itself as a paradigm of legislative authority against the rival claims of human wisdom and collective decision. It is remarkable and significant that neither Dracon nor Solon is reported to have presented his code as divinely ordered, and that as early as c. 650–600 B.C. the city of Drerus in Crete could make its constitutional decisions in terms of what 'was pleasing to the city', invoking the gods only in the as yet obscure initial phrase *θια ολοιον* (M–L 2).

Lastly, gods were deeply involved in punishments, and long remained so. That was not just a matter of other-worldly punishments such as those of Ixion or Tantalus, or even of parables such as that about Glaucus of Sparta, but of much more immediate sanctions. Some were financial. A few lines earlier, the document from Mantinea quoted above had stated:

In the case of anyone whom the oracle has condemned or who by judicial process has been condemned to forfeit his property, this together with the serfs shall belong to the goddess. (lines 14ff)

Such provisions were widespread, indeed normal, even when the offence was not specifically sacral. Another early treaty from Olympia, that made between Elis and Heraea c. 500 B.C., specifies that

if they stand not by each other, those who do the wrong shall pay a talent of silver to Olympian Zeus to be used in his service. And if anyone injures this writing, whether private man or magistrate or community, he shall be liable to the sacred fine herein written. (M–L 16)

The consequences of such financial interpenetration between public law and temple treasury, made easier as coinage spread in the sixth century,

⁷⁴ See *CAH* III².1, 740. c 11, 198 no. 17 = c 31, 216 no. 29, lines 18ff.

⁷⁵ Aristotle *F* 548 Rose ap. Schol. *Pind. Ol.* x.17; D 8, 68ff.

went far towards creating the matrix for Greek public finance in the fifth century. Yet divine sanctions went far beyond the financial. 'If anyone pillages (Deucalion's land), let him go forth [i.e. be accursed] to Zeus', enjoins another document of c. 500–475 from Olympia,⁷⁶ and similarly a document from Teos of about 470 lays down, as penalty against (*inter alios*) poisoners, re-exporters of corn, traitors, and those who encourage pirates or plot with Greeks or barbarians against the state, the formal curse 'Let him be annihilated, both himself and his lineage' (M–L 30). These phrases represent something much more far-reaching than any specific penalty, even than the withdrawal of civic status embodied in *atimia*. Those thus condemned are being left open to whatever the gods choose to inflict, which may include a vendetta-free death at human hands but extends far beyond. To be thus *enages* was therefore not just to be an out-law but also to be out-god: myth after Greek myth bears witness to the imaginative fearfulness of that sanction.

Latte saw in the use of such sanctions an acknowledgement by the archaic state that its power of coercion over recalcitrant members was inadequate by itself.⁷⁷ Structurally, that is correct, but it need not at any stage have been a matter of conscious decision. Conscious awareness rather operated in the other direction, as criticism of amoral gods began to be voiced, the force of oaths began to dwindle, the possibility of hoodwinking an oracle became real⁷⁸ and the growing coercive power of the state turned a litigant in court away from the task of convincing his opponent and more towards that of convincing the judge(s). Though older forms and formulations were tenacious, this area of activity and of interaction between state and religion seems therefore to have seen a gradual movement of the state towards autonomy, or at least a slightly greater distancing between god and the human order.

That cannot be said of the second area of interaction, the financial, where the impact of increased wealth had a profound and complex influence. We must begin here with the concept of resources, for the performance of any ritual involves the diversion of resources. It may be only a matter of an individual's or a group's time – time taken to make a momentary libation, to learn words, music and dance for a *choros*, or to perform priestly functions – and there may of course ensue a return of goods, e.g. in the form of perquisites to the priest, or maintenance of a chorister by a *choregos* during the rehearsal period, as well as a return in the form of the favour of the gods for the praise, honour and gifts accorded to them. However, most rituals involve far more than that. They could

⁷⁶ C 31, 222 no. 8, pl. 42. ⁷⁷ C 451; C 452, 252ff; C 453; C 454.

⁷⁸ Xenophanes DK 21 A 14; Theognis 254; Hdt. v.63.1 and vi.66. Whether bribery, by Alcmaeonidae or Cleomenes, actually occurred is immaterial. What matters is that it was conceivable and could be plausibly alleged.

include the animal, grain, fruit or vegetable produce required for a sacrifice, or the cost of spices, or the allocation of sites for the altars, *temenē* and temples of the gods. They could include the dedication of objects, not always of great intrinsic value but sometimes including expensive bowls, cups, statues, or whole monuments. They could include a tithe on produce, such as the 1/600th of their barley crops and 1/1200th of their wheat crops which Athenians and their allies were required to give to the Eleusinian goddesses 'in accordance with ancestral custom and the oracle from Delphi' (*IG* 1³78, lines 4–7 and 14ff). They could even include the denial, to individuals as beneficiary landholders, of a significant portion of the available land and its allocation instead to a god for the maintenance of his buildings, rituals and servants. In at least one known case, of the later fifth century, that proportion was a tenth (Thuc. III.50.2), and it has been reckoned that in the later fourth century land in Attica owned by *koima*, cults and shrines accounted for something under ten per cent of the superficies.⁷⁹ Most expensively of all, they could include the resources of men, money and materials needed to build stone temples, and here a change in practice is important. Though there had been temples in Greece from the late ninth century onwards,⁸⁰ the eighth and seventh centuries saw few temples built wholly of stone: it was the men of the sixth century who first found themselves able to build those, and on so increasingly grandiose a scale too that they must have absorbed no small fraction of the surplus resources available.

The economic, political and organizational impact of these practices varied considerably. Offerings of first fruits, the sacrifice of animals, or the dedication of terracotta figurines had only limited consequences, since their effect on resources, though negative, was usually minor enough to be embraced within the economy of a single household (and the goods concerned could only be for immediate use, if of use at all). However, even these practices could come to be of public concern when used ostentatiously for social and political effect; if (as we know he did) Solon laid down in his code the prices to be paid for sacrificial animals, they served not only as minima, to ensure that rituals were not skimped, but also as maxima, to ensure that ceremonials did not escalate into potlaches. Dedications and tithes such as those of Midas and Gyges at Delphi (Hdt. I.14.2–3) or of Colaeus at the Samian Heraeum (Hdt. II.152.4) were a different matter, since their preservation called for men and buildings able to keep them safe and since they, or their metal or bullion content, represented a valuable non-perishable asset owned by the god but perhaps 'borrowable' by a community *in extremis*. True, the

⁷⁹ C 4. ⁸⁰ A 54, 408ff; C 474, 132ff.

notion of borrowing a god's monies for secular use postdates our period, being unattested during the Persian Wars, a novelty tentatively suggested in the Peloponnese in 432/1 (Thuc. 1.121.3), and certain for Athens only from 441/0 onwards (*IG* 1³63). However, the growth (indeed the clutter) of dedications in major shrines can be detected epigraphically and archaeologically by the late sixth century if not before. There can be little doubt that such growing accumulations helped to prompt the institution of cultic-public officials such as those listed above (pp. 374f). It was to accommodate them, too, that major shrines such as Delphi and Olympia were transformed visually and spatially by the building of the Treasuries from the mid-seventh century onwards, which themselves came to serve as symbol and focus of civic pride and identity.

All the same, it was the construction of temples which presented the biggest challenge and precipitated the greatest change, not least because the sums involved were so much greater. Admittedly, the only figure of costs which we have for temple-building in the later archaic period is the 300 talents that the Delphians raised with difficulty from the Greek world in order to finance what became the Alcmaeonid temples (Hdt. 11.180.1 and v.62), but that gives us an order of magnitude which can safely be transferred to, e.g., the Olympieum at Athens or to the Apollonium at Selinus. Wherever the money came from, it was not from the shrine itself. Some temples we know to have been financed by prominent public men (above, n. 15), and others such as the Corinthian treasuries at Delphi and Olympia, the seventh-century temple of Apollo at Corinth, and the Olympieum at Athens were certainly or probably financed by tyrants. Non-monarchic communities had to do things differently. Tithes and booty will have accounted for some, such as (arguably) the Athenian treasury at Delphi, said by Pausanias to have been built out of the booty from Marathon,⁸¹ but other sources and mechanisms are visible too. A brief and broken document of c. 525–500 from Sidene on the Propontis records that '[– son of –]enos and his companions made the roof from (the proceeds of) the sacred domains and of the skins (from sacrifices). [–]os son of Leukippos finished off the temple with his own hand.'⁸² Another and fuller document of c. 550 concerns the building of the 'Croesus'-temple of Artemis at Ephesus. Croesus had donated 'the golden oxen and most of the columns' (Hdt. 1.92.2), but other monies mattered just as much:

Forty mnai were first weighed out from the gifts of gold; they were brought from the (*akro?*)polis. Twenty-five mnai of silver were weighed out together with the first gold. Six mnai were weighed out from the wood(-tax?). Ten mnai

⁸¹ Paus. x.11.5. This is not the place to enter the complex controversy over its date: see M–L and c 560, 1 167ff with 11 644 n. 23.

⁸² L. Robert, *Hellenika* 9 (1950) 78ff, pl. 10 = c 31, 372 no. 50, pl. 71.

of gold were weighed out from here (i.e. from the temple treasures?). Thirty-three mnai of silver were weighed out from here. Seventy mnai of silver were weighed out from the ship-tax. [---] ten [mnai] from the salt(tax?) . . .⁸³

If the interpretation is correct, the document shows how at a remarkably early date the surpluses of various city taxes, already being levied in money, were being bespoke for a building-fund. The picture is consistent; very largely, the resources needed to build sixth-century temples came from outside, from cities themselves or from the rich and powerful. Such patronage was not just piety but also an investment in civic or personal prestige and *charis*: to honour the god so elaborately was also to subordinate him, to dynast or to city.

In this way our two strands of explanation complement each other. One represented the partial disengagement of legal process and public order from its original theocentric framework, the other a greater involvement of the state in the direction and financing of cult and ritual. Both combined to tip the balance of power between religion and state further in favour of the latter, and thereby to make the latter increasingly the main framework of religious activity and to intensify the difficulties and fragmentation of fifth-century theodicies.

⁸³ c 31, 344 no. 53, pl. 66, with p. 339 and *SGDI* IV.4, pp. 87off no. ⁿ49.

CHAPTER 7b

THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS, 750 to 500 B.C.

G. S. KIRK

The development of thought and ideas during the period in which the city state came into being, roughly from 750 to 500 B.C., must have been heavily affected by three factors: the continuing influence of the epic tradition, the spread of literacy, and the social, political and economic changes associated with the polis itself. Individuals, too, obviously played their part – poets like Hesiod and Archilochus as well as self-declared sages like the earlier Presocratics. The period was one of major changes in the whole literary and intellectual sphere, beginning as it did with Homer and ending with the rise of philosophy and drama. Accompanying developments in religion and ritual (also treated in Ch. 7a, above) have to be taken into account in attempting to reconstruct the whole intellectual background – a precarious and demanding operation in any event, but valuable if absurdity and one-sidedness can be avoided.

Homer remains influential in different ways throughout, and it is important to begin by establishing what the epic does and does not imply for the intellectual capacity and interests of contemporary audiences. The *Iliad* seems to have reached something like its present form by around 730 or a little later, the *Odyssey* by around 700; for it is hard to imagine Hesiod's *Theogony* as later than about 675, and the *Odyssey*'s language is almost certainly pre-Hesiodic.¹ At all events the Homeric epics came into being, whether or not with some help from writing, when the oral heroic tradition was still in full swing. They contain, therefore, much of the thought, ideas and view of life which that tradition reflected; and this in turn means (especially since no other public and formalized means of expression was available) some part of the outlook of 'ordinary people'.

Questions immediately present themselves. Were the epics, after all, composed for ordinary people? Were they not rather performed, as is often said, in the houses and at the banquets of the nobility? Conceivably Homer's monumental *Iliad*, brought to perfection in the cities of Ionia, had that sort of *milieu*; but its shorter predecessors both in Ionia and Aeolis and on the mainland of Greece were surely popular as well as

¹ c 21, 199f and e.g. c 36, 282–7.

aristocratic in their appeal and audience. Indeed the *Odyssey* itself classes singers, *aidoi*, among the *demioergoi* or 'workers for the community' (*Od.* xvii. 383–5). Again, what allowance should be made for the traditional nature of the great poems, that is for their containing elements of varying antiquity as well as more modern elements, all compounded into an amalgam which became a fiction in so far as it no longer represented any one period or society? Does that largely discredit them as evidence for the beliefs and behaviour of actual people? The problem has been examined at length in its straightforwardly historical aspect in *CAH* II³.2, ch. 39b; here we are concerned with the effect on ideas, and equivalent cautions must be applied.

The outlook of Homer's heroic characters was quite certainly not that of his audiences in the late eighth century B.C.; yet their taste for such things is some index of their own mental attitudes. At least they are likely to have been little if any less rational and thoughtful than the epic characters they admired, and whom their descendants continued to cite as models of behaviour. The poems were obviously archaic in some respects, but we should not make the mistake, any more than their ancient audiences did, of considering them as primitive or naive. In tracing the development of ideas one is at least entitled to assume that the mental capacities implied in Homer were the equal possession of many of his contemporaries – together, no doubt, with a great deal more that lay beyond the scope of heroic poetry.

For Homer's characters were not, in short, imaginary Lévy-Bruhlian savages devoid of reason or organization, motivated only by emotion, aware of causation only as the unpredictable operation of unseen powers. Rather they were fairly reasonable people, often intelligent ones, suiting their actions and behaviour to a careful assessment of material circumstances, as well, of course, as to a complicated nexus of social, religious and ideological preconceptions. Far from being unable to 'take decisions', as is sometimes claimed, rather than responding to random, superstitious or divinely implanted impulses, their behaviour is often as consciously controlled as our own might be in similar circumstances – or more so.² Odysseus is the embodiment of *metis*, the cunning intelligence that Greeks continued to admire and that controlled many of their dealings; but much of his activity is determined by more straightforward logical analysis, as is that of many of his less intellectual companions. As he swims toward the Phaeacian shore in the fifth book of the *Odyssey*, and as soon as he hears the crash of the surf, he embarks on a despondent but carefully analytical soliloquy: if he tries to land through the surf he will be smashed to pieces, if he swims along the coast looking for a smoother

² *Contra* c 468, chs. 1 and 2, especially, e.g., p. 30.

landing-place he is in danger of being swept out again to sea. Events force him to take the latter course, but he is able to clamber ashore, exhausted, at a river-mouth. He loses consciousness, but immediately on recovery undertakes yet another careful assessment of the possibilities and dangers (*Od.* v. 407–87): if he stays on the open beach all night he will die of exposure, especially because cold winds tend to blow out of rivers just before dawn; if, on the other hand, he goes deep into the forest for shelter he may be attacked by wild animals. ‘Thus he considered, and this seemed to him best’: to take shelter in an isolated thicket close to the shore, so making a compromise between the two most obvious and extreme courses of action whose dangers he had worked out with such a nice combination of special observation and general prediction. Certain ‘theological’ details have of course been omitted, but they should not be allowed to disguise the underlying logic. Odysseus has been kept afloat for two days by a magic scarf lent him by the sea-goddess Leucothea; it is Zeus, he thinks, that has brought him close to land, just as it is Poseidon that still compasses his destruction; he prays to the river-god who, he assumes, controls the waters at the river’s mouth, and it is this god that calms the waves and allows him to land.

Some such degree of divine involvement – which reflects, when one comes to think about it, little more than moderate piety and superstition – may well have been accepted by the Homeric audiences themselves. But Homer’s gods often intervene more decisively than that, and even more personally. Hera, Athena, Poseidon and Apollo in the *Iliad* are constantly visiting the battlefield and controlling events there through their manipulation of the leaders or by instilling panic into one army or the other. Ares and Aphrodite join in the fighting in the fifth book, where Ares kills and strips one of the Achaean warriors; while Aphrodite in Book III personally sees to it that the reluctant Helen goes to bed with Paris (*Il.* v.840–4; III.389–420). The general progress of events is overseen by the gods in council, who ultimately carry out the orders of Zeus; Iris or Hermes is despatched as divine messenger to give instructions to mortals or minor deities. Such councils are conspicuous in the early part of the *Odyssey*, also, but once events are launched there it is Athena in her many appearances to her protégé Odysseus that plans with him the course of action at critical points.

All this goes some way beyond the superficial religious detail that punctuated Odysseus’ largely self-motivated swim ashore, and it is a question whether anyone at any stage of the tradition really believed in that intensified degree of divine control. If not, then the role of the gods in the poems is to a considerable extent an artificial affair, a literary elaboration. Precisely how far that may be true is a matter that has been much discussed; but it is a reasonable conclusion that, whereas there are

many indications in Homer of genuine religious feeling and a belief in individual deities who might help or harm and whom one tries to propitiate, much of the 'divine apparatus', including the elaborate council-scenes on Olympus and the exact visualizing of domestic details there, as well as the more dramatically anthropomorphized interventions by gods on earth, is a poetical invention. This does not mean that the Olympian deities were not sometimes the object of genuine veneration by members of epic audiences, or that some part of the complex of divine and human motivation revealed in the poems was not reflected at different times and places in actual belief and real life – any more than that Milton and his readers did not have orthodox Christian feelings about many of the poetically-elaborated events of *Paradise Lost*. But it does mean that the ordinary man's assessment of the world around 700 B.C. was more rational and systematic than that suggested by a superficial reading of Homer; at best, perhaps, even more rational than that of Homer's characters at their most careful and secular, like Odysseus, with religious preconceptions playing a smaller part than they were often imagined as doing for the Homeric heroes.

At least three modifications need to be made to that relatively simple conclusion, and one footnote to be added. First, to redeploy an already familiar argument, the Homeric audience's acceptance of the poetic view of the gods is itself part of their mental and emotional condition. Second, the Homeric tradition tended to play down the ritual side of contemporary religion as it must have been. Apart from the routine burning of thigh-bones and inwards before certain meals, and four or five public sacrifices (including the holocaust to propitiate Apollo in *Iliad* I, the oath-sacrifice before the duel in *Iliad* III and the sacrifice to Poseidon on the sea-shore at Pylos in *Odyssey* III), there is surprisingly little reference to ritual behaviour and none, even in the more domestic *Odyssey*, to agrarian rituals. Third, the heroic ethos of personal honour cannot have been shared in that form by the audiences of the developed tradition, for whom the baronial and military values of Achilles, Agamemnon and Ajax must have seemed quite archaic. As for the footnote, it concerns the amount that Homer himself (that is, primarily the composer of the monumental *Iliad* in the mid-eighth century) is likely to have contributed to the mythical and divine background. Obviously he made innovations, including perhaps much of the detail of divine dwellings and feasts on Olympus. But the status and functions of the individual gods and goddesses and their exact relations with each other were already familiar; so much can be shown both from the developed formulaic language attached to deities and from the lack of explanation as they make their first appearances in the poems – for example Aphrodite in *Iliad* III is

known straight away to be paramount in matters of sexual passion.³ The idea of the gods in council is a particularly ancient one, and the theme goes back ultimately to Akkadian and Sumerian literature. Thus it can scarcely be doubted that much of the theological and intellectual background of the poems is considerably earlier than the eighth century B.C., as of course is much of the social content.

The style of Homer, as well as his matter, contributes to the conclusions to be drawn about ideas and thought-processes in an otherwise undocumented period. It is especially significant, for instance, that so much of the action is reflected by means of direct speech. Divine decisions are not just reported – the speeches on either side tend to be set out in full. Some of the scenes of fighting obviously had to be presented in objective narrative, but even so they are heavily interspersed with speeches of reminiscence and intention, of challenge and triumph. So too in the *Odyssey* the audience is made aware of practically everything that passes through Odysseus' mind, either through soliloquies when he is alone or through conversations with Athena, Telemachus, Eumaeus and others. It is this dramatic and personal focus that makes the poems so intimate, so life-like and so subtly revealing in motivation. Once again the roots of the dramatic epos lie far back in the ancient Near East and precursors like the 'Epic' of Gilgamesh; but the technique's extreme development in the Homeric tradition (and much of it demonstrably goes back well beyond the monumental composer himself) is a special phenomenon, a pattern among other things for that kind of intensely personal confrontation between the individual and the outside world that is seen in Archilochus in the following century. It is scarcely too much to claim that, despite the monolithic side of the heroic mentality and the sparseness of the traditional vocabulary for psychological events, the Greek habit of self-analysis is already firmly established.

'Proverbial wisdom', which usually amounts to naive over-simplification, is only occasionally allowed to rise to the surface in Homer. Aeneas' untypically muddled reply to Achilles in *Iliad* xx ends in a welter of commonplace: 'Zeus gives more or less prowess to men as he pleases, for he is strongest of all . . . The tongue of mortals turns many ways and contains many tales of every kind, and the range of words is wide both here and there. Whatever kind of saying you utter, such will you hear in return' – and so on (*Il.* xx. 242–50). Fortunately the epic tradition did not encourage much of this kind of thing, partly no doubt because it was inappropriate to great chieftains; although even the humbler characters of the *Odyssey* avoid it. Nevertheless it serves to remind us that homely

³ *Il.* III. 374ff, cf. 54; there had been a single-verse reference to her as Aeneas' mother in the Trojan Catalogue, *Il.* II. 820.

generalizations about the fate and fortunes of men were a constant element of ordinary thought and communication – an element that was later to lay too strong a hold for its own good on the elegiac poetry of the seventh and sixth centuries, seen at its most obvious and verbose in the collection attached to the name of Theognis of Megara. Another popular thought-form, the animal fable, is entirely absent from Homer (and occurs only once in Hesiod), although its developed appearance in Archilochus and Aesop a little later suggests a long history. Again, there must have been deliberate exclusion of what was felt to be too rustic a mode for high poetry.

Allegory is another matter, and the latest generations of oral heroic singers obviously enjoyed elevating *Atē*, Infatuation, to daemonic status and describing her as racing over the earth followed by stumbling shifty Prayers that can undo the damage she causes, or as being Zeus's eldest daughter who flits over men's heads and does them harm (*Il.* ix.502–7; xix.91–4). Such a device in itself implies considerable sophistication in the power of abstraction and the organization of ideas. Hesiod will develop it further – or at least allow it to occupy a more conspicuous place in his poems with their humbler style – together with the further elaboration of personifications like Strife, Panic and Sleep. What Homer uses and Hesiod does not is the formal *paradeigma* or mythical *exemplum*, seen at its fullest in the tale of the Wrath of Meleager that is related as a warning to Achilles in the ninth book of the *Iliad* (524–605). Meleager had been the Aetolian champion in the fight over the spoils of the Calydonian Boar, but relapsed into sulky inactivity when his mother cursed him for her brothers' death. More and more people implored him to return to battle; eventually he gave in to his wife, but by then it was almost too late. Achilles, it is implied, is in danger of doing the same thing. In fact the paradigm is more than a means of persuasion; it is an informal method of comparing elements of one's own experience – mythical and predictable in outcome on the one side, real and unpredictable on the other – so as to choose a correct course of action. Some kind of mediation is thereby established between the world of myths and the living world of the present; but basing their actions on heroic *exempla* was surely more sensible for Homer's characters than it was for living members of his audience, who were perhaps too prone to cling to heroic archetypes that were really obsolete.

All in all the intellectual model provided by the epic must have had both advantages and disadvantages. Against the clarity of thought that underlies much of the decision-making, and against the healthy rejection of fable and folk-moralizing, are to be set the complications arising out of the poetical elaboration of the role of gods and the confusions and

ambiguities wrought by any complex and long-standing tradition. The artificial amalgamating of aspects of material culture – like the imaginary chariot-tactics discussed in *CAH* Vol. 11³.2, ch. 39*b* – is relatively harmless, but the epic's special inconsistency over marriage- and inheritance-rules in Ithaca, or the relation between *Moirai*, Destiny, and Zeus, or the conception of the dead and their power to affect the living, can hardly have helped the development of a reasonable view of human society and the world at large. Sometimes, admittedly, the apparent anomalies are more positive in their effects, as when a late stage of the tradition – Homer himself perhaps – can be seen turning against earlier assumptions and subjecting them to criticism. Usually this is done in an intensely dramatic way, and the aim may be literary as much as logical; but when Achilles explodes in rage and frustration against (among other things) the conventions of heroic chivalry in *Iliad* IX, or when Zeus expostulates at the beginning of the *Odyssey* at the human tendency to blame the gods for all evil, it is hard to escape the feeling that an intellectual advance is being made (*Il.* IX.414–29; *Od.* I.32–43).

That is not surprising when one considers the changes in the air: the material recovery, the building of stone temples, the elaborate burials, the development of town-settlements and their administration, the growth of literacy from early in the eighth century onward. Of these, the last is not the least significant. The earliest surviving alphabetic inscriptions are of around 725 B.C. and are in verse.⁴ Whether or not the first impulse was commercial (and Phoenician prototypes found in Cyprus are surprisingly not so), it is clear that literature was quickly affected. By the time of Archilochus around 650 we can be certain that some poets, at least, whatever relics of oral diction they retained, used writing as an essential part of their poetic skills.⁵ The epic tradition dragged on in a drastically reduced way, whether in the form of narrative hymns (the so-called Homeric Hymns, of which the longest and best date back to the late seventh and the sixth centuries and are quite impressive in their distinct ways, although self-conscious and heavily aetiological in tone),⁶ or of lifeless exercises on those portions of the Trojan War and its consequences that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* had left alone, or of indifferent miniature epics about Heracles and Theseus. No doubt the success of the two great epic masterpieces – still maintained by the rhapsodes, professional reciters rather than creative singers – had enervated the oral

⁴ See, among other summary accounts, C 16, ch. 11; C 36, 69–71. By far the fullest treatment is now Alfred Heubeck, *Schrift* (Archaeologia Homerica x, Göttingen, 1979), especially 75ff. He concludes (86f) that Cyprus is the most likely environment for the development of a Greek alphabetic system, early in the eighth century B.C. and originally for mercantile use (151f). Rhodes may have played an important part in the transmission to Greece as a whole (87), and Eretria too (77f):

⁵ C 35, 197–200

⁶ C 464, 3–12; C 1, 118ff, 194ff, 267ff.

tradition and diverted its remaining exponents to the exploitation of Homer's genius; at the same time the spread of writing favoured new literary *genres* and was making the epic, Homer apart, look dated.

Into the gap between the oral heroic tradition and the new literacy Hesiod, in rural Boeotia, succeeded in inserting two poems of a quite eccentric and, in a way, inventive kind. The mainland tradition of heroic verse may have specialized in catalogues, and in a sense the *Theogony* is a catalogue of gods (although it is more than that), and *Works and Days* a catalogue, much expanded, of the farmer's tasks and of propitious and unpropitious days. Hesiod's third poem was overtly a *Catalogue of Women*, a less original affair which survives, predictably, only in fragments. All of his work was subjected to rearrangement and elaboration by editors of one kind or another, perhaps primarily by rhapsodes. That accounts for the fluid ending of the *Theogony*, despite which its main intention is clear: to show how the gods had multiplied from the beginning of the world, to place them in separate generations and relate some of the obscurer figures more precisely to each other, and in particular to demonstrate the legitimacy of the sovereignty of Zeus, his descent from a line of divine rulers, and his struggle to gain permanent supremacy by overcoming first his brutal father Cronus and then two parallel threats from jealous rivals, the Titans and Typhoeus. Special interests reveal themselves during the development of the main theme: the more precise recording of the half-snakes and other monsters that peopled the background of Greek myths and in most cases had a distinctly oriental origin; the up-grading of Hecate and the reconciliation of her divergent roles in popular thought and ritual; and Zeus's transition from the necessary use of force (personified most vividly in the hundred-handed Giants who helped him defeat the Titans) to the establishment of an agreed order, semi-personified as *Dikē* or Justice.

It is this same conception of *Dikē* as guiding principle of the rule of Zeus that becomes, in a slightly more applied form, one of the main themes of the more complex and even chaotic *Works and Days*. Having described in the earlier poem how Zeus came to power, the poet turns to consider what has happened to the operation of justice in back-country Boeotia. Whatever it is, it evidently does not please him. Disappointed by the outcome of a lawsuit with his brother Perses over their inheritance, he accuses the *basilees*, the kings or aristocrats who should be the worthy patrons of poets, of venality and malpractice (*WD* 27–39, cf. *Theog.* 79–97). Society is evidently undergoing change, and the quasi-allegorical tale of the five generations of men, declining from the golden race that was a recurrent element of Greek myths to the depressing iron generation that was Hesiod's own, projects his disillusion with the present on to the whole canvas of mythical prehistory (*WD* 109–201).

Yet his own experience is really totally removed from that of tradition. The message to Perses is that he should achieve prosperity, or survival rather, not by inheritance, let alone by deceit, but by hard work. Hesiod amends his description of *Eris*, Strife, in the earlier poem by saying now that there are two kinds of strife, not just one (*WD* 11–24). As well as the strife and warfare of the epic tradition there is a more positive and creative kind that reveals itself in the competitiveness of farmers to finish their tasks in season and extract as much as possible from the reluctant soil. All this is distinctly different from the moral and practical background of the Homeric poems. Inevitably the *Odyssey* had occasionally mentioned the ordinary tasks of farming and herding; the daily life of the swineherd Eumaeus (but he was typically of noble birth) is sketched in some detail, more to provide local colour than to imply that herding is important in itself; and in a pathetic scene toward the end Odysseus finds his old father Laertes dressed as a peasant and messing about in a field (*Od.* xxiv. 226–34). Yet it remains clear that the full life is that of a well-born man still engaged from time to time in warfare or reminiscing with his peers in palace or country estate. The Greeks never quite recovered from that aristocratic bias which had so remarkably survived the subsistence conditions of the Dark Age; but in discriminating the second kind of strife Hesiod performed a crucial analytical exercise which, as well as providing a psychological bridge from the heroic to the farming ethos, was a distinct step forward in the establishment of a secular view of life.

Ever since 1912, when F. M. Cornford published *From Religion to Philosophy*, historians of Greek thought have been particularly eager to claim Hesiod as true forerunner of the Ionian natural philosophers of the sixth century B.C. It is indeed a critical issue, one which will come up again, how far he can be seen as initiating a new rational trend in Greek thought that culminated in philosophy itself. That there is a certain connexion cannot be denied, any more than that there was a kind of transition, not a complete break, between the practical, religious and mythical outlook of Homer's audiences and the more secular attitude of citizens of the developing city states of the late seventh and the sixth centuries B.C. When Hesiod wrote about the rule of *Dikē*, about the two kinds of strife, about the relations between men and gods by means of sacrifices, about the nature of mortality and the genesis of evils, it must be granted that he was reaching toward an area that philosophy was later to occupy. In organizing the disparate and sometimes chaotic figures of gods and monsters with the ultimate intention of justifying the power and supremacy of Zeus he was carrying through a systematic and encyclopaedic task that was part of the organization of knowledge, and as such not entirely distinct from the historical work on theology and

natural philosophy later to be undertaken in Aristotle's Lyceum. In extending the range of allegory by the development of semi-abstractions like Metis and Themis (Cunning and Custom-law, two of Zeus's wives) or Death, Sleep, and Dreams, he was continuing an organizing process, already under way in Homer, whereby different facets of human life and activity are systematically related to the anthropomorphic world of the established gods. Yet the framework is still mythical, and when Hesiod implicitly asks his audience to consider the origin, nature and status of women in terms of the story of how Prometheus tried to outwit Zeus over sacrifices, and was punished for it (and men together with him) first by the withdrawal of fire and then by the creation of the first woman, he is hardly inviting them to consider human and social realities in a straightforward way, let alone an incipiently philosophical one (*WD* 42–105).

Rational structures and connexions can be traced here and there, and the composite Prometheus tale seems to have a certain special meaning; but it is in the end an instance of what J.-P. Vernant has termed 'the logic of ambivalence' which is seen particularly in the working of myths. Where Hesiod does introduce additional rational procedures is mainly in the organizing of certain secondary mythical materials, especially concerning the gods, that had not been dealt with already in the course of the long Homeric tradition. That is part of the basis of Herodotus' well-known comment (II. 53) that it was Homer and Hesiod that made a family tree for the gods, gave them their titles, distinguished their prerogatives and powers and indicated their shapes or appearances – a judgement that is shown by the historian's immediately preceding remarks to be based on a serious misapprehension of both the religious and the epic tradition from the end of the Bronze Age onward. Herodotus' opinion, despite its historical weaknesses, has a certain interest all the same, not least because he sees Hesiod no less than Homer as an exponent of mythical theology and not in any sense as a precursor of the rational wisdom he himself professed.

Claims continue to be pressed, however, on behalf of Hesiod's proto-philosophical status, and perhaps the best way to assess the advances he did make is to examine two of the main arguments offered by one of his most sympathetic and acute modern interpreters. In his *Mythe et société* Jean-Pierre Vernant contends that, although Hesiod's mode of thought is still mythical, yet his elaborations of myths possess 'all the finesse and all the rigour of a philosophical system'.⁷ Vernant is thinking primarily of the tale of Prometheus, developed in slightly different forms in both *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, and the quasi-mythical model of the five

⁷ C 476, 209.

generations of men that occurs only in the latter. The Prometheus sequence reflects, in an evocative and at times subtle way, important social and religious preoccupations; that can scarcely be doubted. In particular the deceit over sacrifices goes far beyond the straightforward aetiological tale that many critics see in it; Hesiod has compounded certain simple folktale motifs (the attempt to deceive a god, his awareness or ignorance of the trick, his choice of an appropriate revenge) in such a way as to reflect seriously on the problem of the relations between men and gods and the part sacrifice plays there. Yet some of the structural antitheses detected by Vernant and others (for example that Prometheus' deceitful gift to Zeus of sacrificial meat is balanced by Zeus's deceitful gift to Epimetheus of the first woman) are a little strained; and others, both here and in the five races, are pressed far too hard. One of Hesiod's intentions in the latter is undoubtedly to divide generations into pairs: gold and heroic are good, silver and bronze are relatively bad, with *hybris* (arrogance and impiety), as the main *differentia*. In arguing that the iron race itself conceals a similar pair, Vernant may or may not be pushing the symmetry too far – but in any case it is imperfect, since the heroic race, with its historical overtones, is incongruous with the rest. Hesiod's inherited components are various, including the Near Eastern metaphor of metallic generations, the idea of a deteriorating (or improving) sequence of men or gods, the picture of the Giants as clad entirely in bronze, and the unavoidable but inconsistent *datum* provided by the heroic tradition. What he does with them is more akin to Lévi-Strauss's *bricolage*, a kind of inspired mythological shuffling around, than to philosophical rigour. It is in the silver generation that he has to use his own imagination most actively to fill the gap in traditional motifs, and here, as the immature hundred-year-old boobies are contrasted with the complete maturity of the golden race, he continues to show his mettle – but as myth-maker rather than as philosopher, scientist or logician.

A different and even more important claim had been made by Vernant in his *Mythe et pensée* of 1965. In applauding Cornford's approach to the problem of the origins of Greek philosophy against that of John Burnet, who had described Ionian natural philosophy as 'a completely new thing in the world', Vernant repeated the idea that a 'community of structure' links Hesiod with Anaximander, and at the same time assumed a kind of 'mutation' of religious into rational thought.⁸ Great care must be exercised in accepting judgements of this kind, appealing as they may seem at first sight. 'Religious thought' is a difficult concept in itself, even if not quite so deceptive as the chimerical 'mythical thought'.⁹ That there is a structural similarity between Anaximander and Hesiod is possible,

⁸ C 475, 287ff (structure); 297 (mutation). ⁹ C 37, 280–3.

but it would depend partly on the generality of the concepts involved and might mean little more; much of the 'structure' of Milesian cosmogonies, moreover, has been imposed from outside by the interpretation of Theophrastus and ultimately Aristotle, from whom much of our information comes. The assumed structural similarity lies in the emergence of couples (Gaia and Ouranos in Hesiod, the 'opposites' in Anaximander) out of an undifferentiated originative substance (*chaos* in Hesiod, the *apeiron* or Indefinite in Anaximander).¹⁰ The couples then interact to initiate the cosmos as we know it. Hesiod's *chaos* is puzzling (*Theogony* 116: 'First *chaos* came into being, and then . . .'); Cornford's explanation that it is the *gap* between sky and earth (the implication then being simply that sky and earth separated) is only partly correct, and elsewhere in the poem it, or the similar term *chasma*, is used of gloomy, boundless wastes. There is, however, an undeniable shift toward abstraction; after all, Hesiod could easily have placed a more concretely mythical figure like Night in this position with much the same effect, as indeed imitators like Acusilaus did later. Anaximander's Indefinite bears only a superficial resemblance to Hesiod's *chaos* in any case; it is presumably so described in order to avoid identifying it with any particular substance in the developed world, partly perhaps as a criticism of Thales' archetypal water.

It was above all a predisposition to the idea of one single origin that appeared to unite Hesiod with many of the Presocratics. Once that 'origin' had somehow emitted a pair, the model of human reproduction could be used to account for further proliferation, as it explicitly is in the *Theogony*. *Eros*, Love, as well as its contradictory *Eris*, Strife, was commonly used by the early philosophers (most clearly Empedocles) as a principle of aggregation or separation; both metaphors reveal plainly enough that the anthropomorphic attitude to the world persisted even after the traditional gods and goddesses had been heavily intellectualized. The *Theogony* is one embodiment of such an anthropomorphic conception of the world, no doubt a very influential one; but that does not make its author into a philosopher – indeed it is arguable that the genealogical model had to be explicitly discarded before philosophy could make much real progress.

It is probable, in fact, that far more than that genealogical model had to be discarded. The whole mythical background, and that meant the traditional way of life with which it was so closely connected, needed to be rejected, or at least reinterpreted as an interesting and sometimes instructive archaism, before men could begin to examine the world objectively, directly, analytically, and without the intervention of too

¹⁰ Hesiod, *Theog.* 116–27 (in which, however, Ouranos comes from Gaia and not directly from Chaos); Anaximander fr. 1 Diels, with doxographical elaborations, cf. c 450 105ff.

much in the way of metaphor and symbol. That is what philosophy requires, and its achievement in Greece was a long and complicated process. Its earlier stages depended not so much on innovations by Hesiod (although a reasonable streak both in him and in Homer must have helped) as in a change in overall world-view that took place in the five or six generations that separated Homer from Anaximander. Admittedly the division between traditional and non-traditional societies, and the intellectual implications of such a division, can be drawn too sharply; the anthropological model of the static, 'simple', non-literate community as opposed to the changing values of the literate urban community is one that can be abused.¹¹ It is, nevertheless, highly suggestive for ancient Greece – which presents, however, once one comes to think about it, an unexpected, possibly unique and potentially creative complication.

For the Greeks did not undergo a straightforward and progressive transition from the conditions of a traditional, non-literate society, after the pattern, for instance, of an African tribal community coming within the orbit of western colonialism. What tended in Greece to produce a quite untypical amalgam of the traditional and the potentially revolutionary was that literacy arrived so late in relation to other cultural progress, and then in two distinct stages. The first stage was the brief heyday of the linear scripts toward the end of the Bronze Age, mainly for the purpose of the centralized distribution of goods. In touch as they were with Egypt and the Near East, where hieroglyphic and cuneiform writing systems had been in use for almost two millennia, it was inevitable that the Cretan and Mycenaean palace-states should dabble in something similar; and almost equally inevitable that, with the final collapse in the disturbances of around 1150 B.C., this clumsy and restricted form of literacy should become a casualty. In administration, architecture, religion and general sophistication neither Mycenaean Greece nor Minoan Crete had borne any resemblance to a conventional 'traditional society'; and some part of the sophistication, at least – witness the continuity of the oral tradition about the Trojan War – passed down into the early Iron Age.¹² Yet writing had disappeared, and necessity as well as nostalgia required the restitution of a more static and traditional view of the world. The heroic past survived, in more or less distorted form, in memory and in song, despite a drastic decline in population and material wealth; but its true social and cultural environment had disappeared. By the tenth century B.C. many parts of Greece were once more on the move, and a remarkable recovery seems to have been initiated; but writing was still entirely absent for almost another two

¹¹ c 24, 46–51. ¹² c 36, ch. 6.

hundred years, during which the contrast between oral traditionality and social evolution must have been even more strongly marked than before. By now both religion and myths had started to reorganize themselves, as the Homeric poems suggest – but in a society that was already beginning to require something more radically different.

Yet the traditional elements in culture and intellectual life were not simply abandoned. They were adapted and secularized, and thus integrated without too destructive an effect with the fresh vitality signified by the alphabet, by the rising polis, even by the new military tactics associated with the hoplite, the fully armoured citizen-soldier. For from the time of Homer onward literacy spread rapidly through the Greek world, the city state began to stabilize itself (perhaps after the model of colonial settlements overseas) in many parts of Greece, economic exchange was regulated by the introduction of money, and mercantile communities like Miletus, in touch not only with Greek colonies and trading centres on the Black Sea and in Egypt but also with the ancient cultures of Lydia and the west-Asiatic hinterland, prospered and became influential. All this was impossible to reconcile with a traditional and Homeric ideology and had only literary, patriotic or ‘charter’ connexions with the divine and heroic world of myths. A new approach was called for, one that was exploratory, hard-headed, unrestricted by too many conservative assumptions. It was not, in the end, the approach of Hesiod, despite the practical realism of parts of *Works and Days*; surprisingly enough it can first be detected, in an individual person, in Archilochus of Paros, active around the middle of the seventh century.

Not that Archilochus is typical; he must have been a very unusual character by any standards. A fighter-poet, ‘servant of lord Enyalios [that is, Ares] and knowing the lovely gifts of the Muses’ as he himself proclaims (fr. 1 West), he displays his lack of interest in the old heroic and divine apparatus by almost entirely ignoring it in his surviving fragments, except for routine invocations to functional divinities like Ares and Athena as gods of war and Poseidon as god of the sea. Animal-fables on the other hand were a favourite medium, but he used them sharply and precisely.¹³ He knew his Homer well and his language reflects many epic phrases, which are cunningly remoulded, certainly with the help of writing, to fit the variety of metres of which he was master. From the content and ethos of Homer, on the other hand, he took relatively little. The main influence here seems to have been the rather anti-heroic figure of Odysseus, whose short, thick-set stature is the probable model for the stocky and bandy-legged general whom Archilochus prefers to the smooth and aristocratic coxcomb (fr. 114

¹³ So far as least as we can tell from frs. 172–87 West.

West); and the poet's boast that he had abandoned his shield but would get another just as good (fr. 5 West) reflects something of Odysseus' calculating genius for survival.

That may be a relic of the Homeric ethos in its final phase, but the drunkenness and womanizing in which Archilochus also glories mark him down as something quite distinct: as a tough new kind of self-reliant guerrilla, fighting on behalf of himself and his island-state Paros, colonizing in Thasos, dealing in gold or silver with uncouth Thracians, cursing his companions if they let him down. Here is nothing, or practically nothing, of the old heroic ideology based on reputation and honour. The self-esteem is still there in a different form, but the preoccupation with wealth as a sign of success is not. Rather the poet looks out on his world cynically, appraisingly, without excessive expectation – aware of his own selfhood and its limitations as he confronts the unyielding environment without flinching. A newly-discovered fragment shows him deriding Neobule, whom he had expected to marry, as a whore, and carefully persuading her younger sister to submit to his love-making.¹⁴ The masculine opportunism is touched with lyrical tenderness, but the poet's exposure of the girls' frailty and that of their father Lycambes became a pattern of vitriolic persecution for later ages and exemplifies the public and propagandist role that poetry was now beginning to assume. That personal, autobiographical poems should take on this kind of function is surprising in itself. We shall probably never know what drove him to reveal his own questionable eroticism so completely in the new fragment. Whatever it was, the conception of poetry, of the self and of the relation between individuals has radically changed.

Two Spartan poets, Alcman and Tyrtaeus, were his near contemporaries. Alcman wrote a famous 'Maiden Song' for competing choirs of girls at a local religious festival – but also, to our surprise, a poem containing a theogonical or even cosmogonical prelude featuring the curiously abstract and un-mythical *Poros* and *Tekmor*, something like 'Means' and 'End'.¹⁵ Here is versatility, originality, a widening world-view – and certainly no propaganda. Tyrtaeus, on the other hand, urged his fellow-citizens in conventional elegiacs to stand fast and fight to the death on behalf of their city. The phrases are Homeric, but the spirit, significantly, is that of the newly-developed hoplite phalanx, in which each closely-packed fighter depends for survival on his own and his neighbour's discipline, not on the virtuoso prowess and rash conceit of the old Homeric warriors or their like.

¹⁴ Cologne papyrus no. 3511; D. L. Page (ed.), *Supplementum Lyricis Graecis* (Oxford, 1974), no. S478, pp. 151–4.

¹⁵ D. L. Page (ed.), *Lyrica Graeca Selecta* (Oxford, 1973), no. 3, col. ii.

Alcman's girls admire their chorus-leaders to the point of idolatry. Agido is like the sun, Hagasichora like a racehorse, and the feeling is not so different from that of Odysseus' comparison of Nausicaa in the sixth book of the *Odyssey* to Artemis with her nymphs, where 'all are fair but she stands out above all';¹⁶ one suspects that Spartan austerity, already signalled by Tyrtaeus but not yet soul-destroying, would have approved that athletic and authoritarian prototype. In the island of Lesbos, where Sappho and Alcaeus wrote poetry a generation or so later, around 600 B.C., circumstances were very different, and the new individualism – still a markedly Aegean phenomenon – was able to assert itself more strongly.¹⁷ Alcaeus has something in common with Archilochus and sometimes imitates him; he too gets drunk, curses his enemies, ranks loyalty above other virtues, likes homely comparisons (but seriously overplays the 'ship of state in a storm' metaphor). Unlike Archilochus he is a born loser, constantly on the wrong side in a protracted political wrangle. Sappho was his contemporary, they knew each other, and Alcaeus wrote admiringly of her. She too was caught up in the feuding for a while and had to leave Mytilene, the island's capital, for a short time. Little else is known about her circumstances; she had a small daughter called Cleis and a less satisfactory brother who sailed down to Egypt and wasted some of the family substance on Doricha, a notorious courtesan (frs. 132 and 15b Lobel–Page). Sappho's own adventures, to judge from the poetry into which she poured her soul, were mainly of the emotions. Striking as that poetry is, the question should be put whether much can be determined from her (or from Alcaeus, or other equally fragmentary near-contemporary poets like Hipponax, Mimnermus and Anacreon) about the state of the Greek mind at this period. Certainly they are evidence of its continuing liberation from heroic archetypes, except as a source of familiar literary topics. But more? One has, I believe, to press this kind of evidence for as much as it can possibly yield, if only because other direct documentation for the development of ideas – except in bare accounts of political and constitutional changes – is almost entirely lacking. Apart from the early philosophers, and they not until the following century, it is the poets that shine out here and there from the dark map of the Greek intellectual world in this archaic age. Poetry in the west of Greece, except for the developments that were to lead eventually to comedy, was more conservative, and Stesichorus of Himera in Sicily, Sappho's rough contemporary, exploited the old heroic and mythical themes with prolixity and technical skill rather than great imagination; but on the eastern coasts and islands it was a different matter.

¹⁶ D. L. Page (ed.), *Lyrical Graeca Selecta* (Oxford, 1973), no. 1, lines 40f, 58f; Homer, *Od.* vi. 102–8. ¹⁷ C 48, 130–52.

For all their differences in temperament and gifts, then, the two Lesbian poets, taken together, give a unique glimpse of what life in their island state may have been like. Alcaeus' themes are nearly all borrowed, but not from the heroic tradition; even the drinking-songs draw on ideas represented in Hesiod's *Works and Days*; but it is his own personal tone of complaint and disappointment that stands out most strongly. Sappho by contrast enormously extends the range of poetical and intellectual perception. For the first time in Greece the sensuous feeling for faces and bodies, as well as landscape, is elevated to an almost religious concern. Archilochus had led the way, but there is something both self-absorbed and almost scientific in Sappho's listing of physical symptoms (sweating, pallor, roaring in the ears . . .) as she imagines gazing at one of her girls. Sometimes the mood is more traditional and less serious: Aphrodite is summoned to win over a recalcitrant friend as she had done in the past (fr. 1); the goddess' demeanour is tender and mocking, not unlike that of Athena to Odysseus in the thirteenth book of the *Odyssey* – for Athena is amused by the obsessive canniness that was one of Odysseus' special contributions to the heroic ethos, whereas Aphrodite responds with feigned despair to the campaign of love that Sappho wages with almost Gallic desperation. But Aphrodite's chariot is drawn by sparrows, and elsewhere, too, Sappho elaborates half-humorously on the legendary trappings of divinity; the tone is quite unlike that of Alcaeus' neat but conventional little hymns to Hermes or the Dioscuri (frs. $\bar{\alpha}$ 2(b), β 2(a)). The shrines at which she describes herself as praying to Aphrodite are set in a poetical landscape that drips with apple blossom, with roses, with plashing streams, and the altars are redolent with frankincense, unknown to Homer's heroes (fr. 2). It is a different matter when Alcaeus enjoins Zeus, Hera and Dionysus to lead him back from exile and punish Pittacus for disloyalty; there are no roses here, and Dionysus is *Omestes*, 'devourer of raw flesh' (fr. G 1). For once, in these poems of passionate anger, Alcaeus is direct where Sappho exploits the mythical tradition almost too luxuriantly. And yet she does nothing without a purpose; the temporarily mythical approach is part of a carefully generated romanticism that reflects, perhaps, one of the contradictory aspects of Mytilenean life. How extraordinary that must have been, and how untypical of most Greek communities at that time. It was Ionia and the settlements and islands to the south of Aeolis that were chiefly famous for luxury, yet there in Aeolic Lesbos is a society that could accommodate not just Sappho conducting her long campaigns for the kisses (and more) of Anactoria, of Atthis, of Gongyla; but also her friends and rivals, Andromeda and Gorgo among them, doing much the same. These are not academies or music-clubs or cult-groups (although the last must have played their part); they are the well-to-do women of Mytilene pursuing

their genteel erotic interests while their husbands and brothers conveniently slog it out in vendettas that call to mind Montagues and Capulets rather than any full-scale civil war. Alcaeus has to live all of eight miles out of town as he rages in exile, missing the life of political assemblies – in Pyrrha, in fact, where the famous annual beauty-contest evidently fails to console him.

A freedom for women that contrasts strongly with the almost servile role later to be recommended by Pericles: that is one thing that emerges from these poems. Another, despite the class and family struggles and the war over Sigeum that murmured in the background, is the air of comfortable and almost bourgeois prosperity, with one of Sappho's brothers caught up with a Greek adventuress overseas, another an equerry passing round drinks in the town hall (frag. 203). Girl-friends marry abroad, in foreign and exotic Lydia, which has become, in that part of the world, the model both of manners and of military display (frs. 96, 16). There is no sign of a beginning of philosophy here; yet it was only a long day's sail down the coast, in Miletus, equally in touch with Lydia and overseas, that Thales and Anaximander were even now beginning to be active. In Miletus, for the moment, there were no major political distractions – although it had in the past been far more exposed than Lesbos to foreign attacks. That may have been the main difference, although Miletus was also more heavily mercantile and less in-bred. For in Lesbos literature, like politics, was too confined, too parochial, for the encouragement of advances in other intellectual spheres. Admittedly its poetry displayed a quite exceptional discipline in metre and in diction, and in its precise uses of conventional *exempla* or of figures like the priamel. There is keen intellect and orderliness of mind when the occasion demands; but the limiting factor, from a wider point of view, is the lack of a 'grand theme'.

The world of heroes had constituted such a theme, so long as it worked through the great tradition of Homer and his predecessors. Hesiod's *Theogony* was ambitious enough to constitute another, and even his other poem of work and pessimism had contained such a theme in embryo, for in its more constructive moments it pointed to the *Dikē* of Zeus as the permanent order of being. Yet those same themes, expressed as they were and inextricably tangled with religion and the conservative world-view of an oral tradition, had to be rendered harmless – emasculated almost – before they could be succeeded by a secular estimate of nature as a whole. Even when that is done, conceptions of this kind do not arise out of male squabbling and female eroticism, even if the latter can produce a Sappho and the former an Alcaeus. Yet the freedom of imagination, the confidence and originality, the catholicity of taste and feeling, were there to be tapped when the time and the place were right.

Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes all lived in Miletus, and their activities, which amount to the beginnings of Greek philosophy, lasted from early in the sixth century B.C. until well after its mid-point. It was a reasonable ancient assumption that there was something like a school of Milesian physical enquiry in which Anaximander criticized and improved on Thales, and Anaximenes tried to meet objections formulated against Anaximander. We have seen why such a school should flourish in Miletus rather than Lesbos; but it is also instructive to ask why such an intellectual leap forward did not take place on the mainland, in Corinth for example or Athens – which even at this period could claim to be among the most intellectually advanced places in Greece. Several reasons can be adduced against Athens at least, and they are revealing for the intellectual climate of much of metropolitan Greece as a whole: that the economic and class war to which Solon's poetry testifies, including the conflict of interest between town and countryside, was too intense and too distracting; that the individualism of the island and colonial cultures had not developed there — Athens lacked personal poets, and Solon wrote mainly as a means of political persuasion; that the poetry that flourished best in Athens was choral and public, and was turned through the medium of the nascent drama to the exploration of current social problems and the glorification of the city. Athens had strong overseas interests and many citizens with experience of the practical side of trade and navigation; what it may have particularly lacked in comparison with Miletus, apart from political stability, was close contact with west-Asiatic ideas beyond the field of art.

There is an additional factor, important in relation to the interplay between tradition and innovation. For Athens also provides by far the fullest evidence for a systematic organizing of myths and rituals as part of the conscious development of the city state. Cleisthenes' remoulding of the old tribal system at the end of the sixth century was to impose an almost mathematical structure on the constitution, but even before that a kind of totalitarian reinterpretation of the religious and mythical tradition had been initiated. Theseus, the legendary king who was believed to have unified Attica under the leadership of Athens, suddenly in the sixth century became a dominant motif on the black-figure vases for which the city was famous.¹⁸ Through his exploits, elaborated after the model of Heracles, Athens laid claim to pre-eminence even in the mythical past – much as the text of the *Iliad* itself was adjusted at roughly the same time, through the reorganized Panathenaic festival, to give her a more fitting place at the siege of Troy (e.g. *Il.* II. 557f). Sacred aetiology flourished in such a climate, and old agrarian rituals like the Pyanepsia (a

¹⁸ c 496, 215f, 225f.

festival of seed-time and the fruits of the earth which included the *Oschophoria* or 'Grape-carrying', a procession led by two transvestite youths) were explained in terms of Theseus' patriotic mission to rescue the Athenian youths and maids trapped in the Cretan Labyrinth, and of the death of his father Aegeus on his fatal return. Originally the *Oschophoria* seems to have been the private celebration of a particular clan from Salamis,¹⁹ but by now most of the clan and 'brotherhood' festivals were formalized as the *Apaturia*, not only in Athens but also in other Ionian states, and concentrated on questions of citizenship and legitimacy. The fertility emphasis of most of the old rituals was maintained, if not fully understood, in the obscene objects and actions and the compulsory bawdry and abuse; but women's rites like the *Thesmophoria* gradually became more important as social and feminist institutions than as a serious means of improving the harvest, while the *Mysteries of Demeter at Eleusis*, once Athens had gained control of them late in the seventh century, likewise lost much of their agrarian reference; or rather the old agricultural solemnities of the displayed ear of corn and the like were converted into an allegory of rebirth for the initiates – initiation, once again, being a process strictly controlled by Athens in favour of her own power and reputation.²⁰

Finally the development of law and order that had been an essential part of social and political evolution depended heavily on the control of vendetta and the rationalizing of archaic ideas about pollution. *Dracon's* homicide laws belong probably to the late seventh century, once more, and their ritual counterpart was the perhaps roughly contemporary conversion of the *Bouphonia* or 'ox-slaying' (part of the *Dipolieia* festival in the month of *Scirophorion*) from a reflection of complex and ancient attitudes connected with hunting and herding into a dramatized murder trial.²¹ All this reinterpretation of traditional myths and rituals came to a climax in the often rather dull *Amazonomachies*, *Gigantomachies* and *Centauiromachies* that became a standard subject of serial temple-decoration in the fifth century B.C.; had it not been for technical developments in sculpture and the genius of a few individual craftsmen, that final outbreak of allegorical propaganda might have seriously impeded further artistic progress. Naturally enough, this kind of cultural activity in the service of constitution and state was hardly conducive to a passionate interest in explaining the world at large, or aetiology in a higher sense. The subjection of traditional myths and religion to a deliberate revaluation on behalf of the city turned out to be a limiting factor on the imagination, for the time being at least – and not a

¹⁹ c 463, 77–80; c 460, 675.

²⁰ c 464, 9f, argues for the sixth rather than the late seventh century B.C.

²¹ c 426, 35of; c 460, 140–3.

liberating impulse as their mere downgrading had been in the settlements across the Aegean Sea.

That kind of social and political reinterpretation of the cultural tradition undoubtedly had significant effects on intellectual development, as well as on the growth of new literary forms like tragedy, comedy and the choral victory-ode. In itself it reveals much that is important in the history of ideas. But for the period down to about 500 B.C. it is to the Presocratic thinkers that one returns to perceive that development in its most splendid form. Secure in the simpler constitution of an originally colonial settlement, relatively free from tensions between town and country because of its primarily mercantile economy, in touch both with the prosperous individualism of the island states and with the exotic culture of Sardis and Lydia, rich in information about foreign geography, customs and beliefs, Miletus in the age of Thales and Anaximander was a cosmopolitan centre, not, like Athens or in a different way Corinth, a community distractedly at grips with social and economic revolution. That is why (or very largely why) the earliest form of philosophy found it, and not the mainland centres, a suitable breeding-ground.

The reconstruction and understanding of Presocratic ideas is a special and difficult field in itself; no more can be attempted here than to stress the most significant trends in the earlier half of the movement's history – a task in which it is possible, as respectable modern accounts amply show, to make serious mistakes of emphasis. First it is important to notice, what is obvious from the ancient reports on which our knowledge is based, the strongly pragmatic character of the three Milesian thinkers. Each of them, and particularly Thales and Anaximander, had wide-ranging practical interests; they were engineers and inventors as much as theoreticians, and 'philosophers' only in a secondary or etymological sense. Thales gave forthright political counsel (he wanted the Ionian states to form a federation) as well as tactical advice which involved diverting a river; more sensationally he predicted an eclipse, which means that he must have had access to Babylonian records. He also propagated new techniques of measurement and joined the debate about the causes of the annual flooding of the Nile. Anaximander made a map of the known world, introduced the *gnomon* or solstice-marker from Babylonia and made rather loose astronomical and meteorological observations as well as an acute inductive study of fossils. Anaximenes concentrated more heavily on cosmology, but drew an important analogy with the function of breath in the human body.²²

None of the three seems to have made much use of mythical language, although two of them are reported to have applied the term 'divine' to

²² c. 450, nos. 65, 66, 74–6, 79–80, 71 (Thales); 99, 95, 133–7 (Anaximander); 160 (Anaximenes).

their originative substance, while Thales is credited by Aristotle with the thought that 'all things are full of gods'.²³ But 'divine' here means little more than 'inherently kinetic'; the origin of motion was a problem they were beginning to isolate, and the power of the gods to be active for ever and to move things at a distance was a traditional idea which, *faute de mieux*, the Milesians accepted at least in a metaphorical sense. It is true that Thales' choice of water as originative substance was probably due to a synthesis of mythical ideas mainly from abroad; for it was not only the waters of Oceanus, the river imagined in the Homeric tradition as surrounding the earth, but also Apsu and Tiamat, the primeval waters of the Babylonian 'Creation epic', or Nun, on whose waters the Egyptians believed the earth to rest, or the Tehom of Deuteronomy that is 'the deep that coucheth beneath', that were the probable source of Thales' theory. The flirtation with foreign myths was in any case quickly abandoned. Anaximander preferred to think in terms of an indeterminate originative substance, and Anaximenes pointed out that mist or air, through the changes it undergoes by compression or relaxation, can combine the advantages of an *apeiron* source-material with a continuing presence (like that of Thales' water) in the varied constituents of a developed world.

They were all, of course, obsessed by the idea of what Aristotle, and perhaps they themselves, called an *archē* or beginning. Presumably the inquisitive confidence that brought them to the solution of navigational and mechanical problems, backed perhaps by the challenge of replacing the traditional cosmology of Homer and Hesiod by something more plausible, made them anxious to tackle the history and causation of the world as a whole. The semantic or logical fallacy of the 'single cause' drove them in the same direction as Hesiod with his *chaos*, and, a more direct influence perhaps, the genealogical model for differentiation lay ready to hand. That is speculative, but at least their insistence on the world as a developing organism is conspicuous. The next stage in the argument came not from Miletus but from its near neighbour Ephesus, where Heraclitus, arguably the most important of all the Presocratics, was active around 500 B.C. Remarkably enough he seems to have rejected the whole genetic pattern, and the whole blind-alley topic of cosmogony with it, by reverting to a different model of the world that was no less mythical in origin – that was more overtly mythical, in fact. 'This world-order', he wrote in fragment 30, 'was made by none of gods or men, but always was, is and shall be – an everlasting fire, kindling in measures and extinguishing itself in measures.' The fire is a permanent principle of order as well as the material of the world itself, and its genesis in Heraclitus' thought is suggested by his calling it 'Thunderbolt' in

²³ Their language is often poetical (rather than mythical); so for example Anaximander fr. 1 (cf. Simplicius, *Phys.* 24.17).

another fragment (64), and declaring in a third (32) that 'The only wise thing [with which it is probably to be equated] is both unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus.' Surely it is not wrong to see Thunderbolt as Zeus's familiar mythical instrument of power and punishment? What directs the physical changes of the world for Heraclitus is precisely a component of order or measure like the Justice or *Dikē* of Zeus, and that is why Measure, Logos or 'the one wise thing' bears a certain resemblance to Zeus himself. It is as though Heraclitus specifically rejected the pattern of cosmic development, suggested most clearly in Hesiod's *Theogony*, in favour of the pattern of cosmic permanence, under a regular dispensation, contained in the whole conception of Zeus as all-powerful god – a conception most sharply formulated, perhaps, by the Hesiodic version of Zeus and *Dikē* in *Works and Days*. That would not make Hesiod into the originator of philosophy (or of this strand of philosophy) but rather into a useful and familiar source of religious thought-patterns that could still be handily deployed in general arguments about permanence and change.

Heraclitus was a quite different kind of person from the Milesians. Deliberately expressing himself in paradoxes, he saw himself as an oracular figure revealing deep truths to men who refused to perceive them (frs. 1 and 93 Diels). The pragmatic background is mostly left behind; Ephesus was more religious, more oriental and less cosmopolitan than Miletus, and perhaps these conditions encouraged the adoption of a less intransigent attitude to traditional religious beliefs. In any event the degree of reinterpretation and invention is impressive. Far from being carried away by inherited ways of thought, like the genealogical assumption that had edged the Milesians almost too wholeheartedly toward cosmogony, he treated religion as a repository of pregnant half-truths. A curious mythical association between Hades and fertile Dionysus, for instance, becomes support for his intuition of the coincidence of opposites – in this case the close contact between life and death (fr. 15). More theoretical than the Milesians, he was nevertheless interested in their detailed cosmology and in some respects improved on it. But his real achievement was to extend the range of physical enquiry to the point at which it became a genuine, if primitive, kind of philosophy in itself; for his directive Fire operated in the same manner in men and animals as it did in external nature, and so joined the principles of psychology and epistemology to those of cosmology and physics.

There was undoubtedly a mystical streak in Heraclitus. Something similar is seen in the no less brilliant Pythagoras, born some thirty years earlier in the near-by island of Samos.²⁴ He migrated, according to

²⁴ c 425, *passim*; c 442, I ch. 4.

tradition, to Croton in south-east Italy in order to escape the vagaries of the Samian tyrant Polycrates. There he founded a group that was devoted partly to politics but even more to the contradictory pursuits (which were to recur in Newton) of mathematics and superstition. Pythagoras and his followers avoided eating beans and red mullet for reasons no more scientific or sensible than those that underlay Hesiod's blend of magic and folklore in the latter part of *Works and Days* – it is illuminating to observe how such notions persist beneath the surface. They also worshipped the 'decad', we are told, set out as ten dots or units in the form of a triangle, and used it to develop the Pythagorean theorem and explore the implications of irrational numbers. The bizarre mixture continues; their cosmogony and astronomy seem to have been mainly mumbo-jumbo, but underneath it lay the extraordinary intuition of the mathematical structure of the universe – which it may not be fanciful to see as a development of Heraclitus' concept of all-permeating Logos or Measure incorporated in Fire. For Pythagoras was, after all, an Ionian by birth and upbringing; that is important to remember, along with the mystical side of the Ionian Heraclitus, because both ancient and modern scholars have been prone to distinguish a pragmatic vein of philosophy in eastern Greece as opposed to a metaphysical vein in the west. It is true that Sicily was to produce Empedocles a generation or so later, and that he developed the Pythagorean notion of the passage of souls through different bodies to a point of extreme eccentricity; but generally speaking the shamanistic element in Greek thought was not confined to a single school or region, but broke out sporadically in different places and at different times.²⁵

That may be a salutary note on which to end; for whereas the main development of ideas in these two critical centuries was away from myths and religion and toward a self-conscious and reasoned ordering of society and nature, many Greeks remained in important respects reactionary, pious and irrational. Popular superstition remained untamed, and Homer, despite his reduction to purely literary status by sophisticated souls, maintained his position as a moral force among many ordinary people, so that Plato in the fourth century B.C. still found it necessary to conduct a running battle against his influence.²⁶ Philosophy was the undoubted crown of intellectual development, but in its early stages it had no popular following and small social effect. Organized religion, on the other hand, picked up fresh support from effectively modernized cults like the Eleusinian Mysteries (not to speak of the operations of Apollo's oracle at Delphi, discussed in *CAH* III².3, 305–20). On the whole, however, and despite outbreaks of irrationalism here

²⁵ c 433, *passim*. ²⁶ c 444, chs. 1 and 2.

and there, the use of reason made steady progress during this period – its excesses were to be reserved for the sophists and demagogues of the century that followed. Even so the process of advance was complex and discontinuous, a process in which reactions to the past and to its mythical and religious archetypes varied between tacit or outright rejection, deliberate or inspired reinterpretation, aristocratic nostalgia or revolutionary disgust, and constructive or merely pedantic allegorization. The secular common sense that had enabled Tyrtæus or Mimnermus to see historical events like the annexation of Messenia or the prehistory of Colophon and Smyrna in objective and non-mythical terms was a continuing factor (frs. 5 and 9 West); so was the realism about human limitations that was inherited, surely, from long before Hesiod and Homer. Above all, perhaps, it was literature (even more than art), with its continuing mediation between novelty and tradition, that best expressed and abetted the adventurous brilliance but also the rooted resoluteness of the archaic cast of mind.

CHAPTER 7c

MATERIAL CULTURE

JOHN BOARDMAN

Athens' achievements in the Persian Wars, the brilliance of Periclean Athens and the activity of her own historians (the Attidographers) have ensured that in our record even of the archaic period, before the Persian Wars, Athens occupies the centre of the stage. If this prominence was merely an accident of Athens' later history, it would seem less than just to the fortunes of Argos, Corinth or Sparta. But in the material record of archaic Greece Athens occupies a comparably dominant position, wholly supported by the multitude and often the quality of her monuments and artefacts, and only in part due to the accidents of later years. For any account, therefore, of the material culture of late archaic Greece it would be foolish not to look most closely at Athens, and in fact it proves pointless to linger, certainly in such a brief survey, over the lacunose record of other cities, apart from observing some difference in quality, sometimes some difference in behaviour. Regional studies have rightly taken a prominent place in these volumes, but no more apology than this paragraph need be offered for devoting this section almost wholly to Athens. For an account of other aspects of the material culture of archaic Greece, and especially the riches of its cemeteries and sanctuaries, the reader is referred to the Plates Volumes accompanying *CAH* III² and IV².

A review of the physical evidence for Athens in the period covered by this volume should attempt to resolve itself into the three main periods of its fortunes – the last years of tyranny, the new democracy, the Persian invasions. This is accordingly attempted here, but changes of life-style occasioned by changes of political authority or threat of invasion do not always leave a clear physical record, and *ars longa, vita brevis* – even such a dire event as a sack may be attested more by ruined buildings than any perceptible changes in things made, used, bought and sold. So our account of structures can proceed chronologically and with an eye to the history of the day, but other subjects – Pictures and Politics, War and Peace – are more instructive if taken synoptically.

* Much that is mentioned in this section is illustrated in *Pls. to Vol. IV*. References are given only to relevant illustrations in *Pls. to Vol. III*.

I. THE TYRANTS' ATHENS

Almost all the substantial building activity of archaic Athens appears to fall in the period of the tyrants.¹ Earlier, we detect only hints of monumental building on the Acropolis and of some civic ordering of the Agora; and later, the new democracy's interest in major construction was, with a few telling exceptions, not impressive.

The Athens left by the tyrants was already remarkable for the variety and number of its public buildings. The city, walled or not,² was nearly 1.5 km across, but certainly not all occupied since there were some bare hill slopes and probably sparsely occupied areas to south and east. The Acropolis was well stocked with elaborate cult buildings. The Agora had taken on something of its classical shape, with the west side presenting a row of public buildings or shrines facing the open area across which ran the Panathenaic Way, towards the Acropolis. Few of the new buildings in the lower town were of great size and the Athens that sprawled around its Acropolis in about 500 B.C. was one of low buildings, probably mainly one-storey, and showing vestiges only of regional city-planning.

It seems likely that the Athens of Pisistratus' sons became a notably different place from that of their father. It is notoriously difficult to determine when most of the tyrant's major building projects were begun or finished and the recent tendency to attribute most of them to the sons may not be fair to their father's initiative in promoting work which he did not live to see completed.³ This may account for some of the contradictory evidence in our sources. A further problem is posed by Pisistratus' periods of 'exile' and the possibility that the various sculpture-decorated Acropolis buildings (Pls. Vol., pls. 118, 119), the decoration of its main temple, and the construction of, for instance, the temple of Apollo Patrou in the Agora, were undertaken when he was away from Athens.

By 510 B.C. the Agora had been transformed into something resembling a town square, its limits being defined by public buildings preventing further encroachment by the industrial quarters to the south west and north west, though these were to remain the foci for the activities of metalsmiths and potters for long to come. Of the west-side buildings only the temple of Apollo Patrou and the big South-west House, suspected by some as a tyrants' residence, survived into the fifth century: but the imposing façades of the later classical buildings, along

¹ Prime sources for Athens' buildings are C 142; C 217; C 506; C 570; C 576; C 579.

² C 584; *CAH* III², 3, 414.

³ For conflicting views on their relative roles see C 142 and C 506. For Pisistratus' buildings *CAH* III², 3, 411–15.

the foot of the Kolonos Agoraios hill, were anticipated by humbler counterparts – the early Bouleuterion and shrines. Beside the northern end of the stretch of the Panathenaic Way which crossed the Agora Pisistratus' homonymous grandson built the Altar of the Twelve Gods, a cult novelty and navel of the city from which radiated the Attic roads, *toutes directions*. Beside the other end of the Way a fine new colonnaded fountain house was built, either Enneakrounos itself or part of the new system of water supply for Athens, with pipes running north and south of the Acropolis from the east, to which the name, and the tyrants' patronage, were attributed in antiquity (cf. Pls. Vol., pl. 195). In the northern part of the 'square' lay Athens' open theatre, the *orchestra*, where the earliest formal dramatic performances were presented, and the rest of the area served whatever commercial purposes (probably few) the Agora still accommodated and as a meeting place for the citizen *ekklesia*.

To what extent and for what time Pisistratus or his sons occupied the Acropolis is not clear. From the 560s the rock probably ceased to be in any way a political centre rather than a religious one, but it was the natural strongpoint for a tyrant to occupy in times of stress. When Hippias fortified Munychia in 511 B.C. it was not because he had no safe place in town, but to secure a way of escape.⁴ Certainly, the new buildings on the Acropolis, whether Pisistratan or not, seem from their decoration to be expressing purposes which go beyond the service of the city goddess (see below).

The final refurbishing of the old Athena temple has generally been thought to have been completed by Pisistratus' sons and perhaps initiated by them. Its marble pediments combined the older theme of animal fights, which had decorated the temple in its earlier days, with a gigantomachy (Pls. Vol., pl. 119) – a theme with associations closer to Athenian and Panathenaic interests, and one adopted by the Alcmaeonids when they made their marble gift to the new temple of Apollo at Delphi (Hdt. v.62). With it went a new Propylon entrance to the Acropolis. Unfortunately, these Alcmaeonid and Delphic associations could as readily be used as arguments in favour of a date for the marble pediments *after* 510, and on grounds of style alone a date soon after 510 can be supported as readily as one little before 510.⁵

By the time of Pisistratus' death the Acropolis had attracted more by way of new building than of grand offerings. Some have thought that this means that the rock was not readily accessible to the citizenry, possibly with Pisistratus in residence some of the time, or that his sons inaugurated a new policy for its use or encouraged a new policy of dedication. Several of the earlier vases dedicated on the Acropolis bear

⁴ C 142, 104f; C 506, 14f.

⁵ C 499, 153f; C 580, 579–80.

elaborate scenes of gigantomachy,⁶ reminding us of the probable appearance of the subject woven on the peplos given to Athena in the Great Panathenaea, and of its celebration later in the century in her temple's new marble pediment. Statuary dedications certainly become much more common after Pisistratus' death, but it is possible that this is no more than a symptom of greater prosperity and of other changes in the ostentation and manner of Athenian life in these years, which we shall explore further. Another symptom of these same factors may be perceived in the importance attached to new or revamped festivals – the dramatic festivals for Dionysus,⁷ the new Panathenaea. The quadrennial games required new vases for the prize oil and the well-known series of Panathenaic black-figure amphorae must be presumed to begin in the 560s (Pls. Vol., pls. 204–5). But it is only after Pisistratus' death that systematic commissioning of the vases seems to have become a regular practice and we can identify the workshops and painters favoured.⁸

It had been tyrant policy to bring cults from the countryside into Athens as well as to establish new ones. On the Acropolis Artemis Brauronia was introduced from near the tyrants' home ground, and a cult of Athena Nike established or promoted. On the south slopes a small temple of Dionysus was built, already perhaps the setting for some dramatic performances and later to grace the site of Athens' great Theatre of Dionysus. An Eleusinium was built beside the Panathenaic Way on the way up to the Acropolis, to serve the Lesser Mysteries, and at Eleusis itself a new Telesterium. Elsewhere outside the main city area there were works at the Academy ('Hipparchus' Wall') and in the sanctuary of Apollo Pythius (another altar, from Pisistratus' grandson: M–L 11, Fig. 30, p. 295 above), and down by the Ilissus work was started on a new temple of Zeus Olympius which was to rival the great temples of the East Greek cities – a project abandoned after 510 and only completed, in a new architectural order, by Hadrian (above, pp. 295–6). Whatever other changes the tyrants worked on the prosperity and way of life of the Athenians, physically they left them a city of new temples and public works, of marble where before there had been limestone and brick.

II. ATHENS AFTER THE TYRANTS

The physical changes wrought by the new democracy in Athens may have changed its face but little, but most of them had a purpose more obviously in tune with the new society. On the Acropolis the great Athena temple stood and was graced with its new marble pediments although, as

⁶ E.g. C 496, 220, fig. 64; C 548. ⁷ C 142, 115–33. ⁸ C 496, ch. 7; C 507.

we have seen, it is not easy to say whether they might not have been an early (and perhaps unexpected) display on the part of the new democracy, replacing limestone with marble as the Alcmaeonids had done at Delphi. Some lesser buildings on the Acropolis may have been cleared away at this time rather than after the Persian sack and a stela recording the tyrants' misdeeds was erected on the rock (Thuc. VI.55). Dedications from the period of the tyrants seem to have been left undisturbed and new dedications joined them to line the paths across the rock – more now in bronze, which explains why the surviving (marble) pieces seem relatively few, but with as many humbler dedications of small bronzes and painted vases as before.

Successes beyond Athens' borders were commemorated by the new regime with the bronze quadriga and captives' chains set on the Acropolis for the victory over Boeotia and the Chalcidians in 506 B.C. (Hdt. V.77.4)⁹ and Athena Nike was given a simple shrine and altar.¹⁰ After Marathon came the most notable of the innovations, the laying out of a new temple for Athena, the 'pre-Parthenon', on a newly consolidated terrace south of the old Athena temple. This again seems likely to have been commemorative of military success, against the Persians, but it was to be the Persians who were to overthrow the incomplete structure in 480, and Pericles who would later enlarge and complete it, still in its way a memorial of Athens' successes against the easterners. For Athens after 490, however, this was a major civic undertaking – a marble temple rivalling the largest of mainland Greece and the rich western colonies, outdone only in the Ionian cities and by the Athenian tyrants' own aborted Olympieum.

Down in the Agora we find the same commemoration of the passing of the old regime and service of the new. A statue group of the tyrant-slayers Harmodius and Aristogeiton, was erected, the work of Antenor. It was an important early example of civic heroization of the recent dead, regardless, it may be, of the motive for their act. Further definition of what was to be the nucleus of the classical city is not easily identified. Several major works have in the past been attributed to the years before 480 – a Bouleuterion ('Old'), the Stoa Basileios, the arrangements on the Pnyx for the citizen assembly – but these are now regarded by some as the work of the new-rich Athens after the Persian Wars.¹¹

Beyond the main occupied area lay the cemeteries of Athens.¹² The western edge of the town had been fairly clear since the eighth century and the cemeteries were clustered beyond it, along the main roads away from Athens outside what were to be its classical gates, sober

⁹ C 189, no. 168. ¹⁰ C 506, 132.

¹¹ C 578, 136f; but see C 82A, 52–7; see also above, p. 328, n. 39. ¹² C 541, ch. 5; C 566, C 585.

valedictions to the traveller from home. Older cemetery areas within the town, even in the Agora, continued in use for a while in the archaic period¹³ and some gave rise to hero cults of some importance in later years. While grave offerings remain comparatively meagre, the above-ground monuments were expensive and included major works of archaic Athenian art.¹⁴ The most elaborate relief stelae belong to the years before Pisistratus' death but the change to a simpler form may not be so much evidence for legislation against expense and display (the *kouros* grave markers continue to be made for Athens and for the countryside cemeteries) as another symptom of changing taste. After about 500 B.C., however, there is a decided break in the production of relief tombstones and a falling off in the erection of *kouroi*, and this does seem likely to be the result of legislation¹⁵ directed against display by the richer families. An innovation in the cemetery, however, is the appearance of state graves for citizens who had fallen in battle,¹⁶ answering the new state memorials on the Acropolis for their military successes.

In 480 B.C. the Persians took and sacked Athens, and they returned the next year. We can see that the standing buildings on the Acropolis were burnt and overthrown. After the Persian withdrawal parts of both the old Athena temple and the incomplete 'pre-Parthenon' were built into the north wall of the Acropolis in such an orderly way as to suggest to some that they were themselves a form of memorial, readily visible from the Agora below in years when the Acropolis rock was itself bare of temples. Marble statues, bases and minor offerings lay to be buried eventually in pits: the major bronzes were removed and presumably melted down. Whether or not there was an Oath of Plataea (see below, p. 604), Athens did nothing to restore the temples destroyed by the Persians until she and her League had loosened the Persians' grip on all Greek lands, and Athena's sacred statue must have found makeshift accommodation in the ruins of her own temple or elsewhere. The old Propylon too seems to have been repaired. In the Agora Antenor's Tyrannicides had been removed by Xerxes; substitutes were made by the sculptors Critius and Nesiotes and erected in their place.¹⁷ The temples had been pillaged but the public buildings seem to have needed no more than minor repairs, and new ones were soon to be erected. In the town, of course, houses and workshops were rebuilt, but our first-hand evidence for this is necessarily scant. It was soon 'business as usual' for all but the structures in the sanctuaries, and the cemeteries remained relatively unadorned for another half century.¹⁸

¹³ C 541, 70; C 592. ¹⁴ C 554-5; C 499, 72-6, 84, ch. 8; C 492; *Pls. to Vol. III*, pls. 330-2.

¹⁵ C 541, 121f, 357; C 573, 71-86. ¹⁶ C 573, 200-24. ¹⁷ C 499, 83; C 504, 24f.

¹⁸ C 541, ch. 6; C 573, 224-38.

III. THE REST OF GREECE

If we look away from Athens there is little enough, by comparison, to inform us about the appearance and development of the major cities, except in some colonial areas, and even less than Athens offers (see below) to tell us about their way of life and how it may have changed since the seventh century. Of the cities of Thebes, Argos, Sparta and Corinth at the end of the Archaic period we know virtually nothing, except for the temple area in the last. In Boeotia the massive import of poor Athenian vases is as much a reflection on the entrepreneurial skills of the merchant as on Boeotian taste. Regional styles of pottery decoration had generally been abandoned and Athens by now provided all the finer clay table vases for a market which, in the Greek homeland at least, still preferred vases decorated in the old black-figure style. But we do the other cities less than justice if we think that artistic skills were an Athenian monopoly, and although the attribution of important classes of bronze vessels to different centres is not the surest of archaeological pursuits, it is still clear that the Peloponnesian cities led the Greek world in this craft at least, and a bronze vase was a far more significant indicator of wealth than a clay one.¹⁹ Sparta, for instance, is a possible source for the great bronze volute craters that travelled east, north and west (Plates to Vol. III, pl. 373; Plates to Vol. IV, pl. 233), and which seem to have served as expensively heroic gifts to friendly and influential foreigners.

An East Greek world beset by Persians is unlikely to offer much, and its mainland cities, which suffered most from the invader, tell little or nothing. The great temple at Ephesus was long to stand unfinished (Pls. Vol., pl. 114a, b), and most of the work on the Archaic Didymaeum near Miletus was done well before the end of the century.²⁰ Things may have been easier in the islands and temple building seems to have continued in Chios, at Phanae,²¹ but post-Polycratean Samos shows a marked falling off in expensive dedications at the Heraeum, and perhaps in carved gravestones, though continuing sculptural work on the great temple and other sanctuary structures is suspected.²² But already East Greek artists were answering the call to work for neighbouring kingdoms which enjoyed semi-independence under Persia – on the sculpted tombs of Xanthus in Lycia, for instance (see p. 225) – and these years too see the flowering of archaic East Greek gem-engraving in studios working on or within the confines of the Persian empire, including Cyprus, and contributing even to the glyptic styles of the important Persian administrative centre at Sardis (Pls. Vol., pls. 157–61, 76).²³

¹⁹ C 562, ch. 3. ²⁰ C 490, 176f. ²¹ *Antiquaries Journal* 39 (1959) 186.

²² *Ibid.*, 202; *Samos* XI (1974) 4f. ²³ C 493; C 494, ch. 4; B 694.

IV. PICTURES AND POLITICS

Our most plentiful source of material evidence for late archaic Athens is pictorial, mainly figure-decorated vases and to a lesser degree works of sculpture in the round or in relief. To these we might surely have added panel pictures on wood, but they have not survived though their existence can be readily inferred from both finds and texts.²⁴ The Greeks lived with pictures as we live with newsprint, and the pictures served for more than mere entertainment, decoration or narrative. Most of the subject matter was mythological but to most Greeks what we call myth was regarded as part of their history, whatever the views of a handful of Ionian intellectuals, and we find their poets using, adapting, even inventing myth-history to explain or illustrate contemporary events or problems, as well as to serve new cults. Their artists did the same, sublimely in the sculptural decoration of major buildings, humbly in the thousands of decorated vases which told in pictures the stories of current interest as well as traditional themes. Through them we may catch a glimpse also of what might be called a 'political' use or manipulation of myth, but we must let the vases speak for themselves, and examine new stories or changes in stories for any ulterior motives they may attest, rather than force the history on to the pictures.

In the 550s, Athenians saw the familiar scene of Heracles' Introduction to Olympus shown, not as a procession on foot with Heracles led by Athena to Zeus, but as a chariot procession with Athena as charioteer, and they could hardly have missed the allusion in Phye's impersonation of Athena, leading Pisistratus back to Athens and her Olympus, the Acropolis, by chariot (Hdt. 1.60).²⁵ The Athena-Heracles relationship was older than Homer, and as a symbol of Athens it may already have been used by Cleisthenes of Sicyon in a sculptural group of Heracles seizing Apollo's tripod, which seems to have served as a parable for the First Sacred War at Delphi.²⁶ The presence of Athena indicated Athenian participation on Cleisthenes' side, under Alcmaeon, later reinforced by the marriage of Alcmaeon's son Megacles to Cleisthenes' daughter Agariste. It was Megacles who, with Pisistratus, then staged the Phye charade. Throughout the period of tyrant rule in Athens Heracles dominates the pictorial record of Athens, with a remarkable near-monopoly even of the sculptural decoration of the new buildings on the Acropolis. It came close to a full assimilation of tyrant and hero, under the patronage of the city goddess. When, for a short while on Athenian vases only, Heracles acquires Cerberus not by force but by negotiation

²⁴ c 359; *Pls. to Vol. III*, pls. 299, 323. ²⁵ c 495; c 547. ²⁶ c 501.

with Persephone, we are reminded of Pisistratus' take-over of the Eleusinian Mysteries, and of his priests' explanation for the foundation of the Lesser Mysteries at Athens, as a means of naturalizing Heracles as an Athenian citizen and preparing him for the initiation required before his underworld adventure.²⁷ When, for a short while and on Athenian vases only, Heracles fights the fishy monster Triton in a scheme borrowed from his familiar fight with Nereus, we might look for the commemoration of some amphibious success: against Megara, it may be, over Salamis or over access to the Propontis.²⁸ When, for a short while and on Athenian vases only, Heracles takes up the cithara like a rhapsode, we recall Hipparchus' introduction of epic recitals in the Panathenaea.²⁹

Even during the tyranny some counter-interest may be detected in the work of some artists – promoting Ajax, naturalized Athenian through his connexion with Salamis and to be appointed an eponymous hero of one of the democracy's new tribes; or the Dioscuri, gods of Sparta and, selectively, champions against tyranny; or Theseus.³⁰ Theseus was to be for democratic Athens what Heracles had been for the tyrants – not that Heracles could lose much ground since Athena's patronage depended on more than political propaganda, and mythographers could not do much to shift her attention to Theseus in the pictorial or literary record. After 510 B.C. a cycle of exploits occupying Theseus on the road from Troezen to Athens, and leading to his recognition as an Athenian prince, was invented and popularized by many pictures and, almost certainly, by a new Theseus poem.³¹ The cycle echoed Heracles' labours in many respects but the heroes were not treated as rivals. It did not take long for Theseus to be as closely associated with the fortunes of the Philaids, Miltiades and Cimon, as Heracles had been with Pisistratus and his sons. When Athens built a new treasury at Delphi, the base from which the tyrants had been overthrown and the showplace of the Greek world, its sculptures shared the honours between Heracles and Theseus, and displayed a new story, linking them in an expedition against the Amazon-easterners (Pls. Vol., pls. 117b, 125). The reprisal for this, the Amazon invasion of Attica thrown back by Theseus, was later to serve as parable for the Persian invasions of Attica. If the invasion of Attica is the Amazonomachy of the treasury it is likely that it was built, as Pausanias says (x.11.4), after Marathon. If this stage in the story had not yet been invented, then it is the eastern expedition that is shown – also in a novel version allowing Theseus to join Heracles, and the building may be earlier, as some have suspected on archaeological grounds. It might even commemorate the Athenian part in the Ionian Revolt and their 'revenge'

²⁷ c 498. ²⁸ c 495, 59f; c 528.

²⁹ c 564; also on Heracles and Pisistratids, c 501; c 505; c 569; c 589.

³⁰ c 500; c 548; c 567. ³¹ c 484; c 511, 3–26; c 565, 161–8; c 572, 99.

at Sardis on the Persians who had overthrown pious Croesus, friend of Delphi (cf. *Pls. Vol.*, pl. 230).³²

The inspiration and channel for this sort of political propaganda which we can detect only in pictures are not easy to define. Clearly the vase-painters were reflecting stories and attitudes propagated in other ways and were almost certainly not themselves commissioned to advertise them. It would have been up to the aristocratic priestly families and to officials such as the archon basileus to determine what decoration was to appear on temples and public buildings, and to invent or commission *aition* myths (such as that for the Lesser Mysteries) which might be celebrated in song, recitation or picture. The vase-painters, as popularizers of stories in pictures, would follow the lead given them, some more thoughtfully than others. If concern is felt over the fact that our evidence for the pictures comes principally from vases exported to Italy and not kept in Athens, we have only to remember the accidents of survival and excavation. Each vase from an Etruscan grave is but an echo of perhaps a hundred other, similar works, not all exported. The scraps of vase dedications from the Athenian Acropolis demonstrate the exceptionally high quality and range of what remained at home, and it is easy to imagine that the streets of the Ceramicus, just off the Agora, served rather as the Peking wall of posters, to display new views on old stories, and topical comment in pictures which were much more readily appreciated and understood in Archaic Athens than they can be by scholarship today, unaided by any explicit explanations from the past.

It is unlikely that this style of comment through myth was confined to Athens but the arts of other cities have not left us the wealth of pictorial evidence which we can test. It is enough, perhaps, to observe that the principle was not exercised only by Athenian artists – Pindar does the same for his patrons, for example; and that the first link in the Heracles–Athena–Athens chain seems to have been forged in Sicyon, by a tyrant who could use myth and cult in his dispute with Argos (*Hdt.* v.67; *CAH* III².3, 313–14).

V. WAR

Marathon demonstrated that the hoplite phalanx was an effective force against a differently organized and potentially more flexible army. Inter-Greek hoplite battles had been, and were to remain, almost ritualized *agones* determined by relative discipline, numbers and morale as much as by tactics. The hoplite's armour has been described in *CAH* III².3, 455–7 and *Plates to Vol. III*, pls. 335–41, and nothing needs to be added to that

³² C 503, 1–15; C 527.

account. There seems, however, to have been some development in the organization and use of secondary arms in the late archaic period. Cavalry might not be able to break a hoplite phalanx but they could harass and perhaps turn it. The Thessalians were the cavalrymen *par excellence* of the mainland and had been much involved in the local wars of central Greece, from the Lelantine to the first Sacred War. They helped the sons of Pisistratus against the Spartans (Hdt. v.63–4) and are shown on Athenian vases wearing no armour, but with a tunic, brimmed hat of the *petasos* type, and carrying spear and sword.³³ The ordinary Greek cavalryman is shown on vases bare-headed and fighting with spear only, and the occasional mounted archer appears. Pisistratus' interest in the north-east Aegean might account for the common appearance of Scythian bowmen on Athenian vases in the last third of the sixth century.³⁴ Archers had been much used in Greece before, but the Scythians and Cimmerians were specialists, with their composite bows, slim arrows with socketed bronze heads and distinctive broad bowcase-quivers (*gorytoi*). Already on the François Vase of about 570 B.C. a Bowman called Kimerios had joined the Calydonian Hunt, wearing his pointed cap, but later we see the full dress – skin cap with long lappets to fasten it at the neck, and the close-fitting, patterned dress with sleeves and trousers, like a track suit (Fig. 36). This specialist intervention in the Athenian fighting forces was short-lived, though artists wished Scythian dress on their Amazons, until they seemed more appropriately attired as Persians.

Thrace was another area where the tyrants had an interest (the Pangaeum mines, for instance) and which made its contribution to Athenian military affairs in the equipment of the light-armed *peltastes* with their lunate *pelta* shields and, usually, throwing spears, but they seem not yet to be organized as an independent fighting force (Fig. 37).³⁵ The Thracian horsemen, with their finely patterned woollen cloaks (*zeirai*) and fox-skin caps (*alopekides*) appear also at the end of the century in Athens, but not to fight, and their dress is soon affected by Athenian cavaliers (Fig. 38). We see them on vases wearing it at the *dokimasia*, inspection of horses and horsemen (Pls. Vol., pl. 194).³⁶

When Athens sent twenty ships to help the Ionians in 499 B.C. these may have been nearly half their fleet, but the value of command of the seas and the need for skilled seamanship in combat were soon learned. In the later sixth century the awkward penteconter was still the usual type of warship, and Polycrates' great fleet was composed mainly, if not wholly, of penteconters (Hdt. III.39, 44). The stouter, faster and more manoeuvrable trireme was being developed after the pattern of, and to meet the

³³ C 529, 146–50. ³⁴ C 553, ch. 1; C 571, 83f; C 587.


³⁵ C 491; C 553, ch. 2; C 571, 78f. ³⁶ C 513.



36. Black-figure interior to a red-figure cup by Oltos. A Scythian archer. (Paris, Louvre F 126; *ARV²* 55, 13; after *CVA Louvre* 10, pl. 2, 1.)



37. Red-figure cup interior. A Thracian with *pelta* shield. (Harvard, Fogg Museum 1959.219; after *CVA Robinson Coll.* 2, pl. 10.)



38. Red-figure cup interior by the Foundry painter. A Thracian horseman. (Rome, Villa Giulia Museum 50407; *AR* V² 402, 24; after P. Hartwig, *Die griechischen Meisterschalen* (1893) pl. 54.)

threat of, the Phoenician fleets deployed by the Persians.³⁷ Herodotus (v.99) says that Eretria sent five triremes to aid the Ionian Revolt but does not specify the type of the twenty Athenian ships that accompanied them. Salamis was mainly a trireme battle (cf. *Hdt.* viii.48): the Greeks had completely mastered the construction and handling of the new craft (*Pls.* Vol., pl. 181).

VI. PEACE

The arts of peace are, in some areas, better documented than the arts of war in this period. We can conjure a vivid picture of life in late archaic Athens with the help of poetry and art, and it is this life that Thucydides recalls (1.6). Life in the city and, no doubt, the countryside, can hardly have been calm, with incursions against the tyranny, the repressive years of Hippias' rule, invading Spartans and eventually the Persians. And though the freedom of the citizen was only intermittently threatened we may be sure that the lot of the slave population would not appreciably have improved as their numbers grew, to serve the mines and the state's mini-industrialization. Athenian trade, the spread of her coinage (see

³⁷ c 485.

below, p. 443) and her overseas interests, notably in the north-east Aegean, probably guaranteed a more varied fare in goods and foodstuffs than hitherto. The true luxury articles, however, of gold or ivory, which had reached Athens and other Greek cities of the mainland since the eighth century, had most of them come from Anatolia and the east. Once the growth of the Persian empire had overtaken the Greek ports of call on the Syro-Palestinian coast and even the Greek cities of western Asia Minor, these sources were mainly cut off – not necessarily from trade, though this was reduced, but the flow of valuable presents to rulers and sanctuaries came to an end and with it the provision of precious materials and objects. For their own precious metal, silver, the Greeks were finding other uses – coinage.

It is not at any rate the presence or absence of the exotic that catches our attention. The realia of everyday life and behaviour are not necessarily much affected, at least in the long term, by incursions or state economics. Our sources, mainly pictorial still, present a society whose everyday manners seem not to have changed significantly from the last days of the tyranny through the early years of democracy. That this quality is discernible clearly under the Pisistratids indicates that it is in some respect thanks to conditions under their rule both that this was achieved, and that it survived after they had been expelled. The newly created setting of temples, public buildings and public works was the backdrop to a way of life which, for the average wealthy citizen, was perhaps barely excelled in the more affluent years of classical or Hellenistic Greece.

Our view of life in this period is no doubt somewhat distorted by the bounty of pictorial evidence for it. Some of this is discussed in the Plates Volume. Public and private behaviour is well documented – convivial, commercial, sacred. There is a sore temptation to believe that what the painter thought worth depicting were the major preoccupations of the day, or that he could trespass into cult or social intimacies barely alluded to in texts. The danger of copious evidence is that it may be deemed complete. The reasons for any special quality in life in these years are likely to be very diverse, but it is equally likely that there were some guiding factors which we ought to be able to detect. One must be the policy of the tyrants themselves. Tyrants' 'courts' attracted poets and artists both to entertain and to design the major public works which characterize several of the Greek tyrannies (think of Polycrates in Samos). Their behaviour would set the pattern for the behaviour of the well-to-do and, in an appropriately reduced or modest form, of the citizen body. So this form of patronage must account for some part at least of the new manners of late archaic Greece. Another guiding factor, which we shall find recurrent in the rest of this account, is the example of

Ionia and the East Greek world generally. From early in the sixth century the East Greeks had been exposed to the wealth and manners of Lydia. Barbarian gold financed political factions and flowed into Greek sanctuaries. In Mimnermus and Sappho we have references to the luxury and ease of life up the Hermus valley. The East Greek cities were rich, their temples of the mid-century were long to remain the largest of the Greek world, and their life-style reflected the manners of their neighbours inland. When the Persians sacked Sardis and gradually took over most of the East Greek cities in the third quarter of the sixth century, there began that exodus of Greeks to the west which we can trace best in the arts they carried with them. Their influence is strongest, perhaps, in Etruria, but it was felt in Athens too, and we can moreover detect there changes in behaviour which can be attributed to the same source. This 'Ionicizing' period in Athenian art fell out of scholarly favour after the Panionism of early in this century, but it can now be better judged and appreciated. Not all the changes or characteristics of life in late archaic Athens can be laid at the door of the Ionian immigrant, but several demonstrably can, and others may have been stimulated or swept along by the same new current of inspiration.

The crucial years are from the 520s on, mainly, it seems, after Pisistratus' death. In the arts these years see the main production of the most ionicizing of the *korai* for dedication on the Acropolis.³⁸ The dress style, of loose full-sleeved chiton and short himation or mantle slung across one shoulder, must also have become the fashionable wear for Athenian women at this time. The chiton at least had been known before and there were intimations of the new style soon after the mid-century, but now it is fully accepted and we can read the names of Ionian sculptors on Acropolis bases, from Chios, Ephesus, Miletus. At about this time the Ionic capital begins to appear commonly for the column dedications,³⁹ and now too is the time of the change to the simpler type of gravestone without the sphinx finial, which is inspired by Ionian stelae, best known to us from the rich series on Samos.⁴⁰

About 530 B.C. the red-figure technique of vase-painting was invented in Athens.⁴¹ It was not demonstrably an Ionian invention, though this is not unlikely and the outline-drawing techniques it exploited had been longer-lived in the East Greek world than in Attica, but it expressed more readily than the black-figure technique the interest in pattern of dress, if not of anatomy, which characterized Ionian sculpture. Its first practitioners produced virtual translations of the black-figure technique, on the familiar shapes (Pls. Vol., pls. 144–6). They were followed by artists who devoted themselves almost wholly to the production of cups,

³⁸ c 499, 85f; c 550, 55–63; c 556. ³⁹ *Op.cit.* n. 21, 206.

⁴⁰ c 555, 37f; *Pls. to Vol. III*, pl. 332. ⁴¹ c 497, 11–29.

and a distinctive group of artists, dubbed the Pioneers, who decorated the full range of shapes with drawing of the highest quality which realized the full potential of the new technique (Pls. Vol., pls. 147–50).⁴² Meanwhile, the old technique continued to be practised in Athens, and the black-figure vases continued to be preferred by the Greek states which imported Athenian pottery. The new red-figure was for home consumption or for export to Etruria where there must have been an exceptional demand for cups, to explain the odd pattern of distribution.⁴³ After 500 B.C. the full range of shapes is decorated and the black-figure production falls off and worsens. The Pioneers were brilliant and intelligent artists. They refer to each other on their works, and we can come close to understanding the comradeship and rivalries of a group of artists, whose work apparently spans the transition from tyranny to democracy in their city. One of their darlings was Leagros, later a general, who is praised on their vases as *kalos* in the formula common on Athenian pottery from after the mid-century.⁴⁴ Leagros' family lived in the deme where the potters' quarter was situated and the lad must have been a regular partner of their carousals. The homosexual implications are clear in the *kalos* inscriptions, and the act was not an uncommon subject on vases⁴⁵ – commoner than the heterosexual, the portrayal of which was left mainly to the capable figures of satyrs. The social implications of this cannot be discussed here, but it is worth noticing how early it appears to be accepted as a theme for open comment and portrayal.

It would be good to know who the Pioneers were but, in common with a high proportion of Greek vase-painters, some bear nicknames (Smikros, 'little'), some non-Athenian (Phintias), some names which could be non-Athenian or made-up (Hypsis, Euphronios, Euthymides) or which are at least uncommon for Athenians until later.⁴⁶ It seems to argue a notable contribution by painters who were metics if not slaves in the potters' quarter, yet on terms of easy familiarity with young notables of the day. The potters, at least, could get rich, and several made valuable dedications on the Acropolis.⁴⁷

The Pioneers and their immediate successors dwell much on the conduct of party-going, of the *comus* and *symposium*.⁴⁸ The men, young to middle-aged, caper naked, or nearly so (and in no 'heroic' manner) from party to party, or stretch out on *klinai*, served by cup boys, entertained by girls with pipes or lyre. The manners and furniture of the *comus* and *symposium* are rendered quite explicitly, as they had been on some earlier vases (*CAH* III².3, 452–3), but there are new elements here

⁴² *Ibid.*, 29–62; C 560, 214–39. ⁴³ C 502; C 544. ⁴⁴ C 561.

⁴⁵ C 20; C 487, 6–31; C 516, ch. 5. ⁴⁶ C 497, 9f. ⁴⁷ C 189; C 486, 21–5.

⁴⁸ C 534, 171–85.

which require attention. A number of the revellers are now shown wearing turban headdresses. Some are naked, but some wear voluminous chitons and himatia and many even carry parasols, later even wear ear-rings: transvestites, we might think. But the turban was a male Lydian headdress (*mitra*); the chiton a common male dress in East Greece (many East Greek *kouroi* are dressed, unlike their homeland cousins) and worn by Athenian Dionysuses and seniors; in Anatolia and the east a parasol marked a male dignitary or king rather than a woman, and ear-rings were worn by men. The effeminacy of the dress may have recommended it to Athenians, but there is no doubt about its East Greek, ultimately Lydian, male origins. Some revellers wear new soft boots, not laced or provided with tongues, which must be the Lydian *kothornoi*. And in their hands now there often appears the *barbiton* lyre, a long-armed instrument suited to the accompaniment of the male voice, and of eastern origin. Clearly all these factors indicate a notable influx of Iono-Lydian manners, but it may be possible for us to be more specific still. Turban and *barbiton* are associated in literature with the Tean poet Anacreon, and on a vase his name appears on a *barbiton* in a scene with turbaned, dressed revellers (Pls. Vol., pls. 192–3).⁴⁹

Anacreon served first at Polycrates' court, and on the death of his patron he was fetched to Athens by Pisistratus' son Hipparchus (Plato, *Hipparchus* 228b). It was in Athens, after travels to Thessaly, that he died in old age. The new eastern manners had their high priest, it seems, and he was later honoured by a statue on the Acropolis (Paus. 1.25.1).⁵⁰ Such observations may be merely of the trivialities of life in late archaic Athens but they seem to bring us close to the men who were soon to face the Persians and build Athens' empire.

⁴⁹ c 488, 57–61; D. C. Kurtz and J. Boardman, *Greek Vases in the J. Paul Getty Museum* 3 (1986) 35–70.

⁵⁰ c 557, 176f., 283–6.

CHAPTER 7*d*

COINAGE

COLIN KRAAY

Among the peoples living around or in touch with the Mediterranean basin, it was certainly the Greeks who, stimulated by certain Near Eastern practices, made coinage an institution peculiarly their own, for their non-Greek neighbours – the Etruscans, the Sicels, the Carthaginians, the Phoenicians, the Egyptians – despite preoccupations with trade, adopted coinage in frank imitation of the Greeks only at comparatively late dates. Yet the Greeks themselves do not seem to have regarded the development or, as they would have called it, the invention of coinage as marking either the beginning of a new era of commercial practice, or as the discovery of a new and more conveniently liquid medium in which to store surplus wealth. If they did see it in this way, remarkably little echo of it has come down to us in the literature of the period. The growth of wealth during the seventh and sixth centuries and its evil social and political consequences did indeed receive much comment in the writings of Theognis and Solon and others, but hardly any specific mention is made in this connexion of wealth in the peculiarly concentrated, tangible and portable form of coinage. Herodotus tells the story of the Lydian Pythius who claimed to possess, as explicitly surplus wealth, nearly four million gold Darics (VII.27–9); though the story is dated little more than a generation after the initiation of the Persian imperial coinage by Darius, it is only the scale of his wealth that is seen as remarkable, not the fact that so much was held in coin. Elsewhere (I.94) Herodotus remarks that the Lydians were the first people known to have used coins of gold and silver; unfortunately we cannot be sure whether Herodotus here means to credit the Lydians with the ‘invention’ of coinage as such, or with the introduction of gold and silver coins (as opposed to the earlier electrum), or more probably both. Although Herodotus was certainly aware of the use of electrum as a precious metal, as in his account of the gifts of Croesus to Delphi (I.50), he cannot be shown to have been aware that electrum was used for coinage before the

* Colin Kraay died in 1982. The editors are grateful to Daphne Nash and to Martin Price for making additions to the Bibliography for this chapter, and to the latter for the comments included here in nn. 13, 25, 30. See also *Pls. Vol.*, pls. 302–20.

time of Croesus, who is generally believed to be the first to mint coins separately in pure gold and pure silver.

Though the Greeks appear unwittingly to have developed in coinage a commercial device which was never thereafter abandoned, it is necessary to try to discern the circumstances and the conditions in which this happened, and so to try to divine the purpose of this fruitful innovation. Apart from the Herodotean statement of doubtful meaning already mentioned there is one other early Greek tradition about the origin of coinage which deserves some credence because it does provide a philologically acceptable explanation of some of the names given to Greek denominations. Various late writers, who, however, drew on sources at least as early as the fourth century B.C., attribute the earliest coinage (in some sources silver, in others gold) to Pheidon, king of Argos, who is said to have minted it in Aegina; a variant version gives the credit to the Aeginetans alone without the intervention of Pheidon. In addition it is reported that when Pheidon issued his silver coins, he withdrew from circulation the existing currency of iron spits which he dedicated to Hera at Argos; this early utensil currency explains the terms drachma (handful) and obolos (spit) later applied to silver denominations, for, whereas six silver obols would not fill even the smallest hand, six iron spits were as many as the hand could comfortably grasp.¹

This rather detailed tradition has certain points in its favour and others against it. In its favour may be cited:

1. a plausible explanation of the names of silver denominations, for some such explanation is certainly required;
2. the fact that the earliest identifiable Aeginetan coinage does seem to have a reasonable claim to be also the earliest silver coinage in mainland Greece, and very possibly the earliest *silver* coinage anywhere (though certainly not the earliest *coinage*, which was minted in Asia Minor in electrum);
3. the discovery in 1894 at the Argive Heraeum of a massive dedication of iron spits, though there is no means of proving that this was the original dedication of Pheidon;² and
4. the widespread trading activities of the Aeginetans, through which they could have experienced coinage in direct contact with East Greeks either in their home towns or in the emporium at Naucratis in Egypt which they both shared (Hdt. II.178; *CAH* III².3, 38–40).

Against the tradition may be quoted:

1. the fact that it was unknown to Herodotus, who describes Pheidon

¹ C 597, 177–80, 190–8. ² C 646, 61–3.

only as the man who instituted the measures of capacity used in the Peloponnese (VI.127);

2. the fact that Pheidon is not otherwise known to have ruled over Aegina; and
3. the difficulty that the most probable date for his reign – in the first half of the seventh century³ – now seems much too early for any of the coinages of mainland Greece.

The most serious objection is the last, for whereas fifty years ago it was not unreasonable to postulate the existence of Aeginetan coinage in the ninth or eighth centuries B.C. (and by implication in Asia Minor earlier still), the steadily increasing number of adequately recorded finds of archaic Greek coins has tended to define the context of the earliest coins of Aegina more and more closely as around the middle of the sixth century.⁴ If a tradition which seems to contain much of value is not to be wholly abandoned some means must be found of linking the high date of Pheidon with the low date of the known coins. The most plausible solution is to suppose that the transition from spits to coins was not simple and immediate. The essence of the change was the determination of the quantity of silver which was to be the equivalent in value within Pheidon's kingdom of the 'handful' of spits; this *weight* of silver, whether stamped with a device or not, was a drachma, and its sixths were obols. Such lumps of metal, uncoined but adhering to the weight standards of later coins, have been found at Ephesus and elsewhere, together with examples of carefully weighed ingots punch-marked on the reverse, but still lacking any device or type upon the obverse.⁵ Pheidon may thus have established for his realm a standard drachma (as a weight of metal); it is likely that that standard was the one known today as the Aeginetan with a drachma weighing about 6 gm, which was widely used in the Peloponnese as well as in Aegina itself. A simple confusion in later times, that a reform of the weight system must have affected coinage, has led to considerable misunderstanding over the dating of coinage itself. Similar developments will have taken place elsewhere producing local drachmae with different weights as at Corinth and Athens. Only in the sixth century, with the multiplication of different standards and the more general availability of silver, was the practice adopted in mainland Greece of stamping drachmae and other denominations with a distinctive device, a practice borrowed from the earlier electrum coinage of Asia Minor.

The factors which determined the various weights of local drachmae are probably now lost to us. It used to be argued that an element of

³ C 237, 70ff; *CAH* III².3, 338–9. ⁴ C 636, 12–22; C 627, 335–8. ⁵ C 639, 164.

competition for foreign markets was involved, and that the city which offered the heaviest drachma would have a commercial advantage over its rivals. But there is little evidence that the earliest coins were minted with an eye to foreign markets, except in one or two cases in which the existence of local mines ensured a surplus of precious metal for export over and above local needs. Coins were certainly exported, as the distribution of hoards shows, but once they had passed into an area from which they were unlikely to be traded back to their areas of origin, they were treated as so much bullion, to be subdivided regardless of the units in which they had been originally struck. Among the factors upon which the weights of coined drachmae depended will have been the media which the coins replaced; spits were not universal, for local currencies are also recorded in the form of axes and cauldrons, the value of each of which would have been different when expressed in silver. Another factor will have been the local availability of silver, which in itself may have varied from time to time; but though we may reasonably suppose that silver may have been cheaper at Athens, where there were local mines, than at some other places, this factor alone will hardly account for the difference between a drachma of *c.* 6 gm at Aegina and one of *c.* 2.7 gm at Corinth only thirty miles away.

The origin of coinage in mainland Greece has been described first, because for this area our ancient sources have provided a plausible account; but coinage certainly started at an earlier date in Asia Minor, where the most readily available metal was alluvial electrum rather than silver. In this area there is no evidence for a managed transition from a base metal to a precious metal currency as there is for mainland Greece; rather, the root of coinage seems to lie in a Near Eastern tradition of the use of precious metal in transactions of all sorts. This development can be illustrated on the one hand by the large cast silver ingots from the North Palace at Zincirli (Sendschirli) in south-east Anatolia, which are inscribed with the name of the local ruler Barrekub (*c.* 730 B.C.),⁶ and on the other by one of the earliest inscribed East Greek electrum coins which reads 'I am the seal of Phanes' above the figure of a grazing stag.⁷ From this explicit instance we can deduce that most of the numerous unscripted coin types of the period represent the seals or devices of local dynasts.

This dependence on royal or princely courts is further reflected in the system for smaller denominations adopted in Asia Minor. Whereas in mainland Greece the practice was to multiply up from the single utensil (spit, axe or cauldron) to produce the drachma and its multiples, in Asia Minor the unit was the large and valuable electrum stater, of which the

⁶ *c.* 594, 5–6. ⁷ *c.* 608, pl. 1.6.

smaller denominations were simply described as fractions – thirds, sixths and so on down to the minute ninety-sixth.

The precise chronology of the developments outlined above, whether in mainland Greece or Asia Minor, is still very uncertain. In the Peloponnese the transition from a utensil currency to a currency of silver appears to have begun under Pheidon in the first half of the seventh century but true coins are unlikely to have been minted at Aegina before the sixth century, and some would argue not before 550. But whatever the date of the earliest Aeginetan coins, it is generally agreed that the first electrum of Asia Minor must be earlier still, because in this series alone there are found, in immediate association with fully developed coins, a number of primitive stages of development, which are absent elsewhere. Unfortunately few early electrum coins have yet been found in dated archaeological contexts; the principal document remains the ninety-three electrum coins found in the British Museum excavations at Ephesus in 1904–5 at various points between the foundations of that temple of Artemis completed with the aid of Croesus in the mid-sixth century.⁸ But while the varieties included in these finds can all be dated with confidence earlier than the middle of the sixth century, they do not provide a representative sample down to that date, for most of the coins and the varied material found with them (jewellery, ivory statuettes, etc.) are associated mainly with the earliest structures on the site rather than with the subsequent modifications which immediately preceded the Croesus temple. It has therefore proved difficult to judge the lapse of time (*a*) from the most primitive to the most developed coins included in the deposit, and (*b*) from the end of the deposit to the erection of the Croesus temple.

Three divergent chronologies may be said to have emerged, an early, a middle, and a late. The early chronology claims that a stylistic analysis of certain human heads on early electrum coins shows that they are to be dated as early as the second quarter of the seventh century; if this be accepted, the phases of coinage before the emergence of a clear coin type must be earlier still, and will thus have started no later than the beginning of the century.⁹ This dating of early electrum coinage is arrived at independently of the finds from the Artemesium, for none of the types upon which the analysis is based was certainly represented in those finds. This line of argument appears to lead to the strange but not impossible conclusion that while the most primitive coins, dated to the early seventh century, were present in some numbers at the Artemesium, those dated on grounds of style to the second quarter of the century were wholly absent. Another possibly surprising result of this chronology is

⁸ C 639, 156–67; *CAH* III².3, 204–5. ⁹ C 648, 80–109.

that the duration of the electrum coinage which preceded the introduction of gold and silver by Croesus *c.* 560/550 is extended to about one hundred and fifty years. Admittedly this electrum coinage is extremely varied in its type-content, but technically and stylistically it is rather uniform; the impression is that the duration might, at most, be two or three generations rather than four or five.

The middle chronology is founded upon a careful archaeological analysis of the material, other than coins, found within the Basis of the Artemisium, which was the earliest structure on the site. The conclusion was that 'the objects . . . are almost all of them from the seventh century B.C., a very few are later, and one piece only is possibly of the eighth century'.¹⁰ The deposit was thus closed in the early sixth century, and this would also be the date of the latest coins included, some of which already had a fully developed obverse type. Yet the presence of a number of primitive varieties without fully developed obverse types would imply that the beginning of the whole process was not so far distant, perhaps no more than a couple of generations, suggesting a date near the middle of the seventh century.¹¹ On this view something like a generation is available to accommodate those later varieties of electrum which are not included in the Basis deposit, but which must be presumed to be earlier than the abandonment of electrum by Croesus *c.* 550.

The latest date for the coinage would follow not from numismatic arguments but from the interpretation of the Basis and its associated structures as the actual votive deposit for the mid-sixth-century temple. In this case the terminus for the deposit and its coins would be *c.* 560.¹² This very low date, however, leaves virtually no time for those phases of electrum coinage which are missing from the deposit but still have to be fitted in before *c.* 550 if it was Croesus who abandoned electrum in favour of pure gold and silver.¹³

Of these three alternatives the middle chronology seems on present evidence to be the most attractive. On this view something like a century or a little less sufficed for the whole course of electrum coinage in Asia Minor until the reform of Croesus (*i.e.*, *c.* 650/640–550); within this bracket the terminus of the Basis deposit would fall *c.* 590/580. The objection that this chronology allows insufficient time for the various phases of rebuilding on the site, all of which must precede the mid-sixth-century temple, may be met by interpreting these not so much as successive 'temples' (of which the superstructures were swept away by the builders of the Croesus temple) as repeated attempts within a short

¹⁰ *C* 612, 85. ¹¹ *C* 646, 165; *C* 610. ¹² *C* 636, 123.

¹³ *C* 644. (There are some who would even date the construction of the Artemisium to the time of Darius I, but this requires such a cavalier treatment of the evidence that the resulting mid-sixth-century date for the introduction of coinage seems rather implausible.)

period to consolidate on marshy ground the original Basis, which clearly remained the focus of the site throughout.¹⁴

The evolution in Asia Minor of issues of coins with distinctive obverse types by the early sixth century provides a *terminus post quem* for the coinages of mainland Greece, but this terminus serves to exclude only some of the higher dates which used to be proposed for the coinages of Aegina and Corinth; it does not necessarily follow that the electrum model was at all immediately copied in silver. Of the three principal mints of the Greek mainland, Aegina, Corinth and Athens, the first was in the sixth century the most productive, and by Greek tradition the earliest, but reliable evidence for the date of its first issues remains elusive.¹⁵ The earliest datable context for an Aeginetan coin is the foundation deposit of the audience-hall of Darius I at Persepolis, which can be no earlier than *c.* 515.¹⁶ Clearly the earliest Aeginetan coinage must have been minted at least several decades before this.

Two somewhat tenuous and imprecise lines of argument are available, one based on the relationship of Aeginetan coinage to the coinages of her neighbours, Athens and Corinth, the other on the possible relationship with the silver coinage of Croesus. The approximate chronology of early Corinthian coinage can be deduced from specimens found in a number of archaic hoards; from these it would appear that a head of Athena was first added to the coinage towards the end of the sixth century (*c.* 510/500). For the preceding phase without the Athena head some seventy obverse dies have been recorded,¹⁷ and though the actual number was probably higher, it is the sort of figure which might suggest a duration of not more than half a century in a moderately active mint, which in turn would place the beginning of the coinage around the middle of the century. If the Aeginetan coinage was the earliest, then it in turn could have begun as late as *c.* 570/560.

The case of Athens is more controversial because here we have literary evidence that Solon made certain changes in the Athenian coinage (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 10), which implies that the origin of the coinage must go back to at least the end of the seventh century. Most modern opinion has regarded this as too early, and has accordingly concluded that the prestige of Solon as a legislator has attracted to his name measures which were really much later in date. As in the case of Pheidon, there has been confusion between a reform of weight standards and a reform of coinage. In addition there are now known a number of archaic hoards the contents of which appear to confirm the conclusion that the owl coinage of Athens did not begin before the last quarter of the century.¹⁸ This, however, was not the first coinage of Athens, for it was preceded by a

¹⁴ C 634, 2-4. ¹⁵ C 636, 73-6. ¹⁶ C 632, no. 1789. ¹⁷ C 637, 41-56.

¹⁸ C 636, 61-8; C 626, 26-31.

much more modest series of issues, known collectively as the *Wappenmünzen*,¹⁹ the earliest of which need not be dated much before the middle of the century. There thus emerges the possible conclusion that the period 570–550 witnessed the beginning of Aeginetan coinage, followed quickly by the first coinages of Corinth and Athens. Given the rapidity with which the practice of coining seems to have spread over the Greek world, it is unlikely that a long period of time separated the earliest coinages of three states which all faced on to the same stretch of water.

At much the same time in the middle of the century, Lydia abandoned the traditional electrum in favour of related issues of pure gold and pure silver, which in turn provided the model for the Achaemenid royal coinage. Croesus needed coined money above all to hire mercenaries to protect his kingdom against the Persians (Hdt. 1.77); so long as these mercenaries were drawn from territories neighbouring Lydia, payment in the royal electrum currency was acceptable, but when Croesus extended his area of recruiting to mainland Greece, and allied himself with Sparta, his allies would no longer welcome payment in an alloy of uncertain composition which was not normally available in Greece, accepted though it might be in a distant kingdom. Pure gold and pure silver were, however, acceptable anywhere, and the fact that Croesus converted his gold and silver bullion into coin perhaps suggests that his Greek allies were already familiar with coined silver rather than that they subsequently adopted silver coinage after they had become aware of a Lydian prototype.

If we have been right in deducing that the coining of silver became established in central Greece in the second quarter of the sixth century, it must have been very soon after the middle of the century that coining commenced in South Italy.²⁰ Precise dates are, as usual, difficult to establish, but the destruction of Sybaris by Croton in 510 B.C. was certainly a major event in the history of the area, which disrupted the existing pattern of inter-state relations; it will also have brought to an end the main Sybarite coinage, which is clearly distinguishable from the minor coinages of the various fifth-century refoundations of Sybaris. In the absence of a detailed monograph on the archaic coinage of Sybaris its volume cannot be exactly determined, but it was clearly a major coinage, of which the duration can hardly be less than two or three decades; the contemporary coinages of Metapontum and Croton appear to have had similar durations. Since, however, it has usually been thought unlikely that coinage can have started in South Italy before it began in central Greece, the years around 550 B.C. constitute a *terminus post quem* for South Italy. This conclusion receives some support from the special case of

¹⁹ C 611; C 641; C 627, 326–33. ²⁰ C 618.

Velia, where coinage must be later than the foundation of the city *c.* 540 B.C.

The most remarkable characteristic of the archaic coinage of South Italy is its uniformity in both weight standard and fabric. The so-called incuse fabric, whereby the design of the obverse was repeated incuse or intaglio on the reverse, is peculiar to South Italy and was employed in common by Sybaris, Metapontum, Croton, Caulonia and Poseidonia;²¹ the only exception was Velia, founded from Phocaea in Ionia, where an Aegean type of flan and reverse punch was adopted. Similarly the four southernmost cities all minted a stater of about 8 gm, a weight used neither in Sicily nor in central Greece, though the system of sub-division was the same as the Corinthian; only Poseidonia further north used a lighter standard and a different system of subdivision introduced by the Phocaeans of Velia. This uniformity has sometimes been interpreted as evidence for a monetary convention between the cities, but a more probable explanation is that coinage of a distinctive pattern was initiated by the wealthiest and most powerful city in the area, and that neighbouring cities then conformed to this pattern for their own convenience in inter-city commerce. According to the historical tradition that pre-eminent city can have been no other than Sybaris.

There remains Sicily, where the earliest coinages are to be found at the three Chalcidian colonies, Himera, Zancle and Naxos, and at Selinus. The Chalcidian colonies all minted a denomination which at 5.70 gm was equivalent to a third of a Chalcidian stater, but otherwise there is no uniformity among the four mints, nor do their coinages appear to be derived from foreign models; while Naxos has a full reverse type throughout (remarkable at so early a date),²² Zancle has a pattern of reverse punch unknown elsewhere, and though the square punch divided into triangles at Himera could be remotely derived from Aegina, the particular development is purely local.²³ Selinus stands apart, for the weight standard, though erratic, appears to coincide with the Corinthian, and the flat fabric of the coinage is in general reminiscent of that of the archaic issues of Corinth; a few specimens have been observed to have been restruck upon Corinthian coins, so that the latter were evidently known locally. In short, unlike what happened in South Italy, the earliest Sicilian coinages appear to have developed independently in each area to serve local needs; this picture is reinforced by the contents of the earliest hoards from the area, each of which usually contains only local coinage,²⁴ and thus stands in strong contrast to the very mixed character of most later Sicilian hoards.

Problems of chronology in Sicily are similar to those elsewhere; a

²¹ *c.* 605. ²² *c.* 598. ²³ *c.* 623. ²⁴ *c.* 632, nos. 2059, 2061–3.

general context is discernible, but the evidence for more detailed conclusions is still indecisive. The early coinages of Zancle, Naxos and Himera were brought to an end respectively at least by 494, *c.* 490 and *c.* 483, when each of these cities lost their independence (and sometimes their existence) to the powerful new tyrannies based on the Straits, on Gela (later on Syracuse), and on Acragas; the early coinage of Selinus possibly ends *c.* 480 with the defeat at Himera of the Carthaginians, whom the Selinuntines had supported.²⁵ For the period before these early fifth-century dates a careful comparison of the heads of Dionysus on the coinage of Naxos with works of sculpture and vase-painting has allowed the nineteen obverse dies to be distributed over the two generations from 550 to 490 despite little change or development within the coinage as a whole.²⁶ The very much larger coinage of Himera with about 150 obverse dies displays much more internal variation, including the addition of a reverse type to an originally single-type coinage, and the occurrence of a number of marks indicating a succession of controlling authorities.²⁷ The intensive patterns of die-linking, however, are a sign that many obverse dies were used within short periods, so that the mint is unlikely to have opened much before 540; dates in the first half of the century, which used to be proposed, are now usually dismissed as being too early. Zancle with about sixty known obverse dies occupies an intermediate position in terms of volume, but is unlikely to be far from the other two in date. Slight as the evidence is, coinage appears to have started in Sicily in the third quarter of the sixth century, very shortly, that is, after it began in South Italy, though in neither case does one area appear to have influenced the other to any significant degree.

The practice of coining is thus seen to have been spreading across the Greek world during the sixth century, and by its last quarter to have become established in all the main areas of Greek settlement, though it was still a rather recent phenomenon in the West. In the same period a more or less standard format had been evolved, despite the persistence of certain regional peculiarities; electrum had been abandoned, except at a few mints, presumably because the metal (or its major constituent gold) was not readily available outside Asia Minor; and silver had become the preferred material. Except in occasional emergencies gold was not employed for coinage outside Lydia and Persia. Despite the variation in local weight standards, the acceptable size for a coin was generally agreed within quite narrow limits, as was the requirement that it be struck in very pure metal. The designs stamped on coins were the distinguishing

²⁵ *c.* 595, 40–5. (One fixed point in the chronology which will survive recent attempts drastically to lower the dates of archaic coins is the coinage struck by the Samian exiles who settled at Zancle for the short period 494–489 B.C. Their coins depict the lion scalp from the statue of Hera on Samos and the distinctive prow of a Samaina galley (see Fig. 79).) ²⁶ *c.* 598, 29–41. ²⁷ *c.* 623.

devices of the issuing authorities, whether personal or corporate, and these authorities seem to have always been public rather than private; as the number of such authorities increased the devices were quickly supplemented by explanatory inscriptions. By the end of the century a secondary design was beginning to be added to the reverse in place of the uninformative geometrical punch.

What purpose were these coins intended to serve, and why were they so readily adopted all over the Greek world?²⁸ Since the Greeks themselves have not provided answers to these questions, plausible answers have to be reconstructed by observing the characteristics and behaviour of the coins. The natural assumption that because ancient coins are recognizably coins they were intended to perform the same function as modern coins, namely to serve the purposes of retail trade, encounters immediate difficulties. The essential nature of retail trade lies in a vast number of transactions each of very low value; to serve such a trade, not only are very low denominations needed, but they need to be available in large quantities. Neither of these conditions can be met in early Greek coinage before the development of base metal coinage from the late fifth century onwards. Even the smallest electrum fraction, the ninety-sixth of a stater, has a relatively high intrinsic value because about half its content is gold, and equally small coins were rarely minted in silver in the archaic period. Although the impression that the archaic coinages consist overwhelmingly of large silver coins may be distorted owing to the predominance of the higher denominations in hoards, from which most of our evidence comes, it is not difficult to point to coinages for which no really small denominations are known. For example, the earliest coinages of Syracuse and Gela include nothing below the didrachm, and at Croton fractions of the stater (8 gm) are virtually unknown before a date well into the fifth century; at Athens the huge output of tetradrachms in the archaic period was accompanied by very few fractions indeed. Greek coinage cannot have been designed to serve the needs of retail trade in the first place.

For overseas trade large denominations have usually been preferred to small in all periods, and the evidence of hoards shows that Greek coins did in fact travel abroad, yet the pattern of hoards does not encourage the view that the export of silver coins in exchange for goods was the primary purpose of coinage. Before looking at this pattern it is necessary to remember how one-sided it may be. A coin from area *A* discovered in area *B*, whether in a hoard, as a single site-find, or restruck with local dies, has unquestionably moved from *A* to *B*, probably in the course of trade, if the phenomenon is frequently repeated, but possibly also as the result

²⁸ c 620.

of loot, piracy or the payment of taxes. But the absence of such finds need not mean that such movements did not take place, for imported coins could either be attracted back to their places of origin, where their use was probably obligatory in official payments, or be melted down to provide bullion for the local coinages. In neither case would the movement of the coins be easy to detect. In the archaic period, however, such concealed movements were perhaps less likely than they may have become later, for most coinages were still comparatively new and the movements seem to have been modest except in one or two special cases.

The most impressive group of archaic hoards are those buried within the western satrapies of the Persian empire between *c.* 520 and 470.²⁹ Sometimes of considerable size, their contents are drawn from all the mints active in the Aegean and Cyprus (though rarely from South Italy and Sicily), and they often include silver bullion in the form of ingots, or plate or jewellery. Clearly these hoards represent a substantial transfer of silver bullion (partly in the form of coin) from sources of silver in the Greek world to the Persian satrapies whose tribute to the Persian king was assessed in silver (Hdt. iii.89–93). Much of this transfer will have come about through trade in grain, flax and Near Eastern luxuries, but by the end of the sixth century tribute to the occupying Persian power from the mining areas of Macedonia and Thrace may also be involved, for the coinages of these areas form a substantial element in most hoards. Nevertheless, though Greek silver certainly flowed into the Persian empire, and though the empire may have stimulated Greek production of silver by providing a ready market, it cannot have had anything to do with the original development of Greek coinage which took place at a much earlier date.

Finds elsewhere in the Greek world provide little evidence to support the view that external trade was the original purpose of Greek coinage. Mention has already been made of the earliest Sicilian hoards which contain only local coinage; at no date is there evidence for Sicilian coinage travelling abroad in any quantity, though from the early fifth century there is ample evidence for a general circulation of all local coinages within the island. The same is true of the South Italian coinages which never crossed even into Sicily, though Italian hoards contain a considerable mixture of local coinages. Lycia and Cyprus form similar closed areas from which small groups of coins escape only into the very mixed Near Eastern hoards.³⁰

²⁹ *c.* 636, 13–22.

³⁰ (It is, of course, true that it is more expensive to produce coinage than to use raw bullion, and it may be regarded as certain, particularly where coins are found in a limited geographical area, that the value of the coin was fixed to be in excess of its weight as silver bullion. The profit accruing to the state through the striking of coins was probably one of the more cogent reasons why coinage became so widely attractive.)

In mainland Greece it might have been expected that at least Aegina, a state which had both a reputation for far-flung trade and an ample coinage, would provide evidence for the dispersal of that coinage through trade. Yet even in this case, though small groups of Aeginetan coins are a feature of most Near Eastern hoards, the major hoards of Aeginetan coins are confined to the Aegean islands and Crete – an area, that is, comparatively close to Aegina and using the same weight standard.³¹ Other examples of the same phenomenon are provided by Acanthus and Mende where in each case a major hoard of the local coinage comes from the site of the city.³²

In Asia Minor localized early finds are few, but from its very nature as an alloy, the intrinsic value of which could not be easily determined, electrum coinage did not meet with universal acceptance, but was confined to those areas where it was minted and accepted by convention or through the political authority of the Lydian kings.

To this picture of coinages staying for the most part close to their points of origin there are two obvious exceptions, both of them significantly areas which possessed their own local silver mines, Athens and the Thracio-Macedonian region. The earliest coinage of Athens, the so-called *Wappenmünzen*, had been a small local coinage starting, as was suggested above, before the middle of the sixth century. In the last quarter of the century this was replaced by a much more explicitly Athenian coinage, which very soon came to be minted on an enormous scale from metal won by intensive exploitation of the mines of Laurium.³³ From the end of the century this Athenian coinage with an owl as its reverse type begins to be found all over the Greek world, sometimes in considerable quantity – in Sicily, South Italy, mainland Greece, the Aegean islands, south Anatolia, Syria, Egypt and Cyrenaica. This may be an example of a coinage minted with an eye to overseas markets and founded on an assured supply of bullion, but if so this was a secondary development having nothing to do with the circumstances in which coinage was originally initiated. Likewise, the coinages of those Thracio-Macedonian tribes who controlled mines (Hdt. VII.112) were often minted in exceptionally large denominations which regularly found their way into Near Eastern hoards, but this too was a secondary development, for coinage certainly did not originate in this area.

If coinages normally tended to be retained in their areas of origin rather than dispersed abroad in trade, then their original purpose must be sought within the issuing state. If retail trade, for which archaic coinage is unsuitable because of its high intrinsic value, be excluded, the only remaining function is that of serving the purposes of the state by

³¹ c 632, nos. 1, 6–8. ³² c 632, nos. 357, 360. ³³ c 617.

providing a standard medium in which to make or receive payments. Receipts would include taxes, fines, and harbour-dues, payments would cover the salaries of public officials, pay of mercenaries, and expenditure on public buildings or monuments. That some such public purpose lies behind the institution of coinage is assured by the invariable use of the civic badge or name as the design stamped on the coin; even when a personal name appears, that individual is either himself the ruler of the state or the person delegated by the government to produce coinage from time to time. There is no evidence in the Greek world for coinage ever being produced by the private initiative of merchants or bankers.

Coinage may thus be seen to represent a state's savings or surplus wealth, which can be stored in this form until needed for use. Created for this purpose the primary tendency will be not to disperse it in trade, but to retain a rare and valuable commodity within the area which has won it, except in the case of those few and fortunate communities who were blessed with local mines, and so could afford to export what was surplus to their local needs. Seen in this light the genitive in which the ethnic is normally expressed is not simply an informative statement – '(this is a coin) of the Syracusans'; it is a statement of ownership – '(this is the property) of the Syracusans'. Similarly the design stamped on the coin is the state seal which marks it as state property; only in a secondary sense does it become a guarantee of quality or weight for those who have learned by experience that it is so.

The speed with which the practice of coining spread across the Greek world cannot have been due solely to its practical convenience, otherwise the neighbours of the Greeks, many of whom had had a far longer experience of complex financial dealings, would have adopted it more promptly or even have evolved it first. The cause must lie in the totally different characters of the large centralized eastern kingdom on the one hand and the small, numerous and highly competitive city states on the other. In the former the king was the supreme, unchallenged authority, who had no need within his kingdom to emphasize his difference from a distant neighbour who might well be foreign in both race and language. A Greek city, however, took every opportunity to distinguish itself from a neighbour only a few miles away, which shared a common language and culture. If coinage represents a city's property, that property must not only be clearly marked, but must differ in outward form as much as possible from the properties of neighbouring cities. We have seen this happening in the earliest coinages of Sicily, and the same is true of mainland Greece, where the coinages of Athens, Aegina and Corinth are all quite distinct in fabric as well as coin-types; South Italy is exceptional in having a common fabric perhaps imposed by the pre-eminence of Sybaris in the area. Sometimes the aesthetic quality of the coinage

became a matter of national pride, as when Gelon celebrated the transference of his capital from Gela to Syracuse by minting the most splendid and elaborate coins that the Greeks had yet seen.³⁴

In the Greek world the sixth century B.C. marked the culmination of a long period of social, political and economic development; as has recently been said, 'cities, coinage, workshops, tradelines within and without the Aegean world, and a richly articulated social structure existed in 500, but not in 800'.³⁵ In this complex society there had evolved quite recently many circumstances in which an accurate measure of value was required, and one in which multiple payments or receipts on different scales could be expressed with precision: the payment of troops, the purchase of labour or materials for architectural enterprises, the exaction of taxes or fines, and the payment of salaries. The sale of coinage could also be a source of profit to the state, for by making its use obligatory in official transactions citizens and foreigners could be forced to acquire the coinage for more than its value as bullion; there are even hints that the state could sometimes increase its profit by declaring a coinage invalid, and so forcing its users to incur the cost of acquiring a new issue (Arist. *Oec.* II, 1347a). Such a valuable commodity, originally created by the state for its own convenience and profit, rapidly became a measure and a store of private wealth available for both internal and external transactions.

³⁴ c 608, pl. 7.30. ³⁵ c 60, 5.

CHAPTER 7e

TRADE

C. ROEBUCK

By the time of the Persian Wars, when the great sea battles, Lade in 494 B.C., Salamis and Mycale in 480 and 479, brought sea power into the political reckoning of Greeks and Persians, the Greeks had worked out a far-ranging trade by sea.¹ The Aegean region had become an important market centre. Rural towns of the eighth century had developed into city states, still largely agricultural, but increasingly dependent on the goods of trade for well-being and continued growth. Some cities, by the early fifth century, had substantial populations: Athens perhaps over 100,000 free men, women and children, and the Ionian cities, collectively, more than 250,000.² In the cities there was a wealthy, if small, upper class, traditionally eager for luxuries, and a growing middle group, able to buy beyond their needs of subsistence. Some cities produced craft goods, olive oil and wine for export, as well as for local use, and all needed the constituents of bronze (copper and tin) and iron, scarce in the Aegean, for tools and weapons. Silver, mined in Attica and Thrace and found in small deposits in some Aegean islands, was in general demand for the new Aegean coinages, and electrum, available in Lydia, was used for jewellery and the coins issued by the Greek cities of western Asia Minor. Silver was needed, too, to pay for grain from Egypt and for the luxuries and exotics from the Levant. The slender threads of commerce, apparent in the eighth century in ventures from the Aegean to western Italy (Ischia) for metals and to the Levant (Al Mina) for eastern luxuries, had been woven into a complex net. Professional traders, carrying goods along regularly travelled routes, were busy from north-eastern Spain to Egypt and had penetrated into the Adriatic and Black Seas. In the cities market-places provided facilities for business and retail sale. Pottery and metal-working establishments served the local market and offered their goods for sale to traders collecting a cargo for export. Production and trade were intertwined, to serve the local city, to distribute goods among other cities of the Aegean and to carry them to and from the overseas markets, the Greek colonies and foreign countries beyond the Aegean.

¹ C. G. Starr, *CAH* III².3, ch. 45a.

² Athens: c 108, 3; Ionia: c 259, 21–3.

While the range of the Greeks was wide, they had to share trade in both the western and south-eastern basins of the Mediterranean with Phoenicians. In the west the North African coast from Syrtes to the Atlantic, the coast of Spain below Emporium (Ampurias) and the western end of Sicily were ringed with Phoenician trading posts, some originally established by Phoenicians from Tyre and Sidon, some secondary foundations from Carthage. This region and its routes of access by the islands – Malta to Sicily and on to Sardinia or to the Balearics and Spain – were protected jealously by Carthage. Direct access to the tin, copper and silver available in southern Spain was denied to the Greeks from the latter part of the sixth century, although Samian and Phocaeans traders had brought back valuable cargoes to the Aegean a century earlier. Presumably the metals might be obtained still but Phoenician traders would have reaped the initial profit. Greeks and Phoenicians did trade at Selinus in Sicily and both shared the rich Etruscan market.³ Yet Etruscans did not want Greek settlements in their region. They had combined with the Carthaginians to force the Phocaeans out of Alalia on Corsica *c.* 540 B.C. (see *CAH* III².3, 142). Massilia, founded by 600 B.C., and Emporium remained the chief ports of call in the far-western Mediterranean.

In the Levant, the home area of Phoenician trade from the Bronze Age, there were few Greeks. Some did live in trading posts on the Syrian coast, like Al Mina, along with Cypriots and the native population. Yet the trade itself was significant, for from this region had come the eastern goods, textiles, metalware, faience, jewellery and ivories, which had so strongly influenced the development of Greek crafts in the eighth and seventh centuries. They were brought to the Aegean by Greek traders, mainly Aegean islanders at first, and by Phoenicians and Cypriots, plying to Rhodes and Crete and, less frequently, into the Aegean. In addition to these luxury goods, mainly from North Syrian and Phoenician workshops, there were copper from Cyprus, and exotics, incense and spices, from Arabia. Probably these were obtained by Phoenicians in Egypt, to whom the Saïte kings had granted a trading post in the eastern Delta. After the Assyrian hold on the Levant was broken, the Babylonian and Persian governments continued to tolerate Greek traders and found use in their armies for Greek mercenary soldiers but excluded Greek settlement. The south-eastern Mediterranean remained primarily a Phoenician area of trade.

The Greeks, however, had made a large part of the Mediterranean, the Adriatic and the Black Seas their own in the process of colonization.⁴ In addition, they had gained regular trading privileges in Egypt and

³ Before the sixth century there is little trace of Phoenician trading in Sicily. Then Etruscans, too, were trading there. ⁴ See *CAH* III².3, 83–189.



Map 13. Greek and Phoenician trade in the period of the Persian Wars.

Etruria. The Greek colonies, particularly in the first few generations of growth, were a market for Aegean craft goods, pottery and metalware, for olive oil, both for cooking and for cosmetic purposes, and for wine. As the colonies grew in population and developed their own local crafts and agriculture, they imported fewer products of this kind but became better markets for the fine and luxury goods of the Aegean and those brought by Greek carriers from the Levant and Egypt. Etruria, too, became such a market as its towns were urbanized and the wealth of its upper classes grew. However, in the Levant and in Egypt Greek craft goods could not compete with those from the long-established and skilful native workshops, nor did olive oil and Greek wine become staples of native diet. Resident Greeks provided a small market for these, but for the native commodities which they desired Greeks had to pay mainly in silver. The goods carried for trade, then, were conditioned by the nature of the markets that they had to serve in Aegean cities, Greek colonies and foreign lands.

Until the latter part of the seventh century Greek trade was relatively simple in organization and on a small scale. Traders, mainly from Corinth, from Chalcis and Eretria in Euboea and from the larger islands of the Cyclades, carried goods needed in the new colonies in South Italy and Sicily into which a stream of migration was flowing. Corinthian pottery was a particularly important import for the western colonies,⁵ but the traders also brought some luxuries from the Levant to supply the growing demand in Etruria. Some Greek colonies also found profit in this trade by acting as ports of call on the sailing routes, especially to the west and conspicuously Corcyra, from which ships crossed the Adriatic to strike the Italian coast or ventured farther north. While Corcyra did not become an important producing centre for export, like its founding city, Corinth, the Corcyreans were able to assert their independence of Corinth by a sea battle in 667 B.C. Colonies in South Italy and Sicily, too, like Rhegium and Zancle, controlling the Strait of Messina, not only offered harbourage but soon began to play a role as middlemen in trade with native Italians.⁶ Probably for the Aegean Greeks the primary goal of trade was still the metals for which they had come originally to Ischia. The colonies themselves would have produced little for export as yet.

Traders from the same cities as those engaged in the western trade were active in the south-eastern Mediterranean, but in that region in the seventh century there was no large Greek colonial region. Despite the great effect on Greek craft production of goods obtained from the east, their volume must have been relatively slight, for the Aegean market for luxuries was small and the Greeks had relatively little with which to pay.

⁵ For example, the archaic pottery from Megara Hyblaea: D 570, 9–10. ⁶ D 567, 182–3.

Probably piracy, not only trade, was a motive for Greek sailors to venture east. For this route Rhodes, situated off the tip of south-west Asia Minor, played a somewhat similar role to that of Corcyra for the western route. The island's towns, Lindus, Ialysus and Camirus, provided harbourage on both east and west coasts for Greeks from the Aegean and for Cypriots and Phoenicians sailing to Crete or into the Aegean. Perhaps the lack of a colonial market in the south east helps to explain the relative slowness of Rhodes, in contrast to Corinth, in developing its production for export. But Rhodes did respond quickly to the change in the range and character of trade which set in later.

After 650 B.C. the range was extended to Spain in the far west, and by 600 Massilia and Emporium provided ports of call for those Greeks coasting north along the Italian shore who wished to avoid the Phoenicians in Sardinia and the Balearics. Both colonies, too, provided links with the native peoples in north-eastern Spain and the Rhône valley in France.⁷ Trading posts were founded, too, in Egypt and the Black Sea. In the course of the sixth century the import of pickled fish from the Black Sea and of grain from its north shore⁸ and from Egypt increased the food supply of Aegean cities. Egyptian luxuries now could be obtained directly and new commodities, linen and papyrus, were brought into the Aegean. The trade in metals was enlarged by iron from the region of Sinope in the Black Sea and by new sources of precious metals: silver from Thrace and Laurium in Attica and electrum from Lydia. Consequently, by the time of the Persian Wars the organization of trade had become complex, and its list of commodities ranged from luxuries and metals to cargoes in some bulk of grain, olive oil and wine. Possibly, timber, too, was carried on some scale, for it is unlikely that local sources could supply the big pieces of fir and pine needed for ship construction and monumental building. To judge from the size of the navies used in the Persian Wars, the traffic was substantial. Probably Corinth obtained timber for its own ship-building and supplied other Aegean states, like Aegina and Athens, from north-west Greece and perhaps from Macedonia. The enlarged volume of trade was facilitated in the latter part of the sixth century by the use of precious metals,⁹ particularly silver, for international exchange. While the new coins were

⁷ D 28, 137–61. See *CAH* III².3, 139ff. Trade with the Celts became substantial in the sixth century.

⁸ C 259, 116–30. C 254 argues that export of wheat began only in the first quarter of the fifth century; C 243 considers that the goal of early Greek trade in the Black Sea, before 700 B.C., was Chalybian iron. However, a fragmentary graffito, found on Berezan Island and dated in the first half of the sixth century, attests trade in grain at that time; it lists sums from trade by a visiting Ionian merchant. Also, a letter on a lead tablet from a merchant to his son, dated in the second half of the sixth century, has a reference to trade; the son lived in Olbia but the letter was found on Berezan (C 586). ⁹ See further above, Ch. 7d.

not used as money in such transactions, large coins were a form of bullion to be tested and weighed in transactions. Also monetary exchange was fast replacing barter in local trade, to judge by the issues of fractional denominations in Athens, Corinth and the Ionian region.

In this expansion of trade the activity of Eastern Greeks was particularly noticeable.¹⁰ As well as Rhodians, traders from the big islands of Samos and Chios and from the coastal cities of Phocaea and Miletus, all advantageously sited at termini of the cross-Aegean sailing routes and as way stations on the voyage from Rhodes to the Hellespont, joined the Corinthians and islanders. It was a Samian, Colaeus (below, p. 456), who opened the trade in metals from Spain *c.* 640 B.C., and the new trading regions of Egypt and the Black Sea were developed mainly by Ionians acting primarily from commercial motives. Egypt permitted Greeks to settle at Naucratis only for purposes of trade and Herodotus characterizes the Black Sea settlements as *emporía*, trading centres (IV.17.1, 20.1, 24, 108).

The Ionians, on the seaboard of Asia Minor, enjoyed one advantage denied to other Greeks. Lydia, with which a close economic relationship was worked out, provided a hinterland for which the Ionians acted as middlemen. Although Lydian kings sought to extend political control over the Ionians, first by *razzias* into their territory and then by alliance, they did not try to establish a seapower based on Ionian ports. In fact, the islands Samos and Chios remained independent, and Miletus, secure in its peninsular position, was able to repel Lydian attacks. Phocaea, at the mouth of the Hermus River, as it then flowed into the sea, was well situated to communicate with Sardis. In Lydia the Ionians found a market for their own craft products and an employer for their labour. They bought Lydian products for their own use and for distribution in trade. Most important was Lydian electrum, used for jewellery and for the coins issued by Ionian states and by Lydia itself (see above, Ch. 7*d*). While the old view of the Ionian cities as the termini of long routes from the Anatolian plateau and beyond is no longer accepted, Ionia and Lydia were tied together by a network of roads which were used by pack-animals and carts and brought goods to the coast for carriage by sea.

The growth of this network of trade in the several centuries before the Persian Wars was not seriously retarded by war or foreign occupation. Clashes with Phoenicians in the areas where both traded seem to have been piratical in nature. The Persians did not apply economic sanctions in war nor interfere overtly with trade in the lands which they occupied. After 540 B.C., when Ionia was subject to Persia, and after 512, when Thrace was a Persian province, the Persian control seems to have been a

¹⁰ *c.* 259, 131–7.

mixture of benefit and harm. Probably the Persian governor in Thrace siphoned off some of the silver, sought by Ionians for their trade with Egypt,¹¹ into the king's treasury, and Phocaeans and Samians do seem to have turned their commercial attention even more to the west. But for Ionians in general the patronage of Persian satraps replaced that of Lydian kings, and the construction of the great Persian palaces offered them employment (below, p. 478 and Pls. Vol., pl. 234). Persian control of the waterway between the Black Sea and the Aegean did not stop the grain transports (Hdt. vii.147), and there is little evidence that the campaigns of Xerxes resulted in more than a temporary slackening in Greek trade in the Levant and Egypt. Indeed, Greeks may have been able to move about more freely in Egypt under Persian government than in the time of the Saïte kings. Greeks continued to use Naucratis (cf. *CAH* III².3, 134f), and Athenian silver came into Egypt and the Levant in increasing volume. Ionian production and trade may have been a partial casualty of the wars but certainly that of Athens was not.

In the Aegean area internecine Greek wars, fought largely on land and for brief periods, would have had little effect on the trade by sea, but Greek piracy did interfere. The practice was endemic along the trade routes and limited only by the trading cities themselves out of concern for their own waters. Thucydides (i.7–8, 13) couples the suppression of piracy with the emergence of sea powers, notably that of Corinth, and with the rise of commerce. While Corinth and Polycrates of Samos made their own waters safe and their harbours secure, beyond the reach of their own warships trade was risky for the slow merchant vessels. Sailors in harbour towns along the routes, particularly in north-western Greece and in the small Aegean islands, could sally out to cut off a solitary merchantman. Yet there was general concern to secure freedom of navigation and safety of trade. Very soon after the Persian Wars, Athens and the Delian League postponed their vendetta against Persia to raid Carystus on Euboea and Scyros, presumably to stamp out pirate nests. Even the pirates could agree to respect each other's persons and property, although regarding foreign ships as fair game, as a treaty between Oeanthea and Chaleum in western Locris, made c. 450, indicates.¹²

We can trace the trading activity of various cities to some degree by studying the production and distribution of their pottery fabrics. For example, certain amphorae, containers for oil or wine, recognizable by individual shape and fabric or stamp of origin, mark Chios as an early shipper of wine and Athens as a producer of olive oil. The track of Corinthian trade may be traced by the distribution of its ubiquitous

¹¹ c 53, 239–40.

¹² *IG* ix².1717; M. N. Tod, *GHI* 1, no. 34.

aryballoi, small jugs for scented oil. We can deduce, too, from the replacement of Corinthian pottery by Athenian, that Athens captured the export market for fine pottery in the second quarter of the sixth century, thanks to the superior quality of its wares. The mosaic picture of trading made from such evidence, however, may be misleading, for the pottery reflects production rather than carriage. For example, we know from merchants' marks that much of the pottery exported from Athens in the latter part of the sixth century was carried by Ionians and Aeginetans (below, p. 458). It is also convenient, rather than accurate, to speak of the trading activity of city states, for it was the producers and traders who established the pattern of trade, not the policies of their governments. Most Greek cities, from their situation inland or from their lack of special resources to produce for export, were local market centres. Others, situated advantageously on the sea routes, like Chalcis and Aegina, might engage in a carrying trade, peddling the goods of others. In the case of Aegina this seems to have been on a considerable scale. But the leaders of Greek trade were those cities which combined the advantage of siting with resources to produce goods for export beyond their local needs. In the sixth century these were Corinth, Chios, Samos, Miletus and Rhodes. Athens, too, became an important producer in this period, particularly of fine pottery and olive oil, but the carriage of its goods seems to have been largely in the hands of foreigners. Perhaps the examples of Corinth as a centre of trade in the Aegean, and of Naucratis as a trading post in a foreign land, to which traders of many cities resorted, will illustrate the nature of Greek trade.

For almost two hundred years, from the mid-eighth century, Corinth, situated almost literally at the cross-roads of Greece by land and by sea, was the leading trading city of Greece and a centre to which traders resorted. The trade went both to the west through the Gulf of Corinth and east across the Aegean to the Levant. Each route had its particular terminus, the harbour at Lechaem for the west and Cencreae, on the Saronic Gulf, for the Aegean and the east. *C.* 600 B.C. a roadway, the *diolkos* (see *CAH* III². 3, 349, fig. 52), was constructed for hauling ships across the Isthmus.¹³ Corinthian production kept pace with the trade in a mutually stimulative fashion.¹⁴ Large clay beds near the city provided the material for a terracotta industry which supplied much of the pottery used by western colonies in the eighth and seventh centuries and architectural revetments for a wide local region. The owners of the workshops skilfully adapted their products to the markets. In addition to ordinary household vessels, small cups, jugs, dishes and the like, special containers – aryballoi and alabastro – were made to hold scented oil, and

¹³ O. Broneer, *Antiquity* 22 (1958) 80. ¹⁴ *c.* 260.

bowls – pyxides and cothons – for salves. It is probable that the contents, too, were manufactured in Corinth. When the market began to flag, the potters invented new shapes and modified old ones, and, to satisfy particular local needs, produced special vases for burials and figurines for dedication. The industry was energetic and imaginative, and its goods, to judge from merchants' marks in the Corinthian alphabet, were carried by Corinthian traders. From the western trade presumably came the metals to supply the Corinthian bronze workers, famous for their products in antiquity. Probably, too, Corinth still got timber for its ship-building and silver from north-west Greece and, in the sixth century at least, grain from Sicily and Egypt. While its trade in fine pottery was largely lost to Athens after 575, Corinth's production and export of its other commodities sustained it as an important trading city until the Peloponnesian War.

Regular Greek trade with Egypt began relatively late, in the last quarter of the seventh century, and then by permission of the Saïte government. At that time Greeks were allowed to use a quarter of the Egyptian town of Naucratis in the western Delta for trading and residence.¹⁵ It was not only traders, mainly East Greeks, who came seasonally for grain and other Egyptian commodities, but also craftsmen and Greek women, as prostitutes or wives, because intermarriage with Egyptians was prohibited. Some of the early traders and settlers founded sanctuaries for their native gods, and, through the pottery dedicated by them and the description of Naucratis by Herodotus (II.178–9), we can learn something of the community which gradually formed. Its basic organization was set in the reign of Amasis, when, in addition to the earlier, individual sanctuaries, a large sanctuary, the Hellenium, was established for common use. Although the nature of the political arrangements is controversial, it is obvious that the Greeks were permitted a considerable degree of local autonomy, so that something like a Greek polis evolved. Probably representation of the various Greeks involved was worked through membership in the Hellenium, for Herodotus states that its members selected *prostatai* to administer their affairs. Possibly the community was dual, made up of the permanent Greek residents of Naucratis and those who came to trade.¹⁶ In any case, except for a mercenary camp at Tell Defenneh, the Greeks in Egypt seem to have been concentrated in Naucratis. Perhaps enough Greek pottery has been found at Memphis to indicate a small resident group, but from elsewhere in Egypt there is only a scattering of sherds. Egyptian goods, then, were obtained from Egyptians who brought them to Naucratis, where they would be stored until cargoes were made up for shipment on

¹⁵ c 5; cf. *CAH* III².3, 134.

¹⁶ c 5, 29–33; I have followed my own reconstruction of the organization in c 54.

Greek vessels. Presumably representatives of Greek traders made up a part of the population, so that in them and in the Greek craftsmen who settled there the traders would have found a small market for pottery, olive oil and wine. The Greeks could pay with their own craft goods, made in imitation of native Egyptian products, but the evidence of payment in silver to Egyptians for grain, linen and papyrus is apparent in the hoards of coins and pieces of silver found elsewhere in the Delta.¹⁷ This concentration of Greek life in their own quarter of Naucratis, despite the varied origin of the traders and settlers, resulted in a lasting Greek enclave, for Naucratis was counted as a Greek city in the Ptolemaic period.

In Etruria, too, the activity of Greek traders seems to have been regulated in somewhat the same fashion as at Naucratis, although their presence was more transitory and we do not know of specific restrictions. The excavation of Graviscae, the port of Tarquinia, revealed a sanctuary of Hera in one quarter of the port town.¹⁸ To judge from the dedicatory inscriptions on pottery in the Ionian alphabet, most of the traders were Samians, but a stone anchor was dedicated to Aeginetan Apollo by a certain Sostratus. Presumably this was the famous trader mentioned by Herodotus (iv. 152; Fig. 39; pp. 365, 669). In any case this dedication indicates that the sanctuary was in common use by the various Greek traders carrying cargoes to Etruria.

While most Greek traders remain anonymous or are known by name or a few initials scratched on pottery, a few became sufficiently famous to have a record in tradition. Herodotus tells the story of Colaeus (iv. 152), the Samian trader who opened the metal trade in the far west c. 640 B.C. While on a venture to Egypt, Colaeus put into the island of Plataea, offshore from Cyrene in Libya, where he found a group of Therans trying to found a colony. From Plataea Colaeus was blown by a great storm through the Mediterranean and into the Atlantic by the straits of Gibraltar as far as Tartessus in south-western Spain. From Tartessus, previously unvisited by traders, he got a cargo of metal, returned safely to his native Samos, and, in gratitude, dedicated one tenth of his profits to his native goddess, Hera, in the form of a large bronze mixing bowl. While the storm may have been invented to hide Colaeus' route from competitors, the rewards of the new source of metal in the far west were tangible enough to lure other Greeks in search. Phocaeans followed Colaeus' voyage to their own profit – Phocaea was able to build a new fortification wall. Herodotus notices another famous trader, Sostratus the Aeginetan (iv. 152), who was active in the more prosaic period of the late sixth century. As mentioned above, Sostratus dedicated a stone anchor (Fig. 39; see *CAH* III².3, 428) in the Greek sanctuary at

¹⁷ C 53, 243 n. 5 (bibliography).

¹⁸ D 302; C 249; D 163; D 310.



39. Stone anchor dedicated by Sostratus of Aegina at Graviscae. (After D 302, 56, fig. 7; see n. 18.)

Graviscae, whether to mark his retirement from sailing or in gratitude to Aeginetan Apollo for safe return from a hazardous voyage we do not know. Evidently Sostratus could well afford to do so, for Herodotus identifies him as most famous of all traders for his wealth. One source of his affluence was the carriage of Athenian pottery to Italy. His initials (p. 365) are the most numerous among the merchants' marks on Athenian pottery found in Italy, dating from the last quarter of the sixth century.

Colaeus and Sostratus are representative of the type of trader who established long-range trading by sea throughout the Mediterranean. They were men of sufficient wealth to have their own ships, venturesome and skilful enough to sail over the long routes and knowledgeable about their markets and sources of commodities; in short, professionals, who apparently were owner, captain and trader combined. By Sostratus' time, however, Greek trade seems to have been entering a more sophisticated stage, in which investors financed such voyages by loans. A series of inscriptions, scratched on lead plaques found in Corcyra and dated *c.* 500 B.C., are so interpreted.¹⁹ The tablets record in regular formulas, which reflect established practice, the loans of large sums, over 100 drachmas, by various creditors. In one case the names are those of minors whose patrimony was apparently being invested for them by a guardian. Thus the use of money in the late sixth century facilitated trade by subsidization of ventures and offered opportunity for gain to ordinary people.

Study of the large amount of Athenian pottery exported to Italy in the

¹⁹ C 242.

late sixth and early fifth centuries gives a notion of how traders made up their cargoes in that commodity at least. Like the Corinthian potters (above, pp. 454f) Athenians specialized their production for both local sale and for export.²⁰ They made special shapes for a particular product, for example, lekythoi for high-grade olive oil, and sets for the particular purpose of symposiums. The latter, like the vases inscribed with *kalos* names, would have been made to individual order for sale to customers in Athens. But many vases of this type have been found in Italy. Presumably the first buyer returned them to the shops in Athens, where they were picked up second-hand by a trader collecting a cargo for Italy. Also, Italian tastes seem to have affected Athenian production directly. Traders must have told the makers that certain shapes, Tyrrhenian amphoras and the bizarre experiments of Nicosthenes, (Fig. 40; see *CAH* III². 3, 454) would be popular in Italy. Similarly the increase in production of fine, large, red-figured vases in the early fifth century is explained by their popularity in Etruria. But good pottery was made, too, for the ordinary Athenian worker. While interpretation of the few prices for vases known before 475 B.C. is disputed,²¹ small decorated vases of good quality were within his reach, and pottery for daily use in the household was cheap.

The merchants' marks, the first several letters of a name, scratched or painted on the foot of a vase, are a clue to the identity of traders.²² Several thousand examples are known, almost all on vases found in Italy, and, after 550, large groups of pots may be identified as bearing the mark of a single trader. Those on Corinthian vases are in the Corinthian alphabet, indicating that Corinthian pottery was carried by Corinthian traders. On the Athenian vases, in addition to the initials of Sostratus of Aegina, there are many marks in Ionian letter forms. Evidently Ionian traders carried Athenian vases in addition to their own, as we might expect from the Ionian dedications in the sanctuary at Graviscae. Presumably the traders made the rounds of pottery shops in Athens, buying some good second-hand pieces, some new vases, which they thought would find a ready sale, and picking up some special lots ordered for the taste of Etruscan buyers. To judge from the provenance of fine red-figured pottery, Athenian potters manufactured more for the export than the local market.

While the variety of goods exchanged in trading was impressively large and specialization for export was practised in their production, we should not exaggerate the volume of trade. We do not have any statistical basis for making an estimate, and, as was indicated above, population and wealth were large only in relation to their size in the early archaic

²⁰ C 588, 291–2; C 496, 12; C 497, 88. ²¹ C 66; C 539. ²² C 539, 138–52.



40. Nicosthenic amphora, of Attic manufacture. (Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum 3605; after R. J. Hoppin, *A Handbook of Greek Black-Figured Vases* (1924) 285.)

period. Also, certain obvious physical factors limited the volume of trade by sea. Navigation was seasonal, from April to October, and, even in the good summer weather, when clear skies made the use of landmarks easy, adverse winds could cut the speed of the square-rigged merchant ships in half.²³ The technical innovation of a square foresail in the late sixth century did improve manoeuvrability, but the ships remained tubby, small (70–80 tons) and slow. Because navigation was in its infancy, ships did not sail into the open sea for preference but tended to stay within sight of land, in order to use the striking landmarks and coastal winds which are a feature of the Mediterranean basin. Being dependent on sail, they were easily caught in calm water or in light winds by warships which operated under oar, and their small crews (? three or four hands) had little or no chance of resisting any attack (see *CAH* III².3, 454–5, fig. 61).

Because no essential changes in type were made, we can probably use information of a later date about duration of voyages for this early period. In favourable weather a speed of 4 to 6 knots was standard. Thus the trip from Rhodes to the Cimmerian Bosphorus in the Black Sea took 9½ days, Rhodes to Byzantium 5 days, Crete to Egypt 3 or 4 days, Corinth to

²³ c 515.

Puteoli on the west coast of Italy $9\frac{1}{2}$ days. An Ionian trader from Phocaea or Samos, sailing to the Levant and Egypt to pick up some cargo, returning through the Aegean and proceeding on the long trip to Massilia or Emporium, with stops to peddle and exchange his goods on the way, probably would make only one round trip during the season. The Corinthian or Aeginetan, running regularly between Athens or Corinth and Italy might, of course, make several voyages.

By the time of the Persian Wars Greek trade had grown from a trickle of luxury goods and scarce metals to become a factor necessary to the well-being of the city states. As such it was obviously a matter of concern to their governments. Most obvious were the possibilities of revenue. Corinth is said to have levied tolls in the period of the Cypselid tyranny and certainly we may suspect that the city did not offer free transport on the *diolkos* constructed *c.* 600 B.C. (see *CAH* III².3, 349, fig. 52). In 540 when the Phocaeans were looking for a new home after the Persian occupation of Ionia, the Chians prevented them from settling on the Oenussae Islands in the channel between Chios and the Asian coast (*Hdt.* 1.165). They did not wish the tolls which they levied on shipping to be diverted to a Phocaean emporium. While it is difficult to extend fiscal concerns of this nature to deliberate mercantile policy in colonization, Corinth did show unusual strategic concern to plant colonies on the western trade route and to maintain connexions of a political nature with them.²⁴ Ionian colonization, too, in the Black Sea and Egypt seems to have been motivated consciously by commercial aims rather than the simple desire to export surplus population. Freedom of navigation and trade, already of common concern at the end of the Persian Wars, became, within a generation, an issue dividing the two great powers of Greece, the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League.

²⁴ *c.* 30, ch. 7.

CHAPTER 8
THE IONIAN REVOLT

OSWYN MURRAY

I. INTRODUCTION


Like the Jews, the Greeks learned to define themselves as a nation in the course of their contacts with the Persians: from the series of conflicts between them in the early fifth century arose that sense of separateness and superiority over other peoples which created the conditions for Greek culture of the fifth century, exclusive, self-confident and helleno-centric.¹ It is this autonomous aspect of Greek culture which has caused it to become the Classical Age for European civilization. As John Stuart Mill declared, 'The battle of Marathon, even as an event in English history, is more important than the battle of Hastings. If the issue of that day had been different, the Britons and the Saxons might still have been wandering in the woods.'

It is hard to discern to what extent Herodotus' *Histories* are a symptom or the cause of this central importance of the Persian Wars in the history of western culture. Born between the two great wars, composing his work as a contemporary of Sophocles some thirty years after their end, he retained an understanding of the wider horizons of early Greece, which made Plutarch accuse him of being 'a friend of the barbarian' (*Mor.* 857A). Yet it was his conception of the meaning of the Persian Wars which caused him to write the first non-religious historical narrative, and it is his history which in turn has given these wars their universal significance.

This is the account of the investigation of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, undertaken so that the achievements of men should not be obliterated by time, and the great and marvellous works of both Greeks and barbarians should not be without fame, and not least the reason why they fought one another. (Herodotus I.1)

The account that follows has traditionally been seen as containing two elements: the first a wide-ranging (and perhaps in intention complete) collection of *logoi*, descriptions of the customs and traditions of the

¹ A 44.



Map 14. Western Asia Minor.

peoples of the Mediterranean and Near East in their geographical setting; the second a narrative of the actual events in the series of conflicts between Greeks and Persians. These two elements are of course neither mutually exclusive nor clearly separated in Herodotus' work, though they must have been separately present to him in the two certain literary influences which shaped his approach. The first was the tradition of Ionian geography and ethnography embodied in the work of Hecataeus of Miletus (*FGrH* no. 1), whom Herodotus clearly saw to some extent as his predecessor, and criticized accordingly; yet the bare collection of names and facts which seems to have been Hecataeus' *Description of the Earth* is quite different from Herodotus' detailed accounts of foreign cultures. The second literary influence on Herodotus is Homer.² Herodotus was regarded in antiquity as 'the most Homeric' of all writers (Longinus, *On the Sublime* XIII, 3). It is from Homer that he took the idea of a war as the central theme, and formulated the duty of history as of epic to record 'the great deeds of men'. Indeed his mastery of the digression and recapitulation, his techniques of narrative and characterization, his use of Homeric echoes and vocabulary show more than mere literary influence; they are part of a conscious attempt to present the history of the Persian Wars as the history of a new Trojan War won by a new race of heroes.

These two elements also serve to clarify the relationship between Herodotus' own methods and modern debates on the nature of that science of history which he began; for they correspond to the difference widely recognized today in one form or another, between the history of structures and the history of events.³ A true appreciation of the importance of Herodotus can only be reached by considering the two aspects of his legacy: it must always be remembered that, in studying merely his narrative of the Persian Wars, we exclude half (and the most important half) of his conception of history; we also seek to measure the character of this part of his achievement with tools and attitudes developed over two millennia, since Thucydides made politics and war the main theme of history.

One concept central to the history of human events is that of historical causation; here Herodotus does not seem to have innovated: he merely accepted the causation appropriate to his subject and period. The range of phenomena which he admits as causes is limited to two main areas, the explanation of events in terms of personalities, and belief in the inevitability of the rise and fall of states, explained in terms of the 'envy' of the divine powers. For much of his narrative these simple explanatory techniques are sufficient; for events were dominated by the decisions of

² A 28. ³ A 57.

the leaders, and yet responded to the religious sentiment expressed in the Delphic saying, 'nothing too much'. It is certainly hard to find fault with his general view that the only adequate explanation for the Persian Wars must be a complete account of relations between the two peoples since the conquest of the Ionian cities in 545 B.C.

A series of episodes in the next half century showed both the intention of successive kings of Persia to extend their control over the eastern Mediterranean lands, and the Greek awareness of their danger. From the start it was Sparta who saw this most clearly. The older kingdoms of Lydia and Egypt had long depended on Greek hoplite mercenaries, probably recruited through religious centres like Delphi and Branchidae where the dedications of foreign kings were a reminder of their wealth and power; but the increasing threat from Cyrus led both Croesus and Amasis to attempt to establish more formal links with the largest and best hoplite army in Greece: Herodotus records diplomatic presents passing between these kings and the Spartans, showing that Sparta was momentarily regarded as one member of the grand alliance of older powers against Persia (I.51, 69–70; III.47). Her attempt to assert her leadership of all Greeks by warning Cyrus off the Ionian cities in 545 B.C. (I.152) reveals how far she had entered into this fantasy, and various later episodes show her continuing to accept the role of leader against Persia.

Thus the Persian conquest of Phoenicia changed the balance of naval power in the eastern Mediterranean, and forced Polycrates of Samos to abandon his defensive alliance with Amasis of Egypt; he subsequently sent a flotilla of ships carrying his aristocratic enemies to join Cambyses' attack on Egypt in 525 B.C. The crews mutinied and were welcomed at Sparta; with them, Spartans and Corinthians mounted an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Polycrates (III.39–56). This unprecedented overseas expedition indicates how far Sparta was prepared to react to the extension of Persian control over Greeks. The same pattern emerges from the relations between Sparta and Cyrene, a Dorian colony of Thera due south of Sparta, a mere 440 kms across the open sea on prevailing winds. Their contacts had long been close, but Cyrene found it expedient to offer allegiance to Cambyses when Egypt fell; shortly afterwards Sparta acted to send out Dorieus, a member of the Agiad royal house, at the head of a colonizing expedition clearly intended to found a city on the African coast in place of Cyrene; again the expedition failed, and the colonists moved on to Italy and western Sicily where they were defeated by the Phoenicians (v.42–8).⁴

Darius demonstrated his interest in western expansion when he sent out a Phoenician spy ship with his Greek doctor, Democedes of Croton,

⁴ D 8, 348–54.

to map the coasts of Greece and Italy (III.130); but far more serious was his expedition into Scythia and the subsequent continuation of Persian expansion in the Propontis and Thrace (pp. 243f). A number of Spartan bronze mixing-bowls, a traditional diplomatic present, have been found in the tombs of Scythian princes, and Scythian ambassadors are said to have offered the Spartans an alliance against the Persians during the reign of Cleomenes (VI.85). The Persian activity in the Black Sea and Propontis area also engaged the interests of the second most powerful mainland Greek state, Athens, which already depended heavily on corn imports from that area, and during the sixth century had acquired political control over Sigeum and the Thracian Chersonese on either shore of the Hellespont. The first consequence was a shift towards Persia on the part of Hippias, tyrant of Athens, who contracted a marriage alliance with the tyrant of Lampsacus, a city on the Hellespont within Persian territory. It is not clear whether this policy played any part in the Spartan decision to break off friendly relations with Hippias and help his enemies to expel him. The new democratic government of Cleisthenes, having quarrelled with Sparta, sent to Persia an abortive embassy, which gave earth and water and was disowned on its return (V.73); but thereafter Athens was inevitably bound to an anti-Persian policy by the fact that the Pisistratids had accepted Persian protection and were settled in Sigeum itself. The only question was how far Spartans and Athenians would go in provoking Persia.

Both Greeks and Persians were well aware of the inevitability of a future conflict as a necessary consequence of Persian imperial ambitions; it was natural for Herodotus, looking back on the failure of those ambitions, to interpret the wars in terms of divine envy: 'you see how the god strikes with his thunderbolt the tall, and will not allow them to display themselves, while small beings do not vex him; you see how the lightning throws down always the greatest buildings and the finest trees' (VII.10). Accepting this interpretation, and rephrasing it in modern terms, we may say that the causes of the Persian Wars lay in the psychology of the Persian ruling class and in the necessities of the Persian imperial system. An empire constantly threatened with national and religious revolts was held together essentially by the actions of the king in mobilizing his subjects for war: it was only on expeditions that the power of the monarchy was exhibited and the centrifugal tendencies were temporarily suspended. Once the navies of Ionia and Phoenicia had been acquired, expansion into the Mediterranean must follow, and must ultimately lead to disaster: no power has been able to hold together two such disparate economic and military units as the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin in their entirety.

In this march of history the Ionian Revolt may seem almost an

irrelevant diversion, to be noted merely as the first major occasion on which Greeks tried to seize the initiative. Herodotus however asserts its importance: the ships which Athens sent to help the rebels were 'the beginning of evils for Greeks and barbarians' (v.97); these ships certainly focused the forthcoming conflict, so that Persian expansion was directed first towards the punishment of those who had helped the rebels. The burning of Sardis and its temple was a symbolic act which justified the Persian burning of Ionian temples after the revolt and of the Athenian Acropolis in the Great War (v.102): this led in turn to the demand for vengeance and reparations incorporated in the Delian League, and to the use of League funds for the Periclean building programme; the hereditary curse was only finally laid to rest with the burning of Persepolis by Alexander the Great. Seldom has such a symbol reverberated through history with such consequences. The fact that the narrative of the Ionian Revolt marks the beginning of the full-scale account in Herodotus of political and military events shows that he and his contemporaries regarded it as an intrinsic part of the series of wars between Greece and Persia.

II. SOURCES AND EVIDENCE

For the Ionian Revolt Herodotus is our only surviving literary source; yet his narrative has generally been regarded as one of the most problematical sections of his history. Inevitably the desire to teach Herodotus what he ought to have said leads to 'substituting for the Herodotean reconstruction one which is completely personal, more rational perhaps, but not necessarily more true' (P. Tozzi);⁵ it is the argument of the present chapter that a proper understanding of Herodotean method sets the limits for any such reconstruction.

Many attempts have been made to place Herodotus in a literary context that would provide him with written sources for his information, and also perhaps explain the origins of his conception of history; this type of investigation already found support among later Greek authors; thus Dionysius of Halicarnassus mentions Herodotus' relation to various contemporary writers, notably the school of local historians which began to emerge in the second half of the fifth century (*On Thucydides* v). In antiquity it was clearly believed that some at least of these writers were earlier than Herodotus, even if this belief was perhaps based largely on the unsophisticated character of their narrative style. Others went further: Ephorus alleged that Herodotus 'took his starting-point' from Xanthus of Lydia's *Lydian History* (FGrH 70 F 180) and there is

⁵ c 400, the best modern account of the revolt.

circumstantial evidence in support of the claim that he took over certain descriptions word for word from Hecataeus' account of Egypt: this information probably comes from a general essay by Pollio *On the Thefts of Herodotus* (Eusebius, *Praeparatio evangelica* x.3.16 and 23).

It is easy to dismiss such assertions in both ancient and modern scholarship as the anachronistic misconceptions of an age of libraries and competitive scholarship, utterly different from the travels of Herodotus and his emphasis on hearing and seeing; but these views retain a certain perennial fascination precisely because they make Herodotus a modern historian. It has not indeed proved impossible to find a literary source for his Ionian narrative. The shadowy Dionysius of Miletus (*FGrH* 687) was accepted as a contemporary of Hecataeus; a list of his works includes, among titles certainly by other men of the same name, two which arouse speculation – *Affairs after Darius* in five books, and a *Persika* written in Ionic dialect. The four possible references to either of these works display variants of items of information also found in Herodotus. It is a pleasing speculation that one of the group described as 'the Milesian writers, Anaximander, Hecataeus and Dionysius' should have been the first to write the history of events, drawn perhaps to his task by the experience of the Ionian Revolt itself.⁶ But such fantasies meet with one insuperable objection – the text of Herodotus; not only does this provide no secure indication of the use of literary sources, whether these be conceived as general history, local history or even biographical memoirs; more positively, the idiosyncrasies and weaknesses of his account are explicable only if he did not use such sources. The same observation holds for Herodotus' history of the Persian Wars in general; the nature of the evidence makes it impossible to state with certainty whether all those literary works which can be compared with Herodotus are later than Herodotus; but it is at least clear that his surviving text gives evidence of being composed according to principles incompatible with the extensive use of earlier historical writings. The history of events was certainly conceived under the influence of events themselves, but not by contemporaries; it was a generation later, as the great events began to be 'obliterated by time', and as they therefore began to take on the attributes of an heroic age, that Herodotus 'the most Homeric' conceived his theme.

Other literary accounts of the Ionian Revolt written later than Herodotus certainly existed. For general histories there is little evidence. The few surviving sentences of Diodorus' abbreviation of the standard account of the fourth-century historian Ephorus of Cyme (Diodorus x.25) suggest that this was based on Herodotus, though presumably

⁶ A 14.

more sympathetic to the revolt; whether Ephorus made use of local knowledge is unknown: at least this was one occasion when he could not write, 'during this period the people of Cyme lived at peace' (*FGrH* 70 F 236). Local histories are more important, for they may preserve genuine traditions unknown to the general historian of Greek affairs; unfortunately they also tend to derive much of their information from standard histories, and, where they differ, merely to rewrite these to the greater glory of the city which is their subject. Plutarch cites two such authors on the Ionian Revolt in his essay *On the Bias of Herodotus* (*Mor.* 861). Charon of Lampsacus (*FGrH* 262) is capable of competing with Dionysius of Miletus as Herodotus' predecessor: four direct quotations show him offering a bald factual narrative less detailed than but identical with that of Herodotus, a narrative that could be interpreted as either source or abbreviation of Herodotus. Plutarch's second author, Lysanias of Mallus (*FGrH* 426), in his history of Eretria offered an account of the 'great epic' of Eretrian intervention in the Ionian Revolt: in one campaign they won a major victory over a Cypriot or Persian fleet off Pamphylia, and attacked and besieged Sardis, thereby causing the Persians to raise the siege of Miletus. Neither Herodotus nor apparently Charon of Lampsacus knew of this sea battle or of a siege of Miletus at this date: it would seem that Lysanias' 'great epic' consists of a selection of famous episodes from the revolt rearranged in defiance of chronology and then attributed to Eretrian valour.

Similarly a fascinating document of patriotic antiquarianism, the Hellenistic inscription from the temple of Athena at Lindus on Rhodes (*FGrH* 532), consists of a list of dedications at the temple from the mythical period to the present age, complete with bibliographical references, followed by an account of the miraculous epiphanies of the goddess at turning-points of Rhodian history. The first of these divine manifestations was during the invasion of Greece by Datis under Darius: the city was besieged and ran out of water; Athena sent a miraculous rainstorm, and Datis came to terms, offered a dedication at the temple and departed. These events were recorded by nine literary authorities, of whom one, doubtless attempting to reconcile the legend with the account of Herodotus, said that the Persian involved was not Datis, but Mardonius acting as his subordinate – which at least demonstrates that in this chronicle the episode was connected with the Marathon campaign; the appropriate dedication appears in the preceding list, attested with scholarly caution in whole or in part by seven of the same names.⁷ The implausibility of a siege of Lindus by the Persian expedition of 490 B.C., and its absence from the detailed account of the Persian advance given by

⁷ C 238; C 239, no. 2, pp. 149–99, esp. 192–8.

Herodotus (vi.95) have persuaded some modern historians to place the episode during the Ionian Revolt, before the battle of Lade;⁸ this view has been rendered somewhat more plausible by the discovery from Persian records that Datis was in fact already in a position of importance in the Lydian satrapy by 494 (below, p. 487), and could therefore perhaps have been in command of the fleet. But Datis became a figure in Greek popular traditions, and the whole episode concerns a miracle designed to attest the Lindian participation in the great Persian wars, not the Ionian Revolt: ‘when Darius king of the Persians sent out great forces for the enslavement of Greece, his naval fleet approached this island first of the islands’. Despite the alleged agreement of nine separate authors, the visit and the dedication of Datis are no more historical than those of Cadmus (complete with Phoenician letters), Minos, Heracles, Menelaus and Helen.

The characters and events of the revolt certainly appeared in other literary contexts: the Eretrian commander killed on the Sardis expedition was the famous athlete Eualcides, ‘often celebrated by Simonides of Ceos’ (Hdt. v.102). The contemporary traveller and geographer Scylax of Caryanda is alleged to have written an account of the tyrant Heraclides of Mylasa, who was the Carian leader who planned the successful ambush of the Persian army on the Pedasus road.⁹ It was also an age when history was a proper subject for tragedy: but the fact that Herodotus makes no use of Aeschylus’ *Persae* in his account of the battle of Salamis confirms the impression that he did not consider Phrynichus’ *Capture of Miletus* (below, p. 490) a possible historical source; neither should we, since no fragment of that play survives.

The most important epigraphic evidence for the period is the list of eponymous priests or *stephanephoroi* from Miletus, which runs continuously from 525 B.C.: it attests the aristocratic control of the priesthood throughout the period.¹⁰ Excavations in the area, most notably at Sardis, Miletus and Paphus in Cyprus, but also at many other smaller sites, provide evidence of the military operations and their consequences for the Greek cities; they are also beginning to reveal the extent of the fusion of cultures among the aristocracies of the area, Persian and Lydian as well as Greek. Attempts have been made to link the numismatic evidence from the Ionian cities to the revolt: if this could be done with confidence, it would indeed shed important light on the extent of co-ordination among the Ionian Greeks.¹¹ On the Persian side the Fortification Tablets from Persepolis cover the years 510–493 B.C.;¹² the occasional references to personalities known from the period of the revolt serve mainly to confirm the accuracy of Herodotus’ knowledge of the names of Persian

⁸ A 11, 218. ⁹ A 42, 29; but see the second edition of F. Jacoby, *FGrH* I (1957) 543.

¹⁰ C 257, 320ff. ¹¹ Below, p. 482. ¹² B 85.

high officials and their marriage relations; occasionally they offer glimpses of these officials about business which must be connected with the revolt. All of this evidence can and indeed has to be related to the narrative of Herodotus in order to gain any historical context; it therefore offers no opportunity to test that narrative.

No good literary or material evidence therefore either suggests that there was in antiquity any better account of the Ionian Revolt than that of Herodotus, or offers a basis on which to construct one. Herodotus' own version of events rests essentially on oral traditions and must be analysed appropriately, in the light of comparative evidence for the characteristics of oral traditions and for their reliability as history, not with methods appropriate to a documentary tradition.¹³ Unlike the Jews, the Greeks did not possess any specialized group dedicated to the preservation of tradition: their attitude to the past was more casual and more pragmatic, and it appears that different types of tradition were available in different areas. In the cities of mainland Greece the 'guardians of tradition' (*logioi andres*) whom Herodotus consulted can be identified as members of aristocratic families or men who held public office; their information was often biased towards family or political interest but usually rational in its outlook and lacking in religious or moral dimensions. The traditions of Delphi are those of a priesthood proud to explain the dedications and monuments at the shrine, anxious to offer successful interpretations of Apollo's oracles, and concerned to impose a moral pattern on history, in which excess leads to disaster according to the ethic of the famous inscriptions on Apollo's temple, 'Know yourself' and 'Nothing too much'.

The traditions of the East Greeks represented in Herodotus are non-aristocratic, and much closer to this Delphic type than to the secular traditions of the mainland: they show no serious interest in family or politics, and tend to structure events in terms of a series of moral tales, whose popular origin is often revealed in the use of well-attested folk-tale motifs. To the extent that it is easier to discount political bias than to discern the truth behind a folk-tale, it may be asserted that Herodotus' account of East Greek history is less reliable, that is more difficult to handle, than his account of the mainland; it is certainly more suited to the interests of the cultural historian than to those of the historian of events. In analysing such oral traditions the length of time a tradition has been in existence is of little material significance: for instance, although Herodotus spent his youth on Samos only a generation after the death of Polycrates and must have met those who had partaken in events of the period of the tyranny, there is no sign of his use of such informants: his

¹³ A 60; A 3.

account is structured as a series of folk-tales no less mythical than the Delphic tales of Cypselus of Corinth more than a century earlier. Herodotus' account of the Ionian Revolt contains many similar folk-tale motifs and clear evidence of this type of moral structuring; it is evident that much of the modern dissatisfaction with his narrative concerns the signs of incoherence between episodes, lack of motivation for events, and implausibility of moral explanations, which derive from precisely such a type of oral tradition.

The absence of a politically oriented oral tradition in Ionia may reflect certain characteristics of Ionian society, where aristocratic dominance was perhaps less marked than on the Greek mainland; but equally the disappearance of aristocratic traditions may well be a consequence of the successive distortions and destructions of Ionian political life, caused in part by the interventions of Persia and later Athens, but more importantly by the failure of the Ionian Revolt itself. This absence must also be related as symptom or cause to the fact that it was from Ionia that the *logopoios*, the maker of tales, emerged, as the demotic counterpart in prose to the aristocratic Ionian epic poetry. Herodotus himself imposes on the narrative of the Persian Wars precisely that moral patterning which is found in the evidence he used for Ionian traditions: he was able to see the whole story from a curiously 'Persian' viewpoint, the pride and humbling of Persia as much as the triumph of Greece; such attitudes are not based on a genuine understanding of the Persian conception of history, but reflect a standard Greek narrative pattern. This pessimistic vision of the historical process reveals Herodotus as himself a 'maker of tales': like Homer, he stands in relation to a tradition, the last and greatest of the *logopoioi*, who is also a *logographos*, a writer as well as a maker of tales, who by the act of writing fixed the tradition for the future, and perhaps thereby began the destruction of that oral art form on which his own achievement rested.

A further factor serves to complicate the tradition of the Ionian Revolt. The Persian Wars themselves were a story of co-operative effort (however imperfect) and success; the tale had a natural coherence which could only improve with time, as for later Greeks it became a symbol of a national identity and a lost unity. Inevitably the tradition presented the action as more coherent and the Greeks as more united than they actually were, and local variants disappeared. The oral traditions of a defeated people behave quite differently from those of a victorious one. No unity presents itself, memory is fragmented into individual episodes of folly, treachery or heroism; self-justification and accusation become primary reasons for remembrance. Also typical in such cases is the rejection or reversal of previous values: the Ionians admit to having always been weak, and many of them are ashamed of being Ionian (1.143); the

emphasis on their lack of military spirit and on Ionian luxury is a self-created myth resulting from defeat: an agonistic society which believed so strongly in the competitive Homeric ethic was especially vulnerable to this reversal of values. Herodotus has often been accused of bias against the revolt and against Ionians in general, whether through comparison of the revolt with the later wars, or as a citizen of Dorian Halicarnassus, or because of the alleged guilty consciences of his Ionian informants. This is to misunderstand the nature of the historical deformation which has taken place: Herodotus was not primarily responsible for that deformation, but is himself a witness to the demoralization of his own society, accepting the verdict of that society upon itself.

The narrative of the Ionian Revolt spans Books V and VI of Herodotus: it is interspersed with a number of long digressions, and therefore gives the misleading impression of a series of disconnected episodes. In fact, with one major exception, the narrative is unified and coherent, without obvious changes in source or approach. The exception is the group of stories which concern Histiaeus, former tyrant of Miletus, which stand out as demanding separate investigation (p. 486). But one characteristic suggests that they are best considered later: a number of the stories offer alternative versions of events which are already satisfactorily explained within the main tradition, versions distinguished by their imagination and their lack of connexion with the central story. It is clear that the legend of Histiaeus, however it may relate to the truth, is not to be confused with the real story of the Ionian Revolt, to which Histiaeus himself was indeed at all times essentially irrelevant. The main narrative of Herodotus concentrates on particular points in the history of the revolt, its origins and the early actions of the rebels on the one hand, and the final battle on the other; but these set pieces are integrated into a continuous account which falls into two blocks, the period from the outbreak of the revolt to the failure of the first Persian counter-offensive in Caria and the flight of Aristagoras to Thrace, and the period which begins with the preparations for the battle of Lade and continues beyond the revolt into the Marathon campaign and the main wars. Problems naturally arise in the relationship between events taking place simultaneously in different theatres of war; but the major difficulty lies in the break between the two main blocks of narrative, and the apparent absence from the record of one or even two campaigning seasons. It is however demonstrable that Herodotus possessed an overall chronological framework for the revolt, from his statement that the sack of Miletus took place 'in the sixth year from the rebellion of Aristagoras' (VI.18); though it is unclear whether this framework provided annual dates of the type that were certainly available to him from the fall of Miletus onwards; and Herodotus himself was probably unable to date all

individual events.¹⁴ Thus, although the revolt is dated from 499 to 494 B.C., within these limits any detailed chronology is to some extent arbitrary; that which follows rests on the assumption that events within each block of Herodotean narrative are indeed continuous, and that a gap of at least a year lies between the two blocks.

III. IONIA AND PERSIA

The immediate cause of the Ionian Revolt lay in the failure of the Persian attack on Naxos. About 500 B.C. a group of Naxian aristocratic exiles appealed to Aristagoras, Histiaeus' nephew and son-in-law and his replacement as tyrant of Miletus; Aristagoras, lacking the resources necessary to support an attack on Naxos, suggested enlisting Persian help. A plan was formulated with the agreement of Artaphernes satrap of Lydia; the consent of Darius was obtained, and Megabates, a member of the Achaemenid family, cousin of both Darius and Artaphernes, was appointed admiral. The expedition comprised 200 triremes from the Greek cities of Artaphernes' satrapy, and a large body of Persian and other troops; its expenses were guaranteed by Aristagoras and the Naxian exiles. In 499 B.C. they set sail from Miletus, ostensibly for the Hellespont, and waited at Chios for a north wind in order to make a sudden descent on Naxos. According to Herodotus a quarrel arose between Aristagoras and Megabates, which provoked Megabates into warning the Naxians of their danger. As a result the expedition arrived to find Naxos prepared for a siege; after four months the provisions and money of the besiegers ran out, and they were forced to return to the mainland.

It is hardly necessary to believe in double dealing by the Persian admiral to explain how the Naxians were forewarned of the real purpose of the expedition; but the rest of Herodotus' narrative is credible. The expedition was an important one, of considerable size and commanded by a close relative of the king: this is in fact the first appearance of Megabates, but a Treasury Tablet from Persepolis attests him there sometime between 492 and 486 B.C., still described as 'admiral of the fleet' (no. 8); and his son was a naval commander in the great expedition of 480. Herodotus makes it clear that, under the guise of aiding the king's friends, Darius was in fact seeking to extend his empire into the crucial area of the Cyclades: Naxos and its dependencies Paros and Andros would lead inevitably to Euboea, as Aristagoras is made to say (v. 31); and the Persians would then be threatening Greece itself by land from the north and from the east by sea.

¹⁴ A 56, esp. 151-61; A 33, 440.

The failure of the expedition left Aristagoras in a vulnerable position: his credit with Artaphernes was gone and he had no doubt in fact quarrelled with Megabates: he could not redeem his promise to pay for the expenses of the expedition. He therefore decided to organize revolt from Persia: Herodotus portrays a council of his partisans at Miletus in which only the historian Hecataeus spoke against war (v.36). A messenger was sent to Myus where the Ionian fleet was still assembled; as was usual in Persian expeditions, many of the Ionian tyrants were present with their forces, and they were seized and handed over to their cities to be variously dealt with. Aristagoras himself laid down his tyranny and proclaimed *isonomia*, 'equality of rights', at Miletus: there followed a general expulsion of tyrants in the area. These events occurred towards the end of the campaigning season of 499 B.C.

The Herodotean account of the origins of the revolt is formulated in terms of personal politics until the final declaration; and, though it is clear from his narrative that the demand for *isonomia* was an important factor, Herodotus himself, usually so favourable to such aspirations, shows curiously little sympathy for them here, an attitude which has been one of the main reasons for attributing to him bias against the revolt in general. But it must be remembered that this political slogan had quite different connotations for the Ionian world which Herodotus himself knew: the institution of democratic government no longer meant freedom, but was itself a weapon of control imposed on cities by the Athenian empire. The ambivalence of the concept of *isonomia* for Ionians in the mid-fifth century may well explain why this aspect of the revolt was not emphasized by Herodotus' informants.

Political aspirations were clearly of major importance in the origins of the revolt; yet it is not easy to determine the nature of *isonomia* in the context of Ionia around 500 B.C., for detailed evidence exists only in the case of Cleisthenic Athens (above, Ch. 5). The extant law from Chios of the second quarter of the sixth century (M-L 8) shows that, before the Persians came, the cities of Ionia had been no less advanced in their constitutions than those of mainland Greece; and Herodotus can portray Histiaeus in 514 B.C. as arguing that, without the Persians, 'each of the Ionian cities would choose to be governed democratically rather than tyrannically' (iv.137). At Athens it is important to recognize that no great constitutional difference existed between the Cleisthenic and the radical democracy in terms of political participation: already the rejection of Spartan *eunomia* implied the rejection of a hoplite predominance in favour of mass participation in the assembly; and in a situation of national emergency, in cities as economically advanced as those of Ionia, when survival depended on the skills and courage of the fleet, the concept of *isonomia* will have implied general participation in the political

process. It was certainly the appeal of this idea which created the widespread popular support for a full-scale revolt from Persia.¹⁵

The Athenian example may well have prompted the reforms on Naxos, which in turn drove the party of 'the Fat' into the arms of Aristagoras. The reversal of his political stance is typical of the volatility and self-confidence of other Greek princelings of his age, most notably Cleisthenes of Athens himself, but also such figures as Miltiades and Histiaeus.¹⁶ His action in laying down his tyranny indeed recalls the offer by Maeandrius of Samos after the death of Polycrates about 520 B.C., to establish *isonomia* for the Samians, instituting a cult of Zeus Eleutherios and reserving for himself only the hereditary priesthood of that cult (III. 142). 'Democratic' government remained characteristic of the Ionian states involved in the revolt throughout its course. Behind this movement of events must lie a genuine desire for political reform, together with a genuine desire for independence: this was recognized by the Persians when in 492 B.C. they sought to reassert their imperial control while placating the Greeks with the establishment of 'democracies' in the defeated cities. The demand for political reform did not therefore begin with the revolt, and Aristagoras did not underestimate its popular appeal. The revolt in fact marks a decisive step in the creation of that polarity between despotic Persia and Greek democracy; freedom from Persia and freedom from tyranny became identified.¹⁷

It is in this sense that the Ionian Revolt is most rightly seen as part of the general conflict between Greece and Persia, for it is a particular example of that clash between oriental despotism and Greek liberty which is the main theme of Greco-Persian relations in the classical period. This first episode in the conflict is the more intriguing because it involved a despotism with considerable claim to be enlightened, and an excellent record in respecting the prejudices and traditions of peoples far more difficult than the Greeks. To ask why Persia failed in Ionia with policies which proved relatively successful in Judaea is to illuminate important aspects of the Persian problems in their relations with the Greeks.¹⁸

In general the Persians had sought to present their conquests as a liberation from previous oppression: the peoples of the east were to be freed to pursue their own traditions under the beneficent eye of Ahura Mazda. In each area the Great King was represented as the protector of the national god and the restorer of his worship, the servant of Marduk at Babylon, of Amon-Re in Egypt and of Jehovah at Jerusalem; the Persian satrap was often assisted by a local official close to the previous ruling group, and more detailed control was delegated to local dynasts or the

¹⁵ C 176, 109–11. ¹⁶ C 275. ¹⁷ A 45. ¹⁸ B 500.

local priesthood. This policy was most successful in Judaea, where Cyrus decreed the return of the Jews from exile and the rebuilding of Jerusalem, and where he and his successors continued to favour the new state (above, Ch. 3*b*); for the Jews therefore Cyrus was 'The Lord's Anointed'.

Such techniques were ideally suited to the control of areas dominated by a priestly caste or with a stable tradition of autocratic government; they worked less well in Ionia. Local aristocrats were elevated to the status of what the Greeks called 'tyrants', and established in permanent authority; but tyranny was rapidly becoming an unacceptable form of government in the face of demands for wider participation. Like his Lydian forerunners, the Great King sought to be recognized by the gods of Greece; to the foreign observer Apollo was clearly the chief of these, for he was the only god to possess at the great centres of Delphi, Delos and Branchidae a permanent priesthood, temples and oracular shrines on anything like the scale of the great gods of the East. The famous letter of Darius to his satrap Gadatas illustrates well the traditional beneficent aspects of Persian rule. Gadatas is praised for his activities in planting Syrian fruit trees in western Asia Minor, but threatened with punishment because he has levied taxes from the sacred gardeners of Apollo and ordered them to till holy land, 'disregarding the will of my ancestors towards the god, who has spoken all truthfulness towards the Persians' (M-L 12). But Apollo did not possess the powers of Marduk or Jehovah; such concern for his interests may have helped to influence the attitude of Delphi during the Persian War, but it did not have any effect on the Greek response to Persia. The priests of Apollo lacked political power, and the origins of the Ionian Revolt in a general expulsion of tyrannies shows how badly the equation of Persian rule with local tyranny served Persian interests.

Other aspects of the Persian control were less acceptable. After the initial conquest Persian attention had been directed elsewhere, to expansion in the far east and in the south; but a change came with the reign of Darius. The presence of the king's half-brother as satrap at Sardis and a whole series of other relatives in western commands was evidence of the new importance that the king attached to his western provinces and to the continued advance of Persian power in that area; the greater activity brought more intervention and more demands on the Ionian cities. Military service was one requirement of Persian rule: substantial Ionian forces were present on the Scythian expedition, and saw the discomfiture of the Great King. Under Darius the 'gifts' to the king previously demanded from time to time were made an annual tribute in silver due from each satrapy, and the Greeks were for the first time faced with the requirements of an oriental bureaucracy. Herodotus

records the general impression of this development of Persian government in the famous remark attributed by him to the Persians, that 'Darius was a tradesman, Cambyses a tyrant and Cyrus a father' (III.89).

Beyond these political tensions lay powerful economic forces. The western expansion of Persia was disastrous for the Greek mercantile cities of Ionia, who had dominated the trade of the Aegean and the Black Sea, and whose interests spread as far as Egypt and the western Mediterranean. The Phocaeans were famous for their western trading colonies before their flight from the Persians in 545 B.C.; other cities were also involved: on the destruction of Sybaris in 511 the people of Miletus went into public mourning, 'for these two cities were those most closely bound in friendship of any that I have known' (Hdt. VI.21). The close contacts between east and west are shown by that continuous flow of refugees throughout the late sixth century which began the cultural development of Magna Graecia. These western connexions were however increasingly threatened both by the independent growth of the western Greek cities and by the resurgence of Phoenician power. Neither of these was directly caused by the Persian intervention; but in the eastern Mediterranean the situation was different.

Military operations and conquests inevitably disrupt patterns of trade. Trade in staple commodities was a marked feature of the sixth-century Mediterranean economy: it was deeply affected by the conflicts between Persia and Greece, and recovered only on a different orientation in the fifth century, with the establishment of Athens as the main commercial port of Greece. In the sixth century, Naucratis was the most important Greek *emporion* in the Mediterranean, and was dominated by East Greek cities and Aegina; its trade in corn was derived from a Pharaonic royal monopoly.¹⁹ With the conquest of Egypt by the Persians in 525 B.C. there is a clear break of some twenty-five years in the archaeological record of Greek pottery, and it was not until the early fifth century that the town revived as a trading centre. The Scythian expedition affected another area of Greek interest, producing corn and slaves; and it was followed by the Persian expansion into the Propontis and Thrace, where were the main sources for such essential raw materials as timber, hides, silver, and again slaves; Histiaeus' attempt to found Myrcinus on the Thracian coast (Hdt. V.23) as a Milesian *emporion* was the action of an Ionian tyrant aware of the importance of new channels of trade in a worsening economic situation. In addition the disappearance of the 'royal markets' of Lydia and Egypt must have had an important effect on two more specialized areas of the economy. The excavations at Sardis have provided good evidence for the inflow of luxury goods manufactured or supplied by the

¹⁹ T. F. R. G. Braun, *CAH* III²3, ch. 36b.


cities of the coast;²⁰ and the military power of Saïte Egypt and (to a lesser extent) Lydia depended on the employment of Greek mercenaries, who, on the evidence of the graffiti scratched in 591 B.C. on the left leg of the colossal statue of Rameses II at Abu Simbel, were from the smaller towns of Ionia and from Caria (M–L 7): this major source of employment and revenue ceased of course with the Persian conquests. The twenty-five years since the fall of Egypt had seen the increasing erosion of the economic prosperity of Ionia; the revolt was both consequence and consummation of this process; for its failure marks the end of Ionia as a political and economic force.

The cities of Asia Minor in the late archaic period shared a certain common culture based on the interchange of services and artistic and intellectual ideas, and on the movement of individuals. The hellenization of Lydia is demonstrated by the excavations at Sardis and by the record of royal dedications at Delphi and Branchidae. The process was mutual: the luxury of the Lydian life-style was famous in the Greek world and believed to be especially characteristic of the Ionians. These developments had not ceased with the Persian conquest, which opened up the possibility of cultural interchange for the whole area from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean coast. Two late archaic chamber tombs of the plain of Elmali in upcountry Lycia may well record episodes in the defeat of the Ionian Revolt itself. They are painted in East Greek style; the first shows scenes of warriors in Greek armour, and the symbolic departure of the dead man by chariot, again in Greek armour (Fig. 41); the second portrays the ritual funerary banquet of a noble of distinctly Persian hairstyle (Pls. Vol., pl. 81), and the defeat of Greek hoplites by Persian cavalry.²¹ Such a fusion of Persian, Greek and Anatolian culture among the dynasts of Lycia and Caria can be traced from this period to the age of Mausolus; although the political eclipse of Ionia and the polarization created by the Persian Wars undoubtedly created a break for much of the fifth century.²²

The question of relations between Persians and Greeks has various aspects. Economically overland trade through Anatolia was always a minor phenomenon, even after the building of the Persian royal road. Skilled Ionian stonemasons were employed in large numbers on the great Persian palaces at Pasargadae, Susa and Persepolis, and may be said to have deeply influenced if not created the Persian style of sculpture; they have left their traces in graffiti (see Pls. Vol., pl. 234), and in the Treasury Tablets of Persepolis: Darius states in the foundation inscription at Susa, ‘The stone-cutters who worked the stone, they were Ionians and Sardians’.²³ But, with the possible exception of the most highly skilled,

²⁰ B 710–12; B 733. ²¹ A 6, 107. ²² B 717, ch. 1.

²³ Darius Susa F in B 110; see B 166; B 153.



41. Wall-painting from Elmalı. (After B 723 (1973) pl. 43; cf. A 6, 106, fig. 122.)

this labour was forced labour recruited by the satraps and working under slave-camp conditions; if any of these Ionians returned home, they will not have been spokesmen for Persia.

In contrast Greek expertise (as opposed to craftsmanship) was highly rewarded at the Persian court. Scylax of Caryanda was entrusted with the exploration of the eastern sea and river routes from the Indus to Suez; Democedes of Croton was the first of a succession of Greek doctors at court, and special agent for Darius' reconnaissance of the west; Pytharchus of Cyzicus was rewarded by the king with the revenues of several coastal cities, and a man of the same name appears in a graffito in the stone quarries of Persepolis, perhaps as a contractor for skilled labour or operator of the quarry.²⁴ From December 499 B.C. to September 498 Pharnaces, chief financial officer at Persepolis, has as his aide a man known as 'the Ionian'.²⁵

The extent of the intellectual influence of Persian religious ideas on Greek philosophy is much disputed;²⁶ but at the highest political level Greek and Persian could meet on terms of familiarity. The Persian king

²⁴ A 50. ²⁵ B 85. ²⁶ A 64; A 43, 123-9.

was always willing to protect and offer refuge to aristocratic Greek exiles, whatever their past disservices to the Persians had been, and however unlikely it might be that they could promote the purposes of Persia in the future; they were treated like other high-ranking pensioners and officials of the king, and given land or the revenues of certain cities for their sustenance. This type of reward may indeed be seen as a potential source of grievance to the Ionians, for on occasion it was their cities, their lands and their revenues which were allotted to individuals; it was an aspect of Persian generosity which served to emphasize the incompatibility between oriental despotism and the world of the Greek polis. Histiaeus, Hippias of Athens, the Ionian tyrants during the revolt, Demaratus of Sparta and Themistocles are the most famous beneficiaries of this style of patronage by the king; lesser names are just as significant. When Miltiades fled to Athens in 493 B.C. his eldest son, Metiochus, was captured and brought to Darius, 'who provided him with a house and property, and a Persian wife by whom he had children who lived as Persians' (Hdt. VI.41). Metiochus was the half-brother of Cimon, creator of the Athenian empire.

From many perspectives the revolt of the Ionian cities might seem inevitable; the surprising fact is that the Greeks did not seize the far more favourable occasion of the accession of Darius, when so many other areas of the empire broke free. In part this may demonstrate the limitations of Greek understanding of the nature of the Persian imperial power; but any revolt needs a leader, and, at least until Aristagoras' defection, the Persians could rely on the self-interest of the tyrants they had established, and on the good relations which traditionally existed between themselves and the aristocracies of their subject peoples.

IV. THE IONIAN REVOLT

Aristagoras' proclamation of *isonomia* in the late summer of 499 B.C. created a group of insurgent cities, who had demonstrated that they were in revolt from Persia by deposing, and, at least in the case of Mytilene, by killing their tyrants. Herodotus mentions four of these tyrants by name, and writes of 'many others' and of 'the rest of Ionia' being liberated in this first autumn (v.37-8). By winter Aristagoras was in a position to invite each city to appoint its own generals for its own forces, and to set off for mainland Greece to seek alliances in the name of the Ionians.

A form of central organization of the Ionians for their revolt can therefore be seen to have existed from the beginning; thereafter it is most clearly attested in Herodotus' references to alliances between the Ionians and both the Athenians and the Carians (v.103), and in his description of

the preparations for the final battle.²⁷ It is only in this last episode that Herodotus does more than mention this aspect in passing; and his silence has often led to criticism either of Herodotus or of the Ionians, whose disunity is contrasted with the unity displayed by the Greeks in the Great Persian War. In fact the two leagues show an essential similarity in their general lack of organization; and their contrasting fortunes are the result more of geographical and strategic problems than of failure or success in co-ordination.

The Ionian organization is once referred to as 'the *koinon* of the Ionians' (v. 109. 3), more often merely as 'the Ionians'; the word *koinon* in this sense is used elsewhere by Herodotus only of city states. Here it is explained by the existence of a common decision-making body, in which representatives (*probouloi*) of the various cities met at the Panionium, the religious centre of the old Ionian League of twelve cities:²⁸ excavation at the site has revealed nothing relevant to its organization before the fourth century except an altar and a sanctuary wall large enough to accommodate a festival rather than a meeting.²⁹ A similar joint meeting of the Ionians at the Panionium had been held when the Persians had first threatened Ionia after the fall of Sardis, and had led to a common appeal to Sparta (i. 141, 152), but to no joint military actions, though these meetings continued after the Persian conquest (i. 170). The members of the original League undoubtedly constituted the core of the revolt: nine of the ten cities who sent contingents to the battle of Lade belonged to it. But as the presence of Lesbos at Lade shows, at various times during the revolt the *koinon* must have included representatives from other cities outside the old League; it was the place of meeting and the spirit which it engendered which linked the new political with the old religious organization. How often the new *koinon* met is unknown; but it must have decided the plans of campaign for the joint expeditions of the Ionians to the Hellespont and Caria; and it certainly agreed to send a fleet to assist the Cypriot cities, though the request had come to the cities of Ionia individually; it also organized the final naval defence of Miletus. In each case it appears that the individual contingents were commanded separately by their own admirals, who met together on campaign in council without a supreme commander and decided tactics in accordance with the overall strategic decisions of the *koinon*: the only attempt at a more unified command, at Lade, was voluntary, and arranged for the occasion.

It is not easy to see any more formal organization behind the pattern of events, which reveals little more than the casual workings of common

²⁷ Political aspects: c 288; c 258. ²⁸ Religious aspects: c 265; c 326. ²⁹ c 251.

interest; the same use of a traditional meeting place to plan a concerted response can be seen in Caria, where the rebels met together at the White Pillars on the River Marsyas (v. 118) in the face of the Persian advance.³⁰ The only evidence which might suggest a more sophisticated form of organization among the Ionians is numismatic. A series of electrum staters on the Milesian standard, with some ten different obverse types, can be argued from their uniformity of style and fabric to be the product of a single mint.³¹ Some of the types are clearly related to the types of cities active in the revolt, others may less certainly be connected with other cities; a hoard of these coins was found at Clazomenae. If this is a league coinage, it is puzzling that no type has been identified which can be attributed to the leading city of the revolt, Miletus; it may be that the whole series is to be attributed to Chios. But the full extent of joint planning is necessarily obscured because most actions after the first stage of the revolt were taken in response to Persian initiative and by the individual cities affected. One fact however stands out: the Ionians were far more successful in organizing their fleets for common action than in persuading their armies to co-operate: in the Carian campaign it was not the Ionians who arrived to help but 'the Milesians and their allies' (v. 120); and even the one land venture attributed to 'the Ionians', the attack on Sardis, was accomplished by a primarily Milesian force under Milesian generals with Athenian and Eretrian assistance: how large a body was provided by the other Ionians is unknown, though Ephesus did at least supply guides and a forward base for the raid. A class bias to the revolt can perhaps be detected: the idea of common action appealed especially to the beneficiaries of *isonomia*, the rowers who manned the ships; the aristocratic cavalry and the hoplites, apart from those of Miletus, were only willing to defend their own cities. The failure of the revolt rests at least in part on the absence of any means to motivate the hoplite class: Sparta was needed for successful resistance to the Persians.

Aristagoras' embassy to Sparta in the winter of 499/8 B.C. failed: Cleomenes was perhaps too preoccupied with the Argive threat. It is unlikely that Aristagoras could have appealed to Argos at the same time as Sparta, though the oracle given by Delphi to the Argives about this time, with its clear prophecy of doom for Miletus (vi. 19), can be seen as a warning to the rest of Greece not to become involved. However at Athens, champion of *isonomia*, Aristagoras found it easier to fool 'thirty thousand Athenians than one Spartan', and twenty ships together with five Eretrian ships arrived at Miletus in the spring of 498. The attempt to involve mainland Greece had failed, thanks to Sparta and Delphi: only

³⁰ B 717, 55–61. ³¹ C 602; A 38, 441–2; C 621, 30, 36–40, 213, 301–5.

the supporters of *isonomia* and those with ancestral connexions with Ionia, and more especially Miletus, responded.


A dramatic success was urgently needed in the first campaigning season, and the Milesians and their allies provided it in the name of the Ionians. Using Ephesus as a base, and taking an unusual route with Ephesian guides, they made a surprise attack on Sardis, captured the lower town and forced the satrap Artaphernes to withdraw into the citadel. However the town was accidentally set alight (the destruction level is noted in the modern excavations), and the temple of Cybele was burned; but the trapped Lydians and Persians put up a vigorous defence, and the Ionians hurriedly withdrew on the news of approaching reinforcements. The attackers were followed and caught near Ephesus, where they were severely defeated. The only joint Ionian military expedition of the war disbanded, and the Athenians and Eretrians went home: it was clear that the Persian superiority in cavalry, as instanced in the pursuit of the Ionians to Ephesus, made continued land operations impossible.

The burning of Sardis may well have antagonized possible Lydian support, but it gave great impetus to the revolt. In the course of 498 B.C. the Ionian fleet won over Byzantium and the Hellespont area, then turned south to raise the coastal towns of Caria. At the same time the Greek cities of Cyprus revolted under Onesilus of Salamis, and the chief Phoenician city of Amathus was besieged. For the Persians Cyprus was the key to all naval operations in the Mediterranean, and its recapture was the first priority. They began a counter-offensive there with the Phoenician fleet carrying a large Persian army, and Onesilus appealed to the cities of Ionia individually. The opportunity for the Ionians to fight a decisive sea battle at a favourable time was not to be lost, and the *koinon* as a whole responded. The subsequent battle (in the early summer of 497?) was the first of those great double battles on land and sea which were to dominate the conflicts between Persians and Greeks for the next fifty years. The land battle was the fiercest and most important of the revolt; Onesilus personally killed the Persian general, but the treachery of Stesenor of Curium with his considerable forces, who were followed by the war-chariots of Salamis, turned the day for the Persians. At sea the forward policy of the Ionians paid off; they were victorious, and it was not until three years later that their command on this element was disputed. However Cyprus itself had to be abandoned by the Ionians; its recovery by the Persians with help from the Phoenician cities on the island, involved a series of sieges, which ended with the fall of Soli after four months; excavations here have revealed the destruction level. The freedom of the Greek cities in Cyprus had lasted a year.

One of the towns besieged in this campaign was Paphus, where excavations provide the best documented example of those siege techniques for which the Persians were famous (Fig. 42).³² They were faced with a U-shaped ditch, recently constructed, and behind it a well-built stone-faced wall of mud-brick. Against this they raised a siege-mound which was gradually pushed into and across the ditch, and up to the wall; in the ditch were found large quantities of stone statues and architectural ornaments from a nearby sanctuary. The distribution of missiles through the mound reveals the tactics of both sides. Three-winged arrow heads of an eastern type, made to a standard pattern, were concentrated in particular areas of the mound, notably in the re-entrant between the wall and the north-west bastion of the gate; these seem to be the standardized weapons of a professional archery unit, which provided covering fire during the operation and concentrated fire-power for the final assault. In contrast four-sided javelin heads, crudely made, were scattered widely over the mound; they belong to the defence, able with the advantage of height to throw javelins by hand in a pattern of continual harassment. Stone balls of varying size from 2.7 to 21.8 kg were found not concentrated, but scattered mainly along the base of the wall; they perhaps belong to the defence rather than the attack, and represent attempts to crush the attackers in the later stages. The Persian archers were also mounted on siege towers; in response the defenders drove four mines under the walls and the mound, and tried to overturn the towers. The impression is on the attacking side of a thoroughly professional army with a well-established technique of siege warfare, which relied not on artillery to destroy the fortifications but on the siege mound, built doubtless by impressed local labour and protected by archery (though at Soli the Persians did ultimately undermine the walls); on the defending side an experienced commander of an unwarlike community made use of all available means of defence.

On the mainland the Persian land forces were regrouped after the defeat of the Ionian attack on Sardis into three armies under three sons-in-law of Darius for a major counter-offensive, which began probably in 497 B.C. The main army under Daurises operated in the Hellespont and captured five cities in an attempt to re-establish Persian links with the north Aegean coastal lands: the recapture of Byzantium and the Bosphorus route was too difficult a task. A second army under Hymaeës operated on the Propontis coast, and a third under Otanes and the Lydian satrap Artaphernes began the recapture of the towns of Aeolis and Ionia, taking Clazomenae and Cyme. However the news that the Carian hinterland had joined the revolt caused a major revision of plans, for the

³² C 349; C 348.



42. Plan of the siege mound and tunnels at Old Paphus. (After c 348, fig. 8.)

Carians were capable of reversing the balance of power on land. Daurises made the long march south, leaving the Hellespont to Hymaëes; he defeated the Carians at a major battle on the river Maeander; the Carians regrouped with Milesian support and were even more heavily defeated. Daurises began (perhaps in the campaigning season of 496 rather than 497) the long task of reducing the Carian strongholds. But the Carians united once more and Daurises fell into an ambush on the Pegasus road; his forces were annihilated and he and four other commanders were killed. This disaster created a stalemate on land as at sea. It is not surprising that no further military actions can be attributed to the campaigning seasons of 496 and 495 B.C.

It was in the course of 497 B.C. at the height of the Persian counter-offensive that Aristagoras' position in Miletus became untenable; he called together his political supporters, and announced his intention of leading them either to Sardinia or to the city of Myrcinus, founded by Histiaeus (Hdt. v.124). The logographer and aristocrat Hecataeus, a member of Aristagoras' group, is said by Herodotus to have proposed instead that, if driven out of Miletus, they should fortify Leros and use it as a base from which to return to the city. This plan of establishing a nearby base makes no sense as a response to danger from Persian attack but is typical of those exiled for internal political reasons. It is to the credit of Aristagoras that he chose not to exacerbate these problems, which would have been fatal to the cause of the Ionians, but to withdraw

to Myrcinus. Here he and his supporters were killed by treachery in a raid on a Thracian town; Thucydides dates this event to 497/6 B.C. (IV. 102. 2–3). The fall of Aristagoras reveals a further weakness in the Ionian position: fifty years of Persian-backed tyranny had left Ionia without trustworthy political and military leadership. Little is heard of the generals appointed in the other cities; it had been Miletus, where Aristagoras had only formally laid down his power, that provided the leadership for the revolt. Once he was gone, no common offensive action was undertaken.³³

It is in this context that the claims of Histiaeus must be considered. The account of his activities contained in Books IV–VI of Herodotus provides the most detailed biographical description of any Greek hero in the work, rivalling Herodotus' descriptions of oriental monarchs. The narrative though broken is consistent in tone and style, and covers the last twenty years of Histiaeus' life; it must be considered as in origin a separate biographical *logos*, the earliest surviving Greek attempt at biography, which may perhaps offer some insight into the 'biography' by Scylax of Caryanda of a similar figure, Heraclides of Mylasa.³⁴ The general characteristics of this account are clear. It is not apologetic, because it does not offer a consistent political viewpoint: the aim is merely to demonstrate that Histiaeus was responsible for every important event of the period; he plays a succession of roles with astonishing virtuosity, tyrant, founder of cities, courtier, King's Adviser, instigator of revolt, potential leader, privateer. The consistency of character which emerges is the consistency of that favourite folk-hero, the Trickster, whose presence in Greek culture is guaranteed by the prototype of Odysseus. Some of the roles which Histiaeus fulfils are plausible, others are sheer fable, borrowed from the arts of the professional teller of stories – so the account of the message tattooed on the slave's head which began the Ionian Revolt. The problem for the historian of events is to determine how much of this legend is true; for it is at least clear that Histiaeus, like Themistocles later, was such a man as he was believed to be, embodying that virtue of *metis*, cunning, which the Greeks admired so much;³⁵ the stories about Histiaeus were woven into a biographical account because of the Greek fascination with this ideal. One version of the Ionian Revolt was told entirely in terms of Histiaeus, and that version is both coherent and attractive; our suspicions are aroused only because it is essentially an alternative version.

Yet much of the story must be true. Histiaeus is indeed a recognizable type, brought into being by the Persian kings themselves, the type of the Greek courtier and adviser. If he did not save Darius at the Danube bridge, he was at least in high favour after the Scythian expedition. And if

³³ C 385. ³⁴ A 26; A 42. ³⁵ C 19.

he did not start the Ionian Revolt, he did at least manage to find himself dispatched to Sardis to stop it (tired, like so many Greeks, of his gilded captivity) in time to seek to become its leader. He left Sardis for Chios. Here his fantasy began to go wrong, perhaps to the ultimate disadvantage of those he sought to help. Experts in Persian thinking were in short supply; but the Milesians, having got rid of one former tyrant were not anxious to be led by another. When he attempted to force his way in by night, he was wounded and driven off. Histiaeus became an outcast; he found refuge in Lesbos, where the people of Mytilene set him up as a privateer in the interests of the Ionians at Byzantium. Doubtless during this progress Histiaeus' claims became more extreme; he had started the revolt, Artaphernes knew it and was his personal enemy, he had even arranged a plot among the Persians at Sardis against the Persians!

To return to history, by the campaigning season of 494 B.C. the Persians were ready for their counter-offensive. The revolt had gone on too long, the strategy of picking off cities one by one had not succeeded. It was now decided to strike at the centre of resistance, Miletus, by land and sea. The armies west of the Halys were united, the main Persian fleet, 600 triremes (at least in theory) from Phoenicia, Cyprus, Cilicia and Egypt, was brought up. The representatives of the Ionians met at the Panionium and decided not to fight on land, but to leave the defence of Miletus to the Milesians; instead they would man every available ship and concentrate them at the island of Lade. Both sides recognized that the crucial conflict was to be at sea: if the Persian fleet could once again be defeated, Ionia would remain free. The battle was fought in the autumn of 494, at the time of the Thesmophoria.

We catch a glimpse of the Persian side during these preparations. Between 17 January and 15 February 494 B.C., Datiya is recorded as having received rations at Hidali, four days' journey on foot from Persepolis: 'He carried a sealed document of the king. He went forth from Sardis (via) express (service), went to the king (at) Persepolis' (Persepolis Fortification Tablet Q.1809). Datiya is on a ration of 70 quarts of beer, and is therefore one of the highest ranking officials in the empire; he is surely correctly identified with Datis the Mede, who must have had previous experience in the Greek area before leading the expedition to Marathon with Artaphernes, son of Artaphernes the satrap during the Ionian Revolt. His journey was clearly connected with the preparation of the Persian offensive.³⁶

On the Ionian side Herodotus gives a detailed and impressive account of the preparations which led to the gathering of the Ionian fleet at the island of Lade. Three hundred and fifty-three triremes from nine cities

³⁶ B 125.

were assembled: the power and the unity of the Ionians were triumphantly demonstrated; but so was their lack of organization. The appointment of a commander had not been made by the *koinon*, but was left to a council of war on the actual campaign: it was perhaps a basic weakness of the Ionians that their cities were too equal in power to make questions of leadership easy to settle, whereas for the mainland Greeks there was an obvious choice. On this occasion the solution was ingenious: the council chose Dionysius of Phocaea, admiral of only three ships. Thus rivalries between the great states were avoided; and the Phocaeans possessed a long tradition of armed trading in penteconters and of naval experience against Phoenician ships in the western Mediterranean, culminating in the battle of Alalia. Since the Phocaeon migration to avoid Persian conquest the home city might be small, but it retained its traditions and its contacts with the west.

The Ionian fleet went into training under Dionysius' instructions. The story in Herodotus (VI.12) that the conditions imposed were so hard that they provoked a mutiny can probably be rejected, since it is designed to explain and excuse the Samian decision to enter into treasonable negotiations with the Persians. The Persians in fact had been attempting to suborn individual contingents by threats and offers of preferential terms with the help of the former tyrants of the cities, who were with the Persian army.

'When they came together and attacked one another, I cannot say for certain which of the Ionians fought well and which fought ill in this battle: for they accuse each other' (Hdt. VI.14). The Samian contingent, allegedly as a result of a prearranged plan, set sail for home, with the exception of eleven triremes whose captains stayed to fight against orders, and were later (presumably after the Persian Wars) honoured with a column inscribed with their names in the agora of Samos.³⁷ Next in line were the Lesbians, who fled in turn, as did most of the fleet. The Chians stood firm and fought their way through to safety with their few remaining ships; the crews of the ships crippled in battle were forced to beach at Mycale, and were subsequently butchered by the Ephesians as they tried to make their way home by land, an incident which was later claimed to be a mistake.

Miletus was now invested by land and sea, and was finally captured by sapping the walls and with the help of rams: the men were either killed or deported to Mesopotamia, the women and children were enslaved; the temples at Branchidae and elsewhere were destroyed. The list of eponymous Milesian priests compiled later continues through this

³⁷ A 40.

period; but the widespread evidence of the sacking of the city, and the permanent abandonment of the harbour area tell another story.

Each city was now alone. A number of Samian aristocrats and Milesian refugees sailed west and captured Zancle in Sicily. But Samos alone was spared; as promised before the battle, neither town nor temples were burned, and their former status was restored along with their tyrant. Caria fell. Histiaeus lived out his final fantasy: posing as leader of the resistance, he came from Byzantium with his Lesbians and devastated Chios; he then proceeded with a mixed force of Ionians and Aeolians to attack Thasos. When the Persian fleet advanced from Miletus on the rest of Ionia, he was forced to return to the defence of Lesbos, and was caught by the Persian army under Harpagus on the mainland, while he was on a foraging raid in Mysia. Taken alive he was yet thought to be able to talk his way into a royal pardon; but Artaphernes had him impaled and sent only his pickled head to the Great King. After wintering at Miletus, the Persian fleet began a systematic and ruthless extermination in the traditional Persian fashion with rebels. The islands were netted with a human chain, to search out all inhabitants; there and on the mainland the cities and temples were burned to the ground; the men were all killed; the luckier boys were castrated for eunuchs, the luckier girls sent to the royal harem; the rest were sold into slavery or deported to distant provinces (vi. 3.1–2; cf. vi. 9.4). The fleet moved north to complete the reconquest of the European side of the Hellespont. Miltiades, who had clearly taken too independent a line in the Chersonese during the revolt, fled to Athens to become the next leader of resistance against the Persians.³⁸

The revolt was suppressed with severity, as evidence of destruction and abandonment or resettlement from an increasing number of sites shows; but already in 493 B.C. a new policy was in the making. Artaphernes forced representatives of all the Ionian cities to swear oaths to each other at Sardis to settle all differences by arbitration; this procedure was still operating a century later, when an inscription records 'the judges of the Ionians' as competent to decide disputes between member states, subject to confirmation by the satrap (Tod, *GHI* 113);³⁹ it implies that the Ionian League was not disbanded by the Persians after the revolt, and therefore that its actual role in the revolt had in Persian eyes been insignificant. Artaphernes also had the territory of each city surveyed as the basis for a new and fairer taxation at the same level as before: the results of his survey remained in force throughout the fifth century, at least in respect of Persian claims, and perhaps also for the assessment of tribute to the Athenian empire.⁴⁰ The fact that the cities'

³⁸ C 73; A 37, 242–52. ³⁹ A 35, 118 n. 75. ⁴⁰ C 363.

wealth was now measured in land demonstrates the collapse of the Ionian mercantile domination of the eastern Mediterranean.

The last act of reconciliation was performed by the new commander, Mardonius, son-in-law of Darius, who arrived in 492 B.C. to inaugurate a new advance into Greece. He finally recognized the importance of *isonomia* for the origins and conduct of the revolt; he deposed the tyrants who had been reinstated, and set up what Herodotus calls 'democracies' in the cities. Perhaps that was safe enough now that the economic basis for real democracy no longer existed.

The failure of the Ionian Revolt marks the end of Ionian history: that group of cities which had dominated the trade of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea from Spain to south Russia, and which had created Greek poetry, philosophy, science and history, did not regain its economic prosperity or cultural eminence until half a millennium later in the very changed conditions of the high Roman empire. The size of the navies at the battle of Lade is the most significant indication of the prosperity and naval power of Ionia in this period: Chios had provided 100 triremes, Miletus 80, Samos 60; in contrast the two great naval powers of mainland Greece in the archaic age, Corinth and Aegina, could provide only 40 and 30 triremes respectively at the battle of Salamis. The ruin of Chios and the sack of Miletus mark the end of the archaic period more definitely than any other political event: the two greatest cities of the Greek world, with populations perhaps double that of Athens, never recovered. The Athenians themselves understood the lesson of Miletus, and were so moved by Phrynichus' tragedy *The Capture of Miletus* that the audience broke down in tears, the author was fined 1,000 drachmas, and any further performance of the play was forbidden. To Herodotus this was the lesson of history:

For the great places of old have often now become small, and those which are great in my day were formerly small; knowing therefore that human fortune never remains in the same place, I shall commemorate each alike. (1.5)

The defeat of Ionia was intended to be the first step in the conquest of the Mediterranean area by Persia and by the Phoenician cities who would be the chief beneficiaries. Herodotus' story must continue.

CHAPTER 9
THE EXPEDITION OF DATIS AND
ARTAPHERNES

N. G. L. HAMMOND

I. THE NATURE OF THE SOURCES

Herodotus' description of the Persian Wars was based on many accounts by eyewitnesses, mainly but not exclusively on the Greek side (sometimes he himself heard a participant, sometimes he obtained a report at second hand), and this description in turn was recited to audiences which contained veterans of those wars. Thus it was contemporary history in the fullest sense, deriving from contemporaries of the wars and checked by contemporaries at each audition. How good was the memory of those contemporaries about the Persian Wars? We should not be misled by comparisons with the monotonous trench warfare of 1914–18;¹ for moments of action against Persia were brief in time and exciting in character, and they must have stayed vivid in men's minds. Thus the facts related by Herodotus are very likely to be correct; for instance, that the Athenians 'went to the defence of Marathon' (VI.103.1) and marched back 'as fast as possible' after the fighting (VI.116), or that the Athenians faced the Phoenicians shortly after dawn and a westerly wind was blowing that evening in the Salamis Channel (VIII.83, 85, 96). The sequence of events too is likely to be correct: for instance, Eretria falling a few days before the Persians landed at Marathon, or the shield signal being followed at once by the race for Athens, and the Phoenicians arriving by sea and the army overland that very evening.

Since this has been denied,² it is advisable to note the difference between the writing of contemporary history and the writing of ancient history, especially by professional ancient historians. An imaginary example will suffice. Any writer today of the 1939–45 war would have to include the inactive or 'phoney' year. However, an ancient historian from Mars in two thousand five hundred years' time may well find the emptiness of that year improbable and the events of the following year too crowded for credibility, and he may then re-allocate the events to his own satisfaction and also to that of his fellow-historians. He may

¹ C 418. ² C 361, 237f; A 27, 113; C 321 and C 322.

produce a more handsome series of events but it will be entirely a work of fiction. In the following narrative Herodotus' sequence of events is taken to be almost certainly correct.³

His interpretation of the facts is another matter. Each informant had his own view of this or that general and this or that state, and Herodotus did not scrutinize their information with neutral eyes. Themistocles, for instance, was no less controversial a figure than Churchill; and Herodotus and Thucydides represented him quite differently in their histories. Athens came off splendidly, Corinth badly. Reasons are not far to seek. Born c. 484 B.C., Herodotus gained his information from Athenians after the beginning of that 'bitter enmity' which started between Athens and Corinth in 460 (Thuc. I.103.4). Then Herodotus recited his version by invitation at the Panathenaic Festival or on some such occasion in 445, when Athens was desperately in need of a paean of panhellenic praise, and Herodotus was bountifully rewarded by the Athenian state (tradition says with ten talents – not excessive in view of the effect then and thereafter of his *History*).⁴ It is only from other sources that Herodotus' indictments of Corinth are refuted.

The selection of facts is not what we expect.⁵ Herodotus and his listeners had a *penchant* above all for the marvellous and the miraculous as seen, for instance, in Hippias shedding a tooth and fulfilling a dream, Scyllias swimming ten miles underwater, and dream after dream and oracle after oracle revealing divine purposes in the end. This may dismay the modern historian; but it tells him much about the mentality of the wartime generation, and it warns him against supposing that their minds worked like his or that his standards of historical truth will be found in the narrative of Herodotus. The fact is that Herodotus concentrated deliberately and consciously on 'the great and marvellous deeds', which give his narrative its epic tone. Not for him the logistics of a seaborne expedition or the watering of cavalry horses in hot September weather. What he found worthy of record, *ἀξίον λόγου*, was the courage of the Athenians in mass formation (VI.112.3) and the furious fighting 'tooth and nail' of the Greeks who stayed at Thermopylae (VII.223.3) as well as individuals' acts of bravery. No doubt these instances of courage featured from the time of the events themselves in the accounts which men gave to one another and were essentially true. The facts spoke for themselves in contemporary memory. Subsequent generations altered or adorned the record for even more sensational effects.⁶ Thus in the

³ C 315, 406ff; *contra* C 67, A 11, 267; see C 332, C 183, 400ff.

⁴ For the sum compare 1½ talents given by Athens to Pindar for a flattering dithyramb (fr. 76, Loeb); modern writers expect less! Diyllus (*FGrH* 73 F 3), dated by Eusebius; the proposer Anytus was presumably grandfather of Anytus prosecutor of Socrates. *Contra* A 15, 46.

⁵ And omissions, e.g. of the squadron despatched to the narrows between Salamis and Megara.

⁶ C 315, 234-45.

Marathon campaign Miltiades fights on the very day he leaves Athens (Isoc. *Paneg.* 87), numbers are manipulated and divine figures are added.

The way in which Herodotus narrates his facts seems strange to us. He writes in the manner of an easily distracted man. The mention of *X* in a narrative about *W* will start off a digression about *X*: thus among the generals on the way to Marathon was Miltiades and Miltiades' father was Cimon and Cimon had a famous team of mares and so on. But this method of narration was no doubt pleasing to his hearers, all of whom knew pretty well what was going to happen when Miltiades did reach Marathon. Of other accounts the most notable are the *Persae* of Aeschylus, a participant in the wars, which was played to an Athenian audience in 472 B.C., and the description by Pausanias of the painting at Athens which in 460 or so commemorated the victory at Marathon. The excavation of mounds in the plain of Marathon, the discovery of inscriptions (Persian as well as Greek) and the study of coinages have yielded interesting information, often earlier in date than Herodotus' recitation at Athens. Literary sources after Herodotus have to be judged individually, from Thucydides to Justin.⁷ They should not be regarded as rivals to Herodotus. Rather they sometimes drew their information ultimately from different contemporaries, or they used fifth-century writers on the Persian Wars (Dion. Hal. *Tb.* 5, and Thuc. 1.97.2). Important among the later writers were local historians, like Cleidemus and Demon of Attica, who collected topical allusions in early writings or recorded native tradition. All these add much to the account of Herodotus, and it is sometimes possible to check his version.

II. THE PERSIAN BASE IN EUROPE

Persian authority was reaffirmed with a mixture of severity and mercy in 493–492 B.C. (see above, p. 489). The weakest points in the lines of Persia's communications, the Hellespont and the Bosphorus, were occupied by the Persian navy in 493. Landing parties looted and burned the rebellious Greek cities, temples included, as the fleet sailed up the narrows. Miltiades, the Athenian ruler of the Thracian Dolonci and tyrant of the Chersonese (Hdt. vi. 39.2), escaped from Cardia just in time but with the loss of one of his five triremes, and the Greeks of Byzantium and Chalcedon fled to Mesembria in the Black Sea. These reprisals were followed immediately by the announcement of a conciliatory policy, which soon brought the Greeks back to their burnt cities, at Byzantium and Chalcedon and elsewhere, but not Miltiades, who stayed at Athens. The whole operation cleared the way for a Persian advance in 492 under

⁷ C 320, 7ff; A 11, 1ff; C 315, 227ff (Marathon), 265ff and 304ff (Salamis).

the command of a young man who had recently married a daughter of Darius, Mardonius.

According to Herodotus vi.43–5 large naval and military forces met in Cilicia early in 492 B.C. As Mardonius sailed offshore and his army marched overland, he endeavoured to win the favour of the Greek cities by a new policy, that of deposing tyrants and setting up democracies. It was summer when he ferried his army over the Hellespont and marched, accompanied and supplied by his fleet, along the Thracian coast without encountering any opposition at Cardia or elsewhere. The Thasians, the strongest naval power in the northern Aegean, submitted at once, and the Macedonians were ‘added to the subjects’ of Darius (vi.44.1). But two disasters occurred. The fleet never reached Macedonia; for a violent north wind wrecked 300 ships with the loss of more than 20,000 men off the eastern cliffs of Mt Athos. Then ‘a Thracian tribe, the Brygi, in Macedonia’ made a night-attack on the Persian camp, inflicted many casualties and wounded Mardonius himself. But they in turn were made subject to Darius. With the end of the normal campaigning season Mardonius took the main force back to Asia.

Herodotus judged the Persian campaign to have been ‘disgraceful’ in its achievements, because he assumed that the aim of Mardonius was to reduce as many Greek cities of the north Aegean as possible (he had failed to reach most of the numerous cities of Chalcidice), and that the aim of Darius was to punish Eretria and Athens. It is probable that Herodotus failed to understand the significance of the campaign. Had the intention been to attack Eretria and Athens, Darius would have sent envoys into Greece as he did later, in order to isolate the two cities as far as possible. It seems that no Greek city on the Thracian or Macedonian coast offered any resistance to Mardonius. Being so much concerned with Greek affairs, and with marvellous events, such as sea-monsters off Mt Athos, Herodotus overlooked the hinterland and the peoples of the hinterland, the Thracians.

In the Persian records ‘the lands beyond the sea’ (i.e. beyond the waters surrounding Asia Minor) were mentioned first at the time of Darius’ campaign in Europe, and the peoples of those lands were named as three in an inscription usually dated c. 492 B.C. The *saka paradraya* or ‘Saciae beyond the sea’ are best identified with the Getae whom Darius had conquered (iv.118.5); the *yauna takabara* or ‘Ionians (viz. Greeks) with a shieldlike hat’ with the Macedonians, whose kings were sometimes portrayed with such a hat; and the *skudra* – a Phrygian name, used for the Phrygian homeland in Europe (vii.73) – with the peoples, mainly Thracian, who lay between the Getae and the Macedones.⁸ The

⁸ See B 753, 6f; B 761 advances a claim for the Paconians.

extent of the Persian satrapy inland is a matter of dispute. The present writer has stated on p. 245 above some of his reasons for believing that Persia controlled central Thrace as well as the coastal sectors of the region. If so, the inner core of the satrapy was formed by the central plain, from which routes radiated to the lower Danube, the Black Sea coast, the Bosphorus and the Aegean coast, where Doriscus at the mouth of the Hebrus river was garrisoned *c.* 513 B.C. and indeed held continuously until *c.* 463 (VII.59.1).⁹ In the interior the limit of Megabazus' advance westwards was set by his failure to conquer the Agrianes, a Paeonian tribe of the upper Strymon valley; the Doberes of the Strumitsa valley; the Odomanti north west of Mt Pangaeum; and the Paeonians of Lake Prasias, which guarded the approach to the Rupel pass on the Strymon (V.16.1, retaining the text common to all codices).¹⁰ That part of Thrace, protected on the east by the great mountains of Rila, Pirin, and Rhodope, has always been a centre of resistance to foreign invaders.

The most striking achievement of Megabazus in the eyes of Herodotus was the conquest of the coastal area south of Rhodope, the area known today as Greek Thrace. The strongest people there, the Paeonians, resisted but were crushed, and their lands from the Strymon basin to the lower Axios were mostly given to loyal Thracian tribes. The leading or royal tribe, the Edones,¹¹ acquired the gold-yielding region, Crestonia, and the river there was named at this time Edonus (the later Echedorus). It is probable that the royal cemetery recently discovered at Sindos, between the Axios and the Edonus in Mygdonia, was the burial-place of the kings of these Edones. The finds include gold death-masks, similar to those at Trebenishte, large gold-headed gold pins, gold-decorated weapons, and silver and bronze objects (see above, pp. 250–1, Fig. 18). The kings were subject to Persia, and their frontier with the Macedonians was the lower Axios river, as in Aeschylus, *Persae* 492f.

Herodotus has more to say about the Macedonians, where his chief informant was the king Alexander, who reigned *c.* 495–452 B.C.¹² When they met, Alexander was anxious to stress his services to the Greek cause. Although the submission of his father, Amyntas, to Persia was undeniable, Alexander told Herodotus a story, certainly fictitious,¹³ that on his own initiative as a boy *c.* 510 the first Persian envoys to visit the Macedonian court were murdered at a state dinner by men dressed as women (V.18–21), and that Megabazus was placated by receiving the hand of a Macedonian princess for his son Bubares. Although Herodotus implied the contrary at VI.44.1, Macedonia did not secede from the satrapy during the Ionian Revolt; for Amyntas, like the kings of such Thracian tribes as the Edoni, had benefited from Persia's pruning of

⁹ See B 759; *contra* B 753. ¹⁰ Tribal positions in C 248, I 193–202. ¹¹ C 248, II 55ff.
¹² C 248, II 98ff. ¹³ C 248, II 99; B 753, 3.

Paeonian power, and he had added Amphaxitis and Anthemus to his kingdom.

'Skudra', like the European allies of Troy in the Trojan Catalogue, looked eastwards, and the already extensive trade between the central Balkans and Asia Minor, especially Ionia, increased greatly. The unusually pure silver of Thrace was much prized by the Persians. With their establishment of the satrapy the 'Thraco-Macedonian' area produced coinages in large denominations of silver which served also as bullion and have been found in hoards in Persia, Syria, Afghanistan and Egypt.¹⁴ The issuing authorities were tribes as far afield as the 'Tynteni' (later Atintani) near Lake Ochrid, kings such as the Edonian Litas, and Greek cities such as Aenea and Acanthus. The Macedonian kingdom had no silver mines. It exported its fine ship-timber to the shipwrights of the Persian navy. The additional opportunities for trade with the east and the needs of large Persian armies brought unparalleled prosperity, which stimulated areas even west of Macedonia; for it was particularly in the period 520–480 B.C. that the royal tombs at Trebenishte, north of Lake Ochrid, were rich in gold and silver objects and in Corinthian bronzes.¹⁵ Some traffic in luxury goods was developing along the line of the later Via Egnatia from the Thermaic Gulf to the lower Adriatic Sea, across which Thracian silver was exported to South Italy (see above, p. 250).

The aim of Mardonius in 492 was rather to consolidate this Persian satrapy and indeed to extend it to the Demir Kapu defile of the Axios river, near which the Thracian Brygi are probably to be located.¹⁶ When he withdrew with part of his forces in 491, he left a well-organized and prosperous satrapy, which was to serve as a base for further operations. What interested Herodotus was the coastal fringe on which the Greek cities lay and the offshore islands. There too Darius made his preparations; for in 491 he ordered the Thasians to deliver their fleet to his general at Abdera and to dismantle the walls which they had built to defend their strong theatre-shaped capital. Although rich and powerful by Greek standards, the Thasians obeyed the order forthwith.

Confident of his base in Europe, Darius ordered his subjects on the Mediterranean coast to build warships and horse-transporters and sent envoys to the Greek states on the islands and the mainland who were to demand the tokens of submission, 'earth and water' (VI.48.2). By late 491 it was obvious to the Greeks that, if they should refuse to submit, their country would be invaded by Darius in 490.

¹⁴ C 263; C 601; C 248, II 69ff; C 621, 138f; C 606.

¹⁵ C 526 and later reports cited in C 248, II 91, n.2

¹⁶ C 248, II 61.

III. THE SITUATION IN GREECE

There was only one coalition of consequence in Greece, 'The Lacedaemonians and their Allies' or, to use not the ancient but a modern name, 'The Peloponnesian League'. The military command of the coalition's forces was vested in the kings of the Lacedaemonians; but the behaviour of the kings was affected by the government of the Lacedaemonians, which was conducted at Sparta but only by the full Spartan citizens, or Spartiates as they called themselves. The army of the Lacedaemonians consisted of the Spartiates, highly trained heavy-armed infantrymen; Helots or serfs who supported the Spartiates as light-armed troops; and Perioeci, or 'Dwellers-around (Sparta)', a militia of heavy-armed infantrymen from the dependent towns of Laconia and Messenia.¹⁷

The reputation of this army reached its zenith *c.* 494 B.C. when it challenged its acknowledged rival, the army of Argos. Cleomenes, the ambitious king of Sparta, planned to invade the Argolid by land. He turned back, because the omens of sacrifice were adverse, but a sacrifice to Poseidon proved more propitious. So Cleomenes embarked his army on ships and made an unopposed landing at Nauplia. Meeting the Argives nearby, at Sepea, he defeated them in battle and slaughtered most of the survivors who had taken refuge in a sacred grove (VI.76–83). The Argive dead numbered 6,000, a huge figure by Greek standards; and Cleomenes was judged sacrilegious since he set the grove on fire during the massacre.

In this campaign only some of the Allies were involved. Sicyon and Aegina sent some ships to help the landing, and their crews joined in the fighting (VI.92.1). The Allies as a whole were Boeotia, Phocis and the Peloponnesian states, apart from Argos and probably Achaea. When they joined Sparta in a war of common concern, the coalition was far superior in heavy-armed infantry to any other state or combination of states in Greece. Its naval forces also came into the first rank after the defeat of the Ionian Revolt. In cavalry alone they were inferior to Thessaly.

Sparta had been unswervingly hostile to Persia. She allied herself in turn with Croesus of Lydia, Amasis of Egypt and the Scythians of Europe; she attacked Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, when he defected to Cambyses, and she arranged the overthrow of tyrants at Naxos, Thasos and Athens, in order, *inter alia*, to prevent further intrigues with Persia and Persian intervention. When the revolt of Ionia was being planned, Sparta refused to send aid, wisely as events proved, but no one doubted

¹⁷ For these categories see *CAH* III², 332ff.

her commitment to the defence of Greek liberty on the mainland. And the attack on Argos *c.* 494 B.C. was no doubt prompted by the fear that Argos might offer herself to Persia as a base in the Peloponnese. On the other hand, the attitude of the Allies had not been put to the test, and it was Darius who took the initiative in sending his envoys to the Greek states. The response was alarming: 'all islanders visited by the envoys and in particular the Aeginetans . . . and many of the mainlanders gave earth and water to Darius' (VI.49.1). To offset this collapse in morale, which brought Persia's orbit to the mainland itself, Sparta publicly committed herself to total war with Persia by executing the envoys of Darius (VII.133.1). This abuse of international usage was an act of sacrilege by Greek standards. It brought in its train 'the wrath of Talthybius' (Agamemnon's envoy in the Trojan War and the patron hero of Spartan envoys), which exacted retribution from Sparta later in Herodotus' lifetime (VII.134–7). In 491 B.C. the execution was a symbol of resistance.

The defection, or 'medism' as Herodotus called it, of Aegina was a threat not only to Sparta but also to Athens, which had been at war with Aegina since 505 B.C. Athens immediately asked Sparta to intervene, and Sparta acted, as she had probably intended to do, by sending Cleomenes to arrest the leaders of the oligarchic party who, being in power (cf. VI.73.2), were held responsible for the submission to Persia. However, they rebuffed him, claiming that both kings had to be present if the intervention was to be official (VI.50.2). In September he and the other king, Leotychidas, went to Aegina, arrested ten leaders and deposited them as hostages for the good conduct of their fellows not at Sparta but at Athens, a decision probably taken by Cleomenes on his own initiative in order to demonstrate the unanimity of Sparta and Athens in opposing Persia. In November 491 Cleomenes died.

Aeginetan envoys hastened to Sparta, criticized Leotychidas for depositing the hostages at Athens and were upheld by a Spartan court of justice, which then surrendered Leotychidas to them. By this act of appeasement Sparta hoped to avoid a break with the oligarchs of Aegina. But the oligarchs' concern was with the hostages; crossing over to Athens with Leotychidas in December, they demanded the hostages in the names of Sparta and Aegina. But Athens played Aegina's trick: she claimed that both kings had to be present! So she kept the hostages (VI.85–6). This narrative was put together by Herodotus from his talks with acquaintances at Athens, Aegina and Sparta. It is decked out with fictitious speeches and some details are not above suspicion; but the substance is true, that both Athens and Sparta wanted to neutralize Aegina by taking the leading Medists hostage, but Sparta was not prepared to alienate Aegina by using force. Events were to show that Sparta had acted sensibly.

We must consider now the background at Sparta to the Aeginetan affair. Cleomenes was something of a maverick: he had twice mishandled his policy of installing his friend Isagoras in power at Athens, and he had been tried but acquitted on a charge of corruption in that he had not captured Argos. After his rebuff at Aegina Cleomenes found that the other king, Demaratus, had been plotting against him; accordingly he managed to have him deposed on a charge of illegitimacy and replaced by Leotychidas. He achieved this by bribing a leading Delphian and through him the priestess of Apollo at Delphi (vi.65–6). The bribery became common knowledge after Cleomenes and Leotychidas had deposited the hostages at Athens, and Cleomenes stayed away first in Thessaly and then in Arcadia, where he was believed to be uniting the Arcadians against Sparta. More of a menace abroad than at home, he was invited to resume his throne, returned in mid-November and went mad. His relatives kept him at home, even putting him in the stocks as a danger to himself and others, but he frightened a Helot into giving him a knife and lacerated himself to death. In the belief of his generation this was divine retribution for his acts of sacrilege since it was the gods who made a man or woman mad. The reputation of Leotychidas was adversely affected as an accomplice of Cleomenes; hence in part his condemnation by the court of justice. Demaratus, however, was not reinstated. When holding some office as a commoner he was insulted by Leotychidas and made his escape to Zacynthos and ultimately to the court of Darius.

Although these quarrels between Cleomenes, Demaratus and Leotychidas may have been embroidered in the transmission, there is no doubt that they were marked by dishonesty, self-seeking and corruption. In the disillusion which ensued the Ephors, as the elected representatives of the people, became more powerful in the affairs of state. Indeed an early law had enjoined that the Ephors were to arbitrate and judge if the kings disagreed (Plut. *Agis* 12.2–3); and it was the Ephors who took action against a king or a regent. Thus the Ephors of the Spartan year September 491 to September 490 B.C. were instrumental in developing and implementing the policies of war with Persia, association with Athens and appeasement of Aegina. This was important because they rather than the kings and Gerousia reflected the will of the citizen body, the Spartiate warriors.

Whereas Sparta had only uttered threats, Eretrians and Athenians had fought against Persians at Sardis in 498 B.C. They were still technically at war with Persia in 491. We know nothing of Eretria's attitudes between those dates. The vacillations of Athens have been described on pp. 338–40 above. It seems that the people's will to resist hardened from 493 onwards. In March the Assembly elected as chief magistrate for the Attic year June/July 493 to June/July 492 not a member of a leading

aristocratic house but Themistocles, a protagonist certainly of resistance, and in the course of 493/2 voted the money for the first stage in the development of the Piraeus as a defensible harbour in preference to the open beach at Phalerum (Thuc. 1.93.3; Dion. Hal. vi.34.1). It was probably early in 492 that Miltiades was tried by the Assembly on the capital charge of 'tyranny in the Chersonese' not over the Dolonci but over Greek settlers (vi.39.2; 104.2). He was acquitted. Whatever the rights or wrongs of the case, the acquittal of the most famous outlawed enemy of Persia was an indication of the people's hostility to Persia. Then in 491 Darius' envoys came to Athens. They were formally condemned to death by the Assembly and were executed as criminals (vii.133.1).

Thus Athens, like Sparta, committed herself to total war by an act of sacrilege. Who proposed it and did 'the wrath of Talthybius' bring retribution? Herodotus remained silent, perhaps because his fortunes were tied up with those of Athens. The answers were supplied many centuries later by Pausanias when he visited the Hellenium, the place where the defenders of Greek freedom against Xerxes met. Close to it, he says, was the grave of Talthybius, from which the wrath took its toll of the Spartan state and of the house of Miltiades; 'for Miltiades had been responsible for the execution by Athens of those of the envoys who came to Attica' (iii.12.7). Rejection of Pausanias is unjustified: the authorship of so heinous a proposal was certainly remembered throughout the fifth century, and any writer on the Persian Wars might have mentioned it.¹⁸ Then early in 490 B.C. the Assembly elected its officers for the Attic year 490/89. Among them were two champions of resistance: Callimachus the *archon polemarchos* or religious head of the armed forces, and Miltiades one of the ten generals.¹⁹

Sparta, Eretria and Athens were exceedingly courageous. The claws of the Persian lion held down Macedonia in the north and Cyrenaica in the south, and his very roar made the islands cower in terror. What chance of survival had these small city states against an emperor whose subjects extended from the Indus valley to their own threshold? Why did they persist against all reasonable odds? The answer was given by Herodotus in another context (vii.102).

'They will never accept your terms which spell slavery for Greece, and they will assuredly meet you in battle, though all the rest of the Greeks may be of your mind. Do not ask about numbers, how many they are who are able to act thus! Let it be a thousand men, or more, or less, they will fight indeed.'

¹⁸ Pausanias supports Herodotus' date which has been questioned: see C 390.

¹⁹ Hdt. vi.104.2 'Miltiades elected by the *demos*': vi.109.2. 'Callimachus appointed by lot', a clear distinction of method, which is not explained away by the supposition of W. Oncken, re-stated by Badian C 71, 25, that candidates for the archonships were elected by the *demos* and then distributed by lot over the named archonships; see C 315, 233 n.1; *contra* C 102, 72 and above, p. 320.

It was not a question of odds or of statistics but of principle, the principle of Greek independence which has echoed down the ages. 'One day of freedom is better than forty years of slavery and bondage.'

It was after these decisions were taken and before the Persian invasion that acts of war occurred between Aegina and Athens according to Herodotus (VI.87–94). Many historians from Grote onwards have claimed that Herodotus was in error. Their chief reason is their belief that the events recorded by Herodotus cannot be fitted with probability into the span of time which he allows for them. They therefore rearrange those events and put some of them after instead of before the Persian invasion.²⁰ The opinion of the present writer is that this is a doubtful procedure in any case (see above, p. 491), and that there are also particular reasons which militate against it. The Persian invasion and the battle of Marathon were a watershed for fifth-century Greeks, and they related events to it, as Europeans related events to the battle of Waterloo (cf. Thuc. I.18.1–2). It is thus inconceivable that a majority of the informants of Herodotus from Aegina, Athens and the Peloponnese should have put events within their own experience on the wrong side of the battle of Marathon, as Grote and others have to assume, and it is most improbable that Herodotus, if correctly informed, should have made the mistake himself and not been corrected by those audiences to which he recited his work. Moreover, quite apart from the evidence of Herodotus, who alone gives a consecutive account, Thucydides at I.41.2 dated an important episode late in this period of war between Aegina and Athens *ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικά* 'before the Persian affairs'. His plural is made up of two affairs, the battle of Marathon (I.18.1 fin.) and the great expedition (I.18.2), which was τὸ *Μηδικόν* *par excellence* (I.23.1).²¹ When he used τὰ *Μηδικά* to date the fleets of the Sicilian tyrants and of Corcyra, he defined the date more clearly by adding '(before) the death of Darius', which fell between the two parts of τὰ *Μηδικά* (I.14.2).

Where Herodotus and Thucydides agree on a matter of fifth-century chronology, it is indeed rash to dismiss both as mistaken and especially on the ground that events as related by Herodotus happened too fast for some modern writers to accept. Presumably Herodotus and Thucydides had thought about that too; and their decision rested on a better knowledge than we can hope to have of what could happen between neighbouring city states within a matter of months. In what follows Herodotus' account is accepted, and indications of timing are added.

Hostilities began in Poseidon's sacred month (December), when Leotychidas was travelling back to Sparta. The Aeginetans took advantage of the sacred truce to kidnap some leading Athenians when

²⁰ See n.3 above. ²¹ c. 312.

they were attending the festival and boat-race in honour of Poseidon at Sunium, and they proclaimed that these Athenians would be held as hostages. The riposte enraged Athens. Having only fifty warships herself, she hired twenty from Corinth for a nominal fee and defeated the fleet of Aegina. Fighting ensued on the island, during which a thousand volunteers came from Argos to help Aegina but suffered heavy losses. Finally, probably in March 490 B.C., the Aeginetan fleet came out unexpectedly, caught the Athenian fleet in disorder and captured four ships and their crews, numbering up to 800 men. At that point operations ceased (VI.87–93).

This part of the ‘unheralded war’ between Athens and Aegina was marked by political ideologies, unofficial interventions and the sense of a great war impending. The pro-Persian oligarchs of Aegina were threatened by left-wing ‘democratic’ revolutionaries, who made a secret plot with Athens. When the plot miscarried, the leaders escaped to Attica; but seven hundred of their followers were arrested and slaughtered. Corinth used lend-lease and Argos volunteers, in order not to commit themselves respectively to war against Aegina and her allies (of which Sparta might be one) and to war against Athens (with which Sparta might join forces). And the impending invasion by Persia cast its shadow over the bitter hostilities. For Aegina and Argos might be saved by a Persian victory; and Athens, Corinth and in the background Sparta feared that their Greek enemies would open the way into Greece for the Persian invader.

IV. THE PERSIAN OFFENSIVE

Darius had no lack of intelligence about conditions in Greece. He employed able Greeks at his court and in his forces; he gave sanctuary to émigrés, such as Hippias, ex-tyrant of Athens, and Demaratus, ex-king of Sparta (the latter reached him in 490 B.C. perhaps after the expedition); and he sent agents and envoys where he pleased. Trade and travel were restricted only by the hazards of weather, piracy and kidnapping and not by any political embargo. As Herodotus tells us (III. 135–7), Darius sent his Greek doctor and some Persian officers to mainland Greece and southern Italy, where they ran into trouble, but they eventually returned without the doctor but with detailed information about anchorages and sailing conditions. It was easy, too, to learn from his seafaring subjects, Ionians, Cypriots, Phoenicians and Egyptians. Thus the strengths of the army and of the navy at Athens, Eretria, Aegina, Sparta and so on were certainly known at the Persian court.

For the campaign Darius appointed Datis, a distinguished Mede (see above, p. 487), as commander in the field and Artaphernes, his own

nephew, as his personal representative; and he sent them with 'a large and well equipped army' from Susa to the coast. There, in Cilicia, they met a fleet of warships and horse-transport, embarked their troops and horses, and sailed with the good weather of early summer along the dangerous coast of southern Turkey. The warships were of the latest model, triremes, six hundred in number according to Herodotus (vi.95.2), and the transports evidently had let-down flaps for landing horses and men; all were operated under oar but could make use of a favouring wind with some sail. The fleet certainly called at Rhodes, where it entered Aegean waters. As we learn from the Temple-Chronicle of Lindus, one of the Persian generals made an offering of weapons and robes to Lindian Athena. The report in the chronicle, a Hellenistic compilation, that Athena saved Lindus from being captured by siege because she sent rain, is more likely to be an invention; for had it been true, Herodotus would almost certainly have mentioned such a divine intervention.²² From Rhodes the fleet proceeded along the coast to Miletus.

Meanwhile news of the expedition must have reached the Greeks of the islands and the mainland. They did not feel immediately threatened; for recalling the movements of Megabazus and Mardonius they expected that the large Persian forces would proceed to the Hellespont and the Thracian coast and would not reach the border of Thessaly until late in the campaigning season. Then, in midsummer, at Samos, the fleet changed course. It headed for Icaria and sailed 'through the islands'. Surprise was complete. Naxos, which had withstood a siege so successfully in 499, was not even organized for resistance. A seaborne armament of such magnitude had always hugged a friendly coast in the past. That it should go out to sea was a novelty, as remarkable in 490 as the Athenian expedition to Sicily was to be in 415 B.C.

The credit for this bold and effective strategy goes to Darius. The detailed planning, the ship-construction and the seamanship were primarily Phoenician. Transportation of considerable forces by sea had probably been undertaken by the Carthaginians (colonists from Phoenicia) some decades before their invasion of Sicily in 480 B.C. with 200 warships and troop-transport, and the Phoenicians of the homeland probably learnt from them. The first essential for a seaborne expedition on this scale was outright naval superiority. What opposition was to be expected at sea? In the sixth century B.C. the leading fleets had belonged not to the states of old Greece but to the western Greeks and the eastern Greeks, who had had to contend with the challenges respectively of Etruscan and Carthaginian fleets and of Phoenician, Cypriot and Egyptian fleets. Then at Lade in 494 the fleet of the eastern Greeks,

²² A 11, 218.

totalling 353 triremes, was utterly defeated, and half of its best flotilla, that of Chios, was destroyed. The Phoenicians were undisputed masters of the eastern waters, and islands like Thasos and Aegina, each with a fleet perhaps of fifty or sixty triremes, saw that it was impossible to resist them at sea. The Phoenicians had built somewhat larger triremes than the Chians, for instance; for they had a crew of 200 and 40 marines, whereas Chian triremes had a crew of 150 and 40 marines.

The numbers which Herodotus gave for Persian fleets were 200 triremes against Naxos, 600 warships at Lade, a large fleet in Thrace which lost almost 300 ships off Mt Athos, and now 600 triremes under Datis and Artaphernes. Although the number 600 may have been a conventional figure for a great Persian fleet (Darius was credited with 600 at the Bosphorus), there were at least 400 triremes at Lade. How many did Datis and Artaphernes need? Aiming as they were for the waters of the Saronic Gulf, they might encounter the combined fleets of Eretria, Athens, Megara, Corinth and possibly Aegina, which would in all have numbered over 200 triremes. The Persians may well have taken 300 triremes,²³ which incidentally is the figure given by Plato, *Menexenus* 240a7.

While the fleet was manned by the peoples of the eastern Mediterranean, the army was drawn mainly from the Iranian satrapies. The *corps d'élite* was the heavy-armed Persian cavalry. Perhaps 1,200 horses were transported²⁴ in order to mount 800 cavalrymen; for that number of cavalrymen could outfight any Greek cavalry force except the Thessalian. The best infantry had to be sufficiently numerous to defeat a combination of the best Greek infantry armies, those of Athens and Sparta, which had some 20,000 front-line troops. We should then allow at least 25,000 infantry in the Persian force.²⁵ Since the crews of 300 triremes were 60,000 and those of the transport and supply vessels perhaps 4,000 the grand total of persons on the expedition was 90,000. This is the figure given by Simonides, a contemporary (Bergk 90). The ratio between the fighting men and the other personnel is much as in the expedition sent by Athens to Sicily (it set out with 94 triremes and 6,400 fighting men).

Datis and Artaphernes made an unopposed landing on Naxos. They burnt the temples and the town in reprisal for the Naxian resistance in 499 B.C. and deported all except those who escaped into the hills. At Delos Datis sacrificed to Apollo and Artemis. It was a part of Darius' policy to show respect for the worship of Apollo (M-L 12); and Datis hoped to win favour with Persia's Greek subjects. Meanwhile detachments of the

²³ C 320, 348, '200 would have been more than sufficient'.

²⁴ Later transports took 30 horses with 60 oarsmen.

²⁵ C 320, 59 gave 20,000 as his figure for those engaged in the battle.

fleet were visiting a number of islands, where they conscripted some men into their forces and took children as hostages for good conduct. The dispersion of the fleet added to the confusion of the mainlanders, who could not tell where the Persians would strike next. In August Datis reassembled the fleet and advanced to Carystus at the southern tip of Euboea, almost equidistant from Eretria and Athens. With remarkable courage the Carystians shut their gates; they refused to fight against their neighbours or to give hostages, as Datis required. The Persians ravaged their lands and laid siege to the town. The Carystians had no option but to submit, provide hostages and send a levy to serve with the Persian army.

Carystus was the first state to resist, and its resistance gave Eretria time to ask Athens for help (vi. 100.1). Although the next objective of Datis was unknown, Athens made a most generous decision: she ordered her 4,000 colonists at nearby Chalcis to join in the defence of Eretria. These 4,000 arrived at Eretria while Datis was still at Carystus, but they learnt from a leading Eretrian that counsels were divided in the city. On his advice they returned to Chalcis, took ship and landed at Oropus in Attica. They were on their way overland to Athens, when the Persian fleet was sailing up the Euboean Channel.

The landing of an army was a difficult operation in ancient times. Warships and transports had to be rowed close inshore at a place where water was calm or sheltered and there were no underwater snags; thus local knowledge was needed, and this the Persians had acquired in advance. Horses and men were then put off into the sea and swam and waded ashore; and the horses had to be disembarked quickly, because they were excited by the smell and sight of land. If enemy forces opposed a landing, horses and men in the water became easy targets for missiles, and a line of heavy infantry in formation on the beach would form an almost impassable barrier for any troops emerging from the sea (see Thuc. vi. 11–12 and Arr. *Ind.* 24). In order to split any defending forces, the Persians planned to land at three suitable beaches. The Eretrians seem to have decided in advance not to defend their beaches, since their options according to Herodotus were to fight a battle in the open plain, to man the walls or to disperse into the hills. Being so much inferior in numbers (they had perhaps 5,000 well-armed men), they decided to stay behind the massive walls of hewn masonry which surrounded the city. This was sensible enough by Greek standards of warfare, because the arts of defence were far superior to those of assault (it was to take Athens two years to capture Potidaea in 430 B.C.); but the Persians had shown an unusual skill in siegecraft during the Ionian Revolt, especially in Cyprus and at Miletus.

The look-outs on the acropolis of Eretria saw the approaching fleet far

off, and the Eretrian army began to man the walls. The Persians put in at the three beaches. Finding them undefended 'they immediately began to disembark the horses and make preparations for the attack' (VI.101.1). Six days of violent assault and ravaging followed with heavy losses on both sides. On the seventh day the city was betrayed by two citizens 'of repute' (presumably by opening a gate or gates). The Persians looted and burned the temples in revenge for the Eretrian burning of the Persian temples at Sardis, and they deported the population in accordance with the orders of Darius. The fall of one of Greece's leading cities in a week must have been almost as shocking as the fall of Thebes to Alexander the Great was to be in 335 B.C.

The far-sighted strategy of Darius had succeeded admirably. Naxos and Eretria had fallen piecemeal. His forces had been increased by conscripts from the islands, his lines of communication and supply were assured, and the advanced base at Eretria had excellent pasturage in the Lelantine plain and also the ample supplies which had been accumulated by the Eretrians for a long siege.

During and after the siege it is probable that Datis and Artaphernes discussed their next move. Since Chalcis had been abandoned by the Athenians, it would be possible to cross into Boeotia where Thebes, the bitter enemy of Athens, might welcome them. Then they might campaign northwards and join hands with the Persian forces in Europe at the Macedonian frontier. The fleet would make it possible to isolate and overcome any opposition which might be offered, for instance in Thessaly. The alternatives were to attack Athens at once, while it was unaided, or to land in the Argolid, where Argos would join them, and cut the line of communications between Sparta and Athens. They decided to attack Athens, perhaps in accordance with the original orders of Darius.

V. THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF MARATHON²⁶

A few days were spent in organizing the base at Eretria. Then the Persians sailed down the Euboean Channel and brought their ships close inshore on the shelving coast of the sheltered bay of Marathon. The Skhoinia, so named after the reeds of the Great Marsh inland, was an ideal landing-beach two miles long, and it was totally undefended. Herodotus explains that it was Hippias who led the Persians to that place (he and his father Pisistratus had landed there from Eretria some fifty years earlier and had marched towards Athens). It was also close to the base at Eretria for purposes of supply, and the plain of Marathon was a most suitable place in Attica for the deployment of cavalry (i.e. being flat

²⁶ Supporting arguments for this account in C 315, 170–250.

and clear of trees and such obstacles; cf. v.63.4). We may add that there was abundant water and lush pasture at the Great Marsh, a strong place for a camp with narrow approaches by Kato-Souli and by the west end of the Skhoinia, and overland roads for supply from northern Attica and southern Boeotia (the problem of feeding about 70,000 persons and 1,200 horses should not be overlooked). The landing successfully completed, the cavalry ravaged the farms ([Dem.] LIX.94; Plut. *Mor.* 305) and threatened Oenoe and Marathon. Datis no doubt intended next day to march on Athens, as he had marched on Eretria, cut it off from any possible aid, and capture the city by assault or by betrayal. But at this point Datis lost the initiative.

News of Eretria's fall reached Athens a day or two before a festival was held in honour of Athens' war-deities, Artemis Agrotera and Apollo. During this festival, which was on the sixth day of the lunar month Boedromion (c. 8 September, 490 B.C.) the Assembly made a vow to sacrifice one goat for each Persian that was killed in the future. Then the landing at Marathon was reported by fire-signal to Athens, where the army was already concentrated. It was probably soon after dawn on 8 Boedromion. The generals on their own initiative sent a runner, Philippides, to Sparta (VI.105.1). In the Assembly one of the generals, Miltiades, proposed that 'they provide themselves with rations, set out' and 'meet the enemy at once', and that a number of slaves be given their liberty in order to fight against the Persians (Arist. *Rhet.* 1411a10; Schol. to Dem. XIX.303; Paus. VII.15.7). A message for help was sent to Plataea. The Athenian army of some 9,000 men probably used the two available routes, partly by daylight and then during the night: one of about 35 kms over the hills between Mt Parnes and Mt Pentelicus (a graded road of the late fifth or fourth century B.C. still exists from the top of the pass almost to the strong spring above Oenoe), and the other about 40 kms over the low pass between Mt Pentelicus and Mt Hymettus by Pallene and then along the coast. By dawn of 9 Boedromion the army was in position on the southern edge of the plain, some six and a half kms away from the Persian camp. By this rapid move the Athenians saved Marathon town and blocked the routes for any Persian advance on Athens. They had two lines of supply from the main plain of Attica, water at Marathon town and access to the strong spring above Oenoe. That night or at dawn next day, the 10th, they were joined by the full force of the Plataeans, 1,000 strong. Philippides sped back to Athens on the 11th. His news, relayed to Marathon the same day, was that Sparta would send her army but that it would not reach Marathon until late on the 18th.

The Persians probed the Athenian position on the 9th and offered battle in the plain on the morning of the 10th. Datis was anxious to destroy his opponents before they were joined by the Spartans or any

other ally. The Greeks were at the moment in a good defensive position: for they had felled trees and built an abattis in order to protect their left flank against attack by the Persian cavalry (Nep. *Milt.* 5.3; cf. Frontin. II.2.9).²⁷ Should they advance from that position and accept the Persian offer of battle? The decision lay with the ten generals to whom the operational command had been entrusted. The substance of their meeting was described by Herodotus on the basis of reports he had from Athenian informants; for it seems that the debate became common knowledge after the event.²⁸


Five generals wished to avoid an engagement on the ground that 'they were few to engage the Persian force', and five generals, including Miltiades, wished to engage. This produced a deadlock. 'The worse of the opinions [i.e. that which appeared worse to Miltiades, the subject of the main sentence, and also to Herodotus] was winning' (either procedurally as the proposal to engage was not being carried, or for some reason unknown to us). At this point it was agreed (we may assume) to ask the polemarch, Callimachus, to vote; for in earlier times the polemarch had had a vote, and it seemed wise now to revive the practice. The proposal to invoke Callimachus was probably made by Miltiades; for it was he who was sent to bring Callimachus to the conference. Herodotus' report of what Miltiades said to Callimachus on the way is certainly apocryphal. All we know is that Callimachus voted to engage, and that the four generals of Miltiades' opinion gave Miltiades their individual days of overall command in advance. Thus the generals were committed on the 10th to engage, but only if and when a suitable opportunity should arise. The fighting spirit was there, as the armies in line of battle faced each other each day and bivouacked in that position each night, but the battle did not take place until the 17th.

In order to appreciate the decision to engage we need to know the topography of Marathon. For this we have the testimonies of ancient writers and the evidence of archaeological discoveries, some made only in the last few years. The position of Marathon town has been indicated by the remains of two fifth-century cemeteries (for a cemetery was usually located close to a town and beside a main road), and it has been confirmed by the excavation of the remains of walls, rooms, and houses in the northern part of 'Marathon Town' (see Fig. 43).²⁹ The precinct of Athena (perhaps Hellotis, a Mycenaean cult-title), known from an

²⁷ Reading 'stratae' for 'rarae' and keeping the MS order in Nep. *Milt.*

²⁸ C 315, 362f; C 320, 57, 62f; A 11, 246; C 276; C 71, 31.

²⁹ Cemeteries in C 394, 1939: 27ff and (at Skorpio Potami) C 397, 234 with Pl. 138a. For walls etc. Soteriades' excavations and summary in C 402, 321. Excavation at Plasi revealed an Early Helladic settlement but only scanty archaic remains which included a piece of temenos wall (C 352, 18 with fig. 2 and C 397, 233). This excavation rules out Plasi as the site of a deme centre as proposed in C 294, C 377, 3f, and C 350, *PAE* 1970, 5.



43. The south-western part of the Marathon plain.

Key

- 1 Mound of the Athenian dead
- 2 Mound of the Plataeans and the slaves
- A Trophy of Miltiades, as reported by Chandler
- Ath Find-spot of stone recording the boundary of the precinct of Athena
- CC1 Cemetery of some sixty graves of Geometric, Archaic and Classical periods, excavated by Soteriades
- CC2 Cemetery of the same periods, reported by Themeles
- EHC Early Hellenic Cemetery (*AAA* 3, 349)
- GC Position of the Greek camp when the Plataeans joined the Athenians (*Hdt.* vi.108.1)

- HQ Headquarters
- G Position of the Greek line at dawn on the day of battle
- MH Middle Helladic and early Late Helladic tumuli
- R1 Coast road, leading to Athens via Probalinthus (Nea Makri) and Pallene
- R2 Inland road over the hills to the pass between Mt Pentelicus and Mt Parnes for Athens and to the pass of Decelea for Plataea
- T Small temple, excavated by Soteriades
- Th Mycenaean tholos-tomb

inscribed boundary-stone, lay about a thousand metres east from a small temple (T on Fig. 43).³⁰ The precinct of Heracles has most probably been located by two inscribed stones, found separately to the south east of the town.³¹ The burial mound of the Plataeans and the (liberated) slaves (Paus. 1.32.3), discovered by excavation, lay at the mouth of the Vrana valley.³² Three reasons for its location are conceivable: it was close to the prehistoric tumuli which were then associated with the local heroes who had appeared during the battle, or it was at the point where the Plataeans first entered the plain, or it was somewhere near the position of the Plataeans on the left wing of the formation. Herodotus helps us to locate the Greek line by saying that the Athenians went to the defence of Marathon and that the Athenians were drawn up in the precinct of Heracles when the Plataeans arrived (vi.108.1). The approximate position is shown on Fig. 43.

When the Greeks moved out from camp into line of battle, their front was c. 1,250 metres long, if we allow a depth of eight men (which was normal), a metre of fighting space for each front-line man and a total force of 10,000 men. The left wing of the line, being in the plain, was defended by the abattis; and its right wing, resting on the Little Marsh, was protected from outflanking. It was also out of range of archers on shipboard. The Greeks were superior in armament for hand-to-hand fighting; for the hoplites or 'the bronze men', as they were called (ii.152.4), had helmet, cuirass, greaves and shield of that metal, whereas the Persians wore turbans, leather or cloth singlet sometimes covered with metal disks, trousers of quilted cloth and a long wicker shield.³³ The Greeks attacked with a 2.4 metre long spear and a sword, whereas the Persians relied on a short spear and scimitar and on the archery in which they excelled. Both sides were well trained. The Athenians had had much experience of battle since 505 B.C. and were in excellent physical condition. The Persians and the Sacae were the pick of the opposing infantry; there were also some troops inferior in armament and morale, which were placed on the wings. In the Greek line the polemarch as titular and religious head of the armed forces was placed on the extreme right (vi.111.1); the Persian infantry commander was in the centre. The Greeks were outnumbered by more than two to one, and they had neither cavalry nor archers. What strength they had lay in their uniformity, not in versatility. The Persians had their superb cavalry which fought at close quarters with lance or scimitar and at a distance with javelins or bows and arrows; moreover, the cavalrymen wore protective armour, their war-horses being stronger and faster than the best Greek horses (vii.40.3; 196). This cavalry was

³⁰ c 394, 1935: 90. ³¹ c 401; c 350, *PAE* 1972: 6; c 397, 236.

³² c 350, *AAA* 3, 357ff; his fig. 15 offsets the objections of c 397, 244.

³³ See *Pls.* Vol., pl. 236 and *JHS* 19 (1978) 20 and pl. 1b.

trained primarily to fight enemy cavalry; it was unable to charge an unbroken line of spearmen from the front, but it could do great damage to an exposed flank or rear or to a broken line either by charging *en masse* or by showering missiles from short range. Archers were less effective against Greeks than against Asiatics, for an arrow could penetrate bronze armour only from short range or from the right flank, which was unshielded.

While the armies faced each other, the Persians hoped that the Greek infantry would advance across the plain. It would then be taken in the flank and rear by the cavalry, peppered by the archers, and lose its formation before it engaged the Persian infantry – if it ever got so far (cf. IX.69.2). On the other hand, Miltiades hoped to engage the Persian infantry; but this would happen only if the Persian infantry attacked him or if the Persian cavalry for whatever reason was unable to deliver an attack on his own line if it advanced. Each night the Greeks shortened the distance between the two lines by a small amount. Felling trees on the hillsides and bringing them down to the plain each night they extended their abattis farther out into the plain. On the night of the 16th to the 17th the infantry lines were no more than eight stades (1,480 m) apart (VI.112.1). In the cool of the night the Persian horses were taken for watering to the Macaria spring and for pasturing to the sides of the Great Marsh, and they were brought back by moonlight in time to be bridled, so that the cavalry squadrons were manoeuvring in no-man's-land at dawn (cf. IX.57.3). On the night of the 16th to the 17th, for the first time that lunar month, the moon now waning set after dawn and that may have caused the grooms to miscalculate the timing of their return. In any case it was shortly before dawn on the 17th that some Ionians of the Persian right wing crossed no-man's-land, came to the abattis and called out 'the cavalry are away' (Suda s.v. *χωρίς ἰππεῖς*, used expressly of 'those who break formation'). This was the opportunity. The Greeks might be able to cross no-man's-land before the cavalry reached the scene and to engage the Persian infantry. It happened to be the day when Miltiades held the overall command.

In the darkness he extended his line to match the known length of the Persian line (perhaps 1,550 m) but in such a way that the wings remained deep and strong and the centre had less than the usual eight men (VI.111.3). In the light of dawn he raised his arm high, pointed towards the enemy and shouted the command 'Charge at them' (Schol. Aristides III.566 ed. Dindorf). The solid line in close order moved fast across the intervening space, ran through the barrage of arrows for the last 140 m and crashed all along its front into the stationary Persian infantry. The impetus of the charge gave the heavy wings an initial advantage. The hand-to-hand fighting was intense, as each man tried to stab or

overthrow an opponent (*Ar. Vesp.* 1081f), and the issue was in doubt for what seemed a long time (vi. 113.1). Then both Persian wings began to collapse and many fled. But in the centre the Persians and the Sacae were winning; they broke the Greek formation, drove it back and pursued the fugitives 'towards the interior'. But Miltiades, having foreseen this development, had ordered his wings in such a contingency to turn back and attack the enemy centre from the rear. As they did so, severe fighting followed.


By now the Persian cavalry had returned. It could not intervene effectively in the close hand-to-hand fighting of the infantry lines or in a very close pursuit (as at Plataea, ix.60 and ix.68). But it was probably able to act against the two Greek wings as they came up to engage the Persian centre. Here anyhow the whinnying of horses was said to be heard by later generations, as well as the sound of men fighting (*Paus.* 1.32.4).

At last the Persians and the Sacae broke and fled, forcing their way through in the direction of their camp with the Greeks in pursuit. A rearguard action was fought to cover the narrow exits on either side of the Great Marsh; but the Greeks broke through, driving many Persians into the water of the marsh, where they drowned, being unable to swim. The fighting continued on the Skhoinia, where first the cavalry and then the infantry were being taken off by the Persian ships. It was here that Callimachus, a general Stesilaus and Aeschylus' brother Cynegeirus fell fighting gallantly. Seven ships were captured. The remainder backed out to sea (vi. 115).

On land the victory was complete. The Persian camp was in Greek hands, and a runner sped off to Athens with the news (*Plut. Mor.* 347c, the origin of the Marathon race). But out at sea the Persian fleet was seen to change course and head south in response apparently to a signal given from the shoulder of Mt Pentelicus or Mt Agriliki by a bronze 'shield' (a signalling disk), which reflected the rays of the morning sun, probably about 9 a.m. A strong wind and a following sea drove the Persian fleet fast on its way to Cape Sunium (*Plut. Arist.* 5.4), and beyond that point the sea would be calm for oar or sail as the ships sped on to Phalerum. A separate flotilla rowed into the wind to collect the Eretrian prisoners from an island where they had been deposited.

Athens was defended by a small force only, and the shield-signal suggested treachery in the city. While one tribal regiment under the command of Aristides stayed to guard the camp and the rich spoils, the victorious army marched 'as fast as their legs could carry them' the 40 km to Athens (v. 116). That evening they were in position in the precinct of Heracles at Cynosarges,³⁴ when the leading ships arrived off Phalerum. It

³⁴ Identified in c 217.



44. The battle of Marathon.

was impossible now to force a landing. As darkness fell, the Persians were resting on their oars. Then the fleet disappeared out to sea.³⁵

Memorials on the battlefield supplement the literary accounts. The Great Mound, some 45 m in diameter, stands today over the cremated Athenian dead, 192 in number; the stone *stelae*, inscribed with the names and tribal affiliations of the fallen, have disappeared. The Mound was 'on the spot' (Paus. 1.29.4, *κατὰ χώραν*) where most casualties were suffered, i.e. in the broken Greek centre; and this is confirmed by the discovery of many arrowheads of the Persian barrage in the fill of soil which came from nearby in the construction of the mound.³⁶ The position is shown on Fig. 43. Pausanias mentioned from his own visit the Mound of the Plataeans and the slaves (1.32.3), now excavated near Vrana. Next a Memorial to Miltiades where 'one can hear throughout the night horses whinnying and men fighting', presumably in the struggle with the victorious Persian centre when cavalry were present; the base of such a memorial at point A on Fig. 44 was identified in 1776 by R. Chandler as

³⁵ For the march and sea-voyage see C 315, 210 and 220f; the second trireme to Mytilene in 427 B.C. kept up 7 to 8 knots for some 24 hours. See C 45A, 104.

³⁶ C 395; C 315, 172ff.

'part of a trophy'³⁷ and by W. M. Leake in 1829 as 'probably Miltiades' memorial'. Next, 'a trophy of white stone' at point B, evidently an Ionic column of which remains were found by W. Bankes and reported by Leake and discovered again by E. Vanderpool;³⁸ this evidently commemorated the victory over the Persian rearguard. Pausanias expected but failed to find a tomb of the Persian dead, 'about 6,400' according to Herodotus (vi.117.1), and he concluded that they had been thrown into an excavated ditch, presumably between B and the Great Marsh.³⁹ Then he visited the spring Macaria, the Marsh, the mangers of Artaphernes' horses above the river running through the Marsh, its outlet into the sea and a cave of Pan⁴⁰ on the mountain some way from the plain.

One memorial of the battlefield was no less important: the mural painted by Micon and Panaenus c. 460 B.C. which commemorated the victory at the National Gallery or 'Poikile Stoa' of Athens. According to Pausanias 1.15.3 three phases were depicted: Plataeans and Athenians engaging the Persians in an evenly matched battle; Persians in flight from the battle pushing one another into the marsh; and barbarians rushing on board Phoenician warships but being killed by Greeks. Two details are mentioned elsewhere: Miltiades ordering the Greeks to charge (Aeschin. III.186; Schol. Aristides III.566 ed. Dindorf), and Greeks and Persians including a cavalryman by the Phoenician ships (Pliny, *NH* xxxv.57 and the Brescia relief in *Hesp.* 35 (1966) pl. 35).

The Spartans had obeyed a law of religious significance which forbade them to leave Laconia until the moon was full, on 15 Boedromion (this was probably the sacred Carneian month at Sparta), and no one doubted their sincerity.⁴¹ Starting at moonset on the 16th, the Spartan vanguard of 2,000 men covered 225 kms in two days and a night and entered Athens early on the 18th. They went on to Marathon. With the expert eye of the professional soldier they inspected the equipment of the Persian dead, saw the scene of the battle and congratulated the Athenians on their action. They departed with a knowledge of the conditions under which 'the bronze men' in a solid formation were able to overwhelm even the best infantry of Persia.

The Greek victory was due in part to Miltiades, the man of vision who in a full democracy and not in an authoritarian state imposed his will on the assembled people, on his co-equal colleagues and on his citizen-soldiers. He was the architect of victory. But the victory was won by the

³⁷ *Travels in Greece* (Dublin, 1776) 175. ³⁸ c 403.

³⁹ Bones reported there in c 294, 10. ⁴⁰ Identified in *Ergon* 1958, 15ff.

⁴¹ That a revolt in Messenia caused the delay, as stated in Plato, *Laws* 692d, 698d-e, is unhistorical (for great numbers of Helots served at Thermopylae and Plataea); c 320, 63; *contra* c 407; see also c 32, 26ff.

indomitable courage of the Athenians and Plataeans, and of the liberated slaves who fought beside their masters in the line. Aeschylus was fighting there on the Skhoinia when his brother fell. The one act of his life which was recorded on his epitaph – no doubt in accordance with his wish – took place on that shore where the Mediterranean pines still grow:

The grove at Marathon, and the long-haired Mede of his knowledge may speak of the glorious courage of Aeschylus.

It was the courage of free men pitted against an oriental despotism. That at least was the opinion of the *Marathonomachai* ('Marathon-fighters') 'who fought with spear, with shield, standing man by man' (Ar. *Vesp.* 1081f). Every year thereafter honour was paid at the Great Mound 'to those who died in the cause of freedom' (IG II. 1.471 line 26).

'Fighting as champions of Greece the Athenians at Marathon routed 90,000 Medes.' So the contemporary poet, Simonides, set the victory in a wider context. But the fact that Greece was still free was due in popular belief to the gods who preside over human life. Artemis Agrotera and Apollo answered the prayers and the vows of the Athenian people, and Athena answered the appeal of Callimachus, the religious head of the army, who had made a dedication to her in advance of the battle (M–L 18). In the hour before dawn on the day of decision the gods showed their favour through the omens of the sacrifice, and Miltiades was able then to order the charge. During the fighting supernatural phantoms such as the heroes Marathon and Echelus, it was said, were seen on the side of the Greeks; and Athena, Heracles, Theseus (rising from the underworld), and Marathon were portrayed as present in the painting of the battle in the Poikile Stoa (Paus. 1.15.3; Pliny, *NH* xxxv.37). In gratitude every year the Athenians made a state sacrifice of thanksgiving to Artemis Agrotera (Xen. *Anab.* III.2.12) and paid their vow with a token figure, 500 goats. They dedicated a bronze statue of Athena on the Acropolis, and they crowned her head on the victory-coins with a wreath of olive-leaves. And they built a treasury at Delphi 'to Apollo from spoils won from the Medes in the battle of Marathon' (Paus. x.11.5; M–L 19 with references to those who date the treasury earlier). The Plataeans too gave thanks where thanks were due: they built a shrine to Athena Areia, goddess of war, from their share of the spoils at Marathon (Paus. ix.4.1).

The outcome of the battle affected Persia less deeply. The campaign, unprecedented in its boldness and progress, had succeeded admirably until the day of battle, and it was easy to attribute the defeat not to the inferior quality of the Persian infantry but to the late return of the cavalry. The empire was not shaken by the loss of 6,000 men in a land beyond its western frontier. Indeed Darius was more determined than

before not only to punish Athens and Sparta but to conquer the Greek mainland. Nevertheless, Marathon was a battle of world-wide importance. It stiffened the will of Athens, Plataea and Sparta and it inspired many other states to fight for freedom when Greece was threatened again by Xerxes.

NOTES

(1) The structure of command in the Athenian forces is in dispute. According to Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 22.2, the polemarch was *hegemon* of the entire armed forces (i.e. religious and ceremonial head and leader) and the ten generals, one from each tribe, were elected by the people. It was the latter who acted as a war committee. The people appointed all or some of them to conduct a campaign. Herodotus is in agreement: VI.111.1 for the polemarch, and VI.103.1, 104.2, 105.1, 109.2 and 4, and 110 for the generals. So too Polemon 2.2 and 2.5 for Callimachus as *hegemon* and as leading the whole army to Marathon (leading, not commanding). The statement of Herodotus, VI.109.2, that the polemarch was selected by lot (see above, p. 500, n. 19), may be erroneous; if so, Herodotus probably added the statement early in the Second Peloponnesian War and so it went uncorrected. See also above, pp. 333f.

(2) That the level of the Marathon plain is today substantially as it has been since late in the third millennium B.C., and in particular has not experienced a 'fill-in' (of 3 m as proposed in C 375, 141f, 154, 157 but opposed in C 315, 175) is shown by the fact that remains of many periods have been excavated on or near the surface of the plain: the Early Helladic cemetery on the inland side of the plain, the Middle Helladic tumuli and the tomb of the Plataeans on the right bank of the Vranos stream at the same level, the Early Helladic site and the archaic temenos wall just above that site at Plasi, and the geometric, archaic and classical graves in Skorpio Potami ('Where the river's water scatters'). The Charadra has frequently changed its bed or beds, but its direction, being determined by flood-water (cf. Demon, *FGrH* 327 F 8), is likely to have been then as it is now. The sea-level is one to one and a half metres higher today than in antiquity, and the amount of open water in the Great Marsh was less in the time of Pausanias than in that of Leake (see C 315, 182ff), but the general character of the coast and the Skhoinea were then as now. Today the Great Marsh has become an aerodrome.

(3) Herodotus' failure to mention cavalry in the battle has inspired many conjectures. The common ones, that Datis left his cavalry at Eretria or embarked them the night before the battle, are disproved by the portrayal of a Persian cavalryman being killed and his horse captured on the Brescia relief which reproduces a part of the picture in the Poikile Stoa; by Aelius Aristides, *Panath.* 202D, putting horses first among the spoils taken by the Athenians; by Pausanias 1.32.3 referring to horses whinnying; by Nepos, *Milt.* 5.4, mentioning Datis' cavalry in the battle; and by the horsemen on the south frieze of the Nike temple, if C 533 is correct in arguing that the subject of the frieze was the battle of

Marathon. The explanation offered in the text permits of the cavalry being away at the outset and present later in the fighting; it fits local conditions in September; and it accounts for the waning moon on the commemorative tetradrachms struck after the victory. But it is only a hypothesis. The point to bear in mind is that the cavalry were not in formation. This is the meaning of the passage cited in the *Suda*, probably from Demon, a local historian of Attica (see C 315, 237), and not that the cavalry had never come to Marathon or had departed from Marathon.

CHAPTER 10

THE EXPEDITION OF XERXES

N. G. L. HAMMOND

I. ATHENS BETWEEN THE INVASIONS BY PERSIA

Miltiades was the hero of the hour at Athens. The so-called Memorial to Miltiades, erected at the critical point in the Battle of Marathon, ensured his fame for posterity and was destined to fire the ambition of many able Athenians. It was a unique tribute by the Athenian people, the more so because Miltiades was a man with a chequered past: eponymous archon at the age of twenty-five or so under the tyrannical regime of the Pisistratidae in 524/3; ruler of the Chersonese 516–510 and 496–493 B.C.; winner of an Olympic victory in the chariot-race; and tried but acquitted on a charge of ‘tyranny’ over the Greeks in the Chersonese on his return to Athens in 493. At the height of his popularity he made a proposal which was accepted by the Assembly probably in the autumn of 490:¹ to assume the offensive at sea against the island states which had sided with Persia voluntarily or perforce. Reasons for this strategy are easy to supply. Datis and Artaphernes had shown how vulnerable Athens was to a seaborne attack, and there was good reason to suppose that the Persian fleet might return with a larger expeditionary force and base itself upon Aegina, in order to make a landing on the coast of Attica. The best form of defence for Athens was to close the approaches by winning over the island states in the Cyclades (Themistocles was to follow the same strategy in the autumn of 480). The Athenians now mustered their full fleet of seventy ships with a complement of crews or marines totalling some 14,000 men and provided the funds necessary for their maintenance. They entrusted the command to Miltiades alone, without the addition of other generals as colleagues in the field. Perhaps the campaign of Marathon had taught them that there were dangers in a multiple command. It is probable that they left the choice of which island to approach first to Miltiades as an experienced commander and a strong personality.

The account which Herodotus gives of the operations (vi. 132–6) was

¹ Hdt. vi. 132.1 indicates a sequence, not an interval; so C 277, but otherwise A 11, 259.

based on sources bitterly hostile to Miltiades and contains many puerilities. Miltiades is represented as promising the Athenians an El Dorado of gold and obtaining from them a complete *carte blanche*,² and then as attacking Paros for the personal reason that he had a quarrel with a Parian notable. Less biased accounts have come down in the *Life of Miltiades* by Cornelius Nepos, which drew, it seems, from the work of a fourth-century Atthidographer or local historian called Demon, and in a fragment of Ephorus, a general historian, also of the fourth century. Of the two, that of Nepos is to be preferred.³ According to Nepos the purpose of the expedition was to proceed with hostilities against those island states which had helped the Persians;⁴ and Miltiades reduced some of these states by assault and brought others into alliance under duress, before he turned to Paros; perhaps in early summer 489.

Paros was one of the states which had sent a trireme and a crew to serve under Persian command against Athens. Thus a state of war existed between them. Paros was second in importance among the Cyclades to Naxos, which had already given proof of its hatred of Persia, and Miltiades would be in control of central Aegean waters if he could bring Paros into the fold. But negotiations failed. The city was blockaded, siege works were set up and a determined assault brought the defenders to the verge of capitulation, when a fire at night a long way off was interpreted by both sides as a fire-signal indicating the approach of the Persian fleet. The besieged took heart, and Miltiades sailed away, abandoning such siege works as the wooden pent-houses (Nepos, *Milt.* 7).

The siege of Paros was described by Herodotus as well as by Nepos and Ephorus. The general practice of the Athenians in the latter part of the fifth century was to employ blockade, not assault; but it seems that Miltiades applied at Paros the methods which he had learnt from his experience with the Persians.⁵ Movable pent-houses were brought forward to cover the troops who battered or sapped the walls, but the defenders managed during the night to make good any gaps (Hdt. VI.133.3), presumably with replacements in mud-brick. On the twenty-sixth day of the attack the Parians were treating for an agreed surrender; but they broke off their (perhaps provisional) agreement, when they saw what they took to be a Persian fire-signal. Hence arose a proverbial expression 'The Parians reneged' (*ἀναπαριάξεν*, *FGrH* 70 (Ephorus)

² The golden carrot suits a donkey-like Assembly, which the Assembly of 490 certainly was not. This version is favoured by C 73, 96ff and A 11, 258f; C 309, 195ff is sceptical.

³ A 27, 11 120 and A 11, 266 with n. 19 attribute both to Ephorus; see C 315, 239 with n. 1.

⁴ It is doubtful whether Schol. Aristid. ed. Dindorf 572, giving Naxos or Paros, had more than one island as the object of the expedition.

⁵ Athens at this time had a reputation for siegecraft (Hdt. IX.70.2; Thuc. I.102.2); later the citizens were less willing to expend themselves in assault.

F 63). Ironically it was a false alarm: the blaze was due to a forest fire.

Herodotus gave as the cause of Miltiades' withdrawal not the sight of the fire (which he does not mention) but the intervention of Apollo. It was a complicated tale, which, he tells us, was peculiar to the Parians among his Greek sources (vi. 134). In brief, Apollo inspired an assistant priestess to tempt Miltiades into an act of gross impiety, breaking and entering the precinct of Demeter Thesmophoros, the goddess of purely feminine rites, and the consequence was that Miltiades panicked in the darkness and damaged his thigh or knee in jumping over the precinct wall. It was this injury which caused him to withdraw from Paros. This story appealed to the pious Herodotus, but it is generally regarded as unhistorical. It simply shows that the Parians were anxious to blacken the name of Miltiades.

When Miltiades returned to Athens, he was already a sick man, since a wound incurred in the siege (Nepos, *Milt.* 7, rather than a dislocated thigh) had become gangrenous. His enemies brought him to trial on a charge of 'deceiving the People', one form of treason (*prodosia*). The case was tried before the People's Court, i.e. the full Assembly, and the normal penalty was death by being 'hurled into the pit' (see above, p. 332). Miltiades was found guilty. The details of the charge are not known, except that he was accused of having accepted bribes from Persia. The prosecutor was Xanthippus, an aspiring politician connected by marriage with the Alcmaeonid clan. There is no doubt that the ruthless ambition of his political rivals played a part in the condemnation of Miltiades (see above, p. 340).

Whatever the rights or wrongs of the case – and we have no means of assessing them – Miltiades was at the time a sick man, some sixty years old, incapable of speaking in his own defence. Because he had served Athens so well in winning Lemnos for the city and in his brilliant generalship at Marathon, the Assembly did not order that he should be 'hurled into the pit' (Plato, *Gorg.* 516e) but sentenced him to a fine of fifty talents, a huge sum, which his son Cimon paid. Miltiades himself died of gangrene. The sovereign People had the grace not to remove the Memorial to Miltiades from the field of battle at Marathon.

The end of Miltiades illustrates the maxim of Aristotle in *Politics* 1302b15, that when a man is exceptionally outstanding the danger of his becoming a '*monarkhos*' (i.e. dictator) causes dissension in the state. There is no doubt that the People regarded with suspicion any outstanding personality – Miltiades, Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles and Alcibiades, to name a few among many – and when that suspicion mounted it led to a trial on a charge of corruption or treason. At the same time aspirants to political power, frustrated by the prestige of an outstanding leader, were always ready to come forward as prosecutors, as Xanthippus did on this

occasion. It is misleading to speak of party politics or to use party labels; for in a society as small as Athens with a system of direct democratic government the politicians were in immediate contact with the people. Each advocated his own policy at each meeting of the Assembly. They were primarily individuals; if they formed partnerships, they did so on an *ad hoc* basis and readily dissolved them. In 489 B.C. the People certainly lost all trust in Miltiades, and his rivals set upon him. But his fall also brought his personal policy into disfavour, namely the policy of a naval offensive in the Aegean as a form of defence against the threat from Persia, and more generally the policy of war *à l'outrance* with Persia.

What attitude was the People to take towards Persia? As Darius was known to be raising forces in preparation for a great campaign, presumably against Athens and any state willing to support her, a quick decision was essential. The best intermediaries for an accommodation with Persia were members of the Pisistratid family and their 'friends' (*φίλοι*, probably in the sense of persons related by blood or marriage⁶); for other members of that family were with Darius and stood high in his favour. A group of persons, who were willing to collaborate with Persia, was headed by members of the powerful Alcmaeonid clan, which, many thought, had been ready to betray the city to Datis and Artaphernes (Hdt. VI. 121. 1). The motives of the Alcmaeonidae were no doubt mixed: rivalry with the war-leaders, especially Miltiades, a belief perhaps sincere that Persia was bound to win, and an ambition to lead any government installed by Persia. Appeasement may have seemed to them a desirable policy. It is probable too that a section of the ordinary people sought a compromise with Persia; for they knew that the Eretrians had been deported to the vicinity of the noisome oil-wells of Susiana and would never see the isles of Greece again. No one wanted to share their fate, as imagined later by Plato:

Leaving the rough Aegean's surge and swell,
Afar in inland Median plains lie we.
Farewell, Eretria famed, our home; farewell,
Athens, our neighbour there; farewell, dear sea.

On the other hand those who favoured resistance were eager to rid themselves of any threat from the collaborators and to establish and implement their own policy.

At this critical moment recourse was had to ostracism (see above, pp. 334–46). In 488/7 Hipparchus, son of Charmus, eponymous archon in 496/5 and now the leader of the Pisistratid family and their 'friends', was ostracized for ten years; in 487/6 Megacles, son of Hippocrates, a leading

⁶ C 247, 128 with n. 1.

member of the Alcmaeonid clan; in 486/5 another person belonging to one or other of these groups. Thus it is clear that the Athenians had taken the decision by 485 B.C. not to seek any compromise with Persia. Meanwhile the Assembly passed in 487/6 a measure which weakened the position of the archons, hitherto the most influential executive magistrates: they were to be selected each year by lot from 500 candidates elected by deme-assemblies (of which there were about 140, so that on average each deme elected three candidates).⁷ The change from direct election (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.5) to this mixture of election and selection made it impossible for anyone, however popular, to count on being appointed archon; and when a man was appointed he owed his appointment to the support of one section of a deme-population (this itself numbered on average only 200 citizens in all), and to a random selection (in which luck or divine will, whichever way you viewed the matter, was solely responsible), whereas in the past an archon had been supported by a majority of the entire citizen population as the best man in his tribe. This measure removed one ladder of ascent to a position of exceptional pre-eminence (see above, p. 320).

An immediate effect of the change in the status of the archons was to make the generalship the post most sought after by an ambitious man. For ten generals, one from each tribe, were elected by the Assembly to hold office on a military-and-naval board for one year; and one or more of them was chosen by the Assembly to take command of any operation voted by the Assembly. Moreover, there was no bar against re-election year after year. In a modern democracy the transference of the most prestigious and influential office of state from a prime minister to a most popular general would be interpreted as a step on the road towards dictatorship. But the Athenian democracy had its safeguards: a general was not a professional soldier but a civilian; he had no citizens under his command until he was appointed for a specific operation (and even then he might have up to nine colleagues, as Miltiades had had at Marathon); a general was only one of a board of ten in all matters of civil defence and internal order; and any mistake or misconduct could be visited with immediate suspension and trial before the Assembly, as the case of Miltiades had shown to the Greek world in 489 B.C. Even so this transference had its dangers. But they were acceptable in a period of national emergency, when an attack by a vastly stronger state was imminent.

In 486 B.C. there was a respite. Egypt revolted and Darius switched his attack to the south. Late in that year he died and was succeeded by Xerxes, the son of Darius and Atossa, a daughter of Cyrus the Great. In 485 Xerxes crushed the revolt in Egypt, and in 484 he imposed a harsh

⁷ Arguments for and against emendation in c 116, 173f.

regime and offended Egyptian religious sentiment by acts of impiety. Thus there was no clear indication of an impending invasion of Greece until 483, when the engineers of Xerxes began to dig a canal through the neck of the Athos peninsula.

At some time during the three years of respite, 486–484 B.C., it is probable that hostilities occurred in the unresolved war between Athens and Aegina (see above, p. 343). The Athenians had established the survivors of the Aeginetan ‘democrats’ at Sunium in 490, and from there they carried on a guerrilla war against Aegina. The rulers of Aegina made no move during the campaign of Datis and Artaphernes or during the naval offensive by Miltiades, who was no doubt careful not to offer any provocation to Aeginetan shipping. But there were certainly clashes at sea after his death and before 483 in which the Aeginetan navy again proved itself superior to the Athenian navy (as we may infer from *Hdt.* VII.144.1–2 and *Thuc.* I.14.3),⁸ and the handling of that war became an important issue in the politics of Athens. It was clear that Athens could not hope to defeat Aegina unless she increased her own fleet by large public expenditure.

Such an increase might also be highly desirable if Persia planned to mount another seaborne invasion of Attica. Yet in 486–484 the probable inference to be drawn from Persia’s delay was that an overland invasion was in prospect. This was made almost certain when work began on the canal through the neck of the Athos peninsula in 483 B.C. If the Persians were coming overland, the decisive battles would be military. Athens might be better employed in improving her army rather than her navy.

In 485/4 Xanthippus, the prosecutor of Miltiades, was ostracized, and, probably in 483/2 (*Plut. Arist.* 8.1), Aristides, who had been eponymous archon in 489/8, when the office was still won through election by the People; he had been entrusted by Miltiades with the guarding of the Persian camp and spoils on the day of battle at Marathon. Aristotle made the point that Xanthippus and Aristides (and perhaps others) were not connected with the first group of victims, those of 488–485. The statesman who weathered all the occasions of ostracism and emerged as leader in 483/2 was Themistocles, who had been eponymous archon in 493/2 and had then implemented a naval programme. The difference between Xanthippus and Aristides on the one hand and Themistocles on the other was not then over the question of appeasement or resistance; but it may have been over the best way to prepare for resistance. In 481/0, when the decisive step, to expand the navy, had been taken and the invasion was imminent, all who had been ostracized were brought home (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* 22.8).

Fresh light has been shed on the ostracisms of 488–482 by the

⁸ Aegina was the leading seapower in this period in the so-called List of Sea Powers; see A 48, 193.

American excavators of the Agora and the German excavators of the Kerameikos at Athens (see above, p. 336). Many hundreds of ostraca, that is sherds of pottery naming a candidate for ostracism, have been found for this period, and these lead to certain inferences which must be regarded as tentative, because the ostraca are not a cross-section of those cast in 488–482 but a random lot. Ostraca bearing the name of Themistocles are far more numerous than those with the name of any other candidate; this should mean that he was regarded by a minority at all ostracisms of these years as the man to be ostracized. The next highest scores are those of two Alcmaeonids (Callixenus, son of Aristonymus, and Hippocrates, son of Alcmaeonides). One of them may have been the victim in 486/5; but another has been suggested, Callias, son of Cratius. A large number of ostraca carry the name of Aristides; they were probably cast on more occasions than the one when he was the victim. In all, the names of some thirty persons survive on ostraca which were cast probably on six occasions in these years. This strengthens the view that the advocacy of political views was not organized in a restricted party system.

Voters sometimes recorded their feelings on the ostraca: ‘Callixenus the traitor’, ‘Aristides, Lysimachus’ son, spurner of the suppliants’, and ‘Xanthippus, Ariphron’s son, is declared by this ostrakon to be the out-and-out winner among accursed sinners.’⁹ One deposit of ostraca seems to indicate that fourteen writers had prepared 191 ostraca with the name of Themistocles for use by illiterate citizens. It makes the following story less improbable. An illiterate Athenian asked Aristides, whom he failed to recognize, to write the name ‘Aristides’ on his sherd. ‘What injury has Aristides done you?’ said Aristides. ‘None at all’, was the answer, ‘but I am fed up with hearing him called “Aristides the Just” here, there and everywhere.’ Aristides wrote the name on the sherd in silence (Plut. *Arist.* 7.5–6). It will be recalled (see above, p. 335) that both the decision to hold an ostracism (only once in any one year) and the casting of the ostraca were made in the Assembly without any public debate. Thus there was no opportunity for blackening one’s opponents in public, and this made ostracism less damaging for the victims and less rancorous for all concerned.

The effect of this run of ostracisms was obvious. The Athenians chose their Churchill not after but before hostilities began, and they were able to arm in good time. Themistocles, son of Neocles and perhaps of a non-Athenian mother, was of a good, if undistinguished, Athenian family which resided in a country deme, Phrearrhii, and he was wealthy already in 493/2 when he was elected eponymous archon and carried his policy of

⁹ M–L p. 42.

developing and fortifying a naval base at the Piraeus (Thuc. 1.93.3). He had grown up with the free democracy and was an opponent of the supporters of the tyrants. In 483/2 he showed his powers of persuasion. The Athenians were in the habit of distributing any profit from the state-owned silver mines at Laurium as a bounty for the citizens, and in this year a lucky strike at Maronea in the Laurium district yielded a large sum (fifty talents in Hdt. VII.144.1 with V.97.2, preferable to the Atthidographic tradition of a hundred talents in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.7 and Polyæn. 1.30.6). Themistocles persuaded the people in the Assembly to vote this sum, and presumably other funds also since Herodotus reported that the treasury had large reserves, to the building of warships, two hundred in number. It is probable that Herodotus was correct about the number of ships; for even after the extensive damage to the Athenian fleet at Artemisium Athens and her colonists of Chalcis had 200 ships at Salamis ten days later. His account is more trustworthy than the Atthidographic tradition of one hundred new ships corresponding to the one hundred talents. Rich Athenians contributed in some way, perhaps in advancing money to construct a ship; for Herodotus mentioned that Cleinias, a rich Athenian, provided his own costs and commanded 'his own ship' (VIII.17; the trick with rich men in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.7 seems anachronistic).

The sources are unanimous that Themistocles persuaded the Assembly to build the ships for the war against Aegina (e.g. Thuc. 1.14.3). At the time of his proposal that war was 'at its height' (Plut. *Them.* 4.1) and was terminated only by the offices of the Greek League late in 481; in those years Aegina was 'the leader of the islanders' (Plut. *ibid.*), and she figured as such in the so-called List of Thalassocracies in Eusebius. Our best source, Herodotus, was particularly emphatic: 'it was the Aeginetan war which compelled the Athenians to become seamen' (VII.144.2). The implication is that they not only built the 200 ships but also manned them, thereby becoming 'seamen', before the end of the Aeginetan war, i.e. before the formation of the Greek League. In fact Themistocles achieved the objective of Miltiades by peaceful means, by building his huge fleet which probably trebled that of Aegina.

The find of silver was mentioned in *Persae*, which Aeschylus produced in 472 B.C. When Atossa, mother of Xerxes, asked whether Athens had adequate means for waging war, the answer came 'A fountain of silver is theirs, the treasure of the land' (238). But silver alone was not enough. Athens needed suitable timber in quantity, available only at a distance either in Macedonia which was subject to Persia or in north-western areas to which Corinth and Corcyra had access. We know from Herodotus VIII.136.1 that Alexander, king of Macedon, was honoured at some time before 480 B.C. by the Athenians as their 'public friend and

benefactor'. As this honour was usually for services rendered, it is a plausible conjecture that Alexander supplied timber from Pieria in southern Macedonia nominally for war against Aegina. At the same time he was on the best of terms with his Persian master. His sister, Gygaea, had born a son, Amyntas, to the high-ranking Persian general Bubares, and this Bubares was one of the two commanders in charge of making the canal through the neck of the Athos peninsula and of building a bridge across the Strymon. Alexander was already showing that ability to keep in with both sides which Themistocles was to show later.

II. PERSIAN PREPARATIONS AND THE ADVANCE TO THERMA IN MACEDONIA

The defeat of the Persians at Marathon had no effect on their position in the north Aegean. They encountered no opposition at all as they made their preparations there for invading the Greek peninsula. Like the Egyptians and the Phoenicians, the Persians relied on huge labour forces for the construction of such public works as the canal dug in the reign of Darius from the Nile to the Red Sea (Hdt. II.158). Thus the Athos canal, 2,200 m long and well over 20 m wide so that triremes under oar could pass one another, was dug by hand out of low-lying land (the highest point being 17 m above sea level) by a labour force of army units and local conscripts, who worked in relays 'under the whip' as they passed soil in baskets from hand to hand (VII.22-3). The Phoenicians provided the expertise: they realized the importance of shelving sides in the sand and marl through which they were digging, and their experience of wind and wave enabled them to design a breakwater at either end of the canal, which prevented the silting-up of the entrances (VII.37). Rations for the troops in the form of flour were brought from Asia, and a market of local produce was set up in a place of assembly. The whole operation took more than two years to complete; but once cut, the canal served not only for the campaign but also for cargo ships which, sailing close inshore, no longer had to round the storm-breeding peak of Mt Athos. Xerxes' canal was far superior to the Corinthian *diolkos* at the Isthmus.

Persia was justly famous for the royal roads, of which Herodotus described one, from Sardis to Susa (v.52). These roads were built by hand by large labour-forces; thus a third of Xerxes' army built a road across the Pierian range (VII.131). They were paved where necessary and were designed for wheeled transport as well as for mounted couriers; and there were guard-posts, inns and courier-stations, as later on the main roads of the Roman empire. Rivers were crossed by ferry-boats or bridged. Xerxes had the coastal road in the European satrapy improved in advance of his arrival. Surveys were made, bridges built (for instance

more than one over the Strymon at Nine Ways), and sites chosen for dumps of supplies, which were transported from Asia by ferry-boats in sheltered waters (e.g. to Leuce Acte and Tyrodiza on the European side of the Propontis) and by merchantmen at sea (e.g. to Doriscus, Eïon near the Strymon and the shore of the Thermaic Gulf). It is possible that bridges were built on wooden piles driven into the clay bed of the river. That was the method employed c. 425 B.C. at Nine Ways (then the site of Amphipolis), and it was tried by Alexander the Great at the river Oxus (Arr. *Anab.* III.29.3). Such well-appointed roads were built in Europe for the first time by the Persians, and they were regarded with awe, for instance by the Thracians (VII.115.3). When the Persians departed, the art of road-building was inherited by the Odrysians and later by the Macedonians (Thuc. II.98.1 and 100.2).

The spanning of wide surfaces of water was another remarkable achievement of the Persian empire, which could call upon the experience and the materials of its subjects. Darius employed a Samian engineer, Mandrocles, and to his design two pontoon-bridges were constructed (IV.88 and IV.139.1), one across the Bosphorus with its four-knot current, and the other across the wide Danube above the head of its delta. This type of bridge was called by the engineer a 'float' (σχεδίη, IV.88.2), because the roadway was carried on floating ships, anchored head-on to the current (so too in Roman times, Arr. *Anab.* V.7.3–4). As it could float in whole or in part, there was no difficulty in taking a ship or a section out for the passage of the special ship of Darius (IV.85.1). For the spanning of the Hellespont, which was almost twice as wide as the Bosphorus and more exposed to winds and rough seas, Xerxes chose Harpalus, probably a Greek mathematician-astronomer of that name. He devised a sophisticated combination of pontoon-bridge and suspension-bridge, which has been inadequately described by Herodotus and inadequately understood by his commentators (from Arr. *loc. cit.*, who thought cables instead of wooden beams and planking were used to tie the pontoon-ships together, onwards).¹⁰

Herodotus first described the suspension cables, a novel feature to Greeks, and Aeschylus also placed that feature first in his descriptions of the bridge 'a flax-bound float' (λινοδέσμων σχεδιά, *Persae* 68, and 104 λεπτοδόμοις πείσμασι, 'finely wrought cables'). Twelve cables, each about 1,500 m long, were woven, some of 'white flax' (λευκολίνου, probably esparto-grass) by Phoenicians who imported it from North Africa and Spain, and others of papyrus by Egyptians who grew it in Egypt (VII.34). A pair of bridges, each made with one type of cables, was built well ahead of time, but was destroyed by a great gale, which

¹⁰ A 48, 220–3 grapples with some of the problems; he has the ships hanging on the cables – an impossible strain – but Herodotus says they were anchored (VII.36.2).



Map 15. Greece and the Aegean.


presumably broke the ships off their anchors. For the next pair the types of cables were mixed, each bridge having two of esparto-grass (the heavier material) and four of papyrus (VII.36.3). The cables were no doubt laid dry (they would be much heavier awash), when the pontoon-ships were already at anchor in position, and the ends of the cables were attached to land piers. Then the cables were twisted and tightened on wooden 'donkeys', i.e. capstans, so that they were taut above the decks of the ships. It was on the six cables of each bridge that a roadway was constructed with planking, brushwood and earth (the 'much-bolted way' of *Persae* 71) and with parapets on either side, so that draught-animals could not see the water. The weight of the roadway and of the traffic on it must have brought the cables down on to the decks of the pontoon-ships, but even so, much of the pressure was still carried by the cables. The bridges were held in position by the ships' anchors in depths down to 104 m against a variable current which even reverses its direction in freak weather.

The positions of the bridges between Abydos and the opposite shore, as stated by Herodotus VII.34.1 and Strabo VII fr. 55, are shown in Fig. 45. In the upstream bridge 360 warships – penteconters and triremes – were anchored in line; they were parallel to one another and at right angles to the cables.¹¹ In the downstream bridge 314 ships were anchored in line 'in accordance with' the current, i.e. head-on to it, which varied in direction as it came through the narrowest part into a widening area.¹² The object of so placing the ships in relation to the current was that, presumably in each case, the pontoon-bridge should 'support the strain of the cables' (VII.36.1), i.e. be constantly under the taut cables. The ships were secured by exceptionally long anchors, designed to hold the ships against the northerlies blowing from the Black Sea towards the upstream bridge and against the southerly and westerly winds blowing from the Aegean. When wind or/and current were unusually strong (cf. Polybius XVI.29.14), the ships had the added support of the cables to which they were (one imagines) loosely attached.¹³ In each bridge one or more narrow openings were left to let ships pass through under the cables; elsewhere the ships were very close to one another (314 ships, averaging some 4 m amidships, make 1,256 m, and Herodotus at IV.85.4 and VII.34 gave the width at the narrowest part of the straits as seven stades, i.e. 1,300 m, but Xenophon's eight stades (*Hell.* IV.8.5) is nearer the mark).

¹¹ Because they faced a uniform current; see *The Black Sea Pilot* (11th edn, 1969) 43 'the main current fills the whole width of the strait' (between Nara Burnu and Bigali fort).

¹² *Op.cit.* 40 'at a bend the current sets strongly towards the convex side', i.e. the west side here.

¹³ In case a ship dragged its anchor; if it came loose from bridge A, it would otherwise crash into bridge B. The tautness of the cables is transferred to 'the bridges' and 'the pontoons' at VIII.117, IX.106.4 and 114.1.



45. Xerxes' bridges at the narrows of the Hellespont, based on British Admiralty Chart No. 2429.

Triremes may have been placed beside the openings, as their decks stood higher than those of the penteconters.¹⁴

The most remarkable features of these bridges must have been what I have called the land-piers, against which the cables were tightened. These piers had to take an immense strain. I imagine that narrow shafts (as in ancient mining) were sunk in the rock and that large timbers, reinforced perhaps with metal rods, were placed in the shafts, so that their tops formed the land-anchors of the cables. The cable-ends were set at about the same height as the roadway which they were intended when taut to carry. To the Greeks the cables themselves were spectacularly long and large, and it was natural that they took them as spoils of war a year later (IX.121) and dedicated parts of them to the gods. Warships rather than merchantmen were used as pontoon-ships, because being narrow amidships and shallow in draught they offered less resistance to the current. The openings were evidently large enough for passage by grain-ships plying between the Black Sea and the Aegean. The bridges withstood wind, wave, current and weight of traffic, because the cables and the pontoons were equally supportive and had the required elasticity

¹⁴ C 346, 141-6.

of movement. In our era the Bosphorus was not bridged until 1973. The Hellespont has not yet been bridged.

The scale of these operations and the reliance on mass methods in terms of labour and materials (674 warships committed to the bridges!) should have convinced even the most sceptical that Xerxes was planning a very-large-scale invasion of the Greek peninsula. That his forces were indeed enormous was certainly the presumption of Simonides in his epigram commemorating the Battle of Thermopylae and written shortly after it: 'four thousand men of the Peloponnese once fought here against three hundred myriads' (VII.228). Greeks of that year may have thought the number 3,000,000 inflated but not absurd for the whole host on land and sea which accompanied Xerxes. Eight years later Aeschylus represented Xerxes' army as 'the entire strength of Asia's sons' (*Persae* 12; cf. 126), and he dropped enough names to suggest that units came from all parts of the Persian empire. A generation later Herodotus produced a grand total of 5,283,220 men from all parts of the empire, which certainly supported his contention that the forces of Xerxes were greater than those of any previous expedition in history (VII.20.2 and 186.2). This absurd exaggeration by Herodotus should not be used to detract from the opinions of Simonides and Aeschylus, that the expedition of Xerxes was huge by Greek standards and drawn from a huge area.

When we turn to specific numbers, Aeschylus believed that 1,207 ships were engaged at ram-point at Salamis (*Persae* 336 and 341–3) and expected his audience to believe it; and there is good reason to suppose that the number was made known to the Athenians by deserters at the time or by Greeks from the Persian navy afterwards.¹⁵ There was in addition a detachment of 200 ships according to Plutarch (*Them.* 12.5 and 14.1), and a figure 'in excess of 1,327 ships' was recorded by Herodotus (VIII.66.1 with VII.184.1 and 185.1). The Persian battle-fleet at Salamis consisted of triremes or larger ships, and the naval personnel, omitting Persian troops on board, for 1,407 ships totalled 281,400. Naval support vessels – penteconters, triaconters, *kerkouroi* (in descending order of size) and horse-transport – were twice given as 3,000 by Herodotus (VII.97 and 184.3). The proportion of these to the ships of the line is not unreasonable, when we recall that most states were still equipped with penteconters rather than triremes; and their naval personnel, even if we halve the estimate of Herodotus who rated all the ships by the penteconter class, is some 120,000 men. A naval force of some 400,000 men needed many supply-ships, say 400, as the Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415–413 had more than one supply-ship to 1,000 men: and a

¹⁵ C 315, 268f; C 346, 151, A 11, 330f and C 320, 345f, for instance, reduce the Persian fleet to 600.

supply-ship might have 20 hands, totalling some 8,000 in all. We should bear in mind also the 674 warship hulls in the pontoon-bridges across the Hellespont, and a considerable body of men to manage them and row them if the bridges should break up, as the first pair had done.

It is much more difficult to assess the number of those who served under Xerxes on land. Yet a historian must make the attempt, even if his conclusion is as tentative as it is controversial.¹⁶ The Greeks in 480 never saw Xerxes' army deployed (it fought only in a narrow pass), and Aeschylus did not hazard a total number in *Persae*, produced in 472. But he did mention a commander of 30,000 'Black Horse' (line 315), three commanders of 10,000 each (one cavalry and two infantry, it seems, at lines 302, 314 and 994), and an important Chiliarch, 'commander of 1,000' (probably a Persian Royal Guard regiment) at line 304. Then he mentioned 'the King's Eye' who inspected units of 10,000 each (line 980). So much was no doubt correct; but it does not follow that officers with these honorific titles had so many men under their command in Greece in 480 B.C.¹⁷

Herodotus gave no details of the forces brought by the satraps to Critalla in Cappadocia (VII.26), or of those on the march from Sardis apart from the Persian troops. These numbered 24,000: being four Royal Guard regiments, each 1,000 strong (two cavalry and two infantry, VII.40-1), 10,000 cavalry, and 10,000 infantry called 'The Immortals'. They were mentioned again specifically as crossing the Hellespont, except for the 10,000 cavalry (VII.55). Herodotus reserved his enumeration until the dramatic moment, the concentration of the entire sea and land forces at Doriscus. No one, he says, recorded the number of each contingent (VII.60), but the total was arrived at there by making a pen to hold 10,000 men, driving that number in and out repeatedly, and so coming to a figure of 1,700,000 for the land force alone. Such a method was familiar to the Greek shepherd. Herodotus probably wrote tongue in cheek. Next he gave a list of national contingents and national armaments (61-80), based apparently on an official Persian record of the infantry forces of the Persian empire. Herodotus assumed, like Aeschylus, that 'the entire strength of Asia's sons' marched on foot to Greece. He is less incautious about the cavalry: 80,000, he said, apart from camel-riders and those on chariots, horse-drawn and ass-drawn, and he included among the cavalry 8,000 lassoing Sagartians (if so, they went home with Xerxes). These figures of 1,700,000 and 80,000,

¹⁶ C 346, 150-67, A 11, 326-32, C 320, 350-5. Figures in Diod. XI.3.7-9, being probably guesses by Ephorus, are of no help.

¹⁷ Attempts to infer the number of troops in Xerxes' army from the system of command, which is given here and in Herodotus' lists, are of no avail if the lists give merely the entire levy of the Persian empire; but see C 362, 271f.

repeated at 184.4, are very far from dependable. Those for the Persian troops alone have probability; for Xerxes is likely to have taken his elite troops with him.

The size of Mardonius' army in autumn 480 is our only yardstick. Its numbers were known, if only approximately, to the Greeks who fought in it and to those who fought against it at Plataea. According to Herodotus (VIII.113), Mardonius chose two of the Royal Guard regiments and the 10,000 Immortals; all Medes, Sacae, Bactrians and Indians, cavalry and infantry alike; and only a few from the other nations. (These were the best troops available, apart from the other two Royal Guard regiments and the 10,000 Persian cavalry.) The force which Mardonius selected to stay in Europe totalled 300,000 men (VIII.113.3), and from it he sent 60,000 men to escort Xerxes (VIII.126.1). (Of these not all will have rejoined him, since he had to post detachments on the lines of communication.) How many troops did Mardonius need? Enough cavalry to offset the cavalry of his Greek 'allies' and only a small force of enemy cavalry, but enough infantry to defeat a force of Greek infantry exceeding 100,000 (such was in fact the force at Plataea) which was known to be better in quality and weaponry than most of his infantry. We may then estimate at least 120,000 men under arms at Plataea – this was the figure given by Ctesias, a Greek doctor at the court of the Great King at the end of the fifth century – and we may allow another 30,000 men for the supply services and for the guarding of the lines of communication in Europe.¹⁸

The expeditionary force of Xerxes was certainly much larger than the army left with Mardonius. For Xerxes faced the possibility of fighting against a united Greece, whereas Mardonius had on his side the states north of the Isthmus apart from Athens. Moreover, as we have seen, his faith was in massive numbers. A reasonable estimate, then, may be 220,000 men under arms on land,¹⁹ and another 22,000 for the supply service and other duties. These figures together with the 408,000 which we estimated for the fleet and supply-ships make a grand total of 650,000 men. It is an indication of Xerxes' mentality that even in Europe he continued to add to his vast host by conscripting troops, though not of course to the extent of Herodotus' 300,000 men (VII.185).

Supply for the labour forces at the Athos canal and the Hellespontine bridges and then for the huge expeditionary force was a complex undertaking. The chief source was Asia. Supplies and men were brought by sea to Elaeus, a Persian naval base at the southern end of the

¹⁸ A 11, 511 calculated the size of the army from the capacity of the stockaded compound, but the size of the camp is the correct guide (ix.15.2–3).

¹⁹ C 362, 273 by different reasoning put the combatant troops in Xerxes' army at 180,000; C 320, 355 cut down to 80,000 Asiatic infantry and cavalry.

Chersonese, and they were taken on from there, overland or by sea according to the time of year, to the head of the Athos peninsula (VII.22.1). The basic ration, flour from Asia, was supplemented by local produce (VII.23.4). Similar arrangements were made presumably for road-building labourers and for those engaged at the Hellespont. In order to provide for the men and draught-animals of the expeditionary force preparations were made in advance. Main dumps of material brought by sea from Asia were located on the coastal route in Europe, as we mentioned earlier (VII.25.2). Communities on the various routes were instructed in advance to prepare 'hospitality' for the army; this meant accumulating flour and meal and fattening livestock for months, so that the native people ran short of food (VII.116–21.1).

Even so the expeditionary force was accompanied by a large commissariat. While the armed forces marched over the upstream bridge into Europe, porters and waggons and attendants moved slowly over the shorter bridge (VII.55.1; cf. VII.40). No doubt they carried food as well as gear. In later times we hear of armies of porters – 30,000 at Damascus (Curt. III.13.16) – and 400 waggons carrying flour and wine for the 13,000 European troops of Cyrus the Younger (Xen. *Anab.* I.10.18). Waggons were drawn perhaps by oxen as well as by horses. Pack-animals were mentioned once by Herodotus at VII.187.1; they were probably camels. The fleet too was accompanied by supply-carrying merchantmen in order to feed the crews of the warships which had little space for stores, and these merchantmen depended on sail only. They sailed as far as the coast of Thessaly (VII.184.5; 186.1; 191.1), and probably to Attica.

Movement was easier in the summer months. Then the ships were at sea, carrying men, supplies and cavalry mounts – the last on specially designed horse-transporters as for the campaign of 490. In the winter months Xerxes depended on the roads alone. For this reason he built two permanent road-bridges over the Hellespont and two or more bridges over the Strymon and probably all other rivers on his routes. The army was split as often as possible into three columns, each using its own route, in order to avoid long delays at the inevitable bottlenecks. Indeed we may conclude that Xerxes and his staff showed great skill in planning, preparing and organizing the movement of the very large and very mixed forces of the Persian empire into Europe and into central Greece.

Herodotus was not vitally concerned with Xerxes' skill in logistics. Moral qualities and religious matters were more to his liking. One attendant to each combatant and the provision of eunuchs, concubines and cookhouse women underlined the luxury-loving life of the East. The behaviour of Xerxes in meting out 300 lashes to the Hellespont, branding its waters with red-hot irons and beheading the officers in charge of the bridge-building were typical of the oriental despot. The

higgledy-piggledy confusion of the army on the march out of Sardis apart from the elite Persian troops, the numbering of the host by the sheep-pen method, and the drinking of most rivers dry were indirect comments on the folly of excess in mustering over five million men. It is perhaps beside the point to ask whether Herodotus himself believed these things to be factually true. They were part of the drama which he was unfolding, a drama of religious and human significance which was moving towards a predestined tragic end. 'As he looked and saw the whole Hellespont covered with the vessels of his fleet, and all the shore and every plain about Abydus as full as possible of men, Xerxes congratulated himself on his good fortune; but after a little while he wept' (VII.45).

In 481 B.C. Xerxes mustered the contingents of Persia, Media and the eastern satrapies at Critalla, somewhere in eastern Cappadocia, from which they marched through the Anatolian plateau (well north of the narrow Cilician Gates) via Celaenae (Dinar) to Colossae (near Honaz) at the head of the Maeander valley. No doubt they were joined *en route* by contingents from the southern satrapies and from Asia Minor. Descending the Maeander valley to Cydrara (near Sarayköy) they crossed into the Hermus valley and reached Sardis, the capital of the satrapy. There the army was equipped and trained during the winter, and Xerxes sent envoys to the Greek states except Athens and Sparta with the demand that they render the tokens of submission, 'earth and water'. In 480 'with the spring', i.e. early in April, the army set off, not in disorder nor with the adverse omen of a solar eclipse as Herodotus affirmed (VII.37); for the eclipse which was visible at Sardis occurred two years later, on 16 February 478. The departure from Sardis was a ceremonial occasion. In the centre of the procession was the chariot of the Persian god, Ahura Mazda, drawn by eight greys and driven by a walking charioteer. In front of the chariot went ten sacred horses of Nesaean stock, larger than European horses, and behind it Xerxes rode seated in a chariot drawn by Nesaean horses and driven by a standing charioteer.

The army proceeded, probably by several routes, to the Hellespont. Herodotus reported the route taken by Xerxes in person. After passing Adramyttium and Antandrus on the coast, Xerxes turned inland, keeping east of the peak of Mt Ida (Kaz Dag, 1,767m),²⁰ and so entered the Troad by the valley of the Scamander. His purpose perhaps, like that of Zeus in *Iliad* VIII.47–52, was to see Troy and the Hellespont spread out below him from the ridge of Ida. In any case his first act on arrival was to ascend the acropolis of Troy and sacrifice to Troy's goddess (whom the Greeks called Athena), while the Magi poured libations to 'the heroes' of

²⁰ Perhaps by the so-called 'Portai' or Gates, cf. c 290A, 306. So too Xenophon (*Anab.* VII.8.7).

Troy – Priam, Hector and others. Xerxes had a sacred mission, to avenge the sack of Troy and the burning of its shrines by the Greeks.

Xerxes spent a month at the Hellespont, from late April to late May. During this time the squadrons of the fleet came up (some from Egypt), and a regatta in the Hellespont was won by a Phoenician ship of Sidon, while Xerxes watched from a throne placed on a height near Abydus. In the course of the month the army and the commissariat passed over the two bridges,²¹ and the fleet sailed to its first European base, Elaeus. A special road for waggons had been built on the east side of the Chersonese,²² but the passage thereafter was easy, over loamy hills and across the wide, marshy plain of the Melas with good grazing for cavalry mounts and the draught animals. The army moved in several columns, and one drew supplies from the fleet which had been ordered to wait at Cape Sarpedon. Army and fleet then met at Doriscus, an administrative centre in the satrapy ‘Skudra’ (see above, p. 248). Here the fleet was hauled ashore and careened on the beaches of the Hebrus delta, and the army was reviewed by Xerxes. June was nearly over when the expeditionary force left Doriscus.

The leisurely pace between Abydus and Doriscus, some 75 km apart, was not without design. Xerxes is made to say by Herodotus (VII.50.4): ‘although we carry great supplies on our march, we shall also have the corn of those we encounter on the way, since they are not migrant shepherds but agriculturalists’. Xerxes intended to commandeer the harvests which ripened in July and August in the rich and fertile plains: first on the coast between Doriscus and Kavalla; then inland of Kavalla and Eion; and then in the plains of Macedonia. In addition, these plains being well watered would provide pasture even in the summer for his cavalry and draught-animals. Even so it was advisable to split up the huge army of over 200,000 men both to relieve traffic on the coastal routes and to commandeer other crops. Herodotus stated categorically that the infantry was divided into three groups, each commanded by two generals, and that from Doriscus one followed the coast ‘along with the fleet’, one went on ‘the inland road’ (VII.121.3 *ἦιε . . . τῆν μεσόγαλαν* sc. *ὁδόν*) and one went in between the two.

Herodotus being ignorant of the terrain and having no map was unable to give a clear account of the routes, but a knowledge of this part of Thrace leaves little doubt. Between Doriscus and Kavalla there is a coastal plain of varying width, composed mainly of alluvium deposited by fast-flowing rivers. In 480 B.C. the plain was perhaps less wide than today, but it had more marshy ground and lakes (they existed then by Doriscus, Maronea, Dicaea and Pistyrus). An all-weather road, suitable

²¹ The seven days and seven nights may be symbolic rather than actual in Hdt. VII.56.1.

²² See C 242A, 214f.

for waggons, could have been built only on the inland side of the plain. Such was the 'Old Royal Road' – evidently that of Xerxes – which Livy described as being clear of the territory of Maronea: 'it approaches the Paroreia of Thrace and never deviates to the sea' (xxxix.27.10), the Paroreia being the range which separates the rich plains from the interior of Thrace.²³ The coastal belt, including the Strymon basin to the west, is cut off from the interior by the steep and lofty ranges of Rhodope (2,191 m), Pirin (2,822 m) and Orbelus (2,031 m), which are pierced by two great rivers, the Hebrus and the Strymon. There is no conceivable route for an army along these ranges from east to west, and it follows that 'the inland road' went from Doriscus up the Hebrus valley into the central plain of Thrace, which was the heart of the satrapy (see above, p. 245), and thence either via Samokov, Kjustendil and Valandovo to Amphaxitis in Macedonia or/and via Razlog and Petrić to the Strymon basin.²⁴

Herodotus described the route of Xerxes from the viewpoint of his own visit to Thasos and perhaps Eïon. Thus he enumerated the Greek cities on the coast which Xerxes did not visit but 'kept upon his left hand as he passed along' (vii.109.2). As he jumps from Pistyrus (Pontolivadhō)²⁵ to Eïon and omits Neapolis, we may infer that Xerxes was farther inland at that point. The column marching along the coast 'beside the fleet' and the cavalry which grazed their mounts beside the lakes probably passed close to the Greek cities, including Neapolis (Kavalla), and went as far as Bromiscus. The central column, with which Xerxes went when seated on his chariot, followed the vehicular road which was graded and paved. Its course from Doriscus was probably along the inland side of the plain to Makri, then over a belt of low limestone hills with gulleys to Khamilon (thus being clear of the territory of Maronea) and round the inland margin of the plain to a large lake, now disappeared or shrunk, inland of Pistyrus. From there a road, it seems, was cut through the hills inland of Nea Karvali to enter the plain of Crenides near Philippi. The royal road ran from there on the south side of Mt Pangaeum; there is a narrow entry at Elevationopolis, two low passes (at Alexovunion and Kokkinokhori), good grazing in a fertile valley and an easy descent towards Eïon, on the low coastal range east of the present mouth of the Strymon. Herodotus mentioned the tribes of coastal Thrace and among them those inland of Mt Pangaeum which Xerxes bypassed. At the Strymon the Magi sacrificed white horses and buried alive nine youths and nine girls of the local Thracians, the Edoni, before the

²³ Specifically the range east of the Rupel Pass; see c 248, I 199 n. 2.

²⁴ The problem of 'the inland road', realized by W. F. Anderson in 1897 (A 27, II 171), has generally been overlooked since then.

²⁵ B 762A, 170. Most of the area is known by the present author.

army began to cross on the already prepared bridges at Nine Ways (later Amphipolis).

Xerxes accompanied the coastal column to Acanthus, but the cavalry and the commissariat no doubt took the easy route with good grazing which ran from Bromiscus past Lakes Bolbe and Koronea to Therma on the Thermaic Gulf.²⁶ After inspecting the Athos canal and mourning the death of one of its overseers, Artachaeës, Xerxes returned to the Strymon basin and took the road of which he constructed 'the inland part' for vehicles (VII.124). This went along the west side of the basin; then up the Kumli valley and over the pass Stena Dov Tepe (this being 'the inland part'); then down the Echedorus valley, which enters the Thermaic Gulf west of Therma.²⁷ On this route the pack-camels but not the draught-animals were attacked by lions at night. Meanwhile the fleet and the coastal column made their ways round Chalcidice and Crousis and reached Therma. The column which had set off up the Hebrus valley and marched through central Thrace rejoined the rest of the expeditionary force. The fleet covered the coast from Therma to the mouth of the Axios, and the encampments of some 600,000 men extended over the coastal plain as far as the mouth of the Haliacmon. Looking south they saw the towering mass of Mt Olympus, the bastion of Greece.

During the advance from the Hellespont Xerxes had conscripted 120 ships and their crews from the Greeks of the coastal cities and the offshore islands of Thrace, and forces of infantry from both the inland Thracians (i.e. of central Thrace) and the coastal Thracians,²⁸ the Paeonians, the Pierian Thracians, the tribes of Chalcidice (including the Bottiaei) and the Eordi, who lived near Lake Bolbe (VII.185). The inland column had strengthened Persia's control of the hinterland and deepened the defences of the coastal route. In Macedonia Xerxes implemented the same policy. This is known to us not from Herodotus but from Justin VII.4.1, who reported that the friendship of Xerxes and Alexander resulted in his giving to Alexander the rule over 'the whole region between the mountains Olympus and Haemus' at the time when 'a storm of trouble swooped down on Greece'. The Haemus range is here regarded as extending westwards into the catchments of the upper Strymon and Axios rivers, and the meaning of Justin's phrase is that Alexander was recognized by the tribes of Upper Macedonia as their king within the overall authority of the Persian empire. At that time, whether in 480 or an earlier year, tribes such as the Orestae ceased to be *'Ορέσται Μολοσσοί* and became *'Ορέσται Μακεδόνες*, as in the time of Thucydides (II.99.2 and IV.83.1).²⁹ The strategy of Xerxes was very sound. He

²⁶ As on Xerxes' return in Aesch. *Persae* 494. ²⁷ C 248, I 194f. ²⁸ B 759.

²⁹ C 248, II 63f.

had established a broad base and an excellent system of communications for the invasion of Greece. The only questions were the timing of the attack and the quality of his huge expeditionary force.

III. THE ORGANIZATION OF GREEK RESISTANCE AND THE EXPEDITION TO TEMPE

Whereas Xerxes made far-reaching preparations over four years, preparations of which the Greek states were fully aware, Sparta and Athens procrastinated in the manner which seems typical of free states. True, they improved their war potential. Sparta must have expanded her army and trained her soldiers, in particular the Helots who were to be used in large numbers. Athens not only completed the programme of ship construction intended for the war with Aegina, but also laid the keels of more triremes in 481 B.C. (Hdt. VII.144.2 fin.). But the army of Xerxes was already at Sardis when Sparta invited the Greeks to confer on measures of resistance.

The leadership which Sparta and Athens failed to exercise until so late was to some extent taken by Delphi. The Oracle of Apollo stood high in the favour of Persia. 'The god had spoken complete truth to the Persians', wrote Darius in an edict (M-L 12), and the god had been honoured by Datis, who made rich offerings to him at Delos and ordered the return of a stolen cult-statue to his temple at Delium. The god's advice to the Greeks in Ionia had been acceptance of Persian rule, and he had described Miletus, the leader of the Ionian Revolt, as 'the deviser of wicked deeds'. Delphi's attitude during the expedition of Datis and Artaphernes has not been recorded, but we may conjecture that the Oracle shared the view of its favourites at Athens, the Alcmaeonids, who sought an agreement with Persia. As news reached Delphi of Xerxes' plans and an invasion from the north by overwhelming numbers became imminent, the priests realized that the shrine was almost certain to fall into Persian hands. The members too of its secular organ, the Delphic Amphictyony, were mostly tribes of northern and central Greece, which would face the first attack, and their policy in general was one of non-resistance. This is not to say that they wanted Persian occupation. Rather, politicians and priests alike studied the odds and put their stake on Persia. Also it was important that Apollo should be proved right in the end; and in this case it seemed most probable that Xerxes would win. Gelon of Syracuse came to the same conclusion later and chose Delphi to be his intermediary with Persia in Greece.

Prophecies are seized upon by believers and even by some unbelievers in times of terror. What Delphi said in 481 and 480 B.C. made a deep impression on contemporaries who were almost to a man credulous and

religious; and in some states Delphi's utterances were kept in the official archives, for instance at Sparta (VI.57.4). It is most unlikely that the oracles which Herodotus reported for these years were anything but genuine; otherwise the contemporaries among his hearers would have rejected them. What is uncertain is the precise time of their delivery. Thus 'at the first stirring of the war', says Herodotus (VII.220.3), Sparta consulted the god and received the response which Herodotus quoted and also summarized as follows: 'either Sparta will be destroyed by the barbarians or their king will perish'. In the full response the attacker 'has the strength of Zeus'.³⁰ Athens too consulted the god. Before the envoys put their question the god spoke. His first words were these:

Wretches, why sit you here? Fly, fly to the ends of creation,
 Quitting your homes, and the crags which your city crowns with her
 circlet.

And he foreshadowed the sack of Athens by the Persians. The envoys, appalled, presented themselves as suppliants and received a second response, which was written down by them and discussed by the Assembly at Athens. It foreshadowed the occupation of Attica by the Persians but ended with a concession by Zeus in answer to the prayers of Athena:

Safe shall the wooden wall continue for thee and thy children.
 Wait not the tramp of the horse, nor the footmen mightily moving
 Over the land, but turn your back to the foe, and retire ye,
 Yet shall a day arrive when ye shall meet him in battle.
 Holy Salamis, thou shalt destroy the offspring of women,
 When men scatter the seed, or when they gather the harvest.

(Trs. George Rawlinson)

Was the wooden wall a real wall or a figurative wall? Were the offspring Persian or Athenian? Men remembered the response to Croesus that he would destroy a mighty empire. Those who were expert in the art of interpretation advised flight overseas and avoidance of battle at Salamis; but Themistocles carried the Assembly with his view that the wooden wall meant the fleet and the epithet 'holy' made 'Salamis' favourable to Athens. The Athenian people thereupon decided 'in obedience to the god to receive the attack of the barbarian invader with their whole force on board their ships, together with those of the Greeks who were willing' (VII.144.3).³¹ This was the famous Decree of Themistocles, cited together with the Decree of Miltiades (above, p. 507) as proof of Athens'

³⁰ c 49, 181ff are sceptical but do not mention in this context the recording of oracles at Sparta. Herodotus' concern with oracles was typical of the time.

³¹ c 49, 181ff, while accepting as historical the responses to Athens, reject that to Sparta; yet it was at Sparta that oracular responses were officially recorded.

courage. Ulpian mentioned the occasion ‘when Themistocles saw that the situation by land was impossible’, and gave as corollaries ‘the abandonment of the city and the transfer of the population to Salamis’. Athens began now to train her able-bodied free population, citizens and foreign, in the rowing of triremes and in naval warfare, both arts which need much practice; for a fleet of 200 triremes required as crews and marines about 40,000 men.³² The trireme should be envisaged as an outsize whaleboat, 33.5 m long (twice as long as a rowing eight), 4.5 m wide amidships and only partly decked. On a long journey she was rowed probably by thirty oars on each side; and in battle by 170 oarsmen, each having his own oar, who were placed three by three *en échelon* and in banks on either side of the central gangway.

These two consultations of Delphi were introduced by Herodotus not in any temporal sequence but to adorn an argument. However, he gave some clues to the occasions. The Spartans consulted the oracle when they had just received the news from Demaratus at Susa that Xerxes was ‘setting out’ from Susa (the message was written on the wooden base of a tablet which was then covered with wax, VII.239). As a courier took three months from Susa to Sardis (v.53) and a month or more from Sardis to Sparta, he will have reached Sparta about August 481, since Xerxes may be assumed to have started in the spring. This explains the phrase ‘at the first stirring of the war’ (VII.220.3). The same phrase, expanded to show that it was the Persians who stirred the war, was applied to the consultation of Delphi by Argos (VII.148.2), which occurred also then, about August 481. The god’s response was clear: ‘Sit thou still with thy lance drawn inward.’ The consultation by Athens followed in August/September.³³ For Sparta informed the other Greeks of Xerxes’ ‘setting out’ (VII.239.4 fin.) and especially Athens, since Sparta and Athens were the only declared targets of the expedition. In the course of September 481 Athens took the fateful decision to meet the attack with her forces at sea and not, as at Marathon, on land.

The envoys which Xerxes sent to Greece on his arrival at Sardis, i.e. in early October 481, travelled overland during the winter and reached south Macedonia perhaps in early November. ‘The first Greeks to medize’ were the first they approached, the Thessalians, controlled by the Aleuadae of Larissa, who were already friends of Persia and were coining at Larissa on the Persian standard (VII.6.2 and 130.3). As the envoys travelled south, they received earth and water from many states: not from Phocis, Doris, Euboea, Thespieae or Plataea, but from almost

³² The Decree of Themistocles at Troezen is discussed later (below, p. 558). Dem. XIX.303 refers to the two decrees together: Ulpian ad loc. *ὁ δὲ Θεμιστοκλῆς κατὰ γῆν ἄπορα βλέπων τὰ πράγματα συνβούλευσε μὲν ἀφείναι τὴν πόλιν, εἰς Σαλαμίνα δὲ μετοικισθῆναι.*

³³ Dated by c 362, 282 to after the expedition to Tempe.

everyone else down to their southernmost limit, the border of Boeotia with Attica. By mid-November Xerxes' diplomatic initiative had succeeded amazingly well (VII.132.1).

Meanwhile Sparta moved at last. It was after Athens' decision to concentrate her forces at sea and before the news of Xerxes' arrival at Sardis reached Sparta (VII.145), i.e. before November and in fact probably in October, that the Spartans invited representatives of Greek states to consider with them measures of resistance to Persia. Those who responded agreed to end all wars among themselves (notably the war between Athens and Aegina), entered into an alliance against Persia and declared war on Persia. They took an oath, probably not to forsake their allies. Calling themselves 'the Hellenes' and their meeting place at Sparta 'the Hellenium' (Paus. III.12.6), they pledged themselves to mutual aid at all times. Next, they had to decide on a system of command for their forces. As Sparta was trusted by the others and had greater military strength than any other member of 'the Hellenes', they voted the supreme command by land to Sparta. Since Athens had decided to put all her manpower into her fleet and therefore was likely to contribute more than half of the whole fleet, she had some claim to the supreme command by sea; but the other states distrusted her (VIII.2.2–3.1). They conferred the supreme command by sea also on Sparta. The commanders of contingents were elected one each by his own state, and they alone sat on a council of war when it was called by the supreme commander at his discretion and solely for advice. This system of command for the Hellenic forces was eminently sensible. It did not, of course, displace the local system of command which each state enjoyed – Athens, for instance, having ten equal generals, and Megara five equal generals. Thus in 480 Themistocles was elected from all Athenians³⁴ as sole commander of the Athenians sent to serve in the forces of the Greek League, while ten generals, one from each tribe, were elected to serve as the college of generals of Athens. Arrangements were no doubt made at the first meeting for financial contributions,³⁵ so that matters of transportation, supply and equipment would not be left to the haphazard efforts of individual members.

In many respects 'The Ionians' were the model for 'The Hellenes' (see above, p. 481). However, the Hellenes had one great advantage: they adopted one state to exercise sole and continuing command in all theatres (VII.159; 161.2; 204). The credit for organizing and operating the

³⁴ C 315, 379ff; in Hdt. IX.114.2 Xanthippus is 'the general' in relation to the Greek League forces (cf. VIII.131.3), and in 117 one of the generals of the Athenian state (*τὸ Ἀθηναίων κοινόν*). Interpreted otherwise in C 74, 110f.

³⁵ Sometimes denied, e.g. C 281, 138, but who paid the expenses of transport for the expedition to Tempe?

Greek League, as we shall call it, lay with Sparta despite the special pleading of Herodotus for his beloved Athens (VII.139).³⁶ She did not exploit her position as leader of the Peloponnesian League and insist on taking the command; rather, she left the nature of the alliance and the allocation of the command to the members of the alliance.

The immediate need was to stop the submission of Greek states to the envoys of Xerxes. 'The Greeks' swore an oath to confiscate, when their own affairs turned out well,³⁷ the territory of all states which, being Greek, had given themselves to the Persian not under compulsion, and to dedicate one tenth to the god of Delphi. The aim was not to attack those states at once, but to push them into changing their attitude by the threat of eventual retribution. Although Xerxes was still in Asia, a war between Greek states would have been disastrous. The Greek League avoided that. The medizers recanted. The Thessalians pleaded compulsion and blamed the Aleuadae (VII.172.1); they, the Locrians and the Thebans subsequently provided troops. These changes of policy were no doubt attended by changes of government in each state; but they did not earn admission to membership of the League. Meanwhile the envoys escaped to Macedonia and reported to Xerxes in Sardis.³⁸

Next the League sent spies to obtain information about Xerxes' forces at Sardis. They were captured but sent back by Xerxes, who wished the colossal scale of his preparations to be known. The spies returned perhaps in January 480. Meanwhile the League invited Argos to join, and ordered Gelon of Syracuse, Corcyra and Crete to come to its aid. Argos agreed, subject to sharing the overall command equally with Sparta and obtaining from Sparta a thirty-years' armistice. The Spartans in the allied deputation refused to grant more than a third of the command. Argos declined. This was a negative form of medism (VII.149.3); the positive form appeared later (IX.12.2; cf. VII.151). Gelon too demanded part of the command, which was refused, so he declined. But he sent an agent armed with a friendly formula and a handsome gift for Xerxes to Delphi, where he was to await events. Corcyra gave a smooth answer; but her contingent of sixty triremes stopped short of rounding the Peloponnese when help was needed by the Greeks. The Cretans declined. They alone sheltered behind a response from Delphi;

³⁶ Herodotus failed to point out that, if Sparta had submitted, Athens could not have succeeded in repelling the Persians.

³⁷ The translation of VII.132.2 is here at issue. I take *σφί* to refer to the subject not of *ἔδοσαν* but of *δεκατεύσαι*. This is the meaning of Diod. XI.3.3 and C 320, 99. If taken with the former, it adds nothing to 'not under compulsion'. The phrase *ἄσσοι ἔδοσαν* in the aorist shows that a number of states had already submitted; C 320, 99 thinks otherwise.

³⁸ C 309, 223f and A 11, 339 think the envoys returned to Xerxes in Pieria. A 11, 343f saw the problem of the envoys being absent 'for the best part of a year' and pictured them lurking in the Thessalian hills and doing nothing, instead of crossing into Macedonia and going safely on to report to Xerxes. See C 317, 77f.

for the god had recommended neutrality in his allusive manner (VII.169).

By spring 480 the Greek League was in full operation. Each member state elected one or more representatives, called *probouloi* (VII.172.1), but each state had only one vote, whether Sparta, Plataea, Athens or Mycenae. They met in the precinct of Poseidon at the Isthmus of Corinth and decided matters of policy. When the news reached Thessaly, probably late in April, that Xerxes was about to cross into Europe, the Thessalians sought and received aid from the League, which sent a force of infantry by sea to Halus. The commander-in-chief was a Spartan, Evaenetus, not a member of either royal house but elected by the Spartiates from among their senior officers, who were called polemarchs. Each contingent had its own commander who had been appointed at home: the Spartans had Evaenetus, the Athenians Themistocles and so on. Those states which had reversed their decision to medize – although apparently not admitted to the Greek League – sent their troops; Thebes, for instance, contributed 500 men under Mnamias (Plut. *Mor.* 864E). Thessalian cavalry escorted the force of infantry, 10,000 in all, to Tempe, where they adopted an immensely strong defensive position, and probed as far as Heracleum (*FGrH* 5 Damastes F 4).³⁹ Xerxes was still at Abydus (174.1).

The Greeks stayed only a few days. They then disbanded, the forces of the Greek League returning to Halus and sailing home. Herodotus attributed this volte-face to the advice of Alexander of Macedon, whose messengers reported the huge size of the Persian navy and army and advised withdrawal. They added that Tempe could be turned by enemy forces descending from Upper Macedonia (as happened in 1941). Fear of treachery by the Aleuadae and their supporters must also have been a factor. Evaenetus was right to withdraw. It was the Council of the Greek League which had made the error of judgement through lack of information. Now, in June, it decided to hold Thermopylae by land and Artemisium by sea. Tribes north of that line would have to submit ‘under compulsion’ at the enemy’s coming, and pro-Persian parties no doubt came into power in anticipation of the day.

The formation of the Greek League had saved the Greek states from either submitting piecemeal or resisting one by one and being inevitably defeated. It revolutionized the situation in Greece and presented the priests at Delphi with something of a dilemma. They stopped preaching non-resistance, except in an indirect manner to the Cretans. The people of Delphi, living within a loyalist state, Phocis, may have been encouraged by the priests to consult the Oracle. The god replied: ‘Pray to the winds and it will be better’ (Clem. Al. *Strom.* 753). By then Xerxes was in Pieria. It was in August, the month of the Etesian winds.

³⁹ c 381, 101.

IV. THERMOPYLAE AND ARTEMISIUM

When the Persian forces were resting in the Macedonian plain, Xerxes knew that Thessaly was undefended; for two months and more had passed since the withdrawal of the Greek army from the Tempe position. Sailing from Therma, Xerxes made a personal reconnaissance of the Tempe pass, an 8 km long defile with hardly room for a burdened pack-horse then (Livy XLIV.6.8), and decided against building a road there for his commissariat. There were two alternatives. One route went from Pella via Edessa over the Kara Burun pass into Eordaea and Elimiotis, crossed the Haliacmon at Servia and climbed steeply through the Stena Portas to the Volustana pass, leading into the upland plateau of Perrhaebia. Another approach to this pass from the coastal plain was via Verria to the pass of Zoodokos Pege, high above the almost impassable Haliacmon gorge;⁴⁰ from there the descent to Servia was gradual. The region of Servia, being in Elimiotis, had been acquired only recently by Alexander of Macedon (above, p. 339). No doubt both these routes were used by detachments of the huge army, but not by the commissariat. Xerxes chose instead the Petra pass which involved only one ascent, from Katerini over Mt Titarium – ‘the Macedonian mountain’ of VII. 131 (cf. 128.1) – into the same upland plateau of Perrhaebia.⁴¹ It was a difficult feat of engineering to make a road for wheeled traffic, even with abundant timber. One climbs along very steep slopes above precipitous gorges through a luxuriant forest of oak, plane and sweet chestnut and then of conifer and beech to Ayios Dimitrios, above which there is open cultivated highland with wheat, beans and honeybees. The descent on the Perrhaebian side is at first over steep and rugged limestone slopes and then gradual to Elassona. From there one proceeds directly by the Meluna pass to Larissa, or, if one is avoiding the Tempe pass, to Gonnus (Dereli), a Perrhaebian city of Lower Olympus.⁴²

Xerxes waited ‘many days’ in Pieria, while ‘a third of his army’ felled trees and built the road which was to form his permanent line of communication and supply. Herodotus said the road was for the whole expeditionary force (131); but this is unlikely in itself, and his phrase ‘a

⁴⁰ The fallacy that there is a route up the Haliacmon (e.g. in A 17, III 545), dies hard. Having walked up the gorge in February 1930 with W. A. Heurtley and T. C. Skeat I quote a letter of the latter. ‘The path, often nearly 1,000 feet above the river . . . winds in and out of immense cliffs which often rise sheer from the water.’

⁴¹ Descriptions of the routes and passes in C 248, 151, 117 and 123. The author walked over the Volustana pass first in 1930, drove over the Petra pass in 1978 and knew the areas on foot in 1943.

⁴² Herodotus VII.128.1 describes the start of the route correctly as ‘the inland road through the Macedones who live high up’, these being the Macedones of Macedonis south of the Haliacmon river (127.1) who lived on ‘the Macedonian mountain’ (131). Being ignorant of the geography, he went on to the terminus in relation to the Tempe pass and so was told of Gonnus (128.1 and 173.4). The best map is that of the National Statistical Service of Greece, Sheets 15 and 38, 1:200,000.

third part' suggests that this was the central of three columns and that the others were to use the Tempe pass and the Volustana pass. Once in Thessaly, where Aleuas welcomed the king, the army crossed the plain, where the Persian horses showed themselves far superior in speed to the Thessalians, the best in Greece. Xerxes took the coastal route through Halus and encamped in the plain of Trachis, probably on 12 September. During his march along the coast he will have learnt that the Greek fleet had left its station at Artemisium and had been seen sailing down towards the narrows of the Euripus, and that the pass of Thermopylae was held by an enemy force. The obvious plan was to await the arrival of his fleet, which could then land troops in the rear of the Thermopylae pass. He had indeed expected the fleet to arrive on the 12th; but he had to wait another three days before he had news of it (196). Meanwhile he sent forward a mounted scout who reported that he had seen at the head of the Thermopylae pass a small number of men practising gymnastics and combing their long hair who had paid no attention to him. Puzzled by this, Xerxes sent for Demaratus, who assured him that these were the bravest men in Greece, the Lacedaemonians. And Demaratus reminded Xerxes of his earlier remark that, however few in number, the Lacedaemonians would join battle in defence of freedom (208–9 and 102–4).

The first clash at sea occurred between the ten fastest Persian ships under oar, which came on a direct course from Therma to Sciathos, and three Greek ships, stationed at Sciathos as look-out ships.⁴³ When the Persians were sighted, the Greeks fled. Two were overtaken and captured. The third ran aground at the mouth of the Peneus river, and the crew escaped. This incident demonstrated the superior speed under oar of the fastest ships in the Persian fleet (VII.179–82 and VIII.10.1).⁴⁴ The Greeks on Sciathos reported by fire-signal to the main fleet, which lay, unknown to the Persian fleet, off Artemisium south east of Sciathos. The Persian ships marked a reef between Sciathos and the mainland with a stone pillar which they had brought for the purpose, since the main fleet was to come through the Sciathos Channel.⁴⁵

The main fleet left Therma eleven days after the departure of Xerxes (towards the end of August) at the head of the main army from Therma.

⁴³ The present participle in VII.179 marks the Persian base of the fleet, and the aorist participle at 183.2 the Persian fleet's departure; the operation by the ten ships was several days before the latter. Otherwise in C 362, 285 n. 1.

⁴⁴ C 284, 118 thinks otherwise; yet *ἐπισπόμενοι* at VII.180 means pursuit and it was presumably the result of the pursuit which led the Persians to suppose their ships to be faster (VIII.10).

⁴⁵ The text of VII.183.2 may be corrupt. The meaning seems to be that the three Persian ships went on to the vicinity of the reef and fixed the stone pillar which they had brought for the purpose from Therma (so A 27, II 210) rather than that the ships were wrecked on the reef, as in C 362, 285, for which meaning one would expect not *περί* but *ἐπί* as in the following sentence.

In a full day (VII.183.3) of twelve hours the leading ships reached the Sciathos Channel, 180 km away, and the others were strung out off the rock-bound coast from Casthanaea to the Channel. In this stretch there were some narrow beaches, where one line of ships could moor close in; but the remaining ships rode out at anchor in as many as seven lines. That night it was calm. But at dawn out of a clear sky a north-easterly gale, called the Hellespontias, and a rising sea broke upon them and smashed many ships on the lee shore, especially at the limestone caves called 'Ipnoi', 'The Ovens'.

The storm did not abate until the fourth day.⁴⁶ The Persians paid dearly for their stupidity in not breaking their voyage at the delta of the Peneus and in anchoring their ships too close to one another and too close inshore. The Greeks gave thanks to Poseidon. They had prayed to him and to the gods of the winds in accordance with the response of Apollo of Delphi; and they were greatly heartened by the fact that the gods were on their side. Herodotus ended his epic account with the lowest estimate given to him of the losses: 400 warships (triremes and penteconters) and innumerable supply-ships and other craft (VII.190). It seems likely that the number of warships lost was very greatly exaggerated, since ships under oar could head out to sea, and that the damage was done mainly to merchantmen which relied on sail and could not tack into the wind and waves. But at the time no Greek wished to underrate the help of the gods.

On the fourth day, when the wind and the sea fell, the fleet rounded Cape Sepias (probably on 15 September). Merchantmen and damaged ships entered the Gulf of Pagasae, but the battle fleet put in at Aphetae, all except the rear flotilla of fifteen ships which sailed on in error and was captured by the Greek fleet off Artemisium (VII.194-5). Inter-communication was not a strong point in the Persian navy. The days of storm (probably 12-14 September) had coincided with Xerxes' days of inactivity in the plain of Trachis. If there had been no storm, the army and the navy would have arrived at their respective stations on about the same day, the main army having covered a distance of some 300 km in a fortnight on prepared routes.⁴⁷

Although the Council of the Greek League had taken the decision in June to stand at Thermopylae by land and at Artemisium by sea, the Greek forces did not move from the Isthmus, where supplies were available, until the news arrived that the Persian was in Pieria (he reached there early in August). The mustering of the forces occurred in the sacred month of Carneian Apollo, and as in 490 B.C. (see above, p. 514) the

⁴⁶ c 362, 287f reduced the storm to a single day.

⁴⁷ A rate of some 20 km a day may be compared with one of some 28 km a day for Alexander the Great's army marching 560 km from Amphaxitis to Sestus.

Spartans were not prepared to send their army out of Laconia until the Carneian festival ended on the night of full moon, i.e. on 18 September. But they overcame their religious scruples to the extent that one of the kings, Leonidas, was allowed to take his personal guard of 300 Spartiates, whom he selected from men with sons in Laconia, and a considerable number of Helots, already trained as infantry. They also contributed ten ships with crews of Lacedaemonian Perioeci to the League fleet. It happened also to be the month of the Olympic Festival, during which there was a sacred truce, and it seems that this was a reason for the Peloponnesian states to send relatively small forces to the army and navy: Corinth 400 infantrymen and 40 triremes, Aegina 18 triremes, Megara 20 triremes; Arcadian states 2,120 infantry, Phlius 200 infantry, Mycenae 80 infantry, Sicyon 12 triremes, Epidaurus 8 triremes and Troezen 5 triremes. Both Sparta and the Peloponnesian states expressed their intention to send their full forces as reinforcements *βοηθήσειν πανδημεί* (VII.206)⁴⁸ but only after the full moon, by which time the Carneian festival at Sparta and the Olympic festival were completed. Athens had already decided to put all her manpower into the fleet. Thus she alone of the Greek states gave all she had to the war: 200 triremes, of which 20 were manned by her cleruchs at Chalcis and the rest by the Athenians and the Plataeans. The survivors of Eretria manned 7 triremes, and Styrea in Euboea sent 2 triremes. And one island, Ceos, sent 2 triremes and 2 penteconters.

The above numbers were recorded by Herodotus (VII.202 and VIII.1). They were not complete for the army since his total for the Peloponnesian infantry is 3,100 men but the contemporary epigram set up at Thermopylae mentioned the number from the Peloponnese as 4,000 (Hdt. VII.228.1). The best solution of the problem is to assume that there were some 900 Helots (Herodotus mentioned 'the Helots' among the dead at Thermopylae, VIII.25.1).⁴⁹

On his march north Leonidas was joined by 400 Thebans and 700 Thespians, so that he had in all some 5,000 men. This might be enough to hold the pass, provided there were no turning-routes. But as soon as he arrived he learnt that there was such a route. The Council of the League had made the same error as at Tempe, an error even more inexcusable because there had been plenty of time for reconnaissance before sending

⁴⁸ The distinction between the *prodromoi*, enumerated in 202, and the full forces is entirely clear in Herodotus (cf. VIII.40 *πανδημεί*).

⁴⁹ Diod. XI.4.5 gave 1,000 Lacedaemonians and 300 Spartiates to reach the total of 4,000, and some modern scholars have followed him; but Herodotus having mentioned Lacedaemonians in the fleet would not have omitted them if in the army. On the other hand, Herodotus mentioned Helots only sporadically: losses but not presence at Thermopylae, presence but not losses at Plataea, e.g. at IX.70.5. As there were seven Helots to each Spartiate in the Plataea campaign, an allocation of three to each at Thermopylae is not unreasonable. C 362, 283 proposed 10,000 troops for Leonidas' force.

the troops north. Leonidas called upon the nearest peoples for help. The Opuntian Locrians sent all their infantry and seven penteconters, and the Phocians 1,000 infantry. There was still the hope that the Persians, having been so slow to reach Pieria, would not threaten the pass before the arrival of the main Greek force. This hope vanished with the arrival of Xerxes' army on 12 September. Leonidas held a meeting of the contingent-commanders. Some advised withdrawal. Others, especially the Locrian and Phocian commanders, refused to abandon their countries to the enemy. Leonidas took the decision, to hold the pass and send messages for help to the members of the Greek League. The acropolis of Trachis was garrisoned, and the Phocians guarded the turning-route. Leonidas posted his Spartans at the head of the pass, and it was there that Xerxes' mounted scout saw them practising gymnastics and combing their hair.

The personnel of the Greek fleet numbered over 65,000 men. Although somewhat smaller with its 324 triremes and 9 penteconters than the Ionian fleet had been at Lade, it had one great advantage, a regular commander-in-chief, the Spartan Eurybiades. Supplies for so great a body of men must have been dumped in advance in northern Euboea, and these were supplemented by local produce; for warships ready for action could carry very little cargo. The contingents mustered off a coastal plain with gentle hills behind it, which took the name Artemisium from a temple of Artemis on a small rise (now called Ayios Yeoryios). The warships could be hauled up on to the level beach; there were no snags offshore and the water deepened quickly to 20 m, so that launching was easy, except when a north-easterly gale brought breaking seas onto the beach.

The Greeks on the League Council had chosen Thermopylae and Artemisium as stations close enough together for intercommunication some weeks before the Persians reached Macedonia (VII.175). They had no means of knowing what course the Persians would pursue. For instance, Xerxes might advance inland of Thermopylae and descend through Phocis into Boeotia where he expected to find support, and his fleet might follow the island route – Sciathos, Peparethos, Scyros and Andros – to reach the Boeotian coast from the south. In posting their fleet at Artemisium the Greeks hoped to prevent the use of the island route, because their own fleet would be on the flank of the enemy fleet and could cut its communications with Macedonia, and to draw the Persian fleet rather into the Gulf of Pagasae. Once there, the Persian fleet would have to defeat the Greek fleet at Artemisium before it could enter the northern end of the Oreus Channel, which was effectively enfiladed by the Greek fleet, and use the Euripus route (VIII.15.2). Further, by placing themselves at Artemisium the Greeks kept two lines of retreat

open: through the Oreus Channel and the Euripus or out to sea and east of Euboea. There was one possible disadvantage, that the wide waters of Artemisium, 11 km from the Magnesian coast, would favour the much larger Persian fleet. It might have been thought that Oreus itself within the narrow channel would be a better station; but there are underwater snags and reefs in its bay, and a Persian fleet off the Gulf of Pagasae would bottle up a Greek fleet inside the Oreus Channel.

When the ten Persian ships appeared off Sciathos, Eurybiades had only 268 triremes and 9 penteconters at Artemisium; for 53 of the expected 180 Athenian triremes had not yet arrived. The loss of 3 look-out triremes revealed the unpleasant truth that the Persian fleet moved faster than the Greek fleet; and this meant that the Greek fleet could withdraw with safety only at night, if the Persian fleet was nearby. The size of the enemy fleet was not known (the spies at Sardis having seen the land forces only); but reports had no doubt come in from merchant ships that it was enormous, and fire-signals now from Sciathos may have been misinterpreted as meaning that the main fleet was on its way to the Pagasaean Gulf. Afraid of the consequences if his small fleet had to fight in the wide waters off Artemisium, Eurybiades moved back into the Euripus and made Chalcis his base (VII.183.1). Herodotus is probably mistaken in supposing that Eurybiades intended 'to guard the Euripus', i.e. hold the narrows at Chalcis, because he would then have exposed the rear of Leonidas' position to a landing of troops by sea. Rather, Eurybiades had the possibility of moving forward to fight either within the Oreus Channel or in the narrows between Cnemides and Dium.⁵⁰ In the event the storm changed the whole situation; and during it, by a happy chance which Eurybiades cannot have foreseen, his fleet lay in sheltered waters when the Persian fleet was caught off the Magnesian coast.⁵¹

Observers posted by Eurybiades on high points in north Euboea sent messages, presumably at first by fire signal, to the Greek fleet in the Euripus. They indicated that the enemy fleet had gone down in the storm, then in its second day. The Greeks sacrificed to Poseidon the Saviour and sailed with all speed to Artemisium. There on 14 September, the last day of the storm, 'they lay in wait for a few enemy ships which might oppose them' (VII.192). Next day the Persian fleet appeared. It was

⁵⁰ A sensible decision if he thought the Persian navy to be at least four or five times larger than his own.

⁵¹ Any rearrangement of the Greek fleet's movements to suit modern ideas of probability (as in c 362, 286, A 11, 387) rests on the tacit assumption that the bulk of Herodotus' informants or the best of them, according to one's opinion of his method, not only gave him false information but also the same false information. Such an assumption is unjustified. Contemporaries knew of their movements and reported them as they remembered them. History is not determined by any rules of probability.

very much larger than Eurybiades had hoped! However, fifteen ships fell into his hands that evening, and full information was obtained. The crews were sent under arrest to the Isthmus of Corinth; for in the incident off Sciathos the Persians had taken prisoners⁵² and the Greeks now followed suit.

That night Eurybiades and the commanders of the national contingents discussed the situation. Some wished to withdraw towards the Isthmus of Corinth,⁵³ as the enemy fleet was so much superior in numbers. Eurybiades decided to stay, supported by Themistocles and others. Herodotus attributed the decision to clever bribery by Themistocles. This we may regard as unhistorical, for the decision was inspired by strategic considerations. The forces at Artemisium and the forces at Thermopylae were interdependent, in the sense that as long as the navy controlled the entry to the Oreus Channel the Persian fleet could not land troops in the rear of the army at Thermopylae, and as long as the army held Thermopylae the Persian land forces could not threaten the narrows of the Euripus on the fleet's line of retreat from Artemisium. Thus Eurybiades refused to withdraw the fleet, because in so doing he would have exposed Leonidas to encirclement and annihilation. But there was also a positive reason. The disparity of the Greek forces on land and at sea is very striking. The small army could delay but never defeat the Persian army, but the fleet was large enough to defeat or severely damage the Persian fleet. Eurybiades' duty was to go into the attack. Leonidas' duty was to hold the pass by defensive action and safeguard the rear of the Greek fleet. For intercommunication Eurybiades and Leonidas each had a boat ready to report the progress of any actions (VIII.21). The distance between them was 65 km by water.

While the Persian fleet was repairing damage on the 15th and 16th inside the Pagasaean Gulf, Xerxes made his plans in consultation with his navy and army commanders. He knew now the approximate size of the Greek fleet which lay 11 km away from his advanced naval station at Aphetæ,⁵⁴ and he must have inferred from the camp fires that the army in the pass was numbered in thousands rather than tens of thousands. Thessalian and other medists will have told him of the easy route which leads via Cytinium in Doris into the Cephissus valley and enters Boeotia; a part of his army using this route could occupy the Boeotian side of the Euripus narrows and cut the best line of retreat for the Greek army. But Xerxes was pressed for time, as the better part of the campaigning season was over. Moreover, he was anxious not only to bring the Greeks to

⁵² Except for the sacrifice of one Greek prisoner called Leon (VII.180).

⁵³ The meaning of the phrase at VIII.4.1 *fin.* is apparent from its use at VIII.18 *fin.*

⁵⁴ The site of Aphetæ is disputed, being put sometimes in the mouth of the Gulf and sometimes outside by Olizon (see C 359A, 310; and Wace in *JHS* 26 (1906) 145; and C 410).

battle on both elements but also to trap their forces by land and sea. Whatever might happen at Thermopylae, the hinge to any trap at sea was formed by the narrows of the Euripus, only 60 m wide, which lay on the line of retreat for the Greek fleet. Xerxes' plan was to occupy these narrows.

On the afternoon of the 17th a detachment of 200 ships, specially selected (we may assume for their speed), left the main fleet at Aphetae and went north through the Sciathos Channel. Once out of sight of the Greek fleet at Artemisium the detachment turned east and with nightfall south east and aimed to round the southern tips of Euboea and reach the narrows of the Euripus. If we allow not the 15 km an hour of the leading ships from Therma to Cape Sepias but the 12 km an hour of the ships from Marathon to Phalerum in 490 B.C., the detachment might reach its objective in 25 hours, i.e. on the afternoon of the 18th. Xerxes, therefore, ordered his admirals to attack the Greek fleet only when the detachment should have reached its objective; and it was indeed to signal that it had done so (VIII.7.2, perhaps by some system of signal-ships). On land his aim was to break his way through the pass, destroying the Greek army in the process; but, as the pass presented great difficulties, he started the attack on the 17th and hoped to break through on the 18th. On that day, if the signal came through, his fleet would go into action and drive the small Greek fleet down the Oreus Channel and the Euripus to the blocked narrows.

On the 17th, then, the Persian fleet did not offer battle when it took station at Aphetae after noon. A Greek diver in Persian service, one Scyllias of Scione, crossed unobserved to Artemisium (some said by swimming underwater, but according to Herodotus by boat), and he reported the despatch of the Persian detachment *en route* for the Euripus narrows, as well as the extent of the damage by storm of the Persian fleet. A council of war was held by Eurybiades. The first plan was to stay all that day at Artemisium with their ships beached, avoiding battle, and after midnight to set out on the voyage of 140 km to the Euripus narrows which they would reach by noon in time to lay an ambush for the Persian detachment of 200 ships. The reasoning behind this plan was, we may suppose, that Eurybiades' 268 triremes had no chance in a set battle against the Persian fleet, now known to be four times as large, and that Leonidas must be left to make his own escape, while the Greek fleet might win a minor victory by destroying the detachment of 200 Persian ships. Fortunately, braver counsels prevailed later that day. Eurybiades decided to attack the Persian fleet in order to discover their battle tactics and skill in manoeuvre (*diekplous*, VIII.9).

The chief difference between the Greek fleet, especially its Aeginetan and Athenian squadrons, and the Persian fleet, was in tactics. The Greeks

had developed to a fine art the tactics suited to ramming, one of which was the *diekplous*, and they carried only a small number of marines (cf. Thuc. III.94.1 and 95.2) in order to keep their ships handy for manoeuvre and because they intended to disable and not to board an opponent. For these tactics they preferred a relatively open order. On the other hand, the Persian fleet, being made up of many national squadrons with differing skills, relied primarily on boarding tactics, and their ships throughout the fleet carried not only the marines native to each squadron but also thirty picked Persian, Median and Sacan infantry marines (VII.96.1; 184.2; cf. Thuc. I.49.1–3). Having greatly superior numbers of ships and of marines to a ship, the Persians preferred to keep close order and hoped to overwhelm the Greek ships by coming alongside or crashing into them and then boarding. At the same time the *diekplous* was not ruled out for the Persian fleet (cf. VI.15.2). The Phoenicians may well have invented that manoeuvre (*FGrH* 176 F 1); but it is clear from descriptions of mass attacks in close order by the Persian fleet in 480 that it relied primarily on boarding (VIII.16.2; Aesch. *Persae* 412–16; VIII.86; 89.2).⁵⁵

The Greek ships rowed into the wide waters in an extended line some 4 km long, and the Persian fleet rowed forward in an even longer line. When the Greek line slowed down, the Persian line began on either wing to encircle its opponents. As it did so, at a given signal the Greek ships of the wings stopped and backed water, while the centre was still moving forward, so that the formation changed into the circumference (or the major part of the circumference) of a circle with all prows presented to the enemy and the sterns closer together than the bows (VIII.11.1, cf. Thuc. II.83.5). Meanwhile the Persians continued their encircling movement. Their tactic generally was to come alongside, hurl missiles and then board the enemy; and they had the advantage of greater height above water and quicker movement. But they were unable now to come alongside, because the Greeks were in too tight a formation. On the other hand, the Greek tactic was to ram an enemy in the side or stern, hole the hull and strip the oars off one side; and they had the advantage of being heavier, lower and equipped with a bronze-sheathed underwater ram. At the next signal, when the Greeks were already crowded into a relatively small space and face to face with their enemies, they rowed forward and rammed their opponents, who were in a less close order and engaged in the encircling movement. The action was a brief one, because at nightfall the fleets disengaged and returned to their stations. But by then the Greeks had captured 30 Persian ships. It was a clear, if minor, victory for Greek seamanship,⁵⁶ and one Lemnian ship took the

⁵⁵ See C 44 and C 45A, 52ff.

⁵⁶ This is clear from the number of captured ships and the surprise of the Persians, whatever the precise meaning of *ἑτεράλειος* at VIII.11.3 (cf. *ἑτεράλειος* in *Persae* 952).

opportunity to desert from the Persian fleet. The Greeks' spirits rose. They abandoned their plan for the night voyage, and Eurybiades sent a message to tell Leonidas of his intention to hold the position at Artemisium next day.


Xerxes opened his attack on land early on the 17th. The entrance to the pass at that time was only 2 m wide (see Fig. 46). Then came a stretch of about a mile between the cliffs and the sea with an average width of some 15 m, and this stretch ended in a crosswall of dry stone which the Greeks had now strengthened. Beyond the wall there was a similar stretch about a mile long which ended in another narrow part, some 2 m wide, and beyond that point lay the village of Alpeni. Leonidas intended to fight in the forward half of the pass; his camp was between the wall and Alpeni. Xerxes' troops – Medes, Kassites and then the Persian 'Immortals' – fought in waves throughout the day on this tiny front. The Greeks had longer spears, better defensive armour and stronger shields, and the Spartans in particular were superior in the drill tactics of beating a retreat and wheeling. Consequently they inflicted far more casualties than they suffered, and their grip on the pass was not loosened by the end of the day. Leonidas sent an encouraging report that night to Eurybiades.

The night of the 17th to the 18th was marked by a thunderstorm with torrential rain and a tempestuous wind from a south-easterly direction which drove the wreckage and corpses into the Persian anchorage at Aphetæ. Out at sea (*ἐν πελάγει*)⁵⁷ the detachment of 200 Persian ships was entirely destroyed on the rocky lee shore of south-eastern Euboea which was known as 'The Hollows'. The Greeks were indeed fortunate in not having to put to sea at midnight, as they had at first intended. The news of the Persian disaster reached the Greeks at about the same time as the expected reinforcement of 33 Athenian ships, which had come up the Euripus Channel and had been by chance in sheltered water during the night of storm.⁵⁸ The gods were indeed on the Greek side. The Persians meanwhile did not receive the expected signal that the detachment had reached its objective, and as the day wore on they may have suspected that it had failed in its mission. In accordance with their orders, they did not attack. But the Greeks, now reinforced, delivered an attack at the same late hour as on the 17th and sank some Cilician ships (VIII. 14). The message to Leonidas was again encouraging.

Xerxes' troops attacked throughout the 18th, and the Greek national contingents took turns in meeting the attack – all except the Phocians – and kept their firm control of the pass. But during the day Xerxes was informed of the existence of a turning-route by a man of Malis, Ephialtes, and perhaps two others, and he decided to send a force along it that very

⁵⁷ This phrase means that the ships were off south-eastern and not, as in Str. 445, south-western Euboea; and this would be so in terms of distance and time, the storm being at night.

⁵⁸ For ingenious rearrangements of Herodotus' reported events see C 359A, 311 and A 48, 257f.



46. Thermopylae.

night, the night of full moon, as it happened. Secrecy was essential. To escape observation the start had to be made not from the plain near the entry to the Thermopylae pass but from farther back and in the hills. That evening Ephialtes led Hydarnes and several thousand of his Immortals out of the camp 'at the lighting of the lamps'. They took a path inland of the Trachinian cliffs, which led to a break in the hills above the enemy-held acropolis of Trachis, and they then crossed the Asopus river above its precipitous gorge (VII. 215).⁵⁹ They were well on the way by midnight.

On the 19th at noon the Persian fleet opened the attack. Adopting a crescent formation in order to enclose the wings of the Greek line they bore down on the Greek ships which had stayed close to their base at Artemisium. The Greeks then rowed into action. Herodotus recorded the loss of many ships and many men on the Greek side but maintained that the losses on the Persian side were 'much greater', in part because the Persian ships being so numerous fell foul of one another. It is probable that Herodotus' informants had an exaggerated idea of the Persian losses. In a long-drawn-out engagement the Greeks suffered losses which they could ill afford as their fleet was numerically so inferior, and of the

⁵⁹ For the route see Paus. x. 22. 8 and c 273A, 243f; A 11, 407f; C 376, 71ff with plates 66–84; C 409, 17ff with walking times. Hdt. VII. 223. 1 states that 'the route round' (i.e. from camp to crossing of the Asopus) and 'the ascent' (i.e. from the crossing to the saddle) were longer and took more time than the descent (i.e. from the saddle to Alpeni), which can hardly have taken more than six hours.

Athenian ships a half were damaged. That evening, their ships hauled up on the beach, the crews were feasting on the Euboean cattle they had slaughtered and were discussing plans for sailing away, when a messenger reported to Eurybiades what had happened at the pass of Thermopylae. There being no point in staying, the fleet set off during the night and sailed through the Oreus Channel.

Hydarnes and his men moved slowly along the high Anopaeon path. They knew probably where the path would be guarded and so timed their arrival at the summit to be just at dawn. They met no pickets or advanced posts on the way. Then their approach was given away by the rustling of dead oak-leaves under their feet,⁶⁰ and a thousand Phocians sprang to arms; but the Persian attack and especially the showers of arrows drove them off the track and up the mountainside. As the Phocians withdrew the Persians pressed on along the path and began the long descent, which would bring them to the coast beyond Alpeni. News of this turning movement was brought to Leonidas while it was still night,⁶¹ and soon after dawn he learnt from watchmen posted on the hills that the Phocians had failed in their task.

Leonidas held a council at once, at which some advocated resistance, others retreat. The decision lay with Leonidas. His own orders from Sparta were clear, to stand to the end, and that was for him and his men the course of honour. The Thespians and the Thebans stayed with him. The others he ordered to withdraw.⁶² One man disobeyed the order, Megistias, the diviner, who had reported adverse omens at dawn that day. He stayed but sent his only son away. It is possible that Leonidas was influenced by Apollo's response to Sparta in 481 (see above, p. 541). His staying made no difference to the fleet, which was in any event at Artemisium that day and could not safely withdraw until nightfall. By then, resistance at Thermopylae, as Leonidas knew, would be at an end.

In order to give Hydarnes time to reach Alpeni, Xerxes did not attack until an hour or two before noon. The Persian soldiers (driven forward with whips according to Herodotus, which we may doubt)⁶³ found Leonidas and his men farther forward in the pass than hitherto, and the fighting was fierce and continuous. As their spears were broken, the Greeks drew their swords. When Leonidas fell fighting bravely, the

⁶⁰ The leaves which rustled were those of the preceding winter, which fall in the spring and form a thick carpet; not fresh leaves as in A 11, 415 n. 20 with references.

⁶¹ Deserters reported the first part of the Persians' march, *τὴν περίοδον* at VII.219.1 (cf. 223.1 the first of three parts being *ἡ περίοδος*); otherwise c 320, 372.

⁶² Herodotus' considered judgement at VII.220.2-4 seems preferable to modern speculations as summarized in c 320, 372ff. Men's motives in such situations are not known even to themselves. The Thespians chose to die perhaps because they knew their city would be destroyed. The Thebans' surrender at the end should not obscure their long fight; the speculation in VII.222 arose from the subsequent medism of their city.

⁶³ The only possible witnesses being the Thebans whom Herodotus regarded as traitors.

battle swayed to and fro over his corpse. The Greeks recovered it just before they heard of the approach of Hydarnes in their rear. Then they fell back to the crosswall. There all, except the Thebans who stood aside and surrendered, made their last stand on a hillock, fighting tooth and nail until they were surrounded and overwhelmed by showers of missiles.⁶⁴

An Athenian observer of the silence which fell on Thermopylae that afternoon slipped away from Trachis, reached his triacontar in the bay and delivered his news some five hours later to the Greeks at Artemisium who were roasting the slaughtered cattle. Far to the south those whom Leonidas had sent away were out of reach of any Persian pursuers. The combined operations at Artemisium and Thermopylae had not repelled the Persian invasion; but no one at the time had expected that they would. They had inflicted serious losses on the Persian forces; at sea more than fifty triremes in action and two hundred of their best in storm off Euboea, and on land the cream of the Persian infantry including two sons of Darius on the last day. The Greeks had gained the experience in battle at sea which was to prove of crucial value, and they had more than held their own against greatly superior numbers. In the pass of Thermopylae the Spartans had shown the iron will and the undaunted courage which inspired others to follow their example – a courage immortalized later in the simplicity of directness:

Tell them in Lacedaemon, passer-by:
Obedient to their orders, here we lie. (VII.228.2)

A most exciting discovery may be mentioned at this point, 'The Decree of Themistocles', inscribed on Pentelic marble and probably therefore cut at Athens. To be precise, it is a decision by the Athenian people adopting a proposal made by Themistocles in the Assembly. The stone was found at Troezen in the Peloponnese; it had evidently been placed there in connexion with some statues of women and children⁶⁵ which commemorated the evacuation from Athens to Troezen mentioned in the inscription (Paus. II.31.7). As the lettering of the inscription is dated to the late fourth or more probably the early third century, it was copied at that time from an inscription or a document at Athens. Ever since this discovery was published by M. H. Jameson in 1960, scholars have argued whether the contents of the inscription derive from a fourth-century fiction by some pro-Athenian propagandist which imposed itself as fact upon the Troezenians *inter alios*, or from a genuine document

⁶⁴ Arrowheads were found on the site by S. Marinatos; see *JHS* 59 (1939) 200.

⁶⁵ Like the statue 'The Woman of Pindus' at Pentalophos in Macedonia which commemorates the ammunition-carrying women of 1940–41. For a lost inscription which recorded at Troezen the details probably of the reception of Athenian evacuees see c. 301.

which contained the record of a decision taken during the Persian Wars.⁶⁶ For those who hold the former view, the inscription has no relevance to this chapter. On the other hand, it is of the greatest importance to those – and the present writer is one of them – who suppose that the ‘many traces of official and archaic language’ are due to the original record and that such omissions as the dating of the decision and such additions as the patronymic and the demotic of Themistocles are due to one or more editings in the course of transmission over two centuries, which have brought it closer to literary prose than it may have been originally.

The inscription records decisions to evacuate the population, concentrate all men of military age for war at sea, distribute these men over a fleet of 200 ships, allocate two spheres of operation for the naval forces and deal with persons recalled from ostracism. It was natural at first to relate the decree to the known evacuation *after* the battle of Artemisium, which Herodotus mentioned as following upon a ‘proclamation’ (VIII.41.1); but the mention in the decree itself of sending ships to Artemisium shows that the decree was passed *before* the battle of Artemisium. It does not matter that late literary sources ascribe to the ‘proclamation’ evacuation a decree by Themistocles which has certain echoes and almost verbatim quotations from the first part of our inscription, that dealing with evacuation.⁶⁷ It is these authors and their predecessors who made the transfer for sensational effect just as they transferred the recall of ostracized persons to the eleventh hour (e.g. Plut. *Them.* 10–11.1).⁶⁸

Since the decree is *before* the sending of ships to Artemisium, the question to be considered is whether it was passed in June or so of 480 when the Greek League was planning to hold Thermopylae *in strength* (the delay of Xerxes, which caused the reduction of the forces because of the Carneian and Olympic festivals, not being predictable), or in late September of 481 when the Greek League had not yet come into existence.⁶⁹ We shall try to answer that question as we deal with the contents of the decree under two headings.

1. *The evacuation and the concentration on war at sea*

In the first part there is no mention of ‘the Hellenes’. Yet it was they, or rather their *probouloi*, who decided on resisting at Thermopylae and Artemisium and ordered the despatch of ships to Artemisium (Hdt.

⁶⁶ Published in *Hesp.* 29 (1960) 198ff = C 330; M–L 23 with commentary; bibliography in C 289, 157f. ⁶⁷ C 344, 66.

⁶⁸ Down to Aelius Aristides XIII (Dindorf I 225–6) and XLVI.192 (II 256 and III 606).

⁶⁹ An alternative which seems not to have been considered until C 317.

vii. 172–7). In the decree all decisions are those of the Athenian people, and the reference to other states is in the words ‘to resist the barbarian in defence of their own freedom (? and that of Greece) with Lacedaemonians, Corinthians, X (lacuna for a name, probably Chalcidians) and the others willing to share the danger’. In these respects, then, the decree is appropriate to September 481 and not to June 480. The states mentioned by name were already friends of Athens: Sparta as a named objective of Xerxes; Corinth as an aider of Athens against Aegina; and Chalcis, the state of the Athenian colonists, who had moved to Attica and fought at Marathon. The phrase ‘and the others willing to share the danger’, is not unlike the phrase ‘together with those Greeks who are willing’, which Herodotus used at vii. 144.3 in mentioning the Athenian resolve to put all their forces on their fleet, before the first meeting of the Greek League was held (see above, p. 541).

In lines 41ff of the decree the fleet is to operate in two theatres, each with one hundred ships: ‘to go to help to the Euboean Artemisium’ and ‘to lie in wait off Salamis and the rest of Attica and to defend the land’. In June 480 there was no need to defend Salamis *and the rest of Attica* with a hundred ships, because the Greek fleet was to be stationed at Artemisium in waters between the Persian fleet (then known to be on the north Aegean coast) and the territory of Athens.⁷⁰ On the other hand, in September 481 there was every reason to defend Salamis and Attica and lie in wait for the enemy ships of Aegina. For the war with Aegina reached its height at the time when Themistocles persuaded the Athenians in 483/2 to build a fleet against Aegina, and it continued until the formation of the Greek League, when ‘the Greeks’ negotiated the end of intestine wars, especially that between Athens and Aegina (see above, p. 543). But why send one hundred ships to Artemisium in September 481? The answer may be that Artemisium was at any time the best position in which to await the oncoming Persian fleet, and the best advanced station for protecting the Athenian citizens at Chalcis in Euboea as well as the Athenians in the Salamis theatre against the Persians.⁷¹ It was known that Persia had been making naval preparations for two years and the Athos canal was probably already open in September 481. The possibility of a strike by the Persian navy from there in September 481 could not be discounted.

The decision to evacuate the population and to concentrate all forces in the navy had to be taken well in advance of the main attack. That was when Herodotus put it at vii. 144.3 ‘The Athenians decided, in their deliberations after the oracular response, to receive the barbarian on his coming [a future event, ἐπιόντα] against Greece with all their strength on

⁷⁰ And in fact Athens sent 200 ships in all to Artemisium.

⁷¹ Halus was a better base for troops in Thessaly in spring 470 (Hdt. vii. 173.1 and 4).

their ships, in obedience to the god, together with those Greeks who were willing.’ There was then time to evacuate from Attica (for the land would be undefended) all flocks and herds (as in 431 B.C. these no doubt went to Euboea), moveable property of all kinds and the infirm to the nearest island, Salamis, and the women and children to a safer place. With all able-bodied men in naval service and the population in the throes of evacuation, there was a stop to sowing, harvesting and farming. Now, if the decision was taken only in June 480, the harvest which begins normally in late May⁷² would already have been brought in for the most part and arrangements for bringing in the rest would have been improvised. On the other hand, if the decision was taken in September 481 and evacuation was carried out that winter, crops would not be sown and there would be no harvest of cereals in 480. This is what happened according to Herodotus VIII.142.3; for the Athenians were said in 479 to have been ‘deprived of two harvests’, i.e. those of 480 and 479. Thus the evacuation which led to no harvest in 480 occurred in winter 481/0, if not earlier.⁷³

In lines 44ff ‘in order that all Athenians in unanimity may repel the barbarian, those who are in their ten-year exile are to leave for Salamis and they are to wait there until such time as the people may decide about them’. The archaic expression means those ‘ostracized’ – a colloquial and later universal term for those who had been ‘sharded’ – and the fact that their status had not been decided indicates that they are still in exile, as indeed the perfect participle shows.⁷⁴ The date of the recall is given in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.8 as in the archonship of Hypsichides, which most scholars equate with 481/0; in addition, since two of the ostracized, Aristides and Xanthippus, were elected generals for 480/79 at the elections of February/March 480, they must have been recalled for some months before then to re-establish themselves in the electorate’s favour. Thus this part of the decree cannot be dated to June 480, but it is very suitably dated to September 481.

Other details in the decree, such as the entrusting of the city to the gods, the selection of evacuation areas and the decision that the Treasurers and the priestesses should stay behind, suit either date. The naming of the exceptions shows that the decision envisaged a full-scale evacuation.

⁷² A 23, 662 and A 17, 11 70.

⁷³ Plut. *Them.* 7.1 placed between the ostracism of Aristides and the expedition to Tempe an attempt by Themistocles to embark the citizens on the fleet and evacuate the city; he says that Themistocles tried ‘again’ after the retreat from Artemisium and then succeeded. Plutarch may have changed the decision into an attempt. Nepos, *Them.* 2 fin., put the oracular response, the move to the fleet, the laying down of more ships and the evacuation all together before the despatch of troops to hold Thermopylae. Athens had to import great amounts of grain in the years of evacuation; the famous grain-carrier sent from Sicily by Gelo to the Piraeus may be an example (*Epistolographi Graeci* 746, Hercher). ⁷⁴ Plut. *Them.* 11.1, citing this decree, used the perfect participle also.

2. *The re-deployment of the state's manpower*

'All other Athenian men and the foreign men⁷⁵ who are of age are to embark on (? the prepared) 200 ships and resist the barbarian' (lines 12–15). This is the decision recorded by Herodotus at VII.144.3, a passage which refers to the time before the formation of the Greek League in autumn 481. The problem was to convert an army of 10,000 men of classes above the thetic class in ten tribal regiments (*taxeis*) and a fleet of some 16,000 men, mainly thetes, in some 80 ships into a huge navy of 200 ships requiring 40,000 men skilled in naval warfare and in the art of ramming under oar. As Pericles was made to point out in Thuc. I.142.6–9 the art of seamanship and the technique of naval warfare were very difficult to acquire and required long training. It is obvious that it would have been madness to make this decision in June 480 on the eve of meeting the main Persian fleet at Artemisium (again Xerxes' delays in Macedonia not being predictable). But it made excellent sense in September 481 with the winter months ahead for training.

The re-deployment was to commence 'the very next day' (line 20) after the decision, which at the time was therefore dated. The ten generals, as the ministers for war, were to appoint 200 'trierarchs' in the archaic sense of the word and in that of Hdt. VIII.93.2, i.e. as captains, and ships were to be allocated by lot to the captains. The complement of a ship was 200 men (Hdt. VIII.17). It consisted of marines and oarsmen (using oarsmen to include the helmsman and other specialists). At this time a third component had to be added, a section of the army. In the decree provision is made for the drafting of these three groups: (1) ten marines from the register of the age-group 20–30 and four archers for each ship; (2) an already experienced oarsmen-group (*ὑπηρείσία*) of some 80 men, allocated from the pool of 16,000 naval men to '(? the prepared) two hundred ships'; and (3) a section (*taxis*) from the military regiments (*taxeis*) 'at one hundred in number' for each of the 200 ships. It is evident from the decree that the groups of oarsmen existed already; for on the appointment of the captains, the groups were to be allocated to individual ships by lot (lines 26–7), and the name of the captain and the name of the group were to be written up on each ship's noticeboard⁷⁶ (this is the likely interpretation of line 33), so that the ex-military sections could recognize the ships on which they had to embark (lines 34–5). The ten generals were to divide the military regiments into the sections and publish them as 'sailors' (a probable word for the lacuna being *ναύτας*).⁷⁷ When all the regiments (*taxeis*) are distributed and allocated by lot to the

⁷⁵ An archaism for 'metics'.

⁷⁶ See C 124, 239 proposing *πρύχτι* in line 33, and C 317, 89 n. 56.

⁷⁷ Proposed by A. G. Woodhead, supported by C 124, 235 and C 45 for line 28.

triremes, the process is complete; and then it is for the Council and the generals, after sacrifices to named deities, to man all the 200 ships for active service.

This part of the decree is particularly interesting for the naval historian.⁷⁸ It shows how a navy was quickly expanded to almost thrice its previous size. The hulls were laid down, and groups of oarsmen were trained as components-to-be of the ships' companies, so that they were ready when the ships came off the stocks. Each group had its own morale and cohesion, like the crew of a modern 'eight'.⁷⁹ The final stage was the distribution of the army in such a way that the *esprit de corps* of a tribal regiment was not entirely lost.⁸⁰ The gods were to play their part. They were to defend the city and its territory in the absence of the army (lines 1–6), and in response to sacrifices of propitiation they were to bless the new navy on its putting to sea for the first time ever. The named gods were Zeus Almighty, Athena Patroness of Athens, Victory and Poseidon the Saver (*asphaleios*).⁸¹ And it was they who determined through the drawing of the lot who should be in a given ship. Nothing was to be done without the participation of the gods.

Almost a year later the Greeks had good reason to utter prayers of gratitude to Poseidon the Saviour (*soter*, VII. 192. 2) and to award the prize of valour to the Athenian fleet, not because it was far and away the largest flotilla in the Greek fleet but because of the courage and expertise of its trained personnel. If our interpretation and dating of the decree are correct, the action at Artemisium was proof positive of Themistocles' ability in framing so decisive a policy, drawing up so thorough a blueprint for the new navy and heeding the religious beliefs of the time, and of the Athenian people's courage and clarity of mind in adopting the proposal. Pindar appreciated the Athenian achievement at Artemisium 'where Athens' sons laid the bright foundation of Liberty' (fr. 77).

V. THE PERSIAN ADVANCE AND THE SACK OF ATHENS

In accordance with the Persian practice of honouring brave men Xerxes buried the Greek dead by the hillock of their last stand, some four

⁷⁸ Themistocles' terminology lasted but with changing meanings. In the fourth century, when foreign oarsmen were much employed, the citizen components were *nautai* (citizen oarsmen), *epibatai* (marines) and *hyperesia* (helmsmen and other seamen with specialist skills), as in [Dem.] 50. 29–30. See C 45, 49–55 and C 45A, 109ff. But it is a mistake to apply the fourth-century meanings to the Decree of Themistocles.

⁷⁹ Including probably some liberated slaves, since liberated slaves had fought and been honoured at Marathon. Herodotus VIII. 142.4, referring to the evacuees of 479, makes the Spartan envoy offer to feed 'those of the households useless for war'; this implies that fit household slaves were absent on war service, i.e. on the fleet.

⁸⁰ This may account for the ambivalence of the term *taxis* in lines 30–1 and 35–6.

⁸¹ All attested in fifth-century Athens; and Nike alone in Hdt. VIII. 77. 2.

thousand altogether over the three days of fighting. But he made one exception, Leonidas. Because Sparta had executed the envoys of Darius, Xerxes retaliated by treating the corpse of the Spartan king as that of a criminal: the head was cut from the body and impaled upon a pole.⁸² His own losses were estimated by the Greeks at 20,000; the figure is probably too high but it included many of his best troops.

Hitherto in northern Greece Xerxes had won the support of the Greeks by lenient treatment. Although they had submitted to his envoys in autumn 481, he overlooked their opposition and his troops did not ravage their lands. As his subjects they provided forces of infantry without demur to fight at Thermopylae – from Perrhaebia, Magnesia, Achaea Phthiotis, Aeniania and Dolopia (VII.185) – and the sons of Aleuas with the famous Thessalian cavalry rode beside the king. Xerxes now adopted a new policy, that of terrorism. The Thebans who had surrendered were members of a state which had submitted and then fought against him; so he had them branded on the forehead with the royal mark as slaves, man by man, beginning with their commander, Leontiades.⁸³ All Greeks who had resisted or might resist in the future were to be treated ruthlessly, and the army was given every licence, as it set off southwards on 22 September. One column, taking the inland route through Doris, devastated the land of the Phocians, looting and burning cities, temples and villages, destroying flocks and trees, and raping any captured women (VIII.33). Part of the column ravaged westwards in pursuit of the fleeing population and crossed the pass of Arachova which leads to Delphi.

The citizens of Delphi had fled. But the interpreter of the god's will, the *prophetes*, and sixty men remained in the precincts of Apollo's temple, hoping perhaps that Xerxes, like Darius, would show respect for Apollo and his servants. The Persian army was seen descending from the pass and then coming up the steep side of the valley to the sacred area of Athena Pronaea, the goddess of the approaches to the shrine. But they came no further. The Delphian account of what happened was reported by Herodotus (VIII.36–9). When the Delphians consulted the god, he replied that he was able to protect his own property, and during the Persian approach his armour was seen to have moved miraculously from inside the temple and to be lying on the ground outside. Then as the Persians came up to the precincts of Athena Pronaea 'thunderbolts from the heavens fell upon them, two peaks split off Parnassus and came crashing down upon them, killing many, and shouts and war-cries resounded from within the temple of Pronaea'. The Persians fled, pursued by the apparitions of two local heroes (as in the battle of

⁸² The same treatment was accorded to a bandit at Elassona in February 1930.

⁸³ Not a Boeotarch, as in c 282, 47ff.

Marathon) and by Delphians who emerged from their hiding-places. The story of the thunderstorm and the panic of the Persians was universally believed at the time, and Herodotus was shown the two great rocks which had fallen from Parnassus upon the Persians.⁸⁴

Xerxes sent ahead into Boeotia some Macedonian officers, chosen by the Macedonian king, Alexander, who was a member of Xerxes' entourage. They were to take over the cities which had submitted in 481 and had not now sent troops to Thermopylae, and their presence protected Boeotia from the treatment which Phocis had received. Even Thebes was spared; for it was an important base for Xerxes, and the narrow pro-Persian group, headed by Attaginus and Timagenidas, which came into power, was judged worthy of trust. But Thespieae and Plataea were handed over to the army for looting and destruction. Refugees from these cities streamed into the Megarid and Attica, heading for the Isthmus.

Another column, accompanying the baggage-train, had marched along the coast through Locris, where the people were spared, and it joined the rest of the army in Boeotia. The full forces then entered Attica, where they encountered no resistance and wrought destruction to temples and towns. On 27 September they marched into an empty Athens. Everyone had disappeared except a small number of people on the Acropolis. They were the Treasurers of Athena and men too poor to provide themselves with means of transport overseas, and they had blocked the entry with a wooden barricade, which, they hoped, was 'the wooden wall' of Apollo's oracular response (VIII.51.2). The Persians occupied the Areopagus hill opposite the entry and ignited the barricade with incendiary arrows (some of the arrowheads have been found in excavations), but the defenders drove off all attacks by rolling huge stones down the slope. Negotiations offered by the Pisistratidae in Xerxes' service were spurned, and the king himself, according to Herodotus, was 'for a long time at a loss'.⁸⁵ But next day the end came quickly. Some Persians climbed up by a precipitous route and entered the Acropolis. Some of the defenders committed suicide over the cliffs (as the Greek guard did in 1941) rather than live to see their city enslaved, and others fled into the inner sanctuary of Athena, where they were massacred without mercy.

That evening the temples were looted and everything on the Acropolis was burnt, and later the city suffered the same fate. Xerxes had achieved the first objective of his crusade, the destruction of Athens. He

⁸⁴ Complete sceptics have to account for the arrival of the great rocks; see c 49, 187ff. The inscription in Diod. xi.14.4 is a later composition.

⁸⁵ A literary phrase, not to be taken literally, as by J. B. Bury in *CR* 10 (1896) 52. The timing is given in *Hdt.* VIII.50.1 and 56; not three weeks as in c 362, 304 and c 389.

sent off a messenger to report his success to the court at Susa. That was on the 28th.

Meanwhile the Persian fleet had remained in the Gulf of Pagasae and the Oreus Channel for six days after the battle of Artemisium, repairing damage and receiving reinforcements which came in from the offshore Greek islands as far south as Tenos. Oreus (Histiaea) was used as a base. It had been spared, because it opened its gates and no doubt a pro-Persian party was in power. But the Euboeans in general had never submitted and did not submit now, and most of the villages and farms of northern Euboea were devastated by raiding parties. The fleet sailed south on the 26th, through the Euripus and round Cape Sunium, while landing parties raided the coastal towns and burnt the temples, and moored off the long beaches of Phalerum early on the 28th after a voyage of some 300 km. There were as many ships of war as there had been in Macedonia, thanks to repairs and reinforcements (VIII.66.1);⁸⁶ but many of the best ships and crews had been lost, and the reinforcements from the Greek islands were not altogether dependable. Xerxes conferred that day with his commanders and made his plans for immediate action.

The Greeks had lived and died at Thermopylae in the hope of reinforcements. They had been told they were a mere vanguard (VII.203.1; 206) and Leonidas had sent urgently for help on his arrival; and it is arguable that with reinforcements the Anopaeon route could have been held. The troops who withdrew on Leonidas' orders hoped to find those reinforcements in Boeotia or Attica. But there were none. The Council of the Greek League and its member-states had failed to fulfil their promises (VII.206). The Greek fleet left Artemisium during the night after the battle, the Corinthians leading and the Athenians last. Themistocles arranged for inscriptions to be cut in the rocks at watering-points in northern Euboea, inciting the Greeks in the Persian fleet to desert or fight backwardly; for he reckoned that when the Persian ships sailed over they would draw water at these points and the messages would cause dissension in the fleet and even lead to desertions. As the Greek fleet sailed down the Euripus, they took on board the dependants of the Athenian colonists at Chalcis, and they landed the Plataeans who had been crewing, so that they could join their own people. The general expectation that they would find large Greek reinforcements in Boeotia was disappointed (VIII.40), and it was soon confirmed that a line of

⁸⁶ From the Greek islands, except the five western Cyclades, and probably from Ionia; the fleet at Doriscus had only seventeen ships from the islands, and one hundred from Ionia, but at the battle of Salamis the Ionians on the left wing were evidently a large element in the fleet. The reinforcements for the army were mainly from Greek states which had submitted (cf. IX.32.2). Xerxes had no reason to bring the Greek contingents from the islands to Doriscus and along the Aegean coast; they presumably joined him in the Thermaic Gulf and some even later. For doubts see C 320, 345ff.

defence was being prepared not north of Attica but across the Isthmus. The Athenians, faced with this new situation, asked that the fleet should put in at Salamis, and it did so on the evening of the 21st.

The Athenians went to their own harbours on the mainland. When the new situation was reported, the Athenian board of generals (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23.1) used their authority in an emergency to issue a proclamation that any Athenian should save his children and his household as best he could (VIII.41.1). It was not to be an evacuation planned in advance, though no doubt the fleet helped where it could, but a *saute qui peut* for those who had not taken advantage of the earlier evacuation resolved in the decree of Themistocles (above, p. 560), or who had come back in mistaken optimism. Now they could not leave fast enough, as they recalled the warning of Apollo (above, p. 541):

Wretches, why sit you here? Fly, fly to the ends of creation,
Quitting your homes, and the crags which your city crowns with her
circlet.

Moreover, the priestess of Athena announced a new and terrifying portent. A honey-cake, put out for the huge snake which guarded Athena's temple on the Acropolis, had always in the past been consumed; but at this time it was not touched. The snake must have gone. This was particularly sinister, because the People had entrusted the protection of the city and its land to Athena as their Patroness (above, p. 563), and most men thought now that she too had gone (VIII.41.3). In accordance with the Decree of Themistocles the Treasurers of Athena's treasure had to stay, but the priestesses, whose duty it was to wait on Athena, were now allowed to depart despite the Decree. During what proved to be six days the bulk of the refugees reached Troezen, which raised a fund for relief; some went to Aegina and others to Salamis.⁸⁷ Some stayed behind (IX.99.2).

Another reason for putting in to their own harbours was that the Athenian state had to decide what to do under the new circumstances (VIII.40.1). The Council of the Areopagus, hallowed by long tradition and influential in matters of religion, carried the greatest weight in the crisis, and its advice was adopted, to stand and fight at Salamis, the 'holy Salamis' of the oracle. More crews were needed to replace the Plataeans, and the Areopagus found the money – perhaps from the treasure of Athena on the Acropolis – for the recruitment of men at eight drachmae a head (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23.1). Sufficient ships were available; for since

⁸⁷ Aegina had not been mentioned as a refuge in the Decree of Themistocles, because Aegina was then at war with Athens.

October 481 Athens had built a large number of triremes over and above the 200 mentioned in the Decree of Themistocles (Hdt. VII.144.2 fin.), and the damaged ships were replaced.⁸⁸

When the fleet had finished transporting evacuees, it rejoined the main fleet at Salamis. Meanwhile the reserve fleet of the Greek League, stationed at Troezen, had come forward to Salamis. The bold decision of the Athenian state to stand and fight at Salamis was no doubt conveyed to Eurybiades, the commander of the combined fleets, and a council of war was in session on the 27th when the news arrived that the Persian army had entered Attica. The captain of each national contingent was there to express his opinion (VIII.49.1), and not surprisingly most of them wished to station the fleet by the Isthmus of Corinth, where the army was intending to make its stand. They were still arguing on the evening of the 28th when the fall of the Acropolis was reported. This caused something of a panic. Athena and the other gods, it seemed, had deserted the Greek cause and abandoned the defence of the city against the invading barbarians.⁸⁹ A few captains left the council, hurried to their ships and hoisted sail. The views of the remainder were so emphatic that Eurybiades decided that the fleet would fight at the Isthmus of Corinth. As night was falling, the meeting broke up.

The Isthmus had always been regarded by the Peloponnesians in the loyalist forces as their best line of defence, and it was no doubt this conviction that explained the failure of the Council of the Greek League to reinforce the position at Thermopylae. When Xerxes' army approached Thermopylae, the Peloponnesians in Leonidas' army wished to retreat at once to the Isthmus (VII.207), and as soon as the fall of Thermopylae was reported the Council of the Greek League decided to defend the Isthmus line. From a military point of view it was good sense, in that the northern frontier of Attica was long and vulnerable at several points and there was no suitable base from which the Greek fleet could cover the north-east coast of Attica. But it was a cruel decision for Athens and Megara, the crueller because it came so late that the refugees had to leave much of their property behind. The Council left the decision at sea to Eurybiades.

As the Greek fleet was withdrawing towards Salamis, it became known that work had begun on defences at the Isthmus (VIII.40.2). 'Many tens of thousands' of men were called up from the loyalist states in the Peloponnese – Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, Elis, all Arcadia and Lacedaemonia (including Messenia) –

⁸⁸ The large number of ships Athens provided – up to 300 in all if the half damaged were replaced for Salamis – may underlie the tendentious argument in Thuc. I.74.1 that Athens supplied 'a little less than two thirds of the four hundred ships in the Greek fleet'. See C 315, 270 n. 1.

⁸⁹ See C 335, written before the discovery of the Decree of Themistocles at Troezen.

and they camped at the Isthmus under the command of Cleombrotus, a king of Sparta in succession to his brother Leonidas. Other states made no move. Herodotus described them correctly as ‘medizing’ (VIII.73.3): Argos with Orneae and Cynuria, Cleonae, Nemea and cities between Elis and Messenia. For troops approaching the Isthmus from the north the longest and most difficult route followed the coast of the Corinthian Gulf, the shortest but also difficult route ran above the Scironian Cliffs facing the Saronic Gulf, and the high but relatively easy route over the saddle of Mt Gerania was across country not suitable for cavalry.⁹⁰ The forces of Cleombrotus demolished the ‘Scironian Way’ and were probably ready to hold the saddle of Mt Gerania and the other coastal route. But these were only advance posts to the main defence, a wall which they began to build of stone and brick, reinforced with timber and packed with sand, across the neck of the Isthmus at a place where seven and a half kilometres (Diod. XI.16.3) separated the two Gulfs. As they had left this to the last moment, the troops worked day and night without remission (VIII.71 and 74.1); for they did not believe that the Greek fleet would be able to delay the advance of the Persian army. Rather, they expected the Greek fleet to fall back to Cenchreae and support the army’s defence of the Isthmus. That in fact was what Eurybiades decided just before nightfall on the 28th.

VI. THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS AND THE RETREAT OF XERXES

The commanders of the national contingents who formed the council of war on the 27th and 28th were alarmed by several developments in the course of these days.

(1) Probably on the 27th a Persian army group began building a mole out into the Salamis Channel where the waters were narrowest between the island and Attica, the start of the mole being at Heracleum, ‘the precinct of Heracles’.⁹¹ We owe this information to Ctesias (fr. 26), who was probably the source used by Strabo (395) and Aristodemus I.2 (*FHG* v.1), the former dating this activity before the battle and the latter mentioning the Heracleum. Strabo defined the mole’s position as at ‘the ferry to Salamis’, mentioned by Aeschines as being in the strait (3.158 ἐν τῷ πύρῳ), and Strabo gave the distance across as ‘about two stades’, which probably represented the space between the islet on the Attic side and the island of Ayios Yeoryios (actually more than two stades). That is where the ferry goes today and must have done then, because any swell from the south east diminishes at that point in the Channel. The Heracleum was thus at the modern Perama. This place was certainly best

⁹⁰ C 315, 422f.

⁹¹ Different from the sanctuary of Heracles Tetrakomos at Piraeus; see C 278, 41.

for the construction of a mole; for the shortest and the shallowest stretch of open water is between the islet and the island, and the army had recently built moles off the Athos canal. Herodotus mentioned the building of a mole only after the battle (VIII.97.1), because he thought of it then as a bluff by Xerxes to cover his retreat. It is much more likely that it was a serious undertaking begun before the battle and continued after it. Xerxes' intention was to exploit the absence of the Greek army, 80 km away at the Isthmus, and put a group of the Persian army on to the island to capture the Greek navy's base.⁹² At this time too a mole, if completed, would confine the Greek fleet to the Bay of Eleusis, unless it chose to emerge eastwards in the face of a far superior and faster fleet. The sight of the mole starting filled the commanders with alarm; for defeat at sea or confinement within the bay of Eleusis would make their position at Salamis a death-trap (VIII.49.2 and 70.2). The Persians used their excellent archers to give covering fire for the builders of the mole, and the Greeks replied by using archers from their ships.⁹³

(2) Early on the 28th the Persian fleet arrived at Phalerum. That afternoon the Persian navy, sailing from Phalerum, deployed in battle formation in the 8 km wide waters between the Piraeus and Salamis south of the island Lipsokoutali. The Greeks refused battle, riding at sea inside the Channel; but the aggressive spirit of the enemy fleet was unmistakable.

(3) The Acropolis fell that evening.

(4) The Persian army that evening was marching towards the Peloponnese (VIII.71.1). News of this was probably signalled by scouts left on Mt Aegaleos, and the commanders realized that troops would be holding the coast of the Bay of Eleusis and of the narrows near Megara next day.

(5) The commanders must have realized that, as at Artemisium, Xerxes might send a squadron westwards round the island to block the narrows near Megara.

Bearing these fears in mind let us consider the position of the Greek fleet. It numbered 379 triremes, drawn from many more places than the fleet at Artemisium, and 7 penteconters (VIII.42–8), and there were many auxiliary vessels.⁹⁴ The personnel exceeded 80,000, and there were also evacuees on the island in addition to the native population. Dumps of

⁹² Opposite view argued in c 478, 34.

⁹³ C 315, 273; A 11, 437f; *contra* C 320, 415, summarizing other views. Herodotus was selective and did not use footnotes; points in other accounts should not be dismissed because not found in Herodotus. Persian archers were famous (*Persae* 278); Athens probably had few trained archers of her own (she had none at Marathon) and obtained the best Greek archers, Cretans, as volunteers or mercenaries. A dedication by archers in *Anth. Pal.* vi.2.


⁹⁴ Herodotus' total disagrees with his itemized figures but is confirmed at VIII.82.2; the total is doubted by c 320, 209.

grain, deposited in advance, would last for a limited period, and water was probably brought from the west side of the island's narrow waist. The fleet, like out-of-commission ships today, certainly lay for shelter within the Salamis Channel, and sandy beaches suitable for hauling the triremes up at night were as shown on Fig. 47. The level of the sea was then some 1.5 to 1.8 m lower than it is today. The beaches were much the same, but Ayios Yeoryios and the islet were more extensive and the Bay of Ambelaki on the south side of ancient Salamis town was smaller than today. The alternatives open to Eurybiades were two. He could slip out of the situation that night and reach the Isthmus. Or he could engage the Persian fleet, not out at sea in open waters but in the narrow waters of the Channel, if the enemy could be drawn in; for it was obvious, to cite the words Herodotus put in the mouth of Themistocles, that to fight in the narrows was to the Greeks' advantage and to fight in open waters was to the Persians' advantage. Eurybiades, as we have seen, decided towards nightfall to slip away that night towards the Isthmus.

Themistocles had other plans and devised the means of enforcing them. Although only one of many in the council of war, he commanded more than half the fleet; for the squadrons of Athens and of the Athenian colonists of Chalcis numbered 200 triremes (VIII.61.2). If he went elsewhere with these ships, the Greek fleet would be incapable of meeting the Persian fleet at all. Themistocles visited Eurybiades, and it was probably by using that threat that he persuaded Eurybiades to reconvene the council (VIII.58). There was much argument (the account of Herodotus is fictional but contains the relevant issues), but in the end Eurybiades announced his decision, to stay and fight, and this was accepted by the commanders. Everything was to be prepared during the night for action on the morrow, and a trireme was to be sent from the fleet to Aegina in order to fetch the images of Aeacus and the Aeacidae as divine protectors (VIII.64). But after the disbanding of the council, when the sailors knew what was intended, the Peloponnesians among them became almost mutinous and the council was convened yet again.⁹⁵ There was at least an hour of daylight still.

Seeing that Eurybiades might feel forced to change his decision, Themistocles tried to make a withdrawal impracticable. He sent a trusted slave, Sicinnus (later enfranchised at Thespieae and so described as a Greek by Aeschylus), to obtain an audience with Xerxes and report on behalf of the Athenian commander that during the dark hours of the night (up to moonrise at 2 a.m.) the Greeks intended to row stealthily away from their position (*Persae* 355–60) and this would be Xerxes' chance to catch them disunited and even fighting against one another

⁹⁵ Longlasting councils, alien to Anglo-Saxon methods, were a commonplace in the 'Free Greece' of 1943.



47. The approaches to Salamis

(VIII.75).⁹⁶ While Sicinnus went on his mission, Themistocles returned to the council where he was supported only by Aegina and Megara, and the arguing went on far into the night. In the small hours before moonrise Themistocles was called out of the council to see Aristides, who had just come from Aegina and *en route* had seen Persian ships off the west coast of the island. Themistocles sent Aristides⁹⁷ to the council to tell the company that they were being surrounded. The majority did not believe him. Soon afterwards, still before moonrise, a ship of Tenos deserted from the Persian fleet and brought full information of what the Persians were doing. There was no more argument. Everyone got ready for battle, and the trireme came back just in time with the images of Aeacus and the Aeacidae.⁹⁸ They might help the Greeks to fight their way out of the trap which had closed round them.

The Persians had always hoped that dissension would split the Greek defence, and this had seemingly happened at Thermopylae, where the majority of troops had left Leonidas in the lurch. Xerxes was quick to exploit his victory. Cities and farms in Phocis and Euboea and then the

⁹⁶ C 320, 403ff regards this as a fiction, accepted already in *Persae*. Sicinnus, probably a Persian or Persian-speaking (Plut. *Them.* 12.3), defected in daylight.

⁹⁷ Although he was one of Athens' ten generals, Aristides had no right to attend the council of war (VIII.81; see C 315, 380).

⁹⁸ VIII.83.2 fits badly with VIII.64.1-2: a loose end left by Herodotus.

Acropolis of Athens went up in flames, work started on a mole at the Heracleum, and the main army swept on its way towards the Peloponnese on the 28th. The fleet had hammered its opponents on the last day at Artemisium. Now refitted and reinforced, it arrived in full strength – probably 1,427 ships of war⁹⁹ – on the day after the army took possession of Phalerum. On that afternoon the Persians offered battle at sea. Such fast movement and aggressive spirit were calculated to break the morale of the Greek fleet, now isolated from its land forces, and to produce a situation in which, when it came to battle, most of the Greek fleet would sail away as had happened at Lade in 494 (above, p. 488). Indeed the refusal of the Greeks to engage on the afternoon of the 28th, in contrast to their readiness to engage on three days at Artemisium, may have been interpreted as a sign that they were already disunited – an interpretation not far from the truth.

The Persian fleet was returning to Phalerum for supper when Sicinnus arrived and made his report (*Persae* 355–76). Everything accorded with the expectations of Xerxes: the demoralization of the Greek fleet, the dissension between contending groups, and the assurance that only a fraction of the fleet might fight. Xerxes believed what he wished to believe. He made plans to capture the entire Greek fleet and the island of Salamis. A squadron of 200 Egyptian ships was to sail at once round the west side of the island, its tasks being to patrol the western bay at the island's waist and cut communications with Aegina and to hold the narrows off Megara (*Persae* 368; Hdt. VIII.79.4; Plut. *Them.* 12.5; Diod. XI.17.2; Hdt. VII.89.2–3). Starting about 8 p.m., the leading ships would reach the narrows about 2.30 a.m. and would be in time to intercept there any Greek ships which fled from their station after 11.30 p.m. It was therefore important not to startle the Greek fleet into flight before that time.¹⁰⁰ The main fleet was accordingly to sail at midnight, its task being to guard the (eastern) exits from the Salamis Channel and the routes out to sea (*Persae* 365–7). Should any Greek ships escape by any exit, all held responsible were to be beheaded. A force of picked Persian infantry, probably 400 strong (Paus. I.36.2), was to be taken on boats to the island Psyttalia 'situated between Salamis and the mainland' (Hdt. VIII.76.1), 'in order that when a battle at sea might develop and men and wreckage might be cast up mainly in that area (for the island lay on the course of where a battle was likely to take place) the Persians might aid their friends and destroy their enemies'.¹⁰¹ The sailing of the main fleet and the

⁹⁹ *Persae* 341f for the battle and 368f for the encircling squadron which other sources put at 200 ships. Total reduced by C 320, 209 to 340 ships (his Greek fleet is 310 ships) with a very different sort of battle; cf. A 11, 330f and 443. C 362, 304 gave 'about 350' ships.

¹⁰⁰ A study of the times in C 315, 298f.

¹⁰¹ Seen by daylight to be unoccupied by any Greeks; *contra* C 320, 397.

landing on the island were to be done in silence, and the Greeks would be unable to see any movements until after 2 a.m. when the waning moon would rise. A 'throne' was to be set up during the night for Xerxes to use at dawn, when he would view the movements of his forces and any engagement which might develop in front of Psyttalia.¹⁰²

It must have been obvious to the Persians that any part of the Greek fleet which might fight would do so in the narrowest waters available, that is to say at the bend of the Channel between Ayios Yeoryios and the islet, and not in the wider waters east of there or to the south of Lipsokoutali. As we learn from Aeschylus, Xerxes saw next day the killing of his men on Psyttalia; 'for he had a seat with a clear view of all the armaments, a high hill close to the salty sea' (*Persae* 466–7). This seat, according to Herodotus VIII.90.4, was 'under Mt Aegaleos opposite to Salamis', and according to Phanodemus, a fourth-century writer, 'above the Heracleum where the island is separated from Attica by a narrow strait' (Plut. *Them.* 13.1 βραχεῖ πόρω). Thus Psyttalia should be identified with Ayios Yeoryios, and the seat of Xerxes was on hill 57 at the bend of the Channel above the Heracleum and enjoying a clear view of any action on Psyttalia. We should also take into consideration an oracle current in Herodotus' day which, it was believed, foreshadowed the position of the Persian fleet on the day of Victory: 'when their ships bridge (the waters to) the sacred shore of gold-accounted Artemis and briny Cynosoura', that is from the Attic coast to the Artemisium, a shrine of Salamis town, and Cape Cynosoura ('Dog's Tail') (Hdt. VIII.77).¹⁰³ See Fig. 48.

The plans of Xerxes were executed without the Greeks being aware at the time. The report by Aristides revealed one part of them, but too late for any Greek ships to escape through the narrows of Megara. Then the captain of the Tenian ship which deserted revealed the disposition of the main Persian fleet as well as the despatch of the Egyptian squadron, but not the landing of troops on Psyttalia; for this had been conducted, we may assume, not from the naval base at Phalerum but from the army camp at Heracleum. The position of the front line of the Persian fleet, as described by Herodotus, was 'on the one hand curving towards Salamis with its western wing' and 'on the other hand stationed around Ceos and Cynosoura'. Thus the western wing was close to the Attic coast and curved towards Salamis town. The right and the centre were around the small island Talantonisi, evidently Ceos,¹⁰⁴ and around Cape Cynosoura.

¹⁰² *Persae* 466, ἔδραν as in LSJ⁹ s.v. 1.1; other references in C 300, who limits its use to a mounting-box. The command-post (Hdt. VIII.90.4) was manned at dawn (Plut. *Them.* 13.1).

¹⁰³ Further on this identification in C 315, 253f and C 10, 332f; for Psyttalia as Lipsokoutali see C 376, 195f, C 320, 397ff, A 11, 472f.

¹⁰⁴ Being the unnamed island of Str. 395, who gives the sequence down the Channel as Psyttalia, Atalante (i.e. Lipsokoutali), unnamed island, Piraeus; for Atalante being near Piraeus see Steph. Byz. s.v.

Their aim was to intercept any Greek ships which might try by hugging one or other coast to slip out during the hours of darkness. The whole fleet, being under oar, in open order and in movement all night (*Persae* 382), covered the waters as far to the rear as Munychia (VIII.76.1). Moreover, the orders of the fleet were revealed by the Tenian captain: it was to swing forward into the Channel and advance at dawn towards the bend, where Xerxes would watch it going into action if there was need for action at all.

Eurybiades, it seems, adopted the battle-plan proposed by Themistocles. We can infer the plan partly from Themistocles' previous experience and partly from what happened. The first battle at Artemisium had shown him that the Greeks' tactics could succeed well with favourable dispositions of the two fleets, and the third battle that if the Greek fleet was encircled even partially by the much larger and faster Persian fleet it would suffer severe damage, if not total destruction. It was therefore essential for Themistocles to fight in narrow waters, which would prevent encirclement and offset the disparity in numbers (VIII.60β). It would be better still if within those narrow waters the Greeks had more sea room for manoeuvre than their opponents, for instance by adopting a crescent formation, and could use their ability to ram. There is no doubt about the importance of the ramming. Themistocles had designed the 200 new triremes and trained his crews of oarsmen for that speed off the mark and that quickness in turning (*περιαγωγή*, 'bringing her round') which were needed for superiority in ramming. They were not built to carry large numbers of marines, as the Persian ships were (see above, p. 554); for their decks did not extend from bulwark to bulwark (Plut. *Cimon* 12.2 and Thuc. 1.14.3). Rather, they were relatively low amidships, heavily built and lower above the plimsoll line than their opponents; and these characteristics made them more stable and more under control in a choppy sea under oar than the high-decked and high-sterned Persian ships (Plut. *Them.* 14.2) with large numbers of marines on deck. In fact in this battle the Athenian triremes carried only four archers and fourteen marines, whereas the Persian ships had probably 20 native marines and 30 picked Persian, Median and Sacan infantry on board.¹⁰⁵

As he was fighting in home waters, Themistocles knew the local conditions of wind and wave. The night of the 28th–29th was calm enough for the Persian fleet to stay under oar and then to advance under oar at dawn. By then a southerly wind was blowing – the 'Sirocco' which is common in September – and Themistocles knew that in a couple of hours or so it would freshen and a swell would come up the Channel from

¹⁰⁵ For different ideas of naval warfare see A 11, 400f, e.g. 'the sea-fights of 480 were largely marines' battles', 'the raw, mass-produced Athenian navy' and fifty marines or fighting men to each Athenian trireme.

the open sea. This wind is usually followed in the afternoon by a westerly wind, whether the Maistro Bounentis or the Maistro proper, which is more north of west.¹⁰⁶

The plan of Themistocles was to tempt the Persian fleet into the Channel. The message conveyed by Sicinnus had the intended effect of bringing the Persian fleet to the entrance near Cape Cynosoura at dawn. In order to draw it not just into the vestibule between the Cynosoura peninsula and the Attic coast but right into the narrows, Themistocles had to make the Persians suppose that the Greek fleet was indeed divided and about to sail away in part or whole. Once he was confident of drawing the Persians' leading ships into that narrow space, he had to devise a formation for the Greek fleet which would enable it to use the rams to deadly effect (Aesch. *Persae* 278–9 and 336). How did Themistocles bring these desiderata to pass?


As dawn was breaking, the Greek commanders harangued their own national groups of marines (VIII.83.1). The hulls were launched, the crews and marines embarked, and the triremes in some disorder moved off under oar northwards out of sight not of Xerxes on his throne but of the oncoming Persian fleet. The general impression of confusion and flight was enhanced for Xerxes' benefit by a detachment of seventy ships hoisting sail and running before the wind towards the Bay of Eleusis (VIII.94.1). Xerxes and his entourage saw no reason to check the advance of their own fleet under oar towards the narrower waters. In one account he positively ordered it (Diod. XI.18.3).

The Persian fleet began at dawn to contract itself into close order. The Phoenicians held the right wing near the Attic coast, the Ionians the left wing near Cape Cynosoura and the other nationalities the centre (these divisions being the three 'columns' of *Persae* 366) (see Fig. 48).¹⁰⁷ As the dense array came up the vestibule of the Channel, the front line of some ninety ships abreast covered about 1,600 metres and the rearmost ships of the thirteen files were some 800 m distant from the front line.¹⁰⁸ The left wing was delayed by congestion in rounding Cape Cynosoura and the right wing pressed ahead faster under the eye of Xerxes, so that in relation to the coasts on either side the front line became oblique. During this advance the Persians did not see any opposing fleet. For the Greeks were in the northern part of the Channel, out of sight, adopting their own formation for battle. This was probably in ten columns, each led by a fast Aeginetan trireme, with a frontage of up to 300 m and a depth of up to

¹⁰⁶ See C 315, 293f.

¹⁰⁷ C 315, 278 and 296f; those who suppose *στροίχος* to mean 'single file' have a front of three ships and an immensely long tail up to 16 km long, which makes nonsense of *στῆφος*; however, see C 44, 21 and C 45A, 59.

¹⁰⁸ For calculations of space covered by the ships see C 315, 295ff, and C 383, 80f.



48. The battle of Salamis.

2,000 m. In each column there were 31 ships, making 310 in all (*Persae* 338–40). For the detachment of 70 ships had sailed northwards into the Bay of Eleusis to protect the rear of the Greek fleet, in case the enemy squadron, known to have reached the narrows off Megara, was now approaching the north end of the Channel.

The next stage is graphically described by the Messenger in *Persae* 384ff, from the point of view of a Persian sailor on a leading Persian ship as it rowed slowly through the vestibule towards the narrows:

‘And night was passing, and no stealthy sortie was being made at all by the Greek forces. But when radiant Day, drawn by her white steeds, took full possession of the land, first of all a cheer rang out from the Greeks, loud like a song, and therewith from the island crags Echo replied in shrill antiphony. And fear fell on all the barbarians, disappointed of their hopes; for the solemn warsong of the Greeks at that moment was an indication not of flight but of an impetuous onset for battle with bold hearts. The trumpet’s blast was firing all the scene, and at once on the word of command they smote the sounding sea with the even stroke

of foaming oars.¹⁰⁹ Swiftly they all hove in sight: first the right wing leading in orderly formation, and next the whole fleet coming out in turn.⁷

The ten leading ships ('the right wing' in *Persae* 399)¹¹⁰ rowed to Cape Tropaea on the north side of the Bay of Ambelaki, and then the whole formation, being now in sight of the oncoming Persian fleet, slowed and turned left to form perhaps four lines of ships in a crescent formation extending back as far as the islet off the Heracleum. The Greek fleet was now in the position described by Diodorus xi.18.2: 'they sailed out and held the strait between Salamis and the Heracleum'. The Aeginetans, with Eurybiades and the Lacedaemonian ships, were now on the right wing; the Athenians held the left half of the line; and the other contingents were in the middle right part (Hdt. viii.85.1).¹¹¹ As the Persians came slowly on with the Phoenicians leading the oblique line on the right, the Greek fleet backed water with prows facing the enemy and drew the Phoenicians farther into the narrows. This manoeuvre was carried out longest by the Athenians facing the Phoenicians (viii.84–85.1), and the leading Phoenician ships became isolated from the succeeding lines by the interposition of the islet. Meanwhile the whole Persian fleet in close order was flowing on into narrowing waters with some confusion (Diod. xi.18.4); any withdrawal was impossible. Within the narrows the front lines of the two fleets were already facing each other prow to prow, like boxers about to spar, when the swell which Themistocles expected came billowing up the Channel and threw the higher Phoenician ships and the other enemy ships off their bearing, so that as they rolled they exposed their sides; into which the Greek triremes charged smartly, ripping the sides with their rams and smashing the oars with their bulkheads (Plut. *Them.* 14.2; Diod. xi.18.6). Athenians and Aeginetans both claimed to have struck first, that is from the wings of the crescent formation.

The Persian fleet was now in the position where its destruction had been prophesied in the oracle attributed to Bacis (viii.77). 'The Phoenicians were on the wing nearest to Eleusis and the west, and the Ionians held the wing towards the east and the Piraeus' (viii.85.1);¹¹² a few of the latter hung back in accordance with the orders Themistocles had set up (above, p. 566). Thus the oblique line is described with the rather tilted orientation which is characteristic of Herodotus.

The Messenger in *Persae* 409ff continues from the beginning of the action:

¹⁰⁹ Like crews in a boat-race when the Thames is calm.

¹¹⁰ The head and the tail of a column were often called 'wings' in Greek warfare.

¹¹¹ For a different order of battle see c 46, 143 and 153, and c 383, 70; Diod. xi.18.1–2 places the Lacedaemonians elsewhere. ¹¹² Compare vii.36.2.

‘A Greek ship charged first and sheared off the whole high stern of a Phoenician ship, and every captain drove his ship against another ship. To begin with, the onward-flowing Persian fleet held its own; but when the mass of ships was congested in the narrows, and there was no means of helping one another, and they were smashed by one another’s rams sheathed in bronze, then they shivered their whole array of oars, and the Greek ships intelligently encircled them and battered them from every angle. Ships turned turtle, piles of wreckage and dead men hid the sea from sight, corpses were awash on shores and reefs, and the entire barbarian fleet rowed away in disorderly flight.’

While Aeschylus gave a general picture and a speedy conclusion, Herodotus lost his way in a series of individual incidents. His main point may be derived from *Persae* 417, that the Greeks in formation fought in an orderly manner and the barbarians no longer in formation showed no intelligence in their actions. He remarked of the retreat that, when the front line of the Persian fleet turned in flight, it crashed into the oncoming lines of ships which were trying to go into action under the eye of Xerxes; and that, while the Athenians attacked some still resisting and others in flight, the Aeginetans stood firm¹¹³ in the vestibule and destroyed those who were sailing out towards Phalerum, so that those who escaped from the Athenians fell into the hands of the Aeginetans (VIII.91). Thus the crescent formation became at the end almost a circle.¹¹⁴ By then a west wind was blowing some of the wreckage out towards the open sea (VIII.96.2). The oarsmen on the Persian side had had a gruelling time; for they had been at the oar from midnight to dawn and then rowed at once up the Channel and into action. The Greeks were fresh at the start, and being in a crescent formation they were never outnumbered in the actual fighting between the opposing lines. On the other hand the Persian ships which faced them were themselves disadvantaged by the press of ships depriving them of room for manoeuvre (Plut. *Them.* 15.2).

The picked Persian troops on Psyttalia found themselves on the wrong fringe of the battle. Had Xerxes been justified, their fleet would have occupied the narrows (VIII.76.2), and any battle would have been in the northern part of the Channel. Now they were between the Greek fleet and the Athenian hoplites¹¹⁵ who lined the shore of Salamis town’s territory and soon detected them. It was after the swing to victory and ‘in the confusion’ of the Persian flight (*Persae* 454–6; Hdt. VIII.91 and 95) that Aristides as one of the ten generals embarked his men on auxiliary vessels and took them to ‘the island which lies in the strait in front of Salamis’ (town) (Plut. *Arist.* 9.1). The Persians were annihilated in the sight of Xerxes (*Persae* 465).

¹¹³ For this meaning of *ὑποστάτες* see C 315, 288; otherwise A 11, 439.

¹¹⁴ See C 315, 290 fig. 16. ¹¹⁵ Being Salaminian cleruchs; see C 315, 261 n. 3.

The battle over, the Greeks towed to Salamis those wrecked ships which had not drifted towards the open sea, and prepared for a further engagement in the expectation that Xerxes would reorganize his fleet and return to the attack. But no ship of war moved out of Phalerum that evening. Diodorus alone gave a figure of the Persian losses 'over 200 ships apart from those captured with their crews', which may not be far from the mark if only a third of the fleet got into action; but these losses were suffered by the best ships and the best troops, since the Persian, Median and Sacan infantrymen could not swim. Xerxes had no intention of sending his fleet again into the same trap. On the Greek side outright losses may have been 40 ships (Diod. xi. 19. 3), but many more ships were damaged. The first award of honour was accorded to the Aeginetans, the second to the Athenians, and individual awards to one Aeginetan and two Athenian captains. The Corinthian squadron returned from the Bay of Eleusis when it sighted no enemy, and it fought well in the final stage of the action. An inscription on a marble block at old Salamis town paid honour to the Corinthian dead, who were buried there by permission of the Athenians (M-L 24; Plut. *de Mal. Hdt.* 39).

The brilliance of Themistocles, though belittled by Herodotus (viii. 57), has been generally recognized. He foresaw Xerxes' reactions correctly, chose the place and the time for the decisive engagement (Plut. *Them.* 14. 2) and was the man 'most responsible for the Greek victory in the narrows' (Thuc. i. 74. 1). In the opinion of Thucydides his genius was exceptional: his natural intelligence enabled him to meet each crisis with sure judgement and to foresee the future course of events (i. 138. 3). Thucydides had in mind not only the battle of Salamis but also the conversion of Athens into a naval state and the creation of a navy excelling in manoeuvre and ramming, like that of Pericles later.

The other members of the Greek League earned their meed of praise, especially Aegina which sent its best ships to Salamis and left the protection of its own people and the evacuees to its reserve fleet. The fighting spirit of 'The Hellenes', as the members of the League called themselves, is not to be understood without reference to or experience of the fanaticism of 'freedom-fighters' in many periods of history. 'Freedom', 'Liberation' and 'Patriotism' did not excite cynicism and apathy but faith and daring. They figured, rightly, in all records of Greek action: especially in dedications at the time where the cause was not one of state but of 'Hellas' (M-L 24; 26; Diod. xi. 33; *Anth. Pal.* vii. 347), and eight years later in *Persae* 402-5 when the shout was raised by the sailors going into action: 'You sons of Hellas, go; free your fatherland; free children, wives, shrines of ancestral gods, graves of your forefathers. All is now at stake.'

The authors of victory were not men but gods and heroes in the belief

of the time (VIII.109.3 and Pindar. *Isth.* v.48–53). When the Greeks were backing water, a female apparition was said to have halted them with a stentorian cry and to have cheered them forward into action. The prayers to Aeacus and the Aeacidae were answered; for ghosts in armour were seen coming from Aegina and raising their arms in front of the Greek triremes, as they were about to engage. Then too a bright light flashed from Eleusis (visible only from the north part of the Channel) and loud singing was heard echoing from the Thriasian plain near the sea, as if the mystic initiates were processing in honour of Dionysus (Hdt. VIII.84.2; Plut. *Them.* 15.1). The gods had spoken through oracles and they had not lied: the wooden wall had been safe, holy Salamis had destroyed the offspring of women, and the day of freedom for Hellas had dawned when the enemy ships bridged the waters to the shore of Artemis and Cynosoura. Three monuments of victory, ‘*tropaia*’, were built to overlook the scene of the battle and to mark decisive phases – one on Psyttalia, one on the hill of Salamis town and one on the middle of the Cynosoura peninsula. When men visited these monuments the god whom they honoured was Zeus Tropaios, ‘the turner’ of the battle.¹¹⁶ Eight years later *Persae* was produced as a paean of praise to Zeus, as well as a dirge for Persia.

Having described the defeat of Salamis and the loss of the men on Psyttalia Aeschylus went straight to the immediate and disorderly flight of the Persian army and then to the downwind and disorderly flight of the surviving ships of the Persian fleet (lines 469–70 and 480–1). He wished to show the speed of divine retribution, the humiliation of Xerxes and the desolation of Asia. It was an excellent use of poetic licence for dramatic purposes. However, it set the tone for the historian of the Persian Wars. Herodotus showed considerable ingenuity. He appended to the sending home of a report of the defeat a description of the weeping and wailing at Susa and the alarm for the life of the king (VIII.99.2). He pictured Xerxes as overcome with fear (97.1 and 103). The very day of the battle Xerxes thinks the Greek fleet may rush to the Hellespont, destroy the bridges and leave him stranded in Europe (97.1) and so he decides on flight. Mardonius and Artemisia, divining his mood, encourage him to go. And the reader is given the impression that the fleet fled the very night after this decision by Xerxes (107.1; cf. Diod. XI.19.4).

However, with his usual honesty Herodotus did not suppress certain facts which were inconsistent with his colourful picture. Xerxes stayed ‘a few days’ after the battle. He attempted to build a mole across to Salamis. He made preparations for a naval engagement, and this was what the Greeks expected (97.1, 108.1 and 96.1), presumably because the Persian

¹¹⁶ See C 315, 306ff with fig. 17 and C 403, 102 n. 20; and compare the three trophies at Marathon (above, pp. 513f).

fleet was still much larger than the Greek fleet. He arranged for Mardonius to select an army of occupation; this involved considerable reorganization, Egyptian marines for instance being landed from the fleet at Phalerum and formed into a regiment (IX.32.2).¹¹⁷ Of course Herodotus placed his own interpretation upon these facts: Xerxes was bluffing to cover his plans for flight, and speeches put in the mouths of Mardonius and Artemisia pandered to the king's pusillanimity of purpose.

It is probable that Xerxes had a serious intention. His victorious army was left by Herodotus marching towards the Peloponnese on the evening of 28 September. Presumably it held the shores of Eleusis and Megara next day in case the Greek fleet was defeated, and then it went on to ravage the Megarid, as it had ravaged Phocis and Attica. The plain of Megara was good cavalry country. The infantry may well have probed the enemy's defences at the Isthmus, and there is some indication that they were not unsuccessful. Excavation has revealed that at the Isthmus the temple of Poseidon, the headquarters of the Council of the Greek League, was burnt at the time of the Persian Wars,¹¹⁸ and the chances are very great that the burning was due to the Persians, as there are so many indications in literature and in excavation of their destruction of shrines and temples. If so, when were the Persians there? Pausanias I.44.4 mentioned *en passant* that Persians fired arrows at night near Pegae, which is on the western coastal route towards the Isthmus (see above, p. 569). Such Persian archers were normally infantrymen. Herodotus mentioned in an aside that Cleombrotus, the Spartan king in command of the Greek army at the Isthmus, conducted a sacrifice (i.e. to consult the omens) 'with reference to the Persian' on the day when the sun was eclipsed (on 2 October).¹¹⁹ We are left to understand from this unfavourable omen that he stayed behind his defences. This may well have been the occasion of the burning of the temple; for it was in an open position some three kilometres north of the improvised wall.¹²⁰ An interesting comment was made by Herodotus with reference to Mardonius' army in 479. 'The Megarid was the furthest limit of the advance of this Persian force' (IX.14, the Persian cavalry overrunning the plain of Megara). The earlier Persian army, the great army of Xerxes, had

¹¹⁷ Herodotus gave two places, Phalerum and Thessaly, as the scenes of the reorganization. In the narrative, designed to convey the impression of breakneck speed, he made Xerxes ask Mardonius to select his troops within a single day and he had the fleet depart that very evening (VIII.107). This was hardly possible, since the marines who had to be reallocated were not only the Egyptians but also the Persians, Medians and Sacans (VIII.113.2-3). On the other hand the reorganization in Thessaly was apparently done at leisure (VIII.114.1). ¹¹⁸ O. Broneer, *Isthmia I* (New Jersey, 1971) 3ff.

¹¹⁹ See Note (1) on p. 588 below. The phrase has generally been taken to mean that Cleombrotus intended to pursue and attack the retreating army of Xerxes despite his lack of cavalry; so C 362, 315.

¹²⁰ J. Wiseman, *The Land of the ancient Corinthians* (Göteborg, 1978) 60; the wall began by Cenchræe (Diod. XI.16.3), a fortified city, which served as Cleombrotus' base.

by implication reached a different limit – probably Pegae in the Megarid and the Isthmus in Corinthia – and was exploring the possibility of invading the Peloponnese.¹²¹

While one part of his army threatened the Greek position at the Isthmus, another part renewed the attempt to build a mole out towards Ayios Yeoryios and Salamis. This time he made use of Phoenician merchant-ships, lashed together, to form a breakwater, a wall of defence and a 'raft' both for the builders of the mole and as a floating bridge, like the bridges at the Hellespont (VIII.97.1; cf. 'raft' at VII.36.4). The merchant-ships were presumably brought along the Attic coast from Phalerum with covering fire, when needed, from Persian archers on shore and on the ships; thus the Greek fleet was not in complete control of the Salamis Channel. The mole served two purposes. If it were to be completed, a bridgehead would be established from which the Persian army would be able to conquer the island and capture the population and the evacuees; and before it was completed, the Greek fleet would be prised out of its position and would either come out into the open sea or fall back on the open waters off the Isthmus. The Persian fleet was being refitted for action in either eventuality. Indeed the Greek fleet feared a further engagement right up to the unexpected departure of the Persian fleet (VIII.108.1).

A sudden change of plan was probably due to Xerxes himself. The time of year was becoming unsuitable for campaigning, especially at sea (VIII.113.1); the eclipse of the sun may have seemed an unfavourable omen, since the Persian god Ahura Mazda determined the ways of the heavenly bodies; and the difficulties of forcing the Isthmus defences and of completing the mole may have proved greater than he had thought. In any case his forces were withdrawn to the Piraeus and to Phalerum. There Mardonius took from the fleet the marines that he wanted. When all was ready, the fleet sailed at night. At dawn next day the Greek fleet was ready to face an attack, and then on realizing that the Persian fleet had gone it sailed to Andros without sighting the enemy. There Eurybiades held a council of war. His decision was not to pursue further but to besiege Andros, which had submitted to the Persians (as all the islands had done except the western Cyclades (VIII.46.4)) and had sent ships to serve in the Persian fleet at Phalerum. Failing to capture Andros, he ravaged the territory of Carystus, which continued to support Persia, and then returned to Salamis. Thus the campaigning season ended with the best bases for the return of a Persian fleet still in pro-Persian hands.

The pre-eminence, the ingenuity and the fall of Themistocles became the subject of many stories which cannot be verified. Herodotus reported

¹²¹ The invasion figured in speeches devised by Herodotus (VIII.100.3; 101.2) and was the objective of Mardonius (VIII.113.1).

with gusto a trick of Themistocles, when Eurybiades had decided not to pursue the enemy fleet. In his version Themistocles' advice in the council of war was to sail through the islands, chase the Persian fleet and destroy the bridges over the Hellespont (VIII.108.2); the advice was rejected not without good reason, since the Persian fleet was larger, the islands were on Persia's side and October weather was unreliable, and Themistocles acquiesced in Eurybiades' (much more sensible) decision. Themistocles then sent some men, including Sicinnus, secretly to inform Xerxes, who was still in Attica, that he had dissuaded the Greeks from destroying the bridges over the Hellespont.¹²² Now the fact that this story was accepted by Thucydides (I.137.4) establishes a presumption that Themistocles did send such a message, and the friendly reception which Themistocles later received from Xerxes' successor suggests that something of the sort had been done. The details, however, are untrustworthy (for instance, that Themistocles had to dissuade the eager Athenians from going on their own to the Hellespont, an absurdity quite apart from the Athenians being under the orders of Eurybiades as commander-in-chief). Later variants of Themistocles' ambidexterity depart further from probability (e.g. Plut. *Them.* 16; *Arist.* 9.3-4). Herodotus also told a story of Themistocles extracting money from the people of Andros and Carystus by a form of blackmail without the knowledge of the other Greek commanders. This is almost impossible within the narrative supplied by Herodotus (VIII.111-12). But the story is in keeping with Themistocles' love of money, to which Timocreon bore testimony (Plut. *Them.* 21), and the occasion was probably not at this time but in or after 479.

On returning to Salamis the Greeks dedicated offerings to the gods from the spoils of war: a large statue holding a prow to Apollo of Delphi, and a Phoenician trireme apiece to Poseidon at the Isthmus, Athena at Sunium and Ajax at Salamis. When asked whether he was satisfied, Apollo of Delphi replied that the Aeginetans should make a special dedication in gratitude for having been awarded the prize for valour. They then dedicated three gold stars on a bronze mast. When the Greek forces disbanded for the winter, Eurybiades took Themistocles to Sparta. There Eurybiades was given an olive wreath as the prize for valour and Themistocles an olive wreath too for 'wisdom and dexterity' and, in addition, a most handsome carriage. When he drove home in it, he was escorted to the frontier by the royal bodyguard, 'the three hundred horsemen', a unique honour for a non-Spartiate (VIII.124.2-3). At home, at the peak of his fame, he built a small temple to Artemis Aristoboule, 'Best Planner';¹²³ the reference was to the goddess of Salamis and the

¹²² These bridges were of symbolical importance; in fact the Persian fleet was there to ferry the army across, until it disbanded and a squadron wintered at Cyme.

¹²³ Very probably the shrine west of the Acropolis; see c. 399, 26ff.

epithet reflected favourably upon himself. But during the winter his popularity declined. He had saved Sparta but not Athens from destruction. He was not elected commander of the Athenian squadron which was to be sent to the Greek fleet in 479,¹²⁴ and he was not elected even as one of the ten generals for the Attic year 479/8. The credit for victory at Salamis belonged not to Themistocles but to the state: to 'Famous Athens, city divine, bulwark of Hellas, glistening, violet-crowned Athens, the subject of song' (Pindar fr. 76, Loeb).

In *Persae* 480–514 the army of Xerxes, as it marched to the Hellespont, was punished by the gods for its acts of sacrilege in Greece. Some soldiers perished of thirst in Boeotia; others died of starvation and thirst in Thessaly; and the survivors suffered great hardship in Thrace. Most terrible of all, the frozen Strymon thawed under the heat of the sun as the army was marching on the ice, and those who drowned quickly were the fortunate ones. 'Few' reached home. And of the many who stayed behind with Mardonius 'few' were destined to return, as the Ghost of Darius prophesied (796–800).

Herodotus gave a very different account of the first part of the march, as far as Macedonia, no doubt because he gathered information from eyewitnesses. The entire army marched through Boeotia into Thessaly and rested there, while the army of occupation was being organized under the command of Mardonius. This army was to winter in Thessaly and Macedonia, both areas being rich in cereals and in autumn and spring pasture for horses. It is clear that there was no shortage of supply there. But Herodotus rallied to the support of Aeschylus in the second part of the journey through Macedonia and Thrace. His account was sensational. The soldiers ate grass, bark and leaves, were overcome with dysentery and died from plague. The army left a trail of sick in Thessaly, Macedonia and Paeonia. Xerxes reached the Hellespont in forty-five days from Thessaly (an average of some sixteen kilometres a day) but he brought 'hardly a fraction of his force' with him (VIII.115). At the Hellespont he found the bridges had been destroyed by a storm. But the fleet was there to ferry the survivors across to Abydos, where many died of a surfeit of food and a change of water. There were other stories of the retreat through Thrace, reaching a climax in Xerxes relieving himself first at Abdera. We need to take all this with a cellar of salt.

That there was any breakdown in the Persian system of supply is rendered unlikely by the reports of Herodotus that Mardonius' forces accompanied those of Xerxes as far as Thessaly and that Artabazus in command of 60,000 men accompanied them from there to the Hellespont. For if there had been a breakdown the forces would have

¹²⁴ The command went to Xanthippus (VIII.131.2; IX.114.2); for this command within the Greek League forces see C 315, 321f and 380ff. See Diod. XI.27.3.

dispersed, in order to draw on local foodstuffs from as wide an area as possible. It appears rather that supply was extremely efficient from start to finish, thanks to forward planning, regular depots and good overland communications. Thus the combined forces of Xerxes and Mardonius took the inland route through Boeotia, Phocis and Doris to Thessaly. From there Xerxes and Artabazus went through Magnesian territory, i.e. through the area of the Tempe pass, into Macedonia, and from there along the route used later by the Via Egnatia past Lake Bolbe and Mt Pangaeum (*Persae* 485–95) to the Hellespont. Similarly in 479 the army of Artabazus took ‘the inland route’ (ix.89.4). Thus these armies did not depend upon seaborne supplies delivered during their march, and it follows that the roads were maintained for regular transport. We hear from Herodotus of the bridges over the Hellespont being swept away by a storm before Xerxes arrived; but they were reconstructed (ix.114.1). The same was no doubt true of the Strymon bridges, which were evidently down when the army crossed the frozen river.

Persia had extended her empire on the mainland to the borders of Attica and at sea to Carystus and Andros. The conquered areas had supplied troops and ships which had fought well, and they continued to do so in 479 (viii.85; ix.31–2). As far as we know, revolts were very rare. The king of the Bisaltae refused to serve and fled to Mt Rhodope, but his sons and their followers went along with Xerxes. The chariot of Ahura Mazda and its eight greys disappeared from Paeonia, where Xerxes had left it on his way to Greece, and the story was that it had been stolen by inland Thracians who lived at the sources of the Strymon, perhaps the unconquered Agrianes (viii.115.4; cf. v.16.1). Some Phocians conducted a guerrilla war from their hide-outs on Mt Parnassus. The only organized revolt was that of Potidaea, a colony of Corinth, situated at the neck of the Pallene peninsula and defended by walls which reached to the sea on either side.

When the Potidaeans learnt that the Persian fleet and then Xerxes himself had departed to Asia, they and the Greek cities on the peninsula declared their independence. On his way back to Mardonius Artabazus laid siege to Potidaea and to nearby Olynthus, a fortified city of the Bottiaei, which he suspected of being disaffected. He took Olynthus by storm, gave the site to collaborating Greeks of Chalcidice, and massacred the entire population in a marsh outside the town. This act of terrorism only stiffened the resistance of Potidaea and the Pallenian cities which sent troops to help defend its walls. The city was almost impregnable to an enemy who lacked sea power, and survived a three-months’ siege, being saved at the end by the intervention, as the citizens believed, of their patron god, Poseidon Hippios, god of the sea and of the earthquake (he figured on their fine silver tetradrachms). It happened that the sea

ebbed away from the walls in an unprecedented manner and a Persian detachment tried to pass below the walls and gain a footing on the peninsula. But the sea returned in a tidal wave. All who could not swim were drowned, and those who could were killed in the water by the Potidaeans who came out in their boats. In the spring of 479 Artabazus abandoned the siege and joined Mardonius, and the Potidaeans sent 300 men to serve in the forces of the Greek League.

Aeschylus was probably correct in representing Xerxes as an impetuous and headstrong ruler, whose ambition was to extend the empire of his predecessors and to rival the great achievements of Darius (*Persae* 754–8).¹²⁵ His preparations were on a scale appropriate to that ambition: the completion of the Athos canal, the bridging of the Hellespont, the mustering of huge forces by land and sea, and the grand parades of the empire's strength at the Hellespont and at Doriscus. Although he listened to the advice of his councillors and commanders, he made the plans and he took the decisions as an autocratic ruler. His planning was certainly thorough and capable, and far superior to the planning of most Greek states. His ability to move and maintain very large forces in Europe was without parallel until the rise of Macedon. He consolidated his conquests by using the methods of his predecessors, tolerance towards those who submitted to his rule and deportation or destruction of those who resisted or rebelled. He vindicated the power of Ahura Mazda by burning the temples of the Greek gods, and he thereby avenged the sacrilege committed by the Greeks in burning the temple of Cybele at Sardis during the reign of Darius. His successes by the end of the campaigning season were considerable; for he had burnt the Acropolis of Athens and extended his frontiers to the Isthmus of Corinth and the offshore islands of Andros and the Cyclades. In the opinion of Artemisia, the Carian queen, whom Herodotus commended as the wisest of Xerxes' advisers, complete success came within his reach (VIII.68).

Xerxes made a number of errors. He mistimed the delivery of his offensive. He delayed so long at the Hellespont and in Macedonia that his fleet ran into the month of stormy weather, and his army stopped short of engaging the Peloponnesian forces in what might have been a decisive battle. Had he reached Aphetæ and Thermopylae in June, the sequel might have been very different. His strategy on land was unimaginative. Instead of operating with separate army groups, as Artybius, Daurises and Hymaeës had done during the Ionian Revolt, and instead of using his superb cavalry forces in mobile warfare, he delivered a head-on attack with massed infantry against a prepared position at Thermopylae. The result of the mistiming and of the steam-roller strategy was that his huge

¹²⁵ For Herodotus' view of Xerxes see c 61, 65ff.

army fought only for three days and then against a mere fraction of his enemy's strength, and his cavalry saw no action at all. At sea he was more enterprising. But he had little knowledge of the Aegean. It was a gross error of seamanship to let his fleet be benighted off the Magnesian coast; and he ran undue risks in sending a squadron to circumnavigate at night the rockbound coast of Euboea. But his greatest mistake was to be duped by Themistocles; for he lost entirely the advantage of superior numbers, and he sent tired oarsmen into action under unfavourable conditions. There was sense in Artemisia's contention, that he would have been wiser to have refused battle and let dissension split the Greek fleet (VIII.68).

Writing with hindsight and eulogizing Athens, Herodotus saw the victory at Salamis as the salvation of Greece (VII. 139.4–5). We may doubt whether Xerxes or Eurybiades thought so at the time. The Greek fleet had indeed inflicted greater damage than at Artemisium; but it had not come out of its retreat and challenged the Persian fleet to a decisive battle in open waters off Phalerum. As the resistance of Andros and Carystus showed, it was Persian sea power which ruled the Aegean waves at the end of 480.¹²⁶ The future depended on Xerxes' plans for the next campaigning season. In November 480 there is little doubt that his intention was to return to Thessaly in the spring; for he left with Mardonius the royal pavilion, resplendent with gold and silver furnishings, which was the headquarters of the Great King on campaign (IX.82.1). If he did return, he would bring forces commensurate with his self-importance, and they would include a fleet comparable in size with that of 480. The issue of sea power would still be open. What made Salamis decisive at sea was the change in the plans of Xerxes. Whatever his reasons, he did not return; and in 479 a Persian fleet of a mere 300 sail stayed on the eastern side of the Aegean. He decided to rely for victory on the army he had left in Greece, an army relatively small by his standards but composed of the finest troops (*Persae* 803, *πλήθος ἔκκριτον στρατοῦ*) and commanded by the general who had had most experience in Europe, Mardonius. Xerxes may have realized the truth which Alexander the Great was to demonstrate a century and a half later, that victory on land would automatically decide the issue at sea.

NOTES

(1) The chronology of the Persian advance has been clarified by K. S. Sacks, c 384, on the assumption, shared by the present writer, that Herodotus was probably right, not wrong. The solar eclipse of 2 October 480 (IX.10.3) gives an end-stop. Cleombrotus saw it when sacrificing 'in regard to the Persians' (*ἐπί*

¹²⁶ For a different view see c 320, 239 and 264ff.

with the dative being as in Xen. *Anab.* vi.4.9, and not ἐπί with the accusative, as e.g. in Hdt. v.44.2). Regarding the eclipse as an unfavourable omen, Cleombrotus led the army away from the Isthmus (not necessarily at once). Had the omen been favourable, we may infer that he would have attacked the advanced units of the Persian army. Once they had withdrawn beyond the Megarid he was able to take his army home. Thus on 2 October Persia's advanced units were at the Isthmus. Xerxes left Athens perhaps on the 5th. As he spent 'a few days' in Attica after the battle (viii.113.1), the battle happened near the end of September. The suggestion, that the Greek fleet would escape on the night before the battle, was made more plausible by the fact that it was a dark night; this is emphasized by Aeschylus' addition of μελαίνης at *Persae* 357 (cf. the normal phrase for night at 365). A dark night towards the end of September is the 28th–29th with moonrise at 1.55 a.m. (as compared with 12.58 a.m. on the 27th–28th). If we choose the 29th for the battle of Salamis, the fleet had taken Oreus on the 20th (viii.23, 24 and 66) and fought at Artemisium on the 17th to the 19th. The full moon, ending the Carneian and Olympic festivals, was on the 18th, so that reinforcements sent then from the Peloponnese could have been in Attica on the day the Athenian fleet was disappointed not to find them, i.e. the 21st. The dates in Table 4 can then be given with a high degree of probability. Chronology is discussed fully in c 320, 379ff and 448ff.

(2) Sailing and marching speeds, based mainly on Herodotus, are quite consistent. The leading ships of the Persian fleet made the following times: (1) vi.115–16, Cape Cynosoura by Marathon to Phalerum, 108 km in some 9 hours; speed 12 km an hour. (2) vii.183.2–3, Therma to Sciathos Channel, 180 km in 12 hours, or if the leading ships started say from Pydna (vii.127 for spread of army camps) 160 km in 12 hours; speed 15 or 13 km an hour. (3) viii.66.1, Histiaea to Phalerum, 300 km in 25 hours of daylight sailing (normal without navigational aids and shore lights; cf. vii.183.3 πανημερόν); speed 12 km an hour. (4) viii.7 and 13, Aphetae to the Hollows off south-eastern Euboea at night, some 200 km e.g. from 3 p.m. to 5 a.m.; speed 14 km an hour, by specially chosen ships. It is apparent, then, that the Persian ships were capable of speeds ranging from 8 knots to 6½ knots an hour over considerable distances, no doubt with favouring winds as in (1), and in (2) when an Etesian wind was probably blowing. See c 315, 220f; *contra* c 321, c 322. The Greek fleet was slow in comparison (viii.10.1). Artemisium to Phalerum, 320 km perhaps in 40 hours, if we allow 10 hours the first night, two days making 24 hours and 6 hours on the third day; speed 8 km an hour. The Aeginetan ship which fetched the images of the Aeacidae covered some 90 km between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. (viii.64 and 83.2); speed 8 km an hour, mainly or entirely under oar since the night was calm after midnight. Thus the speed is about 4½ knots. This has been regarded as standard for a Greek trireme 'rowed at some 4 to 5 knots' (A 17, 120). The difference in speed between Persian ships and Greek ships was due not to the former 'drying out' at Doriscus (they had been at sea since Doriscus, whereas Greek ships lay in dock until needed for action), as suggested by Morrison and Williams, but to differences in construction; the Phoenician ships especially sailed the open sea to the western Mediterranean (the Greeks controlled most of the coasting routes)

and sailed faster with their larger, higher hull, complete decks and superstructure, whereas the Greek trireme was designed for rowing along a coastal route and had less canvas.

Greek army marches in the Marathon campaign may be estimated: for the Athenians on the day of battle some 42 km from the Skhoinia to Cynosarges in 8 hours (c 315, 210 and 226) and for the Spartan vanguard from the Laconian frontier to Athens some 220 km in three days, i.e. 73 km a day. The Persian army covered some 300 km from Trachis to Athens in five days, i.e. 40 km a day. When Xerxes returned to Asia his army marched from Thessaly to the Hellespont, some 720 km in 45 days, i.e. 16 km a day. The Greek examples were forced marches, comparable to Alexander's pursuit of Darius for $5\frac{1}{2}$ days over 270 km, i.e. 50 km a day. The Persian march on Athens was also a fast one. The march from Therma to the Trachinian plain may be compared to the march of Alexander from Amphaxitis to the Hellespont, some 560 km, at 28 km a day. Thus the data provided by Herodotus for sailing and marching speeds command respect, all the more so since he had no maps from which to obtain exact distances.

Table 4. *The chronology of Xerxes' invasion.*

	<i>480 B.C.</i>	<i>Persian Army</i>	<i>Persian Navy</i>	<i>Greek Army</i>	<i>Greek Navy</i>
Aug.	1-14	Reaches Therma	Reaches Therma		
	14-28	Road-building in Pieria	X. sails to Peneus	To Thermopylae	To Artemisium
	c.30	Main army leaves Therma on march south			
Sept.	1-9		Ten ships reach Sciathos		After losing three ships withdraws to Euripus
	10 (Carneia begins)		Main fleet leaves Therma		
	11		Main fleet off Magnesia		
	12	Reaches Malis	Storm		
	13	Inactive	Storm		Messages reach fleet in Euripus
	14	Inactive	Storm		Moves to Artemisium
	15	Inactive	Advances to Gulf of Pagasae		Captures 15 ships
	16	Inactive	Re-fits		
	17	Attacks	Detaches 200 ships; attacked by Greeks	Fights	Attacks p.m.
	18 (full moon)	Attacks	200 ships lost at sea; attacked by Greeks	Fights	Attacks p.m.
	19	Hydarnes descends; X. attacks	Attacks	Fights to the end	Attacked about noon; retires by night
	20		To Oreus (Histiaea)		
	21		Re-fits	Work begins on Isthmus defences	Reaches Salamis
	22	Army sets out; ravages Phocis			
	23-26	Moves south	26th Sails from Oreus		
	27	Enters Athens			
	28	Takes Acropolis a.m.; moves south p.m.	Reaches Phalerum a.m.; out at sea p.m.		
	29	By Eleusis and Megara	Battle of Salamis		Battle of Salamis
Oct.	2 (new moon) (solar eclipse)	Threatens the Isthmus		Cleombrotus sacrifices	
	3	Withdraws to Attica			
	?3		Fleet leaves Phalerum at night		
	?6	Main army sets out from Athens			Sails to Andros

CHAPTER 11
THE LIBERATION OF GREECE

J. P. BARRON

The campaigning season of 479 opened to a sense of uneasy calm, the belligerents all equally at a loss how to strike the decisive blow which all alike knew would spell freedom or subjection for the Greeks, for the Persians a continuing drain of resources or a secure frontier in the west.

The first forces to move were the naval on either side. In early spring the Persian fleet mustered at Samos, having passed the winter in two divisions, there and at Cyme, no doubt for greater ease of provisioning as well as to keep hold of the eastern Greeks (Hdt. VIII. 130. 1–2). The fleet numbered 300 including Greek vessels, according to Herodotus, a very different figure from the 1,207 triremes and 3,000 smaller vessels which he gives for its strength in Xerxes' review at Doriscus the previous year, even though more than half of those triremes are said to have been lost by the end of the battle of Artemisium, to say nothing of the further losses at Salamis.¹ In fact one assumes that the numbers in 480 are much exaggerated; and the figure of 300 in 479 may be likewise, not necessarily by the same factor. As to the composition of the Persian fleet at this time, we can only speculate. The Egyptian marines had been left with Mardonius and the land forces (Hdt. IX. 32): presumably the ships which bore them had sailed for the Delta before winter came on. The Phoenicians, on the other hand, reputedly the flower of the force, appear to have been present still, if Herodotus is right in recording their dismissal at a very much later stage (XI. 96. 1).² But a high proportion of the vessels and their crews must by now have been drawn from Asiatic Greece.³ That will have disquieted the new commanders, Mardontes and Artachaeës, and the latter's nephew Ithamitres, and morale was low (Hdt. VIII. 130. 2–3).

On the other side of the Aegean, Samos' old enemy Aegina was the muster-station of the Greek fleet, and here King Leotychidas assembled

¹ See above, pp. 530, 546, 564, 571, 578.

² See A 4, II i 59 n. 1, for earlier withdrawal; but departure for 'Asia' in Diod. XI. 19. 4 means Asia Minor.

³ In 480, 277 ships are listed as coming from the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, Hdt. VII. 93–5. Cf. A 11, 502.

a force of 110 vessels – again a very different total from that of the previous year, 271 at Artemisium or 378 at Salamis (Hdt. VIII.131; cf. 2.1, 48). In fact Leotychidas' force was comparable to the Peloponnesian and Aeginetan contingents at Salamis, 119 (Hdt. VIII.43, 46.1); and its trifling strength is only to be explained on the supposition that Athens, who had contributed 180 vessels to the battle-fleet at Salamis, and had provided twenty hulls more for the Chalcidians to man, for the moment withheld her contingent.⁴ At Aegina Leotychidas was approached by Chian patriots, sent on to him by the home government in Sparta whom they had first approached. Six in number and aristocratic in temper – to judge from the patronymic of their leader Herodotus son of Basileides ('princely scion') – they sought help to dislodge Strattis the tyrant from Chios and the Persians from Ionia. Leotychidas was attracted by the proposal but conscious of the imperfection of his intelligence about Persian strength in the eastern Aegean, to say nothing of the inadequacy of his force. In the end he was persuaded to sail as far as Delos. But as he gazed east across the open sea from Myconos, Samos, invisible in the haze beyond Icaria, seemed (in Herodotus' memorable phrase) as far off as the Pillars of Heracles. So, for all the Chians' pleading, the Greek fleet would not sail past Delos; nor would the Persians venture from their base in Samos. 'And so fear stood sentry between them' (Hdt. VIII.132).

On the mainland of Greece both sides faced a similar impasse. Behind their fortification at the Isthmus, which they now strengthened until they supposed it impregnable (Hdt. IX.7.1, 8.1), the Peloponnesians waited, secure so long as they made no venture beyond, but with the prospect of seeing the best of their manpower tied down indefinitely. They knew, moreover, that their defences could at any time be turned by sea; for the fleet of no more than 110 ships mustered under King Leotychidas would not long delay the enemy armada, if it returned in anything like the strength it had brought to Salamis. Between the two opposing forces, the Athenians sat exposed in no-man's-land. From their refugee camps on Salamis and elsewhere they gazed upon the ruins of their city and sighed for the broad acres of Attica, which they could visit and some intrepid farmers even dared to cultivate.⁵ But for the population at large there could be no safe return until Mardonius and his Persians were routed decisively, a deliverance which only the advance of the Peloponnesian infantry could achieve for them. The Athenians' only bargaining counter was their fleet, which (as we have seen) they appear to have kept beside them. They had, however, used the same counter to good effect before Salamis, when Themistocles made it clear that if the Peloponnesians

⁴ Munro's explanation, C 360, 145–7, overlooks the fact that Hdt.'s total at Salamis was 378. See C 320, 249f. With Athens' fleet at Salamis Xanthippus was able to go to Sparta as in Plut. *Arist.* 10 fin.

⁵ Hdt. VIII.142.3, cf. 109.4–110.1: the Athenians lost two harvests, 480 and 479 (p. 561, above).

stayed behind the Isthmus they could not count upon the Athenian fleet to join them (Hdt. VIII.62; see above, p. 569); and they had every reason to hope that the argument would serve again now.

In Thessaly Mardonius himself waited with the army Xerxes had left him, probably about 60,000 strong, as well as 40,000 whom Artabazus brought from Potidaea at his urging, and the dubious strength of perhaps 20,000 medizing Greeks from Boeotia and elsewhere.⁶ The Persian commander well knew the strength of the Isthmian defences, knew too that his only hope was to turn them by sea if he could not lure the defenders forward; and only he knew why the great battle fleet of Xerxes, which had emerged from winter quarters reduced but still formidable at 300 strong, lay idle under its three new commanders at Samos and made no move at all to resolve the impasse. With the benefit of hindsight Herodotus attributed their inertia to a collapse of morale, and he may well be right. If so, the risk of a new Ionian revolt must have lain heavy on every Persian mind. But at the time the Greeks could not be sure that the fleet would make no move.


Among the Athenians, caught as they were between the two great land-powers, the public mood was particularly uncertain. Themistocles' great victory might indeed have saved the Peloponnese, and the Spartans had honoured him accordingly; but it had done nothing for Athens. To some, indeed, the only hope seemed to lie in reconciliation with Persia. And though others bitterly resented the mere suggestion, when the elections to the generalship were held in March, Aristides and Xanthippus were among the successful ten (Hdt. VIII.131.3, IX.28.6). Both had been recalled from ostracism by Themistocles' decree (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 22.6–7), and both might have been thought capable of treating with Mardonius – Aristides, whom one ostrakon had bitterly characterized as 'Datis' brother' (Fig. 49), and Xanthippus who had married into the inner circle of the Alcmaeonidae, suspected of treason at Marathon.⁷ Themistocles, by contrast, is not known to have served in 479, and is not recorded as having commanded the fleet ever again. Ephorus, indeed, believed that he failed to be re-elected in 479, having seemed to put Spartan interests before those of Athens in his command; and this may well be right.⁸

It was not long before the new board received overtures from the enemy. Astutely, Mardonius chose an old friend of Athens – saluted there as Benefactor and Honorary Consul (*proxenos*) – King Alexander of Macedon, to be his envoy (Hdt. VIII.136, 140–4). The offer he came to

⁶ Hdt.'s high figures in VIII.113.2–3, 126.1 and IX 32.2 are for the present writer rhetorical, not mathematical; see C 320, 267, 350–3; A 11, 326ff. For numbers generally, see above, pp. 487, 502, 530–3, 547 and 571.

⁷ Ostraca, M–L 42; Hdt. VI. 115, 121, 123.

⁸ Diod. XI.27.3. See A 11, 491f; more cautiously, C 320, 275–8.



Ἀριστ[είδεν]
τὸν Δά[τιδος]
ἀδελφ[όν].

49. Ostrakon from Athens, Agora (p 9945). (After A. Raubitschek in *Charites* (Festschrift E. Langlotz, 1957) 240.)

make in the name not only of Mardonius but of Xerxes himself was attractive. In return for her alliance, Athens would be granted an amnesty and local autonomy, would recover her territory and even add to it if she so desired, and receive Persian aid in rebuilding temples destroyed in the war. The alternative hardly needed to be spelled out. But Alexander nevertheless gave it as his own view that Greece could never finally defeat the Persian empire, with the almost limitless resources it commanded, and Athens therefore could at best look forward to the role of no-man's-land for ever, the site of continual battles; at worst, she risked outright conquest and annihilation. It was tempting: anyone could see that. More particularly, the Spartans could see. Athens asked Alexander for space to consider, and meanwhile lost no time in making sure the Spartans knew of his visit. No doubt it was the Athenians also who circulated a 'prophecy' to the effect that the Dorians would one day be driven from the Peloponnese by Persia and the Athenians (Hdt. VIII.141.1). At last Athens had a means of breaking the deadlock; for her fleet could enable Persia to turn the Peloponnesian defences, and the need to remove that threat must force the Spartans out from behind their fortifications, force them to agree to return to Attica and central Greece. Nor was the threat to Sparta in any way unreal. The Athenians had in fact kept their fleet aloof that spring, and could commit it to either side; and no one could forget that they had the previous year declined to help the Peloponnese precisely if they made their stand at the Isthmus, and had by this means alone compelled the Peloponnesians to undertake the successful stand at Salamis. The Spartans now sent an embassy to Athens, keenly aware that Mardonius stood to benefit from either

outcome of the argument. For if he did not seduce the Athenian fleet, he would at least draw the Greek land-forces into mortal danger.

What follows in Herodotus' account is deeply coloured by the rhetoric of his own day. The Spartans have little to offer, merely support for non-combatant Athenians for the duration of the war. The Athenians, on the other hand, are made to declare in ringing tones that, such is their patriotism and love of freedom, they will never make peace with Xerxes so long as the sun rises and sets in the heavens; and to end with a plea to Sparta to advance into Boeotia to anticipate the Persian army's arrival. The plea no doubt is historical, the rhetoric not so. Of course the Athenians will have declared their preference for the Greek cause; but it is more likely that their decision was left in suspense than that they of all people would so soon give away the only card they held.⁹

On Alexander's empty-handed return, Mardonius at once determined to march south, urged on by his Thessalian friends, especially the Aleuadae of Larissa whose regime depended on him. In Boeotia the Thebans urged him to make his base among them, and to try what bribery could do. But Mardonius pressed on toward Attica to forestall the gathering of the harvest, and then reoccupied the city itself about the end of June (Hdt. xi.1-3).¹⁰ At his approach the disappointed farmers retired to Salamis once more, and there they were visited by an envoy of Mardonius, come to repeat his master's offer. This time his spokesman was one Murychides, a Greek collaborator from the Dardanelles. His name is possibly Athenian:¹¹ perhaps he was one of the colonists in Sigeum or Chersonesus. If so, he was a bad choice. The arrival of Mardonius before their eyes served not to weaken but to strengthen the Athenians' will to resist. When one Lycidas proposed to his fellow councillors, not that the terms should be accepted, but that they should at least be put to the people, he was at once lynched and his wife and children also. Murychides, however, was allowed to depart (Hdt. ix.4-5).

Urgently the Athenians now dispatched a high-level mission to Sparta. According to Plutarch who cites the decree for its sending, presumably from Craterus' collection, the mission was led by at least two of the ten generals, Xanthippus and Myronides, accompanied by Cimon who was perhaps a third, making his first appearance in high command (Hdt. ix.6.11, Plut. *Arist.* 10). With them went representatives from Megara and Plataea. As so often in times of crisis, they found the Spartans

⁹ Plut. *Arist.* 10, includes a curse on medizers, which might be historical (see Lycidas' proposal, below).

¹⁰ I.e. ten months after Xerxes' capture of Athens, for which see above, p. 563.

¹¹ Cf. the archon of 440/39 and (significantly) the proposer of the decree of 451/0 in honour of Sigeum (R. Meiggs, *JHS* 86 (1966) 95).

in the grip of religious inertia, this time celebrating the Hyacinthia. Obtaining audience of the ephors, the Athenians reminded them of Mardonius' attractive offer, which they would be compelled to accept unless the Spartans came at once to do battle, no longer in Boeotia as they would have hoped, but in Attica, in the plain of Thria, about Eleusis. (Simultaneously, the Athenians had sent to Delphi for an oracle commending this chosen battleground (Plut. *Arist.* 11).¹²) The Spartans were undecided: the Isthmian defences were practically complete by now, up to battlement level, and within the Peloponnese they had always to guard against giving an opening to Argives or Arcadians, Helots or Messenians, as well as to watch their long coastline for a sea-borne raid upon the harvest. So they put off the decision day after day until a fortnight had passed, and until (it appears) Aristides himself came to lend his powerful voice to the Athenian suit.¹³ Then at last, apparently without the Athenians' knowledge, they sent a Spartiate force of 5,000 heavy infantry with 35,000 Helots in attendance – that, at least, would keep them out of mischief – north by a circuitous route under the command of Pausanias (nephew of Leonidas and regent for the latter's young son Pleistarchus), together with a colleague whom he co-opted, Euryanax, the son of Dorieus (Hdt. ix.10.3). Herodotus says the advice of a Tegean, Chileos, proved decisive: the strategic analysis put into his mouth is superfluous – but he could advise on the state of feeling in Arcadia, a critical factor in the Spartan decision. Next day, when the Athenians returned for one last interview with the ephors, to say that with deep regret they must now go over to Persia, the ephors told them what they had done. The envoys were incredulous, declared the Spartan pretence a joke in the poorest taste. But it was no pretence, and the Spartans even sent them off with 5,000 more troops, drawn from the perioecic settlements of Laconia.

The purpose of this secrecy, it soon became clear, was to avoid obstruction by the Argives, who were always looking for a chance to ruin Sparta and were in Mardonius' pay. Argos in fact sent a runner, who eluded the guard at the Isthmus and passed the word to the Persian commander in Attica. He at once decided to retire to Boeotia, where his cavalry would have greater scope and there would be no risk of defeat in difficult country, as would have been the case in Attica from which a fighting withdrawal would have been barred by easily held passes over the hills. So he burned and demolished what little Xerxes had left of Athens, including the shrine of Demeter and Persephone at Eleusis, and turned his column back to Boeotia (Hdt. ix.12–13, 65.2). For their part, the Peloponnesians knew well that their phalanxes of heavy infantry,

¹² For the oracle's response see below, p. 601.

¹³ So c 307, 230 n.; c 320, 283f; dissenting, A 11, 505 n.49.

matchless in quality and training though they were, would be wholly ineffective against a strong and mobile force of cavalry such as Mardonius had in plenty. Their only hope, therefore, lay in inducing Mardonius to risk an engagement on unfavourable terrain. To this end they sent a conspicuously small force of a thousand men to bait the trap near Megara, tempting Mardonius to delay his retreat. He did indeed delay, and rode for Megara. But though he overran the Megarid, he seems not to have succeeded in bringing the Peloponnesian infantry to battle, and so turned and rejoined the main body of his force on the road to Boeotia (Hdt. IX.14).¹⁴

The Persians retreated by way of Decelea, with local guides to take them across to Tanagra, where they bivouacked for a night, and on past Scolus to the friendly land of Thebes. Mardonius took up his position along the north bank of the Asopus facing Erythrae (Katsoula?), Hysiae (on the Pantanassa ridge) and the territory of Plataea to the west, and covering all the passes by which the Greeks might enter Boeotia. Behind this line, some 8 km long, he constructed a stockade of local timber 2 km square (that is, 900 acres (*c.* 360 ha) – great enough to have served as the camp of twelve to fourteen Roman legions),¹⁵ and sat down to await the arrival of the Greeks (Hdt. IX. 15.1–3).

There are one or two indications that morale was not high. First, the stockade itself. This device, as we shall see (below, pp. 613f, was used simultaneously by the Persians on Mycale, there certainly in response to panic at the approach of the Greek fleet: was its purpose here a similar one, to reassure the faint-hearted? Secondly, Herodotus repeats the eyewitness account, given him by one Thersander of Orchomenus, of a dinner-party in Thebes at this time, at which fifty Persian noblemen including Mardonius himself shared the couches of fifty Thebans. As the evening wore on and the drinking became deeper, Thersander's neighbour, who spoke Greek, sobbed that in a short time few of the company, and few of their men now in camp by the river, would be left alive (IX.15.4–16). One anxiety must have haunted Mardonius' mind – needlessly, as it proved. A substantial minority of his force consisted of turn-coat Greeks (50,000 according to Herodotus, IX. 31.2, perhaps 20,000 in fact): might these not return to a more natural loyalty, and turn their swords against him? This anxiety explains the odd incident of the Phocian contingent, who had stood aloof from Mardonius' force on its way to Attica but now joined him at Thebes, a thousand strong. Ordered to take position at a distance from the main force, they found themselves surrounded and threatened by the Persian horse in strength, and even

¹⁴ See also Paus. 1.44.4 (cf. 40.2) and C 320, 291f.

¹⁵ So A 11, 511; C 320, 293–6 placed Mardonius south of the Asopus, wrongly since Hdt. does not mention any later crossing of the river.

had to parry some missiles before the cavalrymen rode off (IX.17–18). Plainly, the Phocians' hesitation had been from doubt of the outcome. Mardonius did not trust them, and so had recourse to this somewhat crude act of intimidation.


Upon the withdrawal of the Persians from Attica, Pausanias, who seems to have enjoyed a particularly close and understanding relationship with his seers throughout the campaign, found the omens favourable for an advance, and marched his Peloponnesians from the Isthmus to Eleusis. Here he was joined by Aristides and eight thousand Athenians, ferried across from Salamis no doubt by their own fleet which thereupon sailed for Delos under Xanthippus' command, to join Leotychidas and the other allies and to intercept any sea-borne intervention or diversion which might come from the Persian base at Samos. Encouraged by continuing good omens, Pausanias crossed into Boeotia by a shorter route than Mardonius had taken, the main road over Cithaeron by the pass of Eleutheræ (Gyphtokastro) (Hdt. IX.19; Plut. *Arist.* 11).

From this point on, the campaign at Plataea has been almost as bitterly contested by modern topographers as it was by the original belligerents (see Fig. 50). Herodotus' account, based largely on eye-witness reports and on much talk with veterans, as well as personal inspection of the terrain, is full of local precision and ought to have made reconstruction easy. But the key is lost – place-names have disappeared or (worse) been transposed – and one can only repeat the locations Herodotus gives, supplemented by the informed guesswork of those who have visited and revisited the sites.¹⁶ There is further difficulty in interpreting the detailed course of the battle. The overall strategic imperatives are clear enough: each side had somehow to tempt the other away from the favourable terrain it had chosen and on to ground amenable to a decisive blow by its strongest arm – Persian cavalry, Greek hoplites in phalanx formation. For Mardonius' forces lay in excellent cavalry country beyond the Asopus, whereas the south bank, held by the Greeks, was infantry terrain and close to the foothills of Cithaeron. But Herodotus gives little indication that the result owed more to tactics than to chance. For him, it is a soldiers' battle. True, it is clearly possible that Pausanias had a plan, that it was disrupted by the enemy, but that the Greeks won none the less through sheer dogged courage. Yet it must be remembered that for reasons unconnected with Plataea Pausanias was subsequently displaced, and an effort made to damn his memory.¹⁷ It is at least possible that part of that process was to obscure his tactical contribution to victory.

Pausanias and his force marched past Eleutheræ, and plunged down

¹⁶ See C 376, 103–21, cf. C 372, 9–28; C 320, 289f, App. XI pp.422–34, 302ff; C 246, 103–22.

¹⁷ Thuc. 1.95–96.1, 128–34.



50. The battle of Plataea.

the north slope of Cithaeron into Boeotia. As they crossed the summit, with Boeotia laid out below them like a map, they will have caught sight of Mardonius' great stockade, and soon have learned the disposition of the enemy forces along the farther bank of the Asopus. Turning right a little to the east of modern Kriekouki, they made their way along the foot of the Pantanassa ridge to the neighbourhood of Erythrae, and halted there upon the lower slopes, believing the terrain a sanctuary from enemy cavalry, the only arm a strong and well-trained hoplite force had to fear (Hdt. ix.19.3).

How quickly Mardonius moved against them is not clear: he ought to have moved at once, before they were clear of the pass. At any rate, 'when he saw that the Greeks would not come down into the plain', he sent his cavalry in full strength under the command of a distinguished and flamboyant officer of legendary courage, Masistius, to attack them where they were, and to taunt them with cries of 'Women' (no doubt parroted in Greek for the occasion), in the hope of luring and dislodging them from the foothills. Here and there the enemy had some success, notably against the Megarians (who found themselves in a comparatively open position)

until the Athenian detachment of three hundred hoplites together with the whole of the Greek corps of archers volunteered to come to their aid. Before long the archers had the good fortune to hit Masistius' splendid Nesaean charger, which threw him. Unable to rise for the weight of the gilded armour under his scarlet surcoat, and yet too well protected to make an easy prey, he was at last dispatched by a Greek spear through the eye-hole of his helmet. His men soon observed that he had fallen, and tried hard but vainly to recover his body from the mêlée, until, leaderless and baffled, they withdrew. So the Greeks were left to revive their spirits in Homeric fashion by parading the gorgeously dressed corpse along their lines, while the Persians held an empty funeral, with loud laments and the almost theatrical gesture of shaving the manes of their horses and pack-animals as well as their own heads (Hdt. ix.20–5; Plut. *Arist.* 14). It had been a bad day for both sides. But Mardonius cannot have hoped for outright victory on that terrain, and his apparent failure might at least draw the Greeks forward into the trap.

It must have been at about this time that word came from the oracle at Delphi, with the sanction Aristides had sought for the planned engagement at Eleusis, now embarrassingly overtaken by events: the Athenians would indeed overcome their enemies – so long as they fought on their own territory in the plain of the Eleusinian goddesses. If the oracle were to become generally known, as it surely would, to seek to bring the Persians to battle in Boeotia was bound to lead to a collapse of Greek morale, if not to outright mutiny. Aristides confessed his embarrassment to the Plataean commander, Arimnestus, and together they concocted a solution. The oracle was amplified, adding a command to pray and sacrifice to deities and local heroes of Plataea; and Arimnestus reported that Zeus had explained to him in a dream that Apollo referred to the plain of Plataea, where there was indeed (as commonly in Greece) an ancient shrine of the Eleusinian goddesses. As for 'their own territory', Arimnestus persuaded the Plataeans to take up the boundary markers along their border with Attica, and so dedicate their land to Athens – a patriotic gesture for which they were to be well rewarded by Alexander the Great when he undertook his crusade against Persia a century and a half later (Plut. *Arist.* 11).¹⁸

Pausanias had now made his plans. The victory over Mardonius' cavalrymen had indeed given him the confidence to advance. He decided to deploy his army westward towards Plataea, in forward positions on and about the 'Asopus ridge', west of the main road to Thebes and no longer covering Mardonius' position, nor indeed defending the mouth of the main pass by which he had come. By making use of the ridge he

¹⁸ See c 49, I 174ff; doubted by c 320, 419f.

could still cling to terrain hostile to cavalry and be sure of defeating enemy infantry if they were launched against him. But he left Mardonius the opportunity to sever his lines of communication by raids across the more level ground between the ridge and the foothills he had left. The chief advantage of the new position was its plentiful supply of water (which Erythrae had lacked) from the group of springs at Gargaphia (Retsi), near the sanctuary of the local hero Androcrates. Its seeming isolation might even lure Mardonius to an assault on unfavourable ground. So, withdrawing back along the foot-hill road from Erythrae, past Hysiae, the Greeks evidently followed the route north of modern Kriekouki and Plataea to take up their new positions at the ridge. Here Pausanias' dispositions were intended to exploit the solid strength and coherence of larger contingents on the wings – his own Spartans would take their traditional position on the right – while the detachments from smaller towns were massed in the centre. Not all of his arrangements went unchallenged, however, and when he allocated the left wing to Athens, this place of honour was disputed by Tegea, Sparta's oldest ally. But the Athenians maintained their claim, and Tegean feelings were appeased by a station next to the Spartans' own (Hdt. ix.25–8).

Herodotus (ix.28–32) gives the infantry order of battle on either side, and the strength of the Greek hoplite contingents; see Table 5. It will be seen that Pausanias' principle was to station the contingents of neighbouring cities together, except where traditional hostility demanded insulation, as Orchomenus served to keep Sicyon from Corinth. Assuming that the Greek hoplites fought in line abreast with roughly a metre to each man, and in a phalanx eight deep, these figures would imply a front of nearly five kilometres, occupying the whole area between the road from Plataea to Thebes and the eastern end of the Asopus ridge.¹⁹

With their forces in position, each side waited for the other to make a false move, quelling the nervous and impatient spirits of their men by the paraphernalia of popular military religion, warning seers, unfavourable sacrifices and reports of ill omen. Pausanias' seer was an Elean turned Spartan, Tisamenus, destined to participate in this role in five Spartan victories over the next twenty years. He interpreted the sacrifice as Pausanias' tactics demanded: success if the Greeks stood fast in their defensive position, disaster if they advanced to the attack or crossed the Asopus. Mardonius too had an Elean seer, Hegesistratus, who likewise urged a waiting game, as did the renegade Leucadian whom his Greek allies employed (Hdt. ix.33, 35–8). So the two commanders waited.

Idleness on campaign was a notoriously quick poison to Athenian minds – it was to be suspected at Ithome in 462 and observed at Tanagra

¹⁹ For the calculation, see c 320, 306f, citing other views; and for discussion of the Greek numbers, *ibid.* 435.

Table 5. *Infantry order of battle and strength of the Greek hoplite contingents at Plataea, according to Herodotus*

Athens	8,000	} Left wing,	8,600	<i>vs.</i>	Macedonians, Boeotians, Locrians, Malians, Thessalians, Phocians.
Plataea	600				
Megara	3,000	} Left centre	9,700	<i>vs.</i>	} Sacae Indians Bactrians
Aegina	500				
Pala (Cephalonia)	200				
Leucas and Anactorium	800				
Ambracia	500				
Chalcis	400				
Eretria and Styra	600				
Hermione	300				
Phlius	1,000				
Mycenae and Tiryns	400				
Lepreum	200				
Troezen	1,000				
Epidaurus	800				
Sicyon	3,000	} Right centre	8,900	<i>vs.</i>	Medes
Orchomenus (Arcadia)	600				
Corinth & Potidaea	5,000				
Tegea	1,500	} Right wing,	11,500	<i>vs.</i>	Persians
Sparta	10,000				
			38,700		
To these he adds:					
Light-armed Helots	35,000	} 71,300			Phrygians, Thracians, Mysians, Paeonians, Ethiopians, Egyptians; Cavalry stationed separately
Other light-armed	34,500				
Unarmed Thespians	1,800				
			110,000		'300,000'

five years later²⁰ – and some of Aristides' officers began to relieve their boredom in political intrigue. An oligarchic plot was uncovered among a group of aristocrats who had come to feel that Athens had chosen the wrong side. The infection was evidently spreading fast; Aristides had to act quickly, not least to clear his own name of suspicion, yet he could not know the extent of the conspiracy. He arrested eight ring-leaders of whom the two most deeply implicated – named as Aeschines of Lamptra and Agesias of Acharnae – soon found it easy to escape and so saved him

²⁰ Thuc. 1.102.3, *νεωτερονόϊαν*; 107.4; Plut. *Cimon* 17.3–7.

the embarrassment of a show-trial. The others he then released with a warning, and the lesser conspirators, unsure whether they had been discovered or not, quietly resumed their watch (Plut. *Arist.* 13).

It is possible that the threat of disaffection was more general, for Pausanias caused the whole army to swear an oath of solidarity, the terms of which seem perhaps to presuppose the threat of some such trouble. The Oath of Plataea, denounced as an Athenian forgery by Theopompus and by many modern scholars with as little reason as by him, survives in a fourth-century version on stone (Tod, *GHI* II, no. 204) and in literary paraphrases of Lycurgus (*Leocr.* 81) and Diodorus (IX. 29.3).²¹ On pain of terrible sanctions, the combatants swore to obey their officers, to fight to the death and not desert. They promised to give all their dead a proper funeral, and to annihilate the centres of collaboration with the enemy, such as Thebes, dedicating a tenth part of their land and possessions to the gods. For the future, however remote, they swore never to destroy the cities of their present comrades – Athens, Sparta, Plataea are named – nor even to permit their reduction by hunger and thirst. The two literary versions record a further clause (which was judged obsolete after the Peace of Callias c. 450 B.C.), to leave as a memorial for ever in ruins such temples as the Persians had destroyed. The religious note is entirely characteristic of Pausanias, who well appreciated the use of religion to bolster morale. The oath, for all its transposition into fourth-century language, bears several hall-marks of its genuineness. What is remarkable, and abnormal, is that Pausanias thought it necessary to bind his army in this way.

Despite the evidence of instability among his Athenian and perhaps other allies, the waiting game had more attraction for Pausanias than for his enemy. Mardonius depended on supplies brought overland, largely from Thessaly 160 km away. For though he might have kept open a line to the coast at Oropus he had no transport vessels available, nor any warships to guard a convoy from Euboean raids. Moreover he must have known that Xanthippus had now taken the Athenian fleet to join Leotychidas, and that a further Greek victory at sea would leave any Persian force in Greece manifestly marooned beyond the reach of reinforcement. In that case, the Greeks in his force would rapidly melt away, and he would find himself no longer among friends in northern Greece. Pausanias, on the other hand, enjoyed a continual replenishment of his supplies by waggon-trains across the mountain behind him, on which he appears to have left the bulk of his light-armed troops to keep the several passes free. Along the same trail, more and more new contingents made their way and swelled his army. After a week of

²¹ See A 11, 512–15, providing an earlier context; doubted by c 320, 460f.

inactivity, Mardonius decided to force the issue. With the benefit of local Theban advice he was able to send his cavalry behind the Greek lines to disrupt the supply-route, and at the first attempt destroyed a train of no fewer than five hundred draught animals, coming down to Plataea by the Dryoscephalae pass from Megara, the gentlest route for shambling oxen to negotiate (Hdt. ix.38–9). What is harder to understand is why Mardonius did not attempt to interpose his whole force between Pausanias and the hills, so taking the Greeks at a fearful disadvantage if they were compelled to fight an action with their prepared front reversed.

Three days later, Mardonius held a staff conference at which his colleague Artabazus was all for withdrawing to the safe and well-supplied haven of Thebes, from there to try what gold could do among the Greeks. But Mardonius had been sent to win a military victory, and was not so easily to be turned aside. His decision was to attack on the following day, and he was discouraged neither by old and obscure oracles nor by Hegesistratus and his ill-omened sacrifices (Hdt. ix.41–3).

When darkness had fallen and the armies had settled down for the night, Alexander of Macedon rode up to the Athenian line unrecognized, and demanded to speak with Aristides. Claiming, almost certainly untruthfully, that he had come without Mardonius' knowledge, he said he was there to warn the Athenians and Pausanias of the coming attack – and would expect his reward when victory was theirs. He strongly advised against withdrawal, saying that Mardonius' supplies were so low that he would himself be compelled to retreat very soon, if only the Greeks could hold on a little longer (Hdt. ix.44–5). Whether Alexander came in fact as Mardonius' agent or simply to hedge his own bet, in advising against retreat he was certainly playing Mardonius' game; for the one manoeuvre which could upset the Persian's plan was a retreat by Pausanias to the safety of Cithaeron. However that may be, Alexander's mission appeared to create the confusion Mardonius required. Herodotus reports that his words threw Pausanias into such a panic that he besought the Athenians on the left wing to change places with him at dawn so as to face the Medes and Persians in his stead – and when the move was observed by the enemy, who exchanged their wings to correspond, he returned his own to their original positions (ix.46–7).²² No reason is advanced for this sudden failure of nerve: Pausanias might have had to face an assault on his position at any time during the past ten days. That he waited for daylight before making the clumsy exchange raises suspicion that the manoeuvre was meant to be seen, that it was meant to delude Mardonius into supposing that even Spartan morale had

²² Disbelieved C 320, 317; see A 11, 528f.

cracked, and so into relaxing his guard. Certainly the Persian commander believed the evidence of his eyes. Pausing only to send a herald with a taunting speech and an equally Homeric challenge to a contest of champions (such as Sparta had successfully entered against Argos in c. 546 B.C., Hdt. 1.82), Mardonius threw his cavalry into the attack (IX.48–9).

If lancers were an irritant to hoplites, and often fatal on level open ground, mounted archers could be a yet surer threat, especially when, as now, the attack had to be made uphill. Not needing to ride close to the enemy, and as able to shoot uphill as down, they above all carried far more ammunition than a lancer. The Spartan defenders were forced away from the universal water-supply, Gargaphia, in their sector, and the Persians in one way or another managed to foul and choke it. To restore the flow might not have cost a party of Greek engineers more than half an hour's labour, but the enemy cavalry saw to it that no such opportunity arose. At the same time their patrolling of the Asopus banks prevented access to that alternative source, so that the Greeks had nowhere to turn for water. Moreover, Mardonius' interception of the supply-trains had by now become so effective that all their provisions were gone. In short, the Asopus ridge had lost its attraction. Pausanias and his senior officers therefore decided to hold it only for that day, and, failing a full-scale Persian attack with infantry as well as cavalry, to withdraw under cover of darkness. Eloquent testimony to the state of the commissariat, no less than half of the force was to be sent to secure the supply lines from Cithaeron. This implies that a very substantial Persian detachment had moved to occupy the passes, of which the waggon-route from the Megarid to Kriekouki by Ayios Vasilios must have been at least as significant as Dryoscephalae, the scene of their earlier success in these tactics.²³ The other half of the Greek army would stand and fight 2 km to the south west of their present position, half-way to Plataea. The area chosen lay across the hardly perceptible watershed, no longer in the basin of the Asopus but enclosed between two arms of the westward-flowing Oëroë, and for that reason called 'the island' (Hdt. IX.49–51).

For a large formation to retreat quickly and in good order by night was, and is, the hardest of military manoeuvres. Pausanias had no choice. But in ordering the retreat was he merely reacting to the demands of hunger, or would he make a virtue of necessity and hope to lure the incautious Persians by giving an impression of headlong flight, until he turned suddenly to a counter-attack for which they were unprepared?

The Greeks withstood the enemy cavalry as best they could until merciful night gave the signal for retreat. The centre moved first.

²³ On this waggon route, see C 246, 103ff.

According to Herodotus, poor discipline and a collapse of morale led these contingents to pass by the island and pitch camp at twice the distance ordered, outside the very walls of Plataea (Hdt. ix. 52). But this is no doubt a later calumny. In fact the centre will have formed the 'half' sent to restore the supply-lines, and their encampment at the Heraeum of Plataea would enable them to cover the mouth of the important Dryoscephalae pass. When the time came for the wings to move, just before first light, a different kind of confusion arose in the Spartan camp. The commander of the battalion from Pitana, Amompharetus, who had missed that day's planning conference, refused to join the retreat. The argument between Amompharetus and his commander-in-chief was observed by an Athenian dispatch-rider, who made sure that no detail of the apparent mutiny was left to imaginations less fertile than his own. One detail betrays him. At the height of the altercation, Amompharetus was said to have taken up a great rock and dropped it at Pausanias' feet, exclaiming, 'With this pebble I give my vote not to run away from the foreigners.' But voting by pebble was an Athenian, not a Spartan device; and the dispatch-rider's account may be false in other ways also. However that may be, Pausanias and the other Spartans at length moved off, leaving the men of Pitana where they stood. But Amompharetus' delay meant that dawn was breaking as the two wings began their simultaneous retreat. The Athenian left moved directly across the plain to the island. The Spartans, as a precaution against interference by enemy cavalry, took a more circuitous route, going first to the foot of Cithaeron, where after a march of 2 km they halted at Argiopiium, by a stream called Moloeis and near the very temple of Eleusinian Demeter which had saved Aristides' embarrassment when the oracle came in (Hdt. ix. 53–7, cf. above, p. 601). Herodotus' indications of place, once so precise, are more than usually obscure; but it is reasonably probable that the site was close to modern Kriekouki.

Here Pausanias awaited the men of Pitana, who would be bound to move when they found themselves alone. In fact Amompharetus came up with Pausanias only minutes before an assault by Persian cavalry, who had resumed their reconnaissance in strength, found the Greeks gone from the ridge, and followed the Spartan line of retreat. In the event, Amompharetus' delay had given him the role of rearguard.

By daybreak Mardonius knew of the Greek retreat and assumed it to be a rout. In his belief he threw caution to the winds. Exulting he taunted the Thessalian dynasts and Artabazus with their feeble-minded advocacy of a defensive posture, and even, in Artabazus' case, of a retreat behind the walls of Thebes. Artabazus was unimpressed, and in the event withheld his men from the pursuit. Mardonius gave the order for a general attack, and led his forces against what he supposed to be the

whole Greek army in flight, actually Pausanias' wing, now halted in good order near Kriekouki. His scouts had failed to tell him of the former Greek centre encamped at Plataea, and the Athenians' route to the island had kept them out of sight. Sharing Mardonius' belief that the Greeks were in headlong flight, the greater part of the barbarian host sped after him in some disarray. This over-confidence, theirs and his, was the first of their fatal mistakes that day (Hdt. ix. 58–9).

Pausanias sent a dispatch-rider to summon the Athenian division, and they would have come, but found their way barred by the renegade Greeks who had marked them at the Asopus ridge and had now made their way forward along the main road from Thebes to Plataea. The Spartans and Tegeans were therefore left to bear the whole weight of Mardonius' attack. With iron determination not to expend his limited forces too soon, Pausanias fell back on his seers, who duly produced unfavourable sacrifices, while the Persian infantry set up a barricade of their wicker shields from the cover of which they expected to fire their arrows with impunity. When his men could be restrained no longer – the Tegeans were particularly impatient – Pausanias suddenly found the sacrifices favourable, and ordered the charge. The wicker shields were overborne; and in the hand-to-hand fighting which developed Mardonius' infantry, with nothing now to shield them but a desperate courage which called forth the ungrudging admiration of the Greeks, were no match for their disciplined and bronze-clad adversaries. So long as Mardonius lived, the fight raged fiercest where he rode on a white charger among his picked and personal battalion. But when the Spartan Aemnestus – 'ever to be remembered' – struck and killed him with a stone, the enemy had no more stomach for the fight. They turned, and covered the three kilometres to their stockade across the Asopus as fast as their legs could carry them – which was no doubt a good deal faster than the heavily armoured Greeks could run after them, harassed as they still were by enemy cavalry covering the retreat. Elsewhere on the field, the Athenian wing still faced the onslaught of Mardonius' Greeks, among whom the Thebans were remembered as having fought with especial courage until three hundred of them were killed. But in the end they too turned and fled, not to the stockade but right on to Thebes. The contingents of the former Greek centre, encamped at Plataea, played little part in the battle. At a later stage, however, when the result was already becoming certain, two divisions advanced, the Corinthians by way of the foothills of Cithaeron, the Megarians and Phliasiens across the plain. The latter paid for their impatience, suffering six hundred casualties at the hands of the Theban cavalry (Hdt. ix. 60–5, 67–9; Plut. *Arist.* 19).

Meanwhile the prudent Artabazus had kept his force in reserve.

Advancing at a leisurely pace to the Asopus ridge, they alone could observe the whole field of battle, and from that vantage-point it did not take Artabazus long to make up his mind. He wheeled his troops and retreated, not to the stockade, not even to Thebes, but to Byzantium and thence across into Asia. Such speed did he make that at every stage of this remarkable forced march he outstripped the news of the defeat, and so avoided attack except by the wild tribes of Thrace, and by the common enemy of those lands, famine (Hdt. ix.66, 89).

Within the stockade the Persians strengthened their defences and for a time held off the Spartans. But before long the Athenians came up, gained the top of the palisade, and breached it. The Greeks poured in, and fought for hours, taking no prisoners, until (so they said) nine tenths of the enemy lay dead, at the cost of negligible casualties on their side – ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, fifty-two Athenians all of the tribe Aeantis (Hdt. ix.70; Plut. *Arist.* 19).

All the time he had been in Boeotia, as we have seen, Pausanias' army had daily been swollen by the arrival of new troops. The last two such contingents, from Mantinea and Elis, actually came in after the battle, and were so mortified that they afterwards banished their generals. Their lateness has often been thought sinister, a sign of anti-Spartan sentiment.²⁴ This interpretation, based on the later history of the two states, may or may not be correct (Hdt. ix.77).

At last the storm was over, and it was possible to assess the scale of the Greek success. Here and there little knots of camp-followers and other non-combatants began to emerge and pick their way across the field. Among them was a Coan lady from the harem of the Persian Pharandates. Shrewdly waiting until she could identify the supreme commander, she threw herself on Pausanias' mercy, and he agreed to grant her safe conduct to Aegina (Hdt. ix.76). Hers will not have been the only case, and it is to be noted that her treatment was very different from that accorded to medizing Greek soldiery. In fact – and the contrast with his alleged behaviour later at Byzantium makes this worth saying – the restraint of Pausanias in victory was truly remarkable. Angrily he refused to avenge Leonidas by insulting Mardonius' corpse, and no doubt it was he who permitted the latter to disappear to secret burial (Hdt. ix.78–9, 84). Vast booty was left behind, whole fortunes in precious metal and luxuries of every kind, all of which the Helots were directed to collect into one place. No looting was permitted, and before the booty was distributed in fair shares to all ranks, a tithe was set apart for Pythian Apollo, and allowances also for Olympian Zeus and Poseidon on the

²⁴ A. Andrewes, *Phoenix* 6 (1952) 2; W. G. Forrest, *CQ* N.S. 10 (1960) 229; A 11, 506f. C 320, 279f cf. 341, does not see this meaning in it.

Isthmus. Athena Alea at Tegea received the bronze manger in which Mardonius' horses had browsed; his marquee, a gift from Xerxes, went to Athens where it served later as a model for Pericles' Odeon (Plut. *Per.* 13.9).²⁵ Pausanias himself received a hero's share, ten of everything – women, horses, camels, and so on. He permitted himself a wry joke. Ordering Mardonius' cooks to set out a banquet in their master's lavishly decorated marquee and his own servants to set beside it a typical Spartan meal, with a laugh he pointed out the display to his generals: how could any sane man, with so much at his command, have coveted the poverty of Greece (Hdt. ix.80–3)?

The Marathonian honour of burial on the field of battle was accorded to all 1,360 of the fallen Greeks, state by state in separate tombs (Hdt. ix.85). This done, the Greeks held a council to plan their next move. Herodotus records only a decision to punish Thebes (ix.86), but the discussion must have ranged more widely than that: here, after all, were the masters of Greece. Simultaneously, across the sea in Samos, Leotychidas' council not only examined far-reaching proposals for the transfer of whole populations from Asia back to Greece, but also evidently had authority formally to accept certain Ionian states into the Greek alliance (cf. below, p. 615). Pausanias will not have been more diffident. In fact, Plutarch's report of the conference at Plataea asserts that the agenda put before political and religious delegates here had even more far-reaching implications (*Arist.* 21). In addition to the establishment of a quadrennial freedom-festival, the Eleutheria, Aristides, he says, successfully proposed to raise a standing army of 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, with a permanent Greek navy of 100 ships – with financial backing, presumably, from the contributions which he elsewhere records as paid even before Aristides' later reorganization at Delos (*Arist.* 24). Such a proposal is far from inherently improbable at this time. However, Plutarch's evidence has been doubted more often than not, partly because Herodotus and Thucydides say nothing of such a decision, partly because Plutarch names no such source for his assertion, and largely because it is felt that such a council held on the morrow of the battle could not have had the authority for such an enactment.²⁶ None of these arguments, of course, is conclusive. Granted that any decision could have required subsequent ratification, the silence of both Herodotus and Thucydides is notoriously quixotic; and both of them knew of accounts of the Persian War and its aftermath other than their own.²⁷ One of these may have lain behind Plutarch's source; a cautious verdict is in order, not proven.

²⁵ O. Broneer, *Calif. Publ. in Class. Arch.* 1 (1929) 305–11, *id.*, *AJA* 56 (1952) 172.

²⁶ So A 11, 544; C 341, 176ff, cf. C 340, 262–7; briefly dismissed by C 329, 342; cf. C 281, 153 and n.2.

²⁷ Hdt. ix.81.2 cf. viii.128.1; Thuc. 1.97.2. E.g. Damastes, C 317, 91–3. Plutarch's source could as well have been the respectable Cleidemus, cited in *Arist.* 19.6 (*FGrH* 323 F 22), as the disreputable Idomeneus cf. *ibid.* 10.9 (338 F 6).

Though it is to run ahead of events in the naval theatre, to which we must turn, the final act of Pausanias' campaign may conveniently be recorded here. After the council broke up, the army duly marched against Thebes, which they had previously vowed to annihilate (*δεκατεύειν*, see above, p. 604) and now resolved to compel to surrender the renegades. They arrived and demanded that the latter be handed over, especially two of the ringleaders. Meeting with a refusal they laid siege to the city. Within three weeks Thebes was prepared to negotiate, the impasse resolved by the courageous decision of those sought to give themselves up for trial, providing only that Thebes offered a ransom for their eventual release. Pausanias accepted the terms offered, did not stay to fulfil the Greeks' oath, but took his prisoners straight to the Isthmus where, to forestall the chance of bribery and escape, he executed them all without trial (Hdt. ix.86–8).

More than Marathon or even Salamis, the victory at Plataea determined the course of European history. Whether it was won by luck or by management is impossible to decide. Herodotus, writing for Athenians at a time when Pausanias was disgraced and Athens unwilling to give due credit to Sparta, put it down to chance and to the courage of those engaged. It is at least equally likely that the true hero was Pausanias, who had the gift of seeing how to turn his own limitations to good effect, and so managed and controlled an inevitable retreat as to overwhelm the unwary pursuers with his counter-attack.²⁸

While attention was focused on these great doings on land, the Greek fleet was not idle. It will be recalled that a Chian approach earlier in the year had sufficed to tempt Leotychidas as far as Delos, but no further (above, p. 593). For their part, the Persians still lay at Samos in three hundred vessels, and had not the heart to sail westward: they enjoyed the use of Polycrates' great harbour, the finest in the Aegean, adjacent to a long beach open to the south, and close to an unfailing water-supply which again in the seventeenth century A.D. was to prove sufficient to furnish a whole fleet.²⁹ However, during the month of July a trio of Samian patriots – Lampon, Athenagoras, Hegesistratus – slipped away secretly to Delos to see the Greek admiral and press him to venture into Ionian waters. Ionia, they told him, was ready to rise. The mere sight of the Greek fleet would be enough to spark a new revolt against Persia and her quislings, men such as Theomestor in Samos, whose tyranny had been his reward for steadfast service at Salamis. Moreover morale among the Persians was low, and it was by no means impossible that they would

²⁸ Plato, *Laches* 191b–c. The favourable verdict of Hdt. ix.64.1 and Thuc. i.130.1 is supported by c 320, 343f. See also c 360, 144–65; c 420, 66f, 118.

²⁹ J. Georgirenes, *A Description of the Present State of the Islands of Samos, Patmos and Nicaria* (London, 1678) 13.

altogether decline to fight. Leotychidas was persuaded; the envoys gave guarantees and oaths of alliance, and on the very next day led the fleet towards Samos (Hdt. ix.90–2).

That the Samians should have succeeded where the Chians had failed has been thought remarkable.³⁰ The main reason is likely to have been the accession to the Greek fleet of Athens' contingent, previously withheld (cf. above, p. 593). Moreover, the Persian fleet was at Samos, and Leotychidas needed a clear promise of local support before he could move. This was the first real intimation of the island's partiality which he had received. For against the ransom and repatriation by the Samians of five hundred Athenian prisoners (Hdt. ix.99.2), he had to set the bitter opposition of Theomestor and his colleagues at Salamis, and the fact that Samian vessels were still serving under Persian command. Perhaps equally decisive a factor, the time was ripe. The Greeks, no less than the Persians in 490 and 480, appreciated the demand their watery country makes for amphibious warfare. If events on land were moving to a conclusion, then it became imperative to anticipate the long expected mobilization of the enemy fleet; to overlook a chance of destroying it where it lay would have been unthinkable.

The most uncomfortable part of the voyage was the first, out of the shelter of the Cyclades and into the forty or so kilometres of open sea which stretch from there to Icaria, and so on past the Coressiae isles (Founi) towards the great brooding peak of Mt Ampelus in Samos. Passing the southern shore of the island without incident the fleet reached Calami, the reed-covered marsh about the Heraeum, at the west end of the great plain of ancient Samos and some five kilometres from the town. Here the Greeks formed into battle order and prepared to fight. The Persians took to their ships at once; but instead of coming to meet the Greeks they withdrew across the straits to the mainland, to the broad waters of the Latmian gulf in the lee of Mt Mycale. The plan was not without wisdom: the straits, only about one kilometre in width at the narrowest, would not allow deployment of the whole fleet at once, and the geography of the place was disquietingly like that of Salamis, though Mycale lacked the hospitable shores of Piraeus and Phalerum. However, the Persians did not deploy for battle; nor did they sail across to the great harbour of Miletus, for they could not trust the inhabitants. Instead they kept close to the north shore, the territory of Priene. Here they had the advantage of concealment, for no height in Samos commands a view of Priene, whereas it was a simple matter to place a look-out upon the hills to watch for the approach of the Greeks. But Hegesistratus and his friends had guessed aright. The Persians had no stomach for the fight.

³⁰ Cf. c 43, III 187.

Among the Phoenician contingent, indeed, morale was so low that they were sent home – either now, as Herodotus says, or even at some earlier stage, like the Egyptian vessels which had been sent home after Salamis, leaving only their marines to fight with Mardonius (Hdt. ix.96–7; cf. above, pp. 580, 592).

The rump of their fleet, now reduced to not much more than a hundred, was no match for the Greeks. Moreover, by this time a considerable proportion must have consisted of flotillas of the Asiatic Greeks, not wholly to be trusted in the following engagement. Mardontes, Artayntes and Ithamitres, colleagues in the divided command, decided to beach their ships and join forces with Tigranes – Herodotus remembers him as the tallest and handsomest officer in the Persian army – whom Xerxes had sent down from Sardis with a force which, though scarcely numbering sixty thousand as Herodotus reports, must nevertheless have been substantial.

For their stand, battle or siege, they chose a point some way to the west of Priene, close to a temple of Eleusinian Demeter reputedly founded by the original settlers, and at the mouth of a stream, the Gaeson. The site is not quite certain: Domatia and Ak Bogaz are both possible, the latter affording the additional advantage of easy access to a good pass over the mountain.³¹ Having beached the ships, the Persians proceeded to build a stockade around them, with rocks and trees from the neighbouring orchards and crowned by a palisade of sharpened stakes so formidable that the memory of it gave the name Scolopoeis, ‘the palings’, to the place thereafter. Here they waited, but not for long.

The Persian withdrawal had left Leotychidas with four options (cf. Hdt. ix.98.1). He could, of course, merely secure Samos and wait upon events. But that would have been to risk the arrival of Persian reinforcements, who might indeed have cut him off from the Greek mainland. Alternatively, to anticipate that hazard, he could retire again to the Cyclades. A bolder stroke, if the Persian fleet was indeed a spent force, would be to make straight for the Dardanelles in the hope of severing Mardonius’ line of communications. Better still, and this is what was in fact resolved, he might destroy the remnants of the enemy fleet where it lay beached, and then sail for the Dardanelles in full security.

Leotychidas prepared for battle, in case the Persians should even now put out against him; but no one did. Rowing close, therefore, by means of a crier he called an invitation to the Greeks in Persian service, to remember freedom and join in their own liberation. His intention, Herodotus comments, was the same as Themistocles’ when he called his similar message at Artemisium – either to detach the Ionians from their

³¹ For Domatia, see Th. Wiegand and H. Schrader, *Priene* (Berlin, 1904) 17; Ak Bogaz, c 338, 171–4. See also c 320, 255f.

masters or at least to render them an object of apprehension and so a source of weakness (IX.98.2–4, cf. VIII.22). In this he succeeded, for the Persians very sensibly disarmed their Samians while the Milesians they sent a safe distance away, to guard-duty on the paths and passes of Mycale. As soon as it became obvious that Leotychidas' intention was to land his marine force for an assault on the stockade, the Persians hurriedly constructed an outer defence, a close-set fence of shields. It was to prove no more effective than the fence which Mardonius that day erected at Plataea (Hdt. IX.99).

It was indeed at this very moment that Leotychidas' force was swept by the rumour of Pausanias' great victory. Herodotus has excited criticism and disbelief in this matter, for the swiftness of the news has been thought to be beyond the power of ancient communications.³² Of course it is possible that the rumour, unverifiable but later confirmed, was a deliberate invention to improve morale among the Greeks. It is at least equally likely that the news was genuine, flashed across the Aegean by a chain of beacon-fires like that which Mardonius himself had expected to employ to give news of *his* victory to the Great King in Sardis (Hdt. IX.3.1). In either case, word of the morning's events in Boeotia served to add strength to Leotychidas' soldiers in the afternoon (Hdt. IX.100–1).

Sailing past the Persian stockade further into the gulf, Leotychidas landed half his force – the Athenians, Corinthians, Sicyonians and Troezenians – on easy ground close to Priene, from which they were to approach the Persians along the beach.³³ He himself led the Spartan contingent by a devious route through the folds of the mountain, intending to take the enemy force in the rear once the direct assault had tempted the defenders from within their stockade. And so it fell out. The sight of the very small force advancing against them from the east did indeed tempt the Persians to come out in hope of an easy triumph, and from behind the fence of shields their archers began to pick off the Greeks with deadly accuracy. The only response possible was a frontal assault, carried out with great vigour and noise. Even this left the issue in doubt for some time. But at last the enemy turned and fled to the stockade, closely pursued by the Athenians and the others, eager to win the day before Leotychidas and his men could arrive. When not even their fortification proved secure, the subject contingents deserted their Persian masters with what haste they could, while the Persians themselves continued to fight in disordered groups, facing not only the Greek assault force but the Samians and other Ionians who now saw their chance to change sides. Artayntes and Ithamitres, the unnerved admirals,

³² A 27, II 331, *ad loc.*; C 309, 526; cf. C 320, 258f. For the hypothesis of beacons, C 307, 281.

³³ Excellent accounts of this battle in C 307, 277–83; also C 320, 247–59.

got away. Mardonides died, and with him Xerxes' trusted general Tigranes, that tallest and handsomest of Persian officers (Hdt. IX.102).

When the fighting was almost over, Leotychidas arrived. Those of the enemy who could fled to the hills, where the Milesians first misled and finally attacked them, leaving few survivors to tell the tale in Sardis.³⁴ Leotychidas had little to do but count the dead – the Greek casualties were particularly heavy in the detachment from Sicyon – and award the battle honours. These went to Athens, with an individual award to one Hermolycus, a pancratiast. So, as the setting sun cast its rays on Mt Latmus at the head of this great gulf, the Greeks gathered the spoils, burned the Persians' ships and their stockade, and so took ship for Samos at the end of a day as decisive as any in the history of Greece or Europe (Hdt. IX.103–106.1).

Back in Samos, from which no doubt the tyrant Theomestor had now fled, a council was held to decide what to do next. In the absence of definite instructions from home, its deliberations had of course no binding effect. But it was here that the erosion of Sparta's hegemony began, a process that was shortly to leave Athens at the head of the alliance. The issue was the most pressing, how to secure the future of the Ionians of the mainland, now not only subjects but traitors in the eyes of the Great King. Traditionally isolationist, the Spartans put forward the eminently realistic view that Ionia was essentially indefensible. Rather than attempt the impossible, they proposed to dispossess the traitor-states in Greece – Argos, Thebes and the others – and bring back the Ionians to the greater safety of those lands. Athens opposed this presumptuous Dorian plan for her colonists, as she insisted on calling them, so Leotychidas shelved the question of the mainlanders and with a good grace accepted Samos, Chios, Lesbos and other smaller islands into the Greek alliance.³⁵ The islands were the prizes of victory, says Herodotus (IX.101.3). A doubtful reward they must have seemed to Sparta, but she administered the oath of alliance and loyalty none the less (Hdt. IX.106.2–4).

Upon the conclusion of the council, Leotychidas concerned himself briefly with the cities of mainland Ionia and drove the tyrant Aristogenes from Miletus (Plut. *Mor.* 859D). No doubt he had been a puppet like Theomestor, rewarded for his services to the Persian cause. Then Leotychidas sailed for the Dardanelles to break down the renovated bridges and so prevent both the retreat and the reinforcement of Mardonius' shattered force in Greece. Bad weather delayed the Greeks in the Troad near Assus, but they soon reached Abydos, in the vicinity of modern Canakkale. There at the narrows they found the bridges already

³⁴ For different figures in Diod. IX.34.3 and 36.6 see C 320, 257.

³⁵ C 313, 44f. Mainlanders, however, seem to have shared in the Sestus campaign: C 320, 259–62.

destroyed, no doubt by the weather. At this, Leotychidas and the Peloponnesians were for sailing home. For the Athenians, Xanthippus proposed to remain and liberate the Chersonese. In the end the force divided, the Peloponnesians sailing home as they desired, while Xanthippus crossed to the Chersonese and began the siege of Sestus, in which he was joined by Ionians and Hellespontine Greeks in the flush of enthusiasm to spread to others the liberty they had just taken for themselves from Xerxes (Hdt. IX. 114; Thuc. I. 89. 1–2).³⁶

The great strategic stronghold of Sestus, seat of the satrap Artayctes, was a hard place to storm. But it had had no warning of the Greeks' approach, and so was not provisioned for a siege. None the less it held out for some months until Xanthippus' men began to tire and longed to go home for the winter. Xanthippus insisted on staying, however; and once the Persians had boiled and eaten their bedstraps, the impossibility of further resistance became clear to them. They managed to slip out by night, leaving the Greek inhabitants to throw open the gates at dawn. The satrap was overtaken near Aegospotami, and brought to the neighbourhood of Madytus, in sight of Xerxes' bridgehead, where he was cruelly put to death for the violation of the shrine and sacred lands of the hero Protesilaus at Elaeus.

Xanthippus went on to Cardia, which he took from its pro-Persian garrison of Aeolians. Inside he found the great cables of linen and papyrus which had carried Xerxes' bridge. These he loaded onto his ships for dedication nearer home, and so sailed south in triumph (Hdt. IX. 115–21).

Victory was complete. The remaining task was to record it for posterity, in battlefield trophies and tombstones, in the dedication of spoils both in the home towns of the participants and at the great panhellenic sanctuaries, and in the foundation of memorial festivals whose annual celebrations would stir the hearts of generations unborn.

Miltiades had sent spoils of Marathon to both Olympian Zeus and Pythian Apollo (cf. above, p. 513). For Salamis, Apollo received from the Greeks generally a bronze statue 5.5 m high, no doubt of the god himself, holding in his hand the *akroterion* or stern-ornament of a ship, and from the Aeginetans three gold stars mounted atop a bronze mast; while sanctuaries at Salamis, Sunium and the Isthmus each received a captured warship (Hdt. VIII. 121–2). Pausanias was no less dutiful with the spoils of Plataea. Olympian Zeus received a 4.5 m bronze of himself, Poseidon on the Isthmus a statue over 3 m. But the greatest gift, again, was for Apollo at Delphi, a lofty spiral-twisted column of three bronze snakes, on whose

³⁶ On the possible identity of these new allies, see A 38, 35; C 43, III 190f; C 356, 405–46, esp. 418ff.

head rested a tripod of solid gold, made from a tenth of the spoils (Hdt. ix.81). Somewhere on this monument, no doubt on the limestone base, a dedicatory epigram was inscribed, with no message beyond the glorification of the commander (Thuc. I. 132.2 = Simonides 17 Page):

Pausanias, Captain-general of the Hellenes, dedicated this monument to Phoebus when he destroyed the army of the Medes.

The ambiguity – who destroyed the Medes? – was no doubt intended. The couplet was erased not long afterwards, when Pausanias fell into disgrace.³⁷ But the serpents survived to be transported to Constantinople, where they still stand in the hippodrome, though headless since the eighteenth century. On their coils is a list of ‘those who fought the war’, somewhat idiosyncratic, with a few names whose presence is as hard to explain as is the absence of others (Fig. 51).³⁸ Perhaps all date from the time when Sparta erased Pausanias’ inscription and substituted her own, and the omissions reflect the politics of that later date.


Like Pausanias, Themistocles was eager to enhance his own glory in a public monument. But in his case, his credit had to be bought from his own resources. So he commissioned a small temple and altar near his home in the deme Melite, and dedicated it to Artemis Aristoboule, ‘best in counsel’, a reference to his own counsel which had been the decisive factor in both siting and winning the battle of Salamis (Plut. *Them.* 22). The building has been found, apparently desecrated after the statesman’s disgrace, but renovated in the fourth century.³⁹ Inside stood a statue of Themistocles himself. The art of portraiture was in its infancy, and such a work must have been a great rarity in Athens then. It is almost certainly to be recognized in a Roman copy found at Ostia, a work closely related to the Aristogeiton of Critius and Nesiotes whose Tyrannicides (replacing Antenor’s group which Xerxes had looted) were the first great public commission after the war, in 477 B.C.⁴⁰ In spring 476 Themistocles is recorded to have served as *choregos* in the competition for tragedy with Phrynichus as playwright (Plut. *Them.* 5.4); and it was probably on this occasion that Phrynichus, whose ability to stir the Athenian audience’s emotions had been seen all too clearly in his *Capture of Miletus* in c. 493, was persuaded to make another foray into the dangerous political field of contemporary history. His *Phoenissae* (literally ‘Phoenician women’, but in common parlance equally ‘Phoenician ships’) told the story of Salamis

³⁷ For the date of this, see M. White, *JHS* 84 (1964) 142ff.

³⁸ M–L 27. See discussion by C 320, 435–8; A 11, 543f.

³⁹ C 399, 26ff; C 182, 174–6, with further bibliography.

⁴⁰ C 557, 197ff, figs. 405–8; J. P. Barron, *Introduction to Greek Sculpture* (London, 1981) 57. For the Tyrannicides, *ibid.* 58.



51. The bronze serpent column from Delphi. (Istanbul, Hippodrome; after H. Roehl, *Imagines Inscriptionum Graecarum*³ (1907) 101, 16.)

in suitably patriotic vein, and, though no longer extant, is said to have been the main source for Aeschylus' *Persae* in 472.⁴¹ It is a story the mere telling of which could not but glorify Themistocles.

Public commemoration of the victories and of the dead called forth a considerable number of funerary epigrams, as well as other literary productions, in the words of which one sees most clearly the contemporary view of the significance of those great events. In this the Hellenes' laureate was Simonides, master of both the lyric and the elegiac style, friend of both Themistocles and Pausanias, employed by both their

⁴¹ Hypoth. to *Persae*.

cities. His most ambitious works are lost, 'The Sea Fight off Artemisium' and 'The Sea Fight off Salamis', both lyrics, the former probably composed for the dedication of a temple of Boreas the north wind at the river Ilissus.⁴² Of a third, 'The Sea Fight with Xerxes', it is possible that some scraps of papyrus bearing elegiacs which refer to sea, to war, to Medes, Persians, Phrygians and Phoenicians, may be fragments (P.Oxy. 2137). A larger piece survives of a lyric on Leonidas and Thermopylae, written for one of the Spartan commemorations, in which the poet reflects on the immortality of the dead in the glory of their courage (PMG 531).⁴³ Better known are Simonides' epigrams. For a friend, Leonidas' seer at Thermopylae, Simonides wrote (Fr. 6 Page; Hdt. VII.228),

This is the memorial of famous Megistias, whom once the Medes
killed, when they had crossed the river Spercheus –
a seer he, who clearly recognized the Fates approaching then,
but could not bring himself to desert Sparta's commanders.

The couplet which the Amphictyons wrote on the Spartans' tomb conveys the same narrow message of steadfast discipline (Fr. 22b Page; Hdt. *loc. cit.*):

Tell them in Lacedaemon, passer-by:
Obedient to their orders, here we lie.

At Athens a very different view prevailed. By great good fortune the original stone inscription of an epigram for Salamis has survived, almost certainly the work of Simonides and cut by a contemporary mason on a base which once carried a pair of herms:⁴⁴

The valour of these men shall beget glory for ever undiminished,
so long as the gods allot rewards for courage.
For on foot and on their swift-moving ships they kept
all Greece from seeing the dawn of slavery.

Here is a very different and wider view. The Athenians too speak commonplaces of undying glory. But instead of dwelling on marvels of discipline, they insist on the panhellenic aspect of the city's struggle. Two epigrams for Plataea, both attributed to Simonides, show the same difference of view (Frs. 8–9 Page; *AP* VII.251, 253). In one, presumably for the Spartans, the poet wrote,

These man wrapped their dear land in unquenchable glory
and themselves in the dark cloud of death.
Yet in death they are not dead, for their exultant courage
reaches down to lift them from the house of Hades.

⁴² Cf. c 9, 342ff. ⁴³ See c 9, 346ff; D. E. Gerber, *Euterpe* (Amsterdam, 1970) 314–17.

⁴⁴ M–L 26, with bibliography.

The other strikes the Athenian note:

If to die well is the greatest part of valour,
 fortune granted this to us above all men.
 For in our eagerness to clothe *Greece* in liberty,
 we lie in unaging good repute.

Athens was characteristically quick to see the potential of her achievement as propaganda, and the Greeks were not to be allowed to forget her part in their deliverance. For thirty years she willingly obeyed the injunction of the oath sworn at Plataea, to leave her temples ruined as a reminder of barbarian sacrilege, making the message yet more pointed by gathering a stack of damaged column drums from the unfinished temple of Athena and mounting them in the new Acropolis defences at a point where they would be for ever visible from the Agora. Then she erected trophies of victory at Marathon and at Salamis, not the usual suit of armour nailed to a post, eventually to rot and fall away when the memory of hostility had died, but grandiose monuments of stone, to stand for all time.⁴⁵ Three festivals of remembrance were established, for Marathon, Salamis and Plataea.⁴⁶ Marathon was remembered on the eve of the Boedromia, a festival already heavy with heroic reminiscence of legendary victories won against seemingly impossible odds. For Salamis, the annual commemoration was annexed to the festival of Artemis Munychia, at which the highlight was a regatta in memory of the battle. Plataea was celebrated on 3 Boedromion, three days before the commemoration of Marathon. These three battles are the only ones before the fourth century to have won a permanent place in the sacred calendar of Athens. On them, the Athenian case was allowed to rest.

There is little doubt that Athens was already at work, exploiting her contribution as a foundation for future hegemony. Already before Artemisium the Athenians had sought the command at sea, but did not press their claim to the point of splitting the alliance (Hdt. VIII.2–3). Xanthippus had tried, with a large measure of success, to make Mycale an Athenian victory before the Spartans could arrive on the scene, and he had insisted on staying to press the war in the Chersonese when Leotychidas and his Peloponnesians were longing to return home. Among the spoils of the campaign, it will be recalled, he took home for dedication the cables of Xerxes' great bridges. It is possible that parts of them festooned the ruined stylobate of the great new temple of Athena on the Acropolis. What is almost certain is that parts of the cables, interspersed with stern-ornaments from the ships destroyed at Mycale, were hung at Delphi on posts erected against the polygonal retaining

⁴⁵ Marathon, Paus. I.32.5; C 403, 93–106; E. Vanderpool, *Hesp.* 36 (1967) 108–10. Salamis, Plato, *Menex.* 245a; C 403, 102 n.20. ⁴⁶ See C 463, 54f; C 432, 204, 209, 235.

wall of the temple terrace and protected from the elements by a pretty stoa of the Ionic order.⁴⁷ On the top step of this colonnade, a little way up the sacred way from Miltiades' treasury for Marathon, the pilgrim could pause and read,

The Athenians dedicated the stoa, and the cables and stern-ornaments, which they took from the enemy.

No word of 'the Greeks', or even the Ionian allies, let alone the Spartan commander-in-chief as whose surrogate Xanthippus had stayed to pursue his siege. It was as victors in their own right that the Athenians required to be remembered at the navel of the earth.

Increasingly, over the years, the Athenians' estimate came to be taken at face value. It received new emphasis when, in 472 B.C., Aeschylus, veteran of Marathon, produced the *Persae* as part of a tetralogy on the relations of Greece and Asia.⁴⁸ The play is not to be thought of as mere patriotic rhetoric, however. It is truly a tragedy, illustrating the general theme of the punishment of *hybris* without any gloating over the Persian defeat. Giving some credit to the Spartans – Atossa's foreboding dream shows Greece characterized by a woman in Dorian dress (*Pers.* 183), and Darius ascribes the victory at Plataea to the Dorian spear (*ibid.* 817) – the message nevertheless is that it was the essentially Athenian battle of Salamis that destroyed Persia's arrogant hope of conquering Greece (cf. 249–55). The play picks up the propaganda of the epigrams, several times emphasizing that the battle, fought in Athenian waters, saved all Greece from slavery. In dialogue with the Chorus, Atossa seeks information about Athens (230–42):

At. This I would learn, my friends, in what region of earth Athens is said to lie.

Cb. Far off, close by where our lord the Sun sinks as he sets.

At. But did my son indeed long to seek out this city?

Cb. Yes, for all Greece would have become subject to the King ...

At. What shepherd is in charge, lord of their host?

Cb. They are not called the slaves or subjects of any man.

That the decisive role of Athens in preserving all Greece from slavery quickly became a commonplace is particularly clear from Pindar, Theban citizen of the most notorious of the medizing states.⁴⁹ The great lyric poet was evidently embarrassed by his city's choice of friends; but his own career seems not to have suffered in consequence. Already in the mid-seventies, in a dithyramb composed for the Athenians, Pindar had written (Frs. 92–3 Turyn = 76–7 Snell = 64–5 Bowra):

⁴⁷ C 482, 37–121; cf. M–L 25. For a different interpretation, see J. Walsh, *AJA* 90 (1986) 319–36.

⁴⁸ See, however, the cautious discussion in C 10, lv–lx.

⁴⁹ For echoes of contemporary politics in Pindar, see C 8, esp. ch.iii.

Brilliant, violet-crowned, epic
 support of Greece, famous Athens,
 divine city . . .
 where the sons of the Athenians laid the glittering
 foundation of liberty.

Perhaps more significant is the view he expresses to a non-Athenian audience. In 470 he celebrated the triumph in the Pythian games of Hieron, tyrant of Syracuse, and implored Zeus to save the Syracusans from Carthage and Etruria, taking heart from Hieron's recent defeat of the Etruscans before Cyme (*Pythian 1*). The latter engagement he explicitly compared with the battles won by Greeks in the east; and the extent to which the Athenians' view of Salamis had imposed itself outside Attica is illustrated by Pindar's plain allusion to the epigram for that engagement (*Pyth.* 1.73–8, cf. above, p. 619). Of the defeated Etruscans, he wrote,

. . . such things as they suffered, vanquished by the lord of Syracuse who from his *swift-moving ships* cast their youth in the sea, *dragging out Greece from heavy slavery*. From *Salamis* I shall win the thanks of the Athenians as my reward, and in Sparta from the conflicts before Cithaeron, in which the bowmen of the Medes collapsed.

Hieron was a Dorian monarch, prepared to look to Sparta for a model (cf. *ibid.* 61ff), and the reference to Plataea is to be expected. That Pindar, a Theban in Syracuse, includes also the Athenian estimate of Salamis shows clearly to what extent this estimate had gained acceptance in the decade since the battle. It was to be the foundation of the Delian League, the Athenian empire, and ultimately of all the greatness for which the Athens of Pericles is remembered.

CHAPTER 12
ITALY FROM THE BRONZE AGE
TO THE IRON AGE

DAVID RIDGWAY

I. INTRODUCTION

In approximately 740 B.C., an amphora of Greek type bearing various inscriptions (two of them in the Aramaic script and language) was deposited in the cemetery of the Euboean establishment at Pithecusa on the Bay of Naples.¹ To define the archaeology of Italy as 'text-aided' from this time onwards is unduly optimistic, as the next chapter will show. Beforehand, however, there can be no doubt that it is wholly 'text-free':² many sequences of events – essential to the comprehension of later periods – are concealed by the impersonal nature of prehistoric evidence and by the competing terminologies woven around it by prehistoric archaeologists. Furthermore, the distribution of the evidence for the prehistory of at least two Italian areas, later of vital interest to the historian, is more than usually uneven. South of the Tiber, in *Latium vetus*, official resources were concentrated between 1923 (the excavation of Riserva del Truglio) and 1971 (the excavation of Castel di Decima – discovered in 1953) on the discovery and excavation of the remains of imperial greatness, with scant attention even to the republican period and less still to the *prisci Latini* and to any conceivable predecessors they may have had. Similarly Etruria, in spite of the seemingly interminable preoccupation with the alleged enigma of Etruscan origins, has until very recently been considered the proper business of Etruscologists – to the substantial exclusion, in modern times, of the prehistorian (and indeed of the Romanist too). By contrast, the prehistory of areas (such as Apulia, Sardinia and north Italy) outside Latium, Etruria and Magna Graecia, has by and large received a quality and a quantity of attention that approximate more closely to a fair share. The prehistory of these allegedly peripheral areas, however, holds less attraction for the historian of later periods; he is, as a result, too often tempted to see the immediately pre-Iron Age period in Italy in the unappetizing terms of a sterile

¹ See below, ch. 13, section III.2; and *CAH* III².3 97–103.

² *CAH* II³ ch. xxxvii, section 1. On the distinction between 'text-free' and 'text-aided' archaeology, see C. F. C. Hawkes in *American Anthropologist* 56 (1954) 155–68.

chronological wrangle that is intended at best to document the change – banausic, and thus of limited interest – from a technology based on bronze to one based on iron. The demonstration that the facts of the matter are very different, and of much more general significance, is perhaps the greatest single debt that ancient history owes to the post-war generation of Italian pre-historians: and it is primarily their achievement that will be briefly surveyed below, in the hope that the result may provide a protohistoric prologue to the contents of the next chapter.

It is necessary to state clearly at the outset that the comprehension of this chapter's subject matter depends on the conceptual and terminological distinction between chronological matters on the one hand and cultural and stylistic considerations on the other. The reasoning behind this distinction, frequently blurred in Italian prehistoric archaeology before 1962,³ is in no way more arcane than that which refrains from defining Rome in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries A.D. as a 'Gothic city': cultures and art-styles are not the same as periods of time in prehistory any more than they are in history. 'Apennine', 'Sub-Apennine' and 'Proto-Villanovan' are among the adjectives (coined at various stages in the present century) that describe certain cultural features of the Middle, Recent and Final Bronze Ages in Italy; pottery and other cultural material may thus, for example, be defined as 'Proto-Villanovan' in *appearance* but not in *date*. It remains to stress that, like 'the Villanovans' (and for the same reasons), 'the Apennine folk' and 'the Proto-Villanovans' are meaningless substantives extrapolated from modern adjectives: their supposed ethnic significance in ancient times does not correspond to any reality that is either attested by the evidence of archaeology or susceptible to recovery by its techniques.

II. CHRONOLOGY: ITALY FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TENTH CENTURIES

The most recent (and by far the simplest) classification of the predominantly ceramic Bronze Age cultural material generally known as 'Apennine'⁴ divides it into Phases 1A, 1B and 2. Various ceramic forms, combined with specific features of shape, decorative motifs and methods of expressing them, are exclusive to the contexts of Phase 1A; associations with Mycenaean I, II and IIIA₁ pottery⁵ allow this phase to be dated approximately to the period between 1600 and 1400 B.C. Some vase types and decorative motifs continue from Phase 1A into Phase 1B; others are exclusive to Phase 1B, which may be assigned approximately

³ D 231. ⁴ D 156. ⁵ D 23; D 26; D 212.

to the century between 1400 and 1300 by associations with Mycenaean IIIA₂ and IIIB pottery. The differences between the Phase 1B cultural repertoire and that of Phase 2 are more striking than those which distinguish 1A from 1B: decorative motifs on pottery disappear altogether in Phase 2, which also sees the birth of a new plastic taste in vase handles. The associated Mycenaean pottery extends now to Mycenaean IIIC₁, which thus implies a lower limit for Phase 2 of the Apennine Culture at around 1200. Phase 1A may also be defined as 'Early Apennine', and Phase 1B as 'Late Apennine'; the first phase as a whole may be equated with the three centuries of the Italian Middle Bronze Age. Phase 2 may be defined as 'Sub-Apennine', and equated with the Recent Bronze Age – the penultimate period before the Iron Age. Alternative Apennine terminologies abound; and concordances have from time to time been provided.⁶

The last pre-Iron Age period of Italian prehistory is the Final Bronze Age, equated by association with the Mycenaean IIIC_{1b}, IIIC_{1c}, Sub-Mycenaean and Protogeometric phases of the Greek sequence, and so contemporary with the Hallstatt A₁ (part), A₂ and B₁ phases of Europe north of the Alps.⁷ The Italian Final Bronze Age, which should thus be dated to the twelfth to tenth centuries, affords chronological accommodation for the emergence of a number of geographically distinct cultural phenomena: they are attested in those areas which, in the succeeding Iron Age, will see the rise of the first cultural entities in Italy to have a wholly regional basis. Of these Final Bronze Age phenomena, the most significant – for our present purposes, which are also those of the following chapter – is, as its name implies, that constituted by the repertoire of well-defined pottery and bronze types known culturally as 'Proto-Villanovan'.

III. LATE BRONZE AGE ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

The establishment of the above chronological and terminological framework, however inadequate, allows us to pass to an examination of the economic basis and social characteristics of the seven centuries involved.

1. *The Middle and Recent Bronze Ages*

In the Middle Bronze Age, there are signs not only of an overall increase in the population but also of a fundamental change in the nature of its physical distribution. Some settlements that appear during these three centuries – such as Bologna, Rome and Taranto – are of a more obviously

⁶ E.g. D 242, 92; D 156, 268. ⁷ D 219.

permanent nature than any that have gone before. At a more modest level than that represented by these establishments, the caesura in ceramic typology between Phases 1A and 1B of the Apennine Culture is accompanied by the decline of many 1A sites at the beginning of 1B, when new sites appear in different places. At this stage, in fact, coastal sites – both in Apulia and in Etruria, for example – are abandoned in favour of inland sites near permanent water-courses. Such locations were evidently selected as more appropriate to the changing needs brought about by the gradual, but nevertheless perceptible, evolution in the agricultural economy: the mainly pastoralist methods of production, characteristic of Phase 1A, gave way in Phase 1B to a combination of pastoralism with agriculture and stock-raising. In Phase 2 (the Recent Bronze Age), life and mixed economy continue in the settlements established in Phase 1B (the latter part of the Middle Bronze Age); the prevalence of pastoralism is not, however, in doubt.

With the thirteenth century, indeed, at least at the abstract level of this framework, the full cycle of the following dynamic process seems to have been achieved:⁸ the stabilization of settlement in a number of more densely inhabited centres, characteristic of the later Middle and of the Recent Bronze Ages, is facilitated by the diversification (and consequent strengthening) of the agricultural economy; developments in the latter sector are made possible in their turn by certain qualitative and quantitative improvements in the production of bronze tools in response to changing market conditions brought about by the changing nature of the social structure – which, of course, results from the stabilization of settlement in a number of more densely inhabited centres . . . Such a full cycle clearly has a mainspring; of which, equally clearly, there can hardly fail to be an outward and visible sign in the surviving physical record. In fact, the cycle crudely delineated above coincides in time with immense changes in the nature of one type of archaeological evidence: hoards of metalwork. The addition of this highly significant class of evidence to the archaeological record is in fact foreshadowed on a modest scale in the Italian Early Bronze Age (1800–1600),⁹ when hoards usually comprise a limited number of whole artefacts belonging in each case to only a few typological categories – frequently, indeed, to that of the ubiquitous flat axe. From the Recent Bronze Age onwards, however, hoards of metalwork are incomparably more numerous and more varied in content: worked, unworked, broken and melted-down pieces of metal now acquire an unprecedented importance as a sign of accumulated reserves of what can reasonably be described as material resources. This innovation in the nature of the archaeological evidence available for

⁸ D 244. ⁹ D 245, s.v. ‘*ripostigli?*’.

exegesis at all levels is in itself indicative of a new economic situation: a new economic situation, moreover, that affects much of Europe north of the Alps no less than Italy between the late fourteenth and the early twelfth centuries. This extraordinarily brief period sees the creation of nothing less than a metallurgical *koine* that involves the contemporary cultures of the Aegean, of central Europe and of the Italian peninsula.¹⁰ The status of this *koine* and the rapidity of its creation can both be explained in terms of the extent and of the effect of the Mycenaean commercial ‘empire’ – which reached its zenith in the thirteenth century.

2. *The Final Bronze Age*

One of the results of the fall of the Mycenaean commercial ‘empire’ in the twelfth century is, naturally enough, the dissolution of the metallurgical *koine* which embraced the Aegean, central Europe and Italy in the Recent Bronze Age. In Italy, in fact, the twelfth century sees the first stages in the rise of cultural phenomena on a purely regional basis, represented at the metallurgical level by a gradual reversion to local specialized forms. This purely technological characteristic provides a yardstick for the assessment of certain overall tendencies which, from now onwards, are destined to distinguish the cultural development of central and southern Italy from that in the north – a divergence of immense historical significance, of which the first signs are exemplified at this stage by the continued preference in north Italy for the European-style long cavalry sword, while central and southern Italy develop a short sword which is more suitable for hand-to-hand fighting. Divergence in military technology is a notorious symptom of profound social differences in the areas compared: and developments in the structure of society, once achieved, are perhaps less easily reversible than those of a technological nature. However unfashionable the view, it has to be – and indeed has been – admitted that the thirteenth and early twelfth centuries saw the rise of at least four urban communities in Apulia, that these townships ‘arose as a direct result of trade with the Aegean world and that they would not have arisen without it’.¹¹ No such development, stimulated from outside, can be perceived in the north – for example in the contemporary Po Valley (where Bologna should be aligned with central Italy); and it is tempting to postulate a connexion (however remote) between this fundamentally different experience of the Recent Bronze Age and the differing rhythms and modes of subsequent proto-urban and urban progress in the two areas. It remains true that, in the vacuum created by the effective disappearance of active Mycenaean involvement,

¹⁰ D 220; D 289; D 69. ¹¹ D 317, 623.

the peninsula as a whole appears to owe its cultural allegiance more to central Europe than to the Mediterranean: it has been suggested that, at the end of the Recent Bronze Age, the cultural boundary between the Urnfield and the Mediterranean worlds slips from the Po Valley to the northern coasts of Sicily.¹² It seems unduly simplistic to interpret the signs of this cultural realignment in terms of substantial southward movements across the Alps of European Urnfield folk intent on spreading the cremation rite in Italy¹³ – where it had already been adopted, with varying degrees of alacrity, in some of the Apennine Culture areas during the later part of the Middle Bronze Age. Italian Final Bronze Age contacts with some of the cultures in the transalpine Urnfield world (itself not exactly uniform, or united) there certainly were; and exchanges (not least of ideas) there may well have been: but it is hard to see, especially in the contemporary climate of interpretation, why any more extensive intrusion or invasion should be expected – and why the assumption that it took place should be treated with any more respect than that now accorded to the wide-ranging activities of the ‘megalithic missionaries’ postulated elsewhere in a more robust age.

IV. THE PROTO-VILLANOVAN CULTURE

1. *Definition*¹⁴

As we shall see in the following chapter, the cultural term ‘Villanovan’ was coined in the mid-nineteenth century to describe certain Iron Age funerary material excavated in the first instance near Bologna, and, later in the same century, south of the Apennines in southern Etruria as well. Many problems of terminology (and thus more apparent than real) might have been avoided if the term ‘Proto-Etruscan’ had been preferred, in view of the correct assumption of a cultural relationship between the ‘Villanova’ finds and those previously attributed to the historical Etruscans. Be that as it may, Patroni coined the term ‘Proto-Villanovan’ in 1937 for a precisely analogous reason: to describe certain cultural features, characteristic of a late stage in the Italian Bronze Age, in such a way as to stress not only their dissimilarity from what had gone before but also their status as the source of what was yet to come in the Villanovan culture of the Iron Age. It is not Patroni’s fault that his perfectly reasonable contribution to Italian archaeological terminology has been both confused and confusing.

For some, the possessors of Proto-Villanovan culture were a distinct people: since they cremated their dead, gathered the ashes into urns and deposited the urns in cemeteries composed of well-like shafts, it followed

¹² D 244, 153. ¹³ D 53, 91, 106. ¹⁴ D 280; D 157.

that they must have arrived on the crest of one or other of the waves of cremation which surged across the Alps between 1913 and 1942 to enliven the pages of authorities from Ghirardini to von Merhart – many of whom may well have been under the impression that their theory was a rationalization of the eccentric hypothesis of Luigi Pigorini (1842–1925), whose Indo-European-speaking lake-dwelling invaders sojourned in the Po Valley on their way to the far south, where their material culture was finally transformed into Villanovan by oriental influences. In the English-speaking world at least, this interpretative vein is still not entirely worked out: Hencken, indeed, has actually drawn a parallel between the alleged southward migration of the central European Urnfield peoples and the movements of the Celts and of the Germanic tribes into the Spanish, Italian and Greek peninsular extremities of Europe.¹⁵

Other authorities, meanwhile, have employed the word ‘Proto-Villanovan’ for a wide range of different purposes. The most regrettable result for the outsider has indeed been the multiplication of meanings and of imprecise shadings incorporated in this overworked adjective. It has been used in an absolute chronological sense, to indicate a period that begins for some in the twelfth and for others in the tenth century; a relative chronological sense appears to be intended by those who use ‘the Proto-Villanovan’ as a synonym for ‘the Final Bronze Age in Italy’; some degree of causal connexion between the Bronze and Iron Ages lurks behind the addition of the descriptive term ‘transition’ to the chronological concept of the ‘period’; another school of thought has relegated all Bronze Age matters and reminiscences of them to an Apennine-based vocabulary (from ‘Proto-’ to ‘Sub-’), reserving the definition of ‘Proto-Villanovan’ for one or other horizon of the Iron Age itself; more ingeniously still, the word has been used to describe the prolongation of basically Bronze Age modes in the hinterland of southern Etruria at a time when Early Iron Age Villanovan innovations were already being registered in the more advanced coastal sites. The moral is obvious: no one word can reasonably be expected to incorporate the momentous value-judgements implicit in the concepts of ethnic identity, absolute and relative chronology, pseudo-historical transition and cultural conservatism – more especially when these concepts are mingled in different proportions, and with different degrees of ambivalence and generalization, by different authors. The only reasonable alternative to replacing the old term with a series of new ones is to revert to Patroni’s original intention. In this way, ‘Proto-Villanovan’ will be used, *in an exclusively cultural sense*, to describe those archaeological

¹⁵ D 182, 630.

contexts of the Italian Final Bronze Age (twelfth to tenth centuries) which satisfy *both* the following conditions:¹⁶

- (a) the presence of a reasonable number of elements from the appropriate cultural 'package': the cremation rite; the biconical ossuary, with cover-bowl; certain other vase forms – not all of them funerary – rendered in specific ways, and bearing characteristic decorative motifs (grooved, combed or impressed); various specific types – again by no means exclusive to cemeteries – of bronze axe, sword, 'razor', pin, fibula and of personal ornament in general;
- (b) geographical location in one of the areas where the Villanovan Culture is attested from the Early Iron Age onwards:¹⁷ southern Etruria and Tuscany to the south of the Apennines, central Emilia and the eastern Romagna to the north, and certain areas of the Marche and of Campania.

2. *Proto-Villanovan–Villanovan continuity*

That the above elegant solution can be contemplated at all is due in no small measure to the crystallization of a majority view in favour of cultural continuity between the Final Bronze and the Early Iron Ages – and in favour, too, of continuity between the Recent and Final Bronze Ages. In the former case, as we have seen, the subject has been blurred by the wish to contrast 'backward conservatism' (Proto-Villanovan) in the hinterland of Etruria with the 'cultural innovation' (Villanovan) of the coastal centres; indeed, it was even suggested at one point that 'Sub-Apennine' and 'Proto-Villanovan' amounted respectively to the domestic and to the funerary aspects of the same cultural phenomenon. As a formula for shortening chronology, of course, a combination of these two interpretative tendencies could hardly be bettered: Sub-Apennine thus becomes the contemporary of Villanovan! In point of fact, however, the evidence – recently and reliably excavated – for a succession in vertical stratigraphy, and therefore in time, from the Final Bronze into the Early Iron Age in Apulia is matched by that in southern Etruria for a similar relationship between Proto-Villanovan and Villanovan cultural contexts. The same sites in both areas – notably Satyrium in Apulia¹⁸ and Narce¹⁹ in southern Etruria – also demonstrate a succession from the Recent into the Final Bronze Age. These stratigraphical sequences – like others in Emilia and the Romagna – have been established on non-funerary sites; it is still true that the orderly linear sequence in time established by horizontal stratigraphy (for example at Veii²⁰) or by

¹⁶ D 157.

¹⁷ See below, ch. 13, section II.

¹⁸ D 203–5.

¹⁹ D 248; D 254.

²⁰ See below, ch. 13, section II.2.

typology (for example at Tarquinia²¹) from early to late Villanovan in the Iron Age cemeteries of southern Etruria is nowhere preceded by an equally clear development from Proto-Villanovan to Villanovan – indeed, the discovery of Proto-Villanovan and Villanovan tombs in the Puntoni cemetery at Sasso di Furbara²² in the territory of Caere is so far unique. In view of the evidence from the settlement sites, however, there can be no question of reviving the hypothesis of contemporaneity between these two cultures. If Proto-Villanovan and Villanovan were contemporary cultures in different areas, we should surely expect to find evidence in the ‘backward’ Proto-Villanovan area for intercourse with the more ‘advanced’ Villanovan area – just as, in the ‘advanced’ Villanovan area itself, we shall find the actual imported artefacts which document exchanges from c. 800 with the first western representatives of the oriental and Euboean worlds. In sharp contrast to this later (and perfectly logical) situation, *no Villanovan objects have ever been found in Proto-Villanovan graves.*

There are, however, a number of cases of Proto-Villanovan objects in Villanovan graves at certain coastal and mainstream centres of southern Etruria.²³ At Vetulonia, one Proto-Villanovan ossuary is apparently associated with an Early Iron Age fibula in the Poggio alla Guardia cemetery; at Tarquinia, one Proto-Villanovan ossuary and one Proto-Villanovan fibula occur in an early Villanovan grave in the Selciatello cemetery; and at Veii, there is one Proto-Villanovan fibula in an eighth-century fossa grave in the Quattro Fontanili cemetery. There is surely no reason why these three isolated occurrences should not be seen in terms of an ‘heirloom model’, which might indeed be cited in favour of Proto-Villanovan–Villanovan succession. A similar interpretation may also be applied to the two recorded instances of individual Proto-Villanovan graves in Villanovan cemeteries – at Caere (the Sorbo cemetery) and at Veii (the Casale del Fosso cemetery). Better evidence for on-site continuity is not lacking, however, in the form of clear indications of the successive use of different areas of the same site. At Populonia, there are a few Proto-Villanovan tombs in the Villa del Barone area to the north of the Villanovan cemeteries of Poggio and of Piano delle Granate; and at Veii, Proto-Villanovan fragments are reported from the area of the North-West Gate.

What, meanwhile, of the interior and of the concept of *attardamento culturale*? Reference has been made above to the stratigraphical and therefore chronological sequence at Narce, in the Ager Faliscus, where a section through the successive occupation deposits was exposed by the River Treia beneath the acropolis and investigated between 1966 and

²¹ D 182; D 56.

²² D 86.

²³ Exhaustive bibliography for this in D 143, 477, n.94.

1971 by Italian and British teams. It was suggested that such Bronze Age–Iron Age continuity of settlement on a site which owes its cultural allegiance to the Villanovan area would appear to align Narce with sites in Latium (Rome itself, Ardea and Lavinium) and to reflect an early version of the distinctive cultural and ethnic character of the historical Faliscans²⁴ – who wrote an Indo-European language closely akin to Latin. Now, however, in addition to the evidence for Proto-Villanovan–Villanovan succession in the mainstream centres, it must also be pointed out that there is evidence for a similar continuity elsewhere in the hinterland of south Etruria. Proto-Villanovan material has been found on Monte Bisenzio and in Lake Bolsena nearby, so attesting an apparently uninterrupted continuity of settlement at Bisenzio throughout the Bronze and Iron Ages and the Etruscan, Roman (Visentium) and medieval periods.²⁵ These discoveries, new at the time of writing, add a much-needed perspective to the evaluation of the early end of the Villanovan funerary sequence yielded by the cemeteries in the vicinity. In the past, the early stage at Bisenzio has been defined as representing a ‘sub-Bronze’ prolongation of the Bronze Age, and equated with material from the Monti della Tolfa; on this analysis, Proto-Villanovan could not fail to be prolonged in the interior to the point of at least partial contemporaneity with the earlier Villanovan of the mainstream centres.²⁶ For at least one school of thought, furthermore, emphasis on the similarities seen in the earliest material from the Bisenzio cemeteries to Proto-Villanovan on the one hand and to the earliest material from Rome and Latium on the other has indicated an actual emigration from Latium to the shores of Lake Bolsena. In reality, however, there are no parallels with Latial material that are at the same time peculiar to early Bisenzio and inexplicable in terms of a common derivation – presumably via Tarquinia – from Allumiere.²⁷ The principal difference between the early Villanovan stage at inland Bisenzio and those of mainstream Tarquinia and Veii would in fact appear to reside precisely in the different relationship with the preceding Final Bronze Age Proto-Villanovan cultural stage: continuity and gradual change at Bisenzio; caesura and radical reorganization elsewhere. And the concept of *attardamento culturale* now appears to be valid for Bisenzio in the ninth century, to which may be assigned various ceramic forms, a number of cult and ritual features, and arguably certain aspects of social organization. The latter are suggested by the multiplicity of scattered settlements, not yet centralized, that is emerging from recent and current field-work in the area: this is typical of the Final Bronze Age elsewhere, and, taken with the other features, is thus indicative of a slow Final Bronze–Early Iron Age

²⁴ D 248, 142–4.

²⁵ D 143, 456–60.

²⁶ D 225, 94ff, 120.

²⁷ D 114, 297.

transition. After the glorious interval of the eighth century,²⁸ history appears to repeat itself at Bisenzio in the seventh century, during which the production of painted pottery continues on stereo-typed Geometric lines, outmoded elsewhere.

As we shall see in the next chapter, the appearance of the Early Iron Age Villanovan culture on the mainstream sites is typified by the case of early Villanovan Veii. The funerary evidence there for the structure of society is far from clear at this stage; it is easier to deduce the existence of distinct 'communities' from the presence of separate cemeteries, each sited on raised ground at intervals around the perimeter of the central settlement area and each yielding its earliest tombs at the highest point (Casale del Fosso, Quattro Fontanili, probably Vaccareccia, and the Grotta Gramiccia groups²⁹). To what degree these supposed communities maintained their autonomy, and how far – or indeed whether – they were linked by anything more than a common need for good land, a water-supply and room for expansion, can only be matters for speculation. But it does not seem unduly hazardous to describe ninth-century Veii, along with other contemporary centres rising on previously uninhabited – or sparsely inhabited – sites elsewhere in south Etruria, as 'proto-urban' in view both of their physical extent and of their demonstrable demographic superiority over the sites of the preceding Final Bronze Age. In fact, 'one might almost think that new forms of political power have appeared, strong enough to compel different groups and tribes to live together' on terms that it is reasonable to describe as 'phenomena of synoecism'.³⁰

The appearance of such phenomena, associated with the massive populations indicated by the vast numbers of tombs in Iron Age cemeteries, is destined to lead to an unprecedented degree of regional individuality at the level of material culture – a tendency that began with the Final Bronze Age. It should not be forgotten for a moment that the regional cultures of the Italian Iron Age, the end-product of the processes outlined in this brief survey, form the basis of the ethnic definitions – real or perceived – made by the earliest writers of history. For what it is worth, we, unlike them, have reason to believe that the Proto-Villanovan cultural phenomenon (provided, and only provided, that it is understood in the typologically and topographically restrictive sense proposed at the end of the previous section) represents nothing less than the outward and visible sign of the Etruscans themselves in their embryonic, Final Bronze Age, stage.

²⁸ D 143, 483–90; and see below, ch. 13, section 11.2. ²⁹ D 316, pl. 32. ³⁰ D 244, 158.

CHAPTER 13
THE ETRUSCANS

DAVID RIDGWAY

I. INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

From Livy's account (iv.60.9–v.1) of the Etruscan reaction to the Roman declaration of war on Veii at the end of the fifth century, we may glean the following impressions: separate Etruscan city states, normally with republican governments, were organized in a League of Twelve Peoples; the League¹ was capable of meeting in full council at the federal sanctuary of Voltumna and of debating questions such as that of aid to Veii. In this instance, the decision to withhold all assistance found justification in the twin outrages committed by the king of Veii: on republican sentiment by his appointment; and on religion by his impious termination of a festival because the Twelve Peoples had not elected him priest. Livy is clear enough: the first offence compounded the second: the other states opposed aid to Veii principally on religious grounds. It might be thought, therefore, that the League was a merely religious assembly. But we know of no other kind of assembly: so it is more likely that the League concerned itself with the religious aspects of conduct in all spheres of life, including national politics, because those aspects were self-evidently the most important – a point of view as difficult, in some quarters, of modern comprehension as definitions of the Veii decision as 'apathetic', 'lacking in national sentiment' and 'politically blind' would have been in fifth-century Etruria. Such an interpretation of the League's importance accords well both with Livy's explanatory remark that the Etruscans were more concerned than any other nation with religious matters² (v. 1.6 – *gens itaque ante omnes alias eo magis dedita religionibus quod excelleret arte colendi eas*) and with the archaeological evidence for the massive expenditure on the construction and maintenance of local sanctuaries all over Etruria from the late seventh century onwards. Archaeology has not yet succeeded in identifying the site of the federal sanctuary, which was probably near Volsinii;³ and it remains true that neither the written sources nor archaeology can tell us when the League was formed, how often it met, which were the Twelve Peoples that

¹ D 288, 231–6. ² D 233, 138–52. ³ CIL XI 5265 (4th cent. A.D.).

formed it at any given period (there were usually more than twelve candidates), and how many representatives they were entitled to send to the meetings.


It is a sobering thought that Livy's description of the Veii episode is perhaps the most detailed and reliable ancient account we have of Etruscans making their own history in Etruria. No Etruscan literature or historical writing has come down to us;⁴ Livy does not seem to have read any that had survived to the Augustan period – for all his encouragement of the Emperor Claudius, who allegedly did (Suet. *Claud.* 41–2). At virtually any stage in their rise and fall, in fact, an account of the internal relations between the Etruscan city states must be based mainly on the competent exegesis of funerary and votive material, much of it mass produced – and, in the case of the ubiquitous terracotta votive statuettes and architectural decorations, often mass produced in travelling moulds. This analytical approach to huge quantities of what is often frankly minor art is gradually building up a network of interlocking local sequences, like that which shows Greek, Western Greek and Faliscan influences being succeeded in a votive deposit at Veii⁵ by Chiusine in the fifth and Campanian in the fourth centuries.

As far as the literary sources for Etruscan history are concerned, it must be realized that Greek and Roman historical writers were concerned exclusively with the Greek and Roman views of the episodes which brought Etruria into contact with the Greek states and with the growing power of Rome; they thus offer only limited assistance on purely Etruscan affairs – and, where contact became conflict, we cannot reasonably expect an objective account from an interested party. A case in point is that of Tyrrhenian piracy.⁶ Geographical logic compels belief both in perpetual rivalry at sea between Greeks and Etruscans and also in Etruscan designs on the adjacent land masses of Corsica and Sardinia (Diod. v.13; Strabo 225). We do not, however, have to believe in Ephorus' fourth-century reference (Strabo 267) to the opposition from Tyrrhenian pirates encountered off the east coast of Sicily by the timid predecessors of the Chalcidian founders of Naxos and Megara. Such Villanovan corsairs are not impossible: we would, however, be better advised to note that the hard core of commonplaces on Tyrrhenian pirates is not hard enough to be incorporated by Greek mythology until the final stages of its elaboration between the seventh and the fifth centuries. The same period has yielded many Etrusco-Italic representations of ships (Fig. 52) and naval engagements.⁷ Tyrrhenian pirates do not appear in the Homeric epics; by the time of the Homeric Hymn to Dionysus, they can kidnap the god. Similarly, the scandalized accounts by foreign authors of female immorality among the Etruscans arose from

⁴ D 121. ⁵ D 313. ⁶ D 168. ⁷ D 224.



Map 16. Italy and adjacent islands.



52. Boat of the early seventh century B.C. incised on a local impasto vase from Veii. (D 224, 221, fig. 7.)

a misunderstanding, wilful or otherwise, of social customs that were not those of Greece and Rome.⁸


In sum, the moral is obvious – and challenging: the historian of Etruria, from its rise in the ninth century to the beginning of its decline in the fifth, must be excused if he continues for the most part to apply the methods of the prehistorian, with a bias towards the impersonal economic basis.⁹ It has indeed been well said that

the Etruscans are not heralded by such voices as those of Homer, Sappho and Herodotus, with all that they mean for our contemporary Western culture: the memory of any conceivable spiritual adventure that accompanied the early flowering of Etruscan civilization was erased by its equally early decline. That is why the Etruscans and their remains are still remote, alien to ourselves and largely silent.¹⁰

In sharp contrast to the silence of the Etruscans themselves, a remarkable number of modern and more or less detailed accounts of their affairs are in print as this chapter is written. Of the purely popular treatments of Etruscan ‘mystery’, this is not the place to speak; the fact remains that the historian will find far more specific information than space permits here in the text-books by such authorities as Banti, Heurgon, Mansuelli, Pallottino, Richardson and Scullard.¹¹ In the circumstances, the present writer has felt it appropriate to offer no more than the merest outline of the period between *c.* 580 and *c.* 480, to do so with primary reference to the remarkable discoveries of the last decade, and to review at rather greater length the less familiar Villanovan and Orientalizing past of the

⁸ D 6. ⁹ D 116. ¹⁰ D 233, 238.

¹¹ D 52; D 184; D 11; D 210; D 232; D 233; D 271; D 288.



Map 17. Etruria.

ninth to seventh centuries. It was, after all, these two stages in Etruscan history which saw the birth and early development of the hellenized way of life characteristic of the relatively well-trodden and accessible archaic period in Etruria. Meanwhile, it is neither necessary nor proper to begin an account of the Etruscans by referring to the 'enigma' of their origins on the one hand and to the supposed difficulty of 'deciphering' their language on the other.

On language, all that need be observed here has been said elsewhere: the recent standard account¹² of Etruscan is prefaced by the stern admonition 'Even today, ninety per cent of the educated public firmly

¹² D 233, 187-234.

believes that Etruscan is totally indecipherable. This belief . . . is over two hundred years out of date.' In fact, the Etruscans used a version of the Greek alphabet to write their language: all the surviving texts can easily be *read*, and most of them can also be *understood* – especially the literally thousands of funerary inscriptions which merely retail the name, age and presumably titles of the deceased. The longer and more complex texts (mainly legal documents and ritual instructions) still present problems: here the precise significance of a number of words and formulas is not yet apparent. The lack, noted above, of any remotely literary Etruscan text presents profound disadvantages on the linguistic front no less than the historical and spiritual. (See below, pp. 719–24.)

As for origins, it is now generally agreed that the peninsular Iron Age culture conventionally termed 'Villanovan' represents the outward and visible sign of the Etruscans in their Iron Age stage. Exotic elements begin to appear in the native proto-urban archaeological record in the early eighth century, largely as a result of activity around the Bay of Naples (Pithecusa and Cyme) organized by Euboean traders and colonists with oriental experience and contacts (Al Mina). Such activities, arguably preceded by and then coupled with direct oriental contact elsewhere in south Italy (Francavilla Marittima in Calabria) and in Sardinia, gave rise to a decisively hellenized Orientalizing movement in Etruria; it lasted from the end of the eighth century until the influx of Ionian modes after *c.* 580. Etruscan Orientalizing is the result of the first large-scale contacts between Etruria and the outside world: it is not the same as the oriental origin reported by Herodotus, and collected by him from Lydians interviewed four or five centuries after any possibly relevant event.¹³ There is little point in imposing modern – and fundamentally antiquarian – needs on an ancient literary controversy which never at any time included an unbiased search for what actually happened.¹⁴

Accordingly, it is assumed below that the formative process of the historical Etruscans took place gradually between the Tiber and the Arno and that the final stages of the process can be detected in the archaeological record of the Villanovan culture there during the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. This approach is not a furtive (and anachronistic) subscription to the autochthonous theory of Etruscan origins expounded by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in the first century B.C. (1.30); and although it may include an attempt to identify the exotic origin of the various cultural elements that eventually gave rise to the overall (externally perceived) Etruscan phenomenon, it rejects out of hand the concept of provenance in the grotesquely over-simplified sense of the

¹³ Hdt.1.94; *CAH* II³.2, 361. ¹⁴ D 68.

arrival of a nation *en bloc* from outside – for which there is no archaeological evidence whatsoever in Etruria, and no historical parallel elsewhere.¹⁵

As we have seen, our evidence for Etruscans in all periods is primarily archaeological, of arts and crafts; the contexts of this evidence are primarily funerary. In other words, we still know far more about Etruscan cemeteries than we do about Etruscan cities: a fact that is commonly and wrongly attributed to death-worship on the part of the Etruscans rather than to the predilection of private and public collectors from Lucien Bonaparte (1828) onwards for tombs rather than towns. In recent years,¹⁶ however, this preference has diminished significantly, as has the tendency to concentrate at least official resources on the major centres. Sanctuaries in the ports (Pyrgi and Graviscae) and at nameless provincial sites in the hinterland ('Acquarossa', Luni, San Giovenale, Murlo) are adding much to our knowledge of religious practice, everyday life and domestic and other architecture. Along with this has gone a more demanding approach to the evidence secured by excavation, old and new: the modern period of Etruscan studies is *par excellence* one of definition – of what is, and of what is not, Etruscan – and of analysis of the material thus defined. Paradoxically, this has contributed largely to the demise of Etruscan studies as a closed shop: the Etruscans emerge as an indispensable component of pre-Roman Italy as a whole. It remains true that the sheer bulk (vast cemeteries, mass produced terracottas, abundant inscriptions) of the material evidence combines with its demographic and commercial implications to suggest that, between the second half of the eighth and the beginning of the fifth centuries, Etruscan civilization was a phenomenon of primary significance in the Mediterranean world.

It is now clearer than ever before, in fact, that the Etruscans are too important to be treated as a second-rate alternative to the glory that was Greece or as a mysterious overture to the grandeur that was Rome.¹⁷

II. THE VILLANOVAN CULTURE: THE ETRUSCANS IN THE NINTH AND EIGHTH CENTURIES

1. *Introduction*

The word 'Villanovan' was coined *c.* 1853 by Gozzadini for the first reports¹⁸ on his excavations of a cemetery in the *comune* of San Lazzaro di Savena, 6 km south east of Bologna (Gozzadini's vast personal estate of Villanova was in the neighbouring *comune*). As the titles of his reports

¹⁵ D 33. ¹⁶ D 273; D 275. ¹⁷ D 233, 235–8. ¹⁸ D 166–7.

imply, Gozzadini saw a cultural and ethnic continuity between his 'Villanova' finds and those which had previously been attributed to the historical Etruscans elsewhere in the province. South of the Apennines, analogies with 'Villanova', as well as important differences (such as a more marked oriental influence in the south) were identified in the material found in the municipal excavations at Tarquinia, studied by the Bolognese scholar Ghirardini from 1881 onwards;¹⁹ he also drew attention to chronological differences between Tarquinia and Allumiere, and to certain typological similarities between Tarquinia and Latium. Ethnic and chronological controversy ensued in both the northern and southern areas, considered singly, in relation to each other and worst of all in relation to the supposed question of Etruscan provenance: these battles, which have been well summarized elsewhere,²⁰ are associated primarily with the names of Undset, Helbig and Brizio on ethnic matters, and initially with those of Montelius and Karo (respectively 'high' and 'low') on chronology. Suffice it to say here that the regrettably polemical infancy of the subject under review in this section has left its traumatic mark in the illegitimate but still all too frequent juxtaposition of Villanovans and Etruscans²¹ – at worst by invasion ('the Villanovans ousted by the Etruscans'), at best by chronological succession ('the Villanovan predecessors of the Etruscans'). It must be stressed at the outset that, of these two terms, 'Etruscan' was used by ancient writers of history to describe the non-Greek and non-Roman inhabitants of Etruria; in sharp contrast, the noun 'Villanovans' is an unjustified ethnic extrapolation from the modern description of an archaeological culture. The 'Villanovans', in fact, are nothing more than the nineteenth-century successors to the 'Aborigines' and 'Pelasgians' of the eighteenth;²² in the present century, historians and other consumers of archaeological evidence would do well to ponder an authoritative reminder that 'an archaeological culture is not a racial group, nor a historical tribe, nor a linguistic unit, it is simply an archaeological culture'.²³

It has to be admitted that, since their inception, Villanovan studies have not succeeded in attracting the attention they deserve from specialists in adjacent fields. Sadly, the reasons are not far to seek. Almost all the raw data come from more than a century of excavation in cemeteries: it is self-evident that (as one historian has observed all too accurately of Iron Age Rome) 'no necropolis, however rich, can ever replace the living tradition of a nation'.²⁴ In addition, the accuracy of the limited information yielded depends entirely on the accuracy of the observation, recording and preservation of the relationships between the

¹⁹ D 161. ²⁰ D 326, 224–41, 331–57. ²¹ D 264; D 182; cf. D 326, 264.

²² D 233, 37. ²³ D. L. Clarke, *Analytical Archaeology* (London, 1968) 12.

²⁴ A. Momigliano, *JRS* 53 (1963) 98.

tombs in each cemetery and between the objects in individual tombs – and these processes depend in turn upon the accuracy of the excavation concerned. The quality of such primary observation and preservation, though certainly no more variable in Italy than elsewhere in Europe, has not been uniformly high. Finally, the rapid publication of more or less brilliant overall syntheses, or exegetical discussions devoted to outstanding individual tombs, single atypical artefacts or distinctive categories has always been an intrinsically more attractive (and humanly feasible) activity than the routine compilation of fully illustrated catalogues of massive quantities of seemingly monotonous material. The classic nineteenth- and early twentieth-century excavations in the Bologna area were not subjected to the latter treatment until 1975,²⁵ when definitive publication began with just over 800 tombs in the San Vitale cemetery, excavated by Ghirardini in 1914–15; there is thus, at last, a generally accessible context – albeit now impaired by lost associations – for the limited selection of material previously available,²⁶ as well as an antidote to gross errors of fact based on previous and imperfect acquaintance.²⁷ In south Etruria, the first re-edition of old material – more than 500 graves at Tarquinia – appeared in 1968;²⁸ this was followed by one of the cemeteries at Caere in 1972,²⁹ and both were complemented between 1961 and 1976 by the excavation and punctual cataloguing of the Quattro Fontanili cemetery at Veii.³⁰ A smaller but nevertheless important group of graves from Poggio Buco (Statonia), on the west bank of the river Fiora, appeared in 1972;³¹ at the time of writing, the definitive publication of the Villanovan material from Bisenzio is in progress,³² and that of Vulci appears to have been abandoned. For all practical purposes, indeed, our knowledge of the latter site in its Villanovan stage still depends on Gsell's work of 1891;³³ contemporary Vetulonia and Populonia may be cited as further tragic examples of indifferent excavation and inadequate publication.

Clearly, the treatment of the increasing volume of accessible funerary material is the proper business of the archaeologist. Unfortunately, the tools of his trade – artefact types, tables of type-associations in graves, seriations of graves in horizontal stratigraphies and finally numbered periods – do not inspire either confidence or comprehension among the uninitiated; among the initiated, meanwhile, it sometimes seems as though the results obtained for one site automatically fail to earn acceptance by those working at another.³⁴ Nevertheless, a general chronological outline is emerging, and it is to this that the Villanovan culture of the Italian Iron Age owes the historical perspective that is

²⁵ D 251. ²⁶ D 264, pls. 2, 3; D 219, pls. 59–72. ²⁷ D 190, 74, fig. 5. ²⁸ D 182.

²⁹ D 252. ³⁰ D 315. ³¹ D 55. ³² D 143. ³³ D 170; D 326, 285–9; D 269.

³⁴ E.g. D 56 on D 182; and see n. 57 below.

slowly but surely replacing the frankly sporadic speculation of the last century and more.

The geographical distribution of the Villanovan culture covers southern Etruria and Tuscany south of the Apennines, central Emilia and the eastern Romagna to the north, Fermo in the Marche, and parts of Campania³⁵ (where a southern version of Villanovan has been divided into the topographically distinct northern or 'Capua', southern or 'Pontecagnano' and Vallo di Diano or 'Sala Consilina' groups). The outward and visible signs of the Villanovan phenomenon vary considerably between these areas – and, within each area, literally from site to site. Such differences are evidently symptomatic of a cantonal condition at the Villanovan stage that resembles nothing so much as that of the historical Etruscan civilization itself. Throughout the period reviewed in this section, there is archaeological evidence for a constant ebb and flow of contacts, influences and relationships between and within all the Villanovan areas,³⁶ and between some of them and the non-Villanovan world at large. Given the limitations of the evidence at our disposal, it is doubtful whether a satisfactorily coherent narrative will ever emerge: but it may be noted that here too typology has a vital role to play in the objective assessment of the evidence. The accurate definition of types can lead us swiftly and surely to close parallels for individual artefacts in such a way as to permit informed consideration of, for example, the historical (and social and economic) significance of the possession in death of bronze Campanian swords³⁷ or Bolognese pins³⁸ at Tarquinia. The gathering, and still more the exploitation, of this kind of information is still in its infancy.

2. *South of the Apennines*

In the first instance, it is convenient to take the Villanovan cemetery of Quattro Fontanili at Veii as a particularly instructive example. Here, several hundred graves were excavated from 1961 onwards and published in catalogue form by 1976.³⁹ By 1965⁴⁰ it was possible to construct a typology; the types thus defined were plotted on an association-table of grave-groups, arranged in such a way that 'new' types came in on one side and 'old' ones dropped out on the other. The resulting linear sequence does not amount to a statement that is chronological in all its details. It was, however, possible to establish certain broad temporal divisions based on synchronisms between the

³⁵ D 134, 11–26, 85f. ³⁶ D 107; D 110.

³⁷ D 67, nos. 207–9, 213, 352 (Pontecagnano type). ³⁸ D 94, nos. 671, 1989.

³⁹ D 315. ⁴⁰ D 101.


appearance and disappearance of significant numbers of types. That these broad divisions in fact correspond to chronological periods is confirmed by a comparison of the linear sequence of types with the internal topography of the cemetery, as seen on distribution maps of types and of graves: such a comparison yields a pattern on the ground that coincides precisely with the typological sequence, in that early graves are in the centre and progressively later graves occur towards the outer edge. In this way, a working 'relative chronology' of successive periods was arrived at; it was converted into an absolute chronology⁴¹ by means of 'pegs' in some tombs in certain periods. The most notable of these are: painted skyphoi⁴² imported from Greece (Fig. 53; Euboean Middle Geometric II), and dated there nearer 800 than 750, in a number of Veii Period IIA tombs; the presence of a Veii Period IIIA type of *anforetta a spirali*⁴³ in tomb 159 of the Western Greek cemetery at Pithecusa (Fig. 54) where its Early Protocorinthian associations are dated to the last quarter of the eighth century by parallels in tomb 325⁴⁴ associated with an Egyptian scarab bearing the cartouche of the Pharaoh Bocchoris (reigned 718–712) – who is also represented on a well-known faience vase in a tomb at Tarquinia (Pls. Vol., pl. 273).⁴⁵ Finally, a sequence of fibulae has been established:⁴⁶ it includes a number of types common to the cemeteries of Veii (and other centres in south Etruria) and Pithecusa – where they are reliably associated with well-defined and well-dated imported Greek pottery types. The Veii sequence, with approximate dates, is thus as follows: Period I: ends c. 800; Period IIA: c. 800–760; Period IIB: c. 760–720; Period IIIA: begins c. 720.

As we have seen, these absolute dates for Veii are based partly on finds of actual Greek imports there, and partly on associated finds of Villanovan types (known, and defined in terms of relative chronology, at Veii) at datable stages in a Western Greek context. For all practical purposes, the chronological status of the relevant Greek material is not in doubt;⁴⁷ the nature and the historical significance of the periods in the native Veientine sequence that it fixes in time, as well as that of the actual contacts involved, must now be examined and related to the development of the Villanovan phenomenon as a whole.


Veii I is represented by cremation burials in handmade comb-incised biconical ossuaries of coarse pottery (*impasto*), interred in small well-like shafts (*tombe a pozzo*). Many graves of this period contain no more than the characteristically Villanovan biconical urn and its lid; there are comparatively few *impasto* accessory vessels; iron is extremely rare; the use of bronze is limited, and functional – mainly fibulae (some set with decorated bone or amber segments), but also sporadic spear-heads,

⁴¹ D 102. ⁴² D 276. ⁴³ D 274, 14, fig. 2c. ⁴⁴ C 17. ⁴⁵ D 182, 364–78; D 266.

⁴⁶ D 102, 327; D 87, 78; D 192. ⁴⁷ D 219, 182–228; C 15, 302–31.



53. Euboean Middle Geometric II skyphos from a IIA grave (c. 800–760 B.C.) in the Quattro Fontanili cemetery at Veii. (D 276, pl. 58j.)



54. Villanovan impasto *anforetta a spirali* of Veii IIIA (c. 720 B.C. on) type, from a LG II (c. 725–700 B.C.) cremation grave in the Euboean cemetery at Pithecusa. (D 274, 14, fig. 2c.)

ferrules and the type of semi-lunate ‘razor’ that may be considered as characteristically Villanovan as the biconical urn itself.

The growth, for whatever reason, of densely populated centres in the ninth century (Veii I ends c. 800) cannot fail to have had certain obvious repercussions in the eighth (above, p. 633): greater stability, craft specialization amounting to the appearance of a significant degree of ‘industrialization’ in ceramic and metallurgical production techniques, and the provision of greater scope for exchanges both local and farther flung. These are, at any rate, tenable deductions from the material classified as ‘Veii II’ (c. 800–720), subdivided into IIA and IIB.

Veii IIA (c. 800–760) sees a variety of innovations. Inhumation burial in trench-graves (*tombe a fossa*) appears at an early stage, and soon becomes the predominant burial rite; the ceramic repertoire now

includes examples of at least two original painted Greek types,⁴⁸ wheel-made of purified clay – skyphoi of the Euboean ‘Sub-Protogeometric’ (with compass-drawn pendent semi-circles) and Middle Geometric II (multiple-brushed chevrons) varieties mentioned above – as well as a more varied and more frequently represented range of impasto shapes; iron is used on a large scale for fibulae, and not infrequently for knives and ferrules too; the number of available bronze types increases dramatically, as does the number of actual examples of each type – mainly fibulae again, but also horse-bits,⁴⁹ and the first examples of the very different technology required to manufacture belts, bowls, helmets and urns in sheet bronze. Scarabs, and occasional faience figurines – types of gew-gaw that had been imported to Euboea since the mid-ninth century⁵⁰ – may well bear further witness, no less than the painted skyphoi, to exchanges between the first generation of Western Greeks (Euboan merchants with Levantine contacts) and the population they found in early eighth-century Etruria. The presence of similar Greek vases and Levantine trinkets at Cyme and Capua⁵¹ suggests analogous pre-colonial exchanges with mainland Campania. In the opposite direction, a Villanovan sheet-bronze belt appears to have found its way to Euboea;⁵² a good parallel for it in a Veii Period IIA grave at Quattro Fontanili was associated with a pair of imported Bolognese fibulae (Fig. 55).⁵³


In Veii IIB (c. 760–720), the majority of the painted vases are most probably local imitations of the types imported during IIA,⁵⁴ accompanied by forms – including slipped and painted impasto vases – of which the inspiration by Greek models appears to be more general than particular. Embossed linear decoration appears on sheet-bronze types; iron types are now often larger – axes, horse-bits and swords. Exotica include amber and other scaraboids and figurines, and small plaques of sheet gold. It is not unreasonable to conclude that, at the end of Veii II (c. 720), we are fast approaching a stage in which the funerary evidence is sophisticated enough to express social differentiation in death in terms of the equipment necessary for fighting (helmets, shields and swords), the personal adornment of females (fibulae and *periammata* in general), feasting (after cooking and roasting on fire-dogs) and the ceremonial preparation and consumption of special drink (much of the imported or locally imitated fine pottery). The occupants of graves that are endowed with unusually rich selections of these items may be defined as the socially superior arbiters of such important communal activities: it does

⁴⁸ D 278; *Not. Scav.* 1972, 246, fig. 36 (grave AAβγ, 1); D 276.

⁴⁹ D 173, Ortsregister s.v. ‘Veji’. ⁵⁰ C 16, 65. ⁵¹ C 16, 224. ⁵² D 103.

⁵³ *Not. Scav.* 1965, 70, fig. 11 (belt); 72, fig. 13n. (fibulae; cf. D 251, pl. 326. 2, 8, 9, etc.).

⁵⁴ D 276, 317.



55. Bronzes from a IIA (c. 800–760 B.C.) grave in the Quattro Fontanili cemetery at Veii: (a) decorated sheet-bronze belt; (b) fibula with enlarged bow; (c) leech (*sanguisuga*) fibula; (d) one of a pair of imported fibulae with lowered bow, of Bolognese type.

not seem unduly hazardous to see them and their ladies as an elite of some kind.⁵⁵ In the fullness of time, their status will be expressed in various parts of Etruria, as in Latium and Campania, by the actual form of the great monumental ‘princely’ tombs of the Orientalizing period.

In the century or so that we have briefly reviewed in the preceding paragraphs, is the story of Veii typical of the rest of south Etruria as a whole? Clearly it is not, for a variety of reasons. In the first place, Veii is the most southerly of the great Villanovan–Etruscan centres of Etruria, and therefore the nearest to the most northerly – as well as the earliest, and most obviously commercial – Greek foundations in southern Italy: Euboean Pithecusa and Cyme on the Bay of Naples. In the circumstances, it is not surprising that tangible evidence for Villanovan contact with the outside world is earlier at Veii than elsewhere: and that Veii thus emerges as a ‘mainstream’ Villanovan centre of south Etruria, along with Tarquinia, Vulci and Caere. Of these, the sequence of events in the early and late stages of the Villanovan culture are relatively clear at Tarquinia;⁵⁶ as noted above, Villanovan Vulci is practically inaccessible; and the Villanovan aspect of Caere is represented by a number of cemeteries, of which only that in the Sorbo area is available for study. Regrettably, however, the Sorbo material has been subjected to an idiosyncratic and therefore confusing process of stylistic and

⁵⁵ See below, p. 660. ⁵⁶ D 182; D 56.

chronological analysis (discredited elsewhere); and its author⁵⁷ defines the Etruscans as a new ethnic element which reached Caere at the turn of the eighth century, and coexisted in the first instance with the indigenous population encountered there. In fact, at Caere as elsewhere, the archaeological record points clearly to a high degree of continuity, both in settlement and culture, from the eighth (evolved Villanovan) to the seventh (Orientalizing) century. In spite of the apparent difficulty of establishing divisions in the Sorbo material on the lines of the Veii and Tarquinia sequences, its development seems in the main to resemble those of the other two centres; and there is in addition some indication of earlier Proto-Villanovan–Villanovan site-continuity.⁵⁸

Inland from the coastal and other mainstream centres of south Etruria, the exegesis of the Ager Faliscus and of centres such as Vetralla, Bisenzio (with the sites around Lake Bolsena generally), Pitigliano and Saturnia (in the Tuscan Maremma) revolves around the recurring question of *attardamento culturale*. As we have seen in the previous chapter, this phenomenon affects Bisenzio in the ninth and again in the seventh century. In sharp contrast, the eighth century – and more particularly its second half – yields evidence for a rich network of contacts between Bisenzio and the mainstream centres, and demonstrates that it played an important part in the diffusion of advanced culture towards the interior.⁵⁹ Relations between Bisenzio and Vulci stand out as especially significant now, and are shown in the flourishing production at Bisenzio of painted pottery, derived ultimately from Euboeo-Cycladic Late Geometric models, in an artistic milieu that seems to have its epicentre at Vulci. A magnificent crater, perhaps by the Euboean Cesnola Painter himself, has recently come to light at Pescia Romana⁶⁰ in the territory of the latter centre; a degenerate version of the same painter's favourite motif (a pair of rampant goats flanking the 'tree of life') appears on an unprovenanced barrel vase,⁶¹ now in New York, that resembles the form of others long known from Bisenzio.⁶² In addition, the funerary material there shows a substantial body of cultural affinities that are redolent of contact with a wide range of other centres and thus indicate early exploitation of the natural north–south land-route constituted by the valleys of the Tiber, Sacco, Liri and Volturnus rivers. In the medium range, this route links Bisenzio to Rome and Latium via the Ager Faliscus and Veii, following lines of communication later used by the *Viae Clodia* and *Cassia*. This is confirmed in two ways: by the similarities in prestigious sheet-bronze products and fine painted pottery from

⁵⁷ D 252; cf. *JRS* 64 (1974) 248–9.

⁵⁸ D 252, 34–5, fig. 31; D 143, 477, n. 94; and see above, p. 631. ⁵⁹ D 143, 483–90.

⁶⁰ D 93, figs. 6, 7. ⁶¹ New York Metropolitan Museum of Art 1975.363.

⁶² D 1, pl. 12, 4.


Marsiliana, Bisenzio, Poggio Montano (Vetralla), Veii, La Rustica (Tor Sapienza near Rome: Caenina?) and Palestrina; and by the differences between the contemporary repertoires of Bisenzio and the sites around the modern town of Bolsena (diametrically opposed, respectively on the south-west and north-east banks of the lake), which in turn probably foreshadow the later territorial distinction between the Roman *municipia* of Volsinii and Visentium.⁶³ Further afield, the same route connected Bisenzio, Chiusi and the territory of Vulci to the northern or ‘Capua’ Villanovan group in Campania (where the predominantly coastal southern or ‘Pontecagnano’ group shows contacts, presumably sea-borne, with coastal Etruria – Tarquinia and Caere). Not least as a result of these external stimuli, we can detect much of the social and industrial sophistication at Bisenzio in the decades immediately following the middle of the eighth century that we have seen at contemporary Veii (in IIB: c. 760–720): but at Bisenzio and elsewhere in the hinterland the promise of a brilliant future is short-lived, and the circumstances surrounding its demise are as elusive as those which attended its birth.

Between Lake Bolsena and the Apennines, there is a no less complex story of early interaction between mainstream or coastal centres (Populonia and Vetulonia) and those in the interior (such as Chiusi, Orvieto, Perugia and Volterra);⁶⁴ the story here must take account too of the relationship between Tuscany, in whole or in part, and south Etruria on the one hand and the area north of the Apennines on the other. For our present purposes, it is sufficient to note a number of basic factors.

The Colline Metallifere of Tuscany, together with the island of Elba, are rich in the metals – especially iron – that may reasonably be supposed to have focused the attention of the outside world on Etruria (Fig. 56).⁶⁵ To the north, Tuscany is the most obvious source of the raw materials required by the Villanovan metal-workers at Bologna (see below, p. 652). To the south, iron-slag has been found in an eighth-century context at Pithecusa;⁶⁶ and analysis of an unstratified piece of iron mineral from the same site has shown that it was mined on Elba. The total lack of evidence for a Greek Geometric presence in Tuscany has led to the suggestion that the more southerly of the great Villanovan centres of Etruria owed part at least of their material prosperity to the activities of resident middle-men in the trade in iron and other raw materials attractive to the first Western Greeks.⁶⁷

Populonia deserves a special mention among the major centres in north-west Etruria for its status as the only so-called coastal centre that is actually on the coast: its magnificent natural harbour might well have

⁶³ D 110, 63. ⁶⁴ D 326, 320–3. ⁶⁵ D 176, 163 (map). ⁶⁶ D 274, 18.
⁶⁷ D 276, 318; and see below, p. 661.



56. The mineral resources of Etruria: Ag – silver; Cu – copper; Fe – iron; Hg – mercury; Pb – lead; Sb – antimony; Sn – tin; Zn – zinc. (After D 176, 163, fig. 1.)

served as a reception point for artefacts and ideas from Sardinia – a suggestion that is supported by the ninth-century date generally accorded to a small Populonian tholos or ‘pseudo-cupola’ tomb (the earliest chamber tomb in Etruria), most probably of Sardinian inspiration.⁶⁸ Late ninth-century Sardinian bronzes occur at both Vetulonia and Populonia, whence we may infer the onward transmission of the others that have been found at Vulci and Tarquinia⁶⁹ – and speculate on the possibility of early Phoenician interest, operating out of Sardinia, in the Tuscan mineral resources.

⁶⁸ D 116, 4–5; cf. D 233, 85–6. ⁶⁹ D 37, 41–5.

3. North of the Apennines

The Villanovan of the modern administrative region of Emilia Romagna is represented by the numerous sites in the areas crossed by the river valleys of the Reno and the Marecchia; it focuses respectively on the major centres of Bologna and Verucchio. The material from the important recent excavations (1960 onwards) at the latter centre is not available for detailed study at the time of writing; the chronological sequence at the former, laboriously discussed for nearly a century⁷⁰ by Montelius, Grenier, Ducati, Randall-MacIver, von Duhn, Åberg, Messerschmidt, Pittioni, Müller-Karpe,⁷¹ Pincelli, Frey, Carancini and most recently Morigi Govi,⁷² provides the essential chronological *trait d'union* between the peninsula, the indigenous Este and Golasecca cultures further north and finally Hallstatt. Villanovan Bologna thus provides the backdrop to an informed assessment of later affairs, such as the Greek and Celtic connexions of Adria, Spina and Felsina.

The Villanovan culture at Bologna is characterized by cremation throughout the period covered by the two Veientine phases described above, and long afterwards. The earliest phase is that associated in the traditional nomenclature with the cemeteries of San Vitale (excavated by Ghirardini in 1914–15 and finally published in 1975⁷³) and Savena. These two eastern cemeteries were in use during the ninth century; at the beginning of the eighth, burial shifted for good to the western cemeteries of Benacci (more than 1,000 unpublished tombs, excavated between 1873 and 1875), Benacci-Caprara, De Lucca, Melenzani, Romagnoli, Cortesi, Nanni-Guglielmini, Arnoaldi, Stradello della Certosa and Aureli. Unlike the centres south of the Apennines, there is relatively good settlement evidence for Iron Age Bologna: at the beginning of the present century, Zannoni⁷⁴ published no fewer than 550 mainly circular huts. Most of these may be attributed to the Iron Age: their distribution in four nuclei (west, south, north and south-west), separated by substantially open spaces of 'common ground' (?), accords well with the 'proto-urban' status (similar to that postulated (see p. 633) for Veii) implied by the economic, social and political structure that is emerging from analysis of the contemporary graves. At Bologna, however, it is important to note that the concomitant 'phenomena of synoecism' have been attributed by more than one authority to an advanced stage of the Bronze Age.

In Bolognese Villanovan I graves, the characteristic biconical urn is accompanied by relatively few grave-goods – in the respective typologies (especially 'razors' and fibulae) of which the eye of faith may nevertheless discern the end of Bronze Age sequences side by side with

⁷⁰ D 326, 326–9, 331–57 *passim*. ⁷¹ D 219, 74–88. ⁷² D 217. ⁷³ D 251.

⁷⁴ D 323.

the beginning of their Iron Age counterparts. Certain bronze fibula types, exclusive to Bologna, already indicate the existence of autonomous metallurgical production. Villanovan II, dated to the first half of the eighth century, is attested on the outer edge of the San Vitale horizontal stratigraphy to the east and apparently to a much greater extent in the Benacci cemetery to the west. In this essentially transitional period, which thus sees a definitive change – for unknown reasons – in internal emphasis from east to west, cremation in biconical ossuaries is accompanied by an increased range of impasto accessory vessels; and progress in metallurgy is attested magnificently by a series of remarkable decorated sheet bronze belts. It is tempting to see a no less remarkable, and contemporary, decorated belt in bone⁷⁵ as positively the last appearance of the Emilian Bronze Age tradition of worked horn and bone. Villanovan III defines the period between the middle of the eighth century and some time (opinions vary) well into the seventh. South of the Apennines at this time, which surely sees a final parting of the northern and southern ways, ‘Villanovan’ is transformed into ‘Orientalizing’ by external influences associated with the earliest and most northerly Greek foundations in the West; Bologna remains ‘Villanovan’ until the arrival of dominant Etruscan interest from the south in the sixth century. Though indeed reaching the height of its demographic and economic development during Villanovan III, the Bolognese archaeological record is now characterized by features that are essentially conserving and provincial. Horse-bits⁷⁶ are a not infrequent indication of the social superiority of some male and female graves; metal vessels – cistae, situlae – and utensils are now numerous (as are imitations of them in pottery); and the San Francesco hoard, with 1,418 kg of bronze (14,800 pieces),⁷⁷ affords further conspicuous testimony to Bologna’s continued status as an important centre of metal-working. The metal-rich area of north-west Etruria, south of the Apennines, is the most likely source of the raw materials required; of the centres there, Vetulonia⁷⁸ seems to have the most direct contacts with Bologna – and the unusual quantity of amber in Vetulonian graves suggests in addition a significant degree of Bolognese mediation between the regions north and south of the Alps.

While much will doubtless emerge from the current programme of analysis and publication of the Bologna cemeteries, one aspect of Villanovan life there is unlikely to change: the seemingly total absence of defensive works round the site itself, and the equally startling rarity of weapons – which amount so far to no more than four antenna swords,⁷⁹ presumably brought from central Italy and central Europe. The panoply

⁷⁵ D 251, pl. 225. ⁷⁶ D 175, Ortsregister s.v. ‘Bologna’.

⁷⁷ D 322; D 219, 87; D 67, no. 175. ⁷⁸ D 91, 35–42; and see above, p. 649.

⁷⁹ D 67, nos. 324 (Fermo type); 332, 334, 338 (Weltenberg type).

of the warrior represented on the well-known horned animal–bird askos⁸⁰ from the Benacci cemetery, datable to the late eighth to early seventh century, is not paralleled by actual finds of the component parts (Pls. Vol., pl. 287).

In sharp contrast, it is known that contemporary Verucchio is rich in arms and armour⁸¹: bronze and iron swords from the graves; and, from the 1963 excavations in the settlement, remarkable bronze shields recalling in detail (embossed geometric decoration in concentric zones) the shields in the Warrior's Tomb at Tarquinia and in the Regolini-Galassi Tomb at Caere. A further link with mainstream south Etruria is the use of pottery or bronze helmets as ossuary-covers, a common practice at Tarquinia and Veii but not at Bologna (or indeed anywhere else north of the Apennines). The fortunes of Verucchio obviously owe much to its control of the Marecchia valley, the principal route between the Adriatic and Etruria during the eighth and seventh centuries; in addition, much could doubtless be made of its hegemony over the surrounding minor centres, presumably agricultural in character. Given the choice of a naturally defended stronghold site for the settlement, the hypothesis of a Villanovan 'colony' from south Etruria is perfectly acceptable. Fermo,⁸² in the Marche (the territory of the Piceni), also seems to be interpreted most efficiently as another transapennine projection from the south; it too has much in common with the second periods at Tarquinia and Veii.

III. THE 'ORIENTALIZING' PERIOD: c. 720–580

1. *Etruscan thalassocracy*

Two important aspects of the Villanovan Culture in Early Iron Age Etruria have emerged from the previous section and from certain considerations expounded briefly in chapter 12. Firstly, a massive demographic increase with a preference for large concentrations (arising naturally out of the continued development of sedentary agriculture and related technical skills) presents an overall pattern of settlement that differs fundamentally⁸³ from that yielded in the relevant areas by the Proto-Villanovan Culture⁸⁴ of the preceding Final Bronze Age. Secondly, the great increase in material resources, characteristic particularly of the more evolved Villanovan stage, is clearly the result of contact with the wider Mediterranean world. These tendencies are especially apparent in the mainstream (coastal and Tiberine) centres in south Etruria; and

⁸⁰ D 290, pl. 11. ⁸¹ D 160. ⁸² D 326, 323. ⁸³ D 107.

⁸⁴ See above, ch. 12, section III.

further dramatic developments under both headings are registered in the period to be considered in this section. In the seventh century, a third aspect comes into its own: Etruscan seafaring. Often regarded by others as piracy (above, p. 635) – for obvious reasons of hostility and jealousy, as we have seen – Etruscan domination of the western Italian seas – ‘thalassocracy’⁸⁵ – is a commonplace in Greek authors from the seventh century onwards. We may, indeed, reasonably assume that Etruscan seaborne activities go back as far as the ninth century: that the Etruscans in their Iron Age stage played an active, and not a purely passive, role in the progressively more intimate relations established with Orientals and Greeks is suggested by the remarkable fact that no actual Phoenician or Euboean colony was established on Etruscan soil at the time of the first foundations, respectively in Sardinia and Campania. It is hard not to connect such active Etruscan participation with the very real degree of overall ‘political’ direction that must have existed by the end of the eighth century in the individual centres of Villanovan culture. It may also be supposed that from the earliest times Etruscan merchantmen were accompanied by warships – or at least manned by armed guards (below, p. 661). By the seventh century, it appears that a proper war fleet had been set up (or more probably a number of individual fleets, one for each of the main coastal centres); sea battles could be engaged, as both written sources and figured representations indicate.⁸⁶ In addition, an Etruscan (Pisaeus, the son of Tyrrhenus) was credited with the invention of the *rostra* (Pliny, *NH* VII. 56.209) – later of prime importance in the conflicts between Rome and Carthage. These conflicts, in which the Etruscans were from the start allied with the Carthaginians against the Greeks, were a natural consequence of the situation created by the earliest Greek colonial enterprises to the south.

It remains to note that foreign – oriental and Greek – interest in Etruria was aroused in the first instance by the proximity of some of the emerging centres there (such as Vetulonia and coastal Populonia) to the metal-rich zone of north-west Etruria. Resident Phoenician and Euboean ‘agents’, artisans or merchants in eighth century Etruria can by no means be ruled out; even much later, the assimilation of aliens into local society apparently presented no difficulties to Demaratus and his retinue at Tarquinia (after *c.* 656), nor yet to his son and daughter-in-law in Rome *c.* 616 (below, p. 671). No less significant, however, is the fact that by the early eighth century Euboean Greeks were well and truly aware of the area north west of Rome: however they described its commercial potential in unrecorded private and public discussions, there can be no doubt that their references to the people they found there

⁸⁵ D 233, 82–90.

⁸⁶ D 224.

corresponded to the Tyrsenoi/Tyrrhenians of later historical usage. In this sense – surely a very real one – the Etruscans achieved a fully formed national identity by the second half of the eighth century. But, irrespective of any national image perceived by others, the Etruscan substance was and always remained as essentially cantonal in character as it had been in its Iron Age stage.

2. *Genesis of the Orientalizing movement: Pithecusa and Cyme*

The exchanges between Etruria and the outside world that had begun during the first half of the eighth century were subsequently put on a more solid footing by the activities of the second generation of Western Greeks:⁸⁷ and most of all by the establishment of the first permanent Euboean outpost in the West, Pithecusa on the island of Ischia, followed in the third generation by the first mainland colony at Cyme. It has to be admitted at once that the absolute dates of these foundations are not clear. At Pithecusa, there is so far no imported Greek material that need be dated earlier than 750: but the earliest imported and locally imitated Greek ceramic type there, whence this date is derived, stands at the head of all the sequences in a variety of component contexts – the cemetery, the acropolis, the suburban Blacksmiths' Quarter, and a number of surface sites – distributed around an axis that is 1 km in length. Such a large centre, fully diversified by 750,⁸⁸ could not have appeared overnight: a foundation date in the second quarter of the eighth century is thus indicated. An even earlier date is possible, but it is on balance unlikely to go far back into the period of the imported Euboeo-Cycladic Middle Geometric II skyphoi (Veii IIA: *c.* 800–760; above, p. 644) and their earliest local imitations: the distribution of this type coincides in space and time with that of Oenotrian Geometric pottery in southern Etruria,⁸⁹ which denotes a form of competition that would surely not have worked, or have been allowed to work, after the establishment of a firm basis for the Euboean operation. The earliest colonial finds at Cyme are Early Protocorinthian, and therefore not earlier than 725:⁹⁰ and this will have to serve, at least for the time being, as the date for the foundation of a new Greek polis on the mainland of Campania, subject to none of the natural disadvantages of Pithecusa – isolation; earthquakes and eruptions (Strabo 248) – and therefore capable, in a way that Pithecusa was not, both of commercial expansion and of the agricultural exploitation of the *chora* that typified the first Sicilian foundations (Naxos in 734, Syracuse in 733 etc.) effected by the third generation of colonists. The alternative hypothesis, according to which 'the earliest colonial

⁸⁷ D 3; D 47 (1969). ⁸⁸ D 87, 66–7 with pl. 1 (CAH III².3, 98, fig. 15). ⁸⁹ D 112.

⁹⁰ C 15, 326; D 88, 142–8.

horizon has yet to be recovered' at Cyme, and assigned to a foundation there that 'must fall somewhere within the bracket 760–735'⁹¹ has much to commend it: but, on present evidence, it blurs the importance of Pithecusa at precisely the time (c. 750–725, local Late Geometric I) when it appears to be the only permanent Greek establishment in the West – and therefore a natural magnet for other foreigners, too.

In this latter respect, it is useful to examine the contents of the 493 graves of the second half of the eighth century in the area (c. 2.5% of the whole) excavated at Pithecusa between 1952 and 1961.⁹² They fall into two broad temporal divisions, Late Geometric I and Late Geometric II, corresponding roughly to the third and fourth quarters of the century respectively. Pithecusan Late Geometric II corresponds to Early Protocorinthian elsewhere, and is thus contemporary with the earliest colonial material at Cyme. In Late Geometric I, 70% of the fine pottery is local, and 30% is imported; 55% of the personal ornaments are made of bronze or iron, and 45% are 'exotica' – usually seals, scarabs, glass pastes and precious metals (principally silver; gold is extremely rare). In Late Geometric II, 48% of the fine pottery is local, and 52% is imported; this change is partly accounted for by the flood of Early Protocorinthian funerary pottery (especially aryballoi). There is no such ready explanation for the fall in exotic ornaments, from 45% in Late Geometric I to 27% in Late Geometric II; it could be reasoned that the corresponding rise in personal ornaments of bronze and iron, from 55% in Late Geometric I to 73% in Late Geometric II, tallies with the increased availability of these metals from sources in Etruria. To judge from its grave-goods, in fact, Late Geometric I Pithecusa, which is largely contemporary with Veii IIB (760–720), looks like a reception point for goods from a range of quarters hitherto unparalleled in the Mediterranean world. The variety is already diminished in Late Geometric II; and the swift decline of Pithecusa from the first quarter of the seventh century corresponds on the one hand to the disappearance of the Euboeans after c. 696 in North Syria⁹³ and on the other to the rise of Cyme on the adjacent Italian mainland.

Many of the exotic personal ornaments counted above are clearly oriental imports. Numerically, the largest class is that of the North Syrian or Cilician 'Lyre Player Group' seals, of which there are more in Late Geometric I contexts than in those of Late Geometric II; the handful from Etruria include examples from Tarquinia, Falerii and Vetulonia.⁹⁴ The notable quantity of silver, especially in Late Geometric I graves, may be related to the Pithecusan (and Tarquinian) parallels for pottery found in the excavation of the remains of a Phoenician or Phoenicianizing

⁹¹ C 16, 230; generally on Pithecusa, D 277, D 277A. ⁹² D 277; D 277A. ⁹³ D 274, 10.

⁹⁴ D 273, 44; *CAH* III², 3, 100, fig. 17.

community of silver miners at Riotinto in Spain;⁹⁵ nearer Ischia, Sardinia (see p. 650) is another source which has not received the attention it deserves. Clear evidence for resident Orientals at Pithecusa is not lacking.⁹⁶ A coarse amphora of uncertain fabric (the form is most probably Greek) bears an inscription in Aramaic (Fig. 57) concerned with the vessel's primary (commercial and domestic) function as a container of liquid, and an incised Semitic religious symbol that refers unequivocally to its secondary (funerary) purpose as the container of an infant burial. As such, the amphora was inserted into a family plot of normal Pithecan type, within which it is well dated by stratigraphy to around *c.* 740; it is thus a generation earlier than a sherd from a locally-made vase with a Phoenician inscription, found in a context assigned to the last decade of the eighth century (*CAH* Pls. to Vol. III, pl. 378d).

Important though they are, neither of these discoveries is really surprising. Aramaic was the language spoken in the hinterland of Al Mina, the great international emporium at the mouth of the Orontes, where a Euboean presence⁹⁷ is attested from the late ninth century (see *CAH* III². 3, 9–11) – in the form, *inter alia*, of pendent semi-circle skyphoi similar to two found at Veii in southern Etruria.⁹⁸ The political simplification of Syria by the Assyrian conquest, achieved by the middle of the eighth century, could well have persuaded Syrian artisans to flee to the comparative tranquillity of the far West, where the establishment of a base by Euboeans with oriental contacts could have facilitated such emigration – to the benefit of all concerned. Phoenicia, too, fell to Assyria in the eighth century: but Phoenicians were familiar with western waters long before this. A Phoenician merchantman wrecked off Cape Gelidonya in southern Turkey provides parallels, and a round date of 1200, for seven copper 'ox-hide' ingots found in Sardinia;⁹⁹ and according to one (purely philological) interpretation¹⁰⁰ of the Phoenician inscription on the Nora Stone, the Tyre of Pygmalion (831–785) sent an army to Sardinia to protect its mining and industrial interests there (presumably in the Sulcitano highlands of the south west, rich in argentiferous lead and iron ore). In the late eighth century, a Euboean – surely from Pithecusa – painted a vase and lid (Pls. Vol., pl. 271) for a most un-Greek use in the Phoenician *tophet* at Sulcis.¹⁰¹ On the Italian mainland, a Phoenician source has been attributed to the advanced bronze technology of the magnificent accoutrements that furnished the graves of three noble Oenotrians of the early eighth century,¹⁰² interred in the Macchiabate cemetery near Francavilla Marittima (in the province of Cosenza): this coastal site is ideally placed for such sea-borne exchanges, and for exploiting the internal lines of communication –

⁹⁵ D 274, 16–17.

⁹⁶ D 89.

⁹⁷ D 274, 6–10.


⁹⁸ See n. 48 above.

⁹⁹ D 4, 52–78; A 53, 101, fig. 58.

¹⁰⁰ D 132.

¹⁰¹ C 15, 388.

¹⁰² D 319.




57. Semitic inscriptions on a coarse amphora, used for a LG I (c. 750–725 B.C.) infant burial in the Euboean cemetery at Pithecusa. Primary: (a) Aramaic KPLN ('double'); (b) Aramaic numeral – '200' (standard units?). Secondary: (c) all-purpose Semitic religious symbol (D 89, 133, fig. 2).

among them the route across the isthmus from the Ionian to the Tyrrhenian Sea. As we have seen, the trickle of Oenotrian Geometric pottery into south Etruria seems to cease abruptly with the foundation of Pithecusa. Interestingly enough, a Phoenician relief bowl has been found in a grave dated c. 750 at Francavilla (*CAH* III²3, 97, fig. 14), and another comes from a roughly contemporary context at Vetulonia (Fig. 58); apart from the Euboean zone of Campania, these two centres are also among the relatively few Italian sites which have produced 'Lyre-Player Group' seals.¹⁰³

It remains to stress that, on the Tyrrhenian if not on the Ionian side of southern Italy, oriental residents and exchanges were regulated from an early stage by the framework of a society that was firmly Greek. When the prosperous middle class – the only one so far attested – at Pithecusa

¹⁰³ D 275, 54.



58. Relief decoration inside a fragmentary Phoenician bronze bowl from Vetulonia, c. 750 B.C. (*Stud.Etr.* 41 (1973) 76, fig. 2.)

cremated its adult dead, it used a rite that recalled in detail the Homeric burial of Patroclus (*Il.* xxiii.250–7); and at least one section of the community was sufficiently acquainted with contemporary epic poetry to appreciate a reference to Nestor's cup in a metrical inscription (c. 720).¹⁰⁴ Such is the milieu within which, as early as the third quarter of the eighth century, Euboean Pitheculia provides a stable domicile and a safe port of call for Syrians and Phoenicians in the West: at this time and in this place, it is not at all fanciful to postulate the existence of an international community of merchants, of skilled metalworkers, and indeed of specialists (refugee and otherwise) in arts and crafts of all kinds. The Pitheculian 'Blacksmiths' Quarter' proves the local working of bronze and iron (presumably from Elba, and elsewhere in north-west Etruria; above, p. 649) from the earliest attested period down to the first quarter of the seventh century; there is evidence that could well imply the working of precious metals there too – measured, symbolically enough, on the Euboean weight standard of later coinage.¹⁰⁵ Clearly, it is not a coincidence that the two strands of the Orientalizing movement in early Etruscan art have been defined as Syrian and Phoenician;¹⁰⁶ and still less that they are intertwined to a particularly inextricable degree. The multiple affinities (Syrian, Cypriot, Cycladic, East Greek) of the

¹⁰⁴ C 16, 300, 343, 350; *Pls. to Vol.* III, pl. 378; *CAH* III².3, 100, fig. 16; M-L 1.

¹⁰⁵ D 87, 80–1. ¹⁰⁶ D 85, 1–2.

decoration incised on an early seventh-century ostrich egg¹⁰⁷ in the Tarquinia Museum (Pls. Vol., pl. 274) owe much to the events of the previous century. The individual motifs on this and on countless other pieces are in turn influenced by the diversion of originally religious sources and purposes to purely decorative ends: the great majority of Orientalizing products found in Etruria, whether luxury goods or mass-produced lines, should in fact be considered as craft rather than as art. Difficult though it is to disentangle subsequent progress in the various crafts represented in Orientalizing Etruria in the seventh and sixth centuries, it is most probable on present evidence that Pithecusa saw the beginning of many of them in the second half of the eighth. Towards the end of that remarkable century, the initiative passed to Cyme, and eventually – by the mid seventh century – to specialized ateliers in the various Etruscan centres themselves. Demaratus was responsible for none of this: but, when his turn came to flee his homeland, one can understand his choice of refuge.

The presence of an alien, literate, technologically advanced and commercially inclined establishment on the Bay of Naples from some point between (say) 770 and 750, reinforced on the mainland from c. 725, cannot fail to have had a profound social effect on the Etruscans emerging from their formative Iron Age stage north of the Tiber. As we have seen in the review of the Veii material in the previous section, exchanges took place even before what appears on present evidence to be the first period of Pithecusa's existence; in the opposite direction an early *anforetta a spirali* was deposited, along with Levantine aryballo and silver fibulae, in a Late Geometric I grave¹⁰⁸ at Pithecusa (Pls. Vol., pl. 270) – an admirable summary of Mediterranean intercourse at the time.

On the Etruscan side, as indeed on the Greek, we have no idea of the mechanisms which governed such modest exchanges (of gifts,¹⁰⁹ as later?), and still less of the long-term policies or short-term thinking on both sides that they must represent. But we have followed, in the period defined as IIB (c. 760–720) at Veii (above, p. 647), the emergence of an elite: ranking the individuals involved is difficult, but they cannot all have been chiefs. Do the rich graves of the evolved Villanovan stage in southern Etruria contain unusually astute individuals who owed their personal prosperity to private enterprise connected with pre- and proto-colonial trade? If they do, the emphasis (at least in the archaeological record) on armed combat is disconcerting. North of the Apennines, weapons are conspicuous by their absence; in south Etruria, they are not accompanied by a preoccupation with defence – the main plateau at Veii

¹⁰⁷ D 301. ¹⁰⁸ Unpublished (D 252, 299). ¹⁰⁹ D 123.

was not properly fortified until the fifth century. Rather than postulate 'Tyrrhenian bandits' on land to match Ephorus' alleged pirates at sea (Strabo 267) we should – perhaps – be prepared to think in terms of foreign visitors ('prospectors' or 'agents' or merchants) 'buying' access to the metal-rich area from appropriate individuals, and needing armed protection along the land and sea routes to it.¹¹⁰ These inevitably crossed a number of different territories – a factor which was for Livy an even stronger argument than chronology against the possibility of the Sabine Numa Pompilius' sojourn with Pythagoras in southern Italy: *quove praesidio unus per tot gentes dissonas sermone moribusque pervenisset?* (Livy I.18.3). This suggestion has the considerable merit of accounting for at least one paradox: the evidence for late eighth-century rich graves in Etruria is concentrated in the more southerly centres (such as Tarquinia and Veii) rather than in those of the metal-rich area itself. And one does, after all, wonder whether the choice of a base on an island in the Bay of Naples by Euboeans attracted to the mineral resources of north-west Etruria was an entirely free one. We are still, however, left with the mechanics of the exchanges themselves: and on this there is simply no evidence. It has been suggested that the foreign visitors would have dealt on arrival with the local authorities (as distinct from private individuals) in their capacity as the repositories of the community's available surplus of negotiable raw materials.¹¹¹

3. Consolidation: Demaratus

So much for the economics and for the accumulation of material benefits (by individuals, or by communities, or by both) characteristic of the late eighth century. The process continues apace in the first decades of the seventh, during which a vital new category of evidence presents itself for analysis. Writing appears in Etruria around 700, in an alphabet derived from the Euboean of Pithecusa–Cyme. One of the earliest extant Etruscan inscriptions defines the ownership and shape of a local red impasto vase (of post-Villanovan and non-Greek type) from the territory of Caere: *mi spanti nuzinaia* ('I am the plate of Nuzina'; Fig. 59).¹¹² *Spanti* is an Umbrian word, loaned to Etruscan some centuries before the first evidence for literacy on its home ground. Less surprisingly, Nuzina's plate is associated with imported ceramic types that are common in Late Geometric II Pithecusa and early colonial Cyme: they include an Early Protocorinthian kotyle, a fabric (though not a shape) that is rare north of the Tiber. As it happens, a number of other inscriptions are found in south Etruria on local *anforette a spirali* of the type that found their way to

¹¹⁰ D 116, 6–7; and see above, p. 654. ¹¹¹ D 116, 6.

¹¹² D 111, 144; *Stud. Etr.* 36 (1968) 269, fig. 3 (Casaletti di Ceri).



59. *mi spanti nuzinaia* ('I am the plate of Nuzina') inscribed c. 700 B.C. on the underside of a local red impasto plate from Casaletti di Ceri, near Caere. (*Stud.Etr.* 36 (1968) 230, 266, fig. 1.)

Pithecan associations¹¹³ first with Levantine aryballo (Late Geometric I) and later with Early Protocorinthian (Late Geometric II). An important group of early seventh-century inscriptions demonstrates that the *praenomen-nomen* combination is now in use: this may reasonably be interpreted as an onomastic symptom of progress in Etruria towards a definitive urban organization, founded on the characteristically Italic gentilicial structure.¹¹⁴ As in the case of manufactured goods such as pottery, the common use and wide distribution of the new skill of writing enables linguists to differentiate between local traditions within Etruria: distinct scripts have been identified on the basis of the different (but contemporary) ways in which the originally Euboean alphabet was modified in different areas to represent certain key sounds.¹¹⁵ From the Orientalizing period onwards, information on this complex matter assists the evaluation of relations between the coastal and the interior centres of Etruria itself; later, it is of immense value in the apportionment of responsibility among the individual centres for expansion to Campania, the Po Valley and to Corsica.

On the ceramic front, fine wares are produced by recognizably local schools from the beginning of the seventh century onwards. An early example is the so-called 'Cumano-Etruscan' class at Tarquinia,¹¹⁶ which has much in common with the output of the contemporary Greek-derived workshops at Cyme; its painted oinochoai display a number of decorative reminiscences of both Pithecan Late Geometric II and Early Protocorinthian aryballo and lekythoi. The less ambitious but equally Sub-Geometric 'heron class' (Pls. Vol., pl. 272),¹¹⁷ made at Caere and Veii in the second quarter of the seventh century, is distributed over a wider area: examples have been found as far away as Gela and Elorus in south-east Sicily. And before the middle of the seventh century, the first

¹¹³ See above nn. 43, 108. ¹¹⁴ D 127. ¹¹⁵ D 360. ¹¹⁶ D 92, *passim*.

¹¹⁷ D 116, 8; D 305, 135.

and finest bucchero is being produced in some quantities at Caere.¹¹⁸ This, the only product that can be described as typically and exclusively Etruscan, assimilates Greek, oriental and local forms and decorative motifs in a technique that must have been invented in south Etruria. Three of the earliest examples are associated with Nuzina's plate, mentioned above. Other centres (such as Tarquinia, Vulci, Orvieto and later Chiusi) soon joined Caere in the production of this unique fabric; it accounts for a high proportion of the fine pottery deposited in funerary and votive contexts between the seventh and the fifth centuries.

Side by side with pottery, there was further progress in other fields of technology. The Tomba del Carro di Bronzo at Vulci,¹¹⁹ assigned to the second quarter of the seventh century and containing an exceptionally fine range of local Orientalizing bronzework, illustrates the capacity of specialized craftsmen for serving a prosperous elite. A similar interpretation is even more likely to be valid for the increasingly numerous products of contemporary gold- and silver-smiths, and of ivory-workers. These master craftsmen cannot possibly be distinguished satisfactorily into Etruscan 'natives' and oriental 'guest-workers'. As one authority¹²⁰ cogently observed, long before the true significance of Pithecusa was recognized, 'migrations of skilled men must have played a major part in the introduction to Italy . . . of highly specialized techniques which had been evolved in the East and which arrived fully developed in Italy'. For the same authority, ivory-working is a case in point:

It seems on all counts likely that the specialized art involved came to Italy with the material from the East. Some of the earliest ivories found in central Italy must in fact be the work of orientals, and there is a strong probability that Syrian ivory-workers actually settled in Southern Etruria or Latium in the early seventh century and planted the craft there. Such a settlement would well explain the facts, for one can watch the ivories becoming steadily less oriental in character, doubtless as local apprentices replaced their foreign masters.

To a greater or lesser degree, the excellent model here postulated now has to take account of the new evaluation of Pithecusa's role, more particularly in respect of early Orientalizing precious metalwork in Etruria:¹²¹ but the significance, and indissoluble nature, of the master – apprentice relationship will always remain.

The precise nature of the seventh-century elite who patronized such Orientalizing specialists continues to elude us: but the contemporary view of them and of their families, at least in death, cannot be doubted. The great Etruscan Orientalizing 'princely' tombs of the first half of the seventh century, like the Regolini-Galassi Tomb¹²² in the Sorbo

¹¹⁸ D 186.¹¹⁹ D 273, 41, fig. 16.¹²⁰ D 85, 2.¹²¹ D 87; cf. D 177.¹²² D 237.

cemetery at Caere and the Tomba del Duce at Vetulonia,¹²³ are monumental receptacles for the tributes and treasures due to heroes:¹²⁴ and so are their non-Etruscan counterparts in Latium and Campania (the Barberini, Bernardini and Castellani Tombs at Praeneste; Fondo Artiaco 104 and others at Cyme;¹²⁵ 926 and 928 at Pontecagnano).¹²⁶ All three areas were drawing on the same sources of supply and specialized craftsmen. The exotic finished products in the princely tombs of Latium and Campania do not necessarily imply ‘invasion’, ‘domination’ and ‘conquest’ from Etruria in these areas: other models are readily available.

‘Heroes’, whether real or prudently treated as such by society, are a further measure of permeation by Greece – which naturally includes the imaginary Greece of the Greek epics. In this respect, the ceramic progress achieved from the outset of the seventh century provided an ideal medium through which all (the lower orders included) could be reminded of appropriate stories, current and mythical. The much-travelled émigré Greek painter Aristonothos,¹²⁷ who worked at Caere in the mid-seventh century, painted one of each on the well-known crater traditionally named after him: a sea battle fit for heroes (or pirates, in the eyes of the losing side); and the blinding of Polyphemus.

In addition to resident craftsmen, epigraphy enables us to infer the presence of Greek entrepreneurs engaged in the kind of mundane activities that do not usually leave traces in the archaeological record.¹²⁸ A bucchero aryballos, made around the middle of the seventh century, bears the inscription *mi larθaia telicles lex̄tum[za]* (‘I am the little bottle of Larth Telicles’); another calls itself *aska eleivana* (‘container of oil’).¹²⁹ Larth Telicles, whose name – like that of Rutilia Hipocrates,¹³⁰ painted on a contemporary oinochoe – reveals his Etruscanized Greek identity, appears at first sight to be simply the proud owner of an attractive small vase. But to judge from the other three words used in these and other inscriptions on similar vases, the vocabulary of the oil business is no less Greek than he is: *aska* comes from ἀσκός (goatskin, and so any form of leather container), which should remind us of the leather vessels for oil that have not survived;¹³¹ *eleivana* is related to ἔλαιον (oil); and *lex̄tum* is derived from a literally Homeric word (λήκυθος: lekythos), and as such most probably reached Etruria in the time of Euboean commerce. In the circumstances, Larth Telicles could be seen as the bottler and/or retailer (or even the manufacturer) of the oil no less easily than as its purchaser. Other Greek-derived names for vases¹³² attested in the seventh century are: *gutum* (Caere and Narce only, 675–625; not from κῶθων, but from the Sicilian dialect form κῶθος – perhaps a sailor’s word

¹²³ D 90. ¹²⁴ D 135. ¹²⁵ D 35. ¹²⁶ D 136. ¹²⁷ D 287; D 66, 3–5, pls. 4–9.

¹²⁸ D 116, 9. ¹²⁹ D 436, 761–2; D 111, 143–4. ¹³⁰ D 436, 155; D 109, 649, n. 4.

¹³¹ D 208. ¹³² D 111, *passim*; cf. D 364.

for a sailor's jug); *pruxum* (Caere; from the *προχόος* of Homer and Hesiod); *thiva* (Caere; from *θίvos* – understood as 'olla', the *tina* of Varro's convivial typology.¹³³ These vases are for storing, transporting and consuming wine as well as oil: and by the late seventh to sixth century there are substantial indications of a flourishing export trade in Etruscan wine.¹³⁴ A number of fragmentary Etruscan wine amphoras of this period have been found in Provence, Languedoc and Catalonia;¹³⁵ and a ship wrecked off Antibes¹³⁶ contained no fewer than 170 of them, associated with bucchero and Etrusco-Corinthian pottery datable to the second quarter of the sixth century. Discoveries like these warn us that by now metal was not the only commodity in which Etruria traded – if indeed it ever was: in addition to the urban manufacturing industries in pottery and bronze, vines and olives must have been cultivated on large rural estates for the oil and wine merchants in the ports. Greek traders might have reflected sourly that such rustic pursuits were good investments for retired pirates.

The rise of a wealthy property-owning class in Etruria may be related to its reception of yet another feature of life in seventh-century Greece. There, wealth – expressed primarily in landed property – was the indispensable qualification for membership of the new hoplite class: 'in a country as poor as Greece, one would judge that only a fairly substantial landed proprietor could afford a panoply which was not only intrinsically valuable, but which . . . required exceptional skill in the bronze-smith and a considerable amount of his time'.¹³⁷ In Etruria, which was not a poor country, the hoplite phalanx was adopted during the sixth century, and the Etruscans taught the Romans to fight with bronze shields (Diod. xxiii.2); but for various reasons the appearance of the Greek hoplite's equipment can reasonably be assigned to a period well before 600.¹³⁸ As in the case of Etruscan dress in general, distinctions in armour between elements worn in real life and those worn only in representations are not always easy to observe. Specimens of hoplite armour have been found in Etruria, however; it is in any case clear that the series of Etruscan single-grip pre-hoplite shields¹³⁹ (found in tombs from the evolved Villanovan period onwards) is characteristic of early Orientalizing, and therefore can hardly be extended after the mid-seventh century. It is worth noting that the introduction of the hoplite system in Etruria did not have the far-reaching social consequences for which it is normally held responsible in contemporary Greek history: one wonders if this could be a reflection of the difference between Etruscan prosperity and Greek poverty in natural resources of all kinds.

¹³³ *antiquissimi in conviviis utres vini primo, postea tinas ponebant, id est oris longi cum operculo, aut cupas, tertio amphoras (de vita pop. rom. i, Riposati fr. 57; cf. D 111, 145–9).* ¹³⁴ D 116, 10.

¹³⁵ E.g., D 259.

¹³⁶ D 34.

¹³⁷ C 58, 114.

¹³⁸ C 58, 116–19.

¹³⁹ D 296, figs. 1–36.

The extent of Hellenic acculturation characteristic of the middle and later Etruscan Oriental stages is symbolized, to a quite extraordinary degree of coincidence (or accuracy), by the story of Demaratus of Corinth.¹⁴⁰ As a Bacchiad, Demaratus was obliged to leave Corinth when the oligarchy there was overthrown by Cypselus (c. 656). For reasons not unlike those which had influenced some Orientals a hundred years earlier in their choice of a relatively familiar refuge (Pithecusa), Demaratus chose to settle in Tarquinia: as a nobleman who was also a merchant, he had already visited Etruria many times before. When the time came to leave Corinth for good, he took with him an appropriate selection of transparently named craftsmen: Eucheir, Eugrammos and Diopos. Remarkably, it is precisely to the last stage (c. 630–580) of the Orientalizing movement that the first examples in Etruria of their respective arts – sculpture, wall-painting and monumental architecture – must be assigned on archaeological grounds. Some of the best early evidence in these fields comes from areas far removed from the great coastal sites. The construction date of the lower building in the Poggio Civitate sanctuary (Murlo, near Siena; excavated from 1966 onwards)¹⁴¹ has been tentatively assigned to the late seventh century; its sophisticated architectural arrangements include a ridgepole tile with acroterion,¹⁴² related to the roofing system of certain late Villanovan hut urns. By the second quarter of the sixth century, decorative frieze plaques representing four subjects were being mass produced in moulds for the same sanctuary; and a local ‘Eucheir’ – still imbued, perhaps, with a late Villanovan spirit – felt able to undertake a stylistically unique group of thirteen nearly life-size seated-stature acroteria. At another provincial town, christened ‘Acquarossa’ (near Ferento; excavated from 1966 onwards),¹⁴³ painted architectural terracottas – associated with apparently private houses – should be dated to the very end of the seventh century; a similar date accords well with the late Orientalizing manner of two early painted tombs (the Tomba Campana and the Tomba delle Anatre) at Veii.¹⁴⁴ Even where actual stone and mud-brick walls have not survived, the presence in vast quantities of tiles and decorative terracotta revetments affords clear evidence for the transformation of comparatively flimsy and frequently renewed huts into more permanent houses. This is an unmistakable sign of the transition, already complete, from village to city – and in most cases to city state: a development that was reached in Italy (outside the Greek colonies) only by Etruria, whence it passed first to the Rome of the Tarquins and later to native Campania and the Po Valley (below, pp. 671–4), and finally (like so many other

¹⁴⁰ Livy I.34; Dion. Hal. III.46; Strabo v.2.2; VIII.6.20. ¹⁴¹ D 250; D 275, 56–7, figs. 20–2.
¹⁴² D 147, 181, 192. ¹⁴³ D 223; D 275, 51. ¹⁴⁴ D 131; D 133.

features of ultimately Hellenic inspiration) played a major part in the shaping of Western civilization as a whole.

From c. 630 too, the influence of Corinth is seen to particularly good advantage in the 'Etrusco-Corinthian' vases by the Bearded Sphinx Painter,¹⁴⁵ the first recognizable personality in the great tradition of vase-painting at Vulci that lasted from the late seventh to the late sixth century. This painter may have been an immigrant Corinthian; the formation of the Rosoni Painter,¹⁴⁶ active at Vulci c. 580–560, took place more obviously on Etruscan soil – as did that of the other painters (the *Ciclo dei Rosoni*) gathered around him. Caere and Tarquinia, among other centres, were not slow in joining Vulci as centres of production; already by the end of the seventh century, the foreign and home markets reached by Etrusco-Corinthian match those of the more obviously mass-produced plain bucchero;¹⁴⁷ the latter ware is found in Sardinia, the Balearics, the south of France, Catalonia and Carthage (as well as in Greek southern Italy and Sicily) between c. 620 and the middle of the sixth century. Significantly, the predominant shapes in both wares are appropriate to the concurrent trades in oil and wine.

IV. THE ARCHAIC PERIOD: c. 580–480

1. *Political and social change in south Etruria*

The expansion of industrial and commercial interests in Etruria during the seventh century, no doubt related to the contemporary expansion and change of pattern in Magna Graecia (in its turn connected with large scale social and political changes in Greece itself and in the eastern Mediterranean), led *inter alia* to the emergence of a new class: that of the rich Etruscan merchants¹⁴⁸ and landowners. By the middle of the sixth century they appear to wield the main economic and political power within the structure of the polis – and to have achieved the virtual exclusion of the elite which had been responsible for the rise of the Etruscan cities in the eighth and seventh centuries. The clearest indications of this development are yielded, as usual, by the archaeological record. The monumental tumuli, erected in the Orientalizing period over multiple chamber tombs containing exotic luxury goods, are now replaced by more numerous and more modest single-family chambers; they often take the square shape of a *dado*, typical of Caere and of the rock-sepulchres¹⁴⁹ in the interior, and are grouped along straight streets in regularly planned funerary *quartieri*. Perhaps the most striking

¹⁴⁵ D 324. ¹⁴⁶ D 85, 55f; D 105–6. ¹⁴⁷ D 298, *passim*, map on p. 235; D 116, 9, n. 20.

¹⁴⁸ *Stud. Etr.* 22 (1952–3) 193f. (D 227); D 303, 15ff, 22, 26; D 116, 13ff. ¹⁴⁹ E.g. D 104.

example of this phenomenon is that of the well-planned and far from 'heroic' ring-cemetery at Orvieto (Volsinii urbs vetus): here, in the Crocefisso del Tufo section,¹⁵⁰ epigraphy attests the presence of no fewer than ninety different families between 550 and 500. A wider and more even distribution of wealth and political power clearly provides the basis of new concepts in town-planning (which were certainly not limited to cemeteries); for obvious reasons, they lent themselves to deployment – by the Etruscans as well as by the Greeks – in new colonial foundations, such as Marzabotto¹⁵¹ north of the Apennines. In the early sixth century, too, the first pottery from Athens reached the tombs not only in the major coastal towns (especially Caere, Tarquinia and Vulci), but also inland (e.g., Orvieto and Chiusi). All the most important Attic black-figure and red-figure workshops active c. 550–475 are represented among the literally thousands of vases with an Etruscan provenance; they include no less than 75% of all Attic pottery with known provenance of the last quarter of the sixth century – there are 1,700 pieces from Vulci¹⁵² alone in the late Sir John Beazley's indices, and there can unfortunately be no doubt that many more pieces, deliberately deprovenanced for the purposes of public and private collections, have been systematically pillaged from this and other sites in the last 150 years (the process, alas, continues). Some idea of the far-reaching social changes which must have affected the major Etruscan cities in the course of the sixth century may be gleaned from the information in the sources concerning Rome under the Tarquins, Servius Tullius' reforms¹⁵³ and the links between him and the Etruscan *condottieri* Aulus and Caelius Vibenna and Mastarna.¹⁵⁴ The reliability of such tales, indirectly validated by the fourth-century paintings of the François Tomb at Vulci, is confirmed by the contemporary evidence of the votive offering inscribed with the name of *Caile Vipiines*, found in the Portonaccio cemetery at Veii. There is also evidence for the abrupt extinction, around the end of the sixth century, of a number of minor centres (with their aristocratic *castella* and sanctuaries) such as Acquarossa, Castro, Poggio Buco and Murlo; developments in this direction should probably be connected with the activities of *tyrannoi* like Lars Porsenna at Chiusi or Thefarie Velianas (below, p. 672) at Caere, and they bear witness to the emergence both of new concepts in polis-administration and of a new relationship between town and country.

How much the features and events briefly outlined above owe to the effect of contemporary upheavals in the Greek – and especially East Greek – world is not at all easy to assess in detail. Fascinating new

¹⁵⁰ D 70. ¹⁵¹ D 211. ¹⁵² D 269. ¹⁵³ D 159; D 234; and see below, p. 671.

¹⁵⁴ D 233, 96, pl. 20; D 122.

information on this complex subject is afforded by the recent excavations at Graviscae (Porto Clementino),¹⁵⁵ the port of Tarquinia. Evidence of a resident Greek community there goes back to around 600 B.C. At first, wells and post-holes, suggesting basic and perhaps merely temporary structures, provide the modest context for the inscription *ὑδρὴν μετρήν*, scratched on a pottery receptacle presumably used for measuring out water. Around 580, a more permanent rectangular building identified as a *naiskos* was erected and remained in use until 530–520: the impressive range of imported votive material associated with it includes a good deal of Middle and Late Corinthian, Attic and East Greek pottery, ‘Aeolic’ bucchero and a Laconian crater, faience, ivory and a fine *promachos* in bronze. Four inscriptions, three Ionic and one Etruscan, indicate a cult of Aphrodite – protectress of navigation and harbours. In the second half of the sixth century, especially after 540, other areas of the sanctuary have yielded votive material accompanied by inscribed dedications to Apollo and – covering the family, reproduction and food – to Hera and Demeter. Apollo is attested by *Ἀπό|λῶν|ος Αἰ|γινῶ|τῶ ἔμ|ί Σῶσ|τ|ρατος| ἐπο|έ|σε ἤο* (‘I belong to Aeginetan Apollo; Sostratos [son of] . . . had me made’) inscribed in the alphabet and dialect of Aegina on a stone anchor, part of which was later re-used in a fourth-century Etruscan building (above, p. 457, Fig. 39). Herodotus mentions a Sostratos¹⁵⁶ of Aegina: he was even richer than Colaëus of Samos, who traded with Tartessus in southern Spain. The alphabetic, dialect and onomastic affinities of the thirty or so inscribed dedications to Hera, like the archaeological material associated with them, indicate a considerable Ionian presence, principally from the area of Ephesus, Samos and Miletus; the Greek, East Greek and local lamps – an important feature of Demeter’s cult – together total more than 5,000.¹⁵⁷

The quality and quantity of high-class votive material at Graviscae (Pls. Vol., pl. 296) is impressive throughout the sixth and early fifth centuries: East Greek plastic perfume vases, a dinos of the late Wild Goat style, Fikellura, Ionic Little Masters and a magnificent bronze griffin protome; Attic Little Masters, Eye Cups and a plethora of sherds attributed to the hands or manners of Amasis, Exekias, Nikosthenes, Oltos, Epiktetos, Phintias and Euthymides. There is, too, a notable series of Corinthian, East Greek and local amphoras: if these literally represent the sacrifices of ‘tithes’, they afford further testimony of trade in oil and wine on an impressive scale. Side by side with the *anathemata* of wealthy merchants, however, the thousands of poorer gifts – such as Demeter’s lamps – are a clear pointer to the use, increasingly frequent in the late sixth century, of the sanctuary by a more modest class of person.

¹⁵⁵ D 302; D 306.

¹⁵⁶ *τούτω γὰρ οὐκ οἶά τέ ἐστι ἐρίσαι ἄλλον* (Hdt. IV.152); D 310.

¹⁵⁷ D 308, 262–85 (F. Boitani).

This is clearly the direct result of the flight from the Ionian coasts provoked by the Persian menace: after the pan-Ionian congress of 546, the Phocaeans' well-documented exodus¹⁵⁸ to join their kinsmen at Alalia (Aléria; founded c. 560)¹⁵⁹ in Corsica is doubtless symbolic of many lesser loss-cutting decisions.

The momentous events in the wider Mediterranean world can be synchronized with a major transformation in Etruscan taste. Between 550 and 480, many a refugee Ionian craftsman must have been relieved to receive commissions from the wealthy and profoundly hellenized upper class in Etruria. Nor should we underestimate the demand for products in the new style from the new and prosperous middle class, who frequented sanctuaries such as that of Pyrgi,¹⁶⁰ the port of Caere, and who were buried in cemeteries like that of Crocefisso del Tufo at Orvieto (above, p. 668). This 'Ionian' period of Etruscan art in all fields is typified by such individual enterprises as those encapsulated in the 'Caeretan hydriae' (Pls. Vol., pl. 278)¹⁶¹ and the no less distinctive 'Pontic' black-figure amphoras from Vulci.¹⁶² The latter site is by now also a leading centre of artistic bronze production: characteristic products include rod tripods (with notable East Greek affinities) and *Schnabelkannen* (bronze jugs with beaked spouts),¹⁶³ widely diffused in Italy and central Europe. The majority of the earliest painted tombs at Tarquinia¹⁶⁴ belong to the same period and style: and colours for fresco painting have actually been found in a votive context dated c. 580–480 at Graviscae.¹⁶⁵ Not least, the new fashion is reflected in Etruscan dress. Monuments from c. 550 illustrate the introduction of the Ionic *chiton*, which appears with the older 'Daedalic' form on the Boccanera painted plaques¹⁶⁶ from Caere, now in the British Museum; there, and in innumerable other representations, it is accompanied by new, characteristically pointed, shoes. These, the so-called *calcei repandi*,¹⁶⁷ are descended from a form of the Greek *endromides* seen on Spartan and Ionian figures in the second quarter of the sixth century: they are destined to feature as perhaps the most typical item of Etruscan dress between c. 550 and c. 475.

2. Expansion

Etruscan prosperity, founded in the seventh century and subsequently enjoyed to the full in the sixth, led inevitably to two principal results outside Etruria: territorial expansion beyond the Tiber and the Arno by some centres; and limitations on the maritime activities of others, imposed by interested third parties.

¹⁵⁸ D 215. ¹⁵⁹ D 188–9. ¹⁶⁰ D 260. ¹⁶¹ D 181, 198. ¹⁶² D 146; D 172–3.

¹⁶³ D 80–1. ¹⁶⁴ D 228; D 209. ¹⁶⁵ D 308, 238, 299. ¹⁶⁶ D 281, nos. 16–20.

¹⁶⁷ D 74, s.v.

On land, we are told that Lucius Tarquinius Priscus – the son of Demaratus and *divitiis potens* (Livy 1.34.1) in his own right – emigrated with his Etruscan wife Tanaquil, and founded the Tarquin dynasty¹⁶⁸ in Rome. His reign there (traditional dates: 616–578) is associated with extensive building and especially with what can only be called town planning (Livy 1.35.10 – *circa forum privatis aedificanda divisa sunt loca . . .*): from which it would appear that Tarquinius brought to Rome some of the urban arrangements to which he was accustomed in Tarquinia. Further reforms, of a primarily constitutional nature, are attributed to his successor and son-in-law Servius Tullius (578–535), an Etruscanized Latin. Some aspects of these, as recounted by the sources,¹⁶⁹ are surely anachronistic; nevertheless, the overall impression they leave is that Rome lost its ‘open’ character (so successfully exploited by Tarquinius and Tanaquil) in the second and third quarters of the sixth century. The new ‘closed system’, which now and for all time differentiated Rome from the countryside, was emphasized by Servius’ improvements and extensions to the city defences and by his allocation of foreign sanctuary-sites to areas specifically outside the *pomerium*; a feature that may be compared to the position of Graviscae *vis-à-vis* Tarquinia. Prior to the dramatic end of the monarchy in Rome, Lucius Tarquinius Superbus (535–509) is credited with the construction of the great temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus, *quae digna deum hominumque rege, quae Romano imperio, quae ipsius etiam loci maiestate . . .* (Livy 1.53.3). To that end, Vulca¹⁷⁰ – thanks to Pliny’s account of this episode, the only Etruscan artist known to us by name – was summoned from Veii to make the cult statue. The whole ambitious project is virtually contemporary with the Portonaccio temple at Veii: where the magnificent terracotta ‘Apollo of Veii’, modelled by hand (presumably Vulca’s) and painted, is one of the most famous surviving examples of the Ionian style in Etruscan art.

Inevitably, the accounts of the Tarquin dynasty provided by Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus contain a certain amount of extraneous matter generated by the requirements, especially cyclic and etymological, of the Augustan age. The fact remains that the traditional allowance of roughly three generations between the late seventh and the late sixth centuries matches the degree of material Etruscanization achieved at Rome by the time of the Tarquins’ downfall. The Etruscans did not found Rome: the Tarquins turned it into a city. In addition, the presence of an Etruscan ruling family in Rome may well have facilitated Etruscan control of the land route to Campania, of which we have seen evidence as early as the evolved Villanovan period at Bisenzio (above, p. 649). At all

¹⁶⁸ D 11, 137–55; D 159. ¹⁶⁹ Livy, 1.42–5; Dion. Hal. iv.16; Cic. *Rep.* ii.22.39.

¹⁷⁰ Pliny, *NH* xxxv.157; D 226.

events, in the second half of the sixth century, an earlier Oscan settlement was transformed into the chief city of Etruscan Campania at Capua (Etruscan Volturnus).¹⁷¹ Twelve allied city states, presumably under the hegemony of Capua, are attributed by Strabo to the Etruscans in Campania.¹⁷² The alphabet of the early sixth-century Etruscan inscriptions found in this area seems to derive from a model used in the coastal cities of south Etruria; that used in the centres of the Campanian hinterland between c. 550–450 should be aligned specifically with Veii; and Capua develops certain original features of its own.

The first stage in the gradual restriction of Etruscan maritime activities was that constituted by the continuing Greek colonial activity in South Italy and Sicily. Naval battles near or within range of Sicily are mentioned by Strabo (275) and Herodotus (VI.17,22–4); and an early imperial eulogy recalls a naval expedition led to Sicily by a member of the gens Spurinna¹⁷³ of Tarquinia, most probably in the sixth or early fifth century. There are references (Arist. *Pol.* III.5.10–11) to treaties between the Carthaginians and the Etruscans, no doubt arising out of common anti-Greek interests; this alliance has been connected with the evidence of the inscribed gold tablets¹⁷⁴ from the Pyrgi sanctuary (Pls. Vol., pl. 297) for the acceptance by the local ruler, Thefarie Velianas, of a Carthaginian cult in his port c. 500–480. Long before this stage had been reached, however, Herodotus (I.165–6) tells of a naval battle fought and won by the combined Carthaginian and Caeretan fleets against the Phocaeans of Alalia (the establishment of which was a direct threat to Etruscan interests) in the Sardinian Sea c. 540. The victory was an expensive one for the Etruscans; worse still, they were in any case under pressure not only from the Western Greeks but also from their own Carthaginian allies – who, unlike the Etruscans, had been able to consolidate and extend their power after Alalia. It is, in fact, more than possible that Thefarie Velianas was imposed on Caere by the Carthaginians to ensure anti-Greek feeling in an area noted for its ancient cultural affinity with Hellas.

After the battle of the Sardinian Sea, the Phocaeans retreated to found their colony of Elea (Velia) in South Italy; and the Etruscans increased their commitment to Corsica. The pre-Roman cemetery at Aléria has yielded the most significant group of Etruscan inscriptions outside the peninsula;¹⁷⁵ not surprisingly, they are related alphabetically to those of Populonia. But the Etruscan thalassocracy never recouped the losses sustained in 540. Accordingly, the initiative in expansion passed to the

¹⁷¹ Livy, IV.37.1–2; Vell. Pat. 1.7.

¹⁷² Strabo v.4.3; D 154.

¹⁷³ D 304, pl. 4 and *passim*.

¹⁷⁴ D 260, 730–43, pl. 4.

¹⁷⁵ D 188, 547–76 (Heurgon).

inland centres: and sights were set on the area north of the Apennines, rich in commercial possibilities in its own right – and rendered more attractive still, perhaps, by the possibilities it promised of fruitful exchanges with the remote people, barely known, still further north.¹⁷⁶

Etruscan domination in the Po Valley¹⁷⁷ is attested archaeologically from the late sixth century, and attributed in the sources¹⁷⁸ to the foundation of twelve cities – principally Felsina (Bologna) – by such legendary personalities as Tarchon and Ocnus.¹⁷⁹ Chiusi, Volterra and Arezzo provide the alphabet attested from the beginning of the fifth century in Emilia and Romagna and in the north generally. An amusing reminder of the perennial need of the centres south of the Apennines to dispose of their agricultural surplus is enshrined in the story of Arruns of Chiusi¹⁸⁰ – who set off with a consignment of wine, olives and figs to sell to the Celts towards the end of the fifth century. Less amusingly, one version of the story blames Arruns for the Celtic invasion of northern Italy: using the excellence of his products as bait, he planned to achieve precisely this unpatriotic end in order to avenge the seduction of his wife by a compatriot (who was so important that he could only be punished by foreigners). Whatever the status of this rather confused rustic figure, he was certainly not a pioneer: his prospective customers were already well provided with the products of the flourishing south Etruscan bronze industry – as the very term *Schnabelkanne* testifies in the modern archaeological literature.

On the coast, Livy (v.33.8) calls Hatria (Adria) an Etruscan colony from which the Adriatic Sea takes its name; from the last quarter of the sixth century, its commercial role was shared with Spina, identified archaeologically in 1922 and known from the sources¹⁸¹ as a Greek city flourishing on Etruscan soil. In point of fact, epigraphic evidence from Adria¹⁸² suggests that it was in the first instance an Aeginetan foundation, established in an area – the coastal Umbria of the sources¹⁸³ – rich in natural resources as well as geographically good for business; on this reckoning, Spina will have been a competitive Etruscan creation (520–510), designed to attract Greeks (though keeping them at a distance, as at contemporary Graviscae and in Servius Tullius' Rome), and therefore indeed later than Adria – which would have come under direct Etruscan control in the fifth century. More significant than questions of nationality are those concerning the cultural effect of these two great ports as clearing houses for Greek trade with the Etruscanized Po Valley and with Europe north of the Alps, and of the inevitably close

¹⁷⁶ D 140; D 75; D 76. ¹⁷⁷ D 115. ¹⁷⁸ Polyb. II.17; Livy v.33–5.

¹⁷⁹ Serv. *Aen.* x.198–200. ¹⁸⁰ Dion. Hal. XIII.10–11; Livy v.33.2–3; Plut. *Camill.* 15.

¹⁸¹ Strabo v.1.7; Pliny, *NH* III.16.120. ¹⁸² D 113.

¹⁸³ Strabo VIII.6.16; Hdt. IV.49; Steph. Byz. s.v. 'Ombrikoí'.

relationship between Greeks and Etruscans in the face of, for example, Liburnian ‘pirates’ along the Dalmatian coast to the south.

The existence of permanent links with Etruria south of the Apennines at this time is suggested by the position of the nameless centre of Marzabotto.¹⁸⁴ This important commercial and industrial city has the air of a colonial foundation on Arruns’ route from Tuscany to Bologna; its orthogonal town plan, like that of Spina, incorporates contemporary Greek concepts. Another nameless centre, corresponding to modern Casalecchio del Reno, was established where the valley opens out into the plain – not far from the Etruscan cemetery of the Bologna Certosa, which gives its name to the material culture of ‘Etruria Padana’.

3. Decline

In sum, Cato’s famous claim – *in Tuscorum iure pene omnis Italia fuerat*¹⁸⁵ – though exaggerated, nevertheless recognizes the existence of considerable Etruscan expansion, confirmed by archaeology from the Gulf of Salerno in the south to the Tridentine Alps in the north. The necessity of protecting so many different interests against the competition (Celts, Romans, Greeks, Carthaginians – to say nothing of the neighbouring Italic peoples) arising simultaneously in so many different quarters finally proved too much: Etruria had, after all, no central organization that ever felt able (outside Macaulay’s *Lays*) to concert a unified action. The term ‘Etruscan Empire’ is a misnomer.

The expulsion of the Tarquins from Rome in 509 and the waning of Etruscan influence in the archaeological record there by 475¹⁸⁶ suggests that the land-route across Latium to Campania could no longer be taken for granted by the early fifth century. A desperate attempt to capture the port of Cyme failed miserably in 474, when the Syracusan fleet summoned by the city inflicted a crushing defeat on the Etruscans.¹⁸⁷ Testimony to the end of Etruscan greatness, in the form of a battered Etruscan helmet¹⁸⁸ from Cyme, was dedicated by Hieron and the Syracusans in the sanctuary of Olympia. Unlike the Carthaginians, defeated in 480 by Theron and Gelon at Himera, the Etruscans were in no state to fight another day. In the middle of the fifth century, the Samnites descended on Campania (Strabo 249); at the beginning of the fourth, Celtic tribes drove the Etruscan settlers and colonists out of the Po Valley¹⁸⁹ – perhaps the culmination of two hundred years of intermittent raids, as suggested by the earlier representations of Celtic warriors on the grave stelae of Felsina. In south Etruria, meanwhile, the now reduced

¹⁸⁴ D 71, s.v.; D 211. ¹⁸⁵ Serv. *Aen.* xi.567; cf. Livy 1.2.5 and v.33.7–11.

¹⁸⁶ D 159, 549. ¹⁸⁷ Diod. xi.51; Pind. *Pyth.*1.72. ¹⁸⁸ D 233, pl. 16.

¹⁸⁹ Polyb. II.17; Diod. xiv.113; Livy v.33–5.

states faced indignities such as the sack of the Pyrgi sanctuary by Dionysius of Syracuse in 384 (Diod. xv.14) – on the cynical pretext of suppressing Etruscan piracy – and the inexorable advance of Rome into Etruria and Umbria. This final, fatal, encroachment was signalled by the almost yearly campaigns against Veii between 437 and 406, culminating in her destruction in 396 (Livy v.21; see p. 634) after the refusal of help by the other states in the circumstances described at the beginning of this chapter. The two characteristics which identified the Etruscans at home and abroad, their language and their dress, were slowly eliminated by Rome's progressive absorption.¹⁹⁰ The process took time: but there is no 'Classical period' of Etruscan art.

¹⁹⁰ D 445, 7–9; D 174, 171–80; D 74, 3.

CHAPTER 14

THE IRON AGE: THE PEOPLES OF ITALY

EDWARD TOGO SALMON

The trend towards more permanent settlements and diversified economies, already under way in Italy during the Final Bronze Age, continued unabated in the Iron Age and led to the development of distinct and stable regional cultures. The pace and extent of the change to regionalism, however, varied from one part of the peninsula to another; and scholarly investigation of it has been similarly uneven. The great importance and spectacular archaeology of Etruria have inevitably kept activity there at a high and constant level; Campania, too, has remained an area of intense interest, especially after the momentous discoveries on Ischia and at Pontecagnano; and Magna Graecia has at last begun to receive its due of careful scrutiny. But in the south-eastern, central and north-western parts of Italy exploration has been more sporadic. Nevertheless for them, too, the years since 1950 have brought a rapid accumulation of new knowledge, fresh assessments, and clearer perspectives; and it is with these areas, Apulia, the Mid-Adriatic region, the Italic Osco-Umbrian core of peninsular Italy and the Ligurian north west, that the present chapter is concerned.

I. APULIA AND ITS PEOPLES

Apulia (in Italian Puglia) is the region east of the river Bradano and south of the river Fortore; it extends to the tip of the Salentine peninsula. The Latin name seems to derive from the Greek *Iapygia* by way of Oscan *Apudia*.¹

Greek tradition recorded that from prehistoric times it was inhabited by Iapyges; these, however, were not autochthonous Italians, but immigrants from overseas, although from precisely where was a matter of dispute. Herodotus (VII.70) and others thought that they came from Crete. For other writers, including apparently Hecataeus (F 86–9), they were Illyrians (a generic name for those who lived east of the Adriatic),

¹ But, for the Romans, Apulia did not include the Salentine peninsula, which they called Calabria.

and the majority of modern scholars seem to accept this conjecture.²

There is in fact documentary evidence to prove that from at least the sixth century on, the Iapyges constituted a distinct linguistic group in Apulia, speaking a tongue that modern philologists have agreed to call Messapic. In view of the immemorial two-way traffic across the narrow Strait of Otranto a Balkan origin for it is an obvious possibility, but it cannot be demonstrated that it was in fact an 'Illyrian' dialect.

According to Hellanicus (*apud* Dion. Hal. 1.22.3), the Iapyges had arrived in Italy a century before the Trojan war; but it is more probable that their settlement in Apulia was the result of protracted infiltration than of sudden mass invasion.

Quite uncertain is the identity of the natives among whom they settled. These could hardly have been Oenotri. Admittedly the latter, with their alleged sub-tribes (Chones, Morgetes), were regarded by the Greeks as a predominant element in the proto-historic population of southern Italy; they were however always depicted as living, not in Apulia, but west of the Bradano; and it is there that modern archaeologists localize the 'Oenotrian' culture.

There is some evidence (Dion. Hal. 1.22.3; cf. Lycoph. *Alex.* 593) that the natives encountered by the incoming Iapyges were Ausones. These, too, were regarded as a major ethnic element in southern Italy. According to Aristotle (*Pol.* VII.10.5, 1329b) another form of their name is Osci (earlier Opici, Obsci); and tradition insisted that they once occupied a very large territory stretching from Basilicata to Campania and beyond, which is where the Romans found them (with their name rhotacised to Aurunci) in the fourth century. Even so, the Ausones, like the Oenotri, were generally envisaged as residing west of the Bradano: modern archaeologists indeed give their name to the culture of the Lipari Islands and Sicily.³

In any case, the predecessors of the Iapyges, whoever they were, could not have been completely wiped out. They must have remained the substratum of the population, and it was from the fusion of them with the Iapyges (and possibly other immigrants, such as refugees from the collapsed Mycenaean power centres) that the regional culture of Apulia evolved in the Iron Age.

In Neolithic times the porous but fertile soil of Apulia had supported a large population. During the Bronze Age this had grown even larger, and several of its many settlements then burgeoned into pre-urban communities, chiefly as the result of extensive trade with the Mycenaean

² E. Pulgram, *Italic, Latin, Italian* (Heidelberg, 1978) 63, vigorously dissents.

³ D 47, XI; *Popoli anellenici in Basilicata* (Potenza, 1971).



Map 18. Northern and Central Italy.



Map 19. Central and Southern Italy.

world. The population continued to expand in the Iron Age and, despite the Mycenaean breakdown, its contacts with the Greek world were never completely interrupted.⁴ If they were rare in the tenth and ninth centuries, it was clearly due to the disturbed conditions beyond the Ionian Sea and not, as used to be believed,⁵ to an Apulian lapse into stagnation and backwardness.

Only a minority of the population could have been engaged directly in trade. The overwhelming majority lived by farming (growing cereals especially), stock raising (mostly sheep and horses), and fishing. Surviving vestiges show that the huts in which they dwelt, at Salapia and elsewhere, were fairly sizeable, sometimes consisting of more than one room. But the evidence is scanty and much remains elusive.⁶ It is cemetery archaeology that supplies most of the information about the life of the people.

Although, as is now known, cremation had been introduced into the region in the Bronze Age,⁷ it had not been generally adopted, and inhumation remained the normal practice in the Iron Age. But the practice of doubling-up the knees of the corpse in the Neolithic manner fell into disuse. Small rock-cut tombs seem to have been the rule on Monte Gargano. At Ascoli Satriano, Ortona and elsewhere trench graves have been found; and at a number of places (including Acquarica, Altamura, Arpi, Bitonto, Gravina, Mottola, Vanze) stone cairns locally known as *specchie*, were heaped over the graves. Many of the graves show similarities with those of Dalmatia (at Nin, for instance) and, to some extent, with those of Mid-Adriatic Italy. One notable feature is that the dead were sometimes buried even inside the settlements.⁸

In the earliest graves the pottery, if any, was impasto. By the eighth century the grave goods, now more abundant, included a new painted ware of purified clay, the so-called Iapygian Geometric. The shapes do not greatly differ from those of the impasto ware, but the decorative patterns and the quality of the craftsmanship distinguish it from its predecessor. The technique and designs appear to derive from pre-colonial Greek Geometric models such as the vases found at Scoglio del Tonno.

Iapygian Geometric may have been first produced, in the wake of its Proto-Geometric forerunner, at Torre Castelluccia, but soon it was being locally made in many parts of Apulia, from Monte Gargano in the north to Gnathia in the east and to Matera in the south: a large hoard of it was unearthed in the Borgo Nuovo quarter of Taranto (Fig. 60). It has also been found in Lucania, Campania, the Mid-Adriatic region and

⁴ D 21, 77. ⁵ See, e.g., D 311, 150, 154.

⁶ F. and S. Tiné in *Arch. Stor. Pugliese* 26 (1973) 131–85. ⁷ F. G. Lo Porto in D 198, 15.

⁸ On Apulian burials, D 134, 53–63. For similar burials at Nin, D 60, 389f.



60. Iapygian Geometric vases from Borgo Nuovo. Eighth century B.C. (Taranto, Mus. Naz.; after *CVA Taranto* 1 pl. 715.2, 6, 7.)

other parts of Italy, a harbinger of the intense export trade in Apulian ceramics that flourished in the seventh and sixth centuries and later.

The new skill in pottery-making was matched by improved craftsmanship in metalwork. The repertory of fibulae becomes much wider and more varied in the eighth century. Of the many types, those with a bow that is either trapezoidal or adorned with spirals are very typical and also rare outside southern and Adriatic Italy, although by no means unknown in Balkan Europe.

Apulian trade must have been conducted with the use of metal, bronze chiefly, as the medium of exchange, and how the supplies of it were obtained one can only conjecture. Numerous hoards of metal objects (tools, some of them novel and specialized, arms, jewellery, vessels of all sorts, many of them damaged or unfinished) have been found, the earliest (c. 960 B.C. or later) at Mottola and Reinzano and others somewhat later at Manduria and many other places, most of them in the Salento and at some distance from the sea and thus less exposed to piratical raids of the kind that forced abandonment of coastal points like Porto Perone and Porto Saturo. The axe-heads, both socketed and shaft-hole types, have trans-Adriatic affinities; but the end-winged type, normal further north in Italy, is rarely found in Apulia. Some of the hoards must have been deposited for security reasons; but others may not have been collected and hidden in circumstances of danger and could have served merely as a surplus of material reserves. They imply a certain degree of social stability and fairly regular patterns of trade: there is actual evidence for such traffic between Reinzano and Bosnia.⁹

The Iapyges had not spread evenly over Apulia, nor was their fusion with their native predecessors uniform. Consequently separate tribes had developed, and after 700 B.C. ceramic evidence justifies the Greek identification of them as, from north to south, Daunii, Peucetii and

⁹ D 134, 62.

Messapii. By then formal colonization of southern Italy by the Greeks was well under way, and this was to bring the coastal parts of Basilicata and the Bruttian peninsula under Greek military and political control, dooming the native cultures in these areas. In Apulia it was a different story. Here the Greeks managed to found only one colony and that on the fringes, at Taranto. This absence of colonies did not exempt Apulia from Greek cultural influence, but for the most part it was adapted to suit the needs and traditions of the region. Even the Salentine peninsula, geographically the most exposed, remained distinctively Messapian.

The most characteristic of Apulian craft products, the pottery, brightly illustrates the strength and independent taste of the local culture. Traditional, conservative and selective in their use of Greek models, the Apulian potters produced types and designs largely of their own invention. They adhered to the tradition of the Iapygian Geometric, elaborating and expanding the style with great variety. Each part of Apulia developed its own forms and patterns.¹⁰ North Daunian vases (from Ortona, Ascoli Satriano) differ somewhat from those produced further south (in Canosa), but in general the Daunii tended to cover their vases with bands and rectangles of solid colour and to shape the handles with peculiar fantasy (Fig. 61). The Peucetii decorated their ware, much of it consisting of craters, with a *pettine* designs framing rhomboid panels minutely and meticulously drawn (Fig. 62). The speciality of the Messapii were the *vasi a trozzella*, so called from the small disks at the articulation of the handles,¹¹ on which geometric motifs alternate with bands either of solid colour or of hatching (Fig. 63). All three kinds of Apulian vases, and particularly the Daunian, enjoyed a wide market, not only in Campania, Lucania and Etruria, but also and especially in the Adriatic region of Italy (coastal Molise and Abruzzi, Marche, Istria), as well as in Dalmatia and even Slovenia. The Apulian potters continued to produce them down to the fourth century.

Funerary customs and beliefs among the Daunii are illustrated by the stelae that since 1960 have been coming to light in their hundreds near Siponto.¹² These are rectangular limestone slabs, about 60 cm high, that schematically symbolize the dead (Fig. 64). Only a few of the slabs still have the head attached to them. Incised designs, once coloured, cover one or both sides of the slabs. The dead person is merely hinted at by converging arms and hands and by items of adornment or, in the case of males, weapons. Varied geometric patterns around the border represent the funeral garb and frame scenes that depict everyday activities (sailing, fighting, sacrifices, burials, etc.) or religious practices and eschatological

¹⁰ See, e.g., J. Martens in *EAA* Suppl. (1970) s.v. 'Ortona' 566–8.

¹¹ They resemble the *nestorides* of Lucania.

¹² See S. Ferri in *Boll.d'Arte* 1962 and succeeding years.



61. Daunian vase with demon-shaped handle. Sixth/fifth century B.C. (Marseilles, Borély Mus.; after D 65, pl. 102.)



62. Peucetian crater with Geometric and a *pettine* design. Mid-sixth century B.C. (Bari, Mus. Arch.; after D 256, no. 40.)

beliefs. Birds and other animals, some of them weird creatures of fantasy, are often included in the scenes. Greek mythology and epic are the obvious source for some of the scenes, but they are treated in a peculiarly Daunian way. The stelae show similarities with those of Novilara in the Mid-Adriatic region of Italy. They date from the second half of the seventh century, to judge from the boat, leech and crossbow types of fibulae depicted on them. But finds elsewhere in the Daunian region, at



63. Messapian *a trozzella* crater. Sixth-fourth century B.C. (Lecce, Mus. Prov.; after D 65, pl. 99.)



64. Limestone stela from Daunian Siponto, incised with the figure of the dead in funerary dress. Seventh century B.C. (Manfredonia Mus.; after D 65, 88, fig. 95.)

Monte Saraceno and Castelluccio de' Sauri, imply that they had precursors.

Roughly contemporary with the fibulae on the Sipontine stelae are the small bronze figurines from Lucera with elongated torsos and twisting, sinuous arms (Fig. 65). If they are votive offerings, these could be early newcomers to the lively crowd of *bronzetti votivi* diffused throughout Italy.


The Messapic inscriptions indicate that by 500 B.C., if not earlier, the assimilation of the aboriginal substratum (or substrata) in the Sallentine peninsula was total. It had led to the formation of three local tribes there: Messapii proper astride the Taranto–Brindisi line; Sallentini along the eastern coast; and Calabri along the western. It may have been difficult for outsiders to tell these tribes apart, since they seem to have been quite homoglottic. For this reason the adjective Messapian is suitable for all three.

It is not equally applicable further north, since there the Messapic-speaking element in the population was much more diluted. Messapic inscriptions are less common among the Peucetii north of the Taranto–Brindisi line and rarer still among the Daunii on the further side of the Ofanto. The Romans later obviously regarded the Taranto–Brindisi line as a sort of boundary: for them that was where Apulia proper ended, the Sallentine peninsula being an appendage which they called Calabria, a name transferred in mediaeval times to the ‘toe’ of Italy. The tradition of fighting between the various Apulian peoples also suggests heterogeneity. Nevertheless, despite their differences, the Greeks seem to have regarded all who lived south of the river Celone as Iapyges, whether they were Daunii, Peucetii or Messapii (cf. Hdt. iv.99; Polyb. xiii.88).¹³

As late as the fifth century the Iapyges were living under ‘kings’ (Thuc. vii.33; cf. Strabo vi.231). By the fourth century political evolution had converted the monarchies into republics and multiplied the number of states. There were twelve such statelets among the Peucetii, and twelve more among the Sallentini; the number among the Daunii, Calabri and Messapii is not recorded. Many of the states issued coins with Greek legends, and wealthy local families are known to have wielded power in them, the Dasii clan of Brundisium apparently in more than one.

In spite of their political disunity the Iapyges could give an excellent account of themselves in battle. Even Tarentum, founded by Sparta, militarily the toughest of Greek states, came close to destruction at their hands. About 473 the Messapii inflicted upon it what Herodotus

¹³ Strabo vi.279 may except the Daunii.



65. Bronze figurine from Lucera. Seventh century B.C. (Oxford, Ashmolean Mus., 1836–68 Catalogue, p. 19; after D 65, 94, fig. 106.)

(VII.170) describes as the bloodiest defeat ever suffered by a Greek army, and this even though it had help from Rhegium.

The Apulian communities do not seem to have made much use of the few mountains in the region for purposes of defence. They depended rather on powerful walls to protect their centres, and at Salapia a canal system reinforced the defence. Impressive and sometimes extensive remains of their installations can still be seen at Altamura, Manduria, Monte Sannace, Ruvo and elsewhere.

Geographical proximity made it very easy for Apulian traders and craftsmen to import and often imitate the products of the Greek world: Corinthian and Attic vases, architectural terracottas, even sculptures such as the sixth-century bronze Zeus recently found at Ugento.¹⁴ After 600 B.C. Greek influence in Apulia grew steadily and ultimately it became very pervasive, particularly amongst the Messapii and Peucetii: amongst the Daunii it was more intermittent: these, however, had close and constant contacts with much hellenized Campania.

The people of Apulia quickly learned the art of writing from Tarentum. Otherwise the influence of Tarentum seems to have been somewhat peripheral: Aristotle (*Pol.* VII.9, 1329c) even says that it was not from there that the Iapyges obtained their system of Spartan-like communal meals for men. Later, after recovering from its humiliation of c. 473, Tarentum was indeed very prominent: but in the seventh and sixth centuries the chief cultural roles were played by Corinthians, then busy expanding their interests into the Adriatic (Hdt. I.163), by Ionians and by Athenians.

¹⁴ Cf. N. Degrassi in *EAA* s.v. 'Taranto' 614. Pls. Vol., pl. 264.

Hellenism ultimately affected all aspects of life in Apulia, its religion, political practices, commercial life, warfare; and it became and long remained an area from which new ideas from the east were channelled to the rest of the peninsula.

Presumably it was the hellenization of Apulia that gave rise to the tale that Achaean heroes had founded many of its towns: Diomedes is even credited with the principal Daunian cities: Arpi, Canusium, Luceria and Sipontum. More substantially historical are the immigrant Greek artisans in the region. Even Greek trading posts seem to have been tolerated there, near if not actually in the settlements.

By the fourth century hellenization was very marked everywhere. By then Apulian potters were concentrating on imitations of Greek models, and one fourth-century observer says that Hydruntum was as Greek as Tarentum itself (Ps. Scylax, *Periplus* 14; cf. Ath. xii p. 523). Nevertheless Apulian receptiveness was not total. The region retained much of its own distinctive character. Its Greek-type red-figure vases in size, designs and plastic decoration are unmistakably Apulian. The noted fourth-century tomb-painting at Ruvo may be Greek in composition, but the way colour is used to give the dancing mourners their rhythm and movement is Apulian. So, too, with mythology and epic: Calchas and Diomedes were accepted, but naturalized into Iapygians. The gods themselves were not immune: Zeus was identified with Menzana and endowed with the latter's equestrian traits.

The linguistic evidence tells a similar story. Clearly Greek was widely known throughout the region and bilingualism, if not polyglottism, must have been common.¹⁵ Of the inscriptions from Apulia those in Messapic contain many graecisms, and even the later ones in Latin have some. But Greek apparently never became a family language there, no matter how much used in trading transactions or in sophisticated social circles. Nor are inscriptions in the Greek language, as distinct from the Greek script, found in Apulia, except at Taranto and very, very rarely in the port city of Brindisi.¹⁶

Our knowledge of protohistoric Apulia now seems likely to be very soon greatly augmented. In 1983 a large carstic cavern at Roca Vecchia, just north of Otranto, was found to have its walls covered with innumerable incised designs and graffiti. The latter date from the fourth century and later and are nearly all in Messapic, only a few (the very latest, from the second and first centuries) being in Latin. They seem to be addressed chiefly to Thaotor, presumed (by Cosimo Pagliara, who discovered them) to be the otherwise unknown god immanent in the cavern.¹⁷ If and when they are unscrambled and minutely studied, these

¹⁵ Note the implication of Plaut. *Mil. Glor.* 648; and see R. Giacomelli, *I grecismi nel messapico* (Brescia, 1979). ¹⁶ *IG* xiv 672, 674.

¹⁷ See Pagliara's own account in *Il Messaggero* 28 August 1985, 4.

graffiti may well provide the clue for understanding the Messapic language.

By the fourth century, and probably earlier, another ethnic group was making its presence felt in Apulia. These were speakers of Oscan, and it was probably the Iron Age expansion of the Italic peoples,¹⁸ to be described later in this chapter, that had brought them into the south east. They can hardly have been identical with the Daunii, but may well have been offshoots of the Frentani.¹⁹ Strabo (vi.286; v 1.285) calls them Apuli. But for Horace (*Sat.* 1.5.77; II.1.38) and Roman writers generally (and apparently even for Strabo himself in other passages: see, e.g. vi.277) Apuli was a generic term for all who dwelt north of the Taranto–Brindisi line, just as for Herodotus and Polybius Iapyges had been the generic name for all who dwelt south of the Celone. A better generic for the Oscan-speakers of northern Apulia would be Sabelli.

Whatever name be chosen for them, coin legends indicate that by the fourth century not only were they firmly astride the Fortore, on whose right bank they had a powerful bridgehead at San Paolo di Civitate (Oscan Teate; Latin Teanum Apulum), but were also to be found in the Daunian lands well south of the river at Lucera (Luceria), Ascoli Satriano (Ausculum), and possibly at Arpi, whose very name may be Italic (cf. Arpinum). They do not seem, however, to have controlled much Peucetian territory: there Oscan is conspicuous by its absence.

Presumably the Oscan-speakers contributed to the fourth-century increase in military activity in Apulia noted by ancient writers and archaeologically confirmed by a great strengthening of the fortifications of Manduria and other cities.²⁰ Simultaneously, especially in Daunian Apulia, there was some reduction of imports and for the time being a decline in Greek influence. From now on, too, Canusium replaced Arpi as the principal Daunian centre (Strabo vi.283, corroborated by archaeology).

By the end of the fourth century, however, Roman power had begun its penetration of Apulia, and this brought Sabellian military expansion there to an end; but it was also to bring an end to the sovereign independence of all the peoples of the region.

II. THE MID-ADRIATIC REGION

The strip of territory roughly 50 km wide that lies east of the main crest of the Apennines and stretches along the central Adriatic coast between the rivers Foglia and Pescara (Aterno) is usually and conveniently called

¹⁸ For the meaning given to 'Italic peoples' in this chapter see below, p. 669.

¹⁹ See, however, D. Briquel, *MEFRA* 86 (1974) 28.

²⁰ On Apulian fortifications, B. d'Agostino in *PCIA* 2 (1974) 241.

Picenum. But to use this Roman designation is more than a little misleading, since the area concerned, corresponding roughly to today's Marche and northern Abruzzi, greatly overlaps in both directions the limits of Picenum as laid down by Augustus.²¹ Accordingly in this chapter the expression Mid-Adriatic, recently proposed for this part of Italy, will be adopted: although cumbersome it is at least geographically suitable.²²

No account of the Mid-Adriatic culture survives from antiquity. The Greeks had no formal colonies anywhere near the region before the foundation of Ancona c. 400 B.C. and consequently had little reason to write about it;²³ and Roman interest there was negligible until a hundred years later still. Hence only archaeology and epigraphy supply documentation.

They reveal a culture that developed gradually during the Iron Age, assimilating many heterogeneous elements. Archaeological finds indicate that there had been a Proto-Villanovan phase at Pianello di Genga, Massignano and Ancona in the Final Bronze Age. Moreover Villanovan cemeteries of the Early Iron Age have been unearthed, one recently at Verucchio on the inland edge of the Mid-Adriatic region and others at Fermo in the very heart of it (cf., too, Strabo's record of a prehistoric 'Etruscan' foundation at Cupra: v.241).²⁴ These Proto-Villanovan and Villanovan influences were absorbed, and from the ninth century onwards a regional culture evolved in Mid-Adriatic Italy that was to attain its apogee in the sixth century and preserve its particular character down to 400 B.C., when it was not so much overwhelmed by Gallic pressure from the north as caught up in the Italic diffusion spreading over central Italy.

Excavation since 1950 of some settlements and many cemeteries has shown that the Mid-Adriatic culture was less unitary than has sometimes been asserted. The river Tronto in particular served as some sort of dividing line between the northern part of the region and the southern. Moreover it is possible to identify seven successive phases in Mid-Adriatic cultural evolution.²⁵ Nevertheless much of the same tradition persisted through all the variety and change and the general *facies* is sufficiently homogeneous and distinctive to be unmistakable.

The population was evidently engaged largely in agrarian pursuits: there was much stock-raising, hunting and fishing, and dairy products were almost certainly important staples. A large sector of the population,

²¹ Augustan Picenum was bounded by the river Aesis in the north and the Matrinus in the south: Strabo v.241; cf. Pliny, *NH* III.110–11.


²² D 96, 43; but note the reservations of D. G. Lollini in *PCIA* 5 (1976) 113.

²³ E. Wikén, *Die Kunde der Hellenen von dem Land und den Völkern der Apenninenhalbinsel* (Lund, 1937) 146f. ²⁴ D 326, 323. ²⁵ Lollini, *ibid.* 122–57.

however, must have been involved in trading operations of a relatively wide range. From the ninth century, if not earlier, there were close contacts and frequent exchanges between the Mid-Adriatic region and the Liburnian and Istrian zones across the Adriatic. There was also, as noted above, active trade with Apulia, and the rituals and customs of the two regions show definite similarities. Another trading partner was Venetic Este, the probable transmitter of the Orientalizing designs that clearly caught on at Fabriano, Pitino di San Severino and other Mid-Adriatic sites; and it may also have been through the Veneti that Hallstatt influences reached the region. The rivers that traverse the region, especially its southern section, served as arteries of communication with Tyrrhenian Italy and there was a good deal of traffic with Etruria and the Faliscan territory, particularly after 540, when the Tyrrhenian thalassocracy of the Etruscans declined and obliged them to bring in their imports by way of the Adriatic. The Greek presence did not become very marked until the sixth and fifth centuries. An effect of this trade was to make rocky Numana (as Silius Italicus calls it: VIII.431) a port of as much consequence as Spina or Adria. Ancona acquired importance only later, after its colonization by the Syracusans *c.* 400 B.C.

Inhumation, not cremation, was normal in the Mid-Adriatic region. Early in the Iron Age (ninth/eighth centuries) the corpse was laid, usually clothed, on its right side and with its knees doubled up, on a thick layer of gravel at the bottom of an east–west orientated trench grave that was then filled in with stones and earth. This simple rite later underwent changes. From 700 B.C., or earlier, doubling-up of the knees gradually ceased and the corpse then began to be placed supine or prone; the layer of gravel dwindled and finally, *c.* 500 or a little later, was dispensed with almost entirely. Some of the larger, opulent tombs of the sixth and fifth centuries were surrounded by one or more circles of stones (as at Campovalano, Moie di Pollenza, San Severino); others (at Fabriano, for instance) were covered with stone tumuli similar to those in Apulia; at Numana there were interior flights of steps; and further north, at Novilara, important tombs were singled out by uninscribed stelae suggestive of those at Siponto. Even wagon burials have been found (for example at Grottazzolina); and after 400 Celtic practices, such as the sacrifice of a horse and the ritual breaking of weapons, began to be adopted (at San Ginesio, Camerano and elsewhere). But everywhere inhumation remained the almost invariable practice.

The earliest graves contained little or no pottery. But already in the eighth century the typical Mid-Adriatic small *kothon* had made its appearance (Fig. 66); and as specimens of it have been found, together with the tell-tale layer of gravel, in the Villanovan necropolis at Fermo, one can assume that the Mid-Adriatic culture was already showing its



66. Mid-Adriatic bowl, conventionally known as a *korbon*, in use from the ninth century B.C. (After *PCIA* 5 (1976) pl. 118.)

assimilative capacity.²⁶ After 700 pottery was placed in the tombs in increasing quantity: much of it was locally produced and by the end of the seventh century it was exhibiting a great variety of new shapes.²⁷ The Mid-Adriatic craftsmen were skilful at adapting borrowed techniques and models to their own purposes with distinct originality. This is well illustrated at Campovalano, where an impressive array of impasto ware has come to light, some of it displaying Faliscan and Apulian elements.

The earliest imported pottery is Iapygian Geometric of the eighth century; and this Apulian connexion was maintained in the seventh century and later when much Daunian ware made its way into the region. From c. 650 Etruscan bucchero was also coming in, and it was soon imitated in local types of bucchero. By the late sixth century and early fifth Greek black- and red-figure vases were to be found, even at inland points like Tolentino and Pitino.

Before the eighth century there were no metal objects in the graves except for a few pins and fibulae. But after 800 tools and arms, some of them of iron, gradually made their appearance and by the end of the seventh century iron is common. Military equipment (in the form of ribbed spear-heads, north Italian long and, increasingly, south Italian short swords, disk cuirasses, etc.) was regularly placed in male tombs. Some of the weapons are similar to those found in Balkan Europe (e.g. scimitars, oddly angled daggers), others exclusively Mid-Adriatic (e.g. daggers with triple-antennaed hilts).

Other metalwork includes household utensils and in the prosperous seventh to fifth centuries innumerable objects of adornment. Both male and female graves contain a great deal of jewellery, its main types being chain pendants, head-bands, massive neck ornaments etc., almost all of bronze. A pendant in the shape of a two-headed bull (or ram), which

²⁶ *Ibid.* 129.

²⁷ Note, e.g., the elegant anthropomorphic vases at Campovalano.

perhaps served as an amulet, was very popular (Fig. 67). Fibulae, usually of bronze until 600 B.C., and of all shapes and sizes, some as much as 20 cm long and 7 cm wide, have been found in enormous numbers: in a sixth-century cemetery at Numana there were thousands, more than five hundred of them in a single female tomb.²⁸ The types are often fanciful, some of them rare, obsolete or unknown elsewhere in Italy, even though common in the Balkans, like the spectacle fibula with twin spirals on its bow. Spirals, in fact, were much in vogue on both sides of the Adriatic: they are a standard feature of Mid-Adriatic decoration and jewellery. Mid-Adriatic metalwork of the highest quality is to be found in such objects as the bronze *cistae* from the Orientalizing tombs (at Fabriano with stylized stag designs, peculiar to the region, Fig. 68).²⁹

The grave goods also included articles of glass, amber (in abundance, especially during the sixth century), bone or even ivory (at Belmonte, Castelbellino, Numana, Pitino di San Severino),³⁰ some silver and a little gold. Objects of personal adornment cease, however, after 500 B.C.

The amber, the ivory and the raw materials for the metal articles were all imported. For that matter so were many of the finished products including some splendid vessels from workshops of southern and Faliscan Etruria, Cisalpine Italy or the further shore of the Adriatic. How the region could afford to import so much is not immediately obvious. Its export of cereals and other produce could hardly have paid for everything. The suggestion that its inhabitants profited from transit trade, from working the amber locally, and perhaps from mercenary soldiering is plausible. Another conjecture is that they engaged in slave dealing.³¹

The stelae at Novilara, noted earlier, illustrate the ability of Mid-Adriatic designers. To incise the scenes of sailing, hunting and combat on them the same technique was used as on the Daunian stelae, the figures however being curvilinear instead of rigidly geometric and drawn with a lively spontaneity.


A more important feature of Mid-Adriatic culture is the monumental sculpture. Slabs or blocks of stone over 1 m high (one over 2 m), inscribed and sometimes vaguely anthropomorphic in appearance, have been known from the region since 1843. But far more impressive are some newer finds. In 1934 the limestone statue of a standing warrior belonging to the late sixth century was discovered near Capestrano (Pls. Vol., pl. 299). Larger than life-size the Warrior is represented in full panoply with a disk cuirass on his chest and back. His hands are placed

²⁸ D 15, II 170; Lollini, *op.cit.* 177.


²⁹ See B. Stjernquist, *Ciste e cordoni* (Lund, 1967); O. H. Frey, *Die Entstehung der Situlenkunst* (Berlin, 1969) 76.

³⁰ The figured ivory of Pitino is particularly worthy of mention.

³¹ Lollini, *op.cit.* 118, 168.



67. Mid-Adriatic bronze pendant. Sixth century B.C. (Ancona, Mus. Naz. 19003; after D 256, no. 69.)



68. Mid-Adriatic bronze cista from Fabriano of the so-called Ancona type. Seventh/sixth century B.C. (Ancona, Mus. Naz.; after D 65, 368, fig. 427.)

ritually across his body. He is flanked by two upright side-supports, of which the one on his right bears a long inscription written in an alphabet derived from the Greek. Except for these letters, however, there is nothing Greek about the statue.³² Finds since 1934 establish its iconography as peculiarly Mid-Adriatic. Fragments of large sculptures have been discovered at Atessa and Rapino, displaying the same frontality and the same ritual gesture of arms and hands, and a carved slab

³² D 20, 5, 11.

from Guardiagrele is also iconographically related. Moreover the features of the Warrior strikingly resemble those of the roughly contemporary large head from Numana. It might be added that the visage also recalls the schematic heads of the Sipontine stelae and the funerary sculpture from Istrian Nesazio.³³

No information survives concerning Mid-Adriatic political organization. It would be surprising if it were unitary. The many rivers flowing from the Apennines into the Adriatic, roughly parallel with, but also separated from, one another by mountain ridges, split the region into compartments, and it is not known that one compartment united itself with others.

The plethora of weapons in the graves must mean that the men were often called upon to fight, and the many representations of Mars in the votive deposits suggest the same thing. The warfare may not have been exclusively internecine: the wealth of the region was more than sufficient to tempt external attackers. Oddly enough, however, the settlements do not seem to have been protected with walls of stone.

Mid-Adriatic cultural influence extended far afield.³⁴ Artefacts of strikingly Mid-Adriatic appearance have been found at more than a few sites between the rivers Pescara and Biferno: for instance at Alfedena, Casteldieri and Paglieta (in what were later respectively Samnite, Paelignian and Frentanian territories) and even as far west as the valley of the lower Tiber.³⁵ The unanswered question is: What was the population that developed the culture?

That it was very mixed seems certain. The substratum (the element responsible for the burial custom?) presumably consisted of people who had been in the Mid-Adriatic region from Neolithic times. Whether or not those who brought Proto-Villanovan and Villanovan usages there in the Final Bronze and Early Iron Ages were intruders, they were assimilated. More indubitably immigrant were newcomers from across the sea, whose arrival during the Iron Age or earlier goes far to explain the trans-Adriatic elements in the culture of the region. That there were such immigrants seems certain, even though the ancient texts recording their presence are not all equally trustworthy. Festus' tale (p. 248L) of an Illyrian origin for the Paeligni is hardly convincing as it stands: perhaps it has to be interpreted as meaning that all Italic originated from the Balkans. Much more to the point, however, are the repeated references to Iapodes (i.e. Iapyges) in the Iguvine Tables (1b17; 1b54, 58, 59; VIIa12, 47, 48) and the Elder Pliny's allusion to a 'Liburnian' community still existing in Picenum in his own day (*NH* III, 110). Even the patently trans-

³³ V. Cianfarani in *PCIA* 5 (1976) 77–86. ³⁴ D 96, 32–8; D 114, 316.

³⁵ M. R. Giove and G. Baldelli in *Studi in onore di F. R. Vonwiller* (Como, 1982) II 646f.

Adriatic Asili of Silius Italicus (VIII.445) may not be a figment of that poet's usually prosaic imagination. Possibly it was the trans-Adriatic element that brought the name Picenum into the region: the word may be Illyrian.³⁶

The early inscriptions that have been found in the region confuse the ethnic picture of Mid-Adriatic Italy still further. They are written in a variety of scripts, all deriving ultimately from Greek writing, possibly through Etruscan intermediaries. These inscriptions fall into two groups. The four as yet untranslated northern documents from near Pesaro in what the Romans later knew as the *Ager Gallicus* include the long and well preserved one from Novilara which seems to date from c. 500 B.C.³⁷ It is impossible to say whether the language should be reckoned 'Illyrian' or something else and perhaps not even Indo-European.

The other group of inscriptions, now numbering more than twenty, all come from south of Ancona, some of them, including the longest, from as far south as the other side of the Aterno-Pescara.³⁸ Written in a primitive script, they are conventionally known as 'South Picene', even though some of them were found in north Picenum (the region between the rivers Esino and Tronto) and others outside Picenum altogether. The archaeological context of the document from Campovalano suggests 550–450 B.C. as the date for them.

That the language of these 'South Picene' documents might be Indo-European has always been recognized; and its relationship to the Osco-Umbrian dialects of the *Italici*, rendered probable with the finding of the Loro Piceno inscription in 1943, now seems definitely confirmed by La Regina's discovery in 1973 at Penna Sant'Andrea near Teramo of three early fifth-century 'South Picene' texts that clearly allude to Safineis, the name by which the historical *Italici* (or at least those with Oscan-type vernaculars) evidently called themselves.³⁹ Admittedly the 'South Picene' language still cannot be interpreted with certainty; but there is little doubt that it is a forerunner of the Osco-Umbrian dialects of historical times.

The find-spots of the documents are of great interest for later developments. Four of those found north of the Tronto or near Ascoli Piceno allude to a people called Pupeneis or something similar: could these be the Italic Picentes known to the Romans? Similarly the larger number, from the part of the Abruzzi between the Tronto and the Aterno-Pescara, were discovered in what were the habitats later of the Italic Praetuttii and Vestini; and the inscriptions from Casteldieri and Crecchio, both south of the Aterno-Pescara, likewise come from Italic

³⁶ E. Norden, *Alt-Germanien* (Leipzig, 1934) 229–31. ³⁷ D 378, 393–400.

³⁸ D 434, 561–84. ³⁹ D 429, 113–58.

areas, respectively the territories of Paeligni and Marrucini. Attention can also be directed to two other 'South Picene' texts from securely Italic regions: one found years ago near the Fucine Lake and since lost, and another that turned up on a bronze bracelet in the central Abruzzi in 1979 and seems to mention Umbri.⁴⁰

It is difficult to resist the conclusion that all these Osco-Umbrian peoples of the fourth century must have descended for the most part from the 'South Picene' speakers of the sixth and fifth. But by what formative process they had been brought into being and how long they had been in the Mid-Adriatic region one can only conjecture. The ancient tradition that the Italici were conducted to Picenum by a *picus* (woodpecker) is an aetiological fiction devoid of chronological context (Strabo v.240; Pliny, *NH* III.110; Festus p. 235 L). The earliest concrete reference to Italici in the region is the statement by Ps. Scylax (*Periplus* 15, 16) that the Adriatic coastline was in the hands of 'Samnites' from Monte Gargano to Ancona and of 'Umbri' from Ancona to the Gulf of Venice. In the present writer's opinion, Ps. Scylax was writing in the middle of the fourth century, but clearly Italici of some sort had been in the Mid-Adriatic region for more than a hundred years before then and perhaps very many more.

Recently it has been suggested that the ancestors of all Italici came to Italy, long before the Iron Age, by way of the Adriatic and that some of them had remained in the Mid-Adriatic region ever since.⁴¹ But, whether that was the case or not, it seems highly probable that, during the great expansion of the Italic peoples in the sixth and fifth centuries, to which allusion has already been made, groups from the mountainous interior of Italy expanded not only into Campania (as they can be shown to have done), but also into the Mid-Adriatic region and ultimately made themselves masters of it. As the many weapons in the graves there make it unlikely that they could have done so peacefully, one is obliged to assume that the formation of the historical Picentes, Praetuttii and Vestini took place in a turbulent environment. Indeed the violence may have taken the ancestors of these people into areas distant from the Mid-Adriatic region. Modern toponymy confirms the tradition that the Campania-Lucania border zone was held in antiquity by Picentes (or Picentini). Allegedly they had been transferred to the area from Picenum by the Romans in 268 B.C. (Strabo v.251; Pliny, *NH* III.70, 110). But some of them may have been there well before 268. There was certainly regular traffic between the Mid-Adriatic region and southern Campania in the sixth century. One indication of it are the 'Picene' bronzes and pottery of Mid-Adriatic type found, together with local products, in the cemetery of Oliveto Citra in the valley of the Sele.⁴² Furthermore in 1973 two (sixth-century?)

⁴⁰ J. Whatmough, *Prae-Italic Dialects* (Cambridge, 1933) II 257.

⁴¹ D 235, 91-6

⁴² P. S. Sestieri, *Not. Scav.* 1977, 211-29.

inscriptions were found, at Nocera and Vico Equense respectively, somewhat resembling in script and language the 'South Picene' documents (Pocetti nos. 144, 145). They are inscribed on bucchero vases and might have reached southern Campania through trade or Mid-Adriatic influence. But that they were written by Italic residents there is also a distinct possibility: sixth-century Etruscan inscriptions from nearby Fratte contain names of an Oscan type.⁴³ Moreover, since 1973, two more documents in 'South Picene' script (and language?) have been reported from the Tyrrhenian side of Italy: one (of the sixth century?) is said to have been found at Capena, a town that despite its location seems in historical times to have spoken neither Faliscan nor Etruscan; the other was found at Cures, the principal settlement of the Sabini in Roman times, and appears to belong to the fifth century.⁴⁴

III. THE ITALIC EXPANSION

Italian scholars define as Italic all peoples that spoke Osco-Umbrian dialects. Ancient authors, it is true, do not confine the expression to these. Nevertheless the restrictive meaning for Italic can perhaps be justified because of Cicero's name for the Social War (91–87 B.C.), *bellum Italicum*, the war in which all the insurgents were (or once had been) speakers of Osco-Umbrian dialects.⁴⁵

The peoples, who under this definition can be designated as Italic by the fifth century, must have been in Italy since at least the Bronze Age. But it was only in the Iron Age that their specific tribes could be identified and assigned ethnic labels.

The ancients postulated an ultimate point of origin for them all in the Sabine region bounded by the rivers Tiber, Anio, Nera and upper Aterno (cf. Dion. Hal. II.49; Strabo V.228, 250), envisaging Umbri and Sabini as originally one people who, however, split apart and then splintered still further by resorting repeatedly to a Sacred Spring. This was a religious rite, historically documented, whereby a group vowed to devote all creatures born to it in the following spring to Mars and to send forth the young people born then to seek a new abode, on their coming of age, under the guidance of an animal sacred to the god.

In view of the linguistic relationships, one must concede a modicum of truth to this naive version of the Italic diaspora, especially as it was recorded by Italiotes, in whose presence and often at whose expense the later stage of the expansion took place.⁴⁶

The original core of the Italic peoples is undoubtedly to be sought in

⁴³ D 154, 306; D 169, 92.

⁴⁴ A. L. Prosdocimi in *Sannio: Atti del Convegno, 1980* (Isernia, 1984) 65.

⁴⁵ For a different definition of 'Italic' see below, p. 690.

⁴⁶ For the complexity of the process see D 11, 9.

the heart of the Apennines, but there is little archaeological evidence for their beginnings. In the earliest Iron Age they were nomadic shepherds who lingered in a delayed and uniform primitivism and have left nothing to enable one to distinguish separate Umbrian and Oscan cultures.

Such evidence as there is, from cemeteries at Camporeatino, Monteleone di Spoleto, Piediluco and Terni (tenth to seventh centuries), suggests that in the mountainous habitats of the early Italic the end of the Bronze Age and the advent of the Iron witnessed the introduction of some sporadic cremation to the prevailing inhuming culture, but otherwise for long brought little change to the common Apenninic pattern of a population more heavily dependent on pastoralism than on subsistence agriculture.⁴⁷

At first the inhabitants of the mountain districts may have lived in groups that all used what was virtually the same vernacular ('South Picene?'). Perhaps it is in such undifferentiated forebears of the historical Italic that one is to seek the Aborigines of the ancient antiquarians (see Dion. Hal. 1. 14, here citing Varro). North of the Fucine Lake, however, in the region of the high Apennines, the lofty peaks (Monte Sirente, Gran Sasso, Monte Vettore, etc.), that make up the principal ridge, kept the dwellers on the western slopes from easy or daily contact with those on the eastern, with the result that two groups of dialects developed, an Umbrian group west of the great divide and an Oscan group east of it. A line running due south from Ancona on the Adriatic to Gaeta on the Tyrrhenian marks the approximate frontier between the two idioms.⁴⁸

South of the Fucine Lake the situation was different. There the mountains are low enough for passage to be relatively easy, and even their peaks could be used for summer pasturage of sheep and goats, especially the former. Hence transhumance was feasible and movement between the western and eastern slopes constant. Here, therefore, two tongues did not develop; the vernaculars all remained basically the same language, Oscan and dialects of Oscan.

Raids and counter-raids for the use of suitable pastures must have been unceasing and the nomadic herdsmen needed to be armed to protect their animals. The Sacred Spring could have originated under violent conditions like these as a religious exercise for enlisting divine aid in the struggle for the next transitory feeding ground.⁴⁹

When, as elsewhere in Iron Age Italy, agriculture became more diversified and important and the population more numerous and sedentary, relations between farmers and herdsmen had to be regularized

⁴⁷ See U. Rollini, *Bull. Paletn. Ital.* 33 (1933) 63–96; D 258, *passim*. But note the remarks in D 54, 195–9.

⁴⁸ The names of Umbrian (probably) and Oscan (certainly) derive from the subjugated natives: D 144, 56f. ⁴⁹ D 199, 24–7.

and some sort of order ensured for the unavoidable pastoral migrations. Presumably it was then that clans fused and tribes formed, and such extraneous and possibly indigenous elements as the wandering groups had encountered were absorbed. Tribal formation of this sort was probably in full swing during the Early Iron Age (that is, before 700 B.C.), a period for which there is as yet little archaeological evidence apart from some fibulae of uncertain provenance, a few cemeteries north of the Fucine Lake and a handful of speartips and swords from the Molise region.

The similarity of the Osco-Umbrian dialects indicates that all Italic were somehow related. But kinship did not mean that the Italic tribes were all alike (note Strabo's remarks on their diversity: VI.254), and it certainly did not cause them to unite. As elsewhere, differing ethnic mixtures made for heterogeneity. One small symptom of it can be seen in the manner of disposing of the dead: although the general practice of all Italici was inhumation, in the parts of Umbria and of southern Italy most exposed to Etruscan or Italiote influences cremation was sometimes adopted. Ultimately, however, the members of a group became sufficiently conscious of their own distinctiveness to realize that they constituted a separate *nomen*. Livy (x.38.6) takes such a sense of tribal solidarity for granted when he records how the highlanders of Samnium in the fourth century were well aware of their connexion with ancestors who had left the Apennines in the sixth and seized Capua c. 423.

The first Italic groups to reach an elementary stage of solidarity were perhaps those closest to Etruria and Latium, regions where considerable political evolution had taken place; that is, the groups who used Umbrian vernaculars and lived north and west of the Fucine Lake on the Tyrrhenian side of the Apennines. The Roman tradition about the Umbri being the most ancient people of Italy then becomes understandable, and the more innovatory and evolved character of their language as compared with Oscan may also thereby receive some explanation.

Inevitably their harsh and inhospitable surroundings forced the mountain tribes to expand into the more fertile coastal regions, either by persistent infiltration or by assault. If there were Umbrian attempts to settle in the north Tyrrhenian coastal zones, they failed to make much headway against the Etruscans.⁵⁰ But Umbri did penetrate to the upper Adriatic coast. There they are said to have founded Ariminum and Ravenna:⁵¹ and although the primitive inscriptions (pre-600 B.C. ?) from Pieve Bovigliana, Staffolo and Rimini are too fragmentary or suspect to

⁵⁰ Hdt. 1.94; 1v.49; Dion. Hal. 1.20, 22, 27; Strabo VIII.376; Pliny, *NH* III.112f.

⁵¹ Cf. too Pliny, *NH* III.115 on Butrium.

prove an Umbrian presence there in the seventh century,⁵² it is probable that Umbri had been holding the coast above Ancona long before c. 350 when they were noted by Ps. Scylax; and according to Livy (v.35.2) Umbri were also at Sarsina on the northern slopes of the Apennines well before the Romans got there in 266 B.C.

Other Umbrian groups moved south. The Sabini, separated from the Umbri proper by the river Nera, even penetrated into Latium. For them an actual date can be tentatively suggested. Roman tradition places Sabini (or Proto-Sabini) at the site of Rome when Romulus 'founded' the city in 753 B.C. That they were in the Tiber valley very early seems proved by archaic cemeteries, one of which has yielded an inscription pronounced, after recent re-examination and more careful transcription, to be of the seventh century and probably in primitive Sabine (Vetter no. 362);⁵³ and to this can now be added the roughly contemporary necropolis discovered in 1971 at nearby Colle del Forno, which is thought to have served the Sabine settlement of Eretum.⁵⁴

Another people, they too probably of Umbrian stock, to reach Latium were the Hernici. Their name is said to have been Marsic (i.e., Umbrian) and to mean 'men of the rocks' (Festus, p. 89L): and even if this explanation is apocryphal, it is certain that the expression *Hernica saxa* became proverbial (Virgil, *Aen.* vii.684; Sil. Ital. iv.226; viii.393). The 'rocks' from which the Hernici came could be the Monti Simbruini west of the Fucine Lake: from there they pushed into Latium and settled in the Ciociaria district overlooking the valley of the river Sacco. They may have been later arrivals than the Sabini, but they were established in Latium from at least the days of the kings of Rome.

That the Volsci and Aequi were also Umbrian seems probable from the scanty remains of their vernaculars (Vetter nos. 222, 226, 228h). Both peoples were thrusting aggressively into Latium c. 500 B.C. The Volsci, whose name may mean that they came from a marshy district (such as existed near the Fucine Lake) took possession of the Monti Lepini, the valley of the middle Liris and the coast of Latium from Antium to Formiae. Their Aequian kinsmen, however, were less successful and by the end of the fifth century had been driven out of Latium by a combination of Romans, Latini and Hernici. They fell back to areas around Alba Fucens, Carseoli and the Piani Palentini north and west of the Fucine Lake, perhaps the level place of origin which gave them their name.

The Marsi were another group with an Umbrian dialect (Vetter nos. 223-5, 228a, c-g). Their original nucleus presumably came from Marruvium in the Sabine country (Dion. Hal. i.14.4). By establishing a

⁵² For the texts, G. Radke, P-W Suppl. ix (1962) s.v. 'Umbri' 1751-3. ⁵³ D 377, 816.

⁵⁴ P. Santoro, *Not. Scav.* 1977, 211-29.

new Marruvium at the eastern end of the Fucine Lake and then expanding round the southern end of the lake as far west as the Valle Roveto, they formed themselves into a separate tribe.⁵⁵

The formation of Italic tribes east of the Ancona–Gaeta line was also under way by the sixth century if not earlier, and there, too, must have been virtually complete by 500 B.C. By the fourth century the Italic tribes could be identified as, from north to south, Picentes, Praetuttii, Vestini, all in the Mid-Adriatic region and participants in its culture, and Marrucini, Paeligni (in the interior) and Frentani, less involved with the Mid-Adriatic world and more closely related to the Oscan. The Frentani indeed used the same type of Oscan as the Samnites, although it should be added that in the sixth and fifth centuries they seem to have been more advanced and prosperous than the latter, having extensive contacts with Daunian Apulia and with Campania, to judge from the painted Geometric ware and bucchero found in cemeteries recently excavated at Termoli and Larino.⁵⁶

To the south of the central Italian tribes lay Samnium, the region between the rivers Sangro and Ofanto that was the home of by far the most important Oscan-speaking people. Indeed it is their variety of Oscan that is regarded as the standard form of that tongue.

Oscan, the name by which the language has been known from ancient times, is in fact a misnomer, since its speakers were not Osci (Opici), but conquerors of the Osci. The Romans called them Samnites. Their own name for themselves, however, was Safineis (Vetter nos. 149, 200G); and as this word is etymologically identical with Latin Sabini, they were commonly believed to have descended from the latter people. It may be that in a remote past, before ever the Apennine peoples had diverged into eastern and western groupings, one name had served for them all. This could have been Safineis. It has already been pointed out that the Italic infiltrators of Picenum seem so to have called themselves; and Strabo (v. 240), Pliny (*NH* III. 110) and Festus (p. 235) all describe them by the Latin form of that name, Sabini. This latter designation, however, came to be restricted to the historical bearers of it, while the Oscan-speakers became known as Samnites, whether they lived in Samnium or not. It may have been to end this ambiguity that the Romans later, perhaps in the third century, coined the word Sabellus as their generic expression for Oscan-speakers. It is so used in this chapter, the name Samnites being reserved for actual inhabitants of Samnium.

Archaeological evidence shows that by the seventh century in the region later known as Samnium sedentary agriculture had become

⁵⁵ D 199, 22–41 ⁵⁶ B. d'Agostino in *Sannio* (n.44) 25f.

common and the process of tribal formation was well advanced. By the sixth century stable settlements must have been the norm there, and it is highly probable that four separate tribes could already be distinguished, all with a marked degree of tribal solidarity. The heart of Samnium was occupied by the Pentri. Their territory extended from the Matese massif in the west to the upper reaches of the Fortore in the east and included Aesernia, Aufidena,⁵⁷ Bovianum, Saepinum, Terventum and a multitude of dwelling sites along the valleys of the rivers Sangro, Trigno and Biferno.⁵⁸ The Pentri were the real core of the Samnite nation; indeed after the dismemberment of Samnium by the Romans in the third century, it was they alone who continued to be officially recognized as Samnites, the others by then being known only by their tribal names.

South of the Pentri in and around the valley of the Calore lived the Hirpini with settlements of consequence at Aeclanum, Compsa and Malventum (later renamed Beneventum).

The two remaining tribes were smaller. The Carricini, whose name and habitat were both very uncertain until recently, are now proved by epigraphic finds to have been immediate neighbours of the Marrucini in the north-east corner of Samnium. Their principal settlement was known, in Roman days at least, as Cluviae.⁵⁹ The Caudini, so called after their chief centre (Caudium), were to be found in the area bordering on Campania. As a result of their proximity to that hellenized region they were culturally the most advanced of the tribes of Samnium.

In general the inland Italic were less affected by hellenism than other parts of Italy. To them the Greek world was remote and they rarely possessed the means to import much either from there or anywhere else. But they did not deliberately resist extraneous influences nor were their mountain habitats completely impenetrable. The Umbri in particular borrowed heavily from the Etruscan and Mid-Adriatic cultures. This made them more prosperous and more advanced than the Sabelli. The latter, however, were by no means cut off. Artefacts of Mid-Adriatic and Apulian types reached not only the Frentani, but also the Samnites by way of the valleys of the Sangro and Biferno. Even Attic pottery occasionally turns up in Samnium, on the fringes mostly, among the Caudini, for instance.⁶⁰

Information about life in the interior begins to be more substantial in the sixth and fifth centuries, the archaeology of Samnium providing most of the evidence. This has produced no epigraphic material earlier

⁵⁷ Aufidena is placed incorrectly amongst the Carricini by Ptol. III.1.58.

⁵⁸ G. Barker, *Antiquity* 51 (1977) 20–4; *idem*, J. A. Lloyd and D. Webley, *BSR* 32 (1978) 35–51.

⁵⁹ A. La Regina, *Rend. Linc.* 22 (1967) 87–99, and *Arch. Class.* 25/6 (1973/4) 331–40.

⁶⁰ M. W. Frederiksen, *JRS* 58 (1968) 225.

than 500 B.C. but has laid bare much else of great interest. The most extensive exploration has been carried out at Alfedena which preserves the name, even though it does not occupy the exact site, of Roman Aufidena. The important earlier discoveries there are now being carefully reassessed and since 1974 new excavations have been carried out in the cemetery of the Campo Consolino zone and the results published with praiseworthy rapidity.⁶¹

The dead were invariably inhumed supine in rectangular trench graves, usually lined and covered with stone slabs. Groups of such tombs were surrounded with a perimeter of stones, somewhat as at Mid-Adriatic Campovalano, where however most graves are encircled individually. Within each group the tombs were placed at various distances, sometimes in concentric rows, around an area left vacant for the burial functions. The richer tombs, and in particular male tombs with weapons, are closest to the vacant area; the prominence accorded to them may mean that there was a warrior aristocracy in a stratified pastoral and agricultural society of a type confidently postulated for other parts of Italy.

The tools and weapons, which include swords, lance heads and daggers, as well as knives and axes, are of iron and often resemble those of the Mid-Adriatic region. Of exceptional interest among the defensive equipment are the disk cuirasses (Fig. 69) sometimes, but inappropriately, called *kardiophylakes*,⁶² of the sort worn by the Warrior of Capestrano (Pls. Vol., pl. 299). Usually decorated with an Orientalizing emblem in the shape of a heraldic or apotropaic double-headed quadruped, outlined either in relief or incised, these chest protectors have also been found in Picenum and Umbria.⁶³ They may have been manufactured in southern Etruria, although local production is also a possibility.

The female graves contain items of ornament, many of iron and not a few of bronze. Notable are the so-called chatelaines, once thought unique to Alfedena, but now known from other Pentrian sites (Carovilli, Casalciprano, Monte Vairano).⁶⁴ These are long pendants of linked spirals and are sometimes decorated with the same theriomorphic figure as the disk cuirasses.⁶⁵ Fibulae are common. Most of them are of iron and the very long specimens must have been worn, strung with pendants, for ceremonial occasions. Some graves contained amber charms and necklaces, probably of Mid-Adriatic provenance.

⁶¹ D 238.

⁶² The word comes from Polybius (VI.23.14) who, however, is describing Roman equipment of several hundred years later. ⁶³ Early specimens are decorated with Geometric designs.

⁶⁴ *Molise Economico* 19, 30. Fragments of 'chatelaines' have even been found at Palestrina: D 114, 346.

⁶⁵ The figure also appears on women's bronze belts: R. Papi, *Arch. Class.* 30 (1978) 186-92.



69. Italic bronze disk cuirass decorated with double-headed, swan-necked quadruped. Sixth century B.C. (Alfedena, Mus. A. di Nino; after *PCIA* 5 (1976) pl. 69.)

The pottery is largely domestic impasto, the indigenous utility product. A little bucchero, some black painted ware, and the occasional imitation of a Daunian vase indicate contacts, some of them through transhumant shepherds perhaps, with Campania and the south.

On the whole, the graves at Alfedena leave the impression of a scantily supplied community. The contrast in wealth between them and the contemporary tombs at Campovalano is striking.

The settlement at Alfedena goes back to the eighth century. By the sixth it had acquired some importance as a nodal point for the transhumant routes linking not only Samnium, but also Marsic and Paelignian areas with Apulia. The valleys of the Sangro and Volturno also provided it with comparatively easy access to Mid-Adriatic and Tyrrhenian Italy; and objects known from Alfedena, such as a particular type of small impasto amphora or fibulae *a bozze*, have been found in Latium (at Frosinone, Cassino, Valvisciolo and Satricum).⁶⁶

Despite the vast size of its burial grounds, its stone fortifications and the importance of its site, Alfedena cannot be described as a genuinely urbanized community, and the same is true of other Samnite settlements. Recent and as yet largely unpublished excavations of cemeteries at Pietrabbondante and at Pozzilli and Presenzano in the valley of the Volturno⁶⁷ have disclosed essentially similar sixth-/fifth-century material, although Mid-Adriatic influence is much weaker and Campanian much stronger in these places than at Alfedena.

⁶⁶ D 238, xvi, xxxix, xlii n.45; D 114, 316; G. Bartolini in *Civiltà del Lazio primitivo* (ed. G. Colonna, Rome, 1976) 334.

⁶⁷ Presenzano is the ancient Rufrae (or Rufrium), well known to Cato (*Agr.* xxii.135).

In Iron Age Samnium life was a continuous struggle against natural conditions and constant vigilance against neighbouring peoples, and for long its inhabitants seem to have had few aesthetic notions and perhaps little perception of the world of the intellect. Amongst them the Greek catalyst does not seem to have been active until later. Yet one can detect already in fifth-century Samnium some signs of cultural influence and assimilation from the hellenized south. The large fragment of a stone centaur from Boiano seems to reflect elements from the metopes of the Heraeum at the mouth of the Sele.⁶⁸ A head from Pietrabbondante looks like a native attempt to represent a gorgon; and votive wooden figures from the sanctuary of Mefitis in the Vallis Amsancti bear some resemblance to herms. Votive stone sculptures from Trivento and Agnone also show Greek influence.⁶⁹

The Romans regarded the Samnites as their most formidable foes in Italy. Their martial skill is well illustrated by the massive military works they erected throughout Samnium, mostly in the fourth and third centuries so far as present evidence goes. Sometimes they surrounded entire mountain tops with strong walls of polygonal limestone blocks. These circuits, as can be clearly seen from the network of them near Capracotta, were closely co-ordinated within signalling distance of one another to form tribal defensive systems that would not collapse even should one of the circuits fall. Their proximity to transhumant trails, as at Monte Ferrante or Monte Pallano, suggests that the circuits were intended as refuges for animals as well as men in times of danger. Some of them provided summer or even year-round shelter for herdsmen and their families. This is certainly true of the recently explored circuit at Monte Vairano: it is three kilometres long and provided with the three gateways normal for Italic settlements.⁷⁰ Others, like the fortifications on Monte Acero or near Venafro, were so bleak and exposed that their purpose must have been almost exclusively military.⁷¹

The dynamic vigour of the Sabelli led to a great diaspora of the Italic peoples during the last half of the Iron Age. The Umbri seem to have had little part in it; at any rate the ancient writers regularly attribute it to 'Samnites', presumably because Samnium was regarded as the area that generated and maintained the impetus of the movement.

In Tyrrhenian Italy Sabelli acquired possession of the iron ore district of the Assano valley just north of Campania, exactly when is uncertain, but by 400 they were known as Sidicini and had a burgeoning settlement at Teanum.⁷²

For Campania the chronology is firmer. The possibility of a sixth-

⁶⁸ P. Orlandini in *PCLIA* 7 (1978) 258.

⁶⁹ A. La Regina in *Ulisse* 9 (1966) 121; cf. P. C. Sestieri, *Not. Scav.* 1952, 151. ⁷⁰ D 137, 7–12.

⁷¹ See *JRS* 58 (1968) 225; 71 (1981) 159. ⁷² C 50, s.v. 'Teanum Sidicinum' 888.

century 'South Picene' presence at the southern end of Campania has already been noted. Further north, Oscan names on artefacts from Capua, Nola, Saticula and Suessula also indicate that Sabelli had been infiltrating there in the sixth century, at a time when it was controlled by Etruscans and Greeks and largely peopled by natives described as Opici (Osci) (Ausones, Aurunci).⁷³ Whether these latter were at all akin to the incoming Sabelli is a moot point: early (seventh-century?) inscriptions from Cyme, presumably belonging to them, are too fragmentary and obscure to be conclusive.⁷⁴ In any case it is unlikely that proto-historic Campania could have been homogeneous: Caes, Capua and Suessula in the north had connexions with the Liris valley and Latium that differentiated them from Pontecagnano in the south; and recent finds at San Marzano and San Valentino Torio in the Sarno valley east of Pompeii provide further evidence of the variety, both of population and of culture, in seventh-/sixth-century Campania.⁷⁵ Whoever they were, the natives of Campania were ultimately assimilated by the Sabelli, although the name of the Opici (Osci) survived as a designation for the language of the latter. By 445 the Sabelli in northern Campania had emerged as a distinct tribe known as Campani and about twenty years later they seized control of Capua from its Etruscan and Cyme from its Greek overlords (Diod. xii.31, 76; Livy iv.37; Velleius 1.14). In southern Campania the Sabellian Alfaterni of Nuceria had made themselves similarly dominant.

In the fourth century Sabellian expansion was still continuing. By then, or perhaps earlier, they controlled Atina, possibly in order to exploit iron ore deposits nearby. They also held Arpinum and other Volscian settlements in the valley of the Middle Liris. But there they were halted; Rome prevented them from advancing into Latium.

In the far south, however, there was as yet no opposing Roman power, and there Sabelli had been able to establish themselves, not only in the regions known today as Basilicata and Calabria, respectively the Lucania and Bruttium of antiquity.⁷⁶ These more developed regions had been exposed since Mycenaean times to Greek influences⁷⁷ and were densely populated, but their indigenous inhabitants cannot be identified, the various Greek designations for them (Oenotri, Ausones, Chones, etc.) being no more revealing than the very early, but impenetrable inscriptions from Castelluccio, Staletti and Croton.⁷⁸ The natives tended,

⁷³ G. Colonna in *D* 48, 151–69. ⁷⁴ G. Baffioni, *Stud. Etr.* 42 (1974) 304–11.

⁷⁵ B. d'Agostino, *MEFRA* 82 (1970) 511–618; *D* 48, 85–101.

⁷⁶ Bruttium is the convenient modern coinage for Ager Bruttius, the cumbersome expression used by Roman writers.

⁷⁷ Tradition recorded Philoctetes as founder of Petelia in Bruttium (Strabo vi.254) and Mycenaean pottery has recently been found in quantity in Basilicata: *D* 169, 22.

⁷⁸ For these inscriptions see *D* 408; *D* 414; *D* 492, no. 186.


like other Italians in the Early Iron Age, to form more stable settlements with emerging aristocracies and a burgeoning agriculture: note the remarks of Aristotle (*Pol.* VII, 1329b).

In Lucania the regional culture was by no means uniform, but one widespread manifestation of it was the wheelmade, painted *a tenda* pottery (so named after the tent-like decoration on the shoulders of the vases, Fig. 70).

After 700 B.C. and the settlement of formal Greek colonies on the Ionian and lower Tyrrhenian sea-coasts, Greek influence became even more marked in Lucania, and the natives of the maritime districts, where not exterminated, were thoroughly subdued by the Italiotes. In the interior, however, and especially along the valleys of the Basento and Bradano rivers, the natives remained independent, living in a multitude of small and unurbanized settlements, some of which even as late as the fourth century were still adhering to the immemorial practice of inhuming their dead in a doubled-up position. The locally produced pottery, usually predominating over the imported variety, is an indication of cultural, as well as political autonomy. Nevertheless the many river valleys provided routes for trade between the coasts of southern Italy and the interior; and in seventh-/sixth-century Lucania there is abundant evidence of strong outside influence, predominantly Greek, but also Etruscan and Apulian. The more spectacular artefacts include the architectural terracottas from Serra di Vaglio, the bronze horsemen from Grumentum (Pls. Vol., pl. 261), and the contents of princely tombs recalling those of contemporary Etruria and Latium, at Bisaccia, Melfi and Lavello in northern Lucania and at Armento and Chiaromonte in southern. In general the cultural, economic and social pattern revealed by archaeological finds is complex and diversified, with variations even in the normal inhumation custom.

At some time speakers of Oscan asserted themselves in Lucania. They may have been elements in the indigenous population long resident in the region. But the disappearance, progressively from north to south, of painted Sub-Geometric pottery between c. 600 and 470 B.C. makes it more probable that they (or, at any rate, most of them) were intruders from further up the peninsula.

The Greek tradition preserved by Strabo (VI.252-4) implies that the Oscan-speakers irrupted into the region *en masse*; but a picture of hordes of invading Sabelli is not reflected in the archaeology. Nor is it altogether credible. It is more likely that, as in Campania, the Sabelli infiltrated over a protracted period, their immigration being no doubt facilitated by the destruction of Sybaris in 510 and the simultaneous collapse of Etruscan power in Campania. Thus, the formation of the Italic tribe of the Lucani was slow and gradual. It must have involved ethnic fusion and



70. Olla with a *tenda* decoration from S. Maria d'Anglona in Lucania. (Policoro Mus. della Siritide; after *PCIA* 7 (1978) pl. 13.)

assimilation in varying proportions,⁷⁹ as in other Italic regions; but details of the process are irretrievable. Nor is there any certainty as to the origin of the name Lucani: it has nothing to do with *lukos*, the Greek word for wolf. One of the earliest signs of Lucani is in the sixth century perhaps, at Padula, where the population increased, the pottery changed with the appearance of column-craters in quantity, and the dead were inhumed supine.⁸⁰ In the fifth century Lucani are identified as the attackers of Thurii between 443 and 433 B.C. (Polyaenus II. 10. 2–4). In the fourth they won the long battle for the legacy of Sybaris, Dionysius of Syracuse shortsightedly helping them to defeat an Italiote coalition. They cannot be positively proved to have erected the many fourth-century fortifications still to be seen in Lucania (at Satriano, Tricarico, Serra di Vaglio and elsewhere); the polygonal masonry supporting a sanctuary at Buccino at least might well be their work. By c. 400 they were masters of Lucania with only Greek Elea (Velia) maintaining a precarious independence against them. Poseidonia, Pyxus and Laus had been subjugated.

The vicissitudes of Bruttium, separated from Lucania by the Laus–Thurii line, were not very dissimilar. In the seventh and sixth centuries both its Ionian and Tyrrhenian coastlines had been brought under the sway of Greek colonies, so that it was subject to even stronger Hellenic influence than Lucania, and this was further reinforced by the proximity

⁷⁹ There were sub-tribes among the Lucani; e.g., Serdae, Utiani and presumably others.

⁸⁰ D 169, 92.

of much hellenized Sicily. In fact Greek was still used as a second language in Bruttium by its non-Italiote inhabitants as late as Ennius' day (Festus p. 31L). Nevertheless the mountainous and densely wooded nature of most of the region enabled its natives to preserve much of their own character. These natives may well have been of a different stock (or stocks) from those of Lucania.⁸¹ Like these, however, they were exposed to Sabellian infiltration, and their amalgamation with the intruders led ultimately to the formation of the Italic tribe known as Bruttii. These claimed a 'metropolis' of their own (Consentia) and could be distinguished from Lucani by differences in their ethnic make-up and customs. In the fourth century the Bruttii seized some Italiote centres, such as Terina and Hipponium, and established their own Sabellian state, traditionally in 356 B.C., an action represented by Greek writers as a revolt from the Lucani (cf. Strabo vi. 255; but his statement that Bruttii is the Lucanian word for runaway slaves is unconvincing; more probably the name derives from local natives: cf. Diod. xii. 22; Steph. Byz. s.v. Brettos).

Yet another group of Sabelli, known as Mamertini, established themselves across the strait of Messina in Sicily. They were not an overflow or advanced outpost of the Bruttii, but mercenaries who had originally gone to Sicily in the pay of Agathocles; after his death they seized the city of Messana by an act of treachery that, no doubt unfairly, came to be regarded as typical of Sabelli and their methods of conquest.

The Italic had a very large number of open-air shrines – on hilltops, in forest glades, by running water, in grottoes. Some of these cult centres, those at Pentrian Pietrabbondante and Campochiaro, Sidicinian Loreto and Lucanian Rossano di Vaglio for instance, remained in use for centuries. Roofed temples were a later Hellenistic development chiefly due to contact with Rome.

The many shrines allowed full scope to the votive propensities of the Italic peoples, and plastic offerings have been found in very large numbers throughout peninsular Italy and not least in its central regions. Marked symbolic significance was attributed to the human head, often represented by itself: many such heads have been found, for instance, in a deposit at Aequan Carseoli.⁸² The votive offerings were frequently in terracotta, especially in Campania and Tyrrhenian Italy. Campania also produced large votive statues in tufa, the well-known 'mothers' from Capua, seated women holding swaddled infants in their arms: the earliest specimens (fifth century) show some Ionic features and may derive from a Sicilian terracotta *kourotrophos*; but the perennial characteristic of the

⁸¹ Allegedly they included Siculi at one time.

⁸² A. Cederna, *Arch. Class.* 5 (1953) 186f.

Capuan 'mothers' is their square, Italic frontality. Perhaps the most impressive manifestation of Italic popular devotion, however, is to be seen in the small bronzes (Pls. Vol., pl. 301): they are found in great numbers throughout south and central Italy, representing sometimes a donor, more often a god.

Jupiter and other universally worshipped gods might be among those invoked. Some localities seem to have regarded themselves as dependent on the goodwill of particular goddesses (Angitia, Cupra, Kerres, Mefitis, Vacuna, Vesuna) to care for their specific needs. But the Italic particularly sought the protection of warlike divinities, Mars and Minerva, Hercules and the Dioscuri. Many bronze images of Mars have turned up in Umbria, at Cagli and elsewhere;⁸³ the Sabelli seem to have preferred Hercules and countless representations of him have been found throughout their territory. The statuettes may date from as early as the fifth century; but small bronze figures of Hercules were still very common in Samnium and Lucania in the Hellenistic Age at a time when all Italic had been brought under Roman control.


The hard life in the mountains bred warriors that were tough and often pugnacious. The Sabelli relished the gruesome sport of the arena, were famous as mercenary troops (see, e.g., Dion. Hal. viii.8–10), and taught the Romans much about warfaring: it was from the Samnites that the Romans acquired the *pilum* and possibly the *scutum* and learned how to use mobile tactics instead of cumbersome phalanx manoeuvres.⁸⁴ The soldier's skills are also a dominant theme in the post-400 Sabellian tomb-paintings from Campania and the Paestum area and elsewhere in Lucania: these show scenes of funerary rituals and other aspects of Sabellian life; but especially numerous are their representations of armed combats, chariot races and warriors taking leave or returning from victory.

The Umbri seem with the lapse of time to have grown more pacific; at any rate in the fourth century they offered relatively little resistance to Rome. In general, however, the Italic, those of Umbrian extraction as well as Sabellian, were regarded by the Romans as the finest fighting stocks in Italy, and South Italian vases and tomb-paintings of the late fifth and fourth centuries frequently depict Italic warriors wearing no longer the disk cuirasses of the sixth century but trilobate cuirasses (Fig. 71), bronze belts, and, as an indication of military distinction, feathered helmets.⁸⁵

Surviving information about the form and character of Italic rule shows that, by the fourth century, Umbri and Sabelli had come to differ widely

⁸³ N. Alfieri in *EAA* II 254. ⁸⁴ D 283, 105–7.

⁸⁵ The influence of Tarentum is apparent in the defensive armour: D 187, 170–7.



71. Italic bronze trilobate cuirass from Alfedena, a type depicted on red-figure vases and in Lucanian tomb-paintings. Fourth/third century B.C. (Alfedena, Mus. A. di Nino; after D 65, 368, fig. 428.)

in their political practices. The Umbri by then seem to have adopted the city state form of government and were divided like the Etruscans among many small urban commonwealths (Iguvium, Tuder, Asisium, Spolegium, etc.) that are not known ever to have banded together in confederacies or even in military leagues (cf. Strabo v.227). Apart from the Atiedian brotherhood at Iguvium little is known about their internal arrangements, other than that some had magistrates with the title of *maro* and *ubtur*. Recently found epigraphic evidence (Pocchetti no. 3) reveals the latter to have been a civic official of real standing: he was not, as once thought, a minor religious functionary.⁸⁶ The *maro* for his part seems to have been a junior magistrate.

The central Italic and Sabellian tribes, on the other hand, were hardly urbanized at all, except in northern Apulia and near-by Larinum, the city state concept being foreign to them. They lived under tribal arrangements in settlements that varied in size and were called *pagi* and *vici* by the Romans. Some of these, like Pentrian Saepinum, were strongly walled. Sabellian magistrates bore the title *meddix* (morphologically similar to Latin *iudex*), and the chief *meddix* enjoyed very wide powers. Even the central Italic tribes of Umbrian extraction had *meddices*: there is epigraphic evidence for them among the Volsci, Aequi and Marsi (Vetter

⁸⁶ D 421, 50-4.

nos. 222, 223, 226), and they can be inferred for the Sabini from the frequent use this people made of the name *Mettius*.

The Sabellian peoples are said to have been democratically structured, except in time of crisis when they appointed a supreme *meddix* with apparently unlimited powers (Strabo VI.254, speaking of the Lucani). Nevertheless onomastic study of Livy leaves little doubt that, amongst the Samnites at least, power was effectively monopolized down to the first century by a handful of wealthy families; and the same seems to be true also of the Lucani. Presumably only the wealthy could afford to hold office.

Exactly how the *pagi* and the *vici* of the Sabelli and the communities of the peoples they conquered were fitted together to form federated tribal states is unknown. What is known is that they were willing to have their tribes form loose combinations. The four tribes of Samnium, the *universum Samnium* of Livy (VIII.23.2), were joined in a league evidently intended to be permanent; and a similar arrangement existed among the central Italic tribes of Marsi, Paeligni, Vestini, Marrucini and Frentani. Even the Sabelli, who made themselves masters of Campania and as a result became thoroughly familiar with the city state idea, retained their federative instincts. Those in northern Campania formed a league headed by Capua, and those in southern Campania were organized in what modern scholars often call a pentapolis headed by Nuceria. Sabellian preference for federative arrangements was clearly shown in 91 B.C. when they sought to put an end to the hegemony of Rome by replacing it with a confederacy named *Italia*.

Transhumance may account for their federative disposition. In pre-Roman days the treks of their herdsmen between uplands and valleys may have been on a small scale and for shorter distances than they ultimately became, but even then seasonal migration seems to have been the common practice. It must have involved trespassing on one another's territories, and perhaps it was the need to regulate the movements and ensure the safety and orderly passage of the flocks that caused the tribes to form leagues. It may be significant that in Umbria, where there is little evidence of transhumance, there is also no trace of such combinations.⁸⁷

The Sabelli had little material culture of their own. In general they seem to have been content to adopt the more advanced and sophisticated ways of the regions into which they spread. In Campania they took to commerce, improved their agriculture, readily switched from barter to a money economy, built elegant houses,⁸⁸ and followed prevailing modes of dress. Most important of all they learned to read and write devising a

⁸⁷ D 158, 87–91 (and literature cited).

⁸⁸ E. La Rocca, M. and A. de Vos, *Guida archeologica di Pompeii* (Milan, 1976) 31–7.

national alphabet of their own, evidently by modifying the Etruscan script used in Campania. In fact one of the earliest surviving specimens of Oscan, dating from shortly after 500, is on a stamnos from Capua, now in Leningrad, written in the local Etruscan alphabet (cf., too, Vetter nos. 125–8).⁸⁹ The alphabet devised by the Sabellian Campani was soon adopted by the tribes of Samnium and even by the more distant Frentani, in whose territory part of an *abecedarium* for it has recently been found (Pocchetti no. 101). The Lucani and Bruttii, however, before falling under Roman domination, were content to write their Oscan in Greek characters.

For a Greek writer like Strabo (vi.253) the Oscanization of southern Italy meant barbarization. But if there was regression in the standards of skill and the quality of life under the rougher ways of the new arrivals, these in turn absorbed and diffused the knowledge, ideas and technology that had been generated by the various Hellenic currents in Magna Graecia. The Sabelli adapted them to their own usages, and their linguistic unification of the south made contacts between the coast and the interior much easier, intensifying exchanges. Ultimately the influences radiating from the Italic centres in Campania, Lucania and Apulia came to touch Rome herself and through Rome all of peninsular Italy.

IV. THE LIGURES

The Italic expansion did not directly affect the tribes, collectively known to the Romans as Ligures, that inhabited the mountainous north-western part of Italy between the river Arno and the St Bernard passes. The remote and secluded interior of this region saw little change throughout the Iron Age down to Roman times. Primitive, prehistoric traditions persisted there, to judge from the more than fifty statue-stelae found in the Lunigiana area east and north east of La Spezia.⁹⁰ These stone slabs resemble stelae from elsewhere in Italy and Europe, including Corsica and southern France, and belong to the same cultural tradition as the rock-paintings in the Maritime Alps and in Val Camonica. The Lunigiana stelae, varying in height from under 50 cm to over 2 m, are recognizably anthropomorphic with schematic figures carved on their fronts. They represent female or, more often, male figures, the latter with weapons (axes, daggers, occasionally darts). Their purpose is uncertain: funerary, religious and other interpretations have been suggested. They are of three types, respectively from the Pontevecchio, Malgrate and Reusa districts in the valley of the river Magra; but whether any of them was fashioned by Ligures of historical times cannot be determined.⁹¹ The nine found aligned at Pontevecchio seem earlier than the Iron Age; but

⁸⁹ D 154, 302. ⁹⁰ D 39, 30–53.

⁹¹ One Reusa-type stela has the date 1907 carved across its face.

some of those from Filetto (near Malgrate) display weapons of seventh-sixth-century type and even a few Etruscan letters.

In fact little is known about the Ligures. Plutarch's statement (*Marius* 19.6) that they called themselves Ambrones can hardly be taken to mean that they were related to the Umbri. Ignorant of their own origin (Cato, 31P), they themselves claimed no such affinity. According to classical writers, they had been living in their historical habitat from time immemorial and had formerly occupied a much wider area that included Corsica, southern France and even parts of Spain (Hdt. v.9; Thuc. vi.2; Ps. Scylax 3; Strabo iv.203). It is unlikely that they extended that far, but in Italy they had undoubtedly not always been confined to the north-west. In the late third century the Romans encountered them around Placentia and Mutina and were uncertain whether the Anares (or Anamares), whose chieftain Marcellus slew to win the *spolia opima* at Clastidium in 222 B.C., may not have been Ligures rather than Gauls; and people with Ligurian names were still living south of Placentia, at Veleia, as late as A.D. 102 (*ILS* 6675; cf. *ILLRP* 517; *ILS* 6509). But that the Stoeni, who lived near Brescia and were conquered by Q. Marcius Rex in 117, were genuine Ligures seems very doubtful: the Triumphal Fasti may call them such simply for want of a better name.

Nevertheless, regardless of literary misuse of their name, it may well be that the people described as Ligures, who fought Rome so doggedly for much of the third and second centuries, were all of the same stock; and the ancients may also be right in thinking that the natives of eastern Provence, perhaps as far as the Cévennes, were related to them. Certainty, however, is impossible, since in their pre-Roman days the Ligures were illiterate and have left no certain specimen of their language: the inscription on the statue-stela from Zignago may or may not be theirs.⁹² The toponymy in their part of Italy does not justify the assumption that they spoke a variety of Indo-European; their burial rite is equally inconclusive, since some of them inhumed and others cremated.

Whatever their ethnic background, the Ligures certainly did not constitute a unitary nation. They were split up into a large number of tribes completely independent of one another; and it is improbable that these tribes had much consciousness of relationship: they may not even have had a common name for themselves.

The best known tribes are the Apuani and Ingauni, around La Spezia and Genoa respectively, and after them the Bagienni, Friniates, Intemelii and Statielli, who lived further north; most of the others, including some north of the Po, are little more than names, whose very spelling, let alone

⁹² D 487, 159f.

their ethnic identity, is uncertain. The pre-Roman archaeology for all of them is too meagre to tell us very much.

For the Romans the Ligures seem to have been all of a type: small, dark and wiry men, expert with the sling-shot, primitive, cunning and fiercely independent, who lived in caves or miserable forest huts and maintained themselves by hunting and farming. This picture is not to be totally rejected. Excavation of hilltop settlements and cemeteries at Bec Berciassa, Monte Bignone, Rossiglione and Camaiore, suggests that there is at least some truth in the highly coloured picture of Ligurian poverty found in the pages of Diodorus (v.39).

But more extensive exploration of Ligurian areas might well prove the generalization to be misleading. Years ago the discovery of a cemetery at Genoa, in use from the fifth to the third century, indicated that the Ligures there were relatively prosperous, for they could afford to import late Attic, Italiote and Etrusco-Campanian ware.

This evidence from Genoa has now been strikingly confirmed. Since 1959 the exploration of another and earlier cemetery, at Chiavari, has revealed a community whose manner of life was in startling contrast with that usually attributed to Ligures. The necropolis at Chiavari dates from the late eighth or early seventh century. Vast, monumental and wealthy, it was divided into circular and rectangular enclosures in which slate caskets were deposited containing globular cinerary urns with cylindrical necks. There was also an abundance of other pottery and of bronze and iron objects. The local dark impasto, often coarse and roughly imitative of Etruscan shapes, is sometimes decorated with either plastic or incised figures and designs. There was also much pottery that had evidently been imported by sea, either from Etruria or from Provence, especially Phocaeen Massilia. A nearby copper mine and the availability locally of slate and schist may help to account for the evident wealth at Chiavari.⁹³

The coastal dwellers controlled fine harbours (Genoa, La Spezia, Savona etc.), were reputedly good sailors and keen traders, and lived so differently from the inland Ligures that they might almost be taken for an entirely different people. In their part of Italy the mountains extend almost to the sea-coast and were an effective obstacle to the development of a cultural hinterland. This may explain why, away from the coast, the Ligures remained, if not the noble savages that Diodorus says they were, nevertheless very poor and primitive.

It has often been suggested that the cremating Golaseccan and Comacine peoples who lived near Lakes Maggiore and Como, west and north of Milan, and whose Iron Age cultures are known from a number of

⁹³ F. Rittatore Vonwiller in *PCIA* 4 (1975) 288f.

necropoleis, shared a common origin with the Ligures.⁹⁴ But there is no firm evidence for such an ethnic relationship, and the cultural differences are more marked than the occasional similarities. Golaseccan urnfields and artefacts seem more indicative of a central European connexion. In the Roman period much later a people known as the Lepontii were living in the Golasecca region, and it is to them that a number of inscriptions, found in the vicinity of Ornavasso and written in a modified Etruscan alphabet, have been attributed.⁹⁵ The documents date from the fourth century to the first, and their language, if not Celtic, is closely related to it; and the suggestion has been made that the Lepontii may have been celticized Ligurians.⁹⁶

Whether this be true of them or not, it seems undeniable that such mixed peoples were ultimately brought into being in the far north-western part of Italy as a result of insistent Celtic pressure. Precisely when Celts reached the region in force is disputed; but infiltration of some sort may well have been going on since the sixth century. By the time that the Romans reached Piedmont in the second century, it was a territory of many tribes, some Ligurian, some Celtic, and some a mixture of both. The Celtiberi in Spain show that the Celts were capable of such fusions, and Strabo (IV.203) actually uses the word *Keltoligues* for some inhabitants of the region under discussion. In fact, the two peoples of greatest consequence there in Roman times, the Salassi and the Taurini, may well both have been mixed tribes of this kind.

The Salassi lived in the Val d'Aosta, the valley through which the river Dora Baltea flows; and it was almost certainly they who worked the placer gold deposits in the vicinity of Victumulae, leaving abundant evidence of their operations for modern archaeologists to find. But whether or not the Salassi were Ligures it is not easy to determine. Strabo (IV.205) may well be right in saying that originally they were, since it is difficult not to see some connexion between them and the nearly homonymous Salyes (or Salluvii), who lived in the hinterland of the great port of Massilia and were near neighbours and kinsmen of the Oxybii and Deciates, regularly pronounced Ligures by ancient writers (Livy, *Per.* XLVII; Strabo IV.203; Pliny, *NH* III.47). But even if the Salassi were originally a Ligurian people, they could not avoid becoming very mixed up with Celts: Eporedia, one of their principal settlements and the key to their territory, bears an unmistakably Celtic name; and Strabo (IV.204, 208; V.211) must be right in implying that by Roman times they could no longer be reckoned unequivocally Ligurian.

Immediately to the south of the Salassi lived the Taurini, after whom Turin is named. Both Strabo (IV.204) and Pliny (*NH* III.123) regard this

⁹⁴ On these cultures see D 21, 413–511. ⁹⁵ For the texts, D 487, 134–54.

⁹⁶ J. Whatmough, *The Foundations of Roman Italy* (London, 1937) 134f.

people as Ligurian, but Polybius does not agree: if in one passage he implies that the Taurini, confidently to be identified with his Taurisci, were not Celts, elsewhere he seems to take it for granted that they were.⁹⁷ Hence it is quite probable that, like the Salassi, the Taurini were a mixed people, and in one passage Livy (xxi.38.5) actually refers to them as *semigalli*. Certainly the first element in their name appears to be distinctly Celtic.

About other Ligures of the north west little can be said. Ethnic and tribal outlines remain blurred until well into Roman times.

⁹⁷ F. W. Walbank, *Historical Commentary on Polybius* 1 (Oxford, 1957) 177.

CHAPTER 15

THE LANGUAGES OF ITALY

J. H. W. PENNEY

An astonishing diversity of languages in pre-Roman Italy is attested by contemporary inscriptions, which are found, though rarely in any great quantity, in nearly every region, and range in date over a period of more than 700 years, from the introduction of the alphabet by Greek colonists in the eighth century B.C. to the disappearance in the first century of at least the written forms of the local languages, as a consequence of the general adoption of Latin. As evidence for these languages, the inscriptions, however few, are clearly superior to the rare and often unreliable glosses in ancient authors and to the speculative constructions, based on etymologies of proper names, that are occasionally to be encountered in works of modern scholarship; whatever literature there may have been besides that of Rome has been lost. Identification and classification of the various languages may contribute to the identification of the peoples of ancient Italy and their connexions, while the best evidence for the indigenous institutions of these peoples is often to be found in the inscriptions.

The study of these dead languages through inscriptions necessarily involves consideration of the alphabets in which the inscriptions are written, and the diffusion of writing in itself constitutes an important part of the cultural history of early Italy. The peoples of the far south and of Sicily borrowed the alphabet from the Greek colonies, with which they were in direct contact; the alphabet was also borrowed very early by the Etruscans, and transmitted by them to other parts of Italy. The process of transmission was not a simple one: almost invariably, the borrowing of the alphabet involved alterations and adjustments to fit the received model for the writing of another language.¹ Even within a particular graphic tradition the alphabetic system might be subject to reform or the shape of letters changed. The result was a variety of alphabets, characteristic of different places at different times, but usually retaining enough inherited features to allow their origins to be traced.

Citations of inscriptions: Marinetti = A. Marinetti, *Le iscrizioni sudpicene* (D 430); Po. = P. Poccetti, *Nuovi documenti italici* (D 448); TLE = M. Pallottino, *Testimonia linguae etruscae* (D 436); Ve. = E. Vetter, *Handbuch der italischen Dialekte* (D 492)

¹ D 404; D 354.

There are some 10,000 Etruscan inscriptions, the earliest dated to the beginning of the seventh century, the most recent to the end of the first century. Disappointingly few of them are of any appreciable length, the great majority being short epitaphs that rarely contain more than personal names – a description that applies also to the first-century bilingual inscriptions, in Etruscan and Latin. Among the more important inscriptions are the Cippus Perusinus (*TLE* 570), apparently a legal document; the tile from Capua (*TLE* 2), on which some 300 words of a ritual are still legible; and the inscribed sheets of gold from Pyrgi (*TLE* 874–5), dated to the early fifth century, whose texts – in Etruscan and Phoenician – seem, without being literal versions of one another, to have substantially the same content, concerning the dedication of a shrine to Uni/Astarte. The most remarkable Etruscan document, however, is the linen book (*TLE* 1) recovered from the binding of an Egyptian mummy; the surviving text, liturgical in content, runs to over 1,200 words. Apart from these written remains, there are also a number of glosses.

It is clear from the letter-forms of the earliest inscriptions that the Etruscans adopted the alphabet in use amongst the Euboean settlers of Pithecusa and Cyme. A number of early *abecedaria* show that the alphabet was borrowed in a fuller form than the selection of letters actually used for writing Etruscan might suggest: for instance, the theoretical alphabet contained the letter O, which was not used in practice since only one back rounded vowel, written V (*u*), was distinguished in Etruscan, and also the letters *beta* and *delta*, which, as signs for voiced stops, were otiose in an Etruscan context since voice was apparently not a distinctive feature within the consonantal system. (The absence of some or all of these letters betrays the Etruscan derivation of many of the alphabets of ancient Italy.) Conversely, Etruscan had a fricative – probably labio-dental [f], to judge from Latin transcriptions with F – for which the Greek alphabet provided no sign; for this a diagraph F. Θ (*vb*) was used.

Adaptation of the alphabet to the practical requirements of writing Etruscan also involved establishing a notation for the unmarked velar [k] and for the sibilants, of which Etruscan apparently distinguished two – they may arbitrarily be represented as [s] and [š]. Divergent choices with regard to these were important in the creation of regional varieties of the alphabet, which, apparent already in the seventh-century inscriptions, continued to develop into more settled forms by the second half of the sixth century. Three main divisions are recognized.²

In the south, including Caere and Veii, the unmarked velar was represented by *kappa* (*k*) before *a*, *gamma* (*c*) – not required to indicate a

² D 349; D 358; D 360.

voiced stop, and therefore available for other purposes – before *e* and *i*, and *koppa* (*q*) before *u*. This notation (of allophonic variants, not contrasting phonemes) gave way by the end of the sixth century to the general use of *c* in all contexts. The sibilants were at first represented by three letters: a three-stroke *sigma* (*s*), a four-stroke sigma (*ś*), and the cross-sign X (*š*); by the mid-sixth century the indiscriminate use of these signs was given up in favour of a distinction between *s* for [s] and *ś* for [š].

A striking innovation in this southern area is the introduction towards the end of the seventh century of a system of syllabic punctuation, which continued in use throughout the following century. Although its origin is obscure, the practice argues a sophisticated interest in writing, and it may have been associated with scribal schools attached to sanctuaries.³ This punctuation is also characteristic of the inscriptions of northern Campania (around Capua and Nola) from the mid-sixth to the mid-fifth century, providing clear evidence of connexions with southern Etruria.

Progression from a threefold representation of [k] – *ka*, *ce/i*, *qu* – to a general use of *c* may also be seen in central Etruria, including Tarquinia, Vulci and Orvieto, save that in the earliest inscriptions from Vulci *k* alone is found. As regards the sibilants, after some initial hesitations and experiments with the southern *ś* and *š*, from the first half of the sixth century *s* was adopted for [s] and *san* or *tsade* (*ś*) for [š]. This central alphabet is also found in the sixth-century inscriptions of southern Campania, from the area at the base of the Sorrentine peninsula.

Inscriptions from northern Etruria do not appear until the middle of the seventh century, which suggests that writing was introduced there rather later than in the rest of Etruria, and perhaps introduced from Vulci, which could explain the use of *k* alone to represent [k]. This feature remained characteristic of the whole region until the fourth century, when the southern *c* was progressively adopted. For the sibilants, *s* and *ś* were in use from the end of the seventh century: the same signs as in central Etruria but with reversed values, *s* standing for [š] and *ś* for [s]. It was from this northern region that writing spread to the Etruscan settlements in the Po valley; the inscriptions here date in part from the fifth century but belong mainly to the fourth.

The Etruscan alphabets are also distinguished by differences in the forms of letters, some of the variations being of very local distribution: for instance, at Clusium between *c.* 575 and *c.* 525 B.C. there appears a sign X that is now recognized as a simplification of the crossed *theta* (\otimes), the surrounding circle having been omitted;⁴ in the Valdichiana region from the second half of the third century the five-stroke *my* (\mathcal{M}) was replaced

³ D 470. ⁴ D 360, 382.

by Λ , perhaps not so much the product of formal simplification as a transference, through the acrophonic principle, of the symbol for 'five', for which the Etruscan word was *max*.⁵

There was, however, a development in the alphabetic system that affected all regions. In the second half of the sixth century, a new letter θ came to replace the digraph *vb* as a notation of [f], and was duly added to the alphabet in final position, as can be seen from late sixteenth-century *abecedaria*. The origin of the letter is disputed: the suggestion that it represents a local Etruscan development from the *b* of the earlier digraph is certainly plausible,⁶ but a borrowing from the Sabine region has also been proposed (see below); a connexion with the θ = [f] of the Lydian alphabet seems less probable.

The familiarity of the Etruscan letters, with their Greek antecedents, means that the study of the inscriptions does not involve actual decipherment, but there remain substantial obstacles in the way of advancing beyond the provision of a mere transcription. The adaptation of the Greek alphabet to the writing of Etruscan affords some clues as to the nature of the sound system, as in the case, already mentioned, of the omission of \omicron and signs for voiced stops from the alphabets in practical use, but even where there seems to be a good match between Greek letters and those retained in use by the Etruscans, there can be no guarantee that the sound values correspond. It is clear, for instance, that in Etruscan there was a distinction between two sets of consonants, written *p, t, c* (*k, q*) and *\phi, \theta, \chi* – although the opposition could be neutralized in certain environments.⁷ The choice of the Greek letters *phi, theta, chi* to represent the second set would suggest an opposition based on aspiration, but it is quite possible that some other distinctive feature (e.g., palatal quality)⁸ is in question, the particular Greek letters being used only for want of anything more suitable (although Latin transcriptions with *ph, th, ch* and the treatment of Greek loan-words tend to support the case for aspiration). As regards the sibilants, the early Greek model alphabet offered a wide range of signs, a residue of its Phoenician past, and selection was in due course made to mark an opposition between two sibilants in Etruscan; but the choice of letters gives no indication of the nature of the opposition, which remains a subject for debate.⁹

The long recorded history of Etruscan permits the observation of certain changes, from which further information about the sound system can be deduced. In the fifth century, confusion seems to arise over the spelling of vowels in internal syllables, and shortly afterwards the vowels disappear altogether: thus *avile* (a personal name) alternates with *avale*

⁵ On the distribution of this letter-form see D 391; D 424; on its origin, D 471.

⁶ D 406. ⁷ D 364, II 177ff; D 373. ⁸ D 477, 220, 222. ⁹ D 376; D 477, 220f.

before becoming *avle* or *aule*, whence Latin *Aulus*; *axile*/*axele*/*axale* ‘Achilles’ becomes *axle*; etc. This phenomenon is best explained as reflecting a process of neutralization of vowel quality, followed by syncope, the most probable cause being the development of heavy stress on word-initial syllables; exactly analogous changes were taking place in other languages of central Italy at this time. The syncope applied to Greek loan-words as well (cf. *axle*), but only short internal vowels were lost, the long ones remaining (cf. *atunes* ‘Adonis’, etc.). It would seem then that at least as late as the fifth century the Etruscans distinguished vowel length in loan-words; this suggests that vowel length may have been distinctive in Etruscan itself, although ignored by the spelling conventions.¹⁰

Notable progress has been made in recent years in the study of Etruscan grammar through careful morphological analysis, though much remains obscure and residual uncertainties may attend even the more secure identifications of categories and their exponents. There are, for instance, two genitival suffixes, *-s* and *-(a)l* (archaic *-ia*): these are used to differentiate between masculine and feminine forms of family names, which must be a secondary usage, since it seems that family names only developed *c.* 700 and that otherwise Etruscan marked no distinctions of gender (in connexion with these names, influence from neighbouring Italic languages has been suspected); in individual names, however, the two suffixes are distributed according to a simple phonotactic rule – *-(a)l* to names ending in *-θ* or *-s*, yet common nouns show no such restrictions, some indeed being attested with both genitive forms; the original distribution of the suffixes seems beyond recovery, and an original difference of function may be only surmised. A verbal suffix *-ce*, apparently a past tense marker used indifferently for 3 sg. and 3 pl., contrasts with the passive marker *-χe*; beside these forms there occur in predicate function also forms in *-u* that have been identified as verbal nouns or adjectives, but it is not clear what conditions the choice of form in particular instances. There is a further puzzle in the formal relationship between the forms in *-u* and the forms in *-ce* and *-χe*: the suffixes may be added to the same stem (as *zilaχnu* beside *zilaχn(u)ce* ‘served as magistrate’), or the *u*-form may serve as the base for a derived verb (as *mulu* for *muluwanice* ‘gave’); on the other hand, the *u*-form may apparently be based on the past tense form (as *aliqu* to *al(i)ce* ‘gave’ (?), *zinaku* to *zin(a)ce* ‘made’) or on the passive form (as *ceriχu*); but it seems that these derived *u*-forms may in turn serve as bases for derived verbs (so *ceriχunce* ‘built’ from *ceriχu*). Derivational patterns can thus be established, but it is still not clear what determines their direction and whether any difference

¹⁰ D 364, II 48ff.

of meaning accompanies the different formations. That such problems can be recognized is an indication of a significant advance in the understanding of the structure of the language.¹¹

At a general level, a number of Etruscan texts can be reasonably well understood. The nature of an inscription can often be deduced from external evidence, such as what it is written on or where it was found, and parallels from the ancient world indicate what the content is likely to be; this is the so-called bi-linguistic method, which, explicitly recognized as such or not, is the foundation of all study of Etruscan texts.¹² With the further assistance of combinatory analysis, it is possible in many instances to assign a meaning to various elements of the text.

Best understood is the onomastic system,¹³ for which there is exceptionally plentiful evidence, especially from epitaphs and dedications. These inscriptions have also permitted the identification of several kinship terms (as *apa* 'father', *ati* 'mother', *sex* 'daughter', *puia* 'wife', etc.), verbs of giving or dedicating (as *tur(u)ce*, *mulwanice*), and a formula for recording age at death that includes numerals, *avil* 'year' and *lupu* or *lupuce*, probably 'dead' or 'died'. Epitaphs containing a *cursus honorum* have yielded magistrates' titles,¹⁴ principally *zilaθ*, *maru* and *purθ* or *purθne*; a federal magistrate has been recognized in the *zilaθ mexl rasnal*, since Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.* 1.30.3) relates that *Rasenna* was the Etruscans' name for themselves, but other occurrences of *rasna* (in various cases) in the inscriptions rather suggest that the word means 'people' (Latin *populus*), so that *mexl rasnal* (gen. sg.) would be equivalent to Latin *reipublicae* and the title that of a local magistrate.¹⁵ A designation of social status is *lautni*, rendered by Latin *libertus* in the late bilinguals.¹⁶

The identification of at least the area of meaning of the words of an inscription may allow some progress towards a translation; complete success must depend also on grammatical analysis, for which the prospects now seem more hopeful. Improved understanding of the grammatical system may further help eventually to determine the affinities of Etruscan, which has not been convincingly shown to belong to any known family of languages (so that no assistance with the interpretation of texts can be expected from the etymological method). The only evident connexions are with the language spoken on Lemnos before the Athenian conquest, attested by a fifth-century stela and a few fragmentary inscriptions; on the stela, age at death seems to be recorded in the words *avis sialxvis*, strikingly reminiscent of Etruscan, cf. *avils maxs sealxisc* (*TLE* 98), probably 'at the age of 65', and further morphological parallels can be observed in what appears to be a dating formula.¹⁷ There

¹¹ See in particular D 477. ¹² D 438, 441ff. ¹³ D 468; D 473; D 356; D 393.

¹⁴ D 435; D 398; D 392; D 359, 82ff. ¹⁵ D 476. ¹⁶ D 468, 356ff; D 174, 126ff.

¹⁷ D 469; D 394.

can be no doubt that the languages belong closely together, and a genetic relationship seems likely.

Contact with the Etruscans brought literacy to the peoples of northern Italy, whose languages are known from inscriptions written in the so-called north Etruscan alphabets. The most numerous (between 250 and 300) are the Venetic inscriptions. They come from two main areas: Este, with Padua and Vicenza, and the mountains to the north and east, the principal site here being Lâgole (Cadore). The range of dates is from the fifth century to the first; the later inscriptions, from c. 150, are written in the Latin alphabet and show progressive Latinization of the language. Etruscan influence was responsible both for the initial introduction of writing and for a subsequent reform that introduced the southern practice of syllabic punctuation, to which the Veneti remained faithful long after the Etruscans had abandoned it; an associated formal scribal training is indicated by dedicatory writing tablets, which are inscribed not only with alphabets but also with lists of the consonantal clusters that are exempt from punctuation.¹⁸ The use of *kappa* for [k] and the presence of *sigma* and *san* to note sibilants point to a model alphabet from northern Etruria; the use of the digraph *vb* to write [f] shows that the borrowing took place before the middle of the sixth century. It is clear from the later inscriptions in the Latin alphabet that Venetic distinguished between voiced and voiceless stops; in the absence of *beta*, *gamma* and *delta* from the Etruscan model alphabet, *phi* and *chi* were used for the voiced labial [b] and velar [g], while for the voiced dental [d] various solutions were found. (Divergence with regard to the notation of dental stops, both voiced and voiceless, is the chief diagnostic feature in distinguishing local varieties of the Venetic alphabet.) The deficiency of the Etruscan model with respect to vowels was met by the introduction of O, presumably from a Greek source – perhaps Adria; this O is shown to be a later addition to the alphabet rather than a resurrection of a sign still present in the theoretical Etruscan alphabet by its position at the end of the Venetic alphabet (the order of which is known from the dedicatory writing tablets). The scope of the inscriptions is extremely limited: very short epitaphs and dedications. Knowledge of the language is therefore restricted, and while it is clear that Venetic is of Indo-European descent, its position within Indo-European is harder to determine; a connexion with Italic, and in particular with Latin, is widely favoured, but much of the crucial evidence consists of forms whose interpretation is disputed.¹⁹

Immediately to the north west lies the region that according to ancient sources was inhabited by the Raeti, and Raetic is the name given to the

¹⁸ D 410. ¹⁹ D 415, 163ff; D 459; D 491.

language of the local pre-Roman inscriptions (dating from the fourth century through to the second), written in various alphabets derived from a northern Etruscan model, the principal variants being the Magrè alphabet, from Padua and Verona northwards, and the Bolzano alphabet, in the South Tyrol and across the Brenner. Votive texts for the most part, to judge from the objects on which they are written and the circumstances of the finds, their language seems not to be Indo-European, but has been claimed rather to show some affinities with Etruscan (forms in *-al* reminiscent of Etruscan genitives, a possible verb *tinake* – in various spellings – that recalls Etruscan *zinace*); the claim is usually supported by reference to statements in Roman authors to the effect that the Raeti were descendants of Etruscans driven into the mountains by the Gauls (Pliny, *NH* III.133), Etruscans whom the habitat had turned wild, but who retained a corrupted version of the language (Livy v.33.11). Too little of the texts is understood for any firm conclusion to be possible, and the formal resemblance may be only superficial.²⁰ The same language may be present in inscriptions in the Sondrio alphabet (also derived from a northern Etruscan model) from further west; but at least some of these form a group apart, viz. the rock inscriptions of the Val Camonica, to the north of Lake Iseo, though the Italic connexions sometimes claimed for them are not convincing.²¹

A further alphabet of north Etruscan derivation, the Lugano alphabet, is characteristic of a group of eighty or more inscriptions – many of them fragmentary – from the area around Lake Maggiore and Lake Como. These are conventionally classified as ‘Lepontic’, although the historical Lepontii seem to have dwelt rather further to the north. The inscriptions apparently belong to the last four centuries B.C., but the letter-forms indicate that the alphabet was constituted considerably earlier; a noteworthy feature is the presence of O, presumably taken from a Greek model – Marseilles has been suggested as a likely source. Almost exclusively funerary, apart from one or two dedications, the inscriptions provide evidence chiefly for personal names, which turn out to be virtually indistinguishable from Gaulish names (except for a patronymic suffix *-alo-*, probably developed under the influence of the *-al* of neighbouring Raetic). The presence of Gauls in the region would no doubt account for this, but the phonology and morphology of the texts in general point to a Celtic classification for Lepontic. Yet comparison with the certainly Gaulish inscriptions of Briona and Todi (both written in the Lugano alphabet – the latter presumably the work of Gauls who had recently moved to Umbria from the north) shows that Lepontic is not actually identical with Gaulish, although very close to it.²² One clear

²⁰ D 466; D 443.

²¹ D 451; D 488; D 427.

²² D 198; D 412; D 487.

point of difference is the treatment of final nasals: *-n* in Cisalpine Gaulish, *-m* in Lepontic, cf. Gaul. (Todi) *lokan*, Lep. (Vergiate) *palam* – both acc. sg.; this is the main criterion for the assignment to Gaulish of the recently discovered inscription from Vercelli.²³ Lepontic may represent the language of an earlier wave of Celtic immigrants, preceding perhaps by some centuries the main Gallic incursions of the late fifth and fourth centuries. The arrival of the Gauls and their spread throughout northern Italy is marked linguistically by the appearance of Celtic names in many areas: but it is in the context of a long history of Celtic infiltration, to which the Lepontic inscriptions bear witness, that the presence of Celtic names already in archaic Orvieto should be seen.²⁴

Doubtfully Celtic, on the other hand, are the inscriptions on four of the archaic statue-menhirs from the Lunigiana, inland from La Spezia; written in an Etruscan alphabet, only two of the inscriptions are sufficiently legible to be used and their interpretation is most uncertain.²⁵ Only geographical considerations support their assignment to Ligurian, understood as the Indo-European language vestigially attested in certain place-names of the region.

On the Adriatic coast, a further language is attested by a small group of inscriptions from the Pesaro area, comprising two or three fragments (one found *in situ* in the prehistoric cemetery at Novilara) and a stela of c. 500 B.C. with a complete inscription of twelve lines. The letter-forms indicate an Etruscan model for the alphabet used, but the presence of *b*, *g*, *d* and *o* points to the influence of a Greek model. Curiously, the letter *V* appears only in the form \check{V} , with a diacritic; this suggests that the distinction between [o] and [u] was first marked by splitting the Etruscan *V* into two signs, *V* and \check{V} , the former being subsequently replaced by *O*.²⁶ The point is of interest in view of the appearance of \check{V} in contemporary ‘South Picene’ inscriptions, from the region that extends along the Adriatic coast roughly from Ancona to Ortona, for a link is not unlikely in the light of the archaeological evidence for the cultural homogeneity of the region as a whole. Linguistically, however, the northern area is quite separate: the language of the Novilaran inscriptions, despite attempts to claim it for Indo-European, remains in isolation, and the speakers of it unidentified.²⁷

The early Latin and Faliscan alphabets, attested from the seventh century, show close similarities to those of southern Etruria as regards letter-forms, and Etruscan influence on the alphabetic system must be acknowledged in respect of the adoption of the southern pattern for the representation of [k]: *ka*, *ce/i*, *go/u* – albeit with some inconsistencies in

²³ D 417; otherwise D 486.

²⁴ D 368.

²⁵ D 198, 133ff; D 425.

²⁶ D 405, 154f.

²⁷ D 378; D 450.

practice. (The resulting lack of a letter in the Latin alphabet to represent [g] was not remedied until G was invented, by modification of C, in the third century.) Independent developments, however, also took place. An accessory Greek model must be invoked to explain the presence of *delta* in the Faliscan alphabet, *beta* and *delta* in the Latin alphabet, and O in both. In addition, a new sign † for [f], perhaps a modification of *digamma*, was created for the Faliscan alphabet; by the sixth century, the *digamma* as such had come to represent [f] in the Latin alphabet, no doubt by simplification of the digraph *vb* that had earlier been used in accordance with Etruscan practice. The maintenance of connexions with southern Etruria is reflected in the generalization of *c* in place of earlier *k*/*c*/*q* – apart from the Latin retention of *qu* to write labio-velar [k^w]; this took place in both alphabets in the second half of the fifth century. Etruscan connexions were particularly strong at Falerii, where a right-to-left direction of writing was adopted from the end of the sixth century, after a long period of fluctuating usage, in line with the contemporary standardization of practice in Etruria; whereas Greek influence, seen also in the introduction of certain letter-forms, was no doubt responsible for the adoption in the same period of the left-to-right direction for writing Latin.²⁸

The remains of Faliscan are not extensive. A few vase-inscriptions survive from the archaic period; from the fifth century through to the destruction of Falerii in 241 B.C., a period of heavy Etruscan influence, there are a number of epitaphs, but little else. After 241 the inscriptions bear witness to a rapid process of Latinization; Faliscan elements often appear as no more than dialectal features in essentially Latin texts. The process was no doubt assisted by the close relationship between the two languages, which seem to have diverged substantially only from the beginning of the fifth century: archaic Faliscan is remarkably like the language of the earliest Latin inscriptions – an impression now reinforced by the appearance of gen. sg. *-asio*, hitherto attested within Italic only in Faliscan, in the recently discovered inscription from Satricum.²⁹ Not that the early remains of Latin are so ample as to give more than a glimpse of the state of the language. A few vase-inscriptions, a broken *cippus* from the Roman forum, and a number of dedications from various sites in Latium make up the small total. Now that the Praenestine fibula is suspected of being a forgery,³⁰ the earliest inscriptions reach no further back than the end of the seventh century. Latin inscriptions do not begin to appear in any substantial numbers until the second century, by when the language, known also from the surviving literature, has in most respects attained its classical form.

²⁸ D 350.

²⁹ D 369, 82f.

³⁰ See, for instance, D 386.

Latin and Faliscan together form a sub-group of Italic, a term here to be understood as a conventional designation for the group of closely related Indo-European languages spoken in ancient Italy that includes, besides Venetic (possibly) and perhaps other languages of which there are some sparse remains in the far south, an Osco-Umbrian sub-group, consisting of Oscan and Umbrian and certain minor languages or dialects that show close affinities with them. Common features link all these languages and thus justify the recognition of an Italic group within Indo-European, but the two main sub-groups are clearly set apart by separate innovations; there is no general agreement as to whether this state of affairs is the product of a process of divergence, whereby a more or less unified Proto-Italic split up into sub-groups, or convergence, whereby languages that were originally more clearly distinct developed common features as the result of prolonged contact within Italy.³¹

The term Italic, however, is frequently used as a label for the Osco-Umbrian languages only, through association with the ancient Italic (although this designation in Roman sources is by no means confined to one linguistic group) and the use of the name of Italy as a rallying call in the Social War. A more appropriate designation might rather be sought in the group of etymologically related names that includes *Sabini*, *Sabelli*, *Samnium*, Osc. *safnim*, etc.,³² were it only possible to find a term that did not already have too particular a reference. It seems clear that the name underlying this group of derivatives was that used by the Osco-Umbrian peoples to refer to themselves; a further attestation now comes from three recently discovered mid-fifth-century inscriptions from Penna Sant' Andrea (Teramo), two of which even mention a *safina t(o)úta* 'Safine people'. The wide occurrence of these names, together with the traditions of the 'Sabine' origins of the Umbrians and the Picentes, reflects an expansion of the Osco-Umbrian peoples from the central Apennines; the well-attested movements of the fifth century may be seen as a continuation of this process.

The Penna Sant' Andrea inscriptions belong to a small group, dated to the sixth and fifth centuries, from the area corresponding roughly to the southern part of ancient Picenum. The South Picene alphabet includes a number of idiosyncratic signs, whose value, long disputed, has now been largely settled by the evidence of the recent finds. The more satisfactory readings establish with fair certainty that the language belongs to the Osco-Umbrian sub-group of Italic; an apparent tendency to

³¹ D 423, 25*ff; see also D 431, 48ff; D 402; D 403; D 395; D 332; D 333.

³² D 467; D 429, 119ff; D 430, 32ff.

monophthongization of diphthongs (cf. *túta* beside gen. sg. *toútas*) suggests a particular affinity with Umbrian. The interpretation of the greater part of the texts, however, remains uncertain.³³

The South Picene script survived at least until c. 300, when it appears on two inscribed helmets, one from Bologna, the other from Canosa, although the language of the two texts cannot be securely identified. Two characteristic South Picene letters also appear in third-century inscriptions from Capena.³⁴ More important are the South Picene associations of the alphabet used in two sixth-century vase-inscriptions from Nocera and Vico Equense in Campania;³⁵ the readings are not wholly clear, particularly with regard to word division, but the texts can be recognized as statements of ownership, bearing a remarkable similarity of form to the South Picene vase-inscription from Campovolano (Marinetti TE.4). The language may thus be identified as a form of Osco-Umbrian, and is presumably that spoken in Campania before the Etruscan domination.

An even earlier attestation of an Osco-Umbrian language is perhaps to be seen in the late seventh-century inscribed flask from Poggio Sommavilla, in Sabine territory.³⁶ Although the text is obscure, the linguistic forms have an Osco-Umbrian appearance, and it may reasonably be supposed that this is a document of the Sabine language, known otherwise only from glosses in Roman authors. The appearance of so early a written text in this area (and there is a further fragmentary one)³⁷ suggests that this may have been the route for the transmission of the alphabet from Etruria to south Picenum. One noteworthy feature is the presence of the sign 8 at Poggio Sommavilla, read as *f*, although in one instance the sign seems close in form to *beta*, which may be indicative of its origin. In the South Picene inscriptions there appears a sign *;*, which has now been shown to represent *f*, being a drastic simplification of the 8 sign by the reduction of the circles to points, just as *· = o* comes from *O*. Given that 8 does not appear in Etruscan inscriptions until the sixth century, it is at least a possibility that the sign was a Sabine invention, passed on with the alphabet to the related peoples to the east, and eventually borrowed by the Etruscans.³⁸

All this early evidence for forms of Osco-Umbrian invites a reappraisal of the so-called minor dialects of the mountainous central region – Marsian, Vestinian, Marrucian and Paelignian. These dialects have generally been classified in terms of their closeness to Oscan or Umbrian, but given that the latter three are attested in the same area as the South Picene inscriptions, albeit at a much later date (third to first centuries), it might be preferable to think in terms of continuity from the earlier

³³ D 429; D 430.

³⁴ D 335, 829ff.

³⁵ Po. 144, 145 (with refs.); see also D 458, 142ff.

³⁶ D 437; D 357.

³⁷ D 381.

³⁸ D 357.

period.³⁹ Unfortunately, the minor dialects are attested only by relatively few inscriptions, and at a time when the influence of Latin was very strong, as shown by the use of the Latin alphabet, the presence in some inscriptions (particularly Paelignian epitaphs) of Latin forms, and also the hyper-archaism of the Paelignian inscription from Pentima (Ve. 213), which seems to represent a reaction against Latinization.⁴⁰ Two other minor dialects, also scantily attested by late inscriptions in the Latin alphabet, show marked affinities with Umbrian: the inscriptions come from those parts of Latium settled by the Aequi and the Volsci after the migrations of the early fifth century, recorded in Roman sources.

A similar Samnite expansion into Campania culminated in the seizure of Capua in c. 424 B.C., signalling the end of Etruscan domination; the capture of Cyme followed in 421. With the exception of Naples, which remained a Greek city, and an isolated area around Pontecagnano, where Etruscan was still being written throughout the fourth century,⁴¹ Campania became Oscan-speaking. Oscan was the name given by the Romans to the language of the Samnites, though the Oscans as a people seem rather to have been earlier, pre-Etruscan inhabitants of Campania; now that the early presence there of Osco-Umbrian speakers seems assured, some degree of continuity of language is to be reckoned with. Certainly there is evidence for Oscan in Campania well before the Samnite seizure of power, suggesting a long process of infiltration: Oscan personal names make an early appearance in the Etruscan inscriptions of the region, and there are fifth-century vase-inscriptions in Oscan, written in the local Etruscan alphabet, complete with syllabic punctuation.

Around 400 B.C., a new alphabet was devised for writing Oscan. Based on the Etruscan alphabet of northern Campania, it must yet have been constituted in the knowledge of the Greek alphabet since it includes signs for voiced stops, *b*, *g* and *d*. There was at first no sign for [o], true to the Etruscan model, while for the front vowels the two available signs, E and I, were insufficient since Oscan (in common with all Osco-Umbrian languages) distinguished three front vowels: a close [i], an intermediate [ī], and an open [e].⁴² The deficiencies with respect to the notation of the vowels were remedied c. 300 by a reform which introduced two new signs, apparently made from existing ones by the use of diacritics: Ḃ (i) for [ī] and Ḅ (e) for [e].⁴³ This alphabet was diffused throughout Samnium and also amongst the Frentani and northern Apuli, and seems to have been accompanied by a standardization of at least the written

³⁹ D 377; 345.

⁴⁰ D 401.

⁴¹ D 348.

⁴² Some prefer to write [i], [e], [ɛ].

⁴³ D 404, 100.

language, for the inscriptions suggest that Oscan remained remarkably uniform for some four centuries.

Further south, in Lucania, Oscan was written in a Greek alphabet, but a connexion with Campania and Samnium is shown by the adoption of $\theta = f$ (with various modifications of form) and the practice of writing long vowels double. A reform c. 300 introduced a new orthography for the front vowels – a similar reform to that conducted in Campania but operating upon a quite different system of notation; later, c. 200, *zeta* came into use to note the sound resulting from an earlier cluster [dʒ].⁴⁴ Consonantal palatalizations such as this are a late dialectal peculiarity of the South Oscan area, and can be seen also in a further Lucanian inscription, the *Tabula Bantina* (Ve. 2); this is a bronze tablet containing a compilation of laws, written in the Latin alphabet (but showing local influence in the use of Z) and now dated to the first half of the first century B.C.⁴⁵ A few more Oscan inscriptions in the Greek alphabet come from Bruttium, as the result of a Lucanian invasion in the fourth century, and from Messina, which was taken over by Oscan mercenaries, the Mamertini, in the third century. From northern Apulia, subject to Oscan expansion in the fourth century, there come only coin legends.

Although none too numerous – a few hundred only, of which many consist of no more than a letter or two, whether as abbreviations of names (especially on tile stamps) or as mere fragments – the Oscan inscriptions cover a fairly wide range in their content. Official inscriptions include the *Cippus Abellanus* (Ve. 1), dated to c. 150 B.C., which records an agreement between Nola and Abella for the joint administration of a sanctuary of Hercules on their common border, building inscriptions from a number of sites, and the *Tabula Bantina*, mentioned above. As religious texts one may cite the early *iuvilas* inscriptions from Capua, whose precise function remains in doubt,⁴⁶ the bronze tablet from Agnone (Ve. 147), dated to c. 250, which contains a list of altars and ceremonies pertaining to various deities, and a number of dedications, both public and private. There are also epitaphs, makers' inscriptions on Campanian vases, *defixiones* from Capua and Cyme, and the *etituns* inscriptions, painted on walls at Pompeii, which seem to be instructions for troop movements.

From the Oscan inscriptions and those of the minor dialects it is possible to derive some information about political institutions, despite the late date of many of the documents and increasing Roman influence. The citizen body is the *touto*: at Messina, the magistrates and the $\tau\omega\Phi\tau\omicron$ $\mu\alpha\mu\epsilon\rho\tau\iota\nu\omicron$ make a dedication (Ve. 196); at Bantia, the *touto* is the people in

⁴⁴ D 408.⁴⁵ D 327; D 383.⁴⁶ D 389; D 382.

assembly and as the object of the census (Ve. 2); in several cities the chief magistrate is the *meddiss túvtíks*, the *meddiss* of the *touto*. A wider meaning, ‘people, nation’, may be recognized in Marrucinian – an inscription from Rapino (Ve. 218) proclaims itself a *totai maroucai lixs* ‘a law for the M. people’ – and perhaps in the South Picene inscriptions from Penna Sant’ Andrea (see above): this would appear to be the older sense, continuing that of IE **teutā*.⁴⁷

As regards legislative bodies, Roman sources show that at Capua there was both a senate and a *consilium commune* or *consilium publicum*; the local names are not attested, but a similar arrangement seems to have existed at Pompeii, where the names have survived. Magistrates are recorded (in a formula closely parallel to, and doubtless calqued on, the Latin *de senatus sententia*) as taking action under instruction from two public bodies – [*kú*]mparakineís [ta]ngin(ud) (Ve. 17) and *kúmbennieís tanginud* (Ve. 11, 12, 18) – though it is impossible to tell for certain which is likely to be the equivalent of the senate and which the popular assembly. The Volscian *toticu couebriu* (Ve. 222) would appear to be an assembly of the people. Elsewhere a senate as such is attested, when action is taken *senateís tanginúud*, but the word is a Latin loan and there is no guarantee of the antiquity of the institution. At Bantia the term *comonom* for a place of assembly finds a parallel in Umbrian; but the use of the plural *comono* for the assembly itself is so exactly parallel to the Latin use of *comitia* beside *comitium* that a recent calque is probable.⁴⁸

At Capua the *iúvilas* inscriptions provide evidence for a chief magistrate, the *meddiss túvtíks*; this is the *meddix tuticus* of Roman sources, cf. Livy xxv. 35. 13, etc. Variants of the title, mostly reconstructed from references to the magistracy in dating formulae, are *meddiss kapvans* (where *kapvans* = ‘Capuan’), *meddiss túvtíks kapvans* and just *meddiss*. That *meddiss* can also be used as a generic term for a magistrate is clear from the *Tabula Bantina* and at Capua itself from Ve. 87 *pún medd. pís . . . a[d]fust* ‘when any magistrate shall be present’; and a line of Ennius (298V) indicates the existence of more than one *meddix* at Capua at the time of the Hannibalic War. Elsewhere two *μεδδειξ* are found at Messina (Ve. 196); two *meddiss degetasiús* at Nola (Ve. 115) – but one acting alone also (Ve. 1, 116); a *meddiss púmpaiians* (Ve. 8) or *med(diss) túv(tíks)* (Ve. 13, 14, 15) at Pompeii – appearing just as *meddiss* in a dating formula (Ve. 71); a *meddiss túvtíks* at Herculaneum (Ve. 107); and so forth. That the institution of the *meddiss* is of some antiquity is suggested by the appearance of the magistracy in the central region too: two Paelignian *medix aticus* (Ve. 212), a Marsian *medis* (Ve. 223), an Aequian *meddiss* (Ve. 226), two Volscian *medix* (Ve. 222). Other magistrates appear in Oscan inscrip-

⁴⁷ D 454.⁴⁸ D 341, 116.

tions, but apparently under Roman influence: this is clear in the case of the aediles and quaestors at Pompeii and elsewhere, because the titles are definitely Latin, as must be those of the praetor and plebeian tribune at Bantia; to what extent old offices acquired new Roman titles it is hard to judge. Uncertain is the case of the censor: *keenzstur* at Pietrabbondante (Ve. 149), *censtur* at Bantia, Marsian *cetur* (Ve. 223) all point to an underlying form **kens-tōr* that might seem to justify the assumption that the title is indigenous, but a remodelling of Latin *censor* cannot be ruled out.⁴⁹

The principal remains of Umbrian are the Iguvine Tables,⁵⁰ seven bronze tablets containing over 4,000 words. The texts concern religious rituals associated with the Atiedian Brethren, a priestly college at Iguvium, and do not represent a single redaction: various alphabets are used, from different periods, and the later tables VI and VII (written in the Latin alphabet) give a fuller version of the ritual described in Table I, but yet can be shown to derive not from that text but from some common archetype. The tables probably range in date from the late third century to the late second century.⁵¹ A miscellany of some two dozen brief inscriptions, from the fourth century onwards, constitutes the rest of the corpus. The progress of Romanization is marked by the adoption of the Latin alphabet, beginning in the second century, but earlier inscriptions show various forms of Etruscan alphabet, giving the impression of continuous contact with Etruscan centres. The alphabet of the Todi inscription (Ve. 230), c. 400, is very close to that of fifth-century inscriptions from Orvieto,⁵² and the use of *ε* for [k] in the slightly later Colforito dedications (Po. 2) points to influence from southern Etruria⁵³ – but the *ε* of the late Assisi inscription (Po. 7) and the Mevania sundial (Po. 4), c. 150–100, does not conflict with an assumption of connexions with Perugia, which in general seem likely, since by this period the use of *ε* had spread throughout Etruria. At Iguvium the northern *ε* is found, and the alphabet of the earlier tables is generally close to that of third-century Perugia and Cortona, while the more recent table V shows the $\Lambda = m$ of the Valdichiana region (see above).⁵⁴ There are, however, Umbrian peculiarities: a sound-change affecting intervocalic [d] produced a new sound, noted *rs* in the Latin alphabet; in the Umbrian alphabet the sound was represented by η , transcribed \check{r} , which is most probably a form of *delta* and at Todi and Ameria stands also for [d];

⁴⁹ D 342, 15ff; D 343; D 359, 94ff; D 283, 84ff.

⁵⁰ English translation and commentary in D 449; but the meaning of many of the words is obscure, cf. D 380. The most extensive commentary so far is D 374, but a new edition with commentary is being prepared (the first volume – D 460).

⁵¹ D 460, 151ff. ⁵² D 478, 91ff.

⁵³ D 344. ⁵⁴ See A. Maggiani *apud* D 460, 215ff.

elsewhere [d] was written with *t*, which may have prompted the occasional use of *p* for [b]; inversion of ʎ gave ɖ (ç), standing for a palatal consonant, written Š (š) in the Latin alphabet.⁵⁵

The Iguvine Tables are a major source for the study of Italic religion, but as regards secular institutions the Umbrian inscriptions offer little information.⁵⁶ The *tota* (cognate with Oscan *touto*) is at Iguvium evidently the citizen body or *civitas* but at the same time an entity of which the boundaries (*tuderor totcor*) are defined by reference to physical landmarks, therefore also the city or *urbs*.⁵⁷ Sacrifice may be made *puḫluper totas iuvinas* ‘for the *poplo-* of the Iguvine *tota*’: the phrasing suggests that *poplo-* does not refer to the people as a whole but perhaps rather to those capable of military service (which seems to have been the original meaning of the cognate Latin *populus* also).⁵⁸ Social organization is hard to reconstruct from the references to sacrifices *petruniaper natine* (IIa 21, 35) and *vuçiiaper natine* (IIb 26), probably ‘for the *gens Petronia*’ and ‘for the *gens Lucia*’, and from the mention of *famerias pumperias* and *tekvias* (IIb 1–2); these last are clearly some sort of social groupings, but only the possible etymological connexions with ‘five’ and ‘ten’ provide a clue to the nature of the divisions, and the number *xii* seems to be given in the table, which is uncomfortably at odds with any assumption of a decimal system.

The eponymous magistrate at Iguvium is the *uhtur*. A participant in one of the rituals (III 4–8), he has been regarded as a cult official, but the title also appears on a second-century tombstone from Mevania (Po. 3) simply following the name of the dead man, which rather suggests a public office; this is consistent with the dating formula at Iguvium which mentions the *uhtur* (Va 2–3, 15) and that at Assisi which mentions two (Ve. 236). The etymological correspondence with Latin *auctor* does not help to define the nature of the office more closely. The *kevestur* of the Iguvine Tables, on the other hand, does seem from his recorded actions to be only a cult official, though the suggestion that a public office may have provided the model for the position and title within the cult finds some support in the appearance of two *cevestur farariur* ‘*quaestores frumentarii*’ at Mevania (Po. 4). Other junior magistrates are mentioned in both Umbrian and Latin inscriptions from the region, and they bear the title *maro*. *kevestur* is certainly borrowed from Latin, *maro* is probably an Etruscan loan, so that the *uhtur* alone seems to represent an indigenous Umbrian tradition.⁵⁹

Attempts have been made to claim for Italic certain other languages, attested by scanty remains in the far south of the peninsula and in Sicily, but such a classification is precarious. Two inscriptions from Bruttium,

⁵⁵ D 404, 100ff; D 372. ⁵⁶ D 346; D 347; D 359, 99ff. ⁵⁷ D 454.
⁵⁸ D 369, 81; D 371, 99ff. ⁵⁹ D 342, 49ff.

written in an Achaean alphabet and dated 550–450 B.C., presumably represent the pre-Oscan language of the area, but uncertainties of reading and interpretation preclude any secure identification.⁶⁰ From the north-western part of Sicily, the territory of the Elymi, comes a fairly homogeneous body of material, consisting of fifth-century coin legends from Segesta and Erice and some hundreds of very brief and fragmentary vase-inscriptions – presumably votive – from Segesta and a cult-site near by, which are dated to the late sixth and early fifth centuries.⁶¹ Once allowance is made for doubtful readings, uncertainty as to the value of some letters, and the possible presence of Greek elements, there is scope for little beyond the recognition of an ethnic suffix *-αζι-* in the coin legends and a formula *-αι εμι* on the sherds: if *εμι* is 1 sg. ‘I am’, and if it is not taken from Greek, then an Indo-European classification for the language is probable, but closer specification scarcely possible.⁶² To the Siculi are attributed a few inscriptions from eastern Sicily; written mostly in an alphabet of Chalcidian type and dated to the sixth and fifth centuries, they defy interpretation.⁶³ The language appears to be of Indo-European descent but is not self-evidently Italic. There are in addition some 100 glosses, mainly in Hesychius, but these are very heterogeneous and require cautious handling.⁶⁴ (Mention may also be made of a few graffiti on vases from Gela that may constitute the only remains of the language of the Sicani.)⁶⁵

A further Indo-European language is known from some 350–400 inscriptions from Apulia, chiefly from the Salentine peninsula; it is known as Messapian, after the Messapii, one of the ancient peoples of the region. The alphabet is that of Tarentum, borrowed probably in the sixth century and subjected to various modifications. Connexions with Tarentum persisted strongly enough for the letter-forms of the Messapian alphabet to change more or less in line with those of the Greek alphabet, thus providing a means of dating the inscriptions, which range from the late sixth or early fifth century down to the end of the first.⁶⁶ (A different alphabet, closer to a Greek model, is used in the rare inscriptions from Daunia and Peucetia, just to the north; it is not clear whether these regions were also linguistically separate.)⁶⁷ Epitaphs and dedications make up the greater part of the corpus, and few of these consist of much more than an onomastic formula.⁶⁸ It is clear, however, for all that the linguistic material is so exiguous, that Messapian is not an Italic language; nor is the conventional classification of it as Illyrian acceptable in the absence of any direct evidence for the language of ancient Illyria;⁶⁹ Messapian is therefore best recognized as a separate branch of Indo-European.

⁶⁰ D 414. ⁶¹ D 328, 7. ⁶² The language has been claimed for Italic by Lejeune, D 407.

⁶³ D 480, 25ff; D 413; D 461; D 493; D 330. ⁶⁴ D 340. ⁶⁵ D 420. ⁶⁶ D 363.

⁶⁷ D 479. ⁶⁸ D 490. ⁶⁹ D 366.

The Punic inscriptions of north-west Sicily belong to Carthaginian colonies. From the Greek colonies of Sicily and southern Italy come a large number of inscriptions; Greek continued to be spoken in parts of the south long after the Roman conquest, and indeed, according to some scholars, survives in the modern Greek dialects of the region. In both these cases the way in which the language reached Italy is clear; but for the other languages of ancient Italy, with the exception of Gaulish, no comparable account can be provided. Only in so far as the prehistoric movements of peoples can be reconstructed from archaeological evidence of cultural change or deduced from the recognition of linguistic connexions with other areas, is it possible to tell how and when a given language came to be spoken in Italy.

CHAPTER 16
CARTHAGINIANS AND GREEKS


DAVID ASHERI

I. CULTURES AND CULTURE IN SIXTH-CENTURY SICILY

It is possible to write something like a factual history of ancient Sicily from the end of the sixth century B.C. on, based mainly on Herodotus, Sicilian historians from Antiochus of Syracuse to Timaeus of Tauromenium, and their better preserved successors, such as Diodorus of Sicily. From earlier decades, however, few events are known, so that we are limited to a general outline of cultural development, such as hellenization, town planning, social, ethnic, and cultural intercourse among different elements of the population, and changes in manufacture, art, architecture and trade. Fortunately, a great number of archaeological data have been amassed in recent decades enabling us to fill in some of the details of this general picture.

Three peoples of pre-Greek, pre-Punic Sicily were known to the ancients: Sicels east of the Halycus (Platani) river, Sicans to the west of it, and Elymians on the extreme north-western corner of the island. Modern archaeologists, however, though unable to differentiate culturally between Sicels and Sicans, have discovered two further cultural enclaves in eastern Sicily, one around Mylae (Milazzo) and the other at Morgantina (Serra Orlando), both showing clear traces of Italic, 'Apennine', origin; they are nowadays conventionally identified as

* The few Sicilian inscriptions datable to the period covered in this chapter, though short and fragmentary, are by no means unimportant; see the 'Catalogue' in c 31, 247–8 and 273–8. For archaeological and numismatic evidence see the Bibliography sections C VII and D IV. The Acragantine Odes and Encomia of Pindar (*Ol.* II–III; *Pyth.* VI and XII; *Enc.* I, v–VI Puech) as well as fragments of Epicharmus, Simonides, Bacchylides and Aeschylus, reflect contemporary opinion on some of the personalities and events mentioned in this chapter; see also Pind. *Pyth.* I.137ff and *Nem.* IX.95ff. The main narrative sources include Herodotus (v.42–8; VI.22–4; VII.153–67), the fragments of Sicilian historians (e.g. Antiochus, Philistus, and particularly Timaeus, *FGrH* 566 F 18–20 and 92–6) and a few chapters in Diodorus Siculus (see esp. v.9; x.28–9, 33–4; XI.1, 20–6, 38), probably following mainly Timaeus. See also Justin's epitome of Trogus' *Historiae Philippicae* (IV.2; XVII.7; XIX.1). Pausanias' description of Sicilian dedications at Olympia and Delphi, and a few anecdotes assembled by Plutarch, Polyaeus and Aelian add valuable details. For a copious inventory of ancient sources on the Sicilian tyrants mentioned in this chapter, see c 6, II 593–607.



map 20. sicily.

'Ausonian' and 'Morgete', respectively.¹ In the sixth century B.C. all Sicilian cultures were already in a well-advanced phase of hellenization. Chalcidian influence, spreading from Zancle, Naxos, Catania and Leontini, affected the whole north-eastern belt of the island as far as Milazzo, Adrano and Caltagirone, with an advanced post at Serra Orlando. Several Sicel sites in this area show clear signs of hellenization. For example, at Madonna del Piano (near Grammichele), Caltagirone, and elsewhere, both Sicel and Greek burial grounds have been found, a fact suggesting mixed settlements. Serra Orlando was an urban centre of the Greek type. No Greek strongholds have been identified so far in the area colonized by Chalcidians, which would seem to indicate peaceful coexistence rather than violent domination.² To the south of the Catania Plain, a narrow strip of territory was hellenized from Megara Hyblaea, filling the gap between Ionians and Dorians in eastern Sicily. The south-eastern corner of the island was the preserve of Syracusan rule with its two rivers, the Anapus to the north and the Dirillo to the west, as unofficial limits. Syracusan influence apparently spread through two main channels: one along the coastal road through Helorus to Cape Pachynus (Pachino) and on to the mouth of the river Hipparis (Camerino); the other starting from Polichna, a castle and temple in the immediate *chora* of Syracuse, and running west through the Cavadonna Valley to Acrae (Palazzolo) and Casmeneae (Monte Casale), two military outposts and important centres for dominating the Siculan interior. From Monte Casale the main road branched off north west to Pantalica, southward to Tremenzano, Finocchito and Noto Vecchio, and westward to the Dirillo Valley through Chiaramonte Gulfi (Acrillae?) and Scornavacche, then to the south along the Hipparis (Camerino) and Hyrminus (Irminio) valleys to the coast of Camarina.

This Syracusan 'empire', as it is sometimes inadequately termed, was almost twice the area of Attica, and was, as a matter of fact, a comprehensive amalgam of dependencies of very different types: the city and *chora* of Syracuse, a couple of trunk lines of communication, a number of military strongholds, one agricultural and semi-autonomous colony (Camarina), Sicel villages reduced to the status of serfs (called 'Killyrian' by Herodotus; see below, p. 768), a few native reservations, hellenized areas, and perhaps a few centres of mixed Greco-Siculan

¹ The best survey of the native peoples of Sicily is still L. Bernabò Brea's *Sicily before the Greeks* (London, 1957) (esp. ch. vi). 'Ausonian' is a modern term for late Bronze and early Iron Age Aeolian culture. On Mylae (Milazzo) see D 501A. On Morgantina, commonly located at Serra Orlando (Aidone) see A. J. Graham, *CAH* III², 3, 179, and esp. D 558A, D 559. On Sicilian hellenized towns in general see now D 514A, I 706-64.

² On hellenization in the Chalcidian area see D 568 and Graham, *CAH* III², 3, 177f. Excavations at Caltagirone and Grammichele: D 8, 490-1. Mixed settlement at Grammichele: Graham, *op.cit.* p. 179; at Leontini: D 554.

stock.³ West of the Dirillo began the vast area hellenized by Gela, including such important Siculan townships as Butera (Omphace?), and Monte Saraceno (Kakyron?), and stretching from the coastal strip to the Caltanissetta mountains (Vassallaggi, Gibil Gabib, Sabucina). Some of these sites were inhabited by a mixed population, as for instance Monte Bubbonia (Mactorium?) which was eventually thoroughly hellenized. Other sites, such as San Mauro near Caltagirone, look like true sub-colonies of Gela.⁴ Next to Gela, Acragas held some 80 km of coastal plains from Licata (Ecnomus) and Palma di Montechiaro to Minoa, ruled the whole area between the rivers Himeras (Salso) and Halycus (Platani), from Ravanusa and Naro to Canicatti and Sant'Angelo Muxaro, and hellenized even the northern areas as far as Mussomeli and Castronuovo. Thus Acragas commanded the valley of the river Torto between the Sicani and Madonie mountains, bordering upon the southern territory of Himera and cutting Sicily in two by means of a solid Greek bridge.⁵ To the east of this bridge, the entire area bounded by a semicircle stretching roughly from Cefalù through Enna to Milazzo was the main Siculan area of Sicily. West of it, the main influence was Phoenician, with an Elymian enclave struggling against all foreign pressures. Culturally, the main cities of the Elymians, Segesta, Eryx and Entella, were thoroughly hellenized, although a native language was still in use and Phoenician influence was not lacking, especially at Eryx. Politically, however, these cities changed sides, though their sympathies were usually on the Punic side.⁶

Since the time of Cicero, Greek colonies have often been described as 'a Greek sea-coast fringing barbarian lands' (*Rep.* II.4.9). Greek Sicily, however, cannot be described in this way, for since the sixth century B.C. there existed a broad coastal belt of Greek culture 30 to 40 kms deep, irresistibly expanding from east and south towards the innermost core of the island. Within this belt many Sicel townships were transformed into urban settlements of Greek type. Even beyond its frontiers the impact of hellenization was felt, and trends towards urbanization and polis-life were developing among the Sicels everywhere. The once accepted notion of a clear-cut line of demarcation neatly separating 'pure' Greek colonies from a barbarian hinterland should, therefore, be supplanted by the more dynamic model of cultural osmosis from the primary *apoikiai* on the coast to the indigenous interior, creating various intermediate forms


³ On hellenization (from Syracuse) of the south east see esp. D 509; D 551; Acrae: D 501; Casmeneae: D 522 and *CAH* III².3, 176 (with plan). ⁴ See D 495A; D 540.

⁵ See D 507; D 555; and Graham, *CAH* III².3, 179f. Hellenization at Segesta: D 572; D 524A; D 514A, I 723ff.

⁶ Though rigid consistency is of course impossible, 'Punic' is used in this chapter mainly in socio-political contexts (Carthaginian and western), while 'Phoenician' describes the culture of which the Punic were a part.

of colonial life along the way. These intermediate forms include semi-independent sub-colonies such as Callipolis, Euboea, Mylae, Camarina and Minoa; military strongholds and settlements like Acrae, Casmenae, Helorus, Ecnomus, Phalarium and Mazara; several mixed settlements, and countless sites, some of which we mentioned above. In all of these, there is archaeological evidence of import, trade and the meeting of cultures. This hellenizing irradiation did not cease with the last colonial foundations; the process went on incessantly under the stimulus of mass immigration during the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.

Himera and Selinus, both founded in the second half of the seventh century, were not intended as 'outposts of hellenism' against the barbarians any more than were other Greek colonies. In fact, there was no friction between Greek and Punic settlers in this area as long as the former did not try to penetrate into the realm of the latter. The Punic area was mainly the territory dominated by three cities, Motya, Panormus and Soloeis. Motya (Mozia), the earliest Punic settlement in Sicily (late eighth century), has been most thoroughly studied. Thucydides' well-known characterization of Phoenician settlements as originally trading-stations situated on promontories overlooking the sea and on off-shore islets (VI. 2.6) is well illustrated by Motya, a small, low-lying islet of about 125 acres (50 ha) located in the strait mid-way between the mainland and the Isola Grande (Fig. 72). A large quantity of pots, amulets and scarabs, mixed with Proto-Corinthian and Corinthian ware have been found in an early cemetery containing mainly cremation-burials on the northern corner of the islet. A stuccoed Doric capital, probably of the sixth century, and some archaic Greek inscriptions clearly show that Greek influence was present and profound in Motya at that time. In the sixth century the islet was first enclosed with a defensive wall, and a small artificial basin (an artificial dock, but probably not a *cotthon* of the Carthaginian type) with a channel leading to the sea was dug out near the south gate. In the middle of the sixth century, a small shrine was built near the early cemetery (at the 'Cappiddazzu' site). Later, as recent excavations have proved, a sacrificial precinct (*tophet*) began to be used west of the cemetery, testifying to the well-known Canaanite custom of infant sacrifice to Molech. Some 700 stelae, mostly iconic and some bearing votive inscriptions to Baal, have recently been brought to light in this same area. In the late sixth century, after the islet of Motya was linked to the mainland at Birgi by a causeway, which is still visible under the shallow water of the lagoon, Birgi began to be used as a second cemetery. Here, inhumations, usually in monolithic coffins, predominated, with grave-offerings of local pottery, fine Attic black- and red-figure vases, and Phoenician glass vessels. There is no evidence so far of the spread of permanent habitation from Motya to the mainland



72. Plan of Motya. (After D 516, 79, fig. 10.)

opposite, either at Birgi or at Capo Boeo, although this cape controlled the important natural harbour of Lilybaeum (Marsala). In the fifth century, Motya developed into a strongly-walled town, half of whose population was Greek and which conducted flourishing commerce with Elymians and Greeks. It became one of the key points of Carthaginian control over the narrow passage between Africa and Sicily, and the main naval base for Carthaginians in their wars against the Sicilians.⁷

We know much less about the other two Punic settlements in Sicily. Panormus (Palermo), possibly called *Ṣyṣ* in Phoenician,⁸ was founded during the seventh century B.C. and fortified with a strong wall. Important mainly as a harbour – to this day one of the best in the Mediterranean – the town also developed agriculturally in the fertile Conca D'Oro between Capo Zafferano and Capo Gallo – the Panormitis of the ancients, also called 'The Garden'. The Old City of later Panormus was on the site of the original Punic settlement, roughly on both sides of what is now the Corso Vittorio Emanuele, between the Palazzo dei Normanni and the cathedral of Palermo (a district still known as Cassaro Vecchio, i.e. 'Old Citadel'). An ancient Punic cemetery on both sides of Corso Calatafimi has been under excavation since 1953, and has been

⁷ On Motya see D 576; D 566; D 523; D 523A; D 536; D 501B; and Graham, *CAH* III².3, 186–7. Greek inscriptions from Motya: C 31, 277, n. 45.

⁸ *Ṣyṣ* is the legend on several Punic coins of Sicily; see C 628. For the view recently advanced that *Ṣyṣ* was the abbreviated form of the official name of Punic Sicily, see C 629.

found to contain mixed Phoenician and Greek material. This gave rise to the view that Greeks lived in Punic Panormus even in archaic times.⁹ A 'Nea Polis' or New City of Panormus developed outside the walls, probably as a harbour-suburb around the Cala.

We know even less about Soloeis, the third main Punic centre in Sicily. It has been variously located either underneath Hellenistic Solous (Solunto), or at Pizzo Cannita, or at Monte Porcara, where remains of archaic Punic settlements have been discovered a few kilometres from the coast. Traces of walls can be seen at Cannita, suggesting that this settlement was founded to guard the gulf, facing the Greek area of Termini. Two already famous anthropoid sarcophagi have been brought to light at Cannita, and though resembling eastern sarcophagi from Phoenicia, they show Graecizing female figures, one of them clad in a Doric chiton. A seated goddess flanked by sphinxes, probably from sixth-century Cannita, also betrays clear signs of Hellenic influence.¹⁰

Apart from these three cities, few sites in Sicily can safely be identified as Punic. Punics and Greeks lived at Bolognetta, some 20 km to the south of Palermo. Mazara, later a Selinuntian *emporium*, and Makara, an alternative name for Minoa, are merely Phoenician place names. However, we may expect more information from a systematic search for Phoenician influence in Greek or hellenized areas. This may include such archaeological finds as the Egyptian mouldings from Segesta or the statuette of Baal found in the sea off Selinunte, and such evidence of religious syncretism in western Sicily as the worship of Ashtoreth–Aphrodite at Eryx, or possibly also the cult of Heracles at Selinus and Poggioreale which may originally have been a hellenized form of Melkart. Although a Phoenician cultural background can occasionally be observed in some Greek areas, most of the archaeological evidence is late, while signs of hellenization in Punic areas are earlier and more prominent. One often stands perplexed before a 'Phoenician' statue which might be either the work of a Greek craftsman trying to cater to Phoenician tastes, or a Punic artisan already familiar with Greek artistic canons. Generally, in what remains of archaic Phoenician art in Sicily, content and spirit are tenaciously Phoenician, but the choice of style and form is diverse and free, despite native influences, encroaching hellenization, and cultural pressure from Carthage. A Phoenician veneer is easily discernible over a native Sican layer on the iconic stelae from Mellichios' *temenos* at Selinus (Fig. 73), and the sarcophagi and the seated goddess of Cannita are Phoenician in theme and type, while stylistic conventions are clearly Greek. Finally, most iconic stelae from Motya, as

⁹ See D 563.

¹⁰ See D 564, and D 505; also G. Uggeri, 'La Sicilia nella "Tabula Peutingeriana"', *Vichiana* 6 (1969) 149, and D 528B, 225f.



73. Iconic stelae at Selinus. Heights 18, 26 cm. (After A 6, 187, fig. 224.)

well as the male statue recently discovered at Marsala, bear an unmistakably oriental, Egyptianizing stamp devoid of any trace of Carthaginian influence. Receptivity to foreign forms, coupled with resistance to foreign content, makes any true cultural osmosis impossible, since purely external contacts preclude the thorough mixture of faiths or world views. However, this is a cultural situation pregnant with creativity in the arts, and Punic Sicily was certainly no exception to the rule.

Culturally, sixth-century Sicily should be viewed as a country of manifold ethnic elements, all at some stage of levelling, uniforming hellenization. There is no reason whatsoever for dividing the island into sharply different, impermeable or antagonistic cultural areas. In Sicily as elsewhere, assimilation as well as resistance to it were aspects of the hellenizing process, but all early conflicts between Carthaginians and Greeks were, as we shall see, the result of political or commercial, not cultural, antagonism. Trade and exchange of culture never ceased even in periods when the island was the battle-ground of two rival hegemonies. About two centuries after the first Greek and Punic settlements were founded on both sides of the island, a new Sicilian and colonial culture with an original and provincial flavour of its own was emerging and helping to blur early distinctions. One can perceive it in almost every aspect of material culture. For example, we do not find two clearly distinct types of pottery, Greek and non-Greek, or Phoenician and non-Phoenician. Siculan vases are such close imitations of Greek models that it is often very difficult to distinguish Greek imports from local products, or products of Greek potters for Siculan customers from those made by Siculan potters for local consumption. The same may be said of

many bronze artefacts and works of art, as for instance those found at Grammichele, where Sicels and Greeks lived side by side. A Sicilian decorative style developed in some colonies out of Corinthian elements combined in an original way expressing a peculiar sense of gaiety or ferocity. The best known examples are the gorgons of the Selinuntian temple metopes (especially those of Temple C: see below), and the characteristically Acragantine amalgamation of all 'colonial Doric' styles.

In the field of religion, the survival of native elements is undeniable. The above-mentioned Selinuntian stelae are Phoenicio-Sican in appearance, but devoted to Meilichios, an imported Greek deity, while some even bear inscriptions in good Doric. River-gods and eponymous nymphs of local origin appear everywhere. In the Etna region, the native god Adranos, the father of the Palikoi, was adopted by the Greeks and eventually identified with Hephaestus. At Buscemi a number of Greek inscriptions testify to the cult of Anna, a native fertility goddess,¹¹ and in the Sicilian Megarid the local mother, Hybla, eventually became Aphrodite, as did Ashtoreth at Eryx. Most interesting are the fortunes of Demeter and Core, to whom the whole of Sicily was much devoted. At first there was the local Neolithic cult of the Great Mothers. Then came the Greek cult of the Infernal Goddesses, imported mainly by Rhodian colonists from the eastern Aegean. Finally, Demeter appeared on the earliest coins of Enna, the Siculan holy capital of the Great Mothers, and the rape of Core was said to have occurred in a nearby wood. Thus, by the middle of the fifth century B.C., the full cycle of syncretism was accomplished. In other instances, however, continuity and amalgamation of cults is often taken for granted, but rarely proved. For example, the theory that all Greek extra-mural sanctuaries must inevitably have native predecessors underneath has been neither proved nor disproved archaeologically. Rather, this theory owes its popularity mainly to certain modern ideologies which have become fashionable from time to time. Continuity in the site of cults is not in itself significant, unless continuity in religious content can also be demonstrated.¹² The much discussed Siculan contribution to the Greek language is also of slight import. A few place names (e.g. Gela and Zancle), and several words denoting weights and measures (e.g. *litra*, *nummus*, *onkia*), popular foods (e.g. *tellis*, a shellfish), and domestic objects (e.g. *batanion* and *katinos*, a

¹¹ See *Bull. Paletn. Ital.* 1898, p. 164; *Not.Scav.* 1899, p. 452.

¹² The problem of extra-mural sanctuaries in Sicily and Magna Graecia has been much debated in the last half-century: see E. Ciaceri, *Storia della Magna Grecia* 1² (Genoa, 1940) 20ff; D 8, 181f; G. Pugliese Carratelli, 'Santuari extramurani in Magna Grecia', *PP* 17 (1962) 241ff. A good bibliography on this subject can be found in F. de Polignac's *La naissance de la cité grecque* (Paris, 1984) 160ff.

dish), did in fact infiltrate Sicilian Greek. But of much greater importance is the adoption of the Greek alphabet by Sicels and Elymians for the writing of their own languages.¹³

The extent of miscegenation through cohabitation and intermarriage is not easy to assess. A half-Greek, half-Elymian element did apparently increase during the fifth century in the western corner of Sicily as a result of treaties of intermarriage between Segestans and Selinuntians. Cohabitation, if not legal intermarriage of colonists and natives, either in mixed villages in rural and mountainous areas, or of owners and slaves within the city walls was certainly common, especially among the lower classes. In this kind of cultural situation, we should not be surprised to find Sicel Killyrians and Greek commoners joining in a revolt against the old oligarchy of Syracuse, or Sicels and Greeks struggling side by side for the independence of Camarina from her own mother-city, or Selinus fighting alongside the Carthaginians against most of Greek Sicily. In general, Greek parties and cities had no qualms about allying themselves with Punics or Sicels against other Greeks. In fact, the period down to the battle of Himera was not one of confrontation between Carthaginians and Greeks over Sicily, but rather of continuous struggles between Greeks, the Carthaginians rarely taking sides against the power most threatening to their political or military interests.

II. SIXTH-CENTURY CLASHES BETWEEN PUNICS AND GREEKS IN WESTERN SICILY

A first isolated clash involving foreign Greeks, Elymians and Punics took place at Lilybaeum, the westernmost point of Sicily, about 580 B.C.¹⁴ It was a period when waves of Greeks migrated from the southern Aegean and the Peloponnese to settle in the west. Messenians went to Rhegium, Pisatans to Epidamnus and Ionian Apollonia, Rhodians and Cnidians to Cyrenaica, Apulia, and Acragas in Sicily. One group of Cnidians under the leadership of a certain Pentathlus tried to settle on Cape Lilybaeum but was driven out by Elymians and Punics. The survivors abandoned the Cape and occupied the Lipari Islands. This is the version of Antiochus of Syracuse (*FGrH* 555 F 1), writing in the second half of the fifth century B.C. Diodorus, following another Sicilian version probably mentioned by Timaeus, adds that Pentathlus was a

¹³ Some recent contributions to the study of pre-Greek language in Sicily: D 480; D 413; D 461; D 330; C. Gallavotti, 'Scritture della Sicilia ed altre epigrafi arcaiche', *Helikon* 17 (1977) 97-136; L. Agostiniani, 'Epigrafia e linguistica anelleniche in Sicilia', *KOKALOS* 26-7 (1980-81) 503-30. On Sicel: D 493. On Elymian: U. Schmoll, 'Die Elymer und ihre Sprache', *Sprache* 7 (1961) 104-22; M. Durante, 'Sulla lingua degli Elimi', *KOKALOS* 7 (1961) 81-90; D 328; M. Durante, 'L'enigma della lingua degli Elimi', *Φιλίας χάριν. Miscellanea in onore di Eugenio Manni* (Roma, 1979) III 881-8.

¹⁴ See A. J. Graham, *CAH* III².3, 186-9.

descendant of Heracles, and that among his colonists there were also Rhodians; when Pentathlus took the side of Selinus in a local war against Segesta, he was one of the many who were killed (v.9). The warring parties were the colonists, the Selinuntians, and the Elymians of Segesta. Diodorus does not mention the Punics although quite clearly a Greek settlement on Lilybaeum could be a nuisance to Motya even more than to Segesta. Why the attempt at colonization was made at Lilybaeum may never be known, but to attribute to Pentathlus and his companions either far-sighted schemes of commercial control of the western Mediterranean, or anti-Phoenician racial animosities is to credit them with ideas too modern for sixth-century Greeks. In this context, it might be helpful to recall that after the foundation of Acragas in 580, there was not much room left for new colonies in Sicily except on the Siculan northern coast and the Punic–Elymian west.

Although insignificant in itself, the Lilybaeum incident may have been the starting point of a peculiar irredentist movement in western Sicily. Stesichorus, writing in Himera in the first half of the sixth century, was probably the first to tell the story of Heracles and Eryx, the Elymian eponymous hero, who engaged in a contest as a result of which the defeated party surrendered his land to the victor.¹⁵ This legend may express Greek claims on Elymian, not Punic land; but Hecataeus, writing in the last decades of the century, included both Motya and Soloeis in the area of Heracles' adventures (*FGrH* I F 76–7). Ironically enough, it was a syncretized Melkart–Heracles who eventually became the symbol of Greek *Drang nach Westen* in Sicily.¹⁶

There is, of course, no mention of Carthaginians in connexion with the Lilybaeum incident. It was, in fact, a purely local west Sicilian affair. Carthaginian military intervention in Punic Sicily started only later, probably not earlier than the third quarter of the century when Carthage, in reaction to her final isolation from Phoenicia, began to build her own empire. Commercial and maritime unity between east and west in the archaic Mediterranean was a great achievement on the part of the Phoenicians, lasting as long as their fleets and trade-routes were able to link together Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Cyprus to Morocco and Spain. This unity, however, rapidly crumbled in the course of the century owing to Greek penetration of the west and particularly through the

¹⁵ See D 503; J. Bérard, *La colonisation grecque de l'Italie méridionale et de la Sicile dans l'antiquité* (Paris, 1957) 412; D 8, 339f; D 561, 55; D 567, 265, n. 2; Graham, *CAH* III².3, 187. This quite plausible suggestion is based mainly on what we can gather from Stesichorus' *Geryoneis* fragments about Heracles' adventures in the West, and on the tradition according to which the legend of Heracles and Eryx was exploited to justify Dorieus' expedition in the late sixth century (Diod. IV.23.1–3; Herodotus (v.32.1) mentions a sixth-century collection of oracles passing under the name of Laius).

¹⁶ Heracles' inscription from Poggioreale: M.-T. Manni Piraino, *KOKALOS* 5 (1959) 159–73 = *SEG* XIX (1963), no. 615.

establishment of the Achaemenid empire in the east. The Persian conquest of Tyre (539 B.C.) and the ensuing annexation of Egypt in 525 are the final landmarks in the process after which only traditional ties of devotion and piety survived between the colony and its mother-city.¹⁷ Isolation from Phoenicia and pressure from native peoples compelled many tiny western Punic trading-posts and colonies, scattered as they were all over the coasts of northern Africa, Spain, the Balearics, Sardinia and Sicily, to seek, albeit reluctantly, the protection of the strongest, wealthiest city state of their own stock. The oldest Carthaginian centre of power was in northern Africa; the Sicilian corner, Sardinia and Spain were later additions. As a result of the famous battle of Alalia (c. 535 B.C.), fought by allied fleets of Carthaginians and Etruscans against a Greek fleet, the western Mediterranean became virtually a Punic lake abutting in the east the Tyrrhenian Sea, dominated by the Etruscan thalassocracy, with whom they maintained close relations. Trade was controlled mainly by means of commercial treaties between Carthage and other, mostly Etruscan, maritime cities. The purpose of these treaties was not to exclude Greeks or others, but rather mutually to delimit spheres of influence among partners. Carthage seems regularly to have requested supremacy to the west of Kalon Akroterion (usually identified with Ras Sidi Ali el-Mekki, or Cape Farina), and when this condition was met, the other party might well be a Greek city, as for instance Massalia. By the so-called First Treaty between Carthage and Rome (at that time an Etruscan city), datable to about 509, the Romans were given *inter alia* freedom of trade in Punic Sicily on the same terms as other nations, including the Greeks, as ample archaeological evidence shows.¹⁸ However, spheres of influence were never hermetically sealed. Several Greek trading-posts and colonies continued to flourish in the west, both among Iberians and Punics in the Spanish Levant, e.g. Rhode, Emporium (Ampurias) and Hemeroscopium, and among Etruscans in central Italy from Graviscae to Adria, and even in Corsica a Greek settlement seems to have remained at Alalia long after the battle. In addition, all around the Etrusco-Carthaginian dominion Greek harbours and towns stood firm from Massalia and her sub-colonies to the Cnidian pirate bases on the Liparian archipelago, and Greek cities stretched in an unbroken line from Campania and Apulia to western Sicily.

The effort involved in building the empire seems to have brought upon Carthage a period of foreign and domestic wars. At least this is

¹⁷ See D 8, 338f and above, pp. 48–50, 255.

¹⁸ On commercial relations between Sicily and Etruria see M. Gras, 'La Sicile et l'Italie centrale au VIIe siècle et dans la première partie du VIe siècle avant J.-C.', *KOKALOS* 26–7 (1980–81) 99ff, and G. Colonna, 'La Sicilia e il Tirreno nel V e IV secolo', *ibid.* 157ff. On the wider context, see e.g. A 11, ch. VIII. On fragments of *aes signatum* found at Bitalemi (Gela) see C. Ampolo, 'Servius rex primus signavit aes', *PP* 29 (1974) 382ff.

what we gather from a confused chapter of Justin (xviii.7) concerning Malchus, a Carthaginian general who first waged 'long wars' in Sicily, then transferred the war to Sardinia, and, together with the remnants of his army, was finally banished by his country after a defeat at the hands of the natives, only to sail back and conquer Carthage after a siege.¹⁹ This source is late and unreliable and its details need not be credited, but the essence may perhaps be accepted and even taken as typical of political and social crises in an ancient city state in the process of becoming an overseas empire. What exactly transpired in Sicily under Malchus remains a puzzle. The striking prosperity of sixth-century Selinus and Acragas speaks eloquently against the assumption that Malchus' 'long wars' in Sicily were waged against the Greeks. For this reason it has been very plausibly argued that his enemy may in fact have been Punics from Motya and elsewhere who tried to resist their mother-city's attempts to dominate them.²⁰ After Malchus, the Magonid family came to the fore and controlled the overseas interests of the maritime oligarchy of Carthage for about a century.

The Carthaginian empire was already an entity to be reckoned with, when a second clash between Punics and Greeks occurred on Sicilian soil.²¹ Once more provocation came from outside, and again from a band of Dorian adventurers. The leader was Dorieus, whose elder brother Cleomenes ascended the throne of Sparta about 520 B.C. In the account given by Herodotus (v.42–8), Dorieus is a stock character, the typical younger son of a noble house who, feeling himself overshadowed is impelled to seek his fortune abroad at the head of a band of disaffected persons. He had no clear plans or goal. About 514 he sailed with his men to Africa and settled in an oasis near the mouth of the Cinyps (Wadi Caam) on the Syrtis coast, in a fabulously fertile area some nineteen km south west of Lepcis, a Phoenician colony. It was a hopeless enterprise: a tiny group of Greek adventurers tilling a piece of no-man's land had scarcely any chance of survival in a thinly populated area between the Persian satrapy of Cyrenaica and the Carthaginian empire in Africa. After two years, in fact, the settlers were compelled to leave under the combined pressure of local Libyans as well as the Carthaginians. Dorieus then returned to Greece in search of an oracle. A Boeotian soothsayer advised him to 'found Heraclea in Sicily', as 'the whole country of Eryx belonged to the Heraclids', and the Delphian god was apparently prompt to add his blessing. We can not know who was behind this staged

¹⁹ Damage to the Punic fort of Monte Sirai in western Sardinia may possibly be taken as evidence of native attacks in the sixth century B.C.

²⁰ See D 8, 333; D 561, 24f. On the formation of the Carthaginian empire see now D 517A.

²¹ See A. J. Graham, *CAH* III², 3, 186–9. Chronology of Dorieus' expedition: D 534. On Dorieus see also: D 503; D 562; D 560.

prophecy, although we should look for its sponsors somewhere in mainland Greece, though probably not at Sparta. There is no hint in our sources that Dorieus was ever invited by a Sicilian city,²² whether close to the Punic area as an 'outpost of Hellenism' or further removed from it, nor that he ever received support from any Sicilian Greeks. Dorieus gathered his men who were mostly Laconians, among them four Spartan 'co-founders' besides himself; other adventurers, such as one Philippus son of Butacidas, a handsome Olympic victor, and an exile from Croton staying at Cyrene, joined the expedition, and with them he manned a trireme at his own expense. After a stop on the Bruttian coast where Dorieus apparently took part in Croton's last attack upon Sybaris (c. 510 B.C.), the expedition finally landed in Sicily somewhere on the Elymian coast near the promised land of Eryx. An attempt was probably made to settle there, but the band of intruders was almost wiped out in a battle against a combined force of Segestans and Punics. Then Euryleon, the only surviving Spartan 'co-founder', collected what remained of the contingent, but instead of resuming the fight against the barbarians, he turned against the Greeks. He first took Minoa, a Greek settlement on the Capobianco plateau and a bone of contention between Selinus and Acragas. Then, after helping the Selinuntians to rid themselves of their tyrant, a certain Peithagoras, Euryleon set himself up in his place. Finally, he himself was killed for his tyranny. Thus this famous Heraclid expedition ended like the Fourth Crusade, in a series of military diversions against those whom it had purportedly been called upon to deliver. The dream of Erycian Heraclea never came true, and Heracles had to be content with a new Heraclea established eventually at Minoa, a late but very appropriate appellation for a site which was also known by the Phoenician name Rosh Melkart.

The memory of Dorieus' death was revived at Syracuse in the 480s and played a role in the propaganda of Gelon, who allegedly called upon mainland Greeks to avenge the murder on the Segestans – a rhetorical ruse that impressed no one, not even Dorieus' own brother Leonidas, the hero of Thermopylae. Herodotus' account of the story of Dorieus does not mention Carthaginians, but only Phoenicians. In a Spartan tradition referred to by Pausanias (III.16.4–5), only Segestans appear. Carthaginians were dragged in only much later. It is in Diodorus, presumably following Timaeus, that we read about the Carthaginians who, being jealous of the newly-founded city near Eryx and 'afraid that it would grow stronger than Carthage and take from the Phoenicians their sovereignty', came up with a great army against it and razed it to the ground (IV.23). This sounds too rhetorical and 'ideological' to be earlier

²² However, a passage of Justin (XIX.1.9), although apparently referring to a later period, has been interpreted in this sense by Pareti, D 547.

than the fourth century B.C., the age when the Greeks set out to recover lost territories. In reality, it seems that the people who were truly hostile toward Greek intruders on the western coast of Sicily were the Segestans, an agricultural people always on guard against encroaching neighbours. The Punic became involved only secondarily as allies of the Elymians. Summing up, the Dorieus affair, like that of Pentathlus, seems to have been a purely local, west Sicilian incident without great powers fishing, as yet, in troubled waters.

III. THE RISE OF SICILIAN TYRANNIES: THE CASE OF SELINUS

Timaeus was probably the first historian to express the view that the tendency towards tyranny was stronger in Sicily than elsewhere. He may have had at his disposal a special monograph 'On the Tyrants of Sicily', written by an elder contemporary, Phaenias of Eresus, a disciple of Aristotle. What apparently shocked these authors was the crop of 'new' tyrants whom Sicily produced during the fourth century B.C. rather than the 'old' tyrants who, like their counterparts in mainland Greece, were as a rule partially excused and sometimes even fully rehabilitated in the judgement of later generations. As a matter of fact, the Sicilian Old Tyranny came much later and was of much shorter duration than that of mainland Greece. If we omit the obscure Panaetius of Leontini (end of the seventh century?) and the unique case of Phalaris of Acragas (c. 570–554), the true era of tyranny in Sicily began when in Greece it was already at its end, and before 461 it was over. More important than its duration, however, is the differing socio-political character of Sicilian tyranny. Generally speaking, it aimed at restoration, not revolution, and usually did re-establish, strengthen, and enlarge the old oligarchies instead of overthrowing them as did most mainland tyrants. Although it encouraged trade and manufacture, it reaffirmed agriculture and did not pave the way for Athenian-style maritime democracies.²³

Civil strife (*stasis*), of course, had always been the bane of Sicilian as well as of other city states since their very foundation.²⁴ Tension often arose, we are told, between different groups of settlers who were making unsuccessful attempts at 'living together' (*synoikein*) in a common polis. Secession was usually the result. But this kind of typically colonial ethnic antagonism alone can not explain the spread of civil strife and tyranny in the late sixth century B.C. There is a social factor which should not be

²³ On Sicilian tyrants and tyranny see esp. c 6, 1 128–54 (and notes in Bd II).

²⁴ H. J. Gehrke's *Stasis. Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten im 5. und 4. Jhr.* (Munich, 1985) is confined to the Aegean and Black Sea cities (the Greek West is considered a special case).

ignored. Most colonies were ruled by narrow oligarchies composed of the descendants of the first settlers who regularly monopolized the best arable land and the most important civil and religious magistracies. At Syracuse they were known as *gamoroi*, the 'land sharers'; at Megara Herodotus informally called them *pacheis* ('fat cats'), while in some Chalcidian colonies they styled themselves *hippeis*, 'horsemen'. The sumptuous temples of sixth- and fifth-century Sicily, the Olympic and other panhellenic victories of Sicilian chariot-owners, and their costly dedications at Delphi and Olympia are the best evidence of the wealth, munificence, and lavish expenditures of those horse-breeding oligarchies. However, mass immigration gave rise to an unenfranchised *demos* growing daily in numbers and economic weight, yet excluded from a share in the land and political offices. As a result, a vast crowd of newcomers of mixed origin soon found themselves confined mainly to manufacture, trade and menial occupations. Those ready to live among the Sicels could always venture upon some agricultural or pastoral enterprise on the borderland of the city's territory or even beyond it. There they would meet the natives who harboured their own grievances against the oligarchy, even when they were free yeomen, not serfs. Colonial society appears always to have been beset with manifold tensions and explosive antagonisms between landowners and villeins, oligarchs and *demos*, settlers and natives, and ethnic cliques among the settlers themselves.

Violent outbreaks started toward the end of the century, and it was no accident that Selinus, which was expanding rapidly, took the lead.²⁵ The original Megarian 'acropolis' of this city occupied a walled area of less than twenty-four acres (ten ha), one third of which was reserved for temples and the rest for a somewhat exclusive residential quarter. But during the sixth century the town spread out beyond the walls, northward over the Manuzza plateau until it covered an area of about fifty acres (twenty ha), as well as both sides of the 'acropolis', at the mouth of two rivers, the Cotone to the east and the Modione (ancient Selinous) to the west (cf. *CAH* III². 3, 168, fig. 28; Pls. Vol., pl. 244). Here crowded suburbs developed. The 'acropolis' had a rigid grid plan at right angles probably as early as the sixth century if not earlier. Such a plan was not extraordinary at a time when many Sicilian colonies were planned orthogonally. Rather, the uncommon feature at Selinus is the cruciform intersection of two large main roads, recalling *cardines* and *decumani* of the Roman type. The Manuzza suburb, as we see in aerial photographs and learn from archaeological soundings taken, also had a grid plan, although it was obliquely oriented and less regular, and apparently

²⁵ On Selinus see D 513; C 42, 316–18 and D 530; D 530A; D 524B; D 514A, I 651ff.

included an agora near the northern gate of the 'acropolis'. The suburbs outside the walls became densely crowded with a mass of new immigrants of diverse origin. The Selinuntian pantheon, in fact, reflects a variety of cults, although of course most were of Megarian origin, as for instance the cults of Zeus Meilichios and Demeter Malophoros ('the Apple Bearer'). However, there were also cults of unmistakably Peloponnesian origin such as the cults of Poseidon, Heracles, Phobos and the Tyndaridae, all almost unknown in the mother-cities of Selinus.²⁶

Selinus' prosperity in the sixth century is best attested by her famous temples whose magnificent, though shattered, ruins are still impressive. In approximately 500 B.C. two temples stood on the 'acropolis'. Temple C, dedicated to Heracles, on the highest point of the plateau, is the earliest which has survived. It had an elongated plan with a double frontal colonnade of six, and with seventeen side columns. Among its many decorative elements, the most striking are the frontal metopes representing various mythological scenes in high relief: Artemis and Leto on each side of Apollo in a quadriga, Heracles with the Cercopes, and Athena helping Perseus kill the Gorgon (Pls. Vol., pl. 245). The ferocious expression and the heavy, almost rigid, figures in these metopes, like the brutal realism of some terracotta masks, show a conscious local attempt to break away from the mere elaboration of imported idealistic models. This tendency may perhaps be attributed to the rudeness of colonial life in the Far West, and to the stimulating contacts with Phoenician art. Selinuntian Heracles in particular looks like a colonial symbol of civilizing power grappling with wild beings.

The other temple on the 'acropolis', Temple D, was probably begun about 535. Outside the walls on the far side of the Modione, stood the famous *temenos* of Demeter Malophoros, probably as old as the foundation of Selinus, although a new *megaron* built around 580 apparently replaced an earlier one. Two minor sacred enclosures, those of Triple Hecate and Zeus Meilichios, can still be seen outside the main *temenos*. A number of two-headed stelae (see above) and thousands of terracotta votive figurines, ranging in date from the seventh to the fifth centuries, testify to the vitality of these popular cults. The orientation of their sacred area is the same as that of the Manuzza suburb.

On the eastern hill of Marinella, two of the three monumental temples stood in a sacred area oriented according to the grid plan of the 'acropolis', but linked by a road to the Manuzza quarter. Temple G, one of the greatest Greek temples ever built, was probably dedicated to Apollo. It was begun in the second half of the sixth century, and though in use during the fifth, it was still unfinished at the time of the destruction

²⁶ See C 458; C 462; and *IG XIV 268* – Ditt. *Syll.*³ 1122 = C 31, 277, no. 39, and W. M. Calder III, *The Inscription from Temple G at Selinus* (Duke University, 1963).

of Selinus in 409 B.C. With its eight by seventeen columns and wide cella, this temple exemplifies the changing fashions during a century of architectural development from archaic to classical style.

South of it stood Temple F, even more archaic in style, and with six by fourteen columns. The spaces between the outer columns of this building were filled with screen walls about 3 m high, giving the impression of false doorways. This extraordinary feature, inspired perhaps by Egyptian architecture, may have been the model for the famous Olympieum at Acragas (see below). Early in the fifth century the original terracotta revetments were replaced by stone, and beautiful metopes were added depicting scenes of a gigantomachy. This was the height of a period of intense building activity coupled with an exceptionally creative artistic originality unattested elsewhere.

The territory of Selinus (some 1,165 sq km) was bordered by three neighbours which had inevitably to be reckoned with politically, militarily, commercially and culturally throughout the period of the city's existence – Elymian Segesta, Greek Acragas and Punic Motya. Border conflicts and peaceful coexistence alternated on all three fronts. Between clashes, the Segestans managed to absorb from Selinus a good deal of Hellenic culture, coupled with intermarriage rights, without impairing their stable alliance with the Punics. On the eastern front, the Selinuntian border must have shifted west to the Platani River after the recapture of Minoa by Acragas at the end of the century. Sciacca, known in Roman times as *Thermae Selinuntinae* because of the local hot springs near Monte Calogero, was an important stronghold on this front. The western border of Selinuntian territory marked by the river Mazaro and by a fortified *emporium*, Mazara (del Vallo) at the mouth of the river, was probably the first meeting-place of Selinuntians and Punics from Motya. Carthage and her colonies were, no doubt, a threat to Selinus, but also a temptation. Less than 240 km from Carthage as the crow flies, Selinus flourished, thanks largely to trade with Punic Africa, western markets and Etruria. About 520, coinage started with didrachms (among the earliest coins of Sicily) bearing the leaf of wild parsley (*selinon*), the city's symbol (Fig. 74). A thriving commercial class, doubtless recruited from among the new immigrants, seems to have grown increasingly interested in trade relations with the Carthago-Etruscan world in the late sixth century B.C.

Social changes as well as foreign relations may explain why pro-Punic and pro-Acragantine factions were at loggerheads within the upper classes at Selinus during the last decades of the century. Evidence of civil strife is not lacking. Fragments of what seems to be a sworn agreement between the ruling party at Selinus and a group of returning exiles, have



74. Silver coin of Selinus. (After C 625, fig. 184.)

been discovered at Olympia where the document was deposited.²⁷ Lacking an historical context, this undated find from a lost chapter in the archaic history of Selinus evidently represents a painful record of *stasis* with all of its usual concomitants of violence, trials, executions, banishments and confiscations. Another undated episode of civil strife is preserved in Polyaeus' *Strategemata* (1.28), which tell us about one Theron who seized power at Selinus with the aid of 300 'slaves' (native serfs?) and murdered 'most of the citizens' in their sleep during a war against the Carthaginians. The details of the anecdote have no historical value, but on the whole it fits well into the troubled context of the period. Theron, in fact, would seem to be a pro-Punic tyrant rising against the oligarchy which is blamed for Carthaginian harassment. His successor may have been the Peithagoras whom the Spartan Euryleon overthrew about 508–507 (see above). After Euryleon's brief rule, Selinus may have reverted to the Punic sphere of influence, where it remained for several decades. Although pressure from foreign enemies was certainly a catalyst of events, the root of all civil strife at Selinus, as elsewhere, was social malaise and the clash of class interests. As proof of this assertion, one should bear in mind that tyrants greater and more enduring than the petty and ephemeral ones of Selinus, seized power in other Sicilian cities without the slightest help from external sources.

IV. THE RISE OF GELA AND HIPPOCRATES' EMPIRE

The monarchic contagion spread from Selinus to Gela, temporarily bypassing Acragas, a city partially immunized by its unpleasant memories of the days of Phalaris. Compared to her western neighbours, Gela was a township of very modest size (cf. *CAH* III². 3, 165, fig. 26). The original Rhodian settlement, Lindioi, was really an acropolis of less than seven acres (2.8 ha) on the eastern summit of Terranova Hill. Within this narrow space, a temple apparently dedicated to Athena Lindia was built

²⁷ On this inscription see D 497A.

in the sixth century. It was an impressive building with some fine polychrome terracotta revetments which are still worthy of our admiration. In addition, there are many reliefs, friezes and antefixes from the sacred area, including some magnificent sculptured horses' heads, a splendid gorgon and a relief of Heracles and a giant. The western part of the hill was occupied by a necropolis. Hemmed in in this way between the gods and the dead, the residential quarter of Gela must have been extremely tiny. East of the acropolis, something like a harbour-suburb may have developed on both sides of the widening mouth of the river Gelas, where several ships could easily be accommodated. Most of the population, however, undoubtedly lived scattered over the famous 'Geloan Fields' along the coast towards Camarina and in the valleys of the Gelas and Maroglio rivers. Indeed, remains of farmhouses and rural shrines have been discovered in the countryside.²⁸ These fertile plains were the main source of the wealth of the horse-breeding oligarchy of Gela, which even produced its own Olympic victor at the end of the century.

The entire hilly region around Gela was Sicel and thoroughly hellenized, as systematic excavation in several sites has demonstrated. The widespread penetration of Greek culture on such a vast scale via valleys and rivers was certainly the work of mass immigration to Gela during the seventh and sixth centuries. Apparently, a significant part of the Greek population living on the edge of the original polis was acting as go-between, merging Greek immigrants and Sicel natives socially and culturally into a greater entity. The process may have involved both violence and peaceful coexistence. Growing pains had already been felt about 600 B.C. when a Geloan faction worsted in a seditious uprising chose to leave the town and settle at Mactorium among the Sicels (Hdt. VII. 153). Late in the sixth century, the two Sicel sites of Monte Bubbonia and San Mauro were sacked and burned. The Sicels abandoned San Mauro, but were left undisturbed at nearby Caltagirone. A Greek settlement was established during the same period at San Luigi, and another Greek fortified site appears at Piano dei Casazzi, a former Sicel village. Iny cum, a Geloan fortress on the Acragantine border had formerly been Sicel. Clearly, the rise of a tiny town like Gela to the status of a hegemonic power under Hippocrates seems inconceivable, unless we assume a long preparatory period of social and cultural consolidation of city and territory. The finishing touch to this great achievement may have been added by the first Geloan tyrant, Cleandrus, son of Pantares,²⁹ who seized power c. 505 and ruled for seven years. It was probably he

²⁸ See D 495A.

²⁹ This Pantares is almost certainly the Olympic victor mentioned in *Inscr. Olymp.* v, no. 142 (see C 458A, no. 151). The name appears also on a *kylix* of the same period (*Röm. Mitt.* 63 (1956) 144-5).

who provided Gela with her first city wall. Then, about 498, the tyrant was slain, but his brother Hippocrates arrogated power to himself for another seven years. The brief golden age of Gela had begun.³⁰


Hippocrates secured crack armed forces – a select bodyguard, a renowned cavalry at his command, a strong infantry, and a corps of Sicel mercenaries. He could afford to engage in a series of military campaigns against rival Greek and Sicel cities, and build up the first great ‘empire’ in eastern Sicily. His first and most desirable victim lay just beyond the northern border: the vast and rich Plain of Catania, densely peopled by prosperous Chalcidian colonies and sub-colonies as well as by hellenized Sicel townships. Leontini was probably Hippocrates’ first target.³¹ This was a typical agricultural colony with an outlet to the sea through a river (the Lentini), good walls, a double acropolis (the hills of Metapiccola and San Mauro), and an urban plan (Fig. 75). The northern gate led straight to the extremely fertile territory of the city, i.e. the entire southern part of the Plain up to the Symaethus river (Simeto) whence the local *hippeis* drew their wealth. The southern gate was strongly defended with a ‘pincer’-type gateway. In the sixth century, a large temple was built on the hill of Metapiccola. Excavations have also revealed some private houses and a rich necropolis full of terracotta statuettes of local make and a quantity of imported wares, testifying to the wealth of the local aristocracy and to the widespread trade relations with many parts of mainland Greece and the Aegean. Hippocrates laid siege to this city, probably making his way through the southern gate which seems, in fact, to have been destroyed at the beginning of the fifth century. He then conquered Callipolis, a sub-colony of Naxos probably situated on the eastern slopes of the Etna. Thus he became master of the whole plain (which doubtless included Catana itself), with all its vast resources of wealth and population.

It was now the turn of Naxos, the mother of Chalcidian Sicily, although it was a small city, far surpassed by its own sub-colonies (Fig. 76). Recent excavations have revealed that it occupied a walled area of some 50 acres (20 ha) on the little promontory of Schisò, with a small harbour towards the north, a regular urban plan with parallel streets c. 4.5 m wide, and a sacred area at the southern corner.³² Here were found remains of a temple said to be the Aphrodisium of Naxos. Somewhere outside the walls, the venerated altar of Apollo Archegetes, the patron-saint of Greek colonization, stood undisturbed for centuries. The hilly

³⁰ On Hippocrates see D 8, ch. XIII; C 6, I 137–40 (and notes in Bd II) and D 514A, II.1 iff.

³¹ The assumed sequence of Hippocrates’ campaigns is the geographical order from south to north, not the confused order of Herodotus (VII.154.2) which is not meant to be chronological.


³² See P. Pelagatti, *Boll. d’Arte* 1964, pp. 149–65; 1972, pp. 211–19; C 42, 314–16, and D 514A, I 619ff.



75. Plan of Leontini. (After D 514A, I 3, map 9; F. Walbank, *Polybius* (Oxford, 1967) II 37.)

area along the coast between Cape Schisò and Cape Tauro (Taormina), had always been Sicel. Besides a narrow coastal strip, the Naxians had little land; therefore they had to turn to commerce and colonial enterprises. In fact, the early coins of Naxos, starting from about 530 B.C. do indeed reveal Ionian and Aegean connexions. Once the city of Naxos and its environs had been 'enslaved' by Hippocrates, the littoral way along the Monti Peloritani to the Straits of Messina lay open.

Finally, Hippocrates took Zancle, his northernmost acquisition. In 494, a local 'king' called Skythes was already an 'ally' of the tyrant. This Skythes was, in fact, an immigrant from the island of Cos and it was probably Hippocrates himself who appointed him sub-tyrant of Zancle, which was a very important town in his empire. One of the early Chalcidian colonies, Zancle commanded its sickle-shaped harbour and had a large share of the revenues from the Straits (Fig. 77). On the earliest coins of the city (c. 525–494 B.C.) a bird's-eye view of archaic Zancle shows a dolphin within a sickle-shaped band, which is sometimes




76. Plan of Naxos. (After D 514A, I 3, map 12; C 42, 315.)

indented with four towers or docks (Fig. 78).³³ There is some evidence at Zancle of an urban plan besides Callimachus' well-known poetical description of the foundation of the city (*Aet.* II.43).

The area enclosed within the archaic walls has been described as a rough semicircle with a diameter of almost 1.5 km (including the sickle), lying south west of the port. This is a very large area for an archaic colony and is unsurpassed in Sicily except by Acragas. Many fragments of archaic vases have been found scattered over this area, particularly on the extreme point of the mole (at San Raineri and Madonnina del Porto). A city like Zancle, hemmed in by sea and mountains, had to seek agricultural territory beyond these barriers, and to hold it as islanders held a *peraia*, 'a territory on the other side'. The territory of Zancle extended in fact beyond the Monti Peloritani, on the north-eastern coast of Sicily between Cape Peloro, where a very ancient temple of Apollo

³³ See C 607, 152; C 603; D 567, 326ff and C 616, 16.



77. Plan of Zancle. (After D 567, pl. 1.)

stood, and the Milazzo Promontory. The nucleus of this territory was the fertile plain west of Capo Rasocolmo on the gulfs of Milazzo and Patti, originally inhabited by a people of Italic origin, which practised cremation. The sub-colony of Mylae on the Milazzo Promontory tried to assert its autonomy. Further to the south west, on the plain of Barcellona, the last tentacles of hellenization were felt at Longane, a large Sicel village with two fortified heights, a fifth-century coinage of its own, and cults of Greek type (a bronze caduceus from Longane is preserved in the British Museum). For all its fertile lands, however, the main source of Zanclean wealth always remained the trade through the Straits, which were then a Chalcidian canal through which wares from Corinth, the Cyclades, the Argolid, Ionia and Attica reached Campania, the Lipari archipelago, Etruria and the French Riviera. Attic black- and red-figure vases, some very beautiful, reached the west through the Straits in great quantities during the late sixth and early fifth centuries B.C. Some archaic Athenian tetradrachms found at Messina (the earliest foreign currency imported into Sicily) are thought to be evidence of the presence of Attic merchants in the area.³⁴

Hippocrates was probably behind a famous colonial enterprise sponsored officially by Zancle under her 'king' Skythes in 495/4, ostensibly to settle refugees of the Ionian Revolt at Kale Akte, the 'Fair

³⁴ On the Athenian tetradrachms see D 567, 193ff.



78. Silver coin of Zancle. (After C 625, fig. 49.)

Coast' around modern Caronia, an area on the northern coast of Sicily almost untouched by the Greeks. A 'pan-Ionian' colony on this spot would serve very well to break Sicel continuity and build a Greek searoad to connect Mylae and Himera, an 'imperial' scheme worthy of Hippocrates. According to Herodotus (IV.22–4), the invitation was accepted only by wealthy Samians of the anti-Persian party and by a few Milesian refugees after the battle of Lade, in the summer of 494. The whole contingent probably did not exceed several hundred armed men and their families. They first anchored at Locri on the Bruttian coast in order to receive their instructions from Skythes. But while the 'king' was engaged with his army in the siege of a Sicel town (possibly in the area of Kale Akte), the emigrants were contacted instead by Anaxilas, who had just seized power as the tyrant of Rhegium. Anaxilas then easily persuaded the settlers to capture Zancle instead of wasting their time in settling the dangerous area of Kale Akte. As Zancle was at that moment left without men, it was easy to take her by a stratagem. The coup was successful and Zancle's allegiance to Hippocrates passed overnight to Anaxilas. This, of course, Hippocrates would not tolerate. As soon as Skythes invoked his aid, the tyrant rushed to Zancle with an army. But instead of helping his vassal to recover his city, Hippocrates imprisoned him and his troops and came to terms with the Samians. Hippocrates even delivered up three hundred leaders of the Zanclean army to be put to death by the Samians who were, however, humane enough to spare their lives. By this unscrupulous manoeuvre worthy of a tyrant, Hippocrates restored his rule over Zancle and checked his rival Anaxilas for another five years, though there may have been some armed clashes subsequently.³⁵ Thus Zancle and not Kale Akte became something of a 'pan-Ionian' city.

Besides the Samians there were Milesians, the three hundred Zancleans, and the whole unarmed population including women and children, all of Chalcidian stock. The old Zanclean class survived all

³⁵ D 567, 334–5, n. 3 cites epigraphic evidence for this.




79. Silver coin of Zancle. (After D 567, pl. 19.1.)

vicissitudes, and some of their descendants were among the most distinguished citizens of fifth-century Messana. For about five years, c. 493–489, the Samians were the ruling group. This is amply documented by the well-known series of Samian tetradrachms and fractions coined at Zancle. Normally they bore a lion-scalp on the obverse and the prow of a warship on the reverse (Fig. 79). They were partly inscribed with a series of five consecutive letters of the alphabet which have been interpreted as sequence marks for the five years of Samian rule. Significantly, most of these coins have been found in hoards at Messina and Gela.³⁶ They are usually anonymous, as if the Samians were undecided how to name their new polis, but some bear the name of the new ethnic of Messana which was probably added after 489.³⁷

Until 494/3, Hippocrates' campaigns were limited to the Chalcidian and Sicel part of eastern Sicily; Syracuse, the major city on the eastern coast, was still left outside his empire. The city was in a state of crisis and social unrest inviting foreign intervention. Probably in 492, Hippocrates easily defeated a Syracusan army by the Helorus River (modern Tellaro) in a battle famous enough to have been commemorated some twenty years later by Pindar (*Nem.* ix.40–5). Immediately after the victory, Hippocrates marched north and pitched his camp near the Olympieum at Polichna on the river Ciane. Whether he was prepared to lay siege to Syracuse, or encamped there simply to await the outbreak of civil war within the walls, we do not know. All of this ended with a treaty mediated by Corinth and Corcyra, the mother-city and sister-colony respectively of Syracuse, which were highly interested in western affairs. According to the terms of the treaty, Hippocrates would receive Camarina as the ransom for his Syracusan prisoners (Hdt. vii. 154; Thuc. vi. 5.3).

³⁶ On these famous (and much discussed) Samian series of Zancle–Messana see D 510; D 556; D 567; L. Lacroix, *Monnaies et colonisation dans l'occident grec* (Brussels, 1965) 16–25; C 595, 40–5 (and Plates vi–vii). See Pls. Vol., pl. 317b.

³⁷ Nothing is heard of the Zanclean army which Hippocrates sold into slavery. An obscure passage in Strabo (vi.2.3) concerning the 'Zancleans from Hybla' who colonized the site of Tauromenium (modern Taormina) may refer to the wanderings of these soldiers. For another recent explanation, see D 528A, 71ff.



80. Plan of Camarina. (After D 567, 320.)

Camarina was no mean prize (Fig. 80). A Syracusan colony at the mouth of the Hipparis, she was rapidly recovering from losses suffered during her unsuccessful revolt against her mother-city half a century earlier. Even the revolt had caused no significant destruction: several finds from local graves show a dense population enjoying a state of general prosperity, and possessing a local pottery industry and terracotta statuary, whose sequence shows no gap. Parmenides, a Camarinean, won the foot-race at Olympia in 528. The city exploited her fertile coastal plains, enjoyed trade relations with the Sicel interior (Comiso, Ragusa, Rito and other sites), and imported wares from Greece and Etruria.³⁸ Hippocrates is even credited with having ‘refounded’, i.e. repopulated, Camarina after he annexed it to his dominions.

In his last year, Hippocrates was apparently occupied with mopping up some pockets of Sicel resistance in eastern Sicily. By means of a stratagem, he took Ergetium, an unidentified site in the plain of Catania whence many of his best mercenaries were drawn (Polyaen. v.6).³⁹ When

³⁸ A rather controversial grave-inscription from Comiso has been taken to illustrate the process of hellenization in this area during the late sixth/early fifth century B.C. (D 525, 181ff). On Camarina see D 542; C 42, 319–20 (with plan) and A. J. Graham, *CAH* III².3, 177.

³⁹ Sources and bibliography on Ergetium: D 528B, 172.

he died in an attack on one of the Hyblae around 491/0, he left his own city of Gela at the head of an 'empire', certainly of modest size when compared to those of later ages, but nonetheless comprising a good deal of territory between the eastern coast and a line roughly connecting Milazzo and Licata, excluding only Syracuse and Megara, which were left formally independent. It was not a centralized empire but rather something between a league and a true hegemony. Naxus' coinage ended under Hippocrates, a clear indication of its complete loss of independence, but Leontini's coinage continued under the rule of a Geloan governor, Aenesidemus, as did the coinage of Samian Zancle.

There is not the slightest evidence of Doricization in Hippocrates' policy, nor did he object to the presence of Sicels in the ranks of his army. As to the Siculo-Punics and Carthaginians, they seem to have been absent from the scene during Hippocrates' seven-year rule. Limited as it was to the extreme east of the island, the Geloan empire was apparently unconcerned with the 'Punic problem', and therefore it is futile to ask what Hippocrates' Carthaginian policy might have been.

Hippocrates' rule was Gela's finest hour. Her earliest didrachms with a naked horseman on the obverse and a bearded man-faced bull, the river god Gelas, on the reverse, belong to this period (Fig. 81). The enlargement of the Geloan treasury at Olympia may also be ascribed to this period. It fell, however, to the lot of Hippocrates' great successor to reduce Gela again to the rank of a second-rate, semi-depopulated township.

V. GELON'S EMPIRE AND THE BATTLE OF HIMERA

Hippocrates' death at first awakened hopes of freedom, but when the Geloans took to arms, they were dispatched in battle by Gelon, the cavalry commander who unscrupulously made himself tyrant *c.* 491/0.⁴⁰ The son of a distinguished priestly family, the Deinomenids, his position was nevertheless so insecure during the first years that Anaxilas of Rhegium exploited this situation by stealing Zancle, expelling Hippocrates' Samian allies, and repopulating the city with a mixed Dorian throng (*c.* 489). Zancle became Messina in honour of the homeland of Anaxilas' ancestors and probably also of many of the new settlers, who may have been Messenian refugees leaving their country after an abortive revolt against Sparta about 490 B.C.⁴¹ This was the first act of Doricization in Chalcidian Sicily, yet it was prompted by considerations of pure

⁴⁰ On Gelon see D 8, ch. XIV; C 6, I 140-6 (and notes in Bd II); on his ancestors see D 524. For a stemma of the Deinomenids see below, p. 790.

⁴¹ On the so-called 'Plato's War' in Messenia in about 490, see the discussion of modern theories in C 47A, 139ff.



81. Silver coin of Gela. (After C625, fig. 155.)

Realpolitik. Mylae then seized this opportunity to assert her independence, an act which led eventually to war against Messana.⁴² Thus the north-eastern strip of the island was lost to the Geloan empire, never to be recovered.

It is inconceivable that in the first years of his rule Gelon should have found the time and forces to wage a war against the Carthaginians. According to Herodotus (VII.158.2), when the Greek envoys asked Gelon for help against the Persians in 481, he reminded them that the Greeks had denied him their aid when he requested it against the Carthaginians in his attempt to free certain *emporía* and to avenge the murder of Dorieus on the Segestans. However, this looks more like an item of panhellenic propaganda than evidence of actual fighting, and Justin's statement (XIX.1) about a 'grievous and prolonged war' against the Carthaginians in Sicily before 489 is totally unwarranted. Some frontier clashes between pro-Punic Selinus and the Acragantines may have served as a pretext for Gelon's propaganda, which, in any case, fell on deaf ears at Sparta, for her short-lived thalassocracy had ended by that time and all Spartan interest in freeing *emporía* overseas had already vanished. What Gelon did achieve, thanks to Carthaginian or Selinuntian threats, either real or empty, was a stable alliance between Gela and Acragas, where the Emmenid Theron inaugurated a new era of tyranny c. 489 B.C.

This Theron, the son of Aenesidemus, was a descendant of Telemachus, the traditional slayer of Phalaris, who allegedly seized power at Acragas by the same stratagem which had won it for Phalaris, namely, by paying a bodyguard with money collected for the building of a temple (Polyaen. VI.51).⁴³ His brother Xenocrates won the chariot-race at

⁴² Two helmets recently found at Olympia attest to wars between Mylae and Messana in the early fifth century (*JEG* XXIV, nos. 311–14; C 540A, 103ff). Anaxilas may have required his new vassal city to aid him in a campaign against Locris (Epicharmus, fr. 98 Kaibel).

⁴³ On Theron see C 6, 1 132–6 (and notes in Bd II) and D 506.

Delphi in the year of Marathon – a great family event and the occasion of the Sixth Pythian Ode by Pindar. A family of Rhodian origin, the Emmenids doubtless took part in the foundation of Acragas, and under Theron, if not earlier, they somehow procured an elaborate genealogy which extended back to Oedipus no less – a snobbery typical of colonial elites. Some time after 489, Emmenids and Deinomenids intermarried, Gelon taking Theron's daughter Damareta, and Theron marrying the daughter of Polyzalus, one of Gelon's brothers. Thus the political alliance between the two cities was sealed. This was Gelon's first great act of recovery from his previous reversals. But to most of Greek and Sicel Sicily, the alliance meant the end of any vestige of polis-autonomy for a quarter of a century. To the Carthaginians, who must soon have been on the alert, the alliance represented a newly united Greek bloc to contend with, and a serious threat to their Sicilian province.

The next step in Gelon's course of recovery was the annexation of Syracuse in 485. This city was still suffering from internal crises. The compact oligarchy of the *gamoroi* had ruled the country since the first Corinthian settlers parcelled the plains of Anapus and Helorus into lots. It was a horse-breeding oligarchy like that of Leontini or Gela, but its lands were tilled by serfs. New immigrants pouring into Syracuse by the thousands during the seventh and sixth centuries could scarcely integrate themselves into such a fossilized agrarian social structure. They were therefore forced either to make their living outside the agricultural sector, that is, to form a free *demos* within the city whose business was trade, manufacture and seafaring, or to settle in the hilly 'empire' in sub-colonies or among the Sicels. As long as there was a vast hinterland to absorb the overflow of population, the social and ethnic tensions between oligarchs, commoners and serfs created only a few tremors; but when Camarina and the whole southern coast were lost to Syracuse as a result of Hippocrates' victory, the oligarchy lost control. The *gamoroi*, held responsible for the disaster, were driven from the city by a coalition of *demos* and Killyrians, and took refuge at Casmenae, the Syracusan fortress on Monte Casale (cf. *CAH* III², 3, 176, fig. 30). This military stronghold was also a prosperous agricultural township with its walled urban plan, consisting of some thirty-eight parallel streets intersected perpendicularly by a long axis. An early fifth-century bronze plate, probably from Monte Casale, actually mentions certain *gamoroi* who were apparently granted some privileges.⁴⁴ By offering asylum to the exiled oligarchs, Casmenae openly acted as an independent polis, or rather as a centre of opposition against the ruling *demos* of Syracuse, and contributed its share to the final disruption of the Syracusan 'empire'. Since

⁴⁴ See *SEG* IV (1929), no. 27 = XII (1933), no. 407 = C 31, plate 51, n. 15 and p. 276; also D 501, 151f; and D 511, 53 and n. 58.

Casmenae bordered upon the area annexed to Gela, it was all too easy for the exiles to appeal for help to Gelon, who gladly accepted the invitation and brought them back to Syracuse, even gaining possession of the city itself after the *demos* decided to surrender. Thus ended the first Sicilian attempt at democracy: the landed oligarchy, contrary to all models and rhetorical commonplaces, was restored to Syracuse by a tyrant.

Gelon entrusted Gela to his brother Hieron and removed to Syracuse, which he made the new capital of his dominions. He introduced into Sicily the practice of deporting entire populations from one site to another. This was almost unknown in mainland Greece, but was widely practised in the Middle East on a much vaster scale by the Persians, and before them by the Assyrians and Babylonians. Three Greek cities are said to have been utterly destroyed or at least depopulated by Gelon. One is Camarina, all of whose inhabitants were brought to Syracuse and made its citizens.⁴⁵ The second is Megara Hyblaea, taken by Gelon after a siege. The local *pacheis* were deported to Syracuse and made citizens, the *demos* was sold into slavery abroad, and the land annexed c. 483 B.C. Megara was one of the earliest Sicilian colonies, probably older than Syracuse itself and second only to Naxos (cf. *CAH* III². 3, 108, fig. 19; here, Fig 82). It was a well-fortified city with walls and towers, and since the middle of the seventh century had a double grid of parallel, though not orthogonal, streets on both sides of a trapezoidal agora which was surrounded by temples and other public buildings, including two stoaes, an *herōon*, and possibly a banquet hall. A Doric temple of the sixth century had terracotta revetments and votive deposits, some dating back to a much earlier time. Though an important city until the end of the seventh century, Megara declined during the sixth when she was almost strangled by the encroachments of her powerful neighbours. After her destruction, which is fully confirmed by archaeological excavations, the site remained deserted until Timoleon's day.⁴⁶ The third city destroyed by Gelon was Euboea, a Chalcidian site which was accorded the same treatment as Megara. Euboea never revived, and even its site, though tentatively located at Licodia, remains essentially unknown.⁴⁷ Gelon also brought to his new capital more than half the burghers of his own native Gela and made them citizens. As a result of these deportations, mostly of the wealthy, Syracuse rapidly became the richest city in Sicily, and one of the

⁴⁵ A pretext for the deportation from Camarina may have been a revolt against the local governor, Glaucus of Carystus, an Olympic victor (see c 458A, no. 134); but the whole story is unreliable. On a votive offering at Olympia, a certain Praxiteles styled himself 'Syracusan and Camarinean', but he was originally an immigrant from Mantinea in Arcadia (see c 30A, no. 15).

⁴⁶ The French excavations at Megara Hyblaea, directed by G. Vallet and Fr. Villard (D 571A), are one of the major achievements of Sicilian archaeology in this century.

⁴⁷ Sources and bibliography on Euboea: D 528B, 174.



82. Plan of Megara Hyblaea. (After D 514A, 13, map 11.) Civic and religious buildings are stippled. For whole site see *CAH* III².3, 108, fig. 19.

most populous in the whole Greek world of that time. But a high price had been paid: more than two generations before the first Carthaginian army destroyed a Greek city in Sicily, three had already been annihilated by a true ‘panhellenic’ Greek tyrant.

By 483 the Syracusan–Acragantine bloc encompassed most of Greek Sicily with three remarkable exceptions, Himera and Selinus, both under pro-Punic governments, and Messana, ruled from Rhegium by Anaxilas. Since the west and the whole northern coast lay outside Gelon’s bloc, Himera became a strategically crucial spot. Keeping her in the same pro-Punic block with Selinus and at loggerheads with Acragas was now a vital interest of the Carthaginians, who strove to prevent the creation of a united rival front across the island. Himera, though long famous thanks to Stesichorus and the Battle, was an almost unknown site until recent excavations.⁴⁸ We now know that the city lay in the north-eastern corner of a triangular plateau dropping steeply towards the coastal strip of Buonfornello between the north-Himeras River (Imera or Fiume Grande) and the Vallone di Passo Vicenza. The walled area of ‘Himera

⁴⁸ See D 496.

on a high crag', as Aeschylus called her (fr. 25a *TGrF*), was very small. Since the sixth century the city seems to have had a regular plan with parallel elongated streets of varying lengths and about 5.5 m wide. A sacred area with remains of three temples has been located at the north-eastern corner, and two burial grounds outside the walls. A harbour-suburb may have existed before 480 near the mouth of the Himeras, but the greater part of the population lived scattered in villages along the coast between Cefalù and Termini, meeting daily the Sicels to the east and the Punics of Soloeis to the west. The city prospered partly from traffic on the Tyrrhenian and far-western seas, and from about 520 she minted coins bearing the cock, the emblem of the city. After the crisis of the 480s, Himera was granted another seventy years of prosperity before the Carthaginians destroyed her in 408 B.C.

The later eighties were a time of turmoil in the history of Himera. A local tyrant, Terillus the son of Crinippus, ruled the city. On the basis of an early fifth-century epitaph from Ravanusa bearing Himeræan names, it has been argued that a number of oligarchic families were expelled from Himera by Terillus and found refuge in the Acragantine area.⁴⁹ Terillus was, in fact, openly hostile to Acragas; to strengthen his position, he became on the one hand, the guest-friend of Hamilcar, the Magonid ruler of Carthage and the son of a Syracusan woman, and on the other hand, he married his daughter Cydippe to Anaxilas of Rhegium. Himera thereby became an important link in the chain of pro-Punic Greek cities extending from Selinus to Rhegium, forming a Carthaginian bloc to rival Gelon's alliance. All surviving autonomous communities in Sicily now faced the uncomfortable choice between a pro-Syracusan and a pro-Carthaginian tyranny. Which of the two was more odious is difficult for us to judge. Nor, other things being equal, do we know whether the choice in each case was influenced by purely external military, commercial, or other factors. We know only that a number of prosperous Greek cities in Sicily preferred the Carthaginian to the Syracusan bloc. However, for all his alliances, Terillus' rule apparently lacked a solid base in Himera, for about 482 he was driven out by Theron, who promptly attached Himera to the Acragantine-Syracusan bloc. A new series of coins bearing the cock of Himera and the crab of Acragas (Fig. 83) were probably minted for the first time that same year.⁵⁰ It was clearly a dramatic move which could not fail to disturb violently the very delicate balance of power in Sicily, and cause events to come to a head soon afterwards. The exiled Terillus appealed to Hamilcar, and Anaxilas joined Carthage, even giving his own children to Hamilcar as hostages. It

⁴⁹ See C 31, 278 n. 58; P. Mingazzini, *Mon. Ant.* 36 (1938) 662ff; D 8, 420 n. 7; M.-T. Manni Piraino, *KOKALOS* 10-11 (1964-65) 481ff. On the political history of Himera see D 531.

⁵⁰ See C 607, 144; D 567, 360; and C 631.



83. Silver coin of Himera. (After c 625, fig. 65.)

was obvious that the time for a decisive conflict between the two blocs was fast approaching.

Both sides made their preparations.⁵¹ Gelon is said to have raised a loan at Syracuse in order to pay mercenaries. In 481 mainland Greeks requested his aid against the Persians, and he proposed to contribute 200 triremes, 20,000 hoplites and 2,000 horses, besides archers, slingers and light cavalry. But as he was obviously not in a position to waste his resources abroad, yet did not wish to display too blatant an indifference to the Greek cause, he skilfully managed to extricate himself from any obligations by laying down the unacceptable condition that he be given the command of either the land or the naval forces. Gelon's diplomatic rebuff inevitably gave rise among mainland Greeks to an unsympathetic appraisal of his behaviour for which, in turn, they were promptly rebuked in a Sicilian counterblast, which was later echoed with distortions and given currency by super-patriotic historians of Timaeus' stripe. In any case, there is no reason to reject Herodotus' story (VII. 163–4), according to which Gelon, hearing that the Persians had passed the Hellespont, sent three galleys under Cadmus, the son of Scythes of Zancle, to observe the war and, in case of Xerxes' victory, to give him a large sum of money and offer him 'earth and water', i.e. to acknowledge Persian supremacy over all his Sicilian dominions. Evidently, the idea of a Persian alliance against the Carthaginians seemed to Gelon more advantageous than a Greek alliance.

Meanwhile Hamilcar directed the Carthaginian preparations. Apart from some elite corps from Carthage itself, the rank and file of his army consisted, to an even larger extent than Gelon's, of mercenary auxiliaries drawn from all the Punic provinces. Most of these troops were phoenicized Libyans from North Africa, while the rest were Iberians, Ligurians, Elisycians from southern Spain, Gaul and northern Italy, as well as Sardinians, Corsicans and Sicilian Greeks (mainly cavalrymen from Selinus). This multi-racial army was a result of the growth of Carthage from city state to empire, and despite all the well-known perils,

⁵¹ On the battle of Himera see D 549 and D 531, 35–43.

the financial burden, and moralistic censure involved, it was this army which preserved the Carthaginian empire for about three centuries. Herodotus' figure for Hamilcar's forces – 300,000 men – is, of course, no more credible than his estimate of 5,000,000 men in Xerxes' army. As a matter of fact, Hamilcar's army may not have been significantly larger than the combined armies of Gelon and Theron.

In Herodotus' view, the battle of Himera was the result of a Carthaginian attempt to restore Terillus, an act which Hamilcar considered his personal duty to his exiled guest-friend. Herodotus also considered it merely an incident which eventually prevented Gelon from sending aid to the Greeks in their war against the Persians. For a description of the battle we are dependent upon Diodorus (XI.20–3), probably going back to Ephorus, who gives a very unreliable, rhetorical account. We are told that Hamilcar sailed with his forces from Carthage 'to subdue the Greeks of Sicily'. Arriving at Panormus, he proceeded to Himera, where he pitched one camp for the ground forces to the west of the city, and another camp for the fleet. The first sortie by the Himeraean army was repelled by Hamilcar. Then Theron, who was on guard, hastily sent to Syracuse to ask Gelon for his aid. The Saviour responded immediately with 50,000 foot and 5,000 horses (these figures, too, are exaggerated), and pitched his own camp. At first, his cavalry took no fewer than 10,000 Punic prisoners simply by combing the countryside. Then, after intercepting letters from Hamilcar to his Selinuntian allies, the cavalry entered the Carthaginian naval camp where they set fire to the ships and slew Hamilcar, who was offering a sacrifice at the moment. According to the Carthaginian account known to Herodotus, Hamilcar cast himself headlong into the pyre when he saw the rout of his army, but this might be an aetiological explanation for the heroic cult of Hamilcar in Carthage and her colonies, where it was probably established soon after the battle. Nonetheless, the real battle was apparently fought without Hamilcar. Gelon's army finally advanced against the Carthaginians in battle formation, and won the day somewhere on the banks of Fiume Torto. The whole Carthaginian army, we are told, was almost completely destroyed, a mere handful of survivors escaping to bring the news to Carthage.

Rhetorical and colourful details aside, the battle of Himera was no doubt a major feat of arms. However, very shortly afterwards, a myth sprang up, fostered at Gelon's court. For scarcely ten years had passed before Pindar could mention in one breath Salamis, Plataea, Himera and Cyme, and equally sing the praise of Athens, Sparta and Syracuse (*Pyth.* I.72–80). Already in Herodotus' time the idea that the battles of Himera and Salamis were fought on the same day was current in Sicily. Aristotle, by contrast, considered this synchronism purely accidental on the

grounds that the two events did not tend to any one result (*Poet.* 1459a24). However, a less rationalistic mind (Ephorus?) could argue that Himera and Thermopylae were fought on the same day 'as if the divinity intentionally so arranged it that both the fairest victory and the most glorious defeat should take place at the same time' (*Diod.* xi.24.1).⁵² For those who did not believe in Divine Providence, there eventually arose the explanation that, in order to counterbalance the Greek embassy to Gelon in 481 B.C., the Persians and Phoenicians sent their own to the Carthaginians to plan a concerted onslaught against Hellenism from both east and west.⁵³ As we know, synchronisms which are not simple mnemonic devices are usually intended to convey a message, and here, it was grist for the mill of panhellenic propaganda and rhetoric in its crudest form. Panhellenic 'nationalism' was, of course, a natural by-product of the Persian Wars. Dionysius of Phocaea, the commander of the Ionian fleet at Lade, sailed to Sicily to make his fortune as a pirate, plundering the Carthaginians and Etruscans, while leaving the Greeks unharmed. On the other hand, Herodotus' 'malignant' reference to Gelon's readiness to form an alliance with Persia against the Carthaginians seems more appropriate to the unscrupulous statecraft of the tyrant and the political options of the moment than any mythical alliance of all Hellenes against all barbarians.

Soon after the battle, Gelon and a Carthaginian embassy concluded a peace treaty which contained rather moderate terms. Carthage was to pay a war indemnity of 2,000 talents and to construct two temples in which copies of the treaty were to be deposited. A third stipulation, by which the Carthaginians undertook to abstain from human sacrifices, was mentioned in Theophrastus' treatise on the Etruscans, but Pompeius Trogus attributed it to a Carthaginian treaty with Darius (*Just.* xix.1.10). In any case, the Carthaginians did not give up the custom, and this alleged stipulation seems tendentious and not very trustworthy.⁵⁴

One of the two temples built soon after 480 may well be the so-called 'Tempio della Vittoria', the remains of which can still be seen at Buonfornello, below the hill of Himera, possibly on the very spot of the decisive battle. It was a Doric building with pronaos and opisthodomos, six by fourteen columns, and unusual stair-wells on either side of the cella doorway. Some of its famous marble lion-head spouts are extant. The other temple may have been built either at Syracuse or at Carthage. In addition, the indemnity and spoils were later used to construct many

⁵² See D 527.

⁵³ See Ephorus, *FGrH* 70 F 186, and *Diod.* xi.1, 4; 20, 1. Justin (*xix.1.10*), however, carries this 'alliance' back to Darius' time.

⁵⁴ On this treaty see H. Bengtson, ed., *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums* II, 2nd edn (Munich-Berlin, 1975) no. 131, and D 531, 44-6.

other temples and public buildings at Syracuse and Acragas. Other contemporary documents include a famous quasi-medallic silver decadrachm from Syracuse, with lean horses and a charioteer on the obverse and the head of Arethusa with laurel wreath on the reverse. It is perhaps the first true masterpiece of Sicilian engraving. Struck some time after 480, it has long been termed 'Damareteion' as were the coins struck by Gelon's wife, according to a well-known story told by Diodorus (XI.26.3).⁵⁵ Moreover, a Delphic inscription records Gelon's thank-offerings for Himera: a golden tripod and a Nike created by the Milesian sculptor Bion. An epigram which has been ascribed to Simonides (fr. 106 Diehl) may attest to the dedication by Gelon and his brothers at Delphi of additional tripods made of 'Damareteian gold'. Pausanias mentions also some votive offerings deposited by Gelon and the Syracusans in the Treasury of the Carthaginians at Olympia (VI.19.7).

Although apparently no territorial clause was included in the treaty, Himera was universally recognized as part of the Acragantine–Syracusan bloc. Selinus probably came to terms with Acragas without necessarily breaking with the Punic. And Anaxilas, still ruling the Straits on both sides, must have reached some *modus vivendi* with Gelon, for he eventually gave his daughter in marriage to Gelon's brother Hieron. For another seventy years, the Punic area of Sicily was to be confined to the western corner of the island. For Carthage, the battle of Himera was, of course, a loss, yet not a catastrophe, for not only did she retain all of her possessions, but also she soon displayed her extraordinary talent for quick recovery from set-backs. Facing a period of growing isolation from Phoenicia and permanent confrontation with the Greeks of Sicily, Carthage withdrew into herself. There is a decline in Greek, Etruscan and Egyptian imports into Carthage in this period. Life became more austere in an almost Spartan way of dedication to one goal. She turned towards Africa, where she proceeded to phoenicize the Libyans and africanize herself (Dio Chrys. xxv.7). Under the last Magonids, Carthage consolidated her African empire and ventured upon her famous voyages of exploration to the Atlantic coasts of Africa, Portugal and Brittany.⁵⁶ Defeat may sometimes regenerate the vanquished. Years after the battle of Himera, Pindar offered the prayer that the Phoenicians might put off indefinitely the threatened war to the death, and remain peacefully at home (*Nem.* IX.28ff, *Pyth.* I.72ff).⁵⁷

⁵⁵ See c 396 and c 642. The extant decadrachms are now connected by most numismatists with the liberation of Syracuse from tyranny in 461 B.C. and not with Diodorus' Damareteion: see c 620A, ch. II, and c 649.

⁵⁶ See M. Cary, E. H. Warmington, *The Ancient Explorers* (Harmondsworth, rev. edn 1963) 45ff.


⁵⁷ See D 334A for a different interpretation of these passages.

VI. SOCIETY AND CULTURE AT ACRAGAS AND SYRACUSE IN
THE EARLY FIFTH CENTURY B.C.

There is no better evidence of the vitality of Sicilian civilization in the first quarter of the fifth century than the swift rise of Acragas and Syracuse, the two pillars of the Greek alliance. Their rise belongs to the years preceding the victory at Himera, which should not, therefore, be considered a prime mover, but rather an occasional cause that eventually hastened the further development and prosperity of both cities.

When Theron came to the throne, Acragas was already a big city (Fig. 84; cf. *CAH* III².3, 166, fig. 27; *Pls. to Vol. III*, pl. 366).⁵⁸ Indeed, monumental size as well as ostentatious luxury are the most striking features of this colonial centre of *nouveaux riches*. A vast walled acropolis occupied the Rupe Atenea and probably also the western hill where modern Agrigento stands. South of the Rupe Atenea the lower city developed on an area of terraced slopes delimited by a long, rocky, fortified scarp between two rivers, the Acragas (Fiume S. Biagio) and the Hypsas (Fiume Drago or S. Anna). The ends of this scarp where the famous temples stand, were linked to the acropolis by walls embracing an area of some 4,500 acres (1,800 ha) – by far the largest walled area in Sicily and Greece at the time. Aerial photography has revealed a grid of streets probably going back to the sixth century and consisting of a number of avenues running from east to west, intersected at right angles by a series of parallel streets, thereby creating long, rectangular double blocks of houses. Until the end of the sixth century the Acragantines apparently contented themselves with temples of ordinary size and architecture, such as those dedicated on the acropolis to Zeus Atabyrios, Athena (Lindia?), and the Chthonian goddesses (these temples have been tentatively identified with the remains which today are attached to three churches, S. Gerlando, S. Maria dei Greci and S. Biago), or the little sanctuary in the lower city near the so-called Temple of the Dioscuri. Yet at the end of the century we find evidence of a sudden, extraordinary burst of building activity extending over many decades, the end-product of which is the famous line of temples along the scarp. The so-called Temple of Heracles was begun before Theron. It is a long building of over 60 m on an artificial platform, with six by fifteen Doric columns ending with characteristically wide, curved echini at their top. Roughly contemporaneous is the nearby Olympieum, one of the wonders of Greek Sicily and perhaps the strangest of all Doric temples. This colossal building, the most eloquent memorial to the Acragantine penchant for hugeness, was begun at the end of the sixth century but was never

⁵⁸ See on Acragas D 529; C 27A; D 506; C 42, 90f; D 514A, 483ff; D 508A.



84. Plan of Acragas. (After *EAA* 1, fig. 212.) For whole site see *CAH* III².3, 166, fig. 27.)

completed, and is today no more than a huge pile of stones and tumbled columns. On a massive platform about 106 m long and 54 m wide stood a series of thirty-eight huge Doric half-columns engaged in a continuous screen-wall to half their height (Pls. Vol., pl. 266). After 480, on the upper half between the columns was added a series of giant *telamones* over 7 m tall which support the architrave, probably representing the Punic slaves who quarried the stones. Among the remains are fragments of sculptured scenes from the porticoes depicting a gigantomachy and the capture of Troy.

The other two famous temples on the scarp of Acragas, conventionally called after Hera Lacinia and Concord, were built later in the century, as were many other public and luxurious structures. Renowned for her temples, Acragas was equally famous for her huge wine-cellars, and vineyards covering her vast territory. Moreover, most of the hilly area around the city was planted with olive trees which yielded an abundant harvest, which Carthage exchanged for the wealth of Africa. From about 530, Acragas could pay also in her beautiful eagle-and-crab didrachms. Acragas was equally famous for the breeding of horses. Hundreds of wealthy citizens kept their own stables and put their best chariot teams to the test at panhellenic games. No small percentage of the population was slaves, including a great number of Punic captives. Acragantine luxury was as proverbial in the fifth century as Sybaritic luxury in the sixth, its

good side consisting of the ostentatious patronage of the arts as typified by Theron himself. Certainly the most illustrious beneficiary was Pindar. It was at Delphi in 490 that he made the acquaintance of Xenocrates, Theron's brother, of his son Thrasybulus, and of the Acragantine flautist Midas, whose victories he celebrated in the Sixth and Twelfth Pythian Odes. He also took the occasion to gather information about the Emmenids, a happy, just, sagacious family indeed, men of letters who used their wealth wisely and conducted themselves without injustice or insolence. He had also heard that Acragas was the residence of Persephone and was situated on a hill on a river bank. Yet Pindar probably did not visit Acragas before 476, when he composed the Second and Third Olympian Odes in honour of Theron's victories. For by then he was in a better position to appreciate the munificence of his host, that 'Bulwark of Acragas' and 'Upholder of the City', the 'Most Generous Man of Acragas in a hundred years', and the 'Offshoot of Noble Fathers'. In his First Encomium, Pindar apparently told how the Emmenids came from Rhodes to Acragas, followed by 'a cloud of everflowing wealth', to live in the upper city and occupy themselves with countless offerings to the gods. The poet remained loyal to the Emmenids even in the days of their misfortune, somewhat nostalgically recalling their great banquets in happier times. Pindar's Acragantine Odes also reveal his tragic sense of life, with all his fears of men's jealousy and of calamities befalling those at the pinnacle of their happiness.

Less spectacular than that of Acragas, and always tempered with a sense of moderation, was the rise of Syracuse to power and prosperity.⁵⁹ A city politically weakened and militarily disadvantaged by civil strife, she not only recovered in Gelon's time all her lost possessions, but also won new lands, and suddenly found herself the heir to the whole Geloan empire and alliances. The walled area of Syracuse, including Ortygia and the 'Outer City' of Achradina on the mainland opposite, did not cover more than 300 acres (120 ha) (cf. *CAH* III².3, 106, fig. 18). Ortygia was joined to Achradina by a causeway ('*choma*') mentioned by Ibycus of Rhegium in the late sixth century. Some suburbs were already cropping up outside the walls along the cordon of cemeteries around Achradina, especially in the vicinity of such public buildings as the temple of Apollo Temenites and the monument of Lygdamis. Since Ortygia under the Deinomenids became a preserve of the tyrant and his mercenaries, residing in a huge fortified block of palaces, barracks and docks, most newcomers whom Gelon transplanted in Syracuse were compelled to build their houses outside the walls. In fact, Achradina during the reign of the Deinomenids expanded north and west towards the cliffs of

⁵⁹ On Syracuse in the fifth century see esp. D 511; D 525; D 514A, 1 667ff. On literature: D 514A, 1 136ff; D 539; D 543; D 577.

Epipolae, probably incorporating some Sicel hamlets in the process of creating a series of suburbs, which were later named Tyche, Neapolis and Temenites. At Temenites a new temple was dedicated under Gelon to Demeter and Core. At Neapolis the first theatre of Syracuse was erected and here the plays of Epicharmus and Aeschylus were produced. At Achradina a new agora was established, apparently as part of a new and regular plan for the whole quarter.

Although considerable evidence of quarrying has been discovered for this period at the Latomie and Melilli, the only new temple built under Gelon was that of Demeter and Core at Temenites. The other four known temples of archaic Syracuse, though partly rebuilt and embellished under Gelon, all predated his rule. One of these is the so-called Apollonium (alternatively, the Artemisium), probably the oldest Doric temple in Sicily. Two of his six-by-seventeen monolithic columns, a couple of triglyphs, and remains of the cella are all that is extant at Largo XXV Luglio. Another pre-Deinomenid building was an Ionic temple; a true rarity in the Greek west, it was left unfinished under Gelon. The third and most important temple of Ortygia was the Athenaeum, today incorporated in the Cathedral of Syracuse (Pls. Vol., pl. 265). The original sanctuary was rebuilt in the sixth century B.C., then destroyed and rebuilt. It had six-by-fourteen columns, a great many of them still standing. Its general inner plan with pronaos, cella and opisthodomos is still easily discernible in the church. The last pre-Deinomenid temple was the extra-mural Olympieum at Polichna, where Hippocrates pitched his camp. By then, it had a golden statue of Zeus and gold offerings. Though longer, with six-by-seventeen monolithic columns, this temple had some features in common with the Athenaeum.

Syracuse under Gelon became a densely populated and heterogeneous city mixing old reinstated *gamoroi* and reconciled *demos*, enfranchised Killyrians, new citizens deported from Dorian and Chalcidian cities, naturalized mercenaries of every origin, and possibly also Dorian settlers from the Peloponnese. As mirrored in the mother-country, Syracuse became the prototype of the western colony, 'peopled by motley rabbles, and accepting easy changes and infusions of citizens', as Thucydides expressed it in the speech of Alcibiades (VI. 17. 2-3). It was a place where no one felt at home and everyone was ready to pack up and settle elsewhere. Gelon was certainly the right person to keep these uprooted mobs quiet, and he enjoyed such great prestige that he apparently never considered the necessity of disguising his personal rule with constitutional ruses. Yet Syracuse never became a seafaring state. For all her fleet, harbours and docks, she remained essentially an agrarian city. Gelon favored *gamoroi* and *pacheis*, and considered the *demos* 'a most unthankful fellow resident'. Of course, industry and commerce developed. The

beginning of coinage about 520 marked a change in economic activities. Syracuse minted silver tetradrachms from the start, all early issues depicting quadrigae or a horseman, with the head of Arethusa on the reverse. Under Gelon the minting of coins increased considerably, and works of true artistic value were created. Syracusan wares reached southern Italy, and corn may have been exported as far as Rome. Imports including first-class Attic pottery may have even influenced the artistry of Syracusan engraving.

It was always easier for a rich colony to import culture from the mother-country than to attempt original creation. Glaucias, an Aeginetan, and Bion, a Milesian, were hired to produce Gelon's dedications at Olympia and Delphi. Similarly, it was a Chian, Cynaethus, who first rhapsodized (allegedly *c.* 504 B.C.) Homeric poems at Syracuse. Gelon was not a man of letters, and no great poet was resident at his court to celebrate his victories, yet Phormis, a comedy writer, was reportedly the teacher of the tyrant's son. Eventually, however, the colonies made their own original contribution to some branches of culture. Epicharmus, despite some modern doubts, was a Sicilian by birth, possibly a Megarian *pachys* who settled at Syracuse under Gelon. To us he is the first exponent of typically Sicilian farce and burlesque. All our knowledge of him derives from titles and fragments of comic plays, mostly mythological parodies with Heracles and Odysseus as favourite heroes, yet with no lack of scenes from everyday life. His language was Sicilian Doric and his metres various, yet we do not know with any certainty whether a chorus was introduced in his plays, nor how many actors performed simultaneously on stage. Bucolic poetry was another speciality of Sicily, the land of Daphnis; Epicharmus himself probably dramatized pastoral themes and mentioned that the founder of the genre was a Sicilian herdsman named Diomus. Bucolic poetry may have spread to Sicily from Syracuse together with the cult of Artemis in the early fifth century B.C.

Gelon's iron age was transformed into a golden age in the eyes of later generations. For all his tyranny, deportations, enslavements and wars, he was remembered mainly as benefactor, saviour, liberator and harbinger of peace and prosperity. In 478 B.C. he was awarded a public funeral. The entire population accompanied his remains to his royal tomb outside the city, and accorded him heroic cults. All his sins were expiated forever on the battlefield of Himera.

Ia THE EAST AND GREECE

	PERSIA AND THE NEAR EAST	GREECE PROPER AND EAST GREECE
560	560 Nergal-Shar-Usur (Neriglissar) becomes king of Babylon. Croesus becomes king of Lydia? Astyages king of Media. Amasis king of Egypt	
	559 Cyrus becomes king of Anshan	
	556 Death of Neriglissar; brief reign of Labashi-Marduk; Nabonidus becomes king of Babylon	
	555 Nabonidus invades Cilicia	
	553 Nabonidus in Syria.	
	552-542? Nabonidus in Teima; Belshazzar crown prince in Babylon.	
550	550 Cyrus overthrows Astyages, and takes over Median empire.	
	547? War between Cyrus and Lydia. Fall of Sardis.	
540		
	539 Cyrus invades Babylonia. 10 October: fall of Sippar 12 October: fall of Babylon 29 October: Cyrus enters Babylon. Brief co-regency of Cyrus and Cambyses in Babylonia.	
	After 539? Cyrus in Central Asia.	
530	530 (July-August) Death of Cyrus; accession of Cambyses.	
		528 or 527 Death of Pisistratus.
	526 Death of Amasis; Psammetichus III king of Egypt	526 Hippias elected archon.
	525 Cambyses invades Egypt; death of Psammetichus III	525 Cleisthenes elected archon. Polycrates of Samos aids Cambyses against Egypt.
		524 Miltiades II elected archon.
		c. 523 Sparta and Corinth attack Polycrates.

PERSIA
AND THE NEAR EAST

- 522 Bardiya revolts in Persia (11 March), seizes whole empire by 1 July; death of Cambyses.
Bardiya killed by Darius (29 September); Darius king of Persia.
- 522–521 Widespread revolt in empire.
- 520 520/19 Darius' campaign against Skunkha the Scythian; Bisitun inscription (?).
- 519? Death of Oroetes; Darius gains control in Lydia and Ionia
- 518–514? Conquest of India.
- 517? Capture of Samos; Lesbos and Chios come under Persian rule.
- c. 513 Darius invades Europe.
- 512–511 Conquest of Thrace by Megabazus.
- 510 510? Otanes and Artaphernes take over western Asiatic provinces.

GREECE PROPER
AND EAST GREECE

- 522 Pisistratus the Younger elected archon.
c. 522 Death of Polycrates.
- c. 521 Cleomenes elected king of Sparta.
- 519 Cleomenes invades Central Greece; Plataea becomes ally of Athens.
- c. 516 Miltiades II goes to the Chersonese.
- 514 Hipparchus killed by Harmodius and Aristogeiton.
- 511 Sparta invades Attica unsuccessfully.
- 510 Sparta and the Alcmaeonids expel Hippias.
- 510–509 Athenian citizen rolls revised.
- 508 Isagoras elected archon; expels Cleisthenes and 700 families.
- 507 Cleisthenes implements his reforms.
- 506 Spartan invasion of Attica collapses, and Athens defeats Chalcis and Boeotia.
- c. 505 Athens and Aegina start a long intermittent war.
- 501 Bouleutic oath introduced and army organized at Athens.

Ib SICILY

- 580 *c.* 580 Pentathlus' expedition. Foundation of Acragas and the Cnidian colony on Lipari.
- 540 *c.* 535 Battle of Alalia.
- 530 530–520 Beginning of coinage in Sicily.
- 510 511/10 Destruction of Sybaris.
510–509 Dorieus' expedition to western Sicily.
c. 508/7 Euryleon at Minoa and Selinus
- 500 *c.* 505–498 Tyranny of Cleandrus at Gela.
498–491 Tyranny of Hippocrates at Gela.
c. 496–495 Hippocrates' campaign in eastern Sicily.
494–489 The Samians at Zancle.
494–476 Anaxilas' tyranny at Rhegium.
c. 492 Battle of Helorus.
c. 491 Camarina annexed by Hippocrates. Siege of Ergetium. Death of Hippocrates.
?491 Gamoroi expelled from Syracuse.
- 490 491–485 Tyranny of Gelon at Gela.
489 Anaxilas' repopulation of Zancle-Messana.
c. 489–472 Tyranny of Theron at Acragas.
485–478 Tyranny of Gelon at Syracuse. Hieron governor of Gela.
c. 483 Depopulation of Gela, Camarina, Megara Hyblaea and Euboea. Terillus expelled from Himera by Theron.
482–481 Preparation for war.
481 Greek embassy to Gelon.
- 480 480 Battle of Himera. Peace-treaty between Gelon and Carthage.
478 Death of Gelon. Hieron's accession. Polyzalus governor of Gela.

II THE PERSIANS AND THE GREEKS AT WAR

500

499 Persia attacks Naxos; winter, Aristagoras visits Sparta and Athens.

498 Ionians and allies burn Sardis.

497 Battles in Cyprus and in waters off Cyprus.

497–496 Persian offensives by land in Asia Minor. Darius in Egypt; Suez canal opened.

496 Cyprus reduced by Persia. Hipparchus elected archon at Athens.

495

494 Persia defeats Ionians at Lade.

c. 494 Sparta defeats Argos at Sepea.

493 Persia reimposes her rule in the east Aegean. Themistocles elected archon at Athens. Miltiades escapes from the Chersonese to Athens.

492 Persia replaces tyrants with ‘democracies’ in Greek states. Mardonius confirms Persian rule in the European satrapy. Trial of Miltiades at Athens.

491 Thasos submits to Persia. Darius demands submission of the Greek states. December, hostilities between Athens and Aegina.

490

490 ?March, Aegina defeats Athens at sea. Midsummer, Persia captures Naxos. September, battle of Marathon.

489 Aristides elected archon. Trial of Miltiades.

487 Hipparchus ostracized.

487 or 486 Lot introduced for the selection of archons.

486 Megacles ostracized. Egypt rebels. Death of Darius. Xerxes succeeds in November.

485

c. 485 Hostilities renewed between Athens and Aegina. Egypt subdued.

484 Xanthippus ostracized. Revolt in Babylonia?

483 or 482 Aristides ostracized. Athens decides to build 200 triremes.

482 Revolt in Babylonia?

481 September, Athens decides to put all-her manpower into the fleet.

October, Xerxes reaches Sardis and sends envoys to Greece.

October, Greek League is formed at Sparta.

November, peace concluded between Athens and Aegina.

480

480 September, battles of Artemisium and Thermopylae.

End of September, battle of Salamis. Xerxes returns to Asia.

479 Battles of Plataea and Mycale. Islanders join the Greek League.

479–478 Winter, siege of Sestus.

III LITERARY AND ARTISTIC EVENTS

(See also CAH III².3, 467)

- 500 500–490 Temple of Apollo, Eretria.
 Temple of Aphaea, Aegina.
 Temple of Zeus, Acragas, started.
- 500–497 Aeschylus (born *c.* 525), Choerilus and Pratinas competed at the Dionysia in the Agora; the following Dionysia was held at the Acropolis theatre.
- 500–480 Cleophrades and Berlin painters fl. (prime late archaic Athenian red-figure vases)
- 498 Pindar (born *c.* 518), *Pythian* X.
- 492 Phrynichus (born *c.* 540), *Capture of Miletus*.
- 490 Simonides of Ceos on Marathon.
 Pindar, *Pythian* VI and *Pythian* XII.
- 490–485 Treasury of the Athenians, Delphi
- c.* 486 Comedy already established at Syracuse.
 Pindar, *Pythian* VII for Megacles the Alcmaeonid.
- c.* 485 Bacchylides XIII for Pytheas of Aegina.
- 484 Aeschylus' first victory in the Dionysia.
- 480 Comedy fully established at Syracuse.
 Epicharmus fl.
 Xerxes removes Antenor's Tyrannicides from Athens.
- c.* 480 Simonides on Artemisium and Thermopylae.
- 479 'Oath of Plataea' not to rebuild temples.
 Dedication of the Serpent Column at Delphi.
- 478 Bronze Charioteer dedicated by Polyzelus at Delphi.
- c.* 478 Pindar, *Isthmian* v, honouring Aegina at Salamis.
 New Tyrannicides group erected in Athens.
- 476 Phrynichus, *Phoenissae*
 Bacchylides, Pindar and Simonides in Sicily.
 Bacchylides V and Pindar, *Olympian* I in honour of Hieron, *Olympians* II and III in honour of Theron.
 Aeschylus, *Aetnaeae*, produced in Sicily.
- 472 Aeschylus, *Persae*.

IV ITALY FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TENTH CENTURIES B.C.

(For cultures and periods see D 156)

Dates B.C.	Mycenaean pottery (Furumark)	Cultures	Periods	Centuries B.C.
1600	(Middle Helladic)			XVI
	I			
1500	IIA	EARLY APENNINE: PHASE 1A		XV
	IIIB		MIDDLE BRONZE AGE	
	IIIA1			
1400	IIIA2 early			XIV
	IIIA2 later	LATE APENNINE: PHASE 1B		
1300	IIIB			XIII
	IIIC1a early	SUB- APENNINE: PHASE 2	RECENT	
1200	IIIC1b late			XII
	IIIC1c later			
1100	IIIC2 (= Sub- Mycenaean)		FINAL	XI
	(Proto- Geometric)	PROTO- VILLA- NOVAN		
1000				X
900				

V ITALY FROM THE TENTH TO THE FOURTH CENTURIES B.C.


(In Italy the Iron Age begins *c.* 950 B.C.)

	APULIA	THE MID-ADRIATIC REGION	APENNINIC ITALY	
	Densely populated. Burial practice, inhumation. Medium of exchange, bronze. Few contacts with Aegean world. Immigrants (from Balkans?) fusing with natives to form the Iapyges. Proto-Geometric ware.	Many settlements. Dead inhumed in cramped attitude, with little pottery and no metal objects except fibulae. Many Trans-Adriatic contacts.	Burial practice, inhumation. Nomadic pastoralism (with seasonal transhumance?). Some subsistence agriculture.	—
				E
				A
800 B.C.	Messapic predominant in the 'heel' and spreading north. Diversified and intricate fibulae. Iapygian Geometric ware. Greek trading-posts and colonies established. Tarentum founded, 706 B.C.	Mid-Adriatic culture burgeons. Bronze weapons in tombs. Pottery more diversified: <i>keothones</i> common. Numana the important port.	'Umbrian' dialects develop west of meridian 13°E, 'Oscan' dialects east of it. Expansion through Sacred Spring rite. Movement of mountain- dwellers towards the coastal regions. Growth of agrarian settlements, diversification of agriculture, formation of separate tribes.	R L Y I R O
				N
700 B.C.	Strong Greek influence, especially Corinthian and Ionian. Typical Apulian pottery, distinguishable as Daunian, Peucetian, Messapian. Skilful bronze-casting of figurines.	Iron weapons in tombs. Abundance of imported and native pottery and metal objects, some with orientaling designs. Region becomes literate. 'South Picene'-speakers present in the region.	North Adriatic coast becomes 'Umbrian'. Central Adriatic coast becomes 'Oscan'. Sabini and Hernici separate from Umbri. In central Italy, Sabellic tribes develop. In Samnium, stable settlements grouping into tribes.	A G E
600 B.C.	Spread of literacy. Separate peoples identifiable amongst the Iapyges: Messapii, Sallentini, Calabri in the 'heel'; Peucetii, Daunii further north. Much pottery exported, especially Daunian. Sybaris destroyed, 510 B.C.	Zenith of Mid-Adriatic culture. Imports from Greece and Etruria. Much traffic with Campania. Tombs rich in jewellery, amber and precious metals. 'South Picene' documents appear.	Identifiable Osco- Umbrian tribes in Samnium, central Italy and on Adriatic coast. Sabellian expansion into Campania and towards Lucania and Apulia. Volsci and Aequi expand into Latium.	—

	APULIA	THE MID-ADRIATIC REGION	APENNINIC ITALY	
500 B.C.	Marked Greek influence. Powerful walled settlements ruled by 'kings'. Messapii defeat Tarentum, c. 473 B.C.	Tombs become poorer. Jewellery absent. Region under Celtic attack?	Sabelli get control of Campania. Capua falls, c. 425 B.C. Cumae falls, c. 421 B.C. Oscan alphabet devised. Sabelli expand into north Apulia, Lucania, Bruttium. Volsci established in Latium.	L A T E R
400 B.C.	Republics replace monarchies. Sabelli firmly astride R. Fortore and expanding. Canusium replaces Arpi as the principal Daunian settlement. Roman power reaches Apulia. Latin colony at Luceria, 314 B.C.	Ancona founded, c. 400 B.C. Celtic influence appearing. End of distinctive Mid-Adriatic culture.	Sabelli control all South Italy apart from the 'heel' and some Greek colonies. Bruttii form their own state, 356 B.C. Rome blocks Samnite move into Latium.	I R O N A G E

VI SPARTA: LIST OF KINGS

At Sparta the Kings of the Lacedaemonians claimed descent from Aristodemus and so from Heracles. Those in brackets did not become kings. For problems see J. F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster, 1985) 65.



VII MACEDON: LIST OF KINGS

At Aegeae the Kings of the Macedones claimed descent from Temenus, conqueror of Argos, brother of the Aristodemus of the previous list, and so from Heracles.

Perdiccas, Argaeus, Philippos, Aeropos, Alcetas, Amyntas, Alexander
(Hdt. VIII.139; for later additions see N. G. L. Hammond and G. T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia II* (Oxford, 1979) 5-14.)

VIII THE DEINOMENIDS OF SICILY

The Deinomenids were descendants of Deinomenes, a founding member of Gela c. 688. Only one name, Telines, is known for the generations before Molossus. See Hdt. VII.153-6 and Simonides fr. 141 Bergk.

