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VOLUME VI



# THE CAMBRIDGE ANCIENT HISTORY

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VOLUME VI

The Fourth Century B.C.

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The bibliography is arranged in sections dealing with specific topics, which sometimes correspond to individual chapters but more often combine the contents of several chapters. References in the footnotes are to these sections (which are distinguished by capital letters) and within these sections each book or article has assigned to it a number which is quoted in the footnotes. In these, so as to provide a quick indication of the nature of the work referred to, the author's name and the date of publication are also included in each reference. Thus 'Finley 1979 (G 164) 100' signifies 'M. I. Finley, *Ancient Sicily*, revised edn London, 1979, p. 100', to be found in Section G of the bibliography as item 164.

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## PREFACE

The predecessor of this volume in the first edition was entitled 'Macedon, 401–301 B.C.'. This symbolized the understandable view that the overriding theme of the fourth century was the unification of the Greek world and its expansion into the Near East. The years before the accession of Philip II to the throne of Macedon were seen as having their main significance in illustrating the confusion from which he delivered the Greek city states. It was a view which could be held even without the overtones of the nineteenth-century unification of Germany and Italy which so often accompanied it in the scholarship of the day.

This volume covers a shorter span. The main practical reason for this has been the great expansion in our understanding of the early hellenistic period, which necessitated a more extended treatment of the late fourth century in Volume VII.1. We thus end our formal narrative with the death of Alexander.

This shortening of the period changes the balance of the volume, and accounts for the disappearance of Macedon from the title. For the first forty-odd years of our period, it was only peripheral to the main course of events. The narrative chapters are split to reflect the difference between the years of the continued struggles between the city states, ending, as Xenophon's history did, with the Battle of Mantinea in 362, and the period in which Philip and Alexander are the main guiding forces.

We find the first of these periods interesting in itself, not simply illustrative of the political and other weaknesses of the Greek city states, and hope that we have now done more justice to it. After its victory in the Peloponnesian War, the initiative lay with Sparta, which remained close to the centre of the stage, even after the battle of Leuctra revealed the progress made by Thebes, at least in warfare. Although Athens continues to dominate our source-material and was never unimportant, we have deliberately shifted the narrative focus to Sparta and Thebes and rather reduced the usual coverage of Athens. Though the political achievement of the period was ultimately unimpressive, it was nevertheless full of ideas and innovation; chapter 11 pulls together some of the threads.

Persia, which had returned to the Greek scene in 413, is an essential part of the story throughout; recent work on it has been lively and we now understand more. We compensate for the deliberately narrow geographical limits of Volume v<sup>2</sup> with a new series of surveys of non-Greek areas, inside and outside the Persian empire, parallel to those in Volume iv<sup>2</sup>. In the chapters on Sicily, Carthage and Italy, these constitute a reminder that not all matters of importance were happening in the eastern Mediterranean. The contemporary rise of Rome has already been treated in Volume vii.2.

For the workings of life in the Greek world itself, the evidence is a great deal richer than for the fifth century. We have thus been able to do more to describe the economy and its essential agricultural base. It is seldom possible to be certain what is novel about the fourth century in these matters, and that is even more true of religion, where contributors to Volume v<sup>2</sup> admitted their dependence on later sources. That there is no separate treatment of the traditional religion in this volume is not intended as a denial of its continued importance.

Fourth-century art lives very much on its High Classical past but elements are introduced that will develop rapidly into Hellenistic baroque and it is more diverse in function. It does appear that poetry temporarily lost its capacity for innovation. Rhetoric, perhaps losing some of its freshness, except in the hands of the greatest masters, became dominant in literature, certainly to the disadvantage of the writing of history. Not all prose was thus dominated, and in the hands of Plato, Greek became a uniquely flexible tool for expressing thought. Others with less polish built up a storehouse of technical literature, reflecting important technological developments, not least in warfare.

Even without the employment of technical rhetoric, the masters of prose were also masters of the spoken word in their teaching. The formation of the great schools assured to Athens in her political decline a future as a cultural centre which was to last physically for 900 years and intellectually, particularly in the heritage of Aristotle, a great deal longer than that.

After the accession of Philip, the line of the political and military narrative becomes much clearer. Since 1927, the date of the first edition, there has been intensive work on both Philip and Alexander, though primary evidence remains sparse for both. We can at least claim a better understanding of Macedon itself, owed not least to Professor Hammond, the guiding spirit of this second edition, and a richer and more complex picture of the Macedonian invasion of Asia to compensate for the loss of the first edition's incandescent, but ultimately misleading, portrait of Alexander. We have offered in the Epilogue some thoughts on Alexander in his more general fourth-century context.

A single Volume of Plates is published to accompany this volume and Volume v<sup>2</sup>. It presents a fuller account of Classical art and architecture than has been attempted in the text volumes, as well as consideration of material evidence for other aspects of classical life, trade, religion, warfare and the theatre.

Professor J. K. Davies gave inestimable help in the planning of this volume before being forced by other commitments to lay down his editorship. We are grateful to our contributors for their tolerance of our slow progress. We have to mourn the death of one contributor, Professor H. D. Westlake.

With this volume the second edition of the Greek volumes of *The Cambridge Ancient History* is completed. Its editors, past and present, wish to thank especially the Cambridge University Press editor, Pauline Hire, for her patience and calm efficiency over the years of its preparation and above all for her unwavering commitment and enthusiasm. The drawings have been prepared by Marion Cox; David Cox drew the maps; the index was compiled by Barbara Hird.

D. M. L.  
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S. H.  
M. O.



CHAPTER 1  
SOURCES AND THEIR USES

SIMON HORNBLOWER


No guide comparable to Thucydides exists for the fourth century. This means that we have no firm framework for political and military events, and this lack is a serious obstacle to one sort of knowledge. Thucydides' mind, however, was limited as well as powerful, or perhaps we should say its limits were the price of its power; and in the fourth century certain types of history which he had treated only selectively, particularly social, economic and religious topics, can actually be better studied than was possible in the Thucydidean period. Xenophon, for instance, has glaring faults when judged as a political reporter but is a prime source for the modern historian of religion. In general, fourth-century literary sources (Xenophon, Aeneas Tacticus and others) are less preoccupied than Thucydides had been with the polar opposites, Athens and Sparta. This probably reflects the new multi-centred reality. But we should recall that Thucydides, especially in books iv and v, had allowed us peeps at the politics of Argos, Macedon, Thessaly and Boeotia. A history of the Peloponnesian War written by Xenophon might have told us more about second-class and minor city states than Thucydides did: compare the remarkable detail about the minor cities Sicyon and Phlius at Xen. *Hell.* vii.1–3. But a Xenophon with only Herodotus, not Thucydides, for a predecessor and model would have looked very different anyway.

Another important reason why history of a non-traditional sort, that is history of things other than war and politics, can be more confidently written for the fourth century, is the greater abundance of inscriptions on stone. This is especially true of places other than Athens.

For the years 403–362 there is only one surviving primary account, books ii.3 to vii of Xenophon's *Hellenica*. The first two books of that work have already been briefly discussed in an earlier volume (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 8). With the beginning of book iii Xenophon breaks away from Athenian affairs and moves to Asia Minor. Internal evidence however shows a clear break in composition somewhat earlier, at ii.3.10. This finding is the result of stylometric tests done before computers made such operations routine; but it carries such overwhelming conviction that it is not likely to be overthrown.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Maclaren 1934 (B 69); Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 65.





Map 1. Greece and Western Asia Minor.

The most striking characteristic of the section beginning at II.3.11, which we may call Part Two, is its parochial concentration on Peloponnesian affairs.<sup>2</sup> It is true that books III and IV cover Asiatic events, but that is the exception which tests the rule because Xenophon is interested in Asia only when there is Spartan activity there. We find for instance virtually no sign in the *Hellenica* of the great revolts of the satraps in the 360s (VII.1.27 may be an exception). This Spartan viewpoint has its advantages; for instance Xenophon has a better understanding of the Spartan military and political system than did Thucydides, who had complained of the secrecy of the Spartan constitution, Thuc. v.68.2. Xenophon had good Peloponnesian contacts and eventually settled at an estate at Scyllus in the Peloponnese (*An.v.3*). He is thus able to report such a dangerous and – for the Spartan authorities – embarrassing episode as the Cinadon affair (*Hell.* III.3; see below, p. 43). This was a massive attempted revolt by the Spartan helots or state slaves in c. 399. Xenophon also knows plenty of technical terms for Spartan institutions: the phrase ‘the so-called small assembly’ is mentioned at III.3.8 but nowhere else in Greek literature.<sup>3</sup> He knows about liberated helots, *neodamodeis* (III.1.4, compare already Thuc. VII.19.3 etc.), and about other groups halfway between full Spartiate and helot status, for instance, the *trophimoi*, boys reared with full Spartan children, and the bastard sons of Spartans, ‘men not unacquainted with the good things of the Spartan way of life’ (v.3.9). Above all, Xenophon understands and sympathizes with the system of ‘congenial oligarchies’ (in Thucydides’ brief phrase, I.19), support of which enabled Sparta to keep control of the Peloponnesian League. (But Xenophon is not the only focalizer behind the comment on ‘troublesome demagogues’ at v.2.7, said about Mantinea.) The exponent *par excellence* of the system was Agesilaus,<sup>4</sup> who was one of the two Spartan kings from 400 to 362, roughly the period covered by Xenophon’s Part Two. He was a powerful figure in the Greek world, and Xenophon’s benefactor in his long exile from Athens. As well as giving Agesilaus generous space in the *Hellenica*, Xenophon also wrote an encomium of him after his death, the first surviving Greek essay in biography. Another minor treatise, the *Constitution of the Spartans* (*Lac. Pol.*), is in effect an institutional encomium of the Spartan way of life.<sup>5</sup>

It has often been held that Xenophon in the *Hellenica* is biased towards Sparta and correspondingly antipathetic to Thebes who displaced her in so many respects. ‘Bias’ is however a slippery term: it can mean anything from outright falsification – with which Xenophon cannot seriously be

<sup>2</sup> Cawkwell 1979 (B 26) 23.      <sup>3</sup> Andrewes 1966 (C 274) 18 n. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Cawkwell 1976 (C 285); Cartledge 1987 (C 284).

<sup>5</sup> *Agesilaus*: Momigliano 1971 (B 82) 50–1 and 1975 (B 84). *Lac. Pol.*: Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 56; *contra*, Chrimes 1948 (B 30).



charged – to the manifestation of those sympathies and contemporary preoccupations from which no historian is (or ought to be) free. Xenophon was overwhelmingly interested in Sparta, certainly, but that should not be confused with partisan bias in Sparta's favour.<sup>6</sup> In any case Xenophon was capable of censuring the Spartans, when they behaved irreligiously. For instance, his way of explaining the Spartan defeat at Leuctra in 371 was to treat it as divine punishment for the unjustified Spartan seizure of the Theban acropolis in 383: 'already the god was leading them on', he says at VI.4.3. The moral judgment on the seizure is made explicit at V.4.1: 'There are many instances from both Greek and barbarian history to show that the gods do not overlook impiety or irreligious behaviour.'

Anti-Theban feeling is discernible in, for instance, the sneer at Theban greed over the tithe to Apollo (III.5.5), which the Thebans claimed at Decerea at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Or there is the criticism of Theban 'medizing', that is subservience to Persia, in 367, Pelopidas being singled out (VII.1.33ff). In fact, Spartan medizing on this occasion was no less eager.

But Xenophon's omissions – of which that Spartan medizing is an example – are not a simple matter. The most conspicuous tend to be explicable in terms of his political sympathies. Thus, for instance, he fails to record the extent of Theban penetration into Thessaly after the battle of Haliartus in 395. The truth is inadvertently revealed in the list of Theban allies, including Thessalian Crannon and Pharsalus, at IV.3.3, and again at VII.1.28, dealing with 367, where he records a suggestion that some Sicilian troops should be used in Thessaly 'against the Thebans'. But for the full story of Theban ambitions in Thessaly we have to go to inscriptions or to a different literary tradition altogether (see further below, p. 10). Again, there is nothing in Xenophon about the battle of Tegyra in 375, admittedly a minor affair in itself but a Theban success which anticipated the smashing Theban defeat of Sparta at Leuctra four years later. Still on Boeotian topics, V.4.46 is the vaguest possible allusion to the reconstitution of the Boeotian Confederacy. But not all his omissions are straightforwardly explicable. At VI.3.1 it is surprising that he does not list Orchomenus among the places attacked by Thebes in the 370s, since this would have strengthened his general view of Theban bully tactics (Diod. XV.37, cf. Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.10.).

Xenophon is also very thin on the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy, whose foundation he does not record at all (Tod no. 123 = Harding

<sup>6</sup> This is stressed in what is now the best (excellent, thorough and thoughtful) recent study of the *Hellenica*, C. J. Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11–7.5.27*, *Historia Einzelschrift* 76 (Stuttgart, 1993), 163 and *passim*. Schwartz 1956 (B 103) 167 detected in Xenophon some partiality for *Athens*, but Tuplin shows that even this is not consistently true. Rather, *nobody* stays in favour with Xenophon for very long (Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 47).

no. 35 lines 9–11, cf. Diod. xv.29). Incidental allusions have been detected: at v.4.34 the re-gating of the Piraeus looks like a practical consequence of the new confederacy, and at vi.5.2 (cf. 3.19) he speaks of ‘decrees of the Athenians and their [?confederate] allies’.

Persia is another area of serious omission in Xenophon, as indeed it had been in Thucydides before his book VIII. A feature of the ‘Xenophonic’ period is the series of common peaces (*κοινὰ εἰρήνηναι*) ‘sent down’ to Greece by Persia.<sup>7</sup> After mentioning the first King’s Peace of 386 (v.1.31), which greatly strengthened Sparta in mainland Greece at the price of the abandonment of her claims in Asia, Xenophon systematically under-reports the Persian involvement in renewals of the original peace. His motive is presumably to downplay Spartan ‘medizing’. A clear instance is vi.2.1, the peace of 375: it is only from Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 151) that we learn that this peace was sent from Persia. (Cf. also above on his neglect of the revolts of the 360s.)

Xenophon’s own feelings about Persia and Persians were mixed, though not illogically so – nor even unusually so for a man of his time (see below, p. 69f). He admired many Persian qualities and the individuals who displayed them. But some of his writings, notably the *Agesilaus*, are undoubtedly characterized by political ‘panhellenism’, which means advocating that the Greeks should unite against Persia, if necessary enlisting dissident satraps. Where does the *Hellenica* stand? Panhellenism is there, but it is not virulent.<sup>8</sup> Panhellenism of a mild sort makes its appearance early in the *Hellenica*. Already in Part One Xenophon had written approvingly of the stand taken by the Spartan admiral Callicratidas, who was trying to get money from the Persian Cyrus but was kept waiting. Callicratidas said that the Greeks were wretched in that they had to flatter barbarians in order to get money, and that if he reached home safely he himself would do his best to reconcile Spartans and Athenians (1.6.7). There is a remarkable echo of this sentiment far on in Part Two, an implied criticism of Antalcidas by Teleutias (two prominent Spartans) for flattering anybody, whether Greeks or barbarians, for the sake of pay (v.1.17). Xenophon’s speeches<sup>9</sup> are not, however, simple statements of his own views, any more than are those of Thucydides. For instance, it would be naive to transfer to Xenophon, the author of the *Cyropaedia*, the opinion of Jason that in Persia everybody except for one man is educated to be a slave rather than to stand up for himself; while the inclusion of Antiochus of Arcadia’s

<sup>7</sup> For Thucydides, Andrewes 1961 (B 5); for the Common Peaces Ryder 1965 (C 67) and Bauslaugh 1991 (C 7) 182–255.

<sup>8</sup> Admiration for Persia: Hirsch 1985 (B 59); Tatum 1989 (B 114). Panhellenism of *Hellenica* not virulent: Tuplin, *Failings of Empire* 60, 67, 121 (Jason); cf. 104–8 (important reinterpretation of the ostensibly panhellenist speech of Callias at vi.3); 112 (Procles of Phlius). <sup>9</sup> Gray 1989 (B 49).

remark, that 'the famous golden plane-tree of the Persian kings would not give shade to a grasshopper', proves only that Xenophon had a sense of humour (VI.1.12; VII.1.38). Certainly we can no longer accept the simple view of a century ago<sup>10</sup> that panhellenism was the key to the whole *Hellenica*; that is, that the aged Xenophon of the 350s was seeking to remove the enmity between his adoptive fatherland, Sparta, and the Athens where he was born and brought up.

In the present century the *Hellenica* has sunk in critical esteem: its author, it is said, cuts a poor figure as a historian by comparison not only with Thucydides but with the relatively recently discovered Oxyrhynchus Historian (*Hell. Oxy.*; on whom see below and *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 8 and 482). One, not wholly satisfactory, defence is to challenge the assumption that Xenophon intended to write 'history' at all: he was an explicit *moralist*.<sup>11</sup> There is something in this: it explains some odd exceptions to the general characteristics noted above. So, as we noted above in connexion with Leuctra, his admiration for Sparta was not blind (see also the problematic *Lac. Pol.* xiv). But nothing much is gained by denying Xenophon the title of 'historian', a technical term not yet invented when he wrote. Another, more subjective, reply would be to stress Xenophon's great literary merits, which can be lost sight of in a positivistic preoccupation with his 'omissions' and so forth. An apt but temperate summing-up of Xenophon in the *Hellenica* is 'not a pedantically accurate writer, rather an impressionist with a singular gift for vivid description'.<sup>12</sup> Certainly Xenophon has great strengths as a social historian, most evident in his glimpses of life in Persian Asia Minor (see below, p. 213). And we have already noticed his account of the Cinadon affair.

Of Xenophon's other works, the *Agesilaus* and *The Constitution of the Spartans* have been mentioned already, and the *Anabasis* will be exploited in ch. 3. The *Cyropaedia* or *Education of Cyrus* is controversial. It is usually dismissed as 'completely fictitious' from the factual point of view,<sup>13</sup> and this is better than the other (perverse) extreme, which seeks to detect in it a source of otherwise lost Persian traditions about their own past.<sup>14</sup> Historians of the Persian empire continue to use material from the *Cyropaedia* without making it clear where they stand on the issue of the work's status.<sup>15</sup> A more interesting approach is to see in it a precursor of the treatises 'On Kingship' which we know to have been a feature of the hellenistic age.<sup>16</sup> It is even more rewarding, since so little 'Kingship' literature actually survives, to compare the behaviour described or recommended in the *Cyropaedia* and *Hipparchicus* (or 'Cavalry Com-

<sup>10</sup> Schwartz 1956 (B 103; originally published 1887) esp. 156, 160; but see Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*. <sup>11</sup> Grayson 1975 (B 50), criticized by Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 15–16.

<sup>12</sup> Andrewes 1966 (C 274) 10–11. <sup>13</sup> Murray 1986 (B 88) 198.

<sup>14</sup> Hirsch 1985 (B 59) ch. 4. <sup>15</sup> Briant 1982 (F 10) 175ff. <sup>16</sup> *CAH* VII<sup>2</sup>.1, 75–81.

mander'; another Xenophontic treatise), with the actual tactics, stratagems and exercise of leadership attested for real-life generals of the later fourth century. This has been successfully done for the literary tradition about men like Eumenes of Cardia.<sup>17</sup> The latter falls just outside the scope of the present volume, but his was surely not the first career to demonstrate the *military* importance of Xenophon's writings.

Technical treatises (like that of Aeneas Tacticus,<sup>18</sup> see below, p. 679) abound in the fourth century, and the *Poroi* (otherwise known as *Vectigalia*; *Ways and Means*; *Revenues*) of Xenophon is a monograph on a topic in which the Greeks made little theoretical progress: economics. To the usual verdict that the *Poroi* exemplifies without redeeming that failure, it has been countered that Xenophon has again (cf. above on his intentions in the *Hellenica*) been misunderstood: his aim was political, the achievement of peace.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless the *Poroi* is of particular interest for what it says about the Laurium silver-mines, on which much archaeological and epigraphic work has been done since the Second World War. Xenophon's suggestions here may be unrealistic; but in a valuable and detailed book about the Laurium mines, by a practising engineer who was Minister of Industry and Energy in the Karamanlis government of the 1970s, Xenophon gets credit for being a 'precursor of economic co-operation between individuals' and for 'stressing the interdependence of the different sectors of the economy'.<sup>20</sup> Finally, there is Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, which is about estate management (see further ch. 12*d* below, p. 662). As scholars begin to shift their attentions to the countryside and away from the city, it might have been thought that this treatise would earn their approval but no, 'he fails totally to describe the very real problems of all farmers in Attica . . . the practical value of this discussion is almost nil'.<sup>21</sup> For the student of the ancient economy, the *Oeconomicus* serves merely to illustrate landed attitudes (pious, hierarchical and amateur), and thus re-defined as a work of ethics<sup>22</sup> it regains a certain academic dignity. Its fate is thus not unlike some other Xenophontic treatises we have been considering. Its sections on the duties of wives (including a denunciation of make-up) are revealing, if only about the expectations of Athenian males at a certain social level.<sup>23</sup>

We may now pass to the literary sources other than Xenophon.

The other surviving narrative of the period to 362 is books XIV–XV of the *Bibliothēke* or 'library' (a universal history) of Diodorus Siculus.

<sup>17</sup> J. Hornblower 1981 (B 60) 196–211; cf. *CAH* VII<sup>2</sup>.1, 45–6.

<sup>18</sup> Whitehead 1990 (B 131), bringing out well Aeneas' *general* value for the student of the Greek city state, cf. below p. 530. <sup>19</sup> Gauthier 1976 (B 42) with Cawkwell 1979 (B 27).

<sup>20</sup> Conophagos 1980 (I 26) 114.

<sup>21</sup> Osborne 1987 (I 115) 18. A commentary by S. Pomeroy is announced.

<sup>22</sup> Finley 1973 (I 36) 18. <sup>23</sup> e.g. Lefkowitz and Fant 1982 (I 96) no. 106.

Diodorus wrote in Roman times (late first century B.C.); for his general working methods see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 7. He used one main source at a time;<sup>24</sup> there is nothing to be said for a recent attempt to revive an old view that he interwove two sources in book xvii, which is about Alexander.<sup>25</sup> Book xvi is problematic as we shall see; but there is no doubt that for at least the first four decades of the century (books xiv–xv and parts of xvi) his source continued to be Ephorus, as it had been for the fifth century in books xi–xiii.<sup>26</sup> Diodorus found Ephorus' moralizing tendencies congenial (cf. xi.46) but he got into difficulties reorganizing Ephorus' material; one famous blunder, an apparent confusion between the peaces of 375 and 371, may be due to a misplacing by Diodorus under 375 of an introductory discussion in which Ephorus anticipated his own later narrative of 371.<sup>27</sup> What was said above about 'one main source' needs some, but only some, qualifying to take account of Sicily. The qualification is a double one: not only does the separate Sicilian strand of material run alongside the main Greek narrative; but it seems that for fourth-century Sicily Diodorus *was* prepared to draw on two writers rather than one. Here too the principal source was Ephorus. The other was Timaeus, from Tauromenium and so like Diodorus a Sicilian by origin; but he lived and worked from c. 315–265 in Athens (*FGrH* 566). He is a figure of exceptional importance, the first great historian of western hellenism; we may note here that he was extensively used by Plutarch in his two fourth-century Sicilian *Lives*, those of Dion and of Timoleon.<sup>28</sup> Distinguishing 'Ephorean' from 'Timaeian' material in Diodorus is not an easy matter.<sup>29</sup> The better view<sup>30</sup> is that Diodorus drew primarily on Ephorus and supplemented him from Timaeus; so his approach in the Sicilian sections was different, but not all that different, from that in the main Greek narrative (see further below, ch. 5, p. 121). Behind parts of both Ephorus' and Timaeus' Sicilian material may lie the more shadowy figure of Philistus (*FGrH* 556).<sup>31</sup> Another qualification to the 'one main source' doctrine is required by Diodorus' regular insertions from the chronographic source. This source gives dynastic and other dates. These dates work reasonably well for e.g. the Persian and Hecatomnid rulers but there are serious problems about the Macedonian and Spartan dates; and one Bosphoran ruler is killed off in 349 whereas an inscription shows

<sup>24</sup> Schwartz 1903 (B 101) = 1957 (B 104) 35–97; J. Hornblower 1981 (B 60); Sacks 1990 (B 98).

<sup>25</sup> Hammond 1983 (B 57) with Hornblower 1984 (B 61).

<sup>26</sup> For the fifth century, the correspondence Diod. xi.45 ~ *FGrH* 70 Ephorus F 191 is almost decisive on its own, despite Africa 1962 (B 2). For the fourth, see Diod. xv.5.4 and 32.1 ~ Ephorus FF 79, 210, and the direct citation Diod. xv.60.5 = F 214. <sup>27</sup> Andrewes 1985 (B 7).

<sup>28</sup> Westlake 1952 (G 321), Talbert 1974 (G 304). On Timaeus see Brown 1958 (B 19), done without knowledge of Jacoby's 1955 comm.; Fraser 1972 (A 21) 763–74; Momigliano 1977 (B 85) 37–66; Pearson 1987 (B 92). <sup>29</sup> Meister 1967 (B 74). <sup>30</sup> Jacoby *Komm.* IIC (Text) 529.

<sup>31</sup> Zoepffel 1965 (B 133).

he was alive in 346 (Diod. xvi.52; Tod no. 167 = Harding no. 82). Some earlier views on the reliability of this source were too generous.<sup>32</sup>

Ephorus himself was briefly characterized in an earlier volume (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 7). It is essential to realize that behind Ephorus, who was the immediate source for Diodorus, lie yet other, ultimate, sources, of whom we may single out two who dealt, in part or whole, with the period 404–362. The first is the Oxyrhynchus Historian (see above p. 7). For the modern political historian of the fourth century this writer's best contribution is his account (ch.xvi Bartoletti) of the Boeotian federal constitution, an account which makes intelligible some stray hints in Thucydides.<sup>33</sup> But historiographically the most important thing about the Oxyrhynchus Historian is that he, who clearly represents a tradition independent of and preferable to Xenophon, seems to have been used by Diodorus/Ephorus. (For instance, Xenophon's and Diodorus' accounts of the 395 campaign of Agesilaus in Asia are irreconcilable. Xenophon has an open engagement, Diodorus an ambush, which is less glamorous and so probably right.<sup>34</sup> But *Hell. Oxy.* agrees with Diodorus, down to verbal correspondences e.g. εἰς πλωθίων συντάξας ~ ~ ἐξ]ωθὲν τοῦ πλω[θίου, Diod. xiv.80.1 and *Hell. Oxy.* xi.3.) This means that in Diodorus we have a corrective to Xenophon on some points of detail and interpretation; though it cannot be said, as it can about Callisthenes (the next writer we shall discuss), that *Hell. Oxy.* may have offered a radically different picture of the age from that of Xenophon.

Another demonstrable source of Ephorus, to whom he seems to have turned for events after 386 when *Hell. Oxy.* ended, is a writer whose significance is greater than could be guessed from the small number (nineteen) of the surviving fragments of his *Hellenica*: he is Callisthenes of Olynthus (*FGrH* 124), the nephew of Aristotle.<sup>35</sup> The Christian authority Eusebius tells us explicitly that Ephorus drew on Callisthenes (*FGrH* 70 τ 17); and it is probable<sup>36</sup> that Callisthenes lies behind some of Plutarch's *Pelopidas*, for instance the account of Theban penetration into Thessaly. Through the medium of Diodorus and Plutarch we can vaguely discern a tradition very unlike Xenophon, above all in giving proper space and significance to Thebes. For instance two fragments or quotations of Callisthenes by earlier writers (FF 11 and 18) mention Tegyra; see above for this battle, which Xenophon omitted completely. The most important piece of evidence for the general line taken by Callisthenes – much less pro-Spartan than Xenophon – is F 8. This

<sup>32</sup> Schwartz 1957 (B 104) 44: 'im grossen und ganzen sehr zuverlässig'; see however Hornblower 1990 (C 366) 74. Cf. below pp. 480, 495.

<sup>33</sup> Bruce 1967 (B 20) 157–62. The terminal date of *Hell. Oxy.* is less certain than is sometimes stated; see Hornblower 1990 (C 366) 73 n. 6. <sup>34</sup> Cawkwell 1979 (B 26) appendix.

<sup>35</sup> Jacoby 1919 (D 200) and comm on *FGrH* 124; Schwartz 1900 (B 100) reprinted in Schwartz 1956 (B 103). <sup>36</sup> Westlake 1939 (B 127).

fragment, from a commentary on the *Ethics* of Aristotle, concerns events of 370/69 and has the Spartans deliberately sending to Athens to appeal for help against the Theban invasion (see below, ch. 7 p. 191). This is very close to the line taken by Diodorus in xv.63, and this closeness confirms the general notion that Callisthenes ultimately lies behind Diodorus. But this agreed version of Callisthenes and Diodorus is very different from Xenophon's account at vi.5.33ff: in Xenophon, some Spartans merely 'happen to be present' at Athens and they put their request incidentally. Proof in such matters is not to be had, but this is very close to an 'outright falsification' (cf. above on bias). Xenophon, it seems, recoiled from depicting Spartans as clutching the begging-bowl. Ephorus had much to say about the good qualities, the *arete*, of Epaminondas, judging by Diodorus book xv; Strabo preserves an interesting analysis of the failure of the Theban hegemony (VIII.2.1–2 = Ephorus F 119): despite the personal qualities of Epaminondas, Thebes failed for want of *paideia* and *agoge*, education and discipline. These were the positive qualities associated with Athens and Sparta respectively. This judgment is usually thought to reflect the views of Ephorus' teacher Isocrates (see Isoc. v, the *Philippus*), but note the very similar view of Callisthenes' uncle Aristotle, that Thebes was successful when [and only when?] her leaders were also philosophers (*Rhetoric* 1398). In any case, there were other historians of Boeotia on whom Ephorus could have drawn. (The topic was evidently much debated. Note the interesting discussion of fourth-century Thebes and Athens at Polyb. vi.43–4.) It has even been doubted recently, but not conclusively, whether the Strabo passage is undiluted Ephorus after all.<sup>37</sup> On the hegemony itself, especially on its naval aspects, Diodorus provides much basic material, some of which may ultimately derive from Callisthenes.

The source of Ephorus' Persian material is a special problem. Some was no doubt based on personal knowledge: he came from Cyme in Asia Minor. But written *Persica* existed. For the expedition of the Ten Thousand at the beginning of the century (see below, ch. 3), Ephorus went to Xenophon's *Anabasis*, a decision which meant that Diodorus does after all preserve, at one remove, a Xenophontic tradition (see above for his avoidance of the *Hellenica*). For Persian, and satrapal, material thereafter other writers were available; some of these are discussed below, p. 47. A favourable re-evaluation of Dinon of Colophon (*FGrH* 690) and other authors of *Persica*<sup>38</sup> has disproved the facile view that all fourth-century Greek writing about Persia was trivial gossip,<sup>39</sup> of which there is admittedly too much in Ctesias of Cnidus (*FGrH* 688). But which of these authors lies behind Diodorus' import-

<sup>37</sup> Milns 1980 (B 78).      <sup>38</sup> Stevenson in Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Kuhrt 1987 (F 51) 27–35.

<sup>39</sup> Momigliano 1975 (A 41).

ant account of the Revolt of the Satraps (xv.9off; see below, p. 84) is not an answerable question on present knowledge. On the view of Diodorus accepted above, the *immediate* source should be Ephorus; that is, it is not to be supposed that Diodorus himself crossed over to a volume of *Persica* for a short stretch.

A final strand in the historical tradition for the fourth century continues from the fifth: the local historian of Attica, collectively known as the *Atthis*, discussed in *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 10–11. For the period under review, the numerous relevant fragments of Philochorus (*FGrH* 328) have more than merely chronological importance. Indeed, to say ‘merely’ is churlish, when Xenophon and Diodorus provide so few reliable signposts; in particular, the ingenious modern hypothesis that in Philochorus ἐπὶ τούτου following an archon-name indicates the first event of a year,<sup>40</sup> has been no less ingeniously exploited in the hope of reaching a higher degree of precision on some key issues.<sup>41</sup> On substantive topics we have already seen that Philochorus’ evidence can be decisive, for instance on Persian involvement in the 375 peace (see above, p. 6). For Androtion (*FGrH* 324) see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 11 and 475.

Several of the lost or fragmentary writers so far mentioned were used by Plutarch (c. A.D. 50–120; see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 9–10) in his fourth-century *Lives*. Plutarch’s loss of interest in Athenian figures in the fourth century correctly reflects the changed historical and historiographical reality, but it is very extreme: there is no Athenian biography between the *Alcibiades* on the one hand and the *Demosthenes* and *Phocion* on the other; contrast the six fifth-century *Lives*. (This lop-sidedness gives to the Ephorus-based Athenian *Lives* of Cornelius Nepos, a minor writer of the first century B.C., an occasional importance which they would not otherwise have; he covered Thrasybulus, Conon, Iphicrates, Chabrias and Timotheus, in addition to some figures whom Plutarch *did* cover. Nepos’ occasional value is illustrated by *Timotheus* 11.2, which shows that the peace of 375 explicitly recognized Athenian naval hegemony. This amplifies Diod. xv.38.4. See however below p. 176.)

Instead Plutarch followed the altered historiographical fashions of the age he was describing, by moving out to centres of power other than the traditional Athens and Sparta (the *Agesilaus* is, apart from the *Lysander* whose subject died in 395, the only fourth-century Spartan *Life*, though there are clues for the social historian of classical Sparta in the hellenistic *Lives* of *Agis* and *Cleomenes*).<sup>42</sup> Thus we have the *Artaxerxes*, unique in its Persian principal subject; here Plutarch was indebted to Dinon, who may also have lain behind the unique material in Nepos’ *Datames*, another Nepos *Life* to which there is no equivalent in Plutarch;<sup>43</sup> for the revolt of

<sup>40</sup> Jacoby *Komm.* IIIB 532.      <sup>41</sup> e.g. Cawkwell in Perlman 1973 (D 111) 147.

<sup>42</sup> Africa 1961 (B 1).      <sup>43</sup> Thiel 1923 (B 115); Sekunda 1988 (F 59).



Datames see below, p. 84f. On Plutarch's important Sicilian *Lives*, the *Dion* and the *Timoleon*, see briefly above, and below, ch. 13. The *Pelopidas* was not Plutarch's only Theban *Life*, but the other, the *Epaminondas*, is lost. It may survive in epitome form (Paus IX.13ff), though this is not agreed.<sup>44</sup>

Among the works of Plutarch has come down to us the *Lives of the Ten Orators* (*Mor.* 832B–852C). This is surely not by Plutarch himself. And it should be evaluated against the healthy recent tendency to suspect such literary 'biographies' of having been faked, with the writings of the author in question serving as the base.<sup>45</sup> Allowing for that reservation, these lives are usable: they contain a little independent material. They are evidence of a hellenistic desire – shared by the commentators (such as Didymus) to whom we owe a number of our quotations from the *Atthis*, and perhaps also by Diodorus' chronographic source<sup>46</sup> – for the historical means to the understanding of the orators. Oratory is a category of evidence which becomes important only at the end of the fifth century. It is impossible, in the framework of this chapter, to discuss every aspect of fourth-century history which the evidence of the orators illustrates. The canonical 'ten' (the numerical schematism is characteristically hellenistic, cf. the Seven Wonders or the Seven Sages) were as follows: the fifth-century Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Isaeus, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, Hyperides, Dinarchus.

Andocides III, *On the Peace* – that is, the abortive peace negotiations of 392, see p. 106ff – is of cardinal importance for the 390s. The reason is not so much that it brings out a Persian aspect to those negotiations which Xenophon characteristically neglects, but that it reveals (see especially paras. 12–15) the early revival of Athenian imperial ambitions, public and private. The speech is also notable for its reckless mistakes about fairly recent history,<sup>47</sup> in which respect it is far from unique among the products of Attic oratory: we can trace back to Thucydidean speeches the 'invention' of an Athens which never existed outside the orator's head.<sup>48</sup> This kind of thing was bad history but good ideology.

Lysias also, in his political speeches, enables us to make good certain deficiencies in Xenophon. To identify Lysias' own political views (if any) is a slippery matter.<sup>49</sup> He was a *logographos* or writer of speeches for other people; see further below under Demosthenes for this notion. But there are enough damaging accusations in Lysias of involvement with the late fifth-century oligarchies, however little this kind of thing reflects

<sup>44</sup> Tuplin 1984 (B 118).      <sup>45</sup> Lefkowitz 1981 (B 68A).      <sup>46</sup> Hornblower 1984 (B 61).

<sup>47</sup> Meiggs 1972 (C 201) 134; Thompson 1967 (B 117); Missiou 1992 (B 79).

<sup>48</sup> Loraux 1986 (C 190); Nouhaud 1982 (B 89).

<sup>49</sup> Dover 1968 (B 35). On Lysias a commentary by S. Todd is projected; see meanwhile his *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford, 1993).

the orator's own convictions, to belie Xenophon's confidence (*Hell.* II.4.43) that the amnesty after 403 was honoured in fact and in spirit.<sup>50</sup> This tendency is already strongly present in the long and full speech XII *Against Eratosthenes*, the only one in the 'Lysianic corpus' which was certainly written by Lysias and Lysias alone. At 65ff he drags in the political activity of Theramenes, with whom the defendant had been associated but who was by now dead. The interest of the speech – confirmed by a scrap of papyrus which closely echoes, but is not a quotation from, the relevant section of Lysias<sup>51</sup> – is that it is an early (403) example of the frequent and vigorous forensic use of the recent past which Xenophon would have us believe the Athenians had buried. Elsewhere (xxvi.9f) Lysias appeals to anti-oligarchic feeling as late as 382 B.C., and we often find forensic references to the democratic liberation, as at xxviii.12 (early 380s): 'I expect the defendant will not try to justify the charges but will say that he came down from Phyle [see below, p. 36 for the significance of this], that he is a democrat and that he shared in your time of peril.' (Cf. Aeschin. I.173 of 345 B.C.: 'you [the jury] put Socrates the sophist to death, because he was shown to have been the teacher of Critias, one of the Thirty who put down the democracy'. Nothing about strange gods or corrupting the youth. For Socrates' trial see p. 39f.)

Nobody today should be happy about accepting Lysias' political insinuations. But he remains a precious document for the events, attitudes and economic climate of Athens in the early fourth century: xxviii (*Against Ergocles*) illustrates (like Andoc. III) the pertinacity of imperial aspirations at Athens c.390 B.C., but here the subject-matter is deeds not thoughts, the depredations of Thrasybulus at Halicarnassus. The speech *On the Corn Dealers* (xxii) attests financial hardship in the Corinthian War and strikingly illustrates Athens' dependence on, and vulnerability to, private suppliers even for the staples of her diet.<sup>52</sup> A fragment of a speech *Against Theozotides*, which came under the scholarly microscope in 1971 after a portion of the relevant proposal was discovered on stone (*SEG* xxviii 46 = Harding no. 8), nicely attests both Athens' political desire to be generous to the men who had liberated her from the Thirty Tyrants and the plain economic difficulty of doing so. The proposal, which Lysias opposed, probably aimed to restrict the benefits payable to orphans of the 'liberators'. Other speeches illustrate a range of topics, including the social position of women (1); the liturgical

<sup>50</sup> On the amnesty see Loening 1987 (c 188).

<sup>51</sup> Merkelbach and Youtie 1968 (B76); Henrichs 1968 (B 58); Andrewes 1970 (B 6); Sealey 1975 (B 106); *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 495 n. 68.

<sup>52</sup> Seager 1966 (c 249) and Todd 1993 (see above, n. 49) 316–22.

system (xxi; for the system see below, p. 548ff) citizenship (xxiii); and attitudes to lending and borrowing.<sup>53</sup>

The work of undermining the general credibility of the property lawyer Isaeus, as a presenter of fact, was done as long ago as 1904 in what remains one of the very best (and most amusing) commentaries on an ancient author.<sup>54</sup> But in his twelve preserved speeches Isaeus throws out incidentally much Athenian social, prosopographic and economic evidence which there is no reason to reject. He can also, with extreme care, be used as a source on his own speciality, the Athenian law of inheritance and adoption, in particular on the difficult topic of phratries (for which see *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.3, 366ff).<sup>55</sup>

Isocrates,<sup>56</sup> though included in the 'canon' of the Ten, is really a figure apart. It is true that some of his early speeches were forensic productions which were or could have been delivered in the normal way; but his most important writings were polished political tracts of a kind more familiar in the seventeenth century than today (it is not an accident that Milton's *Areopagitica* recalls the title of an essay of Isocrates – who is referred to early on, though not by name. But the conclusions, on government censorship and interference in morals, are the exact opposite.) On some issues, like the career of Timotheus, Isocrates provides facts not otherwise known (xv, the *Antidosis*); and in xiv (the historically unreliable *Plataicus* of 373)<sup>57</sup> and v (see below) he attests the distrust and dislike which Theban pretensions excited at particular moments. And the *Peace* (viii) of 355, just after Athens' failure in the Social War, is an interesting and hostile analysis of the dynamics of imperialism.<sup>58</sup> Equally important is the evidence he provides for the general mood ('panhellenist', less than enthusiastic for radical democracy)<sup>59</sup> of the educated, propertied classes in fourth-century Greece. That – rather than as a topical and effective pamphlet – is how we should read the *Panegyricus* (iv) of 380, which so accurately 'predicts' the formation of the Second Athenian Confederacy a year or so later; or the attempts (of which the most interesting is the *Philippus* (v) of 346, another uncanny 'prediction') to raise a panhellenic war under the command of some leader in the

<sup>53</sup> Theozotides: Stroud 1971 (B 176). For Lysias I see Todd 1993 (see above, n. 49). For Lysias xxiii (early fourth-century) and citizenship see esp. para. 6, the Plataeans gather in the fresh cheese market on the last day of the month, nice corroboration of Thuc. v.32 which implies that the Plataeans remained a separate group at Athens for social purposes at least, despite the citizenship grant attested by Thuc. iii.55, cf. Dem. LIX. 104. On the grant see Osborne 1981-3 (B 165) II 11–16. III/IV 36–7, and Hornblower 1991 (B 62) on Thuc. iii.55, and on the speech generally Todd 1993 (see above, n. 49). For lending and borrowing note the use made of Lysias by Millett 1990 (I 107) 1–4.

<sup>54</sup> Wyse 1904 (B 132A), and see Todd in Cartledge *et al.* 1990 (A 15) 31.

<sup>55</sup> Wevers 1969 (B 130); Isaeus on phratries: Andrewes 1961 (C 90).

<sup>56</sup> Most recently Cawkwell in Luce 1982 (B 29) giving bibliography.

<sup>57</sup> Buckler 1980 (C 330). <sup>58</sup> Davidson 1990 (B 33) 20–36. <sup>59</sup> Finley 1986 (A 18A) 50.

public eye at the time. In that way – by organized colonization – the ‘troubles’ of Greece could be cured (see e.g. v 120). For these ‘troubles’ Isocrates himself provides some of the best evidence, which has duly been exploited; though we must allow, in some of what he says, for the hostility towards new citizens, and the ‘men without a city’ (i.e. mercenaries and the like), felt by the man of property.<sup>60</sup> But Isocrates’ most lasting importance, which falls outside the scope of this chapter, is his contribution to a theory of education as vocational training, *via* practical rhetoric, for the politician. This was a consciously different recipe from that of Plato, with his insistence on the primacy of what we would call philosophy (Isocrates also claimed that word).<sup>61</sup> Like Plato in Sicily (p. 695), Isocrates sought to educate the monarchs of the emergent fourth-century states. His Cypriot ‘orations’, like the *Cyropaedia* (above), are a valuable contribution to that literature on kingly duties whose importance lay in the future: see esp. speeches II and IX (*To Nicocles* and *Evagoras*). But we shall see in a later chapter that, historically, the *Evagoras* in particular is a travesty: ch. 8*d*, p. 316.

Most of the extant writings of the remaining five of the ‘Ten’ fall within the period of Philip and Alexander, to which we may now turn. But first, we should note the importance to the social and economic historian of the so-called ‘private’ speeches of Demosthenes. (The Demosthenic authorship of some of them is doubtful, and others are certainly *not* by him but by Apollodorus; but in this area of research that does not matter provided the speeches are authentically fourth-century – which they are.) They illustrate (e.g.) deme affairs (LVII);<sup>62</sup> the financing of shipping ventures, and other commercial matters including mining,<sup>63</sup> on all of which see further ch. 10 below; the role of women in Athens (LIX, by Apollodorus)<sup>64</sup>; the organization of the navy (XLVII, XLIX, L, LI); and the liturgical system generally, including the organization of festivals (XXI)<sup>65</sup>. Speech L (*Against Polycles*), actually by Apollodorus, demonstrates the difficulty of separating the study of political and of ‘private’ speeches: it is a valuable source of information on events in the north Aegean in the later 360s. This in turn (it has been suggested)<sup>66</sup> provides reason for discounting its value as evidence for the weaknesses of normal Athenian naval arrangements: this was an exceptionally disturbed time (see below, ch. 7, p. 203).

As to the political speeches of Demosthenes, who (with Aeschines) is the most important orator not so far considered, no account and critique

<sup>60</sup> Fuks 1984 (C 23) esp. 52–79; McKechnie 1989 (I 100); Davidson 1990 (B 33) 34–5 for new citizens. <sup>61</sup> Jaeger 1944 (H 66) III 49. <sup>62</sup> Whitehead 1986 (C 268) *passim*.

<sup>63</sup> Isager and Hansen 1975 (C 176). For mining see esp. Dem. xxxvii.

<sup>64</sup> Fisher 1976 (C 136) 128–44. For Apollodorus see now J. Trevett, *Apollodoros the Son of Pasion* (Oxford, 1992). <sup>65</sup> MacDowell 1990 (B 68B). <sup>66</sup> Cawkwell 1984 (C 114).

of individual speeches can be attempted here. The narrative of chs. 14 and 15, below, inevitably draws on them extensively, and the events and policies there discussed are often those which Demosthenes himself describes, urges, or criticizes:<sup>67</sup> he is, to a degree quite unlike Lysias and the others, part of the political history for which his writings are evidence (but see below for the risk of exaggerating that part). Instead some general points may be made.

First, there is a difficulty already alluded to under Lysias, above: a few of the earlier 'political' speeches of Demosthenes were written for somebody else, as a *logographos* or speech-writer. (For instance, xxii *Against Androtion*.) This means that the problem of sincerity (not wholly absent even where Demosthenes speaks in his own person) is specially acute.

Second, a speech like xxiii (*Against Aristocrates*), shows that it may be crude and anachronistic to speak of the 'date' and of the 'publication' of a Demosthenic speech. That speech endorses a view of Athens' northern interests which would be surprising, if not untenable, if really expressed at or after the latest date implied by events mentioned in the speech. More probably different parts were 'thought' at different times.<sup>68</sup> As for ancient 'publication', this was so haphazard and uncontrollable by the author that it has been suggested we should almost always avoid the word.<sup>69</sup>

Not only the effectiveness but the basic veracity of Demosthenes, especially in his literary masterpiece *On the Crown* (xviii), have been denied: 'historical judgment need not follow what he said of himself and his opponents'.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand some explanation is required for Demosthenes' increasing effectiveness after 346; it has been sought in his powerful but essentially emotive appeals to honour and tradition<sup>71</sup> – in fact, to the 'invented' city of ideology rather than of history. As to veracity, it has been countered – not wholly convincingly – that 'an adviser of the people who told lies repeatedly about contemporary or recent happenings, lies which could be contradicted instantly by other speakers and which would be shown up as lies very soon by the actual course of events, was not one to win the people's confidence decisively and permanently'.<sup>72</sup> As Demosthenes eventually did.

Finally, there is the related problem of proportion and balance. We face a risk, easier to recognize than to avoid, of writing the history of the period in terms of Demosthenes and Athens. It is comparable to the risk

<sup>67</sup> Schaefer 1885–7 (C 71); Pickard-Cambridge 1914 (C 222); Jaeger 1938 (C 177); Perlman 1973 (D 111); Wankel 1976 (B 122A) on Dem. xviii. <sup>68</sup> Hornblower 1983 (A 31) 249 and n. 16.

<sup>69</sup> Dover 1968 (B 35).

<sup>70</sup> Cawkwell 1978 (D 73) 19, quoted with approval by Finley 1985 (A 18) 19, cf. Cawkwell 1979 (B 28) 216 on Wankel 1976 (B 122A). <sup>71</sup> Montgomery 1983 (B 87).

<sup>72</sup> Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979 (D 50) 476.

of equating the history of the late Roman Republic with the career of Cicero. Our evidence for Philip's reign is skewed and will remain so unless the state of the other sources, to which we may now turn, were to change miraculously.

It is doubtful whether any such miracle would be performed by the discovery on papyrus of a complete text of the *Philippic Histories* of Theopompus of Chios (*FGrH* 115). Too wayward and malicious to have appealed to Diodorus, this account (like its author's *Hellenica*, covering 411–394) is known to us only from fragments i.e. quotations, and from epitomated extracts, not from any of the surviving general histories (unless it underlies Justin's occasionally useful epitome of the *Philippica* of the first-century B.C. writer Trogus.<sup>73</sup> Justin himself lived in perhaps the fourth century A.D., see below, ch. 5 n. 2.) The spicy and intelligent Theopompus (for whom see also *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 9) has often, perhaps unjustly, had a bad press, both in antiquity and now.<sup>74</sup> His interests were broad, taking in satraps, Zoroastrians and Etruscans; but the title of the *Philippica* reflects his firm and historiographically important decision explicitly to centre his history on the personality of the king. How he handled that personality is a controversial question. Theopompus' claim that Philip was a 'phenomenon such as Europe never bore' can be interpreted (n. 74) as an ironic introduction to an account whose subject would be depicted as conspicuous for his vices not his virtues. But the Polybian context (VIII.11 = Theopompus F 27) suggests, not least with its talk of *arete*, virtue, that Theopompus' account was indeed troublingly inconsistent.<sup>75</sup>

If Diodorus did not go to Theopompus for Philip, whom did he use? The question is one of the hardest problems in all Diodoran study.<sup>76</sup> Ephorus was available to Diodorus till 341/0, the date of the siege of Perinthus (τ 10 = Diod. XVI. 76), and Diodorus surely used him as far as he could. But Ephorus had not treated one major episode, the Third Sacred War of 355–346; this was finished by his son Demophilus (Ephorus τ 9). Now that the idea that there is a massive 'doublet' in Diodorus' account has definitely been disproved,<sup>77</sup> we need look no further than Demophilus for the origin of XVI.23–40 and 56–64. Demophilus' work was no doubt appended, in the most literal, physical, sense, to copies of Ephorus. This would have made Diodorus' job easy. For 340–336 B.C. the problem is greater. Rather than postulating the early hellenistic Diyllus (*FGrH* 73), which is like postulating 'x' because we know so

<sup>73</sup> Momigliano 1969 (B 81).

<sup>74</sup> Lane Fox 1986 (B 65); Connor 1967 (B 31); Shrimpton 1991 (B 109).

<sup>75</sup> Walbank 1957–1979 (B 122) 11 on Polyb. *loc. cit.*

<sup>76</sup> Momigliano 1975 (B 83) 707ff; Kebric 1977 (B 63).

<sup>77</sup> Hammond 1937 (B 55), cf. 1937–8 (B 56) and Ehrhardt 1961 (C 20).

little about him, it is better to say 'x' frankly.<sup>78</sup> We might even suppose that the interest in oratory shown in these chapters points not to Diyllus but to Diodorus himself – as do the frequent historical mistakes.<sup>79</sup>

A wariness of Theopompus' imbalance has been invoked to explain why Plutarch wrote no *Life* of Philip.<sup>80</sup> A *Philip* paired with the *Caesar*, followed by an *Alexander* paired with an *Augustus*, would have had its attractions. (The assassinated father, his eastern conquests a mere project, leaves the empire to be founded by the son.) But it seems that the pull of the parallelism between Caesar and Alexander was too strong;<sup>81</sup> in any case Augustus was the subject of a lost *Life* in a different Plutarchan series, the *Lives of the Caesars*. Besides, Augustus was on record, elsewhere in Plutarch himself, as saying rather stuffily that Alexander should have spent less time conquering places and more on administering them (*Mor.* 207C–D).

The important surviving sources for Alexander's own reign share a curious feature for which there is no single good explanation: they date from periods between 300 years and half a millennium after Alexander's own time. (But Alexander's contemporaries Demosthenes and Aeschines<sup>82</sup> continue to be relevant for Athenian aspects, as are Lycurgus, Hyperides and Dinarchus.)<sup>83</sup>

The special feature just noted creates special problems: so long a gap between the recorder and the events recorded was bound to be an obstacle, even in antiquity, not only to interpretation but to knowledge. To a large extent the study of Alexander is the study of the literary sources, and modern disagreement centres on the competence and good faith which they brought to the job of bridging the gap in time. It should be said straight away that relevant inscriptions<sup>84</sup> are few and that coins and archaeology do not help much.<sup>85</sup>

The essential narrative is the *Anabasis* of Alexander, by the second-century A.D. Romanized Greek, Arrian of Nicomedia.<sup>86</sup> He belonged to the intense period of literary activity ('renaissance' is too strong a word) known as the Second Sophistic. Thanks to a recent renewal of interest in this period, Arrian can be better placed in his setting as a Roman provincial governor and literary man, in an age when the educated upper classes were unusually absorbed by the culture and history of the past.<sup>87</sup>

<sup>78</sup> For Diyllus (*FGrH* 73) see Hammond 1983 (B 57) with Hornblower 1984 (B 61); Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) 27; Schwartz 1957 (B 104) 64–5. <sup>79</sup> Hornblower 1984 (B 61).

<sup>80</sup> Lane Fox 1986 (B 65). <sup>81</sup> Green 1978 (D 181).

<sup>82</sup> On Aeschines see the works at n. 67 above and on Aeschin. I add Dover 1978 (I 31) and N. Fisher, forthcoming commentary (Oxford).

<sup>83</sup> For Lycurgus see Humphreys 1985 (C 175).

<sup>84</sup> Tod 1948 (B 179), Heisserer 1980 (B 143).

<sup>85</sup> Bellinger 1963 (B 187). <sup>86</sup> Stadter 1980 (B 110), Bosworth 1980 (B 14).

<sup>87</sup> Bowie 1974 (B 17), Vidal-Naquet 1984 (B 120).

Arrian's own aim was literary renown: see *Anab.* 1.12, where he hopes to be Homer to Alexander's Achilles, but Xenophon was another conscious model.<sup>88</sup> In all this he reflects the values and fashions of his time, so it is to his credit that he was not satisfied by stylistic pretensions alone but explicitly sought out those previous authorities he considered to be *truthful* (Arr. *Anab.*, preface). But often Arrian either did not understand, or bother to record correctly or fully, the technical and prosopographical material which his sources gave.<sup>89</sup>

The chief of those authorities were Ptolemy, the first of a long line of hellenistic kings of Egypt; and Aristobulus of Cassandrea (*FGrH* 138, 139). Earlier in the present century an exaggerated, Thucydidean stature was claimed for Ptolemy's history. A reaction was inevitable, and he has been charged more recently with subtle bias (against his political rivals) and self-magnification – so 'subtle' in fact that there has been a slight counter-reaction. Aristobulus' picture of Alexander undoubtedly tended to flattery.<sup>90</sup> But behind both Ptolemy and Aristobulus lay the commissioned account of Callisthenes, a writer we have discussed already. Criticized in antiquity for encouraging Alexander's too exalted view of himself, he fell foul of the king on this very issue and was executed, as will be described in a later chapter (p. 825f). His *Deeds of Alexander* did not go beyond perhaps 331 but may have dropped hints about events of 330 and 329.<sup>91</sup>

Ptolemy and Aristobulus are often called the 'main sources' of Arrian, as opposed to the 'vulgate'. This is the modern term for the other chief literary tradition about Alexander. It was known to Arrian and is sometimes given by him, flagged in various ways such as *legetai*, 'it is said'; unfortunately Arrian is capricious and such formulae can sometimes introduce 'main source' items.<sup>92</sup> There is general agreement that the 'vulgate' goes back to the early hellenistic Cleitarchus of Alexandria,<sup>93</sup> although Arrian oddly does not cite this man directly for any 'vulgate' item. Over-confident attempts have been made to characterize Cleitarchus' history, which is the chief and probably single source (see above, p. 9) for Diodorus book xvii (see e.g. *FGrH* 137 F 11 ~ Diod. xvii. 72); also for Curtius Rufus' account.<sup>94</sup> It was certainly more

<sup>88</sup> Bosworth 1980 (B 14) intro. 36 (guarded). <sup>89</sup> Brunt 1976–83 (B 21) 483–90, 509–17.

<sup>90</sup> Ptolemy: Phase 1 of modern scholarship: Strasburger 1982 (A 57) 83–147 (originally 1934); Kornemann 1935 (B 64). Phase 2 (reaction): Welles 1963 (B 124), but note protests by Fraser 1967 (D 175), Seibert 1969 (B 108); Errington 1969 (B 38). Phase 3 (counter-reaction): Roisman 1984 (B 97); Brunt 1976–83 (B 21) II 510: 'to be effective, obloquy has to be laid on more heavily'. Aristobulus: Brunt 1974 (B 20A), not refuted by Pédech 1984 (B 93). Generally on the lost historians: Schwartz 1957 (B 104); Jacoby 1956 (B 62A); Wirth 1985 (D 249); Pearson 1960 (B 90); Pédech 1984 (B 93).

<sup>91</sup> Parke 1985 (D 218) 63 on the problem of Callisthenes' terminus.

<sup>92</sup> Brunt 1976–83 (B 21) II 553.

<sup>93</sup> Schwartz 1957 (B 194); Jacoby 1956 (B 62A); Pearson 1960 (B 90).

<sup>94</sup> Goukowsky 1978–81 (B 45) with Fraser 1980–4 (B 41). See Atkinson 1980 (B 8) for Curtius Rufus.



sensational, romantic and fanciful (or rather, fanciful in more obvious ways) than the 'main sources'; but we have recently been reminded that Diodorus reduced to a single book a Cleitarchan original which ran to at least a dozen; our knowledge of that original is therefore certainly very imperfect.<sup>95</sup> We should also remember that all the sources, main and vulgate, must have used or at least been aware of *Callisthenes'* account until its terminal point, whenever that is taken to be.

In his *Indike* (see below, p. 838) Arrian drew on Nearchus the Cretan, (*FGrH* 133) who in modern times has been said, a little unfairly, to illustrate the Greek proverb 'All Cretans are liars.'<sup>96</sup>

Most of the above 'primary' sources, and some others like Chares of Mytilene (*FGrH* 125), were used by Plutarch in his long and extremely valuable *Life of Alexander*.<sup>97</sup>

A final surviving source is an attractive and very readable work in seventeen books, the *Geography* of Strabo (late Augustan period, that is, the very first years of the Christian era). We have already (p. 11) met Strabo as a source for the Theban hegemony: here he surely drew on Ephorus and so perhaps ultimately on Callisthenes. Strabo is also useful on fourth-century Peloponnesian topics, for instance his book VIII describes (384–385) the events surrounding the great earthquake which destroyed Achaean Helice in 373 B.C.; Strabo's source for this was the fourth-century Heraclides of Pontus.<sup>98</sup> There was also an Anatolian aspect to this complicated episode: the Ionian League became involved. This is a reminder that Strabo is sometimes of the utmost value to us on Asia Minor topics, cf. ch. 8*a*, p. 220 below on Cappadocia. But Strabo becomes most obviously valuable for fourth-century history when he deals with Alexander. Strabo drew on the more ethnographically minded of the Alexander-historians, especially Aristobulus, for his account of the eastern territories conquered by Alexander. Strabo also used the early hellenistic writer Megasthenes for India. Where Arrian and Strabo can be compared, as (a nice example) over their reproduction of Megasthenes' description of the capture and taming of elephants, each of the two later writers turns out to have his virtues and his weaknesses.<sup>99</sup> Strabo seems to précis his sources more efficiently than does Arrian, and is less prone to indulge in merely literary elaboration. On the other hand Strabo abbreviates his sources more severely, and this can result in loss not just of detail but of clarity. Behind Strabo lies the great lost work of Eratosthenes of Cyrene (third century B.C.), who addressed his conservative but original mind to the new horizons opened by Alexander's eastern acquisitions;<sup>100</sup> that was in his third and final book.

<sup>95</sup> Brunt 1980 (B 22).

<sup>96</sup> Badian 1975 (B 9); Brunt 1976–83 (B 21) II; Bosworth 1988 (B 16).

<sup>97</sup> Hamilton 1969 (B 54).

<sup>98</sup> Baladié 1980 (B 10) 145–63.

<sup>99</sup> Bosworth 1988 (B 15) 40–60.

<sup>100</sup> Fraser 1972 (A 21) 525–39.

Eratosthenes, however, neglected Italy and Sicily, no doubt because Alexander went in the opposite direction (merely 'raiding a harem', as his kinsman and contemporary Alexander of Epirus, who did invade Italy, wittingly put it). Slightly, but only slightly, more interest in the West was shown by Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus of Eresus, alleged by Pliny to have been the first person to write about Rome (*HN* III.57 = *FGrH* 840 F 24a).<sup>101</sup> A systematic treatment of the west had to wait for Timaeus (above, p. 9); Theophrastus probably did no more than draw on the unsystematic knowledge of western ethnography which had been accumulated by the Aristotelian school. Theophrastus' botanical material about the East is, by contrast, of great importance. But he, like Eratosthenes, simply used earlier writers like Androsthenes of Thasos, whom Alexander had sent to sail round the Arabian peninsula and who later wrote up his experiences (*FGrH* 711). The more ambitious view prevalent earlier in the present century, that Alexander was accompanied by a corps of scientists who systematically transmitted information back to Greece, and thus eventually to researchers like Theophrastus, is implausible: Strabo II.1.6 (= *FGrH* 712 F 1) was the main specific evidence, and is too vague. But the material which Androsthenes bequeathed to Theophrastus and Strabo is of great interest to us, because it featured (FF 2–5) the islands of Bahrain (Tylos) and Failaka (Icarus), now known from inscriptions to have been the sites of Seleucid and perhaps earlier occupation: see below, p. 843f and *SEG* xxxv 1476 and xxxviii 1547–8.

Finally, some categories of evidence which are relevant throughout the period. First, comedy. The fourth century down to 321 is the age of Middle Comedy; the last plays of Aristophanes belong to this (somewhat artificially named) category. They are the *Ecclesiazusae*, of 392, a valuable source for students of Athenian democracy, and the *Plutus* of 388.<sup>102</sup> Direct political allusions are still found in the latter, so there is some continuity with Old Comedy (cf. below, p. 66 for an example, the alliance with Egypt); though there is less obscenity. Middle Comedy resembles both Old and New in what it offers for the social historian – for instance in the remarkable scene (*Plut.* 659ff) which gives an idea what it was like to spend a night of 'incubation' in a Greek sanctuary. Other Middle Comedists (e.g. Eubulus) survive only in fragments. Otherwise, the fourth century is an age of prose.

The *Politics* of Aristotle is a work of fundamental importance for the understanding of the Greece of the fourth century even more than of the

<sup>101</sup> Fraser 1972 (A 21) 763–5 and forthcoming in Hornblower (ed.) *Greek Historiography* (Oxford). Note also the extensive use made of Theophrastus for Greek agriculture in ch. 12d below.

<sup>102</sup> Dover 1972 (B 36).

fifth (see ch. 11 below). A good up-to-date commentary is badly needed.<sup>103</sup> For the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* or *Constitution of the Athenians* see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 10–11.

For the fourth century in general (we have seen that the reign of Alexander is an exception), inscriptions are a rich source of evidence for the historian.<sup>104</sup> They are not so numerous as in the hellenistic age, but areas like Asia Minor start to be epigraphically significant in the fourth century. As more places caught the ‘epigraphic habit’,<sup>105</sup> which Attica never lost, it becomes increasingly possible to illustrate, via inscriptions, such topics as hellenization and social and religious life.<sup>106</sup> And inscriptions help to correct the bias in our literary sources towards the main centres like Athens; this is a bias by which ancient historians nowadays are rightly worried.<sup>107</sup> But in view of the gaps in authors such as Xenophon (above), inscriptions like the so-called Charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy (Tod no. 123 = Harding no. 35) can also inform us about central political topics which the literary sources neglect or under-report. The chapters which follow draw too frequently on epigraphic evidence to make necessary more than these brief remarks, and the same is true of the evidence of coinage.<sup>108</sup> Documentary papyri are scarcely significant in this period: the earliest known example was discovered a few years ago. It dates from Alexander’s time and is a notice in the name of Peucestas son of Macartatus (known from Arr. *Anab.* III. 5. 5), putting a temple out of bounds to private soldiers: Turner 1974 (F 542). Peucestas’ scrap of papyrus takes us from the age covered by this volume to the hellenistic world where such evidence will be so abundant.

<sup>103</sup> Huxley 1979 (H 62). W. Newman’s edn of 1887 (H 88) is useful despite its age.

<sup>104</sup> Tod 1948 (B 179); Harding 1985 (A 29) for translations, bibliog. and nn.

<sup>105</sup> Macmullen 1982 (B 70).

<sup>106</sup> See e.g. Fisher 1976 (C 136) for social life; Rice and Stambaugh 1979 (H 97) for religion, including deme calendars.

<sup>107</sup> Gehrke 1986 (C 28); Finley 1985 (A 18).

<sup>108</sup> Kraay 1976 (B 200).

CHAPTER 2  
SPARTA AS VICTOR

D. M. LEWIS

I. THE LEADER OF GREECE

The Greek world had long been accustomed to a situation in which there had been two sources of power, Athens and Sparta. The disappearance of Athenian power left the determination of the future to Sparta. Theoretically, the future was clear. The Spartans and their allies had fought the Peloponnesian War for the freedom of Greece<sup>1</sup> and the day on which Lysander sailed into the Piraeus and the demolition of Athens' Long Walls began was seen as the beginning of that freedom (Xen. *Hell.* II.2.24). However, the course of the war had inevitably shaped attitudes and aspirations. The simple hope of 431 that all would be well if Athens allowed her allies autonomy had become infinitely complex. It was not only that Sparta had made commitments to Persia which substantially modified the freedom of the Greeks of Asia Minor.<sup>2</sup> The course of the war had produced political changes in many cities which were not easily reversible, and at Sparta itself the effect of success and growing power was to produce a taste for their continuance.<sup>3</sup>

Sparta had serious disqualifications for the role of a leading power, even more for that of an imperial power. Her full citizen population was not more than a few thousand and seems to have been in continuing decline.<sup>4</sup> By the time of the Peloponnesian War, she was already using perioecic hoplites alongside full citizens, and from 424 onwards we find increasing use of freed helots, a group rapidly institutionalized under the name of *neodamodeis* (new members of the *demos*).

The traditional training of these citizens was purely military and calculated to produce obedience and conformity rather than independence of thought and enterprise.<sup>5</sup> Convention had even forbidden the

<sup>1</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 65–7.

<sup>2</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 122–5 argues that by the “Treaty of Boiotios” of 408, the autonomy of the Greeks of Asia Minor was guaranteed provided they paid tribute to Persia. Tuplin 1987 (A 60) prefers the traditional view by which they were simply handed over to the King.

<sup>3</sup> For discussion of the ways in which the war had changed Sparta, see Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 34–54. <sup>4</sup> Contrasting views in Cawkwell 1983 (C 286), Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 37–43.

<sup>5</sup> Finley 1973 (C 290).

employment of men of military age outside the city (Thuc. iv. 132.3). Under war conditions many Spartans had in fact seen a wider world and been faced with untraditional situations. Some of them had no doubt learned how to deal with non-Spartans; others were perpetuating a stereotype, created by Pausanias the Regent in the 470s, by which a Spartan outside the restraints of his own system found himself unable to observe the conventions of others or create new ones of his own. Thucydides (i. 77.6, cf. 76.1) represented an Athenian embassy at Sparta in 432 as predicting the likely failure of Sparta as an imperial power for this reason.

During the war, some Spartans had surmounted these disadvantages. Brasidas, besides being a good soldier, had won the trust of allies as well, and had created a store of goodwill on which his successors could draw (Thuc. iv. 81). Lysander had won the confidence not only of Greeks but of Cyrus the Persian. His success in this had made him the principal architect of victory without winning a major fought-out battle. But the success of individuals placed new stresses on the Spartan system, which had little place for successful individuals who were not kings. Brasidas had had difficulties with the home government, when pursuing different aims from it (Thuc. iv. 108.7). The return of Lysander to command after he had already had one year of office as admiral had required a legal fiction to avoid a breach of constitutional convention (Xen. *Hell.* II. 1.7). Already more prominent in the Greek world than any Spartan since Pausanias, who had at least been regent, his continued employment would pose problems for which there was no precedent. At Athens, on the other hand, continued re-election to the generalship had never constituted a difficulty; experience could be built up and used.

At Sparta, in normal circumstances, continuous periods of employment were reserved for the hereditary kings. In 404 Agis had been king for twenty-three years. He had had his difficulties with public opinion, notably in 418 (see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 438), but he had come through them. Based at Decelea since 413, he had had a longer independent position (Thuc. VIII. 5.3) than any Spartan before him. He should have learnt a lot, had made no obvious mistakes, and had made a major contribution to wearing Athens down. But he was at least in his late fifties (Xen. *Hell.* III. 3.1) and might not have much more to contribute. His colleague Pausanias was just over forty.<sup>6</sup> He had only been king in his own right for four years, though he had been king throughout his childhood and youth during the long exile of his father Plistoanax. When he led the main Spartan and Peloponnesian army to Athens in 405 (Xen. *Hell.* II. 2.7), it may have been his first time in the field. Plistoanax had not been much employed even after his return from exile, and we may guess that,

<sup>6</sup> Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) 1.2, 178.



Map 2. Attica and the Peloponnese.

in so far as Spartans had had a choice of attaching themselves to one royal house or the other (*Xen. Hell.* v.4.32), they had preferred Agis.

The importance of the kings when not actually in the field was a matter of prestige and influence rather than of their powers.<sup>7</sup> The normal centre of policy making was a smallish group. Though others may have participated, its institutional core lay in the *gerousia*, a body of twenty-eight men over sixty appointed for life, and the five annually elected ephors. Taking a lead and giving executive orders rested with the

<sup>7</sup> On the institutional bases of Spartan policy, see in general Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 116–38.

ephors, but the *gerousia* was of substantial importance, not least because of its role in political trials.<sup>8</sup> We have little material about the composition of these bodies, except the suspicion that there were some families more likely to be elected to the *gerousia* than others and a statement (Arist. *Pol.* 1270b8–10) that ephors might be very poor. By 404 the attitudes of all will have been shaped in varying degrees by the war; how far practical experience was a necessary qualification for office or influence is unknown. What the central group could do was to send out advisers to commanders overseas or more temporary missions of inspection. Both practices are frequently found, and will have contributed to educating those at home who really took decisions.

Inside the central group, disagreements are sometimes visible. They could be finally resolved by the assembly, otherwise confined to elections, but it only had the power to accept or reject motions put to it.<sup>9</sup> The larger body was perhaps more likely to be moved by more general, more idealistic, considerations than the central group.<sup>10</sup> There have been attempts to analyse Spartan politics in terms of parties,<sup>11</sup> and there were surely groupings, most obviously those of ‘friends’ of one king or the other. They should not be thought to be always relevant; we have many occasions when policy and action are simply attributed to ‘the Spartans’ and we have no reason to assume that they were anything but unanimous.<sup>12</sup> When there were disagreements, there may have been a strong element of personalities as well as policies involved.

By 404, Sparta’s involvement with the outside world had gone too far for the survival of any feeling that her activities should be confined to the Peloponnese, except perhaps in the minds of theorists who regretted a supposed past when Spartans were uncorrupted by outside influences and lived by the laws of Lycurgus.<sup>13</sup> The alliance with Persia had finally proved its worth, and an anti-Persian panhellenism, expressed as late as 406 by the admiral Callicratidas (Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.7) was temporarily quiescent. That it was capable of revival emerges from the reason given by the Spartans (Xen. *Hell.* 11.2.20) for not destroying Athens in 404; they would not enslave a Hellenic city which had done great good to Hellas in the greatest dangers. But for the moment the arrangements with Persia stood. Wherever else Sparta might maintain or extend her

<sup>8</sup> Andrewes 1966 (C 274); de Ste Croix 1972 (C 68) 132–6; Lewis 1977 (A 33) 36.

<sup>9</sup> Andrewes 1966 (C 274) argued against Aristotle for the importance of the assembly. de Ste Croix 1972 (C 68) 126–31 doubted it. Lewis 1977 (A 33) 36–9 adopted an intermediate position (but would no longer argue from Thuc. vi.88–93 that the assembly did have powers of amendment).

<sup>10</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 111–12.

<sup>11</sup> For this period, Hamilton 1970 and 1979 (C 293–4), David 1981 (C 289) 5–42.

<sup>12</sup> Thompson 1973 (C 319).

<sup>13</sup> For the attraction which this concept had outside Sparta see Ollier 1933–45 (C 304); Tigerstedt 1965–74 (C 320); Rawson 1969 (C 310).

influence, the Greeks of Asia Minor had been in some sense abandoned.<sup>14</sup> The more limited watchword was autonomy,<sup>15</sup> promised to all Greek states from the beginning of the war and frequently (e.g. Thuc. iv.88.1) reaffirmed. Pericles had commented (Thuc. i.144.2, cf.19) that the kind of autonomy that Sparta had allowed her Peloponnesian allies was one which suited her, and the event would show the word was capable of considerable manipulation.

Despite her limited citizen numbers, it seemed that there would be no immediate constraint on Sparta's ability to raise as much infantry as she might need for her policies from her allies and from mercenaries. The fleet which had won Aegospotami was still in being and of relatively new construction. But mercenary troops and rowers would need financing. For the moment, there were reserves. Lysander handed over the remains of what he had been given by Cyrus (470 talents according to Xen. *Hell.* II.3.8, 1,500 according to Diod. XIII.106.8).<sup>16</sup> Future income was another matter. How far the traditional haphazard nature of Spartan finance<sup>17</sup> had been improved under war conditions is uncertain; the allies who had been won from Athens had made or had been expected to make their contributions (e.g. Thuc. VIII.36.1, 44.4, 45.5), but we have as yet no sign of regular payments and some of the richest would now be paying tribute to Persia.

One possible weakness in the Spartan position remained. Although no trace of concern about her large helot and subject population (see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 430) is reported after 421 and the threat of the Messenian base at Pylos had been removed in 410 (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 486), it was always possible that trouble might recur.<sup>18</sup>

One point about the future had already been settled. It had already been agreed that Athens as a city would survive in some form. What would happen to her former subjects was less clear. The arrangements with Persia meant that Sparta would not succeed to Athens' position on the Asiatic mainland, but, at the time of the fall of Athens, Darius II was dead or dying<sup>19</sup> and the future position of Sparta's friend Cyrus was still uncertain. As possible compensation, Sparta as a land-power might consider expansion of her influence on the Greek mainland to the north.

There is little trace of any Spartan thought for her traditional allies who had fought the war with her. Those of their representatives who

<sup>14</sup> See note 2.

<sup>15</sup> Despite Ostwald 1982 (c 55), it is not impossible that the concept originated in the Peloponnese. <sup>16</sup> David 1979/80 (c 288).

<sup>17</sup> Although Lewis' attempt to downdate the random contributions of M-L no. 67 to 396 (see the commentary there) is supported by Jeffery 1988 (B 145), a new fragment (Matthaiou and Pikoulas 1989 (B 154)) makes a date between 430 and 416 highly probable.

<sup>18</sup> On Sparta's internal structure, see in general Cartledge 1987 (c 284) 160–79.

<sup>19</sup> See p. 238.



had asked for the destruction of Athens had been overruled. Nothing was done to rebuild the shattered remains of Corinthian influence in the north west, a matter so prominent before and during the Archidamian War, and the plans for northern Greece, so far as we can see them, took no account of what Boeotians might think. What was more evident was a feeling that the opportunity had come to settle some old scores; a grudge against Elis in particular (see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 437) still festered.

Whatever thinking was going on elsewhere, it was for the moment Lysander who commanded the fleet and could shape policy by action.<sup>20</sup> Samos still held out against Sparta, maintaining her loyalty to Athens (cf. M–L no. 94) even after Athens' fall, well into the summer of 404. Eventually, she capitulated (Xen. *Hell.* II.3.6–7). The free inhabitants were allowed to leave with what they stood up in and nothing else (cf. Thuc. II.70.3),<sup>21</sup> and Lysander restored the city and everything in it to 'the former citizens', that is, to those expelled by successive revolutions; these would be controlled by a board of ten magistrates, presumably one of the decarchies to which we have frequent references, and a Spartan harmost, Thorax, who had been serving with the fleet for at least two years (Diod. XIV.3.5; Poralla 1913 (C 307) s.v.).<sup>22</sup>

Samos is not only the only place where we actually see a decarchy being appointed;<sup>23</sup> it gives us the most striking example of gratitude to Lysander. Other cities might set up his statue (e.g. Ephesus, Paus. VI.3.15). At Samos those whom he had restored after the bloodbaths of the preceding period not only set up his statue at Olympia (*ibid.*), but gave him honours normally reserved for the gods, an altar and the singing of a paean, and renamed the festival of Hera the Lysandreia.<sup>24</sup> Nothing like this had ever happened before in the Greek world, though Brasidas had been posthumously converted into the founding hero of Amphipolis (Thuc. V.11.1; *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 430).

From Samos Lysander was summoned back to Athens, where there was turmoil.<sup>25</sup> The peace settlement had dictated nothing about the political future there. Although the *Athenaion Politeia* (34.3) reports that

<sup>20</sup> For Lysander, see Lotze 1964 (C 301); Andrewes 1971 (C 275); Bommelaer 1981 (C 279); Cartledge 1987 (C 284) *passim*.

<sup>21</sup> At some stage in the next year they were at Ephesus and Notium (Tod no. 97 = Harding no. 5, lines 8–9).

<sup>22</sup> For the settlement of Samos, see Shipley 1987 (C 382) 131–4, who doubts whether the entire citizen population was expelled.

<sup>23</sup> Nep. *Lys.* 2 is probably evidence for adding Thasos.

<sup>24</sup> Duris *FGrH* 76 F 26, 71, confirmed for the last detail by a statue-base (Homann-Wedeking 1965 (J 19) 440). See Habicht 1970 (A 26) 3–6; de Ste Croix 1981 (C 70) 74; Badian 1981 (D 141) 33–8 (arguing that the Samian honours were posthumous); Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 82–6.

<sup>25</sup> For Athens in 404/3, Hignett 1952 (C 174) is still a useful guide, though more ready to detect prejudice in Diodorus and *Ath. Pol.* than in Lysias. See also Rhodes 1981 (B 94) 415–81; Krentz 1982 (C 182); Ostwald 1986 (C 214) 460–96.

it had contained the condition that Athens should be governed by the 'ancestral constitution' (*πάτριος πολιτεία*), it surely only contained a phrase, conventional in Peloponnesian treaties, that the Athenians could follow their traditional constitution (*πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*).<sup>26</sup> That was enough, however, to provoke dispute between traditional democrats, survivors of 411 (see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 474–81) who favoured a more restrictive franchise, and others, including exiles who had returned under the peace-treaty, who favoured extreme oligarchy. The democrats were fighting a losing battle. To follow an account written from their point of view (*Lysias XIII*), Cleophon, the most prominent demagogue of the last years of the war, had been judicially disposed of even before the peace, and a loyal group of generals and taxiarchs were already under arrest for a suspected coup.

Lysander sailed in with a hundred ships and enforced a solution, claiming that the Athenians were already in breach of the treaty through their slowness in pulling down the walls. On the proposal of Theramenes,<sup>27</sup> a body of thirty was appointed to draft new laws for the government of Athens (*Xen. Hell.* II.3.11, *Diod.* XIV.4.1).<sup>28</sup> That would at any rate ensure that democracy would not remain unaltered. Though the detail is not clear, the Thirty would enjoy executive power as well, and they proceeded to appoint magistrates and a council for the year 404/3 (*Xen. loc. cit.*, *Ath. Pol.* 35.1). What they did with the executive power has made more impression on the sources than their primary function. Having settled the matter for the moment, Lysander finally sailed home in triumph.

Lysander, therefore, in both Athens and Samos, had imposed a regime which he thought reliable; there is no difficulty in thinking of the Thirty as a larger decarchy for a larger state. These cities had finally been the core of the Athenian empire, and one might wonder whether they were thought of as needing special solutions, but they could be held to fit into an already predetermined personal plan, described in Plutarch's *Lysander*. In his first nauarchy of 407, he had formed personal followings, which were the origin of the later decarchies (4.5), and the implementation of the policy came in between Aegospotami and the fall of Athens (13.5–9), with a systematic liquidation of democracies and other consti-

<sup>26</sup> Fuks 1953 (C 138) 60–1, Rhodes 1981 (B 94) 427; against, McCoy 1975 (C 191).

<sup>27</sup> It is clear that *Lys.* XII.74–6 takes priority over *Diod.* XIV.3.5–7 on this point. For a compromise position by which Theramenes spoke twice, once against and once for oligarchy, see Salmon 1969 (C 247), accepted by McCoy 1975 (C 191) 142–4; Krentz 1982 (C 182) 49 n. 21; Ostwald 1986 (C 214) 476–7. It is preferable to stress the drafting character of the Thirty's appointment (see next note).

<sup>28</sup> Krentz 1982 (C 182) 50 and Ostwald 1986 (C 214) 477 n. 70 argue that the laws to be drafted are those by which the Thirty will govern, but the traditional interpretation that they are the laws by which the Athenians will conduct their affairs is to be preferred.

tutions and the establishment of decarchies, in all cities, whether previously hostile or not, each with a Spartan harmost. These new regimes rested not on birth and wealth, but on personal loyalty to him, and would contribute to a personal leadership of Greece.

There is here surely some later distortion of Lysander's career and ambitions, and the suggestion of a plan for personal power, exercised beyond the state, is not plausible. The end of Athenian control meant the end of many regimes, democratic or of democratic colour (cf. *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 383–5). Unanimity among those who replaced them is not to be expected, and those factions which won the ear of the Spartan commander were likely to come out on top and to gain any protection they might think necessary to maintain themselves. Not all sources think of the system as purely Lysander's, and Diodorus (xiv.10.1) in fact attributes to the Spartans as a whole an instruction to Lysander after the war to establish harmosts and oligarchies in every city, and follows it with a statement that they now established tribute on the conquered cities, which raised more than 1,000 talents a year.<sup>29</sup> Although the timing and credentials of this passage present difficulties,<sup>30</sup> there is no real reason to suppose that any serious measure of renunciation and withdrawal was contemplated by anyone at Sparta in 404.

There may already have been thinking about an extension of Spartan influence into areas which had remained untouched by Athenian imperialism. By 395, we can see a substantial degree of control in central Greece, which, in the first phase of the Corinthian War, the Boeotians exert themselves to undo (see below, p. 101). It has been argued<sup>31</sup> that a strand of Spartan thinking had been looking northwards since the foundation of Heraclea Trachinia in 426 (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 390). The main argument for supposing that an extensive plan for northern expansion went into operation in 404 unfortunately lies in a speech set in Larissa in Thessaly and attributed in its manuscripts to the orator of the second century A.D., Herodes Atticus. The speech has been widely held to be a genuine product of the end of the fifth century and many of those who hold this view have settled for a date in the summer of 404;<sup>32</sup> it would

<sup>29</sup> On the detail of the 'second Spartan empire' nothing has really replaced the judicious discussion of Parke 1930 (C 305), certainly not Bockisch 1965 (C 278). On Spartan imperialism in general, see Andrewes 1978 (C 276); Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 86–98.

<sup>30</sup> See Andrewes 1971 (C 275) 209–10, who thinks that Diodorus has created a formal decision out of a description by Ephorus of a gradual development. That a formal tribute structure existed by 403 results from *Ath. Pol.* 39.2, where both parties to the final settlement at Athens are to pay out of their income *eis to symmachikon*. We know nothing else about the tribute; 'more than a thousand talents' seems high.

<sup>31</sup> Andrewes 1971 (C 275) 217–26 is fundamental for what follows. See also Funke 1980 (C 24) 39–40.

<sup>32</sup> Morrison 1942 (C 373) and Wade-Gery 1945 (C 388), followed by Andrewes. The older view of 400/399 (Meyer 1921 (A 38) 56–8, Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) III.2, 16–8) is preferred by Funke.

result that Sparta was at that time proposing an alliance to Larissa against Archelaus king of Macedon. The speech is surely a later rhetorical production,<sup>33</sup> and, whatever recondite knowledge of detail is claimed for it, it is hazardous to affirm that its occasion ever took place.<sup>34</sup>

Even without this support, there is evidence for Spartan activity in the north, though its beginnings cannot be dated. Whatever view we take of the Herodes speech, there was considerable disturbance in Thessaly at the time the war ended. The Athenian Critias had taken part in civil strife in Thessaly during his exile (Xen. *Hell.* II.3.36). Lycophron of Pherae, 'wishing to rule the whole of Thessaly', won a victory over Larissa and other states in September 404 (*ibid.* II.3.4). Sparta had a friendship with him at some time (*ibid.* VI.4.24), and the hardest evidence for Spartan intervention in Thessaly is that Sparta had a garrison at Pharsalus in 395 (Diod. XIV.82.5–6), which does put her on the side of Pherae against Larissa. Heraclea had had more or less continuous troubles with its neighbours and with Thessalians since its foundation (Thuc. III.93.2, V.51, VIII.3.1, Xen. *Hell.* I.2.18). This had been an interest of Agis, but the first attention we hear of after the war is a Spartan mission in 400 or 399 to deal with *stasis* there and punish its neighbours (Diod. XIV.38.4–5, Polyae. II.21; cf. Diod. XIV.82.7). Some of these neighbours turn up in the mixed force from central Greece which Lysander was sent to bring to Haliartus in 395 (Xen. *Hell.* III.5.6; see below, p. 99). That forces are available from this area shows that there has been rather more activity around here than is actually attested, and the mission of Lysander has suggested that he might have been involved there before. Activity west and north of Boeotia will have provoked attention in Thebes; Heraclea had already caused friction between Boeotia and Sparta in 419 (Thuc. V.52.1).

## II. ATHENS

By far our fullest accounts of events after the peace are, as usual, for Athens, and Athens turned into a test for Spartan policy. The accounts are full and at times contradictory. The deepest contradiction, of which we have already seen traces, is over the role of Theramenes. The most important factual clash is over the timing of the introduction of a Spartan garrison. Variation in the accounts will have started very early, when survivors of the Thirty attempted to emphasize their differences with the

<sup>33</sup> Albini 1968 (B 3); Russell 1983 (H 102) 111.

<sup>34</sup> Funke appeals to a consensus that, whatever the authorship, the speech contains reliable material, but there is no real corroboration for the projected Spartan attack on Macedonia. That Archelaus had recently made a successful attack on Larissa is found plausible by Hammond and Griffith 1979 (D 50) 140–1.

extremists. Lysias XII makes the process clear; the defendant has been maintaining that he had been a Theramenes man, not a Critias man.

For once, the Diodorus account (cf. pp. 9–10) seems to have no *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* material in it; Ephorus seems to have overlaid an account taken from Xenophon with a very low-level pro-Theramenean source. Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia*, for once has a very full account (34.3–40), perhaps taken from the Atthidographer Androtion (see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 11). Starting with a very dubious pro-Theramenean account, it ends with invaluable documentary detail about the final settlement and amnesty. Apart from this section, Xenophon must have the priority in all purely factual matters. Although his account was written a good deal later (see p. 1), it is surely that of an eye-witness among the Athenian cavalry. The detectable stages of his disillusion are a document in themselves.<sup>35</sup>

Defeat inevitably led to reassessment of the institutions under which the war had been fought. Though convinced democrats could satisfy themselves with thoughts of treachery at Aegospotami (Lys. XIV.38, cf. Xen. *Hell.* II.1.32, Dem. XIX.191), opponents of democracy, silent since 410, now had their chance. It was not only that the ultimate say in Athens' future was now in Spartan hands. Athens had been stripped of her empire and her internal make-up may well have been much changed. Though the absolute figures remain violently debated, it is clear that population losses through plague and war had been enormous, particularly among the lowest, thetic, class, and only to a small extent compensated by the enforced return of citizens from colonies and cleruchies.<sup>36</sup>

Our accounts of political opinion at Athens vary, not least about the attitude of Theramenes.<sup>37</sup> We have already dismissed the version in which he opposed the setting-up of the Thirty. It was surely he who proposed it, but it perhaps remains uncertain whether he now was prepared to remake the state through a tight oligarchy (the view of Lysias XII) or saw the opportunity of re-establishing the hoplite franchise which he had engineered briefly in 411–410 (see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 479–81, 484). Xenophon lets him claim in his dying speech (*Hell.* II.3.48)<sup>38</sup> that this had consistently been his ideal.<sup>39</sup>

Even Lysias XII admits some measure of compromise in the compo-

<sup>35</sup> Apart from a willingness to accept Xenophon material in Diodorus (cf. Krentz 1982 (C 182) 135–9), this represents a fairly orthodox view of the sources. Krentz continues (139–47) by attributing *Atb. Pol.*'s account ultimately to the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* rather than to an Atthidographer, and gives it priority over Xenophon. This is not a very plausible position.

<sup>36</sup> See, most recently, Strauss 1986 (C 259) 70–81; Hansen 1988 (C 167) 14–28.

<sup>37</sup> Fuks 1953 (C 139); Harding 1974 (C 169); Rhodes 1981 (B 94) 359–60.

<sup>38</sup> For qualifications about the authenticity of this speech, see Usher 1968 (C 264).

<sup>39</sup> But the claims made for his consistency by *Atb. Pol.* 28.5 are different.

sition of the Thirty,<sup>40</sup> but disagreement only emerged slowly. The sources highlight Theramenes and the returned exile Critias.<sup>41</sup> Whereas Theramenes' family can be traced no further back than his father Hagnon, the Periclean general and founder of Amphipolis, Critias' family was much older and widespread; in the same generation it produced Plato. Talented and well versed in the sophistic movement,<sup>42</sup> Critias, like Theramenes, had previous associations with Alcibiades. Returning from exile in 404, he showed a clear-minded instinct for personal power. It should not be thought that all those who joined in the establishment of the Thirty were men of birth and wealth; the largest single identifiable element is that of men who had been in trouble with the democracy.<sup>43</sup>

There were some points about the present Athenian law and constitution on which the new regime in its drafting capacity could agree. Some of the codification in progress since 410 (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 484–5) was deleted.<sup>44</sup> Ephialtes (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> ch. 4) had been a decisive figure in the construction of radical democracy; his and later laws about the Areopagus were repealed (*Ath. Pol.* 35.2), though no further steps seem to have been taken to rehabilitate that body.<sup>45</sup> Solon too, it was said, had made mistakes in complicating his laws, thereby giving the popular courts too much say, so they were simplified (*ibid.*, cf. 9.2 and, probably, *Pol.* 1274a4–11).<sup>46</sup> Dislike of the operations of those courts came out more vigorously in the prosecution and execution of so-called sycophants; none of our sources has any sympathy for them. These measures are Athenian responses to Athenian problems. Though we may agree that the Thirty may have had a coherent view of the future of Athens which

<sup>40</sup> He says (xii.76) that ten were nominated by the 'ephors who had been established', evidently extreme oligarchs, ten by Theramenes, ten by those present. That is not official language but what could be alleged to be an unofficial deal. A different kind of factional difference appears in *Ath. Pol.* 34.3. Here the 'ancestral constitution' which it says was imposed by the peace treaty is interpreted by democrats as democracy, oligarchs as oligarchy, but by the best people, headed by Theramenes, as the ancestral constitution; since two of the other four named went into exile and only Theramenes joined the Thirty, the kindest view which can be taken of this account is that the similarity of views alleged of the five was not translated into similar action. For the attempt by Loeper 1896 (C 189) to show that the Thirty represented the thirty Cleisthenic *trittyes* (*CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> 312–15), see Whitehead 1980 (C 266); Krentz 1982 (C 182) 51–4.

<sup>41</sup> That other views were possible emerges from the emphasis on the almost unknown Charicles (see Ostwald 1986 (C 214) 461) in *Arist. Pol.* 1305b26.

<sup>42</sup> D–K 88; see Ostwald 1986 (C 214) 462–5. The striking account of the origin of religion in the *Sisyphus* (*TGF* 43 F 19) surely belongs, not to him, but to Euripides; see Dihle 1977 (H 28).

<sup>43</sup> This is the contention of the speaker of *Lysias* xxv, who denies that there are natural democrats and natural oligarchs; analysis seems to confirm it, but cannot of course disprove the presence of political conviction. Cf. Ostwald 1986 (C 214) 460–8. Krentz 1982 (C 182) 55–6 sums up rather differently. <sup>44</sup> Fingarette 1971 (C 135).

<sup>45</sup> Hall 1990 (C 148) argues that the Thirty had no wish to rehabilitate the Areopagus, and assesses the motives for the repeal differently. <sup>46</sup> Lewis 1993 (C 187).

has been obscured, the evidence does not really support the recent view that they were trying to remake Attica in the Spartan image.<sup>47</sup>

We need have reached no further than the late summer of 404, but precise and even relative chronology is unavailable.<sup>48</sup> We should follow Xenophon in placing the request for a Spartan garrison before the death of Theramenes,<sup>49</sup> but we have no certain means of placing the exile of certain prominent figures<sup>50</sup> and, most important, a request to the Persian satrap Pharnabazus for the execution of Alcibiades.<sup>51</sup> The Spartan garrison was sent, but funds were needed to pay for it, and the execution, partly for financial reasons, of wealthy metics<sup>52</sup> and even prominent Athenians,<sup>53</sup> begins in this phase.

This violence apparently alienated Theramenes, and constitutional differences emerged when the majority of the Thirty put through a measure to reduce the citizen body to three thousand. Theramenes argued that the number was arbitrary and should be larger; how much further theoretical differences went we do not know. If Theramenes thought that he could repeat his success of 411 in curbing the extremists (see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 479–81), he was wrong. Critias had enough armed support at his disposal to convince the Council and force Theramenes' execution. All outside the Three Thousand were now forced out of the city.

How much convincing the Council or indeed the wider citizen body needed, we do not know. The movement which eventually broke the regime started outside Attica and, through terror, apathy or general satisfaction, support inside Attica was extremely slow to emerge.<sup>54</sup>

That not all rich men saw the future of Athens in the same way as Critias is clear from the fact that it was two wealthy ex-generals,

<sup>47</sup> Krentz 1982 (C 182) 63–8; Whitehead 1982–83 (C 321); Ostwald 1986 (C 214) 485–7, stressing Critias' interest in Spartan ideas, the nickname 'ephors' for the extremists and the coincidence of the number thirty with that of the *gerousia*, but glossing over the important role of the totally non-Spartan council.

<sup>48</sup> The sources are most clearly laid out in Hignett 1952 (C 174) 384–9; Rhodes 1981 (B 94) 416–19. For the most recent attempt at a reconstruction see Krentz 1982 (C 182) 131–52.

<sup>49</sup> Krentz *ibid.* and Ostwald 1986 (C 214) 481–4 take the opposite view. It is not clear whether its displacement in *Atb. Pol.* is a conscious attempt to exculpate Theramenes.

<sup>50</sup> The exile of Thrasybulus, Alcibiades and Anytus is referred to in Theramenes' dying speech in Xen. *Hell.* II.3.42, but see n. 38.

<sup>51</sup> Varying accounts in Diod. XIV.11, Plut. *Alc.* 38–9. See Hatzfeld 1940 (C 173) 319–49; Robert 1980 (F 711) 257–307.

<sup>52</sup> The outstanding case was that of the very wealthy shield-maker Polemarchus, best known now from his prominence in Plato *Rep.* I. The episode is described by his brother Lysias (XII.6–24), who managed to escape.

<sup>53</sup> Another aim, according to Plato *Ep.* VII 325a, was to force others to take part in the arrests and implicate them with the regime. Leon, against whom Socrates was sent (*ibid.*), was not a metic, but a former democratic general (Andrewes and Lewis 1957 (C 2) 179 n. 10). Niceratus, son of Nicias, was a particularly rich and important victim.

<sup>54</sup> So, rightly, Krentz 1982 (C 182) 83–4.

Thrasybulus of Steiria<sup>55</sup> and Anytus, who, with a force of only seventy, crossed the Boeotian border and seized the hill of Phyle<sup>56</sup> in winter 404. They had had some private support in Thebes (*Hell. Oxy.* 17.1), and indeed one of the most notable facts about the democratic revival is the wide range of support it enjoyed in other states, some of whose representatives had, less than a year before, called for the destruction of Athens.<sup>57</sup> This is eloquent testimony to the suspicion of Sparta that now ruled in Greece; a puppet-regime in Athens was not acceptable. The Thirty moved out with the Three Thousand and the Spartan garrison to nip disaffection in the bud, without great success. Their situation gradually deteriorated, and some of their measures of mass terrorism, notably a massacre at Eleusis,<sup>58</sup> belong to this period. Eventually, the exiles, now up to about a thousand in strength, managed to force their way into Piraeus. Civil war was now in full swing.

In a battle on the river Cephissus, Critias was killed. During the truce for taking up the dead, Cleocritus, herald of the Eleusinian Mysteries, appealed for reconciliation against the un-Athenian activities of the Thirty. Dissent set in in the city, and the immediate effect was the deposition of the Thirty, who were replaced by a new body of Ten.<sup>59</sup> These struggled to save the situation by appealing to Sparta, on the grounds that the *demos* had revolted from Sparta. They negotiated a loan of 100 talents and Lysander secured his own despatch to wipe out the Piraeus group with an allied force and the despatch of the Spartan fleet under the *nauarch*, his brother Libys. He seemed still to be able to control Spartan policy.

But it is at this point that dissension in Sparta surfaces.<sup>60</sup> King Pausanias, 'afraid lest Lysander might not only win reputation by achieving this, but make Athens his own', persuaded three (that is, a majority) of the ephors to let him take out a Peloponnesian League force to settle the situation. Not all allies saw his motives clearly, and the Boeotians and Corinthians, in their first open gesture of disaffection, refused to march against the Athenians on the grounds that they were in

<sup>55</sup> Confusingly, there is another prominent Thrasybulus, of Collytus, who had denounced Alcibiades' behaviour with the fleet in 407 (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 490); his intermittently successful career can be traced as far as 373.

<sup>56</sup> There was a fort there in the fourth century, but no evidence for this time. See Ober 1985 (κ 49) 145–7. <sup>57</sup> For the evidence see Hignett 1952 (C 174) 290–1; Funke 1980 (C 24) 47 n. 3.

<sup>58</sup> Xenophon (*Hell.* II.4.8–10) describes this massacre, in which he evidently took part, with considerable distaste.

<sup>59</sup> The statement (*Ath. Pol.* 38.1, cf. *Lys.* XII.55) that they were expected to end the war is not supported by their actions; contrast Fuks 1953 (C 138). That there was later a second Ten (*Ath. Pol.* 38.3) goes, despite Walbank 1982 (B 180) 93 n. 47 and Krentz 1982 (C 182) 97, against all the contemporary evidence; see Rhodes 1981 (B 94) 459–60.

<sup>60</sup> The execution of Thorax, Lysander's appointee in Samos, on a charge of possessing coined money (*Diod.* XIV.3.5, *Plut. Lys.* 19.7), is not easy to date.



no way breaking the peace-treaty; they were clearly expecting him to maintain the puppet-state. Pausanias indeed opened operations with a show of strength against the Piraeus; they would at any rate be shown where the power of decision lay. But it rapidly became clear that the settlement of Athens had gone disastrously wrong. Nicias' family had gone to seek Pausanias' help, and a member of it claimed later (Lys. XVIII.10–12) that it had been their plight which had shown Pausanias what the Thirty had really been like. 'For it had become clear to all the Peloponnesians who had come that they were not killing the most objectionable of the citizens, but those who were most deserving of honour for their birth and wealth and other virtue.' This is a plausible claim. No Athenian had been better thought of in Sparta than Nicias, and Sparta could not afford that kind of advertisement for her new world.

The contending parties were encouraged to send to Sparta. The ephors and the assembly sent fifteen men to settle the matter on the spot with Pausanias, and they presided over the negotiation of a settlement<sup>61</sup> which would satisfy the men of the Piraeus while doing everything possible to allay the political and economic fears of the 'City men' who had gone along with the Thirty. There would be an amnesty for all, except for the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven commissioners of police, and the board which had controlled the Piraeus before the exiles recovered it, and for them too if they were prepared to render account of their actions.<sup>62</sup> All other magistrates would render accounts before representatives of their group.<sup>63</sup> Even property which had been confiscated by the Thirty would stay with its new owners. Those who could not reconcile themselves with the new regime would be allowed to withdraw to a separate city state at Eleusis. In September 404 the exiles returned in procession and sacrificed to Athena on the Acropolis.

In theory, provided that Athens met her financial and military obligations to the Peloponnesian League, she would be allowed to get on with her own affairs. The settlement imposed no particular political solution. That the Piraeus faction had not been composed of straight democrats was made clear when one of them, Phormisius,<sup>64</sup> suggested

<sup>61</sup> For the settlement see Cloché 1915 (C 116); Funke 1980 (C 24) 1–26; Loening 1987 (C 188).

<sup>62</sup> At least one member of the Thirty, Eratosthenes, remained in Athens to argue that he had been a Theramenes man and meet the charge of murdering Polemarchus (Lys. XI); whether he won his case and survived to be later killed in an act of adultery (Lys. I) is not agreed. Rhinon, one of the Ten, was immediately elected strategos by the new regime. But a considerable amount of property was confiscated from this group and sold in 402/1 (Walbank 1982 (B 180) = *The Athenian Agora* XIX p 2). The proceeds were used to make, among other things, new processional silver hydriae for Athena (Philochorus *FGrH* 328 F 181; *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1372 + 1402 + Woodward 1958 (B 183)).

<sup>63</sup> The oligarchic Treasurers of Athena made the normal transfer to their democratic successors (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1370 + 1371 + 1384 + (?)1503; West and Woodward 1938 (B 182) 78–83), and their accounts were published (*IG* I<sup>3</sup> 380), so they stood their account; Lewis 1993 (B 151).

<sup>64</sup> One of those who was said to have supported the ancestral constitution in *Ath. Pol.* 34.3 (see note 40).

that citizenship be confined to landowners, which, we are told, would have excluded 5,000 from the citizenship (Lys. xxxiv with *hypothesis*). Though there seems to have been some Spartan support for the proposal, it was rejected. The activities of the Thirty had thoroughly discredited anything short of full democracy in Athens for over eighty years to come. But, despite the population losses, the democracy remained restrictive in its citizenship policy. The Periclean citizenship-laws, which seem to have been slightly relaxed towards the end of the war, were re-enacted,<sup>65</sup> and, when Thrasybulus attempted to get a citizenship grant for some of his supporters, the attempt was blocked.<sup>66</sup> The permanent consequence seems to have been that fourth-century Athens was a much more bourgeois and less split society than it may have been in the fifth century.<sup>67</sup>

The condition for this overall harmony lay in a fairly determined attempt by the returning party to reconcile themselves with those of the city who chose to remain in Athens. For this the sources, even those whose sympathy for democracy was weak (e.g. Xen. *Hell.* II.4.33, Pl. *Ep.* VII.325b5), give them very good marks, particularly for the gesture of assuming the debts incurred by the oligarchs in fighting against them (*Ath. Pol.* 40.3, Isoc. VII.67–9, Dem. xx.11–12). Their record is of course not totally blameless. The oligarchic state at Eleusis was wiped out in 401 by a mixture of treachery and persuasion (Xen. *Hell.* II.4.43, *Ath. Pol.* 40.4). The cavalry who had served under the Thirty in particular were subject to intense suspicion and dislike (Xen. *Hell.* III.1.4, Lys. xxvi.10), and, despite the oath taken ‘not to remember the evils’ (μη μνησικακεῖν), the whole corpus of speeches attributed to Lysias shows that arguments about an opponent’s behaviour in 404 were still being used as late as 382 (Lys. xxvi). But on the whole the record is remarkably good.

The process of law reform started in 410 was resumed.<sup>68</sup> The result was the establishment of a comprehensive corpus of written law, a regular procedure for amending it, and a clear distinction between the permanence of laws and the temporary nature of decrees. Other reforms are discussed in chapter 9. The most significant is perhaps the introduction of Assembly pay, to ensure the presence of a quorum in the Assembly and probably not paid to more than a quorum.<sup>69</sup> Its introduc-

<sup>65</sup> See Funke 1980 (C 24) 19–20 n. 9.

<sup>66</sup> *Ath. Pol.* 40.2. The relationship of Thrasybulus’ attempt to what looks like the final settlement of the matter (Tod no. 100 with new fragments = Harding no. 3) remains controversial (Krentz 1980 (C 181); Osborne 1981–83 (B 165) D6; Whitehead 1984 (C 267)).

<sup>67</sup> Social class is still sometimes said to be relevant to political views (*Hell. Oxy.* 6.3, Ar. *Eccl.* 192–3), but for anything like a really drastic statement of a split between rich and poor, we have to wait till the late 340s (Dem. x.35–45). See, on rich and poor, Mossé 1962 (C 208) 147–66.

<sup>68</sup> Harrison 1955 (C 171); Dow 1953–1959, 1960, 1961 (C 129–31); Ostwald 1986 (C 214) 509–24; Robertson 1990 (C 232); Rhodes 1991 (C 230). <sup>69</sup> Rhodes 1981 (B 94) 490–2.

tion cannot be precisely dated; it had risen in two stages from one to three obols by 392.

In the first years of liberation, it was inevitably the principal liberators who were most prominent, although some City men can be traced in office. Modern scholarship no longer finds it helpful to speak of 'parties' in analysing Athenian politics. We do see personal groups and can sometimes wonder whether they differed in principle as well as on personalities, but analyses<sup>70</sup> have tended to lay too much stress on the line-up on one particular issue in the winter of 396/5. Even on the very few issues, whether of particular policies or about individuals, where we have information, the groupings are not always solid.<sup>71</sup> On the cornerstone of Athenian policy, the necessity of adhering to the Spartan alliance, there seems to have been no dissent before, in 397, the appointment of an Athenian exile, Conon, to command the Persian fleet (see below, p. 67) offered an alternative possibility. Athens fulfilled her obligations as a member of the Peloponnesian League throughout.

Two major trials about which we happen to be well informed illuminate some more general issues. The orator Andocides had been in exile since confessing his part in the mutilation of the Hermae in 415 (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 449). His main contact with Athenians in his exile (*Andoc.* II.11–12) had been with the fleet during the period when it had functioned independently of the city under Alcibiades and Thrasybulus (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 485–6). Taking advantage of the amnesty, he had returned to Athens and held posts of distinction appropriate to his birth and wealth before, probably in 400, his past caught up with him and he was prosecuted for impiety. Some purely personal and political issues can perhaps be dimly detected from his own defence (*Andoc.* I), but, in the prosecution speech which we possess (*Lys.* VI), religion is not a mere political weapon, but the whole breath of the accusation. This speaker at least is convinced that the evils which have defeated Athens indicate that special care is needed to make her right with the gods. Andocides, defended by the powerful Anytus, was however acquitted.

There is a strong case<sup>72</sup> for identifying the speaker of *Lysias* VI with the Meletus who, in the next year, joined Anytus in the prosecution of Socrates, accused of not believing in the city's gods (*D.L.* II.40). It is an almost impossible task to disentangle from later literary debate the various strands which were relevant to Socrates' trial and death.<sup>73</sup> Even

<sup>70</sup> E.g. Sealey 1956 (C 253); more elaborately, Strauss 1986 (C 259) 89–120. General good sense in Funke 1980 (C 24) 1–26.

<sup>71</sup> The key-word *ἔσπερον* in *Hell. Oxy.* 6.3 does not mean that 'the sensible and propertied people' actually liked the present situation (so Funke 1980 (C 24) 13 n. 55), but that they put up with it. <sup>72</sup> Dover 1968 (B 35) 78–80.

<sup>73</sup> A useful introduction to the problems in Guthrie 1962–81 (H 56) III 380–5. Stone 1988 (C 258) has plenty to offer, even to the professional.

if we could be sure about the charges and the way the real prosecution went about its case, we cannot know what influenced individual members of the jury. That the associations of Alcibiades and Critias with Socrates were in some way relevant seems certain, though 'corrupting the young' is not likely to have been part of the formal charge. We need not doubt that the whole trial is evidence of a deep civic unease, whether at the level of worrying about the gods' displeasure or in a feeling that Socrates was associated with an unhealthy spirit of questioning and disbelief which, in some hands, had contributed to bring Athens down. That Socrates' death, rather than his exile, was intended seems unlikely, but he himself blocked all routes of escape, in court and afterwards.

Economically, the loss of her empire and fleet transformed Athens. She still possessed the advantages of a central position, and a stray text (*Andoc.* I. 133–4) shows the yield of the 2 per cent import tax rising by a fifth from 402 to 401. But it could also be plausibly asserted that there was a desperate shortage of public funds (*Lys.* xxx. 21). Individuals were no better off. The few attested figures for sizes of private fortunes show much lower figures for the fourth century than for the fifth; agricultural property will have been slow to recover from the years of neglect while Sparta had held Decelea, and any money which had been invested in land overseas (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 295) will have been lost. At the other end of the scale, those who had been forced to return to Athens by Lysander may well have found it hard to get started again, even in a period of reduced population. It is not surprising to find in 391 that there was a mood to go on fighting for 'the Chersonese, the colonies, the overseas possessions and debts' (*Andoc.* III. 15). That it was possible even to think of such things thirteen years after Athens' defeat depended almost entirely on external circumstances.

### III. SPARTA, 403–395 B. C.

The situation at Athens had been taken out of Lysander's control, and Sparta had seen the dubious results of allowing a regime which was, or might become, too narrowly based. It is likely that it was now, in autumn 403, that the ephors, presumably after consultation, took the point and proclaimed that Lysander's decarchies should be abolished and that the cities should return to their ancestral constitutions (*Xen. Hell.* III. 4. 2).<sup>74</sup> Withdrawal of Spartan control may have gone even further than that. In the next year we find (*Diod.* xiv. 12. 2) that there is no Spartan presence in

<sup>74</sup> The date argued by Andrewes 1971 (C 275) 206–16 has been generally accepted; cf. Funke 1980 (C 24) 31 n. 15. The alternative, less satisfactory, date is 397, argued by Smith 1948 (C 316) 150–3 and Hamilton 1979 (C 294) 128–9. For the sense in which the ephors' proclamation applied to Asia Minor, not strictly within their control in 403, see Lewis 1977 (A 33) 137–8.

the key point of Byzantium; the harmost left there at the end of 405 (Xen. *Hell.* II.2.2) must have been withdrawn.

This shift in Spartan policy was not put through without some tension. On his return to Sparta, Pausanias was put on trial for his conduct at Athens and, for the only time in Spartan history, we happen to have the voting (Paus. III.5.2). The twenty-eight members of the *gerousia* split evenly; the other king, Agis, voted for condemnation,<sup>75</sup> but all five ephors for acquittal. This is good evidence of split opinion among the elite. We should not think in terms of anything like a total fall or eclipse of Lysander, but certainly his influence was not all that it had been, and he may have judged it prudent to remove himself from the scene by taking on a diplomatic mission to Syracuse (Plut. *Lys.* 2.7, cf. p. 135).<sup>76</sup>

If there was a mood at this point to lessen overseas commitments, it rapidly became clear that this was inconsistent with being the great Greek power. After the withdrawal of its Spartan harmost, Byzantium soon ran into difficulties with internal *stasis* and the neighbouring Thracians, and asked for a Spartan general. The experienced Clearchus was sent, but used the opportunity to set himself up as tyrant. This was too embarrassing, and Sparta actually had to send a force to suppress him (Diod. XIV.12.2–7, very different from Xen. *Anab.* II.6.2–6). A more acceptable way of using his energies would be found shortly.

In 402<sup>77</sup> it was decided to do something about a long cherished design nearer home. Relations with Elis had long been bad (see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 437), and the major insults of 420, the exclusion of Sparta from the Olympic games and the public beating (Thuc. v.50.4) of the wealthy Lichas, had not been forgotten;<sup>78</sup> there had been other insults. More importantly, perhaps, Elis had been accumulating a local hegemony of the type that Sparta disliked in the Peloponnese (see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 104, 106). ‘Autonomy’ was a useful watchword here, and the Eleans were told that the Spartan authorities thought it right that they should let their perioecic cities be autonomous. Their refusal meant war, which extended into 400. At the end Elis had to agree to a large loss of territory, but the democratic

<sup>75</sup> For speculation about Agis’ attitude, see Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 134–5, but he has not established that Agis had backed Pausanias’ mission in the first place.

<sup>76</sup> See Hamilton 1979 (C 294) 96–7, but this mission is very poorly attested and not everyone believes in it; see p. 135 n. 66.

<sup>77</sup> The chronology of this war remains controversial; see the summary in Funke 1980 (C 24) 32 n. 16. Xenophon synchronizes its beginning with the operations of Dercyllidas in Asia, which would produce 399–397 and intolerable results for estimating the dates of Agesilaus’ reign. Once we are free of that synchronism, the absence from all accounts of the Olympic games of 400 dictates 402–400, which happens to be Diodorus’ date. There are substantial differences in the accounts of the war, which is discussed by Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 248–53.

<sup>78</sup> There is little reason to think that Lichas is still alive, as supposed by Pouilloux and Salviat 1983 (C 308) 384.

regime which had come to power there during the war was left undisturbed (Xen. *Hell.* III.2.21–31; Diod. XIV.17.4–12, 34.1). An even older score was settled after that war. The Messenians whom Athens had settled at Naupactus in 456 and another group on Cephallenia were thrown out of these homes (Diod. XIV.34.2–6); Messene, it seemed, was once more off the map – this time for good.

There were greater events elsewhere. By the end of the Peloponnesian War, Spartan relations with Persia had become in practice the relations of Lysander with the King's son Cyrus. It might have been hoped in Sparta that Cyrus would in fact succeed Darius at his death in 404, but the succession of his elder brother Artaxerxes made Cyrus' position doubtful. He did in fact manage to hold his former position in the west under the new reign,<sup>79</sup> but his relations with the satrap Tissaphernes were difficult, not least in the Greek cities.<sup>80</sup> By 402, he had determined on revolt against his brother and begun to collect troops; the displacement of Clearchus from Byzantium provided a suitable commander for the Greek hoplites which would be necessary. At least the opening stages of the campaign would be easier with naval support, and he requested the Spartans to be to him what he had been to them in their Athenian war (Xen. *Hell.* III.1.1). The ephors accepted the obligation, lent him the use of the fleet, and even provided troops.<sup>81</sup> His campaign in 401 was ultimately unsuccessful (see below, pp. 49, 52, 64–5), and left two main legacies. The more permanent was that the successful retreat of the Ten Thousand left the Greeks with a conviction that Persian power was by no means as great as it looked. The immediate point was that Sparta had compromised itself badly with Artaxerxes. Whatever the final arrangements with Darius about Asia Minor had been (see above, p. 24 n. 2), they were now effectively void, and Artaxerxes would conduct himself for the next thirteen years on the basis that 'the Spartans were the most shameless of all men' (Dionon *FGrH* 690 F 19).

The new situation took some time to sink in, and meanwhile, just after the end of the Elean War, in early summer 400, Agis died. This provoked an argument about the succession, which surely had political overtones, though we lack practically all the background.<sup>82</sup> Agis' son Litychidas was not of age, and his paternity was suspect; it was even suggested that his real father was Alcibiades. The next in line was his uncle Agesilaus, now about forty-five. His record was said to be good, but he was congenitally lame. An old oracle was produced which warned Sparta to beware of a lame kingship, but Lysander maintained that this referred to

<sup>79</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 120–1 against Andrewes 1971 (C 275) 208–9.

<sup>80</sup> Tuplin 1987 (A 60) 142–5 discusses their position.

<sup>81</sup> Spartan support is glossed over by Xenophon in the *Anabasis*, but the evidence is ample (Lewis 1977 (A 33) 138 n. 14).

<sup>82</sup> A full discussion in Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 110–15.

a king who was illegitimate, not to one who was physically lame. Agesilaus was chosen. What motives Lysander had is unclear, but he had carried his point at the centre of affairs. Time would show how real the success would be.

Before the summer of 400 was out, the pressures of great power status reasserted themselves in an acute form. Tissaphernes had succeeded to Cyrus' position in the west, and was subduing Greek cities. A mission to Sparta asked that the leaders of all Greece should look to the freedom of the Greeks in Asia also. Compromised with Artaxerxes in any case, the Spartans agreed; the wartime alliance was at an end and the appeal seemed just. The activities of Thibron and his successor Dercyllidas are discussed in the next chapter, but one overall point must be made. It has been held that answering the appeal was motivated by imperialism, a desire to extend the Spartan empire, perhaps inspired by Lysander, once more in the ascendant, perhaps by Agesilaus, anxious for glory.<sup>83</sup> This is surely too simple a view. Not only were the decarchies not restored, but the story lays heavy emphasis on the nature of conduct to the allies. Thibron was recalled and charged with maltreating them. Dercyllidas was praised for his proper conduct to them, and it is hard to give any very black colour to his civilizing operations in the Chersonese (Xen. *Hell.* III.2.8–10) or his expulsion of the Chians at Atarneus (*ibid.* III.2.11).<sup>84</sup> It is unsafe to deny that the Spartan assembly collectively or even individually had some kind of conscience, and there was nothing to be gained now from Persia by suppressing better feelings.

At the time of the opening moves in Asia Minor,<sup>85</sup> Sparta had a fright at the centre, which reminds us of the roots of this contradictory society (Xen. *Hell.* III.3.4–11). Whether it was unique or one we simply happen to hear of, we do not know. A young man called Cinadon, who, though not a full Spartiate, had been trusted with various tasks, was accused of plotting against the state. The ephors succeeded in suppressing the plot, secured a confession and executed the ringleaders. Whether there was really a serious plot or not, we remember it for the story of how Cinadon is said to have taken an associate into the agora and invited him to count the Spartiates. He got up to about forty, and was then told to regard them as enemies; all the other 4,000 there were friends. The plotters, it was reported, were not many, but they had the sympathy of helots, *neodamodeis*, *hypomeiones*, and perioeci; whenever these groups talked about Spartiates, they could not conceal that they would gladly eat them

<sup>83</sup> Judeich 1892 (F 663) 41–2; Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 191–2.

<sup>84</sup> A case could be made (cf. Diod. XIII.65.4) for calling these 'democrats', but that would not make them less of a nuisance to the stability of Ionia.

<sup>85</sup> Agesilaus had not been a year in the kingship. Whether Thibron left for Asia in autumn 400 or spring 399 is not easy to establish.

raw. With efficient and ruthless controls, as the Spartans certainly exercised, large subject populations are slow to translate their feelings into action. The Spartans were able to use *neodamodeis* in Asia in this period,<sup>86</sup> whether because they thought them reliable or to remove them to a safer area.

In autumn 397, the news came in of the Persian rearmament. This time it is certainly Lysander who is credited with persuading Agesilaus to offer to go to Asia with thirty Spartiates, 2,000 *neodamodeis* and 6,000 allies. His calculation was said to be that the Spartans still had naval superiority and that the performance of the Ten Thousand had shown Persian weakness by land, but he also hoped for Agesilaus' help in re-establishing his decarchies. Agesilaus presented the mission as a crusade, and went to Aulis to sacrifice, as Agamemnon had done before going to Troy, but the boeotarchs intervened (see pp. 97–8). He arrived in Asia, asking for autonomy for the Greek cities. It is by no means clear that this was only a facade, and, when all the allies assumed that it was Lysander who had the true power, he rapidly showed his alienation from him. Lysander eventually went home to meet his death outside Haliartus in 395, in the first battle of the war which was to bring Agesilaus home next year (see below, ch. 4). In Asia Agesilaus matured into the leadership which made him the most influential king in Spartan history, though one with clear limitations who did little to slow Spartan decline.

There was perhaps another solution. After Lysander died, posthumous papers were said to show that he had long been meditating a constitutional reform which would have brought him the kingship.<sup>87</sup> It may be doubted whether, given the nature of Spartan society, that would have done much to ensure the permanence of Spartan power. The future of true monarchies lay elsewhere.

<sup>86</sup> 1,000 with Thibron (Xen. *Hell.* III.1.4), 2,000 with Agesilaus (III.4.2).

<sup>87</sup> Diod. XIV.13, Plut. *Lys.* 24–6, 30. See Hamilton 1979 (c 294) 92–6 and Cartledge (c 284) 94–6, who believe Ephorus' view that Lysander did conceive such a plan in 404 or 403. That the thought occurred to him is likely; how much he actually tried to do about it, we cannot know.



## CHAPTER 3

### PERSIA

SIMON HORNBLOWER

#### I. INTRODUCTION

Problems of method and evidence make it particularly difficult to write a history of Persia in the fourth century B.C., or rather, an account of Persia which will fit satisfactorily into a general history of a century whose study has traditionally been dominated by Greek evidence, or evidence perceived as Greek.<sup>1</sup>

There are two main, related, difficulties. The first is the risk of 'hellenocentricity' – that is, the adoption of an unduly Greek viewpoint.<sup>2</sup> This fault is easier to identify than to avoid. Nor would it be right to avoid it in all areas, for instance the military: the extensive Persian use of Greek infantry soldiers means that there will always be one Greek dimension to the study of fourth-century Persia. To the general charge of hellenocentricity, the traditionalist might reply that the dominance, in the relevant modern studies, of Greek evidence is the result not of cultural bias, but of a recognition of the quantity and quality of that evidence. In the same way the existence of Thucydides' text makes it possible to talk about the Peloponnesian War in far greater depth and detail than about the eighth-century Lelantine or the third-century Chremonidean Wars, for neither of which is a text as rich as Thucydides available. This does not prove scholarly 'bias' against the eighth century, or the third. Students have tended to fasten on the Greek evidence because the Persian period seems in some respects (for instance, in the archaeological record) curiously invisible. On the other hand, it can be argued that in the relevant areas of study, which include art and iconography, the very distinction between 'Greek' and 'Persian' evidence needs to be re-assessed, and that the apparently meagre impact of Persia on the culture of the western satrapies was the result of deliberate

<sup>1</sup> On the Greek sources generally see Sancisi-Weerdenburg and Kuhrt 1987 (F 51).

<sup>2</sup> For warnings against the risks see esp. F 51, but also F 47, F 40 and F 52 *passim* e.g. F 40, xiv and F 52, 267; also Kuhrt 1988 (F 130) 60. But note the admission of Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1987 (F 51) 118: a history of the Achaemenid period without the Greek sources would be a 'history without backbone'. And note the surprising claim of Austin 1990 (F 2), 291 that the topic of Persian relations with the Greek tyrants has been approached too exclusively from the *Persian* side.

policy: the Persians deliberately tried to play down their own power.<sup>3</sup> Again, we shall see (below) that it may be too absolute to speak of an 'absence' of Persian historiography: Greeks in long-term employment within the Persian governmental system, and so presumably affected by Persian attitudes, may have contributed to the 'Greek' literary tradition which has come down to us.

An honest account of the sources for the Persian empire as a whole should, however, stress their poverty, relative to what survives from the Athenian or Roman empires (the hellenistic Seleucids are a better analogy). The Persepolis Fortification Tablets, though they are welcome and valuable evidence, not yet fully published or exploited,<sup>4</sup> are not comparable, on present showing, with the Athenian Tribute Lists of the fifth century. And in any case the tablets themselves relate to the fifth century not the fourth. Nor can a Greek, or Greco-Macedonian aspect, be excluded altogether from the study of the tablets, which survive only because they were baked hard when Alexander fired the palace. (If one of his aims was to obliterate the memory of Persia, history cheated him nicely.)

Above all, there is (after Herodotus, who was born a subject of the Persian empire and travelled inside it) no fully surviving 'inside source' to reveal the attitudes of the Persians themselves. We should however reckon with the important possibility that Persian-employed Greeks with bureaucratic expertise may have influenced the documentary form and even the content of some of Herodotus' Persian material. Nevertheless Herodotus' own understanding of, and his curiosity about, the Persians had its limits.<sup>5</sup> Among Greek literary sources, Xenophon's *Anabasis* comes closest to being an inside source (see below at pp. 5 iff). Perhaps the nearest *Persian* approach to an imperial viewpoint is to be found in the way subject peoples are depicted on the Persian palace reliefs.<sup>6</sup> In some parts of the empire, notably Greek Asia Minor and to a lesser extent Judaea, the encounter with articulate subject races has left informed comment, whether admiring like Xenophon, Isaiah and Nehemiah, or mistrustful like the Athenians of the fifth century, whose tragedians seem to have invented the concept of 'barbarian' only after the Persian Wars of 490–479 – or re-invented it: the word is after all in Homer.<sup>7</sup> And in western Anatolia in particular, epigraphic finds have made it a well-documented district even by Greek or Roman standards (ch. 8a). Again, we know a reasonable amount about Achaemenid Egypt; but it has to be acknowledged<sup>8</sup> that it is not safe to generalize from

<sup>3</sup> Invisibility: Root in F 53, 7, cf. Hornblower 1990 (F 36) 90. Persians 'playing down power': Root in F 53, 3. <sup>4</sup> Hallock in Gershevitch 1985 (F 25) ch. 11; Lewis in F 52, 1ff.

<sup>5</sup> Momigliano 1975 (A 41); Lewis in F 51, 79; Murray in F 51, 108ff.

<sup>6</sup> Walser 1966 (F 67); Seager and Tuplin 1980 (C 74) 149ff; Root 1979 (F 46); Calmeyer in F 51, 11ff. <sup>7</sup> Hall 1989 (B 53); *Iliad* 11.867. <sup>8</sup> Briant in F 47, 15.

the Egyptian experience (Egypt was in any case outside Persian control between c.404 and 343). There are after all many much darker areas, notably in the eastern satrapies. All this means that it is easier to accept in principle, than to implement in practice, the interesting suggestion<sup>9</sup> that we study the Persian empire in terms of the interaction between central power and local structures, rather than in terms of the priority of the one over the other ('centralism' versus 'autonomism').

The second main problem is the persistent ancient and modern tendency to disparage fourth-century Persia for its 'decadence'.<sup>10</sup> This problem flows from the first. If the fifth-century 'barbarian' is to some extent a Greek literary construct, so too is the decadent and effeminate fourth-century Persian: perhaps Ctesias of Cnidus, for whom see above, p. 11, was the first writer to see Persia as somehow 'feminine'.<sup>11</sup> To accept insights like these is not to endorse the modern view<sup>12</sup> that all Greek historical interest in Persia was trivial after 400: on the contrary, the Persepolis Fortification Tablets have revealed an elaborate system of rationing, and payments in kind, which was evidently well understood by Heraclides of Cyme (*FGrH* 689 F 2).<sup>13</sup> In Greece, he says, soldiers get money, *but their Persian counterparts get food instead*. The Oxyrhynchus Historian (p. 10) has a good discussion (*Hell. Oxy.* XIX) of the pragmatic reasons for the fitfulness of Persian subsidies to 'governors'. And reliable information about Persian affairs, transmitted by our surviving Greek sources, can plausibly be traced to the *Persica* or Persian History of Dinon of Colophon, the father of the celebrated Alexander-historian Cleitarchus.<sup>14</sup>

How decadent *was* fourth-century Persia? Some counts in the traditional indictment are, we may readily agree, misconceived.<sup>15</sup> First, inability to cope with an exceptional invader like Alexander is not proof of exceptional military or structural weakness.

Second, the extent and significance of satrapal unrest in the fourth century may have been exaggerated by our sources (see below, p. 84), and in any case some flexibility at the margins can be seen as a sign of Persian strength not weakness; see further below, p. 51. (Paul Veyne has criticized the tendency of historians to attempt to explain complex phenomena, like feudalism, by the use of facile abstract language such as 'the central power being weak and far away, each man looked for a protector close by'. He asks the question:<sup>16</sup> '. . . "Weak and far-off power". What power is not?')

<sup>9</sup> Briant in F 47, 3ff.      <sup>10</sup> Sancisi-Weerdenburg in F 47, 33ff, cf. xiff; F 40, 117ff.

<sup>11</sup> Sancisi-Weerdenburg in F 47, 43f.

<sup>12</sup> Momigliano 1975 (A 41), still echoed at F 51, xiii; but see Stevenson in F 51, 27 and Lewis in F 51, 79, also Stevenson (B 111) forthcoming.      <sup>13</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) ch. 1, cf. n. 4 above.

<sup>14</sup> Stevenson (B 111) forthcoming.      <sup>15</sup> Hornblower 1990 (F 36) 93.

<sup>16</sup> P. Veyne, *Writing History* (Manchester, 1984) 111f.

Third, dependence on Greek infantry troops may simply reflect a shrewd value placed on professionalism (just as the private arrangements made by the rich fourth-century Athenian, for the discharge by others of his obligation to take to the sea in person, may be evidence of something more constructive than the lack of personal commitment for which the orators blame him).<sup>17</sup>

There remains a fourth count, Persia's inability to reconquer Egypt, despite huge efforts from the end of the fifth century to the 340s. Egypt mattered to Persia economically (see below, pp. 63, 344), and it remains surprising that Persian efforts at recovery were not more successful sooner.

So there were failures, which it would be reasonable to ascribe to weakness in some departments. But Persian 'decadence' in the first half of the fourth century is something of a myth. It arose, we may suspect, from an excessive ancient – and modern – interest in the personality of one man, Artaxerxes II (for whom see below; Plutarch wrote a biography of him, which was not however altogether disparaging, see especially Plut. *Artox.* 24). His alleged characteristics, or the less attractive of them, have too often been projected by modern scholars, admittedly following some cues in Plato and Xenophon, on to Persia as a whole. Thus it has been said of Artaxerxes II that 'his incapacity and subservience to the will of his mother and of his wife, Statira, caused a progressive decline and disintegration of the Empire'.<sup>18</sup> Tacitus knew better than to suppose that the whole first-century A.D. Roman empire shared in, or suffered as a result of, Nero's personal defects of character.

The present chapter does not claim to be a history of the fourth-century Persian empire: such a thing is desirable, but not possible in the present state of our knowledge. It is unapologetically constructed out of the often Greek evidence which we happen to have. First the Persian Kings and their dates will be given, then a sketch of satrapal powers, then a narrative account.

## II. THE ACHAEMENID DYNASTY, 479–330 B.C.<sup>19</sup>

Xerxes I died in 465. His successor Artaxerxes I probably ended the old quarrel with Athens in 449, with a definitive Peace of Callias, which may however have been foreshadowed as early as the 460s.<sup>20</sup> Thereafter Athens and Persia rubbed along together in the areas where their

<sup>17</sup> Cawkwell 1984 (C 114).

<sup>18</sup> D. Wormell *OCD*<sup>2</sup> 1970, 126 s.v. Artaxerxes II. See already Plato *Laws* 694–8, and Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.8 (with Hirsch 1985 (B 59) 91–100 on the problems of this final chapter).

<sup>19</sup> For the dates, see below, pp. 234ff; for the facts, Cook 1983 (F 14) and Gershevitch 1985 (F 25).

<sup>20</sup> Badian 1987 (F 3), better in *From Plataea to Potidaea* (Baltimore, 1993).

influence overlapped, with only isolated moments of tension.<sup>21</sup> The reign of Artaxerxes ended in late 424 and after brief confusion he was succeeded by Darius II.<sup>22</sup>

Darius II's reign, like that of Artaxerxes I, falls outside the scope of this volume, but for Greek historians he is remarkable as the Persian King who – whatever his other failures, like the loss of Egypt – settled the Peloponnesian War in Sparta's favour in the years 407–404, so producing the Spartan supremacy with which the fourth century begins. Darius' decision to abandon the Peace of Callias was perhaps motivated by exasperation at Athenian support of the rebel satrap Amorges (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 465). The King's attempt to exclude the Spartans from Asia in 411, as the price of his financial support, may have had to be qualified four years later, see below, p. 65 for the "Treaty of Boiotios".

Nearly a quarter of a century after the troubles of 424, after the reign of Darius II, the throne was again contested when at the end of the fifth century Cyrus the Younger sought to dislodge the new king Artaxerxes II. Cyrus was defeated and killed at the Battle of Cunaxa.<sup>23</sup>

Artaxerxes II's reign (404–359) saw some loosening of control in the west; some of this may have been deliberate, see ch. 8*a* for the emergence of smaller, subdivided satrapies and of local dynasts with or without the satrapal title. But some was involuntary, see p. 84*f* below for the Satraps' Revolt. Against all this must be set the King's Peace of 386 (p. 79*f*), an undoubted success for Persian diplomacy, comparable to, but more lasting than, Darius' settlement of 411. It secured undisputed Persian control of Asia Minor for half a century. This Artaxerxes' reign may have been characterized by religious innovation: he is supposed to have favoured Anaitis (*FGrH* 680 Berossus F 11) and Mithras, as well as the traditional Ahura-Mazda. Certainly there is literary evidence that he introduced a statue of Anaitis (Greek Artemis) into the temple at Sardis (Clement of Alexandria *Protr.* v.65.6,<sup>24</sup> cf. ch. 8*a*, p. 230 for a new Artemis/Cybele relief). But 'religious innovation' may, as at classical Athens, just be a scholarly way of saying that there is now evidence for the cults which was not there before.

The third Artaxerxes (Ochus) acceded in 359 and re-established Persian authority in the west. But the collapse of the Satraps' Revolt through treachery meant that the worst was already over by 360, and as we shall see, the extent of the trouble may in any case have been exaggerated by our sources. Artaxerxes III straight away ordered the dismantling of satrapal mercenary armies (scholiast on Dem. iv.19); and

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 69*ff*, with Stolper 1983 (F 60) and 1985 (F 177) 116–24.

<sup>23</sup> Westlake 1989 (A 62) ch. 17.

<sup>24</sup> Bidez and Cumont 1938 (F 8) 4; Cook 1983 (F 14) ch. 14; L. Robert 1969–90 (B 172) vi 137–68; Briant 1982 (F 10) 458*ff*. Cf. below p. 258 (Stolper).

in the late 340s he recovered Egypt, which had been in revolt since about 404.<sup>25</sup> The death of this able ruler in 338 has prompted speculation<sup>26</sup> as to Macedon's chances later in that decade if he had lived on: they would have been less good.

King Arses, now known to have taken the title Artaxerxes IV (*SEG* xxvii 942 = M9),<sup>27</sup> lasted from 338 to 336. He was succeeded by Darius III Codomannus, Alexander's cowardly opponent, who despite an early personal reputation for bravery (*Diod.* xvii.6, against the Cadusians, for whom see p. 64) was to flee at the battles of Issus and Gaugamela and end the direct line of the Achaemenids.

### III. THE NATURE OF PERSIAN RULE AND THE POWERS OF SATRAPS<sup>28</sup>

Persian methods, though of great interest and importance for the student of imperialism in the ancient world, have had less attention, in modern comparative works, than might have been hoped.<sup>29</sup> Persian imperialist aims have until recently been neglected still more comprehensively: for a long time, few of the sophisticated questions familiar from the study of Athenian or Roman imperialism were even asked. Were the Persians' aims fundamentally aggressive, or was Persia merely drawn involuntarily into Greek affairs?<sup>30</sup> How conscious was support of 'medizing' (i.e. pro-Persian) factions and individuals, or did Persia just respond to power-seeking overtures as and when they came her way?<sup>31</sup> Did Persia routinely support oligarchies?<sup>32</sup> There are certainly grounds for supposing so,<sup>33</sup> of which not the least, to confine ourselves to the fourth century, is Alexander's subsequent installation of democracies in Greek territories taken from Persia (Tod no. 192 = Harding no. 107 is the clearest instance). But if the policies of Athens, Sparta and Alexander (not to mention Republican Rome) can all be shown to have been

<sup>25</sup> Bresciani in Gershevitch 1985 (F 25) 512, 522.

<sup>26</sup> A. Toynbee, *Some Problems of Greek History* (Oxford, 1969) 421ff.

<sup>27</sup> For the date Badian 1977 (B 135); Burn in Gershevitch 1985 (F 25) 38of and n. 1 should be corrected. For 'M'-numbered inscriptions see Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 364ff.

<sup>28</sup> See generally Petit 1990 (F 45); Tuplin 1987 (F 65) and below pp. 251ff (Stolper).

<sup>29</sup> A. N. Sherwin-White 1980 (A 56), reviewing Garnsey and Whittaker 1978 (A 22) and commenting on the absence in that book of a Persia chapter.

<sup>30</sup> Walser in F 51, 155ff, but see Hornblower 1990 (F 36) 92. Balcer 1984 (F 5) ch. 1 has a discussion of Achaemenid imperialism but it is over-theoretical and schematic.

<sup>31</sup> Austin 1990 (F 2).

<sup>32</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 644) ch. 5, where the fourth-century evidence for this proposition, and the exceptions to it, are discussed.

<sup>33</sup> For the fifth century, M-L no. 40 = Fornara no. 71 (Ionian Erythrae), has traditionally been taken to show that if you opposed democratic Athens you looked for support to Persia, but see Lewis 1984 (C 41), who shows that the situation at 'democratic' Erythrae was not straightforward, with general cautionary remarks about Athenian 'support of democracies'.

pragmatic and ideologically flexible, may not the same have been true of Persia? Some suggested answers to some of these questions will, it is hoped, emerge from the present chapter, but the first step must be an attempt to examine the concrete realities of Persian control.

We may begin by contrasting two passages in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, the first highly general, the second highly particular.

First, I.5.9: the Persian empire is strong in respect of extent of territory and number of inhabitants; but it is weak in respect of its lengthened communications and the dispersal of its forces, that is, if one can attack with speed. Second, IV.5.24: a *komarch* (village head man) in Armenia agrees to co-operate with Xenophon's troops who have billeted themselves on him, and he shows them where some wine is buried. The interesting thing about the second passage is that although the Persian satrap is said earlier in the same chapter to be only 5 km away, and although there is a mention of seventeen colts on their way from the village via the *komarch*,<sup>34</sup> cf. para. 34, to the Persian King as tribute (all of which shows the reality of the Persian presence), still the *komarch* is the man with whom Xenophon and his colleague Cheirisophus automatically negotiate. We should like to know more about the sequel: were there Persian reprisals against the village? Or did the *komarch* (whom Xenophon later forced to act as guide, until he ran away) find a means of saving his credit with the satrap? Or did the satrap just shrug the incident off? Whatever happened, this second passage rings absolutely true, and would be easy to parallel from the writings of travellers in outposts of any large, peasant-populated empire run on Burke's principle of 'wise and salutary neglect', from Roman to Ottoman or Tsarist Russian. We could, for example, compare Roman Thessaly in the second century A.D., the world of Apuleius' *Golden Ass*, where the administrative picture is one of self-help, organized by communities which largely ran themselves, for protection against brigandage and so forth.<sup>35</sup> 'The Emperor's distant existence was felt by all. But only very special circumstances would bring his forces into action.' Thus the donkey at the centre of the Roman story is requisitioned for the governor, such commandeering of transport being, for Rome as for Persia, one way – road-building was another<sup>36</sup> – of shortening the 'lengthened communications' which Xenophon had criticized in the first passage above; and we should remember the seventeen colts of his second passage. (Note also Diod. XVI.42.5: fodder, for horses, is collected at Phoenician Sidon by the King's satraps in the 340s.) Such demands, like those for wine and corn

<sup>34</sup> Briant 1982 (F 10) 416 and n. 52; cf. Strabo XI.14.9. For Achaemenid Armenia generally see Cook 1983 (F 14) 197f.

<sup>35</sup> Millar 1981 (A 40); cf. Robert 1937 (F 705) 94ff; Sancisi-Weerdenburg in F 52, 268.

<sup>36</sup> Cawkwell 1973 (B 25) 62 n. 3; Cook 1983 (F 14) 107ff.

at *An.* III.4.31, were probably the most obvious way in which at normal times the central power impinged. Otherwise, the *komarch* coped and controlled, as no doubt his grandson did in Alexander's time. (For similar latitude enjoyed in western as opposed to eastern Anatolia in the fourth century see ch. 8a, where more formal, epigraphic evidence is adduced, for control by Greek or hellenized local communities of such matters as citizen intake and, up to a point, taxation.)

What, though, of Xenophon's first, more general, passage? The positive half – the strength conferred by human and territorial resources – is not to be denied; though the battles of Marathon in 490 and Gaugamela in 331, and the persistent failure in Egypt, showed that numbers did not guarantee victories.<sup>37</sup> But the other, the negative half, of Xenophon's assessment, is more doubtful. The idea that the Persian empire was vulnerable to rapid *anabasis*, thrust up-country, from the west was a dangerous, because delusory, myth, much promoted by Isocrates (IV, *Panegyricus* esp. 145ff; V *Philippus*) and owing its origin precisely to the events of 401 B.C. and the near-success of Cyrus and his Greeks at Cunaxa. But when Alexander crossed to Asia, the Persian satraps lined the banks of the river Granicus to repel him. It was, as Arrian rightly called it (*Anab.* VII.9.7), a 'satraps' battle', mounted extempore by loyal satraps at the head of mostly local levies. We can add that the fiercest resistance to Alexander west of Iran came from places such as Halicarnassus, Tyre and Gaza, which had a long tradition of clientship to Persia, and whose rulers therefore had nothing to gain from seeing Persia overthrown. This was true throughout the fourth century, and has to be set against the revolts of the period.

What was the difference between 400 and 334? That is, why did Cyrus nearly succeed? The key was surely in the position of Cyrus himself, and in the anomalous conditions in western Asia Minor at the end of the Peloponnesian War. At that time, Tissaphernes and Cyrus had competing and simultaneous claims to the seaboard, with Tissaphernes being granted 'the cities' (i.e. their revenues, as Themistocles had been: p. 213).<sup>38</sup> This created inter-satrapal rivalry, and the result was political confusion in which Cyrus was able to recruit mercenaries extensively in Ionia<sup>39</sup> (as well as the Peloponnese and Thessaly) without attracting too much notice. Even so, he had at first to pretend to be planning a punitive campaign against the Pisidians; this was a plausible tale, cf. p. 219 for the Pisidians. (Tissaphernes, *Xen. An.* I.2, suspected the truth when Cyrus was still at Sardis, but seems not to have been strong enough to do more than report Cyrus to the King, and this took time. The delay enabled Cyrus to leave Anatolia.) It was Cyrus' anomalous standing in 407–401,

<sup>37</sup> Cawkwell 1968 (F 13).      <sup>38</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 122.

<sup>39</sup> Roy 1967 (K 53) 297, 300, 302, 307.



as ‘satrap of Lydia, Greater Phrygia and Cappadocia, and lord of those who muster in the Plain of Castollus’ (Xen. *An.* 1.9.7) which enabled him to turn Persia’s first line of defence, namely the loyalty of the great west Anatolian satraps, by the simple means of being those satraps himself, rolled into one. None of that was true in 334. Nor was it true even when Agesilaus invaded Asia Minor, perhaps with the more limited objective of creating a cordon of rebel satraps (see below, p. 69): he could not secure Ionia and Caria, so, unlike Cyrus who got out of Anatolia before trouble could start, he could not – even supposing he wanted to – have gone east with an unprotected rear. He would have been bottled up in the interior. (The further question, why Alexander succeeded in this area where Agesilaus failed, is to be answered by pointing to Alexander’s ability, the largely fortuitous result of technological advance in places like Sicily and Thessaly, to take fortified cities.)<sup>40</sup>

The loyalty of the satraps at the Granicus is striking, and important; by explaining it we shall have explained the secret of Persian success over so long a period. To a large extent the fall of the Achaemenids is to be laid at the door of Darius III personally, and is not, despite Xenophon, to be attributed to the nature of the Persian empire as a whole. There was nothing fatally wrong with the troops, or with the generals and satraps. True, Persian infantry was weak, but Persian cavalry fought bravely and well against Alexander at the Battles of Issus and Gaugamela. As for the Persian commanders, it is only the obsession of the literary sources with Alexander and his glorification which has concealed the effectiveness of the Persian counter-offensive in the Aegean in the late 330s.<sup>41</sup>

For Xenophon in his more theoretical writings on the Persian empire, namely the *Oeconomicus* (book IV) and the relevant parts of the *Cyropaedia*, as also by implication for Isocrates, the good behaviour of satraps was guaranteed by a set of institutional controls: a standing royal army (Isoc. IV.145), divided commands to encourage spying and delation (Xen. *Oec.* IV.11), garrisons appointed by the Great King to supervise and guard against potentially delinquent governors<sup>42</sup> (Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.6.1), touring inspectors with police functions (*ibid.* 16), royal scribes at satrapal courts (Hdt. III.128.3) and so on. The idea of the King’s Eye (Hdt. I.114, Aesch. *Pers.* 980, Plut. *Artox.* 12), and even the King’s Ear (Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.2.11) was an attractive one to Greeks – but of the two, the oriental evidence has so far corroborated the existence only of the ‘Ear’, in the Aramaic form *guskaye*, ‘listeners’. But even this is not certain.<sup>43</sup> (Cf. p. 301.)

Indeed, not much of this Greek picture gets support from the Persian

<sup>40</sup> Anderson 1970 (K 3) 140 and 1974 (B 4) 28, cf. Meyer 1909 (B 77) 7.

<sup>41</sup> Burn 1952 (D 164). <sup>42</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 145ff.

<sup>43</sup> Eilers 1940 (F 18) 22f; Kraeling 1953 (F 465) 37; Cook 1983 (F 14) 143; but note Hirsch 1985 (B 59) and Sancisi-Weerdenburg in F 52, 269. On *guskaye* see the doubts of Petit 1990 (F 45) 171 n. 282.

side. For the Greeks it was natural – remembering the last tyrannies of their own archaic age, backed up by club-bearing bodyguards; or looking sideways to the methods of the Syracusan Dionysius I – to associate one-man rule with close and oppressive control. Thus in Xenophon's *Hellenica* (vi.1.12) a Thessalian speaker, Polydamas of Pharsalus, is made to say 'in Persia everybody except for one man is educated to be a slave rather than to stand up for himself'. (He goes on to remark on the extremities to which the Great King was brought by comparatively small forces, those of Cyrus and Agesilaus, a judgment whose weakness as applied to Cyrus we have already discussed, and which as applied to Agesilaus was plain false, or at best untested, though no less popular a belief for that.) Greeks, then, for whom society was polarized between the citizen hoplite and the chattel slave, tended to see Persian subjects in the metaphorical terms of the second or servile category – since they evidently did not belong to the first. (Cf. Diod. ix.31.3; Hdt. i.89.1; ii.1.2.) Persian imperial diction may have given some support to this conception: Gadates is addressed by the Persian King as his *doulos* or slave, see the Greek inscription M–L no. 12, a letter of Darius I; and the same Darius in the Behistun inscription calls Gobryas his *bandaka*, Old Persian for 'servant'. But in the first of these texts the Greek word for 'slave' may represent some form of the semitic '*ebed*', which can 'mean' anything from a household man-servant to a political subject – or an officer of the King.<sup>44</sup> Old Persian *bandaka* is similarly imprecise (servant or subject? Cf. Kent 1953 (F 39)). The truth is that oriental terms for dependent status are notoriously treacherous, and Greek terminology is poor evidence for Persian attitudes. It is slightly more significant that the status of Persian 'slave' was objected to in the 380s by Evagoras of Cyprus, who wanted to be '*subject as king to king*', Diod. xv.8: Evagoras presumably knew the semitic nuances of whatever Aramaic word meant 'slave'. But in the end the Persians were not fussy about Evagoras' label: they conceded Evagoras' right to be subject as king to king (*ibid.* 19.2), a concession by Orontes which was not reversed by Artaxerxes. But the whole point of this incident is that Evagoras wanted to be treated as a special case – or perhaps like the 'kings' of Sidon in Phoenicia.

It is best to start, not with terminology or Greek misconceptions, but with attested satrapal actions and areas of inaction. The relationship which emerges is a feudal one, allowing much satrapal freedom of action, in return for military service, and dependent ultimately not on formal controls but on loyalty to a system of allegiance, protection, and territorial and other kinds of gift-giving, which was foreign to Greeks of

<sup>44</sup> F. Brown, S. R. Driver and C. A. Briggs, *Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament* (Oxford, 1907) 713–14.

the classical age. Their ancestors of the seventh century and earlier might have understood the relationship better, if the pre-Solonian status of 'hektemorage' has been correctly interpreted in an earlier volume as in some sense voluntary and contractual: *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.3, 380. Though the word 'feudal' was there avoided, we need not be afraid of using it or 'serf' and so on either for the interpretation of Solon or of Persia:<sup>45</sup> the differences from medieval Europe are obvious enough, and are less important than the similarities. It is true that classical Greeks themselves like Herodotus were very 'reciprocity-minded', and Herodotus' *History* can be understood as a network of acts of requital for good or evil done by others.<sup>46</sup> But Herodotus, Xenophon and even Thucydides (II.97)<sup>47</sup> would surely not have commented on the importance of Persian gift-giving unless they had seen it as truly exceptional even by their own hospitable standards.

The actual behaviour of Persian satraps does not, as already briefly indicated, show much sign of deference to, or inhibition by, the royal controls listed by the Greek sources. (What were the royal scribes and King's Eyes doing in the unrest of the 360s?) Xenophon (above) says that garrisons, responsible only to the King, watched over the loyalty of satraps.<sup>48</sup> There is *some* confirmation in the sources for this: thus there are gates on the Royal Road (Hdt. v. 52), and a royal garrison at the Cilician Gates (Xen. *An.* I.4.4); again, Orontas (*ibid.* I.6) at the royal fortress of Lydian Sardis is loyal to Artaxerxes not the rebel Cyrus. But in the great trilingual inscription found at Lycian Xanthus and published in 1974, the satrap Pixodarus himself appoints the garrison-commander of the city (*SEG* xxvii 942 = M9: 337 B.C.). Perhaps Xenophon was seduced into shaky generalization by the single instance of Lydia, which does contain a number of the classic literary mechanisms of control.<sup>49</sup>

More generally, the military competence of satraps was in practice unfettered, as far as routine campaigning and policing went, despite Ephorus' exaggerated statement that the 'Persian commanders, not being plenipotentiaries, refer to the King about everything' (Diod. xv.41.5). Fourth-century satraps like Orontas, Abrocomas and Tiribazus take minor military action without (as far as we can see) telling the King,<sup>50</sup> and Pharnabazus is not likely to have asked for the King's consent every time he raided Mysian brigands (Xen. *Hell.* III.1.13). The forces used were probably either mercenaries, some no doubt drawn from the garrisons (mercenaries are attested in satrapal hands as early as

<sup>45</sup> Rhodes 1981 (B 94) 94. Achaemenid feudalism: Petit 1990 (F 45) 243ff.

<sup>46</sup> Gould 1989 (B 46).

<sup>47</sup> Briant in F 51, 6; Hornblower 1991 (B 62), commentary on Thuc. II.97.

<sup>48</sup> Tuplin 1987 (F 66) and in F 40, 67ff. <sup>49</sup> Tuplin 1987 (F 66) 234.

<sup>50</sup> Meyer 1901 (A 37) 72f; Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 146; Cook 1983 (F 14) 84 and ch. 16 generally.

the time of Pissouthnes in c.440: Thuc. I.115);<sup>51</sup> or else they were *ad hoc* native or Persian levies, men like those who are said by Xenophon to muster under their *karanos* or commander<sup>52</sup> in the plain of Castollus (*An.* I.1.2; 9.7, with *OGIS* 488) or 'at Thymbrara' (*Cy.* VI.2.11).<sup>53</sup> Such a force is glimpsed in action in the 350s, the levy from the 'territory of the Persian Tithraustes', attested in a papyrus published in 1903, covering events of the Social War between Athens and her allies (*FGrH* 105, P. Rainer, with scholiast to *Dem.* IV.19). And in the great set battles like Salamis and Gaugamela, satraps more often than not command troops from their own territories.<sup>54</sup>

All this can be used to dispose of yet another Greek myth, the Persian standing army. Such a thing is poorly attested: the famous 'Immortals' may just be a mistranslation of a word meaning feudal 'Followers'; and Darius I's 'Persian and Median army that was with me' (the Behistun inscription) dates from an untypical period of imperial convulsion.<sup>55</sup> (Better evidence would be the 'royal army' of 120,000 who were sent against the Cardouchi, *Xen. An.* III.5.16, if this incident were wholly credible, see below, p. 64.) And we need not deny that satraps could ask for troops 'from the King', as Tissaphernes does in 396, and gets plenty of them, too: *Xen. Hell.* III.4.6; 11. But why should this sort of thing not have been done in the Flavio-Antonine way, by shuffling troops around different trouble spots, according to what the strategic analysts call a 'regional deployment policy'?<sup>56</sup> For Persia as for Rome, difficulties of communication and transport were good arguments against having a 'single centralised reserve in the modern manner'.<sup>57</sup> Naval operations were certainly organized in something like the way here suggested (cf. *Diod.* XIV.98.3; XVI.42, both against Cyprus). Fleets were purpose-built when necessary, a lengthy business:<sup>58</sup> cf. p. 67 for 397 B.C. More important than the question of attestation, which could be a matter of chance, a standing army was unnecessary: the Persian system was flexible, informal – and feudal. Heraclides of Cyme speaks (*FGrH* 689 F 2) of the king's 'fellow-diners', and he connects this status with military service: as we have seen, this insight is confirmed by the Persepolis Fortification Tablets inasmuch as they are evidence of a 'rations' system. But, as in later feudal societies, the relationship was reproduced at levels

<sup>51</sup> Roy 1967 (K 53) 322f; Seibt 1977 (K 54); Lavelle 1989 (K 32).

<sup>52</sup> On the *karanos* Petit 1983 (F 44) and 1990 (F 45) 133ff.

<sup>53</sup> Thymbrara is perhaps at or near Adala/Satala, and is not the same place as Castollus 50 km ESE, *pace* Cawkwell 1979 (B 26) 405. For the better location Buresch 1898 (F 595) 184 and Robert 1962 (F 706A) 100ff. Thymbrara is not identical with Thybarna, again *pace* Cawkwell; see Buresch, already rejecting this. See too Meyer 1909 (B 77) 13 and n. 1.

<sup>54</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 147.

<sup>55</sup> Immortals: Frye in Walser 1972 (F 68) 87. *Contra*: Cook 1983 (F 14) 101 and 246 n. 1; Petit 1990 (F 45) 145 and n. 152. Behistun inscription: Andrewes 1961 (B 5) 17ff.

<sup>56</sup> Luttwak 1976 (A 34) 80ff. <sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* 84. <sup>58</sup> Cawkwell 1970 (C 109) 47f.

lower than the royal: so Cyrus the Younger has his 'table-sharers' (Xen. *An.* 1.8.25), and the satrap Spithrobates at the Granicus has his own 'kinsmen', his personal 'Companion Cavalry', as it were (Diod. xvii.20.2).<sup>59</sup> Some of these, though hardly all, were perhaps real kinsmen, like Pharnabazus' half-brother Bagaesus, who commands a detachment of cavalry at Xen. *Hell.* III.4.14. In his obituary of Cyrus the Younger (*An.* 1.8), Xenophon praises above all the loyalty and love which he inspired; certainly the gesture with which Orontas the traitor clutches Cyrus' girdle is authentically feudal, and can be paralleled, more or less, from medieval times.<sup>60</sup> (In the Arab historian Tabari, the belt of the Abbasid general Afsin is grasped by his Turkish executioner.)

Another technique claimed by literary sources as a way of weakening satrapal authority was to separate civil and military responsibility (Xen. *Oec.* IV.11), or to divide the authority in some similar way. This happens to be attested for one satrapal capital, Lydian Sardis, both at the beginning of Achaemenid rule (Hdt. 1.153, not however a success) and its end (Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.7 gives Alexander's dispositions, which exactly match those of Cyrus the Great two centuries earlier). Indeed Lydian arrangements may, as we have seen, be the basis for Xenophon's generalization.

Power could be 'divided' in less formal ways: the two most famous satraps of Thucydides' day, Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, are explicitly said to be in competition at Thuc. VIII.109, cf. 99. Again, from Xen. *Hell.* III.4.26 bad blood may be inferred between Pharnabazus and Tithraustes;<sup>61</sup> and Diodorus (xv.8ff) proves the same for Tiribazus and Orontes. Though these rivalries mostly stop short of being mutually destructive, that between Cyrus and Tissaphernes certainly is (Plut. *Artox.* 3.3); while 'the Persians' at Sardis (identity and status not specified), are dissatisfied with Tissaphernes' conduct even before the Battle of Sardis,<sup>62</sup> denounce him (Xen. *Hell.* III.4.25), just as he had denounced Cyrus, and because Cyrus' mother Parysatis feels the same way Tissaphernes is beheaded.<sup>63</sup> Neighbourly rivalry is one thing, but actual joint satrapies are very rare indeed. It is not clear whether the 'sons of Pharnaces' at Thuc. VIII.58.1 are joint satraps. Orontobates, a Persian, and the Hecatomnid Pixodarus share the rule in Caria (Strabo XIV.2.17), but the context of the appointment of Orontobates is not disloyalty by Pixodarus but its opposite, a return to allegiance; while the shared brother-sister satrapies of the earlier Hecatomnids in Caria (Mausolus-

<sup>59</sup> Sekunda in F 40, 185 follows the view here suggested.

<sup>60</sup> M. Bloch, *La société féodale* (Paris, 1949) 224ff. 'La formation des liens de dépendance'. For Tabari, Widengren 1969 (F 71) 27f. <sup>61</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 143 n. 51.

<sup>62</sup> Anderson 1974 (B 4) 52; Lewis 1977 (A 33) 142 n. 47; Beloch 1912-27 (A 5) III<sup>2</sup> 1.46 n. 1; Meyer 1909 (B 77) 20. <sup>63</sup> Westlake 1989 (A 62) ch. 17.

+ Artemisia: *ILabraunda* 40 = M7; Idrieus + Ada: L. Robert, *Hellenica* VII.63ff = M5) are incestuous anomalies, not a central Achaemenid device for weakening, but a Hecatomnid device for strengthening, the native family's power. It was also perhaps an imitative gesture towards their endogamous Achaemenid masters, and a way of posing as legitimate in the grand Iranian manner.<sup>64</sup> However, it should be mentioned that it is precisely this sort of thing, particularly the unprecedented *female* satrapies of Artemisia and Ada, which has led to doubts about whether the Hecatomnids were 'really' satraps at all,<sup>65</sup> though they certainly use the title on Greek inscriptions (see p. 215 and n. 23).

Ephorus' generalization, about satrapal deference to the King in all things, is widely expressed, and is presumably supposed to cover diplomacy as well as warfare. Here too Greek theoretical notions, and the attested reality, diverge. The Carduchi of southern Armenia are said to make treaties with the 'satrap in the plain' (*Xen. An.* III.5.16): how typical was the satrapal independence which this implies? Modern historians speak of 'peripheral imperialism' to describe far-reaching decisions made by the man on the spot who is in no position to consult the distant home authorities.<sup>66</sup> Perhaps the Persian empire expanded at the edges in this way, via satrapal initiatives which the King did not authorize – but did not repudiate either. Such initiatives are not exactly evidence for disloyalty. On the other hand, Demosthenes (XV.11–12) and Xenophon's Agesilaus (*Hell.* IV.1.36, said to Pharnabazus: 'increase your own rule (*arche*) not the King's') do coolly assume that satraps will seek to profit from the King's setbacks; and Isocrates in both 380 and 346 was similarly optimistic: IV.162 and V.103, both expressing the hope that the Carian Hecatomnids will be disloyal to Persia in the Greek interest. Actually Isocrates in 346 got it conspicuously wrong: soon afterwards, Idrieus invaded rebel Cyprus on Persian authority (p. 329f). In other words, Greek literary generalizations, especially those of orators or pamphleteers, do not get us very far. We should also remember that satraps may themselves invoke Ephorus' principle as a bluff, or to win time.<sup>67</sup>

A notable instance of satrapal action is Mausolus' help to the enemies of Athens – island secessionists from the Second Naval Confederacy, and others – in the Social War of the 350s: since the war was brought to an end (*Diod.* XVI.22) by a threat of the Great King to involve himself, evidently for the first time, the implication is that Mausolus' original interference (*ibid.* 7) was not royally sanctioned. Diodorus (XV.10.2), that

<sup>64</sup> For *Thuc.* VIII.58.1 see Andrewes in Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1945–81 (B 44) *ad loc.*, and Lewis 1977 (A 33) 52 n. 17. For Caria see Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 151, 167; 358ff.

<sup>65</sup> Petit 1988 (F 693).

<sup>66</sup> Richardson 1986 (A 49) 177, citing Fieldhouse 1981 (A 17) 23.

<sup>67</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 58.

is Ephorus, implies that it was open to Artaxerxes to disapprove (and to repudiate?) Orontes' settlement with Evagoras, though he actually does neither. Inscriptions survive which record dealings between the Greek states and Persian satraps as apparently independent agents: the difficulty is that there is reason to doubt the loyalty, at the time, of some of the satraps concerned. Thus the 'Reply to the Satraps' (Tod no. 145 = Harding no. 57, cf. p. 88f), and Athens' grant of citizenship to Orontes (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 207a, see p. 88) may both date from periods of instability in the western provinces. Epigraphically, the best attested satrapy is Caria, and here two diplomatic documents, a proxeny decree for Cnossus in Crete standing in the names of Mausolus and Artemisia, and a treaty with Pamphylian Phaselis (*ILabraunda* 40; Bengtson, *SdA* 260 = M7 and M10) show no sign of deference to Persia. Nor are there any but question-begging grounds for dating them to the short period in the late 360s when Mausolus was in open revolt from Persia (he was loyal again by 361/0: Tod no. 138 line 17). Anyway the Phaselis text probably included the 'royal oath',<sup>68</sup> a formula which, though it does not exclude satrapal diplomatic initiative in the matter, surely does exclude rebellion. The Cnossus decree uses the phrase 'the land which Mausolus rules', *archei*, and this verb is audacious; although Herodotus (VII.19), Thucydides (VIII.6.1; 99) and Xenophon (*An.* I.1.8) had all used the *noun* (*arche*) of satraps. (Xen. *Hell.* IV.1.36, about Pharnabazus, quoted above, is a particularly revealing use.) The problem with the Hecatomnid satraps (cf. above) is to know whether they are unusually independent, or unusually well documented. Perhaps both.

The last major area of satrapal competence, after military and diplomatic activity, is finance and taxation. That satraps were obliged to forward tribute to the King is stated by Thucydides (VIII.5, about Tissaphernes) and implied by Diodorus, who says (xv.90) that in the Satraps' Revolt half the King's revenues were cut off. Satraps certainly coined money, but the view taken in the first edition of this work (*CAH* VI<sup>1</sup> 21) that satraps who strike gold are aiming for the throne, has been disproved:<sup>69</sup> a number of places and individuals under Persian suzerainty, and not in revolt at the time, strike gold in the fourth century. Gold is 'money of necessity' – a symptom at most of emergency, which might or might not be an act of revolt.

So money and other kinds of tribute (like the horses and wheat in Armenia: above) were collected by satraps. (Even Persis itself, non-tributary according to Hdt. III.97.1, seems in fact to have paid a tribute, called *bazis*.<sup>70</sup> But this did not need to be forwarded far, and in any case

<sup>68</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 153.      <sup>69</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 179.

<sup>70</sup> Dandamayev *VDI* 1973, 3ff; Briant 1982 (F 10) 414 n. 43; also 501ff discussing Hdt. III.97. See also Koch 1981 (F 39A) and 1990 (F 39B) 8–40.



1. Tetradrachm of Cyzicus; Pharnabazus (413–372 B.C.). (After Kraay and Hirmer 1966 (B 201) fig. 718.)

Persis does not always seem to have had its own satrap.)<sup>71</sup> In the western provinces, at any rate, some of this tribute was restruck into Greek-style coins, no doubt for payment of mercenaries. (An example is a coin of Pharnabazus (Fig. 1) with his portrait on the obverse, and a warship on the reverse, possibly<sup>72</sup> used to pay some Greek sailor at the battle of Cnidus, for which see below, p. 73.) Of the tributes listed at Hdt. III.89ff, we have to assume<sup>73</sup> that some part at least was retained by the satrap for his own expenses – the payment of mercenaries, or, in the Hecatomnid case, the upkeep of a hundred-ship fleet: Xen. *Ages.* II.26ff. The Oxyrhynchus Historian (XIX) says that Tithraustes subsidized Conon with 220 talents out of the former *ousia*, property, of Tissaphernes; but the same chapter implies that satrapal resources on their own would not normally have financed a war for long, or at all. But surely not everything was forwarded to court (a long influential view, according to which Persia went in for economically disastrous hoarding of precious metal, has been challenged,<sup>74</sup> despite Greek evidence like *FGrH* 128 Polyclitus F 3). There is no explicit, general, ancient statement that satraps subtracted something for running expenses, though the passage from Xenophon's *Anabasis* already discussed (III.4.31) says that the wheat-flour, wine and barley had 'all been collected for the man who was satrap of the country'.<sup>75</sup> But the Persepolis Fortification Tablets show a complex, centrally organized ration system.

The commonsense conclusion is that the running expenses of a

<sup>71</sup> Dandamayev and Lukonin 1989 (F 16) 106f; Petit 1990 (F 45) does not really seem to realize that there is a problem about a satrapy of Persis.

<sup>72</sup> Kraay and Hirmer 1966 (B 201) 72ff and plate 718. <sup>73</sup> Petit 1990 (F 45) 160.

<sup>74</sup> Briant 1982 (F 10) 489, Stolper 1985 (F 177) 143–6; Petit 1990 (F 45) 162, against Olmstead 1948 (F 43). But cf. Cameron 1948 (F 12) 10ff and Cook 1983 (F 14) 137, 204.

<sup>75</sup> Altheim and Stiehl 1963 (F 1) 137ff, 150ff.



satrapy were indeed locally derived: the satrap took what he needed before sending the rest on. But we frankly do not know how the balance was struck between central and local expenditure. This is not a kind of ignorance confined to Persia: we think we know a lot about classical Athens, but it is equally unclear how an Attic deme (village) like Rhamnous could put up an expensive temple to Nemesis out of her deme funds, attested as small, without 'some subvention' from the state (M-L no. 53 and comm.). The phrase 'taxes over which the community has control', which implies the coexistence of a partially autonomous, exemption-granting, local unit and of a fiscally sovereign higher power, first occurs approximately simultaneously in fourth-century Persian Asia Minor (ch. 8a, p. 226) and in fourth-century Attic deme administration: SIG 1094, relating to Eleusis, a text which implies a contrast with taxes paid to the city of Athens. In other words, the satrapally held communities of western Anatolia may have borrowed from Athens the fiscal concepts and terminology needed to draw the line between where the claims of the local community ended and those of the King began.

But as we have seen, not all the dues exacted by Persia were of a kind we can call financial. Persian open-handed gift-giving, *polydoria* (Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.2.7, cf. VII.1.43), conferred prestige on the giver (above, p. 55). It was also a euphemism for what could be seen as a system of expropriations and dispossessions, if viewed from the angle of those who had to move out to make room for the Persians or Persian favourites who were endowed in this way by the crown (cf. p. 213 for the position in fifth-century Ionia). Finally, it was a system of *reciprocal* obligation: a man like Tithraustes on his *chora* or estates had to lead out the militia from those estates when the empire, or his corner of it, was under threat. The link between gift-giving and military dues or service is provided<sup>76</sup> by the most general word for 'dues' in Achaemenid Babylonia, *nadanattu*, which is related to the Hebrew root 'to give'. And the ambiguity between 'dues' and military service is illustrated by another word for 'dues', namely *ilku*, which is connected with a semitic root meaning 'to go'.

In Babylonia, dues were forwarded to the King by the heads of the local collectives, the *hatru* (we may compare the role of the Armenian *komarch*,<sup>77</sup> or of the local *eklogeis* or collectors, Antiphon F 52 Blass, who collected the tribute for the Athenian empire); perhaps the dues were forwarded through intermediaries – the Babylonian satrap? It would be easy to imagine a similar system operating in the villages and *poleis* of Anatolia, with the villages serving as the chief unit of collection. Thus Alexander lays claim to the *chora*, territory, of Priene (he remits the

<sup>76</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 157, citing Cardascia 1951 (F 83) and 1958 (F 84) and Dandamayev 1967 (F 92), 1969 (F 93) and 1984 (F 95). <sup>77</sup> Briant 1982 (F 10) 416 and n. 52; below p. 245f.

'contribution' of the city)<sup>78</sup> and tells the villages, whose inhabitants were non-Greeks and so in his eyes less entitled to consideration than the Greeks of the polis, to go on paying *phoros*, tribute, to him. Some of this tribute, as suggested above, would be used to meet local expenses; we may compare a land conveyance from hellenistic Sardis (Buckler and Robinson 1932 (F 594) no. 1) which shows that certain villages were liable for the upkeep of detachments of soldiers. This may be a legacy from Achaemenid practice (or from Macedonian? cf. *SEG* XIII 403 for a similar set-up in the hellenistic Macedon of Philip V).

The Aristotelian *Oeconomica*, probably an early hellenistic treatise describing Seleucid conditions, but with some Persian-looking features, distinguishes private, civic, satrapal and royal taxation (I 345b7ff). We have seen that the distinction between satrapal and royal is blurred, partly because, although the satraps were obliged to forward revenues, they had their own expenses; and partly because the kinds of 'tribute' levied by Persia include obligations of a non-financial, or personal, kind: transport, requisitioned food, and liability to military service under the command of a satrap or Persian feudatory. It would be hard to say if these obligations were owed to the King or to the satrap. But the distinction between satrapal/royal tax on the one hand and civic on the other is clear and important. Two inscriptions, from Labraunda and Lagina respectively<sup>79</sup> record grants by local communities of tax-freedom from 'all but royal taxes' (Lagina), or confer tax-freedom on Dion of Cos (the Labraunda text) 'from royal or civic imposts' (*epigraphai*), but without prejudice to the royal *tele*, which must be paid (*tele* = 'dues', obviously different from *epigraphai*, though we cannot say how). The community honouring Dion is that of the Plataseis. These people will be calling themselves a polis by the year 319/18: *REA* 92 (1990) p. 61, a decree noted below p. 226 n. 93. And a text from Achaemenid Sinuri, a sanctuary in Caria, first published in 1945 (*Hell.* VII.63ff = M5), confers 'tax-freedom except for the *apomoira*'. The *apomoira* has long been known as a Ptolemaic royal tax (*OGIS* 90, *SEG* XII 550), and is now here attested as Achaemenid Persian.

The revelation of the debt owed by the Seleucids and the Ptolemies to Persian institutions is an interesting feature of these inscriptions; and its significance for Asia Minor is brought out elsewhere, p. 226. But for the purpose of understanding the powers of Persian satraps another aspect may be stressed: these documents are ratified by the satrap alone, they show no sign that the King was consulted. Nor should we suppose that Persian Kings, any more than Roman emperors,<sup>80</sup> were too grand to

<sup>78</sup> Bosworth 1980 (B 14) 280f, a different view from Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 163; see also S. M. Sherwin-White 1985 (B 175).

<sup>79</sup> Crampa 1972 (F 619) 42 and *SEG* xxvi 1229 (Lagina) = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) M8 and M12. See further below, p. 226. <sup>80</sup> Millar 1977 (A 39).

concern themselves with trivialities like grants of citizenship or tax-exemption by the Carian Plataseis to Dion of Cos. After all, Darius II writes to the Jews at Egyptian Elephantine with astonishingly detailed orders about the keeping of the Feast of Unleavened Bread: 'word was sent from the King to Arsames saying: let there be a Passover for the Jewish garrison . . . drink no beer, and anything at all in which there is leaven do not eat, from the 15th day from sunset till the 21st day of Nisan' (Cowley, *AP* no. 21, with some editorial restoration). Possibly, like such imperial rescripts as Trajan's letter on the Christians (Pliny *Ep.* x.97) this was intended<sup>81</sup> to have general application to all the Jews of the empire. Persian Kings, like Roman emperors (see n. 80), may have tended to react rather than act, answering appeals via rescripts and so forth, rather than taking initiatives. Compare Tod no. 138 line 5 for a Carian delegation to Artaxerxes II, apparently leap-frogging the satrap; and perhaps (see n. 81) Darius' Elephantine letter is the product of another such appeal, as is Darius I's letter to Gadatas (M-L no. 12: above p. 54): evidently the sacred gardeners of Apollo have been complaining and the King sets inquiries on foot, line 5 ('I ascertain that . . .'). But if so, it was precisely this passivity which gave such latitude to their satraps. The satraps were the people with whom the locals had to deal, and in the satrapies for which we have good evidence they largely left these locals to their own devices. Alexander's liberation and restoration of autonomy to Ionia (Arr. *Anab.* 1.17-18) was hollow.

It is tantalizing that we do not know how far Ionian and Carian conditions were typical. Take two extreme cases: though sixth-century *India* had been tributary, it seems<sup>82</sup> that 'there was by Alexander's time no memory of Persian dominion beyond the Indus' (but note that Ctesias *F* 45 speaks of Indian deference to Persia via gift-giving. Like the Romans, the Persian Kings could have regarded such gift-giving neighbours as *membra partesque imperii*, Suet. *Aug.* 48.) By contrast, Curtius (iv.7.1) speaks of the arrogance and avariciousness of Persian rule in *Egypt* (cf. Diodorus' very similar language about the Persian satraps in Phoenicia, xvi.41.2: Sidon). This is supported by the history of rebellion in, and the evidence for Persian economic exploitation of, this great satrapy, the spoils from which, it was said, paid for the building of Susa and Persepolis. Rostovtzeff said of Egypt that it was 'apart from Greece, the only powerful rival of Persia'.<sup>83</sup> India then, was lost because control was so loose (permissiveness taken to the point of abandonment); Egypt was lost through over-harsh treatment. Again, *Bactria* had been dissident in the fifth century (Diod. xi.71: 460s), so it is interesting to find Orontes, leader of the Satraps' Revolt a century later, described in a later

<sup>81</sup> Meyer 1912 (*F* 489) 96.

<sup>82</sup> Brunt 1976-83 (B 21) 1547, preferable to Vogelsang in *F* 47, 183ff. On Achaemenid India see Cook 1983 (*F* 14) 61f, 292; *CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> ch. 3d. <sup>83</sup> Rostovtzeff 1953 (A 51) 82; below p. 344.

inscription as 'a Bactrian by race' (*OGIS* 264) – the phrase is emphatic and surely excludes the idea<sup>84</sup> that Orontes' family were mere settlers in Bactria. But Bactrians fought well at Gaugamela, and even afterwards Sogdia and Bactria were more trouble for Alexander to subdue than anywhere else. (We cannot be sure that Sogdia was no longer Achaemenid by the 330s.)<sup>85</sup>

We are back where we began: as with the satraps at the Granicus, so with the lords of Bactria: they put aside old animosity in defence of the system by which they were sustained on their fertile, irrigated meadows.<sup>86</sup> In any case, two centuries is a long time, and the local Bactrian aristocracy may have coexisted happily with Persian settlers at Bactrian Ai Khanum in Afghanistan (for such settlers cf. *SEG* xxviii 1327, a hellenistic attestation of the Iranian name Oxybazos). Fraternization, intermarriage and religious syncretism were surely not confined to the western satrapies (for the position in these satrapies see p. 229). Such coexistence may have produced what has been called a 'dominant ethno-class',<sup>87</sup> a powerful factor making for stability.

But in general our ignorance makes the picture at points east of Sardis very opaque. Thus we hear intermittently of serious revolts by the Cadusians near the Caspian (e.g. *Diod.* xv.8: 380s),<sup>88</sup> an old problem, and one surprisingly close to the Persian home. It is even more remarkable that the Uxian hillmen, who actually lived between Susa and Persepolis, had never been subject to Persia but allowed the King to pass through only on payment of a fee (*Arr. Anab.* III.17.1). Again, of the Carduchi in Southern Armenia, Xenophon says that 'a royal army of 120,000 had once invaded their country and not a man of them had got back, because of the terrible conditions of the ground they had to go through'. The details of this story are not completely convincing, and not only because of the implication that there was a standing army of this staggering size (above). But the casual mention of this fiasco, whatever really happened, is a good reminder that our knowledge of the Persian empire is not only poor, but too often derives from the Greek side.

#### IV. PERSIAN POLITICAL HISTORY: THE INVOLVEMENT WITH THE GREEKS, 400–336 B.C. •

The failure of Cyrus the Younger at the battle of Cunaxa in 401 reopened the issue of Persian policy towards the Greeks, because the Spartans had

<sup>84</sup> Cook 1983 (F 14) 193.

<sup>85</sup> Altheim and Stiehl 1963 (F 1) 163. For Sogdiana and Bactria, Cook 1983 (F 14) 192ff.

<sup>86</sup> Gardin and Gentelle 1976 (F 23); Gardin and Lyonnet 1978–9 (F 24); Gardin 1980 (F 22); cf. *CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> 183.

<sup>87</sup> Briant in F 40 137ff. But see the reservations of Sancisi-Weerdenburg in F 32, 267f.

<sup>88</sup> Syme 1988 (F 64).

helped Cyrus. Xenophon plays this down in the *Anabasis* but is more candid about it in the *Hellenica* (III.1.1). The Athenian Alcibiades (Thuc. VIII.46) had warned Tissaphernes more than a decade earlier that Persia should be careful whom she backed in the Peloponnesian War: the Athenians were old hands at imperialism, and Persia would not find it hard to reach an accommodation with them after the war. The accommodation Alcibiades had in mind would presumably have been on the lines of the Peace of Callias (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 121), which Athenian support of the rebel Amorges had shattered. Thucydides makes Alcibiades speak of ‘partnership in rule (*arche*)’, a phrase with a certain resonance to us, because picked up by Arrian to describe Alexander’s policy of fusion with, once again, Persia, *Anab.* VII.11.9. Sparta, on the other hand (Alcibiades continues) came to the Peloponnesian War posing as a liberator (cf. Thuc. II.8). It would therefore be illogical of her to stop short of liberating the Asiatic Greeks from Persia once she had liberated the rest of the Greek world from Athens. So far Alcibiades. It is true that Sparta, by the end of Thucydides’ narrative, has effectively abandoned her pretensions in Asia; but a strong case has been made<sup>89</sup> for thinking that the question was reopened in 407, and for speaking of a “Treaty of Boiotios” of that year (Xen. *Hell.* I.4.2ff), by which the autonomy of the Greeks of Asia was conceded by Persia. (Boiotios was the name of the Spartan diplomat who negotiated this.) In other words, Alcibiades’ prophecy was coming true well before the fifth century was out. The full vindication came after Cunaxa.

With Cyrus dead, Tissaphernes, now firmly reinstated as ‘satrap of his own former possessions and those of Cyrus also’ (Xen. *Hell.* III.1.3), mounted hostilities against the Ionian cities, which had supported Cyrus in his revolt. These cities promptly appealed to Sparta (*ibid.*), who told Tissaphernes not to commit any hostile acts against the cities, and in 400 B.C. sent out Thibron to enforce that requirement. How far fear of Sparta’s Anatolian policy was a cause of the Corinthian War, fought against her in Greece by Athens, Thebes and Corinth, is a topic which lies outside the scope of this chapter (see ch. 4, pp. 97ff). But the ‘liberator’ Thibron was very unpopular with the cities in Asia friendly to Sparta, because he allowed his army to plunder them: Xen. *Hell.* III.1.8.

He had to be replaced by Dercyllidas. Whatever the rest of Greece felt about such behaviour, it certainly went down badly in Persia. Artaxerxes reacted strongly, ordering a fleet to be built. (He was evidently untroubled by scruples about the “Treaty of Boiotios”, which had anyway been made with his predecessor and did not bind him, cf.

<sup>89</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 124. *Contra*, Seager and Tuplin 1980 (C 74) 144 n. 36; Cartledge 1979 (C 282) 266 and 1987 (C 284) 189f; Westlake *JHS* 99 (1979) 195, review of Lewis 1977 (A 33); Tuplin in F 51, 133ff.

Hdt. VII. 151.) More powerful with the Persian King than any opinion or feeling that the “Boiotios Treaty” had lapsed, was surely his simple personal loathing for the Spartans, those ‘most shameless of men’ (Dion F 19 = Plut. *Artox.* 22.1), who had helped Cyrus (it is relevant to this that many ex-Cyran mercenaries had re-enlisted under Thibron).

There were moreover good reasons, both strategic and political, for Persia to be alarmed by an energetic Spartan presence in the south-east Mediterranean and west/south-west Asia Minor.

First, strategic: it is clear that Sparta, as early as Dercyllidas’ expedition in 399–397, which follows that of Thibron, perceived the importance of naval supremacy in the south-east Aegean as a necessary precondition for a land offensive. This follows from the instructions given to Dercyllidas in 397 by the Spartan ephors to co-operate with Phrax, the Spartan *nauarch* (admiral) off Caria: Xen. *Hell.* III.2.12. Now Caria was not merely the seat of the private *oikos*, estate, of Tissaphernes (*ibid.*), and therefore a vulnerable and desirable target; it was the key to Persian control of Ionia, since the Maeander valley was the main thoroughfare joining southern Ionia to the Anatolian interior, and was more strategically important for this purpose even than the Royal Road, further to the north. This also helps to explain the importance of the island of Rhodes in the naval warfare of the 390s and 380s: the Hecatomnids of Caria later in the century needed Rhodes and her fleet for their own security – and took them. Demosthenes was to call Rhodes a ‘fortress to overawe Caria’ (xv.12). Conversely, when the boot was on the other foot, whoever controlled Rhodes could not afford the hostility of Caria over the water. Hence hellenistic Rhodes in her great period of hellenistic power and prosperity did well to spend money on fine ashlar fortifications for her possessions on the *peraia*, or Carian mainland opposite.

Second, political: most of our sources see the warfare of this period from too Greek a perspective; but Egypt had been in revolt since about 404 and its pharaoh, when appealed to by Sparta for an alliance, sent generous material help instead: equipment for a hundred triremes, and 500 measures of grain (Diod. xiv.79), which however went astray. As pointed out in an earlier volume (*CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.3,39), with a reference to this very passage, the ‘equipment’ referred to probably included papyrus for cordage, something Greeks could always do with. A Spartan–Egyptian axis was, for Persia, a threat indeed. An Athenian–Egyptian one, such as in fact materialized (Ar. *Plut.* 179) later in the war when the political alignments shifted, was no better. So, when Diodorus implies, rightly, that one of the King’s motives for imposing the peace of 386 was to have a free hand against revolted Cyprus (xiv.110), he could have added ‘and against Egypt’. This was especially true since Evagoras of Cyprus was

himself another ally of Egypt (Diod. xv.2.3), and like the Spartans a decade earlier got a consignment of Egyptian grain, supplies and triremes: *ibid.* 3.3.<sup>90</sup>

No wonder, then, that, as early as 397, the Great King, through Pharnabazus the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, ordered a full-scale naval armament, appointing the Athenian Conon (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 495) as admiral, *nauarch*. See Diod. xiv.39.2, where however a wrong date (399) is given. That 397 is the right date is certain. It follows from three pieces of evidence. First, a fragment of Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 144/5) mentions Conon's appointment and is dated to the Athenian archon-year 397/6. Second, Isocrates (iv.142) says that the Battle of Cnidus, which is dated by an eclipse to August 394, happened three years after the Persian rearmament. And third, in 396 Herodas the Syracusan was able to bring news to Sparta of massive Persian preparations, by now well under way: *Xen. Hell.* III.4.1ff, cf. *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.3,11.

Herodas' news caused a Spartan expedition to be sent to Asia, under the new king, Agesilaus. The outbreak of the Corinthian War, the stab in the back which, on Xenophon's interpretation, brought Agesilaus home again, was only a year away (395). But there is one more event which is needed before we can explain why Athens and other Greek states were prepared to tackle Sparta in mainland Greece. After all, the Battle of Cnidus, which halted the Spartan naval offensive off Caria, was in 394, but war had broken out a year earlier, in 395. How then could the enemies of Sparta feel so confident of success in 395? The answer, as so often in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, lies in an event known from the Diodoran not the Xenophontic tradition. The key event was the revolt of Rhodes from Sparta in 396 (Diod. xiv.79.6, confirmed by *Hell. Oxy.* xv: Conon said to be in charge of Rhodes in 395). This was the first really solid success against Sparta in that part of the world; hitherto the honours had been the other way, with Conon besieged by Pharax in 397 at Carian Caunus. The change of pattern between 397 and 396 is easily explained: ships take time to build and it was not until they were finished (Diod. xiv.79.5) that Conon could be relieved by the newly completed fleet. Then the Rhodians saw which way the wind was blowing, and they revolted. An Athenian general, albeit a Persian admiral in name, had now, eight years after the defeat of Athens at the Battle of Aegospotami, won a major moral and strategic victory over Sparta, foreshadowing the more concrete victory at Cnidus in 394. It adds to the piquancy that Conon was actually a fugitive from Aegospotami, having taken refuge afterwards with Evagoras of Cyprus. The appeal of the Thebans to Athens in 395 would have been ineffective,

<sup>90</sup> Spyridakis 1935 (F 331) 62.

whatever the prospective attractions of empire (Xen. *Hell.* III.5.10), if it had not already been known at Athens that Rhodes' allegiance had changed and that Conon was beginning to look like a winner. It was a Rhodian, a man called Timocrates, who was sent by Pharnabazus in 396, perhaps after and because of the Rhodian revolution,<sup>91</sup> with Persian money to induce Athens to fight Sparta. (If Timocrates' mission belongs in 397 – the alternative chronology<sup>92</sup> – it would be too early for events in his home state, though not for a general Rhodian strategic perspective, to be relevant. But if as has sometimes been held<sup>93</sup> Timocrates made a second Athenian visit in 395, the persuasiveness of his Persian gold could after all have been enhanced, on that occasion, by arguments from recent events. Timocrates may conceivably have been an exile, but it is surprising that his origins have excited virtually no ancient or modern comment.<sup>94</sup> For a Rhodian honoured at Athens in 394–3 see *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 19.)

Timocrates and his gold became a famous bribery scandal, a motive for the Corinthian War which the Oxyrhynchus Historian, ch. VII, discounts, by comparison with the 'truest cause' (cf. Thuc. I.23) of fear of Sparta. But that historian is right against Xenophon (III.5.2) to say that money was accepted at Athens. 'It is certain that the fleet which won the Battle of Cnidus was paid, however erratically, with Persian money and built in Persian-controlled harbours.'<sup>95</sup>

But to speak of the outcome of the Battle of Cnidus is to anticipate. We left Agesilaus departing for Asia. His place of embarkation was Aulis opposite Euboea. This was not the obvious place from the practical point of view, but was chosen for symbolic reasons: it was where Agamemnon had left for Troy, after sacrificing his daughter Iphigenia. (Sparta's propaganda had long stressed an affinity with Agamemnon and Orestes: Hdt. I.67.8; VII.159.) Like Agamemnon, Agesilaus (Xen. *Hell.* III.4.4), made a solemn though less drastic sacrifice for his oriental invasion, or he tried to, until he was prevented by the jealous magistrates of federal Boeotia. The implication here, that Agesilaus was making a bid for Asia i.e. the Persian empire, is spelt out by Xenophon at *Ages.* I.8. Elsewhere (*Hell.* IV.I.41, the last fling in 394), Xenophon's formulation is even more extreme and explicit: Agesilaus was 'planning to march as far as possible into the interior with the idea of detaching from the King all the nations through which he should pass'. But straight after his arrival at Ephesus, Agesilaus tried to come to terms with Tissaphernes on a footing of 'autonomy for the Greeks of Asia'. In other words, he was suggesting a return to something like the Peace of Callias, only with

<sup>91</sup> Seager 1967 (C 250) 95 n. 2.      <sup>92</sup> Bruce 1967 (B 20).

<sup>93</sup> Bruce 1967 (B 20) 60; Hamilton 1979 (C 294) 207 n. 76.

<sup>94</sup> Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) III<sup>2</sup> 2.216, whom Seager 1967 (C 250) follows, perhaps makes the point obliquely.      <sup>95</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 143.



Persia and Sparta, rather than Persia and Athens, as the principals (Xen. *Hell.* III.4.5; *Ages.* I.10 adds that the truce was to be for three months initially).

The inconsistency between the pomp and pretensions of the Aulis sacrifice and the reality of Agesilaus' diplomacy can be, and has been explained in a number of ways, not all exclusive. We can say either, that bargaining often does involve a climb-down from an impossible position. Or, that Agesilaus was really inviting a return to the "Treaty of Boiotios", cf. above, and that this would make Spartan policy, apart from the Aulis incident, consistent and intelligible over a longer period (cf. Xen. *Hell.* III.2.20 for Dercyllidas). Or, that Aulis tells us less about Agesilaus' 'panhellenist', i.e. anti-Persian, sentiments than about Xenophon's own. (This may well be true, but Xenophon surely did not invent the historical fact of the sacrifice.) Or, finally, we can say<sup>96</sup> that Agesilaus' aim was always different from the conquest of Asia. It was no more (and no less) than to create 'a buffer zone of rebel satraps and tribes' (cf. generally *Hell.* IV.1 for Paphlagonia and elsewhere) 'between the territory still controlled by the King and that of the Greek cities on the seaboard'. That would account for Agesilaus' invitation to Pharnabazus to secede (cf. p. 72 on *Hell.* IV.1.36), and perhaps also for Agesilaus' guest-friendship, *xenia*, with the young Mausolus of Caria, son of the Hecatomnus who was soon to be promoted satrap.<sup>97</sup> (See Xen. *Ages.* II.26 for this *xenia*, describing events of the 360s; but the *xenia* is there said to have existed 'beforehand' and could date from much earlier, in fact from the mid 390s.) Hecatomnus was to give the King very half-hearted and even treacherous help against Evagoras of Cyprus, whom he secretly supplied with money (Diod. xv.2). Agesilaus' visit to Asia had perhaps sowed a seed of disaffection.

Such guest-friendships, and the fellow-feeling which they presuppose between upper-class Greeks and Persians, run through the writings of Xenophon, despite his 'panhellenist' propaganda against Persia. Fellow-feeling of that kind deserves to be stressed not just as an aspect of social and cultural fusion (ch. 8a), but because it surely affected policy. We should, however, remember not just the obvious qualification made at Xen. *Hell.* IV.1.34 (guest-friends sometimes kill each other when their city's interests require it) but also the actual history of one such relationship: a hereditary Spartan *proxenia* (consulate) in the family of Alcibiades was made, renounced and reactivated by different generations (Thuc. v.43, vi.89). Nevertheless, if Artaxerxes' personal hatred of Sparta helps to explain his hostility to her on the political level in the 390s, the 'long-standing guest-friendship' between the Persian satrap

<sup>96</sup> Seager 1977 (C 315) (cf. Kelly 1978 (C 299)); Lewis 1977 (A 13) 154ff; Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 193.

<sup>97</sup> Herman 1987 (C 34) for guest-friendship generally, but not this one.

Ariobarzanes and the Spartan Antalcidas (Xen. *Hell.* v.1.28) helps to explain why the Great King in 387/6 accepted peace on terms nearly identical to those he had refused in 392/1 (p. 74). Political *homonoia*, harmony or fusion, between Greeks and Persians was no more Alexander's invention than was social or cultural fusion; and this is relevant to the problem (to which a final answer must be given in another chapter, p. 840) whether Alexander could have hoped for such political *homonoia*. If we recall that Artabazus (son of the Pharnabazus who is so prominent in Thucydides book VIII) spent years at the court of Philip II (Diod. xvi.52) before eventually being made Alexander's satrap of Bactria, we will find it easy to suppose that Alexander knew something of *homonoia* before he ever set out for Asia. Finally, no hatreds were permanent. Not Artaxerxes' for Sparta, as we have seen; nor even Athens' for Persia. How far Demosthenes or others looked to Persia against Macedon in the 340s and 330s is a question lying outside this chapter (though see p. 93), but one item may be cited. By the time of Artabazus' appointment to Bactria, Athens passed a decree, Tod no. 199 = Harding no. 119 of 327 B.C., which would have surprised Thucydides (less so Xenophon or any other historian of the victory at Cnidus in 394, won by the Athenian Conon with Persian forces). The decree calls Pharnabazus a 'benefactor of Athens and helper in her wars'. As a speaker in Polybius says (v.104), even the freedom to fight one's own wars looks like a luxury when you have lost it. There were worse people than Persians.

Whatever the reasons for Agesilaus' readiness to do a deal, there was no deal: Tissaphernes asked the Persian King for an army (see above, p. 56 for what this might mean), and the result was the Battle of Sardis, a Persian defeat. Xenophon on the one hand, and the alternative tradition represented by Diodorus and the Oxyrhynchus Historian on the other, give discrepant accounts of this engagement. Both Xenophon and the alternative tradition<sup>98</sup> have modern defenders; neither can be thrown out without qualms, but one of them must be. In Xenophon, Agesilaus marches directly from Ephesus to Sardis, and in the absence of Tissaphernes there is a cavalry battle, a straight fight with no mention of an ambush. In the alternative tradition (Diod. xiv.80; *Hell. Oxy.* xi) Agesilaus first strikes north via Mount Sipylus and thence east to Sardis, in a hollow square formation because he was being harried by Tissaphernes; he ravages the outskirts of Sardis, Xen. *Ages.* 1.33. Then he turned back to a point midway between Sardis and a place called Thybarna and ambushed Tissaphernes. (For Thybarna see p. 56 above; 'turned back' rules out a position for Thybarna in the immediate Castollus region further east.) It is in Xenophon's favour that in his

<sup>98</sup> Anderson 1974 (B 4); Cawkwell 1979 (B 26) 405ff; Gray 1979 (B 47); Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 215; Hamilton 1991 (C 295) 99 n. 50.

account the achievement of his hero Agesilaus is actually less spectacular (cavalry only; Tissaphernes absent) than on the alternative account; but the ambush is decisive in favour of the alternative account (which we must therefore prefer as a whole, after eliminating blemishes like Diodorus' tenfold magnification – 600/6,000 – of the Persian losses). Like Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* III.10.2), Agesilaus could not be allowed to have 'stolen a victory', and this is why Xenophon suppresses the ambush. (Xenophon was not consistent about this, because he does sometimes report stratagems by Agesilaus involving deceit, *Hell.* III.4.11 and v.4.48.) Finally, a chronological point: Xenophon is wrong to link the Sardis defeat and Tissaphernes' downfall as cause and effect. More time than that must be allowed for the appointment of Tissaphernes' successor as satrap of Lydia, namely the 'chiliarch'<sup>99</sup> Tithraustes. So the dissatisfaction felt with Tissaphernes by the Persians at Sardis, and at the royal court, must have antedated his most conspicuous failure on the field (cf. above, p. 57).

This was the high point of Agesilaus' Asiatic achievement. Tithraustes' first move, after cutting off Tissaphernes' head (through the agency of Ariaeus, for whom see below, p. 78) was to offer Agesilaus something similar to the deal rejected by Tissaphernes. What Tithraustes now suggested was that the Greek cities in Asia should, first, be autonomous, but, second, they should *pay the ancient tribute*: Xen. *Hell.* III.4.25. The addition this time of the formula about 'ancient tribute' makes more explicit the aim of a return to the position in the middle of the fifth century. At that time Persia probably did not abandon her claims to the revenues of Asia, despite the Peace of Callias.<sup>100</sup> Agesilaus, however, said that he was not competent to accept this offer without reference to the Spartan government at home, and Tithraustes then urged him to move on to Pharnabazus' territory and ravage that instead, until orders came from Sparta.

Why did Agesilaus refuse Tithraustes' 'autonomy' offer? His doubts about what the Spartan government would swallow must, if sincere, be confined to the second clause, about tribute: earlier on, during the negotiations with Tissaphernes (III.4.5), Agesilaus had evidently felt competent, without further instructions from Sparta, to climb down from grand invasion plans to mere 'autonomy for the cities'. If this is right, Agesilaus, we may feel, was splitting hairs. Alternatively, it has been held<sup>101</sup> that it was Tithraustes, not Agesilaus, who was insincere, and that the satrap was practising the old politics of procrastination familiar from the last decade of the Peloponnesian War. But this will not quite do: Xenophon explicitly says that the offer came from the King,<sup>102</sup>

<sup>99</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 17ff and n. 96; Cook 1983 (F 14) 143ff.      <sup>100</sup> Murray 1966 (F 687).

<sup>101</sup> Judeich 1892 (F 663) 68.      <sup>102</sup> Judeich 1892 (F 663) speaks only of Tithraustes.

not his mouthpiece Tithraustes. Perhaps the explanation of Agesilaus' refusal should be sought, not in the proposed treaty clauses, but in the obvious but sometimes<sup>103</sup> neglected demand which precedes Tithraustes' offer. 'The King *requires that you should sail home*, and that the cities . . .' etc. Tissaphernes, in the earlier phase of diplomacy, had spoken as if sailing home was merely something that Agesilaus himself might wish to do. Dercyllidas, even earlier, had been invited more or less frankly to go home, III.2.20. But it is in Tithraustes' mouth that the Persian demand becomes absolute.

But Agesilaus, flushed with the victory at Sardis, did not feel like sailing home, and perhaps could not do so without authority: when orders from Sparta do arrive (para. 27) nothing is said about autonomy or the ancient tribute, but only about what is to happen to the Spartan fleet and army. So perhaps as early as this, the future of Spartan power in Asia, not the status of the Greek cities, was what exercised the Spartan government, and Agesilaus guessed as much when he declared himself unable, on his own authority, to settle things with Tithraustes.

Even after he reached Pharnabazus' country, Agesilaus' own intentions remain hard to ascertain. On the one hand, he tried to detach Pharnabazus from his allegiance, *Hell.* IV.1 – but that chapter ends with one of the strongest statements in all Xenophon of Agesilaus' intention to 'go as far east as he could' (the whole passage is quoted above, p. 68. It refers to spring 394). So it is unclear right to the end of his stay in Asia whether his thinking was genuinely panhellenist or whether Xenophon was exaggerating and Agesilaus merely intended to cut off the western satrapies.<sup>104</sup> Agesilaus' reluctance (endorsed by the home government) to quit Asia may have concealed personal motives as well: he had made some friendships in Asia, not just the young Mausolus but the sons of Pharnabazus and of Spithridates as well (for the latter see *Hell. Oxy.* XXI.4, but contrast *Xen. Ages.* v.4). And in Asia he had enjoyed 'conscious mastery of men and events', to borrow Syme's phrase about Julius Caesar's psychologically liberating decade in Gaul.<sup>105</sup> If the options in 394 were conquest of Persia or co-operation with individual Persians, Agesilaus may have been genuinely torn.

His dilemma, if there was one, was solved for him by events in Greece, namely the beginnings of the Corinthian War (recounted elsewhere in this volume) which led to his recall. Before leaving for Pharnabazus' satrapy, Agesilaus had appointed his brother-in-law Peisander to the command of the fleet.<sup>106</sup> In Agesilaus' absence from Asia, the eighty-five Spartan triremes engaged Pharnabazus' and Conon's fleet of 170, now

<sup>103</sup> E.g. by Judeich. <sup>104</sup> Cawkwell 1979 (B 26) 193, cf. 1976 (C 285) 71.

<sup>105</sup> R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939) 53.

<sup>106</sup> Cawkwell 1976 (C 285) 67 n. 24 defends Xenophon's chronology.

ready at last; and the result of the Battle of Sardis was reversed at sea off Caria in a Spartan disaster, the Battle of Cnidus. Xenophon could not bring himself to recount it. (*Hell.* iv.8.1 is the barest mention.) Diodorus (xiv.83) records the capture of fifty Spartan triremes and 500 crew.

The Battle of Cnidus is a break in two ways, historical and historiographical. (Theopompus recognized this, when he ended his *Hellenica* at this point: Diod. xiv.84.7.)

First, historiographic. With Agesilaus back in Greece, and the Spartan fleet defeated, Xenophon's narrative in the *Hellenica* has not much more to say in detail about Asia Minor. Diodorus' Persian and satrapal material, even when it is derived from parts of Ephorus not enriched by Ephorus' own use of the Oxyrhynchus Historian, is precious, and noticeably better than his offerings for the fifth century; and Diodorus gives some satrapal dates from an independent, reasonably well-informed 'chronographic source'.<sup>107</sup> But Diodorus was a Sicilian, and his distribution of attention in books xiv and xv, though welcome to the modern historian of Dionysius and Sicily, has led to severe abbreviation of Ephorus' Anatolian and Persian material. (This, it should be said, is true of the whole period from 404 on.) In general, after 394 and still more after 386, we have to make progressively more use of incidental literary references, with help from inscriptions. This is a procedure which makes Persian and satrapal history seem more jerky and episodic from now on. Thus the so-called Revolt of the Satraps surely lasted several years, but is described by Diodorus (improbably but characteristically under one year, 362) in just three chapters, amounting to about the same quantity of Greek as the one long chapter which Xenophon devotes to a few months of campaigning on Corcyra in 373/2 by Mnasippus and Iphicrates (*Hell.* vi.2). It is unlikely (but see below) that Diodorus' brevity of treatment here is a reliable index of the episode's importance.

Second, historical: the events of 394 ended a wholly anomalous period of alliance between Athens and Persia. The victory at Cnidus was not the first manifestation of revived Athenian imperialism, but it was the most spectacular so far. Henceforth, Sparta and Persia had a common interest in the repression of that imperialism; in other words there was a return to the alignments of the Ionian War. Every Athenian success made it more urgent for Persia and Sparta to 'settle their diplomatic differences'.<sup>108</sup>

The changes did not however come about immediately or smoothly: there is an impression of jerkiness about Persian policy towards Greece from 394 to 386 which is not just the fault of the sources.

At first, Persia and Athens, or rather Pharnabazus and Conon, continue to co-operate, taking advantage of what Diodorus sweepingly

<sup>107</sup> See Hornblower 1990 (C 366) 74 and nn.    <sup>108</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 147 for this phrase.

calls Spartan loss of sea-power, xiv.84.4: their successes in winning allies in Asia and the islands are listed in that chapter (reading 'Telos' for 'Teos').<sup>109</sup> As will be explained later (ch. 8a, p. 216), epigraphic evidence (*SEG* xxvi 1282 = Harding 28A) suggests that the Persian and Athenian promises of autonomy to Ionia (*Xen. Hell.* iv.8.1) were not after all empty, despite the existence at this time of a 'satrap of Ionia' attested in Tod no. 113 (= Harding no. 24) of c.392.<sup>110</sup> (An independent 'alliance' coinage of the east Aegean and islands may also belong here.)<sup>111</sup> This shrewd behaviour by Persia weakened in advance any serious effort by Sparta to recover her standing as liberator in Asia Minor. But what really precluded Spartan operations in the east Aegean was the voyage (*Xen. Hell.* iv.8.8) of Pharnabazus and Conon to Spartan waters, where they established a garrison and governor on the offshore island of Cythera.<sup>112</sup> That must have shaken Spartan morale badly so soon after the abortive helot rising known as the Cinadon affair (*ibid.*, III.3).<sup>113</sup> Throughout the fifth century, Spartan foreign policy had fluctuated between aggression and timidity as the threat of helot disloyalty advanced or receded; and the puncturing of Spartan imperialism abroad, by means of helots at home, was no secret to Pharnabazus or Conon. They were after all both veterans of the great Peloponnesian War: each man first appeared in history in the year (413) of Demosthenes' similarly motivated landing opposite, precisely, Cythera (*Thuc.* vii.26). Some Persian sling-bullets have been published from Anticythera, the smaller island to the south, bearing the King's 'signature'. They are presumably a relic of this period (*Arch. Rep. for 1974-75* p. 42).

The result was that Sparta sued for peace (392/1), sending Antalcidas to Tiribazus (for whose status see below, p. 77f). The sources are Andocides III *On the Peace* and Xenophon *Hell.* iv.8.<sup>114</sup> The terms offered involved the complete sell-out of the Greeks in Asia (*Xen. Hell.* iv.8.14): the islands and cities of Greece were to be autonomous, and Sparta would not fight Persia for the Greeks in Asia. Antalcidas the Spartan offered these terms to Tiribazus, rightly describing them as 'a peace such as the King desired' (Xenophon). This errs only on the side of understatement.

Diplomatically, at least between Sparta and Persia, the position which had now been reached was exactly the same as that represented by the King's Peace of 386. Why then did negotiations break down as they did?

<sup>109</sup> Marshall 1905 (C 200) 2 n. 4 and Robert 1969-90 (B 172) I 569ff.

<sup>110</sup> But see Petit 1988 (F 693) 310, who thinks Strouthas is called 'satrap of Ionia' in Tod no. 113 = Harding no. 24 merely because he is handling Ionian business at the time.

<sup>111</sup> Cawkwell 1956 (B 189); 1963 (B 190); Cook 1961 (B 191 = F 608).

<sup>112</sup> Coldstream and Huxley 1972 (C 287) 39. <sup>113</sup> Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 362.

<sup>114</sup> Badian 1991 (F 4) argues against the usual view that Philochorus F 149 relates to the 392 attempt at peace, rather than to the King's Peace proper of 386.

Persia's position is the least logical of that of any of the principals to the affair. Tiribazus urged Artaxerxes to accept the 392 terms. These were first proposed at Sardis; Andocides omits this stage. They were then considered by the other Greek states at Sparta, a stage which Xenophon the panhellenist admirer of Sparta omits. (The order Sardis–Sparta is the likelier one; the order Sparta–Sardis would have involved Persia, inconceivably, in considering the consequences of a *Greek* decision.)<sup>115</sup> Tiribazus was right, but the king would not see it. So the Spartan proposals were not ratified. Why not? The answer must lie in Artaxerxes' hatred of Sparta for helping Cyrus the Younger's revolt (p. 66). Practical politics would soon require that that hatred should be given up. But for the moment Strouthas or Strouses was sent down instead of Tiribazus (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.17, cf. Tod no. 113) to carry on the war against Sparta. Sparta sent out Thibron again to Asia Minor.

Sparta's position is simplest: combined Athenian-Persian hostility meant that she had to fight on.

Then there is Athens. It was Athens' refusal to accept the decision taken at Sparta which caused negotiations to break down at the Greek end. Why did she refuse? First, there is some evidence for anti-Persian feeling at Athens.<sup>116</sup> We should not make too much of this,<sup>117</sup> but the alliance of Athens and Persia during the years before 392 had certainly been an unusual one. A fragment of Athenian honours to Evagoras of Cyprus (*SEG* xxix 86 + Tod no. 109) may show that already in 393 the Athenians, by using extravagant language about Evagoras as a Greek benefactor of Greece, were seeking to disguise from themselves the Persian aspect of the Cnidus victory: Evagoras had given a refuge to Conon and had introduced him to Pharnabazus, and it was more congenial to stress Evagoras' role than that of Pharnabazus.

Second, there was Athens' desire (Andoc. III.12ff; 36) to get back the old 'overseas possessions . . . and debts' (i.e. money lent under the fifth-century empire by individual Athenians to individuals in the allied states, no doubt at high rates of interest: Androtion in Tod no. 152 = Harding no. 68, of perhaps the 360s, is praised for making *interest-free* loans, no doubt because this was something unusual). The details of Athens' attempts to realize this aim over the next forty years belong to Athenian history, but not exclusively. After all, Persia and her satraps had good cause for alarm at this Athenian programme of recovery, in its private as well as its public aspects (the fifth-century private possessions of rich Athenians had included land in the Persian Troad at a place called Ophryneum); and the satraps were later to capitalize on the general

<sup>115</sup> But see Badian 1991 (F 4) 33; agnostic.

<sup>116</sup> Jacoby comm. on Philochorus F 149, at 517; Lewis 1977 (A 33) 86 and n. 19. Cf. Isoc. iv.157.

<sup>117</sup> Finley 1985 (A 18) 80.

mistrust of Athens, a mistrust which her territorial ambitions aroused among her allies and others in the period of, and well before, the Social War of 357–355. It is also relevant to Athenian attitudes that Conon's fleet passed to Athens (Clark 1990 (B 138) 58), a boost to Athenian confidence.

One of Tiribazus' last actions before his supersession had been to imprison Conon (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.16) who had been associated with the Sardis proposals. More vigorous and openly anti-Persian policies now prevailed at Athens. These were associated with the name of Thrasybulus; they can be described here only to the extent that they affect Persia directly. That extent is not negligible.

One immediate consequence of the breakdown of the 392 negotiations was the help (ten ships) sent by Athens, perhaps as early as 391,<sup>118</sup> to Evagoras of Cyprus, now in revolt from Persia: Athens' policy here had been adumbrated by the honours conferred in 393, see above. In a celebrated passage, Xenophon comments (*Hell.* iv.8.24) on the paradoxical character of Athens' actions: the King's allies were helping the King's enemy. The point of this remark is not much weakened by the possibility<sup>119</sup> that the ships were sent before Evagoras went into open hostility. The original ten ships were captured, but immediately afterwards, Thrasybulus was sent out with forty triremes, a more formidable force: his mission was in response to an appeal from Rhodian democrats (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.25) after a Rhodian counter-revolution (Diod. xiv.97) supported by Sparta. Given the importance of Rhodes, which we have examined, Diodorus' remark (above) about the destruction of Spartan sea-power at Cnidus had been a little premature. Successful elsewhere in gaining or recovering allies for Athens (Thasos, Samothrace, Byzantium, Mytilene, Chios, etc.), Thrasybulus could do nothing about Rhodes; and it was the Spartan possession of the two great corn-routes, Egypt via Rhodes (cf. Dem. lvi and Thuc. viii.35.2) and the Hellespont (below) which explain why Athens would have to agree to the King's Peace.

But from Persia's point of view the most annoying Thrasybulan successes were those which affected her own cities and *chora*, territory, on the Asiatic mainland. A speech of Lysias (xxviii) shows Thrasybulus exacting money from Halicarnassus, an Asiatic polis. That was not quite what Persia had in mind by Pharnabazus' promises of 'autonomy' (above); and Thrasybulus was killed at Pamphylian Aspendus, a startlingly long way round the south coast of Asia Minor. He was evidently up to the same extortionate game there: Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.30. His exactions did not stop at that: from an inscription (Tod no. 114 = Harding no. 26) honouring Clazomenae, an Ionian island which could however be

<sup>118</sup> Cawkwell 1976 (C 112) 274.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*



regarded as a kind of *peninsular* site (below), i.e. one in the King's ancestral Asia, we learn that Athens had levied a '5 per cent tax in the time of Thrasybulus'. Putting that together with the help to Evagoras of Cyprus, we will not be surprised to find that in the King's Peace precisely those two places<sup>120</sup> are singled out as exceptions to the autonomy of the islands. (Clazomenae's position, joined to the mainland by a causeway of probably hellenistic construction, and in modern times housing a quarantine station,<sup>121</sup> perhaps made its status ambiguous. But the ambiguity was not allowed to extend to the political sphere, hence Persia's emphatic claim to the place.) There is to be no mistake: these two places are to be *Persian* possessions. As the last of Persia's irritations, we should not forget the Athenian alliance with rebel Egypt (above).

Finally the Persians realize their true interests. Strouses or Strouthas, with his anti-Spartan mission, is superseded by Tiribazus, who thus reappears at the beginning of *Hellenica* book v. (Xenophon, as so often, merely leaves us to infer the truth, in this instance Tiribazus' reappointment.) The supersession of Strouses was surely a direct consequence of Thrasybulus' depredations at places like Halicarnassus in Caria. (Caria, like Ionia, and for similar reasons, gets separate satrapal status about now.) The reason is that Thrasybulus' oppressions surely made the Persians see that Athens must be compelled explicitly to abandon all claims to the Asiatic mainland. (In view of this, the good relations between Athens and Persia which Xenophon implies at *Hell.* iv.8.27, cannot have lasted long.)

The satrapal dispositions of this period deserve a word, because not all the appointees are territorial satraps of the normal type. The view taken here is that Tissaphernes' replacement in 395, the chiliarch Tithraustes, was briefly caretaker satrap of the normal territorial satrapy of *Lydia*. He was succeeded (we do not know exactly when) by the Autophradates whom Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 103) says was satrap of Lydia c.390, and who was still satrap of Lydia in 362, a long tenure (Diod. xv.90). During the later 390s and early 380s, however, there was, running parallel to the tenure of the ordinary Lydian satrapy, and co-ordinate with or better super-ordinate to it, a short series of non-territorial satraps with special powers in the west. Tiribazus was succeeded by Strouses, who was succeeded by Tiribazus again. Tiribazus is the 'King's general', in control of 'Ionia' (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.12; v.1.28, unless – an old suggestion<sup>122</sup> – we read *choras* for *Ionias* in the latter passage, 'territory' instead of 'Ionia'). Strouses is described in Tod no. 113 (= Harding no. 24) as 'satrap of Ionia'; *not* Lydia as a modern reconstruction<sup>123</sup> makes

<sup>120</sup> Ryder 1965 (C 67).      <sup>121</sup> Cook 1953/4 (F 601).

<sup>122</sup> Krumbholz 1883 (F 670) 67; cf. Petit 1988 (F 693) 310 n. 22. Cf. Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 37 n. 11.      <sup>123</sup> Cawkwell 1976 (C 112) n. 19.

him. That this is an anomalous appointment, and that 'Ionia' means something particular (see ch. 8a, p. 216) is shown by Xenophon's description of Strouses, whom he calls Strouthas, as 'looking after the affairs of the coast' (*Hell.* iv.8.17). After the King's Peace of 386, the need for such western Anatolian appointments with special powers comes to an end, and Tiribazus' extraordinary mandate, his *maius imperium* to use an anachronistic but apt Roman expression, is exercised in *southern* Anatolia instead. He is given the 'supreme command' (Diod. xv.8.2), based apparently in Cilicia, for the war against Cyprus. (For the later position of Ionia see p. 216 below.)

The satrapal tenure of *Greater Phrygia* in the Anatolian interior is a blank to us between the beginning of the fourth century and Atizyes in 334 (Arr. *Anab.* i.25.3). The Arsames mentioned by Polyaeus (vii.28) is undated even as to his century; and another Tithraustes attested in the 350s is surely resident not in this but in Hellespontine Phrygia on the coast, and is anyway not a satrap.<sup>124</sup> He is certainly not the same man as the Tithraustes who was satrap of Lydia in the 390s. Other problems are raised by Ariaeus, who helped that Tithraustes to kill Tissaphernes (above). The question is, was he a territorial satrap or just an agent of other satraps? He is usually, but wrongly, held to have been satrap of Greater Phrygia in 395. (His position in 400, to which Xen. *Hell.* iv.1.27 is just a back reference, is not relevant here.) It is true that Diodorus calls Ariaeus 'a certain satrap' at xiv.80 (where Ariaeus' name is a very plausible emendation for 'of Larissa').<sup>125</sup> But this cannot be pressed, especially in the light of 'a certain'; and Polyaeus (vii.16) may imply parity of esteem for Ariaeus with both Tissaphernes and Tithraustes. But in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (xix), Ariaeus looks more like a subordinate of Tithraustes than a colleague at the territorial satrapal level: he is there bracketed with an unknown figure called Pasiphernes, both men being appointed by Tithraustes as 'generals to deal with the current situation'. Diodorus also (above) says that Tithraustes worked 'through' Ariaeus to bring about Tissaphernes' death; this may be another indication of inferiority. Further evidence of a kind is to be found in the very fragmentary thirteenth chapter of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*: if Ariaeus is the name of one of the 'best of generals' there mentioned at para. 2 line

<sup>124</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 144 n. 57. (but Beloch is there misrepresented: he says that T. is satrap of Greater Phrygia). The view of Cook 1983 (F 14) 172ff that Greater Phrygia was not a satrapy at all fails because of Atizyes. On the satrapy list at Xen. *An.* vii.8.25 (which mentions an Artakames satrap of Greater Phrygia) see Cook 1983 (F 14) 82. Xen. *Cyr.* ii.2.5., viii.6.7 also has an Artakames satrap of Phrygia (whence *An.*?) which is at least evidence of a kind for the existence of the satrapy, though hardly evidence that Artakames is himself historical, *contra*, Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) III<sup>2</sup> 2.152. Note also Andrewes 1971 (C 275) 209 n. 9 and Sekunda in F 53 110ff.

<sup>125</sup> The emendation is by Paulmier and is clearly right; it removes the basis for Briant in F 47 16 and n. 31; F 40, 161 and n. 39. See Hornblower 1990 (F 36) 93.

35, that could support the view here taken. But the original editors were doubtful about the traces of the name. Finally, if Ariaeus was really satrap of Greater Phrygia, he was not taking his domestic duties very seriously by the time of Xen. *Hell.* iv.1.27, when we find him at Sardis, ‘minding the shop’ for Tithraustes against the arrivals of both Tiribazus as ‘King’s general’ (above) and of Autophradates as satrap of Lydia in the normal way (Theopompus, above).

For the other satrapies and districts of Asia Minor see ch. 8a, pp. 217ff. This is a good place to make a general point. We should not think of the satrapies of Asia Minor (and this is no doubt true of other parts of the empire also) as covering the map of Anatolia completely, capable of being inked in different colours like the modern *vilayets* of Turkey. There were areas and peoples which at times it would be hard or positively wrong to attribute to any one satrap: Pisidia (p. 219), Mysia (not a satrapy itself, p. 220), parts of Cappadocia (p. 220f), Lycia (dynastic in the early fourth century, but subsumed under Hecatomnid Caria by 337, presumably with royal permission; see p. 218f); the Pamphylians (a rebellious *ethnos* or tribal people in the 360s, Diod. xv.90, and containing a city, Phaselis, which treats with Mausolus as an equal, Bengtson, *SdA* = M10). A satrap who could make his writ run in these areas might expect to get away with it, as far as the King’s approval went. Finally, the case of Tralles, put in Caria at Xen. *Hell.* iii.2.19 (cf. for the 340s Robert, 1936 (B 169) no. 96), but in Ionia by Diodorus (xiv.36.3) perhaps suggests that boundaries were fluid (rather than vague): these things were subject to adjustment. There were however some clear and firm frontiers, like the Oxus River which divides Sogdia and Bactria, Strabo xi.11.2. Between one Roman province and another there were customs posts, so that you knew where you were. We do not hear of this in Achaemenid Persia. None of all this means that we should be defeatist about trying to ascertain which satrap ruled what, and when. Mausolus knew what he meant when he spoke of ‘the land which Mausolus rules’ (Crampa 1972 (F 619) no. 40).

In *Hellespontine Phrygia*, Pharnabazus had been succeeded (Xen. *Hell.* v.1.28) by the beginning of the 380s by Ariobarzanes, who may have been a usurper satrap. Or rather, perhaps, a caretaker with official sanction. At any rate he helped to bring about the King’s Peace, by helping his guest-friend Antalcidas (cf. p. 69f above) to seal off the Hellespont and its corn-route, and so threaten Athens with starvation ‘as once before’ (Xen. *Hell.* v.1.29. This is a more or less explicit back-reference to Aegospotami). Now that both the Hellespont and Rhodes were in hostile possession, Athens’ hand was played out and she accepted the Peace on the terms given at Xen. *Hell.* v.1.28: the cities of Asia were to be the King’s, including the ‘islands’ Cyprus and Clazomenae

(inverted commas because of Clazomenae, cf. above), while the other Greek cities, great and small, with the exception of three Athenian cleruchies, were to be autonomous. If either side declined these terms, the King would make war on them by land and sea, with ships and with money.

A more detailed document<sup>126</sup> may have contained very specific requirements, like a stipulation that Athens pull down the gates of Piraeus, as well as more general rules about the taking back of exiles. (But the Peace did not, it seems, restrict Athenian naval activity.) More relevant for the history of Persia and Asia Minor is the likelihood (ch. 4, p. 118) that by the terms of the King's Peace the fertile mainland possessions, *peraiiai*, of islands like Tenedos, Chios, Samos and Rhodes passed to Persian control in 386 as part of 'royal Asia'. This must have been a blow to the economies of these islands, and must be relevant to their absence of vigour in face of satrapal infiltration over the next decade – all except Samos, where Athens moved in instead. Chios and Mytilene perhaps tried to recover their *peraiiai* in the 340s through the agency of Hermias of Atarneus, see below, p. 94. Similarly, Tenedos and Mytilene tried to recover theirs in the 330s. But they were told by the Persians, who were now in a position to give orders again as a result of the anti-Macedonian counter-offensive, to 'return to the King's Peace' (Arr. *Anab.* II.1–2). That expression is problematic, but is best interpreted as meaning that the islands should give up their *peraiiai* on the Persian mainland. On any other construction the reference to the King's Peace is mystifying, because the Peace did not, as we have seen, give islands like Tenedos to Persia; the reverse is true.

How complete a divide is the King's Peace, considered as an event in western Asiatic history? For Persia, as we have noted, it meant not less but more warfare in the western satrapies. The difference now was that the fighting was against the combined forces of Cypriots and Egyptians rather than against Greeks (for the Cyprus–Egypt revolts as a 'common', i.e. shared, war against Persia see Diod. xv.4.3). Hecatomnus, the new satrap of Caria, was expected to earn his keep by subduing Cyprus (*ibid.* 2), and though he actually helped the rebel, Tiribazus and Orontes had settled Cyprus by the end of the 380s (see above, p. 57). In 385–383 Abrocomas, Tithraustes (formerly satrap of Lydia) and Pharnabazus, formerly of Hellespontine Phrygia, led an unsuccessful assault on Egypt (Isoc. IV.140, virtually the only source). The repulse of the Persians by Acoris of Egypt with the help of the Athenian Chabrias and his mercenaries shows the real as opposed to the 'mythical' (above p. 52) significance of Cyrus and his 10,000, namely the introduction of the

<sup>126</sup> Cawkwell 1973 (C 111); 1981 (C 113), *contra*, Sinclair (C 76) and Clark 1990 (B 138), specifically on the naval aspects. See also Badian 1991 (F 4) 35ff.

Greek mercenary as a decisive factor in Mediterranean warfare. It is wrong to try to minimize this.<sup>127</sup> To Artaxerxes' preoccupations in the 380s should be added a long-standing revolt of the Cadusians (p. 64). The crisis of this revolt is synchronized by Diodorus (xv.8) with the later phases of the Cyprus operations.

So Persia's hands were full. But it was not even true that she had seen quite the last of Spartans and Athenians on the Asiatic mainland; and this is the proof that the King's Peace was not final for them either. (The following discussion ignores famous instances of help to rebel satraps like Ariobarzanes in 366 – for which see p. 85 – although that should be remembered too.)

First, Sparta. One of the Persian admirals in the Cyprus operations, Glos, himself moved into revolt, perhaps in central Ionia (Diod. xv.9.3f, cf. xv.18). He received help from Sparta, at a date perhaps as late as 380/79.<sup>128</sup> This revolt fizzled out after the deaths of Glos and his son (after which 'the Asian rebellions spontaneously ended', as Diodorus says at xv.18.4, not quite correctly). But the revolt is of interest as showing that Spartan opportunism in Asia was not a thing of the past.

As for Athens, an inscription shows her general Timotheus during his Samian adventure of about 365 (p. 201) embroiled in some way with Erythrae in mainland Ionia (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 108* = Engelmann and Merkelbach 1972 (F 627) no. 7, cf. Dem. xv.9). It is tempting to associate this with a remark of Demosthenes in 341 (VIII.24) about Athenian generals visiting places like Chios and Erythrae looking for money. The mention of Erythrae here is interesting, because Erythrae was now part of the King's Asia, having been 'handed over to the barbarian' in 386 (in the language of the new Erythrae inscription discussed at p. 216 below). Evidently, then, there were moments even after 386 when Athens, like Sparta, was prepared to interfere directly in the Persian King's Asia. And an inscription mentioning Athenian soldiers who 'fought with Chabrias at Aianteion' in the Hellespontine region (Burnett and Edmonson 1961 (C 100)) is probably evidence that Athens, in about 375, gave some help to Philiscus the 'hyparch' or subordinate of Ariobarzanes, on what for Persia was her Hellespontine Phrygian mainland.

Nor was Persia for her part wholly scrupulous about keeping her hands off the *islands*. From Demosthenes (xv.9) we learn that by 366 there was a Persian garrison on Samos, under Cyprothemis, installed by 'Tigranes the hyparch', a man otherwise unknown. The notorious Athenian cleruchy on Samos was actually (on one way of looking at the

<sup>127</sup> With Cartledge 1979 (C 282) 272; 1987 (C 284) 209.

<sup>128</sup> Ryder 1963 (C 313). Cawkwell 1976 (C 285) 70 says that it is impossible that Sparta actually helped. He does not mention Ryder. Surely there were some dealings between the Spartans and Glos.

matter) no more than a pre-emptive response to this clear provocation. As for Hecatomnid Carian encroachment in the islands to the south, that is now thought to have begun in the 360s also (F644, 134: Cos).

The King's Peace, then, created no impenetrable iron curtain for either side. Nor, we can add, was it a commercial or social curtain of any kind. Thus Phaselites are found trading as a routine matter at mid-century Athens (Dem. xxxv, *Against Lacritus*). There is also evidence for Phoenician trade with Athens and vice versa, cf. p. 335. Again, Attic epigraphy is rich in Asiatic immigrants, and statue-bases and other evidence from the most hellenized provinces, Lycia and Caria, attest an eastward diaspora of Athenian craftsmen and intellectuals to satrapal and dynastic courts in the Persian empire. Aristotle's stay at Atarneus is only the most celebrated. The effects of mercenaries on warfare is a topic discussed elsewhere in this volume (p. 678), but the social consequences, for racial and other attitudes, deserve a word here. Mercenary service was something you did not any longer need to feel ashamed of as in Alcaeus' day (the archaic period). To have served with the great mercenary commander Iphicrates is a matter of pride for the speaker of Isaeus II.6; and in New Comedy the mercenary is by no means always portrayed as the 'braggart' of literary convention.<sup>129</sup> Returning mercenaries, naturally, brought with them native women; and a more complex family history – though still, surely, one with mercenary service at the back of it – is implied by Aristotle's mention (*De Gen. Anim.* 722a) of a woman from Elis whose child had an Ethiopian father.<sup>130</sup> All this produced the mental climate in which Menander was able to say 'the man whose natural beauty is good, though he be an Ethiopian, is nobly born' (F 612 κ, cf. Agatharchides *GGM* I 118; [Callisthenes] III.8.16). But these attitudes did not prevail overnight, or at all levels of society (just as *homonoia*, 'harmony of outlook', or guest-friendships between upper-class Persians and Greeks – whether Greek visitors like Agesilaus or Greek residents like the Demaratids, p. 213 – tell us nothing about the prejudices of ordinary Spartans or the Athenian *demos*). Thus when the soldiers of Xenophon's *Anabasis* in 400 B.C. discover that Apollonides the self-styled Boeotian has actually got pierced ears, 'just like a Lydian', he is soon sent packing: III.1.16.<sup>131</sup>

The year 380, when Sparta helped Glos, is given by Diodorus as the acme of her power. Henceforth, with the founding of the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy, whose first stirrings are to be dated early in 378 (p. 166), Persia's main enemy among the Greek states must have

<sup>129</sup> A. W. Gomme and F. Sandbach, *Menander Commentary* (Oxford, 1973) 25.

<sup>130</sup> F. M. Snowden, Jr., *Blacks in Antiquity: Ethiopians in the Greco-Roman Experience* (Cambridge, MA and London, 1970) 104 and generally.

<sup>131</sup> The interest of this passage was pointed out to the present writer by Mr Thomas Braun.

seemed once again to be Athens. The charter of the confederacy, though probably framed in deference to the King's Peace (Tod no. 123 = Harding no. 35, lines 13–14), menaces not just Sparta but (line 42) *anyone* who attacks a confederate state, and it is fair to assume that Persia and the satraps are here included. Certainly the earliest names on the list of members at the end of the text include islands, such as Chios and Rhodes, for whom Persian satrapal aggression was a nearer and more real threat than Sparta. This aspect of the new confederacy's origins should not be neglected as it often is (Isoc. iv.163 makes the point). In Caria, where Mausolus had succeeded his father Hecatomnus in 377, his move of capital to coastal Halicarnassus from inland Mylasa may be part of an aggressive attempt by the satrap to stem Athenian political influence. That is, to forestall, at least in his own back yard, financial exactions like those of Thrasybulus at Halicarnassus in the period before the King's Peace, or of Timotheus at Erythrae in (?) the 360s.

But Egypt was still the major Persian preoccupation, and the years 377 to 374 and 373 (an abnormally long period even by Persian standards, p. 56) were absorbed in massive preparations for an attack under Pharnabazus (Diod. xv.29;42): this time however it was Persia who made most conspicuous use of Athenian talent – under first Iphicrates then Timotheus – and of Greek mercenaries, 20,000 of them. It was the need to recruit these which provided a strong motive for Persia to effect the second 'King's Peace' of the year 375:<sup>132</sup> Diod. xv.38 and *FGrH* 328 Philochorus F 151. But this huge effort against Egypt also failed, and Pharnabazus gave way to Datames (below, p. 84f) as Persian commander in Egypt (372). It goes a little too far to speak<sup>133</sup> of an 'Atheno-Persian entente between 380 and 374'. Nevertheless the presence of the Athenian Iphicrates on the Persian side, where he had been since 379 when Chabrias was recalled at Persian insistence from helping the rebels (Diod. xv.29), needs an explanation, or more than one, if it is right to see the new Athenian confederacy as constructed with at least one eye on the Persian King and his Anatolian delegates. Can we simply write off Iphicrates as an independent operator? It is true that, given Athens' poor public finances in the period, fourth-century Athenian generals were less obviously servants of the state than their predecessors of the fifth; but their independence of action can be exaggerated, especially if we believe everything said by Athenian orators.<sup>134</sup> Thus stiff diplomatic notes from Persia led to the smart recall not just of Chabrias (above), but of Chares in the 350s: p. 89 below. So that explanation will not do. The truth is that Athens preferred to be non-committal, except when she was roused to counter absolutely flagrant satrapal encroachment in the east Aegean

<sup>132</sup> Cawkwell 1963 (C 16) 123.      <sup>133</sup> Cloché 1934 (C 117) 77.

<sup>134</sup> Pritchett 1971–91 (K 51) II 59ff.

(below); or when she gauged that the political wind was blowing very hard indeed against Persia. This non-committal attitude is clearly enunciated in Tod no. 145 = Harding no. 57, the Reply to the Satraps of (?) 362 (p. 88f). Another motive, though, for the so-called 'entente' with Persia was simply Athens' desire to get jobs and pay for her officers and men. (Chabrias' help to Philiscus and Ariobarzanes in ?375, for which see above p. 81, is not of great moment, because Ariobarzanes is not yet in revolt. But as we have noted it is interesting as showing Athens acting on the Asian mainland.)

The elevation of Datames marks the beginning of the unrest traditionally known as the Revolt of the Satraps.<sup>135</sup> The main literary sources are Nepos' *Life of Datames*<sup>136</sup> (which is one of the most valuable of that author's *Lives*, comparable to the *Atticus* in that it provides for once material not better reproduced elsewhere); chapters 90–3 of Diodorus book xv<sup>137</sup> (with more material about Artabazus in book xvi); further Ephorus-derived material in writers like Polyaeus; the Tenth Prologues of Trogu; and for the Ariobarzanes affair Xenophon's *Agas*. II.26f. But there are also several helpful inscriptions, and some informative coinage.<sup>138</sup> Finally, the Rainer Papyrus on the Social War, *FGrH* 105, adds to our knowledge about Artabazus.

The scale, the importance and even the historicity of the Revolt have been reasonably, but not in the end convincingly, questioned.<sup>139</sup> Certainly, 'regional instability' of this sort does not prove Persia to have been basically weak, nor can it be proved that the revolts were planned or co-ordinated. But it is not likely that Diodorus' source Ephorus made the whole thing up, or that he was merely transmitting the panhellenist wishful thinking of his teacher Isocrates. Things are not so simple: Ephorus got his own account from some even more nearly contemporary authority (Dion? Callisthenes?).

The four periods of the Revolt or revolts – that of Datames which began in the 370s, of Ariobarzanes in the mid 360s, the general insurrection in the second half of the 360s, and Artabazus' revolt in the next decade – occupy nearly twenty years. (What Diodorus records under the single year 362 can only be the climax of the third or main phase.) It is therefore not surprising that it was not until the late 350s that Persia had the energy or resources to resume the struggle for Egypt (half of the King's revenues were cut off by 362, if we may believe Diodorus).

Datames' revolt probably began soon after 372, when Timotheus replaced Iphicrates in Egypt. He can be traced via the mints of Tarsus

<sup>135</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 170–82; Weiskopf 1989 (F 69).

<sup>136</sup> Sekunda 1988 (F 59).

<sup>137</sup> Stylianos 1985 (B 112).

<sup>138</sup> Moysey 1989 (B 210).

<sup>139</sup> Against Weiskopf 1989 (F 69) see Hornblower 1990 (F 37) 363ff and R. Moysey, *Ancient History Bulletin* 5 (1991) 111–20.



and Side (whose coins he overstruck)<sup>140</sup> in southern Anatolia, to Sinope and Amisus in the north. He remained in north Cappadocia, though under siege by Autophradates of Lydia (who was later a rebel but was still loyal at this time) and also perhaps, as coinage suggests,<sup>141</sup> by the Lycian dynast Artumpara. Datames detached north Cappadocia completely from Persian control. (For the later history of Cappadocia see ch. 8a, p. 220f.) His example showed other potentially disloyal satraps what they could hope for: an independent enclave.

The second phase of insurrection begins far away, at Delphi in 368, where Philiscus of Abydus distributed money provided by Ariobarzanes, satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, in exchange for Greek mercenaries (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.27). This was ostensibly to help Sparta but more probably for himself in his planned revolt. It seems that the ‘legitimate’ satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia was Pharnabazus’ son Artabazus, who had Achaemenid blood<sup>142</sup> through his mother Apame. Artabazus’ uncle Ariobarzanes was under instructions to hand over the satrapy to his nephew, now of age (cf. Xen. *Hell.* IV.1.40, assuming that ‘Pharnabazus’ brother’ there is Ariobarzanes).<sup>143</sup> But Ariobarzanes refused, and the satraps Mausolus of Caria and Autophradates of Lydia were sent against Ariobarzanes at his current base in the gulf of Adramyttium (either at Adramyttium itself, modern Edremit, or at Assus. See Xen. *Ages.* II.26 and Polyæn. VII.29.6). At this point Athens and Sparta joined in on Ariobarzanes’ side, with forces commanded by Timotheus (in a campaign which was more celebrated for its operations against another Persian force, that on Samos: Dem. xv.9) and Agesilaus (Xen. *Ages.* II.26) respectively. Now Agesilaus and Mausolus are described by Xenophon as guest-friends, and this relationship is explicitly said to be older than the episode which prompted Xenophon to mention it. Perhaps (see above, p. 69) it goes back to the 390s. That may be relevant to Mausolus’ odd behaviour at Assus: he and Autophradates gave money to Agesilaus and raised the siege. This, we may suppose, was part of a deal for Greek mercenaries, reminiscent of the Philiscus affair at Delphi; if so, it would show that Mausolus and Autophradates were contemplating revolt *as early as the middle of the 360s*.<sup>144</sup>

There are therefore reasons for linking the second and third phases of

<sup>140</sup> *Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum* Berry II nos. 1294–5.      <sup>141</sup> S. Atlan, *Anadolu* 3 (1958) 89ff.

<sup>142</sup> But Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 173 is wrong to make Pharnaces one of the Seven to whom Darius I owed his throne.

<sup>143</sup> Doubted by Weiskopf 1989 (F 69) and Sekunda in F 40, 180; but see Hornblower 1990 (F 37) 365.

<sup>144</sup> Xen. *Ages.* says that Tachos was associated with Mausolus on this occasion; for the difficulties of this (and an attempted solution) see Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 174ff, but see p. 341 below. Note R. Moysey, ‘Diodorus, the Satraps, and the Decline of the Persian Empire’, *Ancient History Bulletin* 5 (1991) 111–20.

the revolt, or rather for seeing the central period of disturbances as a long-drawn-out process. This idea is supported by the mention at Diod. xv.90, describing the third and main phase of the revolt, of rebellious *ethne* (Mysians, Pamphylans, Lycians, etc.); this suggests general and protracted upheaval.

(The issue is not straightforward. In Diodorus' account it is unclear whether the revolt is a revolt like that of the Ionians in 500–499 B.C., that is, a revolt of subject peoples against their Persian masters; or a revolt by dissident satraps against the King; or both. The introductory sentence certainly leads us to expect an account of a revolt by subject peoples – 'the coastal inhabitants of Asia revolted from the Persians' – but Diodorus continues 'and some of the satraps and generals made war on Artaxerxes'. This implies that the revolt was one of both subjects and satraps. But in the narrative which follows the revolt is represented as a series of satrapal initiatives, based on Greek mercenary support. In view of the general quiescence of Asia Minor in the fourth century after the King's Peace, it is hard to believe in a general rebellion, although in ch. 90 Diodorus does include the 'Greek cities in Asia' among the King's enemies, and he emphatically lists the rebellious *ethne* at the end of the chapter.)

The leader of the revolt was neither of the satraps just mentioned, Mausolus and Autophradates, nor Tachos, the rebel satrap of Egypt (prominent though he was among the rebels, Diod. xv.90.3), but Orontes, satrap of Armenia. (This is what Trogus calls him; Diodorus calls him satrap of *Mysia*. There are strong grounds for thinking<sup>145</sup> that Diodorus' description is a mistake; or rather that there has been a displacement in the text, and the Mysians belong in his list of rebellious *ethne* and have been wrongly attached to Orontes' name.) Orontes was a half-Bactrian, cf. *OGIS* 264 (with p. 63f above). He was also married to the king's daughter (Xen. *An.* II.4.8 and *OGIS* 391). This suggests that he may have had grander aims than mere territorial enlargement, in fact that he hoped to do a Cyrus the Younger not a Datames. (But his gold coinage, of which three examples survive, should not be counted among the proofs that he aimed for the throne; cf. p. 59.) Artabazus, apparently loyal for the moment (it is a feature of these revolts that satrap *a* is sent to subdue satrap *b*, and that we next find *a* himself in revolt) was imprisoned by Autophradates (Dem. xxiii.154). This momentarily made a clean sweep of the western satrapies: Datames and Ariobarzanes of Hellespontine Phrygia were certainly involved, Polyæn. viii.21.3 and Diod. xv.90.3. The position in Greater Phrygia, in the interior, is unknown (cf. p. 78); but the later achievement of Antigonus as Alexander's satrap at Celaenae, where he kept open the line of Macedonian communications

<sup>145</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 177; another view: Osborne 1981–3 (B 165) II 1982, 65ff.

under huge pressure, shows that an obstructive satrap there would have been hard to circumvent. The way was now open for a push on the Iranian heartland.

Datames crossed the Euphrates (Polyaenus), Orontes moved on Syria (Trogus, *Prologue* x) and Tachos and Agesilaus on Phoenicia (Diod. xv.92.4). Was this a grand pincer attack? If so, Artaxerxes must have been steeling himself for another Cunaxa. But a co-ordinated rebel strategy is no more than speculation. In any case, the second Cunaxa never happened. Tachos was finished off by mutiny at the lower levels, and there was treachery at the higher: Orontes and an associate Rheomithres took the Great King's money and submitted (Diod. xv.91–2). Datames (*ibid.* 91) was killed, though his Cappadocian kingdom survived (ch. 8a, p. 221). Mausolus, the great opportunist (he is not mentioned for any specific action while the revolt was at its height) rapidly returned to his allegiance, in fact by 361/0 (as an inscription shows, Tod no. 138. This is a text from Carian Mylasa, and is dated by Mausolus' satrapy and the 45th year of Artaxerxes: line 17). There is no evidence, though it is often assumed, that he received Lycia as his reward for leaving the revolt.

The Greek attitude to all this is enigmatic to us, and the level of Greek involvement hard to determine. Athens' intervention on Samos was against a Persian garrison (Dem. xv.9), which justified morally the cleruchy which Athens installed there – something anyway justified technically, despite the renunciations of cleruchies in the confederacy charter (Tod no. 123 = Harding no. 35), because Samos was not a member. It was consistent with this anti-Persian stance, one might think, that Athens should help Ariobarzanes, who was now in Persian disfavour; but did Athens greatly care who held the Dascyleum satrapy? If the Ariobarzanes episode is really just a deal for mercenaries, it may be safer once again to invoke, as a motive, Athens' desire for pay for her officers and men. But that is not the whole story, because there is independent evidence for strong Athenian resentment of Persia in the early to mid-360s: a quadrilateral (Persian–Athenian–Spartan–Theban) peace conference at Susa in 367 had endorsed a Theban proposal (which never came to anything) for the disbandment of the Athenian fleet. One of the Athenian ambassadors there present threatened that Athens would now 'look for some friend other than the Great King' (Xen. *Hell.* vii.1.37). These words were not wholly idle: Ariobarzanes apart, an inscription in the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford, for which a date has been argued around 364,<sup>146</sup> attests an Athenian alliance with Strato, the king of Sidon in Phoenicia (Tod no. 139 = Harding no. 40). Now Phoenicia was on the direct line of any rebel thrust towards Persia

<sup>146</sup> Moysey 1976 (F 305).

(above), and there is an interesting wisp of evidence for collusion between Strato and King Tachos of Egypt (Hieron. *Adv. Iovinian.* 1.45). Certainly Tachos fled to Sidon in 360 (Xen. *Ages.* 11.3). Again, a (chronologically problematic) Athenian decree honouring Orontes may belong c. 361/0 (*IG II<sup>2</sup> 207a*, see below). Finally, the Athenian Chabrias helped the rebel cause with mercenaries and perhaps naval help (Diod. xv.92.3, Nep. *Chabr.* 11.3, Hicks and Hill no. 122). But see above, p. 83 on Iphicrates, for the difficulties of evaluating this kind of appointment.

As for Greek relations with Mausolus, Agesilaus may have taken his money (the Susa talks were no more pleasing to Sparta than to Athens, involving as they did the recognition of Messenian independence – hence Spartan readiness to injure Persia by helping Ariobarzanes. In 362 Agesilaus perhaps just needed money). But what of Athens? The Samos cleruchy imposed by the Athenian Timotheus was not a friendly move towards a nearby satrap who may already have had designs on Samos.<sup>147</sup> In other words the Persian hyparch Tigranes, who garrisoned Samos, may have been working in the same direction and interest as the nearest and most powerful satrap, namely Mausolus of Caria. (He is not likely to have been working directly and openly for him, because this is a point which Demosthenes is not likely to have missed.) Athens saved Samos from Persian Hecatomnid intervention, if that was the threat; but Rhodes, Cos and Chios were to succumb (Dem. xv; v.25). What made these encroachments possible was, in large part, the distrust of Athens caused by precisely the Samos cleruchy, whatever its justification. So Mausolus was the long-term gainer, even if he was perhaps the short-term loser, from the Samos affair of 366. It is interesting in this connexion that places in the Persian empire, some of them specifically in Mausolus' sphere of influence (including islands gobbled up by Caria at one time or another), offered a refuge to Samians expelled as a result of the cleruchy.<sup>148</sup> In so doing, they were making an anti-Athenian gesture. There was thus a long prehistory to Persian support of the Social War rebels of the 350s (see below). Samos, where events in 366 helped to concentrate allied feeling against Athens, can be seen as a testing-ground for the open collision of Athenian and Persian interests and forces in the next decade.

Officially, though, the Greeks, in the Reply to the Satraps (Tod no. 145 = Harding no. 57 of, probably, 362/1) declined involvement on the rebel side. Athens took the lead in the matter, if we may judge from the

<sup>147</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 109 and n. 19; 135 and n. 247; note however Shipley 1987 (C 382) 137 n. 55 (but the coins are not essential to the argument. Samian proximity to Caria is reason enough to suppose that Mausolus was alarmed by Timotheus' activities).

<sup>148</sup> *SEG I* 352: Phaselis; *Ath. Mitt.* 87 (1972) 192 no. 2: Erythrae; *ibid.* 199 no. 4: Miletus; *ibid.* 72 (1957) 190 no. 23: Heraclea on Latmus; *ibid.* 94 no. 26 and *SIG* 312: Iasus; *Ath. Mitt. ibid.* 196 no. 29: Rhodes; *SEG I* 350: Cos.

Attic dialect of the inscription, although the stone was found at Argos. Athens' own difficulties in the Aegean, which are described elsewhere in this volume (p. 203), meant that she had few resources to spare. Sparta, deprived of Messenia by Epaminondas, was also in very low water. The Great King had won.

Almost the first act of the new King Artaxerxes III, who succeeded to the throne in 359, was to order the disbandment of the mercenary armies of the coastal satraps: scholiast on Dem. iv.19. He was obeyed. The purpose and scope of this order are debatable. It surely did not (despite the word 'coastal') include satrapal *fleets*, in satrapies where they existed (cf. p. 56 for the usual Persian way of raising a navy). Thus Mausolus, whose ships number 100 at Xen. *Ages.* II.26f. (366) still has a navy in 357, Diod. xvi.7, with which he helps Chios, Rhodes and Byzantium in their war against Athens. As to the purpose of the order, the scholiast says that it was an economy measure. It is tempting to reject this curiously modern-looking explanation, in terms of 'defence-cuts', in favour of a political motive, the need to discipline the satraps after recent experiences. If *that* was the purpose, it failed badly, because the mercenaries thus disengaged eventually hired themselves out to Chares, the Athenian commander in the Social War; and when Chares ran short of funds, he engaged himself and his forces to Artabazus, now in revolt (scholiast on Dem. iv.19; Diod. xvi.22).

This revolt of Artabazus is the fourth and final phase of the Revolt of the Satraps. Chares was successful at first, ravaging the (Hellespontine) Phrygian territory of Tithraustes, a Persian (scholiast on Dem. iv.19; *FGrH* 105, the Rainer Papyrus) and winning a 'Second Marathon' in the Anatolian interior. But the Great King now took a hand: he threatened to help Athens' rebel allies unless Chares was recalled. (This may show that Mausolus' original help to Rhodes and the others was given independently, cf. p. 58.) Athens complied and Artabazus had to look for mercenaries elsewhere; in fact, from Thebes. Thebes was in bad financial trouble in the Third Sacred War (p. 741), where she had bitten off more than she could chew against the Phocians, who had the advantage of the Delphic temple treasures. So she sent 5,000 men (citizen-soldiers, perhaps, rather than mercenaries; or better, perhaps, 'citizen-mercenaries'): Diod. xvi.34.1, winter 354/3. Pammenes, the Theban commander, was briefly successful at first (*ibid.* 2), but then he quarrelled with Artabazus, who had him killed. What happened to Pammenes' mercenary force after that is strictly unknown, but an acute modern suggestion<sup>149</sup> has them hire themselves out to the obvious employer, the Persian King himself, poised for another attack on Egypt.

<sup>149</sup> Ehrhardt 1961 (C 20) 50ff (whence also 'citizen-mercenaries' and the pay calculations). *Contra*, Buckler 1989 (D 67) 100, n. 24.

Certainly the King sent Thebes 300 Attic talents (Diod. xvi.40), which is exactly a year's pay for 5,000 men at the rate of 1 drachma per day; and this was surely not for the 'beautiful blue eyes'<sup>150</sup> of the Thebans. This kind of side-switching anticipates the behaviour of some of the early hellenistic armies, more concerned with their *apokene*, baggage (i.e. booty)<sup>151</sup> than with the fate or identity of their paymaster. These Thebans, stuck in the Persian-held interior without a leader, at least have the excuse that there was not much else they could do. Artabazus fled to the court of Philip of Macedon (Diod. xvi.52). This was neither the first (cf. p. 213 for Amyntas son of Boubares) nor the last (p. 863) instance of Macedonian co-operation with individual Persians. Young Alexander surely took note. (Artabazus was eventually recalled to Persia at the instance of his kinsman Mentor.)

Before we turn to Egypt again, Orontes must have a final mention. It seems<sup>152</sup> that there is no epigraphic evidence for a second phase of insurrectionist activity by him in the 350s. But a reference to him in Demosthenes' *On the Symmories* in 354/3 (xiv.31) does look like an allusion to a currently, if briefly, dangerous enemy of Persia. In any case, Artabazus is evidently the main rebel of the 350s – the hero, so to speak, of the '45 rebellion, as Orontes, a tarnished hero, had been of the '15 (both men had royal blood). The details of any post-360 activity by Orontes elude us; his bribery by Artaxerxes II and his 'desertion of those who trusted him' (Diod. xv.91.1) would in any case have made him, in Browning's phrase about Wordsworth, a 'lost leader'.

The Persian attack on Egypt in 351/0, which certainly happened (it is alluded to by Dem. xv.12 of that year), has unfortunately slipped from Diodorus' account. It was mentioned by Ephorus: Diod. xvi.40.3 (cf. 44) has a reference to an 'earlier', but in the extant narrative non-existent, campaign. This omission has produced a muddle: Diodorus records under 351 a successful campaign which belongs in 344 or 343. (Dem. xiv.31 may imply an even earlier attempt, in 354/3, cf. 'for a third time' in Trogus *Prologue* x.) Of the details of the Persian repulse from Egypt in 351 Diodorus has ensured that nothing can be said. But it was that Persian failure in Egypt which now stimulated, and it was the Egyptian king who now encouraged and helped, a revolt in Phoenicia as well (we may compare the Strato–Tachos axis of the 360s). The Phoenicians must also have resented<sup>153</sup> the demands on them which Persian preparations

<sup>150</sup> Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) III<sup>2</sup> 1.483 n. 1.

<sup>151</sup> M. Holleaux, 'Ceux qui sont dans le bagage', *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* III (Paris, 1968) 15–26; cf. Cook 1983 (F 14) 263 n. 22.

<sup>152</sup> Osborne 1971 (B 164) and 1973 (F 688); Weiskopf 1989 (F 69) 79; but note Moysey 1987 (B 161). <sup>153</sup> Cook 1983 (F 14) 220.

against Egypt involved: Phoenicia was the main Persian base for that campaign.

Diodorus' account of this Phoenician revolt (xvi.42ff) is for a change satisfyingly full, and we get a glimpse, not afforded us in the half-century since the events of Xenophon's *Hellenica* book III, of what Persian rule was actually like. We have already noticed the fodder collected by the satraps for the war, surely typical of countless such requisitions. There is also a mention (xvi.41.5) of the 'royal paradise' (= enclosed garden or park, *pardesh*, cf. the 'keeper of the king's *pardesh*' at Nehemiah 3.8), 'where the Persian Kings took their ease'. Posidonius adds the detail that at Damascus, 80 km inland from Sidon but perhaps not far from Diodorus' 'paradise', there were vineyards which supplied Chalybonian wine for the Persian King. This was allegedly the only kind he would drink: *FGrH* 87 F 68. Readers of *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* will remember the galloping horseman who accosts Lawrence of Arabia with a bunch of yellow grapes: 'Good news: Damascus salutes you!' (p. 644).

The satraps Belesys of Syria and Mazaeus of Cilicia commanded the Persian invasion force, which assembled in Babylonia. Tennes, king (i.e. client-king) of Sidon was the leader of the rebel forces ('many triremes and a host of mercenaries'), which were strengthened by 4,000 mercenaries loaned by Egypt and commanded by Mentor of Rhodes.

A third revolt, on Cyprus, now broke out, 'in imitation of the Phoenicians' (Diod. xvi.42.5), who had themselves imitated the Egyptians. The suppression of this revolt can be dated fairly closely because Idrieus (satrap of Caria 351–344, succeeding Artemisia who ruled 353–351 after Mausolus' death in 353) and the Athenian Phocion were entrusted with its suppression by the Great King. The resources of Syria, Cilicia and Babylonia were now fully committed, and Artaxerxes must have been feeling the strain; hence this unusual pair of commanders. The chronological argument goes like this: Isocrates in the *Philippus* of 346 expressed the hope (v. 103) that Idrieus might prove disloyal to Persia. These hopes of 346 were dashed by, and therefore antedated, Idrieus' behaviour on Cyprus. But Idrieus was dead by 344. Therefore, Cyprus was crushed 346–344. Idrieus' action on this occasion proved the strength of Persia's policy in the western empire: a native Carian satrap crushes a native Cypriot king in the name of Persia. But his father Hecatomnus' help to Evagoras earlier in the century is a warning against generalization.

Meanwhile the Phoenician revolt was so seriously viewed in Persia that the King himself set out to deal with it, a rare event. (In the 390s the King had 'crossed the upper [eastern] satrapies' to deal with Evagoras of Cyprus, but he does not seem to have got there: Diod. xiv.98.4. The text

should not be emended so as to make Hecatomnus of Caria rather than the King do the 'crossing', a geographical impossibility.)<sup>154</sup> Tennes took fright and negotiated secretly by letter with Artaxerxes, who therefore felt free to proceed against what was in reality the more important object, namely Egypt. For this purpose he needed mercenary help on an unusual scale and sent to Sparta and Athens: Diod. xvi.44. (The visit to Athens of this embassy is also recorded by Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 157, cf. 324 Androtion F 53.) The Spartans and Athenians replied that friendship was one thing, help another. (Note that in Athens' case this was the usual equivocation, given that Athens had had no qualms about sending Phocion to help the Persians on Cyprus, see above.) Once again it was Thebes which obliged, with 1,000 hoplites under Lacrates; there were also 3,000 Argives, and 6,000 Asiatic Greeks. This was a large total (cf. ch. 8a, p. 225), making 10,000 in all, a 'myriad', and perhaps a believable Diodoran 'myriad' for once: myriads are suspiciously frequent in Diodorus. To these, Mentor's 4,000 would soon be added, see below. On the other side, Nectanebo had 20,000 Greeks, not to mention some Libyans and Egyptians. Even allowing for exaggeration, this stupendous grand total of 34,000 Greek mercenaries on the two sides put together marks the climax of Greek mercenary activity in the fourth century.

Sidon meanwhile had fallen by treachery even without direct Persian assault: Tennes, after betraying Sidon, was executed by the King 'as being of no further use'. The Sidonians scuttled their navy and the population committed a mass Wagnerian suicide by fire; gold and silver in huge quantities was later discovered in the burnt rubble of their houses. (This precious metal was then sold off by Artaxerxes, Diod. xvi.42.5. He had mercenary bills to pay.) Mentor and his mercenaries, like Pammenes' army in the previous decade, joined Artaxerxes; for Mentor this was the beginning of a distinguished career in Persian service. He now became one of the three Persian field-commanders against Egypt, the others being Rhosaces, satrap of Lydia and Ionia (ch. 8a, p. 216) and Aristazanes (xvi.47.2 and 3). The last two co-operated with the Greek mercenary *condottieri*, Nicostratus of Argos and Lacrates of Thebes.

In Egypt, Nectanebo's Greek contingents succumbed one by one: first 5,000 of them under Cleinias of Cos, slaughtered by fellow-Greeks for whom the cause of re-establishing Persian authority in Egypt was not specially close to the heart, one would have thought. (Diod. xvi.49.3 however indicates that there was some fellow-feeling felt by Greek for

<sup>154</sup> C. Reid, *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 123ff at 136 n. 37; Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 37 n. 10; Petit 1988 (F 693) 311f, preferring the view of Cawkwell *op. cit.* Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 37 n. 10 that Autophradates is meant.



Greek.) There is, to turn to the Egyptian side, no reason to attribute anti-Persian sentiments to Cleinias of Cos<sup>155</sup> merely on the strength of his presence with Nectanebo; and the same goes for most of the individual Greeks known from the affair. It may be slightly more significant that Thebans and Argives were to be found on one side while Athenians fought on the other, that is the Egyptian, side. (As we may infer they did from Tod no. 199 = Harding no. 119, an *Athenian* decree acknowledging Mentor's role in saving 'the Greeks who had fought in Egypt'. In 351 Athenian and Spartan generals had certainly been used by the Egyptians, Diod. xvi.4.2.)

Thebans had a reputation going back to 480 as inveterate 'medizers' or Persian sympathizers; and though on the present occasion they may have been helping Persia in order to spite their enemy Philip of Macedon,<sup>156</sup> the medizing Thebans were not popular with other Greeks in general or with the Athenians in particular. The reasons for their unpopularity go beyond the events of 480, and have to do with the 'Leuctran arrogance' which Thebes had shown in the years after 371. Greek loathing of Thebes is attested by the events of 335 (below, p. 848), when the city was destroyed by Alexander with full Greek support as an act of 'piety'.

Argos too had 'medized' in the fifth century, or rather had stayed neutral in a way which was thought culpable: Hdt. viii.73.3. (But Argos was never hated for this as Thebes was hated.)

It would therefore be tempting to think that the Athenians, by taking up arms against Thebans and Argives, were trying to be good panhellenists. Isocrates certainly called the Thebans and Argives betrayers of Greece (xii.159) for helping Persia in Egypt. But the Persian service of Iphicrates in the 370s, and Phocion's activities in the 340s, as also the prompt recalling of Chabrias in 380 and of Chares in 355 when Persia required it, show that Athens' attitude is too complex and too heavily compromised to earn the panhellenist label. In 341, if the manuscripts of Demosthenes are sound (ix.71), that orator would be urging that an Athenian delegation should be sent to the Great King asking for help against Macedon, and a little later this was actually done, Dem. xii.6.

To return to Egypt: Lacrates at Pelusium now surrendered, and so finally did the third group of Greeks, the mercenaries at Bubastis. Nectanebo, whose failure in 343 (contrast 351) Diodorus puts down to his refusal to delegate the supreme command, fled from his bunker at Memphis to Ethiopia. The date of the conquest of Egypt, the last great success of the Achaemenids (despite a brief Egyptian revolt in the 330s, p. 344f) is 343/2: the *Letter of Speusippus* speaks in spring 342 of a 'shortage of papyrus' due to Artaxerxes' reconquest of Egypt: *FGrH* 69

<sup>155</sup> Sherwin-White 1978 (C 381) 73; 549 for the correct form of the name.

<sup>156</sup> Cawkwell 1963 (C 106) 129.

τ 1 para. 14. Pherendates, who has a good Iranian name (no native appointment here) was installed as satrap: Diod. XVI.51.3. A satrap of Egypt in the time of Darius I had been called Pherendates too; perhaps an ancestor.<sup>157</sup>

From Egypt, Mentor proceeded to the suppression of Hermias, the ruler of Atarneus in the Aeolid (north-western Asia Minor). This man's pocket principality is discussed elsewhere (ch. 8a, p. 220). Diodorus says (XVI.52) that he ruled many cities and strongholds, and that he had revolted from Persia. An inscription (Tod no. 165 = Harding no. 79) records a treaty between him and Erythrae, to the south. Now Erythrae, which had honoured Mausolus in the 350s (Tod no. 155), was still on good terms with the Hecatomnids as late as the time of Idrieus, who died in 344; see *SEG* xxxi 969 = Harding 28B, Erythraean honours to Idrieus. So it seems wrong to conclude that Hermias' treaty with Erythrae implies that 'Carian power is declining there' i.e. at Erythrae.<sup>158</sup> Erythrae could surely have honoured both men, Idrieus and Hermias, within a short space of time. (The likelihood of this is not much reduced if the honours to Idrieus were actually granted in the 350s, i.e. in his brother Mausolus' satrapal tenure. The honours to Mausolus and to Idrieus seem to have been carved on the same stone.)

From Theopompus we learn (*FGrH* 115 F 291) that Hermias possessed Assus as well as Atarneus, and that he was put in charge in some capacity (the noun is missing) of (?recovering) some territory, by Chios and Mytilene.<sup>159</sup> But Hermias pulled out when his mercenaries were not paid. This is normally taken to refer to interference on the islands themselves, but there is another possibility: the 'territory' could be land on the Asiatic mainland (*peraia*), which had been lost since the King's Peace (p. 80), but which the anti-Persian elements on the islands were seeking to recover. (Tenedos and Mytilene seem to have made another such attempt a few years later, pp. 80, 804.) It is in favour of this that Chios had once owned Atarneus (Hdt. I.160.4; Xen. *Hell.* III.2.11), and if she wanted it back, to make some contact with the present ruler would be the obvious first step. If that was Hermias' game, Persian misgivings about him look even better founded. Idrieus' successor Ada, the ruler of Chios in the late 340s (because she was satrap of Caria in 344–340, a period when Caria controlled Chios) cannot have been much pleased at the intrigues between Hermias and Chios. But the main charge against Hermias was correspondence with Philip (Dem. x.32, with the scholiast on para. 10, p. 202 Dindorf edn). In 341 Mentor lured him to negotiations and sent him to Artaxerxes who tortured and executed him. Hermias did 'nothing unworthy of philosophy' (*FGrH* 124 Callisthenes F 2), that is he did not talk when tortured.

<sup>157</sup> Cook 1983 (F 14) 64.

<sup>158</sup> Wormell 1935 (H 124) 70.

<sup>159</sup> Lane Fox 1986 (B 65) 111 n. 51.

The philosophical and literary consequences of this moving affair cannot be examined here. It is however of great political interest because it is early and concrete evidence that Philip already had designs of some kind on the Persian empire. Arrian (*Anab.* II.14.2) alludes to ‘friendship and alliance’ between Persia and Philip. Some scholars put this in 351, as part of a Persian effort to secure a free hand against Egypt. Others put it in 344/3. Others, more plausibly perhaps, deny its historicity altogether.<sup>160</sup> More credible is the evidence for hostile *Macedonian* intentions: leaving the *Philippus* of Isocrates out of account, we have, first, the harbouring of Artabazus in the 350s (p. 90); second, the explicit statement of Diodorus (xvi.60) that Philip, already after the Peace of Philocrates in 346 (p. 751) hoped to be chosen as ‘leader of the “Persian War”’ – an item which some would like to reinforce by pointing to his mild handling of Athens in the late 340s: he wanted to break away east, not be bothered with Demosthenes and company; third, perhaps, the organization of Thrace in 342–334 into something like a ‘satrapy’ on a consciously Achaemenid model<sup>161</sup> (cf. Diod. xvi.71; xvii.62.5; Arr. *Anab.* vii.9.3); fourth, the possibility that as early as the end of the 340s, Philip was encouraging pro-Macedonian factions in the Persian-held cities and islands of the east Aegean and on the Asiatic mainland.<sup>162</sup> Thus there were altars to Zeus Philippios at Eresus on Lesbos (Tod no. 191 line 5) and a statue to Philip at Ephesus on the mainland: see Arr. *Anab.* I.17. Fifth and finally, there is the Hermias episode.

There was, however, no open clash between the Persians and Macedon (and, we can add, no concrete co-operation between Persia and Athens) until Philip’s sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium. In 340/39 (following Philochorus F 54 rather than Diod. xvi.75: 341) the ‘coastal satraps’, as Diodorus calls them, helped Perinthus against Philip. Philochorus’ mention of the *royal* satraps, and Diodorus’ language, preclude attempts<sup>163</sup> to see this as an exercise of independent satrapal initiative. The only named satrap is Arsites of Hellespontine Phrygia (Paus. I.29.10); but what happened at Byzantium (below) may suggest that satraps as far south as Caria (which was certainly ‘coastal’) were involved.

In the next year, Byzantium got help from Chios, Cos and Rhodes: Diod. xvi.77, confirmed for Chios by *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 234 (cf. perhaps Tod no. 175 = Harding no. 97, Tenedos). Again, this should be seen as satrapal, Persian action, not as a manifestation of independence by the islands. All

<sup>160</sup> Cawkwell 1963 (C 106) 127ff; Bosworth 1980 (B 14) 229ff.

<sup>161</sup> Kienast 1973 (D 102); Griffith in Hammond and Griffith 1979 (D 50) 559. The title ‘general over Thrace’ is not actually attested until Alexander’s time.

<sup>162</sup> Ehrenberg 1938 (D 170); Badian 1966 (D 137); Heisserer 1980 (B 143); Fraser review of Heisserer, *CR* 1982, 241.

<sup>163</sup> Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) III<sup>2</sup> 1.601; *contra*, Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 123.

three places were still under Hecatomnid control (see Dem. v.25 for the year 346). It is wrong to argue independent status for these islands from literary references to Athenian diplomacy with 'Chios and Rhodes' (see e.g. *FGrH* 115 F 164; Dem. ix.71; or the lost Rhodian and Chian orations of Hyperides). Behind 'Chios and Rhodes' stood the Carian satrap who controlled them. The better view is that places like these (Cos is another) remained under Persian garrisons until Alexander. They may, however, have briefly attempted to recover their mainland possessions from Persia in the short initial period of Macedonian liberation in the 330s, before the Persian counter-offensive: p. 80.

Philip's invasion of the Persian empire after his defeat of the Greeks at Chaeronea was planned to take place in two stages; the second, led by himself, never happened because he was assassinated. But the first did: an advance force of 10,000 crossed under Parmenion and Attalus (Polyaen. v.44.4). It has been wrongly assumed<sup>164</sup> that this force stayed in Asia until the arrival of Alexander, and its inclusion or non-inclusion in the total of his foot-troops is then held to explain a discrepancy between the two ancient estimates of this arm of his forces (30,000: 40,000). But even if we believe that conventional 'myriad' (see p. 92), what Polyaeus actually says is that the Macedonian force was very substantially reduced. It was mauled, Polyaenus says, by the Persian general Memnon near Magnesia (probably Magnesia on the Maeander rather than Magnesia ad Sipylum, the modern Manisa).<sup>165</sup> 'Many were killed, many captured.' The rump surely came home.

Alexander's invasion of Asia should thus be reckoned as, in the narrow military sense, a new beginning. But we have argued at several points in this chapter that in the social sense it was anything but that (pp. 69f, 72, 90 on political *homonoia*); and in a later chapter (8a, p. 229ff) it will be shown how far, in western Anatolia at least, cultural fusion and hellenization had already progressed under the fourth-century Achaemenid kings and their satraps.

<sup>164</sup> Brunt 1976–83 (B 21) I 1xx. On Philip's Persian War see Ruzicka 1985 (D 116A).

<sup>165</sup> Judeich 1892 (F 663) 303 n. 1.

CHAPTER 4  
THE CORINTHIAN WAR

ROBIN SEAGER

I. THE CAUSES AND OUTBREAK OF WAR

The outcome of the Peloponnesian War had left many of the victors discontented.<sup>1</sup> Sparta had totally disregarded the wishes and interests of her allies and had pursued a policy of aggressive expansion in the Peloponnese, central and northern Greece and the Aegean which had at times seemed directed specifically against them. Though Lysander had been a prime exponent of this policy, it had not been his alone, and his temporary eclipse in 403 had not led to any softening of Spartan attitudes.<sup>2</sup> Corinth had wanted to see Athens annihilated, but her desire had been thwarted and she had had no share in the spoils of victory (Xen. *Hell.* II.2.19). Moreover, Spartan intervention in Syracuse had damaged Corinthian interests there (Diod. XIV.110.2ff). Thebes had been even more displeased. She alone of Sparta's allies had ventured to claim her share of the profits, but in vain (Xen. *Hell.* III.5.5, Plut. *Lys.* 27.2), and she too had demanded to no avail that Athens be destroyed. Instead Sparta had put ominous pressure on Thebes by strengthening her own position in central Greece and Thessaly, securing control of Heraclea in about 400 (Diod. XIV.38.3f) and garrisoning Pharsalus (Diod. XIV.82).<sup>3</sup> Thebes had responded by making a major contribution to the overthrow of Sparta's puppet government at Athens, the Thirty, only to be somewhat disappointed by the cautious behaviour of the restored democracy, whose subservience to Sparta had led to tension between Athens and Thebes (*Lys.* xxx.22). Both Thebes and Corinth, with the Thebans taking the lead, had pursued a policy of military non-cooperation with Sparta. They had refused to take part in the expedition to the Piraeus, the war against Elis, and Agesilaus' expedition to Asia (Xen. *Hell.* II.4.29, III.2.25, 5.5, Diod. XIV.7.7, Paus. III.9.2ff). On this last occasion Thebes had been stirred to still greater provocation. When Agesilaus had attempted to imitate Agamemnon by sacrificing at Aulis

<sup>1</sup> Funke 1980 (C 24) 46ff.

<sup>2</sup> Funke 1980 (C 24) 27ff; Thompson 1973 (C 319); against: Hamilton 1979 (C 294) 25ff.

<sup>3</sup> Andrewes 1971 (C 275) 223ff.

before his departure, the boeotarchs had forcibly disrupted proceedings (Xen. *Hell.* III.4.3f, 5.5, Plut. *Ages.* 6.4ff, Lys. xxvii.1).

The course of events in Asia had done much to determine the degree of overt opposition to Sparta expressed in Greece. At first she had enjoyed some success on land, which had offered no encouragement to the malcontents at home. But the mounting by the Persians of a major offensive at sea, which had led to the defection of Rhodes from Sparta in summer 396 (Diod. xiv.79.6), had given them hope at a time when Lysander's recent return to prominence had sharpened their dislike of Sparta. A more practical stimulus had soon followed, for the activities of Agesilaus had inspired the Persians to foster and co-ordinate discontent in Greece in the hope that the outbreak of a war at home would force Sparta to recall her army from Asia. Of their Rhodian emissaries the first, Dorieus, had been caught and executed by the Spartans (Paus. vi.7.6), but the second, Timocrates, in autumn 396, had done his work well, finding a sympathetic hearing for his promise of Persian subsidies not only at Thebes, Corinth and Argos, but probably at Athens too (*Hell. Oxy.* vii.2ff, Plut. *Artax.* 20, Paus. III.9.8, against Xen. *Hell.* III.5.1f).<sup>4</sup>

For even defeated Athens, though she had dutifully provided troops for the Elean war and the expedition of Thibron (Xen. *Hell.* III.1.4, 2.25, Diod. xiv.17.7), had been aroused to provocative acts by the resurgence of Persian naval power. In 397 naval officers and equipment had been officially dispatched to Conon and an embassy had been sent to the King, which on its way home had fallen into Spartan hands and perished (*Hell. Oxy.* vii.1, Isae. xi.8). In 396 Athens had followed the lead of Thebes and Corinth and refused, albeit with copious excuses, to contribute to Agesilaus' expeditionary force (Paus. III.9.2). Yet when in winter 396/5 Demaenetus had sailed off to join Conon with one of Athens' permitted twelve ships, he had been denounced to the Spartan harmost on Aegina on the advice of Thrasybulus, Aesimus and Anytus, who judged that Athens was not yet strong enough to risk facing Sparta's wrath alone (*Hell. Oxy.* vii.1).

In all this there is no reason to suppose that social, economic or ideological factors in the various cities had played any significant part.<sup>5</sup> Resentment of Sparta's high-handed neglect of their interests and fear of her ruthless expansionism will have been almost unanimous at Corinth and Thebes. At Athens even the unconvincing analysis offered by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* does not obscure the essential fact that hostility to Sparta was by now universal. The only point at issue was whether Athens was as yet strong enough to go to war. In the preceding years the

<sup>4</sup> Seager 1967 (c 250) 95f; Lehmann 1978 (c 39).

<sup>5</sup> Perlman 1964 (c 56), 1968 (c 220); Seager 1967 (c 250); Lehmann 1978 (c 39); Funke 1980 (c 24) 1ff, 46ff; against: Kagan 1961 (c 35), Hamilton 1979 (c 294) 137ff.

vital division had been that between the City and the Piraeus. This was not economic: there were rich men on both sides. Nor was the constitution a live issue: by now there can have been few in the ranks of the City who nursed serious regrets for the passing of the oligarchy. Some of their number saw perhaps in the subservience of Athens to Sparta a guarantee of their own safety, but there is every reason to suppose that a large majority would have been glad to see Athens once again independent of Sparta and able to assert herself as a force in Greece.

It was the leaders of the Thebans who precipitated the conflict in Greece which Persia had tried to encourage (Xen. *Hell.* III.5.3ff, *Hell. Oxy.* XVII, Paus. III.9.9ff). Ismenias and Androcleidas were aware that the Boeotians would be afraid to attack Sparta while she seemed to be at the height of her power, while Sparta would be reluctant to incur the guilt of breaking the peace, though she would welcome the chance to humble the arrogance of Thebes if someone else initiated hostilities. Their task was therefore to contrive a situation in which Sparta would be provided with a morally plausible excuse for doing what she wanted to do, attack Thebes, so that Boeotia would then have to fight to defend herself. A long-standing squabble between Phocis and Ozolian Locris gave them their opportunity. Both parties had been in the habit of making raids in disputed territory, but in the past these quarrels had been settled by peaceful means. Now Ismenias and Androcleidas persuaded the Phocians to mount a full-scale invasion of Locris. Since the Locrians were allies of Boeotia, the Theban leaders were then able to urge the Boeotians to a counter-invasion of Phocis. On hearing of the Boeotian decision to invade, the Phocians appealed to Sparta to restrain the Thebans. Though the Spartans did not believe the Phocian story that they had been forced to invade Locris in self-defence, they were glad of the pretext to interfere and ordered the Boeotians to keep out of Phocis. This ultimatum was couched in terms which suggest that they hoped the Boeotians would refuse. The Spartan demand was angrily rejected and the Boeotian invasion of Phocis went ahead. Once again the Phocians turned to Sparta, this time for military aid, and Sparta happily agreed to protect her ally. So, with consummate skill, Ismenias and Androcleidas had achieved their objective.

The Spartan attack was planned to take place in two stages (Xen. *Hell.* III.5.6ff, Diod. XIV.81.1ff, Plut. *Lys.* 28f, Paus. III.5.3ff). First Lysander was sent to Phocis to pick up Phocian troops. He was then to make his way to Haliartus in Boeotia. The king Pausanias was to follow with the full force of Sparta's allies and join Lysander at Haliartus on a predetermined day. So Lysander marched into Boeotia from Phocis and scored an initial success by detaching Orchomenus from Thebes. Then

he headed for Haliartus. Only now, when they could unequivocally claim to be acting in self-defence, did the Thebans turn to Athens (Xen. *Hell.* III.5.7ff).<sup>6</sup> Their envoys played on the yearning for empire that still smouldered in the breasts of the Athenian people (cf. Andoc. III.20ff) and suggested that Sparta's hold on the Peloponnese itself could easily be broken if the disaffected had a leader to turn to. This expectation was not unreasonable – something similar had happened after the Peace of Nicias – though in the event it proved false. In formulating their appeal they had judged the mood of Athens well. A few months before Thrasybulus had not been prepared to challenge Sparta alone. But now he played a leading role in promoting the alliance, and according to Xenophon the vote in favour was unanimous (Xen. *Hell.* III.5.16, cf. Ar. *Eccl.* 195f), even though it was tantamount to a vote for war, for the alliance, though defensive, was made with the Boeotians (Tod no. 101 = Harding no. 14, *Lys.* XVI.13), and Lysander was already on Boeotian soil.

In the mean time Lysander had reached Haliartus (Xen. *Hell.* III.5.17ff). But instead of waiting for Pausanias, he first tried to persuade its people to follow the example of Orchomenus, then, when the Theban garrison which had been hastily installed prevented this, he besieged the city. In a Theban counter-attack Lysander was killed, and though the Thebans suffered some losses when they pursued his men, his Phocian troops seized the chance to slip off home. When Pausanias arrived at Haliartus, he found himself confronted not only by the victorious Thebans but also by an Athenian force commanded by Thrasybulus (Xen. *Hell.* III.5.22ff, *Lys.* XIV.5, 14, XVI.13f, *Plut. Lys.* 29.1, *Paus.* III.5.4). His position was unattractive, he lacked cavalry, and his Peloponnesian troops were reluctant to fight. So the king decided not to offer battle and chose instead to recover the bodies of Lysander and his men under a truce before withdrawing under the insults of the Thebans. At Sparta he was put on trial for his life on charges that seem to stem from the friends of Lysander: he was accused of arriving too late at Haliartus, of failing to fight to recover the bodies of the dead, and most revealingly of all of allowing the *demos* of Athens to go free when he had had it in his power. Since he wisely did not present himself for judgment, he was condemned to death in absence and went into exile at Tegea.

## II. THE WAR ON LAND, 395–394 B.C.

After Haliartus Athens and Thebes set out to strengthen themselves (Diod. XIV.82.1ff, cf. Tod no. 102 = Harding no. 16: Athenian–Locrian alliance). Corinth and Argos were quickly persuaded to join forces with them: the belief with which the Theban envoys had tempted Athens, that

<sup>6</sup> Seager 1967 (C 250) 96ff.



the universal hatred in which she was held would make the overthrow of Sparta an easy matter, seems to have been shared by all the major powers. The allies established a council of war at Corinth, about the detailed workings of which nothing is known. Their first step was to send out embassies to detach as many cities as possible from Sparta. In regions where Athens and Corinth had long been influential they had considerable success: according to Diodorus Euboea, Acarnania, Leucas, Ambracia and the cities of Chalcidice all threw in their lot with the allies, though the surviving Athenian alliance with Eretria belongs to 394/3 (Tod no. 103 = Harding no. 2). But ominously, despite the Theban prophecy at Athens, there were no further defections from Sparta within the Peloponnese itself.

The first operations of the alliance, probably in the autumn of 395, were conducted in central and northern Greece, with a view to weakening Sparta's position in the region and perhaps to hindering Agesilaus' return should he be recalled (Diod. xiv.82.5ff). A force was sent north in answer to an appeal from Medius of Larissa, who expelled the Spartan garrison from Pharsalus, while the Boeotians and Argives took Heraclea and restored the place to its Trachinian inhabitants with an Argive garrison. Of the prisoners taken, the Spartans were killed, while the other Peloponnesians were allowed to depart unharmed, a decision which shows the desire to drive a wedge between Sparta and her allies. Ismenias then detached the Aenianes and Athamanes from Sparta and led a force recruited from these peoples into Phocis, where he won a victory. The armies then dispersed to their various homes.

It is also probable that, immediately after Haliartus, work was begun at Athens on the rebuilding of the Long Walls and the restoration of the fortifications of the Piraeus.<sup>7</sup> Thrasybulus had stressed Athens' defenceless condition in his reply to the Theban envoys, and though the earliest surviving evidence for work on the walls comes from the last month of 395/4 (Tod no. 107A = Harding no. 17), there is every reason to suppose that it began as soon as war broke out. The task was an urgent one, on both military and psychological grounds. Not only must Athens be able to defend herself; she was also setting out to recover her empire, of which the walls were a potent symbol as well as the practical foundation.<sup>8</sup>

In winter 395/4 Sparta came to a decision which marked a further triumph for Persian policy. Convinced that she could not face the alliance now ranged against her and carry on a major war in Asia, and deprived of two experienced commanders by the death of Lysander and the exile of Pausanias, she recalled Agesilaus (Xen. *Hell.* iv.2.1ff, Diod. xiv.83.1ff, Plut. *Ages.* 15). The king was bitterly disappointed at this

<sup>7</sup> Maier 1959 (B 153) 32; Perlman 1968 (C 220) 261; against: Pritchett 1971–91 (K 51) II 120, in ignorance of the date of Cnidus, for which cf. Lys. xix.28. <sup>8</sup> Seager 1967 (C 250) 112.

blow to his ambitions, but obeyed without question, though he promised to return if circumstances should permit and left a substantial force in Asia. In spring 394 he set out for home by the roads once taken by Xerxes. He was accompanied by contingents of troops from his Asiatic allies, though his own men needed the stimulus of prizes for turn-out to overcome their reluctance to fight against Greeks.

In Greece both sides were busy with preparations for the new campaign (Xen. *Hell.* iv.2.9ff). Timolaus the Corinthian urged the allies to fight in Laconia or as close to it as possible, before Sparta could assemble her full complement of allied forces. His advice was recognized as good, but the inevitable arguments over the division of command and disposition of troops caused delay, while the Spartans, led by Aristodemus, regent for the young king Agesipolis, were already on the move after collecting men from Tegea and Mantinea. So the Spartans reached Sicyon at the same time as the allied army arrived at Nemea. As well as the forces of the four major powers, the latter included contingents from Euboea, Locris, Malis and Acarnania (Xen. *Hell.* iv.2.17). The battle of Nemea (or Corinth) took place probably in April or May 394, for inscriptions alluding to Athenian losses in the territory of Corinth in 394/3 (Tod nos. 104, 105, *IG II<sup>2</sup> 5221* = Harding no. 19B, C and A) need not refer to it.<sup>9</sup> To Xenophon's partial eye it was a triumph for the organization of the Spartans over the arrogance and indiscipline of the Thebans. Though all Sparta's allies were defeated, the Spartans themselves inflicted substantial casualties on all four of their principal opponents as their forces rashly pursued the routed Spartan allies. The eventual losses of the anti-Spartan alliance were more than double those on the Spartan side, and the allied army fled for refuge to Corinth, where at first it found the gates shut against it, though thanks to the efforts of a minority of Corinthians they were opened in time to prevent further losses. Their action was gratefully remembered at Athens (Dem. xx.52ff), but the original closing of the gates continued to rankle (Ar. *Ecc.* 199f). In general Athenian enthusiasm for the war seems to have been waning. Even before the battle men had tried to evade service, and Thrasybulus, who was again in command, was free with accusations of cowardice afterwards, while morale grew even worse at the news of Agesilaus' approach (Lys. xvi.15f).

Agesilaus had reached Amphipolis when he heard of the victory at Nemea. Much encouraged, he pressed onwards through Macedon to Thessaly, where the allies of the Boeotians did their best to delay his advance, but with little success (Xen. *Hell.* iv.3.1ff, *Ages.* II.2, Plut. *Ages.* 16). By 14 August 394 (the date is given by an eclipse) the king had crossed the borders of Boeotia and was encamped at Chaeronea (Xen.

<sup>9</sup> Funke 1980 (C 24) 79ff; against: Aucello 1964 (C 4) 33ff.

*Hell.* iv.3.10ff, *Plut. Ages.* 17). There he received news of a different kind: the report that Spartan naval power in the Aegean had been shattered by the victory of Conon and Pharnabazus at Cnidus. For the sake of morale he told his troops that Sparta had won a naval battle, then advanced into Boeotia, where he was joined by Spartan and allied reinforcements from the Peloponnese and contingents from Orchomenus and Phocis. The Boeotians and their allies had gathered at Coronea, and there a battle was fought towards the end of August (*Xen. Hell.* iv.3.15ff, *Ages.* 11.6ff, *Diod.* xiv.84.1f, *Plut. Ages.* 18f). Agesilaus routed the Argives, but an initial success won by the Thebans drove him to adopt dangerous tactics and, though he emerged victorious, he was wounded. The Thebans refused to fight again, and so the Spartans set up a trophy. They then disbanded their forces, and Agesilaus sailed home (*Xen. Hell.* iv.4.1).

There was to be no further major land battle between the more or less complete forces of the two sides. Until the first Spartan invasion of the Argolid in 391, the land war was confined to the neighbourhood of Corinth, which served as a base for the allies, while the Spartans operated from Sicyon. At the end of this first phase of the war none of the major Greek powers had much cause for satisfaction. If Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos had hoped to see Spartan power in the Peloponnese crumble to nothing, that hope had been disappointed. To that extent Sparta could claim success, but she had been forced to abandon her enterprise in Asia, while beyond the Isthmus she had suffered setbacks in central and northern Greece. This last point gave Thebes some comfort. But the only power to have derived unmitigated gain from the struggles of the Greeks was Persia.

### III. THE RETURN OF CONON

After the Persian naval victory at Cnidus, Conon and Pharnabazus spent the rest of the summer of 394 on a tour of the islands and coastal cities, driving out Spartan harmosts but promising respect for the autonomy of Sparta's former subjects (*Xen. Hell.* iv.8.1ff, *Diod.* xiv.84.3ff). This approach was recommended to the Persian by Conon on the cynical but practical ground that any open admission of Persia's imperial objectives might provoke troublesome, perhaps even concerted, resistance. Conon may also have had at the back of his mind the thought that, if the liberated cities kept a measure of independence, it would be easier at some time in the future to detach them from Persia and bring them once more into a revived Athenian empire. His policy met with considerable success, both among the islands and on the mainland. Sparta was deprived of Cos, Nisyros and Telos, Chios expelled its Spartan garrison, and Mytilene, Ephesus and Erythrae followed suit. Statues were erected

in Conon's honour at Erythrae, Ephesus and Samos (Tod no. 106 = Harding no. 12D, Paus. vi.3.16). Some of these cities then formed an alliance known from its surviving coins.<sup>10</sup> While Pharnabazus spent the winter trying in vain to dislodge Dercyllidas from Abydos, he sent Conon to win over the cities of the Hellespont, to recruit mercenaries, and to assemble as large a fleet as possible by spring 393.

At the beginning of spring the expedition set sail and made its way through the Cyclades to Melos. A garrison was placed on Paros, which was seized with the aid of Siphnian exiles, while the approach of the Persians provoked an exodus from Siphnos itself (Isoc. xix.18ff). The Spartan garrison was driven from Cythera and replaced by one commanded by the Athenian Nicophemus. Not only could Cythera serve as a base for raids on Laconia; it occupied a crucial position on the sea routes round the Peloponnese and from Egypt. Pharnabazus then proceeded to the Isthmus, where he encouraged the coalition to vigorous prosecution of the war and, according to Diodorus, made an alliance with its members. He then returned to Asia, leaving behind all the money he had had with him (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.7ff, Diod. xiv.84.4ff).

His fleet he entrusted to Conon, who promised to maintain it from the islands (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.9ff, Diod. xiv.85). Conon also expressed his intention of joining in the rebuilding of the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Piraeus. Pharnabazus accepted that by strengthening Athens this enterprise would benefit Persia and gave the project his blessing. Apart from the beginning of work on the walls there had already been certain other signs of reviving Athenian ambitions: the embassy of Phormisius and Epicrates to Persia probably belongs to the summer of 394, as soon as the news of Cnidus reached Athens,<sup>11</sup> and honours were paid to Dionysius of Syracuse early in 393 (Tod no. 108 = Harding no. 20). But when Conon came to Athens in the middle of summer 393 his contribution to the work of rebuilding was so vital that it is hardly surprising that he gained almost all the credit.<sup>12</sup> His crews performed a large part of the labour, and Persian gold was employed in paying for the services of others, both Athenians and from elsewhere, including a contingent of 500 skilled men from Thebes (cf. Tod no. 107 = Harding no. 17, Diod. xiv.85.3).

Whether Conon also conducted naval operations in the Aegean is obscure. He is unlikely to have had much time in 393, but the accusations brought against him by Antalcidas on his mission to Tiribazus in summer 392 suggest at least some measure of activity. The psychological significance of Cnidus for Athenian imperialism had been great.<sup>13</sup> The fact that it had been a Persian victory was conveniently forgotten and

<sup>10</sup> Cawkwell 1956 (B 189), 1963 (B 190).      <sup>11</sup> Funke 1980 (C 24) 106.

<sup>12</sup> Seager 1967 (C 250) 103.      <sup>13</sup> Seager 1967 (C 250) 99ff.

Conon was hailed at Athens as the liberator of the allies (Dem. xx.69). The implication is clear: in theory at least the unfortunate hiatus in the history of the Athenian empire brought about by Aegospotami and the peace of 404 was now at an end, and any city which had been an ally of Athens before 404 was still an ally, whether it liked it or not. It may be that Conon found it necessary to use his fleet to explain this development to bewildered and perhaps reluctant allies and persuade them to accept the situation, but no specific instance is recorded.<sup>14</sup> Naval intervention may not have been needed to restore Athenian control of the amphictyony at Delos, which had taken place by 393/2 (*Inscr. Délos* 97), but in any event is not ascribed to Conon.

Conon certainly financed and perhaps organized the establishment of an Athenian mercenary force at Corinth, the first commander of which was Iphicrates (Dem. iv.24, Ar. *Plut.* 173, Androt. 324 F 48 = Philoch. 328 F 150). And although the Athenians had not needed his prompting to honour first Dionysius and then Evagoras of Salamis, for his part in the victory of Cnidus (Tod no. 109, *SEG* xxix 86), it was Conon who devised the more grandiose scheme of persuading Dionysius to contract a marriage alliance with Evagoras and to give his active support to Athens against Sparta. However, all that the Athenian embassy to Syracuse achieved was to dissuade Dionysius from sending a squadron of ships he had prepared to help the Spartans (Lys. xix.19ff).

The summer of 393 also saw the renewal of naval activity in the Corinthian Gulf (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.10f).<sup>15</sup> The Corinthians had used their share of Pharnabazus' money to man a fleet, of which Agathinus was placed in command. With it they gained control of the Gulf, and were at first successful against Spartan countermeasures. The Spartan *naumarch* Podanemus was killed, perhaps late in 393, perhaps not until the spring of 392, and his *epistoleus* Pollis was wounded and returned to Sparta.

In the spring of 392, after a season of campaigning in 393 in which only Corinth had suffered from the ravages of war while the lands of her allies had been cultivated without hindrance, men whom Xenophon somewhat paradoxically describes as the 'most and best' of the Corinthians decided to try to take their city out of the conflict (Xen. *Hell.* iv.4.1ff, Diod. xiv.86.1ff).<sup>16</sup> But their intentions became known, and the other allies, together with those Corinthian leaders who had been responsible for the original decision to go to war, set about forestalling them. Athens, Thebes and especially Argos were afraid that Corinth would return to her allegiance to Sparta, while the Corinthians involved were doubtless also concerned for their lives. The universally accepted dictum that they wished to impose a democratic constitution on Corinth rests solely, however, on a rather adventurous emendation in the text of

<sup>14</sup> Funke 1980 (C 24) 127ff.

<sup>15</sup> Funke 1980 (C 24) 83f.

<sup>16</sup> Funke 1980 (C 24) 84f.

Diodorus. They planned to massacre their opponents on the last day of the festival of the Eukleia, but the plot was only partially successful. Many of the older partisans of peace were cut down, but the younger men had gathered in a gymnasium, for one of their leaders, Pasimelus, had got wind of what was afoot. They occupied Acrocorinth and resisted an attempt by Argive troops to dislodge them. But omens persuaded them to abandon their position and so they withdrew from the city. Some later returned to Corinth under a guarantee of safe conduct from those who had seized power, but they found themselves unable to endure the situation they found there. For politically Corinth was being swallowed up by Argos. Argive citizenship was being forced on the Corinthians and the city was no longer even known by the name of Corinth but was called Argos. It is likely that, despite modern doubts, Xenophon is right in his consistently expressed view that this union of Corinth with Argos took place in a single stage and was completed not long after the coup of March 392.<sup>17</sup>

So a group led by Pasimelus and Alcimenes plotted to restore Corinthian independence of Argos, expel the perpetrators of the massacre and re-establish ordered government. Pasimelus and Alcimenes succeeded in making contact with the Spartan polemarch at Sicyon, Praxitas, and promised to admit him within the long walls which joined Corinth to her port of Lechaem. Praxitas duly accepted the offer and set out with his own troops, the Sicyonians and the Corinthian exiles. But at first he was reluctant to enter the gates, then, when he was once inside, he did no more than fortify a position within which he could wait for assistance. One day passed without incident, but on the next a force of Argives and Corinthians and Iphicrates' mercenaries came up. The Argives first drove the Sicyonians down to the sea, but were later thrown into a panic by the Spartans and Corinthian exiles and suffered heavy losses. More seriously, the Boeotian garrison which had held Lechaem for the allies was wiped out and the port fell into Spartan hands. But despite this success Praxitas was in no position to try to force an entry into Corinth proper. Instead he first of all breached the walls between Corinth and Lechaem to strengthen his hold on the port, then captured and garrisoned Sidus and Crommyon and fortified Epieicea before disbanding his troops and withdrawing to Sparta.

#### IV. THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS OF 392–391 B.C.

Early in the summer of 392, before Praxitas' success at Lechaem, Sparta decided to make an attempt to detach Persia from her enemies (Xen. *Hell.* iv. 8. 12ff).<sup>18</sup> Four years before it had been the activities of Agesilaus

<sup>17</sup> Tuplin 1982 (C 387); against: Griffith 1950 (C 362) and Whitby 1984 (C 390).

<sup>18</sup> Aucello 1965 (C 5); Seager 1967 (C 250) 104ff; Funke 1980 (C 24) 136ff.

on land that had threatened Persian dominion in Asia Minor and Persia had moved with uncommon speed to counter the danger. But now it could be argued that the principal threat to Persian interests lay in the resurgence of Athenian naval power, even though the 4,000 men whom Agesilaus had left behind under Euxenus (*Xen. Hell.* IV.2.5) were still in Asia. Conon's position had from the first been full of ambiguities, and as Athens' ambitions grew with her confidence there was ground for suspicion that Conon was in fact betraying the King by using Persian money with the ultimate object of restoring the Athenian empire. So Antalcidas was sent out to put this point of view to the satrap Tiribazus at Sardis and to try to negotiate a peace between Sparta and the King. The Spartans hoped that, if he succeeded, Tiribazus would give them active support or at least stop financing Conon.

The news of Antalcidas' mission alarmed Sparta's enemies, and Athens took the lead in organizing countermeasures. She sent envoys to Sardis, who were accompanied by Conon, and persuaded Boeotia, Corinth and Argos to do the same. In his proposed peace between Sparta and Persia Antalcidas had suggested terms which were eventually to become the nucleus of the King's Peace: that Sparta would not challenge the King for control of the Greek cities of Asia – she was of course in no position to do so – and that the islands and the Greek cities elsewhere should be declared autonomous. This, he pointed out, would be sufficient to secure Persia against the ambitions of either Sparta or Athens. Tiribazus found the proposal attractive, but the allies were unimpressed. According to Xenophon Athens feared that she would be deprived of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, which were not only vital stations on the corn route from the Black Sea but important sources of supply in their own right; Thebes that she would have to restore the independence of the Boeotian cities; and Argos that she would be unable to maintain her hold over Corinth. The objection ascribed to Athens does less than justice to the scope of her ambitions, but the fears of Thebes and Argos make clear what Antalcidas may not have seen fit to stress to Tiribazus, that the terms he was proposing would not only guarantee Persia's position in Asia Minor but would also restore Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnese and central Greece. The allies' attitude must also have made it clear to Tiribazus, if he had not realized it already, that, however attractive the terms were on paper, a purely bilateral peace with Sparta could not bring the desired results unless the other Greek cities were prepared to accept its conditions. For the moment they refused to do so, and the envoys all went home. Tiribazus did not dare to commit himself openly to Sparta without instructions from the King, but he gave Antalcidas money to strengthen the Spartan naval effort and arrested Conon for acting against Persian interests, though the Athenian

later escaped and made his way to Cyprus, where he died (*Nep. Con.* 5.4).<sup>19</sup> The satrap then set out to consult his master.

The representatives of the Greek states met again at Sparta in the winter of 392/1. It must have been Sparta who took the lead in arranging the meeting, but Tiribazus will obviously have been interested in the outcome, though he may not have sent a representative. One of the Athenian envoys was Andocides, and the speech in which he recommended acceptance of the peace to the Athenian Assembly reveals the nature of the people's ambitions.<sup>20</sup> In his bizarre account of fifth-century history he purported to show that peace with Sparta had never threatened the existence of democracy at Athens. But democracy and empire had flourished and fallen together, and it is plain from the detail of his arguments that what he was really trying to prove to his hearers was that peace with Sparta had always been compatible with, and had indeed fostered, the acquisition and enjoyment of empire. At the same time he issued a warning. A concession had been made: Athens was to be allowed to keep Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros. But any attempt to recover other lost ground would not be tolerated by Persia or by Athens' Greek allies. That was as close as Andocides dared to come to a mention of the fate of the Greeks of Asia. In conclusion he urged the Athenians to be patient, to rest content for the moment with possession of their walls and fleet, the foundations on which any empire must be built, and to wait for a better opportunity for further expansion, since to fight both Sparta and Persia could lead only to disaster.

Of the other allies, Boeotia was now prepared to make peace, for Sparta had made a much greater concession to Thebes than she had to Athens. Autonomy need be granted only to Orchomenus; the rest of the Boeotian confederacy was to remain intact and under Theban control (*Andoc.* III.13,20). But for Sparta compromise on the independence of Corinth was out of the question, and so Argos still pressed for war, for her territory had so far suffered no damage and she was eager to maintain her dominion over her neighbour (*Andoc.* III.41). Andocides stressed the change in the attitude of Thebes, for he knew that the opposition to peace at Athens was led by the architect of the Boeotian alliance, Thrasybulus (*Andoc.* III.25,28,32, *Ar. Eccl.* 202f,356).<sup>21</sup> The lack of success at Nemea and Coronea had driven Thrasybulus from the centre of the stage, and the excitement of Cnidus and Conon's return had kept him out of the limelight. But now Conon's arrest and the terms of the proposed peace had made it clear that Athens' imperial ambitions could no longer be pursued without offending Persia. So the way was open for Thrasybulus to reassert himself as the champion of unlimited expansion

<sup>19</sup> Barbieri 1955 (C 93) 185ff.

<sup>20</sup> Seager 1967 (C 250) 105ff.

<sup>21</sup> Seager 1967 (C 250) 107f.



in defiance not only of Sparta but of Persia too, and he intervened decisively in favour of continuing the war. The Spartan ambassadors may not even have been allowed to state their case, and the assembly voted, as Philochorus puts it (328 F 149, cf. Pl. *Menex.* 245b), not to abandon the Greeks of Asia to the King. Andocides and his colleagues were charged with neglect of duty by Callistratus and condemned to exile. The mood of disillusionment with Conon's achievement and the renewed ascendancy of Thrasybulus are both reflected in Lysias' *Epitaphios* (II. 59f,63), where Cnidus is lamented as a disaster for Greece and the rebuilding of the Long Walls is ascribed, not as elsewhere to Conon, but to the men of Phyle.

#### V. THE WAR ON LAND, 391–388 B.C.

During the period of the diplomatic moves at Sardis and Sparta there had been no change in the nature of the war on land (Xen. *Hell.* IV.4.14ff, Diod. XIV.86.4). The allies continued to hold Corinth, the Spartans Sicyon. For the former the most important objective was the recovery of Lechaeum and the rebuilding of the walls which linked it with Corinth. This was accomplished in the winter of 392/1, probably after the failure of the negotiations at Sparta (cf. Andoc. III.18). Xenophon speaks only of the restoration of the walls by a major Athenian expedition, but Diodorus mentions a siege of Lechaeum, with Boeotians, Argives and Corinthians involved as well as Athenians, and suggests, though the text is uncertain, that the siege was successful and that Lechaeum was again garrisoned by Boeotian troops. Since the rebuilding of the walls would be pointless, even if it could be carried out, while Lechaeum itself remained in enemy hands, it is reasonable to suppose that Xenophon has taken this for granted.

However, the allied success was shortlived. The Spartans sent out Agesilaus in spring 391 (Xen. *Hell.* IV.4.19ff, *Ages.* II.17, Diod. XIV.86.4, Plut. *Ages.* 21.1). His initial and, in Xenophon's view, principal target was Argos, for her attitude had played a major part in the outcome of the conference at Sparta. But after ravaging widely in the Argolid the king turned towards Corinth by way of Tenea, and it may be that the move against Argos, though worthwhile in itself, was intended in part as a diversion, to lull the occupants of Corinth into a false sense of security and perhaps to draw off Argive forces. At all events the second phase of the operation was a brilliant success. Agesilaus recaptured the newly rebuilt long walls, while his brother Teleutias, with only twelve ships, seized the port and dockyards of Lechaeum, driving the survivors of the garrison back to Corinth. This completed the restoration of Spartan naval supremacy in the Gulf, for Teleutias' predecessor Herippidas had

already dislodged Agathinus' successor Proaemus from Rhium (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.11).

Elsewhere Iphicrates' mercenaries ranged far afield, trapping a Phliasian force in an ambush and ravaging widely in Arcadia (Xen. *Hell.* iv.4.15ff, Diod. xiv.91.3). The former exploit was counter-productive, for the Phliasiens were so alarmed that, despite their fear that Sparta would restore the exiles to power, they called in the Spartans and asked them for protection, which was granted.

In 390 Agesilaus again invaded Corinthian territory (Xen. *Hell.* iv.5.1ff, *Ages.* II.18f, Diod. xiv.91.2). The main object of his expedition is again uncertain. Xenophon presents it as solely an attempt to weaken the position of those in the city by capturing or destroying the cattle which they kept on the peninsula of Piraeum and which formed one of their major sources of food. This would have been, of course, a perfectly adequate target for the Spartans. But Diodorus speaks of a would-be coup by the exiles now re-established in Lechaeum, who were actually admitted into Corinth, but were driven back with heavy losses by Iphicrates when they tried to seize the walls. If this is so, then Agesilaus' move from Piraeum towards Corinth, which in Xenophon is no more than a feint to draw off Corinthian forces from his real objective, may have been intended to support the coup, only to be forestalled by Iphicrates' prompt response. At the Isthmus Agesilaus found the Argives celebrating the Isthmia. They fled back to the city at his approach, and Agesilaus waited in the neighbourhood until the festival had been held by the Corinthian exiles (Plut. *Ages.* 21.1ff, cf. Diod. xiv.86.5). But after his departure the Argives returned and conducted their own Isthmia.

The Corinthians on Piraeum took refuge in the Heraeum, while Agesilaus captured the fort of Oenoe. The occupants of the Heraeum then surrendered to him, and those who had played any part in the massacre of 392 were handed over to the exiles. This series of Spartan successes encouraged the Boeotians to send a fresh embassy to the king to enquire about terms (Xen. *Hell.* iv.5.6ff, Diod. xiv.91.2, Plut. *Ages.* 22.1ff). Agesilaus pretended to be unaware of their existence, but then came news which completely changed the situation. Iphicrates had followed up his prevention of the attempted coup at Corinth with another, more dramatic victory. Agesilaus had left at Lechaeum all the Amyclaeans in his army so that they could return home, as was their custom, to celebrate the Hyacinthia. The polemarch at Lechaeum escorted them past Corinth with the *mora* which was stationed at the port and his Spartan cavalry. He then set out to return to Lechaeum with some 600 hoplites, apparently convinced that no force would come against him from Corinth. But Iphicrates and Callias (the commander of

the Athenian hoplites in the city) seized their opportunity and led out their men, though the fighting seems to have been almost exclusively the work of Iphicrates' peltasts. The polemarch compounded his initial arrogance with a display of suicidal tactics which resulted in the loss of about 250 of his men. The survivors escaped to Lechaeum. Agesilaus made at once for the port, but when he heard that the bodies of the dead had already been recovered, he returned to Piraeum and went on with the sale of his booty. The Boeotian envoys now said nothing more about peace, but asked instead for safe conduct into Corinth to visit their troops. Agesilaus refused, but took them with him to the walls of Corinth. When his challenge to battle had not surprisingly been ignored he sent the ambassadors home by sea, installed a fresh *mora* at Lechaeum, and led the survivors of the battle home past those Arcadian cities whose fear of the mercenaries the Spartans had recently mocked and who now in their turn jeered the Spartans in their defeat.

But for all its short-term psychological effect and its place in the orators' roll of the triumphs of Athens the defeat of the *mora* was of little real importance. Spartan losses had not been great, and although Iphicrates was able to undo most of Praxitas' work, driving the Spartan garrisons out of Crommyon and Sidus and also recapturing Oenoe, the Spartans retained control of Lechaeum (Xen. *Hell.* iv. 5. 19). It is possible that at this point the Argives sent a large force to strengthen their hold on Corinth (Diod. xiv. 92. 1f, cf. Xen. *Hell.* iv. 8. 34), though Diodorus is almost certainly mistaken in placing the union of Corinth with Argos as late as this.<sup>22</sup> This increase in the Argive presence led to friction with Iphicrates, who in winter 390/89 went so far as to plan a coup of his own to seize the city for Athens. But his designs were thwarted and the Argives asked for his removal. Reluctant to offend an ally close to home when their thoughts were on naval adventure in the Aegean, the Athenians complied. In spring or summer 389 Iphicrates was replaced by Chabrias, who had recently returned from Thrace, where he had been serving with Thrasybulus. In this year or the next he too scored successes at Phlius and Mantinea and made raids into Laconia (Scholiast on Aelius Aristides *Pan.* 274f.D, Polyae. III. 11. 6, 15).

In 389 Agesilaus was diverted to north-west Greece. There the Achaean garrison which had occupied Calydon was under pressure from the Acarnanians, who had some help from Boeotia and Athens (Xen. *Hell.* iv. 6. 1ff, *Ages.* II. 20, Plut. *Ages.* 22. 5). So the Achaeans sent envoys to Sparta, who discreetly threatened to withdraw from the Spartan alliance unless she gave them support. Agesilaus presented the Acarnanians with an ultimatum, saying that he would ravage their land unless they renounced their alliance with Boeotia and Athens and changed

<sup>22</sup> Tuplin 1982 (c 387).

sides. They refused, and so he began to carry out his threat and also, in response to Achaean pressure, made assaults on some Acarnanian cities, though with no success. When autumn came he returned to the Peloponnese despite Achaean complaints that he should at least prevent the enemy from sowing next season's crops. The king pointed out that if the Acarnanians had a crop at stake they would be more likely to make peace in the following spring, when he promised to return. He then made his way through Aetolia (for the Aetolians hoped that he would help them to recover Naupactus) and crossed to the Spartan-held port of Rhium, for the presence of Athenian ships at Oeniadae made a crossing direct from Calydon impossible. Xenophon's sudden surprising mention of this squadron is a reminder of how scrappy our information is, even on so vital a strategic matter as control of the Corinthian Gulf, but at least it highlights the strain that was being placed on Athenian resources by this time.

Early in 388 Agesilaus kept his promise and announced a fresh expedition to Acarnania (*Xen. Hell.* iv.7.1). His prediction was at once fulfilled. Without waiting for the invasion to take place the Acarnanians made peace with the Achaeans and an alliance with Sparta. This left Sparta free to turn her attention to Argos, with the alleged objective of clearing the ground for a possible campaign against Athens or Boeotia (*Xen. Hell.* iv.7.2ff, *Diod.* xiv.97.5). While the Spartan army assembled at Phlius, the young king Agesipolis consulted Zeus and Apollo about the propriety of ignoring the old Argive ploy of delaying the invasion by resort to a sacred truce. Reassured by the gods that such abuse of religion had no force, he marched into Argive territory, but on his first night in the field an earthquake led his men to expect a return home. However, Agesipolis insisted that the tremor demonstrated the favour of Poseidon and went on with the campaign in an effort to outdo Agesilaus. Only after he had done considerable damage did unfavourable omens finally compel him to withdraw.

#### VI. THE AEGEAN, 391–386 B.C.

It was not only in Greece that Antalcidas' mission failed to bear the fruit that Sparta had hoped for. When Tiribazus reached Susa he found Artaxerxes unsympathetic to the notion of co-operation with Sparta (*Xen. Hell.* iv.8.16ff, *Diod.* xiv.99.1ff). Tiribazus was retained at court, and in his place the King sent down Struthas, who was more concerned with what Persia had actually suffered at the hands of Agesilaus than with the threat of a revival of Athenian imperialism and so preferred to help Athens. So the Spartans were forced to renew the war in Asia, sending out Thibron in the summer of 391. He established himself at Ephesus

and soon gained control of the plain of the Maeander. But as Struthas bided his time, Thibron's raids on Persian territory grew increasingly arrogant and careless, and eventually the Persian cavalry caught him off his guard. Thibron himself was killed at the outset of Struthas' attack, and his force suffered heavy losses.

But Sparta was now offered an opportunity to recover at least some of the ground that she had lost in the Aegean as a result of her defeat at Cnidus. An embassy arrived from the oligarchic exiles on Rhodes, who had been expelled from their city in 395. The envoys suggested that Rhodes was in danger of falling completely under Athenian influence, and the Spartans were both alarmed by this prospect and eager to restore their own position on Rhodes (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.20ff, Diod. xiv.97.3).<sup>23</sup> In autumn 391 they sent out Ecdicus with eight ships, to aid their friends on Rhodes; and Diphridas, to take over the survivors of Thibron's army, protect the cities which had welcomed Thibron, and raise troops to fight against Struthas. Diphridas enjoyed some success, capturing Struthas' daughter and son-in-law on their way to Sardis and exacting a substantial ransom with which to hire more men. But Ecdicus, though he contrived to detach Samos from Athens, got no further than Cnidus, where he spent the winter, for he had heard that the *demos* was in full control on Rhodes, with twice as many ships as he had himself.

Early in spring 390 Teleutias was ordered to take over from Ecdicus, with the twelve ships under his command at Lechaeum (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.23ff, Diod. xiv.97.4). He sailed by way of Samos and Cnidus, more than doubling the size of his fleet on the voyage, for he eventually arrived at Rhodes with twenty-seven ships. On the last leg of his journey, between Cnidus and Rhodes, he captured ten Athenian ships, commanded by Philocrates, which had been on their way to Cyprus to help Evagoras of Salamis, whose policy of expansion had provoked Persian countermeasures in 391. It is striking that the Athenian rejection of peace in the previous year does not seem to have been followed by any immediate resumption of naval activity in the Aegean. The cessation of Persian subsidies after Conon's arrest may have contributed to the delay. Nor, until Sparta's attempt to intervene on Rhodes in autumn 391, was there any urgent task for an Athenian fleet to perform. But Philocrates' mission makes it clear that the spirit in which Athens had rejected the peace still prevailed, for the sending of help to Evagoras was a blatant act of provocation towards the King.

The voyage of Teleutias convinced Athens that steps must be taken to check the resurgence of Spartan power in the Aegean.<sup>24</sup> Thrasybulus, the principal advocate of war in 391, proposed the sending out of a fleet, and

<sup>23</sup> Seager 1967 (C 250) 108ff; Perlman 1968 (C 220); Cawkwell 1976 (C 112); Funke 1980 (C 24) 94ff. <sup>24</sup> Seager 1967 (C 250) 109ff; Perlman 1968 (C 220); Funke 1980 (C 24) 152ff.

he himself was put in command of forty ships (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.25ff, Diod. xiv.94.2ff, Lys. xxviii.4). His expedition was conceived specifically as a counter to that of Teleutias and he had firm orders to assist the democrats on Rhodes. His precise movements are unclear, but it seems likely that he came as close to Rhodes as Halicarnassus (Lys. xxviii.17) before deciding for the moment against intervention on the grounds that his own force was not strong enough to dislodge the exiles from their fortress, while the *demos* was in no danger of losing control of the cities. Instead he sailed up the Ionian coast towards the Hellespont, collecting money as he went from the allies of Athens. Athens was now interfering on the mainland of Asia for the first time since Cnidus. This lack of concern for Persian sensibilities is typical of Thrasybulus and the change in Athenian policy.

In the north Thrasybulus achieved considerable success. He reconciled the Thracian princes Amadocus and Seuthes and brought them into alliance with Athens (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 21, cf. 22). He also won over Thasos, where Athenian sympathizers led by Ecphantus ejected the Spartan garrison, and probably Samothrace (Dem. xx.59, Xen. *Hell.* v.1.7). Thasos was required to pay the 5 per cent tax which had replaced the old tribute in 413, and may have been subject to judicial interference and the presence of an Athenian *archon* (*IG II<sup>2</sup>* 24). The 5 per cent tax is also recorded at Clazomenae, which Thrasybulus visited in either 390 or 389 (Tod no. 114 = Harding no. 26). At Byzantium he established a democracy and revived the 10 per cent duty, first imposed in 410, on all goods coming from the Black Sea (Dem. xx.60). He also intervened again in Asia, securing Chalcedon, though without causing offence to Pharnabazus, whose sympathies lay largely with Athens. But it is probable that complaints had been made at home about his neglect of his original mission, and during the winter a decree was passed recalling the other generals on the expedition, though Thrasybulus himself retained his command (Lys. xxviii.5). Inspired by this warning he moved southwards in spring 389 (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.28ff, Diod. xiv.94.3f, 99.4f). On Lesbos he found Mytilene favourable to Athens, but the other cities, obeying the canons of local rivalry, were pro-Spartan; Methymna had even retained a Spartan garrison and harmost, despite the general upheaval after Cnidus. Thrasybulus anchored off Eresus, but had the misfortune to lose twenty-three ships in a storm. Nevertheless he defeated the harmost and received the surrender of Eresus and Antissa.

He now made haste towards Rhodes with his surviving ships and others drawn from Mytilene and Chios. The motive for his hurry may have been the news that the situation on Rhodes had taken a turn for the worse: the principal city of the island had fallen to the exiles (cf. Diod. xiv.97.1f, confused and misplaced). But he still went as far afield as

Aspendus in his quest for money, and there the activities of his men provoked a night attack by the inhabitants, in which Thrasybulus himself was one of the victims. The fleet was brought to Rhodes by the trierarchs, who joined forces with the Rhodian democrats, now exiled in their turn.

Thrasybulus' campaigns demonstrate not only the determination of Athens to restore as much as possible of the fifth-century empire regardless of what this might do to relations with Persia, but also the desperate shortage of money felt by the treasury at home and commanders in the field (cf. *Ar. Ecccl.* 823ff, 1006f). The speeches composed by Lysias (xxviii, xxix) for the prosecution of Ergocles, one of Thrasybulus' colleagues, and Philocrates, perhaps Ergocles' *tamias*, bear witness to the preoccupations of the people. The generals had been appointed to make Athens 'great and free', a familiar euphemism for the enjoyment of imperial power. Instead they had allegedly diverted into their own pockets money intended for the war, rendered the people's fleet ineffective, and betrayed cities which belonged to the people. Of concern about the way in which the missing funds had been acquired or the treatment meted out to the allies there is no trace.

Nor did Thrasybulus' death and the disgrace of his colleagues bring about any change in Athenian policy. Agyrrhius was at once sent out to the Hellespont to try to retain control of Thrasybulus' gains (*Xen. Hell.* iv.8.31ff, *Diod.* xiv.99.5). The Spartans too were well aware of the vital importance of the region and sent out Anaxibius to succeed Dercyllidas as harmost of Abydos. At first Anaxibius enjoyed some success, but the Athenians in their turn sent out Iphicrates, whose enforced withdrawal from Corinth had not damaged his credit, to protect Thrasybulus' achievement. For the remainder of 389 the two commanders limited themselves to skirmishes, but in the next year Iphicrates laid an ambush for Anaxibius, who was returning in unguarded fashion from a mission to win over Antandrus, and the Spartan harmost was killed.

Meanwhile, however, Athens had been brought under pressure nearer home.<sup>25</sup> The Spartan harmost on Aegina, Eteonicus, encouraged raids on the Attic countryside, and this nuisance compelled the Athenians to send out a force under Pamphilus, with naval support, to establish a base from which to blockade Aegina. Teleutias, who had returned from Rhodes, drove off the Athenian fleet, but Pamphilus succeeded in holding on to his fort. The new Spartan naval commander, Hierax, sailed to Rhodes in summer 389, but stationed his *epistoleus* Gorgopas at Aegina with twelve ships, and the Athenians were forced to mount a relief expedition to evacuate their fort. In consequence the raids on Attica

<sup>25</sup> Funke 1980 (c 24) 98ff.

started up again, though a fleet under Eunomus was manned to try to prevent them.

By spring 388 Athens had allied herself with another rebel against the King, Acoris of Egypt (Ar. *Plut.* 178), and Artaxerxes had at last seen enough to realize that Tiribazus had been right when he claimed that Athens would be a greater threat than Sparta. So Tiribazus was restored to his post and the pro-Athenian Pharnabazus was recalled to court, to be replaced by another friend of Antalcidas, Ariobarzanes. These changes gave Sparta new hope, and in late summer Antalcidas was appointed as *nauarch* (Xen. *Hell.* v. 1.6ff). His first task was to reopen negotiations with Tiribazus and if possible to gain access to the King himself. When he reached Ephesus he placed his *epistoleus* Nicolochus in command of his ships and set off for Susa in company with Tiribazus.

On Aegina in the summer of 388 Gorgopas inflicted a defeat on Eunomus, but was in his turn defeated and killed by Chabrias, who put in at Aegina on his way to Cyprus to help Evagoras. For a time the Athenians controlled the Saronic Gulf unopposed, since Eteonicus was unable or unwilling to pay his crews, who therefore refused to man the ships. In this critical situation the Spartans turned once again to Teleutias, whose popularity with the men had been emphatically shown at the end of his previous command. He not only persuaded them to return to duty, but carried out with twelve ships a daring night raid on the Piraeus, which succeeded in its principal objectives of undermining Athenian confidence and securing sufficient booty to pay the troops.

But it was not only on Aegina that spring 387 was to prove a turning-point. Antalcidas now returned to the coast with Tiribazus, bearing a promise from Artaxerxes that if the Athenians and their allies refused to accept the peace terms to which the Spartan had persuaded the King to commit himself, Persia would come into the war on the Spartan side to enforce compliance (Xen. *Hell.* v. 1.25ff). Antalcidas now emerged as an able commander as well as a skilful diplomat. By a feint he drew off the Athenian fleet from Abydos and so was able to capture a squadron of eight ships under Thrasybulus Collyteus which was attempting a rendezvous. He was soon reinforced by twenty ships from Syracuse and others from the territories of Tiribazus and Ariobarzanes. This brought his naval strength up to more than eighty ships and he was able to control the sea. Though he was not strong enough to repeat in every detail Lysander's strategy in the final phase of the Peloponnesian War, he imitated its most important element, the cutting off of supplies of corn from the Black Sea to Athens. This move was both militarily and psychologically effective. Athens' concern about the corn supply is revealed by her dealings with Satyrus of Bosphorus<sup>26</sup> and the prosecution

<sup>26</sup> Tuplin 1982 (E 404).



of the *sitopolai* (Lys. xxii). She still enjoyed some support on the coast of Asia, at Clazomenae, to which she made important concessions (Tod. no. 114 = Harding no. 26), and at Erythrae, which was soon to beg her not to deliver the city into the hands of the barbarians (*SEG* xxvi 1282 = Harding no. 28A), though significantly both places were divided by faction. But she feared another disastrous defeat, while Argos was reluctant to face another Spartan invasion after that of 388. When in the autumn Tiribazus summoned to Sardis all those who wished to hear the terms sent down by the King, representatives of all the major Greek powers convened with flattering speed.

#### VII. THE KING'S PEACE

On this occasion Tiribazus was armed with a royal rescript, on which the King's seals could be displayed (Xen. *Hell.* v.1.3off, Diod. xiv.110.3, xv.5.1). In it Artaxerxes proclaimed the terms which he deemed just. The cities of Asia, as well as the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, were to belong to Persia. The other Greek cities, both large and small, were to be left autonomous, except for Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros, which were to belong to Athens. If either side did not accept this peace, the King would make war on them with any who were willing to help him. Two features of the rescript stand out. First, the concession made in 392/1 to the Thebans was withdrawn. This will surely have been at Sparta's suggestion: the matter can have been of little interest to Persia, but it was important to Sparta, who was stronger now than she had been in 391 and will not have forgotten the Theban reaction to the defeat of the *mora* at Lechaem. Secondly, Artaxerxes threatened the Spartans as well as the Athenians and their allies. This seems unnecessary, since the whole scheme was of Spartan devising, but the King may have wished to set himself equally above both parties, while despite the impression that Antalcidas had made on him he probably still distrusted Sparta.

The envoys reported to their various cities and then assembled at Sparta in spring 386 to swear to a peace based on Artaxerxes' rescript. The precise nature of this peace is highly controversial. It may, however, be regarded as certain that the rescript was not the peace. At the very least its provisions would have had to be recast and clauses added concerning such matters as the taking of the oaths and the publication of copies of the peace. It may also be accepted that a representative of the King took part in the oath-swearing ceremony, as documentary evidence attests (Tod. no. 118 = Harding no. 31 lines 10ff), despite claims that the nature of oriental monarchy made such participation unthinkable. What remains debatable is whether the peace contained only the two substantive clauses propounded in the rescript, or whether other

clauses found in later renewals of the peace were already present in this original version. It might, for instance, have been prescribed that each city should possess its own territory (though that would have created a problem with regard to *peraiiai* on the mainland of Asia, which it is reasonable to suppose were claimed by the King), that garrisons and governors were to be withdrawn, and that all forces, military and naval, were to be demobilized. But such clauses, which aimed at greater clarity and precision, may well have been the product of later experience. It would have suited the Spartans in 386 if the autonomy clause were as general as possible: autonomy was to mean what Sparta wanted it to mean in any given case.<sup>27</sup>

The taking of the oaths did not pass off without incident. The Thebans tried to circumvent the autonomy clause by swearing on behalf of all the Boeotians (Xen. *Hell.* v.1.32ff, Plut. *Ages.* 23.3). Agesilaus firmly rejected this subterfuge and when the envoys temporized told them to warn their people that if Thebes did not back down she would be excluded from the peace. Without waiting for a reply he then began preparing for war in the hope that the Thebans would refuse. But while he was still at Tegea mustering his troops, the envoys returned, ready now to concede the autonomy of the Boeotian cities. The Corinthians too were reluctant to dismiss their Argive garrison. Even if there were in fact a clause in the peace which guaranteed freedom from foreign garrisons, it would hardly have been rational to apply it to a case where the presence of the garrison was welcome to its hosts. But Agesilaus knew perfectly well what the autonomy clause was meant to achieve where Argos and Corinth were concerned. He declared that he would make war on both cities if the Corinthians did not dismiss the Argives or the Argives refused to leave. The Argives duly evacuated the city and Corinth recovered its independence. The authors of the coup of 392 and their supporters prudently withdrew, finding a welcome at Athens (Dem. xx.54), and the exiles returned.

The peace was then sworn and the military and naval forces of both sides were disbanded. Though Sparta had done no more than hold her own during the war, she did extremely well, as Xenophon justly observes, out of her championship of the peace and in particular of the autonomy clause, which enabled her to put an end to Theban domination of Boeotia, to terminate Argive control of Corinth, and to restore Corinth to her own alliance. There is, however, no reason to suppose that the position of *prostates* of the peace was officially assigned to Sparta by a clause of the treaty or in any other way. It was simply that the favour of Persia and her own military strength made Sparta able to interpret the

<sup>27</sup> Sinclair 1978 (C 76); against: Cawkwell 1981 (C 18). See also Badian 1991 (F 4) and Clark 1990 (B 138).

terms of the peace to her own advantage and to enforce her will on the other Greek states. Within a decade the weapon which served her so well in 386 would be turned against her. But for the moment, with her enemies humbled, Sparta was free to examine the recent conduct of her friends.

## CHAPTER 5

### SICILY, 413–368 B.C.

D. M. LEWIS

In the period between the Peloponnesian War and the accession of Philip of Macedon, it is perhaps the events in Sicily which carry the greatest potential interest. Although in the eastern Mediterranean the military and political battle for the Greeks of Asia Minor continues, Greek civilization there is not in cultural danger; in fact, it continues to expand despite its political subjection. In Sicily it remains unclear whether Greeks, the semitic power of Carthage or some Italian people will come out on top. Politically, Sicily offers a chance to see in operation a possible solution to the Greek political dilemma. The Athenian democracy has failed to expand political control beyond the city state, and Sparta will show that oligarchy is no more successful. In Sicily, monarchy has its chance, and operates on a larger scale than the city state. Dionysius I, with his one-man rule over a large territory, his professional army, and his technological resourcefulness, prefigures the hellenistic period with some clarity. On a different level, it is arguable that much of Plato's political experience is Sicilian experience and that understanding Sicily is a prerequisite for understanding him.<sup>1</sup>

That study of these matters is relatively undeveloped compared to the amount of effort put into mainland Greece in the same period is attributable to the nature of the evidence. A very few references in Xenophon and Athenian orators, three Athenian inscriptions, and the controversial letters under the name of Plato practically exhaust the fourth-century evidence for us, and then we have a long gap until the first century B.C. Even then, the once useful evidence provided by Pompeius Trogus<sup>2</sup> is hopelessly obscured for us by his epitomator Justin. Essentially, the story comes to us in one source, Diodorus, and he poses two problems. Firstly, his coverage is wildly uneven; the second half of the reign of Dionysius is covered in very brief references.

<sup>1</sup> Narrative and other help throughout this chapter may be sought in Stroheker 1958 (G 302), Caven 1990 (G 134). There is much useful material on relations between Sicily and Carthage in Manni *et al.* 1982–3 (G 225). For Carthaginians in Sicily see Tusa 1988 (G 312).

<sup>2</sup> On Trogus and Justin, see Seel 1972 (B 107); Forni and Bertinelli 1982 (B 39); Syme 1988 (B 113). On Trogus' Sicilian books, see Jacoby, *FGrH* III b (Noten), 314–15 n. 42; Forni and Bertinelli 1982 (B 39) 1334–40.

Secondly, at any rate on the surface, he presents a picture very hostile to Dionysius. There are possibilities for manipulating his evidence, but we have to have some idea of what it is we are manipulating.

On Diodorus' Sicilian narrative, there have been many opinions. Volquardsen,<sup>3</sup> who first established the general principle that Diodorus only used one source at a time, argued that Diodorus used Timaeus of Tauromenium (the modern Taormina) (c. 350–270 B.C.), the famous historian of the West,<sup>4</sup> for western matters; there are many named quotations from him in books XIII–XIV. Some major authorities<sup>5</sup> have followed the overwhelming evidence for supposing that Ephorus, as long as he lasted, was Diodorus' main source for mainland Greek affairs<sup>6</sup> and have found it improbable that he just rolled up Ephorus when he moved to the West, although they have acknowledged the clear evidence that he used Timaeus as well for books XIII and XIV. Unfortunately, the detail of this position has only been worked out in such an extravagant way<sup>7</sup> as to leave it amply vulnerable to successors of Volquardsen. These,<sup>8</sup> satisfied that Diodorus only used one source at a time and knowing that Timaeus was later than Ephorus, find no difficulty in distinguishing features in Diodorus' narrative which they can say are essentially Timaeian and prove that he was Diodorus' source. Even they have some difficulty in finding much use of Timaeus in Diodorus book XV.<sup>9</sup>

In recent years, there has been a reaction against crudely single-source views of Diodorus, and many now allow him more independence.<sup>10</sup> The view has some weight in Sicilian history. It seems likely that his own addition or selection has produced an undue emphasis on his native Agyrium (e.g. XIV.95, XVI.82.4–5, 83.3), and there is a fair amount, not always successfully executed, which may well be attributed to his own interests and work (XIII.34.6–35, 90.5, XIV.16.3–4, XVI.70.6). As far as his major predecessors are concerned, the most plausible view is that he tried to reinforce Ephorus with Timaeus in books XIII–XIV, but

<sup>3</sup> Volquardsen 1868 (B 121) 72–107.

<sup>4</sup> On Timaeus (*FGrH* 566), see Jacoby's commentary on the fragments; Manni 1957 (B 71); Brown 1958 (B 19); Sanders 1987 (G 283) 79–85; Pearson 1987 (B 92).


<sup>5</sup> Schwartz 1903 (B 101) 681–2 = 1957 (B 104) 62–3; Jacoby, *FGrH* III b (Text), 528–30.

<sup>6</sup> See *CAH* V<sup>2</sup> 7, and pp. 8–10 here. <sup>7</sup> Laqueur 1937 (B 66) 1082–162 and 1958 (B 67).

<sup>8</sup> Meister 1967 (B 74); Pearson 1984 (B 91).

<sup>9</sup> A native Sicilian school (Lauritano 1956 (B 68); Manni 1957–8 and 1970 (B 72–3)) knows that Diodorus only used one source at a time, but claims that for the West it was the virtually unknown Silenos of Calcacte (*FGrH* 175); the hypothesis is not only unfruitful, but improbable. Nor is there much to be said for the view (Hammond 1938 (B 56)) that Diodorus used Theopompus for Sicilian affairs; see Westlake 1953–4 (B 128).

<sup>10</sup> The most careful treatment of a single stretch of Diodorus along these lines is that by J. Hornblower 1981 (B 60) 18–75. For the West, see now Sanders 1987 (G 283), too dismissive of the probable use of Ephorus.



Map 3. Sicily.

abandoned the attempt thereafter; the result was a much reduced account of Dionysius I's last years and a strangely curtailed account of Dion.<sup>11</sup>

The only clear fact about the way that Ephorus and Timaeus treated western history is that Timaeus had much lower figures than Ephorus for the numbers of military forces; there is no real reason for supposing that one was more hostile to Dionysius than the other. The essential point is to try to get behind them<sup>12</sup> to what was perhaps the only contemporary narrative source, the history of Philistus.<sup>13</sup> Philistus was a contemporary and very early supporter of Dionysius, who was trusted for the first twenty years of the reign and then in exile for the rest of it. We know that he wrote most of his history in exile, but that no hostility to Dionysius was visible because he hoped to secure his recall. However, he was not thought to be a mere flatterer, but rather someone who actually believed in tyranny as a form of rule. A historian of this character will have found much to interest him in the hard world of Thucydides, and in fact it is clear that he was the most determined imitator of Thucydides in antiquity. There is no real trace of any other contemporary narrative, and it seems likely that Diodorus' account must be ultimately, though indirectly, dependent on Philistus for facts, but that its hostile elements are not due to the use of another contemporary source, but to positive deformation of those facts by an intermediary or intermediaries. It is clear enough that some bits of Philistus have come through virtually unchanged, above all, the account of the plague which hit the Carthaginian army in 396 (xiv.70.4–71), or the accounts of Dionysius' fortification (xiv.18) and his armaments (xiv.41–2), which show him in a very favourable light. There are other tracts of narrative (e.g. xiv.9) where one only needs to omit a few rude words to get an account basically favourable to Dionysius, perhaps not even that if Philistus was prepared to take a frank, Machiavellian attitude.<sup>14</sup> There is therefore an important sense in which Diodorus can be used if we look at his facts and leave out the colour and interpretation which now enfold them.

If we operate on these principles, it becomes, for example, more than possible that Diodorus has substantially antedated Dionysius' wish to become tyrant. Though the text assumes that this was his wish from the first, everything he is actually said to recommend during the first year,

<sup>11</sup> There is much to be said for Schwartz's view (B 101, 681–2 = B 104, 63) that the abandonment of Dion at xvi.20.6 is due to the fact that Ephorus may well have stopped in 356, but it can be partly neutralized by arguing that *FGrH* 70 F 221 shows that Ephorus described Timoleon's expedition.

<sup>12</sup> Sanders 1979–80 (G 282), 1981 (B 99), 1987 (G 283), and Caven 1990 (G 134) 4–5 believe that Diodorus used Philistus directly. The practical difference of adopting this approach is not great.

<sup>13</sup> *FGrH* 556 with commentary; Manni 1957 (B 71); Zoepffel 1965 (B 133); Pearson 1987 (B 92) 19–30; Sanders 1987 (G 283) 43–71.

<sup>14</sup> xiv.8 *fin.* is possibly such a case, xiv.107.4 even more likely.

406, of the resumed Carthaginian invasion can be amply paralleled on other occasions in Syracusan history when military preparedness was needed, most obviously in lines taken by Hermocrates during the Athenian invasion of 415–413. Dionysius had been an adherent of Hermocrates. Few other sequences can be dealt with as neatly, but the attempt must be made.

By Greek standards, Syracuse in 413 was a largish place. Thucydides (especially VII.58.4) repeatedly speaks as if there were a difference in scale between the cities of western Greece and those of the mainland. We have no figures for Syracusan population. Acragas was evidently the second largest city, and Diodorus (XIII.84.3) gives her 20,000 citizens in 406, 200,000 including foreigners.<sup>15</sup> Thuc. VI.67.2 suggests a Syracusan hoplite-force of over 5,000 and affirms a cavalry-force of more than 1,200; a relative shortage of hoplites in relation to population is suggested by Hermocrates' proposal to share out weapons (Thuc. VI.72.4; cf. Polyæn. I.43.1). The nature of the Greek population is far from clear. Alcibiades' assertions (Thuc. VI.17.2–3) of the mixture and shifting of Sicilian populations and consequent lack of local patriotism are *ex parte* and may be exaggerated. There had been very marked shifts of population under Gelon in the interests of building up a greater Syracuse (CAH IV<sup>2</sup> 769–70) and more after the fall of the tyranny (CAH V<sup>2</sup> 154–61), and these would be sufficient to create such an opinion at Athens. The 7,000 foreign mercenaries who had been given citizenship by Gelon had long since left (Diod. XI.72.3–73, 76), and the only recent shift of which we know is the move to Syracuse of some of the upper class of Leontini in 423/2 (Thuc. V.4.2–3).<sup>16</sup>

Even more enigmatic is the non-Greek population. Although Nicias asserts and Thucydides endorses the view that nothing much was to be gained by encouraging class warfare at Syracuse (Thuc. VI.20.2, VII.55.2), we do hear of an abortive slave-revolt during the Athenian siege (Polyæn. I.43.1).<sup>17</sup> It is tempting to associate these slaves with the Cilicyrioi who appear in the 480s, who are evidently some form of indigenous population,<sup>18</sup> though the name does not reappear. It is not possible from the sources to distinguish them from straight slaves or from the local Sicel population under direct Syracusan control, some of whom deserted to the Athenians (e.g. Thuc. VI.88.4).<sup>19</sup> These indigenous populations are rarely of political importance, but they may well have been fundamental to the social structure. We have next to no evidence, but it may be the case that agricultural work was in their hands

<sup>15</sup> Beloch 1886 (A 4) 281–5 doubts the second figure; see De Waele 1979 (G 156). For Himera see Asheri 1973 (G 103). <sup>16</sup> Diod. XIII.18.5 suggests that they were not yet fully integrated by 413.

<sup>17</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 28 n. 11.

<sup>18</sup> Hdt. VII.155, Phot. *Lex.* s.v.; Dunbabin 1948 (G 160) 111. <sup>19</sup> See Vattuone 1979 (G 317).



and that the citizen of Syracuse (and indeed of other Sicilian cities) was less closely associated with the land he owned than the Athenian citizen; the mobility of Sicilian populations would be easier to understand if this were so.<sup>20</sup>

For Thucydides, Syracuse appears to be more or less indistinguishable from Athens, in character and in institutions (VIII.96.5, VII.55.2). The demagogue Athenagoras (VI.35.2) is described in terms very similar to those applied to Cleon (III.36.6, IV.21.3), and not much in his defence of democracy (VI.38–9) would sound strange on Athenian lips. The Syracusan *demos* can be exhibited as no less unstable than that of Athens (VI.63.2). Diodorus (XI.68.6) and Aristotle (*Pol.* 1316a33) also speak of democracy in this period. Precise constitutional pointers are few. There were fifteen *strategoï* when the Athenians arrived (VI.72.4).<sup>21</sup> In VI.72.5–73 the board is reduced to three (including Hermocrates); they are to have full powers (*autokratores*) and an oath is to be sworn to allow them to conduct affairs as best they can. This is in no sense a revolution. They do not take office until VI.96.3; the oath is not observed, and they are replaced by three new generals in VI.103.4. The *demos* evidently remains in ultimate control.<sup>22</sup>

Despite Thucydides' emphasis on democracy in the period of the Athenian siege, there is a substantial tradition that there were more radical political changes after 413. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1304a27) says that the success of the *demos* in the war against Athens resulted in a change from a moderate constitution (*politeia*) to democracy. Diodorus has much more. In a passage certainly taken from Ephorus,<sup>23</sup> he introduces us to a demagogue Diocles (XIII.19.4; Eurycles in Plut. *Nic.* 28.1) and moves from the debate about the fate of the Athenian captives to a short account (XIII.34.2–3) of how he later made laws for Syracuse. A longer account attached to the next year (XIII.34.6–35) describes how Diocles persuaded the citizens to change the constitution, have magistrates appointed by lot and have new laws. This account, almost certainly Diodorus' own,<sup>24</sup> is unusable in detail, since it surely confuses the fifth-century Diocles with an archaic law-giver.<sup>25</sup> All we can say is that the number of *strategoï* was

<sup>20</sup> For an attempt to see the economic relations between Syracuse and the Sicels, see Ampolo 1984 (G 99). Archaeological evidence of the classical period for the countryside of the Greek cities is sparse; for farm-sites at Camarina see *Arch. Rep. for 1981–2*, 90.

<sup>21</sup> It is not a necessary inference from VI.41.1 that they presided over the assembly. In Diodorus (XI.92.2, XIII.91.3) *archontes* preside.

<sup>22</sup> The command situation is changed by the arrival of the Spartan Gylippus and the Corinthian Pythen, but there are further changes among the Syracusan generals (VII. 46, 50.1, 70.1), not specifically noted. <sup>23</sup> Barber 1935 (B 11) 164–5.

<sup>24</sup> It refers to King Hiero, probably too late even for Timaeus, and events of 443 B.C.

<sup>25</sup> For the archaic Diocles, see Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) I.1, 350 n. 1. There are impossible chronological features in Diodorus' account, and the laws described were in archaic language, hard to understand in the time of Timoleon.

raised again,<sup>26</sup> and that there are arguments for an expansion of state pay.<sup>27</sup>

In the West, after the defeat of the Athenian expedition, there were still mopping-up operations to be done against Athenian allies. A campaign against Catana, where there were Athenian survivors, and Messene was still going on at the time of the Carthaginian invasion (Thuc. VII.85.4, Lys. XX.24–5, Paus. VII.16, Diod. XIII.56.2).<sup>28</sup> Syracuse took less interest in western Sicily, where Selinus resumed her interrupted war (Thuc. VI.6.2) against Elymian Segesta (Diod. XIII.43.2–3). Segesta was conciliatory, but Selinus greedy; there would be substantial consequences.

Revenge on Athens seemed a more important matter. In late summer 412 Hermocrates led twenty Syracusan and two Selinuntine ships to help finish off Athens (Thuc. VIII.26.1).<sup>29</sup> Later reinforcements from the West included ten ships from Thurii under the command of the Rhodian exile Dorieus (Thuc. VIII.35).<sup>30</sup> The Syracusan and Thurian crews were, evidently untypically, mostly free men (Thuc. VIII.84.2). The Syracusan ships were not only effective militarily (Thuc. VIII.28.2, Xen. *Hell.* I.2.10); Hermocrates was a powerful spokesman in negotiations with Tissaphernes (Thuc. VIII.29, 45, 85). But they shared the general disaster at Cyzicus in spring 410 (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 483), and had to rebuild their ships at Antandrus (Xen. *Hell.* I.1.26). It was there apparently that news came from home that Hermocrates and his colleagues had been exiled (Xen. *Hell.* I.1.27, Diod. XIII.63.1). We need not place the ‘Dioclean revolution’ as late as this. If Syracuse had expected quick success and instead heard of the loss of the fleet after two years, dissatisfaction is not surprising. Hermocrates resisted suggestions from the officers of the fleet to ignore his dismissal, but waited for the arrival of his successors, who arrived to take over the rebuilt fleet at Miletus late in 410. Yet another five ships arrived from home in spring 409 (Xen. *Hell.* I.2.8).<sup>31</sup> All fought well at the battle of Ephesus in summer 409 (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 485); the Syracusans were given fiscal privileges, the Selinuntines, ‘since their

<sup>26</sup> Even if we did not have the direct assertion (Pl. *Ep.* VIII.354d) that there were ten generals at the time of Dionysius’ rise, it could be inferred that the groups of three generals in the Aegean (e.g. Thuc. VIII.85.3) were members of a larger board.

<sup>27</sup> Meyer 1921 (A 38) 59–60. The pay to citizen troops (Diod. XIII.93.2, 95.1) is obviously more than a ration allowance.

<sup>28</sup> See Giuffrida 1979 (G 184). Further from Syracusan influence, Thurii, where the pro-Athenian party had come to the top in 413 (Thuc. VII.33.6, 57.11), ejected 300 atticizers, including the orator Lysias, in 413–12 ([Plut.] *Mor.* 835D).

<sup>29</sup> The thirty-five ships of Diod. XIII.34.4 evidently include the returning sixteen Peloponnesian ships of Thuc. VIII.13.

<sup>30</sup> In 411, there was an unspecified number from Taras and Locri (Thuc. VIII.91.2, M–L no. 82).

<sup>31</sup> Their commanders were among those who had replaced Hermocrates in 414 (Thuc. VI.103.4), and may have been regarded as politically more reliable.

city had been destroyed', citizenship as well (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.10). Shortly afterwards, they disappear from the Aegean. Other events have called them home.

All this, based on the chronology argued in *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 503–5, allows the inference that the Carthaginian threat had not seemed important at Syracuse when five more ships were sent in early 409, but that the news of the fall of Selinus had reached the Aegean by, say, June. It follows that the preliminaries to the Carthaginian invasion described in Diod. XIII.43–4 belong to 410 and that the year of the Carthaginian invasion which destroyed Selinus and Himera was 409.<sup>32</sup>

It has in general been held (*CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> 775, and ch. 11*o* here) that the years after the battle of Himera in 480 had seen a retreat of Carthage from Mediterranean history. In Sicily, she had been penned back on her three settlements in the north-west corner, Motya, Soloeis and Panormus,<sup>33</sup> with friendly ties perhaps with Elymian Segesta, possibly also Selinus.<sup>34</sup> There was trade with Greek Sicily, best attested for Acragas, which had been exchanging the crops of its olives and perhaps its vines for the wealth of Libya. It is not easy to identify this wealth; perhaps Spanish silver was going into Acragas' substantial coinage.<sup>35</sup> The extensive settlements of Carthaginian traders attested for Syracuse and elsewhere in Greek Sicily in 397 (Diod. XIV.46) may only have arrived after the Carthaginian successes of 409–405, but the Greek settlers in Carthage of Diod. XIV.77.5 can have been there for some time. Politically, Carthage is quiescent; only a difficult allusion (Diod. XI.86.2)<sup>36</sup> attests any kind of brush. It seems that some Athenians had long had Carthage in mind (Ar. *Eq.* 1302–4, Plut. *Per.* 20.4);<sup>37</sup> Hermocrates in 415 suggested using Carthaginian fear of Athens to get help, evidently not thinking her a threat comparable to Athens (Thuc. VI.34.2). Nevertheless, it was not

<sup>32</sup> It is neither certain nor important that the interpolator of Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.37 dated the fall of Selinus to the Attic year 409/8. See also Meyer 1921 (A 38) 64–5, who arrived at 409 using the wrong Aegean chronology, and Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) II.2, 255–6, who used the right Aegean chronology, but arrived at 408.

<sup>33</sup> There is no evidence that Carthage had more than the loosest control of them before this time: Meyer 1921 (A 38) 69; Finley 1979 (G 164) 64; Whittaker 1978 (G 91); the fullest study is by Hans 1983 (G 30).

<sup>34</sup> Selinus had been on the Carthaginian side in 480 (Diod. XI.21.4–5, XIII.55.1), but Gescon, exiled from Carthage after his father Hamilcar's defeat at Himera, had found a welcome there (Diod. XIII.43.5). It is doubtful how much Punic influence can be demonstrated at Selinus before 409; see *Arch. Rep. for 1976–77*, 74.

<sup>35</sup> Kraay 1976 (B 200) 226. Note also the Acragantine overstrike on a Carthaginian coin, Jenkins 1974 (G 201) 24–5.

<sup>36</sup> See *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 159 n. 10. That Lilybaeum could be an anachronistic reference to Motya is possible (cf. Diod. V.9.2), but it would still be unclear what is going on.

<sup>37</sup> Treu 1954/55 (G 86) 45–9, thinks, probably rightly, that the proposition that it was an aim of the Athenian expedition in 415 was a bogey raised by Alcibiades to frighten the Spartans (Thuc. VI.90.2), but Thucydides accepted it (VI.15.2).

Syracuse but Athens which had made an attempt to get Carthaginian help in 415–413 (Thuc. vi.88.6).

Nothing had happened to suggest any Carthaginian threat to deter Syracuse from her operations in north-east Sicily and in the Aegean. Selinus, still relying on her services to Carthage in 480, had neglected her walls (Diod. xiii.55.7)<sup>38</sup> while pursuing an elaborate temple-building programme.<sup>39</sup> If Segesta had already attempted to get Carthaginian help against Selinus in 416 (Diod. xii.82.7; not in Thuc.), she had had no success. It was therefore surprising that a renewed application in 410 was more warmly received (Diod. xiii.43.4–5). The Carthaginian *gerousia*, we are told, was eager to acquire a well-placed city (not an obvious description of Segesta), but was afraid of reaction from Syracuse. The weight of emphasis is on the attitude of Hannibal, the current head of the Magonid house, grandson of the Hamilcar who had died at Himera in 480 (CAH iv<sup>2</sup> 771–5), naturally hostile to Greeks and anxious to wipe out the family disgrace. His precise position is unclear. He was at the time ‘*basileus* according to the laws’. What is meant by that is obscure,<sup>40</sup> but it is distinguished from the generalship he is now given. It is slightly clearer that the Magonids had been hereditary generals since the sixth century.<sup>41</sup> One nuance in his appointment, ‘if there is need to make war’, suggests that the *gerousia* may have hoped that war would be unnecessary. The diplomatic negotiations of 410 (Diod. xiii.43.6–7) not only produced a peace-party in Selinus (*ibid.* 59.3). They may well have been a genuine attempt to isolate Selinus and keep out Syracuse; even in 409, Hannibal beaches his ships to avoid giving the Syracusans the impression that he has designs on them (*ibid.* 59.5).<sup>42</sup> Though Syracuse offered Selinus some form of help (*ibid.* 44.4–5), she seems to have been as over-

<sup>38</sup> For the walls of Selinus see Di Vita 1984 (G 158) and *Arch. Rep. for 1987–88*, 145–6. For the town-plan, see Rallo 1984 (G 273); Di Vita 1984 (G 159).

<sup>39</sup> For temple-building at Selinus, see Berve and Gruben 1962 (J 5) 421–32; Lawrence 1983 (J 22) 151–5. There is no agreement about the implications for fifth-century Selinuntine activities from the major text M–L no. 38.

<sup>40</sup> That ‘*basileus*’ means that he was one of two annual ‘*suffetes*’ (cognate with the Hebrew word for ‘judge’) is normally assumed (most recently by Huss 1985 (G 39) 458–66), and there is sufficient evidence to show that the latter office already existed. Picard (p. 367 here) rightly doubts the identification; it is Aristotle (*Pol.* 1272b37ff) who first asserts that Carthage had a dual kingship, noting with pleasure that, unlike the Spartan kings, they did not have to be of a given family; if his ‘kingship’ was also annual, he should have said so. That Greeks saw Carthaginian institutions through Greek eyes is only too likely; see Weil 1960 (B 123) 246–54; Seston 1967 (G 79). Without more evidence, we are helpless.

<sup>41</sup> It used to be held (e.g. by Warmington 1964 (G 90) 60–1) that they had lost the post shortly after Himera, at a time when a commission was instituted to check the generals (Justin xix.2.5–6). Maurin 1962 (G 48), accepted by Huss 1985 (G 39) 464, argued that this did not happen until shortly after Himilco’s defeat and suicide in 396 (see below, p. 144), but was unduly agnostic about the evidence that there were Magonid generals even after Himilco; see Picard, G. Ch. and C. 1970 (G 75) 125–9; however, see p. 373 here. <sup>42</sup> See Hans 1983 (G 30) 53–5.

confident as she had been about Athens in 415 when she sent five more ships to the Aegean in early 409.

It seems to be a universal rule that big Carthaginian expeditions take at least a year to prepare, and all that Hannibal had available in 410 was 5,000 Libyans and 800 Campanians (*ibid.* 44.2).<sup>43</sup> These Campanians, ominous for the future of Sicily, are said to have been hired for Athenian use by the Chalcidians of Sicily.<sup>44</sup> They sufficed to keep Selinus in play, while Hannibal prepared a fleet and accumulated a much larger force of Iberians, citizens and Libyans, which appeared in 409 (*ibid.* 44.6, 54).<sup>45</sup> Here and later, Carthaginian forces are deployed in two sections in a most unGreek way, a front-line force and one to exploit opportunities. The siege-engines ruined the neglected walls and the shock-troops went in, after a mere nine days (*ibid.* 56.5).<sup>46</sup> Diodorus paints a picture of dreadful savagery, but the unfinished temples were apparently not destroyed, only looted, and surviving Selinuntines were allowed to remain in the city and farm the land, paying Carthage tribute (*ibid.* 59.3).

Whether Himera had offered help to Selinus, we do not know, but, in any case, nothing would stop Hannibal from avenging his grandfather's defeat. As he moved to the north coast, again in two groups, he was joined by the native Sicels and Sicans, 20,000 according to Diodorus, evidently eager to shake off Greek control. Greek Sicily, which had underrated Carthaginian siegecraft, was now alert to the danger. Gela and Acragas had been waiting for Syracuse. Three thousand Syracusans had arrived at Acragas by the time of Selinus' fall, and Diocles now concentrated 4,000 men in Himera. There was some inconclusive fighting, and the fleet had now arrived from the Aegean, but Diocles despaired. Professing worry that the Carthaginians might sail against an unprotected Syracuse, he decided to evacuate Himera. He moved so fast as to abandon unburied Syracusan bodies, a political mistake, but not fast enough to get his ships back to evacuate the population of Himera before it fell.<sup>47</sup> Hannibal executed 3,000 captives, expiating the disaster of 480, broke up his army (the Campanians were not pleased at the loss of their paymaster), and went home. He had evidently done all he had set

<sup>43</sup> For fuller narrative accounts of all the wars with Carthage in this chapter, see Huss 1985 (G 39), not always followed here on details of the chronology.

<sup>44</sup> Thucydides knows nothing of Campanians; the Etruscans and Iapygians of Thuc. vii.57.11 (cf. 33.4) are different. For Campanians in this period, see Frederiksen 1968 (G 171), especially 12–13, and 1984 (G 173) 106.

<sup>45</sup> Ephorus gave him 60 long ships and 1,500 transports, siege-engines, 200,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, Timaeus 'not many more than 100,000 men'. There are some mysterious Greeks on the Carthaginian side at Diod. xiii.58.1.

<sup>46</sup> See Di Vita 1984 (G 158) 76–9.

<sup>47</sup> Asheri 1973 (G 103). For what is claimed as archaeological evidence of destruction at Himera see *Arch. Rep. for 1987–88*, 139 (Tusa 1984–85 (G 311) 629).

out to do, in a campaign which had lasted a mere three months.<sup>48</sup> The Greek cities had been totally ineffective in stopping him.

The coins of Selinus and Himera now disappear, though those of Egesta and Eryx may continue for a short time. The coins of Panormus, which had looked purely Greek, continue to imitate Syracuse, but get the Punic inscription *ZIZ*.<sup>49</sup>

After leaving the fleet in late 410, Hermocrates had attached himself to Pharnabazus (see also *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 478). The sources (*Xen. Hell.* 1.1.31, *Diod.* XIII.63) suggest that he started at once to prepare a return to Sicily, but, on the late Aegean chronology, he and his brother Proxenus were still in the Aegean in late 408, preparing to go on an embassy to the King of Persia (*Xen. Hell.* 1.4.1–3).<sup>50</sup> This suggests that nothing happened in Sicily in 408 and that the appearance of continuity between *Diod.* XIII.62 and 63 is misleading. Enough Sicilian news reached him in 408 to show that he had a chance to carve out a place in Sicily, perhaps even in Syracuse, now that the Dioclean regime was partly discredited.

With help from Pharnabazus, he returned to Sicily, hired 1,000 mercenaries, picked up 1,000 Himeraeans, and, after an attempt to get back into Syracuse, established himself at Selinus. Here, he built his force up to 6,000, ravaged the Carthaginian area, and shook the security of Motya and Panormus; the news was heard in Syracuse, and a feeling in his favour set in (*Diod.* XIII.63, continued in 75). His first step was to collect the unburied Syracusan bones at Himera and send them back to Syracuse to discredit Diocles; with perfect propriety, he himself waited at the frontier. The bones were accepted and Diocles exiled, but Hermocrates was not recalled; some Syracusans feared a tyranny. Some time later, his friends sent for him and he was killed while trying to force his way in. Those of his party who were not killed were exiled or given out for dead. We have no reason at all to deny him patriotism, but he never seems to have had more than minority support; even the upper classes will have worried about tyranny.<sup>51</sup>

Greek sources totally obscure Carthaginian policy, assuming that it had always been the intention to subdue the whole island and ignoring the gap of two and a half years between Himera and the next Carthagi-

<sup>48</sup> The timing from the interpolator of *Xen. Hell.* 1.1.37; from Timaeus, whose army numbers he follows?

<sup>49</sup> So argued by Jenkins 1971 (G 201); see Kraay 1976 (B 200) 227–8, but there has been considerable scepticism about attributing *ZIZ* coins to Panormus; see Lo Cascio 1975 (G 45) (attributing them to the *epikrateia* as a whole); Tusa Cutroni 1983 (G 314–15) and *ap. Manni et al.* 1982–3 (G 225) 213–36; Gandolfo 1984 (G 178). Note Jenkins 1974 (G 201) no. 36 *QRTHDST MHNT*, apparently a Carthaginian campaigning coin of 410–390.

<sup>50</sup> That he fought at Aegospotami (*Polyb.* XII.25 k 11) must be a mistake for Cynossema. A discussion of the chronology of his return with slightly different conclusions: Seibert 1979 (C 75) 238–41 with 558 n. 124. <sup>51</sup> See in general Westlake 1958–9 (G 322); Sordi 1981 (G 297).

nian move.<sup>52</sup> Doubtless, the successes of 409 had whetted some appetites and the operations of Hermocrates showed that security had not yet been attained. Hannibal was re-elected, though because of his age Himilco of the same family was associated in the command, and there was a big recruiting drive, including a new group of Campanians (Diod. XIII.80). Apparently with Syracuse in mind, the naval component was increased.<sup>53</sup> In fact, there was greater Syracusan energy in 406; a force of forty ships was sent as far as Eryx, without in fact impeding Hannibal's crossing. Syracuse sent embassies throughout Sicily, to Italy, from which some help came, and to Sparta, from which, unsurprisingly in 406, it did not. It appears from a desperately fragmentary text (*IG I<sup>3</sup> 123* = M-L no. 92) that Carthage applied to Athens and got at least a sympathetic hearing; Athens had no help to spare, but would be glad to see Syracuse further distracted.

It was universally clear that the first target would be Acragas, the most resplendent prize, at the height of her prosperity (see *CAH IV<sup>2</sup> 776–8*, v<sup>2</sup> 168–70). Although she had been neutral during the Athenian expedition, she had been the obvious base for helping Selinus in 409 and had been impressed and generous about her fate (Diod. XIII.58.3). She turned down proffered terms, and hired Dexippus, a Spartan mercenary commander, 1,500 Greek mercenaries, and the 800 Campanians whom Hannibal had upset. The Carthaginian force, split as usual, started to suffer almost immediately from a 'plague', which killed the aged Hannibal; even they thought this due punishment for attacking Theron's tomb. A Syracusan force, under Daphnaeus, with reinforcements from Italy and Messene, picking up troops from Camarina and Gela on the way, built up to 30,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, supported with a fleet of thirty ships. A victory over the Carthaginian reserve was however not pressed, and the troops' wish for a sortie from Acragas was ignored; four Acragantine generals were stoned, and Dexippus became less popular. The strategy was not necessarily wrong;<sup>54</sup> the Carthaginians became hungry and were unwilling to face a pitched battle. Command of the sea was crucial, but it was lost through casualness about convoying a supply squadron. Himilco brought his fleet round from Panormus and Motya, and won a naval battle. It was now Acragas which was hungry, and the Campanians changed sides again. The Italian allies went home, and it was agreed that Acragas could not be held, and that it would be better to retire on Gela. The evacuation was better conducted than at Himera; the Acragantines were later settled in Leontini, deserted

<sup>52</sup> Some allowance has to be made for the time needed to prepare the new expedition, but there must be a substantial gap. <sup>53</sup> If the forty and fifty ships of Diod. XIII.80.6–7 are distinct.

<sup>54</sup> Polyæn. v.7a shows that someone thought well of Daphnaeus.

since 423. The siege had lasted eight months (Diod. XIII.91.1 (Ephorus?); seven in Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.21 (Timaeus?)) and ended a little before the winter solstice of 406. Himilco wintered in Acragas, while the enormous booty was digested.

There was panic throughout Sicily: some fled to Syracuse, some even to Italy. The Acragantines arrived in Syracuse and were vocal about the faults of their own generals, and there was, we are told, criticism about Syracusan choice of leaders. The story goes that, at an assembly in Syracuse, no one was prepared to speak except Dionysius, a young man of twenty-five or so (Cic. *Tusc.* v.20.57; cf. Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F 218), who had participated in Hermocrates' last attempt at a coup. His origins are unclear;<sup>55</sup> on the most plausible story, he had held minor clerical office.<sup>56</sup>

It was not unHermocratean that he should attack the generals, but he had learnt the need for broad support, and took a demagogic line. The generals had been bribed; other notables were oligarchs; there should be new generals who were real democrats (Diod. XIII.91. Cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1305a26; he attacked Daphnaeus and the rich). The magistrates tried to fine him, but the wealthy Philistus (the later historian) announced that he would be prepared to pay the fines all day. The *demos*, already dissatisfied with the conduct of the war, did elect a new board, including Dionysius, who however professed distrust of his colleagues and refused to sit with them. At further assemblies, he proposed and carried a motion for the return of exiles. This was appropriate to a time of national emergency, though the chief beneficiaries would be what remained of Hermocrates' party.<sup>57</sup>

Dionysius' refusal to sit with the other generals, if authentic, was met by giving him an independent command at Gela, held by Dexippus, now in Syracusan service. There too there was *stasis*; Dionysius supported the *demos*, and wealthy men were condemned to get funds to pay the mercenary garrison and double the pay of the Syracusans. Revolutionary Gela sent to Syracuse to sing his praises, but he did not get on with Dexippus and went home, redoubling his attack on the traitors in their midst. He claimed to have learnt from Himilco's herald that the other generals had sold out, and offered to resign rather than be the only loyal

<sup>55</sup> All sources give his father's name as Hermocrates, though making no point of it, but it was probably Hermocritus, like his son (Tod no. 133 line 20); an adopted father, Heloris, appears later.

<sup>56</sup> Cicero *loc. cit.* gives a vague, but favourable, account of his family and position, but all other sources, even of the fourth century (Isoc. v.65), put him pretty low. Dem. xx.161 is the earliest evidence for the clerical office; cf. Diod. XIII.96.4, XIV.66.5, Polyæn. v.2.2 (secretary to the *strategoi*).

<sup>57</sup> The colouring of the source claims all this as part of a plan for tyranny already made; the exiles would be glad to get their property back, murder their enemies and seize their property, and would in gratitude back him for tyrant.



general. It is hardly impossible that there had indeed been some feelers to see on what terms Carthage might be bought off.

The next section of Diodorus (XIII.94.5–96), when deprived of the source's insistence that Dionysius was already aiming at tyranny, can be rationally read as a Hermocratean programme of military reform. A proposal to dismiss the board of ten generals and replace them by Dionysius as general with full powers (*strategos autokrator*) was justified by an appeal to the model of Gelon. We do not know whether Gelon in fact ever held such a post, though this might well have been believed in 405.<sup>58</sup> A much more recent precedent was the proposal of Hermocrates (Thuc. VI.72.5) to replace a board of fifteen by three *strategoï autokratores*, and the implication that sole power for Dionysius was involved would be reduced if we accepted the statement of Pl. *Ep.* VIII 353a (whence probably Plut. *Dion* 3) that Hipparinus was associated with him in the *strategia* as an adviser and older man.<sup>59</sup> The prominence of Hipparinus in this phase is confirmed by Aristotle (*Pol.* 1306a1) who ranks him among the dissolute aristocrats who go in for tyranny themselves or as supporting others. Given the appointment of Dion and Megacles as joint *strategoï autokratores* after the fall of the tyranny in 357 (Plut. *Dion* 29.4), Diodorus' source may well be tendentiously over-simplifying.

Dionysius' first move was to double the soldiers' pay. His second was to take a force of those aged under forty to Leontini. Besides the possibility of collecting troops there (there were other refugees besides those from Acragas), it might not be unreasonable to retrain the army away from the comforts of their homes. At Leontini, we are told, he claimed a plot against him and made the classic request for a body-guard.<sup>60</sup> Since the request was for one of precisely 600, the standard fifth-century number for Syracusan elite forces (Diod. XI.76.2, Thuc. VI.96.3), we need see nothing sinister in this, and the subsequent selection of more than a thousand citizens, lacking in money, but bold in spirit, to be armed expensively follows Hermocrates' proposals (Thuc. VI.72.4) to increase hoplite strength. That he spoke in a friendly way to the mercenaries, changed their officers and dismissed Dexippus to Greece need hardly be due to a worry that he should give the Syracusans back their liberty; we have not had much reason to see military ability in the officers or Dexippus. A further concentration of forces from Gela and elsewhere is not unreasonable. The hardest phrase to interpret is what is intended to be the key one: after returning to Syracuse, he camped in the

<sup>58</sup> Caven 1990 (G 134) 56 thinks Dionysius' friends now invented it.

<sup>59</sup> The statement has been regarded as a falsification by Niese 1905 (G 244) 883 and Sanders 1979–80 (G 282) 79–80. Caven 1990 (G 134) 56 thinks there were more than two generals.

<sup>60</sup> Compare the slightly different account in Arist. *Pol.* 1286b35–40.

dockyard, openly proclaiming himself (or showing himself) tyrant (XIII.96.3); there may be some Gelonian nuance which escapes us. To this the Syracusans could not object, because the city was filled with mercenaries and they were frightened of the Carthaginians. Two more specific facts might be more easily interpreted as exhibiting the triumph of the Hermocratean party. Dionysius married Hermocrates' daughter and gave his sister to Hermocrates' brother-in-law. An assembly was summoned to order the execution of Daphnaeus and of Demarchus, who had been one of the generals who replaced Hermocrates in 410 (Thuc. VIII.85; Xen. *Hell.* I.1.29). The hostile source<sup>61</sup> does not conceal that constitutional forms were used.

As an organizer, Dionysius may have been doing well; as a commander, he was less successful. At the beginning of summer 405, Himilco razed Acragas (Diod. XIII.108.2) and moved against Gela, which defended itself gallantly. Dionysius, getting help from Italy, came, on the lower figures quoted from Timaeus, with 30,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, together with fifty ships which he used in close support and with which he tried to cut off Carthaginian supplies. After twenty days, he decided on more aggressive measures, but an over-elaborate three-pronged attack failed because of the slowness of his own force in going through the middle of the city. Though the losses were hardly decisive, a council of his friends thought the place unsuitable for a pitched battle, and it was decided, for no very obvious reason, to abandon both Gela and Camarina.<sup>62</sup>

The troops were furious, and evidently suspected treachery. Feeling was strongest in the upper-class cavalry. A group of them rushed home, plundered Dionysius' house and so maltreated his new wife that she committed suicide (Plut. *Dion* 3.2). With 100 loyal cavalry and the 600 elite troops, Dionysius briskly followed and suppressed the revolt; what was left of the cavalry retired to Etna (Diod. XIII.113.3, emended from XIV.7.7). The main body of the army arrived next morning, but the Geloans and Camarinaeans were understandably angry with Syracuse and joined the growing settlement at Leontini.

A lacuna in our manuscripts of Diodorus now breaks the story. There was evidently further 'plague' in the Carthaginian camp (Diod. XIII.114.2), which forced Himilco to send a herald. Whatever the constraints on him, he exacted severe terms (Diod. XIII.114.1; *SdA* 210).

<sup>61</sup> There is no obvious link in the account to the relevant fragments of Philistus (*FGrH* 556 F 57–8) or Timaeus (*FGrH* 566 F 29, 105), and we have no relevant Ephorean material.

<sup>62</sup> If Timaeus' synchronism with Tyre is right, we are already in August; Arr. *Anab.* II.24.6 (Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) II 2, 257 f). The topography of the siege of Gela has been studied by Adamesteanu 1956 (G 92). Caven 1990 (G 134) 59–72 attempts a full reconstruction of Dionysius' plans.

Carthage would keep her own area, and get the Elymians and Sicans too.<sup>63</sup> *Poleis* would be allowed at Selinus, Acragas, Himera,<sup>64</sup> Gela and Camarina, but they were to have no walls and must pay tribute to Carthage. Leontini, Messene and the Sicels were to be autonomous. The Syracusans were to be under Dionysius.<sup>65</sup> He can hardly have accepted this as a permanent solution, but must have welcomed the chance to reorganize and regroup his forces. That Himilco was induced by disastrous losses by plague to be content with his very substantial gains rather than risk further operations against Syracuse with a depleted force needs no special explanation. He had certainly brought Carthaginian power in Sicily to its highest point.

We have detected some positive aspects of Dionysius' first rise to power, but it is pointless to think of him as anything but a monarch thereafter. Some fairly drastic measures to be discussed in the next paragraph are placed by Diodorus immediately after the peace. If this timing is correct, Dionysius was already settling in for good. He was clearly very badly scared by the cavalry revolt, and an even worse mutiny broke out not long after the peace, in which he is said to have nearly despaired; there was some competition later among his friends as to who had encouraged him with the remark that 'tyranny was a good shroud'. It is not improbable that resistance will have strengthened his will to rule, and, as Pericles said in another context (Thuc. II.63), abandoning tyranny is dangerous. Formal recognition came in a sense when, after the end of the war in Greece, a Spartan and a Corinthian came to investigate the situation they had been unable to help in 406 (Diod. XIV.10, cf. 70.3), and decided to back Dionysius.<sup>66</sup> By 400, an orator in an Athenian court (Lys. VI.6) can casually refer to Dionysius as a *basileus*.

The text which shows Dionysius beginning to remake Syracuse as a personal structure is Diod. XIV.7. The Island (Ortygia) was divided from the rest of the city by a substantial wall and contained a fortified acropolis and the dockyards. Houses in it were confined to his friends and his mercenaries. There had already been confiscation of land at Gela, and its practice at Syracuse was implicit in the attacks on the rich and the execution of political opponents. The best Syracusan land was given to

<sup>63</sup> See on this clause Anello 1986 (G 101) 115–21.

<sup>64</sup> Himera had already been replaced by Thermae, 10 km to its west (Diod. XIII.79.8).

<sup>65</sup> That he was actually personally named in the treaty seems unlikely. See Freeman 1891–4 (G 174) III 579–86, with App. XXXI; Caven 1990 (G 134) 76.

<sup>66</sup> The story is connected with an alleged disarming of Syracusan citizens and a decision to rely on mercenaries in future; the rule does not seem to have been as absolute as that (see, e.g. Diod. XIV.44.2). There were also contacts with Lysander, perhaps even a visit from him (Plut. *Lys.* 2.7–8, accepted by Caven 1990 (G 134) 84, but see Sansone 1981 (C 314), who, comparing the text of Plut. *Mor.* 229A, shows that the story in 2.8 refers to the ambassador named by Diodorus). See also Bommelaer 1981 (C 279) 177–9.

his friends and commanders. We later find that Dion had an estate valued by Plato at 100 talents (*Ep.* VII.347b); his father Hipparinus had been near bankruptcy in 405. It is clear that Dionysius kept a good deal for himself; when his son was negotiating his abdication in 356 (see below, p. 700), he tried to retain the revenues of the Guatas estate, a large and fertile area stretching from the sea into the interior (*Plut. Dion* 37.2). The rest of the land was given on equal terms to foreigners and citizens, but (the Gelonian model again) the concept of citizenship was widened. Diodorus here speaks of manumitted slaves whom he called *neopolitai*. It is not clear whether this refers to the Cilicyrioi (see above, p. 124). That citizenship went to mercenaries and to favoured inhabitants of conquered towns goes without saying.<sup>67</sup> Houses outside the Island were also distributed, presumably carefully. At the end of the tyranny, the question of land-distribution was inseparable from the question of freedom.<sup>68</sup>

Constitutionally, we are left very much in the dark. Assemblies continue to be referred to. It is clearly at least possible that the title of *strategos autokrator* continued to be used, and there is clear evidence for an office of admiral, which also recurs after the end of the tyranny. The most substantial evidence for official organization is lost in lacunae in the Athenian alliance with Dionysius of 368–367 (Tod no. 136 = Harding no. 52 lines 34–7). Restorations are largely conjectural,<sup>69</sup> and all one can really say is that, though the treaty is with Dionysius and his descendants, some aspects of Syracusan polis organization are recognized.

What Athenian texts (Tod no. 108 lines 6–7 (Harding no. 20), no. 133 lines 19–20, no. 136 line 8 (Harding no. 52)) do tell us is what title Dionysius chose to use for the outside world. Gelon and Hieron had used no title in Greece proper. Gelon had simply called himself a Syracusan in his tripod-dedication at Delphi (M–L no. 28); Hieron paired himself with the Syracusans in dedicating the spoils of Cyme at Olympia (M–L no. 29, with *BCH* 84 (1960), 721, *SEG* xxxiii 328). This was not without some arrogance. The situation of Gelon's monument set it as a pendant to the golden tripod dedicated by the Spartans and their allies for their victory over the Persians, nor was anyone expected to inquire who Hieron was. Court-poetry had a rather different picture; Pindar three times (*Ol.* II.23, *Pyth.* II.60, III.70) refers to Hieron as *basileus*, once even as *tyrannos* (*Pyth.* III.85). We are still in a period in

<sup>67</sup> Cf. e.g. the case of Dikon, the brilliant sprinter from Caulonia (Moretti 1957 (A 43) nn. 379, 388, 389), transferred to Syracuse just in time for the Olympic games of 384.

<sup>68</sup> See below, p. 700; Asheri 1966 (C 3) 85–93; Fuks 1968 (G 176). For Dionysius I's land policy, see Mossé 1962 (C 208) 221–2, 340–7, right to see that the citizenship grants have implications for land, but wrongly implying that all upper-class estates remained untouched.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. Stroheker 1958 (G 302) 239 n. 17; even the last word might be *φρου]ραρχούς* as well as the current *τρη]ραρχούς*.

which verse, at any rate, can use *basileus* and *tyrannos* as interchangeable.<sup>70</sup>

The model of Gelon could hardly be irrelevant to a later ruler of Syracuse, and he crops up twice in Diodorus' narrative about Dionysius. We have already seen him used as a model for the post of *strategos autokrator*, and there is a long speech made in the assembly by a disaffected Syracusan in which a whole chapter (xiv.66) compares Dionysius very unfavourably with Gelon.<sup>71</sup> We cannot do more than note that the model was there to be used, and may have been of wider importance than titles.<sup>72</sup>

Even though Dionysius could be named in an Athenian court in 400 as the only one of many *basileis* who had not been deceived by Andocides (Lys. vi.6–7) and even if, which is clearly very doubtful, Gelon and Hieron had been *basileis* in any official usage, there might well be some doubt about using the word now. In some other areas the title had more continuity,<sup>73</sup> but the word and its cognates are avoided for Macedonian kings in foreign relations at least until 338.<sup>74</sup> By and large, there seems to be a feeling in sources before Alexander that *basileus* is best reserved for someone who rules non-Greeks.<sup>75</sup>

The Deinomenid dedications and the Macedonian precedents show that no title at all would be necessary, but by 393, at least, one had been decided on. When the Athenian *boule* in winter 394/3 (Tod no. 108 = Harding no. 20) drafted an honorary decree for Dionysius, it named him as 'the *archon* of Sicily', [τὸν Σικ]ελίας ἄρχ[ο]ντ[α]. The title recurs in Athens in two decrees from Dionysius' last year (Tod nos. 133, 136 (= Harding no. 52)), and we cannot doubt that it was known to be acceptable to him. Curiously, and probably accidentally, it echoes a less formal phrase in a Spartan ambassador's speech to Gelon in Hdt.

<sup>70</sup> Andrewes 1956 (A 1) 20–6. Later in the century, Gelon is a *tyrannos* for Herodotus (vii.156.3), though the speech at vii.161.1 has *basileus* (cf. Ferrill 1978 (C 21) 388), and Thucydides describes the last Sicilian tyrants as *tyrannoi* (i.14.2, 18.1). Diodorus' source is curiously consistent about the Deinomenids. After Gelon's victory at Himera, he summoned an assembly in arms, which he attended without arms, and gave an account of his life (xi.26.5–6). The Syracusans, so far from proceeding against him as a *tyrannos*, acclaimed him as 'benefactor, saviour and king'. Thereafter in book xi, both he and his successor-brothers, Hieron and Thrasybulus, are described as *basileis* and their rule as *basileia*.

<sup>71</sup> Sanders 1981 (B 99) argues improbably that Philistus wrote a bad speech to show the intellectual inadequacies of the opposition. Whoever wrote the speech, we certainly cannot be sure that its details are contemporary.

<sup>72</sup> Timoleon also appealed to the Gelonian precedent (Diod. xvi.79.2). There is no evidence for Agathocles, but the Syracusan royal house revived Deinomenid names in the third century.

<sup>73</sup> It is a shade surprising that the new fragments (Lewis and Stroud 1979 (B 152) = SEG xxix 86) of the Athenian decree for Evagoras in 393 refer to him (as the fifth-century decree IG<sup>1</sup> 113 had not) as *Salaminion basileus*.

<sup>74</sup> Errington 1974 (D 30); Hammond and Griffith 1979 (D 50) 387–9.

<sup>75</sup> The nuance is clear in the Bosphoran kingdom (see pp. 496–7), where Leucon and Pairisades are described in a double title as *archon* of Greek cities and *basileus* of barbarian *ethne* (Tod no. 115B (Harding no. 27C), 171).

VII.157.2. We should probably look for other origins, but they are not easy to find. Epigraphic texts take us back to the middle of the sixth century, with an *archos* of Teichioussa (*DGE* 723 (3)); it is not clear whether he is an independent ruler or an official subordinate to Miletus. Herodotus has one instance of a singular *archon* plus a genitive of place, the *archon* of Babylon at I.192.4.<sup>76</sup>

It would be foolish to affirm that we have a complete knowledge of the repertoire available for Dionysius, and something better than Herodotus' satrap of Babylon may yet turn up. Both parts of his chosen title have their interest. The word *archon* is apparently totally neutral, with nothing of the unfavourable colour which might surround *tyrannos*, *basileus*, *monarchos*, or *dynastes*. If it has any colouring, it may be that of military control. *Sikelias* is a geographical term. It does not directly involve rule over individuals. It asserts a wider sphere than simply Syracuse.<sup>77</sup> We can see it as on the way to the monarchy of a territorial state, but in this period it is perhaps not more than vague and grand.

That anecdote made play with the tyrannical nature of Dionysius' rule is hardly surprising,<sup>78</sup> but there is little direct contemporary evidence which would justify us in asserting that Syracuse was a police-state. When Aristotle (*Pol.* 1312b34ff) discusses repressive methods of tyranny, it is Hieron's network of informers which constitutes the Sicilian example; for Dionysius he merely speaks of harsh taxation. It is, however, sufficiently clear that his associates found it inadvisable to cross his will.

Construction of such a personal rule could not be merely a matter of force and judicious benefaction. The two army revolts among native Syracusans early in the reign hardly encourage a very favourable view of Dionysius' capacity for leadership, but he seems to have learnt. The clear Philistan passages (*Diod.* XIV.18 and 41) describing his wall-building and his preparations for renewing the war against Carthage in 397 give quite a different picture, which cannot be totally distorted. Besides careful organization of the workforce and splendid prizes for achievement, there is enormous stress on his personal participation. He in person, together with his *philoï*, oversaw the work on the walls for whole days at a time, visiting every section and lending a hand to the toilers. He laid aside the heaviness (*baros*) of his office (*arche*) and showed himself as a private citizen (*idiotes*). Putting his hands to the hardest tasks, he endured the same toil as the other workers, so that great rivalry was engendered

<sup>76</sup> Thucydides is full of *archontes*, though we can seldom be sure whether he is reporting a technicality or avoiding one. The nearest he gets to using the word in this way is the *archon* that Alcibiades puts into Cos at VIII.108.2. For semi-technical uses in official Attic, note the *archon* for Pylos (ἐς Πύλον) in M-L no. 84.10, and, with a genitive, the *archontes* of the fleet in 409 (*Agora* XVII 23. 104-9). <sup>77</sup> The coinage, however, (see n. 93) continues to bear the name of Syracuse.

<sup>78</sup> See Sanders 1987 (G 283) 21-4.

and some even added a part of the night to the day's labour; such eagerness had infected the multitude. And, when we get on to the armaments drive, the language is similar. He circulated daily among the workers, conversed with them in kindly fashion, and rewarded the most zealous with gifts and invited them to his table.

Abroad, it was not merely the speaker of Lysias VI who put him on a monarchical plane. That he had in some sense moved on to such a plane is equally implied by a diplomatic plan contemporary with Tod no. 108. One of the elements in an idea of Conon's in 393 about detaching Dionysius from his Spartan sympathies (see above, p. 105) was to arrange a marriage-alliance between him and Evagoras (Lys. XIX. 19–20); in the passage needs neither title nor other identification. The mission did not persuade Dionysius to change sides from Sparta and further relations between Athens and him had to wait over twenty years until Athens moved closer to Sparta.

Dionysius surely had ideas about how a Greek quasi-monarchical figure should behave.<sup>79</sup> There were precedents here, as we have seen. Unfortunately a substantial and recognizable victory over barbarians continued to elude him, so there is no trace of any notable dedication at Delphi or Olympia, or any move to one,<sup>80</sup> until, at the end of his life (Tod no. 133), we find him writing letters at least to Athens and her allies 'about the building of the temple'. That is surely Apollo's temple at Delphi which had burnt down four years before, and the attractions to him are obvious. If he was attempting to take a lead in the rebuilding, it came to nothing.<sup>81</sup>

It needed less diplomatic preparation to imitate the other ways in which the Deinomenids had exhibited themselves. No Greek could be stopped from competing in the Olympic games. On one famous occasion,<sup>82</sup> Dionysius tried to do a thorough job. There was at least one nearer model than Hieron. Like Alcibiades in 416 (Thuc. VI. 16.2, Plut.

<sup>79</sup> Sanders 1979–80 (G 282) 65–70 and 1987 (G 283) 2–3 tries to extract some formal theory out of the names of his daughters and fragments of his tragedies.

<sup>80</sup> The expensive dedications of 372 intended for Delphi and Olympia in Xen. *Hell.* VI. 2. 33–6 (see below, p. 150) are evidently not architectural.

<sup>81</sup> There is no trace of him or his successor in the extensive building-accounts, and there is only one known Syracusan contribution to the funds during the period, 30 drachmae from an unknown Eudamos in 360 (Tod no. 140 line 40 = Harding no. 60 (misprinted) = *Corpus des Inscriptions de Delphes* II 4, 140).

<sup>82</sup> In Diodorus (XIV. 109), the date is 388, while Dionysius was besieging Rhegium, (though there is a partial doublet under 386, XV. 7.2), and that date for the siege of Rhegium had been established before Polyb. I. 6. 1–2. But, as Grote 1846–56 (A 25) X 103–4 n. 2, XI 48–9 n. 1 observed, it is much easier to date Lysias XXXIII to 384 than to 388; in 388, Lysias, resident at Athens, can hardly have described the Spartans as 'leaders of the Greeks, not unjustly' (XXXIII. 7, which need not imply that there is a war on). There is some confirmation for 384 in Paus. VI. 3. 11 (cf. VI. 2. 6), and it is easier to reconstruct Dionysius' conduct to his relations (see below) by using the date. But the uncertainty is serious.

*Alc.* 11–12), he sent several four-horse chariots; like him he set up elaborately decorated marquees. But there was one way in which he was unlike Hieron or Alcibiades. He would be his own poet, even before the victory. He may have been engaged in literary composition for some time.<sup>83</sup> The delegation, headed by his brother Thearidas, also included rhapsodes and actors to recite his verses. The crowd, at first attracted by the beautiful voices of the actors, did not like the poems or said they did not, and started wrecking the marquees. They were encouraged in this by the orator Lysias, who, perhaps conscious of his Syracusan ancestry, happened to be present and ready with a powerful speech (xxxiii), denouncing the subservience of Greeks to Dionysius ‘the *tyrannos* of Sicily’ and to Artaxerxes. The chariots all crashed during the race, and there was trouble on the return journey as well. According to Diodorus, the survivors blamed the quality of the verses, and Dionysius was so upset by the fiasco that he embarked on a purge of his nearest and dearest, of which more later. Some of this must be taken seriously; there was certainly a conscious propaganda enterprise. It is hard to determine in what proportions its failure was due to inefficiency, bad luck, sabotage, or a simple failure to recognize the possible unpopularity of monarchs in Hellas. He did not repeat it.<sup>84</sup>

The time would come to deal with Carthage, but the first task was to extend his control in eastern Sicily (Diod. xiv. 14–17), in defiance of what the treaty of 405 had provided. The recovery of Etna from the dissident Syracusans presented no great problem, but his siege-techniques were not yet equal to the task of subduing the settlement at Leontini. Sicels were dealt with by a mixture of force and diplomacy; he regained control of Enna and made peace with Herbita. Use of traitors enabled him to succeed where the democracy had failed. He captured Catana and Naxos, and sold their populations; Naxian land was given to Sicels, Catana to Campanians. Leontini was now isolated and submitted. Its population was moved to Syracuse. Since its largest component must have been the refugees from Gela and Camarina, the inference must be that he found their Dorian stock more assimilable than the Ionians of Catana and Naxos.<sup>85</sup>

Facilitated by the Carthaginian destructions, a renewed Gelonian model was beginning to take shape in eastern Sicily. There would be a great Syracuse, and not much else in the way of Greek towns. Sicels

<sup>83</sup> If we trust the story that, after Euripides’ death, he paid the heirs a talent for the poet’s lyre, writing-table and desk to improve the quality of his inspiration (*TGF* 76 r 10 Snell).

<sup>84</sup> Belated recognition of a sort for his poetry came with his victory at the Athenian Lenaea of 368 (see below, pp. 150–1).

<sup>85</sup> There may be a Gelonian model here; cf. the paradox of Hdt. vii. 156 (*contra*, *CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> 766). Another Dorian group, Messenians expelled from Naupactus (see p. 42), were also acceptable, at least as mercenaries (Diod. xiv. 34.3).



would be allowed a good deal of local independence, provided that, we may assume, they sustained Syracuse economically.<sup>86</sup> Either now or eventually, there would be a scattering of mercenary settlements, situated as much for defence as for anything else;<sup>87</sup> we happen to have a date, 400/399, for the foundation of Adranum (Diod. xiv.37.5, from his chronographic source). The enlarged Syracuse was given a new and splendid wall-circuit,<sup>88</sup> presented (see above) as a matter of national urgency.

The new settlement might yet come under threat. Syracusan exiles were gathering on the Straits, based on Rhegium and Messene. The government of Messene was prepared to back an attempt on Syracuse, but its troops thought the war a purely upper-class cause, and refused to move.<sup>89</sup> It is entirely plausible that Dionysius should have thought that readiness to receive exiles might be a preparation to join Carthage, as Anaxilas, in control of both sides of the Straits, had done in 480 (*CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> 763–75). Messene was bought off with a territorial concession, presumably from the territory of Catana; by 396 it is in alliance with Dionysius. Rhegium, which rejected friendly overtures, was neutralized by a marriage-alliance with her neighbour Locri. With that trouble out of the way and the new wall-circuit built, thought could be given to renewed war with Carthage. Reports that Carthage was immobilized by plague had already encouraged some Greeks to move back into the Carthaginian area, and Dionysius began to stockpile weapons. With timber brought down from Etna and imported from Italy, the fleet was to be trebled from its present strength of 110; half its crews would be citizen, the other half hired. Technical invention was encouraged;<sup>90</sup> lack of success at Leontini had shown Syracusan deficiencies in siegecraft, and there may have been early experiments with catapults.<sup>91</sup> Despite this activity, there is an emphasis on economy. Weapons would be built up before mercenaries actually came, since they would be expensive to keep hired for long. It is hardly surprising that Dionysius should be financially cautious. We have heard of no money raised except by

<sup>86</sup> For numismatic evidence, some surely of this period, on Sicel communities, see Jenkins 1975 (G 203).

<sup>87</sup> I learned much about the sites of mercenary settlement from unpublished work by P. J. Tickler. For various coinages, some later than 396, which may be associated with mercenary foundations, see Consolo Langher 1961 (G 143); Kraay 1976 (B 200) 229–30; Macaluso 1979 (G 220).

<sup>88</sup> It is virtually impossible to distinguish Dionysius' fortifications from the largely later constructions we now see. See Lawrence 1946 (G 210) and his general comment (1979 (K 33) 117).

<sup>89</sup> For events at Messene and Rhegium in this period, see Raccuia 1981 (G 271).

<sup>90</sup> In doublet passages (Diod. xiv.41.3, 42.2, cf. 44.7), it is claimed that quadriremes and quinqueremes were now built and the latter invented. (Ancient tradition (Arist. *F* 600 *ap.* Pliny *HN* vii.207; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1 p. 132) claimed the quadrireme for Carthage.) These types do not appear until the 320s at Athens. See Morrison and Williams 1968 (K 48) 249.

<sup>91</sup> These too do not appear elsewhere until much later in the century; see Marsden 1969–71 (K 45) and below, p. 683.

confiscation,<sup>92</sup> and it is by no means clear where the resources came from for the issues of gold pieces and silver decadrachms, clearly intended for mercenary pay, which should be associated with the period.<sup>93</sup>

In 397,<sup>94</sup> when all the equipment was ready, mobilization could start. Citizen troops were enrolled and mercenaries hired on a large scale, with active assistance from Sparta. The more genial atmosphere at home was still further promoted by great public banquets to celebrate Dionysius' double marriage, of which more later. A few days later, the assembly was summoned in due constitutional form and induced to declare war on Carthage, unless she set free the Greek cities she had enslaved. The property of Carthaginians now settled in Syracuse and their ships were seized, and hatred of the barbarians was similarly manifested in a series of Sicilian Vespers even in cities outside his control.

Carthage was unprepared, and clearly had no substantial force in Sicily. Dionysius drove straight through the Greek zone tributary to Carthage. Camarina, Gela, Acragas rose to meet him, and forces from Himera and Selinus came to join him at the Carthaginian stronghold of Motya,<sup>95</sup> an offshore island joined to the mainland by a causeway. It was imperative to destroy this Carthaginian forward base.<sup>96</sup> Here he is said to have assembled 80,000 foot, 3,000 cavalry, 200 warships and 500 supply-ships, with siege-engines. Leaving his brother Leptines to begin the siege, he himself subdued the other Carthaginian settlements. To begin with, Himilco only had ten ships to spare for a remarkably successful diversionary raid on Syracuse harbour, but he rapidly raised a hundred to relieve Motya by catching the Syracusan fleet on land. Dionysius hauled his ships across the peninsula, and the Carthaginian ships were

<sup>92</sup> A battery of financial expedients, not always easy to understand, is listed by [Arist.] *Oec.* II 1349a14–1350a5, 1353b20–6.

<sup>93</sup> Older arrangements of Syracusan coinage left little for Dionysius. For revision of the dates, see Kraay and Hirmer 1966 (B 201) 280–1, 287–9; Jenkins 1966 (G 200) 30; Kraay 1976 (B 200) 231–3. We have two denominations of gold coinage, which, at a gold–silver ratio of 15:1, would be equivalent to two and one respectively of the contemporary silver decadrachms, many signed by Euainetos, which were much copied. There was no other coinage in precious metals under Dionysius; the tetradrachm denomination of the fifth century had disappeared along with the neighbours who had shared and imitated it. This does not amount to all that much. Very rough computation from the number of decadrachm dies might suggest that they produced a total coinage of about 250 talents. The bronze coinage has not yet been fully restudied; Consolo Langher 1964 (G 144) 161–6, 293–300, has some basic material.

<sup>94</sup> Diodorus' date will be confirmed if we accept the identification of Pharacidas the Spartan who arrives in the second summer of the war (below, p. 143) with Pharax, the Spartan nauarch (*Hell. Oxy.* VII (II). 1; he was probably still in the Aegean in spring 396 (Diod. XIV. 79.4). The reader will observe how little we know about Dionysius' activities between the two Carthaginian Wars.

<sup>95</sup> See Whitaker 1921 (G 324); Isserlin and du Plat Taylor 1974 (G 40); for more recent work there, see *Arch. Rep. for 1987–88*, 149–50. For the siege, Diodorus is for once supplemented, by Polyæn. V. 2.6; see Whitaker 1921 (G 324) 75–91; Caven 1990 (G 134) 100–6.

<sup>96</sup> For the importance of denying forward bases to the enemy in galley-warfare, see Guilmartin 1974 (K 21) 97–107, 217, 264.

driven off by archers and slingers on the ships and land-based catapults. Himilco had to leave Motya to its fate. After heavy fighting for some days, it fell to the siege-engines. There was much slaughter, and a good deal of booty. The new siege-engines had proved their worth, but summer was at an end, with the island not entirely conquered; Elymian Segesta and Entella still held out. A Sicel garrison was put into Motya; Leptines was left with a squadron to watch the straits, and Dionysius went home.

It would seem that, despite the booty of Motya, he was under some financial stringency, since in 396 he evidently had many fewer troops.<sup>97</sup> When he returned to the field, Segesta still held out. Himilco this year had raised substantial forces and, despite losing many ships to Leptines' force, landed at Panormus and recovered Eryx and Motya. Dionysius abandoned western Sicily, and gave Himilco a clear march along the north coast.

His objective was Messene (now evidently under Dionysius' control), both for the sake of its harbour and to cut off possible reinforcements from Italy, and he took it fairly easily. Most of the Sicels of east Sicily went over to him.<sup>98</sup> Dionysius sent for mercenaries, strengthened the fortresses of Leontini and Etna, and marched north from Syracuse to meet him. Leptines also took the fleet to sea. Though the Carthaginian fleet was superior in numbers, Himilco's plan had been to move down the east coast with army and fleet in close conjunction.<sup>99</sup> Although an eruption of Etna made the coast road impassable, so that he had to take the army round the west of it, his admiral Mago broke Leptines' fleet, and sailed into Catana.

The threat this posed to Syracuse was unmistakable. Dionysius retreated there, to the irritation of the Greeks thus abandoned, and sent his brother-in-law Polyxenus off to Italy and Greece to implore help to save Greek Sicily. Before long, the Carthaginian fleet was filling the Great Harbour and Himilco's army was at the gates of Syracuse, preparing to succeed where the Athenians had failed seventeen years before. That Polyxenus' mission brought thirty ships and the Spartan Pharacidas<sup>100</sup> seemed of no great moment.

Dionysius and Leptines were away bringing in a supply squadron when a chance battle brought the Syracusans something of a naval

<sup>97</sup> What proportion of the 80,000 troops of 397 (Diod. xiv.47.7) were mercenaries is not clear (the armament figures of 43.2 are no real help), but the general impression left by the conduct of the two campaigns is perhaps confirmed by the figure of 10,000 mercenaries left in service at the end of 396 (xiv.78.2).

<sup>98</sup> But Dionysius was confident enough in the city-slaves to recruit them for the fleet.

<sup>99</sup> For a discussion in a sixteenth-century context of the necessity of co-operation between galley-fleets and land forces, particularly if a siege was imminent, see Guilmartin 1974 (κ 21) e.g. at 186.

<sup>100</sup> See n. 94.

victory.<sup>101</sup> This, we are told, encouraged a feeling that Dionysius was not indispensable, and Diodorus reports an assembly and a long speech<sup>102</sup> demanding his dismissal and his replacement, perhaps from their mother-city Corinth or from the Spartans, the leaders of Greece. Pharacidas was however unresponsive; his instructions, he said, were to help the Syracusans and Dionysius against Carthage, not to overthrow Dionysius. The mercenaries present were equally firm for Dionysius, and he stayed in control.

That the danger was dispelled was so remarkable that supernatural reasons had to be invoked for it. The Carthaginians, it was said, as they prepared their siege, had plundered the temples of Demeter and Kore and destroyed the tomb of Gelon and Demarete. It was little wonder that they first became prey to irrational fears and then to an exceptionally virulent plague.<sup>103</sup> Dionysius seized his chance by both land and sea, and won victories on both.

Himilco was forced into negotiation, and eventually secured a promise that at least Carthaginian citizens would be allowed to escape. The rest of the force, except for the Sicels who got home and the Iberians whom Dionysius enrolled, were enslaved. The scandal was that Dionysius had been bribed, worse, that he wanted to preserve some element of Carthaginian threat to ensure that he would remain tyrant. It might also be said that he was enhancing the Carthaginian disaster by disgracing them as well.<sup>104</sup> Himilco did reach home, but was very badly received and starved himself to death. The disaster and disgrace sparked a major revolt against Carthage in Libya (see below, p. 373).

Although the mercenaries had stood with Dionysius against the dissatisfaction of the citizens, they wanted their pay and had to be bought off with Leontini.<sup>105</sup> Further regrouping was made possible by Himilco's destruction of Messene. Here Dionysius settled Italian Greeks from Locri and her colony Medma.<sup>106</sup> This was a continuation of the insight of 397 (p. 141) that the Straits had to be controlled. Although a bride from Rhegium might have been preferable then, the negotiations had ended

<sup>101</sup> Caven 1990 (G 134) 115–16 disbelieves in this battle.

<sup>102</sup> For this speech see n. 71.

<sup>103</sup> The plague (see Littman 1984 (G 217)) is described in great detail; evidently Philistus was trying to repeat Thucydides' achievement in the line. As usual, it is vain to speculate about its identity, though it may be worth noting that mental symptoms, the absence of which is a substantial obstacle to identifying the Athenian plague as typhus, are present here in abundance. A useful discussion of plague in these campaigns by Seibert 1982–3 (G 289).

<sup>104</sup> For a similar arrangement made by Athenians to discredit Spartans, see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 411.

<sup>105</sup> From this point until 388 or so, the chronology is very fluid for those who place no particular faith in the years under which Diodorus gives his accounts.

<sup>106</sup> He also intended, appropriately, to include his 600 exiles from mainland Messenia who had joined him after the destruction of Naupactus in 400 (see n. 85 and Asheri 1984 (G 104) 35–6), but his Spartan allies objected to the idea and they were moved to the west to found Tyndaris, on which see Barreca 1957 (G 115).

with an alignment with Locri which lasted for fifty years.<sup>107</sup> When Locrians now moved into Messene, Rhegium not unnaturally felt herself encircled. While Dionysius was settling with the Sicels and making a good deal of progress with them, Rhegium stepped up its support for Dionysius' opponents, settled Naxians and Catanians at Mylae, west of Messene, and, under the Syracusan exile Heloris, laid siege to Messene itself. The attempt failed and brought with it the loss of Mylae.

War with Rhegium was now inevitable, but delayed by the continuation of the Sikel campaign against Tauromenium (Taormina), where Himilco had established a Sikel position in 396 (Diod. xiv.59.2). Diodorus' picture of a winter attack on it gives us the clearest picture we have of Dionysius personally involved in battle, scrambling up the rocks in the frost, and barely getting away with his life. The disaster did no good to outside appreciations of the strength of his position.<sup>108</sup>

At this point Carthage re-enters the story.<sup>109</sup> Mago, now in command, once again made for Messene, but was beaten off. It is legitimate to suppose that the tradition, which will want to dilate on the heroism of Rhegium, has suppressed the fact that she was effectively acting with him, and Dionysius forthwith tried a *coup de main* against her. All he succeeded in doing was make it clear that he had ambitions beyond the Straits, thus contributing a reason for the formation of the Italiote League (see below, p. 387). Mago, now reinforced, saw his best chance in continued action with the Sicels and tried a drive through central Sicily,<sup>110</sup> but found himself running out of supplies in rough country. Dionysius was content to let him see the error of his ways, despite the wish of his Syracusan troops to engage; they are even said to have taken themselves off home. Peace now at last followed. The terms were those of 405 (p. 135), with the exception that the Sicels were now explicitly put under Dionysius.<sup>111</sup> Modern scholarship is reluctant to believe that Diodorus can have got this right.<sup>112</sup> Could Dionysius' successes of 397 and Carthage's failure outside Syracuse in 396 have gone for nothing? It is widely assumed<sup>113</sup> that the position of the Greek states outside Dionysius' control must have been improved. It would be foolish to

<sup>107</sup> For Dionysius' marriage-alliance with Locri, see Musti 1977 (G 236) 92–9, arguing that the marriage gave Dionysius and still more his son by it, Dionysius II, permanent rights in Locri.

<sup>108</sup> Diod. xiv.88.5 says that Acragas and Messene now abandoned their alliances with Dionysius. This is plausible enough for Acragas, but not for Messene (cf. xiv.90.3), despite Caven 1990 (G 134) 127–8, 131, trying to find a place for Polyæn. v.2.18.

<sup>109</sup> There may be little duplication between Diod. xiv.90 and 95.

<sup>110</sup> Diodorus' account puts a suspicious amount of emphasis on his native city of Agyrum.

<sup>111</sup> Tauromenium, which Himilco had hoped would be a permanent Sikel threat to Syracuse, was abandoned and turned by Dionysius into yet another mercenary settlement. It is clear that the site was already thoroughly hellenized (*Arch. Rep. for 1987–88*, 121).

<sup>112</sup> Confrontation with Diod. xv.17.5 (see below, p. 149) certainly poses problems for one passage or the other. <sup>113</sup> See e.g. Stroheker 1958 (G 302) 82–5.

place implicit faith in Diodorus, here or anywhere, but it is not obvious that he was wrong. On any rational assessment, the Greek cities were no longer of real importance. What was important was that Carthage had, after several attempts to invade eastern Sicily, in effect acknowledged that the task was beyond her powers.<sup>114</sup>

Dionysius could now turn his attention to Rhegium, and sailed, evidently fairly late in the year, with 20,000 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 120 ships to its border with Locri (from which some help doubtless came; cf. *Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom.* xx.7.2). On his way to the Straits, he ravaged the land. The Italiotes tried to relieve Rhegium with a fleet of sixty ships from Croton, but their efforts did less to upset Dionysius' plans than a nasty storm, which cost him seven ships and sent him into Messene. He broke off the campaign for the year, but laid a more firm foundation for the future by an alliance with the Lucanians, which might divert the Italiotes.

The Lucanians duly attacked Thurii in the next year,<sup>115</sup> supported by a Syracusan fleet under Dionysius' brother Leptines. But Leptines, moved apparently by the heavy defeat which the Lucanians inflicted on Thurii, negotiated peace between the Italiotes and the Lucanians instead. This was totally contrary to Dionysius' plans; not unnaturally, he sacked Leptines and replaced him with his younger brother Thearidas.

Thus deprived of Lucanian help, he changed his strategy for dealing with the Italiotes. With a much smaller fleet,<sup>116</sup> but a larger cavalry force and ample supplies, he laid siege to Caulonia,<sup>117</sup> thus drawing on himself whatever the Italiotes could put in the field. The exile Heloris, based on Croton, marched to relieve the siege, with 25,000 infantry, thus outnumbering Dionysius, and 2,000 cavalry. But Dionysius had scouts out and surprised Heloris with his advance guard at dawn on the river Elleporus.<sup>118</sup> Heloris was killed, and the rest of the Italiotes, coming up in no sort of formation, were put to a disorderly flight. The main body, 10,000 men, spent two days on a waterless hill before surrendering unconditionally. To their surprise, Dionysius let them go without ransom, and gave generous terms to most of the cities involved, 'the finest act of his life'. Rhegium settled by handing over its fleet of seventy ships, paying 300 talents and handing over a hundred hostages. Caulonia was destroyed as a city and its territory given to Locri, but its inhabitants

<sup>114</sup> So Caven 1990 (G 134) 130–1.

<sup>115</sup> Diodorus has managed to miss a clear division of campaigning season here.

<sup>116</sup> Sufficient, however, to give Thearidas a useful victory over a squadron from Rhegium off the Lipari Islands. <sup>117</sup> Presumably with unmentioned assistance from Locri.

<sup>118</sup> The Galliparo Caven 1990 (G 134) 137, the Stilaro Walbank 1957–79 (B 122) on Polyb. 1.6.2, following Nissen 1883–1902 (G 245) II 949. On the battle, see also Gianelli 1928 (G 180) 73–6, 108–10; De Sensi Sestito 1988 (G 155) 282–3.

were moved to Syracuse, given citizenship and freedom from taxation for five years.

Next year<sup>119</sup> he took similar action with Hipponium. His friends in Locri now controlled a massive territory across the toe of Italy; Rhegium was completely isolated and had lost her fleet. Pretending to be returning to Sicily, he manufactured a *casus belli* by asking her for the courtesy of the provision of a market for supplies.<sup>120</sup> When, after some days, they became suspicious and suspended the market, he returned their hostages and opened his siege.

The siege of Rhegium lasted eleven months,<sup>121</sup> and Dionysius conducted it with bitter determination, despite a serious spear-wound in the groin. The Rhegines countered everything he could put against them in the way of siege-engines, but in the extremities of famine eventually surrendered. Picking his way through piles of corpses, he found 6,000 survivors. He ransomed those who could pay a mina, and sold the rest as slaves. The general Phyton he reserved for an unparalleled flogging round the city before drowning him. Our sources attribute this violent hostility of Dionysius to the Rhegines to their having refused him a bride in 397; we may rather think of its constant willingness to serve as a refuge for Syracusan refugees and of at least one actual alignment with Carthage. Eastern Sicily, in association with Locri, now included the toe of Italy as well; Dionysius even tried to build a wall across the isthmus (Strabo VI.1.10).<sup>122</sup>

After this, Dionysius' dealings with southern Italy become very obscure, and yet they must have a bearing on the next item of foreign policy which Diodorus chooses to relate, a venture in the Adriatic and beyond (xv.13–14).<sup>123</sup> Under 385/4 B.C., we are told that Dionysius resolved to found cities in the Adriatic Sea, with the intention of controlling the *Ionios poros*, which ought to mean the crossing.<sup>124</sup> The alleged intention was to invade Epirus and rob the temple of Delphi; the second half of that can at any rate be discounted. With the help of Alcetas

<sup>119</sup> If we accept that 'in the previous year' in xiv.107.4 comes from the source and is not editorial work by Diodorus, who has made a year-break between Caulonia and Hipponium; there might be some doubt about this, since nothing is said about his wintering in Italy. Cf. n. 115.

<sup>120</sup> For this custom, see the partial collection of references in de Ste Croix 1972 (C 68) 399–400.

<sup>121</sup> It is universally held to run over 388 and 387, but this should not be founded on Diodorus' chronology (see n. 82 for doubts about the Olympic games he places during it), but rather on Polyb. 1.6.1, who is already using a synchronism, perhaps established by Timaeus, in which the siege is in progress in a year which must be 387/6; see Walbank 1957–79 (B 122) 146–8.

<sup>122</sup> What actually happened to the site of Rhegium before it was refounded by Dionysius II as Phoebia (Strabo VI.1.6) is unclear, except that Dionysius had a *paradeisos* there, in which he tried to naturalize plane-trees, which did not grow well (Theophr. *Hist. Pl.* iv.5.6; Pliny *HN* xii.7 adds a house). <sup>123</sup> Vial's Budé text (1977) should be used for book xv.

<sup>124</sup> Anello 1980 (C 100) 83 ff emphasizes the importance of the Straits.

the Molossian, in exile in Syracuse,<sup>125</sup> he made an alliance with the Illyrians and sent them troops and weapons, with which they invaded Epirus (see below, p. 428). He also assisted the Parians to found a colony on Pharos (Hvar). Both these events are presumably meant to refer to 385/4, and, not many years earlier, he had already established a colony on the east coast at Lissus<sup>126</sup> (Lesh), at the mouth of the Drin. A lacuna of uncertain length follows, and ch. 13 returns to Syracuse. Under the next year, 384/3, the Parians are in trouble with the barbarian inhabitants of their island, who have called in help from Illyrians, but they are assisted by the governor appointed by Dionysius in – where? The manuscripts have *Lishi*, *Lisshi*, *Lissoi* and argument continues as to whether they mean Lissus or Issa (Vis), 320 km to the northwest. It is not now held that both passages refer to Issa, but there is still quite a strong possibility that the second one does,<sup>127</sup> in which case Dionysius' direct interests extended far beyond the Straits.<sup>128</sup> On the present evidence, we can hardly speculate on his motives, and a substantial historical phenomenon may have been lost.<sup>129</sup>

That new evidence can bring some unexpected light to aspects of the story is demonstrated in the next episode, also reported under 384/3. Dionysius, saying that he was suppressing pirates, raided the Etruscan Pyrgi, the port of Caere, and took enormous booty, which strengthened his financial position. We could view this as simply a piratical raid,<sup>130</sup> but another dimension has been added to it by the discovery of the Pyrgi gold tablets, which attest considerable Carthaginian influence there, at least in the previous century (*CAH* VII<sup>2</sup>.2, 256).

With the Carthaginian War which follows, all recounted under 383/2 B.C., Diodorus confessedly more or less gives up, and not much can be

<sup>125</sup> Whether this man, well known from his alliance with Athens in 375 (Tod no. 123 line 109 = Harding no. 35; cf. Xen. *Hell.* vi.2.10, [Dem.] XLIX.22), is identical with the Alcetas son of Leptines of Syracuse honoured at Athens in 373 (*IG* II<sup>2</sup> 101) is an intractable problem; see Tod pp. 217–18. <sup>126</sup> Mss *Lisson*, *Lison*; there can be no doubt what is intended here.

<sup>127</sup> Stroheker 1958 (G 302) 123–4 suggests that the foundation of Issa was recorded in the lacuna in ch. 13. [Scymn.] 414–15 is reasonable evidence that Issa was a Syracusan foundation of some date. However, Ditt. *SIG* 141 frequently quoted in this context, does not belong to the 380s but to the early third century; see Woodhead 1970 (G 325) 509–11. Note also Ancona, founded by Syracusans exiled by Dionysius (Strabo v.4.2, p. 241). See also n. 143.

<sup>128</sup> That it was Dionysius who first opened up the Adriatic to Greeks was a theory made untenable by Beaumont 1936 (G 116), but his attempt (202–3) to puncture an older picture of Dionysius' 'Adriatic Empire' and to reduce Dionysius' interests to Lissus (so also Woodhead 1970 (G 325)) was modified by Gitti 1952 (G 183), who showed that there was rather more evidence, though even he did not think the venture lasted very long. See also Anello 1980 (G 100).

<sup>129</sup> Stroheker 1958 (G 302) 119–28, places the weight on a desire to solidify communications with old Greece; Caven 1990 (G 134) 149–53 sees Dionysius attempting to build up an empire which would match the resources of Carthage. That Illyrian piracy was as yet a problem is denied by Dell 1967 (E 64) 344–6.

<sup>130</sup> For the theory of Sordi 1960 (G 291) 62–72 that Dionysius was acting in concert with the Gauls who had been attacking Rome, see *CAH* VII<sup>2</sup>.2, 305–6.



got from him. It may have lasted as long as eight years.<sup>131</sup> Apparently, Dionysius started it by detaching cities under Carthage. Carthage sought the collaboration of the Italiote League and actually landed troops in Italy. Dionysius had to fight a war on two fronts. Of the Italian front, all that we hear of Carthaginian activity is a re-establishment of Hipponium (xv.24.1, not connected with the war narrative), and we merely have the bare fact that Dionysius captured Croton by finding a way up its acropolis and may have held it for some time (Livy xxiv.3.8, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* xx.7.3).<sup>132</sup> For Sicily, we cannot even place the final battles, Cabala, in which the Carthaginians lost 10,000 killed, including Mago, and 5,000 prisoners, and Cronium, perhaps somewhere on the north coast, in which Leptines was killed and the Carthaginians, giving no quarter, were supposed to have killed 14,000 Sicilians. The peace terms are again (see pp. 135, 145) described as being on the same terms as before, but, since Carthage explicitly gets Selinus and part of Acragantine territory, both of which should have technically been tributary to her since 405, there is something seriously wrong. The new element is that Dionysius agreed to pay an indemnity of 1,000 talents, which he can hardly have afforded.<sup>133</sup>

We hear a certain amount of Dionysius' interventions in old Greece. As we have seen (p. 139), the outbreak of the Corinthian War might have been thought to create a doubt as to whether he would act with Sparta or with Corinth, mother-city of Syracuse. Despite Athenian honours for him and an embassy in 393 (Tod no. 108 = Harding no. 20, Lys. xix 19–20), which claimed to have stopped him sending help to the Spartans, he never seems to have been seriously doubtful about backing Sparta; if he had any regard for Syracusan public opinion, he could hardly have taken the Athenian side. His first actual intervention was in 387, when his brother-in-law Polyxenus took twenty ships from Sicily and Italy to help Antalcidas in the final campaign which blockaded the Hellespont and ended the Corinthian War (p. 116) (Xen. *Hell.* v.1.26).<sup>134</sup> That he was a supporter of the system created by the King's Peace is taken for granted all round (Lys. xxxiii.6, Isoc. iv.126, Diod. xv.23.5). The only break in this picture comes with his support of the Illyrians (p. 148), who used it in such a way that Sparta had to help the Molossians (Diod. xv.13.3).

That nothing is heard of Syracuse when war broke out again on the mainland in 378 may be due to the Carthaginian War. Indeed, the first

<sup>131</sup> 382–374, Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) III.2, 376–7.

<sup>132</sup> Since the latter passage groups the falls of Rhegium and Croton, we cannot use it with any assurance to date the capture of Croton to 378.

<sup>133</sup> Note Plato *Ep.* vii 332c, 333a; Dionysius barely escaped and arranged to pay tribute to the barbarians.

<sup>134</sup> Presumably the Italian ships came from Locri. The siege of Rhegium can hardly have been over when this fleet left.

sign of renewed contact involves a Spartan fleet in autumn 373 trying to enlist Dionysius' support for an attempt on Corcyra, on the grounds that it would be important to him that Corcyra should not be under Athenian control (Xen. *Hell.* vi.2.4; cf. Diod. xv.46.2). In 372, a Syracusan fleet of ten ships in fact appeared. They were ambushed by Iphicrates, and turned out to contain expensive dedications intended for Delphi and Olympia, presumably for the Olympic games of 372. Iphicrates, with clearance from home, sold them off, attracting a very angry letter to Athens with a complaint of sacrilege (Xen. *Hell.* vi.2.33–6, Polyæn. iii.9.55, Diod. xv.47.7, xvi.57.2–4).

No other force arrived from the west until after Leuctra, but then Dionysius did something to repay his old debts to Sparta. In 369, more than twenty ships arrived with 2,000 Celts and Iberians, the first appearance of such a force in mainland Greece, with fifty cavalry and pay for five months. They made a very good impression (Xen. *Hell.* vii.1.20–2, Diod. xv.70.1), and a similar force appeared the next year. Though instructed to return within a fixed time, it played an important part in the 'Tearless Battle' (pp. 192–3; Xen. *Hell.* vii.1.28–32). The time-limit is presumably in some way connected with the renewal of war in western Sicily in this year (Diod. xv.73). It says much for Dionysius' loyalty to Sparta or his desire to assert himself on the mainland that he sent the force at all.

This desire to make himself felt in Greek affairs at this time emerges from two decrees from Athens, whose rapprochement with Sparta (p. 188) brought her back into contact with him. In summer 368 (the last prytany of the archon-year 369/8), ambassadors came from Dionysius to Athens bearing letters about the 'building of the temple', i.e. the temple of Apollo at Delphi, destroyed in 372, and about the Peace (Tod no. 133). The *boule* referred the foreign policy aspects of the letters to the *synedrion* of the confederacy, but proceeded to recommend to the Assembly purely Athenian honours for Dionysius and his sons, crowns and Athenian citizenship for their services to the 'King's Peace, which the Athenians and the Spartans and the other Greeks made'. There is other evidence that the confederacy was not happy about some of the consequences of drawing close to Sparta, and Dionysius was apparently a particularly unwelcome associate. The decree which followed (Tod no. 136 = Harding no. 52) was a purely Athenian alliance with Dionysius and his descendants, with no word of the Athenian allies.<sup>135</sup>

The rapprochement with Athens was crowned in the following winter when Dionysius won the tragic contest at the Lenaea with his *Ransoming*

<sup>135</sup> That this decree belongs to the spring of 367, as used to be held, is unlikely; it should be dated as close to its predecessor as we can put it, perhaps in the second prytany of 368/7 (Lewis *op. Develin* 1989 (C 127) 255). For an Athenian embassy to Sicily about this time, cf. [Dem.] LIII.5.

of *Hector*. The story went that he greeted the news with such drunken jubilation as to bring on his death, and at least the time-relationship must be right. We can therefore place his death in spring 367.

From time to time, we have alluded to associates of Dionysius, and it is an essential part of the story to look at them and the inner fabric of the reign.<sup>136</sup> It is a question, not only of the nature of his supporters, but of the succession. Even nowadays, students of the Roman empire are allowed to turn their minds from the development of institutions to the fascinating topic of Augustus' search for an heir; the succession in monarchies is an important matter. The tensions are the same for Dionysius as they will be for Augustus: the interlocking of friends with marriages, the implicit rivalry of different family groups, the matching of the hereditary principle against competence. Augustus' two families stem from his own daughter by his first marriage and his step-sons by his second. Dionysius was more thorough. After the loss of his first wife, the daughter of Hermocrates, he married two wives simultaneously, Doris, a foreigner from Locri, and Aristomache the Syracusan, daughter of his early supporter Hipparinus and the sister of Dion.<sup>137</sup> He is said to have taken great precautions to conceal which marriage was consummated first; as it happens, Doris produced sons long before Aristomache.<sup>138</sup> But, of course, he needed friends long before his children started growing up; he had friends, brothers and a brother-in-law.<sup>139</sup> He lost some of the early friends very early. Hipparinus died quite soon. Heloris, his 'adopted father', as we have seen, went into irreconcilable exile, shortly after 402, and led an exiles' party in south Italy (Diod. xiv.8.5, 87.1, 103.4–104.1). The only known early supporter who was left was Philistus, not yet a historian, who for a long period commanded the fort on Ortygia and, allegedly, had Dionysius' mother as a mistress (Plut. *Dion* 11.5). But in the early part of the reign Dionysius put most reliance on his brother Leptines, who has the formal title of admiral and acts as such (Diod. xiv.48.4, 53.5, 59.7–60.4, 72.1, 102.2–3) from 397 until his dismissal in 390 (p. 146), and on his brother-in-law Polyxenus, brother of Hermocrates' wife, clearly influential and useful (Diod. xiv.62.1, 63.4, Tod no. 108 = Harding no. 20, Xen. *Hell.* v.1.26).

At one stage or another, Philistus, Leptines and Polyxenus all went

<sup>136</sup> Besides the general books, see Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) III.2, 102–7; Gernet 1953 (C 29); Sartori 1966 (G 288).

<sup>137</sup> She was presumably older than Dion, who seems to have been born about 409 (Nep. *Dio* 10.3, misread by Beloch).

<sup>138</sup> In Tod no. 133 (368 B.C.), only Dionysius and Hermocritus, the sons of Doris, are named. That Aristomache was long childless (Plut. *Dion* 3.6) is not literally true, since her daughters were marriageable fairly early (Beloch *loc. cit.*) 102–3, 105, but drawing the conclusion that the story of the double marriage is false).

<sup>139</sup> Tod no. 108 = Harding no. 20 (393 B.C.) honoured Leptines, Thearidas and Polyxenus alongside Dionysius; the text is incomplete, but it is not obvious who else will have been included.

into exile. We have no material on Polyxenus' flight in fear (Plut. *Dion* 21.7–8), but we can see clearly enough a picture in which Leptines had more obvious popularity than Dionysius and was tactless enough to settle Italian affairs without reference to him. The culmination came in 386, according to Diodorus (xv.6–7). His story is that the fiasco at Olympia reduced Dionysius to such a state of mad rage that he killed many of his friends on false charges<sup>140</sup> and exiled not a few, including Philistus and Leptines, who fled to Thurii, where they were well received by the Italiotes, but afterwards returned to Syracuse, when Leptines was given Dionysius' daughter. The story is improbably motivated, in that nothing seems to have happened to Thearidas who had headed the mission to Olympia. We find a better story<sup>141</sup> in Plutarch (*Dion* 11.6), in which Leptines offers one of his daughters to Philistus without consulting Dionysius. This reads as if it could appear that the dismissed admiral and the garrison-commander were aligning themselves to force Dionysius into a triumvirate, if not worse;<sup>142</sup> it is not surprising that Dionysius' reaction was swift. In this version, Philistus did not return during Dionysius' lifetime, and this is evidently correct.<sup>143</sup> That Leptines did return is certain,<sup>144</sup> but he had been replaced as admiral by the youngest brother Thearidas. Both brothers were given daughters of Dionysius to marry, and there must have been interesting tensions until Leptines was killed in battle and Thearidas died not long after. Meanwhile Dionysius' own sons were getting older, but in his last years he was again opting for tension and balance. This time it was between the two families he himself possessed. He seems to have been backing the eldest son, by the foreign wife, the later Dionysius II, but his chief adviser<sup>145</sup> was now Hipparinus' son Dion, his own brother-in-law and son-in-law, himself uncle of two other sons of Dionysius. Dion was not unnaturally credited with preferring his own nephews, and Dionysius eventually died, like most tyrants, to the accompaniment of rumours of a succession crisis and a doctors' plot (Timaeus *FGrH* 566 F 109, Nep. *Dion* 2.4–5, Plut. *Dion* 6.2). Chapter 13 will show how inadequately Dionysius had provided for

<sup>140</sup> No names are given.

<sup>141</sup> What is by far the earliest story (Aen. Tact. x.21–2; c. 350 B.C.) assumes Leptines' popularity and Dionysius' suspicion of him, and reports a ruse by which he was made to leave the city without fuss.

<sup>142</sup> Some confirmation for the alignment comes from Philistus *FGrH* 556 F 60; Philistus wrote about the sufferings of Leptines' daughters.

<sup>143</sup> In this version, Philistus is exiled to the Adriatic, where he wrote most of his history. For a mysterious *fossa Philistina* and attempts to relate this to Dionysius' Adriatic ventures (pp. 147–8), see Gitti (G 182 and G 183, 172–6).

<sup>144</sup> He was represented as continuing to disagree with Dionysius (Polyaen. vi.16.1); Plut. *Mor.* 338B, Ael. *VH* xiii.45 represent a tradition in which Dionysius deliberately failed to save him from his death.

<sup>145</sup> That Dion was admiral under Dionysius I is likely enough, but it should not be deduced from Plut. *Dion* 7.2, which is a reference back to 6.5.

the succession; on this test of successful monarchy, he must be faulted.

The main lines of his reshaping of Sicily and its extension into the toe of Italy have already been traced (pp. 140, 167). As later events would prove, there continued to be a feeling of civic solidarity in greater Syracuse, despite its changes in population. Outside Syracuse, the older cities had become unimportant, but there were now several new foundations, e.g. Tauromenium and Tyndaris, which had resulted from mercenary resettlement. Not all of these were purely Greek, and, outside the direct area of his control, we have evidence of at least one example of the way in which the events of his reign had reshaped the ethnic map. In 404 a group of Campanians for which he had no further use did not return to Italy, but went to the west and forced themselves on Elymian Entella, killing the men and marrying the women (Diod. xiv.9.9). They maintained themselves under Carthaginian control, defying attempts by Dionysius to dislodge them (Diod. xiv.48.5, 53.5, 61.5). A remarkable epigraphic discovery<sup>146</sup> shows them still there, perhaps in the 280s, despite many vicissitudes, retaining in part their Oscan nomenclature, but expressing themselves, at least publicly, in Greek constitutional forms and a form of *koine* Doric.

Elsewhere, at Selinus<sup>147</sup> and various hilltop sites,<sup>148</sup> above all at Monte Adranone,<sup>149</sup> with its Punic temples, the fourth century shows considerable evidence of increasing Punic influence. There are, however, overlaps between regions of influence. On Monte Caltafaraci 6 km east-north-east of Acragas, there seems to be a Greek fort of Dionysius' time.<sup>150</sup>

Since Diodorus' accounts of the Carthaginian Wars become more and more inadequate, we cannot make a full assessment of Dionysius' failure to drive Carthage out of Sicily altogether. It seems likely that his resources were always inadequate for the task. What we know of the coinage (see p. 142 n. 93) suggests that his basic method of rewarding mercenaries had to be in land-allotments. These could not always be found without alienating others,<sup>151</sup> and perhaps mercenaries once settled were reluctant to get involved in new enterprises.

To assess Dionysius' character through the hostility of the tradition is perhaps beyond us. On the whole, the story seems to go downhill. It is certainly the case that Diodorus' account gets thinner and thinner, but we do get a picture of growing isolation and bad temper, even without

<sup>146</sup> Nenci 1980 (B 162, summarized in *SEG* xxx 1117–23); Nenci *et al.* 1982 (B 163, summarized in *SEG* xxxii 914); Knoepfler 1987 (G 206); see also *SEG* xxxv 999 (a new text). The dossier also includes a text from a similar settlement at Nacone, even more Italian in character; cf. *SEG* xxxiv 934.

<sup>147</sup> Rallo 1982–83 (G 272).

<sup>148</sup> *Arch. Rep. for 1987–88*, 131; Anello 1986 (G 101).

<sup>149</sup> Fiorentini 1979 (G 165).

<sup>150</sup> Castellana 1984 (G 132), trying to reconstruct Dionysius' penetration in this area.

<sup>151</sup> Compare Dion's final dilemma (p. 703), as succinctly described by Nep. *Dio* 7.1–2.

the mass of later<sup>152</sup> picturesque anecdote about suspicion and precaution. Of this there is a rich collection. He built a sort of moat around his bedroom and raised the drawbridge before going to bed. He trusted no one but his daughters to shave him, and, when they grew up, he took the razors away even from them and had himself shaved with hot walnut-shells.<sup>153</sup> These will serve as specimens.

How much can we really believe? Scholars, particularly perhaps Anglo-Saxons, are prone to scepticism over stories about the corruption of monarchs, whether by luxury or suspicion, particularly when their public lives show some signs of cohesion and success. Alexander and Caligula are not corrupted; they are trying logically to work out new forms of monarchy. Stories of violent action and atrocity are discounted. Periander of Corinth turns into a Lorenzo de Medici, despite the fact that virtually all Periander's misconduct can be paralleled in the career of Ali Pasha of Jannina in the early nineteenth century with a British consul down the road sending in regular reports. In a generation which has had the opportunity of watching the career of, say, Field Marshal Amin, there should be no need to argue that there are at least some people whom absolute power can corrupt absolutely, and that this sort of thing is not incompatible with considerable military and political success can be demonstrated quite adequately by a close examination of Stalin as he appeared to men close to him.

Recent work on Dionysius<sup>154</sup> has overwhelmingly tried to trace the hostile nature of Diodorus' account to prejudice, and discounts it accordingly. It is true that our sources for Dionysius are very bad and that scepticism is in order. But one important source remains to be considered.

It is certain that Plato visited Sicily in the early 380s, though the accounts of Dionysius' treatment of him are full of myth.<sup>155</sup> His description in the *Republic* (562–71, 577–80) of how democracy changes into tyranny and how the tyrant himself develops is familiar. Some of it, notably the emphasis on the tyrant's sexual habits, does not seem to suit Dionysius well, but much of it does: the impeachment of the rich as oligarchs, the bodyguard, confiscations and redistribution, the distrust of friends, the recruitment of mercenaries, the provoking of wars to cover a weak position at home. Powerful voices<sup>156</sup> have been raised against those who see Dionysius here, holding that the picture of the tyrant is a generalized picture; if Plato had anyone in mind, it was

<sup>152</sup> Not all later; see n. 141.

<sup>153</sup> During the revision of this chapter, a hostile press reported that the President of Iraq changed his barber frequently.

<sup>154</sup> Stroheker 1958 (G 302), Sanders 1979/80 (G 282) and 1987 (G 283) 1–40, Caven 1990 (G 134), varying on the sources of the prejudice. <sup>155</sup> See Sordi 1979 (G 294).

<sup>156</sup> Wilamowitz 1920 (H 120) 432; Stroheker 1958 (G 302) 106.

Pisistratus of Athens. Even more of the account, however, cannot apply to Pisistratus. We may agree that Plato's tyrant is not only Dionysius, but Dionysius was surely much in Plato's mind. Even more certainly, he would inevitably be in the mind of any reader of the 370s and 360s.<sup>157</sup> Who, after all, was the tyrant of the age? And with the scene at Olympia (p. 140) before us, it is hard to resist the reference to the tragic poets who will go the round of other states and hire actors with fine sonorous voices to sway the inclination of the assembled crowd to tyrannies.

The most important passage is that on the tyrant as a person. The passage which describes the unparalleled degradation of the tyrant, unable to trust anyone and a prey to constant fear, is introduced in a very peculiar way. In order to see what a tyrant is really like, the judgment is needed of one who is not dazzled by the outward pomp and parade of absolute power, but whose understanding can enter into a man's heart and see what goes on within. Such a competent judge should be listened to, if he had also lived under the same roof and witnessed the tyrant's behaviour, not only in the emergencies of public life but towards intimates in his own household. 'Shall we then make believe that we ourselves are qualified to judge from having been in contact with tyrants, so that we may have someone to answer our questions?' It is hard to believe that Plato is not saying 'I have seen Dionysius and I know.'<sup>158</sup> The devastating passage which follows amounts, on our terms, to a judgment that tyranny had destroyed Dionysius' personality. A more explicit passage (332c) in the Seventh Letter (see below, p. 693) attributes what Plato saw as Dionysius' failure to the fact that, in his wisdom (*sophia*; the word can be bitterly ironic), he trusted nobody.

<sup>157</sup> So Caven 1990 (G 134) 167–8, 226.

<sup>158</sup> Wilamowitz 1920 (H 120) 437 n. 1 denied this, but see, e.g. Heintzeler 1927 (C 33) 77. Caven 1990 (G 134) 168–9, 226–7 argues that Plato did not meet Dionysius on his first visit to Sicily and was reporting the views of the young Dion, which fitted his own prejudices. It is hard to reconcile this with Dion's successful career at Syracuse over the next twenty years.

CHAPTER 6  
THE KING'S PEACE AND THE SECOND  
ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY

ROBIN SEAGER

I. THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA

The Peace of Antalcidas had humbled Sparta's enemies and left them impotent, at least for the time being. The breaking of the Theban hold over Boeotia was followed by the refoundation of Plataea (Paus. ix. 1.4), which probably took place at this time rather than after the seizure of the Cadmea, the citadel of Thebes, and it is likely that Thebes was forced into alliance with Sparta (Isoc. xiv. 27, Plut. *Pel.* 4.5). This has been doubted,<sup>1</sup> but the absence of any allusion to the alliance at the time of the Theban negotiations with Olynthus and the trial of Ismenias is not sufficient to prove that it did not exist.

The Corinthian War was over. Now, as she had in 421 and 404, Sparta turned her attention to the conduct of her friends in the war. Her aim (Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 1) was to punish those of her allies who had favoured the enemy and make such disloyalty impossible for the future. The first victims of her displeasure were the perennially restive Mantineans, who had shown their unreliability in various ways. They had evaded military service under pretext of a sacred truce, shown little enthusiasm when they had served, rejoiced at Sparta's military failures and even supplied the Argives with corn. Therefore, in 385, Sparta issued an ultimatum. Mantinea must dismantle her fortifications: compliance would be accepted as retrospective proof of loyalty. The Mantineans refused, and so an expedition was mounted. Agesilaus was reluctant to command, allegedly because of Mantinea's services to his father, so Agesipolis led the Spartan army, even though his father Pausanias had been on good terms with the leaders of the Mantinean people (Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 3).

Diodorus (xv. 5) condemns the Spartan action as a flagrant violation of the peace, and it is highly likely that the Mantineans made this point when they appealed to Athens for help. But the Athenians voted not to break the peace, and Mantinea was left to fight alone. This decision need of course reveal nothing about views held at Athens on the legality or morality of the Spartan attack; it merely reflects her isolation and military

<sup>1</sup> Buckler 1980 (C 330).



weakness. Sparta, on the other hand, called upon her new allies, perhaps chiefly for psychological reasons, for she can hardly have expected to need their assistance. A Theban contingent duly served on the Spartan side, in which both Pelopidas and Epaminondas were present (Plut. *Pel.* 4.4f, Paus. IX.13.1).

After ravaging the land, Agesipolis settled down to a siege. Throughout the summer the Mantineans kept up their resistance, allegedly aided by sympathizers among Sparta's allies who sent in supplies secretly by night (Polyaen. II.25). But with the onset of the rainy season the Spartans dammed the river which flowed through the city, so that it began to undermine the fortifications (Xen. *Hell.* v.2.4f, against Diod. xv.12.1, Paus. VIII.8.7). The Mantineans now offered to pull down their walls, but Sparta was no longer satisfied with this concession, insisting instead that the city of Mantinea must be abandoned and destroyed and its people dispersed into the four or five village communities into which they had been divided in ancient times (Xen. *Hell.* v.2.5ff, Ephorus 70 F 79, Diod. xv.12.1f, Strabo VIII.3.2, Paus. VIII.8.9). It is just possible, but hardly likely, that the autonomy clause of the peace was perversely cited to justify this demand. The defenders had no choice but surrender. The partisans of Argos and leaders of the people, some sixty in number, expected to be put to death, but the former king Pausanias intervened from his exile at Tegea to negotiate a safe-conduct for them. The dioecism was then carried out. At first the burden of moving provoked general discontent, but those whom the purge had left in power eventually decided that the change was a good thing. Sparta too had reason to be satisfied, for when troops were levied from the villages they served with much greater enthusiasm than they had when united under a democratic government (Xen. *Hell.* v.2.7).

Sparta's preoccupation with the conduct of her allies in the war and in particular with their willingness to supply troops was next exploited by the exiles from Phlius (Xen. *Hell.* v.2.8ff).<sup>2</sup> They pointed out that, while they had been in power, Phlius had provided men and welcomed Spartan armies into the city, whereas after their exile the Phliasians had refused to follow the Spartans and closed their gates against them. The charges were exaggerated, but the ephors, perhaps more impressed by their own opportunity than by the exiles' case, issued a thinly veiled threat. The exiles, they said, were friends of Sparta and their expulsion had been unjustified. Nevertheless Sparta would prefer to see them return by mutual agreement, without the use of force. The Phliasians feared treachery if Sparta sent out an army, since there were many friends and relatives of the exiles in the city, some of whom desired a change of

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Legon 1967 (C 369) not refuted by Piccirilli 1974 (C 375) or Thompson 1970 (C 385).

government. So they voted to readmit them, restore their property, and settle any disputes that might arise in open court.

It was not until 382 that affairs outside the Peloponnese again engaged Sparta's attention. Some ten years before, Amyntas of Macedon had been driven out of his country by an Illyrian invasion and had ceded some border territory, of uncertain location and extent, to Olynthus in return for help. On recovering his position the king somewhat optimistically asked for the return of this land, but Olynthus refused. Amyntas resorted to war, but the Olynthians, posing as liberators, secured the upper hand and by summer 382 had even gained control of Pella. So Amyntas appealed to Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* v.2.11ff, Diod. xiv.92.3, xv.19.2f, Dio Chrys. xxv.6). Envoys also came from Acanthus and Apollonia and were brought by the ephors before the assembly and the allies. The theme on which the Acanthian ambassador Cleigenes spoke was one to which the terms of the King's Peace were clearly relevant: the expansion of Olynthus at the expense not only of Amyntas but also of the smaller and weaker cities of Chalcidice. Olynthus had threatened to force Acanthus into membership of the Chalcidian state if she refused to lend assistance in Olynthus' wars, and while Acanthus was eager to retain her autonomy and political identity, she needed help if she were to resist the pressure which Olynthus could bring to bear.

Thus far the argument might appeal to Sparta if she wanted to establish her influence in the Thraceward region, as Diodorus insists (xv.19.3), on the respectable pretext of upholding the autonomy clause against Olynthian aggression. But the greater part of Cleigenes' speech was, if Xenophon can be trusted, directed at questions of Spartan security not only in Chalcidice but nearer home (Xen. *Hell.* v.2.15ff). Already, he warned, there were in Olynthus envoys from Athens and Thebes, and the Olynthians had voted to send missions to both cities to negotiate alliances. The combination of Athens, Thebes and Olynthus might prove a major threat to Sparta. It would therefore be irrational if, after taking steps to undo the unity of Boeotia, she were to stand by and watch the growth of a much greater power, and one which was still on the increase, for Olynthus, already holding Potidaea, would soon control all Pallene, while her friendship with the kingless Thracians would give her access to the gold of Pangaeum. It is striking that the parallel with Sparta's treatment of Thebes is presented in terms of pure power politics and not, as it might easily have been, of her credibility as champion of the King's Peace.

Cleigenes stressed the need for rapid intervention. For the moment the cities which had been compelled to join the Chalcidian state would be happy to defect if a leader came forward, but if once their new status had time to become established, they would prove much less easy to detach.

His apparent belief that Sparta was far more concerned with questions of security and military strength than with posing as the defender of the autonomy clause was vindicated by the Spartan response (Xen. *Hell.* v.2.20ff). She asked for the opinion of her allies, not on the question of whether the King's Peace had been broken, but as to what would be best for the Peloponnese and themselves. It is noteworthy that in Xenophon's opinion those who wanted to curry favour spoke for war. Nevertheless their enthusiasm knew bounds, for it was in preparing for this expedition that Sparta was forced for the first time to accept financial contributions from her allies in lieu of men.

Conscious of the need for haste, the Acanthians asked that a Spartan commander with as large a force as possible should be sent north at once while the allies were mustering. Eudamidas was duly dispatched with 2,000 men who might be considered expendable. On his arrival in the north he occupied Potidaea, which gave colour to Cleigenes' claims by coming over of its own accord, and garrisoned various towns that had not yet fallen to Olynthus. The bulk of the Peloponnesian forces was commanded by Eudamidas' brother, Phoebidas, who marched by way of Thebes.

The King's Peace had not only put an end to Theban control over Boeotia but had no doubt at least temporarily diminished the standing within the city of those like Ismenias and Androclidas who had conceived the policy that provoked the Corinthian War.<sup>3</sup> Leontiades and his supporters will have returned to power, paying with as good a grace as possible Sparta's price: the dissolution of the Boeotian Confederacy, the restoration of Plataea and the enforced alliance. But by 382 it seems that the opponents of Sparta had regained some of their strength. Both Ismenias and Leontiades were polemarchs in that year, and the city was in the throes of a struggle for supremacy between them (Xen. *Hell.* v.2.25ff). The opening of negotiations with Olynthus in disregard of Sparta's predictable wishes suggests that Ismenias was gaining the upper hand, and he had just achieved one important success in a matter very close to Sparta's heart: Thebes had decreed that no Theban should join the expedition to Olynthus. Leontiades saw a chance to recover his position, albeit in exchange for the total sacrifice of Theban independence. He proposed to Phoebidas that the Spartans should seize the Cadmea. This would put the city completely under Spartan domination, and if he and his friends were given power, they would ensure that Thebes provided Sparta with a host of troops. Phoebidas agreed, and Leontiades led the Spartans into the city. He arrested Ismenias in the council-chamber, but Androclidas and at least 300 of his supporters made their escape to Athens (cf. Androtion 324 F 50).

<sup>3</sup> Hack 1978 (C 338).

In Xenophon's version the initiative came solely from Leontiades, for purely selfish motives, while Phoebidas did no more than accept his suggestion. But there were those in Greece who believed that Agesilaus had put the idea into Phoebidas' head before he ever left Sparta (Plut. *Ages.* 23.4, 24.1), while Diodorus (xv.20.2) goes so far as to claim that all Spartan commanders had secret standing orders to seize Thebes if they got the chance. This last is probably an exaggeration. The resurgence of Ismenias and the consequent growth of Theban recalcitrance were of recent date, and Xenophon's circumstantial account of reactions at Sparta to the news of the coup makes it clear that the mass of Spartans at least was taken completely by surprise. Nor need the fact that Phoebidas appeared at Thebes at all have any sinister implications: a desire to put pressure on the Thebans to join the expedition would suffice to explain his choice of route. Yet it is not incredible that Agesilaus, who had surely supported a hard line against Olynthus,<sup>4</sup> and whose hatred of Thebes may have made him particularly sensitive to any manifestation of Theban independence, had suggested that Phoebidas explore the possibility of setting up a reliable puppet government.

When Leontiades came to Sparta to justify himself, he found the ephors and most of the people hostile, not, it must be admitted, because Thebes had come under Spartan control but because Phoebidas had acted with no instructions from the city (Xen. *Hell.* v.2.32ff). Agesilaus, however, showed a guarded approval, proclaiming that initiative might be tolerated if exercised for the good of the city. Leontiades was equally pragmatic. In the past, he said, Sparta had repeatedly complained of Theban hostility, but now Thebes, which had been on the brink of alliance with Olynthus, would never again be a threat to Sparta, providing that he and his adherents were maintained in power. Sparta's eventual course of action was even more cynical. Phoebidas was fined, but the garrison remained on the Cadmea, while arrangements were made to put Ismenias on trial before judges drawn from Sparta and her allies. She might have appealed to the terms of the peace and accused Ismenias of undermining her crusade in defence of the Thraceward cities against Olynthian encroachment. But in fact the charges looked back to the Corinthian War: Ismenias was said to have favoured Persia to the detriment of Greece and taken Persian money, and he and Androclidas were blamed for all the confusion in Greece. Inevitably he was condemned and executed.

The occupation of Thebes was decried throughout Greece as the most flagrant and outrageous of the violations of autonomy which Sparta had been perpetrating ever since 386 (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.1, Diod. xv.19.4, 20.2, Polyb. iv.27.4ff, Plut. *Ages.* 23.3, Justin VIII.1.5). She might perhaps

<sup>4</sup> Cawkwell 1976 (c 285) 77.

have made some attempt to defend herself by pointing to Leontiades' invitation, but the case would have been a pitiful one, and it was better to say nothing. Indeed, Sparta's behaviour since 386 consistently reveals a single-minded pursuit of power and military resources accompanied by total unconcern for the dictates of the peace.<sup>5</sup>

In the north the Spartans and their ally Amyntas had achieved little during the summer of 382. So, in autumn of that year, Teleutias was sent out as harmost with a force of Spartans and allies (Xen. *Hell.* v.2.37ff, Diod. xv.21). He received enthusiastic help from the Thebans, in part because they knew that he was Agesilaus' brother. His first aim was to collect as large a force as possible, and to that end he urged Amyntas, who may have relaxed his efforts when the Spartan threat drew off the Olynthians from Macedon, to hire mercenaries and buy the support of neighbouring kings. He based himself at Potidaea, and before the end of the season fought a battle before Olynthus in which only one of those kings, Derdas, saved the Spartans from defeat. The spring of 381 brought varying fortunes (Xen. *Hell.* v.3.1ff). At the beginning of the campaigning season Derdas defeated the Olynthians at Apollonia, but a little later, in an action at Olynthus, Teleutias himself was killed, while the Spartan army suffered heavy casualties and was dispersed among the friendly cities of Spartolus, Acanthus, Apollonia and Potidaea. Reaction at Sparta was prompt and energetic (Xen. *Hell.* v.3.8f, 18ff, Diod. xv.21.3, 22.2, 23.2). The king Agesipolis was sent out with thirty advisers. He too had the support of Amyntas and Derdas. At first he enjoyed some success, ravaging the territory of Olynthus and storming Torone, but soon he fell ill with a fever and was dead by the middle of summer (Tod no. 120). Xenophon sees fit to remark that Agesilaus did not rejoice at his passing (*Hell.* v.3.20), and indeed the schematic contrast between Agesipolis the champion of autonomy and Agesilaus the ruthless exponent of Spartan self-aggrandizement (Diod. xv.19.4) is grossly exaggerated. To replace him yet another Spartan commander, Polybiades, was sent out as harmost, either in autumn 381 or spring 380.

The summer of 381 also saw fresh trouble in Phlius (Xen. *Hell.* v.3.10ff). The Phliasians had won praise from Agesipolis for the readiness with which they had supplied him with funds for his campaign against Olynthus, and they reckoned that with the other king so far from home Agesilaus would not feel free to move against them. So they plucked up courage, first to make allegedly unjust decisions in disputes involving the exiles whose return Sparta had enforced in 384, then, when the exiles and their supporters complained at Sparta, to fine them for going on an embassy unauthorized by the city. The victims complained again, playing on the old Spartan grievance: the men who were now

<sup>5</sup> Seager 1974 (C 73) 39ff.

denying them their rights were the same, they said, who had excluded the Spartans from Phlius in the Corinthian War. The ephors decided on an expedition, which pleased Agesilaus, for among the exiles were friends he had inherited from his father and others he had made himself. On reaching Phlius he asked that the acropolis be handed over to the Spartans, and when this demand was refused settled down to a siege which was to last until summer 379. The Phliasians conducted their assemblies in full view of the besiegers, and there was even some muttering in the Spartan ranks at undertaking an arduous campaign against such worthy opponents just to please a few exiles. But the number of the exiles gradually increased as their friends and relatives slipped out of the city to join them, till Agesilaus was eventually able to form them into a unit a thousand strong.

Not all the opponents of the exiles in Phlius were passionately hostile to Sparta, even if they did not want to be her puppets. By 379, when the defenders were holding out on half rations, Xenophon reckons that the supporters of Delphion, the chief spokesman for continuing resistance, numbered only 300 (*Xen. Hell.* v.3.21ff). When Phlius finally surrendered, Agesilaus arranged that the details of the settlement should be left in his hands. Delphion prudently escaped. Agesilaus' terms, predictably enough, showed a complete disregard for Phliasian autonomy. A committee comprising fifty exiles and fifty men from the city was first to put to death whomsoever it pleased, then to draw up laws for the conduct of public affairs. To ensure that the committee carried out its functions properly, Agesilaus left a garrison and six months' pay. There is no sign that Sparta tried to defend her behaviour by stressing that the purge would be carried out and the new constitution drafted by Phliasians, not Spartans.

The same summer, 379, also saw the successful conclusion of the Olynthian War (*Xen. Hell.* v.3.26f, *Diod.* xv.23.3). Since his arrival Polybiades had won several victories, of which no details are known, and had finally subjected Olynthus to a blockade so effective that its people, faced with starvation, sent to Sparta to sue for peace. The terms, that Olynthus should have the same friends and enemies as Sparta and follow wherever she led, were on the one hand traditional but on the other reflect faithfully Sparta's current concerns: military expansion and sources of manpower. However, it is probable that she also dissolved the Chalcidian state, perhaps in the name of autonomy, though the Olynthians continued to call themselves Chalcidians.<sup>6</sup>

Both Xenophon and Diodorus see this moment as the pinnacle of Spartan power (*Xen. Hell.* v.3.27, *Diod.* xv.23.3). Since 386 her military undertakings, at Mantinea, Thebes, Phlius and Olynthus, had all been

<sup>6</sup> Zahrt 1971 (C 392) 95ff.

crowned with success. She had even risked the anger of Persia, first perhaps in 381 by thinking of helping Evagoras (Isoc. iv.135, Theopomp. 115 F 103. 10, cf. Diod. xv.8.4), then, in about 380, by concluding an alliance with the rebel commander Glos, though his assassination brought this strange adventure to an end before the pact could bear fruit for either side (Diod. xv.9.3ff, 18.1, 19.1).<sup>7</sup> But at the same time her ruthless dedication to imperialism and her contempt for the peace which she herself had championed while it benefited her to do so had stirred up bitter resentment not only in those cities which had felt the weight of her hand but all over Greece. As yet no city had been strong enough to offer a challenge, but events at Thebes and Athens were soon to show how precarious Sparta's apparent supremacy really was.

## II. THE RESURGENCE OF ATHENS

The cautious response of Athens to the Mantinean appeal in 385 had been typical of her behaviour since 386. The King's Peace had brought an abrupt and humiliating end to that brief attempt to restore the fifth-century empire which had culminated in the expedition of Thrasybulus. Resentment was deep and, as always at Athens, there were those who thought the generals were to blame for the outcome of the war (cf. Lys. xxviii, xxix, Tod no. 116). Both Agyrrhius and Thrasybulus Collyteus suffered condemnation (Dem. xxiv.134f). But for the moment all that Athens could do was to try very discreetly to maintain some of the links that had been forged in the preceding decade. In 386/5 she honoured Hebryzelmis of Thrace (Tod no. 117 = Harding no. 29), successor of Amadocus, with whom Thrasybulus had concluded an alliance. A little later the Athenians granted immunity from taxation to those Thasians and Byzantines who after the King's Peace had been exiled for their Athenian sympathies and had taken refuge at Athens; they had granted similar immunity to refugees from the dioecism of Mantinea (*IG* 11<sup>2</sup> 33, Dem. xx.59f). Events at Byzantium may cast doubt on Isocrates' claim (xiv.28) that it, as well as Chios and Mytilene, remained loyal to Athens after 386, though both Lesbos and Chios might fear potential Persian encroachment, against which Sparta would be most unlikely to protect them. In the case of Chios more detail is provided by the surviving treaty made between her and Athens in 384 (Tod no. 118 = Harding no. 31). The terms once again show Athens in cautious mood, taking great care not to tread on Persian toes. The alliance is strictly defensive, and both parties insist that their action is not merely compatible with, but conducive to, the maintenance of the King's Peace. All allusions to the peace are entirely passive. There is here, in sharp contrast to the posture

<sup>7</sup> Ryder 1963 (C 245) 105ff; above p. 81.

of Athens in the seventies, no accusation brought against Sparta for her offences against the autonomy clause, no suggestion that Athens is setting herself up in rivalry as the new *prostates* of the peace.<sup>8</sup>

It is true that Isocrates in his *Panegyricus*, to be dated probably to 381, perhaps 380,<sup>9</sup> could preach a panhellenic crusade against Persia and claim leadership for Athens (Isoc. iv.3, 18ff). His diatribes against Spartan imperialism (78ff, 110ff), the King's Peace in general (115ff) and Spartan breaches of the autonomy clause in particular (126) might have won applause not only from Athenians but from the Greeks at large. But his unabashed defence of the fifth-century empire (100ff), with its justifications of Athenian judicial and constitutional interference and even of the hated cleruchies, was hardly likely to win support for Athenian hegemony (cf. Diod. xv.23.4), and his final appeal for the repudiation of the peace (175) fell on deaf ears. Indeed, it was probably late in 380 that, in response to a complaint from Pharnabazus, the Athenians recalled Chabrias, who had on his own initiative taken service with the rebel Acoris of Egypt (whom Athens had supported before the King's Peace), and instead sent out Iphicrates to help the Persians (Diod. xv.29.2ff).

In mainland Greece Athens' flirtation with Olynthus in 382 had come to nothing. But in the same year she had offered a haven to Androclidas and those of his supporters who had escaped Leontiades' coup. Androclidas himself had been assassinated at Athens, but Spartan pressure to surrender the rest of the exiles had been resisted (*IG* 11<sup>2</sup> 37, *Din.* 1.39, *Plut. Pel.* 6.2f). In the depths of the winter of 379/8 a number of them at last matured a plot to liberate their city and secure their own return. The leading figures in the conspiracy were Pelopidas, Phillidas and Melon among those at Athens, and Charon inside Thebes (*Plut. Pel.* 7ff, *Mor.* 576ff, *Xen. Hell.* v.4.2ff). Unlike the previous generation of Theban nationalists these younger men favoured democracy and planned, if they were successful, to establish a democratic constitution at Thebes. Our sources disagree over the details of the story, but it is certain that the leaders of the exiles, after penetrating Boeotia in the guise of hunters, gained entry to the city and assassinated their principal opponents, Leontiades and Archias, even though they knew that a plot was afoot. It is even said that Archias had received a letter which revealed the conspirators' plans in full but had put it aside to be opened in the morning (*Plut. Pel.* 10.3). The assassins were now joined by two other men who were to be prominent in the years to come, Epaminondas and Gorgidas. They released those of their sympathizers who were in jail, summoned the remainder of the exiles from outside the city and made a proclamation to the Thebans. However, the people did not respond until daybreak. Then an assembly was held, at which boeotarchs were elected

<sup>8</sup> Seager 1974 (C 73) 44ff.

<sup>9</sup> On the date, cf. Tuplin 1983 (C 263) 179ff.



for the first time since 386. Their number is uncertain – it may even have been the full seven of later years – but they included Melon, Charon, Pelopidas and perhaps Gorgidas (Plut. *Pel.* 12f, Xen. *Hell.* v.4.8f).<sup>10</sup> The significance of this step is clear. Even before the Spartans had been dislodged from the Cadmea, the new leaders of Thebes were asserting her claim to rule the whole of Boeotia.

Xenophon's version of the retaking of the Cadmea is very different from that of Diodorus (*Hell.* v.4.9ff). On hearing of the coup the Spartan garrison sent to Plataea and Thespieae for aid, while the Thebans summoned help from an Athenian force under two generals, stationed on the border. Despite Athens' later repudiation of the generals, this contingent must surely have been intended to assist the exiles, and the Thebans knew where to find it. A relief force from Plataea was turned back by the Thebans, then, as soon as the Athenians had arrived, preparations were made to storm the Cadmea. The garrison surrendered, apparently at the first assault, in return for a guarantee of safe-conduct, despite which the Thebans among them were lynched as they departed, except for those who were protected by the Athenians. When the Spartans heard what had happened, they condemned the harmost to death because he had not held out until the promised reinforcements came and mounted an expedition against Thebes. Agesilaus refused the command, and so the ephors, impressed by the stories of the Theban refugees who had come to Sparta, appointed Cleombrotus.

Diodorus (xv.25.3–27.4) offers a more protracted siege, at the beginning of which the defenders of the Cadmea sent to Sparta itself for assistance and the Thebans dispatched an embassy to Athens. In response the Athenians voted to send out as large a force as they could. On the next day Demophon set out with 5,000 men, while preparations were begun for an expedition in full force, though this did not in the event prove necessary. Only after prolonged resistance in the hope that help would come from Sparta did the garrison commanders finally decide to surrender, for their allied troops were reluctant to fight on, though the Spartans were ready for a struggle to the death. By this time Cleombrotus' expedition was already on its way, and so the three senior Spartan officers were condemned on their return, two to death, the third to a heavy fine.

This account receives confirmation from several sources. Isocrates too (xiv.24) has the Theban embassy to Athens, and may well be right in suggesting that the envoys made much of the autonomy clause, though in Diodorus they base their appeal on Theban services to Athens in 404. Dinarchus (i.38f) adds the detail that it was Cephalus who proposed the decree to send out a force. Plutarch (*Pel.* 13.2) tells us that the members

<sup>10</sup> Buckler 1979 (c 328).

of the garrison on their way home had got no further than Megara when they met Cleombrotus and his army, and agrees that three Spartan officers were condemned. While doubts must remain, it seems likely that Xenophon's story is as severely truncated as it appears and his chronology of events at Sparta misleading, and that Diodorus' version of the length of the siege and of the nature of Athenian involvement is historical.<sup>11</sup> If Isocrates (xiv.29) is telling the truth, the liberators also sent an embassy to Sparta immediately after their success, offering friendship on the same terms as before, that is, a return to the Spartan alliance. However, Sparta's conditions were too harsh: she demanded the restoration of the exiles and the expulsion of the leaders of the coup, and so the Thebans withdrew. The story has often been rejected, but, although Isocrates may have overstated the objective, it is not implausible that the new rulers of Thebes should have made some attempt to mollify Sparta and counteract the propaganda of the refugees.

The Athenian forces in Thebes had returned home after the capture of the Cadmea, but a contingent of light-armed troops under Chabrias was sent to hold the road through Eleutherae against Cleombrotus.<sup>12</sup> But the king took a different road to Plataea, wiping out a Theban guard post on the summit of Cithaeron, then made his way to Thespieae. However, after only sixteen days in Theban territory he led his army home, leaving his men in doubt whether they were at war with Thebes or not. At Thespieae he left Sphodrias as harmost, with a third of his allied troops and money to hire mercenaries (*Xen. Hell.* v.4.15f). It is possible that the Theban embassy, despite its failure, had given rise at Sparta to hopes that a full-scale war would prove unnecessary, and such hopes may have contributed to Cleombrotus' moderation, while the king himself, in contrast to Agesilaus, may have subscribed to the view that Athens represented a greater potential danger to Sparta than did Thebes. The apparent weakening of Theban resolution, as much as fear at the strength of Cleombrotus' army (*Xen. Hell.* v.4.19), may also have been the cause of a sudden attack of cold feet at Athens, where the two generals who had lent their aid to the original coup were selected as scapegoats, put on trial and condemned (*Xen. Hell.* v.4.19, *Plut. Pel.* 14.1). Unfortunately the charge is not recorded.

But if Athens was as yet reluctant to become involved in a struggle on land between Sparta and a possibly wavering Thebes, her determination to reassert herself at sea was by now gaining momentum. It is likely that the establishment of the nucleus of the Second Athenian Confederacy belongs, as Diodorus suggests (xv.28.2ff), early in 378, before the raid of Sphodrias.<sup>13</sup> The first recorded members were Chios, Byzantium,

<sup>11</sup> Judeich 1927 (C 340) 173ff.      <sup>12</sup> Cawkwell 1973 (C 111) 58.

<sup>13</sup> Cawkwell 1973 (C 111) 47ff.

Rhodes, Mytilene and perhaps Methymna (Diod. xv.28.4, Tod nos. 121, 122 = Harding nos. 34, 37, *SEG* xxxii 50). A common council or *synedrion* was established at Athens, in which each member state was to have one vote, and the autonomy of members was guaranteed, though they accepted Athens as *hegemon*. Unlike the alliance with Chios in 384, the negotiations which brought the confederacy into being made it clear from the first that the object of the exercise was to defend freedom and autonomy against Spartan encroachment, even though some of the earliest members may have been more frightened of Persia than of Sparta. In other words Athens was now for the first time proclaiming herself as the champion of the principles laid down in the King's Peace.

It may well have been resentment and alarm at this open challenge to her supremacy that prompted Sparta to send an embassy to Athens (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.22), though the original object of the mission is not recorded. However, while the envoys were in Athens, the Spartan harmost at Thespieae, Sphodrias, made a foolhardy attempt to seize the Piraeus, which still had no gates (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.20ff, Diod. xv.29.5ff, Plut. *Pel.* 14.1, *Ages.* 24.4). He had reckoned to reach his objective before dawn, but when day came he had got no further than Thria. Nevertheless, instead of slipping off as quietly as possible, he did all he could to advertise his presence before withdrawing. The Athenians arrested the Spartan ambassadors, who insisted, probably with truth, that they and Sparta knew nothing of the scheme and promised that Sphodrias would be tried and condemned to death. Of Sphodrias' intentions there can be no doubt: his provocative behaviour shows a clear determination to bring about a breach between Sparta and Athens. It may also be regarded as certain that he had not been acting on his own initiative, but our sources disagree as to who was behind him. Xenophon blames the Thebans, who were afraid that they would have to fight Sparta alone and so bribed Sphodrias to provoke a war between Athens and Sparta. Plutarch agrees, and names Pelopidas and Gorgidas as the authors of what for him was a brilliant stratagem. Diodorus on the other hand makes Cleombrotus responsible. These suggestions are not of course mutually exclusive. The former is extremely plausible: the motive ascribed to the Thebans is rational and cogent. But it may also be true that Cleombrotus was alarmed enough at the revival of Athens to devise a wild scheme to nip it in the bud.

Despite her outrage Athens was prepared to keep the peace provided that Sparta honoured her ambassadors' promise and Sphodrias was condemned (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.24ff). Sphodrias himself expected the worst and did not present himself for trial. The friends of Cleombrotus were inclined to acquit him, which may lend support to Diodorus' accusation, but they feared the hostility of the mass of Spartans and of Agesilaus,

who believed, or affected to believe, that Sphodrias had been bribed by the Thebans. But whatever his reasons Agesilaus eventually changed his position, declaring that, although Sphodrias had done wrong, Sparta had need of such soldiers. This must mean in practical terms that he had decided Sparta was capable of fighting a war simultaneously against Thebes and Athens, foreseeing perhaps that their alliance would prove uneasy. So Sphodrias was acquitted.

Reaction at Athens was swift and vigorous (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.34, Diod. xv.29.7). The Athenians decreed that Sparta had broken the peace and prepared energetically for war. Gates were put on the Piraeus, troops were to be levied and ships built and manned, and Timotheus, Chabrias and Callistratus were appointed to command. An alliance was made with the Thebans (*IG* 11<sup>2</sup> 40 = Harding no. 33; Diod. xv.28.5 is probably non-technical and proleptic, rather than misplaced), and Thebes was admitted to membership of the confederacy.<sup>14</sup> It was on Thebes that Sparta for the moment concentrated her efforts (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.35ff, Diod. xv.32f). In summer 378 Agesilaus led an invasion and established himself at Thespieae, on which the Thebans had already made an unsuccessful attack (Diod. xv.27.4). This was the first campaign undertaken by Sparta after the military regrouping of her allies into nine divisions: Arcadia accounted for two, Elis and Achaëa one each, Corinth and Megara another, Sicyon, Phlius and the cities of Acte a sixth, while the last three units were drawn from central Greece and the north: Acarnania, Phocis and Locris, and Olynthus and the other allies in the Thraceward area (Diod. xv.31.2). Agesilaus broke through the defensive works of the Thebans and ravaged the land right up to the city, but the Thebans would not risk a pitched battle, while the king declined to challenge Chabrias and his mercenaries in an incident later made famous by Chabrias' statue.<sup>15</sup> After fortifying Thespieae Agesilaus went home, leaving Phoebidas as harmost. Fighting in Boeotia continued: first Phoebidas carried out raids on Theban territory, then the Thebans made a full-scale attack on Thespieae. It failed, but Phoebidas was killed. From this point on the Thebans sent out repeated expeditions against Thespieae and other neighbouring cities, while those who sympathized with the Theban democracy gathered at Thebes. The Spartans for their part contented themselves with sending out one *mora* under a polemarch to reinforce the garrison at Thespieae.

The behaviour of the Thebans made it clear that they intended to pursue the objective implied by their election of boeotarchs immediately after the democratic coup, the recovery of Theban dominion over

<sup>14</sup> Burnett 1962 (c 99); Buckler 1971 (c 324). Clark 1990 (B 138) shows, however, that ship-building at Athens did not cease in the 380s.

Boeotia. This put Athens in an embarrassing position. She had founded the confederacy and challenged Sparta in the name of freedom and autonomy, and the Thebans in their hour of need had been prepared to join as Thebans, not Boeotians. Both she and her allies might have doubts about a war, the successful conclusion of which would leave Thebes, freed from the threat of Spartan invasion, at liberty to destroy freedom and autonomy in Boeotia. So the need to reassure existing allies as well as to secure new ones may have contributed to the passing, in February or March 377, of the decree of Aristoteles (Tod no. 123 = Harding no. 35, Diod. xv.29.8), which set out to encourage more cities to join the confederacy by reiterating and defining in greater detail Athens' dedication to the principles of freedom and autonomy. The measure was timely, for many Greeks, whatever they thought of Sparta, must still have distrusted Athens' motives, whether or not they had read the *Panegyricus* (cf. Diod. xv.23.4).

The decree restated the confederacy's fundamental aim: to force Sparta to allow the Greeks secure possession of their territory in freedom and autonomy. This clear reference to the terms of the King's Peace may have been followed by a specific commitment to its preservation, though the lines in question were erased at a later date and their content must remain uncertain.<sup>16</sup> Applications for membership were invited from anyone, Greek or barbarian, mainlander or islander, who was not a subject of the King of Persia. Plainly Athens still wished to present herself as the champion of the King's Peace, not to repudiate it and so risk Persia's wrath. The conditions of membership which follow are best seen as glosses on the basic guarantee of freedom and autonomy, which had probably received no closer definition in the King's Peace itself. Each member state was to have what constitution it wished, to receive no garrison or governor, and to pay no tribute. Moreover, Athens relinquished all claims to property, public or private, in the territory of member states, and existing records of such claims were to be destroyed. Henceforth neither the Athenian state nor any Athenian citizen was to acquire a house or land in allied territory by any means whatever. Any charges that might arise from this provision were to be heard not in an Athenian court but in the allied *synedrion*.

These clauses were obviously meant to serve a double purpose: first, to remind those still inclined to be loyal to Sparta of the outrages perpetrated by her above all in the time of Lysander, secondly, and surely a more important matter in context, to renounce those abuses practised by Athens herself in the fifth century which had stirred up such resentment against her rule and inspired a stubborn reluctance to believe

that she had really changed her ways. There followed a guarantee that, if any member were attacked, the forces of Athens and the rest of the alliance would come to her aid. This must have been directed chiefly at Sparta, but may also have been intended as a discreet warning to Persia. The names of all members of the alliance, present and future, were to be inscribed on the same stone which bore the decree.

It is ominous that at the same time a further decree was passed, authorizing an embassy to Thebes, 'to persuade the Thebans of whatever good it may' (Tod no. 123 = Harding no. 35 lines 72ff). It may well be that the conduct of the Thebans in Boeotia was already causing Athens concern, though she may also have been eager to secure a contribution from Thebes for the naval operations which the confederacy was soon to mount. Meanwhile she soon had grounds for satisfaction, for the decree of Aristoteles served its purpose well, allaying suspicion and creating good will towards her (Diod. xv.29.8). The first to respond were the cities of Euboea, with the exception of Hestiaea (Diod. xv.30.1); the alliance between Athens and Chalcis survives (Tod no. 124 = Harding no. 38). It is significant that Euboea had suffered much in the fifth century from both cleruchies and private Athenian property holdings.

The growth and workings of the confederacy in the years before Leuctra raise a number of questions to which no certain answer can be given. The eventual total membership is given as seventy by Diodorus (xv.30.2), seventy-five by Aeschines (II.70). Yet the names appended to the decree of Aristoteles cannot have numbered more than fifty-eight. Therefore either the figures in the literary sources are inflated, perhaps by the inclusion of allies of Athens who were never confederacy members, or, at some unknown date and for some unknown reason, the Athenians stopped adding the names of new members to the list which was begun in 377 and kept up at least until 375, probably until 373. No compelling date or reason has ever been suggested, nor is there any state whose membership is securely attested elsewhere – though such attestation is admittedly extremely rare – whose name is not or could not have been recorded on the extant list. Thus it is probable, though not quite certain, that at some point Corcyra joined the confederacy, though her name does not appear;<sup>17</sup> however, it could have stood in a lacuna. It may therefore be better to reject the evidence of Diodorus and Aeschines and opt for the lower figure.<sup>18</sup> If this is correct, the confederacy had reached its fullest extent by 373 at the latest, and after that time no new members were added. Instead, treaties were made which bound new allies to Athens and the league without actually admitting them to membership. Attempts have been made to date the accession of various known

<sup>17</sup> Coleman and Bradeen 1967 (C 121); Tuplin 1984 (C 81) 544ff; *SEG* xxxii 53.

<sup>18</sup> Cargill 1981 (C 101)38ff; Cawkwell 1981 (C 113) 41ff.

members and to connect their adhesion with the naval expeditions undertaken by Chabrias in 377 to 375 and Timotheus in 375 and 373.<sup>19</sup> But not enough is known about the details of the procedure adopted in making and recording admissions for anything to be said with confidence on this subject.<sup>20</sup>

The promises made in the decree of Aristoteles have often been dismissed as empty, never meant to be kept and quickly broken. But at least in the years down to Leuctra, before Athens fell victim to her fatal obsessions with Amphipolis and the Chersonese, her record will bear examination.<sup>21</sup> No cleruchies were inflicted on confederacy members,<sup>22</sup> and no constitutional interference is recorded, while if garrisons were temporarily installed in allied cities, this was done in response to the needs of the military situation and with the consent of the recipients. It was easy to say (Theopomp. 115 F 98) that the *syntaxeis* paid by members of the confederacy were merely *phoros* under a different name, but extortion and misapplication of confederacy funds are again not attested before Leuctra, though it is equally clear that Athens had begun to slip back into her old ways long before the critical period of the Social War.<sup>23</sup>

The decree of Aristoteles says almost nothing about the composition, powers and general functioning of the *synedrion* and its relationship to the Athenian *boule* and Assembly, or about finance, apart from the repudiation of *phoros*, though the existence of a common treasury is implied (Tod no. 123 = Harding no. 35 line 46). No doubt all these matters had been dealt with in the lost decrees which actually brought the confederacy and the *synedrion* into being. We know that the *synedrion* met at Athens and that every member had one vote (Diod. xv.28.4). It would be natural to assume that every member therefore sent one *synedros*, and this may well be correct (cf. Tod nos. 153, 175 = Harding nos. 65, 97; *IG* 11<sup>2</sup> 232); the apparent indication in one inscription that Mytilene had more than one *synedros* (Tod no. 131 = Harding no. 53, cf. 126) may be due to careless drafting. How the president was chosen and for how long he served is not known; a Theban president is attested in 372 (Accame 1941 (C 87) 229ff). On one occasion the *boule* is found instructing the *synedrion* to bring a *dogma* before the Assembly, while at the same time publishing its own *probouleuma* (Tod no. 133). On another a decree of the Assembly was preceded by a *dogma* of the allies, which had been presented first to the *boule* (Tod no. 144 = Harding no. 56). It may be that both these cases offer partial descriptions of a normal procedure in which the *boule* first suggested business for the *synedrion*, then vetted the allied *dogma* before

<sup>19</sup> Accame 1941 (C 87) 72ff; Woodhead 1962 (C 273).

<sup>20</sup> Cargill 1981 (C 101) 38ff; Cawkwell 1981 (C 113) 45ff.

<sup>21</sup> Cargill 1981 (C 101) 134ff; Cawkwell 1981 (C 113) 50f.

<sup>22</sup> Cawkwell 1973 (C 110) against Davies 1969 (C 123).

<sup>23</sup> Cargill 1981 (C 101) 125; Cawkwell 1963 (C 16) 91ff, 1981 (C 113) 48.

passing it on to the Assembly. It might be hoped that usually there would be no controversy, that the *boule* would approve the *dogma* and simply reinforce it with its *probouleuma*. But later, in the negotiations which led up to the Peace of Philocrates, though the *synedrion* had promised in advance to ratify whatever the Assembly decided, it seems that the *boule*, influenced by Demosthenes, sent on a *probouleuma* which contradicted the *dogma* of the allies instead of endorsing it. Whether in such circumstances the allied *dogma* never reached the Assembly is unclear, but it is perhaps more likely that when there was a conflict both *dogma* and *probouleuma* were put before the people.

Whether the original constitution of the league made any provision at all for the financing of confederate operations is also uncertain. The earliest mention of *syntaxeis* refers to 373 ([Dem.] XLIX.49), but even these need not have been fixed and regular amounts, while Athenian annoyance in 375 that Thebes was not contributing to the cost of the fleet (Xen. *Hell.* VI.2.1) need imply no more than a moral obligation. It is not unlikely that until 373 Athens bore the cost of campaigning alone, and that even after that date the levying of *syntaxeis* was carried out on an irregular and *ad hoc* basis.

In spring 377 Agesilaus again marched into Boeotia and penetrated the Theban stockade, ravaging the land between Thebes and Tanagra, which was still loyal to Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.47ff, Diod. xv.34.1f). The Thebans were prepared to challenge him to battle, but Agesilaus declined and instead moved on the undefended city. However, the Thebans succeeded in turning him back, and after settling a civil disturbance at Thespieae Agesilaus returned home by way of Megara. There he fell victim to a circulatory disorder, and an emergency operation weakened him further by causing massive loss of blood. He was seriously ill until the next year and was still unfit to go on a campaign six years later. Indeed, he disappears from history till summer 371, and it is possible that during this interval his influence on Spartan policy was diminished.

Chabrias and his peltasts had again gone to the aid of the Thebans (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.54). But after Agesilaus' withdrawal from Boeotia Chabrias took command of a naval expedition which went first to Euboea to protect Athens' newly acquired allies there and attack Hestiaea, which had remained loyal to Sparta because Sparta, some three years before, had liberated it from the tyrant Neogenes, who had established himself with the support of Jason of Pherae (Diod. xv.30.2ff). Chabrias ravaged the territory of Hestiaea, fortified the hill known as its Metropolis and left a garrison there before departing for the Cyclades, where he won over various islands which had been subject to Sparta, including Peparethos and Sciathos. It was, however, the The-



bans who detached Hestiaea from Sparta. They were suffering from a shortage of corn, for it was now two years since they had been able to work their land. An expedition to Pagasae to buy Thessalian corn fell into the hands of Alcetas, the Spartan commander in Hestiaea. But thanks to Alcetas' neglect of duty the Thebans escaped and, after seizing the citadel, were able to bring the city over. Henceforth Thebes was able to import corn unimpeded (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.56f).

In 376, because of the illness of Agesilaus, the annual Spartan invasion of Boeotia was entrusted to Cleombrotus (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.59). But when he found the Thebans and Athenians holding Cithaeron against him, he turned back without engaging the enemy and went home. Irritation at this fiasco, coupled with exhaustion, led the allies to complain at Sparta. They urged the Spartans to take to the sea and starve Athens into submission by a blockade, and also pointed out that an army could be shipped to Boeotia. The Spartans duly manned a fleet of sixty ships under Pollis, which controlled the waters around Aegina, Ceos and Andros and was able during the summer of 376 to interfere with the import of corn from the Black Sea to Athens (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.60f, Diod. xv.34.3–35.2). Athens could not ignore this menace. First the blockade was broken, when a large corn fleet was successfully escorted into the Piraeus, then in September Chabrias set sail with eighty-three ships to besiege Naxos and challenge the Spartan fleet to a decisive battle (Plut. *Phoc.* 6.3, Polyae. III.11.2, 11). Pollis accepted, despite his inferior numbers, and indeed had some initial success. But eventually Chabrias got the upper hand and put the Spartans to flight, though, mindful of Arginusae, he did not pursue them but stopped to save the crews of his own disabled ships. At the end of the day the Athenians had lost eighteen ships, the Spartans twenty-four, with eight more captured (cf. *IG* II<sup>2</sup> 1606.78, 82). The victory of Naxos had important consequences. Not only was the threat to Athens' corn supply removed, but she also regained control of the amphictyony of Delos (Tod no. 125), which she had first recovered after Cnidus, but of which she had probably then again been deprived by the King's Peace.

Cleombrotus' failure to invade had left the Thebans free to work towards their goal of renewed domination in Boeotia (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.63). It may have been in this year that the Spartan harmost at Tanagra was killed in battle, though that need not mean that the city fell into Theban hands (Plut. *Pel.* 15.4). But Thebes' most striking success so far was to come in 375 (Plut. *Pel.* 16f, Diod. xv.37.1), when again there was no Spartan invasion. The Spartan garrison of Orchomenus had made an expedition into Locris, and so Pelopidas attacked with the Sacred Band, hoping to find the city undefended. In this he was disappointed, but on his way home he fell in with the Spartans returning from Locris at

Tegyra and inflicted a heavy defeat, to which Spartan over-confidence made an important contribution.

At sea in 375 Chabrias operated in the Thraceward area, where he saved Abdera from attack by the Triballi, who had come from beyond Mt Haemus, driven by famine, and established a garrison in the city (Diod. xv.36.4, cf. Dem. xx.77). Moving on to the Hellespont, he may even have risked intervention in Asia in defiance of the King's Peace, though the details are obscure and he may have been invited (*Hesp.* 30 (1961) 79ff). But Athens' principal naval undertaking in this year was mounted at the request of Thebes. The Thebans asked her to send a fleet round the Peloponnese, so that Sparta would be too busy protecting herself and her allies to bother with Boeotia (Xen. *Hell.* v.4.62ff). Continuing resentment at the raid of Sphodrias overcame any qualms which Athens might have felt at the growth of Theban power and Theban disregard of the King's Peace. Timotheus was sent out with sixty ships, though Athens was already suffering grave financial problems and he received only thirteen talents (Isoc. xv.109, cf. [Arist.] *Oec.* 1350a31).

Timotheus' mission was a brilliant success. He gained control of Corcyra, and by his moderate conduct – he enslaved no one, exiled no one and did not interfere with the laws – encouraged other peoples in the region to adhere to Athens, including the cities of Cephallenia, the Acarnanians, and Alcetas, king of the Molossi, and his son Neoptolemus (Diod. xv.36.5). However, apart from Alcetas and his son, only the Acarnanians and one of the Cephallenian cities, Pronnoi, are recorded as members of the confederacy, which suggests that the arrangements made in a decree of this year (Tod no. 126 = Harding no. 41), which mentions Corcyra and the Cephallenians, must somehow have fallen through.<sup>24</sup> Whether Jason of Pherae, a friend of Timotheus and an ally of Athens by 373, ever joined the confederacy now or later is also open to doubt.<sup>25</sup>

The Spartans were sufficiently alarmed to send out a counter-expedition under Nicolochus, who joined battle with Timotheus at Alyzia. He had fifty-five ships, for six from Ambracia had failed to arrive. The Athenians were victorious and set up a trophy (cf. *IG II<sup>2</sup>* 1606.11, 24, 29, 69, 74, 86). But while Timotheus was refitting his ships, Nicolochus challenged him to a second engagement and, when the offer of battle was declined, put up a trophy in his turn. By now, however, Timotheus had secured enough ships from Corcyra to give him numerical superiority, though he was desperately short of money, for which he sent repeated requests to Athens (cf. [Arist.] *Oec.* 1351a31).

The successes of the Thebans in Boeotia inspired them to range

<sup>24</sup> Tuplin 1984 (C 81) 545ff. <sup>25</sup> Woodhead 1957 (C 272) but cf. Cawkwell 1981 (C 113) 44.

further afield and mount an invasion of Phocis (Xen. *Hell.* vi.1.1). The Phocians appealed to Sparta, warning that they would have to surrender if no help came. Sparta took the matter very seriously and sent out Cleombrotus with four *morai* and contingents from the allies. This vigorous response frightened the Thebans off, and they withdrew from Phocis and prepared to resist an invasion. But Sparta was compelled to return a negative answer to another appeal which she received at about the same time (Xen. *Hell.* vi.1.2ff). Polydamas of Pharsalus, the Spartan *proxenos*, came to ask for Spartan assistance against the growing power of Jason of Pherae, whose designs allegedly encompassed the building of a navy larger than that of Athens and the organization of a panhellenic crusade against Persia. The Spartans would have been happy to check Jason's expansion, but on reviewing their resources they decided that worthwhile intervention was beyond them and told Polydamas to find his own salvation.

Nor did the Spartan invasion of Boeotia take place (Xen. *Hell.* vi.2.1); instead, in the summer of 375, the King's Peace was renewed.<sup>26</sup> In his encomium of Timotheus Isocrates gives him the credit for compelling Sparta to make peace (xv.109), and the battle of Alyzia was no doubt a relevant factor, as was Tegyra (Plut. *Ages.* 27.3). Her allies for their part resented the protracted war with Thebes (Plut. *Ages.* 26.3). But Sparta may already have begun to think of peace after her defeat at Naxos at the end of the previous summer, and she may well have been negotiating with Persia over the winter. Artaxerxes wanted mercenaries for his war in Egypt and so had good reason to assist in putting an end to the wars of the Greeks (Diod. xv.38.1). A peace conference was summoned at Sparta, and the Athenians, despite their recent naval successes, responded eagerly (Xen. *Hell.* vi.2.1f). The navy lists of this decade reveal that Athens was building almost no new ships. Two thirds of her fleet consisted of old vessels, many of which were in poor repair and badly equipped.<sup>27</sup> Nor are the problems experienced by Timotheus the only evidence for Athenian preoccupation with finance. A recently discovered law of 375, which unfortunately cannot be dated in relation to the peace, shows concern for the purity of Athenian silver coinage. The need for a reputable currency will have increased with the growth of the confederacy, while the financial distress of these years may have encouraged forgery.<sup>28</sup> By now the Athenians were exhausted physically as well as economically and were coming more and more to believe that the only people to benefit from the war were the Thebans, who were pursuing their own ends while Athens kept Sparta occupied, and did not even contribute to the cost of the fleet.

<sup>26</sup> Cawkwell 1963 (C 16); Buckler 1971 (C 12).

<sup>27</sup> Wilson 1970 (C 271); Davies 1969 (C 123) 311ff.

<sup>28</sup> Stroud 1974 (B 177).

The manner of the making of the peace and its terms are bedevilled by confusion in Diodorus' account between it and the peace of Sparta in 371.<sup>29</sup> However, Persian participation is certain (Philoch. 328 F 151). Perhaps for the first time it was specifically stated that no city was to be subject to a foreign garrison, and officials were appointed to oversee the evacuation of existing garrisons (Diod. xv.38.2). Though the Thebans had no reason to want peace, their participation is assured by Isocrates (xiv.10). The argument between Callistratus and Epaminondas which allegedly led to their exclusion (Diod. xv.38.3) belongs to 371, but it may have been at this conference that the threat of exclusion forced Thebes to abandon her claim to Oropus (Isoc. xiv.37). Whether the Thebans swore as Thebans or Boeotians is not recorded. The lack of any mention of a dispute on the point may suggest the former, but if Thebes made the concession, she did not allow it to influence her future conduct. Both Diodorus (xv.38.4) and Nepos (*Tim.* 2.2) speak of an agreement between Athens and Sparta whereby Sparta acknowledged Athenian hegemony at sea, Athens Sparta's supremacy on land. It is, however, unlikely that the peace contained a clause to this effect. The basis of the belief was probably no more than a tacit acceptance by Sparta that the continuing existence of the confederacy did not constitute an infringement of the autonomy clause.<sup>30</sup> This was Athens' only concrete gain from the peace, for the recognition of her claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese by Persia and the Greeks at large belong to a later date.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless the conclusion of peace was hailed with great joy at Athens and an altar was set up to Eirene, with annual sacrifices (Philoch. 328 F 151, Isoc. xv.110, Nep. *Tim.* 2.2).

### III. THE RISE OF THEBES

If Diodorus is to be believed, the making of the peace led to numerous civil upheavals in the Peloponnese, in Arcadia, Megara, Phlius, Sicyon and Corinth, where the exiles who had gone to Argos after the King's Peace made an unsuccessful effort to return (Diod. xv.40). But events of greater moment were to occur in north-west Greece. As soon as the peace had been concluded, Athenian envoys went directly from Sparta to summon Timotheus home. On his way he landed some Zakynthian exiles, who had fought with him at Alyzia, on their island and established them in a stronghold (Xen. *Hell.* vi.2.2ff, Diod. xv.45.2ff). They may already have been members of the confederacy; if not, they were now admitted.<sup>32</sup> The accounts of subsequent developments in the region offered by our sources are so confused and contradictory that any

<sup>29</sup> Lauffer 1959 (C 38); Andrewes 1985 (B 7).      <sup>30</sup> Roos 1949 (C 60) 279; Ryder 1965 (C 67) 58ff.

<sup>31</sup> Ryder 1965 (C 67) 128.      <sup>32</sup> Cawkwell 1963 (C 16) 88; Mitchel 1981 (C 205).

chronology and any reconstruction must be regarded as conjectural.<sup>33</sup> The people of Zakynthos promptly appealed to Sparta, and the Spartans in their turn sent envoys to Athens to protest. They obtained no satisfaction, and so Sparta manned a fleet of twenty-three ships under Aristocrates, either in autumn 375 or spring 374, to go to the help of Zakynthos. Probably in the summer of 374 another appeal came to Sparta, this time from Spartan sympathizers in Corcyra, who were eager to overthrow the democracy and promised to betray the city to the Spartans if Sparta would send a fleet. Sparta was well aware of the strategic importance of Corcyra and at once sent out twenty-two ships under Alcidas. The Corcyraeans naturally turned to Athens, and the Athenians voted to help both them and the Zakynthian exiles. It may have been at this time that Corcyra joined the confederacy, as the price of Athenian aid (Tod no. 127 = Harding no. 42).<sup>34</sup> Ctesicles was sent out, perhaps in winter 374/3, to take command of the exiles, while preparations were begun for a major expedition to Corcyra in the spring. As was natural in view of his earlier successes in the region, Timotheus was appointed to command. But although he had been voted sixty ships, it proved impossible to man them all, and when he set out in early summer 373 ([Dem.] XLIX.6) he was forced to sail among the Cyclades in search of crews and may even have ranged as far afield as Thrace. If so, he may have played a part in the conclusion of an alliance between Athens and Amyntas of Macedon which probably belongs to the middle seventies (Tod no. 129 = Harding no. 43). The Athenians believed, or were persuaded by his enemies, that Timotheus had frittered away the sailing season, and so they deprived him of his command and recalled him (Diod. xv.47.3, [Dem.] XLIX.9). Timotheus, who had again been plagued by financial problems, returned from Calauria in the autumn of 373. He was charged with treason by Callistratus and Iphicrates, who had recently returned to Athens from Egypt after a difference of opinion with Pharnabazus, but both Alcetas and Jason – who was by now an ally of Athens, though not necessarily a member of the confederacy – spoke in his favour and he was acquitted. He was not, however, reinstated in his command and departed to serve the Persian King in his war against Egypt ([Dem.] XLIX.9ff, 22ff, [Plut.] *Mor.* 836D).

Meanwhile the summer of 373 had brought dramatic developments in Boeotia. By this time Thebes had succeeded in recovering Tanagra and Thespieae, had destroyed their walls and forced them into submission (Isoc. xiv.9, cf. 19, 35).<sup>35</sup> Unfortunately it is not entirely clear how the Thebans organized Boeotia in these years. There are two possibilities: either the Boeotian Confederacy was revived, much as it had been before

<sup>33</sup> Cawkwell 1963 (C 16); Gray 1980 (B 48); Tuplin 1984 (C 81).

<sup>34</sup> Against: Cargill 1981 (C 101) 69ff. <sup>35</sup> Tuplin 1986 (C 350).

its dissolution in accordance with the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas, or those cities which came under Theban control were absorbed by a form of synoecism into a single Boeotian state, in which Thebes predominated by weight of numbers and because the assembly met at Thebes. Certainty is impossible, but the latter alternative seems perhaps more consistent with the language of the sources.<sup>36</sup> After Thespieae the Thebans looked to Plataea. To save themselves the Plataeans decided to hand over their city to Athens (Diod. xv.46.4ff). We may wonder how Athens would have replied to this somewhat embarrassing offer, but the Thebans did not wait to see and attacked at once. By the terms of Plataea's surrender, its people were constrained to depart with their movable property, never to return to Boeotia. They fled to Athens, where they were granted isopolity. Plataea was razed to the ground and its land divided up among Theban owners (Isoc. xiv.7, Paus. ix.1.7f).

Not surprisingly the fate of Plataea provoked violent reactions at Athens, which are reflected in the *Plataicus* of Isocrates. The Thebans might claim that they had acted in the interests of the confederacy, since Plataea had served as a Spartan stronghold ever since the King's Peace (Isoc. xiv.11f, 21). But she had had no choice in the matter, nor had the Thebans consulted the *synedrion*; her destruction was merely the culmination of a series of violations of the autonomy clause by the Thebans (1, 5, 10). It is striking that Isocrates does not make his Plataeans appeal to Athens as the avowed champion of the peace of 375, a position which she had apparently made no attempt to claim. He argues rather that to let Thebes go unpunished would be inconsistent with the grounds on which Athens had gone to war against Sparta in 378 and with the principles proclaimed in the decree of Aristoteles (17, 44). If Athens now assumed the *prostasia* of the peace, such a stand would greatly strengthen her position and improve her image, whereas to sit back and allow the Thebans to destroy any city they pleased would have disastrous consequences (42f).

The argument was a powerful one, but to accept it would have meant too great a reversal in Athenian policy. There were still Boeotian ships in Timotheus' fleet in this year ([Dem.] xlix.14, 48f), and for all her disillusionment with Thebes, Athens would not go so far as to fight her in defence of Boeotian autonomy, or even to propose her expulsion from the confederacy. Isocrates' appeal fell on deaf ears, and the Thebans, by the summer of 371, had meted out to Thespieae the same treatment as to Plataea, though the Thespians do not appear to have been expelled from Boeotia (Xen. *Hell.* vi.3.1, Diod. xv.46.6, 51.3).<sup>37</sup> Yet the fate of Plataea may well have contributed to the downfall of Timotheus, who could be presented as the favourite general of the partisans of Thebes at Athens. It

<sup>36</sup> Thiel 1926 (c 349); Sordi 1973 (c 348).      <sup>37</sup> Tuplin 1986 (c 350).

is not unlikely that anger at Thebes helped to turn the people against him.

In the north west a Spartan fleet of sixty ships commanded by Mnasippus, which had set sail shortly after that of Timotheus, had reached Corcyra, gained control of the countryside and put the city under siege (Xen. *Hell.* vi.2.4ff, Diod. xv.47.2f). The Spartans had also sent to Syracuse for help, pointing out to Dionysius that it would be a bad thing if Corcyra fell into Athenian hands. The Athenians at once sent out Ctesicles with 600 peltasts, while making preparations for a more serious expedition to be commanded by Iphicrates in the spring of 372 (Diod. xv.47.4ff, Xen. *Hell.* vi.2.10ff). Ctesicles was brilliantly successful. He made his way into the city and set about improving the morale of the defenders. Meanwhile Mnasippus' troops were becoming discontented, since he ill-treated them and kept them short of pay. By spring Ctesicles was strong enough first to launch a sortie, then to fight a pitched battle against the besiegers, in which Mnasippus was killed and the Spartan camp almost captured. This defeat and rumours of Iphicrates' imminent arrival inspired the *epistoleus* Hypermenes first to ship out the booty and slaves, then to evacuate the Spartan forces to Leucas.

Iphicrates, whose fleet numbered some seventy ships, had not surprisingly sailed round the Peloponnese with all possible speed, training his men as he went (Xen. *Hell.* vi.2.27ff). At the time of Mnasippus' death he was in the neighbourhood of Pylos, though he had certain news of it only when he reached Cephallenia. There he gained control of the cities – Xenophon's language suggests the use of force – before sailing to Corcyra. A much damaged alliance between Athens and Cephallenia, which may belong to this time, makes ominous reference to garrisons and to the sending of Athenian overseers (Bengtson, *SdA* 267). Shortly after his arrival he succeeded in intercepting a squadron of ten ships which had come from Syracuse in response to the Spartan appeal and captured nine of them (Xen. *Hell.* vi.2.35, Diod. xv.47.7). But though the profits of this coup were used to pay his men, Iphicrates was still in great financial difficulties and was forced to hire his sailors out to the Corcyraeans as farm labourers. After an expedition to Acarnania to help friendly cities there, he returned to Cephallenia with a fleet that now numbered ninety ships and extracted money from the cities of the island, again using force or the threat of force where necessary. Then he set about making preparations for a campaign not only against Sparta's remaining allies in the north west but against Laconia itself. For this enterprise he asked the Athenians to send him as colleagues not only Chabrias, but Callistratus, despite the orator's reputation for hostility to him (Xen. *Hell.* vi.2.39).

But the spring of 371 saw new moves for peace, though Iphicrates

began his campaign and made some gains, even after the peace had been concluded (Xen. *Hell.* vi.3.1ff, 4.1, Diod. xv.50.4). The Thebans too were active, making another attempt to gain control of Phocis, to which Sparta responded by sending out Cleombrotus as she had done in 375. Once again the initiative for peace came from Persia (Diod. xv.50.4, Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 12, confirmed by Xen. *Hell.* vi.3.18); whether Artaxerxes had been prompted by yet another Spartan appeal inspired by Iphicrates' successes of the previous year we do not know, but it is not unlikely.<sup>38</sup> The Athenian motive for compliance, according to Xenophon, was increasing discontent at the aggressive behaviour of Thebes, fanned by the presence of the Plataean refugees in Athens, appeals to avenge the destruction of Thespieae, and the spectacle of the new Theban invasion of Phocis. But the Athenians still felt that they could not go so far as to make war on Thebes, even if such a course had seemed expedient, which it did not. So, in the somewhat optimistic hope that a renewal of the King's Peace would put a brake on Theban expansion, despite the precedent of Theban behaviour after the peace of 375, they persuaded the Thebans to accompany them to Sparta. One of the Athenian envoys was Callistratus, for Iphicrates, paralysed by lack of funds, had sent him home to Athens to obtain money or bring about a peace.<sup>39</sup> That Callistratus chose to pursue the latter course may reflect both his own political preference and the harsh realities of Athens' financial situation.

Xenophon reports the speeches of the principal Athenian ambassadors at Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* vi.3.3ff).<sup>40</sup> Callias, the Spartan *proxenos*, chose to emphasize the common ground between Athens and Sparta, the anger both felt at the destruction of Plataea and Thespieae, while Autocles was sternly critical of Spartan hypocrisy, pointing out the inconsistency between her championship of the autonomy clause in theory and her persistent breaches of it in practice. Callistratus then took up a position between these opposing views, reminding Sparta that it was thanks to the seizure of the Cadmea that the Boeotian cities, which she had been so eager to liberate in 386, had again fallen under Theban domination. Nor, he insisted, was Athens seeking peace because she feared that Sparta and Persia would again combine against her, for Athens, who championed autonomy and practised what she preached, could have nothing to fear from the King. The explanation of Athens' presence at the conference was to be found in her displeasure at the behaviour of Thebes. But if Athens and Sparta were to settle their differences, they would have nothing to fear from Thebes or any other Greek power and could share the mastery of Greece as they had done in the past.

This Cimonian vision appealed to Sparta, and she voted to accept the

<sup>38</sup> Cawkwell 1972 (C 334) 258.      <sup>39</sup> Tuplin 1977 (C 262).

<sup>40</sup> Mosley 1962 (C 206); Ryder 1963 (C 245) 237ff.



peace. Its terms included not only the withdrawal of governors from the cities by both sides but also the demobilization of both military and naval forces, as well as the inevitable restatement of the autonomy clause. But if any city violated these conditions, only those who wished need go to the aid of the victims (*Xen. Hell.* vi.3.18). With this change in the customary guarantee Callistratus could be well satisfied. If Thebes proved recalcitrant, Athens could remain neutral while Agesilaus, if his health permitted, played once again the role he had performed with such gusto in 386. The Spartans, as usual, swore for themselves and their allies, while Athens and her allies took the oath individually. All now depended on the attitude of the Thebans. On the first day they allowed themselves to be listed as Thebans, but on the next they returned and demanded that Boeotians be substituted (*Xen. Hell.* vi.3.19). Their leader was Epaminondas, and his change of front drew down the wrath of Callistratus, for the altercation between the two men which Diodorus (xv.38.3) places at the conference of 375 really belongs here.<sup>41</sup> But an even more dramatic clash came between Epaminondas and Agesilaus. Agesilaus offered Epaminondas the choice between swearing as Thebans and exclusion, while Epaminondas declared that Thebes would leave the Boeotian cities autonomous when Sparta did the same for the cities of Laconia (*Xen. Hell.* vi.3.19, *Plut. Ages.* 27.4–28.1, *Paus.* ix.13.2). So Thebes was excluded from the peace, which was concluded in about July 371 (*Plut. Ages.* 28.5: 14th of the month Scirophorion 372/1).

Two explanations of the behaviour of the Thebans are possible.<sup>42</sup> Either their envoys were at first not all agreed that Thebes was now capable of facing Sparta alone, but Epaminondas was able to convince them overnight that the risk was worth taking, or the whole affair was deliberately stage-managed to provoke the anger of Sparta and of Agesilaus in particular and so to bring on a confrontation that Epaminondas at least was confident of winning. If Xenophon is right in saying that the Thebans departed in great gloom, then the former view is perhaps more likely. But if Epaminondas did lay a trap, Agesilaus walked boldly into it, delighted at being given another chance to humble Thebes (*Plut. Ages.* 28.2), while the Athenians too are said to have looked forward eagerly to the Thebans' seemingly inevitable humiliation (*Xen. Hell.* vi.3.20), though expectations at Athens must surely have been more complicated than that.

Events now moved swiftly, though the interval of twenty days between the making of the peace and the battle of Leuctra (*Plut. Ages.* 28.5) cannot be accepted with confidence, since it relies upon Plutarch's arbitrary equation of 5 Hippodromios in the Boeotian calendar with 5

<sup>41</sup> Lauffer 1959 (C 38), Cawkwell 1972 (C 334) 257.

<sup>42</sup> Cawkwell 1972 (C 334) 264f; Mosley 1972 (C 342); Buckler 1980 (C 329) 52f.

Hecatombaion in the Athenian.<sup>43</sup> However, the interval is unlikely to have been more than a month or six weeks at the most, and may have been less, since twenty days is in practice just possible.<sup>44</sup> The Athenians withdrew their garrisons in accordance with the terms of the peace and instructed Iphicrates to hand back everything he had acquired since the peace had been sworn. The Spartans did the same, with one significant exception: the army of Cleombrotus was not recalled from Phocis (Xen. *Hell.* vi.4.iff, Diod. xv.51.iff). When the king sent home for orders – that he should feel the need to do so when the terms of the peace were clear is itself remarkable – Prothous spoke in favour of disbanding the army and giving the Thebans a chance to back down. This delay should be used to encourage the cities to make contributions to a common fund and then Sparta should lead those who favoured autonomy against anyone who tried to resist. This course would have had the advantage of reaffirming Sparta's claim to sole championship of the King's Peace, but the Spartan assembly was as eager as Agesilaus to force a show-down with Thebes, and Prothous' suggestions were dismissed as nonsense. Cleombrotus was ordered to keep his army together and to attack Thebes at once if she would not grant the Boeotian cities their autonomy. The king duly sent an ultimatum, demanding not only that the Boeotian cities should be left autonomous but that Plataea and Thespieae should be refounded and their land restored to its former owners. The Theban reply was intransigent and consistent with the position taken up by Epaminondas at Sparta: Thebes had never interfered in Laconia and Sparta had no business to do so in Boeotia.

Cleombrotus promptly advanced into Boeotia. At first he did no more than cross the border and halt at Chaeronea (Diod. xv.52.1),<sup>45</sup> hoping perhaps that the Thebans might still have second thoughts. But they signalled their intention of resisting, and of withstanding a siege if the worst came to the worst, by voting to remove their women and children to Athens (Diod. xv.52.1). Their apparent confidence that Athens would have welcomed them is on a par with their subsequent expectation that the Athenians would be overjoyed at the result of Leuctra. It is unclear whether the plan, which Pausanias (ix.13.6) mentions only at the time of the boeotarchs' debate before Leuctra, was ever put into operation. There is no trace of Theban refugees at Athens, and it may be that, even if the evacuation was begun, the non-combatants never crossed the border into Attica. Epaminondas then led out the Theban army and took up his position at Coronea (Diod. xv.52.7). But Cleombrotus withdrew to Ambrossus in Phocis, then entered Boeotia over Mt Helicon. This route avoided the main Theban force at Coronea and was only inadequately defended by a detachment under Chaereas, which Cleombrotus wiped

<sup>43</sup> Pédech 1972 (C 343).

<sup>44</sup> Beister 1970 (C 322).

<sup>45</sup> Tuplin 1979 (C 80).

out (Paus. IX.13.3). He advanced by way of Thisbe to Creusis, where he captured the fortifications and twelve Theban ships (Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.3ff).<sup>46</sup> Then, moving inland along the road to Thebes,<sup>47</sup> he came to the plain of Leuctra and encamped on the hill to the south, while the Thebans and other Boeotians established themselves on the slope at the opposite side of the plain. Sparta's allies had expected that there would be no battle, but Cleombrotus now came under great pressure from friends and enemies alike to prove that he was able and willing to take action against Thebes.

The six boeotarchs who were with the Theban army were not in agreement as to the best course to pursue. Epaminondas and two others felt that, if they did not fight, not only would Theban control of Boeotia collapse but the city itself might turn against its present leaders (Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.6), but three were in favour either of withdrawing and choosing a more favourable site for a battle (Diod. XV.53.2ff) or of carrying out the planned evacuation of Thebes and preparing to resist a siege (Paus. IX.13.6f). The deadlock was broken on the arrival of the seventh boeotarch, Brachyllidas, who had been guarding the pass over Cithaeron. He voted to fight. Once this decision had been taken, omens of victory began to be reported from Thebes, probably engineered by Epaminondas to counter those which had accompanied the army's departure.

On the day that battle was finally joined, Epaminondas, who did not trust the loyalty of the other Boeotians, especially and understandably the Thespians, gave them permission to depart, but the Spartan mercenaries and some of their allies misguidedly drove them back into the camp (Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.9, Paus. IX.13.8). Xenophon ascribes this to the good fortune of the Thebans, as he does the allegedly excessive potations of the Spartan commanders at lunch, but he does not deny what is clear from other sources, that sound planning by the Thebans was the principal cause of their victory. The essential feature of Epaminondas' scheme was his decision to concentrate his attack, with a phalanx drawn up fifty deep, almost exclusively on the Spartan right wing and especially on Cleombrotus and his Spartiates, and so to win the battle by 'crushing the serpent's head' (Polyaen. II.3.15). Historians both ancient and modern have disagreed as to how precisely this goal was triumphantly achieved (Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.12ff, Diod. XV.55f, Plut. *Pel.* 23). Four facts stand out, to which any reconstruction must attempt to do justice. First, Cleombrotus took the unusual step of placing his cavalry in front of his infantry and the Thebans followed suit. Secondly, the Theban infantry

<sup>46</sup> Burn 1949 (C 332); Beister 1970 (C 322) 37ff; Buckler 1980 (C 329) 54ff; see also Tuplin, 'The Leuktra campaign: some outstanding problems', *Klio* 69 (1987) 72–107 at 72–7.

<sup>47</sup> Tuplin 1981 (B 119) 19off.

advanced diagonally towards the Spartan line, and in response Cleombrotus tried to swing his right wing forward to envelop the Thebans. Thirdly, a cavalry skirmish took place just before the infantry made contact, in which the Spartans were quickly defeated and fell back on the hoplites behind them, causing some disruption. Fourthly, the Theban infantry encountered Cleombrotus unexpectedly quickly, partly because Pelopidas and the Sacred Band moved forward at speed from their station at the front left corner of the Theban phalanx and fell on the Spartan right wing before it could complete its intended enveloping manoeuvre.<sup>48</sup> Nevertheless, as long as Cleombrotus survived, the Spartans held their own, and even after he fell they were able to carry him still living from the field, but eventually they were driven back almost to their camp. The rest of the Peloponnesian army, which had hardly been engaged at all, happily followed. Some Spartans still felt that they should fight again to recover the bodies of the dead and prevent the Thebans from setting up a trophy, but the polemarchs decided to ask for a truce. Spartan casualties were in the vicinity of 1,000, including 400 of the 700 Spartiates present, and their allies had no desire to fight. Indeed, some were not ill pleased at what had happened. So the Thebans set up their trophy and the bodies were returned.<sup>49</sup>

News reached Sparta on the last day of the Gymnopaedia, and the ephors ordered that the celebrations be completed and forbade the relatives of the fallen to mourn (Xen. *Hell.* vi.4.16). The two remaining *morai* were then sent out, together with all available members of the *morai* that had been at Leuctra, up to forty years over the minimum military age. Agesilaus was still convalescing from his illness, so his son Archidamus was appointed to command (Xen. *Hell.* vi.4.17ff; Diod. xv.54.6, 55.1 are misplaced). Sparta was still able to secure allies from Tegea, Mantinea, Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius and Achaea, and preparations were made to ship the army across the gulf, though in the event it went by land.

Meanwhile the Thebans had sent a message to Athens immediately after the battle, to report their great victory and encourage the Athenians to join them in taking revenge for all they had ever suffered at Sparta's hands. They may have hoped that the Athenians would be carried away on a wave of emotion, or they may have been too overcome themselves to think anything coherent at all. In fact the Athenian reaction was first, inevitably, shock and then dismay. The Theban herald found the *boule* in session, but it gave no answer to his request for help and sent him on his way without even the usual courtesies. So the Thebans turned to Jason of Pherae (Xen. *Hell.* vi.4.20; Diod. xv.54.5 is misplaced). The tyrant made

<sup>48</sup> Tuplin 1981 (B 119) 233ff.

<sup>49</sup> Tod no. 130 = Harding no. 46 is, however, a gravestone, not a trophy.

a lightning march through Phocis to Leuctra, but when the Thebans urged him to join them in finishing the Spartans off, he advised them against risking a decisive engagement which, if it turned out badly, might undo all their good work. He then gave similar advice to the Spartans, telling them to wait until they had recovered some strength before taking the field again. The Spartans accepted his offer to arrange a truce, and the survivors of the battle withdrew from Boeotia, meeting Archidamus and his force at Megara.

Jason's motive in dissuading both parties from a further confrontation is plain enough. If the Thebans won, which must now be deemed the likely result, they might quickly overrun the Peloponnese and be free to turn their undivided attention northwards and lead all Sparta's former allies against Thessaly. It would be far better for Jason if Sparta remained capable of offering some resistance to Thebes, so that part at least of the Theban effort would be diverted from the temptations of expansion to the north. On his way home Jason strengthened his own position by capturing and destroying Heraclea (*Xen. Hell.* vi.4.27f), so that, should he feel inclined at any future date to march south, his path could not be blocked at that point.

After Athens had recovered from the immediate shock of Leuctra, she attempted yet again to check Theban expansion by diplomatic means, inviting to a conference at Athens all those who wanted to share in the King's Peace (*Xen. Hell.* vi.5.1ff). Xenophon presents the motive as a desire to humiliate Sparta even further and reduce her to the position that Athens had been in in 404. Some Athenians may indeed have felt like this (cf. *Xen. Hell.* vii.1.12ff). But Athenian policy was not controlled by those who were obsessed by hatred of Sparta. Athens was certainly proclaiming herself sole champion of the peace, a position she had failed to seize in 375 and which Sparta had disastrously reclaimed a few weeks before. But to close ranks in the face of the Theban threat will have been the principal object, just as it had been before Leuctra, though the urgency was now much greater, as may be seen in one of the two striking features of the terms. If any participant in the peace was the victim of aggression, from any source, the other signatories bound themselves to come to her aid. This was not far short of a defensive alliance against Thebes. The other remarkable development was that those who swore undertook to abide not only by the peace which the King sent down but also by the decrees of the Athenians and the allies. The most natural reference of this clause is to those expansions and clarifications of the original autonomy clause which had been embodied, for instance, in the decree of Aristoteles. It does not mean that all who swore to the peace became members of the Athenian Confederacy.<sup>50</sup> Of those present, only

<sup>50</sup> Hampl 1938 (C 31) 24f; Sordi 1951 (C 77); Ryder 1965 (C 67) 133.

the Eleans objected, out of reluctance to concede autonomy to Margana, Scillus and Triphylia. So, when the other cities took the oath, Elis refused to swear, from which it emerges that for the first time Sparta did not presume to swear for her allies. That Sparta herself participated in the peace should not be doubted (Xen. *Hell.* vi. 5. 5, 10, 36f).<sup>51</sup>

On paper the peace was a diplomatic triumph for Athens, and it is also of note as the first renewal of the Peace of Antalcidas in which Persia played no part. 'The King's Peace' had become no more than a name (cf. Tod no. 133.23ff). But the Thebans had of course not attended the conference, and the initiative in Greek affairs now lay not with Athens or with Sparta and her allies but with Thebes.

<sup>51</sup> Sordi 1951 (C 77).

## CHAPTER 7

### THEBES IN THE 360s B.C.

J. ROY

Thebes' victory at Leuctra allowed it to attract allies and wield influence in many parts of the Greek world. It moved quickly from a position of relative weakness to become a leading power in Greek inter-state politics, acting in central Greece, Thessaly and Macedon, the Peloponnese, and – briefly – the Aegean. The available evidence of Theban activity in these various regions is very uneven. Information is richest on events in the Peloponnese, because Xenophon, who gives the fullest ancient account of the 360s, concentrates on Peloponnesian affairs to the neglect of other parts of Greece. Even on Peloponnesian affairs Xenophon is partisan in his judgments, both political and social, and also omits major events of the first importance, such as the liberation of Messenia. None the less his account, taken in conjunction with other available evidence, offers a quantity of information on Peloponnesian affairs that we do not possess for other areas. Much remains uncertain even in Peloponnesian history, but even more in the history of other Greek areas in these years.<sup>1</sup>

The opportunities which opened up for Thebes in the aftermath of Leuctra were great and tempting, but not all predictable. In the Peloponnese Sparta had for long done what it could to prevent unwelcome change. Resentment had none the less developed among Peloponnesian states on a great number of issues; some of these were particular matters, such as Elis' claim to Triphylia and Mantinea's desire to refound her urban centre, while others were wider, such as a wish to create an Arcadian federal state. Many such resentments and aspirations were linked to the widespread tensions between oligarchic and democratic factions in Peloponnesian states. It was natural for those Peloponnesians hostile to Sparta to try to take advantage of Spartan weakness following the setback at Leuctra; but their attempts led with surprising rapidity to a further weakening of Sparta, and offered Thebes remarkable opportunities in the Peloponnese.

<sup>1</sup> The nature of our sources makes chronological reconstruction of these years uncertain at many points. See in general the full and reasoned discussion by Buckler 1980 (C 329) 233–62, with a survey of the available literary sources, *ibid.* 263–77. Help may also be sought in Gehrke 1986 (C 28) and Cartledge 1987 (C 284).

Likewise in central and northern Greece in 371 B.C. any prospect of expanding Theban influence seemed to be checked by the strength of the Thessalian tyrant, Jason of Pherae. His murder, however, in 370 was followed by instability in Thessaly, and similarly in Macedon the death of King Amyntas (probably in later 370) brought on an unsettled period. In both areas Thebes found opportunities to seek influence which could not have been foreseen in 371.

In northern Greece, however, Thebes had to reckon with the ambitions of Athens. Athens had to adjust to the progressive shift of power in Greece which followed Leuctra.

The Second Athenian Confederacy had been set up to oblige the Spartans to allow other Greeks peace and freedom; but after Leuctra it became clear that Athens must consider the growing power of Thebes more dangerous than Sparta's depleted strength. By 369 Sparta and Athens were allied, while opposition between Athens and Thebes grew. This opposition, a natural development of the balance of power in the years following Leuctra, was sharpened by Thebes' interest in northern Greece, since Athens was interested in the same area, particularly in Amphipolis and the Chersonese.<sup>2</sup>

In their several areas of activity the Thebans tended to compartmentalize their efforts rather than to combine them. Clearly the strain of sending forces simultaneously to Thessaly and Macedon and to the Peloponnese, as in 369, or to the Aegean and to Thessaly, as in 364, must have affected decision-making at Thebes; but the Theban expeditions to these several areas, even when simultaneous, are presented by our sources as separate ventures. Because of that, and because of the state of our evidence, it is convenient to survey events region by region.

#### I. CENTRAL GREECE

In the period after Leuctra Thebes strengthened its position both within Boeotia and across central Greece. Orchomenus, a potential rival within Boeotia, was obliged to join the Boeotian federation, and a series of states – Aetolians, Acarnanians, Aenianians, West and East Locrians, Phocians, Heracleots, Malians, and Euboeans – formed alliances with Thebes (Diod. xv.57.1; cf. Xen. *Hell.* vi.5.23, *Ages.* 2.24). It is notable that the Euboeans defected from the Athenian Confederacy to join Thebes; Theban connexions with the island are illuminated by an

<sup>2</sup> The status of Athens' claims to Amphipolis and the Chersonese is unclear because of the difficulty of identifying the diplomatic transactions in the course of which Athens' claims could have been recognized by other states as Athenian orators later asserted (Aeschin. ii.31–3; Dem. vii.29; ix.16; xix.137, 253; on the difficulties raised by these passages see Buckler 1980 (C 329) 252–4). The passage of Aeschines, if reliable, shows an Athenian claim to Amphipolis before the death of King Amyntas of Macedon (probably late in 370 B.C.).



inscription recording loans made to Carystus around 370 by individual wealthy Thebans.<sup>3</sup> By late 370 Thebes' network of alliances in central Greece made her secure in the area – as she had not been before Leuctra – and offered scope for further expansion of Theban influence.

Lack of evidence obscures Thebes' relationship with these allies in central Greece. They provided troops for Theban-led campaigns, although the Phocians claimed successfully in 362 that their treaty with Thebes provided only for mutual defence (Xen. *Hell.* vii.5.4). It does appear however that alliance with Thebes saved the area from being a theatre of war during the decade following Leuctra. Campaigning took place to the north and to the south, but not in central Greece. The one major and notorious exception occurred in 364, when the Thebans destroyed Orchomenus; because of a supposed plot by Orchomenian knights and Theban exiles against Thebes, the knights were executed, the other inhabitants of Orchomenus sold into slavery, and the city razed (Diod. xv.79.3–6). Otherwise only a brief flurry over Oropus is noted (Xen. *Hell.* vii.4.1). Therefore, while we do not know why the states of central Greece were willing to ally with Thebes in 371 or 370, there was eventually advantage for them in such an alliance.

Jason of Pherae, himself increasingly powerful, had been a potential obstacle to Theban ambition in this area. He however was murdered in late summer 370 (Xen. *Hell.* vi.4.28–32). His brothers Polydorus and Polyphron succeeded him, but Polydorus was soon killed, possibly by Polyphron. Polyphron himself was murdered in 369 by Alexander of Pherae, who became the leading figure in Thessaly but met fierce opposition from other Thessalians (Xen. *Hell.* vi.4.33–7). This situation allowed Thebes more chance of developing influence in the north, besides removing any Thessalian threat to central Greece.

## II. PELOPONNESIAN AFFAIRS, 370–367 B.C.

Other opportunities, however, were presented to Thebes by developments in the Peloponnese in late 371 and 370 B.C. In Argos an extreme democratic movement (the *skytalismos*) broke out (Diod. xv.57.3–58.4), and there may have been attempted revolutions in Phigalea, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon and Phlius.<sup>4</sup> The most significant events, however, occurred in Arcadia.

The Mantineans, relying on the autonomy guaranteed by the peace at Athens, re-established a democracy and recreated their city, split up by Sparta in 384 B.C. (see above, p. 157). Sparta sent King Agesilaus to

<sup>3</sup> Wallace 1962 (B 181).

<sup>4</sup> Diod. xv.40 dates these revolutions to 375/4. Although his date has been defended (Roy 1973 (C 378)), the revolutions are often dated to the period after Leuctra.

persuade the Mantineans at least to postpone their plans, but he found no effective argument (Xen. *Hell.* vi. 5.3–5). At the same time in neighbouring Tegea a violent struggle broke out between pro-Spartan oligarchs and anti-Spartan democrats; when, with Mantinean help, the democrats prevailed, the oligarchic leaders were executed and 800 of their supporters fled to Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* vi. 5.6–10). A major issue in the Tegean *stasis*, according to Xenophon, was the democrats' proposal to found a federal Arcadian council. From the democrats now in control in Mantinea and Tegea came the impetus for an Arcadian federation.

It was debatable whether the Mantinean intervention in Tegea violated the peace recently concluded at Athens (cf. Xen. *Hell.* vi. 5.36), but Sparta mounted an expedition against Mantinea. Many Arcadian states assembled to assist Mantinea; only Heraea and Orchomenus, in Arcadia, are known to have supported Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* vi. 5.10–11). Xenophon says that Orchomenus refused to join the *Arkadikon*, thus making it clear that an Arcadian League had been created by the time Sparta attacked in late 370 B.C.<sup>5</sup> (The League was therefore not inspired by the Boeotians, who had not yet intervened in the Peloponnese, and indeed its constitution showed marked differences from the Boeotian federal structure.)<sup>6</sup> Argos, fiercely democratic, sent help to Mantinea. So too did Elis, probably not firmly democratic but undergoing tension between democrats and oligarchs, as was certainly the case in 365: Elis' main object was to recover Triphylia and Margana, removed from Elean control by Sparta in 400 B.C. (Xen. *Hell.* iii.2.30, vi.5.2; see p. 41f). Presumably Arcadia, Argos and Elis formed alliances with each other, for they jointly sought an alliance with Athens against Sparta, and, when Athens refused, they similarly appealed to Boeotia, which accepted (Diod. xv.62.3; Dem. xvi.12, 19–20). These negotiations were going on while the Spartan army under King Agesilaus was in Arcadia in the winter months of late 370. When the Eleans informed the Mantineans that the Thebans would certainly come to their aid, the Mantineans and their allies waited, refusing to face Agesilaus in battle (Xen. *Hell.* vi.5.19). Agesilaus then withdrew to Sparta. On his departure the Arcadians attacked pro-Spartan Heraea in western Arcadia, and then returned to Mantinea to join the Thebans and their allies (Xen. *Hell.* vi.5.22). By this time many Arcadian states were members of the Arcadian League, and most, if not all, joined by 369 B.C.

The Thebans and their allies had come to protect Arcadia against Sparta, which was no longer necessary. Their Peloponnesian allies, however, urged that all together should now invade Laconia, and the

<sup>5</sup> Dušanić 1970 (C 357) 281–90 puts the formation of the Arcadian League in August or September 370, but that is too early; cf. Roy 1974 (C 379).

<sup>6</sup> Dušanić 1970 (C 357) 285–6.

Boeotian commanders agreed.<sup>7</sup> There followed a major invasion, during which Laconia suffered considerable devastation. The Spartans successfully defended the town of Sparta itself, but could not prevent attacks on many towns in Laconia and on the dockyards at Gytheum, despite help from allies in the north-east Peloponnese (Xen. *Hell.* vi.5.23–32, 50–2; Diod. xv.62.5–65.6). The invaders then moved from Laconia to Messenia; they liberated Messenia from Spartan control and founded the city of Messene (Diod. xv.66.1–67.1: there are numerous other references to these events in ancient literature, but Xenophon omits them entirely from the *Hellenica*). The creation of the new Messenian state was evidently due to Epaminondas, and as such the first Boeotian initiative in Peloponnesian affairs. During the invasion of Laconia Sparta had appealed successfully to Athens for help (Xen. *Hell.* vi.5.33–49). The Athenians sent a force to the Peloponnese under Iphicrates, but he achieved little, and the Boeotians were able to leave the Peloponnese without serious hindrance (Xen. *Hell.* vi.5.51–2).

This campaign weakened Sparta drastically and permanently. Coming soon after Leuctra, the invasion of Laconia was a severe blow to Spartan military prestige; and the losses in Laconia through looting and destruction were heavy. Of the Peloponnesian League little was left except some allies in the north-east Peloponnese (Xen. *Hell.* vi.5.29, vii.2.2), themselves now under threat. Worst of all by far for Sparta, however, was the loss of most of Messenia, and with it the Messenian land and helots. Deprived of these resources for the support of Spartiates, Sparta could not hope to recover her former strength. Moreover her neighbours to the north and west were now hostile. Sparta remained a military power of note, and within a few years Agesilaus was able to campaign in the Hellespont and Egypt; but over the next decade in mainland Greek affairs Sparta's activities were confined to the Peloponnese.

In 369 the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans persuaded the Boeotians to undertake another campaign in the Peloponnese (Diod. xv.68.1). Sparta and Athens had meanwhile formed an alliance (Xen. *Hell.* vii.1.1–14; Diod. xv.67.1), but their forces failed to prevent the Boeotians from entering the Peloponnese (Xen. *Hell.* vii.1.15–17; Diod. xv.68.1–5). Epaminondas, after joining his Peloponnesian allies, attacked Sicyon and Pellene. Sicyon, after early losses, came to terms with Epaminondas and his allies; Epaminondas installed a garrison in the citadel but left the ruling oligarchs in control (Xen. *Hell.* vii.1.18, 2.2–3, 2.11, 3.2–4). The capitulation of Pellene is not directly attested, but it certainly joined the

<sup>7</sup> In undertaking further operations the boeotarchs somehow exceeded their authority, and Epaminondas and Pelopidas were tried as a result, but evidence for this episode is very poor: see Buckler 1980 (C 329) 138–45; Beister 1970 (C 322) 75–111.

anti-Spartan alliance (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.18, cf. 2.2–3, 2.11–15). Then Epaminondas attacked Troezen and Epidaurus, and later Corinth, where the defence was strengthened by Athenian troops and by mercenaries sent by Dionysius of Syracuse to help Sparta (see above, p. 150). These attacks achieved nothing and brought some losses, and Epaminondas and his allies returned to their homes (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.18–22; Diod. xv.69.1–70.1).

Also in 369, before and after the main campaign, Argos and Arcadia fought elsewhere. Argos attacked Phlius and Epidaurus (Xen. *Hell.* VII.2.2–4; VII.1.25), and evidently had hopes of expanding its power in the north-east Peloponnese. Arcadia attacked Pellene (Xen. *Hell.* VII.2.2–4; Diod. xv.67.2) and Asine (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.25). Argos, Arcadia, and Elis together jointly tried, without success, to help democratic exiles take over Phlius (Xen. *Hell.* VII.2.5–9).

In the winter of 369/8 Philiscus arrived in Greece as an emissary of the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes, presumably to win influence for Ariobarzanes and recruit mercenaries in Greece. He organized a peace conference at Delphi attended by the major Greek states. Sparta and Thebes could not, however, agree over the status of Messene, and the talks collapsed. Before leaving Greece Philiscus handed over to Sparta 2,000 mercenaries, paid for in advance (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.27; Diod. xv.70.2). Sparta seems subsequently to have entered into an alliance with Ariobarzanes (Xen. *Ages.* II.26).

The Boeotians did not campaign in the Peloponnese in 368, nor are the Eleans recorded as playing any part in that year's fighting. In the spring the Arcadians and Argives helped Euphron of Sicyon set up what he represented as a democratic government in Sicyon; Euphron argued that the oligarchs currently in power were liable to revert to alliance with Sparta. The initial phase of the change of government at Sicyon, despite the presence of Arcadian and Argive troops, may have seemed legitimate; but Euphron soon made himself tyrant. Relying on mercenary troops and popular support, he banished opponents and killed or exiled the other democratic leaders (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.44–6).<sup>8</sup>

Strengthened by Philiscus' mercenaries and by another force sent by Dionysius of Syracuse, Sparta recaptured Caryae near the Arcadian border and invaded south-west Arcadia. Arcadia received help from Argos and Messenia. (Messenia was evidently too weak to play much part in the fighting of these years, but mobilized when – as now and in 364 (Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.27) – Sparta threatened south-west Arcadia, through which ran the main military route from Laconia to Messenia.)

<sup>8</sup> On the chronology of Euphron's career see Meloni 1951 (C 370). For the interpretation followed here see Roy 1971 (C 61) 579–81, but cf. the criticisms of Thompson 1983 (C 386) on that and other aspects of Arcadian federal politics.

The Arcadians and their allies cut off the Spartan army and forced a pitched battle, which they then lost. This Spartan victory at the ‘Tearless Battle’ had little long-term significance, but at the time it helped restore Spartan prestige and morale, and it also gratified Elis and Thebes, now somewhat mistrustful of their ally Arcadia (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.28–32; Diod. xv.72.3).

Despite the defeat the Arcadians and Argives went on to attack Phlius yet again (Xen. *Hell.* VII.2.10). The most important act in the Peloponnese in 368 after the Tearless Battle was, however, the foundation of Megalopolis. The communities of much of south-west Arcadia, and in particular of the main Megalopolis basin (as it can now be called), were united into a single polis with a fortified urban centre.<sup>9</sup> Though Epaminondas received considerable credit in antiquity for the founding of Megalopolis (Paus. VIII.27.2, IX.14.4, IX.15.6), it seems to have been essentially an Arcadian creation, carried out at a time when relations between Arcadia and Boeotia were beginning to cool, though Thebes sent Pammenes with 1,000 men to help protect the building of the city (Paus. VIII.27.2). In addition to the social and economic importance of providing a major urban centre for south-west Arcadia, the new fortified city also created a serious obstacle to Sparta, as did the fortified cities of Mantinea (newly rebuilt) and Tegea, in south-east Arcadia, and Messene.

Some fighting continued in the Peloponnese in 367. Phlius was attacked yet again by Argos, Pellene, Sicyon and the Boeotian garrison in Sicyon (Xen. *Hell.* VII.2.11–15; Diod. xv.75.3). There is no record of other campaigning.

Thebes could feel reasonably satisfied with events in the Peloponnese since Leuctra. Sparta had been drastically weakened, while Thebes had formed alliances with Arcadia, Argos, Elis, Sicyon and Pellene. (It is notable that, while Thebes called on its allies from central Greece for campaigns in the Peloponnese, no attempt was made to use Peloponnesian allies outside the Peloponnese.) Though other Thebans might disagree with the policy, Thebes under the leadership of Epaminondas did not support any particular form of government among her allies, forming ties with both the democrats of Argos and Arcadia and the oligarchs of Sicyon. Elis too did not try to promote any particular form of government elsewhere; Elis’ prime aim in these years was to recover

<sup>9</sup> The main ancient accounts of the foundation are in Diod. xv.72.4 and Paus. VIII.27.1–8; Xenophon does not mention it. Much remains controversial about both the date and the nature of the synoecism. See Moggi 1976 (C 48) 293–325 no. 45, where ancient evidence is cited and discussed; also Dušanić 1970 (C 357) 317–31; Lanzillotta 1975 (C 368); Buckler 1980 (C 329) 107–9; and, with a review of earlier arguments, Hornblower 1990 (C 366). While dates from 371 to 367 have been proposed for the foundation, the date reported by Diodorus (368) is adopted here. Pausanias lists much wider participation in the synoecism than Diodorus; it is in any case clear that some communities, intended to join the new foundation, resisted strongly (Diod. xv.94.1; Paus. VIII.27.5–6).

lost territory, but that aim was producing conflict with Arcadia. Elis sought Triphylia and Lasion, but both claimed to be Arcadian (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.26) and were admitted to the Arcadian League; Triphylia joined by 367 at latest (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.33, cf. Paus. VI.3.9) and Lasion by 365 at latest (Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.12), but both may have been admitted as early as 369. Elis accordingly had little left to fight for, unless it challenged its ally Arcadia. Argos and Arcadia, both themselves democratic, had shown a desire to promote democracy elsewhere, most notably at Sicyon. Argos in addition evidently had ambitions in the north-eastern Peloponnese, though these made little progress; in 366 Argos was still unsuccessfully attacking Phlius (where the defenders were then helped by the Athenian Chares (Xen. *Hell.* VII.2.18–23; Diod. XV.75.3)). Arcadia still faced a threat from Sparta, since Sparta could act in the Peloponnese only by first passing through Arcadian territory. Moreover, Arcadia held territory won from Sparta; besides Aegyptis and Sciritis, incorporated in Megalopolis (Paus. VIII.27.4), the Arcadians occupied Sellasia in Laconia as late as 365 (Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.12). Arcadia, moreover, had the capacity to strike elsewhere in the Peloponnese. It was thus doubtful whether Thebes or Arcadia was the more influential in the Peloponnese, and Thebes had reason to be suspicious of Arcadian ambitions.

### III. THESSALY AND MACEDON, 369–367 B.C.

North of Boeotia in 369 B.C. Alexander of Pherae was attempting to secure control in Thessaly, nominally as chief federal magistrate (*tagos*) but effectively as tyrant. His Thessalian opponents appealed to the young King Alexander of Macedon, who had succeeded his father King Amyntas, probably in later 370 (Diod. XV.61.2–3). King Alexander moved into Thessaly before the tyrant could forestall him, and took and garrisoned the Thessalian towns Larissa and Crannon before returning to Macedon (Diod. XV.61.4–5). When the tyrant's opponents also appealed to Thebes, Pelopidas was sent into Thessaly with an army. No agreement between Pelopidas, or Thebes, and King Alexander at this stage is recorded, but Pelopidas was able to take over Larissa and Crannon with an ease which suggests some previous arrangement.<sup>10</sup> Meanwhile in Macedon King Alexander was being challenged by a pretender, Ptolemy; both king and pretender appealed to Pelopidas, who

<sup>10</sup> See Buckler 1980 (C 329) 113–14. For the chronology of these events adopted in the text, see Buckler *ibid.* 245–9; a different view is offered by Hammond and Griffith 1979 (D 50) 180–5. Buckler (*ibid.* 247) also argues that some scattered evidence of campaigning in Thessaly by Pelopidas can be assigned to 369 B.C. It is also possible (Buckler *ibid.* 247–8) that Pelopidas initiated constitutional reforms there that year, though it is only certain that the reforms were in effect by 361/0; cf. Tod no. 147 = Harding no. 59, showing an *archon* as chief Thessalian magistrate.

marched into Macedon. There, according to Plutarch, Pelopidas arbitrated between the king and the pretender, composing their differences, while according to Diodorus he made an alliance with the king. The latter, at least, must be true, since the king handed over to Pelopidas hostages including his own younger brother Philip, the future king. Pelopidas then returned through Thessaly to Boeotia (Diod. xv.67.3–4; Plut. *Pel.* 26).

In 368 the Thessalian opponents of the tyrant Alexander of Pherae again appealed to Thebes against his conduct. Thebes decided to send Pelopidas and Ismenias as ambassadors to investigate. Once in Thessaly, however, Pelopidas, who had no Boeotian troops, found it necessary to recruit in Thessaly. Meanwhile in Macedon the pretender Ptolemy had had King Alexander murdered, and now ruled as regent for the young Perdiccas. Ptolemy was himself challenged by a further pretender, Pausanias, who captured some places at the north end of the Chalcidic peninsula. Because of interest in Amphipolis, Athens tried to profit from this uncertain situation, and sent Iphicrates with a force to the area. (He remained until replaced by Timotheus in 365 (Dem. xxiii.149).) Iphicrates drove Pausanias out of Macedon, no doubt in the hope of gains for Athens in the Chalcidic peninsula. Pelopidas, however, also entered Macedon. He had only unreliable mercenaries at his disposal, and might have found himself in a dangerous situation, had not he reached an agreement with Ptolemy. Ptolemy in fact made an alliance with Thebes much as his predecessor Alexander had done. Pelopidas then returned to Thessaly, still with no effective military force. When he and Ismenias met the tyrant Alexander of Pherae at Pharsalus, the tyrant seized the two men and imprisoned them at Pherae (Diod. xv.71.1–2; Plut. *Pel.* 27; Aeschin. ii.26–9). Thebes sent an army to Thessaly to free the two Thebans. Alexander of Pherae in the mean time had made an alliance with Athens, which sent Autocles with thirty ships and 1,000 men to Thessaly. The Theban force not only failed to overcome the tyrant and his allies, but got into serious difficulties when it tried to withdraw; Epaminondas, serving as a private soldier, succeeded in extricating it (Diod. xv.71.3–7; Plut. *Pel.* 28.1–29.1).

In spring 367 Epaminondas led a second Theban expedition to free Pelopidas and Ismenias. He proceeded cautiously in order to avoid provoking Alexander of Pherae. The tyrant had in fact recently shown his character by massacring the inhabitants of two Thessalian towns, Meliboea and Scotussa. At length Epaminondas' tactics moved Alexander to seek terms. He offered to release his prisoners in return for a treaty of peace and friendship, but Epaminondas refused to agree to more than a thirty days' truce. This was accepted, and the prisoners returned to Boeotia with Epaminondas and his army (Plut. *Pel.* 29). In

effect the truce left Alexander with his power, such as it was, intact in Thessaly for the time being, since Thebes did not send another force into Thessaly in 367.

The limited evidence for Theban activity in Thessaly and Macedon from 369 to 367 makes it difficult to judge what was happening, the more so because our sources tend to concentrate on Pelopidas and say little of policy-making at Thebes. Thebes clearly sought to limit the power of Alexander of Pherae; if securely in power in Thessaly he would be a potential threat to central Greece, as Jason of Pherae had been at the end of his life. So long as the situation in Thessaly was unstable, however, there was the prospect of extending Theban influence; and the same was true in Macedon so long as it too remained unstable. Athens was clearly willing to seek advantage in such a situation, as the expeditions in 368 of Iphicrates to Macedon and Autocles to Thessaly show (and Athens had tried, but failed, to persuade Sparta to send Dionysius' mercenaries to Thessaly for use against Thebes, *Xen. Hell.* VII. I. 28); Thebes apparently was equally willing to exploit the situation. Insecure rulers in Macedon and the ineffective Thessalian opposition to Alexander of Pherae could not, however, give Thebes secure influence in these areas, and Thebes had achieved nothing of lasting significance there by 367.

#### IV. PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, 367–366 B.C.

In 367 B.C. Sparta sent an embassy to the Persian King at Susa. When the Thebans and Athenians learnt of this, they too each sent an embassy. The Thebans consulted their allies, and ambassadors from Elis and Arcadia accompanied Pelopidas, the Theban representative. Thebes evidently now felt that it was powerful enough to merit Persian support, as well as being anxious to ensure that Sparta or Athens did not succeed in obtaining Persian backing to an extent dangerous to Thebes. Before the King Pelopidas could make good use of Thebes' medism during Xerxes' invasion of Greece, and of Thebes' very recent successes. He proposed to the King that peace be arranged in Greece on condition that Greeks should be autonomous; that Messenia be independent; that the Athenian fleet be beached; and that parties to the peace agree to make war on anyone breaking it. During the negotiations Pelopidas received a surprising degree of support from Timagoras, one of the Athenian ambassadors. Other issues must have been discussed, but the only one explicitly recorded is the possession of the territories disputed by Elis and Arcadia; although Arcadia held these territories, and had in fact chosen a man from Lepreum in the disputed area as Arcadian ambassador, the King favoured Elis, no doubt prompted by Thebes. Most such



minor issues are not recorded in the evidence. We can surmise that, from the King's point of view, there were attractions in supporting Thebes rather than Sparta or Athens, because Athens was still powerful in the Aegean through its confederacy, while Sparta had received help in 368 from the dubiously loyal satrap Ariobarzanes. Persian support for Thebes could weaken Athens and Sparta while offering no danger to Persia. Artaxerxes did, in fact, approve of the Theban proposals, and the ambassadors returned home. When they reached home, the Athenians tried and executed Timagoras for his part in the negotiations (*Xen. Hell.* VII.1.33–8, *Plut. Pel.* 30).

The embassy had lasted several months, and it was probably early in 366 that Thebes organized a congress of states in order to have the terms of the peace accepted. The congress went very badly. Thebes wanted those present to swear to the terms of the peace, which were announced by a representative of the Persian King. Some of the ambassadors objected that they were there only to listen to terms, not to swear to adopt them. The Arcadian leader Lycomedes went further and challenged the right of the Thebans to hold the congress in Thebes; he then, in the face of Theban anger, refused to take part in the congress. The congress finally failed to make any progress at all (*Xen. Hell.* VII.1.39). The Thebans then tried again to persuade Greek states to accept the terms of the peace by sending ambassadors to individual cities. Corinth, the first state so approached, refused to accept the terms, and other states in turn did the same (*Xen. Hell.* VII.1.40). Thebes' diplomatic initiative failed utterly.

#### V. CENTRAL GREECE AND THE PELOPONNESE, 366–365 B.C.

In 366 B.C., after Thebes' abortive diplomatic initiative, Epaminondas again led an army into the Peloponnese, in order to win over Achaëa and also to gain more influence over Arcadia and the other Peloponnesian allies. The Achaean cities were oligarchic, but had so far remained neutral in the recent conflicts in the Peloponnese. Having united with his Peloponnesian allies, Epaminondas entered Achaëa, where the ruling oligarchs rapidly came to terms with him. They agreed to form an alliance with Thebes provided that they remained in control in Achaëa; the agreement was similar to that made by Epaminondas with Sicyon in 369. He none the less 'liberated' three strategically important places, Dyme in western Achaëa and Naupactus and Calydon, both north of the Gulf of Corinth but at the time Achaean; he then returned home (*Xen. Hell.* VII.1.41–2; *Diod.* xv.75.2). Epaminondas' acceptance of the Achaean oligarchies roused protests from the Arcadians and 'the

opponents' (presumably Achaean democrats, but possibly Theban opponents of Epaminondas), who complained at Thebes. By Theban decision Epaminondas' settlement was drastically modified. Theban harmosts were sent to Achaëa, where they expelled the oligarchs and set up democracies. The exiled oligarchs, however, joined forces and marched against each city in turn, and rapidly regained control. Whereas they had been neutral before 366, once back in power they were firmly pro-Spartan (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.43).

A surprising incident in 366 was the deposition of Euphron by the Arcadians. In 368 the Arcadians and Argives had helped Euphron establish a democratic regime in Sicyon. He had then made himself tyrant. In 366 the Arcadian federal general Aeneas of Stymphalus, thinking the situation in Sicyon intolerable, led a force to the acropolis of Sicyon, apparently with the acquiescence of the Theban governor; there he summoned the leading citizens still in Sicyon and recalled the exiles. Euphron fled, handing over the harbour at Sicyon to the Spartans before he left. It is not clear what form the government of Sicyon now took, save that oligarchs and democrats were at odds. With Arcadian help the Sicyonians recovered control of their harbour. Euphron returned with mercenaries from Athens, and with popular support again took control of the city. Unable to secure full control while a Theban governor held the acropolis, he went to Thebes in the hope of persuading the Thebans to exile the oligarchs and give him complete control. Some former exiles, however, learnt of his plan, and one of them assassinated him in Thebes. The Sicyonians took his body home and buried it with honour in the market-place (Xen. *Hell.* VII.1.44–6, 2.11–15, 3.1–12, 4.1; Diod. xv.70.3). Sicyon maintained its links with Boeotia and with its Peloponnesian allies (Bengtson, *SdA* II<sup>2</sup>285a; Diod. xv.85.2). This episode was not in itself of great political importance, but it is illuminating. Besides offering yet another example of the internal conflict so widespread in Peloponnesian communities at this time, it shows that the Arcadians, while supporters of democracy, were not prepared to tolerate a tyrant, even one acting in the popular interest.<sup>11</sup>

Around midsummer 366 Themison, tyrant of Eretria on Euboea, seized from Athens Oropus, which had fairly recently returned to Athenian control after periods of independence and of Theban domination. When Athens sent a force to recover Oropus, the Thebans, Themison's allies, took over Oropus to protect it, and subsequently retained possession of it, the Athenians failing to recover it in a legal

<sup>11</sup> See note 8 above. Thompson 1983 (c 386) sees the deposition of Euphron as evidence that there were in the Arcadian League two principal factions, one supporting the *demos* in Sicyon and its leader Euphron, the other supporting Euphron's opponents. He also sees these factions as having much wider significance in Arcadian affairs.

arbitration.<sup>12</sup> The incident poisoned the already difficult relations between Athens and Thebes, and the two states remained unfriendly until they allied against Philip of Macedon in 339. Athens was also distressed at her allies' failure to help during this incident, and Lycomedes, the Arcadian leader, profited by the situation to propose an Arcadian–Athenian alliance. Although some Athenians doubted the wisdom of forming such an alliance with Sparta's enemy while the Athenian–Spartan alliance made in 369 was still in force, there were advantages for Athens in reducing Arcadia's reliance on Boeotia, and Athens entered into a mutual defence pact with Arcadia. While returning home from these negotiations Lycomedes was murdered by Arcadian exiles (Xen. *Hell.* vii.4.2–3). The Theban–Arcadian alliance had lately been under considerable strain. The negotiations with Persia had favoured Elis over Arcadia on the Triphylian question, and Lycomedes had played a considerable part in wrecking the subsequent congress at Thebes; and then Epaminondas' settlement in Achaëa, clearly unpopular with the Arcadians, would, had it lasted, have increased considerably Theban influence in the Peloponnese. Yet the Boeotian–Arcadian alliance was still in force; as Xenophon says, reducing Arcadia's dependence on Boeotia was one of Athens' motives for forming an alliance with Arcadia, and Thebes did continue to provide military support for Arcadia (e.g. in 364, Xen. *Hell.* vii.4.27; Justin vi.6.6–10). Lycomedes thus succeeded in maintaining Arcadia's alliance with Boeotia while reducing Arcadia's dependence on Thebes.

During the negotiations with Arcadia it was also proposed in Athens to ensure that Corinth could not be a threat to Athens. Corinth, hearing of the proposal, forestalled any such move by obliging all Athenian troops to withdraw from Corinth. Corinth then hired mercenaries to protect her independence, and went on to campaign against hostile neighbours (Xen. *Hell.* vii.4.4–6; cf. Plut. *Tim.* 4.1). The brief tyranny of Timophanes at this time may suggest some internal unrest in Corinth.<sup>13</sup> These events probably occurred over the winter 366/5 B.C.

<sup>12</sup> Xen. *Hell.* vii.4.1; Aeschin. iii.85 with schol.; Diod. xv.76.1. On the date of the incident see Buckler 1980 (C 329) 250–1; on the arbitration Buckler 1977 (C 325). On the changing status of Oropus from 411 B.C. see Thuc. viii.60 (in 411 garrisoned by Athens and captured by the Boeotians), viii.95.1–4 (Peloponnesian base in 411); Lys. xxxi.9 (independent in 403); Diod. xiv.17.1–3 (after *stasis* and Theban intervention in 402, first independent and then incorporated into Boeotia); Isoc. xiv.20 (Oropian territory ceded to Athens) and 37 (unsuccessful Theban attempt to overthrow the Athenian claim to Oropus). Sealey 1956 (C 253) 190–2 dates the events referred to in Isoc. xiv.37 to 375/4; Oropus had evidently by then become independent of Boeotia, no doubt under the Peace of Antalcidas.

<sup>13</sup> Plut. *Tim.* 4; Arist. *Pol.* i.306a19–24; Nep. *Tim.* 1.1.3; Diod. xvi.65.3–5 (obviously misdated); cf. the earlier unsuccessful revolution in Corinth (Diod. xv.40.3). On the possibility that Timophanes' tyranny is evidence of unrest in Corinth, see the balanced judgment of Salmon 1984 (C 380) 384–6. Cf. below p. 709.

Corinth also initiated peace negotiations of considerable importance. After a preliminary inquiry at Thebes as to whether negotiations about peace might be fruitful, Corinth sought permission from Sparta to make peace with Thebes, and Sparta granted that permission not only to Corinth but to any of her other allies who wished to make peace. Exactly how many states made peace in spring 365 is not clear from the evidence; certainly, of Sparta's allies, Corinth, Phlius, and Epidaurus made peace with Thebes and Argos (though Argos did retain a fortress in Phliasian territory), but it is possible that on both sides others were also party to the agreements. Thebes wanted Corinth to join in an alliance, but Corinth made it plain that it wanted only peace.<sup>14</sup> These agreements brought to an end the Peloponnesian alliance which had been a major support of Spartan power since the sixth century B.C.; Thebes had now deprived Sparta of both Messenia and the Peloponnesian League. For the Thebans and their Peloponnesian allies the peace meant that any further warfare in the Peloponnese was essentially an Arcadian affair. The north-east Peloponnese was now at peace, and Argive ambitions in the area had to be abandoned. There remained, however, war between Sparta and Arcadia, and that was soon to be extended when Elis changed sides and, supported by Sparta and Achaea, fought Arcadia. Arcadia's allies were still committed to helping Arcadia; but such campaigns did not directly concern their own interests.

#### VI. NORTHERN GREECE AND THE AEGEAN, 366–364 B.C.

The background to Thebes' renewed interest in northern Greece and her unique naval venture is increased Athenian activity in and around the Aegean. In 366 the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes, then in revolt, appealed to both Athens and Sparta for help. Despite their difficulties in mainland Greece, both responded. Sparta sent King Agesilaus, who in these years sought to raise money by military service abroad, first for Ariobarzanes and later in Egypt (Xen. *Ages.* 25–31). Athens sent Timotheus with instructions to help Ariobarzanes but to avoid violating the terms of Athens' treaty with the Persian King (Dem. xv.9). Timotheus acted as an

<sup>14</sup> The nature of the peace treaty is controversial. The main sources are Xen. *Hell.* VII.4.6–11 and Diod. xv.76.3; further information comes from Isoc. VI, set during these negotiations. Xenophon's version (followed in the text) is clearly not a full account. Diodorus has only a brief statement that Persian ambassadors arrived and persuaded the Greeks to make a Common Peace. Cawkwell 1961 (c 14) argues in favour of Diodorus' version (*contra*, Buckler 1980 (c 329) 251–5); Ryder 1957 (c 66) (summarized in Ryder 1965 (c 67) 83) supports Xenophon's version, but supposes that the terms of the peace were those already unsuccessfully proposed by Thebes in the congress at Thebes in 366 B.C.; Salmon 1984 (c 380) 379–81, rejects Diodorus' version but also stresses (against Ryder) that the initiative for the negotiations came from Corinth, which wanted peace only, and not from Thebes.

opportunist, going wherever there were gains to be made.<sup>15</sup> He first took Samos after a ten-month siege; it had had a Persian garrison but was not protected by the King's Peace (Dem. xv.9; Isoc. xv.111). It was not a member of the Athenian Confederacy, and the Athenians felt free to expel Samians and install Athenian cleruchs (Arist. *Rh.* 1384b32–6; Diod. xviii.8.7, 18.9); even though not a breach of the rules of the confederacy, Athens' action may have worried members of the confederacy, as may the installation of another cleruchy by 361/0 at Potidaea (Tod no. 146 = Harding no. 58). After Samos, though the details and timing of his activities are unclear, it is apparent that Timotheus devoted much of his energies to Macedon and the Chalcidic peninsula on the one hand, and to the Hellespontine region on the other. In the Hellespont he took Sestus and Crithote (Xen. *Ages.* II.26; Isoc. xv.112; Nep. *Timoth.* 1.3). In the area of Macedon and Chalcidice in a series of campaigns he took Methone, Pydna, Torone and Potidaea (Dem. iv.4; Isoc. xv.113; Din. I.14; Diod. xv.81.6). Here the young king of Macedon, Perdiccas, had murdered his regent Ptolemy, probably in 365 (Diod. xv.77.5, xvi.2.4). He fought with Amphipolis against the Athenian forces (Aeschin. II.29) but eventually co-operated with them (Dem. II.14; Polyae. III.10.14). While Athens thus sought to extend her influence, Thebes made two attempts, one by sea and one by land, to develop her own influence.

Boeotia had never been a major naval power, although it did have ships (e.g. [Dem]. XLIX.14–15, 21; Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.3). It was hampered by a lack of suitable harbours, and by the fact that from its east coast the Aegean could be reached only through the straits past Euboea. None the less Thebes decided, probably in 366, to build and launch a major war-fleet. The cost of building, equipping and manning such a fleet must have been very great, and it is entirely likely (though not attested) that Thebes, favoured by Persia in the negotiations of 367–366, received financial help from the Persian King for its navy. Epaminondas persuaded the Thebans to build 100 triremes, together with the necessary dockyards (Diod. xv.78.4–79.1). Time was obviously needed to build the ships and train the crews, and the fleet finally sailed in 364.<sup>16</sup> Epaminondas' plan was to win over Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium; if successful, it would have given Thebes allies at major strategic points. Epaminondas' fleet escaped from an Athenian squadron under Laches, and visited the three cities, but no lasting gains for Thebes seem to have been made, except perhaps to detach Byzantium from alliance with

<sup>15</sup> The lack of a coherent narrative of Timotheus' campaigns after the siege of Samos makes any reconstruction of them difficult. Buckler 1980 (C 329) 255–7, offers a discussion of the evidence and a reconstruction; cf. the comments by Kallet 1983 (C 180) 246 n. 24.

<sup>16</sup> On the date see Buckler 1980 (C 329) 257–9.

Athens.<sup>17</sup> Epaminondas also intervened in internal conflict at Heraclea on the Black Sea, as Timotheus had done before him (Justin xvi.4.1–3). It is possible, but far from certain, that a revolt from Athens on Ceos, the second in quick succession, was inspired by Epaminondas' voyage; but in any case the Athenians soon re-established control (Tod no. 142 = Harding no. 55). While, remarkably enough, Epaminondas was able in 364 to sail a war-fleet across the Aegean without serious opposition, he did not commit the fleet to any major fighting and he did not succeed in using it as an effective diplomatic instrument. After this one, ineffective, voyage the Theban fleet returned home and did not venture forth again. If the fleet was in fact subsidized by the Persian King, he may well have declined to continue paying for a fleet which achieved so little; but this is conjecture.

On land the Thebans again marched north in 364. In his struggle against Thessalian opposition Alexander of Pherae made progress, capturing and garrisoning Phthiotic Achaia and Magnesia. His opponents appealed to Thebes to send a relief force under Pelopidas. Thebes agreed, but then disbanded the army because of an eclipse of the sun (13 July 364). Pelopidas then set off with a force of volunteers and mercenaries, and joined his Thessalian allies. When his forces met those of Alexander in battle at Cynoscephalae, Pelopidas' men won a hard-fought victory but he himself was killed. His death provoked an intense reaction among his Thessalian allies, who begged for the honour of conducting his funeral and carried it out in a rich and splendid style (Diod. xv.80.1–5; Plut. *Pel.* 31–4). It was probably on the same occasion that a statue of Pelopidas was dedicated at Delphi by Thessalians (*SEG* xxii 460 = Harding no. 49 (incomplete)). Thebes, on learning of his death, immediately sent a powerful expeditionary force, which defeated Alexander's army in a second battle. Thebes obliged him to withdraw from the Thessalian cities which he had occupied, and to become an ally of Thebes (Diod. xv.80.6; Plut. *Pel.* 35.1–2). Thebes had for the time

<sup>17</sup> On these events see Diod. xv.79.1; Isoc. v.53; Plut. *Phil.* 14.1–2. There seems to be no doubt that Rhodes and Chios remained members of the Second Athenian Confederacy until they revolted from it in 357 (Diod. xvi.7.3). Only Byzantium may conceivably have been detached from alliance with Athens by Epaminondas' naval efforts in 364 (so, e.g., Cargill 1981 (C 101) 169). Though Byzantium too is described by Diodorus (xvi.7.3) as having revolted from Athens in 357, it may already have been unfriendly to Athens in 362 ([Dem]. L.6). But, despite Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 200, there is no evidence that Byzantium formed an alliance with Thebes in 364 B.C. Tod no. 160 = Harding no. 74 shows Byzantium as friendly enough with Thebes in the period 355–351 to send two financial contributions to help Thebes in the Sacred War. It refers to the official Byzantine representatives as *synedroi*, but it is hazardous to conclude from this that Byzantium was part of a Theban alliance within which member-states were represented in a *synedrion* (so now Lewis 1990 (C 341)); even if it is regarded as evidence of an alliance between Byzantium and Thebes, the alliance need not have been formed as early as 364. Dem. ix.34 is ambiguous, and in any case refers to 341.

being achieved the dominant influence in Thessaly which it had sought since 369. Alexander was in effect a subordinate ally, and had to provide troops for Theban campaigns, as did his Thessalian opponents also (e.g. *Xen. Hell.* vii.5.4). He was so far separated from his former ally Athens, that in the late 360s he launched piratical raids in the Cyclades, attacked Peparethos and Tenos (both members of the Athenian Confederacy), and even raided the Piraeus ([*Dem.*]L.4; *Diod.* xv.95.1–2; *Polyaen.* vi.2.2; cf. *Xen. Hell.* vi.4.35). Finally in 361/0, when Thebes was weakened by the Battle of Mantinea, Alexander's Thessalian opponents made an alliance with Athens against him (Tod no. 147 = Harding no. 59). In 364, however, by defeating Alexander and imposing an alliance on him, Thebes had done much to counter any growth of Athenian influence in northern Greece.

#### VII. PELOPONNESIAN AFFAIRS, 365–362 B.C.

War between Sparta and Arcadia continued. In 365, with the help of mercenaries sent by Dionysius II of Syracuse, Sparta recovered Sellasia (*Xen. Hell.* vii.4.12). The war was soon extended, however, when Elis seized Lasion, hitherto claimed by Elis but incorporated in Arcadia, and so provoked an Elean–Arcadian war (*Xen. Hell.* vii.4.12; *Diod.* xv.77.1–2, confused). Athens must have regarded Elis as the aggressor, since it sent help to Arcadia under the mutual defence pact of 366 (*Diod.* xv.77.3; *Xen. Hell.* vii.4.29); Boeotia, Argos and – when Sparta entered south-west Arcadia in 364 – Messenia also sent troops to help Arcadia (*Xen. Hell.* vii.4.27, 29, 36; *Justin* vi.6.6–10). Elis had clearly broken with the Boeotian–Peloponnesian alliance, and instead formed an alliance with Sparta and Achaëa (*Xen. Hell.* vii.4.17–19). Within Elis there was conflict between oligarchs and democrats; the oligarchs succeeded in taking control and expelled the democrats, who were friendly towards Arcadia (*Xen. Hell.* vii.4.15–16). During the war the Arcadians tried to establish the Elean democrats at Pylus, east of Elis, and also to promote a democratic revolution at Pellene in Achaëa, but both attempts soon collapsed (*Xen. Hell.* vii.4.16–18, 26). The first Arcadian counter-attack against the Elean seizure of Lasion reached the agora of Elis itself, and thereafter the Eleans had to fight on their own territory, much of which fell under Arcadian control. Two notable incidents during the war were the capture by the Arcadians and their allies of a Spartan force at Cromnus in south-west Arcadia (*Xen. Hell.* vii.4.19–27; *Justin* vi.6.6–10), and a battle in the sanctuary at Olympia while the 104th Olympic games were being held (*Xen. Hell.* vii.4.28–32; *Paus.* vi.4.2, 8.3, 22.3; *Diod.* xv.78.1–3 is confused, with a doublet at

xv.82.1). With the territory captured from Elis, Arcadia created independent states in Acrorea and Pisatis; an inscription shows them as parties to an alliance with Arcadia, Messenia and Sicyon.<sup>18</sup>

No further fighting in this war is recorded after the battle at Olympia in 364. The reason appears to be that the initiative lay with the Arcadian League, and that the league was hampered by internal dissension, at the very time when its influence in the Peloponnese was strongest. Though the new state of Pisatis controlled Olympia, Arcadian officials evidently had access to treasure at Olympia, and used it to pay for the Arcadian League's standing force (the *eparitōi*). Mantinean protests at the practice eventually won a majority in the federal assembly, and the practice stopped; this meant that the *eparitōi* were no longer paid, and they dropped out, to be replaced by wealthier Arcadians. The assembly also voted for peace with Elis. Federal officials, however, were opposed to these tendencies, and looked for Theban support. A crisis was provoked when the officials, with the help of the Theban commander present in Arcadia, tried and failed to arrest their leading opponents. The Theban commander was sent back to Thebes and an Arcadian embassy complained about his conduct. This provoked a bitter complaint from Epaminondas that the Arcadians had made peace with Elis without consulting Boeotia, and the threat that the Boeotians would march into Arcadia (Xen. *Hell.* vii.4.33–40; Diod. xv.82.1–2 is confused). The split in the Arcadian League thus brought major warfare again to the Peloponnese.

The Arcadians opposed to Thebes, among whom the Mantineans were prominent, allied themselves with Elis, Achaea and Sparta, and appealed to Athens under the mutual defence pact for military help, which was sent. The pro-Theban Arcadians, including the Tegeans and Megalopolitans, continued to benefit from Arcadia's alliances with Argos, Sicyon, Messenia and Boeotia. After attempts on Sparta and Mantinea, Epaminondas and his allies faced Sparta, Athens and their allies near Mantinea. Epaminondas' army broke the enemy line, but Epaminondas himself was killed, and this major confrontation produced no decisive outcome (Xen. *Hell.* vii.5 *passim*; Diod. xv.82.3–87.6).

#### VIII. INTERNAL POLITICAL CONFLICT IN GREEK STATES IN THIS PERIOD

It is difficult to discern the internal politics of Thebes in this period. The available sources concentrate on the two friends and leaders Epaminondas and Pelopidas, who were in fact chosen to play a leading part in most

<sup>18</sup> *SEG* xxii 339 = Bengtson, *SdA* 285a; see also *SEG* xxix 405, xxxii 411 (reporting a new fragment mentioning Acrorea). See also the Pisatan proxeny-decree, *SIG* 171.



of their state's campaigns and embassies abroad and therefore presumably enjoyed considerable political support at home. Plutarch singles out the opposition to Epaminondas and Pelopidas of Meneleidas, attributing it to spite (Plut. *Pel.* 25.2–7; cf. Nep. *Epam.* 5.2–6); his opposition may, however, have had a sounder political basis, and in particular a desire for less warfare. Certain incidents show that there was opposition to political leadership of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. These include the trials of Epaminondas and Pelopidas in 369, in which Meneleidas played a part;<sup>19</sup> and Thebes' readiness in 366 to overturn Epaminondas' agreement with the ruling Achaean oligarchs and set up democracies in Achaia. These are mere glimpses, just as there are glimpses of out-and-out hostility to the current constitution of Thebes. After political failure Meneleidas apparently attempted a revolution (Plut. *Pel.* 25.7); and Orchomenus was totally destroyed by Thebes in 364 because of a supposed plot by Orchomenian knights and Theban exiles to overthrow the Theban constitution (Diod. xv.79.3–6). It is possible that the two occasions were the same.<sup>20</sup> Nothing came of such attempts, and there is no reason to believe in serious political instability within Thebes.

It is in Peloponnesian states that such instability can be observed. Because of Xenophon's interest in the Peloponnese, it is in this period the area of Greece for which evidence is fullest. The number of attested cases of internal political conflict in the Peloponnese is, however, probably due not merely to the bias in the available evidence but also to the removal of Spartan control. Isocrates (vi.64–8) puts into the mouth of the Spartan prince Archidamus a bitter description of instability in the Peloponnese at this time; his words are clearly rhetorical and tendentious, but other evidence makes it clear that unrest was widespread. After the unsuccessful revolutions in Phigalea, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon and Phlius dated by Diodorus to 375/4 (Diod. xv.40), there are known cases of severe internal conflict between 370 and 365 at Argos (Diod. xv.57.3–58.4), Tegea (Xen. *Hell.* vi.5.6–10), Phlius (Xen. *Hell.* vii.2.5–9), Sicyon (Xen. *Hell.* vii.1.44–6, 3.1–12), Achaia and especially Pellene (Xen. *Hell.* vii.1.41–3, 4.17–18), and Elis (Xen. *Hell.* vii.4.15–16, 26). Several of these cases involved bloodshed and banishment on a large scale.

The fear of political instability is shown in alliances of the period. In the alliance uniting Arcadia, Sicyon, Messenia, Pisatis and Acrorea (Bengtson, *SdA* 112.285a), the fragmentary surviving text shows provisions against internal revolution or unconstitutional movements. In the network of alliances linking Boeotia with Peloponnesian states, it was

<sup>19</sup> See note 7 above. Buckler 1980 (c 329) 142–5 argues for the historicity of Epaminondas' second trial (Diod. xv.72.3), questioned by others.

<sup>20</sup> Buckler 1980 (c 329) 147–8; see *ibid.* 130–50 on Theban politics of this period generally.

provided that exiles could be extradited from all allied states, and probably also that exiles from one allied state should be banished from all;<sup>21</sup> such measures limited the chance that exiled political dissidents might strike back.

Internal conflict typically took the form of a struggle, more or less acute, between two political groups, who may broadly be labelled oligarchs and democrats. These terms however are somewhat misleading, since on occasion the two factions could both pursue their political aims within a given constitution. That had presumably happened at Elis until the oligarchs took control in 365. A shift of power could take place without formal constitutional change, as at Mantinea in 370, where no such change is recorded although a democratic, anti-Spartan, group took over control (*Xen. Hell.* vi.5.3–5, 8–9). Xenophon's account of dissension in the Arcadian League in 364–362 (*Xen. Hell.* vii.4.33–40) shows how such change could occur within a constitution. It follows that the political groups engaged in such conflict were not primarily interested in establishing particular forms of government for doctrinaire reasons; but our evidence is too meagre to allow us to identify what the main issues were, although so many Peloponnesian communities were bitterly divided over them.

For any such partisan group within a community foreign alliance was an important resource. In general a group's political complexion determined where it could usefully seek allies, and, for example, the oligarchs of Achaëa and Elis, when impelled to seek help against the Thebans and their allies, turned naturally to Sparta for support. It was rare for a form of constitution to be imposed because of alliance with a foreign power, although the Thebans and their allies, notably the Arcadians, did impose democracies in Achaëa in 366. Although the tendency for partisan political groups to seek sympathetic foreign alliances was clear, Epaminondas did not support or exploit that tendency, but instead allied with oligarchs and democrats alike. At Sicyon in 369 and in Achaëa in 366 Epaminondas used military strength to force the other side into an alliance, but in both cases he left the ruling oligarchs in control. The Arcadian League, on the other hand, sought to promote democracy abroad, in Phlius, Sicyon, Achaëa and Elis, though none of these attempts was ultimately successful. Epaminondas' policy was more tolerant, but it gave Thebes allies who could not live together, as the Arcadian protest at Epaminondas' settlement in Achaëa shows. This basic disagreement between Epaminondas' policy and that of his principal Peloponnesian ally was a serious disadvantage to them both.

<sup>21</sup> *Xen. Hell.* vii.3.11, discussed by Roy 1971 (C 61) 598. Cf. Lewis 1990 (C 341).

## IX. THE AFTERMATH OF THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA

After the Battle of Mantinea the states of mainland Greece succeeded in composing their differences and making a common peace treaty. The one exception was Sparta. When other states, notably the Megalopolitans and other Arcadians associated with them, wanted the Messenians to be included in the peace, Sparta refused; this led finally to the exclusion of Sparta and the inclusion of the Messenians (Polyb. iv.33.8–9; Diod. xv.89.1–2, 94.1; Plut. *Ages.* 35.2–4). The text on a fragmentary inscription found at Argos and now again lost (Tod no. 145 = Harding no. 57) is usually supposed to emanate from some or all of the parties to this common peace of 362/1; in it ‘the Greeks’ inform the emissary of ‘the satraps’ (probably rebel satraps rather than a group loyal to the Persian King) that by diplomacy the Greeks have settled their differences in a common peace in order that, free from war against each other, they may make their cities prosperous; and further that they have no hostility to the Persian King and will live in peace with him if he shows no aggression and provokes no trouble. From this it appears that the Greeks achieved their common peace by their own diplomatic efforts among themselves without Persian intervention.

The peace treaty, according to Diodorus, included the provision that ‘each should return to their own territory after the battle’. (Such a clause may have been intended to ensure that all armies withdrew to their home territory.) About a year after peace was made, however, some of the Arcadians who had been moved into the new foundation Megalopolis interpreted the clause to mean that they could leave Megalopolis and return to their homes. When conflict developed between them and Megalopolis, they appealed to Mantinea and the Arcadians associated with it. A Theban army under Pammenes was sent to help Megalopolis, and forced the reluctant settlers back into Megalopolis, thus averting the danger of fresh trouble in the Peloponnese (Diod. xv.94.1–3). The incident shows that the Tegea–Megalopolis fragment of the Arcadian League had maintained its alliance with Thebes (see also Dem. xvi.19, 27–9).

The states of mainland Greece, despite Spartan recalcitrance and flurries at Megalopolis, had found peace at least briefly after a decade of warfare. Some were none the less still wary, and in 362/1 the anti-Theban section of Arcadia (Mantinea and its allies), Achaea, Elis and Phlius made an alliance with Athens, pledging mutual assistance against invasion or against any attempt to subvert their respective constitutions.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Tod no. 144 = Harding no. 56, on which see also Dušanić 1979 (C 358) 128–35.

Thebes' period of greatest influence had come to an end. Thebes was much stronger and more secure in 361 than before Leuctra, and could show her strength (as in Pammenes' expedition to Megalopolis). Yet Thebes had lost some of the capacity she had had before the battle of Mantinea to initiate change in Greek inter-state politics. It is notable that Thebes now concerned herself only with central and southern Greece, and made no further attempt to manipulate affairs in Thessaly and Macedon. Indeed, the Thessalian opponents of Alexander of Pherae, still locked in conflict with him in 361/0, turned for help not to Thebes but to Athens (Tod no. 147 = Harding no. 59). In the Peloponnese Thebes' most powerful ally, the Arcadian League, had suffered a split that was to last for at least twenty years (scholion on Aeschin. III.83), and the section still allied to Thebes was too weak to give Thebes much support (just as the other group of Arcadian states was too weak for a major role in inter-state politics). Sparta, though not crushed, had been drastically and permanently weakened by Thebes. There remained Athens, still a major international power, to which the 360s had brought both gains and losses, neither spectacular enough to change markedly Athens' international standing.

## CHAPTER 8a


# ASIA MINOR

SIMON HORNBLOWER

A speaker in Xenophon's *Hellenica* describes Temnos, a small city north of Smyrna (Izmir) in the Aeolid, as a place in the Persian King's Asia 'where one could nevertheless live without being one of the King's subjects' (iv.8.5: 390s). This is a paradox: how could a city escape 'subjection' to the king in whose territory it lay? The solution lies in the nature of Persian control of Asia Minor in the fourth century. That control was indirect, respectful of (or indifferent to) local autonomy, and, by the standards of ancient imperialism, light. Because of the amount of documentary evidence, chiefly inscriptions on stone, from fourth-century Asia Minor, we are better informed about Persian rule in that part of its empire than about any other group of satrapies (which is not to say that Asia Minor conditions were reproduced elsewhere). By far the greatest part of the evidence comes from the south-west corner of Anatolia, the satrapy of Caria.<sup>1</sup> This region was ruled in the two generations between 400 and Alexander by a vigorous native dynasty, the Hecatomnids. The dynasty's best known member was Mausolus. But Lycia, and the area round Dascylium on the sea of Marmara (Propontis), are also rich in remains from the 200-year period of cultural confrontation with Greece (546–334), as are parts of Lydia further into the interior.

The Persian Wars of the early fifth century had added a word to the vocabulary of Greek political abuse: medism. Until then, the pro-Persian

<sup>1</sup> For archaeological evidence on Caria and the other districts of Asia Minor see Mitchell and McNicoll, 1978/9 (F 684) and Mitchell alone, *Arch. Rep. for 1984–85* (F 681) and 1989–90 (F 682). (For Turkish periodicals and reports I sometimes cite Mitchell, where full references can be found.) Mitchell has also (1980) usefully revised Bean's classic works on Ionia (F 571), Pamphylia etc. (F 573), and Caria (F 572): for Lycia see Bean 1978 (F 570). Akurgal 1985 (F 558) covers the whole of Anatolia, unlike Bean, but is less good than Bean, and the quality of the revision is uneven. For Caria see also Hornblower 1982 (F 644); for northern Caria Marchese 1989 (F 677). The epigraphy of western Asia Minor is now being covered by the ongoing series *Inscripfen griechischer Städte aus Kleinasien* = IGSK (Bonn, 1972– ), but see also Bibliography under Herrmann 1981–9 (F 643: N. Lydia), Crampa 1969–72 (F 619: Labraunda) and Robert (F 702–13). On western Asia Minor generally in the Greek period Cook 1962 (F 611) is brilliantly readable but getting dated; for more up to date insights by the same author see the relevant parts of Cook 1983 (F 14). Where the articles of Louis Robert could be cited by ref. to two major collections, Robert 1969–90 (B 172) or 1987 (F 712), I have not given the original publication.



Map 4. Asia Minor.

acts and feelings, which that word denotes, were not discreditable. But even afterwards there was one part of the Greek world where Persian culture and the Persian political system continued to have its admirers, namely Asia Minor.<sup>2</sup> There one could live free from interference from either Sparta or Athens.

The political status of the 'Greeks of Asia' as a separate group in need of 'liberation' by their kin on the Greek mainland may date from no earlier than the diplomacy around 400.<sup>3</sup> This resulted in the King's Peace of 386 (see above, p. 79f), whereby Greek claims to western Anatolia were abandoned in favour of Persia. Nevertheless the history of Greek Asia is different from that of mainland Greece because of the high density of settlement by Persians and Persian favourites, and the date 400 (or 386) has no relevance to this process of uninterrupted social penetration by Persians.

A chapter of Herodotus, vi.20, may be taken as the starting point. After the failure of the Ionian Revolt (*CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> ch. 8) the territory of Miletus was distributed between Persians, who took the land round the city and also the plain, and Carians from Pedasa who got the hilly parts (less good).<sup>4</sup> This passage is important because it reminds the reader that archaic Miletus was not just a trading city but like all Greek *poleis* relied for agricultural produce on its hinterland, which in Miletus' case was unusually large and fertile.<sup>5</sup> One difference between archaic and classical Miletus, then, was that its ability to exploit its own territory was curtailed, as Persians were given fiefs on Milesian soil. Other cities may have suffered in this way even earlier, and the hardship so produced may have been one cause of the Ionian Revolt.

The political settlement of Ionia after the revolt (*Hdt.* vi.42–3) was generous: it included the limiting of the power of Persian-installed tyrants and in some cases their actual suppression. But the continuance and even stepping-up of the economic colonization of Anatolia, by Iranian individuals and groups, meant that the cities of Western Asia Minor were henceforth not fully Greek *poleis* in one important sense: after 546, and even more after 494, they were no longer in complete control of their own *chora* or territory.<sup>6</sup> Such enfeoffment had begun with Cyrus the Great in the sixth century, who 'gave' seven cities, that is presumably their revenues, to Pytharchus of Cyzicus. Pytharchus' signature, or perhaps a descendant's, to judge from the letter-forms of


<sup>2</sup> Momigliano 1979, reprinted 1984 (A 42). On Persian fief-holders in Asia Minor (Persians and Greeks) see generally Cook 1983 (F 14) ch. 17 and Sekunda 1985 (F 719) and in F 40, 175–96 and F 53, 83–143.

<sup>3</sup> Seager and Tuplin 1980 (C 74).

<sup>4</sup> Cook 1961 (F 609); *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.3, 211.

<sup>5</sup> Robert (1969–90) (B 172) 1 393; Müller-Wiener 1986 (F 686); Mitchell 1989/90 (F 682) 107.

<sup>6</sup> Hampl 1939 (C 32) at 26f.



Map 5. Western Asia Minor.



the inscription, has now turned up at Persepolis.<sup>7</sup> The distant find-spot of this item may mean that the older Pytharchus was an absentee *rentier* like the Iranian owners of Egyptian estates (A31, 64).

The process of enfeoffment continued in the fifth century with the grant of cities like Magnesia on the Maeander and Lampsacus to Themistocles,<sup>8</sup> and of the revenues of Blaundus in Greater Phrygia, if that is the right name for the city, to the son of a Macedonian princess and an Iranian called Boubares.<sup>9</sup> The results were visible in Xenophon's day, when the descendants of the 'medizers' Demaratus the ex-king of Sparta and Gongylus of Eretria still ruled valuable holdings in the Aeolid, given them by Xerxes as a reward for taking the Persian side in 480–479 (Hdt. vi.70.2; Xen. *Hell.* III.1.6; *An.* VII.8.8–19). The results were still visible right up to the third century B.C. By this time the two dynasties, like true introverted colonials, had evidently intermarried: an inscription from Delos (SIG 381) honours a Demaratus son of Gorgion, and Gorgion is the name of one of the descendants of Gongylus whom Xenophon met. That this Demaratus is called a Spartan may show that, like Roman colonial elites,<sup>10</sup> some members of the family had returned to their origins after making good, or rather, having lived down an old scandal. It is even possible that a third family, that of Themistocles, was connected to the other two: the wife of Gongylus is called Hellas or 'Greece', which is just the kind of name Themistocles in exile might have picked. He did, after all, call two of his daughters Asia and Italia.<sup>11</sup> Finally, there was a marriage between Demaratus' descendants and Hermias the ruler of a pocket kingdom at Atarneus nearby.<sup>12</sup> Remarkably, the philosopher Aristotle was caught up in this family network (see below, p. 622, cf. 220).

These resident feudatories were the beneficiaries of the Persian dispensation, profiting at the expense of the Greek cities. Many of those cities also suffered in the fifth century from being squeezed between two tribute-levying empires, Athens as well as Persia; it seems likely that they were assessed for tribute simultaneously by both,<sup>13</sup> and perhaps they actually paid twice over. This is one possible explanation for the material poverty of fifth-century Ionia, and the failure of the Ionians in that century to do much monumental building.<sup>14</sup> Perhaps settlement in Ionia

<sup>7</sup> Fornara no. 46; Pugliese Carratelli 1966 (F 694); Jeffery and Johnston 1990 (B 146) 474, dating the text to the second half of the fifth century.

<sup>8</sup> Thuc. I.138.3 with Hill *Sources*<sup>2</sup> B 122, C 10; Cahn and Gerin 1988 (F 596).

<sup>9</sup> Hdt. VIII.136 with Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 218 n. 2; E. Badian, forthcoming.

<sup>10</sup> Syme 1958 (A 58).

<sup>11</sup> For Hellas, Xen. *An.* VII.8; for Asia and Italia, Plut. *Them.* 32.

<sup>12</sup> Six 1890 (F 721) 192 n. 27; Pareti 1961 (F 689A) esp. family tree at 191; de Ste Croix 1972 (C 68) 38–40. <sup>13</sup> Murray 1966 (F 687).

<sup>14</sup> Cook 1961 (F 610) but see Boardman 1964 (F 583) 83.

was in any case more dispersed and less polis-based than has traditionally been allowed (see below, p. 223).

But the social and religious institutions of classical Ionia did not necessarily suffer from the Persian reconquest. The settlement of 494 had provided that the cities should submit their disputes to arbitration, and a century later an inscription (Tod no. 113 = Harding no. 24) shows that there existed among the Ionian cities an elaborate system for settling disputes, with five votes per represented city. This panel had heard, reported on, and nearly decided a case between Miletus and Myus when the Myusians threw in their hand and the Persian satrap of Ionia, Strouses, had to decide the matter instead (but he would perhaps have ratified an Ionian verdict, had one been given). That this system of judges was somehow connected with the old Panionian League<sup>15</sup> is suggested by a fourth-century inscription rediscovered in the 1960s at the site of the league's meeting-place, the Panionion.<sup>16</sup> This text mentions *dikai*, lawsuits. And the continued existence of the Ionian League, as a religious institution at least, though no longer a focus for anti-Persian resistance, is attested by Thucydides III.104. This long and interesting chapter speaks of the Ionians of the 420s as gathering at the Ephesia, which on the likeliest interpretation<sup>17</sup> is just another name for the Panionian festival. So too the old Carian League, which figured at the end of Herodotus book v, resurfacing in the fourth century when it sent a delegation to Artaxerxes II (Tod no. 138), probably survived the fifth century intact.

The Carian League was a native, rather than a Greek, local institution, and this native element deserves a word. In addition to Persians and their favourites on the one hand, and the old-established Greek polis-dwellers on the other, there was a third group, the indigenous Anatolian peoples. Their ruling classes begin, in the second half of the fifth century, to adopt the forms of both Greek and Iranian culture. In the early fourth century, Pericles of Limyra in south-east Lycia made a metrical Greek dedication to 'Zeus, son of Kronos and Rhea, ruler of the gods'. He boldly calls himself 'king of [all] Lycia', perhaps a hit at the pretensions of the Xanthian dynasts.<sup>18</sup> Xanthus in the south west of Lycia was ruled, perhaps a little earlier than Pericles, by a man with a Persian-looking name, Arbinas son of Gergis, originally dynast of Tlos and a Lycian native. He celebrated in seventeen crude Greek hexameters, written by the Greek seer Symmachus of Achaean Pellane, his conquests of Xanthus, Pinara and Telmessus of the fair havens.<sup>19</sup> It has now been

<sup>15</sup> For which see *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.1, 749f; III<sup>2</sup>.3, 217; IV<sup>2</sup> 481.      <sup>16</sup> Kleiner *et al.* 1967 (F 667).

<sup>17</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 645); *contra*, Stylianou 1983 (F 722) but see Hornblower 1991 (B 62) 528.

<sup>18</sup> Wörle 1991 (F 732) 203–17, at 213.

<sup>19</sup> *SEG* xxviii 1245 (= *CEG* 2 888–9), with L. Robert 1969–90 (B 172) VII 381–426, cf. already Gergis at M–L no. 93 (with 314 of 1988 reprint); see Childs 1979 (F 598). Note that M–L no. 93 is accompanied by long inscriptions in Lycian. See now *Fouilles de Xanthos* IX (1992).

suggested that the Nereid Monument, with its massed hoplites and archers, was commissioned by Arbinas the conqueror;<sup>20</sup> perhaps the Mausoleum at Limyra was a kind of propagandist reply.<sup>21</sup> One line of Arbinas' poem is particularly remarkable: Arbinas refers to wise men, like himself, who practise archery, virtue and hunting. The allusion is surely to the description in Herodotus (1.136) of Persian education, which taught how to ride, to shoot with the bow and to speak the truth. Arbinas is therefore claiming to participate not only in the Greek *paideia* or culture of which his poem is a manifestation, but also in the value system of his Persian political masters. Arbinas' use of Greek to declare attachment to non-Greek values looks forward to such hellenistic documents as the third-century edict of Asoka from Kandahar in Afghanistan, a Greek vehicle for Buddhist sentiments: *SEG* xx 326. But in Arbinas' verses there is also a strongly emphasized native Lycian aspect: Arbinas may have struck fear into the Lycians (line 10) but he is still their glorious king (line 4; cf. n. 19 for Gergis).

In the fourth century this fusion in Anatolia between native, Greek and Persian was taken further, symbolized by the three languages – Lycian, Greek and the official Persian chancellery language, Aramaic – in which was carved the important trilingual inscription found at Xanthus and published in 1974: *SEG* xxvii 942, see below, p. 219. In the best documented satrapy, *Caria*, the process was superintended by satraps whose own indigenous origins to some extent guaranteed the preservation of the native element (see further below on this important aspect).

The appointment by Persia of a local ruling house, the Hecatomnids, to full satrapal status in a now separate Carian satrapy, falls in the decade after the end of the main Peloponnesian War and is causally related to it. The view here taken about the status of Caria as a proper satrapy is traditional, and the present writer justifies it elsewhere against a recent suggestion that the Hecatomnids merely usurped the title from an impotent Persian government.<sup>22</sup> It is not in dispute that the family used it on their inscriptions,<sup>23</sup> see above all the Aramaic text of the new trilingual inscription mentioned above: this calls Pixodarus 'satrap in Caria and Lycia'. The problem is that extant contemporary literary sources appear to avoid the word 'satrap' for the Hecatomnids, whose status was certainly unusual (joint 'satrapies', non-Iranian 'satraps',

<sup>20</sup> Coupel and Demargne 1969 (F 616) and esp. Childs and Demargne 1989 (F 600) with refs. in Mitchell 1989/90 (F 682) 116. <sup>21</sup> Wörle 1991 (F 732) 215.

<sup>22</sup> Petit 1988 (F 693) but note Xen. *Cyr.* viii.6.7, a satrap of Caria appointed, contrast vii.4.2, no satrap sent to Cilicia or Cyprus, which were left under native kings. This cannot be used as straightforward historical evidence for any period, but has some bearing on Xenophon's perception of the fourth-century position.

<sup>23</sup> *SIG*<sup>2</sup> 573 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 365 M4, cf. 364 M3; *SIG* 167 (= Tod nos. 138) and 170 = Blümel 1987–8 (F 582) 1–3, 5; Crampa 1972 (F 619) 42 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 366 M8. For the Aramaic text of the trilingual inscription see the full publication at Metzger *et al.* 1979 (B 158).

female 'satraps') and whose behaviour is unusually free. But unusual is not the same as impossible.

A suitable moment and motive for the creation of a new Carian satrapy is not hard to find. The early years of the fourth century are also the early years of the reign of Artaxerxes II. The revolts of Pissouthnes, Amorges and the younger Cyrus had been a warning to Persia against allowing ambitious Iranian proconsuls to profit from the opportunism of the Greek city states and the availability of their mercenaries. The support by Athens of Pissouthnes and Amorges (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 464–5), and, more alarming from the Great King's point of view, Sparta's support of Cyrus, had shown that western Anatolia must be secured from satrapal subversion and from Greek would-be liberators of Asia Minor. Hence the promotion of the Hecatomnids to satrapal status. Such local men could only extend their frontiers, they could not expect to succeed in a bid for the Persian throne.

In Ionia also, at any rate in the early years of the fourth century, the threat posed to Persian interests by Athens and Sparta led to some fresh thinking, but here the result took a different form, namely a degree of temporary emancipation for the Greek cities of the coast. After the Persian and Athenian victory at the battle of Cnidus in 394, Pharnabazus the satrap and Conon the Athenian promised autonomy for the Greek cities (see above, p. 74). Until recently this was thought to be palpable insincerity, since Strouses, in the inscription already cited (Tod no. 113 = Harding no. 24), is called 'satrap of Ionia' soon after, which seemed to imply outright subjection.

But a text published in 1976 from Ionian Erythrae, for which the likeliest context is shortly before the King's Peace of 386, showed Erythrae pleading with Athens not to be 'handed over to the barbarian' i.e. Persia. In other words, it was 386 not 394 which for Ionia constituted the end of liberty.<sup>24</sup> Strouses' competence perhaps extended only over the *chora* or countryside, not the cities, of Ionia;<sup>25</sup> or else 'satrap of Ionia' refers to a military authority of an overriding, non-territorial type, something found at other times.

After 386, Ionia, cities and territory alike, was subsumed once more under the satrapy of Sardis: Diodorus mentions Rhosaces, a 'satrap of Ionia and Lydia' in the 340s. By 334, one Spithrobates is satrap of Ionia, and this is the first unproblematic evidence for Ionia as a separate satrapy of a normal territorial type.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> *SEG* xxvi 1282 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 369 M14 = Harding no. 28A. See Lewis 1977 (A 33) 144 n. 55.

<sup>25</sup> For this as a Persian distinction see Thuc. VIII.37.2 with de Ste Croix 1972 (C 68) 313–14 and Lewis 1977 (A 33) 105. I. *Labraunda* (F 619) 42 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 366 M8 may also be relevant, see Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 163–4 and n. 212.

<sup>26</sup> Diod. XVI.47 (Rhosaces); XVII.19 (Spithrobates).

Otherwise the political pattern of the Asia Minor satrapies is not different except in details in the fourth century from the fifth and sixth, though a tendency has been noted towards 'more compact and manageable satrapies';<sup>27</sup> see above on Caria and below on Cappadocia.

The main palatial centres continue, after the anomaly of Cyrus' accumulation of satrapies (p. 53), to be Dascylium, Celaenae and Sardis. There was a secondary centre at Magnesia on the Maeander in the fifth century at least (M–L no. 12 = Fornara no. 35 and Hdt. III. 122. 1)); and it has even been claimed that Tissaphernes had a residence at Miletus (at Kalabaktepe in the southern suburbs of the city).<sup>28</sup> He certainly had a Carian *oikos* or estate somewhere (p. 66), but Miletus, despite its Carian element,<sup>29</sup> is perhaps a bit far north for this. Even in the Hecatomnid period the evidence for direct satrapal control of Miletus is slight, the evidence of the coinage being inconclusive.<sup>30</sup> The Carian capital was Halicarnassus on the coast, but inland Mylasa, the modern Milas, was the satrapal centre both before and after (see below) Halicarnassus' *belle époque* under the Hecatomnids.

Dascylium was the capital of *Hellespontine Phrygia*. It has been definitely located on lake Manyas, in good hunting and fishing country, as we would expect from Xenophon's description of it. Proper excavation of this satrapal palace, recently begun, may be expected to produce rich results, judging from the numerous Greco-Persian stelae or gravestones found in the vicinity.<sup>31</sup> The most spectacular new find is a Babylonian cylinder seal of the second millennium B.C., but there is Attic red- and black-figure pottery and Achaemenid material.<sup>32</sup>

Celaenae, modern Dinar, was the capital of *Greater Phrygia* and is described by Xenophon in language as lyrical as his sketch of Dascyleum. Celaenae was always a place of military importance, the headquarters for many years of Antigonos Monophthalmos, who was one of the greatest of Alexander's immediate successors; it was also the approximate site of a famous Seleucid Apamea, a foundation of Antiochus I.<sup>33</sup>

Sardis was the capital of *Lydia*.<sup>34</sup> It had once been the royal capital of a great kingdom, the Mermnad Lydian, and can be seen as a kind of 'second city' of the western empire – Alexandria to Susa's Rome.

<sup>27</sup> Cook 1983 (F 14) 172.      <sup>28</sup> Mitchell 1989/90 (F 682) 104.

<sup>29</sup> For which see Hdt. I. 146 with Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 17, cf. 112 n. 42.

<sup>30</sup> Against Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 111 see Kinns 1986 (F 665) 249 and 1989 (F 666); also Moysey 1989 (B 210) 129–30 with n. 65.

<sup>31</sup> Xen. *Hell.* IV. 1. 15f; Mitchell 1989/90 (F 682) 89–90. Earlier work: Cook, 1959/60 (F 607) 34. Cf. Balkan 1959 (F 564) and below n. 145.

<sup>32</sup> Mitchell 1989/90 (F 682) 89, Lewis 1977 (A 33) 51–2, and see refs. in preceding n.

<sup>33</sup> Xen. *An.* I. 2. 7–8; Ramsay 1895–7 (F 701) 396–450, cf. n. 72 below; Billows 1990 (F 579) 241, 246; Briant in Bilde *et al.* 1990 (F 578) 62 n. 15. For Iranians at Celaenae/Apamea see Robert 1963 (F 707) 348–9.      <sup>34</sup> Lewis 1977 (A 33) 52–5; Cook 1983 (F 14) 165–6; Hanfmann 1983 (F 636).




Fig. 2. The Pyramid Tomb at Sardis. (Reconstruction by Christopher Ratté; see *Ist.Mitt.* 42 (1992) 135–61.)

Evidence for the Persian presence here is plentiful, not just from literary references (Hdt. v.101; vi.4) but from dedications to ‘Artemis Anaitis’ and to ‘Persian Artemis’ at Maibozani/Mermera, which was in the Roman assize district of Sardis in the imperial period; the name Maibozani is itself an Iranian survival.<sup>35</sup> At Sardis, as at Dascyleum, there are Greco-Persian stelae, including one with a Lydian inscription; and the Achaemenid Persian seals from Sardis are very attractive miniature art.<sup>36</sup> (See further below, p. 232.) The so-called ‘pyramid tomb’ at Sardis (Fig. 2) is in fact a tomb built to house a Persian dignitary (we may compare the ‘Ptolemaion’ at Rhodes, which was not Ptolemaic at all but a Persian-period tomb from the days of Hecatomnid Carian occupation).<sup>37</sup> This is not the only monumental ‘mausoleum’ in the vicinity of Sardis.<sup>38</sup> The area round Sardis was surely covered with villages, feudally obliged to provide a turn-out of militia, or to pay for their upkeep, when required, as in the hellenistic text from Sardis known as the Mnesimachus conveyance.<sup>39</sup>

*Lycia*, east of Caria, was always an enclave apart, isolated by mountainous barriers both from Caria and from Pamphylia on the other side. Classical Lycia was highly balkanized under a plethora of local dynasts, as the coins have always shown; inscriptions are now helping to fill in the

<sup>35</sup> Robert 1964 (F 708) 27; Robert 1987 (F 712) 334; Habicht 1975 (F 635) 65 (line 10); 73. The Iranians later found at Carian Aphrodisias, Robert 1987 (F 712) 349–53, must similarly represent some kind of throw-back to the Achaemenid period.

<sup>36</sup> Ramage 1979 (F 700); Radt 1983 (F 699); Cook 1983 (F 14) 165; Starr 1977 (C 79) 69–75, stressing that the workmanship on the seals need not be Greek at all. See n. 149 below, esp. Root 1991 (F 53) there cited, an interesting discussion of problems of ‘ethnicity’ in their relation to ‘Greco-Persian’ art. <sup>37</sup> Fraser 1977 (F 630) 5.

<sup>38</sup> Hanfmann and Ehrhardt 1981 (F 637).

<sup>39</sup> Buckler and Robinson 1932 (F 594) no. 1 with Billows 1992 (F 580) ch. 4, devoted entirely to this inscription.

picture of their rivalries.<sup>40</sup> Theopompus evidently narrated some of all this (*FGrH* 115 F 103), and it is a pity that we have only Photius' bare epitome. The remarkable hellenized decoration of the fourth-century tombs at coastal Limyra, and Hoiran to the south west (ancient name unknown) stresses warrior motifs, and reminds us of the conquests of which Arbinas boasts (p. 214); these elaborate graves look back to the important sixth- and fifth-century paintings at Elmali (Karaburun) in northern Lycia, but also forward to the Alexander Sarcophagus from Sidon.<sup>41</sup> Lycia was unsubdued by Persia in any formal sense in the early fourth century, as Isocrates remarked in 380; but it was eventually absorbed by the Carian Hecatomnids, as is shown by the trilingual inscription from Xanthus.<sup>42</sup>

The Hecatomnid Mausolus also penetrated as far east as *Pamphylia*<sup>43</sup> and even *Pisidia*,<sup>44</sup> a refractory area in the fourth century, the Afghanistan of Anatolia: first Pharnabazus, then Datames are recorded as leading raids on Pisidia without establishing Persian authority there on a permanent footing. *Lycaonia* too was hostile and recalcitrant country.<sup>45</sup>

Late fifth-century *Cilicia*, like fourth-century Caria, was subordinated to a native dynasty, the house of Syennesis (cf. Hdt. VII.98) but on present evidence they were unlike the Carian Hecatomnids in that they did not have the satrapal title.<sup>46</sup> Syennesis is not heard of after the beginning of the fourth century, in whose early decades the satraps Tiribazus, Pharnabazus and Datames coined at Cilician Tarsus. But this need not imply that Cilicia was now ruled by Iranians, to the exclusion of local appointees: at any rate we hear of the 'provincia' of the Carian-born Camisares, father of Datames, in northern Cilicia.<sup>47</sup> The grand Tarsus

<sup>40</sup> Isolation of Lycia: Treuber 1887 (F 723) 10–11; Robert 1969–90 (B 172) VII 389. Fifth- and fourth-century coins: Kraay 1976 (B 200) 271; Mørkholm 1964 (F 685); Mildenberg 1965 (F 680); Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 182, 170; Bryce 1982 (F 391); Zahle 1989 (F 734) and in F 53 (1991) 145–60 (taking in archaeological and epigraphic evidence as well). Inscriptions: see Robert 1969–90 (B 172) VII 381–426; Badian 1977 (B 135) and above all Wörle 1991 (F 732).

<sup>41</sup> Limyra and Hoiran: Mitchell 1989/90 (F 682) 119; Borchhardt *et al.* 1984 (F 587); Elmali/Karaburun: Mitchell 1984/5 (F 681) 102, 1989/90 (F 682) 119, cf. Cook 1982 (F 14) plate 30. For the Lycian sarcophagi ('Satraps' Sarcophagus', 'Alexander Sarcophagus') see Robertson 1975 (J 35) 404 with refs.; Schmidt-Doumas 1985 (F 718).

<sup>42</sup> Isoc. IV.161; *SEG* XXVII 942 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 367 M9, from the time of Pixodarus. Already under Mausolus, Caunus, in the part of Caria closest to Lycia, was in the Hecatomnid sphere of influence. See *SEG* XII 470–1, with Bean 1953 and 1954 (F 567); and for Caunus generally Robert 1987 (F 712) 487–520; Mitchell 1989/90 (F 682) 109.

<sup>43</sup> Bengtson, *SdA* 367 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) M10 (Phaselis).

<sup>44</sup> Steph. Byz. s.v. Σόλυμοι; Cook 1959 (F 605) 120. For Pisidia see esp. Mitchell 1991 (F 683).

<sup>45</sup> Polyæn. VII.27.1.

<sup>46</sup> Xen. *Cyr.* VII.4.2, for what it is worth, is explicit; see n. 22 above. *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 224 (Cilicia a satrapy) follows Hdt. III.90.3, but Hdt. is here, despite his use of the word 'satrapy', really describing financial *nomoi* or 'taxation districts', see Lewis 1977 (A 33) 52 n. 19, 118 n. 69.

<sup>47</sup> Nep. *Dat.* 1. For Syennesis see Xen. *An.* 1.2.

coinages<sup>48</sup> were perhaps struck only for military convenience at what was an obvious base for the operations being conducted at the time against Cyprus and Egypt.<sup>49</sup> Cilicia was perhaps not fully 'satrapal' until Mazaëus in the 340s.<sup>50</sup> Somewhere around this time Cilicia, as the coins suggest, was possibly amalgamated with *Syria* (which falls outside this sub-chapter); but by 334 Cilicia had again been hived off, under Arsames, and Mazaëus controlled Syria alone.<sup>51</sup> (See also *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 154.) Despite the late date at which Cilicia became a formal satrapy, there is cultural evidence of a Persian presence, for instance another Greco-Persian relief sculpture<sup>52</sup> (compare above for Dascyleum and Sardis).

North of Ionia were *Mysia* and the *Troad*.<sup>53</sup> They were still under feudal-type rule: we hear of 'Memnon's country' in this region.<sup>54</sup> This enclave lay in the old mainland holdings of island Tenedos. Such *peraiiai* right down the coast opposite the islands Chios, Samos, Rhodes and Tenedos probably passed to Persia with the King's Peace (p. 80). We also hear of the territory of Tithraustes,<sup>55</sup> a Persian to judge from his name. There are also the Gongylids and Demaratids, whom we have already noticed, and full-blooded Persians like Asidates (*Xen.* VII.8, a splendid chapter); and a spectacular pocket principality at Atarneus in the middle of the century,<sup>56</sup> whose ruler Hermias was patron, father-in-law and friend of Aristotle, through whom he was connected by marriage to the Demaratids (p. 213). He engaged in anti-Persian intrigues with Philip II of Macedon, and made a treaty with Erythrae.<sup>57</sup> But no separate satrapy of Mysia existed, despite a doubtful reference in Diodorus to Orontes as satrap of Mysia; this is surely a slip for *Armenia* over in the eastern half of Anatolia.<sup>58</sup> (See ch. 3, p. 51f for the Armenian evidence from Xenophon's *Anabasis*.)

The other great satrapy in this eastern half of the subcontinent was *Cappadocia*, valuably described for us by Strabo (XI.1.1–2). Cappadocia was probably divided in two during the fourth century; Datames ruled a northern kingdom in the 360s.<sup>59</sup> Datames was perhaps no more than a successful rebel (for the Satraps' Revolt see ch. 3) rather than a

<sup>48</sup> Kraay 1976 (B 200) 281.      <sup>49</sup> Diod. XIV.39.4; XV.4.2; cf. above, ch. 3, p. 80.

<sup>50</sup> Diod. XVI.42.      <sup>51</sup> Bosworth 1980 (B 14) 111, 286.

<sup>52</sup> Mitchell 1984/5 (F 681): find from Cilician Corycus; Hermay 1984 (F 642); Fleischer 1984 (F 628) at 92–8; cf. Borchhardt 1968 (F 586). Note also the Aramaic law from Cilicia at Mitchell 1989/90 (F 682) 130, promulgated by an Artaxerxes, who could however be the fifth-century Artaxerxes I, not II, III or IV (all fourth-century; for Artaxerxes IV see above, p. 50).

<sup>53</sup> Rostovtzeff 1923 (F 715) for Mysia; Cook 1973 (F 163) for the Troad.

<sup>54</sup> *Arr. Anab.* I.17.      <sup>55</sup> *FGrH* 105 no. 4 = Harding no. 72c.

<sup>56</sup> Wormell 1935 (H 124).      <sup>57</sup> Tod no. 165 = Harding no. 79.

<sup>58</sup> Diod. XV.90, on which see Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 176–9. Another view: M. Osborne 1982 (B 165) II 65–72, cf. Osborne 1975 (F 689); Moysey 1989 (B 210) 123–5.

<sup>59</sup> Division: Strabo XII.1.4 and perhaps Polyb. F 54; Datames: Diod. XV.91. For settlement in Cappadocia see Gwatkin 1930 (F 633) 18 and n. 14; Phrygian-style strongholds known as *tetrapurgiai*. See n. 72 below.



recognized satrap, and the partition of Cappadocia may have been a *de facto* affair, never formally acquiesced in by Persia: another usurper, Ariarathes, was established in the northern, Pontic, part by around 350. Certainly the south stayed in Persian hands: Mithrobouzanes is called 'satrap' in 334, and he may be identical with the unnamed Persian to whom a king Artaxerxes gave 'Cappadocia' as a reward for saving him from a lion.<sup>60</sup>

*Paphlagonia* to the west was included in northern Cappadocia by the 320s, but in the earlier fourth century, as no doubt in the fifth, this tribal enclave was first independent under a king called Gyes or some similar name;<sup>61</sup> then it was reduced by Datames in the 370s, but the evidence does not justify us in speaking of a satrapy of Paphlagonia at this time. By 334 Paphlagonia was subsumed under *Hellespontine Phrygia*.<sup>62</sup>

In this area, but wholly unique, was *Sinope*,<sup>63</sup> which was independent between the 430s, when the Athenian Lamachus deposed the tyrant Timesileos,<sup>64</sup> and the King's Peace of 386. In Xenophon's *Anabasis* (400 B.C.) it actually ranks as a minor imperial power in its own right, still levying tribute on places like Trapezus – itself a future imperial city in Byzantine times – and its own colonies Cotyora and Cerasus, the 'place of cherries'.<sup>65</sup> Datames held Sinope in the years after 372 (p. 85), and its inhabitants are treated by Alexander as subjects of Persia; perhaps by the middle of the fourth century it was subsumed, after an autonomous interval following the disappearance of Datames, in satrapal Cappadocia.<sup>66</sup> The results of excavation at the site of Sinope have not quite matched the splendour of what literary sources show was a 'golden day of autonomous prosperity' between the 440s and 386, but there have been finds of decent work of conventional classical Greek type – antefixes, egg-and-dart simas, and so on.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Mithrobouzanes: Arr. *Anab.* I.16; lion: Polyb. F 54. For another king (Alexander) saved from a lion see Plut. *Alex.* 40 with Moretti *ISE* 74 (dedication by Craterus at Delphi), cf. below, p. 659f. For royal lion hunts in Macedon and Persia see Briant 1991 (F 11A).

<sup>61</sup> *Hell. Oxy.* xxii Bart. Cf. Xen. *An.* vi.1.2 and v.5.23; Corylas ruler of Paphlagonia c. 400.

<sup>62</sup> On Datames, see Nep. *Dat.* 2, but note that 'praefectus <Paphlagoniae>' at Trogus *Prologue* x is an editor's supplement; more could have dropped out than the supplement assumes. It does not justify us in speaking of a 'satrapy' of Paphlagonia: Bosworth 1980 (B 14) 188. For 334 see Diod. xvii.19.4.

<sup>63</sup> On the history and prosperity of Sinope see Robinson 1906 (F 714); Leaf 1916 (F 673); Burstein 1976 (E 222) 59 and 129 n. 57, 70 and 135 n. 15; Hind 1983/4 (E 258) 95–6; Moysey 1989 (B 210) 121–2. For Sinope's reputation for table-woods see Meiggs 1983 (I 101) 296 citing Strabo xii.3.12 and other passages. For iron from Sinope see *CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> 451. Cf. below ch. 9f.

<sup>64</sup> Plut. *Per.* 20.1 with *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 146 and nn. 113 and 114, also P. A. Stadter, *Commentary on Plutarch's Life of Pericles* (Chapel Hill, 1989) 216–19.

<sup>65</sup> Xen. *An.* v.3 and 5; Gschnitzer 1958 (C 29A) 18–19. For Byzantine Trebizond see Gibbon (ed. Bury) vi 421 and n. 25.

<sup>66</sup> Burstein 1976 (E 222); Arr. *Anab.* III.24.4, a problematic passage, see Bosworth 1980 (B 14) 353. The Scythian king Scydrothemis ruled Sinope in the time of Ptolemy I Soter: Fraser 1972 (A 21) 247.

<sup>67</sup> Akurgal–Budde 1956 (F 559).

Further west towards Byzantium was *Heraclea Pontica*. Like Byzantium, Heraclea was a Megarian colony (but with a Boeotian element, which Xen. *An.* VI.2.1 was wrong to suppress completely). It was democratically ruled till 364, when Clearchus, a pupil of Plato, seized power. He was succeeded, after his assassination in 352, by his brother Satyrus, as regent for his sons Timotheus and Dionysius, who themselves ruled, in even more openly autocratic fashion than their father, between 346 and 305. The history of the city is, at certain phases of the classical period, closely bound up with that of the Bosporean kingdom to the north, and this aspect, and Heraclea's importance as a grain-supplier, is treated in ch. 9f below. But Heraclea deserves a mention here because of its 'position of unchallenged preeminence among the Greek cities of northern Anatolia'<sup>68</sup> in the century and a quarter after Clearchus' seizure of power. (Heraclea continued to suffer from tyranny till 281 but that phase is outside the scope of the present volume.) Our main source for the dynasty's history is the local historian Memnon, who preserves such details, interesting if true, as, that Dionysius of Heraclea bought up the household effects of Dionysius of Syracuse (*FGrH* 434 F 4.5, not saying which Dionysius. Perhaps both.) This recalls Diodorus' statement (xv.81, from the chronographic source, above, p. 9) that Clearchus imitated Dionysius I of Sicily; an analogy which the Platonic connexion would have suggested to us anyway. Clearchus went further than his Sicilian model in his claim to be son of Zeus (*FGrH* 434 Memnon F 1.1; Justin xvi.5.8) but it is hard to know what to make of this.

From polis-dwelling Greeks to Pisidian guerillas, with tribal Paphlagonians and dynastically controlled Lycians and others somewhere in between, this was a patchwork of peoples, with very different settlement habits. Numbers are impossible to determine without census records. An interesting attempt has however been made to use the old Athenian Tribute Lists (on these see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 55–61) for the Troad, an area of small-to-medium cities without the usual peppering of villages in between. When taken together with modern and medieval figures for what the population will support, this yields not more than 3,000–4,000 head of population per one talent of tribute, with about 5,000 per polis. But a more recent general examination of the implications of the Tribute Lists for the size and resources of Greek cities concludes that 'the assumption of a direct relationship between tribute and population does not work'.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>68</sup> For Heraclea Pontica see Burstein 1976 (E 222); quotation from 65. For its grain see Garnsey 1988 (155) 151, 155. This is surely relevant to the large number of Heracleots buried at Athens. For instance, they had a special precinct in the Ceramicus. For Epaminondas and Heraclea see p. 202.

<sup>69</sup> Tribute lists are used as indicators of population by Cook 1973 (F 613) 382, cf. 267f. See however the scepticism of Nixon and Price in Murray–Price 1990 (C 52) 146, cp. 160 nn. 38 and 40. For other indicators, e.g. ships, see Cook 1958/9 (F 604) 22 n. 55; *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.3, 217f.

As for Ionia, settlement here has traditionally been seen in polis terms; but a case has now been made for a more dispersed pattern, characterized by isolated farmsteads or *pyrgoi*. This may be right, but it is still true that most of the evidence for these farmsteads is from round Teos, a region which may or may not have been typical.<sup>70</sup>

Elsewhere in Anatolia, we can be a little more confident that village-based settlement was normal. It is explicitly said by ancient writers to be characteristic of Caria<sup>71</sup> and Greater Phrygia;<sup>72</sup> here the population was definitely scattered. This was something that, in western Caria at least, the Persian authorities and their delegates, anticipating more ruthless hellenistic methods, set out to adjust: it is not too much to speak of a limited policy of urbanization. The most conspicuous example is Mausolus' concentration (synoecism) of native 'Lelegian' places in the Myndus peninsula to swell the population of Halicarnassus.<sup>73</sup> Halicarnassus' ruler in the Persian Wars commands a mere five ships (a good index for this kind of thing,<sup>74</sup> as should be the figures for the battle of Lade in the mid 490s, though there are some oddities here).<sup>75</sup> The city's tribute to Athens is a mere 1 $\frac{2}{3}$  talents; however crude a pointer to population (see n. 69) this is in sharp contrast with Ephesus, which paid 6 talents. But as a result of the forcible addition in the (?)370s of hundreds of Lelegian families, whose settlements have now been meticulously studied,<sup>76</sup> Halicarnassus became, in the hellenistic period, a city with a maximum attested citizen population of 10,000. The evidence for this is the attendance total for its assembly, preserved on an inscription.<sup>77</sup> (It must however be said that another inscription records a mere 1,200 votes.)<sup>78</sup> Mausolus (see above) moved the capital from Milas to Halicarnassus;<sup>79</sup> but in the very early hellenistic period the satrapal capital was once again Milas: *SEG* xxxiii 872 = *I. Mylasa* (F 582) no. 21, dated by the satrap Asander. This may reflect some decline in Halicarnassus' fortunes after Alexander's punishing siege (for which see below, p. 802); if so it could well be that mid-fourth-century Halicarnassus had been even more populous and prosperous than it was to be in the hellenistic period.

<sup>70</sup> Balcer 1987 (F 563) cf. Hunt 1947 (F 648).

<sup>71</sup> Village-based settlement generally: Briant 1982 (F 10) 137–60. Caria: *FGrH* 26 Conon F1, cf. Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 10 and n. 46, 163.

<sup>72</sup> Curt. III.1.11; cf. Anderson 1897 (F 561) 412 and Ramsay 1895–7 (F 701) 123–30. For the relation between these villages and the *tetrapurgi* or strongholds of the Caelaenae area see Ramsay 1895–7 (F 701) 419–290, on Plut. *Eum.* 8.

<sup>73</sup> *FGrH* 124 F 25; Pliny *HN* v.107, with Hornblower 1982 (F 644) ch. 4.

<sup>74</sup> Hdt. VII.99 with n. 69 above. But it is relevant that Artemisia also commanded Coans and others. <sup>75</sup> Hdt. VI.8 with *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.3, 217–18.

<sup>76</sup> Radt 1970 (F 698), building on the pioneering work of Bean and Cook 1955 (F 575).

<sup>77</sup> Michel 455 with Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 8 n. 38 and 102 n. 186 citing Beloch.

<sup>78</sup> Cousin and Diehl 1890 (F 617) 95 no. 3.

<sup>79</sup> *Vitr.* II.8.10f is explicit for a move which could anyway have been inferred by combining Strabo XIV.2.23 and Diod. XV.90.3. See Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 297–8, cf. 78 and 188.

Other sites also seem to have been physically moved, perhaps for reasons of defence, cf. Diod. xiv.36.3 for the alleged motive behind Thibron's move of Magnesia on the Maeander in 400 B.C.; or to make possible some grandiose building scheme or other (Asia Minor in the fourth century seems to have been a more prosperous place than in the fifth, cf. above, p. 213); but perhaps also with the intention of bringing a broader catch of population within the trawl of town life on the Greek model. Individual cases are sometimes controversial; the reader should be specially warned that archaeological finds and fashions are likely to upset anything said dogmatically on this topic.

At Ionian Erythrae,<sup>80</sup> and the Carian cities of Cnidus, Heraclea on Latmus, Bargylia and Mylasa,<sup>81</sup> fourth-century moves of site have been postulated, and historians have, without certainty but not without reason, detected the hand of the Hecatomnids. The position at Erythrae is archaeologically controversial,<sup>82</sup> and the political situation is also worth pausing over. The city was closely aligned with Mausolus and Artemisia in the 350s: Tod no. 155. But it was independent enough, about 350, to make a treaty with Hermias (p. 220 above on Tod no. 165 = Harding no. 79). It would, however, be too simple to infer from this an automatic loosening of Hecatomnid involvement, because in 1981 there was published an Erythraean inscription honouring Mausolus' younger brother Idrieus (satrap 351–344 B.C.) in terms partially similar to the honours to Mausolus: *SEG* xxxi 969 = Harding no. 28B.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>80</sup> For Magnesia (geographically Ionian, though ethnically Aeolian) see Bean 1980 (F 571) 248 and Demand 1990 (F 623) 165; silting may also be relevant, in addition to the military motive given by Diod. Erythrae: Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 100 with refs., cf. 102, following Cook 1958/9 (F 604). But see Mitchell 1984/5 (F 681) 83 (where 'decisive' is a little strong, see n. 82 below); Graf 1985 (F 631) 156 and n. 11. Graf is interesting on Erythrae, Phocaea and Clazomenae generally.

<sup>81</sup> *Cnidus*: Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 101 and n. 180, cf. 318, following Bean and Cook 1952 and 1957 (F 574 and 576) for a move from Datça to Tekir; but see Mitchell 1984/5 (F 681) 89, citing contributions on both sides of the argument; Mitchell 1989/90 (F 682) 109 cites further objectors to the move; see esp. Demand 1989 (F 622). *Heraclea on Latmus*: see Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 100–1, 321–3; Peschlow-Bindokat in Linders and Hellström 1989 (F 674) 69–76; Wörrle 1990 (F 731) 41. *Bargylia*: Bean and Cook 1957 (F 576) 141; Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 100 and 319. *Milas/Mylassa*: for the move of capital to Halicarnassus see n. 79 above, and for a possible earlier physical move from Milas to Peçin Kale see Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 99, 101; for Peçin or Beçin see also Koenigs 1980 (F 669) with Mitchell 1984/5 (F 681) 88.

<sup>82</sup> See n. 80. It should be emphasized that archaic material found at sites to which a move is postulated, such as Tekir, do not automatically disprove the hypothesis of a basic move, any more than a classical move *away* from a site is disproved by post-classical sherds or other material evidence. (Cook and Bean were well aware of some of the archaic evidence now being cited against them.) Settlement changes were not always abrupt or total, cf. Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 92–3 for evidence that some Lelegian sites synoecized by Mausolus (above nn. 73, 76) had an after-life of sorts. As for the choice of new sites, Alexander's eponymous 'foundations' were often, for good geo-political reasons, located on pre-existing settlement centres. See now Blümel's volume on Cnidus in the *IGSK* series (above, n. 1).

<sup>83</sup> See Varinluoglu 1981 (F 725) 45. D. M. Lewis tells me he thinks it possible that the honours to Mausolus and to Idrieus were carved on the same stone.

Honours to Idrieus in his brother's lifetime cannot be ruled out (the title 'satrap' is not used in either text). But it is surely likely that Idrieus is being honoured during his own tenure of the satrapy. If so he is being honoured by a city able at roughly the same period to deal with Hermias in terms that, remarkably for a city which had been 'handed over to the barbarian' in 386 (see above, p. 216), include pledges of mutual military assistance. To return to the hypothetical move of the physical site, it might, in the light of this evidence for Erythrae's relative freedom of action, be safer to speak of Hecatomnid encouragement rather than insistence. And that, quite apart from the archaeological uncertainties, may go for some other places within the reach of the long but not always overpowering arm of Mausolus.

This policy, if that is not too strong a word, looks forward to Alexander's refoundation of ancient sites like Smyrna, Alinda, and Priene. (But Priene may be the work of the Hecatomnids;<sup>84</sup> or again, perhaps there was no single act of re-creation but a gradual physical and social revival in the fourth century.)<sup>85</sup> There is certainly some reason to believe in population growth to fill these new cities (though Mausolus was too optimistic at Theangela, the old Syangela, and the place had to be bisected and thus reduced in size).<sup>86</sup> At any rate, in the 340s, 'coastal', that is presumably western, Anatolia provided 6,000 soldiers, not a contemptible total, for the great Persian drive against Egypt.<sup>87</sup> The prolific city-coinages of fourth-century Pamphylia and Cilicia<sup>88</sup> suggest that there was progress in urbanization here as well. But more intractable north and north-central Anatolia had to wait till the third- and second-century hellenistic kings, or even (in Pontus) till Pompey<sup>89</sup> and the Roman emperors. But Pisidia, whose citadels defied Alexander (see below, p. 803), crystallized into a set of city states early in the hellenistic period. It is less surprising that the more accessible and amenable Troad made strides rather earlier than Pontus, in fact under Antigonos and Lysimachus.<sup>90</sup>

Returning to Caria, the Halicarnassus synoecism did not terminate life in the old Lelegian places, where fortifications, and archaeological traces of habitation, prove that a life of sorts went on in the otherwise evacuated rubble.<sup>91</sup> This gradualist policy towards the local, native

<sup>84</sup> Bean and Cook 1957 (F 576) 141, etc. For Priene see Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 323–30, more diffident than represented by the valuable discussion in S. Sherwin-White 1985 (B 175) 88–9.

<sup>85</sup> Demand 1986 (F 621) and 1990 (F 623) 140–6: no 'relocation' of Priene.

<sup>86</sup> Bean and Cook 1957 (F 576) 94. Other explanations for the cross-wall are of course possible.

<sup>87</sup> Diod. xvi.44.4. See above, p. 92, and cf. Curt. vii.10.12: 4,000 Asia Minor infantry and 500 cavalry brought from Lycia under Alexander. <sup>88</sup> Kraay 1976 (B 200) 275–86.

<sup>89</sup> A. N. Sherwin-White 1984 (F 720) 229–30; S. Mitchell, *Anatolia* i (1993) ch. 7.

<sup>90</sup> Pisidia: Mitchell 1991 (F 683). Troad: Cook 1973 (F 613) and 1988 (F 614).

<sup>91</sup> Above, n. 82.

element is confirmed by the inscriptions put up by the various *koina* or commonalties (the word is the standard one for 'league') of Caria. The most important and presumably biggest of these, the Carian League, persisted through the fifth and fourth centuries as we have seen, but other smaller leagues blossomed too. Thus Telmissus, one of the places incorporated in Halicarnassus by Mausolus, survived as a post-Mausolan *koinon*,<sup>92</sup> and the local communities of the Koarendeis and the Plataseis<sup>93</sup> grant tax-exemptions and so forth *in conjunction* with the Hecatomnids, thus anticipating Seleucid and general royal hellenistic practice.<sup>94</sup> With this Carian evidence we may perhaps compare the slightly earlier involvement of Pericles, the Limyran dynast, with the *koinon* of the Lycian Pernitai, as attested by a badly preserved letter on stone.<sup>95</sup> All this looks enlightened: here is no high-handed removal of internal sovereignty and autonomy. So much for Alexander's claim to have liberated Asia Minor, and to have given back its laws (cf. below, p. 868ff). The taxes of the king must be paid, but there are other taxes over which the community has control. Thus the local 'Group of Pelekos' grants immunity from all tax 'except the *apomoira*'.<sup>96</sup> This word is interesting because it is an attested Ptolemaic royal tax (above p. 62). And at Hecatomnid Lagina there is a mention of tax-exemption from 'all except royal tribute'.<sup>97</sup> Xanthus actually grants tax-freedom unconditionally, subject only to ratification by the satrap.<sup>98</sup> Finally, an inscription from the Carian sanctuary of Labraunda<sup>99</sup> shows that the Plataseis controlled their own citizen-intake in the time of the satrap Pixodarus (341–336 B.C.). Such control was an important ingredient in any ancient notion of autonomy. Even Athens had lost it by the time of the early Successors of Alexander (see *SIG* 315).

This generally permissive policy was confined on present evidence to the Carian mini-empire – whose rulers' sphere of influence was, however, large. It extended from Erythrae in the north, with evidence for military involvement still higher up, at Assus and even Sestus.<sup>100</sup> It went round to Pamphylian Phaselis and Pisidia in the south, taking in the

<sup>92</sup> Michel 459 with Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 65. For the survival of other, (?)religious leagues in Asia Minor after the fourth century see Boffo 1985 (F 585) and Isager in Bilde *et al.* 1990 (F 578) 79–90.

<sup>93</sup> *SIG* 311 (Koarendeis) with Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 64; for the Plataseis grant see Crampa 1972 (F 619) no. 42 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 366 M8, and see Varinluoglu *et al.* 1990 (F 726) for an early hellenistic decree of the polis of the Plataseis/Pladaseis.

<sup>94</sup> Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 161; Wörle 1988 (F 730) 458; for the relation between Seleucids and Achaemenids see generally Briant in Bilde *et al.* 1990 (F 578) 40–65; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993 (F 672). <sup>95</sup> Wörle 1991 (F 732) 224–34. <sup>96</sup> Robert 1940–65 (B 171) VII 63.

<sup>97</sup> *SEG* xxvi 1229 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 368–9 M13.

<sup>98</sup> *SEG* xxvii 942 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 366 M9.

<sup>99</sup> Crampa 1972 (F 619) no. 42 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 366 M8.

<sup>100</sup> Xen. *Ages.* II.26f; above p. 85, and F 644, 201.

Greek offshore islands Rhodes, Chios and Cos. Even Crete, as we now know, came within the sweep of Hecatomnid diplomacy.<sup>101</sup>

In the Greek states, Hecatomnid interference or perhaps just proximity seems to have resulted in oligarchy. Demosthenes attests it for Rhodes, Chios and Cos (n. 101 above); and a similar progression, by which Athenian democratic influence was gradually undermined, is likely at Erythrae. Here where we may contrast the democratic assembly of the 390s (Tod no. 106 = Harding no. 12D) with the formula in the honours to Mausolus later in the century: 'it seemed good to the Council, on the motion of the generals' – no mention of a sovereign *demos*, which is equally absent from the honours for Idrieus (Tod no. 155; *SEG* xxxi 969 = Harding no. 28B. The preamble to the Hermias treaty is not preserved). To this extent Persia, and specifically its agents and appointees the Hecatomnids, deserve the discredit for bringing to an end western Anatolian, and east Aegean, democracy on an Athenian model, and for helping to settle what in modern language would be called the class struggle, in favour of the men of property.<sup>102</sup> Five qualifications should, however, be made.

First, it is in Demosthenes' interests in the most relevant speech, that *On the Freedom of the Rhodians* (xv), to paint Mausolus very black. (See F 644, 210f, and for the general issue of Demosthenes' truthfulness, p. 17 above).

Second, distinctions between democracy and oligarchy are not absolute, and we should be specially careful how we use crude introductory formulae in inscriptions; even Athens' famous fifth-century 'support of democracies' becomes more complicated on a second look.<sup>103</sup>

Third, it is only fair to point out that satrapal tolerance or perhaps indifference was not confined to the native *koine*: at Iasus, a more than partly Greek city, a pro-Mausolan decree<sup>104</sup> has a democratic preamble with a mention of popular assembly as well as council (though this should be seen as a concession rather than as an indication of where the real power lay. It has been well said that 'assemblies often continued to meet even under tyrannies, in Sicily as elsewhere').<sup>105</sup> There was also assembly pay, a very democratic institution and surely a survival from the fifth-century Athenian period, at the same city as late as the third century, and so presumably in the satrapal fourth century as well.<sup>106</sup> And we have seen (above) that even Erythrae, where political change can be most straightforwardly correlated with the growth of Hecatomnid

<sup>101</sup> Phaselis and Pisidia: above, nn. 43 and 44; Rhodes, Chios, Cos: Dem. xv; v. 25; Crete: Crampa 1972 (F 619) no. 40 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 366 M7. See generally Hornblower 1982 (F 644) ch. 5.

<sup>102</sup> de Ste Croix 1981 (C 70).

<sup>103</sup> See above, p. 50 n. 33.

<sup>104</sup> *SIG* 169 = Blümel 1985 (F 581) no. 1.

<sup>105</sup> Finley 1979 (G 164) 98.

<sup>106</sup> Michel 466 = Blümel 1985 (F 581) no. 20 with de Ste Croix 1975 (C 69).

influence, had relative freedom of diplomatic action as late as the middle of the century. But (to return to Iasos), it is significant that the hellenistic city bothered to republish a decree honouring some men known from other evidence to have been opponents of the Hecatomnids; this, it has been said, 'testifies to Iasos' lasting sympathy for Carians who were hostile to the dynasty of Hekatomnos and Mausolos'.<sup>107</sup> There is other, slight, evidence for strong if predictable reaction, a fragmentary inscription from Labraunda which may call one of the family 'tyrant'.<sup>108</sup> The date is uncertain, but nobody, surely, would have dared call Mausolus' family tyrants while they were still in power, not even in the time of Alexander's appointee Ada, who, though part of the new supposedly liberal dispensation, was nevertheless Mausolus' younger sister.

Fourth, female rulers like Ada, her older sister Artemisia, and Mania in the Aeolid, show that elite Asia Minor culture avoided one of the most basic and usual exclusions of Greek political life. But it now seems clear that the extent of Lycian 'matriarchy' was exaggerated in the nineteenth century, by over-interpretation of Hdt. I.173.<sup>109</sup>

Fifth and last, if the class struggle is envisaged not just in terms of *Greek* oligarchs versus *Greek* democrats, the possibility has to be faced that native Carians, Lydians, Lycians and so on, hitherto something of an exploited class, actually had a better deal under the fourth-century satraps than either under the Athenian empire or under the Seleucids of the third and second centuries. The latter, on one extreme and admittedly controversial view, employed a mere 2½ per cent of natives in the upper cadres of their administration.<sup>110</sup> When the Greeks arrived in Anatolia during the Dark and Archaic ages, they had reduced to servitude people like the Pedieis of Priene, the Mariandynoi of Bithynia, and the Lelegians of Caria.<sup>111</sup> Though there is evidence that, for instance, some Lelegians were still used as helots in hellenistic times,<sup>112</sup> still the epigraphic finds of the second half of the twentieth century have shown that some natives at least attained high office and status in Asia Minor under the Achaemenids. Thus Artemelis, a Carian name, is made garrison-commander at Xanthus;<sup>113</sup> Hyssollos and Obrokas, two more

<sup>107</sup> SEG xxxviii 1059 reporting Pugliese Carratelli.

<sup>108</sup> Crampa 1972 (F 619) no. 41 with Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 70–1 and Petit 1988 (F 693) 316.

<sup>109</sup> Pembroke 1965 (F 692), 1967 (I 118). Note also, for female 'property power' in the Persian empire, the interesting short study by Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1988 (F 48). Mania: Xen.Hell.III.1.12.

<sup>110</sup> Habicht 1958 (F 634), but see S. Sherwin-White in Kuhrt and Sherwin-White 1987 (F 671) 6. Note however the reservations on this point in the important review by Walbank 1988 (F 727) of Kuhrt and Sherwin-White. See also now Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993 (F 672).

<sup>111</sup> For the evidence for such Asia Minor 'serfdom' cf. generally Jones 1971 (F 662) 384 n. 20 and J. K. Davies, CAH VII<sup>2</sup>.1, 300 n. 264; and see Petit 1990 (F 45) 244–53 for the theoretical problems of using such feudal language in this context (also CAH VII<sup>2</sup>.1, 300 n. 263).

<sup>112</sup> FGrHist 741 Philip of Theangela F 2.

<sup>113</sup> n. 98 above.



Carian names, feature as *archontes* at Lagina;<sup>114</sup> and the same office is filled by local men at the Carian sanctuary Amyzon. The same text honours Bagadates and Ariaramnes; these names are Iranian;<sup>115</sup> and there is a possible Iranian dedicant at (?) late fourth-century Labraunda.<sup>116</sup> But it is clear that native Carians, or people with Carian names, were prominent alongside those bearers of Persian names whose presence in Asia Minor, down to hellenistic and even Roman times, was constantly and rightly insisted on by the late Louis Robert (above, nn. 35 and 115).

Hecatomnid furtherance of this native Carian element is an important feature of family policy. As the present writer has emphasized elsewhere,<sup>117</sup> we can legitimately speak of active 'Carianization' alongside the more obvious processes of hellenization. It would certainly be wrong to 'privilege' the Greek element in the dynasty's activities and in the Caria over which they presided.

Thus Zeus Kaunios, so called from the Carian city of Caunus, gets an altar in the Xanthus trilingual, and Zeus Idrieus, whose epithet is certainly Carian, is mentioned at Iasus.<sup>118</sup> Obviously, none of this is crude evidence of a Hecatomnid religious, still less political, programme (see n. 117); but the blend of Greek and native elements is very striking. Negative evidence is also significant: the Hecatomnids lavishly patronized the Carian sanctuaries (Amyzon, Labraunda, Sinuri, Lagina and no doubt Kasossos) with buildings and dedications;<sup>119</sup> but on present evidence they made no effort whatsoever to buy and build their way into prominence at the old panhellenic sanctuaries of Greece. Even at Ionian Clarus, an oracular site which had an archaic history and featured, though not as a sanctuary, in Thucydides,<sup>120</sup> there is very little evidence for activity of any sort till the end of the fourth century. The Hecatomnids are equally noticeable by their absence from Didyma in Milesian territory, despite this great sanctuary's (?) Carian name.<sup>121</sup> This absence would be less surprising if Darius or Xerxes had indeed sacked the

<sup>114</sup> *SEG* xxvi 1228 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) M368 M12.

<sup>115</sup> Robert 1983 (F 703) 97 no. 2, *SEG* xxxiii 851 (summary, no text given).

<sup>116</sup> Crampa 1972 (F 619) no. 28. But the Persian name is very hard to read.

<sup>117</sup> See Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 276, 352, 342 and *passim*. On Gunter 1985 (F 632A) see my reply at Hornblower 1990 (F 647).

<sup>118</sup> Zeus Kaunios: see *SEG* xxvii 942 = Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 366 M9 with 115 n. 71; Zeus Idrieus: see Pugliese Carratelli 1969/70 (F 695) 372 no. 1 = Blümel 1985 (F 581) no. 52 with Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 113.

<sup>119</sup> Amyzon: Robert 1983 (F 703); Labraunda: Jeppeson 1955 (F 651); Westholm 1963 (F 729); Hellström and Thieme 1982 (F 641); Hellström 1965 (F 639); Säflund 1980 (F 716); Jully 1981 (F 664); Crampa 1969 and 1972 (F 618, 619). Sinuri: Robert 1945 (F 706); Lagina: *SIG* 311; Kasossos: Robert 1945 (F 706) 17 and Wörle 1991 (F 732) 205 n. 10.

<sup>120</sup> III.33.1 with my comm., Hornblower 1991 (B 62) *ad loc.* For Clarus see Robert 1989 (F 713) and Parke 1985 (F 690); Mitchell 1989/90 (F 682) 98–9.

<sup>121</sup> Fontenrose 1988 (F 629) 3–5; Zgusta 1984 (F 736) 162 and n. 170. The word suggests also the Greek 'twin', and was so understood by the ancients.

temple of Apollo there, as ancient sources tell us, but even this has been challenged.<sup>122</sup> Such revisionism is extreme; but at the very least, it has cautiously been said that 'we now have sufficient evidence of cult activity at Didyma in the period from 494 to 334'.<sup>123</sup> But when the Milesians wished to honour the Hecatomnid satraps Idrieus and Ada with a pair of bronze statues, they chose Delphi, not Didyma as the place to do so, suggesting that in the middle of the fourth century the city looked to Delphi as the great Apolline centre.<sup>124</sup> After 300 B.C., it has been observed, this statue group would certainly have stood at Didyma.<sup>125</sup>

Moving away from Caria, a very elegantly carved Greco-Lylian bilingual inscription records a dedication by Nannas son of Bakivas (Dionysocles) to Artemis.<sup>126</sup> (The name Bakivas also appears on a pyramidal seal of Persian type from this part of the world.<sup>127</sup>) Epigraphically attested cult titles like 'Mother of the Lylian Gods'<sup>128</sup> can be seen as expressive of a Lylian ethnicity surviving into the hellenistic period. We may compare Arr. *Anab.* 1.17.4 for Alexander's restoration of the 'old customs of the Lyilians'. If this means anything, it ought to imply that memory of those 'customs' had survived.

The 'iranization' of Anatolia is illustrated by the 'gods of the Greeks and Persians' in the plain of Tabai in east Caria,<sup>129</sup> and by a fourth-century decree from Sardis standing in the name of the sub-satrap Droaphernes, and attesting the influence of Zoroastrianism.<sup>130</sup> Also from Sardis is a bilingual inscription in Lylian and Aramaic about the destruction of temple property, and dated to the 'Tenth Year of Artaxerxes'; but the inscription nevertheless refers to Artemis of Ephesus by that title, a Greek goddess however deep her oriental tinge.<sup>131</sup> There is archaeological as well as epigraphic evidence for such fusion: excavations at Sardis have brought to light a relief depicting Cybele, with lion and tympanum, side by side with Artemis, draped and carrying a hind across her chest.<sup>132</sup>

Hellenization in Western Anatolia is not confined to religion. Priest lists from the Carian sanctuary of Sinuri<sup>133</sup> show that Carian personal names give way to Greek in the course of the later fourth century, a process which can be documented elsewhere in the Hecatomnid despo-

<sup>122</sup> Tuchelt 1988 (F 724); cf. Parke 1985 (D 218) and 1986 (F 691); Mitchell 1989/90 (F 682) 105–6.

<sup>123</sup> Fontenrose 1988 (F 629) 15. <sup>124</sup> Tod no. 161B with Parke 1985 (F 690) 35.

<sup>125</sup> Parke 1985 (F 690) *ibid.* For the great series of hellenistic dedications Günther 1971 (H 55).

<sup>126</sup> Littmann 1916 (B 675) 1 p. 38. <sup>127</sup> Boardman 1970 (F 584).

<sup>128</sup> Robert 1987 (F 712) 323. <sup>129</sup> Robert 1969–90 (B 172) v 736.

<sup>130</sup> Robert 1969–90 v (B 172) 485–309 and 1983 (F 703) 116. Note also Cook 1983 (F 14) 149: Oromedon, the name of the father of Syennesis of Cilicia (Hdt. vii.98) may imply 'some recognition of Ahura-Mazda west of the Euphrates before the time of Darius I'. Cf. West 1971 (H 116).

<sup>131</sup> Littmann 1916 (F 675) 1 p. 23.

<sup>132</sup> Hanfmann and Ramage 1978 (F 638) no. 20 figs. 78–83. For Artemis/Anahita Robert 1969–90 (B 172) vi 137–68 at 140–60. <sup>133</sup> Robert 1945 (F 706) no. 5.

tate (though it should always be remembered that *natives* may give their children Greek-looking names).

Western Anatolia was invaded in the fourth century by a diaspora, in part the result of the collapse of the Athenian empire as paymaster, of Greek artists, sculptors, poets and intellectuals generally. Martin West has written of Hesiod's 'hob-nailed hexameters'; we might say of Symmachus, the Achaean hack poet and seer in the pay of Arbinas of Lycia, that his were Greek hexameters in Persian trousers (above, p. 214). The Hecatomnid court alone (but perhaps it *was* alone in the intensity of its patronage) played host to Eudoxus the mathematician,<sup>134</sup> Dexippus the doctor from Cos,<sup>135</sup> Aeschines the Athenian orator,<sup>136</sup> Theodectes the tragedian, and the numerous other performers at the cultural contest organized by Artemisia after her brother Mausolus' death.<sup>137</sup>

Then there are the architects Pytheus, Satyrus, Timotheus, Leochares, Scopas and Bryaxis, most of them top artists, who built the Mausoleum – a building which blends Greek, Persian, native Carian and even Egyptian elements.<sup>138</sup> And Pytheus may have had a hand in the fine temple of Zeus at Labraunda,<sup>139</sup> a shrine spectacularly endowed by the Hecatomnids. All these visitors had their precursors in the hellenizing entourage of Pericles of Limyra, an older contemporary of Mausolus. It now seems clear that it was wrong to dismiss Pericles' hellenizing activity as just a veneer:<sup>140</sup> he was true to his famous name.<sup>141</sup> The Nereid Monument from Xanthus, now in the British Museum, was surely the work of Greek or Greek-influenced craftsmen<sup>142</sup> as were the Caryatids at Limyra, on display in the museum at Antalya;<sup>143</sup> we have seen (p. 215 above) that there may have been artistic as well as military and political competition between these cities and their respective dynasts. Lycian

<sup>134</sup> See generally Hornblower 1982 (F 644) ch. 12. Eudoxus: D.L. VIII.88.

<sup>135</sup> Suidas s.v. <sup>136</sup> Philostr. *VS* para. 481 Kayser.

<sup>137</sup> *FGrH* 115 Theopompus τ 6 a-b and F 345; Lane Fox 1986 (B 65) 108–9.

<sup>138</sup> Jeppesen 1958 (F 652) 1–67; 1961 (F 653); 1967 (F 654); 1974 (F 655); 1976 (F 656 and 657); 1977/8 (F 658); Jeppesen *et al.* (F 660); 1984 (F 659); Waywell 1978 (F 728); Hornblower 1982 (F 644) ch. 9. On the testimonia Jeppesen in Jeppesen and Luttrell 1986 (F 661) is unreliable, see Hornblower 1988 (F 646) 175–7. The Mausoleum is the subject of several of the papers collected in Linders and Hellström 1989 (F 674), on which see my forthcoming review in *Gnomon*. For the blend of Greek and non-Greek, specifically Persian and native Carian, elements in the Mausoleum in particular and Hecatomnid culture generally see Hornblower 1982 (F 644) *passim* esp. 246, 251 on Persia; also Hornblower 1990 (F 647) on Gunter 1985 (F 632A). See also below p. 658.

<sup>139</sup> Hellström and Thieme 1982 (F 641) 56; Carter 1983 (F 597).

<sup>140</sup> Wörzle 1991 (F 732) 216 n. 69, protesting against Asheri 1983 (F 562) 85–105 and Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 120–1. For Persian as well as Greek influence on Lycian art in the Achaemenid period Jacobs 1987 (F 649).

<sup>141</sup> Bryce 1980 (F 590). See also Bryce 1982 (F 591), 1983 (F 592), 1986 (F 593).

<sup>142</sup> Above, n. 20. Greek influence does not necessarily indicate the workmanship or even the presence of Greeks, see Hornblower 1990 (F 647) 138–9. <sup>143</sup> Borchhardt 1976 (F 586A).

die-cutters imitated the finest types of Syracusan coinage.<sup>144</sup> But the achievement of less magnificent names, figures of minor or anonymous talent, supplements that of Pytheus and the others. There are the craftsmen who carved the Greco-Iranian stelae from Dascylium, now in Istanbul Museum;<sup>145</sup> these carry banqueting or funerary subjects executed in a partly Greek manner, but their Persian cultural origin is underlined by the presence of the occasional inscription in Aramaic. Or there are the Athenians, artists of no particular fame or consequence, attested as working in western Asia Minor: Philistides, at Carian Theangela, or Theodorus, who left an exquisitely carved statue-base signature at Lycian Tlos.<sup>146</sup>

Throughout this chapter we have discussed the evidence for cultural fusion, and used expressions like 'Greco-Persian'. These expressions are not, however, intended to beg the questions of ethnicity to which such mixed cultures give rise. It must be emphasized that it is difficult, in the Achaemenid period, to say whether an artistic product is the product of a Greek, or a Persian, or a native workshop, or what kind of clientele the object was designed for. The position at the end of the period here discussed is neatly illustrated by a text from Pamphylian Side, a place which 'discovered' its Greek origins when it was convenient to do so.<sup>147</sup> The text is a bilingual inscription<sup>148</sup> in Greek and the local Sidetan script, which may be from as early as the late fourth century. The signature, again on a statue base, runs 'Mnaseas son of Artemon, the Sidetan, made this.' What is remarkable about this is the artist's explicit assertion of a local origin. In the couple of centuries preceding Mnaseas' inscription it would often be impossible to say confidently what ethnic group the artist belonged to. Certainly we should, in trying to identify ethnic origin, beware of such assumptions as that Greek means beautiful but Persian means stiff.<sup>149</sup> Even the validity of the concept of hellenization, which

<sup>144</sup> Kraay 1976 (B 200) 271.

<sup>145</sup> Bernard 1969 (F 577); Dentzer 1969 and 1982 (F 625 and J 12); Starr 1976 and 1977 (C 79); Cook and Blackman 1970/1 (F 615) 60; Metzger 1971 and 1975 (F 678 and F 679); Altheim-Stiehl *et al.* 1983 (F 560); Bammer 1983 (F 565); Cremer 1984 (F 620); cf. Radt 1983 (F 699).

<sup>146</sup> Robert 1936 (B 169) 93–4; *TAM* I p. 25.

<sup>147</sup> Arr. *Anab.* 1.26.4. For the allegedly Greek (specifically Argive) origins of Pamphylian Aspendus in the early hellenistic period see *SEG* xxxiv 282, cf. Strabo xiv.4.2 for both Side and Aspendus. But 'invented tradition' has been at work here: many places found it expedient to claim Argive origins after the time of Alexander, whose family also liked to think of themselves as Argives: Hdt. v.22.2. For the reality (Aspendus in the earlier fourth century not Greek at all) see Lewis 1977 (A 33) 144 n. 55. *FGrHist* 4 Hellanicus F 15 may however be relevant (fifth-century interest in Aspendus' origins). <sup>148</sup> Bean 1965 (F 569) 81; cf. Woudhuizen 1988–9 (F 733).

<sup>149</sup> See Root in F 53 (1991) 1–29. Nothing in the present chapter should be understood to imply that the only people in Achaemenid Persia capable of turning out convincingly Greek-looking art were ethnic Greeks; cf. above, nn. 36, 117, 142 and the works there cited, and see above all Root in F 53 (1991), e.g. 18: 'the notorious circularity of discussion on "Graeco-Persian" art is caused to some degree by the refusal to relinquish the notion that only Greeks could produce Greek-style art-forms'.

once seemed unproblematic, has been challenged ('a modern idea, reflecting modern forms of cultural domination').<sup>150</sup> More theoretical clarification of these notions is needed, and we can be confident that new and exciting evidence will continue to emerge – and that it will continue to subvert the theories.

<sup>150</sup> Bowersock 1990 (A 11) xi.

## CHAPTER 8*b*

### MESOPOTAMIA, 482–330 B.C.

MATTHEW W. STOLPER

Xerxes and his successors succeeded in consolidating imperial control over Mesopotamia. There is, at least, no explicit record of Babylonian resistance to Achaemenid rule after the revolts in the early years of Xerxes' reign (*CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 73–5, 133–5). Later political disturbances were not matters of provincial reaction, but struggles among members of the Achaemenid dynasty and the imperial aristocracy. Even these left few plain marks in Babylonian texts.

The available Babylonian texts are similar in kind to those from the early Achaemenid reigns, but there are fewer of them. They include few fragments of historiographic texts and royal inscriptions. Most are legal and administrative documents. Among about 1,100 published texts of these kinds from the last 150 years of the Achaemenids, a few are temple records, but most belonged to the private archives of Babylonians – in fact, nearly two thirds of them come from a single source, the Murashû archive (454–404 B.C.) – and, although they record contacts with agencies of the provincial government, they are not documents from the conduct of government as such. What they divulge is limited by the concerns of city-based businessmen. They are conservative in form, almost oblivious to political events, and often enigmatic in their allusions to contemporary institutions. They are a rich source of detail on local conditions, but an episodic source on the history of their times.<sup>1</sup>

#### I. TRACES OF POLITICAL HISTORY

As has been shown in *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 133–5, the classical accounts of Xerxes' reprisals after the Babylonian revolts have no counterpart in Babylonian

<sup>1</sup> Of the legal and administrative texts that do not belong to the Murashû archive, about one third can be assigned to a dozen archival groups from Babylon, Borsippa, Kish/Hursagkalama, Nippur, Ur and Uruk. Most of the published legal, administrative and epistolary documents from the period are listed in Oelsner 1976 (F 149) 312ff n. 10 and Dandamayev 1984 (F 95) 16–18. Cuneiform texts are cited in the style of the Chicago Assyrian Dictionary (F 157), with minor adaptations to *CAH* style and additional abbreviations noted in the list of abbreviations. Babylonian dates are cited in this form: day (Arabic numerals)/month (Roman numerals)/regnal year (Arabic numerals). In Babylonian chronological conventions, regnal years are coterminous with calendar years, beginning 1 Nisannu (March/April); a ruler's accession year is the balance of his predecessor's last regnal year, i.e. the period between the previous ruler's death and the next New Year. Conversions to Julian dates follow Parker and Dubberstein 1956 (F 159).

texts. If Xerxes sacked Esagil, the temple of Marduk in Babylon, the event was as transient in effect as his destruction of the Athenian Acropolis, for both property and personnel of Esagil recur in texts from later reigns.<sup>2</sup> The revolts and their aftermath may only have affected northern Babylonia, where all of the known texts dated by the rebel kings were drafted. Some legal archives from the northern cities came to an end at about this time (the latest available text of the large archive of the Egibi family at Babylon, for example, is dated under the rebel Shamash-erība),<sup>3</sup> but family archives from Ur in the south cover the period of the revolts and beyond without interruption.<sup>4</sup>

Nor do the changing royal titles used in date formulae tell a clear story. The element 'King of Babylon' was not dropped from the titulature at once and everywhere as a token of reprisal against the revolts. 'King of Babylon' and 'King of Persia and Media' appear intermittently in date formulae from the later reign of Xerxes, and in a few texts from the reign of Artaxerxes I, as late as 441 B.C. (*Bagh. Mitt.* 15 268 No. 4).<sup>5</sup> What is striking in Xerxes' titles is their variation, contrasting sharply with the mostly regular usages of legal texts from earlier and later reigns, and the introduction of 'Persia and Media' beside 'Babylon and the lands'. It is still likely that these traits and the general reduction of the title to 'king of the lands' in later reigns do indeed reflect changes in the empire's structure and the provinces' status, or at least in the view of those matters that the rulers wished to propagate. This development in royal policy, however, was not abrupt and it was not a response provoked only by the Babylonian revolts, but part of a long political process.<sup>6</sup>

Babylonian astronomical texts put the date of Xerxes' death in early


<sup>2</sup> See Stolper 1989 (F 181) 295f. The records of tithes paid for clearing debris from Esagil, dated soon after Alexander's seizure of Babylon (CT 49 5 and 6, see Oelsner 1964 (F 146) 265, McEwan 1981 (F 137) 59), along with references in an astronomical diary and two Seleucid chronicles (Sachs and Hunger 1988 (F 172) No. -321 r. 14, Grayson 1975 (F 105) no. 10 obv. 6, rev. 13, 33, 11 obv. 2) to similar clearing operations in the times of Philip Arrhidaeus and Antigonos, are not evidence of the persistent effects of Xerxes' ravages but only of building campaigns conducted and described in traditional Mesopotamian terms.

<sup>3</sup> ZA 3 157 no. 16. See Böhl 1962 (F 79) 110 for a group of unpublished texts from Babylon, covering the period between the Neo-Babylonian king Nabopolassar and the rebel Shamash-erība. The latest texts of the Ea-ilūta-bāni/Ilī-bāni family archive from Borsippa date from the final years of Darius I; the aftermath of the revolts against Xerxes may have caused the closing of the preserved part of the archive; see Joannès 1984 (F 117) 145f and 1989 (F 119) 24, 126.

<sup>4</sup> Texts in the group with the excavation number U.17243 (the Barber family archive in UET 4) reach through the entire Achaemenid period to the early years of Macedonian rule; texts in the group with the excavation number U.20089 include documents from as early as Neo-Assyrian times and as late as the fourteenth year of Xerxes (UET 4 115); see Figulla 1949 (F 101) 1; Van Driel 1986 (F 198) 10 and 1987 (F 197) 164-8.

<sup>5</sup> See Kessler 1984 (F 125) 262, Joannès 1989 (F 119A), and Stolper 1985 (F 177) 9 n. 24, with references. See also CAH IV<sup>2</sup> 134f; Kuhrt and Sherwin-White 1987 (F 132) 72f.

<sup>6</sup> But Joannès 1990 (F 121) 180 interprets the evidence to indicate a sharp break with the past and a general political reorganization in the time of Xerxes.



Map 6. Mesopotamia. For detail on ancient water-courses see F 73 fig. 28.



August 465.<sup>7</sup> The few texts that can be ascribed to the beginning of Artaxerxes' reign show no sign of disturbance during the succession.

Texts from the Murashû archive of Nippur begin in Artaxerxes' tenth year, and they show some of the local effects of imperial politics, for they name influential figures of the court, including some who participated in the events that brought Darius II Ochus to the throne. Among them are Menostanes (Babylonian Manushtānu), a nephew of Artaxerxes and son of the satrap of Babylonia, Artarius (Babylonian Artarēme); Arsames, the satrap of Egypt (Babylonian Arshamu); Ochus' queen Parysatis (Babylonian Purushātu); the courtier Artoxares (Babylonian Artahsharu); and others of comparable stature. They controlled wealth and men in the region around Nippur, and although it is not likely that figures of such rank were often at their Babylonian holdings, they were still able to act on local affairs through their Babylonian agents.<sup>8</sup>

There are discrepancies concerning the date of Artaxerxes' death and Darius' accession, both among classical authors (Thuc. iv.5of, Diod. xi.69.6, xii.64.1, xii.71.1, Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F 14.15) and between them and Babylonian texts. The Babylonian sources, though, are consistent among themselves. According to the scribes who drafted legal texts at the time of the events and the scholars who compiled astronomical records later, Artaxerxes I died in the forty-first year of his reign, Darius II was his immediate successor, and the succession occurred between 24 December 424 and 13 February 423 B.C.<sup>9</sup>

No known Babylonian texts, neither legal documents contemporary with the events nor later astronomical compilations, acknowledge Xerxes II's or Sogdianus' evanescent tenure on the throne, known from non-Babylonian sources, but several texts from Nippur and Babylon explicitly treat Darius' accession year as the continuation of Artaxerxes' final regnal year.<sup>10</sup> Darius II Ochus was himself in Babylon very soon after Artaxerxes' death, as one of the Murashû texts (BE 10 1) indicates.

<sup>7</sup> Stolper 1988 (F 61) 196–7, disposing of contrary evidence. Cowley, *AP* 6 supplies a *terminus ante quem* of 3 January 464 for knowledge of the succession in Upper Egypt; it names Artaxerxes as King, but refers to his accession period as the balance of the twenty-first regnal year (*sc.* of Xerxes). The new king's given name is damaged in the astronomical diary Sachs and Hunger 1988 (F 172) No. –440:1. Babylonian [*Ar*]shu, i.e. Arses, is plausible but uncertain, since the date to which the text refers is not confirmed by the astronomical contents, and all Greek mss of Joseph. *AJ* xi.6.1 (184) have the ruler's name as 'Cyrus', commonly emended to 'Asuēros' (Gutschmid). See Sachs 1977 (F 171) 13of.; Schmitt 1982 (F 57) 83, 87; Sachs and Hunger 1988 (F 172) 61.

<sup>8</sup> Similar conditions may underlie earlier references to a major domo (Babylonian *rab bīti*) of Mardonius (Babylonian Mardiniya, Marduniya) in Evetts 1892 (F 100) App. 4 (Xerxes, year seven (collated, despite Graziani 1986 (F 107) 38 No. 31)) and BM 64535 (Xerxes, year eight), both from Babylon; see Stolper 1992 (F 188). If this Mardonius is Xerxes' cousin, brother-in-law, and general, the later mention of him is posthumous. A reference in Xerxes' accession year to a wet-nurse of the king's daughter (Evetts App. 2, see Graziani 1986 (F 107) 10 No. 8) at least verifies that members of the royal family were sometimes in Babylonia during tranquil times. <sup>9</sup> Stolper 1983 (F 60).

<sup>10</sup> BE 8/1 127; BE 10 4, 5, 6, 7; PBS 2/1 3; *AMI* NF 16 233f.

Ochus' party controlled Babylonia, using it as a staging area during the succession crisis, and the Murashû archive may reflect their preparations. A sharp increase in the number of Murashû texts that record lands pawned by smallholders coincides with the period during which the succession was at issue, a phenomenon that may result from extraordinary demands for money and service that participants in the contest imposed on their subordinates. If so, local short-term circumstances were surprisingly sensitive to imperial politics, precisely because the Great Kings had granted Babylonian offices, estates and revenues to their relatives, friends and potential rivals.<sup>11</sup>

The astronomical texts agree with the Greek sources on the point that Darius' given name was Ochus,<sup>12</sup> but direct evidence of events during his reign is slight. A few Murashû texts refer to smallholders in Nippur called to arms for travel to Uruk on the King's service during the second year of the reign (BE 10 61, 62; PBS 2/1 54, 162, 194; UCP 9/3 275), but the occasion is not indicated. If Ctesias is to be believed, it was in Babylon that Darius contracted his fatal illness (*FGrH* 688 F 16. 57). In the same passage, however, Ctesias erroneously gives Darius a thirty-five year reign, while Babylonian legal texts put Darius' death in the last half of his nineteenth regnal year, between 17 September 405 and 10 April 404.<sup>13</sup>

Soon after the accession of Artaxerxes II,<sup>14</sup> the penetration of Cyrus the Younger's army to the vicinity of Babylon (p. 49), the raising and provisioning of the king's forces to oppose him, and the armed retreat of the Greek mercenaries must have caused serious local disruptions. No Babylonian texts now available record these events, but there are texts that hint at their background. Two documents (*ZKM* 2 pl. after 324 = *TSBA* 4 pl. after 256 no. 2 [12/III/17 Darius II], and *ZKM* 1 pl. after 254 = *Actes du 8<sup>e</sup> Congrès International* 25, [7/X/3 Artaxerxes II]) record transactions done in Babylonia by agents of a man called Bēlshunu, entitled 'governor of Across-the-River'. He was Belesys, the governor of Syria whose palace and park Cyrus' army destroyed on their march to the Euphrates (*Xen. An.* 1.4.10, cf. VII.8.25) only a few months after the later of these tablets was drafted. The same Bēlshunu had been a district governor at Babylon early in the reign of Darius II and perhaps

<sup>11</sup> So Stolper 1985 (F 177) 104–24; Van Driel 1987 (F 197) 174–6 and 1989 (F 200) 223–4 demurs.

<sup>12</sup> *LBAT* 163 and 1426 (see Sachs 1977 (F 171) 130–3) and Sachs and Hunger 1988 (F 172) No. 418B.

<sup>13</sup> The latest published text from the reign is Durand *Textes babyloniens* pl. 36 17603 = Joannès 1982 (F 116) 103 No. 34 (2/VI/19). CBS 1714, dated in the first year of Artaxerxes II, records a receipt of rent due for the period covering the nineteenth year of Darius and the first year of Artaxerxes, implying that the two years were contiguous.

<sup>14</sup> With the given name Arses (Babylonian *Arshu*): Sachs 1977 (F 171) 132–39; Schmitt 1982 (F 57) 84 and 88f.

even late in the reign of Artaxerxes I. He and his agents conducted business in Babylonia throughout this period and for at least a short time after Cyrus' invasion.<sup>15</sup>

The texts that mention this Bēlshunu supply a rare glimpse of a Babylonian's political career under Achaemenid rule. Bēlshunu was a member of a prosperous business house that operated at Babylon. He was recruited into government as a district official in the reign of Artaxerxes I or the early years of Darius II. He was promoted to the provincial governorship of Syria in the middle years of Darius and remained in that post until the early years of Artaxerxes II. He achieved a political rank normally occupied by members of the Iranian imperial aristocracy, and he survived two troubled royal successions. His career may reflect the monarchy's delicate political circumstances; his promotion by Darius II to the governorship of Syria came perhaps not only because Darius' Babylonian mother had given him a special regard for Babylonians, or as a reward for services rendered in Babylon during Darius' accession to the throne, but as a method of securing Darius' control by taking Syria out of the hands of an aristocratic family that was dangerous to a usurper and putting it under a man who was safer for having no ties of blood or marriage to the royal house. Bēlshunu's promotion from Babylon to Syria, at any rate, implies some tightening of the ties between the two regions in spite of their administrative separation in earlier reigns.

Astronomical diaries mention fighting in the early 360s: in April 369 troops were sent on a campaign to Razaunda (Sachs–Hunger *Diaries* No. –369 r. 8), evidently in Media (Ptol. *Geog.* vi.2.12), and in May or June 367 royal forces were engaged in battle at an uncertain location (Sachs–Hunger *Diaries* No. –366 A ii 3). If Artaxerxes II's attempts to reconquer Egypt and the revolts of the western satraps (pp. 50–64) made demands on Babylonian resources, however, known Babylonian texts do not show their effects.

Artaxerxes II died between November 359 and April 358.<sup>16</sup> Babylonian astronomical texts, a chronicle fragment, and a fragment of uncertain literary character confirm classical notices that the given name of his successor, Artaxerxes III, was Ochus.<sup>17</sup> The chronicle fragment alludes to Artaxerxes' suppression of the rebellion in Phoenicia, recording the arrival of prisoners from Sidon at the king's palace in Babylon during the autumn of 345. No Babylonian corroboration is available,

<sup>15</sup> Stolper 1987 (F 178).

<sup>16</sup> VAS 6 186 (Babylon); see Parker and Dubberstein 1956 (F 159) 19.

<sup>17</sup> Sachs and Hunger 1988 (F 172) Nos. –346, –343, –342, *AJAH* 2 147 (see Sachs 1977 (F 171) 138ff); Schmitt 1982 (F 57) 85 and 89f; Grayson 1975 (F 105) no. 9:1 (Sollberger *op. Cawkwell* 1962 (C 103) 137–8 suggests that the year should be read as the fourth rather than the fourteenth).

however, for the supposition that Belesys, the governor of Syria who took part in an attempt to take Sidon in 344 (Diod. xvi.42.1), was related to the like-named Babylonian who had governed Syria fifty years earlier. The few texts that can now be assigned to the time of Artaxerxes III<sup>18</sup> have no clear bearing on the political events of the reign.<sup>19</sup> The colophon on a literary tablet from Uruk dates by the twenty-first and final year of the reign,<sup>20</sup> and an astronomical fragment fixes the date of this Ochus' death and the accession of his son Arses in the sixth month of that year, August–September 338 B.C.<sup>21</sup>

Babylonian records from the stirring times during the Macedonian advance are tantalizing. A hellenistic astronomical compilation called the Saros Canon (*LBAT* 1428) dates a lunar eclipse by Arses' first regnal year. Arses, again called the son of Artaxerxes Ochus, figures in a narrative fragment that also mentions Alexander in connexion with activities at Esagil (*AJAH* 2 146), but too little of the tablet survives for certain interpretation. The Uruk King List (*UVB* 18 58 W.20030,105) enters someone with a Babylonian given name (Nidin-Bēl, or Nidin-Ishtar, or Nidinti) immediately before Darius III. His identity is unexplained: he is unlikely to be Arses; he may be one of the rebels from the reign of Darius I, misplaced by manuscript corruption; but he may also be an otherwise unrecorded local usurper who claimed power in Babylon during the unstable period of the assassinations that brought Darius III to the throne.

Astronomical texts mention the first three regnal years of Darius III, supplying his given name, Artashâta.<sup>22</sup> A single legal text from Ur (*UET* 4 25) dates from the end of his fourth year, in March 331. It is a record of a routine sale, with no hint of the preparations that were under way in the months before the Battle of Gaugamela.<sup>23</sup>

Astronomical texts record Alexander's approach and arrival. The obverse of a diary fragment describes a pitched battle after which the army deserted the losing commander and fled to the highlands (in Babylonian, 'the land of the Gutians'), and since the event is dated to 1

<sup>18</sup> CT 49 1–4 (Babylon, years 4 and 5), *UET* 4 1 and 2 (Ur, year 9); perhaps VAS 6 293, *OECT* 12 pl. 41f B 2 and B 7 (see Joannès 1982 (F 116) 344f), and Durand *Textes babyloniens* pl. 10 A0 6027 and pl. 4 A0 2137 and CT 44 80 (all probably from Babylon or Borsippa, years 2 through 18, see Joannès 1982 (F 116) 331ff); probably VAT 16476 = w.16584 (Uruk, 10 + x/VIII/1, unpublished, see Sarkisian 1974 (F 173) 16); see Kuhrt 1987 (F 128) 152; Oelsner 1971 (F 147) 161 and 1976 (F 149) 314.

<sup>19</sup> The interpretation of the astronomical fragment VAT 4924 in Unger 1931 (F 192) 318 n. 3 is erroneous; see Kuhrt 1990 (F 129) 179; Stolper 1988 (F 61) 197f, and the edition of the fragment in Sachs and Hunger 1988 (F 172) No. –418.

<sup>20</sup> *TCL* 6 56; see Hunger 1968 (F 113) 47 no. 112 and Oelsner 1986 (F 153) 409 n. 571.

<sup>21</sup> BM 71537, courtesy of C. B. F. Walker.

<sup>22</sup> Sachs 1977 (F 171) 142f; Schmitt 1982 (F 57) 90f; Sachs and Hunger 1988 (F 172) Nos. –333 and –332.

<sup>23</sup> See Oelsner 1976 (F 149) 314f. The fragmentary ration list Durand *Textes babyloniens* pl. 77 A0 26771 may also belong to the reign of Darius III; see Joannès 1982 (F 116) 333.

October 331 B.C., the text can only refer to Darius III's defeat at Gaugamela and his flight to Arbela and Media. The reverse describes the Macedonian progress southward during the following month, to Sippar by 18 October and to Babylon on 20 October.<sup>24</sup> Mazaius, who had withdrawn with his contingent to Babylon after Gaugamela, led a delegation of Babylonian notables to surrender the city to the Macedonians before an assault could be launched (Arr. *Anab.* III.16.3; Curt. v.1.17ff). Babylon was an open city, and astronomical diaries record Alexander's arrival in approving terms. The Babylonians' rejoicing was an act of formal compliance with the terms of surrender, modelled on Mesopotamian precedents,<sup>25</sup> but their relief must have been sincere.

## II. DOCUMENTATION, SETTLEMENT AND LANDSCAPE

Alexander's conquest brought him a prize that was of great value and greater potential. Archaeological surveys in Babylonia show an increase in the number and average size of settlements between the periods identified as Middle Babylonian and as Neo-Babylonian/Achaemenid, with eastern and south-eastern Babylonia undergoing an especially pronounced resurgence. These developments were part of a long trend of growth that continued until Sassanian times, but the archaeological criteria for distinguishing among Neo-Babylonian, early Achaemenid and later Achaemenid remains, and for correlating these material categories with political epochs are very insecure, and the short-term situation of late Achaemenid Babylonia is therefore not well defined by these means. There were probably temporal fluctuations in Babylonian demography that are undetectable by archaeological survey methods, and there were certainly local variations.

Ur, in the extreme south, benefited only from the beginnings of the long cycle of growth, when the Neo-Babylonian kings and Cyrus the Great sponsored the reconstruction of its temples. A shift in the main channel of the Euphrates gradually choked off the city's access to water, and the density of the urban population was low. The location of Achaemenid graves and kilns indicates the beginnings of encroachment on the precincts of the refurbished temples.<sup>26</sup> Nevertheless, the city was

<sup>24</sup> Sachs and Hunger 1988 (F 172) No. -330 (partly in Wiseman 1985 (F 207) 119-21, the date corrected by Brinkman 1987 (F 82)); see Bernard 1990 (F 78) 515-28). A passage in a literary fragment called the 'Dynastic Prophecy' (Grayson 1975 (F 106) 34 iii 1-13), widely considered to be an account of the contest between Darius III and Alexander, almost certainly refers instead to the wars for control of Mesopotamia between Antigonus and Seleucus after 310 B.C.; see Geller 1990 (F 103) 5f.

<sup>25</sup> Sachs 1974 (F 170) 47; Wiseman 1977 (F 206) 374, citing BM 36923 (unpublished); Kuhrt 1988 (F 130) 68-71 and 1990 (F 131).

<sup>26</sup> Wright *ap.* Adams 1981 (F 73) 334; Woolley and Mallowan 1962 (F 208) 49ff. Compare UET 4 11, recording an alienation of real estate described as temple property (Darius II).

occupied throughout Achaemenid times, and legal texts were still drafted there under the earliest Macedonian rulers.<sup>27</sup> Over fifty legal texts document the late Achaemenid occupation, most of them belonging to two family archives.<sup>28</sup> About a third of them deal with the possession and exploitation of agricultural property at Ur and in its hinterland, and mention properties of the same range of juridical types found in other late Achaemenid texts, located with reference to no more than six canals, three outlying settlements and five named meadows and marshlands. None deal with large-scale agricultural operations. Late Achaemenid Ur was a modest settlement, well along in its final decline.

Late Achaemenid documentation from Uruk, in south central Babylonia, is anomalous. There are thousands of published legal and administrative texts drafted there and dated in Neo-Babylonian and early Achaemenid reigns, and hundreds more from Seleucid and Arsacid reigns, but very few from the interval between Xerxes and Alexander.<sup>29</sup> This situation probably does not result from a historical decline in the city's fortunes, to judge by the existence of a sizeable late Achaemenid literary archive,<sup>30</sup> the existence of unpublished late Achaemenid legal and administrative texts,<sup>31</sup> and the mentions of Uruk as a military destination in texts from the Murashû archive (see above, p. 238). The network of canals developed around the city in Neo-Babylonian and early Achaemenid reigns was surely intact under the later Achaemenids and capable of supporting substantial rural and city populations. Larsa, about 20 km to the east, was probably part of Uruk's hinterland, since late Achaemenid texts from Larsa sometimes mention men who also figure in contemporary texts from Uruk.<sup>32</sup>

Nippur, in north central Babylonia, was surrounded by a similar grid of canals, probably linked to the network around Uruk. Extensive residential building in the city continued into the late Achaemenid reigns.<sup>33</sup> About 650 published texts from the Murashû archive, found at Nippur, and about 80 other late Achaemenid legal and administrative texts drafted there and at nearby towns<sup>34</sup> display well-developed settle-

<sup>27</sup> IM 17801 = U.17243, 16, Alexander the Great, year 12 (unpublished); UET 4 43, Philip Arrhidaeus, year 7; see Oelsner 1976 (F 149) 314 n. 15 and 1986 (F 153) 235.

<sup>28</sup> UET 4 *passim* and Brinkman 1976 (F 81) 44f; see Oelsner 1974 (F 148) 1056 and n. 74; Van Driel 1987 (F 197) 164–8.

<sup>29</sup> Stolper 1990 (F 182) 563ff nos. 1–9, 11, 13–19, 22 and other texts listed *ibid.* 560 n. 4.

<sup>30</sup> Oelsner 1983 (F 152) 248f, and add von Weiher Uruk 8; also *Bagh. Mitt. Beih.* 2 84; Oelsner 1986 (F 153) 94 and n. 299. <sup>31</sup> See Stolper 1990 (F 182) 560 n. 5.

<sup>32</sup> Stolper 1990 (F 182) 576 no. 12, 585 no. 20. Similarly, a text excavated at Larsa, dated in the third year of Philip Arrhidaeus, records a debt owed by a man from Uruk (Arnaud 1985 (F 76)), and other hellenistic texts drafted at Larsa were probably found at Uruk (Oelsner 1986 (F 153) 154, 235 and n. 872. <sup>33</sup> McCown *et al.* 1967–1978 (F 136) II 39–41, I 71–3.

<sup>34</sup> Including a small group from Shaṭir, a town probably located between Nippur and Uruk; see Joannès 1982 (F 116) 86ff. An archive of scholarly manuscripts from Nippur is also of late Achaemenid date: Oelsner 1982 (F 151) 94f and 1986 (F 153) 467 n. 870; Joannès 1982 (F 116) 6f and 73; Van Driel 1986 (F 198) 10f.

ment throughout the city's hinterland. They name six major waterways that traversed the region, forming the boundaries of administrative subdivisions and the arteries of local communication, as well as sixty derivative canals, the lifelines of agriculture. That two of the major canals are not attested before Achaemenid times (one of them not before the fifth century) signifies the continuing extension of the irrigation network under Achaemenid rule. Some of the texts found at Nippur were drawn up at fifteen smaller towns, the secondary centres of the region; others mention more than 180 outlying settlements, including villages, farmsteads and centres of estates. Many of the village names, of the type 'House of So-and-So' or 'Village of So-and-So', were no more than a generation or two old, again suggesting the shifting and probably the expansion of rural settlement. The documents include plain evidence of large- and small-scale date and cereal cultivation and of large- and small-scale herding. A few texts found at Nippur but drawn up at other cities (Babylon, Susa)<sup>35</sup> or mentioning property at cities from which contemporary records are unavailable (Marad, Isin, Larak), along with business records from Nippur and Babylon that mention the same individuals in both cities,<sup>36</sup> indicate active extra-regional contacts. The countryside around Nippur was flourishing, at least in the aggregate, through late Achaemenid times. It produced much revenue for the rulers, supported many absentee landlords and some commercial agricultural contractors, and was capable of supporting a large urban population.

Aside from the Murashû texts, the largest numbers of late Achaemenid legal and administrative documents come from the old cities on the north-western alluvium of Babylonia – Babylon itself, Borsippa, Cutha, and Hursagkalama – or from small towns in the same region. As in earlier times, these cities formed a kind of conurbation, the interactions among their propertied inhabitants often producing texts that were drafted at one town and deposited at another.<sup>37</sup> In this region too the Neo-Babylonian kings had refurbished most of the major temples. The irrigation network underwent a change of orientation and its eastern sections were extended during Neo-Babylonian and Achaemenid times, with a concomitant increase in the number of settlements.<sup>38</sup> More than 300 late Achaemenid legal and administrative texts and fragments from this region are available. Many of them record sales or leases of houses in the cities, indicating a more active urban life than the modest remains of

<sup>35</sup> See Donbaz 1989 (F 97) and Stolper 1992 (F 186), rebutting Dandamayev 1986 (F 96).

<sup>36</sup> Cited in Stolper 1988 (F 179) 141 n. 32.

<sup>37</sup> On this standard, Dilbat can be considered a southern extension of the region; see Stolper 1992 (F 187). According to Durand *Textes babyloniens* pl. 6 AO 2569 (dated in or after the eighth year of Darius II), a case concerning property missing from a temple in Dilbat was brought before an assembly of the temple Esagil and the district governor at Babylon.

<sup>38</sup> Gibson 1972 (F 104) 50f, 53ff, 253f; Adams 1981 (F 73) 191 fig. 40; McEwan 1983 (F 139) 121f.

Achaemenid residential areas excavated at Kish and Babylon would suggest.<sup>39</sup> Many others deal with the control and exploitation of agricultural properties, naming fifteen canals and thirty-five villages and small towns. Two archives record commercial agricultural operations of a type and perhaps of a scale comparable to the enterprise of the Murashûs at Nippur.<sup>40</sup> The sorts of property they deal with correspond to those mentioned in Quintus Curtius' account of events around Babylon after Alexander's death (x.8.11–13): the hinterland of Babylon was organized in villages and estates, sufficiently numerous and productive to support the city. The shift of population away from the old cities along the Euphrates may already have begun, but the demands of the provincial and imperial centres at Babylon must have retarded the process, and the general suggestion of the available texts is that much of this region was still well settled and exploited throughout the late Achaemenid reigns.

The status of Sippar, the north-westernmost of the old cities of the alluvium, is uncertain. There is archaeological survey evidence of Achaemenid settlement and irrigation at Sippar itself and in its vicinity. At Abu Qubûr, about 10 km north west of Sippar, traces of occupation in the Achaemenid period occur on all areas of a 55-hectare mound; a large public building was built there near the end of the period.<sup>41</sup> Known texts from the voluminous archives of the temple Ebabbar end early in Xerxes' reign, and the latest published private archival text (Durand *Textes babyloniens* pl. 1 AO 1729) is dated in Xerxes' sixth year. Yet Sippar was still an important centre at the end of the Achaemenid period, to judge by its mention in the astronomical diary that records Alexander's approach to Babylon (see above, pp. 240f). There are texts from Sippar dated as late as Artaxerxes I,<sup>42</sup> but since none is available, no assessment of the adjacent late Achaemenid landscape can be made. Similarly, there is no textual counterpart to the archaeological evidence for growing Neo-Babylonian and Achaemenid settlement in the Diyala region,<sup>43</sup> despite Strabo's allusion (xvi.1.4) to a palace of Darius I in the area between the Lower Zab and the Diyala.

In sum, most of the old cities of Babylonia were still active centres of legal and commercial activity. Traffic among them was unimpeded. Some were surrounded by well-developed hinterlands dotted with numerous villages and somewhat fewer small towns, and sustained by large, regular irrigation grids. The decline of the extreme south was

<sup>39</sup> Moorey 1978 (F 142) 179; Reuther 1926 (F 164) 34f, 147f.

<sup>40</sup> On the Tattannu archive, see Van Driel 1987 (F 197) 176–9 and 1986 (F 198) 10, with additions in Stolper 1990 (F 185). On the Kasr archive see Stolper 1987 (F 178) and 1990 (F 183).

<sup>41</sup> Adams 1981 (F 73) 191 fig. 40; Gasche *et al.* 1989 (F 102) 5, 6f, 24.

<sup>42</sup> Walker and Collon 1980 (F 204) 96. <sup>43</sup> Adams 1981 (F 73) 192.



offset by the increasing use of lands in the east, along the Tigris. Whether or not Babylonia as a whole prospered, some elements of Babylonian society certainly did, and the region was equipped to support a large resident population, a growing number of landlords holding estates and entitlements from the imperial government, and the demands for taxes and manpower made by the imperial government itself.

### III. TENURE, EXTRACTION AND CONTROL

One of the keys to the control and exploitation of the province was a pattern of land-grants propagated by the early Achaemenids and especially well attested in texts from later Achaemenid reigns. The relationships among its elements can be traced best in texts from Nippur, but the elements appear in late Achaemenid texts from all parts of Babylonia.

The distinctive units of this pattern were smallholdings called 'bow lands', 'horse lands', and 'chariot lands', that is, properties intended to support archers (infantrymen), cavalrymen, and chariot crews. They were occupied by groups of agnatic relatives, on condition of military service and payment of an annual tax. The regular service obligation was often commuted to equivalent payment, although actual service might still be required and some texts therefore record the provisioning of soldiers called up from such tenancies.<sup>44</sup> The properties could be leased or pawned, and shares in them were transmitted by inheritance, but they were not normally alienable. The few legal records in which the proprietorship of such holdings was transferred involve extraordinary circumventions.<sup>45</sup> Judging by the rents drawn from them, such tenancies were small.<sup>46</sup> The characteristic terminology that names them appears sporadically in the earliest Achaemenid reigns (*CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 128–9), but the properties figure as the objects of legal transactions with increasing frequency in texts from the reign of Darius I on, and above all in the Murashû texts.

The Murashû texts (and a few texts from other sources) show these smallholdings and their occupants as organized into groups called *batrus*.

<sup>44</sup> Cardascia 1951 (F 83) 99; Joannès 1982 (F 116) 19f. UET 4 109 (25/IV/8 Artaxerxes II), records an agreement to provision a substitute soldier to discharge obligations at a royal muster, but without explicit mention of a property encumbered by these obligations.

<sup>45</sup> UCP 9/3 271ff (a uniquely detailed account of the equipment for a mounted warrior called up for royal service) presupposes a prior adoption transferring a share in a 'horse land' to the Murashû family; VAS 6 188 records such an adoption, the adopted parties receiving a share of a 'bow land' in perpetuity on condition of their discharging the incumbent service obligations; Durand *Textes babyloniens* pl. 43f. AO 17611 appears to record the sale of a limited interest in a 'bow land' (see Joannès 1982 (F 116) 94ff).

<sup>46</sup> Durand *Textes babyloniens* pl. 52 AO 17645 records the dimensions of several parts of a single 'bow land', totalling about 13 hectares; see Joannès 1982 (F 116) 84.

The term is of uncertain etymology; it is probably an Aramaic or Iranian loan-word. It is not well attested before the reign of Artaxerxes I, so the institution that it labels may have been newly introduced (or else reorganized and renamed) under the late Achaemenids.<sup>47</sup> Each *ḫaṭru* was overseen by a superintendent responsible for allocating the constituent properties and for collecting the incumbent taxes and services. Texts from the Nippur region mention more than sixty such groups. Some are named for military, administrative, craft and agricultural occupations, others for estates and administrative installations to which their members were attached, and others for the local or ethnic origins of their members, including groups from Iran, India, Anatolia and other parts of the empire, but also indigenous Babylonians. This regime was extended to some of the central institutions of pre-Achaemenid Babylonian society, embracing temple personnel and property (see below, p. 250) and elements of the urban population.<sup>48</sup>

Many smallholders were also subject to a higher level of control. The Murashû texts mention estates, also granted by the crown, including manors called by the names of their proprietors (some of them qualified as officials or princes), manors named for social ranks ('estate of the queen', 'estate of the crown prince', without mention of the proprietors' names), and 'administrative estates', that is, blocks of property committed to the support of permanent state offices or institutions (e.g. 'equerry's estate', 'treasury'). Some *ḫaṭrus* were demonstrably subordinate to these estates.

The proprietors of such estates included leading figures in contemporary political history: Parysatis, Arsames, Menostanes and Artoxares, all active participants in the succession crisis of 425/4 B.C. In Babylonian legal transactions they were represented by their bailiffs or agents, mostly Babylonians. When the upheavals of 425/4 eliminated some courtiers and promoted others, the control of some smallholders' organizations and administrative estates was transferred from prominent supporters of the losing factions to prominent allies of the successful contender for the throne. The proprietorship of large estates and the control of administrative establishments were, if not matters of

<sup>47</sup> The word may occur as a common noun, without the late Achaemenid administrative connotations, as early as 544 B.C. (YOS 19 125 *ap.* Beaulieu 1988 (F 77) 38 (4/XII/11 Nabonidus)), and as a place name in the reign of Xerxes (OECT 10 184 (Hursagkalama, 4/VI/19 Xerxes), cf. Dar. 477 (19/—/18 Darius II(?)). The institution may also be older than the attested appearances of the word; see *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 128 n. 123 and Van Driel 1989 (F 200) 207.

<sup>48</sup> Stolper 1988 (F 179) 131 with references; also CT 44 82 (Babylon, 27/V/36 Artaxerxes), see Van Driel 1989 (F 200) 210. At Nippur, the men who oversaw townsmen's 'bow lands' and collected rents on them even held the same titles as the superintendents of *ḫaṭrus* (Babylonian *šaknu*); Stolper 1988 (F 179) 131–8, against Zadok 1978 (F 214) 275, Oppenheim 1985 (F 156) 569 n. 2 and others who treat the holders of this and kindred titles as city-governors.

immediate political importance to the royal court, at least among the prerogatives of political success.

While the Great Kings parcelled out some of Babylonia's real wealth and production in this way, they reserved other resources for themselves. Some texts refer explicitly to crown lands. More importantly, the crown controlled the major elements of the irrigation network, the limiting resource of all Babylonian agriculture. These properties produced crown income from the direct use or lease of land and perhaps also from the sale or lease of water-rights. Their local overseers were the crown's agents or contractors.<sup>49</sup>

The role of other forms of tenure in the late Achaemenid regime is less plain. Some texts mention temple lands, occasionally supervised by crown agents rather than by temple personnel. Some mention holdings called, literally, 'hand property', smallholdings assigned by the crown or by temple agencies, but without clearly documented fiscal or military encumbrances.<sup>50</sup> Some mention 'royal grants' of agricultural property or urban real estate, again without indication of encumbrances.<sup>51</sup> Still others mention land supervised by bailiffs acting for proprietors of unspecified social or political status; at least some of these proprietors were surely members of a provincial landed gentry that included both Babylonians and Iranians. Records of real-estate sales and references to them are scarce, and very few of them deal with agricultural properties, but the exceptions demonstrate the continued existence of outright private property, without restrictions on alienation, though they do not clarify the importance of such tenure in local or provincial economies.<sup>52</sup>

The direct exploitation of land rarely needed formal documentation. It is chiefly because proprietors sometimes leased or pawned their holdings to commercial contractors that elements of late Achaemenid tenure appear in the textual record. Some of these contractors operated on a large scale, and the best documented of them is the Murashû firm,

<sup>49</sup> The characteristic title of the lower rank of agents who controlled canals and crown lands in the Nippur region, Babylonian *ša muḫḫi sūti ša nār* NN, literally '[man] in charge of revenues [or: rents] from such-and-such a canal', is formally similar to the titles of the individuals who controlled temple *latifundia* in sixth-century Uruk and Sippar, and the latter were commercial contractors who paid annual rents to the temple administration and/or to the crown. Overseers of canals and crown properties may have stood in a similar relationship to the crown (cf. Van Driel 1987 (F 197) 173 and 1989 (F 200) 215), but no leases issued to them are extant.

<sup>50</sup> Ries 1976 (F 165) 38f; Joannès 1982 (F 116) 11ff.

<sup>51</sup> Eilers 1940 (F 18) 107, FuB 14 29 No. 21, OECT 10 192, Kelsey 89490, YBC 11586; see Stolper 1992 (F 187).

<sup>52</sup> E.g. Durand *Textes babyloniens* pl. 41f. AO 17612; UET 4 18; ZKM 4 pl. after 258, F. Cf. Oelsner 1974 (F 148) 1055f and 1987 (F 155) 122f, Stolper 1992 (F 187) 126. A text from Ur confirms that single individuals might hold both crown grants and private lands, since it includes a clause in which one party renounces any claim to the other parties' land held from the king and any property held independently of the king (UET 4 194, 5/X/39 Artaxerxes I or II).

active at Nippur in the last half of the fifth century. Members of the firm held extensive properties outright, but most of their records deal with operations of lease and credit. They rented land from smallholders and estate owners. They rented land, water-rights, and sometimes equipment and farm-hands from crown agents. They subleased these items to their own tenants, also supplying draft animals and seed. They paid rents to their landlords and they paid the taxes due from rented smallholdings. Furthermore, they supplied short-term credit to smallholders, with the use of the holdings commonly pledged to secure the debt. When debtors defaulted, more land came under the firm's control without additional costs to the firm in rents. Most of the firm's income was in the form of crops; most of its outlays were in silver. The firm therefore had some means of converting crops into cash, perhaps selling produce to the urban population, but the process is not documented.

The Murashû firm's operations made adjustments between the juridical pattern of tenure and the actual pattern of land use. They permitted some beneficiaries of crown grants to convert their holdings into sources of cash rents. They assured the regular payment of taxes, again in cash, even when the smallholders from whom the taxes were due were impoverished or indebted. And since the Murashûs could combine smaller parcels of land into larger ones without regard for juridical status and could supply them with water-rights and equipment that were difficult for small farmers to obtain otherwise, they rationalized and perhaps intensified local production.

By fostering production and facilitating extraction, the Murashûs enriched the Achaemenid government. Nevertheless, such general benefits were obtained at specific costs. Some texts deal with distrained debtors held in the Murashûs' workhouses.<sup>53</sup> One records litigation over the predatory, even lawless behaviour of the firm's representatives.<sup>54</sup> Above all, the many texts that record loans to smallholders actually reflect defaults; the smallholders were reduced to long-term indebtedness.<sup>55</sup> These defaults are an indication that the economic conditions under which the firm prospered kept many smallholders in precarious circumstances. If Mesopotamia experienced overall growth under the Achaemenids, the Murashû archive suggests that the results were not enjoyed equally even among direct beneficiaries of the Achaemenid government. As the firm acquired effective control over pledged smallholdings, its operations, however useful they were for the production of crops and taxes, became oppressive to the lowest order of the

<sup>53</sup> See Cardascia 1951 (F 83) 161–5.      <sup>54</sup> BE 10 9; see Cardascia 1951 (F 83) 183.

<sup>55</sup> Otherwise Van Driel 1987 (F 197) 175 (suggesting that many of the unpaid notes are the product of a conjectured remission of debts at the beginning of the reign of Darius II) and 1989 (F 200) 223f (suggesting that the notes are merely stale documents recording bad debts).

government's beneficiaries. Despite this contradiction, the Achaemenid government not only tolerated the firm's operations for more than thirty years, but actually fostered them, as princes and state agencies extended their patronage to the firm.

The Murashû archive may reflect some circumstances untypical of Babylonia at large, but it is clear that other firms of commercial contractors were active in Babylonia. A Murashû text (BE 9 28) refers to another such contractor in the Nippur region; the Tattannu archive documents large-scale commercial contracting of date cultivation in the vicinity of Borsippa during the reigns of Xerxes and Artaxerxes I and probably later; and the remains of a private archive from Hursagkalama, also from the reigns of Xerxes and Artaxerxes I, include texts that reflect the leasing and subleasing of property belonging to Iranian estate-holders and of temple property controlled by an individual with an Iranian name.<sup>56</sup> The Kasr archive includes transactions from the region around Babylon, Borsippa and Cutha, similar in kind to the Murashû firm's operations and roughly contemporary with them.

Members of leading business families sometimes travelled to the imperial residences (one of the Murashûs to Susa and one of the Tattannus to Ecbatana, both in the reign of Darius II,<sup>57</sup> as members of the Egibi firm had travelled to the vicinity of Persepolis in the 520s (CAH IV<sup>2</sup> 117)), but if political connexions or occasions lay behind these trips they are not expressed. The Kasr archive, however, is suggestive about the relationship between such businesses and the provincial government. During the Neo-Babylonian and Persian periods, the Kasr mound at Babylon had become a sort of acropolis where residential palaces and centres of government were located, and the Kasr archive is so named because it was stored there. The link between the archive and the provincial government was one of the principals in the business that produced the archive, the governor Bēlshunu (Belesys, see above, pp. 238f). Bēlshunu may have used his political status to develop the business of lease and credit recorded in the Kasr texts, but it is also possible that the business antedated his political career, that the Achaemenid rulers recruited a local entrepreneur into the upper ranks of their political administration, and that the commercial house that supported Bēlshunu thus became a functional counterpart of the Babylonian domains that supported influential aristocrats.

The status of the Babylonian temples in the late Achaemenid provincial regime is uncertain. Published legal and administrative texts from the great temple archives of Uruk and Sippar come to an end in the reigns of Darius I and Xerxes I, respectively, and no inscriptions recording late

<sup>56</sup> OECT 10 191 and 192; for other texts from the same archive see Joannès 1988 (F 118) 360.

<sup>57</sup> Stolper 1990 (F 185) and 1992 (F 186).

Achaemenid temple construction or endowments are extant. Nevertheless, late Achaemenid textual evidence on the property and personnel of Babylonian temples is ubiquitous and diverse, not only in the records of the temples themselves, but in private legal documents.<sup>58</sup> The disjointed information produces no orderly image of any late Achaemenid Babylonian temple. It does, however, demonstrate what the more abundant information on the temples of Seleucid and Arsacid Uruk and Babylon leads one to suppose: that established temples continued to exist throughout Babylonia under the later Achaemenids, not only as cult centres, but also as social units with dependent populations and extensive administrative staffs, and as economic units with widespread real property, diverse sources of income, and facilities for accumulating and redistributing their wealth.

The temples had long been inviting targets for royal intervention, and there was no reason for the later Achaemenids to abandon the control that their predecessors had exerted. A few documents indicate some of the means of control. In texts from the Murashû archive, the leasing of property called 'land of the god Bēl' was overseen by the same set of functionaries who handled crown lands and crown-controlled waterways, reflecting direct government claims on temple holdings.<sup>59</sup> Other Murashû texts record rents paid for land of oblates of the god Bēl to a supervisor of the oblates who was comparable in title and function to the supervisors of *ḥaṭrus* (PBS 2/1 94 and 211, TuM 2–3 182). Texts from Ur (UET 4 41, 42, 53) refer to land characterized simultaneously as property of the god Sin and as 'bow land', and others (UET 4 48 and 49) mention taxes due from oblates, using the Iranian loan-word (Babylonian *bāru* from Iranian *bāra-*) that elsewhere labels taxes due from the holders of 'bow lands'. A text of uncertain provenance (BM 13 249) refers explicitly to 'bow lands' held by oblates of the god Bēl. This modest information suggests that the Achaemenid government incorporated some temples into a general system of government-regulated tenure, treating them as functional counterparts of the administrative estates that supported permanent state offices, allotting to temple dependants holdings of the same kinds, with the same encumbrances, as those that supported the dependants of other estates.<sup>60</sup> There is no evidence, however, that a significant measure of control over the temples was awarded to figures of high political rank, like those to whom other domains were granted.

The elements in this regime were not new to Mesopotamia. The assignment of income-producing allotments, the distribution of administrative prerogatives to members of a ruling elite, state intervention in

<sup>58</sup> Stolper 1989 (F 181) 295–6 with references. <sup>59</sup> See Stolper 1985 (F 177) 42f.

<sup>60</sup> Joannès 1982 (F 116) 25 and 45 observes evidence of this process as early as the reign of Darius I. See Stolper 1988 (F 179) 139f.

temple administration, and commercial manipulations of state-controlled property were all venerable in Mesopotamian states and were constitutive features of Neo-Babylonian society and economy.<sup>61</sup> The nature of the regime in late Achaemenid texts, however, does not reflect the concerns of a Mesopotamian state, but those of the continental empire to which Mesopotamia was now subject.

The smallholdings supported a military reserve. Indeed, to judge by the terms for the allotments, this may once have been the primary rationale of such grants. They were also a means of placing new settlers in Babylonia, and of maintaining, monitoring and extending cultivation. Above all, they were a means of extraction: they supported labour for state agencies and for state-assigned manors, and they returned a large part of their production in taxes. A text from Nippur (Durand *Textes babyloniens* pl. 50 AO 17637) appears to list the annual taxes paid by some constituents of a single *batru*; the total is thirty-three minas of silver. If this amount is typical, the sixty-odd known *batrus* of the Nippur region alone paid more than 30 Babylonian talents of silver in taxes each year.

The manorial organization superimposed on the smallholdings was a distributive device. It conferred real wealth on the king's friends, it was a means of assigning the control of some locally important administrative units (such as the royal 'treasury', and the 'equerry's estate' mentioned in the Murashû texts), and it was a means of transferring some crown income – that is, the taxes and labour of smallholders – directly to members of the ruling classes without centralized redistributive agencies. It did not merely create a provincial landed gentry, but, as the Murashû texts show, it also supported members of an imperial aristocracy close to the politics of the Achaemenid court. It conferred on them wealth and administrative responsibility, and consequently some effective political power in the province.

This distribution of power must have put restraints on provincial governors. It is common to view Achaemenid satraps as virtual sovereigns in their territories, granted a high degree of political autonomy in order to ensure the internal coherence of the provinces. Nevertheless, when significant local resources were controlled by individuals like Parysatis, Artoxares, Arsames and princes of the royal house, the governor of Babylonia must have required political negotiation and competition, both in the province and at the imperial court, to maintain his control. Hence, the distribution of manors was not only a way of rewarding the king's friends but also of checking his potential rivals. (Xen. *Cyr.* VIII.6.5–20, imputes similar policies to Cyrus the Great.)

Babylonian legal texts, however, give little explicit information on

<sup>61</sup> Van Driel 1989 (F 200).

satrapal government, or even on the names and titles of the governors. Murashû texts from the reign of Artaxerxes I mention Artarême, giving him no title but naming him as the father of Manushtānu, the latter entitled 'prince' (*mār bīti*, a Babylonian loan-translation from an Iranian word). This can only be Artarius, according to Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 14.41) the brother of Artaxerxes, the father of Menostanes, and the governor of Babylonia.<sup>62</sup> Murashû texts from the reign of Darius II mention Gubāru, entitled 'governor of Babylon' or 'governor of the land of Akkad',<sup>63</sup> possibly the Gobryas who was one of Artaxerxes II's commanders at the battle of Cunaxa (*Xen. An.* 1.7.12). No extant Babylonian texts mention the other late Achaemenid governors Herodotus names (*Zopyrus* III.159; *Megapanos* VII.62; *Tritantaichmes*, 1.192) – or late Achaemenid successors of the Iranian 'treasurers' attested at Babylon in earlier reigns.<sup>64</sup>

Moreover, the usual Babylonian terms for 'governor', like their Iranian counterpart 'satrap', may denote not only the provincial governor, but also a district subgovernor.<sup>65</sup> This was the case with Bēlshunu (Belesys), who held the titles 'governor of Babylon' before and during the time when Gubāru (Gobryas) was governor of Babylonia,<sup>66</sup> and may have been entitled 'satrap' still earlier.<sup>67</sup> There are a few other references to such subgovernors, also with Babylonian names.<sup>68</sup> The satrapal government appears, therefore, to have echoed some of the organization of aristocratic estates: as in other satrapies, the provincial governors were normally Iranians of high social rank; they delegated the routine conduct of local affairs to district officials recruited within the province.

<sup>62</sup> The earliest mention of Artarême is BE 9 39, dated 26/VII/34 Artaxerxes I; the latest, naming a Babylonian subordinate entitled 'law-officer' (*dātabara*), PBS 2/1 185, dated 2/VII/1 Darius II, may be posthumous.

<sup>63</sup> The two titles were synonymous and no political significance should be imputed to the variation between them (see Stolper 1987 (F 178) 397 n. 38, against, e.g. Schwenzner 1923 (F 58) 247; Oppenheim 1985 (F 156) 564). <sup>64</sup> Dandamayev 1968 (F 15).

<sup>65</sup> Babylonian *pīhātu*, *pāhātu* and cognate titles: see Stolper 1989 (F 181) 290f. The synonym *muma'iru* does not appear in legal texts, but its use under the Achaemenids is implicit in the mention of *muma'irūtu*, 'governorship, satrapy', beside Babylonian administrative titles (*mašennu*, *rab ummu*) in an astronomical diary from the reign of Artaxerxes II (Sachs and Hunger 1988 (F 172) No. –366 A ii 8).

<sup>66</sup> Earliest: YBC 11550, —/—/2 or 3 Darius II; latest; FuB 14 11 No. 1, 12/I/9 Darius II; both from the Kasr archive.

<sup>67</sup> McEwan LB Tablets 48, from Nippur, 18/X/35 Artaxerxes I (?); for the date see Stolper 1987 (F 178) 399 n. 47, 1988 (F 179) 150–1, 1989 (F 181) 291 n. 1 despite Zadok 1984 (F 217) 73f, 1986 (F 217A) 285f, and CAH iv<sup>2</sup> 154.

<sup>68</sup> A Kasr text (YBC 11554, —/XII/2 Artaxerxes II [?]) mentions Erība, entitled 'governor of Babylon'. A Murashû text (PBS 2/1 2, 11/—/accession year Darius II) mentions Šihā, entitled 'satrap'. A text from Shaṭir (Durand, *Textes babyloniens* pl. 43 AO 17611, 1/IX/42 Artaxerxes II) mentions a field belonging to an unnamed 'governor', (*šākin tēmi*) and a text from the Murashû archive (PBS 2/1 198) mentions an 'estate of the governor' (*šākin māti*). The last two titles may be anachronisms embedded in place names.



To judge by the case of Bēlshunu, some district officials, like the supervisors of some estates and *hatrus*, might weather political disturbances more easily than their aristocratic superiors.

Yet the actual conduct of satrapal government is not well documented. Bēlshunu was involved in the adjudication of a dispute over missing temple property (see n. 37). His superior Gobryas may have supervised the crown agents who managed the use of canals and crown lands.<sup>69</sup> A Murashû text (PBS 2/1 21) refers vaguely to the possibility of legal action brought before ‘the king, the satrap, or a judge’. Otherwise, the legal texts mention judges, law-officers, investigators, messengers and other judicial and administrative functionaries. They have both Iranian and Babylonian names, both Iranian and Babylonian titles. Some held grants of land. A few are explicitly called subordinates of the governors, and others surely belonged to bureaus of the satrapal regime. But they appear chiefly in passive roles, as witnesses to legal transactions, and the texts do not clarify the organization of government services.

This information on tenure and control does not corroborate Xenophon’s schematic description of a satrapal regime (*Oec.* IV.4–11) in any detail, but it does suggest, as Xenophon does, a decentralized regime. At the apex of both provincial government and manorial tenure, imperial aristocrats tied the province closely to the Achaemenid court. At a lower level, indigenous functionaries helped to insulate provincial arrangements – and, above all, the province’s ability to produce revenue – from the occasional political shocks that originated in imperial politics.

#### IV. BABYLONIAN SOCIETY AND CULTURE UNDER ACHAEMENID INFLUENCE

The Assyrian and Babylonian empires had brought foreign populations into Mesopotamia by immigration and deportation, and by recruiting defeated soldiers into imperial forces. The Achaemenid empire extended the areas on which these processes drew and late Achaemenid Babylonian texts are rich in evidence of foreign presence. They sometimes give individuals ethnic labels (Persian, Median, Magian, Egyptian), and sometimes mention settlements named with ethnic terms (e.g. Village of Carians)<sup>70</sup> or named for distant towns (e.g. Gaza, Ashkelon).<sup>71</sup> Some *hatru* organizations have foreign ethnic or local names (e.g. Lydians, Urartians, Melitenians, Carians, Cimmerians, Tyrians, Indians); most such groups probably began as foreign military units resettled in Babylonia. Above all, the texts abound with personal names of Iranian,

<sup>69</sup> Stolper 1985 (F 177) 48f.

<sup>70</sup> See *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 133; also *OECT* 10 404 (Cambyses); *OECT* 10 406 (Nebuchadnezzar IV).

<sup>71</sup> Zadok 1978 (F 213) 61.

West Semitic, Anatolian, Egyptian or other non-Babylonian origin. Such names appear throughout the Achaemenid period, but the evidence rarely fixes the date of arrival of individual groups with any precision. The growing frequency of foreign names despite signs of acculturation suggests continuous movements into Babylonia.

Names of foreign origin, though they should indicate that the individuals who bore them had some present or past connexion with immigrant groups, are doubtful indicators of ethnicity. It may be a sign of ethnic cohesion that some legal texts record transactions conducted among people with non-Babylonian names and witnessed by others with names of related linguistic origin, but apart from *ḫatru* names indications that foreigners formed identifiable, self-regulating ethnic enclaves are scarce.<sup>72</sup> Babylonian legal texts record specifically Babylonian behaviour, and individuals with foreign names appear in the same roles as individuals with Babylonian names.

The most distinctive of the foreign elements are Iranians, a small but growing minority of the Babylonian population in late Achaemenid reigns.<sup>73</sup> Some are named as the occupants of 'bow lands' (particularly in the Murashû texts). Many are named as landholders represented by bailiffs or stewards, the latter usually with Babylonian names. Some of these landholders and many other individuals with Iranian names were administrative or judicial officers, bearing titles of both Iranian and Babylonian origin. Occasionally, men with Iranian names appear as agents of commercial firms,<sup>74</sup> or as outright chattel slaves, bought and sold by Babylonians (Patiridata, McEwan LB Tablets 35). That is, by late Achaemenid times Iranians (or at least individuals with Iranian names) were to be found at almost all identifiable levels of Babylonian society. The staffs and dependants of Babylonian temples, among whom Iranian names are as yet unattested, are the only apparent exception.<sup>75</sup>

Iranians did not, however, monopolize any role within those areas of Babylonian society and government that are discernible in legal texts. Individuals with Babylonian names also appear as smallholders and estate owners. Among the bearers of the Iranian administrative title or honorific *ustarbaru* (of uncertain significance), men with Iranian and non-Iranian names occur in roughly equal numbers.<sup>76</sup> Bearers of the

<sup>72</sup> Eph'al 1978 (F 99) 76–83; cf. a possible reference to 'free citizens of Caria(?)' in VAT 16043 (cited in Eilers 1940 (F 373) 189 n. 1), and the remarks of Zadok 1984 (F 217) 67. The bond among people with Egyptian names and patronyms whose transactions with each other are recorded in a group of Babylonian texts from late Achaemenid Susa is perhaps not identification with an ethnic enclave but a common subordination to the service or household of a single official; see Joannès 1990 (F 122) 178. <sup>73</sup> See Zadok 1977 (F 211) with additions in 1981–2 (F 216) 139.

<sup>74</sup> In the Murashû firm, Tirakam, son of Bagapanu; see Cardascia 1951 (F 83) 12.

<sup>75</sup> But in OECT 10 191 (Hursagkalama, 14/1/4 Artaxerxes I) land held by an individual with an Iranian name, Baḫameri, is called property of the Babylonian god Zababa, one of the principal gods of Kish. <sup>76</sup> Eilers 1940 (F 18) 83–9.

Babylonian title ‘judge’ include men with Iranian names, but more with Babylonian names.<sup>77</sup> Individuals with the Iranian title *dātabara*, roughly ‘law-officer’, have both Iranian and Babylonian names.<sup>78</sup> Iranians certainly constituted the empire’s ruling aristocracy, and in Mesopotamia as elsewhere they dominated the uppermost political posts, but, being a small minority in a region with well-established juridical and administrative practices, they shared lower juridical and administrative posts with Babylonians, and some of them were simply part of the subject population of the province. Like other foreign populations in Babylonia, Iranians – at least those of modest economic status – were prone to acculturation; hence, many individuals with Iranian patronyms or ethnic labels had non-Iranian given names. Acculturation was far less pronounced among Iranians of high status in Anatolia, and the same was probably true of Iranian members of the political elite in Babylonia.

The other conspicuous ‘foreign’ populations in late Achaemenid Babylonia were West Semites, including small numbers of Arabs (identified not only by personal names, but also by place-names and a *ḥaṭru*-name), Phoenicians, and Jews (identifiable only by their personal names), and large numbers of Arameans.<sup>79</sup>

The Aramaicizing of Mesopotamia had already been under way for centuries; the Achaemenid conquests had accelerated the process, spreading the use of Aramaic as a language of recording and administration. Marks of this continuing process are abundant in late Achaemenid Babylonian texts. There are frequent references to functionaries called *sepīru*, itself an Aramaic loan-word, properly indicating a scribe competent in both Aramaic and cuneiform recording, and commonly used to indicate literate administrative or commercial agents, but not applied to the scribes who drafted cuneiform tablets. Aramaic ‘dockets’ – short texts inked or incised on cuneiform tablets to identify or summarize their contents – are increasingly frequent on tablets of the fifth century.<sup>80</sup> Cuneiform texts occasionally refer to documents written on leather or parchment; these were certainly in Aramaic, and some of the lacunae in our documentation may result from the partial replacement of cuneiform recording on clay tablets with Aramaic recording on perishable materials. Nevertheless, most allusions to leather documents do not refer to legal records of the kinds represented by surviving

<sup>77</sup> Cardascia 1951 (F 83) 20f; Eilers 1940 (F 18) 108; McEwan LB Tablets 35; BM 54091 (see Stolper 1991 (F 184)).

<sup>78</sup> BM 30136, cited in Zadok 1977 (F 212) 107; ZA 5 279:19 (collated by M. A. Dandamayev); BE 9 82–84, PBS 2/1 1, 34, 185 (all referring to the same person); Stolper 1985 (F 177) Nos. 55 and 110.

<sup>79</sup> Coogan 1976 (F 91); Zadok 1976 (F 210), 1977 (F 212), 1981 (F 215) 69–79; Bickerman 1978 (F 362); and others.

<sup>80</sup> Clay 1908 (F 88); Vattioni 1970 (F 202); Jakob-Rost and Freydank 1972 (F 115); Oelsner 1987 (F 154) 40f.

cuneiform texts, but to administrative orders authorizing agents to make collections or take legal actions. Government administrative recording may have relied more heavily on perishable Aramaic records, but such documents probably formed only a small component of private Babylonian archives.

Neither late Achaemenid Babylonian texts nor the earlier administrative records from Persepolis use 'Aramean' as an ethnic label. Classical mentions of 'Assyrian characters' almost certainly refer to Aramaic, and Elamite texts from Persepolis explicitly designate as Babylonians the scribes writing on leather, presumably in Aramaic.<sup>81</sup> Hence, even though it is unlikely that Babylonian survived as a widely spoken language, the use of Aramaic script and language was not a marker of ethnicity but a trait of Mesopotamian behaviour. Judged by the uncertain standard of personal names, people of West Semitic extraction were always a minority in late Achaemenid Babylonia. Judged by the same standard, the majority population was Babylonian, regardless of its spoken language.

This population maintained the cuneiform writing of Mesopotamian languages both in utilitarian and in scholarly applications. Competence in cuneiform recording was not restricted to professional scribes, for late Achaemenid texts were sometimes drafted by parties to the transactions they record.<sup>82</sup> The continuity of scholarship is documented in archives from Borsippa, Nippur and Uruk that include manuscripts dated in late Achaemenid reigns. They are exemplars of texts from the main stream of Mesopotamian scholarly tradition: lexical texts, diagnostic omens, commentaries, hymns and rituals.<sup>83</sup> They prefigure the more extensive scholarly collections from Seleucid Babylonia.

Similarly, the flowering of Babylonian astronomy manifest in the astronomical texts from Seleucid and Arsacid reigns relied on developments in late Achaemenid reigns. In the larger and earlier of the two major archives of late Babylonian astronomical texts, from Babylon itself, texts increase steadily in number from the middle of the fifth century B.C. to a peak in the second century B.C.<sup>84</sup> In particular, although the earliest extant datable astronomical diary is from 652 B.C., diaries begin to occur in significant numbers only from the beginning of the fourth century, recording observations of astronomical and meteorological phenomena and monthly summaries of the silver prices of commodities (including records of significant intra-monthly price fluctu-

<sup>81</sup> Hallock 1973 (F 28) 322; Stolper 1984 (F 176) 305.

<sup>82</sup> E.g. TuM 2-3 63 (Nippur, Xerxes; promissory note with debtor as scribe); VAS 3 189 (Borsippa, Artaxerxes); Moore Michigan Coll. 50 (Borsippa, Darius II; receipt with recipient as scribe); see Joannès 1982 (F 116) 80.

<sup>83</sup> Hunger 1968 (F 113) Nos. 112, 119, 120f, 123-33; Joannès 1982 (F 116) 6f; Oelsner 1982 (F 151) and 1983 (F 152) 249. <sup>84</sup> Sachs 1948 (F 168) 271f; Neugebauer 1967 (F 145) 965 with fig. 1.

tuations), river levels, and occasional political or religious events.<sup>85</sup> The nineteen-year intercalation cycle – that is the Metonic cycle that persisted in Islamic and western medieval astronomy – was fixed in Babylonian calendaric notation during the first third of the fourth century, having been apparently known and followed with rare deviations since 498 B.C.<sup>86</sup> It is imprecise to assert that the zodiac was invented in fifth-century Babylonia, since the names of the zodiacal constellations had become traditional at least as early as the seventh century, but the division of the ecliptic into twelve houses of thirty degrees each is first attested in Babylonian texts from the second quarter of the fifth century.<sup>87</sup> This innovation was one of the preconditions of horoscopic astrology, and the earliest Babylonian horoscopes appear at the end of the fifth century.<sup>88</sup> Astronomical advances are perhaps the most important cultural contribution of late Achaemenid Babylonia, not only because they endured for so long among the foundations of science, but also because they were so widely spread among the societies of the time. Elements of Babylonian mathematical astronomy (as well as of traditional Babylonian divination) appeared in Greece, Egypt and India in the fifth and fourth centuries, transmitted by the long-range cultural exchanges that the Achaemenid empire brought into effect.<sup>89</sup>

The maturing of Achaemenid imperial rule left a literal imprint on Babylonian documents in the form of changes in glyptic style. While seal impressions with traditional Neo-Babylonian motifs and style persist on tablets from late Achaemenid reigns, impressions with Iranian motifs and style become common only in and after the reign of Darius I,<sup>90</sup> and impressions with Greek motifs and style appear sporadically on tablets from later Achaemenid reigns.<sup>91</sup> These gradual changes in frequency reflect increasing access to foreign craftsmen or foreign artistic models, but they must also reflect the penetration into everyday behaviour of tastes encouraged by imperial authority.

The very use of seals reflects gradual changes in legal behaviour. In late Achaemenid reigns, more seals were applied to legal texts of more diverse formal types than in earlier reigns, and the application of many witnesses' seals to individual legal tablets became prevalent.<sup>92</sup> These may have been internal Babylonian developments, but there are other

<sup>85</sup> Sachs 1974 (F 170) 44–8; Sachs and Hunger 1988 (F 172).

<sup>86</sup> Neugebauer 1975 (H 87) 355.

<sup>87</sup> Aaboe and Sachs 1969 (F 72) 12 Text B (475–457 B.C.); see Neugebauer 1975 (H 87) 593.

<sup>88</sup> *JCS* 6 54 and Durand *Textes babyloniens* pl. 52 AO 17649 (see Rochberg-Halton 1989 (F 167) 111–14), both 410 B.C. <sup>89</sup> Pingree 1982 (F 163) 617–19. <sup>90</sup> Zettler 1979 (F 218).

<sup>91</sup> E.g. TuM 2–3 pl. 98 No. XXVII and pl. 99 No. LV, Legrain 1925 (F 133) Nos. 971 and 972 (all from the Murashû archive); Moore Michigan Coll. 43; *FuB* 14 14 No. 4, 17 No. 7, OECT 10 140 (all from the Kasr archive); McEwan 1982 *LB Tablets* 35; CBS 1594; FLP 1716; HSM 8414.

<sup>92</sup> Oelsner 1978 (F 150).

suggestions of new legal conditions imposed by the Achaemenids. Occasional mentions of royal registries of property ownership (including chattels as well as real estate), clauses in some slave-sales requiring registration of the document of sale, and clauses in others that mention the transfer of the slaves 'in the royal revenue office' are the traces of Achaemenid taxes and institutions that anticipated the taxes on slave-sales extracted by Seleucid rulers and the *chreophylakion* where sales were registered.<sup>93</sup> A Murašû text stipulates flogging and the plucking out of the hair and beard as a penalty for default.<sup>94</sup> Such a corporal penalty is not a Babylonian commonplace but a sharp departure from the fines or distraints usual in such texts. The passage is both a suggestion of new practices and a tantalizing evocation (scarcely a corroboration) of Plutarch's claim that Artaxerxes I exempted members of the ruling classes from just such punishments (*Mor.* 173D, cf. *Mor.* 565A and *Amm. Marc.* xxx.8.4).

The most conspicuous marks of Achaemenid influence on Babylonian institutional behaviour are the Iranian loan-words that appear in Babylonian texts from the outset of Achaemenid rule and increase in number from the late reign of Darius I on. Almost all are special to the language of legal and administrative practice: titles of officials, honorifics, names of administrative institutions or records. They reflect real innovations, since one may assume that the rich idiom of Babylonian legal recording adopted these terms only when no precise Babylonian equivalent existed. Etymologies provide approximate ranges of meaning for most of them (yielding generic translations like 'accountant', 'investigator', 'storehouse', 'registry' and so on). But most of them were never common; most label offices or practices that impinged on Babylonian business life without being a regular feature of it; hence, the real functional relationships that most connoted are uncertain. Surprisingly few survived in Seleucid Babylonian texts.<sup>95</sup>

Little can be said of changes in Babylonian religion under Achaemenid influence. There is no cuneiform corroboration of Berossus' statement (*FGrH* 680 F 11) that Artaxerxes II introduced a statue cult of Anahita in Babylon and in other imperial centres, nor would such corroboration be expected if the cult was meant exclusively for resident Iranian communities. The prominence of the Anu-cult in Seleucid Uruk had its beginnings in the late Achaemenid period, as the personal names that contain the divine name Anu in the late Achaemenid documents from Uruk imply.<sup>96</sup>

<sup>93</sup> Stolper 1977 (F 175) 259ff, see *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 132; Stolper 1989 (F 180).

<sup>94</sup> Stolper 1985 (F 177) No. 91 (28/—/5 Darius II).

<sup>95</sup> Eilers 1940 (B 18); Hinz 1975 (F 35); Zadok 1976 (F 209) 213–18; McEwan 1981 (F 137) 185.

<sup>96</sup> See Stolper 1990 (F 182) 561 and *passim*.

The evidence for gauging the overall economic standards of late Achaemenid Babylonian society is inadequate. The terms of leases from Nippur suggest normal expectations of crop yields that were good to very good in comparison to those of large-scale farming in the sixth century.<sup>97</sup> Farm labour was probably in short supply throughout the Achaemenid period, and leases in the Murashû archive indicate a local situation in which the rental value of land was relatively low and the costs of draft animals, water and other inputs relatively high, a situation generally unfavourable for small proprietors with limited access to capital. Occasional prices scattered among texts from other sources are in general agreement. The sale prices of slaves fell in ranges that were higher than in the Neo-Babylonian period but not much different from the range in the reign of Darius I.<sup>98</sup> Commodity prices indicated in astronomical diaries were subject to sharp fluctuations, but the ranges within which they varied seem to have abated slightly from the peaks of the early fifth century.<sup>99</sup> There is no serious evidence of sharp increases in interest rates, disruption of markets, or shortages of cash, and none to support the commonplace judgment that the period was one of economic stagnation and decay. The evidence is generally consonant with conditions of overall growth, which were accompanied by fairly high levels of taxation, and which were unfavourable for small-scale proprietors subject to juridical restraints. Secure evaluation of the information, however, is impeded by the almost complete lack of evidence on investment, wage and ration levels, the conduct of trade and manufacture, and the basic means of livelihood of any segments of the population except those with a direct interest in the exploitation of real estate.

Babylon itself was an imperial metropolis of growing importance under the later Achaemenids. Herodotus' and Ctesias' descriptions of the city include preposterous characterizations of oriental society, but accurate physical depiction, and they represent Babylon as rich and populous. A Babylonian chronicle mentions a royal palace at Babylon under Artaxerxes (see above, p. 239), and the palaces built by the Neo-Babylonian rulers were maintained by the Achaemenids and still occupied by Alexander. At some point in the Achaemenid period, a light enclosure wall was thrown around the Kasr mound, segregating the palaces, the celebrated Ishtar gate, and the processional way from the city at large. A small, elegant palace was added on the Kasr, with a columned portico and columned hall, coloured pavements, and glazed brick wall decoration. It was the work of Artaxerxes II, whose fragmentary Elamite inscription is found on pieces of black stone that belonged to the

<sup>97</sup> Van Driel 1989 (F 200) 216, 222, and 1990 (F 201) 241–9 expounds the grave uncertainties in this evidence and its interpretation. <sup>98</sup> See Stolper 1991 (F 184) 57.

<sup>99</sup> Oelsner 1974 (F 148) 1052f.

plinth of a column from the building; other fragments from inscriptions of Artaxerxes II were found elsewhere on the site.<sup>100</sup>

Imperial crises enhanced the city's importance. It was probably from Babylon that Darius II Ochus launched his successful attempt to take the imperial throne in 425/4 B.C.; Babylon was the target of Cyrus the Younger's unsuccessful attempt in 401; and in the narratives of Arrian and Quintus Curtius Babylon overshadows Susa as the principal royal residence, the command centre, and the staging area for organized Achaemenid resistance to the Macedonian invasion. When Babylon was lost, Iranian resistance stiffened, but the Near Eastern empire of the Achaemenids ceased to exist.

<sup>100</sup> See *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 115 n. 16, with references, and cf. MDP 24 127 no. 28 (= A<sup>2</sup>Sb Elamite). Also Weissbach *ap.* Wetzel *et al.* 1957 (F 205) 49 no. 6 (a fragment of an Akkadian version of the same text) and 48 no. 1 (a fragment from the processional street on the Kasr with the name of Artaxerxes in Old Persian); see also Vallat 1989 (F 194), rebutting Haerinck 1973 (F 111).



## CHAPTER 8c

# JUDAH

HAYIM TADMOR

This chapter was planned independently from *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.2, ch. 31, to which the reader may also refer for the period of the Restoration. It is, however, intended to be complementary to *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> ch. 3*b*. That chapter looked at Judah as a part of the Achaemenid empire; here we try to consider its internal development during the period.

The Old Testament books which are relevant are inevitably controversial.<sup>1</sup> It is here assumed (see below, p. 292) that the book of Ezra-Nehemiah was put together, long after the time of the events, from the 'building blocks' which included much contemporary documentary material, including a first-person narrative by Nehemiah himself; how much Ezra had to do with his own narrative is more doubtful. The compiler did not aim at a chronological composition, and he tends to build his narrative round the major personalities; gaps and a certain amount of confusion result. We do not believe that this compiler was the same as the author of the Book of Chronicles (below, p. 293), although that used to be the dominant view.

There is little other literary material to help us. Josephus' survey of the period in the *Jewish Antiquities* is largely dependent on the edited version of the book of Ezra-Nehemiah in some form or another, and most of his variations are in general likely to arise from his attempts to resolve contradictions than from independent information. Much more help comes from contemporary material, the Elephantine papyri,<sup>2</sup> the Samaria papyri from Wadi Daliyeh,<sup>3</sup> ostraca, coins, seals and other remains of material culture.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Biblical references are primarily to the Hebrew text; references to the Authorized Version are added in brackets where necessary.

<sup>2</sup> Cowley 1923 (F 427); Porten 1968 (F 504); Grelot 1972 (F 443). The texts are being re-edited in Porten and Yardeni, 1986– (F 505). <sup>3</sup> Cross 1969 (F 370); 1985 (F 371A); 1988 (F 371B).

<sup>4</sup> A major collection of the material by Stern 1982 (F 397), summarized in Stern 1984 (F 398).

## I. THE RETURN

1. *The Edict of Cyrus*

Shortly after Cyrus conquered Babylon in 539, he issued an edict to the exiles of Judah in Babylon, permitting them to rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem. The context of this in his religious policy has been discussed elsewhere.<sup>5</sup> The original version, probably in Aramaic, has not survived. However, a brief Hebrew version, recast in the wording of a later editor, is preserved in Ezra 1:2–3: ‘Thus saith Cyrus king of Persia, The Lord God of Heaven hath given me all the kingdoms of the earth and he hath charged me to build him an house at Jerusalem which is in Judah. Who is there among you of all his people? His God be with him, and let him go up to Jerusalem, which is in Judah and build the house of the Lord God of Israel, he is the God, which is in Jerusalem.’ In structure, style and terminology, this Edict in Ezra resembles other documents of the period. According to the heading, it was issued in the first year of Cyrus’ reign, that is, it would seem, in the first year of his reign as the king of Babylon (538 B.C.), perhaps in the spring, in the course of the New Year festivities. At the same time an Aramaic version, found in Ezra 6, was prepared for the use of the royal chancellery. It gives the measurements of the Temple and states expressly that the funds of rebuilding should be taken from the royal treasury (Ezra 6:3–5).

The Edict awakened substantial hopes. The very granting of permission to rebuild the Temple from the funds of the royal treasury was an incentive to return. As early as 538, the year of the proclamation, the first group of returnees was organized. The number recorded is 42,360 (Ezra 2:64), together with 7,337 men and women servants and more than 200 male and female musicians. These figures presumably constitute the total of the several waves of returnees during the reign of Cyrus and his successors, and some assume that they actually include the returnees down to the days of Ezra as well. It is plausible that the return ceased for some time during the wars waged by Cambyses in Egypt. Obviously, a considerable number of exiles decided to remain in Babylonia, despite the enthusiastic urging of Deutero-Isaiah: ‘Go ye forth from Babylon, flee ye from the Chaldeans with a voice of singing . . .’ (Isa. 48:20). In the course of fifty years in exile, the uprooted Judaeans had established themselves in their new country, and their economic situation was apparently quite favourable.

<sup>5</sup> See *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 40–1, 124.

## 2. *Sheshbazzar* ‘the prince of Judah’

The returnees were headed by Sheshbazzar ‘the prince (*nāsī*) of Judah’ (Ezra 1:8), who is also referred to as ‘governor’ (*peḥā*) in a contemporary Aramaic document (*ibid.* 5:14). It was to Sheshbazzar that the Persians delivered the gold and silver vessels plundered from the Temple by Nebuchadnezzar. The return of these vessels and their restoration to their original sanctuary accords with Cyrus’ policy as formulated in his proclamation to the Babylonians (*CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 124), except that in that case it was the images of the gods which are said to have been restored to their temples, now rebuilt by royal decree.

It is probable that Sheshbazzar was a Davidite prince, most likely<sup>6</sup> to be identified with Shenazzar son of Jehoiachin (1 Chron. 3:18). However, the theory<sup>7</sup> that Sheshbazzar and Zerubbabel (see below) were one and the same must be rejected. Sheshbazzar is a Babylonian name (*Šamaš-aba-ušur*, meaning ‘(the god) Shamash [pronounced Shashu] protect the father!’). Zerubbabel is also a Babylonian name (*Zēr-Bābili*, meaning: ‘seed of Babylon’), and no person can have been known by two different Babylonian names. These Babylonian names should not surprise us. Princes from foreign lands, captured and deported by the Babylonians (or by the Assyrians before them), or taken as hostages, raised at the royal court and educated as courtiers loyal to the king, were customarily given Babylonian names as an indication of their prestigious new identity. This custom appears explicitly in the prose narrative of Dan. 1:7, which relates that the king’s chief officer gave Daniel and his three companions Babylonian names. We may thus reasonably assume that Sheshbazzar was raised at the royal court of Babylon, like the rest of the family of the exiled Jehoiachin, who lived at court as part of the king’s entourage (*CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.2, 418–19).<sup>8</sup>

Sheshbazzar’s title, ‘prince (*nāsī*) of Judah’, corresponds exactly to that employed by the prophet Ezekiel (34:24, 37:25, 45:17, 46:16 etc.) for the scion of the restored Davidic line. ‘Prince of Judah’ may therefore be considered as a Hebrew adaptation of Sheshbazzar’s formal title ‘governor’ (*peḥā* – an Akkadian loan-word in Aramaic and late Hebrew). Although the title ‘prince’ could hint at Jewish hopes that the Davidic governor would ultimately restore the monarchy, it is certainly no proof of Cyrus’ intentions. The Jews were authorized solely to rebuild the

<sup>6</sup> See e.g. Cross 1975 (F 371) 12 n. 43; Japhet 1982 (F 377) 96; the identification is denied by Berger 1971 (F 359); Williamson 1985 (F 400) 5.

<sup>7</sup> This seems to have been the view of Josephus, *AJ* XI.13–14, and is revived from time to time; see Williamson 1985 (F 400) 17.

<sup>8</sup> The fate of Jehoiachin of Judah was shared by the king of Ascalon; see *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.2, 420.

Temple at Jerusalem. Barring a few isolated exceptions, such as Tyre, Sidon and Lycia, the hierarchic structure of the Persian empire did not provide for vassal kings, but only for governors and satraps (some of whom may indeed have been representatives of local royal dynasties). Just as Cyrus was considered king of Media, Elam and Babylonia, he was also king of Judah.

## II. CONSTRUCTION OF THE TEMPLE

### 1. *Zerubbabel son of Shealtiel*

Sheshbazzar apparently served only for a short time as governor, and was succeeded by Zerubbabel son of Shealtiel, grandson – or great-grandson – of Jehoiachin (cf. 1 Chron. 3:17–19).<sup>9</sup> The prophet Haggai, in an oracle (1:1) delivered in the second year of Darius, refers to Zerubbabel as ‘governor (*pehā*) of Judah’. However, this does not necessarily imply (as many scholars have concluded)<sup>10</sup> that Zerubbabel had taken up his post at Jerusalem only a short time before that date. Judging by the extent of his activities, as reflected in the book of Ezra, he had probably been in Judah for a considerable time. There are good grounds, therefore, to assume that Zerubbabel came to Judah with one of the first waves of returnees, possibly even in that led by Sheshbazzar. When Sheshbazzar died, Zerubbabel was appointed to succeed him.

This assumption allows sufficient time for Zerubbabel to have consolidated his position in Judah, as is implicit in the prophecies of Haggai and Zechariah. Moreover, in view of the disorder and grave political crises which shook the empire after the death of Cambyses, particularly from Darius’ assumption of the throne to the end of his first year, it is extremely doubtful that there could have been any immigration from Babylon to Judah in that period. Babylonia was then in the throes of rebellion (*CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 129–30), and the long roads through the empire were presumably quite unsafe, and not conducive to the free movement of civilians. In addition, a period of rebellions in the name of descendants of local dynasties (*CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 57–63) was hardly an appropriate time to appoint a Davidite as governor of Judah.

Zerubbabel was not the only leader of the community of returnees; he shared the burden of leadership with Joshua son of Jehozadak the High Priest (Hag. 2:1–5; Zech. 3:1–4). Although a later chronicler of the Restoration in Ezra 1–5 made every effort to maintain a balance between the two leaders (like the balance between Ezra and Nehemiah evident in subsequent chapters of the work), attentive readers of the prophecies of

<sup>9</sup> Japhet 1982–3 (F 377).

<sup>10</sup> E.g. Wanke in *CHJud* 1 (F 372) 164.

Zechariah detect marked tension, if not outright strife, between them at one point. Zechariah describes Joshua as ‘clothed in filthy garments’ and ‘Satan standing at his right hand to accuse him’ (Zech. 3:1–3). The prophet, hinting at the supremacy of Zerubbabel, expresses the hope that Joshua will be cleared of some unspecified accusation levelled against him and that ultimately ‘the counsel of peace’ will reign between him and Zerubbabel, who, according to Zechariah (6:13), is destined to occupy his throne, not merely by virtue of his position as Persian governor, but as an offshoot of the Davidic line.

Several statements in the oracles of Haggai and Zechariah, who witnessed the events personally, would seem to imply that it was not Sheshbazzar who laid the foundations of the Temple, as claimed by the elders of Judah in their letter to Tattenai, governor of Beyond the River (Ezra 5:16), but Zerubbabel. Zechariah says explicitly (4:9): ‘The hands of Zerubbabel have laid the foundations of this house: his hands shall also finish it’, while Haggai even specifies a date for the foundation of the Temple – ‘the four and twentieth day of the ninth month’ (Hag. 2:18), i.e. 30 December 521.

The events in question cannot be fully grasped without a careful study of the various chronological data embedded in the text of Haggai and Zechariah. It has been suggested<sup>11</sup> that the regnal years of Darius in the book of Ezra–Nehemiah are not reckoned according to the system current in Babylonia and in Beyond the River, by which every year began on the first of the month of Nisan, and by which what was designated Darius’ first year did not start until 14 April 521. The dates are consistent only if we assume that Darius (and he alone) reckoned his regnal years from the death of Cambyses in July 522 or perhaps even from the accession of Gaumata (Smerdis) in March of that year. In other words, that he credited himself with an additional half-year, since the throne was occupied at the time by Gaumata, whom he considered a usurper. By this reckoning, then, Darius’ first regnal year would have begun in spring or summer of 522 and not in spring 521, as customary in the Babylonian system of reckoning.

This earlier date for Darius’ first year harmonizes particularly well with Haggai’s hopeful references to Zerubbabel, who was to come when Darius was still struggling to subdue the last rebellion in Babylonia and Elam, in the winter of 521 (the second year of his reign, by this reckoning). The same is true of Zechariah’s prophecy of 24 Shevat in the second year of Darius, which speaks of peace reigning in the land (1:11), obviously referring to the situation shortly after Darius had successfully quelled all unrest and consolidated his rule. By contrast, the chronology

<sup>11</sup> Bickerman 1981 (F 363) 23–8.

hitherto commonly accepted,<sup>12</sup> by which Darius' first regnal year did not begin until April 521, would imply that Haggai's oracles hinting at the fall of the Persian empire and Zerubbabel's restoration of the monarchy in Judah were delivered long after the suppression of the rebellions; such hopes would hardly have been reasonable under the circumstances.

This prophecy of Haggai, though not actually inciting rebellion, associated Zerubbabel with expectations which could not but raise Persian suspicions. This could have been a reason for removing Zerubbabel shortly afterwards from his official position in Judah. When Tattenai, the Persian governor of Beyond the River, came to Jerusalem (see below), it was not Zerubbabel who negotiated with him, but the elders of the Jews, an anomalous procedure under any administration. It would appear that Zerubbabel was not then in Jerusalem, and he may well have been deposed, never to complete the construction of the Temple.

### 2. *Delays and completion*

Why was the Temple not built immediately, at the very beginning of the Restoration, as sanctioned by Cyrus' Edict to the Jews? In Ezra 4, the ancient chronicler attributes this failure to interference by the 'adversaries of Judah and Benjamin', i.e. the 'people of the land' who had been denied participation in the building of the Temple (*ibid.* 4:1-3). They harassed the people of Judah and 'hired counsellors to frustrate their purpose' and impede completion of the work (*ibid.* 4-5). Though this account may contain grains of historical truth, it is more likely that the story reflects Nehemiah's struggle with the leaders of Samaria, or perhaps it even originates from a still later period, the time of the schism with the Samaritans in the fourth century (see below, pp. 288-90).

Another possible suggestion is that it was not only the people of Samaria who tried to prevent the building of the Temple; Persian officials in the provincial administration will have constantly put obstacles in the way of work on the Temple and the reconstruction of Judah in general. The sources tell us nothing explicit to this effect, but it is not inconceivable that the administrators and bureaucrats of the province of Beyond the River were in no hurry to implement Cyrus' edict or to render assistance to the building of the Temple.

It seems more probable, however, that the major factor in the delay was the grave economic situation in Judah at the time, possibly as a result of a long drought (Hag. 1:6). The details are supplemented by Zechariah's account (8:10), which may also hint at civil unrest. Such a

<sup>12</sup> See P. R. Ackroyd, *JNES* 7 (1958) 13-22; *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.2, 436; D. L. Peterson, *Haggai and Zachariah 1-8* (Philadelphia, 1984) 43-4.

conjunction of troubles could not but occasion widespread despair and a feeling that the time was not yet ripe for the reconstruction of the Temple.

The general mood of the people, endeavouring to explain away their failure to act, is depicted succinctly by Haggai: ‘This people says: “The time has not yet come” – the time to rebuild the house of the Lord’ (1:2). The term ‘time’ (*et*) here has to be understood as predestined and predetermined period of time. The idea underlying the popular slogan ‘the time has not yet come’ has to be explained in the context of other prophecies.<sup>13</sup> It surely refers to Jeremiah’s prediction that the land would lie desolate for seventy years, during which it would be ruled by the king of Babylon (Jer. 25:11–12). Jeremiah interpreted these seventy years as comprising three generations, Nebuchadnezzar, his son, and his grandson, during which the people of Judah would have to serve the king of Babylon ‘until the time [*et*] of his own land come’ (Jer. 27:7), and there could be no question of deliverance before that time of retribution was over.

‘Seventy years’ also figures as a standard length of punishment in Isaiah’s ‘burden of Tyre’: ‘Tyre shall be forgotten seventy years’ (Isa. 23:15); only after seventy years would Tyre be remembered and her commerce with all the nations be resumed. The same length of time is mentioned in a retributive context in an inscription of Esarhaddon,<sup>14</sup> king of Assyria (681–669 B.C.), in connexion with the destruction of Babylon by his father Sennacherib in 689 B.C. According to this text, the Babylonian god Marduk had decreed that Babylon ‘would lie desolate for seventy years’ but he was appeased, had mercy on the city and converted ‘seventy’ into ‘eleven’;<sup>15</sup> the reconstruction of Babylon was indeed initiated in the first years of Esarhaddon’s reign. Predestined periods of catastrophe appear in other Assyrian and Babylonian literary works; it was an age in which prophecies and omens were taken particularly seriously, whether they involved a predetermined time (*adannu* in Akkadian) or not.

The significance attached by the peoples of the ancient Near East to predictions of the destruction and reconstruction of temples should not surprise us. The principle of theodicy implied that the destruction of any temple – including the House of YHWH in Jerusalem – was necessarily an expression of divine wrath. In his anger, the god orders the destruction of his temple and thus punishes his worshippers by depriving them of a legitimate place to practise their cult. A temple, once

<sup>13</sup> Ackroyd, *JNES* 7 (1958) 23–7; Meyers and Meyers 1987 (F 384A) 117–18.

<sup>14</sup> Luckenbill (who first interpreted the passage) 1927 (F 134A) 243 §643; Borger 1956 (F 80) 15; *JNES* 18 (1959) 74.

<sup>15</sup> Interchanging the appropriate cuneiform signs in fact changes 70 into 11.

destroyed, can be rebuilt only on the express instruction of the god, whose wrath has been appeased. In Mesopotamia such instructions were delivered through omens, interpreted by astrologers and *haruspices*. In Israel it was the prophet who announced such instructions. Jeremiah, for example, emphasizes more than once that divine retribution will be followed by redemption: Jerusalem's ruins will be rebuilt; her exiles – both those deported by the Assyrians and those now being deported by the Chaldeans – will return to their homes; the Temple will rise again and the glory of the Davidic monarchy will be restored (e.g. Jer. 33:14–18).

It was now evident to the people of Judah that, as far as the destruction of Jerusalem was concerned, Jeremiah's prophecy had been fulfilled, as befitted a genuine prophecy (so according to the concepts of that age; cf. Deut. 18:21–2). The exiles were therefore convinced that the desolation would have to last exactly seventy years; any pre-emptive action would be reprehensible. The seventy years would end in 527, if reckoned, on the more lenient view, from the deportation of Jehoiachin in 597, or in 516, if reckoned, more stringently, from the actual destruction of the Temple in 586. On either calculation, the period of retribution was near its end, and one can readily appreciate Deutero-Isaiah's impassioned appeal to the exiles in Babylon on the eve of its occupation by Cyrus, to the effect that indeed '[Jerusalem's] time of service is accomplished . . . her guilt is paid off' (Isa. 40:2), and that deliverance was now at hand.

At the beginning of Darius' reign, the 'seventy years' prophecy was again invoked, in the stricter interpretation reckoning from the destruction of the Temple. Hence, the popular slogan quoted by Haggai asserting that the time had not yet come to build the Temple. Nevertheless, Haggai and his supporters seem to have prevailed, and in that very year – the second of Darius' reign (according to the Babylonian system), the work of reconstruction began.

While the building of the Temple was in progress, apparently in the third (or fourth) year of Darius' reign, the Persian governor of Beyond the River, Tattenai, arrived in Jerusalem and demanded to know by what authorization the Jews were rebuilding their Temple. Tattenai is known to us from contemporary Babylonian documents (*CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 154). His name is written Tattanu, and his direct superior was Uštanu, whose title in these documents is 'governor of Babylon and Beyond the River'. His visit was probably part of some reorganization of the province<sup>16</sup> after the suppression by Darius of revolt throughout the empire. The Jewish representatives who received him were unable to produce the required document and thus to prove that they were proceeding on

<sup>16</sup> It can no longer be held that Beyond the River was formally split from Babylonia at this time; see *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 130–1, 153–4.



the direct authorization of Cyrus. But they did tell Tattenai the story of the Edict, mentioned Sheshbazzar, and bolstered their argument with the observation that the work had actually begun under Cyrus and had never been interrupted though it had not yet been completed. Accordingly, they requested that a search be made in 'the king's treasure-house' in Babylon, where a copy of Cyrus' Edict would presumably be found. The governor passed the matter on to Darius (Ezra 5:3–17), and the King ordered a search to be made in the royal archives at Babylon. Official evidence of the Edict was indeed discovered, not in Babylon, but in the fortress at Ecbatana, the capital of the Median kingdom before its occupation by Cyrus. The document found was not the Edict itself but an internal memorandum (*dikbrōnā*) dealing with monies drawn from the royal treasury for the construction of the Temple. Darius, whose administration of the empire was governed by strict legalism and his claim to be the legitimate successor of Cyrus, authorized the completion of the work. Moreover, he took pains to order that the work be financed by royal funds in the province of Beyond the River, in accordance with Cyrus' original Edict as summarized in the memorandum. Thus the people of Judah were not obliged to bear the costs of the reconstruction, and we may assume that the provincial bureaucracy now complied with alacrity.

The work now continued uninterrupted and was soon completed, on 3 Adar in the sixth year of Darius' reign (Ezra 6:15), that is, 12 March 515 (by the Babylonian reckoning of regnal years). It is surely no accident that the work of rebuilding was thus actually completed a full seventy years after the destruction of the Temple in 586. It would seem that the returnees, having witnessed the fulfilment of Jeremiah's prophecies of doom, were intent on finishing the work at the appropriate time, as if proclaiming that the 'cup of bitterness' (Isa. 51:17) had been drained and that a new era, that of divine mercy, was about to begin.<sup>17</sup>

### 3. Jerusalem as a temple city

With the construction of the Temple, all the provisions of the original Edict of Cyrus had been implemented, culminating in the establishment of Jerusalem as a full-fledged temple city. This special privilege was further reinforced by a decree of Darius providing for the sacrificial cult, and in particular the sacrifice for the welfare of the King and his sons (Ezra 6:10). Cyrus, in a similar vein, had requested in his cylinder inscription from Babylon that all the gods restored to their temples by his generosity should pray to Marduk daily for the welfare of himself and his son Cambyses (*ANET* p. 316). This sacrifice for the welfare of the

<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of the physical evidence for the Second Temple, see *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.2, 437–9.

ruling power remained in effect in Jerusalem during the periods of the Ptolemies, the Seleucids and the Romans; its abolition in A.D. 68 signalled the beginning of the great revolt against Rome. It may be assumed that the Temple and its personnel were relieved of the obligation to pay taxes and participate in the various forced labour projects customary in the Persian empire. Elsewhere in the empire important temples were also given special favours and relieved of these burdens. This was a method by which the government secured the loyalty of major temples; their priests probably also received economic privileges (cf. *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 124–5). Thus the new status of Jerusalem and its Temple as a major centre – cultic, spiritual and even political – was not dissimilar from that of other temple cities of the period, particularly those of Babylonia. The priesthood increased its economic power, in a way which remained in effect until the economic reforms of Nehemiah. It was only natural that from this time the priests, thanks to their exclusive role in the Temple, enjoyed a much improved standing and prestige among the people of Judah. The hierarchy was headed by the High Priest, who would gradually come to be regarded as the recognized leader of the people. But, in contrast to the times of Zerubbabel and Joshua, who had shared the responsibilities of leadership, the void left by the disappearance of Zerubbabel was not at first filled by the High Priests and their families, but rather by the ‘Elders of the Jews’, a council which was to become a permanent instrument of government in a later phase of the Second Temple period.

Towards the end of the Persian period, additional changes took place in the organizational structure of the Temple personnel. The principal source for these changes is the book of 1 Chronicles, in which we read of twenty-four priestly divisions or courses (1 Chron. 24:7–18). This division is well documented by various Jewish sources, ranging in date from the end of the Second Commonwealth to Byzantine times.<sup>18</sup> Also listed in 1 Chronicles (23) are various groups of Levites, now officially constituted, such as musicians and door-keepers. Most of these changes are listed there as reforms instituted by King David, but scholars are generally agreed that their development should be ascribed to a late stage of the post-exilic period.<sup>19</sup>

#### 4. *From Zerubbabel to Ezra*

The sixty years or so that elapsed from the completion of the Temple to the arrival of Ezra constitute one of the most obscure periods in the

<sup>18</sup> Schürer, Vermes and Millar 1973–87 (F 394) II 245–50; H. G. M. Williamson, *VTSupp.* 30 (1979) 251–68.

<sup>19</sup> Schürer, Vermes and Millar 1973–87 (F 394) II 251–6.

history of the Restoration. The author of the book of Ezra, faithful to his method of building his historical narrative around major personalities, has virtually nothing to say about this period. The few hints to be found in Ezra provide some evidence of tension between the returnees and certain communities in Samaria. This tension, of which we are given no details, was the motive for a letter of accusation sent to Xerxes (486–465). Its contents are not cited in the collection of documents in Ezra 4, but in that chapter another such letter, sent to Artaxerxes (465–424), is cited in full. This letter, requesting a halt to the Jews' construction of the walls of Jerusalem, was composed by Rehum, the *bē'el tē'em* (*bēl-tēmi* in Akkadian), the officer responsible for the composition of official documents,<sup>20</sup> and Shimshai the scribe, on behalf of the community of Samaria, descendants of the people deported there centuries before by the Assyrians (*CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.2, 342–4). The authors of the letter point out that Jerusalem had always been considered a rebellious city, and warn the King that, if the construction of the wall is completed, payment of taxes to the King will cease and the income of the royal treasury will be adversely affected (Ezra 4:7–16).

Though the events detailed at the beginning of the letter lack any known historical background, the implication is that a daring attempt had been made to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem and thus reinforce its standing as a privileged temple city. Had the work been completed, Jerusalem would have enjoyed an advantage over Samaria, which was also the seat of a governor but had no temple. Hence the leaders of Samaria were vigorously opposed to the rebuilding of Jerusalem's walls, and their petitions were indeed successful. Artaxerxes was convinced that the action of the Jews constituted a threat and commanded a halt to the building; at the same time he issued a warning against causing the Jews any harm. His orders were carried out, and the walls of Jerusalem lay in ruins until the advent of Nehemiah.

In this context, it is worth noting that Artaxerxes I must have been particularly sensitive to any hint of rebellion. His father Xerxes had been assassinated, and he himself had ascended the throne only after his elder brothers had been murdered.<sup>21</sup> Rebellions broke out throughout the empire. Egypt rose against the Persian overlord, aided by Athens; Athenian ships anchored off Cyprus and even approached the shores of Palestine (*CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 144, v<sup>2</sup> 52). It is quite possible that this situation helps to explain the two major events in Jewish history in the early years of Artaxerxes' reign: the interruption of the unauthorized building of the

<sup>20</sup> For recent discussions of the phrase see Lewis 1977 (A 33) 10 n. 38; Stolper 1984 (F 176) 305 n. 17.

<sup>21</sup> Stolper 1988 (F 61) 196 gives the primary evidence (BM 32234) for the assassination. The Greek evidence has not yet been reassessed in the light of it.

Jerusalem wall and the mission of Ezra to Palestine with the express permission and assistance of the central government.

### III. EZRA AND HIS MISSION

#### 1. *The authority of Ezra*

Modern scholarship is divided as to the chronological sequence of the activities of Ezra and Nehemiah. Some authorities<sup>22</sup> maintain that the biblical date, 'in the seventh year of Artaxerxes the King' (Ezra 7:7), refers not to the reign of Artaxerxes I (465–424) but to that of Artaxerxes II (404–359), implying that Ezra arrived on the scene some fifty years after Nehemiah. Alternatively, it has been suggested<sup>23</sup> that the text is corrupt and should read 'in the thirty-seventh year of Artaxerxes (I)', i.e. 428, which again puts Nehemiah before Ezra. However, there seems to be no definite evidence which justifies emending the dates in the sources and inverting the sequence of events as described by the editor of Ezra-Nehemiah; it therefore seems preferable to accept this aspect of the biblical account and assume that Ezra's mission did precede that of Nehemiah.<sup>24</sup>

Ezra son of Seraiah was descended from a High-Priestly family (Ezra 7:5); the genealogy of Ezra 7 traces him to the Zadokite line. His other title, as specified in the King's certificate of credentials (*ništēwān*, Ezra 7:12–26) is 'the scribe of the Law of the God of Heaven' (*sēphar dātā di 'ēlāh šēmayā*, *ibid.* 12; *dātā* is an Old Persian word for 'law'). This title is very similar to the title 'scribe of the words of the commandments of the Lord' (*ibid.* 11). Yet another similar title for Ezra is 'a ready scribe in the Law [*tōrāh*, teaching, instruction] of Moses' (Ezra 7:6); 'ready scribe' (*sōphēr māhīr*) is an ancient title, appearing as far back as the Ugaritic documents of the thirteenth century.

It is commonly agreed that the term 'scribe' as it appears here does not have the connotation of one who copies books of the Law or other sacred texts. It should rather be understood as the official designation of a post in the imperial administration.<sup>25</sup> It has often been assumed that Ezra was the spiritual leader of the community and wielded both the power and the authority to assemble a large number of Jews to accompany him to Judah. The far-reaching letter of credentials he

<sup>22</sup> The best discussions of this view are by Rowley 1952 (F 390) 131–59 and 1963 (F 391) 211–45.

<sup>23</sup> Bright 1960 (F 366) and 1981 (F 367) 391–402, but see Emerton 1966 (F 374).

<sup>24</sup> The corner-stone of all chronology is the belief that the Artaxerxes in whose twentieth year Nehemiah came to Jerusalem was Artaxerxes I. That Artaxerxes II and the year 385/4 cannot be ruled out of account has been argued from time to time, most recently by Saley 1978 (F 392) on the basis of the Samaria papyri. But see Blenkinsopp, *JBL* 106 (1987) 420; 1989 (F 365) 205.

<sup>25</sup> Schaefer 1930 (F 393); Stolper 1989 (F 181) 298–9.

received from the King, cited in full in the book of Ezra, authorized him to appoint magistrates and judges over the community and to execute judgment in accordance with the law of his God and the law of the King. He was empowered to exact severe punishment, including the death penalty (Ezra 7:25–6). The letter extended his authority, not only over the Jews in the province of Judah, but also over all Jews resident in the satrapy Beyond the River who observed the ‘Law of the God of Heaven’.<sup>26</sup>

The King permitted Ezra to convey to the Temple vessels of gold and silver, gifts from the King and his counsellors. He also granted him a special allowance from the royal treasury and charged the royal treasurers of Beyond the River to comply ‘with all diligence’ (Ezra 7:19–21). Moreover, he decreed (*ibid.* 24) that from now on the priests, Levites, singers, porters and other Temple servants would be exempted from payment of the various state taxes, ‘tribute, impost or toll’ (*mindā, bēlō, bālakh*, taxes familiar from Babylonian documents of the period as *mandattu, biltu* and *ilku*). In short, the *ništēwān* granted Ezra far-reaching privileges as a leader, thereby greatly enhancing the prestige of the community of the returnees and of the group which accompanied him. It is quite possible that the document, which attests familiarity with the internal affairs of the Jewish community, was originally formulated by Ezra himself.<sup>27</sup> The powers were broad, but one is struck by the contrast between them and the rather limited scope of his activities as described in the memoir.

## 2. *Spiritual awakening in Babylon*

The stormy events on the international stage and the subsequent consolidation of Artaxerxes’ control were not the only factors which prompted the departure of Ezra at the head of a group of 1,754 returnees. A no less significant contribution to the organization of the move at this particular time came from within the Jewish community. Examination of the Jewish names in the documents of the house of Murashû, a family of Babylonian businessmen based at the time in the city of Nippur, has revealed an important feature, not hitherto noted in this context. It turns out that, around the middle of the fifth century, the Jews seem to have experienced a marked change of spirit; third-generation exiles began to resume the use of Jewish names with the theophoric element *yahu*,

<sup>26</sup> There has been some scepticism about this extension; but see H. Mantel, *Hebrew Union College Annual* 44 (1973) 63–71; H. G. M. Williamson, in R. E. Clements, *The World of Ancient Israel* (Cambridge, 1989) 154.

<sup>27</sup> Schaeder 1930 (F 393) 53 ff. But cf. Neh. 11:24 for a royal adviser at the King’s hand in all matters concerning the people.

together with many compound names incorporating the element *hanan* ('was gracious').<sup>28</sup> This observation, if correct, may well indicate that the community of exiles in the region of Nippur began to evince a renewed interest in their Jewish heritage in the first half of the fifth century. If this local reawakening can be applied to the Babylonian Jewish community as a whole, we have here unique evidence of a spiritual process which culminated in the immigration with Ezra.

The Ezra memoir contains a list of heads of families of the immigrants who accompanied him, first and foremost priestly families. Ezra made special efforts to include Levites in his group; these were required in their capacity as Temple servants. In general, the returnees in this wave were members of families and circles with particularly strong ties with Jerusalem and its Temple.

The actual timing and organization of the move reveals a symbolic resemblance to the events of the Exodus from Egypt. The company set out in the first month, the same month in which the Children of Israel had left Egypt (Exod. 13:4). In addition, upon their arrival in Judah, the immigrants sacrificed bullocks, rams and he-goats, in multiples of twelve. Probably the emphasis on this number was intended to represent the participation of the entire people in the return to Zion.

### 3. *The 'congregation of the captivity' and the 'peoples of the lands'*

Despite the broad scope of Ezra's authority, his actual activities were confined to the 'congregation of the captivity' (the *gōlāh*, the community of the exiles) alone. As is evident from the fragments of Ezra's memoirs and the biblical editor's narrative, his prime concern was not for the political or social welfare of the people in Jerusalem and Judah, but for the relations between the returnees and the local inhabitants, who had not experienced the spiritual awakening of the exiles. Ezra addresses his admonitions to the 'captivity', 'the children of the captivity' or the 'congregation of the captivity' (Ezra 8:35, 9:4, 10:6, 8), while his opponents are termed 'peoples of the lands' (*ammē hā-ʾārāšōt*, the plural of *am ha-ʾareṣ*, 'people of the land', *ibid.* 9:1–2), a phrase having the connotation of 'gentiles'. The original connotation of *am ha-ʾareṣ* in First Temple times was the nation of Judah (2 Kgs. 24:14), perhaps sometimes the influential and privileged element of the population (2 Kgs. 21:24). As late as the time of Haggai and Zechariah the term was still being used in a positive sense, denoting the entire nation or an element acting on its behalf. Thus, when Haggai urges the people to build the Temple, he appeals (2:4) among others to 'the people of the land'. Similarly, Zechariah (7:5) applies the phrase 'all the people of the land' to the entire

<sup>28</sup> Bickerman 1978 (F 362) 7 with Table 1, drawing on Zadok 1976 (F 210).

community of returnees. The Ezra narrative uses the term in a radically different sense. Ezra employs it for the inhabitants of Judah, in sharp distinction from his 'congregation of the captivity', also referred to as 'the holy seed' (9:2). The concept apparently encompasses not only the people of Judah who had not been deported to Babylonia, but also converts and neighbours of Judah who worshipped the God of Israel.

We have explicit indications of widespread religious conversion in the account of the celebration of the Passover festival in Ezra 6:19–21. The paschal lamb was eaten not only by the returnees, the 'children of the captivity', but also by 'every one who had joined them and separated himself from the pollutions of the peoples of the land to worship the Lord', that is to say, all those who had adopted the cult of the God of Israel as required by the Law. A similar term occurs in Neh. 10:28: 'all who have separated themselves from the people of the lands to the law of God', while Esther 8:11 speaks of 'many of the people of the land who became Jews' (RSV 'declared themselves Jews').

The reference here is to gentiles who had joined 'the people of Israel' and undertaken to observe the Law, for this category is mentioned after the enumeration of the various divisions of the Jews themselves: priests, Levites, porters, singers and Nethinim (Ezra 2–3). These 'converts' are referred to by the archaic term *gēr*, originally meaning 'stranger', and in the course of the Second Temple period the new meaning of 'convert' or 'proselyte' became fully entrenched. Conversion was ultimately instituted as a ritual procedure with well-defined laws and ceremonies, some of which still survive.

Ezra's primary goal, however, an integral component of his spiritual outlook, was to shape the community of returnees as a unique body, adhering as far as possible to the norms which had governed their life in Babylonia; hence his adamant demand for ethnic and religious separatism. This separatist philosophy rejected the universalistic expectations expressed by Zechariah (8:23) in the early days of the Restoration: 'Thus saith the Lord of hosts: In those days it shall come to pass, that ten men shall take hold, out of all the languages of the world, shall even take hold of the skirt of him who is a Jew, saying: We will go with you, for we have heard that God is with you.' This view, however, was rejected in favour of the isolationism of Ezra and Nehemiah, which was, it seems, the dominant outlook of the Jews in Babylonia and the Persian diaspora. Ezra's major achievement, described at length in his memoirs (9–10), was an uncompromising implementation of this separatist attitude. The situation facing him upon his arrival in Judah is described in his memoirs in the following terms:

Now when these things were done, the princes drew near unto me, saying: The people of Israel, and the priests and the Levites, have not separated themselves

from the peoples of the lands, doing according to their abominations, even of the Canaanites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Jebusites, the Ammonites, the Moabites, the Egyptians and the Amorites. For they have taken of their daughters for themselves and for their sons; so that the holy seed have mingled themselves with the peoples of the lands; yea, the hand of the princes and rulers hath been first in the faithlessness.

(9:1–2)

His reaction, as described in the sequel, was dramatic: he rent his garments, plucked out the hair of his head and his beard, and sat in mourning and fasting. On rising from his fast, he uttered a prayer of confession, the gist of which was that the adverse conditions in Judah were occasioned purely by the marriage ties of ‘the people of Israel’ with ‘the peoples of the land’. It is most instructive that this motif, as formulated here, makes no appearance in the historical literature of the First Temple period or even in the book of Deuteronomy, which forms the basis for Ezra’s admonition in 9:6–12. Ezra, in broadening the biblical prohibition on marriage with Ammonites and Moabites (cf. Deut. 23:4–7 (23:3–6)) was thus enunciating a significant new principle of homiletic interpretation of Mosaic Law (below, pp. 284–5).<sup>29</sup>

He now made an impassioned appeal to ‘the congregation of the captivity’ (subsequently (10:9) referred to by the archaistic term ‘men of Judah and Benjamin’) and urged them to divorce their gentile wives. The memoirs end (10:18–44) with a list of persons, mainly priests, who had wed foreign wives, but so abruptly that it is by no means clear whether those listed did indeed divorce their wives. An endeavour of this magnitude, with its grave social and humanitarian implications, required a leader of a different stamp. The necessary properties were to be embodied in the person of Nehemiah.

#### IV. NEHEMIAH’S ACHIEVEMENT

##### 1. *The personality of Nehemiah*

We turn now to Nehemiah son of Hacaliah, cupbearer to King Artaxerxes I (465–424), who appointed him governor of Judah. His achievements, which were to leave a clear imprint on the history of the country, were founded both on his forceful personality and on the extensive powers attached to his position. These properties were a sharp contrast to the character of Ezra. Nehemiah’s natural milieu was the royal court at Susa, where high posts were filled by officers of noble

<sup>29</sup> The position in the development of the book of Ruth, which takes a strongly positive view of one Moabite wife, is far from clear.



origin from the diverse nations which made up the Achaemenid empire.<sup>30</sup>

Nehemiah's reference (2:3) to Jerusalem as 'the city of my ancestors' graves' and the accusation made against him by his political opponents: 'You have also set up prophets in Jerusalem to proclaim about you: There is a king in Judah! . . .' (Neh. 6:7) have been taken<sup>31</sup> as an indication that he was of Davidic descent, although the genealogical data in 1 Chron. 3 provide no evidence to that effect. His post, cupbearer to the King, was considered a most honourable one (Hdt. III.34.1), since only the most reliable persons were permitted to approach the King, let alone serve him wine.

Nehemiah took up his post in Jerusalem as governor of Judah in 445/4, the twentieth year of Artaxerxes I.<sup>32</sup> It is very likely that he only remained there for a short period, a year or, at the most, two. According to Nehemiah 13:6, he returned to Persia, coming again to Jerusalem after Artaxerxes' thirty-second year. Our primary source for his activities is the book of his memoirs (Neh. 1-7:5; 12:27-13), possibly written after his second term of office. A personal document, apologetic in parts, addressed to God and to a future reader, it is the only one of its kind in biblical literature. Because of his achievements in solidifying the political fortunes of Judah and, equally importantly, the faith which pervades them, his memoirs were destined to enter the biblical canon, alongside works attributed to David, Solomon and other famous men of old. Indeed, in one later tradition which telescopes the past, Nehemiah is credited with the restoration of the Second Temple. In another, only he and not Ezra is mentioned as the leader of the community in Judah (see below, p. 285).<sup>33</sup>

Very little is known of Nehemiah's predecessors in the post of the governor of the province of Judah (*yēhūd mēdintā* in Aramaic). Nehemiah (5:15) refers to them as 'the former governors who were before me' and states explicitly that these officials imposed heavy taxes on the people and burdened them with the maintenance of the governor's household ('the bread of the governor'). Some authorities maintain that seal impressions on jar handles from the Persian period, bearing such inscriptions as *yhw'zr phw'* and *'hzy phw'* indicate the names of some of those former governors.<sup>34</sup> In any case, one can no longer agree with the once common

<sup>30</sup> Bearers of such posts were often eunuchs (cf. Lewis 1977 (A 33) 20-1), and tradition affirms this of Nehemiah (see the variant in LXX II Esdras 11.11 and Origen on Matthew 19:12). But see Yamauchi 1980 (F 401).

<sup>31</sup> Kellermann 1967 (F 380) 156-9, but see Williamson 1985 (F 400) 179. <sup>32</sup> But see n. 24.

<sup>33</sup> For these and other later traditions, see Blenkinsopp 1989 (F 365) 54-9.

<sup>34</sup> See *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 161 fig. 5, and Avigad 1976 (F 355) 33-5; Stern 1982 (F 397) 202-6, 237, agrees that they are governors (which is not all that certain), but dates them later.

view<sup>35</sup> that Judah did not constitute a separate administrative unit before Nehemiah's day, but was subordinate to the governors of Samaria. This, it was suggested, was the real background to the struggle between Nehemiah and Sanballat, the governor of Samaria, which started at the very beginning of Nehemiah's term of office. However, it appears that the reasons for this struggle were far more complex, and only partly concerned the range of Nehemiah's authority.

In the Persian empire, the governor, by virtue of his position as representative of the King, could frequently appeal directly to the royal court, bypassing his immediate superior, the satrap. This must have been particularly obvious in the case of Nehemiah, who, as the King's cup-bearer, was reckoned among the monarch's inner circle. It is not likely that Sanballat enjoyed any such standing, although he may have been superior to Nehemiah in administrative status, since Samaria was more important than Jerusalem as a centre of government and administration (cf. 'the army of Samaria', Neh. 3:34 (4:2)).

### 2. *Nehemiah's opponents and the refortification of Jerusalem*

The governor of Samaria already appears as Nehemiah's principal opponent at the inception of his very first project – the fortification of Jerusalem with a new wall. His Babylonian name Sin-uballit and the epithet 'the Horonite' (Neh. 2:10) may perhaps indicate that he originally came from the city of Harran in northern Mesopotamia, the cult-centre for Sin, the moon-god. Yet the Yahwistic names of his sons Delaiah and Shelemiah<sup>36</sup> leave little doubt that, despite his Babylonian name, Sanballat worshipped the God of Israel. Nehemiah never accuses him of idolatry or syncretism.

A second adversary mentioned in Nehemiah's memoirs (3:35 (4:3)) is Tobiah the Ammonite. Although Nehemiah refers to him as 'the Ammonite slave' (*hā-<sup>c</sup>ebed hā-<sup>c</sup>ammōnī*, *ibid.* 2:19, probably a word play on his official title '*ebed ha-melekh*', 'slave of the king'), it is very likely that he was a member of a wealthy family which, though originally from Judah, owned property and estates across the Jordan, where it wielded considerable influence.<sup>37</sup> This family, known from Josephus as the Tobiads, was to attain a position of some prominence in Palestine some 200 years after Nehemiah, when one of its members, Joseph son of Tobiah, played a significant part in the country's history under Ptolemaic rule. Tobiah had an office ('chamber', Neh. 13:7) in the Jerusalem

<sup>35</sup> Alt 1934 (F 354); see e.g. Smith 1987 (F 396) 149–50 and *CAH* 1v<sup>2</sup> 160–1.

<sup>36</sup> These are mentioned in a letter of 408, Cowley, *AP* 30.29, from the Jews of Elephantine to Bagohi, governor of Judah. <sup>37</sup> Mazar 1957 (F 383).

Temple; he was related by marriage to Eliashib the High Priest (*ibid.*) and to other distinguished Jerusalem families (Neh. 6:17–19).

Nehemiah (2:19) mentions yet a third opponent – Geshem the ‘Arab’, probably the king of the Qedarites, a tribal grouping in northern Arabia which monopolized the highly profitable incense trade.<sup>38</sup> His attitude to Nehemiah may have been primarily politically motivated, reflecting the threat to his position which would be posed by the strengthening of Judah and his fear of Nehemiah’s ambition.

It is only natural that the powers granted the new governor and his multifaceted activities as a reformer were looked on as a threat to the social establishment throughout Palestine, not only in Jerusalem and Judah. At the very beginning of his term of office, he threatened these three influential opponents: ‘But you have no portion, nor right, nor memorial, in Jerusalem’ (Neh. 2:20). Thus he denied them the privileges which their administrative, social and economic status had previously given them in Jerusalem and its Temple.

Nehemiah also had to cope with antagonism from within the Jerusalem community itself, headed by the High Priest, Eliashib, related by marriage to Sanballat, but this opposition appears to have been less violent than that of Sanballat or Tobiah; Eliashib is not directly criticized in Nehemiah’s memoirs.

Nehemiah’s first project was the fortification of Jerusalem, a crucial step in buttressing its status as a temple city.<sup>39</sup> Construction of walls on such a scale required an immense labour force, part of which was supplied by families who volunteered their efforts. But these voluntary contributions were not enough, and, since large sections of the population refused to take part, Nehemiah had no choice but to exercise his authority as governor and impose corvée labour (termed *pelekh*, a Babylonian loan-word, in Nehemiah 3). The *pēlākīm* – teams of corvée labourers – were presumably mobilized on a territorial and administrative basis (*CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 159 and n. 50). The work was finished in fifty-two days (Neh. 6:15).<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> For a silver bowl, found at Tell el-Maskhuta, at the eastern approaches to Egypt, bearing an inscription with the name of Qainu son of Geshem, king of Qedar, see *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 148, 164, *Pls. to Vol.* IV, pl. 93.

<sup>39</sup> Nehemiah (2:1–8) makes it clear that the rebuilding of the walls had been mentioned to the king and authorized by him. That some imperial calculation lay behind the wall-building is not to be excluded; see Lewis 1977 (A 33) 51 n. 5, 153 n. 118.

<sup>40</sup> Josephus (*AJ* XI.179) has it that the work took two years and four months. It has often been suggested that the two figures be reconciled by assuming that the biblical account refers only to the last stage of construction, but see Bewer 1924 (F 360).

### 3. *Nehemiah's social reforms*

Although the immediate goal of Nehemiah's mission was to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem, he was quick to recognize the sorry condition of the population of Judah and initiated reforms in social and economic spheres. For two generations, social polarization had been on the increase. On the one hand, the notables and senior officials (the *sēgānīm*) and priestly families, unburdened by taxation, lived comfortably; on the other, the peasants and petty landowners were burdened by famine and exorbitant taxes, and many became destitute. Slavery and serfdom were rife, as evidenced by the people's appeal to Nehemiah:

For there were that said: 'We, our sons and our daughters, are many; let us get for them corn, that we may eat and live.' Some also there were that said: 'We are mortgaging our fields, and our vineyards, and our houses; let us get corn, because of the dearth.' There were also that said: 'We have borrowed money for the King's tribute upon our fields and our vineyards. Yet now our flesh is as the flesh of our brethren, our children as their children; and, lo, we bring into bondage our sons and our daughters to be servants, and some of our daughters are brought into bondage already; neither is it in our power to help it; for other men have our fields and our vineyards.'

(Neh. 5:2–5)

The radical solution devised by the new governor was the remission of debts and restitution of lands to their former owners. He convened most of the people at Jerusalem in a 'great assembly' (Neh. 5:7), with the wealthy sections of the population in the minority. Speaking forcefully and persuasively, appealing both to the popular will and to his authority as governor, he proclaimed a far-reaching social reform. The wealthy were obliged, there and then, to take a public oath that they would forthwith restore fields, vineyards, olive plantations, houses, money, grain, wine and oil, to the original owners. Such radical social reforms are well attested from the history of ancient Mesopotamia, where they were not infrequent occurrences, particularly in the *andurarum* legislation of Babylonian kings. The suggestion has been made<sup>41</sup> that Nehemiah's reforms should be compared with Solon's in Athens in the sixth century, or, even more aptly, with his fifth-century contemporaries, tyrants in Ionia and Sicily.

Another far-reaching reform undertaken by Nehemiah was the repopulation of Jerusalem. This he achieved by issuing a decree,

<sup>41</sup> E.g. by Smith 1987 (F 396) 103–9. For an attempt to sketch social and economic developments in the period, see Kreisig 1973 (F 381); Japhet 1983 (F 378); J. P. Weinberg, *Klio* 34 (1972) 45–59, *VT* 23 (1973) 400–14, and in J. Harmatta and G. Komoróczy (eds.) *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im alten Vorderasien* (Budapest, 1976) 473–86. But see recently J. Blenkinsopp, in P. R. Davies (ed.), *Second Temple Studies, 1 Persian Period* (Sheffield, 1991) 22–53.

commanding that a tenth of the population of Judah should settle in the city (Neh. 11:1–21). Parallels to this legislation may again be found in Greece and in the hellenistic period, in the practice of synoecism, that is, the forced repopulation of a city by decree.<sup>42</sup> If the decree was to work, it was first necessary to hold a census. Genealogical lists associated with this census appear in the book of Nehemiah, in chapters 7 and 11.

The account of these activities in Nehemiah's memoirs incorporates new terms for various social groups and government offices, *hōrīm* and *sēgānīm*. The first is already attested in 1 Kgs. 21, and means free men, mostly of noble birth. Its semantic parallel in contemporary temple records of Babylonia is *mār banūti*, meaning 'well-born' persons. The second term is a loan word from the Babylonian *šaknu*, which at that time denoted any appointed official of high rank (in contrast to its specific meaning 'governor' in the Assyrian period). Nehemiah does not use the term *gōlāh*, the community of the captivity, as Ezra had done. The general public, outside the ranks of the *hōrīm* and *sēgānīm*, are categorized as 'Jews' (*yēhūdīm*), priests and Levites. The first of these terms, however, carries several different connotations. It sometimes refers to the population of Judah as a whole (Neh. 3:34 (4:2), 6:6), sometimes to those who are neither priests nor Levites (*ibid.* 2:16), and sometimes it is used in an ethnic-religious sense and contrasted with the gentiles (*ibid.* 4:6 (4:12)).

#### 4. *Intervention in Temple affairs*

Though not a priest, Nehemiah intervened extensively in Temple affairs and administration. He instituted improved regulations for the maintenance and upkeep of the Temple and its priests, and for its routine administration. One much needed innovation was his provision for its regular funding by official organization of the various offerings and tithes (Neh. 10:33–40 (10:32–9), 13:10–12); this measure contributed significantly to the economic independence of the Temple and its personnel. On the other hand, he did not hesitate to clash openly with the Temple leadership, as, for example, when he had Tobiah's household effects removed from the Temple and abolished his chamber there (*ibid.* 13:4–9, 28–31). It is noteworthy that Nehemiah, who generally reports his own actions in a rather apologetic vein (5:19; 13:14), rounds off the list of his achievements with the measures which he took to improve the lot of the priests and Levites, the lowest priestly class (13:29–30).

Nehemiah no doubt believed that by improving the status of the Temple and its priestly staff he was enhancing the prestige of Jerusalem as a whole and reinforcing the city's economic base. While decreeing regular payment of tithes (the most common form of tax in Mesopota-

<sup>42</sup> Smith 1987 (F 396) 109.

mian temple cities in the sixth and fifth centuries), he also instituted a significant reform. Hitherto, priestly families had administered the Temple finances and controlled the distribution of gifts in kind brought to Jerusalem by the people of Judah; the Levites had been left without a regular source of income. Wishing to provide for these Levites, the most needy of the Temple personnel, Nehemiah designated new functions for them in the Temple service and provided them with a permanent income from the priests' prebend (Neh. 13:10–13).

Such actions could not fail to create an element indebted to Nehemiah and sympathetic to his cause, through which he could exert his influence in the Temple and pursue his struggle with the established priestly aristocracy. From this time the Levites gained in strength, and in the course of the Persian period they were to attain a position of respect as door-keepers and guardians of the Temple precinct, as reflected in the book of Chronicles (edited several generations after Nehemiah).

Another topic of particular interest to Nehemiah was the strict observance of the Sabbath. This is not surprising, since this aspect of religious observance had become one of the most important manifestations of faith among the Jewish community in Babylonia,<sup>43</sup> whereas it was apparently less rigorously observed in Judah. Accordingly, he ordered the gates of Jerusalem to be closed to the Tyrian tradesmen who were accustomed to bring their wares on the Sabbath; it was the Levites who were charged with enforcement of the day of rest (Neh. 13:16–22). It is doubtful, however, that he was able to ensure cessation of agricultural and other labour throughout Jerusalem on the holy day (*ibid.* 15).

Like Ezra, Nehemiah was faced with a problem of mixed marriages, particularly among the upper classes. In addition to the legal arguments cited by Ezra (Ezra 9:11–12) he based the condemnation of mixed marriages on cultural and historical considerations as well (Neh. 13:25–7). However, his campaign against intermarriage was also motivated by his personal conflict with the family of Eliashib the High Priest, who was related to Sanballat by marriage and on familiar terms with Tobiah. Nehemiah scored a victory, evicting Eliashib's grandson, Sanballat's son-in-law, from the Temple (Neh. 13:28), but the victory was only temporary, since at the end of Nehemiah's term of office the High Priest regained his former position. Nevertheless, for the most part, Nehemiah's reforms had a lasting impact, though in a somewhat modified form.

In spite of the close similarity between Ezra and Nehemiah in their attitudes to mixed marriages, there is a certain difference between them:

<sup>43</sup> See below, p. 284. Note its importance in Isaiah 56:6, and see Smith 1984 (F 395) 247, 258, 263, 271.

whereas Ezra confined his mission to the community of the returnees, Nehemiah appealed to the entire population of Judah, though not to the inhabitants of Samaria and other territories bordering on Judah. Nehemiah considered all the Jews, whether returnees or the indigenous population who had never been deported, as an element apart, drawing a sharp line between them and the residents of the province of Samaria. Ezra's separatism was now reinforced by the injection of a political administrative dimension – the distinction between the Jews and the Samaritans.

### 5. *Enforcement of the Law and the covenant*

Interwoven with the memoirs of Nehemiah is a comprehensive account of two major endeavours credited to both Ezra and Nehemiah. Though neither mentions the other in his memoirs, they are portrayed as coming together in the context of measures taken to impose the Law in Judah. The first was a major public assembly dedicated to the reading of the Law (Neh. 8–9:1–3). The dominant figure here is that of Ezra; the reference to Nehemiah in the ceremony (*ibid.* 8:9) is doubtful and believed<sup>44</sup> to be an editorial addition.

At the beginning of the 'seventh month' (Tishri) (Neh. 7:73),<sup>45</sup> the people gathered in Jerusalem for the ceremony, which was held on the first and second of the month, and continued during the Feast of Tabernacles, reaching its peak on the twenty-fourth of Tishri (Neh. 9:1). Standing on a specially prepared wooden pulpit, Ezra read the Law to the assembled people. Simultaneously, an Aramaic translation was read and an explanation was provided by Levites, described in the text as 'they that cause the people to understand' (*ibid.* 8:7). It would appear that the comminatory sections of the Pentateuch containing the blessings and maledictions (Deut. 28 or Lev. 26) were among the passages read. The extent and content of the 'book of the Law of Moses' (Neh. 8:1) read out by Ezra are by no means clear; it would seem that the sections read to the people, which included the commandment to celebrate the Feast of Tabernacles, were selected specifically from the Priestly passages in the Pentateuch (e.g. Num. 29:12–39).

The most instructive feature of this ceremony is its treatment of the reading of the Law as a communal ritual. When Ezra opens the book, the people rise and he delivers a benediction, blessing God. The people respond 'Amen, Amen', *lifting up their hands, bowing their heads, and prostrating themselves*. This is the first record in Jewish history of a

<sup>44</sup> Williamson 1985 (F 400) 279.

<sup>45</sup> The relationship of this to the development of the New Year Festival is beyond our present scope, but Leviticus 23:23–6 must be relevant to this choice of date.

ritual revolving around the Law, rather than around sacrifices, and it was to provide a model for Jewish worship throughout the Second Temple period. Indeed, later traditions in Judaism stress the pivotal role of Ezra in creating this new status for the book of the Law. Prominent in these traditions is the parallel drawn between Moses and Ezra as law-givers: 'Ezra would have been worthy of the Law being given through him, had not Moses anticipated him' (BT *Sanhedrin* 21b).

The other major event in which Ezra and Nehemiah appear together is the conclusion of the covenant (Neh. 9:38 (10:1); the Hebrew word used here – *ʾāmānāh* – is coterminous with *bērīt* in the language of the time). In contrast with the reading of the Law, this initiative is attributed to Nehemiah. The biblical editor placed the account of it after that of the reading of the Law, but most scholars<sup>46</sup> view the covenant as a separate entity, resembling that concluded by King Josiah upon the discovery of the 'Book of the Covenant', usually identified with Deuteronomy (2 Kgs. 32). The covenant in Neh. 10 extended the prohibition on mixed marriages to all 'peoples of the land'; it forbade on the Sabbath not only labour, but also trade and commerce, which had not been explicitly prohibited by the Law. Sabbath observance had become one of the most characteristic marks of the Jews in Babylonia, setting them apart from those around them. The injunction against the slightest desecration of the Sabbath thus became one of the measures adopted to impose the religious norms customary in the Babylonian and Persian diaspora upon the Jews in the province of Judah.

In the covenant, the people undertook to suspend all agricultural work and to forego the exaction of debts during the sabbatical year (Neh. 10:32), as well as to maintain the regular payment of various tithes to the Temple and gifts to the priests and Levites. Among other things, they were to pay an annual tax of one-third of a shekel to the Temple (*ibid.* 33) and to bring a 'wood-offering' (*ibid.* 35). The payment of one-third of a shekel was an innovation, ultimately raised to half a shekel, (as in Exod. 30:11–16), at which level it remained throughout the Second Temple period; the wood-offering was intended to provide the sacrificial service with a regular supply of fuel, a vital commodity in a country far from rich in forests.

These last two measures are not explicitly stipulated in the Pentateuch, but were derived from the text by the procedure later known as *midrash halakhah*, 'interpretation of the Law'.<sup>47</sup> In fact, the other measures listed in the covenant also betray evidence of the application of this procedure: they are not formulated in the language of the biblical text, and are

<sup>46</sup> See Williamson 1985 (F 400) 325–31; Blenkinsopp 1989 (F 365) 311–14.

<sup>47</sup> Clines 1981 (F 369); M. Fishbane, *Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel* (Oxford, 1985) 114–27. See also J. Liver, *Studies in Bible and Judean Desert Scrolls* (Jerusalem, 1971) 116–20 (Hebrew).



considerably broadened and extended to cases not explicitly mentioned in the Pentateuch. Hence the covenant marks the beginning of an important process, developed over the coming centuries, signalling one stage in the formulation of the Oral Law. It is highly significant that it is not Ezra, the priest and scribe, but Nehemiah, the governor, who is associated with that process. According to his memoirs, Nehemiah not only interpreted, but even enforced, some of the measures listed in the covenant (Neh. 13).

It should thus come as no surprise that historical tradition credits Nehemiah with the creation of institutions of lasting importance. Particularly striking is the attitude of Ben Sirach in his catalogue of praises of past worthies, who makes no mention whatever of Ezra (in itself a significant omission), but pays homage to Nehemiah as one 'who rebuilt our walls, which lay in ruins, erected the gates and bars and rebuilt our houses' (Ecclesiasticus 49:18–19 (49:13 NEB)). Yet another tradition even attributes the building of the Temple and the altar to Nehemiah, extolling his memory as the person who restored the eternal fire to the Temple (2 Macc. 1:18–36).<sup>48</sup>

#### 6. *Nehemiah's successors*

After the career of Nehemiah, the influence of the governorship in the life of the community in Judah began to decline. Epigraphic sources have furnished the names of two further governors: Bagohi, approached by the Jews of Elephantine in 408 with a request that he intervene on their behalf (Cowley, *AP* 30), and Yehizkiyah, whose name appears on coins dating to the end of the Persian period.<sup>49</sup> Despite Bagohi's Persian name (compare Bigvai in the list of repatriates, Ezra 2:2), the fact that he was requested to assist in the repair of 'the House of YHW that is in Elephantine' seems to imply that he was a Jew; perhaps he, like Nehemiah, came to Judah from the Persian court. Some scholars<sup>50</sup> have suggested that the Hananiah mentioned in some of the Elephantine letters (Cowley, *AP* 21, 38) should be identified with Hananiah 'the governor of the castle' (Neh. 7:2); however, this and other names derived from the root *hnn* were quite common among Jews in the fifth century, so that this identification need not necessarily be valid.

As the governorship lost prestige, the priests were able to regain their former position. Instructive evidence of the political prominence of the

<sup>48</sup> 2 Maccabees also (2:13) attributes to Nehemiah the collection of 'the chronicles of the kings, the writings of prophets, the works of David, and royal letters about sacred offerings', to found his library. For Nehemiah in Josephus and Talmudic sources, see Blenkinsopp 1989 (F 365) 54–9.

<sup>49</sup> Rahmani 1971 (F 389); Naveh 1971 (F 385) 30; H. G. M. Williamson, *Tyndale Bulletin* 39 (1988) 73. <sup>50</sup> See Porten 1968 (F 504) 130, who offers an alternative view at 279–80.

priests comes from a coin dating to the end of the period (contemporary with the Yehizkiyah coins), bearing the inscription *ywhnn hkwbn* (Yohanan the priest).<sup>51</sup> This Yohanan is not to be identified with Yohanan son of Eliashib (Neh. 12:23), who may be Yohanan, the High Priest mentioned in the petition of the Elephantine Jews to Bagohi (Cowley, *AP* 30:18). The (High) Priest of the coin presumably dates to a later period; he may have been the predecessor of Jaddua (below). Henceforth, the High Priest is leader of the community and its acknowledged representative with the government. This is reflected by the legend about the High Priest who is alleged to have welcomed Alexander the Great on the outskirts of Jerusalem in 332, at the head of a delegation of notables.<sup>52</sup> Josephus (*AJ* XI.302) identifies this high priest as Jaddua, but talmudic tradition (BT Yoma 69a) relates that it was Simeon the Righteous. Of the non-Jewish sources, Hecataeus of Abdera (*FGrH* 264 F 6(5)) explicitly states that the Jews were governed in their land by a High Priest. It is quite likely that the High Priest was supported in his tasks by a council of elders, the institution known in hellenistic times as the *gerousia*, but there is no direct evidence of this.

This hierarchy of government left no place for the descendants of the Davidic dynasty (though they maintained their privileged status in Babylonia – witness the later traditions of the exilarchs). That was a consequence of the imperial policy of the Persian Kings. After the disappearance of Zerubbabel, no scion of the House of David ever headed the community in Judah. Nevertheless, interest in the ancient royal house remained alive and its genealogy was preserved. Full details of the dynasty are given in 1 Chron. 3:19–24, in a register which extends several generations beyond Zerubbabel. The restoration of the Davidic monarchy was now linked to eschatological hopes, and it was to become an integral part of the messianic vision of Second Temple times.

#### V. THE SAMARITANS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR SEPARATION

It should be clear from this survey of the history of Judah in the Persian period that the ethnic component of the population described in the sources by the adjective ‘Jewish’ (*yēhūdī*, Judahite) had not been modified after the destruction of the First Temple and retained its distinctive identity through exile and restoration. The Babylonian monarchs, unlike the Assyrians, did not normally repopulate conquered territories with foreign peoples, but only uprooted the local populations

<sup>51</sup> Barag 1985 (F 356); 1986–7 (F 356A); *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 152 with fig. 2.

<sup>52</sup> No non-Jewish source knows anything about this visit, which is accepted by few. See Bickerman 1988 (F 364) 4–5 with 314.

and deported them to Babylonia. The Assyrians, by contrast, had practised the method of 'bilateral deportation', which as a matter of course ultimately produced a new ethnic entity replacing the deported nation. The new inhabitants, strangers to their new environment, were naturally dependent on the imperial authorities in all areas of economic and civil life.

This was certainly true in the case of the inhabitants of Samaria, settled there by the Assyrians after Sargon's destruction of the kingdom of Israel in 720. Sargon's inscriptions tell us that Arabs were deported to Samaria (*CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.2, 436 and n. 176), as well as peoples from other lands of his kingdom who were settled in the city itself (*CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.2, 342 and nn. 149, 150). Our principal biblical source on this matter, 2 Kgs. 17, does not name the Assyrian king, but provides a detailed list of those cities whose residents were transported: 'And the king of Assyria brought men from Babylon, and from Cuthah, and from Avva, and from Hamath and Sepharvaim, and placed them in the cities of Samaria instead of the children of Israel; and they possessed Samaria and dwelt in the cities thereof' (2 Kgs. 17:24).

The deportees were thus for the most part natives of Babylonia and of the regions to its east, on the border with Elam. In time, Jewish sources came to call them 'Cutheans', to the exclusion of all other names. The usual name in post-biblical sources from the hellenistic period is 'Samaritans'.<sup>53</sup> Surprisingly, this name is not to be found in the book of Ezra–Nehemiah, whose accounts of the controversy between the Jerusalem leaders and those of Samaria employ other names: in Ezra 4:1, they are named 'the adversaries of Judah and Benjamin', while Nehemiah's northern enemies are referred to as the brethren of Sanballat and the army of Samaria (Neh. 3:34 (4:2)).

It is quite evident that the historians and the editors responsible for the book of Ezra–Nehemiah made particular efforts to highlight the hostility between the returnees and the leaders of Judah on the one hand, and the governing circles of Samaria on the other. The circumstances which gave rise to this relationship are complex, and fall into two categories: ethnic/religious and political/administrative. We do not know when the newly arrived peoples became truly assimilated with the remnants of the indigenous population of Samaria (it is hardly likely that the entire population of the northern kingdom went into exile) nor how far-reaching this process was. It may be assumed that a considerable measure of intermixture took place. There is no doubt that the 'Samaritans', or at

<sup>53</sup> The word only occurs once in the Bible, in 2 Kgs. 17:29, and there refers to the former inhabitants of the kingdom of Samaria; see M. Cogan and H. Tadmor, *II Kings* (Anchor Bible) (New York, 1988), 211; S. Talmon, in *Gesammelte Aufsätze 1* (Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1988), 131–4, and in S. Talmon (ed.), *Jewish Civilization in the Hellenistic-Roman Period* (Sheffield, 1991) 30–1.

least their political leadership, recognized the cultic pre-eminence of the Jerusalem Temple. Moreover, as we have already seen, Sanballat was related by marriage to the High Priest at Jerusalem; his sons were given Yahwistic names, Delaiah and Shelemiah, and were approached by the garrison of Elephantine with a request that they intervene to secure permission for the rebuilding of the 'House of YHW' at Elephantine (Cowley, *AP* 30). Thus the political and administrative rivalry between Nehemiah and Sanballat has to be seen in the light of such co-operation between the leaders of Samaria and the High Priests in Jerusalem. However, the roots of the rivalry lie farther back; they are already evident in the letter of accusation from Rehum and Shimshai to Artaxerxes (Ezra 4:8ff, above, p. 271). The writers of this letter introduce themselves to the King of Persia as descendants of exiles from Erech (Babylonian Uruk), Babylon and Susa. The reference to Susa is particularly significant, since it was the ancient capital of Elam and now one of the capitals of the empire. Thus, by stressing their Mesopotamian and eastern origins, these writers seem to be suppressing any links with Judah, at the same time as they emphasize the rebellious tendencies of Jerusalem and the dangers to the central government inherent in its fortification (Ezra 4:12–14). But it is doubtful whether Sanballat and his family, with their close ties with Jerusalem, can have belonged to this anti-Judah faction in Samaria. What is clear from the letter is that the population of Samaria consisted of several ethnic and religious groups; further details are unknown.

It is significant that an army was stationed at Samaria (Neh. 3:34 (4:2)), whereas Jerusalem did not enjoy this military-administrative privilege.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, Samaria was not considered a temple city like Jerusalem, so that it is only natural that the 'Samaritans' sought to establish a foothold in the Jerusalem Temple, an attempt which continued throughout the period of the Restoration.

Ezra and Nehemiah, through their separatist policies, were determined to sever any bonds between the Jews and the 'Samaritans', but these policies had their opponents within influential circles in Jerusalem. Nehemiah used his authority as governor to dislodge Sanballat's family from its position in the Temple, evicting from it Sanballat's son-in-law, the son of the High Priest (Neh. 13:28). But this was not the final outcome. Once Nehemiah's term of office was over, the ties between the

<sup>54</sup> This proposition is not universally accepted. Tuplin 1987 (F 66) 182, 238, pointing to the fortress-commander in Jerusalem (Neh. 7:2), counts both Jerusalem and Samaria as provincial capitals with military forces attached to them, and thinks it possible that Dor, Lachish and Ashdod should be put on the same level. Whatever the eventual situation, it is by no means obvious that Jerusalem had a garrison before the completion of its wall. On the other hand, it has also been doubted (Williamson 1985 (F 400) *ad loc.*) whether *byl* in Neh. 3:34 (4:2) is necessarily an official Persian force, rather than a local militia.

leaders of Samaria and the High Priest's family were resumed, and in fact the attitude of the Chronicler to the northerners implies that the people of Judah were favourably disposed towards them; they are described as worthy to participate in the Temple services at Jerusalem (see below, p. 293).

We have as yet very meagre sources for fourth-century historical developments at Samaria and Jerusalem;<sup>55</sup> what is clear is that the dissension finally brought on a complete rupture. According to Josephus (*AJ* XI.309–12), presumably drawing on a reliable tradition, Sanballat (now known to be the third governor of that name)<sup>56</sup> encouraged his son-in-law Manasseh, son of the High Priest, to establish himself in Samaria. Allegedly with the permission of Alexander, shortly after his conquest of Palestine, Sanballat built a new temple on Mount Gerizim (the mount of blessing, Deut. 27:12) and Manasseh became its High Priest.

The Samaritans claimed to be the real Israelites, worshipping the God of Israel in their new temple. In the hellenistic period an offshoot community of theirs on Delos describes itself as 'The Israelites on Delos who send their contributions to the holy shrine Argarizein'.<sup>57</sup> This drastic and unprecedented step of erecting a rival to the Jerusalem Temple would be inconceivable, had there not been a grave rupture between Jerusalem and Samaria. Was this rupture the result of a Judahite initiative, as in the time of Nehemiah? Did it stem from a web of family intrigue, as described by Josephus? Alternatively, perhaps the process was a gradual one: relations between the communities deteriorating to the point where the breach could not be healed, with the northern community going its separate way as a distinct national and religious body, as in the days of the ancient Kingdom of Israel. In that case, we can better grasp the significance of the recent discoveries of coins minted in Samaria at that time in the name of Jeroboam.<sup>58</sup> We have no way of knowing whether this personage was a governor or a High Priest, but the mere use of this archaic, historically pregnant, name may well be a demonstrative act of independence on the part of the people of Samaria: it would signify the inception of a new era, like that ushered in by

<sup>55</sup> There is something to be hoped for from the final publication of the Wadi Daliyeh papyri (see Cross 1969 (F 370), 1985 (F 371A), 1988 (F 371B)); the new numismatic evidence (Meshorer and Qedar 1991 (F 384)) makes a substantial contribution. It is now clear, for example, that coinage in the name of *smryn* (the city, the province, or both?) started a few years after 375 B.C. and ran parallel to the *yhd* coinage, to which it is more closely dated; *ibid.* 66.

<sup>56</sup> Cross 1975 (F 371). Meshorer and Qedar 1991 (F 384) 52–3 nos. 41–5 are probably coined in his name.

<sup>57</sup> *SEG* xxx 810 (250–175 B.C.) and 809 (150–90 B.C.), published by Bruneau 1982 (F 368).

<sup>58</sup> Meshorer and Qedar 1991 (F 384), 14, 49 nos. 23–7 (five different types). They are not the first coins minted in Samaria, as originally suggested; they do not appear in the Samaria hoard, buried c. 345 B.C.

Jeroboam son of Nebat when he broke away from Jerusalem and the House of David (1 Kgs. 12, 2 Chron. 10).

The next, irrevocable, step in the schism was the sanctification of Mount Gerizim in writing – in the Samaritan Pentateuch.<sup>59</sup> A fragment of a historical work by a Samaritan author of the hellenistic period, known as Pseudo-Eupolemus (*FGrH* 724 F 1.5 *ap.* Eus. *Praep. Ev.* 9.17), relates that Abraham visited ‘the temple at Argarizin (which is, being interpreted, “the mountain of the Highest”) and there received gifts from Melchizedek, who was priest of the god and also king’. The process had thus come full circle: the myth associated with the new temple and its location on Mount Gerizim appropriated the entire body of traditions which had built up round Jerusalem and its Temple. However, shortly after the establishment of the temple, Samaria revolted unsuccessfully against Alexander and became the site of a Macedonian colony (Curt. IV.8.9–10, Eus. *Chron.*, Jerome p. 123 (cf. p. 365) Helm).<sup>60</sup> The exiled Samaritans settled around their temple, perpetuating the distinctive identity and traditions of their community and in continuing rivalry with Jerusalem.<sup>61</sup>

## VI. LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE

### 1. *The vernacular as a literary language*

The destruction of the First Temple and the Babylonian exile constitute a watershed in the cultural history of Israel. The fact is evidenced, first and foremost, in a linguistic sense: Hebrew ceased to function as the exclusive vernacular tongue in Judah and a second language came into gradually increasing use – Aramaic, the lingua franca of most of the Persian empire. At that time, the importance of Aramaic was unrivalled. No longer merely a political, diplomatic language, as it had been in the Assyrian empire, it had become both the vernacular and a vehicle for literature and administration. A variety of Aramaic documents have survived: royal inscriptions, such as the Aramaic version of Darius’ inscription at Behistun, literary works, like the Proverbs of Ahiqar, and legal and economic documents. Though primarily a script for the pen, on papyrus and parchment, there is plenty of evidence for its use on stone and clay as well.

It is obvious that documents on papyrus and parchment could

<sup>59</sup> For the Samaritan Pentateuch see Purvis 1968 (F 388).

<sup>60</sup> Whether the temple was actually built at this time seems very uncertain (Meshorer and Qedar 1991 (F 384) 26–7). But see more recently I. Magen, in F. Manns and E. Aliata (eds.), *Early Christianity in Context: Monuments and Documents*, 91–148 (Jerusalem, 1993).

<sup>61</sup> For later history of the Samaritans see Schürer, Vermes and Millar 1973–87 (F 394) II 16–20, with bibliography in n. 50; J. D. Purves in *CHJud* II 596–613.

withstand the ravages of time only in regions having a dry climate, primarily in Egypt, and their survival in Palestine is more or less confined to the dry regions of the Jordan Valley and adjacent areas like Wadi Daliyeh. However, other locations in Palestine, such as Arad and Beersheba, have produced numerous ostraca. It is apparent that the exigencies of everyday life compelled the inhabitants of Palestine to turn increasingly to Aramaic, which became a major unifying element, common to all the diverse administrative units and ethnic groups in the country.

As we have seen from the biblical account of reading the Law in public (Neh. 8:8), many of the Jews could not understand the original Hebrew of the text and had to have it explained in Aramaic. The very fact that the historian who compiled Ezra 1–7 frequently shifts from Hebrew to Aramaic and back attests the co-existence of the two languages in Judah during the Persian period. The items of official correspondence incorporated in the text were naturally written in Aramaic and the compiler saw no need to translate them into Hebrew. Another indication of the increasing influence of Aramaic is the large number of Aramaic loanwords and Aramaic linguistic usages in the Hebrew of the period, extending to the use of prepositions, verb forms and sentence structure.<sup>62</sup> However, in spite of the prevalence of Aramaic among the Jews in the Diaspora and among the returnees to Judah, Hebrew retained its vitality. Nehemiah's memoirs attest the author's excellent command of written Hebrew, despite his career at the Persian court. In Judah, where some of the population had not been deported to Babylonia and which was naturally less exposed to Aramaic influence, the level of Hebrew was considerably higher. This is evident from the books of the Restoration prophets, Haggai and Zechariah, whose language is relatively free of Aramaic influence. That Hebrew was occasionally maintained for official use can be deduced from the epigraphic evidence, such as the seal inscription *lyrmy hspr* (= *ha-sōphēr*, the scribe, not the Aramaic form *spr'* = *saphrā*) (Avigad 1976 (F 355) 7–8 no. 6), or the seal impression [. . .] *yhw bn [sn']blt pht šmrn* (Cross 1969 (F 370) no. X), in which the Hebrew forms *bn* and *šmrn* are preferred to the Aramaic *br* and *šmrn*, for 'son' and 'Samaria'. The Hebrew vernacular figures in the literary works of the period, conclusive proof that it too, not only Aramaic, was a living tongue.<sup>63</sup> The linguistic heritage of Hebrew was still preserved in later books, although these sometimes betray evidence of archaism.

<sup>62</sup> See A. Hurvitz, *Biblical Hebrew in Transition – A Study in Post-Exilic Hebrew and its Implications for Dating of Psalms* (Jerusalem, 1972) (Hebrew); *A Linguistic Study of the Relationship between the Priestly Source and the Book of Ezekiel*, (Cahiers de la Revue Biblique 20) (Paris, 1982); R. Polzin, *Late Biblical Hebrew – Toward Historical Typology of Biblical Hebrew Prose* (Harvard Semitic Monographs 12) (Missoula, Montana, 1976). <sup>63</sup> Naveh and Greenfield 1984 (F 386) 120–2.

2. *Literature and its social context*

The most characteristic literary genre of the Persian period was historiography, represented by two major works: the book of Ezra–Nehemiah and the book of Chronicles. The book of Ezra–Nehemiah represents a new historiographic form, in which personal memoirs and original documents are incorporated into a historical narrative framework with a well-defined ideology.<sup>64</sup> The author of this comprehensive account, writing long after the events, begins his work with the Edict of Cyrus and concludes it with the end of Nehemiah's mission. The account has two main focuses: the beginning of the Restoration and the achievement of Ezra and Nehemiah. No attempt is made to create a continuous historical development exhibiting some coherent notion of cause and effect, as in the book of Kings; indeed, the failure to do so sets this book far apart from the mainstream of biblical historiography.

The book of Chronicles differs markedly from Ezra–Nehemiah. (The once common view that these works were written by the same author is untenable.)<sup>65</sup> The book relates the history of Judah and the House of David, presenting events within the context of a historical process reflecting a comprehensive philosophy of ideas. The author, known in scholarly literature as the Chronicler, draws most of his historical material from the books of Samuel and Kings, but leaves his ideological and linguistic imprint even on these borrowed passages. His ideology is concentrated on two points: glorification of the House of David, and the Temple and its cult personnel. This dual perspective had no use for the history of the northern kingdom of Israel alongside that of Judah; indeed the historical survey does not even refer explicitly to the destruction of the northern kingdom and the exile of the ten tribes. Moreover, in the Chronicler's view, the presence of the Israelites in their homeland has nothing to do with the conquest and settlement under Joshua. He traces a continuity extending from the fathers of the world, through the patriarchs of the nation, to Jacob-Israel, and, ultimately, in a direct line to David and his descendants. The history of Israel is thus envisaged as a single continuum. Even the Babylonian exile is considered a mere episode in this chain: once 'the land had been paid her sabbaths' (2 Chron. 36:21), the continuity is resumed 'to fulfil threescore and ten years'. Within such an ideological frame, Judah is the only possible protagonist in the story of Israel in its land, and the northern

<sup>64</sup> See Japhet in Tadmor 1983 (F 398A) 176–202 and the recent commentaries by Williamson 1985 (F 400) and Blenkinsopp 1989 (F 365).

<sup>65</sup> Japhet 1968 (F 376) and 1989 (F 379); Williamson 1977 (F 399); resistance in Blenkinsopp 1989 (F 365) 47–54.



kingdom has no part to play. As we have said, the Chronicler does not explicitly mention the destruction of Samaria and the deportation of the ten tribes, merely hinting that nothing remains to the north of Judah except a remnant that escaped 'out of the hand of the king of Assyria' (2 Chron. 30:6). This remnant is not defined as consisting of foreign peoples or their descendants, but as the brethren of the people of Judah; both Hezekiah and Josiah, kings of Judah, call on these northern remnants to participate in their purification of the cult (2 Chron. 30; 34:9, cf. 6). It follows, therefore, that those who returned as a consequence of Cyrus' edict are not the exclusive bearers of the heritage of Israel, but only one of its constituents. This attitude towards the Israelites is diametrically opposed to that of the authors of Kings and of Ezra–Nehemiah; it is certainly at variance with what Ezra, Nehemiah and their supporters consider to be the distinctive identity of the nation. The book of Chronicles may therefore have originated in those circles which opposed the separatist ideology of the returnees to Judah from Babylonia and Persia. Such oppositional views were apparently common in influential circles, including those of the High Priesthood. Thus the book throws some light on social and religious views prevalent in Judah in the days following Nehemiah, especially on the attitude towards what might have been regarded as the remnants of the northern kingdom of Israel.

Another genre which evolved during the Persian period is that of the historical novella, which derives from the literature of the ancient Near East.<sup>66</sup> We know several novellas written in that period, such as the older part of the book of Daniel (chapters 1–6) and the book of Esther, both included in the biblical canon, and the books of Tobit and Judith, which survive today only in translation as books of the Apocrypha. However, the only one of these works which can definitely be associated with Palestine is the book of Judith, which may even have been written there. The geographical background of the book, the Persian names of its characters and a few other features link it directly to the Persian period and its specific administrative and military milieu.

Also belonging to this genre is the book of Jonah,<sup>67</sup> which is essentially a pseudepigraphic work revolving, after the fashion of the period, around the person of an ancient hero, Jonah son of Amittai (compare the prophet of the same name from Gath-Hepher, 2 Kgs. 14:25). Jonah is sent to the 'great city of Nineveh'; this is not the capital

<sup>66</sup> Elements of it spread into Greek literature by way of those authors who treated Persian history, e.g. Dinon of Colophon.

<sup>67</sup> Bickerman 1967 (F 361) 1–49; J. Sasson, *Jonah* (Anchor Bible) (New York 1990) 26–8.

of the Assyrian empire, destroyed in 612, but the symbol of an iniquitous metropolis.<sup>68</sup>

The same principle of attributing a work to an ancient hero is employed in the Song of Songs, whose hero is King Solomon. This book,<sup>69</sup> too, is dated by many authorities to the Persian period, at least on linguistic grounds (cf. such Persian loan-words as *pardēs* (4:13) and *ʿappiryōn* (3:9)). The pseudepigraphic principle was common, not only in the literature of the Persian period, but also in that of the hellenistic age, in which it evolved still further.<sup>70</sup>

Yet another common literary genre in the area was wisdom literature. The creators of this literature were scribes and learned men, a small group of those who would today be called 'intellectuals', who apparently wielded no small influence in the upper ranks of society. Such literati are known from Egypt and Mesopotamia during this period. A characteristic feature of the wisdom literature of the ancient Near East, as we know it today, is its preservation of ancient traditions, which are reworked and adapted to the spirit of the period. For this reason, it is extremely difficult to determine which elements in the book of Proverbs, for example, date to the Second Temple period. A similar situation exists in the case of Job, except that the prose framework of the book (chapters 1–2, 42:7–17) reveals some characteristic features of late Hebrew and post-exilic religious concepts. The most prominent of these is the motif of Satan tempting Job, which has no parallels in the biblical literature of the pre-exilic period or in the entire literature of the ancient Near East. It is commonly agreed<sup>71</sup> that the concept of Satan as an independent entity took shape in the Persian period, and indeed his earliest appearance in the Bible in the role of 'Accuser' is in the book of Zechariah: 'The Lord rebuke thee, O Satan' (Zech. 3:2).

The book of Ecclesiastes<sup>72</sup> actually contains nothing to link it explicitly with a real Palestine. Nevertheless, it is most definitely a Second Temple work, and it has often been claimed that it was written in the hellenistic period. Some of the pessimistic attitudes expressed in it are known from various phases of wisdom literature in the ancient Near East, but their formulation in Ecclesiastes betrays clear signs of re-editing in Second Temple times. The prospective readership of the book quite obviously consisted of a well-defined circle of intellectuals and

<sup>68</sup> The literature of the period frequently uses Assyria, sometimes as a substitute for Persia, and sometimes as an abstraction of a gentile world power (cf. e.g. Ezra 6:22). The plot of Judith revolves around the killing of Holofernes, commander of the army of 'Nebuchadnezzar king of Assyria', who invades Palestine, and Tobias, the hero of the book of Tobit, is associated with the Assyrian Nineveh. <sup>69</sup> Pope 1977 (F 387).

<sup>70</sup> For pseudepigraphy, see Bickerman 1988 (F 364) 201–4 with 322.

<sup>71</sup> Lods 1939 (F 382); Meyers and Meyers 1987 (F 384A) 183–6; P. L. Day, *An Adversary in Heaven* (Harvard Semitic Monographs 43) (Atlanta, 1988). <sup>72</sup> Bickerman 1967 (F 361) 139–67.

thinkers; the author both refers to and contests their ideas. There is no need to assume that the conceptions of life and its futility expressed in Ecclesiastes are drawn from Greek philosophical schools; such pessimistic world-views are quite common in ancient Near Eastern literature, both in Mesopotamia and in Egypt.

The last genre of the Second Temple period to be considered is that of psalms, especially those associated with worship in the Temple. The lateness of the language of some psalms, e.g. 103, 117, 119, 125 and 143, is indisputable, and some authorities ascribe several additional psalms to this period. Many of these pertain to the Temple cult and to pilgrimage to Jerusalem. At this time liturgical song was evidently an important component of the Temple service, and entrusted to a special team of singers, some of them named after eponymous ancestors: Asaph, the sons of Korah, Heman, Ethan and Jeduthun, ancient masters of their craft.

Besides the psalms which praised God and Temple, there are others of a didactic nature, which review major events in the history of Israel according to contemporary historical and philosophic ideas. Psalm 106 is a typical example of this category, relating Israel's past sins from the Exodus to the destruction of the Temple, and ending with the entreaty 'Save us, O Lord our God, and gather us from among the nations, that we may give thanks unto thy holy name, that we may triumph in thy praise' (Ps. 106:47).

### 3. *The cessation of prophecy*

By the beginning of the Restoration, prophetic literature, so rich in the pre-exilic period and during the Babylonian exile, had already begun to decline; it was to disappear completely in the course of the Persian period.<sup>73</sup> The prophetic texts of that period can be divided into two: those which deal with communal or national matters, and those which were concerned mainly with the Temple. To the first category belong the prophecies of Joel and Obadiah, the contents of which, although not dated, reflect the ambience of the early Restoration years. In both books the neighbours of Judah are castigated for rejoicing at her misfortune: Obadiah predicts the utter ruin of Edom, who 'rejoiced over the children of Judah on the day of their destruction' (v. 12), and Joel preaches the great day of judgment in the Valley of Jehoshaphat, when sentence will be passed on all the nations (Joel 4:2 (3:12)).

Joel's prophecies return to the motif of 'the Day of YHWH' in its national sense, familiar from First Temple times, and at the same time

<sup>73</sup> For a recent treatment see Barton 1986 (F 357).

glorify Zion and Jerusalem: 'Then shall Jerusalem be holy, and there shall no strangers pass through her any more' (Joel 4:17 (3:17)).

The second category of prophecies and prophets manifests a concern with the Temple, either with its actual construction (Haggai and Zechariah) or with the purity of Temple worship (Malachi). Whereas First Temple prophecy was concerned with a critique of society and its mores, particularly those of its leaders, the Restoration prophets pay no attention to such matters. Their great object is to comfort the people and to encourage them to proceed with the building of the Temple. Occasionally they were consulted on cultic matters, as, for example, when Zechariah (ch. 8) was asked about the continued observance of the national fasts, once the Second Temple had been built (Ezekiel fulfilled a similar role for his contemporaries in Babylonia); Malachi gives explicit injunctions about the priestly gifts – the tithes and the heave-offerings (Malachi 3:10), and is even more emphatic in his demand for the perfection and the purity of the sacrifices, finding fault with the priests for their failure to observe these codes (*ibid.* 1:6–7). We find here a highly significant stage in the development of prophecy: while the First Temple prophets criticized the Temple cult and belittled its importance, Malachi, the last of the classical prophets, fought for the maintenance of sacrifices, tithes and other priestly gifts as enjoined in the Pentateuch. The proclamation 'Remember ye the law of Moses my servant, which I commanded unto him in Horeb for all Israel, even statutes and ordinances' (*ibid.* 3:22 (4:4)) clearly reflects the transformation of prophecy. There was no room for the prophet in the fulfilment of such demands; the 'word of the Lord' was now permanently and officially entrusted to those who had preserved and interpreted the Law of Moses. Unfortunately, we have no sources for this critical juncture in the ideological and spiritual history of Judah and the Jewish people in general, and the details of the process remain obscure. No less obscure are the details of the collection, standardization and canonization of most of the Scriptures, a process which must have been in full swing during the Persian period and was presumably completed by the beginning of the hellenistic period. This canonization, which also involved the editing of the texts, was practically the final stage in the creation of biblical literature.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>74</sup> For recent work on the formation of the canon see Beckwith 1985 (F 358); Barton 1986 (F 357); Goodman 1990 (F 375).

## CYPRUS AND PHOENICIA

F. G. MAIER


When Cyprus and Phoenicia were incorporated into the Achaemenid empire during the later sixth century B.C. they already looked back upon long centuries of trading connexions and cultural exchanges. During the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. both areas, forming part of the Fifth Satrapy (Hdt. III.91.1), had a number of basic problems in common. Both were divided into a number of relatively small, half-independent political units. These polities were long-established monarchies: Salamis, Ceryneia, Lapethus, Soli, Marium, Tamassus, Citium, Idalium, Amathus, Curium and Paphos in Cyprus; Sidon, Tyre, Byblus and Aradus in Phoenicia.

One trend to be observed in the history of both Cyprus and Phoenicia during this period is a continuous conflict of interests between these kingdoms. Again and again local feuds arise from their attempts to extend their own territory at the cost of neighbouring states or to gain domination over the whole area. These conflicts are superseded for short periods by a common policy when the kingdoms unite in their aim to gain greater, if not absolute, independence from their Persian overlord. Such a tendency – which can be observed in all regions of the Achaemenid empire which had strong political and cultural traditions of their own – is more marked in Cyprus than in Phoenicia. The front-line position of the island during the wars between the Greek *poleis* and Persia more easily prompted attempts to shake off Achaemenid rule.

Cypriot kingdoms and Phoenician city states also confronted a number of similar social problems, not least the process of growing Hellenization with its consequences. Yet despite such common problems and tendencies the traditions and the development of Phoenicia and Cyprus are different to such a degree that it seems necessary to treat both areas separately during most of the period under review.

## I. THE KINGDOMS OF CYPRUS

The local kingdom had been the dominant form of political organization in Cyprus since the Late Bronze Age, but it is difficult to assess to what



Map 7. Cyprus.

extent the traditions of Mycenaean monarchy and of Canaanite kingship were instrumental in shaping the peculiar system of Cypriot monarchy. As in Phoenicia, monarchic institutions survived throughout the archaic and classical periods, setting the island apart from the Greek world where (except for its northern fringes and Cyrene) kingship had disappeared long before. Diodorus neatly sums up the situation in the middle of the fourth century: ‘in this island were nine important cities (πόλεις ἀξιόλογοι); beside them existed small towns (μικρὰ πόλίσματα) which were dependent on the nine cities. Each of these cities had a king who ruled it, but was subject to the King of the Persians’ (xvi.42.4).

The history of Cyprus and of its cities during the fifth and fourth centuries is difficult to reconstruct, as the evidence is extremely scanty and often confused. Yet the history of the island in the classical period has been presented in a surprisingly precise way as a conflict between the Greek dynasties and Persia, based on ‘national’ aspirations and cultural antagonism – assuming that Persia used Phoenician dynasties as tools, and that this led to a temporary ascendancy of the Phoenicians in the island and to a repression of the Greeks and their culture.<sup>1</sup> Such a view of Cypriot history is liable to impose the modern concept of nationality upon the past. Critical examination of the evidence thought to support the idea of a Greek–Phoenician antagonism shows, however, that much of it has to be discarded. The following account presents only those facts which are reliably recorded or can be inferred with a sufficient degree of plausibility.<sup>2</sup>

The Achaemenids had refrained from altering the existing political system and had recognized the status of the Cypriot kings. The conditions of their vassalage and the resulting restrictions of sovereignty are not known in great detail. The kingdoms had to pay a regular tribute and to contribute their contingents to the Persian fleet in case of war. On the other hand the Cypriot monarchs kept the right to issue their own coins; the royal mints were active throughout the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.

Information about the political organization of these kingdoms is very inadequate. In the fifth century it is practically confined to Herodotus who hardly records more than the bare fact of monarchic rule in the cities of Cyprus. It seems of no peculiar significance that he describes the Cypriot rulers sometimes as *basilees*, sometimes (but often in the same chapter) as *tyrannoi*: this simply denotes autocratic rule.

<sup>1</sup> With special emphasis in Gjerstad 1933, 1946, 1948, 1979 (F 254–7).

<sup>2</sup> Detailed examination of the evidence in Maier 1985 (F 285), Seibert 1976 (F 329). Yet factoids die hard. The restatement of the romantic-nationalist view of events by Stylianos 1989 (F 339) demonstrates once more how preconceived ideas impair the critical assessment of sources and research.

In the fourth century Aristotle wrote a *Kyprion Politeia*, Theophrastus *peri Kyprion basileias*. But of both treatises only one fragment of Aristotle survives, supplemented by the speeches of Isocrates and by a few fragments of Clearchus of Soli and of the comic poet Antiphanes (preserved in Athenaeus). Thus it is impossible to reconstruct in detail the internal structure of these small kingdoms, although a number of characteristic traits emerge from our sources.

The basically autocratic character of the Cypriot monarchies is confirmed by those elements of their political organization which are reliably recorded. The male relations of the ruler bore the traditional title of *anaktes*, the women were called *anassai* (Arist., F. 203). The *anaktes*, described by Eustathius (*Il.* XIII.582) as a notable class (*tagma endoxon*), seem to have wielded some degree of political influence, as the *kolakes* were directly responsible to them. These noble *kolakes*, described in some detail by Clearchus of Soli,<sup>3</sup> formed a secret police organization, expressly characterized as a tyrannical institution (*ktema tyrannikon*). The *kolakes* were of good family, but apart from the most prominent members of this body neither their number nor their names were known. The *kolakes* of Salamis, which may have served as a model for other courts, were divided into two hereditary branches, the *Gerginoi* and the *Promalanges*. The *Gerginoi* acted as spies and informants, listening to the talk of the people and reporting daily to the *anaktes*. The *Promalanges* investigated those cases which seemed to deserve closer scrutiny, using subtle techniques of disguise in their work.

Some fourth-century authors describe the rule of these kings as a mixture of soft living, ostentatious display of wealth and tyrannical cruelty. Princes of Paphos are depicted as lying on a silver-footed couch spread with expensive carpets from Sardis, clad in white shirt and purple robe, and attended by slaves and flattering courtiers.<sup>4</sup> The king of Paphos is said to keep himself cool by being fanned by doves which are attracted by the smell of Syrian perfume and shooed off by his slaves.<sup>5</sup> Nicocles of Salamis, on the other hand, is reported to have put to death the harpist Stratonicus and the sophist Anaxarchus for their witticism and freespoken utterance.<sup>6</sup> As some of these anecdotes occur in comedies and as all nicely fit the cliché of oriental despotism and decadence, they may largely be conventional. It is therefore open to question how far they depict the realities of life at the Cypriot courts of the age.

The palaces erected by Cypriot rulers during this period certainly were symbols of monarchic power, meant to impress by their splendour and wealth. The extensive palace of Vouni (Fig. 3) on the north coast of

<sup>3</sup> In Ath. VI. 255F–256B (fr. 19 Wehrli).

<sup>4</sup> Clearchus in Ath. VI 255E, 256F–257C (fr. 19 Wehrli).

<sup>5</sup> Antiphanes in Ath. VI 257D–F (fr. 200 K–A). <sup>6</sup> Ath. VIII 349C–F, 352D; D.L. IX.10.58–9.






Fig. 3. Plan of the Palace at Vouni. (After Karageorghis 1982 (F 276) 160, fig. 118.)

Cyprus was built in the early fifth century B.C. Remains of similar royal residences were recovered at Paphos and possibly at Soli.<sup>7</sup> At Vouni the rooms were arranged round a central colonnaded court; on its southwestern side, above a flight of stairs, rose tripartite state apartments of *liwan*-type. Both Vouni and Paphos show the strong impact of contemporary oriental, especially Persian, palace architecture, but it would be rash to read details of political structures or events into the ground plans of such royal residences.<sup>8</sup>

To the Greeks of the fourth-century polis such institutions may have appeared strange and decidedly oriental. It is indeed obvious that the organization of the *kolakes* was modelled closely on the imperial police of Achaemenid Persia, the 'eyes and ears of the King'. The Persian *otakoustai* are indeed equated by Eustathius (*Il.* XIII. 582) with the Cypriot

<sup>7</sup> Maier 1989 (F 286), with relevant bibliography.

<sup>8</sup> Gjerstad's hypothesis that the palace of Vouni was built by a persophile ruler of Marium in order to dominate a hellenophile Soli (and subsequently rebuilt by an hellenophile Marium king installed by Cimon) is far too speculative; Maier 1985 (F 285) 36–7; Maier 1989 (F 286) 18.

*kolakes*. But in the Greek world the Sicilian tyrants would also provide a model for autocratic forms of government.

The basic structure of a hereditary autocratic monarchy, supported by the close relations of the king, seems to have been common to all Cypriot kingdoms – whether they were ruled by Greek or by Phoenician dynasties. It survived in this form until the kingdoms were abolished by Ptolemy at the end of the fourth century B.C. Isocrates' description of the ruling methods of Evagoras, despite its openly eulogistic tendencies, in principle conforms with it (*Evag.* 20–3).

Democratic or representative institutions seem not to have developed in the island. The fifth-century bronze tablet from Idalium (*ICS* 217) mentions together with king Stasicyprus the city (*ptolis*) of Idalium. The city had to contribute to the emoluments of the physician Onasilus and his brothers and thus seems to have had a separate treasury. But it does not follow from the extant text that king and city shared the government of Idalium.<sup>9</sup>

At Paphos the political powers of the king were traditionally combined with the cult functions of the high priest of Aphrodite, as several inscriptions testify. In these texts the Paphian king – who wore an elaborate double crown of manifestly Egyptian inspiration – invariably styles himself *basileus* and *iereus tas Wanassas* (the traditional cult name of the Paphian Aphrodite). This combination of secular and religious powers originated from the special role of the sanctuary of Aphrodite at Paphos. There is so far no proof that the idea of sacral kingship played a role in other dynasties in the island.<sup>10</sup>

Hardly anything reliable is known of the social and economic structure of the Cypriot kingdoms during the classical period. Burial customs did not change markedly as compared with the archaic period. Rock-cut chamber tombs remained the burial place for the majority of people; only a number of wealthy families used more elaborate built tombs. The fourth-century Paphian kings Echetimus and Timocharis were buried in a large, elaborate chamber tomb just outside the city.<sup>11</sup> Limestone and marble sarcophagi became more widespread. A number of these, with the lid carved in human form, were imported from Phoenicia; later they were imitated locally, for instance at Citium. It also became a custom now to mark burial places by tombstones, partly executed in local Cypriot style, partly derived from contemporary Greek models. As regards the structure of society at the time, however, the cemeteries reveal hardly more than the basic fact that there were well-to-do as well as poorer citizens.

<sup>9</sup> *ICS* 217: Mitford and Masson in *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.3, 72.

<sup>10</sup> Maier 1989 (F 312). Inscriptions: *ICS* nos. 7, 16, 17, 90, 91; Masson 1980 (F 291). Yon 1989 (F 352) 373 and 1993 (F 353) 14 assumes a 'théocratie' at Citium.

<sup>11</sup> Maier and von Wartburg, *Arch. Anz.* 1992, 585–6.




Fig. 4. Plan of the north-east gate at Nea Paphos in the classical period. (After Maier and Karageorghis 1984 (F 288) 209, fig.195.)

The cities of Cyprus remained, as in the archaic period, seats of government and centres of social and economic life. But except for the royal residences mentioned above, few remains of the public and private architecture of the period have been recovered so far. The cities continued to be fortified – for obvious reasons, if we consider the political situation in the island during these two centuries. Idalium built an elaborate system of fortifications in the fifth century, which was used into the hellenistic period; Golgi erected a city wall presumably in the fourth century.<sup>12</sup> The fortifications consisted of limestone walls with a rubble core or of mudbrick walls on a stone foundation; only parts of special importance were built of fine ashlar masonry. Thus when Paphos reconstructed its walls in the second half of the fourth century, only the North East Gate (Fig. 4) and the city wall immediately adjacent to it were built of large bossed ashlars. The plan of the gate incorporated both Near Eastern and Greek elements.<sup>13</sup>

Living quarters in the cities and towns – partially uncovered for instance at Idalium, Ayia Irini, Citium or Paphos – consisted of fairly modest houses with mudbrick superstructures of traditional type. The style and technique of the stone-built houses in the harbour town of Ayios Philon (in the Karpas), however, are clearly influenced by contemporary Phoenician building. In Citium workshops for the smelting of copper were still built next to the temple of Astarte – a close

<sup>12</sup> Idalium: *BCH* 98 (1974) 882; 102 (1978) 925; 103 (1979) 708–10. Golgi: *BCH* 95 (1971) 404–6; 96 (1972) 1073; 97 (1973) 673. Possibly also Tamassus: *RDAC* 1977, 303–5.

<sup>13</sup> Maier, *RDAC* 1967, 43–4; 1973, 190–2. Masson and Szyner 1972 (F 294) 209–12.

connexion between metallurgy and religion to be observed there as early as in the Late Bronze Age.

Public architecture so far is represented mainly by sanctuaries, though there are remains of well-constructed buildings which may have served as administrative centres or official residences – such as a large Late Classical mansion with a peristyle court at Paphos.<sup>14</sup> Sanctuaries were as a rule constructed (or reconstructed) in the traditional form, combining a large courtyard with altars and votive gifts, a small covered *cella*, and sometimes a number of other buildings bordering the central court. Such traditional cult-places are represented by the sanctuaries of Athena at Vouni, of Aphrodite-Astarte at Tamassus, or of Heracles-Melqart at Citium-Bamboula. The dominant traditional cult in the island was still the worship of Aphrodite-Astarte with its antecedents in the fertility goddess of prehistoric Cyprus. At Citium the Phoenician temple of Ashtart, reconstructed for the last time, still flourished: an interesting painted fourth-century inscription illustrates its cult life.<sup>15</sup> But the centre of Aphrodite's cult remained Paphos, where the goddess was venerated as the *Wanassa* (the cult title *Paphia* does not appear before the hellenistic period). The buildings of the Archaic and Classical sanctuary at Palaepaphos were destroyed by Roman structures around A.D. 100. But a rich harvest of broken votive terracottas of the Classical period recovered from *favissae* near the temple, testifies to the flourishing life of the great sanctuary.<sup>16</sup>

No temples of Greek design have been discovered so far, although Ionic capitals found at Citium and Paphos may point to the existence of such buildings.<sup>17</sup> Greek cults – of Zeus, Hera, Apollo, Artemis, Athena or Heracles – gained popularity in the island, as coins and inscriptions demonstrate. This spread of Greek cults is but one aspect of growing Greek influence in Cyprus. Greek art was imported and imitated on an increasing scale, the bulk of Greek objects being represented by Attic pottery. The flow of such objects had already begun in the sixth century: after the Ionian Revolt it continued throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. A certain fall-off of imported Attic pottery during the first half of the fifth century – in contrast to Phoenicia or Palestine – has been attributed to the impact of the political and military situation on trading exchanges. But even if Attic pottery could be dated so precisely that the quantity of imports in the first and second half of the century could be reliably compared, such a temporary reduction in pottery imports is balanced to some degree by imported Greek sculpture, such as the

<sup>14</sup> Maier and von Wartburg, *RDAC* 1985, 113–17.

<sup>15</sup> *CIS* 1 86 A-B (*KAI* 37); Chaumont 1972 (F 228); Masson and Sznycer 1972 (F 294) 21–68.

<sup>16</sup> Maier and Karageorghis 1984 (F 288) 182–3, 208.

<sup>17</sup> Nicolaou 1976 (F 308) pl. XXI 1; Maier and Karageorghis 1984 (F 288) 222–3.

famous bronze head of the 'Chatsworth Apollo' (c. 470–460), or the head of a youth from the Paphian sanctuary (c. 480–470).<sup>18</sup> Cypriot sculptors during the second quarter of the fifth century were obviously inspired by contemporary developments in Greek art.<sup>19</sup>

During the second half of the fifth century, the volume of Greek trade in the eastern Mediterranean increased perceptibly. This has been noted also in Cyprus. At Citium nearly 50 per cent of fifth- and fourth-century Attic pottery found so far is dated c. 450–400 B.C., at Salamis the largest group of red-figure vessels belong to the years c. 420–370 B.C.<sup>20</sup>

The time-honoured arts and crafts of Cyprus, representing a highly original blend of autochthonous, Greek and oriental elements, still lived on. Traditional White Painted, Bichrome or Black-on-red pottery continued to be produced in quantity. A few new types were invented, such as jugs with a terracotta *kore* on the neck which acted as a spout. But some of the vigour and *Kyprios charakter* of the Archaic potters seems to be lost. Greek motifs and ornaments increasingly find their way into the decoration of vessels. The same process can be observed even more markedly in terracottas and jewellery.

Tradition still had a hold on the civilization of Cyprus. Amathus seems to have been a stronghold of the autochthonous population; Eteocypriot, written with syllabic signs, was still its official language in the fourth century (*ICS* 190–7). The long survival of the Syllabic script is a further proof of Cypriot conservatism. Salamis had begun to use the Greek alphabet on coins and inscriptions by the end of the fifth century.<sup>21</sup> But at Paphos alphabetic texts do not occur before c. 320 B.C. (a dedication of the last king Nicocles whose other inscriptions are still Syllabic), while at the Kafizin sanctuary in the territory of Idalium the Syllabic script was employed for cult purposes until the late third century B.C.

The Phoenician element in Cypriot society, religion and art was still vigorous, radiating from Citium, the Tyrian colony on the south-eastern coast of the island. Citium enlarged its territory, acquiring Idalium before the middle of the fifth century, and later (about 350 B.C.) for a short time also Tamassus. Political rule was followed by Phoenician influences: Phoenicians lived at Idalium (as their tomb inscriptions testify) and Melqart, Reshef-Mikal, Anat and Astarte were worshipped in the city. But the Phoenician presence and Phoenician cults spread

<sup>18</sup> Vermeule 1976 (F 348) 15–17; Yon 1986 (F 350) 100; Maier and Karageorghis 1984 (F 288) 181 fig. 170.

<sup>19</sup> *Salamine de Chypre* x 1978 (F 323) 78; see also Pouilloux 1975 (F 314) 116; Yon 1974 (F 349).

<sup>20</sup> For Cyprus e.g. *Salamine de Chypre* IV (F 321) 71–3, 77–78, VIII (F 322) 4–9, X (F 323) 215–18; Salles 1983 (F 325) 54–8; Hermay 1989 (F 266) 189; Maier and Karageorghis 1984 (F 288) 217–18. For Phoenicia, Elayi 1983 (F 246). Short summary with bibliography up to 1985, Collombier 1987 (F 229). <sup>21</sup> See the digraphic inscription of Evagoras I, *Salamine de Chypre* IV (F 321) 81–4.

beyond the zone of direct political influence, as inscriptions and other finds demonstrate. The cult of Melqart, Anat and Astarte is attested at Larnaka *tis Lapithou*; a Phoenician sanctuary existed in the early classical period in the territory of Amathus, at Limassol.<sup>22</sup> Phoenicians resided at Ayia Irini and at Tamassus (before *c.* 350 B.C.). The present state of evidence does not warrant the hypothesis of an 'economic expansion' aimed at exploiting the copper deposits in the Tamassus and Amathus area. Nor does it support the concept of antagonism and enmity between Greeks and Phoenicians. A number of testimonies point to a considerable degree of peaceful co-existence, mutual cultural impacts and even intermarriage between the two ethnic groups.<sup>23</sup> The kingdom of Lapethus possibly represented a kind of Graeco-Phoenician community; in fifth-century Salamis the presence of Phoenicians is attested by a tomb inscription recording Phoenician names in Greek language and Syllabic script.<sup>24</sup>

Despite Eteocypriot traditions and Phoenician presence, however, an increasing impact of Greek art, manners and religion is to be observed in the civilization of fifth- and fourth-century Cyprus. The process of Hellenization, originating from the strong ties formed between Cyprus and the Greek world in the sixth century B.C., was gathering momentum even if political developments seemed for a time antagonistic to it.

## II. CYPRUS BETWEEN PERSIA AND THE GREEKS, *c.* 495–411 B.C.

The history of Cyprus between the Ionian Revolt and the middle of the fifth century is dominated by the conflict between the Achaemenid empire and the Greeks. The offensive strategy of the Delian Confederacy made the eastern Mediterranean, where an open flank of Persia could be attacked from the sea, a principal theatre of war. Cyprus, capable of supporting a large fleet, inevitably became a naval base contested by both sides. For Athens it was a necessity to secure such an advanced base; at the same time it was of the utmost importance for Persia to hold Cyprus as a base for her own fleet. In this she succeeded for most of the time, although Athens within thirty years made three attempts to gain a foothold in the island.

'After a year of freedom, the Cypriots were again reduced to slaves': Herodotus (v. 116) thus sums up the consequences of the abortive rising of the kingdoms of Cyprus in 499/8 B.C.; some of the conquered cities were, as it seems, garrisoned for a time by Persian troops (Diod.

<sup>22</sup> *CIS* 1 88ff. *KAI* nos. 38, 39 with Vol. III p. 64; Yon 1986 (F 350).

<sup>23</sup> Seibert 1976 (F 329); see also Chaumont 1972 (F 228) 179; Hadjisavvas 1986 (F 262); Michaelidou-Nicolaou 1987 (F 297); Hermary 1987 (F 265); van Berchem 1975 (F 347) 53–4.

<sup>24</sup> Karageorghis 1970 (F 274) 269–73.

xI.44.2).<sup>25</sup> We have no detailed information regarding the aftermath of the revolt, but it can hardly be doubted that the unsuccessful rising marked a turning-point in the history of fifth-century Cyprus.

The subsequent events of the Persian Wars demonstrate that Achaemenid control over the island was firmly re-established. The Cypriot kings discharged the duties to which they were bound by their allegiance to the Great King, whatever their real feelings and aspirations may have been. Already in the final stage of the Ionian Revolt Cypriot vessels formed part of the Persian fleet which defeated the Ionians in 494 B.C. at Lade, although the Cypriots (as may be inferred from Herodotus vi.6) seem not to have been very keen fighters. In 480 B.C. the Cypriot kings like other vassals had again to detail contingents to the fleet. The Cypriot ships numbered 150 and thus represented the fourth largest contingent after 300 or so East Greek, 300 Phoenician and 200 Egyptian vessels (Hdt. vii.89–90; Diod. xi.3.7).

The Cypriot ships were commanded by their own kings such as Gorgus of Salamis or Timonax, son of Timagoras (his city is not specified); the squadron of the Paphian general Penthylus numbered twelve vessels (Hdt. vii.98, 195). Herodotus records that the Cypriots were clad like Greeks except for their head-dress: their kings wore a *mitra*, the others (presumably the officers) a *kitaris* (Hdt. vii.90). The *mitra* as a sovereign's headgear may have been similar to the Egyptian-style crown worn by the priest-kings of Paphos, while the *kitaris* may have resembled the head-dress of Persian satraps or that worn by a number of Late Archaic statues from Paphos.<sup>26</sup> Herodotus' distinction between Greeks and Cypriots represents in any case an interesting parallel to Aeschylus' famous lines (*Supp.* 288–9) referring to the *Kyprios charakter* as something definitely recognizable.

The Cypriot contingent earned little distinction in the naval war of 480 B.C. The fate of the Paphos squadron is described in some detail by Herodotus. Penthylus lost eleven of his ships before the battle during a storm off Cape Sepias. With his last vessel he was then taken prisoner at Artemisium; so was Philaon, the youngest brother of Gorgus. This shows that a number of Cypriot vessels were amongst the thirty Persian ships captured during the battle. The prisoners were sent to Corinth bound in chains, as the Greeks hoped to elicit from them information about the Persian plans (Hdt. vii.195, viii.11).

Those Cypriot ships which were left to fight at Salamis proved to be a failure. According to Diodorus (xi.18.6–19.1) they broke first, together

<sup>25</sup> There is no proof for a Persian commander's residence at Paphos (as suggested in Schäfer 1960 (F 326)); Maier and Karageorghis 1984 (F 288) 208.

<sup>26</sup> Maier 1989 (F 287) 383; Maier and Karageorghis 1984 (F 288) 185 fig. 172; different interpretation, Hermary 1989 (F 266) 180; see also Gjerstad 1979 (F 257) 119 n. 4.

with the Phoenicians. It seems unlikely that the Cypriots fled on purpose, in order to help their Greek compatriots. But their not very creditable performance (Hdt. VIII.100.4) may indicate that the Cypriots were indeed disaffected. During the Persian council of war preceding the Battle of Salamis Queen Artemisia of Caria (who led her own ships with great valour and was in a position to judge) had already rated the fighting capacity of the Cypriots rather low: 'these so-called allies, Egyptians, Cypriots, Cilicians and Pamphylians, are of no use at all' (Hdt. VIII.68γ). But the Cypriots at least escaped the severe punishment meted out to some of the Phoenician commanders by Xerxes.

The defeats of 480 and 479 B.C. seem to have momentarily loosened Persian control over the kingdoms of Cyprus. Aeschylus' *Persae* (472 B.C.) implies that the cities freed from Persian rule included Soli, Salamis and Paphos in Cyprus (891–2). Such an implication, surprising at first, seems to be supported by the events of 478 B.C. In the spring of this year a Greek fleet of eighty ships, commanded by Pausanias, sailed to Cyprus and 'reduced most of it' (Thuc. I.94); according to Ephorus in Diodorus' epitome, Pausanias 'liberated those cities which still had Persian garrisons' (XI.44.1–2). The extent and success of these operations are not recorded. But it is certain that the Greek fleet left after a short time and that Achaemenid rule not long after reasserted itself.<sup>27</sup>

The Persian reserve squadron of eighty Phoenician vessels which in 466 arrived too late to join the main fleet at the Eurymedon, was obviously based on Cyprus. Cimon subsequently captured this squadron off the coast of Cyprus, together with other vessels that had escaped from the Eurymedon battle but did not attack the island (Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F 192; Diod. XI.60.5–6). There were still good strategic reasons for an occupation of Cyprus, but Athens did not make a new attempt to gain control of the island before 460/59 (or 459/8) B.C. A fleet of 200 ships under Charitimides operated in the waters of Cyprus, but was soon diverted to Egypt in order to assist the revolt of Inarus (Thuc. I.104.2). There is no record of Athenian operations in Cyprus at that time, except for the list of the members of the *phyle* Erechtheis who in 459/8 B.C. died in action 'in Cyprus, in Egypt, in Phoenicia' (M–L 33). As the Cypriots, together with Phoenicians and Cilicians, supplied the Persian fleet sailing for Egypt in the spring of 456 B.C. (Diod. XI.75.2), there can have been no lasting successes.

A last attempt to secure Cyprus as a base was made when Cimon resumed operations against Persia in the Eastern Mediterranean in 450/49. A fleet of 200 ships – 60 of which were soon detached to Egypt at the

<sup>27</sup> See also Meiggs 1972 (C 201) 56–8; the plea of Stylianou 1989 (F 339) 441–4 for Cypriot members of the Delian Confederacy is based on too many hypotheses.



appeal of Amyrtaeus, the king in the Marshes – arrived in the island in the spring of 449. The Athenian forces besieged both Marium in the west and Citium in the east, but neither the chronology nor the results of these operations are entirely clear (Thuc. I.112.2–4; Diod. XII.3–4; Plut. *Cim.* 18–19).<sup>28</sup> For obvious geographical reasons Marium seems to have been the first target. But it is uncertain whether the Athenian forces took the city or whether they raised the siege to proceed to the eastern coast of the island. A conquest of Marium has sometimes been inferred from Diodorus' 'he took by siege Citium and Marium' (*Κίτιον μὲν καὶ Μάριον ἐξεπολιόρκησε*). But as it seems certain that Citium was not taken (Thuc. I.112.4; Plut. *Cim.* 19), this sentence furnishes no positive evidence for a conquest of Marium either.

The siege of Citium met with no success and Cimon died during the operations. His death was concealed for thirty days and the siege raised. The homeward-bound Athenian fleet encountered Persian naval forces consisting of Phoenicians, Cypriots and Cilicians (Thuc. I.112.4); a combined action on land and sea was fought off Salamis. The victorious Greeks sustained such severe losses that Isocrates later compared the battle with the Athenian defeats in Egypt, Sicily, and at Aegospotami (VIII.86). Whether the battle was a chance encounter (as the text of Thucydides seems to suggest) or whether it resulted from a systematic Greek attack on Salamis, remains uncertain.

The failure of this last Athenian attempt to occupy Cyprus practically confirmed the *status quo* created by the Battle of the Eurymedon and put a definite end to the ambitious Athenian strategy in the eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus from now on remained firmly under Persian rule. Achaemenid control of the island, except for the years of Evagoras' 'Cypriot War', was not disputed until the conquest of Alexander.

Salamis was ruled by a Greek dynasty which traced its ancestry back to the legendary Teucer. King Gorgus had been dethroned when he refused in 499 to join the Ionian Revolt. He must have been re-installed after a comparatively short time as he appears in command of the Salaminian contingent in the fleet of 480. In the thirties of the fifth century the Greek dynasty was ousted by a Phoenician adventurer from Tyre (whose name is not recorded). He came to Salamis as a fugitive and won the confidence of the king but in the end 'expelled his benefactor and himself seized the throne' (Isoc. *Evag.* 19–20). Isocrates draws a gloomy picture of the usurper's rule: 'he reduced the city to barbarism (*ἐξεβαρβάρωσε*) and brought the whole island into subservience to the

<sup>28</sup> The ingenious attempts of Barns 1953/4 (F 222) and Sordi 1971 (F 330) to divide Diodorus' account into a 'lost campaign' of 460 B.C. and the events of 450/49 B.C. fail to convince; see Parker 1976 (F 309). See also *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 34, 301–2.

Great King' (*Evag.* 20). But apart from Cyprus having been under Persian rule for a hundred years already, archaeology has disproved his notion of a 'barbarized city' (*Evag.* 47).

The importance of Citium must have increased considerably when its Phoenician dynasty succeeded in annexing the kingdom of Idalium which bordered the Citian territory to the north. A state of conflict between the two kingdoms is proved by the Idalian bronze tablet (*ICS* 217; *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.3, 72, 78; *Pls. to Vol. III*, pl. 224) which records a siege of Idalium by 'Medes and Citians'. The date of the inscription is disputed (between *c.* 478 and *c.* 445, if not later); the circumstances of this attack are unknown. It can, however, not have been connected with the conquest of Idalium: the text shows that the siege at that time was unsuccessful and the Idalian king Stasicyprus still ruled when the inscription was set up. Idalium was definitely incorporated during the reign of King Ozbaal who styles himself 'king of Citium and Idalium', while his father and predecessor Baalmelek I was 'king of Citium' only. Ozbaal seems to have ruled shortly after the middle of the fifth century, but the precise chronology of the kings of Citium (except for Pumiathon, the last of the line) is still disputed.<sup>29</sup>

Next to Salamis and Citium, Paphos seems to have been the most important kingdom; it owed its special role to the famous sanctuary of Aphrodite. Yet of the history of Paphos and of other kingdoms nothing is known but the names of some rulers. The Paphian dynasty was Greek and used the Syllabic script for inscriptions and coin legends.

Marium and Lapethus present a slightly more complex situation. King Sasmas of Marium (*c.* 470/60–450?) bears a Phoenician name, and on some of his coins the Phoenician *mlk* for 'king' occurs beside the usual Syllabic signs. But as both his father Doxandrus and the later kings Stasioecus and Timocharis (second half of the fifth century?) have perfectly good Greek names, it seems difficult to decide whether he was actually a Phoenician or a Greek who was given a Phoenician name for reasons unknown to us. At Lapethus Greek and Phoenician names occur side by side in the list of kings, but in contrast to Marium their coin legends (except for the last king, Praxippus) uniformly use Phoenician signs. The population of Lapethus was primarily Greek; but there is evidence of not inconsiderable Phoenician presence. These facts, however, do not make the interpretation of the list of kings less difficult.

An unbiased assessment of our body of reliable evidence hardly supports the hypothesis of a Persian–Phoenician alliance to oppress the Greek dynasties and their populations. What can be reasonably inferred

<sup>29</sup> Recent archaeological research at Idalium has yielded important fourth-century ostraca with both Syllabic and Phoenician graffiti, and has proved that the acropolis was not destroyed suddenly, but abandoned gradually (Dr M. Hadjicosti, personal communication).

from a number of fairly isolated facts is the existence of conflicting aims and divided interests amongst the Cypriot kingdoms, which had already become apparent during the Ionian Revolt. The building and reconstruction of fortifications may be considered as additional proof for this state of affairs, although these building operations cannot be reliably connected thus far with particular events or rulers.

Political disunity facilitated Persian rule, and Phoenician kings may indeed have been more amenable at times, as they could not count on backing from outside. But one single instance of a co-operation of Persians and Phoenicians against a Greek city proves neither a general support of the Phoenicians nor a systematic anti-Greek policy of the Achaemenids. Persia did not act ideologically: no measures were taken, for instance, when the Greek Evagoras deposed the Phoenician Abde-mon at Salamis in 411 B.C. There is, furthermore, no proof that Persia exchanged Greek for Phoenician rulers at Marium or Lapethus. Achaemenid rule relied on diplomacy and persuasion; it pragmatically resorted to a well-tried instrument of politics when it exploited conflicting interests of the kingdoms in order to tighten the hold on the island.

A fundamental conflict between Greeks and Phoenicians resulting from racial or cultural motives can hardly be inferred from one single instance of a Phoenician dynasty annexing a Greek kingdom (Citium would meet Greeks wherever it tried to extend its territory), and one single instance of a Phoenician pretender forcibly ousting a Greek king. The vehement anti-Greek policy of the Tyrian usurper at Salamis is alleged only by Isocrates; none of the Phoenician kings at Marium or Lapethus can be connected with such policies. Generally our sources reveal more co-existence than conflict between Greeks and Phoenicians (see above, pp. 305–6); it seems significant for the political climate in the island that a Phoenician could attain an influential position at the Greek court of Salamis.

Differences between Greeks and Phoenicians may have influenced politics to some degree. But the Greeks themselves seem rarely to have been united by national aspirations. In 499 Phoenician Citium joined the revolt, while the Greek kings of Salamis and Amathus refused to do so, and Stasanor of Curium deserted the Greek cause in battle. In the following years our sources never mention Greek Cypriot support of Athenian operations; in the battle of Salamis in 449 Cypriot contingents fought with the Persian fleet, not with the Athenians. Divided loyalties must have been even more marked in the Greek Cypriot kingdoms than in the Ionian cities of Asia Minor.

What we know for certain about the history of the Cypriot kingdoms reveals nothing but elements of inter-dynastic conflicts. Their policies aim at the extension of power, irrespective of the ethnic group: thus

Evagoras will indiscriminately attack Citium, Soli and Amathus – cities with Phoenician, Greek and ‘Eteocypriot’ populations.

### III. THE REIGN OF EVAGORAS OF SALAMIS

A new phase in the history of Cyprus began when Evagoras seized power in Salamis in 411 B.C. The career of this outstanding monarch, who was to dominate Cypriot politics for a generation, culminated in a number of successes which made Salamis for some years a power in the eastern Mediterranean. Yet it became apparent very soon that Evagoras’ rise was mainly due to a number of favourable but fleeting conditions in the foreign policy of his time. When these conditions changed, the political decline of Salamis set in and Evagoras’ position dramatically collapsed within a number of years.

At Salamis a descendant of the Tyrian usurper had been murdered by another Phoenician, Abdemon, in c. 415 (Isoc. *Evag.* 26). Abdemon was either of Tyrian (Diod. xiv.98) or Citian origin (Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 103.2); as he was one of the *dynasteuontes* at Salamis (Isoc. *Evag.* 26), his career may have been similar to that of the first usurper. Evagoras, born c. 435, claimed descent from the royal house of Teucer (Diod. xiv.98.1; Isoc. *Evag.* 18) and seems to have lived unmolested at Salamis until Abdemon gained power. Regarded by the new ruler as a political rival, he was threatened with arrest and fled to Soli in Cilicia. From there he returned in 411 with a small group of devoted supporters to Salamis, broke at night into the city through a postern gate, attacked the royal palace and sent Abdemon into exile (Isoc. *Evag.* 26–32; Diod. xiv.98). This coup, so reminiscent of Ibn Saud’s action at Riyadh in 1902, made Evagoras king of Salamis; the Greek population of the city remained remarkably indifferent (τῶν δ’ ἄλλων πολιτῶν θεατῶν: Isoc. *Evag.* 31).

Evagoras consolidated his newly won power at Salamis by an extensive programme of reconstruction: he strengthened the fortifications, enlarged the harbour and built a fleet of triremes (Isoc. *Evag.* 47). Such measures were not prompted by a ‘barbarization’ of Salamis under Phoenician rule, as alleged by Isocrates; no decline in the arts and material culture of Salamis or Cyprus is to be observed during this period (see above, p. 306). Evagoras’ basic aim was to increase the power of his kingdom: ‘he caused it to become so powerful that many, who had previously held it in contempt, now feared it’ (Isoc. *Evag.* 47). There is no evidence for an anti-Persian policy at that time, let alone for plans to liberate Cyprus from Achaemenid rule.<sup>30</sup> Evagoras’ two-pronged policy during the first part of his reign shows this clearly. His one aim was to

<sup>30</sup> Costa 1974 (F 231), where Evagoras’ career up to c. 391 is discussed.

extend the rule of Salamis, possibly over the whole island (*ἅπασαν τὴν νῆσον σφετερίσασθαι*: Diod. xiv.98.1): in this he eventually succeeded, partly by adroit political manoeuvres, partly by military force. At the same time he carefully inaugurated a foreign policy calculated to further his plans in Cyprus and shrewdly taking advantage of the complicated conflicts between Persia, Sparta and Athens. But this foreign policy worked for a long time in the interest of Persia, assisting her to eliminate Spartan naval power.

Persia did not react to the overthrow of Abdemon and the re-establishment of Greek rule at Salamis. From the terms concluded with the rebel Evagoras in 380/79 B.C. (Diod. xv.9.2: he submitted to the Great King 'as king to king' (*ὡς βασιλεὺς βασιλεῖ*) it can be inferred that he was recognized by the Great King as vassal king of Salamis from the beginning. Evagoras could hardly have acted as a mediator between Tissaphernes and Athens around 410 B.C. if he had been on strained terms with his Persian overlords. Towards the end of the century, some friction seems to have developed, for reasons we cannot verify conclusively (taking advantage of Cyrus' revolt?). But relations went back to normal when Evagoras in 398/7 agreed to pay the arrears of the customary tribute which he had obviously withheld for some years (Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F 30); until 391 he remained in principle loyal to the Great King.

The relations which Evagoras established with Athens during the first years of his reign are not easy to define. In 410 or 409 the Athenians honoured the king by a decree which survives in a very mutilated state.<sup>31</sup> It seems plausible that these honours were occasioned by negotiations which Evagoras conducted in the Athenian interest, and that they included a grant of citizenship (Dem. xii.10) – 'because of many great benefactions', as Isocrates records (*Evag.* 54). During the final phase of the Peloponnesian War refugees from Greece, not always of unambiguous repute, flocked to the court of Salamis (Isoc. *Evag.* 51). Prominent amongst these was the orator Andocides. His dealings with the king were not free from complications (he was imprisoned by Evagoras for a time: Lys. vi.28), but through him Evagoras in 407 supported hard-pressed Athens with grain (Andoc. ii.20). The arrival of the Athenian Conon in Cyprus made a greater impact on the future policy of Evagoras. After the Athenian defeat at Aegospotami in 405 he escaped with a small squadron of eight triremes to Cyprus and stayed there for several years (Isoc. *Evag.* 52; Xen. *Hell.* ii.1.29). In due time the Athenian relations of the king of Salamis gained greater political significance.

<sup>31</sup> *IG* 1<sup>3</sup> 113 = *Salamine de Chypre* x (F 323) 113–15 no. 247 = Osborne 1981–3 (B 165) D3; see Spyridakis 1935 (F 331) 46–50. Dated January 411 by Gregoire and Goossens 1940 (C 145); 'as late as possible in 408/7', Lewis 1977 (A 33) 130 n. 133.

The policy advocated by Conon was directed at overthrowing the Spartan hegemony over Greece and thus tried to get support from Persia. The Great King was indeed willing to back such a policy to a certain extent, as became apparent when Evagoras – won over to support Conon's claim to be appointed admiral of the Persian fleet – in 398 opened negotiations with Artaxerxes through the historian and physician Ctesias (*FGrH* 688 F 30; Isoc. *Evag.* 54–6; Diod. xiv.39). Agreement was reached after lengthy bargaining. Pharnabazus in 397 ordered the Cypriot kings to build a hundred triremes (Diod. xiv.38.2), to be commanded by Conon. The fleet finally sailed in 396 and after initial setbacks – being blockaded in Caunus where the Cypriot mercenaries mutinied (*Hell. Oxy.* xx (xv)) – in 394 won a decisive victory at Cnidus which terminated the short-lived Spartan dream of a domination of the seas. Athens in 393/2 once more decreed a number of special honours for the allied Cypriot king, including the *proxenia* and a bronze statue to be erected beside a statue of Conon in front of the *stoa Basileios* (Isoc. *Evag.* 57; Paus. i.3.2).<sup>32</sup>

The co-operation between Evagoras and Conon primarily had a political function, although Diodorus mentions a friendship between the two men (xiii.106.6; also Isoc. *Evag.* 53). Evagoras seems to have had a sincere interest in assisting Athens against Sparta, but Conon may well have considered the Salaminian king (to whom he proposed a marriage-alliance with Dionysius of Syracuse, presumably in order to detach him from Sparta (see above, p. 105): Lys. xix.19–20) merely a pawn in his game. But it is obvious that the course of events also fitted Evagoras' plans very well. Under the cover of his good relations with the Great King (whom he had assisted during the naval war against Sparta) he could reasonably expect to be given a free hand in his schemes for extending his hegemony over all kingdoms of Cyprus. The first open conflicts with other Cypriot monarchs are recorded in 398 (Ctesias *FGrH* 688 F 30). Further operations, 'by force or by persuasion', began in 393 or even earlier; by 391 only three cities still resisted: Citium, Soli and Amathus (Ephorus *FGrH* 70 F 76; Diod. xiv.98.2–3).

These three cities appealed for help to Artaxerxes. The reaction of the Great King, which seems to have come as an unexpected blow to Evagoras (Isoc. *Evag.* 58), marked the real turning-point in the career of the Salaminian king: it was the beginning of the 'Cypriot War'. Artaxerxes immediately ordered Hecatomnus, the dynast of Caria, to intervene in Cyprus; at the end of 391 Hecatomnus seems to have landed his troops in Cyprus unopposed by an apparently unprepared Evagoras

<sup>32</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 20 = *Salamine de Chypre* x (F 323) 117 no. 250. Two new fragments of the inscription, Lewis and Stroud 1979 (B 152) = *SEG* xxix 86; see also Funke 1983 (C 140). For a possible portrait head of Evagoras see Hermary 1989 (F 266) 181.

(Diod. xiv.98.3–5). It is open to discussion whether the attempted conquest of the whole of Cyprus by the king of Salamis was connected with the reversal of Persia's Greek policy in 392/1.<sup>33</sup> But it seems to follow from our sources that Evagoras' revolt was not a planned insurrection, part of an anti-Persian 'grand design': it arose from a wrong assessment of Persian policy in Cyprus. The initiative lay with the Great King. For some years he apparently did not object to the gradual expansion of Salaminian rule. But once Sparta's offensive schemes seemed to have been effectively curbed, he decided to forestall the potential threat of a united Cyprus: 'The King, not only because he did not wish Evagoras to grow any stronger, but also because he appreciated the strategic position of Cyprus and its great naval strength whereby he would be able to protect Asia in front, decided to accept the alliance' with Amathus, Soli and Citium (Diod. xiv.98.3).

Evagoras, thanks to his diplomatic skill, was able to thwart the Great King's first measures and thus gained time to enlist support from outside. The small squadron of ten triremes which Athens sent to assist Evagoras was captured near Rhodes by a Spartan fleet. The delicacy of the situation did not escape Xenophon: Athens, still siding with Persia at that time, tried to help Persia's enemy Evagoras, while the Spartan enemies of Persia destroyed a force destined to fight the Persians (Xen. *Hell.* iv.8.24). But Evagoras managed to come to an arrangement with Hecatomnus who evacuated his forces and later secretly assisted the king with money. At the same time he consolidated his position by allying himself, not only with Athens, but with the Egyptian king Acoris (who had concluded a treaty with Athens in 388) and some other discontented Achaemenid vassals.<sup>34</sup>

In the spring of 387 a new Athenian fleet of ten ships, carrying 800 peltasts and commanded by Chabrias, got through to Cyprus. With the help of these forces Evagoras succeeded in subduing *σχεδὸν ὅλην τὴν Κύπρον* (Xen. *Hell.* v.1.10; Diod. xiv.110.5). How far his control of the island really went, is impossible to establish; we have no proof that his conquests included the cities of Citium, Soli and Amathus.<sup>35</sup>

The peace of Antalcidas (before the middle of 386) forced the Athenians to withdraw Chabrias with his squadron; the treaty expressly named Cyprus as an island subject to the Great King (Xen. *Hell.* v.1.31).

<sup>33</sup> Costa 1974 (F 231) 52–6. M. Yon and M. Sznycer announced in December 1991 a new Phoenician inscription from Citium, celebrating a victory of King Milkyaton over other Cypriots which may refer to the conflicts of the period.

<sup>34</sup> Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 103; Diod. xv.2.3–4; Bengtson, *SdA* nos. 234, 237.

<sup>35</sup> The coins of the 'Athenian king Demonicus', supposed to have been installed at Citium in 388 by Evagoras, have been shown to come from Lapethus by Schwabacher 1947 (F 328); see also Robinson 1948 (F 320) 45–7, 63–5; Masson and Sznycer 1972 (F 294) 100; Kraay 1976 (B 200) 302–3, 309.

But the King's Peace not only isolated Evagoras from his Athenian allies. It also released Persian forces to deal with the rebellious vassal ruler; and Diodorus (xiv.110.5) views the settlement precisely in this context.

For the moment, however, Evagoras' position was not impaired and the years after 386 marked the zenith of his career. The preoccupation of Persia with its Greek enemies had hitherto made possible his successes; Artaxerxes' decision to concentrate his forces against one of the areas of unrest, Egypt, gave him further respite. In secret understanding with a number of other disaffected dynasts, he built up large funds and assembled a considerable force said to have consisted of 90 triremes and 6,000 peltasts. This enabled him to extend his hegemony in Cyprus and beyond: in Phoenicia he conquered 'Tyre and some other cities' (Diod. xv.2.3; Isoc. *Evag.* 62; *Paneg.* 161). Evagoras seemed the undisputed master of the eastern Mediterranean and a threat to Persian naval power.

But a Persian expeditionary force, commanded by Orontes and Tiribazus, slowly assembled in western Asia Minor; its fleet was provided by the Greek cities under Persian rule. As in 498, Cilicia was chosen as a base of operations and the army ferried over to Cyprus from there. Evagoras, supplied with ships, grain and money by Achoris of Egypt, put up a gallant resistance on sea and land, but was defeated in a naval battle off Citium (Diod. xv.3-4). A long drawn out siege of Salamis followed, remarkable both for the courage and ingenuity of the defenders and for the discord between the Persian commanders. Despite successful intrigues (which led to the arrest of Tiribazus and the flight of the Persian naval commander Glos to Egypt) Evagoras had to come to terms in 380 or 379.<sup>36</sup> He was forced to give up all his conquests but retained the kingdom of Salamis, paying the customary tribute and acknowledging the suzerainty of Artaxerxes not 'as slave to master' (ὡς δούλος δεσπότῃ) but 'as king to king' (ὡς βασιλεὺς βασιλεῖ) (Diod. xv.8-9.3).

The final seven years of Evagoras' rule over a defeated and exhausted Salamis (Isoc. *Nic.* 31.33) are not known in any detail. He was murdered, together with his eldest son Pnytagoras, in 374/3 – the victim of a court scandal according to Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 103.12). Evagoras was fortunate in finding a first-class public relations manager immediately after his death: Isocrates' *Evagoras* glosses over the slightly unsavoury circumstances of his end but depicts him as the image of an ideal king, worthy to rule not only over Salamis but over all Asia. There is no doubt that Isocrates wrote not history but an *encomium*, full of rhetorical exaggerations. But even a more sober assessment of Evagoras' life has to concede his remarkable qualities as a ruler: a shrewd politician, a skilful

<sup>36</sup> See for the chronology Hill 1949 (F 267) 140; Swoboda 1907 (F 341) 825-6.



diplomatist with a wide experience of the machinery of Persian government, and a bold strategist.


His career, which made Cyprus for a few years almost autonomous, once more demonstrates two points. (1) The internal policies of Cyprus were dictated not by 'national' motives but by the interests of the individual kingdoms. Evagoras impartially subdued Greek and Phoenician dynasties: adapting himself to the changing situation, he fought with his Persian overlord or against him. Independence may have been his final aim; his monarchy would hardly have conformed to the political system of Greece. Not by chance Isocrates, foremost advocate of monarchy and severe critic of Athens, was to be his panegyrist. (2) Independence from Persia was to be realized only for short periods, by taking advantage of unstable political conditions and temporary weaknesses within the Achaemenid empire. But now, as before in the fifth century, Persian rule reasserted itself in the end.

The political schemes of Evagoras failed; Cyprus gained no permanent independence. But his impact on the history of the island should not be underrated. What has been termed rather loosely his 'cultural policy' (and what was mainly the attraction of his court) had a more lasting effect than his power politics. To credit Evagoras – who in many ways remained a pure despot – with creating an 'Attic-Salaminian culture' may be an exaggeration. But philhellene he certainly was. We may believe Isocrates that Evagoras made Salamis 'inferior to none of the cities of Greece' (*Evag.* 47); he was the first king in Cyprus to use the Greek alphabet – albeit still beside the traditional Syllabary on coins and inscriptions. Greek writers, musicians and artists lived at Salamis; the marble head of Hygieia in early Praxitelean style found at Salamis may well be the work of such a resident artist. An Attic colony now formed at Salamis, with its counterpart in the Salaminian merchants living at Athens.<sup>37</sup> This philhellenic attitude in art, letters and life style was to be continued by Evagoras' successor Nicocles. One may still ask whether this testifies to a 'Greek national consciousness' or whether it simply represents philhellene pretensions similar to that of the Great King and many of his satraps and vassal rulers, such as the Phoenician kings. Yet in the end it emphasized and accelerated the integration of Cyprus into the Greek culture of the fourth century.

#### IV. THE CITY STATES OF PHOENICIA

Herodotus, who visited the country in the middle of the fifth century, defined the Phoenicians of his time as living on the coast of Syria (*τῆς Συρίας οἰκέουσι τὰ παρὰ θάλασσαν*: VII.89.2). Now, as in earlier centu-

<sup>37</sup> Pouilloux 1975 (F 314) 118–19.



Map 8. Judah and Phoenicia.

ries, Phoenicia formed neither a geographical nor a political unit: it consisted of a string of cities on a narrow strip of the Syro-Palestinian coast, bordered by and interlocking with Syrians, Aramaeans, Hebrews and Philistines.<sup>38</sup> Connexions with the island of Cyprus off the Phoenician coast were long established – commercial, cultural, but also political. Citium had been colonized from Tyre and formal relations between the two cities seem to have existed as late as in the fourth century: a sarcophagus found at Citium bears the inscription of ‘Eshmounadon, son of Eshmounadon, minister (*skn*) of Tyre’, an official presumably accredited to the king of Citium.<sup>39</sup>

Phoenicia was divided politically into the city kingdoms of Sidon, Tyre, Byblus and Aradus. The history of Phoenicia is thus the history of these quasi-independent city states; but despite a number of obvious differences they share basic features of political organization, economy and civilization. These can be reconstructed only in the broadest outline, as the sources for the history of the Phoenician cities during the fifth and fourth centuries are very meagre and often conflicting. Fragmentary, often second- or third-hand, literary tradition is only very partially supplemented by inscriptions and coins. Archaeological evidence is unfortunately far less extensive than for the Bronze Age or the Hellenistic-Roman period. Thus our knowledge of the internal history of the cities, especially of their political and social systems, is severely limited; many problems remain unsolved.

Phoenicia was of special importance to Achaemenid Persia for two reasons. The country formed part of the land bridge connecting the empire’s western Asian dominions with the vital province of Egypt; the fleets of the Phoenician cities with their great naval experience, suitable harbours and ample supply of ship timber were indispensable in building up a Persian navy (as Herodotus rightly implies: 1.143). The naval strength of Achaemenid Persia rested largely on the Phoenician contingents which – as a rule commanded by their own kings – formed the backbone of the fleet. That ‘the whole navy was dependent on the Phoenicians’ (Hdt. III.19.3) may not be an actual saying of Cambyses, but certainly formulates a basic truth of Achaemenid warfare and strategy. Phoenician warships played a decisive role in the Persian wars (Hdt. V.108, 109, 112; VI.6, 41; Paus. I.15.3); Phoenician engineers proved to be more efficient and skilful than other units in constructing the bridge of boats across the Hellespont and in cutting the Athos canal (Hdt. VII.23).

The Phoenician contingents in the Persian fleet were usually provided by Sidon, Tyre, Aradus and Byblus. The Sidonian squadron was considered the most efficient in the fleet of 480 (Hdt. VII.96.1, 99.3) and

<sup>38</sup> For the approximate extent of Phoenicia during this period see Elayi 1982 (F 245).

<sup>39</sup> Masson and Sznycer 1972 (F 294) 69–75.

was in special favour with Xerxes. He reviewed his fleet at Abydus aboard a Sidonian vessel (Hdt. VII.100.2; also 128.2); during the council of war on the eve of the Battle of Salamis the commanders 'sat according to the rank assigned by the King to each; first the king of Sidon, then he of Tyre, then the others', and the king of Sidon was the first to give his opinion (Hdt. VIII.67.2 – 68.1). He must have been Tetramnestus who heads Herodotus' list of the most renowned naval commanders (VII.98).<sup>40</sup> The poor performance and subsequent execution, on Xerxes' orders, of a number of Phoenician crews at Salamis (Hdt. VIII.90; Diod. XI.18, 19.4) did not end the loyal service of Phoenician contingents in the Achaemenid fleet. They occur in most naval encounters of the fifth century, usually acquitting themselves bravely – helping, *inter alia*, to defend Cyprus from the Delian Confederacy or to destroy Athenian forces at Prosopitis (Thuc. I.110.4).<sup>41</sup> Conon's fleet in 396 was still reinforced by 80 Phoenician triremes, commanded by the Sidonian king (*Hell. Oxy.* IX (IV).2; Diod. XIV.79.8). In Evagoras' Cypriot War, however, the Persian navy had for the first time to fight without the experienced Phoenician detachments.

To respect existing political structures as long as they were compatible with Persian rule was a constant maxim of Achaemenid policy. But the strategic role of Phoenicia may explain why her cities – similar to the kingdoms of Cyprus – obviously enjoyed a very considerable degree of local autonomy. The Achaemenid conquest of Syria and Phoenicia after the fall of Babylon in 539 caused no fundamental changes in the traditional political system of the area, which consisted of a number of hereditary monarchies. Darius I, revising in c. 515/14 the administrative organization of the Persian empire, incorporated Phoenicia into the Fifth Satrapy, together with 'Syria, Palestine and Cyprus' (Hdt. III.91.1).<sup>42</sup> In contrast to Jerusalem or Samaria no local governors seem to have been installed in the Phoenician cities. The Phoenician kings, allowed to mint their own coins, were in many ways treated rather as allies than as subjects. Their position seems to have fitted the formula of Evagoras: vassals of the Great King not 'as slave to master' but 'as king to king' (Diod. XV.8.2–3).

The Great King recognized the Phoenician rulers only on certain conditions which restricted their autonomy: to remain loyal to the Persian interest in general, and to contribute their naval forces to the Achaemenid fleet. Control was exercised by the satrap and by periodic inspections of *otakoustai*. For a long time there are no records of disaffection or insurrection. Throughout the fifth and well into the

<sup>40</sup> The king of Sidon was, however, never 'admiral' of the Persian fleet; Hauben 1970 (F 264).

<sup>41</sup> M–L no. 34: fifteen Phoenician ships taken by the Samians in Egypt, 460–454 B.C.

<sup>42</sup> The organization of the Fifth Satrapy has been discussed by Elayi 1978 (F 242); see also CAH IV<sup>2</sup> 153–4.

fourth century the Phoenician kings proved again and again loyal to their overlord. Only from the time of the Revolt of the Satraps did a growing hostility against Persian rule make itself felt, culminating in the Phoenician revolt following the Egyptian campaign of 351/0.

The internal situation of Phoenicia under Persian rule resembled that prevailing amongst the Cypriot kingdoms of the time: local conflicts for the extension of political power and economic influence of the individual kingdoms, during which those cities able to do so seem to have enlisted the help of Persia. According to the literary sources Sidon, Tyre and Aradus were the most important Phoenician cities during these two centuries. This is confirmed by the distribution of the cities' coins<sup>43</sup> and by the archaeological evidence from those sites which have been excavated so far. Byblus also was a prosperous city with imposing public architecture, but its coins did not attain the same extensive circulation as those of the three first-named cities.

Political power corresponded with wealth and prosperity of the cities: Sidon, Tyre and Aradus obviously were the kingdoms able to consolidate and to extend their rule during this period. The Phoenician states were not 'city kingdoms' in the strict sense. They consisted of the city itself and of a territory of varying extent in the coastal plain, which comprised a number of townships and villages and supplied the agricultural products needed. In only a few cases Phoenician rule extended beyond the coastal range, as (probably) with the Aradian towns of Mariamme, Marsya and Raphanea.<sup>44</sup> These territories were often discontinuous – a characteristic feature of Phoenician political organization made feasible by the good sea communications: Sidon ruled Dor south of Tyre, but Crocodeilon and Ashkelon south of Dor were again controlled by Tyre.

Aradian territory included, beside the towns already mentioned, Antaradus, Amrit/Marathus, Simyra (still an independent city in Assyrian times), Carne and Enhydra. Tyre won control over the coast from Sarepta in the north to the southern slopes of Mt Carmel during the fifth century; its territory also included – as just mentioned – parts of the Philistine coast.<sup>45</sup> Sidon was rewarded by the Great King with new territories, either in the late sixth century or in the first half of the fifth century, according to the sarcophagus inscription of King Eshmunazar II: 'and the Lord of Kings gave us Dor and Jaffa, the fine corn lands in the plain of Sharon, for the great deeds I did' (*KAI* 14.18–20).<sup>46</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Elayi 1982 (F 245) fig. 3.

<sup>44</sup> Elayi 1982 (F 245); Teixidor 1980 (F 345). <sup>45</sup> [Scylax] (*GGM* 178).

<sup>46</sup> The date – and thus the motive – is disputed: Dunand 1975–6 (F 240) 494 puts Eshmunazar II at c. 535–520, a date supported by recent archaeological research (R. A. Stucky, personal communication); Huss 1977 (F 268) 139 – following Assmann 1963 (F 220), Galling 1963 (F 251) – in the early fifth century; Mullen 1974 (F 306) 28 gives 465–51. If Dor really paid tribute to Athens in 459–454 (*ATL* III 174–5, 260–1, 269), this last date would seem plausible. See also *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> 144.

The kingdoms jealously guarded their autonomy; it is characteristic that their naval contingents were usually commanded by their own leaders (Tetramnestus of Sidon, Mattam of Tyre and Marbalus of Aradus in 481/0: Hdt. VII.98). Some temporary alliances must have been formed, but none of these developed into a permanent confederation of the Phoenician cities – as is sometimes inferred from the one common action recorded of the three leading kingdoms: Sidon, Tyre and Aradus founded Tripolis in the early fourth century. The new city was divided into the three quarters ‘of the Aradians, of the Sidonians and of the Tyrians’, but was also meant to serve as a place where ‘the Phoenicians held their common council and deliberated on matters of supreme importance’ (Diod. XVI.41.1). Thus the cities, at least in the fourth century, met to discuss or to concert their policies; a permanent confederation, however, does not necessarily follow from such meetings.

None of the cities, on the other hand, was ever able to impose its hegemony upon the other kingdoms. Tyre had lost its leading role in Phoenicia in the course of the sixth century,<sup>47</sup> while Sidon during the fifth century attained a prominent position which lasted until the revolt against Persia. This was partly due to Sidon’s economic prominence, based on the rich alluvial soils of its territory and even more on its especially advantageous harbour. Sidonian trade, as demonstrated by coin finds, prospered in advance of Tyre and Aradus; in the fourth century ‘in wealth and other resources the city far excelled the other cities of Phoenicia’, being able to muster more than a hundred triremes and quinqueremes (Diod. XVI.44.6; also 41.4). The rich jewellery and other precious gifts found in the tomb of a Sidonian lady illustrate the enormous wealth of the city’s upper classes in this period.<sup>48</sup> In a way Sidon’s pre-eminence must have been enforced by serving – at least in times of war – as a meeting place of Persian officials and as a main garrison (Diod. XVI.41.2, 5). At the same time the special importance of the city and harbour for Persia may have made Achaemenid control over Sidon more strict than over the other cities. But our sources are insufficient to elucidate fully the complex relations between the Great King and his Sidonian vassal, and between the monarch and his Sidonian subjects.<sup>49</sup> Sidon’s leading role seems beyond doubt, yet there is no indication that it ever amounted to a hegemony over the other cities.

The political system of the Phoenician cities during the fifth and fourth centuries can only be reconstructed in its most basic lines. The

<sup>47</sup> Katzenstein 1979 (F 279).

<sup>48</sup> Parrot, Chebab and Moscati 1977 (F 310), 107–10.

<sup>49</sup> It may be significant in this context that only Sidon issued coins showing the Great King (in the fourth century). The attempt of Bondi 1974 (F 224) to demonstrate that the Sidonian kings had an especially ‘persophile’ policy rests on too slender evidence.

cities were ruled by hereditary kings, who dressed – as the relief of Yehawmilk shows – in Persian fashion. The surviving dynastic lists are, however, fragmentary and their chronology is still disputed.<sup>50</sup> It seems beyond doubt that the ruler wielded considerable powers; ladies of a dynasty could act as regents for minor sons, such as queen mother Amashtart for Eshmunazar II at Sidon (*KAI* 14). The record of Persian naval operations in the fifth and fourth centuries demonstrates that one of the chief functions of the king was to command the fleet (and most likely also the other forces) of the kingdom. Employment of mercenaries is recorded at least in the fourth century (Diod. xvi.41.4, 42.2); Phoenician defence of cities and siege warfare were of an advanced technical standard (Diod. xvii.41.4, 43.1; Arr. *Anab.* II.21.1–7).

Justice is praised as one of the king's virtues (*KAI* 10.9). But it remains uncertain whether the king acted, as at Carthage, as supreme judge (*šofet*). The king's political powers were traditionally combined with religious functions. Eshmunazar I (c. 479–470?) and Tabnit (c. 475–460?) of Sidon were 'priests of Ashtart' (*KAI* 13.1–2), King Ozbaal of Byblus (c. 350?) 'priest of Baalat' (*KAI* 11). Inscriptions demonstrate some of the religious activities of the kings. Eshmunazar II of Sidon (c. 465–451?) built or reconstructed sanctuaries for Ashtart, Eshmun and Baal (*KAI* 14, 15–18); Bodashtart of Sidon (c. 451–?) for Reshef and Eshmun (*KAI* 15, 16); Yehawmilk of Byblus (c. 450?) for Baalat, 'mistress of Byblus' (*KAI* 10.3–6).

The king's power was limited by the prerogatives of the Persian overlord and his satraps, but it seems not to have been shared – as is often assumed – with a 'council of elders'. The existence of such councils in pre-Persian times can hardly be inferred from the treaty between Asarhaddon and Baal of Tyre<sup>51</sup> or from a sixth-century reference of Ezekiel to Tyre (27:9). For the fifth and fourth centuries there is no proof at all of such an institution. The 100 prominent citizens King Tennes of Sidon took with him as advisers (Diod. xvi.45.1) and the *presbeis* of Tyre who pleaded with Alexander (Arr. *Anab.* II.15.6–7) were not constitutional bodies with an authority independent from the king, but ad hoc delegations formed in an emergency.<sup>52</sup> But those two episodes indicate that the opinion of the subjects could at times differ from the king's policy and had to be taken into account. There is hardly any doubt that the rich merchant families which formed the upper classes in the Phoenician cities (Diod. xvi.41.4, 45.6) played an important part in forming and expressing such public dissent.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>50</sup> For the reconstruction of the Sidonian king-list, see now Mullen 1974 (F 306) and Peckham 1968 (F 311) 72–6; for the fragmentary dates of the Byblus dynasty: Dunand 1965 (F 235) 35; *KAI* II 10–15; Jidejian 1968 (F 269) 211–12; Moscati 1979 (F 303) 63.

<sup>51</sup> Borger 1956 (F 80) 69, Rs. III 7. <sup>52</sup> Bondi 1974 (F 224) 158–60.

<sup>53</sup> There is no conclusive evidence (despite Elayi 1981 (F 244)) for placing the often-discussed slave revolt at Tyre in such a fourth-century context.

The cities of Phoenicia benefited from Persian rule. Favoured by the Great King and profiting from peaceful conditions and good communications in the empire, their prosperity increased despite the loss of Carthage and other colonies in the West. As in earlier centuries, Phoenicia exported cedar and other hardwoods of the Lebanon; Tyrian purple; fine garments of Byblus, Tyre and Berytus; glass, faience, metalwork and salt. Phoenician shipyards were renowned for their products. At the same time the cities profited greatly from their position at the end of the caravan trade routes leading from the East through the Achaemenid empire: from their harbours the goods were shipped all over the Mediterranean. Phoenician traders were active at Ezion-Geber, a Red Sea post on the road of incense and spices;<sup>54</sup> a Tyrian trading colony, comprising a temple of 'Aphrodite the Stranger', was established at Memphis (Hdt. II.112.2).

Phoenicia was not only situated in the best position for trade; it formed at the same time – in a way similar to Cyprus – the crossroads of peoples and civilization. Thus in Phoenician culture now as in earlier periods foreign influences mingle with strong indigenous traditions of life and art. The luxurious courts of the kings, attracting foreign products and artists, must have promoted such exchanges to a considerable degree. Egyptian influence had been very marked from the ninth to the seventh century. During the sixth century impulses of Neo-Babylonian and Achaemenid art and architecture made themselves felt, without entirely suppressing Egyptian traditions, which are to be observed as an undercurrent until the Roman period. From the fifth century onwards the impact of Greek art slowly increased – both through Cyprus as an intermediary (as demonstrated by the import of Archaic Cypriot sculpture in the late sixth century) and through direct contacts with the Greek world.

In the monumental Phoenician architecture of the period Persian influence is dominant. The remains of a fifth-century palace at Sidon, marble capitals with bull protomai and column bases, are clearly inspired by the Achaemenid style of Persepolis and Susa, but are more vivid and naturalistic in execution. Despite Diodorus' reference to a royal park, *basilikos paradeisos*, at Sidon (xvi.41.5) it is still uncertain whether these remains belong to a palace of the Phoenician king or to the *apadana* of the Persian satrap. Achaemenid in style are also the fifth-century fortifications at Byblus. The defences of the coastal cities were a constant preoccupation of the Achaemenid kings and a common interest of both Phoenicians and Persians.<sup>55</sup> Remains of the strong walls of Aradus still survive; the enormous walls of fourth-century Tyre are described by Arrian (*Anab.* II.21.4).

<sup>54</sup> Glueck 1971 (F 258).

<sup>55</sup> Dunand 1968 (F 236) and 1969 (F 237).



Sanctuaries were still built in traditional form: a fairly small holy of holies enclosed by an open walled *temenos*, which sometimes contained an artificial lake as at Amrit/Marathus.<sup>56</sup> In the main cities, however, monumental temples were built or reconstructed in a different style. At Byblus a sanctuary of rectangular plan with two rows of pillars rose on an extensive podium, reminiscent of the podium of the reconstructed temple of Jerusalem:<sup>57</sup> most likely the temple of Baalat-Gebel, the 'mistress of Byblus', of King Yehawmilk's inscription (*KAI* 10). At Sidon King Eshmunazar II had reconstructed 'near the spring of Ydlal, in the mountains' (*KAI* 14.17) the temple of Eshmun. The podium of this temple, comparable to that of Pasargadae, the ashlar style of the masonry, and four marble bull protomai clearly demonstrate Persian inspiration. Some fragments of marble columns, Ionian capitals and palmetted cornices seem to be the work of Greek masons, but this is nothing foreign to the eclecticism of Achaemenid architecture. The Greek impact becomes definite only with the addition of a choreographic tribune (by King Bodashtart: *KAI* 16?); its rich sculptural decoration clearly adapts Attic models of the fourth century. Yet the early fourth-century marble votive statuettes of 'temple boys', found in the temple, still demonstrate elements of Cypro-Phoenician tradition.

In the Phoenician religion of the time a corresponding development is to be observed. The strong hold of traditional deities on Phoenician society is obvious. Sidon worships Ashtart, the Phoenician goddess of fertility, love and also war, as 'our lady'; the protective god of the city is the 'holy prince' Eshmun, the only god also venerated as a healing god in the Near East (and as such likened to Asklepios). The great god of Tyre was of old Melqart, the 'ruler of the city'; Baalat, the 'mistress', remained the goddess of Byblus. On the stela dedicated by King Yehawmilk she is characteristically represented in the form of the Egyptian Hathor-Isis.<sup>58</sup> But if the religion of the Phoenicians shows a strong persistence of ancestral gods, it exhibits at the same time a marked ability to adapt elements of foreign cults. Egyptian influence here gradually gave way to Greek cult names, cult objects and votive gifts.

Burial customs follow a similar trend. In contrast to the Persian models adapted in the architecture of the sixth and fifth centuries, the mummification of the dead and the forms of sepulchral art show dominating Egyptian influence. The anthropoid sarcophagi, in which the royal families and the rich were buried during the fifth and fourth centuries, are of special interest in this respect. The earlier sarcophagi of

<sup>56</sup> Egyptian influence in plan and construction is obvious here; the sanctuary is dated to the hellenistic period by Lézine 1961 (F 283), in contrast to Dunand 1946/48 (F 233) 106–7.

<sup>57</sup> Dunand 1954 (F 234) 26–41 and 1969 (F 237).

<sup>58</sup> There is no proof for a 'triad of divinities' at Byblus: Szynger 1981 (F 342) 252.

this group were either imported from Egypt – as the black basalt coffin of Eshmunazar II with the king's portrait and inscription on the lid – or modelled closely on Egyptian prototypes. From the first half of the fifth century onwards the Sidonian ateliers were famous for their anthropoid marble sarcophagi which blend Egyptian and Greek elements in a way highly characteristic of Phoenician art. Egyptian traditions still survive in this local industry – sometimes in a surprising form when a head of pure Greek style displays an Egyptian plaited beard. But the influence of Classical Greek models, imitated by Phoenician craftsmen with great finesse, becomes more and more apparent especially in the treatment of the sculptured head on the lid. From the beginning of the fourth century Greek inspiration dominates Phoenician sepulchral art, as the famous relief sarcophagi from the royal necropolis of Sidon demonstrate. The sarcophagi of 'the Lycian' (c. 400), 'the Satrap' (c. 380/70), 'the Weepers' (c. 365/55), and the 'Alexander sarcophagus' (c. 333) are truly representative examples of Greek funeral art at its best.<sup>59</sup> The impact of Greek civilization, as reflected in sepulchral art, is also demonstrated by the steadily growing import of Attic pottery which penetrates from the coastal cities into Galilee, Samaria and even Judaea.<sup>60</sup>

Evagoras of Salamis had occupied Tyre and possibly some other Phoenician cities around 385 (above, p. 316). There is no further information about his operations but it is certain that his rule over parts of Phoenicia ended with the Cypriot War. After 379 all the traditional local dynasties were re-installed both in Phoenicia and in Cyprus; the state of political fragmentation which seemed most effectively to guarantee Persian control was thus restored. Conditions in both areas were similar, and so were the effects of the situation: insurrection against Persia – this time of Cypriots and Phoenicians alike.

#### V. CYPRUS AND PHOENICIA: FROM THE CYPRIOT WAR TO THE PEACE OF 311 B.C.

With the end of the Cypriot War Phoenicia and Cyprus reverted to their own affairs. The traditional divergence of interests between the local kingdoms must have persisted in both areas and influenced their politics. But we have scarcely any information about actual conflicts. A state of tension between Salamis and the other Cypriot cities (Isoc. *Nic.* 33) was nothing but the natural aftermath of Evagoras' policy. The destruction

<sup>59</sup> See for the dating now Gabelmann 1979 (F 249); in general Kukahn 1955 (F 280); Fleischer 1983 (F 248). It is still questionable which Sidonian kings were buried in these sarcophagi (see now Gabelmann 1982 (F 250)) as the chronology of the kings is only provisionally established: Mullen 1974 (F 306) 28. Generally on Greek influences in Phoenicia: Stucky 1983 (F 335) and 1984 (F 336).

<sup>60</sup> See Stern 1982 (F 397) 136–41, 283–6.

of the palace of Vouni in the early fourth century may as well have resulted from Evagoras' actions in the nineties as from a violent settling of old scores between Marium and Soli.<sup>61</sup>

The only major change in the political system of Cyprus we know of was the further expansion of the kingdom of Citium-Idalium, this time by peaceful methods. The bankrupt ruler of Tamassus, Pasicyprus, sold his kingdom for 50 talents to Pumiathon of Citium around 350; he then retired to live as a private citizen at Amathus. Pumiathon henceforth styled himself 'king of Citium, Idalium and Tamassus'.<sup>62</sup> Thus by the middle of the fourth century the eleven kingdoms of Cyprus were reduced to nine (Diod. xvi.42.4): Salamis, Citium, Paphos, Curium, Amathus, Marium, Soli, Lapethus and Ceryneia.

Citium must have gained in political and economic power by acquiring Tamassus with its copper mines. But Salamis still seems to have retained its position as the most important city in the island. The kingdom was ruled from 374/3 onwards by Nicocles, the second son of Evagoras.<sup>63</sup> Nicocles' claim to fame mainly rests on his close relation with Isocrates whose disciple he may have been for a time. For which of the three Cypriot pamphlets dedicated to the king the author received 20 talents ([Plut.], *Mor.* 838A) remains uncertain. But there is no doubt that these three orations were instrumental in propagating the idea of monarchy. The *Nicocles* couples severe criticism of democracy with very outspoken defence of monarchy as a political system. The tenets of *Ad Nicoclem* were understood as guiding principles for the conduct of the 'good prince' and strongly influenced later writings on that subject, such as the treatise of the Byzantine author Agapetus.<sup>64</sup>

The impact of Isocrates' writings on the kings of his time is hard to gauge. One doubts whether Nicocles himself heeded the author's concept of rulership as a serious responsibility with the task 'to relieve the state from any distress, to maintain its prosperity and to enlarge it' (*Isoc. Nic.* 9), or his sensible advice 'to be a slave to no pleasure but rule over your desires even more firmly than over your people' (*Nic.* 29). It seems equally possible that he only used high-sounding principles to represent despotic government as a lawful, enlightened monarchy.

<sup>61</sup> Maier 1985 (F 285) 36–7.

<sup>62</sup> Duris *FGH* 76 F 4. He does not mention Pasicyprus's kingdom, but the inscriptions of Pumiathon of Citium show that it was Tamassus; in his 8th year he rules Citium and Idalium only (*CIS* 192), but in his 21st year Citium, Idalium and Tamassus (*KAI* no. 32). In his 37th year – after Alexander had transferred Tamassus to Pnytagoras of Salamis (see below, p. 333) – he is reduced again to Citium and Idalium (*KAI* no. 33). The exact dates remain uncertain, as the conventional date for Pumiathon's accession, 361, is no more than probable. Diod. xvi.42.4 seems to imply that Tamassus was sold before the revolt against Persia.

<sup>63</sup> Diod. xv.47.8 (Nicocles the eunuch who had Evagoras assassinated) is an obvious error.

<sup>64</sup> F. Dvornik, *Early Christian and Byzantine Political Philosophy* (Washington, DC, 1966) I 200–3, II 712–14. See also *CAH* vii<sup>2</sup>.1, 75–7.

How far Isocrates' description of the situation at Salamis and of Nicocles' ruling methods generally depicts reality, or how far it is only an exercise in irony, is impossible to decide. The portrait of the king is certainly as strongly biased as that of his father Evagoras. Had Nicocles been such a model of virtue and justice, he could hardly have been described by contemporary historians as a tyrant living in extreme luxury and dissolution, vying in his excesses with the Sidonian King Straton (Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 114; Anaximenes *FGrH* 72 F 18). This image of the oriental despot again may partly be a cliché: the true character of Nicocles remains difficult to assess.

The Salaminian monarch and Straton I of Sidon (c. 375/4–361) obviously had more in common than a taste for debauchery and a predilection for Greek musicians, dancers and courtesans (Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 114). Nicocles patronized Greek literature and art, like his father. Straton I (his hellenized name: on his coins he appears as Abdashtart) was called 'Philellēn' – with good reason, as the arts and crafts of Sidon during this period demonstrate. An Athenian decree of about 364 exempts from taxes Sidonian merchants and honours Straton I as *proxenos* (IG II<sup>2</sup> 141).<sup>65</sup> Whether this testifies only to close commercial relations between the Phoenician metropolis and Athens or whether it possibly implies a political understanding, remains uncertain.

But it seems not impossible that opposition to Persia formed another bond between Nicocles of Salamis and Straton I of Sidon. Unfortunately we lack precise information about the relations of the Cypriot and Phoenician vassal kingdoms and their overlord at this time. But a growing hostility against Achaemenid rule, notably in Phoenicia, is to be inferred from subsequent events. Such a change of political attitude obviously resulted from an interaction of the increasing prosperity of the Phoenician cities and the harsher ruling methods adopted by the Achaemenid empire as it became more unstable.

Straton I was involved, with the help of Egyptian troops and possibly on the instigation of the Pharaoh Tachos, in the main phase of the Satraps' Revolt, c. 362–360.<sup>66</sup> The king died during the revolt, reputedly getting himself stabbed by his wife (Hieron. *adv. Jovin.* 1. 45). Nicocles also met with 'a violent death' in prison about this time (Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 114; Maximus Tyr. *Diss.* II. 14): thus it seems not impossible that he was in some way involved too.

The Satraps' Revolt turned out to be a portent of things to come as far as Cyprus and Phoenicia were concerned. When Artaxerxes III Ochus succeeded in 359/8 he was determined to restore the Great King's rule over the territories in revolt. But disaffection had spread wide in the Persian empire and for several years Artaxerxes' measures met with

<sup>65</sup> Moysey 1976 (F 305).

<sup>66</sup> Diod. xv.90.3, 92.3–4. See p. 84.

limited success only. In 351/0 Persian forces began an attack on Egypt, the main area of revolt. The Phoenicians, at some later time, followed the example of the Egyptians: on the instigation of the Sidonians they formed an alliance against Persia, concluded a treaty with the pharaoh Nectanebus and prepared for war (Diod. xvi.40.3–41.4). Diodorus tries to explain the reasons for the rising: ‘the King’s satraps and generals dwelt in the city of the Sidonians and behaved in an outrageous and high-handed fashion towards the Sidonians in ordering things to be done; the victims of this treatment, aggrieved by their insolence, decided to revolt from the Persians’ (xvi.41.2). This seems to be a correct assessment of the actual situation. The spirit of revolt had been fostered to no small extent by the billeting and provisioning in Phoenicia of troops destined for the Egyptian campaign.

The signal for the rising of Phoenicia was the destruction of the *basilikos paradeisos* at Sidon, combined with the burning of the fodder stored for the Persian cavalry and the arrest of the leading Persians (Diod. xvi.41.5). The Cypriots followed suit: the kings of the island ‘in common agreement and in imitation of the Phoenicians revolted, and having made preparations for the war, declared their own kingdoms independent’ (Diod. xvi.42.5).<sup>67</sup> At Salamis Nicocles had been succeeded about 360 by his son (or brother) Evagoras II who advocated a pro-Persian policy; he was dethroned and in turn succeeded by Pnytagoras. Both Cyprus and Phoenicia were rarely nearer to achieving unity of political purpose than during this short period.

Events developed in a pattern similar to the strategy adopted by Persia during the Cypriot War. As Artaxerxes’ forces were fully engaged in Egypt and Phoenicia, Cyprus was for the moment being left to its own devices. In Phoenicia the revolt was led by King Tennes of Sidon who in the end betrayed his city, only to be executed himself by order of Artaxerxes.<sup>68</sup> The Great King crushed the rebellion in a merciless way. Sidon was destroyed by fire and (according to Diodorus) 40,000 of its inhabitants perished; ‘the rest of the cities, panic-stricken, went over to the Persians’ (Diod. xvi.45.4–6). Straton II succeeded Tennes as king of Sidon; the destruction of his city cannot have been as thorough as suggested by Diodorus, because only twenty years later Sidon is described as an important city with a considerable fleet.<sup>69</sup>

The task of recovering Cyprus was, as in Evagoras’ war, entrusted to the satrap of Caria – Idrieus, the son of Hecatomnus (351/0–344/3).

<sup>67</sup> The exact chronology of the Phoenician and Cypriot revolts is somewhat hazy, but the relative sequence of events seems clear. For the chronology of Diod. xvi.40ff in general see Sordi 1959 (F 59A); Cawkwell 1962 (C 105).

<sup>68</sup> For a fuller account of the Phoenician campaign see *CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> 145–6; also Barag 1966 (F 221).

<sup>69</sup> *Arr. Anab.* II.20. Kahrstedt 1926 (F 272) 39 suggested that after 351 Tyre took over some Sidonian territories in the south.

Operations did not begin before 346 and ended presumably in 344/3.<sup>70</sup> Ironically, the force of forty triremes and 8,000 Greek mercenaries was now commanded by the Athenian Phocion, accompanied by Evagoras II bent on recovering his throne at Salamis. The Cypriot cities were reduced with comparable ease. Only Salamis under King Pnytagoras had to be invested from land and sea, while the mercenaries pillaged the island (Diod. xvi.42.6–9, 46.1). After a long-drawn, skilful defence Pnytagoras surrendered of his own will and was allowed to remain king of Salamis. Evagoras II, contrary to his plans, was not reinstated but given ‘another and higher command in Asia’: coin evidence seems to suggest the kingdom of Sidon. His misgovernment there lasted a few years only (c. 344/3–342/1?); he had to flee to Cyprus and was executed there (Diod. xvi.46.2–3). Sidon was again ruled – *Darei opibus adiutum* – by the local king Straton II (Curt. iv.1.16).

Persia had for a last time reasserted her rule in Phoenicia and Cyprus. Again it is obvious that neither ‘national’ motives nor solidarity between Achaemenid vassals were dominant factors in the politics of the time: a Carian dynast and an Athenian general combined to enforce impartially the submission of the Greek and Phoenician kingdoms of Cyprus. Artaxerxes was free now to concentrate his forces against Egypt and to crush the revolt there finally in 343/2. Persia seemed to have recovered her strength once more. Yet after the short span of a decade Alexander’s campaigns put an end not only to the Achaemenid empire but also to the old-established kingdoms of Cyprus and Phoenicia.

The highly skilled Cypriot and Phoenician contingents operated for a last time with the Achaemenid navy in 333. Their presence may have prompted Alexander not to engage the Persian fleet at Miletus (Arr. *Anab.* i.18.7) – the more so as Cypriots and Phoenicians now had in commission true quinqueremes, the most decisive innovation in sea warfare before the adoption of the naval gun.<sup>71</sup> When Alexander’s army began its march into Phoenicia after the battle of Issus, the fleets of Tyre, Sidon, Byblus and Aradus still sailed with the Persians under Autophradates (Arr. *Anab.* ii.20.1–2). Cypriot and Phoenician ships formed part of the fleet of Amyntas heading for Egypt (Arr. *Anab.* ii.13.2–3; Diod. xvii.48.1–2).

With Alexander’s advance into Phoenicia things began to change. Aradus, then Byblus and Sidon, surrendered without a fight: ‘the Sidonians who loathed Persia and Darius called him in themselves’ (Arr. *Anab.* ii.13.7–8, 15.6; Curt. iv.1.15–16). The feeling created by the

<sup>70</sup> For the chronological problems see Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 41–5. It does not follow, however, from Diod. xvi.42.6ff that Cyprus was recovered before Phoenicia; for military reasons this seems rather unlikely.

<sup>71</sup> Tarn 1930 (κ 57) 129–32; Morrison and Williams 1968 (κ 48) 183, 235, 249.

abortive revolt of 346; the shock of the Persian defeat; the absence of the kings, except for Straton II of Sidon, with the fleet (Arr. *Anab.* II.15.7, 20.1): all this may have contributed to these easy surrenders. Alexander's strategy to neutralize the Persian fleet by depriving it of its bases seemed successful beyond hope. Tyre, however, probably strengthened in its attitude by an embassy from Carthage and apparently not convinced of a final Persian defeat, was not prepared to yield its autonomy. The city offered a formal submission but refused to admit a Macedonian garrison (Arr. *Anab.* II.15.6–16.8).

Alexander, believing it imperative to secure his sea communications with Greece, considered it too great a risk to advance further in pursuit of Darius with a hostile Tyre at his rear. Thus lengthy and complicated siege operations began, described in great detail by Arrian (*Anab.* II.18–24) and Diodorus (xvii.40.2–46). The strength of the Tyrian position is neatly summed up by Arrian: 'the siege of Tyre obviously was a difficult proposition. The city was an island, strengthened with high walls on all sides; all operations from the sea were in Tyre's favour, as the Persians still controlled the sea and the Tyrians still had many ships left' (II.18.1–2). Thus it must have been a most welcome surprise for Alexander (who had secured already the assistance of the Phoenician naval forces except for those of Tyre) when the kings of Cyprus sailed into the harbour of Sidon with 120 warships, voluntarily shifting their allegiance to Macedonia (Arr. *Anab.* II.20.3; Plut. *Alex.* 24.2).

The eventual success of the seven months' siege – one of the great siege operations in history – was in no small measure due to Phoenician and Cypriot assistance. The Tyrians, like all Phoenicians, were accomplished masters of defence under siege. Alexander, on the other hand, employed engineers 'from Cyprus and all Phoenicia' (Arr. *Anab.* II.21.1) to construct a mole on which to attack the island city and to drive home his assault with the most advanced siege techniques. At the same time he proceeded to blockade Tyre from the sea, combining the Cypriot and Phoenician squadrons. The Cypriot quinqueremes posted at the north wing suffered severe losses when the Tyrians made an unexpected and well-disguised sally – destroying, *inter alia*, the ships of Pnytagoras of Salamis, Androcles of Amathus, and Pasicrates of Curium.

With the fall of Tyre in July or August 332 the history of the semi-autonomous kingdoms of Phoenicia ends – even if the kings retained their thrones for the time being, except for the Persophile Straton II of Sidon whom Hephaestion replaced by Abdalonim (Diod. xvii.46.6–47; Curt. IV.1.15–26). Alexander's administrative arrangements in Syria and Phoenicia, an area of great strategic value which formed the centre of his communications, are difficult to reconstruct.<sup>72</sup> In December 331, control

<sup>72</sup> Bosworth 1974 (F 225).

over the entire area seems to have been concentrated in the hands of Menes of Pella, appointed 'hyparchos [satrap] of Syria, Phoenicia and Cilicia' (Arr. *Anab.* III.16.9; Diod. XVII.64.5). There are no further records about Syria and Phoenicia until Alexander's death in June 323. In the settlement of Babylon, Cilicia and Syria (including Phoenicia) were made separate commands, obviously for military reasons: Syria was given to Laomedon (Arr. *Diad.* I.5). From a group of vassal states governed by local rulers Phoenicia now was definitely reduced to the status of a mere province.

The Cypriot kings' well-considered and timely move after Issus, on the other hand, gave their monarchies another lease of semi-autonomous life. Persian rule had ended after 200 years, but the status of the kings with their local autonomy remained – except for the abolition of the tribute – largely the same as under the Achaemenids, either because Alexander wanted to acknowledge the kings' services or because the island was of less strategic importance than Phoenicia. It seems significant, however, that the kings' traditional right to mint their own coins was curbed; the mints of Salamis, Citium and (to a lesser extent) Paphos now issued Alexander's imperial coinage.<sup>73</sup>

Cypriot and Phoenician cities had, as before, to contribute their contingents to the fleet. Their experienced shipyards were kept busy constructing new quinqueremes (Arr. *Anab.* VII.19.3–4). A hundred Cypriot and Phoenician ships were requested when a naval force under Amphoterus was sent against Sparta in the summer of 331 (Arr. *Anab.* III.6.3). Nearchus employed Phoenician and Cypriot crews and specialists in his Indus expedition; two of his trierarchs were Cypriot princes – Nicocles, son of Pasicrates of Soli, and Nithaphon, son of Pnytagoras of Salamis (Arr. *Anab.* VI.1.6; *Indike* 18.8). Hieron of Soli (but he may have come from Cilician Soli) was ordered to circumnavigate Arabia and reached the mouth of the Persian Gulf (Arr. *Anab.* VII.20.7–8).

The Cypriot rulers attended the magnificent victory celebrations staged by Alexander on his return from Egypt in the spring of 331, Nicocreon of Salamis, the successor of Pnytagoras, and Pasicrates of Soli competing as *choregoi* (Plut. *Alex.* 29.1). Alexander's entourage included a number of noble Cypriots such as the trierarch Nicocles. One of these, Strasanor of Soli, was appointed governor of Areia and Drangiane in 329, of Bactria and Sogdiana in 321 (Diod. XVIII.3.3). It seems not unlikely that these Cypriot *hetairoi* were both hostages and representatives of their kingdoms at the centre of power.

In the island the contest for the leading position between Salamis and

<sup>73</sup> The issue of superb gold coins by Milkyathon and Pumiathon of Citium (Kraay 1976 (F 200) 307) does not warrant Tarn's assumption (*CAH* VI<sup>1</sup> 432) that the Cypriot kings were treated as 'free allies', the Phoenicians as 'subject allies'.



Citium continued, the rivals as usual trying to gain the overlords' support for their own interests. This became apparent immediately when Alexander rewarded the kings who had succoured him at Tyre (Curtius IV.8.14). Pnytagoras of Salamis, who seems to have led the move, asked for and received Tamassus (Duris *FGrH* 76 F 4). This city with its copper-mining district was as valuable an acquisition for Salamis as it was a severe loss to Citium which had bought Tamassus but twenty years before. There is no reliable clue as to the reasons for Citium's fall from favour;<sup>74</sup> nor are any other inferences of this kind recorded in the time of Alexander. But the history of Cyprus during these years is at least as obscure as during the preceding decades.

The death of Alexander and the ensuing contest for supreme power was bound to involve Cyprus. If the Alexander coins of Nicocles of Paphos, inscribed with his own name in almost illegible miniature signs, were indeed issued immediately after 323, they may indicate a brief moment's hope of greater independence.<sup>75</sup> But the island was strategically the key to the eastern Mediterranean. Its ships, shipyards and ship timber were of utmost importance to all contenders, as were the coastal cities of Phoenicia.

Ptolemy, destined to annex Cyprus in the end, moved first – not least in order to secure the ship timber which Egypt did not provide. In 321 he won four Cypriot kings as allies against Perdiccas: Nicocreon of Salamis, Nicocles of Paphos, Pasocrates of Soli, and Androcles of Amathus. Other cities obviously refused an alliance, as Ptolemy dispatched a fleet of about 200 ships to besiege a city in Cyprus, while Perdiccas sent a force of 800 foot and 500 horse to its relief. Our information is so scanty (Arr. *Diad.* 24.15–28) that it is neither possible to locate the city nor to reconstruct subsequent military operations in the island. We only know that Antigonus Monophthalmus came from Cyprus to attend the conference of Trisparadisus late in 321 (Arr. *Diad.* 1.30) and that Eumenes later recruited forces in southern Asia Minor, Syria, Phoenicia and 'in the cities of Cyprus' (Diod. xviii.61.4).

Antigonus, strongest of the pretenders after the execution of Eumenes in 316, faced a military coalition of Ptolemy, Lysimachus and Cassander in 315 (Diod. xix.57.2). Perceiving clearly that the want of a fleet was one of his main weaknesses, Antigonus summoned the kings of Phoenicia to 'old Tyre' (the mainland suburb of the city) and inaugurated an extensive ship building programme in the yards of Tripolis,

<sup>74</sup> Pumiathon of Citium issued no coins between 332/1 and 323/2, but obviously remained 'king of Citium and Idalium', as an inscription of his 37th year (326/5?) shows (*KAI* no. 33).

<sup>75</sup> May 1952 (F 295). The attempt of Gesche 1974 (F 253) 113–19 to date these coins to 310/9 is subtle but not convincing. Nicocles also repaired for a last time the walls of Paphos: Maier and Karageorghis 1984 (F 288) 222.

Byblus and Sidon. His control of Phoenicia was, however, not complete: he had to take Jaffa and Gaza by storm and to besiege Tyre which only capitulated after a long fight in 314 (Diod. XIX.58–59.3, 61.5).

Parallel to securing Phoenicia and its naval resources Antigonos in 315 tried to get a hold on Cyprus by means of diplomacy. His envoy Agesilaus was able to conclude alliances with Pumiathon of Citium,<sup>76</sup> Praxippus of Lapethus, Stasioecus II of Marium, and the king of Ceryneia (Themison, to whom Aristotle dedicated his *Protreptikos*?); but he had to report that Ptolemy's allies stood firm (Diod. XIX.57.4, 59.1). Ptolemy, who had already sent 3,000 soldiers to Cyprus, reacted immediately and despatched a strong force of 100 ships and 10,000 men to the island, commanded by his brother Menelaus. This force encountered Seleucus, who had arrived from the Aegean with a fleet, but the leaders came to an understanding. A large part of their troops were detailed to the Peloponnese and to Caria; Menelaus and Seleucus, supported by Nicocreon and the other allied kings, proceeded to subdue those cities which sided with Antigonos. Ceryneia and Lapethus were taken after an apparently brief investment; Marium and Amathus came over without fighting; Citium, however, had to be reduced by a systematic siege (Diod. XIX.62.1–6).

Yet these successful military operations obviously did not ensure the loyalty of the former allies of Antigonos. In 312 Ptolemy, having crushed the insurrection of Cyrene, crossed in person to Cyprus to settle the affairs of the island. Harsh measures were adopted. Praxippus of Lapethus and the ruler of Cerynia, suspected of treachery, were arrested. Pumiathon of Citium, who had been found in contact with Antigonos, was executed; the temple of the city god Melqart-Heracles was destroyed, presumably also that of Ashtart.<sup>77</sup> Stasioecus of Marium was deposed or executed, his city destroyed, the population removed to Paphos – probably to the harbour town of Nea Paphos founded during these years by King Nicocles of Paphos. Unfortunately it is impossible to prove whether the fragment of an oath, found recently at Paphos and mentioning the king several times, is in some way connected with these events.<sup>78</sup> Nicocreon of Salamis was appointed *strategos* in Cyprus, receiving the cities and revenues of the deposed kings (Diod. XIX.79.4–5).

Whether Ptolemy regarded these arrangements as workable and durable we do not know. As his brother Menelaus also retained the title of *strategos* and commanded the troops in the island (Diod. XX.21.1), friction was bound to develop. Nor was Antigonos to accept the loss of

<sup>76</sup> Still referred to as 'king of Citium and Idalium' in an inscription of 320/19 (Karageorghis and Guzzo Amadasi 1973 (F 277) A 30). <sup>77</sup> Karageorghis 1976 (F 275) 116, 171–2.

<sup>78</sup> Masson and Mitford 1986 (F 293) no. 237.

Cyprus. In the event Ptolemy's dispositions lasted only for a very short time – in the same way as the treaty of 311 between Antigonos, Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy (Diod. XIX.105.1–4) proved to be nothing but an uneasy truce.

During the fourth century the kingdoms of Cyprus and Phoenicia for brief moments had hoped to gain greater, if not complete, political independence. But the change from Persia to Alexander resulted – in contrast to what some Greek cities may have expected – merely in a reduction of autonomy. The rule of the Successors finally abolished the traditional political system in both areas, although the end of the old dynasties was not everywhere as dramatic as at Salamis (Diod. XX.21.1–3).<sup>79</sup> Cyprus and Phoenicia became mere provinces of a hellenistic monarchy.

But Cypriots and Phoenicians were not only politically integrated into the hellenistic world. The influence of Greek art and civilization now became paramount. In the later part of the fourth century the lively economic and cultural exchanges between Greece and the Levant continued, hardly hampered by the military operations. The steady flow of Attic pottery, terracotta statuettes and other Greek imports did not diminish.<sup>80</sup> The products of the sarcophagus ateliers of Sidon demonstrate that the Phoenicians even surpassed the Cypriots in the masterly adaptation of Late Classical Greek art.

There are additional proofs for a close connexion with Greece. At Athens the Salaminian trading colony still flourished; in the later fourth century it formed a cult community venerating Aphrodite and Adonis.<sup>81</sup> King Pnytagoras, whose coins depict Athena and Artemis, was honoured at Delos as *proxenos* and dedicated a gold crown there; so did King Androcles of Amathus between 315 and 310.<sup>82</sup> The Citian merchant community at Athens obtained in 333/2 the right to build a temple of Aphrodite.<sup>83</sup> Sidonians formed another Phoenician trading colony at Athens, accorded tax privileges in the middle of the fourth century (above, p. 328). The *hieronautai* of Tyre at about the same time

<sup>79</sup> The end of Nicocreon and his family is still enigmatic; see Karageorghis 1969 (F 273) 151–64; Kyrris 1985 (F 281).

<sup>80</sup> See above n. 20.

<sup>81</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 1290; Pouilloux 1975 (F 314) 119–20.

<sup>82</sup> Pnytagoras: *Inscr. de Délos* 1409 Ba II 113–114, 1429 A I 78, 1441 A I 98–99, 1450 A 63; IG XI 2, 161 B 88–9. Androcles: IG XI 2. 135, 39–41; cf. SEG xxx 1571 = CEG 872. A list of *theorodokoi* from Nemea (Miller 1988 (B 159) = SEG xxxvi 31), dated 323/2 by its editor, includes Nicocreon and Teucer from Salamis, Pasicrates and Themistagoras from Curium, and Stasicrates from Soli (who may be identical with the Pasicrates mentioned by Plutarch; see Hill 1949 (F 267) 150 n. 5; Stylianou 1989 (F 339) 513).

<sup>83</sup> IG II<sup>2</sup> 337 = Tod no. 189 = Harding no. 111; see also the dedication by Aristoclea of Citium to Aphrodite Urania (IG II<sup>2</sup> 4636), and other inscriptions recording Salaminians and Citians residing at Athens in the fourth century (IG II<sup>2</sup> 9032–6, 10176, 10178–9, 10202–3, 10205, 10208–9, 10217/18).

dedicated at Delos two statues representing Tyre and Sidon.<sup>84</sup> The process of Hellenization of the Phoenicians was slower than is sometimes assumed; strong and conscious Phoenician elements are still to be observed at Citium and Lapethus in Cyprus in the third century.<sup>85</sup>

The process of Hellenization meant even for the Greek Cypriots the loss of some of their individuality; for the Phoenicians it meant virtually the end of their own culture. Under Achaemenid rule it had been able to develop for a last time; now the uncompromising and all-pervading standards of Greek art and literature gradually eradicated the indigenous tradition.

<sup>84</sup> *CIS* 1 114; Parrot, Chebab and Moscati 1977 (F 310) 461.

<sup>85</sup> *Studia Phoenicia* v 1987 (F 338) 15–17, 21–3; Mitford 1953 (F 301) 86.

## CHAPTER 8e

### EGYPT, 404–332 B. C.

ALAN B. LLOYD

#### I. INTERNAL HISTORY

The domestic history of Egypt during her last age of independence was dominated by power struggles both within dynasties themselves and between great families of the Delta each jealous of the other and anxious to gain possession of the crown. These dissensions were greatly exacerbated by the sectional interests of the native Egyptian warrior class or *Machimoi*, the priesthood, and the greed and jealousy of foreign mercenaries.<sup>1</sup>

Initially, however, the major problems confronting Amyrtaeus, the sole king of the XXVIIIth Dynasty,<sup>2</sup> were the expulsion of Persian forces from the kingdom and consolidation of his position as an independent ruler. It would appear that his credentials for this role were impeccable. He was certainly a Saite and probably a descendant of the brilliant and prosperous XXVIth Dynasty;<sup>3</sup> it has also been plausibly suggested that he was the grandson of the Amyrtaeus who succeeded Inarus as the leader of the great but abortive revolt of Egypt against Artaxerxes II.<sup>4</sup> For all that, his task was no easy one. His accession date can be located *c.* 404, but he was certainly not in complete control of the country until some time later; for in the Jewish colony at Elephantine Artaxerxes II was still recognized as late as 401 whilst the first document in the name of Amyrtaeus does not appear until regnal year 5 (*c.* 400).<sup>5</sup> Of the details of his reign virtually nothing is known. However, the *Demotic Chronicle* speaks at III. 18–19 of violation of the divine law in his reign and states a little later (IV. 1–2) that he was deposed as a result of this and his son not permitted to succeed.<sup>6</sup> The immediate change to the XXIXth Dynasty after Amyrtaeus lends credibility to these cryptic comments and suggests that we are in all probability confronted with our first example of the dynastic squabbling endemic to the period.

<sup>1</sup> Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 76–121; Gyles 1959 (F 447) 45, 67, 71–4; Drioton and Vandier 1962 (F 434) 605–14; Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 287.

<sup>2</sup> In general see Pietschmann, *RE* 1 2012–3; De Meulenaere in Helck *et al.* 1975– (F 453) 1 252–3. <sup>3</sup> See below, pp. 355ff.

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Kraeling 1953 (F 465) 112 n. 3; Porten 1968 (F 504) 236 n. 3. For the revolt see Lloyd 1975–88 (F 473) 1 38–49. <sup>5</sup> See note 99. <sup>6</sup> Johnson 1983 (F 459) 66.

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The XXVIIIth Dynasty was succeeded by the XXIXth which derived from the great Delta city of Mendes. We know that its founder Nepherites received some support from the important Delta city of Letopolis<sup>7</sup> and, like most of his successors, was careful to foster good relations with the priesthood. He also nurtured the idea that his rule was nothing less than the restoration of the glories of the XXVIth Dynasty, a policy which he may well have taken over from Amyrtaeus and which was pursued with fervour by all subsequent Egyptian rulers until the Persian reconquest of the country.<sup>8</sup> A badly damaged Brooklyn Aramaic papyrus refers to Nepherites' accession, but the precise circumstances remain obscure.<sup>9</sup> The history of this family was clearly wracked with turmoil. The contradiction in our evidence on the order of kings is best interpreted as a reflection of recurrent internal dissension over the succession in which Nepherites' death was followed by a power struggle between three claimants, Psammuthis, Achoris and a third whose name is unknown. This was a struggle eventually won by Achoris who undoubtedly figures as the outstanding ruler of the dynasty. Even after his victory he made unusual efforts to assert and establish his legitimacy, particularly in his choice of titles. This image of instability is confirmed by the fact that only Achoris enjoyed a reign of any length (thirteen years): Nepherites I died in his seventh year; king  $\alpha$  was deposed, if that is the correct interpretation of the opaque wording of *Demotic Chronicle* iv.6; Psammuthis had one year; and Nepherites II four months only.<sup>10</sup> Indeed, it is a matter of explicit comment in the *Chronicle* that Achoris completed his reign (iv.9)! In view of this lamentable history, it is not surprising to find the XXIXth Dynasty swiftly replaced, almost certainly deposed, by a rival family, this time from Sebennyus.<sup>11</sup>

The precise relationship between the kings of the XXXth Dynasty and those of the XXIXth has been much discussed. On the basis of Spiegelberg's translation of *Demotic Chronicle* iv.3–5, it has been claimed that Nectanebo I was a son or grandson of Nepherites I,<sup>12</sup> but Johnson's new rendering reveals that this view is untenable.<sup>13</sup> The most we can say is that he was an army commander before his accession and that his father Tachos was also a high-ranking military officer who may have been a prince.<sup>14</sup> Given such an ancestry and the extreme brevity of Nepherites' reign, the advent of the new dynasty looks suspiciously like a military coup, and it may well be that Nectanebo's great Hermopolis stela

<sup>7</sup> Vercoutter 1962 (F 543) 102; Traunecker 1979 (F 538) 422.

<sup>8</sup> Traunecker 1979 (F 538) 420–3. In general see below, p. 349ff.

<sup>9</sup> Kraeling 1953 (F 465) 283–90 n. 13. In general see Bianchi in Helck *et al.* 1975–(F 453) IV 454–6.

<sup>10</sup> See pp. 356f. <sup>11</sup> Traunecker 1979 (F 538) 436; Traunecker *et al.* 1981 (F 539) 14.

<sup>12</sup> De Meulenaere 1963 (F 487) 90–1; Johnson 1974 (F 457) 7–9.

<sup>13</sup> Johnson 1974 (F 457) 7–9. <sup>14</sup> De Meulenaere 1963 (F 487) 90–1.



actually refers to disturbances surrounding such an event (lines 8–9). However that may be, it comes as no surprise to find that the XXXth Dynasty, like its predecessor, was subject to the recurrent malady of dynastic instability.<sup>15</sup> This is probably the explanation for the surprising appearance of a co-regency at the end of the reign of Nectanebo I who associated his son Tachos with him in government from regnal year 16 until his death in year 19.<sup>16</sup> The reign of Tachos provides the best-documented example of the phenomenon in the period as a whole in the form of the civil war between Tachos and Nectanebo II. When Tachos embarked on his great expedition against Persia in Asia, he left a general in control in Egypt called Tja-ḥap-imu who was clearly his brother.<sup>17</sup> The latter promptly persuaded his own son Nectanebo, who was campaigning with Tachos, to rebel. Nectanebo, in turn, prevailed upon the Spartan king Agesilaus, who commanded Tachos' Greek mercenaries and harboured a personal grudge against Tachos, to join the insurgents. These multiple acts of treachery proved a signal success, and Tachos was forced to take refuge with the Great King. This was not, however, the end of the matter. An unnamed Mendesian was then declared pharaoh by a section of the Egyptian populace and rose against Nectanebo. There can be little doubt that he was a member of the royal house of Mendes making a bid to restore past glories and he certainly constituted a formidable threat since he was able to field a substantial army, presumably *Machimoi*, and forced Nectanebo and Agesilaus to take refuge in an unspecified fortified city. Nectanebo, through the excellence of his Greek troops and the generalship of Agesilaus, was able to extract himself victoriously from this crisis, but nothing can disguise the mortal danger in which he stood or the precarious nature of royal power in Late Period Egypt.<sup>18</sup>

One of the most intriguing aspects of the episode just described is the crucial role played by foreign troops, but the kings of this period, in their attempts to maintain control of the country, had also to cope with two important groups within the populace itself: the *Machimoi* and the

<sup>15</sup> On the history of the dynasty see Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 88–112; Drioton and Vandier 1962 (F 434) 609–12; Johnson 1974 (F 457) 10–17.

<sup>16</sup> Johnson 1974 (F 457) 13–17; Murnane 1977 (F 492). Since Tachos would have become co-regent in 364/3, the difficulties of Hornblower 1982 (F 644) 174f in relation to Xen. *Ages.* 11.27 would seem to disappear. If he became co-regent in that year, he may well have occupied a dominant position even before that and may, therefore, have been treated as *de facto* ruler by outside observers as early as 366. <sup>17</sup> De Meulenaere 1963 (F 487) 91; von Kaenel 1980 (F 460) 40.

<sup>18</sup> On this episode see IG 11<sup>2</sup> 119; Xen. *Ages.* 11.28ff; Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 106, 108; Nep. *Ages.* 8; Plut. *Ages.* 36–9; Diod. xv.92–3; Polyæn. 11.1.22; Lyceas of Naucratis *FGrH* 613 F 2; Paus. 11.10; Eust. *Od.* 10.515 (1642); Plut. *Mor.* 214D–E. Plutarch's figure of 100,000 men for the Mendesian's army is surely too high (cf. Diod. xv.93, where Tachos is named in error for the rebel). In addition to these classical sources we now have a fragmentary hieroglyphic inscription which refers to these events (von Kaenel 1980 (F 460)).

priests. That the *Machimoi* were a power to be reckoned with is quite certain, and it is equally clear that they were perfectly prepared to play the king-maker.<sup>19</sup> The ease with which Nectanebo got support c. 360 shows that they were unreliable and suggests that their services were very much at the disposal of the highest bidder; it would be very surprising if the adherents of Nectanebo's unnamed Mendesian rival were not a further illustration of this point, but paucity of evidence makes certainty in this case impossible. It is, however, noteworthy that the *Machimoi* played an extremely prominent part in the military operations of the fourth century: according to Diodorus (xv.92) Tachos had c. 80,000 in his expeditionary force; the unidentified Mendesian usurper had 100,000 men, probably mainly *Machimoi*, at his disposal in his struggle with Nectanebo c. 359 (Plut. *Ages.* 38);<sup>20</sup> and Nectanebo, in the defence of Egypt against Ochus, deployed 60,000 (Diod. xvi.47). We can be sure that all these figures are exaggerated, but they can nevertheless be taken with confidence to symbolize very substantial forces and generate the nagging suspicion that the kings of this period, unlike Apries in the XXVIth Dynasty, did their utmost to avoid offending *Machimoi* susceptibilities. It was clearly crucial for the royal house to keep control of this military element, and we find that it was standard practice for royal princes to serve as generals in the army.<sup>21</sup> The effectiveness of this policy can best be judged by considering that, of the three kings of the XXXth Dynasty, Nectanebo I probably and Nectanebo II certainly came to the throne as the result of military coups. The wealth and influence of the priesthood were also potent forces which the crown ignored at its peril.<sup>22</sup> Concern for the temples formed part of pharaoh's traditional priestly role and was a time-honoured expression of royal power and wealth,<sup>23</sup> but it would be a mistake to ignore its political ramifications.<sup>24</sup> Unfortunately, relations with the priesthood at this period are far from well documented, but the broad outlines are clear and present an ambiguous picture. On the one hand, we have instances of open-handed generosity. Achievements in temple-building were a pale shadow of former glories, but they became progressively more spectacular to culminate in the great temple of Behbet el-Hagar begun by Nectanebo II.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, benefactions were frequently made by the crown to major shrines: e.g. an inscription at Edfu enumerates gifts conferred on the temple between the beginning of the reign of Necta-

<sup>19</sup> Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 309f.

<sup>20</sup> Diod. xv.93 erroneously names Nectanebo as the commander of this force.

<sup>21</sup> Clère 1951 (F 425) 135; De Meulenaere 1963 (F 487) 90, 93.

<sup>22</sup> Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 122–6; Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 301–9.

<sup>23</sup> Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 293–5; Johnson 1983 (F 459) 67ff.

<sup>24</sup> Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 122–6; Johnson 1974 (F 457) 11.

<sup>25</sup> See below, p. 353 and in general Kienitz 1953 (F 463).

nebo I and year 18 of Nectanebo II;<sup>26</sup> the Hermopolis stela of Nectanebo I describes in detail that king's benefactions to the deities of the city;<sup>27</sup> the Naucratis stela of regnal year 1 of Nectanebo I records the donation of one tenth of the royal income from imports from the Mediterranean at Henet and Naucratis to the Saite temple of Neith.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, the wealth of the temples provided a capital asset which excited the acquisitive instincts of more than one ruler of the period; e.g. Tachos, under the influence of Chabrias, imposed severe pecuniary restrictions upon them in order to meet the costs of his Asiatic campaign ([Arist.] *Oec.* II. 2 (1350–1a)).<sup>29</sup> Such actions must have been bitterly resented by their many victims,<sup>30</sup> and we can hardly doubt that the ensuing priestly opposition to Tachos was a significant factor in the triumph of Nectanebo II.

When we turn to the structure of the general administration at this period we encounter a marked paucity of evidence. The residence city and centre of administration was probably Memphis, and the signs are that government functioned on traditional centralized lines,<sup>31</sup> and was dominated by great officers of state, such as Somtutefnakht,<sup>32</sup> who were capable of holding at one and the same time a wide range of offices, civil, religious and military. We know of one official bearing the title of vizier in this period, Harsiese in the XXXth Dynasty, but whether he functioned as the chief minister of state is an open question.<sup>33</sup> Provincial government operated on the basis of nomes which were administrative districts roughly comparable to English counties. Taxation was demonstrably a major concern of the provincial governors, or nomarchs, but we can assume that, as in earlier times, they exercised a wide range of administrative functions (cf. [Arist.] *Oec.* 2.2 (1350–1a)). On the character of the administration there is little information. Doubtless the accustomed Egyptian stance of benevolent despotism continued to operate at all levels, but there is evidence of stringent and, at times, oppressive taxation ([Arist.] *Oec.* 2.2 (1350–1a); *Demotic Chronicle* IV.4–5; Polyæn. III.11.5).

Not the least interesting feature of the Late Period is the fact that our

<sup>26</sup> See n. 104.      <sup>27</sup> Roeder 1952 (F 518) 375ff and 1959 (F 519) 91.

<sup>28</sup> Lichtheim 1980 (F 472) 86ff. In general see Meeks 1979 (F 481) 653ff.

<sup>29</sup> Will 1960 (F 550). It is now recognized, on the basis of Johnson's new translation, that *Demotic Chronicle* IV.4–5 refers to Tachos' exactions from the temples (Johnson 1974 (F 457) 7–9 and 1983 (F 459) 64).

<sup>30</sup> Apart from priests who officiated in the temple, many Egyptians clearly held salaried priestly offices which did not entail any duties. All would have been equally affected.

<sup>31</sup> Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 331–7. Inscriptions of royal officials are uncommon but do occasionally occur, e.g. Bothmer 1969 (F 414) 92ff; Traunecker 1979 (F 538) 422.

<sup>32</sup> His biography is preserved on Naples 1035. Discussions: Schäfer 1897 (F 520); Tresson 1930 (F 540); Gardiner 1961 (F 440) 379ff; Lichtheim 1980 (F 472) 41ff; Lloyd 1982 (F 475) 178ff.

<sup>33</sup> De Meulenaere 1958 (F 485); Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 332.

classical sources permit a rather clearer picture of the personal character of Egyptian kings than it is possible to gain for any earlier age. Most of them show the keenest perception of Egypt's best interests and were often adept at directing their policy to meet them, but the impression gained of some is by no means consistently flattering: Amyrtaeus emerges as ruthless to the point of treachery,<sup>34</sup> Tachos as obtuse and headstrong (Diod. xv.92), and Nectanebo II as a ruler in whom arrogance was alloyed with a disturbing tendency to panic or precipitate action in times of crisis which played no small part in losing him his kingdom (Diod. xv.93 – substitute Nectanebo for Tachos and the unnamed Mendesian for Nectanebo; xvi.46–51; Plut. *Ages.* 36ff; Polyen. II.1.22).

The impact of the Persian conquest was severe. Once Ochus gained control, he pulled down the walls of the major cities, plundered the temples, and amassed a large quantity of gold and silver. He also carried off Egyptian sacred writings, though his minion Bagoas subsequently sold them back to the priests. Egypt was then turned into a satrapy under the rule of Pherendates (Diod. xvi.51).<sup>35</sup> Details of its history down to 332 are severely limited. It is clear that the Persians did receive the support of some Egyptian officials like Somtutefnakht who were perfectly prepared to make the best of the situation and accepted positions in the government,<sup>36</sup> but Egyptian and classical sources leave us in no doubt as to the character of the administration which is described as violent, avaricious, arrogant, impious and disruptive of the norms of ordered life.<sup>37</sup> In consequence, when the Macedonian rebel Amyntas arrived in Egypt in 333 he was welcomed by the Egyptians who flocked to him to assist in destroying the Persian garrisons, and the arrival of Alexander the Great in 332 was greeted with equal jubilation (*POxy.* I.xii.IV; Diod. xvii.49; Curt. IV.1(5); 7(29)).<sup>38</sup> It is, however, possible that, even before that time, Egyptian discontent had led to open rebellion and that a short-lived independence had been wrested from the Persians by an enigmatic pharaoh called Khababash.<sup>39</sup>

The origin and date of Khababash have been matters of considerable debate. To judge from his name, he was not Egyptian but probably

<sup>34</sup> See below, p. 347.

<sup>35</sup> The tradition on the iniquities of Ochus was subsequently greatly elaborated: Schwartz 1949 (F 521).

<sup>36</sup> For Somtutefnakht see above, p. 343. See also Lepsius 1849–59 (F 470) VI 69 no. 162; Meyer 1915 (F 490) 291 n. 4.

<sup>37</sup> Petosiris inscription 81: Lefebvre 1923–4 (F 469) I 136–45, II 53–9; Otto 1954 (F 497) 180ff with page references to discussion indexed at 128, 46; Lichtheim 1980 (F 472) 45ff; Lloyd 1982 (F 475) 178; *POxy* I xii col. IV; Diod. xvii.49; Curt. IV.7 (29).

<sup>38</sup> The Amyntas episode is also mentioned in Arr. *Anab.* II.13.2–3.

<sup>39</sup> Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 185–9; Gardiner 1961 (F 440) 380ff; Drioton and Vandier 1962 (F 434) 612–14, 621; Lloyd 1988 (F 477).

Libyan or Ethiopian by extraction. As for chronology, the evidence is as follows: (1) The Satrap Stela of regnal year 7 of Alexander IV (312–311 B.C.)<sup>40</sup> informs us at lines 7 ff that, after the reign of Xerxes, a pharaoh called Khababash had given a piece of land to the gods of Buto while he was reconnoitring the northern Delta ‘to keep off the fleet of the king of Asia’. These events clearly took place before the Macedonian conquest in 332; (2) A marriage contract of a minor Theban priest is dated to regnal year 1, month 3, of Khababash and is signed by the same notary as a text of the year 324;<sup>41</sup> (3) An Apis sarcophagus mentions regnal year 2, month 3, of Khababash.<sup>42</sup> The Satrap Stela clearly yields the termini 464–332, but a scribe active in 324 could hardly have been born earlier than the beginning of the fourth century and will have begun his career rather later, i.e. the Khababash whose name appears in the dating formula of P. Libbey (Spiegelberg 1907 (F 533)) can be located no earlier than the XXIXth Dynasty.<sup>43</sup> We must, therefore, look for him within the time-span of the XXIXth–XXXIst Dynasties. Although Khababash is regarded as a legitimate king in the Satrap Stela and Egyptian documents give him two regnal years, there is no trace of any such reign in the lists given in Manetho or the *Demotic Chronicle* for the XXIXth–XXXth Dynasties. Therefore, he was probably contemporary with the XXXIst. If so, there are several obvious dating possibilities: Khababash might have been the immediate successor of Nectanebo II, and the late date given for the conquest of Egypt in pseudo-Manetho (339/8) could reflect the defeat of Khababash, not that of Nectanebo II; alternatively, he might have rebelled on the death of Artaxerxes (338/7) or Arses (336/5).<sup>44</sup> There is no decisive argument to offer in favour of any of these possibilities, but it is evident that all the probabilities point to the hypothesis that Khababash was a rebel pharaoh who achieved a brief independence during the Second Persian Occupation.

## II. FOREIGN RELATIONS

Our sources for Egyptian foreign relations between 404 and 332 are pre-eminently classical and reflect the interests of the classical world.<sup>45</sup> The

<sup>40</sup> Text *Urk.* 2.11ff; translations, Bevan 1927 (F 408A) 28–32; Spiegelberg 1907 (F 533) 2ff; Spalinger 1978 (F 528) 147ff and 1980 (F 529); Ritner 1980 (F 514); Lloyd 1982 (F 475) 175ff.

<sup>41</sup> Spiegelberg 1907 (F 533) 3; Erichsen 1950 (F 437) I 71, II 28–30; Lüddeckens 1960 (F 467) 22–3.

<sup>42</sup> Gunn 1926 (F 446) 86ff no. III.

<sup>43</sup> Since the average lifespan in ancient Egypt was less than forty years, it is probable that the scribe was born during the XXXth Dynasty.

<sup>44</sup> Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 187f concludes that the rebellion ran from winter 338/7 to winter 336/5, but his case is not strong.

<sup>45</sup> For general surveys see Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 76–112; Olmstead 1948 (F 43) 396–416; Bresciani 1969 (F 416) and in Davies and Finkelstein 1984 (F 372) 358–72; Traunecker 1979 (F 538) 396ff; Cook 1983 (F 14) 208–25; Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 337–46; Hornblower 1983 (A 31) ch. 14ff. There is much useful material in Hornblower 1982 (F 644); see his index under the relevant kings.

record is, therefore, overwhelmingly concerned with events in the eastern Mediterranean in which Greeks were closely involved and which impinged strongly on Greek historical consciousness. Indisputably, the Libyan frontier of Egypt continued to be a matter of close political, economic, and strategic concern, and it is equally clear that cordial relations existed with the Nubian kingdom to the south,<sup>46</sup> but, since neither area saw Greeks participating in major historical events, our information on Egypt's relations with peoples to the west and south is extremely sparse.

It is evident that the dominant issue is Egypt's relations with Persia from whom she achieved independence at the end of the fifth century but whose claims to the country were never abandoned. The Egyptian response to this problem was essentially a resumption of Saite Asiatic policy in that an attempt was made to keep the Persians at bay by two methods: dissidents in the western provinces of the Persian empire were given moral and logistic support to keep the Great King embroiled in conflicts away from the Egyptian frontier; Egyptian forces engaged in active military operations against the Persians. In this strategy the Egyptians received on many occasions the support of Sparta whose ambitions in Greece and the Aegean area frequently brought her into conflict with Persia and, *ipso facto*, created a happy community of interest with Egypt.

Egypt's Persian policy falls into four phases: (1) Initial caution (Amyrtaeus); (2) Material support of rebels against the Great King but stopping short of armed conflict (Nepherites I; the early part of the reign of Achoris); (3) Full-scale military confrontation (the second half of the reign of Achoris; Tachos); (4) A return to a policy much closer to that of phase 2 (Nectanebo II). As for the Persians, their capacity to resolve the Egyptian problem was severely impaired by their distance from Egypt and more pressing concerns nearer the heart of the empire. Nevertheless, at least four major attempts were made to bring Egypt to heel, one in the reign of Artaxerxes II (374) and three by Artaxerxes III (*c.* 354, *c.* 351, and 343–342).

It is clear that, as early as 401, the Persians were contemplating the recovery of Egypt (Xen. *An.* II.1.14; 5. 13; possibly also *An.* I.4.3 and 5), but there is no proof positive of Egyptian operations against Persia at this time. Egypt does, however, figure in the events of 400 immediately following the defeat of the rebellion of Cyrus when we are informed that Cyrus' leading supporter, Tamos, governor of Ionia, fled to Egypt,

<sup>46</sup> Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 343–6. It should be noted that the claim that Achoris' cartouche appears at the temple of Aghurmi in the Siwa Oasis (Steindorff *et al.* 1933 (F 537) 19–21; Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 83) is based on a misinterpretation of a damaged inscription (Traunecker 1979 (F 538) 418 D1). There is, however, evidence of a treaty with Barca (Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 103; Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 83).

taking with him most of his family as well as a fleet laden with treasure.<sup>47</sup> The Egyptian king, who must surely have been Amyrtaeus,<sup>48</sup> promptly killed his unwelcome guest and requisitioned the fleet and its cargo. The fact that Tamos fled to Egypt, together with Diodorus' cryptic comment that pharaoh was under an obligation to Tamos, suggests, in turn, that the Egyptian king may well have been giving him covert support in his rebellious activities. However, suspicions are not facts, and the most that can be said at present is that such support, if it were given, was neither sufficiently active nor obvious to make a clear impression on our sources.

We have to wait until the intensification of Sparta's military operations against Persia in 396 for the first clear evidence of Egypt's role as the paymaster of Persia's enemies. In that year, the Spartans requested an alliance from Nepherites I, who refused, but he did dispatch equipment (presumably sails and cordage) for 100 triremes and 500,000 measures of corn (Diod. xiv.79; Justin vi.6.1–5; Oros. iii.1.8).<sup>49</sup> Nepherites' policy was initially followed by Achoris. An alliance with Athens is mentioned in Aristophanes' *Plutus* (178) produced in 388. This must be seen in the broader context of Athens' support for Evagoras of Cyprus who was in rebellion against the Persian King. Achoris' alliance with the Pisidians (Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 103) had a similar strategic motive. However, we do not have any evidence of a large military commitment by the Egyptians to the war. It was the Peace of Antalcidas of 386 which led to that. By this treaty the Great King removed the rebels' supporters on the mainland of Greece and was able to devote his full attention to Evagoras and Egypt (Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F 103; Oros. iii.1.25). The attack on the latter appears to have been mounted in 385. We have no unequivocal information on subsequent military operations, but if, as is probable, an enigmatic passage in Isocrates' *Panegyricus* refers to this conflict, it lasted for three years and ended in the defeat of the Persians.<sup>50</sup> This was soon

<sup>47</sup> This date is that of Diodorus (xiv.35) and fits the historical context well. On the career of Tamos, who came from Memphis, see Lewis 1977 (A 33) 92f, 107 n. 96, 118 nn. 72, 74.

<sup>48</sup> Diodorus (xiv.35) calls him 'Psammetichus, a descendant of Psammetichus'. In view of the date we should expect the king to be Amyrtaeus, and the fact that he is said to be a descendant of Psammetichus tends to strengthen this suspicion since it indicates that he was a Saite, as Amyrtaeus certainly was (cf. Drioton and Vandier 1962 (F 434) 606; Kraeling 1953 (F 465) 112 n. 3; Hall 1927 (F 448) 144; De Meulenaere in Helck *et al.* 1975– (F 453) 1 252). Given Diodorus' notorious carelessness, a mistake is perfectly feasible. Nevertheless, we cannot absolutely discount the possibility that Psammetichus was a rival of Amyrtaeus (cf. Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 76f; Traunecker 1979 (F 538) 399).

<sup>49</sup> Cf. Lewis 1977 (A 33) 141 n. 43. Diodorus gives the date as 396 (xiv.54), and this is compatible with other evidence.

<sup>50</sup> *Panegyricus* 140 speaks of a campaign conducted in the reign of Artaxerxes II by Abrokomas, Tithraustes and Pharnabazus against the Egyptians. In view of the date of this speech (c. 380) and the comment's historical context it is difficult to see what it can refer to except Achoris' war (cf. Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 85). It is possible that Egyptian operations in Phoenicia are reflected by the presence there of three altar bases of Achoris (Traunecker 1979 (F 538) 435; Stern 1982 (F 397) 205), but this would not be the only interpretation of the presence of such small and easily portable finds.

followed by a severe setback in the defeat of Egypt's major ally Evagoras who received rather less than total support from his Egyptian allies. In 381 we find Achoris supplying Evagoras with food, money and other resources. In addition, 50 triremes were sent, but no crews are mentioned, and it may well be that it is the vessels only which are at issue. In the following year Evagoras went to Egypt in person to persuade Achoris to prosecute the war more vigorously, but he obtained nothing but further financial support (Diod. xv.3–4, 8–9; Justin vi.6.1–5).<sup>51</sup> The defeat and capitulation of Evagoras in, or shortly after, 380 were in some small measure alleviated by the rebellion in the same year of Glos, son of the ill-fated Tamos, who created an anti-Persian alliance with Achoris and Sparta. Achoris mustered a large force of Greek mercenaries and also hired the services of the Athenian commander Chabrias, but the latter was soon lost to the Egyptian cause when he was recalled to Athens at the request of the Persian commander Pharnabazus (Diod. xv.9.3–5, 29).<sup>52</sup> We hear nothing of subsequent Egyptian military operations, though Glos and his successor Tachos are known to have maintained their rebellion for two further years.

It is hardly surprising that these events were soon followed by the first known major Persian attack on Egypt itself which fell in 374/3 B.C. during the reign of Nectanebo I. It was mounted by a massive Persian force allegedly consisting of 20,000 Greek mercenaries, 200,000 non-Greek troops, 300 triremes, 200 *triaconters* and a large supply train, and was commanded by Pharnabazus and the distinguished Greek general Iphicrates who attempted a full-scale invasion of the traditional Persian amphibious type. The operation was a complete failure. Not only did the slowness of the Persian build-up give the Egyptians ample warning, but Iphicrates and Pharnabazus were continually at loggerheads on the conduct of the expedition. These deficiencies were sufficient in themselves to breed disaster, but the Persians also had to contend with adverse geographical circumstances and an Egyptian defence conducted with consummate skill (Diod. xv.38, 41–3).<sup>53</sup>

Nectanebo's spectacular success in defeating this threat was doubtless a factor in inspiring his successor Tachos to resume Achoris' aggressive policy in Asia *c.* 360.<sup>54</sup> Encouraged by a large-scale rebellion against

<sup>51</sup> Diodorus' dates for the rebellion of Evagoras are untenable; those in the text follow the reconstruction of Beloch 1912–27 (A 5) III 2, 226–30.

<sup>52</sup> The military preparations described in xv.29 are dated to 377, which is impossibly late (see below, p. 358).

<sup>53</sup> As usual, the figures should be treated with a measure of caution. If we could accept the suggestion of Kuhlmann 1981 (F 466) that Nectanebo married a Greek woman named Ptolemais, we might well have evidence of an attempt to strengthen his hand against the Persian threat by establishing the closest connexions with the Greek world. Such a ploy is by no means improbable, but the text in question is too mutilated to justify complete confidence in its interpretation.

<sup>54</sup> The date is discussed by Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 180f, who opts for spring 360.



Persian authority centred on Asia Minor, he concluded an alliance with Sparta and collected together a large force of mercenaries and Egyptian troops as well as 200 triremes. The Spartan king Agesilaus was given command of the mercenaries and Chabrias of the fleet whilst Tachos assumed overall command. The force then moved north, but, when it reached Phoenicia, the entire operation collapsed owing to treachery at home aggravated by hostility between Agesilaus and Tachos which led to Tachos' deposition and the accession of Nectanebo II (Xen. *Ages.* II.28–31; Diod. xv.92–3, with confusion of Tachos and Nectanebo II at 93; Nep. *Ages.* 8; Plut. *Ages.* 36; Polyæn. III.11.7).<sup>55</sup> With him we revert to the more cautious policy of the beginning of the dynasty; he certainly gave some support to the great Cypro-Phoenician rebellion of the mid-340s, but his known involvement fell a long way short of full-scale commitment of all Egypt's military resources; probably the policy throughout his reign was to give the minimum assistance required by the circumstances. Be that as it may, his disruptive influence in the Levant was quite sufficient to guarantee the active hostility of Artaxerxes III who paid him the dubious compliment of mounting three determined attempts to re-establish Persian control of Egypt (Trogus, *Prol.* x (F 73 Seal)). The first, of which no details are known, was perhaps around 354; the second, apparently in 351, is alleged to have failed through the cowardice and inexperience of its leaders and seems to have made Artaxerxes something of a laughing-stock (Diod. xvi.40, 44, 48; Isoc. v.101).<sup>56</sup> The third was an altogether different matter. After the most meticulous preparation, Artaxerxes marched south again in 343/2, and in 341, thanks to the military incompetence of Nectanebo and treachery within the Egyptian forces, the country was once more in Persian hands, and the last native pharaoh of Egypt had been driven south into Nubia never to return (Diod. xvi.40–52).<sup>57</sup>

### III. CULTURE

The final period of Egyptian independence, so rudely cut short by Ochus' invasion, was an age of renaissance and national rediscovery. It aimed at the revival of the great traditions of the past, particularly those of the XXVIth Dynasty, by the resuscitation of ancient norms, in the fond hope, perhaps, of recreating some small measure of the glories

<sup>55</sup> Diodorus dates all these events to 362 which is close to our date of 361/0 for the beginning of Tachos' reign (see p. 358).

<sup>56</sup> The date is not given by Diodorus, but must lie between 358, the year of Artaxerxes' accession, and 346, the date of the composition of *Philip* (Mathieu and Brémond, *Isocrate. Discours* IV (1962) 7f). If we assume that Diodorus' erroneous date of 351 for Artaxerxes' *third* campaign arose from confusion of the two expeditions, we get a precise fix, but this should be treated as no more than a plausible hypothesis; cf. Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 99–107. <sup>57</sup> For the date see pp. 359f.

which Egypt had known before the Persian conquest of 525. This policy did not, however, result in an arid and moribund classicism, but rather engendered a culture of considerable vitality capable, at times, of surprising innovations and destined to form the basis for the civilization of the Ptolemaic period.

The concept of kingship, which provided, at all periods, the ideological basis of Egyptian civilization, exemplifies at this period a typical mixture of tradition and evolution. The last Egyptian pharaohs, as restorers of the ancient order, functioned in the main with scrupulous regard for the conceptual framework and canonical programme of action which had determined pharaoh's role as a divine king from the beginning of Egyptian history.<sup>58</sup> It comes as no surprise, therefore, that one of the most favoured elements in royal iconography at this time was the blue crown, the wearing of which constituted from the Second Intermediate Period onwards an emphatic claim to legitimacy.<sup>59</sup> Efforts are also frequently made in royal epithets to establish links with the XXVIth Dynasty which was regarded at this time as the model of all that was truly Egyptian.<sup>60</sup> The cult of royal statues which begins in the XXVIth Dynasty is also maintained and developed.<sup>61</sup> On the other hand, contemporary circumstances clearly led to a crucial modification in the Egyptian perception of kingship. Traditionally, and with few exceptions, pharaoh's omnipotence and unassailable righteousness had been undisputed, but, in our period, there is compelling evidence that a greater willingness had developed to concede dependence on the gods, and that the idea took root that the king might even be at odds with the divine will. Indeed, in the *Demotic Chronicle* this notion is developed systematically into a theory of historical causation according to which Egypt's history between Amyrtaeus and Nectanebo II was dominated by a series of expressions of divine wrath at royal iniquities.<sup>62</sup>

The society ruled by these kings is not copiously documented, but its general character is beyond dispute. In basic structure and conditions of life there is no reason to suspect any significant divergence from traditional practice. The population was probably below the total of around 3 millions which we have some reason to believe it attained during the Saite period, and was divided into two basic categories, free and unfree. The former included officials, priests, warriors and a proletariat made up of craftsmen, peasants and similar elements, whereas the unfree consisted of serfs and slaves. There were, in addition, large

<sup>58</sup> Otto 1954 (F 497) 102ff; Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 288–99.

<sup>59</sup> Davies 1982 (F 433). <sup>60</sup> Traunecker 1979 (F 538) 395 ff.

<sup>61</sup> Otto 1957 (F 498); De Meulenaere 1958 (F 485) 233ff; Yoyotte 1959 (F 553); De Meulenaere 1960 (F 486); Traunecker 1979 (F 538) 425; von Kaenel 1980 (F 460) 40.

<sup>62</sup> Meyer 1915 (F 490); Johnson 1974 (F 457); Lloyd 1982 (F 474) 41–5.

numbers of foreigners, particularly Greeks, in the country.<sup>63</sup> This population lived in settlements which ranged in size from individual farms to large cities. Urban centres were usually built on a mound, most of which normally consisted of the accumulated debris of centuries of occupation, and these settlements would have had at least one nodal point such as a temple, palace or large administrative complex. Towns were protected with circuit walls and also, in some cases, boasted citadels which would often have shown a consummate mastery of military engineering. Sites such as Nebesheh<sup>64</sup> and Elephantine<sup>65</sup> demonstrate that street planning could be very rudimentary, and that houses were mainly constructed of mud brick. At Elephantine they were often two-storey dwellings, but there is good reason to believe that taller buildings were known elsewhere.<sup>66</sup> In the Delta the cemeteries were laid out in suitable land adjacent to the settlement whereas in the valley the dead were interred in the neighbouring deserts, usually, though far from invariably, to the west.

The style of life presents no startling innovations. The spectacular discoveries of the Egypt Exploration Society at the animal necropolis in North Saqqara have significantly increased the amount of documentary evidence for our period, though most of it still awaits publication.<sup>67</sup> It is, however, already clear that it contains a wealth of detail on the socio-economic life of Egypt at this time. As yet, nothing has emerged which the student of earlier Egyptian history or the Ptolemaic period would not expect, but a number of points are worthy of note: administration was still characterized by a complex and paper-ridden bureaucracy; oracles were an important means of extricating people from difficulties; appeals to pharaoh at Memphis were not infrequent; and literacy was sufficiently widespread to embrace even such people as stonemasons.<sup>68</sup> Other evidence does reveal novelties of a modest nature: from *c.* 365 a new type of marriage-contract appears, called the *sh-n-s<sup>c</sup>nh*, 'maintenance document', which subsequently becomes very common. This type of contract created particularly favourable conditions for the wife since it imposed crushing financial penalties on the husband in the event of divorce. Such a situation is certainly within the spirit of earlier Egyptian practice, but, as far as is known, no attempt had previously been made at

<sup>63</sup> Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 299–301, 316–18.

<sup>64</sup> Porter and Moss (F 506) IV 7ff; Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 318–25.

<sup>65</sup> Porter and Moss (F 506) V 221ff; Porten 1968 (F 504) 94–102.

<sup>66</sup> Porten 1968 (F 504) 97. Petrie found at Memphis a Late Period house model, precise date unknown, which shows a mud-brick town house with three storeys (Petrie 1910 (F 502) pl. XXXVIII 6).

<sup>67</sup> For a useful preliminary survey of the material see Smith 1974 (F 526); cf. also Ray 1976 and 1978 (F 511–12).

<sup>68</sup> On literacy in ancient Egypt see now Baines and Eyre 1983 (F 407); Baines 1983 (F 406).



Fig. 5. (a) gold coin – horse; combination of *nb* and *nfr* signs. (b) silver coin – head of Athena; double falcon/owl with olive twigs, *nb* and *nfr* signs. (After Daumas 1977 (F 432) 433, 442, figs. 1–2; Curtis 1957 (F 429) pl. 10.2.)

such a rigorous formulation.<sup>69</sup> Novelty is also detectable in economic life. Payments in kind were still the basic means of achieving circulation of goods, though emmer wheat and quantities of silver measured by weight were employed as media of exchange. From the Persian period we hear of ‘*kite* of the treasury of Ptah’ which were presumably pieces of silver weighed according to the standard used in the temple of Ptah at Memphis and stamped to guarantee the weight.<sup>70</sup> However, in our period for the first time we encounter native Egyptian coinage. The extant examples, inscribed in demotic or hieroglyphic, are struck in gold and silver and probably date to the XXXth Dynasty (Fig. 5). They are modelled on Greek or Macedonian prototypes, and their poor workmanship clearly betrays the inexperience of the moneyers. The rarity of these coins suggests that they never came into general use.<sup>71</sup> It is possible that they were intended as payment for mercenary troops, but the inconsistency in their weight and the unreliable quality of the metal would not have recommended them to foreign recipients accustomed to money of high quality, and they would probably have proved unaccept-

<sup>69</sup> Nims 1958 (F 496); Lüdeckens 1960 (F 467), Index, *Urk.* ID.; Pestman 1961 (F 500) Index s.v. P. Orient. Inst. 17481; Seidl 1968 (F 522) 72ff; Allam 1981 (F 403), particularly 119; Lloyd 1983 (F 476), 311–14. Whether the *sh n s' nh* mentioned in the sixth century was of the same kind is, as yet, an open question; see Seidl 1968 (F 522) 74.

<sup>70</sup> Préaux 1939 (F 509) 273ff; Lüdeckens 1960 (F 467) 316ff; Pestman 1961 (F 500) 105; Porten 1968 (F 504) 62–70; Lloyd 1983 (F 476), 328f.

<sup>71</sup> Jenkins 1955 (B 197) 144ff; Curtis 1957 (F 429); Mørkholm 1974 (B 208); Shore 1974 (F 524); Daumas 1977 (F 432). Hoards of Greek coins continue into our period. It is clear that they were generally treated as bullion rather than as a medium of exchange. Athenian coins are particularly numerous, e.g. the Tell el-Mashkuta hoard buried c. 380 contained about 10,000 Athenian tetradrachms (*IGCH* 1649) (cf. Naster 1970 (F 494); Kraay 1976 (B 200) 294–5).

able. On the whole, it seems more probable that they were introduced experimentally on a small scale for native use and never achieved a wide circulation. At all events, they provide an unequivocal instance of foreign influence at this time.

Temples continue to be a dominant feature of towns and even of necropolises. Their construction and maintenance formed, at all periods, an integral part of the role of pharaoh, and the archaizing rulers of this period were inevitably active in this area.<sup>72</sup> The foci of interest are significant and present a consistent picture. There is a resurgence of building work on temples connected with the cult of Amon-re<sup>c</sup> at Thebes which had largely been ignored by the Persians. It begins in the XXIXth Dynasty, the most significant monument being the shrine for the sacred bark of Amon-re<sup>c</sup> west of the First Pylon. This intriguing building was possibly begun by Nephertites I, who was certainly active at Karnak, but its decoration was exclusively the work of Psammuthis and Achoris. Together with contemporary work at Medinet Habu, it formed part of the resuscitation of the ancient cult of the Theban creator gods, a cult which was intended not only to maintain the potency of the gods themselves but also to promote the demiurgic power of the king.<sup>73</sup> The XXXth Dynasty was equally active at Thebes. The temple of Khonsu excited its interest, but the main emphasis of its work lay in the protection of the ancient sacred areas by careful attention to the girdle walls and gateways.<sup>74</sup> The first archaeologically attested example of the *mammisi* or birth temple was built by Nectanebo I at Dendera,<sup>75</sup> though temples certainly contained some such installation at least as early as the Ramesside period.<sup>76</sup> These structures were to become common features of Graeco-Roman temples. The cult of Isis was also a focus of particular attention. Nectanebo I built the elegant vestibule of her temple at Philae,<sup>77</sup> and Nectanebo II at the very least began the large and splendid temple of Behbet el-Hagar in her honour.<sup>78</sup> In their devotion to this cult the kings of the XXXth Dynasty were, as often, following XXVIth Dynasty precedent,<sup>79</sup> but it is probable that there were also other dimensions: these kings originated in the Delta, and Isis was probably a

<sup>72</sup> On donations see Meeks 1972 (F 480) and 1979 (F 481) 65 2ff. For a key to the monuments see the royal indexes in Porter and Moss (F 506). For those of the XXIXth Dynasty see Traunecker 1979 (F 538) 407ff. Older lists are those of Petrie 1905 (F 501) 373ff; Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 190–232.

<sup>73</sup> Traunecker *et al.* 1981 (F 539) 89ff.

<sup>74</sup> Porter and Moss (F 506) II, Royal Index, s.v. Nektanebos I and II, Teos; Spencer 1979 (F 530) 73f.

<sup>75</sup> Daumas 1952 (F 431). Birth-temples appear in temples where triads consisting of god, goddess and child were worshipped. They function in cult as the birthplace of the infant (Bonnet 1952 (F 410) 209f and in Helck *et al.* 1975– (F 453) II 462ff). <sup>76</sup> De Meulenaere 1982 (F 488).

<sup>77</sup> Porter and Moss (F 506) VI 206f 94.

<sup>78</sup> Porter and Moss (F 506) IV 40ff; cf. Clère 1951 (F 425) 136, 144ff.

<sup>79</sup> Lloyd 1983 (F 476) 294.

Lower Egyptian goddess; her cult was popular, and kings devoted to it inevitably increased their stock amongst the people at large; finally it was a cult closely associated with kingship. Building on behalf of sacred animal cults was also a conspicuous feature of the period:<sup>80</sup> there is reason to believe that kings of the XXIXth Dynasty were involved in the development of the temple area at the north end of the sacred animal necropolis of North Saqqara;<sup>81</sup> Nectanebo I was active on behalf of such cults at Hermopolis, Saft el-Henna, Mendes and Hermopolis Parva,<sup>82</sup> and Nectanebo II at the Serapeum, the North Saqqara animal necropolis, Bubastis, Heliopolis, Hermopolis, Edfu and Elephantine.<sup>83</sup> In part, the motivation may well have been that these cults were popular, but, since they were also distinctively Egyptian, their encouragement may perhaps be seen as promoting a sense of Egyptian national identity.<sup>84</sup> It should, however, also be remembered that, since the large-scale development of animal cults gathers momentum in the Saite period,<sup>85</sup> the last native kings of Egypt may even here be associating themselves with their great XXVIth Dynasty predecessors.

In physical structure the temple buildings of the last dynasties evidently follow standard Late Period practice, typical features of which were the use of artificial platforms and elaborate subterranean foundations.<sup>86</sup> Temple platforms of our period have been identified at North Saqqara;<sup>87</sup> the example in the great temple complex on this site was possibly begun in the time of Psammuthis and Achoris, but it was certainly the focus of considerable attention on the part of Nectanebo II.<sup>88</sup> Earlier Late Period temples were laid on foundations consisting of a huge pit excavated into the soil, lined with brick, and filled with sand, e.g. the Saite temple at Mendes.<sup>89</sup> An instance specifically of our period has yet to be identified, but there can be no doubt that this practice was followed by the rulers of the time. Both temple platforms and sand-box foundations reflect the same mythological prototype, the primeval hill or island from which all life was claimed to have emerged at the creation, i.e. all these temples, whatever their size, were regarded as being built on this island and became, *ipso facto*, centres from which demiurgic power could permeate the land of Egypt.<sup>90</sup> This concept of the temple may also

<sup>80</sup> Smith 1974 (F 526) 6, 85.      <sup>81</sup> Smith 1974 (F 526) 36f.

<sup>82</sup> Roeder 1940 (F 517) 78; Saft el-Henna, Roeder 1914 (F 515) 58–99; Mendes, *ibid.* 99–100; Hermopolis Parva, Porter and Moss (F 506) IV 40.

<sup>83</sup> Serapeum, Porter and Moss (F 506) III 2, 778; North Saqqara, *ibid.* III 2, 820f; Bubastis, Naville 1891 (F 495) 56–9; Hermopolis Parva, Brugsch 1867 (F 418) 91; Heliopolis, Bosse 1936 (F 412) 70 no. 187; Hermopolis, Chabân 1907 (F 421) 222; Edfu, Porter and Moss (F 506) VI 146; Elephantine, Honroth *et al.* 1909 (F 454) 52–9.

<sup>84</sup> Wiedemann 1912 (F 549) 20f; Hopfner 1913 (F 455) 25; Lloyd 1975–88 (F 473) 293.

<sup>85</sup> Hopfner 1913 (F 455) 23ff.      <sup>86</sup> Spencer 1979 (F 530) 70ff and 1979 (F 531).

<sup>87</sup> Spencer 1979 (F 530) 72f and 1979 (F 531) 132f.

<sup>88</sup> See above, n. 83.      <sup>89</sup> Spencer 1979 (F 530) 71.      <sup>90</sup> Spencer 1979 (F 531) 132f.

emerge at Hermopolis where the XXXth Dynasty enclosure wall was built of bricks laid in undulating courses which are possibly intended to imitate the waters of the primeval ocean.<sup>91</sup> In much of this architectural work and particularly in decoration, e.g. the use of composite palm capitals and the style of sculptural decoration,<sup>92</sup> the builders of this period established or confirmed the traditions to be followed by their successors in the Ptolemaic period.

Predictably, developments in the plastic arts are very much of a piece with the picture already sketched.<sup>93</sup> The work of the XXIXth Dynasty, though not abundant, shows that it was an important transitional phase between the Persian period and the XXXth Dynasty. The work of the latter is often of outstanding quality. It sometimes imitates that of the XXVIth Dynasty, but it also shows a taste for adaptation and innovation so that the overall impression is one of considerable diversity. It has sometimes been maintained that these developments were the result of Greek influence, but this is now generally discounted.<sup>94</sup> Old features continue: in sculpture in the round the Late Period tendency to greater freedom and the shift from bipartition to tripartition of the human form are continued;<sup>95</sup> old forms and features such as the block statue and the valanced wig are much used, and technical processes remain unchanged. On the other hand, true portraiture appears for the first time; the modelling of the body can achieve unprecedented excellence; there is an interest in unusual stones such as red breccia; and startling novelties in costume are in evidence. As for relief sculpture, the XXXth Dynasty even surpassed its Saite models. Here their work is distinguished by excellent draughtsmanship, outstanding technical mastery, and a marked taste for soft, sensuous, plastic modelling which, in the treatment of the face, can create an impression of puffiness. There is also, at times, an erotic element which shows itself in a taste for emphasizing the female genitals. In all these activities the Sebennytes, as so often, were not only preserving and developing older traditions, but established the pattern to be followed by the artists of the early Ptolemaic period.

#### APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGY

Chronology has been a recurrent problem in the study of this period, and we are still some way from resolving all the difficulties. Nevertheless, recent research

<sup>91</sup> Spencer 1979 (F 530) 73.      <sup>92</sup> Stevenson Smith 1981 (F 527) 411.

<sup>93</sup> Bothmer 1969 (F 414); Aldred 1980 (F 402) 233ff; Stevenson Smith 1981 (F 527) 416ff.

<sup>94</sup> Stevenson Smith 1981 (F 527) advocated Greek influence; Steindorff 1944–5 (F 536) 58, Bothmer 1953 (F 413) 6 and Aldred 1980 (F 402) 236 contest it. On the much discussed question of Greek influence in the late tomb of Petosiris see Picard 1931 (F 503).

<sup>95</sup> Bipartition involves bisecting a figure along a well-marked vertical axis to create two distinct halves; tripartition involves constructing the torso out of three distinct parts, the chest, rib-cage and abdomen.

has made substantial progress in this area, particularly at the most basic level of the dating and sequence of kings.

The chronological framework for the XXVIIIth–XXXth Dynasties is provided by the king-list of the Egyptian priest Manetho supplemented by data from hieroglyphic, demotic, Aramaic and classical sources. This list was compiled in the third century B.C. and in its extant form consists simply of a catalogue of kings' names with an indication of the length of their reigns.<sup>96</sup> It is evident that these year-totals were calculated in terms of Egyptian civil years and generally reflect the last completed regnal year, i.e. any residual days or months in the year of a king's death were simply assigned to the first regnal year of his successor.<sup>97</sup> Unfortunately, the list only survives in the much later and defective excerpts of such writers as Africanus, Eusebius and Syncellus. These extracts are frequently contradictory and corrupt, but, if they are combined with other chronological data, it is possible to establish a workable king-list for the XXVIIIth–XXXth Dynasties:

*XXVIIIth Dynasty.* All Manetho's excerptors assign the dynasty one king called Amyrtaeus with a reign of 6 years. His position as the sole ruler is confirmed by the *Demotic Chronicle* (III.18 F.; IV.1),<sup>98</sup> and the reign-length is not only corroborated by the *Palaion Chronikon* (FGrH 610 F 2) but is also in line with an Aramaic papyrus which mentions his 5th regnal year.<sup>99</sup>

*XXIXth Dynasty.* The excerptors are contradictory:

<i>Africanus</i>		<i>Eusebius (Armenian Version)</i>	
4 kings		4 kings	
Nepherites	6 years	Nepherite	6 years
Achoris	13 years	Achoris	13 years
Psamuthis	1 year	Psamuthes	1 year
Nephorites	4 months	Muthes	1 year
		Nepherites	4 months
Total: 20 years 4 months		Total: 21 years 4 months	

<i>Eusebius (Syncellus)</i>		<i>Eusebius (Jerome)</i>	
4 kings			
Nepherites	6 years	Neferites	6 years
Achoris	13 years	Achoris	12 years

<sup>96</sup> Text in Jacoby, *FGrH* 609; translation in Waddell 1940 (F 545).

<sup>97</sup> Cf. Psammetichus II who is given 6 years in Manetho whereas he died in regnal year 7 (De Meulenaere 1951 (F 484) 65), and Amasis who is given 44 years whereas a regnal year 45 is certain (Lloyd 1975–88 (F 473) 1192). This system is identical to that observed in the Ptolemaic Canon (Skeat 1954 (F 525) 1ff). It was not, however, employed in the account of the XXXIst Dynasty which appears in our fragments of Manetho, but, since this section was not written by him (Waddell 1940 (F 545) 184 n. 1; Lloyd 1988 (F 477)), this anomaly need not concern us. In general see Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 153f, 168; Gardiner 1961 (F 440) 69ff.

<sup>98</sup> Spiegelberg 1914 (F 534); Roeder 1927 (F 516) 238ff; Bresciani and Donadoni 1969 (F 417) 55 1ff. Discussions in Pieper, *RE* XVI 2236f; Kaplony 1971 (F 461); Johnson 1974 (F 457); Kaplony in Helck *et al.* 1975– (F 453) I 1056ff; Johnson 1983 (F 459) and 1984 (F 458).

<sup>99</sup> Cowley, *AP* no. 35; Porten 1968 (F 504) 295–6, cf. 160–4, redating Cowley, *AP* no. 22 to this year.



Psammuthis	1 year	Psammuthes	1 year
Nepherites	4 months	Neferites	4 months
Mouthis	1 year	Nectanebis	18 years
		Teo	2 years
Total: 21 years 4 months			

Africanus gives 4 kings and Jerome's version of Eusebius clearly reflects the same tradition, though we must correct the patent error whereby the first two kings of the XXXth Dynasty have been transferred to the XXIXth. However, the traditions of Syncellus and the Armenian version of Eusebius both add a Muthes/Mouthis to give 5 kings, though the rubrics claim that there were only 4 rulers. On the other hand, these two sources differ on the positioning of the extra king, the Armenian version placing him after Psammuthis, whilst Syncellus locates him after Nepherites.

The most obvious and attractive solution to these contradictions is to regard Muthes/Mouthis as a post-Manethonian interpolation; indeed, the similarity of his name to that of Psammuthis and the fact that both Psammuthis and Muthes/Mouthis are given the same reign-length suggest that the latter is nothing more than a ghost, the product of a scribal slip-of-the-eye, who should be removed from the list altogether.<sup>100</sup> If this is done, we are left with a list of 4 kings whose reign-lengths are identical in all versions except for Achoris who is given 12 years rather than 13 in Jerome's version of Eusebius, but the lamentable state of the received text of Jerome deprives this anomaly of any force; in all probability a XIII has simply been corrupted into XII in the course of transmission. Manetho's XXIXth Dynasty would then have run: Nepherites (I), 6 years; Achoris, 13 years; Psammuthis, 1 year; Nepherites (II), 4 months. However, when we turn to other sources, this scheme is contradicted. The *Demotic Chronicle* (III.18ff; IV.1ff) yields a list: Nepherites (I), x, Psammuthis, Achoris, Nepherites (II).<sup>101</sup> We are also informed that Psammuthis had a short reign and Achoris a long one, though precise figures are not given. The best solution is to argue that Achoris succeeded Nepherites and was faced at some point in his reign with a power-struggle against a rival claimant called Psammuthis who was successful in achieving some measure of autonomy for approximately a year and was then deposed to leave Achoris as undisputed pharaoh, and Demotic sources do indeed suggest that Psammuthis' reign coincided with Achoris' regnal year 2.<sup>102</sup>

*XXXth Dynasty.* Once the error in Jerome's text is rectified (see above), the excerptors are agreed on the order of kings, but reign-lengths are a matter of considerable confusion. Africanus and Jerome assign Nectanebes/Nectanebis 18 years whereas the Armenian version of Eusebius and that of Syncellus give him only 10. The essential accuracy of the former tradition is confirmed by the *Demotic Chronicle* which allots him 19 years (IV.13ff), if we assume that Manetho's

<sup>100</sup> Cf. Meyer 1915 (F 490) 290; Helck 1956 (F 451) 49.

<sup>101</sup> At II.2-4 the *Chronicle* contains an abbreviated list which omits king x and Psammuthis. The omissions presumably reflect an alternative tradition which denied their legitimacy.

<sup>102</sup> Ray 1986 (F 513).

figure means that this king's last completed regnal year was year 18 and that he died in year 19 (see above).<sup>103</sup> There is agreement amongst the excerptors in allotting 2 years to Teos, and this is also compatible with the *Chronicle* (iv.16–17) which assigns him one full year of independent rule, i.e. Manetho counted the year of his accession in his father's regnal year 19 as Teos' year 1 so that his last completed year would have been year 2. The excerptors disagree on Nectanebos who gets 18 years in Africanus and Jerome but only 8 in the Armenian version and Syncellus. Again the *Chronicle* vindicates Africanus, allotting Nectanebos 18 years (iv.18–19), and that figure is corroborated by a text of Edfu which gives him a regnal year 18, the highest known for this king from any monument.<sup>104</sup> Our list should, therefore, run: Nectanebos, 18 years, dying in his 19th; Teos, completed his 2nd year, deposed in his 3rd; Nectanebos, 18 years.

At this stage all we need in order to convert to our own chronological system is a synchronism. Until the publication of Kienitz's *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens* (F 463) in 1953, it was generally held that this was provided by the Ptolemaic *Tale of the Dream of Nectanebo*, the narrative of which is dated to the night of the 21–22 Pharmouthis in regnal year 16 of Nectanebo II; the night in question is expressly stated to have had a full moon. This information enables us to pinpoint the date by astronomical means to 5 July 343, and, since, at this period, the Egyptian civil year began in the middle of November, Nectanebo II's 16th regnal year would have begun in November 344.<sup>105</sup> Computing back from this point, we can now convert our chronological data into years B.C. as follows:

Amyrtaeus	c. 404/3–398/7
Nepherites I	c. 398/7–392/1
Achoris	c. 392/1–379/8
Psammuthis	1 regnal year, probably contemporary with Achoris' regnal year 2
Nepherites II	c. 379/8. His 4-month reign would have fallen in the time-range 379–8, but its precise location cannot be established.
Nectanebo I	379/8–361/0
Teos/Tachos	361/0–359/8
Nectanebo II	359/8–342/1

Kienitz, however, discounted the evidence of *The Dream* and preferred to place the beginning of the XXXth Dynasty in 381/0. Not all his arguments need refutation, but his thesis has, on the face of it, two cogent supports: in the first

<sup>103</sup> The relevant passage has been discussed by Johnson 1974 (F 457) 13–17. Her analysis makes all previous discussions obsolete. The *Chronicle* also reveals that Nectanebo associated Tachos with himself as co-regent from regnal year 16; see p. 341.

<sup>104</sup> Chassinat 1932 (F 422) 239; Meeks 1972 (F 480) 133f.

<sup>105</sup> Text, Lavagnini 1922 (F 468) 38; discussion, Bickermann 1934 (F 409) 78f; Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 171f.

place, a Theopompus epitome (*FGrH* 115 F 103(10)) speaks of Nectanebo being king of Egypt before the end of the rebellion of Evagoras which is generally placed in 380. However, the evidence for the precise date of Evagoras' surrender is far from conclusive – a date in 379 is by no means inconceivable – but, even if we accepted 380, Theopompus could well have been referring to a position of *de facto* power acquired before Nectanebo's formal accession;<sup>106</sup> for there is good reason to believe that Nectanebo was in rebellion against the last ruler of the preceding dynasty before he came to the throne (see p. 340).

A second argument which can be used to support Kienitz's chronology is the fact that the invasion of Egypt by Artaxerxes III took place between November 343 and February 342, i.e. in Nectanebo's regnal year 17 by the old chronology, whereas Egyptian sources give him a regnal year 18, and a text at Edfu refers to a donation made by him in that year. This is not as damning as it looks. Regnal year 18 by the pre-Kienitz chronology would be 342/1 and would have begun about 10 months after the latest date for the invasion accepted by Kienitz. Given the defective nature of our sources, it is by no means impossible that Nectanebo II maintained, or even restored, his position sufficiently in the south in that year for such an inscription to be possible (see p. 343).

All in all, therefore, the case for abandoning the old chronology is not as cogent as has often been assumed. Since its dates are compatible with such monuments as exist and with the information available from classical sources (see below), it has been preferred in the narrative, but it should be borne firmly in mind that the matter is far from settled and is likely to remain so without the acquisition of new information.

*XXXIst Dynasty.* Reliable dates are, in the main, available from Babylonian chronology: Ochus, 358–337; Arses, 337–335; Darius III, 335–332.<sup>107</sup> The only problem here is the date of Ochus' succession *in Egypt*. There can no longer be any doubt that he gained control of the country some time between summer 343 and spring 342<sup>108</sup> but, according to pseudo-Manetho, he conquered Egypt in his twentieth regnal year, a date which must be expressed in terms of Babylonian chronology, i.e. 339/8.<sup>109</sup> If the text is correct, this claim means that, as far as some Egyptian chronographers were concerned, there was a gap of 1 or 2 years between the last year of Nectanebo II and Ochus' first Egyptian regnal year, i.e. Ochus invaded *c.* 343/2, but several years were spent bringing the country to heel, and he was only recognized as the legitimate king from 339/8.<sup>110</sup>

<sup>106</sup> On this question the comments of Cawkwell 1976 (C 112) 274 are well worth careful consideration.

<sup>107</sup> Parker and Dubberstein 1956 (F 159) 19, 35f. For our purposes the reign of Darius III ends with the conquest of Egypt by Alexander in 332.

<sup>108</sup> Bickermann 1934 (F 409) 80ff; Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 170–3; Johnson 1974 (F 457) 10.

<sup>109</sup> Parker and Dubberstein 1956 (F 159) 35. *Pace* Kienitz 1953 (F 463) 170, it seems probable to me that ps.-Manetho's statement was based on Babylonian chronology and that the Egyptian system was only employed in such cases once the foreigner had been recognized as king of Egypt. Waddell 1940 (F 545) 185 n. 2 is equally in error in dating it to 343.

<sup>110</sup> The suspicion that there were different views on the question of when Ochus became pharaoh is confirmed by the manuscript variants of ps.-Manetho. Africanus' version, the most authoritative

So much for kings. When we attempt to pinpoint events within a reign we are, in general, thrown back on classical sources. Dates, when given, are expressed in terms of eponymous magistrates and Olympiad dates which can easily be converted into our system of chronology by using Bickerman's tables.<sup>111</sup> It should be noted, however, that serious problems arise with Diodorus Siculus, our main source for the history of the period. We must use extreme caution in dealing with his chronology and can only accept it when corroborated by other evidence.

source, gives Ochus a reign of two years which agrees with the statement that he became king in year 20; on the other hand, Eusebius, in both the Armenian and the Syncellan versions, gives him six years, despite the fact that he also dates the conquest to year 20. If Ochus is given a reign of 6 years, the conquest has to be dated to 343. Evidently, the Eusebian tradition reflects an incomplete revision of ps.-Manetho intended to bring his chronology into line with a different view of Egyptian history; cf. Lloyd 1988 (F 477). <sup>111</sup> Bickerman 1968 (A 9) 146ff, 168ff.

## CHAPTER 9a

# CARTHAGE FROM THE BATTLE AT HIMERA TO AGATHOCLES' INVASION (480–308 B.C.)

G. CH. PICARD

### I. SOURCES AND APPROACHES


The two centuries of the history of Carthage with which we deal are crucial: in this period the Tyrian colony becomes a city state important both for the expansion of her African territory to an area of about 30,000 sq.km. (equal to Roman territory in about 300 B.C.), and for her empire of the seas which is practically identical with the western Mediterranean coastal area, except for the much smaller sphere of influence of Marseilles. The acquisition and maintenance of empire were the cause of terrible wars, especially against the Sicilian Greeks. Within the city state, this period corresponds to a change from a monarchical regime to a complex aristocratic one. This evolution has been variously interpreted by modern historians;<sup>1</sup> many think that monarchy was the result of an irregular concentration of power in the hands of a few noble families; others, with whom I agree, consider monarchy an inheritance from the Phoenician colonists. From the religious point of view, the most important cult, which had direct ties with the city state, gave to the goddess Tanit a place at least equal to that held by her partner, Ba'al Hammon, who had previously been named alone in dedications. At the same time, Demeter and Kore were borrowed from the Greeks at the very moment of the most intense struggle between the two cultures.

We discern all these facts through a kind of mist, the result of the great weakness of our sources, composed of very diverse elements of unequal value and often contradictory. No interpretation is entirely sure; we have to appeal to hypotheses in the search for coherence. We first deal briefly with the literary and epigraphic evidence.

Punic literary texts have all perished, with the exception of one document, which raises great problems and has been interpreted in quite contradictory ways; it is in fact a Greek text, pretending to be a translation from the Punic, called 'Hanno's Periplus'. Some consider it a

For the earlier history of Carthage and the Punic world see *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.2, ch. 32, section III (W. Culican), and *Pls. to Vol. III* pls. 103–11 (D. Collon).

<sup>1</sup> Huss 1985 (G 39) 467–74.



Map 10. The Punic world.

fake, others an account of an expedition on the coasts of Morocco. I think that it is a combination of two genuine Punic texts, of which the second describes a voyage around the tropical shores of western Africa at the beginning of the fifth century B.C.<sup>2</sup>

Punic inscriptions, especially numerous after the beginning of the fourth century, can be divided into two categories: epitaphs and votive inscriptions. The latter almost all come from the *tophet* of Salamambo, which will be briefly described in the following pages. Three or four sacrificial tariffs must be added, which may be dated in the fourth century. No proper legal text, no list of magistrates, not even a single dedication of a monument is known for our period. The historical interest of the inscriptions is practically limited to the titles of magistrates (*shophet*, *rab*) assumed by the dedicators themselves or by some of their ancestors.<sup>3</sup>

A few Greek inscriptions do mention Carthaginians, some of them historical figures. The most important is a decree of the Athenian *boule* concerning the Magonids Hannibal and Himilcon, in the last years of the fifth century (M–L 92; *IG* 1<sup>3</sup> 123).<sup>4</sup>

Greek and Roman authors wrote many books about Carthage. Of the few that survive we must chiefly mention some passages of Herodotus, of which the most important (VII. 166–7) will be studied later, and books XI to XX of Diodorus of Sicily, written in the third quarter of the first century B.C. This is the essential source, not only for the wars between Greeks and Carthaginians, but also for the internal politics of Carthage during the fourth century. Aristotle devoted several passages of his *Politics* 1272b to the *politeia* of the Carthaginians; his point of view changed as he learned more of this subject, so his remarks are sometimes contradictory and generally difficult to understand.<sup>5</sup> Polybius, who dealt with Carthage at the time of her wars with Rome, summarizes the previous history of the city (VI. 51) as a transition from a well-balanced regime with kings, senate and people to an immoderate democracy. Pompeius Trogus' *Philippic Histories*, written under Augustus' reign, are known from the prologues and a summary written by Justin. The end of Justin XVIII, and XIX–XXI are for the greater part devoted to Carthage, an essential source, especially for the story of the Magonids. Unfortunately Justin was a very bad historian, who mixes myth (for instance, that of Dido and Malchus) with fact, and distorts Punic institutions by giving them names (dictatorship, triumph) which have no meaning except in

<sup>2</sup> Szynger 1978 (G 83) 478, bibl. nos. 1429–60; Picard 1982 (G 65) 175–80.

<sup>3</sup> Szynger 1978 (G 83) bibl. nos. 1429–31a, 1442–4.

<sup>4</sup> Meritt 1940 (G 49) 247–53. A man called Iomilkos is called *basileus* in Delian inscriptions: *IG* XI,2 161 (inventory dated 279 B.C.) and 223 B 11 (dated 262 B.C.) which gives the title. He is no *shophet* as O. Masson thinks (Masson 1979 (G 47) 53–7) since these magistrates had no jurisdiction outside Carthaginian territory.

<sup>5</sup> Weil 1960 (B 123) 228–52.

Latin, and no equivalent in Punic. No fact attested by Justin alone can be considered trustworthy.

Archaeology offers some valuable help. At Carthage, the place where Ba'al Hammon and Tanit were worshipped, the *tophet* (a Hebrew word borrowed from the Book of Kings in the Bible) where children were sacrificed, was located in 1921 near the harbours, in the district now called Salamambo. Many monuments, once dedicated there and displaced in the Roman period, had previously been discovered. We know several hundred dedications which can be dated in the fifth and fourth centuries. We shall study the typological evolution later.

Tombs of the sixth century are numerous and rich; the relative scarcity of those of the fifth century raises problems. For the fourth, we know many cemeteries; one of them, called the *rabs*, was certainly used by the aristocracy at the end of the century and enclosed the most magnificent monuments ever built in Carthage.<sup>6</sup>

In Africa outside Carthage, Hadrumetum must have been occupied about 600 B.C., Kerkouane about 550, the Tripolitanian *emporia* about 500. There is no proof that Utica is older than Carthage and the story told to Pliny (*HN* XVI. 216) by the warden of Apollo's temple about the age of its timbers deserves little respect. But it is true that the town had some kind of independence from Carthage, both in politics and in religion, being one of the very few African towns which lacks a *tophet*.<sup>7</sup>

In Sicily, Punic presence is most evident at Motya; there is a *tophet* which must be contemporary with that of Carthage, but showing marked originality in the decoration of its stelae. Dionysius of Syracuse destroyed the town in 396 B.C. It was replaced by Lilybaeum (Marsala). Palermo and Solunto are Phoenician but not Punic towns, probably founded by colonists from Lebanon. They lack a *tophet*, as well as typical Punic objects such as razors. At Selinus a mosaic with the so called Sign of Tanit attests Punic presence after the sack of 409 B.C. Untypical sites on the island have often been called Punic without reason.<sup>8</sup>

In Sardinia *tophets* exist at Sulcis, Monte Sirai and Nora, where a Phoenician inscription, perhaps of the ninth century, has been found.<sup>9</sup> Punic culture existed beside the Nuraghic and survived the Roman conquest for several centuries.

In Spain a distinctive Phoenician culture appears on several Andalusian sites, probably not before 1000 B.C. at the earliest. It differs from the Punic culture especially in its lack of *tophets* (since there was no cult of Ba'al Hammon and Tanit before the Barcids) and the persistence of red-varnished ware, originating in Lebanon, which disappears in Carthage by 700 B.C. There was only one genuine colony of Carthage, nearby on

<sup>6</sup> Bénichou-Safar 1982 (G 9) 132-5.

<sup>7</sup> P-W Suppl. IX s.v. 'Utica' (G. Ville).

<sup>8</sup> Moscati 1980 (G 55) 111-49.

<sup>9</sup> *KAI* 63, 339, no. 46.



Ibiza. Carthaginians, however, maintained strong political and economic ties with Phoenicians settled in Spain and Morocco, whom they considered fellow-countrymen. (See also *CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.2, 512–35, 540–6.)

In Italy, an important stream of commerce brought to the centre of the peninsula fine jewellers and works of art such as the Praeneste bowl, and established at Pyrgi a colony which played a decisive part in religion and politics under the reign of Thefarie Veliunas (about 500 B.C.). This traffic seems to have been controlled by the Phoenician cities in Lebanon. However, an alliance was concluded between Carthaginians and Etruscans to resist the establishment of Phocaeans in Corsica, and was victorious at Alalia in 535 B.C. Subsequently, this alliance played no part in the war in Sicily during the fifth century, but it was revived in the fourth century so effectively that Aristotle (*Pol.* 1280a 36–8) could comment on the extreme closeness of their commercial ties. Archaeological evidence attests the strength of cultural ties between Carthage and Etruria in the last years of the fourth century, confirming Aristotle's observation.<sup>10</sup>

## II. THE RULE OF THE MAGONIDS

On this evidence we have to build a largely hypothetical scheme. First we deal with the political regime, and especially the ruling authority. No single Punic text certainly designates the head of the state for this period, and words used by Roman writers, such as *dictator* or *imperator* are meaningless in any other language, as is apparent from the fact that the translators of Punic dedications to Roman emperors could find no words for them. We call the kings of Carthage *basileis*, the title regularly employed by the Greeks for them, as for the absolute King of Persia. It is most probable that the Punic equivalent was *milk*, a title given to Thefarie Veliunas in the Pyrgi tablets.

The fundamental evidence is that of Herodotus, contemporary and credible. He tells us (VII.166) that in 480 B.C. Hamilcar, son of Hanno of the family of Mago, was elected as *basileus*, and this because of his valour (*andragathia*) which proves that the *basileus* was primarily a war leader. We know from Diodorus XIII.43.5 and Justin (XVIII.7.19) that Hamilcar's ancestor Mago, was himself (apparently the first in his family) *basileus* about the middle of the sixth century.<sup>11</sup> We have also to account for a very obscure and mutilated passage in Aristotle (*Pol.* 1272b 38–40): 'The advantage in Carthage (*vis-à-vis* Sparta) is that the kings are not confined to one family, and that one of no particular distinction, and also that if any family distinguishes itself . . .' (trans. Rackham, Loeb,

<sup>10</sup> Picard 1970 (G 75) 132–4.

<sup>11</sup> Genealogy of the Magonids: Maurin 1962 (G 48) 13, n. 2.

1959 p. 161). Aristotle speaks for his own time, when kings could be chosen from several families; but, like Herodotus, he seems to think that the *basileus* was selected in consideration of his personal qualities among his kinsmen or other nobles. This is what Samuel does, when, at the direction of the Lord, he anoints David, youngest son of Jesse, excluding his elders.<sup>12</sup> Such a process certainly excludes popular election, even if there was some kind of solemn recognition of the *basileus* after the choice by the people or the army. The choice itself could only be made by a select body, perhaps one of the pentarchies, which, according to Aristotle (*Pol.* 1273a 13–15), had the right of appointing the Hundred Judges (see below) and the most important dignitaries.

Even if the *basileus* was essentially a war-lord, he could not act as commander of the armies without being previously endowed with religious authority. This is clear in Herodotus: during the whole battle at Himera, Hamilcar remained in the camp, slaughtering victims and studying the omens from their viscera (VII.167). It was normal in antiquity that a general should take the omens before a battle, but it is astonishing in this case, that a man chosen especially for his valour, took absolutely no part in the action either as commander or as fighter. This shows that even the military function of the Carthaginian *basileus* consisted primarily in obtaining the favour of the gods, and this is quite in accordance with the practice of all Semitic peoples.

This religious role of the *basileus* carried with it considerable responsibilities. For this again Herodotus is informative: seeing defeat Hamilcar threw himself into the pyre and died in the flames. This version of the king's death must have been given Herodotus by the Carthaginians since the Syracusans knew nothing of it. He says also that Hamilcar was worshipped as a god or hero by his countrymen, a monument being dedicated to him in Carthage and others in each Punic colony.<sup>13</sup> This is confirmed by Diodorus (XIII.62.4 and cf. XI.22.1): after his revenge at Himera in 409 B.C., Hamilcar's grandson Hannibal sacrificed 3,000 prisoners in honour of his forebear. This behaviour corresponds better with theories of kingship dependent on cult, than with other explanations recently offered (suicide from remorse or 'potlatch').<sup>14</sup>

Hamilcar's self-sacrifice clearly prefigures Vergil's account of Dido's voluntary death, and somewhat later Himilco's penance will be an

<sup>12</sup> This way of choosing the king seems very similar to the Spartan: Carlier 1984 (A 13) 248–9.

<sup>13</sup> A statue of the middle of the fifth century recently discovered at Motya could belong to Hamilcar's monument in the city: Falsone 1986 (G 20); 1988 (G 21).

<sup>14</sup> Grotanelli 1983 (G 27) 437–41; he borrowed the notion of 'potlatch' from R. Mauss, who found it in Amerindian ethnology. It describes a challenge for power in which the competitors try to outdo each other by the splendour of their gifts, the lesser eventually taking his own life. The main objections are that potlatch is attested in neither the Semitic nor the Greek world, and that it exists only within a society and not between two peoples at war, especially of different cultures.

attenuated form of the same ritual (see below). This means that there existed a tie between the myth of the origins of the city, unparalleled elsewhere and perpetuated by the cult of Dido, and the royal ideology of the Magonid period; this tie consisted essentially in the religious responsibility of the king.<sup>15</sup>

In the fifth and fourth centuries, the *basileus* of Carthage had no colleague. This is shown by the fact that in 407 B.C., Hannibal being already an old man, his nephew Himilco was required to assist him without having the royal title, which he received only after Hannibal's death.<sup>16</sup> If there had been two kings, either the second would have been able to replace Hannibal, or Himilco, being already king, would immediately have taken command after the death of his associate.

We shall see that the judicial powers of the king were practically nonexistent; the title of *shophet*, whose basic meaning is judge, is inappropriate, but, as we have observed, *milk*, attested in the Pyrgi inscription, is wholly suitable.<sup>17</sup>

On two occasions, Diodorus (XIII.43.5 and XIV.54.5) describes the king of Carthage as *basileus kata nomous*; the same formula is used by Thucydides (v.66.2) for the king of Sparta.<sup>18</sup> This means that the king of Carthage was not exactly elected, the Lacedaemonian *basileis* being hereditary, but that he had to obey the laws of the city. The *basileus* of Carthage could not in fact undertake any expedition without the agreement of the people, and some special authority to make war. Sometimes (for instance in 410) the opposition was strong enough to delay the declaration of war, or to reduce the forces granted to the king.<sup>19</sup> The first sentence of the 'Periplus of Hanno' is probably a version of a decision of the popular assembly defining the royal mission (foundation of colonies on the Atlantic coast of Morocco). Though we have no case of a royal trial, one of the sons of Hamilcar of Himera, Giscon, was banished for a time (Diod. XIII.43.5). It is possible that the necessity of obtaining the people's agreement to their enterprises, which perhaps included the adoption of a special title by the *basileus*, gave rise to the use by Roman writers of the word *dictator*, to translate a formula more or less analogous to the Greek *basileus autokrator*.

The main achievement of the Magonids was the establishment of empire. The story of Malchus, found in Justin XVIII.7, is entirely mythical: there is no trace of important wars in Sardinia and Sicily in the middle of the sixth century and it is quite incredible that Carthage could

<sup>15</sup> Picard 1954 (G 67) 27-45.

<sup>16</sup> Diod. XIII.43.5 says that the Carthaginians established as general Hannibal, who was already king according to the law; and in XIV.54.5, that they chose Himilcon as king according to the law in order that he could lead the war. <sup>17</sup> *Pls. to Vol. IV* pl. 297, for the Pyrgi inscription.

<sup>18</sup> Carlier 1984 (A 13) 248. <sup>19</sup> Diod. XIII.43.3; Huss 1985 (G 39) 108.

have raised an important army from her citizens at this time, since she was not able to do this even at the height of her power. The death of Carthalo, crucified by his father in his sacerdotal dress, is evidently a tale invented to justify one of the forms of the sacrifice of the king's son. At the Battle of Alalia the Punic force comprised only the fleet, the military power of the city being just sufficient to maintain its navy and to guard Carthage against the Libyans to whom tribute was still paid.<sup>20</sup>

The first task of Mago and his successors was diplomatic. Many important treaties were concluded in the last third of the sixth century, thanks to the activity of Mago and his son Hasdrubal. The alliance with the Etruscan League, and especially with Caere, resulted in the victory of Alalia and the driving of the Phocaeans out of Corsica (535 B.C.). Shortly after, Caere was ruled by Thefarie Velinus, and an important Phoenician colony lived in her harbour town, Pyrgi, worshipping Astarte, assimilated to Uni. Rome was then very closely associated with Caere, and there is no difficulty in accepting the date of the first treaty she concluded with Carthage, recorded by Polybius who gives (III.22.7–9 see Walbank *ad loc.*) a detailed translation of the text (509 B.C.). Romans were forbidden to travel in Byzacium and Tripolitania, which Carthaginians were in the process of settling but they were permitted, under supervision, to sail to western Sicily and Sardinia which Carthaginians regarded as their property. Other treaties were concluded with the Persians, whose King seems to have considered Carthage as a dependency of his empire, and with the Phoenicians of Spain, which Punic forces seem to have protected against the natives. At the beginning of the fifth century, Hanno's and Himilco's expeditions must be the consequence of these agreements, but Hanno's attempt to colonize the Atlantic coasts of Morocco proved a failure. As for the Greeks, Phocaeans (including Massaliotes) on one side, and Gelon on the other, were considered as enemies, but Anaxilas of Rhegium and Terrillus of Agrigentum were friends, and Carthage protected them against Gelon and Theron of Agrigentum.

This political activity could deploy an army of a very peculiar type, created by the Magonids as a logical consequence of the shortage of manpower in the city and the relations established with a great number of 'under-developed' barbarians. The force consisted of mercenaries bred among those fierce savages who liked war and would accept relatively little pay. Only a small guard, the so-called Sacred Band, was composed of young Carthaginian nobles. Herodotus tells us (VII.165) that Hamilcar of Himera disembarked in Sicily with the Phoenicians (the guard), Libyans, Iberians, Ligyans and Elisyces (whose fatherland was Catalonia and Languedoc), Sardinians and Corsicans: on the whole, a

<sup>20</sup> Gauthier 1960 (G 26) 268–70; Maurin 1962 (G 48) 20–1, n. 3.

colonial army, not unlike, *mutatis mutandis*, those of France and Great Britain in the beginning of this century. This sort of army has the advantage of being relatively cheap, both in wages and weapons; but it required brave and cunning recruiting officers, who after the creation of the army remained on its staff. It restricted use of the hoplite phalanx and did not allow complicated manoeuvres. Its strength relative to Greek armies was comparable with that of the Persians relative to the Greeks, and in both cases Greeks won. Tactics and equipment seem to have improved considerably in the course of the fifth century, as is shown by the brilliant victories of Hannibal at Selinus, Himera and Agrigentum.

War and the economy are obviously related. War was expensive in antiquity but an army and navy are profitable investments for well-organized states, since looting is the greatest source of profit. However, for the state of Carthage trade was necessarily the only important source of income. At the beginning, as has been shown by C. Picard and J. Alexandropoulos,<sup>21</sup> the city was essentially a staging-point for ships returning from Spain, which had travelled from Lebanon to Malta, Sicily and Sardinia. Colaëus' voyage (*CAH* III<sup>2</sup>.3, 139, 214) demonstrates the colossal profit to be gained from such voyages, but Carthage had long to be content with a tiny share of this wealth, and could expand only when she was able to enjoy most of it. This could happen when Tyre was besieged by Nebuchadrezzar (587–574) and, under the pressure of Greek competition, Carthage was better able to resist than any of the Phoenician cities.

But an ancient commercial economy is well balanced only when it controls land where trade profits can be invested in agriculture. Centuries elapsed before Carthage was able to secure such property on her very restricted peninsula. According to Justin (*xix*.1.3–4), who on this occasion seems credible, the first Magonids failed to suppress the power of the neighbouring chieftains, and it was only during the period of apparent quiet after the battle of Himera that their successors (among whom was the mysterious Hanno the Great) succeeded in subduing them. Thereafter Carthage need no more fear caprices of fortune. The foundation of Kerkouane about 500 B.C., and the extraordinary expansion of the cemeteries all over Cape Bon during the fifth century, as well as the digging of quarries at El Haouaria, whose sandstone was used for every sort of building in Carthage, confirm that the peninsula was under firm control. It is quite possible that the impoverishment suggested by the tombs in Carthage herself during the fifth century was caused by the migration of some of the richest families to the newly conquered lands. The famous Punic agronomist Mago, who probably lived much later, advises the landlords to live on their estates rather than in town

<sup>21</sup> Picard 1982 (*G* 74) 161–73.

(Columella 1.1.18), and this seems to have been the usual practice. As soon as they controlled Cape Bon and the mountainous district which lies between it and the capital, Punic farmers could develop the vine and olives, which could be sold at high prices, while corn was supplied in abundance by the lower Mejerda valley and Byzacene. Land was tilled by Libyan peasants who were reduced to a very harsh serfdom, which later occasioned fierce revolts, but had the advantage of reducing the cost of labour almost to nothing.

If we examine the activities of the *basileus*, we see that he had very little time left to administer Carthage: diplomacy, recruiting, wars and voyages kept him abroad for years. Justice, holding of the various assemblies and councils, enforcement of the laws, required a full-time magistrate. Those who admit the existence at this time of *shophets* are certainly correct; but it is impossible that the same man could have held both offices, and we have seen that there was only one *basileus*. This office was certainly distinct from the *shophet*, and the two offices were complementary. We do not know how many *shophets* were in office then, nor for how long they held office, nor how they were chosen. The tariff of Marseilles is dated by the names of two eponymous *shophets*;<sup>22</sup> these at least were certainly in office for one year, but the same text says that they had colleagues. It is therefore possible that from a college of several members, two had been selected each year to preside and these gave their names to the year. I think this solution more probable than the assumption that the colleagues mentioned in the text were other magistrates, elected for duties different from those of the eponymous *shophets*. However, there were certainly financial managers, municipal officers in charge of streets, markets and public buildings, controllers of the temples, officers of the police and perhaps many other civil servants. All certainly answered to the senate, which had the task of co-ordinating public activities in general, including those of the *basileus*. The poverty of the Punic language necessitated the use of very few words to name the different magistrates, instead of creating special terms for each, as in Greece and Rome. Some conclude from this that there were only as many magistrates as there were words for them, but it is quite impossible that such an important political system could have been managed like a small borough.

The astonishing strength of the Punic city state was certainly founded on the religious faith that motivated most of its citizens, which was considered by most other people as cruel fanaticism. In fact the Carthaginians had in common with most Semitic peoples a feeling for the transcendency of divinity which is lacking among Indo-Europeans. This did not, as with the Hebrews, lead to a belief in the unity of God,

<sup>22</sup> *KAI* no. 69; Huss 1985 (G 39) 540, n. 296.

but to a very hierarchical conception of the pantheon: only one god, or a god and his partner, were really transcendent, the others acting as mere assistants or intermediaries with the mortal world. As in Egypt, several theological systems existed, each giving the supreme role to a different god or goddess. What is characteristic of Carthage is the giving of the first rank to Ba'al Hammon, a god to whom the homeland Phoenicians paid little respect.

Our knowledge of Punic religion in this period is founded essentially on the excavation of *tophets*, of worship-places characteristic of Ba'al Hammon, though the word *tophet* itself has not been found in Punic inscriptions, but is borrowed from the Bible. Its true meaning seems to be 'the place of burning' where infants, probably previously killed with a knife, were reduced to ashes, which were sealed in a pot buried in the sacred area. Very often a stone monument was raised over the urn. Nowhere else, except perhaps at Hadrumetum has the burning place been discovered. The *tophet* of Carthage consists of a large area west of the commercial harbour. The oldest monument, called 'chappelle Cintas' after its discoverer, must be studied from his original reports which are credible,<sup>23</sup> and can be tested on site. It had been built at the very beginning of the cult, at least by about 750 B.C. In the period of the Magonids the votive monument standing over the urn with the ashes of the sacrificed child, sometimes mixed with those of an animal, and some offerings, is a block of sandstone, carved in the shape of a throne bearing a pillar, or a chapel resembling an Egyptian temple. Some of these monuments bear an inscription reading 'cippus dedicated (by sacrifice) *molk* to Ba'al'. No goddess is named. When the cippus is in the form of a chapel, figures are frequently represented inside it; some are symbols, the most frequent being in the form of a bottle (Fig. 6), and some in human shape. The latter are much more numerous at Motya<sup>24</sup> than at Carthage. Before the end of the fifth century a symbol appears composed of a triangle bearing a bar and a circle, which it is customary to call the Sign of Tanit and which probably represents the divine power (Fig. 7).<sup>25</sup>

### III. THE DISMANTLING OF KINGSHIP

The fourth century B.C. is a deeply disturbed period in Punic history. A terrific struggle, in which neither of the adversaries could succeed, was engaged with Syracuse, which, under Dionysius' tyranny, became the champion of western hellenism. One consequence of this war was the fall of the Mago family. Other statesmen, the most illustrious being Hanno, tried in vain to restore a strong personal power. Aristocracy at last

<sup>23</sup> CRAI 1946, 373-4; P. Cintas, *La céramique punique* (Paris, 1950) 490; Picard 1954 (G 67) 30-1.

<sup>24</sup> Moscati and Uberti 1981 (G 57). <sup>25</sup> Picard 1978 (G 63) 91-112.




Fig. 6. Stela with 'bottle' symbol from Motya; Motya Museum. (After Moscati and Uberti 1981 (G 57) fig. 34.746.)




Fig. 7. Stelae with Tanit signs from Carthage; Carthage Museum.

imposed its authority through a pitiless justice. At the same time, fundamental reforms transformed religion. In the *tophet* cult the goddess Tanit took pre-eminence over her partner Ba'al Hammon. The cult of Demeter and Kore was introduced, borrowed from the Syracusans but soon punicized, while the Punic gods, Eshmun and Shadrappa, were more or less assimilated, the former to Asclepius, the latter to Dionysus. The basic spirit of Punic religion was, however, not altered since these gods were only auxiliaries of the supreme deities, and did not share their transcendence, and it is interesting to observe that the harshness of political conflict did not suppress cultural development.



The events that resulted in the institution of an aristocratic republic in Carthage belong to the first half of the fourth century. In 409 B.C. royal power was in the hands of Hannibal, grandson of the Hamilcar who perished at Himera in 480 B.C. The Athenians' expedition against Syracuse appeared to him as an opportunity to avenge a still painful defeat. Though resisted by a large body of opinion, the king succeeded not only in destroying Himera but in conquering all the southern coast of Sicily, sacking Selinus and Agrigentum. But after his natural death, his cousin and heir Himilco failed to take Syracuse. Already disagreeing on the decision to go to war, his countrymen did not judge that the penance he inflicted on himself, completed with his suicide, was enough to restore the fortunes of the dynasty,<sup>26</sup> especially since the threat had helped Dionysius to regain his tyranny at Syracuse, and to develop an ambitious international policy, eased by the triumph of Sparta over Athens. The destruction of Motya in 397 compensated for the loss of Selinus and Agrigentum, which remained henceforth dependent on the Carthaginian *eparchia* in Sicily. Carthage could even be vulnerable in Africa, as was shown by a terrible rising of the Libyan peasants (Diod. xv.24), which Himilco's successor, Mago, whose family is unknown to us, had to face. Just after surviving this trial, Mago had to prevent an attempt of Dionysius to unite Magna Graecia. He was able to revive the old Etruscan alliance, and it is probably then that the pact with Rome, still intimately associated with Caere, was renewed. But Mago fell in a battle with Dionysius. The two adversaries exhausted themselves without obtaining victory and a peace, quite profitable for Carthage, was concluded in 373 B.C.

External and internal problems (a new Libyan revolt broke out immediately after Mago's death) embittered contentions within the leading class. The second third of the fourth century was especially disturbed. The outstanding personality, Hanno, nicknamed the Great as had been an homonymous Magonid in the previous century, is depicted by Justin (xx.5.11; XXI.4) as a very wealthy man who was reputed to own as much money as the state. He could seek support from popular societies, and even the slaves and Libyan serfs; many of these features seem borrowed from the traditional image of the Greek tyrant, but there may be some truth in them. For instance, the banquets at which Hanno is said to have tried to poison the senators, are perhaps those public meals which Aristotle calls *syssitia* (*Pol.* 1272b). J. M. Dentzer has shown that this was an oriental institution borrowed by Greek aristocrats and tyrants, and so it is quite probable that it existed also in Carthage.<sup>27</sup> Traces of the practice can be found in the cities of Roman North Africa.

Hanno succeeded first in having the leader of his opponents, Eshmu-

<sup>26</sup> Maurin 1962 (G 48). <sup>27</sup> Dentzer 1982 (J 12) 433-4.

niaton (whose name has been altered to Suniaton), sentenced to death. His victim had supported a reconciliation with Syracuse, possibly with the help of philhellenic circles. Hanno was firmly attached to national traditions, and went so far as to forbid by law the teaching of Greek, but when he tried to restore absolute power and to suppress the legal authorities, the people rose against him; taken alive, he died after terrible torture.

The fall of the Magonids and the failure of Hanno resulted in the conclusive institution of an oligarchy, which Aristotle registered among his *politeiai*, comparing it to the constitutions of Sparta and Crete. Information reached the philosopher at various times, registering situations that changed quickly. His aim and method was to generalize not analyse. This led him to compare institutions which seem to have little in common, such as the ephors of Sparta and the Court of the Hundred at Carthage, only because both exercised essentially a right of control. We must not conclude that Aristotle did not understand the laws of Carthage, but that he saw them from a point of view different from our own.

This difficulty is aggravated by the great poverty of Punic political language. Three or four words were enough to define most diverse offices. The words *rab* and *shophet* occur frequently in inscriptions; the first may apply to the chief or president of any group, club, senate or religious college, as well as the general of an army. Sometimes the meaning is made more precise by a determinative: *rab kohanim* means chief of the priests. But the dignitaries buried in the beautifully carved sarcophagus at Sainte Monique in Carthage are called *rab* without other determinative.<sup>28</sup> The title *rab mahanat*, which means chief of the army, has been found so far only in Punic inscriptions of the Roman imperial period, where it is translated as consul; but it would certainly be absurd to conclude that there were no generals to lead Punic armies in the fourth or third centuries.

It is certain that supreme authority lay with a senate or council, which Aristotle and Polybius compare with the Spartan *gerousia* and the Senate of Rome, though these two assemblies had little in common.<sup>29</sup> It is generally admitted that the members of this senate were many. We do not know anything about the mode of election. It had a board of maybe thirty men and was divided into committees of five members, called pentarchies by Aristotle, whose very imprecise remarks suggest that the selection of officers was based both on the personal qualities and the

<sup>28</sup> Huss 1979 (G 38) 217–32, and 1985 (G 39) 465, argues that the *rab* were the heads of the financial administration. I think this is not supported by any evidence.

<sup>29</sup> On the title of ‘senators’ (DRM or RSM) Huss 1985 (G 39) 462, n. 37. It is remarkable that there seems not to have existed a word for the ‘senate’ as a whole.

wealth of the candidates. Aristotle says also that the pentarchies chose the Hundred Judges (*Pol.* 1273a 13–15), whose first task was control of the magistrates who held the political and military power. We already saw that he speaks of *basileis* who were taken from several families; this agrees with the assertions of Diodorus and Justin (xxi.4.1) about Hanno the Great and Bomilcar: kingship has been dismantled rather than abolished, and the *basileis* retained the right of commanding the armies, under the rigorous control of the Hundred. The *shophets*, among whom two were eponymous, strictly had no military competence, as is shown by the fact that no one was able to face Agathocles' attack.<sup>30</sup> They probably dealt with non-political justice. The popular assembly could interfere only when there was a contest between the senate and the magistrates, which probably seldom occurred, since the aristocracy could easily get rid of its adversaries by the sentence of the Hundred. But the power of societies such as Aristotle's *sysitia* could eventually balance the authority of councils, as is shown by Hanno's experience. One thing is sure: until the end of the fourth century, Punic military command maintained an efficiency that was to be lost in the third, the unfortunate generals then being deprived of any authority by the tyranny of the Hundred.

There is probably some relation between political changes and religious innovation (cf. Diod. xx.14.4–7). One example is the cult of the *tophet* which, as we have seen, directly concerned the fate of the city; this appeared clearly when Carthage was for the first time besieged by Agathocles, and public opinion compelled the nobles who had managed to save their sons from the pyre to sacrifice them, arguing that their fraud was the cause of the disaster. About one century before, the monuments of the *tophet* had taken a new shape: around 400 B.C., massive cippi are replaced by stelae looking like small obelisks, topped by a pyramid and carved on their fronts with decoration almost always associated with an inscription. This is a dedication mentioning first 'the Lady Tanit, face of Ba'al' and only in second place the god Ba'al Hammon.<sup>31</sup> The discovery by Pritchard of a plate dedicated at Sarepta to Tanit and Ashtart solves conclusively the problem of the Phoenician origin of Tanit.<sup>32</sup> It is remarkable that this goddess, of apparently little reputation in Phoenicia, could rise to the first place in the Punic pantheon, overshadowing even her partner. This can only be the result of a drastic reform of which the causes remain unknown to us, but which is contemporary, on the one hand with the adoption of the cult of Demeter, on the other with the dismantling of kingship. It is hardly credible that there was no connex-

<sup>30</sup> It appears clearly from Diod. xx.6.3 that before the election of Hanno and Bomilcar as *strategoi* there was no possibility of opposing the invaders, who met no resistance at Cape Bon.

<sup>31</sup> Huss 1985 (G 39) 513–14. <sup>32</sup> Pritchard 1982 (G 76) 83–92.




Fig. 8. Stela with priest holding child, from Carthage. (Height 1.15m; Tunis, Bardo Museum Cb 229). (After Harden 1980 (F 263) pl. 35; Picard 1976 (G 63) pl. 8.10.)

ion between these three phenomena which redefined the character of Carthage. The symbols and figures carved on the stelae are as numerous and various as the texts of their dedications are monotonous; the depiction of worship, especially the image of a priest in Egyptian linen robes and a round cap (the Phoenician national dress) holding in his arms an infant ready for sacrifice (Fig. 8), is highly impressive.

The installation of the cult of Demeter is related by Diodorus (xiv.77.5). It was intended to expiate Himilco's sacrilege, and according to the historian, priests and priestesses were chosen among Greeks living in Carthage. However, the cult very quickly became punicized, and in the Roman imperial period inscriptions distinguish the *Ceres punica* from the Greek. A *favissa* excavated by Father Delattre on the Borj Jedid hill




Fig. 9. Bronze razor from Carthage; Carthage Museum. (Cf. Picard 1967 (G 66) pl. 30, no. 37.)

seems to mark the place where the temple stood.<sup>33</sup> Demeter was accompanied by her daughter Kore, and Pluto; terracotta statues found at Cape Bon are likely to represent the cult images. A *naiskos* found in Thuburbo Maius, where Greek architectural mouldings are used in a characteristic non-Greek composition with a heavy flat entablature, is probably a model of the temple in Carthage.

All this shows that Punic society in the fourth century is relatively well known. Even the physical appearance of the Carthaginians is sketched on the stelae of the *tophet*, in silhouettes rather than portraits, and may be compared with the statues adorning the sarcophagi from Sainte Monique. These statues are the result of a cultural syncretism to which Phoenicia, Egypt, Greece and Etruria contributed. None, of course, is a portrait, even idealized, but the men wear the dress of Punic dignitaries, a long tunic with an *epitogium* on the shoulder, while the women are

<sup>33</sup> *CRAI* 1923, 354–66; Picard 1982/3 (G 64) 187–94.

clasped in the wings of a gigantic dove, a strange garment characteristic of Isis. Engraved finger rings bear human heads worthy of the best Greek jewellers.<sup>34</sup> Engraving was also used to adorn the flat sides of razors in the shape of a hatchet, which are found only in Punic tombs; some drawings are inspired by Egypt, others illustrate Greek myths or figures (Fig. 9).<sup>35</sup>

It was long believed that Carthage did not use coins before 400 B.C. and first used them only to pay her mercenaries, especially in Sicily. Now an issue can perhaps be dated to the end of the fifth century,<sup>36</sup> while Palermo and Motya already had mints, strongly influenced by Greek workshops. This Siculo-Punic coinage persisted throughout the fourth century, having as its main purpose the paying of the army. But as early as the first half of the fourth century Carthage started to issue gold coins whose weight is the Phoenician shekel, while Sicilian coins observe the drachma standard. We can see that there was a twofold stream in trade, one directed towards Sicily and the other towards the old eastern fatherland, which, after Alexander's conquest, depended upon the flourishing Lagid kingdom. We must not forget that ambitious economic plans embraced the whole far west, with Spain, the mysterious cultures of Atlantic Gaul, then withering under Celtic pressure, Morocco and even tropical Africa, the marvellous islands of the western ocean.<sup>37</sup>

Carthage's prosperity, which had already struck Thucydides (in the speech by Hermocrates, VI.34.2), is reflected in brilliant architecture. The building of a double harbour in the pools at Salamambo started with the digging of a large channel running from south to north, which probably began in Kram bay and went as far as the later war harbour, constructed only at the time of the wars with Rome.<sup>38</sup> Kerkouane, destroyed by Regulus, has preserved her double rampart, and quite hygienic and comfortable houses with bathrooms including shoe-shaped tubs.<sup>39</sup> Hellenistic innovations were quickly adopted: for instance, the internal courtyard becomes a peristyle, adapted to local usage.

In spite of this prosperity, the Punic city state was not spared that universal crisis of the polis which had begun in Greece. Polybius (VI.51), following Aristotle (*Pol.* 1316b 5), describes this as a decay, leading from well-balanced institutions to extreme democracy, which he considers as the end of the political cycle. The Achaean historian's views are biased by his conservatism, but he is right to consider that the evolution in Carthage was more rapid than in Rome. The Punic system was in fact more intricate than the Roman, and the causes of unrest more numerous.

<sup>34</sup> Quillard 1979, 1987 (G 77).      <sup>35</sup> Picard 1967 (G 66).

<sup>36</sup> Cutroni-Tusa 1983 (G 16) 40 gives the latest account of the problem.

<sup>37</sup> Huss 1985 (G 39) 84-5.      <sup>38</sup> Hurst 1983 (G 36) 603-10.      <sup>39</sup> Fantar 1984/5 (G 23).

In Africa, Carthage's large and well-managed territory of course procured important income, and when one walks in the streets of Kerkouane, one can see that the inhabitants of this rather modest borough were as well-off as their contemporaries in Greece or Campania. But this prosperity did not benefit the Libyan peasants who constituted the main manpower. Carthage's leaders, conscious of this problem, attempted to solve it by settling colonists in the region of the present Bou Arada, and by cultural assimilation, which succeeded in giving birth to half-breeds called by the Greeks Libyphoenicians. But frequent revolts showed that ethnic opposition remained alive. The still independent tribes were beginning to build a political organization, which obliged Carthage to keep an army on the border and to extend occupation to the west and south. In Sicily, Carthage could have taken advantage of the end of Dionysius' tyranny, but Timoleon, who tried to restore aristocracy in Syracuse, wanted to strengthen his regime by military glory, and his victory on the Crimisus, in which the elite of the Punic army was annihilated, made clear that Carthage had not solved her war problems. It is on this occasion that our sources mention for the first time the execution of incompetent or unlucky generals (Plut. *Tim.* 22). However, the military leaders had not yet entirely lost authority, and a kind of balance between the powers, highly praised by Aristotle (*Pol.* 1272b 24ff), seems to have still prevailed.

Though we are able to follow more or less the changes in Carthage's external policy, her real character remains obscure. Even the textless pictures on the stelae of the *tophet* raise many problems to which there is no logical answer. The outburst of fanaticism that resulted in the slaughter of hundreds of adult noble children, when Agathocles attacked the city, attests the existence of hidden tendencies that might be called retrograde. This means that we can draw no ready parallels with situations elsewhere and in other periods. The only certainty is that the aristocracy, which was probably not homogeneous, hardened its resistance both to personal power, lacking now the support of solid institutions and becoming a mere toy for the ambitious, and to popular aspirations. Agathocles' invasion, foolishly daring as it was, revealed in the clearest light all the weaknesses of the city state: the incapacity of the lawful holders of civil power, especially the *shophets*, to oppose the invaders with the slightest force, because they entirely lacked anything like the Roman *imperium*; the outburst of religious fanaticism; the crimes and excesses of military leaders called back from Sicily, among whom the most illustrious, Bomilcar, was perhaps an offspring of Hanno the Great; the cruelty and meanness of the aristocracy. This gloomy picture has been drawn for us by Timaeus, whom Diodorus faithfully transcribed, and Timaeus was a rhetorician. Bomilcar's speech in the agora of

Carthage (Justin xxii.7.9–11), uttered from the cross on which he died, is clearly a scholastic exercise. But even embellished or distorted facts remain facts; the very expansion of the city had destroyed the basis of legal order, as had been the case in Greece before, and as would happen later in Rome.




## CHAPTER 9b

# SOUTH ITALY IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B. C.

NICHOLAS PURCELL

The fifteen decades which elapsed between the expedition to Sicily of the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War and the war between Pyrrhus of Epirus and the Romans are something of a heroic age in Italian history. It was a time of trial during which the success or failure of communities was constantly at stake, and in which the patterns of the preceding centuries were often obliterated and those which were to endure until the late imperial period formed. The trial took the form of almost unceasing warfare, confused by continuous changing of sides according to a mutable diplomacy and the exigencies of more or less mercenary manpower. Overall, the losers were the already ancient *apoikiai*, the city states of the Greek diaspora, whose champions, whether leaders from within the body politic or *condottieri* summoned from the east, all failed to establish their power sufficiently for either their descendants or their successors to share in it. The victory went to the Italic communities, whose elites in this period provided the forebears of long lines of city aristocrats whose tradition endured until the Roman empire. That such continuity came out of this period reminds us that it was no Dark Age. The victors were not usually in a position to despoil or obliterate completely; the fighting was not genocidal. This was partly because the warfare of the time was promoted and fuelled by background social and economic conditions which were tending, despite the dangers of the time, in positive directions: demographically, Italy was regarded at this time as a place with relatively abundant manpower, and the rewards of the integration of local production systems into Mediterranean-wide networks of distribution and consumption were becoming generally more palpable. In this situation the assertiveness of the Italic

This account is intended to follow the themes of *CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> chs. 14 (Salmon) and 15 (Penney), and to replace the brief résumés of *CAH* vi<sup>1</sup> 127–31 (on Dionysius I in Italy) and 299–301 (on the *condottieri* at Taras). It is a slender attempt at a fusion of the themes of the political history of Megale Hellas as they were set out by Ciaceri 1927–32 (G 138) and Giannelli 1928 (G 180) with the much more recent understanding of the social and cultural circumstances of the time. I am grateful to the editors for their help, and for the facilities of the British School at Rome where much of it was composed. Readers should note that the term *Italiote* means a citizen of a Greek city on the Italian mainland; *Italic*, on the other hand, refers to the other inhabitants of the peninsula.



Map 11. Italy.



Fig. 10. Bronze corslet dedicated by Novius Fannius; Switzerland, private collection. (After Colonna 1984 (G 142) pl. 1.)

peoples was accompanied and tempered by their continued rapid adoption of the cultural and social institutions of the Hellenic Mediterranean *koine*, as it is sometimes called, that coalescence of local social forms into the more or less homogeneous civilization that was eventually to underlie the Roman empire. Imitation, assimilation and acculturation in fact made the ethnic stand-off less damaging, and an interactive, settled, productive social system was spreading to a greater extent, in aggregate, than it was set back by *razzia* or reprisal.

To open this account, however, it may be helpful to take three vivid individual illustrations of these wider tendencies. First, the inscriptions set up by a proud Etruscan-Roman family of Tarquinii in the first century A.D. which commemorate their early ancestors, including a chieftain whose expedition with a local contingent to a war in Sicily may plausibly be linked with the Athenians' expedition and its support from western communities.<sup>1</sup> This remarkable document illustrates the fortunes, centuries ahead, of those who emerged most successful from the years of turmoil at which we are looking. Second, equally remarkable, equally eloquent, the magnificent corslet (Fig. 10) of the third quarter of the fourth century taken as a prize of war against the peoples of the coast by a Samnite chieftain called Novius Fannius, as we know from the inscription he had engraved on his trophy – in Greek letters.<sup>2</sup> Such ornaments,

<sup>1</sup> Torelli 1975 (G 307); cf. Thuc. VII.53, 54, 57.11. 800 Campani in Sicily, Frederiksen 1984 (G 173) 143; Diod. XIII.44.2.

<sup>2</sup> Novius Fannius: *JEG* xxix 1026; Colonna 1984 (G 142) (the object was first published in 1979).

we may guess, were not uncommon in the sanctuaries of the mountain zone, increasingly coming to resemble the shrines of the Hellenic peoples with whose goods they were now embellished. Finally we may compare with the Tarquinian document the famous painting from the tomb of the *gens Fabia* on the Esquiline Hill in Rome in which the heroic exploits of some of the Fabii in wars in the south in the early third century are depicted in ways which once again are wholly characteristic of the region in which, and to some extent against which, they were fighting: in the style of the painting, and in the details of the military equipment.<sup>3</sup>

In the west as in the Aegean world the third quarter of the fifth century saw a new interest in the recording and expounding of the past. Antiochus of Syracuse, whose treatise on the affairs of Italy selecting 'the most trustworthy and the clearest material' went down to 424 B.C., is the exemplar of this new concern.<sup>4</sup> There were indeed many lessons to learn, and many puzzling circumstances of life in the western Mediterranean, with its strange juxtaposition of peoples and traditions, which it will have seemed of the highest importance to understand and analyse. The question of the nature of the community and how it related to the practical or desirable forms of power was prominent. In many of the cities of South Italy the ideology of the ruling elite had long been shaped by a system of philosophical ideas linked with the name of Pythagoras, in which adherence to a set of distinctive intellectual, moral and spiritual principles appears to have marked out individuals worthy of political prominence and to have been used to promote their cohesion with each other to form an elite that transcended community boundaries. But violence had shown that the system was not unquestioned. We hear of an episode in which the meeting-places of the Pythagoreans were burned, killing the chief men of each city, with murder, revolution and general turmoil as the result, and cannot but liken it to the episodes of stasis which are so prominent a part of Thucydides' profile of the contemporary Greek world.<sup>5</sup> The question of the stability of the power of the elites remained a live one in the Italian cities throughout this period, gaining importance through the effect internal dissension had on decision-making in external politics, and through the direct influence the mutual

<sup>3</sup> Esquiline painting: Felletti Maj 1977 (G 163); Dondero, I. and Pensabene, P. (edd.), *Roma repubblicana fra il 509 a.c. e il 270 a.c.* (Rome, 1982) 200f. *CAH* VII.2, 13, fig. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *FGrH* 555, cf. Pearson 1987 (G 92) 11–18.

<sup>5</sup> Polyb. II.39.2 with Walbank 1975 (B 122) *ad loc.*; von Fritz 1942 (G 175); Minar 1942 (G 234); Guthrie 1962–81 (H 56) I 178–91. The event is hard to date but may most plausibly be assigned to the fifties or forties of the fifth century. For some sense of geographical unity among the city states of South Italy under the hegemony of Croton in the fifth century, expressed in Pythagorean thought and perhaps in the name Megale Hellas itself, Maddoli 1982 (G 221); Mele 1982 (G 231).

sympathy of aristocracies had in constructing relations between communities.

It was the question of the nature of such relations which was most pressing at the end of the fifth century. The success of the Deinomenid tyrants of Syracuse, though it had not proved very durable, was an interesting precedent, which was to be resumed in 405 by Dionysius I. More specifically, the constitutional and diplomatic initiatives which they had taken were temptingly well suited to other parts of the Hellenic west; the binding of daughter settlements to the polis, the redeployment of large populations and the use of a fluid citizenship policy, control of varied and flexible military resources, the building up of networks of client states through diplomacy which gave small communities a share in the life of the strong, and a general ability to manage the social complexities of the co-existence of native and Hellene: these were all things in which the Deinomenids had had a certain measure of success, and they were of the utmost relevance to other Greeks from the plains of Campania to the Strait of Otranto.<sup>6</sup> The importance of the resources of the whole region – surpluses of grain, timber for ship-building, and above all abundant manpower – was a further preoccupation. The management of these resources had already made some of these cities recognizable naval powers, a role which they would long retain.<sup>7</sup> Other Mediterranean states had begun to solve the problems of organization involved in the control of more than one or two cities and their territory more quickly than some of the Hellenes of the west, and that these were clearly interested in expanding their hegemony in the area made the issue more pressing. The days of complacent autonomy and purely local hostilities were over when the Athenian fleet sailed for Sicily in 415 B.C.; the Athenians – who had also intervened in the politics of the mainland – failed, but not so the Carthaginians in their war in western Sicily from 409 to 405.<sup>8</sup>

Carthage seems to have developed its hegemony out of the network of relations which tied a metropolis to daughter-settlements, and such a structure was not unfamiliar in the southern part of the Italian peninsula.<sup>9</sup> Croton had made use of a similar arrangement in her Pythagorean heyday of the first half of the fifth century, and Locri long exerted similar

<sup>6</sup> For the Deinomenids, see *CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> 757–80, v<sup>2</sup> 149–70.

<sup>7</sup> Resources of Magna Graecia: cereals, [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 11.7; Pliny *HN* xvii.65, quoting Sophocles' *Triptolemus* (fr. 600 Radt); timber, Meiggs 1983 (I 101) 124–5; manpower, cf. below, p. 400.

<sup>8</sup> Athenian involvement with Artas and Iapygia, Thuc. vii.33; see Nenci 1979 (G 242) 43–4. Carthaginian war in Sicily, above, chs. 5, 9a.

<sup>9</sup> Structures of Carthaginian imperialism, Whittaker 1978 (G 91), tracing an economic development in some ways parallel to the experience of peninsular Italy as outlined in this chapter. See also *CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> 749–51; pp. 367–700 above.

control over her dependants.<sup>10</sup> Tarantine power in the fourth century, when the government of a Pythagorean ruler, Archytas, made it possible to revive in some sense the departed glory of Croton, owed something to this.

Institutional consolidation was not only an issue for the Greeks. The native peoples of the peninsula are found in the late fifth century already beginning to form federal arrangements. In Campania the Oscan peoples centred on Capua seem to have formed some precise new arrangement in 438–437, and all the Greek cities of the area except for Naples succumbed to the ‘nation of the Campanians’ (*Kampanon ethnos*) which resulted.<sup>11</sup> A similar system can be glimpsed to the south at Nuceria.<sup>12</sup> The Samnite League, although not specifically attested until the middle of the fourth century, may also be this early. Similarly the Lucanians, who are found causing trouble at Thurii as early as 433, may have had a corporate form by then.<sup>13</sup> The effectiveness of the Italicis is not in doubt; by the year 390 the whole Tyrrhenian coast down to Rhegium was in their control except for Naples and Hipponium, and their influence even without conquest in those cities was great, as we shall see. What is more problematic is whether these basically federal forms can be regarded as a largely, or wholly, independent political evolution of Italic society, or whether the spirit and the forms owe something to contemporary Greek federalism.<sup>14</sup> This question cannot be regarded as closed.

Certainly we find the Greeks too moving in the direction of the federal solution to their problems. It should be stressed that this was neither easy nor natural. The cities were the foundations of very different and often mutually hostile communities in Greece; their geographical settings were very varied; politically, many of the cities found their principal preoccupations away from their Greek neighbours of the peninsula. Rhegium, on the Straits, and behaving frequently as if it were part of Sicily, is a case in point. A league around Croton, Sybaris and Caulonia was nevertheless formed in the years before 417 B.C. which intended to use the institutions of the Achaean League as a blueprint for creating a sense of common interest among the Italiotes.<sup>15</sup> The step is specifically attributed to the alarm that followed the Pythagorean crisis, but is likely

<sup>10</sup> Crotonian hegemony: Giangiulio 1989 (G 179) 213–59.

<sup>11</sup> Diod. xii.76.4 for the fall of Cumae (421/0), cf. Livy iv.44; Frederiksen 1984 (G 173) 139.

<sup>12</sup> Frederiksen 1984 (G 173) 141–2.

<sup>13</sup> The Samnite League is first attested in 351 B.C.; cf. Salmon 1967 (G 279) 95–9. ‘Lucanians’ as a collectivity already, however, the object of campaigns by the Spartan Cleandridas in the years after the foundation of Thurii; Polyæn. ii.10.2, cf. ii.10.4.

<sup>14</sup> On Italic federalism, Salmon 1967 (G 279) 42. Note the foundation of the Bruttian state, 356 B.C. (n. 33).

<sup>15</sup> Formation of the Italiote League, Polybius (n. 5); Giannelli 1928 (G 180) 63f; Larsen 1968 (C 37) 95–7; cf. Lombardo 1987 (G 219) 55–6 and for the problems involved in organizing common action, Sabbatini 1989 (G 278).

to have had external objectives as well. It may owe something to the diplomatic initiatives with which the Athenians attempted to make their relations with the west easier (certainly the Italiote League supported the Athenians in 415–413), but most importantly provided a bulwark against the native peoples – and against other aggressors. Certainly the effective history of the Italiote League dates from 393 when it was afforded by the inclusion of Thurii, Hipponium, Rhegium and Elea and perhaps even Naples.<sup>16</sup> The motive force for this step came indeed from the Italic threat, but as wielded by the then tyrant of Syracuse.

Dionysius I had wide ambitions in the southern Tyrrhenian, where the Greek cities were weak through long exposure to both seaborne hostility and to the attention of the Lucanians and Bruttians in the hinterland.<sup>17</sup> The improved Italiote League notwithstanding, in a series of campaigns and wars Dionysius created a Syracusan province in the Bruttian peninsula. His old ally Locri formed the core, and the other cities were disposed of in more or less generous settlements: after his victory at the Helleporus in 389 Dionysius was inclined to be lenient to the combatants, but the subsequent fate of Caulonia was more serious – her territory was assigned to Locri but, significantly, her population was removed wholesale to Syracuse.<sup>18</sup> Thurii was sacrificed to the Lucanians; Hipponium had a similar fate to Caulonia; Rhegium was reduced by siege in 387. Finally, after the war of 379–378 Croton too was humbled.<sup>19</sup> In all this the Italic peoples, especially the Lucanians, played a major role. Manpower resources, whether Greek, as in the deportation policy, or Italic, as with the soldiers who alongside Syracusans helped Sparta in 387, were the principal concern.<sup>20</sup> Meanwhile to the east Taras, which had also helped Syracuse during the Athenian crisis, was consolidating its power to the south over the Messapians and to the west, through her satellite Heraclea (founded 437), had more or less neutralized Metapontum.<sup>21</sup> The Gulf was Tarantine in more than name. The mutually

<sup>16</sup> Diod. xiv.91.1, cf. 101 for provisions of mutual aid against the Lucanians. On Dionysius, Caven 1990 (G 134); ch. 3 above; also Sanders 1987 (G 283); Sabbatini 1988 (G 277), both good on the historiographical tradition and with earlier bibliography.

<sup>17</sup> Expedition against Lipareae (389), Diod. xiv.103; against Etruscan Pyrgi (384), Diod. xv.14.3. Carthaginian involvement: Diod. xv.15.2; 24.1 (the restoration of the Hipponiates).

<sup>18</sup> Battles of Laus, Diod. xiv.101–2.3; of the Helleporus, Diod. xiv.104. Caulonia, Diod. xiv.106.3; cf. Paus. vi.3.11. Also above, p. 146.

<sup>19</sup> Thurii, Diod. xiv.101–2; Hipponium, Diod. xiv.107; role of the Lucanians in the battle of Laian Draco, Strabo vi.1.1, cf. Diod. xiv.102. Fall of Rhegium and humiliation of its general Phytton, Diod. xiv.112. Croton, Ath. xii.541.6; [Arist.] *Mir. Ausc.* 196 (the cloak of Alcisthenes). For the problem of comparison with Dion. Hal. xx.7, Lombardo 1987 (G 219) 61. See now Sabbatini 1988 (G 277) for the almost continuous hostilities of this period; above, pp. 149–50.

<sup>20</sup> Help to Sparta: Xen. *Hell.* v.1.26 (ships).

<sup>21</sup> Taras, Heraclea and Metapontum, Brauer 1986 (G 125). Thurii–Taras treaty, Strabo vi.1.14 p. 264, vi.3.4 pp. 280–1 refers to events during the expedition of Alexander the Molossian, Lamboley 1983 (G 208). Athenians attempt to stir up Iapygians and Messapians against Taras, Thuc. vii.33.4, with Frederiksen 1977 (G 109) 204; see also Santoro 1972 (G 286).

beneficial connexion with Syracuse made Tarantine power virtually unassailable, and it is not surprising to find that in due course this position is expressed through a hegemony of the old Italiote League. A federal coinage begins in 380, and it is tempting to see the subjugation of the League to Taras as the culminating stroke of policy of Dionysius after his long series of victories. The symbolic movement of the League's sanctuary from Croton to Tarantine Heraclea seems however to have taken place in 374.<sup>22</sup> The security and tranquillity of Taras in the ascendancy of Archytas, who came to power in 366, cannot be ascribed solely to Pythagorean benevolence. Taras' power remained secure even after Dionysius' death.

In terms of political history, then, from the end of the first quarter of the fourth century, the *apoikia* cities of Magna Graecia had dwindled or been eclipsed or destroyed in one way or another so as to render them second-rate powers. This is not to say that they were grass-grown ruins – Locri and Metapontum still flourished and retained not only civic continuity but even some prosperity throughout the period.<sup>23</sup> But two cities achieved a standing which was comparable with the greatest independent political entities of the fourth-century Mediterranean, and between them started to shape the history of south Italy: Neapolis and Taras. The importance of Neapolis is only beginning to emerge, although it has long been obscured by the brilliance of the encompassing Oscan aristocracies of Campania, with which it was in close touch, and by the vast Roman endeavours in Campania after the defeat of Hannibal and the foundation of Puteoli. Reconsideration of the texts and a better understanding of the archaeology is leading to a new emphasis on the cultural, economic and political effects of the prominence of the city in the fourth, third and second centuries.<sup>24</sup> One may almost guess that it was *because* there was so little antagonism between Neapolitans and Italics (and indeed Neapolis clearly became Oscanized to a considerable extent) that the stature of Neapolis has been taken less seriously than that of Taras: but if we can see the influence of the latter city so clearly in the

<sup>22</sup> Tarantine domination of the League, Brauer 1986 (G 125) 55 and 58–9 with nn. 29–30; Willeumier 1939 (G 326) 64–6. On the weakness of the tradition for Dionysius' Adriatic ambitions, Woodhead 1970 (G 325); cf. however Mambella 1986 (G 222) for cultural reflections of the influence of Sicily there. Strabo vi.4.2 p. 241, if right in claiming that Ancona was founded by refugees from Dionysius, may give a glimpse of the real complexities. See also pp. 147–50.

<sup>23</sup> Continuity at Locri, Musti 1977 (G 236), cf. Costabile 1980 (G 146), and De Franciscis 1972 (G 150) for the incontrovertible evidence of the Locrian tablets. Prosperity of Metapontum, Carter 1988 (G 129), estimating the surplus wheat production of its *chora* at the end of the fourth century as 235,000 medimni p.a. available for external sale, with a value of 98 talents. Decline of Croton: Mele 1984 (G 232) 79–87.

<sup>24</sup> Lepore 1952 (G 212) is still fundamental on the economy of hellenistic Naples. For the archaeology of the city Greco 1988 (G 188); for its influence on Rome, Baldassare 1988 (G 114); for the history of Roman intervention, Càsola 1988 (G 130), Colonna 1984 (G 142), Frederiksen 1984 (G 173), 208–12.



material evidence for the culture of its foes, we can agree wholeheartedly with the view that it is likely that 'Neapolis is a no less effective centre for the diffusion of Greekness than Taras'. However, we shall, as is appropriate, consider it in more detail alongside its contacts, turning now to the more southern metropolis.<sup>25</sup>

In the case of Taras there is no alternative centre to distract the attention of the historian; after the Roman settlement of 281–280 the history of the cities of the deep south is nearly a vacuum, and there is no need to refuse to fill it with some sort of a role for Taras. Archaeology is now showing increasingly, against the earlier consensus, that political eclipse by no means ended the city's influence, but that when reconsidered, the evidence of material culture across the whole spectrum from gold and silver of the utmost luxury to ceramics,<sup>26</sup> reveals an extended prosperity that reaches the late Republic if not the early Empire. To understand why this is such a surprise we need to consider the political history of Taras in the fourth century.

This subject has a perceptible shape in the ancient literary tradition, and it is this shape that has survived with too little scrutiny in the modern analyses. Basically, the problem is, as so often in the historiography of politics, the pattern of a hero followed by unworthy successors. The clearest statement of the whole picture is that of Strabo, which has been highly influential.<sup>27</sup> Enough survives of the tradition about Archytas son of Mnesagoras for it to be clear that the ancient view was hagiographical: he represented a philosopher king in a Spartan city who could be seen against the background of either the Laconian tradition or the aristocratic intellectual ideology of the Pythagoreans.<sup>28</sup> He could provide a foil to the vicissitudes of the pursuit of political wisdom at Dorian Syracuse, coming to the rescue of Plato in 362–360.<sup>29</sup> His position was all the more poignant because of the perennial tendency to *truphe* (luxurious excess in defiance of morality) in the rich lands of South Italy, which is latent in the historiography of the region, ready to be evoked in set pieces on Sybaris or Syracuse, Taras (*molle Tarentum*) or Capua.<sup>30</sup> The whole could readily

<sup>25</sup> On the Oscanization of Naples, Frederiksen 1984 (G 173) 209, 217; our quotation is from Prodocimi 1976 (G 261) 234. For Naples as the heart of the late fourth-century cultural *koine*, Pontrandolfo (G 112) 269–71, cf. Baldassare (G 112) 222, Morel (G 112) 309–10 and 359.

<sup>26</sup> Continuity already adumbrated, Moretti 1971 (G 235); see now *Gli ori di Taranto* 1984 (G 185). The older view: *Atti 10 Conv.* (G 106) 280. <sup>27</sup> Strabo vi.3.4 p. 280.

<sup>28</sup> For Archytas, Ciaceri 1927–32 (G 138) II 438–49; Lombardo 1987 (G 219) 68–75 (note 70 'Archita, autentica figura di reggitore-filosofo coerente e capace'). The biographical tradition went back to Aristoxenus; Aristotle also wrote on Archytas, but probably more on his thought than his life (D.L. v.25). For a summary of his achievements, D.L. VIII.79–82.

<sup>29</sup> Archytas and Plato: Plut. *Dion* 20, cf. D.L. III.22; [Plato] *Ep.* VII 338–50; cf. pp. 154–5.

<sup>30</sup> *Truphe* in the Taras of Archytas: Polyarchus 'Hedypathes' ('voluptuary'), in Aristoxenus, *Life* fr. 50 Wehrli; Gigante 1971 (G 181) on Aristoxenus, Archytas, the *vetus oratio* and *truphe*. In general see also Mele 1984 (G 232) on these themes in Crotoniate history, and on Archytas specifically, Mele 1981 (G 229). The tradition goes back to Antiochus: Nenci 1979 (G 242) 33–41.

be set against the perennial theme of Rome's eventual victory: what had enfeebled the Hellenes? And this question in turn was rendered poignant by the revival of another old theme, the contrast of the fortunes of East and West, going back to Herodotus on the coincidence in the timing and fortunes of the battles of Salamis and Himera, and in this case contrasting the ineffectual leaders who eventually lost to Rome with the glory of Alexander the Great and his successors. Given these interpretations we should be very cautious about accepting uncritically the pattern of Tarantine glory in the age of Archytas, followed by an age of decadence and decline when the city was reduced to seeking the disastrous help of outsiders, the five *condottieri* whose names dominate the narrative: Archidamus of Sparta, Alexander of Epirus, Cleonymus of Sparta, Agathocles of Syracuse and Pyrrhus of Epirus.<sup>31</sup>

In fact the ancient pattern has little to recommend it: though we should stress as usual that the authors who formulated it had more evidence at their disposal by far than they have been able to transmit to us. Archytas is attributed seven successive generalships and wars against the Messapians, but these are hard to date (the usual view, for want of another synchronism, is that they coincided with Plato's visits to the west in 366/5 and 361/0), and impossible to fit in to any sort of a framework of political and social history. Was he having a beneficial effect on Taras even before his supremacy of office? Did his influence survive his defeat? Was the felicity of Taras real? Did it derive from the successful *Realpolitik* which we have examined, linking Taras with the tyranny at Syracuse, a relationship which the Plato story shows that Archytas could still capitalize on, though it cannot have been of his creating? In what aspects of Tarantine society was the practical efficiency of Archytian Pythagoreanism found, and how transient was the phenomenon? In the absence of answers to these questions the contribution of Archytas to the prosperity of Taras over half a century should not be casually exaggerated.

Nor do we understand the chronology of the events of the second half of the century. The Roman annalistic system of the period is hotly debated, and its complexities have perplexed Diodorus Siculus, our only continuous source for the affairs of Sicily and Magna Graecia.<sup>32</sup> The crisis of the middle years of the century seems to have been provoked as much by events in Syracuse as by any Italian circumstances, though the organization and ambitions of the Italic peoples were continually

<sup>31</sup> Clearest presentation of the *condottieri* as a sequence: Strabo vi.3.4 p. 280. Flaws of Taras, especially commercial prosperity and theatrical life, played up in the *mise-en-scène* of the outbreak of war with Rome at Florus 1.18. For the coinage of the period, Brauer 1986 (G 123) ch. 5. Cf. De Sensi Sestito 1987 (G 154).

<sup>32</sup> See Sordi 1969 (G 293); Frederiksen 1984 (G 173), chs. 8 and 9; Pearson 1984 and 1987 (B 91–2).

increasing – the formation of the Bruttian League is only the most visible step.<sup>33</sup> In 352 a revolution removed Rhegium from Syracusan control; in 345 Locri similarly abandoned Dionysius II, murdering his family.<sup>34</sup> The fall of the tyranny was followed by the appeal of Syracuse to Timoleon, whose arrival was just in time to save Locri from the Bruttians, who had already seized Hipponium. Taras was by then at war with the Lucanians.<sup>35</sup> This was the context in which the Tarantines appealed to their mother-city, and induced King Archidamus of Sparta to come to their aid; but it is not clear precisely when the appeal was made.<sup>36</sup> It was noted that the death of Archidamus in battle at the siege of Manduria occurred at the same instant as the great battle of Chaeronea – a sign of how eagerly parallels between East and West were observed.<sup>37</sup> What we do not know is whether until the unfortunate siege of Manduria he had been successful at promoting the diplomatic and military cause of the Tarantines. There is no reason to assume the worst; that it was as soon as the fourth year after that the next outsider came to lead the Tarantines suggests that the services of such leaders were considered fruitful and reappointment an urgent matter – but also that the job was not without its appeal.

The activities and chronology of the expedition of Alexander of Epirus are not clear either, 334–331 being the preferred estimate for the latter. He too died in battle, at Pandosia (identified with S. Maria d'Anglona), but had certainly by that time had a profound diplomatic impact. His contribution can have been disappointing only by the standards of his namesake. We can glimpse the extreme delicacy of his relations with Rome and the Italic peoples of the Campanian area, and observe the significance of the fact that he was operating at least briefly in the ambit of Paestum.<sup>38</sup> His successes were not acceptable to the Tarantines, who abandoned him. The treachery is not admirable, but it

<sup>33</sup> Formation of the Bruttian League, a slanted and chronologically loose account in Diod. xvi.15.1–2 under 356/5 B.C.; cf. Justin xxiii.1.3–14; Strabo vi.1.4 p. 255. See Lombardo 1987 (G 219) 73–4 and, for background on the Brettii and bibliography, Guzzo and Luppino 1980 (G 193) 865–6.

<sup>34</sup> Rhegium, Diod. xvi.45.9; Locri, Diod. xvi.66.6. For the close ties of Locri with Syracuse, above, pp. 144–7. <sup>35</sup> Plut. *Tim.* 16.2; 19.2; for Taras and the Lucanians, Diod. xvi.61.4.

<sup>36</sup> For Archidamus Ciaceri 1927–32 (G 138) III 6–7; Diod. xvi.61–3 – 63.5. Diodorus is recording the fate of the sacrilegious Phalaecus (cf. p. 758), and his remarks on Archidamus need not be in their right chronological context. The appeal by Taras need not then be as early as 346/5 and his arrival can be put nearer his death at Manduria in 338. It is worth recalling that the outbreak of war between Rome and the Samnites in 343 will have made the atmosphere in the south more critical (for that war *CAH* vii<sup>2</sup>.2, 351–9). The later date for the appeal to Archidamus means disjoining that Lucanian War from the Bruttian War of Timoleon's reinforcements. <sup>37</sup> Diod. xvi.88.3.

<sup>38</sup> For Alexander Livy viii.3.6–7; Justin xii.2.12; Strabo vi.1.5 p. 256; see Manni 1962 (G 223) for the date, and Ciaceri 1927–32 (G 138) III 7–16, seeing in Alexander the missed opportunity for strong unification of South Italy. D'Agostino 1974 (G 147) saw the main effect of Alexander's visit as being the realization by the peoples of Apulia that their real enemy was the Italic peoples, not the Italiotes. See also n. 21 above. For general contact between Taras and Epirus in the fourth century, *CAH* vii<sup>2</sup>.2, 458.

seems unreasonable to blame Taras at the same time, as some are inclined to, for being craven enough to need outside help and sufficiently brazen to jettison it!

In the supposed series of props for declining Taras there is now a gap of some twenty-seven years. We may guess that both the city and potential helpers found discouraging food for thought in the double saga of Archidamus and Alexander. Sparta produced plenty of candidates, however, one of whom, Acrotatus, was briefly seen at Taras by accident in 314.<sup>39</sup> By 303 Taras was ready to welcome a new royal general from Sparta on its own behalf, Cleonymus, who raised an army of nearly 30,000 from mercenaries of various origins as well as from Taras itself.<sup>40</sup> But the sequel showed how different the world was from the experience of a generation before. The interval had seen – and perhaps been maintained by – the long struggle between Rome and the Samnites, and its ramifications in the Tyrrhenian and Adriatic areas. Rome was now on the hit list supplied to Cleonymus.<sup>41</sup> The other hellenic cities had now begun to wane visibly, whereas the native cities were, as we shall see in more detail shortly, increasingly homogeneous and hellenized. International politics, in the first age of the Diadochi, was a different business too, and as the concerns of Cleonymus in Corcyra showed, for example, South Italy could now be considered only part of a much greater game. Horizons were suddenly very much wider.

Cleonymus did not achieve anything very remarkable, despite a Draconian style in keeping with the swagger of the new age – he took female hostages, for example, an unprecedented and suspicious act.<sup>42</sup> He too was abandoned by Taras, but did not pay the price of his life. Once again the next Tarantine supporter is a quick successor; behaving in a similar way, though again in the style of the age after Alexander the Great rather than of that of Archidamus and Alexander of Epirus. The contacts of the Cleonymus episode brought in Agathocles, the new and formidable tyrant of Syracuse, following in the footsteps of the two Dionysii in supporting Taras, as in maintaining a lively Italian mercen-

<sup>39</sup> Diod. xix.70.2, with 70.7–8. Note that Agathocles' first military service was on behalf of Croton and later against it: *CAH* vii.2.1, 385–7.

<sup>40</sup> Diod. xx.104, cf. Livy x.2. On Cleonymus Ciaceri 1927–32 (G 138) III 25–30; cf. Vattuone 1989 (G 318) 61–5; also Braccisi 1991 (G 124) for the Adriatic. A glimpse of the impact of the *condottieri* on their supporters may be had in the financial records of Locri, if De Franciscis 1972 (G 150) 75–9 is right in seeing the *basileus* to whom the Locrians contributed more than a third of their annual income as Pyrrhus in the years 280–274.

<sup>41</sup> In assessing this claim Roman exaggeration – and the search for a precursor for Pyrrhus – should be borne in mind. But Duris was aware of the Battle of Sentinum in 295, a sure sign of how high the stakes now were: the conflict has recently been called 'the greatest military engagement that had ever taken place in Italy' (*CAH* vii.2.2, 379).

<sup>42</sup> Ath. xiii 605e, from Book III of Duris' Life of Agathocles (*FGH* 76 F 18). The city in question was Metapontum.

ary policy.<sup>43</sup> We catch only fragments of all this; alliance with Iapyges and Peucetians, attacks on the Bruttians of Hipponium; Agathocles was a man of the widest plans.<sup>44</sup> Taras can scarcely be credited with the initiative in this association, but it is somewhat unreasonable for critics of the Tarantines to regard as a sign of decay an association, with a powerful Syracuse, which had also characterized an age which they regard as preceding the decadence. In many ways the scene is now being set for the first act of the new drama of Pyrrhus: the colourful populist stylishness of Agathocles, so well suited to the cities that shocked and insulted Roman ambassadors for fun; and the spreading networks of ties which precisely did include the Epirote monarchy, through the marriage to Pyrrhus of Agathocles' daughter Lanassa.<sup>45</sup> The Cleonymus–Agathocles–Pyrrhus story is not a tale of three more lone *condottieri*, but part of a single complex phenomenon, the near-birth of a Successor state in the west. But neither in Taras nor in Hieron's Syracuse did that ever quite come about.

The glory of the age of Archytas, then, and the mounting mollitude which succeeded it, driving the Tarantines to hire swords while they kept holiday, may be regarded as a historiographic construction of some interest but little real interpretative value. It is a *mythos*, an explanatory narrative, that is informed by another powerful antithesis, that between the pure Hellenism of Laconian Taras and the native hordes growling at the borders.<sup>46</sup> This is a tradition which has for many reasons long been in vogue, and the corrective now being provided by archaeology has been tardy because of the enormous prevalence in our knowledge of the antiquities of South Italy of the cemetery – and worse, of the looted contents of tombs sold to collectors: the Hellenic long dominated this type of evidence too. But it has become clear over the last three decades that there is a real possibility of tracing the realities of cultural change in the south Italian peninsula through the archaeological remains – and that to adhere to the old schematisms is not just to distort the truth, but also

<sup>43</sup> Agathocles and Italy: Ciaceri 1927–32 (G 138) III 28–33; Lombardo 1987 (G 219) 84; Vattuone 1989 (G 318). For Agathocles as heir of the Dionysii, cf. Justin xxiii.1. Even in 330 Syracuse was still continuing the policy of opposing the Italic peoples, helping Croton against the Bruttii: Diod. xix.3.3.

<sup>44</sup> Diod. xxi.3.4, xxi.3.8 (perhaps of 295 and 294 B.C.). See *CAH* vii<sup>2</sup>.1, 406–7; Vattuone 1989 (G 318) 71.

<sup>45</sup> Agathocles' buffoonish and theatrical behaviour (Diod. xx.26.2) must owe something to Duris' presentation. Compare the famous scene of the Romans at Taras, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* xix.5.1–5, cf. Val. Max. 2.2.5. Lanassa: Diod. xxi.3.4. For Pyrrhus see now the account in *CAH* vii<sup>2</sup>.2, 456–85.

<sup>46</sup> For these views Brauer 1986 (G 125) 53, cf. 61 (whence these phrases); note that some directions in the study of Greek art have helped the tendency to oversimplify, e.g. Carter 1975 (G 128) 7. Against the simple oppositions, Pugliese Carratelli 1972 (G 263) 38, stressing both the divisions of the Italic peoples and the ethnic complexity of the Greek cities. Note Florus 1.18 of Taras 'Civitas semigraeca', and cf. n. 53.

to miss the opportunity to examine one of the most fascinatingly complicated patterns of cultural interchange which we can perceive from antiquity.<sup>47</sup>

It must be conceded that the ancient sources help the simple view to survive, representing, as they do, gallant outposts of Hellenism fighting off aliens. The quotation from the contemporary Tarantine Aristoxenus observing the fate of Posidonia is well known:

we do as do the Posidoniates who dwell in the Tyrrhenian Gulf. It has been their lot, who in the beginning were Greeks, to become completely barbarized, turning into Etruscans or Romans, and to change their language and other customs so that today they celebrate only one Greek festival. Coming together for this, they recall the ancient names and practices, lament one with another and go on their way after shedding many tears. In this way, then, says Aristoxenus, when the theatres are barbarized and the music which has spread so far has fallen into deep corruption, those few of us who survive also recall among ourselves what real music was.<sup>48</sup>

We have a triple picture of this phenomenon. First, texts such as the above, which form a strand in the complex historiography of social and political values that was outlined briefly above (p. 389). Second, archaeology, to which we shall return; but conscious as ever of the limitations of the deduction of ethnicity from material culture. Third is the study of language, thanks to the epigraphic habit a relatively useful tool in this operation, but one which also needs methodological care.

Through patient study of inscriptions specialists have been able to identify linguistic traditions which can be associated with various types of Oscan, and with Messapian, Peucetian and Daunian, and to trace something of the history of the interaction of these with each other and with Greek.<sup>49</sup> This gives us altogether a quite subtle view of one aspect of the tension between regional survival of cultural identity and incorporation in a world of wider allegiances. Two caveats are worth advancing, however. The first is that the medium of the language fragments which have come to us is always more than one step towards acculturation; even if the language is non-Greek, both the letter-forms and the very idea of the inscription are potently Hellenic.<sup>50</sup> The second is

<sup>47</sup> It is perhaps preferable, as well as in keeping with the more sophisticated notions of ethnicity now usually applied to the social history of the western Mediterranean in the first millennium B.C., to refrain from the term 'native peoples'. Cf. Adamesteanu 1974 (G 93) 187–215. For an overview of the ethnic situation Salmon 1982 (G 280) 10–21.

<sup>48</sup> Aristoxenus fr. 124 Wehrli, linked by Frascchetti 1981 (G 170) with the mood in Taras and south Italy in the 320s. For the nature of the hellenizing process in the case of the aristocracy of Oscan Paestum, Greco Pontrandolfo 1979 (G 257) 47, cf. 50.

<sup>49</sup> For recent work on the languages see *CAH* IV<sup>2</sup> ch. 15; Santoro 1978 (G 287) (Peucetian and Messapian); Pisani 1972 (G 253) (Oscan and Messapian); Prosdocimi 1976 (G 260) on the coexistence of language seen from the Roman context; Landi 1979 (G 209) 115f on the 'mondo indigeno'.

<sup>50</sup> Thus Adamesteanu 1974 (G 93) 209 on the Armento wreath (below, n. 54) 'in poche parole tanti errori di lingua greca': but it is in Greek, and that fact is far more important than the lapses.

that we must not unthinkingly give linguistic identity the same status among the indicators of ethnic belonging which it has in familiar modern societies. The attitude of its last speakers towards Messapian is unlikely to have resembled the defence of Scots Gaelic.<sup>51</sup> One case of the misuse of the linguistic argument has been analysed recently: the false antithesis between a Messapian culture surviving and maintaining stalwartly its linguistic independence, and one permeated by and heavily influenced by Greek to the extent of preserving Greek language through the Roman period and into more recent times. The point of the antithesis has been to explain the 'grico' of the Sallentino, a Hellenic dialect which has a quite different social history.<sup>52</sup>

However, language helps us to perceive the tension between the tendency to form common cultural traits and the underlying dividedness of the Italic peoples; and, moreover, that it is a tension evolved in a stable system and is the product of phenomena like the widespread use of mercenaries – as with the Oscan-speakers in Sicily – rather than emigration or invasion. It is now thought that there was no Oscan 'barbarian invasion', and that the fourth century is simply the last phase in a long, though not peaceful, coexistence between Hellenic and indigenous peoples (cf. *CAH* iv<sup>2</sup>). It is necessary to insist on this point, since the differences between the non-Greek populations, from the Samnites of north Campania to the Messapians of Calabria with their geographical and cultural links with Illyria, are of very great historical importance.<sup>53</sup> Unity eluded the Italici, paradoxically, until they adopted a sufficiently adaptable Hellenization to form social and political institutions which could transcend local differences. The race was on to see which Italic people could adopt its Hellenizing *mores* most effectively first. As we know, this race was won by Rome. It was however not an easy victory, and there were many other contenders. This means that the task of tracing the interpenetration of Hellenic elements across the southern part of the peninsula is complex to the point of despair, as we have already seen in the example of language. The same thing can be said of elaborate artefacts<sup>54</sup> – are they Greek or local in style? – and of the archaeology of whole communities. So the formation of nucleated settlements like Roccagloriosa in western Lucania, in their early stages, seems to respond to purely local and short-term needs; until the arrival of

<sup>51</sup> For 'Oscan' and 'Messapian' as different kinds of label from 'Latin' or 'Italian', Pisani 1972 (G 253). <sup>52</sup> Parlangei 1970 (G 250), cf. Nenci 1979 (G 242).

<sup>53</sup> Illyrian connexions of the Messapians, Parlangei and Santoro 1978 (G 250A). On differentiation between peoples, Pontrandolfo Greco 1982 (G 258) 160. Note as an additional complexity the survival until the third century of Etruscans in Campania (D'Agostino 1974 (G 147) 212); this is now known to be true further south at Pontecagnano too.

<sup>54</sup> Note for example the debate on the Armento wreath: is its workmanship in the Macedonian/Hellenic tradition mediated through Taras (Pontrandolfo Greco 1982 (G 258) 145) or in an Italic artisan tradition just interpreting a Greek idea (Lipinsky 1975 (G 216))?

a major fortified enceinte, which seems to hint that the whole process of nucleation might be better seen against a background of awareness of an urban ideal and the political institutions associated with it.<sup>55</sup> In fact a historical process *can* be seen at work which enables us to make sense of the whole of South Italy in the late fourth and early third centuries, and to get beyond the simple evolutionist perspective of analysing hundreds of local experiences in geographical order.

The principal phenomenon of the social history of South Italy in this period is cultural change, the acculturation, to put it broadly and too simply, of the indigenous peoples by the Greeks; a process which seems to reflect topography in its irradiation of the mountainous interior from the coasts by way of the greater river valleys. It is worth stating again that this is to be regarded as the principal phenomenon because it is to us the one which is visible; and to remark that it is visible to us, as not all forms of cultural change of this kind might be, because the Hellenic goal was one which, to our good fortune, was expressed in terms of material culture which has, to some extent proved durable – buildings, especially fortification and tombs, ceramics, especially in grave-deposits, and the inscriptions which convey the linguistic data to which we have already alluded. It would be easy to think of profound cultural influences which could escape the archaeological search entirely. We must also be wary, as so often in the study of acculturation, of seeing all the processes as transmission and none of them as inventive or creative.

It is not unnatural to begin by asking who was acculturated. The traces of the process are closely linked with the activities of a social elite, and one of a certain type. There is always the possibility that there was an equivalent process outside the elite by which, say, small agriculturalists of Greek territories came to influence religious or economic practices of their non-Greek neighbours through direct interchange; but such tendencies can only be guessed, since the evidence happens to be remarkably specific towards an elite: a competitive, hierarchical, image-conscious, aggressive, militaristic elite at that.<sup>56</sup> Since, moreover, the

<sup>55</sup> Fracchia 1983 (G 168) models Roccagloriosa as an *oppidum* of North West Europe. It is a site of the first importance, as the central place for the exploitation of the Mingardo valley; excavations are illuminating the process by which it inherited the functions and identity of the Greek *apoikia* Pyxus and passed them on to the Roman *colonia* at Buxentum (cf. Ridgway 1989 (G 275) 139): something similar may have happened in the case of Hipponium-Veipo-Vibo further south (cf. n. 69). Interesting contrast between Roccagloriosa and Moio della Civitella in the territory of Velia, assessed as more Hellenic and taken as a subsidiary of Velia because of the regularity of its plan and degree of urbanization, Greco and Schnapp 1983 (G 189); cf. Tréziny 1983 (G 310), on the problems of distinguishing it from other types of settlement. Fortifications of the late fourth century also at Laus (S. Maria del Cedro, on the hill of S. Bartolo di Marcellina).

<sup>56</sup> As Guzzo 1984 (G 191) puts it in the case of the territory of Sybaris ‘si hanno due sibaritide . . . quella italiota, costituita della razionale città di Thurii sulla costa, e quella italica, che occupa l'interno con le sue piazzeforti e i suoi nuclei sparsi. Il collegamento e lo scambio fra le due sono costanti e continue.’ On the funerary evidence see the formulation of Pontrandolfo Greco and Rouveret 1982 (G 259).



signs of acculturation are co-extensive with a social milieu we should hesitate to interpret them ethnically. When we are tempted to see a 'Samnite' cultural preserve infiltrating, as it might be, a Daunian context, we should be careful that this is not just a case of social change affecting a local elite and encouraging them to adopt the forms of behaviour of the warrior aristocracies which were most *à la mode*.<sup>57</sup>

To begin with the military side. The fortification of settlements in the interior proceeds rapidly towards the end of the fourth century. On the fine ashlar masonry of one case an inscription attributes the work to the 'arche (rule, command) of Nummelos': here at Serra di Vaglio a leader is attested whose name is Italic but whose building and authority are Greek, as are the language and style of the commemoration of both.<sup>58</sup> The Oscan inscription at Muro Lucano attributing the fortification work to an Italic institution, the *meddikia*, is only somewhat more removed from the Hellenic sphere.<sup>59</sup> In some places the contemporary fortification of a cluster of strongpoints in a locality is attested, and can be linked to particular forms of regional cohesion and organization.<sup>60</sup> The choice of sites reflects the pattern of through high- or low-level routeways (see Map 11) which shapes the mountainous interior of the southern part of the Italian peninsula, a pattern which has been essential for the historical development of the region at all periods.<sup>61</sup>

So there is a new and impressive emphasis on the formation and fortification of nucleated settlements, which can in some cases amount to the spread of what it may not be too rash to call urbanism or its beginnings.<sup>62</sup> Even where the architecture is not devoted to overtly

<sup>57</sup> Thus Torelli, sensitively, on the Melfese in *Sannio* 1984 (G 285) 31: contrast the view which makes of the Period III of the Daunian culture the age – visible at Canusium from c. 400 onwards – of the extirpation of a distinctively Daunian culture by Samnite pressures.

<sup>58</sup> Nummelos at Serra di Vaglio, Adamesteanu 1990 (G 97) and 1987 (G 96): *epi tes Nummelou arches*.

<sup>59</sup> Note that although the title is Oscan, in terms of constitutional theory the magistracy is Greek, as is the epigraphic habit itself. The sudden boom in Oscan epigraphy (other early inscriptions, e.g. from S. Giovanni in Fonte and Atena Lucana) is a phenomenon of considerable historical importance in its own right.

<sup>60</sup> Fortifications at Serra, Cività di Tricarico, Torretta di Pietragalla, Serra del Carpine di Cancellara, Croccia Cagnato (all possibly associated with Nummelos), Adamesteanu 1974 (G 93) 196–7. Note that earlier scholarship labelled these 'Greek': a full account in Tréziny 1983 (G 310), agreeing with Adamesteanu. The social group involved here in the Melfese may be the Utiani (Adamesteanu 1974 (G 93) 204) whose federal centre lay at the Rossano del Vaglio sanctuary. Similar fortifications among the Brettii, Guzzo and Luppino 1980 (G 193) 865–6; urbanization in Daunia, Mazzei 1984 and 1987 (G 226–7).

<sup>61</sup> Adamesteanu 1983 (G 95), cf. 1974 (G 93). Note especially the routes followed by the later Roman roads Via Appia and Via Annia, the Catanzaro Isthmus and the long routeway identified by Quilici *et al.* 1969 (G 270) 64–7.

<sup>62</sup> Changes at Ruvo and Oppido Lucano, Ridgway 1982 (G 274) 73. The late fourth-century form of Laus, regular in plan and monumental, totally eclipsed its Greek predecessor (cf. n. 55 above). Similar changes in a Hellenic context at Velia; compare the *teichopoiia* of the Locri tablets (with Musti 1977 (G 236)).

military purposes it is still connected to the maintenance of the ideology of a warrior aristocracy, most explicitly in the great extra-urban sanctuaries. The best known of these in the south is the *temenos* of Mefitis at Rossano di Vaglio, but the sanctuary of Hercules at Armento in the Agri valley is another case, and it is clear that we have here further instances of the well-known sanctuaries of the Samnites further north at Campochiaro or Pietrabbondante.<sup>63</sup> Here the trophies, of the same kind as the breastplate of Novius Fannius (above, Fig. 10) were dedicated, potent testimony to the source of the wealth and authority and ambition which built these complexes. At Pietrabbondante – now clearly seen to be a federal centre of particular importance – the sanctuary was hung with the spoils of Taras, from the wars of the fifth century and from the defence against the champions of the series which culminated in Pyrrhus.<sup>64</sup> Similarly, the funerary ideology which can be traced in the design of tombs and in their decoration and furnishing reinforced the military ethos as did the practice of the cults of the new sanctuaries. Once again, the scenes of the glorification of the individual warrior, especially the cavalryman, and the tendency to display wealth and power through the elaboration of the outward form also of the tomb, are found in both the Hellenic world, imitating the rulers of Macedon and their success, and in the territories of the indigenous peoples. Close parallels can be drawn between the well-known Oscan cemeteries of Paestum and the experience of Neapolis and Taras.<sup>65</sup> Indeed when archaeological accident deprives us of such a source, our information suffers: the abandonment of the Fornaci cemetery at Capua deprives us of much crucial information about the early Samnite aristocracies of Campania.<sup>66</sup>

This is the archaeological counterpart of the continual presence of the mercenary theme in the literary sources, as we have already seen it emerging: the contingents involved in the Athenian and Carthaginian Wars in Sicily in the late fifth century, the dispositions made by the Dionysii, the Campanian cavalry and its relationship to Rome, the forces used by the *condottieri*, the Mamertini and the Campanian garrison of

<sup>63</sup> For the inscriptions of Rossano Lejeune, *Rend. Linc.* 26 (1971) 664; 27 (1972) 399; 30 (1973) 319. *Id. ap. Atti 11 Conv.* (G 107) 83 claimed, too strongly, that the sanctuary was 'immune to Greek religious forces'. For the Serra Lustrante shrine at Armento (late fourth-century) see Pontrandolfo Greco 1982 (G 258) 158. On the Samnite sanctuaries see now *Sannio* 1980 (G 284), esp. B. D'Agostino, pp. 140f on the Tarantine spoils. Etruscan origin (? via Campania) for the Heracles cult, *Atti 11 Conv.* (G 107) 68–9.

<sup>64</sup> For the particular importance of Pietrabbondante, Lejeune in *Sannio* 1984 (G 285).

<sup>65</sup> For this process at Paestum, Pontrandolfo Greco 1979 (G 257), Pontrandolfo Greco and Rouveret 1982 (G 259), esp. 127–9; at Capua, Johannowsky 1972 (G 204), drawing attention to the parallels at Taras and Neapolis. Also Pontrandolfo in *Atti 25 Conv.* 268–9. For domestic architecture, in the case of hellenistic Locri, see Barra Bagnasco, *Studi A. Adriani* 1985. For the military subjects of wall- and vase-paintings, Trendall 1989 (J 51).

<sup>66</sup> Johannowsky in *Sannio* 1984 (G 285) 52f.

Rhegium.<sup>67</sup> An inscription shows us a *vereia Campsanas Metapontinas*, a mercenary force of this kind, in the ailing community of Metapontum at the end of the fourth century, and perhaps the Oscans at Neapolis were not so very different in 327/6, when we hear of a Neapolitan leader with the probably Oscan name of Nymphius (cf. Nypsius the Neapolitan general of Dionysius II: Diod. xvi.18.1).<sup>68</sup> Nor was this practice wholly land-based. Maritime power seems to have been accumulated in similar ways, and the contribution of 'pirates' of the Messapians to Agathocles was close to the more acceptable use of contingents of city naval forces (like that sent by the Tarantines with Acrotatus in 314 B.C.).<sup>69</sup> The use later made by the Romans of these cities as *socci navales* was nothing new.

This mercenary phenomenon both promoted the aristocratic ideal which we have noted and made more general cultural influence and exchange much easier.<sup>70</sup> In particular, the interesting suggestion has been made that the simple ideals of personal military excellence were infused with the legacy of the thought of the Pythagoreans, and a cultural influence can be traced extending from the Laconian background of Taras and Locri through the political interpretations of the Pythagoreans to the age of Archytas. The Pythagorean Italici, like the mysterious figure Ocellus, or the C. Pontius Herennus who conversed with Archytas and Plato at Taras, are invoked as part of this intriguing picture. Once again, the presence of similar influences at Rome may be taken as further confirmation of the general picture.<sup>71</sup> We certainly must not overemphasize how rough the soldierly life of the hinterland was: for alongside these military phenomena a whole range of associated cultural activities was tending to produce a *koine* across the peninsula. The life of the popular theatre and the spread of religious forms such as the mysteries of Orpheus and Dionysus may be cited as examples, known from a variety of sources but especially from painted ceramics.<sup>72</sup> The local styles of painted pottery, vigorous, varied and independent as they are, constitute the most impressive, and certainly the best-known

<sup>67</sup> Diod. xxi.3.3 (Agathocles), cf. xxi.18, their dismissal c. 288. Diod. xxii.1 (Decius at Rhegium); *legio Campana* in Sicily, Frederiksen 1984 (G 173) 222–3 with n. 27. Note also Diod. xiii.88.7, mercenaries in the Carthaginian War of 409–405.

<sup>68</sup> The contingent at Metapontum: La Regina 1981 (G 207) 135 *vereias kampsanas metapontinas*. On the *vereia* see most recently Tagliamonte 1989 (G 303).

<sup>69</sup> Messapians, Diod. xxi.4; Acrotatus, Diod. xix.70.7–8. Note Agathocles' development of the port of Hipponium, a foreshadowing of the functions of Roman Vibo, Strabo vi.1.5 p. 256; cf. Dionysius II's refoundation of Rhegium as Phoebia, Strabo vi.1.6.

<sup>70</sup> Stressed by Lepore in Borraro 1975 (G 119) 63.

<sup>71</sup> Pontrandolfo Greco 1982 (G 258) 161; cf. Mele 1982 (G 231). For Rome, Fraschetti 1981 (G 170). Ocellus: D–K no. 48 (vol. 1, 440–1).

<sup>72</sup> Space forbids proper consideration of these themes, but note Pontrandolfo Greco 1982 (G 258) 135–6 on red-figure vases and the theatre; a useful brief overview in Trendall 1989 (J 51). Orphic tablets: a new example from Hipponium, Pugliese Carratelli 1974 and 1976 (G 264–5). Compare the Agnone tablet, Vetter 1953 (G 319) 147.

manifestation of the shared experience of the southern part of the peninsula in this period. They remind us forcefully, in their enormous quantities, of the extent of cultural sophistication and moderate means, which is salutary considering the literary concentration on war and our knowledge of the violence with which it all ended.

We cannot but revert here to the importance of manpower, fundamental to the mercenary phenomenon, and stressed by the literary sources: for example Polybius' praise of Taras as being associated with the most populous of the indigenous peoples.<sup>73</sup> The organization of this resource for the purposes which we have examined had a variety of other consequences, economic and social. In the Greek cities, the concentration of population seems to have given each *politeia* or state a potential human resource which would have been far less easily deployed in the more relaxed days of the sixth century, and which the Sicilian tyrants were impelled to gather by mass deportation. The phratries of Neapolis, for example, show by their names the incorporation of refugees from Cumae. But there were also, undoubtedly to the demographic gain of Neapolis, the Oscan speakers whose presence is remarked on by the sources. In a city like Posidonia/Paestum which had technically 'fallen' but which was perhaps, despite Aristoxenus' lament, not so very different in composition or social forms from the Hellenic 'survivors', the demographic resource again seems to have been exceptionally buoyant.<sup>74</sup> The wealth and populousness of the cities of the region in turn combined to produce an elaboration of the forms of citizen life which was unusual by contemporary Mediterranean standards; in the opulence of life at Taras and the forms it took, with spectacles and buildings for them, frequent holidays, the origins of widespread public bathing, and so on, we find not only the raw material for the tradition about immoral luxury that we have already noticed, but also for the developed Roman/Italic ideology of urban life.<sup>75</sup>

Such a phenomenon had its economic implications. The typical landscape of an organized society of this kind, whether the older nuclei or the increasingly self-conscious 'peoples' of the interior, with their league institutions or the increasingly elaborate Oscan constitutional ideology of the *touta* (Lat. *populus*), was a division into productive units

<sup>73</sup> Polyb. II.39.

<sup>74</sup> Cumaean refugees at Neapolis, Frederiksen 1984 (G 173) 93; incorporation of Oscan-speakers, *ibid.* 139, cf. 101. For increase in population in Campania, Johannowsky, *Sannio* 1984 (G 285) 52f. On Paestum, Pontrandolfo Greco and Rouveret 1982 (G 259); Greco Pontrandolfo 1979 (G 257) 36, 48.

<sup>75</sup> Praises of Taras, Polyb. II.39, cf. x.1; Plautus *Men.* prol. 27f stressing *mercatores* and *ludi*, cf. Strabo VI.3.1 p. 277; Florus I.18 'in ipsis Hadriani maris faucibus posita in omnis terras Histriam Illyricum, Epiron Achaiam African Siciliam vela dimittit'. Oscan *lavacrum* at Cumae, *Arch. Rep.* for 1976-7 45.

based on the *oikos* or household;<sup>76</sup> but the division was something which could be centrally controlled, and the production was increasingly oriented towards the network of consumption which spread with the formation of the larger *poleis* (city states) and the escalation of their aspirations. Meanwhile the process of exchange was being further enhanced not just by more complex systems of redistribution, but by monetization of the economy as a result of coining to pay for the mercenary activities themselves: while the fighting made available manpower in the form of slaves who were redeployable either in the pursuit of city amenities or of intensified agricultural production. So in the countryside archaeology has revealed formal or informal land division, agricultural changes across whole landscapes which must be oriented not simply to local consumption but to the opportunities provided by major changes in the redistribution-network: new forms of scattered rural settlement and distinctive farmhouse forms; and the spread of deployable coinage in the interior.<sup>77</sup> By the beginning of the third century, in short, a change in the whole of the southern part of the Italian peninsula had come about which affected the Greek *poleis* and their non-Greek neighbours, and which produced out of the pursuit of glorification through violence a rosy show of prosperity: big communities, strongly walled, impressive sanctuaries filled with the glitter of the trophies of war, new farmhouses in a recently ordered countryside producing the wherewithal for the comfort of the cities. But it was prosperity which was illusory to the extent that it depended on the roughly equal distribution of success, and even then could be intercepted by the practice of violence itself. When the balance of success of the pursuit of military goals began to shift finally in the direction of Rome, the other signs of prosperity, including wealth and population, began to ebb from South Italy, in a process which was exacerbated but not caused by the violence of the Pyrrhic and Hannibalic Wars. Not that the decline was irreversible or ubiquitous; we have seen how well Taras and Campania did, the latter for obvious reasons of proximity to the new centre of power. But the hectic prosperity of the fourth century, the

<sup>76</sup> On new forms of magistrate, the evolution of the *touta*, the *basileus* and the *meddix*, *oikos*, *ethnos* and league, the excellent account of Lepore in Borraro 1975 (G 119) esp. p. 54.

<sup>77</sup> Metapontum (Carter 1986 (G 129)) is the best-studied case of the spread of land-divisions; note the Roman use of the practice from 318 B.C. (Ager Falernus). The Metapontum project has shown a change to large-scale grain production at this period. Adamesteanu 1974 (G 93) 207 for new patterns of settlement in the Val d'Agri: new studies of farmhouses at Cancellara and Tolve, see Ridgway 1989 (G 275) 142. On rural slavery some of the anecdotes of the Pythagorean/Archytas tradition give us a little evidence, cf. Biliński in *Atti 10 Conv.* (G 106) 207–10. Monetization of Lucania, Adamesteanu 1974 (G 93) 187, cf. Stazio Cantilena in *Sannio* 1984 (G 285) 85f with bibliography.

fantastic product of frenetic but inconclusive military competition in an age of social and economic upheaval, was at an end.<sup>78</sup>

The epilogue is Roman. Not that that should lead to its exclusion, for all that has been said here goes to show how little of what Rome did in South Italy between 350 and 250 was 'really' Roman. The Roman aristocracy of this epoch is a perfect example of the new military elites, and it is no surprise to find it producing documents like the painted tomb which was one of our starting-points. It can even be argued that it shows traces of the sub-Pythagorean influence which provided the social and political ideology of the age. Ap. Claudius and M' Curius must be seen beside Ocellus and Pontius Herennius, Nummelos and Nypsius.<sup>79</sup> The relations of Rome with other communities, like the surrender (*deditio*) of Capua, the treaty with Naples, the network of protection celebrated by the *PISTIS* (loyalty) coinage of Locri, fit in to the voluntary associative phenomena which we have seen at work all through the period, to a world in which mercenary behaviour is fundamental and in which new opportunities for protection and power are always being sought.<sup>80</sup> We have seen how the associative tendencies of the elites lie behind the varied and flexible federalisms of the age; in 326 Rome's cultivation of the elite of Arpi, the rich centre of Daunia whose espousal of the Roman cause is represented as *deditio* (surrender) by Livy, is no different. Such relationships formed the position of Rome in Magna Graecia years before the time of Pyrrhus.<sup>81</sup> What Rome did when she was in a position of strength was again not unique – land-division, construction of military works, transfer of populations, whether her own or others, the formation of new cities to serve as strongpoints. We may think of the formation of the *tribus Falerna* (318) and the building of the Via Appia (312), the colonization of Luceria (314) and Venusia (291) as truly Roman, but they are merely larger scale applications of well-trying strategies, long familiar to the peoples of the south.<sup>82</sup> Rome, in fact,

<sup>78</sup> Toynbee 1965 (G 309) II ch. 1 attributed the decline of the south to the Punic Wars. Archaeology now points to earlier discontinuities: Pontrandolfo Greco 1979 (G 257) 48 (end of ex-voto offerings in territory of Paestum); Settis *Athenaeum* 43 (1965) 127 (Medma abandoned); *Atti 22 Conv.* 571 (Laos abandoned, end of third century); Adamesteanu 1983 (G 95) 157 (transience of the fortified centres of the fourth century; note that the Rossano sanctuary survives); *Atti MSMG* 23–4 (1976–7) 163 (general decline in the Potentino). The story of the settlements at Le Murge di Strongoli in the retroterra of Croton (perhaps the ancient Macalla) is typical – incipient urbanization in the fourth century, decline in the third, replacement by a neighbouring Roman centre (Petelia) thereafter; see *Stud. Etr.* 52 (1984) 491–2. Add now Ridgway 1989 (G 275) 139, destruction level at Pontecagnano c. 300.

<sup>79</sup> South Italian influences on Roman aristocracy: Frascchetti 1981 (G 170).

<sup>80</sup> Frederiksen 1984 (G 173) ch. 9.

<sup>81</sup> For Rome and Arpi, Livy VIII.25; Mazzei 1984 and 1987 (G 226–7). Moretti 1971 (G 235) 52 stresses continuity of Roman-Tarantine relations despite Pyrrhus. See also Clemente 1988 (G 140).

<sup>82</sup> On Roman imperialism in this period see Salmon 1982 (G 280) ch. 3; *CAH* VII<sup>2</sup>.2, ch. 8. Luceria (walls c. 314, Ridgway 1982 (G 274) 70), colonized in 325 according to Velleius I.14, is of central

made the grade and succeeded in applying all this as well as did the hellenistic monarchs of the eastern Mediterranean; she attained true modernity, the latest in state management, going further even than Syracuse and Carthage in bringing to the west the new methods of the hellenistic age.<sup>83</sup>

The results were far from good in South Italy; but – not that it will have been a goal of the Roman aristocrats – the extension of the cultural *koine* which we have studied in formation in the fourth century to form a truly hellenistic melting-pot society was eventually achieved. That limestone ‘island’ the Messapian peninsula, which had so long resisted the influence of nearby Taras – it was here that Archidamus had died, at the siege of Manduria only 25 km from his base – survived as a district of independent *mores* and considerable agricultural prosperity. But it came to form part of the Roman *koine* as it had never of the Hellenic. Direct heirs to the prosperous and independent Messapian past, its dozen or so solid urban communities survived to become, eventually, Roman municipalities. Even before that, though, it was from one of them that there came that classic figure of third/second-century Italy, speaking Greek, Oscan and Latin and writing in them all – the epic poet Ennius.<sup>84</sup>

importance: centuriation Torelli 1984 (G 308) 328. *Ibid.* 329–30 for S. Salvatore votive deposit, showing very rapid Latinization. Cf. the case of Sthenius Sthallius the Lucanian, 285 B.C., Pliny *HN* xxxiv. 32.

<sup>83</sup> Adamesteanu 1974 (G 93) 215 contrasts the particularist character of the Greek and indigenous experience of the fifth and fourth centuries with the newer and vaster vision of the Roman state in the epoch after Alexander.

<sup>84</sup> Ennius: see Strabo vi.3.5 p. 281. On Messapia, *CAH* iv<sup>2</sup> 683 ff – more Corinthian than Tarantine. Cf. [Scylax] 14 (cf. Ath. xii.523) on the Greekness of Hydruntum, on the coasting route.

CHAPTER 9c  
CELTIC EUROPE

D. W. HARDING

Any synthesis of Europe north of the Alps in the first half of the first millennium B.C. is conditioned by imbalances in the archaeological record. Much of the evidence is derived from cemeteries with specialized inventories of grave-goods, or from high-status fortified sites of exceptional character and function, rather than from a full spectrum of settlement or material remains. Even these data are unequally distributed regionally, or at any rate unequally studied, and not equally represented in successive chronological phases. The effect of this imbalance and discontinuity of evidence can be the creation of artificial horizons, which may be used to justify historical episodes or socio-economic climaxes, and which compound a tendency towards a 'selected highlights' view of European prehistory.

The classification and chronology of later prehistoric Europe is still largely based upon the system devised by Reinecke at the beginning of the century, named after the Alpine type-sites of Hallstatt and La Tène. In Reinecke's scheme, Hallstatt A and B equate with the Older and Younger phases respectively of the Urnfield Culture, in absolute terms spanning the twelfth to eighth centuries B.C., whilst Hallstatt C and D, dating from later eighth to early sixth, are generally recognized as the first Iron Age in central and western Europe. The system is essentially a Central European one, with important transalpine correlations, and it has been developed in large measure from the concentration of systematic research on the rich cemetery assemblages in these regions. West of the Rhine, in both Urnfield and Iron Hallstatt phases, the cemetery inventories show a more limited range of types, with fewer examples that could be regarded as diagnostic of the Central European culture, and local regional variants that progressively lend assemblages a distinctively Atlantic aspect.


Whatever its limitations, the Reinecke system at least has the merit of underlining the element of cultural continuity from later Bronze to earlier Iron Ages, which is evident from a study of the material assemblages themselves. An older conventional view had placed great emphasis upon the novelty of the appearance of so-called Thrac-



Cimmerian equestrian equipment in chieftains' burials of the Hallstatt C phase, especially in the eastern Hallstatt zone, with an implied equation with the introduction and adoption of iron technology from regions further east around the seventh century B.C. In fact, the knowledge if not the regular use of iron is already evidenced in eastern Central Europe in the earlier second millennium, and by 1000 B.C. iron regularly appears among Urnfield grave inventories. Nor can these finds be dismissed as exotic imports, since in several instances they are unequivocally associated with the debris of local production. The commonly held view that iron was initially used for ornamental rather than functional purposes is not sustained by the presence of utilitarian artefacts such as knives and axes in assemblages as early as Reinecke A<sub>2</sub>/B<sub>1</sub>, even though they occur at this stage in very limited numbers.<sup>1</sup> In fact, iron is not quantitatively the dominant metal in most Hallstatt C and D cemeteries, even though that period is generally regarded as the first Iron Age of Europe. The stages in the process of adoption of iron, from the point of technological introduction to its regular or commercial exploitation, are not the concern of the present essay, however, except in so far as such a study might underline the importance of social and economic factors in its local development in Europe, in contradiction to older diffusionist models.

A primary consideration in the study of the Celtic Iron Age in Europe and its relations with the classical world must be the question, 'When did Celtic Europe become Celtic, and in what sense?' It is a common misconception, fostered by linguists, that the term can only be used correctly of Celtic-speakers, even though the earliest commentators, Hecataeus and Herodotus, writing in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., evidently intended it as an ethnic identification of one of the major barbarian neighbours of the classical world. That these people were indeed linguistically Celtic is indicated by references to personal and tribal names in classical sources, as well as by place-names and inscriptions recorded widely throughout Europe north and west of the Alps. Furthermore, since language could only be transmitted, before the advent of literacy or telecommunications, by direct population contact, the emergence of an Indo-European language in Celtic Europe has been taken to imply some measure at least of settlement from regions further east. Given the historical references alluded to above, this episode or sequence of episodes must have preceded the middle of the first millennium B.C., and cannot be equated, for instance, with the La Tène culture which is widely regarded as synonymous with Celtic culture. In fact, the earliest Celtic settlement in Europe need not accord exclusively with any observed archaeological culture, but if such an equation were

<sup>1</sup> Waldbaum 1978 (E 54) 22–3.



Map 12. The Celtic world.

admitted, it should be with a pan-European culture earlier than La Tène, among which the Urnfield culture might afford a possible contender. The process need not be the product of a single, simple episode but part of a progressive sequence of 'cumulative Celticity'.<sup>2</sup> It must, in all events, have involved people who cannot have become Celtic-speaking by a process of linguistic osmosis, or 'Celtic by accretion' extending the whole process back into remote antiquity.

In the light of the linguistic issue, the evidence for continuity of culture from Urnfield to Iron Hallstatt is particularly relevant. In fact, many types, correctly regarded in detail as diagnostically Hallstatt C, none the less have antecedents in the Urnfield sequence, including swords, horse-gear and luxury goods like beaten bronze vessels, while a comparison of south Bavarian Hallstatt C pottery types<sup>3</sup> with their Urnfield counterparts<sup>4</sup> further reinforces the essential continuity of ceramic tradition. The break in settlement continuity has been frequently remarked, though this would appear to be less applicable to open, lowland settlements than to hillforts. The major innovation of the Hallstatt C phase is the change in burial rite, with inhumation replacing inurned cremation as the dominant practice, and with the reappearance of tumulus burial, some exceptional for the wealth of their grave-furnishings and equipment.

At the top of the social order, and reviving a much older Eurasian tradition, were vehicle-burials,<sup>5</sup> generally of four-wheeled wagons or carriages, buried intact within a timber chamber, as in the Hallstatt C phase at Hradenin in Czechoslovakia or at Grosseibstadt in Bavaria, or even more lavishly and with the inclusion of southern imports among their grave-goods in Hallstatt D, as at Hochdorf<sup>6</sup> in Baden-Württemberg (Fig. 11), or at Vix,<sup>7</sup> where the vehicle was dismantled to accommodate the wealth of grave-goods, on the upper Seine. Though there may be a principal central burial, as at the Hohmichele<sup>8</sup> or the Grafenbühl, there are commonly additional graves within the tumulus; in the case of the massive Magdalenenberg tomb<sup>9</sup> 126 lesser burials are disposed concentrically around the perimeter of the mound. Some tumuli were evidently marked by a stone stela, which appears to have been the function of the Hirschlanden statue, an ithyphallic figure with helmet, torc and dagger found by a Hallstatt D barrow containing more than a dozen modestly furnished inhumations. It is important to recognize, of course, that the princely tombs are a small minority of the total number of known Hallstatt burials, even in southern Germany, where cemeteries of several hundred graves are not uncommon. Less

<sup>2</sup> Hawkes 1973 (E 17).

<sup>3</sup> Kossac 1959 (E 28).

<sup>4</sup> Müller-Karpe 1959 (E 39).

<sup>5</sup> Piggott 1983 (E 44).

<sup>6</sup> Biel 1982 (E 1).

<sup>7</sup> Joffroy 1954 (E 22); cf. *Pls. to Vol. III* pl. 373.

<sup>8</sup> Riek and Hundt 1962 (E 46).

<sup>9</sup> Spindler 1971–3, 1976–7, 1980 (E 51).




Fig. 11. Reconstruction of the burial at Hochdorf; later sixth century B.C. (After Moscati (ed.) 1991 (E 5) 86; see Biel 1982 (E 1); *Trésors* 1987 (E 52) 95–188.)

spectacular in their grave assemblages, these cemeteries are none the less equally significant in reflecting the shift to inhumation as the dominant rite, and furthermore they are crucial for determining the regular and recurrent types which distinguish Hallstatt C and D, and the subdivisions within each phase. Whether or not the change in burial rite is attributed in part to new elements within the population, other factors, such as the exploitation of mineral resources and the establishment of trading relationships with the Mediterranean world, could have had an equally profound impact upon the social and economic patterns of Hallstatt Europe.

One region within the eastern Hallstatt province where such factors appear to have taken effect early in the first millennium B.C. is Slovenia. Here, major fortified settlements with extensive tumulus cemeteries nearby, like Stična and Magdalenska gora, were evidently dependent not simply upon the rich agricultural potential of the region, but upon its iron-ore resources which were being widely exploited by the eighth century. From this period for several centuries a pattern of trade was established in the northern Adriatic, from which the major centres of north-eastern Italy like Este received iron products in exchange for wine and other Italic and Mediterranean luxury goods, like the Etruscan bronze tripod from Novo Mesto. In the sixth century, this relationship between the Venetia region and Slovenia culminated in the distinctive

style of figural art represented on sheet-bronze *situlae*, a remarkable fusion of central European and southern traditions.<sup>10</sup>

The site of Hallstatt<sup>11</sup> itself did not enjoy the advantages of a fertile agricultural environment; its wealth was based exclusively upon the mineral resources of the Austrian Alps, and specifically the local deposits of salt in the *Salzkammergut* range. Though the cemetery at Hallstatt dates mainly from the eighth century onwards, the salt-mines were apparently being worked from the late Bronze Age, perhaps initially on a seasonal basis. Of the estimated total of 2,000 or more excavated graves, a relatively high proportion was richly furnished, including a number of warrior burials, though few attain the exceptional wealth of the princely burials of Hallstatt D in the West Hallstatt province. As a community engaged in a specialized industrial economy, Hallstatt may not have been unique, though other sites do not appear to have equalled its size or importance.

By contrast, the late Hallstatt citadels of south-west Germany have been seen both as aristocratic strongholds controlling a territorial hierarchy of settlement, and as entrepreneurial centres controlling the exchange and redistribution of goods.<sup>12</sup> Crucial to their function and status was the introduction of Mediterranean imports, following the establishment of the Greek colony at Massilia in 600 B.C., or within the half century thereafter.<sup>13</sup> The distribution of amphorae of Greek type, of so-called grey Phocaean wares, and local imitations of these, suggest a hinterland which was receptive to Mediterranean fashions, and beyond that a natural corridor led via Rhône and Saône to the heartlands of Celtic Europe, to the upper Danube and Rhine, where the Heuneburg fortress<sup>14</sup> with its nearby cemetery of princely tombs was a major regional focus in the Hallstatt D phase, and to the headwaters of the Seine, where the Mont Lassois hillfort<sup>15</sup> and the burials at Vix bear witness to the imported wealth which these Celtic chieftains could command. Mediterranean influence was not restricted to the import of luxury goods, however, as can be seen by the use of mud-brick walls and bastions in the defensive circuit of the Heuneburg fortress. What was supplied reciprocally from Celtic Europe is not so obvious from the archaeological record, and presumably must have included agricultural products, raw materials and even mercenaries and slaves.

The function and status of these *Fürstensitze* have been much debated. Dehn, Kimmig and others have distinguished a hierarchy of settlement, though the criteria for defining the princely residences of the first rank have not always been consistent, nor yet susceptible to demonstration by

<sup>10</sup> Frey 1969 (E 10); Boardman 1971 (E 2).      <sup>11</sup> Kromer 1959 (E 29); Peroni 1973 (E 43).  
<sup>12</sup> Wells 1980, 1984 (E 55–6).      <sup>13</sup> Kimmig 1983 (E 26).      <sup>14</sup> Kimmig 1983 (E 27).  
<sup>15</sup> Joffroy 1960 (E 24).

excavation.<sup>16</sup> More recently, emphasis has been placed upon their function as regional territorial *foci*, or as commercial and economic centres without any necessary concomitant political role. Their relatively short-lived supremacy – few seem to have outlasted Hallstatt D – has suggested a dependency upon Mediterranean trade, though it is still unclear whether this gave them their status or whether it was simply a manifestation of their status. An instructive comparison might be drawn between the impact of Massilia upon west-central European Hallstatt society and the native communities in the hinterland of the trading settlement at Emporium. Insufficient distinction in this context is made between relatively utilitarian Greek imports, like the black-figure wares of no great distinction found on a number of late Hallstatt sites, and truly prestigious goods like the Vix crater, or the Etruscan furnishings of the Hochdorf burial. The presence of the former may reflect little more than the commercial or redistributive role of a hillfort, but the latter must surely be indicative of aristocratic status.

West of the Rhine, French archaeology since Déchelette has also recognized a two-phase division of the first Iron Age, traditionally termed Hallstatt I and II – regarding the Urnfield period simply as *Bronze Final* (I, II, III) – though more recently a threefold classification (*ancien, moyen, final*) has gained favour. In eastern France and the Jura, correlation with south-west Germany is understandably quite close, but progressively north and westwards the recognizably Hallstatt elements within assemblages of this period acquire the aspect of exotic imports rather than diagnostic types. Hallstatt assemblages in Belgium and the Netherlands, like the horse- and vehicle-gear from Court-St-Etienne<sup>17</sup> or the warrior-grave from Oss, have the appearance of exotic introductions, and have been seen as evidence for intrusive Celtic warlords dominating the indigenous population. Other notable regional groupings west of the Rhine include the Vixien of Hallstatt Final, characterized at the Mont Lassois hillfort by painted pottery and Italic-style brooches, and the Jogassien from the Marne,<sup>18</sup> named after a cemetery which like Vix included a later Hallstatt wagon-burial, but which was apparently at this time beyond the zone of high-status Mediterranean imports. To the south another distinctive regional culture, the Mailhacien, developed in the Mediterranean hinterland, taking its name from a series of sites in the vicinity of Mailhac in Languedoc.<sup>19</sup> Here the local sequence is unbroken from the late Urnfield cemetery at Le Moulin to the middle of the sixth century cemetery at Le Grand Bassin II, in which imported Greek and Etruscan amphorae are used as ossuaries with grave-goods including black-figure pottery, Etruscan *bucchero nero*, ‘Phocaeen’ and native

<sup>16</sup> Härke 1979 (E 14).      <sup>17</sup> Marien 1958 (E 33).

<sup>18</sup> Favret 1936 (E 8); Hatt and Roualet 1976 (E 15).      <sup>19</sup> Louis and Taffanel 1955–60 (E 31).

pseudo-Ionian wares, together with iron antenna daggers, cross-bow brooches, and belt-hooks of late Hallstatt derivation. This combination of local Urnfield, Hallstatt and Mediterranean elements may be matched in varying degree from Provence to the Ebro, and reflects both conservatism and innovation in this important cultural interface.

Across the Pyrenees, a parallel sequence is exemplified at the settlement of Cortes de Navarra<sup>20</sup> on the middle Ebro. Though the stratigraphy from this type-site is far from clear in detail, the settlement like a tell with its characteristic buildings of adobe-brick construction evidently spanned a final Urnfield and Hallstatt phase into what is locally termed 'post-Hallstatt' with a final abandonment around the fourth century B.C. Conventionally, these Urnfield and Hallstatt elements south of the Pyrenees have been attributed to successive waves of migration from unspecified west-central European sources, introducing peoples who were both ethnically and linguistically Celtic. Yet the peninsular cultures have always been regarded as a fusion of indigenous and intrusive elements, with local traditions in some regions remaining dominant, as in the *castro* culture of the north west. In fact, even in the Ebro and the Meseta, Hallstatt or Hallstatt-derived types are strictly limited in number: antenna-swords, daggers, belt-clasps and certain brooch types may be cited, while ceramic influences, though generally acknowledged, are somewhat indeterminate.<sup>21</sup> This pattern continues into the La Tène Iron Age, with a relatively sparse distribution of types in the middle and upper Duero. The castros of the peninsular north west, in their developed and surviving form, are evidently later Iron Age in date, though their stone-built defences and circular houses may obscure earlier phases of settlement which have yet to be fully investigated. These sites have been regarded as the fortified settlements of Celtic communities, whose establishment in the region, presumably by late Hallstatt times, has yet to be demonstrated in the archaeological record.

The case for Celtic settlement south of the Pyrenees, then, rests not upon the presence of diagnostic artefact types or distinctively central European settlements or cemeteries, but upon the testimony of historical sources, particularly in reference to the wars of the second century B.C. waged by the Romans against native 'Celtiberians', and upon the evidence of place-names. Celtic elements in place-names occur in some abundance across the northern half of Spain and Portugal, in marked contrast to the south and east where Mediterranean connexions gave rise to the distinctive Iberian culture in the second half of the first millennium B.C. But the onomastic evidence is of interest as much for elements which are absent as for those, notably the suffix *-briga*, which are present, a pattern which has been taken to indicate an early introduction of Celtic

<sup>20</sup> Maluquer de Motes 1954 (E 32).

<sup>21</sup> Schüle 1960, 1969 (E 47-8).



Fig. 12. Bone sphinx with amber face, from Klein Aspergle; late sixth century B.C.; Stuttgart, Württembergisches Landesmuseum. (After Moscati (ed.) 1991 (E 5) 74.)

speakers into the peninsula. Closer archaeological definition of Celtiberian culture, however, is constrained here, as elsewhere in the Atlantic west, by the problems of identifying material types which might be regarded as diagnostically Celtic beyond the primary zone of Hallstatt and La Tène culture.

The transition from late Hallstatt to early La Tène has been well documented in Europe north of the Alps in terms of artefact typology, but its significance is less evident in cultural or social terms. The fifth century B.C. saw a number of important changes in settlement, burial and economy, as well as the appearance of an art-style distinctively Celtic for which local antecedents were almost totally lacking. At the same time, certain traditions continue, like that of vehicle-burial in rich graves with southern imports included among the grave-goods, though the four-wheeled wagons of the previous phase are replaced by two-wheeled chariots or carts, and the exotic grave-goods testify to the ascendancy of transalpine trade routes from Etruria rather than connexions with the Greek colonies of the Mediterranean littoral. Most striking is the shift in settlement patterns away from the late Hallstatt princely strongholds of south-west Germany to the Hunsrück-Eifel<sup>22</sup> and the middle Rhine, where the domination of a new regional elite is declared, not so much by prestigious fortifications as by the wealth displayed in its chieftains' burials, including a variety of Greek and Etruscan imports (Fig. 12). On the southern fringe of this group, the Klein Aspergle tomb, with its spectacular drinking service – including Etruscan stamnos, bronze beaked-flagon, bronze cordoned bucket, gold-embellished drinking horns and pair of Greek cups – is the latest of a series of princely tombs in near proximity to the Hohenasperg hillfort, suggesting that here the late Hallstatt regime may have continued into the La Tène A phase. One element in this shift may have been the increased exploitation of the local

<sup>22</sup> Joachim 1968 (E 21); Haffner 1976 (E 12).



iron deposits of the Hunsrück-Eifel, which could have been the basis of the region's social and economic ascendancy in the early–middle La Tène periods. Central to the interpretation of this apparent shift in locational emphasis is the chronology of the late Hallstatt–early La Tène transition, whether these phases are regarded as wholly exclusive and successive, or whether in particular the final Hallstatt (D<sub>3</sub>) phase, characterized by certain developed brooches and allied material types, is seen as overlapping and contemporary with La Tène A in adjacent regions.<sup>23</sup> Nor is the problem restricted to this horizon alone, for similar issues may be raised in considering the La Tène A–B sequence, particularly in the context of the development of early Celtic art. In fact, the distribution of southern imports shows marked local groupings and associations. Bronze situlae are concentrated in the Rhein–Mosel area, while Etruscan bronze-handled dishes are restricted to the Hochwald–Nahe and Rheinhessen–Palatinate regions. Only bronze beaked-flagons are found in both. Such a selective distribution may argue against a system of regional redistribution, and favour a view of independent links with individual chiefdoms which would be consistent with, and perhaps consequent upon, the decline of late Hallstatt princely centres. Any interpretation of southern imports in central Europe in the early La Tène phase, however, must be qualified by the fact that, in the absence of complementary evidence from settlements or hoards, finds derive exclusively from high-status funerary contexts, and their occurrence or survival therefore may be determined by cult requirements rather than reflecting an effective pattern of trade or exchange.

A similar shift in the focus of commercial activity at the end of the fifth century in the eastern Alps saw the decline of the salt-mines at Hallstatt and the development of a new industry at Dürrnberg-bei-Hallein,<sup>24</sup> not far to the west but located in a valley which was easier of access and supported by a better local agricultural potential. The cemetery at Dürrnberg was smaller than that at Hallstatt, though its grave-goods indicate that the community enjoyed a high standard of material wealth, including imports from the Mediterranean world. One warrior inhumation with a two-wheeled vehicle was accompanied by a rich assemblage of grave-goods, including weapons, helmet, a huge bronze situla 88 cm high, and an Attic cup of late-fifth-century date. A secondary burial from the same tomb accompanied by a Certosa brooch and lens-shaped pottery vessel characteristic of the fourth century indicates the continuing occupation of the Dürrnberg settlements, probably into the middle La Tène period.

In Switzerland, a prolonged period of use from La Tène A–C also

<sup>23</sup> Dehn and Frey 1979 (E 7); Frey and Kossack 1978 (E 11).

<sup>24</sup> Penninger 1972 (E 42); Moosleitner *et al.* 1974 (E 38); Pauli 1978 (E 41).

accounts for the size of the cemetery at Münsingen,<sup>25</sup> near Berne, where more than two hundred graves were excavated at the turn of the century. Study of diagnostic artefacts indicated that there had been a linear spread of burials over time from north to south, and this horizontal stratigraphy, together with the existence of good individual grave-associations, enabled a detailed typological sequence of the principal groups of artefacts to be worked out. In particular, the Münsingen type-series of brooches serves as a model for the La Tène period in Europe from Bohemia to Britain. Most enigmatic of all the Swiss La Tène sites, however, is the type-site itself,<sup>26</sup> situated at the north-east end of Lake Neuchâtel, where it drains into Lake Biel. The site can be classified neither as a settlement nor a cemetery, comprising a vast collection of artefacts – the estimated total of items exceeds 3,000 though the authenticity of provenance is not always established beyond doubt – recovered at various times since the middle of the nineteenth century. In addition to several hundred swords, spears and brooches, this material included domestic and agricultural utensils, and evidence for a range of related activities such as carpentry, leatherwork and basketry. Structural evidence from the vicinity included timbers of bridges, among which a number of skeletons was also recovered. The main period of use of the site was evidently the middle La Tène phase, but its function is highly problematical. It has been variously interpreted as a ritual or ceremonial site, as a kind of prehistoric supermarket, or, in view of its location between the subsequent territories of the Helvetii and the Sequani, as a frontier establishment serving a garrison or custom-post. The sheer quantity of prestige goods, however, argues that La Tène was a major centre for exchange or redistribution, a function which need not have been exclusive of other activities, economic, social or ritual.

Southern imports in the early La Tène phase were not restricted to the eastern Alpine communities, but penetrated further into east-central Europe, to the settlements of the Vltava and the tumulus burials of southern Bohemia. The initial occupation of hillforts like Zavist in the late Hallstatt–early La Tène phases may have coincided here as in the middle Rhine with the beginnings of the commercial exploitation of the iron resources of the southern highlands, providing the reciprocal basis for long-distance trade and exchange. To the north, the rich löss soils of the lowland hills of northern Bohemia had been the agricultural basis for the flourishing Bylany culture; here by the La Tène B phase, the small cremation cemeteries of late Hallstatt had given way to inhumation in flat cemeteries of the so-called ‘Dux’ horizon, a phase characterized by brooches of a type represented in the votive hoard from Duchcov.<sup>27</sup> This

<sup>25</sup> Hodson 1968 (E 19).      <sup>26</sup> Vouga 1923 (E 53); de Navarro 1972 (E 40).

<sup>27</sup> Kruta 1971 (E 30).

contrast in burial rite in Bohemia has been seen as an archaeological reflection of distinct cultural groupings, and even the product of migrating Celts of the fourth century as recorded in classical sources.<sup>28</sup> Without discounting such factors, we should exercise caution in making such a simple or direct correlation between population groups and archaeological distributions, to the neglect of other factors, environmental or economic, which may have determined the pattern of archaeological evidence.

West of the Rhine, a distinctive early La Tène culture developed in the Champagne,<sup>29</sup> successive to the local Jogassien late Hallstatt, and counterpart to the contemporary group of the Hunsrück-Eifel. Its cemeteries are distributed in great profusion in the valleys of the Aisne and the Marne, and include more than a hundred chariot-burials of the early La Tène warrior aristocracy. The layout of these graves sometimes provided vertical slots for the chariot-wheels and an extension for the yoke and pole, so that the vehicle bearing the dead could be lowered intact into the burial-pit. The grave-furnishings commonly include a bridle-set in lieu of the horse itself, together with pottery, weapons, ornaments and occasionally, as at Somme-Bionne and La Gorge-Meillet, imported Italic wine-flasks or Attic red-figure pottery. Lesser burials also conform to the rite of extended inhumation, though in a simple rectangular grave, sometimes grouped and encompassed by a square-ditched barrow. Grave goods are nonetheless relatively prolific, as in neighbouring north Alpine groups of the early La Tène phase. Brooches, bracelets, torcs, swords and spearheads in a range of variant forms have provided the basis of a detailed system of classification, particularly for the phases Hallstatt *Final* and La Tène *Ancienne*. In the Paris basin and northern France, early La Tène assemblages invite comparison with the more distinctive material of the Marne and Aisne, or with the contemporary *groupe de la Haine* in Belgium.<sup>30</sup>

In the Atlantic west La Tène types are more sparsely distributed, and in some areas are totally absent prior to La Tène 3. In Aquitaine,<sup>31</sup> some early La Tène types, including brooches and weapons, are represented among grave-goods in cremation barrows, but in the centre-west of France early and middle La Tène material is virtually non-existent. A notable exception is the recently discovered helmet from Charente (Fig. 13): made of iron and bronze with coral and leaf-gold ornamentation, its form and decoration are reminiscent of the helmet from the Seine at Amfreville-sous-les-Monts, and must represent a high-status import into a region otherwise largely devoid of La Tène influence. Brittany,

<sup>28</sup> Filip 1956 (E 9).

<sup>29</sup> Bretz-Mahler 1971 (E 3); Hatt and Roualet 1977 (E 16); Joffroy 1958 (E 23).

<sup>30</sup> Marien 1961 (E 34). <sup>31</sup> Mohen 1980 (E 37).



Fig. 13. Gilt iron and bronze helmet with coral inlay, from Agris (Charente); Angoulême, Mus. de la Soc. Arch. et Hist. de la Charente. (After Moscati (ed.) 1991 (E 5) 293.)

though peripheral to the archaeology of Celtic Europe, was doubtless known to the Greeks through the reported trading expeditions of Tartessians before the voyage of Pytheas in the later fourth century.<sup>32</sup> The region has a distinctive Iron Age culture, exemplified particularly by its characteristic field monuments. Burial practices reveal a measure of continuity from late Hallstatt to early La Tène, notably in the persistence

<sup>32</sup> Hawkes 1977 (E 18).











































































































































































































































































































































